FAILURE TO REGULATE—
ASBESTOS: A LETHAL LEGACY
HEARING
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JUNE 28, 1983
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
25-994 0 WASHINGTON : 1983
FAILURE TO REGULATE—
ASBESTOS: A LETHAL LEGACY
HEARING
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVEENMENT OPERATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JUNE 28, 1983
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
25-994 0 WASHINGTON : 1983
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JACK BROOKS,
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
DON FUQUA, Florida
JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
GLENN ENGLISH, Oklahoma
ELLIOTT H. LEVITAS, Georgia
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
TED WEISS, New York
MIKE SYNAR, Oklahoma
STEPHEN L. NEAL, North Carolina
DOUG BARNARD, Jr., Georgia
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
TOM LANTOS, California
RONALD D. COLEMAN, Texas
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
BARBARA BOXER, California
SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
BUDDY MacKAY, Florida
MEL LEVINE, California
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina
JOE KOLTER, Pennsylvania
BEN ERDREICH, Alabama
Texas, Chairman
FRANK HORTON, New York
JOHN N. ERLENBORN, Illinois
THOMAS N. KINDNESS, Ohio
ROBERT S. WALKER, Pennsylvania
LYLE WILLIAMS, Ohio
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr., Pennsylvania
RAYMOND J. McGRATH, New York
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JOHN R. McKERNAN, Jr., Maine
TOM LEWIS, Florida
ALFRED A. (AL) McCANDLESS, California
LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho
DAN SCHAEFER, Colorado
9
3
William M. Jones, General Counsel
John E. Moore, Staff Administrator
John M. Duncan, Minority Staff Director
Manpower and Housing Subcommittee
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts, Chairman
MEL LEVINE, California
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina
JOE KOLTER, Pennsylvania
BEN ERDREICH, Alabama
JOHN R. McKERNAN, Jr., Maine
DAN BURTON, Indiana
DAN SCHAEFER, Colorado
JACK BROOKS, Texas
Ex Officio
FRANK HORTON, New York
James M. Dolan, Jr., Staff Director
June Saxton, Clerk
Nan Elwood, Minority Professional Staff
(II)
CONTENTS
Page
Hearing held on June 28, 1983 1
Statement of —
Auchter, Thorne G., Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety
and Health, U.S. Department of Labor, accompanied by Edward Baier,
Director of Technical Support, and Leonard Vance, Director of Health
Standards 160
Brandt, Edward N., Jr., M.D., Assistant Secretary for Health, U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services, accompanied by Dr. David P.
Rail, Director, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences,
National Institutes of Health, and Richard Lemen, Director, Division of
Standards Development and Technology Transfer, Centers for Disease
Control, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 136
Frank, Hon. Barney, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Massachusetts, and chairman, Manpower and Housing Subcommittee:
Opening statement 1
McKinney, John A., chairman of the board and chief executive officer,
Manville Corp., accompanied by John Lonnquist, director, Washington
public affairs office, and Dennis Markusson, assistant corporate
counsel 191
Miller, Hon. George, a Representative in Congress from the State of
California 3
Nicholson, William J., Ph. D., associate director. Environmental Sciences
Laboratory, Mount Sinai School of Medicine 7
Seminario, Margaret, department of occupational safety and health,
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions 216
Settle, Russell F., Ph. D., associate professor of economics, University of
Delaware, and visiting associate professor of economics, the Maxwell
School, Syracuse University 15
Wodka, Steven, director of health effects research, Frederick M. Baron &
Associates 269
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by —
Auchter, Thorne G., Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety
and Health, U.S. Department of Labor: Prepared statement 165-178
Brandt, Edward N., Jr., M.D., Assistant Secretary for Health, U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services: Prepared statement 141-156
Frank, Hon. Barney, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Massachusetts, and chairman. Manpower and Housing Subcommittee:
NOVA program No. 1006 286-309
McKinney, John A., chairman of the board and chief executive officer,
Manville Corp.: Prepared statement 194-211
Nicholson, William J., Ph. D., associate director. Environmental Sciences
Laboratory, Mount Sinai School of Medicine:
Paper entitled "Occupational Exposure to Asbestos: Population at
Risk and Projected Mortality— 1980-2030" 28-80
Prepared statement 11-15
Seminario, Margaret, department of occupational safety and health,
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions:
Correspondence concerning EPA demolition of worksites which con-
tain asbestos 230-234
Documents relative to the hearing 237-268
Prepared statement 220-228
iiili
IV
Page
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by— Continued
Settle, Russell F., Ph. D., associate professor of economics, University of
Delaware, and visiting associate professor of economics, the Maxwell
School, Syracuse University:
Paper entitled "Benefits and Costs of the Federal Asbestos Stand-
ard" 81-135
Prepared statement 18-22
Vance, Leonard, Director of Health Standards, U.S. Department of Labor:
Counting asbestos fibers 183
Wodka, Steven, director of health effects research, Frederick M. Baron &
Associates: Prepared statement 272-283
APPENDIX
Material submitted for the record 311
FAILURE TO REGULATE— ASBESTOS: A LETHAL
LEGACY
TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 1983
House of Representatives,
Manpower and Housing Subcommittee
OF THE Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m., in room
2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Barney Frank (chair-
man of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Barney Frank and John R. McKernan
Jr.
Also present: James M. Dolan, Jr., staff director; June Saxton,
clerk, and Nan Elwood, minority professional staff, Committee on
Government Operations.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN FRANK
Mr. Frank. The hearing of the Subcommittee on Manpower and
Housing of the Committee on Government Operations will come to
order.
We meet today to talk about the costs involved when this Gov-
ernment fails to regulate with the particular example of asbestos.
We are going to begin with an opening statement from the rank-
ing minority member from Maine, Mr. McKernan.
Mr. McKernan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to commend you for scheduling these hearings. I want to
apologize to Congressman Miller and also to those of you in the au-
dience, I am going to have to leave probably before Congressman
Miller even makes his opening statement because I have a markup
in another committee but I will be back within the hour.
I commend you all for coming. I do have a short statement that I
would like to read because I think this is an important issue.
I really appreciate both the seriousness of asbestos in the work-
place and the wide difference of opinions on how best to address
this problem. So I welcome the hearings and, Mr. Chairman, again,
I commend you for focusing this subcommittee's attention on the
cost and benefits of regulations.
As you and I have discussed before, the question of asbestos is a
serious and troubling one that has been debated for years without
any real consensus of conclusions other than the fact that asbestos
handled improperly or carelessly can be very dangerous to one's
health.
(1)
When this subcommittee, in March of this year, went to Kittery,
Maine, in my district, we heard from workers at the Kittery-Ports-
mouth Naval Shipyard and it convinced me that the Government
must do everything possible to protect our workers from the haz-
ards of asbestos.
As I said at that hearing, however, the issue is really not that
asbestos is dangerous but how it is handled and what precautions
are taken to protect our citizens.
It is a fact of life that asbestos in large quantities has been used
in ship construction for years, even as far back as World War II
when the Government commandeered all the asbestos in the
United States for naval and other military uses.
As we heard in our Kittery hearing, it is also a sad fact of life
that the Government, private industry, and even the public, have
been painfully slow in recognizing and dealing with the various
problems associated with asbestos.
We will be hearing today from several witnesses who will tell us
that the costs to regulate the dangerous substances like asbestos
are invariably less than the inevitable costs of nonregulation.
There is a good case to be made for that argument and I certain-
ly welcome frank and open discussions on the costs of nonregula-
tion and perhaps, more importantly, on what the proper role of the
Government is if we are going to regulate.
While debating that point, though, I hope that we do not lose
sight of the fact that encouraging progress is being made at OSHA.
I really hope that we don't overlook that because I believe they are
starting to make a vigorous and effective standard on asbestos, a
top priority of that agency. I welcome that progress and I frankly
find it refreshing that the debate at OSHA is not over the absence
of a standard but over the possibility of -an even tougher standard
than is already in existence.
I am sure that the chairman will join me in agreeing that we, as
a subcommittee, look forward to working with the Federal agencies
to make sure that the standard is tough enough, that it is effective,
and that the regulation that does go into effect is going to work at
the lowest possible cost to the Government.
Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you and I will be back.
Mr. Frank. Thank you, Mr. McKernan.
I would just like to say that one of the purposes that motivated
this hearing is the seriousness of asbestos. We will, along with
other subcommittees of the Congress, focus on the effort to provide
protection to Americans, not just workers, schoolchildren, and
others, from this deadly substance.
There is also a broader issue at stake and that is the proper role
of regulation in our society. We have heard a great deal in recent
years about the costs of regulation and a lot of talent and energy
has gone into calculations which tell us, in some cases, we lose a
certain amount of productivity. It costs us a certain amount of
money when we regulate. It is true, regulation bears a cost.
We have also looked at the benefits of regulation. What has not
been looked at is the cost of not regulating. Is it possible to total up
what the costs are of a particular regulation, and be accurate?
There was insufficient attention given to what it cost not to regu-
late. If there had been an OSHA in 1930 and it had banned asbes-
tos as it seems to me it then would have, the savings to this society
would have been enormous.
As we calculate today what the role of this Government ought to
be in adopting, tightening, or loosening regulations, we have to
keep sight of the role of Government.
The costs of not regulating in the area of asbestos have been
enormous to this society, not just in human pain, suffering, death,
and illness. But for people who seem somehow to be able to rise
above such emotional considerations, the cost of not regulating has
been very substantial in money, in work hours lost, in medical
bills, and in physical repairs in school buildings. That is a subject
we will deal with later, the cost of education alone.
That is one of the points that seems to me has been lost and has
to be emphasized. The costs of not regulating can be to our society
greater than the costs of regulating. I think in the case of asbestos
we face an enormous set of problems: the private insurance system,
the Bankruptcy Act, the public education system, and health of
workers. A whole range of institutions are stressed very badly by
the failure of this society to regulate at an appropriate point years
ago.
So, in addition to focusing on the specific question of asbestos, I
hope through the work of this subcommittee now and in the future
that we can also focus on the costs that a society incurs when it
fails to provide the minimal protections that its citizens are enti-
tled to.
We will begin with an individual who I think more than anyone
else in the Congress has been working hard to deal with the prob-
lems that are the legacy of our failure to regulate asbestos. Con-
gressman Miller, who is the chairman of the Labor Standards Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Education and Labor.
Mr. Miller.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MILLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and
the members of the committee for inviting me to appear before this
subcommittee and to congratulate you on your leadership in not
just holding these hearings but in the whole discussion of the ques-
tions of cost-benefit and regulation.
There is no better time in our history to be making an honest
assessment of the cost of failing to regulate adequately the work-
place exposure to harmful substances.
The asbestos situation is a tragic example of the immense cost
and enormous human suffering which results from that exposure.
. But it is only one example.
Asbestos has long been recognized as one of the most dangerous
substances in the workplace. And yet, when the OSHA undertook
the establishment of a safe threshold level for asbestos exposure,
the asbestos industry mounted a comprehensive effort to fight back
the OSHA's proposed standards.
Regrettably, the view of industry prevailed, and we put into
place an asbestos standard which is now generally regarded as
tragically inadequate.
And interestingly enough, in the court cases where industry is
battling back lawsuits by workers, we find the industry telling the
court if the Government had only regulated us more this would not
have happened and it is raised as a matter of defense.
And yet, in 6 years of hearings in our subcommittee, we have
found that industry has fought every effort and regulation. And
during these 6 years in the subcommittee, we have held hearings
as the result of that policy and earlier unsuccessful efforts to con-
trol asbestos exposure.
Tens of thousands of American workers have become disabled or
have died as a result of the asbestos disease. Every year through
the end of this century, another 10,000 workers will die or become
disabled as a result of asbestos exposure which has already oc-
curred, a quarter of a million casualties in all.
Inadequate controls of asbestos and the resulting number of ill-
nesses have spawned the most massive compensation and litigation
crisis in history.
The 51 workers' compensation programs in the States have
proven to be totally incapable of effectively responding to the
claims of asbestos and other occupational disease victims. The
small number of workers who are awarded compensation benefits
receive a meager amount.
The failure of the responsible industry to pay for the disabilities
suffered by their workers has passed the cost of compensating occu-
pational diseases to the taxpayers of this Nation.
Through social security, medicare, veterans' assistance, and
other publicly financed programs, the taxpayers spend $3 billion a
year in an inadvertent subsidy of hazardous industries.
These disabled workers and their survivors, who are left without
income or medical support, turn to the courts for compensation
through third-party litigation, swamping the judicial machinery of
this Nation.
As of this time, approximately 25,000 lawsuits have been filed by
asbestos victims, tying in knots virtually every court in the land.
And this litigation has been unsuccessful in compensating the vic-
tims.
While a few plaintiffs have received large judgments and settle-
ments, most who receive anything at all receive a very small
amount.
Only about 10 percent of the lawsuits have been finally resolved
at all, and the remaining plaintiffs continue to suffer and many
will die before they get their trial dates.
Court costs and attorneys' fees are immense. Witnesses have esti-
mated that for every dollar that goes into this litigation process, no
more than 10 or 15 cents ends up in the pockets of the victims.
Litigation, while producing paltry payments to victims, has
driven three major companies into the bankruptcy courts. This sit-
uation imperils not only industry, but the ability of a quarter mil-
lion future injury victims to receive compensation.
Obviously we need a different system for compensating victims of
asbestos disease. Just yesterday, the Subcommittee on Labor Stand-
ards completed hearings on H.R. 3175, my bill to establish a ration-
al and responsive compensation system for the victims of asbestos-
related disease.
Interestingly, we have asked that this entire endeavor be fi-
nanced by the industry that is responsible for placing this in the
stream of commerce.
I am heartened by the response to this legislation. Organized
labor, the asbestos industry, the affected employers and insurance
carriers, have all agreed that the bill represents a sound route for
a compensation crisis, and are working with us toward advancing
that legislation.
Compensating the victims of past practices is only one step. We
must also take those actions which are needed to prevent another
generation of victims.
We must commit ourselves to a policy of controlling workplace
exposure to toxic substances.
The cost of saving a few dollars on this quarter's bottom line by
delaying installation of effective engineering controls will be mil-
lions of dollars of compensation down the road, and incalculable
human misery.
Workers shouldn't have to make this tradeoff in order to protect
their jobs. The families of workers shouldnt't have to make this
tradeoff in order to exist. No civilized society should expect work-
ers to sacrifice their health and their lives for such short range ob-
jectives.
Mr. Chairman, in closing I would like to add a word about the
very serious situation faced in schools throughout this country that
contain hazardous asbestos.
Concidentally, today, June 28, is the date by which all 110,000 of
the Nation's public and private elementary schools are to have
complied with the EPA requirement to inspect their facilities for
the presence of hazardous asbestos-containing materials.
It is expected that some 14,000 of these schools will find asbestos
materials and will be required to remove or contain that material
to protect the health and well-being of both school employees and
the students.
So we find that the asbestos problem cuts across our society ex-
acting a tremendous cost, both economically and physically for
those involved.
And, again, I would welcome this committee's effort to try to
look at what kind of rational regulation is proper and what, in fact,
it will really mean in terms of the benefits that it can generate,
not just for the workers but for our entire society, and the costs
that we are now paying for the past generations. And what steps
we can take in terms of prevention for future generations.
Thank you.
Mr. Frank. Thank you, Mr. Miller.
The work you have done has been very important.
I would like to ask you one specific question. You raise the sub-
ject of schools. Obviously, the notion of schoolchildren being ex-
posed to asbestos, is a pretty chilling one.
You chaired a hearing a couple of months ago, Education and
Labor, involving the schools and the role of EPA. Did EPA give you
an assessment of where we are today with regard to schools and
their compliance with notification on asbestos?
Mr. Miller. They gave us an assessment of where they are. I cer-
tainly didn't find it satisfactory. I doubt that you would. What, in
fact, we found out is that standards have been delayed. They de-
layed in issuing the inspection rules and as a result there has been
a great deal of confusion among school districts as to exactly how
they are to proceed.
One of the tragic facts we found out is that in fact nationwide,
we are stuck with a staff of some 10 individuals along, I believe,
with full-time volunteers, to monitor 110,000 schools.
A person from the Southeast of this country estimated that it
would take 7 years and 6 additional staff people and $1 million to
monitor the 17,000 schools within his jurisdiction.
So I think what we see is no sense of urgency at EPA. I just re-
ceived a letter, as a matter of fact, yesterday, from an individual at
EPA suggesting that the full effects of this inspection rule will not
be known until some time in 1984.
I would hope that you would consider, and other members of this
subcommittee, would consider along with my committee and I
think concerned members on the Appropriations Committee that
are having problems with asbestos in the school, writing Mr. Ruck-
elshaus and explaining to him that this is a matter of some con-
cern and urgency for Members of Congress who are being beseiged
by schools that now have detected a problem. EPA simply, in the
past, has historically not responded to this problem with any sense
of urgency at all.
Mr. Frank. On that subject, having found it, what do we do
about it? It is an expensive process. I have in my own district sev-
eral municipalities which are faced with financial problems. They
have an unanticipated cost to remove asbestos that was put in
years ago. Nobody existed to tell them that it was dangerous.
You got a bill through a couple of years ago, in 1980, to authorize
some funding for that.
What is the status of that and where do we go from here?
Mr. Miller. We will be seeking an effort in the Appropriations
Committee to fund Public Law 96-270, the Asbestos School Hazards
Detection and Control Act, which provides for $150 million. We cer-
tainly don't expect to get that full amount but I think what you
have found out is that your district is not atypical and that this is
going on nationwide.
We are hearing from Members all over the country who are
hearing from their local school districts regarding the immense
cost of the removal of this material. People consider the cost-bene-
fit of regulations and review the testimony given our committee
about the special hazard children share in the failure to properly
use and contain asbestos. There is a great deal of concern among
the scientists and the medical profession that they may be more
susceptible and we may, in fact, be incubating another generation
of asbestos-related victims in our public schools.
Again, I would ask for your help in going to the Appropriations
Committee to secure that funding so those schools which have al-
ready detected that they have a hazard that exceeds what we
would allow, even under what I believe is an inadequate OSHA
standard for workplace exposure. We have children that are ex-
posed there hours and hours, and days and days of the year, along
with the employees. We should make an effort to remove that
hazard from those individuals.
Mr. Frank. As it stands EPA is doing very, very little to enforce
any kind of inspection requirements on the schools. We have got a
problem. We know there is a significant amount of asbestos in the
schools in this country, and our children are being exposed to it.
I am wondering if you think we might possibly be able to per-
suade the President of the United States that protecting children
from asbestos exposure is basic and that as we get back to basics
maybe worrying about the terrible harm that asbestos causes could
come within his newly kindled concern in education?
Mr. Miller. I would hope so because it would be darn frighten-
ing to suggest that we are going to extend the schoolday only to
continue to have those children spend a longer time in a hazardous
environment.
I think the real test is we have seen the statements now by Mr.
Ruckelshaus who has taken charge of EPA, and said that he wants
to put back a sense of purpose, a sense of mission. There is really
very little argument about what the prolonged exposure to asbestos
can do to you.
There is some argument about what the casual exposure of as-
bestos can do to you.
It is just a question of whether we want to gamble with the lives
of those children in creating this next generation.
I think we have an opportunity to prevent it and it requires
some commitment.
I would hope that EPA would start to foster that under its new
leadership.
It is very clear that there was no interest in this subject at EPA
prior to the new administration. We simply hope that your over-
sight and the oversight of our committee will inspire them to take
on a mission that the Congress has asked them to do but which has
been bungled to date.
I think your subcommittee has the ability to get their attention.
Mr. Frank. Sometimes I get the sense they are afraid if they
help people find the problem, they might be asked to help finance
its alleviation. When we are talking about kids' health, I would
hope that wouldn't get in their way.
Mr. Miller. Thank you. And thank you for the opportunity to
testify.
Mr. Frank. Thank you very much.
Our next witnesses will be Dr. William Nicholson from the Envi-
ronmental Sciences Laboratory, Mount Sinai School of Medicine,
and Dr. Russell Settle, associate professor of economics. University
of Delaware, and visiting associate professor of economics, the Max-
well School, Syracuse University.
Gentlemen.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. NICHOLSON, Ph. D., ASSOCIATE DI-
RECTOR, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES LABORATORY, MOUNT
SINAI SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
Dr. Nicholson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is William J. Nicholson. I am an associate professor of
community medicine and associate director of the Environmental
Sciences Laboratory of Mount Sinai School of Medicine.
8
Since 1969, my work at Mount Sinai has been largely concerned
with the quantification of health effects associated with asbestos
exposure. In this activity I have conducted industrial hygiene sur-
veys, and clinical or statistical epidemiological studies of asbestos
disease.
I have recently been concerned with the mortality experience
that might be projected from past exposures beginning in 1940 to
asbestos in a variety of trades and occupations.
The results of this research illustrate the tragic consequences of
our past inadequacies in controlling asbestos.
From an analysis of exposures in 11 major occupational catego-
ries, it is estimated that from 1980 onward there will be 350,000
premature deaths of asbestos-related cancers from exposures that
occurred between 1940 and 1980.
In addition to deaths from malignant disease, asbestos will claim
other lives.
The toll is even extended by deaths that are occurring among in-
dividuals who simply lived with asbestos workers and among
people who were exposed in other than occupational circumstances.
You have heard already of the concern for asbestos exposures to
our schoolchildren.
In my testimony I have submitted a table that lists the estimated
number of deaths by occupation along with recent data on the pos-
sible number of individuals who were exposed to asbestos in these
different work activities.
A review of these data demonstrate that most deaths will occur
in individuals who were exposed to asbestos fibers released during
the installation, repair, or removal of thermal insulation materials
containing asbestos.
Over 70 percent of the projected mortality can be associated with
this use of asbestos.
I might point out that of the 350,000 deaths, roughly 120,000 are
estimated to occur among individuals in the construction trades,
and about 74,000 among individuals that were exposed by virtue of
their work in the shipbuilding industry.
Ironically, most of these individuals' jobs did not directly involve
the use of asbestos, they were simply working nearby when insula-
tion application or removal work was underway.
The asbestos fibers did not respect craft lines. Electricians, car-
penters, plumbers, and others working near insulators would
breathe the dust as well as those directly using the asbestos mate-
rial.
I was requested to address the question of what would have been
the consequences had our current standard of two-fibers per millili-
ter been in force and complied with since 1940. Table 1 lists the
estimated minimum number of deaths that might have been avoid-
ed in each trade with potential asbestos exposure.
Overall, at least 280,000 of the 350,000 premature deaths could
have been prevented by the vigorous application of the current as-
bestos standard. By application of that standard, I mean the pre-
vention of any exposure that would exceed two fibers per milliliter.
Many individuals were exposed to less but the generators of the
dust were exposed often to 20 fibers per milliliter or more. If all
such high concentrations had been reduced to less than two fibers
per milliliter, 280,000 could have been saved.
In a practical situation, application of an exposure limit would
have led to an even lower average exposure (at the site of genera-
tion).
I might mention that had there been vigorous application of even
the standard proposed in 1938, the so-called 5 million particle per
cubic foot standard at least 175,000 fewer asbestos-related deaths
would have occurred.
Let me turn to the question of the adequacy of our two fiber
standard. One can make estimates of the risks to workers exposed
to that standard. These estimates are based upon exposure-re-
sponse relationships determined in a variety of exposure circum-
stances. Because of the variability of the exposed relationships a
range of risks is provided [table 2].
It is estimated that if a worker weie exposed to two fibers per
milliliter for a working lifetime, the risk of death would be be-
tween 2,700 to 24,000 per 100,000 individuals exposed. That is, in
such work circumstances, 2.7 percent to 24 percent of the deaths of
workers would be related to the asbestos exposure. The most prob-
able percentage would be about 8 percent. Lower exposure concen-
trations would lead to a proportionally lower percentage of asbes-
tos-related deaths.
Clearly, a current standard ill-serves the working man or
woman.
Let me now address the question of the effects of the two-fiber
standard on future mortality from current exposures. That is, what
would be the effect on future mortality if a standard much more
stringent than two-fibers per milliliter is implemented now or had
been implemented earlier, what deaths could have been prevented?
This is difficult to answer because of the limited information
available on the current concentrations different groups of workers
are exposed to.
As seen in table 1, it is estimated that more than 3 million work-
ers may be exposed to asbestos by virtue of their current jobs in
construction and shipbuilding, in building maintenance, and in
direct manufacturing trades.
However, most of them are not exposed currently to a concentra-
tion of two fibers per milliliter. In the case of garage mechanics
and construction workers the average intensity of exposure is cer-
tainly less. However, in other trades and other industries, average
exposures of one to two fibers may occur and in many circum-
stances. I am sure they are exceeded.
For purposes of illustration let me assume that 1 million workers
are currently exposed to an average of 1 fiber per milliliter. That is
to half the current standard.
This will lead to asbestos-related mortality of from 400 to 4,000
deaths for each year the assumed exposure continues. Clearly, a
more effective standard should be rapidly promulgated.
Finally, I would like to point out that the establishment of a nu-
merical standard is only one aspect of protecting the workingman
and woman from asbestos. Lives will only be saved if there is com-
pliance with established numerical exposure limits and with work
10
practice specified in a standard. I would emphasize that work prac-
tices are an extremely important aspect of any asbestos standard.
In order for effective compliance to be achieved, several condi-
tions must be met. They are: No. 1, employers must be aware of
the need for and the requirements of a standard; No. 2, workers
must be educated about the effects of asbestos and on effective
methods to prevent exposure.
The exposures that are taking place now are largely in structure
where asbestos has previously been applied as thermal insulation
or as fireproofing, in ships, in factories, in powerplants, in refiner-
ies, in chemical plants.
There are now 1 million tons of friable asbestos in place in such
facilities. The exposures of the future will be in the maintenance
and repair of that now asbestos in place. One of the most impor-
tant aspect of controlling risks in the future is for effective work
practices to be established for maintenance work and for workers
to know what they are and to utilize them.
No. 3, engineering controls and work practices must be developed
to reduce the exposures to the lowest levels commensurate with ex-
isting technology.
No. 4, an effective compliance force must be available to assure
that the standard is met.
This is an enormous task. It involves providing guidance to in-
dustry and labor, it involves stringent enforcement of improved
standards. Clearly these activities will involve considerable man-
power and considerable expense. Resources and directors must be
provided to OSHA to assure that it is done.
Thank you.
Mr. Frank. Thank you very much. Dr. Nicholson.
[Dr. Nicholson's prepared statement follows:]
11
Prepared Statement of William J. Nicholson, Ph. D., Mount Sinai School of
Medicine
My name is William J. Nicholson. I am an Associate Professor of Community
Medicine and Associate Director of Che Environmental Sciences Laboratory of Mount
Sinai School of Medicine. Since 1969 my work at Mount Sinai has largely been
concerned with quantification of health effects associated with asbestos exposure.
In this I have conducted industrial hygiene surveys of asbestos exposed workers,
clinical and statistical epidemiological studies indentifying disease patterns
among individuals exposed to to asbestos, and risk estimates of disease from
current and past asbestos exposures.
With respect to the latter activity, I have recently published a paper on
the projected mortality from exposures to asbestos that occurred between 1940
and 1980 in a variety of trades and occupations. A copy of this paper is
provided for tha hearing record. The results of the research illustrate the
tragic consequences of our past inadequacies in controlling asbestos. From
an analysis of exposures in eleven major occupational categories, it is estimated
that from 1980 onwards there will be 350,000 additional deaths of asbestos related
cancers from exposures that occurred between 1940 and 1980. In addition
to the deaths from malignant disease, asbestosis will claim other lives. The
toll is even extended by the deaths that are occurring among individuals who
simply lived with ashescos workers and people who were exposed in other than
occupational circumstances. Table 1 lists the estimated number of deaths by
occupation along with recent data on the possible number of individuals
exposed to asbestos in these different work activities.
A review of Table 1 demonstrates that most deaths will occur among
individuals who were exposed to asbestos fibers released during the installation,
repair or removal of thermal insulation materials containing asbestos. Over 70%
of the projected mortality can be associated with this use of asbestos. Ironi-
cally, a large number of deaths will occur in workers who were exposed simply
12
by working in the area where insulation application or removal was under way,
such as in the hold of a ship during World War II. The asbestos fibers did not
respect craft lines. Electricians, carpenters, plumbers and other working
near insulators would breathe the dust as well.
I was requested to address the question of what would have been the consequences
had our current asbestos standard of 2 f/ml been in force and complied with
since 1940. Table 1 lists estimates of the minimum number of deaths that might
have been avoided. Overall, at least 280,000 of the 350,000 premature deaths could
have been prevented by the vigorous application of the current asbestos standard.
The estimate in the third column of Table 1 was made by assuming that exposures in
the work activity releasing asbestos fibers were reduced to 2 f/ml. In a practical
situation, application of an exposure limit leads to average exposures at least
50% lower, so the saving effect would be much greater than indicated. Parenthetically,
if there had even been vigorous application of the standard suggested in 1938,
the 5 million particle per cubic foot standard, at least 175,000 fewer asbestos
related deaths will occur.
Let me turn to the question of the adequacy of our current 2 fiber standard.
Table 2 lists the range of deaths per 100,000 exposed males that might occur
in the various exposure circumstances. These estimates are based upon
dose response relationships determined in a variety of exposure circumstances
and the range of risks reflects the variability of the observed
relationships. As can be seen, from 2.7" to 24% of the deaths of workers exposed
for a working lifetime to 2 f/ml will be asbestos related. The most probable
percentage is about 8%. Lower exposure concentrations would lead to a propor-
tionally lower percentage of asbestos related deaths. Our current standard ill
ser^/es the exposed woman or man.
Addressing the question of the current effects of OSHA's 2 f/ml standard on
future mortality. This is difficult to answer because of the limited information
available on the current concentrations different arouos of workers are exposed to.
13
As seen in Table 1, more than 3 million workers may be exDosed to
asbestos by virtue of their current job. However most of them are not exposed
to an average concentration of 2 fibers/ml. In the case of garage mechanics
and construction workers the average intensity of exposure is certainly less.
However, in the other trades and industries, average exposures of 1-2 fibers may
obtain and in many circumstances even be exceeded, however for purposes of
illustration let me assume that 1,000,000 workers are currently exposed to an
average of 1 fiber /ml. This will lead to an asbestos related mortality of from
400 to 4000 deaths for each year the assumed exposure continues. Clearly, a
more effective standard should be rapidly promulgated.
Finally, I would like to point out that the establishment of a numerical
standard is only one aspect of protecting the working man and woman from asbestos.
Lives will only be saved if there is compliance with established numerical
exposure limits and with work practices specified in a standard. In order for
effective compliance to be achieved several conditions must be met. They are:
1. employers must be aware of the need for and the
requirements of a standard,
2. workers must be educated about the effects of asbestos
and on effective methods to prevent exposure,
3. engineering controls and work practices must be developed
to reduce exposures to the lowest levels commensurate with
existing technology, and
4. an effective compliance force must be available to assure
that the standard is met.
This latter. activity would involve providing guidance to industry in methods
of compliance and enforcing existing standards where violations occur. Clearly
these activities require considerable manpower and resources must be provided
to OSHA.
25-994 0-83-2
14
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15
Table 2
Estimated asbestos related cancer
mortality from exposure to 2 f/ml
Cancer mortality/100,000 exposed
Lung
Mesothelioma
Other
Total
45 years
1200 - 14,400
760 - 6840
320 - 2880
2680 - 24,100
beginning
at age 20
•
1 year
48 - 428
63 - 566
10 - 86
120 - 1080
beginning
at age 20
1 year
47 - 423
14 - 128
9-85
71 - 635
beginning
at age 40
1 year
beginning
at age 60
27 - 239
1-10
5 - 48
33 - 297
Mr. Frank. Next, Dr. Settle.
STATEMENT OF RUSSELL F. SETTLE, Ph. D., ASSOCIATE PROFES-
SOR OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE, AND VISIT-
ING ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, THE MAXWELL
SCHOOL, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY
Dr. Settle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As part of its exploration into what would have happened had
there been an occupational asbestos standard before passage of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, the subcommittee requested
that I consider in this testimony the costs and benefits to society of
the current asbestos standard as if that standard had been in effect
from 1940 to the creation of OSHA in 1970.
Data limitations make this task an extremely difficult one. Pre-
cise measurements of all of the social costs and benefits that would
have arisen from the imposition of an asbestos standard over this
30-year period cannot be developed from data available currently.
Accordingly, the conclusions expressed here are, of necessity,
highly tentative, based more on expert judgment than on hard
data.
With respect to assessing on economic grounds, the desirability of
the asbestos standard as if it had applied to the 1940 through 1970
period, there are a variety of benefits and costs to consider. The
principal economic benefits of an effective asbestos standard for
this earlier period are: First, the additional production of goods and
services by those who otherwise would have been disabled; second,
savings in medical expenditures occasioned by asbestos-induced ill-
nesses and; third, savings in legal expenditures from the thousands
of liability suits that have resulted from asbestos-related illnesses.
The principal economic costs of an effective asbestos standard
over this earlier period are: First, the cost to private industry of
complying with the standard and; second, the costs incurred by
16
Government as a result of inspections and enforcement efforts re-
sulting from this standard.
In my previous benefit cost study of the current Federal asbestos
standard, a study conducted in 1975, I developed quantitative esti-
mates for most of these and other less important economic benefits
and costs occasioned by the standard .
Those estimates led me to conclude that, on balance, the cost-
benefit analysis favors the current Federal asbestos standard. That
is, the evidence suggested that for every dollar of cost society in-
curred as a result of the Federal asbestos standard, it received in
return more than a dollar in benefits.
A best guess places the benefit-cost ratio at about 1.2, implying a
$1.20 in economic benefits for every $1 in economic costs.
These estimates pertain to economic effects only; of course, had
the intangible benefits of avoiding premature illnesses and deaths
been quantifiable, the estimated benefit-cost ratio would have been
even more favorable.
Now, let us turn to the difficult issue of evaluating the costs and
benefits of the current asbestos standard as if it applied to the 1940
through 1970 period.
In the absence of hard data on many of the key economic effects
of applying such a standard, what conclusions, if any, can be in-
ferred about the desirability of this hypothetical Governmental in-
tervention?
What are the principal facts known about the asbestos dust
hazard during the 1940 through 1970 period?
Clearly, the hazard was an extremely serious one for those work-
ers exposed to it, leading to thousands of illnesses, many of them
fatal.
Second, the hazard of exposure to asbestos dust was understood
well enough by medical experts so as to provide the appropriate
basis for governmental regulation of that hazard.
Third, the extremely long latency periods for the asbestos-in-
duced diseases make it extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible,
for workers to draw a close connection between exposure and even-
tual illness, especially since many of the diseases arise from other
causes.
Accordingly, without governmental regulation or widespread con-
cern among workers exposed to the hazard, firms would have had
no clear economic incentive to help protect workers against expo-
sure to asbestos dust.
These facts clearly suggest that some form of governmental regu-
lations over occupational exposure to asbestos dust during the 1940
through 1970 would have been desirable on economic grounds.
The only issue at contention is whether the current Federal as-
bestos standard would have been appropriate for this period.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, one is inclined to
accept the results of my 1975 study as the best, although admitted-
ly crude, indicator of how well the current standard would have
fared on economic grounds during this period.
Technological differences between this earlier period and the
present could lead to different estimates of the absolute magni-
tudes of the costs and benefits of an asbestos standard, as it applies
to the two different time periods.
17
However, there is no apparent reason to believe that the relative
magnitudes of the costs and benefits would differ.
Accordingly, I would conclude that the best available evidence in-
dicates that on economic grounds the current Federal asbestos
standard should have been imposed some 30 years earlier than it
actually was.
Mr. Frank. Thank you.
[Dr. Settle's prepared statement follows:]
18
Benefits and Costs of Applying the Current Federal Standard on
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos Dust to the 1940-1970 Period
Russell F. Settle, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Economics
University of Delaware
and
Visiting Associate Professor of Economics
The Maxwell School
Syracuse University
♦Testimony before the Manpower and Housing Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Government Operations, Washington, DC, June 28, 1983.
19
As part of its exploration into what would have happened had there
been an occupational asbestos standard before passage of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, the subcommittee requested that I consider in this
testimony the costs and benefits to society of the current asbestos
standard as if the standard had been in effect from 1940 to the creation
of OSHA in 1970.
Data limitations make this task an extremely difficult one. Precise
measurements of the social costs and benefits that would have arisen from
the imposition of an asbestos standard over this 30 year period cannot be
developed from data available currently. Accordingly, the conclusions
reached in this paper are, of necessity, highly tentative, based more on
"expert" Judgment than on "hard" data.
My credentials relevant to the issue at hand are as follows. One of
my areas of expertise is cost-benefit analysis, especially as it applies
to federal regulations. Among other things, 1 have co-authored a
textbook on cost-benefit analysis, and have served as staff economist for
a National Academy of Sciences investigation of the cost-benefit
methodology employed by the Environmental Protection Agency for
evaluating proposed pesticide regulations. Moreover, as part of my Ph.D.
dissertation, I developed quantitative estimates of the social benefits
and costs of the current federal asbestos standard. Under commission
from the U.S. Department of Labor, I recast this dissertation work (into
a paper titled "Benefits and Costs of the Federal Asbestos Standard") for
presentation at a 1975 DOL-sponsored conference on occupational safety
and health regulations; a version of this cost-benefit study was also
invited for presentation at the annual meetings of the American Economic
Association.
20
-2-
Before turning to the specific issue of the costs and benefits of an
asbestos standard for the 1940-1970 period, a few general remarks about
the economic advantages and disadvantages of government regulations may
be useful. All government regulations impose economic costs on society.
However, they also all confer economic benefits on society. Accordingly,
whether any specific regulation is desirable, on economic grounds,
depends on whether the benefits of the regulation outweigh the costs.
The determination of the relative magnitudes of the economic costs and
benefits is, fundamentally, an empirical or measuranent problem, not a
problem susceptible to resolution by appeal to philosophical, legal, or
political positions.
With repsect to assessing, an economic grounds, the desirability of
the asbestos standard as if it applied to the 1940-1970 period, there are
a variety of benefits and costs to consider. The principal economic
benefits of an effective asbestos standard for this earlier period are:
(1) the additional production of goods and services by those who
otherwise would have been disabled; (2) savings in medical expenditures
occasioned by asbestos-induced illnesses; and (3) savings in legal
expenditures from the thousands of product liability suits that have
resulted from asbestos-related illnesses. The principal economic costs
of an effective asbestos standard over this earlier period are: (1) the
costs of complying with the standard; and (2) the inspection and
enforcement costs associated with the standard.
In my previous study of the current federal asbestos standard, I
developed quantitative estimates for most of these (and other less
important) economic benefits and costs occasioned by the standard. Those
21
-3-
estimates led me to conclude that, on balance, the cost-benefit analysis
favors the current federal asbestos standard. That Is, the evidence
suggested that, for every dollar of cost society incurred as a result of
the federal asbestos standard, it received in return more than a dollar
in benefits. A "best guess" places the benefit-cost ratio at about 1.2,
implying a $1.20 in economic benefits for every $1.00 in economic costs.
These estimates pertain to economic effects only; of course, had the
intangible benefits of avoiding premature illnesses and deaths been
quantifiable, the etimated benefit-cost ratio would have been even more
favorable .
Now, let us turn to the difficult issue of evaluating the costs and
benefits of the current asbestos standard as if it applied -to the
1940-1970 period. In the absence of "hard" data on many of the key
economic effects of applying such a standard, what conclusions, if any,
can be inferred about the desirability of this hypothetical governmental
intervention?
What are the principal facts known about the asbestos dust hazard
during the 1940-1970 period? Clearly, the hazard was an extremely
serious one for those workers exposed to it, leading to thousands of
illnesses, many of them terminal. Secondly, the hazard of exposure to
asbestos dust was understood well enough by medical experts so as to
provide the appropriate basis for governmental regulation of that
hazard. Third, the extremely long latency periods for the
asbestos-induced diseases make it extraordinarily difficult, if not
impossible, for workers to draw a close connection between exposure and
eventual illness, especially since many of the diseases (e.g. lung cancer)
22
-4-
arise from other causes (e.g., smoking). Accordingly, without
governmental regulation or widespread concern among workers exposed to
the hazard, firms would have had no clear economic incentive to help
protect workers against exposure to asbestos dust. These facts clearly
suggest that some form of governmental regulations over occupational
exposure to asbestos dust during the 1940-1970 period would have been
desirable on economic grounds.
The only issue at contention is whether the current federal asbestos
standard would have been appropriate for the 1940-1970 period. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, one is inclined to accept the
results of my 1975 study as the best — although admittedly
crude — indicator of how well the current standard would have fared, on
economic grounds, over the 1940-1970 period. Technological differences
between this earlier period and the present could lead to different
estimates of the absolute magnitudes of the costs and benefits of an
asbestos standard, as it applies to the two different time periods.
However, there is no apparent reason to believe that the relative
magnitudes of the costs and benefits would differ between these two time
periods.
Accordingly, I would conclude that the best available evidence
indicates that, on economic grounds, the current federal asbestos
standard should have been imposed 30 years earlier than it actually was.
23
Mr. Frank. We will begin, with Dr. Nicholson. First, I want to
make sure I get what seems to be one of the central points.
Let me say, first of all, I appreciate both of you gentlemen join-
ing us and engaging in this kind of speculation. I realize that at-
tempting to project backward what would have been the effect of a
standard isn't going to yield the hardest data. On the other hand,
those of us who have just been engaged in the congressional budget
process and in estimates of the deficit are used to data of a certain
degree of softness so we welcome you to that status.
But it is important, it seems to me, because of the effort to quan-
tify—and I should make clear my own bias in this— the costs of
regulation has been used as an antiregulation tool. And while it is
legitimate for us to know the costs it is also important that we at-
tempt to quantify the benefits of regulation and the costs of not
regulating so that judgment is made in a reasonable way.
Dr. Nicholson, I was struck by your argument that as best as you
can tell, given the inherent weaknesses of this kind of method of
projecting backward, that approximately 280,000 would not have
died from asbestos-related causes if we had had a 2-fiber standard
in effect in 1940? How best to phrase that?
Dr. Nicholson. The number that I gave you, the 350,000, is the
projected mortality from exposures that took place in that period of
time. Those deaths have not yet come about and they are going to
come about. And that speaks clearly for the need for some mecha-
nism of intervention separate from
Mr. Frank. There are 350,000 people now alive who will tragical-
ly, and statistically, die because of exposure to asbestos; 280,000 of
those deaths from asbestos would have been avoided had we im-
posed that standard 40 years ago.
Dr. Nicholson. That is the estimate, yes.
Mr. Frank. And the great majority of those deaths could have
been avoided and all the costs that are there.
You said that in 1938, someone, parenthetically, if there had
been vigorous application of the standard suggested in 1938, 5 mil-
lion particles per cubic feet, we would have been able to avoid half
the deaths that we can now anticipate.
Who suggested that standard in 1938?
Dr. Nicholson. In the period just prior to 1938, there was a
study of the U.S. Public Health Service of four textile plants in
North Carolina that looked at the presence of asbestosis among the
workers that they were able to examine.
Although the study was limited by the circumstances, they found
that there was not a significant increase in asbestotic signs in
those that were exposed to a concentration less than 5 million par-
ticles per cubic foot.
It was suggested by the Public Health Service that maintenance
of that level of dust in a workplace would probably protect against
asbestosis. However, it was a tentative conclusion.
Had such a standard been applied to the workplaces where ther-
mal insulation was used after 1938 the mortality that I described
would have been avoided.
Mr. Frank. Have you any idea why it wasn't adopted?
Mr. Nicholson. It did not have the force of law. It was adopted
by a private organization, the American Conference of Governmen-
24
tal Industrial Hygienists, and published as a recommended thresh-
old limit value for asbestos dust from 1945 onward.
It finally did have force of law in the early 1960's when the
ACGIH TLV's were incorporated into the Walsh-Healey Act for
those industries doing more than $10,000 of business with the Fed-
eral Government. Unfortunately, there was no enforcement of
these standards. There wasn't the manpower to educate the work-
ers, to educate the employers as to the need for compliance or to
inspect the workplaces. And, thus, the ACGIH TLV's simply served
as recommendations, which may or may not have been followed in
the different workplaces.
Mr. Frank. That was my next point.
You put a lot of emphasis, when you talk about what we have to
do for the future and you do it again now, in saying that simply
having the standard isn't enough. Is there nothing self-enforcing
about them?
One of the things we are told is that industry is often beset by
hordes of inspectors — and inspectors seem to travel in hordes, they
don't come in groups, and they go out and bother people by inspect-
ing them. We have been told that really is unnecessary.
Are you suggesting that since it has already been put in place,
that there is no cheap way to enforce the standard?
Dr. Nicholson. I don't think there is a cheap way to do it. Many
industries, indeed, are complying with the existing standard, they
are doing the best they can. These are usually the larger industries
that have a skilled engineering force and an inplace industrial hy-
giene staff that can work toward a safe workplace in their plants.
However, most of the asbestos is in place when there is only one
or two people that may be exposed. It is in buildings, it is in
schools, it is in a lot of little, tiny plants that do not have the capa-
bility, or the knowledge, for self-enforcement.
Mr. Frank. That is an interesting point because often we .are
told that what we should do is to exempt smaller businesses from
regulation. And what you are suggesting, I gather, is that at least
with regard to asbestos and protecting the health of the workers
and avoiding the economic costs and further illness and injury
from asbestos, that it would not be sensible to exempt the smaller
ones and go after the bigger ones. The problem of enforcement is
likely to be because of the prevalence of this stuff in places where
people work. What you are saying is that 70 percent of the deaths
occurred from people who were not in what we would think of as
the asbestos industry? That 70 percent of the projected mortality is
associated with the repair or removal of thermal insulation.
Dr. Nicholson. And the vast majority
Mr. Frank. And the vast majority would be 70 percent, I'm
sorry.
Dr. Nicholson [continuing]. Would be people that were just, in
essence, bystanders.
Mr. Frank. So a very large percentage, maybe not more than
half, are people who were in the construction trades, or in ship-
building, and which makes it all the more important, is that we
have an adequate corps of inspectors.
Dr. Nicholson. And an adequate education program so that
these diverse workers — diverse in the sense that they are not orga-
25
nized in a nice group — can learn of the hazards and of the proper
procedures to take.
Mr. Frank. But it is important that the workers themselves un-
derstand what the problems are, what to look for, what to avoid,
and how to deal with it.
One last question Dr. Nicholson. In your testimony you talk
about the need for effective compliance, engineering controls, and
education of workers, since we have made the mistake of not regu-
lating isn't it more expensive to undo than it would have been to
avoid it in the first place?
I gather that a large part of the problem we face is that because
people did not stop it at the beginning, we now have this serious
health problem all over the place and that causes us a great deal of
difficulty in trying to protect ourselves.
Dr. Nicholson. Yes, indeed, that is certainly true. In fact, the
cost of reducing this toll would have been relatively little because,
as I pointed out, 70 percent of the mortality had its source from the
use of one particular type of product. That product now has been
changed such as there is no asbestos in it and the cost of doing so
was relatively limited.
To have done that earlier, would have been a great benefit.
Mr. Frank. Were the substitutable materials available at an
early period, or is this something new?
Dr. Nicholson. To a large extent, yes. They had fibrous glass
available which could have been used.
Mr. Frank. Failing to adopt a strict standard and impose it in
the first place has made it a problem? When we were too lax at the
beginning, we now have this pervasive problem all over the place.
The cost of undoing of regulatory lapse is a very serious one.
Dr. Nicholson. Yes, that's right. I am reminded of the story of a
corseteer in New York who observed that some things are more dif-
ficult to get out of than to get into.
Mr. Frank. All right.
Dr. Settle, one thing in particular which struck me in your testi-
mony, we are told one of the arguments for deregulating is that
Government should not do what the private sector can do for itself
and do better.
I think one of the confusions that exist is that we call two very
different things deregulation. Or maybe we call two very different
things regulation so we call them then deregulation.
One is an attempt by Government to replace those functions that
the market is supposed to perform, setting airline ticket prices, or
deciding where trucks ought to go.
There is an arguable case there that the market is supposed to
allocate these offices and fix prices so that Government interven-
tion in that regard is one set of phenomena. We are talking here
about another where, if I understand your testimony, in a perfectly
functioning market this wouldn't be taken care of.
What you say at the beginning of page 3 is that because of the
long latency periods there is no close connection from the stand-
point of any individual employee between the costs of exposure to
asbestos and problems that he or she is going to have. So that
absent Government regulation, what you are saying is that firms
have no clear economic incentive to help protect workers against
26
exposure. Now, that doesn't mean that they are wantonly cruel
and that they want to expose people.
What it does mean, unlike the areas of economic regulation
where the Government is involved in some kind of price fixing, and
theie is arguably a private sector mechanism that will do it as well
or better. I gather you are saying here there is no private sector
mechanism. There is nothing absent some Government action that
gives the private firm any incentive whatsoever from the economic
standpoint, leaving aside the humanitarian.
But from the economic standpoint, there is no incentive to be
concerned about asbestos given the nature of the problems it has
caused.
Dr. Settle. That is exactly right. In these areas involving occu-
pational health hazards, particularly those with long latency peri-
ods, you would have to believe that the individual workers con-
fronting such hazards fully understood them and behaved in an
optimal way when they were around them. It takes tremendous
faith in the workings of the free marketplace to believe in that par-
ticular assumption.
So this is an area where the market will generally fail to operate
properly without some form of governmental regulation.
Mr. Frank. So regulation here is not an attempt to displace the
market. It is not a case of the Government saying, we know better
than the private sector on how to deal with this. It is a case of soci-
ety saying, this is a goal that simply will not be accomplished
unless it is accomplished this way. It is not a substitution of one for
another. It is a function that is not going to be there.
In other words, being a private manufacturer since 1940, 1950, I
would not see any costs to the use of asbestos in my operation?
Dr. Settle. That is right.
Mr. Frank. I take it the long latency means that even my insur-
ance isn't going to be affected. I mean, nobody is going to raise my
premiums at that point because it hasn't happened.
Dr. Settle. Yes; especially since many of these diseases are
caused by other factors such as smoking. It is extraordinarily diffi-
cult to pin down the particular source of a disease even though it
realistically was caused by exposure to asbestos. For legal purposes
it is just very difficult to do.
Mr. Frank. Your basic conclusion, leaving aside humanitarian
concerns et cetera, should be on a dollars and cents basis. We paid
a price because there was no Government agency that stepped in
and said this is a dangerous substance and don't use it. I mean, in
dollars and cents it cost us more than the efficiency of using it.
Dr. Settle. That is precisely right. That is the bottom line of this
analysis.
Mr. Frank. Even if one has respect for the free market and the
way it operates there are social costs that will come in the best
functioning situation and that can only be avoided if there is some
Government action that says you are going to have to stop this be-
cause it is going to cost us more.
Dr. Settle. Yes; for the free market to operate properly, the par-
ticipants in those markets have to have very good information and
this is clearly a case where that information simply wasn't at the
disposal of the workers.
27
Mr. Frank. That's right, and from the standpoint of the manu-
facturer, even if the information, again, setting aside humanitarian
concerns which may or may not exist. There are people who have
said, for instance, that recently one respected figure just said there
is no such thing as a dangerous substance. It was the President of
the United States who said there is no such thing as a dangerous
substance, and there are only amounts that are dangerous.
A manufacturer who might have believed that, might then have
said, look, I am going to follow the law and there is no law against
using this stuff and this is the cheapest and most efficient way for
me to use it, that would have been a socially approved form of be-
havior and there would have been no concern for the cost whatso-
ever.
Dr. Settle. Absolutely. For the manufacturers to have had some
concern, they would either have had to conform to Government
regulations over the use of this substance or they would have had
to be in the position of paying workers a risk premium for working
around it.
Since asbestos workers in general were not responsive to the
hazard that was confronting them, the manufacturers would have
had no reason, on economic grounds, to act to reduce that hazard.
Mr. Frank. The only way the market could have done it would
have been if we had somehow gotten word to the workers that they
were going to be incurring this problem and then presumably they
would have demanded a higher wage to work there.
Dr. Settle. Not only would we need to have gotten word to them
but we would also need to have them understand and believe in
what we were saying.
Mr. Frank. In the thirties, I doubt whether that would have
been a serious disincentive for people to take what few jobs were
there.
Gentlemen, I thank you both. Without objection, the paper by
Dr. Nicholson, Mr. Perkel, and Dr. Selikoff; and "Benefit Costs to
the Federal Asbestos Standards" by Dr. Settle, will be submitted
for the record.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Dr. Nicholson. Thank you.
[The documents follow:]
28
American Journal of Industrial Medicine 3:259-311 (1982)
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos: Population at Risk
and Projected Mortality -1980-2030
William J. Nicholson, Pho, George Perkel, ma, and Irving J. Selikoff, mo
Estimates have been made of the numbers of cancers that are projected to result from
past exposures to asbestos in a number of occupations and industries. From 1940
through 1979, 27,500,000 individuals had potential asbestos exposure at work. Of these,
18,800,000 had exposure in excess of that equivalent to two months employment in pri-
mary manufacturing or as an insulator (> 2-3 f-yr/ml). 2 1,000, 000 of the 27,500,000 and
14, 100,000 of the 18,800,000 are estimated to have been alive on January 1, 1980.
It is further estimated that approximately 8,200 asbestos-related cancer deaths are
now occurring annually. This will rise to about 9,700 annually by the year 2000. There-
after, the mortality rate from past exposure will decrease, but still remain substantial for
another three decades.
Key words: asbestos, occupational exposure, risk assessment, moralil> projections
INTRODUCTION
A large volume of research has been conducted on the adverse health effects of
exposure to asbestos. However, relatively little is known about the magnitude of the
population at risk to asbestos-related disease. A number of occupations and industries
have been identified as involving substantial occupational exposure to asbestos, but no
detailed evaluation has been made to quantify the number of persons whose employ-
ment experience has resulted in sufficient exposure to warrant characterizing them as at
risk. This analysis is designed to provide an assessment of the extent and consequences
of occupational asbestos exposure in the United States between 1940 and 1979.
The task of estimating the population at risk to asbestos-related disease is compli-
cated by a number of factors:
Environmental Sciences Laboratory, Mount Sinai School of Medicine (CUNY), New York.
The analysis was prepared as pan ofa study for the US Depanmeni of Labor entitled "Disability Compen-
sation for Asbestos-Associated Disease in the United States," June 1982.
Address reprint requests to Dr. William J. Nicholson, Environmental Sciences Laboratory, Mount Sinai
School of Medicine (CUNY), One Gustave Levy Place, New York, NY 10029.
Accepted for publication July 23, 1982.
0271-3586/82/0303-0259$14.00 ^ 1982 Alan R. Liss, Inc.
29
260 Nicholson, Perkel, and SelikofT
1. The precise number of persons occupationally exposed to asbestos at any
given time is not known.
2. The level of exposure to asbestos necessary to increase the risk of incurring as-
bestos-related disease is only imperfectly known, estimates being complicated by the
varying interactions of the two elements that go into "dose" (time and intensity).
3. The extent to which workers have changed occupations and/or industries
from time to time so as to place them at risk to asbestos-related diseases (or to end such
exposure) at any time in the past four decades is not known.
We have sought to overcome these obstacles by compiling the best available data
concerning worker exposure to asbestos and the turnover of workers in the occupations
and industries involved. The sources and methods used to estimate the population at
risk are set forth below.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Identification of Industries and Occupations at Risk
Workers are exposed to asbestos in a wide variety of industrial pursuits from
mining and milling to primary manufacturing (producing manufactured goods from
raw asbestos fibers) to secondary manufacturing (processing asbestos manufactured
products to make other products) to consumer industries (utilizing a finished product
containing asbestos without modification) [Daly et al, 1976].
Mining and milling. Fewer than 600 persons in the United States are employed
in mining and milling asbestos [Meylan, 1978]. In view of the small number involved
and the lack of information on employee turnover, we have excluded this industry from
our estimates.
Primary manufacturing. The Asbestos Information Association has estimated
that there are upwards of 3,000 discrete uses of asbestos. A selection of major asbestos
products and their uses is presented in Table I. The primary manufacturing industries
in which asbestos products are produced and which involve substantial asbestos
exposure to production and maintenance employees are as follows:
Asbestos products industry (SIC 3292). The major products of this industry are
friction produas, asbestos<ement pipe and sheet, asbestos textiles, fioor tiles, roofing
felts, insulating materials, and other asbestos building materials.
Extensive data indicate that excessive fiber concentrations existed in the produc-
tion of asbestos products during previous years. In a study of retirees from one of the
largest asbestos products manufacturers, Henderson and Enterline [1979] categorized
work exposures according to total dust concentration (as measured by a midget im-
pinger) times period of employment. Using recently obtained data on the conversion
between such particle counts and fiber concentrations, it is estimated that the average
concentration to which the members of his cohort were exposed was 30 fibers/mi
[Asbestos Information Association, 1979]. Similar concentrations were suggested for
the work force exposure in a large United States asbestos products manufacturer
studied by Nicholson et al [in press]. Here subjective data, consistent with company
measurements of dust concentrations, suggested that the person -weighted average ex-
posure was approximately 25 fibers/ml between 1945 and 1965. In two asbestos insula-
tion manufacturing facilities in Port Allegany, Pennsylvania, and Tyler, Texas, aver-
25-994 0-83
30
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 261
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262 Nicholson, Perkel, and SelikofT
age concentrations of 35 fibers/ml were measured by NIOSH between 1968 and 1971
[National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 1972].
These concentrations were characteristic of early exposure levels in manufactur-
ing industries. In recent years, considerable efforts have been made to reduce fiber con-
centrations. During 1975, air levels of from 0.5 to 4.0 f/ml were found to characterize
most primary manufacturing processes (see below). With appropriate engineering,
even asbestos textile manufacturing can be controlled to levels below 1.5 f/ml
[Lewinsohn et al, 1979].
Since substantial asbestos exposure is involved in all production and maintenance
operations in this industry, we have included all production and maintenance workers
in our estimates of the population at risk.
Gaskets, packing and sealing devices industry (SIC 3293). This industry
encompasses products made of asbestos, leather, metal, and rubber. Prior to 1972, as-
bestos was the predominant raw material used. A change in the industry classification
system in 1972 expanded the definition of this industry to include products made of
leather, metal, and rubber [Office of Management and Budget, 1972]. Since approxi-
mately one half of the employees of the newly defined industry were employed in plants
manufacturing asbestos products, we have included one half of the production and
maintenance employees since 1972 in our estimates of the population at risk. For years
prior to 1972, we counted all employees in the at-risk group.
Building paper and building board mills (SIC 2661). TTiis industry covers the
produaion of asbestos paper, asbestos board, and sheeting and various types of papers
and insulating boards used in building construction. Since approximately one half of
the employees in 1972 were employed in construction paper plants (where asbestos was
the principal raw material), we have included one half of the production and mainte-
nance employees in our estimates of the population at risk.
Recent (1975) fiber concentrations measured in the primary asbestos manufac-
turing industry have been reported in the Asbestos Information Association -Weston
submission to OSHA as a response to the Oaober 1975 proposed revision to the asbes-
tos standard [Daly et al, 1976]. These data indicate the following asbestos concentra-
tions were present in the respective industry segments:
1975 asbestos
fiber concentrations (f/ml)
Primary industry
Range
"Typical"
Asbestos paper
O.IO- 2.8
0.75-1.9
Asbestos cement pipe
0.25- 4.5
0.50-2.2
Floor tile
0.25- 4.3
0.50-1.75
Friaion products
0.10-22.0
1.00-3.3
Paints, coatings, and sealants
0.25- 8.0
1.00-2.5
Asbestos cement sheet
0.25- 8.7,
1.00-3.0
Gaskets and packing
0.10- 2.5'
—
Reinforced plastics
0.20- 3.0
0.75-2.0
Asbestos textiles
0.25-15.0
1.00-4.0
32
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 263
Secondary manufacturing. Secondary industries are those that receive products
containing asbestos and further process, modify, or fabricate them to produce other in-
termediate or final products. The following industries involve such processes:
Heating equipment except electric and warm air furnaces (SIC 3423). This indus-
try is engaged in the production of heating boilers; domestic furnaces and gas burners;
and oil burners, space, and wall heaters, all of which tended to incorporate asbestos in-
sulation in their construction. We have included one half of the production and mainte-
nance employees in our estimates of the population at risk.
Fabricated plate workers (Boiler Shops) (SIC 3443). Establishments in this
industry are engaged in manufacturing power and marine boilers, pressure and non-
pressure tanks, processing and storage tanks, and heat exchangers and similar
products, many of which include asbestos insulation. The subdivisions of this industry
that utilize extensive asbestos insulation (heat exchangers and steam condensers; steel
power boilers, parts and attachments; and nuclear reactor steam supply systems) ac-
counted for approximately one half of the industry's total production workers in 1977.
We have included one half of the production and maintenance employees in our esti-
mates of the population at risk.
Industrial process furnaces and ovens (SIC 3567). This industry produces indus-
trial process furnaces, ovens, induction and dielearic heating equipment, and related
devices. All of the subdivisions make extensive use of asbestos insulation and all of the
produaion and maintenance employees are included in our population at risk
estimates.
Electric housewares and fans (SIC 3634). Establishments in this industry are en-
gaged in manufacturing electric housewares for heating, cooking, and other purposes
and electric fans. We estimate that lO^/o of the production and maintenance employees
are at risk of asbestos-related disease.
Asbestos is used in a variety of other secondary industries. These include friaion
products, reinforced plastics, products containing asbestos paper, various industries
manufacturing laboratory equipment, electrical switchboards, cooling tower compo-
nents, fire proteaion materials, etc. It is impossible to extract the number of individu-
als in all secondary manufacturing from BLS data. The only published information is
that from the Weston analysis done in cooperation with the asbestos industry [Daly et
al, 1976]. They report the following 1975 employment data for secondary manufactur-
ing industries, categorized by the primary source of asbestos:
Primary source of Number of exposed
asbestos materials employees
Asbestos paper 158,400
Friction products 27,600
Asbestos cement sheets 19,200
Gaskets and packings 12,000
Reinforced plastics 8,400
Asbestos textiles 6,000
Miscellaneous 8,400
Total 240,000
33
264 Nicholson, Perkel, and SelikofT
By comparison, our estimate of the asbestos-exposed employment during 1975
for the four industries listed previously (SIC 3433, 3443, 3567, and 3634) totaled
38,000. Moreover, only employees of companies manufacturing electric housewares
and fans would appear to have been included in the Weston tabulations. However, it is
difficult to be cenain that their classification of primary and secondary is similar to
ours. In their classification, they estimate 23,000 to be exposed in primary manufactur-
ing in 1975 versus our estimate of 31,000.
Thus, some of our primary industry may be their secondary. It is difficult to esti-
mate the exposures the individuals identified by Weston would have had. Some data
are presented on current asbestos concentrations (see below). It is unlikely, howe\er,
that 158,000 employees would have had significant exposures during the manufacture
of produas containing asbestos paper. The data in the other manufacturing segments
appear reasonable, however. To account for all these exposures, we will consider that a
number equal to twice the four groups specified by SIC numbers are additionally ex-
posed in secondary manufacturing. (This additional number totals 76,000 in 1975.)
Data provided by Asbestos Information Association-Weston on fiber counts in
secondary manufacturing are:
Asbestos fiber concentration
Secondary industry^ range reported (f/ml)
Asbestos paper 1.0-3.5
Friaion products^' 2.5-6.5
Asbestos cement sheet 1 .0-6.0
Gasket and packing 0.2-5.0
Asbestos-reinforced plastic 0.5-2.0
Asbestos textiles 0.5-5.0
^Categorized by primary source of asbestos material.
''Does not include brake and clutch mamtenance.
No information is available on dust counts in these industries in earlier years.
Shipbuilding and repair (SIC 3731). The risk of asbestos-related disease among
shipyard workers was emphasized in 1968 by Harries, who reponed five cases of
pleural mesothelioma among employees of the Royal Navy Dockyard in Devonport
(Harries, 1968]. His findings were notewonhy in that none of the patients was an "as-
bestos worker. "They were employed in othertrades (boilermaker, shipwright, laborer,
welder, fitter) and worked in shipyards with asbestos workers but did not them-
selves often use asbestos. In addition, cases of asbestosis were noted. Stumphius de-
scribed similar findings in the Netherlands [Stumphius, 1968]. Again, the mesotheli-
omas were among workers other than those in the usual asbestos trades. Since these
initial communications, experiences have been detailed in many parts of the world iden-
tifying charaaeristic asbestos-associated disease among former shipyard workers, in-
cluding pleural mesothelioma, peritoneal mesothelioma, asbestosis, and lung cancer.
Evidence of asbestos-associated disease has been reponed among workers employed in
United States shipyards during and after World War II [Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, 1981; Felton, 1979; Selikoff, 1965]. These findings indicate that the
nature of shipyard work during this period provided significant opportunity for expo-
sure to asbestos of the many trades employed, even though such exposure might have
been only intermittent or indirect.
34
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 265
We have included all production and maintenance employees of private and
naval shipyards in our estimates of the population at risk. The estimates for naval
shipyards, however, are taken from the United States Depanment of the Navy
[Nunneley, Depanment of the Navy (Personal Communication, 1980)].
Construction. The construaion industry accounts for an estimated 70''^o-80''7o
of total United States consumption of asbestos fiber [Levine, 1978]. Substantial direa
exposure to asbestos occurs in the following subdivisions:
1. General contractors — residential buildings other than single family (SIC
1522).
2. General building contractors— nonresidential buildings (SIC 154).
3. Water, sewer, pipe line, communication, and power line construction (SIC
1623).
4. Construction— special trade contractors (SIC 17, except 1771 [concrete
work], 1781 [water well drilling], 1791 [structural steel erection], 1794 [excavating and
foundation work], 1796 [installation or erection of building equipment, not elsewhere
classified]).
Among the asbestos products involved in direct exposures in construction work
are asbestos-cement pipe installation; asbestos-cement sheet installation; architectural
panel installation; built-up roofing installation; drywall removal, replacement, and in-
stallation; removing of roofing felts; asbestos insulation of pipe, tubing, heating units,
and electric power generation equipment; paints, coatings, and sealants. In addition to
the direa exposure resulting from the use of the above products, construction workers
have been subjea to considerable indirect exposure to asbestos as a result of the prac-
tice of spraying asbestos insulation in multistoried structures during the period 1958-
1972. An investigation of the spraying of mineral fiber insulation material in New York
City colleaed on-site samples taken at various distances from the spraying nozzle. It
showed fiber counts ranging from 70 f/ml 10 feet from the nozzle to 3 f/ml 25 feet
away [Reitze et al, 1972]. Workers in occupations not directly involved in spraying (car-
penters, electricians, pipefitters, plumbers, welders, and others) who were on construc-
tion sites during or after such spraying are at risk to asbestos-associated disease.
We have included all construction workers in SIC 1522 and 154 in our estimates
of the population at risk and the following proportions of the workers in other con-
struction subdivisions:
SIC 1623. Thirty percent of the water distribution pipe sold in the United States
in 1974 was asbestos cement [Meylan et al, 1978]. We assumed that this proportion of
the workers in the water, sewer, etc, line construction industry is exposed to asbestos
from asbestos-cement pipe. In addition, we included maintenance mechanics and help-
ers employed in SIC 16 (construaion other than building construction) to reflea the
fact that these workers are exposed to asbestos during the repair of brakes on heavy
construction equipment [Hill, 1980]. These workers comprise approximately 5% of
the total number of construction workers in SIC 16 [Bureau of Labor Statistics,
unpublished].
SIC 17. We have included all construction workers in 171 (plumbing, heating
[except electrical], and air conditioning) and SIC 172 (painting, paperhanging, and
decorating) in our estimates of the population at risk. The former group has extensive
exposure to asbestos in pipe covering and insulation for heating and ventilation equip-
35
266 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
ment . A mortality study of the members of the union of plumbers and pipefitters in the
United States noted their potential exposures to asbestos and found significant excesses
in proportional mortality ratios for malignant neoplasms of the esophagus, respiratory
system, lung, bronchus, and trachea, and "other sites." [Kaminski et al, 1980]. Seven
deaths were due to mesothelioma, a clear indicator of asbestos-associated disease.
The latter group (painting, paperhanging, and decorating) has been exposed to
many asbestos-containing materials, including spackle compounds used by general
painters, taping and joint compounds used in drywall construction, and additions of
asbestos to sealant compounds or surfacing materials. Moreover, these workers have
indirect exposure to asbestos materials used by other trades in the construction indus-
try. A study of drywall taping workers employed in the New York metropolitan area
found mean asbestos fiber concentrations ranging from 5.3 f/ml in hand-sanding to
47.2 f/ml in dry mixing operations [Fischbein et al, 1979]. Other researchers repon
mean fiber concentrations of from 0.9 to 19.6 f/ml during various activities of drywall
taping [Vermaand Middleton, 1980]. In addition to the tapers and painters directly en-
gaged in these operations, members of all the construction trades working in the vicin-
ity of ongoing drywall construction were significantly exposed. Mean fiber concentra-
tions varying from 2.3 to 8.6 f/ml were observed at distances from 3 to 20 feet from the
taping operation in the same room. In adjacent rooms, background mean fiber levels
varied from 2.6 to 4.8 f/ml at distances from 1 5 to 25 feet from the taping operations.
For the remaining groups covered by SIC 17 (except the five groups identified
under 4 above as not being substantially exposed), we have estimated that the propor-
tion of the construction workers at risk during 1958-1972 was 50% (when multi-storied
buildings were sprayed with asbestos fireproofing material) and 20To during 1940-1957
and 1973-1979. The following proportions of these groups were found to be exposed to
asbestos in the National Occupational Hazard Survey [National Institute for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health, unpublished]:
SIC
% Employees
code
SIC description
exposed to asbestos
173
Electrical work
15
■174
Masonry, stonework, tilesetting,
and plastering
27
175
Carpentering and flooring
15
176
Roofing and sheetmetal work
41
1793
Glass and glazing work
40
1795
Wrecking and demolition work
NR
1799
Special trade contractors, not
elsewhere classified
23
NR, Not reported.
It should be noted that the above percentages understate the proportions of "con-
struction workers" exposed to asbestos in these industries since they are based on the
total employment reported rather than total construction workers; the latter concept
excludes executive and managerial personnel, professional and technical employees,
and routine office workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1976].
36
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 267
Electric, gas, and combination utility services (SIC 491. 492. 493). Power gener-
ating facilities have many work areas with c!evatcd temperature^, which have been in-
sulated with asbestos-containing materials, including preformed blocks of hydrous
calcium silicate insulation reinforced with asbestos fibers. Other insulation used in this
industry consists of asbestos boards, blankets, felts, cloths, tapes, sleeves, and cements
that contained various quantities of asbestos [Fontaine and Trayer, 1975]. Studies con-
ducted in England [Bonnell ei al, 1975] and France [Fontaine and Trayer, 1975] have
found substantial evidence of asbestos-associated disease among persons engaged in
maintenance work at power stations, including persons not directly involved in apply-
ing or removing insulation materials. We have included one quarter of the "physical
workers" employed in electric and gas utilities in our estimate of the population at risk:
10% representing maintenance workers and 15% other persons in the area who are in-
directly exposed [H. Jones, 19S0].
Occupational groups. The industrial aaivities for which employment statistics
are gathered do not correlate closely with those in which there is occupational contact
with asbestos. It has been necessary, therefore, to supplement the estimates derived
from the above analysis of industrial employment statistics with estimates of the num-
ber of persons employed in particular occupations (crossing industry lines) where sig-
nificant asbestos exposure has occurred. We have reduced the industry estimates of
persons at risk by the numbers employed in the selected occupations to avoid double-
counting. The following occupational groups were defined as at risk:
Asbestos and insulation workers. A strikingly increased death rate of lung and
other cancers has been observed among a group of asbestos and insulation workers
[Selikoff et al, 1979]. All such individuals have significant risk.
Data are available from three research groups on average fiber concentratfons in
insulation work prior to 1970, when the techniques of application and control measures
used were typical of the industry during previous years [Balzer and Cooper, 196S; Ferris
et al, 1971; Murphy et al, 1971; Nicholson, 1975]. The data are presented in terms of
time (and job-weighted) average concentrations. During certain operations (cement
mixing, hand- or band-saw cutting, removal), extremely high concentrations were ob-
served (up to 100 f/ml). However, these operations constituted only a small fraction of
the insulators' work activity. Data were also estimated for earlier years when the asbes-
tos content of insulation was twice that of 1965-1970.
Summary of Average Asbestos Air Concentrations
During Insulation Work
Average fiber concentration (f/ml)
Light and heavy
Research group construction Marine work
Average concentrations of fibers longer than five micrometers evaluated
by membrane filter techniques and phase -contrast microscopy
Reitze-Nicholson, Mount Sinai 6.3
[Nicholson, 1975]
Balzer-Cooper, U. of Calif. 2.7 6.6
[Balzer and Cooper, 1968]
Burgess-Lynch, Harvard 2.9
[Ferris et al, 1971]
37
268 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
Average concentrations of all visible fibers counted
with a konimeter and bright-field microscopy
Murphy, Harvard [Murphy et ' ! 8.0
al, 1971]
Fleischer, US Navy [Fleisher et 30-40
al, 1946]
Estimates of past exposure based on current membrane filter data
Nicholson, Mount Sinai 10-15
[Nicholson, 1975]
Automobile body repairers and mechanics. A study of brake-lining maintenance
and repair work has found short-term concentrations of asbestos of 16.0, 3.3, and 2.6
f/ml at distances of 3-5 feet, 5-10 feet, and 10-20 feet, respectively, from a worker
blowing dust out of automotive brake drums [Rohl et al, 1976]. Grinding truck brake-
shoes gave an average concentration of four f/ml and bevelling produced an average
count of 37 f/ml. Measurable concentrations (0.1 f/ml) were found at distances up to
75 feet from the blowing-out operation (14 minutes after), 60 feet from grinding and 30
feet from bevelling, indicating that other garage employees besides those directly in-
volved in brake and clutch repair are at risk.
Average fiber concentrations during brake and clutch work, however, are much
lower and average about 0.1-0.3 f/ml during the course of an entire brake repair job.
These data and the sources are:
Summary of Asbestos Concentrations During Automobile and
Truck Brake Maintenance Activities:
Long-Term Samples During Lining Removal and Replacement
Range of all Range of garage
concentrations mean concentrations
Source measured (f/ml) (f/ml)
Personal
NIOSH [R. Zumwalde, personal 0.01-3.24 0.03-0.59
communication] Sampling may
have been done during non-
brake work. No information
on work practices.
Hickish and Knight [1970] Ap- 0.08-7.09 0.68-3.1
pears typical of past work
practices with air blowing of
drums. Sampling throughout
complete brake repair job.
Raybestos-Manhattan [J. Marsh, 0.02-0.4 0.05-0.1
personal communication] Well-
controlled exhaust ventilation
utilized.
38
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 269
Area
NIOSH [R. Zumwalde, personal 0.01-1.72 0.1-0.57
communication]
J-Iickish and Knight [1970] 0.07-0.28 0.15
Initial clinical surveys of garage mechanics indicate that they have a small excess
prevalence of X-ray abnormalities (~ 5'Vo) compared with blue-collar control groups,
in agreement with the dust count information above [Nicholson, 1982].
Engine room personnel, seagoing vessels, United States Merchant Marine. The
potential for exposure to asbestos insulation material on merchant ships is not confined
to the shipyards where the ships are built or repaired. After the vessels have been put to
sea, flaking and cracking of the asbestos insulating materials covering machinery cas-
ings, steam and hot water piping, and tanks are common. In the course of a \oyage,
crewmen make repairs on pipes, pipe flanges, or valve leaks. This generally requires
tearing down the insulation materials and replacing them [PoUand, unpublished]. A
study of 6,671 X-ray films of marine engineers in the United States showed an unusu-
ally high proponion (16'7o-20''7o) of pleural abnormalities, indicating the adverse ef-
fects of inhaled asbestos. [R.N. Jones, 1980]. We have included all engine room per-
sonnel on seagoing vessels of the Merchant Marine in our estimates of the population
at risk.
Maintenance employees: Chemicals and petroleum manufacturing. The manu-
facturing processes of chemical production and petroleum refining involve the use of
extensive networks of pipes, boilers, and other high temperature equipment. Asbestos
materials provide thermal insulation for these networks and a large force of mainte-
nance workers is employed to maintain and repair the production equipment. A study
of maintenance workers in a large chemical plant and an oil refinery showed relatively
frequent chest X-ray abnormalities [Lilis et al, 1980]. These findings strongly suggest
that asbestos exposure characteristic of maintenance work in chemical plants and in oil
refineries, including indirect ("bystander") exposure, results in risks comparable to
those documented for other types of asbestos exposure in other industries and occupa-
tions. We have included all maintenance workers in the chemicals and allied products
(SIC 28) and petroleum refining and coal products (SIC 29) in our estimates of the
population at risk.
