1 09 352
EXISTENTIAL
METAPHYSICS
by Alvin Thalheimer
PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY
New York
Copyright, I960, by
Philosophical Library, Inc.
15 East 4Oth Street, New York, N. Y.
AH rights reserved,
Library of Congress Catalog Card. Number: 6O- 15963
Printed in the United States of America
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Chapter VIII
Chapter IX
Chapter X
Chapter XI
Chapter XII
Chapter XIII
Chapter XIV
Chapter XV
Chapter XVI
Chapter XVII
Chapter XVIII
The Existential Method
Towards Determining the Meaning of
"Existence"
How We Shall Use the Terms: Existence
and R^jdijJ ^
Towards Determining the Meaning of
"Truth"
35
94
131
158
190
223
258
289
More About True and False Propositions
Does Thinking Exist?
Minds and Bodies
Thinking, Object and Idea
Percept, Memory and Concept
Feeling, Believing and Knowing
Spatial Relations among Contemporaneous
Entities 325
Date, Duration and Interval 360
Spatial Relations Among Non-
Contemporaneous Entities; Motion 393
Unity and Substance 422
The Qualities and Relations of an
Individual Substance 460
Universal Substance and Universal Quality 499
Meaning, Explanation, Definition 539
Mathematical Concepts: To What Extent
Are They Real? 578
v
Chapter XIX
Chapter XX
Chapter XXI
Chapter XXII
Chapter XXIII
Chapter XXIV
Chapter XXV
Mass, Force and Energy
The Efficient Cause
Possibility and Potentiality
Inference and Implication
Purpose
Chance and Probability
The Content of Reality
Notes
Index of Terms Explained
Index of Authors
583
584
589
592
596
597
599
601
629
631
PREFACE
Probably every book reaches the reader before it is completely
satisfactory to its author. For, despite the changes that suggest
themselves at each reading of the manuscript, the point is reached
at which it seems probable that further emendations and additions
will not warrant the delay in publication which, they would in-
,volve.
The book before you is, however, in a less finished state than
most. Eight of the projected twenty-five chapters appear only as
titles in the table of contents. Nevertheless, the guiding principle
the methodhas been rather fully developed. And it has been
applied to a sufficient number of problems to indicate to the
reader what my attitude would in general be with respect to
those subjects which I have not had an opportunity to* discuss. The
listing by titles of the unwritten chapters serves the purpose of
pointing to those subjects which in my opinion should have been
discussed to make this treatise a well-rounded system of meta-
physics.
A second mark of the incompleteness of this treatise is the place
left open at the end of Chapter Three, for an enumeration of
certain existent and certain non-existent entities. It will be obvious
that lists of this sort could only have been developed as the treatise
developed. Whereas for purposes of exposition, to give the treatise
a deductive form, such lists belong in the place left open for them,
I have not intended the reader to believe that these lists were fully
developed in my thought before I had considered specific meta-
physical problems. Deduction is after all a method of exposition
rather than a complete account of the processes of cogitation. And
the omission of die lists, no matter how essential they are for
deductive purposes, emphasizes their ad hoc character.
Further study of the manuscript, I may also point out, may well
have resulted in a more consistent use of such terms as "same/'
"many," ''cause" and the like. In the course of this treatise various
vii
of rushing confidently into the midst of things, it seems that W6
should first devote painstaking consideration to the selection of
a fruitful plan of attack. Instead of beginning with a discussion
of specific problems of metaphysics, it seems that we should first
select with great care a method which may perchance furnish the
correct approach to these problems and for want of which so
many eminent minds may have failed. "He who enters the
labyrinth/' says Descartes, 3 "must follow the thread which guided
Theseus." And he who hopes successfully to penetrate the maze
of metaphysical problems must come prepared with a method
which will enable him to cope with the perplexities he is to en-
counter.
It is perhaps to the great thinkers of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries that we are most indebted for what depth
and clarity there is in our metaphysics today. It is therefore
highly significant that many of these philosophers felt the selec-
tion of a fruitful method to be among the most important tasks
confronting them. "It were far better/' says Descartes, 4 "never to
think of investigating truth at all than to do so without a method.
... As well might a man burning with an unintelligent desire to find
treasure continuously roam the streets seeking to find something
that a passer-by might have chanced to drop." "I do not deny/'
he continues, "that sometimes in these wanderings" those who
philosophize in this manner "are lucky enough to find something
true . . . But I do not allow that this argues greater industry on
their part, but only greater luck." The beginning of metaphysical
wisdom, for Descartes as well as for many of his contemporaries
and successors, comes with the choice of a correct method. To
succeed, they hold, one must proceed along the proper path; an
advance in some other direction, with some other method, is
really no advance at all. Indeed, as Bacon puts it, "the lame . . .
in the path outstrip the swift who wander from it, and it is clear
that the very skill and swiftness of him who runs not in the right
direction must increase his aberration/' 5
Bacon's own contribution to the selection of a proper method
is chiefly a word of caution. We must avoid all hasty generaliza-
tions; only after prolonged and intimate acquaintance with
particulars through sense-experience and experiment may we
permit ourselves gradually to consider universals of wider and
wider significance. 6 Among the English philosophers of the period,
Bacon is undoubtedly the better known. Thomas Hobbes of
Malmesbury is however a more acute thinker whose excellent
style fittingly indicates the clarity and profundity of his thought.
Hobbes too felt the need to rebuild our metaphysics upon the
basis of a new method. He emphasizes the importance of a pre-
cise terminology. Like many thinkers as far back as Leonardo da
Vinci and possibly further, he feels that metaphysicians may
learn much from a consideration of the method used so success-
fully in mathematics. Leonardo had written: 7 "There is no
certainty where one can neither apply any of the mathematical
sciences nor any of those which are based on the mathematical
sciences." And Hobbes, selecting one feature for emulation in
metaphysics, writes: "A man that seeketh precise truth hath need
to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it
accordingly . . . And therefore in geometry, which is the only
science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind,
men begin at settling the significations of their words." 8 Proposi-
tions explaining words that represent our fundamental concepts
are, Hobbes holds, of indubitable truth. With these as a basis, he
holds, we should in teaching philosophy demonstrate those things
"which immediately succeed to universal definitions"; 9 and so
on down to less general propositions, affirming nothing "which
hath not good coherence" 10 with the definitions previously set
forth.
Descartes' contributions to the methodology of metaphysics
are likewise traceable to a desire to emulate the successes of
^mathematics. "Archimedes, in order that he might draw the
^terrestrial globe out of its plane and transport it elsewhere, de-
manded only that one point should be fixed and immovable; in
the same way," writes Descartes, 11 "I shall have the right to con-
ceive high hopes if I am happy enough to discover one thing only
which is certain and indubitable." It is not sufficient, however, to
have a fundamental proposition which is free from all doubt.
We must at all times, Descartes insists, eschew vague thinking and
doubtful ideas. In following out the implications of our funda-
mental proposition, we must use scrupulous care to assure our-
selves that our ideas are at all stages "clear and distinct." To reach
our goal, we must make use of the deductive method so success-
fill in mathematics; and we must continually guard ourselves
against vague and indistinct ideas. Moreover, we must not dis-
cuss metaphysical problems in whatever sequence they happen to
come to our attention. On the contrary, we must pay careful
attention to the order in which various subjects are considered,
not attempting to resolve complex problems before we have the
answers to the simpler problems which logically precede them.
"Those long chains of reasoning/' says Descartes, 12 "simple and
easy as they are, of which geometricians make use in order to
arrive at the most difficult demonstrations, had caused me to
imagine that all those things which fall under the cognizance
of man might very likely be mutually related in the same fash-
ion; and that, provided only that we abstain from receiving any-
thing as true which is not so, and always retain the order which is
necessary in order to deduce the one conclusion from the other,
there can be nothing so remote that we can not reach to it, nor
so recondite that we can not discover it."
In the "Essay concerning Human Understanding," Locke,
like many of his predecessors, stresses the importance of a care-
fully examined terminology. "I must confess," he says, 18 "that
when I first began this discourse of the understanding, and a
good while after, I had not the least thought that any considera-
tion of words was at all necessary to it. But when, having passed
over the original and composition of our ideas, I began to ex-
amine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had
so near a connexion with words, that unless their force and man-
ner of signification were first well observed, there could be very
little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge." "I am
apt to imagine," he continues, "that, were the imperfections of
language . . . more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the con-
troversies that make such a noise in the world would of them-
selves cease; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too,
lie a great deal opener than it does." "Some gross and confused
conceptions men indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the
common words of their language; and such a loose use of their
words serves them well enough in their ordinary discourses or
affairs. But this is not sufficient for philosophical inquiries," Be-
sides stressing the importance of clarity in thought and language,
Locke calls our attention to the desirability of determining the
limits beyond which our minds can not engage in fruitful dis-
cussions. "If we can find out how far the understanding can ex-
tend its view, how far it has faculties to attain certainty, and in
what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content
ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state." 14
^The need to determine the limits within which the human
understanding must operate is emphasized -mese strongly by
Immanuel Kant. Beyond the limits of possible experience, Kant
holds, no knowledge is possible. "I had to remove knowledge/ 9
he writes, 15 "in order to make room for belief," Yet in marking
such a frontier, Kant was al0 motivated by a desire to determine
a region within which there can be developed a metaphysics and
a science having absolute certainty) Within the limits of possible
experience we can develop a metaphysics that will not be proble-
matical but apodictic. We can develop such a metaphysics, Kant
holds, if we allow reason to "move forward with the principles of
her judgments according to fixed law" and allow her to "compel
nature to answer her questions." 16 These principles with which
the mind operates are not, to be sure, divorced from experience,
since they are discovered only through attending to the mind in
action. Yet, with them as a basis, we must make use of the deduc-
tive method that has already been so successfully employed in
mathematics and in physics.
These references to certain philosophers of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries constitute of course only a small portion of
the voluminous material on the subject of method. Incomplete as
they are, however, they recall to us certain suggestions that have
been made time and again, suggestions as to what is needed for
the development of a successful metaphysics. Time and again our
attention is called to the necessity of clear thinking and an un-
ambiguous terminology. One writer urges us to cling to clear
and distinct ideas, another insists on determinate ideas, and a
third advises determining the significations of our terms. In one
form or another we are told that a successful metaphysics can be
developed only if we know exactly what we are thinking about
and just what our terms represent. We also find ourselves urged
to confine our thinking to subjects with which the human in-
tellect is competent to cope. For it is felt that, unless we know
what kind of problem can be handled with a prospect of sue-
cessful solution, much effort will be wasted in unprofitable dis-
cussion. Finally, we meet repeatedly with the warning that we
must proceed slowly and cautiously. At each stage in the develop-
ment of our thought we must guard against the temptation to
jump to the consideration of problems for which we are not yet
sufficiently prepared.
Let us seek to adhere in this treatise to the methodological
prescriptions which we have just discussed. Let us endeavor, that
is to say, (1) to make our thinking and the terminology through
which we express ourselves clear and precise, (2) to take up the
philosophical problems with which we shall deal in an orderly
manner and (3) to limit our attention to those matters which are
within the limits of human knowledge.
First, then, how are we to make our thinking and the ter-
minology through which we express ourselves clear and pre-
cise? The two, it would appear, are so interrelated that clear
thinking is well-nigh impossible without a carefully chosen ter-
minology. It seems to be the fate of words that, like machines,
they are capable of doing only a certain amount of work be-
fore they are in need of repair and rehabilitation. In the course
of an extensive use, words acquire secondary significations and
collateral meanings. They come to refer to no definite and pre-
cise entity, but rather to a composite something composed of
various concepts not clearly distinguished from one another. If
then we are to restrict ourselves to words that have definite
significations, such words as have, in the course of an extensive
use, come to have vague and indefinite meanings must either be
banned or rehabilitated.
Consider, for example, the word "idea." If we use the word
"idea" without first asking ourselves what definite entity we are
using it to represent, we shall almost unavoidably be using this
word to represent now one and now another portion of a vaguely
demarcated field of more or less related entities. Such an un-
critical use of the word "idea" on the part of others will make it
well-nigh impossible for us to understand and to evaluate their
pronouncements. If an author who uses "idea" without explana-
tion puts before us an argument whose pretended conclusion is
that ideas are necessarily involved in our thinking, or that ideas
are the sole objects of our thought, we shall find ourselves un-
able to determine whether or not his argument is sound and
his conclusion true. For before a proposition may be accepted or
rejected, it must first be understood. And a proposition in which
the word "idea" has the vague meaning that this word commonly
has is so lacking in exact reference as to be almost unintelligible.
The situation which obtains with respect to the word "idea"
obtains also, we hold, with respect to the word "existence." The
word "existence" has been held to represent what is permanent
and independent of our thought; and it has also been held to
represent what is given in sense-perception and is inseparable
from our thought. In the course of an extensive use, the significa-
tions of the word "existence" have become so various, so ramified
and so vague that the word as it comes to us out of the vocab-
ulary of current usage seems to have hardly any meaning at
all. It follows then that we can not use this word as it is commonly
used without becoming involved in vagueness and obscurity. If
we are to make a determined effort to keep our metaphysics
free from vagueness and ambiguity, we must in our construc-
tive efforts avoid the use of the word "existence" unless we
explain it. How, moreover, are we to understand the writings
of others in which the word "existence" occurs? The realist who
is an epistemological monist tells us that ideas do not exist; the
atheist tells us that God does not exist; some behaviorists tell us
that consciousness does not exist. But if, when such assertions are
made, we are not able to understand the word "existence" as it is
used, we shall be unable to determine whether what is being con-
sidered with respect to ideas, God and consciousness is their
intelligibility, their perceptibility, their inclusion in a systematic
whole, or some vague combination of all of these characteristics.
We shall gather that something is being denied of ideas, God or
consciousness; but we shall be unable to determine precisely
what it is that is being denied of them.
When we meet with the sentence: "Ideas exist," we are fre-
quently unable to determine whether existence is being pre-
dicated of mental content or of universals. And, in view of the
various senses in which "existence" has been used, we are fre-
quently unable to determine whether what is being predicated
of ideas is membership in some organic whole or perceptibility
or freedom from dependence on any conscious subject. The
situation is similar when we meet with the sentence: "Conscious-
ness exists." On the one hand, we may be unable to determine
whether existence is being predicated of a certain sort of mental
activity or whether it is being predicated of the field of objects.
And, on the other hand, it may be one of several characteristics
that the author is attributing to the entity he calls "consciousness."
There is the sentence: "Ideas exist" (or do not exist) and the
sentence: "Consciousness exists" (or does not exist). But we also
meet with the sentences: "Evil exists" and "Electrons exist^ and
"Centaurs exist." Existence or non-existence may be predicated
of anything. If, then, the signification of "existence" is left vague
and indeterminate, we have on our hands, as it were, a general
and blanket ambiguity which overspreads the more limited
ambiguities arising from the indeterminate use of one or another
of such words as "evil" or "consciousness" or "idea." We have on
our hands this all-pervasive ambiguity, that is to say, unless either
we use "existence" more sparingly than it is used or implied in
ordinary speech, or unless we select for this word a determinate
meaning.
It may be said, however, that the use of "existence" is by no
means so widespread as we have suggested. It may be said that
common speech uses "existence" but sparingly and that we can
well forego any detailed consideration of the meaning of this
term. Is not the term "existence" after all a scholastic and aca-
demic one and the question whether an entity "exists" an
artificial one? In the ordinary business of life, it is said, we are
not confronted with the problem whether an alleged entity exists
but only with the practical problem: what entities are we con-
fronted by to which we must give consideration? 17 Yet when we
ask what entities are we confronted by that deserve consideration,
we are asking a question which might in common speech be ex-
pressed as: "What entities are real?" And to ask what entities
are real is to ask whether this or that apparent, alleged, subsistent
entity is really existent or merely illusory and specious. 18 Ques-
tions involving "existence" seem thus to be not merely artificial
and academic, but to be deeply imbedded in our practical life
and in our customary conversation. Indeed when a sentence used
in our ordinary discourse does not explicitly contain the term
"existence," it may frequently be replaced by a sentence synony-
mous with it in which some grammatical form of this term occurs,
a sentence synonymous with it in the sense that we would ordi-
narily take the two sentences to have the same meaning. 19 The
"Some men are bald" of common speech is synonymous in this sense
with: "Some bald men exist." The "Some men are not patriotic"
of common speech is synonymous in this sense with: "Some un-
patriotic men exist." And since these are typical particular cate-
gorical propositions, it would seem that all propositions of this
form occurring in common speech are synonymous with exist-
ential propositions. It would seem, that is to say, that no particular
categorical proposition of common speech is free from vague-
ness so long as "existence" has but an indeterminate meaning.
With respect to this class of propositions, at any rate, it would
seem that ordinary discourse is tainted by vagueness and points
up the need for a renewed consideration of the meaning of
"existence."
The existential import of universal categorical propositions
used in common speech is not so obvious. Yet if "All men are
mortal" is not synonymous with "Mortal men exist," it would
seem that, keeping upon the level of ordinary discourse, a con-
siderable part of what is expressed in "All men are mortal" may
likewise be expressed in the sentence: "Immortal men do not
exist." Similarly, the "No stone is alive" of common speech seems
to be synonymous with "Living stones do not exist/' 20 Thus those
categorical propositions of common speech that are universal
seem, like those that are particular, to be not wholly free from
vagueness so long as "existence" is ambiguous. To the extent to
which common speech is made up of categorical propositions, it
would seem that even when "existence" does not occur explicitly,
it may be said to occur implicitly, resulting in a vagueness and
inaccuracy that can only be remedied by a careful determination
of the meaning of this term.
It may be argued that common speech is not a reliable guide
for the metaphysician in search of terminological exactitude.
Though it may be agreed that common speech is thoroughly in-
fected with a reference to "existence," it may be maintained that
this fact points to the desirability, not of re-examining the mean-
ing of "existence," but rather of developing a terminology in which
the word "existence" has no place. In the development of such a
terminology, modern mathematics, it may be felt, points out the
way for us to follow. For, it may be held, the modern mathemati-
cian makes no legitimate and essential use of "existence." If per-
chance he speaks of the existence of certain roots, he is making
an unfortunate and inappropriate use of the word. Generally
speaking, he does not begin his task, it is held, by predicating
existence of a certain space or of certain numbers. On the con-
trary, he takes this space and these numbers as subsistents, as
postulated entities. And he proceeds to develop their implications
while remaining entirely within the realm of subsistents. The
mathematician, on this view, is not concerned whether, for ex-
ample, Euclidean space exists or not. It is his task merely to point
out that Euclidean space determines the sum of the interior angles
of a plane triangle to a certain particular total.
So, it may be felt, we can develop a metaphysics in which the
term "existence" has no place. The metaphysician too, it may be
held, can begin with entities which are merely presented as sub-
sistents. And he too can limit himself to developing the implications
obtaining among these subsistents. His results, that is to say, may
all take the form: "A implies B." Does A exist? Does B exist? Such
questions, he may say, do not concern him as a metaphysician.
Rather, he may hold, it is for practical experience and common
usage to determine which entities are to be called "existent"; and
it is for the theologian to determine which entities are worthy of
being called "real."
Let us consider however the results that may be arrived at in a
metaphysics of this type. We conclude, let us suppose, that the sub-
sistent A implies the subsistent B. We assert: "A implies B"; and we
do not assert that A implies the absence of B, do not assert: "A im-
plies non-B." Yet when we have before us the two propositions:
"A implies B" and "A implies non-B," on what basis can the
metaphysician reject the latter and assert the former? Must he not
hold that A and B are really linked together in a way in which
A and non-B are not? Must he not be tacitly assuming that some
such entity as is generally called "reality" is so constituted as to
require the connection between A and B and to reject that be-
tween A and non-B? For if we make no such tacit assumption, if,
on the contrary, we constantly remind ourselves that we are dealing
with all subsistents, we must realize that the A that implies non-B
10
is a subsistent as well as the A that implies B. Without some
limitation based upon some distinction between the real and the
unreal, Euclidean space will be a subsistent and the Euclidean
space which involves 180 as the sum of the interior angles of a
plane triangle will be a subsistent. However, the Euclidean space
which involves a total of 90 for such a sum will be a subsistent
also. If we are merely discussing subsistents, in short, we may be
justified in stating: "A implies B." But we would be equally
justified in stating: "A implies non-B." We have no greater
justification for making the one statement than for making the
other; for all positive subsistential statements are on the same
footing.
The metaphysician who would avoid "existence" holds at times
that he is dealing only with what, for his purposes, may be mere
subsistents. And he holds at times that he is dealing only with
what, so far as he is concerned, may be mere postulates. It may
not be inappropriate, consequently, to point out two senses in
which the term "postulate" is used. In one sense an entity is
postulated when its existence is neither asserted nor denied, when
we seem to have it before us as a mere subsistent to be discussed.
In another sense a proposition, one which we should hold to be
explicitly or implicitly existential, will be said to be a postulate.
Such a proposition is a postulate in the sense that it functions as
a premise although unproved, although, that is to say, there are
no other propositions from which it has been deduced. In the
former sense God is a postulated entity in so far as God is regarded
merely as a subsistent. In the latter sense the proposition: "God
exists" may be regarded as a postulate; for this proposition may
be held to be one which is not deduced from other propositions
which are its premises.
The classic geometry brings before us the so-called postu-
late of parallels: through a given point there is only one
line parallel to a given line. The assertion here can hardly
be that there is only one such line that subsists. For every
thing that appears to be presented to us as an object subsists. And
unless a second parallel through the given point did at least appear
to be presented to us, non-Euclidean geometry would be incon-
ceivable and there would be no occasion for the postulate. The
so-called postulate of parallels must therefore be the existential
11
proposition: Through a given point there exists but one line
having certain characteristics. This proposition, it is obvious, is
a postulate in the second of the two senses we have distinguished
and not in the first. Since we are talking about an allegedly exist-
ing line, we are not holding this line before us merely as a subsis-
tent. One may, to be sure, use an existential proposition as a
postulate without accepting it. But to make use of an existen-
tial proposition is to concern one's self with 'existence/ It is
likely then that the metaphysician who would avoid the term
"existence/* and who takes the works of geometers as his guide,
has misread his mathematics. Generally speaking, mathematicians
put before us existential propositions of which they make use in
spite of the fact that these propositions are unproved. But they do
not put before us entities whose existential status is left entirely
out of consideration. They do not put before us the mere subsis-
tents to which the metaphysicians whose views we are considering
assign so important a role.
There is a further comment to be made on the doctrine that
metaphysics should avoid "existence" and should deal largely
with the relations obtaining among subsistents. As we have
seen, a considerable part of what is ordinarily meant by: "All
men are mortal' 1 may be expressed in the sentence: "Immortal
men do not exist/' By analogy, it would seem that much of
what is commonly expressed in "A implies B" might instead
be expressed in the sentence: "The A does not imply B does
not exist/ 1 If then a writer, believing that he is avoiding "exist-
ence" and that he is merely discussing subsistents, writes: "The
subsistent A implies the subsistent B," it would seem that he is
implicitly saying that a certain sort of A the A, namely, that
does not imply B- does not exist. It would seem, that is to say,
that he is referring to 'existence' after all.
"To the extent to which common speech is made up of cate-
gorical propositions/' we have seen, 21 it would seem that even
when "existence" does not occur explicitly, it may be said to
occur implicitly, resulting in a vagueness and inaccuracy that can
only be remedied by a careful determination of the meaning of
this term. And to the extent to which mathematical logicians fall
back upon implication and hypothetical propositions, a redetcr-
mination of the meaning of "existence" is, it would seem, likewise
12
indicated. It is true, that, when we assert: "If A is B, C is D," we
do not assert that A is B. But we are not justified in disregarding
the fact that we are asserting a connection between A being B and
C being D, a connection that in some sense we are asserting to
exist.
It would seem then that the ambiguities of "existence" as com-
monly used can not be avoided merely by the use of some alter-
native term, merely by concerning ourselves, for example, with
"implication" instead. For he who would develop a metaphysics
concerned merely with implications, must, if possible, describe
"implication" so that no reference to existence is involved; and
he must find a basis for rejecting: "A implies non-B" while he
asserts: "A implies B."
It appears then to be no easy task to develop a metaphysics from
which the term "existence" is excluded. Let us therefore acquiesce
in the continued use of "existence." Let us indeed bring into the
open the reference to existence that is so often implicit in our
assertions. And in the development of a metaphysics in which
"existence" has a prominent place, let us agree to make the effort
involved in a reconsideration of the meaning of this term. Indeed,
by continuing to use "existence," we shall be using a term exten-
sively employed in common parlance. And we shall be employing
a term which common parlance seems to regard as peculiarly
appropriate in metaphysics. For what, after all, is commonly
regarded as the proper field for metaphysical speculations? Is it
not commonly felt that the task of the metaphysician is to deter-
mine in a general way the nature of existence, the nature of real-
ity? And if this be the case, if, roughly speaking, the metaphy-
sician has the task of determining the general characteristics of
.existence so far as they may be determined without experiment,
surely it is inappropriate for him to avoid all mention of the
term "existence."
Words that in the course of an extensive use have "come to
have vague and indefinite meanings must," we have said, 22
"either be banned or rehabilitated." It has been our decision not
to avoid all mention of "existence." And so it remains for us
to set about rehabilitating this term. To assign "existence" a
definite signification is however to assign it a meaning which
does not coincide with the vague something to which "exist-
13
ence" commonly refers. A determinate signification can not be
interchangeable with an indeterminate signification. Our task
then will not be to arrive at some statement: "This is what 'exist-
ence* usually means"; but rather to arrive at some statement:
"This is what 'existence* means for us/'
Is it however permissible to assign a meaning to "existence"
as we might assign a meaning to "piety" or to "school"? It may
be agreed that I may assign "piety" whatever meaning I please
so long as I am consistent in my use of that word. But existence,
it may be held, is what it is. The word "existence," it may be held,
can be used to represent nothing else.
An objection of this sort seems to stem from the belief that
directly or indirectly we are aware of various entities, but not of
existence which somehow attaches itself to some of our objects
without being an object itself. If, however, existence characterized
certain objects without itself being an object, then the distinc-
tion between existence and non-existence would be unintelligible
to us. This however seems not to be the case. We do seem to be
aware of certain entities which in some sense of the word we
take to be existent and of certain entities which we take to be
non-existent. Directly or indirectly, therefore, existence must be
presented to us as a characteristic of certain objects. This charac-
teristic, some modification of it, or, indeed, any entity among
those of which we seem to be aware may, it would seem, be
represented by the word: "existence." "Existence," it follows,
may be used to represent a vague characteristic or a definite
characteristic among the entities of which we are somehow aware.
"Existence" may be given a definite meaning. And if "existence"
is to occur in our vocabulary at all, to express ourselves under-
standably we must give it a rather definite meaning.
The motive impelling us to redetermine the significations of
various words is the desire to establish for these words precise
and unambiguous meanings. If then we were to vary the senses
in which we use these words or were to shift from one signification
to another, our purpose would be thwarted and our redetermina-
tion of the meanings of these words would be in vain. Let us
bear such considerations in mind in redetermining the significa-
tion of "existence." Although we can not accept the suggestion
that we leave all concern with existence out of our terminological
14
discussions, there is a sense in which we can not play fast and
loose with "existence." When once the meaning of "existence"
has been even partially determined, all future use of that term
must agree with the signification previously chosen. We can not
continue to attach "existence" at random to whatever entities we
please. On the contrary, we are required to adhere in all strictness
to the meaning already selected. But before "existence" has had its
signification redetermined, existence is by no means a concept
that is sacred and untouchable. At such a stage it is not only
possible but highly desirable that we give "existence" a determi-
nate meaning.
Our initial discussion of method led us to three resolves, the
first of which was to make our thinking and the terminology
through which we express ourselves clear and precise. 28 This
clarity and precision we shall attempt to attain by giving precise
and determinate meanings to all important terms, the term "ex-
istence" being first in importance. A second conclusion to which
we were led by our discussion of method is that we must consider
metaphysical problems in their proper order, lest we attempt to
discuss matters for which we are not yet sufficiently prepared.
What, however, are these matters that we are called upon to dis-
cuss? The various questions which require resolution are for the
most part existential questions. We are called upon to decide, for
example, whether consciousness exists, whether a soul exists that
is able to outlive the death of the body, whether unperceived
entities exist, whether infinite collections exist, whether mental
content exists mediating between the subject and the object. The
resolution of each of these questions, it would appear, will be
affected by the decision we make as to the meaning of "existence."
For, the specific entities which exist and which together constitute
the world of existent entities will vary with the signification given
the term "existence." Not only may the determination of the
meaning of this term put before us the distinguishing character-
istics of existence as we are to use "existence"; it will also deter-
mine in large part the particular entities which exist. Only after
the signification of "existence" has been determined are we in a
position to resolve such questions as whether or not consciousness
exists, whether or not unperceived entities exist, whether or not
infinite collections exist. It behooves us, then, first to deter-
15
mine the signification of "existence"; and only after the meaning
of "existence" has been determined, to concern ourselves with
particular existential problems in the solution of which our deci-
sions as to the meaning of "existence" may be applied.
The writers whose discussions of method we have examined
have in the main emphasized three points. 24 They have urged
clear thinking and an accurate terminology; they have urged an
orderly procedure; and they have urged recognition of the limits
beyond which there can be no fruitful thinking. Clarity of thought
and accuracy in expression we shall attempt to attain through a
close regard for the significations of our important terms. Indeed
we shall seek a greater precision than has usually been attained
through a very careful attention to the signification of the almost
ubiquitous term: "existence." The order of procedure indicated
for us to follow is, first, the determination of the meaning of
"existence" and, second, the consideration of those existential
problems which this determined signification can aid us in solv-
ing. What remains to be asked is how we can avoid the considera-
tion of questions which in view of our equipment and resources
must be unanswerable.
As has already been pointed out, "the various questions which
require resolution are for the most part existential ques-
tions." 25 And so it would seem that when once "existence" has
been given a definite meaning that can readily be applied,
most questions put before us will be questions that we are pre-
pared to attack. An entity whose existence is in question may not
be clearly and unambiguously described. Or we may not be sup-
plied with all of the data necessary to determine whether or not a
given entity exists in our sense of "existence." But there will be
no existential questions in the face of which we shall be unable
to proceed, no entities to which the distinction between the real
and the unreal will not apply. When, however, "existence" has
no definite and unambiguous signification, then, to be sure, an
existential problem may well be unanswerable. 26 To determine
whether God exists, using "existence" in its usual indefinite sense,
that indeed may be beyond our powers. But when once the signi-
fication of "existence" has been determined, it is not unexperi-
enced entities that we shall avoid and not Kantian things-in-
themselves. Rather it is questions involving an indefinite and
16
unexplained "existence" that we shall neglect in order to avoid
the wasted effort that the consideration of an unanswerable ques-
tion involves.
In accordance with the procedure which we have outlined, the
determination of the signification of "existence" is to be the
foundation stone in our metaphysical structure. What then, we
ask ourselves, is the precise and definite entity which we should
use the term "existence" to represent? What is the clear and un-
ambiguous meaning which we should assign this most impor-
tant of terms? As we have already had occasion to observe, cur-
rent usage is, with respect to it, most indefinite. 27 So much so that,
when we assert that an entity exists, we may seem to be doing no
more than calling that entity to our hearer's attention. A hundred
real dollars, it has been said, contain not a penny more than a
hundred imaginary dollars. The assertion that the hundred
dollars exist, it may seem, tells us nothing about the hundred dol-
lars, joins no meaningful predicate to the subject term with which
it is linked.
Nevertheless, the term "existence," as ordinarily used, seems
to have some meaning. The assertion, for example, that God does
not exist is commonly regarded as quite different from the asser-
tion that God does exist, sufficiently different, in fact, to warrant
the most extreme measures. And if there is a difference, if, rather,
there is a difference of which we seem to be aware, that difference
must be between the object apparently presented to us that seems
to exist and the object apparently presented to us that seems not
to exist. Seeming to have as an object a hundred real dollars is
not identical with seeming to have as an object a hundred imagi-
nary dollars. What in the former case seems to be added to the
hundred dollars that is our object is not an additional quantity
of pennies but some vague quality of being important. It is to
be our task to substitute for this vague referend something more
precise that our term "existence" is to mean.
We are at liberty, of course, to determine upon one definite
and unambiguous meaning for our term "existence." Or we may
determine upon two or more distinct meanings, each of them
being definite and free from ambiguity. In the latter case,
for example, we may give "existence" a certain meaning when
"existence" is predicated of mathematical entities. And we may
17
give it a different meaning when it is predicated of characters
occurring in a novel. We may determine the signification of
"existence" so that one definite sense of this term is in question
when the existence of the number two is being considered; and
so that a different sense of this term is in question when the
existence of Hamlet or of Ivanhoe is being considered. We like-
wise are free to give "existence" and "reality" either the same or
different meanings. Ordinary usage is equivocal in this respect,
the terms often being used interchangeably, but sometimes not.
Common usage being indecisive, let us make the choice that
will make our task simplest and our procedure the most direct.
Let us agree to treat "existence" and "reality" as synonymous
terms. In this way, we shall be concentrating our attention upon
but a single task. Moreover, we shall find our language less mo-
notonous in that we shall be able to refer to the entity that exists
now by one of these terms and now by the other. Similarly let us
determine for our term "existence" but a single unambiguous
meaning. Let us agree to use "existence" in but one sense, no
matter what the context and no matter what the entities are whose
existence is being considered. By so doing, we shall be able to
concentrate our attention upon the determination of a single
definite and precise meaning. And we shall be spared the necessity
of explaining in each context just which sense of "existence" is
in question.
To be sure, we may commonly say of a lunatic that his million
dollars exist in his head. We may commonly say that Zeus exists
in Greek mythology but not in the physical world. And it may
not be altogether at variance with common usage to say that the
number two exists in the world of abstractions but not in the
world of concrete entities. 28
Yet in our ordinary speech we also recognize an existence that
is absolute existence. If we ask the man in the street whether the
lunatic's million dollars exist, he will answer immediately that
they do not exist. He will not ask us to specify which realm of
existence we are discussing. It appears then that when we com-
monly ask whether an entity exists, we are for the most part asking
whether it exists in the universe of real objects; existence that is
merely existence in thought or in the world of abstractions does
not concern us. And it is to be noticed that when we insist upon
18
taking into account various realms of existence, upon utilizing
various significations of "existence," the task of rendering the
meaning of "existence" precise has not been accomplished, but
has instead been replaced by a host of new and equally ardu-
ous tasks. We have now to ask what "existence" means when
it is predicated of physical entities, what when it is predicated of
mathematical entities, what when predicated of mental entities,
and what when predicated of the entities of science. Let us conse-
quently concentrate our attention upon the task of determining
a single signification. For if we do otherwise, we disperse our
attention and are likely to content ourselves with specious dis-
tinctions which do not make for real clarity but merely cover up
the difficulty. 29
We shall then select a definite signification which is to be the
signification of "existence," no matter what the context, and
which is likewise to be the signification of "reality." The propo-
sition or group of propositions with which we shall conclude
this part of our task will, let us suppose, be of the form: "An
existent is an entity which is such and such." Our proposition
obviously will not be one that we arrive at as a result of formal
argument and strict proof. It will, on the contrary, be a postulate,
an unproved assertion to be used as a premise in later discussion.
It is however one thing to postulate the Euclidean character of
perceptual space or the uniformity of nature; and it is another
thing to start with the premise: "An existent, in the sense in
which we use the term 'existence/ is an entity which is such and
such." In the former case the reader may feel that he is in pos-
session of some reason or of some experience which warrants
his rejection of the postulate. But in the case of "the existent is
the such and such," since we are merely presenting the meaning
which the term "existence" is to have in our writings, the reader
can have no reason for refusing us this terminological liberty.
We shall thus begin the construction of our metaphysical sys-
tem by attempting to assign to "existence" a precise and unam-
biguous meaning. The propositions in which this meaning is set
forth will be a postulate, a postulate, so to speak, which the reader
can have no reason for not granting. And with this postulate as
a basis, we shall, it is to be hoped, find ourselves in possession of
a premise from which we can determine the existence or non-
19
existence in our sense of the term "existencesof God, of con-
sciousness, and of unperceived entities.
When we come to consider particular existential problems, it
is desirable, we have agreed, that we take them up in the proper
order. In dealing with certain of these problems, to be sure, order
may be a matter of indifference. It may be, for example, that the
existence of individual substances can be considered as readily
after the existence of universals as before. However, we must be
on the watch for existential problems so related that the solu-
tion of one may reasonably be expected to aid us in the so-
lution of the other. Moreover, in dealing with the particular
existential problems which are subsequent to the determina-
tion of the meaning of "existence," order is not the sole con-
sideration to which our discussion of method commits us. It
is desirable that we assign a definite and unambiguous signifi-
cation, not only to the term "existence," but also to the other
important terms of which we are to make use. "Consciousness,"
"idea," "infinity," if these terms are to be used, they too must
represent definite entities if our thinking is to be clear, and if,
consequently, our metaphysical speculations are to result in
sound conclusions. When then we come to consider the exist-
ence or non-existence of consciousness, it is not sufficient that
we come to the task with an already determined definite signifi-
cation for "existence." We must now distinguish the various con-
cepts which the term "consciousness" has been used to represent.
We must bring out one or more definite and unambiguous mean-
ings which have been, or may be, assigned to this term. Only
then shall we find ourselves in a position to determine whether
consciousness in this sense, or in these senses, may be said to exist.
Having determined upon a definite meaning for "existence/*
we must bring into play whatever inventiveness and circumspec-
tion we are capable of in order to bring before us the entities
whose existence it is the task of the metaphysician to consider. We
must clarify the concepts thus brought before us so that in all
cases our thinking is clear, so that in all cases our important terms
have definite and unambiguous meanings. Finally, we must
bring the definite entities with which our analyses furnish us into
relation with our propositions determining the signification of
"existence." We must make use of our fundamental proposition
20
or group of propositions in determining the existence or non
existence in our sense of the term "existence" of these definite
entities.
A metaphysics which is developed in the manner which we have
outlined we shall take the liberty of calling an existential meta-
physics. And the method which we have outlined and determined
upon is, we shall say, the existential method as applied to the
solution of metaphysical problems. 30 A metaphysics that is exist-
ential will be based upon the realization that the term "existence"
is of fundamental importance. It will be based upon the realiza-
tion that this term needs a precise and unambiguous signification;
and upon the conviction that common usage furnishes us with
no signification of this sort. The metaphysician who makes use
of the existential method will consequently begin his constructive
labors by assigning to "existence" a definite, though to some ex-
tent an arbitrary, meaning. His first important propositions will
be those which, taken together, render explicit the significa-
tion that this term has for him. And these propositions, taken
together, will constitute the unfounded but unquestionable prem-
ise, the pou sto, of his metaphysical system. It is this existential
method which we shall attempt to apply in the present treatise.
We shall consequently determine upon a precise signification
which is to be the meaning that "existence" is to have in our
writings. What we are calling the "existential" method does not
however require the choice of the particular signification which
we shall select for "existence." The existential method does not
require us to replace the indefinite and general predicate in the
group of propositions which we may for the present summarize
as: "the existent is the such and such" with one particular and
unambiguous group of words rather than with another. Yet, how-
ever the predicate of this primary proposition is filled in, ex-
panded, or revised, the metaphysician who makes use of the
method which we are calling "existential" will regard the propo-
sitions in which the signification of "existence" is determined
the foundation stone of his metaphysical structure. He will utilize
this primary proposition as a premise from which he may partially
determine the existence or non-existence of various entities. The
content of the world of existents will vary, we have seen, with
the meaning that is chosen for the term: "existence." 81 Two
21
metaphysicians starting from different meanings may arrive at
different conclusions with respect to the existence or non-
existence of some particular entity. Since however they may both
be following the method which we are calling "existential/' it
follows that existential metaphysics does not involve any par-
ticular set of conclusions with respect to the content of the
world of reality. Existential metaphysics, in short, derives its name
from the existential method; and the system which is to be built
up in the following pages is but one of the ways in which that
method may be applied, is but one of the forms that an existential
metaphysics may take.
Descartes begins his "Meditations" by calling into question
practically all of our usual beliefs. He feels that in order to
develop a metaphysical structure that is firmly established, it
is first necessary to clear the ground. He resolves to "reject as
absolutely false everything as to which" he can "imagine the least
ground of doubt." 82 And so he concedes to the admirers of Mon-
taigne the invalidity of almost every proposition that has been
accepted as true. This task accomplished, Descartes undertakes to
find an indubitable proposition which will serve as a foun-
dation stone for a truly valid metaphysical structure. "Archi-
medes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of
its plane and transport it elsewhere, demanded only that one
point should be fixed and immovable; in the same way," says
Descartes, "I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am
happy enough to discover one thing only which is certain and
indubitable." 83 The proposition: "I exist as a being who is now
thinking" is for Descartes an indubitable truth of this sort. It is
a proposition which is shown to be true by the fact that its
denial is a self-contradiction. Not only, however, is this proposi-
tion indubitably true and in this sense clear; it also has, accord-
ing to Descartes, the second characteristic which is essential in a
first principle. "First, ... the principles must be very clear, and
. . . second" they must be such "that from them we may deduce
all other things." 34 Paying close attention to order, Descartes
proceeds, consequently, to deduce some of the implications of his
fundamental proposition. And so he arrives at the existence of
God, and, subsequently, at certain propositions "pertaining to cor-
poreal nature in so far as it is the object of pure mathematics." 88
22
Obviously, this procedure which Descartes employs has some
resemblance to that which we have determined upon. Just as
the Cartesian method begins by endeavoring to clear the ground,
so does the method which we are calling "existential." Whereas
Descartes holds that almost all pre-Cartesian assertions lack valid-
ity and a firm foundation, in a corresponding fashion it has been
our thesis that almost all previous assertions explicitly or im-
plicitly make use of a term which is vague and ambiguous. It is
our contention that in view of their overt or implied use of
"existence," these assertions, if not false, are vague and unin-
telligible. And, like Descartes, we too hold that they lack foun-
dation. For they make use of a term for which no precise sig-
nification has as yet been established. In the matter of the
foundation stone upon which the metaphysical structure is to
be based, here too there is a resemblance between the Carte-
sian method and that which we are calling "existential." In the
one method the structure is erected upon the "Cogito ergo sum,"
in the other upon a proposition or group of propositions in which
the determinate signification to be assigned "existence" is laid
down. There is a profound difference however in the grounds on
which these propositions are found valid. The fundamental
proposition of an existential metaphysics is in the nature of a
postulate; its validity lies neither in self-evidence nor yet in proof,
but rather in the liberty we have to develop a terminology which
is in some sense our own. Yet when the fundamental proposition
is once granted, an existential metaphysics develops in a manner
similar to that in which Descartes intended his metaphysics to
develop.
Let us however consider the possibility of arriving at a funda-
mental proposition in the Cartesian manner. Suppose I refuse to
accept the existence of all those entities whose existence is usually
granted. I am now doubting the existence of trees, of stones, of
men and of God. From this it follows, according to Descartes,
that I exist as an entity who is doubting these things. Such a con-
clusion follows, however, only because of the implicit use of
"existence" in the proposition which is made to serve as a prem-
ise. Just as, using the language of common parlance, "some men
are bald" appears to be equivalent to "some bald men exist," se
so the proposition: "I am doubting various things" appears to be
23
equivalent to the proposition: "I, as a doubter of various things,
exist/' It is this latter proposition which must then be regarded
as the foundation stone in the Cartesian system. And yet, on what
basis, we may ask, can the validity of this proposition be asserted?
Must we not say that the only justification this proposition can
have lies in the fact that in it the term "existence" is assigned a
signification in accordance with which "existence" denotes, among
other things, me the doubter? Descartes' fundamental proposition,
it would seem, turns out to be a sentence partially describing in
a denotative fashion the signification which "existence" has in his
writings.
Perhaps, however, we have misinterpreted Descartes. Perhaps
no reference to existence is to be read into the description of his
doubtings. Perhaps instead of asserting the existence of his doubt-
ing, he is merely refraining from attributing existence to the
various entities which appear to be his objects. Trees and men
and God, let us assume, are now merely subsistent entities. And
his doubting which also comes before him as an entity to be
considered, this too, let us suppose, is to be regarded as a sub-
sistent whose existence is neither asserted nor denied. But then the
absence of doubting in his mind seems also to come before him
as a subsistent. Yet in this situation, if we may so interpret Des-
cartes, he finds himself perforce considering the former object,
namely, the presence of doubting in his mind. He finds himself
in short considering two contradictory entities, the presence of
doubting and the absence of doubting, both of which, however,
are to be regarded merely as appearances, as subsistents. But surely
from this situation involving merely two subsistents, no conclu-
sion can be drawn with respect to reality. It is a matter of com-
mon agreement that we can not find a term in our conclusion
which does not occur in any of our premises. If then we are to
conclude that one of these mutually contradictory subsistents is
real, we must be tacitly assuming as a premise some proposition
which contains the term "real." We must be tacitly making use
as a premise of some such proposition as this: "If an entity insists
on coming before us when its contradictory comes before us,
then the former is a subsistent which is real." Again we find our-
selves brought back to a fundamental proposition in which there
is an assertion of existence. And here too, it appears, the validity
24
of our fundamental proposition must lie in the fact that it gives
existence a certain character, that in it the term "existence" is
being assigned a meaning.
An existential metaphysics, like the Cartesian philosophy, makes
use of a fundamental proposition from which subsequent truths
are deduced. With respect, however, to the justification of this
fundamental proposition, we find ourselves in accord, not so
much with Descartes, as with his English contemporary Hobbes.
"Primary propositions," writes Hobbes, 87 "are nothing but defini-
tions or parts of definitions, and these only are the principles of
demonstration, being truths constituted arbitrarily by the inven-
tors of speech, and therefore not to be demonstrated/'
(jDescartes and Hobbes were in a sense innovators who set op-
timistically to work to rebuild philosophy upon a new and firmer
basis. With the erudition and circumspection of Leibniz comes
a more sympathetic appreciation of the past. Formal logic and
the syllogism\ Leibniz holds, deserve a respectful place in our
philosophizing. Merely by developing the implications of certain
premises in strict logical form, we can, Leibniz holds, uncover the
self-contradictory character of certain propositions and of certain
notions. Thus 'swiftest motion/ he maintains, must be unreal
since logical analysis shows it to be self-contradictory. And the
eternal truths of mathematics and logic are known to be true
once it is shown that their contradictories involve self-contradic-
tion. (According to Leibniz, tfegn, mere logical analysis reveals to
us the non-existence of certain entities and the truth or falsity
of many propositions A There remain, however, many propositions
whose truth or falsity can not be determined by logical analysis.
These are the propositions with respect to which logical analysis
can uncover no self-contradiction either in them or in their con-
tradictories. If then we are to determine, for example, whether
there is ever a vacuum or whether, on the contrary, each place
contains some body, we need, Leibniz holds, some other tool in
addition to logical analysis, some other principle in addition to
the principle of contradiction. "This simple principle (the prin-
ciple of contradiction) is sufficient to demonstrate every part of
arithmetic and geometry" . . . But, Leibniz holds, 88 "in order to
proceed from mathematics to natural philosophy, another prin-
ciple is requisite."
25;
It is from a consideration of God's nature that Leibniz dis-
covers the second principle needed to distinguish reality from
unreality in those situations in which two contradictories are each
free from self-contradiction. God in the act of creation could not
have brought self-contradictory entities into existence. But in so
far as he was confronted by alternative systems of entities, each free
from internal contradiction, His nature, Leibniz holds, must have
impelled Him to bring into being that system and those en-
tities compatible with it that would result in the maximum of
reality. If we are confronted by two contradictory entities each
free from self-contradiction, we know, says Leibniz, that that one
must have been brought into existence which accords with God's
plan to bring into being the greatest possible number of com-
patible entities. We also know, he holds, that it would be incon-
sistent with God's nature for the act of creation to be in any
particular the exercise of an arbitrary and irrational choice. And
so if one of two contradictory propositions, each of which is free
from self-contradiction, points back to an irrational choice in
creation, we know that proposition to be false and its contra-
dictory true. It is these deductions from our knowledge of God
which, according to Leibniz, permit us to distinguish the real
from the unreal in certain cases in which logical analysis fails to
reveal any self-contradiction. A vacuum is not self-contradictory;
but since it does not accord with the fullness of being which fol-
lows from God's nature, it is unreal. A situation in which two
identically constituted substances are located at different places
is not self-contradictory; but since such a situation points back to
an irrational act in placing one here and one there rather than
vice versa, this situation too is unreal.
This distinction made by Leibniz between the principle of
contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason bears no re-
semblance to anything in Descartes' procedure. Yet here too there
is a resemblance to the existential method. The meaning of "exist-
ence" as developed in an existential metaphysics, may be regarded
as having two components. First, there is the vague and indeter-
minate signification of common usage. And, second, there is the
definite but uncommon signification into which the former is
transmuted through the terminological labors of the existen-
tial metaphysician. The former, the rough diamond furnished
26
by common usage, may be regarded as supplying us with the
principle of contradiction. And the more definite form added
by the existential metaphysician may be regarded as supplying
us with what may be called a principle of sufficient reason. Vague
and conflicting as are the significations generally attached to
"existence," it is generally agreed that the world of existent en-
tities contains no contradictions within itself, that the term ' 'exist-
ent" is not to be used to point to self-contradictory entities. This
characteristic of existence, however, which may be regarded as
implicit in the vague current meaning of "existence," does not
by itself furnish us with a complete and definite signification.
Whereas a law of contradiction may enable us to call certain self-
contradictory entities "unreal," we must make use of some second
principle if we are to be able more closely to delimit the real.
The proposition in which a definite but perhaps uncommon sig-
nification is assigned "existence" is, it follows, that element in an
existential metaphysics which is analogous to Leibniz's law of
sufficient reason. For it is this further, more precise element in
the signification of "existence" that must be brought into play if
we are to determine whether or not the term "existent" is prop-
erly to be applied to given entities which, without it, do not ap-
pear self-contradictory.
Our discussion of the "Cogito ergo sum" of Descartes has shown
us that the "Cogito" taken as the foundation stone of a metaphysi-
cal structure is in fact merely a proposition in which a signification
is being assigned "existence." 39 In short, the Cartesian method
turns out to be but a halting, partial, and unintended use of the
method which we are calling "existential." In a similar fashion
it is not difficult to show that Leibniz's principle of sufficient
reason is but an unfounded determination of the meaning of
"existence." What proof, for example, can be offered for the
proposition that God has chosen the maximum of existence? Does
not the validity of this proposition really lie in the fact that we
are, in laying down this proposition, giving "existence" a signifi-
cation in accordance with which it denotes the members of that
system which contains the maximum of compatible entities?
It turns out then that the validity of the law of sufficient rea-
son lies neither in self-evidence nor in proof. Like the "Cogito
ergo sum," and indeed like any proposition determining the
27
meaning of "existence," its validity, we hold, lies merely in
the freedom we have to develop a terminology which is in some
sense our own. The justification which Leibniz had given for
the law of sufficient reason was clearly unsatisfactory. And so
some of his immediate successors in Germany set themselves to
the task of establishing this law on what seemed to them a firmer
basis. These eighteenth-century philosophers whose erudition and
subtlety have not always been sufficiently appreciated, have left
us with arguments purporting to show that a denial of the law of
sufficient reason involves us in self-contradictions. Yet when Kant
begins his labors, the gap between the two principles is still un-
bridged. On the one hand there is the law of contradiction,
marking self-contradictory entities as unreal. And on the other
hand, there is a second and independent principle which must
be invoked, if we are not to accept all non-self-contradictory enti-
ties as real.
In the "Critique of Pure Reason" the distinction between these
two principles is crystallized in the distinction between analytic
judgments and synthetic judgments. "All analytic judgments,"
according to Kant, 40 "depend whoUy on the law of contradiction."
Synthetic judgments, whether a posteriori or a priori, agree, he
holds, in this: "that they can not possibly spring solely from the
principle of analysis, the law of contradiction." 41 "They require
a quite different principle. From whatever they may be deduced,
the deduction must, it is true, always be in accordance with the
principle of contradiction. For this principle must never be vio-
lated. But at the same time everything can not be deduced from
it." To be sure, the body of knowledge we may acquire solely
through the use of the law of contradiction is for Kant more
meagre than it is for Leibniz. 42 For Leibniz all mathematical
propositions derive their truth solely from the principle of con-
tradiction, whereas for Kant "seven plus five equals twelve" is
a synthetic proposition. 43 Nevertheless, in the writings of both
philosophers there is a distinction between two groups of truths;
and it is recognized that we need some principle other than that
of contradiction to give validity to what Kant calls our synthetic
judgments.
One of the most important judgments which Kant holds to be
synthetic is the judgment that all of our experience forms a uni-
28
fied whole. "Without . . . a unity which rests on a rule a priori
and subjects all phenomena to itself, no permanent and general
and therefore necessary unity of consciousness would be formed in
the manifold of our perceptions. Such perceptions would then
belong to no experience at all, they would be without an object,
a blind play of representations, less even than a dream." ** Kant
however seems determined that our perceptions shall not lack
objective reference, that they shall not be a blind play of repre-
sentations. And in order that they may be said to constitute
"knowledge" and that the entities to which they refer may be
said to be "real," Kant lays down the synthetic judgment upon
which, he holds, this consequence depends. The validity of the
proposition that our experience forms a unified whole seems thus
to be based merely upon the fact that this proposition enables us
to call the objects of our perceptions "real." This proposition,
which, in Kant's terminology, is not analytic, seems thus to be
merely an implicit determination of the content of reality and
hence of the meaning of the term "real." We advance beyond
the knowledge furnished us by the law of contradiction only by
adding a proposition which is in the nature of an explanation
further determining the signification of "reality."
The situation is very similar when we consider the synthetic
proposition advanced by Kant that each event has a cause. "If
we supposed that nothing precedes an event upon which such
event must follow according to rule, all succession of perception
would then exist in apprehension only, that is, subjectively . . .
I could not say of the object that it followed, because the follow-
ing in my apprehension only, without being determined by rule
in reference to what precedes, would not justify us in admitting
an objective following." 45 Kant however seems determined that
reality shall include objective and necessary sequences. He seems
to call such sequences "real" and to accept the causal law for
the sole reason that it justifies us in giving these sequences such a
designation. The proposition that each event has a cause seems thus
to be valid merely in the sense that it determines the sequences
we experience to be properly called "real." In laying down the
causal law. Kant is in effect determining the meaning of "ex-
istence" in such a way that this term will be applied to these
sequences. The validity which Kant finds for the causal law, that
29
is to say, is only the validity which attaches to a proposition de-
termining the meaning of a term. And so we add to the knowl-
edge furnished us by the law of contradiction by making use of a
proposition which implicitly determines somewhat further the
meaning of "existence." 46
The proposition that each event has a cause is not what Kant
terms analytic. For, analyze as much as we like, "we shall never
arrive from one object and its existence at the existence of an-
other/' 47 "There remained," Kant writes, "the possibility of
experience as that knowledge in which all objects must in the
end be capable of being given to us if their representation is to
have any objective reality for us." There remained, he should have
said, the promulgation of propositions determining the signifi-
cation of "reality" in such a way that our possible experience
would perforce be designated "real." "It was," quoting again
from Kant, "because people were ignorant of this method and
imagined that they could prove dogmatically synthetical propo-
sitions which the empirical use of the understanding follows as
its principles that so many and always unsuccessful attempts have
been made to prove the proposition of the 'sufficient reason/ "
In the foregoing discussion of Kant, we have been considering
the reality of possible experience and the validity of the synthetic
propositions which Kant holds apply to possible experience. Pos-
sible experience, however, Kant holds, is not the realm in which
lie all of the entities to which our thought is directed. Beyond
the "Herculean columns which nature herself has erected" lies
"a boundless ocean which, after deceiving us again and again,
makes us in the end cease all our laborious and tedious endeavors
as perfectly hopeless." 48 This is the realm of "rationalizing or
sophistical propositions which can neither hope for confirmation
nor need fear refutation from experience." 49 This is the realm
of vain, dogmatic metaphysics, and yet, to some extent also, of
justifiable faith. It was the denial of metaphysics, the denial of
knowledge o things-in-themselves that particularly impressed
Kant's early critics. 50 And Kant was subsequently much concerned
to refute the imputation that he had reduced everything to
illusion.
Without following Kant in his specific replies, let us consider
how such a criticism might well have been answered. "I confess
30
most humbly," Kant might have repeated, 61 that it "is entirely
beyond my power ... to extend human knowledge beyond the
limits of all possible experience." "My denial of a transcendent
metaphysics," he might have continued, "is based on the obvious
absurdity in attempting to go beyond experience with concepts
bound up with experience, and, more especially, on the various
absurdities into which, as I have shown in my Antinomies, an
attempt at transcendent metaphysics leads us. I also call your
attention," he might have continued, "to other sections of my
Dialectic in which I point out the invalidity of the principal
arguments of rational theology and of the major propositions with
which rational psychology is held to furnish us. If now you are
not going to content yourself with the remark that my negative
conclusions are displeasing to you, you must point out specific
errors in these passages of mine."
"Moreover," Kant might have reminded his critics, "I have
not contented myself with denying transcendent metaphysics.
Having shown that there is 'no rational psychology as a doctrine
furnishing any addition to our self-knowledge/ let me remark
that 'this refusal of our reason to give a satisfactory answer to
such curious questions which reach beyond the limits of this life'
should be taken 'as a hint to turn our self-knowledge away from
fruitless speculations to a fruitful practical use a use which'
... is 'directed always to objects of experience only/" 52 And,
he might have continued, "Before we venture beyond possible
experience, let us ask ourselves first whether we might not be
content with what possible experience contains." 53 "I suggest
therefore," he might have replied, "that you turn your attention
away from a transcendent metaphysics which I have shown to be
impossible to an immanent metaphysics, accepting my new point
of view that 'only in experience is there truth/ 54 I offer this sug-
gestion without misgivings," he might have said, "for what things
may be by themselves we know not, nor need we care to know,
because after all a thing can never come before me otherwise than
as a phenomenon." 55 "You may say," he might have added, "that
you are not interested in experience-for-us, that you are con-
cerned only about things in themselves. If, however, the argu-
ments of my Antinomies are sound, you must be convinced that
this hankering after transcendent metaphysics is but baying at
31
the moon. And I am hopeful that a careful study of my Analytic
will persuade you that the theses and problems of immanent meta-
physics which I there discuss will worthily replace in your atten-
tion the transcendent metaphysics which you must in any case
forego/'
Our doctrine that the correct method for metaphysics is to
develop the implications of propositions determining the signifi-
cation that the term "existence" has for us seems naturally to
evoke a criticism analogous to that which met Kant's * 'Critique
of Pure Reason/' "What we are interested in," our critic will tell
us, "is the nature of reality as it objectively is in itself, not the
nature of what you happen to choose to call 'real/ What we want
to know is whether or not God, consciousness and ideas are ob-
jectively real. It will not satisfy us to be told that you have de-
fined reality in such a way that in your terminology the word
'real* is properly to be linked with one or two of these entities
but not with the third. For all we care, you may tell us that
mermaids are real in the sense in which you choose to use the
word 'real/ and that, as you use this word, the King of England
is unreal/' "Our interest/' we shall be told, "lies in a realm
beyond mere terminology. Our concern is not with the word
'real' but with the world of reality itself which is independent
of any choice of words."
Just as this criticism is in some way analogous to that which
met the Critique of Pure Reason, so it points to a reply analogous
to the reply which, we have suggested, Kant might have made.
Just as Kant might have referred his critic to passages in which
he had in his opinion disproved the possibility of transcendent
metaphysics, so we may recall what has been said on the unintel-
ligibility of any discussion of reality which is divorced from a
consideration of the signification of the term "real/' 56 If what we
have said is sound, then must our critic realize what nonsense it
is to ask for a reality which is independent of any choice of words.
Moreover, we follow Kant further in not contenting ourselves
with negative conclusions. We invite our critic to engage with
us in a metaphysics which limits itself to the development of the
implications which may be drawn from propositions determining
the signification of our term "existence/' And we are hopeful
that a closer contact with such a metaphysics will show it to be
a richer and more enticing field than it may at first appear to be.
We are hopeful that, after our critic has been convinced of the
absurdity of baying at the moon, a closer acquaintance with a
metaphysics which applies the method which we call "existential"
will persuade him to shift his attention and his endeavors to this
more modest field. The inconclusiveness of a discussion of reality
which is divorced from a consideration of the signification of the
term "rear, this is a matter for argument and conviction. But
just as Kant could not by logic have forced his reader to become
interested in what is merely experience-for-us, so we can only
hope to evoke an interest in a metaphysics which is founded upon
an explanation of a term. Such a happy outcome, we are confident,
will result from a careful study of the theses and problems of an
existential metaphysics. And, to quote Descartes, 57 "it appears
to me that I can not do better than cause this to be established
by experience, that is to say, by inviting my readers to peruse this
book."
Summary
/In philosophy and indeed in most of our statements we are
-^implicitly, if not explicitly asserting or denying the existence
of some entity or other. The propositions through which we do
this can not be understood or evaluated unless the meaning of
our term "existence" is clear. Since "existence" has been used in
various senses, our meaning will not be clear unless we make it
so, unless we point out the specific sense in which we are using
this term.
The propositions in which we do point out how we are using
the term "existence" can not be overthrown by argument. Never-
theless, they are not trivial propositions. On the contrary, they
will serve as a major premise in a syllogism leading to the de-
termination of what exists and what does not exist in our sense
of "existence/)
Even this may seem trivial. But whether it seems so or no, it
is as far as any one can go. If the proposition "X exists" attempts
to make some assertion beyond "X exists in the sense in which I
am using the term 'existence/ " it is meaningless.
33
The program of this treatise will be to point out the meaning
our term "existence" has; to identify various entities whose
existence or non-existence customarily concerns philosophers (dis-
tinguishing these entities in certain cases from others with which
they may be confused) ; and then to determine whether or not
these entities exist in our sense of "existence."
Chapter 11
TOWARDS DETERMINING THE MEANING
OF "EXISTENCE"
If a proposition is to be a definition, its subject-term and its
predicate-term must, let us agree, represent co-extensive entities.
If, for example, 'man* is to be defined as 'rational animal/ it
must be true that there is no man who is not a rational animal;
and it must be true that there is no rational animal who is not a
man.
Now our task is to determine the meaning of our term "exist-
ence," to define, if possible, the entity that our term "existence"
js to represent. What we seek is some proposition of the form:
''The existent is the such and such" or of the form: "To exist is
equivalent to being an A." And to accept as a definition a prop-
osition of the form: "To exist is to be an A," we must be willing
to accept both the proposition: "No entity exists which is not an
A" and the proposition: "There is no A which does not exist."
But what about: "There is no A which does not exist?" If
there is no A which does not exist, then all A's exist, and if "All
A's exist" is true, then there is at least one universal affirmative
^existential proposition which is true. Thus in order that our term
"existence" may be explained by means of a definition having
the form: "the existent is the such and such," there must be some
universal affirmative existential proposition which is true.
We have already had occasion to refer to certain existential
propositions which are extensively used or implied in ordinary
Discourse. 1 We have found that the categorical propositions of
common speech are to a considerable extent synonymous with
existential propositions similar in form to: "Some bald men
55
exist" or similar in form to: "Immortal men do not exist." Ot
the two existential propositions just stated, one, it is to be noted,
is a particular affirmative proposition and the other a universal
negative proposition. We have not found ordinary discourse
making use of, or implying, existential propositions which are
both universal and affirmative. We have not found ordinary dis-
course making use of that species of existential proposition of
which one instance must be true if our term "existence" is to be
explained by means of a definition having the form: "The exist-
ent is the such and such."
"All men exist" is a typical universal affirmative existential
proposition. But in what sense is it true that all men exist? All
real men, such as Socrates, Napoleon, you and I, do, let us agree,
exist. But if, in asserting that all men exist, we are asserting
merely that all existing men exist, our assertion conveys little
information. If the universal affirmative existential proposition:
"All A's exist" is synonymous with: "All existing A's exist,"
then the universal affirmative existential proposition is of little
use.
Let us see then what the situation is when our subject-term in-
tends to denote, not merely existing A's, but also A's which may
be alleged to exist. Let us suppose that, when we say "All men
exist," our subject-term intends to denote every individual, real
or fictitious, who may be alleged to be a man. The subject-term of
our existential proposition now seems to denote, not only So-
crates and Napoleon, but also Ivanhoe and the man whom I
imagine walking on my ceiling. But if our proposition is under-
stood in this sense, it is a proposition which, using "existence" in
any usual sense, is false.
We run into a similar difficulty whatever term we choose as
the subject of our universal affirmative existential proposition. If
we say that all spatial entities exist, intending to assert that all real
entities having spatial position exist, our proposition is not very
informative. And if, on the other hand, we are intending to assert
that all entities which may be alleged to have spatial position are
real, then we are apparently asserting the existence of the gods
on Mount Olympus and of the dragons who roam the woods*
When I assert that all A's exist, my predicament, to put it
briefly, is this. If I am discussing all conceivable, imaginable,
subsistent A's, my proposition, using "existence" in any usual
sense, is false. To be sure, since we may give "existence" any
meaning we please, "All subsistent A's exist" might be held to be
true. But if it is to be true that all subsistent A's exist, if it is to be
true that any A which I choose to imagine is an existent entity,
the world of existent entities must be regarded as a world that
can be populated at will. If, for example, all subsistent spatial
entities exist, I have merely to think of an entity as occurring
somewhere and, presto, it becomes real. Either then all uni-
versal affirmative existential propositions are either false or of
little value. Or, if we insist upon holding that there is some uni-
versal affirmative existential proposition which is both true and
useful as a definition, then we must be willing to use "existence"
in a sense from which it will follow that the world of existent
entities can be populated at wilL
Although "existence" as commonly used has a signification
which is extremely vague and inchoate, there are nevertheless two
or three propositions that may b laid down with respect to exist-
ence even before we refine upon the signification of this term.
"Existent," as commonly used, seems to be predicable only of
entities which are free from self-contradiction. 2 And "existence,"
as commonly used, seems to refer to a realm of entities which can
not be populated at will. Whereas we have agreed to redeter-
mine the signification of "existence," we also find it desirable to
retain whatever is definite and clear in the signification of this
term as it comes to us out of common speech. The rough diamond
with which ordinary discourse furnishes us is not to be cast aside;
it is to be treasured and cut and polished. If then "existence" as
commonly used seems to refer to a realm of entities which can
not be populated at will, let us agree to give our term "exist-
ence" a signification from which a similar consequence will
follow.
If we admit -universal affirmative existential propositions that
are both true and useful as definitions, the world of existent
entities will be one that can be populated at will. Since however
we have agreed to determine for our term "existence" a significa-
tion such that the world of existent entities will not be one that
can be populated at will, we must hold that there are no uni-
versal affirmative existential propositions that are both true and
37
useful as definitions. We must hold, that is to say, that, using
"existence" in the sense in which we are to use it, any proposi-
tion of the form: "All A's exist" is either false or of little value in
describing existence.
Our methodological discussions in the preceding chapter have
led us to determine to give to the term "existence" a signification
which is in some sense our own. We have supposed that we would
be able to assign a precise signification to "existence" by laying
down some proposition reading: "The existent is the such and
such." 3 We have supposed that we would be able to say that the
existent, in the sense in which we are to use the term "existence,"
has such and such a characteristic; and that the entity having this
characteristic exists in our sense of "existence." We have, in
short, anticipated being able to say that all entities that are such
and such, and that no entities that are not such and such, exist;
and we have supposed that such a statement would make clear
the signification we are assigning the term "existence." Since,
however, we have agreed that the world of existent entities, in
our sense of "existence," shall not be one that can be populated
at will, we can not lay down a truly universal proposition of the
form: "All subsistent entities having such and such a character-
istic exist." If we are to make use of a universal affirmative
existential proposition that is to be true at all, we must assert
merely that all existing entities having such and such a character-
istic exist. Yet, if our purpose is to make clear the signification
which we are assigning "existence," a proposition of this latter
form will be of little service.
It appears then that we can not very well explain our term
"existence" by stating that all entities having such and such a
characteristic exist in our sense of "existence." And so we are
left with but one-half of the statement which we had supposed
would explain our term "existence." We are left, that is to say,
with the proposition: "All existents have such and such a
characteristic," or with the proposition which follows from it, the
proposition: "No entity lacking such and such a characteristic
exists."
If we lay down the proposition: "No non-spatial entities exist,"
we give the reader considerable information as to the meaning
which we are assigning to our term "existence." We are inform-
38
ing him that "existence/ 1 in our sense of that term, is not a
characteristic of a non-spatial God, of ideas that are presented as
being in no place, or of universals regarded as not in their in-
stances. Thus propositions of the form: "No entities with such
and such a characteristic are real" are not to be disdained as
a means of conveying information as to the meaning which is
being assigned the term "real." If we say that no A's exist, the
reader is informed that each subsistent A is a non-existent entity.
Furthermore, the proposition which we thus put before the
reader has what may be called deductive power. There may sub-
sist X, Y and Z, entities whose existence is in question. But if X
and Z appear with the quality A, the non-existence of X and Z is
to be deduced directly from our initial proposition.
Whereas the proposition: "No subsisting such and such exists"
can, as we have just seen, be of much service to us, nevertheless
we can not be entirely satisfied with this proposition alone. If we
wish to explain the word "man," we can hardly content our-
selves with the proposition: "No finny creatures are men." The
reader is informed that to be a man is to be lacking fins; but he
does not have put before him other qualitites which belong to
man. The logical intension of 'man* is only partially revealed.
The logical extension of 'man* is less than that of 'non-finny
creature/ We come closer to our objective when we add the
proposition: "No invertebrates are men" or the proposition:
"No quadrupeds are men." Similarly, when "existence" is the
term to be explained. If we merely say that no subsisting A's
exist, we leave the intension of 'existence' too meagre and its
extension too large. But our failure is less marked when we add
the proposition: "No B's exist" and the proposition: "No C's
exist." In general, the more entities A, B, C ... we refer to in
this fashion in attempting to explain our word "existence," the
more fully we describe existence and the more numerous the
entities which are definitely marked out as non-existent.
With all this, however, we do not fully succeed in describing
the signification which we are assigning the term "existence."
Even when we say that no existent, as we use the term "existence,"
is either an A, a B, a C, or a D, our task has not been satisfac-
torily completed. For I may, it seems, imagine a man under my
chair; and I may imagine this man as being a sense-datum, in-
39
dependent of my thinking, causally related to other entities, and
so on. We can not rule out this man who is to be ruled out, since
we have agreed that the world of existents, in our sense of "exist-
ence," is not to be one that can be populated at will merely by
specifying some additional characteristic that an entity must lack
if it is to be an existent. No matter how comprehensive and
how varied the characteristics we make use of in our proposition:
"No existent is an A or a B or a C ..." we shall still fail to dis-
tinguish the subsistent non-A's, non-B's and non-C's which are
unreal, and which merely appear to be non-A's, non-B's, and non-
C's, from the subsistent non-A's, non-B's and non-C's which are
non-A's and non-B's and non-C's and which consequently are
real.
The proposition: "All existents are non-A's" or "No A's exist"
assigns certain entities to the realm of non-existence. But in order
that we may more fully describe the signification which we are
assigning the term "existence," we need some proposition of
another type. We can not complete our task by using only nega-
tive existential propositions. We have seen moreover that uni-
versal affirmative existential propositions can be of little service.
And so we are forced to make use of singular or particular ex-
istential propositions* We can not fully explain the signification
which we are assigning "existence" merely by laying down the
proposition: "No A's exist." We can not make use of the addi-
tional proposition: "All X's exist." And so we must supplement
our proposition: "No A's or B's or C's exist" with the proposi-
tion: "Some X's exist" or "Xj. and X 2 exist" and possibly with the
proposition: "Some Y's do not exist" or '% and Y 2 are non-exist-
ents."
It appears then that the task of explaining "existence" will not
be so simple as we had supposed. We shall be able to tell the
reader that the subsistents that are real are neither A's nor B's nor
C's nor D's. The more characteristics we make use of in this fash-
ion, the more fully will we be describing the signification which
we are assigning "existence." At the same time by making use of
more and more such characteristics, we increase the deductive
power of our explanation of "existence" with respect to sub-
sequent metaphysical discussions. For with each additional charac-
teristic, we may be assumed definitely to be assigning additional
40
entities to the realm of non-existence. To make our explanation
still more complete, however, we shall also have to make use of
propositions having the form: "Xi and X 2 exist*' and of proposi-
tions having the form: "Yi and Y 2 do not exist/' We shall have
to state that this particular entity and that particular entity are
to be called "existent" in our sense of "existence" and that this
particular entity and that particular entity are to be called "non-
existent" in our sense of "existence." In short, our explanation of
the term "existence" will have to fall into two parts. On the one
hand, we shall be making use of universal negative existential
propositions, marking out classes of entities that are unreal and
characteristics which definitely determine their possessors to be
non-existent. And on the other hand we shall be making use of
singular or particular existential propositions, pointing out defi-
nite entities to be included in the denotation of "existence" and
definite entities to be excluded from the denotation of "exist-
ence."
We shall thus attempt to explain our term "existence" through
the combined use of some such propositions as: "No non-spatial
entities exist," "The King of England exists" and "The immortal
Barbarossa does not exist." But it is necessary to point out some of
the results that propositions of these three types will, and some of
the results that they will not, accomplish. Let me suppose a sub-
sistent King of England alleged to be non-spatial. Since my sub-
sistent appears with the characteristic of non-spatiality, it will
follow, it may be said, that the King of England does not exist.
In determining non-spatial subsistents to be unreal, I rule out of
existence, it may be held, not merely unreal subsistents, but
along with them certain subsistents which are real. It may seem
that I have only in thought to give an existent the characteristic
of non-spatiality and, presto, it becomes unreal. Let us however
consider the singular negative proposition: "The immortal Bar-
barossa does not exist." From this proposition we can not con-
clude that there was no Barbarossa at all. We must, it would ap-
pear, distinguish between two different subsistents on the one
hand, Barbarossa with the qualities assigned him by the historian;
on the other hand, Barbarossa with the qualities assigned him by
legend. "The immortal Barbarossa does not exist" marks out
one clearly described and readily identified subsistent as unreal.
41
It is not to be understood as carrying over into the realm of the
non-existent other subsistent Barbarossas, among them the sub-
sistent Barbarossa discussed by the historian. Similarly with the
King of England. We must distinguish between the King of Eng-
land thought of as residing in Buckingham Palace and the King
of England thought of as non-spatial. "No non-spatial subsistents
are real" marks out the latter as unreal. But it leaves the King o
England residing in Buckingham Palace untouched. "No sub-
sistent A's are real" marks out as non-existent all entities appear-
ing with the quality A. But there may be some similar subsistent
appearing without the quality A which is real. In short our singu-
lar affirmative existential propositions and our singular nega-
tive existential propositions determine the existential status of
only those definitely described and readily identified subsistents
which are represented by the subject terms of our singular prop-
ositions.
The narrow limits within which our existential propositions
operate are also to be borne in mind when our propositions are
universal and negative. "No non-spatial subsistents are real"
disposes of subsistents appearing as non-spatial. But the world of
subsistents also, let us suppose, contains subsistents appearing as
extra-spatial and subsistents appearing as supra-spatial. It is as
fecund as the Hydra which Hercules had to encounter. Just as
Hercules struck off one head only to see two others appear, so we
assign one characteristic to the world of non-existence only to have
left confronting us other characteristics closely resembling what
we have just disposed of. When we dispose of non-spatial sub-
sistents, we dispose at the same time of extra-spatial subsist-
ents appearing as non-spatial. After elaborating a description of
extra-spatial subsistents, some of these subsistents no doubt appear
as non-spatial. But there is a residue which does not. Extra-spatial
subsistents, we may say, "resemble" or "are implied by" non-
spatial subsistents. But it is conceivable for them not to appear to
resemble, not to appear to be implied by, non-spatial subsistents.
We may eliminate whatever appears to resemble non-spatiality.
And by specifically eliminating, for example, supra-spatial sub-
sistents, we may dispose of some particular group of subsistents
whether they appear to resemble non-spatial entities or not. But
there is a residue of resembling or implied subsistents which no
42
negative existential proposition, either universal or singular, can
reach.
Not every subsistent is real, however, that a negative existential
proposition does not mark out as unreal. It is the entities repre-
sented by the subjects of our singular or particular affirmative
existential propositions that alone are definite members of the
world of existents. An extra-spatial subsistent that does not appear
as non-spatial is not unreal as a consequence of the proposition:
"No non-spatial subsistents are real." But it is not definitely
marked out as real unless it is enumerated among our Xi, X 2 , X s ,
. . . We can then determine not to enumerate among our exist-
ents any subsistent which appears as extra-spatial but not as non-
spatial. Having made use of the proposition: "No subsistent A's
are real/' we shall not list as real any subsistent which "ought" to
appear as resembling A or implied by A, but does not.
Whatever existential proposition we make use of in determi-
ning the signification of "existence," whether it be singular or uni-
versal, affirmative or negative, it determines the existential status
of those subsistents only which it definitely describes and identi-
fies. Unless we adopt this attitude with respect to negative exist-
ential propositions, the world of unreality has no obvious limits.
And unless we adopt this attitude with respect to singular affirma-
tive existential propositions, the world of reality can be populated
at will. If "The King of England exists" has the consequence
that the King of England thought of with whatever character-
istics we please exists, then the King of England who died at St.
Helena is real and the King of England who wrote the "Critique
of Pure Reason." We hold consequently that the subject of our
singular affirmative existential proposition is not the King of
England with whatever qualities he might be assigned. The
subject of our proposition is the King of England with his
qualities those which do in fact belong to him fully noted.
Or rather, since this is impossible, it is the King of England so
described as to leave no doubt as to which subsistent our term
"existence" is being used to denote. If then I am presented with
the King of England thought of with various characteristics, I
must distinguish between the various Kings of England presented
to me. The subsistent King of England who lives in Buckingham
Palace is represented by the subject of my affirmative existential
43
proposition. This King of England, consequently, exists. The non-
spatial King of England on the other hand, and the philosophical
King of England, are not represented by the subject of my affirma-
tive existential proposition. Consequently this proposition of
mine does not imply the existence of these merely imaginary
Kings of England.
There is a difference between the singular affirmative exist-
ential proposition and the universal affirmative existential prop-
osition. If we say: ''All subsisting non-A's exist," the world of
existent entities comes to be one that may be populated at will.
If we say: "X!, thought of with whatever characteristics we please,
exists," the world of existent entities is again one that may be pop-
ulated at will. But in order that the universal proposition may
be true, it must be emasculated to: "All existent non-A's exist/'
On the other hand, in order that the singular proposition may
be true, it need merely be reduced to: "Xi, described as such
and such a subsistent, appearing with this and that characteristic,
exists." The singular proposition, thus reduced, is not tautological.
We are not saying that the existing Xi exists. We are pointing
out an individual in such a manner that there is no doubt which
subsistent individual we are pointing to; and we are saying that
this subsistent individual is included in the denotation of "exist-
ence." The universal proposition, on the other hand, can not
fail to be tautological so long as it remains universal. If we are
to describe the existing non-A's without using the term "exist-
ence," our only recourse is to enumerate them, that is to say, to
replace our universal proposition with a collection of singular
propositions.
In order to describe the signification which we are assigning
"existence," it appears then that we are to lay down the universal
negative existential propositions: "No A's or B's or C's exist/'
and the singular or particular existential propositions: "X* and X 2
and X 8 exist" and '% and Y 2 and Y 8 do not exist." If we mention
various characteristics A, B, C, and point to a sufficient num-
ber of individuals Xi, X 2 , X 8 , . . . Y x , Y 2 , Y 8 , . . . the signification
of our term "existence" will, it is to be hoped, be clear. And we
shall, it is to be hoped, find ourselves in possession of a premise
that will be of service in the solution of particular existential
problems. In order to determine whether a given entity that
44
comes up for discussion is real or unreal, we shall have to apply
our propositions determining the signification of "existence/' We
shall first have to ask ourselves if the given entity subsists with
the characteristics A, B, or C. And if it appears that this entity is
presented to us as an A or as a B or as a C, then our task is com-
pleted. The given entity, presented to us in this manner, is un-
real. If, on the other hand, the given entity whose existence or
non-existence is to be determined does not subsist as an A or as a
B or as a C, then is our task not yet completed. We have still to
bring into play the singular or particular existential propositions
in which certain entities denoted by our term "existence" and
certain entities denoted by our term "non-existence" are pointed
out. If the entity under consideration is enumerated in the list
of entities which are specifically excluded from the denotation of
"existence," then, even though this entity lacks the characteristics
A, B and C, it is unreal. And, on the other hand, if, in addition to
lacking the characteristics A, B and C, it is listed among the
entities which are specifically included in the denotation of
"existence," then it is real.
We have agreed to lay down the universal negative existential
propositions: "No A's exist" and "No B's exist" and "No C's
exist." From these propositions, we have seen, it will follow that
any subsistent presented with characteristics A, B, or C is unreal.
There subsist, however, many subsistents lacking the character-
istics: A, B, C. Some of these entities will be enumerated in the
list which we are to draw up of entities specifically included in
the denotation of "existence." Others of them will be enumerated
in the list which we are to draw up of entities specifically ex-
cluded from the denotation of "existence." But no matter how
lengthy we make these two lists, many subsistents lacking charac-
teristics A, B and C will appear on neither list. Our propositions:
"Xi exists" and "X 2 exists" and "X 3 exists" and our propositions:
"Yi does not exist" and "Y 2 does not exist" and "Y 8 does not
exist" will by no means account for all of the subsistents appear-
ing without characteristics A, B and C. With respect to the enti-
ties thus unaccounted for, we can not determine from the sort
of explanation of "existence" that we have decided to give,
whether in our sense of "existence" they are existent or non-
existent. The sort of explanation of "existence" that we have
45
decided to give is thus not a complete definition.
Our interest in this treatise, it is to be remembered, is primarily
in the problems that are regarded as metaphysical. Were our
interest in some other field, our list of entities included in the
denotation of "existence" and our list of entities excluded from
the denotation of "existence" would both of them have to men-
tion entities that our lists will pass by. And were we attempting
in this treatise to deduce a complete system of knowledge and
not merely a system of metaphysics, our lists would have to be
much more encyclopedic, or, what is saying the same thing, our
singular affirmative existential propositions and our singular
negative existential propositions would have to be much more
numerous. Since, however, our interest in this treatise is primarily
in metaphysics, our lists will not have to mention the North Star
or the bee on yonder flower or the city of Bangkok. For we shall
not be called upon in this treatise to determine the existence or
non-existence of individual stars or bees or cities. We shall attempt
to draw up our lists so that our explanation of "existence" will
be available as a premise from which to deduce the existence or
non-existence of those entities whose ontological status is generally
regarded as a matter of concern to the metaphysician. If we suc-
ceed in doing this, then, for the limited subject-matter discussed
in this treatise, our explanation of "existence" will be the touch-
stone we require.
We have rejected the universal affirmative existential proposi-
tion: All men exist. We have agreed to make use of the singular
affirmative existential proposition: Xj exists or Socrates exists.
But what about the proposition: "The universal 'man' described
in such and such a manner, exists"? In asserting such a proposi-
tion, it is to be noted, we are not asserting that any entity that
is thought of as being a man exists. We are saying that the univer-
sal 'man/ considered as an idea in the mind of God, exists. Or
we are saying that the universal 'man/ considered as an entity
that is exemplified in certain individuals, such as Socrates and
Plato, exists. The proposition: "The universal 'man/ described
in such and such a manner, exists" does not, it seems, suffer from
the disabilities which affect the proposition: "All men exist."
For we are attributing 'existence' not to each real man nor to each
subsisting man, but to a certain subsistent that we describe and call
46
the universal: 'man/ We can not, we hold, make effective use o
the proposition: "All universals exist." But "The universal 'man/
described in such and such a manner, exists/' is a proposition
that may be both true and informative. The universal 'man* may
consequently be given a place on our list of entities denoted by
"existence" along with Socrates and Plato. So far as our present
discussion has carried us, our list may mention individual sub-
stances and individual qualities and individual relations. And it
may mention universal substances and universal qualities and
universal relations, whenever there is a suppositio individualis.
It is to be one of our tasks to draw up a list of entities, each of
which is denoted by our term "existence." And it is to be another
of our tasks to draw up a list of entities, each of which is excluded
from the denotation of our term "existence." For the drawing up
of these two lists we require no further discussion. A place is
reserved for these two lists at the end of the following chapter. 4
Taken together, they will, as we have said, partially describe the
signification we are assigning "existence."
When we partially determine the meaning of "existence" by
means of a singular existential proposition, we fix the existential
status of one particular entity. We do this, at least, provided the
subject-term of our singular existential proposition is so phrased
that there is no doubt as to which the entity is to which it refers.
When we partially determine the meaning of "existence" by
means of a universal negative existential proposition, we assign
to the realm of non-existents an entire class of entities. Here, too,
however, it is necessary that the subject-term of our proposition
be so phrased that there is not a complete uncertainty as to what
entities are apparently denoted by it. For if we say that all A's are
non-existents, and if the reader can not at all tell which entities
are presented as A's, then there are no entities that are definitely
being assigned to the realm of non-existents and our universal
negative existential proposition is not explaining, even partially,
our term: "existence." A universal negative existential proposition
asserts that no entities having such and such a characteristic exist.
It asserts that to exist is to be free from this or that characteristic.
Yet if this characteristic is vague and indefinite, if in learning that
existence is free from this characteristic we learn little about exist-
ence, then our universal negative existential proposition will
47
scarcely help one to understand our term "existence." It follows,
consequently, that our universal negative existential propositions
should be so chosen that they mark out fairly definite groups of
entities that are being assigned to the realm of non-existence.
Our task is to assign to the term "existence" a signification
more precise than that which this term ordinarily bears. The
"existence" of common speech is quite vague and ambiguous;
nevertheless, we have seen, it has, even as commonly used, some
meaning. To the extent to which the "existence" of common
speech has a precise signification, we have agreed that it will be
desirable to attach that signification to our term "existence." And
where the "existence" of common speech is vague, we want our
term "existence" to be more precise. If the "existence" of common
speech is precise in so far as it makes freedom from self-contradic-
tion a characteristic of existence, we want to explain our term
"existence" also so that all self-contradictory subsistents will fall
within the realm of the non-existent. We have agreed to explain
our term "existence" in part by means of universal negative exist-
ential propositions. Each such proposition, it is expected, will
assign to existence the property of being free from a certain char-
acteristic; and it will assign a group of subsistent entities to the
realm of the non-existent. We want to choose our universal nega-
tive existential propositions, consequently, in such a manner that
we do not assign to the realm of non-existence entities which
common speech definitely marks out as existent; and we do not
want to leave out of the realm of non-existence entities which
common speech definitely marks out as unreal.
We are at liberty to assign to our term "existence" any signifi-
cation we please. And so, as a partial explanation of the significa-
tion we are assigning "existence," we are as much at liberty to lay
down one universal negative existential proposition as we are to
lay down another. One universal negative existential proposition,
however, will assign to existence freedom from a richer, a more
definite, characteristic than another. One will assign to the realm
of the non-existent a more definite group of entities than another.
And one will assign to our term "existence" a signification more
in accord than another with the ordinary signification of "exist-
ence" in so far as that signification is precise. Whereas then any
universal negative existential proposition that is to be used in
48
assigning a signification to "existence*' is in the nature of a postu-
late without premises from which it can be deduced, one universal
negative existential proposition will enable us to carry out our
purpose more readily than another. Whereas there are no logical
grounds that force us to select one universal negative existential
proposition and to reject another, there are grounds of expediency
that permit us to prefer one universal negative existential propo-
sition to another. Thus we are left with certain criticisms that we
may bring, albeit no logical criticisms, against some of the univer-
sal negative existential propositions which may suggest themselves
to us as propositions to be used in partially describing the signi-
fication to be assigned to the term "existence."
For the remainder of this chapter then, let us call to mind
some of the universal negative existential propositions that might
be used in partially describing the meaning to be assigned
"existence." And, in view of the discussion of the preceding pages,
let us see which of these propositions it will, without more de-
tailed consideration later, be inexpedient to accept. In order to
obtain the material to which our considerations of expediency are
to be applied, let us review some of the philosophical writings
of the past. We must remember however that the philosophers
whom we are about to consider did not lay down universal nega-
tive existential propositions with the overt purpose of explaining
the term "existence." They may have mentioned "existence" only
casually; or they may have given assent to some universal affirma-
tive existential proposition. It is not our primary purpose at this
point to make an historical survey of the use of the term "exist-
ence" in the writings of various philosophers. Our task is to glance
through the history of philosophy in order to put before us
universal negative existential propositions from which to choose.
No question in Occidental philosophy, so far as we know, is
older than the question: What is it to be real? When the Milesians
found themselves confronted by a world of great variety and
ceaseless change, they asked themselves what the "nature" of
things is. "As Anaximandros and most of the physicists say,"
writes Aristotle, 5 the fundamental reality is something which "is
immortal and indestructible." And so we may elicit the doctrine
that only the permanent is real. This proposition, namely, that
whatever is impermanent is non-existent, is not to be extracted
49
merely from what has come down to us from the Milesians. From
Pannenides to Anaxagoras the real is that which persists un-
changed, unaffected by the lapse of time. There is disagreement
as to the number of such permanent entities and the qualities
that these entities possess, but among many Greek philosophers
there seems to be agreement that whatever is impermanent is
unreal. Indeed we find echoes of this doctrine as recent as Herbert
Spencer. "The most conspicuous contrast," writes Spencer, 6 "is
the contrast between that which perpetually changes and that
which does not change, between each ever-varying cluster of vivid
states and their unvarying nexus. This transcendent distinction
needs a name. I must use some mark to imply this duration as
distinguished from this transitoriness this permanence in the
midst of that which has no permanence. And the word 'existence/
as applied to the unknown nexus, has no other meaning. It ex-
presses nothing beyond this primordial fact in my experience."
Shall we partially describe the meaning which we are to
assign the term "existence" by means of the proposition: imper-
manent subsistents are unreal? If we take the term "permanence"
as it comes to us out of our everyday discourse, the typical sub-
sistents appearing as impermanent are such entities as flashes of
lightning. We choose, however, not to make use, unless there are
special considerations, of a universal negative existential proposi-
tion that will assign to the realm of non-existence entities which
common speech unhesitatingly marks out as existent. Surely,
there is no tendency in common speech to call mountains "real"
rather than sunsets, and Gothic cathedrals "real" rather than
soap bubbles. Common speech seems definitely to assign some
sunsets and some flashes of lightning to the realm of existent
entities. And so, unless permanence is used in some special sense,
the proposition: "Impermanent subsistents are unreal" would give
our term "reality" a meaning out of accord with common usage.
Fairly early in Greek thought the conviction developed that
the material things with which we commonly deal in our every-
day life are unimportant and unreal. Emphasis was shifted to
numbers, to forms, to universals, to ideals, and to scientific gen-
eralizations as the only realities. It is reason, the eyes of the mind,
that, it was said, puts us in touch with reality, not the senses which
are the eyes of the body. Among the Pythagoreans, then by Soc-
50
rates and by Plato, the world of intelligible entities was more
and more intensively explored, became richer and richer in con-
tent. And the conviction grew that whatever is merely mundane,
whatever is altogether a part of the spatial world, whatever is
given to us in sense perception only, is unworthy, unstable and
unreal. The Platonic dialogues are the great source of inspira-
tion for this identification of the real with the intelligible. There
we find in abundance passages in which the objects of the intel-
lect, the Ideas, are eulogized and called "real/' and in which
entities which are merely objects for the senses are called "un-
real." 7
With the intensification of religious interest and the spread
of Christianity, the conviction remains that only that is real
which is intelligible and not essentially sensible. The world of
intelligible entities is regarded somewhat differently. It is now
not so much the realm of secular generalizations and of moral
ideals that are independent of religious import as it is the realm
of spiritual truths, the realm of God, His Word, and His ideas.
The mind, says St. Augustine, 8 "is disabled by besotting and
inveterate vices not merely from delighting and abiding in, but
even from tolerating, His unchangeable light, until it has been
gradually healed, and renewed, and made capable of such felic-
ity." Man is naturally sinful; he usually is occupied with material
things, with the world of sense which is the world of illusion and
unreality. The world of sense, it is felt, has no existence per se.
It has only a shadowy and reflected importance in so far as it is
connected with, and derived from, the spiritual Word of God.
Material things "are known in one way by the angels in the
Word of God, in which are seen the eternally abiding causes and
reasons according to which these things are made; and in an-
other way in which these things are seen as they are in them-
selves. In the former way, they are known with a clearer knowl-
edge; in the latter they are known with a dimmer knowledge,
a knowledge rather of the bare works than of the design." 9 Scat-
tered through the Middle Ages we find marks of this other-world-
liness. That "in which there is any mutable element," says St.
Anselm, 10 "is not altogether what it is. ... And what has a past
existence which is no longer or a future existence which is not
yet, this does not properly and absolutely exist."
51
With the great scientific generalizations formulated in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, the world of intelligible en-
tities finds new inhabitants. The world of intelligible entities
is still a world of spiritual truths. But the ideas of God are clear
and distinct ideas, truths of reason, in a word, mathematical for-
mulae. The world of mere sense is still unimportant and unreal.
Material things have no reality except in so far as they exemplify
mathematical formulae. And we have no real knowledge of mun-
dane things except in so far as we can subject them to number
and see their behavior as the fulfillment of some mathematical
law.
A tremendously important line of philosophers thus presents
us with a doctrine from which we may derive the proposition:
Subsistents appearing as merely sensible are unreal. We have
agreed not to make use, unless there are special considerations, of
a universal negative existential proposition that would assign to
our term "existence" a signification out of accord with common
usage where common usage is precise and definite. If now we
were partially to explain the meaning of our term "existence" by
means of the proposition: "All sensible subsistents are unreal,"
we should be assigning to the realm of the non-existent, not
merely sunsets and soap bubbles as these subsistents are com-
monly presented to us, but also ancient trees and Gothic cathe-
drals. If, then, we found the proposition: "Whatever subsists as
impermanent is unreal" unacceptable because of its divergence
from common usage, there is all the more reason for us to reject
the proposition which we are now considering.
However, "All sensible subsistents are unreal" is to be dis-
tinguished from "all merely sensible subsistents are unreal." Sun-
sets and soap bubbles and Gothic cathedrals may be subsistents
appearing as sensible; but they may not appear as merely sen-
sible. Consequently in assigning the merely sensible to the realm
of the non-existent, we may be leaving the door open for sunsets,
soap bubbles and cathedrals, appearing with the characteristics
with which they normally appear. Is there any respect, however,
in which a subsisting Gothic cathedral appears to be connected
with the eternal truths and some other subsisting sensible entity
not connected? The cathedral appears with the characteristic of
having been built in accordance with the formulae of physics;
52
its behavior exemplifies the law of gravitation. Yet, unless we are
told just what the eternal truths are and what sort of connection
with them is demanded, we have no basis upon which to dis-
tinguish the ontological status of a Gothic cathedral from that of
any other alleged sensible entity. Practically every sensible entity
appears connected, in some sense of the word "connection."
with the realm of intelligible truths. The proposition: "Merely
sensible subsistents are unreal" is ostensibly assigning to the
realm of the non-existent certain sensible subsistents. Yet with-
out a more detailed description of the intelligible and of the
nature of the connection that is demanded, none of the sensible
subsistents normally considered is indicated as falling within the
class of the merely sensible. A universal negative existential prop-
osition is effective in explaining the signification being assigned
"existence" in so far as it assigns a definite characteristic to 'exist-
ence' and in so far as it assigns entities to the realm of the non-
existent. It is hardly informative to be told that existence has the
characteristic of being somehow intelligible. And in assigning the
merely sensible to the realm of the non-existent, it turns out that
we are, in the absence of further propositions, leaving the realm
of the non-existent without any obvious inhabitants. It appears
then that: "All sensible subsistents are unreal" will not assign to
"existence" the sort of signification we seek to give it. And it
appears that: "All merely sensible subsistents are unreal" will not,
taken by itself, give "existence" a definite meaning.
At the beginning of Greek philosophy we meet with the doc-
trine that the impermanent is unreal. For many writers it is the
world of sense which is impermanent. And so we have arrived
at the doctrine that the sensible, or the merely sensible, is unreal.
Instead, however, of opposing to the merely sensible that which
is intelligible, there may be opposed to the merely sensible that
which is independent of sense-perception, that which persists
either unsensed or regardless of whether it is sensed or not. In-
dependence of sense perception has grown into independence of
any mental activity. We come thus to the doctrine known as
realism, the doctrine that whatever is merely or essentially mental
content is unreal, the doctrine that whatever is real is independ-
ent of any mind. A realism of this sort does not find very definite
expression in writings prior to the eighteenth century. It was
53
probably accepted by earlier writers. But the explicit statement
of it seems first to have been called forth by the exposition of
epistemological idealism. It has during the past century been
advocated by many eminent writers. And there is no doubt but
that the proposition: "Essentially mental subsistents are unreal"
establishes a partial signification for the term "existence" which
accords very well with current popular usage.
When we partially explain the signification being assigned
"existence" by means of the universal negative existential propo-
sition: "All essentially mental subsistents are unreal," we are
definitely assigning to the realm of the non-existent subsistents
appearing as dream objects, and we are definitely assigning to the
realm of the non-existent subsistents appearing as members of a
Berkeleian or Kantian world of experience. Moreover, we are
definitely assigning to the realm of the non-existent the ideas
which certain epistemological dualists hold are in all cases the
immediate objects of our consciousness. For these ideas, as con-
trasted with the ulterior realities to which they refer, are nor-
mally thought of as having no life outside of the conscious states
whose immediate objects they are. It follows then, if we may in-
dulge in a digression, that one can hardly be an epistemological
dualist proclaiming the existence of such ideas, if one is partially
to explain the signification of "existence" by means of the propo-
sition: "All essentially mental subsistents are unreal."
