©ur fatbcre^
Edited by Mary Sennholz
Faith of Our Fathers
Edited by
Mary Sennholz
The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc.
Irvington-on-Hudson, New York
SE PROKIBS
8l«fcrayQr y/o ^-rg'tr.or sste libro.
Faith of Our Fathers
Copyright © 1997 by The Foundation for Economic Education
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Faith of our fathers / edited by Mary Sennholz.
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN: 1-57246-063-6 . i A >^ i T i V*
1. United States— History. 2. United States— Politics and
government. 3. United States— Civilization. 4. Conduct of life.
I. Sennholz, Mary, 1913-
E156.F35 1997 973
QB197-40315
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 97-60345
Front cover: Christ Church, as seen from South Street, Philadelphia.
Cover design by Beth R. Bowlby
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74
Table of Contents
o> -^J-o^
Introduction 1
I. The Spirit of '76
The Founding of the American Republic
Clarence B. Carson 7
Madison's Answer to Machiavelli
John Wesley Young 25
George Washington on Liberty and Order
Clarence B. Carson 40
John Witherspoon: "Animated Son of Liberty"
Robert A. Peterson 52
Education in Colonial America
Robert A. Peterson 61
Reasserting the Spirit of '76
Wesley H. Hillendahl 11
Faith of Our Fathers
Clarence B. Carson 98
IL A Biblical View
Jeremiah's Job
Gary North
Ezekiel's Job
Ridgway K. Foley, Jr.
The Road to Jericho
Hal Watkins
113
120
132
111
What the Bible Says About Big Government
James C. Patrick 136
A Judeo-Christian Foundation
Hans F. Sennholz 152
III. The Rights of Man
Freedom, MoraUty, and Education
George C. Roche III 161
Morals and Liberty
R A. Harper 175
The Idea of Equality
Jarret B. Wollstein 198
Justice and Freedom
Leslie Snyder 207
On Liberty and Liberation
Bruce D. Porter 220
The Case for Economic Freedom
Benjamin A. Rogge 229
The Moral Premise and the Decline of the
American Heritage
Paul L. Adams 242
IV. The Crisis of Our Age
Moral Criticisms of the Market
Ken S. Ewert 257
The Psychology of Cultism
Ben Barker 274
The Disease from Which Civilizations Die
John K. Williams 284
IV
A Moral Order
Edmund A. Opitz 304
Freedom and Majority Rule
Edmund A. Opitz 321
You Can't Sell Freedom to a Starving Man
Ridgway K. Foley, Jr. 338
The Roots of " Anticapitalism"
Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn 352
Higher Education: The Solution or Part of
the Problem?
Calvin D. Linton 365
Index 383
Introduction
Man does not seek society for its own sake, but that he
may benefit from the company of his fellow man. He
yearns for comfort, protection, and productivity, which
safeguard his life and promote his happiness. He lives and
thrives in society, and is incapable of living alone. Man
gives order and structure to society by way of a constitution
or agreement in convention, custom, and tradition, thereby
touching upon the manner in which he lives.
A constitution comprises the fundamental principles of
government of a country, either implicitly in its laws and
customs, as in Great Britain, or in one or several fundamen-
tal documents, as in the United States. Written in 1787 and
ratified in 1789, the Constitution of the United States was
the first written constitution which became a model for
many subsequent constitutional documents written since
then.
Several of the essays collected in this anthology search
for the opinions, doctrines, and values of the men who
wrote the Constitution. They dwell on two particular pre-
cepts and self-evident truths that guided the Founding
Fathers. There was the theory of the social contract as
developed by John Locke in the seventeenth century. It
became the basis of the idea that government must reflect
the will of all the people and their natural rights, which in
turn became the ideological justification for both the Amer-
ican and the French revolutions.
The Founding Fathers were united in the belief that
preservation of certain natural rights was an essential part
2 / Mary Sennholz
of the social contract, and that "consent of the governed"
was fundamental to any exercise of political power. The
Declaration of Independence enumerated the king's viola-
tions of the rights of the colonists. It presented not only a
justification for the revolution but also a unique statement
of general principles and an abstract theory of government.
Based on the belief in natural rights, the opening paragraph
asserts the fundamental American ideal of government:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, and that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among them are Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these
rights. Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed."