Steam locomotive repair. Employees engaged in the overhaul of railroad engines
during the period when steam locomotives were in service were heavily exposed to as-
bestos. The practices used in the "back shops" where overhauls were conducted, re-
suited in the generation of clouds of asbestos dust that contaminated the environment
of all who worked in the area [Mancuso, 1976]. Five mesotheliomas have recently been
identified by NIOSH among former employees of one shop in Reading, Pennsylvania
We included all employees of railroad repair back shops in our at-risk estimates for the
decade of the 1940s (when steam locomotives were the predominant type). For the
1950s (when the proportion of all locomotives in service which were steam declined
from 63.4''7o to 1.7''7o), we reduced the annual number of employees at-risk by the
annual proportion of nonsteam locomotives to all locomotives.
Stationary engineers, stationary firemen, and power station operators. Opera-
tion and maintenance of stationary engines and mechanical equipment to provide utili-
ties for buildings and industrial processes involve the same types of exposure to asbes-
tos-containing materials as are described above under electric, gas, and combination
utility services. A preliminary field survey of 34 stationary engineers by this labora-
39
270 Nicholson, Perkel, and SelikofT
tory in the New York meiropoliian area has found X-ray abnormalities consistent with
asbestos-induced changes in 60<'7o of the employees with more than 20 years of experi-
ence in this trade. We have included all employees in this occupational group in our
estimates of the population at risk.
Population Estimates
In estimating the mortality (or morbidity) from past exposure to asbestos, we
would wish information on the number of individuals exposed; the distribution of their
employment periods; the time, duration, and intensity of the asbestos concentrations
to which they were exposed; and mortality data, by industry, correlated with the above
variables. Unfortunately, we have little of the above data. There are limited data on the
number of individuals exposed to asbestos in different calendar periods of time. For
some industries data are good (primary asbestos manufacturing, shipbuilding, auto re-
pair and, to a lesser extent, insulation work). Much less certain are data on exposed
populations in construction, secondary manufacturing, and the maintenance indus-
tries. Least cenain is information on the turnover in a given industrial segment. Expo-
sure data are available in recent years, but generally only from a limited number of
measurements in an industry. Extrapolations to earlier years are possible but neces-
sarily uncertain. Of most use are current data on the mortality of entire population
groups exposed in previous years. Such information, if related to exposure periods,
eliminates our need for information on exposure distributions as the mortality data for
an entire group includes all exposure circumstances.
Funher, as will be demonstrated subsequently, several studies show that the risk
of lung cancer is linearly related to the total fiber exposure. This information allows
one to properly account for different durations of employment in a given industry.
Moreover, for the purposes of estimating excess mortality, it also reduces our need for
accurate information on work force turnover within an industrial segment. The excess
monality for 1 ,000 men exposed for ten years is the same as for 2,000 men exposed for
five. The important parameter is the person-years-at-risk. Thus, information on the
total work force exposed at various points in time is much more important than infor-
mation on turnover. However, for consideration of surveillance activities, one would
wish knowledge of the total population at risk. This can be estimated, but greater un-
certainties exist in the values obtained than in the number of asbestos-related cancers
that might develop.
IVIethodological Considerations
Considerable information is available from data published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics and from industry or union sources on the number of individuals em-
ployed in an industry at periods of time. Data from publications of the Department of
Labor also provide some information on the number of individuals entering or leaving
a given industry on a yearly and monthly basis. For some industries subsequent to 1 958,
this includes information on the fractional number of accessions and separations that
occurred for given employees within a calendar period. Often data are provided on the
total fractional number of new hires, recalls, layoffs, and quits. While the information
on the fractional number of new hires is of use to us in estimating the population enter-
ing a given industry, it does not represent true new hires for our purposes. This is be-
cause the industry data are based on individual establishment experiences. A new hire
for an establishment may be an individual who previously worked in another establish-
40
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 271
mem in the same industry. For some manufacturing industries, this may not be too
great a duplication, but for construction trades panicularly, it represents significant
duplication.
To estimate the population at risk for a period of years, it would be most desir-
able to have information on the number of new employees entering a given occupation
or industry at different points in time and information on the number of individuals
currently leaving that occupation or industry permanently. If N = the number in an in-
dustry, a = the fractional number of new entrants in an occupation or industry in a
given year (Nnew/N,ot), and /3 = fractional number leaving an occupation or industry
permanently, the change in an industry work force can be represented by dN = N
X (a -/3)dt.
For small changes in N, N = Nge*" - ^^. In this model, in the absenceof new en-
trants into an industry, the work force will decrease with a half-life, T0.5 = 0.693/ j3. In
the absence of any separations, it will increase with the doubling time, T2 = 0.693/a.
In any steady-state or near -steady -state situation, where a = (3, the avera'ge duration of
employment is equal to 1/a. When one considers finite changes over a year period of
time, AN = (a - /3)N, where AN is the net increase or decrease. Thus, a = /3 -1-
(AN/N). If we consider the time necessary to achieve complete replacement of a work
force in a steady-state situation, AN = N = aNT. Thus T, the time necessary for work
force replacement is equal to 1 /a as expected from the earlier consideration of continu-
ous changes. As indicated previously, we will be using information on the number of
new entrants into a trade or industry, coupled with their average period of employ-
ment, to generate estimates on the expected excess mortality from past exposure to as-
bestos. The excess mortality among a group of individuals entering an industry during
a decade will be proportional to aN x T (new hires x employment period) = kaN x
1/a = kN, where k, the proportionality constant, includes the appropriate risk and ex-
posure variables for the industry. Thus, the crucial item in estimating mortality in a
steady -St ate work situation is information on the number employed in an industry
rather than the number of new hires entering it. More detailed information is only nec-
essary if there are significant changes in the workforce over the period of time being
considered.
Asbestos-Exposed Work Force
The data on the population exposed to asbestos in different industries has been
estimated using the Bureau of Labor Statistics information on employment and earn-
ings in the United States, 1909-1978. Here direct data are available on the yearly em-
ployment in the following industries under consideration: primary asbestos manufac-
turing; selected secondary asbestos manufacturing industries; construction; electric,
gas and utility services; and chemical and oil refining employees. The segments of these
industries that will be considered at risk have been described previously.
We used employment series published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics [1979] as
the basis for estimating the number of persons employed. Where the data do not extend
as far back as 1940, we extrapolated the BLS series to that year on the basis of regres-
sion equations with related variables (Table II) or on the assumption of a straight-line
trend between Census Bureau data for 1939 (Census of Manufacturers) or 1940
(Census of Population) and the earliest year of the relevant BLS series.
In the construction industry, the employment data relate to "construction work-
ers." This group covers "workers up through the level of working supervisors, who are
41
272 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
engaged directly on the construction project either at the site or working in shops or
yards at jobs ordinarily performed by members of construction trades. Exclusions
from this category include executive and managerial personnel, professional and tech-
nical employees, and routine office workers" [Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1976].
In electric, gas, and combination utility services, the employment data relate to
"physical workers." This group includes working foremen and other nonsupervisory
workers engaged in nonoffice functions [Depanment of Labor, 1979].
In manufacturing industries (including private shipbuilding and repair), the em-
ployment data relate to "production workers." This group covers those employees, up
through the level of working supervisors, who are engaged directly in the manufacture
of the product. Among the exclusions from this category are persons in executive and
managerial positions, those engaged in office work, and professional and technical
functions [Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1976].
In the chemicals and allied products industry, it was estimated that 27*^0 of the
BLS employment figure represented maintenance workers. This proportion was calcu-
lated from the BLS Reports on 1971 occupational employment in this industry [Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 1974]. The following classifications were excluded from the main-
tenance occupations to avoid duplication: insulation workers, stationary engineers,
stationary boiler tenders.
In petroleum refining and coal products, it was estimated that 40°7o of the petro-
leum refining produaion employees and ZC/o of the production employees in the re-
maining divisions of the industry represented maintenance employees [Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 1965]. The 1940 employment in the industry was estimated on the
basis of a straight-line interpolation between the 1939 figure reported by the Bureau of
the Census [1939], and the 1944 BLS figure. The same maintenance occupations were
excluded as is noted under chemicals (above) to avoid duplication.
Data are not available that allow direct use of BLS employment data to estimate
the number of individuals employed in insulation work, shipbuilding, automotive
maintenance, merchant marine engine room work, and steam locomotive repair. Sepa-
TABLF II. BLS Emploxmenl Series FAlrapolaled to 1940 bv Means of Regression Kqualions
Series to which extrapolaiion
was applied
Construction— general building
contractors: construction
workers (SIC 15)
Construction —other than
building general contractors:
construction workers (SIC 16)
Construction —special trade con-
tractors: construction workers
(SIC 17)
Electric, gas, combined utilities
employed
Manufacturing: heating equip-
ment excluding electrical:
production workers
Related \ariable used
for estimation
Construction— all employees
1964-1973 (SIC 15, 16. 17)
Construction— all employees
1960-1971 (SIC 15, 16, 17)
Construction —all employees
1947-1956 (SIC 15, 16, 17)
Production of utilities
1959
950-
Manufacturing — fabricated
structural metal products:
production workers, 1972-
1979
Measure of
validity (r-)
0.97
0.68
0.99
0.84
0.61
42
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 273
rate data are available in these industries from union sources, trade associations, the
US Navy, and other government sources.
Insulation workers. For this important group of asbestos-exposed individuals,
we will utilize information from the International Association of Heat and Frost In-
sulators and Asbestos Workers (I AHFIAW) to estimate the work force at any time and
the new entrants into the trade [International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators
and Asbestos Workers, unpublished; R. Steinfunh, personal communication]. The
data available from the union are presented in Table III, which provides information
on the cumulative entrants into the union, reduced by the number of Canadian mem-
bers. Also available are data on the actual union membership in recent years and the
number of new entrants and separations on an annual basis. For the years prior to 1960
where such data are uncenain, the estimates of Union membership were extrapolated
from the trend available in the years 1960-1980. A small correction to the union mem-
bership is made for the estimated number of retired members over age 65. This correc-
tion is a small one because the high monality in this trade limits the number who attain
age 65.
The number of union construction insulation workers in Table III is increased by
40"% for the years subsequent to World War II to account for workers employed on
union jobs on a temporary (permit) basis and by an amount equal to the union mem-
bership to account for construction insulation workers not so represented. For the year
1940, few individuals would have been employed on permit because of the scarcity of
jobs at that time. However, during World War II, a large number of insulators were so
employed, particularly in shipyards. Data suggest that 0.2*^0 of the wanime shipyard
work force of 4,500,000 men and women were insulators. Thus 9,000 individuals
would have been employed for approximately one year in this industry.
Unpublished data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that 3 1 ,900 men
were at work during the spring of 1978 as insulation workers in construction and an ad-
ditional 19,100 employed in industry elsewhere.' The 31,900 estimate from Bureau of
Labor data is a reasonable agreement with the 38,900 estimate using union information
as described above. Short-term layoffs during 1978 could well account for at least 10%
of the work force. We will use the mean of the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimate and
the estimate from union data as the value for construction insulation workers. This will
decrease the values in Table III by 8.3%. The adjusted total number of construction in-
sulators will then be increased by 54.4% (19,100/35,900) to account for insulators em-
ployed in maintenance elsewhere.
Shipbuilding and repair. BLS data awre available on civilian production ship-
yard workers. The number of employees in Naval shipyards was obtained from data of
the US.Navy (J.K. Nunneley, Department of the Navy, personal communication, April
22, 1980]. This information is listed in Table IV. While the Navy estimates that only
50% of the yard work force is exposed to asbestos, the data on mortality and morbidity
that we will use estimates risk for all shipyard workers as a group. We will utilize, there-
fore, the percentage of civilian yard workers that are produaion employees for the
Naval shipyard considered to be exposed to asbestos. (This ranges from 92% in 1 950 to
80% in 1975). In estimating the shipyard employment for 1945, we have used a value of
175,000, which is intermediate between 1940 employment and that of the years subse-
'Based on the ratio of 1978 loial employment reported by BLS (51,000) to the number employed in con-
struction (31,948), an unpublished BLS estimate.
43
Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
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44
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 275
quem to World War 11. We will consider this to be the "permanent" work force that
would have been employed in the absence of World War II. During that conflict, it is
estimated that an additional 4,325,000 men worked in shipyards for short periods of
time [Selikoff and Hammond, 1978]. Their mortality and that of 9,000 wartime ship-
yard insulators will be estimated separately.
Automobile maintenance and repair. Mechanics exposed to asbestos during
brake and clutch maintenance are included in SIC 75, auto repair, services and garages
and SIC 515-2, new and used car dealers, and some in SIC 554, gasoline service sta-
tions. As it is not possible to separate mechanics from other employees in these cate-
gories, we have used census data of the number of individuals employed as mechanics
in auto maintenance and auto body repair. Intercensus data were developed using a
linear interpolation. See Table V for the basic data utilized.
Railroad steam locomotive repair. We have utilized employment data reported
by the Association of American Railroads for occupations exposed to asbestos during
the maintenance of steam railroad locomotives. This was done by reducing the number
of men classified in equipment and stores [Association of American Railroads, annual]
by 45*^0 to reflect the proportion of the total craftsmen accounted for by the carmen
classification. (Carmen were generally engaged in maintenance of railway cars rather
TABLE IV. Estimated Population at Work in United States Naval Shipyards, 1940-1979 (in thousands)*
Years Employed ai start of quinquenium Esiimaied accessions during qumquenium
1940-1944 72 480
1945-1949 335 267
1950-1954 71 132
1955-1959 112 68
1960-1964 96 73
1965-1969 81 93
1970-1974 82 47
1975-1979 60 55
•Source: JK Nunneley, United States Department of the Navy (personal communication, April 22, 1 980).
TABI.F V. The Population Exposed to Asbestos in Automobile Maintenance and Repair
Census''
data
Year (thousands)
1940 372
1945
1950 647
1955
1960 661
1965
1970 912
1975^^^
Motor''
vehicle
Interpolated
registrations
population
(millions)
at risk
33
3"2
32
3"0
50
647
63
655
74
661
92
300
108
912
133
l,l(K)
■■Includes auto body repairmen.
''From Highway Statistics (annual) US Federal Highway Administration.
■■■Weston estimated that 900,000 workers were continuously exposed lo asbestos in automobile brake repair
and 1 ,070,000 were exposed occasionally or infrequently.
45
276 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
than locomotives.) The remaining number was reduced by 50<7o to exclude employees
who were located at maintenance facilities other than "back shops" [DeHague, 1980].
The balance was reduced by 11 "^o to exclude salaried supervisors, coach cleaners, and
stores laborers. As described previously, the resulting number for the years 1950-1960
was reduced by the percentage of steam locomotives in service. These data are listed in
Table VI.
A summary of the employment data for all of the previously mentioned occupa-
tions is given in Table Vll for five-year intervals. The data are quite stable for the years
1950-1980 and well reflect both employment and its trend with time. One exception is
the 1950 value for shipbuilding which is unrepresentative; for the five years, 1948-
1952, employment averaged 189,000.
TABLE VI. Employmeni. Mainienance of Equipment and Stores, Class I Railroads
Locomotives''
Numbers oP
in
service
employees
steam diesei
Percentage
Exposed
Year
(in ihousands)
(in thousands)
steam
employees
1940
281
41.1
0.5
98.8
69
1945
387
39.7
3.0
93.0
95
1950
348
26.7
15.4
63.4
54
1955
273
6.3
26.6
19.1
13
1960
184
0.5
29.1
1.7
1
^Association of American Railroads. 1940-1960.
''Association of American Railroads, Annual, and Interstate Commerce Commission, 1961, 1958,
TABLE VIL Employed Populations Potentially Exposed lo Asbestos in Selected Occupalions and
Industries. 1940-1975
Number employed in calendar year (in ihousands)
Industry of occupation 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
Primary asbestos manufacturmg 23 32 35 37 35 35 32 31
Secondary asbestos manufacturing 30 60 75 75 84 93 108 114
Insulation work^ 17 27" 33 41 47 53 53 55
Shipbuilding and repair 157 175^ 128" 194 184 185 181 177
Construction trades 426 379 741 893 1,102 1,215 1.341 1,029
Railroad engine repair 69 95 54 13 1 0 0 0
Utility services 44 62 62 65 65 64 69 74
Stationary engineers and firemen 295 303 311 348 385 289 291 293
Chemical plant and refinery mamtenance 113 194 186 200 188 187 205 200
Automobile maimenance 372 370 647 655 661 800 912 1,100
Marine engineer room personnel 34 76 37 37 34 35 31 ^2
(except US Navy)
Totals 1.880 l,-773 2.309 2.558 2.766 2.956 3.223 3.095
=>lnsulators are included here and not in other trades in which they were employed, such as shipbuilding, con-
struction, plant maintenance, or power generation.
''Does not include any of the 9,000 temporary wartime insulators in the shipbuilding industry.
■•Estimate of "permanent" shipyard work force. Oocs not include any of the 4,325.000 temporary wartime
shipyard workers,
''Unrepresentatively low value: average lor 1948-1952 was 189.
25-994 0-83-4
46
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 277
New Entrants Into the Work Force 1940-1980
Data on the number of additions to the employment rolls in various manufactur-
ing industries are reponed monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics [1979]. However,
BLS does not report cumulative annual rates for "new hires." Moreover, the BLS data
refer to persons hired by individual establishments in each industry, not the number
hired by the industry as a whole. There may be considerable duplication of persons in-
volved in the new hires reponed on a monthly basis over a year's time. There is addi-
tional duplication involved in countiiig new hires in a particular establishment who
were previously employed in another establishment of the same industry. It was, there-
fore, necessary for us to develop a measure for estimating the unduplicated new hires in
each industry for each year.
This was done by comparing the number of new hires obtained for major indus-
try groups with data available from the continuous work history sample of the Social
Security Administration (SSA) for the years 1957-1960 [Galloway, 1967]. Unfonu-
nately, data are only available for major industry groups such as durable and non-
durable goods manufacturing, construction, transportation, and services. Detailed in-
formation for individual industries is not provided. Information on the number of
individuals who were employed in 1 960 and were also employed in the same industry in
1957 is given in Table VIII. This allows one to calculate an annual transfer rate from
one industry group to another but not from one industry to another within an industry
group (eg, from the manufacture of asbestos products to the manufacture of bolts,
nuts, and rivets). Bureau of Labor Statistics data on the permanent retirement or death
in each of these industries are also available from Bureau of Labor Statistics publica-
tions. In a steady state, the SSA separation rate plus the annual rate of retirement and
deaths would equal the new hire rate. As three years is a relatively short follo\^-up,
there would be some transfers back to an industry group after the observation period.
The correaion for this, however, would be relatively small and somewhat compensates
for the greater adjustment required to account for transfers between industries within
an industry group.
The SSA data are shown in Table IX and compared with the annual rate of new
hires from the Bureau of Labor Statistics data for the years 1958-1960, corrected by the
increase or decrease in the total work force over the three-year period of time (January
1958-January 1961). The correction consisted of attributing the annualized change in
work force between 1958 and 1961 to a change in the number of new hires. Termina-
tions are much less affected by work force changes and then only with severe condi-
tions. The corrections were virtually all less than lO'Vo.
In comparing the data obtained in this manner from the Social Security Adminis-
tration with that estimated using BLS new hires, fractional employment additions in
the chemical industry and oil refinery operation closely matched the fractional number
of transfers from the nondurable goods industry (0.166 and 0.132 vs 0.1 1 1). For these
industries, we will utilize the Bureau of Labor Statistics data on new hires in SIC 28 or
SIC 29 reduced by SO'Vo to reflect possible transfers within these respeaive industries.
Transfers are expected to occur inasmuch as the industries are concentrated within geo-
graphic areas and movement from one company to another is expected. This reduces
the new hire rate for oil refineries to a value less than that for the nondurable goods
industry as a whole. However, both oil refinery and chemical manufacturing have
much less labor turnover than other industries in the nondurable goods manufacturing
segment .
47
278 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
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Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 279
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280 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
For primary and secondary asbestos manufacturing, it would be expected that
there would be less transfer between similar companies. This occurs because of the
widespread geographical distribution of the respective plants. Individuals terminated
by one company would unlikely be hired by another manufacturer in the same indus-
try. Thus, we will adopt a value for the new hires in primary and secondary manufac-
turing that would be equal to 80'7o that of the Bureau of Labor Statistics data. It would
be expected that a greater percentage of terminated shipyard employees would be re-
hired by other yards or by the same yard at some later date. This occurs because of the
highly fluauating nature of shipyard business, depending as it does upon large con-
traas of uncertain frequency. Thus, for shipyard employees we will adopt a value of
50'Vo of the Bureau of Labor Statistics' new hires rate for SIC 3831. The rate of new
hires for 1958-1960 is, thus, 0.216. This compares with 0. 138 estimated by the US Navy
for naval shipyards in these years. The agreement is reasonable as turnover in govern-
ment shipyards is considerably less than in civilian yards.
Individuals employed in construction trades (except insulation work), stationary
engineers and firemen, and automobile mechanics are a highly mobile segment of the
work force. However, they would tend to maintain employment in their respective
trade, simply moving from one employer to another. Therefore, we feel that the Social
Security Administration data on labor turnover well represent the members of these in-
dustries. It is felt that termination from employment in utility services, however, is less
likely to lead to employment in a corresponding industry and data on new hires using
Social Security Administration information would underestimate the actual per-
centage. Thus, we have increased the SSA new hires estimate by SO'Vo. The sources of
all new hire data are listed in Table X. For those industrial segments where the numbers
of new hires are not provided, the new hires for all manufacturing are utilized adjusted
by the ratio of new hires as determined by Social Security Administration data,
1958-1960, to new hires in the corresponding years for all manufacturing.
The number of new hires for insulation workers will utilize the data on new en-
trants into the insulation workers' union from their membership (column 1 of Table
III). We will use the same acquisition data proportionately for the nonconstruction in-
sulators, as data from the chemical and refining industry indicate average employment
periods nearly equal to those of insulators. However, the turnover for those on permit
and employed as nonunion workers is likely to be considerably higher. We have no in-
formation on what their turnover may be relative to union insulators but a value twice
as great would appear to be reasonable. To account for this, we will increase the
lAHFIAW new hires by 0.8 to account for permit workers, by 2.0 to account for non-
union new hires and by 1 .2 for nonconstruction insulators. Thus the total insulator new
hires will be five times the lAHFIAW US new members. The 9,000 wartime shipyard
insulation workers employed for one year are also included in the new hires for the
1940-1949 decade. Their mortality, however, will be calculated separately as will that
of other wartime shipyard workers.
It should be emphasized that these estimates are approximate and subjective.
They are felt to be the best basis for estimating the number of new individuals that enter
a given industrial segment and are important in estimating the total number of individu-
als potentially exposed to asbestos. As discussed previously, however, their influence
on the total mortality experience from past exposure will be small. A misestimate on the
new hires rate will lead to a balancing increase or decrease in the average employment"
m
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 281
time. These annual new hire rates were applied to annual employment data for each oc-
cupation and industry to arrive at estimates of the number of new persons exposed to
asbestos on the job in each year. The data were then cumulated for each decade since
1940. In those industries in which a significant portion of the employees were already
included in our tally under an occupational group (asbestos and insulation workers;
stationary engineers, stationary firemen and power station operators; or automobile
body repairers and mechanics), an adjustment was made to the 1940 industry employ-
ment data and new-hires data to remove duplication. These adjustment factors were
derived from the BLS National Industry-Occupational Matrix in the case of Asbestos
and insulation workers [Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1969b] and the 1970 Census of
Population in the case of stationary engineers, stationary firemen and power station
operators. No adjustment was necessary for the automobile body repairers and me-
chanics since the duplication between this occupation and the industries included in this
study is insignificant.
An additional adjustment in the new-hires data was made to eliminate the
double-counting of persons who were hired in an occupation or industry during the
period since 1940 and who had previously been exposed to asbestos in another occupa-
tion or industry. We developed an adjustment factor for this purpose by analyzing the
occupational histories of 2,544 workers employed in operations exposed to asbestos in
cohorts being studied by this laboratory. Table XI lists the percentage of individuals in
several study groups with previous substantial exposure to asbestos (equivalent to
greater than six months employment in a shipyard). This correction reduces the num-
TABLE X. Source of Annual New Hire Rales by Industry or Occupation
Average
1958-1961
Industry or occupation Source of annual new hire rates^ new hire rates'*
Primary asbestos manufacturing 0.8 x (SIC 329)'> 0.294
Secondary asbestos manufacturing 0.8 x (SIC 343, 3443, 356, 363)" 0.127-0.232
Insulation Data from union new entrants used —
Shipbuilding and repair 0.5 x (SIC 3731)" and US Navy data 0.216
Construction trades 1 x (SIC 20-39) x (0.147/0.268)^' 0.147
Railroad engine repair I x (SIC 20-39) x (0.099/0.268) 0.099
Utility services 1.5 x (SIC 20-39) x (0.149/0.268) 0.149
Stationary engineers and firemen 1 x (SIC 20-39) x (0.155/0.268) 0.155
Chemical plant and refinery 0.7 x (SIC 28)" 0.116
maintenance 0.7 x (SIC 29)" 0.092
Automobile maintenance 1 x (SIC 20-39) x (0. 142/0.268) 0.142
Marine engine room personnel 1 x (SIC 20-39) x (0.099/0.268) 0 099
=The percentage of various workers withm each SIC category, as described in the text, will be used as the
basis population for calculating new hires.
"Data are utilized for the years available. For years for which new hire data were not published, the new
hire data for all manufacturing were used, adjusted by the relationship to the specific SIC code for the
years published.
'^The rate 0.268 is the average annual fraction of new hires in manufacturing for the years 1958-1960, cor-
rected for changes in the work force.
"^Values for other years are proportional to the new hire rates in the indicated SIC classification.
51
282 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
ber of people ever exposed by lOVo (the correction factor used). It will not reduce the
mortality, however, as we must account for all person-years of exposure in asbestos-re-
lated industries. This will be done by using the adjusted population of new entrants to
calculate an average time of exposure (see below) which will overestimate the exposure
time by 10% to account for the 10% reduction in exposed populations. It should be
emphasized that the uncenainties in either the populations exposed or the a\erage
durations of employment greatly exceed 10%
POPULATION AT RISK
The results of the estimation of employment and new-hires at risk are shown in
Table XII, indicating that approximately 27,500,000 individuals were potentially ex-
posed to asbestos from 1940 through 1979 in the occupations analyzed. The uncertain-
ties in estimating this number have been described previously, but they cannot be over-
stressed. The number is an approximation. Funher, it includes a large number of
individuals whose potential exposure to asbestos would have been of low intensity or of
shon duration because of high labor turnover (see section on lower risk population).
Finally, the term potential should be emphasized. In categorizing a segment of a work
force (such as all production shipyard workers) as being potentially exposed to asbes-
tos, some individuals will be included with no actual exposure. On the other hand, in-
dividuals in other jobs (such as management) who did have exposure were not counted.
The numbers may or may not balance. These uncenainties will be compensated for
in the estimates of mortality by using data on the mortality or morbidity of represen-
tative work-force segments, which will also include the full spectrum of exposure
circumstances.
It should also be noted that a large number of asbestos-exposed individuals are
not included in the estimates of Table XII. Important groups with identified risks in-
clude family contacts of asbestos-exposed workers, engine room personnel aboard US
Navy ships in World War 11, and individuals exposed environmentally to asbestos by
vinue of residence or work near the use of asbestos. Additional exposures occur to
many from the use of asbestos in surfacing materials in schools, night clubs, and audi-
toriums, or as fireproofing material in office buildings.
Average Duration of Employment
The average duration of employment can be calculated from the fractional new-
hire rate adjusted by changes in total work force at different periods in time (see section
on methological considerations). Alternatively, the average employment over a decade
can be divided by the average yearly number of new hires entering an industry to obtain
the average employment time. In essence, this is the period of time that is required for
the number of new entrants into an industry to completely replace the work force.
These data for the years 1940-1979 are presented in Table XIII and were used for the
average durations of exposure in each decade for each industry or occupational group.
Supplemental Labor Turnover Data
The Environmental Sciences Laboratory has access to several seniority lists of
work forces employed in asbestos-using industries. These include a large integrated as-
bestos products manufacturer, a major East Coast shipyard and a plastics polymer
plant. Additionally, information on the employment times of all employees in an as-
52
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 283
TABLE XI. Workers Exposed lo Asbestos in Five Cohorls Under Sludv by llie Environmental Sciences
Laboratory. Mount Sinai School of Medicine
No. of
workers curreniK
exposed
Also exposed
in previous
Location
Industry/occupation
Period
Total
employment
Metropolitan New York
Brake repair and
maintenance
1979-1980
699
104
Groton, Connecticui
Shipyard
1976
1,024
98
Baliimore, Maryland
Shipyard
1979
286
10
Port Allegany, Pennsylvania
Asbestos products
manufacturing
1979
254
21
Quincy, Massachusetts
Shipyard
1979
281
16
TABLE XII. Population at Risk lo Asbestos-Associated Disease: Workers Exposed to Asbestos in
Selected Occupations and Industries. 1940-1979 (in thousands)
1940
23
New entrants
Industries or occupations
1940-1949
1950-1959
1960-1969
1970-1979
Totals
Primary asbestos manu-
200
103
86
76
488
facturing
Secondarx asbestos manu-
30
324
227
259 -
308
1,148
facturing
Insulation work^
17
35
47
38
47
184
Temporary, World War 11
9
9
Shipbuilding and repair
157
433
354
434
383
1,761
Temporarv, World War 11
4,325
4,325
Construction trades
426
1,786
1,452
1,866
1.975
7,505
Railroad engine repair
69
194
26
0
0
289
Utilitv services
44
223
116
116
129
628
Stationary engineers and
295
1.136
623
549
510
3.113
firemen
Chemical plant and refinery
104
542
260
239
248
1,393
maintenance
Automobile maintenance
372
1,884
1,099
1.282
1,779
6,416
Marine engineer room per-
34
121
46
40
27
268
sonnel (except US Navy)
Totals
1.571
11,202
4,353
4,909
5,482
27,527
Mnsulators are included here and not in other trades in which they were employed, such as shipbuilding,
construction, plant maintenance, or power generation.
bestos insulation production plant is available. These sources can be utilized for com-
parison with the data obtained from the Social Security Administration and Bureau of
Labor Statistics on labor turnover. They can further be utilized to obtain estimates of
the distribution of employment times in a given industry by comparing the number of
individuals actually employed to those that were known to have been hired in different
time periods. The latter quantity is available from the seniority lists as individuals were
53
284 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
assigned sequential clock numbers upon employment. These data are presented in
Table XIV and supplement the turnover data obtained otherwise.
One notable feature is that the asbestos products manufacturer has an extremely
high turnover during the first month after hire. This occurs because of terminations of
individuals during a one-month probationary period. After that time, the man enters
the union bargaining unit, and any individual terminations are subject to grievance
procedures. While such practices are not universal, they are cenainly not unique, and it
is expected that in primary and secondary manufacturing an extremely high turnover
will result during the first month or two of employment as individuals are screened for
their performance and suitability for a job. In contrast, in construction, shipbuilding,
automobile maintenance, and other industries that require a skill, the turnover in early
periods of time is expected to be less as an individual would have demonstrated profes-
sional competence prior to being hired. Further, he would likely be represented by a
union before employment with a given employer. Thus, nonarbitratable dismissals are
less common.
TABLE XIII. The Average Kmplo>menl Time of All Individual!) Poienliallv Exposed lo Asbestos.
1940-1979
A\
erage duration of
calendar
employment
periods
(years)
Industry or occupation
1 940- 1 949
1950-1959
1960-1969
1970-1979
Primary asbestos manufacturing 1.6
1.6
3.5
3.8
4.0
Secondary asbestos manufacturing
2.0
3.5
4.0
3.8
Insulation work
13.7a
12.4
15.9
12.5
Shipbuilding and repair
4.3»
5.3
4.2
4.6
Construction trades
3.3
8.3
7,5
4.5
Railroad engine repair
4.4
7.7
-
-
Utility services
2.8
5.7
5.7
6.0
Stationary engineers and firemen
2.7
6.3
5.8
5.7
Chemical plant and refinery maintenance
3.7
7.4
8.7
8.1
Automobile maintenance
2.7
6.0
7,7
7.0
Marine engineer room personnel
4.7
7.4
7,8
6.1
(except US Navy)
^Does not include short-term wartime shipyard -workers.
TABLE XIV. Labor Turnover in Selected Industrial Establishments
Time
period
Number of
individuals
considered
N
umber empio
yed b^
■ time after
hire
Establishment
1 year
6 months
2
months
1 month
Shipyard products
1977
1,449
731^0
%0%
Asbestos products
1965-1966
759
37'Vo
—
51»/o
53%
manufacture
Asbestos products
1961-1962
306
^2^0
—
45%
48%
manufacture
Asbestos products
1957-1958
108
21%
—
52%
75%
manufacture
Plastics production
1961-1962
17
—
lOO'Vo
100%
100%
Insulation products
1941-1945
820
38 "Vo
53%
82%
93%
manufacture
54
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 285
A study of workers exposed to brominated chemicals in three plants provides
data on the distribution of employment times of all 3,579 individuals employed in the
facilities [Wong, 1981]. It substantiates the presence of a large number of individuals
with very short employment times. Of all employees, 16.4°7o worked for less than one
month and an additional 28.5"7o for 1-5.9 months. The full distribution of employment
times can be characterized by a two-component decreasing exponential. Thus, the work
force can be considered as made up of two groups. The average emploNinent time of
one,consistingof approximately 2,200 individuals, was 0.5 years and of the other, with
1,400 individuals, was 1 1.7 years in good agreement with the data of Table XIII.
Relative Risk by Industry
To calculate the asbestos-related cancer monality in a given industry or opera-
tion, it is necessary to have an absolute or relative measure of exposure for the
employee group. While detailed information is not available on the asbestos air concen-
trations that have been prevalent in previous years in each of the above industries, esti-
mates can be made of the relative risk of death from asbestos exposure on the basis of a
variety of other studies. In the calculation of asbestos-related cancer monality for a
given industry or occupation, we will utilize the available data for insulation workers
for the dose and time dependence of asbestos cancer. To translate available data for in-
sulation workers to other industries, it is necessary to establish measures of exposure
for the different groups considered at risk relative to that of insulation workers. These
relative risks for equal times of employment will be determined by three indices. The
primary one is the directly measured monality data, especially that of mesothelioma or
lung cancer, in an industry or trade. A second is the directly measured average concen-
trations of asbestos that can be attributed to the work activity. The third is the preva-
lence of X-ray abnormalities after long-term employment in an industry. Here, we will
assume that the percentage of X-ray abnormalities attributable to an exposure circum-
stance after 20 years of employment will be proponional to the total dose of asbestos
inhaled by the workers in that industry. Where the percentage of abnormal X-rays ap-
proaches lOO'^o, the relative risks will be determined using the percentages of X-rays
having a category 2 or greater abnormality on the ILO U/C scale. Information on these
direct and indirect measures is shown in Table XV along with the sources of the
various data.
For industries in which none of the above indices are available (construction, rail-
road steam engine repair) or for which the data are very uncertain, relative risk esti-
mates were made from the numbers of mesotheliomas identified among individuals in
different asbestos exposure circumstances compared with the total work force exposed.
These data utilized the nationwide survey of mesothelioma in 1972 and 1973 by
McDonald and McDonald [1980]. The numbers from this series are shown in Table
XVI.
The relative risks, by industry, estimated from all of the above data, are listed in
Table XVII. Also Indicated in Table XVII are the principal data sources considered in
the relative risk estimates. The data available for the estimates are limited and the esti-
mates are necessarily approximate. For the years 1972-1979, the relative risks for
manufacturing, insulation work, shipbuilding, and utility employment will be reduced
to 0. 1 , and those of the other industries (except automobile maintenance) to 0.05 to re-
reflect the adoption of control measures. Funher, exposures subsequent to 1979 will
not be considered .
55
286 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
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56
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 287
TABLE XVI. The Numbers of Mesolheliomas by Work Activiiy in North America
(I960-I972. Canada: 1972. LSA)*
Occupation or industry
Number of cases
Primary and secondary manufacturing
Insulation work
Shipbuilding and repair
Construction trades
Railroad engine repair
Utility services
Stationary engineers and firemen
Chemical plant and refiner> mamtenance
Automobile maintenance
"Heating trades"
21
27
21-49"
45-76^
5
13 +
3
II
59^
•(McDonald and McDonald. 1980].
•'Highest number only includes some insulators and heating trades workers.
''Highest number may include some insulators, shipyard workers or individuals with
employment in heating trades.
^Includes many individuals that would be assigned to other categories, as stationary
engineers and firemen (furnace repair), shipyard employment (welders, steamfitters),
utilities (plumbing, heating, boiler work), manufacturing (boilermakers).
TABLE XVII. The Risk of Asbestos Cancer Relative to Insulation Work After 25 Years Employment
Occupation or industry
Risk
Source of data for estimate
Primary manufacturing 1
Secondary manufacturing 0.5
Insulation work 1
Shipbuilding and repair (except insulators) 0.5
Construction trades^ (except insulators) 0.15-0.25''
Railroad engine repair 0.2
Utility services 0.3
Stationary engineers and firemen 0.15
Chemical plant and refinery maintenance 0.15
Automobile maintenance 0.04
Marine engine room personnel 0.1
(except US Navy personnel)
Group mortality data, exposure mea-
surements
Exposure measurements
Reference population
Group mortality data, prevalence of
X-ray abnormalities
No. o( mesothelioma cases in general
population
No. of mesothelioma cases in general
population
No. of mesothelioma cases in general
population
Prevalence of X-ra> abnormalities
Prevalence of X-ra\ abnormalities,
group mortality data
Prevalence of X-ray abnormalities.
exposure measurements
Prevalence of X-ray abnormalities
■'See test for percentage of construction population
''Risk for years 1958-1972 when the use of sprayed
considered at risk.
asbestos fireproofing was common.
The relative risks in Table XVII for insulation work, manufacturing, utility ser-
vices ("heating trades") shipyard employment, and construction yield "population"
risks virtually identical to those found by McDonald and McDonald [1980] in their
case-control analysis. They found values of 46.0, 6.1, 4.4, 2.8, and 2.6, respectively,
for the relative risks of the above populations. Multiplying our equal exposure risks by
57
288 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
the average durations of employment of all workers from 1940through 1969(13.2, 2.0,
4.7, 1.9, and 6.4 years, respectively) and further dividing the risk for construction
workers by two to account for the 50*7o of workers to whom we attributed no risk, we
obtain for the relative "population" risks the values, 13.2, 1.3, 1.4, 0.95, and 0.5. Ad-
justing to the McDonald and McDonald [1980] risk of 46 for insulators, we obtain for
"population" risks, 46.0, 4.6, 4.9, 3.3, and 1.8.
Lower Risk Population
While we are unable to obtain full data on the distribution of employment times
in all industries, the information depiaed above allows us to identify a segment of the
work force with considerably less exposure to asbestos. Taking a period of employment
of two months in primary manufacturing or insulation work as a measure of a low ex-
posure, we have estimated the number of individuals with such an exposure among the
27,500,000 individuals identified previously. This would correspond to a total exposure
of 2-3 f-yr/ml (12-18 f/ml x 1/6 yr). The estimates were made assuming 40070 of
the new hires in primary and secondary manufacturing and 20''7o of the new hires in
other industries left within two months. For longer periods, we utilized an exponential
function, e-*^', for the distribution of employment times where i;? is the average steady-
state permanent separation rate. The period of employment characterizing 'lower ex-
posure" for a given industry will be inversely related to the relative risk of the industry
(Table XVII). These data are presented in Table XVIII and suggest that 8,700,000 of
those potentially exposed to asbestos will have a significantly lower risk by virtue of
their short employment period. The extremely large number in automobile mainte-
nance arises because of the low relative risk of asbestos disease in that industry. TTius,
individuals with as much as four years of employment in automobile maintenance were
included in the estimates that gave rise to Table XVIII.
The data in Table XVIII indicate that an enormous number of individuals are
likely to have had 5ome exposure to asbestos: 27, 5(X),0(X) since 1940. Of this number, it
is estimated that 21,0(X),000 were alive on January 1, 1980. (This figure was calculated
TABLE XVIII. The Percenlage of Asbeslos-Exposed Individuals Wiih Lower Exposure*
Total
exposed
Number with
lower exposure
Percentage with
1940
1940-1979
lower exposure
Primary asbesios manufacturing
23
465
186
38
Secondary manufacturing
30
1,118
493
43
Insulation work
17
167
33
18
World War II
9
2
20
Shipbuilding and repair
157
1,604
362
20
World War II
4,325
1,303
30
Construction trades
426
7,079
1,842
24
Railroad engine repair
69
220
72
25
Utility services
44
584
141
22
Stationary engineers and firemen
295
2,818
834
27
Chemical plant and refinery
104
1,289
350
25
maintenance
Automobile maintenance
372
6,044
3,032
47
Marine engine room personnel
34
234
75
28
Totals
1,571
25,956
8,715
32
Lower exposure is characterized as being less than that equivalent to two months employment in an asbes-
tos factory or as an insulator (approximately 2-3 f-yr/ml). It is not to be construed as being without risk.
58
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 289
using procedures detailed in the mortality estimates to follow.) Of those exposed,
18, 8(X),0(X)of the total and 14,l(X),000of those alive on January 1, 1980 were estimated
to have had an exposure greater than 2-3 f-yr/mi. Such exposures carry significant risk
of asbestos disease (as will be detailed subsequently). Further, some risk of asbestos dis-
ease exists for the 6,900,000 alive on January 1, 1980, estimated to have experienced
lesser exposures.
CANCER FROM OCCUPATIONAL ASBESTOS EXPOSURE:
PROJECTIONS 1965-2030
In recent years, considerable data have accumulated that allow projections to be
made of the cancer mortality associated with past exposure to asbestos. These include
new information on the dose and time dependence of asbestos-related cancers in vari-
ous occupational circumstances, an increased awareness of the various trades in which
possible asbestos exposure occurred in past years, as well as information on the abso-
lute and relative exposures of these different occupational groups. While the relevant
data are less complete than desired, they are sufficient to allow estimates of future as-
bestos-related mortality to be made. These may be useful in directing priorities for ap-
propriate surveillance and interventive activities that might be undertaken.
The Spectrum of Asbestos-Related Cancer
The spectrum of malignant disease that occurs from asbestos exposure is best
seen in data from the mortality study of Selikoff et al [1979] on 17,800 insulation
workers. This information is shown in Table XIX in which the numbers of deaths, by
TABLE XIX. Deaths Among 17,800 Asbestos Insulation Workers in the United Stales and Canada.
January 1, I967-I)ecember 31, 1976*
Expected*
Observ
/ed
Ratio 0
i/e
Underlying cause of death
(BE)
(DC)
(BE)
(DC)
Tocal deaths, ail causes
1658.9
2271
2271
1.37
1.37
Total cancer, all sites
319.7
995
922
3.11
2.88
Cancer of lung
105.6
486
429
4.60
4.06
Pleural mesothelioma
b
63
25
—
—
Peritoneal mesothelioma
b
112
24
—
—
Mesothelioma, n.o.s.
b
0
55
—
—
Cancer of esophagus
7.1
18
18
2.53
2.53
Cancer of stomach
14.2
22
18
1.54
1.26
Cancer of colon-rectum
38.1
59
58
1.55
1.52
Cancer of larynx
4.7
II
9
2.34
1.91
Cancer of pharynx, buccal
10.1
21
16
2.08
1.59
Cancer of kidney
8.1
19
18
2.36
2.23
All other cancer
131.8
184
252
1.40
1.91
Noninfectious pulmonary diseases, total
59.0
. 212
188
3.59
3.19
Asbestosis
b
168
78
—
—
All other causes
1280.2
1064
1161
0.83
0.91
•Number of men: 17,800, man-years of observation: 166,853. From Selikoff et al [1979].
"Expected deaths are based upon white male age-specific US death rates of the US National Center for
Health Studies, 1%7-1976.
''Rates are not available, but these have been rare causes of death in the general population.
(BE) Best evidence; number of deaths categorized after review of best available information (autopsy,
surgical, clinical). (DC) Number of deaths as recorded from death certiTicate information only.
59
290 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
cause, over a ten-year period, are tabulated along with those expected from national
rates. Causes of death are characterized both according to those listed on the certifi-
cates of death (DC) and according to the best evidence (BE) available from a review of
autopsy protocols, medical records, and pathological specimens. For most causes of
death, the agreement is relatively good, but for mesothelioma and asbestosis, consider-
able differences exist . Because deaths from these causes are rare in the absence of asbes-
tos exposure, their misdiagnosis has little effect upon general population rates. How-
ever, as they are common causes of death among asbestos-exposed workers, their mis-
diagnosis can seriously affect determination of asbestos mortality. Thus, the "best evi-
dence" mortality will be used for the estimate of asbestos-related cancers. However, as
we will attribute all excess cancer among insulators to their asbestos exposure (see be-
low), the overall results will not differ greatly from that using certificate of death diag-
nosis. Higher rates of death at one site (as mesothelioma) will be balanced by lower
rates at another (as pancreas).
In addition to mesothelioma and cancer of the lung, cancer of the stomach,
colon, rectum, esophagus, larynx, pharyx, buccal cavity, and kidney are each elevated
significantly compared with rates expected for these sites in the general population.
(This group will be referred to subsequently as "asbestos-related" malignancies.) Op-
portunity for fiber contact with the epithelial surfaces of the lung and gastrointestinal
tract is clearly evident. Exposure to the mesothelial tissue and kidney can occur as
fibers readily penetrate into lung lymphatics and reach the pleural mesothelium
("pleural drift") or can be transported to the kidney or peritoneal mesothelium. Simi-
larly, fiber dissemination occurs to other extrapulmonary organs, such as brain, liver,
spleen, etc [Langer, 1974]. While excesses at these other sites are not of statistical sig-
nificance for individual malignancies, the category "all other cancers" is elevated at a
high level of significance (p < 0.0001), and we will attribute these excess malignancies
to asbestos exposure as well. Their contribution accounts for less than 8<'7o of the total
excess cancer compared with the contribution of lung cancer, 56070; mesothelioma,
26%; and the other above specified "asbestos-related tumors," 10%.
The Time Course of Asbestos-Related Cancer
The time course of asbestos-related mortality from bronchogenic carcinoma is
shown in Figure 1 according to ages for individuals exposed initially between ages 15
and 24, and 25 through 34. As can be seen, the two curves of relative risk , according to
age, rise with the same slope and are separated by approximately ten years. This sug-
gests that the relative risk of developing lung cancer is independent of age and of the
pre-existing risk at the time of exposure. In contrast, had one plotted the added risk o{
cancer, the slope and the amount for the group first exposed at older ages would have
been two to four times greater than for those exposed at younger ages. If one combines
these data and plots them according to time from onset of exposure, the curve of Figure
2 is obtained. A linear increase with time from onset of exposure is seen for 35 to 40
years (to about the time when many insulators terminate employment). After 40 years
the relative risk falls significantly, rather than remaining constant after cessation of ex-
posure as might be expected from the linear increase with continued exposure. The de-
crease is not solely the result of the elimination of smokers from the population under
observation as a similar fall occurs for those individuals who were smokers in 1967.
(In calculating the relative risk of lung cancer in smokers, smoking-specific data from
the American Cancer Society study of one million people were utilized [Hammond,
1966].) Selection processes, such as differing exposure patterns or differing individual
9
8
7
6
«5 I-
en
£
<
2 I-
60
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 291
LUNG CANCER, INSULATORS
AGE AT ONSET
• 15-24 ytort
O 23-34 yaort
30 40 50 60 70 80 90
AGE
Fig. 1. The ratio of observed to expected deaths from lung cancer among insulation workmen according
to age and age at onset of employment.
LUNG CANCER, INSULATORS
-I 1 I I 1 I
AGCO 19-94
YEARS AT ONSET
J-
-L.
-L.
_L
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
YEARS FROM ONSET OF EXPOSURE
Fig. 2. The ratio of observed to expected deaths from lung cancer among insulation workmen according
to time from onset of employment.
61
292 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
biological susceptibilities may play a role, but the exact explanation for the effect is not
understood. It is, however, a general phenomenon seen in many mortality studies.
The early ponion of the curve of Figure 2 is remarkable in two aspects. Firstly, it
shows a linear increase in the relative risk of lung cancer according to time from onset
of exposure. This suggests that the dose of asbestos received in a given period of time
increases the risk of cancer by an amount that is proponional to that which existed in
the absence of exposure. This increased relative risk is proponional to the dose of
inhaled asbestos, which in turn is proportional to the time worked. Thus, the linear rise
in Figure 2. However, the linear rise can occur only if the increased relative risk that is
created by a given dose of asbestos continues to multiply the "background" risk for
several decades (at least until age 60), even though the background risk will increase
tenfold or twentyfold in 30 years. Secondly, the extrapolated line through the observed
data points crosses the line of relative risk equal to one (that expected in an unexposed
population) very close to the onset of exposure. At most, the line might be adjusted so
that it passes through the relative risk of one line at a time from onset of exposure of
about ten years. (Note that we are plotting the relative risk of death. Irreversible malig-
nancy would have been initiated several years earlier, since usually one or two years
elapse between identification of lung cancer and death, and it is likely that a malignant
growth was present , unseen, for at least one or two years before becoming clinically evi-
dent.) This means that an increased relative risk appropriate to a given exposure is
achieved very shortly after the exposure takes place. However, if there is a low risk in
the absence of asbestos exposure, as in young workers, cancers that will arise from that
increased relative risk may not be seen for many years or even decades until the back-
ground risk becomes significantly greater.
The same two points, 1) that the effect of an exposure to asbestos is to multiply
the pre-existing risk of cancer in the exposed population and 2) that the multiplied risk
LUNG CANCER, UNARCO
8 I 1 1 1 1 80
7 -
6
^ 5
—
>
10 20 30 40
YEARS FROM ONSET
OF EXPOSURE
Fig. 3. The ratio of observed to expected deaths from lung cancer and the relative lung cancer mortality
rates among asbestos insulation production employees according to time from onset of employment.
25-994 0-83-5
62
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 293
becomes manifest in a relatively short time, can also be seen in the monality from lung
cancer in a study of Seidman et al [1979]. Figure 3 depicts the time course of the mor-
tality from lung cancer of a group (UNARCO) exposed for shon periods of time, be-
ginning five years after onset of exposure. As 77<Vo were employed for less than two
years, exposure largely ceased prior to the follow-up period. As can be seen, a rise to a
significantly elevated relative risk occurs within ten years, and then that increased rela-
tive risk remaiiis constant throughout the observation period of the study. Further-
more, the relative risk from a specific exposure is independent of the age at which the
exposure began. This is seen in Table XX, where the relative risk of death for lung can-
cer for individuals exposed for less than and greater than nine months is listed accord-
ing to the age at entrance into a ten-year observation period. Within a given age cate-
gory, the relative risk is similar in different decades of observation, as we saw before in
Figure 3 with the overall data. However, the relative risk also is independent of the age
decade at entry into a ten -year observation period. (See lines labelled "All" in each ex-
posure category.) There is some reduction in the oldest groups. This can be attributed
to the same effects manifest at older ages in insulators or to relatively fewer cigarette
smokers that might be present in the 50-59 year observation groups because of selective
monality.
In the calculation of asbestos-related cancer, the time course of nonmesothelial
cancer will be treated as follows. The increase in the relative risk of lung cancer will
begin 7.5 years after onset of exposure and increase linearly, following the line of
Figure 2 for the number of years a specified group is employed. After a period equal to
the average duration of employment, the relative risk will remain constant until 40
years from onset of exposure, after which it will linearly decrease to one over the subse-
quent three decades. The magnitude of the increase will be equal to that of Figure 2 for
insulators and factory employees. The rate of increase for other groups will be propor-
tional to their estimated exposure relative to that of insulators. The same time course
TABLE XX. Relative Risk of Lung Cancer During Ten-Year Iniervals al Differeni Times From Onsei of
Exposure*
Years from onset
of exposure
5
15
25
All
30-39
Age at start of period
40-49
50-59
Lower exposure ( < 9 months)
0.00 [0.35] 3.75 (2) 0.00 [3.04]
6.85(1) 4.27(3) 2.91(4)
2.73 (2) 4.03 (6)
3.71(1) 3.52(7) 2.58(10)
5
15
25
All
Higher exposure ( > 9 months)
0.00(0.661 11.94(4) 9.93(8)
19.07(2) 11.45(5) 5.62(5)
13.13(6) 7.41(8)
11.12(2) ■ 12.32(16) 7.48(21)
•From Seidman et al [1979].
( ) = Number of cases.
( ] = No cases seen. Number of cases "expected" on the basis of the average relative risk in the overall ex-
posure category.
63
294 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
will be used for all other nonmesothelial tumors with the magnitude of the increase in
insulators being adjusted by the observed frequency of these tumors compared with
that expected and that of other groups by their estimated exposure relative to insulators
as well.
The treatment of the time course of mesothelioma differs from that of lung can-
cer and other malignancies in that there is no background rate in the absence of asbes-
tos exposure with which to compare the asbestos-related risk. Thus, it is necessary to
utilize absolute risks of death. Figure 4 shows the risk of death of mesothelioma ac-
cording to age for individuals exposed first between ages 15 and 24 and between ages 25
and 34 as in Figure 1 . As can be seen, these data, while somewhat uncertain because of
small numbers, roughly parallel one another by ten years as did the increased relative
risk curves for lung cancer. Thus, the absolute risk of death from mesothelioma ap-
pears to be directly related to onset of exposure and is independent of the age at which
the exposure occurs. The risk of death from mesothelioma among the insulation
workers is plotted according to time from onset of exposure on the right side of Figure
4. It increases as the fourth or fifth power of time from onset of exposure for about 40
or 50 years. Thereafter, data are scanty and information on the time course is not relia-
ble. For the purposes of analyzing the mortality experience among various groups of
workers, the relationship depicted in Figure 4 will be used. After 45 years from onset of
exposure, we will consider the risk of death from mesothelioma to remain constant at
1 .2 per 100 person -years for insulation workers employed for 25 or more years. For in-
sulators employed for shorter periods, the risk will be reduced by the fraction of 25
years worked. For other exposed groups the risks depicted in Figure 4 will be reduced
by the relative exposure of the group compared with insulators and by the fraction of
25 years that a population is exposed.
RISK OF DEATH
FROM MESOTHELIOMA
1000
CO
< 500
200
O
lO
K
UJ
a.
2 100
UJ
0.
in
X
<
a
50
20
10
AGE AT ONSET
* < AGE 23 yra
• > AGE 29 yrs
10 20 40 60 80
AGE
20 40 60
YEARS FROM
ONSET OF
EXPOSURE
Fig. 4. The death rates for mesothelioma among insulation workmen according to age and age at onset of
erhployment and according to time since onset of employment.
64
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 295
Dose-Response Relationships for Asbestos-Related Cancer
Four recent studies have demonstrated that the risk of lung cancer increases line-
arly with dose over a fairly wide range of exposures [Dement et al, in press; Henderson
and Enterline, 1979; Liddell et al, 1977; Seidman et al, 1979]. Unfortunately, the stud-
ies are not directly comparable. For three, the measure of dose was the exposure to as-
bestos and other dusts in terms of millions of particles per cubic foot (mppcf) times the
duration of exposure. This exposure categorization is highly dependent upon the pro-
portion of nonfibrous material in the aerosol being considered. Some relationships be-
tween panicle counts and fiber concentrations in fibers longer than 5 micrometers per
milliliter (f/ml) have been provided in the literature, but these are tenuous at best,
based as they are upon a limited number of observations. Further, the study of Hender-
son and Enterline [1979] was limited to retirees over age 64 of a major asbestos prod-
uas manufacturer in the United States. As was seen in Figure 2, observations of ex-
posed groups begun late in life can differ considerably from those in which follow-up
starts at younger years (as, for example, at age 40-45, 20 years after onset of employ-
ment). In the fourth study, that of Seidman et al [1979], exposure characterization in-
volved the use of data from plants other than that in which the mortality experience oc-
curred. A discussion of some of the differences of the slopes of the dose-response
funaions obtained in these studies has been made elsewhere [Nicholson, 1981a]. The
important aspect is the linearity of effect with increasing amounts of asbestos inhaled.
In the analysis which follows, it is not necessary that one fully understand the
reasons for the differences in the slopes of dose-response relationships in mining and
various manufacturing operations as the relative risks in different industries will be
based largely upon the observed mortality experience in those industries or upon a com-
parison of the number of cases of mesothelioma or excess lung cancers in different
work activities. In this subsequent comparison, however, we will utilize a linear dose-
response relationship to adjust for different periods of employment. While the evi-
dence of linearity is strong for lung cancer, we will assume that it also obtains for meso-
thelioma and other malignancies. The evidence for this is more limited, but an analysis
of the risks of mesothelioma according to time of employment in the study of Seidman
et al would suggest that it is true for that tumor as well. For example, 0 of 215 deaths
from mesothelioma occurred from less than 6 months exposure, 3 of 82 from 6 to 1 1
months exposure, 4 of 74 from 1 to 2 years exposure, and 7 of 63 from more than
2 years exposure.
Calculation of Asbestos-Related Mortality
As discussed previously, for those trades in which workers have possible asbestos
exposure, estimates were made of the number of employees potentially at risk, the rela-
tive exposure of those workers compared with insulators, the average employment time
of individuals entering a particular trade or industry, and the age distribution of new
hires in the various trades or industries. The asbestos-related cancer mortality was
calculated as follows. For those employees entering a trade subsequent to 1940, the
above data from Table XII were utilized to obtain the number of new entrants into an
industry during different periods of time. The age distribution of new manufacturing
employees of 1960 (Table XXI) was used to calculate age-related mortality of new en-
trants into a trade or industry. This distribution also was found in new hires during
1974 at a major northeast US shipyard (E. Christian, personal communication). For
each quinquennium at entry, the appropriate age, calendar year, and asbestos risk spe-
cific rates were applied to calculate the excess lung and other cancer mortality, the risk
65
296 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
of death from mesothelioma, the total mortality (based on US national rates for the
entry quinquennium and all subsequent quenquennia until the year 2030 (assuming
1975-1979 rates to apply to the year 2030). This was done for each five-year period of
entry, 1940-1980, and the calculated numbers summed for each calendar quinquen-
nium, 1940-2030. For those employed in 1940, the appropriate age distribution for an
industry or trade in 1940, as given by the US census, was used. For those employed in
1940, it was assumed that onset of asbestos exposure occurred at age 22.5 or 1930 for
those 32.5 years or older in 1940.
The excess, nonmesothelial cancer mortality was calculated using the time de-
pendence displayed in Figure 2 with the assumption that the manifestation of risk from
a given exposure will first take place 7.5 years after its occurrence and increases line-
arly until 7.5 years after cessation of exposure. The risks of death from mesothelioma
were calculated using the data of Figure 4, adjusted for each industrial group, with risk
assumed to be constant after 45 years from first exposure. Account was taken of the
different periods of exposure for each group in each decade, as indicated in Table XIII.
Calculations were made using US white male rates. Some blacks and some women
would have been employed in the industries under consideration, although their num-
bers would have been small. Were data available on the number of blacks and women,
the use of black male rates would have increased the number of nonmesothelioma can-
cers and the female rates would have decreased the number, resulting in only a small
change from these data.
The results of such calculations are shown in Table XXII through XXV, which
list the average annual excess number of lung cancers, mesotheliomas, gastrointestinal,
and other asbestos-related cancers, and total excess cancer attributable to asbestos ex-
posure in each quinquennium from 1965 to 2030 for the populations in Table XII. In
these tables the average annual mortality in each quinquennium is listed by the mid-
year of the period. As can be seen, the dominant contributors to the asbestos-related
disease are the shipbuilding and construction industries. Industries direaly involved in
the manufacturing of asbestos produas or with the application of insulation material
contribute a significantly smaller proportion to current asbestos disease and that to be
expeaed for the next two decades.^
It is instruaive to look at a display of the number of mesotheliomas and asbestos-
related cancers in the shipbuilding industry from the year 1940 to the year 2000. While
the total number of malignancies are necessarily uncenain, the data on the time course
of the cancers that will occur are relatively good. These data are shown in Figures 5 and
6 for the populations first employed prior to 1940, during World War II, and subse-
quent to 1945. As can be seen, the relative importance of the wartime and postwar ex-
posures are roughly equal, even though a considerably greater number of individuals
were employed in World War II. This, of course, occurs becauseof the relatively short
periods of work for the wartime group. Funher, while the exposures in the construc-
tion industry are more uncertain, the important disease experience is also ahead of us in
^A preliminary report on this research has been presented elsewhere (W.J. Nicholson, G. Perkel, l.J. Seli-
koff, and H. Seidman. Cancer from occupational asbestos exposure: Projections 1980-2000. Banbury Re-
port 9, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, 1981, pp 87-1 1 1). In that publication, an estimate was presented
of the population at risk from asbestos exposure since 1940 (1 3,200,000) and projections of asbestos-re-
lated mortality (8,770 deaths in 1982 to 9,750 in 1990). The estimates of the population exposed to asbestos
presented there, however, did not fully account for the extremely high turnover in workplace employment
that we have discussed here. However, as the mortality estimates did not depend on the total population ex-
posed, they are virtually identical to (hose presented here.
66
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 297
that industry, largely because of the extensive use of asbestos in spray fireproofing ma-
terials between 1958 and 1972. A measure of the overall future disease experience can
be seen in Figure 7, which depicts the projected annual mesothelioma deaths from 1940
to the year 2000. Of all mesotheliomas that are estimated to occur between the years
1940 and 2000, about one third have occurred to date.
The number of mesotheliomas estimated by this procedure is approximately 40%
greater than those that would be estimated to occur nationwide using data of the SEER
program for white males during 1978 [R. Connelly, National Cancer Institute, personal
communication, 1981]. Here, initial data (with one center not analyzed) report 98
mesothelioma deaths in nine of the ten SEER areas. As they represent approximately a
TABLE XXI. Age Distribution of Emplo>ees Hired During 1965 Who Were Not Working January 1.
1965*
Percent of
Number
Percent in
shipyard workers
Age
(in thousands)
age interval
in age interval^
18-19
20-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 +
892
1,614
1,431
861
588
361
146
15.1
27.3
24.3
14.6
10.0
6.1
2.5
17.8
31.6
27.6
12.0
6.1
2.9
0.0
•Data from Bureau of Labor Statistics (1965).
'Based on 478 neN^ hires during 1974. Data from Christian, Sec. Local 5, Industrial Union of Marine and
Shipbuilding Workers of America (personal communication, 1981).
SHIPYARD CANCER
OTHER THAN MESOTHELIOMA
2000 -
1940
I960 1980
YEAR
2000
Fig. 5. The estimated and projected numbers of mesothelioma deaths per annum from past asbestos ex-
posure from 1940 through 1999 among three groups of shipyard employees (those employed in 1940 or
earlier, those employed during World War 11, and those employed subsequent to World War II).
67
298 Nicholson, Perkel. and Selikoff
1 0'^o sample of the US population , the national estimate of cases for 1 978 would exceed
1,000. This is to be compared with our estimate of 1,400 for the quinquennium
1976-1980 (and for the year 1978). In this comparison, however, it should be noted that
the information used for the estimate of asbestos-related cancers in this work relied
upon data that identified asbestos malignancy following analysis of all medical
evidence and after a review of all pathological material available. The SEER program,
on the other hand, used records-based reports with no review of pathological material.
Experience has shown that pathological review will identify as mesothelioma many
neoplasms initially categorized otherwise [Levine, 1978]. Further, while well represent-
ing the shipbuilding industry, the ten SEER areas underrepresent industrial areas and
SHIPYARD MESOTHELIOMA
1000
Tolol
/ \ •
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1940 I960 1980 2000
YEAR
Fig. 6. The estimated and projected numbers ot excess asbestos-related cancers per annum from 19-i0
through 1999 among three groups ot shipyard employees (those employed in 1940 or earlier, those em-
ployed during World War II, and those employed subsequent lo World War II).
3000
2000 -
X 1000
ASBESTOS MESOTHELIOMA
IN WORKERS EMPLOYED
1940 AND LATER
1940
I960 1980
YEAR
2000
Fig. 7. Theestimaiedandprojectednumbersof mesotheliomas per annum Irom 1940through 1999 Irom
occupational asbestos exposure.
68
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 299
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300 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
metropolitan regions that would have had significant construction activities 30 or more
years ago. Thus, it is not unexpected that actual US rates may exceed those estimated
from the SEER program.
There is observational evidence to support the analytical approach used in these
calculations. The data for insulation workers suggest that 650 mesotheliomas and 2,300
excess lung cancers would occur between 1967 and 1976 among members of this craft.
This is to be compared with 175 mesotheliomas and 380 excess lung cancers seen among
insulators in the single union (The International Association of Heat and Frost Insula-
tors and Asbestos Workers, AFL-CIO) studied by Selikoff et al [1979]. The ratios of
0.27 and 0.17 for the number of deaths among Asbestos Workers Union members to
those calculated here is in reasonable agreement with the fraction of all insulators that
the union has organized (0.29). The difference in lung cancer and mesothelioma ratios
can be attributed to the fact that the insulators organized by this union are older than
the entire group estimated to be at risk from 1967 through 1976 and, thus, have a pro-
portionally greater risk of death from mesothelioma than from lung cancer compared
to other insulators. Forty-two percent of the Asbestos Workers Union members were
45 years of age or older at the midpoint of the Selikoff et al study. A comparison of the
ratios of the calculated 1977 mesothelioma deaths from industries (Table XXIII) with
those observed in the study of McDonald and McDonald [1980] (Table XVI) also
shows reasonable agreement.
As discussed previously, one third of those estimated to have had a potential ex-
posure to asbestos were exposed for only a short period of time and were believed to
have a risk less than that equivalent to that from employment in an asbestos products
plant or as an insulator for two months. By calculating the person-years of exposure of
the 'lower risk population" and comparing the result to the total person-years of em-
ployment in each industry the contribution of the lower -risk group to the estimated ex-
cess mortality can be obtained. These results are shown in Table XXVI and indicate
that 32''7o of the exposed group will contribute less than 2°Io of the excess asbestos-re-
lated deaths. The numbers are approximate because of uncertainties in the assumed
shon-term separating rate. They do, however, dramatize the consequences of inclusion
of lower exposed individuals in the population at risk.
Asbestosis Deaths
The above estimates are of deaths from malignancy. There will be additional
deaths from asbestosis that will occur in individuals exposed to high concentrations
over long periods of time. In contrast to the asbestos cancers, deaths from asbestosis
generally require considerable fiber exposure. They will largely occur in insulators,
manufacturing workers and long-term shipyard employees. They will be fewer than the
number of mesothelioma deaths among insulators (perhaps one half to three fourths).
Because of the high labor turnover in manufacturing we would estimate that about one
third as many deaths will occur from asbestosis as from mesothelioma. A similar ratio
is probably appropriate for pre- and post -World War II shipyard workers (short-term
wartime work would carry only a limited risk of death from asbestosis). Thus, approxi-
mately 200 deaths annually are now occurring from asbestosis (the condition, however,
will be contributory to many more deaths). This number will perhaps double during the
next two decades and decline thereafter.
70
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 301
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302 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
Comparison With Other Studies
Some previous estimates of asbestos-related monaiity exceed those discussed
here. In the Department of Heahh, Education, and Welfare estimate that 13''7o-18''7oof
all cancers in the near future will be asbestos-related, recognition was taken that a large
number of individuals were potentially exposed to asbestos, their estimate being 8-11
million compared with ours at 27.5 million, 18.8 million of whom had exposures
greater than 2-3 f-yr/ml [Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1981]. How-
ever, their estimates of the number of heavily exposed individuals was subjective and
no explicit adjustment was made for the different employment periods of exposed
groups. The estimates by Hogan and Hoel [1981] that up to 12,000 deaths may occur
annually from asbestos cancer placed great emphasis upon possible effects from the
shipbuilding industry. They, too, subjectively estimated the number of heavily exposed
individuals in this trade and did not explicitly account for variations in employment
time and may have overestimated the asbestos-related mortality. However, their esti-
mates of the effect of other industries neglected large numbers of individuals with po-
tential exposure. Thus, their estimates for other than shipbuilding would appear to
understate the asbestos disease potential [Nicholson, 1981b]. Finally, Blot and
Fraumeni [1981] estimate that 120,000 lung cancer deaths will occur (over the popula-
tion lifetime) from wanime shipyard employment. Our estimate is 25,000. The differ-
ence lies largely in our assigning a much lower risk to the very short term (< 1 year)
employees.
A lower estimate of 4,000 asbestos cancers annually has been made by Higginson
et al [1980] based upon mid- 1970 SEER data for mesothelioma and a multiplier of
three for other cancers. However, the multiplier depends on time from onset of expo-
sure and population age and exceeded four during the 1970s. (Compare Tables XXII
and XXIII.) Further, the previously mentioned limitations of the SEER data apply
here. Enterline has also estimated that approximately 4,000 deaths will occur annually
[Enterline, 1981]. He attributes 530 lung cancer deaths/yr to primary manufacturing
and insulation work, 900to secondary, 421 to shipyard employment, 212to auto main-
tenance, and 438 for other occupations. In addition to lung cancer, he estimates 1,250
other cancers and 333 mesotheliomas will be asbestos-related. The values for primary
manufacturing, insulation work, and auto maintenance are similar to our estimates
and that for secondary manufacturing considerably more. However, much lower esti-
mates are given for shipbuilding, construction, and other trades. This is in contrast
with the finding that a much greater number of mesotheliomas occur in these trades
compared with manufacturing and insulation work [McDonald and McDonald, 1980].
Expected Mortality in Asbestos-Exposed Workers
Tables XXII through XXV list the projections for the excess mortality associated
with past asbestos exposures. For a given work category, these excess deaths will add to
those expected in the absence of exposure but, with the exception of mesothelioma, an
"excess" death cannot be distinguished from an "expected" one. As each of these deaths
may lead to a claim for compensation or a third party suit, the potential of such cases
can greatly exceed the number of excess deaths calculated above. For the heavily ex-
posed (insulators, for example), where the excess deaths exceed those expected, the
problem is not a great one. However, for groups with lesser exposure, the total nurriber
of lung cancer deaths that could be asbestos-related is very much greater than the
numbers in Table XXII. Table XXVII lists the expeaed lung cancer deaths over the
72
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 303
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74
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 305
years 1965-2030 (assuming 1978 rates for subsequent years). As can be seen, the ex-
pected numbers exceed the excess by nearly six times. Even if the 32°7o of individuals
with lower exposure are excluded from consideration, the ratios of expected to excess
range from 0.4 to 1 1.7.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of excess lung cancers expected between 1980
and 2030 according to equivalent insulator-years of exposure. (An insulator-year of
exposure is that which would create the same risk as employment as an insulator for
one year). The approximate exposure for a doubling of lung cancer risk is also
indicated. Of the excess lung cancers, 50^ occur in individuals with more than this
doubling exposure. The total number of lung cancers is also shown for this group and
is about 60% more than the excess due to asbestos exposure. For lesser exposures,
the curve of the total cancer rises extremely steeply because of the large number of
exposed individuals. At the peak of the asbestos related lung cancer curve, the total
lung cancer curve would be four times higher. Parenthetically, the exposure distribu-
tion of mesothelioma cases will be similar to that of the excess lung cancers.
As mentioned previously at a given exposure level an "excess" death cannot be
distinguished from an "expected" one. The problem, however, extends even across
exposure levels. Many individuals with less than 5 insulator-years of exposure will
have abnormal X-rays, and a significant percentage with greater exposure will have
normal X-rays. This follows from the finding that more than 30% family contacts of
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\«^T0TAL LUNG CANCERS
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YEARS OF EXPOSURE
Fig. 8. The distribution of excess lung cancers expected between 1 980 and 2030 according to equivalent
insulator-years of exposure. (An insulator-year of exposure is that which would create the same risk as em-
ployment as an insulator for one year.)
75
306 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
TABLE XXVI. Percentage of Asbeslos-Relaled Cancers Thai Occur Among Those
With Lower Exposure Who Were Exposed After January 1940*
Industry or occupation Percentage of deaths
Primary asbestos manufacturing 1-2
Secondary manufacturing '-3
Insulation work 0'
Shipbuilding and repair 1-9
Construction trades '0
Railroad engine repair '-8
Utility services 0-8
Stationary engineers and firemen 1-8
Chemical plant and refinery maintenance 1-0
Automobile maintenance 12.4
Marine engine room personnel 2J
•Lower exposure is considered to be less than 2-3 f-yr/ml. The overall contribution
to mortality of all individuals \Mih lower exposure is l.QO'o.
asbestos factory workers (Anderson et al. 1979) and insulators (Nicholson et al, to be
published) have asbestos related X-ray abnormalities (20-30 years after onset of less
than 5 equivalent years of exposure) and that a fair number of insulators with 20 or
more years in the trade have normal X-rays. Pulmonary function tests are even less
revealing. While procedures based on exposure or on clinical evidence of exposure
are possible, the allocation of compensation resources to the deserving individuals is
clearly an enormously difficult scientific problem. It is an even more difficult social
problem.
CONCLUSIONS
Estimates have been made of the numbers of cancers that are projected to result
from past exposures to asbestos in a number of occupations and industries. Only those
potentially exposed by virtue of their employment have been considered. Additional
deaths will result from exposure among family contacts (household contamination),
from environmental exposures, from exposure during consumer use of asbestos prod-
ucts, and from exposure while in the Armed Forces, particularly in engine rooms of
naval ships. No estimates have been made of deaths resulting from asbestosis. These
estimates indicate that:
1. From 1940 through 1979, 27,500,000 individuals had potential asbestos expo-
sure at work. Of these, 18,800,000 had exposure in excess of that equivalent to two
months employment in primary manufacturing or as an insulator (>2-3 f-yr/ml).
21,000,000of the 27,500,000 and 14,100,000 of the 18,800,000 are estimated to have
been alive on January 1, 1980.
2. Approximately 8,200 asbestos-related cancer deaths are currently occurring
annually. This will rise to about 9,700 annually by the year 2000.
3. Thereafter, the mortality rate from past exposure will decrease but still remain
substantial for another three decades.
76
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 307
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308 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
These projections are from past exposures to asbestos. Over one million tons of
friable asbestos material are in place in buildings, ships, factories, refineries, power
plants, and other facilities. The maintenance, repair and eventual demolition of these
facilities provide opportunities for continued significant exposures. If such work is not
properly done, or if asbestos is otherwise used with inadequate controls, the burden of
disease and death from past exposures will be increased by the environmental exposures
of the future.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work has benefited from the critical review and suggestions of Thomas C.
Brown, Fred Siskind. and Howard Vincent oi the Department of Labor. Suppon for
this research was provided by Contract J-9-M-8-0165 of the Depanment of Labor and
Center Grant ES00928 of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences.
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310 Nicholson, Perkel, and Selikoff
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80
Occupational Exposure to Asbestos 311
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81
^^^l^liS i. Pt£i
ikS
Benefits and Costs- of the Federal Asb^istcs Standard
! by
Russell F. Settle
University of Delaware
To be Presented At a Department of Labor Conference
on
"Evaluating the Effects of the
Occupational Safety and Health Program"
March 18-19, 1975
Sponsored by:
Office of the Assistant Secretary' for
Policy, Evaluation and Research
and
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
U.S. Department of Labor
82
BENEFITS A_ND COSTS OF THE FEDEPJiL ASBESTOS STANDARD
by -
Russell F. Settle*
I. Introduction
The social consensus in the United States has held for many
decades that the safety and health of workers should not be deter-
mined entirely by the workings of unconstrained markets. State
occupational safety and health laws date from an 1877 Massachusetts
statute regulating certain hazardous parts of machinery (Page and
O'Brien, p. 53). Most state workmen's compensation laws extend
back more than half-a-century . The first state work^men's compensa-
tion legislation was passed in 1911, and by 1920 all but six states
had adopted at least limited no-fault approaches to compensating
VOrV.'?'"': fnr work-related injuries (NCSV.'CL, p. 34);
The federal government's interest in controlling occupational
safety and health hazards dates at least from the passage of rail-
road safety laws beginning in 1893 (Page and 0'"Brien, p. 54). In
1908 Congress passed the country's first workmen's coir.peiiSEtion
laws, although these acts applied only to railroad employees engaged
i.n interstate commerce and to certain' federal employees (NCSKCL, p. 34).