If, in partially explaining the signification which we are as-
signing to "existence," we make use of the proposition: "Whatever
is essentially mental is unreal," we shall not be running counter
to common usage. And we shall not be failing to give our term
"existence" any definite meaning at all. We have already com-
mitted ourselves however to the acceptance of the proposition:
"Self-contradictory subsistents are unreal." And we shall dis-
cover later that the entity that is in no sense an object of con-
sciousness is self-contradictory. 11 If then we may assume that our
later finding will be correct, the entity that is in no sense an
object of consciousness is an entity that we shall find presented
to us as self-contradictory. It is an entity, consequently, which our
propositions setting forth the meaning of "existence" definitely
will assign to the realm of the non-existent. If, then, in partially
determining the signification of "existence," we were to make
54
use of the proposition: "All essentially mental subsistents are un-
real/' we should find assigned to the world of non-existence both
the subsistent that is in no sense an object of consciousness and
the subsistent that is essentially mental. We should be placing
practically all subsistents among the unreals and should have
nothing for the term "existent" to denote.
Whereas we have found many writers holding that the merely
sensible is unimportant and unreal, there is a distinguished group
of philosophers who take what is, generally speaking, an opposite
point of view. "Reality and the evidence of sensation," 12 says
Diogenes Laertius in expounding the Epicurean philosophy,
"establish the certainty of the senses; for the impressions of the
sight and hearing are just as real, just as evident, as pain." It is
the entities with which we become acquainted through sense per-
ception which are for these writers most certainly known to be
real. Entities which are merely entities of thought are known less
directly, less surely. In becoming acquainted with them the mind
follows a more tortuous path and is more likely to be led astray.
"Let men please themselves as they will," says Francis Bacon, 13 "in
admiring and almost adoring the human mind, this is certain:
that as an uneven mirror distorts the rays of objects according to
its own figure and section, so the mind, when it receives impres-
sions of objects through the sense, can not be trusted to report
them truly, but in forming its notions mixes up its own nature
with the nature of things." And so Bacon arrives at the position:
"The evidence of the sense, helped and guarded by a certain
process of correction, I retain. But the mental operation which
follows the act of sense I for the most part reject." 14
This acceptance of the reality of entities given to us in sense
perception and this sceptical attitude towards entities not di-
rectly bound up with sense perception finds expression in many
passages in Locke, Berkeley and Hume. "The ideas of sense,"
says Berkeley 15 for example, "are allowed to have more reality
in them . . . than the creatures of the mind." A similar attitude
is frequently expressed by Kant. "What is real in external phe-
nomena," says Kant, 16 "is real in perception only, and can not
be given in any other way." "From such perceptions, whether by
mere play of fancy or by experience, knowledge of objects can
be produced, and here no doubt deceptive representations may
55
arise without truly corresponding objects". . . "In order to
escape from these false appearances, one has to follow the rule
that whatever is connected according to empirical laws with a
perception is real."
"The postulate concerning our knowledge of the reality of
things requires perception, therefore sensation and the con-
sciousness of it, not, indeed, immediately of the object itself, the
existence of which is to be known, but yet of a connection be-
tween it and some real perception according to the analogies of
experience which determine in general all real combinations in
experience. . . . But if we do not begin with experience or do not
proceed according to the laws of the empirical connection of
phenomena, we are only making a vain display as if we could guess
and discover the existence of anything/' 17
It is unnecessary to trace this doctrine, which may be called
"empiricism/' down to our own day. It is the doctrine with so
many recent exponents, the doctrine that entities given to us in
sense perception are real, that entities connected with the objects
of perception, objects of possible but not of actual experience, are
less directly and less surely known to be real, and that entities
not properly connected with sense experiences are unreal. In
view of our discussion of the universal affirmative existential
proposition, we are not interested in the proposition: "All objects
of possible experience are real." But the proposition: "Subsistents
appearing as not properly connected with sense experience are
unreal" is a proposition of which we are at liberty to make use
in partially explaining the signification to be attached to our
terms: "reality" and "existence."
A universal negative existential proposition, let us remind
ourselves again, will be effective in assigning a meaning to
"existence" to the extent to which it definitely assigns entities to
the realm of the non-existent. Which, then, are the entities that
appear as not properly connected with sense experience? Unless
the universal negative existential proposition with which we
are dealing is expanded and the nature of a proper connection
defined, there are no entities which will obviously fall within
the realm of the unreal. Universals generally appear as the arche-
types of the objects of sense experience. God appears with the
characteristic of being implied by the objects of sense experience.
56
Even dream objects when recognized as dream objects frequently
appear as caused by something in the world of sense-experience.
Almost all entities, in short, are subsistents which appear as hav-
ing some sort of connection with the objects of sense-experience.
We can give the world of the non-existent some definite content
and thus more effectively explain "existence" if we disregard the
notion of a proper connection. If we lay down the proposition:
"All subsistents not appearing as percepts are unreal/ 1 God, and
the law of gravitation, and the other side of the moon, are at once
marked out as subsistents that, as they usually appear, do not exist.
Such a proposition, however, would assign to the term "existence"
a signification out of accord both with common usage and with
philosophical precedent.
Let us consider, then, the possibility of limiting reality to
entities given to us as having a certain definite kind of con-
nection with sense experience. The entity that seems merely to
be implied by sense experience is not, we may say, properly con-
nected with it. The only entities that are properly connected with
the actual objects of sense experience, we may say, are those that
are possible objects of sense experience, those entities that would
be perceived if we were at a different place or had senses suffi-
ciently acute. We thus arrive at the universal negative existential
proposition: Whatever appears with the characteristic of being
non-spatial is unreal. And we may in a similar fashion arrive at
the proposition: All timeless subsistents are unreal.
At least as far back as Plato we meet with the doctrine that
whatever is real must have a date. Against the timeless Being
of Parmenides, the objection is raised that such an alleged being
is unreal because it is not in time as an entity must be if it is to
be real. 18 An entity that does not participate in time, it is held,
does not participate in being. When we come down to Hobbes,
we find a similar attitude clearly expressed with respect to spatial
position. "If the triangle exists nowhere at all," Hobbes writes, 19
"I do not understand how it can have any nature; for that which
exists nowhere does not exist." Sometimes it is required of a real
entity only that it have a date, sometimes only that it have spatial
position. But quite frequently the two requirements are joined.
Reality is regarded as something that is limited to those subsist-
ents appearing with both a date and a spatial position. As Crusius,
57
one of the philosophers who wrote shortly before Kant, puts it,
to give an entity that is merely thoughtthat is, an entity that in
his terminology is merely possible a date and a spatial position
is to give it existence. 20 "If a substance is to exist, it must exist
immediately in some place and at some time." 21 For Kant, space
and time are transcendentally ideal but empirically real. Every
external entity that is empirically real that is to say, real as a
phenomenon must be in time and in space. And all real phe-
nomena without exception must be in time. Only events, some
recent writers seem to hold, are real. And an event, it is indicated,
is an entity that has a date and a position in a four-dimensional
spatio-temporal continuum.
If we partially explain "existence" by means of the proposition:
"Whatever appears as lacking a date or a spatial position is un-
real," there are various subsistents that our proposition definitely
assigns to the realm of the non-existent. Such a proposition clas-
sifies as unreal mental processes and mental content presented as
occurring nowhere, universals and scientific generalizations ap-
pearing as eternal, God appearing as a supra-spatial Deity. More-
over with such a proposition we assign to existence the char-
acter of being free from utter non-spatiality and the character
of being free from utter timelessness. Thus it can not be objected
that the proposition which we are considering gives no meaning
to "existence." Nor does this proposition definitely assign to the
realm of non-existence entities which common usage unhesitat-
ingly calls "real." A preliminary and somewhat casual discussion,
in short, fails to eliminate from further consideration: "What-
ever appears as lacking a date or a spatial position is unreal." To
be sure, there are such questions as: date with respect to what?
and spatial position with respect to what? In order to determine
which subsistents are unreal because of their lack of spatio-tem-
poral characteristics, a further discussion of space, time, and of
time-space is indicated. If the signification of "existence" is to
be as precise as possible, the realm of non-existence must contain
more entities than merely those which appear as totally undated
and existence must have a more definite characteristic than free-
dom from utter timelessness. In order to make the meaning of
our term "existence" as precise as possible, we shall later mark
out as unreal all subsistents appearing a? undated, or as lacking
58
a spatial position, with respect to a certain type of entity. 22 And
we shall mark out as unreal subsistents appearing as not having
a certain kind of date and position with respect to such an entity.
But in view of this preliminary discussion and pending such
modifications as our search for precision may later lead us to
make, we may at this point agree in explaining "existence" to
make use of the proposition: "Whatever appears as lacking a date
or as having no spatial position is unreal."
It is frequently felt that existent entities are related to one
another in that each of them is in some place and each of them
at some time. It is felt that existent entities taken together form
a system of entities that is bound up with a system of places or
Space and with a system of dates or Time. The non-existent, it
may be felt, is what does not belong to this system, what does
not fit into this one Space and this one Time. With some writers,
however, membership in this one Space and this one Time does
not seem to be the outstanding determinant of membership in
the system of existent entities. To exist is to be a member of a
system of related entities; but membership in this system is not
primarily a matter of place and time. Existence is evidenced by
a wealth of relations of all sorts with various other entities. The
non-existent is that which subsists disjoined from most other en-
tities and unconnected with them.
It is the consideration of fables and dream objects that is likely
to lead us to distinguish the existent from the non-existent in
this fashion. "And I ought," says Descartes at the end of his
"Meditations," "to set aside all the doubts of these past few days
as hyperbolical and ridiculous, especially that very common un-
certainty respecting sleep, which I could not distinguish from the
waking state; for at present I find a very notable difference be-
tween the two, inasmuch as our memory can never connect our
dreams one with the other, or with the whole course of our lives,
as it unites events which happen to us while we are awake. And,
as a matter of fact, if some one, while I was awake, quite sud-
denly appeared to me and disappeared as fast as do the images
which I see in sleep, so that I could not know from whence the
form came nor whither it went, it would not be without reason
that I should deem it a spectre or a phantom formed by my
brain (and similar to those which I form in sleep) rather than a
59
real man/' Similarly, Christian Wolff 23 holds that "in a dream
while you look at some one, he suddenly changes into some one
else or he vanishes straight-way and no one comes back to take
his place." Things behave in a strange, haphazard, and unrea-
sonable manner. And it is this that distinguishes them from real
entities and marks them as dreams. There is thus suggested to
us another manner in which we might partially describe the sig-
nification o our term "existence." We can not make effective use
of a universal affirmative existential proposition. And so we may
pass by the proposition: Whatever has many points of contact
with our usual experience is real. But perhaps in partially ex-
plaining the signification of "existence" it will be well for us to
make use of the proposition: Whatever appears as out of accord
with our usual experience, as having few points of contact with
the entities of which we are normally aware, is unreal.
Our usual experience reveals to us stones that are mute. A
subsistent stone that talks of its own accord differs from most of
its fellow subsisting stones. It appears as something surprising and
unusual, as something that could not be predicted or accounted
for, as a phenomenon having few points of contact with our
normal experience. If then in explaining "existence" we were
to make use of the proposition: "Subsis tents having few points
of contact with our normal experience are unreal," it would be
the unusual and extraordinary phenomenon, the rara avis, as it
were, that we would be assigning to the realm of the non-exist-
ent. What, however, is usual, and what is unusual? Conversations
with the Virgin Mary were not at all unusual in the Middle Ages;
nor were witches unusual in the New England of Cotton Mather.
The universal negative existential proposition which we are con-
sidering would not definitely and unambiguously assign to the
realm of the non-existent either visions of the Virgin Mary or
women riding on broom-sticks. Again, substances that give off
emanations are unusual in our experience, though pieces of
radium that give off such emanations are not rare. Consequently,
if we start from the consideration of all substances rather than
from the consideration merely of radium, our proposition seems
to assign to the realm of non-existence all substances alleged to
give off emanations. In general, we may say that the instances
of any species are few in number, and that this species is rare,
60
if we start with a genus that is sufficiently extensive. Rarity in
short is a relative thing. And so if mere rarity implies unreality,
membership in the realm of non-existence becomes relative and
indeterminate.
The proposition: "Subsistents having few points of contact
with our normal experience are unreal" does not definitely and
unambiguously point out a limited group of entities as unreal.
Nearly every phenomena is usual, if we take into consideration
the experience of some special group of subjects. And nearly
every phenomenon is rare, when we consider it an instance of an
extremely extensive genus. If we describe more closely the notion
of having many points of contact with normal experience, per-
haps we can arrive at a proposition that will definitely and un-
ambiguously assign a limited group of entities to the realm of the
unreal. Perhaps this can be accomplished by identifying the
phenomenon that is unusual with the phenomenon whose be-
havior is unpredictable. Perhaps it can be accomplished by iden-
tifying the phenomenon that is unusual with the phenomenon
that is observed by but a single subject. If we partially explain
"existence" by limiting reality to entities presented as having
been perceived by more than one subject, we rule out of existence
the fall of the tree of which I am the sole observer. We mark out
as "non-existent/' in our sense of the word "existence," an entity
that common usage obviously calls "real." And if we say that the
unpredictable is unreal, we meet with a problem akin to that
into which we run when we limit reality, not to what is experi-
enced, but merely to objects of possible experience. When is an
entity that is not actually experienced an object of possible ex-
perience? We found this a question to be answered only through
the introduction of other concepts than that of experience,
through the introduction, for example, of the concepts of time
and place. So it is with the question: When is a phenomenon that
is not actually predicted one that might have been predicted?
If we limit reality to what is actually predicted, we mark out as
unreal many entities that common usage calls "real." And if we
limit reality merely to what might be predicted, we are forced
to examine other concepts if we would have our universal nega-
tive existential proposition one that definitely and unambiguously
assigns a limited group of entities to the realm of non-existence.
61
A phenomenon is out o accord with our usual experience
when it is rare, exceptional, and surprising. In a more special
sense, however, a phenomenon may be held to be out of accord
with our usual experience when it fails to conform with the vari-
ous scientific generalizations that are valid for the objects of our
normal experience. There are, it may be held, various laws which
all real phenomena obey. There are, it may be held, various truths
of reason which constitute the form of reality. A phenomenon is
real, it may be said, when it conforms with these intelligible laws,
when its behavior presents material for which these truths of
reason can furnish a supplementing form. And a phenomenon is
unreal, it may be held, when it appears inconsistent with these
intelligible truths. A phenomenon is out of accord with our
usual experience, has few points of contact with the system of
existent entities, it may be said, when it disobeys the laws which
constitute the form of reality.
Leibniz is an outstanding advocate of the doctrine that all
existent entities are intimately bound up with one another
through membership in a systematic network of relations. Each
monad, to be sure, is its own cause; but the monads, taken to-
gether, form an organic system in which each bit is essential.
The world of real entities is, he holds, a system of interrelated
compossible entities. An entity is real if it belongs in the system,
if it sustains the relations that all real entities do sustain towards
one another. And a phenomenon is unreal if it appears to us as
coming without antecedents and as going without consequents,
as a stranger that has no connection with the interrelated world
formed by most subsistents. In passages in which he alludes to
the difference between the real and the unreal, Leibniz suggests
some of the doctrines that we have just been discussing. An entity
is real and belongs in the system of interrelated entities only
if it harmonizes with our normal experiences. He uses such
phrases as "agreement with the whole course of life" 24 and al-
ludes to the phenomenon of "future things" being "in a certain
degree . . . foreseen from past things." 25 There also appears how-
ever the more special doctrine that real entities are those which
conform with certain truths of reason, with certain intelligible
laws. "The basis of the truth of contingent and singular things," 26
he writes, "is in the succession which causes these phenomena of
62
the senses to be rightly united as the intelligible truths demand/'
We thus elicit the universal negative existential proposition:
Subsistents appearing as inconsistent with this, or with that, in-
telligible law are unreal. If we accept as an intelligible law the
proposition that every event has a cause, then any subsistent
appearing as an uncaused event is, in accordance with the propo-
sition which we are considering, marked out forthwith as unreal.
Our proposition does not fail to assign a definite group of en-
tities to the realm of the non-existent. It marks out as unreal a
group of entities that will be definite in proportion as our intel-
ligible laws are expressed with precision; and it marks out as
unreal a group of subsistents that will vary with the particular
propositions that are accepted and laid down as intelligible laws.
Nor, if our intelligible laws are carefully chosen, does it appear
that the universal negative existential proposition which we are
considering will assign to the realm of the non-existent any en-
tities which common usage unhesitatingly calls "real." The prob-
lem we run into, however, is the problem: Which propositions
are to be regarded as together constituting the intelligible laws?
The proposition: "Every entity has a date and a spatial position"
may be regarded as an intelligible law. And the proposition:
"Every entity is self-consistent" may be regarded as an intelligible
law. To the extent to which these propositions constitute the
system of intelligible laws, we have already committed ourselves
to the acceptance of the proposition: "Whatever is inconsistent
with the intelligible laws is unreal." For this proposition now
reduces to the proposition: "Whatever appears as lacking date
or spatial position is unreal" and to the proposition: "Whatever
subsists as self-contradictory is unreal."
When, in partially describing the signification to be attached
to the term "existence," we choose to make use of the proposi-
tion: "Whatever subsists as inconsistent with the intelligible laws
is unreal," there is one consequence which ensues which I should
like to point out. The entity which subsists as inconsistent with
some intelligible law is by our proposition forthwith assigned to
the realm of the non-existent. If the proposition: "The quantity
of matter is always constant" is regarded as an intelligible law,
then any phenomenon involving an increase or a decrease in the
quantity of matter is forthwith marked out as an unreal and il-
63
lusory phenomenon. Our intelligible laws, consequently, turn
out to be immune to overthrow by what are known as negative
instances. For the negative instance, instead of weakening or
destroying the validity of the intelligible law, is itself immedi-
ately ruled out as an illusory and unreal phenomenon.
These remarks apply with especial force to Kant, in whose
writings the intelligible truths are developed in some detail. The
most important of what we may call the intelligible laws seem
for Kant to be the propositions discussed in the Analogies of
Experience. In order to be real, a phenomenon must be given to
us as consistent with the intelligible laws; and we are not left
entirely in the dark as to what these intelligible laws are. For one
thing, in order that a given phenomenon may be real, it must not
in its behavior contradict the proposition that the quantity of
substance is constant. For another thing, it must not contradict
the proposition that every event has a cause. And for still another
thing, it must not contradict the proposition that there is dynam-
ical interaction between contemporaneous entities. These three
propositions discussed in the Analogies of Experience constitute
for Kant a part, though not the whole, of what we may call the
intelligible laws. And if we have these propositions in mind when,
in partially explaining "existence/* we make use of the proposi-
tion: "Whatever subsists as inconsistent with the intelligible laws
is unreal/' then the phenomenon that appears, for example, as
uncaused is immediately marked out as a phenomenon that is un-
real. The proposition that every event has a cause comes to be a
proposition whose validity does not rest upon experience. It
comes to be a proposition which can not be over-thrown by any
experience; for any phenomenon seeming to contradict it that
might be presented to us would immediately be marked out as
illusory and unreal. The causal law, in a word, comes to be a
presupposition of experience. But it comes to be a presupposi-
tion of valid experience only in the sense that it is being taken as
one of the intelligible laws to which we refer when, in partially
explaining "existence/* we say that whatever is given to us as in-
consistent with the intelligible laws is unreal. We come thus, by a
somewhat different route, to a position that has already been ex-
pressed in the previous chapter. "In laying down the causal law,
Kant is implicitly determining the signification of 'existence/ "
64
And so it appears "that the validity which Kant finds for the
causal law ... is only the validity which attaches to a proposition
determining the meaning of a term." 27
We might go on to consider a number of universal negative
existential propositions that we have not yet discussed in detail.
With respect to each of them, we might ask whether it assigns a
definite group of entities to the realm of the unreal and attaches
to existence freedom from some clearly described characteristic.
With respect to each of them we might also ask whether it defi-
nitely assigns to the realm of the non-existent entities which com-
mon usage unhesitatingly calls "real." In short, we might bring
up for consideration universal negative existential propositions
ad nauseam. And with respect to each of them we might ask
whether it is the sort of proposition of which we can well make
use in partially describing what we are to call "existence." We
have however already met with some positive results. We have
agreed to make use of the proposition: "Self-contradictory sub-
sistents are unreal." And we have agreed to make use of the prop-
osition: "Subsistents appearing as lacking a date or as lacking a
spatial position are unreal." Perhaps then we can forego a more
extended survey of the writings of the past. Perhaps we can fill
out for ourselves the group of universal negative existential prop-
ositions of which we are to make use in partially explaining our
term "existence."
With respect to logical self-consistency, one universal negative
existential proposition is as suitable as another to the task of ex-
plaining "existence." Our selection of one universal negative
existential proposition in preference to another is a matter of
choice and not a matter of logical compulsion. We have stated
however the considerations on which our choice will be based. 28
And, on the basis of these considerations, there are certain prop-
ositions of which we have already agreed to make use.
Universal negative existential propositions, we have seen, can
not by themselves completely determine for the term "existence"
a meaning that will be sufficiently precise. We must in addi-
tion make use of individual affirmative existential propositions
and of individual negative existential propositions. However,
other things being equal, the greater the number of universal
negative existential propositions of which we make use, the more
65
precise does the meaning of our term "existence" become. We
have consequently the task of joining additional universal nega-
tive existential propositions to the proposition: "Self-contradictory
subsistents are unreal" and to the proposition: "Subsistents ap-
pearing as lacking all date or all position are unreal/'
Moreover, we have the task of assuring ourselves that the uni-
versal negative existential propositions of which we have already
agreed to make use are sufficiently unambiguous and clear.
In a general way, however, we are at this point ready to
enumerate the propositions which taken together will explain
the meaning which "existence" is to have in the constructive
parts of this treatise. We are ready to set ourselves to the task of
laying down a number of universal negative existential proposi-
tions, each as clear in its expression and as unambiguous in its
reference as possible; and to the task of supplementing these prop-
ositions with singular or particular existential propositions both
affirmative and negative, with lists, that is to say, both of some of
the entities that are included in, and of some of the entities that
are excluded from, the denotation of "existence" in our sense
of that term. We are ready in short to address ourselves in earnest
to the task of laying down the group of existential propositions,
which, taken together, are to occupy in our metaphysics a posi-
tion similar to that which Descartes intended for his: "Cogito
ergo sum."
Summary
We are at liberty to determine what meaning we are going to
attach to our term "existence." Still we want the meaning we
choose to conform with the common meaning of "existence" in
so far as the latter can be determined and applied in such a way
as to mark out definite groups of entities as existent and definite
groups as non-existent.
One feature of the common meaning of "existence" is the
'hardness' of facts, the imperviousness of reality to expansion or
contraction through mere thinking. In order that what we call
"existence" may have this characteristic, our propositions explain-
66
ing our term "existence" must be limited to universal negative
ones, supplemented by individual or particular propositions.
Which universal negative propositions shall we use in our
explanation? Various possibilities are considered from two angles:
(1) would they determine for our term "existence" a meaning
somewhat in accord with what "existence" commonly means-
realizing of course that the common meaning is hazy; and (2)
would they determine for our term "existence" a meaning from
which it will follow that certain entities, but not all entities, are
definitely marked out as unreal.
None of these considerations are binding. They merely incline
us to give our term "existence" one meaning rather than another.
Chapter III
HOW WE SHALL USE THE TERMS: EXISTENCE
AND REALITY
There is no entity that is not what we are calling a "subsistent."
The world of subsistents includes the man walking on my ceil-
ing, God, everything, goodness, greater-than, mathematics. It
includes everything that can be mentioned and everything that
can not be mentioned, my alleged objects, your alleged objects,
and entities alleged to be objects for no one. It is this unlimited
field, including all entities that may be held to be real and all
entities that may be held to be unreal, that forms our universe
of discourse and is to be dichotomized into the real and the un-
real. It is difficult to refer to this unlimited field of subsistents
without appearing to hold that its members exist. If we say that
the man walking on my ceiling is a subsistent, the use of the
word "is" may create the impression that this subsisting man
exists. And a similar impression may be created by the remark
that this man has the characteristic of walking on my ceiling.
This danger of misinterpretation can not be completely overcome.
We shall refer to the man on my ceiling as a subsistent or an ap-
pearance. And instead of saying that he has a certain character-
istic, we shall, for the most part, say that he appears with this
characteristic or is presented with this characteristic. But it is not
to be assumed that a subsistent which appears is an appearance of
something which is real. Nor is it at this point to be assumed that
to appear is to appear to some conscious subject. Entities appear-
ing with the characteristic of being objects for no one are sub-
sistents. They too will be called "appearances." They too are
68
included in the unlimited field which it is our task to dichoto-
mize into the real and the unreal.
Some of the subsistents that are to be called "real" and some
of the subsistents that we are to call "unreal" may be dismissed
from our attention until we come to the end of this chapter.
There we shall enumerate certain real, subsistents and certain
unreal subsistents. For we have planned to deal with certain mem-
bers of our universe of discourse individually. The existential
status of these subsistents will be determined, and our term
"existence" explained in so far as it applies to them, by means of
singular or particular existential propositions, some positive and
some negative.
In determining the meaning of our term "existence," we have
agreed to make use of such propositions as "Xi exists" and
"X 2 exists": and we have agreed to make use of such propositions
as "Yi does not exist" and "Y 2 does not exist." But we have also
agreed to make use of universal negative existential propositions,
of propositions of the type: "No A's exist." Indeed, proposition
for proposition, our universal negative existential propositions
will describe the signification we are assigning "existence" more
fully than will our singular existential propositions. And so it is
to the selection of certain universal negative existential propo-
sitions that we turn.
There is one such proposition that we have already agreed to
use, namely, "No self-contradictory subsistents are real." Self-
contradictory subsistents, however, are subsistents which appear
as self-contradictory. The King of England who resides in Buck-
ingham Palace is a self-contradictory subsistent in so far as I
think of him as self-contradictory. And a square circle is not a
self-contradictory subsistent when its alleged squareness and its
alleged circularity do not appear as mutually contradictory. The
proposition: "No self-contradictory subsistents are real" marks out
as unreal the King of England who appears as self-contradictory
and the square circle which appears as self-contradictory. But it
does not determine the existential status of either the subsisting
King of England who does not appear as self-contradictory or of
the subsisting square circle which does not appear as self-con-
tradictory. Whatever appears as self-contradictory is, however, we
69
say, unreal. Existence, as we describe it, is characterized by free-
dom from explicit self-contradiction.
There is the subsistent which appears as round and not-round.
And there is the subsistent which appears as real and unreal. If
we partially determine the signification of "existence" by means
of the singular proposition: "X a exists," then Xi, let us suppose,
appears as real. But Xi may have been presented as, and may
appear as, a self-contradictory or unreal subsistent. One might
choose to use "real" in such a way that entities enumerated as
real are in all cases real. One might hold, that is to say, that
singular affirmative existential propositions used in determining
the signification of "existence" are a court of final authority, that
unreal appearances and self-contradictory appearances are real if
they are enumerated as real. Let us however choose the opposite
path. Let us hold that self-contradictory appearances and unreal
appearances are unreal even though they are enumerated as real.
Or, rather, let us agree to enumerate as real no subsistents which
appear as unreal and no subsistents which appear as self-contra-
dictory. If we partially determine the signification of "existence"
by means of the proposition: "No A's exist," let us agree to limit
the entities represented by the subject-terms of our singular af-
firmative existential propositions to "Xi not appearing as an A,"
"X 2 not appearing as an A," etc. 1
Self-contradictory appearances are in all cases unreal. Whatever
appears as round and not-round, and hence as self-contradictory,
does not exist. But what about the subsistent which appears as
round and square? Round and not-round are explicitly A and
non-A, round and square less explicitly so. To be sure, each
square subsistent that I consider readily takes on the appearance
of not-roundness. As soon as the quality of being not-round is
suggested to me, I recognize this quality as being an additional
characteristic with which my subsistent is appearing. The subsist-
ent under discussion is a subsistent appearing as square which
enlarges itself to be a subsistent appearing as square and appear-
ing as not-round. With respect to subsistents which thus enlarge
themselves, we may say that there are implicit characteristics with
which they appear. The subsistent which I am considering ap-
pears explicitly, let us suppose, as round and as square; and it
70
appears implicitly as not-round and as self-contradictory. Such
subsistents which appear implicitly as self-contradictory are, let
us say, unreal. Whereas we have already assigned to the realm of
-non-existence the subsistent appearing explicitly as round and
as not-round and as self-contradictory, let us also assign to this
realm the subsistent appearing explicitly as round and as square
and only implicitly as self-contradictory. Let us, that is to say, lay
down the additional proposition: "Whatever appears implicitly
self-contradictory is unreal.' 1 Or, to put it another way, no sub-
sistent is real whose explicit and implicit appearances appear to
contradict one another.
This disposes of the round square subsistent which enlarges
itself to become a round, square, not-round, self-contradictory
subsistent. But, whereas the subsistent which we have been dis-
cussing grows from a subsistent appearing as square to a subsistent
appearing as not-round, the unlimited world of subsistents con-
tains round square subsistents which do not thus enlarge them-
selves. It is conceivable, for example, for some one to hold that
round squares are not self-contradictory. The subsistent which he
considers, or can be imagined to consider, does not grow. As we
have already in effect noticed, there is no universal negative
existential proposition that will eliminate from reality the round
square subsistents which neither explicitly nor implicitly appear
as self-contradictory. 2 But we can agree not to enumerate as
real any of these non-growing round squares which do not,
even implicitly, appear as self-contradictory. Our procedure must
be to trace the growth of a subsistent from round and square to
round, square, not-round and self-contradictory; and then to de-
termine to enumerate as real no other subsistent which appears as
round and as square. No A's, we may say, are real; and no sub-
sistents implicitly appearing as A's. We may trace some subsistent
S to the point where it appears as an A. We may, that is to say,
point out some S which implicitly appears as an A. But all S's are
unreal only in so far as we thereupon resolve to enumerate no
S's among the entities we call existents. Subsistents which im-
plicitly appear as self-contradictory are unreal. And when we 3
show one subsistent to appear as implicitly self-contradictory, all
subsistents differing from it merely in that they do not appear as
self-contradictory are likewise unreal. For we have resolved not
to enumerate such resembling subsistents among the entities we
call ''real/' We may point out some S which implicitly appears
as an A. Therefore, we may say, no S is real. But this will be but
a short-hand and condensed way of assuming that our resolve to
enumerate no S's among our existents will be carried out.
Some subsistent appearing as round and square appears with
explicit and implicit characteristics which appear to contradict
one another. So too with the Cretan who appears as truly asserting
that no Cretan ever speaks the truth. My subsistent is a Cretan
making a certain true assertion. As an outgrowth of my original
object, I am led to consider an alleged situation in which no
Cretan ever speaks the truth. I come to consider various alleged
mendacious Cretans, among them my Cretan informant. Indeed I
come to consider my Cretan informant in the act of falsely as-
serting that no Cretan ever speaks truly. My subsistent is a Cretan
appearing explicitly with the characteristic of having just made a
certain true assertion. And this subsistent has grown to be a
Cretan appearing with the characteristic of having just made a cer-
tain untrue assertion. It implicitly appears as self-contradictory. The
Cretan that I am discussing is consequently unreal. And all sub-
sisting Cretans who appear to be truly asserting that no Cretan
ever speaks the truth, all such Cretans, whether they appear as
self-contradictory or not, will be eliminated from our lists of
real entities.
Obviously veracious Cretan does not enlarge itself to become
mendacious Cretan and self-contradictory Cretan as readily as
round square enlarges itself to become round, not-round, self-
contradictory square. There are intermediate subsistents to be
presented and these intermediate subsistents may not spontane-
ously offer themselves for discussion. Veracious Cretan not appear-
ing as implicitly self-contradictory is a more common subsistent
than round square not appearing as implicitly self-contradictory.
But it is all subsistents, whether they be common or uncommon,
that are to be dichotomized into the real and the unreal. It is a
veracious Cretan asserting that no Cretan ever speaks the truth
who implicitly appears as self-contradictory. Remaining in the
unlimited universe of subsistents which is prior to the distinc-
tion between the real and the unreal, one may perhaps describe
72
this Cretan as developing into a self-contradictory Cretan. But it
'Veracious Cretan is implicitly self-contradictory Cretan" is to
apply to the veracious Cretan who does not appear self-contra-
dictory as well as to the Cretan who does so appear, it will not
suffice to trace the growth or enlargement of a given subsistent. 4
In this treatise the growth or development of certain subsistents
is traced and the implicit appearances of these subsistents re-
vealed. Similar subsistents which do not so develop the opinions,
we may say, of those who do not agree with the developments we
trace are disposed of through our determination not to list as
real any subsistents similar to those which, as we develop them,
are implicitly unreal.
We have so determined the signification of our term "exist-
ence" that all round, not-round subsistents are unreal. We have
so determined the signification of "existence" that round squares
are unreal. And we have so determined the signification of "exist-
ence" that any Cretan appearing as truly asserting that no Cretan
ever speaks the truth is also unreal. No entity will be called "real"
that, except for its development, is indistinguishable from a sub-
sistent which our discussion reveals to us as self-contradictory.
How is it now, we may ask, with respect to the subsistent ap-
pearing as in no sense an object of consciousness? The thesis that
only ideas exist is frequently regarded as the doctrine on which
modern idealism is founded. Many idealists assert that only ideas
exist, holding that entities not ideas and entities not objects of
consciousness are self-contradictory. Let us then examine this
alleged contradiction at this point. Let us see if 'entity appearing
as in no sense an object of consciousness* develops into 'entity
appearing as self-contradictory/
"How say you, Hylas," asks Philonous, 5 "can you see a thing
which is at the same time unseen?" "No," answers Hylas, "that
were a contradiction." "Is it not as great a contradiction to talk
of conceiving a thing which is unconceived?" "It is," admits
Hylas. And he continues: "As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary
place where no one was present to see it, methought that was to
conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of: not con-
sidering that I myself conceived it all the while." As Berkeley 6
explains it, "the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to
think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of, , . ,
73
though at the same time they are apprehended by ... itself."
During the present century as realism has renewed its vigor in
Great Britain and in America, the fundamental doctrines of
idealism have been re-examined. "No thinker to whom one may
appeal/' admits Perry, 7 "is able to mention a thing that is not idea
for the obvious and simple reason that in mentioning it he makes
it an idea." Consequently, we are unable to discover what things
are as unknown. "In order to discover if possible exactly how a
thing is modified by the cognitive relationship, I look for instances
of things out of this relationship in order that I may compare
them with instances of things in this relationship. But I can find
no such instances, because 'finding' is a variety of the very relation-
ship that I am trying to eliminate." 8 There is this barrier, which
Perry calls the "ego-centric predicament," which prevents me
from using ordinary methods to discover what difference know-
ing makes to objects. But this predicament, Perry holds, does
not justify me in concluding that knowing makes all the difference
between existing and not existing. "Every mentioned thing is an
idea . . . But what the idealist requires is a proposition to the
effect that everything is an idea or that only ideas exist." 9
"We can not be aware of an entity that is not in some sense an
object. Therefore the entity that is not in some sense an object
does not exist." Here there is an obvious non-sequitur. If this
were the best argument the idealist could put forth, Perry would
be justified in regarding the ego-centric predicament as a method-
ological difficulty without ontological implications. But the real
point of the idealist's proper argument is not that the entity that
is in no sense an object of consciousness is undiscoverable. His
real point is that this entity appears self-contradictory. Indeed,
in some sense, the entity that is in no sense an object of con-
sciousness can be discovered, can be mentioned, can be thought
of. For we seem in the present paragraph to be discussing, men-
tioning and considering: 'the entity that is in no sense an object
of consciousness/ If this entity were not a subsistent at all, we in-
deed could not conclude that this entity is non-existent. We
would be in the predicament of not being able to assert that this
entity exists or that it does not exist. But the idealist asserts that
it does not exist; and the realist asserts that it may exist. In mak-
ing such assertions they claim to be discussing the entity that is
74
in no sense an object of consciousness. Their assertions exemplify
the fact that the entity that is in no sense an object of conscious-
ness can to some degree be discussed and considered. 10
There seems to be given to me, as a subsistent whose ontologi-
cal status is to be discussed, 'the entity that is in no sense an ob-
ject of consciousness/ Indeed at the present moment it is this
subsistent that I am considering. This entity appears as in no sense
an object of consciousness. And yet, as soon as the characteristic
of being in some sense an object suggests itself, I recognize this
characteristic as an additional appearance of the subsistent that I
am considering. Implicitly my subsistent appears as an entity that
I am considering, as in some sense an object of consciousness. The
entity that is in no sense an object of consciousness explicitly ap-
pears with the characteristic of being in no' sense an object of
consciousness. And implicitly it appears with the characteristic
of being in some sense an object of consciousness and hence with
the characteristic of being self-contradictory. However, "what-
ever appears implicitly self-contradictory is unreal." 11 We hold,
therefore, that the subsistent which we have been considering,
the entity that appears as in no sense an object of consciousness,
is unreal. And we resolve to list as real no 'entity that is in no
sense an object of consciousness' even if it does not appear as
self-contradictory.
The subsistent which we have been considering develops, it
may be agreed, into a subsistent which appears as self-contra-
dictory. But, it may be held, there are subsistents which no one
considers. The subsistent which no one considers is, however,
the very subsistent whose development we have just traced. The
subsistent which no one considers is the entity which is in no
sense an object of consciousness. I may refer to each member of
the world of subsistents. And when I talk about all subsistents,
there is no subsistent that as I trace its development does not
take on the characteristic of being in some sense an object of con-
sciousness. It is no ego-centric predicament which makes non-ob-
jects unreal. If non-objects could not be discussed, they could
not be asserted to be unreal. Rather, neither their reality nor
their unreality could be discussed. But the very fact that the
realist holds that some of these non-objects may be real is evidence
that these non-objects are not outside what we call the world of
75
subsistents. Non-objects appear both as non-objects and as objects.
And they are unreal because self-contradictory subsistents are
unreal. The self-contradictory subsistent which appears self-con-
tradictory is unreal because of the universal negative existential
proposition which partially determines the signification of our
term "existence." And the self-contradictory subsistent which does
not appear self-contradictory, the entity in no sense an object of
consciousness, for example, which, as it was apparently presented
to Perry, does not develop the appearance of self-contradictoriness,
this entity is unreal because of our resolve not to list it as real.
Whatever appears implicitly contradictory is unreal. And, we
may add, whatever appears, explicitly or implicitly, as in no sense
an object is unreal. The world of reality is free of subsistents ap-
pearing as non-objects. It contains no entities precluded from
appearing as objects. It is by no means to be concluded however
that each real entity is an immediate datum or object for some
conscious subject. The proposition that no subsistents are real
which appear as in no sense objects does not imply the non-exist-
ence of indirect objects or of entities referred to but not im-
mediately given. For the entity that is in some fashion referred
to is not an entity that is in no sense an object. The entity that is
in some fashion referred to can develop the appearance of being
in some sense an object without developing the appearance of
self-contradictoriness. Likewise it is not to be concluded that each
real entity is definitely and fully presented. Perhaps no one knows
whether Descartes' great-great-grandfather was tall or short. Per-
haps Descartes' great-great-grandfather is a subsistent which ap-
pears with few characteristics. It is a subsistent, let us suppose,
which appears with the characteristic of being one of Descartes'
ancestors, but without name, nationality or size. Nevertheless this
subsistent can develop the appearance of being in some sense an
object without developing the appearance of self-contradictori-
ness. I may refer to each member of the unlimited world of sub-
sistents. But this is very different from cataloging and describing
each subsistent. Subsistents appearing as in no sense objects are
unreal. But, so far as we have yet seen, subsistents appearing with
vague and barren characteristics may or may not be real.
"I know that there are Chinamen, but I know no individual
Chinamen. ... I may be able to think the universe, but may
76
know little of its details. It is therefore evident," says Spaulding, 12
"that there are two kinds of knowing." There is the full, detailed
and explicit manner in which the pen with which I am writing
appears as a subsistent. There is the vague indefinite and unde-
tailed manner in which 'everything' appears. Indeed there are
shades of definiteness, of fulness of content, between and at either
end. A centaur is a subsistent which I consider when I seem to
think of an animal with the body of a horse and the head of a
man. The same subsistent appears more vaguely when I seem to
think of a certain fabulous creature; and still more vaguely when
I seem to think of a given subsistent. Whatever appears with the
characteristic of being in no sense an object of consciousness is
unreal. But up to this point we have not excluded from the world
of existents, as we are to use the term "existence/* either 'a
certain fabulous creature* or 'a given subsistent/
There is the subsistent which appears simply as a fabulous
creature. And there is the subsistent which is less vague, which
appears with more detailed characteristics, the subsistent which
appears as the centaur who attempted to carry off Dejanira, the
wife of Hercules. It is no doubt possible for these subsistents to
be distinguished from one another and to be regarded as two.
Nevertheless as there suggest themselves the characteristic of
having the head of a man, the characteristic of having the body of
a horse and the characteristic of having attempted to carry off
Dejanira, I recognize these characteristics as implicit appearances
of the 'certain fabulous creature* that I was already considering.
'A certain fabulous creature* has developed into 'the centaur who
attempted to carry off Dejanira' just as 'round square* may de-
velop into 'round, not-round, self-contradictory square/ 18 We
have, to be sure, distinguished the Barbarossa who appears to
have died in Asia Minor from the Barbarossa who appears to be
now asleep in a cave. 14 When I begin by considering a Barbarossa
who died in Asia Minor and then come to consider a Barbarossa
now asleep in a cave, I find that a characteristic of my former
subsistent has been wiped out; I find that my subsistent has not
developed but has, on the contrary, been displaced by another
subsistent. A Barbarossa dead in Asia Minor which develops into,
which implicitly appears as, Barbarossa now asleep in a cave is,
let us suppose, unreal. But a Barbarossa dead in Asia Minor which
does not so develop is, let us suppose, real, and is to be dis-
tinguished from Barbarossa appearing as asleep in a cave.
The fabulous creature which develops into the centaur who
attempted to carry off Dejanira is not unreal because of any lack
of definite characteristics. But what shall we say with respect to a
subsistent described as 'a fabulous creature* which does not
so develop? It too the universal negative existential propositions
thus far adopted do not determine to be unreal. For, whereas this
fabulous creature appears neither explicitly nor implicitly with
definite characteristics, it does not develop the characteristic of
being in no sense an object of consciousness and does not im-
plicitly appear as self-contradictory. There is the fabulous crea-
ture which implicitly appears as the centaur who attempted to
carry off Dejanira. And there is the fabulous creature which does
not have any explicit definite appearances. But creatures which do
not have any explicit definite appearances may again be divided.
There is the fabulous creature of this sort which has, or develops,
the characteristic of being definitely presented to no conscious
subject. And there is the fabulous creature which, whereas it
does not develop any definite characteristics as we continue to
consider it, develops the appearance of appearing with definite
characteristics to some one. When I think of paleontology, for
example, I think of nothing definite. And, since I know no
paleontology, as I continue to consider paleontology my
subsistent continues without definite appearances. But my sub-
sistent takes on the characteristic of appearing with more details
to paleontologists. On the other hand, as I consider the millionth
digit in the square root of two, not only does my subsistent not
take on the characteristic of being, let us say, an eight or a nine,
but, since it seems to me that no one will carry the square root of
two out to a million places, my subsistent takes on the character-
istic of appearing to no one as a definite number.
In holding self-contradictory subsistents to be unreal and in
holding subsistents appearing as non-objects to be unreal, we do
not mark those subsistents as unreal which appear with the
characteristic of being definite appearances for no one. We are at
liberty to determine the signification of ' Existence' ' in any man-
ner that we find convenient. But to permit those subsistents to be
real which appear to be definite appearances for no one is to make
78
no attempt to exclude from the world of reality those 'given en-
tities' and 'certain subsistents' which seem to be thoroughly use-
less. Let us then determine the signification of "existence" in such
a manner that it will follow that subsistents with merely vague
and undetailed appearances may in some cases be real. But let
us hold that subsistents appearing with the characteristic of ap-
pearing to no one in a detailed manner are unreal. Indeed, let
us rule out of existence, not merely those subsistents which ori-
ginally appear as detailed appearances for no one, but also those
subsistents which take on this characteristic when it suggests it-
self. Let us partially determine the signification of "existence/*
that is to say, by laying down the universal negative existential
proposition: "Subsistents explicitly or implicitly appearing as
definite appearances for no one are unreal." And let us resolve to
list as real no subsistent which, except for its development, is
indistinguishable from a subsistent which we find taking on the
characteristic of being a definite appearance for no one.
We have in the preceding chapter adopted the rule that "our
universal negative existential propositions should be so chosen
that they mark out fairly definite groups of entities that are being
assigned to the realm of non-existence." 15 In view of the fact,
however, that there are so many shades of vagueness with which a
subsistent may appear, the universal negative existential prop-
osition which we have just laid down does not seem entirely satis-
factory. Is the subsistent that is unreal the subsistent which appears
with the characteristic of appearing to no one with as many as
four details or is it the subsistent which appears with the charac-
teristic of appearing to no one with as many as forty-four details?
I believe that, without attempting at this point further to refine
the distinction between vague appearances and detailed appear-
ances, the universal negative existential proposition just laid down
will be found to mark out some subsistents as unreal and to give
some characteristic to 'reality/ We shall to some extent determine
what is vague and what detailed as various subsistents are con-
sidered in the course of this treatise. We shall, that is to say, point
out certain subsistents that appear with the characteristic of ap-
pearing to no one in a sufficiently detailed manner, subsistents
that, we shall hold, the proposition just laid down marks out as
unreal.
79
Appearing with the characteristic of appearing definitely to no
one is to be distinguished from appearing without the character-
istic of appearing definitely to some one. A subsistent is not un-
real because it appears without a given characteristic. A sub-
sistent is unreal when explicitly or implicitly it appears with the
characteristic of being in no sense an object, with the character-
istic, that is to say, of appearing to no one. And a subsistent is
unreal when explicitly or implicitly it appears with the character-
istic of appearing definitely to no one. But the subsistent which
does not have or develop such an appearance, or the appearance
of being self-contradictory, this subsistent, considering the impli-
cations that may be deduced from the universal negative exist-
ential propositions thus far adopted, need not be unreal. Likewise
the subsistents which do not resemble one that we find developing
the appearance of self-contradictoriness or the appearance of be-
ing no one's definite object, these too, so far as our present re-
solutions carry us, may be listed among existing entities.
The universal negative existential propositions that we have
thus far laid down in partially determining the meaning of our
term "existence" have in one way or another suggested them-
selves to us as a consequence of our interest in the self-contra-
dictory. In the previous chapter we agreed to take as one starting
point the proposition: "Self-contradictory subsistents are unreal."
We also agreed, however, to make use of the proposition: "What-
ever appears as lacking a date or as having no spatial position is
unreal." From this latter proposition it follows that subsistents
appearing as lacking any date or position are unreal along with
subsistents appearing as self-contradictory, subsistents appearing
as non-objects, and subsistents appearing as definite appearances
for no one. Let us also lay down the proposition that subsistents
developing the appearance of utter non-spatiality or the appear-
ance of utter non-temporality are non-existent. And let us re-
solve to list as real no subsistents, which, except for their develop-
ment, are indistinguishable from those which in this treatise we
find takiog on the appearance of utter non-temporality or the ap-
pearance of utter non-spatiality.
No subsistents are real that explicitly or implicitly appear as
lacking all spatial position. No subsistents are real that explicitly
or implicitly appear as utterly undated. What shall we say, how-
80
ever, with respect to the entity that explicitly or implicitly ap-
pears dated with respect to one entity but not with respect to
another? Cinderella left for the ball before she lost her slipper.
The loss of the slipper is presented as occurring after the depar-
ture for the ball. But it is presented, let us assume, as having
neither preceded nor followed the fall of Constantinople. The
fall of Constantinople, we likewise suppose, appears as having
neither preceded nor followed the loss of the slipper. But whereas
the fall of Constantinople appearing as not temporally related to
the loss of the slipper appears without the claim that the loss of
the slipper is nevertheless real, the loss of the slipper, appearing as
not temporally related to the fall of Constantinople, does, we sup-
pose, appear with the claim that the fall of Constantinople is
nevertheless real. The fall of Constantinople presented in this
fashion may, we hold, be real. The loss of the slipper we hold to
be unreal. We mark out as unreal that entity which explicitly or
implicitly appears as utterly undated, as undated with respect to
any entity. And we also mark out as unreal that entity which ex-
plicitly or implicitly appears as undated with respect to some other
entity while appearing explicitly or implicitly with the claim that
that other entity is nevertheless real.
It is one thing to appear with the characteristic of lacking any
date. It is another thing to appear without the characteristic of
having a date. As we use the term "existence," an entity is not
unreal in so far as it appears without a given characteristic. It is
unreal if it appears, explicitly or implicitly, with a given charac-
teristic, with, for example, the characteristic of having no date
with respect to any entity, or with the characteristic of having no
date with respect to some other entity and with the claim that
this other entity is real. The entity that appears without the
characteristic of having a date and without the characteristic of
having no date may be real just as may the entity that appears
with the characteristic of having a date. It is the entity that appears
with the characteristic of having no date that is unreal; and the
entity that appears with the characteristic of having no date with
respect to an entity that appears real.
Without forgetting that the subsistent may be real that appears
without the characteristic of having a date and without the
characteristic of having no date, let us consider a subsistent that
81
appears with the characteristic of having a date. A subsisting
Socrates, let us suppose, appears with the characteristic of having
a date with respect to Plato. And a phase of Socrates' life appears
with the characteristic of being present, rather than past or fu-
ture, with respect to a phase of Plato's life. The phase of So-
crates' life which appears with the characteristic of being present
with respect to a phase of Plato's life may appear with the charac-
teristic of having a spatial position with respect to that phase of
Plato's life or with the characteristic of having no spatial posi-
tion with respect to that phase of Plato's life; or it may appear
without either characteristic. But if it appears with the character-
istic of having no spatial position with respect to an entity which
appears real and with respect to which it appears to be present,
then, let us say, it is unreal. As we use the term "reality," if we
may be permitted to sum up the connections that have up to this
point been brought out between existence, time and space, a sub-
sistent is unreal if it appears with the characteristic of having no
position with respect to any entity or with the characteristic of
having no date with respect to any entity. Moreover it is unreal
if it appears with the characteristic of having no date with respect
to an entity that appears real; or if it appears with the character-
istic of having no position with respect to an entity which appears
real and with respect to which it appears present.
An entity is unreal if it appears both real and unreal and hence
as implicitly self-contradictory, or if it appears temporally un-
related to an entity that appears real. It would of course be mere
tautology to say that an entity is unreal if it is unreal. And it
would be circular to say that an entity is unreal if it appears
temporally unrelated to an entity that is real. But the world of
subsistence which we are attempting to dichotomize includes,
among other subsistents, some subsistents appearing as real and
some subsistents appearing as unreal. It is, I believe, not tautologi-
cal to eliminate those appearing as unreal; and not circular to
eliminate those appearing temporally unrelated to subsistents
appearing as real.
We are attempting to attach a signification to "existence" that
will definitely assign certain subsistents to the realm of unreality.
And we are attempting to attach a signification to "existence"
that will not assign to the realm of unreality fcubsistents which
82
common usage seems to be agreed in calling "real." These are
resolves which we have adopted, although it is not logical con-
siderations which have compelled us to adopt them. We are, I
believe, carrying out these resolves in marking out as unreal the
loss of Cinderella's slipper which appears undatable with respect
to the fall of Constantinople that appears real; and the castles
which some novelist may present to us as being present with re-
spect to allegedly real events, with respect, let us say, to the wars
of Charlemagne, and yet as lacking spatial position with respect
to them.
If, however, we were to mark out as unreal subsistents appear-
ing to lack position with respect to entities alleged to be real
and earlier, or if we were to mark out as unreal subsistents
appearing to lack position with respect to entities alleged to be
real and later, we might be assigning to the realm of unreality
certain subsistents which are commonly called "real." The phase
of Socrates' life in which he was about to drink the cup of hem-
lock appears real, let us suppose; and it appears earlier than my
present writing. I may consider however that at different times
the earth has different positions with respect to the sun and that
whereas, taking the earth as at rest, I am a certain distance from
the place where Socrates was, taking the sun as at rest I am a much
greater distance from the place where the hemlock drinking oc-
curred. I may consider, that is to say, that Socrates^ position may
be projected into the present in various ways and that it is only by
taking one of these present positions as the "same" as Socrates'
that I have position with respect to the hemlock drinking. I may
hold that I have position primarily only with respect to present
entities and that my position with respect to past entities is at the
best ambiguous and is a position at all only in the sense that it is
a position with respect to some present entity held to be in the
"same" place. To hold then that my present writing has no un-
ambiguous position and no direct position with respect to the
hemlock drinking which appears both real and past might be to
have my present writing appear as lacking position with respect to
an entity appearing as real and with respect to which my present
writing appears to be temporally related. And so, whereas we are,
logically speaking, as much at liberty to mark out as unreal the
subsistent appearing as lacking position with respect to an entity
83
that appears real as we are to mark out as unreal the subsistent
appearing as lacking date with respect to an entity that appears
real, we choose in this connection to mark out as unreal merely
that subsistent which appears as lacking position with respect to an
entity that appears real and with respect to which it also appears
present.
Certain subsistents, we say, are unreal that appear with the
characteristic of being temporally unrelated to certain other sub-
sistents. And certain subsistents, we say, are unreal that appear
with the characteristic of being spatially unrelated to certain still
other subsistents. The fall of Constantinople that appears tempo-
rally unrelated to the loss of Cinderella's slipper that appears real
is itself unreal. But the fall of Constantinople that appears tempo-
rally unrelated to the loss of Cinderella's slipper that appears un-
real, this is a different subsistent which, so far as we have yet seen,
may be an existent entity.
It is then certain subsistents appearing with the characteristic
of being temporally unrelated to certain other subsistents that
are unreal; and certain subsistents appearing with the character-
istic of being spatially unrelated to certain still other subsistents.
What is it however to appear temporally or spatially unrelated to
a given entity? The entity that appears as having several dates or
several positions with respect to a given entity does not, we hold,
appear spatially or temporally unrelated to that entity. If Julius
Caesar appears real and the universal 'man* appears both with the
past date with respect to Caesar that is commonly attributed to
Alexander the Great and the future date with respect to Caesar
that is commonly attributed to Napoleon, then the universal 'man'
is not appearing temporally unrelated to an entity that appears
real. To appear temporally unrelated to a given entity is not the
same as appearing with the characteristic of having several dates,
or with the characteristic of having no single date, with respect
to that entity. A universal may be real if it appears as having
several dates and not a single date with respect to a subsistent
that appears real; or if it appears as having several positions and
not a single position with respect to a subsistent that appears
real ajid with respect to which some of its instances appear to be
present. But the universal that appears to have no one date and
no several dates, no one position and no several positions, such a
84
universal is unreal in the sense in which we choose to use the term
"real."
A subsistent is unreal if it appears with the characteristic of
having no date with respect to any entity or with the character-
istic of having no date with respect to an entity that appears real.
Also a subsistent is unreal if it appears with the characteristic of
having no position with respect to any entity or with the character-
istic of having no position with respect to an entity that appears
real and with respect to which it appears present. What appears
nowhere appears with the characteristic of having no position with
respect to any entity. What appears everywhere appears, taken
distributively, with the characteristic of having many positions
and, taken collectively, with the characteristic of having one very
vague position with respect to any entity with respect to which
it appears present. The subsistent appearing to be everywhere,
taken distributively, may, it would seem, be real. The subsistent
appearing to be nowhere is, as we use "existence/* unreal. But
what shall we say with respect to the subsistent appearing to be
everywhere, taken collectively? Shall we say that the cosmos, Space,
Time, etc., appearing as each having a single indefinite date with
respect to each entity that appears real may themselves be real?
Or shall we mark out as unreal not only those entities appearing
as having no date but also those appearing as having only an in-
definite date?
A subsistent, we have seen, may appear with many or with few
characteristics. 16 There are various degrees of accuracy or of vague-
ness with which it may be described and with which it may appear.
Similarly there are degrees of accuracy, we may say, with which a
subsistent may appear dated. With respect to the death of Napo-
leon, the Roman republic, the life of Cicero and the delivery
of the first oration against Catiline all appear earlier. But the de-
livery of the first oration against Catiline appears with a more
definite date with respect to the death of Napoleon than does the
Roman republic. With respect to Napoleon's death, one subsistent
may appear much earlier, another slightly earlier. But one may
also appear as rather definitely dated, another as not so definitely
dated. In determining the signification of our term "existence,"
we choose to make no use of the distinction between the sub-
sistent appearing as much earlier and the subsistent appearing as
85
slightly earlier, or the distinction between the subsistent appear-
ing as earlier, the subsistent appearing as present and the subsist-
ent appearing as later. But in order to eliminate from the world of
reality subsistents that seem to be vague and unmanageable, 17 let
us mark out as unreal certain subsistents appearing with indefinite
dates. A subsistent is unreal, we have said, if it appears with the
characteristic of having no date with respect to any entity or with
the characteristic of having no date with respect to an entity that
appears real. A subsistent is also unreal, let us add, if it appears
with the characteristic of having only a very indefinite date with
respect to an entity that appears real. If, that is to say, the death
of Napoleon appears real and the Cosmos or the time continuum
as a whole appears with the characteristic of having only a very
indefinite date with respect to Napoleon's death, then, as we use
the term "existence," the subsisting Cosmos or the subsisting time
continuum, appearing in this fashion, is unreal.
Similarly with position. A subsistent is unreal, we have said,
if it appears with the characteristic of having no position with re-
spect to any entity or with the characteristic of having no position
with respect to an entity which appears real and with respect to
which it appears present. A subsistent is also unreal, let us add,
if it appears with the characteristic of having only a very indefi-
nite position with respect to an entity which appears real and with
respect to which it appears present. We may again take the Cosmos
as our example, or, better, that instantaneous phase of the Cos-
mos which may be alleged to have been the state of the Cosmos
when Napoleon died. If Napoleon dying at St. Helena appears
real and this state of the Cosmos appears both with the character-
istic of being present with respect to the dying Napoleon and with
the characteristic of having only a very indefinite position with
respect to him, then this state of the Cosmos is appearing with
characteristics which, as we use "existence," mark it as unreal.
An everlasting subsistent, taken collectively, is unreal in so far
as it appears, explicitly or implicitly, with the characteristic of
having only a very indefinite date with respect to an entity that
appears real. An instantaneous but unlimited Space, as dis-
tinguished from limited portions of it, is unreal in so far as it
appears, explicitly or implicitly, with the characteristic of having
only a very indefinite position with respect to an entity which
86
appears real and with respect to which it appears present. An ever-
lasting subsistent or an unlimited Space that appears without
these characteristics is not ruled out of existence by the universal
negative existential propositions which we have thus far adopted.
It is ruled out only in so far as we take up for consideration some
individual subsistent alleged to be everlasting or some individual
subsistent described as an unlimited Space, find it unreal in ac-
cordance witth the universal negative existential proposition
just accepted, and thereupon resolve to list no similar subsistents
among those we call "real." 18
Whac is it, however, to appear with the characteristic of having
only a very indefinite date? The time continuum taken as a
whole appears, we say, at least implicitly, with the characteristic
of having only a very indefinite date with respect to the death of
Napoleon that appears real. The delivery of the first oration
against Catiline appears with a rather definite date, the Roman
republic with a less definite date, with respect to the same entity.
But just how vaguely, it may be asked, must an entity be dated for
it to appear with the characteristic of having only a very indefi-
nite date? In discussing the proposition that whatever appears with
the characteristic of being a definite appearance for no one is un-
real, we made no attempt to mark out any clear line of separation
between the vague and the detailed, between definite appearances
and indefinite appearances. 19 Similarly at this point we shall not
attempt accurately to determine which dates are fairly definite
and which are so indefinite that subsistents appearing to have
them are unreal. The subsisting Cosmos that I am now consider-
ing appears with the characteristic of having only a very indefinite
date with respect to the death of Napoleon that appears real. The
Roman republic that I am now considering appears with the
characteristic of having a not very definite date with respect to
the death of Napoleon that appears real. But neither explicitly
nor implicitly does it appear with the characteristic of having
a date of such indefiniteness that our existential proposition
marks it out as unreal. In short, somewhere between the Cosmos
on the one hand and the Roman republic or the Middle Ages on
the other, there is a line to be drawn between the subsistent appear-
ing with a characteristic that marks it out as unreal and the sub-
sistent with a characteristic that does not mark it out as unreal.
87
Since however we are determining the meaning of "existence"
only in order that we may determine the ontological status of such
entities as are to be considered in this treatise, we shall not at-
tempt to place this line more accurately until occasion, if ever,
requires it.
Whatever explicitly or implicitly appears as self-contradictory
or as not an object or as a definite appearance for no one is un-
real. Whatever explicitly or implicitly appears as lacking any date
or as having no date with respect to an entity that appears real or
as having only a very indefinite date with respect to an entity that
appears real, that too is unreal. And so is the subsistent that ex-
plicitly or implicitly appears as lacking any position; the subsistent
that explicitly or implicitly appears as having no position with
respect to an entity which appears real and with respect to which
it appears present; and the subsistent that explicitly or implicitly
appears as having only a very indefinite position with respect to
an entity which appears real and with respect to which it appears
present. These are propositions which partially determine the
meaning being assigned our term "existence." Together they
assign to the realm of the non-existent many subsistents and they
attribute to 'existence' the characteristic of freedom from self-
contradiction, freedom from utter non-spatiality, freedom from
this, and freedom from that. Our studies in the preceding chapter
left us with the resolve to examine and to utilize in our proposi-
tions explaining "existence** the notions of self-contradiction, of
time, and of space. The propositions with which this paragraph
begins are the result.
We already know that the propositions thus far accepted will
not suffice to give our term "existence" a precise meaning. We
already know that in the end our universal negative existential
propositions will have to be supplemented by singular or particu-
lar existential propositions, both affirmative and negative. But
before we resort to singular existential propositions, let us at-
tempt to develop additional universal negative propositions. Leav-
ing self-contradiction and space and time behind, let us attempt to
3&ark out some additional subsisting entities as unreal. The un-
limited space which appears as having only an indefinite position
with respect to the dying Napoleon who appears real and with
respect to whom thi$ unlimited space appears present, the eternal
8S
verity which appears utterly timeless and the square circle which
appears self-contradictory, these subsistents are already marked
out as unreal. But before we resort to individual existential prop-
ositions, let us attempt to eliminate the phlogiston that does not
appear self-contradictory, the present King of France who does
not appear to lack position with respect to me, and the sleeping
Barbarossa who does not appear undated.
When I think of the King of England I seem to have a feeling
of acceptance or assent or belief. No feeling of hesitation or of
disbelief seems to intervene. But when I press my eyeball and seem
to see a second rose in the vase on my desk, or when I try to im-
agine a man walking upside down on my ceiling, I may become
aware of a feeling of hesitation, a feeling of dissent or rejection
or disbelief. The King of England that I am now considering
appears with the characteristic of being in some sense an object.
And it appears with the characteristic of being an object such that
the apparent awareness of it is generally accompanied by a feeling
of belief. The man on my ceiling that I am now considering also
appears with the characteristic of being in some sense an object.
But it appears with the characteristic of being an object such that
the apparent awareness of it is generally accompanied by a feel-
ing of disbelief. The subsisting man on my ceiling and the sub-
sisting second rose in the vase on my desk, unlike the King of Eng-
land whom I am considering, appear with the characteristic of
being generally discredited. They are therefore, let us say, unreal.
Let us lay down the universal negative existential proposition that
whatever explicitly or implicitly appears as generally discredited
is unreal. And when a subsistent, as we develop it, takes on the
characteristic of appearing generally discredited, let us resolve to
list as real no subsistent which, except for its development, is in-
distinguishable from it.
The man on my ceiling, the second rose in the vase on my desk,
phlogiston, and the sleeping Barbarossa, all of these subsistents,
as we develop them, implicitly appear with the characteristic of
being generally discredited. These subsistents are therefore un-
real. And no other subsisting men on my ceiling, phlogistons, or
sleeping Barbarossas will be listed among the entities we are to
enumerate as real. Some subsisting King of England does, we may
suppose, develop the appearance of being generally discredited,
89
and is likewise unreal. But since the subsisting King of England
which we are considering does not develop this appearance, this
subsisting King of England, and other subsisting Kings of England
which, like it, do not develop the appearance of being generally
discredited, may very well be real.
No subsistent is real which appears with the characteristic of
being generally discredited, with the characteristic of lacking all
position, or with any one of various other characteristics. Repre-
senting that which appears with the characteristic of being self-
contradictory by the letter A, that which appears with the char-
acteristic of being generally discredited by the letter J, and so
on, we may say that no subsisting A's or B's or ... or J's are real.
To exist is at the least to be free from A-ness and B-ness . . . and
J-ness. But the subsistents that do not appears as A's or B's or as
J's, the subsistents that neither explicitly nor implicitly appear
with the characteristic of being self-contradictory or with the
characteristic of being generally discredited are some of them
real and some of them unreal. To exist is not merely to be free
from A-ness, from B-ness, from . . . and from J-ness. To exist is in
addition to be enumerated as real in one of our individual affir-
mative existential propositions. Some of the subsistents which do
not appear as A's or B's or ... or J's we have agreed not so to
enumerate. We have agreed not to enumerate as real any sub-
sistent, which, except for its development, is indistinguishable
from one which, as we develop it, implicitly appears as an A or
a B or ... or a J. Since the subsisting phlogiston which we are
now considering appears with the characteristic of being generally
discredited, we resolve not to enumerate as real any subsisting
phlogiston. But 'the fiftieth President of the United States, a So-
cialist named Jones' appears neither self-contradictory nor gen-
erally discredited; and, considering this subsistent as an individ-
ual subsistent, we have no rule to guide us and to determine us
to list this subsistent as real rather than as unreal. It is not all
subsistents not appearing as self-contradictory, etc., which are
real; not even all subsistents not appearing to resemble one which,
as we develop it, appears as self-contradictory. Reality is limited
to those subsistents really free from self-contradictoriness. And
those entities that are really free from self-contradictoriness can
be further described only by enumerating some of them.
90
No subsistent is real which explicitly or implicitly appears as an
A, a B, or ... or a J. With respect to the subsistent which neither
explicitly nor implicitly appears as an A, a B, or ... or a J, it is
real if listed below as X if X 2 , or ... or X n , unreal if listed below
as YI, Y 2 , or ... or Y a . To exist is to appear free from A-ness, B-
ness, . . . J~ness and to be enumerated as an X. To be unreal is to
appear explicitly or implicitly as an A, a B, or ... or a J; or to be
enumerated as a Y. In so far as a subsistent does not appear as an
A or ... or a J and is not enumerated as an X or as a Y, its existen-
tial status is left undetermined and the significations of our terms
"existence" and "non-existence" are left with some vagueness. It
will be found however that our universal negative existential
propositions: "No subsistent appearing as an A exists," etc., taken
in conjunction with our existential propositions: "Xi, etc. exists,"
"Yi, etc. does not exist," determine with reasonable precision the
characteristics of 'existence* and 'non-existence* and will enable
us to determine the existential status of most of the subsistents
presented to us in the course of this treatise. When we have with
a similar precision determined what it is to be true, we shall, I
believe, be in a position to investigate various problems of con-
cern to the metaphysician with a well-founded hope of being able
to determine which of the entities discussed in these problems are
real, and with a well-founded hope of being able to determine
which of the propositions in which attitudes towards these prob-
lems may be expressed are true.
And so, before we turn from the distinction between the real
and the unreal to the distinction between the true and the false,
we have only to give the following recapitulation of the character-
istics for which A, B, etc. stand and the following lists of X's and
Y's.
A Self-contradictory.
B In no sense an object of consciousness.
C A definite appearance for no subject.
D Lacking all date.
E Having no date with respect to an entity that
appears real.
F Having only a very indefinite date with respect
to an entity that appears real.
G Lacking all position.
91
H Having no position with respect to an entity
which appears real and with respect to which it
appears present.
I Having only a very indefinite position with re-
spect to an entity which appears real and with
respect to which it appears present.
J Generally discredited.
APPENDIX
A List of Certain Subsistents A List of Certain Subsistents
which, appearing neither ex- which, even when they appear
plicitly nor implicitly as self- neither explicitly nor iniplic-
contradictory, undated, etc., are itly as self-contradictory, un-
real. dated, etc., are nevertheless
Xi unreal.
X 2 - Y x -
Xa- Y 2 -
X 4 - Y 8 -
(I ask the reader to assume that there have just been enumerated
each of the entities that will later be referred to as having been
listed in this appendix)
Summary
We explain our term "existence" fairly adequately through
singular existential propositions and the following universal prop-
ositions:
1. No entity is real which is presented as self-contradictory.
2. No entity is real which is presented as in no sense an object
of consciousness.
3. No entity is real which is presented as a definite appearance
for no subject.
4. No entity is real which is presented as lacking all date.
92
5. No entity is real which is presented as having no date with
respect to an entity that appears real.
6. No entity is real which is presented as having only a very
indefinite date with respect to an entity that appears real.
7. No entity is real which is presented as lacking all position.
8. No entity is real which is presented as having no position
with respect to an entity which appears real and contempo-
raneous with it.
9. No entity is real which is presented as having only a very
indefinite position with respect to an entity which appears
real and contemporaneous with it.
10. No entity is real which is presented as generally discredited.
Propositions 1, 4 and 7 seem to give our term "existence" a
meaning in accord with common usage. But they leave the exis-
tential status of various subsistents undetermined to a greater
extent than is desirable. By considering 1, 4 and 7 in turn, we
are led to choose to supplement them with 2 and then with 3,
with 5 and 6, and with 8 and 9. Proposition 10 is added in an
effort to enlarge the content of the world of non-existing entities
in our sense of "existence" and to reduce the reliance that has to
be placed on individual existential propositions.
The discussion of proposition 2 is probably of greatest general
interest. The position taken is that the entity in no sense an
object of consciousness appears with the characteristic of being
implicitly self-contradictory and hence is unreal.
93
Chapter IV
TOWARDS DETERMINING THE MEANING OF "TRUTH"
At this point in our story the meaning of our term "existence"
has been more or less determined. At this point we have agreed
that certain entities YI, Y 2 , Y 8 , even when appearing neither ex-
plicitly nor implicitly as self-contradictory, as undated, etc., are
unreal. And we have agreed that certain entities Xi, X 2 , X 3 , when
appearing neither explicitly nor implicitly as self-contradictory or
as undated, etc., are real in the sense in which we are using the
term "reality." Now, among the entities which are real in our sense
of "reality/' among the entities Xi, X 2 , X 3 , are certain words. The
word "Socrates," occurring in the copy of Plato's "Republic" that
is in my library and appearing neither explicitly nor implicitly as
self-contradictory, etc., is a real entity. And the word "Ivanhoe"
appearing with the characteristic of being in my copy of Scott's
novel is likewise a real entity.
Each entity that can be discussed is a subsistent. Some of these
subsistents, as, for example, the words "Socrates" and "Ivanhoe"
to which we have just pointed, are real entities. And^omeVtf these
subsistents are entities which, in our sense of the term "existence,"
are unreal entities. Without stopping to enquire whether they are
real or unreal, let us note that within the world of subsistents there
appear the entities: 'Socrates, the Athenian philosopher' and 'Ivan-
hoe, the medieval knight/ Thus we seem to have before us the sub-
sistent 'Socrates, the Athenian philosopher' whose ontological
status we may for the present leave undetermined, and an instance
of the word "Socrates" which is real; the subsistent 'Ivanhoe, the
medieval knight', whose ontological status we may for the present
leave undetermined, and an instance of the word "Ivanhoe" which
94
is real. Obviously there is a certain connection or a certain pseudo-
connection between the real word "Socrates" and the subsistent:
'Socrates, the Athenian philosopher/ between the real word
"Ivanhoe" and the subsistent: Ivanhoe, the medieval knight/
To put it briefly, the word "Socrates" represents or intends to.
represent the Athenian philosopher and the word "Ivanhoe"
represents or intends to represent the medieval knight. It would
carry us too far afield to attempt at this stage in our exposition to
analyze what this representation or this intention to represent
consists in. 1 Let us note simply that certain words are real and that
by virtue of their being words they seem to intend, to point to, or
to represent, certain other subsistents which may or may not be
real.
The wc5rd "Socrates," occurring in my copy of Plato's "Repub-
lic" is real; and the word "Ivanhoe" occurring in my copy of
Scott's novel is real. In a similar fashion the words "man" and N
"large" appearing with the characteristic of occurring on this page
are each of them subsistents which are'real. Wherea^, however,
the words "Socrates" and "Ivanhoe" represent or intffod to repre-
sent Subsistents which, if real, are individual substances, "man"
and "large^ represent or intend to represent subsistents which,
if real, arean the one case a universal substance^and in the other
case a universal quality. Nonetheless, the instances of "man" and
"large" to which reference has just been made are words which
are real, words which are to be kept in view along with "Socrates"
and "Ivanhoe." Indeed, we may enlarge the domain of real en-
tities to which we are attending by pointing to the words: "walk-
ing quickly down the street" and to the words: "President of the
United States." Each of these word groups subsisting with the
characteristic of occurring on this page is real and each of them
represents or intends to represent a subsistent which if real is
a quality or substance outside of this page. There is then one
instance of the word "Socrates" which is real, one instance of
"Ivanhoe," one instance of "man/' one instance of "large," one
instance of "walking quickly down the street" and one instance of
"President of the United States." Without further ado we may
say at once that many words and word groups are real, and that
many sentences are real. We may agree, for example, that each
of the preceding sentences in your copy of this book, appearing
95
neither explicitly nor implicitly as undated, etc. is a real sen-
tence. And we may agree that each of these sentences contains
words, word groups and phrases which severally represent, or
intend to represent, subsistents which may or may not be real.
We are working in this chapter towards the determination of
the significations to be assigned the terms "truth" and "falsity."
And we have come to have before us for our consideration various
real sentences, as, for example, the preceding sentences in your
copy of this book, in order that we may apply the distinction be-
tween the true and the false somewhere within the realm of real
sentences. It may be well therefore at this point to note that the
adjectives "true" and "false" as they occur in common speech
are by no means exclusively associated with such entities as sent-
ences. We commonly speak of true sentences, true propositions,
true judgments, true pictures, true ideas, true beliefs and true
friends. And so we ask ourselves whether, when we attempt to
determine the signification of "truth" by applying the distinction
between the true and the false somewhere within the realm of real
sentences, we are maintaining the contact with ordinary usage
that we wish to maintain. In so far as truth is commonly predi-
cated of such entities as propositions and judgments, we need
not be disturbed. For our concern with words, terms and sentences
will guide our attention to propositions and to judgments and
will enable us to point out certain entities to be called true prop-
ositions, certain entities to be called true judgments and certain
entities to be called false propositions. But the signification of
"truth" which we are developing will not enable us to apply the
distinction between the true and the false to friends or to pictures,
to beliefs or to ideas.
What we commonly call a true friend is, I suppose, a devoted
friend, a real friend; what we commonly call a false friend an
apparent friend who is not a friend. The distinction between the
real on the one hand and the unreal on the other is, it appears,
involved in the distinction between the so-called true friend and
the so-called false friend. Let us not use "true" and "false" to
point to the very distinction to which the contrast between the
real and the unreal points. And so let us not determine the sig-
nification of our term "truth" in such a way that there will be
true friends and false friends.
96
Just as it is the distinction between the real and the unreal
rather than the distinction between the true and the false that,
we shall say, applies to friends, so it is the distinction between
knowledge and error rather than the distinction between the
true and the false that applies, in our terminology, to such psy-
chological or epistemological entities as may be called ideas,
opinions, or beliefs. In a later chapter we shall deal at some length
with the distinction between knowledge and error. 2 And so we
are not permanently neglecting this important distinction when
we leave beliefs, ideas and opinions out of consideration in con-
cerning ourselves with the notion of truth and with the distinction
between the true and the false.
The words, word groups and phrases that occur in sentences
represent, as we have seen, 3 or intend to represent, subsistent
entities other than themselves. And the truth or falsity of these
sentences depends, we shall hold, upon the ontological status of
these subsistent entities that are intended to be represented. There
is a sense then in which sentences look beyond themselves and in
which their truth or falsity depends upon their correspondence
with entities beyond themselves. What more natural, then, than
that pictures should be called true or false and that their truth
or falsity should be held to depend upon their correspondence or
lack of correspondence with the objects they intend to portray?
Despite the similarity between words and pictures, however, I
believe we are not violating the ordinary usage of words in dis-
tinguishing between words and pictures, and in making the
distinction between truth and falsity one which does not apply
to pictures but, rather, applies exclusively to words and their
derivatives, to sentences, propositions and judgments.
It is within the realm of real sentences that we shall first at-
tempt to apply. the distinction between the true and the false.
And yet it is not each real sentence that we shall hold is either
true or false. There is the real sentence: "Where are you going?"
and the real sentence: "Shut the door"; but "Where are you go-
ing?" is not true and "Shut the door" not false. It is: "You seem
to be going some place" that may be true, "I desire you to shut
the door" that may be false. The distinction between the true
and the false, in short, is to be applied only to real sentences that
are declarative, not to real sentences that are interrogations or
97
commands.
Just as "Shut the door" is neither true nor false, so it is, as we
shall use the terms "truth" and "falsity," with the sentence:
"Take as your alleged object a subsisting Socrates." A subsisting
Socrates is presented as a datum; but the mere presentation in-
volves no assertion to be concurred in or denied. Similarly with
the sentence: 'Socrates is (i.e., appears as) a subsistent." "Socrates
subsists" expresses no real assertion, adds nothing to the datum
that "Subsisting Socrates" seems to present. Nor have we arrived
at a real assertion when the subsisting Socrates as a subsistent is
said to appear with various characteristics. For "Socrates appears
or subsists as a Greek and as a philosopher" still merely presents
an alleged datum and expresses no attitude with respect to this
datum that can be concurred in or denied. It is, one might say,
synonymous with: "Let Socrates be a Greek philosopher." Only
declarative sentences, we have said, are true or false. But sentences
of the type: "X subsists" or "X does not subsist" or "X subsists
with characteristic A," although declarative in form, are rather to
be classed with interrogations and commands than with the
declarative sentences to which we shall apply the distinction be-
tween the true and the false.
The only sentences that we shall call true or false are declara-
tive sentences, declarative sentences which are real and which
contain words, word groups or phrases which severally represent
or intend to represent subsistent entities. Among these declara-
tive sentences which we have before us, however, there are some
which do not conform to the grammar of the language in which
they are expressed. The English sentence "Green is or" is ungram-
matical and so is "We am here." It is desirable that we put such
sentences aside in working towards the determination of the
signification of "truth"; for without such an elimination we have
the task of applying the distinction between the true and the
false to many sentences which are incomprehensible or ambigu-
ous. The rules of grammar are many and vary from language to
language. They are however rather definite and are fairly gen-
erally understood. With respect to any given sentence it is usu-
ally obvious that it does, or that it does not, conform to the
grammar of the language in which it is expressed. It is generally
agreed, for example, that each English declarative sentence must
98
have a verb and a subject. And so it is clear that a given sentence
which contains no subject is a sentence to which, in the sense in
which we are using the terms "truth" and "falsity," the distinc-
tion between the true and the false does not apply. It may like-
wise be said to be a rule of English grammar that the subject
must be a noun or pronoun. And so, if "Green is a color" is to
be held to be a sentence to which the distinction between the
true and the false applies, the word "green" as it occurs in this
sentence must be held to be a noun. Let us hold that in our
sentence "Green is a color" the word "green" is indeed a noun.
Let us hold that this instance of the word "green" represents a
substance whose important and outstanding quality is its green-
ness. Let us, consequently, agree to use "truth" and "falsity" in
such a manner that the distinction between the true and the false
applies to our sentence: "Green is a color." It is only with respect
to some few sentences"Green is a color" is one of them that
their conformity or lack of conformity to the rules of grammar
is disputable. And so it is only a few sentences and a few grammat-
ical rules that we need discuss in order to make clear which sen-
tences we are eliminating from further consideration in working
towards the determination of the signification of "truth."
The subject of a grammatical English declarative sentence must
be a noun or a pronoun. Our sentence: "Green is a color" is
grammatically correct in that "green" is in this instance a noun.
Our sentence: "White is always serviceable" is grammatically
correct in that "white" in this instance modifies some such noun
as "clothing" which has been elided. Not only, however, must the
subject of a grammatical English declarative sentence be a noun
or pronoun; with certain predicates, abstract nouns are ruled out
as possible subjects of grammatical English declarative sentences.
"Brightness is fire" is not grammatically correct. It is a sentence
to which, as we employ "truth," the distinction between truth and
falsity does not apply. There is, to be sure, the grammatically
correct sentence: "Brightness is cheerful" and the grammatically
correct sentence: "Charity is godliness." 4 But a sentence whose
subject-term is an abstract noun is never grammatically correct,
we hold, when this subject-term is copulated with a concrete noun
or when the predicate-term is a cognate verb. "Brightness is fire"
is, we hold, ungrammatical; and so is "Motion moves." "Bright-
99
ness is fire" and "Motion moves" are both sentences, we hold,
that lie outside the distinction between the true and the false.
They are sentences to be eliminated from our further considera-
tion along with "Green is or" and "We am here" in so far as we
are working towards the determination of the signification of
"truth."
At this point we have before us sentences which are real, sent-
ences containing words, word-groups and phrases which severally
represent, or intend to represent, subsistents, sentences which
are declarative, which do not merely predicate subsistence, and
which conform to the grammatical rules of the language in which
they are expressed. These sentences which we have before us are,
let us say, propositions. And so we may say that sentences which
are not propositions are neither true nor false; and we may say
that, with respect to sentences, it is within the realm of proposi-
tions that the distinction between the true and the false is to
be applied.
Among the propositions which we have before us, let us pick
out for special consideration those sentences of ours which are
singular affirmative existential propositions. There is, for exam-
ple, the proposition: "Socrates, the Athenian philosopher, exists"
and there is the proposition: "Ivanhoe, the medieval knight,
exists." It is with respect to propositions having this form that
we shall find it simplest to apply the distinction between the
true and the false and thus partially to explain our term "truth."
Our sentence: "Socrates exists" is a true proposition, we shall say,
if, and only if, in our sense of "existence," the entity exists which
the word "Socrates" as it occurs in this sentence intends to repre-
sent. And our sentence: "Ivanhoe exists" is a true proposition
as we use the term "truth" if, and only if, in our sense of "exist-
ence," the entity exists which the word "Ivanhoe" as it occurs in
this sentence intends to represent. Since Socrates, the Athenian
philosopher, appearing neither explicitly nor implicitly as self-
contradictory or as undated, etc., is real in the sense in which
we are using the term "reality," the real proposition: "Socrates
exists" which occurs on this page is true in the sense in which
we are using the term "truth." And since Ivanhoe the medieval
knight, even when he appears neither explicitly nor implicitly as
contradictory or as undated, is unreal, our sentence: "Ivanhoe
100
exists" is in our terminology an untrue or false proposition. We
have thus certain real propositions definitely marked out as true
in our sense of "truth" and certain real propositions definitely
marked out as false in our sense of "falsity." We have thus made
a beginning in determining the meaning of our term "truth."
It is a simple matter to go on to determine the truth or falsity
of our negative singular existential propositions. Our sentence:
"Socrates does not exist" is false, let us say, if the entity exists
that the word "Socrates" as used in this sentence intends to repre-
sent; true if this entity does not exist. We are in a position, it
follows, to determine the truth or falsity of any singular existen-
tial proposition of ours. If the individual exists that our word X
intends to represent, "X exists" is true and "X does not exist"
false. And if the individual that our word X intends to represent
does not exist, "X exists" is false and "X does not exist" true. In
their application to singular existential propositions of ours, the
significations which we are assigning to the terms "truth" and
"falsity" have thus been determined.
To the extent to which we have thus far determined the signi-
fications of "truth" and "falsity," we have done so by referring
back to the distinction between the real and the unreal. Roughly
speaking, we have made the distinction between the real and the
unreal prior to the distinction between the true and the false;
and we have explained "truth" in terms of "reality." There are
those however who would object to the treatment of reality and
truth in this order. Truth, according to Bertrand Russell, 5 is
prior to reality, not reality prior to truth. When we discuss reality,
we do so'by means of propositions. And our discussion of reality
has validity, it is held, only in so far as our propositions referring
to reality are true. "When I say: this paper exists, I must," says
Moore, 6 "require that this proposition be true." If I am to make
valid remarks about reality, I must, it is held, already know what
constitutes validity, I must already understand the term "truth."
Do we however avoid such objections when we begin with a dis-
cussion of truth and proceed thence to a discussion of reality? The
distinction between truth and falsity, after it has once been put
before us, applies to all propositions including those in which
"reality" is explained. Similarly, however, the distinction between
the real and the unreal, after it has once been put before us,
101
applies to all entities including the sentences in which the mean-
ing of "truth" is discussed. Unless these sentences are real,
they can neither be true nor determine for us the meaning
of "truth." A discussion of truth presupposes the reality of the
sentences in which truth is discussed just as a discussion of reality
presupposes the truth of the propositions in which reality is dis-
cusssed. In a sense, then, truth presupposes reality; and reality
presupposes truth. Wherever we begin we find ourselves in a circle
rather than at the beginning of a linear chain. Indeed this circle
is even narrower than we have yet indicated. Not only does truth
in a sense presuppose reality, and reality truth; but reality in a
sense presupposes reality and truth presupposes truth. Just as the
sentences are real in which we determine the meaning of "truth,"
so the sentences are real in which we determine the meaning
of "reality." And just as some of the propositions are true
in which we discuss reality, so some of the propositions are true
in which we discuss truth. In a sense we can not discuss reality
unless we make use of real sentences and we can not make valid
propositions referring to truth unless these propositions are them-
selves valid and true, unless, it may be said, we already know what
validity and truth are.
It would be absurd to hold that such observations prevent us
from ever properly discussing either truth or reality. When we
attend to a concept with the purpose of discussing, analyzing and
defining it, we are not always introducing a term which has no
relevance to anything that has gone before. Rather we clarify a
concept so that as a result of the discussion the application of the
concept will be clear both with respect to what has preceded and
with respect to what is to follow. The sentences in the first chap-
ter of your copy of this book are real, but we did not know them
to be real until we had determined the signification of "reality."
The propositions in which we determine the significations of
"truth" and "falsity" are true; but we do not know them to be
true until we shall have determined the signification of "truth."
Without knowing a given sentence to be real or true we can
gather from it the signification that is being assigned "truth" or
"reality." And so a valid discussion of either truth or reality takes
place through the medium of propositions which are true and
of entities which are real, although these propositions are not
102
revealed as true and these entities are not revealed as real until the
discussion has been completed. Obviously the distinction between
the real and the unreal applies to all entities and, limiting our
attention to propositions occurring in this treatise, the distinction
between the true and the false applies, we shall hold, 7 to all
propositions. If this is the case, then we can not discuss either
'truth' or 'reality* by means of propositions without making use
of entities to which these distinctions which are in the course of
being elucidated already apply. But we can, we hold, and in many
cases must, analyze and define concepts whose application is not
limited to what is to follow. With both 'truth' and 'reality/ this
is the case; and it is as much the case with the one as with the
other. In exposition, we hold, we are at liberty to begin with
either concept and then to proceed to the other. Our difficulties
are just as great, or, we should hold, just as unimportant, whether
we begin with reality and proceed to a discussion of truth or
whether we begin with truth and proceed to a discussion of
reality.
It has been our decision to begin with a discussion of "reality "
and to explain "truth" in terms of 'reality/ If the argument of the
preceding paragraph is sound, there is no logical reason to com-
pel us to alter this decision and to begin instead with a discus-
sion of "truth/' But, we may ask, are there not motives of ex-
pediency that may determine us to alter our decision? Before we
proceed to explain "truth" in terms of reality, will it not be well
for us to consider the possibility of explaining "reality" in terms
of 'truth' or at least of explaining "truth" without referring back
to a previous discussion of 'reality'? To explain "truth" in terms
of reality is not logically unsound, but it may be inexpedient.
And explaining "truth" without referring back to a previous dis-
cussion of reality, whereas it is not logically necessary, may make
for greater simplicity in exposition.
There are those, we have seen, 8 who hold that truth is prior to
reality. A proposition or judgment is true or false, it may be said,
not according as the entities intended to be represented by its
terms are real or unreal, but rather according as it has or lacks
intrinsic marks which directly determine it to be true. Certain
judgments, it may be said, come before our minds with an insist-
ence and a claim that forces us to recognize them as true; and
103
certain judgments come before our minds, it may be said, with a
weakness and a logical unattractiveness that forces us to reject
them as false. Thus "two and two are four," it may be said, is
true, not because of anything concerning the ontological status
of 'two' and 'four/ but because "two and two are four" has an
intrinsic vitality and claim which we are bound to recognize.
"The recognition of the claim of a judgment/' says Rickert, 9
"constitutes its truth." In no other way, he holds, is truth to be
defined. For, he continues, "truth can only be defined as the
peculiar value that judgments have." There is here an attempt to
discuss truth without reference to reality. And since we may
begin with either concept, since, moreover, we are at liberty to
assign to terms whatever significations we please, there is no logi-
cal objection that can be raised against this procedure. We may
introduce the term "truth" without referring to a previous dis-
cussion of "reality." And we may subsequently introduce the term
"reality" by saying that an entity is real when the judgment that it
is real has the validity, the claim upon us, that characterizes true
judgments. But whereas there are no logical objections that can
be raised against this procedure, we may question whether a pro-
cedure of this sort explains with any success either "truth" or
"reality." And we may question whether a procedure of this sort
assists us in any way in applying the distinction between the true
and the false to individual propositions and judgments. If we are
in doubt as to the truth of an instance of "Ivanhoe exists," it will
not help us to be told that "Ivanhoe exists" is true if it has a
claim upon us. For, we may ask with James, 10 "What do you mean
by 'claim' here?" But it will help us to be told that our sentence
"Ivanhoe exists" is true if Ivanhoe the medieval knight is a real
entity; and then to be referred back to the rather full discussion
of reality in chapter three.
Just as it may be said that a judgment is true if intrinsically
it has a claim upon us, so it may be said that a judgment is true
if intrinsically it is clear and distinct. "I am certain that I am a
thing which thinks," says Descartes; 11 "but do I not then likewise
know what is requisite to render me certain of a truth? Certainly
in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures me of its
truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception of that which
I state." This clear and distinct perception would not "assure
104
me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that a thing
which I conceived so clearly and distinctly could be false; and
accordingly it seems to me that already I can establish as a general
rule that all things which I perceive very clearly and very distinctly
are true." In this passage, to be sure, Descartes is not holding
that only those judgments are true which are clear and distinct.
But just as it may be held that a true judgment is one which has
validity and a logical claim upon us, so it may be held that a
true judgment is one which is clear and distinct. With either
explanation of "truth/' however, we have little to guide us in
applying the distinction between the true and the false to indi-
vidual propositions and judgments. To make either explanation
serviceable, there would be required a rather complete account
in the one case of 'claim' or Validity* and in the other case of
'clear and distinct/ There would be required indeed something
of an enumeration of the propositions or judgments that have a
claim or are clear and distinct. And so we should explain "truth"
prior to "reality" only by putting something analogous to the
appendix to our third chapter into our explanation of "truth"
instead of into our explanation of "reality."
Let us then proceed in the direction in which we have started.
Let us work towards determining the meaning of "truth" by
continuing to refer back to our explanation of "reality." If
the individual exists that our term X intends to represent, then
our real sentence: "X exists/' let us continue to say, 12 is true
and our real sentence: "X does not exist" false. And if the indi-
vidual that our term X intends to represent does not exist, then
our real sentence: "X exists," let us continue to say, is false and
our real sentence: "X does not exist" true. We are proceeding
thus from reality to truth, from reality to truth in so far as truth
is a characteristic of the real sentences that we call propositions.
But although it may be acceptable to proceed from reality to
truth rather than vice versa, it may seem strange that we leap at
one bound from reality to that aspect of the notion of truth in
which truth is considered a characteristic of the sentences that we
call propositions. "Just one moment!", we may be told; "Truth is
primarily a characteristic of judgments. It has application to the
sentences that you call propositions, sentences occurring on this
page and on that page, only secondarily, only in so far as these
105
sentences represent or express or symbolize true judgments."
Indeed there are those who hold that the distinction between the
true and the false is never properly applied to sentences occurring
on this page and on that page, that it applies only to judgments
which are outside of the printed or spoken word. It is from this
point of view that Leibniz finds fault with Locke's discussion of
truth. "What I find least to my taste in your definition of truth,"
says Leibniz, 13 "is that you seek truth in words. Thus the same
sense expressed in Latin, German, English, French, will not be
the same truth. . . . We shall then have also literal truths which
may be distinguished as truths upon paper or parchment, of
ordinary black ink or of printer's ink." Is there however any
reductio ad absurdam in this conclusion? Sentences exist that are
on this page or on that page. Some of them are of ordinary black
ink and some of them are of printer's ink; some of them in Latin
and some in French. Among these real sentences which are here
and there, of various kinds of ink and in various languages, there
are some which, in the sense in which we are using the terms
"truth" and "falsity," are true and some which are false. We are
at liberty to determine the meaning of "truth" in such a manner
that the distinction between the true and the false applies to cer-
tain real sentences. And we are exercising this liberty in a manner
not altogether at variance with common usage when we call
certain sentences propositions and call some propositions true and
some false.
It is obvious however that certain sentences which are true in
our sense of "truth" have a common point of reference. There is
the sentence: "Socrates exists" which occurs on one page of my
copy of this book; and there is the sentence: "Socrates exists"
which occurs on a corresponding page in your copy of this book.
There is the sentence: "Socrates exists" which occurs on another
page of my copy of this book; there is the sentence: "Socrates
exists" which occurs in my manuscript; and there is the sentence;
"Socrates est" which occurs, let us suppose, in some Latin manu-
script. Each of these sentences is true and each of them, we may
suppose, refers to the same fact. Ought we not then seek truth
in this fact, in this common point of reference? In concentrating
our attention upon sentences made by ink or by pencil, we are
dealing, it would seem, with mere shadows, with entities whose
106
truth or falsity is merely a reflection of the truth or falsity of
some objective situation outside these sentences.
What however is the fact which several sentences, each reading:
"Socrates exists," have as their common point of reference? When
I write the word "Socrates," there is something in my mind. And
so the word "Socrates" is somehow related to some act of cogni-
tion or to some idea of mine. At the same time, however, the
word "Socrates" is somehow related, directly or indirectly, to an
objective subsistent which is alleged to be outside of me and
outside of the word "Socrates." As we have seen, 1 * the word
"Socrates" represents or intends to represent Socrates the Athenian
philosopher who scorned the Sophists and died in jail. In the
case of the word "Socrates" there is thus what we may roughly
contrast as a subjective reference and an objective reference.
When we turn from the word "Socrates" to the sentence: "Soc-
rates exists," there is, it would seem, a similar dual reference.
There is on the one hand an act of judgment, or an asserting,
taking place in my mind; or the copulation of mental ideas that
we may call a mental judgment. And, on the other hand, there
may be some objective fact, some situation involving Socrates
himself, to which the sentence: "Socrates exists" may be said to
refer. Now the former of these entities, the act of judgment taking
place in my mind, or the copulation of mental ideas that we may
call a mental judgment, belongs within the realm of psychological
or epistemological entities to which we have agreed to apply the
distinction between knowledge and error rather than the distinc-
tion between the true and the false. 15 It may be a common refer-
ence to some such mental judgment that links together an in-
stance of the sentence: "Socrates exists" and an instance of the
sentence "Socrates est." Nevertheless let us turn our attention
to the investigation of the possibility of these two sentences being
linked together, not by a common subjective reference, but by a
common objective reference, by a common reference, that is to
say, to some objective situation involving Socrates himself.
What, however, is the objective fact which we may call a judg-
ment and to which we may say that the sentence: "Socrates exists"
intends to refer? It is not the substance Socrates himself, for this
substance the simple word "Socrates" represents or intends to
represent. Nor, we shall say, is the objective fact which might be
107
called a judgment some non-temporal fact having its habitat in
a world of objective but disembodied entities. For we choose to
deal primarily with real entities; and, in the sense in which we
are using the term "reality," any entity that appears as utterly
non-spatial is unreal. 16 The entity related to the sentence "Soc-
rates exists'* that we shall call a judgment or fact is some situation
involving Socrates himself; and yet it is not the substance Socrates.
It is, let us say, the existence of Socrates; that is to say, existence
appearing as an alleged quality of the subsistent Socrates. When
I utter the word "Socrates" or the word "Ivanhoe," I am appar-
ently making no assertion. My expression intends to refer to
a subsistent which may or may not be real. But if I say "Socrates
exists/ 1 there seems to be something that I am asserting, namely,
the existence of Socrates. If then we call such entities as 'the
existence of Socrates' judgments, our use of the word "judgment"
will permit us to say that a judgment is something that may
be asserted. Let us then call the existence of Socrates a fact or
judgment; and, since Socrates exists, let us furthermore call it
a true judgment. In the 'existence of Socrates/ we hold, we have
an instance of a judgment which is an objective situation, a
situation to which various sentences each reading: "Socrates
exists" may be said to refer. Not only, however, is the existence
of Socrates an objective judgment to which various propositions
each reading: "Socrates exists" may be said to refer. It is likewise
a true judgment; and its truth may be thought of as determining
the truth of the propositions which refer to it. Truth may be
thought of, in short, as belonging primarily to the judgment:
'the existence of Socrates' and as belonging secondarily and by
reflection, as it were, to the proposition: "Socrates exists" which
occurs on this page and to the proposition: "Socrates est" which
occurs in some Latin manuscript.
Socrates the Athenian philosopher is a subsistent. Appearing
neither as self-contradictory nor as undated, etc., this subsistent
is real. Likewise the quality of being an Athenian is a subsistent,
a subsistent which, appearing as a quality of Socrates, is real.
Similarly with the quality of existence, appearing as a quality of
Socrates. The existence of Socrates is a real subsistent, or, what
is the same thing, the true judgment 'the existence of Socrates'
is a real entity. How is it however with respect to non-existence
108
subsisting as a quality of Socrates? If Socrates appears as unreal,
both this subsistent and its alleged quality of non-existence are
unreal. Even the Socrates that appears both as real and as unreal
is unreal; and the non-existence of Socrates alleged to inhere in
it unreal. For the subsistent which I am considering appears as
self-contradictory. 17 There is, we conclude, no real objective
situation different from, but analogous to, the existence of Soc-
rates to which the proposition: "Socrates does not exist" refers.
There is no real non-existence of Socrates that might be called a
judgment. And so, whereas we have been successful in identifying
a real objective situation that is a true judgment and to which
various true propositions reading: "Socrates exists" may be said
to refer, we have been unsuccessful in our search for another real
objective situation that might be called a judgment and to which
various false propositions reading: "Socrates does not exist" might
similarly be said to refer.
The judgment 'the existence of Socrates/ appearing neither as
self-contradictory nor as undated, etc., is real. And 'the non-
existence of Socrates' is unreal. What, however, about the reality
or unreality of 'the existence of Ivanhoe'? If Ivanhoe appears with
the characteristic of being generally discredited, Ivanhoe is unreal
and the qualities that are alleged to inhere in such an Ivanhoe
are unreal. It would seem that if my subsistent is an existing
Ivanhoe, I am apparently thinking about an Ivanhoe that, by
hypothesis, is real and about the real judgment: the existence of
Ivanhoe. But if I appear to be thinking about an Ivanhoe that
subsists both as real and as generally discredited, my subsistent
appears as implicitly self-contradictory and, in the sense in which
we are using the term "reality," is unreal. 18 If Ivanhoe appears
as generally discredited, this Ivanhoe is unreal and each of the
qualities inhering in this Ivanhoe is unreal. 'The existence of
Ivanhoe 1 is unreal; and 'the non-existence of Ivanhoe' is unreal.
Just as there is no real 'non-existence of Socrates' that might be
called a judgment, so there is no real 'existence of Ivanhoe' and
no real 'non-existence of Ivanhoe' that might serve as real judg-
ments.
It appears then that the only real objective judgment involved
in a singular existential proposition is that directly referred to
by a true affirmative singular existential proposition, namely,
109
existence appearing as a quality of some real entity. The proposi-
tion: "Socrates exists*' which appears on this page and the propo-
sition: "Socrates est" which appears in some Latin manuscript
both refer to a common judgment which is real and true. Both
of these propositions may be regarded as deriving their truth
from the truth of the judgment: the existence of Socrates. But
the 'existence of Ivanhoe' to which two sentences each reading:
"Ivanhoe exists" might be held to refer is not a real judgment
at all. And so there is no real objective judgment which these
* wo sentences have as their common reference, no real objective
judgment whose falsity determines the falsity of these two propo-
sitions, no fact to which these two false propositions are directly
related.
Our desire then to determine the truth or falsity of groups of
propositions by first determining the truth or falsity of objective
judgments to which they refer has been only partially carried out.
If various false propositions reading: "Socrates does not exist"
are to be regarded as having a common reference to a real objec-
tive situation, the reference which they may be regarded as hav-
ing in common is what we might call a contra-reference to the
true judgment: 'the existence of Socrates.' And even this sort of
common contra-reference is lacking as a common characteristic of
various true propositions each reading: "Ivanhoe does not exist."
It appears then that we can not describe truth and falsity merely
with respect to objective judgments or facts and expect the dis-
tinction between truth and falsity thus determined within the
domain of judgments to indicate to us where falsity ends and
wh^ere truth begins within the entire domain of propositions, or
even within the entire domain of singular categorical existential
propositions. The truth of our sentence: "X exists" and the falsity
of our sentence: "X does not exist" may be said to be corollaries
of the truth of the judgment: the existence of X. But the truth of
our sentence: "Y does not exist" and the falsity of our sentence:
"Y exists" are laid down as partial explanations of "truth" applied
directly to the domain of sentences or propositions.
At this point we have behind us the determination of the
signification of "truth" with respect to certain entities that we
call "judgments." And we have behind us the determination of the
significations of both "truth" and "falsity" with respect to singu-
110
lar categorical existential propositions o ours. How is it, however,
xvith respect to categorical existential propositions that are not
singular? How is it with respect to our sentences: "All men exist,"
"Some men exist/' "No men exist" and "Some men do not exist"?
The universal 'man* it will be remembered, 19 "may ... be given
a place on our list of entities denoted by 'existence* along with
Socrates and Plato." Just as the alleged individual Socrates may
be real and the alleged individual Ivanhoe unreal, so the alleged
universal 'man* may be real and the alleged universal 'centaur'
unreal. Just as we hold that, when the alleged individual X is
real, our proposition: "X exists" is true and our proposition: "X
does not exist" false, so let us hold that, when the alleged univer-
sal U is real, our proposition: "Some U's exist" is true and our
proposition: "No U's exist" false. And just as we hold that when
the alleged individual X is unreal, our proposition: "X exists"
is false and our proposition: "X does not exist" true, so let us
hold that, when the alleged universal U is unreal, our proposition:
"Some U's exist" is false and our proposition: "No U's exist"
true. If, then, the alleged universal 'centaur' is unreal in our
sense of "reality," our sentence: "Some centaurs exist" is false as
we explain our term "falsity" and our sentence: "No centaurs
exist" true as we explain our term "truth." And if the alleged
universal 'man' is real in our sense of "reality," our sentence:
"Some men exist" is true and our sentence: "No men exist" false.
There is, to be sure, the proposition: "Some men do not exist"
as well as the proposition: "Some men exist," the proposition:
"All men exist" as well as the proposition: "No men exist." As
has already been pointed out, however, "all men" as it occurs in
an existential proposition, is synonymous either with "All exist-
ing men" or with "All subsisting men." 20 But: "All subsisting
men exist" is, let us say, false. And I can think of no assertion
expressed in: "All existing men exist" that is not expressed in:
"Some men exist." As "All men exist" is synonymous either
with: "All existing men exist" or with: "All subsisting men exist,"
so: "Some centaurs do not exist" is, it would seem, synonymous
either with: "Some subsisting centaurs do not exist" or with:
"Some existing centaurs do not exist." But our sentence: "Some
subsisting centaurs do not exist" is, let us say, true. And if: "Some
existing centaurs do not exist" is to be considered at all, I can
111
think of no assertion expressed in it that is not expressed in: "No
centaurs exist." Since our sentences: "Some men exist" and: "No
centaurs exist" have both been determined to be true in our sense
of "truth," our sentence: "All existing men exist" is, we hold,
true; and our sentence: "Some existing centaurs do not exist"
true. And since our sentences: "No men exist" and: "Some cen-
taurs exist" have both been determined to be false in our sense
of "falsity," "Some existing men do not exist," which seems to be
synonymous with the former, is, we hold, false, and: "All existing
centaurs exist," which seems to be synonymous with the latter,
likewise false.
We may then formalize as follows our explanations of "truth"
and "falsity" with respect to such categorical existential proposi-
tions of ours as: "Some U's do not exist" and: "All U's exist."
If the alleged universal U is real, "All subsisting U's exist" is
false and "All existing U's exist" true, "Some subsisting U's do
not exist" true and "Some existing U's do not exist" false. And
if the alleged universal U is unreal, then "All subsisting U's exist"
and "All existing U's exist" are both false, "Some subsisting U's do
not exist" and "Some existing U's do not exist" both true.
A categorical existential proposition of ours may express an
assertion with respect to alleged existing entities or with respect
to alleged subsisting entities; it may be affirmative or negative; it
may be a singular proposition, a particular proposition or a uni-
versal proposition. In any case it is true or false according as the
individual or universal whose existence is asserted is real or un-
real; true or false according as the individual or universal whose
non-existence is asserted is unreal or real. It is thus some entity's
reality or unreality in our sense of "reality" that determines the
truth or falsity-as we explain "truth" and "falsity"-of each cate-
gorical existential proposition of ours.
But what about the categorical existential propositions of
others? Since "existence" as used by others may not have the
meaning we have assigned that term, the: "Socrates exists" of
some other writer may not express an assertion with respect to
Socrates which is identical with the assertion expressed in our:
"Socrates exists." Shall we say that his: "Socrates exists" is true if
Socrates exists in the sense in which he is using "existence," in a
sense of "existence" which is perhaps vague and indefinite? Or
112
shall we say that his: "Socrates exists" is true if Socrates exists
in the sense in which we have explained "existence"? The former
course leads to as many meanings o "truth" as there are meanings
of "reality." For, taking such a course, the: "Socrates exists" of
one writer would be true, if the Socrates presented complied with
one set of qualifications; the: "Socrates exists" of another writer
true, if the Socrates presented complied with another set of quali-
fications. No author's: "Socrates exists" is true, let us say, unless
Socrates exists in the sense in which we have explained "exist-
ence." But no author's: "Socrates exists" is true, let us also say,
if it is a statement that we should express in "Socrates subsists." 21
Since our sentence: "Socrates subsists" expresses no assertion 22
and is, we hold, neither true nor false, the: "Socrates exists" of
some other writer that is synonymous with it likewise expresses no
assertion and is likewise, let us hold, neither true nor false. The
proposition that is true is our: "Socrates exists." And the propo-
sition that is true is the proposition of some other writer that is
synonymous with it, whatever form it may take. The: "Socrates
exists" of some other author is true, let us say, if it is synonymous
with a proposition which, in the form in which it would be ex-
pressed by us, is true. The: "Socrates exists" of some other author
is false, let us say, if it is synonymous with a proposition which,
in the form in which it would be expressed by us, is false.
And the: "Socrates exists" of some other author which is synony-
mous with no proposition as it would be used by us is, let us say,
neither true nor false.
Our terms "truth" and "falsity" have been explained with re-
spect to categorical existential propositions of ours and with re-
spect to propositions of others that are synonymous with them.
Each such proposition is true or false according as some entity is
real or unreal. Indeed it is the reality or unreality of some entity
or of some entities using "reality" in our sense of that word that,
we hold, determines the truth or falsity of each sentence of ours
that is a proposition. For each real declarative sentence of ours
which does not merely predicate subsistence, which conforms to
the grammatical rules of the language in which it is expressed,
and which contains words, word-groups and phrases representing
or intending to represent subsistents, 23 each such sentence of ours
is, we hold, synonymous with one or more of our categorical exist-
113
ential propositions. The explanation of our terms "truth" and
"falsity" in their application to propositions of ours which are not
categorical existential propositions is thus to be accomplished
through the reduction of such propositions to the categorical
existential propositions of ours with which, we hold, they are
synonymous.
To say that proposition B as it occurs in this treatise is synony-
mous with our existential proposition A is to say that A and B
express similar mental attitudes of mine. Since A, being a categori-
cal existential proposition, is true or false according as some al-
leged entity is real or unreal in our sense of "reality," the reader
is enabled to determine the alleged entity upon whose reality the
truth or falsity of our proposition B depends. It would seem to
require only patience and circumspection to designate categorical
existential propositions of ours synonymous-for-me with each
proposition as it might be used by me; and thus to support the
assertion that each proposition as it might be used by me is
synonymous with one or more of our categorical existential prop-
ositions. Moreover, the designation of synonymous propositions
sufficient to enable our terms "truth" and "falsity" to be applied
to each of the propositions in this treatise will be a fairly adequate
explanation of our terms "truth" and "falsity."
Let us however not lose sight of those sentences outside of this
treatise that do not have the form of categorical existential propo-
sitions. There are sentences outside of this treatise which do not
express an assertion either of existence or of non-existence in our
sense of "existence" and which consequently are neither true nor
false as we use "truth" and "falsity." But there is the sentence A
of some other writer which has the form of a categorical exist-
ential proposition and which expresses an assertion of existence or
of non-existence in some other sense of "existence." And there is
that writer's sentence B which, whereas it does not have the form
of a categorical existential proposition, expresses a mental attitude
of its author's identical with that expressed by his proposition A.
From the point of view of its author, B, that is to say, is synony-
mous with A. From the point of view of its author, there is ex-
pressed in B an assertion of existence in the very sense of "exist-
ence" in which there is an assertion of existence expressed in A.
The proposition B occurring in this treatise, and the existential
114
proposition A of ours to which it will be reduced, they both, we
assume, express an assertion of existence in a sense of "existence"
different from his. But in choosing the categorical existential
proposition A of ours to which our proposition B is to be reduced,
let us not lose sight of the A of some other author with which that
author's B seems to be synonymous. If some other author's:
"There is no Socrates" seems to be synonymous with his: "So-
crates does not exist," then, even though it is another sense of
"existence" that is involved, let us say that our: "There is no So-
crates" and our: "Socrates does not exist" are synonymous with
one other, that our: "There is no Socrates" expresses an assertion
of existence identical with that expressed in our: "Socrates does
not exist," that our: "There is no Socrates" is true or false accord-
ing as Socrates is unreal or real in our sense of "reality." Let us in
short attempt to conform with general usage in reducing to cate-
gorical existential propositions those propositions of ours which
are not categorical existential propositions, even though in our
case "existence" is used in one sense and in the case of general
usage in some other sense.
There is moreover, let us suppose, the categorical existential
proposition A outside of this treatise which expresses an asser-
tion of existence or of non-existence in our sense of "existence."
And there is the proposition B outside of this treatise which does
not have the form of a categorical existential proposition, but
which likewise expresses an assertion of existence or of non-
existence in our sense of "existence." The sentence outside of
this treatise which expresses no assertion of existence or of non-
existence in our sense of "existence" is, we have said, 24 as we use
"truth" and "falsity," neither true nor false. But our terms "truth"
and "falsity" are to be applied to propositions in which there are
expressed assertions of existence or of non-existence in our sense
of "existence," whether these propositions be propositions of ours
or propositions of others. And yet in order that our terms "truth"
and "falsity" may be applied to these propositions of others that
do not have the form of categorical existential propositions, we
must determine the categorical existential propositions of ours
with which these propositions, as used by their authors, are
synonymous.
The reduction of propositions that are not existential in form
115
to the categorical existential propositions of ours with which they
are synonymous is thus to be considered from two points of view.
On the one hand, we have the task of explaining our terms "truth"
and "falsity" in their application to propositions, not categorical
existential propositions, as they occur in this treatise or as they
might be used by me. And on the other hand, we have the task
of explaining our terms "truth" and "falsity" in their application
to those propositions of others which are not categorical existen-
tial propositions but which may perhaps be synonymous with
categorical existential propositions of ours. With respect to the
former task we can speak with assurance. For, although we choose
to be guided by general usage in determining the existential
propositions with which a proposition of a given form as used by
us is to be synonymous, it is our usage that is being set forth, it
is what is synonymous for me that is being stated. With respect
to the latter task, however, we can not speak with assurance. For
even though it should be existence in our sense of "existence" that
is asserted in categorical existential propositions of others, one
writer's proposition that is not a categorical existential proposi-
tion may be synonymous with a certain categorical existential
proposition of ours, another writer's synonymous with another of
our categorical existential propositions, a third writer's synony-
mous with none of our categorical existential propositions at all.
We can but point out the existential proposition of ours with
which some such writer's proposition, not explicitly existential,
may be presumed to be synonymous, point out the entity or
entities whose existence or non-existence in our sense of "exist-
ence" may be presumed to determine the truth or falsity of his
proposition. And we can on occasion point out alternative cate-
gorical existential propositions of ours with which his proposition
may be synonymous, point out alternative entities whose existence
or non-existence in our sense of "existence" may determine the
truth or falsity of his proposition. The meaning of our terms
"truth" and "falsity" in their application to propositions of
various forms as they might be used by me can, in short, be
adequately set forth. But even where "existence" has the meaning
that it has in our writings, the application of our terms "truth"
and "falsity" to propositions of others will vary with the asser-
tions of existence or of non-existence that a proposition of a given
116
form is used to express.
There is our singular affirmative categorical existential prop-
osition: "This large house exists"; and there is the proposition:
"This house is large," which is synonymous with it. Similarly,
it would seem that, as generally used, and certainly as it occurs
in this treatise, "Socrates, the author of the Critique of Pure
Reason, exists" is synonymous with: "Socrates is the author of
the Critique of Pure Reason." So with: "The man Socrates
exists" and: "Socrates is a man." And so with: "A prince named
Orion who had seven daughters and lived at some past date
exists" and: "Once upon a time there lived a prince named Orion
who had seven daughters." Both in the sense of being synonymous-
for-me and in the sense of being synonymous as generally used,
the singular affirmative proposition: "Si is P" is, we hold, synony-
mous with some singular existential proposition: "SiP exists."
This large house is, we assume, a real entity, the man Socrates a
real entity. Our proposition: "This large house exists" is, then,
true and: "The man Socrates exists" true. And so our proposi-
tion: "This house is large" is true and our proposition: "Socrates
is a man" true. On the other hand, Socrates, the author of the
Critique of Pure Reason, is, we assume, an unreal entity and
Prince Orion with seven daughters an unreal entity. And so it
follows that, as we explain "falsity," "Socrates, the author of
the Critique of Pure Reason, exists" is false and "A prince named
Orion who had seven daughters and lived at some past date
exists" false; hence "Socrates is the author of the Critique of Pure
Reason" false and "Once upon a time there lived a prince named
Orion who had seven daughters" false.
"This house is large" is, we assume, a true proposition. We
assume, that is to say, that this large house is a real entity, that
this house, considered as a unit enduring from its construction
to its demolition, has the quality of largeness inhering in it. But
what about: "Caesar crossed the Rubicon"? The quality of cross-
ing the Rubicon was not a quality of that phase of Caesar's life
in which he was combatting Vercingetorix or of that phase of
his life in which he was consorting with Catiline. Strictly speak-
ing, the quality of crossing the Rubicon does not inhere in Caesar
taken as a substance enduring from birth to death; rather, it may
be held to inhere in a brief phase of Caesar's life, ia the transitory
117
substance which is Caesar at a momentous instant in his career. 25
If: ' 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is synonymous with: "A Caesar
crossing the Rubicon throughout his career exists/' then our:
"Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is false. It is our existential propo-
sition: "Caesar-at-moment-M, having the quality of crossing the
Rubicon, exists" that is, we may say, true. And it is only if it is
synonymous with this latter proposition that: "Caesar crossed the
Rubicon" is true. Generalizing from the example: "This house
is large," it may seem that any proposition: "Si is P" is to be
reduced to a corresponding existential proposition of the form:
"SiP exists." But, both generally and perhaps in this treatise too,
we on occasion refer to some part or related substance by using
words which, if used out of context, would refer to the whole. We
may use the term "France" to refer to the government of France,
may say: "Virgil is difficult to translate" in place of: "The poems
of Virgil are difficult to translate." "Si is P" is, we hold, both
generally and in this treatise, synonymous with some existential
proposition of the form "SiP exists." But the Si occurring in
"SiP exists" may not refer exactly to the entity which our original
subject-term, taken out of context, would normally represent.
"Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is, it would seem, synonymous with
the existential proposition: "Caesar-at-moment-M, having the
quality of crossing the Rubicon, exists," not with the existential
proposition: "A Caesar crossing the Rubicon throughout his
career exists." And "Washington crossed the Hellespont" is, it
would seem, synonymous with the existential proposition: "Wash-
ington-at-some-moment-M, having the quality of crossing the
Hellespont, exists," not with the existential proposition: "A
Washington crossing the Hellespont throughout his career exists."
It is because the former proposition of ours is false, not because
the latter is false, that our: "Washington crossed the Hellespont"
is false.
The question has been asked how the entity represented by the
subject-term of a proposition can be the entity represented by
the predicate-term. 26 It may seem that for S to be P, for "S is P"
to be true, "S" and "P" must refer to the same entity and express
identical mental attitudes. For S, it may be held, can only be S;
it cannot be P in addition. And P, it may be held, can only be
P. As we explain "truth," however, it is not necessary, in order
118
for: "This house is large" to be true, that this house be identical
with largeness. "This house" may express one mental attitude,
"large" another. "This house" may represent a substance and
"large" a quality of that substance. What is necessary, in order
that: "This house is large" may be true as we explain "truth,"
is that this large house exist in our sense of "existence." And this
large house can exist only if there are instances of a quality in-
hering in a substance. Similarly, since: "Socrates is a man" is
synonymous with: "The man Socrates exists," "Socrates is a man"
can be true only if there are individuals that are instances of uni-
versals. Problems concerning substance and quality and prob-
lems concerning the universal and its individual instances will,
however, engage our attention further on in this treatise. 27 It is
in later sections of this treatise that we shall arrive at conclusions
from which it will follow that the S P that is an alleged substance
with its quality, or an alleged universal instanced in an individual,
may be real. And it is our explanation of "truth" in the present
chapter that determines that, when SiP is real in our sense of
"reality," our "Si is P" is true; and that, when SiP is unreal in
our sense of "unreality," our "Si is P" is false.
The singular affirmative proposition: "Socrates is mortal" re-
duces, we hold, to the existential proposition: "Mortal Socrates
exists"; the singular affirmative proposition: "Socrates is im-
mortal" to the existential proposition: "Immortal Socrates exists."
But what shall we say with respect to the singular negative propo-
sition: "Socrates is not mortal"? Let us assume that a mortal
Socrates exists and that a non-mortal or immortal Socrates does
not exist. Whether, then, "Socrates is not mortal" reduces to the
existential proposition: "Mortal Socrates does not exist" or to
the existential proposition: "non-mortal Socrates exists," it is,
when our sense of reality is involved, a proposition which, as we
explain "falsity," is false. But if: "The present King of France
is not bald" is synonymous with our: "The not-bald present King
of France exists/' it is a proposition which is false; whereas if it
is synonymous with our: "The bald present King of France does
not exist," it is a proposition which is true. In either case, "The
present King of France is not bald" seems to be synonymous with
an existential proposition, seems to be true according as some
alleged entity is real or unreal, false according as some alleged
119
entity is unreal or real. In the field in which we can speak with
certainty, in the field of what is synonymous-for-me, "The present
King of France is not bald/' let us say, reduces to: "The present
non-bald King of France exists"; and "Si is not P" reduces to:
"Si: not-P exists/' Whether the: "Si is not P" of some other
writer reduces to one existential proposition of ours or another
or to no existential proposition of ours at all, the: "Si is not P"
that occurs in this treatise is true or false, as we explain "truth"
and "falsity," according as S a : not-P is real or unreal.
As we explain "truth" and "falsity," "Socrates is not mortal," as
it occurs in this treatise, is true or false according as a not-mortal
Socrates is real or unreal, "Socrates is not a man" true or false
according as a Socrates who is not a man is real or unreal. But "A
Socrates who is not a man" is not synonymous with "A man who
is not Socrates." As we explain "truth" and "falsity," "Si is not
P," as it occurs in this treatise, is true or false, that is to say, not
as PI: not-S is real or unreal, but as Si: not-P is real or unreal.
Both in the sense of being synonymous-for-me and in the sense
of being synonymous as generally used, the singular affirmative
proposition: "Si is P" is, we hold, synonymous with some singular
existential proposition: "SiP exists." 28 And both in the sense of
being synonymous-for-me and in the sense of being synonymous
as generally used, the particular affirmative proposition: "Some
S is P" is, it would seem, synonymous with some particular exis-
tential proposition: "Some SP's exist." Our: "Some men are mor-
tal" reduces to: "Some mortal men exist" and is, let us say, true or
false according as 'mortal man' is real or unreal. Our: "Some
men are black" reduces to: "Some black men exist" and is, let
us say, true or false according as 'black man* is real or unreal.
But just as some instances of: "The present King of France is not
bald" express the assertion that there is no bald present King
of France rather than the assertion that a not-bald present King
of France exists, so some instance of: "Some centaurs are not in-
telligent" may express the assertion that some alleged intelligent
centaurs do not exist rather than the assertion that unintelligent
centaurs exist. However uncertain the existential import of some
instance of: "Some centaurs are not intelligent," the instance that
is an expression of ours reduces to: "Some unintelligent centaurs
exist" and is, let us say, true or false according as 'unintelligent
120
centaur' is real or unreal. Just as our "Si is not P" reduces to:
"Si: not-P exists" and is true or false according as the alleged in-
dividual Si: not P is real or unreal in our sense of "reality," so
our: "Some S is not P," let us say, reduces to: "Some S: not-P's
exist" and is true or false according as the alleged universal S:
not-P is real or unreal.
"This house is large" reduces to, and is synonymous with, the
existential proposition: "This large house exists." "Some men
are mortal" reduces to, and is synonymous with: "Some mortal
men exist." And at least in a sense of synonymity lacking univer-
sality in its application, "This house is not large" reduces to:
"This not-large house exists" and: "Some men are not mortal"
to: "Some immortal men exist." It may be one or another existen-
tial proposition with which some singular negative proposition is
synonymous. It may be one or another existential proposition
with which some particular negative proposition is synonymous.
But there appears to be no similar ambiguity with respect to the
universal negative proposition. The universal negative proposi-
tion: "No men are immortal" seems to reduce to the existential
proposition: "No immortal men exist," the universal negative
proposition: "No stone is alive" to the existential proposition:
"Living stones do not exist." 29 There may, to be sure, be in-
stances of "No stone is alive" in which more is asserted than the
non-existence of 'living stone.' Some one may use the sentence:
"No stone is alive" to assert in addition the existence of 'stone/
the existence of lifeless stones. In the uncertain field of general
usage, "No S is P" may be synonymous with the single existential
proposition: "No SP exists" or with the two existential proposi-
tions: "No SP exists" and "S exists," asserted jointly. In the more
limited but more certain field where we explain our terms "truth"
and "falsity" with respect to propositions as they would be used
by me, "No stone is alive" is, let us say, synonymous with the
single existential proposition: "Living stones do not exist" and
is true or false according as the alleged universal living stone'
is unreal or real in our sense of "reality." There are propositions
singular, particular and universal in which the predicate-term
is not "mortal" or "immortal" or "alive," but, rather, "real" or
"unreal" or "true" or "false." Propositions with predicate-terms
of the latter group require special consideration. But with these
121
terms excepted, using "P" here and indeed throughout this
chapter to stand for any predicate-term other than "real," "un-
real," "true" or "false," the universal negative proposition: "No
S is P," as it occurs in this treatise, reduces to "No SP exists" and
is true or false according as the alleged universal SP is unreal or
real in our sense of "reality."
There is the universal negative proposition: "No stone is alive."
And there is the universal affirmative proposition: "All men are
mortal." Some instances of "No stone is alive" are synonymous
with instances of the existential proposition: "Living stones do
not exist," some instances of "All men are mortal" synonymous
with instances of the existential proposition: "Immortal men do
not exist." 80 There may, we have seen, 31 be instances of "No
stone is alive" in which more is asserted than the non-existence
of 'living stone/ And there may be instances of "All men are
mortal" in which more is asserted than the non-existence of 'im-
mortal man/ It is probable that the land-owner whose sign
reads: "All trespassers will be punished" is merely asserting the
non-existence of unpunished trespassers. 32 It is not probable that
he is asserting in addition that there will be trespassers. But just
as "No stone is alive" may be synonymous, not merely with "Liv-
ing stones do not exist," but may in addition express a belief in
the existence of 'stone/ of lifeless stones; so "All men are mortal"
may be synonymous, not merely with "Immortal men do not
exist," but may in addition express a belief in the existence of
'man/ in the existence of men who are mortal. "In the uncertain
field of general usage, "No S is P" may be synonymous with the
single existential proposition: "No SP exists" or with the two
existential propositions: "No SP exists" and "S exists," asserted
jointly." ss And in the uncertain field of general usage, "All S
is P" may be synonymous with the single existential proposition:
"No S: not-P exists" or with the two existential propositions: "No
S: not-P exists" and "S exists," asserted jointly. We have partially
explained our terms "truth" and "falsity" in their application
to propositions occurring in this treatise by reducing "No S is
P" as it occurs in this treatise to: "No SP exists" and by calling it
"true" or "false" according as SP is unreal or real in our sense of
"reality." Let us further explain our terms "truth" and "falsity"
in their application to propositions occurring in this treatise by
122
holding "All men are mortar* synonymous-for-me with "Immortal
men do not exist" and with "Some mortal men exist," asserted
jointly. The proposition: "All S is P" that occurs in this treatise
is true, that is to say, if SP is real and S: not-P unreal; the propo-
sition: "All S is P" that occurs in this treatise is false if SP is
unreal or if S: not-P is real.
"All men are mortal," as it occurs in this treatise, is synonymous
with "Immortal men do not exist" and "Some mortal men exist/'
asserted jointly. Our universal affirmative proposition: "All S is
P," that is to say, reduces to a universal negative existential propo-
sition plus a particular affirmative existential proposition. But
our: "All existing men exist" has not been described as synony-
mous with a corresponding pair of existential propositions. Our
"All existing men exist" has been described as synonymous with
"Some men exist," 84 not with: "Non-existing existing men do not
exist" plus "Some existing men exist." It reduces, that is to say,
to a particular affirmative existential proposition and thus is no
instance of our universal affirmative proposition: "All S is P."
Just as in our "All men exist" the word "all" is not the mark
of what we call a universal affirmative proposition, so in the un-
certain field of general usage the word "all" may occur in proposi-
tions which are not universal propositions. "All the books in the
British Museum would fit into Westminster Abbey" is, it would
seem, a singular proposition. 85 And so is the nursery rhyme: "All
the King's horses and all the King's men could not put Humpty
Dumpty together again." For the latter proposition, despite its
use of "all," appears synonymous with a singular existential prop-
osition of the form: "The individual army exists which is made
up of such and such members and which has the quality: inability
to perform such and such a feat."
Just as the word "all" may occur in a proposition which is
singular rather than universal, so the word "all" may occur in
what seems to be an enumerative proposition rather than a uni-
versal proposition. Unlike the instance of the universal propo-
sition: "All men are mortal" which, as it occurs in this treatise,
expresses a belief in the existence of the universal 'mortal man/
there are propositions of the form: "All S is P" which seem to
express a belief in the existence of various individual SP's. Vari-
ous instances of "All of the pieces of furniture in this room are
123
old" for example, seem not so much to express belief in the
reality of the universal: 'piece of furniture in this room that is
old' and belief in the unreality of the universal: 'piece of furniture
in this room that is not old'; they seem rather to express belief
in the existence of various individuals each of which is presented
as an old piece of furniture in this room. There is, in short, the
instance of "All S is P" which is an enumerative proposition and
which may be read: "Each S is P." And whereas the universal
affirmative proposition as it occurs in this treatise is true if the
universal S: not P is unreal, and the universal SP real, the enu-
merative proposition: "Each S is P" is, let us say, synonymous
with a group of singular propositions, being true if each of them
is true, false if one of them is false. "Each S is P" is true, that is
to say, only if the individuals SiP, S 2 P, S 3 P, . . . exist; "Each S is
not P" true only if the individuals Si: not-P, S 2 : not-P, S 3 : not-P,
. . . exist.
Therels then the universal proposition: "All S is P" and the
enumerative proposition which, whereas it on occasion may also
have the form: "All S is P," is less ambiguous in the form: "Each
S is P." The distinction between them, it is often held, is based,
not so much upon the use of the word "each" in the one case and
the use of the word "all" in the other, as upon the fact that in the
one case each S could be enumerated by the author of the propo-
sition, in the other case not. As it occurs in this treatise, "All men
are mortal" is a universal proposition, not merely because it
makes use of the word "all," but because it expresses an assertion
with respect to the universal 'mortal man' rather than an asser-
tion with respect to individual men. Can it not be, however, that
an author who writes: "All men are mortal" is making an asser-
tion with respect to each individual man? Admittedly, he is not
definitely aware of each individual man. But may he not pri-
marily be holding, not that there are some mortal men, not that
'mortal man' exists, but rather that each individual man is
mortal? "A true proposition," says Hobbes, 86 "is that whose
predicate contains or comprehends its subject or whose predicate
is the name of every thing of which the subject is the name. As,
man is a living creature is therefore a true proposition because
whatever is called man, the same is also called "living creature."
To think of the subject as being included in the predicate is,
124
however, to think of one group of entities as being included
within another group of entities. It is to think of groups, of
classes; in short, it involves taking what is represented by the
subject-term distributively. The fact that the truth of "All S
is P" is held by some writers to be a matter of inclusion, of classes
within classes, evidences the fact that "All S is P" is sometimes
taken distributively, that "All S is P" is sometimes the expression
of an assertion that might have been expressed as "Each S is P."
There are, to be sure, propositions occurring in this treatise
which conform with no one of the categorical forms thus far dis-
cussed. We have still to point out the entities upon whose reality
or unreality the truth or falsity of hypothetical and disjunctive
propositions occurring in this treatise depends. And since "P" as
it occurs in this chapter does not cover the predicate-terms "real,"
"unreal," "true" and "false," 37 we have not yet discussed the
truth or falsity of such propositions as: "This proposition is false"
and "Each of the propositions in this book is true." With these
exceptions, however, our terms "truth" and "falsity," in their
application to propositions occurring in this treatise or as they
might be used by me, have at this point, we hold, been explained.
Propositions are true or false, as we explain our terms "truth"
and "falsity," according as some entity or entities are real or un-
real in our sense of "reality." And each proposition as it occurs in
this treatise or as it might be used by me expresses an assertion of
the reality or unrealityin our sense of "reality" of some entity
or entities.
We have moreover explained our terms "truth" and "falsity"
in their application to various propositions of others who use the
term "existence" as we do. To be sure, the conditions under
which such a writer's: "All S is P" is true may not be the condi-
tions under which our: "All S is P" is true. His "All S is P" may be
true whenever S:not P is unreal, whereas our "All S is P" is true
only if S:not-P is unreal and S P real. 88 And his "Si is not P" may be
true when Si P is unreal, whereas our "Si is not P" is true when
Si: not-P is real. 39 "Even though it should be existence in our sense
of "existence" that is asserted in categorical existential propositions
of others, one writer's proposition that is not a categorical existen-
tial proposition may be synonymous with a certain categorical exist-
ential proposition of ours, another writer's synonymous with an-
125
other of our categorical existential propositions, a third writer's
synonymous with none of our categorical existential propositions
at all/' 40 Our "Ivanhoe is Ivanhoe" is a proposition of the form
"Si is P" and, as "truth" and "falsity" have been explained in
their application to propositions of ours, is true only if Si P is
real, only if an Ivanhoe who is an Ivanhoe is real. But the "Ivan-
hoe is Ivanhoe" of some other writer, even if he uses "existence" as
we do, may be synonymous with no existential proposition at all,
may express no assertion of existence in our sense of "existence"
and may consequently, as we explain "truth" and "falsity," be
neither true nor false.
Since Ivanhoe does not exist, our proposition: "Ivanhoe is Ivan-
hoe" is false. And since the alleged universal 'centaur* does not
exist, our proposition: "All centaurs are centaurs" is false. Our
proposition :"A is A" is true if A exists, false if A does not exist.
As we explain "truth" and "falsity" and as we reduce propo-
sitions to categorical existential propositions, it follows that
"A is A" is not always true. " 'A is A' is always true" is, it may
be held, a formulation of the law of identity. But "A is A' is al-
ways true" has as its predicate-term the word "true." And whether
or not "A is A" is true depends upon the meaning of "truth." The
word "truth" may be assigned a meaning such that it will follow
that "A is A" is always true. Or, as in this chapter, the word
"truth" may be assigned a meaning such that it will not follow
that "A is A" is always true. The law of identity, in short, at least,
the law of identity that may be formulated as: " 'A is A* is always
true" is thus dependent upon, and not independent of, the mean-
ing of "truth." Apart from whatever meaning may be assigned
"truth," it is neither a law of thought nor a law of things. It is
within the framework of our explanation of "reality" that there
is the law of things: A real A is real. And it is within the frame-
work of our explanation of "truth" that, when A is real, our prop-
osition "A is A" is true.
Of any pair of propositions: "Si is P" and Si is not P," at
least one is false. Of any pair of propositions: "All S is P" and
"Some S is not P," at least one is false. Of any pair of propositions:
"No S is P" and "Some S is P," at least one is false. These three
sentences taken together may be said to constitute the law of con-
tradiction. But since the word "false" is the predicate-term in:
126
"One of a given pair of propositions is false/' whether or not one
of a given pair of propositions is false will depend upon the
meaning of "falsity." What, then, is the situation with respect to
our propositions, let us ask, when "falsity" has the meaning
assigned it in this chapter? Can we say that, in our sense of
"falsity," of any pair of our propositions: "Si is P" and "Si is not
P," at least one is false; that of any pair of our propositions: "All
S is P" and "Some S is not P," at least one is false; that of any
pair of our propositions: "No S is P" and "Some S is P," at least
one is false?
In order that our "Si is P" may be true in our sense of "truth,"
Si P must be a real entity. And in order that our "Si is not P" may
be true in our sense of "truth," S x : not-P must be a real entity. Si
P and Si: not-P can not both, however, be real entities. For Si P
and Si: not-P could both be real only if the self-contradictory en-
tity Si: P-and-not-P were real, only if an entity were real that, in
the course of our explanation of "reality," was marked out as
unreal. 41 Again, in order that our "All S is P" may be true in our
sense of "truth," S: not-P must be unreal. And in order that our
"Some S is not P" may be true in our sense of "truth," S: not P
must be real. But S: not-P can not be real when it appears un-
real. For as we have explained "reality," the entity that appears
both real and unreal has been marked out as unreal. Similarly
with our: "No S is P" and our: "Some S is P." Our "No S is P"
is true in our sense of "truth" only if SP is unreal, our "Some S is
P" only if SP is real. It follows then that as we explain "truth" and
"falsity" at least one of our corresponding propositions: "Si is P"
and "Si is not P" must be false, at least one of our corresponding
propositions: "All S is P" and "Some S is not P" false, at least
one of our corresponding propositions: "No S is P" and "Some S
is P" false. For each new meaning of the term "falsity," a new
validation of the law of contradiction is, it would appear, re-
quired. What has just been shown is that, in our sense of "falsity"
and with respect to propositions of ours, at least one of each pair
of what are commonly called contradictory propositions is false.
There are the contradictory propositions: "All S is P" and
"Some S is not P," the contradictory propositions: "No S is P" and
"Some S is P." And there subsists the self-contradictory entity A:
not-A and the self-contradictory entity S: P-and-not-P. As words
127
are commonly used, "contradictory propositions" is no doubt a more
familiar and a less awkward expression than "self-contradictory en-
tities." An object that appears round and not round is unreal, it
may appear, because "This object is round" and "This object is not
"round" are contradictory; not "This object is round" and "This
object is not round" contradictory because a round, not-round ob-
ject is a self-contradictory entity. There are those, we have seen,
who regard truth as prior to reality. 42 And a discussion of truth and
reality that permits "reality" to be explained by a reference back to
'truth' has the advantage of permitting the more familiar expres-
sion: "contradictory propositions" to be introduced before 'the
more awkward expression: "self-contradictory entities." It has
been our choice, however, to discuss reality before discussing
truth, hence to introduce the expression: "self-contradictory en-
tity" before introducing the expression: "contradictory propo-
sitions." 4S But the introduction of our term: "self-contradictory
entity" prior to a discussion of contradictory propositions does
not, I hope, detract from the understanding of our expres-
sion: "self-contradictory entity." There subsists the alleged entity
which appears both straight and not-straight, the alleged entity
which appears both round and not-round. And we do, I hope,
succeed in partially explaining our terms "reality" and "un-
reality" when, even prior to a discussion of contradictory propo-
sitions, we mark out such self-contradictory entities as unreal.
Of our propositions "Si is P" and "Si is not P," at least one, we
have seen, 44 is false in our sense of "falsity." We can not conclude,
however, that, of our propositions "Si is P" and Si is not P," at least
one is true in our sense of "truth." Our proposition: "The pres-
ent King of France is bald" is true only if a bald present King of
France exists; our proposition: "The present King of France
is not bald" only if a not-bald present King of France exists. If,
however, there is no present King of France, a bald present King
of France is unreal and a not-bald present King of France unreal,
hence our proposition: "The present King of France is bald"
false and our proposition: "The present King of France is not
bald" false. When the alleged entity Si is unreal, both our propo-
sition: "Si is P" and our proposition: "Si is not P" are false. In-
deed even when Si is real, "Si is P" and "Si is not P" may both be
128
false. This good deed alleged to be yellow may be unreal and this
good deed alleged to be not-yellow may be unreal. Si, in short, may
be real and yet, having regard to the deductions our explanation
of "reality" permits us to make, Si P may be unreal and S^ not-P
unreal.
Similarly with our contradictory propositions: "All S is P" and
"Some S is not P." Our proposition: "All centaurs are intelligent"
is false in that the alleged universal 'intelligent centaur' is un-
real; our proposition "Some centaurs are not intelligent" false in
that the alleged universal 'unintelligent centaur* is unreal. And
just as the alleged individual: 'this good deed* may be unreal both
when presented as yellow and when presented as not-yellow, so
the alleged universal 'good deed' may be unreal both when pre-
sented as yellow and when presented as not-yellow.
Since the word "false" is the predicate-term in "One of a given
pair of propositions is false," it follows that whether or not one
of a given pair of propositions is false will depend upon the
meaning of "falsity." 45 And since the word "true" is the predi-
cate-term in "One of a given pair of propositions is true," whether
or not one of a given pair of propositions is true will depend upon
the meaning of "truth." "In our sense of 'falsity' and with respect
to propositions of ours, at least one of each pair of what are com-
monly called contradictory propositions is false." 46 But, except
for propositions of the forms "No S is P" and "Some S is P," it
does not follow from our explanation of "truth" that, with re-
spect to propositions of ours, at least one of each pair of what are
commonly called contradictory propositions is true in our sense
of "truth." Within the framework of our explanations of "reality"
and "truth," the law of contradiction in at least one formulation of
it has been deduced as valid with respect to propositions of ours.
Within the framework of our explanations of "reality" and
"truth," the law of identity in at least one formulation of it has
been deduced as valid with respect to propositions of oursbut
only provided the subject-term represents an existent entity. But
it is only within much narrower limits that the law of excluded
middle in at least one formulation of it can be found to be valid
within the framework of our explanations of "reality" and
"truth/'
129
Summary
1 X exists in our sense of "existence," then our proposition
"X exists" is true in our sense of "truth" and our proposition
"X does not exist" false in our sense of "falsity." Thus the ex-
planation of our terms "truth" and "falsity" utilizes and refefs
back to the explanation of our term "existence." Various types
of categorical propositions are considered and the entities pointed
out whose existence or non-existence in our sense of "existence"
determine these propositions to be true or false as we explain our
terms "truth" and "falsity."
The so-called laws of thought are statements about what must
be true or must be false. But we can not say what must be true
or must be false until we know what "truth" and "falsity" mean.
"Truth" and "falsity," like "existence" and "non-existence," are
capable of various meanings. It is only after the meanings of
"truth" and "falsity" have been determined that we are in a posi-
tion to consider the validity of the so-called laws of thought.
When "truth" and "falsity" have the meanings we assign those
terms, the law of contradiction is true, the other so-called laws
of thought only qualifiedly true.
130
Chapter V
MORE ABOUT TRUE AND FALSE PROPOSITIONS
We have at this point agreed that various sentences are real in
our sense of "reality/* some of them being sentences of ours,
some of them sentences of others. Those propositions of others
which express no assertion of existence or of non-existence in our
sense of "existence" are, to be sure, real. But, as we explain our
terms "truth" and "falsity," they are neither true nor false. 1 Ex-
cept for judgments or facts that may be called "true," it is to sen-
tences expressing assertions of existence or of non-existence in
our sense of "existence" that we are limiting the application of
our terms "truth" and "falsity," to sentences expressing asser-
tions of existence or of non-existence in our sense of "existence,"
whether these sentences be propositions of ours or propositions of
others. It is however only in their application to some of these
sentences that we have thus far explained our terms "truth" and
"falsity." Categorical propositions occurring in this treatise,
whether singular, particular or universal, whether affirmative or
negative, are, provided the predicate-term is not "true," "false,"
"real" or "unreal," true or false according as some entity or en-
tities are real or unreal. Categorical existential propositions oc-
curring in this treatise are likewise true or false according as some
entity is real or unreal. And those propositions of others which are
synonymous with one or more categorical existential proposi-
tions as they might be used by me are true or false according as
all of the categorical existential propositions of ours to which they
may be reduced are true or one of them false.
In explaining our terms "truth" and "falsity" as applied to
propositions of others, little more need be said. It remains, how-
131
ever for us to determine the categorical existential propositions
of ours, if any, to which our non-categorical propositions may be
reduced. And it remains for us to determine whether any of
our propositions can not be reduced to categorical existential
propositions, whether any of our propositions express no assertion
of existence or of non-existence in our sense of "existence,"
whether, consequently, any of our propositions, in accordance
with our explanations of "truth" and "falsity," are neither true
nor false.
Within the framework of our explanations of "truth" and
"falsity" as thus far stated, it may seem that our sentence: "This
proposition is true" may be true, false, or neither true nor false.
For "This proposition is true" is not an explicitly existential
proposition like "Socrates exists" nor, since "P" has been said not
to cover the predicate-terms "true" and "false," 2 an instance of "Si
is P." The only sentences which are neither true nor false, how-
ever, are those which are not propositions and those which express
no assertions of existence or of non-existence in our sense of
"existence." Our sentence: "This proposition is true" is what we
call a "proposition"; 3 it does not express an assertion of mere sub-
sistence; it is not synonymous with: "This true proposition sub-
sists." Rather it expresses an assertion that 'this true proposition*
exists; it is, as we explain "truth," true or false according as 'this
true proposition' is real or unreal.
Let us take as our alleged object: 'the sentence "This proposi-
tion is true," apparently presented as false/ What we seem to have
before us is then a 'this proposition' with the characteristic of be-
ing true and with the characteristic of being false. What we seem
to have before us is a subsisting 'this proposition' which appears
self-contradictory, a subsisting 'this proposition' which conse-
quently is unreal. 'This proposition' is real when presented as
true but not false, unreal when presented as both true and false.
And since "This proposition is true," when not presented as false,
exists, "This proposition is true" is itself, let us say, a proposition
which is true.
Just as our sentence: "This proposition is true" exists when
presented as true and not false, so our sentence: "This proposi-
tion is false" exists when presented as false and not true. Since
'this true-false proposition' does not exist, "This proposition is
132
false" is not true. And yet, -since 'this false proposition' exists, a
sentence which expresses an assertion of the existence of 'this false
proposition* does not express an assertion of mere subsistence and
is consequently either true or false. 'This proposition is false'* is,
it follows, false. To be sure, when the predicate-term is not "real,"
"unreal," "true" or "false," then, when Si P exists, our proposi-
tion: "Si is P" is true. 4 And if "This proposition is false" were to
be treated as an instance of "Si is P," then, since 'this false propo-
sition* exists, "This proposition is false" would be true. But "This
proposition is false" is, as we have just seen, not true. And so it
follows that the conditions determining the truth or falsity of a
proposition of ours whose predicate-term is the word "false" are
not always the conditions determining the truth or falsity of a
proposition of ours whose predicate-term is neither "true" nor
"false" nor "real" nor "unreal/* It is some entity's existence or
non-existence which determines a proposition to be true or false,
in our sense of these terms, rather than neither true nor false. But
in one case where an entity exists, a proposition asserting the
existence of that entity is true; in another case where an entity
exists, a proposition asserting the existence of that entity is false.
Our sentence: "This proposition is true'* is a proposition which
is true, our sentence: "This proposition is false** is a proposition
which is false. But whereas our proposition: "This proposition is
true*' is in all instances true, our proposition: "Proposition A,
which is not this proposition, is true*' is, it would seem, true or
false according as proposition A is true or not. And whereas our
proposition: "This proposition is false*' is in all instances false,
our proposition: "Proposition B, which is not this proposition, is
false" is, it would seem, true or false according as proposition B is
false or not.
There exist, let us agree, propositions whose subject terms are
propositions; there exist propositions whose subject-terms are
propositions which in turn have propositions as their subject-
terms. There exist, that is to say, what we may call the first-order
proposition A, what we may call the second order proposition:
"Proposition A is false," what we may call the third-order propo-
sition: "It is true that proposition A is false.** Generalizing, we
may say that a proposition of the (n+l)th order in which the
predicate-term is the word "true" is true or false according as the
133
proposition of the n th order, which is its subject-term, and not
identical with it, is true or not. And we may say that a proposition
of the (n-fl)th order in which the predicate-term is the word
"false" is true or false according as the proposition of the n th
order which is its subject-term, and not identical with it, is false
or not. We thus elaborate the explanation of our terms "truth"
and "falsity" with respect to propositions of ours of higher and
higher order. But no questions concerning propositions of an
allegedly infinite order are involved. For the most complex propo-
sition whose truth or falsity is to be determined will, however
complex, be a proposition definitely presented to us, a proposi-
tion which is real and of a finite order.
There is our singular proposition: "The proposition 'All men
are mortar occurring on this page is a true proposition." And
there is our enumerative proposition: "Each proposition occurring
on this page is true." There is our singular proposition: "The
proposition 'All centaurs are animals' occurring on this page is a
false proposition." And there is our enumerative proposition:
"Each proposition occurring on this page is false." But, as we use
it, "Each proposition occurring on this page is true" is, let us say,
synonymous with "This proposition is true" and "Each remain-
ing proposition on this page is true." And, as we use it, "Each
proposition occurring on this page is false" is, let us say, synony-
mous with "This proposition is false" and "Each remaining propo-
sition on this page is false." Since our proposition: "This proposi-
tion is true" is always true, our proposition "Each proposition
occurring on this page is true" is true if each remaining proposi-
sition on this page is true. And since "This proposition is false" is
always false, our proposition "Each proposition occurring on this
page is false" is never true. If Lucian had been using "existence"
in our sense of "existence" and if he had ended his "True History"
with the statement: "Each of the propositions in this book is
false," his final proposition would have been false in the sense in
which we are using the terms "falsity" and "truth."
"Given any set of objects such that, if we suppose the set to have
a total, it will contain members which presuppose this total, then,"
say Whitehead and Russell, "such a set can not have a total" and
"no significant statement can be made about all its members." 5
But our statement: "Each proposition occurring on this page is
134
false*' is not without meaning in the sense in which the statement:
"Eeny meeny miny mo" is without meaning. Indeed it expresses an
assertion of the existence of various false propositions and, since it
itself exists as a false proposition, it is a proposition which is false.
It is itself, we hold, a proposition; and hence adds to the number
of propositions on this page. And so if it is the last proposition on
a page containing twenty others, that page, it would seem, con-
tains twenty-one propositions and not propositions having no
total at all.
If Si P exists, our proposition "Si is P" is true; whereas if 'this
false proposition' exists, our proposition: "This proposition is
false" is false. To this extent there is a difference between "truth"
as we explain it in its application to certain propositions of the
first order and "truth" as we explain it in its application to cer-
tain propositions of a higher order. It may seem to be a matter
merely of the choice of words whether, as with Whitehead and
Russell, the distinction is said to be between "truth of the first
order" and "truth of a higher order" or whether, as with us, the
distinction is said to be between the conditions under which cer-
tain propositions of the first order are true or are false, and the
conditions under which certain propositions of a higher order
are true or are false. No doubt, some theory of types, though not
Whitehead and Russell's, might distinguish as we do the condi-
tions under which certain propositions of the first order are true
or are false from the conditions under which certain propositions
of a higher order are true or are false. It is to be pointed out, how-
ever, that it is not the order of a proposition alone that determines
the conditions under which a proposition is true or false as we ex-
plain "truth" and "falsity." The conditions determining the truth
or falsity of our second-order proposition: "This proposition is
false" are, to be sure, not the conditions determining the truth or
falsity of a first-order proposition of the form: Si is P. But the con-
ditions determining the truth or falsity of our first-order propo-
sition "Si is unreal" are likewise not the conditions determining
the truth or falsity of our "Si is P." For our "Si is unreal" is true,
not if an unreal Si exists, but if Si is unreal. And our "Si is unreal"
is false, not if an unreal Si does not exist, but if Si is *;eal. The con-
ditions under which propositions of ours are true or false vary with
the f<r m of proposition in which assertions of existence or of non-
135
existence are expressed. But it is always the existence or non-exist-
ence of some entity or entities in our sense of "existence" that
determines a proposition's truth or falsity. It is not existence in
one sense that characterizes entities whose existence is asserted in
first-order propositions, existence in another sense that character-
izes entities whose existence is asserted in second-order proposi-
tions. And it is to this extent not truth in one sense that character-
izes first-order propositions, truth in another sense that character-
izes second-order propositions.
There are second-order propositions whose subject-terms are
first order propositions; there are propositions, that is to say, which
are about propositions. And as there are propositions about prop-
ositions, so there subsist relations between relations, qualities of
qualities, classes whose members are classes. Alleged situations of
these various types may present us with difficulties, with apparent
contradictions. Where such contradictions appear, "the appear-
ance of contradiction/' it has been held, 6 "is produced by the
presence of some word which has systematic ambiguity of type,
such as truth, falsehood, function, property, class, relation, cardi-
nal, ordinal, name, definition." Indeed, as these apparent contra-
dictions may elicit similar diagnoses, so, it may be held, they call
for similar solutions. And so what is said about propositions about
propositions, it may be held, indicates what is to be said about
alleged relations between relations, about alleged qualities of
qualities, about alleged classes whose members are classes. No
doubt apparent contradictions apparently presented to us in con-
nection with alleged qualities of qualities or in connection with
alleged classes whose members are classes require our attention at
some point. It is however in connection with our discussion of
qualities and relations that we shall consider the alleged quality
of being a quality. 7 It is in connection with our discussion of uni-
versals that we shall consider the alleged universal whose instances
are univeisals. 8 And it is in connection with our discussion of
meanings that we shall consider an ambiguity in the term "name."
Let us at this point limit our attention to propositions varying
in form and to the conditions under which propositions varying
in form are true or false as we explain our terms "truth" and
"falsity."
Ever since Aristotle, many logicians hold, propositions of the
136
subject-predicate type have occupied our attention too exclusively.
It is felt that many of the sentences in which we normally express
ourselves fall into the subject-predicate form only by an artificial
and unnatural treatment. "King James was King Charles's son,"
for example, is to be symbolized, it is felt, by "A r B" rather than
by "Si is P." Moreover, it has been pointed out, our neglect of
"A r B" has led us to neglect various valid implications, as, for
example, the implications which are valid when "r" is a transitive
relation. We need, however, merely note these criticisms and pass
on. For our task is not to catalog and discuss the implications
that are valid with respect to propositions of various forms. Nor
is our task to catalog the forms in which we normally express
ourselves. No doubt through the existential proposition: "Anne
exists with the quality of having Ruth as her sister and with the
quality of having Mary as her sister," attention is directed to Anne
as it is not directed to her through the relational proposition:
"Ruth, Mary and Anne are sisters." But the various existential
propositions of ours which are synonymous with our: "Ruth,
Mary and Anne are sisters" need no pointing out. Our task at this
point is to explain our terms "truth" and "falsity" in their applica-
tion to propositions of ours, however these propositions may
vary in form. But the conditions under which our relational prop-
ositions are true or false are, it would seem, clear. For with what-
ever shift in emphasis the reduction of them to existential propo-
sitions may be carried out, however inelegantly the existential
propositions to which they are reduced may have to be expressed,
the existential propositions with which they are synonymous are,
it would seem, clear; hence the conditions under which they are
true or false are clear.
Sentences of others which express no assertions of existence or
of non-existence in our sense of "existence" are, we have said, 10
neither true nor false. There are writers whose term "existence"
has a meaning different from that which our term "existence" has.
And there are perhaps sentencesand certainly clauses which
express no assertion of existence or of non-existence in any sense
of "existence." In the hypothetical sentence: "If A is B, C is D,"
the clause: "If A is B" expresses no assertion that there exists, in
any sense of "existence," an A that is B. There is, for example,
the hypothetical sentence: "If it rains tomorrow, the ground will
137
be wet/' And yet, as this sentence is commonly used, whatever
meaning "existence" has for its author, this sentence's initial
clause expresses doubt, rather that belief, in the occurrence of
rain tomorrow. The statement however is: "If it rains tomor-
row, the ground will be wet," not "If it rains tomorrow, the
ground will be dry." If there is any sense of "truth," any sense of
"falsity," in which the former proposition is true and the latter
false, there would seem to be a corresponding sense of "existence"
in which rain is wet and not dry, a corresponding sense of "exist-
ence" in which rain exists with the quality of causing the ground
to be wet, not with the quality of causing the ground to be
dry. Some other author's: "If A is B, C is D" may express no as-
sertion of existence or of non-existence in our sense of "existence";
his sentence may be neither true nor false in our sense of "truth"
and in our sense of "falsity." Nevertheless there would appear to
be some entity whose existence in his sense of "existence" he is
asserting, some entity which from his point of view is an existent
and supports the statement: "If A is B, C is D" rather than the
statement: "If A is B, C is not D." 1X
There is likewise some entity whose existence or non-existence
in our sense of "existence" determines the truth or falsity in our
sense of "truth" and "falsity" of a hypothetical proposition of
ours. And it is by pointing out the entities whose existence or
non-existence determines the truth or falsity of a hypothetical
proposition of ours that we explain our terms "truth" and "fal-
sity" in their application to that proposition of ours.
A hypothetical proposition of ours is, generally speaking, a
proposition having the form: "If A is B, C is D." But "If it rains
tomorrow" is synonymous with: "If rain tomorrow should exist"; 12
"If some men have six legs" synonymous with: "If the universal
'six-legged man' should exist." 1S And so with our "C is D." There
is the hypothetical proposition: "If rain tomorrow should exist,
then wet grounds tomorrow would exist" and the hypothetical
proposition: "If 'six-legged man' should exist, then 'six-legged
animal' would exist." Many of our hypothetical propositions, that
is to say, may be reduced to instances of: "If entity E should exist,
then entity F would exist," may be said to be true or false accord-
ing as the corresponding instance of: "If E should exist, then F
would exist" is true or false.
138
Our proposition: "If rain tomorrow should exist, then wet
grounds tomorrow would exist" does not express an assertion that
rain tomorrow will exist nor an assertion that there will be wet
grounds tomorrow. Our proposition: "If 'six-legged man' should
exist, then 'six-legged animal' would exist" does not express an
assertion that 'six-legged man* exists nor an assertion that 'six-
legged animal' exists. There are however two-legged men; and
'two-legged man' implies 'two-legged animal/ And there are six-
legged insects; and 'six-legged insect' implies 'six-legged animal.'
Likewise there was rain yesterday which caused wet grounds and
rain a month ago which caused wet grounds. If what may be said
to be analogous to rain tomorrow does not cause what is corre-
spondingly analogous to wet grounds tomorrow, then our propo-
sition: "If rain tomorrow should exist, then wet grounds tomorrow
would exist" is false. And if what may be said to be analogous to
'six-legged man* does not imply what is correspondingly analogous
to 'six-legged animal,' then our proposition: "If 'six-legged man'
should exist, then 'six-legged animal' would exist" is false. E may
not exist and F may not exist. But in order for our proposition:
"If E should exist, F would exist" to be true in our sense of
"truth," some entity in some sense analogous to E must exist in
our sense of "existence"; and some entity correspondingly analo-
gous to F must exist. Indeed, the entity or entities that may be
said to resemble E must really cause the entity or entities that
seem correspondingly to resemble F, must really imply the entity
or entities that seem correspondingly to resemble F, or must really
be synchronous and concomitant with the entity or entities that
seem correspondingly to resemble F. Our proposition: "If E should
exist, F would exist," that is to say, expresses an assertion that
entities in some sense resembling E exist; indeed, that they exist
when presented as entering into certain relational situations with
entities seeming to resemble F. Unless these entities thus pre-
sented are real, our hypothetical proposition, let us say, is false.
Provided these entities thus presented are real, our hypothetical
proposition, let us say, may be true.
There is, moreover, not only an assertion of existence expressed
in our proposition: "If E should exist, F would exist"; there is
also an assertion of non-existence. There may or may not be rain
tomorrow, But an alleged rain tomorrow presented as not caus-
139
ing, or not being concomitant with, wet grounds tomorrow is as-
serted not to exist. 'Six-legged man' may or may not be real. But
'six-legged man/ presented as not implying 'six-legged animal/
is asserted not to be real. Only if E presented as not causing, not
implying and not being concomitant with F is unreal, and only
if entities in some sense resembling E presented as entering into
certain relational situations with entities in some sense resembling
F are real, then and only then is our proposition: "If E should
exist, F would exist" true.
"If it rains tomorrow/' we have said, 1 * is synonymous with "If
rain tomorrow should exist"; "If some men have six legs" synony-
mous with "If 'six-legged man* should exist." Since, however, our
proposition: "No men are immortal" has been reduced to: "Im-
mortal men do not exist," 15 it follows that "If no men are im-
mortal" is synonymous with: "If immortal man should not exist."
There is thus not only our hypothetical proposition: "If E should
exist, then F would exist"; there is our hypothetical proposition:
"If E should not exist, then F would exist," our hypothetical
proposition: "If E should exist and E' not exist, then F would
exist"; our hypothetical proposition: "If E should not exist, then
F would not exist." There is, for example, not only our propo-
sition: "If six-legged man should exist, then six-legged animal
would exist," but also our proposition: "If 'animal' should not
exist, then 'man' would not exist." And there is not only our
proposition: "If rain tomorrow should exist, then wet grounds
tomorrow would exist," but also our proposition: "If there should
be no fire, there would be no smoke."
Our proposition: "If it should rain tomorrow, the ground would
be wet" expresses an assertion that rain tomorrow not concomit-
ant with wet grounds will not exist. And our proposition: "If
there should be no fire, there would be no smoke," we may ten-
tatively say, expresses an assertion that the absence of fire con-
comitant with smoke does not exist. But what is this absence of
fire that is asserted not to exist when presented as concomitant
with smoke? Where there is no fire, there is, let us assume, matter
at a temperature below the point of combustion. It is non-com-
busting matter presented as concomitant with smoke that, it
would appear, we are asserting to be unreal. And it is what might
be alleged to exist on a planet where there are no animals that,
140
it would appear, we are asserting to be unreal when presented
as concomitant with man. In order that our proposition: "If E
should not exist, F would not exist" may be true, what may be
alleged to exist in the absence of E must be unreal when pre-
sented as concomitant with F, must be unreal when presented as
not concomitant with what is alleged to exist in the absence of F.
But when we say: "If E should not exist, F would not exist," is
there anything that we are asserting does exist? Are we asserting
that something does exist in the absence of E and is concomitant
with what exists in the absence of F? Are we asserting at least
that something exists which seems to resemble what might exist in
the absence of E and that this entity is concomitant with an entity
that seems to resemble what might exist in the absence of F? Or
does our: "If E should not exist, F would not exist" merely ex-
press an assertion of non-existence, express no assertion of exist-
ence at all? With respect to that with respect to which we can
speak with certainty, with respect to propositions that are ex-
pressions of mine, let us adopt the last and simplest course. Let us
say that our: "If E should not exist, F would not exist" expresses
no assertion not expressed in: "What is alleged to exist in the
absence of E is unreal when presented as concomitant with F." Let
us consequently say that our proposition: "If there should be no fire,
there would be no smoke" is true or false, in our sense of "truth"
and "falsity," according as non-combusting matter alleged to be
concomitant with smoke is unreal or real. And let us say that our
proposition: "If there should be no animals there would be no
men" is true or false according as there is not, or is, a world
containing men but not animals.
There is our categorical proposition: "All centaurs are animals"
and there is our hypothetical proposition: "If centaurs should
exist, animals would exist." Just as our proposition: "All men
are mortal" is true, as we explain "truth," only if immortal men
do not exist, so "All centaurs are animals" is true only if cen-
taurs who are not animals do not exist. 16 "If centaurs should
exist, animals would exist" is likewise true only if centaurs who
are not animals do not exist. For our proposition: "If E should
exist, F would exist" is true "only if E presented as not causing,
not implying and being concomitant with F is unreal." 1T The two
propositions which we are comparing, one categorical and one
141
hypothetical, both, to be true, require the non-existence of cen-
taurs who are not animals. But they differ in the entities that
must exist, if they are to be true. In order for: "If centaurs should
exist, animals would exist" to be true, there need be no centaurs,
only entities analogous to centaurs whose existence causes or
implies or is concomitant with the existence of animals. But in
order for: "All centaurs are animals" to be true, there must be
some centaur that is an animal. Our categorical proposition: "All
centaurs are animals," it follows, is not synonymous with our
hypothetical proposition: "If centaurs should exist, animals would
exist." For with horses, which may be said to be analogous to
centaurs, being real and being animals, and with centaurs not
being real and not being animals, the hypothetical proposition is
true and the categorical proposition false.
"A hypothetical proposition of ours," we have said, 18 "is, gen-
erally speaking, a proposition having the form: "If A is B, C is
D." But along with the assertions expressed in: "If A is B, C is D,"
there may be the assertions expressed in: "A is not B" as when
we say: "If A were B or had been B, C would be or would have
been D." And along with the assertions expressed in "If A is
B, C is D" and expressed in "A is not B," there may be the as-
sertions expressed in: "C is D." We may be asserting that C is
D but that A is not B; and we may also be asserting that A being
B would cause or imply C being D. We may in short assert that
C is D as though or as if A were B.
In the writings of Vaihinger and others much importance is
attached to fictions. There is the fiction: "All of the sun's mass
is concentrated at the centre." And there is the fictitious or "as
if" proposition: "The earth revolves about the sun in an elliptical
path exactly as if all of the sun's mass were concentrated at the
centre." The fiction itself the proposition, for example: "All of
the sun's mass is concentrated at the centre," may be a proposi-
tion that the physicist finds useful to consider. The mental attitude
which has as its apparent object an alleged sun whose mass is con-
centrated at the centre may lead to other mental attitudes di-
rected upon the behavior of the sun as it actually exists. But when
we assert that C is D as if A were B, we are asserting that A is not
B. We are asserting that A is not B; that C is D; that if A should be
B, G would be D. We are asserting for example: "If the sun's
142
mass should be concentrated at its centre, the earth would revolve
in an elliptical orbit about it." And whereas, in order that this
latter proposition may be true, the sun's mass need not be con-
centrated at the centre, there must be something analogous
to a sun whose mass is concentrated at the centre; and this
analogous entity that is real must really imply, or must really
be concomitant with, an entity analogous to an earth that follows
an elliptical path. It is true, let us suppose, that a laboratory ap-
proximation of a body alleged to have its mass concentrated at
its centre does exist, a body, for example, with a dense core. And
it is true, let us suppose, that the satellite of such a body follows
an elliptical path. If, then, among other assumptions we assume
that the earth's orbit is indeed an ellipse, then the fictitious propo-
sition: "The earth revolves about the earth in an elliptical path
exactly as if all of the sun's mass were concentrated at the centre"
is a proposition which is true; whereas the fiction: "All of the
sun's mass is concentrated at the centre" is a proposition which
is false. tl
Vaihinger distinguishes, however, between what he calls real
fictions" and what he calls "semi-fictions." "Semi-fictions," he
holds," "assume the unreal, real fictions the impossible." But if a
real fiction is to be symbolized by: "The self-contradictory entity
E exists," then the fictitious or "as if proposition that is based
upon it becomes, let us suppose: "F exists as if the self-contra-
dictory entity E existed." "F exists as if the self-contradictory
entity E existed" is, however, true -at least this proposition as it
might be used by me is true,-only if an entity in some sense
analogous to the self-contradictory E is real and only if this
analogous entity really causes, really implies, or is really syn-
chronous and concomitant with, an entity analogous to F. Is
there then, we may ask, a real entity that may be said to be
analogous to the E that is presented as self-contradictory? It
each entity presented as analogous to E appears as self-contradic-
tory as E itself, then no entity analogous to E exists and the
fictitious proposition based upon what Vaihinger calls a real
fiction is false. And if a real entity may be said to approximate and
resemble a self-contradictory one, if a many-sided polygon, for
example may be said to be analogous to a circle bounded by
straight lines, then real fictions and semi-fictions seem to require
143
no separate treatment. For in that case the fictions are equally
false and the fictitious propositions based upon them are equally
likely to be true; in that case, whether our alleged E be self-
contradictory or not, there is a real entity that may be said to be
analogous to it, a real entity whose participation in a particular
relational situation is asserted.
There may be no circle bounded by straight lines. But if there
is a many-sided polygon that may be said to be analogous to such
an alleged circle, then the hypothetical proposition that begins
with the clause: "If a circle were bounded by straight lines" may
be true. There may be no men with six legs. But if 'two-legged
man' may be said to be analogous to such an alleged 'six-legged
man/ then the hypothetical proposition that begins with the
clause: "If some men had six legs" may be true. It may not have
rained last Tuesday. But if there have been other instances of
rain all followed by wet grounds, then the hypothetical propo-
sition: "If it had rained last Tuesday, the ground would then have
been wet" may be true. My alcoholic friend may not be seeing
a snake. But if people have seen snakes and have jumped, my
proposition: "He is jumping as though he were seeing a snake"
may be true.
But if other people have really seen snakes, how can their
experiences which are real be really analogous to an alleged
snake-seeing experience which is unreal? How can yesterday's
rain which was real have the real quality of being analogous to
an alleged but non-existent rain last Tuesday? Real entities, it
would seem, can have only real qualities. Unreal entities, it
would seem, can have only unreal qualities. Last Tuesday's rain
is unreal no matter how it is presented. It is unreal; and its al-
leged quality of being analogous to yesterday's rain is unreal.
And yesterday's rain is real only when presented with qualities
that it really has. The quality of resembling an unreal entity is
unreal. And the yesterday's rain that is presented as resembling
an unreal rain is an unreal subsistent, a subsistent other than the
subsisting yesterday's rain which is real. 20
A real entity, we must agree, can not really resemble an unreal
one. But unreal entities may be presented as apparent objects.
And real entities, which to be sure do not really resemble them,
may subsequently be selected as our objects. There are the real
144
words: "Last Tuesday's rain." And after having these real words
before us, we may subsequently select as our object the real en-
tity: yesterday's rain. There may be no entities really resembling
an unreal E. But our term: "Entities resembling an unreal E" is
real; and this term may suggest other terms which not only are
real but which have real meanings. "If E should exist, F would
exist" is a proposition of ours which is real and which may be
true or may be false. A condition of its truth, we now find, is
not that entities really resembling E enter into relational situa-
tions with entities really resembling F, but rather that the real
entity E 1 , suggested by our real phrase "entities resembling E"
enter into relational situations with the real entity F 1 suggested
by our real phrase: "Entities resembling F."
There is our hypothetical proposition: "If A is B, C is D"; and
there is our alternative proposition: "A is B or G is D." Both in
general usage and as an expression of ours, " A is B or C is D or
E is F" is called true if "A is B" is a true proposition or "C
is D" a true proposition or "E is F" a true proposition. And if
each of the included propositions is false, then the alternative
proposition which includes them is called "false." No matter how
disparate the entities whose existence is asserted or denied in "A
is B" and in "C is D," the alternative proposition: "A is B or C is
D," it would seem, may be true. Thus, since both "Caesar crossed
the Rubicon" and "No centaurs are animals" are true in our sense
of "truth," our alternative proposition: "Caesar crossed the Rubi-
con or no centaurs are animals," let us say, is likewise true in our
sense of "truth." Since our proposition: "All men are mortal" is
true in our sense of "truth," our alternative proposition: "All
men are mortal or Washington crossed the Hellespont" is true
in our sense of "truth." And as we explain our term "falsity"
in its application to alternative propositions of ours, since "The
present King of France is a married man" and "This proposition
is false" are both false, our alternative proposition: "The present
King of France is a married man or this proposition is false" is
false. Our alternative proposition is thus a proposition about
propositions, a proposition that resembles: "At least one of the
propositions on yonder page is true." In its simplest form it is
what we have called a proposition of the second order rather than
a first-order proposition like: "All men are mortal" or like: "If it
145
should rain tomorrow, the ground would be wet/' 21
Let us assume that we have before us a true hypothetical propo-
sition that is, or may be reduced to, an instance of: "If E should
exist, then F would exist." Among the various assertions that this
proposition expresses, there is the assertion that E, presented as
not concomitant with F and presented as neither causing nor im-
plying F, does not exist. 22 Since the hypothetical proposition which
we are considering is assumed to be true, the entity whose non-
existence is asserted in it does not exist. And since an E presented
as not concomitant with F and presented as neither causing nor
implying F does not exist, it follows that an E presented as not
even co-existent with F does not exist. If, that is to say, E does not
exist unless it causes, implies or is concomitant with F, then E
does not exist unless it co-exists with F. Either E does not exist at
all or F is also an existent. Thus at least one of two propositions is
true. Either "E does not exist" is true or "F exists" is true. In
short, if our hypothetical proposition: "If E should exist, then F
would exist" is true, then our alternative proposition: "Either E
does not exist or F exists" is true.
If our hypothetical proposition: "If E should exist, then F
would exist" is true, then our alternative proposition: "Either E
does not exist or F exists" is true. It is not to be concluded how-
ever that if our alternative proposition: "Either E does not exist
or F exists" is true, then our hypothetical proposition: "If E
should exist, then F would exist" is true. Our hypothetical propo-
sition: "If E should exist, then F would exist" expresses an asser-
tion of existence as well as an assertion of non-existence. And even
the assertion of non-existence expressed in it is not the assertion
of the non-existence of an E that is alleged merely not to co-exist
with F. It is an E, alleged not to enter into a particular relational
situation with F, which is asserted to be unreal and which, since
our proposition is assumed to be true, is unreal. E does not
merely not exist without F existing; E does not exist without im-
plying F, or without causing F, or without being synchronous and
concomitant with F. 28 A Caesar who crossed the Rubicon existed;
and rain yesterday existed. The two events co-exist in the sense
that the one is not an existent and the other a non-existent. But
Caesar's crossing the Rubicon did not cause yesterday's rain, did
not imply yesterday's rain, was not synchronous with yesterday's
146
rain. As we explain our terms "truth" and "falsity" in their appli-
cation to propositions of ours, our alternative proposition: "Either
Caesar did not cross the Rubicon or it rained yesterday" is true;
our hypothetical proposition: "If Caesar crossed the Rubicon,
then it rained yesterday" is false.
"It rained yesterday" is a true proposition. There is however
a difference between: "It rained yesterday" being presented as
a true proposition and rain yesterday being presented as an
existent entity, a difference between: "Either it rained yester-
day or Caesar did not cross the Rubicon" being presented as a
true proposition and 'rain yesterday or Caesar not crossing the
Rubicon* being presented as an existent entity. There is no real
entity: 'Rain yesterday or Caesar not crossing the Rubicon.' And
the real entity 'rain yesterday* does not really imply 'rain yester-
day or Caesar not crossing the Rubicon/ The implication in short
is from one true proposition to another, not from the existent re-
ferred to in one proposition to the existent referred to in another.
It is the true proposition P which implies the true proposition: P
or Q; not the entity whose existence is asserted in P which implies
some entity described as "E or F" whose existence might be said to
be asserted in 'P or Q.' There are implications between proposi-
tions, that is to say, which can not be reduced to implications be-
tween the entities that seem to be referred to in these propositions.
There are true hypothetical propositions about propositions,
true hypothetical propositions of the second order, that have no
true hypothetical propositions of the first order corresponding to
them.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to point out the bearing, if
any, which the remarks of the last few pages have upon proposi-
tions advanced in treatises on symbolic logic. "Existence" may
be assigned various meanings; "truth" may be assigned various
meanings; "implication" may be assigned various meanings. And
the relevance of the distinctions to which we have just alluded will
vary with the meanings selected. Our primary task has been to ex-
plain our terms "truth" and "falsity" in their application to
categorical propositions of ours and to alternative propositions
of ours, to hypothetical propositions of the first order and to hy-
pothetical propositions of the second order. And at this point this
part of our task has, it would seem, been accomplished.
147
Let us however not take leave of the alternative proposition
without some discussion of the dilemma, without some discussion
of the situation in which we are alleged to be confronted by two
equally unsatisfactory alternatives. Consider, for example, the
plight of the ship's barber who has agreed to shave each man on
board ship who does not shave himself and no man on board ship
who does shave himself. 24 The barber is himself a member of the
ship's personnel. If he shaves himself, he is breaking his agree-
ment; since he has agreed to shave no one on board ship who
shaves himself. And if he does not shave himself, he is failing to
shave each man on board ship who does not shave himself. The
barber appearing with the characteristic of shaving all non-shavers
and with the characteristic of shaving only non-shavers, like the
Cretan appearing with the characteristic of making the true asser-
tion that no Cretan ever expresses himself in a true proposition 25
is a subsistent implicitly appearing as self-contradictory, a sub-
sistent that is unreal. Of the two statements the barber may be sup-
posed to have made before entering upon his duties, one is false.
Either "I shall shave each man on board who does not shave him-
self" is false or "I shall shave no man on board who shaves him-
self" is false. The sentence: "Either the proposition 'I shall shave
each man on board who does not shave himself is false or the
proposition 1 shall shave no man on board who shaves himself is
false" is, however, not without meaning in the sense in which the
statement: "Eeeny meeny miny mo" is without meaning. 26 Our
alternative proposition expresses an assertion that, of two alleged
false propositions, one presented as false exists. It expresses an
assertion of existence and, as we explain our term "truth," is
true rather than neither true nor false. 27
There is likewise the dilemma that may be supposed to have
been presented to the court in the hypothetical case of Prota-
goras versus Euathlus. 28 Euathlus is supposed to have agreed to
complete payment for the training he had received only after
winning his first case. When his teacher Protagoras sued him for
the unpaid balance and thus forced upon Euathlus his first and
last case, Euathlus is imagined to have proposed to the court a
dilemma. "Either I shall win this case, in which event the court
will have decided that the balance is voided; or I shall lose this
case, in which event I shall never have won my first case." An
148
alleged correct decision in favor of Euathlus is implicitly pre-
sented with contradictory consequences and is unreal. An alleged
correct decision in favor of Protagoras is implicitly presented with
contradictory consequences and is unreal. The agreement to pay
after the first case no matter what the first case might be, and to
pay only after the first case, like the agreement to shave each
non-shaver and no shavers, turns out to have been an agreement
that cannot be kept. Either our proposition: "Protagoras will re-
ceive payment only after Euathlus wins his first case" is false; or
our proposition: "Euathlus will pay after winning his first case"
is false. Unless the case of Protagoras versus Euathlus was implic-
itly excepted, there was no real agreement at all and judgment
must be rendered on the basis that there was no agreement.
There is our alternative proposition: "A is B or C is D." 29 "A
is B" may be positive or negative, singular, particular or universal.
So with "C is D"; and so with any other propositions that are in-
cluded in our alternative proposition. "A" may moreover be
identical with "C," or "B" may be identical with "D." But how-
ever one alternative proposition of ours may differ from another,
despite the multiplicity of types, nevertheless not every proposi-
tion containing the words "or" or "nor" is an instance of "A is B
or C is D." "All animals are vertebrates or invertebrates," for ex-
ample, is not synonymous with "All animals are vertebrates or all
animals are invertebrates," but, as generally used, seems, among
other assertions, to express the assertion that no animal is both
non-vertebrate and non-invertebrate. And "Neither Taft nor
Wilson is now President" seems, as generally used, to be synony-
mous with: "Taft is not now President; and Wilson is not now
President." It is in short our alternative proposition that we have
been discussing, not every proposition containing the word "or"
or the word "nor."
When we turn to the apodeictic proposition, it is likewise not
each proposition containing the word "necessary" or the word
"must" that concerns us. "S must be P" or "S must exist" may
simply express in more emphatic form what would be expressed
in "S is P" or in "S exists"; "S can not be P" or "S can not exist"
may simply express in more emphatic form what would be ex-
pressed in "S is not P" or in "S does not exist." "S must be P" or
"S can not be P" may simply point to the deep conviction with
149
which "S is P" or "S is not P" is asserted. "I am thoroughly con-
vinced that S is P" is, however, no apodeictic proposition, and "I
am thoroughly convinced that S is not P" no apodeictic proposi-
tion.
Whether they be positive or negative, singular, particular or
universal, existential or not explicitly existential, our categorical
propositions, we have said, express assertions of existence, asser-
tions of non-existence, or assertions of the existence of one entity
and of the non-existence of another. They may each be reduced,
let us say, to an instance of: "F exists," to an instance of: "F does
not exist" or to an instance of: "F exists; and F 1 does not exist."
Likewise each of our apodeictic propositions, let us say, expresses
an assertion that some entity must exist; an assertion that some
entity can not exist; or an assertion that it is necessary that one
entity exist and impossible that another exist. Each apodeictic
proposition of ours, that is to say, may be reduced to an instance
of: "F must exist" or to an instance of: "F can not exist" or to
an instance of: "F must exist; and F 1 can not exist." What, how-
ever, is asserted in our proposition: "F must exist" that is not
asserted in our proposition: "F exists"? And what is asserted in
our proposition: "F can not exist" that is not asserted in our
proposition: "F does not exist"?
As we have explained our terms "reality" and "unreality,"
those subsistents are unreal which appear as self-contradictory,
those subsistents unreal which appear as lacking any date, those
subsistents unreal which appear with various other character-
istics. 30 A distinction suggests itself between those unreal sub-
sistents which explicitly or implicitly appear as self-contradictory
and those unreal subsistents which neither explicitly nor implic-
itly appear as self-contradictory. Perhaps we should call sub-
sistents appearing as self-contradictory "impossible subsistents,"
and should call unreal subsistents not appearing as self-contra-
dictory "unreal subsistents" but not "impossible subsistents." We
might then give "truth" and "falsity" significations from which
it follows that "F can not exist" is to be called "true" if F appears
self-contradictory. The sentences: "F appears self-contradictory"
and "F does not appear self-contradictory," however, merely pre-
sent us with subsistents. They seem to put before us an F appearing
as self-contradictory or an F appearing without the characteristic of
150
being self-contradictory. They express no assertions of existence or
of non-existence, are not what we call propositions and hence, as
we have agreed to use the terms, "truth" and "falsity/' are not true
or false at all. 81 Within the statement: "F appears self-contradictory;
therefore F is unreal," it is not the sentence: "F appears self-contra-
dictory" that is true or false, but only the sentence: "F is unreal."
Moreover the alleged distinction between that which appears
self-contradictory and that which does not even implicitly appear
self-contradictory becomes, with further consideration, less clear-
cut. There is the subsistent which appears with the characteristic
of lacking any date. As we explain our term "reality," this sub-
sistent is unreal. But if, in rejecting this subsistent, it is an alleged
real entity appearing as lacking any date that we are rejecting,
then it is an entity implicitly appearing as self-contradictory that
we are rejecting. For the alleged real entity appearing as lacking
any date implicitly appears as real and as unreal, implicitly appears
with characteristics which seem to contradict one another.
The entity appearing as self-contradictory is unreal; the entity
appearing as lacking any date is unreal; the entity appearing as
generally discredited is unreal. But it is not as mutually exclusive
groups of non-existent entities that we have presented these
subsistents. The entity appearing as lacking any date may appear
as generally discredited; the entity appearing as generally dis-
credited may appear as self-contradictory. It is any entity appear-
ing with any characteristic listed in the closing pages of Chapter
Three that is unreal; and any entity listed among the Y's in the
appendix to that chapter. 82 On the other hand, it is only the entity
not appearing with any of these characteristics that is real, only
the entity not appearing with any of these characteristics that,
explicitly or implicitly, is listed among the X's in that appendix.
Among the entities which are real, however, among the entities
not appearing with certain characteristics and listed among the
X's enumerated in the appendix to chapter three, our proposi-
tions explaining our terms "existence" and "reality" do not per-
mit us to point to some as more real and to others as less real. As
we explain our terms "existence" and "reality" there are no
degrees of reality. There are not some entities which merely
exist and others which have a more exclusive kind of existence
to be called "necessary existence." Thus an alleged distinction
151
between merely existing entities and necessary entities is, one
might say, more repugnant to our explanation of ' 'existence" than
an alleged distinction between merely non-existing entities and
impossible entities.
As we explain our term "existence," there are not existing en-
tities and, among them, entities with a kind of existence called
"necessary existence." And as we express ourselves in the proposi-
tion: "F must exist/' "F must exist" does not express an assertion
that F has a kind of existence not asserted in our proposition: "F
exists." Our proposition: "F must exist," let us say, expresses an
assertion that F exists and is implied by some entity E. Our
proposition: "Some animals must exist" is synonymous with the
proposition: "Some entity exists, as, for example, the universal
'man,' which implies that some animals exist." Our: "F must
exist" expresses what might be expressed in: "Therefore F exists."
For, like "Therefore F exists," it refers back to some entity whose
existence has previously been asserted or whose existence has
implicitly been asserted in the context. Our "F must exist" is true
if F exists and is implied by the E thus referred to. Our "F must
exist" is false if F does not exist or is not implied by this E. And
if we are unable to determine which the alleged entity E is that
is alleged to imply F, then we are unable to understand "F must
exist," unable to determine whether it is true or false.
There is our hypothetical proposition: "If E should exist, then
F would exist"; and there is our apodeictic proposition: "F must
exist." They differ, to be sure, in that in the former the term "E"
occurs within the proposition itself, whereas in the latter it is
neighboring sentences that explicitly or implicitly supply the re-
ference to E. They also differ in that, whereas our apodeictic
proposition asserts the existence of some implication, our hy-
pothetical proposition asserts the existence of some relational
situation which may be one of simultaneity or of cause and effect
rather then one of implication. In spite of the rain yesterday, "The
grounds must have been wet" may not be a true apodeictic propo-
sitkmu For yesterday's rain, it may be said, caused yesterday's wet
grounds, but did not imply them. In view of various instances of
rain followed by wet grounds, including yesterday's sequence, in
view furthermore of the non-existence of rain not followed by wet
grounds, the proposition: "If it should rain tomorrow, the
152
ground would be wet" is true. Nevertheless, unless there is an
implication from rain to wet grounds, the proposition: "The
grounds yesterday had to be wet'* is false. 88
Our hypothetical proposition and our apodeictic proposition
differ, moreover, with respect to the assertion of the existence of
F and with respect to the assertion of the existence of E. "F must
exist" is true only if F exists and only if F is implied by E. And
F is really implied by E only if there is a real E to imply it. If
it is the existence of man that enables us to express ourselves in
the true apodeictic proposition: "There must be some animals/'
'man* must exist, 'animal' must exist, and 'man' must imply
'animal.' But 'man' need not exist in order for: "If there should
be men, then there would be animals" to be true, any more than
'centaur' need exist in order for: "If there should be centaurs,
then there would be animals" to be true. It is the existence of an
entity in some sense analogous to man or in some sense analogous
to centaur that is required if our hypothetical proposition is to
be true. It is an entity in some sense analogous to E that must
exist and that must enter into a certain relational situation with
an entity in some sense analogous to F. 84
The apodeictic proposition that we have thus far discussed is
our apodeictic proposition: "F must exist," "F has to exist," "It is
necessary that F exist." What about our apodeictic proposition:
"F can not exist," our apodeictic proposition: "It is impossible
that F exist"? We may say, to be sure, that it is only when F is un-
real that our proposition "F can not exist" is true. But when F is
unreal, this alleged F, with whatever characteristics it may seem to
be presented to us, is unreal. An unreal F is not really implied by
any entity E. 85 The unreality of F is not really implied by any
entity E. The proposition: "Some entity E implies the unreality
of F" is always false. If, then, in explaining our terms "truth" and
"falsity" in their application to our proposition: "F can not exist,"
we were to say that "F can not exist" is true only when "F does
not exist" is true and only when in addition "Some entity E im-
plies the unreality of F" is true, then it would follow that our
proposition "F can not exist" is never true. If F is unreal, it is
some entity that is alleged to exist in the absence of F that may
be real, some entity alleged to exist in the absence of F that may
really be implied by E. 86 Or it is the proposition: "F is unreal"
153
that exists as a true proposition and it is the true proposition: "F
is unreal" that may really be implied by E. Our proposition: "F
can not exist" is true, let us say, if F is unreal and if some entity E
implies what exists in the absence of F or implies the true propo-
sition: "F does not exist." And our proposition: "F can not exist"
is false, let us say, if F is real or if there is no entity E which either
implies what exists in the absence of F or implies the true propo-
sition: "F does not exist." "Men can not be immortal" is true, for
example, in our sense of "truth," if what exists in the absence of
immortal animals implies what exists in the absence of immortal
men or if our true proposition: "No animals are immortal" im-
plies our true proposition: "No men are immortal."
There are the apodeictic propositions: "F must exist" and "F
can not exist." And there are the problematic propositions: "F
may exist" and "It may be that F does not exist." There are the
apodeictic propositions: "It is necessary that F exist" and "It is im-
possible that F exist"; and there are the problematic propositions:
"It is possible that F exists" and "It is possible that F does not
exist." Just as it is not all propositions containing the word "neces-
sary" or the word "must" that are apodeictic propositions, so it is
not all propositions containing the word "possible" or the word
"may" that are problematic propositions. 87 The: "That may be
John" which is synonymous with: "I rather think but am not sure
that that is John" is not what we shall call a problematic proposi-
tion. And tie: "Oranges may be seedless" which is synonymous
with: "Some oranges are seedless" is no problematic proposition.
When F does not exist, there exists the true proposition: "F
does not exist." And there may, in addition, be some entity which
exists in the absence of F. Our proposition "F may exist" is false,
let us say, if some entity E, referred to in the context in which
"F may exist" occurs, really implies the true proposition: "F does
not exist," or really implies what exists in the absence of F. My
hat being in this room implies the true proposition: "My hat,
presented as being in some other room, does not exist." Within a
context which informs us that my hat is in this room, our proposi-
tion: "My hat may be in some other room" is false. If, on the
other hand, there is no true proposition: "F does not exist," or if,
"F does not exist" being true, there is no entity referred to in the
context that really implies it, then, let us say, our proposition: "F
154
may exist" is true. If my hat is in this room, if, that is to say, there
is no true proposition: "My hat, presented as being in this room,
does not exist," then: "My hat may be in this room" is true. And
"My hat may be in this room" may be true even if my hat is in fact
not in this room, even if: "My hat, presented as being in this room,
does not exist" is true. "My hat may be in this room" is true,
provided there is no entity referred to in the context that implies
the true proposition: "My hat, presented as being in this room,
does not exist." "My hat may be in this room" is true, for ex-
ample, if the context informs me only that my hat is not outside
this house. The "F may exist" that is an expression of ours is, in
short, synonymous with: "Either F exists or, if F does not exist,
the proposition 'F does not exist* is not really implied by E." As
we explain our term "truth" in its application to it, "F may
exist" is true if F is real or if, F being unreal, the proposition "F
is unreal," presented as implied by E, is unreal.
It is in an analogous manner that we explain our terms "truth"
and falsity in their application to our problematic proposition: "It
may be that F does not exist." Assuming that our context tells us
that some men are mortal and assuming that 'mortal man' implies
'mortal animal/ then our problematic proposition: "It may be
that mortal animal does not exist" or: "It is possible that no
animal is mortal" is, let us say, false. Assuming, on the other
hand, that our context tells us merely that some plants are mortal,
and assuming that 'mortal plant* does not imply 'mortal animal/
then, even though 'mortal animal' is real, "It is possible that no
animal is mortal" is, let us say, true. And if 'mortal animal' is
unreal, then, no matter what the context, "It is possible that no
animal is mortal" is likewise true.
"As we explain our term 'existence/ there are not existing en-
tities and, among them, entities with a kind of existence called
'necessary existence.' 88 And as we explain our term "truth," no
sentence is true which merely distinguishes those subsistents which
appear self-contradictory from those subsistents which do not ap-
pear self-contradictory. If our sentence: "Whatever is, is possible"
is to be regarded as a true proposition, this sentence is to be re-
garded as expressing, not the assertion that existent entities, in
addition to being real, have a kind of existence called "possible
existence," but rather the assertion that, if an entity exists, then
155
the proposition that it is possible for it to exist is true. It is in
connection with propositions rather than in connection with en-
tities, intended to be represented by the terms of a proposition,
that the word "possibility" has been considered. And it is in con-
nection with propositions rather than in connection with entities
intended to be represented by the terms of a proposition that the
word "necessity" has been considered. Whatever must be, it may
be said, exists. But what is true is not that entities having a spe-
cial kind of existence also have an existence of a more general
kind. What is true, rather, is that, if the proposition: "S must
exist" is true, then: "S exists" is true.
The world of existent entities has on occasion been described
as something of a hierarchy, with effects pointing up to causes and
with conclusions pointing up to premises until at the apex a First
Cause is reached whose existence is not contingent but necessary.
Contingent existents, on such a view, presuppose other existents;
they presuppose, finally, an entity that presupposes nothing out-
side itself, an entity that has necessary existence. As we use the
term "necessity," however, there is, as has been pointed out, no
kind of existence to be called "necessary existence." And as we
have explained our term "truth" in its application to apodeictic
propositions of ours, the proposition "F must exist" is not true
unless F is implied by some entity E. 89 If the alleged Being pre-
sented to us is a Being which appears with the characteristic of
not being implied by anything referred to in the context, then,
as we have explained our term "falsity," the proposition express-
ing an assertion that this Being must exist is false.
It is often a difficult matter to determine whether an entity is
real or unreal. And it is often a difficult matter to determine
whether a sentence placed before us is true or false or, perhaps,
neither true nor false. Whatever the other difficulties, it is a prime
requisite that we recognize the 'reality' and the 'truth* that are in
question. We have, to be sure, not found it possible to attach to
our terms "reality" and "unreality" a signification which is in
accord with every author's use of these terms. And we have not
found it possible to explain our terms "truth" and "falsity" in
their application to categorical propositions, to hypothetical
propositions, to various other propositions varying in form, in
such a way as to conform with the usage of every logician. But
166
the explanations of our terms "reality" and "truth," now com-
pleted, present a reality and a truth. They place before us the
formal conditions under which an entity is real in one sense of
"reality," the formal conditions under which a proposition is true
in one sense of "truth." In order to determine whether or not con-
sciousness exists, we must understand the term "consciousness"
as well as the term "existence." 40 In order to determine whether
or not the sentence: "Some collections are infinite" is true, we
must understand the term "infinite collection" as well as the term
"truth." With the 'reality' before us that our term "reality" repre-
sents and with the 'truth* before us that our term "truth" repre-
sents, we are, we hold, 41 prepared to turn to what, by contrast,
may be called the less purely formal problems of metaphysics. We
are, we hold, prepared to consider the extent to which entities
discussed by metaphysicians are, in our sense of the word, "real";
and the extent to which propositions which assert the existence or
the non-existence of these entities are, in our sense of the word,
"true."
Summary
Chapter Five continues the explanation of our terms "truth"
and "falsity." It asks: Is the proposition: 'This proposition is
false' true or false in the sense in which we are using the terms
"truth" and "falsity"? And it attempts to point out the entities
whose existence or non-existence determines the truth or falsity,
in our sense of "truth" and "falsity," of various types of proposi-
tions of ours not considered in Chapter Four.
The discussion of "This proposition is false" leads to com-
ments on the theory of types. The discussion of the "as if* propo-
sition has implications for the discussion of the problem of error
in Chapter Eight.
157
Chapter VI
DOES THINKING EXIST?
"I was then in Germany to which country I had been attracted
by the wars which are not yet at an end. And as I was returning
from the coronation of the Emperor to join the army, the setting
in of winter detained me in a quarter where, since I found no
society to divert me, while fortunately I had also no cares or
passions to trouble me, I remained the whole day shut up alone
in a stove-heated room where I had complete leisure to occupy
myself with my own thoughts. One of the first considerations
that occurred to me was . . ."
These opening lines from Part Two of Descartes' "Discourse
on Method" seem to introduce to us a situation in which there
was an instance of thinking. This thinking is alleged to have
occurred in Germany, in a stove-heated room, and in winter;
and presumably it was about man, God and the universe. In this
chapter, however, our primary interest is not in determining the
existence or non-existence of Germany, of winter, or of the stove-
heated room. Nor are we at this point interested in determining
whether or not there exists the 'man,' the God or the universe
about which Descartes may be held to have been thinking. Our
present problem is to determine whether or not thinking exists.
To the extent feasible, let us then at this point disregard prob-
lems concerning the existence of brains which may be held to be
the vehicles of thinking; let us disregard problems concerning
the existence of particular settings in which various instances of
thinking may be held to occur; and let us disregard problems
concerning the existence of objects towards which instances of
thinking may be held to be directed.
158
Let us disregard vehicle, setting and object to the extent to
which we can disregard them. But if we are to concentrate our
discussion upon some specific instance of alleged thinking, as, for
example, that suggested by the lines quoted from Descartes, we
must already have passed over the thinking alleged to be alone
in the world, the thinking that is held to be without vehicle, set-
ting, or object. And if we are to discuss the existence of some
specific instance of thinking in a simple and straight-forward
manner, we must already have acknowledged the existence of
some of the features of the setting in which that instance of think-
ing is alleged to have occurred. Our query must be: Granting
that Descartes had a brain and was in a stove-heated room, was
he thinking? For, with the reality of brain, room and thinking all
in question, we should find ourselves confronted by a host of
questions all clamoring at once for solution and all having to be
answered before the reality of Descartes' thinking could be ac-
knowledged.
To be sure, what we have before us when the meaning of our
term ' 'existence" has been determined is, it may seem, merely an
empty canvas. The method we have agreed to employ, it may be
held, imposes upon us the task of filling in this canvas bit by bit.
In considering whether or not Descartes' thinking belongs on this
as yet empty canvas, our method, it may be said, requires us to
assume the non-existence of everything else. But such candidates
for existence as a thinking alleged to be alone in the world
without vehicle, setting or object are, we find, presented as gen-
erally discredited and are unreal. And such candidates for exist-
ence as the thinking of Descartes' that is presented as having a
vehicle and a setting can be discussed in fewer words and in a less
complicated fashion when, instead of regarding thinking, vehicle
and setting as all mere subsistents, we accept the premise that
vehicle and setting are real. We are the less constrained to regard
vehicle, setting and thinking as all mere subsistents, we are the
less reluctant to make use of the premise that vehicle and setting
are real, in that Descartes' brain and the stove-heated room have
already been listed as existents in the appendix to Chapter Three.
As we begin this chapter, we have thus no empty canvas before
us, but rather a canvas containing all of the entities previously
listed as reaL
159
Yet if this be true, our deduction ends with the appendix to
Chapter Three and all the rest of this treatise is mere commentary.