In 1936 Congress passed the Walsh-Healey Act which, in part, authorized
the promulgation and enforcement of safety and health standards for
firms working under contracts to the Federal government exceeding ten
thousand dollars. Federal authority over the work conditions in the
private marketplace was extended even further in the 1960 's with the
passage of the McNamara-O'Hara Act of 1966 — which lowered the ten
83
thousand dollar contract minimum to twenty-five hundred dollars--
nd the Construction Safety Act of 1969, which extended control to
firms with federally funded or assisted construction contracts.
With the passage of these laws, over 30 million non-federal employees,
or about 40 per cent of the civilian non-federal labor force, were
at least nominally protected by federal occupational safety and
2
health (OSH) standards (Page and O'Brien, p. 94).
The culmination of this trend toward greater and greater con-
travention of private decisions regarding occupational safety and
health was the passage of the federal Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 197 0, which extended federal authority in this area to cover
all firms engaged in interstate commerce.. The federal government's
policy, as stated in the OSH Act of 1970, is " . . .to assure so far
.as possible every .working man and woman in the Nation safe and health-
5
al working conditions and to preserve our human resources.""
The need for these governmental interventions was supposedly
obvious. Nevertheless, little is known about the ad«aiLtagfiSae^i>ena(
^f-it£Jai^nd3disa'avalTtag€S'-^costsr)*wsf governmental regulation of work
hazards. This paper (1) develops a conceptual framev;ork for evalu-
ating the benefits and costs (in the narrow efficiency sense of
these terns) of governmental intervention in private OSH decisions,
and (2) applies this methodology in an illustrative quantification
of the benefits and costs of the federal asbestos standard.
II. Benefits and Costs of Improving OSH . • - .
In this section, we develop a taxonomy of the "benefits" and
"costs" of governmental intervention to improve OSH. In the following
84
sections, the operational form for a number of benefits and costs
is discussed, with attention focused on the effects of the federal
asbestos standard.
Benefits of Governmental Intervention
Efficiency gains from governmental intervention in private OSH
decisions take a nujnber of forms. First we identify the forms of intei
vention benefits. As will become clear in the following sections,
a number of these benefits are, unfortunately, not amenable to quan-
tification given the present state of benefit-cost analysis. Never-
theless, it remains important at least to identify all benefits (and
costs) so as to place those that are quantifiable in perspective.
^^ /^ideally, we would like our measures of the gross benefits from im-
I 1 1 Jproved job safety and health to capture all of those elements which,
'ft /ill combination, equal the sum of aU. individual willingnesses-to-psy
'or such improvements. ■ '
. z - ■
L-
1. ■ One obvious form taken by the efficiency' gains from job
safety and health improvements is the increase in present and future
production by those who, in the absence of governmental ir:*:ervention,
would have had their productivity temporarily or permar.ently reduced
g
by a job-related illness or injury. Conceptually, these productivity
gains refer to both market and non-market activities as a disabled
worker will generally contribute less in his role as a producer both
on and off the job.
■ Some studies treat the productivity gains from better health (and
safety) as the savings- -in— output minus the consumption of those who,
without "the health .(or. safety) improvements, would have died; that is.
85
"... 'society' is so defined as to exclude the individual whose life
9
s being valued..." In this study, howev-er, we are attempting to
approximate society's willingness-to-pay for improvements in job
safety and health, where the "society" includes those v;ho, without
the improvements, would be killed. Thus, we are interested in the
tota-l'-contribution to output (i.e., unadjusted for the individual's
ov;n consuroption) by those whose lives are saved.
Furthermore, these productivity measures conceptually encompass
all those who would have been disabled in the absence of collective
action, including non-v;orkers or "th'ixd parties" to whom OSH hazards
represent an externality.
2. These productivity gains no doubt capture only a part of
an individual's willingness-to-pay for increased protection from
work hazards, as there is presumably more to life than what is pur-
.lasable with the income from work. That is, individuals surely
enjoy pure consumption benefits from an existence unhampered by work
disabilities. To claim otherwise would be to say that those who do
not work — the retired, the wealthy, even the chronically unemployed —
would be willing-to-pay nothing for continued good health and well-
being, in fact, for continued existence — surely an untenable position.
Thus, we would ideally like to include in our benefit estimates some
measure of the consumption value of improved OSH.
As will be apparent in the asbestos study, the inclusion of such
a. broad measure is particularly desirable (although nonetheless dif-
ficult to accomplish) when evaluating the benefits of controlling
health hazards which, due to long delays between exposure and illness.
cir
86
affect many of their victims only after retirement. Prospects for
-uantifying this component cf willingnessrto-pay are discussed fur-
ther in a following section.
3. A third potentially important component of a social will-
ingness-to-pay for improved OSH is the value of -the -resources that
otherv;ise would have been used in the detection, treatment, and
rehabilitation of work hazard victims. The quantity and type's
of such resources used will, of course, vary considerably, depend-
ing upon the particular injury or illness under consideration.
For example, injuries may generally require little by v;ay of detec-
tion, whereas health problems (e.g., occupationally-related cancers),
if they are to be found in time for treatment, may be detectable
<
only at great expense.
• 4. Reductions in work injuries and illnesses may also be
V^ved fcr the resources released frc-i the adir,irii5tration of work-
men's compensation and other insurance. Again, the quantity of
resources f^-eed will vary greatly according to types of disability.
Injured workers normally receive v;orkmen ' s compensation, for example,
while workers with certain occupational diseases (e.g., cancers
caused by agents not known to be carcinogenic) nay not receive com-
pensation because of the generally inadequate coverage of occupa-
12
tional diseases by many state workmen's compensation laws.
5. Work-related disabilities may occasion the training of
personnel to replace those disabled. To the extent that improve-
ments in OSH reduce the need for replacement personnel, these train-
ing resources would be freed for alternative uses, and, thus, should
be accounted for in our approximation of social willingness-to-pay
87
for better OSH.
6. The presence of work hazards may lead to efforts by workers
to avoid them, to keep from being injured or sickened. These efforts
could take such forms as simply being more careful, wearing pro-
tective equipment or clothing, etc. In addition, they may cause
employers to take steps to protect their v;orkers, as would generally
be the case when workers demand risk premiums for "hazardous" jobs.
Government intervention, say, with OSH standards specifying the
precise manner in which a particular OSH hazard is to be reduced
or eliminated may well substitute for these private efforts, there-
by freeing additional private resources, and perhaps making workers,
who now need expend less time and energy at being careful, more
productive. Such outcomes, if they occur, should be valued and
included in our 'measurement of gross benefits from government inter-
■ . 13
antion.
7. There are several other forms of losses, termed here
"psychological losses," arising from work-related injuries and ill-
nesses, which those suffering such losses would no do-^bt b-2 willing
to pay to avoid, and which, therefore, should ideally be accounted
for in an evaluation of the benefits from improved OSH. These forms
include those losses arising from (a) the pain and suffering attendant
in work-related injuries and illnesses, including any embarrassment
and anguish from disfigurement, loss of limb, etc., and (b) risk
aversion among those who stand to suffer a probabilistic loss from
14
the existence of work hazards.
8. Governmental intervention to improve OSH may also benefit
owners of capital inasmuch as it prevents or reduces damages not
88
only to workers, but also to the stock of capital. For example,
QSII standards designed to protect against fires or explosions will
confer benefits on the owners of capital to the extent that damage
to capital .is reduced. Clearly, these benefits may, or may not,
be less than the costs imposed on capital-owners by the standard.
For instance, firms or capital-owners may have done their own pro-
tecting against fires, etc., and thus, they may oppose interven-
tions that require changes. In any event, it is conceptually
necessary to include these effects in our benefit measures, since
(as will be clear shortly) our cost measures include the corre-
sponding intervention costs. It should be noted, however, that
increased protection of workers could, conceivably, diminish the
protection afforded capital. If so, these additional losses in
Qaiiia<j<=u capital "..'culd bs counte'^ as a' cost of the intervention.
9. Finally, governmental efforts to reduce OSH hazards may
confer benefits on the firm (or the owners of the firm) as im-
provements in OSH may reduce absenteeism related to job injuries
or illnesses, reduce the number of work-stoppages and slowdowns
caused by accidents, and, possibly, improve the overall morale
and productivity of the work-force.
As in the capital-damage case, it is clear that these bene-
fits to the firm may, or may not, be less than the cost of the
intervention to the firm. If the firm has already taken advantage
of all profitable opportunities to reduce OSH hazards, they will
presumably oppose OSH standards that require changes or additional
expenditures. Nevertheless, it is desirable to include measures
of these "desirable" effects of the standard in our benefit
89
qunntif ications since the corresponding costs arc included in our
cost- calculations.
The major components of a social willingness-to-pay for
governmental interver.tion to protect v/orkers from any particular
job-related injury or illness depend upon:
(a) The present and future productivity of those who
otherwise would have been disabled;
(b) The extent to which the disability affects one's
c
present and future capacity to enjoy "leisure"
(i.e., consumption or non-v;ork activities);
(c) The magnitudes of detection, treatment, and rehabil-
itation expenditures occasioned by the injury or
illness;
■ . (d) The value of the resources expended in ^:he administer-
ing of workmen's compensation or other insurance
claims occasioned by the disability;
■(e) The extent of attempts to avoid, reduce, or prevent
work hazards prior to the intervention;
(f) The extent of "psychological losses',' occasioned by
disability, or the anxiety occasioned by the fear of
disability;
(g) The hazard-related losses (if any) to the firm and
to the owners of capital.
Social Costs of Governmental Intervention
In this section, we identify a number of social costs likely
to accompany governmental intervention in the Market's provision
of OSH. It is these social costs which must be offset against the
90
social benefits nottd above to determine v/hethcr a "potential marliet
viilure" is, in fact, an actual ir.arket failure. If the benefits
exceed the costs, the intervention would enhance efficiency; other-
wise, it would not. That is not to say, of course, that interven-
tion should not be undertaken if the efficiency costs exceed the
efficiency benefits; it may be that an inefficient intervention
advances society toward some equity goal and thus, is considered,
on balance, --"worthwhile. " (The reverse may also be true; i.e., an
efficient intervention may give rise to such inequities as to be
considered "undesirable" by policymakers.)
1. One obvious social cost occasioned by intervention is the
cost of compliance, where by "compliance- costs" we mean the present
and future real resource expenditures on improvements in OSK (i.e.,
reductions in OSH-hazards) necessitated by the law, e.g., by an
oH standard. Examples of compliance costs are expenditures occa-
sioned by an intervention on protective equipment or clothing, on
exhaust fans to reduce the level of noxious gases or dust-contaminated
air in a working area, and on safety training. By contrast with
these real costs, tax payments under a tax-subsidy regime or financial
penalties for violations of the law, while no doubt viewed by the
- firm as a cost of compliance, are seen here as financial transfers
and are, thus, omitted from consideration.
2. Additional resources will be expended in the establishment
and enforcement of regulations' governing OSH . Expenditures of
resources are generally necessary in the establishment of regula-
tions, be they tax ratts on various levels of a hazard or direct
ccntrols over that hazard, as little may be known initially, even
91
among the "experts," about alt,ernative methods for abating hazards,
nr about the likely effects of a hazard — particularly a health
hazard — on the well-being of those exposed to it. That regulations
are not costlessly established is illustrated by the facts that
(1) in fiscal 1973 the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) the federal agency responsible for administering the OSH Act
of 1970, expended approximately $3 million on the development of
safety and health standards, and (2) in fiscal 1972 the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, OSBA's medical research
arm, spent about $25 million on. research to provide information for
18
the establishment of OSH standards.
2. The most important component of the public sector resources
expended as a consequence of the government's intervention, hov.-ever,
is the cost of enforcement, including the costs attendant to inspec-
io'n — CO determint; iT violaLions have cccurrcd--ir.d sd judication — to
prosecute violators. In fiscal 1973 OSHA spent in the neighborhood
of $23 million on enforcement of OSH standards (primarily for inspec-
1 Q ...
tion) while the Occupational Safety and Health Review Cc.TJiiission
(OSHRC) , a special court for hearing cases brought under the OSH Act
of 1970, expended about $1.3 million to adjudicate the cases brought
, , .^ 20, 21
before it.
In addition to these public sector expenditures, there are
private sector expenditures related to the establishment and enforce-
ment of OSH regulations. Firms, trade organizations, unions, and
other interested parties may expend resources in efforts to make
their views known as regards, say, the proposed stringency of a
particular standard. In addition, private parties or organizations,
92
e.g., firms or unions, may direct resources into legal battles in
expectation of obtaining favorable court rulings. The cases heard
by OSHRC have at least one private party. of organization as either
22
the plaintiff or the defendant. Ideally, an evaluatxon of any
particular intervention (e.g., a particular OSH standard) should
account for all of these various forms of public and private sector
expenditures occasioned by the establishir.ent and enforcement of
the OSH regulation.
3. Governmental intervention in the market's provision of
OSH will, unless -all-- compliance co-stS-to the-aff acted firms are com-
pletely subsidized or shifted backward into the factors of produc-
tion';'rrincrease.^production costs and ,. eventually , the price, of. -..the
goods-or services produced by those firms. This process is illus-
trated in Figure 1 for a competitive industry producing some good, X.
"ic intervention, say, in the form of OSK standards, increases the
per unit cost of production, taken to include both fi.xed and variable
costs, and hence price in this competitive industry from P_ to P^.
In response to the higher price, consumers reduce quantity demanded
from X- to X. . Relative to the initial equilibrium, consumers are'
worse off in the post-standards equilibrium by the amount (A + B) ,
i.e., by the decrease in consumers' surplus.
However, only part of this consumers' surplus loss should be
counted as a social cost of the intervention. To see this, suppose
that production relations in competitive industry X are fixed cc-
•efficients. If this assumption is granted, then the OSH standard
will increase per unit production costs (and eventually output price)
by precisely the average compliance cost per unit of output (e.g..
93
12
Figure 1
Consumers' Surplus Loss Caused by OSH Standards
\
\
'\
S'
A
'b\
c
°
^1 '^o
by P - Pq in Figure 1) . Consequently, area A in Figure 1 is exactly
equal to the compliance costs nominally borne by the firms in indus-
try X. That is, the compliance costs are shifted from producers of
X to consumers of X. Since this shifting of costs represents a trans-
fer, to include compliance costs (area A) a second time as a loss in
consumers' surplus would involve a double-counting of compliance costs.
Area B, on the other hand, represents a consumers' surplus loss not
counted elsev'/herc Thus, it is legitimately included as an inter-
vention cost.
4. Generally, benefit-cost analyses assume that the productive
resources released when output is reduced (e.g., from X. to X. in
Figure 1) immediately move into alternative and equally productive
25-994 0-83-7
94
23
activities. This assumption is not, however, maintained in this
study. Miile it seems plausible that resources do find their way
into alternative and equally productive activities, it is implausi-
ble that they do so immediately and costlessly, without an inter-
24
vening period of unemployment. Consequently, this study takes
as its final invervention cost the value. of. production lost during
25
the -period of: txansitional unemployment.
To summarize: There are four potential forms of intervention
costs, all of which are, fortunately, susceptible to some degree
of quantification. In general, the costs of any particular inter-
vention are seen to depend upon:
(1) The value of the resources expended on improving OSH;
(2) The public and private sector expenditures related to the
establishmemi and ciiIorc£;7,cr.t cf the OSH -rpaulations ;
(3) The extent of consumers' surplus losses (not elsewhere
counted) ;
(4) The extent and duration of resource unemployment caused
by . the intervention.
In the next section an approach to operationalizing this
benefit-cost framework is demonstrated through an illustrative
evaluation of the asbestos standard. In this case study we are able
to quantify, to some extent, all of the costs and a number of the
benefits identified above. ' ■
Part II
III.' Donef it-Cost Measurements
In this section, we operationalizc a number of the benefits
95
and costs of governmental OSI! intervention in an illustrative evalu-
^ticn of the federal asbestos standard. Before discussing our
approach to measuring thece various effects of the standard, we
briefly indicate the salient features of (1) the asbestos dust hazard
and (2) the asbestos standard..
The Hazard
. V
-£
Exposure to airborne asbestos dust may cause any one of a num- C
ber of serious, and largely fatal, diseases. There seems to be some ~-
consensus among medical "experts" that occupational exposure to dust -'"
1
concentrations of no more than 2 asbestos fibers per, cubic centimeter
of air would lead to a negligible number of asbestos-related ill-
2 6
nesses. Average dust concentrations encountered by the occupational
groups exposed to asbestos dust may be at least 5-6 fibers per cubic
<-• \.- 27
centimeter.
• - Therp ^tp t^'o ccc'-ipaticr.il groups dircuLly exposed to air-
28
borne asbestos dust: (1) workers in the asbestos -products . industry ,
and (2) asbestos insulation workers (see NIOSH) . In addition, con-
struction workers in general may encounter airborne asbestos dust
generated by the activity of the insulation v;orkers (see NIOSH) .
As a result of the exposure to asbestos dust, these workers run
increased risks of developing any of several diseases, including
lung cancer, stomach cancer, colon-rectum cancer, cancer of the esoph-
agus, pleural mesothelioma (a rare lung cancer) , peritoneal mesotheli-
oma (a rare stomach cancer) , and asbestosis, an irreversible lung
disease caused by the scarring of lung tissue with asbestos fibers;
it progressively reduces the ability of the lungs to take in oxygen
(Selikof f (1969) ) . An important feature of this asbestos hazard is
96
15
the remarkable period of time usually required for these diseases
"■o develop after the initial exposure. Seldom, if over, do asbestos-
induced diseases occur within 10 years of the onset of the exposure.
The "average time'.lag between initial exposure and appearance of the
disease is at least 30 years (Selikoff (1972)).
The Standard
The federal asbestos standard, promulgated by OSHA in 1971,
"requires" that by 1975 firms control airborne asbestos dust so that
no worker is exposed to more than 2 asbestos fibers per cubic centi-
meter of air, determined as a time-weighted average exposure for an
29
eight-hour day. Until 1975, dust concentrations are restricted to
5 fibers per cubic centimeter of air. VThile it is unlikely that
asbestos-induced diseases will be completely eliminated by a 2-fiber
standard, they may be reduced to a negligible jimubci, provided the
tandard is vigorously enforced. In the estimation of benefits and
costs, we assume that the number of asbestos-induced diseases occur- I
I
ring under a 2-fiber standard will be so negligible that they can
be ignored. Thus, in the following empirical work, our quantifica-
tions are based on the assumption that a 2-fiber asbestos standard
-■ '■- ■ 1 I i- -'-■-,- •
v/'ill eliminate asbestos-induced diseases. ■-'y.^--' ■■•-.•j .•--.,■_- - ^•■i^l-'I ■^' -- ■--'■•
The Benefits and Cost Quantified
In evaluating the economic effects of the asbestos standard, it
was found feasible to quantify, to some extent, all of the social costs
discussed above: (a) compliance costs, (b) enforcement costs, (c)
consumers' surplus losses, and (d) unemployment costs. Measures of
ssveral forms of social benefits were also constructed, including
measures of (a) money income gains froni reduced morbidity and mortality.
97
(b) savings in treatnent resources, and (c) non-market productivity
'nd consumption gains from reduced morbidity and mortality. Our
measures of these effects are discussed below. In particular, in
the remainder of this paper we (1) highlight the more restrictive,
and controversial, assumptions made in constructing measures of
these benefits and costs, and (2) summarize the empirical results
of our study.
Market Productivity Gains From Eliminating Premature Deaths
Market productivity gains from eliminating asbestos diseases
are estimated with the conventional -measure: the present value of
the production contributed (i.e., income earned) by those v;ho, in
the absence of the standard, vjould have died from an asbestos disease.
In computing this measure, we used approximate sex-age-income pro-
files for the occupations at risk, adjusted to allow for (a) growth
1 labor productivity (taken to be 1.6 per cent per annum) , (b) po-
tential unemployment (we used a 3 per cent unemployment rate) , and
(c) the possibility of death from other causes (standard mortality
32
rates were employed) . These earnings streams (and all other tine
streams) were discounted with rates of 4 and 10 per cent.
ESTi;-IATION OF THE NUMBER OF PREMATURE DEATHS. To estimate the pro-
ductivity gains from reduced mortality from asbestos disease, we
also needed data on the annual number of asbestos-induced deaths.
Unfortunately, these data were not available, and consequently had
to be developed. ■
In a 5-year panel study of 17,800 insulation workers, Selikoff,
et al. (1972) observed 537 deatiis (144 were expected) from diseases
that could have been causod by exposure to asbestos. Under the
98
XI
assumption that all of the difference betv;cen observed and expected
'eaths can be attributed to asbestos exposure, the implied annual
number of asbestos-caused deaths per 1,000 insulation workers is
about 4.4. Since there are about 40,000 insulation workers in the
U.S. (see NIOSH) , our estimate of the number of asbestos-related
deaths occurring annually among insulation v/orkers is 176 (= 4.4 x
40) . .
Data obtained from the American Cancer Society on asbestos-
related diseases among two cohorts of insulation workers and two
cohorts of asbestos products workers suggest that death rates for
asbestos-related diseases are approximately the same for both oc-
cupational groups. Since there are roughly 50,000 asbestos products
workers (see NIOSH) , this rate implies about 220 asbestos-caused
deaths per year among the products workers.
The remaining group at risk is construction v.-orkers, and obtain-
ing any sort of reliable estimate for this group poses substantial
problems since no studies of t'.ie incidence of asbestos diseases among
constrrictic^i workers have apparently been undertaken. We obtained an
undoubtedly crude estimate of the number of such deaths as follows.
Public Health Service estimates of the number of deaths from lung
cancer — an important asbestos-related disease — among construction
workers in 1950 put the actual number at 1195 deaths and the expected
number at 879 deaths. Adjusted for increases in the number of con-
struction workers and for increases in lung cancer death rates, these
estimates imply an upper bound estimate of 728 asbestos-linked lung
cancer deaths among construction workers in 1970.
To translate this figure into an upper bound -estimate for
99
deaths from all forms of asbestos diseases, we employed the ratio
of (1) the number of deaths from all forms of asbestos diseases to
(2) the number of deaths from 'lung cancer attributable to asbestos
exposure implicit in the Selikoff study (1972); namely, 1.67. This
approach suggests that (at a maximuin) the total number of deaths from
asbestos diseases among construction workers in 1970 is 1216. As
this estimate is clearly imprecise and crude, we also employed some
alternative assumptions in our quantifications; namely, that the
actual number of such deaths is, alternatively !3(1216), or 0 . •
The age distribution of these asbestos-induced deaths was
estimated from American Cancer Society panel data on the deaths, by
age, from selected diseases caused by exposure to asbestos dust.
ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL PRODUCTIVITY GAINS FROM REDUCED MORTALITY. Based
on these assumptions, we obtained the following estimates of annual
..^rket productivity gains. At a 4-per cent rate of discount, the
expected annual gain, assuming 608 construction workers deaths, was
estimated to be $55 million in prices around 1970; alternative as-
asumptions about the number of ccn^-truction worker deaths produced
estimates of $23 million and $86 million annually. At a 10-per cent
rate of discount, our estimate of the income gain was $41 million,
bracketed by $17 million and $65 million.
Morbidity Losses from Asbestos Diseases
To calculate the economic value of morbidity losses, we need,
in addition to the earnings profiles estimated below, estimates of
(1) the number of workers, by age, sex, and occupation, afflicted
annually with asbestos diseases, and (2) the average disability
100
period for these diseases.
As an estirnator of (1) , the number of workers disabled, we em-
ployed the product of (a) the number of workers dying annually from
asbestos diseases, and (b) the ratio--assumed stable — of new cases of
asbestos diseases to deaths from such diseases. Estimation of the
number of deaths was discussed above. We approximated (b) , the
ratio of new cases to deaths, v;ith data on the entire U.S. population
(see T^tell, and also Cancer Facts and Figures , 1971, American Cancer
Society). The overall ratio was estimated to be around 1.17, imply-
■ ing that about 1175 (- 711) new cases of asbestos diseases occur
annually among exposed workers.
As an est'imator of (2), the average disability period, a weighted
average of the median survival times for individual asbestos diseases
was employed (see A>:tell) . The weights were the .proportions of all
.ew cases due to a particular asbestos disease. These data imply
a (weighted) average disability period of approximately 12 months.
Based on these assumptions, the estimated annual income losses
from asiei-tos-induced morbidity is about $8.9 million {- $5.2 million).
These losses were not discounted due to the relatively short time
period involved. ' ■
Savings in Detection, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Resources
The estimator of the annual value of this social benefit that
ve employed is the product of (1) the present value of the average
treatment costs per asbestos-related illness, and (2) the annual
number of such illnesses.
Average treatment cost per illness is taken to be a weighted
101
average of the treatment costD for the individual diseases, where
the weights--the proportion of all new cases attributable to a
particular disease--ref lect the relative frequencies with which the
various diseases occur. The data used to compute the expected
treatment cost per case are shown in Table 1; they imply an expected
treatment cost per case of around $3,120 in 1970 prices.
The second component of the estimator of total treatment costs
is the number of cases of asbestos disease. Since we estimated the
number of cases among workers above, we need only consider the number
of new cases among retirees. American Cancer Society data reveal
about 59 retiree illnesses from asbestos-related diseased for every
100 such illnesses among workers, auggesting that the annual number of
retiree illnesses would be around 693 (i 420).
These data imply a measure of about $5.8 million (i. $3.5 million)
's tne annual social value of freeing rhese treatment: resources for
other uses.
Non-Market Gains Among Workers
Presumably, individuals have a willingness-to-pay for increases
in both market and non-market productivity — broadly defined to include
non-market "work" and leisure activities. Consequently, these non-
itiarket gains should, ideally, be quantified and included as a benefit
of reduced mortality and morbidity.
In principle, the value of non-market time (i.e., production)
at the margin is just equal to the value of market time (i.e., the
net wage rate). While there are, in practice, some difficulties
with this measure of marginal non-market time (e.g., a standard
40-hour workweek may hinder the equating of marginal time values
102
21
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103
22
for different activities) , we employ it as at least a rough proxy
for the value of non-market time. Of course, even in principle the
values of time in alternative uses are equated only at the margin;
consequently, valuing all non-market time at the wage rate estab-
lishes, in principle, only a lower bound estimate for the true
value of non-market time (obviously, the same criticism also applies
to valuing all market time at the -wage rate) .
This measure was operationalized as follows: Non-market pro-
ductive time per year, per individual was defined as the difference
between (1) total productive time available and (2) time spent at
market work (2000 hours). Since a certain part of each individual's
day must be spent in maintenance activities (e.g., to satsify minimal
I
sleep requirement) , total productive time available will clearly be
less than tuLal ti-.c i.i a y^^r (8766 hours) . Vie took 6 hours a day
s a reasonable proxy for average time required for minimal main-
tenance activities. This assumption leaves 4574 hours on average for
non-market activities; that is, 2.28 times the number of hours used
in market work. Thus, our measure of the private value of non-market
time is 2.28 times the private value of market time.
Annual money income represents the social value of market time
for' a year, but these figures have to be adjusted for ta.xes to estimate
the private value of market' time. The average tax on market earnings
was taken to be about 20 per cent for the income classes considered
here.^'^ Thus, our lower bound valuation, T, for the annual non-
market time of an individual is:
T = (2.28) X (.80) X (annual money earnings).
104
If this approach is at all reasonable, the present value of
■•on-market productivity gain'i to workers from the prevention of
premature mortality from asbestos diseases would be about 5104 million
annually at a 4 per cent rate of discount (bounded by $32 million and
§123 million) . . '
Applying the same methodology to morbidity losses, produces
an additional gain of $16.9 million annually for workers (with bounds
of $7.0 million and $26.6 million).
The Willingness-to-Pay of Mon-Workers
Since about a third of those who are affected by asbestos dis-
eases are non-workers (i.e., retirees), it would clearly be useful
to have some measure of the willingness-to-pay for retirees for
improved health. Conceptually, one need not distinguish between the
willingness-to-pay of workers and non-workers. However, the dis-
tinction becc~.es necessary in practice when one employs market earn-
ings to approximate workers' willingness-to-pay because, with the
exception of the semiretired, retirees have no market earnings.
One approach to estimating the willingness-to-pay cf retirees
is to use consumption expenditures as a proxy for willingness-to-pay.
This measure seems, however, to be irrelevant from the vie\^oint of
economic efficiency (i.e., social willingness-to-pay). Consider,
for example, an individual with only transfer income (e.g.. Social
Security payments). Vflien this person dies, the income transfers
cease, thereby benefiting, by the amount of the transfer, those whose
incomes would have been reduced to pay it. Consequently, from a nar-
row economic efficiency stance, the consumption benefits to the
ndividual must be reduced by the amount of the transfer income he
I
105
24
!
receives, including income from his own accumulated vcalth, to reach
social willingness-to-pay. Ignoring interdependent utility losses,
this approach suggests that the net social willingness-to-pay to
prevent the death of an individual whose income consisted entirely
of interest or transfer payments is zero.
An alternative approach (and the one taken here) to estimating
the economic gain to a retiree from improved health is -to value a
retiree's time (excluding maintenance periods) at the foregone market
wage rate; i.e., at the wage rate he could have earned by working.
Except for the semiretired, this measure is a less satisfactory
approximation to the value of retiree time than it was for worker
time. Since the retiree does not work at all, there is no reason,
in principle, for the value of his time at the margin to equal the
wage rate available to him. Prior reasoning in this instance only
.ells us that the marginal time value is no less than the foregone
wage. .
■ In the early years of retirement the foregone wage can be
reasonably approximated by the wage at retirement. Since we are
interested only in the incipient market work effort of retirees,
.there will be no taxes on income, so the gross wage rate at retirement
(roughly about $3.50 per hour on average for these individuals being
considered here) would be the appropriate measure of (marginal) time
value for the early years of retirement. However, as a retiree ages
and his physical and mental faculties deteriorate, the opportunity
cost of his time, as measured by the foregone wage, presumably falls
to zero. Over the entire period of retirement, taken here to be from
106
Z5-
34
age C5 through age 87, an average opportunity "wage" of around
'2.00 per hour does not, therefore, seem unreasonable.
MORTALITY AiMONG RETIREES. Data on deaths from asbestos-type diseases
among retirees suggests that the average age at which retirees die
35
from asbestos diseases is about 70 years. Prevention of premature
retiree deaths from asbestos diseases would therefore have an average
present "worth" to those retirees who would have otherwise died of
about $157,000 at a 4 per cent rate of discount, or $109,000 at a
10 per cent rate (i.e., $2.00 an hour times 6,574 non-maintenance
hours per year from age 70 — the average age at death--to age 88, with
all values reduced to account for the probabilities of dying and the
time value of money) . The estimated number of retiree deaths is
592 (bracketed by 234 and 951). Thus, the average present "value,"
to those retirees who wijulcl have cthcr-..'ico died, of el iTni nating
asbestos-related mortality is about $92.9 million annually, discount-
ing at 4 per cent (bounded by $35.7 million and $149.3 million), and
around $64.5 million annually, discounting at 10 per cent ($25.5
million and $103.7 million are extremes).
MORBIDITY A-MONG RETIREES. To these mortality-related figures we need
to add estimates o£ the "value" of reduced morbidity to retirees in
order to estimate the willingness-to-pay of retirees for the elimina-
tion of asbestos diseases. Earlier we estimnted the average disability
period from asbestos diseases to be about one year. Thus, as our
estimator of the average morbidity losses to retirees, we used $13,000
(i.e., approximately $2.00 per hour times 6,574 non-maintenance hours
in a year) . Thin estimator presumably overstates the actual morbidity
107
Ab
losses since illnesses will not generally prevent one from engaging
'n all productive or leisure-time activities. The estimated annual
number of new cases among retirees is 693 (273 and 1,113 are ex-
tremes) . Consequently, the average "worth" to retirees of prevent-
ing asbestos-related inorbidity is estimated to be $9.1 million
annually ($3.6 million and $14.6 million are extreme estimates).
The "Value" of the Retirement Years to Workers
We have attempted to measure, however crudely, the willingness-
to-pay of retirees for a retirement free of asbestos diseases and the
willingness-to-pay of workers for freedom from asbestos diseases duri.iq
their working years. The measures for workers, however, did not
include the present value of the non-market output (including leisure)
they could expect to produce during their retirement years. In this
In the preceeding section we assumed that a retiree's time was,
on average, worth $2.00 an hour or about $13,000 a year (assuming
6,574 non-maintenance hours in a year) for each year of the retire-
ment period (taken here to be from age 65 through age 87). By reducing
this amount to account for the probability of dying and the time
value of money,, we can compute the present value of the retirement
years to workers in the different age groups.
Given the number and the age distribution of deaths among work-
ers, the additional annual benefits implied by these measures are
$116.8 million (i $70.7 million) using a 4 per cent rate of discount,
and $51.4 million (± $31.1 million) with a 10 per cent discount rate.
108
Compliance Costs
Estimates of the compliance costs occasioned by the asbestos
standard derive from data collected by Arthur D. Little, Inc., for
a study of the economic impact of the then proposed asbestos standard.
Unfortunately, there seems good reason for suspecting a substantial
upward bias in Little's cost estimates. The data were collected using
the DELPHI survey technique, and most of the participants were execu-
tives in the very firms that would be making the compliance expendi-
tures; thus, they seem likely to have strong, profit-.motivated in-
centives to inflate their predictions of compliance costs. Conse- •.
quently, we adjusted these estimates by assuming — an admittedly ar-
bitrary, but not unreasonable assumption — rthat the hypothesized up-
ward bias in the estimates left unchanged the relationship between
compliance costs and the proportion of the initial dust concentration
sated. Under this assumption, we computed ar.nuol co~.plia.".ce costs
to be about $70.5 million with a 4 per cent discount rate, and about
$73.5 million under a 10 per cent rate of discount.
Enforcement Costs
The estimator of enforcement costs we employed is the proportion
of total current inspection and adjudication expenditures occasioned
by the asbestos standard. This estimator is likely to provide only
very rough indications of the enforcement costs that strict enforce-
ment of a 2-fiber standard would require because (a) current data
reflect activities under a 5-fiber standard, and (b) these efforts
may not even be sufficient to attain the 5-fiber goal. Following
this approach, we estimated that public sector expenditures on en-
■■>rcing the asbestos standard would be around $200,000 per year.
109
Consumer Surplus Losses
To quantify the consumer surplus losses, we needed estimates
of the price elasticities of market supply and demand for the in-
dustries affected by the standard. We employed a structural model
of industry supply and demand developed by Richardson (1973a) in
estimating the desired elasticities for the asbestos products in-
dustry; this model assumes constant costs in dorsestic production.
Estimation of this model prod-jced a price elasticity of demand for
asbestos products of -0.7. Assuming that compliance- expenditures -
will have little, if any, effect on all other costs of production,
this elasticity — combined vith 1971 sales of $992 million in the
products industry--implies" that the consumer surplus ("triangle")
loss associated with the compliance outlays is about $500,000
annually. - •
(~\ It was not found feasible to directly estimate the price elas-
ticity of demand for asbestos insulation services. In order to ob-
tain a rough measure of the consumer surplus loss in the insulation
market, we assumed the price elasticity to be -0.5, or pomawhat less
than the elasticity for asbestos products so as to account for the
absence of foreign-produced substitutes. Given initial (1971) in-
- dustry sales of about $570 million, the resulting consumer surplus
loss was calculated to be approximately $660,000 a year.
Unemplo^Tnent Costs ...
Our estimator of unemployment costs was the product of (1) the
average period of unemployment occasioned by the standard, (2) the
number of workers unemployed, and (3) average income lost due to
,•■ he resulting unemployment. The key assumptions made in computing
25-994 0-83-8
no
this cost were (a) that production functions are fixed coefficient,
'jid (b) that the average period of uncmplo^TTient among those laid off
in "response to the standard is the same as the average period of
unemployment for all unemployed workers during the 1965-1973 period,
namely, about 10 weeks. We estimated the standard-induced unemploy-
ment to be in the neighborhood of 1,360 acbestos insulation workers
(3.4 per cent of all such workers) and 1,300 asbestos products workers
(2.6 per cent of all such workers) . Combining these estimates with
the average incomes of the affected workers, we computed total (one-
time) unemployment costs to be around $4.4 million.
Benefits and Costs of the Asbestos Standard: Summary Measures
This section organizes and summarizes the va'rious measures of
benefits and costs that we have discussed in the above sections-
Since some of the benefits we attempted to quantify are usually not
measured in benefit-cost studies--due to the lack of a widely shared
methodology for measuring them — v/e present two sets of summary
benefit-costs figures. One set includes only vhat might be referred
to as the "conventional" measures of benefits from improved health,
namely, money income gains from reductions in premature mortality and
morbidity, and savings in treatment resources. The second set of
summary measures encompasses all of the estimates made above.
.ANNUAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE STANDARD. Tables 2 and 3 merely .
organize all of the quantifications. Table 2 contains estimates of
those benefits of the asbestos standard that we found feasible to
measure. (Obviously, some potentially significant benefits were left
unquantified, e.g., those occasioned by reduced pain and suffering;
Ill
these unmeasured benefits are reviewed below.) The columns in Table
correspond to the alternative assumptions ■ regarding the number of
people presently dying from asbestos disease; columns (3) and (6)
contain the benefit estimates based on the number of (construction
worker) deaths that seem the most plausible. It is important to note
that Table 2 presents estimates of the annual benefits after the
asbestos standard has had time to eliminate asbestos diseases. Be-
cause of the time lag between exposure and onset of the diseases,
the nxomber of asbestos diseases will not fall to zero until at least
30 years after the imposition of the standard (and assuming full
enforcement of the standard over time) . Moreover, these estimates
assume, at this point, that labor's productivity remains constant
over time. We will return to these points momentarily.
The estimated costs of the asbestos standard are presented in
able 3. These costs, with one exception, recur annually from the
time the standard is imposed (and becomes effective) . The one ex-
ception is the one-time cost of unemployment caused by the standard.
These are short-term adjustment costs that are assumed to occur with-
in a year following the imposition of the standard. Possible changes
over time in these costs (and benefits), due, for instance, to tech-
nical change, are discussed below.
PRESENT VALUES OF ANNUAL BENEFITS AND COSTS. Tables 4 and 5 contain
the present values of these annual benefits and costs. Present
values were computed using rates of 4 and 10 per cent for time peri-
ods of 50 and 100 years. The present value computations for the
social costs of the standard assumed constant costs over the time
Deriods considered, excepting the first year. Ben.jfits were also
112
Tabic 2. . • '
I
^ Estimated Annual Eonofits of the Asbestos Standard,
I 30 or Korc Years After Its Inposition, at 4 Per Cent
Discount Rate (rrdllions of 1970 collars)
Form of the Benefit " NujTiber of Lives Saved ;'-nn\:ally
■ . , .' 630 . 1,596 2,563
(1) • (2) • ■ • ■ (3) (A)
Reduced Mortality: Money
Income Gains $23.0 $55.0 $86.0
V
Reduced Morbidity: Money
Income Gains
Treatment Resources Saved
Reduced Mortality: Non-
Market Gains of Workers
Reduced • Morbidity : Non-
Karket Gains of Viorkers
Reduced Kortslity: Non-
Market Gains of Retirees
Reduced Morbidity: Non-
Market Gains of Retirees
Value of Retirement Years
to Workers
3.7
8.9
14.1
2.2
5.8;
9.4
" 43.0
104.0
164.0
7.0
J.6.9
26.6
35.7
92.9
.149.3
.3.6
9.1
14.6
46.1
116.8
187.5
$28.9
$69.7
• $109.5
$164,3
$408.8
$651.5
Total: Conventional
• Measures
.' Total: All Benefits^
"TChe sura of money income gains from reduced morbidity and
mortality and savings in treatriient resources.
•^Includes all of the benefits in the above table.
So\irco of Dat^: Our calculations.
113
Table 2 (continucdj
Estirnatcd Annual Benefits of the Asbestos Standard,
30 or Kore Years After Its Ir.position, at 10 Per Cent
Discount Rate (millions of 1970 dollars)
Form of thQ Benefit Nvunber of Lives Saved Annually
630 1,596 2,563
Reduced Mortality: Honey
Income Gains
(1) (5) (G) TZL.
$17.0 $41.0 $65.0
Reduced Morbidity: Money
Income Gains
Treatment Resources Saved
Reduced Mortality: Non-
>5arket Gains of Workers
Reduced Morbidity: Non-
Market Gains of Workers
Reduced Mortality: Non-
Market Gains of Retirees
Reduced Morbidity: Non-
Market Gains of Retirees
Value of Retirement Years
. to Workers
Total: Conventional
Measures
Total: All Benefits^
3.7
8.9
14.1
2.2
5,8
9.4
■32.0
79.0
123.0
-7.0
16.9
26.6
25.5
64.5
103.7
3.6
. 9.1
14.6
20.3
51.4
82.6
$22.9
$55.7
$88.5
$110.3
$276.6
$439.0
•^T^e sujn of money income gains from reduced morbidity and
mortality end savings in treatment resources.
^Includes all of the benefits in the above table-
Source of Data:' Our calculations.
114
Table 3
Estimates of the ^^nnual Social Costs of the
t
Asbestos Standard (in millions of 1970' dollars)
' ; ■ 4 Per Cent 10 Per Cent
Compliance Costs
Enforcement Costs
Consumers' Surplus
Losses
Unemployment Costs
(one-time costs)
Total Costs, 1st year
Tota.1 Annual Costs,
after 1st year
Source of Data: Our calculations.
$70.5
$73.5
0.2
0.2
1.2 .
- . -i-2
4.4
4.4
$76.3
$79.3
$71.9 .
$74.9
115
34
assumed to be constant after the 29th year. Apparently few, if any,
jeople develop asbestos diseases within the first 10 years of ex-
posure, so there are likely to be few reductions in asbestos-
related deaths and illnesses for at least 10 years after the imposi-
tion of the standard. Consequently, we assumed that benefits will
be zero during the first 10 years. To approximate the "true" annual
increases in benefits from the 10th through the 29th year, we assumed
that benefits would increase by the same absolute amount each year •
of the period. It should be emphasized that this particular ber.efit
growth pattern is a manifestation of the remarkable time-lag between
the imposition of the standard and the elimination of asbestos
diseases. The secular benefit increases due,' for example, to in-
creases in worker productivity are considered below.
Table 4 also contains the benefit-cost ratios corresponding to
Ae various assumptions about discount rates, etc. If all of the
estimated benefits are included in the numerator and benefits and
costs are discounted at 4 per cent, the benefit-cost ratios are sub-
stantially above unity for both the intermediate and upper bound
assumptions about the number of deaths. Using a 10 per cent discount
rate, the ratio exceeds one only for the upper bound assumption about
the. number of deaths, although the ratio is close to unity under the
intermediate assumption. ■ ■ " •
Discounting at 10 per cent, the ratios are "insensitive" to
changes in the time periods for which they are calculated. However,
if one were to adopt a perspective of less than 50 years, e.g., 20
or 30 years, the ratios would fall substantially because of the time-
•5tream pattern of the benefits and costs. (This last statement also
116
Table h
Present Value of BencfitG and Denof i;:-Cost Ratios,
■ 4 Per Cent Discount Rate
(Benefits in ;-iillions of 1970 Dollars)
50 Years
Number of Conventional All B/C: B/C:
Lives Benefits! Benefits^ Conventional All
Saved
Benefxts
Benetits
(1)"
(2)
' (3)
(4)-
(5)
. 630
243.4
1391.8 ■
•0.16
0.90 •
1596
586.8
• 3441.1
0.38 •
2.22
2563
922.0
5484.5
0.60
3.54
.' , .
_ — .
" 100 Years
Number of Conventional All B/C: B/C:
Lives Benefits! Benefits'^ Conventional All
Saved Benefits Benefits
(1) (-6) (7) m (9)
630 330.6 1891.0 0.19 " 1.17
1596 • 797.2 • 4675.3 0.45 - . J2.65
2563 1252.6- 7451.7 0.71 4.22
^Includes money inco-.a gains from reduced mortality and
savings in treatment costs.
^Includes all of the benefits listed in Table 2 .
Source of Data: Our calculations.
117
36
Table k (continued)
Present Value of Doncfits end Boncfit-Cost Hjtios,
10 Per Cent Discount Rate
(Benefits in Millions of 1970 Dollars)
«
^
50 Years '
B/C:
Conventional
Benefits
Number of
• Lives ,
.Saved
Conventional
Benefits^
, All
Benefits^
1
B/C:
All
Benefits
(1)
(10)
(11) • ■
(12) •■ ■
■ (13)
630
50.6
284.6
.^0.07 '
0.38
159 6
120.1
711.6
0.16 ■
0.95
2563
191.7
1121.6
0.26
1.50
•
100 Years'
-.
• - Number of
Lives
■ Saved
Conventional
Benefits^
All
Benefits"
B/C:
Conventional
Benefits
. B/C:
All
Benefits
(1)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
630
53.1
298.5 .
0.07
0.40
1596
125.9
746.3
0.17
0.99
2563
201.1
1176.5
0.27
1.56
The sum of money income gains from reduced morbidity and
mortality and savings in treatment resources.
^Includes all of the benefits in the above table.
Source of Data: Our calculations.
118
37
Table $■
. ■ . Present Value of Costs of Asbestos Standard,.
50 and 100 Years at 4 and 10 Per Cent
Rates of Discount (Millions of 1970 Dollars) '
Period ' ; Rate of Discount
-.---. - . • . 4 Per Cent .10 Per Cent
(1) • (2) (3)
• "..50 .Years $1,549 $747
100 Years $1,766 $753
Source of Data: Our calculations.
119
38 .
holds, although with less force, for those, ratios calculated with a
4 per cent rate.) When a 4 per cent discount rate is used, the
ratios are somev;hat more sensitive to the choice of time periods,
with one ratio increasing by about 19 per cent (from 3.54 to 4.22)
when the time period is increased from 50 to 100 years. Relative
to unity, the assumption one makes regarding the number of deaths
is clearly critical; seemingly less critical is tlie choice of the
discount rate (at least over the range considered, 4-10 per cent) .
Benefits and Costs: Changes Over Time
■ ■■ . A restrictive assumption underlying the values of the benefits
and costs in Table 4 is the constancy of all variables over time
(excepting the once-and-f or-all unemployment costs) . In this sec-
tion, we relax this assumption and investigate its implications for
t>ie magnitudes of the benefit-cost ratios. We consider changes in
the magnitudes of a number of variables, including (a) the number of
wor)iers at risk, (b) labor's productivity (earnings), (c) treatment
39 • ■
costs, and (d) compliance costs.
It seems clear that the number of workers potentially at risk
(i.e., the number that would be exposed in the absence of a standard)
will increase over time. The sources of this increase are (1) the
probable increases in demand for asbestos and asbestos products (in-
cluding insulation) and thus an increase in the number of asbestos
products and insulation workers exposed, and (2) the likely increases
in the number of construction workers, i.e., of those exposed "in-
directly." Between 1950 and 1970, the number of construction workers
increased at an annual rate of 2 per cent, that is, from 2,333,000
40
'■.o 3,34 5,000. We employ this growth rate as a proxy for the
120
39
long-term rate at which those (potentially) at risk v;ill increase.
This assumption will have the effect of increasing all of the es-
timated annual benefits of the asbestos standard (see Table 2) by
2 per cent a year.
In addition to this source of growth, a nuaiber of the benefits
will increase over time because of increases in labor's productivity.
From 1951 to 1970, average weekly earnings (before taxes) increased
an average of 1.6 percer.t a year (from $74.37 to $102.70 in 1967
41
prices). In the followxng discussion, we assnme this rate to
represent the long-term growth rate of labor's productivity. In-
creases in the productivity of labor will increase all of the es-
.timated benefits (i.e., the market and non-market output gains) v;ith
the exception of treatment cost savings (see Table 2) , and will
r>T*i=»5nm;^V)1 V d •?CT'?'r) ^"^^ rnmnl i s nr:^ ;a nd (:>rtfcTrf^m(^rii- cn^t ^ nvf^y timp.
Increases in treatment cost savings are likely to occur be-
cause of increases in the relative price of medical services. Be-
.tween 1941 and 1970, the price index for medical care increased by
about 4 per cent annually, while all consumer prices increased only
about 2h per cent a year. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume
that treatment cost savings will increase Ih per cent annually because
of the increase in the relative price of medical care (treatment
costs) . ".
Finally, technical change may occasion reductions over time in
the real costs of complying with the asbestos standard. Since it is
difficult to predict whether or not such reductions will in fact
occur for any given product, in the following discussion we assume
alternatively that (1) there will be no change in the relative price
121
40
of compliance equipment, etc., and (2) the real cost of compliance
vill decline at a long-term rate of 1 per cent.
The effect of allowing for changes over tine on the benefit-
cost ratios is indicated in Table 6. At a 4 per cent discount rate,
allov?ance for long-term growth in benefits (compliance costs assumed
constant for the moment), has a substantial impact on all the benefit-
cost ratios: the ratios more than double for the 50-year period,
and they more than triple for the 100-year period. When the "con-
ventional" benefit measures are used, 4 of the 6 benefit-cost ratios
(at 4 per cent) exceed unity, while all of them are substantially
greater than one when all of our benefit measures are included in
the numerator. Allowing for a long-term decline in compliance costs
(in addition to the growth in benefits) leaves only one of the twelve
ibove it (e.g., as high as 27.3).
The impact of changes over time on the benefit-cost ratios is
considerably less when time-streams are discounted at 10 per cent.
As compared with the constant benefit-cost case, allowance for long-
term growth in benefits, with compliance costs constant over time,
increases the ratios by 5 to 30 per cent for the 50-year period and
by 35 to 70 per cent for the 100-year period. These increases make
only two previously "unfavorable" benefit-cost ratios "favorable,"
one for each time period. (These two ratios initially were "close"
to one, i.e., 0.95 and 0.99 respectively.) Relaxation of the assump-
tion regarding constant compliance costs has no additional effect on
the balance between "favorable" and "unfavorable" benefit-cost ratios.
Thus, allowance for secular changes in benefits and costs produces
122
■ 1 ■ '
i ' Table 6
f
Benefit-Cost Hatios Calculated Under Alternative Assur.otions
Rega
rdinq Chanocs in
Benefits and Costs
1
Over Time
4
Per Cent Discount
Rate
!, 50 Year Tine
Period
B/C Ra
tios:
Conventional
Increasing
Benefits,
Constant
Costs
(3) ^
"casures-'-
Number of
Lives
Saved
(1)
Constant
Benefits
and
. Costs
(2)
■ Increasing
Benefits.-
and
Decreasing
Compliance
Costs
(4)
630'
■ 1596
1563
0.16
0.38
• 0.60
0.38
0.-91
1-43
0.52
1.20
1.-90
B/C Ratios; Unconventional Measures
• (1) (2)" (3)" - (4)
630 0.90 . 2.21 • - 3.00
. 1596 ', 2.22 5.47 7.50
2563 3.54 8.70 11.90
"Numerator is s\im of money gains from reduced morbidity
and mortality and treatment resource savings.
^Includes all quantified benefits in numerator of ratio.
Source:- Our calculations.
123
42 .
Table 6 (continued)
Benefit-Cost Ratios Calculated Under Alternative Assumptions
Regarding Changes in Benefits and Costs Over Tir^e
"4 Per Conf Discount 'J^atcV 100 Year Tine' Period
B/C Ratios
: Conventional
Measures
Number of
Constant
Increasing
■ Increasing
•Lives
Benefits
Benefits,
Benefits
Saved
and
Constant
and
Costs
Costs
Decreasing
.
V
Compliance
'
•
Costs
•• (1)
(5)
(6)
(7)
. 630 ' _ .
0.19
0.81
1.20
159 6
0.45
- 1.96 .
■ 2.90
256?
B/C Ratios: Unconventional Measures
" (1) (5) (6) (7)
630 ' . 1.17 4.77 6.90
1596 2.65 11.79 17.20
. 2563 4.22 • 18.77 . . 27.30
• Tlunierator is suni of money gains from reduced morbidity
and mortality and treatment resource savings.
2
Includes all quantified benefits in numerator of ratio.
Source: Our calculations."
124
. Table 6 (continued)
Benefit-Cost Ratios Calculated Under Alternativo Assunotions
:. ; . Regarding Chances in Benefits and Costs Over Tine
i
"10 Per Cent Discount K^te, 50 Year Tir.e Period
•
■ B/C
Ratios: Conventional
>2easures
Na-nber of
■> Lives
Saved.
Constant
Benefits
and
Costs
Increasing
Benefits,
Constant
Costs
Increasing
Benefits
and
Decreasing
Compliance
Costs
(1)
(8)-
(9)
(10)
• 630
0.07
0.09
0.11
159 6
0.16
. 0.21
0.26
• 2563
0 . 25
n 'i A
0 = 4'
2
B/C Ratios: Unconventional >^eas\ires
(1) ' (8) (9) (10)
630 0.38 ■ ' 0.40 0.49
1596 0.95 l."07 _ 1.33
2563 1.50 • • 1.70 '2.11
Numerator is sum of money gains from reduced morbidity
and mortality and treatment resource savings.
^Includes all quantified benefits in numerator of ratio.
Source: Our calculations.
125
Tabic 6 (continued)
Benefit-Cost Ratios Calculated Under Alternative Assunptions
Regarding Changes in Benefits and Costs Over Tirr-.e
10 Per Cent Discount Rate, 100 Year Tiir.e Period
■ B/C "Ratios: Conventional
Measures
Number of
' Lives
Constant Increasing
Benefits ; ■ Benefits,
Increasing
Benefits
Saved
and Constant
and
(1)
Costs , Costs
^ • ■ ■ \
(11)- ■• ■ •■ •• (12) • •• ■
Decreasing
Compliance
Costs
■ (13)
630 .'
.0.07. 0.12
0.15
1596 • •
0.17 0.29
0.36
■ 2563
0.27 0.47
0.58
•-
B/C Ratios: Unconventional Measures
(1)
(11) (12)
(13)
630
0.40 . 0.55
0.68
1596
0.99 1.49
1.80
2563
1.56 2.36'
"2.90
^Numerator is sum of rr.oney gains from reduced irorbidity
and irortality and treatment resource savings.
^Inclvdes all quantified benefits in nuir.erator of ratio.
Sourco: Our calculations.
25-994 0-83
126
four "favorable" and eight "unfavorable" benefit-coGt ratios when
time-streams arc discounted at 10 per cent. .
Focusing on the intermediate case (i.e., 1596 lives saved
initially) , measured benefits of the asbestos standard generally
outweigh the measured costs when non-constant benefits (and costs)
are discounted at 4 per cent. This observation is correct even if
■we restrict our attention to the conventional benefit-cost ratios.
However, with a 10 per cent discount rate, none of the convention-
ally measured ratios exceed unity for the intermediate case. It is
necessary to include the non-market benefit msasures in order to
obtain "favorable" ratios in this instance. Thus, the choice of
the discount rate and the benefit measures used in computing the
benefit-cost ratios is crucial in the intermedaite case; that is
depending upon the choice made, the resultant benefit-cost ratio
Tiay be either "favor::blc" or "unf avorablt;. "
Unquantified Benefits . •
It is worth re-emphasizing that even though we quantified several
benefits not usually measured in benefit-cost studies — including
non-market productivity gains to workers and retirees from reduced
morbidity and mortality — there are other potential benefits from the
asbestos standard that were not quantified in this study. (All. of
the social costs of the standard that we identified were, to some
extent, quantified in the present study.) There is reason to assume
that some of these benefits (e.g., savings in the administrative
costs of insurance and workmen's compensation) are negligible," at
least relative to the other benefits (and costs) measured here.
127
One potentially important benefit that was not quantified, however,
is the reduction of "psychological losses" "presumably occasioned by
an effective standard. There may be, for example, a substantial
willingncss-to-pay , among the families and friends of those who would
have otherwise died, for an effective asbestos standard. A second
potentially important unquantified benefit is the reduction in ex-
ternal costs, if any, imposed on, e.g., people living near asbestos
products plants or construction sites whe^^e asbestos insulation is
sprayed.
One approach to bringing these "omitted" benefits into the
evaluation — aside from merely mentioning them--is to ask the follow-
ing question: Could these _ unmeasured benefits plausibly be large
enough to have made an "unfavorable" benefit-cost ratio "favorable"
(greater than unity) ?" Alternatively, we might state the question
IS, "Could the unmeasured benefits per life saved plausibly be large
enough to exceed the net cost per life saved?" ("Net cost per life
saved" is defined as the measured (average) social cost of saving a
life iiiiivjs the measured (average) social benefits of saving a life.)
• To construct a measure of the net cost per life saved, we made
the simplifying assumption that the asbestos standard will save no
lives until 20 years after its imposition (rather than 10 years) ,
after which time it will prevent all illnesses and deaths from as-
bestos diseases. ■....'
All benefits and costs of the asbestos standard were also
assumed to be zero until the 20th year and positive constants there-
after. The levels of the costs and benefits were chosen so as to
equate their present values with those calculated using the "actual"
128 '
47
(i.e., predicted) time streams. Tabic 7 shov/s the CEti:nates of the
let costs per life saved under alternative assiimptionG regarding the
number of lives saved initially, discount rates, and the patterns
of benefits and costs over time. Net costs v;ere computed for only
those cases involving benefit-cost ratios less than unity. The
estimates of net cost per life saved via the asbestos standard range
from $3,000 to $748,000 depending upon the particular assumptions.
This brings us to the following difficult questions, "How
large are these unmeasured benefits per life saved likely to be?"
Unfortunately, we cannot hope to provide a very satisfactory answer
to this question in the present study. VJe will attempt only to put
these figures in perspective by comparing them with life-saving ex-
penditures in selected public health programs.
Grosse estimated the cost per death averted" by head and neck
::ancer treatment to be about $44,000 (in prices around 1970), and
by colon-rectum cancer treatment programs to be approximately $4 5,000.
(These two programs involved the highest costs per life saved of the .
several programs examined by Grosse.) These costs were computed by
dividing program costs by the number of lives saved per period, so
they clearly overstate the average "net cost per life saved." How-
ever, they may be reasonable approximations to the not cost for some
of the lives saved, e.g., the very elderly, by these public health
programs. Interpjfeted as a net cost, these figures compare favorably
with several of the estimates of the net cost per life saved with the
asbestos standard, although they fall far short of several other
estimates. " "
129
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Summary
• An ap- -juitlor:- °^ *-'^^ benefit-cost mcthodoloQy outlined above
to an ev2l-_-;--.^n of' '^^^ asbestos standard produced mixed results.
That is, '^:.-Ui.r i.-ort'^^" reasonable assumptions regarding, for in-
stance, thi i-:iu.il "U-'Tiber of asbestos-related deaths, the quanti-
fied benefj^i oC tr'^ standard exceed the quantified costs; however,
under othir, iounl'^^ plausible assumptions, the measured costs ex-
ceed the ri-^-j-urcd /^'enefits. On balance, though, the benefit-cost
analysis :;-;i-s to r'avor the intervention, especially if "lev/"
discount n-^s -»i'<^ considered appropriate for evaluating public
programs. lT£n nn-"®^ those assumptions that generate costs in
excess of '-,-- ^ f i t ^' /' ^^^ net cost per life saved does not seem
"excessiv;' ir. n p-''rnber of instances, and may easily be less than
the unmea-;,rei hr-c--- -i^s per life saved. VJhile v.'e are inclined to
conclude t'r-t tlie -asbestos standard probably represents a move
toward effI;ioiu:y, "''^ nevertheless realize that this inference is
sensitive to tho (-reasonable) assumptions one makes.
131
Footnotes
♦Assistant Professor, Department of Economics,
University of Delaware
While the primary purpose of these laws is to compensate
victims of work-related injuries, they do seek, as a sub-objective,
to provide employers with at least some economic incentives to
reduce job-related injuries and illnesses. See, for example,
NCSVJCL.
• 2
That the protection was little more than nominal under these
laws was apparently a point strongly argued by labor leaders during
Congressional hearings on the need for additional OSH legislation;
see Business V?eek , September 19, 1970, pp. 112-113. Also, see Page
and O'Brien.
3
This act was cited as a "...piece of landmark legislation in
the area of worker protection" by Sec. of Labor James D. Hodgson
(quoted in Safety Standards, U.S. Dept. of Labor, March/April, 1971,
Vol. 20, No. 2, £. 2) and as "...the most far-reaching piece of
legislation in /0SH_7 ever enacted" by Asst. Sec. of Labor G.C.
Guenther (Safety Standards, May/June, Vol. 20, No. 3).
4
Under the broad interpretation given to the meaning of "inter-
state commerce," few firms, it vjould appear, are not covered--at
least nominally--by this act. "The' term 'commerce' means trade,
traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several
"jcates, or becween a itate and any place outside thereof, or within
the District of Columbia, or a possession of the United States,...,
or between points in the same State but through a point outside there-
of." Public' Law 91-596, Section 3(3).
^Public Law 91-596, Sec. 2(b).
Consider, for example, the following statement by Secretary of
Labor W. VJillard VJirtz (Occupational Safety and Health, Hearings be-
fore the subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, U.S.G.P.O., VJashington: 1968; p. 9):
The facts clearly command action.
Each year in the most modern industrial society ever created
by man: .
■14,500 workers are killed on the job.
Over 2.2 million workers suffer disabling injuries.
$1.5 billion in wages are lost. ' .
250 million man days of productivity are wasted... nearly 10
times the days lost due to strikes and other work stoppages.
The economy suffers a $6.8 billion setback.
Since the case study is an evaluation of an intervention with
a particular instrument, a finding that the costs of the intervention
exceeded the benefits would not imply tliat governmental action in
t'.iis instance is necessarily inefficient. For oiample, some other
132
type of standard could be efficient oven if the present one is not.
Moreover, sorr.e other instrument, e.g., a gpvernmont in Corirction pro-
gram, may be efficient even if all types of asbestos standards rep-
resent moves away from efficiency.
p
These terms are taken to include", as part of their meaning,
death as an ultimate consequence of the disability.
\eisbrod (1961), p. 34.).
To be precise, one might also want to include the economic
value of deferring, e.g., burial expenses from the present (the time
of premature death) to some point in the future (presumably, the
date at which one would otherv;ise die) . For an elaboration on this
point, see Ridker, R.G. , The Economic Costs of Air Pollution ■ N'ew
York: Praeger, 1967.
These administrative costs include those costs occasioned by
selling insurance, processing claims, litigation, etc.
12 . : ■.
See, for example. Bureau of Labor Standards, "Dust Diseases
and Workmen's Compensation," in H. E. Whipple.
For a discussion of, "avoidance costs" in connection v/ith pub-
lic health problems, see Weisbrod (1961).
14
Of course, some workers may be rask-lovers ,- in which case they
would enjcy ci gair.. Conceptually, the losse? ^-r^ ^-hp risk-lovers from
hazard (risk) aba-cement could be subtracted rrom the gains of the
risk-lovers to produce a net change.
There may be other components to this willingness-to-pay. For
example, if workers fail todemand, and receive, efficient risk-
premiums, then firms may be led to inefficient substituticns of
(sub-optimally priced) labor for capital. Whether or n'^t governmental
intervention would correct this inefficiency is difficult to deterr.i.'-.e.
If workers are risk-ignorant (i.e., are not paid efficient risk pre-
miiims) , an OSH standard may have little effect on the wage, and thus
provide no incentives for correcting this substitution inefficiency.
It is conceotuallv possible to design a tax that would stimulate
firms to allocate resources efficiently. However, in prac-
tice such taxes would be very difficult to design because of their
information requirements. Because of these information requirements,
workmen's compensation programs can "experience rate" only relatively
■large firms; small firms pay premiums based on the experience of
firms in their class. Thus, workmen's compensation laws may not even
stimulate most firms to improve OSH, much less encourage them to use
efficioiit combinations of labor and capital. For those reasons we
are reluctant to classify this potential cost of risk ignorance (i.e.,
inefficient substitution of capital for labor) , as a potential benefit
of collective efforts to improve OSH.
133
of course, taxes and subsidies may create inefficiencies (i.e.,
place a "wedge" betv;ecn private and social costs) , but a thorough
consideration of this problem is beyond the scope of this paper.
^^OSHA Budget, Appendix to the Budget for Fiscal Year 1973 , U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 653.
■^^See U.S. Depart.'nent of Labor and U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and V?elfare, p. 108.
^^OSHA Budget, Appendix to the Budget for Fiscal Year 1973,
p. 653.
• ^^OSHRC Budget, Appendix to the Budget for Fiscal Year 1973,
p. 923.
2^Some cases are appealed to higher courts, so the costs of_
adjudicating these cases would not appear entirely in OSHRC's budget.
This statement is based on an examination of the cases cited
in the Occupational Safety and Health Reporter, Bureau of National ■
Affairs, Washington, D.C.
^^As an example of this approach at a conceptual level, see
E. J.' Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Praeger, 1971.
^'^For a study of the periods of unemployment .following job loss,
set; M. D. Dale, .■".diuctr-.or.t to Fr'='='- Tradp . Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
-veristy of 'Wisconsin - ;-;adiso"n, 1972. Hs found that the coverage un-
.jmployment period for workers laid-off from jobs in import-competing
'-industries following tariff reductions may be as long as 8 or 9
months.
"'"""" ^^This measure im.plicitly assu.mes that the additional free tim.e
from being unemployed is worth nothing to the unemployed prrson.
Thus, it serves only as an upper-bound measure on the social costs
of unemployment.
^^To be precise, the fibers may not be more than 5 micrometers
in length. The concentration is measured as a time-weighted average
for an 0-hour working day. See NIOSH, Little^ and Enterline, etal.
There are some dissenters from this opinion. In particular, Selikoff
argues that the 2-fiber standard, while perhaps effective against
asbestosis, will not prevent development of asbestos-related cancers
in all cases; see Brodeur.
^''personal communication from Dr. Irving Selikoff, December, 1973.
^^Asbestos products include asbestos textiles, friction products
(e.g., brake linings), paints and roofing materials, cement, flooring,
gaskets, ironing board covers, and tapes.
134
29
See NIOSH. There are other aspects of the standard; for
example, a requirement that "dusty" areas be posted. These other
features, hov/ever, will not concern us here.
It was not found feasible to quantify the "psychological
gains." In addition, three other potential benefits were not quan-
tified, even though it might have been feasbile to do so, as there
was some evidence (see Settle) that their m-"'cnitudes were negligible
relative to other benefits (and costs) ; these unmeasured benefits
are (a) reductions in insurance administration costs, (b) reductions
in avoidance costs, and (c) reductions in economic (i.e., profit)
losses to the firm and in losses to the ov^ners of capital.
31
Source of data: Occupational Characteristics. Bureau of the
Census, 1973.
32
Source of data: Vital Statistics of the United States. Vol.
II, Public Health Service, 1969.
33
This rate is based on data in Reynolds, M. and E. Smolens)^y,
"The Post Fisc Distribution: 1961 and 1970 Compared," National Tax
Journal, September 1S74.
34
Our data on mortality rates extended only through age 87.
In any event, this is not an unreasonable age at -which to terminate
the Ccilculsticnc: .^t age SO the average life expectancy is ebout
8 years (Source: National Center for Health Statistics).
Unpublished American Cancer Society data.
Source: "The Employment Situation: March 1974," BLS, April
1974. ■
. ■^^Source: Selikoff, (1972) Table 4.
38 •
If the probability of developing asbestos diseases always in-
creased with increases in the period of exposure, then the asbestos
standard would have some effect iirjnedia tely . However, the relation-
ship between exposure and probability of disease is apparently not
inonotonic. After about 35 to 4 0 years of exposure, the probability
of developing an asbestos disease reaches a maximum for the "average"
individual (based on unpublished American Cancer Society data) .
3 9
It did not seem worthwhile to consider changes in the mag-
nitudes of other costs of the asbestos standard (i.e., enforcement
costs and consumers' surplus losses) since they constitute only
about 2 per cent of the estimated total costs of the asbestos
standard.
40
Source: Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1972. BLS, Washington,
1972.
41
Source: Economic Report of the President, 1972. Council of
iconomic Advisors^ Wasliington, . 197 ..
135
BIBLIOGRAPHY '
Axtell, L.M. et al., eds. End Results in Cancer, Report No. 4,
Public Health Service, Washington, 1972.
Brodeur, Paul. "Annals of Industry, Casualties of the Workplace,"
The New Yorker, October 29, 1972 through November 26, 1973.
Enterline, P., et al. "Respiratory Cancer in Relation to Occupa-
tional Exposures among Retired Asbestos Workers," British
Journal of Industrial Medicine, 30, 1973, 162-6.
Grosse, Robert. "Problems of Resource Allocation in Health," in
R. H. Haveman and J. Margolis, eds. Public Expenditures and
Policy Analysis. Chicago: Markham, 1970.
Little, A. D. , Inc., "Impact of Proposed OSHA Standard for Asbestos,"
First Report to the. U.S. Dept. of Labor, processed, April 28,
. 1972.
NCSWCL. (1972) , Report of the National Coir-Tiission on State VJorkmen's
Compensation Laws, V.'ashington, July, 1972.
NIOSH. Criteria for a Recommended Standard Occupational Exposure
to Asbestos. National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, Washington, 1972.
rage, J..^.. and M=ry-v;in O'Brien. Bitter VJages. New York: Grocsr.an
Publishers, 1973.
Richardson, J.D. (1973a), "Estimating Demand and Supply Parameters
for Imports without Import Prices," American Statistical Asso-
ciation: 197,'< Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statis-
tics Section. Washington; ASA, 1972.
.- (1973b), "Some Issues in the Structural Determination
of International-Price Responsiveness," processed. University
of Wisconsin - Madison, December 1973.
Selikoff, I.J., et al. (1968), "Asbestos E.xposure, Smoking, and
■ Neo-Plasia," Journal of the American Medical Association,
" Vol. 294, 1968.
(1969) , "Mortality Experiences of Asbestos Insulation
Workers, 1943-1968," in H.A. Shapiro, ed . , Proceedings of the"
International Conference of Pneumoconiosis, Oxford University
Press, 1969.
(1972) , "Cancer Risk of Insulation Workers in the United
States, " paper presented at the meeting of the Working Group to
Assess Biological Effects of Asbestos, International Agency for
Researcli on Cancer, Lyon, France, October 4, 1972.
136
Mr. Frank. Next we will hear from Dr. Edward Brandt, who is
Assistant Secretary for Health of the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services. Proceed, Doctor. I
STATEMENT OF EDWARD N. BRANDT, JR., M.D., ASSISTANT SEC- i
RETARY FOR HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND |
HUMAN SERVICES, ACCOMPANIED BY DR. DAVID P. RALL, DI- !
RECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
SCIENCES, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, AND RICHARD
LEMEN, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH
Dr. Brandt. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, with your
permission, I would like to summarize my testimony but ask that
the entire statement be entered into the record.
Mr. Frank. Without objection, so ordered.
Dr. Brandt. Thank you very much.
I am pleased to be here to describe the activities of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services related to the public health
problem of asbestos and the interaction of the Department with
other organizations, both Federal and private, on this issue.
I have with me today, on my right. Dr. David P. Rail, Director of
the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences of the
NIH. And on my left, Mr. Richard Lemen, Director of the Division
of Standards Development and Technology Transfer of the Nation-
al Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.
As I mentioned in my June 15 letter to you, Mr. Chairman, HHS
has long provided significant support for research on asbestos,
much of which has had regulatory implications, and issued several
public health advisories on the subject.
Before I elaborate on these efforts, I would like to summarize
briefly the state of our knowledge about health hazards associated
with exposure to asbestos. To an important degree, this under-
standing is a direct result of research supported by this Depart-
ment.
Asbestos is a generic term referring to a group of naturally oc-
curring fibrous minerals that are commercially prized for their
thermal and insulative properties. It is because of some of their
characteristics, however, that asbestos is highly persistent in the
human body once inhaled or ingested.
We know that asbestos causes specific diseases such as asbestosis,
an irreversible and progressively disabling lung disease and meso-
thelioma, an invariably fatal malignancy of the lining of the chest
or abdominal cavity.
Asbestos is one of the leading causes of lung cancer in nonsmok-
ers. Asbestos exposure for smokers increases the risk of lung
cancer approximately 55 times that of those who are not exposed to
asbestos and who do not smoke.
A recent draft report by a nongovernment, international panel of
experts commissioned by the Consumer Product Safety Commission
and discussed in a public meeting on June 20 of this year, conclud-
137
ed that all major fiber types studied appear to be capable of caus-
ing lung cancer and pleural mesothelioma.
They also cited animal studies which suggest that the longer and
finer fibers are more carcinogenic than shorter and coarser ones. It
is not yet possible, however, to reconcile different dose-response
patterns on the basis of fiber size or type.
The conclusion is that asbestos has significant disease and
cancer-causing capabilities.
The Department recommends prudence in preventing all expo-
sure to airborne asbestos wherever it is found. Because cigarette
smoking significantly increases the lung cancer risk of asbestos ex-
posure and aggravates asbestosis, we also recommend that individ-
uals already exposed to asbestos stop smoking or never start. As an
aside, I should point out that stopping smoking is, in fact, good
advice for anyone that does smoke.
The Department position on the health effects of asbestos was
first established in 1938 as a result of a Public Health Service sup-
ported study which found that asbestos exposure was capable of
causing significant, potentially fatal disease.
This has been reinforced by Public Health Service research find-
ings and regulatory recommendations over the years since.
The current position that there is no threshold for asbestos expo-
sure below which excess disease does not occur leads to the recom-
mendation consistent with this conclusion that it is prudent to pre-
vent exposure.
The Public Health Service's first involvement in this problem
took the form of research and recommendation of occupational
guidelines.
In 1938, based upon the limited data then available, the Public
Health Service recommended tentative threshold limit value guide-
lines for controlling occupational exposure to asbestos until better
data became available which would permit development of more
definitive standards.
In 1960, the first Federal standard was set for some workers ex-
posed to asbestos under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act Amendments of 1958.
In addition to this, the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act also
adopted a standard in 1960 for asbestos air exposure.
Let me review quickly the more significant efforts of the various
Public Health Service agencies, starting with the National Insti-
tute for Occupational Safety and Health.
On the basis of studies by NIOSH, in December 1971, the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration issued an emergency
temporary standard, calling for a substantially lower standard for
asbestos than was then in effect.
In 1972, based upon a NIOSH document, OSHA determined that
this temporary standard would be promulgated as their legal
standard at least until July 1, 1976, when a new, more stringent
standard of 2 million fibers— greater than 5 microns in length— per
cubic meter would be come effective. This concentration is still the
current standard.
In October 1975, OSHA announced a notice for proposed rule-
making to lower the exposure limit to 500,000 fibers per cubic
meter.
138
In December 1975, OSHA requested that NIOSH reevaluate the
information available. And one year later, NIOSH recommended a
more protective standard of 100,000 fibers per cubic meter.
In April of this year, OSHA again requested NIOSH assistance
in developing a new, proposed rule for occupational exposure to as-
bestos. This effort is still underway.
NIOSH scientific expertise is also utilized by another Depart-
ment of Labor agency, the Mine Safety and Health Administration.
In October 1978, they developed a list of research needs for
NIOSH consideration, asbestos being included as one of six mine
health hazards.
In April 1983, a final report was received on a NIOSH contracted
study to document the technology currently being used to control
airborne exposures. NIOSH will complete the criteria document for
asbestos exposure in mining by October 1984.
I will now turn to the National Institutes of Health, they conduct
and support a wide range of research related to asbestos. Recent
National Cancer Institute [NCI] studies of lung cancer in several
areas along the Atlantic coast have revealed that work in ship-
yards during World War II, when asbestos exposures were often
high, largely accounts for the elevated rates of lung cancer report-
ed in these areas during recent years.
Within the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, there is
research underway to develop methods for early detection of lung
injury from inhaled asbestos fibers.
A major objective is to design treatment regimens that will even-
tually uncover differences among treatments that prevent pulmo-
nary fibrosis without damaging the delicate structure of the lung.
Principal among its many grant supported efforts in this area
has been the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
[NIEHS] Institute's center grant support of the Environmental
Health Sciences Laboratory at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine.
This group, led by Dr. Irving Selikoff, has pioneered the study of
asbestos-related disease.
An NIEHS and NCI supported study by Mount Sinai scientists,
presented in 1978, indicated that pleuro-pulmonary disease can
occur in nonoccupational settings such as those experienced in
homes of asbestos workers.
I should note that in addition to household asbestos contacts, an-
other major source of nonoccupational contamination, especially in
urban areas, relates to demolition of buildings which have asbestos-
containing insulation.
Congress, in June 1974, directed the NIEHS to initiate research
on the health effects of orally ingested asbestos. I am glad to report
that all five of the seven resulting studies that have been publicly
peer reviewed, found that the forms of asbestos tested did not cause
a carcinogenic response in the animal species tested.