What then becomes of our decision to discuss particular existen-
tial problems "in the proper order"? What becomes of our deci-
sion to "be on the watch for existential problems so related that
the solution of one may reasonably be expected to aid us in the
solution of the other"? 1 We must, I think, distinguish between
logical objection on the one hand and puzzlement and lack of
concurrence on the other. The reader who has read the appendix
to Chapter Three will agree that the entities there listed as real
are real in the sense in which we have explained our term "real-
ity." But he may feel that some of these entities are listed without
due consideration or that our term "reality" has been assigned
a strange and unacceptable meaning. It is in the effort to dissolve
such objections that an analysis of one entity and a discussion
resulting in the reaffirmation of its reality may aid in the analysis
of some other entity and may be utilized in the discussion result-
ing in the reaffirmation of the latter's reality. Except to the extent
to which the listings in the appendix to Chapter Three are too
enigmatic to be understood and require elaboration, the remain-
der of this treatise is not needed. But it does not follow that the
remaining chapters contain no reasoned arguments and that they
appeal merely for psychological concurrence. A conclusion ar-
rived at from one set of premises may again be arrived at from
similar premises or from other premises. A conclusion arrived
at on a second occasion may be redundant, but it is a logical
conclusion nonetheless. It is then as analysis and argument rather
than as rhetoric that the remainder of this treatise is presented.
Indeed it is only within the framework of some explanation of
the term "truth," only after some such section as is incorporated
in Chapter Four, that there is valid argument that may be recog-
nized as valid, and true conclusions that may be recognized as
true. For just as "A is A" may be true in one sense of "truth" but
not in another, 2 so "A implies B" may be true in one sense of
"truth" but not in another. The existential conclusions to be
arrived at in the remainder of this treatise thus not only describe
the entities whose existence is asserted in greater detail than was
possible at the end of Chapter Three, but, in contrast to the con-
clusions of Chapter Three, they follow as conclusions that can be
160
recognized as validly deduced. It is not then an empty canvas
that confronts us as we begin this chapter but rather a canvas
which, although well-filled, requires minute criticism and re-
affirmation. It is not as the painter putting on the initial daubs
of oil that we approach the canvas; but rather as the painter-
critic who concentrates his attention on minute sections of his
work in turn, at each point regarding the rest of the work as un-
questioned and making such adjustments as the section under
consideration requires.
It is then with the premise that there are such entities as brains
and rooms that we inquire whether thinking exists. Yet our ques-
tion is not whether all subsisting instances of thinking exist. For
just as: "All subsisting men exist" is false as we have explained
''truth" and "falsity," so: "All subsisting instances of thinking
exist" is false. 3 And "some subsisting instances of thinking exist"
is true only if there are some such installs as the thinking that
is alleged to have characterized Ooft&rtOG as he paced up and
down the stove-heated room and pondered, or seemed to ponder,
the existence of man, God and the universe. We choose as our
question then whether the instance of thinking that allegedly
characterized Descartes was real. Granted the existence of Des-
cartes' brain rather than the existence of brains generally, and
granted the existence of Descartes* stove-heated room rather than
the existence of settings of all sorts, our query is: Was Descartes
thinking?
Yet, whereas we have what may be described as an individual
situation as our apparent object, it is not clear at this point what
element in this alleged situation is being called: "Descartes'
thinking." There are various alleged entities that need to be
untangled. There is the alleged public object, such as God him-
self, to which Descartes' thinking may be alleged ultimately to
refer. There is an alleged mental attitude which is not in the first
instance content, but said to be directed upon content. And there
is allegedly private content, such as Descartes' idea of God, which
may be held to refer beyond itself to some such public object as
God himself. But it is not the public object that we choose to
call "Descartes' thinking" and not private content. Tfce thinking
whose existence we are primarily questioning in thio chapter J
mental attitude rather thail priVaW ttHlttHtit. It is some such entity
161
as Bsageptes-*- alleged mental activity rather than any image or
picture or obiect. it is, in a word, thinking rather than whatTs
thought.
At first sight the distinction between what is alleged to be
mental attitude and what is alleged to be content, whether pri-
; vate or public, seems clear. And yet this distinction becomes less
clear-cut when we attempt to introspect and to make mental atti-
tude a part of content. fopr mypart," says Hume, 4 "when I enter
most intimately into whafl call rriyself, I always stumble on some
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade,
love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any
time without a perception, and never can observe anything but
the perception.'/" Or, as Lovejoy 5 puts it, "what I seem to discover
when perception occurs is not a perceiving, but a certain complex
of content which is subject to conscious change/* On the other
hand, there are those who hold that what we call "mental atti-
tude" may be introspe'ctecf. And there are others who hold that
mental attitude is an object to be inferred, an object to be in-
ferred even from the circumstances reported by Lovejoy and
Hume. Let us not at this point exclude from the denotation of
"mental attitude" the alleged mental attitude which is presented
as on occasion being an object. So far as we have yet seen, it may
be that, if what we call "thinking" exists, it can be apprehended
by a second act of thinking. It may be that, with respect to such
a second act of thinking, thinking is revealed as content of one
sort or another. And since thinking may be held to be revealed
in introspection or otherwise given as an object, this thinking
whose existence we are to consider is not to be described as some-
thing that is never content. It is rather to be described as some-
thing that, if given as content, is given as attitude, attitude that
is perhaps directed towards other content.
Indeed the possibility of thinking, if it exists, becoming content
is not the only consideration that blurs our initial distinction
between thinking on the one hand and the object of thought on
the other. When we distinguish between thinking or mental
attitude or mental activity on the one hand and object of thought
or private jgtfitent or what is pre^nted as a datum on the other,
we makaaise^f .such terms as "activity" and "passivity," terms
which, it would seem, apply to things which move or are moved,
162
things which attack or are attacked, rather than to such alleged
entities as Descartes' thinking on the one hand and Descartes'
idea of God on the other. We do very little to clarify the distinc-
tion between the mental attitude whose existence we are to con-
sider and the idea of God whose existence we are not at this
point to consider by calling the former "active" and the latter
"passive/' To be sure, Descartes* alleged thinking is not presented
as a mental picture or image, not presented as passive in the way
in which a picture or image is usually passive. But it need j^ot be
presented as manipulating its content in the way in which an
active organism may be held to bring about changes in entities
in its environment. The distinction between what we call "think-
ing" and wihat we call "private content" must at this point remain
a bit blurred. What we call "mental attitude" may by some be
included in what they would call "private content/ 1 Yet what we
call "mental attitude" is presented as not a mental picture or
image and it is presented as not being content except in so far
as it is the object upon which it or some further mental attitude
is directed.
Our problem is whether or not thinking exists. More specifi-
cally, our problem is whether or not, as Descartes paced up and
down his stove-heated room, there existed a mental attitude
apparently directed upon man, God and the universe. We have
at this stage made it clear that we are not in this chapter con-
cerned with the existence of the stove which is in Descartes'
environment, with the existence of God, upon whom Descartes'
thinking is alleged to be directed, or with the existence of a pic-
ture or description of God which may be alleged to be part of
the private content of Descartes* mind. It remains for us to dis-
tinguish what we call Descartes' thinking from certain physical
activities in which Descartes was engaged. Descartes, let us say, was
pacing up and down the room, knitting his brows, staring past
the furniture that was around him. These, to be sure, were phy-
sical activities, whereas his alleged thinking may be said to be a
mental activity. But the thinking whose existence we are ques-
tioning is not at this point being presented as non-physical. Our
query is as to the existence of Descartes' mental attitude, whether
it be non-physical or an aspect of his total bodily reactions. The
mere words "mental" and "physical" do not at this point point
163
to mutually exclusive entities, do not at this point mark off Des-
cartes' alleged thinking from what is roughly called his behavior.
It may be held, to be sure, that what we call Descartes' thinking
is presented as subject to observation by none but Descartes him-
self. Whereas Descartes' behavior may be an object for others,
his thinking, it may be said, is, if it exists, an object for him alone.
We might well make use of this difference, it may be held, to
distinguish the mental attitude whose existence we are to con-
sider from the behavior whose existence we in this chapter as-
sume.jWe may, however, say at once that Descartes' thinking, if
it exists, is not an object for Descartes alone. It is Descartes'
alleged thinking that you and I are now considering, an instance
of thinking, consequently, that, at least implicitly, is presented
as apparently an object for you and for me. 6 Indeed it is only
the thinking, not presented as an object for Descartes alone, that
is presented as free from self-contradiction; only the thinking,
not presented as an object for Descartes alone, that may be real.
Hence it is not in being an object for Descartes alone that Des-
cartes' thinking, if it is real, differs from Descartes' behavior.
But being an object, it may be said, is one characteristic; being
an object which is sensed another. And whereas Descartes' think-
ing and Descartes' behavior are both presented as objects for you
as well as for Descartes, Descartes' thinking, it may be said, is
presented as not only an object for Descartes, but as sensed by
Descartes. However, we do not care to restrict our attention to
an alleged thinking that is presented as having been sensed by
Descartes; or to an alleged thinking that is presented as an entity
that Descartes might have sensed. We do not care to exclude from
our consideration the alleged instance of thinking that may be
alleged not to have been sensed by Descartes. What we are to
consider is a mental attitude of Descartes' that he may or may
not have sensed, a mental attitude that he may or may not have
been able to sense. And with this latitude in the entity which we
are to consider, we can not distinguish Descartes' alleged thinking
from his behavior by a reference to the manner in which that
thinking was apprehended by Descartes.
Is there not a difference, however, between the manner in
which Descartes' contemporaries apprehended his behavior and
the manner in which, if they apprehended it at all, they appre-
164
hended his thinking? His behavior, it may be held, is something
which they saw, his thinking something which they inferred from
what they saw. We have agreed not to limit the entity tinder
consideration to the mental attitude alleged to have been sensed
by Descartes. But shall we not at least describe the entity under
consideration as a mental attitude that is not sensed by others?
Here however we run into the difficulty of distinguishing what is
a sense-datum from what is inferred. "When looking from a win-
dow and saying I see men who pass in the street, I really do not
see them, but infer that what I see are men. . . . What do I see
from the window," asks Descartes, 7 "but hats and coats which may
cover automatic machines? Yet I judge these to be men/' Our
inference however, if it be called inference, is so inseparable from
our apprehension of what is sensed, that we are at once aware of
men. We see two converging tracks with our experienced eyes
and we see the distance. We look at a picture of a landscape and
we see, not a two-dimensional manifold, but a scene which goes
back from foreground to horizon. As Bode says, 8 "we do not first
observe and then supply a context, but we observe by seeing
things as existing in a context/' So, if Descartes' thinking exists,
the contemporary observer may be held to have seen not only Des-
cartes' knitted brow and distant stare, but also the thinking im-
plicit in his total behavior. When we look at Rodin's "Thinker,"
we seem to be aware at once of the alleged thinking; just as we
seem to be aware of depth as soon as we look at a landscape paint-
ing. In both cases it is, one might say, when we attend to the
artist's technique that we distinguish the sense-datum from what
then appears to us to have been inferred. The thinking of Des-
cartes' that we are to consider is presented as likely to be given
to an outside observer as soon as is Descartes' knitted brow or
distant stare. Whether it be physical or non-physical, Descartes'
thinking, if it exists, is as an object so commingled with his other
behavior that any study of his total behavior must include a study
of what we call his thinking.
The distinction between total behavior and thinking is, as we
choose to describe it, not so much the distinction between the
immediately given and the subsequently inferred, as it is the dis-
tinction between the unanalyzed whole and an alleged selection
from this whole. Given the pacing, the staring and the alleged
165
thinking which characterize Descartes, we can say that the pacing
is not the entity whose existence we are to examine; and that the
staring is not this entity either. We may pass from a consideration
of Descartes' total behavior to a consideration of his knitted brow
or distant stare. Or we may pass to a consideration of his alleged
thinking. Indeed, if we accept a suggestion of Alexander's, 9 we
will agree that thinking is normally presented to us as an object
before the knitted brow and the distant stare. It is by separating
out of Descartes' total behavior his alleged interest in man, God
and the universe, it is by concentrating our attention upon one
alleged element in his total behavior, that we come to have as
our apparent object the alleged entity that we call Descartes'
thinking. For whether Descartes' thinking is in his body or merely
associated with his body, it is, if it exists, so intimately associated
with his body that, in having Descartes before us as an unanalyzed
whole, his alleged thinking is within, rather than outside, the
entity before us.
The thinking of Descartes' that may be real may be presented
as a characteristic of Descartes' body like his knitted brow or
distant stare. Or the thinking of Descartes' that may be real, where-
as alleged to be an element abstracted as an object from his total
behavior, may be presented as an entity that is merely associated
with his body, may be presented as an entity that in itself lacks
position and extension. Whereas we may be led to consider Des-
cartes' alleged thinking through having Descartes' total behavior,
Descartes as an unanalyzed whole, as our apparent object, the
alleged thinking that we come finally to consider is, it may be
held, an entity that has no position within Descartes' body and
no position anywhere else, but is rather an entity that is non-
spatial and merely associated with Descartes' body.
We find no clearer exposition of the view that thinking is
immaterial and non-spatial, and merely associated with the body,
than in the writings of Descartes himself. Thinking is for him
the sole attribute of a thinking substance. And this substance
whose sole attribute is thinking and with it the thinking that
is presented to him as inhering in a substance which has no
position and no extension is real, he holds, 10 "because, on the
one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I
am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other,
166
I possess a distinct idea of body inasmuch as it is only an extended
and unthinking thing/*
Now we shall not deny that an instance of thinking with no
position and no extension is an apparent object. For it is such
an apparent object, such a subsistent, whose claim to reality we
are here attempting to evaluate. Something may, to be sure, be
said with respect to its clarity and distinctness. As Arnauld pointed
out, 11 we appear to apprehend a right triangle clearly and dis-
tinctly even when we do not apprehend the fact that the square
on its hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares on its other
sides. Nevertheless we do not conclude from this that the right
triangle exists without the square on its hypotenuse being equal
to the sum of the squares on its sides; and, he holds, we should
not conclude that thinking is unextended, merely because we
seem clearly and distinctly to apprehend it without extension.
It appears however to be Descartes' more matured opinion that it
is only when two substances art clearly and distinctly appre-
hended without either of them being presented with the essential
qualities of the other, it is only then that we can conclude that
these entities exist as they appear to us. If we could apprehend
the substance 'right triangle* clearly and distinctly without appre-
hending the substance 'triangle the square on whose hypotenuse
is equal to the sum of the squares on its sides' and if we could
likewise apprehend clearly and distinctly the substance 'triangle
the square on whose hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares
on its sides' without apprehending the substance 'right triangle/
only then, Descartes would seem to hold, could we conclude that
right triangles exist without this ratio obtaining between their
sides and hypotenuse.
But even with this emendation, even if we limit ourselves to the
cases in which two entities are presented as substances and each
appears without the attributes of the other, how can we "conclude
that the substances are really distinct one from the other from the
sole fact that we can conceive the one clearly and distinctly with-
out the other?" 12 To arrive at a valid conclusion which expresses
an assertion of existence, there must be a reference to existence in
our premises. The validity of Descartes* conclusion depends upon
the validity of some implicit premise which ties together exist-
ence and alleged entities that are clearly and distinctly appre-
167
hended. It is an essential pan of his argument that "God can
carry into effect" (i.e., into existence) "all that of which we have a
distinct idea." And so we find Descartes' argument for the im-
materiality of the soul, his argument for the inextendedness of
thinking, resting upon what in a previous chapter we decided was
an implicit determination of the meaning of the term "exist-
ence." 18
It would ill become us to speak slightingly of an argument be-
cause it makes use of a proposition determining the meaning of
the term "existence." For it has been our thesis that any valid ex-
istential proposition must point back to some proposition in which
the term "existence" is explained. We make no reference to the
'clear and distinct" in our own explanation of "existence." And so
we find Descartes' argument, culminating in the conclusion that
thinking is concomitant with no extension, without relevance to
our own problem. What this suggests, however, is that we turn to
our own explanation of "existence" to determine the existence or
non-existence, in our sense of "existence," of a thinking that is
presented as non-spatial. And when we recall that, for an entity
to be real in our sense of "reality," it may not be presented as
lacking all position, we realize that the alleged instance of think-
ing which is presented as non-spatial is, in our sense of the term,
"unreal." Descartes' alleged thinking as he paced up and down
the stove-heated room may or may not exist. But if it exists, it is
not an entity that is utterly non-spatial.
In rejecting the mental attitude which is presented as non-
spatial however, perhaps we eliminate the possibility of Descartes'
alleged mental attitude being real, however presented. Perhaps the
alternative an alleged mental attitude presented as being spatial,
as having position is so absurd that the unreality of non-spatial
thinking involves the unreality of thinking of any sort. What is
presented as mental, it may be said, is presented as quite different
from what is presented as spatial. It is presented as so different,
it may be said, that any instance of thinking presented as having
position is implicitly presented as generally discredited. Such a
spatial thinking, it may consequently be held, is just as unreal in
our sense of "reality" as the non-spatial thinking which we have
already eliminated.
For one thing, it may be said, there are inorganic phenomena
168
to which scientific formulae apply; and there are organic phenom-
ena to which these formulae do not apply with equal force. There
are organic phenomena, it may be said, which are wayward and
unpredictable and which point to the existence of some entity
whose activities do not fall within the scope of scientific formulae.
It is the waywardness and unpredictability of organic phenomena
which point back, it may be held, to a mental attitude that is non-
spatial and which make incredible a mental attitude that is alleged
to have position with respect to the spatial entities that are its
contemporaries.
So long as we focus our attention upon some alleged mental
attitude presented to us and disregard the organic and inorganic
phenomena that are alleged to be its contemporaries, we can not
come to grips with such a doctrine. Let us then in this chapter
agree that there exist organic phenomena and inorganic phenom-
ena, and that the scientific formulae that have come to be accepted
can on the whole be applied more readily and more satisfactorily
to the latter than to the former. Each organism, let us agree, seems
to have a structure and to develop along the lines that its nature
determines for it. It seems to maintain its own course of develop-
ment with a persistency which is not altogether at the mercy of the
environment. The motions of inorganic bodies, on the other hand,
let us agree, seem to be completely dependent upon the forces
which act upon them. They seem to be such that similar actions
call forth similar reactions; whereas, in the case of organisms,
'learning' takes place and the reaction to a stimulus applied a
second time may not be identical with the first reaction.
With this much common ground established, let us consider
the status of the scientific formulae which, we have agreed, can on
the whole be applied to inorganic phenomena more readily and
more satisfactorily than to organic phenomena. In so far as a
formula is valid, it is, it would seem, both a generalization and a
tool enabling prediction. But, both as a generalization and as a
tool for prediction, it applies, it would seem, not so much to be-
havior as a whole as to qualities which are numbered qualities.
It is not the concrete behavior of an entity that some scientific
formula enables us to predict, but rather, it would seem, some
particular measurable characteristic, as, for example, the number
that is to characterize that entity's speed or the number of de-
169
grees that is to characterize its heat. The admission then that
scientific formulae can be applied to inorganic phenomena more
readily and more satifactorily than to organic phenomena turns
out to be the admission that numbered qualities to which scien-
tific formulae apply are to be found among inorganic phenomena
to a greater extent than among organic phenomena. The mental
attitude which we are to consider is presented as manifested
in organic phenomena which are poor in numbered character-
istics to which scientific formulae apply. The question is whether
a mental attitude so presented may be presented as spatial with-
out being presented as generally discredited.
Organic phenomena are to be called "wayward," it would seem,
if they have characteristics which are numbered and to which
scientific formulae are ready to be applied, and if, nevertheless,
they fail to conform to these formulae. There seems, however, to
be no specific scientific law ready to be applied to organic behavior
that is in fact violated by the apparently teleological behavior of
organisms, no specific scientific law ready to be applied to organic
behavior that 'learning' violates. The disorder that is implicit in
waywardness, as we have described waywardness, seems not to be a
fact. And so, with waywardness described as we have described it,
the mental attitude which is alleged to give rise to wayward
organic phenomena comes to be presented as discredited and un-
real. Just as Descartes' alleged mental attitude does not exist
when presented as non-spatial, so Descartes' alleged mental atti-
tude does not exist when presented as giving rise to organic
phenomena which in our sense are wayward. The mental attitude
which we are to consider is the mental attitude alleged to be mani-
fested in organic phenomena which are poor in numbered quali-
ties. Or it is the mental attitude alleged to be spatial and to be
manifested in organic phenomena which have numbered qualities,
qualities, however, to which, in large part, scientific formula do
not apply or are not ready to be applied. But the mental attitude,
alleged to contravene specific scientific formulae applicable to it,
we at this point reject as discredited and unreal.
Neither the absence of numbered qualities nor the absence of
scientific formulae applying to what numbered qualities there
are, seems to point to an entity that is non-spatial. Before there
were thermometers to measure heat, when heat was presented as
170
an unnumbered quality, heat was not generally presented as non-
spatial or as the manifestation of something non-spatial. And when
heat is presented as a quality that can be measured and assigned a
number, and yet no scientific formula presented which is applic-
able to the relation between the heat of one day and the heat of
another, we still do not think of heat as the manifestation of
something non-spatial. For, the quality that is not numbered,
we seem generally to hold, may perhaps be numbered. And the
qualities which are presented without some scientific formula
which applies to them need not be presented as incapable of
having such a formula apply to them. The mental attitude which
is presented as manifested in organic phenomena which are poor
in numbered qualities is not presented as generally discredited,
we find, when presented as spatial. And neither is the mental
attitude which is presented as manifested in organic phenomena
having numbered qualities to which, in large part, scientific for-
mulae are not ready to be applied.
There is a distinction to be made, however, between the entity
alleged to be poor in numbered qualities and the entity which, it
is alleged, cannot have numbered qualities; a distinction to be
made between the entity presented as having numbered qualities
to which scientific formulae are not ready to be applied and the
entity presented as having numbered qualities to which scien-
tific formulae cannot be applied. We read in McDougalPs "Body
and Mind" that "the soul has not the essential attributes of
matter, namely, extension (or the attribute of occupying space)
and ponderability or mass"; for, says he, 14 "if it had these attri-
butes it would be subject to the laws of mechanism, and it is just
because we have found that mental and vital processes can not be
completely described and explained in terms of mechanism that
we are compelled to believe in the cooperation of some non-
mechanical teleological factor." But when, as with McDougall,
the phrase is "can not be described" rather than "is not de-
scribed," the inference would seem to be from what is non-spatial
to what is not subject-matter for scientific formulae rather than
vice versa. The mental attitude which is alleged to have mani-
festations to which no scientific formula could ever be applied is,
we find, already presented as non-spatial. It is in view of the non-
spatiality with which it is implicitly presented that the mental
171
attitude, alleged to have manifestations to which no scientific
formulae could be applied, is presented as discredited when also
presented as spatial.
The mental attitude is unreal which is alleged to be spatial
and also alleged to be non-spatial. So is the mental attitude which
is alleged to be spatial and implicitly alleged to be non-spatial,
the mental attitude, for example, which is alleged to be spatial and
also alleged to be manifested in phenomena to which scientific
formulae cannot be applied. Not only however is the mental atti-
tude unreal which is alleged to be both spatial and non-spatial;
"the alleged instance of thinking which is presented as non-
spatial" is, we have found, likewise unreal. 15 There remains as
an entity that, so far as we have yet seen, may be real the mental
attitude which is alleged to be spatial and not alleged to be non-
spatial. There remains the mental attitude which is alleged to
be spatial and not alleged to be manifested in phenomena to
which scientific formulae cannot be applied. And this mental
attitude may be real whether it be presented as having or lacking
manifestations which are in fact numbered, whether it be pre-
sented as having or lacking manifestations to which scientific
formulae are in fact or will in fact be applied.
The mental attitude which may be real is the mental attitude
which explicitly or implicitly is alleged to have position with re-
spect to the spatial entities that are its contemporaries. The men-
tal attitude of Descartes' which may be real is the mental attitude
of his which is not merely associated with his body but is alleged
to have position with respect to the phase of his brain and the
phase of the stove that are its contemporaries. Position, to be sure,
may be definite position, position of a sort that a point is alleged
to have; or it may be indefinite position, position of a sort that an
extended entity is alleged to have. Let us however dismiss at once
the mental attitude which is alleged to be at a point. Let us mark
out as unreal the mental attitude of Descartes' which is alleged
to have position with respect to brain and stove, but no extension.
We thus find ourselves considering the mental attitude which is
alleged to have not only position with respect to its contempo-
raries but also extension. We thus find ourselves holding that, if
Descartes had any mental attitude at all as he paced up and down
172
the stove-heated room, that mental attitude had, or was concomit-
ant with, an extension.
Is however an -extended mental attitude at all plausible? Is not
a mental attitude or instance of thinking that is alleged to be
extended presented as discredited and unreal? There are, let
us agree, distinguishable mental attitudes which form an inte-
grated whole and which can not be separated one from the other
as my foot can be severed from the rest of my body. Does it how-
ever follow that "there is a great difference between mind and
body, inasmuch as body is by nature always divisible and the
mind is entirely indivisible"? 16 To be sure, the bolt of blue cloth
or the gallon of water that is presented as extended is implicitly
presented as in some sense divisible. And the mental attitude or
complex of mental attitudes that is presented as extended is like-
wise implicitly presented as in some sense divisible. There is
however a sense in which an extended substance is divisible and
the quality of an extended substance likewise divisible. And there
is another sense in which a quality, without regard to the sub-
stance in which it inheres, is, or is not, divisible. The gallon of
water can be divided into four quarts of water, the bolt of blue
cloth into small pieces of blue cloth. The blueness of the bolt of
cloth is divisible in the sense that the bolt of doth in which it
inheres is divisible. And if thinking or mental attitude is a qual-
ity of an extended substance, dunking is divisible in the sense
that the substance in which it inheres is divisible.
It may however well be another sense of divisibility that is
suggested when we say that blue is a primary color, purple not; or
when we say that some complex of mental attitudes is divisible or
indivisible. The assertion that blue is a primary color is generally
the assertion that blue can not be analyzed or reduced to other
colors, not the assertion that bolts of blue cloth can not be sepa-
rated into parts. And the assertion that thinking is indivisible may
well be the assertion that thinking is not to be analyzed rather
than the assertion that thinking does not inhere in an extended
substance. Whether blue be alleged to be capable of analysis or
not, the blueness that is alleged to be the quality of an extended
and divisible substance is, I find, not presented as incredible and
unreal. And whether the mental attitude of Descartes' that we are
173
considering be alleged to be capable of analysis or not, this en-
tity, alleged to be the quality of an extended and divisible sub-
stance, is, I find, likewise not presented as incredible and unreal.
It may, to be sure, be pointed out that whereas the segments
into which a bolt of blue cloth is cut are all blue, the segments
of some extended substance in which thinking is alleged to in-
here are substances in which no mental attitudes inhere at all.
Yet a round plate may be circular, it would seem, without any of
the fragments into which it is broken being circular. And a mole-
cule may have properties which none of its constituent atoms
have. The alleged circularity of a round plate is not presented as
incredible when the segments are alleged not to be circular. And
the thinking that is alleged to be a quality of some extended brain
or nerve-fibre is not presented as incredible when a segment of
that brain or nerve-fibre is alleged not to be thinking, alleged
not to have a mental attitude inhering in it as a quality.
But if thinking is extended, or the quality of an extended sub-
stance, then the extension of the substance that thinks about a
gallon of water, it may be said, must be four times the extension
of the substance that thinks about a quart of water. If thinking is
extended at all, it may be held, the extension with which it is
concomitant must be proportionate to the extension of the object
upon which it is directed. Thinking about a house would then
have to have the shape of a house, thinking about the moon the
shape of the moon; and a mental attitude apparently directed
upon an inextended object would have to be inextended, and
thus be both extended and inextended at once. If the thinking
that we are considering, the thinking that is alleged to be ex-
tended, had such implicit characteristics as these, it would, to be
sure, be presented as discredited and unreal. But if my uncle is
twice as big as yours, it does not follow that I am twice as big
as you. And if my uncle is twice as big as yours and yet I not
twice as big as you, it does not follow that neither you nor I are
extended at all. Two entities may both be extended and yet the
ratio between their extensions not be equal to the ratio between
the extensions of the entities to which they are respectively re-
lated. And two thinking substances may both be extended and
yet, assuming that they have objects, the ratio between their
extensions not be equal to the ratio between the extensions of
174
their respective objects. The mental attitude o Descartes' that
we are considering is alleged to be concomitant with an extension;
and it is alleged to be the quality of an extended substance whose
extension does not depend upon the extension of the object, if
any, upon which the mental attitude is apparently directed. The
mental attitude that we are considering is not presented with the
implicit characteristics just considered; it is not, so far as we have
yet seen, presented as discredited and unreal.
In order that we might have a suitably limited framework
within which to consider the reality of Descartes' alleged mental
attitude, we have in this chapter agreed that Descartes' brain is
real and his stove-heated room real. 17 Let us likewise agree that
there is some real entity distant from Descartes' body upon which
his alleged mental attitude is alleged to be directed. And let us
agree that there is some real entity distant from Descartes' body
that is alleged to be causally related to his alleged mental atti-
tude. Whether or not the moon is really the object of a mental
attitude of Descartes,' and whether or not the moon really brings
about the mental attitude that may be alleged to be directed
upon it, the moon, let us in this chapter agree, is real and really
distant from Descartes' body. Yet if the moon is real and distant
from Descartes' body, how can a mental attitude which is con-
comitant with an extension within Descartes' body be either
affected by the moon or aware of it? Given a real moon that is
there and an alleged mental attitude that is alleged to be extended
and here, any alleged relational situation, whether of cause and
effect or of subject and object, is so incomprehensible, it may
be said, that the mental attitude, which is presented as extended
and here, comes to be presented as incredible and unreal.
The statement that the distant moon affects a thinking sub-
stance which is extended and here would seem to be less per-
plexing than the statement that the distant moon affects a think-
ing substance which is here but at a point. And the statement
that the moon affects a thinking substance which is at a point
would seem to be less perplexing than the statement that it
affects a thinking substance which has no position at all. The al-
leged influence of one extended substance upon another extended
substance, distant from it, has the advantage of seeming some-
what analogous to the generally credited influence of the moon
175
Upon the tides, or to the generally credited influence of the sun
upon vegetation on the earth. Similarly, an alleged situation in
which there is a subject-object relation between a thinking sub-
stance which is extended and a substance which, although distant,
is likewise extended has the advantage of seeming somewhat analo-
gous to the generally credited situation in which two extended
substances have the relation of being distant from one another or
in which two extended substances, although distant, are like one
another.
We may, to be sure, wonder how any substance can influence
another, distant from it. We may wonder through what media a
distant entity comes to affect a substance that is characterized by
a mental attitude; and to what extent the mental attitude is due
to the media rather than to the distant entity itself. We may
likewise wonder how the mental attitude can, figuratively speak-
ing, reach to the distant substance and have it as an object. And
we may perhaps conclude that a mental attitude can not have a
distant entity as its object, that it either has no object at all or
only an object that is where it itself is. These however, are ques-
tions for subsequent chapters. In this chapter our question is
whether Descartes was thinking, not whether that thinking had
an object, much less how thinking and the distant entity, al-
leged to be the cause of that thinking, come to be related. What
we are considering is the alleged mental attitude of Descartes'
that seems to be directed upon man, God and the universe; or
that seems to be directed upon the moon. The mental attitude
of Descartes' that we are considering is presented with the char-
acteristic of seeming to be directed upon the moon, whether or
not it is presented in addition as having the real moon as its
object. In a later chapter the mental attitude, seeming to be
directed upon the moon, that is alleged to have the real moon
as its object, may be found to be presented as incredible. Or the
subsistent then found to be presented as incredible may be the
mental attitude, seeming to be directed upon the moon, that is
alleged to be directed only upon private content; or the mental
attitude, seeming to be directed upon the moon, that is alleged
to have no object at all. At this point the mental attitude under
consideration is presented without any claim as to what, if any-
thing, is its real cause or what, if anything, its real object. Our
176
subsistent is the mental attitude which pretends to be directed
upon the moon. And this subsistent presented with no claim as
to its real cause or real object need not, so far as we have yet
seen, be presented as incredible.
Our subsistent has been Descartes' mental attitude as he paced
up and down his stove-heated room and seemed to be thinking
about the moon or as he "seemed to ponder the existence of man,
God and the universe." 1S But it is no longer this alleged entity
presented as non-spatial which has been found to be unreal
that we have to consider; 19 nor is it this alleged entity presented
as having position, but not extension. 20 Our subsistent is Des-
cartes' mental attitude presented, not as itself an extended sub-
stance, but as the quality of an extended substance such as Des-
cartes' body or such as the brain, the cortex or a nerve-fibre within
Descartes' body. On the view which seems to remain before us for
our consideration, Descartes' body, or part of his body, has such
qualities as extension, weight and color, qualities which may be
called "non-mental." And it is to such qualities that our atten-
tion is directed when the substance in which these qualities inhere
is called "Descartes' body" or "Descartes' cortex." But the sub-
stance in which these qualities inhere is also, on the view which
we are examining, the substance in which Descartes' thinking
inheres as a quality. For Descartes' thinking, on this view, "is an
event and not a thing or stuff; and it is an event adjectival to the
brain." 21 In order to think of Descartes' brain or Descartes' body
as a substance in which not only non-mental qualities but also
thinking inheres, we must, says Sellars, "enlarge our conception
of a cerebral state over that which physiology gives." 22 And to
give recognition to the differing types of qualities which, on this
view, this substance has inhering in it, this substance may be
called, not Descartes' brain or Descartes' nerve-fibre, but rather
Descartes' mind-brain or Descartes' mind-nerve-fibre. It is this
mind-brain or mind-nerve-fibre which, on this view, thinks. And
since this mind-brain or mind-nerve-fibre is extended, Descartes'
thinking is concomitant with the quality of extension and may
to this extent be said itself to be extended.
When it is alleged that there is a substance to be called Des-
cartes' brain or Descartes' mind-brain, a substance in which think-
ing and extension inhere as qualities, there are various questions
177
that may be raised with respect to substances in general and with
respect to qualities in general. It may be asked what "substance"
means and what "quality" means. And it may be asked how a
substance can have qualities inhering in it, how a substance, for
example, can be thinking or can be extended. To discuss such
questions at this point would, however, carry us far afield. Des-
cartes' alleged mental attitude "presented as having a vehicle and
a setting can be discussed in fewer words and in a less complicated
fashion when, instead of regarding thinking, vehicle and setting
as all mere subsistents, we accept the premise that vehicle and
setting are real." 23 And Descartes 1 alleged mental attitude, pre-
sented as the quality of an extended substance, can be dis-
cussed in fewer words and in a less complicated fashion when
we assume that there are substances and that an instance of
thinking and an instance of extension can, if real, each be
the quality of a substance. "It is not as the painter putting on
the initial daubs of oil that we approach the canvas, but rather
as the painter-critic who concentrates his attention on minute
sections of his work in turn, at each point regarding the rest of
the work as unquestioned." 24 In our present discussion, let us
then make use of the fact that certain substances are listed as real
in the appendix to Chapter Three; and certain qualities. And let
us reserve for subsequent chapters discussions that deal with
substance in general rather than with Descartes* alleged mind-
brain or mind-nerve-fibre and discussions that deal with quality
in general rather than with Descartes' alleged mental attitude.
Let us in this chapter agree that Descartes' brain is a real sub-
stance and extension a real quality inhering in it. Indeed let us
agree that there are some qualities of the sort that are generally
called "secondary qualities." Let us agree that a certain piece of
metal is a real substance which is really hot and really red. And
let us agree that the electric bulb on the desk before me is really
bright and incandescent. Let us further agree that on some occa-
sion before our piece of metal was placed in a furnace, it was not
yet red; and that, after I have turned the switch, the bulb is no
longer incandescent. It is in some such fashion as this that the
alleged mental attitude of Descartes' that remains for our con-
sideration may be held to qualify the substance in which it in-
heres. Just as redness may be held to be a quality of the metal
178
which, before it was heated, was not red, and just as incandescence
may be held to be a quality of the bulb which, after I turn the
switch, is no longer incandescent, so Descartes' alleged thinking,
on the view that remains for our consideration, is presented as a
quality of an extended mind-brain or mind-nerve-fibre which in
some earlier phase may not have been thinking and in some later
phase may again not be thinking. So far as we have yet seen, the
mental attitude of Descartes' may be unreal that is alleged to be
the quality of an extended substance and alleged to be the quality
of a substance which in other phases is not thinking. But if this
subsistent is unreal, it is not unreal in so far as it is presented as
a quality concomitant with extension or in so far as it is presented
as the quality of one phase of a substance but not of another.
Descartes' alleged, mental attitude is not presented as incredible*
in so far as it is presented as a quality concomitant with extension.
For there are qualities concomitant with extension. But this
alleged mental attitude, it may be said, is a peculiar quality, un-
like redness or incandescence. And, it may be held, whereas in-
stances of redness and of extension inhering in the same substance
are plausible, alleged instances of thinking and of extension in-
hering in the same substance are not. Descartes' brain and its ex-
tension, it may be said, were objects for Descartes' contemporaries
but not for Descartes; whereas his mental attitude was an object
for him alone. With the piece of metal and its extension on the
one hand and that metal's redness on the other, or with the con-
cave side of an arc on the one hand and its convex side on the
other, the situation, it may be said, is different. For, both the
metal and its redness can be objects for the same observer. And
"when two percipients observe different sides of the same thing,
like the hasty knights in the fable, they can," as Ward says, 25
"change places and each connect the two aspects in one experience
of an object."
We have in effect agreed, however, that, if Descartes' alleged
mental attitude is real, it and the mind-brain ^in which it is al-
leged to inhere may be objects for the same observer. It is Des-
cartes' alleged mind-brain that you and I are now considering and
Descartes' alleged mental attitude that you and I are now discuss-
ing. 26 To this extent each of us may be said to connect a substance,
its extension and its alleged thinking in one experience, just as
179
we connect the metal, its extension and its redness in one experi-
ence, and just as each knight connects the two sides of the arc
in one experience. It may still be pointed out, however, that, even
if a substance, its extension and its alleged thinking are apparent
objects for the same observer, the substance and its extension
seem to be apprehended in one way, its alleged thinking in an-
other. By Descartes, it may be said, his thinking is sensed, his
brain and its extension inferred; by others, it may be said, Des-
cartes' brain and its extension may be sensed, but his thinking
must be inferred. But in spite of the fact that we see the metal and
its redness and do not see but feel its heat, we do not^eem to dis-
believe that the metal is both red and hot. And when we do not
feel the heat but only infer it from what we see, we likewise do
not seem to disbelieve that the metal is both red and hot. Qualities
are generally believed, to inhere in the same substance, even when
they are perceived through different senses, and even when one
is sensed and the other inferred. And an instance of thinking and
an instance of extension alleged to inhere in the same substance
need not be presented as incredible when they are presented as
being apprehended in different ways or when they are presented
as one being a sense-datum, the other an object which is inferred.
The mental attitude which is alleged to be a quality inhering
in a mind-brain or mind-nerve-fibre need not be presented as
incredible in that mental attitude and nerve-fibre are presented
as being apprehended in different ways. But such an alleged
mental attitude is presented as incredible, it may be said, in that
mental attitudes and nerve-fibres appear totally incommensurate
with one another. "If we know so little what we mean by a 'nerve-
process' that it may turn out ... to be an emotion or a tooth-ache,"
then, says J. B. Pratt, 27 "we have no business to use the term
'nerve-process' at all/* When, however, Descartes' thinking is pre-
sented as a quality of his nerve-process, it need not be presented as
itself the iferve process. In order for a nerve-process to have the
quality of thinking, the terms "thinking" and "nerve process"
need be no more synonymous than the terms "redness" and "piece
of metal" or the terms "incandescence" and "electric bulb." It
may be held, to be sure, that "thinking nerve-fibre" is a perplex-
ing combination of terms, that "thinking" and "nerve-fibre"
joined together seem to represent no apparent object at all. It is
180
however such an apparent object, such a subsistent, that we have
through several paragraphs been describing. Having eliminated
as unreal Descartes' thinking appearing with the characteristic
of being utterly non-spatial, Descartes' thinking appearing as
having position but not extension, and Descartes' thinking ap-
pearing as itself an extended substance, the subsistent remaining
for our consideration is: Descartes' mental attitude seemingly
directed towards man, God and the universe, a quality of, and
abstractable from, all or part of the breathing, reacting, extended
substance that may be called Descartes' mind-body. Although
perhaps perplexing, this subsistent, so far as we have yet seen, need
not be presented as generally discredited. So far as we have yet
seen, this alleged mental attitude of Descartes' may be real.
We have agreed that qualities exist; and substances in which
they inhere. Let us further agree that, when a quality inheres in
a substance, there is a sort of parallelism between them. When an
electric bulb is destroyed, its incandescence disappears. And when
its incandescence disappears, the electric bulb is different from
what it was before, if only in that it no longer has the quality of
incandescence. The view which we are considering, the view that
thinking is a quality of an extended mind-brain or mind-nerve-
fibre which thinks, has implicit in it the view that, as thinking
changes, there is some change in the extended substance which
thinks. The change in the substance may be merely the change
from a phase which has a given mental attitude inhering in it to
a phase which has no mental attitude or a different mental attitude
inhering in it. Or there may be held to be other qualities of this
substance, non-mental qualities, that change when its thinking
changes. If however a change in the thinking extended substance
parallels a change in its mental attitude, then a change in mental
attitude need be no more dependent on a change in the substance
in which it inheres than a change in that substance need be de-
pendent on a change in its mental attitude.
We may ask how an outside stimulus causes both a change in
thinking and a change in the substance which thinks. And we may
ask whether thinking and certain non-mental qualities inhering
in the same substance change together. But the view which we are
considering involves no epiphenomenalism. On the view which we
are considering, there may be changes in non-mental qualities just
181
prior to a change in mental attitude; so that an examination of
non-mental qualities may enable us to predict mental attitudes.
There may likewise be a change in mental attitude just prior to
changes in certain non-mental qualities; so that an examination of
mental attitudes may enable us to predict non-mental qualities.
But in so far as mental attitude, substance and non-mental quali-
ties change simultaneously, they are, on the view which we are
considering, presented as interdependent. "Take away the neural
process/' says Hodgson, 28 "and there is no sensation. Take away
the sensation it can not be done save by taking away the neural
process. There is therefore," he continues, "dependence of the sen-
sation on the concomitant neural process but not vice-versa." But
if thinking and neural process are concomitant, we do not take
away the neural process and then take away the thinking. If we
take away the neural process, we take away simultaneously the
thinking and whatever non-mental qualities inhere in this sub-
stance. If we take away, not the substance, but those of its non-
mental qualities, if any, that occur only when its thinking occurs,
we take away its thinking. Similarly, however, if we take away its
thinking, we take away those of the substance's non-mental quali-
ties that occur only when thinking occurs; and we change the
substance in which both they and the thinking concomitant with
them formerly inhered.
Even if we disregard those non-mental qualities inhering in the
thinking substance that may be alleged to change before or after
there is a change in mental attitude, even if we restrict our atten-
tion to those non-mental qualities, if any, in which a change is
alleged to occur simultaneously with a change in mental attitude,
we may, to be sure, find it convenient to explore what happens
to non-mental qualities more intensively than we explore what
happens to thinking. Let us assume that, when light disappears
from an electric bulb, the bulb simultaneously ceases to have an
electric current running through it. Let us assume that the qual-
ity of being lighted and the quality of being affected by an
electric current are interdependent; that the occurrence of the
quality of being lighted does not precede, and does not enable us
to predict, a subsequent occurrence of the quality of being affected
by an electric current; and that the occurrence of the quality of
being affected by an electric current does not precede, and does
182
not enable us to predict, a subsequent occurrence of the quality
of being lighted. We may nevertheless, it would seem, find it con-
venient to explore the onset and disappearance of electric cur-
rents more intensively than we explore the onset and disappear-
ance of the quality of being lighted, a quality that is concomitant
with it. Such priority, however, as under these circumstances we
might give to the quality of being affected by an electric current
over the quality of being lighted would be a priority in attention
and would not imply that one quality is temporally prior to the
other or that one quality is real and the other unreal. In a
similar fashion, it would seem, priority in attention may be given
to certain non-mental qualities of a thinking, extended substance
rather than to the mental attitude which is alleged to vary with
them. Descartes' mental attitude seemingly directed upon man,
God and the universe may be presented as the quality of an ex-
tended thinking substance. And other qualities of this substance,
non-mental qualities, may be presented as varying with this
attitude, as being present when it is present, absent when it is
absent. But these alleged other qualities may be presented as be-
ing more promising to investigate without being presented as
being temporally prior to the mental attitude seemingly directed
upon man, God and the universe. And they may be presented as
more promising to investigate without this alleged mental attitude
being presented as unreal.
Certain non-mental qualities, let us agree, offer a more fruit-
ful field for investigation than the mental attitudes which, if they
exist, are concomitant with them. These non-mental qualities
along with others, which all together may be said to constitute an
organism's behavior, have been the subject of much study on the
part of behaviorists. Organisms have been confronted by various
stimuli and the organisms' responses noted. "The desire in all
such work/' says Watson, 29 "is to gain an accurate knowledge of
adjustments and the stimuli calling them forth. The reason for
this is to learn general and particular methods by which behavior
may be controlled. The goal is not the description and explana-
tion of conscious states as such." As a result of such work, how-
ever, one may come to hold that we can disregard mental atti-
tudes even if they exist, that information with respect to be-
havior alone will teach us all that we can know that might en-
183
able us to predict and control what organisms will do. If a men-
tal attitude exists and is concomitant with some non-mental qual-
ity, a given stimulus may be said to bring about both the non-
mental quality and the mental attitude; and a given response may
be said to be due both to the non-mental quality and the mental
attitude. But if a study of the causal relation from stimulus to
mental attitude to response gives us no ability to predict and con-
trol not given us by a study of the causal relation from stimulus
to non-mental quality to response, then the alleged mental atti-
tude, it may be said, is, like LaPlace's God, an unnecessary
hypothesis.
The mental attitude which is alleged to be the quality of an
extended mind-brain or mind-nerve-fibre need not be presented
as incredible, we have seen, when it is presented as less promising
to investigate than the non-mental qualities with which it is
alleged to be concomitant. But is it not presented as incredible
when it is presented as unnecessary for prediction and control?
We may imagine two worlds before us, only one of which is the
world of real entities. In the one, an organism is stimulated; the
stimuli bring about non-mental qualities in the brain; and these
non-mental qualities lead the organism to make characteristic re-
sponses. In this imagined world, however, organisms are like
robots; there are no mental attitudes. In the other, organisms
behave just as they behave in the world just described. But, in-
tervening between stimulus and response there are not only the
brain's non-mental qualities, but the brain's mental attitudes,
its thinking, as well. Entities, according to the dictum attributed
to William of Occam, are not to be multiplied beyond what are
necessary. Admitting, then, that mental attitudes, if they exist,
are not needed to enable us to predict and control what organisms
will do, should we not accept the world with fewer entities and
reject the other? In view of its being presented as not needed, do
we not find the mental attitude alleged to be an additional quality
inhering in an extended brain or extended nerve-fibre presented
as incredible and as generally disbelieved?
Let us first remark that, whereas one writer may hold that en-
tities are not to be multiplied beyond what are necessary, an-
other may hold that all entities are real that can be real, all en-
tities, that is to say, that are not inconsistent with some entity
184
that is real. Both assertions ascribe characteristics to what is taken
to be "reality." Each assertion, we hold, depends for its truth upon
the signification that is assigned the term "real." As we have
explained our term "reality," the world o real entities, so far as
we have yet seen, need be neither a world with the maximum
number of compossible entities nor a world with the minimum
number needed for prediction and control. As an element in the
explanation of our term "reality," we have, however, said that
"whatever explicitly or implicitly appears as generally discredited
is unreal." 30 Consequently, it remains for us to determine whether
an entity may be presented as not needed for prediction and con-
trol; and yet not be presented as generally discredited.
There is a distinction to be made, let us suggest, between the
entity which is proposed in order that we may organize our
knowledge, in order that the facts that we know may be known to
be related, or in order that we may predict and control future
events, and the entity which is not proposed with the purpose of
accomplishing any of these objectives. When facts are puzzling and
hypotheses proposed in order that we may become aware of re-
lations between these facts, it would seem that, on the whole,
we accept the simpler hypothesis, the hypothesis which introduces
and proposes fewer entities; and that we reject the more compli-
cated hypothesis, the hypothesis which introduces and proposes a
greater number of entities. When there are similar objectives
and when alternative hypotheses are proposed, we likewise seem
on the whole to accept the hypothesis which accounts for a large
number of facts and to reject the hypothesis which accounts for a
lesser number of facts. But these observations do not apply to the
entity that is not introduced in order that we may predict and con-
trol, not introduced in order that we may become aware of other
entities as mutually related. An alleged God may be proposed, not
after miracles have been experienced and found puzzling, but as
an entity that is itself experienced. The suggestion that my electric
bulb is bright may be made, not to suggest a cause for the waves
that travel out from the bulb, the electric current running
through the bulb may already have been accepted as such a cause,
but the suggestion may be made on the basis of other evidence,
on the basis of independent belief. Whatever may be the situation
with respect to entities that are proposed in order that we may
185
become aware of other entities as mutually related, entities that
are not proposed and introduced with such a purpose need not, we
hold, be presented as incredible when they are alleged not to be
needed in order that we may become aware of other entities as
mutually related. The alleged brightness of my electric bulb need
not be presented as incredible when it is alleged not to be needed
in order that we may become aware of a cause of the waves travel-
ling out from the bulb. And the mental attitude that is alleged to
be a quality of an extended substance need not be presented as in-
credible when it is alleged not to be needed to enable us to pre-
dict and control the organism's responses.
The subsistent that seems to be before us is Descartes' mental
attitude seemingly directed upon man, God and the universe, a
mental attitude which is alleged to be the quality of an extended
mind-brain or extended mind-nerve-fibre. It is a mental attitude
which, along with such concomitant non-mental qualities as vary
with it, is alleged to be a result of certain stimuli and a cause of
certain responses; a mental attitude, nevertheless, which is alleged
to offer a less promising field for investigation than the non-men-
tal qualities which accompany it; and a mental attitude which is
alleged not to have been proposed in order that we might be able
to predict and control Descartes' responses. Such an alleged men-
tal attitude need not be presented as incredible. And yet, since
there are certain behaviorists who reject it, this alleged mental
attitude is presented as being in some quarters disbelieved.
To what extent, however, do behaviorists disbelieve in the par-
ticular subsistent that we are considering? A behaviorist may assert
that there are no entities which lack position altogether. He may
assert that he disbelieves in an entity which is alleged not to in-
here in any extended substance. He may hold that nothing exists
outside what we have called "total behavior." 81 And he may sum
up his position by stating that thinking is behavior. The state-
ment, however, that thinking is behavior may not be incon-
sistent with the statement that thinking and non-mental qualities
inhere in the same substance, with the statement that thinking and
certain non-mental qualities which are concomitant with that
thinking vary together. And the statement that there is no ob-
servable object outside total behavior may not be inconsistent
with the statement that, "in having Descartes before us as an un-
186
analyzed whole, his alleged thinking is within, rather than out-
side, the entity before us." 32 There are, let us agree, behaviorists
who seem to disbelieve in the subsistent that appears to be before
us. There are behaviorists who find that, when they attempt to
abstract thinking, mental attitude, mental activity, from Des-
cartes' mind-brain or mind-nerve-fibre or total behavior, there is
an irruption of disbelief similar to that which breaks in upon us
when we attempt to abstract from this rectangular desk its al-
leged roundness. To a considerable extent, however, it is some
other subsistent, and not the subsistent which we are considering,
that seems to be the object of their disbelief. The subsistent which
we are considering is presented as seemingly disbelieved by some
behaviorists, but not as generally disbelieved by behaviorists.
Some behaviorists seem to disbelieve in the alleged mental
attitude which we are considering. And some epistemologists who
assert the existence of ideas seem likewise to disbelieve in this
subsistent. Such epistemologists may agree that, in addition to
Descartes' non-mental behavior, there is a real mental entity to be
abstracted or to be inferred from his mind-brain or from his mind-
nerve-fibre or from his total behavior. But they may hold that
whatever mental entity is thus to be really abstracted or inferred
is what they would call "content" or "idea," not what they would
call "mental attitude" or "mental activity" or "thinking." Just,
however, as the behaviorist who asserts that thinking is behavior
may not disbelieve in the alleged mental attitude which we are
considering, so the epistemologist who denies the existence of
mental entities other than what he calls "ideas" may not dis-
believe in the alleged mental attitude which we are considering.
For "what we call 'mental attitude' may by some be included in
what they would call 'private content.'" 33 To be sure, what we
call "mental attitude" has not been presented as private content,
as an object for Descartes alone. 3 * But it has been presented as an
entity that may be held to be sensed by Descartes alone. And
whereas what we call mental attitude has been presented as
think-mg rather than as what is thought, it has been presented as
an entity that may be held to be an object "upon which it or some
further mental attitude is directed." 38 The epistemologist who
holds that there are no mental entities that are not pictures or
images disbelieves, we may say, in what we are calling "mental
187
attitudes." But what is alleged to be an idea and not alleged to be
a picture or image may be what we should call a mental attitude
presented as an object for some further mental attitude.
The alleged mental attitude which we are considering is pre-
sented as seemingly disbelieved by some behaviorists, but not as
generally disbelieved by behaviorists. And it is presented as
seemingly disbelieved by some epistemologists who assert the
existence of ideas, but not as generally disbelieved by epistemolo-
gists who assert the existence of ideas. Indeed when we turn from
the opinions of behaviorists and epistemologists to the opinions of
men generally, we seem to note a general belief that men are
not robots and that their mental life is not made up of pictures
and images. In addition to the -words "idea" and "thought/* there
are in common use the words "thinker" and "thinking"; and the
statement that there are thinkers who think would seem to ex-
press a belief in entities that are not pictures or images but are
rather what we in this chapter have called mental attitudes. In
any case the particular mental attitude which we have been con-
sidering, and which we are now considering, is not presented as
generally discredited. And this alleged mental attitude is listed as
real in the appendix to Chapter Three. As Descartes paced up and
down his stove-heated room, he was, we conclude, thinking. He
had a mental attitude which seemed to be directed upon man, God
and the universe, and which was a quality inhering, along with
extension and other non-mental qualities, in his mind-brain or
mind-cortex or mind-nerve-fibre.
Summary
Positive statements about what exists in our sense of "existence"
should, according to our program, be statements about individual
subsistents carefully identified. In this chapter we select an alleged
instance of thinking what we call a "mental attitude" distin-
guishing it from object, from mental content and from non-
mental behavior.
Such an instance of thinking may be presented as spatial or as
non-spatial. Presented as non-spfettial it is unreal. Presented as
188
spatial it may be real; for the arguments which have been ad-
vanced against spatial and extended thinking are unconvincing.
The entity we present is an instance of thinking that is a quality
of an extended substance. Even though this entity is presented as
something that need not be considered in investigations into be-
havior, it is not presented as generally discredited and is real.
189
Chapter VII
MINDS AND BODIES
We begin this chapter with the reality of one instance of think-
ing established. As Descartes paced up and down his stove-heated
room, he had a mental attitude which seemed to be directed upon
man, God and the universe, a mental attitude which was a qual-
ity inhering, along with extension and other non-mental quali-
ties, in his mind-brain or mind-cortex or mind-nerve-fibre.* With-
out discussions that would repeat or parallel the discussion in the
preceding chapter, we shall, I am sure, be permitted to conclude
that there are similar instances of thinking that are likewise real.
Thinking, alleged to be a quality of Plato lecturing in the
Academy, is, let us say, real in the sense in which we are using the
term "reality." The thinking is likewise real that is alleged to be a
quality of a mind-nerve-fibre of yours as you read this page. And
the thinking is real that is alleged to be the quality of a clerk who,
as he sits at his desk with a ledger before him, is engaged in tran-
scribing figures to a statement which he is preparing to mail out.
But whereas there are various instances of thinking that are
real, let us, on the basis of the appendix to Chapter Three, agree
that there are also certain substances which do not have the qual-
ity of thinking. 2 In the sense in which we have explained our
terms "existence" and "reality," there is a ledger which does not
think and a statement on which figures are being jotted down
which likewise does not think. It is, in short, the ledger clerk who
thinks, not the ledger or the statement. The mind-cortex or mind-
nerve-fibre of the ledger clerk who thinks has, like the mind-nerve-
fibre of Descartes', not only the quality of thinking, but also such
non-mental qualities as extension, weight and color. 3 It follows
190
that there is no motion from this mind-nerve-fibre's extension to
its thinking; or from its thinking to its weight. For these quali-
ties are qualities of the same substance. And surely entities that
are alleged to be concomitant, and also alleged to enter into a re-
lational situation in which there is motion from one to the other,
are entities presented with implicitly contradictory character-
istics, entities which are unreal.
But what about an alleged motion to the thinking nerve-fibre,
not from that nerve-fibre's extension, but from the unthinking
ledger in front of which the ledger clerk sits? And what about an
alleged motion from the thinking nerve-fibre, not to that nerve-
fibre's weight, but to the statement on which figures are being
jotted down? Can the ledger which is not thinking affect or bring
about our clerk's mental attitude? And can our clerk's mental
attitude be the cause of the figures that are jotted down on the
unthinking statement?
According to Descartes, mind thinks but is unextended, where-
as matter is extended and unthinking. Between entities so un-
like, some of his successors found interaction incredible. There is
difficulty enough, some of them hold, in accepting a causal inter-
action between two unthinking bodies. "Those that suppose that
bodies necessarily and by themselves communicate their motion
to each other," says Malebranche, 4 "make but a probable supposi-
tion." But, he continues, "the mind and body are two sorts of
being so opposite that those who think that the commotions of
the soul necessarily follow upon the motion of the blood and
animal spirits do it without the least probability." There is more-
over a simple experiment which reenforces Malebranche's con-
viction that there is no causal relation between entities so disparate
as mind and matter. My mind, he holds, can not cause my arm to
be raised since it is not even aware of the means that must be used
to bring about the raising. "Most men," Malebranche finds, 5
"know not so much as that they have spirits, nerves and muscles,
and yet move their arms with as much and more dexterity than
the most skilful anatomists. Men therefore will the moving of their
arms, but," Malebranche's conclusion is, "t'is God that is able
and knows how to do it."
If, however, to be a cause, an entity had to be aware of the
means by which its results are effected, one billiard ball could
191
not cause the motion of another without being aware of the laws
of motion. Chemical substances would have to be chemists and
bacteria bacteriologists. The word "cause" may, to be sure, be
used in various senses. But there is no sense in which we shall use
the word "cause," and no sense in which "cause" is commonly
used, where "A causes B" implies "A is aware of the means by
which A causes B." It is the thinking substance C that is alleged
to be aware of the causal relatiofi between A and B. And where-
as C may be A itself or B itself, there is no self-contradictory sub-
sistent before us when we present to ourselves a C that is com-
pletely outside the relational situation involving A and B.
An alleged causal relation flowing from ledger to mind-nerve-
fibre is not presented as self-contradictory when this ledger is pre-
sented as unaware of the means by which it affects the ledger
clerk's mind. Nor do we find an alleged causal relation flowing
from ledger to mind-nerve-fibre presented as incredible when the
mind-nerve-fibre is presented as thinking, but the ledger pre-
sented as unthinking. A causal relation between mind and matter
has been held incredible in that the former thinks and is un-
extended whereas the latter is unthinking and extended. 6 But
whereas the ledger and the mind-nerve-fibre that we are consider-
ing are presented as unlike in that one is unthinking and the
other thinking, they are not presented as unlike with respect to
extension or the lack of extension. It is an extended mind-nerve-
fibre that we have found real and that is presented to us as affected
by the ledger; an extended mind-nerve-fibre that we have found
real and that is presented to us as the cause of the figures on the
statement. An alleged causal relation between two entities which
are presented as unlike in that one is presented as thinking and
the other as unthinking is not, we find, presented as incredible
when, along with this difference, both entities are presented as ex-
tended. So far as we have yet seen, the ledger may be the cause of
our clerk's mental attitude; and our clerk's mental attitude may
be the cause of the figures on the statement.
There is, let us say, a motion from the ledger to our clerk's
mind-nerve-fibre, to the mind-nerve-fibre which has a mental atti-
tude apparently directed upon the figures in this ledger. For,
such an alleged motion subsists without any of the characteristics
that tvould mark it out as unreal; and such an alleged motion is
192
listed as real in the appendix to Chapter Three. The mind-nerve-
fibre to which this motion flows is a substance with non-mental
qualities and with a mental attitude as well. Hence the motion
that flows from the ledger flows to the thinking, flows to the ex-
tension that is concomitant with that thinking, and flows to the
substance in which thinking and extension inhere. But whereas the
substance, its thinking and its extension are equally end-points of
the motion that flows from the ledger, are they all to be called
"results" caused by the ledger? And whereas the substance, its
thinking and its extension are equally originating points for the
motion that flows to the statement, are they all to be called
"causes" of the figures that appear upon the statement?
There are, let us suppose, other instances of motion flowing
from other ledgers to other mind-nerve-fibres. And on the basis
of many instances, it may be found that there are certain limited
characteristics which ledgers always have when the mind-nerve-
fibres, in which motions from them terminate, are identical with
our ledger clerk's. Or it may be found that, given motions from
many identical ledgers, the mind-nerve-fibres to which these mo-
tions severally flow are identical in some respects but not in all
respects. On the basis of many instances, it may be decided that,
not the ledger, but some particular quality of the ledger, is to be
called the "cause." And it may be decided that, not the mind-
nerve-fibre which is a substance, but some quality of it, some
non-mental quality, some type of thinking, or both, is to be
called the "result." We may use "cause" and "result" in such a
way that not every entity at the source of motion is a cause and
not every entity at the terminus a result. But pending a determina-
tion that there is a sine qua non at the source and pending a de-
termination that there is a constant or inevitable quality at the
terminus ad quern, let us not attempt to distinguish among the
various entities at the source or among the various entities at the
terminus ad quern. Let us hold that our clerk's mind-nerve-fibre
and its non-mental qualities and its thinking are affected by the
ledger. Let us hold that our clerk's mind-nerve-fibre and its non-
mental qualities and its thinking affect the statement that he is
preparing to mail out.
The assertion that the ledger affects our clerk's thinking and
that our clerk's thinking in turn affects the statement he makes
193
out may be said to be an assertion that mind and matter interact.
Our doctrine consequently may be held to be a denial of paral-
lelism. Yet it is not every form of parallelism that is in conflict
with the particular form of interactionism that we have pro-
pounded. Our clerk's thinking, we have held, acts, not upon the
non-mental qualities which inhere in the very mind-nerve-fibre in
which it inheres, but upon such entities as statements that are
separated from it and have positions different from its position. 7
"The view that thinking is a quality of an extended mind-brain or
mind-nerve fibre which thinks has implicit in it the view that, as
thinking changes, there is some change in the extended substance
which thinks. The change in the substance may be merely the
change from a phase which has a given mental attitude inhering
in it to a phase which has no mental attitude or a different men-
tal attitude inhering in it. Or there may be held to be other quali-
ties of this substance, non-mental qualities, that change when its
thinking changes." 8 A change in thinking may thus be held to
parallel a change in certain non-mental qualities that inhere with
it in the same substance; nonetheless, this thinking and these non-
mental qualities may be held to act upon other entities situated
elsewhere.
Indeed it is not only a parallelism between thinking and non-
mental qualities inhering in the same substance that is con-
sistent with the particular form of interactionism which we have
propounded. If various ledger pages are the sources of motions
flowing to various mind-nerve-fibres, if for each page there is a
mind-nerve-fibre that it acts upon, a mental attitude of which it
is in some sense the cause, then it may be found that the series of
acting ledger pages has a one-to-one correspondence with the
series of resultant mental attitudes. Not, to be sure, that each
element in the series of causes will, in such case, be simultaneous
with its corresponding result; or that it will resemble the result-
ing entity that corresponds to it. But the assertion that a given
non-mental entity which is a cause has a resulting mental attitude
which corresponds to it, or the assertion that a given mental
attitude which is a cause has a resulting non-mental entity which
corresponds to it, may be said to be the assertion of a sort of
parallelism. It is the assertion of that sort of parallelism that is
asserted to obtain between the heat of the sun and the heat of the
194
earth when we hold that the heat of the earth varies with the heat
of that phase of the sun which acts upon it.
Yet the parallelism which we have just considered, a parallelism
which we have found consistent with the particular form of inter-
actionism that we have propounded, is a parallelism between such
entities as ledgers or statements on the one hand and mental atti-
tudes or mind-nerve-fibres on the other. It is a parallelism between
causes and results and a parallelism between external things and
mental attitudes, not a parallelism between external things and
private contents or ideas. We have attempted to distinguish
what we call "mental attitude" from what we call "private con-
tent" or "idea." What we call "mental attitude" is "presented as
not a picture or image and it is presented as not being content ex-
cept in so far as it is the object upon which it or some further
mental attitude is directed." 9 Corresponding to the distinction
between mental attitude and idea, there is a distinction to be
made between an alleged correspondence or parallelism be-
tween a series of ledger pages and a series of resultant mental
attitudes on the one hand and, on the other hand, an alleged cor-
respondence or parallelism between a series of ledger pages and a
series of private ideas of ledger pages. "The order and connection
of ideas,". says Spinoza, 10 "is the same as the order and connection
of things." The parallelism between ideas and things that this
proposition is used to assert may be an alleged parallelism be-
tween a series of ledger pages and a series of mental contents, a
series of private ideas of ledger pages. Such an alleged parallelism
differs both from the parallelism which may obtain between the
thinking and the non-mental qualities that inhere in the same
mind-nerve-fibre; and from the parallelism or correspondence
which may obtain between a series of external entities and a
series of mental attitudes. It is a form of parallelism that does not
exist unless private ideas, as distinguished from mental attitudes,
exist. And whereas we have agreed that various mental attitudes
exist, we have not yet agreed .that there are any real instances of
what we call "private contents" 'or "ideas."
Various substances that have mental attitudes exist. Among
them there is the mind-nerve-fibre within Descartes' body as he
paced up and down his stove-heated room, the mind-nerve-fibre
with a mental attitude apparently directed upon man, God and
.195
the universe. Among them, as Descartes paced up and down his
stove-heated room, there is also, let us say, a mind-nerve-fibre of
his with a mental attitude apparently directed upon the stove.
Descartes, we might say, seemed not only to be thinking about
man, God and the universe, but he seemed also to be aware of the
stove. Let us then consider an alleged substance that includes
both of these mind-nerve-fibres. Let us consider an alleged com-
posite substance that has these extended thinking mind-nerve-
fibres of Descartes' as its parts. This alleged composite substance
is presented as composed of extended, thinking mind-nerve-fibres
that are its parts, just as a chair may be said to be composed of
seat, back and legs; and just as a French flag may be said to have
three parts, one red, one white and one blue.
It may, to be sure, be said that there are no substances that are
parts of other substances. It may be said that, if the chair is real,
tifie leg of the chair, taken by itself, is unreal. Or it may be said
that, if the blue strip of a French flag is real, the flag, taken as a
whole, is unreal. We have however found that Descartes' alleged
mental attitude "presented as having a vehicle and a setting can
be discussed in fewer words and in a less complicated fashion
when, instead of regarding thinking, vehicle and setting as all
mere subsistents, we accept the premise that vehicle and setting
are real." ia And in the previous chapter, instead of discussing the
reality of substances as such and the reality of qualities as such,
we have made use of "the fact that certain substances are listed as
real in the appendix to Chapter Three; and certain qualities." 12
At this point let us similarly agree that there are situations in
which some composite substance is real and substances which are
its parts likewise real. Let us agree, for example, that this chair is
real and each of its legs real, that a given French flag is real and
the blue strip which is a part of it likewise real. Let us also agree
that the composite substance and the substance which is a part
of it may each have qualities which are real; and that the quality
which inheres in a partial substance may not be identical with the
corresponding quality which inheres in the including substance.
Just as a plate may be circular "without any of the fragments into
which it is broken beiilg circular/' 13 so, let us agree, a chair may
have a size greater thaii the size that is the quality of one of its
legs. And wheiieas one of the strips that is a part of our French
196
flag has the quality of being blue, the flag as a whole, let us say,
has, not the quality of being blue, but the quality of being tri-
colored. With these examples before us, the entity that we are
considering, the substance that is alleged to include several of
Descartes' thinking, extended mind-nerve-fibres, comes to be
presented as having an extension that may be greater than the
extension of one of its parts. And it comes to be presented with
the quality of apparently thinking about various things rather than
with the quality of having a mental attitude apparently directed
upon the stove.
It is certain mind-nerve-fibres of Descartes' as he paced up and
down his stove-heated room that are alleged to be parts of the
including substance that we have been proposing. Let us however
enlarge this alleged including substance. Let us consider an
alleged substance that has among its parts, not only the mind-
nerve-fibre with a mental attitude apparently directed upon man,
God and the universe, and not only the mind-nerve-fibre with a
mental attitude apparently directed upon the stove, but also the
earlier mind-nerve-fibre of Descartes' with a mental attitude ap-
parently directed upon some teacher standing in front of him at
La Fleche, and the later mind-nerve-fibre of his with a mental
attitude apparently directed upon Queen Christina. Let us in
short consider a substance alleged to have duration, a substance
alleged to have the substance proposed in the preceding para-
graph as one of its momentary phases. This substance is presented
as having the quality of thinking, but as having the quality of
thinking now about one thing and now about another, rather
than as having a mental attitude apparently directed upon the
stove. It is likewise presented as extended in the sense that it is
presented as having momentary phases which are extended. And it
is further, let us say, presented as in some degree a system of
parts rather than as a haphazard aggregation of parts. That is to
say, the mind-nerve-fibre with a mental attitude apparently
directed upon man, God and the universe and the mind-nerve-
fibre with a mental attitude apparently directed upon the stove
are presented as in some sense affecting one another, as being
parts of what might be called a "natural" unit. And parts such as
these that are earlier are presented as affecting certain parts that
occur later. Descartes' mind-nerve-fibre with a mental attitude
apparently directed upon Queen Christina, for example, is pre-
sented as affected by previous mind-nerve-fibres, previous mental
197
attitudes, of his. In short, the composite substance which we are
considering is presented, not only as including parts some of which
are earlier and some later, but as including parts which are in some
sense held together so as to constitute a system.
Now some such entity as has just been proposed does, we con-
clude, exist. For, the various mind-nerve-fibres of Descartes' that
have been alleged to be its parts exist. And just as certain com-
posite substances, such as this chair and the French flag, exist
along with the partial substances which they include, so some
such entity as we have been considering, composed of mind-nerve-
fibres of Descartes', is presented without any of the characteristics
that would mark it as unreal and is indeed listed as real in the
appendix to Chapter Three.
To be sure, the mind-nerve-fibre of Descartes' with a mental
attitude apparently directed upon man, God and the universe is a
pan of several composite substances which are real. The moon
and the earth, we may say, constitute a system, a composite sub-
stance, which is real. The solar system is a more extended com-
posite substance which is real and which likewise includes the
earth as one of its parts. And so with the galaxy which includes
our solar system and of which the earth is again a part. In an
analogous manner we may say that there is a composite substance
which includes Descartes' mind-nerve-fibre with a mental atti-
tude apparently directed upon man, God and the universe and
which also includes other mind-nerve-fibres of his at various
periods of his life when he seemed to be thinking about philo-
sophical subjects; a composite substance, however, which does not
include such mind-nerve-fibres of Descartes' as have mental atti-
tudes apparently directed upon non-philosophical subjects. But
there is also, we may agree, a composite substance which includes
every mind-nerve-fibre which ever occurred within Descartes'
body. There are in short systems within systems. There is one
real composite substance composed of thinking, extended mind-
nerve-fibres of Descartes' which has a greater duration and in-
stantaneous phases with a greater extension. And there is another
real composite substance composed of thinking, extended mind-
nerve-fibres of Descartes' which has a lesser duration and in-
stantaneous phases with a lesser extension. The latter may have,
not the quality that one of its parts has, not the quality of having
198
a mental attitude apparently directed upon man, God and the
universe, but the quality of thinking philosophically. The former
may have, not the quality that one of its parts has, not the qual-
ity of having a mental attitude apparently directed upon the stove,
but the quality of now and then being more or less aware.
There are then various composite substances that are real,
one more inclusive than another, but each having thinking, ex-
tended mind-nerve-fibres of Descartes' among its parts. There
is in particular a composite substance, which on the one hand has
no parts outside Descartes' body, but which on the other hand may
not include every thinking extended nerve-fibre that is within his
body. The mind-nerve-fibres, if any, which, although within Des-
cartes' body, are not parts of this particular composite substance,
are those which we shall say are not parts of a single "person."
There are, we are told, divided personalities. And if one group of
Descartes' mind-nerve-fibres holds together to form a Mr. Hyde
whereas another group holds together to form a Dr. Jekyll, then
it is only one of these two groups that furnishes parts for the
particular composite substance which we are describing. The
mind-nerve-fibres which constitute the particular composite sub-
stance that we are describing have in short a special type of coher-
ence. The particular composite substance which they compose we
call a "person." And whereas one of a person's component mind-
nerve-fibres may have a mental attitude that we describe as ap-
parently directed upon the stove or as apparently directed upon
Queen Christina, the person taken as a whole has a mental qual-
ity that we may call its "personality."
There are, we have agreed, various groups of Descartes' think-
ing extended mind-nerve-fibres which are real. There exists the
group which, taken together, we call Descartes' person. And there
exists the mental quality which this composite substance has, its
personality. Similarly there exists the substance that is my person
and the substance that is your person, the quality that is my per-
sonality and the quality that is your personality. In this treatise
we have, to be sure, discussed the existence of Descartes' person
after having agreed to the existence of a particular mind-nerve-
fibre of his, have discussed the existence of his personality after
having agreed to the existence of his mental attitude apparently
directed upon man, God and the universe. But it is not to be con-
199
eluded that wholes and parts are generally presented in this order.
I may first seem to be aware of a chair and may subsequently dis-
criminate within this chair its seat, its back and its legs. Similarly I
may first seem to be aware of a person as a whole, a person which
has some duration as well as extension; and I may subsequently
seem to be aware of some phase or of some part of this person, of
some mind-nerve-fibre or mind-nerve-fibres that have a lesser dura-
tion or a lesser extension. Thus it is not to be concluded from the
order in which they are presented in this treatise that mind-nerve-
fibres with their mental attitudes have a greater reality than what
we call "persons" with their personalities, or that the former are
normally presented as apparent objects before the latter.
Indeed if we begin with a person as a whole as our apparent
object, there is, it would seem, no fixed number of parts or phases
to be discriminated within that person. One thinker may, figura-
tively speaking, break an apparent object up into fifteen parts
where another breaks it up into ten parts. For, as we shall later
find occasion to observe, "unity, duality and multiplicity are, it
seems, relative qualities.'* 14 The composite substance which we
call Descartes' "person" is, it will be remembered, but one sub-
stance in a series of "systems within systems/ 1 15 The mind-nerve-
fibres which are its parts have a special type of coherence. 16 There
may thus be mind-nerve-fibres within Descartes' body which do
not have this coherence arid which consequently are not parts of
his person. But with such noncoherent mind-nerve-fibres ex-
cluded, Descartes' person does not have an absolute, rather than a
relative, number of parts. It has many parts or few parts, many
phases or few phases, according as the person taken as a whole is
discriminated into many parts or into few parts, into many phases
or into few phases.
There exist various persons with their personalities, various
parts of persons with their mental attitudes. "We must look outside
this chapter to justify the conclusion that persons and personali-
ties, parts of persons and mental attitudes, are not only in some
instances real, but in some instances real objects for thinking sub-
jects. Assuming however that there are situations in which a sub-
ject has first an including substance as his real object and sub-
sequently one of its partial substances as his real object, let us call
the sequence an instance of "discrimination." And assuming that
200
there are situations in which a subject has first a substance as his
real object and subsequently a quality of that substance as his real
object, let us call the sequence an instance of "abstraction." We
are thus discriminating when we turn our attention from Des-
cartes' person to one of his mind-nerve-fibres, abstracting when we
turn our attention from his person to his personality or from a
mind-nerve-fibre of his to the mental attitude which that mind-
nerve-fibre has as a quality. It is not Descartes' person, but one of
his mind-nerve-fibres, that has a mental attitude. And yet if we
say, as we shall, that "Descartes had a mental attitude," our propo-
sition is true in the sense in which "Caesar crossed the Rubicon"
is true. "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is true in so far as it is
synonymous with our existential proposition: "Caesar-aMnoment-
M, having the quality of crossing the Rubicon, exists." 17 And
"Descartes had a mental attitude apparently directed upon man,
God and the universe" is true in so far as it is synonymous with
our existential proposition: "A mind-nerye-fibre that was a part
of Descartes' person, a mind-nerve-fibre with a mental attitude
apparently directed upon man, God and the universe, exists."
The mind-nerve-fibres, that taken together are Descartes' per-
son, constitute, let us repeat, but one of several systems within
systems. In constituting the particular system that they do con-
stitute, they exhibit a special type of coherence. But what is this
special type of coherence? What makes Descartes' mental attitude
apparently directed upon the stove and Descartes' mental attitude
apparently directed upon Queen Christina qualities that inhere
in parts of one person? What common characteristics, if any, do
these mental attitudes have? And what holds together and unifies
the partial substances in which they inhere?
What we seek is some further description of the special type
of coherence that holds together mental attitudes inhering in parts
of the same person, As an answer it may be suggested that, where
this coherence exists, the cohering mental attitudes are all ap-
parent objects for the same subject. Mental attitudes, however,
are to be distinguished from what we call "private contents" or
"ideas." 18 Hence it is one thing to suggest that certain mental
attitudes are held together and exhibit a special type of coher-
ence in so far as they are apparent objects for die same subject.
And it is another thing to suggest that alleged private contents or
201
ideas are held together by being apparent objects for the same
subject. "I myself/' says Berkeley, 19 "am not my ideas but ... a
thinking active principle that perceives, knows, wills and operates
about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both
colors and sounds: that a color can not perceive a sound, nor a
sound a color: that I am therefore one individual principle,
distinct from color and sound; and for the same reason from all
other sensible things and inert ideas." The entities however that
we in this chapter have found cohering are, not an idea of color
and an idea of sound, but such entities as Berkeley's mental atti-
tude apparently directed upon a color and Berkeley's mental atti-
tude apparently directed upon a sound. If ideas exist and are in-
ert, they may be held to imply a thinking substance that in some
figurative sense is active, an entity that is or has what we have
called a mental attitude. But if it is to be held that Berkeley's
mental attitude apparently directed upon a color and Berkeley's
mental attitude apparently directed upon a sound require some
further entity that is apparently directed upon both of these
mental attitudes, then the observation that a color can not perceive
a sound is irrelevant. Even, however, if Berkeley's arguments do
not all apply when the subject-matter is altered, it may still be
maintained so far as we have yet seenthat Berkeley's mental
attitude apparently directed upon a color and Berkeley's mental
attitude apparently directed upon a sound are each apparent
objects for the same entity, that their coherence is due to the fact
that "one and the same self" is aware of them both.
There exist, let us agree, certain mental attitudes which are
apparently directed upon other mental attitudes. For just as
Descartes' mental attitude apparently directed upon the stove is
real, so, let us say, there is a real mental attitude of yours that is
apparently directed upon Descartes' mental attitude. There like-
wise exist, let us say, certain mental attitudes which are apparently
directed upon mental attitudes of one's own. For just as my pres-
ent mental attitude is real that is apparently directed upon the
mental attitude inhering in one of Descartes' mind-nerve-fibres as
he paced up and down his stove-heated room, so my present men-
tal attitude is real that is apparently directed upon a mental atti-
tude I had last night when I was looking at the moon. To go one
step further, there are, let us say, certain mental attitudes which
202
are apparently directed upon themselves. For it is such a mental
attitude that one of my present mind-nerve-fibres has when I now
say: "Let me think about the mental attitude which inheres in
the mind-nerve-fibre of mine that is now thinking."
Your mental attitude apparently directed upon a mental atti-
tude of Descartes' is, we hold, real; my mental attitude apparently
directed upon a mental attitude that I had last night real; my
mental attitude apparently directed upon itself real. We are not
at this point asserting that these mental attitudes which we hold to
be real do in fact reach to the entities that seem to be presented
to them. We are not at this point asserting, that is to say, that
these mental attitudes have apparent objects which are their real
objects. Nor are we asserting that their apparent objects are per-
cepts with respect to them. A mental attitude that Descartes had
may be neither a sense datum nor a percept with respect to the
mental attitude of yours that is apparently directed upon it. 20 And
my present mental attitude may not be a percept with respect to
itself,with respect, that is to say, to the mental attitude of mine
that is apparently directed upon itself. If the sort of perceiving
called "introspecting" exists, it would seem to involve a relation
between a slightly later mind-nerve-fibre which introspects and a
slightly earlier mind-nerve-fibre within the same body which is
introspected. Assuming, however, that it is not presented as an
instance of introspecting as thus described, your alleged mental
attitude, presented as apparently directed upon a mental attitude
of Descartes', is, we hold, real. Aiid assuming that it likewise is not
presented as an instance of introspecting as thus described, my
mental attitude, presented as apparently directed upon itself, is
also real.
Thus Descartes' mental attitude apparently directed upon the
stove may have itself or another mental attitude apparently di-
rected upon it. And Descartes' mental attitude apparently di-
rected upon Queen Christina may have itself or another mental
attitude apparently directed upon it. But in so far as the mental
attitude apparently directed upon the stove is apparently directed
upoA itself, and the mental attitude apparently directed upon
Queen Christina apparently directed upon *-self, what we seem
to have before us are separated mental attitudes which need not
be parts of one person. We are presented with various mental
203
attitudes of Descartes' each aware of itself; not with various
mental attitudes of Descartes' each belonging to his self.
What, then, about some one persisting entity that has each
of Descartes' mental attitudes as its apparent object? Is the
coherence between Descartes' mental attitude apparently directed
upon the stove and Descartes' mental attitude apparently directed
upon Queen Christina a coherence that points back to some per-
sisting entity to be called Descartes' "self," some persisting entity
that is aware of both of these mental attitudes? There is, to be
sure, the composite substance which we call Descartes' "person."
But Descartes' person, we find, has the mind-nerve-fibre with a
mental attitude apparently directed upon the stove and the mind-
nerve-fibre with a mental attitude apparently directed upon Queen
Christina, not as its objects, but as its parts. Descartes' person,
we have seen, had a mental attitude apparently directed upon
man, God and the universe in the sense that such a mental atti-
tude inhered in a mind-nerve-fibre which was one of its parts. 21
But, whereas Descartes' mental attitude apparently directed upon
the stove and his mental attitude apparently directed upon Queen
Christina may have been apparent objects for themselves or for
other mental attitudes of his, they were not, let us agree, apparent
objects for his enduring person taken as a whole. We say, to be
sure, that Descartes "had" various mental attitudes or that vari-
ous mental attitudes were "his." But the system which we call
"Descartes' person" does not possess mental attitudes except in
the sense in which a French flag possesses the blueness which in-
heres in one of its parts. 22 And Descartes' person taken as a whole
was not aware of mental attitudes; although our language, in
calling mental attitudes "his/* may seem to assert the existence
of a "he" that is outside his attitudes. 23
It is not the person taken as a whole which is aware of each
of Descartes' mental attitudes. There is no entity outside Des-
cartes' person, no entity, at any rate, which endures while his
person endures, which either possesses, or is aware of, these men-
tal attitudes. And there is likewise no transcendental Ego, pre-
sented as having no date at all, which possesses or is aware of them.
"No knowledge can take place in us," says Kant, 24 "no conjunc-
tion or unity of one kind of knowledge with another, without
that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuition."
204
But an empirical Ego, presented as an entity which is hot the
person, but presented as an entity which persists unchanged dur-
ing the life of the person, is, we find, presented as generally dis-
credited and is unreal. And a transcendental Ego, presented as
having no date, is presented with a timelessness that marks it out
as unreal in our sense of "reality." Except in the sense in which
every object implies a subject, the coherence exhibited by mental
attitudes inhering in parts of one person does not point to an
entity outside these mental attitudes taken collectively. This
coherence may, to be sure, be called a "unity of consciousness"
or a "unity of apperception/* But if neither the person taken as
a whole nor any entity outside the person, if neither an empirical
Ego nor a transcendental Ego, is definitely aware of each of the
mental attitudes inhering in a part of the person, then it is diffi-
cult to see what the phrase "unity of apperception" adds to the
phrase: "special type of coherence."
There is one sense in which "unity of apperception" may
be used in which this phrase seems to represent an entity other
than that represented by our phrase: "special type of coherence."
There were mental attitudes of Descartes' which had other mental
attitudes of his apparently directed upon them. Just as the various
mental attitudes inhering in parts of Descartes' person may be
said to have cohered in a system, so the mental attitudes of his
which had other attitudes of his directed upon them may be
said to have cohered in a more limited system of their own.
But if the one system is more limited than the other, if not every
mental attitude of Descartes' had another mental attitude of his
apparently directed upon it, then the coherence of the more lim-
ited system is riot the coherence of the more inclusive system.
Each mental attitude of Descartes' that was introspected, or that
had some other mental attitude of his directed upon it, has the
characteristic of having been introspected or the characteristic
of having had some other mental attitude of his directed upon it.
And in using the term "unity of apperception/* we may be refer-
ring to the characteristic which these introspected mental atti-
tudes had in common. There were, however, real mental attitudes
of Descartes' which were not introspected by him. There were, let
us agree, real mental attitudes, inhering in parts of the system that
we call Descartes' person, upon which no other mental attitudes of
205
his were definitely directed. It is as qualities of parts of a more
inclusive system that these non-introspected mental attitudes co-
here; as qualities of parts of the person, not as qualities of parts of
a system from which non-introspected mental attitudes are ex-
cluded. Their coherence is not the sort of unity of apperception
that would imply that each cohering mental attitude has been
introspected. Theirs is a special type of coherence exhibited by
various mental attitudes of Descartes', some of which may have
been introspected and some of which were not introspected. It is
this special type of coherence exhibited by mental attitudes in-
hering in parts of a person that we seek to describe in other
terms, in terms that are more informative.
What we call a special type of coherence is not commensurate
with introspectedness. But is it not commensurate with intro-
spectability? The mental attitude which I had last night when I
was looking at the moon inheres in a part of my person even
though I did not introspect it. But does it not inhere in a part
of my person in that I might have introspected it? Where diffi-
culty arises is in distinguishing non-introspected mental attitudes
that might have been introspected from non-introspected mental
attitudes that could not have been introspected. If the term "in-
trospecting" represents the sort of perceiving which involves a
relation between a slightly earlier mind-nerve-fibre that is intro-
spected and a slightly later mind-nerve-fibre that introspects, 25
then no mental attitude of mine today and no future mental atti-
tude of mine can introspect the mental attitude which I failed
to introspect last night. I may assert that the mental attitude
which I failed to introspect last night might have been introspected
by a mental attitude occurring slightly later last night. But such
an assertion adds nothing to the assertion that the mental atti-
tude which I failed to introspect inheres in a part of my person
and coheres with other mental attitudes of mine. For the belief
in such a coherence is the only basis I have for the assertion that
last night's mental attitude might have been introspected.
Let us then turn from the introspecting, which, if it exists, is
a sort of perceiving, to the mental attitude which has another
mental attitude, not necessarily as its percept, but in any case as
its apparent object. It may be suggested that last night's mental
attitude inhered in a part of my person in that a present mental
attitude of mine may apparently be directed upon it. But Des-
cartes' mental attitude was not yours, even though your present
mental attitude is apparently directed upon that attitude of Des-
cartes.' Last night's mental attitude inhered in a part of my
person, it would seem, not in that my present mental attitude is
apparently directed upon it, but in that my present mental atti-
tude asserts it to have been mine. The proposition which we are
to consider comes thus to be this: "Two mental attitudes cohere
with what we have called a 'special type of coherence' when one
of these mental attitudes believes and asserts that they so cohere."
But I am not describing coherence in other terms when I say
that two mental attitudes cohere when one of them asserts that
they cohere. Furthermore, it would seem that my present mental
attitude and last night's mental attitude may not have inhered
in parts of the same person even though my present mental
attitude asserts that they did. If my mind is deranged, I may
believe myself to be Napoleon, may assert that his mental atti-
tude at Waterloo inhered in a pan of my person. And even if my
mind is not deranged, I may seem to remember, may seem to have
as an apparent object, some mental attitude which I never had.
Two mental attitudes cohere with what we have called a special
type of coherence, two mental attitudes inhere in parts of the
same person, not, let us say, whenever one of these mental atti-
tudes asserts that they cohere, but whenever their alleged coher-
ence is presented as not generally discredited and is real. To be
sure, the statement: "Two mental attitudes cohere when their
alleged coherence is presented as not generally discredited and is
real" is no more an explanation of "coherence" than is the state-
ment: "Two mental attitudes cohere when one of them believes
and asserts that they cohere." But perhaps our search for some
further general description of what we call a "special type of
coherence" can fail; and our term "special type of coherence"
nevertheless be understood. Taken by itself, the proposition:
"Two mental attitudes cohere when one of them believes and
asserts that they cohere" fails to explain "coherence." But, in
addition, it is false. Taken by itself, the proposition: "Two men-
tal attitudes cohere when their alleged coherence is presented
as not generally discredited and is real" likewise fails to explain
"coherence." But it is, we hold, true. And it will lead us to point
207
to individual situations serving to distinguish the coherent from
the incoherent.
Let us suppose that Napoleon had certain mental attitudes at
the battle of Waterloo and that a patient at St. Elizabeth's in
Washington asserts that these attitudes were his. His statement
asserting the coherence of mental attitudes at Waterloo with men-
tal attitudes at Washington seems to be generally understood. But
the alleged coherence that the seems to be asserting is presented
as generally discredited and is therefore unreal. I may likewise
assert that a mental attitude last night when I was looking at the
moon coheres with my present mental attitudes. Again the state-
ment asserting coherence seems to be generally understood. And
in this instance the alleged coherence that is asserted is not pre-
sented as generally discredited and is real. When the body has
not changed fundamentally, testimony that there is coherence,
coming from a mental attitude inhering in a part of that body,
seems generally, though not always, to meet with general accept-
ance. And so there are many instances in which, when coherence
has been asserted between some earlier mental attitude and some
later mental attitude, and when the speaker's body has undergone
no fundamental change, that alleged coherence is not presented
as generally discredited and is real. As we have explained "exist-
ence" and "reality/' general credence or discredence is a consid-
eration of greater relevance than the speaker's beliefs. The Spar-
row may assert, and may seem to believe, that he never had an
intention to kill Cock Robin. But if coherence between such an
intention and a later mental attitude of the Sparrow's is not
presented as generally discredited, such an alleged coherence may
very well be real.
Your mental attitude does not cohere with a mental attitude
of Descartes' even though you seem to be aware of that mental
attitude of Descartes'. The mental attitude of the patient at St.
Elizabeth's does not cohere with Napoleon's mental attitude at
Waterloo even though the patient at St. Elizabeth's seems to be
aware of Napoleon at Waterloo. A contemporary of mine may
be aware of what happened to some one at a distant place or in
a bygone era. And if we find no normal channel through which
his knowledge may have been acquired, we may be led to believe
in telepathy or in some impulse, delayed in transmission, that
208
originated in some past mental attitude and is now affecting my
contemporary. But such puzzling phenomena as may be due to
telepathy do not, I find, lead to the general belief that two men-
tal attitudes, distant from one another, cohere in parts of the
same person. And if a contemporary of mine, without having
studied Greek history or the Greek language, should think and
speak as Plato did, this likewise, we hold, would not lead to the
general belief that his mental attitudes and Plato's cohere in parts
of one person, or to the belief that Plato's person has a phase
existing now. Not only would the method of transmission not
be resolved by the mere assertion of coherence, but coherence, we
find, when it is alleged to hold between mental attitudes not in
the same body, is presented as generally discredited and is unreal.
There is no coherence of the special type which we have been
discussing where there is the sort of discontinuity that there is
between Descartes 1 body and yours or between Plato's body and
the entities that exist today. In this sense there is no transmigra-
tion of souls and no person that endures subsequent to the dis-
integration of its body.
Is there then no force in the classic arguments for the immor-
tality of the soul? "The compound or composite may be supposed
to be naturally capable of being dissolved in like manner as of
being compounded; but that which is uncompounded," we read
in the Phaedo** must be indissoluble if anything is indissoluble."
To what extent, however, is a mind-nerve-fibre uncompounded
or its mental attitude uncompounded, a person uncompounded
or its personality uncompounded? Both the mind-nerve-fibre and
the composite substance which we call a "person" have extension.
Both are divisible in the sense in which a bolt of blue cloth is
divisible. 'Mental attitude' and 'personality' are, to be sure, quali-
ties. And just as it may be held that blue is a primary color, but
purple not, so it may be held that 'mental attitude' is indivisible
in the sense of not being analyzable into other qualities. But just
as the blueness of a bolt of cloth is divisible in the sense that the
bolt of cloth in which it inheres is divisible, so mental attitudes
and personalities are divisible in the sense that the extended
substances in which they inhere are divisible. 27 It may, to be sure,
be held that mental attitudes and personalities, mind-nerve-fibres
and persons, are not the only entities to be considered. Mind-
209
nerve-fibres with their mental attitudes have dates; persons with
their personalities have dates. There is however, it may be held,
some soul or self or ego which has no date. And what has no
date, it may be argued, can not be subject to so temporal a hap-
pening as perishing. As we have explained "existence," however,
there is no soul which has no date. A transcendental Ego which is
presented as having no date is unreal. 28 And any soul or self
which is presented as having no date is unreal. There are real
mind-nerve-fibres and real mental attitudes, real persons and real
personalities. And each of them has a final phase which is tem-
poral. There is no entity which has no date, hence no entity
which, in addition to having no date, is neither a mind-nerve-fibre
nor a mental attitude, neither a person nor a personality.
It will be remembered that the system which we call "Des-
cartes' person" is one of several systems within systems, and that
what we call a "special type of coherence" is the coherence ex-
hibited by mental attitudes inhering in parts of the same person. 29
There are systems, however, which are not persons. And the
mental attitudes inhering in parts of a system that is not a person
may exhibit a coherence which is not an instance of what we have
called a "special type of coherence." There is "no person that en-
dures subsequent to the disintegration of its body." 80 And no en-
tity is real that is presented as having no date. Provided, however,
that it is not presented as timeless and not presented as a person,
there may, so far as we have yet seen, be some system of thinking
substances which does not perish with the disintegration of a body
with which it has been associated. Provided that it is not presented
as timeless and not presented as a person, such a system, so far as
we have yet seen, may in some sense be immortal, and may be
composed of thinking substances exhibiting some sort of coher-
ence.
There can be no causal relation, it may be held, between two
entities one of which is thinking and the other unthinking. 81 But
mental attitudes do exist. They point back to earlier entities
which caused them; and they bring about subsequent entities
which are their effects. From such premises the alleged conclusion
may be drawn that mental attitudes point back only to other
mental attitudes which are their causes and issue only into other
mental attitudes which are their effects. Thus we are presented
210
with an alleged causal chain of mental attitudes, the last of which
may be subsequent to the disintegration of a given body and the
first of which may have antedated that body. 82 We are presented
with a chain of thinking substances that constitutes a system, a
chain of thinking substances which is not a person, but which
may be held to exhibit some coherence, though not the special
type of coherence which we have examined.
It is, to be sure, not true that there can be no causal relation
between thinking entities and unthinking entities. 83 And if the
chain of thinking substances that is presented to us is alleged to
have earlier and earlier phases without any beginning, and later
and later phases without any end, then this chain or system is
presented with so indefinite a date that it is marked out as unreal.
For a subsistent is unreal, we have said, 8 * "if it appears with the
characteristic of having only a very indefinite date with respect
to an entity that appears real." The argument recounted in the
preceding paragraph does not imply that a chain of successive
mental attitudes must be real. And such a chain presented as ever-
lasting, or presented as so enduring that it is presented as having
only a very indefinite date, can not be real. Presented however
as having a date that is not too indefinite, presented nevertheless
as enduring subsequent to the disintegration of some body with
which it has been associated, such a chain of successive mental
attitudes may be real. The system, in which these mental attitudes,
taken together, inhere, is one of the systems that "may in some
sense be immortal," is one of the systems that "may be composed
of thinking substances exhibiting some sort of coherence." 85
Persons are not the only systems of thinking substances ex-
hibiting some sort of coherence. The coherence characteristic of
a person is not identical with the coherence exhibited by a system
of thinking substances which has parts or phases in different
bodies. And the coherence characteristic of a person may not be
identical with the coherence exhibited by a system of thinking
substances composed of all the thinking substances within my
body. "There are, we are told, divided personalities," 86 that is to
say, two or more persons within one body. It may be that various
cells scattered through my body have mental qualities of some
sort and yet are not parts of my person. And it may be that bac-
teria for whom my body is host, or that leucocytes within my
211
blood-stream, have some rudimentary form of mental life. Should
such alleged thinking substances be real, or should there be both a
Dr. Jekyll and a Mr. Hyde within my body, the composite sub-
stance composed of all the thinking substances within my body
might well have phases more extended than that composite sub-
stance which I call my "person." Each phase of the composite
substance composed of all the thinking substances within my
body might, that is to say, be co-extensive with my body, each
phase of my person limited to my cortex. 37 Nevertheless there is
a substance from which none of the thinking substances within
my body are excluded. Such a substance, even though it is not
a person, may be called a "system." Such a system, even though it
does not exhibit a coherence of the special type that a person
exhibits, may be said to be held together in some way, may be
said to exhibit a coherence of some sort.
There are thinking substances which are parts of my person,
some of which may be introspected and some of which are not
introspected. There are, let us agree, substances within my body
which have no mental attitudes. And there may be substances
within my body which have mental attitudes, but which are not
parts of my person. If to be conscious is to be thinking, to have
mental attitudes, then it is only those substances within my body
which have 720 mental attitudes that, literally speaking, constitute
my "unconscious." If, on the other hand, we extend the denota-
tion of "unconscious" to include whatever is not introspected,
then the mental attitude of mine which I failed to introspect
last night, the mental attitude of which I now seem to be aware
and which I now claim coheres with other mental attitudes of
mine, inheres in a part of my unconscious. The word "uncon-
scious," it would appear, is used in various senses. Some instances
of this word may refer to mental attitudes which inhere in parts
of my body, but not in parts of my person. And some instances
may refer to substances which shift, so to speak, from one group
to another. It may be held, for example, that there are substances
within my body that have successive phases; and it may be held
that, witih respect to a substance of this sort, there may be an
earlier phase which has a mental attitude and a later phase which
does not, or an earlier phase which thinks and inheres in a part
of my person and a later phase which thinks but does not inhere
212
in a part of my person. With such facts assumed, it may be the
unthinking phase, of what in some other phase thinks, that is said
to be a part of the unconscious. Or with such facts assumed, the
entity said to be a part of the unconscious may be the phase, not
a part of my person, of what in some other phase is a part of my
person.
Let us agree that there are some substances within my body
with respect to which thinking phases alternate with unthinking
phases. Let us further agree that there are some substances whose
phases that are parts of my person alternate with phases that are
not parts of my person. Finally, let us agree that there may be
phases of my body when there are no phases of my person. Let
us agree, that is to say, that my person may be discontinuous,
that each of the nerve-fibres, which today constitute my person,
may last night have lacked mental attitudes exhibiting what we
call a "special type of coherence." It may be pointed out that
criminal courts seem to find relevant the defense that, when a
given crime was committed, the accused was not "himself." 38
And last night when I was asleep, whereas there were thinking
substances within my body, it seems plausible to hold that none
of them had mental attitudes exhibiting a coherence of the
special type that would have determined them to inhere in parts
of my person. In short, a person alleged to be discontinuous need
not be presented as generally discredited; and some allegedly
discontinuous person, not presented as generally discredited, is, I
find, real. 39
Thus the thinking substances which have phases that are parts
of my person bear some resemblance, we may say, to a group of
bulbs on an instrument board. Just at it may be one set of these
bulbs that is now shining and now another set, so my person may
now have certain nerve-fibres as its parts and now others. And just
as occasionally all of the lights on an instrument board may be
out, so my person may be discontinuous. Just, that is to say, as
there may be no lights shining, so there may on occasion be no
phase of my person. Even, however, if my person is discontinuous,
there is a sense in which it may be said to be "one." Even if many
phases may be discriminated within it, phases between which
entities that are not parts of my person intervene, nevertheless
my person need not be presented as a collection of units rather
213
than as itself a unit. A net may be said to be one even though
there are interstices between the strands that compose it. And the
light from a light-house may be said to have shone through the
night, although intermittently. 40
The system of thinking substances that we call my "person" is,
we hold, discontinuous. But what constitutes an interruption of
my person may not constitute an interruption of some other sys-
tem of thinking substances exhibiting some other type of co-
herence. If the leucocytes within my blood-stream have some
rudimentary form of mental life, 41 if they are parts of a composite
substance composed of all the thinking substances within my
body, then, whereas my person was interrupted last night, some
more inclusive system of thinking substances may not have been.
Moreover, there may be intermediate systems of thinking sub-
stances, systems more inclusive than my person but less inclusive
than that which is composed of all the thinking substances within
my body. We would, to be sure, be hard put to describe the
coherence that characterizes each system in such a series of systems
within systems. And we would be hard put to determine with
which system discontinuity ends and with which more inclusive
system continuity begins. The boundaries between one system
and another seem too fluid to permit us to describe with accuracy
the type of coherence that characterizes any one of them. The
system that we call my person has however been described with a
fair degree of definiteness; and so has the system that we call the
substance composed of all the thinking substances within my
body.
Yet whatever systems are distinguished and placed before us,
it is still a problem to determine in which systems a given
mental attitude is to be included and from which systems it is
to be excluded. Does a given mental attitude inhere in a part
of my person; or does it not? Does it exhibit, or fail to exhibit, a
coherence of the sort that characterizes the particular system in
which it may be alleged to be included? A mental attitude of
Napoleon's at Waterloo and a mental attitude of a patient at
St. Elizabeth's in Washington may be alleged to exhibit the type
of coherence that would determine them to inhere in parts of
the same person. But if these mental attitudes, so presented, are
presented as generally discredited, then they do not have a co-
214
herence of the type ascribed to them. 42 Similarly with mental
attitudes alleged to inhere in leucocytes within my blood-stream.
If these leucocytes are presented as generally believed to have no
mental attitudes at all, if, consequently, any type of coherence
exemplified by mental attitudes is presented as generally believed
not to obtain between leucocytes and other thinking substances,
then these leucocytes do not think; and no coherence of any
type obtains between them and substances within iny body that
really think. In short, for any special type of coherence to charac-
terize a given mental attitude, that mental attitude, presented as
exhibiting a coherence of that type, must be presented as not
generally discredited. Just as an entity, alleged to have a mental
attitude, really has that mental attitude only if, presented as
having it, it is not presented as generally discredited, so a mental
attitude, alleged to be included in a particular system, really is
included in that system only if, presented as being included in
that system, it is not presented as generally discredited.
"There are behlviorists," we have said, 48 "who find that, when they
attempt to abstract thinking, mental attitude, mental activity, from
Descartes' mind-brain or mind-nerve-fibre or total behavior, there is
an irruption of disbelief similar to that which breaks in upon us
when we attempt to abstract from this rectangular desk its alleged
roundness." A Descartes who not only behaves but also thinks is pre-
sented as seemingly disbelieved by some behaviorists, but not as
generally disbelieved. A Descartes who not only behaves but also
thinks is not presented as generally discredited and is, we have
found, real. Similarly with my dog Fido presented as having with-
in his body substances with mental attitudes. Mental attitudes
attributed to substances within Fido's body and alleged to be
apparently directed upon man, God and the universe are, to be
sure, presented as generally discredited; and so are alleged intro-
specting mental attitudes of Fido's. But alleged mental attitudes
of Fido's apparently directed upon Kitty or apparently directed
upon dog biscuits are not. Aside from Descartes and a few mod-
erns, everyone, says Fechner, 44 "takes the nightingale singing in
the tree and the lion roaring in the desert to be something more
than acoustic machines." Thus various mental attitudes, alleged
to inhere in substances that are parts of animals, seem to be
presented as not generally discredited. Various mental attitudes,
215
alleged to inhere in substances that are parts of animals, not only
may be listed as real, but, let us assume, are listed as real.
Let us then hold that not only was Descartes' mental attitude ap-
parently directed upon man, God and the universe real, but also
Fido's mental attitude apparently directed upon Kitty. And let us
hold that not only was Descartes' mental attitude apparently di-
rected upon Queen Christina real, but also the mental attitude
alleged to inhere in one of the leucocytes within my blood-stream.
In holding, however, that various animals have mental attitudes,
we are not precluded from holding that mental attitudes of a
certain type are restricted to men. "Thinking" and "having a
mental attitude" are, as we use these words, generic terms. And
just as a green substance may be pea-green or emerald green, so
a thinking substance may be conceiving or introspecting or feel-
ing. It may be that none but men conceive, that none but men
introspect. But whereas a mental attitude apparently directed
towards man, God and the universe, which Fido is alleged to have,
is, I find, presented as generally discredited and is unreal, never-
theless a mental attitude that is an instance of fearing, which some
non-human animal is alleged to have is, I find, not presented as
generally discredited and is real.
There are behaviorists, let us repeat, who disbelieve in the
mental attitude which is alleged to inhere in one of Descartes'
mind-nerve-fibres. But the alleged mental attitude of Descartes'
which we finally considered was not presented as generally dis-
credited and was, we found, real. There are, as Fechner says,
"Descartes and a few moderns" who disbelieve in the mental
attitude which is alleged to inhere in some part of Fido's body or
in a leucocyte's. But some of these alleged mental attitudes are
likewise, we find, not presented as generally discredited, and are
likewise, we find, real. When, however, we turn to the thinking
substance which is alleged to be embodied in, or to animate, a
rolling ball or the sun or wind, we find disbelief more general.
It is not only certain behaviorists, but most of us, who find that
when we attempt to abstract its alleged mental attitude from a
rolling ball "there is an irruption of disbelief similar to that
which breaks in upon us when we attempt to abstract from this
rectangular desk its alleged roundness/' 45 The alleged mental
attitude which we are considering, the mental attitude which is
216
alleged to inhere in inorganic matter, is, let us say, presented
as generally discredited. And any mental attitude which is alleged
to inhere in inorganic matter is, let us say, unreal.
The world of real entities, as we have explained "reality,"
includes mental attitudes inhering in substances to be found
within the bodies of animals, but no mental attitudes to be found
in inorganic matter. What shall we say, however, with respect to
plants? Plants live; they reproduce themselves; and, like animals,
they grow through intussusception. Shall we say that, just as con-
ceiving, introspecting and feeling are species of mental attitudes,
so there is a species of mental attitude that is indistinguishable
from life, from reproduction and from growth through intussus-
ception? Or shall we say that, despite the fact that mental atti-
tudes are of various species, there is no species of mental attitude
that is implied merely by life, by reproduction, and by growth
through intussusception? Aristotle, writers of the Renaissance,
Leibniz and others put before us such terms as "psyche," "anima,"
"soul," "entelechy," "monad" terms which frequently seem to
represent Vital principle* as well as 'mental attitude/ And if
our term "mental attitude" had a similar meaning, if our term
"mental attitude" were to represent a vital principle manifested
wherever there is life, there would of course be some species of
mental attitude, instances of which would be qualities of living
plants.
As we use "mental attitude," however, "mental attitude" and
"vital principle" are not synonymous. "We may pass from a
consideration of Descartes' total behavior," we have said, 46 "to a
consideration of his knitted brow or distant stare." "Or," we have
said, "we may pass to a consideration of his alleged thinking." His
thinking is distinguishable from his staring; and it is likewise
distinguishable from his living. There are, to be sure, species of
mental attitude that are exemplified in qualities inhering in
mind-nerve-fibres of Descartes', and not exemplified in qualities
inhering in a leucocyte. But those qualities inhering in a leuco-
cyte which we call "mental attitudes" are distinguishable from
the leucocyte's quality of being alive or from the leucocyte's vital
principle; just as the quality that we call "Descartes' mental atti-
tude" is distinguishable from the quality of being alive that
accompanies it. As we use "mental attitude," a plant's alleged
217
mental attitude is not presented as identical with the plant's
quality of being alive. If our term "a plant's mental attitude"
represents anything, it represents something comparable to an
instance of feeling rather than something implied by the fact
that the plant lives, reproduces, and grows through intussuscep-
tion.
What then shall we say with respect to the existence or non-
existence of a mental attitude, comparable to a feeling, that a
plant may be alleged to have? The subsistent that I seem to be
considering is presented as not a feeling, but as comparable to a
feeling, as mental life of a rudimentary form, but as mental life
that is not of any of the forms with which I am familiar. This
alleged mental attitude appears, I find, in the undetailed manner
in which 'everything* appears. 47 And it likewise appears with the
characteristic of appearing in a detailed manner to no one. It is,
in short, one of those subsistents, "explicitly or implicitly appear-
ing as definite appearances for no one," which are unreal. 48 Thus
the subsistent which I seem to be considering is unreal; and so
are other alleged thinking plants. As we have explained "exist-
ence" and "reality/' plants, consequently, do not think, do not
have mental attitudes.
But if the transition from one form of life to another is gradual,
how can we draw a line so that on one side there will be animals
having mental attitudes of various types and on the other side
plants having no mental attitudes at all? There are, we must
agree, borderline cases; just as there are borderline cases between
a tent and a house, between work and play, between neighboring
colors in a spectrum. Such cases, however, do not force us to
abandon all 'distinctions, do not lead us to say that whatever is a
tent is a house and that whatever is a house is a tent. It may
depend upon the system of classification used whether some
borderline organism is a plant or an animal. Hence the denota-
tion, and even the meaning, of the term "plant" will vary accord-
ing as one system of classification is used or another. And to the
extent to which the meaning of the term "plant" is unclear, so is
the meaning of the proposition in which it is asserted that plants
do not think. Without a drawing of lines between plants on the
one side and animals on the other, the assertion that plants do
not think is not, we must admit, completely definite. It does not
218
follow, however, that the attempt to distinguish between plants
and animals must be abandoned altogether, or the attempt to
distinguish between organisms which may think and organisms
which do not.
It still may be asked, however, why the distinction between
organisms which may think, on the one hand, and organisms
which do not, an the other, coincides with the distinction be-
tween animals and plants. The term "plant" may be assigned
various meanings in that the line between plants and animals may
be drawn at one point or at another. Yet there are not fewer organ-
isms which think, it may be said, when "plant" has a more exten-
sive denotation; nor are there more organisms which think, when
''plant" has a narrower denotation. Now, we must agree that the
proposition that only animals think is true only when "animal"
and "plant" each have meanings which fall within a narrow
range. Yet, within such a range of meanings, our terminology
does seem to be a factor in determining whether or not a given
borderline organism may have a mental attitude. Thinking exists
only in such organisms as are not presented as generally dis-
credited when presented as thinking organisms. And, with respect
to certain borderline organisms, I find' that mental attitudes
attributed to them tend to be presented as generally discredited
when these organisms are called "plants," whereas certain mental
attitudes attributed to these borderline organisms are not pre-
sented as generally discredited when these organisms are called
"animals."
We may grade the mental attitudes which are real, may present
to ourselves an ordered series of mental attitudes, each mental
attitude being of a different type. Thus we may have as an ap-
parent object a series of mental attitudes, ordered in such a way
that near one end of the series there is some instance of feeling
inhering in a simple animal, near the other end an instance of
conceiving inhering in some mind-nerve-fibre of a man. Such a
series of mental attitudes, however, is not to be confused with a
series of systems within systems. The series of mental attitudes
which has as one of its initial members a feeling, as a subsequent
member an instance of perceiving, and as a still later member an
instance of conceiving, is not to be confused with a series of
systems of mental attitudes which has as an earlier member a
219
substance including only those of my mind-nerve-fibres which
have mental attitudes apparently directed upon philosophical
subjects, as a later member the more inclusive substance which
we call my "person," and as a still later member the substance
including all parts of my body which have any mental attitudes
at all. The one series may be alleged to have as a member, subse-
quent to the instance of conceiving that inheres in some mind-
nerve-fibre of a man, an instance of some allegedly higher type
of mental life inhering in some part of what is said to be an angel.
The other series may be alleged to have as a member, subsequent
to the substance including all thinking substances within my
body, a substance which includes all thinking substances which
are in or on the earth. But the coherence exhibited by mental
attitudes inhering in parts of the composite substance which
includes all thinking substances within my body is not itself an
instance of conceiving. And the coherence exhibited by mental
attitudes inhering in parts of the composite substance which in-
cludes all thinking substances on the earth is not itself an in-
stance of some allegedly higher type of mental life.
There are in Fechner's writings some curious and perhaps edify-
ing statements allegedly referring to the angel of the earth and to a
heaven "filled with hosts of angels instead of with a system of dead
bowling balls/' 49 But if the substance composed of all the think-
ing substances on earth is to be called an "angel/* it is an angel
which feels, perceives and conceives only in so far as its parts
feel, perceive and conceive; and the coherence exhibited by the
mental attitudes inhering in its parts is a coherence quite differ-
ent from that exhibited by mental attitudes inhering in parts of
my person. It is a coherence much closer to that which charac-
terizes the composite substance composed of all thinking sub-
stances within my body than it is to the coherence which charac-
terizes my person.
There are mental attitudes which vary in type and systems of
mental attitudes which vary in inclusiveness. We may group to-
gether mental attitudes characteristic of a certain epoch and may
speak of the Romantic mind or of the spirit of Romanticism. But
the coherence that relates mental attitudes of Schelling and
mental attitudes of Schleiermacher is not the coherence that re-
lates mental attitudes inhering in parts of the same person. We
220
may agree that the mental attitudes of one person are affected by
the mental attitudes of those with whom he is associated. But no
society, no corporation and no State, has a mental attitude of a
special type which is coordinate with feeling, with perceiving and
with conceiving. And no society, no corporation and no State, is
characterized by a coherence of the type that we have found char-
acterizing a person.
Summary
Is our doctrine interactionism or parallelism? The position
taken is a form of interactionism in that mental attitudes, quali-
ties of nerve-fibers, are held to affect, and to be affected by, sub-
stances in the environment. But this is not inconsistent with
certain doctrines that might be called parallelist. There is a) con-
comitant variation between the series of mental attitudes and the
series of non-mental characteristics of the nerve-fiber in which
these mental attitudes inhere, b) correspondence between a series
of mental attitudes and a series of external stimuli, but c) no
parallelism of the sort Spinoza is often held to urge, i.e., no
parallelism between mental content and objects referred to by
that content.
Mental attitudes inhere in mind-nerve-fibers. A systematic se-
ries of mind-nerve-fibers constitutes a person. What we call "per-
sonality" inheres in a person just as a mental attitude inheres
in a mind-nerve-fiber that is a part of (and "discriminated" from)
that person.
"What is it that holds certain mind-nerve-fibers together and
makes them parts of one person? Various mental attitudes are
not 'mine* because I claim they are mine or claim to be able to
introspect them. Various mind-nerve-fibers constitute one person
when they are generally believed to constitute one person.
The term 'the unconscious' may refer to mind-nerve-fibers
which at the moment have no mental attitudes; or it may refer
to thinking mind-nerve-fibers which are not parts of my person.
There are various grades of mental attitudes, conceiving, per-
ceiving and so on down to the sort of mental attitude that char-
acterizes leucocytes in the blood stream. Not to be confused with
221
this classification is the fact that there are systems within systems
of cohering mental attitudes. The system that we call a person
is neither the most exclusive nor the most comprehensive. What
we call a person has definite temporal limits (that is, it is not
immortal). It is like the set of lit-up bulbs on an instrument
board, where some bulbs are now lit up and at other times others.
222
Chapter VIII
THINKING, OBJECT AND IDEA
Two chapters back we directed our attention to certain mental
attitudes which Descartes had, when, returning from the corona-
tion of the Emperor, he found himself in a stove-heated room.
Let us begin this chapter by turning back to the coronation it-
self. Let us take as our apparent object the ceremonies in which
the Emperor and the Bishop of Mayence were among the actors
and at which Descartes was an interested spectator. For our con-
cern at this point is with the Emperor and Descartes in relation
to one another; our concern is with certain relational situations
within which Descartes and the Emperor may be alleged to have
been terms.
For one thing, the Emperor may appear as the source of mo-
tions which flowed to Descartes, as the source of motions which
affected Descartes' thinking and Descartes' behavior. Just as we
have found 1 a ledger clerk's mind-nerve-fibre, its non-mental
qualities and its thinking affected by the ledger from which this
clerk was transcribing his figures, so Descartes' mind-nerve-fibre,
its non-mental qualities and its thinking may appear as having
been affected by the Emperor. With Descartes or his behavior
or his thinking presented as result or as terminus ad quern, and
with the Emperor presented as source or as cause, our apparent
object may be an alleged causal relation flowing from the Emperor
to Descartes. Our apparent object may be the alleged relational
situation: Descartes-here-ajffected-by-Emperor-there or Emperor-
there-affecting-Descartes here.
Instead, however, of our apparent object being what in some
223
sense may be called a causal relation, our apparent object may
be an alleged relational situation within which one term is char-
acterized by a response adapted to the other. If I say: "Come to
dinner," then, as we use the words "adapted to/' my auditor's
response is, let us say, adapted to the meal that is about to be
eaten. And if I hurl a ball and the dog at my feet starts after it, his
response, let us say, is adapted to the ball that is about to fall to the
ground some distance away. The alleged relational situation that
we call "A-making-a-response-adapted-to-B" is thus distinguish-
able from the alleged relational situation that we call "A-affected-
by-B." For, whereas it is to a future phase of the ball that my
dog's response may be held to be adapted, it is the ball leaving
my hand that may be said to bring about my dog's behavior. And
whereas my words "Come to dinner" may be said to be the stimu-
lus which leads my auditor to start for the table, it is to the meal
about to be eaten that his response may be said to be adapted.
There is then the alleged relational situation Descartes-affected-
by-the-Emperor and the alleged relational situation which we call
"Descartes-making-a-response-adapted-to-the-Emperor." These al-
leged relational situations are presented as distinguishable from
one another but not as requiring different terms. So far as we
have yet seen, Descartes' response alleged to be adapted to the
Emperor need not be presented as having been brought about by
a neighbor's: "Here comes the Emperor!" It may be presented as
having been brought about by the Emperor himself. Nor need it
be one phase of the Emperor that is presented as the cause of
Descartes' response, a later phase of the Emperor to which Des-
cartes' response is presented as being adapted. To be sure, it is to
a future phase of the ball that my dog's response has been pre-
sented as being adapted, to a meal about to be eaten that my din-
ner companion's response has been presented as being adapted.
But if sunlight comes to me in a straight line from where the sun
was rather than from where the sun now is, then, when I look
at the sun, my response may be held to be adapted to a past phase
of the sun rather than to the sun's present phase. As we use the
expression "adapted to," A's response that is alleged to be adapted
to B is presented as having a certain direction, as directed, as it
were, to a certain focus, But that focus need not be presented as
future rather than as present or past. Descartes' response may
224
be presented as adapted to a past phase of the Emperor, may be
presented as adapted to the very phase of the Emperor that is
alleged to have brought about his response. In short, Descartes-
making-a-response-brought-about-by-the-Emperor and Descartes-
making-a-response-adapted-to-the-Emperor are presented as dis-
tinguishable relational situations. And yet they are not presented
as relational situations such that the terms of the one can not
coincide with the terms of the other.
There is yet another alleged relational situation to be con-
sidered, a relational situation within which Descartes and the
Emperor are again alleged to be terms. It is as a terminus of mo-
tions flowing towards him that Descartes or his mind-nerve-fibre
is a term in the alleged relational situation: Descartes-affected-by-
the-Emperor. And it is as an organism whose behavior has a direc-
tion that Descartes is a term in the alleged relational situa-
tion: Descartes-making-a-response-adapted-to-the-Emperor. Des-
cartes' mind-nerve-fibre however has mental qualities as well as
non-mental qualities. 2 And as an element within Descartes' total
behavior there is Descartes' mental attitude. 3 Thus we may di-
rect our attention to an alleged relational situation into which
Descartes enters, not by virtue of his total behavior, but by virtue
of his mental attitude. We may take as our apparent object,
not the alleged relational situation: Descartes-making-a-response-
adapted-to-the-Emperor, but rather the alleged relational sit-
uation : Descartes-having-a-mental-attitude-which-reaches-the-Em-
peror-as-its-ultimate-object.
Descartes, let us say, is making a certain response, is character-
ized by a certain behavior. And when we are presented with the
alleged relational situation: Descartes-making-a-response-adapted-
to-the-Emperor, this behavior that characterizes one term is, let us
say, presented as being directed and adapted to a certain entity.
Descartes or Descartes' mind-nerve-fibre is likewise alleged to have
a mental attitude, a mental attitude which we may describe as
seeming to be directed towards the Emperor. And when we are
presented with the alleged relational situation: Descartes-having-
a-mental-attitude-which-reaches-the-Emperor-as-its-ultimate-object,
this mental attitude is, let us say, presented, not only as seeming
to be directed towards the Emperor, but as reaching the Emperor
as its ultimate object. Manifesting a certain behavior and having
225
a mental attitude which seems to be directed towards the Em-
peror, these, in short, are being presented as intrinsic qualities
by virtue of which Descartes may be related to the Emperor. But
our apparent object may not be a Descartes that, it is alleged, has
a quality which permits him to be related to the Emperor; our
apparent object may rather be a Descartes that, it is alleged, is
related to the Emperor. Our apparent object may not be Des-
cartes' intrinsic quality of behaving, but his alleged quality of
manifesting a behavior that is adapted to the Emperor. Our ap-
parent object may not be his intrinsic quality of having a mental
attitude which seems to be directed towards the Emperor, but his
alleged quality of having a mental attitude which reaches the
Emperor as its ultimate object.
There subsists then the quality: Descartes' mental attitude
reaching the Emperor as its ultimate object. And there subsists
the relational situation: Descartes-having-a-mental-attitude-which-
reaches-the-Emperor-as-its-ultimate-object or the-Emperor-reached-
as-an-ultimate-object-by-Descartes'-thinking. Indeed there are sev-
eral subsistents, distinguishable subsistents, each of which may
seem to be represented by our expression: "The Emperor reached
as an ultimate object by Descartes' thinking." The thinking Des-
cartes, for example, may be held to have as an immediate object
an idea of the Emperor, an idea which succeeds in referring be-
yond itself to the Emperor and which thus makes the Emperor
the ultimate object of Descartes' thinking. Or the Emperor him-
self may be held to be, not merely the objective reached by Des-
cartes' thinking, but also the immediate object of that thinking.
The expression: "the Emperor reached as an ultimate object by
Descartes' thinking" may seem to represent an allegedly unmedi-
ated relational situation within which Descartes appears as think-
ing subject and the Emperor himself as immediate object. Or
this expression may seem to represent a relational situation with-
in which we are presented not merely with an ultimate object
and a thinking subject, but with an idea of the Emperor as well.
At this point, however, let us not differentiate between the al-
leged relational situation that is presented as direct and unmedi-
ated and the alleged relational situation that is presented as in-
direct and mediated by an idea. It may be that one of these
alleged relational situations is real, the other not. But at this
226
point we choose to ask whether Emperor-reached-as-ultimate-ob-
ject-by-Descartes'-thinking is real at all, however it may be
particularized, whatever more definite characteristics may be
ascribed to it. Also we present to ourselves the alleged relational
situation: Descartes-here-affected-by-Emperor-there; and we pre-
sent to ourselves the alleged relational situation: Descartes-mak-
ing-a-response-adapted-to-the-Emperor. To whatever extent each
of these subsistents may be in need of further differentiation, we
turn first to the question whether or not in some form they are
real.
Let us begin by agreeing that Descartes and the Emperor are
each real. Each appears with the characteristic of being in Frank-
furt in 1619; neither appears as generally discredited; and each is
listed as real in the appendix to Chapter Three. Let us likewise
agree that various intrinsic qualities of Descartes' are real; and
various intrinsic qualities of the Emperor's. Just as we have agreed
that Descartes in the stove-heated room was "knitting his brows"
and "staring past the furniture that was around him/' * so let us
agree that Descartes in Frankfurt had an air of eagerness and at-
cention. And just as we have agreed that Descartes in the stove-
heated room had "a mental attitude which seemed to be directed
apon man, God and the universe/' 5 so let us agree that Descartes
in Frankfurt had a mental attitude which seemed to be directed
towards the Emperor. Whether or not Descartes manifested a be-
havior that was adapted to the Emperor, he was, let us agree, be-
having. And his mind-nerve-fibre had a mental attitude which
seemed to be directed towards the Emperor, whether or not that
mental attitude reached the Emperor as its ultimate object. 6
But whereas Descartes and the Emperor were each real, there
was, it may be said, no real link between them, no real relational
situation within which Descartes and the Emperor were terms. A
may be real, and B may be real; but, it may be said, A-r-B is in all
cases unreal. Hannibal and Napoleon, for example, may be
acknowledged to be real, but not the similarity that is alleged to
obtain between them. Socrates and Xanthippe may each be ac-
knowledged to be real, but not 'being married to/
Our primary concern at this point, it is to be pointed out, is
with such alleged relational situations as Descartes-making-a-re-
sponse-adapted-to-the-Emperor and Descartes-having-a-mental-at-
227
titude-which-reaches-the-Emperor-as-its-ultimate-object. Were we
at this point to discuss the reality of relations in general, we should
find ourselves delayed in coming to close quarters with the alleged
relational situations which in this chapter are our primary con-
cern. On the basis of the explanation of "existence" already laid
down, let us then assert that, in the sense in which we use the term
"reality," some alleged relational situations are real. The marriage
relation in which Socrates and Xanthippe are alleged to participate
as terms appears dated and placed in the Athens of the second half
of the fifth century B.C. It appears neither explicitly nor im-
plicitly as generally discredited. And it is listed among the exist-
ents enumerated in the Appendix to Chapter Three. There is, let
us agree, the real relational situation: Socrates-married-to-Xan-
thippe and the real relational situation: Hannibal-like-Napoleon.
There is likewise, let us agree, the real relational situation: Des-
cartes-younger-than-the-Emperor and the real relational situation:
Descartes-near-the-Emperor. Let us in short defer to a later chap-
ter 7 such remarks as are to be made with respect to A-r-B. And let
us in this chapter agree that, if Emperor-reached-as-an-ultimate-
object-by-Descartes'-thinking is unreal, it is not its being presented
as a relational situation that makes it so.
There is the real relational situation: Descartes-near-the-Em-
peror; and there is the real relational situation: Descartes-affected-
by-the-Emperor. For, just as there is a motion flowing to a ledger-
clerk's mind-nerve-fibre from the ledger in front of him, 8 so there
is a motion flowing from the Emperor to Descartes. The clerk's
"mind-nerve-fibre and its non-mental qualities and its thinking
are affected by the ledger/' 9 And Descartes, his behavior and his
mental attitude are affected by the Emperor. One may, to be sure,
be puzzled that, when motions terminate in Descartes, qualities
should appear which are not themselves motions, but, rather, are
such qualities as behaving and thinking. It may seem less puzzling
for one billiard ball on receiving impulses from another to be itself
set in motion than for a piece of metal on receiving heat waves to
be set glowing or for Descartes on being affected by the Emperor
to be set thinking and behaving. For we may see no reason for the
connection between the reception of motions, waves or impulses
on the one hand and the origination of glowing or thinking or be-
having on the other. Such problems however lead us to seek a rea-
228
son through a closer study of the structure of the entity which is
heated and glows, of the entity which is affected from outside and
thinks. Or we may be led to abandon such problems as specious
ones. But whether we pursue these problems or abandon them, we
do not, it seems, deny the glowing, the thinking or the behaving.
We have agreed that a "certain piece of metal is a real substance
which is really hot and really red." 10 And we have agreed that
Descartes in the stove-heated room had a mental attitude which
seemed to be directed upon man, God and the universe. Our
piece of metal's alleged glowing is not presented as generally dis-
credited, even though the transformation, as it were, of heat waves
into glowing is presented as puzzling. Nor is Descartes' mental
attitude seemingly directed upon the Emperor presented as
generally discredited, even though its occurrence just when Des-
cartes is affected by the Emperor is presented as puzzling. Des-
cartes was behaving, and his behavior was affected by the Emperor,
whether or not his behavior was adapted to the Emperor. He had
a mental attitude seemingly directed upon the Emperor and this
mental attitude was affected by the Emperor, whether or not this
mental attitude reached the Emperor as its ultimate object.
There is however a difference between the metal which on being
affected by heat waves glows and the behavior which on being af-
fected by in-coming motions is held to be adapted to something
outside it. In the latter instance there is not only a transformation,
as it were, from motion to what is not motion; the quality which
arises at the terminus ad quern is presented as having direction
also. This again however is not a respect in which thinking and
behaving are presented as unique. The needle of a compass, on
being affected by a magnet, is presented as having direction. And
this needle, presented as related to the magnetic pole of the earth,
is not presented as generally discredited even when the entity pre-
sented as impinging upon it is presented as adjacent to it. With
the needle's behavior, Descartes' behavior and Descartes' .mental
attitude all alleged to be brought about by entities which im-
pinge upon them, the relational situation: Needle-related-to-the-
magnetic-pole-of-the-earth is, we hold, real and the alleged rela-
tional situations: Descartes-making-a-response-adapted-to-the-Em-
peror and Descartes-having-a-mental-attitude-which-reaches-the-
Emperor-as-its-ultimate-object need not be presented as incredible
229
and unreal.
When a needle, however, is related to the magnetic pole of the
earth, it is also related to intervening entities in the magnetic
field which stretches from it to the pole. A needle which is related
to the magnetic pole is, it may be admitted, real. But a needle al-
leged to be related to the pole and also alleged not to be similarly
related to intervening entities, such a needle, it may be said, is
presented as generally discredited and is unreal. Descartes' be-
havior may, so far as we have yet seen, be adapted to the Emperor;
but only, it may be said, if it is also adapted to the entities through
which the motions originating in the Emperor have passed. It is
only by going back step by step, as it were, over the path through
which its behavior was affected that the needle, it may be said,
comes to be related to the magnetic pole of the earth. And it
would only be by going back step by step, as it were, over the path
through which Descartes' mental attitude was brought about, that
that mental attitude, it may be said, might come to reach the
Emperor as its ultimate object.
When there exists the relational situation: A-grandson-of-C,
there also exists the relational situation: A-son-of-B. And when a
compass needle points in the direction of the magnetic pole of the
earth, it also points in the direction of some intervening entity.
But not all relational situations are similar. A butterfly may be
like a butterfly ancestor, but not like the larva and caterpillar that
intervene. And the sounds that come out of my telephone re-
ceiver may be like the sounds spoken into another instrument
some distance away, but not like the intervening telephone wires.
The alleged relational situation A-like-C need not be presented as
generally discredited when A-like-intervening-B is presented as un-
real. And the alleged relational situation: Descartes-having-a-men-
tal-attitude-which-reaches-the-Emperor-as-its-ultimate-object need
not, we hold, be presented as unreal when Descartes-having-a-
mental-attitude-which-reaches-intervening-air-waves-as-objects is
presented as unreal. So far as we have yet seen, Descartes' be-
havior may not only be brought about by the Emperor but also
adapted to the Emperor. And it may be adapted to the Emperor
even though it is not adapted to Descartes' own ears, to the ears
through which the Emperor's voice has affected Descartes' be-
havior.
230
The Emperor, alleged to be both the cause and the ultimate
object reached by Descartes' thinking, need not be presented as
unreal when intervening entities are presented as nearer causes,
but not nearer objects, of Descartes' thinking. Nor need the Em-
peror alleged to be both the cause of Descartes' behavior and the
entity to which that behavior is adapted, be presented as unreal
when intervening entities are presented as causes but not as en-
tities to which Descartes' behavior is likewise adapted. But the
Emperor whom we are considering, it may be said, is not pre-
sented as what is properly to be called a ''cause" at all. The Em-
peror, or parts of the Emperor, may be at the sources of light
waves and sound waves which terminate in Descartes. In this
sense the Emperor may be said to affect Descartes' thinking and
Descartes' behavior. But it is not "every entity at the source of
motion," 13 - it may be said, that is properly to be called a "cause."
And for A's behavior to be adapted to B without being caused by
B, this, it may be said, is incredible. When Descartes' behavior is
presented as not having been caused by the Emperor, the alleged
relational situation: Descartes-making-a-response-adapted-to-the-
Emperor is, it may be said, presented as incredible and is unreal.
It is, it may be said, certain vibrations of the Emperor's larynx
that are, properly speaking, the cause of Descartes' behavior, cer-
tain vibrations of the Emperor's larynx and certain points on the
surface of the Emperor's body from which light waves of different
wave-lengths emanate. Strictly speaking, it may be said, it is not
the Emperor himself or the Emperor's beard or the Emperor's
piety which is the "cause" of Descartes' behavior. Indeed it is not
the Emperor's size and not the spatial relation between one point
on the surface of the Emperor's body and another. For "the con-
nection of anything manifold," it has been held, "can never enter
into us through the senses." 12 But if none of these entities are
causes of Descartes' behavior or of Descartes' thinking, how can
they be entities to which his behavior is adapted or entities
reached by his thinking as ultimate objects? An Emperor's piety,
alleged to be the entity reached as an ultimate object by Descartes'
thinking but alleged not to be the cause of Descartes' thinking, is,
it may be said, incredible and unreal. And the Emperor himself,
alleged to be the entity to which Descartes' behavior is adapted
but alleged not to be the cause of that behavior, such an entity
231
likewise, it may be said, is incredible and unreal.
To be sure, the Emperor's piety and the Emperor himself are,
if they exist, at the source from which motions flow to Descartes'
thinking and to Descartes' behavior. But they may, let us in this
chapter grant, not be sine quibus non with respect to Descartes'
thinking or behavior. As we use the verb "to affect," 18 such en-
tities, if they exist, affected Descartes' behavior, although, in some
sense of "cause," they may not have caused that behavior. But is it
not possible for Descartes' behavior to be adapted to the Emperor
without the Emperor having caused that behavior? Indeed is it
not possible for Descartes' behavior to be adapted to the Emperor
without the Emperor being at the source of motions terminating
in that behavior?
It would seem that some relational situation A-r-B may be real
when B is presented as not the cause of A. And it would seem that
some relational situation A-r-B may be real when B is presented
as not having affected A. No waves or impulses, let us agree,
flowed from Confucius to Socrates. And yet when we are presented
with the alleged relational situations Socrates-later-than-Confucius
or Socrates-thinner-than-Confucius, we do not ask: How can Soc-
rates have been later or thinner than Confucius when Confucius
was at the source of no motions flowing to him? Some instances of
A-r-B, it would appear, are not presented as generally discredited,
need not be unreal, when B is presented as not having affected A.
Let us turn however to an instance of the alleged relational
situation: A-like-B. If we are told that two primitive peoples in
different parts of the world have identical ceremonies or speak
similar languages, we look for some mutual influence or for some
common ancestry. We expect to find the relational situation A-
like-B supplemented by some additional relational situation in
which A and B are likewise terms. Similarly, it may be said, when
Descartes' behavior is alleged to be adapted to the Emperor or
Descartes' mental attitude alleged to reach the Emperor as its ulti-
mate object, we look for some additional relation uniting the
Emperor to Descartes. In the absence of a causal relation of some
sort, it may be said, Descartes' behavior allegedly adapted to the
Emperor and Descartes' mental attitude allegedly reaching the
Emperor as an ultimate object are presented as generally dis-
credited and are unreal.
232
What, however, is the situation with respect to the two primi-
tive peoples alleged to have similar customs? We do not, it would
seem, withhold belief in the alleged similarity until some mutual
influence or common ancestry has been tracked down. Indeed,
assuming that after investigation any mutual influence or com-
mon ancestry has been ruled out, nevertheless the alleged fact of
similarity still remains, is still an entity that need not be pre-
sented as generally discredited. "One may," we have noted, 14 "be
puzzled that, when motions terminate in Descartes, qualities
should appear which are not themselves motions, but, rather, are
such qualities as behaving and thinking/' And one may likewise
be puzzled that peoples should be similar despite a lack of mutual
influence or common ancestry. In the former instance, however,
we do not, we have found, reject the thinking itself, do not find
the behaving itself presented as discredited. Similarly we need
not, in the present instance, reject the existence of a similarity.
A "piece of metal's alleged glowing is not presented as generally
discredited even though the transformation, as it were, of heat
waves into glowing is presented as puzzling." 15 And a similarity
between two peoples need not be presented as generally discred-
ited even though such a similarity unaccompanied by mutual
influence or common ancestry is likewise presented as puzzling.
Presented as unaccompanied by a causal relation, the alleged
relational situation: Socrates-thinner-than-Confucius need not be
unreal. Presented as unaccompanied by a causal relation, the
alleged relational situation: this-primitive-people-like-that-primi-
tive-people need not be unreal. And, so far as we have yet seen,
presented as unaccompanied by a causal relation, the alleged rela-
tional situation: Descartes'-behavior-adapted-to-the-Emperor need
not be unreal. 16 The Emperor is real, Descartes real and Descartes'
behavior real. Descartes'-behavior-adapted-to-the-Emperor need
not be presented as generally discredited. And the subsisting Des-
cartes'-behavior-adapted-to-the-Emperor which we are considering
is not presented as generally discredited. Some subsisting rela-
tional situation which we call "Descartes making a response
adapted to the Emperor" is, we hold, real. The Emperor has the
real quality of being that to which Descartes' response is adapted.
And Descartes has the real quality of making a response adapted
to the Emperor.
233
How is it, however, with respect to Descartes-having-a-mental-at-
titude-which-reaches-the-Emperor-as-i ts-ultimate-ob j ect? There are,
to be sure, several subsis tents, "each of which may seem to be
represented by our expression: 'The Emperor reached as an ul-
timate object by Descartes' thinking/ " 17 But the Emperor is real,
Descartes real, and Descartes' mental attitude seemingly directed
towards the Emperor real. 18 The alleged relational situation: Des-
cartes-having-a-mental-attitude-which-reaches-the-Emperor-as-its-ul-
timate-object need not be presented as generally discredited. And
whereas the relational situation which we are considering the
relational situation which we call "Descartes-having-a-mental atti-
tude-which-r eaches-the-Emperor-as-its-ultimate-ob j ect' 'is indefi-
nite in that it is not definitely presented as an unmediated relation
and not definitely presented as a relation that is mediated by an
idea, nevertheless this relational situation is not presented as gen-
erally discredited. Some subsisting Descartes-having-a-mental-atti-
tude-which-reaches-the-Emperor-as-i ts-ultimate-ob j ect is, we hold,
real. Whether or not he be the immediate object, the Emperor has
the real quality of being reached as an ultimate object by Des-
cartes' thinking. And whatever its immediate object may be, the
mental attitude of Descartes which seems to be directed towards
the Emperor really reaches the Emperor as its ultimate object.
There is a real relational situation: Descartes-in-Frankfurt-hav-
ing-a-mental-attitude-which-reaches-the-Emperor-as-its-ultimate-ob-
ject. And there is a real relational situation: Descartes-in-Frank-
furt-making-a-response-adapted-to-the-Emperor. There is a real re-
lational situation: My-dinner-companion-making-a-response-adapt-
ed-to-the-meal-about-to-be-eaten. 19 And there is a real relation-
al situation: Descartes-en-route-to-Frankfurt-making-a-response-
adapted-to-the-ceremony-about-to-be-witnessed. There is likewise,
let us say, a real relational situation: Descartes-en-route-to-Frank-
furt-having-a-mental-attitude-which-reaches-as-its-ultimate-object-
the-Emperor-about-to-be-witnessed-in-Frankfurt. And, taking it for
granted that, in reading this chapter, you have had a thinking
mind-nerve-fibre with the intrinsic quality of seeming to be di-
rected upon the Emperor, there is, let us say, a real relational
situation: Your-having-a-mental-attitude-which-reaches-the-Emper-
or-in-Frankfurt-as-its-ultimate-object. The Emperor has the real
quality of being reached as an ultimate object by a mental atti-
234
tude belonging to Descartes at Frankfurt, the real quality of being
reached as an ultimate object by a mental attitude belonging to
Descartes en route to Frankfurt, and the real quality of being
reached as an ultimate object by a mental attitude of yours. Some
thinking mind-nerve-fibre of Descartes' en route to Frankfurt
did not only have the intrinsic quality of seeming to be directed
upon the Emperor; it also had the quality of reaching the Em-
peror as an ultimate object. And so with some thinking mind-
nerve-fibre of yours as you were reading this chapter.
One of the alleged relational situations which seem to be repre-
sented by "Descartes at Frankfurt having a mental attitude which
reached the Emperor as an ultimate object" is real. But is this
relational situation which is real an unmediated relation; or is it
a relation in which an idea of the Emperor intervenes? The Des-
cartes en route to Frankfurt had the real quality of having a men-
tal attitude which reached the Emperor as an ultimate object.
But is this real quality of Descartes' or of Descartes' mind-nerve-
fibre the quality of being aware of the Emperor as an immediate
object? Or is it the quality of being aware of "an idea which suc-
ceeds in referring beyond itself to the Emperor"? 20 The Emperor
has the real quality of being reached by a mental attitude which
you had as you were reading this chapter. But is this real quality
of the Emperor's the quality of being the entity of which you were
immediately aware? Or is it the quality of being referred to by an
idea of which you were aware?
Our problem at this point is whether or not an idea of the
Emperor intervenes in the relational situation within which the
Emperor is one term and you, or Descartes en route to Frankfurt,
or Descartes at Frankfurt, another term. But what is it to inter-
vene? Your mental attitude directed upon the Emperor at his
coronation may have been preceded by a mental attitude of yours
directed upon some other episode in the Emperor's life. This
other episode in the Emperor's life, which was an object for a
previous mental attitude of yours, is, let us agree, related to that
phase of the Emperor's life in which he was being crowned. And
it may deserve mention in an account of the genesis of your pres-
ent mental attitude directed upon the coronation. But if this
object for a previous mental attitude is no longer an object of
yours, then it does not, let us say, intervene in the relational situ-
235
ation within which your present mind-nerve-fibre with its present
mental attitudes is a term. Being an immediate object, being an
idea, is not, in short, merely being an object for some previous
mental attitude.
There is the proposition "The world exists"; and there is the
proposition: "God exists/' It may be held that the existence of the
world implies the existence of God, that the proposition "God
exists" may be deduced from other propositions. Or it may be
held either that God is known intuitively or that His existence
is to be accepted as a postulate, that the proposition "God exists"
is not to be "deduced from other propositions which are its prem-
ises/' 21 There is a distinction, that is to say, between the entity
whose existence we accept, or in whose existence we believe,
without proof; and the entity in whose existence we believe as the
result of proof. This distinction, however, is not the distinction
between an unmediated subject-object relation and a subject-
object relation in which an idea intervenes. For, just as objects
for previous mental attitudes of yours, in so far as they are merely
objects for previous mental attitudes, need not intervene "in the
relational situation within which your present mind-nerve-fibre
with its present mental attitudes is a term," 22 so, if I am really
aware of God and really believing in His existence, the relation
between me and the proposition "God exists" may be unmediated,
whether or not some previous mental attitude of mine reached as
its ultimate object the proposition: "The world exists." "I cannot
demonstrate" says Thomas Reid, 23 "that two quantities which are
equal to the same quantity are equal to each other; neither can I
demonstrate that the tree which I perceive exists. But, by the
constitution of my nature," Reid continues, "my belief is irresis-
tibly carried along by my apprehension of the axiom"; and it is
"no less irresistibly carried along by my perception of the tree."
But if, contrary to Reid's opinion, there are other entities such
that a belief in their existence leads to a belief in the existence of
the tree, nevertheless the relational situation which exists when
Reid's mental attitude reaches the tree as its ultimate object need
not be mediated by an idea. And if, on the other hand, a belief
in the existence of the tree is intuitive and the proposition: "This
tree exists" accepted without proof, there may nevertheless be an
idea of the tree which is Reid's immediate object, an idea of the
236
tree which intervenes when Reid's thinking reaches the tree as its
ultimate object.
As we use "intervene/* an entity does not, by being an object
for a previous mental attitude, intervene in the relation between
thinking subject and ultimate object. And as we use "idea/* an
entity is not an intervening idea when it is indistinguishable from
the subject's thinking. Descatrtes had a mental attitude which
seemed to be directed upon the Emperor. And if this mental
attitude, as a mental attitude, were to be called an "idea," then
of course the real relational situation: Emperor-reached-as-an-ulti-
mate-object-by-Descartes'-thinking would imply the existence of
an idea in one of its terms. If it is a type of thinking, a mental
attitude, that we call a "perception/* then "it is clearer than the
day that we are able to see, perceive and know" ultimate objects
"only by the perceptions that we have of them." 24 The relational
situation, however, which is alleged to involve only the Emperor
and Descartes' mental attitude is, let us say, presented as an un-
mediated relation, not as a relation in which an idea of the
Emperor intervenes. The relation between thinking subject and
ultimate object is mediated by what we call an "idea," only if
some entity exists which is distinguishable from the subject's
thinking and which refers beyond itself to the ultimate object.
What we call "mental attitude" may, to be sure, be called
"idea" in some other terminology. 25 Hence, the relational situa-
tion which we should say is presented as "unmediated by an idea"
might by others be said to be presented as "involving an idea." It
is not to be concluded, however, that the question whether or not
the subject-object relation is mediated by an idea resolves itself
into a question as to how we are to use the term "idea." Whatever
meaning is assigned the term "idea," there are several subsisting
relational situations each of which may seem to be represented by
our expression: "Descartes having a mental attitude which reaches
the Emperor as an ultimate object." There is on the one hand the
alleged relational situation within which there is alleged to be a
mental picture of the Emperor. And since what we call "mental
attitude" is "presented as not a mental picture or image," 26 the
relational situation which is alleged to include a mental picture
presents an entity distinguishable from the mental attitude which
we have found real. On the other hand, there is the relational
237
situation alleged to include no mental picture, the relational
situation in which the Emperor is alleged to be the direct object
of Descartes' thinking and alleged to be referred to by no entity
distinguishable from that thinking. Descartes' mental attitude is
real and reaches the Emperor as its ultimate object. The question
is whether the Emperor is a direct object of what is not a mental
picture or whether he is referred to by an entity distinguishable
from the mental attitude that has been found real.
In order for the relation between thinking subject and ultimate
object to be mediated by what we call an "idea/* some entity must
be real, and involved in the relation, which is distinguishable
from what we have described as the subject's thinking. The entity
which is alleged to be an intervening idea need not be presented
as differing in date or position from the thinking subject. Think-
ing and idea, for example, mental attitude and immediate object,
may be presented as qualities inhering in the same substance. On
the other hand, an entity may be called an "idea," let us say, if
it is real and has a date or position different from that of the
mental attitude itself. The idea of the Emperor, alleged to be
distinguishable from Descartes' thinking, may be alleged to be
where Descartes' thinking is or where the Emperor is; it may be
alleged to have a position which is neither Descartes' nor the
Emperor's; or it may be alleged to have no position at all.
To be sure, if the idea alleged to intervene is nothing but the
Emperor himself, then the relation said to be mediated by an
idea is the very relation that we should describe as unmediated.
But what about a quality of the Emperor's presented as the inter-
vening idea? The relational situation: Descartes-having-a-mental-
attitude-which-reaches-the-Emperor-as-ultimate-object may be pre-
sented as a situation in which Descartes' immediate object is a
quality of the Emperor's, a quality of the Emperor's which points
to the Emperor in which that quality inheres. Just as it may be
said 27 that it is a quality of the Emperor's, rather than the Em-
peror himself, that is the sine qua non of the mental attitude of
Descartes' which reaches the Emperor as an ultimate object, so it
may be said that it is a quality of the Emperor's which is Des-
cartes' immediate object, a quality of the Emperor's which refers
to the Emperor as ultimate object.
Let us agree that, whereas one phase of the thinking Descartes
238
may have reached the Emperor as an ultimate object, a previous
phase or a subsequent phase may have reached as an ultimate
object a given quality of the Emperor's. When this quality is the
ultimate object, the immediate object, it may be said, is the ulti-
mate object and the subject-object relation an unmediated one.
But when a mental attitude which reaches this quality is succeeded
by a mental attitude which reaches the Emperor himself, then the
immediate object, it may be said, although intrinsically unaltered,
acquires a reference. And when this quality is abstracted 28 from
its substance, this immediate object, it may be said, although
intrinsically unaltered, loses its reference and becomes the ulti-
mate object also.
But why should the relation between Emperor and thinking
Descartes, in which a quality of Emperor's is alleged to intervene
as immediate object, be presented as real; and the relation be-
tween them, in which it is alleged that no entity intervenes, be
presented as incredible? It may be that, with respect to the causal
relation flowing from the Emperor to Descartes, some quality of
the Emperor's, rather than the Emperor himself, is the sine qua
non of Descartes' mental attitude. 29 The relation between think-
ing subject and ultimate object is, however, distinguishable from
the relation between cause and effect. The Emperor, presented
as ultimate object, need not be presented as generally discredited
when it is a quality of the Emperor's, rather than the Emperor
himself, that is alleged to be the cause of Descartes' thinking. And
a quality of the Emperor's which is alleged to be the cause of
Descartes' thinking need not be presented as an intervening idea.
The Emperor himself, that is to say, need not be presented as
generally discredited when he is presented as not the cause, but
nevertheless the immediate object, of the thinking directed upon
him. Moreover, if a mental attitude may reach a quality of the
Emperor's without the intervention of an idea, another mental
attitude, it would seem, may likewise reach the Emperor himself
without the intervention of an idea. A quality which is reached
directly and a substance which is reached indirectly this com-
bination is not impossible. But it is not a combination that we
find necessary. In order not to be presented as generally discred-
ited, the Emperor himself, so far as we have yet seen, need not be
presented as an ultimate object which is not an immediate object,
239
need not be presented as an ultimate object with respect to which
a quality of die Emperor's is an intervening idea.
The quality of the Emperor's, whose function as intervening
idea we have been considering, appears as an individual quality
having the position and date that inhere in the Emperor himself.
It is some such entity as the Emperor's color or the Emperor's
quality of being the source of certain vibrations. But there also
subsist such entities as color in general, universal qualities which
are held to be in some manner exemplified or instanced in the
Emperor's color or in the Emperor's being the source of vibrations.
And it may be held that, when Descartes' mental attitude reaches
the Emperor as ultimate object, it is color in general that is the
intervening idea rather than the Emperor's color, a universal rather
than that quality of the Emperor's which is the cause of Des-
cartes' thinking. The subsisting relational situation with which
we are presented may be Descartes-aware-of-universal-which-refers-
to-the-Emperor rather than Descartes-aware-of-a-quality-of-the-Em-
peror's-which-ref ers-to-the-Emperor. But the universal, whose func-
tion as an intervening idea we are now to consider, subsists, let us
say, either as in its instances or as not in its instances. Color in gen-
eral is presented as being where various colored things are, as
having, along with other dates and positions, the date and posi-
tion of the Emperor's color. Or color in general is presented as
merely being realized in the Emperor's color, as being in itself
without any dates or any positions. Yet if, when the Emperor is
presented as ultimate object, it is not required that his color be
presented as intervening idea, it would not seem to be required
that the color, which is where he is and where other colored things
are, be presented as intervening idea. If, in order not to be pre-
sented as generally discredited, the Emperor need not be presented
as "an ultimate object with respect to which a quality of the
Emperor's is an intervening idea," 80 then, in order not to be pre-
sented as generally discredited, he need not be presented as an
ultimate object with respect to which a universal, alleged to be in
its various instances, is an intervening idea.
But what shall we say with respect to the universal which is
alleged merely to be realized in entities having dates and posi-
tions, the universal which in itself is alleged to be non-temporal
and non-spatial? "Whatever appears as lacking a date or as having
240
no spatial position" is, we have said, 31 unreal. Hence the alleged
relational situation with which we are presented is one in which a
real thinking subject is alleged to be aware of an unreal immedi-
ate object and this unreal immediate object alleged to refer to a
real ultimate object. But the entity which is presented as unreal
is unreal. And the entity which is unreal has no real qualities,
inheres in no real substance and is a term in no real relational
situation. The universal which is unreal refers to no real Emperor,
is the immediate object of no real mental attitude, intervenes in
no real subject-object relation. The relational situation in which
only an unreal universal intervenes is a relational situation in
which there is no intervening idea. "Some subsisting Descartes-
having-a-mental-attitude-which-reaches-the-Emperor-as-its-ultimate-
object is, we hold, real." S2 So far as we have yet seen, this subsistent
may be Descartes-aware-of-an-intervening-idea-which-refers-to-the-
Emperor. But it is not Descartes-aware-of-a-non-temporal-and-non-
spatial-universal-which-refers-to-the-Emperor.
The relation between thinking subject and ultimate object may,
so far as we have yet seen, be a mediated relation. And it may, so
far as we have yet seen, be an unmediated relation. But if Descartes
is here and the Emperor there, is it not necessary that there be an
intervening idea, an immediate object which is here and hence
distinct from the ultimate object? The mind, it is said, does not
travel out to interact with its ultimate objects in the places where
they are. "We see the sun, the stars and an infinity of objects out-
side of us." But, as Malebranche ss puts it, "it is not likely that the
soul leaves the body and goes, so to speak, to wander through the
heavens to contemplate all these objects there." Nor is there an
interaction which somehow occurs both where the subject is and
where his ultimate object is. "If I do not perceive the effects of
the fixed stars, remaining all the while here upon the earth," then,
says Montague, "I and they must interact at a distance, that is,
must be in two places at once." 34
Now, we have agreed that "Descartes, his behavior and his men-
tal attitude are affected by the Emperor." 85 They are affected in
such a way that what finally impinges on Descartes' thinking is
here where his thinking is, not there where the Emperor is. But
the last cause need not be the first object. That which finally im-
pinges on Descartes' thinking and is here may be no object for
241
Descartes at all. It is one thing to be a cause, whether last cause
or distant source. And it is another thing to be an object, whether
immediate object or ultimate object. "The Emperor, alleged
to be both the cause and the ultimate object reached by Des-
cartes' thinking, need not be presented as unreal when intervening
entities are presented as nearer causes, but not nearer objects,
of Descartes* thinking." 86 And the Emperor need not be presented
as unreal when he is alleged to be the immediate object of Des-
cartes' thinking as well. For, if it is not incredible for intervening
entities to be causes but not objects, then it is not incredible for
the Emperor to be the nearest object, hence the immediate ob-
ject. Whereas the thinking and its last cause are here, the immedi-
ate object of that thinking may, so far as we have yet seen, be
there. The mind-nerve-fibre which is here may have concomitant
with it no mental picture, no mental quality distinguishable from
its mental attitude, no characteristic, in short, which, as we have
explained our term "idea/' 37 is an idea of the Emperor.
There exists a relational situation represented by our expres-
sion: "Descartes in Frankfurt having a mental attitude which
reaches the Emperor as its ultimate object," a relational situation
in which the subject is here and the ultimate object there. But
there also exists a relational situation represented by our expres-
sion: "Your having a mental attitude which reaches the Emperor
in Frankfurt as its ultimate object/' 88 a relational situation in
which the subject is now and the ultimate object then. In the in-
stance in which the subject is here and the ultimate object there,
the entity which is the ultimate object may, so far as we have yet
seen, be the immediate object as well. But may the ultimate ob-
ject also be the immediate object in the instance in which the sub-
ject is now and the ultimate object then? Your present mental atti-
tude, it may be said, can not have as its immediate object the Em-
peror in Frankfurt who is past. "The present awareness," as Love-
joy puts it, 89 "manifestly has, and must have, a compresent con-
tent." For if your only object were the Emperor who is your ulti-
mate object, your attention, it may be said, would be directed en-
tirely to the past and you would not be aware of the Emperor as
past with respect to your present thinking. To think of the past,
it is held, is in part to think of the present with respect to which
the past is past. It is, it is said, to have a contemporary immediate
242
object which refers beyond itself to an ultimate object which is
past.
Now when your present mental attitude reaches the past Em-
peror in Frankfurt as its ultimate object, there is, to be sure, one
sense in which your immediate object is present. Your immediate
object is "present" in the sense that it is given or presented to the
mental attitude directed upon it. But it is one thing to be pre-
sented to your present mental attitude, another thing to be con-
temporaneous with your present mental attitude. Whatever the
date of your immediate object, your ultimate object, in the in-
stance we are now considering, is past with respect to your present
thinking, past with respect to Napoleon Bonaparte, future with
respect to Julius Caesar. It would appear that you may be aware
of the Emperor in Frankfurt as past with respect to Napoleon
without being aware of him as past with respect to any present im-
mediate object of yours. And it would likewise appear that you
may be aware of this Emperor as past with respect to what is now
happening without being aware of him as past with respect to a
present idea. For the entities with respect to which the Emperor
is dated, the entities which are objects of yours along with the past
Emperor, may be the events chronicled in today's newspaper, or
they may be your present mental attitudes, rather than some pres-
ent idea of the Emperor. In order to think of the Emperor as past,
it is, we conclude, not necessary that your immediate object be a
present idea of him. Your immediate objects may, on the one hand,
be contemporaneous events which are not ideas, and, on the
other hand, the Emperor himself who is your ultimate object.
"When I think of my grandfather's time, I do not think in
my grandfather's time." 40 And if your present mental attitude
reaches the Emperor in Frankfurt, not only as its ultimate
object but as its immediate object as well, then subject and
immediate object are not contemporaneous with one another.
It is, however, no more incredible for a subject to be now and
its immediate object then than it is for one end of this couch
to be here and the other end there. The couch taken as a whole is
presented as having an indefinite rather than a punctual position.
And the relational situation, within which your mental attitude is
now and the Emperor who is your immediate object then, is pre-
sented as having an indefinite rather than a momentary date. It is
243
presented, that is to say, as having a date no more definite than
that of an entity which has endured since 1619. The alleged re-
lational situation which is thus presented with an indefinite date
need not however be presented as unreal, need not be discarded in
favor of an alleged relational situation in which subject and im-
mediate object are presented as contemporaneous with one an-
other.
So far as we have yet seen, the relation between subject and ulti-
mate object need not be mediated by an idea. Indeed such a rela-
tion can be mediated by an idea only if the idea which is alleged to
intervene is real. Now, the idea which is alleged to be the im-
mediate object, and alleged to refer beyond itself to the ultimate
object, is frequently held to be an entity which is non-spatial.
Thinking itself is held to be non-spatial, incapable of entering in-
to causal relations with extended entities. And in view of the lack
of "proportion" 41 between an inextended thinking and extended
ultimate objects, the immediate object of such a thinking, it may
be held, must be an idea which, like thinking itself, is inextended
and non-spatial. Were such an argument acceptable, we should
likewise have to agree, it would seem, that there is no proportion
between the inextended idea and the extended ultimate object.
We should have to reject the alleged relation between inextended
idea and extended ultimate object. And we should likewise have
to reject the alleged relation between inextended thinking and ex-
tended ultimate object. We should in short find ourselves consider-
ing an alleged extended object presented as not referred to by an
intervening idea and presented as not reached as an ultimate ob-
ject by the inextended thinking said to be directed upon it.
It has been our conclusion, however, that the thinking which
appears as non-spatial is unreal; 42 that thinking presented as spatial
is in some instances real; 48 and that some instances of a thinking
which is spatial reach the ultimate objects upon which they are
directed. 44 As we use the term "reality," whatever appears as non-
spatial is unreal. Hence the subsistent which appears as a non-
spatial idea does not exist and does not intervene as an immediate
object. In the real relational situation in which Descartes' mental
attitude reaches the Emperor as its ultimate object, the immediate
object may be the Emperor himself, but cannot be an alleged non-
spatial idea of the Emperor. So far as we have yet seen, it is simi-
244
larly possible for the immediate object to be a quality of the ulti-
mate object or a universal which exists in the ultimate object. But
it can be no "essence," 45 no universal, no logical entity, which ap-
pears as having no date and no position.
There subsists the intervening idea which is presented as having
no position. And there subsists the intervening idea which is pre-
sented as having position, but only with respect to other ideas. An
idea of the sun may be presented as having no position. Or an idea
of the sun may be presented as being to the right of an ideal Venus
and beyond an ideal mountain, but as lacking position with re-
spect to Venus, the mountain and the sun which are, let us
agree, real ultimate objects. An idea however which appears as
having no spatial position with respect to entities which appear
real, and with respect to which it appears present, is itself unreal. 46
And so alleged ideas are unreal and cannot function as immediate
objects, either if they appear as non-spatial, or if, appearing as
located with respect to other ideas, they appear as not in the same
spatial world as real ultimate objects contemporaneous with them.
There is also to be considered the idea which is held to be an ob-
ject for but a single subject. There may be held to exist: Descartes'
idea of the Emperor presented only to Descartes, your idea of the
Emperor presented only to you, and the Emperor who is an ulti-
mate object both for your mental attitude and for Descartes', the
Emperor, that is to say, to whom both your idea and Descartes*
idea are alleged to refer. But the idea of the Emperor that is al-
leged to be an object for Descartes alone is a subsistent implicitly
presented as an entity which you and I are now considering. 47 Des-
cartes' idea of the Emperor subsists explicitly with the character-
istic of being an object for Descartes alone and implicitly with the
characteristic of being an object for others also. Descartes' alleged
idea of the Emperor appears free from self-contradiction only when
Descartes' alleged exclusive awareness of it is limited to an aware-
ness of some special kind, only when, for example, Descartes' idea
of the Emperor is presented as being an immediate object for
Descartes alone, or is presented as being presented in detail to Des-
cartes alone.
We turn then to the idea which is alleged to have position with
respect to ultimate objects and alleged to be an object of some
sort for various subjects. There is for example the idea of the
245
moon which is alleged to be my immediate object, presented in
detail to me alone, but which is alleged to be here with respect
to my mental attitude and to be there with respect to the moon
which is my ultimate object. The alleged idea of the moon which
is presented to me in detail, but presented in some sense to you
also, is presented, let us say, not only as being in my head, but as
having certain intrinsic characteristics also. It is, let us say, pre-
sented as silver in color and shaped like a crescent. But along with
the alleged silver crescent in my head, I find myself considering
another subsistent, namely, an alleged silver crescent in the sky.
And I find that what is presented as my immediate object is an al-
leged silver crescent in the sky rather than an alleged silver crescent
in my head. The silver crescent in my head when alleged to be
my immediate object is presented as disbelieved and is unreal.
And the alleged silver crescent in the sky is unreal and cannot
be my immediate object. Nor is there an idea of the moon in
my head which is not silver and not a crescent. For whatever in
my head is not silver and not a crescent appears as no object of
mine in the situation in which the moon is my ultimate object.
My mental attitude is real and the moon real which is its ultimate
object. Descartes' mental attitude is real and the Emperor real
which is his ultimate object. But when Descartes' mental attitude
reaches the Emperor as its ultimate object, his immediate object
is not his thinking itself and it is not an alleged idea that has
approximately the same position as that thinking.
When a mental attitude reaches an entity outside it as its ulti-
mate object, no idea need intervene which is distinguishable from
thinking itself and distinct from the ultimate object. Indeed the
immediate object is not an idea when that idea is held to be non-
spatial, held not to be spatially related to ultimate objects contem-
poraneous with it, held not to be an object for other subjects, or
held to be adjacent to thinking itself. It would seem that in order
for the immediate object to be an idea distinct from the ultimate
object, it must, in the case of non-introspective thinking, be some
public object distinct from the ultimate object but related to it in
some such fashion as a sign is related to that towards which it
points. Either Descartes' immediate object is the Emperor himself
or it is some symbol, picture, description, or what not, that refers
beyond itself to the real Emperor. But if the immediate object has
246
spatial position with respect to the real Emperor, if it is not adja-
cent to the thinking which has it as an object and if it is in
some sense an object for all of us, then it is not plausible for the
Emperor himself to be held incapable of being an immediate
object. Just as the admission that a quality of the Emperor's may
be an immediate object seems to carry with it the admission that
the Emperor himself need not be an indirect object, 48 so does the
admission that the immediate object may be a picture of the
Emperor which is spatially related to the Emperor and not ad-
jacent to Descartes' thinking. For the picture then simply takes
the place of the Emperor. The unmediated subject-object relation
between the thinking subject and the picture is to be classified, it
would seem, with the alleged unmediated relation between sub-
ject and ultimate object rather than with the relation in which an
idea is alleged to intervene.
What indeed is the function of a sign, of a description, of a pic-
ture? An arrow succeeds in being a sign pointing to some place of
interest in so far as mental attitudes directed upon the arrow are
followed by mental attitudes directed upon the place of interest
to which the arrow refers. I may have before me a picture of the
Emperor. But if my attention is not directed exclusively to colors
on a flat surface in front of me, my attention turns to other objects,
to the seventeenth-century individual, for example, whose picture
is before me. In being aware of the Emperor or of the place of in-
terest, the arrow or the picture may no longer be an object of mine.
And if arrow and picture are no longer objects, then, as we use
"intervene," they do not intervene in the relational situation with-
in which the Emperor or the place of interest is my ultimate ob-
ject. For, "being an immediate object, being an idea, is not/' we
have said, 49 "merely being an object for some previous mental
attitude."
It may be however that, simultaneous with the mental
attitude directed upon the picture, there is a mental attitude
directed upon the Emperor. I may, as it were, see through the
picture to the Emperor; or see around the arrow to the place of in-
terest. But this is to see picture and Emperor together, to be aware
of the relational situation picture-of-Emperor or of the relational
situation: arrow-pointing-to-place-of-interest. Yet if arrow-point-
ing-to place-of-interest is an immediate object, it would seem that
247
a component within that relational situation may be, and on oc-
casion is, an immediate object also. If one of Descartes' mind-nerve-
fibres has as its immediate object picture-pointing-to-the-Emperor,
another of his mind-nerve-fibres may have, and at least one of them
we hold does have, the Emperor as its immediate object.
Some relational situation is real, we have said, 50 which is repre-
sented by our expression: "Descartes in Frankfurt having a mental
attitude which reaches the Emperor as its ultimate object/' What
we are now concluding is that the expression representing this
real relational situation may be spelled out as: "Descartes in Frank-
furt having a mental attitude which reaches the Emperor both as
its ultimate object and as its immediate object." There exists a
relational situation in which no idea intervenes, a relational situa-
tion in which the thinking Descartes is one term and the Emperor
the other term. And there likewise exists an unmediated subject-
object relation in which your mind-nerve-fibre is one term and the
Emperor the other term. The Emperor, we hold, is not only the
ultimate object, but also the immediate object, reached by a men-
tal attitude belonging to Descartes at Frankfurt, reached by a men-
tal attitude belonging to Descartes en route to Frankfurt, and also
reached by a mental attitude of yours.
Up to this point, however, we have failed to consider the situa-
tion in which a mental attitude fails to reach an ultimate object. A
straight stick may be real and in one of its phases may be half
under water, half above. I may have been looking at the partially
submerged stick; but my mental attitude may have failed to reach
the straight stick as its object. I was, let us agree, aware of no
straight stick, but seemed, rather, to be aware of a bent stick. Since,
however, there was no bent stick in the water in front of me, what
was the entity, it may be asked, to which my thinking mind-nerve-
fibre was joined in a subject-object relation? In one of the rela-
tional situations which we have been considering, in the relational
situation in which your mental attitude reached the Emperor as
its ultimate object, it was the Emperor himself, we have con-
cluded, and not an idea, that was your immediate object. But
was not my immediate object an idea, we now ask, or an entity
analogous to an idea in the situation in which my mental attitude
failed to reach the straight stick in front of me, in the situation
in which I seemed to be aware of a bent stick?
248
Let us begin by agreeing that the straight stick partially sub-
merged was the source of vibrations reaching my mind-nerve-fibre
and affecting my thinking. Light waves, reaching me from that part
of the stick which was under water, followed a path not parallel to
that followed by light waves coming from that part of the stick
which was above water. Hence, it may be agreed, my mental atti-
tude had the intrinsic quality of seeming to be directed upon a
bent stick rather than the intrinsic quality of seeming to be di-
rected upon a straight stick. Our problem, however, is not with
respect to the cause of the mental attitude of mine which we are
considering, but with respect to the object, if any, that this mental
attitude had.
Now just as the straight stick that is real was no object for this
mental attitude of mine, so there is no bent stick that is real and
that was its object. There are, to be sure, bent sticks which are real,
bent sticks in the forest and elsewhere. But when I was looking at
the stick in the water in front of me, it was not such sticks that
were my objects. Presented with the characteristic of having been
my objects, that is to say, such other bent sticks are presented as
discredited and are unreal. A bent stick alleged to have been in my
head and to have been my object is likewise presented as dis-
credited and is unreal. For along with the bent stick alleged to
have been in my head, "I find myself considering another sub-
sistent," 51 namely, an alleged bent stick in the water. And I
find that what is presented as having been my object is an alleged
bent stick in the water, not the bent stick alleged to have been in
my head. I find, that is to say, that the bent stick in my head, pre-
sented with the characteristic of having been an object for the
mental attitude which we are considering, is presented as disbe-
lieved and is unreal.
My past mental attitude had as its object no bent stick in the
forest and no bent stick in my head. And it had as its object no
bent stick in the water and no non-spatial bent stick. There exists
no bent stick in the water and no stick which is non-spatial. "And
the entity which is unreal has no real qualities, inheres in no real
substance and is a term in no real relational situation." 52 If I
have no sister, if all my alleged sisters are unreal, then there is no
real sister-brother relation in which I participate as a term. And
just as there is no real relational situation joining me to an
249
imaginary sister Mary, so there is no real relational situation join-
ing a mental attitude of mine to a bent stick that is unreal. When
I was looking at the stick in the water in front of me, I was behav-
ing and I was thinking. But since there was no bent stick in the
water in front of me, my behavior was not adapted to a bent
stick in front of me. And since there was no bent stick that was my
object, no bent stick was either the ultimate object or the im-
mediate object of my mental attitude. My behavior was real; but
there was nothing to which it was directed and adapted. My think-
ing was real; but it had no object.
Now it may be agreed that my behavior can not have been
adapted to a bent stick that didn't exist, that my mind-nerve-fibre
cannot have been aware of a bent stick that wasn't real. But what
do our words mean, we may be asked, when we say that I was
thinking, but that my thinking had no object, when we say that
I was aware, but not aware of anything? To be aware, it may be
said, is to be aware of something. The phrase "being aware, but
not aware of anything" is, it may be said, a phrase which is un-
intelligible.
There is, let us recall, a distinction to be made between Des-
cartes' "intrinsic quality of having a mental attitude which seems
to be directed towards the Emperor" and "his alleged quality of
having a mental attitude which reaches the Emperor as its ulti-
mate object"; and there is a distinction to be made between "Des-
cartes' intrinsic quality of behaving" and "his alleged quality of
manifesting a behavior that is adapted to the Emperor." 53 There
are similar distinctions to be made when, confronted by a menac-
ing dog, Kitty is characterized by a certain mental attitude and a
certain behavior. It is by virtue of Kitty's tenseness and arched
back, by virtue of her behavior, that Kitty enters as a term into
the relational situation: Kitty-manifesting-a-behavior-that-is-
adapted-to-the-menacing-dog. But Kitty might be tense, might
have her back arched, and might fix her eyes on some spot in
front of her, even if there were no dog there. Were this the situa-
tion, Kitty would, let us say, have the intrinsic quality of behav-
ing, but not the quality of manifesting a behavior adapted to a
menacing dog in front of her. She would, we may say, be "respond-
ing," but not "responding-to."
It is in a similar fashion, we hold, that a mind-nerve-fibre may
250
be aware, but not aware-of. There is an intrinsic quality which
Descartes' mind-nerve-fibre has when it reaches the Emperor as
both its ultimate and immediate object, an intrinsic quality which
we describe as Descartes' mental attitude seemingly directed upon
the Emperor. A similar intrinsic quality may have been present,
we hold, on a different occasion, may have been present in a situa-
tion in which Descartes' mind-nerve-fibre failed to reach the Em-
peror as its object. If such a situation existed, Descartes was then
aware, but not aware-of. And when I was looking at the stick in
the water in front of me, I likewise was aware, but not aware-of. My
mind-nerve-fibre had the intrinsic quality of having a mental atti-
tude seemingly directed upon a bent stick, but not the quality of
being joined in a relational situation to any ultimate object or to
any immediate object.
Even if it is agreed however that there was an intrinsic quality
which I had when I was looking at the stick in the water in front
of me, it may be said to be confusing to call this quality an instance
of "thinking" or an instance of "being aware" and also to de-
scribe this quality as "having a mental attitude seemingly directed
upon a bent stick." There is, it may be said, no quality that the
reader recognizes as being called to his attention by the term "be-
ing aware." And when, on the other hand, we describe the men-
tal attitude as "seemingly directed upon a bent stick," we refer to
an entity external to the mental attitude and thus, it may be said,
belie the assertion that we are describing an intrinsic quality. In
order to identify the mental attitude which we hold to be real and
which we hold has no immediate object, we use the expression
"seemingly directed upon a bent stick," an expression which has
meaning, it may be said, only if the mental attitude has an im-
mediate object.
Since it had no immediate object, it is not altogether unobjec-
tionable, let us admit, to describe as "seemingly directed upon the
Emperor" the mental attitude which Descartes had when his
mind-nerve-fibre failed to reach the Emperor. And it is not al-
together unobjectionable to describe as "seemingly directed upon
a bent stick" the mental attitude which / had when, looking at the
stick in the water in front of me, my mental attitude had neither a
straight stick nor a bent stick as its immediate object. In the situa-
tion in which there is no menacing dog in front of Kitty, it is
251
equally objectionable, it would seem, to describe Kitty's behavior
as "seemingly adapted to a menacing dog." For if it is objection-
able to use the expression "seemingly directed upon a bent stick" in
connection with a situation in which I was aware but not aware-of,
it is equally objectionable to use the expression "seemingly
adapted to a menacing dog" in connection with a situation in
which Kitty was responding, but not responding-to. In an effort to
avoid any reference to this unreal menacing dog, we may, to be
sure, say that Kitty was tense, that she had her back arched, and
that she was staring at a spot in front of her. And in an effort to
avoid any reference to a bent stick, we may describe my mental
attitude as an entity that was not a mental picture and, further
to identify it, may describe the non-mental behavior which ac-
companied it. We may perhaps point to the fact that I uttered the
sounds "bent stick" or to the fact that I indicated with my fingers
two lines at an angle. Yet when we attempt to avoid any reference
to menacing dogs or to bent sticks in pointing to the intrinsic
quality of behaving that Kitty manifested or in pointing to the in-
trinsic quality of being aware that / had, then our expressions are
awkward and will in many instances fail to direct the reader's at-
tention to the qualities we wish to describe.
Kitty's behavior was not adapted to anything. We may point to
her behavior by saying that she had her back arched and was star-
ing at a spot in front of her. But we may also point to her behavior
by saying that she was behaving as though her behavior were
adapted to a menacing dog. Similarly, I was aware; but my men-
tal attitude had no ultimate object and no immediate object. We
may point to the mental attitude which I had by saying that it
was an instance of thinking, not a mental picture, and by saying
that it was an element in a total behavior in which I indicated with
my fingers two lines at an angle. But we may also point to this
mental attitude of mine by saying that I was aware as though I
were aware of a bent stick.
For let us recall the conditions under which the proposition is
true which has the form: "C is D as though A were B." Our propo-
sition: "C is D as though A were B" is true, we have indicated, 54
when "C is D" is true, "A is not B" true and "If A should be B,
C would be D" true. There is the proposition: "Kitty has her back
arched and is staring at a spot in front of hei* as though her be-
252
havior were adapted to a menacing dog." And this proposition is
true, as we have explained our term "truth," if Kitty has her back
arched, if her behavior is not adapted to a menacing dog, and if it
is true that, if Kitty's behavior should be adapted to a menacing
dog, her back would be arched and she would be staring at a
spot in front of her. Advancing another step, the proposition:
"If Kitty's behavior should be adapted to a menacing dog, her
back would be arched and she would be staring at a spot in
front of her" is an instance of: "If A should be B, C would
be D." And in order that this instance of: "If A should be B,
C would be D" may be true, there must be instances of behavior
analogous to Kitty's arched back and there must be relational
situations in some sense analogous to the alleged but unreal
situation: this - Kitty's - behavior- being - adapted - to a - menac-
ing-dog-in-front-of-her. There must, that is to say, be some other
cat, or this cat on some other occasion, whose behavior is adapted
to a menacing dog. There must be some instance of adapted be-
havior which, if not really analogous to the unreal: this-Kitty's-
behavior-being-adapted-to-a-menacing-dog-in-front-of-her, is at
least suggested by our real words: "Analogous to Kitty's behavior
being adapted to a menacing dog in front of her." 55 Further, the
cat whose behavior is adapted must have that adapted behavior
accompanied by a back arched as Kitty's is and not unaccompanied
by a back arched as Kitty's is. 56 These conditions however are ful-
filled. The propositions are true which determine the "as if" propo-
sition before us to be true. And just as it is true that Kitty has her
back arched and is staring at a spot in front of her as though her be-
havior were adapted to a menacing dog, so it is true that I had a
mental attitude as though I were aware of a bent stick. I had a
mental attitude. I was not aware of a bent stick. But other subjects
have been aware of bent sticks; and in such real subject-object re-
lational situations, the subjects have been characterized by mental
attitudes which, considered as intrinsic qualities, resemble mine.
There is thus at least one sense, in which the proposition: "I had
a mental attitude seemingly directed upon a bent stick" may be
used, in which this proposition does not imply that there was a
bent stick in front of me and does not imply that my mental atti-
tude had an object. When "A had a mental attitude seemingly di-
rected upon B" is used in a sense in which it is synonymous with
253
our proposition: "A had a mental attitude as if he were aware of
B," what is asserted is that A was not aware of B but that some
subject A 1 had some entity B 1 as an object. Not every instance of
"A had a mental attitude seemingly directed upon B" is, however,
synonymous with an instance of "A had a mental attitude as if
he were aware of B." For, some instances of our proposition: "Des-
cartes had a mental attitude seemingly directed upon man, God
and the universe" do not express an assertion that some other sub-
ject was aware of man, God and the universe and that Descartes
was not. 57 And some instances of our proposition: "I had a men-
tal attitude seemingly directed upon a bent stick" do not express
an assertion that other subjects have been aware of bent sticks. 58
Some instances of our proposition: "A had a mental attitude
seemingly directed upon B" are synonymous with: "A had a cer-
tain attitude, an intrinsic quality which the phrase 'seemingly di-
rected upon B' may help to identify." When: "A had a mental atti-
tude seemingly directed upon B" is used in the latter sense it sub-
stitutes for a proposition which points to intrinsic qualities alone. 69
Used in either sense, however, "I had a mental attitude seem-
ingly directed upon a bent stick" is, we hold, true. I had a certain
mental attitude, a mental attitude which the phrase "seemingly
directed upon a bent stick" serves to identify. And in view of
the fact that others have been aware of bent sticks, I had a mental
attitude as though I were aware of a bent stick.
Others have been aware of bent sticks. But no one, let us agree,
has really been aware of a unicorn. In the situation in which one
seems to be aware of a unicorn, is there then no real subject-object
relation analogous to that in which some other subject is really
aware of a bent stick; no real subject-object relation in view of
which "I had a mental attitude as though I were aware of a uni-
corn" may be just as true as: "I had a mental attitude as though I
were aware of a bent stick"? There have been instances, let us as-
sume, in which a horse has been dressed up with a horn; and there
have been instances in which a mental attitude has had such a
horse as an object. Considered as an intrinsic quality, the mental
attitude which participated in such a subject-object relation re-
sembles the mental attitude of mine which I describe by saying
that it was seemingly directed upon a unicorn. Based on such facts
as these, "I had a mental attitude as though I were aware of a uni-
254
corn" may, we hold, be true and "I had a mental attitude as
though I were aware of a griffin" may be true. Neither the atti-
tude seemingly directed upon a unicorn nor the attitude seemingly
directed upon a griffin had an object. They can not be distin-
guished from one another by a reference to the objects that they
respectively had. And when we attempt to distinguish between
them by pointing to intrinsic qualities alone, our words may fail
to identify either of these mental attitudes and may fail to call
the reader's attention to the difference between them. But there is
a real subject-object relation in which there is a mental attitude
analogous to the one; and a real subject-object relation in which
there is a mental attitude analogous to the other. There are in each
case real entities which are objects for resembling mental attitudes;
and the differences between these real objects may serve to distin-
guish one mental attitude which has no object from another. 60
There is no unicorn, no griffin, no bent stick that was my object.
What, then, becomes of the bent stick that was alleged to have been
my object? This bent stick, to be sure, subsists. It subsists with
whatever characteristics it may be alleged to have. There is a sub-
sisting bent stick which appears as the immediate object of my
thinking. There is a subsisting bent stick which appears as in-
dependent of all thinking, unaffected by the mental attitudes
which are alleged to direct themselves towards it. But "when the
alleged entity Si is unreal, both our proposition: 'Si is F and our
proposition: 'Si is not P' are false." 61 "The bent stick in yonder
pool is independent of my thinking" is false; and "the bent stick
in yonder pool is not independent of my thinking" is false. For
these propositions resemble "the present King of France is bald"
and "the present King of France is not bald." The only true propo-
sitions that can be asserted with respect to the bent stick are those
in which non-existence is predicated of it. A bent stick subsists with
the characteristic of being bent at an angle of 5. And a bent stick
subsists with the characteristic of being bent at an angle of 55.
The one subsists as well as the other. The one is no more real than
the other.
But surely, it may be said, the bent stick which I seem to see, the
bent stick which appears to be one inch in diameter and bent at
an angle of 5, has more reality than a purely imaginary stick, a
stick which I imagine to be bent at an angle of 55. Similarly when
255
I look towards the moon, a silver crescent in the sky, although un-
real, has, it may be said, more substance and more reality than, for
example, a black dwarf in the sky. But if all unreals are equally
unreal, what can be the basis for such alleged distinctions? Since
Ivanhoe was unreal, "Ivanhoe married Rowena" and "Ivanhoe
married Rebecca" are both false propositions. There may, to be
sure, be more instances of the real proposition: "Ivanhoe married
Rowena/ 1 fewer instances of the real proposition: "Ivanhoe mar-
ried Rebecca." Again, there is a real mental attitude which is as
though it were directed upon a silver crescent in the sky; and a
real mental attitude which is as though it were directed upon a
black dwarf in the sky. But there may be more mental attitudes
which, considered as intrinsic qualities, resemble the former
than resemble the latter. There may be more mental attitudes
which are as though they were directed upon a stick bent at
an angle of 5 than there are that are as though they were directed
upon a stick bent at an angle of 55. And finally, there is the dis-
tinction that may be made between an hallucinatory experience
and an illusory experience. Some attitudes, which merely seem to
be directed upon objects, are caused, or at least are affected, by
entities which exist where the alleged object is alleged to be;
whereas others are not. When I look at the moon, there is a round
moon which brings about the mental attitude of mine which is as
though it were directed upon a silver crescent in the sky. But
when, sitting at my desk, I have a mental attitude which is as
though it were directed upon a black dwarf in the sky, this round
moon is not at the source of light waves which travel uninter-
ruptedly to my mind-nerve-fibre and which thus affect my think-
ing. Nevertheless, black dwarf and silver crescent, stick bent at an
angle of 5 and stick bent at an angle of 55, all are equally unreal.
The mental attitudes which seemingly are directed upon them are
equally without objects.
It is, we may say, only real entities that can be objects for real
mental attitudes. The world of real entities is, as it were, closed
off from the world of merely subsisting, unreal entities. As Par-
menides held in the early days of Greek philosophy, Being is and
Non-Being is not. And Being is not related to Non-Being.
256
Summary
Descartes is said to have witnessed the coronation of the Em-
peror. In this situation we distinguish three relational situa-
tions in which Descartes and the Emperor are terms, namely,
a) Descartes-affected-by-the-Emperor, b) Descartes-responding-to-
the-Emperor, c) Descartes-aware-of-the-Emperor. Corresponding
to the relational situation: Descartes-responding-to-the-Emperor
there is an intrinsic quality of Descartes', the quality of behaving
or responding in a certain direction. And corresponding to the
relational situation: Descartes-aware-of-the-Emperor there is Des-
cartes' intrinsic quality of being aware as if of the Emperor. All
of these entities are real, (In the main body of this chapter, we
assert first the reality of the intrinsic qualities and then, after
various objections are disposed of, the reality of the relational sit-
uations: Descartes-responding-to-the-Emperor and Descartes-aware-
of-the-Emperor.)
But is Descartes-aware-of-the-Emperor an unmediated relational
situation or one in which ideas mediate between Descartes and
the Emperor? We consider various entities that may be proposed
as intervening ideas and conclude that, generally speaking, there
is no intervening idea. Generally speaking, the subject-object
relation is an unmediated one.
How can this be so when there is the phenomenon of error?
Where there is error, there is a mental attitude which is as if it
had an object; but there is no object, hence no subject-object
relation. The mental attitude is real and can be described, but
it is not the term of a subject-object relation.
257
Chapter IX
PERCEPT, MEMORY AND CONCEPT
There are, we have seen, instances in which mental attitudes
are affected by entities in their environment. And there are in-
stances in which mental attitudes reach entities in their environ-
ment as their ultimate objects. While Descartes was witnessing
the coronation ceremonies at Frankfurt, light and sound waves
originating in the Emperor were flowing to Descartes' mind-nerve-
fibres and were affecting his thinking. 1 And the thinking thus
brought about reached the Emperor as its ultimate object. There
was, that is to say, not only the real relational situation: Descartes-
affected-by-the-Emperor, but also the real relational situation:
Descartes-in-Frankfurt-having-a-mental-attitude-which-reached-the-
Emperor-as-its-ultimate-object. 2 Similarly with the ledger clerk
mentioned in a previous chapter, the ledger clerk concerned with
figures on a ledger page in front of him. On the one hand, this
clerk's mind-nerve-fibre, its non-mental qualities and its thinking
were affected by the figures on the page in front of him. 3 And on
the other hand, before turning to the statement which he was
about to prepare, he was aware of the figures which had affected
him. It is within such situations that there are what we shall call
"percepts" and what we shall call "instances of perceiving." A
mental attitude is an instance of perceiving, let us say, when it
reaches as its object an entity which is at the source of motions
flowing uninterruptedly to it and affecting it. And an entity is a
percept, let us say, when it is at the source of motions flowing
uninterruptedly to the mental attitude directed upon it and
reaching it as an object. As we use the words "percept" and "per-
258
ceiving," Descartes at Frankfurt was perceiving and the Emperor
was his percept.
We have, to be sure, suggested a distinction between the entity
merely at the source of motions terminating in a given mind-
nerve-fibre and the entity at the source, in the absence of which
the mind-nerve-fibre would not have been affected as it was. "We
may use 'cause' and 'effect' in such a way that not every entity at
the source of motion is a cause and not every entity at the termi-
nus a result/'* As we use the terms "percept" and "perceiving,"
however, no strict sense of "cause," and no strict sense of "result,"
is involved. An entity which is real, which is the object reached
by a given mental attitude, and which is at the source of motions
flowing uninterruptedly to that mental attitude, such an entity
is in our terminology a "percept" whether or not it be a sine
qua non with respect to the mental attitude directed upon it.
And a mental attitude which is real, and which reaches as its
ultimate object an entity at the source of motions flowing un-
interruptedly to it, is, in our terminology, an "instance of per-
ceiving," whether the entity which it reaches as an object merely
has affected it or, in some strict sense of "cause," has caused it.
If the Emperor presented as a substance was real and if the Em-
peror was really pious, then Descartes at Frankfurt, in being
aware of the Emperor or of his piety, was perceiving. The Em-
peror and his piety were percepts, even if it should be true that,
in a strict sense of "cause," it was not the Emperor but some
. quality of his, and not the Emperor's piety but some other quality
of his, that caused Descartes' thinking. 5
Descartes at Frankfurt was aware of the Emperor in front of
him. Descartes was perceiving and the Emperor was his percept.
You too, we have agreed, 6 are aware of the Emperor. And yet, as
we have explained our term "perceiving," your mental attitude
directed upon the Emperor is not an instance of perceiving. For,
whereas the Emperor was at the source of motions flowing un-
interruptedly to Descartes' mental attitude, he was, let us agree,
not at the source of motions flowing uninterruptedly to your
mental attitude. The Emperor, it follows, was a percept with re-
spect to one thinking mind-nerve-fibre reaching him as an ulti-
mate object, but not a percept with respect to another mind-nerve-
fibre reaching him as an ultimate object.
259
The Emperor was real, a percept with respect to one mind-
nerve-fibre but not with respect to another. The mere fact that
a given mental attitude reached the Emperor as an object does
not determine whether that- mental attitude was, or was not, an
instance of perceiving. And the mere fact that the Emperor was
real, plus the fact that he was an object for some mental attitudes
which were instances of perceiving and for some mental attitudes
which >3 frere not, does not determine whether a given mind-nerve-
fibre was aware of him or was not aware of him. The Emperor's
being real, in short, does not imply that Descartes was perceiving
him or even that Descartes was aware of him. And we may express
our rejection of such alleged implications by asserting that the
Emperor might have been real if Descartes had not perceived
him and might have been real if Descartes had not been aware
of him.
The Emperor in Frankfurt, although an entity reached as an
object by your mental attitude, is not a percept with respect to
your mental attitude. And the other side of the moon, although
reached as an object by various mental attitudes, is not a percept
with respect to any of the mental attitudes reaching it as an
object. Just as your mental attitude reaches the Emperor as an
object but is not at the terminus of motions originating in the
Emperor and flowing uninterruptedly to this mental attitude
of yours, so various mental attitudes reach the other side of
the moon as an object but are not at the termini of motions
originating in the other side of the moon and flowing unin-
terruptedly to them. Nevertheless, the other side of the moon
is real just as the Emperor is real. Just as the Emperor is not
presented with the characteristic of lacking date or position
or with the characteristic of being generally discredited, so the
other side of the moon is not presented with the characteristic
of lacking date or position or with the characteristic of being
generally discredited. And just as the Emperor, presented with-
out certain characteristics that would mark him out as unreal,
is listed as real in the appendix to Chapter Three, so is the other
side df * the 1 moon. As we have explained our term "reality,"
the characteristic of not being a percept with respect to any
mental attitude' is not a mark of unreality. An entity presented
with the characteristic of not being a percept with respect to any
260
mental attitude need not be unreal. And the other side o the
moon, so presented, is, we find, real.
There is a fallen tree in the woods which is real and which is
a percept of mine. And there was a prior phase of this tree, a
phase in which the tree was falling, which, although real, was, let
us agree, a percept for no one. Since one entity which is real is a
percept with respect to some mental attitudes and another entity
which is real a percept with respect to no mental attitudes, the
mere fact that the fallen tree is real does not determine whether
it was some one's percept or no one's percept. Just as the Em-
peror's being real "does not imply that Descartes was perceiving
him," 7 so the fallen tree's being real does not imply that the
fallen tree was some one's percept. Just as in the one case we may
express our rejection of an alleged implication by asserting that
the Emperor might have been real if Descartes had not perceived
him, so in the other case we may express our rejection of an
alleged implication by asserting that the fallen tree might have
been real if no one had perceived it.
Descartes however was perceiving the Emperor; and I, simi-
larly, am perceiving the fallen tree. An Emperor presented as
perceived by Descartes and presented as not perceived by Des-
cartes is presented as self-contradictory and is unreal. And an
Emperor presented as in no sense an object of consciousness is
presented with a characteristic which likewise marks out the
Emperor so presented as unreal. 8 Similarly with the fallen tree.
The fallen tree presented as some one's percept and no one's per-
cept is unreal; and the fallen tree presented as no one's object is
unreal. Thus in a context which informs us that the Emperor
was Descartes' percept, it is not possible, as we have explained
the term "truth" in its application to problematic propositions,
for Descartes not to, have perceived the Emperor. 9 And in a con-
text which informs us that the fallen tree was some one's percept,
it is not possible for the fallen tree to have been no one's, percept.
In a more limited context, however, in a context which informs
us merely that the Emperor was real and the fallen tree real, we
may say that the Emperor may have been real, though unper-
ceived by Descartes; and we may say that the fallen tree may be
real though unperceived by anyone. But even within so limited
a context, the proposition: "The Emperor may have been real,
261
though an object for no one*' is false, and the proposition: "The
fallen tree may have been real, though an object for no one" is
likewise false. There is a sense, we have seen, in which it may be
asserted that the fallen tree might have been real if no one had
perceived it. But the proposition is false in which we express the
assertion that the fallen tree might have been real if no one had
been aware of it. The fallen tree's being real, in short, does not
imply that this tree was some one's percept, but it does imply that
this tree was some one's object ojr, more precisely, that it did not
have the characteristic of being no one's object.
The Emperor was a percept of Descartes'. And lawyer Jones,
who stands before me, is a percept of mine. There was, however,
some previous occasion on which I first saw lawyer Jones and
was about to be introduced to him. And on that occasion, let us
agree, I was at first not aware that the man before me was a law-
yer or that his name was Jones. The lawyer Jones who now
stands before me had, in short, a prior phase, a phase which
affected my thinking and which led me to be aware, not of lawyer
Jones, but of Mr. X. Let us then abstract from the lawyer Jones
who stands before me his quality of being a lawyer and his qual-
ity of being named Jones. And let us seek within my present per-
cept for some residual element to correspond to what my object
was when lawyer Jones first affected my thinking. Indeed, let us
seek to disregard or to neutralize not only the mental attitudes
which I have directed upon lawyer Jones since that first meeting,
but various other mental attitudes as well. When I first met law-
yer Jones, I was aware of him as being a man. "What do I see,"
we have, however, found Descartes asking, 10 "but hats and coats
which may cover automatic machines?" When a baby is first con-
fronted by a man, he is, let us agree, no more aware of his percept
as being a man than I was of lawyer Jones as being a lawyer
named Jones. Just as my present mental attitude aware of lawyer
Jones' name and profession points back not only to what I first
saw but to what I later learned, so the baby's mental attitude
which is aware of a man as being a man points back not only to
what he was aware of when first confronted by a man but to other
experiences of his as welL
It is the alleged residual element within a given percept that
we shall call a "sense-datum." A sense-datum, that is to say, is, if
262
%
it is real, that real quality of a percept, or that real element within
a percept, which corresponds to the object of some previous in-
stance of perceiving unaffected by experience. To be sure, when
today I am confronted by lawyer Jones, I do not, let us agree,
first perceive a sense-datum or even a Mr. X. While I am looking
at lawyer Jones, there need be no particular succession of mental
attitudes, no mental attitude directed upon a sense-datum fol-
lowed by a mental attitude directed upon lawyer Jones, his name
and his profession. Indeed if there is any element within my
percept which is to be called a "sense-datum" as we have ex-
plained that term, it may be that I today am aware of it only
after a process of analysis and abstraction. When confronted by
Rodin's "Thinker" or by a landscape painting, "it is, one might
say, when we attend to the artist's technique that we distinguish
the sense-datum from what then appears to us to have been in-
ferred." 11 And if there is a sense-datum within the lawyer Jones
who is the object of my present perceiving, it is perhaps only
after reflecting upon the meaning of "sense-datum" that I today
come to be aware of it. The prior instance of perceiving, to whose
object the sense-datum included in my present percept corre-
sponds, need not then be the earliest in the series of mental atti-
tudes that I today direct upon lawyer Jones. The prior instance
of perceiving to whose object a sense-datum corresponds is al-
legedly a mental attitude with a real object but a mental attitude
unaffected by experience. And the search for such a mental atti-
tude may lead us to think of mental attitudes much earlier in the
history of the individual or in the history of the race.