Mount Sinai scientists reported in 1973 that asbestos-containing
building material often erodes with age, releasing asbestos fibers
into the air.
In 1979, the EPA issued an Advanced Notice of Rulemaking for
inspection and treatment of asbestos-containing materials in school
buildings.
139
A final rule was issued in May 1982 which requires that elemen-
tary and secondary schools be inspected to determine whether they
contain friable asbestos-containing materials.
As a result of concern over asbestos exposure in schools, the Cen-
ters for Disease Control in May 1977 notified all State health de-
partments of the potential hazard of asbestos in schools and other
buildings.
In August 1978, the HHS Secretary advised the Governors of all
50 States of the potential health risk of low levels of exposure to
asbestos.
The National Cancer Institute in 1979 supported a demonstration
grant in two New York City schools. This project was administered
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The ap-
proach developed in this project is now used as a model by numer-
ous other school districts faced with a similar problem.
Working closely with EPA and the City of New York School Dis-
trict, NIOSH developed a 40-minute slide/tape program dealing
with the health hazards of asbestos, possible problems during re-
moval and disposal, and personal protective equipment for asbestos
removal workers.
There have been many other actions taken to alert the public to
the serious health risks associated with asbestos exposure and my
written testimony, Mr. Chairman, includes references to a number
of those.
In 1979, CDC was asked by the Arizona State Department of
Health Services to evaluate human exposure and make recommen-
dations regarding asbestos contamination of home sites in Globe,
Ariz.
Last year, CDC participated in discussions with the State and
EPA regarding the site's eligibility as a Superfund site. It was offi-
cially declared a Superfund site in July 1982.
In addition to all of these efforts, the Department has encour-
aged the exchange of information about asbestos by sponsoring sev-
eral scientific conferences.
In December 1979, the Department hosted a meeting between sci-
entific experts and national educational associations to discuss the
potential for health risks from exposure to asbestos in schools.
Many of the efforts that I have been discussing are the result of
interaction between various HHS organizations and other Federal
agencies. Over the years there have been frequent ad hoc, often in-
formal, exchanges with individuals and groups, both in and out of
Government, on the subject of asbestos.
The central mechanism in HHS for coordinating programs, for
exchanging information and providing advice to the Department on
such public health issues as asbestos is the Committee to Coordi-
nate Environmental and Related Programs.
A subcommittee of this committee has held interagency meetings
to discuss asbestos matters of mutual concern and has sponsored
two asbestos workshops.
In addition to the interaction between NIOSH and OSHA that I
have already mentioned, I should add that Mr. Lemen and mem-
bers of his staff at NIOSH meet monthly with their counterparts in
OSHA to discuss asbestos workplace standards.
140
He, along with representatives of NCI and NIEHS, is also on a
Department of Education task force which is to provide scientific
and technical assistance to State and local educational agencies to
enable them to conduct asbestos detection and control programs
and to identify asbestos hazards in schools.
This task force has been recently reconvened by Secretary Bell.
My testimony today has merely highlighted our activities related
to asbestos. Our efforts to understand this health hazard and to
inform the public about the risks from exposure will continue. I be-
lieve in this way we are providing the basis for prudent action
where necessary.
This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I and my col-
leagues will be glad to try to answer any questions you might have,
sir.
[Dr. Brandt's prepared statement follows:]
141
Prepared Statement of Edward N. Brandt, Jr., M.D., Assistant Secretary for
Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am Edward N. Brandt, Jr., M.D., Assistant Secretary for Health of the
Department of Health and H'jman Services (HHS). I am pleased to be here to
describe the activities of the Department of Health and Human Services related
to the public health problem of asbestos, and its interaction with other
organizations, both Federal and private, on this issue. I have with me today
Dr. David P. Rail, Director of the National Institute of Environmental Health
Sciences of the National Institutes of Health and Mr. Richard Lemen, Director,
Division of Standards Development and Technology Transfer, Centers for Disease
Control/National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (CDC/NIOSH).
As I mentioned in my June 15 letter to you, Mr. Chairman, HHS has long
provided significant support for research on asbestos, much of which has had
regulatory implications, and issued several public health advisories on the
subject. Before I elaborate on these efforts, I would like to summarize
briefly the state of our knowledge about health hazards associated with
exposure to asbestos. To an important degree, this understanding is a result
of research supported by this Department.
Health Effects Associated with Asbestos Exposure
Asbestos is a generic term referring to a group of naturally occurring fibrous
minerals that are commercially prized for their thermal and insulative
properties, in addition to their flexibility, durability and tensile
strength. Because of these characteristics, asbestos is highly persistent in
the human body once inhaled or ingested.
25-994 0-83-10
142
Based on studies of workers heavily and regularly exposed to asbestos in the
past before general government regulation of the workplace, we know that
asbestos causes specific diseases such as asbestosis, an irreversible and
progressively disabling lung disease which impairs breathing, and
mesothelioma, an invariably fatal cancer of the lining of the chest or
abdominal cavity. Asbestos is one of the leading causes of lung cancer in
non-smokers. Asbestos exposure' for smokers increases the risk of lung cancer
approximately 55 times that of those who are not exposed to asbestos and who
do not smoke. Asbestos is also associated with an increased risk of
gastrointestinal and other cancers.
A recent draft report by a non-government, international panel of experts
commissioned by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and discussed in
a public meeting June 20, 1983, concluded that all major fibers types studied
(i.e., chrysotile, amosite, and crocidolite) appear to be capable of causing
lung cancer and pleural mesothelioma in humans. Laboratory data are
consistent with this conclusion. The report also cited animal studies which
suggest that longer and finer fibers are more carcinogenic than shorter and
coarser fibers. However, short fibers are far more numerous in the
environment, and no dimensional threshold has been established. It is not yet
possible to reconcile different dose-response patterns on the basis of fiber
size or type.
143
ne conclusion drawn by experts, in this and other countries, is that asbestos
has significant disease and cancer causing capabilities. A substantial number
of these experts believe that there is no level below which exposure to
asbestos is without risk to health, although lower levels carry lower risks.
The Department recommends prudence in preventing all exposure to airborne
asbestos wherever it is found. Because cigarette smoking significantly
increases the lung cancer risk of asbestos exposure and aggravates asbestosis,
we also recommend that individuals already exposed to asbestos stop smoking or
never start. Cessation of smoking reduces the increased risk of lung cancer
for smokers previously or currently exposed to asbestos. Stopping smoking is,
in fact, good advice for anyone who does smoke.
The Department position on the health effects of asbestos was first
established in 1938 as a result of a Public Health Service (PHS) supported
study which found that asbestos exposure was capable of causing significant,
potentially fatal disease (asbestosis). This has been reinforced by PHS
research findings and regulatory recomiendations over the years since. The
current position was established in a 1978 physician advisory from the Surgeon
General and in a letter from the HHS Secretary to the Governors of all 50
states. The current position that there is no threshold for asbestos exposure
below which excess disease does not appear leads to the recommendation
consistent with this conclusion that it is prudent to prevent exposures. The
CPSC Chronic Hazard Advisory Panel on Asbestos reaffirmed that there is no
level of exposure at which there is no risk. It also concluded in its draft
report that there is a clear link between exposure to asbestos and cancer,
with disease risk aggravated by increasing exposure.
144
4
Early Public Health Service Efforts
The Public Health Services' (PHS) first involvement in this problem took the
form of research and recommendation of occupational guidelines. PHS began
research into the health effects of asbestos exposure in the mid-1930's.
These early research efforts found excessive lung disease (asbestosis) in
asbestos workers and later suggested that lung cancer may occur more
frequently in asbestos workers than in the general populations. In 1938,
based upon the limited data then available, PHS recommended tentative
threshold limit value guidelines for controlling occupational exposure to
asbestos until better data became available which would permit development of
more definitive standards. While these guidelines did not have the force of
law, and were not binding, they did provide guidance from which industry and
the states could develop and enforce protective measures and a safe working
environment. In 1946, the PHS proposed limit on asbestos exposure was adopted
by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), a
private technical society which pioneered in formulation and recommendation of
occupational health standards.
In 1960, the first Federal standard was set for some workers exposed to
asbestos. This was established under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act Amendments (44 Stat. 1444, 33, U.S.C. 941) of 1958, which
provided compensation for injuries suffered by employees when they were
navigable waters of the United States, including dry docks.
In addition to this Act the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act (49 Stat. 2036,
41 U.S.C. 35 et seq.) Also adopted a standard in 1960 for asbestos air
145
exposure. In 1969, under the Walsh-Healey Act a new set of standards was
adopted using the ACGIH recommended level for asbestos at 2,000,000 fibers
(greater than 5 microns in length) per cubic meter..
I would like to review quickly the more significant efforts of the various
Public Health Services agencies since these early findings first raised
concern over exposure to asbestos.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
With the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the
Department of Labor's new Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), adopted for general industry all of the 1968 ACGIH standard threshold
limit values, which included an occupational exposure limit for asbestos.
This Act established the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) to develop and recommend occupational safety and health standards. In
December 1971, citing: "increasing information on the results of exposure of
employees to airborne asbestos dust, including recent studies by the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and others. . . ." OSHA issued an
emergency temporary standard, calling for a substantially lower standard.
This standard included engineering controls such as vacuum sweeping and local
exhaust ventilation as well as a respiratory protection provision for limiting
worker exposure. In 1972, based on a NIOSH criteria document, OSHA determined
that this temporary standard would be promulgated as their legal standard
until July 1,- 1976, when a new, more stringent standard of 2,000,000 fibers
(greater than 5 microns in length) per cubic meter would become effective.
This concentration is still the current standard.
146
With mounting evidence of the adverse health effects of exposure to asbestos,
OSHA, in 1975, decided that a reexamination of the standard's general premises
and structure was necessary. In October 1975, OSHA announced a notice for
proposed rulemaking to lower the exposure limit to 500,000 fibers (greater
than 5 microns in length) per cubic meter. In December 1975, OSHA requested
that NIOSH reevaluate the information available on the health effects of
occupational exposure to asbestos fibers and advise OSHA on the results of
this study. One year later, NIOSH recommended a more protective standard of
100,000 fibers (greater than 5 microns in length) per cubic meter should be
promulgated.
No further action on the OSHA Standard or the NIOSH recommendation occurred
until September 1979, when a NIOSH/OSHA Committee was formed to review the
scientific information concerning asbestos-related disease and to assess the
adequacy of the current OSHA occupational health standard. This committee
reaffirmed the December 1976 NIOSH recommended standard.
In April of this year OSHA again requested NIOSH assistance in developing a
new proposed rule for occupational exposure to asbestos. This effort is still
underway.
NIOSH' s scientific expertise is also utilized by another Department of Labor
agency, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). In October 1978,
MSHA developed a list of research needs for NIOSH' s consideration; asbestos
was included as one of six mine health hazards. Because MSHA believed the
current standard needed to be re-evaluated, NIOSH was requested to develop the
necessary criteria. In April 1983, a final report was received on a NIOSH
147
contracted study to document the technology currently being used to control
airborne exposures to asbestos in mines and mills. NIOSH will use this
information in order to complete the criteria document for asbestos exposure
in mining by October 1984.
In carrying out its responsibility to develop and recommend health and safety
standards, NIOSH (and its predecessor organizations) has conducted studies of
workers involved in manufacturing asbestos textiles, cement pipe, floor tile,
friction materials, roofing materials, thermal pipe insulation, and other
asbestos products. NIOSH has provided health hazard evaluations at more than
100 plants involving exposure to asbestos in many applications. Approximately
80 industrial hygiene and medical surveys have been conducted in support of
NIOSH epidemiological studies on asbestos. As a result of these and other
studies, NIOSH has published more than 65 scientific papers on the health
effects of asbestos and methods for controlling asbestos exposure.
National Institutes of Health
NIH conducts and supports a wide range of research related to asbestos.
National Cancer Institute (NCI): NCI is involved in laboratory and
epidemiological studies on asbestos. The experimental work includes the study
of the length of asbestos fiber as a determinant of asbestos-related diseases;
study of their mechanism of action and the possible role of asbestos as a
tumor promotor and/or as a co-carcinogen. Interviewing is being conducted in
New York and California with groups of patients with mesothelioma to help
clarify the effects of differing levels of exposure and differing types of
asbestos. The Cancer Institute is also conducting studies of lung cancer in
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8
Texas, Louisiana, and New Jersey, areas where rates for this are high. These
studies will provide information on risks associated with a variety of
occupations, including those involving potential asbestos exposure. NCI also
has two ongoing community intervention programs.
Recent NCI studies of lung cancer in several areas along the Atlantic coast
have revealed that work in shipyards during World War II, when asbestos
exposures were often high, largely accounts for the elevated rates of lung
cancer reported in these areas during recent years. High rates of
mesothelioma have also been found in seaboard areas and also attributed to
shipyard work, particularly in jobs with heavy asbestos exposures.
Asbestos is being evaluated in NCI studies of risk factors for other than
mesothelioma and lung cancers, including cancers of the larynx, stomach,
bladder, kidney, and ovaries. These studies will provide data to assess
whether, and to what extent, asbestos may increase the risk of these cancers.
National Heart Lung and Blood Institute (NHLBI): NHLBI has research underway
to develop methods for early detection of lung injury from inhaled asbestos
fibers and to establish the mechanisms of asbestos-related disease processes
that may eventually lead to lung fibrosis. A major objective is to design
treatment regimens that will eventually uncover differences among treatments
that prevent pulmonary fibrosis without damaging the delicate structure of the
lung.
149
National Institue of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS): Since 1967 NIEHS
has been involved in asbestos research. Principal among its many grant
supported efforts in this area has been the Institute's center grant support
of the Environmental Health Sciences Laboratory at the Mount Sinai School of
Medicine. This group, led by Dr. Irving Selikoff, has pioneered the study of
asbestos-related disease in occupational and other environmental settings, and
laid out the major adverse health effects of asbestos in human populations.
Many of their studies have served as the basis for asbestos regulatory
recommendations.
Another of their major accomplishments has been to link mineralogy
to medicine through development of methods for detecting and quantifying
asbestos in air and water samples and in human tissue. For example, this
group obtained air samples during the use of spackling compounds in home
repair work. Their analyses of the samples revealed that asbestos is a
significant component of some of these products. In 1977 the Consumer Product
Safety Commission banned spackling and patching compounds containing asbestos.
An NIEHS and NCI supported study by Mount Sinai scientists, presented in 1978,
indicated that pleuro-pulmonary disease can occur in non-occupational settings
such as those experienced in homes of asbestos workers. Other studies by the
Mount Sinai group, as well as studies done elsewhere, have found that
household asbestos contact, and other types of environmental exposures, are
established with an increased risk of mesothelioma, especially pleural
mesothelioma. I should note that in addition to household asbestos contacts,
another major source of non-occupational contamination, particularly in urban
areas, relates to demolition of buildings which have asbestos-containing
insulation.
150
10
Congress, in June 1974, directed NIEHS to initiate research on the health
effects of orally ingested asbestos. To date, five of the seven resulting
studies have been publicly peer reviewed. I am glad to report all five found
that the forms of asbestos tested did not cause a carcinogenic response in the
animal species tested.
Mount Sinai scientists reported in 1973 that asbestos-containing building
material often erodes with age, releasing asbestos fibers into the air. In
their 1977 study, they found that in the New Jersey schools studied, where
there was damage to building materials, concentrations of asbestos were
significantly above background ambient air levels. In 1979, EPA issued an
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for inspection and treatment of
asbestos-containing materials in school buildings. A final rule was issued in
May 1982 which requires that elementary and secondary schools be inspected to
determine whether they contain friable asbestos-containing materials; and to
keep records and notify employees and parent/teacher organizations if such
materials are found.
Public Health Notification
As a result of concern over asbestos exposure in schools, the Centers for
Disease Control in May 1977 notified all state health departments of the
potential hazard of asbestos in schools and other buildings. In August 1978,
the HHS Secretary advised the Governors of all 50 states of the potential
health risk of low-levels of exposure to asbestos. He urged them to consider
whether it would be prudent to eliminate from schools and other public
buildings potential sources of exposure to asbestos.
151
11
The National Cancer Insitute in 1979 supported a demonstration grant in two
NewYork City schools. The project, administered by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, took advantage of ongoing asbestos removal and
containment activities to develop audiovisual materials on safe work
practices. These materials have been distributed throughout the country and
widely used in training of school personnel and contractors. The approach
developed in this grant project is now used as a model by numerous other
school districts faced with a similar problem.
NCI also funded a grant program through NIOSH to demonstrate, on a regional
basis, methods of dealing with asbestos in schools and other buildings.
Working closely with EPA and the City of New York School District, NIOSH
developed a 40 minute slide/tape program dealing with the health hazards of
asbestos, possible problems during removal and disposal, and personal
protective equipment for asbestos removal workers. Copies were distributed
through the NIOSH, OSHA and EPA regional offices to many of the Nation's
school districts and others interested in the protection of workers involved
in asbestos removal operations.
There have been many other actions taken to alert the public to the serious
health risks associated with asbestos exposure. In April 1978, following
completion of a study supported by NIEHS indicating the significant risk of
asbestos-associated disease in U.S. shipyards, the former Secretary announced
steps the Department was taking to inform doctors, workers and others about
the increased health risks of asbestos exposure. The Surgeon General then
sent an advisory letter to all physicians in the nation describing the health
risks posed by asbestos and providing sources of additional information on
asbestos -related diseases.
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12
NCI initiated a public information campaign to further increase awareness of
the nature, extent, and seriousness of asbestos exposure for populations at
risk. The campaign included recommendations to stop smoking, consult a
physician where there has been possible exposure, and seek prompt medical
treatment for any respiratory ailment.
As part of this effort, forty million flyers were distributed to Social
Security and Civil Service retirees. Ten thousand information kits were sent
to groups such as labor, industry and fraternal organizations. Special
material was included for retired military employees. Media kits containing a
press release, several magazine and newspaper public service announcements,
and pamphlets written for lay audiences were mailed to city editors of
approximately 1500 daily newspapers across the country. As with radio and
television materials, a special effort was made to reach the high priority
markets.
Further strategy to reach high risk groups directly was the placement of an
asbestos pamphlet, "Asbestos Exposure— What It Means, What to Do," in
supermarket racks and Social Security regional offices. Over 1.2 million
copies of these pamphlets were placed in racks in about 4000 supermarketsand
discount stores.
Another significant NCI supported information dissemination effort was the
completion and distribution in 1981 of a National Correspondence Course on
Lung Cancer and Asbestos-Related Pulmonary Disease, by the American College of
Chest Physicians. To date, approximately 40,000 copies have been distributed
to physicians specializing in pulmonary diseases, occupational and internal
153
13
medicine, and for use in medical schools, cancer centers and special training
programs. This course, which is based on review of the world literature, is
believed to be unique in its field.
In 1979, CDC was asked by the Arizona State Department of Health Services to
evaluate human exposure and make recommendations regarding asbestos
contamination of home sites in. Globe, Arizona. In early 1980, after CDC/NIOSH
evaluated initial data on asbestos exposure, CDC Director, Dr. William Foege,
recommended to the State that all residents be evacuated from the site as
expeditiously as possible with arrangements made to minimize exposure during
this process. Subsequently, the State temporarily relocated the residents,
covered home sites with topsoil, decontaminated the house trailers, and
demolished the old asbestos mill that was still on the subdivision site. CDC
continued to participate with the State in an environmental monitoring program
designed to provide a more detailed assessment of the exposure to asbestos.
And last year CDC participated in discussions with the State and EPA regarding
the site's eligibility as a Superfund site. It was officially declared a
Superfund site in July 1982.
On April 4, 1983, CDC issued a Public Health Advisory for the Globe, Arizona
site recommending that remedial action to prevent chronic, long-term exposure
to asbestos was justified from a public health standpoint. The rationale for
this advisory, based on long standing Department concern for asbestos health
hazards, was essentially identical to that for recommendations in early
1980. This latest advisory continued to recommend action to prevent further
long-term exposure to asbestos and limitation of exposure, by workers and
nearby populations, during and after cleanup operations.
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14
In addition to these type of efforts, the Department has encouraged exchange
of information about asbestos by sponsoring several scientific conferences.
In 1964, NIH supported a New York Academy of Sciences' international
conference on the "Biological Effects of Asbestos." By bringing togethei- a
remarkably diverse range of disciplines, this conference is considered a
milestone in the evolution of awareness of asbestos health hazards. Four
years later, NIEHS held a Mesothelioma Registry Conference to develop a method
of information collection upon which to base standards. In 1973, NIEHS and
EPA sponsored an international conference on "The Biological Effects of Orally
Ingested Asbestos." Then in 1978, NCI, NIOSH and NIEHS sponsored another New
York Academy of Sciences' international conference on "Health Hazards of
Asbestos Exposure," designed as a follow up to the 1964 conference. In April
1982, FDA's National Center for Toxicological Research (NCTR) jointly
sponsored a "Second International Workshop on the Effects of Mineral Dusts"
with the National Toxicology Program (NTP), a program to coordinate toxicology
research and testing in HHS.
In December 1979, the Department hosted a meeting between scientific experts
and national educational associations to discuss the potential for health
risks from exposure to asbestos in schools. This meeting reflected the
Department's desire that the biomedical basis for concern about asbestos be
available to those who must make decisions regarding this problem.
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15
Interagency Cooperation
Many of the efforts I have just mentioned are the result of interaction
between various HHS organizations and other Federal agencies. Over the years
there have been frequent ad hoc, often informal, exchanges with individuals
and groups, both in and out of government, on the subject of asbestos. Many
of these have been at the working scientist level.
P
The central mechanism in HHS for coordinating programs, exchanging information
and providing advice to the Department on such public health issues as
asbestos is the Committee to Coordinate Environmental and. Related Programs
(CCERP). For example, a subcommittee of CCERP has held interagency meetings
to discuss asbestos matters of mutual concern and has sponsored two asbestos
workshops. In February 1980, NIEHS published the proceedings of one of these,
a "Workshop on the Biological Effects of Mineral Fibers and Particulates;"
asbestos was the central topic.
An earlier CCERP interagency subcommittee developed the protocol, which was
publicly reviewed, for the asbestos oral ingestion studies I previously
mentioned. The National Toxicology Program, which is now responsible for
these studies, combines the toxicological resources of NIH, FDA/NCTR and
CDC/NIOSH. Members of its Executive Committee include the major environmental
health regulatory agencies (FDA, CPSC, EPA and OSHA). NTP is also responsible
for compilation of the congressionally mandated Annual Report On Carcinogens,
an interagency effort which provides, among information on other chemicals,
yearly updates on production, use, and regulation of asbestos.
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16
In recent weeks EPA has initiated an investigation of asbestos sites in the
country. EPA headquarters staff has directed their regional offices to obtain
asbestos consultation and health advisories from HHS on each site
investigated. In response to this increased effort by EPA, our staff members
have visited seven sites in New Hampshire and have issued recommendations and
health advisories to EPA on these sites. Initial consultation has also been
provided to EPA on potential sites in Delaware and South Carolina. Other
sites have been identified in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana,
Texas, Louisiana and Nevada. As EPA continues its investigation, we expect
our involvement in asbestos to increase.
In addition to the interaction between NIOSH and OSHA that I have already
mentioned, I should add that Mr. Lemen and members of his staff at NIOSH meet
monthly with their counterparts in OSHA to discuss asbestos workplace
standards.
Mr. Lemen, along with representatives of NCI and NIEHS, is also on a
Department of Education Task Force which is to provide scientific and
technical assistance to state and local educational agencies to enable them to
conduct asbestos detection and control programs and to identify asbestos
hazards in schools. This Task Force, has been recently reconvened by
Education Secretary Bell. COC's Center for Environmental Health continues to
be available to assist state health departments as they advise school boards
on implementing EPA regulation and guidelines.
Conclusion
My testimony today has merely highlighted the Department's activities related
to asbestos. Our efforts to understand this health hazard and to inform the
public about the risks from exposure will continue. I believe in this way we
are providing the basis for prudent action where necessary.
This concludes my statement to the Committee. I would be glad to answer any
questions you might have.
157
Mr. Frank. Thank you very much, Dr. Brandt.
First, I want to congratulate you for the presentation which was
a useful one and also for the fact that you did, summarize it. I have
found from experience that people who come with written state-
ments and tell us that they are going to summarize them, almost
inevitably take 10 percent more time to summarize the statement
than they would to read them.
I would suggest that if there is any in-service training you might
run a testimony-summarizing institute for people in Washington.
Summarizing doesn't mean that when you read the testimony you
think of some new things and you explain it. I appreciate that. It is
a rare talent that you have and I have come to appreciate it more
and more in my new capacity here.
Reference was made earlier that in 1938, the Public Health Serv-
ice looked at asbestos, and proposed a standard which caused a lot
of debate. This isn't a partisan issue, this is one where there was
really a failure of the Government apparatus in general over a
long period of time, both legislative and executive, to act to protect
people from something that only Government could have protected
them from. We have just begun to address it correctly.
Are you real familiar with the circumstances in 1938? Do you
know if there was any effort to try and get that established as a
standard that people would adhere to when the Public Health
Service, at the governmental level, said this is a dangerous busi-
ness and it is going to cause serious problems?
Dr. Brandt. I wasn't, of course, in this job in 1938, but the Public
Health Service widely distributed that guideline at that time and,
of course, there was no regulatory mechanism in place at the time.
I think, obviously, that the war certainly intervened shortly after
that document was published and made available. So I think there
was an attempt by the Public Health Service in those days to get
the information out and make it available.
However, it is clear that the intervention of World War II obvi-
ously interfered with perhaps even wider dissemination.
Mr. Frank. I guess that is true, although, we had about 3 years
before the war broke out and the period after.
Is there any evidence that you are familiar with of substantial
adherence to the standard once it was promulgated as a voluntary
standard?
Dr. Brandt. In 1938?
Mr. Frank. And subsequently, including, say, m the post World
War II period.
Dr. Brandt. Let me ask Mr. Lemen to respond to that.
Mr. Lemen. I think probably the most appropriate answer is that
some of the companies probably did try and adhere to that stand-
ard to the best of their ability. However, because it really carried
no force of law they were at no obligation to do so.
So many of the companies, for economic reasons, did not install
control technology in their plants, did not adhere to it. So I would
say, and I have no firsthand knowledge of this, however, from the
reading I have done, I would say that some companies did try to
adhere to it. However, a great majority did not.
Mr. Frank. That is what I would have expected. I guess also
some of those that might have tried to adhere to it might have
25-994 0-83-11
158
found themselves at a certain competitive disadvantage. In a close-
ly competitive industry they were incurring a cost that had no im-
mediate short-term benefit to them; it had a societal benefit.
I think that is relevant because in one of the models we are told
to consider sometimes is that we need not impose a strict, binding
regulation, but that we can promulgate information and people can
deal with that voluntarily.
Although it is not a scientifically studied point, but your sense is
that having promulgated it voluntarily did not bring about a lot of
compliance, that the majority did not comply. I think that is what
you would expect in a situation in which people are competitive
with each other, people have a responsibility to stockholders, and
voluntarily incurring a cost that they were not legally required to
incur is not something that appeals to most people who are in busi-
ness to make a profit.
Dr. Brandt. I think there are two other points to make though,
Mr. Chairman, and one of these is that our awareness of occupa-
tional exposures to hazardous materials was certainly not very well
developed in the 1930's. And indeed, I think one could argue not
well developed in this country until the 1950's, so that it is, I think,
in one sense, not too surprising that that did not attract as much
attention as it certainly would today.
Second is the whole issue of technology and the availability of
technology for control which was obviously not as well developed in
those days.
Our understanding of occupational illnesses and occupational ex-
posures certainly has grown considerably, I guess, since around the
midfifties, early sixties.
Mr. Frank. I understand that. Dr. Brandt, but in 1938 the Public
Health Service said, look, this is a dangerous thing and it is going
to cause some illnesses. The general sense of occupational problems
might not have been there but this may have been seen as an ex-
ception. It was promulgated in 1938 and 1946, the Public Health
Service proposed a limit, and it was adopted by the American Con-
ference on Governmental Industrial Hygienists. My guess is still
that what Mr. Lemen said is correct, that that was really not going
to produce a lot of compliance.
Again, when you run a competitive situation this way, I think
that there has to be some uniform rules if you are going to expect
people to deal with it.
You have heard some of the estimates of what we would have
saved. I am assuming that if that had been promulgated in 1938 as
a binding standard, would that have made economic sense?
Dr. Brandt. Quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, I don't know whether
it would have made economic sense or not, but I think clearly it
would have made sense from the standpoint of the number of
people who might have been protected from the development of ill-
ness.
Mr. Frank. As you point out, we have known about this for some
time, we still do not have an adequate treatment for mesothelima.
So we seem to be dealing with a substance where prevention is the
only appropriate treatment.
Dr. Brandt. Obviously, not only with this disease but with a lot
of others, prevention is most effective. I think that our work at the
159
NIH is aimed at trying to stop the spread of the disease, or the fur-
Ither development of the disease once people have already been ex-
'posed, because we have some people who have clearly been exposed
to asbestos who have not developed some of the more serious com-
plications.
So I think we have two approaches. One is to try to prevent expo-
sure and the second is to try to intervene and prevent the further
development of the disease once somebody has been exposed to it.
Dr. Rail may want to add something to that.
Dr. Rall. I might point out also, that lung cancer is essentially
incurable.
The chemo-prevention program at NIH and NCI based on epide-
miological studies has focused and some animal studies have found
that the application of certain compounds, after exposure, but
before overt development of the disease, appears to delay or pre-
vent the development of the cancer. And that is terribly exciting.
Hopefully, 5 or 10 years from now we can come back and tell you
about real progress in this area.
Mr. Frank. Obviously, we all want to do what we can to deal
,,with people who have contracted the disease in the early stages.
That is a high priority.
My point, though, is we have known about the dangers of asbes-
tos for sometime and we are now getting these kind of break-
throughs. The point I make and what I am trying to do is look at
the benefits and the cost of regulation. Controlling the cost of
health care is obviously a major concern of all at the Federal level.
The medicare problems, and others are very serious.
It seems clear to me, from what I have heard so far and what I
expected to hear, is that had we imposed a fairly strict standard
against the use of asbestos 40 years ago, our medicare problems
today would be somewhat less than they are. An example that pre-
vention, among other things, not only saves us money if you look
at work lost, et cetera, but prevention is a very essential part of a
rational scheme to control health care costs. And where we, by our
laxity, allow people to contract diseases that we could have avoided
as we did forty years ago, we are incurring health care costs.
I assume, you know, we want these breakthroughs, they are
going to cost us, and we don't stint on those costs but it does show
in other areas proper regulation is an economically beneficial thing
to do. This kind of prevention is a very important piece of an over-
all health care cost control program, particularly when we start
projecting out into those later years— look at the year 2000, and
look at those numbers— it would scare the hell out of everybody.
I thank you gentlemen. I appreciate it very much.
Dr. Brandt. Thank you.
Mr. Frank. Our next witness is Mr. Thorne Aucther, Assistant
Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of
Labor.
Go ahead, Mr. Auchter.
160
STATEMENT OF THORNE G. AUCHTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF LABOR FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ACCOMPANIED BY EDWARD BAIER.
DIRECTOR OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT, AND LEONARD VANCE,
DIRECTOR OF HEALTH STANDARDS
Mr. AucHTER. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee:
I have with me at the table Mr. Edward Baier, our Director of
Technical Support, and Dr. Leonard Vance, our Director of Health
Standards.
I welcome the opportunity to discuss the regulatory philosophy of
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration as well as the
agency's present policy on regulation of asbestos.
Underlying OSHA's approach to standards setting is the determi-
nation that this agency will undertake regulatory action only when
sound, objective data demonstrate a need for regulation.
The agency is guided in its rulemaking by certain long and estab-
lished procedures and principles that must be observed under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.
There are also more recent requirements under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act and Executive Order 12291 of February 17, 1981,
that affect OSHA's rulemaking. Furthermore, Federal court deci-
sions, notably the Supreme Court ruling on OSHA's standards for
benzene and the ruling on cotton dust, have had a major impact
upon the agency's standards development process.
Four major principles guide OSHA in setting standards to regu-
late workplace safety and health.
First, before a standard can be promulgated there must be a
demonstration of significant risk. This is required by the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court
in a case involving OSHA's standard for workplace exposure to
benzene.
Second, in accordance with the Court's decision in that case, it
must be shown that the standard will actually reduce the risk that
has been demonstrated.
Third, along with scientific data to justify the standard, the
agency must gather data to show that the regulation is economical-
ly and technologically feasible for an entire industry.
Finally, the Executive order and the Regulatory Flexibility Act
in their provisions for regulatory analysis require OSHA to consid-
er carefully and systematically the economic and social conse-
quences of all rulemaking.
Once OSHA has determined the maximum feasible level of pro-
tection in accordance with section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, the agency analyzes the cost effectiveness of var-
ious means of achieving that level of protection.
In order to implement its regulatory principles as efficiently as
possible, OSHA has put in place a regulatory management system
instituted as part of an effort to strengthen the agency's overall
management. This system is designed to allow the agency to deter-
mine before it initiates a regulatory action whether alternatives to
regulation might not result in an equal level of workplace protec-
tion.
161
It also is designed to establish basic policies governing OSHA's
standard setting to assure that comments from effective groups are
obtained and analyzed at all stages of the standards process; to
assign responsibility and schedules for standards development
workloads, and to produce the documents and decision papers for
use in standards projects.
This regulatory management system, together with semiannual
agendas of projected standards activity that are required by Execu-
tive Order 12291, provides OSHA with effective mechanisms for
placing regulatory activities under appropriate management con-
trol.
The system helps to insure the observance of existing legal policy
and administrative requirements and the attainment of efficient
cost-effective control of workplace hazards.
One of the items on OSHA's present regulatory agenda is the As-
bestos Standard, which is the subject of this hearing.
Asbestos is used in the manufacture of a variety of products such
as cement, plastics, asphalt, brake linings, ceramics, floor tiles, in-
sulation, textiles, paper, and paint.
Asbestos exposure is also a potential hazard in roofing installa-
tion, drywall removal, demolition, and auto and ship repair.
Because asbestos fibers are carried throughout the workplace by
air currents, the activities of employees directly involved with the
fibers can expose numerous other manufacturing and construction
workers to those asbestos fibers.
Exposure to asbestos fibers is associated with a number of dis-
eases, including asbestosis, lung cancer, and mesothelioma, a
cancer of the chest cavity lining or abdominal cavity.
Symptoms often do not appear until 20 to 30 years after initial
exposure. Once established, asbestos disease may progress even
after exposure ends.
From its beginnings as an agency, OSHA has recognized the dan-
gers of asbestosis resulting from occupational exposure to asbestos.
Under the Walsh-Healey standards adopted by OSHA in 1971,
the agency set a permissible workplace exposure limit of 12 air-
borne asbestos fibers per cubic centimeter of air.
By late 1971, accumulating medical evidence indicated that the
12-fiber limit set by OSHA earlier that year did not provide ade-
quate worker protection.
Accordingly, an emergency temporary standard was issued in De-
cember 1971 which lowered the permissible exposure level for an 8-
hour period to 5 fibers of airborne asbestos per cubic centimeter of
air.
In June of 1972, OSHA issued its present asbestos standard
which further lowered the permissible 8-hour exposure limit initial-
ly to 5 fibers per cubic centimeter of air, and later to 2 fibers with
a maximum ceiling of 10 fibers at any one time.
This is the asbestos standard that OSHA enforces today. It was
phased in over a 4-year period; the 2-fiber limit became fully effec-
tive in July 1976.
As the first comprehensive health standard developed by the
agency, it served in many ways as a model for other health regula-
tions that followed. Not only does it set a permissible exposure
162 '
level, but it also provides for work practices as well as medical sur- ,
veillance. i
The standard specifies engineering controls, work practices and \
respirators to reduce worker exposure. It requires as well that em- i
ployers provide or make available comprehensive medical examina- I
tions to determine the extent and impact of exposure. Provision !
must also be made under the standard for change of clothing
rooms, laundering of clothing, workplace monitoring, caution signs, ;
labels, housekeeping, waste disposal, and recordkeeping. j
Since promulgation of the 1972 standard, much new information |
has appeared on the effects of asbestos, particularly regarding the I
spectrum of cancers associated with exposure and the prevalence of {
disease in people exposed to relatively low concentrations of ashes- (
tos dust. i
In the past several years, it has become apparent that the con- I
trols required in the 1972 standard are insufficient to prevent i
cancer, at least in some instances.
Consequently, in October 1975, OSHA published a Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking to lower the permissible exposure level to 0.5
fiber per cubic centimeter of air. This proposal was not developed
into a final rule.
Two months after publication of its 1975 proposal, OSHA asked
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to re-
evaluate the information available on the health effects of occupa-
tional exposure to asbestos fibers and to advise OSHA of its find-
ings.
In 1976, NIOSH recommended that the PEL for asbestos be re-
duced to 0.1 fiber per cubic centimeter, with peak concentrations
not to exceed 0.5 fiber per cubic centimeter based on 15-minute
samples; I repeat, based on 15-minute samples. That may be impor-
tant later on.
These exposure levels were believed to be the lowest that could
be detected by analytical techniques.
In 1979, NIOSH and OSHA formed a joint committee to assess
the adequacy of the 2 fibers per cubic centimeter exposure level.
In a report issued in November 1980, the OSHA-NIOSH commit-
tee concluded that the permissible exposure level in OSHA's 1972
standard was inadequate.
The committee suggested that a new standard be developed for
asbestos, requiring the use of substitutes where feasible and the es-
tablishment of a PEL of .1 fiber per cubic centimeter.
After taking office, I found that although there were scattered
agency efforts relating to asbestos, there was no cohesive OSHA
policy on development of a new standard.
In the past year, using the Regulatory Management System that
I have described, the agency has completed preparatory work on
revision of the standard.
A preliminary regulatory development team was created in the
spring of 1982 to develop recommendations for a revised standard.
The Department of Labor team included scientists from OSHA's
Directorate of Health Standards, economists from our Office of
Regulatory Analysis, and an attorney from the Office of the Asso-
ciate Solicitor for Occupational Safety and Health.
163
In February 1983, this team of experts recommended to me that
the PEL be reduced and that the asbestos standard be revised in its
entirety.
June 1984 was set as the projected date for a notice of proposed
rulemaking, and pubHcation of a final rule was scheduled for Sep-
tember 1985.
Because of the extremely serious nature of the hazards posed by
asbestos, I have accelerated this schedule. In the next few months,
OSHA will publish a notice for a public hearing based upon the
1975 notice of proposed rulemaking. Reduction of the permissible
exposure limit will be the primary focus of this rulemaking.
A final rule, addressing that particular issue, should be complet-
ed by the end of this year.
OSHA will then begin to revise other aspects of the standard in
light of the scientific, technical, and legal changes that have oc-
curred since 1972.
The agency intends to involve labor, industry, the scientific and
medical communities as well as the general public extensively in
every stage of this rulemaking process.
We appreciate the' efforts of this subcommittee and welcome the
assistance that information developed during the course of this
hearing can provide to the rulemaking process.
Mr. Chairman, you have inquired about OSHA's relationship
with other Federal agencies regarding the asbestos problem.
There has been a mutual effort on the part of concerned Federal
agencies to insure that regulatory authority is extended to all pos-
sible sources of asbestos exposure and that duplication is avoided in
the Government's asbestos control activities.
For example, OSHA meets informally with the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Consumer Product Safety Commission
to coordinate agency activities that address the hazards of exposure
to asbestos.
EPA and CPSC, like OSHA, are reviewing medical and scientific
data and developing estimates of risk assessment.
OSHA is also a member of a task force on asbestos established by
the Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act of 1980.
OSHA provides advice, informally, on a case-by-case basis to local
school districts on the appropriate controls and procedures to be
followed in protecting workers who remove asbestos from schools.
OSHA also has produced a film or video tape series called "Doin'
It Right" to guide administrators and contractors and their em-
ployees in safe asbestos removal or encapsulation techniques.
OSHA works closely with the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health on a broad range of occupational safety and
health issues, including the asbestos standard.
The Director and Deputy Director of OSHA's Health Standards
Programs meet on a monthly basis with officials from NIOSH and
with EPA's Office of Toxic Substances.
These are working meetings. NIOSH is also being asked to par-
ticipate in discussions concerning regulation of asbestos exposure
and to review drafts of OSHA's proposed new standard.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I believe that OSHA's present
standards-setting process is capable of producing effective, enforce-
able regulations.
164
In the past, OSHA has been criticized for failing to articulate a
coherent, viable regulatory policy.
Individuals required to comply with OSHA standards were never
completely certain of the agency's direction. We believe that OSHA
now has a regulatory philosophy that produces standards which
are reasonably necessary and appropriate to address a significant
risk of material health impairment or injury. Each standard is
technically and economically feasible for the regulated industry to
the extent practicable.
The most cost-effective approach which insures maximum feasi-
ble protection from risk is adopted and the public has a meaningful
opportunity to participate in the development of each rule.
With those principles in place, OSHA is building the public con-
sensus that is essential for its regulatory efforts to succeed.
[Mr. Auchter's prepared statement follows:]
165
STATEMENT OF THORNE G. AUCHTER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR
FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
BEFORE THE
MANPOWER AND HOUSING SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
June 28, 1983
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the regulatory
philosophy of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) as well as the Agency's present policy on regulation
of asbestos. After outlining the general principles that
guide OSHA in setting standards and the new management tech-
niques the Agency has adopted to improve its rulemaking, I
will describe, as you have requested, OSHA's relationships
with other Federal agencies regarding asbestos.
OSHA Standards-Setting;
Under this Administration, OSHA has taken a number of
steps to ensure that its regulations are developed, designed,
and applied in a fair and objective manner. Underlying
OSHA's approach to standards-setting is the determination
that this agency will undertake regulatory action only when
sound, objective data demonstrate a need for regulation.
OSHA is also determined that all interested parties
be given an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking
process. I do not need to remind you that development of
166
- 2 -
occupational safety and health standards is a time-consuming
and complex process. One factor contributing to the length
of this process is the need for public participation. A
minimum comment period, an informative notice of proposed
rulemaking, and an oral presentation of views are all
required under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (the OSH Act). It seems reasonable to assume that if
employers and employees affected by the regulations are
excluded from the process of developing OSHA's rules, they
are more likely to challenge and delay their implementation.
OSHA believes that an opportunity for public comment and
participation in its rulemaking is essential in gaining
acceptance of occupational safety and health standards.
In addition to the OSH Act, the Agency is guided in
its rulemaking by certain long-established procedures and
principles that must be observed under the Administrative
Procedure Act. There are also more recent requirements
under the Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order
12291 of February 17, 1981, that affect OSHA's rulemaking.
Furthermore, Federal Court decisions, notably the Supreme
Court rulings on OSHA's standards for benzene and cotton
dust, have had a major impact upon the Agency's standards-
development process.
167
- 3 -
Four major principles guide OSHA in setting standards
to regulate workplace safety and health. First, before a
standard can be promulgated, there must be a demonstration
of significant risk. This is required by the OSH Act as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in a case involving OSHA's
standard for workplace exposure to benzene (Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO v. API). Second, in accordance with the
Court's decision in that case, it must be shown that the
standard will actually reduce the risk that has been demon-
strated. Third, along with scientific data to justify the
standard, the Agency must gather data to show that the
regulation is economically and technologically feasible for
an entire industry. That requirement stems from the OSH Act
as interpreted by a Federal Appellate court in a case
involving the Agency's asbestos standard ( lUD v. Hodgson) ,
as well as from the regulatory analysis requirements in the
Regulatory Flexibility Act and E.O. 12291. Finally, the
Executive Order and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, in their
provisions for regulatory analysis, require OSHA to consider
carefully and systematically the economic and social conse-
t
quences of all rulemaking. Once OSHA, following the prin-
ciples I have outlined, has determined the maximum feasible
lev«l of protection in accordance with section 6(b)(5) of
the OSH Act, the Agency analyzes the cost-effectiveness of
168
, - 4 -
various means of achieving that level of protection. In
this way, OSHA is able to design standards that provide
adequate protection for workers without imposing unnecessary
requirements and expense on society.
Regulatory Impact Analyses, which are required
not only by Executive Order but also by the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, provide important information about the
capital and operating costs of compliance with various
regulatory approaches as well as estimates of reduction in
risk to workers. Without these analyses, OSHA would not
have adequate information on the costs its regulations
impose on society or the amount of protection received by
employees and would be unable to demonstrate, for example,
that a standard, or a proposed standard, would actually
reduce the risk in question.
In the cotton dust decision the Supreme Court ruled
that the OSH Act prohibited OSHA from setting levels of
protection in its health standards by means of cost-benefit
ratios. However, the Court did not rule that the Act
prohibited the performance of cost-benefit analyses per se.
Information on benefits and costs of regulatory alternatives
are helpful to the Agency in evaluating the impacts on
society of proposed regulations. Such information also lets
the public have as complete a picture as possible of what
regulations can accomplish as well as what they cost.
169
- 5 -
It needs to be emphasized that neither before nor after
the Court decision did OSHA use cost-benefit analysis to
establish levels of worker protection. What OSHA has done
and continues -to do is to use cost-effectiveness analysis to
determine the contents of proposed standards on the basis of
risk and feasibility of compliance. Non-quantifiable costs
and benefits are set forth in the regulatory analyses
accompanying standards as well as in the preambles to
proposed and final rules.
In order to implement its regulatory principles as
efficiently as possible, OSHA has put in place a Regulatory
Management System. This system, instituted as part of an
effort to strengthen the agency's overall management, is
designed to allow the agency to determine, before it initi-
ates a regulatory action, whether alternatives to regulation
might not result in an equal level of workplace protection.
It also is designed to establish basic policies governing
OSHA standards-setting, to assure that comments from affected
groups are obtained and analyzed at all stages of the stan-
dards process, to assign responsibility and schedules for
standards-development workloads, and to produce the documents
and decision papers for use in standards projects. This
Regulatory Management System, together with the semi-annual
170
- 6 -
agendas of projected standards activity that .are required by
E.O. 12291, provides OSHA with effective mechanisms for
placing regulatory activities under appropriate management
control. The System helps to ensure the observance of
existing legal, policy, and administrative requirements,
and the attainment of efficient, cost-effective control of
workplace hazards. Using this system, OSHA expects to com-
plete action on 15 health and 16 safety standards by the
end of 1984.
Some of the results of OSHA's new approach to standards-
setting are already apparent. In March 1983, OSHA issued a
revised version of a hearing conservation standard that is
not only less expensive than the version developed by the
previous Administration, but is also oriented toward per-
formance, or results, rather than to required specifications.
The annual costs to industry of the new version are $197.3
million, compared to $278.7 million for the old. At the
same time, the revised version maintains effective protection
for an estimated 5.1 million employees exposed nationwide i
to high levels of worTcplace noise.
OSHA's Asbestos Standard;
One of the items on OSHA's present regulatory agenda is
the asbestos standard, which is the subject of this hearing.
171
- 7 -
Asbestos is a generic term used to describe certain mineral
fibers which have high tensile strength, flexibility, and
excellent heat resistance. These fibers, which may be
readily inhaled, are used in the manufacture of a variety of
products such as cement, plastics, asphalt, brake linings,
ceramics, floor tiles, insulation, textiles, paper and
paint. Asbestos exposure is also a potential hazard in
roofing installation, drywall removal, demolition, and auto
and ship repair. Because asbestos fibers are carried
throughout the workplace by air currents, the activities of
employees directly involved with the fibers can expose
numerous other manufacturing and construction workers
to asbestos fibers.
Exposure to asbestos fibers is associated with a number
of diseases, including asbestosis (a non-malignant scarring
of the lungs), lung cancer, cancers of the stomach, colon
and rectum, and mesothelioma, a cancer of the chest cavity
lining and abdominal cavity. Symptoms often do not appear
until twenty to thirty years after initial exposure. Once
established, asbestos disease may progress even after
exposure ends.
172
- 8 -
From its beginnings as an agency, in April 1971,
OSHA has recognized the dangers of asbestosis resulting
from occupational exposure to asbestos. Under the Walsh-
Healey standards adopted by OSHA in 1971 as a basis for
enforcement action under section 6(a) of the OSH Act, the
Agency set a permissible, workplace exposure limit of 12
airborne asbestos fibers per cubic centimeter of air. By
late 1971, accumulating medical evidence indicated that the
12-fiber limit set by OSHA earlier that year did not provide
adequate worker protection. Accordingly, an emergency
temporary standard was issued in December 1971 which lowered
the permissible exposure level (PEL) for an eight-hour
period to 5 fibers of airborne asbestos per cubic centimeter
of air.
In June 1972 OSHA issued its present asbestos standard
which further lowered the permissible eight-hour exposure
limit to 2 fibers per cubic centimeter of air, with a
maximum ceiling of 10 fibers at any one time. This is the
asbestos standard that OSHA enforces today. It was phased
in over a four-year period and became fully effective in
July 1976. As the first comprehensive health standard
developed by the Agency, it served in many ways as a model
for other health regulations that followed. Not only does
it set a permissible exposure level, but it also provides
for work practices and medical surveillance. The standard
173
- 9 -
specifies engineering controls, work practices and respirators
to reduce worker exposure. It requires as well that employers
provide or make available comprehensive medical examinations
to determine the extent and impact of asbestos exposure — a
subject discussed before this subcommittee at a hearing on
April 18 in Kittery, Maine. Provision must also be made
under the standard for change-of-clothing rooms, laundering
of clothing, workplace monitoring, caution signs, labels,
housekeeping, waste disposal, and recordkeeping.
Since promulgation of the 1972 standard, much new infor-
mation has appeared on the effects of asbestos, particularly
regarding the spectrum of cancers associated with exposure
and the prevalence of disease in people exposed to relatively
low concentrations of asbestos dust. In the past several
years, it has become apparent that the controls in the 1972
standard are insufficient to prevent cancer, at least in
some instances.
Consequently, in October 1975 OSHA published a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking to lower the PEL to 0.5 fiber per cubic
centimeter of air (0.5 fiber/cc). This proposal, which
would also have made other changes in the 1972 standard, was
not developed into a final rule. We can only surmise that
previous OSHA administrations, in exercising their regulatory
discretion, established other standards-setting priorities.
25-994 0-83-12
174
- 10 -
Two months after publication of its 1975 proposal,
OSHA asked the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) to reevaluate the information available
on the health effects of occupational exposure to asbestos
fibers and to advise OSHA of its findings. In 1976, NIOSH
responded by recommending that the PEL for asbestos be
reduced to 0.1 fiber/cc, with peak concentrations not to
exceed 0.5 fibers/cc based on fifteen-minute samples. These
exposure levels were believed to be the lowest that could be
detected by analytical techniques.
In 1979 NIOSH and OSHA formed a joint committee to
assess the adequacy of the 2 fibers/cc exposure level. In
a report issued in November 1980, the OSHA-NIOSH committee
concluded that the permissible exposure level (PEL) in OSHA's
1972 standard was inadequate. The committee suggested that
a new standard be developed for asbestos, requiring the use
of substitutes where feasible and the establishment of a PEL
of 0.1 fiber per cubic centimeter.
After taking office I found that although there were
scattered Agency efforts relating to asbestos, there was no
cohesive. OSHA policy on development of a new standard. In
the past year, using the Regulatory Management System that I
have described, the Agency has completed preparatory work on
175
- 11 -
revision of the standard. A preliminary regulatory development
team was created in the spring of 1982 to develop recommen-
dations for a revised standard. The Departmeht of Labor
team included scientists from OSHA's Directorate of Health
Standards, economists frcxn our Office of Regulatory Analysis,
and an attorney from the Office of the Associate Solicitor
for Occupational Safety and Health. In February 1983, this
team of experts recommended to me that the PEL be reduced
and that the asbestos standard be revised in its entirety.
June 1984 was set as the projected date for a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, and publication of a Final Rule was
scheduled for September 1985.
Because of the extremely serious nature of the hazards
posed by asbestos, I have accelerated this schedule. In
the next few months OSHA will publish a notice for a public
hearing based upon the 1975 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
Reduction of the permissible exposure limit will be the
primary focus of this rulemaking. A final rule addressing
that issue should be completed later this year. OSHA will
then begin to revise other aspects of the standard in light
of the scientific, technical, and legal changes that have
occurred since 1972.
The Agency intends to involve labor, industry, the
scientific and medical communities as well as the general
176
- 12 -
public extensively in every stage of this rulemaking process.
We appreciate the efforts of this subcommittee and welcome
the assistance thSt information developed during the course
of this hearing can provide to the rulemaking process.
Interagency Cooperative Efforts on Asbestos;
Mr. Chairman, you have inquired about OSHA's relation-
ship with other Federal agencies regarding the asbestos
problem. There has been a mutual effort on the part of
concerned Federal agencies to ensure that regulatory authority
is extended to all possible sources of asbestos exposure and
that duplication is avoided in the government's asbestos-
control activities. For example, OSHA meets informally with
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to coordinate agency
activities that address the hazards of exposure to asbestos.
EPA and CPSC, like OSHA, are reviewing medical and scientific
data and developing estimates of risk assessment. By using
these interagency meetings as a forum for exchange of
information, OSHA has been able to inform EPA and CPSC of
its future regulatory plans and to provide an opportunity
for other government experts to contribute to the development
of an improved standard.
177
- 13 -
OSHA is also a member of a task force on asbestos
established by the Asbestos School Hazard Detection and
Control Act of 1980. The task force is tentatively sche-
duled to meet this summer. OSHA also provides advice,
informally, on a case-by-case basis to local school dist-
ricts on the appropriate controls and procedures to be
followed in protecting workers who remove asbestos from
schools. OSHA also has produced a film or videotape
series called "Doin' It Right" to guide administrators and
contractors and their employees in safe asbestos removal or
encapsulation techniques.
Another example of cooperation among Federal agencies
in minimizing risk from exposure to asbestos is the assis-
tance OSHA has provided to the Coast Guard in developing a
circular dealing with the safe use of asbestos. OSHA has
worked with the Coast Guard to define respective areas of
jurisdiction regarding asbestos exposure. The Coast
Guard enforces occupational safety and health regulations
aboard Coast Guard-certified vessels and at facilities
located on the Outer Continental Shelf.
OSHA works closely with the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) on a broad range of
occupational safety and health issues, including the asbestos
standard. The Director and Deputy Director of OSHA's Health
Standards Programs meet on a monthly basis with officials
178
- 14 -
from NIOSH's Office of Toxic Substances. These are working
meetings at which OSHA describes its current work on the
asbestos standard and the two agencies agree on ways in
which NIOSH can be of assistance in this effort. NIOSH in
turn presents the results of its latest scientific studies.
Moreover, NIOSH is being asked to participate in discus-
sions concerning regulation of asbestos exposure and
to review drafts of OSHA's proposed new standard.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I believe that OSHA's
present standards-setting process is capable of producing
effective, enforceable regulations. In the past, OSHA has
been criticized for failing to articulate a coherent, viable
regulatory policy. Individuals required to comply with
OSHA standards were never completely certain of the agency's
direction. We believe that OSHA now has a regulatory philo-
sophy that produces standards which are reasonably necessary
and appropriate to address a significant risk of material
health impairment or injury. Each standard is technically
and economically feasible for the regulated industry to the
extent practicable. The most cost-effective approach which
ensures maximum feasible protection from risk is adopted and
the public has a meaningful opportunity to participate in
the development of each rule.
With those principles in place OSHA is building the
public consensus that is essential for its regulatory
efforts to succeed.
179
Mr. Frank. Thank you, Mr. Auchter.
Mr. Auchter. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frank. Let's begin by touching on a couple of things that
was talked about earlier. I take it you would agree that in 1938,
the Public Health Service proposed a standard that didn't have
binding authority. In 1938, the Federal Government's Public
Health Service said, look, this is a very dangerous substance and
we should have stopped it. Would we have been better off if people
had at that time enacted a binding restriction on the use of asbes-
tos, in your judgment?
Mr. Auchter. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the information on
asbestos certainly would have provided a much better environment
in the workplace if it had been acted on more prudently.
Mr. Baier would like to make a comment on that.
Mr. Baier. Yes. When Dr. Brandt mentioned that, I recalled that
in 1938 the Surgeon General had convened a group of the States
and, as you well know, all occupational safety and health activities
were controlled by the States back then; the State group was con-
vened fundamentally to determine the differences that the States
had in terms of standards. In fact, out of that meeting came the
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists; that
was the beginning of ACGIH.
Now, when the act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, was
signed into law, five States had half of the occupational health per-
sonnel employed by all of the States. So, when you are talking of
developing a strong regulation, the enforcement aspect may not
have been there. I think that is a point to consider.
Mr. Frank. Would you elaborate on that?
Mr. Baier. Prior to the passage of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, the States had control of the occupational safety and
health matters, and five of the States had roughly half of the occu-
pational health
Mr. Frank. I see. So you are saying
Mr. Baier [continuing]. People to enforce the standard.
Mr. Frank. Before the passage of the Federal Act, what you are
saying is that while people knew asbestos was dangerous, not very
much was being done to protect people from it?
Mr. Baier. Apparently in five States it may have been but in 45
States, no.
Mr. Frank. Were not?
Mr. Baier. Yes.
Mr. Frank. So that this does seem to be a good case for Federal
action?
Mr. Baier. Oh, yes; in fact, that was one of the reasons that we
had an Occupational Safety and Health Act.
Mr. Frank. I mentioned that because we are at a point where
people are beginning to discuss where and how, and why we should
regulate these things. And it seems from what we have heard
today, that neither voluntary adherence or a State-by-State en-
forcement worked very well. You might have had the problem
where people didn't know it was dangerous, and sometimes we
learn things later on.
But here we have known for 45 years that we had a dangerous
substance on our hands, at least 45 years. And it wasn't until the
180
Federal Government got into the act that anything serious was
done to protect people in most of the country against this.
I think that is a strong argument that has to be kept in mind on
the need for uniform national activities.
Let me ask a related question. One of the points that was made,
by Dr. Settle, was that while in some cases there may be an incen-
tive for the particular employer or industry to adopt safety regula-
tions given the nature of the harm that is caused by asbestos, that
incentive is at best attenuated and the absence of a binding pro-
mulgated governmental standard, are you not likely to see much
adherence?
This is not a case where there was a free market incentive to
adopt it, and while there might be in some other cases, there isn't
one here.
I wonder, Mr. Auchter, what your response would be to that?
Mr. Auchter. I think that would be a fair statement, Mr. Chair-
man. The difference with asbestos compared to many of the other
toxic substances that we regulate is that relatively short-term expo-
sure can produce very, very serious consequences 20 or 25 years
down the road. And unless an organization was doing a really good
job of planning for that sort of contingency, they would, I think,
tend to ignore that.
Mr. Frank. And the organization itself might not be the one that
would have to bear the costs so that you would have the incentive
to incur some extra costs in the short term on your own isn't as
strong as it would be
Mr. Auchter. Really because of that long-term gestation period.
Mr. Frank. Right.
Let me switch to our current situation. It seems we have a poor
record on the part of government. I don't mean just this adminis-
tration or just the executive branch.
In 1938, we decided this is serious. We finally get around, after
30 years or so, or more, to doing something about it. A standard
was then promulgated since 1975 or 1976, and almost everyone has
felt it has been inadequate. We are now in our third administra-
tion, we have had a lot of OSHA's, a lot of Congresses— I don't
mean to exempt Congress from this because we are all in this one
together.
Isn't it a somewhat unfortunate commentary that we have come
from 1976 to 1983 with an admittedly inadequate standard at the
Federal level?
As you point out, Mr. Auchter, a relatively short-term exposure
can have very serious long-term consequences. We have allowed
people to be exposed — let me go back again— because we have had
a Federal piece of this as well, in shipyards and elsewhere. The
Federal Government has exposed people and allowed people to be
exposed for 7 years now to far more asbestos than we know to be
healthy for them.
How do we resolve this kind of shortcoming in our overall ad-
ministrative structure?
Mr. Auchter. Mr. Chairman, I do not know why in the previous
Administration OSHA did not pursue its 1975 rulemaking. I have
tried to find an answer to that and I have not been able to.
181
I will say that from the exposure levels that OSHA is currently
aware of, that the levels that are in the workplace today are con-
siderably lower than they were during the forties and early fifties
when much of this exposure was taking place.
Lastly, let me see if this is the right time to bring this up. The
question of how you regulate asbestos is a very, very difficult one.
It technically, is very difficult. It is one thing to say, OK, the per-
missible exposure level should be half a fiber per cubic centimeter
or 0.1, or whatever the rulemaking comes out with. But the techni-
cal aspects of how you determine what the level is get very, very
complicated.
If I may, I would like to ask Dr. Vance to demonstrate what we
mean by that. Just to give you a picture of some of the technical
problems. It is really the third leg of the feasibility question. We
deal with economic feasibility, technological feasibility, and now we
have an enforcement feasibility because of the nature of the meas-
urement of asbestos fibers.
Mr. Frank. When you say enforcement, you don't mean postpro-
mulgation of the standard enforcement? You are still talking about
enforcement in terms of what the standards ought to be?
Mr. AucHTER. I am talking in terms of what the standard may be
after our rulemaking comes out. Just take a look at what Dr.
Vance is going to show you here.
Mr. Frank. Why don t you get a microphone over near by there?
Unless this is going to be a silent demonstration.
Mr. Vance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
What we have here is a picture of what an asbestos sample
would look like on a microscope slide. This is a fairly typical pic-
ture of what
Mr. Frank. I wonder if you could just do that from the side?
Mr. Vance. Certainly.
Mr. Chairman, what we are attempting to do is to illustrate the
difficulty that occurs when one carries out a microscopic analysis
of an asbestos sample. A slide typically looks like this. The stand-
ard regulates exposure to fibers which are 5 microns or longer in
length and which have a 3 to 1 length-to-width ratio.
When you look at one of these samples you see an accumulation
of dirt. There is a morass of stuff that accumulates on that slide.
The sample gets more
Mr. Frank. What is that a slide of?
Mr. Vance. This would be a typical sample of asbestos collected
on a filter. The way that one collects a sample is to attach an air
pump onto the worker's belt, collect air that is in the breathing
zone of the worker, and collect it on a filter. The sample is then
placed underneath a microscope and a trained microscopist, a very
carefully trained microscopist, examines that slide in order to de-
termine fiber concentration. It takes a lot of skill for that microsco-
pist to carry out his job.
The less asbestos there is in the air, the more difficult the mi-
croscopist's job becomes. That is a simple point that we are trying
to get across here. As the standard becomes lower and lower, it be-
comes more and more difficult for the microscopist to get an accu-
rate count of the exact amount of asbestos that is present in the
air.
182
This chart is for the purpose of illustrating that point.
A series of techniques have been developed that are commonly
used by all of the asbestos counters in order to attempt to get an
accurate count. It is a real art to be able to examine and get cor-
rect values for asbestos counts.
These slides at the bottom indicate a grid that a microscopist
would examine when he looks through his instrument in order to
determine how many fibers there are in that sample.
This fiber, for example, would not be counted. There is a stand-
ard technique that is used. Fibers which fall outside of the grid
area are not counted. There is a technique for apportioning the
count. This fiber entirely in the grid would be counted. This one
would be counted as half a fiber. This one as half a fiber.
There are six slides here. The count from this would be two
fibers in these six grids. There is a graph, which in the interest of
time I won't explain in complete detail unless you are interested,
which is used by the industrial hygienist who goes in and collects
the sample to determine how long he should run the pump, exactly
how he should carry out his collection of the sample.
Sample collection is a key to getting an accurate result. If one
collects too long, you end up with a mass of stuff on the filter,
which is unreadable. If one collects for too short a time, you end up
with an insufficiently large number of fibers to be able to carry out
any kind of reasonable analysis.
There have been two major studies that have been done of tech-
niques of measurement. One by NIOSH, one by the Asbestos Infor-
mation Association, which was just provided to us within the past
couple of weeks.
Mr. Frank. What is the Asbestos Information Association?
Mr. Vance. It is a private group of asbestos manufacturers. It is
an industrial trade group.
Analyses of these studies are a part of our rulemaking as Mr.
Auchter just pointed out.
Mr. Frank. When did the NIOSH study come to you? When was
that completed?
Mr. Vance. The NIOSH study was completed, oh, 4 or 5 years
ago.
A comparative analysis of these two will be a part of our work.
And as we have said, NIOSH is working with us in the develop-
ment of this standard. So we will have NIOSH evaluating the pri-
vate group study as well as the English OSHA officials. This partic-
ular problem is one of the major things we are looking at in devel-
oping the standard and we expect to have not only some support
from NIOSH but also from our international colleagues in occupa-
tional safety and health.
Mr. Frank. In other words, what you are saying is that when
you promulgate a standard, one of the things you are taking into
account is the enforceability of the standard after promulgation?
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frank. Without objection, a copy of the chart will be submit-
ted for the record.
[The chart follows:]
183
UIV INVId dO 33/ SUBflld aOVU3AV
S8
E .
II
IS
11
184
Mr. AucHTER. As a followup, Dr. Vance was also over at the Na-
tional Bureau of Standards recently. Relate that experience, Dr.
Vance, if you would.
Mr. Vance. We touched base with all of the relevant Govern-
ment agencies in developing these standards. We were at the Na-
tional Bureau of Standards about a month ago talking to the indi-
viduals responsible for comparative electron microscopy and phase
contrast light microscopy techniques for evaluating asbestos.
The individual responsible for that group told me that one of his
counters who is being used in development of the standard, consist-
ently calculated results lower than the rest of the people who were
associated with her.
A comment was simply made to that counter that her results
were consistently low and for the next 6 months the results were
doubled on every slide that this particular individual looked at.
The individual counter makes a great deal of difference. Through
training they were able to improve the results of that counter's
evaluations within a month.
Mr. Frank. One thing I take from this, Mr. Auchter, is that this
is a very difficult one to enforce. I take it, then, that when we get
the new standard you are going to ask us for more people to help
you enforce it?
Mr. Auchter. I would hope not.
Mr. Frank. You have made a pretty good case. You have told me
how tough this is and how difficult it is to train them. If you get a
new tougher standard and you don't come back and tell us we need
more people to train, I am going to be very skeptical, because it
seems to me you have just made a very strong argument for a
great increase in enforcement force unless it is your intention for
an adequate way to enforce the standard.
Mr. Auchter. Mr. Chairman, I guess you better get ready to be
skeptical because I am not going to ask you for any more.
Mr. Frank. How can you give me this demonstration about how
difficult this is to enforce — I mean, if the difficulty of enforcement
is a factor to be taken into account in delaying the promulgation of
the standard, why is it not a fact to be taken into account in en-
forcing the standard?
Mr. Auchter. Mr. Chairman, let's see if I can put this in a little
different perspective.
First, this administration has no intention of delaying the pro-
mulgation of a regulation. As a matter of fact, we are acting on it
and doing it expeditiously.
Second, the people who go out into the workplace, the industrial
hygienists who collect the samples, are not the ones involved with
this particular problem that we were just discussing.
We do have adequate facilities at our laboratory to do the appro-
priate job once the regulatory process determines what the appro-
priate job is.
Mr. Frank. You don't have a problem, now you say it is difficult
to train people and difficult to find the right people. Are you well
staffed now to evaluate all the samples that come in?
Mr. Auchter. Yes, sir, we are.
185
Mr. Frank. And promulgating a newer and more difficult stand-
ard is not going to require any increase in the number of people
who monitor this at your end?
Mr. AucHTER. No, sir.
Mr. Frank. You have got this unused capacity now among these
people? If you are going to promulgate a standard that is more dif-
ficult to enforce, I don't understand why it is not going to take
more resources to enforce it.
Mr. AucHTER. The question is one of numbers of samples taken.
So far we are able to handle comfortably — I think our latest count
is about 800 samples a month, and I would suspect that the level
will remain something around there for the near future.
Mr. Frank. But they are more difficult to analyze. What you are
saying is that the samples are going to become more difficult to
analyze as you get a tougher standard.
Mr. AucHTER. Depending on what level the permissible exposure
level moves to.
Mr. Frank. I assume the purpose of this was to say we are going
to move to a stricter standard. I mean, we have a standard without
prejudging what you are going to come up with; we have a stand-
ard that everybody, NIOSH, I assume everybody thinks is too high
right now. So when we get to a stricter standard, it is going to
make it more difficult to analyze. I totally miss the point of that
demonstration.
I didn't study science — I guess I was a little better in science
than the President but not a lot, as I remember his comment in
Tennessee. But I think I grasp the point of that demonstration.
You say that you are moving quickly. I am a little disturbed. I
have copy of some correspondence between yourselves and people
from the AFL-CIO. Mr. Taylor wrote you in March, you responded
to Mr. Samuels a month or so later and said, you are going to move
up the timetable. I am glad that the timetable is being moved up
but I guess I am curious as to why it was such a leisurely timetable
for the first 2 years.
We had this inadequate standard. I don't know why there wasn't
movement in the prior two administrations, there should have
been. You took office and for the first 2 years of your administra-
tion your timetable was the summer of 1984. Now you are moving
it to the summer of 1983. I would have thought the nature of the
health hazard here would have led to an earlier date from the very
beginning.
Mr. AucHTER. Once again, Mr. Chairman, OSHA did not have a
cohesive policy on the development of a new asbestos standard.
And it was sometime after I had taken office that I did get together
with the Director of Health Standards and put that preliminary
team together.
The purpose of the previous demonstration was to show you that
it is a very complicated issue at every level and that appropriate
rulemaking we believe is the way to handle that and get as much
information as possible.
Mr. Frank. I understand. But there is also, of course, the fact
that while we are doing this, people are being exposed to the
health hazard.
186
What about the question of an emergency standard pending the
adoption of the final one?
Your timetable for the new standard is won now. We have got a
rulemaking this summer, when will the new standard be promul-
gated?
Mr. AucHTER. We expect to have a lower permissible exposure
level by the first of next year, or by the end of this year, whichever
way you want to look at it. We believe we can meet that timetable.
Mr. Frank. You don't think there is any basis for an emergency
standard between now and then?
Mr. AucHTER. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Frank. Are we talking now about new installations when
you talk about the lowered standard? Obviously, we have got a
problem, especially when things are already there. We have got a
standard admittedly too high.
What would be the harm in having a temporary emergency
standard that was lower pending the promulgation of the new one
in January?
Mr. AucHTER. We don't believe it would be enforceable.
Mr. Frank. Why wouldn't it be enforceable?
Mr. AucHTER. Because the employee exposure information that
is necessary for us to have, we simply do not have today. From the
information we have, we believe that employees are exposed well
below the 2-fiber level in any case.
Mr. Frank. What is that based on? Let me go back a step.
When you said you don't have the employee information expo-
sure, why not? Whose responsibility is it for you to get that? You
are saying that you don't now know what people are being exposed
to?
Mr. Auchter. Mr. Chairman, our current PEL is 2 fibers.
Mr. Frank. That is the permitted exposure level?
Mr. Auchter. Yes, sir.
In OSHA's history, OSHA has attempted to promulgate, I be-
lieve, nine emergency temporary standards. Of the five of those
standards that were challenged in court, four were overturned.
Mr. Frank. Before we get to the court, let's get to the question
which I am concerned about and that is where you said that you
don't really have the information. I think you said you don't know
now what the employee exposure level is? I mean, if you don't, who
does? Aren't you supposed to?
Mr. Auchter. We will after rulemaking.
Mr. Frank. But you have got a rule now. Why don't you now?
There is a standard now on the books. People all say it is inad-
equate. But you are telling me that you won't get the information
until you get a new rule. Shouldn't you have that now? I mean,
how are you enforcing the current rule?
Mr. Auchter. We compile that information through contractor
studies, going to various industry groups, organized labor, and so
forth, and look for exposure information. It is part of the rulemak-
ing process.
Mr. Frank. You don't do any of it on your own right now in
terms of enforcement?
187
Mr. AucHTER. No, sir; we would not be gathering that exposure
level activity — we would not be doing that unless we were in rule-
making to gather that on an industry-by-industry basis.
Mr. Frank. What kind of enforcement can you do if you don't
have that kind of data? I would have thought that would have been
important to the enforcement?
Mr. AucHTER. Our enforcement activities are based on our
health standards program — our health inspection program. Our in-
dustrial hygienists go into the workplace and collect samples. They
do that based on the sort of materials they believe might be in use
or available in a particular workplace.
Mr. Frank. Are they doing that now?
Mr. Auchter. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frank. I thought, you said, you don't have information on
the exposure level of employees? If your people are getting it, why
don't you
Mr. Auchter. In order for us to promulgate an emergency tem-
porary standard and have it be upheld in court, we have to show a
couple of things. One, we have to show a major emergency in the
workplace — something new has occurred out there.
Second, we have to say and document the fact that there are sig-
nificant numbers of employees exposed. We have no such documen-
tation available to us today.
Mr. Frank. You have no means of getting it? You took office and
paid NIOSH and others, there was an exposure level was too high
don't you think that should have been dealt with earlier? It has
been 2y2 years now. I guess I don't understand why you don't have
the information. Have you tried to get it?
Mr. Auchter. That is part of the preliminary work our team has
been doing.
Mr. Frank. Starting when? When did they start getting it?
Mr. Auchter. Last year. Spring of last year.
Mr. Frank. How long is it going to take them for you to have an
adequate standard — an adequate basis of information?
Mr. Auchter. We will gather more from this rulemaking, from
the hearing that we are going to request from the public. Then we
will incorporate that in our final decision prior to the end of this
year.
Mr. Frank. Again, we have a health hazard here and a standard
that is too high. Why wasn't there an effort to gather that informa-
tion earlier? I would have expected that.
Mr. Auchter. Well, the effort is a lengthy one, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Frank. I understand that, but you are telling me that the
rulemaking process is the process in which you are going to get
much of this information.
Mr. Auchter. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frank. Up until April of this year, you were shooting for a
rulemaking process in the summer of 1984. That suggests to me
that we were not moving as expeditiously to get that information
as we could have. A couple of years have gone by, it is a little bit of
a catch-22, you can't do an emergency standard because you don't
have the information but you don't have the information because
you weren't trying to get it until the summer of 1984.
188
Up until April, your timetable for the rulemaking was the
summer of 1984. What you are telling me is that, therefore
Mr. AucHTER. A final rule, 1985.
Mr. Frank. Yes. Therefore you were, delayed, in terms of gather-
ing the information. I think the argument that you can't do an
emergency rule because you didn't have the information is based in
part by the fact that you didn't try to get the information until
fairly recently.
Mr. AucHTER. Mr. Chairman, OSHA does not believe at this time
that an emergency temporary standard is the appropriate action to
take here, for a number of reasons. And I can go into more
detail
Mr. Frank. Then why are you moving this up 1 year? Why have
you changed your original timetable to go a year earlier in promul-
gating a
Mr. AucHTER. An emergency temporary standard violates the
public's right to be involved in the rulemaking process. As we dem-
onstrated earlier, on just that one subject, the regulation of asbes-
tos is a very, very complicated and difficult issue.
We believe very strongly the public should be involved in that.
An emergency temporary standard is only good for 6 months.
Mr. Frank. To get you to the new rulemaking period.
Mr. AucHTER. We have 6 months between now and the end of
the year, which is our target for a final rule with complete public
input. So we believe that the action that we have taken is the most
appropriate and a fair balance between the public's right to be in-
volved in the process and timeliness.
Mr. Frank. Let me ask you. A recent report from Business
Week, stated that industry opposition to stricter exposure rules is
fierce. And that OSHA aides suspect that skeptical Office of Man-
agement and Budget officials may team up with industry officials
and try to kill the proposal.
Is Business Week here engaging in some kind of a radical dema-
goguery in suggesting that industry is opposing the stricter stand-
ards? What kind of cooperation are you getting from industry?
Mr. AucHTER. We are getting a lot of cooperation so far and I
would anticipate that that will be the case throughout.
Our standards activity today tries to have involved, and we be-
lieve does involve, interested parties at very early stages.
Mr. Frank. So what Business Week reported in the July 4 issue,
Washington Outlook, that industry opposition to stricter exposure
rules is fierce, are they incorrect?
Mr. AucHTER. They are incorrect as far as OSHA is concerned.
Mr. Frank. That's who they are talking about. I don't think the
State Department is having too much problem with the question of
asbestos.
The timetable is rulemaking this summer, new rule by January
1984, is the hope?
Mr. Auchter. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frank. And you expect it to be in lower without prejudicing
exactly what your
Mr. Auchter. Yes, sir; we do.
Mr. Frank. Then the question will be what is the form of en-
forcement?
' 189
Let me just ask the last question.
The new rule is on the permissible exposure level. Is there any
thought being given to changing the level at which monitoring has
become controversial, for instance, because the Department of De-
fense, was refusing to follow OSHA's promulgation with regard to
monitoring, charging that you had mispromulgated it, or that it
had been mispromulgated in the previous administration and that
mispromulgation hasn't been corrected.