A sense-datum, if real, is that element within a percept which
corresponds to the object of some previous instance of perceiv-
ing unaffected by experience. But as I look at lawyer Jones,
my mental attitude is an instance of perceiving, whether I am
aware of a lawyer named Jones, whether I am aware of my
object as Mr. X., or whether I am aware of a sense-datum that
is a real quality or element in lawyer Jones. As we use the terms
"percept" and "sense-datum," a sense^datum, if it is real, may
be a percept; and an element in the object before me, an ele-
ment not a sense-datum, may likewise be a percept. If there
is a quality of the lawyer Jones who stands before me that is a
sense-datum, and if I am aware of it, then that quality is at the
263
source of motions which flow uninterruptedly to me and which lead
me to be aware of it. But the quality of being a lawyer named Jones
is likewise at the source of motions which flow uninterruptedly to
me and which lead me to be aware of a lawyer named Jones. In
either instance I am perceiving. For whether it be a substance
or a quality, a residual element or some less elementary object, so
long as the entity of which I am aware is at the source of motions
flowing uninterruptedly to me and leading me to be aware of it,
that entity is a percept of mine and my mental attitude an instance
of perceiving. 12
As we use the term "percept," lawyer Jones' quality of being a
lawyer is a percept of mine and the Emperor's piety was a percept
of Descartes'. But whereas lawyer Jones' quality of being a lawyer
is at the source of motions flowing uninterruptedly to me and
leading me to be aware of this quality, there may be some other
quality inhering in lawyer Jones without which I would not be
affected as I am. Some other quality inhering in lawyer Jones may
be that without which I would not be aware of Jones as a lawyer;
and some quality other than the Emperor's piety may be that
without which Descartes would not have been aware of the Em-
peror as pious. 13 Although Jones' quality of being a lawyer affected
my thinking, and although the Emperor's piety affected Descartes'
thinking, there may be some strict sense of "cause" in which Jones'
quality of being a lawyer does not cause my thinking nor the Em-
peror's piety Descartes' thinking. 14 As we use the term "percept,"
the Emperor's piety was a percept with respect to Descartes' think-
ing whether or not it was a sense-datum with respect to that think-
ing. And as we use the term "percept," the Emperor's piety was a
percept with respect to Descartes' thinking, whether it merely
affected that thinking or whether, in a strict sense of "cause," it
was the cause of that thinking. 16
Nevertheless, the distinction which we have sought to make
between the percept which is a sense-datum and the percept which
is not a sense^datum is not to be confused with the distinction which
we have sought to make between the entity at the source, which
merely affects the instance of perceiving directed upon it, nd the
entity at the source, which, in a strict Sense of "cause/' is the cause of
that instance of perceiving. A mental attitude which is an instance
of perceiving has been affected by its percept; it also reaches its per-
264
cept as its ultimate object. In the search for sense-data we concern
ourselves with the relational situation involving mental attitude
and object and are led to consider relational situations involving
earlier mental attitudes and earlier objects. But in the search for
entities at the source without which a given instance of perceiving
would not be affected as it is, we concern ourselves with relational
situations involving motions flowing to terminus from source.
We are led to consider, not earlier mental attitudes with real
objects but unaffected by experience, and not residual objects, but
rather a group of mental attitudes, some similar and some dissimi-
lar and a group of sources, some similar and some dissimilar. On
the one hand, if any entities exist which are denoted by our term
"sense-data," they are, it would seem, such vague entities as some-
thing - making - a - noise - somewhere or something - shining -
somewhere. On the other hand, if there is some entity at the source
in the absence of which a given mental attitude would not be
affected as it is, that entity at the source may be some quality
which is neither vague nor elementary; it may rather be a quality
such that only a student of physics is aware of it and can describe
it.
The Emperor was at the source of motions which flowed unin-
terruptedly to Descartes who was in front of him, at the source
of motions affecting the mental attitude of Descartes' which
reached him as an object. He was likewise, let us agree, at the
source of motions which flowed uninterruptedly to the Bishop
of Mayence who stood at the Emperor's side, at the source of
motions affecting the mental attitude of the Bishop which like-
wise reached him as an object. Not only then was the Emperor
a percept with respect to Descartes; he was also a percept with
respect to the Bishop who stood at his side. He may indeed
have been an immediate object both for Descartes' perceiving
and for the Bishop's perceiving. For he was, we have held,
"not only the ultimate object, but also the immediate object,
reached by a mental attitude belonging to Descartes at Frank-
furt." 16 And he may likewise have been, not only the ultimate
object, but also the immediate object, of the mental attitude be-
longing to the Bishop.
But how, it may be asked, can Descartes and the Bishop have
had a common immediate object? 17 Descartes and the Bishop
265
looked at the Emperor from different positions just as when there
are ten people "sitting round a dinner table," 18 they all see the
table from slightly different points of view. What is it, however,
that I see when I sit at one end of a rectangular table, and what is
it that you see when you sit at the other end? The table is rec-
tangular, neither narrower at your end nor narrower at mine. It
is a rectangular table, not a table narrower at my end, that affects
your thinking. And it is a rectangular table, not a table narrower
at your end, that affects my thinking. Hence, if your apparent ob-
ject is a table, presented not as rectangular but as narrower at my
end, then the real table which has affected your thinking is not the
object of your thinking. And if my apparent object is a table,
presented not as rectangular but as narrower at your end, then the
real table which has affected my thinking is not the object of my
thinking. In such a situation you are not perceiving and I am not
perceiving. In so far as you seem to be aware of a table narrower
at my end, you are aware but not aware-of , 19 And in so far as I seem
to be aware of a table narrower at your end, I too am aware but
not aware-of.
Instead, however, of my seeming to be aware of a table narrower
at your end, it may be that I am aware of a rectangular table. And
instead of your seeming to be aware of a table narrower at my
end, it may be that you too are aware of a rectangular table. A state
of affairs in which you and I are in continual disagreement as to
the shape of the table is presented as generally discredited and is un-
real. What exists, let us agree, is a relational situation in which my
mental attitude, having been affected by a rectangular table, is
aware of a rectangular table; and a relational situation in which
your mental attitude, having been affected by a rectangular table, is
likewise aware of a rectangular table. A mental attitude apparently
directed upon a table narrower at your end may have preceded my
mental attitude reaching the rectangular table as its object. But the
trapeziform table alleged to have been the object for such a pre-
ceding mental attitude is not a residual element, not a sense-
datum, within the rectangular table that comes to be my object.
Nor is it a quality of the rectangular table without which I would
not be aware of the rectangular table. Being unreal, it "inheres
in no real substance and is a term in no real relational situation." 20
There is a situation in which my mental attitude, having been
266
affected by the rectangular table at which I sit, is without a real
object, but is as though its object were a trapeziform table. And
there is a situation in which my mental attitude, having been af-
fected by a straight stick in the water in front of me, is without
a real object, but is as though its object were a bent stick. 21 These
mental attitudes are, let us say, "instances of pseudo-perceiving."
They differ from mental attitudes which are without objects, but
which are not instances of pseudo-perceiving, in that they are
"affected by entities which exist where the alleged object is al-
leged to be." 22 The distinction, in short, to which we have already
alluded, the distinction between illusory experiences on the one
hand and hallucinatory experiences on the other, is the distinc-
tion between mental attitudes without objects which we call "in-
stances of pseudo-perceiving" and mental attitudes without objects
which are not what we call "instances of pseudo-perceiving."
There is motion flowing uninterruptedly from the rectangular
table to the mental attitude of mine which is as though it were
directed upon a trapeziform table. And there is motion flowing
uninterruptedly from the Emperor at Frankfurt to that mental
attitude which Descartes had when he perceived the Emperor in
front of him. 23 What is the situation, however, when I listen to a
symphony by Beethoven as recorded on a phonograph record; or
when I see the coronation of George VI as represented in a news-
reel? If I am aware of sounds as coming from the record or of
colors as being on a screen, my mental attitude has as its object
the sounding record, or the picture on the screen, which is at the
source of motions flowing uninterruptedly to my mental attitude
and affecting it. My mental attitude is an instance of perceiving
and the sounding record, or the picture on the screen, is its percept.
Let us agree, however, that, while the record is being played,
some mental attitude of mine is directed upon what happened in
the studio when the Philadelphia orchestra was performing the sym-
phony and recording it. And let us agree that, while looking at
the news-reel, I turn my attention from the screen in front of me
to certain events which occurred in Westminster Abbey. Neither
the performance in Philadelphia nor the events in Westminster
Abbey are, it would seem, at the source of motions flowing unin-
terruptedly to my present mental attitudes. Motions originating
in Westminster Abbey were, as it were, held up in the film and
267
released only when the film was run off in front of me. And mo-
tions originating in Philadelphia and finally affecting me were
interrupted while, for example, my record lay in a warehouse or
in my cabinet. There are, let us agree, relational situations in
which I am aware of such entities as this performance in Philadel-
phia or this coronation in Westminster Abbey. There are indeed
relational situations in which such entities as these are my im-
mediate objects. 24 Such objects are however not percepts for the
mental attitudes thus directed upon them. For they are, as in the
instances given, not at the source of motions travelling uninter-
ruptedly to the mental attitudes whose objects they are.
I may attend a performance by the Philadelphia orchestra. The
performance may affect me through a phonograph record. Or a
friend who attended the performance may describe it to me. Just
as, when I listen to the record, the sounding record may be my
object rather than the performance to which it refers, so when I
listen to my friend, his voice or his mental attitude may be my
object rather than the performance to which his words refer. But
just as I may turn my attention from the record, which is here
and now, to the performance which was there and then, so I may
direct my mental attitude, not upon my friend, but upon the per-
formance which he is describing. Again my object is the past per-
formance in Philadelphia. Again, when I come to fix my attention
on this object, it may be my immediate object. 25 And again my
object is at the source of motions which have travelled, but have
not travelled uninterruptedly, to me. For the process by which
the performance affected my friend corresponds to the process by
which the recording was made. And the motion, coming to me
from the playing record which I hear, corresponds to the motion
coming to me from the friend of mine who describes to me the
performance he has attended. My friend, to be sure, is no record
and no record cabinet. But in the process from ultimate object
to mental attitude aware of that object, motions may, as it were,
be intercepted, more or less transformed, and later released, by
mind-persons as well as by records or pictures.
When I direct my attention to a performance which my friend
describes to me, my experience is no doubt different from what it
is when the performance takes place in my presence. To think
about a performance is, one may say, to be aware of an object
268
which is presented somewhat indefinitely, without its full detail.
But whether I attend the performance, hear a recording of it or
merely think about it, it is the performance which is my object.
And when I pass over air waves in the one case, the record in the
second, and my friend's voice and attitude in the third, when, in
short, I do not direct my attention to the intermediaries through
which my object has affected me, then the performance is my im-
mediate object.
There are instances of perceiving, as when I am aware of the
rectangular table in front of me which has affected me. There are
instances of pseudo-perceiving, as when, with a rectangular table
in front of me which has affected me, I seem, nevertheless, to be
aware of a trapezif orm table. 26 Similarly there is on the one hand the
situation in which I am aware of a performance in Philadelphia
which, through friend or record, has affected me; and there is on
the other hand the situation in which, after listening to a friend
who was pseudo-perceiving, I seem to be aware of an alleged event
which did not occur. A soldier may have left the battle at Water-
loo with the report that the French were victorious. Some of the
sentences written by an historian may not be true. My friend may
have given me what is commonly called a "false impression" of
what occurred in Philadelphia. Indeed, with reporters, historians
or other interpreters as intermediaries, it may be held that we are
never aware of events as they actually occurred, that our mental
attitudes are always analogous to instances of pseudo-perceiving
rather than to instances of perceiving. But whereas the object of
which I came to be aware through an interpreter may not be pre-
sented with the detail with which that object is presented when I
am perceiving it, nevertheless the elements in the object which
are presented need not, we hold, be unreal. Charles the First, let
us agree, did die on the scaffold. And when, with niany historians
and ultimately an eye-witness as intermediaries, I come to be aware
of Charles dying on the scaffold, then I am aware of a real object.
My object, that is to say, is at the source of motions, which, al-
though delayed in transmission and transformed by the inter-
mediaries through whom they have passed, have affected the men-
tal attitude of mine directed upon this real object.
"Motions may, as it were, be intercepted, more or less trans-
formed and later released, by mind-persons as well as by records or
269
pictures." 27 And the mind-person doing the intercepting, trans-
forming and releasing may, it would seem, be a previous phase of
the very subject who is aware of the ultimate object. It may not
have been my friend, but I, who attended the performance in
Philadelphia. And the mental attitude which I today direct upon
this past performance may have been affected by the performance,
not through my friend as intermediary, but through the attitudes
which I had last night when I was attending the performance. Last
night I was perceiving; today I am not. Today I seem again to be
aware of last night's performance; and if my apparent object is
not unreal, if it is all or part of what did occur, then I today am
really aware of last night's performance. But last night's perform-
ance is not at the source of motions which have travelled uninter-
ruptedly to the mental attitude which I have today. With respect
to today's mental attitude directed upon last night's performance,
those motions have been intercepted, and yet in some sense passed
on, by nerve-fibres within my body which were affected last night.
I am, let us agree, aware of last night's performance. My present
mental attitude which has a real object is then in our terminology
an instance of "remembering." And last night's performance,
which is reached as a real object by today's mental attitude is, let
us say, a ' 'memory" with respect to this attitude.
As we use the terms "percept" and "memory," last night's per-
formance was a percept with respect to the mental attitude which I
directed upon it last night, a memory with respect to the mental
attitude which I direct upon it today. Last night's moon was a per-
cept with respect to the mental attitude of yours which was aware
of it last night, with respect, that is to say, to the mental attitude of
yours which was at the terminus of motions flowing uninter-
ruptedly from moon to mental attitude. And last night's moon is
a memory with respect to the mental attitude which you today di-
rect upon last night's moon, with respect to the mental attitude
where the flow of motions from moon to mental attitude has been
interrupted and yet transmitted by earlier phases of your body or
mind-person.
When a record is being played in my presence, I may, on the
one hand, we have seen, 28 be aware of the sounding record before
me rather than of the events in the studio where the record was
made; or I may, on the other hand, be aware of the performance
270
in the studio and not of the record. Descartes at Frankfurt may at
one moment have been aware of the Emperor who was his percept;
and he may at another moment have been aware of his own ears, of
the ears through which the Emperor was affecting him. Similarly
there may today be one thinking mind-nerve-fibre of yours which
is aware of last night's moon and remembering it. And there may
today be another thinking mind-nerve-fibre of yours which is
aware of the mental attitude which you had last night when you
were perceiving the moon. There are in short, let us agree, in-
stances of remembering; but there also are instances in which men-
tal attitudes reach as their objects prior mental attitudes of one's
own, prior mental attitudes which are intermediaries in the process
from memory to instance of remembering.
In being aware of the fact that the Emperor was his percept, Des-
cartes, we may suppose, was aware of the fact that the Emperor was
affecting him through air-waves and ears, through light waves and
retina. To be aware of a percept as a percept, we may say, is to be
aware of the process from percept to instance of perceiving. And to
be aware of a memory as a memory, to be aware of the fact that a
given entity is a memory with respect to a given instance of re-
membering, is, we may say, to be aware of the process from memory
to remembering. But there are, we hold, instances of perceiving
which are not accompanied by mental attitudes aware of the per-
cept as a percept. And there are instances of remembering not
accompanied by mental attitudes aware of the memory as a mem-
ory. Descartes' behavior may have been adapted to the Emperor,
but not to Descartes' own ears, not "to the ears through which
the Emperor's voice has affected Descartes' behavior." 29 The rela-
tional situation: Descartes-having-a-mental-attitude-which-reaches-
the-Emperor-as-its-ultimateobject may be real; and the alleged
relational situation: Descartes-having-a-mental-attitude-which-
reaches-intervening-air-waves-as-objects unreal. And you today may
be remembering last night's moon, but aware neither of the proc-
ess from last night's moon to today's remembering, nor of the per-
ceiving which occurred last night and which was an intermediarv
in that process. When I remember the performance which I at-
tended last night, I say, for example: "First they played an over-
ture, then a symphony" rather than "First I heard an overture,
then I heard a symphony." My mental attitude, that is to say, is
271
directed towards last night's performance, and not towards the
mental attitudes which I had last night. It is directed towards the
entity that was a percept with respect to last night's perceiving and
is a memory with respect to today's remembering, but not towards
the fact that that entity was a percept with respect to last night's
perceiving and is a memory with respect to today's remembering.
Let us assume that one of my mind-nerve-fibres today is aware of
the process from last night's performances to today's remembering,
or is aware of the mental attitude which I had last night when I was
perceiving the performance. And let us assume that subsequently
another of my mind-nerve-fibres remembers the performance but is
not aware of it as a memory. Then in the subject-object relation
between remembering mind-nerve-fibre and memory not recog-
nized as a memory, the performance need not be an indirect ob-
ject with process or prior perceiving intervening as idea. For be-
ing an idea, we have said, is not "merely being an object for some
previous mental attitude." 30 Nor does the fact that there are inter-
mediaries in the process from memory to instance of remembering
imply that there is an idea intervening in the subject-object re-
lation involving remembering subject and memory object. "The
Emperor, alleged to be both the cause and the ultimate object
reached by Descartes' thinking, need not be presented as unreal
when intervening entities are presented as nearer causes, but not
nearer objects, of Descartes' thinking." S1 And last night's perform-
ance, presented as the immediate object of today's remembering,
need not be presented as unreal even though last night's perceiv-
ing is presented as an intermediary in the process from perform-
ance to remembering. The process from memory to remembering
need not be an intervening idea. Last night's perceiving need not
be an intervening idea. And no entity which is present and not
past need be an intervening idea. For it is "no more incredible for
a subject to be now and its immediate object then than it is for
one end of this couch to be here and the other end there." 82 In-
deed last night's performance, presented as the immediate object
of my present remembering, is, we hold, real; and last night's
moon, presented as the immediate object of your present remem-
bering, is, we hold, likewise real. For last night's performance and'
last night's moon so presented are presented neither as self-con-
tradictory nor as incredible; and they are listed as real in the
272
appendix to Chapter Three.
It has been held, to be sure, that a given mental attitude's im-
mediate objects must all be contemporaneous with it. If a bell is
struck twice in succession, then, although I am perceiving the
second stroke which is now, I can be aware of the first stroke
which is past, it is said, only by being aware of a present idea re-
ferring back to that past stroke. If I am to be aware of both strokes
together, if I am to compare them, or if I am to say: "The bell has
struck twice," one of the objects of my present mental attitude, it
has been held, must be a contemporaneous replica of the entity
that was my object when I was perceiving the first stroke. I must, it
is said, "reproduce" 33 the object of my former perceiving.
When, however, my present mental attitude reaches the past
stroke as its ultimate object, my immediate object is not an idea
"held to be non-spatial," not an idea "held not to be spatially re-
lated to ultimate objects contemporaneous with it," not an idea
"held not to be an object for other subjects/' and not an idea held
to be adjacent to my thinking. 34 The alleged contemporaneous
replica of the object of my former perceiving is unreal when it is
presented with any of these characteristics and when it is also
presented as primarily an object and hence as distinguishable
from my mental attitude itself. It is my present mental attitudes
which are real. And these mental attitudes have as their immediate
objects, we hold, the second stroke which is present, the first stroke
which is past, and the relational situation first-stroke-prior-to-
second-stroke as well. The first stroke which is past enters as im-
mediate object into subject-object relational situations with two
thinking mind-nerve-fibres of mine, with my former mind-nerve-
fibre with respect to which it was a percept and with my present
mind-nerve-fibre with respect to which it is a memory. There are
indeed respects in which my present mind-nerve-fibre, which re-
members, resembles my former mind-nerve-fibre which perceived.
Both mind-nerve-fibres, for example, have the same object. It is
however not an object which is reproduced, but two mind-nerve-
fibres which are similar, one occurring after the other in different
phases of the same mind-person.
There are instances of remembering. But "there also are in-
stances in which mental attitudes reach as their objects prior men-
tal attitudes of one's own, prior mental attitudes which are inter-
273
mediaries in the process from memory to instance of remember-
ing." as I may remember the first stroke which is past, and may be
aware of the fact that it was prior to the second stroke which is
present, without being aware of the process from first stroke to
present remembering, and without being aware of the former per-
ceiving of mine with respect to which the first stroke was a per-
cept. But along with instances of being aware of a series of objects,
there are instances of being aware of a series of mental attitudes,
all of which are directed upon one of these objects. I may, it
would seem, be aware both of my present remembering and of my
past perceiving, may be aware of the fact that; an earlier mental
attitude directed upon a given object has preceded a later mental
attitude directed upon the same object. We do not agree, how-
ever, that "without our being conscious that what we are think-
ing now is the same as what we thought a moment before, all re-
production in the series of representations would be in vain." 36
Not only is there no reproduction of objects, but such repetition
of mental attitudes as there is does not require a mental attitude
which is both contemporaneous with the second of two resembling
mind-nerve-fibres and aware of the first.
This much however is true. The entity which is alleged to be
my memory, and also alleged to be recognized as my memory by
no one, is unreal. For to impute to the quality of being my mem-
ory the characteristic of being no one's object is to impute to that
alleged quality a characteristic which, as we have explained "re-
ality," marks out that alleged quality as unreal. 37 But to say that
my memory does not exist when presented with the character-
istic of being recognized as my memory by no one is somewhat
different from saying that, for my memory to be real, it must
have the quality of being recognized as my memory by someone. 38
And it is far different from saying that, for my memory to be
real, it must be recognized as a memory by a mental attitude of
mine contemporaneous with my remembering.
Last night's performance in Philadelphia may be at the source
of motions travelling uninterruptedly to the mental attitude which
I had when I was attending the performance. Or it may be at the
source of motions, which were held up, as it were, in a record, but
which affected the mental attitude which I had when I listened to
this record. It may be at the source of motions which affected my
274
friend who attended the performance, and which, through him,
affected the mental attitude which I had when I heard him de-
scribe the performance. Or it may be at the source of motions af-
fecting me through a process in which some previous mental atti-
tude of mine was an intermediary. There are real mental atti-
tudes at the termini of motions flowing uninterruptedly from the
entities of which those mental attitudes are aware. And there are
real mental attitudes such that the motions, flowing to them from
the objects of which they are aware, have been delayed in passing
through some such intermediaries as a record, a friend's attitude,
or a prior mental attitude of one's own.
What however is the situation when there are alleged to be no
interrupted motions, and no uninterrupted motions, flowing from
an alleged object to a mental attitude alleged to be aware of that
object? There are, let us agree, no interrupted motions, and no
uninterrupted motions, flowing to you from the other side of the
moon. And similarly the mental attitudes which I have today are
not affected, let us agree, by the sunrise which will occur tomorrow
morning. Nevertheless as you read this, you do have a mental atti-
tude which seems to be directed upon the other side of the moon.
And since the other side of the moon is real, 89 your mental attitude
is not without a real object, but reaches as its object the other side
of the moon. The other side of the moon is thus a real object with
respect to a mental attitude of yours which it has not affected. And
tomorrow's sunrise is, we hold, a real object with respect to a men-
tal attitude of mine which it has not affected. Tomorrow's sunrise
may be a percept with respect to a mental attitude that will exist
tomorrow morning. It may be a memory with respect to a mental
attitude that will exist still later. But with respect to the mental
attitude which I have today, it is, let us say, an "inferred object/'
And the other side of the moon is, let us say, an "inferred object"
with respect to the mental attitude which you successfully direct
upon it.
Some phase of the sun today, or some prior phase of the sun,
has affected me. And these phases which have affected me are re-
lated to that phase of the sun which will exist when the sun rises
tomorrow. They are all, that is to say, phases of the same enduring
entity; and the past phases with their acceleration lead on to the
future phase. But does the fact that past phases of the sun reach
275
out, as it were, in two directions, on the one hand, to the present
mental attitude which they affect and, on the other hand, to to-
morrow's sunriseaccount for the fact that my present mental atti-
tude has as its object tomorrow's sunrise? The ball which I am
about to throw affects the dog at my feet and is related to the ball's
falling to the ground which will occur some distance away. But if
we do not confuse what is usual with what is free from puzzle-
ment, we may find it puzzling that my dog's behavior, unaffected
by a future phase of the ball, is nevertheless "adapted to the ball
that is about to fall to the ground some distance away." 40 Such be-
wilderment as there may be, however, does not imply that my dog's
behavior, presented as adapted to a future phase of the ball, is
presented as generally discredited and is unreal. "A similarity
between two peoples need not be presented as generally discredited
even though such a similarity unaccompanied by mutual influence
or common ancestry is ... presented as puzzling/' 41 So with my
dog's behavior presented as adapted to a future phase of the ball
which has not affected him. And so with my present mental atti-
tude presented as reaching as its object tomorrow's sunrise. There
5, we find, a real relational situation: my-dog's-behavior-adapted-
to-the-ball-about-to-Ml-to-the-ground. And there is a real rela-
tional situation: my-present-mind-nerve-fibre-aware-of-tomorrow's-
sunrise.
Suppose, however, that I do not throw the ball but merely pre-
tend to throw it. The dog starts off. But whereas he behaves as
though his behavior were adapted to a ball about to fall to the
ground, his behavior is not adapted to anything. 42 Somewhat
similarly, having been affected by entity A, I may merely seem to
be aware of an entity B that is alleged to be related to it. B may be
unreal, not really connected with A and not really the object of a
mental attitude of mine. In short, just as there are instances of
perceiving and instances of pseudo-perceiving; and just as "there is
on the one hand the situation in which I am aware of a perform-
ance ip Philadelphia whi^h, through friend or record, has affected
me,** wd, "on the other hand, the situation in which, after listen-
|ijg to a friend who was pseudo-perceiving, I seem to be aware of
an alleged event which did not occur;" 4S so, let us agree, there
are instances of mental attitudes which are aware of inferred ob-
jects and instances o mental attitudes which merely seem to be
27S
aware of inferred objects.
I may, we have seen, be aware of the performance in Philadel-
phia and may pass over the friend or record through which this
performance has affected me.* 4 The performance in Philadelphia,
that is to say, may be my immediate object. Similarly, tomorrow's
sunrise, which is an inferred object with respect to my present men-
tal attitude, may be my immediate object. For just as I may be
aware of the performance without being aware of friend or record,
so I may be aware of tomorrow's sunrise without there being a con-
temporaneous mental attitude of mine directed upon the past
phases of the sun which have affected me. Tomorrow's sunrise
may be an immediate object with respect to the mental attitude
with respect to which it is an inferred object. It may be an im-
mediate object with respect to tomorrow's mental attitude with
respect to which it will be a percept. And it may be an immediate
object with respect to some later mental attitude with respect to
which it will be a memory.
Furthermore, just as there is a distinction to be made between
the mind-nerve-fibre which perceives and the mind-nerve-fibre
which is aware of a percept as a percept; and just as there is a
distinction to be made between the mind-nerve fibre which remem-
bers and the mind-nerve-fibre which is aware of a memory as a
memory, 45 so there is a distinction to be made between the mind-
nerve-fibre aware of an inferred object and the mind-nerve-fibre
aware of its object as an inferred object. For just as I may be
aware, not only of last night's performance, but also of the fact that
I formerly perceived this performance and am now remembering
it, so I may be aware, not only of tomorrow's sunrise, but also of
the fact that my present mental attitude, although directed upon
tomorrow's sunrise, has been affected, not by it, but by other en-
tities related to it.
The mental attitudes which we have thus far in this chapter
been classifying and discussing have all been mental attitudes di-
rected upon individual objects or seeming to be directed upon in-
dividual objects. But what about mental attitudes alleged to be
directed upon universals? Are there real instances of mental atti-
tudes reaching universals as their objects, just as there are real in-
stances of mental attitudes reaching what for them are inferred
objects, and just as there are real instances of perceiving?
277
If there were no real individuals, there would be no mental
attitudes reaching individuals as their objects. And if there were
no real universals, there would be no mental attitudes reaching
universals as their objects. That some universals exist is a propo-
sition which calls for considerable discussion. 46 But it would carry
us far beyond the limits set for this chapter to discuss this propo-
sition at any length at this point. Just then as in previous chapters
we have agreed to the existence of certain entities on the basis of
their being listed as real in the appendix to Chapter Three, 47 so
here let us on a similar basis agree to the existence of certain uni-
versals. The universal 'man/ presented as existing where various
individual men exist, is, let us agree, a real entity; and the uni-
versal 'star/ presented as existing where various individual stars
exist.
Moreover there was, let us say, a mind-nerve-fibre of Newton's
which seemed to be directed upon the universal 'star/ and a mind-
nerve-fibre of Aristotle's which seemed to be directed upon the
universal 'man/ The mind-nerve-fibre of Newton's, which had the
intrinsic quality of seeming to be directed upon 'star/ was brought
about, let us suppose, not by 'star/ but by various individual stars.
And it was various individual men, let us suppose, who affected
Aristotle and brought about his mental attitude seemingly di-
rected upon 'man/ But it is not incredible, we have seen, that my
dog's behavior should be adapted to a future phase of a ball even
when that future phase is presented as not having affected my dog's
behavior. 48 And Newton's mental attitude, presented as having
reached 'star' as its object, and also presented as not having been
affected by 'star/ is not presented as generally discredited and
need not be unreal. Even though my present mental attitude has
not been affected by tomorrow's sunrise, it not only seems to be di-
rected upon tomorrow's sunrise, but reaches tomorrow's sunrise
as its object. So with Newton's mental attitude apparently directed
upon 'star'; and so with Aristotle's mental attitude apparently di-
rected upon 'man/ 'Star' is a real universal and 'man' a real uni-
vexsaL And they are, we hold, real objects with respect to certain
mental attitudes directed upon them.
There was a mental attitude of Aristotle's which reached the
universal 'man* as its object. And there is a mental attitude of
yours which reaches the universal 'man' as its object. Both mental
278
attitudes are, let us say, "instances of conceiving.'* And the uni-
versal 'man' let us call a "concept" with respect to the mental atti-
tude which Aristotle directed upon it and a "concept" with respect
to the mental attitude which you direct upon it. *Man,' that is to
say, is in our terminology a "concept" with respect to several in-
stances of conceiving, just as the Emperor at Frankfurt was a per-
cept with respect to Descartes and a percept with respect to the
Bishop of Mayence. 49
Along with instances of perceiving, however, there also exist
instances of pseudo-perceiving. 50 Just so, let us hold, there exist
instances of pseudo-conceiving, mental attitudes, that is to say,
which resemble instances of conceiving but which fail to reach
real universals as their objects. The universal 'man' is real, but the
alleged universal 'centaur' unreal. Nevertheless there are thinking
mind-nerve-fibres seemingly directed upon 'centaur/ thinking
mind-nerve-fibres with intrinsic qualities similar to those of mind-
nerve-fibres which succeed in reaching universals as their objects. 51
Such thinking mind-nerve-fibres have no object, since their alleged
object is unreal. They are instances of pseudo-conceiving which, in
that they have no object, resemble instances of pseudo-perceiving
and resemble "instances of mental attitudes which merely seem to
be aware of inferred objects." 52
"I may be aware of tomorrow's sunrise," we have said, 53 "with-
out there being a contemporaneous mental attitude of mine di-
rected upon the past phases of the sun which have affected me."
Similarly, although your mental attitude directed upon 'man'
may have been brought about by various individual men whom
you have seen, or by some instance of the word "man" which you
have read, your mental attitude directed upon 'man 1 need not be
accompanied by a mental attitude directed upon the entities which
have affected your thinking. 'Man* may be your immediate object
just as tomorrow's sunrise may be my immediate object and the
performance which I remember my immediate object.
There is some universal 'man* which is real. But an alleged uni-
versal 'man,' "presented as in no sense an object of conscious-
ness," 54 presented, we may say, as not a concept with respect to
any mental attitude, is unreal. Similarly the universal 'man' is un-
real which is presented as a concept with respect to the mental
attitude which you had a moment ago and also presented as not a
279
concept with respect to the mental attitude which you had a mo-
ment ago. For the subsistent presented as in no sense an object is un-
real and the subsistent presented with contradictory characteristics
is unreal. But the universal 'man/ presented as not having been
a concept with respect to any mental attitude which you had yester-
day, need not be unreal. And unless it is also presented as a con-
cept with respect to your mental attitude of a moment ago, the
universal 'man/ presented as not a concept with respect to your
mental attitude of a moment ago, need not be unreal. The fact
that there is some universal 'man' which is real does not imply that
any particular mental attitude is aware of that real 'man/ And we
may express our rejection of such an alleged implication by assert-
ing that 'man* would have been real even if you a moment ago had
not conceived it.
An entity is unreal which is presented as no one's object. A uni-
versal is unreal which is presented as no one's concept. An en-
tity need not be unreal, however, which is presented as no one's
percept. And an entity need not be unreal which is presented as no
one's memory. For the entity presented as no one's percept, or pre-
sented as no one's memory, need not be presented as no one's ob-
ject. But just as a universal is unreal which is presented as no one's
concept, so is a percept unreal which is presented as no one's per-
cept and a memory unreal which is presented as no one's memory.
Within a context which informs us that an entity is an object for
some particular mental attitude or for mental attitudes of a cer-
tain type, it is not possible for that entity not to be an object for
that particular mental attitude or for it not to be an object for
mental attitudes of that type. Within a context however which
merely informs us that a given universal is real, then, although it
is not possible for that universal to be no one's concept, it is pos-
sible for that universal not to be a concept with respect to this or
that mental attitude. And within a context which merely informs
us that a given individual is real, then, although it is not possible
for that individual to be no one's object, it is possible for that in-
dividual not to be a percept with respect to this or that mental atti-
tude and not a percept at all. And it is possible for that individual
not to be a memory with respect to this or that mental attitude
and not a memory at all.
There is a sense then in which it is not this or that mental atti-
280
tude which makes its percept real or its memory real or its concept
real. Not that mental attitudes which are earlier may not be at the
source of motions flowing to objects of theirs which are later. Lady
Macbeth may have had a mental attitude directed upon Macbeth's
queen which she was to be; and this mental attitude of hers may
have been effective in bringing about her future regal status. But
Descartes did not create the Emperor who was his percept and his
immediate object. / did not create last night's performance which
was my memory and my immediate object. And you did not create
the universal 'man* which was your concept and your immediate
object.
The universal 'man/ let us agree, did not bring about your men-
tal attitude directed upon 'man/ But how can we conclude from
this that your mental attitude created 'man? Again, there may be
assumed to be elements in the Emperor which, in a strict sense of
"cause," were not the cause of Descartes' mental attitude directed
upon the Emperor. But how can we conclude from this that such
elements in the Emperor were created by Descartes' mental atti-
tude? There seem, however, to be instances of arguments of this
sort. Secondary qualities, it may be held, are not, in a strict sense of
"cause," the cause of the mental attitudes directed upon them.
Therefore, it seems to have been held, these mental attitudes
create the secondary qualities which are their objects. The distance
between two points, it may be said, is not the cause of the mental
attitude directed upon that distance. Therefore, it may be held,
points have various spatial relations added to them through the
action of the subjects who are aware of them. Universals, it may
be said, do not bring about the instances of conceiving which are
directed upon them. Therefore concepts, it may be said, are mental
products.
But if 'man' exists where Socrates exists and where you exist,
then Aristotle did not produce 'man' any more than he produced
Socrates. And if the Emperor's qualities existed in the Emperor,
then Descartes did not produce the Emperor's color or the sound
of the Emperor's voice any more than he produced the Emperor's
size. Similarly I do not produce the distance between two points
outside me any more than I produce the points themselves. Except
in so far as there are motions from certain mental attitudes which
are earlier to certain objects of theirs which are later, one real ob-
281
ject, we hold, is not more mental than another. The term "mental'*
may, to be sure, be used in various senses; and there is a certain
sense of the term "mental" in which all real entities are mental,
individuals as well as universals, secondary qualities as well as pri-
mary qualities, relational situations as well as the terms which they
relate. Each real entity is mental in the sense that it is an object for
a mental attitude, or, rather, in the sense that, presented as not an
object, it is unreal. But it is one thing to assert that an alleged en-
tity, presented as not an object, is unreal; and it is another thing to
assert that entities are created by the mental attitudes aware of
them.
But what about primeval events which occurred before there
were sentient beings to be aware of them? If we imagine ourselves
back at a date at which there were no sentient beings, can we not
say that such primeval events did not then exist and that they with
their dates first became real when sentient beings, occurring later,
came to be aware of them? And can we not say that there were no
instances of 'star/ that 'star* did not exist, until some one was aware
of 'star'? In general, whereas it may be agreed that a given entity
did not come into being following motions flowing to it from a
mental attitude, is it not true, we may be asked, that that entity
first came into being at the date of the first mental attitude aware
of it? ^
Surely, however, events can not have existed both with the
characteristic of having preceded all sentient beings and with the
characteristic of having existed only after there were sentient be-
ings. And 'star* can not exist in so far as it is presented both with
the characteristic of having had instances prior to sentient beings
and with the characteristic of not existing before there were
sentient beings to conceive it. Events and universals, we must hold,
exist with the dates which they have, not, on the whole, with the
dates of the mental attitudes which are aware of them. And if we
are asked to imagine ourselves back at a date at which there were
no sentient beings, we are, in effect, asked to present to ourselves
events occurring in a world devoid of mental attitudes, events
alleged to be objects for no one. Such alleged primeval events are
however unreal. For such alleged entities are, as we have seen, 56
implicitly presented with the characteristic of being objects for
ourselves. What may be real, it follows, are not primeval events
282
presented as objects for no one, but primeval events presented as
objects only for later thinkers who did not create them. Indeed
some alleged primeval events, so presented, do, let us agree, exist
They exist with the early dates which they are alleged to have. And
they exist with the characteristic of being objects, not for thinkers
contemporaneous with them, but for various mental attitudes
which came after them.
Similarly with the universal 'star/ The statement that 'star' is
made real by the first mental attitude aware of 'star' is, to say the
least, confusing. For such a proposition may seem to express an as-
sertion that a given subsistent called "star" is first unreal and then
real. Instead, there are distinguishable subsistents to be considered.
There is the subsistent 'star' which is unreal, the subsistent 'star,'
presented not only as not an object for mental attitudes contem-
poraneous with its earliest instances, but presented also as not an
object at all. And, distinguishable from it, there is the subsistent
'star' which is real, the subsistent 'star* presented, not as no one's
concept, but presented as a concept with respect only to mental
attitudes which were subsequent to its earliest instances. The sub-
sistent 'star' which is unreal does not become real through the
action of the first mental attitude allegedly directed upon it. Nor
is the alleged .primeval event which is unreal transformed into the
alleged primeval event which is real. On the contrary, the date or
dates with which a given subsistent is presented are elements
within that subsistent, characteristics with which it is presented.
If the subsistent is real, the dates with which it is presented belong
to it. And if it is unreal, it never becomes real.
There is then some subsistent *star' which is real and which is an
object with respect to various mental attitudes directed upon it.
And there are such entities as last night's performance in Phila-
delphia, tomorrow's sunrise and the Emperor's piety, entities
which likewise are real and real objects for various mental atti-
tudes. But what about the mental attitude directed upon 'star' or
upon last night's performance, upon tomorrow's sunrise or upon
the Emperor's piety? I may, it would seem, be aware of the men-
tal attitude which Descartes directed upon the Emperor's piety or
of the mental attitude which Newton directed upon 'star.' I may,
it would seem, be aware of the mental attitude which I had last
night when I was perceiving the Philadelphia orchestra's perform-
283
ance. 56 And I may, it would seem, be aware, not only of tomorrow's
sunrise, but of the mental attitude which I have just directed upon
tomorrow's sunrise. Indeed, let us agree that an introspecting men-
tal attitude of mine exists, namely,. the introspecting mental atti-
tude which perceives the slightly earlier mental attitude directed
upon tomorrow's sunrise. And let us agree that there exists the
mental attitude of yours which is not an instance of perceiving,
the mental attitude of yours which reaches as its object Descartes'
mental attitude directed upon the Emperor's piety. For we have
already agreed that certain mental attitudes exist which apparently
are "directed upon other mental attitudes," 57 which, that is to say,
have the intrinsic qualities which they would have if they reached
other mental attitudes as their objects. And having found that "the
mental attitude of Descartes' which seems to be directed towards
the Emperor really reaches the Emperor as its ultimate object," 5S
we find no reason to deny that the mental attitudes now being
considered, not only seem to be directed upon other mental atti-
tudes, but reach these other mental attitudes as their real objects.
Thus there is Descartes' mental attitude directed upon the
Emperor; there is your mental attitude directed upon this mental
attitude of Descartes'; and there is my mental attitude directed
upon this mental attitude of yours. But such a series of thinking
mind-nerve-fibres with mental attitudes directed upon other
thinking mind-nerve-fibres does not, it would seem, lead us to
accept the actual existence of additional thinking mind-nerve-
fibres ad infinitum. There is, it would seem, a last term in each
series of real entities, in each series composed of a mental attitude,
a second person's mental attitude directed exclusively upon the
first person's mental attitude, a third person's mental attitude
directed exclusively upon the second person's mental attitude,
and so on. For at some point in an alleged series of this sort, we
are presented with an alleged mental attitude which, at least
implicitly, is presented as no one's definite object. And since
"subsistents explicitly or implicitly appearing as definite appear-
ances for no one are unreal," 50 such an alleged mental attitude
has no place in a series of real mental attitudes each directed
upon another mental attitude. There is, let us agree, a real men-
tal attitude of yours which is directed upon the mental attitude
which Descartes directed upon the Emperor. But this series of
284
mental attitudes directed upon other mental attitudes has, let
us hold, a finite number of different members, not an infinite
number of different members.
A subsistent is unreal, we have said, if it is alleged to be a defi-
nite object for no one. And a subsistent is unreal if it is presented
as not an object at all. How then can there be a last in the series of
mental attitudes directed upon mental attitudes? For the last in
such a series, it may be said, has no mental attitude directed upon
it and is consequently presented as not an object at all.
In approaching the problem thus put before us, let us recall a
distinction which we made in explaining our term "reality." "A
subsistent is unreal," we have said, 60 "when, explicitly or implicitly,
it appears with the characteristic of being in no sense an object,
with the characteristic, that is to say, of appearing to no one." A
subsistent is not unreal, however, in so far as it appears without
the characteristic of being an object; nor is it unreal in so far as
it appears without the characteristic of being a definite object.
There subsists, for example, a bird outside my window. This bird
appears neither explicitly nor implicitly with the characteristic of
being no one's definite object. Implicitly, we may say, this bird ap-
pears with the characteristic of being my definite object. But ex-
plicitly it does not. This subsisting bird is, let us agree, real. And it
exists with the characteristics with which it explicitly appears. But
it does not follow from what has been said in this paragraph that
there is a real mental attitude of mine directed upon this bad and
that this bird which is real has the real quality of being my definite
object. For it is one thing to say that an entity is unreal which im-
plicitly appears with the characteristic of not being a definite ob-
ject. And it is another thing to say that an entity which is real has
the quality of being a definite object. Particularly is the distinction
to be pointed out when the quality of being a definite object is a
quality with which the subsistent under consideration appears only
implicitly. The entity which appears explicitly or implicitly as not
an object is unreal. And the entity is unreal which appears implic-
itly as an object and explicitly as not an object. 61 But so far as we
have yet seen, the entity which is real need not have the quality of
being a definite object, a quality with which it appears only im-
plicitly.
So far as we have seen, the bird outside my window need not be a
285
definite object; although, presented as not a definite object, it is
unreal. And so with the mental attitude directed upon a mental
attitude. A mental attitude, it would seem, may have the real
quality of being directed upon another mental attitude, and yet
not have the real quality of having still another mental attitude
definitely directed upon it. A contrary position would seem to lead
us to accept the existence of an infinite number of thinking mind-
nerve-fibres, most of which are presented as generally discredited
and as definite objects for no one. For if the bird outside my win-
dow had to be an object and, indeed, a definite object, the mental
attitude whose object it is alleged to be would have to be real. And
if this mental attitude in turn had to be a definite object in order
to be real, the further mental attitude whose definite object it is
alleged to be would have to be real.
Let us agree then that there are such entities as the bird outside
my window and such entities as my mental attitude directed upon
the mental attitude which Descartes directed upon the Emperor,
entities which are real but which do not have the quality of being
definite objects. Being real, however, these entities are not pre-
sented with the characteristic of not being definite objects. Thus
the real bird outside my window lacks the quality of being a defi-
nite object but does not appear, even implicitly, with the quality of
not being a definite object. And similarly with one of the thinking
mind-nerve-fibres in each series of thinking mind-nerve-fibres with
mental attitudes directed upon other thinking mind-nerve-fibres.
In a given series of this sort there may be no fifth member which is
real, an alleged fifth member being presented as no one's definite
object. In this series the fourth member may be real and may have
the real quality of being the fourth member. But presented as it-
self no definite object, such an alleged fourth member is unreal.
The fourth member is real, we may say, in so far as it is presented
as the fourth member but not presented as the last member.
There exists, then, a thinking mind-nerve-fibre with a mental
attitude directed exclusively upon another mental attitude, which
in turn is directed exclusively upon another mental attitude, which
in turn is directed upon an object which is not a mental attitude.
There also exists, let us say, a thinking mind-nerve-fibre with a
mental attitude directed exclusively upon itself. For example, I
may try to direct my attention to my present thinking. 62 When I
286
do this, my mental attitude, let us hold, not only seems to be di-
rected upon itself, but is directed upon itself. Like the mental at-
titude directed upon another mental attitude, the mental attitude
which is directed upon itself is an instance of a mental attitude
directed upon a mental attitude. But whereas in the one instance
we are called upon to distinguish the mental attitude presented, say,
as the fourth member of a series from that mental attitude presented
as the last member of a series, in the other instance we are not. For
the mental attitude directed upon itself is presented as its own defi-
nite object and is not so readily presented as no one's definite object.
Consequently, when there is a mental attitude directed upon it-
self, either alone or in conjunction with a mental attitude di-
rected upon another mental attitude, the problem of an alleged
infinite series is less troublesome. If my mental attitude directed
upon your mental attitude directed upon the mental attitude
which Descartes directed upon the Emperor is a definite object for
itself, then this self-conscious mental attitude of mine is not only
the fourth member of the series but also the last member. For in
being presented as the last member it is not being presented as no
one's definite object but as its own definite object.
Summary
There are various kinds of mental attitudes and various kinds
of objects. This chapter attempts to develop a vocabulary that
will distinguish with some precision these various kinds. It also
attempts to discuss problems that arise with respect to them.
The mental attitude which is aware of an object at the source
of motions flowing uninterruptedly to it I call an instance of per-
ceiving and I call its object a percept with respect to it.
A sense-datum, if it exists, is, in our terminology, "that ele-
ment within a percept which corresponds to the object of some
previous instance of perceiving unaffected by experience." It is
to be distinguished from another element within the percept
which, if it exists, is that without which the percept would not
cause the perceiving.
Some mental attitudes are instances of remembering. Their
objects are memories with respect to them. A public object may
287
be the immediate object of an instance of perceiving and also
the immediate object of an instance of remembering. It may be
a percept with respect to one mental attitude, a memory with
respect to another. Being aware of a percept or of a memory is to
be distinguished from being aware of the fact that one's object
is a percept or a memory.
Finally we define conceiving as that type of mental attitude
in which the object is a universal; and we call a universal in so
far as it is the object of a mental attitude a "concept."
Neither percepts, memories or concepts are mental in the
sense of being created by the mental attitudes which have them
as objects. But a percept, memory or concept, presented as not
a percept, memory or concept, or presented as no one's definite
object, is unreal.
288
Chapter X
FEELING, BELIEVING, AND KNOWING
Descartes, we have found, was perceiving, and the Emperor was
his percept. 1 You today are remembering; last night's moon is a
memory of yours. 2 And I am aware of tomorrow's sunrise which is an
inferred object with respect to the mental attitude which I today
direct upon it. 8 Similarly, let us agree, Laocoon standing on the
walls of Troy perceived the Greeks fighting in the plains below.
Later, standing beside the wooden horse, he remembered the
Greeks whom he had formerly perceived. Or his mental attitude
reached the Greeks who had temporarily sailed away, so that the
Greeks off in their ships were an inferred object with respect to
him. But whether Laocoon was aware of the Greeks off in their
ships or of the Greeks whom he had formerly perceived, there was,
it may be held, an additional mental attitude which Laocoon had.
Laocoon was afraid. Distinguishable from his remembering or
from his mental attitude directed upon an inferred object, there
was, it may be held, a mental attitude of his which was an instance
of fearing.
Our question is whether this alleged instance of fearing, pre-
sented as a mental attitude of Laocoon's, exists. But just as, in or-
der to determine whether or not Descartes was thinking, we had
to distinguish Descartes' mental attitude apparently directed upon
man, God and the universe from other entities with which that al-
leged mental attitude might be confused; 4 so, in order to deter-
mine whether or not Laocoon was fearing, we must distinguish his
mental attitude alleged to be an instance of fearing from other
entities whose existence at this point is not in question. Descartes,
we have seen, was pacing up and down the room, knitting his
289
brows and staring past the furniture that was around him. 5 And
Laocoon standing beside the wooden horse was, let us suppose,
trembling; his heart was beating more rapidly than usual and his
glands secreting more freely. But just as Descartes' thinking is
distinguishable from his non-mental behavior, so is Laocoon's al-
leged fearing presented as distinguishable from Laocoon's non-
mental behavior. Descartes' thinking and Descartes' non-mental be-
havior are each abstractable from Descartes' total behavior. 6 And
it is by separating out of Laocoon's total behavior an alleged men-
tal attitude held to accompany that mental attitude of his which
was directed upon the Greeks, it is thus that we come to have as
our apparent object his alleged fearing.
The alleged instance of fearing whose existence we are to deter-
mine appears with the characteristic of being a quality of the ex-
tended substance that is Laocoon or Laocoon's mind-nerve-fibre,
a quality distinguishable from its substance's non-mental behavior.
And the alleged relational situation alleged to have as its terms the
fearing Laocoon and the feared Greek army is to be distinguished
from the relational situation which has as its terms the reacting
Laocoon on the one hand and, on the other hand, the Greek army
to which Laocoon's behavior is adapted. 7 There is the relational
situation: I^ocoon-affected-by-the-Greek-arrny-which-he-formerly-
perceived. There is the relational situation: Laocoon-making-a-re-
sponse-adapted-to-the-Greeks. And there is a subject-object rela-
tional situation which is either Laocoon-remembering-the-Greeks
or Laocoon-having-as-an-inferred-object-the-Greeks-off-in-their-
ships. What is still in question is the existence of fearing in addi-
tion to remembering or being aware of an inferred object; and in
addition to behaving. And what is still in question is the existence
of a relational situation including Laocoon and the Greeks, into
which Laocoon enters, not by virtue of his remembering or of his
being aware of an inferred object, and not by virtue of his respond-
ing, but by virtue of his fearing.
It may be held, we have seen, that behavior exists, but that no
mental attitudes exist which are distinguishable from behavior. 8
And as mental attitudes in general appear to be discredited in
some quarters, so do such alleged mental attitudes as we would call
"instances of fearing." Just as it may be said that thinking is be-
havior, so it may be said that Laocoon's secreting glands, beating
290
heart and trembling are his fearing. It is however a rather rare
form of behaviorism whose proponents disbelieve in a fearing
which, while distinguishable from bodily excitation, is neverthe-
less alleged to be an element in total behavior. The fearing of
Laocoon's which we are considering, it is to be pointed out, is not
presented as some non-spatial entity. It is presented, to be sure,
with the characteristic of being distinguishable from bodily ex-
citation, and yet with the characteristic of being an element in
Laocoon's total behavior. So presented, we find, it does not appear
with the characteristic of being generally discredited. In a word, we
find Laocoon's fearing, appearing with the characteristics just de-
scribed, a subsistent which is real. Laocoon, we hold, was remem-
bering. Laocoon, we hold, was reacting. And Laocoon, we also
hold, was fearing. He was characterized by non-mental behavior in
that he was reacting. And he was thinking, characterized by mental
attitudes, in that he was fearing and remembering.
On the one hand there is Laocoon's remembering, reacting and
fearing. And on the other hand there exists the Greek army form-
erly on the plains of Troy and now resting in its ships out at sea. It
is to some phase of the Greek army that Laocoon is reacting. It is
towards some phase of the Greek army that Laocoon's remember-
ing is directed. And it is in connection with his remembering the
Greeks, or in connection with his mental attitude directed upon
the Greeks off in their ships, that Laocoon is fearing. His fearing
is related to the Greeks. There is a real relational situation, that
is to say, which includes on the one hand the Greeks who are real
and on the other hand the fearing Laocoon who is likewise real.
It is a relational situation which appears with the characteristic of
being somewhere outside Troy, in the extended place which in-
cludes the spot at which Laocoon was standing and the place
where the Greek ships were idling. And it is a relational situation
which, appearing neither as non-spatial nor as discredited, is
listed in the appendix to Chapter Three. It is a relational situation
which is real just as is the relational situation whose terms are the
Greeks and the reacting Laocoon and just as is the relational situa-
tion whose terms are the Greeks and the remembering Laocoon.
There is thus a relation between Laocoon and the Greeks into
which Laocoon enters by virtue of his reacting, a relation between
Laocoon and the Greeks into which Laocoon enters by virtue of
291
his remembering, and a relation between Laocoon and the Greeks
into which Laocoon enters by virtue of his fearing.
In so far as there is a relation between Laocoon and the Greeks
into which Laocoon enters by virtue of his reacting, the Greeks
may be said to have the quality of being responded to. In so far as
there is a relation between Laocoon and the Greeks into which
Laocoon enters by virtue of his remembering, the Greeks may be
said to have the quality of being a memory. And in so far as there
is a relation between Laocoon and the Greeks into which Laocoon
enters by virtue of his fearing, the Greeks may be said to have the
quality of being feared. Laocoon, we hold, is reacting, remember-
ing, and fearing. The Greeks, we hold, are responded to, a memory,
and feared. They are a memory in that vibrations emanating from
them, after being held up in some phase of Laocoon's mind-person,
led to Laocoon's remembering. They are feared in that the mental
attitude directed towards them is, or is accompanied by, fearing.
Fearing is a mental attitude by virtue of which Laocoon is re-
lated to the Greeks, remembering a mental attitude by virtue of
which Laocoon is related to the Greeks, perceiving a mental atti-
tude by virtue of which Descartes is related to the Emperor. We
have agreed however that mental attitudes exist which have other
mental attitudes directed upon them. 9 There exists, we suppose,
a mental attitude of Descartes' which is directed upon his thinking
about the Emperor, a mental attitude of Laocoon's which is di-
rected upon his thinking about the Greeks, and a mental attitude
of mine which is directed both upon Descartes' perceiving and
upon Laocoon's remembering. But if it is agreed that Descartes'
perceiving may be an object both for Descartes and for me, and if
it is agreed that Laocoon's remembering may be an object both
for Laocoon and for me, then there appears to be no reason to
deny that Laocoon's fearing may likewise be an object. My think-
ing of a moment ago was real. Laocoon, we have agreed, had a
mental attitude which was an instance of fearing. And there was,
we hold, a real subject-object relation between my thinking and
the fearing of Laocoon's that is my alleged object. Similarly with
Laocoon's mental attitude alleged to have been directed upon his
Searing. In one phase, we may suppose, Laocoon was perceiving
the Greeks; in a later phase, we may suppose, he was introspecting
his previous remembering or his previous fearing.
292
We find real, accordingly, instances of the mental attitude that
is fearing and instances of the mental attitude that is the intro-
specting of fearing. Indeed we may take another step and admit the
existence of mental attitudes which are directed, not upon the
mental attitude that is fearing, but upon the relation between the
fearing subject and the feared object. Fearing, the introspecting
of fearing, the thinking that is directed upon the relation between
the fearing subject and the feared object, these mental attitudes
resemble respectively remembering, the introspecting of remem-
bering, and the thinking that is directed upon the relation be-
tween the remembering subject and its memory. To be aware of a
memory as a memory is to be aware of it as related to the subject
remembering it. 10 That is to say, to be aware of the quality of
being a memory that an object has is to be aware of the memory
object, of the remembering subject, and of the subject-object re-
lation between them. So it is, we suggest, with the quality of being
feared. In so far as Laocoon is fearing the Greeks and is not aware
of the relation between his fearing and the Greeks, he is aware
of the Greeks but not of the Greeks as feared. When, on the other
hand, he is aware of the Greeks as feared, he is, we hold, aware
of his previous mental attitude; and he is aware of the relation
between the Greeks and his fearing. When he is not introspecting
but is merely fearing the Greeks, we might expect him to exclaim:
"Alas! The Greeks!" But when his mental attitude is directed
towards the relation between his fearing and the Greeks, we might
expect him to say: "I fear the Greeks" or "the Greeks are feared
by me."
There are instances of fearing and instances of the introspect-
ing of fearing, instances of the relation between a fearing subject
and a feared object and instances of the awareness of a feared ob-
ject as feared. But whereas it may be agreed that fearing is dis-
tinguishable from the introspecting of fearing, and that there are
real instances of both, it may be held that there are no instances
of fearing that are not introspected by the fearing subject. And
whereas it may be agreed that the relation between a fearing sub-
ject and a feared object is one thing and the awareness of a feared
object as feared another, it may be held that there are no instances
of a feared object not recognized as feared by the fearing subject.
There are instances, we have agreed, of mental attitudes which are
293
riot introspected. 11 But whereas there are some mental attitudes
that are not introspected, it may be held that none of them are
instances of fearing, it may be held that there is no consciousness
instances of fearing. With respect to those mental attitudes that are
without self-consciousness.
To be sure, it seems easy to pass from the state in which I am
fearing an object to the state in which I am aware of my fearing.
There is, we may suppose, a bodily excitation accompanying my
fearing. And both this excitation and the fearing that accompanies
it may be so pronounced, may compel attention to such an extent,
that I become introspective and aware of my fearing. Let me sup-
pose, however, that on my way home yesterday I saw a flash of
lightning and that thereupon I directed all of my energies to the
attainment of a haven. I was, we may say, conscious of the storm
about me and was paying no attention to my own mental atti-
tudes. It was after I was safe at home, we may suppose, that I be-
came aware of the fearing that had been mine. Or it was my com-
panion in the storm, observing my feverish activity and lack of
composure, who perceived or inferred my fearing. Surely cowards
are not all introspectors. On the contrary it would seem that those
whom we call cowards are those who act so as to lead us to think
that they fear unduly. Yesterday's fearing as I rode home in the
storm appears then as not having been accompanied by introspect-
ing. Appearing in this manner, it does not appear as generally
discredited. In a word, yesterday's fearing unaccompanied by intro-
specting is real. Fearing exists- The introspecting of fearing exists.
And the instances of the former are not all accompanied by in-
stances of the latter.
Fearing is a mental attitude, the awareness of fearing a mental
attitude directed upon a mental attitude. Among the entities that
are not mental attitudes, among the entities that are external ob-
jects, there exist, we hold, the feared Greeks and the feared flash
of lightning. What shall we say, however, with respect to the exist-
ence of a private object, an idea of fear, in addition to, or in place
of, either mental attitude or external object? As we have already
seen, it may be held that the immediate object is not the external
object, but rather an idea referring beyond itself to the external
object. 12 And as it may be held that the immediate object of Lao-
coon's remembering is not the Greeks themselves but rather an
294
idea of the Greeks, so it may be held that, when Laocoon fears, his
immediate object is an idea of fear. The contents of Laocoon's
mind, it may for example be held, consist of an idea of the wooden
horse, an idea of the Greeks, and an idea of fear.
Either, however, the alleged idea of fear that Laocoon has ap-
pears as an idea referring beyond itself to some public object; or
it appears as a bit of content without a self-transcendent reference.
Either it appears as an idea referring to a quality of the Greeks or
as an idea referring to the mental attitude we call Laocoon 's fear-
ing; or it appears simply as fear, a bit of content in Laocoon's mind
that is content and not mental attitude. We have seen, however,
that public objects may be the immediate objects of the mental
attitudes that are directed upon them. 13 The subject-object rela-
tion between Descartes and the Emperor is, we have agreed, direct
rather than one that is mediated by an idea of the Emperor. And
as there is no idea of the Emperor mediating between Descartes*
thinking and the Emperor himself, so, we hold, there is no idea
of fear mediating between the fearing Laocoon and the feared
Greeks and no idea of fear mediating between the introspecting
Laocoon and the fearing Laocoon whom he introspects. An idea
of fear alleged to be an immediate object and to refer beyond itself
to either a quality of the Greeks or to Laocoon's mental attitude
that is fearing is, we hold, a subsistent that is unreal.
How is it, however, with respect to the idea of fear that is not
alleged to refer beyond itself but is alleged merely to be Laocoon's
immediate object? Such an alleged idea of fear appears as passive
content rather than as active thinking or fearing; and it appears
as content that is mental rather than as non-mental behavior. If
however this mental content appears as non-spatial, it is, as we use
"reality," unreal. And if it appears with the characteristic of being
in space, if it appears, for example, as distinguishable from non-
mental behavior but as a quality of Laocoon's mind-body or mind-
neural process, the question is how this alleged passive mental
content, this idea of fear that is alleged to inhere in Laocoon, is to
be distinguished from Laocoon's fearing itself. "At first sight," we
have said, 14 "the distinction between what is alleged to be mental
attitude and what is alleged to be content, whether private or pub-
lic, seems clear." But since the entities we call "mental attitudes"
may themselves be objects, Laocoon's alleged idea of fear can
295
hardly be distinguished from an act of fearing that Laocoon intro-
spects. In short, what we call Laocoon's introspecting of fearing
might in some other terminology be called Laocoon's having an
idea of fear. But since there can be fearing without the intro-
specting of fearing, there can be fearing without what others might
call: "Having an idea of fear." An idea of fear does not exist in each
situation in which there is a fearing subject and a feared object.
It exists, if at all, only where there is the introspection of fearing.
And where there is the introspecting of fearing, the fearing that
is introspected may be called an active mental attitude or a passive
idea. It is in any case a quality of the extended substance that is
the thinker's mind-body or mind-neural process. And in the in-
stance in which Laocoon fears the Greeks, it is directed towards,
or accompanies Laocoon's remembering of, the Greeks. Since
however neither "active" nor "passive" are adjectives that can
appropriately be applied to it, we can only say that in our ter-
minology nothing exists to be called an "idea of fear" rather than a
mental attitude, that in our terminology Laocoon is either fearing
the feared Greeks or is introspecting his fearing, but is not aware
of an "idea" of fear.
Laocoon feared the Greeks and Gato was angry at the Cartha-
ginians. Abelard was in love with Eloise and Victor Hugo was
defiant towards Napoleon III. Kant was condescending towards
Berkeley and Hitler was disgusted at modern art. All of these
alleged situations resemble one another. Just as Laocoon was
remembering the Greeks and fearing them, so Cato was remem-
bering the Carthaginians and hating them and Abelard perceiving
Eloise and loving her. In each of these instances there is a subject
who is perceiving, remembering, conceiving, or otherwise thinking
about an object. And in each of these instances the perceiving, re-
membering or what not that is directed upon an object is accom-
panied by, or intermingled with, some such mental attitude as fear-
ing, loving, being pleased or being disgusted. Just as we find Lao-
coon's fearing real, so we find real Cato's being angry and Hitler's
being disgusted. And just as we hold that the Greeks have the qual-
ity of being a feared memory with respect to Laocoon, so we hold
that Eloise has the quality of being a beloved percept with respect to
Abelard. In brief, we find real many instances of a type of mental
attitude that, to use a term constructed like "perceiving," "fear-
296
ing" and "thinking/' we shall call "feeling." 15 And we find many
real instances of the subject-object relation in which the object is
real, the subject real, and the subject not only aware of the object
but also feeling.
However, just as an alleged object of perceiving, remembering
or conceiving may not exist, so an alleged object of fearing, lov-
ing or hoping may not exist. When Descartes perceives the Em-
peror, Descartes' perceiving is real, the Emperor is real, and there
is a real relation between the perceiving subject and his percept.
But when I seem to perceive a bent stick, when the bent stick ap-
pearing as my object is unreal, then, although my mental attitude
is real, there is neither a real object nor a real subject-object rela-
tion between my thinking and its alleged object. 16 Similarly, when
Laocoon remembers the Greeks and fears them, there is a real
relation between the fearing, remembering Laocoon and the
Greeks who exist as his feared memory. But when I seem to fear
the devil, when the devil who is alleged to be my object does not
exist, there is no real relation between this non-existent devil and
any mental attitude which I may have. President Roosevelt, we
may say, was in October 1936 hoping for re-election. His re-elec-
tion in November was real and was really related to the hoping
that was his mental attitude in October. But what about his op-
ponent, Governor Landon? It may be alleged that in October, 1936
Governor Landon was hoping for election to the presidency. But,
since the alleged election of Landon in November was unreal,
it can not have been related to any October hoping. Instances of
hoping, fearing or loving, like instances of perceiving, remember-
ing or conceiving, can only be related to entities which have oc-
curred or which will occur. Governor Landon in October 1936
may have had a mental attitude just as I have a mental attitude
when a bent stick appears to be my object. But the hoping that
may then have been his was neither related to an object nor did
it accompany a mental attitude that had an object.
There is a real mental attitude which, although it has no bent
stick as its object, I describe as being apparently directed towards
a bent stick. It is a mental attitude which exists and which has
intrinsic characteristics such as it would have if the bent stick
appearing as an object existed. 17 So too Governor Landon in Octo-
ber 1936 had a mental attitude which, we hold, existed. His al-
297
leged attitude appears neither as non-spatial nor as generally dis-
credited; and it is listed as real in the appendix to Chapter Three.
It had no real object; but it had intrinsic characteristics resem-
bling those of mental attitudes really hoping for, and really aware
of, events about to exist.
It is a matter of terminology whether, when the bent stick
that appears as my object is unreal, we call my mental attitude
"pseudo-perceiving" or "perceiving that is without an object."
And it is a matter of terminology whether we call Governor
Landon's mental attitude "pseudo-hoping" or "hoping that is
without an object." Mental attitudes, instances of thinking, that
are without real objects exist. But when we choose a term to
represent some species of real mental attitude, we would seem
to be at liberty either to restrict the species thus represented to
mental attitudes that have real objects or to extend it so that it
includes certain real mental attitudes without objects. Exercising
this liberty, let us call only those mental attitudes which have
real objects instances of "perceiving," "conceiving" and "remem-
bering." That is to say, let us define 'perceiving/ 'conceiving' and
'remembering' so that there is no perceiving without a percept,
no conceiving without a concept, and no remembering without
a memory. But, whereas we do not call those mental attitudes
which resemble perceivings but which lack objects instances of
"perceiving," let us call Governor Landon's mental attitude that
has no object an instance of "hoping," just as we designate as
"hoping" the mental attitude of President Roosevelt's that had
an object.
It is, we say, a terminological decision that leads us to call my
mental attitude, when it is as if the bent stick appearing as my
object existed, an instance, not of "perceiving," but of "pseudo-
perceiving," 18 whereas we call Governor Landon's mental attitude,
although it lacks an object, an instance of "hoping." But this dif-
ference between the manner in which we use "perceiving" and the
manner in which we use "hoping" suggests that the situation in
which subjects have real objects and hope for them may not be
analogous to the situation in which subjects have real objects and
perceive them. We say, to be sure, that Abelard loved Eloise and
that Laocoon feared the Greeks just as we say that Descartes
perceived the Emperor. But we also say that Abelard was in love
298
with Eloise, Laocoon afraid of the Greeks, Cato angry at the Car-
thaginians, and President Roosevelt hoping for re-election. It may
seem, not that Laocoon remembered the Greeks and feared them,
not that his fearing and his remembering had a common object,
but that, on the occasion on which he remembered the Greeks,
he had a feeling which, in so far as it was a feeling, was without
an object. The fearing of a fearing, remembering subject may
be held to be related to the feared memory just as directly as his
remembering is. Or the relation between the remembering and
the object may be held to be the primary subject-object relation;
and the object may be held to be feared only in that a fearing that
is without an object accompanies the remembering that is directed
upon the object.
The distinction that we have just drawn is however a spe-
cious one. Upon either interpretation Laocoon is fearing and
remembering. And upon either interpretation there is a real re-
lation between the feared object and the fearing that accom-
panies the remembering. There is no entity that must be real if
Laocoon's fearing as such has an object and that must be unreal
if Laocoon's fearing has an object only indirectly, only in so far as
the accompanying remembering has an object. And since there
is no ontological decision to sway us, we find no basis upon which
to accept one interpretation and to reject the other.
To sum up, there are some mental attitudes which have no ob-
jects. Among these there are some which we call instances of hop-
ing, some which we call instances of pseudo-perceiving, none which
we call instances of perceiving. Other mental attitudes have ob-
jects which are real. There are, for example, instances of perceiv-
ing, remembering, and the like. And accompanying some of them,
intermingled with them or associated with them, there are in-
stances of feeling. Fearing as well as remembering may be ab-
stracted from the thinking substance who both fears and remem-
bers or who fears while he remembers. The feared memory is
the object of his remembering. And either directly or by virtue
of its relation to the accompanying remembering, it may also be
said to be the object of his fearing.
Fearing exists when Laocoon remembers the Greeks and fears
them. Fearing exists when my mental attitude is as if the devil
appearing as my object existed and when, in addition to seeming
299
to be aware of the devil, I am afraid. Can I not however be afraid
when there is neither an object that I am definitely aware of nor
a subsistent that appears to be my object? It would seem that I can
be pleased at my son's progress or at the upturn in the stock-
market. And yet it would also seem that, without the awareness
of any specific object accompanying my feeling, I can be pleased
or in good spirits. Hamlet, we may suppose, was displeased and
troubled at his mother's infidelity. Or, to allow him a broader
object, he was displeased and troubled at man's worthlessness and
the world's decadence. But not even so definite an object as this is
needed to make him the melancholy Dane. Some feelings, we
might almost say, require the accompaniment of mental attitudes
directed upon no objects at all. It would seem that I can be happy
or timorous, displeased or optimistic, without being able to ac-
count for my mood, without my mood being tied up with any
specific object or apparent object. Some feelings in this respect
seem to resemble mental attitudes which are not feelings. The
relation between being unhappy at Hamlet's mother's infidelity,
being unhappy at man's worthlessness, and simply being in a
melancholy mood seems to resemble the relation between perceiv-
ing a definite object, gazing into space, and the sort of contentless
thinking in which, when offered a penny for our thoughts, we
can not earn the proffered penny.
The mental attitude exists in which Laocoon is fearing the
Greeks. The mental attitude exists in which Governor Landon
is hoping, although his election, appearing as his object, does not
exist. And the mental attitude exists in which I am optimistic but
unable to point out a prospective situation with which my mood
is tied up. A feeling, however, can exist without being intro-
spected. And if this is true with respect to feelings in general, it
must be true with respect to the optimistic mood for which I am
unable to account. In order that my optimistic mood may exist, it
need not be accompanied by a mental attitude in which I am
aware of my optimistic mood. On the other hand, my optimistic
mood, to be real, can not appear as no object at all or as not a
definite object for some subject. In general, feelings exist that are
not introspected by the feeling subjects themselves. But these non-
introspected feelings that are real are not presented as non-objects.
They are presented neither as objects nor as non-objects; or they
300
are presented as objects for other subjects.
Laocoon remembered the Greeks and feared them. The leader
of the Greeks within the wooden horse remembered his former
companions and hoped for their success. Both in Laocoon and in
the man within the horse there was a mental attitude which was
remembering the Greeks. The thinking o the two men differed
in that their similar rememberings were accompanied by different
feelings. There was a similar difference, we may say, between
President Roosevelt's attitude towards his re-election and Gover-
nor Landon's attitude towards the re-election of President Roose-
velt. Both men, we may assume, were on occasion aware of the
event that was about to take place. But in the one mind the men-
tal attitude directed towards this future event was accompanied by,
or intermingled with, hoping; in the other mind accompanied by,
or intermingled with, dreading.
But besides there being hoping in the one case and dreading
in the other, may we not also say that there was believing in
the one case and disbelieving in the other? May we not de-
scribe President Roosevelt's mental attitude as hoping for and
certain of his re-election and Governor Landon's as not only
dreading but also as sceptical of, or disbelieving in, the re-
election of President Roosevelt? President Roosevelt's re-election
in November 1936 was real; and in October Governor Lan-
don and many others had mental attitudes directed towards it.
Some of these attitudes were, let us agree, accompanied by, or in-
termingled with, instances of believing; and some accompanied by,
or intermingled with, instances of disbelieving. Governor Landon,
for example, disbelieved in the forthcoming re-election of Presi-
dent Roosevelt. Presented, that is to say, as a quality of the think-
ing mind-person whom we call Governor Landon, an instance of
disbelieving existed. And this instance of disbelieving was really
related to the November event upon which either it, or the mental
attitude of Governor Landon's which accompanied it, was directed.
But what about an alleged believing or disbelieving directed
upon an entity which is unreal? There are instances of pseudo-
perceiving, we have seen, which are real but which have no ob-
jects, instances of pseudo-perceiving which are as though the
objects they seem to have were real. And there are instances of
hoping such that neither they nor the mental attitudes which ac-
301
company them have objects, instances of hoping such that they and
the mental attitudes with which they are intermingled have "in-
trinsic characteristics resembling those of mental attitudes really
hoping for, and really aware of, events about to exist/' 19 Similarly
with the instance of believing apparently directed upon an unreal
object. And similarly with the instance of disbelieving apparently
directed upon an unreal object. A child who says: "I believe in
Santa Glaus" may be believing; but she is not aware of an object
and not, strictly speaking, believing in anything. And when I say:
"I disbelieve in Santa Glaus," whereas my disbelieving is real,
neither it nor the mental attitude accompanying it has a real ob-
ject. There may, that is to say, be instances of believing, and in-
stances of disbelieving, which are as though their alleged objects
existed. But it is only real entities, we conclude, that may really be
believed in, and only real entities that may really be disbelieved
in.
I may disbelieve in the re-election of President Roosevelt but
not in Santa Glaus. I may believe in Socrates but not in Ivanhoe.
But what about the entity which we have distinguished from Soc-
rates and called: "The existence of Socrates'? And what about the
alleged entity which seems to be represented by our phrase: "The
existence of Ivanhoe?" Distinguishable from Socrates there is the
entity which we have called a judgment or fact, namely, "exist-
ence appearing as an alleged quality of the subsistent Socrates." 20
And distinguishable from an alleged Ivanhoe there subsists an al-
leged existence of Ivanhoe. As the word "Socrates" which I utter
differs from the proposition: "Socrates exists" which I assert, so,
we have seen, Socrates differs from the existence of Socrates. And
with Socrates being distinguishable from the existence of Socrates,
believing in Socrates, it would seem to follow, differs from believ-
ing in the existence of Socrates. The wife of Socrates is not the
same person as Socrates; and the father of the wife of Socrates is
not the same person as the father of Socrates. Somewhat similarly,
it would seem, since "the existence of Socrates" and "Socrates"
represent different entities, believing in the existence of Socrates
is not believing in Socrates.
But, it may be objected, not all situations in which an A is re-
lated to a B which is related to a C are analogous to the situation
in which A is the father of the wife of Socrates, but not the father
302
of Socrates. The wife of Socrates may not be the same person as
Socrates. But in a monogamous society where there are no extra-
marital relations, if A is the son of the wife of Socrates, A is also
the son of Socrates. In such a situation being-the-son-of and being-
the-wife-of are not what one might call "additive" as are being-the-
father-of and being-the-wife-of. Or consider the proposition: "A is
the wife of the wife of Socrates." Since the wife of Socrates has no
wife, either the reader does not understand our proposition at all;
or he disregards what he takes to be a redundancy and believes
our proposition to be synonymous with "A is the wife of Soc-
rates/' Somewhat similarly, it may be said, "A is believing in B"
and "B is the existence of C" do not imply that there is a believing
in the existence of C which is distinguishable from a believing in
C. Believing and existing may be held to involve each other to
such an extent that believing in the existence of Socrates is not
distinguishable from believing in Socrates.
The connection between belief and existence is so close, it may
be said, that to believe in an entity is to be aware of that entity as
existing. But even as "existence" is commonly used, it would seem
that we can be aware of an entity as existing without believing in
it. An instance of believing, it would seem, is not an instance of
merely being aware, whether the alleged object of that awareness
is an entity presented as existing, an entity presented as not exist-
ing, or an entity presented neither as existing nor as not existing. An
instance of believing, it would seem, is an instance of being aware
with feeling; or, rather, it is a feeling which accompanies, or is
intermingled with, an instance of being aware. Thus a child may
tell me that Santa Glaus exists; and upon hearing her words I may
have a mental attitude which has as its apparent object a Santa
Glaus presented with those vague characteristics to which "exist-
ence" as commonly used seems to refer. Using the word "existence"
as it is used in ordinary discourse, my apparent object is, in short,
the existence of Santa Glaus. But whereas I seem to be aware of the
existence of Santa Glaus, I am not, let us agree, presented as believ-
ing in Santa Glaus. For my mental attitude which seems to be
directed upon the existence of Santa Glaus is not presented as
being accompanied by a mental attitude which is an instance of
believing.
To be believing in an entity, let us then agree, is not to be
303
merely aware of that entity as existing. In order that there may
be an instance of believing, there must be an instance of what we
have called a "feeling." But assuming that we have before us an
instance of the feeling that we call "believing," how are we to
distinguish the believing which accompanies a mental attitude
directed upon a given entity from the believing which accom-
panies a mental attitude directed upon the existence of that en-
tity? When the word "real" has the meaning with which that word
comes to us out of common speech, "seeming to have as an object
a hundred real dollars" may not be "identical with seeming to
have as an object a hundred imaginary dollars." 21 In the one situa-
tion, we have suggested, the alleged object appears with "some
vague quality of being related to certain other things, some vague
quality of being important"; in the other situation, not. Whatever
difference there may be, however, seems rather intangible and
elusive. Certainly then, when we compare seeming to believe in a
hundred real dollars with seeming to believe in a hundred imagi-
nary dollars, the difference is no less elusive. Indeed, when "exist-
ence" is used in the sense in which it is used in common speech,
one may go so far as to say that it is all one whether I say: "I
believe in a hundred dollars" or "I believe in the existence of a
hundred dollars," whether I say: "I believe in Santa Glaus" or
"I believe in the existence of Santa Glaus."
Our failure to find a noticeable difference between the signifi-
cation of: "I believe in A," as this phrase is commonly used, and
the signification of: "I believe in the existence of A," as commonly
used, may be partially accounted for by the fact that "existence"
in ordinary discourse has a meaning which is extremely vague and
indefinite. But if the difference between "believing in A" and "be-
lieving in the existence of A" is less marked than the difference
between "A" and "the existence of A," then our failure is not
completely accounted for by pointing to the vagueness of the
meaning with which "existence" is commonly used. 22 Our failure
may be due in part to the juxtaposition of "existence" and "be-
lief." As "existence" is commonly used, that is to say, the meanings
of "existence" and "belief may involve one another. "Existing,"
for example, may not mean merely being somehow important; it
may mean being somehow important and being an object of belief.
It would be unrewarding, however, to pursue with any vigor
504
investigations as to the meaning which "existence" usually has.
For, since the meaning o "existence" as commonly used is ex-
tremely vague, we are unable to determine with any accuracy
what that meaning is. And to the extent to which our term "exist-
ence" is not involved, we are expressing ourselves in sentences to
which our terms "truth" and "falsity" do not apply. 23
Let us turn then to believing in A and believing in the exist-
ence of A, where "existence" has the meaning which has been
assigned it in this treatise. To exist is to appear without the char-
acteristic of being self-contradictory, without the characteristic of
being non-spatial, etc.; and it is to be listed in the appendix to
Chapter Three. There is believing in the existence of an entity
when the mental attitude which accompanies an instance of be-
lieving has as its object that entity's quality of appearing without
the characteristic of being self-contradictory, that entity's quality
of appearing without the characteristic of being non-spatial, etc.
And there is believing in A rather than in the existence of A when
the mental attitude which accompanies the instance of believing
has as its object A itself but not such qualities as A's freedom from
self-contradiction. I am believing in the hundred dollars in my
pocket when, while I am believing, I am aware of these hundred
dollars but not of their being presented without the characteristic
of non-spatiality. And I am believing in the existence of these
hundred dollars when the mental attitude which accompanies my
believing is directed upon those characteristics of these hundred
dollars which determine these hundred dollars to be real.
But can we be believing in A without being aware of such
qualities of A as A's freedom from non-spatiality? Believing oc-
curs, it may be said, only when there are among our objects those
characteristics of the entity that we are considering which deter-
mine that entity to be real. When however the terms "feeling of
acceptance ... or belief" and "feeling of ... rejection or disbelief
were first used in this treatise, 24 our term "existence" had not yet
been fully explained. Had we at that point introduced the ex-
pression: "belief in the existence of A," the reader of that expres-
sion would not have been led to think of those characteristics of
A upon which belief was presented as being directed. He might
have understood "belief and he might have understood: "belief
in A"; but he would not have understood: "belief in the existence
305
of A."
What then was the reader's object when he read: "When I
think of the King of England I seem to have a feeling of accept-
ance or assent or belief. No feeling of hesitation or of disbelief
seems to intervene"? 25 And what seemed to be the reader's object
when he read: "When I press my eye-ball and seem to see a second
rose in the vase on my desk, ... I may become aware of a feeling
of hesitation, a feeling of dissent or rejection or disbelief?" In the
one instance, we hold, there was among his objects my believing
directed upon the King of England; not, using "existence" in
our sense, my believing directed upon the existence of the King
of England. And in the other instance there was among his ob-
jects my disbelieving apparently directed upon a second rose, not
a disbelieving apparently directed upon qualities which had not
yet been pointed out, not a disbelieving apparently directed upon
what in our sense of "existence" would be the existence of the
second rose, provided the second rose existed. Believing in A was
an object, but not believing in the existence of A. An instance of
disbelieving which was as though it were directed upon B was an
object, not an instance of disbelieving which was as though it were
directed upon the existence of B.
Using "existence" in our sense then, believing in A may be an
object without believing in the existence of A being an object
also. But whereas the observer may be aware of a belief in A with-
out being aware of a belief in the existence of A, perhaps the
believer may not be believing in A without also believing in the ex-
istence of A. Perhaps believing in A, although distinguishable from
believing in the existence of A, does not occur without it. It will
be agreed, however, that I was believing and disbelieving before
I was engaged in determining the meaning of our term "exist-
ence." There were entities in which I was believing, that is to say,
when I was not yet aware of those characteristics of my object that
were later to be determined to constitute its existence. Similarly,
there are instances of your believing and instances of your dis-
believingon occasions when you are not definitely aware of the
meaning of our term "existence." Situations exist, that is to say,
where your believing or disbelieving is directed upon certain
entities but not upon what, in our sense of the term "existence,"
is the existence of these entities.
306
Using "existence" in our sense then, believing in an entity need
not be accompanied by believing in the existence of that entity.
And using "existence" in our sense, the entity which exists need
not be an object of belief with respect to each of the thinking
mind-nerve-fibres directed upon it. An entity is unreal, to be sure,
if it is presented as generally discredited. But the entity which is
real may be presented without the characteristic of being generally
discredited and yet not presented with the characteristic of being
generally believed in, or even with the characteristic of being
believed in by some. Just as the entity presented without the char-
acteristic of being a definite object may be real, 26 so may the
entity presented without the characteristic of being an object of
belief. Just as an entity may be real and yet not have any real
mental attitudes definitely directed upon it, so an entity may be
real and yet not be an object of general belief or an object of be-
lief at all.
There are, we have agreed, instances of believing and instances
of disbelieving which are directed upon such entities as the re-
election of President Roosevelt. 27 And there are, let us agree, in-
stances of believing and instances of disbelieving which are di-
rected upon such entities as the existence of the re-election of
President Roosevelt. Using "existence" in our sense of that word,
the subject who is disbelieving in the existence of the re-election
of President Roosevelt, or disbelieving in the existence of the King
of England, is, let us say, "erring" or "in error." And the subject
who is believing in the existence of the re-election of President
Roosevelt, or believing in the existence of the King of England,
is, let us say, "knowing." As we choose to use the words "erring"
and "being in error," a subject is not erring when he is aware of
the existence of an existing entity but is not disbelieving. And
he is not erring when he is disbelieving in an entity which is real
but not disbelieving in the existence of that entity. A subject is
in error, his mental attitude is an instance of erring, when that
mental attitude is an instance of disbelieving in the existence
of an existing entity. And similarly with our terms "having knowl-
edge" or "knowing." A mental attitude is not an instance of know-
ing, as we choose to use the word "knowing," when, although
directed upon the existence of an existing entity, it is not an in-
stance of believing. And it is not an instance of knowing when it
307
is believing in an entity which is real, but is not believing in the
existence of that entity. A subject knows, his mental attitude is
an instance of what we call "knowing" when that mental attitude
is directed upon the existence of an existing entity and is believing
in that existing entity's existence.
There are, then, instances of erring, as, for example, Governor
Landon's mental attitude disbelieving in the existence in our
sense of "existence" of the re-election of President Roosevelt.
And there are instances of knowing as, for example, my mental
attitude believing in the existence of the King of England. But
what shall we say with respect to such alleged objects as the exist-
ence of Santa Glaus or the non-existence of the King of England?
Just as "there is no real non-existence of Socrates," 2S so there is
no real non-existence of the King of England. And just as the
existence of Ivanhoe is unreal and the non-existence of Ivanhoe
unreal, so is an alleged existence of Santa Glaus and an alleged
now-existence of Santa Glaus. The entity that is unreal, however,
is neither an object of belief nor an object of disbelief. 29 Just as
the child who says: "I believe in Santa Glaus" is not believing in
him, so the child who says: "I believe in the existence of Santa
Glaus" or "I believe that Santa Glaus exists" is, it follows, not be-
lieving in Santa Claus's existence. And similarly with instances of
belief and instances of disbelief allegedly directed upon the non-
existence of Santa Glaus or upon the non-existence of the King
of England. If I say: "I disbelieve in the non-existence of the
King of England" or "I disbelieve in the alleged fact that the King
of England does not exist," I may be disbelieving, but my dis-
believing has no non-existence of the King of England as its object.
And if I say: "I believe in the non-existence of Santa Glaus" or
"I believe that there is no Santa Glaus," I may be believing, but
my believing is not directed upon the non-existence of Santa Glaus
which, we have seen, is unreal.
Shall we say, then, that there is no erring when some one says:
"I believe that Santa Glaus exists," no knowing when I say: "I
believe in the alleged fact that Santa Glaus does not exist"? These
are situations, to be sure, in which there is believing, but believ-
ing not directed upon the existence of an existing entity. And yet
they are situations to which the terms "knowledge" and "error"
as commonly used would seem to be applicable. Let us then at-
SOS
tempt to use our terms "knowing" and "erring" so that some
instances of believing or of disbelieving may be called instances
of "knowing" or instances of "erring," even though they are not
directed upon the existence of existing entities.
We attempted to apply the distinction between "truth" and
"falsity," it will be recalled, to facts or judgments. But then, find-
ing no real judgments to be called "false," we returned to a dis-
cussion of true propositions and false propositions. 30 Our present
situation is somewhat similar. We have introduced our terms
"knowing" and "erring" by considering the situation in which a
judgment or alleged judgment is apparently the object of belief
or of disbelief. But finding no false judgments to be believed in or
disbelieved in, we turn to the situation in which believing or dis-
believing is directed upon propositions or upon the truth or falsity
of propositions. Just as we chose to explain our terms "truth" and
"falsity" so that truth or falsity may be the quality not only of a
real judgment but also of a real proposition, so let us choose to
explain our terms "knowing" and "erring" so that a mental atti-
tude which is believing or disbelieving may be knowing or erring,
not only when it is directed upon a real judgment, but also when
it is directed upon the truth or falsity of a real proposition.
The qualities of an individual substance, let us assume, have
the date and position of the substance in which they inhere. The
quality which we call "the existence of Socrates" was, like Socrates
himself, in Athens. The truth of some true proposition which J
am reading is, like that proposition itself, on the page in front of
me. My believing may be directed towards the Socrates who was in
Athens, towards the existence of this Socrates, towards the proposi-
tion "Socrates exists" which is on the page in front of me, or to-
wards the truth of this true proposition. We have chosen to call my
believing an instance of "knowing" when it is directed towards the
existence of Socrates. But let us also call my believing an instance
of knowing when it is directed towards the truth of the true propo-
sition: "Socrates exists" which is on the page in front of me. Let
us call my believing an instance of knowing, that is to say, not
only when it is directed towards the existence of an existing entity,
but also when it is directed towards the truth of a true proposition.
And let us call my disbelieving an instance of "erring," not only
when that in which I disbelieve is the existence of an existing
309
entity, but also when that in which I disbelieve is the truth of a
true proposition.
As we explain our term "knowing," I am knowing when I am
believing in the existence of Socrates. And I am again knowing
when I am believing in the truth of some proposition: "Socrates
exists" which I find before me. But whereas I am knowing when
I am believing in the truth of "Santa Glaus does not exist," I am
not knowing when I seem to be believing in the non-existence of
Santa Glaus. And whereas I am knowing, let us say, when I am
believing in the falsity of "Santa Glaus exists," I am not knowing
when I seem to be disbelieving in the existence of Santa Glaus.
Similarly, as we explain our term "erring," I am erring when I
am disbelieving in the existence of Socrates. And I am again erring
when I am disbelieving in the truth of some sentence reading:
"Socrates exists." On the other hand, I am erring when I am dis-
believing in the truth of "Santa Glaus does not exist," but not
when I seem to be disbelieving in the non-existence of Santa Glaus.
And I am erring when I am disbelieving in the falsity of "Santa
Glaus exists," but not when I seem to be believing in the existence
of Santa Glaus. In short, what we call "knowing" is believing in
the existence of an existing entity, in the truth of a true proposi-
tion, or in the falsity of a false proposition. And what we call
"error" is disbelief directed towards such entities. Finally, when
what I seem to be believing in or disbelieving in is neither the
existence of an existing entity nor the truth of a true proposition
nor the falsity of a false proposition, then, let us say, I am neither
knowing nor erring.
However, "what I find least to my taste," we have already found
Leibniz saying a propos Locke's discussion of truth, "is that you
seek truth in words." 31 And if one finds it distasteful to assign
"truth" a meaning from which it follows that a sentence on this
page is one entity that is true, and an identical sentence on another
page another entity that is true, one may well find it distasteful
to assign "knowledge" a meaning from which it follows that the
truth of the sentence on this page is one object of knowledge
and the truth of the identical sentence on another page another
object of knowledge. But just as the non-existence of Santa Glaus,
being unreal, can not be true and can not pass its truth on to
various identical sentences each reading: "Santa Glaus does not
310
exist/' so this non-existence of Santa Glaus can not be my object of
knowledge either when I am believing in the truth of a sentence
on this page reading: "Santa Glaus does not exist," or when I
am believing in the truth of a sentence on another page reading:
"Santa Glaus does not exist.'* Even though we may be assigning
"knowledge" a meaning at variance with the meaning which
"knowledge" usually has, we choose then to assign "knowledge"
a meaning from which it follows that the truth of this sentence
and the truth of that sentence may be separate objects of knowl-
edge and not entities reflecting an alleged object of knowledge to
which they are alleged both to be related.
If, believing in the truth of some sentence reading: "Santa
Glaus does not exist," I come to believe in the truth of a second
sentence reading: "Santa Glaus does not exist," then, as we use
the term "knowledge," I have come to have a second object of
knowledge. As "knowledge" is commonly used, to be sure, a man
would not be said to increase his knowledge when he comes to
believe in the truth of a second proposition identical with one in
whose truth he already believes. Even as "knowledge" is commonly
used, however, there seems to be a distinction between having
additional objects of knowledge and having more knowledge or
having greater knowledge. As "knowledge" is commonly used, the
thinker who has the greater knowledge, who is the more erudite,
is not he who has the greater number of objects of knowledge, but
he who has the greater number of important objects of knowledge.
Objects of knowledge, that is to say, may be weighted and not
merely added together as equal units. And similarly when "knowl-
edge" has the meaning which we are assigning it. Although I have
come to have an additional object of knowledge when I have come
to believe in the truth of a second proposition reading: "Santa
Glaus does not exist," I may be said not to have increased my
knowledge. Just as, when "knowledge" has the meaning which it
usually has, the thinker who knows how clothing is dyed knows
more than he who knows that his tie is blue, so, when "knowledge"
has the meaning which we are assigning it, the thinker who believes
in the truth of one important proposition may be said to know
more than he who believes in the truth of several identical but
unimportant propositions.
There is the fact in which I am now believing, the true propo-
311
sition in whose truth I am now believing, the false proposition in
whose falsity I am now believing. And there is the object of knowl-
edge of which I was formerly aware and of which I can, when I
choose, again be aware. There is what, according to Locke, 32
"may be called habitual knowledge." There is the object of knowl-
edge such that I "can on a given occasion think of it." 8S Thus
there is a distinction to be made when "knowledge" has its usual
meaning. And there is a similar distinction to be made when
"knowledge" has the meaning which we are assigning it. For it
is one thing to be believing in the existence of an existing entity,
in the truth of a true proposition, or in the falsity of a false propo-
sition. And it is another thing to be able to be believing in the
existence of this entity or in the truth or falsity of this proposition.
There are some respects, however, in which "knowing," as we
use it, is not the "knowing" of ordinary usage. The English verb
"to know," as commonly used, is in some instances synonymous
with "kennen" or "connaitre." But in so far as you are acquainted
with your next-door neighbor, you are not knowing him, in our
sense of "knowing," nor do you have the quality of being able to
know him. The mental attitude which you have, or are able to
have, is a mental attitude directed upon your neighbor rather
than upon your neighbor's existence. You have spoken to him,
he is one of your memories, or you are one of his memories. But
it is not the fact that he exists that is your object and the object
in which you are believing; and it is not the fact that he exists
with the quality of living next door. In so far as you are acquainted
with your neighbor, you do, to be sure, have an object. But you
are not believing in a fact or judgment, in the truth of a true
proposition, or in the falsity of a false proposition.
But what about the situation in which there is believing in the
existence of an existing entity, in the truth of a true proposition,
or in the falsity of a false proposition? I may be believing in the
existence of the Shah of Persia and you may be believing in the
existence of your neighbor and in the fact that he lives next door.
As we have explained our term "knowing," I am knowing and you
are knowing. But whereas you are aware of your neighbor's age,
physiognomy and disposition, the Shah of Persia is not presented
to me with a similar wealth of detail. Whereas the entity in whose
existence you believe is an entity of which you are definitely
312
aware, the entity in whose existence I believe is an entity of which
I am aware only indefinitely. There are those, it is to be pointed
out, who discuss what they call "knowledge of acquaintance/' 34
But in so far as you are believing in the existence of your neighbor
or in the fact that he lives next door, and in so far as I am believing
in the existence of the Shah of Persia, the mental attitudes of each
of us are instances of what we call "knowing/' not instances of
what we call "being acquainted with." We are each knowing,
although in the one situation the entity whose existence is be-
lieved in is a definite object, in the other an indefinite object
It is an entity that is presented to me only indefinitely when I
am believing in the existence of the Shah of Persia. It is an
entity that is presented to me only indefinitely when I say that
I know that there is a Shah of Persia but not who the Shah of
Persia is. And it is an entity that is presented to me only indefi-
nitely when I say that I know that alcohol is but not what it is.
Nevertheless, even though the name of the Shah of Persia is not
an object of mine, when I am believing in the existence of the
Shah of Persia, I am knowing in our sense of "knowing/* And even
though the chemical formula for alcohol is not an object of mine,
I am again knowing when I am believing in the existence of al-
cohol.
Indeed, as we explain "knowing," when I say that I do not
know such and such a fact, I may well be knowing the fact of
which I claim to be ignorant. The fact of which I claim to be
ignorant, that is to say, may be a fact in which I believe, although
not presented with the detail that would make my mental attitude
directed upon it an important instance of knowing. Thus I may
say that I do not know who was the tenth President of the United
States. But my mental attitude need not be without an object;
and I may indeed be knowing. What is presented to me, let us
assume, is some President of the United States, but not his name.
I may be knowing that there was a tenth President and that
he held office at some date near the middle of the nineteenth
century. The tenth President however is not presented to me with
the definiteness with which your neighbor is presented to you. I am
knowing that there was a tenth President; but my object of knowl-
edge is not presented with the definiteness with which your object
of knowledge is presented when you are believing in the existence
313
of your neighbor.
There are, we have agreed, instances of what we call "know-
ing." ** And there are, let us agree, instances of mental attitudes
which reach instances of knowing as their objects. Just as "Des-
cartes' perceiving may be an object both for Descartes and for me"
and just as Laocoon's fearing may be an object both for Laocoon
and for me, 36 so an instance of knowing may be an object both for
the knower and for some other subject. Indeed the subject who is
aware of a given instance of knowing may be believing in the
existence of this instance of knowing. He may in a word be know-
ing that this mental attitude is an instance of knowing.
A knower may be knowing; and he may be knowing* that he is
knowing. But is it possible for one to know without knowing that
he knows? "Whereas it may be agreed that fearing is distinguish-
able from the introspecting of fearing, and that there are real
instances of both, it may be held that there are no instances of
fearing that are not introspected by the fearing subject." 87 And
whereas it may be agreed that there are instances of knowing and
instances of knowing that one is knowing, it may be held that
there are no instances of knowing unaccompanied by instances
of knowing that one is knowing. If, in order to know, I had to
know that I know, then in order to know that I know, I would, it
seems, have to know that I know that I know; and so on, ad infini-
tum. 38 An alleged infinite regress of this sort, however, need not
trouble us. "There are instances, we have agreed, of mental at-
titudes which are not introspected." 39 And there are, let us agree,
instances of knowing which are not objects for the knowing sub-
ject. In order that my knowing may be real, this alleged knowing of
mine can not be presented with the characteristic of being no one's
definite object. But it need not be presented with the character-
istic of being the object of a contemporaneous mental attitude of
mine. Much less need it be presented with the characteristic of
being the object of a contemporaneous mental attitude of mine
which is believing in its existence. Juit as I may be perceiving, re-
membering or fearing, without being aware of my perceiving, of
my remembering, or of my fearing, sb l 1 may be knowing, without
knowing that J am knowing. I xriajHbe knowing in our sense of
*1knowing" without fcnptiriiig tkit I aiii knowing; and I may be
knbivring in our sense of "irioWM^ Without being aware of the
314
meaning which our term "knowing" has. I may be believing in
the existence of some entity, that is to say, and yet not be believing
in the existence of the believing mental attitude of mine which is
directed upon the existence of that entity. And I may be believing
in the existence of some entity, without being definitely aware of
the fact that, as we explain our term "knowing," a mental attitude
is an instance of knowing if it is believing in the existence of an
existing entity, in the truth of a true proposition, or in the falsity
of a false proposition.