The Department of Defense now tells us they are going to comply
with your monitoring rule.
Are you planning to deal with the monitoring question at all?
Mr. AucHTER. Not in this rulemaking. This rulemaking is target-
ed toward the question of the permissible exposure level. We will
do a supplemental rulemaking, another part of the rulemaking
that will address other issues. This will be one of them, and other
things might be the work practice control methodology, and so
forth.
Mr. Frank. The monitoring seems to be important and and you
reinforce here in what you say today because we are not dealing
with something where you can push a button and know exactly
what you have to know.
So that given the very difficulties of enforcement that you talk
about, that seems to me to strengthen the case for the workers
themselves and others to have the monitoring.
Have you got a timetable on the new monitoring rule?
Mr. AucHTER. I am informed that we are looking at a target date
on a final rule for that by the end of next summer.
So our first rulemaking will address the PEL, by the end of this
year, and then August or so 1984 is our target date to wrap up the
rest of the rulemaking.
We have to do that following the Administrative Procedure Act
since the 1975 rulemaking is our basis for the approach on the per-
missible exposure level.
Mr. Frank. Let me touch on that point further. We are going to
have some further hearings on this but I was very disappointed to
fmd out until recently that the Department of Defense was refus-
ing to follow OSHA's rules in this regard. With regard to the Kit-
tery Naval Base, the Navy was out of compliance. But then when
they agreed to comply in one regard with the question of access to
medical records, I guess it was not on the monitoring standard.
They agreed to comply early with the monitoring standard.
But on the question of employee access to records, the Depart-
ment of Defense told me that they thought OSHA simply did not
have the right to enforce a standard which you promulgated. You
have a standard now in effect that you inherited but you have been
administering to other Federal agencies on what they should do.
The Department of Defense is taking the position that you are
wrong, that the wrong section was cited, and they are not going to
follow it.
I I wonder if that has come to your attention or whether you will
be able to address that at all.
Mr. AucHTER. Mr. Chairman, the access standard was litigated
and upheld.
Mr. Frank. When was it upheld?
25-994 0-83-13
190
Mr. Vance. About 3 or 4 months ago by a Federal district court
in Louisiana. It has been Htigated before the
Mr. Frank. Can I say, sir, having informed first Mr. Auchter and
then myself, would you put the Defense Department on your list of
people to share that information with? Because I will tell you that
later than the time you told me — April 18 — that is not the begin-
ning of a Longfellow poem. On April 18, the Defense Department
said to me that they weren't going to follow that standard. That
you had made a mistake and they weren't covered.
Now, since it was what — a district court in Lousiana. I assume
they will be taking the position that they are not covered. It seems
to me unseemly, I must say, in the highest degree, for the Defense
Department to be saying just because one Federal district judge in
Louisiana said that OSHA's standard was legitimate, that doesn't
mean that they have to abide by me.
They have recently indicated some willingness to abide. But
there was apparently a serious problem with other Federal agen-
cies claiming that they are not covered.
I have written to the White House on that. I would like very
much to be supportive of the OSHA position. The notion that we
tell private sector companies that they have to do X and Y, Federal
agencies, in identical circumstances, don't do the same thing. I
think it is a terrible problem.
I hope you will be in touch with the Defense Department, maybe
through the Cabinet level or whatever, because that is something
which has to be resolved.
I can tell you as a matter of fact that the Defense Department
told me subsequent to that court decision, that they had no inten-
tion of complying with that particular rule.
Mr. Auchter. Mr. Chairman, I would agree with you. OSHA's
philosophy today is that the Federal Government should enjoy the
same privileges that the private sector enjoys.
So our philosophy is to apply enforcement where necessary in
the Federal sector, and consultation, training and education, stand-
ards activity, and the other things that we do in the private sector.
We will pursue this question.
Mr. Frank. You can tell them, Mr. Auchter, if it would help, and
I think it might, that I intend later this summer to have a hearing
on the question of the other Federal agencies' compliance with
your rules and regulations.
I would be expecting you to come and give me the list who are
out of compliance. If we have to take that up with their author-
izing and approriating committees, we will do it. I don't think any
of us want to tolerate that kind of situation.
Mr. Auchter. Mr. Chairman, the President has the same ap
proach, by the way. He has signed off just recently — I made a pres-
entation to the President and the Cabinet Council on our Federal
agencies program and the President is in the process of sending a
memo out to his agency heads for a 3-percent annual reduction as,
a target over a 5-year period — 3 percent per year for 5 years— off
the injury and illness incidence rates in the Federal Government.
So we are focusing in on this. We mean business and we expect
positive results.
Mr. Frank. Thank you.
(
191
I wrote to the President, along with Mr. McKernan, I believe, a
couple of months ago, and we are still waiting for the kind of deci-
sive response that we ought to get, which is that these shouldn't be
a matter of quibble, they ought to be ordered, all of them, to
comply. And if they want to take some appeal through intra-ad-
ministration processes, fine. But once the decision has been made,
they ought to abide by it.
Thank you very much, Mr. Auchter.
Mr. Auchter. Thank you.
Mr. Frank. Our next witness is John McKinney, chairman and
chief executive officer, the Manville Corp. Proceed, Mr. McKinney.
STATEMENT OF JOHN A. McKINNEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, MANVILLE CORP., ACCOMPA-
NIED BY JOHN LONNQUIST, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON PUBLIC
AFFAIRS OFFICE, AND DENNIS MARKUSSON, ASSISTANT COR-
PORATE COUNSEL
Mr. McKinney. Mr. Chairman, accompanying me this morning
are Mr. John Lonnquist, on my right, who is director of the corpo-
ration's Washington public affairs office; and on my left, Mr.
Dennis Markusson, who is assistant corporate counsel for the cor-
poration.
We are pleased to appear before the subcommittee this morning
in its continuing investigation of the cost and benefits associated
with regulatory structures in place in the country today.
First, I would like to make a comment. Whether or not market
forces caused it, before 1938 when the U.S. Public Health Service
made its standard and recommendation, industry had already un-
derwritten medical studies and at least a portion of industry had
made substantial changes in work practices, such as wearing of res-
pirators and installing of dust-control equipment.
I would like to talk this morning of the use of asbestos by the
Navy under Government regulation because this will illustrate
what you have heard and commented on, although I will amplify it
a little. But the question is not so much whether you have a regu-
lation but whether or not the regulation or standard is enforced.
For decades, the Government and principally the U.S. Navy,
failed to observe and enforce recommendations and regulations for
the safe handling of asbestos-containing materials in America's
shipyards.
As a direct result of this failure, thousands of Americans pres-
ently suffer from asbestos-related occupational diseases, and medi-
cal researchers predict that thousands more will suffer in future
years.
At present, over 20,000 individuals have filed lawsuits in our
Federal and State courts seeking compensation for asbestos-related
occupational diseases.
Almost half of those lawsuits are brought by individuals who
were exposed to asbestos or asbestos-containing materials in the
U.S. Navy or Navy-controlled shipyards, and not more than a
handful of these have been adequately or fairly compensated. Be-
cause of the Government's immunity to suit, these actions are not
brought against the United States of America but, rather, against
192
the companies which suppUed the Government specified asbestos-
containing products to the Navy.
Already three companies, including my own, have been com-
pelled to file for chapter 1 1 reorganization as a result of the crush-
ing and unwarranted economic burden these lawsuits have im-
posed.
Mr. Chairman, I have filed with the subcommittee extensive
written remarks detailing and documenting with Government doc-
uments the Navy's failure to control shipyard asbestos exposures. I
would ask that my written statement be included in the record of
this hearing and that it receive the subcommittee's full attention.
Mr. Frank. It will be so included.
Mr. McKiNNEY. I would add that with each passing week our in-
vestigations reveal additional evidence of the Navy's disregard for
excessive exposures in this Nation's shipyards.
Let me briefly summarize some of the important facts. By the
time of our entry into World War II, the U.S. Navy and the U.S.
Maritime Commission determined that asbestos and asbestos-con-
taining products were of critical importance to our naval and mer-
chant fleet. Asbestos-containing materials were lightweight thus in-
creasing ship's speed, were excellent insulators, and most impor-
tant, were fireproof, thus protecting against fire, the great hazard
at sea.
All of these properties became even more important with the
advent of World War II. The Navy specified asbestos-containing
products as strategic and critical materials to be incorporated in
our rapidly expanding naval fleet.
In fact, continuing as late as 1979, one simply could not construct
a U.S. naval vessel with the Government's mandated specifications
without the use of asbestos-containing products.
Asbestos has served this country well as a strategic and critical
material but as with many valuable materials, asbestos can cause
physical harm if excessive occupational exposures are permitted.
It has already been referred to that as early as 1938, the U.S.
Public Health Service recognized this potential hazard and pub-
lished a recommended "safe" standard for asbestos exposure.
This standard was adopted by the American Conference of Gov-
ernmental Industrial Hygienists by industry, by State and local
governments, and by the Navy.
Tragically, the Navy, while ever increasing its demand for raw
asbestos and asbestos-containing products as strategic and critical
materials, disregarded the necessity of controlling asbestos expo-
sures to levels below those recommended by the U.S. Public Health
Service in the shipyards it operated and controlled.
It is clear from recently declassified Navy documents that during
World War II asbestos exposures in the Navy shipyards were exces-
sive and that these facts were known to high level naval officers.
For example, in March 1941, shipyard asbestos exposures in
excess of Public Health Service recommendations were reported to
the Surgeon General of the Navy, nor were the failures to adhere
to the Public Health Service recommendations freak occurrences.
A reexamination of the Bath, Maine shipyard some 2 years after
first finding excessive asbestos exposures disclosed that exposures
I
193
continued at levels 6 to 10 times the Public Health Service recom-
mendation.
It is in these excessive exposures that the present-day asbestos
disease crisis had its genesis. In short, existing standards and regu-
lations were neither followed or enforced.
I wish I could report to the subcommittee that the massive over-
exposures to asbestos which the Navy chose to tolerate in the ship-
yards were only a phenomena of World War II. However, as de-
tailed in my written remarks, such was not the case.
Even after 1964, when medical developments indicated that the
previous U.S. Public Health standard was, in fact, not safe, the
Navy Bureau of Medicine continued to utilize the obsolete standard
for another 8 years.
I believe the subcommittee has found similar evidence in the
course of its recent hearings regarding the Portsmouth-Kittery
Shipyard. Simply stated, the Navy chose to specify and utilize as-
bestos-containing products as a critical and strategic material nec-
essary for the Nation's defense while at the same time, disregard-
ing known medical and industrial hygiene standards relating to as-
bestos exposure.
The tragic consequence of the Navy's action of past decades is
thousands of asbestos-related disease cases.
The Federal Government's long and irresponsible history in the
asbestos tragedy that the Nation faces today does not speak well
for our collective commitment to continued development and en-
forcement of sound regulatory practices, particularly within the
government's own operations.
In terms of this subcommittee's specific inquiry, one can only
roughly quantify that impact and provisionally arrive at estimates
of costs to be incurred as a result of the Government's failure to
enforce known standards or regulations.
There is, of course, the unquantifiable cost in human health to-
gether with the millions of dollars being expended in asbestos liti-
gation pending in the Nation's courts.
There can be no doubt that additional attention is needed to the
timely development and strict enforcement of industrial hygiene
standards in government operations such as naval shipyards. How-
ever, the tragedy of the past must also be addressed.
Manville and others in the asbestos industry are prepared to do
their fair share of the task of compensating workers injured by the
use of asbestos products. But the private sector should not be called
upon to shoulder the burden created by decades of government ne-
glect.
Based upon the evidence this subcommittee and other congres-
sional committees have already received, it is clear that the Feder-
al Government must also come forward and fully and fairly accept
responsibility for its past actions. Present Federal programs, in-
cluding Federal Worker's Compensation, do not meet this goal.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks this morning and we
would be happy to answer any questions the subcommittee may
have.
[Mr. McKinney's prepared statement follows:]
194
STATEMENT OF
JOHN A. MCKINNEY
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
MANVILLE COPJ'ORATION
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND HOUSING
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JUNE 28, 1983
Good morning, Mr. Chairman. My name is John A.
McKinney. I am Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer of the Manville Corporation.
Accompanying me this morning is Mr. John Lonnquist,
Director of the Corporation's Washington Public Affairs
Office, and Mr. Dennis Harkusson, Assistant Corporate
Counsel for the Corporation. We are pleased to appear
before the Subcommittee this morning in its continuing
investigation of the costs and benefits associated with
the regulatory structures in place in the country today,
It is particularly fitting, Mr. Chairman, that this
morning's deliberations are focused on asbestos. For
decades, the government and principally the United
195
states Navy failed to observe and enforce
recommendations and regulations for the safe handling of
asbestos-containing materials in America's shipyards.
As a direct result of this failure, thousands of
Americans presently suffer from asbestos-related
occupational diseases, and medical researchers predict
that thousands more will suffer in future years. At
present, over 20,000 individuals have filed lawsuits in
our Federal and State courts seeking compensation for
asbestos-related occupational injuries. Almost half of
those lawsuits are brought by individuals who were
exposed to asbestos or asbestos-containing materials in
U.S. Navy or Navy-controlled shipyards.
However, because of the government's immunity to suit,
these actions are not brought against the United States
of America, but rather against the companies who
supplied government specified asbestos-containing
products to the Navy. Already three companies,
including my own, have been compelled to file for
Chapter 11 Reorganization as a result of the crushing
burden these lawsuits have imposed.
Mr. Chairman, Manville Corporation does not contend that
the asbestos litigation crisis facing the nation today
is the sole result of a failure to regulate per S3-.
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196
Throughout the course of events that has led to the
cases of disease we see today, evolving medical
knowledge was utilized, advanced, and codified. As early
as 1935, the United States Public Health Service (USPHS)
was publishing research on asbestos diseases; in 1938,
U.S.P.H.S. did its own research and concluded that if
dust counts could be held below 5 million particles per
cubic foot (Smppcf) , no new cases of asbestosis would be
anticipated. The American Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists endorsed this "standard" and it
was adopted and relied upon by both government and
industry.
Why, then, is there so much asbestos-related disease,
and why do the doctors anticipate thousands of cases in
future years? The answer is three-fold.
First, medical science has subsequently learned that the
1938 Smppcf standard recommended by the U.S. Public
Health Service and endorsed for decades by the American
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists was too
high to protect the workers.
Second, it has recently been learned that the Public
Health Service standard, although adopted by the Navy,
was not regularly enforced in Navy or Navy-controlled
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197
shipyards, resulting in the massive over-exposure to
asbestos for thousands of American shipyard workers.
These facts were known only within the government until
very recently.
Third, even after it was established in 1964 that the
USPHS Smppcf standard was too high, the Navy
nevertheless continued to utilize that obsolete standard
in its shipyard regulations for the next eight years.
The result was to virtually guarantee excessive asbestos
exposures for workers employed in Navy or
Navy-controlled shipyards.
So, in the asbestos cases, Mr. Chairman, the problem is
not only a failure to regulate, but principally a
failure to enforce existing recommendations and
regulations. The asbestos cases are textbook examples
of the federal government saying "Do as I say, not as I
do", with the most deadly of consequences.
I hasten to add, Mr. Chairman, that the government's
failure to control asbestos exposures is not restricted
to any one political party or Administration. As the
Subcommittee is aware, asbestos-related diseases have a
latency period of between fifteen and forty years. The
disease cases we see today are the results of exposures
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198
that occurred as long ago as World War II. However, as
the Subcommittee found in the course of its recent
hearings regarding the Portsmouth-Kittery shipyard, the
Navy continues to expose its workforce to excessive
asbestos concentrations, even today. In essence, the
federal government continues to generate asbestos
disease cases for which private industry will
undoubtedly be blamed!
Mr. Chairman, let me be more specific regarding some of
the background and facts surrounding the Navy's failure
to enforce asbestos exposure standards in its shipyards
and shipyards which it controlled. During World War II
asbestos was classified as a strategic and critical
mineral necessary to the defense of the nation, and
assigned an "AA" Preference Rating. At that time and,
in fact, continuing as late as 1979, one simply could
not construct a United States Naval vessel to the
government's required specifications without the use of
asbestos-containing products.
All shipbuilding in the United States during the World
V7ar II era required vast quantities of asbestos products
in order to meet the government's stringent requirements
for seaworthiness and safety in the event of fire.
Commencing with the issuance of Section 944.2 of the
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199
I
Office of Production Management's "Regulations
Applicable to the Operation of the Priorities System"
and continuing throughout World War II, Manville and
other asbestos product manufacturers were required to
accept any Defense Orders for any material, and to
fulfill any such Orders received "in preference to any
other contracts or purchase orders for such Material."
The practical effect of these federal regulations upon
Manville was such that our entire business was being
operated, in a first priority sense, for the direct
benefit of the U.S. Government. By April, 1942, over
70% of Hanville's total industrial production was
devoted to war-related output.
It is significant to point out, Mr. Chairman, that a
substantial quantity of the asbestos products supplied
to the Navy during the War contained African asbestos.
The African asbestos utilized was NOT mined by Manville
or any of the manufacturing companies currently
defending asbestos lawsuits brought by individuals who
worked in Navy or Navy-controlled shipyards. One type
of African asbestos is amosite. The United States
determined that this particular type of asbestos fiber
was best suited to its unique and pressing military
requirements, and the U.S. Government itself was the
purchaser and supplier of this asbestos. Illustrative
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200
of the high priority which the United States attached to
its own market activities in amosite asbestos is a
Memorandum of Understanding entered into between the
United States of America and Great Britain. Signed in
early 1943, the arrangement between the two countries
was designed to apportion all supplies of "African
asbestos" between them so as to best further their
shared military vessel construction and repair
objectives.
What happened to this government-supplied asbestos
fiber? Under the Priorities System in effect, the
goverment strictly allocated its asbestos fiber to
private companies such as Hanville for the manufacture
of strategic military products, which in turn were
delivered to government-owned or government-controlled
shipyards for installation in new vessels or ships under
repair. It may be of interest to the Subcommittee that
the government realized a five per cent (5%) net profit
on these transactions.
At the same time the government was selling African
fiber to manufacturers to be processed into military
products to be utilized in the shipyards, it is clear
that the U.S. Government knew that the working
conditions in its shipyards were generating levels of
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201
asbestos dust far in excess of U.S. Public Health
Service recommended standards. The present-day asbestos
disease crisis has its genesis in these hazardous
wartime exposures.
As previously stated, Mr. Chairman, in 1938, the U.S.
Public Health Service had concluded that if dust
exposures were held below 5 million particles per cubic
foot, no new cases of asbestosis would be anticipated.
And, as early as 1939, Admiral Mclntire, Surgeon General
of the Navy and President Roosevelt's personal
physician, recognized that excessive asbestos exposures
were occurring in the shipyards. He reported to the
Secretary of the Navy that continued exposures to
present occupational conditions in the shipyards would
not preclude future development of asbestosis.
In a March 11, 1941, memorandum to Admiral Mclntire,
Commander Stephenson, the medical officer in charge of
the U.S. Navy's Division of Preventive Medicine advised
that Navy shipyard workers were, in fact, being exposed
to concentrations of asbestos dust in excess of
U.S.P.H.S. recommendations. After indicating that
President Roosevelt opposed a Public Health Service
request to independently survey the shipyards because
"they might cause a disturbance in the labor element,"
the Commander wrote:
-8-
202
(1) Asbestosis. We are having considerable
amount of work done in asbestos and from my
observations, I am certain that we are not
protecting the men as we should. This is a
matter of official report from several of our
Navy yards.
The general state of working conditions in the Navy
shipyards at that time is further evidenced by Commander
Stephenson's observations concerning the existence of
another occupational dust hazard:
None of our foundries would pass the necessary
inspection to obtain workers' compensation
insurance from any of the insurance
organizations. I doubt if any of our foundries
would be tolerated if the state industrial
health people were to make surveys of them.
Were these just freak occurrences? The unfolding
evidence is to the contrary. A September, 1942,
internal Health Survey of the Bath Ironworks shipyard in
Maine conducted jointly by the U.S. Navy - U.S. Maritime
Commission discloses:
The conditions in this shop present a very
real asbestosis hazard and immediate steps
should be. taken to segregate the most dusty
processes into a well ventilated area.
Returning to the same shipyard for follow-up study a
little over two years later the Navy measured dust
counts at between 34 million and 52 million particles,
or between six and ten times higher than the known and
accepted government standard for "safe" exposure levels!
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203
with dust counts at these excessive levels, it is clear
that the D.S. Government must have known it was
countenancing a potential occupational health hazard for
thousands of shipyard workers. It is similarly clear
that little, if any, information regarding exposure
levels in the shipyards was ever communicated by the
Navy to any of its suppliers or contractors. The
Industrial Health Surveys from which I have quoted were
treated as confidential and disclosure was expressly
restricted by the provisions of the Espionage Act. These
wartime reports continued in classified or restricted
status for decades and were certainly not available for
the guidance of manufacturers or the public or
industrial health communities during the years when
injurious shipyards exposures were occurring.
While the government's seeming disregard for excessive
shipyard exposures to asbestos may in some manner be
understandable, by the overriding need to fight World
War II, its behaviof in the post-War years is not.
Examples of post-war neglect are abundant:
In the early 1950 's, shipyard workers were
being exposed to amounts of asbestos dust from
rip-outs in excess of the D.S. P. H.S. /American
Conference of Governmental Industrial
Hygienist's and Navy standards. (See,
"Estimates of Asbestos Concentration in Long
Beach Naval Shipyard" 2-3, Letter of
Commanding Officer of Naval Regional Medical
Center to Commander, May 8, 1979)
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204
In May-June, 1964, workers were exposed to
hazardous levels of asbestos dust at the Long
Beach Naval Shipyard, and adequate ventilation
for worker protection was not possible with
the equipment at the shipyard. (See, Survey of
Willicun Marr, Chief Industrial Hygienist at
the Long Beach Naval Shipyards, T/P Exh. 146,
Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp. v. United
States of America)
In March, 1968, workers were being exposed to
asbestos dust concentrations above the current
threshhold limit value during shipboard
operations, without provision of adequate
ventilation and other workplace precautions,
at the San Francisco Bay Naval Shipyards. (See
Rep. No. 68-5, San Francisco Bay Naval
Shipyard Industrial Hygiene Division,
Industrial Health Survey of Pipecoverers'
Asbestos Exposures, Hunter's Point Site 3-5,
March 29, 1968)
In 1969, in every government and contract
shipyard surveyed, it was found that although
yard management was aware of the asbestos dust
hazard, it had generally failed to exercise
sufficient care necessary to abate the problem
and failed to enforce the use of respirators
by shipyard workers. (See, Survey of Hazards
of Asbestos, Final Report of Officer in
Charge, Naval Ship Engineering Center,
Philadelphia Division, Project FA-287,
September 24, 1969)
The Government's conduct in this matter is impossible to
rationalize in the post-1964 era, for it was at that
time that Dr. Irving Selikoff's landmark findings were
released and a demonstrable risk of disease for workers
exposed to asbestos-containing insulation materials was
established, and the USPHS Smppcf standard rendered
obsolete.
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205
Mr. Chairman, it is particularly interesting to note the
different responses that Dr. Selikoff's 1964 findings
elicited from industry and the government. Where the
private sector, led by the Johns-Manville Corporation,
began to voluntarily place a warning label on its
asbestos insulation products, the government undertook
no such warning program. It wasn't until June, 1973,
that the Navy issued BUMED Instruction 6260.14,
requiring for the first time the posting of caution
signs and specifying the use of warnings for asbestos
products. And, as late as the summer of 1972 Navy BDMED
instruction 6270. 3E continued to use Smppcf as the
appropriate asbestos exposure standard for Navy
shipyards in spite of the Selikoff findings of some
eight years earlier. These are classic examples of the
Navy failing to change its regulations to adapt to new
medical information.
Moreover, the Navy was not implementing effective
industrial hygiene programs for its shipyard workforce.
Mr. Sheldon Manning, Industrial Hygienist at the Long
Beach Naval Shipyard, made these observations regarding
the industrial hygiene program at Long Beach in a June
30, 1970, memorandum to the Commander of the Yard:
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25-994 0-83-14
V
206
The Industrial Hygiene program at the Long
Beach Naval Shipyard since the second
opening of the billet in 1951 has been
nonexistent, or marked by weakness whenever
the billet was filled
...in 1958 Bill Marr was recruited from the
Naval Gun Factory in Washington, D.C. and
served (as yard Industrial Hygienist) until
the end of 1964. His program lacked
support, with little equipment and no
secretarial help. .. .Before he left for
Panama [in 1964], Mr. Marr gave an interview
to a reporter on the hazards of asbestos
exposure which reflected adversely on the
Shipyard. This bad publicity incurred the
wrath of the Shipyard Commander and soon
afterward the Industrial Hygiene billet was
abolished. After a lapse of two years the
billet was reinstated.
It was the Medical Officers' wish that all
reports be delivered verbally. All actions
were to be cleared by him. The most valuable
service that an Industrial Hygiene Program
can render is the recognition, evaluation
and control of health hazards at the work
site. This is to be reported to cognizant
supervision in a clear concise written
report that may be of a technical nature with
enclosed data. The written report allows the
recipient to refer to it later and offers
less chance for misunderstanding. The
program was effectively suppressed by this
and other tactics [the Medical Officers'
insistence on verbal reports only] . It was
the feeling of the incumbent that the
Medical Officer did not really want an
Industrial Hygienist except for window
dressing. . .
During all this time. Navy contracts continued to
require asbestos-containing materials for use in
construction and repair of Navy vessels until 1975 (ten
years after the Selikoff findings) when the policy was
amended to require the substitution of asbestos-free
products wherever possible (NAVSEA Instruction 5100.24,
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207
October, 1975). The reason given by Navy Vice Admiral
T.J. Bigley for the delay was that an overall Navy
policy prohibiting the use of asbestos could not be
promulgated until the thousands of pounds of government
asbestos stockpiled in government warehouses were
either sold, used, or adequate substitutes obtained".
(See, Letter from T.J. Bigley, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
to Robert F. Hughes, Assistant Director, General
Accounting Office, January 5, 1979). Embarrassingly, in
addition to delaying the implementation of regulations
governing Navy uses of asbestos products until it had
sold its own stockpiled inventory to the private sector,
government memoranda disclose that the Justice
Department and the Navy actually discussed making
"asbestos fodder" out of their own employees — that is,
using federal employees to handle the asbestos which the
government sold. The stated rationale for this option
was to insulate the government from liability: injured
federal employees may seek FECA benefits, but may not
sue the government in tort. (See, Memoranda for Record
by Bruce Kasker, Assistant Counsel, Defense Property
Disposal Administration, Subject: Asbestos; December 19,
1977, December 30, 1977, January 4, 1978, January 28,
1978, April 14, 1978, and June 28, 1978. See also.
Memorandum for the Record, May 8, 1978, by George B.
Seeberg, Safety Director)
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208
In short, Mr. Chairman, the federal government's long
and irresponsible history in the asbestos tragedy that
the nation faces today does not speak well for our
collective commitment to the continued development and
enforcement of sound regulatory practices, particularly
within the government's own operations. In terms of
this Subcommittee's specific inquiry, one can only
roughly quantify that impact, and provisionally arrive
at estimates of costs to be incurred as a result of the
government's failure to enforce known standards or
regulations.
First and foremost, there is the unquantif iable cost in
human health. As I have indicated, had the government
but enforced the minimum exposure standards it knew were
necessary, untold numbers of these workers probably
would not have suffered injury.
Second, v/e know that almost one-half of all third-party
lawsuits filed against asbestos product manufacturers
are brought by workers who were exposed in
government-owned or government-controlled shipyards.
The total relief requested from Manville in these
lawsuits is approximately $45 billion. The direct,
quantifiable impact upon Manville and other
manufacturers of the government's failure could run as
high as 50% of this figure. This is only for the
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209
presently pending claims and does not take into account
any future claims. The ultimate total could be several
magnitudes greater.
Third, there are substantial costs already being
incurred by the federal government as a result of its
historically lax approach to asbestos health. These
include financial responsibility under the Federal
Employees Compensation Act for benefit payments to
federal employees with asbestos disability claims.
And fourth, there are a vast number of federal and
private sector dollars expended and needlessly wasted on
administrative, transaction and legal costs due to the
absence of a more rational and equitable system of
compensation for asbestos-related disease claimants with
the full participation by both industry and government.
In this regard, Mr. Chairman, the prestigious Urban
Institute released a study this past March that is
relevant to the Subcommittee's investigations. Entitled
"Compensation for Victims of Asbestos-Related Diseases:
Potential Cost Savings for the Federal Government" the
report concludes that a legislated compensation program
for asbestos claimants could result in substantial
savings to the government. These savings would derive
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210
primarily from the "opportunity savings" that would
inure to the federal judicial system by removing
asbestos health disputes from the courts — savings
estimated conservatively at $40 million annually. An
additional $19-30 million annually would be saved in
federal income transfer payments if an asbestos
compensation program were enacted. Mr. Chairman, I would
ask that the full Urban Institute report which I have
cited be included in the record of this hearing.
There can be no doubt, Mr. Chairman, but that a
substantial number of workers have been injured as a
result of excessive asbestos exposures. Manville
Corporation and other responsible members of the
asbestos industry have sought for years to place this
issue on the national agenda, and to find an equitable
system through which to provide prompt and adequate
compensation to those workers who suffer asbestos-
related disability. I remain hopeful that the Congress
will act in this area, and in that regard I am
encouraged that Chairman George Miller and the House
Labor Standards Subcommittee has made this issue a
priority concern. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that your
Subcommittee's investigation today, and your earlier
hearing in Kittery, establishes again that the federal
government itself bears a substantial responsibility for
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I 211
the asbestos disease cases we are confronting today, an^
for many of the cases we will encounter in the i
forseeable future. Manville and others in the asbestos
industry are prepared to voluntarily shoulder their fair
share of the burden for compensating workers injured by
the use of asbestos products, and based upon the
evidence this Subcommittee has already received, it is
clear that the federal government must now come forward
and accept its fair share as well.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks this morning. We
would be happy to answer any questions that the
Subcommittee may have.
***********
Mr. Frank. Thank you, Mr. McKinney.
In your testimony you refer to the 1938 U.S. Public Health Serv-
ice proposal of 5 million particles per cubic foot, and you say that it
was adopted and relied upon by both government and industry that
really is at variance with the suggestions we have heard earlier.
Now I know that there is a separate point as to whether or not
that was too high and it appears to have been too high.
But was there in fact widespread voluntary compliance with that
standard from 1938 on?
Mr. McKinney. There certainly was in the part of industry that
\ we know about.
I Mr. Frank. I would be interested if you could submit some docu-
mentation on that for me. I mean, when people began from 1938 on
to restrict the use of asbestos to the 5 million particles per cubic
foot.
Mr. McKinney. Would you like to comment on it.''
Mr. Markusson. Mr. Chairman, speaking for the Manville oper-
ations, that standard was adopted internally as an operating stand-
ard and efforts were made to comply with that and where it could
not be met because of industrial hygiene capabilities and equip-
I ment capabilities at the time, respirators were provided to employ-
i ees within the Manville facilities, that is well documented.
I Mr. Frank. When was that adopted? j -.non' +
I Mr. Markusson. That was adopted as early as the mid-193U s out
of a study that was sponsored by Manville and subsequently pub-
212
lished by the U.S. Public Health Service in 1935 and then those ef-
forts continued on through the decades.
Mr. Frank. And you think that was widespread throughout in-
dustry?
Mr. Markusson. I can't really speak to widespread, Mr. Chair-
man. I certainly have heard testimony and seen documents sug-
gesting that in numerous major manufacturers there were exten-
sive efforts to comply with that 5 million particle standard.
I would also note that the medical and scientific literature cer-
tainly suggested as late as 1964 that the studies which had been
done were indicating that exposures in many aspects of the work
force were indeed below the 5 million particle standard. It is only
recently that we have learned that the Navy and the Navy ship-
yards appear to be one notable exception to that.
Mr. Frank. You said you have only recently learned that. I took
from Mr. McKinney's assessment that people knew at the time the
Navy was not complying with that standard throughout the period.
Mr. Markusson. The Navy people knew. We have only recently
discovered documents that were previously classified that gave us
this information that they knew they were not complying and that
they were creating a possibility of disease.
Mr. Frank. The contractors working for the Navy didn't know
that?
Mr. Markusson. No. We found nothing to indicate that they
knew of it. The Navy kept this as classified material.
Mr. Frank. The Navy was using more asbestos in their ships.
How were they violating it? Were they using more than they
should have?
Mr. Markusson. They were not following good work practices in
handling the materials so that too much dust was created; people
were not required to wear respirators.
Mr. Frank. These were with their own naval employees, not con-
tractor's employees?
Mr. Markusson. Both.
Mr. Frank. Wouldn't the contractors know that with regard to
the contractor's employees?
Mr. Markusson. I am not sure that the contractors had the right
to go in and make dust counts. The work setting was under the
control of the government.
Mr. Frank. I understand. But where there was a contract, con-
tractor, the contractor supplied the workers, it doesn't sound to me
like anybody tried too hard to find out that they didn't know that
people weren't wearing respirators and they knew people weren't
with asbestos.
Mr. Markusson. There is no indication that they knew that the
standard, which was considered safe at that time, was being ex-
ceeded.
Mr. Frank. The new people didn't know they were working with
asbestos?
Mr. Lonnquist. You are talking about a secure area. You are
talking about shipyard work. The suppliers that you are referring
to, the manufacturers who supplied these products weren't on the
site.
I
213
Mr. Frank. So you are talking about only naval employee work-
ers, employees of the Navy Department?
Mr. LoNNQUiST. Navy employees or Navy contract employees.
We are talking about people who were working under the control
of the Navy where they controlled the entire workplace and did the
monitoring.
Mr. Frank. You gave a percentage of what you think resulted
from the Navy, was it 50 percent, what was it?
Mr. McKiNNEY. About half the lawsuits filed or from shipyard
workers.
Mr. Frank. You are saying the other 50 percent of the people
were complying with the standard, but the standard wasn't good
enough; is that your position?
Mr. McKiNNEY. Yes.
Mr. Frank. And if the Navy only accounted for half of it, then
we do have this other problem. You don't think there was a prob-
lem with compliance. You are saying the problem was with the
standard?
Mr. McKiNNEY. It could have been both.
Mr. Frank. That is what we are trying to get it.
Mr. McKiNNEY. You must understand that even under the heav-
iest exposures, many people do not get any disease.
Mr. Frank. We understand that.
Mr. McKiNNEY. OK. So that if you have a degree of overexposure
then that would include a certain number of people with greater
susceptibility even though it excludes some people who aren't sus-
ceptible at all. It would be impossible to say what the numbers
were if a place was characteristically 50 percent over the standard,
how many additional disease cases the excess caused would be very
difficult to say. But you know certainly there would be some.
Mr. Frank. Then you don't know how much of the problem re-
sulted from the standard being too high and how much from people
not complying with the standard?
Mr. Markusson. I believe there has been testimony before the
committee this morning by Dr. Nicholson that even if the 5 million
particle standard had been complied with throughout the country.
Dr. Nicholson estimated, I believe
Mr. Frank. Fifty percent of the deaths.
Mr. Markusson [continuing]. 175,000 fewer deaths. And nobody
is suggesting that the 5-million-particle standard was correct. It
was believed to be correct in 1938 when recommended by the U.S.
Public Health Service and carried on through the years.
Mr. Frank. But Dr. Nicholson also said, as did several other wit-
nesses this morning, that there wasn't widespread compliance with
that standard. That's why there will be twice as many deaths, he
said, as there would have been if people had complied with that
standard.
Mr. Markusson. I can only suggest, Mr. Chairman, that certain-
ly the efforts were made within Manville. And of the documents
that I have seen recently the most widespread disregard for the
standard that I have seen arises out of the U.S. Naval and Naval-
controlled shipyard.
Mr. Frank. It might be widespread but is that the only one? Mr.
McKinney's statement said it was adopted and relied upon by both
214
Government and industry. Now you are saying it wasn't relied
upon by Government.
Mr. McKiNNEY. It was relied upon as being the standard but
they didn't follow it.
Mr. Frank. Mr. McKinney, that is a very strange use of the
word adopted and relied upon. If you meant by adopted and relied
upon
Mr. McKinney. They recognized the standard as being an appro-
priate standard but they didn't follow it.
Mr. Frank. Then I will repeat what I just said. That is a very
strange use of the phrase "it was adopted and relied upon." I would
think most people hearing you say or reading your statement that
it was adopted and relied upon would expect that it was complied
with.
If you meant to indicate that they thought it was a good stand-
ard but didn't pay any attention to it, I would suggest a different
choice of words. I am focusing on your statement.
Mr. McKinney. If you read the attachments to the written state-
ment, it is pretty clear that the medical people in the Government
service, including the Navy, accepted that standard as being appro-
priate. And they were also aware that the groups that they were
associated with were not following that standard because they
wrote to the Surgeon General about it.
Mr. Frank. Mr. McKinney, when you said — you did not say that
the naval medical people adopted and relied upon it. The statement
as you
Mr. McKinney. I don't think anybody else in the Navy would
have had the power to adopt a standard other than the medical
people.
Mr. Frank. You are telling me that the standard was adopted
but nobody followed it?
Mr. McKinney. I won't quibble about the word "adopted."
Mr. Frank. It is not a quibble. The question is whether or not a
promulgation that is not binding is an effective way to regulate?
I believe in part, based upon what I have heard today and other
discussions that I have had, was that in 1938 when the Public
Health Service said this is the standard but did not make it a bind-
ing one, that that was not the proper way to go about it, leaving
aside the fact that it was too high.
Your statement suggests the opposite, that the voluntary promul-
gation led to people adopting and relying on it. But I think that the
evidence suggested, in fact
Mr. McKinney. That statement wasn't intended to indicate that
at all. It would have been much better if it had been a binding
thing which had been enforced, but it wasn't.
Mr. Frank. OK, I appreciate that.
Mr. Markusson. Let me take one last try at this. The documents
certainly indicate that during the war years and subsequent to the
U.S. Public Health Service recommendation that the health offi-
cials within the Navy were endorsing the 5 million standard as an
appropriate standard for use in naval yards. Subsequently, that did
become incorporated in a U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine instruc-
tion which I am advised has the effect of an order within the Navy
controlling operation of a United States Naval shipyard.
215
That then continued in force at the 5-million-particle level until
August of 1972.
Mr. Frank. But as late as 1979 it wasn't being complied with, ac-
cording to the statement? As late as 1979, you are saying that you
couldn't have built a ship if you complied with it.
Mr. Markusson. No, we are saying that you couldn't build a ship
without the use of asbestos-containing materials. Certainly in the
seventies the evidence is that compliance with appropriate occupa-
tional health standards became better in the Navy.
I wouldn't suggest that they were fully complying in 1979 or,
indeed, in 1983. I just don't know.
Mr. Frank. They used some asbestos but there was not a prob-
lem with exposure by 1979. At what point did the Navy begin to
adopt that standard in a binding way for its own procedures?
Mr. Markusson. I believe, Mr. Chairman, and I will be happy to
provide the subcommittee with the first copy of the BuMed regula-
tion I have, but I believe it was sometime in the late 1940's that it
became adopted as a Bureau of Medicine regulation. There may
have been one sooner than that.
Mr. Frank. Were they from that time on fairly good about en-
forcing it themselves?
Mr. Markusson. I think they were terrible.
Mr. Frank. All right, that's my question. Was a point at which
they became better at enforcing it than
Mr. Markusson. Certainly the evidence seems to indicate that by
the mid-1970's they were getting appreciably better than they had
been in previous years.
Mr. McKiNNEY. But by that time there was a new standard.
Mr. Frank. The 1972 standard.
Now, what about the question of further reductions in the stand-
ards? Have you any views on that in terms of the time and
Mr. McKinney. We certainly think it is a matter which OSHA
should address itself to and consider. There seems to be a general
consensus that a 1-fiber-per-cc standard might be appropriate.
There also is some indication — and that chart which you were
shown here this morning was really addressed to this point — if you
go below 1 fiber per cc, there are many people who doubt that you
can accurately determine what the dust level is. And that was the
point, I suppose, of why they showed you that chart.
Those are the various positions that have been taken for some
time. We certainly think they ought to do the review and resolve
these questions.
Let me just ask you. The point at which the Occupational Safety
and Health statute was adopted and a binding standard was then
promulgated, one that was legally binding, did that make a signifi-
cant difference in anybody's behavior, either in the private or the
public sector?
Mr. McKinney. Prior to that the standard had been 5 fibers per
cc. If you are going to comply with 2 fibers per cc, you obviously
have to have equipment which is going to assure you that most of
the time you are well below 2 fibers per cc.
So the change in the standard undoubtedly required considerably
greater dust-control equipment than had been used prior to the re-
duction in ratio limit.
216
Mr. Frank. Was there any difference in the pattern of compli-
ance because one was legally binding and one was simply recom-
mended, not for the Government itself, but for the private sector?
Do you know if there was a difference in that pattern?
Mr. McKiNNEY. Obviously, we can't speak for the whole industry
because we don't know the whole industry. Within our company
targets were set over the years which were lower than the recom-
mended standards and we rather constantly had programs to devel-
op dust-control equipment, and so on, to reduce the levels of dust.
That was all voluntary. We were not required to do that by eco-
nomic forces or by Government regulation. It had largely to do
with providing a comfortable workplace.
Mr. Frank. Was there a problem for you? Or let me put it this
way: Given a situation in which there is a standard which has been
promulgated but not in a binding way, people have said not pro-
mulgated, but a standard has been declared and you are abiding by
it, but some competitors are not. Are you better off if it then be-
comes a legal requirement that everybody abide by it?
Mr. McKiNNEY. If we are talking specifically about asbestos, I
don't think so. It turned out, having decided to provide a good
working environment and as dust free as possible and having de-
veloped the ability to do that, it turned out that the cost of doing
this was not great enough to be a significant competitive factor.
Mr. Frank. Was that at either the 5 or the 2?
Mr. McKiNNEY. Yes. It turned out that way, there were a lot of
people who feared that going from 5 to 2 was going to have a tre-
mendously adverse effect on the economics of the asbestos industry
vis-a-vis other industries. That turned out not to be true.
Mr. Frank. The cost of compliance was less than people thought?
Mr. McKiNNEY. Yes.
Mr. Frank. We have got a rollcall so I am going to recess for
about 10 or 15 minutes.
Thank you, Mr. McKinney, no need for you to stay on. We will
come back and hear from Ms. Seminario or Mr. Wodka.
[Recess taken.]
Mr. Frank. We will reconvene and hear from Margaret Semin-
ario from the department of occupational safety and health of the
AFL-CIO.
STATEMENT OF MARGARET SEMINARIO, DEPARTMENT OF OCCU-
PATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS
Ms. Seminario. Good morning.
The AFL-CIO appreciates the opportunity to appear and testify
before this subcommittee on the very important subject of the fail-
ure to regulate and control exposure to asbestos.
The occupational health disaster resulting from asbestos expo-
sure which we are presently witnessing is of massive proportions.
An estimated 8,200 workers are now dying every year of asbesto-
sis, lung cancers, and mesotheliomas resulting from past on-the-job
exposures to asbestos.
An estimated 200,000 asbestos-related deaths will occur by the
end of the century.
p
217
Lawsuits involving thousands of asbestos victims and millions of
dollars have sent shock waves through the asbestos industry and
their insurance carriers. Bankruptcy actions have been initiated by
asbestos manufacturers to protect against future lawsuits. And
compensation schemes proposed to provide retribution to the scores
of thousands of unwitting asbestos victims.
The tragedy of asbestos is that the tragic destruction could have
been prevented. Information showing the health hazards of asbes-
tos known by the asbestos companies was withheld from the public.
Steps were not taken to warn workers of the dangers or to control
exposures. As a result, hundreds of thousands of workers will die.
Unfortunately, in 1983, the tragedy of asbestos continues. While
the risks of asbestos are documented and well known, Federal Gov-
ernment regulations and enforcement policies still permit expo-
sures potentially lethal to thousands of workers presently exposed.
Our written testimony has reviewed both the failure of the Gov-
ernment to establish and to enforce strong occupational asbestos
regulations.
My oral testimony will focus primarily on the failure of the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration under the Reagan ad-
ministration to enforce the existing asbestos standard. And that
testimony will follow on page 5 of my written statement.
Mr. Frank. The whole statement will be placed in the record.
Ms. Seminario. Thank you.
I am at the bottom of page 5.
The AFL-CIO is gravely concerned about the absence of serious
enforcement of the asbestos regulations that are currently in place,
indeed, the lack of enforcement of all regulations by the current
administration. Even though OSHA has had evidence in hand for
nearly 2 years, documenting the grave risk of exposure at the cur-
rent permissible exposure levels, there has been absolutely no
effort by the agency to step up enforcement of the current stand-
ard.
On the contrary, AFL-CIO analysis of OSHA enforcement data
shows a 60-percent drop in citations for violations of the asbestos
standard from fiscal year 1980 to 1982. This compares to a 27-per-
cent drop in total citations for all standards over the same time
period.
Rather than forcing reductions in asbestos exposure through the
issuance of more serious, willful and repeat citations and larger
penalties, OSHA has backed down in all these enforcement actions.
Serious citations for asbestos violations have dropped 68 percent,
willful citations are down 98 percent, repeat citations are down 73
percent and penalties for violations of the asbestos standard have
dropped by 85 percent.
j The unions have reported difficulty in getting OSHA to conduct
inspections to investigate potential asbestos exposure problems. A
request by the Allied Industrial Workers that OSHA conduct in-
spections of demolition sites listed in documents transmitted to
[ OSHA by EPA was turned down. OSHA responded that the EPA
' reports were not considered formal referrals and, therefore, did not
trigger OSHA inspections.
I At the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, the unions filed several
formal complaints with OSHA that the Navy was failing to provide
218 1
medical exams for asbestos-exposed workers as required by law. In-
stead of conducting a worksite inspection, OSHA forwarded the
complaints to the Navy for handling. The Navy responded that
there was no unsafe or unhealthful condition.
As this subcornmittee knows, it took an all-out effort by the
union, including Washington visits with OSHA and congressional
representatives to get OSHA to schedule an inspection, and a hear-
ing by this subcommittee to get the Navy to comply with the stand-
ard.
In our view, it should not take an act of Congress to obtain an
OSHA inspection and insure employer compliance with the law.
There are also problems where OSHA does conduct inspections
to investigate violations of the asbestos standard. According to
OSHA's field operations manual, revised this April 1983, violations
of the asbestos standard are to be cited as serious when the permis-
sible exposure limit of 2 fibers is exceeded.
However, violations of other provisions of the standard such as
medical surveillance and monitoring may be cited and grouped to-
gether as one other than serious violation, even though failure to
comply with these aspects of the standard put workers at serious
risk.
Penalties and citations are reduced in amount and gravity as
part of an OSHA settlement policy. In one case where the employ-
er was cited for violating monitoring, medical surveillance, respira-
tor, labeling and housekeeping provisions of the standard, a mean-
ingless penalty assessment of $630 was reduced to just $378 as part
of an OSHA settlement agreement.
I might add, in this particular case the employer was also violat-
ing the general respirator standard, the lead standard, a standard
on welding, in addition to other requirements. So this employer
was grossly out of compliance with numerous OSHA standards,
and also with the provisions of the asbestos standard itself.
In another case, serious and willful citations of the asbestos
standard issued by the Carter administration in 1980 were settled
in 1981 by the Reagan administration. The agreement reduced four
willful citations to serious citations and decreased penalties from
$18,475 to just $5,830. The agreement failed to specifically require
close-out medical exams for exposed workers.
The employer is now refusing to provide the exams but there has
been no follow-up inspection or other action by OSHA.
The AFL-CIO and the Industrial Union Department of AFL-CIO
have expressed concern to OSHA about the lack and effective en-
forcement of the asbestos standard and recommended an aggressive
enforcement policy which reflects the serious risk with asbestos ex-
posure.
The failure of OSHA to enforce even the current inadequate as-
bestos standard calls into question the agency's true commitment
to protect workers against the risks of exposure. Revisions of the
current standard will be meaningless unless they are enforced.
Workers will continue to die from asbestos-related diseases.
The AFL-CIO would like to see the following included in the as-
bestos enforcement program: An increased number of inspections
of asbestos hazards, particularly in high risk demolition and remov-
al jobs; a policy mandating serious citations for violations of the
219
standard regardless of exposure levels; greater use of willful cita-
tions where the employer has knowledge of the risks; and maxi-
mum penalties for violations of the standard.
In our view, in 1983 there is no excuse for employer noncompli-
ance with the weak 1972 standard. Aggressive enforcement, not
Government conciliation, is needed to protect workers from this
deadly hazard.
It is our hope that with the encouragement of this committee,
OSHA will respond to the current health risks posed by asbestos
exposure and develop both strong regulations and an enforcement
policy necessary to protect workers.
Thank you.
[Ms. Seminario's prepared statement follows:]
I
220
TESTIMONY OF MARGARET SEMINARIO,
DEPARTMENT OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH,
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS
BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND HOUSING ON
REGULATION OF OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS
June 28, 1983
The AFL-CIO appreciates the opportunity to appear and
testify before this subcommittee on the very important subject
of the failure to regulate and control exposure to asbestos.
The occupational health disaster resulting from asbestos
exposure which we are presently witnessing is of massive pro-
portions. An estimated 8,200 workers are now dying every
year of asbestosis, lung cancers and mesotheliomas resulting
from past on-the-job exposures to asbestos. An estimated 200,000
asbestos-related deaths will occur by the end of the century.
Law suits involving thousands of asbestos victims and millions
of dollars have sent shock waves through the asbestos industry
and their insurance carriers. Bankruptcy actions have been
initiated by asbestos manufacturers to protect against future
law suits. And compensation schemes proposed to provide
retribution to the scores of thousands of unwitting asbestos
victims .
The tragedy of asbestos is that the tragic destruction
could have been prevented. Information showing the health
hazards of asbestos known by the asbestos companies was withheld
from the public. Steps were not taken to warn workers of the
dangers or to control exposures. As a result, hundreds of
thousands of workers will die.
221
- 2 -
Unfortunately, in 1983 the tragedy of asbestos continues.
While the risks of asbestos are documented and well known,
federal government regulations and enforcement policies still
permit exposures potentially lethal to thousands of workers
presently exposed. Our testimony today will focus on the
failure of government to establish and enforce strong occupational
asbestos regulations.
The standards governing occupational exposure to asbestos
in this country have never been adequate. Ever since the passage
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970, meaningful
government action to protect workers exposed to asbestos has
been slow in coming, lagging behind known scientific evidence
by five to ten years .
OSHA's first regulatory action on asbestos was an emergency
temporary standard (ETS) issued in 1971 in response to a petition
by the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO. The emergency
standard which lowered the permissible exposure level to 5 fibers/cc
was followed in 1972 by a permanent standard which incorporated
the same exposure level (2 fibers/cc) , but required the level be
reduced to 2 fibers/cc in 1976. That standard remains in effect
today .
The 2 fiber/cc OSHA asbestos standard promulgated in 1972
was based in large part upon a 1968 standard recommended by the
British Occupational Hygiene Committee. The British standard,
however, was established to protect against asbestosis. Scientific
evidence showing lung cancer and mesothelioma resulting from
asbestos exposure was not considered in the establishment of the
25-994 0-83-15
222
3 -
(
I
British standard or OSHA regulation. Though evidence demonstrating
the cancer risks posed by asbestos has been available since the
1960 's, U.S. government regulations have never been designed to
protect exposed workers from these diseases .
Since 1972, OSHA has initiated revision of its asbestos
stnadard on several occasions. In 1975, in response to a court
decision and new scientific evidence, OSHA proposed to lower
the standard to 0.5 fibers/cc; except for the construction industry
which was to be covered by a separate subsequent action. The
proposed revision was published in the federal register and I
comments received but hearings on the proposal and final rulemaking
action never occurred.
During the Carter Administration, OSHA's activities on
asbestos centered on an evaluation and updating of the scientific
evidence and the preparation of economic and technical feasibility
docximents required for rulemaking. A joint OSHA/NIOSH Asbestos
Work Group was established, and in 1980 the group recommended a
reduction of the permissible exposure limit to 0.1 fiber/cc, and
improvements in the medical surveillance and environmental monitorint
provisions of the standard . The report of the work group also
stressed the need for reductions in the permissible exposures
in the maritime and construction industries. ■
According to the last health standards status report prepared
by the Carter Administration (January 1981) an advanced notice of
a proposed standard for asbestos was scheduled for the 4th quarter
of FY 1981. However, with the change in administration in 1981
I
223
- 4 -
the health standards priorities for OSHA changed dramatically..
Scheduled improvements of inadequate standards such as asbestos
were dropped or postponed; deregulatory actions for existing
standards became priorities. In 1982, action on asbestos was
postponed until the 3rd quarter FY 1982 for an advanced proposal,
but there was no perceptable action indicating that OSHA was in
fact working on revisions to the standard.
In 1982, the AFL-CIO became aware of a preliminary risk
assessment for asbestos prepared by OSHA which reportedly showed
very high levels of risk at current legal levels of exposures .
AFL-CIO requests for a copy of the document were turned down.
OSHA circulated the report to several parties for review, but
failed to put it in the relemaking docket for review and comment
by the general public, even though the agency did so for other
preliminary risk assessments such as benzene.
In February 1983, OSHA finally released the preliminary
risk assessment to the public as part of the agency's filings
to the U.S. Court of Appeals in the ethylene oxide case. The
dociiment estimated that at the current 2 fiber/cc standard as
many as 8/1000-260/1000, or up to 25 percent of exposued workers
may die from asbestos-related lung cancers. For total cancers,
the risk was even greater. And even at reduced levels of exposure
(0.5 fibers/cc and 0.1 f ibers/cc) the assessment predicted a
significant level of risk.
In March 1983, the AFL-CIO wrote the Assistant Secretary
for OSHA criticizing the agency for withholding and failing to
ia
*
224
■ - 5 -
act on evidence showing a grave danger, and requested expeditious
regulatory action on asbestos.
In April, the Assistant Secretary informed the AFL-CIO that
revisions of the asbestos standard was a top priority and set
an expedited rulemaking schedule for a proposal in June 1983,
and final action by the end of the year.
The AFL-CIO is encouraged by the Assistant Secretary's
recent response on the asbestos standard, and from all indications
the agency is now serious about revising the standard. However,
there are several major areas of concerns.
OSHA has indicated its proposed revision will be based upon
the earlier 1975 proposal which would limit permissible exposure
to 0.5 fibers/cc. However, available scientific evidence supports
the need for a stricter standard of 0.1 fibers/cc as recommended
by the NIOSH/OSHA work group in 1980. OSHA's asbestos revisions
will be separated into two rulemakings, one concerning the per-
missible exposure level, the other concerning provisions for medicj
surveillance, monitoring and other aspects of the stnadard. While
a December 1983 final action has been set reducing the permissible
exposure level, no date has yet been set for final action on the
standard's other revisions which are equally important.
But of greatest concern to the AFL-CIO is the absence of
serious enforcement of asbestos regulations, indeed all regulatioE
by the current administration. Even though OSHA has had evidence
in hand for nearly two years documenting the grave risk of exposuri
at the current permissible levels, there has been no effort by tlw
agency to step up enforcement of the current standard.
225
- 6 -
On the contrary, AFL-CIO analysis of OSHA enforcement data
shows a 60 percent drop in citations for violations of the asbestos
standard from FY 1980 to FY 198 2. This compares to a 27 percent
drop in total citations for all standards over the same time
period. Rather than forcing reductions in asbestos exposure
through the issuance of more serious, willful and repeat citations,
and larger penalties, OSHA has backed down in all these enforcement
actions. Serious citations for asbestos violations have dropped
68X, willful citations are down 98%, repeat citations are down 73%
and penalties have decreased by 85%. (See attached).
Unions report difficulty in getting OSHA to conduct inspections
to investigate potential asbestos exposure problems. A request
by the Allied Industrial Workers that OSHA conduct inspections of
demolition sites listed in documents transmitted to the agency
by EPA was turned down. OSHA responded that the EPA reports were
not considered formal referrals, and therefore did not trigger
OSHA inspections .
At the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, the unions filed several
formal complaints with OSHA that the Navy was failing to provide
medical exams for asbestos-exposed workers as required by law.
Ins-tead of conducting a worksite inspection, OSHA forwarded the
complaints to the Navy for handling. The Navy responded that
there was no unsafe or unhealthful condition. As this subcommittee
knows, it took an all out effort by the union, including Washington
visits with OSHA and Congressional representatives to get OSHA to
schedule an inspection, and a hearing by this subcommittee to get
226
- 7 -
the Navy to comply with the standard. In our view, it should
not take an act of Congress to obtain an OSHA inspection and
ensure employer compliance with the law.
There are also problems where OSHA does conduct inspections
to investigate violations of the asbestos standard. According
to OSHA's Field Operations Manual (April 1983) violations of the
asbestos standard are to be cited as serious when the permissible
exposure limit is exceeded. However, violations of other provisions
of the standard such as medical surveillance and monitoring may
be cited and grouped together as one other than serious violation, e
though failure to comply with these aspects of the standard put
workers at serious risk. ■
Penalties and citations are reduced in amount and gravity as
part of an OSHA settlement policy. In one case, (Robert E. Derecktoi
Co. t+67321229) where the employer was cited for violating monitoring,
meidcal surveillance, respirator, labeling and housekeeping pro-
visions of the standard, a meaningless penalty assessment of $630.00
was reduced to just $378.00 as part of an OSHA settlement agreement.
In another case, serious and willful citations of the asbestos
standard issued by the Carter Administration were settled in 1981
by the Reagan Administration. The agreement failed to specifically
require close-out medical exams for exposed workers. The employer
is now refusing to provide the exams, but there has been no follow-
up inspection or other action by OSHA.
The AFL-CIO and Industrial Union Depart-Tient , AFL-CIO have
expressed concern to OSHA about the lack of effective enforcement
i
227
- 8 -
of the asbestos standard and recommended an aggressive enforcement
policy which reflects the serious risks of asbestos exposure.
Failure of OSHA to enforce even the current inadequate asbestos
standard calls into question the agency's commitment to protect
workers against the risks of exposure. Revisions of the current
standard will be meaningless unless they are enforced.
The AFL-CIO would like to see the following included in an
asbestos enforcement program: 1) an increased number' of inspections
of asbestos hazards particularly in high risk demolition and removal
jobs; 2) a policy mandating serious citations for violations of the
standard regardless of exposure levels; 3) greater use of willful
citations where the employer has knowledge of the risks ; and
4) maximum penalties for violations of the standard. In our view,
in 1983, there is no excuse for employer non-compliance with the
weak 1972 standard. Aggressive enforcement, not government con-
ciliation is needed to protect workers from this deadly hazard.
It is our hope that with the encouragement of this committee
OSHA will respond to the current health risks posed by asbestos
exposure and develop both strong regulations and an enforcement
policy necessary to protect workers.
228
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229
Mr. Frank. Thank you, Ms. Seminario.
Let me say we will have hearings scheduled at some point in the
future focusing specifically on the lack of enforcement because I
think that that is a very serious problem in this area as in some
others.
Let me ask you about the reference you made with regard to the
EPA and demolition sites. Demolition — several of the witnesses
told us earlier — was a particularly serious potential cause of asbes-
tos problems. Will you elaborate? You said that they said the list
that they got from the EPA was not a formal referral so they could
not, or would not
Ms. Seminario. Conduct inspections.
I have correspondence that is the subject of an exchange between
the Allied Industrial Workers, which is headquartered in Milwau-
kee, and region 5 of OSHA which is located in Chicago, encompass-
ing the Midwestern heavy industrial States including Illinois, Wis-
consin, and that general region.
The correspondence was from a Mr. Milan Racic who is director
of Health and Safety for the Allied Industrial Workers. Mr. Racic
used to be an OSHA inspector. He used to work for the agency and
when he was with OSHA he recured notices from EPA indicating
that there were going to be demolitions at certain sites. He contin-
ued to get some of that information when he went to work for the
Union and he requested of OSHA what was their policy with re-
gards to this information.
One of the letters from Alan McMillan, who is the region 5 ad-
ministrator, states, and let me just read it.
This is in response to your letter of April 18, 1983 regarding EPA demolition of
worksites which contain asbestos. As this information is received from EPA, it is
transmitted to the area office which has jurisdiction. Since these reports do not indi-
cate any evidence of a violation of our asbestos standards they are not processed as
referrals. Therefore, these reports are informational only and are maintained in the
event that an inspection is scheduled at a facility during the time frame of demoli-
tion or renovation.
I should also note that OSHA has no jurisdiction over the gener-
al public and these or any areas that portion of your inquiry
should be more appropriately addressed to the EPA. Sincerely,
Alan McMillan.
So, according to OSHA, that information is not sufficient to trig-
ger any kind of inspection. It is not considered informal complaint
or information that would be used to schedule a general schedule
inspection into those sites.
Mr. Frank. Let me ask you first if there will be any objection to
entering that correspondence into the record?
Ms. Seminario. Not at all.
Mr. Frank. If not, we will enter it into the record.
[The correspondence follows:]
230
DOMINICK O'AMBROSIO
WILLIAM J SALAMOMC
INTERNATIONAL UNION
3
elEphane
ept
*i*- e*5 -ssoo
■ l*TCD WITm TWt * r L Q ' Q
April 18, 1983
A. I. W au I LOlM C
3S«0 WCST OKLAMOH* AVCHUC
.irLWAUKEE. WISCONStN 53215
Mr. Alan C. McMillan
Regional Administrator
U.S. Dept. of Labor
0SHA-32nd Floor
230 S. Dearborn Street
Chicago. Illinois 60604
Dear Mr. McMillan:
Enclosed is a list of demolition work sites that we received from the
U.S. EPA. According to this document, these buildings did contain
friable asbestos.
Please let me know what action did your office take to insure that
workers at these work sites and the general public in the surrounding
areas were not exposed to asbestos fibers. .
Your prompt response is appreciated.
Sincerely,
(' 'Milan Racic
Health and Safety Director
MR/ab
opeiu#9afl-cio
231
U.S. Department of Labor
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
230 South Dearborn Street
Cliicago, Illinois 60604
May 24, 1983
Mr. Milan Racic
Health and Safety Director
ALLIED INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF AMERICA
AIW Building
3520 West Oklahoma Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53215
Dear Mr. Racic:
This is in response to your recent letter which expanded vpon your inquiry of
April 18, 1983, regarding EPA's "Notification of Demolition (Friable Asbestos).
I responded to your original letter on May 5, 1983. That letter addressed the
questions which are discussed in your recent correspondence.
Blease note that our policy regarding this issue is discussed in our FOM and
' allowing that guideline.
Ala^i C. McMillan
Regional Administrator
232
OOMINICM D'AMtnOSIO
WILLIAM J SALAmONE
i ER NAT lOKAL UN 1
OF A.>IERICA
t * r L - C i O
JBiephant
i« - e«5 - esoo
A. IW auil-DINC
3S>0 WCST ONLAXOM* AVCNUC
•ItLWAUKEC. WISCONSIN 532IS
May 17, 1983
Mr. Michael Connors
Deputy Regional Administrator
U.S. Dept. of Labor
OSHA-32nd Floor
230 S. Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Dear Mr. Connors:
Enclosed is a copy of the latest U.S. EPA Region V "Notification of
DemoMtion (Friable Asbestos)." Please let us know if your office
is regularly receiving this information from the U.S. E.P.A. If your
office is, we would like to know what is being done to prevent exposures
to employees and the general public at these work locations? Please
list your actions in the same order or provide information on the
U.S. EPA forms in column designated "Results of inspections."
I hope that we do not have to discuss here the merits of trying to prevent
unnecessary asbestos exposures. I think that OSHA should take action and
try to assure that asbestos is either removed prior to the demolition or
otherwise handled in a way consistent with OSHA's asbestos standard.
We believe that OSHA has an obligation to act since they are being
informed that the demolition of buildings containing asbestos is taking
place. Not acting on this information given to your agency at least as
a referral requiring field investigations including air sampling, will not
be consistent with OSHA's mandate under the act - to provide safe and health-
ful workplace.
233
Michael Connors
May 17, 1983
Page 2
Please provide us with specific information requested above and also with
an answer to our request for field inspections of all workplaces listed
in this U.S. EPA notification and other similar information in the future.
At the same time would you please discuss this matter with your people in
Washington, D.C. so that we are assured that this new inspection policy
will cover all ten Regional Offices of OSHA.
Your prompt action and response is appreciated.
Sincerely,
MR/ab
opeiu#9afl-cio
Milan Racic
Health and Safety Director
234
U.S. Department of Labor
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
230 South Dearborn Street
Chrcago, Illinois 60604
May 5, 1983
Mr. Milan Racic
Health and Safety Director
ALLIED INDUSTRIAL VDRKERS OF AMERICA
AIW Building
3520 West Oklahona Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53215
Dear Mr. Racic:
This is in response to your letter of April 18, 1983, regarding EPA demolition
work sites which contain asbestos.
As this information is received from EPA, it is transmitted to the Area Office
whic* has jurisdiction. Since these reports do not indicate any evidence of a
violation of our asbestos standard, they are not processed as referrals,
therefore these reports are informational only and are maintained in the event
that an inspection is scheduled at a facility during the time frame of the
demolition or renovation.
I should also note that OSHA has no jurisdiction over the general public in
lese or any areas. That portion of your inquiry should be more appropriately
addressed to the/lEPA.
Sincekely
Alad C. McMillan
Regional Mministrator
I
235
Mr. Frank. What Mr. McMillan, is saying is that with regard to
a list which EPA has referred to OSHA that the appropriate re-
sponse would be to call that list to the attention of the EPA which
sent it to OSHA in the first place.
Ms. Seminario. They are saying for some aspects of it to call it to
EPA's attention because EPA
Mr. Frank. At least someone at EPA must have been aware of
that list since EPA compiled it. I am just wondering, OSHA's re-
sponse didn't seem to be useful.
What would it take to get an inspection? I mean, they said they
are not going to do it just because EPA referred it, suppose some of
the people working there asked for one?
Ms. Seminario. Under OSHA's current inspection policy the
agency has somewhat limited its response to complaints or infor-
mation of this kind.
There are four different kinds of OSHA inspections. They include
general schedule inspections that the agency schedules both for
safety hazards and health hazards. Also there are inspections in re-
sponse to worker or union complaints. Complaints break down into
two categories. Formal complaints are those that come in writing,
are signed by a person who has some relationship with the employ-
er such as an employee or employer representatives.
There is also another category of complaints called nonformal
complaints which come in over the telephone or come in perhaps in
writing but are from a member of the general public. OSHA
doesn't consider them to be a formal complaint. OSHA divides
those two kinds of complaints with respect to how it responds. It
will only respond under its policy with an actual workplace inspec-
tion to a formal complaint.
A nonformal complaint will simply be answered by a letter from
OSHA to the employer saying that OSHA has information availa-
ble, that someone has complained about a situation and ask is it
true? isn't it true? and if it is true, what are you doing to correct
it?
In our view, the agency is really missing the boat because a lot of
those informal complaints may contain serious hazards.
So in this case it doesn't even look like OSHA is considering this
EPA transmittal to be even sufficient to institute a nonformal com-
plaint.
Mr. Frank. Did that union represent any of the people involved
in any of these demolition sites?
Ms. Seminario. Not in these particular sites that I know of.
Mr. Frank. But in the case of the Portsmouth-Kittery Naval
Base even a request by employees and their legal representatives
didn't automatically trigger an inspection; is that correct?
Ms. Seminario. That is correct. If you read OSHA's enforcement
policy, their bible of enforcement, which is a field operations
manual, that kind of non-response is contrary to the policy. Howev-
er, as we talk to our union representatives around the country,
what we find is that the area offices are not necessarily following
the policy as stated from the national office.
In other words, formal written complaints are coming into OSHA
from workers, and they are coming into OSHA from union repre-
sentatives, and they are not being responded to by inspections.
236
They are simply being responded to by letters to the employer.
This is a problem and I don't see any action by the national office
to correct this kind of problem.
Mr. Frank. Let me ask, and I will conclude with this. If you will
continue to compile them, sometime later this summer or later this
fall we will have a hearing specifically addressing the enforcement
policy, not just with regard to asbestos but across the board, be-
cause it obviously ties into the questions of budget adequacy as
well as other issues.
Thank you very much, Ms. Seminario. Can we get a copy of those
documents? Do you have an extra copy?
Ms. Seminario. I do. And there are also just a couple of other
documents I would like to enter dealing with some of my testimo-
ny: One is a settlement agreement in which OSHA reduced these
citations and penalties; another is a citation in which, in our view,
there were inadequate assessments for penalties as well as overly
long abatement periods for asbestos-related hazards. Those are the
three documents I would like to leave with you.
Mr. Frank. Thank you. Those will be entered into the record and
we will also before the record closes, write to OSHA and if they
have any response and explanation they would like to make we
will hold the record open for that.
Ms. Seminario. Thank you.
Mr. Frank. We will give OSHA a chance to respond.
Thank you.
[The documents follow:]
237
i^'iTi-.i) srATF.K or' A:;i':;u"A ■
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY ANO ilT.Al.TH r.A'U.W Ct,Jl»lSf!I("iS'^
SECRETARY OF LABOR, United Sltics
Depnrtiiient '^f Labor,
CcinplaLiiaiiL, ■•• i)OC:<ET N'O. i'.0-U''i?,6
•• [:;;cio:i [
THOMAS 0'CON'»OR l:', CO., INC.,
KespondcriL.
Coraplai:;jriL anil Respoinleiit hereby stipul.ile ami agree that:
(.1) Oil July 17, lOfiO, respondi tiL w.js citi.J C^r .lUcged violations of t!;e
Occupational S.ifety and Health Art of 1970, 29 USC C.51, et scg^, hereinafter refer-
iv<\ 10 .in Lhi' Act and \;:r.: is.snccl .i Not i f i i m; mi: of •■(.•posed [en.ilty in tlic tot.il
jinouMt o! $18, -WS.
(2) Ivcspiindent , an employr'r wiLl-.iii the .ne.iun.?'. ui M.-ctioii 3(j) of Llio Act,
duly filed with 1 represent jl ivc of the Se^rrciry <>[ L.JiOr .i notice ot intent ro
i.,i!tiot Lhe citations .ind proposed [len.j 1 1 nv . 'Ihi;. ii^'ti e '...is ihily tr-iLr-.Tiit ted to
ll:r- Ki A^eu' Coiin:ii .;:, i on .ind it is ai^ieid l!.iL j 1 1 i :. I i ct i ■ ;■ ci Miis | i utrrdiir.' i^ ci n-
(eti-Ml upon said Con;.:ii s:'-ion !)y .-ertioii !0U ' j! tli- A't,
(!i) Tlie Socret.iry of Lal'or li.i;. lil.'d .-. .';.)i..jj1 li nt lieniu ;;i.iLi if, wii'.i
particuL.ri t y il;- violitif.n^ .illcn-d, tl.i ini iL'.-_ prri'cscd rid lae isine.. in coali-;-'-
b. I.OIC tlie Coiti;iu:.s ion.
ti) As a result of cons ider.it i un ny Cu : ;. l,i i n.mt of ■.a-.; i" roir.u t i-.i tu:.;ring
U|Kjn the ficlurs .-.er fcilh in sections 17(jl .iiul 'H.i) of the Act, the CoxpLa i:-..:at
iii-rehy niuves to augend his complaint as follui.s: {.i) Cit^tioa No. 2 - change ail
Lout (.4) Willful items to Serious; lb) Change penalties on the four (4) Willfiil
Items to $1C00 each; (c) All other ptnalties and designations remain the sane;
lotal Aneiuled Penalty - $3830.
25-994 0-83-16
238
(5) Respondent agrees to distribute a written safety procedure to all
management and supervisory personnel regardii^g all OSIIA regulations concerned with
the handling, nixing, application, removing, cutting, scoring, etc., of asbestos
and byproducts of abestos .
(6) In view of the aforesaid, respoiidenL hereby withilrawc its Notice of Con-
test and the parties agree that the citiitini .an! prriporod penalty, as amended by
thir. ai^rci'iiicia, sh.ill bo affiniir.l ind lu'um.i' U;- li:i:il u.-.lcr uf Ihr (Kcupat Lf>n;i I
Safety and Health Kevicv.' Coniaiss loii.
(7) Respondent certifies Lh.aL Llic viclai. i .in.. .Jli'i-ed li.-ivc Ljc-t;n .iii.itcd or will
be abated by the abjtcmer.t daU-s as shewn in Llie ciration as amended above, and tli..iL
the penally, as amended, !ir.s been paid. UL-ipoiidLMa agrLcy to ccmply with the .\ct
in all respects in the fiiLure.
(8) Respondent further certifii^s that llic original .Notice of Contest and a
copy of this agreement have been posted and llial all pleadiiii'.s and documents in this
matter have been served in accordance with Cc>i'.,mi ssion Knlcs 7 and 100.
(9) Respondent's consent to tlic entry of a final nrder by the Conunission pur-
suant to this settlement agreement shall not roiistUutc an admission by Respondent
of violations of the Act in any proccedins^ oti.cr than proceedings brought directly
under the provisions of the Occupational Salety and Health Act ol 1970 including,
but not limited to, any citations issued or pt-ualtits propo.ncd by tlie Secretary
under the provisions of sections lO(.i) and IJlb) oC thf Act.
THOMAS O'CONNOR ). CO., INC.
BY .. ^ . '.' '^j -■
T. Tiiiijthy Hyan, Jr.
Sol '. c 1 tor o r Lalior
/,<■ . Albert H. Uos.s
Ret^ional .Solicit'^r
Koliert J.-;rliirphy I U
AtLon.e.y'
United! Stales D.p.i rl ineut of L.T'r.r.r
Attuniey;, lur Compl.iiiiant
239
U. S. Department o{ Labor
Occupaiionai Sa(e'y and Healih /^c'miniEtralion
169 Weybossct St., 5tli floor
Providence, RT 029033893
Re-ply !C the Allenlion of:
Februjry 3, 1983
Jatnes Lennon, Business Agent
United Steel Workers of America
Local t9057
980 Reservoir Avenue
Cranston, RI 02910
Deal Mr. Lemon:
RE: Robert E. Derecktor of Rhode Island, It
Enclosed plpaso find a copy of the Settlement Agreement reached with
the above referenced company on 1/31/83. Also enclosed is a copy
of the citations with changes noted.
Si nee rely ,
LINDA R. ANKU
A.rea Director
End.
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240
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OCCUPATIONAL EAFI-TY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
In the Matter of: Robert K . Derecktor of OSHA No. G7321-229
Rhode Island, Inc.
Informal Settlement Agreement
The undersigned Lmploycr and the undersigned Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) in settlement of the above citation(s)
and penalties which were issued on January 7, 1985 , hereby agree as
follows:
1. The Employer agrees to abate the violations as
cited in the above referenced citations or as
amended below.
2. The Employer agrees to pay the proposed penalties,
if any, as issued with the above referenced citation(s)
cr, if amended by this agreement, as amended below.
3. The Employer and OSHA agree that the following citations
and penalties (if any) are not being amended by this
agreement. NONE
4. OSHA agrees that the following citations and penalties
are being amended as follows: SEE ATTACHF.D
241
•j. Tnf rmjiloycr, by ''igiilrn; this iiiftirm.il seftlpincnt agreementi
tieieby wjives its lights to contest the above citatlon(s) and penalties,
4
as amended in paragraph A of this agreement.
(j. The employer agrees to immediately post a copy of this Settlement
Agreement in 3 prominant place nt. or near the location of the vlolation(s)
referred to in paragraphs 3 and ^ above. This Settlement Agreement must
remain [losted until the violations have been corrected or for 3 working days
(excluding weekends nnd Federal Ho! i days) , whichever period is longer.
For iTie Occupat-ional Safety
and iJlcaHh Adrni ni stratioti
Date"*
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
The law givcLi you or your representative the opportunity to object to any
abatement date set for a violation if you believe tlie date to be unreasonable.
Any ceritcst to the abatement dates of the citations amended in paragraph 4
of thir. Settlruent Agreement nmst be mailed to:
U. S. Department of Labor - OSHA
1C9 Wcyl'os.set Street, Sth Floor
Providence, RI 0?003
Thic uAst be done within 1? worl'.ing days (excluding weekends and Federal
Holid;.y:.) of the receipt by the Fciploycr of this Scttlenent Agreement. You
or ycui' representative alio have the right to object to any of the abatement
d.^tcr set for vi ;.1 -> I i oris ri-f cried to in paragraph 3, provided that the objec-
tion is mailed' to the office shown above within the 15 working day period
estnblished by the origin;ii citation.
242
U.S. PEPARir.UMr OF LABOn
OCCUPAllOniAL SArETV ANt' Hty^lH ADMINISTRATION
CITATION and NOTIFICAT r6N OF PENALTY
169 (Jeylioasot ot., 5th floor
Providenoa, lil 0?;033J93
ii\_JPtt yrbsH)
1/7/tlJ 4:7321 229
01
oSHniiuMeEn
190
■ PAGE
|1 0' 10 I
TO Robort E. DerftdctoT of Rhode Iclaadi Inc.
and Ite imco«BBoro
Eldg. 18, Coddinjrlcn Cova
Klddlctowa, RI 023.',0
9/>12/M/32
INSPECTION SITE
Bldg. 6
THE {.^V^ REOUIRtS that ■ cofjy ol Ih!'
Citation be polled immcdiattV tn a promt
■V tciu- .
» I »mmiwn«a.»i».Miai ■ i^'
?hio violatioiiE described tn this citation are allcgod to hav^ occurrsd
en or abcrat the day tha inqppction was nado unlecs otherwios Irtdi&ated
v/ithin tho Aoscriptioa given VpIow.
Vhc iutTAiaoe of tbiti citatio;\ doo3 iiot ccnrtitute a firdine that a
violatio:.* of tho Act hrv3 occitru'od unlcon tiiere in a falliir« to oontoct
.13 providsd for in the Act or, if contesrtcd, unless the citation io
^rfirccd by tho llcviov Coimiouion.
1
^9 c:'S 1910.107(c)(2) I Open fl£snc(n) or rpark prcduning eTuipfaMit,
not :oj>arat.Td by a partitioni Mere located within 20 feat of .prajr-
in^ area(B):
Repair TaaM, Tocjjxsi-arj- Pipe Shop: vjolding erfuinBcnt woa
located in the ..prtyinc axoa. on or about K)/26/32.
?.
.'V CrR 1910.107(c)(C): PovtaMo lcinq)(r) wore used In .praying
aiva^a) d\irine jpiciyiiis oporitions;
Repair Yard, Tcmpcrts-ry Pipo 'Jhcp: A npn-eiplosioo-prtxjf
port&Llo lamp Vcc i-'iied to illuainata paj-tn boind nia"ai/«d
on or aboat 10/26/02.
9 CM 1510.11l(b)('!0)(ii)t .Jtatlonary omncnia ■tcxras'
..natalli^tion(B) did not havu ct leoat two r-uitabl« gaa naslui in readily
lococciblo locatj 0.101
Biildin*; 1G: No ricpiratcry protectivo davioo« w»r» waileblc
on or about 9/iO/ J2.
!9 CFH 1910.11l(b;(lO}(iii)t litationcjy ctcraiT* tnctallatton* did not
.civo (in eaolly ftoospoiblo r;ho'jer or a [>0-t;skll«i drua of w«t«r.
Bulldli\: 13» !:c -..hcy^r or iitor for fluuhirc of tho body
wae nvailsiblf cifj ot- about ^/iO/^'i.
:) cm 1910.1.>2(»): Protootl.-?) eTnljaBknt waa not unad «rfi'«
• AflfeAoTpficToS
'•^"■"^ !'■'' <^»iiWt W.W 3g^ffl°3!^;-
1/17/83
1/17/33
4/<?/03
2A/83
2A/83
l/h-i^.
tnnu 1^. A2KU
.>JOTICE TOEMPLOYF.es - The law ijivcmn empluyee or his tM,-LOVER OlSCI'IMINAI ION UNLAWI Ul - Ih. Uvvpiu TOIALfl
^
243
US DEPARrM'"NT OF LAf^iOR
OCCUPATIONAl SAFETY AND MF A.^^M AOMlNtSTR ATION
( )
CITATION and NOTIFICAAOM OF PENALTY
169 '.(ojboaoOt 3t., 5th floor
Provtdcnco, ^I 029033303
ES2B^2SEm2n:3SS2331
emexher
^Q. Rotwrt E. Dcreclctoi' of !<hodo Irlmid, Ino.
oad Ite nujcoBBors
Bld^. 13, Coddir^on Covo
Klddletoim, lil 02340
r^ .
1/7/0 i_ tJTii^^'-'
' RteiiiFi' I'ARtX l''r«ct
01 (|lSK) I2 Of 10
'w^^wm^
.^jCTjogsur
THE LAW REQUIRES thai a cop/ ol Ihll
T^fcrlWtT/v';
I Cl« wowwpcn -
STANDARD, REGULATION OR SECTION OF THE ACT VIOLATED; DESCRIPTION
:i<!ceL6ary whonevor hazard^ oapablo of causing injiiry and
impaiment were encountered:
Hew jubaoeembly Imildinfi: (1) 'Jhipfitter guiding ris^ei
■jtool plate wan not wearing .afety : hoes on or about 10/i3/32.
h'j alleccd violations belou hive boijn (;raupc\l borauuo thej involvo
imilar or related hazurd'j that nay liicroato the potential for Injiii-y
i-cimlting from an eccldcnt.
■5A
29 C.rR 1910.134(a)(2): Thp oDployor did not totabllBh and train-
tain a reepiratory protection progrnn which inolude^l tho jxculre-
;30nt outlined in para{,Tapl. (b) of thir recti on;
H©tf ^iu'tosncmbly Biiildingi Two (2) eraployeea were oxpoBod
to iron oxide TunnB in excess of the 3-hour time weifrhted
Bvcraco of 10 ri\:-/'0 dui-in^ oonfined ;;pace MiG welding
opei'ationa in Icrrtcr butt 4A5 on or about 10/13/(32.
;9 Cl'ii 1910.1OO0(a)(2)i Ihployee(B) uero oxponed to niatorial(B) in
oxceso of the 8-hour tiue weighted average liiait(i;) listed for tho
iKvrticular Batorial(n) in table Z-1 of '-ubjwjrt Z of 29 CTO part I9IO:
How Subasaombly Buildings Two (?) eraployeea perfornlng
confined npaco MIG welding were expocod to Iron ozlda furcea
in excens of the 3 hour tloe weighted avcra^ limit of
10 Bg/»3 on cr about 10/l3/32.
.«; cm 1910.252(f)(4)(l)i Me-unte ventilation to prevent oconmulation
if torio materiala or pocoiblo oiygcn dofioionr^y wsia not provWed
Tor wnldero or bolpers engajjod in welding acd cuttlnfj oporatlono
jr other pcraonaal in tho iaoediate vicinity in confined jpaoAs:
n«v rhibaaoembly Duil-lin^: Tvo (2) CS53I078O8 o/ornrp-OEod
to Iroa oxide fuinf-n froa confined apace MIO -.nlui.ag wcro
not provided with .ide'Tiate ventilation on or nboui IO/13/R2.
■ AREA DiriECTOR
^.flA,
LrrDA n. atiku
4//!/^3
2/7/33
2/7/03
NQUCLJP.t.Ci1£UQYEES - The lav ti vej .m rmplovec or his twrLOYER DISCRIMINATION i/NLAWPUL - Tho low pro
' ■■.■■■4.A r^o»^.»>Aj..-.-.-.-.l»«.i ■■■■ ,-■ , ■ .^ ^ ^^ *"
TOfAirc
244
us DC^ Aflll'f-HT TT LA,iOH
OCCUPAriONAL SAFETY A^-0ME^.JHA0MINI5rR<lII0l^*
CITATION a-id N0TIFICA1 lUN OF PENALTY
169 Woy^ooeot St., 5^-'' floor
Providcnca, RI C2<j033393
nobcrt K. Dorockior of ahodfl Ir>l-»wi, Inc.
end i*B cucooDoore
Bldfi. 13, CoddiiiGton Cove
Middletam, !?I 02C/,0
-rv^
■ RCCIflN
01
> OSIIt MUWIEII
07321 229
0190
• rAcc
3 0, 10
I
THE LAW ((EOUIRES thai • copy ol ihi
Cttalion h« polled immcdisTfliv in • promt
STANDARD. llfcliWHI IUWgW3EFnOM Of THE ACTVIOtATCP; rK^CKTrriCir
29 era 1910.134(b){l)i Written 3tandard oporating procednreB
-ovornlng th« selection and une of reupirators were not eotAUiebedi
Men Suljaosembly Duildlns: Two (2) employees overaxpoeod
to Iron oxida nirara whilo "UG weldinc In confined r.p.Tcos
and written SOf' ^ wero not established for re: pirator
oolection aiid ui*.
29 era 1910.134Cb)(2)t ricnpirator(b) were not ;;electod on the
banic of hasarda to which tho -.rorker was e.xponcdt
How SubaciDcnbly Aiilding: :inplo7o«, overexposed to iron
oiido furass durir^ confirxjd :,pace HIO weldins in Maotor butt
iJA5 wan wearing a 3-e::pirator with organic vapor cartridgso
procodod ty duni and Tsiat filtero on or about 10/13/32.
6"''
:>) CVil 1910. 134(b)(3) I The unero of rccplratorB were not inetrvict-
'■(1 aiki trained in tho proper ur« of reopirators ard their Uaita-
.ionr;
"lew EubasBOBibly Biiildingi Employoa, ovoroiposed to iTon
oxide fxjueo during; confined ;;pace MID welding on Blaster butt
445 wearing a rcopirator with oiganio vaptw oartridqi»8
pMooded by durt ojtl nviot filtoro on or obcwt 10/13/82
was not trained ii' tho proper uro end ll«ltntlon« of
rerpiratore.
I'lC
,'9 era 1910.134(b)(5) I Rcnpiratoro wcra not regularly ol6aa«d and
.;ijinfcotod. Resptratora j.n™od for tho oicluBlva uoe of 0(M *o;-1c«r
<.->ro not cleaned after oacli day' r use, or toore often if nooftcaary.
.espiratore uood by ao\ro than one worker were not cleaned sad
li -infected ei^or each uooi
Wew SubaoaomblT Duildingx Jnployee, crvoraocposed to lr<»
exile fmioB duria-j t'onfinod cp.ioe XIC v^ldiAS on <f about
10/13/32, won uer.rinf: a reapJJfctor that ifsji not cleaned
after each lay' j una. The one r-appil(*l air fa«e ■•sk
was ctorcd in a tojl obtat.
4/4/83
2/7/03
4/4/33
4/4/S3
AHEADIMCCTOR
MnJ^^
tJPOk R. AKTJ
lOTICF. TO EMPLOYEtS - Tho law nivcs on employee ot hit EMPLOYER OlSCrtlMINATION UNLAV/FUL - The law pro
I
' «>ft.t:
U'
TOTAlH'
245
U S. DEPARTMtNr Df LASOR
OCCUf A IIONAL SAtETY ANDHtA.l-JH AOMINISTRA nON
CITATIONand NOTIFICATION OF PCNALTY
169 V/eyboop«t St., ^th floor
Pr<»Tid(»nc«, RI o:?9O33053
rii-]T.Mi'ifii
ornER 2
Robert K. Der«cktar of Rhode lelanli Ino.
end its cmnceosoro
Bldg. 13, CoddlrvrtOD Coy«
mddlotown, Til 02S4O
/>-^ . ,
l/7/a3 G7321 223
REniOl)
01
THE LAW REQUIRES that a copy of Ihii
Cilation bfl poilrd immediHcly in a protni-
■NMtt oiac« at or Mar the location of tfie vio-.
^9 CFR 1910.134('b)(6)j neLflrators were not
aicnt, clean and sanitary looationt
stored In a c<nw«-
Hew Subaocoably Buildlngt Tteploy**, ovoro:qx>Ded to iron
oxide fooon dtiring confload (--pace ?<IG welding on Martor butt
4i5 did not ..tore reapirator in a olean location on or about
10/13/02.
■'J CPil 1910.134(b)(8): Appropriate ^nirveillonoo of work aroa
.oniitionR and decree of croployee eipoaure or rrtreso was not
^ntalnedi
Hew Subaooombly Building: The employer did not evtluato
worlt conditions and degree of eirployee oiposure to at3sure
that employees were provided with rcepiratory protootion
appropriate for protection afrainot the omount aj^d type of
air contoninant.; to -jhich thoy were oxpoaod:
i) Eiaploycoa wore cipocied to iron oxide fuiaea as
veil ac other motul iumcis ottcl goeeu and no curveillance
was perfomed.
..r
J CFR 1910.134(b)(lO): Persons were aBeigaod to tasks rw'Tuirlng
36 of roopiratorB and it liad not bo«n determinod that they were
■hyflcally able to perform the work and uce the o<7ulpE^ent, and the
"ccpirator uoer's nodical . ttituo wa« not revle>wed periodically (fur
n::iexico annually) I
Kew Subaescmbly Bailding: asployoe, ovwoxponed to iron
oxide fnmee, woarln.5 a reapirator prlsr to a doteralnfiticn
that the employBo m.-mj piiyoically ^le to porfcrn the work
while wearing tlio reapirator on or about IO/13/82.
AREA DIRECTOR
///.v/.
LIKDA R. KMU
4/4/03
4/4/B3
4/4/83
lOTICE TO EMPLOYCtS - The la* gives an employee oi his EMPLOVER DISCRIMINATION UNLAWFUL - The law pto
.■.....■■..■„.,I^.MHioiU)ni^Llgji.t;i'^iU'.jlUij)ljaj^'ineii_l^jie_htols iKcr by an tmployci 3<),.irnl an cmp'oyee for
TOIAlPf
fOii ;
246
■ 1 a^ «*■■<■
U S. DECARTME.n .')F LABOR
OCCUPATIONAL SAFtTV AND HtAjt.^l< ADMINISTRATION
CITATION and NOTIFICATTCN OF PENALTY
169 Weyboeoot Ut., ^fix floor
TTvridmaco, RI 029033393
1/7/63 On21 2?9
> RICIDN
01
AREA
0190
PASE
5 Of 10
Rcbart U. Doracktor of Rhode .Island, l2te.
cad Itr cuooeoBOTD
Bldc» l2i Coddifijfton Core
ia(Ul»town, RI 02;J40
INSPECTION QATE:
9/3-1 2/14/32
INSPECTION SITE
Bld«;. 6
THE LAW REQUIRES that a copy ol thij
Citation b« posted immediately in a profni-
.mtal-oltf »L w Ptn. iha location ol th« vio-^
) C?Jl 1910.134(c)(2) t IndividuaU e) iEDuing roopirators were not
le -uatoly inntructed to Innuro that tho corr«ct r«oplrator waa
>u«dl
Hew "JubaaMmbly iJuildlng: Tool crih •ttendantr wans not
ada 'Matolj' inBtrut tod to InEuro that the correct reapirator
was is.ued on or al>ant 10/l3/32.
; Ci^R 1910.134Co)(5)« Both ..uporvioor{E) and workeKo) were not
nstructcd in the proper -election, ute aJid raaintenanc* of roepiratore
.y"a competent perEoa(o). ?rainin« did not provide the iniividualB
■ith the opportunity to handle the respirator, have it fitted properly,
.•Dt it' faoo-pioce-to-facto ccr-l, wear it in noncal air for a long
.uniliarity period, and fir^liy uoap it in a tost atraorpheret
flew Subaaaera'bl.y Building' Enploycan overozponed to iron
oxide fuaes in confined ;paco .'-tlG welding and ^upervioorc
aa well ao workers wero not trained on or about 10/l3/v)2.
J CJ'iC 1910.134(e)(5)(i): '.Vniry respirator uear«r did not receive
itting inntructionsi incl-jdin,'^ Jeiaonotrr.tions and practice in how tho
-eopirator ;hould he worn, ho<< to adjust it, and how to dotenainc
,.r it fitc properly, neupiiuloro were worn whan corrliticns ruoh as
growth of tward, . ide burn:;, a ilcull cap that projected under the face
iece, or tomple piecen on clunaee, provento>l a good faoo oeal. The
'.loe piece fit w.ju not chicked by the wearor to aoauro j-roper pi-otection
very tine he put on the respirator;
Now r,ub£;DSonbl,y BiiildingJ Smployoe overerp-.ced to iron oxide
rumcB irfearing a rorpirator enl a full hnuTxl did not receive
any fitting innti-uotiona on or about JO/l3/02.
:■} Ci'll 1910.25?(e)(2)(l)(a): IlelpeKc) or attendant('i) in aro welding
ir cutting opcration(n) -(jcro uot provide>1 with proper eye protectioai
a) I!oK oubaaRoioblj- IMildinft-t Ilelpor not wearing oye
proloction workin,'; on four foot ertenelon of Hyuter
truck on 9/i.O/a:.
2/7/03
3A/83
4/4/33
■• AKEA DIRECTOR
'/M^i/'^.
losedlately
LHOA H. ABKU
NOT ICC TO tMPLOVFr.S - The \jw qivcs an employee or his EMPLOYEII DISCRIMINATION UNLAWFUL - The law pio-
■ LgiilEU.nlab»lLllUi.OV:ji.'il."i"'y.'o^''l).H'-'l to iiiiV.al'ij11fH":i|' UMe hihin di-.riimin^iioii by jn i-mijloyfi .i.jjinsi an unployce (oi
■oea
o*^
IOTA,
FO.
247
U.S C-.t'.\i( iWi..Ni .if ^A'JUW
* OCCUP»I10NAL SAf £fV AND Ml ArJM 40MIN1STS A flON
CITATION and N0TIFICAT1\Jn OF PENALTY
169 »©ybooB8t 3t., 5tl> floor
Provldctnoo, HI 029033393
illirii'pe^eWtotSJiibN.i
ariER r 2
Robert 5. Dci'oclctor of nhodo loland, Inc.
■"■o- ond Ito Bucceeuors
Bids- 18, Cotldinfftco Covo
Middlotown, RI 0?:i40
'~^5^j^*M/e2
THE LAW REQUIRES that a copy of thd
Citation b« posted immadiately m a promt-
-n— II 3Ur« At or n«or thcjgcalion of the vio-
t^.ljl^.:
t) Now SubsBQembly jiulXdinf,: Kelpsr not wearing eye
protection uorkins on 906/6 on 10/13/32.
le alleged violations beloy have b«en grouped becaur^ they involve
.uilar or related hazards that may increase the potential for injury
.-.ulting from an accident.
C^R 1910.1025(l)(l)(i): "wntplo7Be(a) worlcing in an area where
lere is potential oipomre tt.' airboma lead at any level wore not
iformcd of the content of Appendices A and B of thtr; regulation:
a) Repair Yard: '.inployeeg throughout yard eipopod to
lead were not inforreaJ of the content d of Appendices A I'c B
of 1910.1025.
b) Hew Subassembly Building: rSnployees performing confined
■pace wcldinc were not informed of the content; of App~ryticeo
A i 13 of 1910.1025.
. CV.l 1910.1025(l)(l)(ii): A training proji-sjn was not instituted
U r9 "uired for all employeeB who wci-e .Tibjoct to lead eipoi^re
t. or above the action level, or for whom the po8.;lbllity of akin or
•c irritation existed;
Ttaployeeu lifjted belot» wore expceed to lend in ozcaan of
the action level ai»i wore not trained afi delineated in
para^aph (v) of thir, section:
a) Jrydoci '/2- '/irsfichter: .<elc9-r incida ;;anitary tank
on or about 9/24/B2.
b) Pier ,/l- TO: Wayfaaan burning painted t^tcel in forwani
cargo hold on or abcut 9/24/62.
c) I>rydoc)c «: :?- ?ireflghteri Pipefitter burning coated
.:teel in forward bilce on or abrmt IO/6/O2.
4/4/83
' AREA DIRECTOR
^M.U
A/A/&i
(■y
LITIOA a. AlfKU
\OTICE TO TiMI'LOYEES - The l.iw gives an employee 01 his CMPLOYER DI'JCRIMINATION UNLAWFUL - Thf l7w pro'
'^'''»"-'*^'<^'^^tUlUjcto.tfi>iaiia^U^jiiaicm_tljjc_ hmn tlisi-firninalmnhy on ei:.|.luvci .iq.iiiisi nn cni)ilove« for
3*»4:
fOfi'-
248
U S. DEf ABTMENT OF LABOR
OCCUfATIONAl SAFtTV ANOMCaaJH AOMINISIRATION
CITATION and NOTIFICATTON OF PENALTY
169 rioyboooot St., S^'li floor
Pro\rid«mco, RI 02';033393
... 'L'i
/TD,
ISSUAN(\^ I '• OSHA IIUMHH
■ KEGION
01
AREA
0190
FACE
7 »'
TO: Robort E. IXsrecktor of Rhole loloiui, Inc.
enl itG juocesaora
Bld^. 13| Coddin^on Cove
JJU.ddloto;ni, RI 02340
'EC.TION DATE-
9/3-12/14/32
INSPECllCNSITE:
Dldg. 6
THE LAW REQUIRES ihel 3 top* ol ihii
• -illation liQ pcdMJ inimedialply m a promt-
T|l«l»»F<»!ln
TANDABO. REGULATION OH SECTION OF THE ACT VIOLATED:
~6iicUii>'f\t3u'
!W'."»T,J "^«»5-.»w»ri
'»«u>Ajw»Lwm.j^w^i
d) Drydock #2- IVo abraoivo blaaterB/tendere maovlng
paint frojB valveo removed froa the Ktr«fightar on or abcut
9/24/32.
e) Drydock .v'2- Pircf ightor: Korwaxd bilge-veldar -erving
OE a fir* watch on or about 10/6/32.
f) Pier vl- ferry "Creenport": Uhipfittcr tack vfcldine
on paintod urfaceB on or about IO/26/82.
V i;?H 1S;10.102^l)(2)Ci): A ocpy of 29 C?R I91O.IO25 and it3 appendlce
;aa not ma-le readily avallabl'; to all enployees who had a potential
-xpoDure to airborne lead at any level:
a) Repair Yard: Fjnployeec throushout the yard exposed
to leod did not liave a copy of thib i:tandard and itr
appendices natLe readily available to them.
b) Kcv* Oubaeoorably Building: EKployees performing
confined ..pace welding did not havo a copy of thla .;tand3.rtl
and itc app-3ndiceo made readily avail..>blo to thea.
;.)
■>■) CFR 1910.1025('»)(2)(i): Warning . igns bearing th» legend: "WACTING,
i,;'A!l WORK AR35A, POISON, HO nnCKl.TO Q'\ rATINC" waro not pooted \n eiich
.lork area where the pemdseiblo eTpotrura linlt (PEL) win ezceed«di
Tinployeoa lijtc'd below were oxpor.ed to load in oxc»se» cf
the PEL arel no ^igna were potitod iri the ar«>jn:
a) L)rydock f2- Firefighter: Woldor inside i nnitary tank
on or about 9/24/02.
b) Pier ?'1-T0: 'layrjnnn bumla*; paintod ;;t«<il in forworj
cargo hold on or about 9/24/82.
e) QryJock ,.•2- Tirefightor: Plpafitter burning coated
steel in forward bilge on or about 10/6/i)2.
2A/33
4/4/03
AKEA DIRECTOR
/.Mn7.,
J....
XMMA. a. AI«U
^011?^ JiJ.EJ^jnj5YEES-- Tho law qivos a.i cmplnvpe 01 hii LMPLOYEH OISORIMINATION UNLAWFUL - Th- liw pro
for/a 1' '
><■■ n^»» *wy»'
X .'1
249
u.s 0Er<\RrMt.*JT r,r taeoR
OCCUPATIONAL SftftTY A\DHt*lJH ADMlNlilK Al ION
n
CITATION and NOTinCAVlUN OF PENALTY
16? Weyboonet St., 5th, floor
ProvidouMi, Rl 02^,1033093
Bobort E. Derookior of Kho<*o Island, Inc.
Bad Its oucoenaors
BXdgt 13, Codding-ton Govs
Klddletown, RI O284O
'^-
1 iSSUANTk ^^l
_VA/o3_
• recioh'
01
OSHAKUWHER
^7321 229
?1 22
AfiE« I' P»C(
0190 0
THE LAW RrOUIRES Ihat a copy o( ihii
Citation b« posted immedtately in a promi
1 ttnnm utr^.
STAND^WO. WtnOLI^TIOlM OW SFCnOWOP THf ■HOTVICW.*
d) DrydocV: ,->2: -wo attroaive blusters/tondnra roooving
paint lYora valves ronsovsd ttoet tho rirofiaht«r on or Bboot
9/24/32.
"■y era 1915.34Cc)(l)Civ) ; Dondman control dovico( c) vera not
irovided at the ncialo(r) end of blciatiiv^ hoi;<»(c) to provide dirrot
-uloff or to i'ignal the pot tertlor by aaanf? of a vieuol and sudiblft
ienal to cut off tho flow:
a) Drydook *'!- Throe sbraaivo blast noBcl<?a with no
deodccm otjntrol on or about I0/5 and 10/6/32.
■b) DrydocJc -72- Two abraoiv» blaiJt noexlos with no d«cda«n
control on or about 9/24/82.
\\e ftllogod violations boloi^ havo been grouped beoauDo thoy Involvo
imllar or related hasardo that mcy incrcaa© the potential for iniury
\ limiting froa an accident.
!0A
'[) OV:? 1915.34(c)(3)(iii): liaployueCo), othor than blaater(s),
including niachino tondcr( c) imd abroEive rocovsry etsployBe(E) tforkin^
.n ar<ja(B) «hero unoafetconC4}ntratioa( i;) of abmaivo iBaterial(c)
ind duf;t(s) were present, warfl uot protected Vcr eye and respiratory
rotectivo eruljBsent In c-coordtJice with tha reruirenento of 191!>.151(»)
■.nd (b) and Iv15.152(a) and (d)i
Drydook #1 1 (i) Abriioive blast tsalor exposed to total
nuioanoe duot in cxceoc of tho 8— jour tias voight«d
average limit of I5 ^S,''!* vaa woering an unapproved du''t
najk on or abcut 10/5/32.
(ii) liaploj-e^ tonlinr? itbraeivi blactor una
not woorlng ::ai'ot7 glasoee vltb jlda ::hielda or goggles
on or about IO/5/O2. '
103
•9 CFK 1910.1000(0)1 l}n.ploy©c( 0) wore cipooed to i!ntorial(«() in
xceas of tho &-hour tirao rfciGhtcl avoritw llriit(n) llfrtod for that
-.utoriRl(.tt) In table Z-3 of nit-pcrt S of ?9 CPU part 1910«
2A/33
loEoed lately
AREA DIRECTOR
"/:/pU'.
hi^m. R. A.:iKo
Inuediately
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES-
{::±1
Th» law gives j\ sniijlovcp 01 lui rMI'LOVER DISCRIMINATION UNLAWFUL - The law pro
.ihitfMI In .r>a-a*talninnnl rln'a. t\.L^j|L ^ic^-f .jp|r\jlinn lnj ^p .ii.^.-^l^^.^ .j^^^..^^; ^^ iPPlI j<»'f n Igriiii i
" !)«.•« 'In-
1^.
TOiAire
250
us DlPARTMtrjT OF LADOfi
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY ANU H6^+1H AOMINISTIl AT PON
CITATION and NOTIFlCAlVoN OF PENALTY
1C9 Woybosoet St., 5th floor
Providence, HI 0.>)0333i>3
■..e^-.
•"nfOIOli !• ARCA ' • fACi
01 _Joi2o_L9 ^fJO
OTBES
Hobort E. Dcr^cktor of Rhode iBlend, Ino.
aul itc EAiccesuore
Bldg. 13, Coddincton Cove
MiddlGtoim, HI 02340
."uxtxMi bcqjJ'Ae^j!;;^' " "p' °' ""i
I mtuntr.r
Befor« Poti.
■■■■ mill «JJIMW--.?.CTtri!l»t'e»»iw.
sjMSl^^c.Kn^2}Ouoaf.^
ilry^ock ,/1 1 rinployeo tending a^)raaivo MaBter wao
overexposed to total nuioance dustr during i>»int removal
oporationn froQ bru-ge "IlasBachuaetti." on or about
XO/5/82.
CTW. 1^15.35(b)(7): Lieht(:) that were not explosion proof,
>nroved by the UnJerwriterG Ij.boratorios for une In Class 1,
-oup J atmob-pherca, or approved ao permit ibla by ttc ilino Safety
vi flcalth /UlrainiEtration or the U.o. Coaot Guard, were u;ed in
■e-ili') whore paint(c) and taiuc coatingc were ditinolved in highly
latile, toiic and floraciable . olvontr.:
Orydock 1: Portable waterproof lightn were u-ed to
illuminate painting operation on or ebout lO/6/;32.
vi'i V;i5.35(b)(.9): The f.ice, eyes, hea/l, hando and all other
norod part-- of the bodico of the emplo.vpe( r) handling highly
.lr.tile paint(r) jare not prjtected:
J)rydock v 1 : Iteployao painting the underside of barge
"Mae achu=ottB" had hir goggles atop hio head on or
oborut 10/6/32.
CFH 191'>.72(a)Cl)i Ladrlanc) with r.uch def3Qts ao broken or
;-oin« rungCi^) or --teK^) broken or rplit r,id« roilCo) or other
lully or defective con:;truction aere not lncMdiately withdraHn
con ervice when juch defect(L>) were dincoveredt
Repair Yai-d- Drydoclc ,f\* North acceaa to wing walls.
Lower ruago of ladder were ujwvcnly cpaced.
i.::3. V^15, 73(b) ltoahole( c) or other eoBiporable i-.n»H opening(r,)
;i the deck or other working urfeoea were not nxi'.ably oorverod
- gwvrdodi
i)r;moolc /I- ^orge "!'^t!t»chui-i«ttn"t Port inrJiolo of
iKiilaul tank .'3 mom o^jn and not (Timrdod on or about
10/5/32.
^,towsarn|g.n2rTH-2S-
4/4/83
2/7/33
1/17/83
iBOodlat^ly
• ARCAOinCCTOB
LUfiiA A. iJnrJ
__Jt/(:L^n_ _
"tti:_jj,»j«,n,„«. ......„..L.u«i o> hii... EMPUiVfcRJ,U5£KIMlM/lI.:0JUINi.AVVf,UI-..rJL'!Ui!\i!ifl
po<7o
251
OCCUPATIONAL SA'tTr ANO K, .• ' '•! AC'IMb t R A f ION
CITATION and NOTIFICAYiON OF PENALTY
169 Koyboncot Gt., Jth floor
Providonoe, RI O29O3J093
Robert E. Sereolctor of Rhodo Island, Inc.
aal Its sQCccaeoro
Bide. 13, Coddinjton Coryo
tUddletown, RI 023/;0
1/7/J3 07321 229
> RECIOtI
01
AHEA
0190
THE LAW REQUIRES Ihai 3 copy ol Ihii
Citation be posteti immadototy in a prom
— MQlolKfiflt Of^ntfar tliq locatiofi of ihB VIO-
1' CPH 1915»73(c)' The ed(joo of largo openinge wore not guarded in
ho worlcin^ 6r*a to a hoight of 36 to 42 Inches:
Plrefiphter tfaiudack: Unguarded openijvj In pilot houoo
expo:;in^ employoon to a fall hazard on or aborut 10/6/82.
; CFR 1915«74(a)(4)i The gan^ajr was not kept properly trinmod at
11 tiraeoi
Pier nl- Ferry "Greenport": Cane>?ay to veooel was not trimmed
7
; Crs 1915.97(t>): The employer did not obtain all applicable
tcia( o) of information nocouoary to aocsrtain the potential fir«,
cxic or reactivity hazard(r,) likely to 'l>e encountor«i in the handling,
pplication, or utilisation of hazardous raatarialEt
Tardwidoi The company did not have laaterial cafety data
^;haeti; on file with all the infornation re'-uired for the
haaardous naterialn ured in tho yard including but not
limited to painti:, abrasive raaterials, and filler aetaln
and their ooatirvjc.
; C?iv 1515* 98(a)' At leaBt one <?aploy«e, close at haod, wa« r-ot
iiallfied to adminlBxer first aid to the injured!
Repair Ta^ri: No one on i.eooud ..hift wao train<»d to
adminiBter firul aid on or ahov;t 10/6/32.
Imnodiately
Ininodia1;cly
3/7/33
•' ARCADinECTOrt
MS
LINDA R. UmS
Imeedlately
NOTICE TO EMC'LOYEES - The law gives an eniployon or his EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION UNLAWFUL - The law i>ro
''-'P.'WSilUliitlhSiUJEyi."^"''^ '" °*'i*'^' '° °''V abalemcni d.ite hibils discrimination by jn tniployer aij.imsi an enployor loi
t.1
31^
♦6553
TOTAL !■
for>
252
U.S. DtPAtlfwrNr OF LABOR
OCCUPATIONAI. SAFETY AND HE Avf(< ADMINtSTHATION
■kirf >^ tfif ^ ^1
CITATION and N0TIFICA"Tt3N OF PENALTY
169 Weyboci ot .it., 5th floor
Providence, KI 025033393
:TyE/i«)Pl»/ieutioM,UtiM«ftAtio(Jno,
SURI0U3
1
Robert E. iXsroaktor of l?hod.« IfIsjvcI, Inc.
and itn inicoeGEori;
31dg. 13, Coddirvr'on Covo
lUddletown, MI 02340
• Odl* NUMOEII
57321 p29
01 SX)
1 Of 17
INSPECTION DATE:
9/3-12/14/32
INSPECTION SITE:
Bld£. 6
THE LAW REQUIRES thai o copy of
be- • BtiuiF ■
ing ;
oli- '
• ciw »**>*«oe«-
STANDARD. riEGULATION OR SECTION OF THE ACT VIOLATED; DESCRIPTION
The violationa deacribod in thiB citation ar« allegftd to have oocurred
on or about th« day tho Intpootlon hsb nade ttnlaea otheivleo Indlcatod
within the doccriptloa givtn boloH.
•^Ihe iBsua&co of this citation docs not constitute a fiwling that n
vloletion of the Act ha.) occurred unions there is a failure to contest
as provided for in the Act or, if contested, unlees the citation is
af finned \v tlia l^oview Coir-aosion.
The allogod violet iono below havo been groapod booauoe they involve
: imilar or related haznrdu that may inoroooe tho potontial' for injury
rcBulting frcu on accident.
■ 1A^
Z) C?a 1910.2C(a)(5): L'caffolds »«ro moved horieontally while thoy
were occupied:
Bids. 4O: Uolpor moved two rtage i-eaffold while osyacotylsne
torch oporator waa on it, on or abcnit 10/l3/32.
13"
29 cm 1910.29(a)(3)(vii): All work lovole 10 feet or higher above
^oand or floor dJd not havo a :jtandard guard ralli
a) DiilLUns 40: aoployoe onttla^ plpoa frosi a tvo atsA-o
Boblle ecaffold without fall protect Ion on or aboct 10/13/32.
b) Building .JO: Etaployoo woldlng atop thr»o i;ttyio twbile
eoaffold without fall ppotoction, on or about 10/03/82.
2A
29 CIT! 1910.9!>(a)i Protection aealnst tho offocto of i»loa u9ld not
provided for «a?lo7«o(8) eipooed to 9ouad lsv«la which ezoe«a«d
Ihooo Uatod In Table C-16 of Subpart 0 of 29 CFR I9IO1
The terplaf9«a liertnd bolou uore ovvrazposed to nsioa «id
hoarlaj protection wcui not worn.
a) Bulldin^j 234: Otployca grinding rtaOl parts la South
Ottl of bnllding en or about 9/30/82.
on
" AfltA UIRECTOR
Ifow Subo/iocmbly BulMiry;! liiaployoo crlr^dlnff end ».iadliiur
Hodula 5 o.\ or about IO/13/J2.
LEim R. /i?naj
iM'y4v^
liaaed lately
lawdiately
InBMllAtely
NOTICE TO EMPLOYFtS - The Ijw .live-
ly rr-
I
livts .in crnploym' oi his
■,SSt'-^'±^3^^''::^}^'^^i2i}J^y
253
OCCUPATIONAL SA( t I t
TO
M"l(^i;f.llNl!. I H A l'lON~'~"
CITATION and NOTlFICAlSON OF PENALTY
169 KeyboBBst r.t., 5th floor
Provldenoe, RI 02';0333y3
SERIOirj 1
W
Robert H. Derecktor of nho(fd lolond, Inc.
aad Ito BuooesDora
BLdg« 18, Coddjngton Cov«
Kiddletorfji, RI 020-10
■ REGION
01
' OSMAflUUIEK
S7321 ?29
' AHE*
01S»0
PACi
2 OF 17
INSPECTION^ITE
THE LAW REQUIRES that a cocv of thii
Citation be posted immediaiely in i profni*
•*-"! nlMTM ai or nosr.lha iK^'Qf^ tjifl_vjc^
1,rLa.(e--^^
KT ANUAHU,^t;uvt.^mvwif\/*i *i3w»i<^i« wr
c) Dry Dock r'2t Two eoployo«9 tending abrasive 'blastero
on or about IO/13/J2.
d) Kew Subapsenbly Puilding: Itoployoe grinding and needling
in ooafinod .-pacoa of "inrrter Butt A&S on or about IO/13/O2.
2D
29 c:-TJ 1910.95(0)1 Tho etnployor did not adxdnioter a continuing
cffccti^ro hearing coaaarvation procrom an doaeribod in parcvgrapha
(c) through (c), whenever onployeoa wore exposed to noieo in exceee
of 35 d3A for en 0 hour tirje vaighted averogoi
Vhe eoiiq;>&ii7' liad no hearinc connorvation rrogram.
■X
29 CVH 1910.95(e)(1): '.:;!on infoiTiation indicated that omployeea'
noine eipocuros nay OTial or cicoed an 3 hour tioo weight€)d arvorajxe
of 05 dBA, tho eraployor did not obtain rioanuremcntG for those
cmnloyooa:
Pi^loyooR per^onaiac nuoarona production & repair op^ty-utions
throughout the facility wore oxposod to noise in exceoa of
85 dDA and no uoino nxumurersonts were taJccn by the cospany
to dotenaino oxpociMre levolo. (Uhen moauftfflaj the Gjrplcye«8'
noiEie expoeureo, ell continoouR intoraittor.t and l-jpul*ive
Eound lovelc from 30-130 dBA chall be Inteffrated into
tho confutation.)
2D
29 cm 1910.95(l')(3)j Etorloy^<*8 eicoBDively eipoood to noi«o werw
not piven tho opportunity to soloot thoir h«>orinc protectors ftom
a variety of mitable bearing proteotoro provided hy tho tiaploj"»r:
Taxdwidej Only one tj-pe of hoaring protector waa available.
' AREADIRECTOn
^SMmI'i.
ih/^i
3/7/33
2/7/33
LinDA n. .>'r,a;
NOTICE TO F.MPLOYtES - Th» law ni vis <in tmiilovcc 01 his EMPLOYtR DISCRIMIWATION UNLAWFUL - The Ijw pro :TOI.M t :
25-994 O
83 - 17
254
U S. DEPARTMENT flF LABOR
OCCUPATIONAL SAftlV ANO ME AVBH AOMlNISTRATIOkl
CITATION and NOTIFICATroN OF PENALTY
169 Ucyboa ot bt., 5th floor
Providonoe, RI 02^033333
'jjvf^fniiv^PmimmM^n.
' SKHIOUa
Robert E. Dor«clrlar of Rhode' Iclajnd, Inc.
anl lie suocoosoro
Bld^. 10, Coddirvr'won Covo
Middletc^rfn, Rl 02340
' iflCIOK ]• XdlA
01 [0190
■ PAGE
3 Of 17
mSPtCTION 9ATE_
9/3-1 ?/1 4/3
32
INSPECTION SITE
Bldf. 6
THE LAW REOUIRES that a copy of Ihri
Citation b« polled immediatelv in • promi-
n«nl Didca it or near thejocaiion ot the vio^
"JJt.l. !HI»HI1I
29 era 1910.95(l)(4)i Unployfea oiceoaivcly expooed to oolso vior«
not trained in the une a'ld caa-a of all hearing protectors provided
to them:
Yardwido: Mo training vna rocaivsd in the proper lunertion
techni utjs for tho ear plLice provided.
Z') CfR 1910»95(n)(l)i Tho cnployer did not intrtituto a training
ITCgraiB for all ©aployeeB who nre ocpoaod to noioe at or above a
iimt! weighted nvorago of 35 dB/L.
Tonlwidej llo training progran waa eeta'blish'Jd for onployeoB
expoccd to noire in excope of 35 dBA Ti/A.
?.\i Oi'H I910.95(o)(l): Tho <iinplojt)r did not raake available to th«
.effected enployees or their roprestrfitativBG copies of thin ctaadard
-.nd did not post a copy in tho workplace.
Yarvlwido: !fo copy of the nolce : tandard viae made available
to eraployeeo or their repreBcntatlvas.
?9 ClTi 1910.252(a)(2)(v)(t){iJ)t Cylinders which were not uocured oa
.^ -pecial truck did not hnvo valve-prot»otion capr. put in plaoe
before the cylinders wero moved.
3/7/83
3A/03
Uepair Yard; IVo imcappod acetylene cylinders wore
tranoported uns'jciLred in a front end loadcr« on or aboat 10/2^/32.
.he alleged vlolaticne belovi hawe been grouped bec«ar« they invulve
lailzir or rolntcd haaarUo thrvt may increase tho potential for injury
reeultinj froo cji accident.
•A
.'•J CVn 1910.424(cy(2)l Diver woe not lino toi»J»<^- fron tho rarface
ir ncconpaniod by another dUtr in tho water la contliaioud vlnual
.-.ontaot dcriug :;CUBA divinj oper&tioai
' AREA DIRECTOR
7/^r^'i
InBiediately
iBedlateljr
10/13/02
MOTICE TO EMPLOYECS - The lav< rjivi's
t..i«»h«nimriitLinitv 10 ubiC'-t lV..01'.y.^L'
LIKDA R. AIDOJ
LMPlOYt R OIKCHIMINATION UNLArtHJL - The law pro-
''■liili il I I iiiuM.tt on tiy ari iTnplo^r'i .n.inM jn crfipluyre tur
«J0
lorAif
fon
255
u.s ci.i'Ah'rwt.r-ir nf la&Oi<
OCCUPATIONAL SAf €TY AND Mt M.JH AO'.llNISIR ATION
CITATION and NOTIFICAHdN OF PENALTY
TO:
169 Woyboooot i;t., 5th floor
Provid«noe, RI 02-^'033393
TYMf©iiyiotA-T)oN(«*i{Bar»?jotf((i-
SERIOUS
Ro^rt E. D«rocJctor of Rhod« Inland, Inc.
and Itr succesBorB
Bldg. 13, Coddln^on Co\'a
Middlotovn, RI OSJUO
, C\
ISSUAtri'
1
nccioN
01
f.7321,229
' »ria' I' rAGt'
01i)0 4 OF
17
INSPCCTION aATE,„
9/3-12/14/02
INSPECTIONS) IE
Bldg. 6
THE LAW REQUIRES thai a copy of Ihii
Citation bt posted immediately in a promi
Dry Dock ^1« During diving operations on 10/l/32, the
divTjr »/aB neither lino tanded nor Bccomponiod ly cjioth«r
diver.
4B
29 07K 1910.4?4(c)(l): :".CUI!iA diving unc conducted without a
diver availtblo while a diver was in the water:
tandby
Dry Dock ^v'l: 'lo ctandby driver wan availablo during a
iiix and one-half hour divo or\. 10/l/32.
Abatooant Ilotej Tho standard ro'Tilres a ctandby dlvor
for all oporaticmr. He iliall bo available at the dive
location e'"ulpped and ready to go to the asaistaiico of
tho diver in tha water. A buddy-divor in the water doaa
not .BtiEfJr the rs'-uiremont of a ..tandby diver. A tender
can be the -tandt-iy diver if the diver i? line-totido<i ar^
visible from the urfaoe, and the pornon-in-chfirpti can
bo the ;;tandby diver, but tho Horkin^ interval of the
dive muot end 1 f ho Ik reTuired to enter the water since
there would no lon(,-er bo a dosignatod poroon-in-charce
reni:^nlng at tlic dive location.
29 uPfi 1910.410(c)(1) t
at the divB location:
Mo perron waa designated as "p«roon-i7»-chapga"
iiii—iiiini umitji
2/7/03
Dry iX>ck #1: Ro person vrao donignatod as
during diving oi)erationG on 10/l/32.
' porson-i n-charge"
Abatement Notei The designated "poroott-ln-ohargo" shall
\»x
1. at tb« dive location
2. in charge of all aspecte of the diving operation
3. responsible for tba uzSaXj and health of div* teen
■embers.
4. experioncod ani trained in the oonduot of the assigned
diving operation.
5. experienced and tralnad in the uoe of toolc, errolpnent,
pyctono, techrJi'!uo8, and eoorgoiKsy proo»dure8 which
fertain to tho onoigned tookii and diving node utllliod.
I.e. Sf^UBA)
• AREA DIRECTOR
2A/83
UK
LDfnA s. .irocn
lOTICE TO EMPLOYEES - The law gives an emplovte 01 his EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION UNLAWFUL - The law pto-
r---""'."'-;-»'*y-TiiiinriiiiiiW to obicci ^CLa:^lv.-abalc^•|l■r1^ i3^;e Jiihi^s (liscnmination by jn '■mploYot aijamsi an empUiyef lo'
TOTAL P;
FCni
256
us OtHARTMkMl OF LAaOR
OCCUPATIONAL SAFtTY AfjOHFAUH ADMINISTRATION
CITATION and NOTIFICAITON OF PENALTY
169 Wojbonjet :;t., 5tJi floor
Provld«nco, ni O.r;0.i3393
^1rk*54««WTip«i
buRIOUo
:-:cteh^
Robert C. D«rocktor of Rhode loland, Inc.
•ad Ito fnioce3 30rD
Bldg« 13, Coddinf;;on Covo
tliddletown, KI 023-^0 '
' ISSU
1
' nuion
01
/7/I3
OSHONIIVBdl
07321 |22f>
• AHtA~ • PASE
oi;o 5 ,
17
INSPECTION SITE:
THE LAW REQUIRES ihst a cop» o( thii
Ciution bt posted immedtately in a protni-
STANOARO. REGULATION OR SECTION "or^THE AcTviOLATED; DESCRIPTIOW"
AT'
29 CFR 1910.424(c)(4)(l): A divor-c-irried reserre broathing gao
Gupply connlcting of eithor a manual r&aorve (T Viil-.-e) or an
iiriopondent roBoi-vo cylir>'.er with a > oparato regala'tor or ooimoctod
CO the underwater breathirvj apparatus was «»ot provldsyl for etch
. iiUDA divori
Dry Dock ,fl: The diver vaa not
air i-uppl,y on 10/l/32.
.'.uijplicd with a reserve
29 cm 1910.411(a)(1): 1'he Ginplojner did not deternino that divo
tean riombers who were, or w^ro likely to be, exposed to t^yTJorbiiric
conditionc were mcdiGally fit to pei-form onnigaod tankn in a oafe
and healthful manner:
T^ Dock ,n: .athough tho diver on ^taff on IO/1/82
had hnd a phy -leal eiao witUn tho last year, the atsployer
did not dotcrmiR-! that be had hod tho excia or that he was
medically fit prior to asolgnlns bia dlYlug duties.
20 era 1910.42l(f)(2)i Prior to making IndiTittual dive tenta i>rjb«r
Euieignioentc, the employer did not aa'^nlre ieto tba div« teaa taater*
current : tate of phyoical fitness and ialioate to th« diva t*cai
loombers the procedure for j-cporting phoreioel ra^blaas or ftdvsrs*
phyBiolo{rical cffeote d^iring cad after tha divni
Dry Dock ,fl; The employer did not inf-uiro Into th«
diver' n currci-a -.tata of fitrwsa cm IO/1/82.
4G
2) CFR 1910.42O(ft)i The omployBr did not d»»«lop aai. maictaln a
afe practices nonuali
Dry Dock ,'/\t Vo aafe praoticwa naauAl was derslop^
or nnintaincd:
Abutouicut Hot?: Tho eafo practices traraial oh^ll oontaln
a copy of thin tardjard dad 'bo c.-mploy«r'» pollciou for
' AREA DIRECTOR
[j/Ml
Insediately
Innod lately
iMsdlateljr
2/7/83
LIHUl a. uiKa
NOTICE JP.F.rjPLOYEESj-Jhe ld« •)w% jn^mploype 01 his EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION UNLAWFUL - The la.v p-o :TOIAl C
257
ji^-*-*- -^•*
U.S. DEPARTMENT DF LABOR
OCCUPATIONAL SAFtTY AND lit <iJJH ADMINISIBATION
IfJlJJH A
^TTON OF PENALTY
169 Woyl)06cet Jt.| !>th floor
Providonca, RI O?'>)33093
CITATION and NOTIFICAl
iA'typtaAVitol^TWNpMitiMTiDiiWoi
SEHI0U3
1
l/7/"33
■ ntuiON
01
I OSH«IIUMItR
C7321 229
0190
PACf
6 o> (7
j;m?n7Q2
iNSEIi:jiONSirE
I"
Robert K. DereoJttor of Rhode Inland, Inc.
Bld«. 13, Coddin,-:t;(m Cove
Middletown, UI 02'40
THE LAW REQUIRES Ihat a copy ol this
. Ciuiion Le posted immediately in a promij
■JTANDARD. REGULATION OR SECTION OF THE ACT VIOLATED. __^ _
inploaontiiv? tlio r«<7uirpmcnf s of this r.toiKlara". Fot eacS
dlvlcg Bodo ensi^sod in, the safe jjractioea mamiaX eh«ll
lnolul«i (1) Safety proo«lnr«B snd chBckllotn for
divlsg oiteratlons;
(11) Aeslgnraents and rosponBibllltis* of th«
dive team oenibcrc;
iiii) ivuipmont procedures and cheokllsts; and
iv) Lborcency procoduroa for fire, o'TUpacnt
failure, advcxoe environmental conditlonc, end sedloal
lllneBB and injur}'.
.Ij C?.A 1910.421(b) I A lint of oooreoncy first aid phone nunboro
una not kept at the dive location;
Repair Yard: pbono nunberR liEtcl did not include
avoilablo phyoicicjio and the nearest U.fJ. Coast Guard
Reccue Coordination Center.
Abatcnont Jlota: A liot ohall bo kept at the dive location
of the telephoiio or cnll numborr. of the foHa.j\ng:
(i) All operation::.! decompi'nsaion chanber (if not at the
diva location);
(il) Accecoiblo honpitalo;
(iii) Available ph;v-iciaiioj
(Iv) Available iixjono of traaoportationj and
(v) Vho nearest U.'J. Coast Guard Hiscuo Cooi?dination
Center*
.<1I
.^y CFR 1910.421(c)(3) I An Anericaa Red Crow otantlaid flr«t aid
:iaulbook or equivalent and a bag-type iLaisual reouacitator with
tran::paront aask anl tubing were not available at tb* dive locatiooi
Dry Do<dc //It "ho required flrct aid onppUee were not
arailabla at tbo dive location.
29 CFR 1910.423(d)(l)(v)j Tho ai>pi>oxlDate unlemaiw and surface
conditions (vioibillty, wntor teniperatui'e end cwrrent) were not
recorded ard aaintalnad for each divlsf operatlcai
Dry Do«k *ai /to roocrda of vlriblity wad teurperatare
uere aaintolued.
IsMdlately
2/7/83
iMWdiately
AREA DIRECTOR
'1^_
LISSA R. AISCU
OTICE TO tMPLOYEES -The law qucs an emploype or hii CwriOYER DISCRIMINATION UNLAWPUL - The law pio
***^» ^r"^ -
'li»e iuo:
p-iys^
TOTAL P:
258
us Dkl'AH P,.L-Il :<t LAo^yrl
OCCWATIONAL SAf ETV ANDHE^.IH AOMINISTB ATION
CITATION and NOTIFICATON OF PENALTY
169 Hoybou et St., 5th floor
Prcnrldenco, HI 029033893
Robert E. Doreclrtor of Rhod« Inland, Inc.
exd ItB snccessoro
Bldg. 13, Coddinf:ton Gov©
Hiddlotown, HI 02040
1/7/33
RECION
01
OIHAIUMoCR
C732I 2Z)
AKEA
0190
I
r«ce
7 Of 17
INSPECTIOI
l7>WiV<3:
INSPECTION SITE!
Bld«. 6
THE LAW REQUIRES thai a copy of thil
-•CutMn tJSAQtted tmmodiately in • p(Omt-
kS%7r.).-|.«^ ^Ti
ITEM NOMBtH -"'-'-"
STANDARD. REGULATION OR SECTION OF THE ACT VIOLATED;
- *.X"C'r»ir -vr^ i« u I
'tUfcrfi^fTRTI-
23 C?R 1910.423(d)(l)(v): Th9 maxiraun depth and bottoa tino for
each divor wore not recorded and oalntainod for each diving
operatiooi
rry Book //It IIo maximua depthG tmd bottom tioee were
recorded for euch divor.
29 CFR 1915.7(a)(1): One or more con^wtent potpobCb) were not
dosignated by the employer:
Repair Yard: llo oompetont poroon was desicnated.
Abatoment llotc: 1915.7(a)(2) requiroo that the employer
muct iniicato in U.3. Departn»?nt of Labor Fora OSIU 73
"DeBignation of Corapot^nt Person" those employeea
designated tu> compotont par30no ami forward tho executed
fora to tbo nooroot aroa office of the Occupational
Safety and );'jalth Adainietration.
5D
29 CFR 1915.14(b)j In dry cargo holds for \;hlch a Kiirine Chemiot
certificate is not roTuirod, hot work wao porfonaed before a
compoteat perron hit'i ctircfully cianiined the hold and foond it to
be free of flonoMble li uidB, ga803 and vapors:
Pier /'1-TO: Cuming in bcv oarco hold waa parfcnoed
without a coniMjtcnt perfion oxonination on or at»out 9,'2V'^2.
5c
29 era 1915.14(0)1 Hot work wao porfonaed in angijne or boiler rooB
opao«(B) of veDOol(r) for Mhicli e. !1arlne Clioniata certificate w?-a
not rcxiii-ed, or in cn/ji'io coapirtiueat(B) of bo«t(s), bafcr* the
biVgoe uere inopootod antl teBlod by a coTipctant pert>on to tnfiur*
that they wore freo of fiarauiblo li uids, e^aoos, and vapore:
a) Pier 71 , TO: Grinding waa p^rfonsod in tho engine
room without prior tnalinij or inopectlon V * coB5)«t«ait
person on or about 9/24/'i2.
Inaed lately
3A/83
3/7/83
3/7/33
'• AREA DIRECTOR
//^r/;,^
U5DA R. AinCU
MfiTirK Tri [■j.ipjjYfcES _ The law gives ,vi employee 01 Ins EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION UNLAWFUL - The Mwpio TOltl
259
us DtPARTMr.Nl .Tf LABOR
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY ArjD Ht^.SJH ADMINISTRATION
CITATION and NOTIFICATiUN OF PENALTY
169 W«7boEr.ct it., 5th floor
Providonoo, :ci 0?jO}i.]'Ji
Robert E. Dereolctor of Rliod« Inlnad, Inc.
and Ito jucceoaora
Bide. 13, CoOdington Covo
Kiddletown, ni :i2."/J0
' IS5UA«l.\j^,lr f' ll'H
_ i/7/'a3
> REGION
01
07 32^
ARE*
oiyo
229
fACE
8 OE 17
INSPECTION D
ECTION DATE
9/>1 2/1 4/32
INSPECTION SITE
Bld«. 6
THE LAW REQUIRES Ihat a copy of thii
— CiUUoQ bA posted imrrMKltatel^jnj pfom(,
V«Jlor<fP«r
aTANDARD. rVguLAtIoN OR'SECTION OF THrACT vIoL ATE D; ^' d^kc^ttYKHf"- ■' '■^"■""'J lUM'Mjin-
b) Dry Dock ., 2, liref i/jhterj Grinding aal wsldiivj vaa
perforatod in tho eji^ino roon without prior tenting or
inspection by .-x coinpetant person on or about I0/26/82.
,?j cm 1915»35(b)(0): A coTpctent person did not intrpoct all
power ani lighting cablft(, r ) to ensure that tho insulation waa in
nic( llont condition, frca cf erackn and worn opotr, that there wore
r:o connsctiona within fifty feet of tho operation, that licas woro
not overloaded, azid that t'loy were ouapended ';ith -iifficient
lack to pr«\ront undue strosa or chafing iu arose wharo paint and
-ank coating: Hor« diesolvod in highly volatile, torlo and flaonEible
olrcntci
Dry Dock trl: Mo conpotent person inopsctad tha lighting
cables prior tn liainting. Corjneoticno >fore at tirass
within ten fejt of the operation on or about 10/6/32»
^■; O'.^R 191!i.?3(b)i Tcai.;r; ;rero not conducts by a competent
paruon to dotemdno tha flrun^iability of preoflrvative co«tii^'r',
the flacoability of which san not knowii before welding, cutting
or heating hsm comaencod on ivDy .mrfaco oovorei \y bnah coatingoi
Dry Dock ^2, Firofi^tar: anployeo in biljj« woa cutting
cB coitod ato'jl without prior testing l^jr a ooapotant
parson on or about IO/6/62.
L") CPR 1910.100lCf)(l)i
. uoh a Docaor to d atom:. no
airboma nBbeetca fibers t.
Initial uonltoring wan not ooodocted ia
•j;hoth«r avwry </^lo7»a'o erpoCTuro to
. bftlou tha proocrlbed liKlttJi
EnviroiBiental raonltoring wsib not oonductad in th«
looationfi b^loM t. ,; dotomdna protior rcnptratory iro-
tectioa and i;pf-"ial clothing reqiaitMiiotrtot
&) ^mipbuildltvt l^rt-aj Baildiag /yy~ Oa or nbw.t lo/u/82.
b) Pier /'I, for:^ "Greanporf- Jvglas rot»-» oa or cboiit
10/26/32,
..A DIRECTOR
(fi^yl'V
;33CaK3F.,
3A/03
3/7/03
5/30/Q3
LEiiiV 8. A>na;
nCE TO EMPLOYEES -The
iiw ,jr,ts m tinplovce o. hi^ EMPLOYER DISCniMir.'ATIOi'j ■J^JL AWFUL - die l.w pro
•S^Vio
TOTA^l ;,
....fiL;; .
260
us. OEPARTME.MT OF LABOR
OCCUrATIONAU S4FETV ANDMEA,tJH ADMINISTRATION
CITATION and NOTIFICATTON OF PENALTY
169 Weyboeeet .3t., 5th floor
Providonco, !a OZ^OiiSOi
.■tVPtiflUfyioi^troWt^iifeefTAtiodBo.
SERIOUS
1
Robert E. Dorcckrtor of AhoUe lolaod, Inc.
Bud Ito ^ncoensora
Bldg. 13, Coddlivrton Cove
Hiddletown, ni 02(.M0
01
' OSHA NUHIED
U7321 229
0190
9 ofl7
INSPECTION DATE,
9/3-12/14/02
INSl'ECTIONSirE
Bld^. 6
THE LAW REQUIRES thai a copy of Ihil
>«^v;
STANOARO. REGULATION OR SECTION OF THE ACT VIOl ATED:
ErplanQtory Pootnoto: The employer Is retjuircd to
detenaine tha oiposur« of eaoh of his eraployEea to
airborne oobestoo each day he rfwovea aeheatos-oontalnlng
inculatlon.
6D
29 Cril 1910.100l(c)(2)(ij.i}j linploycea en/;.Tgfy< in th« ..praying
of aobsBtoB, tbe romoval or iefflolitioTi of plpeo, ;;tnictures, or
e •uipnent covered or inmil.ited with aabeBtor;, or the rftjoval or
demolition of aBbestoo inruiation or coveringr; were not provided
with respiratory e nipnent in accordance with paragraph (d) (2)
(iii) of this cection and . pocial clothing in accordnnce with
parasr^h (d) (3) of thi;T r.octioni
a) 31dg. 40- i-'hipbuildin.'j Area: Two enplo:;'ei9a vore
reaoving aabrritoi^-clad pipos wearing only n'^gative
pressure recpirators E^nd full tody dinpouibio coveralls
and glove 0 on or about 10/l3/3?.
b) Tier ,/l~ Porry "Oroonport"- '^iffine Roorai Thme eoployeei
removing naciiinery and valvas from pipen covered with
auboBtoe inrulatjon were not wearing any roupJratory
equipnent or .ipecial clothing on or abowt 10/26/32.
Explanatory Footnote: The eicploTt^r la requlrod to provide
ctqiplled air rftepiratoro until ho baa detortatnod the sxposor^
lerola of hie cnploycen to astsotoo durlrwj danolitlcB or
retaoval oparationo.aro laeo ty^m 100 timen the linlte In
1910.1001(b).
6C
29 CFR 1910.10C1(d)(2)(iv)U)< Tho omployar did not eotabllsh a
respirator proGran in Rcocrdanco with Amcricvin national iitandapde
"Pi-actiooB for Heopirator Protection", Alfsi 2/38.2-1969:
Einployees lintod bolow wore expoeod to aobOBtos flbore and
a roopirator pro£;raa was not nisitablluhed 1:» oooordance
in.th tha abo'Aii
a) Shipbuildliic fjoa, Bldg. -JOi Two eapLoyooa observed
removing eobublon olnd pipoa on or abont lO/lj/82.
5/30/33
AREAOIRECTUn
//^',>^
4/4/83
Il£LlfiiMafiYEts_
■ Tl.e Idw nwr.; an c.plnyee 01 h.5 EMPLOYER DISCRImTnaTION UNLAWFUL - tTc iT^.l'
totaT'?'
— ■*" ...
261
us DEPART.VIENT OF LABOR
OCCUPAriONAL SAFETY AND HtAV^H AOMINfSTR ATION
CITATION and NOTIFICA
TtSn
OF PENALTY
TO:
169 WeyboBoet St., ^th floor
Providonoa, KI O2;O33093
SERIOUS 1
Robert E. Dcrecktor of Rhod« iBlaal, Inc.
baI Ito ouccGsooro
Bldfi. 13, Coddiiv^ton Covo
Middletown, ni 021M0
/iv
1A/C3
REGION
01
07321 229
' (RC*
0190
rtcE
10 Of 17
INSPECTION DflTfA,
9/3-12/14/82
INSPECTION SITE.
PECTIONSn
TilAe. 6
THE LAW REQUIRES thsl a copy o( d
- Ciuiion bfl DOSled immeQiatqty in a orcii
J-f«ior.~;'
STANDAHCrhtGCrDrTTOTfOR SECTION OF THE AfefyTSLAtED.' "pgJcrtlt'TiaTJ ■ —
b) Pier fil, Terry "Or«enport"i liiffine roon; three
ooployeeo obuorvt.-.l reaovinfi machlnsry and valven oa or about
10/26/82.
en
29 Cn? I9IO.IOOIC j)(2)» TUe aeiployer did not provide or oalce
available, to each omployoe, within 30 dayn following his first a»-
ploytiant In aji occupation exposed to airborne levQls of aeboston
fibers, a cor3probenclv« oedical examiaationi
rtaployees listed below were oagactxl in the deioolltlon or
removal of asbeatoo aad were not given medical exaalnatlons:
a) Oldg. /,0 shipbuilding Area: Two employooB obrarved
removing asbeotor, clad pijieB on or about 10/l3/82.
b) Ptor ,7l "cn^ "Greonport"- :>igino Rcomj Throe craployeoo
obtiervod rpnovlntj machinery and valves froa piping coiwrf^d
with aobootoi on or about l0/26/d2.
6.;
29 CrR 1910.100l(e)(l)(i): Caution - igaa wore not pro->rldod and
uisplayed in ;.iich a maimer fo that enployeea could read thea and takn
neoceasry proteotiTW Dtept^ befcro entering an area where alrbome
coDoentratlons of osbestoo fibers Luy be in exoees of pr««aribed licit b:
Ihtranoea to tbo following areas mra not poErted In an/ viayi
a) Shipbulldicg Areai Bld«. 40i On or about IO/13/O2.
b) Pier //It Perry
10/26/82.
'areespart" , eaglae rooas on or about
6F
29 CFH 191O.10O1(k)(2)(1)j Cnation Labola wuro uA affixed to all
rsM saterlala, Blxtnreo, uor^, waste, debris, or otfanr proteoia oon-
talning aab«stoe f ibara, or to tbair oovtaliwr*, wtkioh dorlAS aaj
reaawinbly foretM«eblo nee, bandllnerri otoro^, diepoeal, proe»r43lP|r
or traaaportatioa oould rclsaaa rdrbome coaoentretleAa of aSbActos
fibera excesdins prescribed r-xpoeura lisltsi
■area DIRECTOR
,'/ifiy/.
2hf^l
5/30/33
1/24/33
MOTICE TO EMPLOYEES - The bv* qive-. ».i smploy.e o. hi»
"' * ■■ — -^.-r.iirti -III- " * — ' ""'^'rTrin
'uVOA E. AinCU
EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION UNLAWFUL - Pie Ijw pro
TOTALP?
il I "^'^'
262
TH ADMlMSttl'VriON
OCtUI-ArieNAL SAFf TV ANO "f -■ SI"
CITATION und NO! IFICAllON OF PENALTY
169 Wcybcosot ft., 5^fi floo*"
Provldoaoe, I? I C?9033393
SESIOUS i 1
T
Roljort E. nerockrtor of Rhode lalaai, Ino.
and its Bucceaaoro
Bids. 13, CoddlTvrton Cove
mddlotovm, ni O23/,0
./ \
< ISSUAIICl ./El"
1/Y733
01
07321, 229
AREA
01
190 1
rACi
11
17
THE tAW Hf QUIRES that a copy ol thii
Citotion ho poited immediate 'y '" • PfomJ-
neot plate •» ot near (he location o' the vio-
»~i>M. _ "»•»— f itMi^r^T".**
%c«Ka'JS£l
1' ^♦-•nf •f»-'T»T»."T»d . .!■ Wi ■■■JUIJl*
Pilea of aebeoto-j crap at the follovfing locations were
not laljelod:
a) Dry Dock f/2, Atop South wIcg ualli tags of ao'bostos
Fcrap and looco arbestoo on or about 9/22/32.
b) lini of Plor ./l: Broken bugr of aubeatoB ecrap on or
about 9/24/32 and 9/30/82.
c) Ship'bcdlditv; Area, Worth of Sldg. 40t Arbcetoc ccrap
pilo on or about 10/l3/32.
d) Pior /I, at cangway from ferry "Croenport" i Scaled
bags of BBbCBtoo ocrap on or aboat 10/2d/32.
6G
29 CPR 1510.1COl(h)(2)! Arbestos warrte, .icrap, debi'ln, bet^s, con-
tninoro, equlpncnt, arid aoboatoo-contanlnat«d clothing, coasigM^ for
.\iri,ooal, which nay protiuoe airborne lovsla of ooboBtoc fibers in
••cccas of prcucribod limitr. wao not collected oad dicpoaod of tn
oaled inportooablo 'bac" '^^ olhor clo:;ed, imponaoablo contcinara:
Acbostoo waato and .crap wria not ooU'Xjtod In -ealod
iii^wrmeablo l>af,-i cr other clo ed oonrtainero in the following
aroaat
*) Dry Dock T., Atop winj; wall: Loona asbartoii on or Bkotit
9/22/82.
b) a>d of Fier '.'1: Broken base of anbeirtoo ncrnp on cr
about 9/24/32 and 9/30/32.
o) Shlpbuildir.s Aroa, Ilorkh of Duiliilne 4O1 A.iboatoa
ucrap pileA on or about 10/l3/32.
29 CPU 1910.1025(o)(l)j -inDloyeoCB) ifor« oipooed to lead at coooaa-
trotiona groathor than fifty nvlcrogiwiBB per cubic neter of air
avcn»6«d ©v*r *« eight-hour period i
a) Drydook ,'.'2- Fir«flghteri Heldta- inside oanltajv taak
oa w about 9/24/02.
WVSBTKH.
Inoediately
2/V/O3
' ARtAOIRECTOn
//y/-ii'fn
LrrDA n. ANZU
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES - The law giv;< an employoc or his EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION UNLAWFUL - Thd law
.I'prcMntstiycthcoppoituiiHv to obiect to any abalcmcnt date hibils (liscnfninaiio.i by an employpr aijiinH an cinpljyt(
^am iji^^a.i iiaiiaai* «>«i<»i->
TOTAM'
foa
niT'
Jt til iailirr'- --
263
U S Of P -HT V.E\T OF LADDH
OCCOfATlONAl SAFETY ANllHt/ilTH AOMIMSIR ATION
CITATION and IMOTinCATON OF PENALTY
169 Woyboawt i:t., 5tli floor
Provld3nct), ni 0?;033393
Robert K. Dorocktor of lihode lolaM, Inc.
and Ite unccsasora
Bids. 13, Coddin^Lion Cove
Mlddletoim, RI 02340
i ISSU«klV »*l
._«! _.
OSHAKUMSER
07321, 229
Ant* ' fict
0190 12 Of 17
INSPECTION DATE,
9/>1 2/14/32
INSPECTION SITE
Bld«. 6
THE LAW REQUIRES thai a cony o' tMt
Cilation be posted immedtatetv in • promi-
STANOARO. BgqUI-TITtUW OW SgCI ION ^^ 1 wg
b) Pier iS'l- YO- Wayaman bumixjg painted Gtecl in fomard
cargo bold on or about 9/24/92.
c) DrjTioclc ••'2- rirefightor: Pipefitter twrninc oooted
cteol on forwsxd bilge on or about 10/6/32.
7B
29 CFR 1910.1025(f)(1): "eepiratorB re<talrod tmder this oootion for
protoction agoinrit lead, were not uaed:
The eniployees licted belou were expoocd to lead in excess
of the pcrmisaible eipoeuro level (PEL) and were not
wearing roopiratorat
a) Drydock :' 2- rirofifshtor: Holder inside lanitary tank
on or about 9/24/'J2.
b) Pier :f^- TO- Haysnan burning painted srteel in forvard
cargo hold on or about 9/24/32.
^c
29 cm 191C.1025(f)(2)(iii)j Reaplratora vier« not oeleotcd from
thooe approved for protection againot lead dust. fiuW| and Birt ly
the Mine Safety bjkI Health Adoiaietration (KS5W.) and the SailoBal .
Inrtltttto for Ooo«pii.tional Safety aad Health (KI03a) xmdor tb« jarorlsios! ■
of 30 era Part III
a) nrydock ,V2- Pirof loiter 1 Pipefitter taming oo«t»d uteel
4n forward bllgo on or aiK^jt 10/6/82 was ticarirs a reaptiatoi
with organic vtujot oartrld^ea vhioh did not affoard i»<rt«ctiM
againct ftssaB,
70
29 CF.^ 1910.1025f f)(3)(i)t The asiployer did not oaenro that the
reopiratar(s) intaiod to oi-?iicyoe( c) for protootioo »sainst load
cxhibitod miniffloa faoepicce loakase mA were f ittod pocoperly:
a) Drydock .'?- 7irofi^tor: Plpofitter bumin.T coated
ctool in foTrfunl bilge on or uboivt IO/6/82 was yearing
a ncgnti-srpi propinuro rcBpiritor end wan nort inntroctod in bow
to perforin poritive aai/or nogatlv* prWMtore fit teota to
aaeuro a tight fooopiooo to fao* seal.
2/7/83
■ AREAOIRECTOR
NOTICE TO EMPLO YE tS-
l^l^'v
2A/33
4/4/83
Lnroi H. /jTiOj
The law gives an employee or his
EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION UMLAWFUL - The bw pro-
ii^flp ^j^ m CliiOlQyfif ^^'"""st an cmploypa lor
TOTAl f;
264
TON I
CITATION and NOTIFICAnJN OF PENALTY
169 WoyboP8«t 5t., 5th floor
Provldenco, ni O2';O33093
■,r»t^ti^lVlP^^»PQN(S)»()H.tw*wh»''iP
SKBIDUS
Robert E. Derocktor of khodo Icland, Ino.
and Ito ruccecoorii
Bldg. 13, Coddia(jton Cove
HlddletoKTi, RI 02340
•r-\
G7321 229
i/r/a3
< REGION
01
I
AKEt
0190
rtcE
13 „, 17
THE LAW REQUIRES that a . opy ol Ihn
Citation he posied immediately in ■ prom
ntnt placa at or near the location ol the wio-
laiund) cited be'ow. _The. Citation mmj
j.nIcK A.* nl 10*70 TKa r
W-K—^'^lieW JMII^lllW I
73
29 cr^ 1910.1025(f)(3)(il)j Qunntitntive or ualitativo face fit teats
,.ore not provided at the tine of initial fitting and at leaat ooai-
aanually thereafter for ctioh employee wearing nocativa preemire
rcBpiratora for protection acainst leodt
a) Drydock ,;'2- rirofightert pipoflttor, Iwming coated
ctool in forward bil«o on or about IO/6/O2, woaring a
negatlvn preaoviro roopirator overexpoaed to load, woo not
fit teoted.
Erplanatory ?ootnotoj Qualitative fit testo nhall be cooductejrt
in accordance with Appendix I) of 19IO.IO25.
,'7 CFS 1910.1025(f)(4)(i)! \ rcapiratory protection prosram for
!"3ployoeo crpoEod to lead waa not intrtitnted in sccorc'arcc with 29 CF.I
'910.134(h), (d), (e), and (f)i
Repair Yard: itoepiratori; were u;~cd for protection tytainrrt
lead without a pro^-om for je lection, use, cleaMng, r.toj*acc
anl laaintenance of roBpiratoro.
4/4/33
?9 CPR 1915.53(d)(l)« Sxirfocoa covered with toxic pre«ervBtivo( o)
^n onoloood epooeCe) were not stripped of all toxic coating for a
liotaaco of at loast 4 inch»3 from the area of heat npplicatica nor
jore enployeea protected hy airline reBpirators meeting the r»<iulr«Boat s
of 1915.152(a) «
Iteplc^MS lictod below did Dot ctrip bock all lead oostainiiig
coatings for a dlittanoe of ot loaot 4 inohoe froa th* «r«a
of beat ^^lioation nor did th«y waor airlin* reBpiratorsi
a) DryCock ff2- Firofi«hter« Uelder inold* canitaiy tank
on or about 9/24A^2.
b) Pier #1- TO J UcyooBa burning painted steel in forward
oarco hold on or about 9/'14/32.
e) Prydoot vT- I'irefighterJ Pipoflttor taming ooat-ed
crtoel in forward bllcv< on or ahoiit 10/6/U2.
3A/Q3
AREA DIRtCrOR
/V/^z/m, ,_
LHnU ii. A^IKU
MOTICE TO EMPLOYEES - The law ijnf, ati rniplOYee 01 l>is EMPLOYEn DISCRIMINATION UNLAWFUL - Thfl law |itn
.■preienlalivelheoppoiiiiiiilv to ob|eci to .mv ali.iiemi-tii dai" hihiu .Im iiii.inji.ijn hy an iMniiloyf r o'ljmsl ati cmiiloycc (or
I ■ : ."■ •',1" Hi>i« iiuliiLLiL_Uu ii iiii U) bft-M>y«Moo«Ulft.- Jibija.a.uwtfjUint.m-lfli^'MmiU!fl jny "y^'" ""'i''' 'i"."' ^''^i
TorAipT
fon!
tITAll
I
265
U S. Dtl'ARTWEMT Or LAD(,'f!
OCCUPATIONAL SAf ETY ANO HtAIJH ADMINISTRATICM
CITATION and NOTIFICAIIiIn OF PENALTY
169 Ueybocaot St., Jth floor
ProvidBnce, HI 029033393
' 3KRI0U3 ! 1
Robert E. DerecVtor of Rhofle Is-larei, Inc.
uid Itn ::raocoBBoro
Bld£. 13, Coddlu^.on Covn
mddletown, •<I 02O4O
< lUUANI
l^^^^i ■ d^hanumI
1^/83
01
C7321 229
0190 14 Of 17
INSPECTION OATFy,
-*- -2/14/82
INSPECTION SITE:
IMff. 6
9/3-12/
SPECTIOI
THE LAW REQUIRES thai a copy o( th
Citation ba pusled immfdialcly m a prom
t-ty^vn^'
9 I Mf«LM%*«4^,
r>9 C?n 1910.1025(d)(2)« An initial d«tenalnation vaa not ciado to
uetornino If any employee no^ ba erponed to load art or above tho
action levell
Repair Yard: Initial dstemiinctlonB wore not made during
the follotfinc operations:
a) Welding on painted or coatod •■urfaceD
b) Burning on painted or coatisd :.-urfaooo
oj Abraaivo blaoting on painted or coated inirfacc3
d; Grinding on painted or coatad ij-urfaooo.