As we are using the terms "existence," "truth," and "knowl-
edge," ccftain entities exist or are real and certain alleged entities
are unreal; real judgments are true and real propositions true or
false; and certain mental attitudes which are believing or disbe-
lieving are knowing or erring. We chose to introduce our term
"truth" after explaining our term "existence" and have chosen to
introduce our term "knowledge" after explaining our terms "exist-
ence" and "truth." Indeed in explaining our term "truth" we have
presupposed an understanding of our term "existence"; and in ex-
plaining our term "knowledge" we have presupposed an under-
standing of our terms "existence" and "truth." We have, for
example, suggested that our proposition: "Socrates exists" is true,
in our sense of "truth," if Socrates exists in our sense of "exist-
ence." 40 And we have suggested that my mental attitude believing
in the truth of the proposition: "Socrates exists" is an instance of
knowing, in our sense of "knowing," if "Socrates exists" is true in
our sense of "truth." 41
There are those however who hold that truth is prior to reality, 42
those who, if they believed that their terms "truth" and "exist-
ence" required explanation, would choose to explain their term
"existence" by referring back to what they call "truth/* And there
may be those who somewhat similarly would prefer to explain
"truth" or "existence" by referring back to what they call "knowl-
edge." One may choose to say that an entity exists if it has been
determined that the proposition in which the assertion of its exist-
ence has been expressed is true. And one may choose to say that,
given a mental attitude or state of mind which is an instance of
knowledge, the object in which that mental attitude believes or
to which that state of mind refers is real, and the proposition in
which that belief is expressed true. There were no logical reasons
315
which compelled us "to begin with a discussion of 'reality' and
to explain 'truth* in terms of reality." 4S And there are no logical
reasons which compel us, on the one hand, to presuppose an under-
standing of our terms "existence" and "truth" when we explain
our term "knowledge" and which, on the other hand, prevented us
from presupposing an understanding of our term "knowledge"
when we explained our terms "existence" and "truth." Just how-
ever as something analogous to the appendix to our third chapter,
some enumeration of propositions or judgments which are true,
would be called for as a partial explanation of our term "truth,"
were we to explain, first "truth," and then "reality V 4 so, we
hold, there would be called for, as a partial explanation of our
term "knowledge," some enumeration of the mental attitudes
which are knowing, were we to explain, first "knowing," and then
"existence" and "truth."
As we use the terms "existence," "truth" and "knowledge,"
their meanings are interrelated. And as "existence," "truth" and
"knowledge" are generally used, their meanings seem likewise to
be interrelated. We have chosen to explain, first our term "exist-
ence," then our term "truth," then our term "knowledge." But
whatever distinguishes what we call "real" from what we call "un-
real" conies into play in distinguishing what we call "true" from
what we call "false," and comes into play in distinguishing what
we call "knowledge" from what we call "error." So it may be with
respect to some other writers when it is a matter of distinguishing
what they call "real" from what they call "unreal," what they call
"true" from what they call "false," what they call "knowledge"
from what they call "error." Indeed, when some distinction is
held to depend on the presence or absence of A, it may be diffi-
cult to tell whether the presence or absence of A is being held
primarily to distinguish the real from the unreal and only in-
directly to distinguish the true from the false and knowledge
from error; whether the presence or absence of A is being held
primarily to distinguish the true from the false and only indi-
rectly to distinguish the real from the unreal and knowledge
from error; or whether it is being held primarily to distinguish
knowledge from error and only indirectly to distinguish the
real from the unreal and the true from the false.
Thus one may point to the clear and distinct on "the one hand,
316
to the obscure or confused on the other. Or one may point to the
coherent on the one hand, to the incoherent on the other. It may
be intelligible entities that are held to be presented as clear and
distinct, sensible entities that are held to be presented as obscure
or confused. The distinction between the clear and distinct and the
obscure or confused may thus be held to be applicable to the uni-
verse of subsistents which we dichotomize into the real and the un-
real. 45 Primary qualities to which numbers apply, it may for ex-
ample be said, are real; whatever appears as merely sensible, it
may be said, is unreal. 46 And similarly with the distinction between
the coherent and the incoherent. Whatever coheres with the en-
tities of which we are usually aware, it may be said, is real. And
whatever appears as not coherent with the entities of which we are
usually aware may be said to be unreal, 47 Propositions may then be
said to be true in so far as they refer to entities which are clear and
distinct or to entities which cohere with other real entities in the
world of existents. And mental attitudes may be said to be in-
stances of knowing in so far as the alleged object of knowledge, be-
ing clear and distinct, or cohering with other objects, is real.
But these distinctions between the clear and distinct and the
obscure or confused and between the coherent and the incoherent
may be held to have their primary use in distinguishing the true
from the false. It may be alleged passive ideas, alleged private men-
tal contents, which are held to be clear and distinct or obscure or
confused. It may be propositions which are held to be consistent or
inconsistent with one another. Or it may be alleged entities called
"judgments." Entities may then be said to be real in so far as the
ideas alleged to refer to them are clear and distinct, or in so far as
the ideas alleged to refer to them cohere with other ideas in a co-
herent system of mental contents. Or entities may be said to be
real in so far as the judgments alleged to refer to them, being co-
herent, or being clear and distinct, are true.
Finally, as we have already noted, "one may choose to say that,
given a mental attitude . . . which is an instance of knowledge, the
object in which that mental attitude believes ... is real, and the
proposition in which that belief is expressed true." 48 One may say,
for example, that, the feeling of certainty which is intermingled
with certain mental attitudes is a mark of their clarity. One may
say that mental attitudes which are dear and distinct, in the sense
S17
that they are intermingled with mental attitudes which are not
only instances of believing but instances of being certain, are
mental attitudes which are instances of knowing. And one may
subsequently say that the objects of thinking mind-nerve-fibres
which are thus undisturbed by doubt are objects which are reaL
When we began to assign a meaning to our term "existence,"
various alternative meanings were before us from which to make
our selection. And whereas there were no logical grounds which
forced us to adopt one universal negative existential proposition
and to reject another, there were, we found, "grounds of ex-
pediency" * 9 which permitted us to prefer one universal negative
existential proposition to another. Similarly when we began to
assign a meaning to our term "truth" and when we began to
assign a meaning to our term "knowledge." We might have chosen
to explain "truth" without referring back to what we call "exist-
ence." And we might have chosen to explain "knowledge" with-
out referring back to existence and truth.
Having chosen, however, to explain "truth" in terms of reality,
and "knowledge" in terms of reality and truth, certain alternative
explanations could no longer be adopted. If the distinction be-
tween what we call "true" and what we call "false" was to apply
only to entities which are real in our sense of "reality," we could
not explain our terms "truth" and "falsity" so that truth and
falsity characterize alleged judgments alleged to have their "habi-
tat in a world of objective but disembodied entities." 50 Nor could
we explain our terms "truth" and "falsity" so that alleged private
ideas are true or false. For ideas, alleged to be immediate objects,
do not exist, in our sense of "existence," when they are presented
as non-spatial, as not spatially related to contemporaneous ulti-
mate objects, as not objetts for more than one subject, or as ad-
jacent to thinking itself. 51
Explaining our term "existence" as we have, nevertheless, we
mi^ht still have chosen to introduce the term "truth" by saying
that real propositions are true if they are members of a large
system of real propositions, members of a system none of the mem-
bers df which contradict one another. We might have chosen to
u*&D<lue die term "knowledge" by saying that real mental atti-
tfadfes are instances of kndwitig if they cohere with other real
mental attitudes in parts of the same' mind-person. Or we might
318
have chosen to introduce the term ''knowledge" by saying that
real mental attitudes are instances of knowing if they are inter-
mingled with instances of the feeling of being certain.
It is on what we have called "grounds of expediency 1 ' that we
turn away from certainty and coherence in explaining our terms
"truth" and "knowledge." For it would not be in accord with
ordinary usage to assign "knowledge" a signification from which it
would follow that there is no knowing without being certain, no
being certain without knowing. As we have chosen to explain our
term "knowledge// and, it seems, as "knowledge" is commonly
used, there may be knowing without there being a feeling of being
certain and there may be a feeling of being certain without the
alleged object being real or true. Nor does ''coherence' 9 seem to
have a meaning that is readily understood. To say merely that real
propositions are true in so far as they cohere would not be to be
pointing out certain propositions which do not appear self-contra-
dictory as definitely true and certain propositions which do not
appear self-contradictory as definitely fake. And to say merely
that real mental attitudes are instances of knowing in so far as
they cohere would not be to be pointing out certain mental atti-
tudes which inhere in parts of my mind-person as instances of
knowing and certain mental attitudes which inhere in parts
of my mind-person as instances of erring. What indeed is co-
herence? We have chosen to use the term "coherence" in con-
nection with mental attitudes inhering in thinking substances
which are interrelated and form a system- We have chosen to
use this term, for example, in connection with mental attitudes
which inhere in parts of one mind-person. 52 And using "coher-
ence" in this sense, we find that not all cohering mental atti-
tudes are instances of what is commonly called "knowing." We
find that mental attitudes which are instances of what seems com-
monly to be called "erring/' and mental attitudes which are in-
stances of what seems commonly to be called "knowing," cohere in
parts of the same mind-person. And so we choose not to assign our
term "knowing" a meaning from which it would follow that men-
tal attitudes are instances of knowing in so far as they cohere in
our sense of "coherence"; we choose rather to explain our term
"knowing" by saying that mental attitudes are instances of
ing if they are instances of believing in the existence
919
entities, in the truth of true propositions or in the falsity of false
propositions.
There is another set of proposals that calls for comment in con-
nection with our discussion of the meanings to be assigned "knowl-
edge" and "truth." In some of the writings of William James it is
suggested that the knowing subject has a private idea which corre-
sponds to the public object of knowledge. And it is suggested that,
in some later experience, the subject, acting upon his belief, finds
his private idea merging with the public object. It is as though
I in America had a picture of Vesuvius, carried it with me to
Naples, and there found my picture becoming Vesuvius itself.
But since private ideas are unreal, there is no real relational situa-
tion having as its terms the private idea which I am alleged to
have while in America and the Vesuvius which is alleged to be a
public object in Italy. What is real in addition to Vesuvius, when I
in America think about Vesuvius, is some mind-nerve-fibre within
my body with what we call a "mental attitude" and with what
others may call an "idea." And when I arrive in Naples and look
at Vesuvius there is likewise some quality of my body's, or of my
mind-nerve-fibre's, by virtue of which Vesuvius is my object rather
than some one's else. The thinking which is within my body in
America, and Vesuvius in Italy, can hardly be regarded as earlier
and later phases of the same enduring entity. What are more
readily regarded as inhering in parts of the same enduring entity
are my thinking while I am in America and my looking or perceiv-
ing when I am in Naples.
The proposal which we are examining, it is also to be pointed
out, seems to attribute an unquestioned validity to the experience
which I have when I look at Vesuvius from Naples. Thi$ experi-
ence is regarded, it would seem, as involving knowledge or truth or
reality par excellence. And the mental attitude which I have in
America is called "knowing," or the idea which I have in America
is called "true," in so far as it matches up with the experience
which I am to have in Naples. But although my object seems to be
in finont of me when I am in Naples, I may, we hold, be pseudo-
perceiving and not perceiving, As we use the term "reality" and as
this term is commonly used, the entity which is presented as being
before one, and presented as being presented with the definiteness
which percepts are presented, seed not be real. If while in
20
Naples I take smoke from some other source to be smoke from
Vesuvius, then the mental attitude which I have in America, and
which matches up with the mental attitude which I am to have in
Naples, would not commonly be called an instance of knowing.
Hence if the pragmatist is to assign "truth" and "knowledge" mean-
ings not completely out of accord with common usage, he must, it
would seem, say that a mental attitude is an instance of knowing or
an idea true, not if it matches up with a mental attitude or idea
which seems to be directed upon, or seems to correspond with, an
ultimate object which is perceived; he must say that a mental
attitude is an instance of knowing, or an idea true, if it matches
up with a mental attitude which is really perceiving. He must, it
would seem, distinguish perceiving from pseudo-perceiving, real
percepts from alleged percepts. As a part of the explanation which
explains his term "knowledge," he is thus called on, it would seem,
to distinguish the real from the unreal; hence, to explain his term
"real." But if he were to explain his term "real," he might, we
suggest, find it unnecessary to refer to a comparison of earlier
experiences with later experiences in explaining either his term
"truth" or his term "knowledge."
A thinker may be said to know if, acting on his belief, he will
later perceive and know. Or a thinker may be said to know if,
acting on his belief, he will later keep out of trouble. I may be
said to be in error if, acting on my belief, I am led into a situation
in which I am puzzled and forced to revise my beliefs. Or I may
be said to be in error if, acting on my belief, I make responses
which are inappropriate, enter into situations in which I do not
prosper. The term "knowing" may be explained by referring to
a relational situation involving, on the one hand, the knowing
subject and, on the other hand, a later situation in which that
subject finds himself, a later situation characterized by mental
stability or happiness or by biological adjustment and success. And
the term "erring" may be explained by referring to a relational
situation involving, on the one hand, the erring subject and, on
the other hand, a later situation in which there is mental puzzle-
ment or unhappiness or biological maladjustment and failure.
But if I see a missile coining towards me and try unsuccessfully
to avoid it, my maladjustment would not commonly be said to
mark my earlier mental attitudes directed upon the missile as
321
erroneous. And mental puzzlement, it would seem, points back
to curiosity and doubt as frequently as it points back to what is
commonly called "error." Which, moreover, is the previous mental
attitude that is being marked out as an instance of knowing or
erring? A situation in which there is adjustment and success or
maladjustment and failure points back to a series of successive
mental attitudes in the previous history of the adjusted or malad-
justed subject. And so the terms "knowing" and "erring" are not
assigned definite meanings unless the explanations, through which
it is sought to explain these terms, enable us to determine which
mental attitude in the previous history of the adjusted individual
is being marked out as an instance of what is being called "know-
ing" and which mental attitude in the previous history of the
maladjusted individual is being marked out as an instance of
what is being called "erring/*
We choose then not to explain our terms "knowing" and "err-
ing" by comparing some earlier mental attitude with some later
situation in which the knowing or erring subject is to find him-
self. But why, we ask, have such explanations been attempted?
They may be traced back, it would seem, to a desire not to leave
unexamined the alleged correspondence between alleged ideas
and real ultimate objects, the relation between mental attitudes
which are instances of knowing and the real objects of knowledge
upon which these mental attitudes are directed. But whatever
"correspondence" may mean, if we are to understand "correspond-
ence with reality," we must, we hold, understand "reality," must be
able to distinguish the real from the unreal. And if we are to under-
stand: "being directed upon what are really objects of knowledge,"
we must again be able to distinguish the real from the unreal. With
our term "reality" explained as we have explained it, we have, we
hold, made it clear what it is with which instances of knowing and
true propositions must match or correspond or be related. Using
"existence" in our sense, there exist, to be sure, no ideas which are
non-spatial or which are intra-cranial, but not mental attitudes.
Hence there is no correspondence between such ideas and ultimate
objects, There may however be said to be a correspondence be-
tween reality and what we call "truth," a correspondence which
is not indefinite and has not been left unexamined.
As we explain our term "truth," truth corresponds with reality in
322
the definite sense that propositions are true or false according as
certain entities represented, or alleged to be represented, by the
terms of those propositions are real or unreal. 53 And as we explain
our term "knowledge," mental attitudes which are instances of
knowing match up with reality and truth in the definite sense that
the subject who knows is believing in the existence of existing enti-
ties, in the truth of true propositions or in the falsity of false propo-
sitions. With the propositions which explain our term "reality" as
a foundation, we have, we hold, assigned our terms "truth" and
"knowledge" meanings which are rather definite and precise. Be-
ing in a position to determine whether the alleged object of knowl-
edge is real or unreal, true or false, we are in a position to deter-
mine whether the subject alleged to be believing or disbelieving
in that alleged object of knowledge is knowing or erring. Thus
in order that "knowing" and "erring" may be assigned definite
meanings, we need not assign them meanings which involve a
comparison between the mental attitudes of the knowing subject
and later situations in which that subject is to find himself. In
so far as the meanings of our terms "knowing" and "erring"
enable us to distinguish knowing from erring, there is no occasion,
we hold, to assign these terms alternative meanings in an effort to
be in a position to distinguish knowledge from error.
Summary
Along with mental attitudes which are instances of perceiv-
ing, remembering and conceiving, there are mental attitudes
which are instances of what we call "feeling." Among them are
instances of fearing, of being in love, of being disgusted. These
instances of feeling can exist without the subject who feels being
aware of them. But he can be aware of them, in which case the
situation resembles that in which a subject is aware of the fact
that he is perceiving.
Where there is error, the subject has a mental attitude but no
object. Somewhat similarly, when one fears or hopes for some-
thing that has no reality, the feeling exists but it has no object.
Just as instances of fearing, of hating and of hoping are in-
stances of feeling, so are instances of believing. Believing in an
323
entity is distinguished from believing in the existence of that
entity. This leads to a definition defining knowledge and error.
Knowing is believing in the existence of an existing entity, in
the truth of a true proposition or in the falsity of a false propo-
sition. Being in error is disbelieving in the existence of an exist-
ing entity, in the truth of a true proposition or in the falsity of
a false proposition.
Knowing that a thing is is often distinguished from knowing what
a thing is. As we define knowing, these entities are also to be
distinguished, but perhaps differently.
At this point our terms "reality/* "truth" and "knowledge"
have all been explained. These terms are so interrelated, both in
our terminology and as generally used, that what are put forward
as criteria of existence may be put forward as criteria of truth or
criteria of knowledge. Hence it is appropriate at this point to dis-
cuss these alleged criteria in relation to all three. Included is a
discussion of pragmatism.
324
Chapter XI
SPATIAL RELATIONS AMONG CONTEMPORANEOUS
ENTITIES
Let us consider what is alleged to be a baseball diamond, or,
rather, what is alleged to be an instantaneous phase of a baseball
diamond. There appears, let us say, a phase of the pitcher which
is presented as in the pitcher's box having just hurled the ball.
There appears, let us say, a phase of the batter which is presented
as at the plate about to swing at the ball. And there appears, let
us say, a phase of the catcher which is presented as behind the
plate prepared to catch the ball. Among our subsistents there are
thus instantaneous phases of pitcher, batter and catcher which
are alleged to be substances. But among our subsistents there is
also the quality of being contemporaneous with a phase of the
batter, a quality which is alleged to inhere in the phase of the
pitcher which we are considering and another instance of which
is likewise alleged to inhere in the phase of the catcher which we
are considering. Also there is among our subsistents a quality
which is alleged to inhere in the pitcher, the quality, namely, of
being out-there-in-front with respect to the batter; and there is
the quality of being a short distance behind with respect to the
batter, a quality alleged to inhere in the catcher.
We began Chapter Six of this treatise by asking whether Des-
cartes, as he paced up and down his stove-heated room, was really
thinking. And we begin this chapter by asking whether the phase
of the pitcher which we are considering was really out-there-in-
front with respect to a phase of the batter contemporaneous with
him; and by asking whether the phase of the catcher which we
are considering was really a short distance behind. Let us recall,
325
however, that while we were asking whether or not Descartes was
thinking, we agreed to take it for granted that Descartes had a
body and that there was a stove-heated room. Otherwise, we held, 1
''we should find ourselves confronted by a host of questions all
clamoring at once for solution and all having to be answered
before the reality of Descartes' thinking could be acknowledged."
Similarly let us at this point take it for granted that the phases
of pitcher, batter and catcher which we are considering are real
substances and really contemporaneous, or present, with respect
to one another. It may, to be sure, be questioned whether alleged
substances can be real and can have real qualities inhering in
them. And it may be questioned whether alleged instantaneous
phases of substances can themselves be real substances and can,
without reference to bodies from which they are measured, be
really contemporaneous with one another. But to consider such
questions at this point would complicate the subject-matter of
this chapter and would delay us in coming to close quarters with
such alleged entities as our pitcher's being out-there-in-front with
respect to a contemporaneous phase of the batter. Just as "such
candidates for existence as the thinking of Descartes 1 that is pre-
sented as having a vehicle and a setting can be discussed in fewer
words and in a less complicated fashion when, instead of regard-
ing thinking, vehicle and setting as all mere subsistents, we accept
the premise that vehicle and setting are real," 2 so such candidates
for existence as our pitcher's alleged quality of being out-there-
in-front with respect to a contemporaneous phase of the batter
can be discussed in fewer words and in a less complicated fashion
when we take it for granted that a given instantaneous phase of
the pitcher is a real substance and take it for granted that it has
the real quality of being contemporaneous with a real instantane-
ous phase of the batter. Instantaneous phases of pitcher, batter
and catcher, presented as substances and simultaneity with a
phase of the batter, presented as a quality of our phase of the
pitcher and as a quality of our phase of the catcher these entities
are all presented without any of the characteristics that would
mark them out as unreal; and they are all listed as real in the
appendix to Chapter Three. At this point, then, we hold that
our instantaneous phase of the pitcher is real and really contem-
poraneous, or present, with respect to a phase of the batter. And
326
we ask whether this instantaneous phase of the pitcher is also
out-there-in-front with respect to this phase of the batter. Our
instantaneous phase of the catcher is, we hold, real and really
contemporaneous, or present, with respect to a phase of the batter.
But is it also a-short-distance-behind with respect to this phase
of the batter?
Now we may say at once that our phase of the pitcher, presented
as having some other position with respect to the contemporane-
ous batter, is presented as generally discredited and is unreal. And
we may say that our phase of the pitcher presented as having no
position with respect to the contemporaneous batter is likewise
unreal. For as we have explained our term "reality," that sub-
sistent is unreal "which appears as lacking position with respect
to an entity that appears real and with respect to which it also
appears present." 3 But whereas our phase of the pitcher is unreal
if it is presented as having no position with respect to the con-
temporaneous batter, the phase of the pitcher which is real need
not be a phase which is presented as having position with respect
to the contemporaneous batter. The phase of the pitcher which
is real may be a phase of the pitcher presented without the char-
acteristic of having position with respect to the batter and without
the characteristic of having no position with respect to the batter.
The phase of the pitcher which is real, that is to say, may have
neither the real quality of having no position with respect to the
contemporaneous batter nor the real quality of being out-there-
in-front with respect to him. For upon examination the pitcher's
alleged quality of being out-there-in-front with respect to the
contemporaneous batter may reveal itself as unreal; just as the
pitcher's alleged quality of having no position with respect to this
batter is unreal.
Let us suppose that the pitcher is out-there-in-front with respect
to the contemporaneous batter; and let us suppose that he is at
the source of motions which later reach some spectator in the
grandstand, leading that spectator to be aware of the pitcher.
Now, whereas the pitcher and his alleged quality of being out-
there-in-front with respect to the batter may be at the source of
motions leading to the spectator's mental attitude, neither the
pitcher as a substance nor his alleged quality of being out-there-
in-front with respect to the batter, it may be said, are, in a strict
327
s<3ise of "cause/* causes of the spectator's mental attitude. 4 The
pitcher's alleged quality of being out-there-in-front with respect to
the batter, that is to say, may not be an element at the source such
that, without it, the spectator would not have the mental attitudes
he has. Moreover, the pitcher's alleged quality of being out-there-
in-front with respect to the batter has, it may be said, no special
channel open to it whereby it brings about the spectator's mental
attitudes. The spectator, it may be pointed out, may hear the
pitcher's voice, see the pitcher's gestures or his white uniform;
but there is no line of communication, it may be said, through
which the pitcher's alleged quality of being-out-there-in-front
with respect to the batter could affect the spectator's thinking.
There is no more a line of communication, it may be said, to the
spectator from the pitcher's alleged quality of being out-there-in-
front than there is to me from the alleged man on my ceiling.
Just as the mental attitude of mine, apparently directed upon the
man on my ceiling, is an instance of thinking that is without a
real object rather than an instance of perceiving, so, it may be
said, is the spectator's mental attitude apparently directed upon
the pitcher's quality of being out-there-in-front with respect to the
batter. Just as there is no real man on my ceiling, so, it may be
said, the pitcher has no real quality of being out-there-in-front
with respect to the batter,
As we have explained our term "reality," however, a subsistent
may be real when it is presented as at the source of motions lead-
ing to a given mental attitude, but presented as not a sine qua non
with respect to that mental attitude. And a subsistent may like-
wise be real when it is presented as an entity such that there is
no special channel through which it affects the mental attitude
apparently directed upon it. As we have explained our term
"reality," an entity is unreal if it is presented as generally dis-
credited. Thus the man on my ceiling, presented as having no
special channel through which to affect the mental attitude of
mine apparently directed upon him, since we also find this alleged
man presented as generally discredited, is unreal. But there also
subsists an other-sideof-the-moon which is presented as having no
special channel through which to affect the mental attitude of
yours apparently directed upon it. And this other-side-of-the-
moon is not presented as generally discredited and is, we hold,
328
real. The other side of the moon Is real, even though it is an
inferred object with respect to the mental attitude which you
direct upon it. 5 The Emperor's piety was real even though it
should be true that, in a strict sense of "cause," it was not the
Emperor's piety, but some other quality of the Emperor's, that
caused Descartes' thinking. 6 And the pitcher's alleged quality of
being out-there-in-front with respect to the batter may be real,
even though it has no special channel through which to affect the
spectator apparently aware of it.
But let us consider the pitcher's alleged quality of being out-
there-in-front, not as being at the source of motions which affect
a spectator in the grandstand, but as at the source of motions
which affect the batter. It is, let us agree, a phase of the pitcher
which is slightly past which is at the source of motions leading to
the present batter's mental attitudes. If then the present batter
seems to be aware of the present pitcher as being out-there-in-
front with respect to him, his object, if real, is an inferred object
and not an object which is at the source of motions affecting him.
In seeming to be aware of the phase of the pitcher contemporane-
ous with him as being out-there-in-front with respect to him, the
batter's alleged object may, to be sure, be real. For just as to-
morrow's sunrise is real even though it is an inferred object for
the mental attitude which I today direct upon it/ so the present
phase of the pitcher may really have the quality of being out-
there-in-front with respect to the present batter, even though it is
presented as an inferred object with respect to the present batter's
thinking.
But how does the present batter come to be aware of the pres-
ent pitcher as being out-there-in-front with respect to him? He is,
to be sure, affected by a past phase of the pitcher. But the past
pitcher's quality of being out-there-in-front, it may be said, is not
an entity from which the present pitcher's quality of being out-
there-in-front can be inferred. On the contrary, it may be said,
the past pitcher's quality of being out-there-in-front must itself be
inferred from the fact that the present phase of the pitcher is
out-there-in-front. Primarily, it may be held, I have position only
with respect to present entities. I have position with respect to
some past entitjf only by having position with respect to some
present entity which is in the very place in which that past entity
329
was. 8 Thus the spatial relation seems in the first instance to be a
relation involving terms having identical dates, the causal rela-
tion one involving terms having different dates. If we are to con-
clude that a past phase of the pitcher has not only affected the
present batter but was also out-there-in-front with respect to him,
we must already, it appears, have accepted the fact that the pres-
ent phase of the pitcher is out-there-in-front. On the other hand,
the present batter infers the present pitcher's quality of being out-
there-in-front with respect to him, only, it would seem, as a conse-
quence of being affected by the past pitcher's quality of being out-
there-in-front. It is puzzling "that my dog's behavior, unaffected
by a future phase of the ball" 9 that I throw, is nevertheless
"adapted to the ball that is about to fall to the ground some dis-
tance away/' 10 It is puzzling that my mental attitude reaches to-
morrow's sunrise as its object when the entity which has affected it
is a past phase of the sun. 11 And it is puzzling that the batter is
aware of the present pitcher's quality of being out-there-in-front
with respect to him when, to accept the fact that the past pitcher
who has affected him is out-there-in-front, he must already, it
would seem, have accepted the fact that the present pitcher is out-
there-in-front. "Such bewilderment as there may be, however, does
not imply that my dog's behavior, presented as adapted to a future
phase of the ball, is presented as generally discredited and is un-
real"; it does not imply that my mental attitude is not really aware
of tomorrow's sunrise; and it does not imply that the present bat-
ter has no real object when he seems to be aware of the present
pitcher as being out-there-in-front with respect to him.
So far as we have yet seen, the pitcher's alleged quality of being
out-there-in-front with respect to a contemporaneous phase of the
batter need not be unreal. But no entity is real, we have said,
which "appears with the characteristic of having only a very inde-
finite position with respect to an entity which appears real and
with respect to which it appears present." 12 There subsists, for
example, the phase of the Cosmos which is alleged to be present
with respect to the batter. This subsistent appears with the char-
acteristic of having only a very indefinite position with respect
to the real and allegedly contemporaneous batter. Hence both
this Cosmos and its alleged position are unreal. But being out-
there-in-front, although not so definite a position as being over
330
there where a certain spot is, is not, we hold, an indefinite posi-
tion. Being out-there-in-front with respect to the batter who ap-
pears real and with respect to whom the pitcher is present this
alleged quality of the pitcher appears neither indefinite in position
nor self-contradictory, neither generally discredited nor undatable.
It is, we find, enumerated in our list of real entities. In brief, the
pitcher who is real has the real quality of being out-there-in-front
with respect to the batter with respect to whom he is present.
Similarly, keeping to the baseball players already mentioned, the
catcher is a short distance behind with respect to the batter with
respect to whom he is present and the pitcher out-there-in-front
with respect to the catcher with respect to whom he is present.
Consider now the path from pitcher's mound to home plate. It
is, let us agree, a real substance. It is present with respect to the
catcher. And it appears with the characteristic of being-out-there-
in-front with respect to the catcher with respect to whom it is
present. To be sure, the position with which it appears with re-
spect to the catcher is less definite than the position with which
the pitcher appears with respect to the catcher. The one, we
might say, appears away out in front, the other more or less out
in front. But if we call the pitcher who has no punctual position
real, if we call the pitcher and his position with respect to the
catcher real, we may, it would seem, call the path real and its
position with respect to the catcher. And as the position of the
path with respect to the catcher is real, so is the position of the
distance between pitcher and batter. For as we use the term "dis-
tance," a distance is a certain line or path with the emphasis on
the termini. The baseball diamond as a whole has a less definite
position with respect to the catcher with respect to whom it is
present than has the pitcher. And the distance between pitcher
and batter has a less definite position than its termini. But the
difference in definiteness is one of degree. If only points were
real, neither pitcher nor distance nor diamond would be real. But
if entities may be real provided only that their alleged positions
are not too indefinite, distances may be real along with their
termini and baseball diamonds along with the entities alleged to
be included within them. Distances and baseball diamonds may
be real; and they may have real positions with respect to the
catcher contemporaneous with them.
331
Assuming then that the catcher appears real and that pitcher,
path and diamond all appear 'out-in-front' and present with re-
spect to him, pitcher, path and diamond may all be real despite
the difference in the degree of definiteness with which they are
located with respect to the catcher. But if the catcher is presented
as unreal, if pitcher, path or diamond appears out in front only
with respect to unreal entities with respect, for example, to the
catcher of some juvenile romance or with respect to the private
idea of a catcher which some subject is alleged to have then it is
not true that pitcher, path and diamond may all be real. For, as
we have determined the significations of our terms "real" and
"unreal/* those entities are unreal which appear as having no
position with respect to an entity which appears real. 13 And if
there is some entity which appears real, and if pitcher, path or
diamond appear as having no position with respect to it but only
with respect to private ideas or characters in fiction, then the
pitchers and diamonds that thus appear are unreal. If, however,
we are considering a situation in which the catcher appears real
and pitcher, path and diamond all appear out-in-front with respect
to him, then, our conclusion is, the indefiniteness with which the
diamond is located does not bar it from reality.
But what about the entity which appears more definitely lo-
cated than the diamond, the path, or even the pitcher? What
about the position which may be alleged to inhere in the pitcher's
center of gravity? Unlike pitcher, path or diamond, the position of
such a center of gravity with respect to the catcher with whom it
appears present subsists as a definite position, a punctual position.
Yet neither this center of gravity which subsists as a substance, a
point, nor its definite position which subsists as a quality of that
substance, appears as a source from which motions flow to the
mental attitudes apparently directed upon them. A point, that
i$ to say, appears as a limit never reached by division, an entity
that I never succeed in seeing. Yet even if we do not dissect the
pitdbter to place his center of gravity before us and even if this
center of gravity and its definite punctual position do not appear
as sources from which motions flow to the mental attitudes ap-
parently directed upon them, nevertheless both this center of
giavity and its position with respect to the catcher may, we hold,
be real. For the pitcher's center of gravity which appears as hav-
ing a definite position with respect to the catcher does not appear
as having no position; it does not appear as non-temporal; and it
does not appear as generally discredited. In short, both it and its
punctual position with respect to the catcher appear without any
of the characteristics which would mark them as unreal. They are,
we find, real.
The pitcher's center of gravity appearing as a point, a definitely
located substance, is a subsistent which we find real. We may of
course use the word "point" to represent a group of volumes
within volumes, a group of alleged percepts rather than a limit
which is not itself a percept. And we may call "the pitcher's cen-
ter of gravity" a collection of parts of the pitcher's body that are
within parts of the pitcher's body. When "points, straight lines
and areas are all defined as series of converging volumes," points
may be real; and familiar geometrical propositions using the word
"point" may be true. 14 But "point" need not be assigned a signifi-
cation of this sort to represent a real entity. Some individual sub-
stances having definite positions with respect to real contempo-
raneous entities are real. And when such substances are called
"points," some alleged points are real and their punctual positions
real.
Just as the pitcher's center of gravity and its definite position
with respect to the real contemporaneous catcher are, we hold,
real, so are the North Pole and its position. And just as these
points and their positions are real, so are the equator and its
position. A phase of the equator appears present and below the
horizon; but the position with which it appears is an indefinite
one, since the part of the equator that lies in Ecuador is in a
somewhat different direction from the part of it that lies in
Sumatra. Its position is below the horizon and more or less distant
just as the path from pitcher to batter is out there in front, not
due north, and is more or less distant, not an exact distance away.
Neither the equator nor any part of it appears as an entity that
is seen. And yet just as the North Pole, a substance with a definite
position, is real, so is the equator, a substance without breadth, a
substance that is a line. For, like the pitcher, the path, and the
pitcher's center of gravity, the present phase of the equator ap-
pears spatial, free from self-contradiction, not generally discred-
ited, and is enumerated in our list of real entities.
333
Some alleged points with their
definite positions are real, the
pitcher with his less definite po-
sition is real, and some lines
with their positions are real. In
the diagram on this page, there
is an invisible point O, a sub-
stance with a definite position,
within the region in which the
two broad marks XX' and YY'
cross each other; and there is a
real line without thickness or
breadth within the broad, visible
and undulating mark PP'. This
line is not non-spatial. It has
i roughly the same position with
* respect to O that the printed
mark PP' has, only a more defi-
nite position. It is perhaps without color or weight, but appears
neither self-contradictory nor generally discredited. It is real as
the equator is real and its position with respect to the contempor-
aneous phase of O real as the position of the equator with respect
to the contemporaneous phase of the catcher is real.
There is a real point P, a real point P', and a real point Q that
lies between them. Their positions with respect to O are definite
positions, whereas the position of the line PP' is indefinite. Yet
they are parts of PP' in that their positions are included within
that of the line on which they are. Q is a real point between P
and P', R a real point between P and Q, S a real point between
P and R. Within each dot that we make on the undulating mark
PP' there is a substance with a definite position with respect to
O, there is a point, that is to say, whose position is included with-
in that of the breadth-less line PP'. But since the dot that we
make is not the point but merely indicates the point's position,
the number of real points on the line PP' may not be limited to
the number of dots that we make.
If we ask ourselves how many points, not dots, there are on
the line PF, the answer that is most likely to occur to us is that
the number is infinite. It is, however, not easy to explain "infinite
number" satisfactorily. If the number of points on our line is
334
infinite, then not all of these points ate points that we shall dis-
cover. Yet some finite numbers, it may be held, elude enumeration
also; the points on our line, it may be held, are finite in number,
and yet so many that not all of them will ever be discovered. It is
not the existence of points that will not be discovered that implies
the existence of an infinite number of points, but the existence
of points that can not be discovered during any finite duration,
however long it may last. The number of points on our line is
infinite if, and only if, it would require an infinite duration to
discover them all. But when we describe an infinite collection as
one that would require an infinite duration for an enumeration
of its members, we have merely substituted "infinite duration" for
"infinite number" as a term to be explained.
We may mark out a point S in the segment PQ and then a
point R in the whole line PP'; and if PP' contains an infinite
number of points, we may continue to mark out points in seg-
ment and whole line, alternately, as long as we please. But the
number of points on PP' may be finite and yet so large a number
that in view of the shortness of life and our failure to persevere,
we will be able to mark out points in segment and whole line,
alternately, as long as we please. If the number of points on the
whole line is to be infinite rather than a very large finite number,
no failure in the attempt to find corresponding points in whole
line and segment could occur, it must be held, until after the
lapse of an infinite duration. At the end of any finite duration,
the infinitist must hold, there exist real but undiscovered points
both in whole line and in segment. But this observation, like
the observation in the preceding paragraph, carries us no further
than from 'infinite number' to 'infinite duration/ And if we say
that the whole line contains an infinite number of points when
its segment contains an infinite number, the circularity of our
explanation is even more apparent.
If the whole line contains an infinite number of points, the
segment likewise contains an infinite number. When we say this,
or when we say that an infinite collection is one that would re-
quire an infinite duration for an enumeration of its members,
we give "infinite number," it would seem, the signification which
it usually has, but a signification that is not made entirely clear.
On the other hand, if we say that a line contains an infinite num-
335
ber of points when a segment of it contains as many points as the
whole line, the signification we assign "infinite number," although
not circular, may not be the signification which "infinite number"
usually has. There is a point Q on the line PP' which is not in-
cluded in the segment PR; whereas every real point included in
PR is likewise included in PP'. Whether the number of points
included in PP 7 be termed "infinite" in number or "finite" in
number, there are more points in the whole line than in its seg-
ment. If, in order that the number of points on PP 7 might be
termed "infinite," it were necessary for PR to contain as many
points as PP', then the number of real points on PP' could not
be infinite and "infinite collection" would appear to have a
signification from which it would follow that no infinite collec-
tions exist. A collection of points on a segment, appearing with
the characteristic of being as many as the collection of points on
the whole line, such a subsisting collection appears self-contra-
dictory and is unreal. If "infinite collection" is used to represent
such an alleged collection, infinite collections are non-existent.
If "infinite collection" signifies a collection such that it would
require an infinite duration before the subject matter blocked an
attempt to discover additional points alternately in whole line and
segment and before the undiscovered real points in whole line
and segment were exhausted, infinite collections may, so far as
we have yet seen, exist; but the signification of "infinite collec-
tion" is not entirely clear. If, on the other hand, "infinite collec-
tion" signifies a collection such that there are as many points on
a segment as on a whole line of which the segment is a part, then
infinite collections do not exist; and "infinite collection," al-
though apparently given a more readily understood signification,
represents nothing real.
We are offered, it may appear, a compromise between these
two significations when we are told that "infinite collection"
signifies a collection such that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the points on the whole line and the points on the seg-
ment. If the points on the segment were as many as the points
on the whole line, there would, we may agree, be correspondence.
But if the whole line contains each point on the segment and
Additional points besides, "correspondence," if it refers to any-
thing real, refers to the failure of the subject matter to block
536
the discovery of points in whole line and segment alternately
and to the existence of an inexhaustible number of points in
each. But to say that there is an infinite collection when there
is correspondence in this sense of "correspondence" is to give
"infinite collection" a signification which is identical with, and
no clearer than, the signification which we give it when we
say that a collection is infinite only if it would require an infinite
duration before the subject matter blocked the discovery of addi-
tional points alternately in whole line and segment and only if
any shorter duration left us with existing undiscovered points in
each. Unless we use "infinite collection" to refer to something that
does not exist, we can do no better, it would seem, than explain
"infinite collection" in propositions which involve a certain cir-
cularity. For, the attempt to avoid circularity seems to end merely
in ambiguity and evasion.
If the line PP' contains an infinite number of points, an in-
finite number of real substances having definite positions with
respect to the contemporaneous point O, then each segment of it
likewise contains an infinite number. If PP 7 contains an infinite
number of points, an infinite duration would be required before
the subject-matter blocked the attempt to discover additional
points either in the whole line or in any of its segments. But
conjoined with the requirement that an infinite duration would
be needed before blocking occurred is the requirement that the
end of any finite duration leave us with real but undiscovered
points. Now it is possible to hold and we shall ourselves hold-
that at the end of no finite duration is there blocking and at the
end of some finite duration no undiscovered points. There are,
it would seem, two questions. First: could the subject matter ever
block the attempt to discover additional points? And second: Is
there some finite duration at the expiration of which there are
no real undiscovered points? Only if both questions are truly
answered in the negative does the line PP' contain what we shall
term an "infinite number" of points.
A point, we must repeat, is not a dot, but an alleged substance
appearing to have a definite position with respect to the contem-
poraneous point of reference O. Real dots between S and R are
definitely marked out as real only if some alleged entities appear-
ing between S and R, appearing to be made by ink, and appearing
S37
without the characteristic of being generally discredited, are listed
among the group of entities enumerated at the end of Chapter
Three. Real points, on the other hand, exist between S and R if
some alleged entities appearing between S and R, appearing as def-
initely located objects, appearing as not visible, and appearing
without the characteristic of being generally discredited, are so
listed. An alleged dot between S and R appears generally dis-
credited and is unreal. But an alleged point between S and R ap-
pears without the characteristic of being generally discredited and
is real. Whether an alleged point is presented to us with the char-
acteristic of being one millimeter or one thousandth of a milli-
meter from S, it does not appear, either explicitly or implicitly,
with the characteristic of being generally discredited. In the search
for additional points, there is no finite duration such that at the
end of it the further alleged points with which we would meet
would all appear with the characteristic of being generally dis-
credited. For since the process of finding additional points is not
an overt physical process but a process whereby we present to our-
selves additional alleged objects, points about to be presented, like
those already presented, appear without the characteristic of being
generally discredited. In order for there to be no real point be-
tween S and R there must be no subsisting point between S and
R, or the subsisting point between S and R must be unreal. If
however there is no subsisting point between S and R, there is
no frustration possible, nothing but the sort of puzzlement with
which we would approach the task of finding a point between
S and S. And, on the other hand, if a point between S and R
subsists, it appears, whether real or not, without the characteristic
of being generally discredited.
In order that a subsistent may be real, it must appear without
the characteristic of being generally discredited. But it must also
appear without the characteristic of being no definite object for
any subject. Between Q and R points subsist in so far as we con-
sider such points as possible existents. Whatever points subsist
between Q and R appear without the characteristic of being gen-
erally discredited. But the points that subsist between Q and R
may subsist with the characteristic of not being definite objects
for any subject. No one, let me suppose, happens to be aware of
any subsisting point between Q and R as being a definite number
338
of millimeters nearer to Q than to R, or as being joined to O by
a line which makes an angle of a definite number of degrees with
XX'. Each subsisting point between Q and R, let me suppose,
appears implicitly with the characteristic of not being a definite
object for any subject. Then, as we use the term "existence,"
no subsisting point between Q and R is real. It is not that there
are no subsisting points between Q and R; and it is not that the
points subsisting between Q and R subsist with the characteristic
of being generally discredited. There are no real points between
Q and R in that each subsisting point between Q and R appears
implicitly with the characteristic of not being a definite object
for any subject.
There are no points between Q and R that appear without the
characteristic of being only indefinite objects, no points between
Q and R which are real. There are six or sixty-six or some other
finite number of real points on the whole line PP'. All other
subsisting points between P and P' appear implicitly with the
characteristic of not being definite objects for any subject and
consequently are unreal. The number of real points on PP' is
limited to those that appear without the characteristic of being
only indefinite objects. And it is only a finite number that thus
appears.
At the expiration of some finite duration, our conclusion is,
all of the real points on PP 7 will have been enumerated. For, at
the expiration of some finite duration, all alleged points remain-
ing unenumerated will be such as appear with the characteristic
of being only indefinite objects. To say just how many real points
there are on PP' is thus to make a prediction. To say that there
are no more than sixty-six points on PP' is to predict that no
sixty-seventh point will be a definite object for any subject, or,
rather, that no sixty-seventh point appearing without the charac-
teristic of being no one's definite object will be listed as real. It
is difficult to predict how many points on PP' will be definite
objects and real just as it is difficult to predict how many readers
will read this sentence. In both cases, however, the total is a num-
ber which is finite, a number which can be reached by enumera-
tion in a finite duration. In the two cases, moreover, there are
similar circumstances which account for the fact that the number
is no larger than it is. Potential readers do not fail to be included
339
among actual readers because they are thwarted but because they
have not chosen to read. And subsisting points are only indefinite
objects and unreal, not because the subject-matter at the expira-
tion of a finite duration frustrates or would frustrate the searcher
after additional points, but because at the expiration of a finite
duration no desire to find additional points will remain.
"The meaning of 'existence/" we said in the first chapter
of this treatise, 15 "may be regarded as having two components,"
one corresponding to the law of contradiction, the other to Leib-
niz's principle of sufficient reason. An infinite collection which
contains as many members as some part of itself appears self-con-
tradictory and is ruled out of existence by that element in our
explanation of "existence" which marks out self-contradictory
subsistents as unreal. But an infinite collection which would re-
quire an infinite duration for its enumeration, which at the
expiration of any finite duration has an infinite number of undis-
covered members, need not appear self-contradictory. It is unreal
because of one of the various elements in our explanation of
"existence" which together take the place of Leibniz's principle
of sufficient reason. "It is not essential to the existence of a collec-
tion," says Russell, 18 "or even to knowledge and reasoning con-
cerning it, that we should be able to pass its terms in review one
by one." But what is essential to existence depends upon the
signification of "existence." And as we use "existence," nothing
exists that appears with the characteristic of being a definite
object for no one.
The pitcher's center of gravity is real and its position real with
respect to the contemporaneous point of reference: O. A finite
number of points on the line PF is real, and the positions of
these points with respect to O likewise real. So with the North
Pole and its position, the center of the sun and its position, the
center of Sirius and its position. There is a finite number of real
points, a finite number of real points whose positions with respect
to the contemporaneous phase of O are real. The point nearest to
O whose position with respect to O is real is the nearest alleged
point that does not appear as merely an indefinite object and is
Hsted as real, the nearest point, one might say, whose distance and
direction from O are specifically mentioned. And the point far-
thest from O of all real points is likewise the farthest of all those
3*0
whose distances from O are not merely indefinite objects. One
may of course imagine with Lucretius a man standing in this
allegedly most distant point and hurling a dart outward. 17 But if
through some such fancy a more distant point comes to be a
definite object, and, appearing as a definite object, is listed as real,
we have simply misjudged the position of the farthest definite
object. There is, we may agree, no point so distant that one would
be frustrated in an attempt to hurl a dart beyond it. But there
is a distant pointand it is the most distant point that is real
which happens to be a point such that no one having it as a defi-
nite object will imagine a dart hurled beyond it. It is a point of
which we can say, in effect, that no more distant point is or will
be a definite object and real.
There is no real point between Q and R, no real point between
the point that is the most distant but one and the point a dart's
throw beyond that is the most distant of all. Points between Q
and R subsist; points beyond the most distant of all real points
subsist. They subsist in that the preceding sentence intends to
refer to them. But they appear with the characteristic of being
only indefinite objects. Q and R are next to one another, not
in the sense that the subject-matter will frustrate any attempt to
present to ourselves intermediate points, but in the sense that
intermediate points will appear as indefinite objects and will not
be listed among the entities enumerated as real.
When we say that, for a subsisting entity to be real, it may not
appear with the characteristic of being only an indefinite object,
we rule out of existence, it would appear, all subsisting points
between Q and R. Why then, the question suggests itself, lay
down the additional requirement that real entities be listed in the
appendix to Chapter Three? If no alleged point appearing as a defi-
nite object appears as generally discredited, why not explain "ex-
istence" so that each point appearing as a definite object is real,
whether listed or not? We have agreed, to be sure, that the world
of existents, both as we are to use "existence" and as "existence"
is generally used, is a world not to be populated at will. 18 In order
not to be required to call "real" the entity that merely appears
to be a definite object, merely appears to be spatial, temporal,
and so on, we have agreed to determine as real only those entities
that we enumerate. But whereas one may hold that there is a
341
subsisting man on my ceiling who appears to be an object of be-
lief, appears to be causally related to other entities, but who
nevertheless is unreal, what is the significance of the correspond-
ing assertion that there is a subsisting point which appears as a
definite object and an object not generally discredited, but which
nevertheless is unreal?
A singular existential proposition is required, we may answer,
to distinguish the man on my ceiling who is an object of belief
from the subsisting man on my ceiling who merely appears with
the characteristic of being an object of belief. And similarly a
singular existential proposition is required to distinguish the
point which is a definite object from the alleged point which
merely appears with the characteristic of being a definite object.
It is to eliminate the alleged point that merely claims to be a
definite object that we must definitely determine as real only such
points as are individually enumerated as existents.
What distinguishes subsisting points, lines and spaces from
subsistents in general is this: With respect to subsistents in gen-
eral which do not appear self-contradictory, non-spatial or gener-
ally discredited, those are real which are listed as X's, those unreal
which are listed as Y's; and the ontological status of those which
are neither X's nor Y's is left undetermined. But among subsisting
points, lines and spaces there are no Y's. No points, lines or spaces
not appearing as self-contradictory, non-spatial or generally dis-
credited and not appearing as not definite objects are available to
be specifically listed as unreal. And so there are only those points,
lines, spaces subsisting without self-contradictoriness, etc. which
are real and those whose ontological status is left undetermined.
There is then a finite number of points which are real, a finite
number of points whose definite positions with respect to the
contemporaneous point O are real. Similarly there is, let us agree,
a finite number of lines which are real together with their indefi-
nite positions with respect to the contemporaneous point O, a
finite number of planes, a finite number of volumes. The line PP'
has as many segments as are definite objects. There exist as many
spherical figures as, let us say, lines or segments of lines are pre-
sented as being diameters of. The most distant spherical figure
is some such figure as that which has as a diameter the line join-
ing the most distant real point to the real point that is most dis-
342
tant but one. The smallest spherical figure has as diameter a line
such that no point subsisting between its extremities will itself
appear as a definite object and be listed as reaL It is not that the
subject-matter frustrates or would frustrate an attempt to present
to ourselves as definite objects points subsisting between the
smallest diameter's extremities in the way in which the subject-
matter might frustrate an attempt to separate off some part of an
atom or small material particle. It is that the attempt will not be
made.
As, in consonance with the conclusions of the last few para-
graphs, there is a most distant spherical figure and a smallest
spherical figure, so there is a longest line and a smallest segment
of a line. No line extends beyond the most distant point on it that
is a definite object and real. And yet each line is extensible in
that we are not blocked in the attempt to present to ourselves as
definite objects more distant points lying along it. If a curve has
an asymptote, there is a point on the curve that is closer to the
asymptote than any other point on it that will be a definite object
and real. And yet curve and asymptote approach indefinitely in
that the attempt to find smaller and smaller distances between
them never stops through frustration, always through lack of per-
severance. As we use "infinite," nothing infinite exists and noth-
ing infinitesimal. For as we use "infinite," an infinite collection
implies not only the absence of frustration after any finite dura-
tion, which we accept, but also the existence after every finite
duration of real undiscovered entities, which we deny.
In order, however, that a point, a line, or a spherical figure may
exist and have position with respect to the contemporaneous point
O, there must exist, it may be said, a larger spherical figure in
which it is included and adjacent figures by which it is bounded.
Just as the State of Wyoming is included in the United States
and bounded by neighboring states, so each real entity having posi-
tion, it may be said, has real parts of space around it and a real
all-inclusive Space including it. "A limit of extension," it has
been said, 19 "must be relative to extension beyond." "We must
look upon every limited space," says Kant, 20 "as conditioned also,
so far as it presupposes another space as the condition of its limit."
To be sure, with respect to any real entity having position, we
are never frustrated in the attempt to present to ourselves alleged
343
parts of space surrounding it and an alleged Space including it.
If the alleged parts of space surrounding it appear as definite
objects and are listed, they are real. And if an all-inclusive Space
were presented as a definitely located object and listed, it too
would be real. But there are real entities having position such
that no alleged parts of space surrounding them appear as definite
objects and are listed as real. And since an all-inclusive Space
appears as having only an indefinite position, any alleged all-
inclusive Space is unreal. Bounding figures, more inclusive fig-
ures, appear without the characteristic of being generally dis-
credited. But in so far as they appear as indefinite objects, they do
not follow as definite objects the more circumscribed figures that
would otherwise imply them.
Some figures do not have, and therefore do not imply, real
figures beyond them. Some figures do not have, and therefore do
not imply, real points and real included figures within them.
Where a figure is real and a figure within it real, where a segment
of a line is real and a point within it real, the implication from
one to the other is no one-way street. Belief in the existence of
the included point precedes belief in the existence of the line as
readily as it follows it. And as we can make no true universal
propositions with respect to logical priority, so we can make no
true universal propositions with respect to psychological priority.
In one subject a mental attitude directed towards the point
marked by the dot Q may precede a mental attitude directed
towards the line marked by the undulating scratch PP'; in an-
other subject a mental attitude directed towards PP' precedes a
mental attitude directed towards Q. Q is real and PP' real; and
we may pass from a mental attitude directed upon either of these
objects to a mental attitude directed upon the other. Geometrical
propositions require the existence of no all-inclusive Space. They
depend for their truth upon the existence of the lines and figures
to which they refer. And if there is a problem with respect to the
universality and alleged necessity of true geometrical proposi-
tions, that problem is not resolved by reference to an all-inclusive
Space. 21
I we ask ourselves how we come to know so many true uni-
versal propositions concerning lines and figures, it would seem
that our inquiry must be in two directions. There is a question
544
how, whatever the subject-matter, a limited number of individual
propositions lead us to accept a universal proposition; there is, in
a word, the problem of induction or generalization. And there
is a question as to what the unique characteristics of lines and
figures are simplicity, for examplethat facilitate generalization
when lines and figures constitute the subject-matter. But an all-
inclusive Space, even if it existed, could not account for our
mathematical knowledge any more than the mere presence of a
catalyst accounts for a chemical reaction. A certain chemical
reaction takes place only in the presence of a catalyst. But how?
Similarly, an all-inclusive Space, if it existed, might be held to
be present whenever mathematical generalization took place. But
such an assertion would still leave us asking how this all-inclusive
Space enters into, and facilitates, our mathematical generaliza-
tions,
PP 7 is a real line; Q, R, S, and a finite number of other entities
real points that are included within it. PP' has a rather indefinite
position with respect to the contemporaneous phase of O; P, S,
R, Q, P' have each, taken individually, a definite position with
respect to O. Taken collectively, however, the points included
within PP' are the line PF. For, taken collectively, the collection
has no more definite position with respect to O than has PP'.
And yet, just as an army may be strong and yet called a "collec-
tion" of individuals, individuals who, taken individually, are
weak; so the line, called a "collection" of points, may have length,
a quality which each point composing it, taken individually, lacks.
Thus what, taken individually, are points may, taken collectively,
be a line, a plane, a space; and what, taken individually, are three-
dimensional figures or spaces, may, taken collectively, be a more
inclusive space. 22 The individuals which are real have positions
with respect to the contemporaneous point O which are real; and
the collections which are real have less definite positions with
respect to the contemporaneous point O which likewise are real.
Among the spaces, the closed three-dimensional figures, which
are real and whose positions with respect to the contemporaneous
phase of our baseball catcher are real, there is the space within
the periphery of the pitcher's body as well as the space within
some distant spherical figure. The distant spherical figure is, let
us assume, real appearing as an empty space, unreal appearing as
345
material. The space within the periphery of the pitcher's body is
real as a space and real as a body. But although the space within
the periphery of the pitcher's body is a real substance and the
pitcher's body a real substance, nevertheless, as we shall later
agree to use "one" and "two," the collection of these substances
is one and not two. Just as Socrates is real appearing as a Greek
and also appearing as a philosopher, so there are some substances
which are real appearing as spaces and also appearing as material
bodies. Just as a man may be both Greek and philosophical and
thus both a Greek and a philosopher, so an entity may be both
three-dimensional and material and thus both a space and a body.
A body, in short, is not in a space so much as it is a space. Real
spaces may be, some of them material, some of them non-material,
and some of them partly material and partly non-material. Those
spaces which are material may also be called three-dimensional
bodies just as those Greeks who are philosophical may also be
called Greek philosophers.
Whether or not there are non-material spaces depends of course
upon the significations we assign "material" and "body." If mere
three-dimensionality plus the ability to transmit energy do not suf-
fice to make a substance a "body," there may be non-material
spaces, the most distant body may not be so distant as the most
distant space, the largest body may be smaller than the largest real
space; and the number of real bodies less than the number of real
three-dimensional figures or spaces. Alleged bodies beyond some
great distance may be unreal, not for the reason for which some
alleged spaces may be unreal, not because they appear as not defi-
nite objects, but because, presented as material, they appear as gen-
erally discredited. And frustration, which never puts an end to our
efforts to think of larger or of smaller spaces, may well put an end
to our efforts to find larger bodies appearing as relatively homo-
geneous that are not discredited and our efforts to find smaller
and smaller bodies that are qualitatively distinguishable from the
entities around them.
We find then that real points, real lines, real spaces are un-
limited in number but not infinite in number. Real body-spaces
that are homogeneous and distinguishable from the entities
around them are likewise not infinite in number; and when
"body" is used in such a way that not every space is a body, they,
unlike real points, real lines and real spaces, are not even un-
limited in number. But what about real spaces, if there be any
such, that are not body-spaces, not material bodies? If 'body' is
defined in such a way that empty spaces three-dimensional fig-
ures having volume but containing no matter are not self-contra-
dictory and do in fact exist, then it would seem that these existing
empty spaces are scattered about and related to one another in
much the way in which we customarily think of stars and other
material bodies as being scattered about and interrelated. For it
is not each such existing empty space that would then have other
existing empty spaces contiguous to it. Not that each such alleged
contiguous empty space appears with the characteristic of being
generally discredited; and not that one is frustrated in the attempt
to become aware of such an alleged contiguous empty space. It is
simply that "there are real entities having position such that no
alleged parts of space surrounding them appear as definite objects
and are listed as real." 23 And in so far as alleged empty spaces,
alleged to be contiguous to real empty spaces, are presented as
definite objects for no one, these alleged empty spaces do not
exist and the empty spaces which are real have no real empty
spaces contiguous to them. Bodies, in short, are discrete rather
than all contiguous; and if 'body' is defined so that not all spaces
are bodies, then empty spaces are discrete also.
No collection, neither the collection of all empty spaces nor the
collection of all points with definite positions with respect to the
contemporaneous point O nor the collection of all grains of sand
contemporaneous with O, is infinite in number. But is each of
these collections finite in number? Taken as an extended, indefi-
nitely located collection rather than as a group of individual
units, all empty spaces, taken collectively, is presented with the
characteristic of being so indefinitely located that, as we explain
our term "reality," it is unreal. The collection of all grains of
sand contemporaneous with O, taken collectively, is, however, pre-
sented without the characteristic of having so indefinite a location
that it must be unreal. If the earth may be real and the surface
of the earth real, then the sand on the earth's surface, taken col-
lectively, may be real. But how many granular parts, how many
grains of sand, does it contain? There is no particular number, it
would seem, that anyone is aware of as being the number of par-
347
tides making up the sand on the earth's surface. And since such
an alleged number is presented as no one's definite object, the
sand on the earth's surface has no definite number of parts. The
grains of sand, taken as a collection of individual grains, is un-
numbered or numberless. And yet, taken as individuals, there are
only so many grains of sand as are individual objects. There may
be fifty or a thousand or ten thousand individual grains of sand
which are real. But the sand on the earth's surface, taken as a
collection of individual grains, is without number. There is, to
be sure, "a finite number of points which are real, a finite number
of points whose definite positions with respect to the contempor-
aneous point O are real." 24 These, however, are all points that
are objects as individuals, or, rather, points that are not presented
as no one's definite objects. Points taken collectively, on the other
hand, may be presented as forming so extended, so indefinitely-
located, a collection that the collection is not only without num-
beras is the collection of grains of sand but is unreal altogether.
There is, let us agree, a point on the line OX which, measured
from a certain reference body, is TT inches from O. There is, let
us likewise agree, a point on the line OX which, similarly meas-
ured, is 3.14159 inches from O. Corresponding to real decimals
greater than 3.14159 and less than TT, there are intermediate
points, one of which is, we hold, the nearest, of all points exempli-
fying decimals, to the point ir inches from O. There is, let us
agree, the number TT; but no decimal exemplified by the distance
from O to the point TT inches from O. There is a decimal exempli-
fied by the distance from O to the point nearest, of all points
exemplifying decimals, to the point ir inches from O. The decimal
which is less than K may be as large as we please. But alleged
decimals larger than we do in fact make explicit, alleged points
so close to the point TT inches from O that they appear as definite
objects for no one, are, we hold, unreal. What then is the decimal
exemplified not by the point TT inches from O; for there is no
such decimal but by the point nearest to the latter point of all
points exemplifying decimals? What, to put it arithmetically, is
the largest decimal 4ess than TT? It is, we may say, a decimal with
a great number, but a finite number, of digits. Presented as a
decimal whose last digit is a particular number, odd or even, it
is presented as some one's definite object. But its last digit,
MS
whether odd or even, is presented as no definite object of mine.
Just as facts known by paleontologists are real even though I am
not aware of them in any detail, 25 so the last digit in the largest
decimal less than TT is real and is odd or is even, even though it is
not presented to me as definitely odd or as definitely even.
The alleged number presented as the largest decimal less than
TT differs from the alleged number presented as characterizing the
sand on the earth's surface, taken as a collection of individual
grains. In each case what is presented is an alleged number pre-
sented as no definite object of mine. But the latter alleged num-
ber is presented as no one's definite object and is unreal, whereas
the former alleged number is not so presented and is real.
We turn now to the number of pennies in a bowl full of pennies
that I see in some store window. I, let us agree, do not know how
many pennies are in the bowl. But the number alleged to char-
acterize this collection of pennies, taken individually, is not pre-
sented as no one's definite object. Just as the number presented
as the largest decimal less than TT may be real even though pre-
sented as no definite object of mine, so may the number be real
which, presented as no definite object of mine, is alleged to charac-
terize the collection of pennies in the bowl before me. I do not
know whether the largest decimal less than w has a last digit which
is odd or even and I do not know whether the number of pennies
in the bowl is odd or even. There is nevertheless a difference be-
tween these two situations. For whoever is definitely aware of the
largest real decimal less than IT is definitely aware of no larger
decimal less than TT, merely because he has not chosen to prolong
the process of determining larger decimals; whereas he who is
definitely aware of the number characterizing the collection of
pennies taken individually is definitely aware of no larger num-
ber characterizing this collection, because there are no more
pennies to count. In both situations the laigest number that is
real and applicable to the collection being numbered is finite and
is presented as no definite object of minealthough not presented
as no one's definite object. But in the one situation one would be
frustrated in the attempt to find real applicable numbers beyond
the last; whereas in the other situation the last number that is
real and applicable merely indicates the end of our perseverance.
In the past few paragraphs we have been discussing collections
349
to which finite numbers are applicable, finite numbers, however,
which are presented as not definite objects of mine. There are,
let us agree, collections to which finite numbers are applicable
where these finite numbers are definite objects of mine. Thus
counting each chair in this room as one, the number of chairs in
this room is, let us agree, four, and is presented to me as four.
There is the number of chairs in this room which is four. There
is the number of positive integers up to four which, is four. A
fifth chair in this room is unreal in that it appears generally dis-
credited. A fifth integer no greater than four is unreal in that it
appears self-contradictory as well. Between the chair in this room
nearest to me and the chair in this room furthest from me there
is a finite number of other chairs. Between one and four there
is a finite number of other positive integers and a finite number
of decimals. But whereas the search for intermediate chairs or for
intermediate positive integers may be brought to an end by frus-
tration, whereas, that is to say, one may reach the point where
alleged additional intermediate chairs appear generally discredited
and alleged additional intermediate integers appear self-contradic-
tory as well, the number of intermediate decimals, although finite,
is unlimited. One may find intermediate decimals, but not inter-
mediate chairs or intermediate integers, as long as one pleases.
And yet there are respects in which the collection of real chairs,
the collection of integers up to four and the collection of decimals
from zero to four resemble one another and differ from other
finite collections whose characteristics we have still to point out.
Not only is the collection of decimals from zero to four as well
as the collection of chairs in this room finite in number, and not
only are these collections such that their end-terms have definitely
determined characteristics; they have in common the fact that
between members of the collection there are real entities not
members of the collection. Thus between 3.14 and 3.15 there is
the real entity TT which is not a decimal between zero and four;
and between the chair nearest to me and the chair next nearest
to me there is a table which is not a member of the collection of
chairs in this room.
And so we are led to consider the last type of collection that
we shall mention, the collection, namely, in which no real en-
tities that are not themselves members of the collection interpose
350
themselves between entities that are members. In contrast to
the collection of chairs in this room and in contrast to the col-
lection of decimals from zero to four, the collection of all numbers
from zero to four and the collection of all numbers without
limitation are collections of this latter type. They are collections
which we may call "continua." And yet whereas we are never
frustrated in the attempt to find new members between members
of a continuum and never find real non-members between mem-
bers, the members which compose a continuum, we should like
to emphasize, are, like the members of every real numbered col-
lection, finite in number.
Some points, some lines, some three-dimensional figures or
spaces, exist; they are finite in number. Some, if not all, of the
spaces which exist are body-spaces or material bodies. Points, lines,
spaces and bodies alike have each a real position with respect to
the phase of the point O with respect to which they each are
present. And each of them has a real position with respect to a
finite number of other real and contemporaneous entitiespoints,
bodies, or what not that may function as points of reference.
The point P', the baseball pitcher, the sun, have each of them
the real quality: position with respect to the phase of the batter
with respect to whom they are present. And they have each of them
the real quality: position with respect to the phase of the point P
with respect to which they are present. Position with respect to P
inheres in P' along with position with respect to the batter. And
since in describing these qualities inhering in P' we refer in the
one instance to P and in the other instance to the batter, position
with respect to P and position with respect to the batter may be
said to be relative qualities inhering in P'. There are occasions of
course when we describe the position that an entity has with
respect to some other entity without any explicit mention of
the point of reference. I may say that an entity is far away and
the context may make it clear that I am asserting this entity
to be far away from where I now am. Or I may attribute to
some point on the earth's surface the quality of being seventy-
five degrees west and forty degrees north without bothering to
make it explicit that I am discussing this point's position with re-
spect to the intersection of the equator and the meridian of Green-
wich, There are thus positions that entities have that may be
351
described without explicit mention of the point of reference. "Po-
sition" may be synonymous with "position with respect to P." And
in so far as the quality which P' has may be called "position" where
"position" is synonymous with "position with respect to P," this
quality may be called a pseudo-absolute quality as well as a
relative quality.
If I talk about "the position of P'" and no point of reference
is implied, then "the position of P'," if it is not merely a collection
of words, refers, or means to refer, to an alleged absolute quality of
P'. As we use "the position of P / " however, either there is a point
of reference implied and my expression represents a pseudo-abso-
lute quality, or my expression is merely a collection of words. P'
has no absolute quality represented by my expression: "the posi-
tion of P'," for my expression: "the position of P'" puts before
me no subsisting quality alleged to be absolute whose reality or
unreality might be considered. But, from the fact that P' has no
absolute quality represented by my expression: "the position of
PY* we can not conclude that P' does not have an absolute quality
somehow connected with the relative quality that it really has,
the relative quality represented by my expression: "the position
of P' with respect to P." P' has position with respect to P and P
position with respect to F. If either P or P 7 appeared as non-
spatial, neither P nor P' could appear without contradiction as
having position with respect to the other. If either Peter or Paul
appeared as lacking height, Peter could not without contradiction
appear as taller than Paul nor Paul as shorter than Peter. We may
then present to ourselves an alleged absolute quality in P 7 that
we may call "spatiality," a quality that may be alleged to make
it possible for P' to have position with respect to various points
of reference. This alleged spatiality is not position with respect
to some unmentioned point of reference, some center of the uni-
verse, for example; for what we call "spatiality" is alleged to be
absolute, whereas a position with respect to some unmentioned
point of reference would be merely pseudo-absolute. Spatiality, it
turns out, is nothing but the possibility of having position with
respect to various entities. 26 Vague, however, as a spatiality of this
sort is, the alleged spatiality of P appears without the character-
istic of being no definite object and without the characteristic of
being generally discredited. I find in short that P 7 has the absolute
S52
quality that I call "spatiality," but no absolute quality repre-
sented by my expression: "the position of F." F has the absolute
quality 'spatiality' and the pseudo-absolute quality 'position' which
is merely position with respect to some implied point of refer-
ence. Similarly, Peter has the absolute quality 'height' and the
pseudo-absolute quality 'tallness' which is merely tallness with
respect to some implied standard.
P' has position with respect to P, we hold, and Peter tallness
with respect to Paul. But just as "P' has position" and "Peter
is taller than" are incomplete expressions, so "F has position
with respect to P" and "Peter is taller than Paul" may be held
to be incomplete expressions. Peter is taller than Paul, it may be
said, from the point of view of a man equally distant from both,
not from the point of view of an eye so close to Paul that the angle
subtended by the distant Peter is less than that subtended by Paul.
And P' has one position with respect to P, it may be said, when the
distance between them is measured from an entity at rest with
respect to them, another position with respect to P when the
distance between them is measured from an entity in motion. The
length of the line PF may, we must agree, be assigned various
numbers. To number a quantitative entity is to correlate it with
some external unit quantity. To measure a given length is to
engage in a process involving motion and hence involving spatio-
temporal entities other than the length that is to be measured
We use an incomplete expression, we may agree, when, without
any point of reference being implied, we say that PF is "one
inch in length." PP' may be one inch long with respect to the
contemporaneous point O that is at rest with respect to it, less
than one inch long with respect to the contemporaneous phase of
the sun that is in motion with respect to it. There is no absolute
quality represented by my expression: "one inch long"; there
are the relative qualities represented by: "one inch long as meas-
ured from O" and by: "less than one inch long as measured from
the sun." And in so far as the context or common usage makes
it clear that the point of reference is some such contemporaneous
entity as O that is at rest with respect to PF, PF has the pseudo-
absolute quality of being one inch lopg and the proposition: "PF
is one inch long" is neither incomplete nor ambiguous, but true.
Being one inch long is a real pseudo-absolute quality of PF in so
353
far as "being one inch long 1 ' is synonymous with "being one inch
long as measured from O"; just as position is a real pseudo-absolute
quality of P' in so far as "position" is synonymous with "position
with respect to P." But with no point of reference implied, my
expression "being one inch long," like my expression "position,"
does not represent a quality that is absolute and real.
P' however has the absolute quality of spatiality which may be
said to be the possibility of having position with respect to various
entities. Peter has the absolute quality of height without which
he would not be taller than one entity and shorter than another.
And PP' may appear with the absolute quality of extension or
length. It is this length that we think of as being assigned one
number or another, as being correlated with one entity or an-
other, in a word, as being measured. The alleged quality of
length or extension that PP' has is not the quality of being
one-inch long, but the possibility of being one inch long with
respect to O and of being less than one inch long with respect
to the sun. Allegedly it is what is measured, what is correlated
with spatio-temporal entities other than PP'. To be sure, this al-
leged absolute length or extension of PP', that, as absolute, has
no number, is vague. But it appears without the characteristic
of being generally discredited and is, I hold, real. PP' has absolute
length, P' position with respect to P, P position with respect to
P'. Absolute length and relative position exist within the same
situation, the situation, namely, which includes P, P', and PP'. As
absolute length, in so far as it is absolute, does not involve a refer-
ence to entities outside PP', so relative position does not involve a
reference to entities outside P, F and PP'. "P' has position with
respect to P" is true, does not first become true by being changed in-
to "P' has position with respect to P a measured from O." It is for
the purpose of giving a number to P"s position with respect to P or
for the purpose of giving a number to the length of PP' that refer-
ence to some such entity as O is required if ambiguity is to be
avoided. To hold, on the contrary, that "P"s position with respect
to P" is ambiguous and must be changed into "P"s position with
respect to P as measured from O" may well lead us to hold that
"P"s position with respect to P as measured from O" must give
way to "P"s position with respect to P as measured from O
from the point of view of A"; it may well lead us to hold that
354
no propositions referring to position are unambiguous and true.
And to deny to PP' an absolute quality of length may well lead
us to hold that new points of reference without limit must be
brought into consideration before "PP"s length as measured from
O" is freed from ambiguity.
What is true with respect to the line PP' will also be true
with respect to a line connecting P with O. Just as PP' is one inch
long as measured from one spatio-temporal entity and less than one
inch long as measured from another, so the number assigned the
length of OP is relative to the spatio-temporal entity from which
this length is measured. But PP', we have said, has absolute length,
vague as length that is not numbered length may seem; and P'
has position with respect to P that is not relative to any point of
reference outside PP'. Just so, OP has absolute length and P
position with respect to O that is not relative to entities outside
OP.
To say that P is three inches away from O is to say that OP
is three inches long. And since "O P is three inches long" is an
incomplete expression, since O P is three inches long as measured
from some entity outside O P, P is three inches away from O only
relatively, only as measured from some entity or other. The posi-
tion that P has with respect to O, the position that involves no
reference to entities other than P and O, is consequently not a
numbered position. Just as the spatiality that P has is merely what
makes it possible for P to have one position with respect to P' and
another position with respect to O, so the position that P has with
respect to O is merely what makes it possible for P to be three
inches away from O as measured from one entity and less than
three inches away from O as measured from another entity.
It is with this sense of "position" in mind that we hold to
the conclusions arrived at in the earlier paragraphs of this chap-
ter. The real position that we asserted that P has with respect
to O and the real position that we asserted the pitcher has with
respect to the batter, these are not numbered positions but rather
positions that have the possibility of being numbered differently
from different points of reference. P has a definite position with
respect to O and the pitcher's center of gravity a definite position
with respect to the batter, not in the sense that these positions
carry with them unique definite numbers with respect to their re-
355
spective points of reference, but rather in the sense that they have
the possibility of being given various definite numbers varying
with the spatio-temporal entity from which their relations to their
points of reference are measured. Similarly, the path from pitcher's
box to home plate has an indefinite position with respect to the
catcher, is more or less out-in-front, in the sense that the spatial
relation it sustains to the catcher has the possibility of being given
various number ranges, all of them indefinite.
The path from pitcher's box to home plate and the line PP'
each have extension; whereas the point P and the pitcher's center
of gravity are not extended. But how can a laige extended entity
affect the mental attitude which comes to be directed upon it?
And how can an inextended entity, a point, affect the mental atti-
tude which comes to be directed upon ft? One may perhaps accept
as free from puzzlement the situation in which one billiard ball
impinging upon another is in some sense the cause of the second
ball's motion. And the situation may be held to be analogous when
some minutely extended entity is at the source of motions leading
to the mental attitude which is said to perceive it. Thus one may
agree that there are minute percepts, such as atoms or electrons,
which, after the fashion of billiard balls, initiate impulses affect-
ing the sense-organs and resulting in instances of perceiving. But
that entities of greater size or that entities with no size at all,
should bring about instances of perceiving, this, it may be held, is
not only bewildering but incredible. There is no entity outside
the perceiving subject himself, it may be said, which is the cause
of the mental attitude directed upon a large extended object. For
"the connection of anything manifold," it may be held with Kant, 2T
"can never enter into us through the senses." And similarly with
the mental attitude allegedly directed upon inextended objects.
My mental attitude allegedly directed upon a point, it may be
said, points back to no external entity as its cause. Hence mental
attitudes allegedly directed upon entities not big enough to be
sources of material motion are, it may be said, examples of men-
tal over-simplification and distortion. And mental attitudes al-
legedly directed upon laige objects are to be accounted for, it
may be said, by referring to a faculty of mental synthesis or
imagination.
Now we may agree that s6me extended entities are not percepts
with respect to the mental attitudes directed upon them. And we
may agree that points are never percepts. Nevertheless it does not
follow that points are unreal and unperceived extended entities
unreal. To be puzzled as to how my dog's behavior happens to be
adapted to a future phase of the ball which I am about to hurl
does not imply that his behavior is not adapted to that future phase
of the ball. To be puzzled as to how my mental attitude happens to
be directed upon tomorrow's sunrise does not imply that my
mental attitude is not directed upon tomorrow's sunrise. 28 And to
be puzzled as to how I happen to be aware of a point, on the one
hand, or of a large unperceived extended entity on the other, does
not imply that these alleged objects of mine are unreal or that I
am not really aware of them. The pitcher's center of gravity, dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter, is, we have found, real. 29 My mental
attitude, seemingly directed upon this pitcher's center of gravity,
is, we hold, real. And my mental attitude reaches as its object
this center of gravity upon which it seems to be directed. Thus
my mental attitude reaches a point as its real object, even though
the processes leading up to this mental attitude of mine are ob-
scure. And so with the mental attitude of mine directed upon a
real entity too large to be perceived.
To be sure, the mental attitude which is not an instance of per-
ceiving, and not caused by the object upon which it is directed, may
have some cause other than its object. But if a given mental attitude
is not at the terminus of motions leading to it from the entity upon
which it seems to be directed, we can not conclude that it is at the
terminus of motions leading to it from some other definite entity
in the absence of which this mental attitude would not have oc-
curred. Much less can we conclude that the mental attitude, not at
the terminus of motions leading to it from the entity upon which
it seems to be directed, has a mental cause; that it is affected by
some mental faculty of synthesis or imagination which is respon-
sible for synthesis on the one hand and for over-simplification on
the other. Moreover, the bewilderment which we may experience
at being unable to give a detailed account of the genesis of the
mental attitude directed upon an unperceived entity, this be-
wilderment is not assuaged by our being referred to an alleged
mental faculty of synthesis or imagination. For such an alleged
faculty is presented, not as the source of motions leading to the
357
mental attitudes whose origin puzzles us, but as having no exist-
ence apart from these very mental attitudes themselves.
The conclusion which we have reached in this chapter is that
some extended entities are real and some inextended entities reaL
Extension is a real quality of some minute entities and it is a real
quality of the line PP', of the baseball diamond, of various entities
which may be too big to be perceived by the mental attitudes
directed upon them. There exists a finite number of extended
entities just as there exists a finite number of points, lines, spaces
and bodies. Each real extended entity, whether it be a line or a
space, material or immaterial, has absolute spatiality and relative
position, position, that is to say, that is relative to a finite number
of contemporaneous points of reference. And each real extended
entity, similarly, has absolute length and relative measured length,
measured length, that is to say, that is relative to the spatio-tem-
poral status of the contemporaneous entity from which it is
measured-
In this chapter we have derived directly from our propositions
explaining our term "reality" the existence of certain entities
contemporaneous with one another, the existence, that is to say,
of entities having the quality of being present with respect to cer-
tain other entities. Moreover, we have in this chapter discussed
spatial relations only in so far as they are alleged to hold among
contemporaneous entities. It will require another chapter to dis-
cuss temporal relations as such; and still another to discuss such
spatial relations as are held to obtain between entities temporally
related, but not present with respect to one another.
Summary
Certain entities have position with respect to other entities
contemporaneous with them. These positions may be definite
(the position that a point has with respect to some contempo-
raneous entity) or indefinite (the position that an extended entity
has); but it may not be too indefinite. Some points are real and
some lines real. There is a finite number of points on a line; for
alleged points in excess of this finite number appear with' the
characteristic of not being definite objects for any subject.
358
There is a finite number of bodies and a finite number of three-
dimensional volumes or spaces which may not be bodies. Not all
bodies are contiguous and not all empty spaces.
Position is a quality which is relative in that an entity has one
position with respect to its contemporary P, another position
with respect to its contemporary P'. But what we call the quality
of "spatiality" is not relative. Spatiality is the quality of an entity
without which it could not have one position with respect to one
entity and another position with respect to another. Just as there
is a distinction between spatiality and position, so there is a dis-
tinction between extension or length, which is absolute, and
numbered extension or length, which is relative.
The awareness of extended entities does not presuppose that
the mind's object in such a situation is a mental construction.
359
Chapter XII
DATE, DURATION AND INTERVAL
We began the preceding chapter by presenting to ourselves a
baseball batter, a pitcher appearing as out-there-in-front with re-
spect to him, and a catcher appearing as a short distance behind
him. 1 Let us begin our investigation of temporal relations in an
analogous manner, by presenting to ourselves Napoleon Bona-
parte, Louis IX (called St. Louis,) appearing as having preceded
him, and Napoleon III appearing as being subsequent to him.
Pitcher, batter and catcher all appeared as substances. So do St.
Louis, Napoleon and Napoleon III. Out-there-in-front with re-
spect to the batter and a short-distance-behind with respect to
the batter appeared as qualities of pitcher and catcher respec-
tively. Similarly, before-Napoleon is presented, let us say, as a
quality inhering in St. Louis, after-Napoleon as a quality inher-
ing in Napoleon III. As in the preceding chapter let us derive
directly from the propositions which explain our term "exist-
ence" the existence of the substances that particularly concern us;
and the existence of certain qualities inhering in these substances.
St. Louis, Napoleon and Napoleon III, let us thus agree, are real
substances; and there are real qualities inhering in St. Louis and
in Napoleon III. Our question is whether, among the real quali-
ties inhering in Louis IX there is the real quality of being prior
to Napoleon Bonaparte, whether among the real qualities inher-
ing in Napoleon III there is the real quality of being subsequent
to Napoleon Bonaparte.
In the preceding chapter, it will be recalled, we took it for
granted that the pitcher, alleged to be out-there-in-front with re-
spect to the batter, was not only a real substance having qualities,
360
but also that he had the particular quality of being present with
respect to the batter. 2 In investigating St. Louis's alleged quality
of being prior to Napoleon, shall we not then complete the anal-
ogy by taking it for granted that St. Louis is 'here' with respect to
Napoleon? Since we chose to restrict our discussion of spatial
relations to the discussion of spatial relations among entities
which are 'now' with respect to one another, should we not
similarly choose to restrict our discussion of temporal relations to
the discussion of temporal relations among entities which are
'here* with respect to one another?
The substances which are presented to us, let us say, are not St.
Louis taken as a whole, Napoleon taken as a whole, and Napo-
leon III taken as a whole. Rather, the substances which we take
to be real are, let us say, a phase of King Louis IX when he was
in Paris and indeed in Notre Dame cathedral, a phase of Napo-
leon Bonaparte when he was in Notre Dame, and a phase of
Napoleon III when he was in Notre Dame. But when our objects
are St. Louis in Notre Dame, Napoleon in Notre Dame and
Napoleon III in Notre Dame, does it follow that these objects of
ours are presented as 'here' with respect to one another? If the
sun and not Notre Dame is taken to be at rest, the position which
St. Louis in Notre Dame had with respect to the phase of the sun
contemporaneous with him is, it may be said, not identical with
the position which Napoleon in Notre Dame had with respect to
the phase of the sun contemporaneous with him. St. Louis, that
is to say, may be said to have been much farther away from the
sun contemporaneous with him than Napoleon was from the sun
contemporaneous with him. And taking a given position with re-
spect to successive phases of the sun as our enduring point of
reference, Napoleon may have been 'here' and King Louis IX
'there/ Being 'here* with respect to Napoleon in Notre Dame, it
may thus be said, is a quality that inheres in St. Louis from one
point of view but not from another. St. Louis, it may be said, is
here with respect to Napoleon relative to an enduring Notre
Dame which is at rest, but is there with respect to Napoleon rela-
tive to an enduring sun which is at rest.
Let us then not take it for granted that the St. Louis, whose
alleged priority to Napoleon we wish to investigate, has the real
quality of being 'here' with respect to Napoleon. For if we were to
$61
take it for granted that St. Louis has the quality of being 'here'
with respect to Napoleon whatever the enduring point of refer-
ence, we should be assuming as real an alleged quality of St. Louis's
which, it would appear, is unreal. And to accept as a premise the
alleged fact that St. Louis had the quality of being 'here' with re-
spect to Napoleon relative to an enduring Notre Dame which was
at rest, would be to presuppose the existence of enduring entities
and to presuppose an understanding of our terms "duration" and
"at rest/' At this point, then, we choose not to take it for granted,
either that there is some absolute sense of ''being here" in which
St. Louis was 'here' with respect to Napoleon; or that St. Louis
had the real quality of being 'here' with respect to Napoleon re-
lative to an enduring Notre Dame which was at rest.
Thus to some extent the premises with which we enter upon our
discussion of temporal relations differ from those with which we
entered upon our discussion of spatial relations. In discussing the
existence of the pitcher's alleged quality of being out-there-in-
front with respect to the batter, we took it for granted, not only
that pitcher and batter were real, but also that the pitcher was
really present with respect to the batter. But in discussing the
existence of St. Louis's alleged quality of being prior to Napo-
leon, we take it for granted that St. Louis and Napoleon were
real, but not that St. Louis was really 'here' with respect to Napo-
leon. St. Louis, Napoleon Bonaparte and Napoleon III were all,
let us agree, in Notre Dame. But in asking whether, with respect
to Napoleon, St. Louis was before or Napoleon III after, let us
not assume that they were all 'here' with respect to one another.
The pitcher, we have seen, was out-there-in-front with respect
to the phase of the batter contemporaneous with him. But to
attribute to a substance position with respect to another substance
not contemporaneous with it is, it would seem, to refer, explicitly
or implicitly, to a third entity, to an enduring point of reference
which is at rest and which has phases, one contemporaneous with
one of the substances being compared and one contemporaneous
with the other. But if, explicitly or implicitly, we are referring to
an enduring point of reference when we attribute to a given sub-
stance the quality of being 'here' with respect to an entity not
contemporaneous with it, is there not, similarly, a reference to
some third entity when we attribute to a given substance the
362
quality of being 'now' with respect to a substance which is not
'here' with respect to it?
Early in the last chapter we agreed that the phase of the pitcher
being considered was 'now/ or present, with respect to the
phase of the batter being considered. But perhaps it was no
more to be taken for granted that the pitcher alleged to be
out-there-in-front was absolutely 'now' with respect to the bat-
ter than it is to be taken for granted that St. Louis, alleged
to be prior, was absolutely 'here' with respect to Napoleon.
If in assuming that St. Louis is absolutely 'here' with respect
to Napoleon we would be taking for granted a quality of St.
Louis's which we hold is unreal, perhaps in assuming that the
pitcher was absolutely 'now' with respect to the batter, we took
for granted a quality of the pitcher's which he did not have. Per-
haps the pitcher was contemporaneous with the batter from a
certain point of view, when dates are measured in a certain man-
ner, and was not contemporaneous with the batter from another
point of view, when dates are measured in another manner.
We found in the preceding chapter, however, that there are
instances of the quality 'spatiality,' an absolute quality; and in-
stances of the quality 'position/ which is a relative quality. Simi-
larly there are instances of the quality of having length which are
instances of an absolute quality and instances of the quality of
being one-inch long which are instances of a relative quality. 3 But
if some line PP' has, on the one hand, the absolute quality of hav-
ing length and, on the other hand, the relative quality of being
one-inch long as measured from O, may it not be that some entity
A has, on the one hand, a quality of simultaneity with B which is
not relative to C and, on the other hand, the quality of being no
seconds earlier, and no seconds later, than B as measured from C?
That is to say, may there not be a sense of "simultaneity" in which
the assertion that A is simultaneous with B is not synonymous with
the assertion that A is no seconds earlier and no seconds later than
3 as measured from C? What we are attempting to present is a
sense of "simultaneity" such that a given instantaneous phase of
A may be held to be simultaneous with a given instantaneous
phase of B, even though it is agreed that it is an earlier phase of A
which is found to be no seconds earlier and no seconds later than
B as measured from a body moving in one direction; and even
363
though it is agreed that it is a later phase of A which is found to
be no seconds earlier and no seconds later than B as measured
from a body moving in another direction. In short, what is being
presented is A's alleged quality of co-existing with B as distin-
guished from A's quality of having been found by measurement
to have a date identical with B's.
A co-existence of this sort, an unmeasured simultaneity, may,
it seems, be presented without being presented as incomplete.
We seem on occasion to consider simultaneity without consider-
ing measurements, just as we seem on occasion to consider red-
ness without considering wave-lengths, and just as we seem on
occasion to consider heat without considering mercury-filled
thermometers. Such an unmeasured simultaneity, presented as an
absolute quality, subsists. And there are instances of it which are,
we find, real. Presented as a quality of some entity A, that is to
say, unmeasured simultaneity with B is presented, we find, with-
out any of the characteristics which would mark it out as unreal
in our sense of "reality"; and, so presented, it is listed as real in
the appendix to Chapter Three. Thus the phase of the pitcher
and the phase of the batter which we considered at the beginning
of the previous chapter were, we hold, simultaneous with one an-
other. In taking it for granted that the pitcher, alleged to be out-
there-in-front, was present with respect to the batter, we were not
taking for granted an alleged quality of the pitcher's which he
did not have. 4
In this chapter, we have said, we do not take it for granted that
St. Louis in Notre Dame was 'here' with respect to Napoleon in
Notre Dame. St. Louis was real and Napoleon real. But did St.
Louis have the real quality of being before-Napoleon?
Napoleon, let us assume, had a mental attitude which reached
St. Louis as its object. And this mental attitude may have been at
the terminus of motions originating in St. Louis. There may have
been motions, that is to say, "which, although delayed in trans-
mission and transformed by the intermediaries" through whom
they passed, originated in St. Louis and terminated in Napoleon's
mental attitude directed upon St. Louis. 5 But St. Louis as a sub-
stance is to be distinguished from his alleged quality of being
prior to Napoleon. It is St. Louis's alleged quality of being
prior to Napoleon, let us remember, that at this point concerns
us. And this alleged quality of St. Louis's, it may be said, can
364
hardly be believed to have initiated motions which resulted in
Napoleon's mental attitude directed upon it.
Just as the pitcher's alleged quality of being out-there-in-front
with respect to the batter has no special channel through which
to affect the spectator apparently aware of it, so, it may be said, St.
Louis's alleged quality of being prior to Napoleon has no special
channel open to it through which to affect Napoleon. But where-
as "the man on my ceiling, presented as having no special channel
through which to affect the mental attitude of mine apparently
directed upon him" is, we have seen, unreal, the other-side-of-the-
moon, "presented as having no special channel through which
to affect the mental attitude of yours apparently directed upon
it," is real. 6 The entity, that is to say, which is presented as having
no special channel through which to affect the mental attitude
apparently directed upon it, need not be presented as generally
discredited and need not be unreal. So far as we have yet seen,
the quality of being prior to Napoleon which is alleged to inhere
in King Louis IX may be real even though it is not a sine qua
non with respect to Napoleon's mental attitude apparently di-
rected upon it and even though it is presented as having no spe-
cial channel open to it through which to bring about that mental
attitude of Napoleon's. We may be puzzled as to how Napoleon
could come to be aware of St. Louis as past with respect to him*
But it does not follow that Napoleon had no mental attitude
apparently aware of St. Louis as past. And it does not follow that
St. Louis's alleged quality of being past with respect to Napoleon
was unreal.
It is with a thirteenth century date that Louis IX is alleged to
have existed. But could St. Louis in the thirteenth century have
had the quality of being prior to a Napoleon who did not yet
exist? It may be said that it was not until the fourteenth cen-
tury that St. Louis acquired the quality of being prior to four-
teenth century events, not until the fifteenth century that he
acquired the quality of being prior to fifteenth century events,
and so on. In the thirteenth century, it may be said, St. Louis's
alleged quality of being prior to Napoleon was unreal. But
what was the situation in the thirteenth century? No one was
aware of Napoleon as the victor at Marengo or as a prisoner at St.
Helena. If he was an object at all for thirteenth century mental
365
attitudes, he was an object only in so far as thirteenth century
mental attitudes may have been directed upon some unnamed fu-
ture person who might be a ruler and a soldier. But St. Louis's
alleged quality of being prior to Napoleon, presented as not an
object, or as not a definite object, for mental attitudes contempor-
aneous with it, need not be unreal. It may have been real, though
an object only for mental attitudes occurring centuries later. And
if it is real, its thirteenth century date belongs to it. To be aware,
apparently, of Louis IX as now lacking the quality of being
prior to Napoleon and of Louis IX as now having the quality of
being prior to Napoleon is, as we have seen, 7 to exchange one sub-
sistent for another.
So far as we have yet seen, the quality of being prior to Napo-
leon, alleged to inhere in the thirteenth century Louis IX, need
not be unreal. Indeed the subsisting quality of being prior to
Napoleon, which we are considering, is, we find, real. It is pre-
sented without the characteristic of lacking position or date; it is
presented without the characteristic of being generally dis-
credited; and, so presented, it is listed as real in the Appendix to
Chapter Three. Similarly with the quality of being subsequent to
Napoleon, an entity presented as a quality of Napoleon III.
Neither Napoleon III nor his alleged quality of being after-
Napoleon were percepts of Napoleon's. Neither Napoleon III nor
his alleged quality of being after-Napoleon had special channels
open to them through which to affect the mental attitudes which
Napoleon may have directed upon them. But just as St. Louis's
alleged quality of being before-Napoleon is presented without
any of the characteristics which would mark it out as unreal in
our sense of "reality," so is Napoleon the Third's alleged quality
of being after-Napoleon. Just as St. Louis had the real quality of
being before Napoleon, so Napoleon III had the real quality of
being after-Napoleon.
With respect to today's events, to be sure, King Louis IX,
Napoleon Bonaparte and Napoleon III are all, let us agree, past.
But what is past, it may be said, no longer is. If we may say that
"eatistence" as commonly used is predicated only of that which
is somehow important, 8 only of that which in some fashion must
be reckoned with, then the tendency of many languages to iden-
tify "existence" with "present existence" points perhaps to the
366
fact that what is past need no longer be combatted or propitiated
by living men. But using "existence" in the sense in which we are
using it, the proposition: "St. Louis is dead" does not imply the
proposition: "St. Louis is unreal." An entity which is presented as
past with respect to today's events need not be presented with any
of the characteristics which would mark it out as unreal. As we
use "existence" and "reality," an entity presented as past may be
real just as may an entity presented as present.
Similarly with an entity presented as future. Just as, using
"existence" in some sense other than that in which we are using
this term, an event which is alleged to have occurred last year no
longer exists, so, using "existence" in some sense other than that
in which we are using it, an event, which, it is alleged, will occur
next year, may be said to have only potential existence, may be
said to be unrealized rather than real. As we use "existence" and
"reality," however, to have potential existence is not to be non-
existent; to be as yet unrealized is not to be unreal. In our sense
of "reality," to be sure, an entity is unreal if it appears with the
characteristic of being generally discredited. And, it may be
agreed, no event, which, it is alleged, will occur next year, is so
firmly believed in by today's thinkers as are Napoleon Bonaparte
and today's sunrise. The inauguration of Lincoln as President in
1861 appears, let us say, with the characteristic of being generally
believed in, whereas the inauguration of a President of the
United States in 1961 appears with the characteristic of being less
firmly believed in. Our government may be overthrown; there
may be no inauguration in 1961. There may be some cosmic
catastrophe; and there may be no sunrise tomorrow. Nevertheless
the inauguration in 1961 appears without the characteristic of be-
ing generally discredited. Or, rather, there is a subsisting in-
auguration in 1961 which, appearing without the characteristic of
being generally discredited, is listed as real in the appendix to
Chapter Three.
The inauguration of 1961 is real; and it has, we hold, the real
quality of being subsequent to certain real events of today. But
if certain alleged future events are real, if, for example, there
will be an inauguration in 1961, then, it may be said, there is an
inevitability with respect to future events which rules out chance
and accident. "What will be, will be" is a tautological proposi-
367
tion. But it is frequently understood as an assertion that we can
not affect the course of history, that future events are already de-
termined. And in holding that certain future events are real, we
may be held to be committed to the doctrine that future events
are determined by present events, to the doctrine that there is a
compulsion issuing out of the past and present which makes the
future inevitable.
Let us recall however our discussion of the necessary proposi-
tion: "F must exist." "F must exist" is true, we have said, 9 if F
exists and if there is in the context some proposition: "E exists"
which implies the existence of F. If E implies the existence of F,
then F must exist and it is not possible for F not to exist. If the
inauguration of 1961 exists, then it is not possible for there not
to be an inauguration in 1961. An implication from one proposi-
tion to another is however to be distinguished from an alleged
compulsion linking prior physical events with subsequent physical
events. It is some proposition: "E exists" which implies that there
will be an inauguration in 1961, not some prior physical event
which makes the 1961 inauguration inevitable. Moreover, whether
or not "There must be an inauguration in 1961" is true depends
upon the instance of : "E exists" that occurs in the context. If we
start with the premise that the 1961 inauguration is real, then it is
not possible for there to be no inauguration in 1961. If we start
with the premise that I today am really aware of a 1961 inaugura-
tion, then, since a real subject-object relational situation implies
real terms, 10 it is again impossible for there to be no inaugura-
tion in 196 L But if what is given is merely the fact that I seem to
be aware of a 1961 inauguration, if it is left undetermined
whether my real mental attitude has a real object or whether it
is merely "as though" ll I were aware of a 1961 inauguration, then
our premises do not imply the 1961 inauguration and it is pos-
sible for there to be no inauguration in 1961.