Vjie ollecod violations below have boen grouped bocaasa they involve
. imilar or i-elatod haairds tliat may increaoe the potential for injury
resultlnc froa an accident.
29 C'AI 1910. 1025(e)(3)(iiH"): The cioploycr ■■jhoso crr,ployc-«a wore
oxixjcod to load in air conccntr.iticno in fMcooo of the formiorible
expoairo limit did not have ado uate writt.jn work praotloe prccraar:
for itciaei ro .Ttircd under .ectiono (g)(h) t< (i) of ?9 CiR I9IO.IC251
a) Repair Tarv\: Enployees uero oxpoBed to cioeeoivo air
lead ooaoentrationo and tUo ooureny dli not lia-/« Krlttea
policies nod piccediirea for tho i;,.:uanofl and <xxk of
protecti'/e work clothJ.n^, houBsdcoeping and peroonal Jc^fslono
practiooD.
93
29 CFR 1910.1025(g)(l)« Appri^priate protective uork clothtas w>d
c uipaant v;ore not provided (at no oost to Mm ctzplojto) and itn
use RBsaipad wiioi Cfflployuea were sipoisod to lead abova lh« poruiiaoible
cipocnire llialtl
The enployoao lli-ted below wert> ovorcxpcncd to IvA reid >«er«
not provided with m-A re<T«lred to v^•^ ccroraili or fi.ll
body protpctivo work clothlrvr, hot", nrv.l nhoofj or dliiix>«xbl8
choe coverlet n:
5/9/33
5/9/03
a) Dry Dock "2- rirefl^htei-;
on or alKiut 9/24/^2.
Welder tnoido jaaitary tank
5/9/83
' AREADinEClOR
'^//tU.
I
J.
Lijrr^^ 1!, AVtOj
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES - The lijw giv.'S an employee oi his
EMPLOYF.n DISCRIMIWAI ION UNLAWPUl. - 1 lie I. w pro
fi
TOTAl
ft.:
266
OCCUPATIONAL SAf f TY AND Ht/j^IH ADMrNISTH AI ION
CITATION and NOTIFICATION OF PENALTY
169 Weybosoot 3t., 3^^ floor
ProTidonoe, RI 029033893
SERIOUS
1
Uobort 2. Derecktor of Rhode Itland, Inc.
•ind Itc caocosBora
Bldg. 18, Coddins^on Cove
Klddlotwm, «I 02'i40
I lltUAXLX iep n5ll«llilMf[ll
l/?/tJ3 G732t 229
• KtCION
01
• AKEA
0190
rue!
15 OF 17
'^f^9m^2
INSEECTIONilTE;
"^iSS?"^
THE LAW REQUIRES thai > copy of Ihii
Citation be p03I«d imniediatelv 'O a promi
T>t^gm<nmi
STANPARP."nrotlCTTIOM OB »FCTION OF THE ACTVIOtinTr
t) Pier ivl-YO: '..'nyflman turning painted ;.te<il in fotvard
cargo hold on or aliaut 9/24/32.
o) Drydock ,'2- Firefighter: Pipefitter twrnin^ coated
tteel in forward bil^e on or about 10/6/32.
29 C'.Tv 1910.102S(i)(2)(ii)! Ohang» rooms \*ore not oTuipped with
rcpurate ctcroco faciliticc for protective Mork clothinc and a-Tiipoent
Fjvi for :traet clothoo to prevent croo contanination from lead:
BsployooB liGtod below were overexposed to lead and the locker
room did not have ceparate r.toraee facilltiee
a) Drydock !,'2~ "iroftghtor:
or about 9/24/32.
.Welder inride 1 anitary tank on
b) Pier "1-YC: VlaytaMn burning painted c-toel In farvard
carco hold on or about 9/24/32.
0) DrydocI: .;;?- i'ireflGhtart Pipefitter burning coated ^to«l
in forward bilje on or about IO/6/G2.
d) Drydock ,2- IV0 abraaive blaatcro/tendere removing paint
frore the valves removed from Firefighter on or about 9/24/82.
9P
29 OKn 1910.1025(i)(3)(i.i.): Shcwnr faoilitieo, la aooordaaoo with
29 CPn 1910.141(a)(3), wire not providcKl for RtipLoyeeC e) cxj^osod to
lead in excoea of the penaiaoible exposure limit (PEL), without regard
to the uoe of i-eupiratorDi
Shouore wore not availabl* for eiBployo«« orTwrwxpofled to lAad
as Lloted below:
a) Drydoolc ,','2- Pireftghteri Keller laeid* sanitary toJc
on or about 9/2/,/32.
h) Pior (5'1-YO: WayGaon buraln.t painted 3te«l in forward
cartjo hold on or about 9/24/32.
■ AREA DIRECTOR
7//r7
I.IHDA R. .UOCU
5/9/03
5/9/83
pt;.
fJOTICfc TO EMPLOYEES - The law (jiuti an i^inployre nr hi! EMPLOYER DISCBIMINAriON UNLAVVPUL - The law pit,
TOTAL
f on '■
267
us Dtt'ARTMENT DF LAl.OR
OCCUPATIONAL SAFtTY AND HEAU^H ADMINISTRATION
CITATION and NOTIFICAtfON OF PtNALTY
IFICATfON-
169 JoybooGct St., 5th floor
Providence, HI 02-;03i393
S3?10US
:3B5H23
Robert E, Dorocktor of Rhode' loland. Inc.
i»tH its cucceoocra
Bldg. 13, Coddinclon Cove
MiddletowB, RI 02840
1/7/33
> fltCION
01
L<ji4A NIIMeER
07321,229
0190
16
17
THE LAW REQUIRE? that > copy of ihii
Citation be posted immediatelY in a prom
Tolor-i.at;'
•TANDARD. nEGin.'aTION OR SPCTION OF THE ACT VIOt wrrui moor.
o) Drydock /'2- Tireflghter: Plpofittor 'bumj/v: coated
Bteol in forward bil^o on or about 10/6/32.
d) J*ydock ;-2- Cvo abror.ive blasterB/tendara roinovirjs p*int
from the valvce removed fi-om the Firefighter on or about
9/24/32.
■ crK 1910.1O25(i)(4)(iii): ;>Tployeo( 9) eipored to lend in eiceoa
r the permlsDible oxposuxo 'unit (PKL), without regard to the uee of
;3piiatarB, wore not roquirixl to Hoah their hrjida and face prior to
iviivii drinkinci uiujlcing or applying coBmcticei
JisploycoB lintod be low wore ovoroiporwd to lead nnd were
not i>c''uirod to wash their hands and faoea prior to eating,
drinking or oiaokiivj.
a) Drydock •/?- Tirofi^ter: ilelder inside sanitary tank
on or about 9/24/32.
"b) Fier //I- TO: .Jaysman burning pair.ted metal in for-.«ard
cargo hold on or about 5/24/82.
c) Drydoclc i,'2- Firoflghtert Pipofittor humlng coated
steel in forward bilga on or about IO/6/82.
d) Qrydock r'2- 'iVo ahraoive blaatoTB/tendors removlag paint
fron the volvoa r*aovod from the Firoftghtor on or aboot
9/24/32.
■J CPU 1910,1025(i)(4)(iv): l>iiploy»ca entering liinohrooa facllitiee
ith protective work clothauv? or e'mipoen*. were not requlrrwi to rewj^/o
arfaoe load dT»ot by vaomimins, donadraTt booth, or other olcaniad
ctbod(o}l
Daployeee listed below were overeipoood to lead nnd eoployer
did rot provide leann 00 that enployeea could rseove rMrfwe
load contamlrjitio.. before eatinji
a) Urydook if2- Firefightori
cm or about 9/24/32.
Welder inelxie uvnitary tonic
2/7/83
5/9/03
■ AREA DIRECTOR
Z^^ft/.
LUTOA R. Aiao;
AlOTlCE TO EMI'LOYEES - The l»w i^ives ati employee oi hn Er.TLOYER DISCRIMINATION UNLAWFUL - Tiic law [mu
Tor;.i fi.
, .^,...-.ni ,!.■.- ,i..l|H. ^TTiifliiiVrnl'V i^y4i.|il(^ui. liUiniL All '■■.•'''|"yfg|j[_|
!(■
268
•■■'" U S. DEPARI.VCNT OF LABOR
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY ANO Ht/<>,^TH ADMINISTO ATION
CITATION and NOTIFICATION OF PENALTY
165 Wpyboaaot Ct., 5^^ floor
Provldance, Til O2';033-393
,fm'tiMymmmN[im.mmnD.>
OERIOira
1
Robert 12. I)er«cktai> of Rhodo leland, lac.
•ad itc sucoaaoars
Bld£. 13, Coddini^ton Cova
Middletovm, RI 023/50
Ktibn
01
> OSHtKUMIEH
C7321 i229
• URTA " • >Xg|
0190 17 ofl?
JCECTIONOATE^
>PECTIO
Bldg.
INSPECTIONSITE
i- 6
THE LAW REQUIRES th.t > coov of Ih
___^Ci!8Iion ba posled immeOiately in a pfom
icuwiiViwuiWM efcu nun UP int wcivum-hi e». ■
b) Pier //I- TO: V/syntan burning palntod E;teol in forward
cargo hold on or about 9/24/32.
o) Drydock ,/2 Pirefighten Pipefitter bamlng coated
ct*«l in forward bil^e on or about IO/6/82.
d) Jlryilock ,r2- Abranivo blaatera/tendors reaoving paint
froB valvo3 remc/ud from the Firefighter on or abont 9/2^/32.
10
.;•) CVR 1910.1035;.l)(l)(l)i A medical rnrveillanoa progron Has not
incrtituted for all etBployoe( r) who wero, or could be exposed to lead
:;bove tho turtlon level for nore than thirty (30) day:; per year:
EJnployoen listed bolow were exposed to load in oxcono of the
action level and the company did not iaatituto a otedio&l
Burveiliance procrtia:
a) lirydock ^2- Firefighter: V/elder inside aaitarjT taxik
on or about 9/2^/32.
b) Pier ,.'1-Y0; Ucynman burning painted steel in forward
cargo l\old on or about 9/24/32.
o) DiyJ-ock #2- I'Urofightert Pipefitter bumlag ooated
etoel in forward bil(;o on or about IO/6/62.
d) Di'yilock /,'2- "iSio abrasive blaotero/teniJ.ers ronwvias
paint frcj) valves renoved froM the Firefighter on or about
9/24/a2.
e) Drydook #2-Piraflght«ri i'omar*fbilB»-«old«r nervia;
as a fire watch on or a)>oat 10/6/32.
f) Pier /►'!- Ferry "aroonport"- Shlpfltter tack waldii^ on
painted curfaceo on or about 10/26/82.
' AREA DIRECTOR
7/W^^^
2/7/B3
LSUA R. AIXTJ
MOTICE TO EMPLOYEES -The law giv« an cmploypeot his EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION UNt AWFUL - The law pro ;TOTALP<
269
Mr. Frank. Our final witness is Steven Wodka from Frederick
M. Baron & Associates.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN WODKA, DIRECTOR OF HEALTH
EFFECTS RESEARCH, FREDERICK M. BARON & ASSOCIATES
Mr. Wodka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will try and summarize my 14-year obsession with asbestos in
10 minutes or less.
I began following this mineral in 1969 when I was an interna-
tional representative with the oil, chemical and atomic workers as-
signed to the health and safety department.
In 1981, I became employed by Frederick M. Baron & Associates
which is a plaintiffs law firm representing about 700 asbestos
claimants throughout the United States.
OSHA's asbestos standard was a total disaster from the day it
was published in the Federal Register in June 1972. The standard
established a permissible exposure limit of 2 fibers greater than 5
microns in length per cubic centimeter.
The protection that the standard seems to provide is deceptive.
Two fibers per cubic centimeter is the exact equivalent of 2 million
fibers per cubic meter. The average working man inhales from 4 to
8 cubic meters of air during an 8-hour workday. Therefore, the real
permissible dose under the standard is 8 million to 16 million in-
haled asbestos fibers per working day. Even in 1972, OSHA's hear-
ing record was replete with medical evidence that such a high daily
dose of asbestos fibers would induce cancer.
Since then the medical community has developed models for pre-
dicting the cancer risks due to asbestos at varying exposure limits.
Ironically, it was OSHA's own staff that compiled this data into a
"preliminary risk assessment for asbestos" on August 12, 1981.
This document was withheld from the public until recently.
It is fairly apparent why the agency tried to keep this study from
the public view. The risk assessment revealed that continued occu-
pational exposure to asbestos at the current legal limit of 2 million
fibers per cubic meter of air would result in a range of 18,400 to
598,000 excess lung cancer deaths based on an exposed population
of 2.3 million workers. These shocking figures were in addition to
the 200,000 excess cancer deaths that the Mount Sinai School of
Medicine has estimated will occur over the next 20 years due to the
legacy of asbestos exposure from World War II to 1972.
The studies on which the OSHA risk assessment was based were
all available in the literature by 1980. So OSHA and NIOSH
formed an asbestos working group that year to gather the scientific
basis for a new standard. Their report, transmitted on April 17,
1980, concluded that "immediate action" was necessary because the
current permissible exposure limit was so high that it will "cause
several types of cancer and other lung disease."
The regulatory process began with a Federal Register notice on
November 24, 1980, announcing the schedule to result in a final
rulemaking by winter of 1981. But the 1980 presidential election in-
tervened.
25-994 0-83-18
270
On February 10, 1981, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce submitted
to President Reagan's Task Force and Regulatory Reform a list of
10 OSHA rulemakings that should be "prevented."
One of the 10 was the asbestos proposal because, as the Chamber
claimed, the existing asbestos standard was "adequate." Eleven
days later, with seemingly knee jerk precision, Budget Director
David Stockman revealed in the Washington Post that the Reagan
Administration was preparing to rescind the proposed asbestos
rulemaking. Stockman stated that no regulation should be issued
unless it is necessary and unless benefits to society are reasonably
related to its costs.
To perform a cost-benefit test one has to assume that there is no
value in saving lives and in protecting human beings from needless
pain and suffering. This generally reduces the question to a deter-
mination of the economic value of lives saved compared to the cost
of control.
For better or for worse, the tort liability litigation over asbestos
has produced an average settlement figure of $170,000 per case, ac-
cording to a 5-year study completed in 1977 by the insurance serv-
ice office, an arm of the insurance industry.
If Stockman had taken the lowest estimate of asbestos induced
cancer that will be caused by continued exposure at the current
permissible limit, which is 18,400 excess deaths, and had multiplied
that figure by $170,000 per case, he would have realized that bring-
ing asbestos exposure under control would result in a benefit to
American society of $3.1 billion. The cost of containing exposure to
a safe level is but a fraction of that figure.
While Stockman may not have had the benefit of the risk assess-
ment document in early 1981, Secretary of Labor Raymond Dono-
van and Assistant Secretary for OSHA Thorne Auchter certainly
were in a position to know of its existence later that year.
Yet, 5 months after the risk assessment was issued, OSHA pub-
lished a notice in the Federal Register on January 13, 1982, revok-
ing the earlier rulemaking schedule for asbestos that had been es-
tablished by the Carter administration.
Instead of speeding up the regulatory process in light of the risk
assessment, this new notice failed to set any deadline for the issu-
ance of a new standard.
Mr. Chairman, the 3 years of delay that this administration has
injected into the asbestos rulemaking process simply doesn't make
any sense. Here is an agency charged with preventing worker expo-
sure to serious hazards, yet it employs dilatory tactics when the
medical and economic data so overwhelmingly favor it taking deci-
sive and expedited action.
OSHA is simply out of touch with the realities and needs of the
workplace.
Further Mr. Chairman, applying the figures that Dr. Nicholson
provided to us today regarding excess cancers due to each year of
exposure at the current allowable limit of 2 fibers per milliliter,
you will come up with a figure of between 7,200 to 72,000 excess
cancer deaths that are directly attributable to the 3 years of delay
under the Reagan administration.
Thirty-five million tons of asbestos are now in place in office
buildings, factories, oil refineries, chemical plants and schools.
271
Every day, some portion of this lethal substance is released into
the air because of demolition or the need to make repairs on build-
ings or machinery.
The impact of intermittent low-level asbestos exposure has too
long been ignored. When asbestos dust is released into the air, it
breaks down into small invisible fibers which travel deeply into the
lungs when inhaled. There the fiber acts as an indestructible,
sharply pointed spear that relentlessly stabs away at the lung
tissue with every breath.
Yet, low-level intermittent asbestos exposure is precisely the type
of health hazard least controlled by the existing OSHA asbestos
standard.
The current standard contemplates a Keystone Cops-type affair
for any worker who attempts to seek its enforcement. A worker
can't force his employer to follow the various provisions of the
standard unless the employer knows that the asbestos exposure
could be exceeding the limit.
Therefore, the employer is required to monitor the air. If the em-
ployer monitors, it usually takes several weeks for an air sampling
result to come back from a lab. By then, the asbestos rip-out is
typically over and the asbestos fibers are deep in the worker's
lungs.
The vicious cycle of asbestos exposure causing asbestos victims
must be stopped. This can only be done by treating asbestos as if it
were a radioactive substance like plutonium. Plutonium is handled
on a total containment theory. It is never supposed to be released
into the open air. If there is ever a possibility that plutonium could
be released, the worker is to be totally protected with supplied air-
breathing apparatus.
In my prepared testimony is a presentation of what an emergen-
cy standard would look like that follows this total containment
type theory. I purposely made this proposal very simple and it is
not sophisticated at all. The reason is that it only follows a com-
monsense approach that would keep asbestos fibers out of workers
lungs during asbestos rip-outs.
The so-called difficulty in air sampling for asbestos that Mr.
Auchter brought out earlier today is simply not an issue with a
total containment standard. You simply don't have to worry about
all those so-called problems with air sampling with this kind of
standard.
Therefore, there is no reason why within a week from today that
OSHA could not issue my proposal as an emergency temporary
standard.
Section 6(c)(1) of the OSHA act requires the Secretary of Labor to
issue an emergency standard to take effect immediately if he deter-
mines that employees are exposed to a grave danger and that such
action is necessary to protect employees from such danger.
Mr. Chairman, I submit that the record that you have made in
this hearing today alone would serve as ample justification for the
issuance of such a standard.
I thank you very much.
[Mr. Wodka's prepared statement follows:]
272
STATEMENT OF STEVEN WODKA
FREDERICK M. BARON & ASSOCIATES*
BEFORE
MANPOWER AND HOUSING SUBCOMMITTEE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JUNE 28, 1983
A few years ago, a group of oil refinery workers were
required by their employer to work on a multi-story tower
while an overhaul was in progress. That tower, called a
fluid catalytic cracking unit, had thousands of feet of piping .
covered with asbestos. Asbestos block insulated the unit's
boilers. Their employer, American Petrofina, was investing
$70 million to upgrade the unit. Eighteen hundred workers were
involved.
The asbestos insulation was ripped out, sending dust
and chunks of asbestos into the air. Asbestos dust settled
over the floors and machinery. It was then swept up with
brooms, sending more dust into the air. The asbestos containing
debris was placed in plastic bags, dropped over the second
floor, and then broke open upon hitting the ground. The
employer never put up the required warning signs. The employer
never bothered to sample the air to determine how much dust
was in the workers' breathing zone. Worst of all, the employer
refused to provide the workers with respirators so that they
could place some barrier between their lungs and the asbestos
dust, which one worker told me was coming down like show.
These conditions occurred at least 30 times over a
six month period in 1979. These workers, who were organized
by the Port Arthur, Texas local of Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers Union, were knowledgeable of their rights under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act. They filed a complaint.
OSHA inspected a few weeks later. OSHA found three serious
violations of the asbestos standard and issued a few hundred
dollars in penalties.
But the employer contested the citations. Under Section
10 of the OSHA Act, an employer is not required to correct a
violation while it is being contested. The only exception to
this provision is imminent danger situations. But OSHA has
never considered the inhalation of a known cancer-causing
substance to be an imminent danger.
1717 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, (202)775-8784
273
Conveniently for American Petrofina, the hearing on the
contested citations didn't occur until the following year.
By this time, the overhaul had been completed. The company,
therefore, claimed that it had "abated" the violations by
virtue of the fact that asbestos demolition work was no longer
being conducted. The Labor Department's Regional Solicitor
bought this specious argument, reduced the penalty to zero,
and knocked the citations down from serious to non-serious.
The union refused to sign the settlement and objected to it
because it was wholly inadequate to protect the workers in
the future. ■'■
While this case was pending, the asbestos demolition work
had moved to another part of this tower which is 10 stories
tall, reaching nearly 225 feet in height. The same exposure
conditions occurred. The company failed to provide respirators,
so the workers filed a second complaint. Again OSHA inspected,
found 3 serious violations, and issued $900 in penalties.
At this point, the now familiar scenario repeated itself.
The employer contested, didn't correct the hazards, and cut
a deal with the Labor Department Regional Solicitor. The union
protested. In response, the attorney for the Labor Department
contended that to prosecute the serious citations for the
asbestos violations would cause the company to "suffer".^
I. The Flawed Statute
Nothing unusual happened in these two cases. Fundamental
flaws that impede the hope of effective enforcement run rampant
throughtout both the OSHA statute and its asbestos standard.
Consequently, a whole new generation of American workers
are being marked for life as the asbestos victims of the future.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act is one of the
weakest health and safety statutes ever passed by the Congress.
Its maximum fine is $10,000 per violation, which is pocket
Secretary of Labor v. American Petrofina Co. of Texas,
OSHRC Docket No. 79-6847.
2
Secretary of Labor v. American Petrofina Co. of Texas,
OSHRC Docket No. 80-1671.
274
-3-
change to most large corporations. It allows workers to be
continually exposed to life threatening hazards while the
3
employer contests the citation. In fact, one study found
that employers may profit by contesting (rather than promptly
complying) whenever the present use of abatement money is worth
more than the proposed penalty plus the legal costs of delaying
the abatement through litigation. In fiscal year 1982, OSHA
issued a total of 181 citations for serious, willful and repeat
violations of the asbestos standard. The average penalty
4
per violation was $216.35 .
The net result of this wet noodle of a regulatory system
is that there is no incentive on employers to correct hazards
before they maim, kill or expose workers to proven cancer-
causing substances.
This experience is most poignant for occupational health
hazards such as asbestos . For the young refinery workers who
were exposed at the American Petrofina plant that I described
earlier, it will be a minimum of 15 years, but typically 20
to 30 years from those fateful days in 1979, before their lungs
will explode with the scarring or carcinoma due to that asbestos
exposure. Yet, the liklihood that these workers will be able
to tie their asbestos-related disease (which includes
Final Report of the Interagency Task Force on Workplace
Safety and Health (1978), p. III-15.
4
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Management
Information System.
275
-4-
asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma) to American Petrofina
is virtually nil. For the less than 3% of workers who are
currently able to prove such a causal connection , the benefit
levels under workers compensation are of little economic concern
to their employer. For example, in a group of asbestos exposed
workers who died from asbestos induced disease between 1967
to 1976, the mean settlement per workers compensation case
was $22,800.^
II. The Deceptive Standard
The OSHA asbestos standard itself was a total disaster
from the day it was published in the Federal Register in June,
1972. The standard established a permissible exposure limit
of 2 fibers greater than five microns in length per cubic
centimeter. Again, the protection that the standard seems to
provide is deceptive (a cubic centimeter only holds about a
thimbleful of air) . Two fibers per cubic centimeter is the exact
equivalent of 2,000,000 fibers per cubic meter. The average
working man inhales from 4 to 8 cubic meters of air during an
eight hour work day. Therefore, the real permissible dose
under the standard is 8,000,000 to 16,000,000 inhaled asbestos
fibers per working day. Even in 1972, OSHA's hearing record was
replete with medical evidence that such a high daily dose of
asbestos fibers would induce cancer.
An Interim Report to Congress on Occupational Diseases,
U.S. Department of Labor (1980) .
^Disability Compensation for Asbestos-Associated Disease
in the United States, Mt. Sinai School of Medicine (1982).
276
-5-
Since then, the medical community has developed models
for predicting the cancer risk due to asbestos at varying
exposure limits. Ironically, it was OSHA's own staff that
compiled this data into a "Preliminary Risk Assessment for
Asbestos" on August 12, 1981. This document was withheld from
7
the public until recently.
It is fairly apparent why the agency tried to keep this
study from the public view. The risk assessment revealed that
continued occupational exposure to asbestos at the legal
limit of 2,000,000 fibers per cubic meter would result in a
range of 18,400 to 598,000 excess lung cancer deaths based on
an exposed population of 2.3 million workers. These shocking
figures were in addition to 200,000 excess cancer deaths
that the Mt. Sinai School of Medicine has estimated will occur
over the next 20 years due to the legacy of asbestos exposure
from World War II to 1972.
The studies on which the OSHA risk assessment was based
were all available in the literature by 1980. So OSHA and
NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
Department of Health and Human Resources) formed an Asbestos
Working Group that year to gather the scientific basis for a
new standard. Their report, transmitted on April 17, 1980,
concluded that "immediate action" was necessary because the
The draft risk assessment was placed in OSHA's public
docket office on March 4, 1983. Previously, a Freedom of
Information Act request made by Frederick M. Baron & Associates
for the same document was denied by OSHA on September 9, 1982.
277
-6-
current permissible exposure level was so high that it will
"cause several types of cancer and other lung disease."
The regulatory process began with a Federal Register
notice on November 24, 1980, announcing a schedule to result
in a final rulemaking by Winter 1981.
But the 1980 Presidential election intervened. On
February 10, 1981, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce submitted to
President Reagan's Task Force on Regulatory Reform a list of
10 OSHA rulemakings that should be "prevented". One of the
10 was the asbestos proposal because, as the Chamber claimed,
the existing asbestos standard was "adequate".
Eleven days later, with knee jerk precision. Budget Director
David Stockman revealed in the Washington Post that the
Reagan Administration was preparing to rescind the proposed
asbestos rulemaking. Stockman stated that no regulation
should be issued unless it is necessary and unless benefits
to society are reasonably related to its costs.
Stockman, of course, was referring to the familiar cost-
g
benefit balancing test, which the Supreme Court ruled later
that year could not be applied to OSHA's promulgation of
health standards. But even putting the Supreme Court decision
aside. Stockman's rationale still didn't make sense when it
came to asbestos.
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., et. al . ,
Donovan, et. al . , 101 S. Ct . 2478 (1981).
278
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To perform a cost-benefit test, one has to assume that
there is no value in saving lives and in protecting human beings
from needless pain and suffering. This generally reduces the
question to a determination of the economic value of lives
saved compared to the costs of control. For better or for worse,
the tort liability litigation over asbestos has produced an
average settlement figure of $170,000 per case, according to a
five-year study completed in 1977 by the Insurance Service
Office, an arm of the insurance industry. If Stockman had taken
the lowest estimate of asbestos induced cancer that will be
caused by continued exposure at the current permissible limit
(18,400 excess lung cancer deaths) and had multiplied that
figure by $170,000 per case, he would have realized that bringing
asbestos exposure under control would result in a benefit
to the American society of $3.1 billion. The cost of containing
exposure to a safe level is but a fraction of that
figure.
While Stockman may not have had the benefit of the risk
assessment document in early 1981, Secretary of Labor
Raymond Donovan and Assistant Secretary for OSHA Thorne Auchter
certainly were in a position to know of its existence later that
year. Yet, five months after the risk assessment was issued,
OSHA published a notice in the Federal Register on
January 13, 1982, revoking the earlier rulemaking schedule
for asbestos that had been established by the Carter Administration.
279
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Instead of speeding up the regulatory process in light of the
risk assessment, this new notice failed to set any deadline
for the issuance of a new standard. OSHA has since announced
its intention to begin a rulemaking proceeding on asbestos
this summer and claims that it will issue a final rule by
December, 1983.
The three years of delay that this Adminstration has injected
into the asbestos rulemaking process simply doesn't make any
sense. Here is an agency charged with preventing worker
exposure to serious hazards, yet it employs dilatory tactics
when the medical and economic data so overwhelmingly favor it
taking decisive and expedited action. OSHA is simply out
of touch with the realities and needs of the workplace.
What happened at the American Petrofina plant is happening
throughout the United States at hundreds of work sites every
day. Thirty-five million tons of asbestos are now in place in
office buildings, factories, oil refineries, chemical plants
and schools. Every day, some portion of this lethal substance
is released into the air because of demolition or the need
to make repairs on buildings or machinery.
The impact of intermittent low-level asbestos exposure
has too long been ignored. When asbestos dust is released
into the air, it breaks dov)n into small invisible fibers
which travel deeply into the lungs when inhaled. There the
fiber acts as an indestructible, sharply pointed spear that
280
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relentlessly stabs away at the lung tissue with every breath.
At our law firm, Ue are regularly working on cases
where the client had brief, low-level asbestos exposure, yet
developed an asbestos-related disease:
— a baker who 40 years ago worked in a shipyard
for a few years drilling holes has pleural
mesothelioma.
— a chemical plant operator who watched asbestos
insulation being installed and removed while
tending his still, dead from asbestos-related
lung cancer.
— a laborer in a plastics plant where asbestos was
used as a raw material who unloaded bags of
asbestos from railroad cars and swept the floors,
has pleural asbestosis.
These cases of asbestos-related lung disease were predicted
in a 1979 study^ of chemical plant workers who were "bystanders"
to those directly engaged in asbestos work. The study found
that 30% of the bystanders, who only had indirect exposure,
had chest x-ray abnormalities caused by asbestos. While the
risk of disabling asbestosis is low for these workers, the
study indicated that:
Nevertheless, the risk of lung cancer and meso-
thelioma is of concern because accumulated
experience indicates that low-level asbestos
exposure (indirect occupational, neighborhood,
or household exposure) is sufficient to result
in a significant risk of developing mesothelioma.
Yet, low-level, intermittent asbestos exposure is precisely
the type of health hazard least controlled by the existing
^"Asbestos Disease in Maintenance Workers of the Chemical
Industry, " Lillis, et. al.. Annals of New York Academy of
Science (1970), pp. 127-135.
281
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OSHA asbestos standard. The current standard contemplates a
Keystone Cops-type affair for any worker who attempts to seek
its enforcement. A worker can't force his employer to follow
the various provisions of the standard unless the employer
knows that asbestos exposure could be exceeding the limit.
Therefore, the employer is required to monitor the air. If
the employer monitors, it usually takes several weeks for an
air sampling result to come back from a lab. By then, the
asbestos rip-out is typically over and the asbestos fibers
are deep in the worker ' s lungs .
But if the worker exercises his rights under the law,
will OSHA be there to back him up? In an incredulous case
that began in 1981, OSHA was successful in getting a Federal
judge to rule that a worker is protected against discriminatory
discharge when a worker first complains to the news media
and then to OSHA. Here, a worker named Ronald Fent was
involved in renovation work on a university dormitory which
was releasing clouds of asbestos dust into the air. Fent's
complaints to the news media and to OSHA resulted in OSHA
citing the employer and the employer firing Fent.
When Labor Department Solicitor Timothy Ryan heard of
the favorable Federal Court decision that would lead to Fent's
reinstatement, Ryan was described as "angry" that his attorneys
had brought the suit. Ryan then "started exploring ways to
Donovan v. R.D. Andersen Construction Co., Inc.,
552 F. Supp. 249 (D. Kan. 1982).
■'■"'■New York Times, October 19, 1982.
282
-11-
12
undo the judge's decision" by ordering his "regional attorneys
to try to settle" the case which they had just won.
III. A Proposed Remedy
The vicious cycle of asbestos exposure causing asbestos
victims must be stopped. This can only be done by treating
asbestos as if it were a radioactive substance like plutonium.
Plutonium is handled on a total containment theory. It is never
supposed to be released into the open air. If there is ever a
possibility that plutonium could be released, the worker is to
be totally protected with supplied air breathing apparatus.
Likewise with asbestos, it should be required that:
1) All removal of old asbestos be conducted so as to
totally isolate the worker and the environment from
the asbestos dust.
2) In areas where asbestos is to be removed, dust
proof barriers must be erected.
3) Workers shall automatically be provided with
protective clothing and self-contained supplied air
positive pressure breathing apparatus.
4) All asbestos waste and debris must be carefully
contained and disposed.
5) A rebuttable presumption shall treat any existing
insulation materials as asbestos-containing unless the
employer or owner can prove otherwise.
6) Workers shall be fully apprised of all the life
threatening hazards of asbestos before they begin
removal work.l''
No part of my proposed standard is very sophisticated.
It only follows a common sense approach that would keep asbestos
^^Washington Post, October 20, 1982.
^•^Legal Times, October 18, 1982.
14
As a concession to Johns-Manville, OSHA in 1972 went
along with JM's written request that the asbestos standard
not require the use of the word "cancer" in any of the
standard's labeling or posting provisions.
283
fibers out of workers' lungs during asbestos rip-outs. There
is no reason why, within a week from today, that OSHA could
not issue my proposal as an emergency temporary standard.
Section 6(c) (1) of the OSHA Act requires the Secretary of Labor
to issue an emergency standard to take effect immediately if
he determines that employees are exposed to a grave danger and
that such action is necessary to protect employees from such
danger.
All the necessary data and facts on the asbestos crisis
have long been before OSHA. Any hesitancy by the agency to
act immediately and forcefully is only demonstrative of its
recurrent lack of will to enforce the law.
Mr. Frank. Thank you.
Mr. Wodka, on the question of an emergency standard. Do you
know if people have approached OSHA previously and asked about
an emergency standard?
Mr. Wodka. I understand the International Association of Ma-
chinists has filed within the last few weeks a petition for an emer-
gency temporary standard on asbestos.
Mr. Frank. You have mentioned that you have been concerned
with the issue. We had some testimony from Ms. Seminario about
the lack of enforcement. I wonder whether that is something you
have any particular knowledge about?
Mr. Wodka. Yes, when I was with the oil, chemical, atomic work-
ers for 13 years, almost my entire time was spent assisting local
unions in getting enforcement of OSHA standards in the field. It
was quite a saddening experience. I pointed out in my prepared
text a typical example where an employer was overtly violating the
asbestos standard. And not only once but in two separate instances
OSHA inspected the facility but reduced the violations for the as-
bestos standard from serious to nonserious.
There is simply no way that a violation of the asbestos standard
can be considered nonserious.
Mr. Frank. The standard that you propose is an emergency
standard. I would assume that you would like to see that as a per-
manent standard as well?
Mr. Wodka. Yes. The reality of the workplace is this— a lot of
people don't seem to understand this. There is a not a whole lot of
new asbestos being put into the workplace. The problem is what is
out there right now. The problem is millions of workers who come
in contact daily when they are told to repair this machine, or take
out this piece of pipe, and it is covered with asbestos, and have to
rip the asbestos off. The standard doesn't deal with that kind of ex-
posure.
284
This folderol that you saw earlier today with air sampling is not
going to help that worker at all. That job is going to be long com-
pleted by the time any kind of air sampling data comes back. The
only protection for him is some kind of way to totally separate his
lungs from those asbestos fibers. That is why it has to be a total
containment of those fibers.
Mr. Frank. There are two reactions I want to test on you with
regard to that.
One is that given the initial failure by the society to regulate as-
bestos, even had we in 1972 adopted the best standard in the world,
there would still be enormous problems because when you don't
regulate and you allow these substances to permeate the society,
you build in, literally build in, a series of terrible health problems
that are very difficult to undo.
And that, I take it, because we are told, well, we have got to pro-
ceed cautiously, we have to balance everything, et cetera, the prob-
lem, of course, is that some of these things go ahead while we are
proceeding cautiously. And the cost of undoing the mistakes in this
area, really are enormous.
Mr. WoDKA. They are enormous. The very interesting thing here
is that asbestos is the only toxic material where you have such
hard data, both on its medical effects and the cost of disease, death
and disease, caused by it.
The incredible thing is that there is still this debate, as you saw
at this table today, over whether we should do something or what
are we going to do, and this and that. That, to me, is stupidity.
Mr. Frank. The standard you mentioned, is supposed to apply-
when you say it is irrelevant to that worker, what you are saying
is, by the time anybody could make a written proposed remedial
action, he has moved on to the next job because the demolition sit-
uation is
Mr. WoDKA. Precisely. What that worker needs is, he needs to
know that. No. 1, that any time that he is sent up to rip out any-
thing that looks like insulation, not just asbestos, but looks like in-
sulation, there is a presumption that it is asbestos. So, first of all,
he doesn't have to go into a big debate with the employer as to
whether or not it is or it isn't asbestos. That presumption is there.
Once he is told of such a presumption he knows that he doesn't
have to rely on whether or not the air level is going to be above or
below the standard.
He knows that he either does the job with the proper equipment
or he doesn't have to do the job.
Mr. Frank. I think it is important to note, and I think we should
note, that in some other cases the dispute over the size of occupa-
tional safety has switched a little bit in some cases. For instance, in
textiles, some of the antiregulators have been saying, well, just
equip the worker with enough things and we don't have to worry
about the ambient air.
What you are saying here is that given the nature of asbestos
and the nature of the kind of jobs we are doing it is not an ongoing
thing but it is a one-shot deal. There is no alternative but to protec-
tective clothing.
Mr. WoDKA. There are two things in these rip-outs. Yes, there is
the protective clothing and the breathing apparatus. But, also, we
I
285
represent clients in our law firm who never did any direct work
with asbestos. They simply were bystanders. For example, there
are chemical operators in a plant and they had to tend their piece
of machinery, but there was somebody else in that part of the
building who was doing asbestos installation work or rip-out work.
The client died of asbestos-induced lung cancer and he had no
direct exposure.
So I am also advocating that when these rip-outs occur that all of
the surrounding workers need to be protected. And the way to do
that is to put up some kind of
Mr. Frank. It is not just the surrounding workers, but the pass-
ersby, which
Mr. WoDKA. Oh, yes.
Mr. Frank [continuing]. Sounds like what we really need is an
EPA/OSHA linkage here that is better than them passing paper
back and forth and suggesting that it is the other one's responsibil-
ity?
Mr. WoDKA. That is correct. There is this thing on TV the other
day where they blow up these buildings with dynamite and you see
this big cloud of dust going up in the air and you hear this cheer-
ing. I don't know if you saw this on TV just the other day.
Mr. Frank. You are talking about the side of the Tip O'Neill
building, among other things.
Mr. WoDKA. Yes, that's right.
Besides the fact that they are going to get a new building there, I
don't know what they are cheering about. Because when they blew
that building up, they must have released tons of asbestos dust into
the air.
Mr. Frank. So that we are really talking about an OSHA situa-
tion but an EPA situation where there has to be some alternative
method. Are there alternative methods? What do you do in a situa-
tion like that? Do you put a big bubble up and then what would
you do?
Mr. WoDKA. I think you just don't use that technique. Maybe you
have to use a slower technique. Everyone in that community there
in Boston now has got another layer of asbestos dust to breathe in.
Mr. Frank. I won't tell the Speaker.
I thank you for your testimony. I apologize for that interruption.
This hearing is about to adjourn. I am going to insert into the
record a copy of the transcript of the NOVA program No. 1006
which was broadcast on asbestos.
[The information follows:]
I
25-994 0-83-19
286
NOVA #1006
This program was originally broadcast on PBS on
March 1, 1983.
Major funding for NOVA is provided by this station
and other public television stations. Additional
funding is provided by the National Science
FoundaticKi, and the Johnson and Johnson Family of
Conqpanies .
Copyright « 1^83 wcSH Educational Foundation
Asbestos: A Lethal Legacy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright claimant,
Under no circumstances may this transcript or matter contained herein be
reproduced or otherwise used for any purpose beyond the private use of the
recipient (other them for newspaper coverage, purposes of reference, dis-
cussion, and review) without the prior written consent of HGBH Educational
Foundation. For information about reproduction and bulk rates, please
contact:
WGBH Transcripts
125 Western Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02134
(617) 492-2777
287
Members of a television production crew wear three-
layered protective suits with their own oxygen supplies
to film the removal of asbestos from apartments.
288
CONTENTS: Asbestos: A Lethal Legacy
Text
1
Production Credits
20
Participants
21
289
Asbestos: A Lethal Legacy
JOHN WILLIS
These mountains of white powder are the foundation of an international multi-
billion dollar industry: asbestos. World-wide production has topped three
million tons annually. After World War II, asbestos use took off in the
defense and space industries, and the possibilities seemed limitless. Most
famous as a fire-protector, asbestos was woven into the fabric of our daily
lives. It's versatile and nearly indestructible fiber was once called the
magic mineral. But it is people like these who have paid the highest price
for society's use of the magic mineral.
I'm John Willis. NOVA has brought me here to the United States to make a
special presentation of a program about asbestos that I made for British
television. Not that asbestos is just a British problem. It's something
that effects us all. Indeed, much of our film was shot here in the states
and in Canada. Nearly 25 million Americans have been directly exposed to
the dangers of asbestos, risking serious illness. When this program was
shown in Britain last year, it provoked fierce debate about the dangers of
asbestos. It challegned the British government and the asbestos industry
to improve working conditions. As a result, the government lowered the
maximum safe level of exposure to asbestos dust by half. But here in America,
the old, higher level still exists. That means that thousands or even mil-
lions of Americans are still legally exposed to levels of asbestos dust that
are now considered far too dangerous in Britain. We are presenting this
program to draw attention to a problem that is now of world-wide concern.
Our story begins in a mining town in Canada that is actually called Asbestos.
These Canadian mines supply over half the western world's white asbestos,
including most of the 95,000 tons imported into Britain every year. There
are three main types of asbestos, but the white or chrysotiles is the most
commonly used, both in Britain and America.
Mining is on a massive scale. Asbestos in Canada is big business. Exports
are worth 600 million dollars a year. 70 percent of all asbestos used is
in the construction industry. And it is found in over 3,000 different domestic
and industrial products.
Inside these rocks are veins filled with mineral fibers. In a continuous
crushing and milling process the fibers are separated from the host rock.
Few other minerals are as versatile as asbestos. The fibers can reinforce
cement or be woven into fire-resistant fabric. Some fibers are visible
to the human eye. But it is the millions of smaller invisible particles
that are so deadly. Two million of them could fit on a pinhead.
LAWYER
You do solemnly swear that the testimony that you are about to give in this
matter will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God.
290
Asbestos; A Lethal Legacy
JOHN WILLIS
Asbestos is killing this woman.
LAWYER IN COURTROOM
Please state your full name.
JCHN WILLIS
Too ill to go to court, lawyers have videotaped her evidence.
COURTROOM SCENE (CONTINUED)
Lawyer: Could you describe how you would see the asbestos particles as they
affected you?
Mary Johnson: Well, they look like snowflakes you know. Real stringy, and
they come down. They were pretty thick at that time.
Lawyer: What is it that you are presently suffering from?
Mary Johnson: Lung cancer and asbestosis. It's growing, it's all like
grapes , all 1 umps .
Lawyer: Since then how has your physical condition progressed?
Mary Johnson: Look at me.
JOHN WILLIS
Next day, Mary Johnson died of cancer. Ray Price is suffering from asbes- -
tosis, a disease that we have Icnown about for generations. One of the three
most prevalent causes of death associated with exposure to asbestos. It is
a respiratory illness vAiich gradually diminishes his capacity to breathe.
Associated with prolonged exposure it can take up to 20 years before the
effects are felt. As his lungs become thick with scarring, Ray Price will
eventually suffocate. Alice Jefferson is also dying from an asbestos
related disease — she has a rare form of cancer.
ALICE JEFFERSON
Hello little flower, have you had a good day?
JOHN WILLIS
Alice's cancer is called mesothelioma or cancer of the lung lining. It's
invariably fatal. The only established cause — the dust from asbestos.
Alice is 47 years old. Thirty years ago, in 1952, when she was just 17,
Alice worked for nine months at Cape Asbestos in Yorkshire, England.
I
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Asbestos: A Lethal Legacy
JOHN WILLIS/ALICE JEFFERSON INTERVIEW
John Willis: Were you ever warned that working there could be dangerous,
you could finish up. . .?
Alice Jefferson: No. We used to fool about. We used to make wigs out of
that, you know. You knew how you feel at work. We used to make wigs out
of asbestos and put them on our heads and you know. . .No.
John Willis: And management never said?
Alice Jefferson: No, I never thought it was dangerous at all.
JOHN WILLIS
Now Alice is so ill, her 65 year old husband Tom, must look after their
two youngest children. Patsy, age five, and Paul, age 15.
A few months ago, Alice's doctor told her that she was dying of mesothelioma
ALICE JEFFERSON
Well, I jumped around the room like a frog. I did. That's what I did.
I had a feeling that I had something serious by then, you know, because I
wasn't getting any better. And I just said, "You've come to tell me that
I've had it haven't you?" She says, "Yes" and she says and er...I says,
"How long have I got then?" and she says, "three to six months" and when
you think that you know, that it's the results of working, you know, for
a paid wage, at a job that you didn't think was dangerous, it never entered
your head that it was dangerous, it makes me feel right bitter. Because I
mean I know I am 47, but I had a little girl, you know, when I was 43, and
I mean she's only young isn't she, and they are telling me that I've only
got six months to live. I've got a lot to feel bitter about really. I
suppose it is selfish really, isn't it. Because I worry about me not being
able to see their best years, you know. Seeing our Paul, you know, he's me
only lad, and I mean our Patsy is only five. I don't know whether it's
a selfish thing or not, but I think every mother wants to watch her kids
develop and I'd have like to have been there and watched over them.
JOHN WILLIS
We asked Alan Mearns, Alice's specialist, if asbestos was always the cause
of mesothelioma cancer.
ALAN MEARNS
Personally I feel that all mesotheliomas are related to asbestos and it is
really a question of making this connection, and I think in the past the
connection wasn't widely recognised and was not made. That my generation,
certainly my immediate generation, of professional colleagues nationally
do not see mesothelioma in the absence of a history of exposure to asbestos.
292
Asbestos: The Lethal Legacy
JOHN WILLIS
Long before Alice's exposure to asbestos, the manufacturers knew the danger —
this factory inspector's report was the first warning sign. That was in
1898, 84 years ago. By 1906, a British worker reported to his doctor that
his team of ten asbestos workers were all dead. Average age — 30.
By 1931, the link with disease was so clear the government passed its first
asbestos regulations. They ordered that there should be no asbestos dust
in the workplace. By 1935, the link between lung Ceincer and asbestos became
recognized.
Fourteen years after that cancer risk was known, a doctor from America noted
that a British company. Cape Asbestos, in South Africa, used young children
to process raw asbestos by hand. Standing over them, a supervisor with a
whip. Even by the age of 12, he discovered, several child workers had
asbestosis and heart failure.
By 1955, Oxford University scientists found that lung cancer among British
asbestos workers was ten times the national average. Smoking increases
the lung cancer risk for asbestos workers by 55 times. In addition to lung
cancer, by 1960, doctors had established the lethal and once rare form of
cancer, mesothelioma, was also caused by asbestos. Finally in 1969, the
accumulation of years of evidence forced the British government to intro-
duce new workplace regulations.
In determining what they called a "safe" dust level-'-that is how many fibers
can be breathed in per hour — they only took into account the risk of
asbestosis, not lung cancer or mesothelioma. But as asbestos cancer can
take 20 or 30 years to develop, the effects of controlling dust levels
can't be seen for several decades. Asbestos has been regulated for over
half a century. How many victims have been claimed?
DAVID GEE
It's been the biggest killer that we know of in the occupational health
field. It's killed thousands and thousands of people. Most of the others
that we know of have really only killed hundreds. So it is the granddaddy
of the occupational health killers. And it has not only affected work
people, it has affected their wives, their children, their relatives, and
also members of the public. Who because we now know that it gives cancer
as opposed to just an asbestos-dust-clogging-of-the-lungs disease. It
kills members of the public who only get a small exposure.
JOHN WILLIS
That small exposure could come from any\irtiere. Thousands of tons of asbestos
are in pipe insulation. Thousands more are in the roofs and walls of
buildings. Asbestos is used in many domestic products, but it wasn't until
1976, 78 years after the first danger sign, that the British industry
I
293
Asbestos : The Lethal Legacy
JOHN WILLIS (Continued)
introduced warning labels on some but not all of these products. But how
effective is that warning?
BARRY CASTLEMAN
In the United States, I don't think that this would be considered by any
jury to be adequate warning that the material can cause such diseases as
cancer, and fatal asbestosis. It says, if you read it carefully, it says
"Observe the safety rules." It doesn't say the stuff can give you cancer.
It says, "Take care with asbestos." It almost reads like an advertisement
that asbestos will take care of you, so use more of it. This is ridiculous
as a warning, and it is criminal on the part of the British government that
they let this go for a warning in their country.
JOHN WILLIS
These "spacemen" are preparing to remove asbestos from a London housing
project. It's such a dangerous job, the men wear masks with a separate
oxygen supply and three layers of protective clothing, which must be decon-
taminated after use.
In these apartments, asbestos board for insulation is on the walls of five
rooms including this child's bedroom. As local residents were the first
to realize — in damage to them all — and dangerous dust could be released.
Over six million tons of asbestos have been put into houses, schools and
hospitals all over Britain. Now this one London borough has 5,000 dwellings
to remove asbestos from. It's an expensive job that must be very carefully
carried out. This special unit is trained to handle asbestos as if it were
radio-active waste. It must be safely buried immediately at a specially
licensed site.
This extraordinary landscape is in Quebec, Canada. Here whole townships
are dwarfed by the white asbestos mountains. The mines pump out asbestos
waste day and night. The locals call it white gold — the Arabs have their
oil, they say, wo have our asbestos.
Several giant American companies, including the Manville Corporation have
dominated this $480 million industry. In addition, a British company.
Turner and Newall for 44 years owned the Bell mine here. "Death rates in
the asbestos mining towns," say the companies "are no higher than the
general population."
But what about Lisa Garneaux? Dead from cancer at 36. As a child she slid
down the giant slag heaps that shadowed her home. Her family still lives
beneath the same white moutain. With no alternative jobs, her son is already
an asbestos miner, and her daugher plays beneath the same slag heaps.
And then there is Roger Jean. He worked for many years at a white asbestos
mill. Now he can't even drive a car without oxygen. In 12 years, his unions
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Asbestos: The Lethal Legacy
JOHN WILLIS (Continued)
say they have had more than 1,000 claims from men like him. Yet the Quebec
government reported that only two out of every 100 workers here suffer from
asbestosis like Roger Jean. His union called in a team of scientists from
Mount Sinai hospital in New York to do an independent study of long-term
workers. They found 75 out of 100 workers have lung damage from asbestosis
or lung cancer. Paxil Formby comments:;
PAUL FORMBY
Whether it is official or not, they will minimize the hazard cind the suffer-
ing of the workers because obviously this will make it more difficult to
sell the product vAiich is hazardous. They have to pay compensation claims
and it is not in their economic interests to say really what the severity
of the situation is.
JOHN WILLIS
The American research team identified over 700 workers with damaged lungs.
Most of them have never been notified. Despite the health danger, mining
asbestos means thousands of jobs in Canada. Regardless of Mount Sinai
Hospital's finding, the company still wrote in a public relations document
that we were given in 1982, "Asbestos is without a shadow of a doubt one of
the safest products on the market today."
ALICE JEFFERSON AND SISTER
Alice: I don't like to go down that room you know.
Sister: No, no.
Alice: Because if I go down that room, I've got to.
JOHN WILLIS
In Yorkshire, Alice is still struggling against her cancer.
ALICE JEFFERSON AND SISTER
Alice: My friend is there, but I can't get up without help.
JOHN WILLIS
This is her first day out of bed for three weeks. She used to walk miles
over the local hills. Now she can only walk with the help of her sister.
295
Asbestos: The Lethal Legacy
ALAN MEARNS
She's tough and realistic and you can't kid this lady. This lady knows
exactly what the score is. She's watched many of her friends and neighbors
who have suffered this same disease and she knows exactly what is happening.
And she is doing her best to make sure that her family suffers as little
as possible.
ALICE JEFFERSON
My Patsy doesn't know. She just knows that I can't pick her up anymore, you
know. She's always saying, well before I went into hospital for that oper-
ation, she used to say, "IVhen are you going to have that jump off Mum, then
you'll be able to lift me up and play with me." And now you know, she just
knows I can't pick her up and of course she's too young to tell. I have
told my boy. He's 15 you see. I told him when we were walking along the
road one day. I thought it was the best time to tell him then. You know-
so he won't cry so much. But he did.
JOHN WILLIS
Apart from the victims, the rest of Britain remains largely ignorant of
the real dangers of asbestos. It's different in America.
TV COMMERCIAL
You could be a casualty of World War II and not know it. During the war
one of the materials workers used to build this ship was called asbestos ,
and after all these years, they found that working around and breathing
asbestos may cause bad lung diseases, including cancer.
Millions of people have worked around asbestos dust.
JOHN WILLIS
The asbestos epidemic is so big here that the government even televises
warnings.
TV COMMERCIAL
Maybe you worked around asbestos years ago. Maybe you will get sick, maybe
you won't. Don't take any chances.
WHITE LUNG ASSOCIATION MEETING
Voice: Would you please rise and salute the flag?
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Asbestos: The Lethal Legacy
JOHN WILLIS
But those warnings came too late for these victims. They are part of an
epidemic caused by vrtiite and brown asbestos. So this group is called the
White Lung Association.
WHITE LUNG ASSOCIATION MEETING
Voices: I pledge allegiance to the f lag. . .with liberty and justice for all.
This dreadful disease does not care about age, or the amount of money you
have, or how big you are, or how strong you are. It cuts you down.
JOHN WILLIS
It is estimated that 25 million Americans have been exposed to significeuit
amounts of asbestos on the job. This New York hospital is the world's
leading center for the study of asbestos disease. Dr. Irving Selikoff 's
pioneering work uncovered a new problem.
IRVING SELIKOFF
It wasn't asbestos workers, miners and people in factories making these
products who were getting these diseases. But these were people vrtio were
using asbestos products. Insulation workers never worked in a factory. They
were simply using this material. Took it out of a box and put it on to
boilers and put it on to pipes and mixed cement and plaster and things with
it and so forth. Well, that raised a whole new set of questions. Because
for every worker who manufactured a product or mined it, there were more
than a hundred who used that product. There were millions of people who
worked in our shipyards in World War II ~ four-and-a-Oialf million. There
were millions of people working in our very important construction industry ^
And in a host of other industries that used asbestos products. So that by
1964, we had our really bad news before us.
JOHN WILLIS
Dr. Selikoff 's team predicts that every 58 minutes between now and the end
of the century, an American will be killed by asbestos. That's a death
toll of nearly 200 thousand people. New evidence suggests that these tiny
fibers can cause cancer, not just in the lungs but elsewhere in the body.
AUERBACH
We found it in the thyroid gland which is in the neck. We found it in the
brain. We found it in the intestines. We found it in the spleen. We found
it in the liver. And so we concluded that asbestos fibers can be carried
by way of the blood stream to different organs in the body.
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Asbestos: The Lethal Legacy
JOHN WILLIS
The National Institute of Occupational Health determined in 1980, "There
is no evidence for a safe level of asbestos exposure. Even at short exposure
periods — one to three months — significant disease can occur.
This little boy has never seen his father. Five weeks before he was born
his father died. John Rossi was a Wall Street lawyer. His asbestos
exposure was extremely slight. At age 20 he worked in a warehouse loading
asbestos sheets on to trucks for just two weeks. But those two weeks were
enough. At 32, he died of mesothelioma.
NANCY ROSSI
I've lost the most important thing in my life. I think it's very lucky when
one man and one woman can somehow find each other and love each other as
much as John and I did. We were best friends to each other. Laughed a lot.
Had great plans for our future together. Looked forward to growing old
together. I... it's ...it has taken away from me. And from him.
JOHN WILLIS
America's most famous mesothelioma victim, Steve McQueen. Exposed to asbestos
as a marine and in some of his films, he tried every treatment his money
could buy. in a Mexican clinic he recorded this tape.
STEVE MCQUEEN
Congratulations to your wonderful country on the magnificent work that the
Mexican doctors assisted by the American doctors are doing at the Playa
Santa Maria Hospital in helping in my recovery from cancer. And thank you
for helping to save my life. God bless you all. Steve McQueen.
JOHN WILLIS
Soon after this statement was recorded, Steve McQueen died.
Don Carson is a truck mechanic. At work, he used to blow the white asbestos
dusk out of brake drums when he was changing the linings. During school
vacation his sons used to help him. In 1980, when his eldest boy Johnny was
eleven, his parents were told that their son had the asbestos cancer, meso-
thelioma.
MRS. CARSON
Oh, I really went to pieces and so did John. I think we just looked at
each other and John said, "why me?" And I couldn't answer him. And I
called Don and I told him that they were malignant and he just went to
pieces too. You know, this always happens to somebody else. It's not
going to happen to you. And I think we are really... you know when I was
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Asbestos: The Lethal Legacy
10
MRS. CARSON (Continued)
told what it was, I knew it was incurable, because they had told us that.
And there wasn't anything we could do. We had to sit and watch our son
die and not be able to stop it.
MR. CARSON
I never had anything hurt so bad in my life. John could do 50 push-ups last
summer. And then just before he died he couldn't even lift his foot back up
on the wheelchair. And that just killed me because he was so athletic.
MRS. CARSON
We watched his. . .especially his arms and legs. They shrank to just nothing.
There was no muscle left, cind if you went to touch him it was very painful
because all there was was bone. I couldn't hug him. If you hugged him,
it hurt. You couldn't hold his hand. You couldn't sit next to him. You
tried and he'd be quiet about it, but you knew it hurt. Just hurt him
deep, just to hug him. There was nothing left.
JOHN WILLIS
On April 13th, 1981, John Carson had a small party at his home. That night
he died in his sleep. He was 12 years old.
MRS. CARSON
Just for one day, one day, I'd like those asbestos manufacturers to have
the pain and to have the cancer for one day. Just watch him. And I can
guarantee they would never do it again.
JOHN WILLIS
For 18 months Tony Richards blew out brake drums daily, just like John
Carson's dad used to. Thousands of British and American mechanics do the
same.
TONY RICHARDS
That's the way I was showed, in the garage when I first started out. That's
the way they showed me to do it. Just blow it out with an airline.
JOHN WILLIS
Are you worried about your own health at all from blowing out brake drums?
299
Asbestos: The Lethal Legacy . 11
TONY RICHARDS
Well'not really. I don't really know what it does to you. So I'm not really
worried about it. If I knew how it can affect you, then obviously I'd pay
a bit more care. But I've never really read what it does to you. All it
does is... there's a warning on the packet that it can damage your health,
but that's as far as it goes.
JOHN WILLIS
Overgate Hospice, Yorkshire. Alice has been moved here for treatment to
ease her intense pain. The doctors gave her six months to live and already
she has survived for one month beyond that. Alice has now requested her
compensation from her former employer. She is certain her cancer is due
to their failure to provide safe working conditions.
Throughout Britain there are 800 work places using asbestos — 32 of them
large factories. It's a multi-million dollar industry. To promote asbestos,
the industry produces a steady supply of glossy brochures. In 1976, nation-
wide advertising like this cost them over two million dollars.
Turner and Newall, which has several American subsidiaries is the most
powerful company in the industry. Gross income, 995 million dollars.
This is their Rochdale factory--the biggest asbestos textile plant in Europe.
It was here that Samuel Turner began using asbestos 103 years ago. Turner's
prides itself on its pioneering work in health and safety. In 1920 they
said, "The workshop shall be as a sanctuary into which men shall enter with
joy in their hearts and laughter in their eyes."
Refused permission to film inside, we stopped workers and asked them how
much they knew about asbestos disease. Turners 's are clear — "all workers
are fully informed."
JOHN WILLIS INTERVIEWS FACTORY WORKERS
John Willis: Do you know what diseases you can get from asbestos?
Man: I don't know to be honest with you.
John Willis: Do you know what diseases you can get from asbestos?
Woman : Oh , I do yes .
John Willis: Can you tell me what they are?
Woman: Asbestosis for one.
JOhn Willis: Have you ever beard of mesothelioma?
Woman: I've heard of it, yes.
John Willis: Do you know what it is?
Woman: Well, it's chest complaints.
Jonh Willis: It's cancer. Did you know thit?
300
Asbestos: The Lethal Legacy ^
JOHN WILLIS
For 50 years. Turner's has been Britain's showpiece asbestos factory. Since
the 1920 's every investigation into asbestos disease — not just in Britain,
but also in the United States — has depended on evidence from here. The
latest report came from the government's 1977 Asbestos Commission, which
was concerned with the increasing death rate in British factories. Evidence
from Turner's model factory was central in the conclusions of the final
government report published two years later.
Turners 's is proud of the cleanliness in this factory. Thousands of dollars
have been spent on equipment, the monitoring of the asbestos dust, and the
regular medical checkups seem impressive. In 1978, Turner's was very
confident of conditions inside the factory. They told their unions, "It
is extremely unlikely that anyone commencing work at TEA will have his
health affected at all."
However, scientists from Oxford University predict that after a lifetime of
work here, the number of these workers who will dies of mesothelioma, lung
cancer, or chest diesease, may be as high as one out of ten.
Turner's also told the Asbestos Commission that in the weaving shed, which
for 30 years has kept to below the legal limits for asbestos dust, they
have no disease whatsoever. That not one single weaver has contracted
asbestos-related disease.
But what about this man that worked in the weaving shed? Records show that
he had suspected asbestosis, full eight and a half years before Turner's
stated to the Commission that they had no disease at all among weavers. He
wasn't the only one. As these records from that Scime year, 1977, show, the
number of weavers with suspected asbestosis — 13. Turner's also stated that
they had 48 cases of mesothelioma, but that none of these could be described
as cases of slight exposure to asbestos.
Margaret Chrimes worked here as Turner's receptionist. Emma Marshall was
Turner's office cleaner. They both died of mesothelioma.
This is Turner's own company list of mesotheliomas. Among them the exposure
times: 16 months one year, seven months, five months, three years, and the
last one, a woman exposed for just ten days.
In this union- sponsored questionnaire. Turner's said the number of mesothel-
iomas in the previous four years was just three. By examining the death
certificates in the same period, we found six. Turner's also told the unions
at the same time, the level of asbestosis between 1950 and 1979 was just 20.
We found 81. We looked at another of Turner's factories.
Glasgow — for nearly 40 years, Turner's dumped waste asbestos into a huge
hole at their factory here'. Children could easily get into the IB acre
site. Tons of asbestos slid into the River Clyde. In 1981, at public
expense, the huge pit was properly covered. The job was so dangerous the
workmen had to wear full protective clothing.
301
Asbestos: The Lethal Legacy 13
TED RUSHWORTH
I'm on record as calling it a biological bomb, and that is sincerely what
I believe it to be. It's a long term health hazard and this has been blowing
about asbestos dust in this area for very many years. And the result of
that, I am quite certain, will lead to deaths. No one knows how many in
the coming years. This is a sort of tragic memorial to my mind in the
future. This site has now just got to stay clear for eternity. As far
as I can see. And that is what Turner's has left to Clyde Bank.
JOHN WILLIS
And what kind of legacy has Turner's left overseas? Turner and Newall is
a huge multinational with asbestos interests in over 20 different countries.
Are the conditions there up to British standards?
In India, Turner's has interest in five factories. This is Bombay. As
health regulations have tightened at home, western asbestos companies have
moved into the Third World.
This Indian factory was opened by Turner's in the 1930 's, a few years after
the first regulations were introduced into Britain. It may have seemed
benign oaternalism then to build housing and schools within the factory
compound. Now we know that for young children who live next door to a
factory it must be highly dangerous. But in 1982, they still do. Parti-
cularly dangerous when just a few yards down from the school and houses
we found piles of scattered asbestos waste open to any adventurous child.
One X-ray study here showed that 352 men — that is well over one in three
workers — had some form of asbestosis.
This little boy is playing ona pile of asbestos waste in front of an Ameri-
ican-owned factory. At a recent conference, an industry executive stated:
"The Third World provides a rosy glow in the industry's crystal ball."
After months of waiting, Alice has finally received a small offer of comp-
ensation from Cape Asbestos.
ALICE JEFFERSON
I was really insulted because they don't know how I feel and you know for
a week of this pain, what they offered we wouldn' t compensate, it wouldn' t.
And they offered me 13,000 pounds and I mean my husband is 65 and how long
is he going to be here? And you know I wouldn' t wish it on me worst enemy.
I wouldn' t, honest. Not this. It's... I don't know. . .you said what do I
think about Cape? I hate them. I do. I bloody hate them, and I don't
know why I hate them, though I do. Because Cape is just a word.
JOHN WILLIS
Leeds High Court. Although in excruciating pain, Alice must go to court
in person so that she is entitled to a more generous settlement.
25-994 O - 83 - 20
302
14
Asbestos; The Lethal Legacy
ALICE JEFFERSON IN COURT
Alice Jefferson: Well, I don't think I should have to do it in the first
place, not at this time, or at any other time. And expecially this morning,
cuz I've had a right rough night. And I've had three rough nights. I've
been walking the floor like I used to do with a baby. It hurts that much.
I'm going into the hospital tomorrow by the way.
Tom Jefferson: Today.
Alice Jefferson: Today, when I've been here. So I'm hoping they'll be
able to do something.
John Willis: However much compensation you get today, is it any compensation
at all really for you?
Alice Jefferson: Well, what good is it nan? It's no good at all, not as
far as I'm concerned.
JOHN WILLIS
In Britain, most asbestos victims do not go to court. But in America, the
courtroom has become the center of the asbestos controversy.
A wealthy suburb of St. Louis, Missouri. An asbestos widow, Dana Bond,
sued the manufacturer of a product her husband had once used. Richard Bond
had worked for just a few months with asbestos, using a process invented
by Turner and Newall exported to America. Sixteen years later, this healthy
fit man developed mesothelioma. His lawyers recorded this tape.
TAPED INTERVIEW
Lawyer: Are you suffering a particular illness at this time, sir? Do
you understand what it is or what they call it?
Richard Bond: Yes. Pleural .. .pleural mesothelioma asbestosis.
Lawyer: Asbestosis and mesothelioma.
JOHN WILLIS
Three days after this testimony was taken, Richard Bond died, age 32.
Turner's and their American partners made legal history when they paid his
widow 1,400,000 dollars in compensation. But even in America, sums that
large are highly unusual. Ron Motley is one of the lawyers representing
asbestos claimants in the United States.
RON MOTLEY
The asbestos companies and their insurers are bemoaning the fates and saying
we are going to bankrupt, something's got to be done. Well, it's my opinion
that they ought to go bankrupt. And I will personally be delighted if every
303
Asbestos: The Lethal Legacy 15
RON MOTLEY (Continued)
asbestos company in the United States goes bankrupt, and every one of their
insurance carriers suffers a loss. Because it was the asbestos companies
and their insurance companies who had the knowledge and could have stopped
this epidemic of death and disease that we have in the United States from
the sale of asbestos fibers. They knew. An insurance company in the United
States as early as 1918 refused to insure people exposed to asbestos because
they knew that it caused harm. And for 50 to 60 years with this knowledge
they kept selling it and didn't tell people. So anything that happens to
the asbestos companies they deserve. If they go bankrupt they deserve it.
JOHN WILLIS
Overgate Hospice, Yorkshire, England. Once again, Alice has been moved in
here. She seems to be improving. News of her court case against Cape has
come through.
ALICE JEFFERSON, JOHN WILLIS AT OVERGATE HOSPICE
John Willis: What did you say when you heard about your settlement in
court?
Alice Jefferson: Well, I was a bit upset really. Because you don't come
to realize imtil you get a settlement made and realize what it is they are
making it on and when my husband comes to me and he says they awarded
you 76, er. . . 36,000 pounds. And I says, well, it's a new body I want, and
36,000 pounds won't buy that. You just can't give in, can you. You owe
it to yourself and your family to keep fighting, don't you? And when you
get knocked dawn, get up and stand there again and they can have another
go at you. You've got to have something haven't you? I mean just because
we worked at that mill all them years ago doesn't mean to say we can't
fight back does it? So... and that's the sort of people mill workers are
round here. They all fight back, well they try to do, but when you are
dead you can't can you? So you might as well struggle on while you are
alive, do your fighting then. So you have just to keep going on and putting
up with it, the pain and everything.
JOHN WILLIS
A few weeks later, Alice died in her sleep. She was just 48.
Last year, world wide asbestos output rose by 2.4 percent. As Third World
demand increases, output is expected to double by the end of the century.
By 1982, Turner and Newall publicly stated, "Much of the steam has gone
out of the anti-asbestos lobby. There is not that much concern in the
United Kingdom. " Three months before a broadcast we asked Turner and
Newall to answer the serious questions raised in this film. Later, we
repeated the offer. Negotiations were not complete when this program was
finalized.
304
Asbestos : The Lethal Legacy 16
JOHN WILLIS (Continued)
When this film was shovm in Britain in July, 1982, the impact was enormous.
Thousands of viewers wrote to us, deeply moved by Alice's story. Wanting
to help her family and the other victims of asbestos disease. Asbestos
workers went on strike against their employers to improve their working
conditions. Members of Parliment challenged the validity, the current
regulations governing the use of asbestos. And millions of dollars were
wiped off the stock exchange value of the large asbestos companies.
One of the main concerns today, is the 30 million tons of asbestos already
in place. It is widely used in the construction industry. Up until 1973,
it was sprayed on steel supports like these in the World Trade Center.
Asbestos provides insulation and fire-proofing in thousands of buildings
across the country. Workers were exposed during construction. Now every
time maintenance or repair work is done, asbestos can get into the air.
Whole cc«nmunities are exposed whenever old buildings are demolished. Thous-
ands of workplaces like this police station are no longer safe.
With increasing awareness have come efforts to remove or seal off the
asbestos in thousands of public buildings. Only two decades ago , asbestos
was required for fire protection in schools. Today, the E.P.A. has ordered
an investigation to potential health hazards of more than 100,000 schools
across America. Loose fibers are dangerous when inhaled. So some schools,
like Newton North High, in Massachusetts, spent nearly one million dollars
eliminating their asbestos hazard.
Asbestos removal is costly. Without some financial assisteince, for most
schools such removal is impossible.
In 1970, the U.S. Government passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
OSHA's first priority was to regulate asbestos used in thfe workplace.
Relying largely on British evidence they determined that it was safe to
inhale two fibers per cubic milliliter of air each hour. But can there
really be a safe level of exposure to asbestos?
IRVING SELIKOFF
A man who works inhales somewhere around a cubic meter of air which is a
million milliliters. So that if you allow him to breathe in two fibers per
milliliter, you are saying that you can breathe in two million fibers each
hour.
JOHN WILLIS
In addition, millions of smaller ones, which escape detection by the monitor-
in equipment, are also inhaled. These fibers are surrounded by tissue and
magnified 16,000 times. Research shows that even the smallest fibers can
cause cancer.
305
Asbestos: The Lethal Legacy 1"^
IRVING SELIKOFF
The two fiber standard is, among scientists, widely known to be unsafe.
And here we are, people are being allowed to work in circumstances in which
they are breathing in a greal deal of asbestos. Not like 30 years ago, not
like 20 years ago, but still much more than we could do away with at the
present time .
JOHN WILLIS
The British government, within a week of the broadcast of this film, decided
to officially reduce their two fiber standard by half. In 1984, the level
will probably be reduced even further. The public debate in America is
still about the past. Who will pay for this monumental tragedy? How will
these victims be compensated? And who will take the responsibility? While
this controversy dominates newspapers and courtrooms, a small experiment
is underway in Central Pennsylvania.
Port Allegheny was a typical rural town until an asbestos insulation manu-
facturing plant began operation . Eleven hundred workers were exposed to
varying amounts of asbestos between 1964 and 1972, the eight years the
plant was open. In 1973, the factory workers union, concerned about the
lives of its members alerted Pittsburgh Coming to the seriousness of the
problem. After four years of tough negotiiations, Pittsburgh Corning
finally agreed to pay for the first years of a comprehensive medical sur-
veillance program. The Port Allegheny Asbestos Health Program is the
only one of its kind in the country. From this office eligible workers
are tracked down and enrolled in the program where their health care is
carefully monitored. Family members whose exposure came from dust brought
into the home are also examined.
Under the direction of a community Board, the union and the company work
together from the success of the health program. The emphasis is on
preventitive health care designed to detect disease, like lung cancer in
its early stages.
Because prolonged exposure to asbestos damages the lungs, doctors listen
for the first indications of breathing difficulties. Participants are
regularly put through a battery of tests. Most look for early signs of
cancer. This pulmonary function test measures lung capacity.
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
Doctor: ...push, push, push, push. OK.
JOHN WILLIS
Kim Klein is at risk because he worked near asbestos and he smokes cigarettes.
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Asbestos: The Lethal Legacy
18
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION (Continued)
Doctor: You worked for the whole summer of '69?
Kim Klein: Yes.
JOHN WILLIS
If he continues to smoke, his chances of getting lung cancer are 55 times
greater than non-smokers.
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION (Continued)
Doctor: It sounds to me like you are a person who can try and quit. So I
encourage you to try and do that again, and we will help you if you want
us to try.
JOHN WILLIS
The program can alert people to their health problems. But whether or not
medical surveillance can actually prolong anyone's life is still open to
debate. The commitment to this health program by a company that has thousands
of law suits against it puts Pittsburgh Corning in contrast to the largest
asbestos manufacturing company in the United States.
JOHN MCKINNEY (Chairman of the Board, Manville Corporation)
Manville Corporation's Board of Directors is determined that the Corporation
should file for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy act.
Though our businesses are in good shape despite the recession, we are
completely overwhelmed by the cost of the asbestos health lawsuits filed
against us. A recent study estimates that these may ultimately total
about 52 thousand and cost more than two billion dollars. The Chapter 11
action might not have been necessary if the government has accepted finan-
cial responsibility for its role in causing much of the disease.
JOHN WILLIS
The bulk of the lawsuits now filed against Manville are from World War II
shipyard workers and their families. Manville complied with the govern-
ment's specific request for asbestos, and now believes that the government
must shoulder some of the burden of these health claims. Manville has
become one of the most sued companies in history. Five hundred lawsuits
were being filed against it each month. Professor Lawrence Bacow.
I
307
Asbestos: The Lethal Legacy ^ 19_
LAWRENCE BACOW
Once reorganization has been filed for under Chapter 11, basically all the
lawsuits will come to a halt. Nobody gets paid. In effect, Manville is
throwing the ball back in the court of the federal government. Giving the
responsibility to a federal judge to determine who would get paid and how
much. And at the same time also putting some pressure on Congress to try
and figure out a way to pay all these claims and at least from Manville 's
perspective hopefully bail them out.
JOHN WILLIS
Chapter 11 allows Manville to continue business as usual. At the same time
they are lobbying for the establishment of a federal compensation fund.
There are several bills pending now in Congress. Manville is behind a
government industry 50/50 plan. However, Professor Bacow believes that
industry should pay for a hefty share.
LAWRENCE BACOW
If government steps in and takes responsibility for paying off all these
claims, I think industry will get the wrong message. If industry has to
pay, then the cost of those payments to workers ultimately will be incorp-
orated into the price of the product. As a result the price of the products
will be higher than they would be otherwise. This would given industry an
incentive to minimize the risks. It would give industry an incentive to
look for alternative products which don't create risks. It will give
industry an incentive to do research which can try and avoid these problems
in the first place.
JOHN WILLIS
The tragic story of asbestos should be a warning to us all — a lesson that
we should prevent a similar disaster from ever happening again. Meanwhile,
the price we paid for that bitter lesson has been high, paid for in the
lives of ordinary people like Alice, who just went to work everyday believ-
ing it was safe .. .ordinary people from all over the world. Decisions that
we make today will be the legacy that we leave to our children and
to our children's children.
308
PRODUCTION CREDITS: Asbestos: The Lethal Legacy
20
Research
JAMES CUTTLER
PETER MOORE
Rostrum Camera
MICHAEL GATES
Film Research
ANNE JARVIS
Graphics
TREVOR HODGSON
Production Assistant
JILL TURTON
Additional Photography
FRANK POCKLINGTON
Additional Sound
TERRY RICKETTS
Sound Recordist
ROGER DAVIES
Dubbing Mixer
STEVE HAYNES
Photography
GRAHAM BARKER
Film Editors
JOHN WATTS
JOHN SURTEES
Produced and Directed by
JOHN WILLIS
YTV Colour Productions 1982
For NOVA
Written, produced and directed by
MELANIE WALLACE
Narrator
JOHN WILLIS
Production Assistant
JOSEPHINE PATTERSON
Camera
JOSEPH VITAGLIANO
Sound
JOHN OSBORNE
MICHAEL PENLAND
Editor
SUSANNE SIMPSON
Assistant Camera
BARBARA
DICK WILLIAMS
Assistant Editors
ALEXANDRA ANTHONY
CAROL TOWSON
Sound Mix
RICHARD BOCK
Animation Camera
EDWARD JOYCE
Research
ELLEN CARR
Special thanks to:
Charles River Associates
New York City Port Authority
Dr. Robert Sawyer
Telecine Video
AUBREY STEWART
Videotape
MARY KATE SHEA
Videotape Editors
DOUGLAS MARTIN
MARY DOYLE
ANN GAYDOS
Post-Production Supervisor
NANCY LINDE
Post Production Assistant
DENISCE DIIANNI
Graphic Design
PAUL SOUZA
Title animation generated at the
New York Institute of Technology
Executive Producer
JOHN MANSFIELD
Copyright 1983
WGBH Educational Foundation
All Rights Reserved
309
PARTICIPANTS: Asbestos: A Lethal Legacy 21
DR. OSCAR AUERBACH, Senior Medical Investigator, East Orange V.A. Hospital,
formerly of Mt. Sinai Hospital.
PROF. LAWRENCE BACOW, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
BARRY CASTLEMAN, Environmental Consultant.
PAUL FORMBY, Mt. Sinai Hospital research team.
DAVID GEE, National Health & Safety Officer of General & Municipal Workers
Union.
ALICE JEFFERSON, Victim of cancer caused by asbestos.
TCM JEFFERSON, Alice's husband.
JOHN MCKINNEY, Acting President, Manville Corporation (Chairman of the
Board, and Chief Executive Officer) .
DR. ALAN MEARNS, Consultant, Bradford Royal Infirmary.
RONALD MOTTLEY, Lawyer.
DR. IRVING SELIKOFF, Mr. Sinai Hospital.
JOHN WILLIS, Commentator and narrator, producer, "Alice: A Fight for Life".
Mr. Frank. I would repeat that there will be further hearings on
this subject, particularly with regard to enforcement. The subcom-
mittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to recon-
vene subject to the call of the Chair.]
APPENDIX
MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Manville Corporation ^ ^ .^ _^. *H _
Ken-Caryl Ranch PO 5723 llllPlllX/lll^
Denver. Colorado 8021 7 ■ WlWll 1 W ■ I IV^
303 978-2000
August 1, 1983 .-,,-,
V :„. v^ i_ ! V •: 0
AUR . 1983
Honorable Barney Frank
Chairman, Manpower and
Housing Subcommittee
Committee on Government Operations
Rayburn House Office Building
Room B-34 9-A
Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Congressman Frank:
Per your letter of July 11, 1983, I have reviewed the
transcript testimony given by Johan A. McKinney and
myself before your subcommittee on the subject Failing
to Regulate: Asbestos, a Lethal Legacy. The trans-
cripts are accurate and require no changes.
On page 113 and 114 of the transcript, you and I engaged
in a question and answer exchange concerning the Navy's
adoption of the Public Health Service 5 million particle
per cubic foot recommended standard for exposure to
asbestos. I indicated that I would provide additional
information to your subcommittee. I am pleased to
submit the following:
1. Two copies of BUMED Instr. 6260.5 dated
November 7, 1955. These two documents are substantively
the same, but the form is somewhat different. This is
the first formal instruction which I have wherein the
Navy incorporates 5mppcf as the appropriate exposure
standard. To the extent I establish that any instruction
antedated the 1955 instruction, I will so advise the
subcommittee. I do not have an explanation of why the
Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery waited from 1938
to 1955 to issue such a formal instruction.
2. I enclose a copy of a letter dated January 8,
1944, to the Navy Department, Bureau of Ships, from
Phillip Drinker, Chief Health Consultant to the United
States Maritime Commission in which Dr. Drinker sets
forth that the 5mppcf standard for asbestos is recommended.
3. On January 14, 1981, Odyssias Athanasiou in
deposition testimony concerning the Portsmouth Navy Ship-
yard identified a document authored by James E. Fuller,
the yard medical officer and dated July 31, 1945, which
(311)
>
312
Letter to Congressman Frank
August 1, 1983
Page 2 .
states in part, "the maximum allowable concentration
for asbestos dust has been set by recognized authorities
at Smppcf of air."
These additional documents which are referenced for your
consideration, certainly indicate that by the early 1940' s
the United States Navy was well aware of the Smppcf
standard for asbestos exposure and that Naval medical and
industrial hygiene personnel were utilizing that standard
for Naval shipyards.
It was a pleasure appearing before your subcommittee. If
we may be of further assistance to the subcommittee, or if
you have additional questions, please do not hesitate to
contact me at your earliest convenience.
Yours truly,
Dennis H. Markusson
Assistant Corporate Counsel
Attachments
cc: J. A. McKinney
J. Lonnquist
313
DEPARTVENT OF THE NAVY P'Jf-iED
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery BLn iEDO.->i -js-cac
Washington 25. D. C. " November 195S ^ _^
/
<-J-} 0. J
BUMED INSTRUCTION fe^^^ g^\ j^/ /, /^T^^^
Pete S. Hunt. Rep<^«r
From: Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery niTF' / - ^ n Qi i
To: All Ships and Stations
Subj: Threshold limit values for toxic materials
End: (1) Table of Threshold Limit Values /'/ _ / /' . . ^ 1 ^ — , ^
C-> — ~ ''^/' ' ' ' ■
1. Purpose. To establish as a basic reference the* ihresncid limit
values of toxic materials, adopted by the /jncrican I'^on/erence of — •
Governmental Industrial Hygienists, and to provide g-iidance toward.''.
the reduction of potential health hazards encountered ir. the industrial
environment for both military and naval civilian personnel.
Z. General
a. Definition. The term "threshold limit values" <js used hereiT
is intended to indicate the maximum average ■i:mosph'Tic cc:. centra- *
tions of contaminants to which personnel rr..,v oe e.X}., sed ourmg .-. ■»
8-hour workday, over a prolonged period of tirr.;, 'v.:'.ou: ..iversely
affecting their heaJth. The threshold limit values sho Id be uied a? i ■
guide in the control of health hazards and should nc. e re; rded as
fine lines between safe and dangerous concentra'.: :.t5. .. ne n.i st
desirable levels in all cases are those approach-.r.g zero, but • racti .1
considerations frequently require the acceptance o: hig!.- r levels
which are safe but not ideal.
(1) The term "maximum allowable concentr^'ions" is to \z
considered synonymous with the term "threshold limit values"
defined above.
b. Threshold Limits. The threshold limit valu-s containe<i in
enclosure (1) are based on the best available tpxicological informa-
tion, long-term industrial experience, and cxpen.nent?! studies.
Inasmuch as these values are constantly being reevaluated, revisions
or additions will be rhade as further information becomes available
c. Exposure to Ionizing Radiation. Threshold lirrits for exposure
to ionizing radiation have been omitted from this Instruction. These
exposures are adequately covered in NavMed P-13'5, Radiological
Safet>' Regulations.
I.- >., I i: I' V- 1 ' '. I
1 jc JViiJii=Vi.;s/li/:...a 'A
314
BUMEDIiS'ST 6260.5
7 November 1955
d. Limitations . The enclosed listing of threshold limit values
for various chemicals does riot constitute authority for the procure-
ment or use of these items.
3. Action. The medical officer or medical department representative
of each ship and station concerned shall take the following action:
a. Survey industrial operations utilizing the information contained
in enclosure (1) to assist in the identification and control of potential
industrial health hazards.
b. Make recommendations to the commanding officer for specific
corrective actions, when required.
c. "When specialist assistance for adequate survey of a ship or
shore station is desired, requests should be initiated through the
proper channels for the services of an industrial hygienist. This may
be done in accordance with procedures outlined in NCPl 88, or by
request direct to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
B. W. HOGAN
315
Enclosure (1) BUMEDINST 6260.5
7 November 1955 ,
/-
THRESHOLD LDv^IT VALUES */
Abbreviations Used. The following ibbreviations are used:
PPM Parts per million
Ms. per cu. m. (ina/M*) Milligrams per cuoic meter
l^jppCF KUlUon particles per cubic foot
Escablisbed Values
Adopted ai the nth annual meetixig of me Amerlcao Conference of GoverruJiental Industrial Hygienlsis,
Buffalo, 24-28 April 1955.
I
Case3 and Vapors
Substance PP^'
Acetalde-hyde 200
Acetic acid
10
1000
0.5
Acetic anhydride _ 5
Acetone
Acrolein ' ,
AcrylonitrUe " 20
Ammonia ^^^
Amyl acetate - 200
Amyl alcohol (isoamyl alcohol) 100
Aniline 5
Arsine 0-05
Benzene (bensol) 35
Bromine *
Butadiene (1.3-buudisne) 1^°
Butanone (methyl ethyl ketone) ■ *50
Butyl acetate (n-buryl aceute) 200
Butyl alcohol (n-buunol) 100
Butyl ceUosolve (2-butoxyethaDoI) 200
Carbon dioxide 5000
Orbon disulfide 20
Carbon rronoxide 100
Carbon tetrachloride 25
CeUosolve (2-eii:oryethaDOl) 200
CeUosolve acetate (bydroicyethyl acetate) 100
Chlorine 1
Oilorobenzene (monocblorobenzene) 15
Chloroform (trichloron-.ethane) 10''
l-Oiloro-l-nitropropane 20
Chloroprene (2-chlorobutadiene) 25
Cresol (all isomers) ^
Cyclohexane 400
Cyclohexanol , 100
Cyclohcxanone 100
Cyclo'iex-ne 400
Cyclopropane _ *00
Enclosure (1)
316
BUMEDIXST 6260.5
7 November 1955
Ctsea »ni Vtpors fConiinue<i)
Substance PPM
o-DichJoroberuene 50
Diciilorodifluoro.-net.'ane 1000
1.1-Dichloroethiae _ 100
1.2-Dichloroethyleoe * 200
Dichloroethyl ether 15
Dic^JoroI^ononuorometh^ne 1000
l.l-Dichloro-l-nitroethane 10
Dichloroieiranuoroechane 1000
DieibylaiTUDe 25
Dimethylaniline (N-dimethyUnUine) 5
Dimethylsulfate 1
Dioxane (diftbylene dioxide) 100
Ethyl aceute 400
Ethyl alcohol (ethanol) 1000
Etbylamire 25
Ethyl tenaenc 200
Ethyl brotrJde 200
Ethyl chloride 1000
Ethyl ether «0
Ethyl formate ' 100
Ethyl silicate 100
Eihylenc chlorobydrin 5
Ethylene dibrorrjde {l,2-d!bror7r«thane) 25
Ethylene dichloride (l.S-dichJoroeihane) 100
Ethylene oxide 100
riuorine 0-1
nuorotrichloromethanc 1000
Forrruldchyde 5
Gasoline 500
Heptane (n-hepune) 500
Hexane (n-bexane) 500
Hexarone (ir.ethyl buryl keiore) 100
Hexone (aieihyl iscbutyl ketcce) 100
Hydn>gtn chloride 5
Hydrcstn cyanide 10
H.ydrogea fhjoride 3
Hydro^tn selenjde 0.05
Hydrofen sulfide 20
lodijie 1
Isojhorone 25
Mtsiryl oxide 50
Meib.-l icetatc 200
Methyl alcohol (n^thanol) 200
Methyl bromide " 20 .
Methyl cellosolve (meihoryethanol) 25
Methyl cellosolve acetate (e'-.V/lene glycol monomethyl eiher acetatej 25
Methyl chloride 100
Meth^Ul (dimeiboxymethare) 1000
Me:r/1 chloroform (l.l.l-tricMoroeihare) 500
Methylcyclohexine 500
Enclosure ( 1 ) 2
317
BUMEDINST 6260.5
7 November 1955
Cues »nd Vapors (Cominued)
Substaoce
Meth>-lcycloh«anol
Klethy Icyclohtxanone
Methyl (ornute
Methylene chloride (dichloromeihane)
Naphtha (ooaliar)
Kapbtha (petroleum)
Nickel carbonyl
Nitrobenzene
Nitroethane
Nitrogen dioxide
Nitroglycerin
Nitromethane
2-Nitropropane
Niirotoluene
Octane
Ozone
Penune
Pentaoor>e (methyl propyl ketone)
Perchlorethylene (tetrachloroethylene)
Prienol
Ptjosgene (carbonyl chloride)
Riosphiae
Pbosphorus trichloride
Propyl acetate
Propyl alcohol (isopropyl alcohol)
Propyl ether (isopropyl ether)
Propylene didxloride (1.2-dichloroprop»ne)
Stibine
Stoddard solvent
Sryrene monomer (phenyl ethylene)
Sulfur monochloride
Sulfur dioxide
1.1,2,2-Tetrachloroetbaoe
Toluene
o-Toluidioe
Trichloroethylene
Turpentine
Vinyl chloride (chloroeihene)
Xylene
Toxic Dusts. Fumes, and Mists
Subsunce
PPM
100
100
100
500 •
200 •
SOO
0.001
1
100
5
O.S
100
so
•• 5
• 500
0.1
1000
200
200
5
1
o.os
0.5
200
400
500
15
0.1
500
200
1
10
s
200
5
200
100
500
200
Ms. per
cu. in.
Antimony
Arsenic
Earium (soluble compounds)
Cadmiu.-n
Chlorodiphenyl
0.5
0.5
O.S
O.l
1
Enclosure (1 )
25-994 0-83-21
318
BUMEDINST 6260.5
7 November 1955
Toxic Du3ts. Furnas, and Mists (ConLinued)
SubstAuce MS- pcf
OJ. m.
uiromic acid and Oironuies u CrOj 0.1
Cyaoide as CN 5
Diniiroioluene 1-5
DiniiTO-o-cresol 0.2
Fluoride 2.5
Iron oxide fume 15
Lead 0.15
MafCDCsium oxide fume 15
Manganese . ' 6
Mercury '0.1
Parathion (O.O-Dieihyl-O-p-nitrophenyl thiopbosphate) . 0,1
Penrachloronapbthalene 0.5
Pentachloropbecol 0.5
Pbospoorus (yeUow) 0.1
Phosphorus penuchJoride 1
Phosphorus penus;:lfide 1
Selenirm compouDds (as Se) 0.1
Sulfuric acid 1
Tellurium » 0.1
Te:ryl (2.4,6-trLiirropbeoyliT»tliylnitramii)e) 1.5
Trichlorcaaptthalene 5
Trinitrotoluere
Mireral Dusts
Asbestos
Teniative Torcsbold Limit Values
1.5-
Uranium (soluble compounds) 0.05
UraruL'tn (issoljble compounds) 0.25
Zinc oxide fumes 15
Substaace MPPCF
Aluodum (aluminum oxide) 50
5
Carborucdum (silicon carbide) 50
Dust (nuisance, ro free silica) 50
Mica (below B-'o free silica) 20
PonUnd cement 50
Talc 20
Silica
hijb (above SC'';^ free SiOt) 5
rredium (5 to 5C^. free SiOi) 20
low (below Vio f re* SiOj)
Slate (below 5-7« free SiO.)
Soapstoae (below St. free SiOj)
Toul dust (below yfo free SiOj)
SO
50
20
50
The followLns tec'.ative values have been su^ested for (unher oonsideratioo and it is proposed that the
entire list will be presented for adoption at LhemeetiTS of the American Conference of Govemmeptal Indus-
trial Kytienisis in 1956, if no reason to the contrary is fonhcomins.
Enclosure (1 )
319
BUMEDINST 6260.5
7 November 1955
Teniaiive Threshold Limit Values fCon^inu^d^
AWrin (1,2.3.4.10, 10-h«icbloro-l..«,<4,5.e.8i.-hexahydro-1.4.5.8-
dimethanonaphihalene)
AUyJ alcohol
A11>1 propi'l disulfide
Arivnate (ammonium amidosuKate)
Benzyl cliloritle . .
But^l amine
Buryl mer&apun
Calcium arsenate
Chlordane (1.2.4, 5.6.'3,8,B-octachloro-3a.4.7.7a-t«rahydro-4,7-
inethanoindane)
Chlorine trifluoride
Chlorinated diphenyl oxide
Crag Herbicide (sodium-2.4. dichlorophenoxy eihyl sulfate)
2.4-D (2.4-dichloropoenoxyacetic acid)
D.D.T. (2.2-bis-(p-chlorophenyl)-l,l.l- trichlorethane)
Diacetone alcohol (4-hydroxy-4-metbyl peatanone-2)
Diborane
Dieldrin (1.2.3.4, 10. lO-hexachtoro-6.7, epoxy-1.4.4a.5.6.1.8.Ea-
octahydro-1.4,S,8-dirT)eihanoaaphthaIene)
Dii'iuorodibrorm methane
Diisoburyl ketone
EPN (et'nyl-p-ni;rophenyl thiono benzene phosphonate)
Ethyl mercaptan
Ethylene diamine
Ethylene irrune
Ferro vanadium dust
Furfural
Furfur/1 alcohol
Kt)-drazine
Hydrogen bromide
Hydrogen peroxide. 907»
Hydroquinone
Isopropylamine
Lead arsenate
Lindane (bexachJorocyclohejtsne, gamma isomer)
Malathon(O.Odirr<;hyldithio phosphate of diethyl mercaptosuccinate)
Methoxychlor (2.2.di?aramcihoxypoenyl-l,l,l, trichloroeihaiie)
Meihyl acerylene
Methyl iso'ouryl carbinol (methyl amyl alcohol)
Methyl mercaptan
Molybdenum
(soluble compounds) '
(insoluble compounds)
p-Nitroaniline
Organo tnercurials (ss mercurv)
Perchloromethyl mercaptan
Pnenylhyti ratine
Picric acid
Propyler.e iirune
Pyridine
Quinone
0.25
ms/M»
S
ppm
2
ppm
IS
. ms/M»
1
ppm
5
ppm
10
ppm
0.3
me/M»
2.0
ms/M*
O.I
ppm
0.5
ma/M'
15
mg/M«
•10
ma/M»
2.0
ma/M»
50
ppm
0.1
ppm
0.25
mg/M»
ICO
r?m
50
ppm
0.5
ms/M»
250
ppm
10
ppm
S
ppm
1
ms/M»
5
ppm
200
ppm
1
ppm
5
ppm
1
ppm
2
ire/M»
S
ppm
0.2
ma/M»
0.5
mg/M'
15
ms/M'
15
mg/M>
1000
ppm
25
ppm
50
ppm
S
ITX5/M'
15
mg/M»
1
ppm
0.01
ITKjM'
0.1 .
ppm
5
ppm
0.1
ms/M»
25
ppm
10
ppm
0.1
ppm
Enclosure (1)
320
BUMEDINST 6260.5
7 November 1955
Tertitive Threshold Limit Values (Continued)
5odium hydroxide
Sulfur huafluoride
Sulfur pentafluoride
TEDP (tetf jerhyl ditbiono p>-rophosphite)
TEPP(tetraethyl pyrophosphate)
p- Tertiary butyl toluene
Tetrahydrofuran
Tetranjtrorr^tbane
Titanium dioxide
Trifluoromonobromo methane
Vajiadium
(V| 0| dust)
(V, O, fume)
Zirccnium
2
im/M»
1000
ppm
0.025
ppm
0.2
ma/M»
0.05
mft/M>
10
ppm
75
ppm
1
ppm
IS
mg/M'
1000
ppm
o.s
niR/M'
0.1
ms/M'
5
mg/M'
Enclosure (1 )
I
321
•^Vcil Note: COPY l/,0/l2 BSI
rir. Hconan
'j.:ay 2, 1957
J. J. Noonan DEPARTMEM? OF THE KAVY
Bureau of iiecii'.cine and Surgery
V;aohir.Gton 25, D. C. /;)^
f^^n/^ BUMED 6260.5
</!//> BU:iED-7231-JS-c;
f^Cifl November 1955
B'JMSD IHSTRUCTIOH 6260.5 Sir. ' ""'^ 2 Q ior
Frc=: Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery ''"''■ o^^^'^Tq
To: . All Ships and Stations ^^'cs ^^'Oa,
Subj: , Threshold limit values for toxic catsrials
End: (1) Table of Threshold Limit Values
1. Purpose . To establish as a basic refereiice the threshold linit
values of toxic oaterials, adopted by the American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygiei.iots, snd to provide guidance tov.-ard
the reduction of potential health hasfirds cnoou:;tered in the industrial
envirorinent for both nilitarj' and navr.l civilian personnel.
2. General
£. Definition. The terji "threshold licit values" as used hereia
is intenced to indicate the maximua; averajre ataospheric concentrs-
ticns of ccnt2c:in-::ntE to vmich personnel nay be exposed during-^n
fii-hour v.'orl:dEy. over a prolonged period of tir.s, v/ithout adversely
affecting their health. The threshold lir.it values should be used as
a f^uidein the control cf health hazards and shouln not^be regarded as
fine lines betv;een safe and dangerous concentrations. The most
desirable levels in all cases are those approaching zero, but practical
considerations fre juently reo.uire the aocei-tance of higher levels
which -ire safe but net ideal.
(1) The term "naxircun allovrable concentrations" is to be
considered synonymous v.'ith ths term "threshold limit values"
defined above.
b. Threshold Li-r.its. The threshold linit values contained in
end' sure (IJ are based on the best available toxicological informa-
tion, long-term industrial experience, and experimental studies.
In is-.uch as these values are constiintly being reevaluated, revisions
er additions i^ill be made as further information becomes available.
C. axnosure to Icr.i.z'.nrz Rndiation. Threshold limits for exposure
to ionizing radiation have been omitted from this Instr\'.ction. Tiiese
exposures are adequately covered in I!a\'Med P-1325, Hadiological
Safety Regulations.
»t:001240
322
oU:;£DII'ST 6260.5
7 liover/oar 1955
d. i.ir/.5.tr.tJ.on£. The enciossd listirij; o£ t'nrcshold liidt vr.lucs
for various chemicals does r.ot constitute authority for the :.rocu;'e-
lacnt or use of these itcsc.
3. Act.rlQTi. T;io F.edicul officer or iicoical dcpart.-cer.t representr-tive
i»f feuch ship 2iid station concerned she- 11 t-.hs tlie follov/ing Lcfior.:
&.' Sui'vsy induEtriol opsratiorjs utiliiiinr, the ir.rciT.-.aticn co::cs;l!icd
in snclcEurc; (1) to trsist in the ice;:tificatitn and control of potential
iiisustricl health ha^arcs.
b. Make recorcn.er.datior.s to the ca-ininr.din," officer for spetr.fic
correctiv^e actions, v:hen requix-ed.
c.
EpEcielist assistance
Lor
idccuate survey of a ship or
shore station is desired, requests should be initiateii through the
pr rsr ch£.nnsls fcr the ssrvicss of an industrial hysienist. Tliis T^-.y
be done in acocrdcncs v:ith proceJurso outlined in JiCPI CS, or by
request direct to the Eursavi of liiiciicine and Surgery.
IV. nuui'iri
rencil Mote:
This letter is - Referenced in ySI 9190.26
Ser: 533?-.'ol of 15 Mar 1957
rd
•v.
iinies
F.
Dubois
»/.
Marvey
K.
i-'il3
■^
Kch-3
?:.
jladdc-n
A.
V/hitiian
Koran-s^
Dr
. McDouga
K.
Shesto
(^001241
323
rVnrs^--; R^.5.cn.?. UpgO . The folio-..-in5 e.bbrcviations are ustd:
pi-i.' Pavtc per ri:l?i.lior:
Mg. per cu. n. {ag/l-^) J.illiGiTJss par cubic sseter
lH-iZ? I-illion particles war cubic foou
Aclorted nt the i7'ch iruiiiii i.-ic^iins cf wlvj -.-sricr.n Conicrcncs of
Govei'nr.aiital Industrial riygicnists, buTfcilo. 2:,-rib- April .'.;o5.
C;UOStC:nCe
hPri
Acetnldehyde 200
•Acetic acid -^
Anetoi-:e ' -"^^ .
Acrolein • ^'i' ^
Acrylcnitrile ^^Zr^
Amronia ::';::Ji;
e.iTj'l E.lcohoi (isoai-yl alcchol) *^'^
Aniline ?
Arsme
Een32r:e (bsnsol) 3?
Bro:iits3 1
Butadiene (l,3-but£ii2ns) ICC'O
Sutanone (methyl ethyl retonc-) 250
3utvl acetate (n-buwvl ccctace) 'iCD
Butyl alcohol (n-butonr-l) ICO
Butyl cellosolve l2-buto::yeV.hanol) 200
Carbon Jio;:ice 5000
Carbon disulfide _ 20
Carbon aono;:ida lOD
Cnrbon tetrcichloride 25
Cellosolve (2-etlioir.'c-th£nol) 200
Cellosolve acetate (hycroxyethylacctato) 100
Cnlcnne ' i
75
iCO
Chicrorrcr.c (2-chlorobytadierc) I?
Crocol (all isoDRrc; —" 2?
Cyclohexane , _^
Cyclohexanol ■•^^
Cyn1 ohc:cancne , ^i;
Cyclchexene f°^
CycloEroccne f)iz
C 001242 iinclosure (1)
n nc
324
Toxic l^-.'.st.r. . Piir^rr, and Mr.sts jCnutxwjoi)
Substance i.;g. -^j.
cu. ci.
Chronic acid and Chro.TiStos ss CrC-3 0 ■•
Cycnidc as CN '- 5 "
Dinitrotolucne 1,5
Dinitro-o-cresol . 5,. 2
Fluorids ^'.'j
Irori oxide Tune ij
Lead ~0.15
i:=.^.-;C£.i.;JLri oxide fu::£ Ip
i:2r=ury D.a
rii-athion (OjO-Diethyl-D-p-nitrci-hcnyl tniophospiiste) 0.1
rfentachloronaf.hoI12l2.ns C). y
Psntachlorophonol O.5
Fhosnho-.'us (yallov;) . C.i
Fhospijor-us per.taclilorida 1
Ihosphoru.s pantasulfiri-s 1
Seleniua cocpounds (as S2) 0.1
"UlTuric acid 1
Tslliiriun 0.1
Tct :*yi ( 2.4, 6-trir.ifcrop:;2n:y-T.r.;ethylr;itra=inc;J 1 . 5
Trichlorona;;hth2lene • ' 5
Trinitrotc.lusne 1,5
Ur'anius (soluble co.T:?cund3) U.C'I
Uranxua (insoluble cojpc;ujids) 0.?.,
line oxide fujr.ss ^ Ip
Substance 111 PC 1^
AlxmdLiD (aluninua o.xidc) 50
Asbestos 5
CarborunduT: (silicon carbide) pO
Dust (nuis?Jice, no ires silica) ?0
Mica (bslov/ y;3 free silica) 20
Portland cement 5O
Talc 20
Silica
high (above 5C;a free SiO?) 5
Dcdiur. (5 to 50;i free Si02) 20
low (belp;/ 5/* free Si02) 50
Slate ibelbv; ?/' free SiO?) r.Q
Scapstone (belov: 5)^ free Si02) . 20
Total dust (belov; 5J» free SiC?) 50
Tcntritivc Threshold Ll'nit Values
The iollov.'in^ tentative valuiis have been susi^ested for further conr
end it is proi-osod that the entire list v/ill be presented for adcpc
Eeetin^ of the American Conference of Governmental Industrial ".ygi'J
1956. if Eo reason to the contrary is forthccains.
Enclosure (1) 4.
001243
325
r >
Unitcd Statcg Maritimt Commission
washington
55 SbnltucV- St.
BoBtrn 15, Mass.
631 -A
Januery B, 1944
Bureau of Ships
VBTy Depsrtraent
TYashington, D. C,
Gentlemen;
tr.f
Attn: Captain Ingram, Room 2074, Building T6
yesterday I received a long distance call from lir . 7!, G. Hazard, Indus*
! trial Hygiene Division of New Jersey, Trenton, Few Jersey, in which Mr. Hatard
stated that the union men at Few Yorlr Shipbuilding Co. had aslced their help,"
regerding the use of Amoslte for pipe insulation on Navy Tassels they ilto'
constructing.
^<. I happen to know the union official, McCloskoy, who is not easily put'
'^ off and who is distinctly on the reaEonable side. They askj (l) how generallyjf
is AmoEite used, (2) will the Navy allow the use of anything else, and (5)."«
what protection, if any, is needed.
It seems to me these ere reasonable questions and should be answered.
3 know Fniard very wt>ll - ho 1b a D. S. Tublic Flpnlth Sorvloo officer neaif^ned
to Kc» Jersey for the duration. His only desire le to help the company got
on with its job and do it without damBging anyone's health.
Hsrard stated that Dr. Goldman of the Bethesda Labs (C.S .P.H.S , )
found the Amosite to be mostly asbestos. Dust counts in the room where the
men were working were very much higher than anyone would recommend - they
ran up to 25 million, A figure of 5 million for asbestos is recommended.
If this materiel must be used, I suggest the men be required to wear
Bureau of Mines dust respirators approved for the nuisance dusts, or else
that the material be applied wet. If the latter expedient is impracticable
the job ought to be ventilated,
TVe would point out that we had some bad spots in baby aircraft carrier
construction at our Kaiser Vancouver yard. After a little bit of work with
the Labor-Management group we got the men to wear air line respirators and
they now use them without making any objection. The use of dust respirators
in both Kavy and Uaritimo--yard6 is sketchy. Both organi tati ons could save a
lot of trouble by having them used mor^ - just as the mining industry has done*
JXo o S-S-t - ^
326
United States Maritime commission
washington
Pago 2,
Please write or telephone as soon ae poEslble aB the matter 1« urgent,
TTe can eaBily hare a labor disturbance, eBpeclelly if we Ignore the complaint.
It may be better to handle it Terbally - hence the request that you telephoo?
me (jOKgwood 2330). I will then phone Harard at once or you can.
Sincerely youre.
Ccj CoTdr. H. K. SesBionB
D, S. Maritime CommiSBion
Philadelphia, Penna,
Philip ^r inker
Chief Health Consultant
T(IR>
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327
■'l^
d
ULl'OSiTJON
hlXllIHIT
ATI! 3
From: Industrial llyqicne Laboi'tory
To: The Yard Medical Officer
Subj : Report of Invcstiqation "f Potential Health Hazard in
Connection with Pipe-Cov ring Operations.
1. Recent reports from outside Industrial Hygiene Agencies
indicate thiat the increased quantities of asbestos-insulation
products used in shipbuilding, under the stress of wartime pro-
duction schedules have been accompanied by a growing concern
among workers who feared that exposure to some of these products
was causing injury to their health. This concern, in all
probability, has a basis in fad as evidenced by diagnoses of
primary and advanced asbestosis, ai\ionc; ,1 significant number of
shipyard pipe coverers, based upon pliysical examination data and
x-ray findings.
2. In the light of this information, it seemed that a de-
tailed engineering study of activities involved in the use of these
products should be made in orde; to determine whether or not the
extent of exposure to asbestos 'lust in tliis Yard constituted a
lica] Lli liazard. Al] asljestos-con tain intj materiaJs capable of
producing dusty atmospheres when handled were identified and the
shops to which they were issued investigated. Procedures and
operations in connection with tinir use and percent of workers'
time engaged in handling these materials were studied. Atmospheric
dust coi;nts were made during th' various steps of the operations
involved together with petrograi^liic examiantions of the starting
materials and air-borne dusts. Following is a more detailed de-
scription of the work done in tliis connection- and the results of
the study.
3. . Various products containing asbestos are used in the
Navy Yard, but, from the standp'^int of dust creation, pipe-covering
materials were considered to be of greatest importance. The
likelihood of any material hazai d to health arising from the use
of other asbestos products, such as, packing and gaskat materials
328
' W( Ml 1 fl M'C'iii 111 I H • IK M| I i . I i 1)1 (• . 'I'l' ■; s liuly , I, hen w.ii-. 1 i ni i l:o(l to
I • i I '('-(;i ivc I i MM 1 1| II ■ I . 1 1_ i ( )]i'; cxclii!.! '■ ' I y . 'I'hc p i i kIih-I :; um'iI in
coiiiHM- 1 i cm will) l.lu'.'";!' opoi",! L i on; L(k|(-l1iim wj I h c()iisuiiiiJl.ion claLa
J is Led in 'I'libie 1 .
4. Pipe Covcrinq is done by i.hrcc different shops:
(a) Pipe Shop i')6) , All covering on ships afloat.
(b) Power Plant (03) , Yard nuiintenance ; All steam and
hot water lines ashore.
(c) Public Works • ( ?0) , Yard maintenance; All cold water
pipes ashore.
Although the same number of worl.i.;rs (forty) arc involved in both
the Pipe Shop and the Power Plant, the nature of the work, types
of materials used and relative rnnhours of actual exposure seemed
to indicate that the Pipe Shop potentially involved the greater
hazards to health. For this reason the majority of samples were
taken in connection with activities in this shop. The conditions
under which the samples credited to the Power Plant were taken were
conducive to far greater dust concentrations than any other
operations. Inasmuch as these l.ests did not reveal hazardous ex-
posures, further tests in this r.hop were not thought to be necessary.
Public Works pipe-covering acti'^ities were deemed unimportant as
regards dust creation, and therefore, tests were considered
unnecessary. Only one type of covering, a relatively non-dusty
"Air-Coll" asbestos paper, was used and only 3?, of the workers'
time was spent in direct contaci with this material.
5. A breakdown of the distr ) liution of all pipe-covering person-
nel, for the purpose of expressing the relative time exposed to the
various pipe covering materials used, is presented in Table II.
6. All dust counts referred to in this report were collected
and quanticated by means of a Zeiss Konimeter. A complete tabulation
of the results of these counts ;ind field work accomplished is con-
tained in Table III. Mechanical exhaust ventilation is not oin-
ployod in connection with any pi pe-covoring or asbestos handling
oporatitins in Llic Yard. Hcspir.ilory iiroti'ction Ijjy means of an
approved type of respirator is ir;ed by only one worker during
band-sawing operations.
7. The maximum allowable con ::entration for asbestos dust has
])ccn set by rccognizoct authoritii^s at 5 million particles per cubic
loot of air. In all cases, the tests revealed that actual exposures
in this Yard were well below th^s value. However, outside observers
have recently reported cases of asbestosis among workers exposed
329
li> ci iMCcliI r.il i mis loiiiid 111 lie 1 >. ' dw Ihir. ,ii-ri ■) i( cil I h i (.'f.lio 1 (i
I niii I . I II V \f\j >>\ I li I '. I .H-l , i I wi 111 I il Mciu ,i(lv i s.ili 1 1' I <i conduct
I'hy. I CM 1 OMin 111,1 I iiiir;, i in- 1 i ic I i 1 1' i i-li.":| ^: i.iy:;, on ,i| 1 , i: .1 >c;; t:us
pipe CO VI • M • I !. , 1)1 at Icir.l. ii|niii 'liiiM' wli/i li.ivc Ijcch coulin-
iii)ur;ly cnip 1 (■ycd .il the Liadc^ Im live yi'.ir.s (ir mori^, in order
to dclinili'ly di't (' I nil IK' wlifLlici ■ r nuL .my (>\ Lin: iiic-n ong.nyc^d
in I lif-";o (ipcM-.iL I ons in the: Yard irc bciii<i allccLod under present
workinci conditions, mid to scrvt- as a quidc to the reconunendations
of control ineasurci;, if ncccssaiv.
8. This matter lias been brou dit to t)ie attention of the Medical
Officer for Industrial Hygiene and examinations are being conducted
as recommended.
JAMES E. FULLER
I
25-994 0-83-22
330
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333
U.S. Department of Labor
AUG 0 ^ &d
Assistant Secretary for
Occupational Safety and Healtti
Washington, DC 20210
Honorable Barney Frank
Chairman, Manpower and Housing
Subcommittee
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your letter of July 1 , regarding corres-
pondence of April 18, May 5, May 17, and May 24, 1983, between
Milan Racic, Health and Safety Director of the International
Union of Allied Industrial Workers of America, and Alan C.
McMillan, Region V Administrator of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA). The following addresses the ques-
tions you have raised concerning OSHA's enforcement of the
asbestos standard.
1
Neither Mr. Racic's letters of April 18 n
constitutes a request for inspection unde
Safety and Health Act (the Act) or its im
tions. His letters call OSHA's attention
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
taking place at worksites which contain a
letters are general inquiries about actio
protect workers at the demolition sites,
tion in either letter of improper handlin
other hazards to which employees may be e
allegations that asbestos is being handle
specific worksite or that safety and heal
or of May 17, 1983,
r the Occupational
plementing regula-
te notification by
that demolition is
sbestos. The
n OSHA is taking to
There is no indica-
g of asbestos or of
xposed. There are no
d improperly at a
th hazards exist.
2.
A complaint to OSHA, in order to elicit an inspection, must
specify a hazardous condition. A complaint does not have
to allege a specific asbestos exposure level, but must
assert that a hazard exists in the workplace or that there
has been a violation of the Act.
I am enclosing a copy of Chapter IX of OSHA's Field Operations
Manual, which sets forth the criteria for an employee complaint
and describes OSHA's policies for handling such complaints.
As Mr. McMillan's letter of May 5 states, the reports
from EPA to OSHA regarding demolition sites do not indicate
any violations of OSHA's asbestos standard or of the Agency's
general duty requirements [under section 5(a)l of the Act]
to maintain a workplace free from recognized hazards likely
334
to cause death or serious physical harm to employees. EPA's
reports contain no indication that demolition work is being
done in a hazardous manner. OSHA's inspection data do not
indicate any statistical probability of a greater number of
violations of the asbestos standard at demolition sites than
at other workplaces where asbestos is handled.
The EPA reports of demolition indicate only the presence
of asbestos at a worksite, not the manner in which employees
are being exposed or the amount of the substance present.
These reports are based on notification to EPA by the
contractors involved. For purposes of scheduling OSHA
inspections, a better measure of the relative health hazard
would be the degree to which workers are exposed to asbestos,
taking into consideration the work practice controls and
personal protective equipment used. Employee complaints
about employers who allegedly violate OSHA standards are a
good way of directing Agency compliance resources to actual,
rather than merely potential hazards. Moreover, contractors
who notify EPA of demolition work involving asbestos are less
likely to disregard OSHA regulations than those who fail to
notify EPA of such projects. In any case, OSHA does not
ignore the reports transmitted by EPA. We are currently
examining data on demolition sites to determine where such
workplaces fit into inspection priorities. All sources
of data are being considered during this review.
OSHA has not conducted any asbestos-related inspections
at the worksites cited in the lists provided by Mr. Racic.
As explained in response #3, the data provided by Mr. Racic
do not necessarily indicate asbestos hazards and have not
appeared to us to provide a sufficient basis for targeting
inspections. We are, however, as stated, reviewing this policy.
OSHA has no jurisdiction over the general public as distinct
from workplace employees. Section 4(a) of the Act states
that: "This Act shall apply with respect to employment
performed in a workplace in a State...." The Environmental
Protection Agency as well as the state and local health
agencies have authority to protect the public from toxic
substances and other dangers. Despite the statutory
limitation on its authority, OSHA's policy under this
Administration is to supply information on the elimina-
tion of workplace hazards to the extent possible when such
information is sought.
335
6. .The portion of the FOM referred to by Mr. McMillan, Chapter
l'^( of the FOM, is enclosed as noted in response #1.
7.
In t
mana
the
st ri
of 0
OSHA
obje
effe
the
goal
Agen
Offi
to s
Nati
OSHA
Offi
enf o
he p
geme
Act
ctly
SHA'
has
ct i V
ct iv
conf
s an
cy ' s
ces
ee t
onal
' s n
ces ,
rcem
ast t
nt sy
by al
acco
s com
issu
es an
eness
ormit
d pri
resp
are a
hat e
Offi
at ion
chec
ent p
wo an
stem
1 OSH
unt ab
plian
ed a
d has
to p
y of
orit i
onse
udite
nf ore
ce ar
al of
king
olicy
d a h
that
A fie
le fo
ce p r
forma
deve
rovid
the F
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At a meeting on July 21 between your staff and mine, the recent
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which you inquire, was discussed in some detail. I did not have
prepared remarks on that occasion and so cannot supply you with a
copy of my presentation. As soon as the President's message on
this subject has been issued, we will forward a copy to you.
If you have further questions, we will be happy to oblige. We
appreciate your continuing interest in occupational safety and
health .
Sine
Thorne G. Auchter
Assistant Secretary
Enclosure
336
OSHA Instruction CPL 2.45A
APR 18 1983 ^
Office 01 Compliance Programming
CHAPTER IX
COMPLAINTS AND REFERRALS
A. Complaints.
1. General. The discussion of complaints in this chapter is confined to when a
complaint is received and processed at the Area Office before an inspection
rather than when it is given to the CSHO at the time the establishment is in-
spected. (See OSHA Instruction CPL 2,I2B, Appendix B, for sample letters.)
a. ARency Response. The agency's response to a complaint will take a variety
of forms, ranging from an inspection tc a response by letter, depending
upon the formality of the complaint, the nature of the hazard and the abate-
ment response of the employer.
b. Complainant Identity. The identity of formal and nonformal complainants
who wish to remain anonymous will be kept confidential, pursuant to Sec-
tion 8(f)(1) of the Act.
2. Definitions. The following definitions apply in this chapter:
a. Complaint. A complaint is a notice of a hazard or a violation of the Act
believed to exist in a workplace given by an employee or representative of
employees to the Secretary or his authorized representative.
(1) To constitute a complaint the notice must allege that a hazard exists
in the workplace or that the Act (meaning also a standard or regulation)
is violated.
(a) If the notice is so vague and unsubstantiated that the Area Direc-
tor is unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the existence of
the alleged workplace hazard, there is no valid complaint. In such
a case, however, every reasonable attempt shall be made to con-
tact the person giving the notice to obtain more specific infor-
mation.
(b) If, as a result of a recent inspection or on the basis of other objec-
tive evidence, the Area Director determines that the hazard which
is the subject of the notice is not present; e.g., it has already been
corrected, such a notice is not a valid complaint.
(2) The workplace must be one wherein OSHA's jurisdiction has not been
preempted under Section 't(b)(l) of the Act. Thus, if the notice involves
conditions inside a mine, any hazard or violation clearly falls within an
area wherein OSHA's jurisdiction has been preempted. In such a circum-
stance the notice is not a complaint. Such notices shall be promptly
referred to the appropriate agency for its action.
IX-1
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OSH A Instruction CPL 2.^5 A
. .. 1 § ^98i
tice of Compliance Programming
b. Employee. For purposes of submitting a complaint, an employee is either
of the following:
(1) A present employee of the employer about whose establishment the
complaint is being made.
(2) A present employee of another employer if that employee is working
at or near some other employer's workplace and is exposed to hazards
of that workplace.
NOTE: Former employees are not considered employees for purposes of
submitting a formal complaint. They can only submit nonformal
complaints.
c. Representative of Employees. For purposes of submitting a complaint, a
representative of employees is any of the following:
(1) An authorized representative of the employee bargaining unit, such as
a certified or recognized labor organization;
(2) An attorney acting for an employee;
(3) Any other person acting in a bona fide representative capacity, e.g., a
member of the employee's family. In this situation, a complainant
purporting to act as a representative of an employee shall be presumed
to be so acting unless the CSHO obtains information that the com-
plaint was not submitted with the knowledge of or on behalf of the
employee.
d. Formal Complaint. To meet the formality requirements outlined in Section
8(f) of the Act and in 29 CFR 1903. 11, a complaint shall:
(1) Be reduced to writing (either on an OSHA-7 Form or in a letter);
(2) Allege that an imminent danger or a violation threatening physical
harm (i.e., a hazard covered by a standard or by the general duty clause)
exists in the workplace;
(3) Set forth with reasonable particularity the grounds upon which it is
based. This does not mean that the complaint must specify a particu-
lar standard; it need only specify a condition or practice that is hazard-
ous and, if uncommon, why it is hazardous; and
ik) Be signed by at least one employee or employee representative.
(5) The following are examples of deficiencies which would result in the
failure of an apparent formal complaint to meet the requirements of
the definition:
IX-2
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Office of Compliance Programming
(a) A thorough evaluation of the complaint does not establish reason-
able grounds to believe that the alleged violation can be classified
as an imminent danger or that the alleged hazard is covered by a
standard or, in the case of an alleged serious condition, by the
general duty clause (Section 5(a)(1)).
(b) The complaint concerns a workplace condition which has no direct
relationship to safety or health and does not threaten physical
harm; e.g., a violation of a recordkeeping or other regulation or a
violation of a standard that is classified as de minimis.
(c) The complaint alleges a hazard which violates a standard but
describes no actual workplace conditions and gives no particulars
which would allow a proper evaluation of the hazard. In such a
case the Area Director shall make a reasonable attempt to obtain
such information.
e. Nonformal Complaint. Any complaint, such as the examples given under
A.2.d.(5), which does not meet any or all of the formality requirements in
A.2.d. is a nonformal complaint and is to be handled in accordance with the
procedures in A. 8.
(1) Examples. Other examples of such complaints include the following:
(a) Oral complaints filed by employees.
(b) Unsigned written complaints filed by employees.
w
(c) Written and oral complaints filed by nonemployees (persons or
groups other than current employees or their representatives).
(d) Complaints of hazards not covered by a standard or by the general
duty clause.
(e) Complaints of violations of regulations (rather than standards).
(f) Complaints of violations of standards that are classified as de
minimis.
(2) Referrals from Other Agencies. Reports from sources listed in B.2.b,
however, are referrals and are to be handled in accordance with the
procedures in B.3.
Receiving Complaints. An incoming notice of hazards or alleged violations
shall first be referred to a designated professional who shall obtain all available
information from the person reporting it. The notice shall thereafter be for-
warded to the supervisor to complete the evaluation.
IX-3
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Office of Compliance Programming
Employee RJRhts. When an oral notice is received from an employee or
employee representative, that person shall be informed of the right to file
a formal complaint in writing under Section 8(f)(1) and of the right, as a
matter of law and OSHA policy, to have the complainant's identity held
confidential, if requested, regardless o* the formality of the complaint.
Workplace Inspections. The person giving notice shall be informed that
formal complaints generally lead to workplace inspections while nonformal
complaints usually result in letters requesting employers to undertake cor-
rective action.
Formalizing Oral Complaints. If the person is filing a notice orally and
makes a request to formalize the complaint, the supervisor or designated
professional, after confirming that the complainant is an employee or em-
ployee representative, shall complete the Complaint, OSHA-7 Form, to the
extent possible prior to mailing for the complainant's signature.
(1) If the signed complaint form is not returned within 10 working days, it
shall be treated as a nonformal complaint; and a letter shall be sent to
the employer. If, nevertheless, a signed complaint is received after 10
working days but before a letter has been sent to the employer, the
complaint is to be considered formal and evaluated as such.
(2) If a complainant filing orally declines to formalize his complaint, the
supervisor or designated professional shall nevertheless attempt to
obtain the complainant's name, address and telephone number.
Section 11(c) Complaint. The complainant shall be advised of the protec-
tion against discrimination afforded by Section 11(c) of the Act and shall
be informed of the procedure for filing an 11(c) complaint.
(1) Safety and/or health complaints filed by former employees who allege
that they were fired for exercising their rights under the Act are non-
formal complaints and will not be scheduled for investigation.
(a) Such complaints will be handled in accordance with the procedures
outlined in Chapter X, C.l, and transmitted to the appropriate
11(c) personnel for investigation of the alleged 11(c) discrimination
complaint.
(b) No letter shall be sent to the employer until after the Regional
11(c) Supervisory Investigator has reviewed the case and decided
that it will not be returned to the Area Director for inspection.
(c) This screening process by the Regional 11(c) Supervisory Investiga-
tor is not anticipated to take more than 3 work days and usually
less. The Area Director can expect to be informed by telephone
of the decision within that time frame.
ix-k
340
OSHA Instruction CPL 2A5A
APR 1 8 1983
Office of Compliance Programming
(2) In those instances where the Regional 11(c) Supervisory Investigator
determines that the existence or nature of the alleged hazard is likely
to be relevant to the resolution of the 11(c) discrimination complaint,
the matter shall be sent back to the Area Director for an OSHA inspec-
tion to be handled in the manner indicated in 6.2.b.(3).
(3) When, as in most cases, the decision is that no inspection is necessary,
the Area Director shall proceed to send a letter to the employer as
outlined in A. 8.
W Any 1 1(c) complaint alleging an imminent danger shall be handled in
accordance with the instructions in A. 6.
Evaluating Complaints. A careful exercise of investigatory techniques is neces-
sary for complete evaluation of complaints.
a. Classification. Immediately upon receipt of a notice reporting a hazard or
an alleged violation, the supervisor shall decide if the notice meets the
definition of a complaint. If so, the complaint shall be classified as formal
or nonformal.
b. Documentation. Supervisory personnel shall evaluate complaints with all
evaluation decisions fully documented in the establishment case file includ-
ing all information obtained pursuant to the procedures outlined in this
chapter.
c. Both Safety and Health Hazards Alleged. When a complaint alleges both
safety and health hazards, the complaint shall be referred to both safety
and health supervisors for evalution. They shall coordinate the handling of
the complaint. Supervisors shall maximize the use of cross-trained CSHOs
to conduct complaint inspections involving both safety and health hazards.
d. Response to Person Reporting. Whenever the Area Director decides that a
notice which fails to meet the definition of a complaint given in A. 2. a. will
not be responded to or that a complaint submitted by an employee or repre-
sentative of employees which fails to meet all of the formality require-
ments given in A.2.d. will not be inspected, a letter shall be sent to the
person submitting the notice (certified with return receipt) communicating
that decision and the reasons for it. The person shall be informed that he
or she has a right to appeal this decision to the Regional Administrator for
an informal review.
Information Needed for Complaint Evaluation. As stated in AA, supervisory
personnel shall evaluate complaints. The Complaint OSHA-7 Form shall nor-
mally be used to record both formal and nonformal complaints. Most com-
plaints will be relatively unsophisticated and lacking in details. Thus, the com-
plainant will normally have to be contacted, when possible, either for additional
facts or to verify facts supplied. The evaluator must exercise professional
IX-5
341
Office of Compliance Programming
judgment on the basis of the information available to decide whether or not
there are reasonable grounds to believe that a violation exists and, if so, how it
should be classified.
a. Taking Complaints. When the designated OSHA professional receives a
complaint, by letter, in person or over the telephone, the OSHA-7 Form
shall be completed. If the complainant wishes to submit a formal com-
plaint, the person taking the complaint shall ask if the complainant is pre-
sently an employee or employee representative. If the coinplaint has been
received in writing and has been signed, the complainant shall be contacted,
if necessary, for response to questions on the OSHA-7 although the form
need not be sent for signature.
b. Additional Information. Additional information is usually needed to im-
prove the quality of the complaints and to aid in determining their priority.
Therefore, in completing item 4 on the OSHA-7, an attempt shall be made
to obtain detailed answers to the following questions:
(1) For All Complaints.
(a) Describe the unsafe or unhealthful conditions; identify the loca-
tion. What is the nature of the exposure?
(b) What is the work being performed in the unsafe/unhealthful area?
Identify, as well as possible, the type and condition of equipment
in use, the materials (chemicals) being used, the process/operation
involved, and the kinds of work being done near the hazardous
area.
(c) How often is work done at the task which leads to the exposure?
For how long at one time? How long has the condition existed as
far as can be determined? Has it been brought to the employer's
attention? Have any attempts been made to correct the condition?
(d) How many shifts are there? What time do they start? On which
shift does the hazardous condition exist?
(e) What personal protective equipment is required by the company?
Is it used by employees? Include all PPE and describe it as specif-
ically as possible. Include the manufacturer's name and any iden-
tifying numbers.
(f) How many people work in the establishment? How many are ex-
posed to the hazardous conditions? *'hat is their proximity?
(g) Is there an employee representative in the establishment? Include
the name, address, and phone number of the union and/or of the
employee representative(s).
IX-6
342
OSHAJnstruction CPL 2.k5A
APR 1 8 ^3
Office of Compliance Programming
(h) Identify the standard(s) apparently violated by the conditions
described by the complainant.
(2) For Health Hazards. ♦ .
(a) Has the employer administered any tests to determine employee
exposure levels to the hazardous conditions or substance? Des-
cribe these tests. What have been the results?
(b) What engineering controls are in place In the area(s) in which the
exposed employees work? For instance, are there any fans or
acoustical insulation in the area which may reduce exposure to
the hazard?
(c) What administrative or work practice controls has the employer
put into effect?
(d) Do any employees have any symptoms which may have been caused
by exposure to hazardous substances? Have any employees ever
been treated by a doctor for a work-related disease or condition?
What was it? Have there been any "near-miss" incidents?
(3) For Safety Hazards.
(a) Under what adverse or hazardous conditions are employees re-
quired to work? (This should include conditions contributing to
stress and "other" probability factors.)
(b) Have any employees been injured as a result of this hazardous
condition? Have there been any "near-miss" incidents?
6. Responding to Complaints AlleRing Imminent Danger Conditions. Any complaint
which, in the professional opinion of the Area Director or supervisor constitutes
an imminent danger, as defined in Chapter VII, shall be inspected irrespective
of whether or not it meets the formality requirements of Section 8(f)(1). It
shall be inspected the same day received, where possible, but not later than the
employer's next working day after receipt of the complaint.
7. Responding to Formal Complaints. All formal complaints meeting the require-
ments of Section 8(f)(1) of the Act and 29 CFR 1903.11 shall be scheduled for
workplace inspections.
a. Determination. Upon determination by the supervisor that a complaint is
formal, an inspection shall be scheduled in accordance with the priorities in
A.7.b.
IX-7
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Office of Compliance Programming
b. Priorities for Responding by Inspections to Formal Complaints. Inspections
resulting from formal complaints shall be conducted according to the follow-
ing priority:
(1) Formal complaints, other than imminent danger, shall be given a prior-
ity based upon the classification and the gravity of the alleged hazards
as defined in Chapters IV and VI.
(2) Formal complaints involving potentially serious hazards shall be inves-
tigated within 5 working days; those involving other-than-serious condi-
tions, within 30 working days.
8. Responding to Nonformal Complaints. All nonformal complaints shall receive a
response. The procedures described below include responses to nonformal com-
plaints designed to ensure correction of hazards identified in the complaint:
a. Responding by Letter to Nonformal Complaints. Upon receipt and evalua-
tion of a nonformal complaint, the Area Director, as soon as possible, shall
prepare a letter to the employer advising him of the complaint, informing
him of the standards allegedly violated (including copies of such standards)
and outlining the corrective action required. This letter shall be sent by
certified mail with return receipt requested.
(1) Posting. The employer shall be requested to post copies of OSHA's
letter of notification referred to in the previous subparagraph together
with all subsequent correspondence dealing with the complaint items
including the employer's response until such time as the case is closed
by the Area Office. The employer shall be informed that a copy of the
letter and subsequent correspondence will be sent to the complainant.
(2) Letter to Complainant. Concurrent with the letter to the employer, a
letter to the complainant shall be prepared explaining that the employ-
er has been informed of the complaint. It shall request the complainant
to notify the Area Director if no corrective action has been taken or
at least initiated within 30 calendar days (or less if so indicated in the *
letter to the employer) or if any adverse or discriminatory action or
threats are made against the complainant. A copy of the letter to the
employer shall be included with the letter to the complainant. The
complainant shall also be sent a copy of all subsequent correspondence.
(3) Employer Response. If a response is received from the employer and
it appears that appropriate corrective action has been taken or that no
hazard is present, the case file shall be closed. The complainant shall
be informed of all responses received from the employer.
b. Responding by Inspection to Nonformal Complaints. Where the employer
fails to respond or submits an inadequate response within the period speci-
fied in the letter or where the complainant informs OSHA that no correc-
IX-8
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OSHA Instruction CPL 2.'f5A
APR 1 8 1983
Office of Compliance Programming
tlve action has been taken or the action tal<en is inadequate, the Area Di-
rector shall contact the employer to determine what further action he
plans to take. If no action has been taken and none is planned, the nonfor-
mal complaint shall be activated for inspection pursuant to the priorities in
A.7.b.(2).
(1) Status of Corrective Action. Where an ambiguity exists or where the
employer has a correction plan which he has not yet had time to imple-
ment fully, the Area Director shall communicate further, as appropri-
ate, with the employer and/ or the complainant to determine what
interim protective steps have been taken until the corrective action
shall have been completed and, later, whether the hazard has been
adequately corrected. On the basis of information available, the Area
Director shall decide whether an inspection is warranted.
(2) Tenth Letter Inspections. Where employers have sent satisfactory
corrective action letters, the Area Director shall, nevertheless, select
every tenth letter for inspection to ensure that the employer's action
corresponds to that asserted in the corrective action letter. Only
satisfactory letters shall be included in this procedure. Letters shall
be numbered in order of receipt by the Area Office. Employers shall
be informed at the time that the initial letter is sent out that they are
subject to such "tenth letter" inspections.
Scope of Inspection. The scope of complaint inspections shall be determined in
accordance with the guidelines given in this section. Any departure from these
guidelines shall be supported by adequate documentation.
a. Safety Complaint Inspections. The inspection of a safety complaint shall
normally be a comprehensive inspection of the entire workplace (except for
low-hazard areas, such as office areas). The following guidelines shall be
followed in determining exceptions:
(1) Records Review. In a high rate manufacturing establishment (one
whose primary SIC code is listed on the Area Office High Rate SIC
List), an injury records review, as outlined in Chapter III, shall be per-
formed. If such a records review would not result in a comprehensive
safety inspection under the guidelines'in that chapter, the procedures
in d. of this section for a complaint inspection in a low-rate industry
shall apply.
(2) Deletion Criteria. If one of the deletion criteria in Chapter II applies
to a general industry establishment, the procedures in d. shall apply.
b. Construction and Longshoring Inspections. In the construction and longshor-
ing industries, if a substantially complete inspection of the establishment
has been conducted within the last quarter, the procedures in d. shall apply.
IX-9
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OSHA Instruction CPL 2.k5h
APH 1 8 i9oo
Office of Compliance Programming
c. Health Complaint Inspections. The inspection of a health complaint in a
SIC code industry that is listed on the Health Inspection Plan will normally
be a comprehensive inspection of all areas where a potential serious health
problem may exist. Otherwise the procedures outlined in d. for a com-
plaint in a low rate industry shall apply.
d. Low-hazard Industry Complaint Inspections. Generally, a complaint inspec-
tion in a low-hazard industry should be limited to working conditions iden-
tified in the complaint. If, however, the CSHO believes that the scope of
the inspection should be expanded because of information indicating the
likelihood of serious hazards in other portions of the plant (e.g., the CSHO
has observed them prior to the opening conference or the records review
shows that an unusual number or type of injuries has occurred in one time
period, area or operation), or because of a formal complaint alleging immi-
nent danger or serious hazards received while conducting the mspection,
the supervisor shall be contacted. A decision will then be made on the
basis of the information that is available whether the inspection is to be
extended.
e. Advising Participants of Extended Scope. Whenever an extended inspection
is to be conducted, the CSHO shall advise the employer and the employee
representatives of the extended scope at the opening conference or at the
earliest opportunity.
10. Procedures. In general, the procedures in Chapter III shall be followed in con-
ducting complaint inspections. Particular attention, however, is directed to the
following special requirements for complaint investigations:
a. Copy of the Complaint. A copy of the complaint shall be given to the em-
ployer at the opening conference.
(1) In the case of a multi-employer worksite, such as a construction site, a
copy of every complaint, including those against subcontractors, shall
be provided to the general contractor as well as to the employer against
whom the complaint has been filed.
(2) A copy of every complaint against the general contractor or against
one or more of the subcontractors shall be provided, if possible, to
each subcontractor whose employees may be exposed to the alleged
hazard.
b. Identity of Complainant. Section 8(f)(1) of the Act requires that, if the
complainant so requests, names shall be deleted from the employer's copy
of the complaint. If handwritten, the complaint shall be typed, and re-
worded if necessary, so that the identity of the complainant cannot be
discerned by the employer.
IX- 10
25-994 0-83-23
346
Office of Compliance Programming
yyalkaround Rights. In a complaint inspection the walkaround rights of an
employer and an employee representative shall be applicable in accordance
with Chapter III. The employee representative will be chosen according to
the procedures in Chapter III and, thus, the complainant will not neces-
sarily be the employee representative for walkaround purposes.
Results of Inspection to Complainant. After the completion of an inspec-
tion based on a formal or a nonformal complaint (except for a tenth letter
inspection), the complainant shall be informed of the results as follows:.
(1) Each complaint item shall be addressed with a reference to a citation
item on an attached copy of the OSHA-2 issued as a result of the com-
• plaint inspection and/or with a sufficiently detailed description of the
findings and why they did or did not result in a citation.
(2) The complainant shall be informed, if he/she so desires, of any subse-
quent modification of the citation due to an informal conference, a
settlement agreement, or a decision of the Review Commission or a
court, together with the reasons for the modification.
Notification of Delays. If unusual delays are met in issuing a citation re-
sulting from a complaint inspection, the complainant and, if appropriate,
the employee representative shall be informed of such delays. A delay of
more than 15 working days following the inspection would warrant such
notification.
Citation Not Warranted. If the Area Director determines that a citation is
not warranted, the complainant shall be informed in writing of such deter-
mination as outlined in A.8.d.(l). At the same time, the complainant shall
be notified of OSHA's policy granting the right of informal review of the
Regional Administrator's determination and the procedure for obtaining
such a review, which is the same as that set forth in 29 CFR 1903.12(a) for
review of the decision not to inspect.
Communication to Complainant. Written communications to a complainant
shall be sent to the employee's home address unless specific instructions
have been given that such mail be sent to the place of employment.
B. Referrals.
General. As a rule, referrals will be handled in a manner similar to that of
complaints.
Definitions. For purposes of this chapter, a referral is normally distinguished
from a complaint by the source providing information on the alleged hazard.
a. Notices of hazards or alleged violations originated by the sources listed in
b. of this section shall be considered as referrals except as noted in b.(3).
IX-11
347
OSHA Instruction CPL 2.lt5A
APR 1 P 19«3 „
Office of Compliance Programming
All other reports of hazards shall be considered as complaints, including
employee complaints transmitted to the agency by lS(b) States. Formal
and nonformal complaints received by other government agencies and simply
forwarded to OSHA for action are complaints since they do not originate
with the agency or its employees. (See B.2.b.(4).)
b. Referrals may originate from the following sources:
(1) CSHO Referrals. Subject to the exception in the note to Chapter II,
E.2.b.(3)(d) 2, serious hazards shall normally be investigated by the
CSHO wino observes them (after consultation with the supervisor if
required).
(a) Types of Referrals. There are two types of CSHO referrals.
1 Safety (Health to Safety or Safety to Safety).
2 Health (Safety to Health or Health to Health).
(b) Subject of CSHO Referrals. Generally, CSHO referrals shall be
limited to potentially serious hazards observed during an inspec-
tion or visible from or in public areas, such as streets, highways or
the public areas of business premises.
(c) Circumstances. There are circumstances when a CSHO referral
may be necessary or appropriate, such as the following:
j_ The CSHO lacks the necessary expertise. . -
2 The CSHO observing the hazard is already assigned to an
inspection of higher priority.
3 The CSHO observes specific evidence of imminent danger or
serious hazards at a worksite not programmed for an inspec-
tion.
k Equipment necessary for an inspection is not available at the
time.
5 Efficient utilization of Area Office resources requires that a
referral be made; e.g., the size of the workplace, the number
of employees involved, the length of time likely to be re-
quired for an inspection, the extent of hazards observed, etc.
6 The observations occur outside the CSHO's normal working
hours.
IX- 12
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OSHA Instruction CPL 2A5A
APR 1 ^^ 1933
Office of Compliance Programming
NOTE: For inspection classification purposes, if a CSHO lacks
the expertise to handle all complaint items or to complete
an imminent danger or fatality/catastrophe investigation
or for some other reason requires assistance from another
CSHO, such assistance shall be counted as part of the
original complaint, imminent danger or fatality/catastro-
phe and not as a referral. Such assistance shall not be
counted as a separate inspection unless another discipline
is involved (e.g., safety to health or health to safety).
(2) Safety and Health Agency Referrals. This category includes referrals
by NIOSH, 18(b) State programs, 7(c)(1) consultation programs, and
11(c) investigators.
NOTE: For purposes of assigning an inspection priority, referrals
from these sources will be considered as equivalent to CSHO
referrals, although not counted as such by IMIS.
(3) 11(c) Nonformal Complaint Referrals. Regional 11(c) Supervisory
Investigators may decide to send nonformal complaints (Section 11(c)
discrimination complaints which also allege hazardous working condi-
tions or violations of OSHA regulations) to the Area Director for inves-
tigation under the procedures in A.3.d.
(a) If originally received in the Area Office and referred to the 11(c)
personnel for handling of the discrimination complaint as outlined
in Chapter X, C.l, such complaints will already have been recorded
in at the Area Office as nonformal complaints if they also include
a notice which meets the definition of "complaint."
(b) If the complaint was originally filed with 11(c) personnel, it shall
be recorded in by the Area Office as a nonformal complaint.
(c) When a nonformal complaint is received from the Regional 11(c)
Supervisory Investigator with a recommendation for inspection, it
shall be scheduled for inspection and assigned a priority in accord-
ance with A. 7. b. (2).
(li) Other Government Agency Referrals. Notifications of hazards observed
and reported (referred) to OSHA by other Federal, State or local gov-
ernment agencies or their employees; e.g., EPA, Federal Grain Inspec-
tion Service, local building inspectors, fire marshals, etc., are included
in this category.
(a) Such notifications are referrals when non-government employees
are exposed to the alleged hazards.
lX-13
349
Office of Compliance Programming
(b) Reports by federal employees, their supervisors, or their repre-
sentatives of unsafe or unhealthful working conditions within their
own workplaces and to which they are exposed (as provided for in
Executive Order 12196) shall, of course, continue to be handled as
complaints in accordance with Federal Agency Program procedures
currently in effect.
(5) Media Reports. Reports of accidents involving serious injury or of
potentially serious workplace hazards in the media shall be considered
as referrals. "Reports" shall be understood to include news items re-
ported in the media as well as hazards reported directly to OSHA by
media sources. Thus newspaper or magazine articles or photographs or
news items reported over radio or television are examples of media
reports as well as calls to the Area Office by reporters.
c. Referral inspections are unprogrammed inspections and, except for com-
plaints received from 11(c) personnel, shall be recorded in the Area Office
using the OSHA-90 Form.
Procedures. Each referral shall be evaluated as thoroughly as possible in accord-
ance with the guidelines for evaluating complaints given in AA. to determine
whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that a safety or health hazard
exists. If so, the hazard shall be classified as imminent danger, serious or other-
than-serious. Referrals to be inspected shall be assigned a priority by the super-
visor according to the severity of the alleged hazard.
a. When the CSHO observes an imminent danger situation under the circum-
stances outlined in B.2.b.(l)(c) 3, the supervisor shall be contacted immedi-/
ately, if practicable. Otherwise, an inspection shall be conducted without
delay and the supervisor informed as soon as possible after the inspection
has been initiated.
b. If, after evaluation, the supervisor determines that a CSHO referral or a
referral from a safety and health agency should be classified as other-than-
serious, such a referral shall be handled by letter in accordance with d. of
this section.
c. Other government agency referrals shall 'normally be handled by letter
according to the instructions for nonformal complaints in A. 8. a.
(1) A letter shall be sent to the employer whenever a name and address is
given in the referral or is obtainable with reasonable effort. Letters
similar to those used for complaints shall be used for referrals also if
the most appropriate one is revised in accordance with the particular
circumstances of the referral.
IX-lif
350
OSHA Instruction CPL 2A5h
J.PR 1,8 1933 ^
Oitice of Compliance Programming
(2) If no name or address is obtainable, the referring agency shall be noti-
fied by telephone of this fact and shall be informed that OSHA can
take no action without being supplied with such information.
(3) When a letter is sent to the employer, the procedures in A.8. are applic-
able, except that no tenth letter inspections shall be scheduled.
d. There can be extraordinary circumstances when the Area Director may
decide that a Government agency referral identifies a hazard of such a
potentially serious nature that it warrants being placed in the same inspec-
tion priority as media reports.
e. In the case of media reports, reasonable efforts to corroborate the infor-
mation contained in the report shall be made whenever necessary. Specific-
ally, the supervisor shall attempt, before scheduling an inspection, to deter-
mine if the incident is related to an apparent violation of a standard. This
may be done by carefully reviewing the facts as reported by the media or,
when indicated by the particular circumstances, by contacting a third part^
such as the police, the ambulance service or, in rare cases, by calling the
employer.
f. Media reports of other-than-serious hazards will not normally require an
agency response.
g. Except for 11(c) referrals as noted in B.2.b.(3), referrals will not normally
result in an inspection unless they involve potentially serious hazards. Con-
sequently, referrals scheduled for inspection shall be investigated within 5
working days.
h. No letter of acknowledgment or followup communication with the referring
source will be necessary for referrals.
i. The scope of referral inspections shall be decided in accordance with the
guidelines for complaints in A. 9.
j. A case file shall beset up for each referral as it is received. This case file
shall contain a copy of the completed OSHA-9D, all documentation support-
ing the evaluation and classification of the referral and subsequent action
documents. If an inspection is eventually performed, all of the material
will be absorbed into the inspection case file.
351
BAflNt* Ffi*HK MASS CHAiBMAK JOHN* McKEBNAK, JR. MAIN!
DA>« BUflTON IND
M(i iFvthf CAIIF JOHN N CRLENSORN. I|X
MAjOBB 0W(NS NT
JOHN M SPfUTT Jft S C
JOE KOLTER.PA. 33^-4761
"'""°"""'*^ NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
Congress of the lEnited <3tates
House of HEpresentatitJCB
MANPOWER AND HOUSING SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
RAY8URN HOUSE OFFICE BurLDING. ROOM &-349-A
WASHINGTON. DC. 2051S
July 1, 1983
Thorne Auohter
Assistant Secretary for Occupational
Safety and Health
U.S. Department of Labor
200 Constitution Avenue
Washington, DC 20210
Dear Mr. Auchter:
Thank you for appearing before the Manpower and Housing
Subcommittee on June 28. After your testimony, recent
correspondence between Mr. McMillan and Mr. Raclc (attached)
was presented to the Subcommittee, casting doubt on OSHA's
vigilant enforcement of the asbestos standard. I have held
the hearing record open until July 15, 1983 to give you an
opportunity to clarify OSHA's position as provided by Mr.
McMillan.
Please specifically address the following points In your
response:
1. Does each letter from Mr. Raclc (April 18 and May 17, 1983)
constitute a request for an inspection under 29 CFR 1903.11?
If not, why not? Does the complaint need allege a specific
exposure level to asbestos? Please provide the respective
OSHA policy used to determine what constitutes a request
for inspection.
2. Mr. McMillan's May 5th reply states that these reports "do
not indicate any evidence of a violation." Does this mean
that OSHA believes these EPA reports indicate no evidence
of a violation? Given what is known about work practices
in demolition sites containing asbestos, is it not reasonable
to presume from these reports there is a likelihood or some
possibility of a violation of the asbestos standard? Based on
OSHA's inspection data base, how much more likely .are these
demolition worksites than other worksites to have asbestos
violations?
3. Given OSHA's attempts to target Inspections, are not such
reports valuable Information that can assist OSHA in
identifying hazardous worksites?
352
Page 2.
4. Did OSHA inspect any of the worksites contained In the EPA
reports? If not, why not? If so, please provide the number
(and by type) of citations, violations, and penalties as well
as the asbestos exposure levels that were found?
5. Mr. McMillan's May 5, 1983 letter states, "OSHA has no
Jurisdiction over the general public." Does this mean
that OSHA has no jurisdiction and has Issued no directives
or regulations to protect the general public from hazards
eminating from the work place? In addition to airborne
asbestos, other examples in this area might Include falling
debris, manholes, trenches, machinery, and explosives.
6. Please provide the FOM policy Mr.
his May 24 letter.
McMillan reffered to in
7. Mr. McMillan states that his office Is following the respective
FOM. Nonetheless, allegations have been made that regional
offices are not consistently following this policy. Please
describe by what methods you can assure the Subcommittee
that this policy is being consistently adhered to in all regional
offices.
Additionally, during your testimony you referred to a recent
presentation to the Cabinet Council (see enclosed request) that is
expected to result in a message or memorandum from the President.
I will appreciate your supplying the Subcommittee with a copy of
your presentation and the President's message.
The Subcommittee appreciates your cooperation,
to your reply by July 15, 1983-
I look forward
BARNEY PRANK
Chairman, Manpower and Housing
Subcommittee
BP/Jc
enclosures
353
I .'J I ERN A i" lOr-.AL U NM -^ r -J
OF A>IERICA.
j/Eiepho
ne
4 - 64S - 9SOO
OOMIN1CK O'AMBKOSIO
WILLIAM J 5ALAMONC
A.I. w eUlLDIMO
3a»0 WEST OKLAHOMA AVCNUC
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN 53215
May 17, 1983
Mr. Michael Connors
Deputy Regional Administrator
U.S. Dept. of Labor
OSHA-32nd Floor
230 S. Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Dear Mr. Connors:
Enclosed is a copy of the latest U.S. EPA Region V "Notification of
Demol-ition (Friable Asbestos)." Please let us know if your office
is regularly receiving this information from the U.S. E.P.A. If your
office is, we would like to know what is being done to prevent exposures
to employees and the general public at these work locations? Please
list your actions in the same order or provide information on the
U.S. EPA forms in column designated "Results of inspections."
I hope that we do not have to discuss here the merits of trying to prevent
unnecessary asbestos exposures. I think that OSHA should take action and
try to assure that asbestos is either removed prior to the demolition or
otherwise handled in a way consistent with OSHA's asbestos standard.
We believe that OSHA has an obligation to act since they are being
informed that the demolition of buildings containing asbestos is taking
place. Not acting on this information given to your agency at least as
a referral requiring field investigations including air sampling, will not
be consistent with OSHA's mandate under the act - to provide safe and health-
ful workplace.
354
Michael Connors
Hay 17, 1983
Page 2
Please provide us with specific information requested above and also with
an answer to our request for field inspections of all workplaces listed
in this. U.S. EPA notification and other similar information in the future.
At the same time would you please discuss this matter with your people in
Was^hington, D.C. so that we are assured that this new inspection policy
will cover all ten Regional Offices of OSHA.
Your prompt action and response is appreciated.
Sincerely,
MR/ab
opeiu*9afl -cio
Milan Racic
Health and Safety Director
355
U.S. Department of Labor
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
230 South! Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
May 5, 1983
Mr. Milan Racic
Health and Safety Director
ALLIED INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF AMERICA
AIW Building
3520 West Oklahcma Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53215
Dear Mr. Racic:
This is in response to your letter of April 18, 1983, regarding EPA demolition
work sites v^ich cxDntain asbestos.
As this information is received from EPA, it is transmitted to the Area Office
which has jurisdiction. Since these reports do not indicate any evidence of a
violation of our asbestos standard, they are not processed as referrals.
Therefore these reports are informational only and are maintained in the event
that an inspection is scheduled at a facility during the time frame of the
demolition or renovation.
I should also note that OSHA has no jurisdiction over the general public in
'these or any areas. That portion of your inquiry should be more afpropriately
addressed to the/KPA.
Ala4 C. McMillan
Regional Mministrator
356
U.S. Department of Labor
Occupalional Safely and Heallh Administralion
230 Soulh Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
May 24, 1983
Mr. Milan Racic
Health and Safety Director
ALLIED INDUSTRIAL VsDRKEPS OF AMERICA
AIW Building
3520 West Oklahoma Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53215
Dear Mr. Racic:
This is in response to your recent letter which expanded upon your inquiry of
April 18, 1983, regarding EPA's "Notification of Deniolition (Friable Asbestos)."
I responded to iour original letter on May 5, 1983. That letter addressed the
questions whi<di are discussed in your recent correspondence.
9lease note that our policy regarding this issue is discussed in our FDM and
allowing that guideline.
AlaJi C. McMillan
Regional Administrator
357
DOMINICK O'AMBPOSlO
WILLIAM J SALAMONC
INTEIRNATIONAL UNION
J?.
e/epnane
41-4 - e^S - 9500
April 18. 1983
A.I.W BUILOiNC
3520 WCST OHLAMOm* avCNUC
MILWAUKCC, WISCONSrN 53215
Mr. Alan C. McMillan
Regional Administrator
U.S. Dept. of Labor
0SHA-32nd Floor
230 S. Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Dear Mr. McMillan:
Enclosed is a list of denwlition work sites that we received from the
U.S. EPA. According to this document, these buildings did contain
friable asbestos.
Please let me know what action did your office take to insure that
workers at these work sites and the general public in the surrounding
areas were not exposed to asbestos fibers.
Your prompt response is appreciated.
Sincerely,
/O^I^
MR/ab
opeiu#9afl-cio
'Milan Racic
Health and Safety Director
o
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