Certain future events are real; and certain future events are
real objects for today's mental attitudes. On the other hand, just
as I may seem to be aware of a griffin or of a centaur, so I may
seem to be aware of an inauguration in 1961 or may seem to be
aware of myself as falling down the stairs five minutes hence. In
tb latter instance, the mental attitude which is as though it were
directed towards an accident on the stairs may itself bring about
368
the caution that avoids the accident. In short, certain future en-
tities are real and necessarily so in so far as assertions that they
will occur are accepted as premises. But this implies neither that
what is to be flows inexorably out of what is; nor that present men-
tal attitudes are impotent. Indeed it would seem that determinists
and indeterminists alike must accept the doctrine that certain
future entities are real. If there is no present King of France, it is
not true that the present King of France is bald and it is not true
that the present King of France is not bald. 12 If all alleged future
entities are unreal, they are neither determined by what has gone
before nor do they spring up without being determined by what
has gone before. If they are unreal, nothing can truly be said
about them other than that they do not exist or about the man-
ner in which they are related to the events that precede them. If
one is to hold that no future entities are real, one can be neither a
determinist nor an indeterminist; one must hold that "the future
is simply nothing at all." 13
We hold then that Napoleon Bonaparte is real, has the real
quality of being 'after* with respect to St. Louis, the real quality
of being 'before' with respect to today's mental attitudes and the
real quality of being 'before' with respect to the inauguration of
1961. Similarly we hold that the inauguration of 1961 is real, that
it has the real quality of being 'after' with respect to Napoleon, the
real quality of being 'after' with respect to today's mental attitudes
and the real quality of being 'before' with respect to the inaugura-
tion of 1965. To be sure, there are some respects in which the inau-
guration of 1961 which is in the future differs from the inauguration
of 1861 which is in the past. When I today am aware of the inaugu-
ration of 1861, 1 know that it was Lincoln who was being inducted
into office. I may know what the weather was and what Lnicoln said
on that occasion. In short, the object towards which my mental
attitude is directed is presented with a wealth of detail. Not so
the inauguration of 1961. 1 am aware of the inauguration of 1961
neither as the inauguration of a Democrat nor as the inaugura-
tion of a Republican, neither as occurring in fair weather nor in
foul. My object is vague. And if perchance my object is not vague,
if, for example, the President-elect to be inducted into office in
1961 is presented to me as John Stevenson, a Democrat from
Indianapolis, my mental attitude directed towards such a sub-
369
sistent is accompanied by a feeling of incredulity. Real entities
appearing as future appear in the main with few characteristics,
appear in the main as indefinite objects. But they need not appear
as entities that no one has or will have as definite objects. "When
I think of paleontology," we have said, 14 "I think of nothing defi-
nite." "But my subsistent takes on the characteristic of appearing
with more details to paleontologists." So it is with the inaugura-
tion of 196L Although this future entity towards which my pres-
ent mental attitude is directed is bare of details, it appears with
the characteristic of being a more definite object for other sub-
jects with respect to whom it will not be future. Subsistents which
appear with the characteristic of being only indefinite objects for
all of the mental attitudes which are or will be directed towards
them are unreal. But in so far as future entities appear with the
characteristic of being indefinite objects for certain subjects
only, they need not be unreal.
Indeed the distinction to which we have pointed between fu-
ture entities and past entities is not so much a distinction between
what is future with respect to today's mental attitudes and what is
past with respect to today's mental attitudes as it is a distinction
between what is future and what is past with respect to the
particular mental attitude which happens to be aware of it. The
real Napoleon is presented with some detail to us; but to St.
Louis he can only have appeared as an indefinite object, as he
who would rule France at the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury. 15 Indefiniteness is not so much a characteristic of real en-
tities which are future with respect to us as it is a characteristic
with which entities appear to mental attitudes which precede
them.
Last chapter's catcher has the real quality of being a short dis-
tance behind with respect to the batter; 16 Napoleon III and the
inauguration of 1961 have each the real quality of being 'after*
with respect to Napoleon Bonaparte. Last chapter's pitcher has
the real quality of being out there in front with respect to the
batter; and St. Louis has the real quality of being past or 'before'
with respect to Napoleon. But along with the pitcher, the base-
ball diamond too has the real quality of being out there in front
with respect to the catcher. The position which the baseball
diamond has with respect to the catcher is less definite than that
370
which the pitcher has. Yet the indefinite position with which the
baseball diamond appears is not so indefinite as to require us to
call the subsisting baseball diamond and its subsisting position
with respect to the catcher unreal. 17
So it is with the Middle Ages in France and its date with respect to
Napoleon. As contrasted with a subsisting St. Louis, the subsisting
Middle Ages in France is presented to us as having a less definite
date with respect to Napoleon. It is presented merely as some cen-
turies past with respect to him. Yet such a date with respect to Na-
poleon is not so indefinite a date as to require us to call the subsisting
Middle Ages in France which appears with such a date, unreal. On
the other hand, that which appears merely as having occurred once
upon a time, that which appears as being presented to no one
with a more definite date than "once upon a time/' is unreal. And
that which is presented as everlasting is, considered as a single ob-
ject, likewise unreal. These last-named entities are unreal along
with the entity which appears supra-temporal, out of time, and
along with the entity which appears dated with respect to private
ideas or fictional objects only, the entity which we have described
as one that "explicitly or implicitly appears as undated with re-
spect to some other entity while appearing explicitly or implicitly
with the claim that that other entity is nevertheless real.'* 18
The pitcher's center of gravity, the pitcher, the baseball dia-
mond, the Cosmos: this series has its analog in the last moment
of St. Louis's life, St. Louis, the Middle Agas in France, the
world of all temporal events. The Cosmos and the world of all
temporal events are unreal. The last moment of St. Louis's life is
still to be discussed. But the pitcher and the baseball diamond are
real, together with their more or less indefinite positions with
respect to the catcher. And St. Louis and the Middle Ages in
France are real, together with their more or less indefinite dates
with respect to Napoleon. The pitcher and the baseball diamond,
having indefinite positions with respect to the catcher, have ex-
tension. And St. Louis and the Middle Ages in France, having
indefinite dates with respect to Napoleon, have, let us agree, du-
ration.
Now date, like position, is relative. If I use the expression: "the
date of St. Louis" or "the date of the Middle Ages," and if it is
agreed that I am not referring to the dates that these entities may
371
be alleged to have with respect to Napoleon or with respect to
Christ or with respect to any other point of reference, then my
expression: "the date of St. Louis" puts before me no subsisting
quality alleged to be absolute whose reality or unreality might be
considered. But just as in the preceding chapter we found the
point P' to have the absolute quality of spatiality which we de-
scribed as "the possibility of having position with respect to vari-
ous entities/' 19 so we hold that St. Louis and the Middle Ages
have each the real absolute quality of temporality. St. Louis and
the Middle Ages have temporality absolutely, not temporality
with respect to Napoleon and temporality with respect to the
inauguration of 1961. Similarly duration, which we have found to
be a real quality of St. Louis and of the Middle Ages, is an ab-
solute quality. St. Louis and the Middle Ages have duration ab-
solutely, not duration with respect to Napoleon and duration
with respect to some phase of the planet Jupiter.
To be sure, if we have clocks at hand to measure the 'length of
time' that an entity endures, the number of seconds that our
clocks tell off to us will depend upon the speed with which we
and our clocks are moving with respect to the entity whose dura-
tion we are measuring. Napoleon may have a duration of fifty-two
years with respect to an observer at rest with respect to him, a
duration of a different number of years with respect to an ob-
server on Sirius. Measured duration, duration numbered by
seconds or years, .is relative. It presupposes motion between the
enduring entity whose duration is being measured and one or
another of the spatio-temporal entities outside it from which it
might be measured. Yet this measured duration which is relative
points back to the quality of duration which we find not relative.
If Napoleon lacked the quality of temporality, if he were non-
temporal, we could not without contradicting ourselves attribute
to him either the quality of being earlier than Napoleon III or
the quality of being later than St. Louis. And if he lacked the
quality of duration the unmeasured or pre-measured duration
that we hold to be absolute we could not without contradicting
ourselves attribute to him either the quality of enduring fifty-two
years as measured by one observer or the quality of enduring
through a different number of years as measured by another. If he
did not endure, his duration would not be there for various ob-
372
servers to measure.
Napoleon, St. Louis and the Middle Ages have each of them
duration. That is to say, the duration which I present to myself
as a quality of each of them does not appear undated with respect
to real entities, does not appear lacking position with respect to
its contemporaries, does not appear generally discredited, and is
listed as real in the appendix to Chapter Three. Like unnumbered
length or extension, 20 this unnumbered duration is vague. It does
not have the one number that comes from measuring duration
from some preferred point of view, that comes from measuring
duration, for example, from some entity at rest with respect to it.
In itself it is unnumbered, being equally receptive to various
numbers. So it is with temporality. Temporality is not the date
that an entity has with respect to some preferred point of
reference, not date for example with respect to an event at the be-
ginning of the Christian era. It is not date with respect to some
implied point of reference, but rather the possibility of being
dated with respect to various points of reference.
But let us come back to duration. If Napoleon has, as we hold,
the real quality of duration, how, we may ask, do we become
aware of it? Events in his early life may have been witnessed and
ultimately relayed to my present mental attitude. Although these
events are past with respect to me, a chain may be traced from
them to me and they may be both the ultimate causes and the
immediate though non-presentobjects of my present mental
attitude. Similarly his last words at St. Helena may have initiated
disturbances in the air and these waves may be traced in one
form or another to the present mental attitude of mine which is
directed towards Napoleon's last days. But how can the enduring
Napoleon who began in Corsica and ended at St. Helena be the
cause of a mental attitude of mine? How can a single impulse
start from the enduring Napoleon and bring about a present men-
tal attitude directed towards an enduring entity? Even extension
can be held to be a percept with greater plausibility. For we can
imagine a wave-front advancing from an extended object and be-
ing foreshortened more and more as it approaches the eye. But
in the case of Napoleon we would have to imagine a single front
formed by impulses started at different dates, a sort of wheeling
column whose earlier and later elements by the time that I be-
373
come aware of the enduring Napoleon have developed simultan-
eity with one another. We may agree that this is not a satisfactory
account of the genesis of the awareness of duration. But what
then are the alternatives offered us?
It may be held that, corresponding to the earlier and later
phases of an enduring entity, there result in the first instance
earlier and later ideas. But to be aware of the enduring entity as
a whole, as enduring, the acts of apprehension which have been
successive must be replaced by a mental state existing at a given
date which refers equally to the earlier and to the later phases of
the enduring object. Hence, it may be held, the earlier idea is
reproduced at a later moment when the later idea is present; and
it may be held that some web of connection is then spun between
the ideas, now simultaneously held, to correspond to the object's
duration, to correspond, that is to say, to the connection in the ob-
ject between its earlier and later phases. 21 It has been our doctrine,
however, that private ideas do not exist, and, hence, cannot be
reproduced. Mental attitudes may be repeated. An early phase of
an enduring entity may be a percept with respect to one mental
attitude and a memory with respect to a later mental attitude be-
longing to the same mind-person. The successive mental attitudes
of the same mind-person may have the early phase of the endur-
ing entity as their common object, their common direct object.
But the early phase of the enduring entity does not change its
dates, nor does it become mental, by becoming the object of the
second mental attitude. Making these changes to bring the doc-
trine we are discussing into alignment with our own epistemologi-
cal views, we may agree to the possibility of a subject having a
mental attitude directed towards a later phase of the enduring .ob-
ject and simultaneously a mental attitude which, like some previ-
ous mental attitude of his, is directed towards an earlier phase of
the enduring object. Yet if this be all, the subject is not aware
of the enduring entity itself, not aware of earlier and later phases
as phases of one enduring entity. The problem of accounting for
the awareness of the object's duration is still unsolved.
It may be held that the awareness of the connection in the ob-
ject is initiated in the mind itself. But this is mere acknowledge-
ment of failure to discover processes travelling from object to
subject without discovering intra-cerebral processes to substitute
374
for them. Nor does failure to discover processes travelling from ob-
ject to subject prove the alleged object to be unreal. For whether
or not the alleged object is real, whether or not, in this case, the
alleged enduring object really endures, depends upon such con-
siderations as whether or not the alleged enduring object appears
with the characteristic of being generally discredited. An entity,
such as tomorrow's sun or the inauguration of 1961, may be real
and may be the real object of my present mental attitude, even
though there is no process travelling from future object to pres-
ent mental attitude. 22 How much less proof of unreality there is
then in the fact that we can not find processes travelling from al-
leged object to present mental attitude! We hold then that
Napoleon, the Middle Ages in France, and the man who will be
inaugurated President in 1961, each of them has the real quality
of duration. And we hold that the reality of the quality of dura-
tion that each of these entities has is not affected by the unsatis-
factory outcome of our efforts to find processes, initiated by the
enduring object as a whole, that bring about the mental attitudes
directed upon this enduring object's duration.
Napoleon, we hold, had duration. There was, let us agree, an
early phase of his life which was spent in Corsica and a late phase
of his life which was spent on St. Helena. These phases, like
Napoleon taken as a unitary substance, have, we hold, duration.
Just as we use the word "part" to point to a substance 'discrimi-
nated' from a more extended substance that includes it, so we
use the word "phase" to point to a substance discriminated from
a more enduring substance that includes it. 23 Like Napoleon
taken as a whole, Napoleon on St. Helena is a substance, has
duration, and is dated with respect to various points of reference.
It has, to be sure, a lesser duration than the Napoleon from whom
it is discriminated as a phase; and the date which it has with re-
spect to Napoleon III, or with respect to today's events, is not
so indefinite. But Napoleon-on-St. Helena is a real enduring sub-
stance. Assuming now that each real substance has some quali-
ties, it would appear that a certain set of qualities inheres in
Napoleon on St. Helena, that another set of qualities inheres in
Napoleon taken as a whole, and that still another set inheres in
^apoleon's boyhood. According to Schopenhauer, 24 we may "de-
fine time as the possibility of opposite states in one and the same
375
thing." Yet it is not Napoleon taken as a unitary substance who
was both powerful and powerless. Strictly speaking, it was not
Caesar, but Caesar at moment M, who crossed the Rubicon. 25
Similarly it was Napoleon on St. Helena who was powerless,
Napoleon in some earlier phase who had tremendous power. As a
French flag is not red, not white and not blue but, rather, tri-
colored, so Napoleon taken as a whole was not powerful and not
powerless but, rather, has the quality of having been powerful
and powerless in turn. That is to say, different phases of Napoleon
have different qualities just as different parts of a French flag
have different colors. Substances do not have contradictory quali-
ties in so far as they have duration and have phases; any more
than they have contradictory qualities in so far as they have exten-
sion and have parts.
Along with Napoleon's boyhood, Napoleon while First Consul,
and Napoleon on St. Helena, substances which are real, let us
consider an alleged phase of Napoleon which is presented as being
Napoleon at the instant at which exactly half of his life had been
lived. Napoleon on St. Helena, we have remarked, has a lesser
duration than Napoleon as a whole; but it has the quality of
duration. The entity however which presents itself as Napoleon
at the instant at which exactly half of his life had been lived ap-
pears as an instantaneous phase, as a phase without duration. As
the baseball pitcher's center of gravity appears as having position
with respect to the batter but no extension, so this instantaneous
phase of Napoleon appears as having a date with respect to today's
events but no duration. The pitcher's center of gravity is no per-
cept. The point is a limit that is never reached by division. 26
Similarly we may agree that nothing happens at an instant. The
camera's shutter is not shut as soon as it is opened. The most
minute impulse that reaches us, we may agree, has its origin, not
in an instantaneous phase of the object, but in an emitting part
whose action 'takes some time.' Yet none of these observations, if
true, imply that an alleged instantaneous phase is unreal. The in-
tantaneous phase of Napoleon that I present to myself does not
appear undated with respect to real entities, does not appear
lacking position with respect to its contemporaries, does not ap-
pear generally discredited. Like the point on the line PP' or like
the pitcher's center of gravity, it is, we hold, real.
376
But whereas there is an instantaneous phase of Napoleon and
an instantaneous phase of the Duke of Wellington contemporan-
eous with it, there is no 'instant.' An instantaneous phase, not of
Napoleon and not of the Duke of Wellington, but of the cosmos,
subsists with too indefinite a position with respect to its con-
temporaries. There is perhaps a set of real instantaneous phases
contemporaneous with one another; and there may be a universal
which has these instantaneous phases as its instances. But these in-
stantaneous phases, taken together, form no real individual to be
called an "instant." Similarly with things and phases of things
which endure. There is a set of contemporaneous substances:
Napoleon in 1812, the Duke of Wellington in 1812, and the like
which are alike with respect to duration. There may be a uni-
versal substance which has these individual substances as its in-
stances; there may, that is to say, be the universal substance:
'Thing enduring through 1812.' Similarly there may be a uni-
versal quality which has the durations of various individual sub-
stances as its instances; there may, that is to say, be the universal
quality: 'enduring through 1812.' But there is no real individual
substance that we put before us by taking Napoleon in 1812, the
Duke of Wellington in 1812, and so on, collectively. There is no
year 1812 and no real entity which is the quality of such an al-
leged collective individual substance.
Let us suppose that I return home after having been away on a
short trip. The phase of my life during which I am away on
the trip has its duration; and the phase of my home while I
am absent has its duration. It may be that, when these two endur-
ing entities are measured from some spatio-temporal entity out-
side them, their durations will be assigned different numbers. But
let us direct our attention to the unnumbered or prenum-
bered quality of duration that this phase o my life has and to the
unnumbered or prenumbered quality of duration that this phase
of my home has. It may be said that the phases of the two entities
are alike with respect to the unnumbered quality of duration
that each of them has. But there is nevertheless no duration begin-
ning when I leave home and ending when I return that is not the
duration of some substance. "A distance," we have said, 2 * "is a
certain line or path with the emphasis on the termini"; and an
interval, we may say, is the phase of a certain substance with the
377
emphasis on its beginning and end. As there is no distance that
is not, so to speak, imbedded in some path, so there is no interval
that is not, so to speak, imbedded in the phase of some sub-
stance. Now, when we do not specify "distance by automobile
road" or "distance by water," the distance between P and P'
is imbedded, so to speak, in the straight line PP'. But when we
refer to the interval between my departure from home and my
return, are we referring to the interval that is a phase of my home
or to the interval that is a phase of my life? "Interval" we con-
clude, differs from "distance" in this respect. Whereas "distance
between P and P'/' as contrasted with "distance between P and P'
by route A," refers to single path, "interval between P and P' "
that is not similarly specified is either ambiguous or points to a
universal whose instances are phases of substances that are alike in
that they have identical unnumbered durations.
Enduring from my departure from home to my return, there
are phases of two substances, and hence two intervals, that we
have found real. Perhaps there is a phase of a third or of a fourth
substance which begins when I leave home and ends when I re-
turn. But we must remember that no entity is definitely to be
called "real" unless it is presented without the characteristic of
being an indefinite object and unless it is enumerated in the ap-
pendix to Chapter Three. Napoleon is real, and the instantaneous
phase of Napoleon at which exactly half of his life had been
lived; the Middle Ages are real, and the inauguration of 1961.
But since it is only singular or particular affirmative existential
propositions which are both true and informative, the reality of a
whole world of temporal entities can not be validated in a single
proposition. The Middle Ages in France, Napoleon's boyhood
and the inauguration of 1961, all have duration and all have dates
with respect to various entities such as the birth of Christ or my
present mental attitude. But no alleged event of the year 1,000,
no duration that may be attributed to such an event and no date
that such an alleged event may seem to have with respect to
Napoleon or to you, is to be accepted as real until that event, that
duration or those dates are shown to be free from the character-
istics that would mark them out as unreal, and until they are
pointed out as real in the propositions in which real entities are
enumerated. What we have found real up to this point, in short,
378
are a few instantaneous phases, a few substances having duration,
a few intervals. And although we may take it for granted that
there are many enduring entities like Napoleon and like the in-
auguration of 1961, we have thus far no basis for concluding that
their durations are contiguous and that, taken together, they com-
pletely fill an alleged Time-continuum.
In the preceding chapter we pointed to the distinction between
material spaces and non-material spaces. Some distant spherical
figure may be real; and yet we may so define 'body' and 'matter'
that this spherical substance is not a body, is not material. 28 We
may present to ourselves something equal in size and shape to
the sun, something that at each moment is in the same direction
as the sun, but twice as distant. If, now, we may agree that there
is no 'matter' where this substance is, what we have before us is a
non-material substance of definite size and shape whose succes-
sive phases, like the successive phases of the sun itself, lie in dif-
ferent directions with respect to the observer at a given point on
the earth's surface. What we have before us is a substance alleged
to have the quality of duration, a substance alleged to differ from
the sun in its distance from us and in the fact that it is not a body.
This alleged substance presented as immaterial is, let us agree,
real. For no instantaneous phase of it appears lacking in position
with respect to contemporaneous real entities; its various endur-
ing phases, like the corresponding enduring phases of the sun,
appear dated with respect to various real entities; and, presented as
immaterial, it is listed as real in the appendix to Chapter Three.
Along, then, with the Middle Ages in France, Napoleon and the
inauguration of 1961, there are various enduring entities that are
non-material, various enduring entities whose instantaneous
phases are all empty spaces. Yet even when we consider real en-
during entities that are non-material along with real enduring
entities that are material, we have no basis for asserting that the
set of entities with real durations, in addition to overlapping, com-
pletely fills an alleged Time-continuum.
It may be held, however, that each enduring substance, whether
material or immaterial, implies some other substance preceding it.
Just as, when we follow the State of Wyoming to its boundaries,
we do not stop but become aware of neighboring States that
bound it, 29 so it may be held that the awareness of each entity
379
having a certain duration, whether material or immaterial,
leads us on to the awareness of some predecessor. But if the al-
leged predecessor subsists as no one's definite object, it and its al-
leged prior date are unreal. Just as, "with respect to any real en-
tity having position, we are never frustrated in the attempt to
present ourselves alleged parts of space surrounding it," so it may
be that we are never frustrated in the attempt to present to our-
selves alleged predecessor substances having prior dates with re-
spect to Napoleon or with respect to the birth of Christ. But with
respect to those enduring substances where alleged prior sub-
stances appear as no one's definite objects, there exists no prior
substance, whether material or immaterial, and no duration or
prior date as a real quality of it. Even empty time, to put it
colloquially, is no continuum.
When we limit our attention to material substances, the doc-
trine that every real entity implies a predecessor receives support
from the dictum that every event has a cause. For if every material
substance points back to a preceding material substance which
brought it into being, there is an unbroken series of real material
substances and hence an unbroken series of more and more re-
mote dates. If, however, there are substances, material or im-
material, where alleged predecessor substances appear as no one's
definite objects, then there are events which we fail to trace
back to causes. Alleged entities, appearing as no one's definite
objects, are not real and not causes. The material substances, that
might otherwise be regarded as their consequents, have no real
material substances preceding them and no real causes.
We are never frustrated when we attempt to put before our-
selves more and more distant points. There is a point which is
the farthest away of all real points, the point, namely, which is
farthest away of all definite objects. 30 In a similar fashion we can
present to ourselves, as fairly definitely-dated objects, substances
of a million years ago, a trillion years ago, and so on. To be real,
however, an entity must not only be presented without the
characteristic of lacking definite dates; it must also be presented
without the characteristic of lacking position with respect to real
contemporaries. The substances consequently that are the most
remote in time of all real substances are those, not presented as
lacking in spatial relations with their contemporaries, that are
380
the most remote in time of all definite objects. Assuming however
that our objects are not limited to bodies, we can place before
ourselves set after set of spatially related contemporaries, one
prior to another. The earliest set that we thus place before our-
selves includes the earliest of all substances; the dates that its
several members have are the earliest of all dates.
What shall we say, however, with respect to the series of earlier
and earlier substances or phases of substances that are bodies?
We may present to ourselves phases of the sun at various past
dates, one phase earlier than the other. But we may come to
some alleged phase of the sun which is not really a phase of the
sun and not really a body. Although we will not be frustrated
when we search for earlier and earlier substances, we may reach
a point where the entities presented to us, appearing as material,
are all presented as generally discredited. The earliest body, it
follows, may have a later date than the earliest substance. For the
date of the earliest body depends, not merely upon the extent to
which we persevere in presenting to ourselves earlier and earlier
definite objects, but upon the qualities which we insist on sub-
stances having before we will agree to call them "bodies." If we
follow Descartes in calling each extended entity a "body," the
earliest substance is a body. But if "body" has a more limited
denotation, there may be early phases of empty spaces which have
only other empty spaces contemporaneous with them; there may
be early phases of empty spaces which are real and which precede
each body that is real.
Our discussion of the last few paragraphs concerns the past. We
have asked whether each event points back to a cause which must
have preceded it, how far the series of earlier and earlier sub-
stances extends, how far the series of earlier and earlier bodies.
"The world's having a beginning/' it has however been said, 31
does not "derogate from the infinity of its duration a parte post."
An event, it may be felt, implies that a series of preceding causes
is given and real, but does not imply the existence of an equally
definite series of later consequents. 82 As we use the term "reality,"
however, the inauguration of a President of the United States in
1961 is, we have found, real. 58 And since the inauguration of 1961
is real along with the inauguration of 1861, since certain future
events, certain present events and certain past events are equally
381
real, then causal relations, if there are any, may flow from present
events to future events as well as they may flow from past events
to present events. Whatever be the sense of "cause" in which the
inauguration of 1861 was caused or affected by the election of
I860, it is in this sense of "cause" that the inauguration of 1961
will be caused or affected by the election of 1960. Whatever com-
pulsion or lack of compulsion flowed from the election of 1860 to
the inauguration of 1861, a similar compulsion or lack of compul-
sion will flow from the election of 1960 to the inauguration of
1961.
Moreover, the conditions determining the truth or falsity of the
proposition: "There may be no inauguration in 1961" are analog-
ous to the conditions determining the truth or falsity of the propo-
sition: "There may have been no inauguration in 1861." "There
may be no inauguration in 1961" is true only if there are no prop-
ositions in the context which imply a 1961 inauguration. And
"There may have been no inauguration in 1861" is true only if
there are no propositions in the context which imply an 1861 in-
auguration. To be sure, the inauguration of 1961 is not so firmly
believed in by today's thinkers as is the inauguration of 186L 34
Hence an instance of "There may be no inauguration in 1961,"
occurring today, may occur in a context in which there is no
proposition implying a 1961 inauguration; whereas an instance
of "There may have been no inauguration in 1861," occurring
today, is likely to occur in a context in which there is a proposi-
tion implying an 1861 inauguration. But if we start with the pre-
mise that certain future events are real and certain past events
real, it is just as impossible for these future events to be unreal as
it is for these past events to be unreal. And if certain alleged
future events are real, as we hold that they are, the alleged re-
lational situations into which they enter with preceding events
that have affected them are just as real as the relational situations
into which past events entered with their predecessors.
There are however past events with respect to which prior
events, alleged to have affected them, or alleged merely to have
preceded them, appear as no one's definite objects. There are,
that is to say, past events which had no predecessors. 35 Just so,
there are real future events such that alleged subsequent events,
alleged to have been affected by them, or alleged merely to have
382
followed them, appear as no one's definite objects and are unreal.
And just as there is an end both to the series of earlier and earlier
material substances that are real and to the series of earlier and
earlier immaterial substances that are real, so there is an end
both to the series of later and later material substances that are
real and to the series of later and later immaterial substances that
are real.
We hold then that there were substances contemporaneous
with one another, possibly immaterial, which were the earliest
real substances, and whose dates with respect to various points of
reference are the earliest of all real dates. We hold that there was
a first real body which, assuming "body" to have a more limited
denotation than "substance" may have been later than the first
substances and may have had only empty spaces contemporaneous
with it. We hold that, beginning with the earliest body, there
have been, are, and will be, various enduring bodies and various
instantaneous phases of bodies; also various enduring substances
which may not be bodies, and various instantaneous phases of such
substances. And, finally, we hold that there will be a last body, or
bodies, and, possibly subsequently, substances contemporaneous
with one another that will be the last substances.
But how full of material substances is the alleged interval be-
tween the earliest material substance and the latest material sub-
stance? And how full of substances, material or immaterial, is the
alleged interval between the earliest of all substances, material or
immaterial, and the latest of all substances? Let us imagine a
day of none but immaterial substances, alleged to intervene
between a set of enduring bodies preceding it and a set of
enduring bodies following it. On the hypothesis that there has
been a day of empty time, a day on which no events occurred
and no bodies existed, preceding bodies could not have been at
the source of motions travelling continuously through bodies and
finally affecting us who are subsequent to this allegedly im-
material day. But an immaterial day is not, by hypothesis, a non-
existing day. And impulses, alleged to have their source in bodies
preceding it, may be held to have travelled through this day's non-
material substances just as motions originating in the sun may be
held to have reached us across empty spaces. Indeed even if it
were held that there were no motions reaching us across this day
383
from bodies that had preceded it, it would not follow that these
alleged earlier bodies were unreal or that we could not be aware
of them. For tomorrow's sunrise is real and a real object for my
present mental attitude, a situation in which there is likewise al-
leged to be no set of impulses travelling from object to mental atti-
tude. Our conclusion, to be sure, is not that there was an
immaterial day intervening between the earliest material sub-
stances and the latest material substances. But it would seem that
the hypothesis which we have been considering is not inconsistent
with any of the propositions that have been laid down in this
chapter.
Indeed let us go one step farther. Let us suppose that, between
the bodies which precede and the bodies which follow, there not
only are no material substances but no immaterial substances
either. What we are suggesting is as if bodies and immaterial sub-
stances existed through January 15, 1940, and as if no subsequent
bodies and no subsequent immaterial substances began until
January 17, 1940. Whereas on the hypothesis previously considered
alleged intervening bodies were assumed to be unreal, on this hy-
pothesis alleged intervening substances, presented as immaterial,
are likewise assumed to be unreal. Yet this hypothesis, like the pre-
ceding one, is not inconsistent with any of the propositions that
have been laid down in this chapter.
If no substance, material or immaterial, existed with a January
1 6th date, then, to be sure, there would be no substance enduring
from earlier than January 16th to later than January 16th. And
since what we call an "interval" is imbedded in the phase of some
enduring substance, 86 there would be no interval between the
events of January 15, 1940, and the events of today. If there were
no line OP, there would be no number to assign P's position
with respect to O. And without an interval between the events
of January 15, 1940, and the events of today, there would be no
number to assign the date that an event of January 15, 1940, has
with respect to us. But P may have position, albeit an unnumbered
position, with respect to O, without there being a line OP. And
an event having neither material nor immaterial entities as im-
mediate successors may have a date, albeit an unnumbered date,
with respect to today's events,
Thus there exists a series of enduring bodies whose durations
384
need not be contiguous. And there may exist an additional series
of immaterial enduring substances, whose durations, so far as
we have seen, likewise need not be continuous. But, whether an
enduring substance be material or immaterial, whether it have
material substances contiguous with it, immaterial substances con-
tiguous with it, or no substances at all contiguous with it, how
many instantaneous phases, we now ask, does it include?
As an example of an enduring substance which may be imma-
terial, we have pointed to what is equal in size and shape to the
sun, a substance that at each moment is in the same direction as
the sun, but twice as distant. 37 Within today's phase of this sub-
stancewhich we shall assume to be immaterial we can place
before ourselves as definite objects the instantaneous phase of
this substance as it was at three o'clock, the instantaneous phase
at four o'clock, the instantaneous phase at three thirty o'clock, and
so on. These instantaneous phases do not appear lacking in posi-
tion with respect to entities contemporaneous with them; for, even
if there are no instantaneous phases of bodies contemporaneous
with them, there may be other empty spaces. Nor do they appear
generally discredited; for, whereas we may doubt the measurabil-
ity of their dates, the bit of empty space that has an unmeasured
and perhaps immeasurable date with respect to me is no more
incredible than the point between the extremities of the line PP
that has an as yet unmeasured distance from me. 88 There exists,
then, a number of these instantaneous phases that do not appear as
no one's definite objects and that are listed in the appendix to
Chapter Three; just as there exists a number of points on a given
line. But since there are only so many that, appearing without the
characteristic of being no one's definite objects, are listed as real,
alleged instantaneous phases in excess of this number, appearing
as no one's definite objects, are unreal.
An enduring immaterial substance includes then at most a
finite number of instantaneous phases. And an enduring substance
that is a body, Napoleon, for example, or today's phase of the
Capitol at Washington, likewise includes at most a finite number
of instantaneous phases. In the one case as in the other, there are
only so many instantaneous phases that appear as definite objects
for some subject. In the one case as in the other, additional
alleged instantaneous phases appearing as no one's definite ob-
385
jects are unreal. But whereas the number of instantaneous phases
that an immaterial substance has is limited only by the limits to
our perseverance, whereas we are never frustrated in our efforts
to place before ourselves additional instantaneous phases of im-
material substances that are real, the situation may be different
with respect to substances that are bodies. It is possible, so far
as we have yet seen, that Napoleon or the Capitol at Washington
exists now and again, but not as a continuous body. Material
substances may be intermittent like the light of a lighthouse or
firefly. If so, if at four o'clock, for example, the Capitol has ceased
as a body and has not yet reappeared, then an alleged four o'clock
phase of the Capitol is no real phase of a material substance. If
bodies are intermittent, our discovery of additional real instan-
taneous phases of bodies will be limited not only by the limits
to our perseverance but by the subject matter itself. Certain al-
leged instantaneous phases of bodies will be unreal, not because
they appear as no one's definite objects, but because they are
believed to be phases of non-bodies rather than of bodies.
The hypothesis that enduring bodies do not endure continu-
ously but are interrupted by phases which are not phases of bodies
is analogous to the hypothesis that extended bodies are not con-
tinuous but include empty spaces within them. One may hold that
an atom has a certain extended position and may nevertheless hold
that there are empty spaces within it. The atom taken as a whole
might then well be described as partly material and partly imma-
terial and the empty space within it as an immaterial part of an
including substance that is partly material and partly immaterial.
Similarly with respect to the duration of the Capitol at Wash-
ington. If there is no four o'clock phase which is material, let us
not say that the duration of the Capitol is not continuous, but
let us rather describe the Capitol as an enduring substance which
in some of its phases is material and in some of its phases imma-
terial.
It may be observed that greater plausibility attaches to the
doctrine that the extended atom includes empty spaces within it
than attaches to the analogous doctrine that the enduring Capitol
includes phases which are immaterial. We become aware of posi-
tions within the extended atom at which we find no mass, no
qualities that would make these positions the positions of bodies.
386
We find extension and date; hence these positions are positions of
substances. But if we define 'body' so that only substances with
certain additional qualities are bodies, then these positions may
well be the positions of immaterial substances. Whether or not
the enduring Capitol has an immaterial phase at, let us say,
four o'clock will similarly depend in part upon the signification we
assign the term "body." Each phase of the enduring Capitol or of
an enduring atom \vill be extended and dated and will conse-
quently be a substance. But if additional qualities are required of
bodies, if by definition, for example, we restrict the denotation of
"body" to instances of jumping from one electronic orbit to an-
other, then there may be dates at which no such jumping is occur-
ring, dates belonging to phases which are immaterial substances.
Subject to such differences as have been pointed out, the situa-
tion with respect to enduring substances and enduring bodies
is analogous, we hold, to the situation with respect to extended
substances and extended bodies. Subject to such differences as
have been pointed out, the situation with respect to date, duration
and intelrval is, on the whole, analogous to the situation with re-
spect to position, extension and distance. There are, to be sure,
alleged differences in addition to those which we have pointed
out. When we measure distances and compare them in size, we
frequently make use of the method of superposition. We take a
standard distance, as, for example, that between the ends of a yard-
stick; and we place this distance, first over one of the distances
to be measured, and then over the other. When we are dealing with
intervals, however, it is held that a similar method can not be
followed. We can not retain the interval between two strokes of a
clock in order to have the terms of this interval coincide in date
with the terms of a subsequent interval. "In the measuring of ex-
tension," says Locke, 39 "there is nothing more required but the
application of the standard or measure we make use of to the thing
of whose extension we would be informed." "But in the measur-
ing of duration," he continues, "this can not be done; because no
two different parts of succession can be put together to measure
one another."
In the process of finding the length of the yard-long object on
my left equal to the length of the yard-long object on my right, I
compare the former with the length of the yardstick placed over it.
387
I find this in turn equal to the length of the yardstick in a subse-
quent phase when it has been moved into a different position, and
this in turn equal to the length of the object on my right over
which a still later phase of the yardstick comes to rest. Similarly
instead of comparing directly the duration that my clock has be-
tween two o'clock and three o'clock with the duration that it has
between three o'clock and four o'clock, I can make use of some
hour-long duration that begins shortly after two o'clock and
ends shortly after three o'clock. No matter how many hour-long
durations I interpolate, there are no two of them that can be
seen to be equal in duration. But similarly no matter how often I
stop my yardstick in its transit from the object on my left to that
on my right, I can not see that its length when in one position is
equal to the length it had just previously when it was in another
position.
To be sure, the object on my left and the object on my right are
equal in length only relatively, only with respect to certain spatio-
temporal entities. And the duration of my clock between two
o'clock and three o'clock likewise equals the duration of this
clock between three o'clock and four o'clock as measured from
certain spatio-temporal entities and not from others. For whether
it is lengths or durations that we are measuring and to which we
are assigning numbers, the process involves spatio-temporal en-
tities outside those whose lengths or durations are being meas-
ured. 40
Another allegation is that what is to the left of me and what
is to the right of me can change places whereas what is past and
what is future can not. But if a x was to the left of me and bi to
the right of me, it is later phases of a and b that have different posi-
tions. It is a 2 that is now to the right of me and it is b 2 that is
now to the left of me. Similarly however d 2 that is future with
respect to me can have a phase dx that preceded me and Ci that
is past can have a future phase c 2 .
Let us suppose however that I am considered not merely as a
point of reference but as a thinking, experiencing subject. I am
free to become aware of what is on my left before I become aware
of what is on my right or to become aware of what is on my
right before I become aware of what is on my left. But, it has
been felt, my awareness of earlier events precedes and can not
388
follow my awareness of subsequent events.
Real subject-object relations, however, exist between subjects
and objects that are not contemporaneous with one another as well
as between subjects and objects that are present with respect to one
another. 41 One mental attitude may be directed upon the inaugura-
tion of 1961 that is future with respect to it; and a subsequent
mental attitude may be directed upon the inauguration of 1861
that is past with respect to it. The temporal order obtaining
among objects may He the reverse of the temporal order obtaining
among the mental attitudes directed upon these objects. To some
extent this is true even when we limit our attention to instances
of perceiving. For I may perceive one of today's events and may
later have as my percept a past phase of a distant star. Thus, we
conclude that, only when we limit our attention to instances
of perceiving and only when in addition we put other limitations
upon our objects, only then do we find spatial entities reversible
in a way in which temporal entities are not. 42
The inauguration of 1861 that is past, an event that is present,
and the inauguration of 1961 that is future may all three be im-
mediate objects for mental attitudes that are contemporaneous
with one another. If this were not true, if in thinking at a given
moment about both the inauguration of 1861 and the inaugura-
tion of 1961 my immediate objects had to be present, one might
well wonder how these objects would be distinguished from one
another. They would differ, it might be answered, in that they
would refer to different dates. Yet such a difference, it might be
felt, would not suffice. It might be held that the two immediate
objects, both present, would have to differ in some characteristics
which are completely given in the present and yet which repre-
sent the temporal qualities of the non-present ultimate objects.
It may be to some such reasoning as this that we owe the doctrine
that ultimate objects having different dates are represented by
immediate objects having different positions. "In order to make
even internal changes afterwards conceivable to ourselves," says
Kant, 43 "we must make time, as the form of the internal sense,
figuratively comprehensible to ourselves by means of a line, and
the internal change by means of the drawing of this line (motion):
in other words, the successive existence of ourselves in different
states by means of an external intuition," Or, let us suppose that
389
we have to do with sheep which have passed before us one by one.
"If we picture to ourselves each of the sheep in the flock in suc-
cession and separately, we shall never have to do with more than
a single sheep." 44 If we are at this moment to think of the fifty
sheep that passed us in succession, it may be felt that we must
have fifty present images. And, Bergson holds, these images can
be recognized as fifty only if they are spatially external to one
another.
Even however if we should agree that immediate objects must
carry their differences with them and can not merely refer to
ultimate objects that differ among themselves, we should not
agree that immediate objects can not differ in date and so must
differ in position. Immediate objects, we hold, do differ in date.
I need not put dots on a sheet of paper to distinguish the in-
auguration of 1861 from the inauguration of 1961; nor need I
draw a line to be aware of the interval in Napoleon's life between
his birth and his death. This is not to say that dots and figures and
diagrams can not be of service in thinking about objects that differ
among themselves in date. They can be of service in thinking
about objects that differ in various ways. In particular, just as
they can be of service in thinking about objects that differ among
themselves in date, so they can be of service in thinking about ob-
jects that differ among themselves in position. For just as with
points on a line in front of me I can visualize and retain a picture
of successive events in the history of a clock or of a person or of a
nation, so a map enables me to visualize and to retain a picture of
the relative positions of various places, and a figure on a flat
surface enables me to visualize and to retain a picture of a three-
dimensional object. A map is of as much service in representing
the distance between New York and Chicago as a set of dots is in
representing the successive strokes of a clock. It is not then that
spatially distinct entities as such tend to substitute themselves as
objects of our thinking for temporally distinct entities, but that
such differences in position as can be included within the exten-
sion of a limited surface are useful representations, representing
now temporal differences, now spatial differences, now differences
of other sorts.
There are, as we have seen, various respects in which temporal
relations are not entirely analogous to spatial relations. In com-
390
paring durations there is no process available to us that is ex-
actly equivalent to the process of superposition. 45 There may be
several intervals between events having different dates, whereas
the straight line PP' indicates the distance between P and P'. 46
And there is no series o successive events that can be of the help
that maps and diagrams can be. If there were and if the analogy
between spatial relations and temporal relations were complete,
such differences in position as can be included within the exten-
sion of a limited surface could of course continue to be used to
represent temporal differences. Spatial relations could be substi-
tuted for temporal relations; but there would be nothing to be
gained from the substitution.
Despite such differences as have been pointed out, the differ-
ence, for example, that makes substitution helpful, we hold that
relations between entities having different dates are, on the whole,
analogous to relations between contemporaneous entities having
different positions. But it is to spatial relations between contem-
poraneous entities that we hold temporal relations on the whole
to be analogous. Spatial relations between non-contemporaneous
entities are a different matter. It will only be after we shall have
undertaken to enlarge the significations of "here" and "there"
that we shall be in a position to understand an assertion that
attributes a spatial relation to Napoleon III to what is contem-
poraneous but 'there' with respect to Napoleon Bonaparte. With-
out such an enlargement of the significations of "here" and
"there," spatial relations between non-contemporaneous entities
can not be determined to be analogous to temporal relations of
any sort.
Summary
Certain entities are dated with respect to other entities. In
asserting this, we do not limit our assertion to situations in which
the entity that is the point of reference is in the same place as
the entity that has a date with respect to it.
As we use "existence/* entities presented as past with respect
to present-day entities may be real and entities presented as future.
But future events are generally not definite objects with respect
391
to mental attitudes that precede them. The assertion that some
future events are real does not imply that we can not affect our
surroundings, that what will be will be. (Except to the extent
that "What will be will be" is tautological.)
Analogous to the quality of extension, there is the quality of
duration. But since duration is the quality of some enduring sub-
stance, there may be as many durations from a given initial event
to a given final event as there are substances persisting from the
one event to the other.
Just as there may be empty three-dimensional volumes or spaces,
so there may be enduring entities which are not bodies. But
enduring entities which are real, whether they be bodies or not,
need not follow one another without interruption. There is an
earliest body and an earliest enduring entity which is not a body;
also there will be a last body or bodies and last enduring entities
which are not bodies.
On the whole, temporal relations are analogous to spatial rela-
tions between contemporaries. But there are several respects in
which the analogy breaks down or is alleged to break down.
Various alleged differences are discussed towards the end of the
chapter.
392
Chapter XIII
SPATIAL RELATIONS AMONG
NON-CONTEMPORANEOUS ENTITIES;
MOTION
It is often felt that we could picture to ourselves the spatio-
temporal relations obtaining among existing entities if we could
visualize four lines drawn through a given point at right angles to
one another, if, instead of a three-dimensional box, we could
visualize a four-dimensional super-box wherein four co-ordinates
would be required to determine the position of one point with
respect to another. But the discussions of the two preceding chap-
ters suggest an alternative representation, a representation equally
crude, but quite different. Let us imagine a box into which a
number of paper-thin plates are put. Each plate standing on its
end represents a set of instantaneous entities contemporaneous
with one another. To be sure, since substances are here and there
but not at positions which are presented as not definite objects,
each plate turns out to resemble the heavens wherein we can see
stars wherever we look hard enough, but where we never look
hard enough to find just one continuous star. Indeed the plate is
nothing apart from its contents just as the heavens are nothing
apart from heavenly bodies (and heavenly non-bodies). Like the
plate, the set of contemporaneous entities has its limits. But un-
like the fixed circumference of most plates, the limits of our plate
resemble the limits of a man's field of vision. By turning to right
or left, new objects are brought within his field of vision. But his
field of vision never stretches off to infinity.
There are a great many plates in our box. There is a plate
393
made up of all real entities, material and immaterial, that were
contemporaneous with Napoleon at the first instantaneous phase
of his life. And there is a plate made up of all real entities, ma-
terial and immaterial, that were contemporaneous with Napoleon
at the last instantaneous phase of his life. Our box is never so
full that there is no room for additional plates. Additional plates
can always be inserted between any two plates already in the box
and additional plates can be inserted without limit at each end.
Nevertheless there is a last plate to be inserted; there is not an
infinite number of plates behind a given plate nor in front of it.
If now we imagine a line perpendicular to the parallel plates,
a line that pierces a given plate at a given point, then we may
ask how we determine the point at which this line pierces some
second plate. If Napoleon's birth is 'here* with respect to some
point of reference contemporaneous with his birth, which of the
events contemporaneous with his death is 'here' with respect to
that earlier point of reference? Does our line piercing plate after
plate always pass through some event in Napoleon's life and is
consequently Napoleon dying at St. Helena here? Or does our
line pass through successive phases in the history of Ajaccio
so that Ajaccio in 1821 is 'here' and not the dying Napoleon con-
temporaneous with it? Among contemporaneous entities posi-
tion is a quality which is relative. 1 An entity may be 'here' with
respect to one of its contemporaries and 'there' with respect to
another. But when the entity that is to be called 'here' or 'there'
is not a contemporary, its here-ness or there-ness, it would seem,
is relative, not to some instantaneous point of reference, but
rather to some enduring point of reference. It is the enduring
Napoleon with his various instantaneous phases that is the point
of reference, so that Ajaccio in 1769 is 'here,' Moscow in 1812
'here' and St. Helena in 1821 'here.' Or it is the enduring Ajaccio
with its various instantaneous phases that is the point of reference,
so that Ajaccio in 1769 is 'here,' but Moscow in 1812 and St.
Helena in 1821 'there.' Without such an enduring point of
reference being given or implied, my expression: "the position
of the dying Napoleon with respect to the birth of Napoleon"
puts before me no definite subsisting quality whose reality or
unreality might be considered. 2 It is the position of the dying
Napoleon with respect to the birth of Napoleon, taking the en-
394
during Napoleon as the point of reference, it is this that is real
or unreal; or it is the position of the dying Napoleon with respect
to the birth of Napoleon, taking the enduring Ajaccio as the
point of reference.
The pitcher really has position, really is 'out in front' with
respect to the batter who is present with respect to him. 3 Similarly
the dying Napoleon has a real position with respect to the phase
of Ajaccio that is his contemporary, with respect, that is to say, to
Ajaccio in 1821. But the alleged position of the death of Napo-
leon with respect to what happened in Ajaccio in 1769 appears to
involve two relational situations taken together. It is presented to
us as involving the temporal relation between the birth of Napo-
leon and the 1821 event that happens to be regarded as a later
phase of the same enduring entity; plus the spatial relation be-
tween this 1821 event, which comes from projecting the birth of
Napoleon into 1821, and the death of Napoleon which is its con-
temporary.
In order that the death of Napoleon may really have position
with respect to what happened in Ajaccio in 1769, not only
must the two relational situations just referred to both be real,
but the combination must be real. It is of course possible to
restrict the denotation of "relation" to what we may call uncom-
bined relations. If, for example, we restrict our attention to blood
relatives, my brother is a relation of mine, but my brother-in-law
is not. As we use the term "relation," however, three-termed re-
lational situations may be called "relations" as well as two-termed
relational situations. And as we use the term "reality," both two-
termed and three-termed relational situations may be real. I am,
let us agree, related to my brother-in-law. For the relational situa-
tion involving my wife and myself and the relational situation
involving my wife and her brother compose a three-termed rela-
tional situation which itself is real. Similarly, let us hold, Napo-
leon's death may have position with respect to his birth. That is
to say, the spatial relation between two 1821 events and the tem-
poral relation between the 1769 and the 1821 phases of an endur-
ing entity compose a three-termed relational situation which may
itself be real. 4 In order for this three-termed relational situation
to be real, the two-termed relational situations which compose it
must, it would seem, be real; and the three-termed relational
395
situation which includes them must not appear with character-
istics that would mark it out as unreal. In order that there may be
a real three-termed relational situation within which the dying
Napoleon has position with respect to the birth o Napoleon, this
alleged relational situation can not appear as having no date with
respect to an entity that appears real, can not appear as having no
position with respect to an entity that appears real and with re-
spect to which it appears present, can not appear as generally
discredited. 5
But these, we hold, are conditions which are met. And so we go
on to find listed as real the position which the dying Napoleon is
alleged to have with respect to the birth of Napoleon relative to
an enduring Napoleon; and the position which the dying Napo-
leon is alleged to have with respect to the birth of Napoleon
relative to an enduring Ajaccio. Relative to an enduring Napo-
leon, the dying Napoleon is here with respect to his birth. And
relative to an enduring Ajaccio, the dying Napoleon has a position
with respect to the birth of Napoleon, a position, namely, identi-
cal with that which St. Helena in 1821 has with respect to Ajaccio
in 1821. The plates in our box, it would seem, move back and
forth at our will in their planes. If our perpendicular line pierces
our 1769 plate at the birth of Napoleon at Ajaccio, we can, it
would seem, move our 1821 plate in its plane at will so as to have
the perpendicular pierce it at Ajaccio, at St. Helena, or at any
other point.
Relative to an enduring Ajaccio, St. Helena in 1821 has a cer-
tain position with respect to the birth of Napoleon, a position
identical with that which St. Helena in 1821 has with respect to
Ajaccio in 1821. But with respect to the birth of Napoleon in
1769, the 1769 phase of St. Helena had a similar position. That is
to say, if a 1821 measuring stick stretching from Ajaccio to St.
Helena could be carried back to 1769, it might be found to fit
exactly the distance between the 1769 phases of Ajaccio and St
Helena. 6 We have before us then the position that St. Helena in
1821 has with respect to the birth of Napoleon, a position which
involves a spatial relation between two 1821 events conjoined
wkb a temporal relation; and we have before us the position
ihat St. Helena in 1769 has with respect to the birth of Napoleon,
a position which involves a spatial relation between two 1769
396
events. One position characterizes St. Helena in 1821, the other
characterizes St. Helena in 1769. But when we say that the two
positions are similar, we bring into consideration the enduring
St. Helena and not merely instantaneous phases of it. Relative
to an enduring Ajaccio, it is the enduring St. Helena that has two
instantaneous phases with similar positions with respect to a given
event.
Relative to an enduring Ajaccio, the enduring St. Helena has
two phases, namely, an 1821 phase and a 1769 phase, with similar
positions with respect to the birth of Napoleon. But the enduring
St. Helena has additional phases with similar positions with re-
spect to the birth of Napoleon. Relative to an enduring Ajaccio,
the positions with respect to Napoleon's birth that belong to St.
Helena in 1769, to St. Helena in 1803, to St. Helena in 1812 and
to St. Helena in 1821 are all similar, indeed, we may say, identi-
cal. The St. Helena that endures from 1769 to the death of Napo-
leon has, we have seen, 7 only a finite number of instantaneous
phases. But if the number of real instantaneous phases that it
includes is limited only by our failure to make alleged additional
phases definite objects, and if no instantaneous phase that is real
has a dissimilar position with respect to the birth of Napoleon,
then, relative to the enduring Ajaccio, the St. Helena that endures
from 1769 to the death of Napoleon is, let us say, "at rest/' Using
"at rest" in this sense, the enduring St. Helena is indeed at rest
relative to the enduring Ajaccio. For, whereas we have recognized
the possibility of bodies being intermittent, we should, if inter-
mittence really characterized Ajaccio and St. Helena, call these
substances enduring substances which in some of their phases are
material and in some of their phases immaterial. 8 There are no
two successive phases of either Ajaccio or of St. Helena such that
we will be balked in our efforts to find another real phase (which
may turn out to be material or immaterial) between them. And
there is no phase of St. Helena which is real whether it be ma-
terial or immaterial that lacks position with respect either to the
phase of Ajaccio contemporaneous with it or with respect to the
1769 phase of Ajaccio; no phase, indeed, whose position with
respect to the birth of Napoleon is dissimilar to the positions
with respect to this event of other phases of St. Helena. The in-
stantaneous phases which the enduring St. Helena includes have
397
all of them similar positions with respect to a given event. Taken
by themselves, however, these instantaneous phases are not at rest.
They are at rest only in the sense that they are instantaneous
phases of a resting enduring entity; and even in this sense they
are at rest relative to the enduring Ajaccio and not relative to
some instantaneous phase of Ajaccio.
We turn now from the enduring Ajaccio as our point of refer-
ence to the enduring Napoleon or, rather, to the enduring
September 1815 phase of Napoleon. St. Helena at the end of the
month has a position with respect to Napoleon-at-the-beginning-
of-the-month identical with that which it has with respect to
Napoleon-at-the-end-of-tfae-month. For the position which the Sep-
tember thirtieth phase of St. Helena has with respect to the
September first phase of Napoleon involves the spatial relation
between the two September thirtieth contemporaries plus an in-
terval in the life of Napoleon. But these positions that St. Helena
at the end of the month has with respect to both phases of Napo-
leon differ from the position that St. Helena at the beginning of
the month had with respect to the phase of Napoleon that was
its contemporary. During the month Napoleon was on board the
"Northumberland" and he was continually approaching St.
Helena or, taking Napoleon as our point of reference, St. Helena
was continually approaching him. If a measuring stick, that on
September thirtieth stretched from St. Helena to the "North-
umberland," could be applied to the distance that on September
first separated St. Helena from the "Northumberland," there
would be much open water that it would not span. 9 Relative to
the enduring Napoleon, St. Helena, as we have seen, has as many
real instantaneous phases as we choose to make definite objects;
although some of them may turn out to be immaterial. 10 So it is,
we have seen, with respect to the enduring Ajaccio; and so it is
with respect to Napoleon during September, 1815. Just as there is
no real phase of St. Helena that lacks position with respect either
to the phase of Ajaccio contemporaneous with it or with respect
to the 1769 phase of Ajaccio, so there is no real phase of St. Helena
during September 1815 that lacks position with respect either to
the phase of Napoleon contemporaneous with it or with respect
to the September first phase of Napoleon. But whereas, relative
to an enduring Ajaccio, no two instantaneous phases of St. Helena
398
have dissimilar positions with respect to the birth of Napoleon,
relative to Napoleon during September 1815 no two instantan-
eous phases of St. Helena have similar positions with respect to
the September first phase of Napoleon. The enduring St. Helena
we called "at rest" with respect to the enduring Ajaccio; the
enduring St. Helena we call "in motion" with respect to the en-
during Napoleon of September, 1815. It is the enduring St.
Helena which, as we use "rest" and "motion," is at rest with
respect to one enduring point of reference and in motion with
respect to another. It is the enduring St. Helena, that is to say,
whose real instantaneous phases have, in the one case, all of them
similar, and, in the other case, all of them dissimilar, positions
with respect to a given event. 11 "Rest" and "motion," in short, are
terms that we use to point to qualities of enduring entities, to
qualities that enduring entities have relative to one enduring
point of reference or another. And just as an instantaneous
phase is at rest only in the sense that it is an instantaneous phase
of an enduring entity at rest, so an instantaneous phase is in
motion only in the sense that it is an instantaneous phase of an
enduring entity in motion.
Let us suppose that an object rests in one position, then in a
slightly different position. Relative to a given enduring point of
reference, the initial phase of our object has a certain position
and a second phase has a similar position. A third phase, however,
has, let us suppose, a dissimilar position, and a fourth phase has a
position similar to that of the third phase. Taken as a whole, our
enduring object is neither what we call "at rest" nor what we call
"in motion." For the positions that its various instantaneous
phases have are neither all of them similar nor all of them dis-
similar. The enduring phase of our object which endures from its
first instantaneous phase to the second is, it would seem, at rest.
But, we ask, is the enduring phase of it which endures from die
second instantaneous phase to the third in motion? If efforts to
present to ourselves phases of our object later than the second
and earlier than the third could meet with frustration, our ob-
ject would be neither at rest nor in motion. And if our efforts to
present to ourselves such intermediate phases did not meet with
frustration, if intermediate phases were real, then the motion or
rest of the enduring phase under discussion would depend upon
399
the type of position that these intermediate phases were found to
have.
Let us suppose, however, that no intermediate phases are
sought and that as a consequence the third instantaneous phase
of our object is the first real instantaneous phase subsequent to the
second. One phase of our object has then a given position; the
next real phase a dissimilar position. As we are explaining our
term "motion," such a state of affairs is one in which there is an
object in motion; for, included within the enduring phase of our
object that endures from what we have called the second instan-
taneous phase to the third, there are as many instantaneous
phases as we choose to seek and no two instantaneous phases
with similar positions.
In the sense in which we are using the term "motion," there
are, let us agree, real instances of entities in motion. In this
sense of the term "motion," the September 1815 phase of St
Helena, let us agree, was in motion with respect to Napoleon;
and today's phase of the sun is in motion with respect to the
Capitol at Washington. They and a finite number of other en-
during entities are really in motion with respect to enduring
points of reference outside them.
Indeed, as we are using the term "motion," real instances of
motion need not be limited to enduring substances whose in-
cluded phases are all material. If the Capitol at Washington is
intermittent and includes immaterial as well as material phases,
it may still be in motion relative to a given enduring entity out-
side it. For we may regard instantaneous phases while it is im-
material as phases of the Capitol; and we may find the positions
of these phases dissimilar to each other and dissimilar to the
positions of other phases of the Capitol. Indeed substances whose
phases are all immaterial may really be in motion, as we are using
the term "motion." There may be a bit of empty space that is a
definite object, an entity that is regarded as the same substance
as & later bit of empty space elsewhere. We may think of a bit of
empty space in the same direction as the sun, but twice as
distant; 12 we may never be frustrated in our attempts to present
to ourselves additional instantaneous phases of this enduring im-
material substance; and we may find no two such instantaneous
phases with similar positions. But it is at most only a finite num-
400
ber of bits of empty space that we do make definite objects; hence
at most only a finite number of enduring bits of empty space
that can be found to be in motion.
It may also be pointed out that, as we are explaining "rest" and
"motion," an enduring entity is neither at rest nor in motion with
respect to an enduring point of reference which lacks instantane-
ous phases corresponding to some of its own. The enduring Sep-
tember 1815 phase of St. Helena is in motion relative to the Sep-
tember 1815 phase of Napoleon. But that phase of St. Helena
which endures through the nineteenth century is not. For an 1850
phase of St. Helena finds no instantaneous phase included within
the Napoleon of September 1815 with respect to which to have
position. It has no position with respect to a given event in Napo-
leon's life that might be found similar or dissimilar to the position
that some earlier instantaneous phase of St. Helena has.
With our terminology thus explained and with these obser-
vations behind us, let us consider the situations brought to our
attention by Zeno's well-known arguments. "You must traverse
the half of any given distance/' says Zeno," "before you traverse
the whole, and the half of that again before you can traverse it."
Relative to the starting point, that phase of our runner in which
he begins his journey is 'here,' that phase in which he reaches his
goal 'there.' Let us agree that there are intermediate instantaneous
phases and that no two of them have similar positions with respect
to the starting point. But how many intermediate instantaneous
phases and successive positions are there? And how does the run-
ner live to the next phase and advance to the next position if there
are always prior phases to be lived through and nearer positions to
be traversed? The infinitist will hold that our runner enduring
from the beginning of his journey to its end, enduring with a
limited duration, lives, nevertheless, through an infinite number
of instantaneous phases. To be aware of each of these instantane-
ous phases, our runner would require an infinite duration. But
to live through them without making each one a definite object
is no more self-contradictory than it is for a two-inch line to include
an infinite number of points. As we use the term "existence," an in-
finite number of instantaneous phases does not exist. But our rejec-
tion of the infinist view has been due, not to any intrinsic self-
contradiction involved in that view, but to one of those elements in
401
our explanation of "existence" that, taken together, correspond
to the principle of sufficient reason. 14 So far as we have yet seen,
there is no self-contradiction involved in holding that the runner
lives through an infinite number of instantaneous phases and that,
correspondingly, he has successively an infinite number of posi-
tions. It is simply that the assertion of such a view does not de-
scribe what exists in our sense of "existence."
But even if our runner had an infinite number of instantan-
eous phases, no two of them would be simultaneous. There would,
it would seem, be one such that only the initial phase preceded
it and such that all others, infinite in number, followed it. In
short, there would, we hold, be an instantaneous phase of our
runner immediately following his initial phase. Since, by hypo-
thesis, it would require an infinite duration to discover all of the
instantaneous phases included within the duration of his journey,
no finite duration would suffice to present to us this instantaneous
phase that would be immediately subsequent to our runner's
initial phase. There would, to be sure, be an infinite number of
real instantaneous phases included within each finite duration.
But the duration between our runner's initial phase and his next
instantaneous phase would not be finite, but, we may say, infini-
tesimal. The infinitist hypothesis in the form in which we find
it most nearly acceptable has thus implications in two directions,
implications however which are not irreconcilable, the one with
the other. It seems on the one hand to imply that there is an in-
finite number of instantaneous phases included within any phase
of our runner having a finite duration. And it seems on the other
hand to imply that there is no instantaneous phase at all within
that phase of the runner which endures from the initial phase to
the immediately following phase. Our runner would endure up
to this immediately following phase without having endured
through any intermediate instantaneous phase.
An infinitist view can thus be developed which, whereas it is
untrue, is not intrinsically self-contradictory. Similarly one need
not be involved in self-contradiction when one holds that our run-
ner lives through a finite number of instantaneous phases, a num-
ber so great that we do not in fact make each of these phases a
definite object; and when one holds that our runner has succes-
sively a correspondingly great number of positions, some of which
402
are not presented to us as definite objects. The initial phase of the
runner, on this view, is immediately followed by an instantaneous
r>hase that occurs after a finite interval, but so soon afterwards
that we do not present it to ourselves as a definite object; and
this immediately following phase has a position with respect to
the starting point, so close that we likewise do not present it to
ourselves as a definite object. On the view which we are now ex-
amining, however, it would require, not an infinite duration, but
a greater finite duration than we do in fact have at our disposal to
present to ourselves that phase of our runner which immediately
follows the initial one. With a duration at our disposal greater
than this would require, we should find, it may be held, no prior
intermediate phases and possibly no positions nearer the starting
point. For in dealing with finite intervals between adjacent
instantaneous phases, in dealing, that is to say, with what might
be called atomic or elementary finite durations, the subject-matter,
it might be held, would balk our efforts at sub-division in a man-
ner in which it does not do so when we are dealing with greater
durations and in a manner, in consequence, for which our ex-
periences will never prepare us. We can, to be sure, refer in words
to an intermediate phase within the atomic or elementary finite
duration which itself will never be presented to us. But whereas,
on the view which we are examining, the elementary finite dura-
tion which will never be presented to us is real, our verbal expres-
sions apparently referring to an intermediate phase within this
duration do not refer to anything real.
It is not self-contradictory, it would seem, to hold that the
alleged elementary finite duration which will never be presented
to us is real; and to hold that the alleged instantaneous phase
within it, which likewise will never be presented to us as a defi-
nite object, is unreal. But such assertions imply a signification of
"existence" different from our own. As we have chosen to use
"existence," a subsistent appearing as no one's definite object is
unreal. 15 The alleged elementary finite duration that, it is held,
will never be presented to us as a definite object is unreal; and
so is the alleged instantaneous phase within this duration. So like-
wise are the infinitesimal durations and the positions infinitely
close to the runner's starting point which it would allegedly re-
quire an infinite duration to present to ourselves as definite ob-
403
jects. It is our doctrine, deduced, we hold, from our propositions
explaining "existence," that the first real instantaneous phase of
our runner to follow his initial phase is one that is not presented as
no one's definite object, one that is in effect presented as a definite
object for some one. The interval intervening between the initial
phase and this next instantaneous phase has a finite duration, a
duration, however, the determination of which is more a matter
of psychology than of physics. For the duration of this interval
is determined by the persistence with which subjects present to
themselves as definite objects instantaneous phases of the runner
closer and closer to his initial phase. It is as enduring as the most
persistent seeker of next phases permits it to be.
The subject-matter, we hold, will never block us in our at-
tempts to present to ourselves real instantaneous phases of the
runner closer and closer to his initial phase. But there is an end
to persistence and, with it, an end to the series of closer and
closer instantaneous phases. There is the initial phase of our
runner when he is at the starting point; then no instantaneous
phase of him and no position occupied by him until the next
real instantaneous phase when, taking the earth to be at rest, his
position is different. There are as many instantaneous phases
of our runner as we choose to seek, and yet no two of them with
similar positions. Hence, as we have explained "motion," our
runner is in motion. 16 It is however the enduring runner who is
in motion, or some enduring phase of Mm that includes at least
two instantaneous phases. "An instantaneous phase is in motion
only in the sense that it is an instantaneous phase of an enduring
entity in motion/* 17
It may be objected, however, that our view just outlined, along
with the infinitist and finitist views that we have rejected, re-
duces motion to a touching of positions. "What the cinematograph
does," says Bergson, 18 "is to take a series of snap-shots of the
passing regiment and to throw these instantaneous views on the
screen so that they replace each other very rapidly." On the in-
finitist view which we examined, two successive snapshots are
separated by an interval having an infinitesimal duration. For
the finitist who holds that the never-to-be-discovered instants are
finite in number, two successive snap-shots are separated by an
interval having a finite, though perhaps an unattainably
404
duration. And on our view they are separated by an interval
which is as enduring as the most persistent seeker of snap-shots
permits it to be. Yet all three views, it may be said, present to
us a series ^of snap-shots rather than motion itself. There is, says
Bergson, 19 "more in the transition than the series of states, that is
to say, the possible cuts more in the movement than the series
of positions, that is to say, the possible stops."
Now it can hardly be maintained that the term "motion" can
not be assigned the meaning which we assign it. Our runnei
does have a series of successive instantaneous phases. Each of these
phases does have a different position with respect to his starting
point. And the term "motion" may be assigned a meaning from
which it follows that the enduring runner having these instan-
taneous phases is in motion with respect to his starting point.
What may be maintained, however, is that the meaning which
we have assigned our term "motion" is not identical with the
meaning which the term "motion" commonly has. In addition to
the motion that touches which we have found real, there is to
be considered, it may be held, an alleged motion that flows.
In order to put an alleged motion that flows before us, let us
go back to the box of plates with which we began this chapter. In
addition to the paper-thin plates, each of which represented a set
of instantaneous entities contemporaneous with each other, let
us suppose our box to have inserted in it plates which are not
paper-thin but thick. Entities exist which have duration but
which nevertheless are, roughly speaking, contemporaneous with
one another. Thus, roughly speaking, the enduring Descartes and
the enduring Hobbes were contemporaries, the 1812 phase of
Napoleon and the 1812 phase of Wellington contemporaries,
Gladstone and Disraeli contemporaries. A plate having some
thickness may accordingly be used to represent a set of entities
each of which has some duration but each of which is in an in-
definite sense contemporaneous with all other members of the
set. The fact that various points on a two-inch line are real does
not keep the extended line which includes them from being real.
The fact that the legs of a chair are real does not keep the cfaair
taken as a whole which has a somewhat similar position, but a
less definitely located position, from being real. And, reverting
to our metaphor of a box of plates, our paper-thin plates do not
405
hinder the insertion among them of plates having some thickness,
of plates of which they themselves may be regarded as cross-
sections.
There exist, let us agree, pairs of entities each having some
duration where one is in an indefinite sense contemporaneous
with the other. And with respect to such a pair of entities, one, it
may be said, is not only contemporaneous with respect to the
other, but 'moving' with respect to the other. One may, that is to
say, use the term "motion" to point to an alleged quality which
one entity has with respect to another enduring entity in an in-
definite sense contemporaneous with it. During a brief period on a
summer's afternoon I may, for example, be sitting on my porch
and a dog chasing a squirrel in my garden. There are phases of
'me, of dog and of squirrel, each having some duration, but all
in an indefinite sense contemporaneous with one another. Now
without attending to the instantaneous phases which each of these
enduring phases include, we may say that the dog is in motion
with respect to me, and the squirrel also. Instead of using the
term "motion" to point to a quality which an enduring entity
has by virtue of the different positions which its successive in-
stantaneous phases have, "motion" may be used to point to an
unanalyzed quality which briefly enduring phases have with
respect to other briefly enduring phases which are in an indefinite
sense contemporaneous with them.
There are, let us agree, instances of motion, when "motion" is
used in this second sense. There is a motion which flows as well
as a motion which touches. It may well be that, wherever there is
an instance of a motion which flows, there is an instance of a mo-
tion which touches. It may well be that wherever there is a per-
ceptible motion, such as characterizes the phase of the dog run-
ning in my garden, there exists a succession of instantaneous
phases, each with a different position. The entity however which
is presented as having a motion which flows, and not presented
with a motion which touches, is not presented with the instantan-
eous phases which it may well have. Indeed, in so far as an entity
is merely presented as having a motion which flows, its motion
can not be numbered. For it is only by considering initial in-
stantaneous phases, final instantaneous phases, and the distances
traversed in the intervals between them, that numbers can be
406
assigned to the speeds of moving objects. It is the motion which
touches that can be numbered. And it is in connection with a
motion which touches that the problems treated by Zeno arise.
We evade these problems, and we also cut ourselves off from the
possibility of assigning numbers to motion, when we limit our
attention to the motion which flows. To do this however is to
close our eyes to something that is real and that calls for discus-
sion. When "motion" is used to point to a motion which flows, it
points to something real. But when "motion" is used as we have
for the most part used it in this chapter, when it is used to point
to a motion which touches, it likewise points to something real.
It is thus no pseudo-problem with which we deal when we ask
how a runner can reach the end of his journey or, indeed, begin it.
And it is not giving an answer not relevant to reality when it is
stated that the runner has as many instantaneous phases as we
choose to seek and passes through no positions that are presented
as not definite objects.
Our runner does have a series of instantaneous phases, does
touch a series of positions. In living from the initial phase to the
next real instantaneous phase, he no more has to live through
alleged intermediate instantaneous phases or to touch alleged
intermediate positions than a man at the most distant of all real
positions would have to hurl a javelin beyond it. If the javelin
were hurled and its resting place presented as a definite object, he
would not be at the most distant of all real positions. 20 And if an
intermediate instantaneous phase is definitely presented to us as
one that the runner has lived through, what we have taken to be
the 'next' real instantaneous phase is not the next. By hypothesis,
the runner's next instantaneous phase is the very next that will be
presented as a definite object. Any nearer instantaneous phase that
he may be alleged to have lived through is presented as no one's
definite object, is unreal, and can not truly be said to be one that
he has lived through.
The situation which Zeno describes in the "Stadium" may be
transferred to the stage of a theatre. Let us imagine three in-
dividuals side by side at the rear of a theatre stage, hidden from
our view by three other individuals who place themselves along-
side one another in front of them. We must now introduce three
additional individuals who place themselves side by side at the
407
front of the stage and who conceal those in the second row as
these conceal those in the rear. The individuals in the second
row now each move a pace to the left, so that the middle member
of this group comes to be directly in front of the left end member
of the back row. And the individuals in the front row each move
a pace to the right so that the middle member of this group comes
to be directly in front of the right end member of the back row.
Whereas the one on the left in the front row was in front of the
one on the left in the back row, now, having moved to the right,
he is in front of the middle member of the rear group. But,
whereas he was in front of the left end member of the second row,
now, since the members of the second row have also been moving,
he is in front of the right end member of the second row.
Suppose now that our individuals are mere points and that they
are separated from their neighbors by distances in which no points
intervene. Suppose further that there are no instantaneous phases
of any of our nine objects between the phases in which they have
their initial positions and the phases in which they have the
positions that they have when the motions that have been de-
scribed have been completed. In one instantaneous phase the left
end member of the front row is in front of the left end member of
the second row; and in its very next instantaneous phase it is in
front of the right end member of the second row. No intervening
instantaneous phase of it exists in which it might be in front of
the middle member of the second row. By hypothesis we do not
fix our attention upon our member of the front row in the act of
passing the middle member of the second row. And if, contrary
to our hypothesis, we do fix our attention upon this intervening
phase of it and do present it to ourselves as a definite object, then
it has an intervening phase in which it is in front of the middle
member of the second row; and the instantaneous phase in which
it is in front of the right end member of the second row is not its
next.
If it has the intervening phase, either this intervening phase is
presented to us neither as having nor as lacking position with
respect to some member of the row in the rear. Or, if its relation
to some member of the rear row is presented as a definite object,
die rear row contains more than three real members and, con-
trary to our original hypothesis, the members of this row first pre-
408
sented to us are not separated from their neighbors by distances
in which no points intervene. In destroying our hypothesis, we
merely show ourselves to have misjudged the number of points or
instantaneous phases that are to be definite objects.
The "Achilles and the tortoise" calls, we hold, for a similar
treatment. Prior to catching the tortoise there are as many in-
stantaneous phases of Achilles as we choose to present to our-
selves as definite objects; and, contemporaneous with each of
them, an instantaneous phase of the tortoise ahead of him. There
is however a final stage which Achilles begins by being behind
the tortoise and ends by being abreast of him.There is no instan-
taneous phase of Achilles at which he has a position similar to
that from which the tortoise begins the final stage; just as in the
"Stadium" there is no instantaneous phase of our member of the
front row in which he is passing the middle member of the second
row. The alleged instantaneous phase of Achilles in which he
might have such a position is, by hypothesis, presented as no one's
definite object. For, by hypothesis, the instantaneous phase from
which he begins the final stage of the chase, the instantaneous
phase which has a tortoise in advance contemporaneous with it,
is Achilles' very last instantaneous phase, preceding the final one,
that will be a definite object and real.
There are, it follows, more points on the path than Achilles
will touch. Nevertheless the enduring Achilles is in motion with
respect to the enduring tortoise and with respect to the enduring
path. For in order that there may be motion, as we have explained
our term "motion," it is not necessary that each instantaneous
phase of the enduring point of reference have a phase of the
moving object contemporaneous with it. It is necessary that the
number of the moving object's instantaneous phases be limited
only by our failure to make alleged additional phases definite
objects. 21 And it is necessary that no two instantaneous phases of
our moving object, no two phases that we do make definite
objects, lack position or have similar positions. These conditions
are fulfilled and the enduring Achilles is in motion, as we have
explained "motion" even though there be points on the path
that he does not touch. Similarly the runner whom we considered
a few pages back is in motion, the runner whose first instantan-
eous phase after leaving his starting point has a position dissimilar
409
to that of his initial phase. 22 He is in motion whether or not
points intervene between the starting point and the position he
next occupies.
We turn now to figure 1 in which OiO 2 is an enduring point of
reference, PiP 2 an enduring point that is in motion with respect
to it. PI has a position with respect to its con-
temporary Oi and, relative to the enduring
OiO 2 , P2 has a dissimilar position with respect
to Oi, the position, namely, that it has with
respect to O 2 , the instantaneous phase of OiO 2
that is its contemporary. 23 The enduring PiP 2 ,
taken as a single enduring object, has no
single punctual position with respect to OiO 2 .
O,0 But if PiP 2 is to be real and OiO 2 real, the
P * I former can not be presented to us as lacking
position with respect to the OiO 2 that in an
indefinite sense is its contemporary. Although
my dog is running, a phase of him having duration is neverthe-
less out there where my garden is. 24 And although PiP 2 is in
motion, it is nevertheless above and to the left with respect to the
enduring OiO 2 .
Let us however consider, not the moving enduring point PiP 2 ,
but the moving enduring extended entity PiQi P 2 Q 2 . The in-
stantaneous phase PiQi has a position, though not a punctual
position, with respect to the O t that is its contemporary. And
relative to an enduring OiO 2 , the later instantaneous phase P 2 Q 2
has a dissimilar position which likewise is not punctual. The
enduring entity PiQi P 2 Q 2 has a duration similar to that of the
enduring entity P^ and its position with respect to the enduring
entity OiO 2 is only slightly less definite. It too, that is to say, is
above and to the left. But unlike PI, PjQi has length. What it
has, and what the instantaneous phase P 2 Q 2 likewise has, is, it
will be recalled, 25 an unnumbered or pre-numbered length that
is absolute and a numbered length that is relative to spatio-tem-
poral entities outside it. But the enduring PiQi P 2 Q 2 has, we
shall say, taken as a whole, no length at all The instantaneous
phases PiQi and P^ are in motion, we have said, 26 only in the
sense that they are instantaneous phases of the enduring moving
entity PiQi P 2 Q 2 . And, on the other hand, the enduring entity
410
PiQi P2Q2 has length only in the sense that it includes instan-
taneous phases that have length, instantaneous phases such as
P!Q! and P 2 Q 2 .
Let us suppose that, in measuring the length of PQ, we
move a measuring stick along it, starting at P and counting the
times our stick is applied before the stick reaches Q. We be-
gin measuring by placing one end of our stick over P!. But
when our stick covers Q, it covers a phase of Q that is not con-
temporaneous with Pj; it covers a later phase of Q that we may
call Q 2 . If P Q is in motion with respect to the enduring point O,
if PiQi and P 2 Q 2 have such positions as are shown in the figure on
page 410, our measuring carries us from P x to Q 2 . But PiQ 2 , not
being an instantaneous entity, has in itself no length. Even if P Q
is at rest with respect to O, even if Q! and Q 2 have similar posi-
tions with respect to O l9 we complete our measuring by having
our stick over Q 2 , not over Q x . Measurement, in short 'takes
time/ 27 In measuring we are dealing in the first instance, not with
PiQi or with P 2 Q 2 , not with instantaneous phases that have
length, but with the enduring PiQ 2 that in itself has no length.
Measurement 'takes time*; and it also involves motion with re-
spect to the entity being measured. The measuring stick is moved
along P Q. Or, if measurements are recorded at the enduring
point of reference OiO 2 , there are particles or waves that move
from phases of P and Q to later phases of O. Nevertheless the
numbers that our measuring puts before us are applied to the
instantaneous entity PxQ^ We may be presented with one set of
numbers to apply to PiQx in so far as PiQi is regarded as an in-
stantaneous phase of an entity at rest with respect to our enduring
point of reference, with another set of numbers to apply to PiQi
in so far as PiQi is regarded as an instantaneous phase of an entity
in motion with respect to our enduring point of reference. But
it is still only instantaneous phases that have length. 28
To sum up, PjQi has unnumbered length as an absolute qual-
ity. But the application of numbers to this length involves a
reference to spatio-temporal entities outside PiQi. PiQi is one
inch long, not absolutely, but as measured from O, making use
of information obtained from PiQ 2 . PiQ 2 , on the other hand,
has no length to which numbers may really be applied. For, the
numbers with which we are presented when we measure PiQ*
411
apply, not to PiQ2 but to instantaneous phases that do have
length.
What PI Qi has, and what P 2 (2 likewise has, is "an unnum-
bered or pre-numbered length that is absolute and a numbered
length that is relative to spatio-temporal entities outside it." 29
What PI P 2 has, and what PX Qi P 2 Q 2 has, is similarly an unnum-
bered or pre-numbered duration that is absolute and a numbered
duration that is relative to other entities. 30 In the process of assign-
ing numbers to the duration of PI P 2 , or to the duration of PI Qi
P Q, we make use of clocks or we make use of light or electrical
waves or we make use of both. What we find is that the numbers
to be assigned to PI P 2 's duration vary with the relative motion
of the entity from which that duration is measured. But it is
again to be pointed out that we have already jumped into a
world of both spatial and temporal relations when we first begin
numbering either lengths or durations.
PI has position with respect to its contemporary d, St. Helena
in 1821 position with respect to its contemporary: Ajaccio in 1821.
To Use numbers, however, in describing the position that PI has
with respect to Oi, to say, for example, that PI is one centimeter
north of Oi, is to assign a number to the length of OiPi. Similarly
to say that St. Helena in 1821 has a position three thousand miles
from Ajaccio in 1821 is to assign a number to a distance, to the
length of a path. Since the numbered length that a line or path
has varies with the spatio-temporal entities from which that length
is measured, the numbered position that PI has with respect to Oi,
or that St. Helena in 1821 has with respect to Ajaccio in 1821,
likewise varies. But just as we have held that there is an unnum-
bered length that O* PI has that is not relative to spatio-temporal
entities outside Oi PI, so we hold that PI has an unnumbered
position with respect to Oi that is not relative to other entities. 81
St. Helena in 1821 has an unnumbered position with respect to
Ajaccio in 1821 that may be measured from various entities and
may hence be assigned various numbers. But the position that St.
Helena in 1821 has with respect to Ajaccio in 1769 is, we have seen,
relative to some enduring point of reference. 82 Depending upon the
enduring point of reference we choose, the Ajaccio in 1769, with
respect to which St. Helena in 1821 may be claimed to have posi-
tion, may be projected into 1821 in various ways. If Napoleon is
412
our enduring point of reference, our phrase: "the position that
St. Helena in 1821 has with respect to Ajaccio in 1769" points to
the position that St. Helena in 1821 has with respect to itself.
And if Ajaccio or St. Helena is our enduring point of reference,
our phrase: "the position that St. Helena in 1821 has with respect
to Ajaccio in 1769" points to the position that St. Helena in 1821
has with respect to Ajaccio in 1821. With respect to Ajaccio in
1821, St. Helena in 1821 is "there"; it has an unnumbered posi-
tion that may be assigned various numbers. With respect to St.
Helena in 1821, St. Helena in 1821 is here; it has an unnumbered
position that may or may not be assigned various numbers.
"The position of St. Helena in 1821 with respect to Ajaccio
in 1769" is however relative and incomplete, whereas it is merely
the numbered position of St. Helena in 1821 with respect to Ajaccio
in 1821 that is relative and incomplete. With respect to Ajaccio in
1821, St. Helena in 1821 has an unnumbered position that may be
assigned various numbers. But my phrase: "the position that
St. Helena in 1821 has with respect to Ajaccio in 1769" may refer
to the unnumbered position that St. Helena in 1821 has with
respect to Ajaccio in 1821 or to the unnumbered position that
St. Helena in 1821 has with respect to St. Helena in 1821 or to
the unnumbered position that St. Helena in 1821 has with re-
spect to some other contemporary. In one case we know what
we are talking about but not how it is going to be measured. In
the other case we do not know what we are talking about until
the enduring point of reference has been made explicit.
With respect to Ajaccio in 1821, St. Helena in 1821 has an un-
numbered position which may be assigned various numbers. Simi-
larly with respect to the birth of Napoleon, the death of Napoleon
has an unnumbered date which may be assigned various numbers.
Indeed, since Napoleon might not be the only enduring entity
beginning in Ajaccio in 1769 and ending in St. Helena in 1821,
there may be several durations and several intervals; 38 the event
of 1821 may have with respect to the event of 1769 several un-
numbered dates, each of them capable of being assigned various
numbers. Neglecting this possibility, however, and directing our
attention to the duration of Napoleon, we have agreed that this
duration will have one number assigned to it if measured from an
entity at rest with respect to Napoleon, another number if meas-
413
ured from an entity at rest with respect to the surface of the
earth. 34 However we measure, nevertheless, it is the same Napo-
leon who endures; it is an unequivocal duration of his that is
being numbered.
We talk about speeds of ten miles per hour or three centimeters
per second. The numbers that we thus assign to the motions of
moving entities are quotients derived by dividing the numbers
of numbered lengths by the numbers of numbered durations.
Since the application of numbers to both lengths and durations
brings into consideration spatio-temporal entities from which
measurements are made, the determination of speeds, the appli-
cation of numbers to the motions of moving entities, also brings
such spatio-temporal entities into consideration. Moreover, since
the lengths involved indicate distances between non-contempo-
raries, the determination of speeds brings into consideration an
enduring point of reference as well. It is with respect to an en-
during light-house and not with respect to an enduring star that
a given ship has a speed of ten miles per hour. And it is with
respect to that enduring light-house, as measured from it and not
as measured from another ship, that it has that definite speed.
There is no speed, it has been asserted, that is greater than the
speed of light. No matter what entity we choose as our enduring
point of reference and no matter what entity we make our measure-
ments from, numbers in excess of a certain maximum, we are told,
will not be found applicable to speeds. It may be that such a
result follows from the assumptions we make in assigning num-
bers to lengths and to durations and hence in determining
speeds, that is, in assigning numbers to the motions of moving
entities. But there may be moving entities that are bodies and
moving entities that are not bodies. "We may think of a bit of
empty space in the same direction as the sun but twice as distant;
we may never be frustrated in our attempts to present to our-
selves additional instantaneous phases of this enduring immaterial
substance; and we may find no two such instantaneous phases
with similar positions/' 35 We may, similarly, present to ourselves
a substance in motion which yesterday had an instantaneous phase
in common with Arcturus, which today is a bit of empty space
moving in the direction of the North Star and which tomorrow
will have an instantaneous phase in common with Polaris. Such
414
a substance which is now material and now immaterial is in mo-
tion with respect to the earth. If it, as contrasted with the material
entities it from time to time passes through, is the source of no
vibrations reaching us, perhaps its speed can not be measured.
But with respect to the earth it is in motion, whether or not it
has a measurable speed. Its motion, whether measurable or not,
belongs outside the scope of any dictum as to maximum speeds.
We have had occasion to distinguish motions that touch from
motions that flow. 36 In so far as we divide the numbers of num-
bered lengths by the numbers of numbered durations and thus
talk about speeds of ten miles per hour or three centimeters per
second, we are assigning numbers to motions that touch. That is
to say, we are regarding an entity in motion as one that has a
series of different positions at successive instantaneous phases. If
however there is a motion that flows, then, as flowing, it would
seem, no dissection into successive positions and instantaneous
phases is permissible and no numbering possible.
A line, we have said, 37 "may have length, a quality which each
point composing it, taken individually, lacks." Similarly an en-
tity in motion, whether it be motion that flows or motion that
touches, may have qualities that instantaneous phases of that en-
tity do not have. An entity in motion has duration, whereas the
individual instantaneous phases that, taken together, are that
entity in motion do not have duration. 88 Just as we have suggested
that percepts may be restricted to entities that are neither inex-
tended nor greatly extended, 30 so it may be suggested that only
entities having some small duration, enduring through some
"specious present," may be percepts. If however we agree that
instantaneous phases, taken individually, are not percepts, it
does not follow that certain collections of instantaneous phases,
taken collectively, and together constituting an entity in motion,
can not be percepts. The flying arrow is in motion with respect
to the observer on the earth; and certain not too long enduring
phases of this arrow may be percepts with respect to this ob-
server. He may, as we say, see the arrow in motion with respect
to the earth, see the tree at rest with respect to the earth. But if
this be true, the enduring phase of the moving arrow and the
enduring phase of the resting tree that are percepts, and the in-
stantaneous phases of arrow and tree that are not percepts, are
415
equally real.
A ship, let us suppose, is gliding down a river; and a phase
of the moving ship that has duration, not an instantaneous
phase, is a percept with respect to the observer on the bank.
While the ship moving down-stream is real and a percept,
we may imagine a subsisting ship that has remained upstream,
a subsisting ship that claims to be at rest. But in contrast to
the moving ship that was a percept, the alleged ship that was
at rest and that is alleged still to be at rest upstream appears with
the characteristic of being generally discredited. Let us suppose,
however, that I am looking at a house, first at the attic, then at the
ground floor, then at the basement. 40 It is first the attic at rest
that is my percept, finally the basement at rest. While I am look-
ing at the basement, I may imagine that the upper stories, now
unseen, have vanished or have moved and been transformed into
the basement that I see. But since my percept was an attic at rest,
an alleged attic in motion, or that has since vanished, is presented
to me with the characteristic of being generally discredited. Up-
stream now empty of ship and attic still at the top of the house
and at rest are not so presented. Upstream now empty of ship
and attic still at the top of the house are not percepts, but they
are real. Ship still upstream and attic no longer at the top of the
house are likewise presented as not percepts. But since they are
not inferred from the entities that previously were percepts, since,
on the contrary, they appear generally discredited, they are unreal.
Although the phase of the attic that is a percept is prior to the
phase of the basement that is a later percept, there is an unseen
phase of the basement contemporaneous with the seen phase of the
attic; and an unseen phase of the attic contemporaneous with the
seen phase of the basement. Entities perceived successively may be
phases of entities that have phases contemporaneous with one
another. Indeed the very phases that are perceived successively
may be contemporaneous with one another. The phase of the sun
that is a percept for a present mental attitude of mine may be
contemporaneous with a phase of the tree that was a percept for
a mental attitude of mine some eight minutes ago. And, similarly,
mental attitudes that are simultaneous may have objects that are
not contemporaneous with one another. For, physicists and as-
tronomers have taught us to distinguish simultaneity among per-
416
ceivings from simultaneity among percepts. They have brought it
about, that is to say, that objects of simultaneous perceivings,
presented as simultaneous with one another, appear in certain
instances as generally discredited. 41
The ship that was upstream is a moving ship and an enduring
ship that in one of its phases was upstream and now, in a later phase,
is downstream. There is also a certain section of the river let us
call it: "upstream" that is enduring and at rest. Simultaneous
with the phase of the ship that is down-stream, there is a phase of
'upstream* that is empty of ship. But previously there was a phase
of 'upstream* that was not empty of ship. Both ship and 'upstream'
have duration and various instantaneous phases; and one of the
instantaneous phases of 'upstream* was also an instantaneous phase
of ship. Just as two lines may intersect one another at a point so
that this point is on both of them, so an enduring entity at rest
and another enduring entity in motion may have an instantaneous
phase in common. The enduring entity that we are calling "up-
stream 7 * has one instantaneous phase that is also an instantaneous
phase of ship; it has a later instantaneous phase that is air and
water; and it might even have some phase that is immaterial
altogether. If, nevertheless, 'upstream/ taken as an enduring entity
that in some of its phases is material and in some of its phases
possibly immaterial, is not presented as no one's definite object,
'upstream* may very well be real.
There are, we hold, entities such as 'upstream* that are real,
enduring entities at rest that we shall call "places." As we use
the term "place," "an enduring entity at rest" and its "place"
are expressions representing the same substance. In so far as
material entities are at rest, they and their places are not sepa-
rate substances. And in so far as the material substances with
which we concern ourselves are all in motion, the relation between
a place, which in many of its phases may be immaterial, and a
moving enduring entity, which on some occasion occupies it, is
similar to the relation between two intersecting lines. As we have
explained "motion" and "place," it may be added, an enduring
entity at rest, a "place," need not be an entity most of whose
phases are immaterial; nor need an entity in motion be one most
or all of whose phases are material. A bit of normally empty space
in the same direction as the sun but twice as distant may be in
417
motion; 42 some resting body that it moves through may be the
place of one of its phases.
It is of course relative to one enduring point of reference that
a given enduring entity is at rest and relative to another enduring
point of reference that it is in motion. Hence what are places with
respect to one enduring point of reference may not be places
with respect to another. It is within the framework of a given
enduring point of reference that enduring entities A, B, C, etc.,
are places. Given this point of reference, the enduring entities
A, B, C, etc. that are places are finite in number; and their instan-
taneous phases that are contemporaneous with one another need
not be contiguous. Whether we deal with the collection of all empty
spaces, the collection of all body-spaces, or the collection of all
spaces, material and immaterial alike, we are dealing with a col-
lection which is discrete and which has a finite number of
members. 43
Let us turn now to the consideration of a wheel with, let us
say, twelve spokes which we suppose to be revolving in a clock-
wise direction with respect to a given enduring point of reference.
With respect to this given point of reference there is a place
which extends from the hub to where the number "eleven" would
appear on a clock, a place from the hub to where the number
"twelve" would appear on a clock, and a place from the hub to
where the number "one" would appear on a clock. Likewise there
is a spoke which now has an instantaneous phase in common
with the place which points to "twelve" and is about to have an
instantaneous phase in common with the place which points to
"one"; and a spoke behind it which now points to "eleven" and is
about to point to "twelve."
If the speed with which one spoke revolves is increased or
retarded, the other spokes seem to be similarly affected. But since
a pre-established harmony seems incredible, it is reasonable to
conclude that through motions within the wheel the acceleration
is carried from spoke to spoke and hence to conclude that the
different spokes do not alter their speeds simultaneously. If
however the rate of revolution is constant, one spoke ceases point-
ing to eleven exactly when the spoke ahead of it ceases pointing to
twelve. By what may seem to be a remarkable coincidence all
twelve spokes vacate their places simultaneously, or, to use the
418
terms which we have just explained, cease having phases in com-
mon with the places with which they have just had them in com-
mon. What is a place, however, and what is in motion is, we have
said, relative to the enduring point of reference. The enduring
point of reference may be so chosen that the wheel is at rest and
the spokes themselves places. Hence the coincidence whereby
spokes vacate their places simultaneously is, using a different
point of reference, the coincidence whereby spokes are at rest
with respect to one another, the coincidence whereby the spatial
relations obtaining among one set of instantaneous phases turn
out to be similar to the spatial relations obtaining among a
previous set of instantaneous phases. Whatever would be a satis-
factory answer to the question why the spatial relations between
New York in 1942 and Washington in 1942 are similar to those
between New York in 1932 and the Washington that was its
contemporary would be a satisfactory answer to the question why
the spokes of a revolving wheel vacate their places simultaneously.
It has sometimes been assumed that a group of substances can
not vacate their places simultaneously and, with this premise, it
has been argued that some places void of matter are necessary.
"If there were not void," writes Lucretius,* 4 "by no means could
things move; for that which is the office of body, to offend and
hinder, would at every moment be present to all things; nothing
therefore could advance, since nothing could give the example of
yielding place." To reject the premise and hence the necessity
of empty places is however not to hold that there are no places
with phases which are immaterial. The spoke which has just
pointed to eleven may move into a next place whose preceding
phase was immaterial. The next place with which it is to have
an instantaneous phase in common may just previously have been
material or may just previously have been immaterial. And it
may be contiguous or not-contiguous to the place which the spoke
has just vacated. For, if an alleged contiguous place is presented
as no one's definite object, it is unreal and the next real place
is one that is not contiguous. Indeed if one were to suppose that
the 'next* place is contiguous and previously immaterial, one
might still be asked to explain the simultaneous movement of
different substances. For in that case the "void" would have to
move simultaneously with the spoke behind it. And although this
419
"void" would not be thought of as having as its function to
"offend and hinder," it would nevertheless have either to move
simultaneously with the spoke behind it or to "give the example
of yielding place/'
A place, we have said, 45 is an enduring entity at rest, an endur-
ing entity that may be material or immaterial or in one phase
material and in a subsequent phase immaterial. In previous chap-
ters we have used the term "space." <* Among a group of entities
contemporaneous with each other, there are points and lines and
baseball players and volumes and spheres and bodies and perhaps
empty spaces. We have used the term "space" to refer to any
volume, a volume that might be filled with matter or be void of
matter or be partly material and partly immaterial. It appears
then that in our terminology a space is an instantaneous phase
of a place. In so far as a body is at rest and hence a place, its in-
stantaneous phases are material spaces; and insofar as there is a
place through which bodies and vacua move, its instantaneous
phases are now material spaces and now empty spaces.
Our language presents us with the two terms "space" and
"place" to which we have chosen to assign different significations.
But our language does not present to us an analogous pair of
temporal terms. There is only the term: "time"; and even that we
have not felt urged to explain or to make use of in this or the
preceding chapters. Even though we have in many respects found
temporal relations analogous to spatial relations among contem-
poraries, our treatment of the terms: "space," "place" and "time"
is a parting reminder of the differences between spatial relations,
temporal relations, and spatial relations among non-contempo-
raries.
Summary
When two entities are not contemporaneous, the position that
one has with respect to the other depends upon what entity is
considered to be at rest during the interval from one to the other.
We define rest and motion as a preliminary to discussing Zeno's
paradoxes. Whereas neither the finitist nor the infinitist arrives
at self-contradictory conclusions, our explanation of "existence"
420
implies that a body in motion touches only a finite number ot
positions.
Besides motion as we have defined it, there is a motion that
flows. The latter exists too, but is not useful when we want to
apply numbers.
"When we measure motion (motion that touches) we make use
of certain assumptions. This may account for certain results such
as the fact that the speed of light is a maximum. But when we
do not limit our subject matter to moving bodies, the speed of
light is not a maximum.
421
Chapter XIV
UNITY AND SUBSTANCE
We have compared entities in their spatial and temporal rela-
tions to entities on a series of plates in a box. The entities con-
temporaneous with Napoleon at the first instantaneous phase of
his life we have represented by one plate, the entities contempor-
aneous with Napoleon at the last instantaneous phase of his life
by another plate. 1 The plate, as first introduced, stood for a set of
instantaneous entities contemporaneous with one another. But to
this was added the fantasy of plates having some thickness, plates
whose members have some duration but are nevertheless in an
indefinite sense contemporaneous with one another. 2 Whether a
plate have some thickness or be without it, whether our set of
contemporaneous entities be a set of instantaneous entities or a
set of enduring entities that are in only an indefinite sense con-
temporaneous with one another, our plate is nothing apart from
its members and its members, finite in number, are not every-
where contiguous to one another. 3 We are presented with a set of
entities, in one sense or another contemporaneous with one an-
other, that are, as it were, spread out before us. And we have said
that these entities, some of them material and some of them per-
haps immaterial, some of them spaces that are bodies and some
of them perhaps empty spaces, are both discrete and finite.
One might say that, being presented with an extended mani-
fold, we concentrate our attention here and there, and that only
the objects of such a concentrated attention, only the entities pre-
sented as not merely indefinite objects, are real. Since, however,
the extended manifold, alleged to be presented to us before we
concentrate our attention, is without a definite position and is
422
presented as no one's definite object, there can be no true propo-
sition discussing its alleged priority to the more definitely located
entities within it. It is simply that various contemporaneous en-
tities within the alleged but non-existent manifold are real and
are objects of a concentrated attention.
My desk is real; it is an object of my concentrated attention; it
is, we shall say, "one." The man in my garden is likewise real and
an object of my concentrated attention; he, too, we shall say, is
"one." If the man's background and the desk's background were
real, we could say that man and desk are severally selected as
objects of concentrated attention from their respective back-
grounds. But we can in any case say that, in our sense of "many,"
there are as many objects as are severally objects of a concentrated
attention. Man and desk, that is to say, are to be called "two."
And even if the man comes inside to sit on the desk, even if I
am presented with a real man and a real desk that are contiguous,
man and desk are still to be called "two," assuming that each is
the object of a concentrated attention.
But whereas I may be aware of the desk and also aware of the
man sitting on it, some other subject may be aware simply of the
composite:
TVNews
OpenLibrary