God-given natural rights were the guiding light of the
Founding Fathers. The stirring closing paragraph of the
Declaration of Independence was not only the formal pro-
nouncement of independence but also a powerful appeal to
the Creator of all rights: "We, therefore, the Representatives
of the United States of America, in General Congress,
Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world
for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by
authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly
publish and declare, that these United Colonies are and of
Right ought to be free and independent States." In the final
sentence of defiance they appealed to the Almighty for His
protection: "And for the support of this declaration, with a
firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we
mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and
our Sacred Honor."
To the Founding Fathers, the God of nature and the God
of Scripture was the same God. Surely, there were differ-
ences in the understanding of natural law and the interpre-
Introduction / 3
tation of revealed law, but the differences did not raise a
doubt on the common bond, the Judeo-Christian faith. It
was the spiritual and moral foundation on which America
was built. To the Founding Fathers the world was ordered
well. They looked upon the future of their country with
confidence and in the knowledge that, in the end, all things
would work together in freedom. The Reverend Frederick
Faber later could write:
Faith of our fathers, God's great power
Shall win all nations unto thee
And through the truth that comes from God
Mankind shall then be truly free.
Throughout the nineteenth century this optimism
slowly gave way to alien philosophies that are highly criti-
cal of all ramifications of freedom and that were to become
the guidepost for most Americans. Positivism, a philosoph-
ical doctrine that denies the validity of first principles,
teaches that such principles are unfathomable and that the
only knowledge is scientific knowledge. If there are no first
principles, there can be no economic principles. In order to
prevent confusion and chaos, man obviously needs direc-
tion, command, and instruction by authority. This is why
many Americans, especially those who profess to be ratio-
nal and scientific, keep the company of central planners
calling on legislators, regulators, judges, and policemen to
retrieve order out of chaos.
Other Americans unwittingly embrace the philosophy
of materialism which explains all political, social, and eco-
nomic phenomena as entirely dependent on matter, beyond
which nothing needs to be explained. Modern communism
is based on it, socialist doctrines are derived from it, and
4 / Mary Sennholz
political interventionism builds on it. The sociological doc-
trine of class struggle, the economic doctrines of labor the-
ory of value, of labor exploitation, business concentration,
and monopolization are popular offshoots. Countless labor
laws and regulations spring from it.
Several essays in this anthology point at the sway of
positivistic and materialistic doctrines as the ideological
causes of the crisis of our age. In his essay on "The Psychol-
ogy of Cultism," Dr. Ben Barker describes some of the
symptoms of the crisis: "There is no prayer in the schools
and unionized, socialist teachers insidiously program our
youth. Mindless violence and senseless trivia beam at us
from our television, our newspapers are full of lies and
scantily clad females posing for underwear ads. Heroin is
the opiate of the ghetto, alcohol of the middle class com-
munity, and cocaine of the wealthy. Valium, which we sup-
ply, is abused by all social classes."
The moral precepts and the self-evident truths that
guided our Founding Fathers may not be fashionable in our
time, but they are as inescapable and inexorable as they
have been throughout the ages. We are free to ignore and
disobey them, but we cannot escape the rising price we
must pay for defying them.
February 1997 Mary Sennholz
I. THE SPIRIT OF 76
The Founding of the American Republic
Clarence B. Carson
Scribes are quite often merciless tyrants in dealing with
characters out of the past, spearing them with an assort-
ment of verbs and freezing them in predetermined cate-
gories with their adjectives, much as a butterfly collector
does with his helpless insects. There is no surer way to shat-
ter the integrity of an individual or to distort a historical
epoch ihan by the indiscriminate use of categories. No man
of wit is likely to believe that a category comprehends him,
even when it is well chosen. But when categories drawn
from other times and places are imposed upon men and
events which are foreign to them, the result can only be to
confuse the subject under discussion.
Some twentieth-century historians have done just this
to American history of the late eighteenth century. They
have called Americans of the time by names, some of which
were unknown to them and others which they would have
disavowed; they have categorized them as revolutionaries
or reactionaries, democrats or aristocrats, nationalists or
states' righters, liberals or conservatives, and other such
categories. They have tried to thrust the events into revolu-
tionary and "social" revolutionary categories, categories
drawn from other revolutions and other circumstances. It is
Dr. Carson has written and taught extensively, specializing in
American intellectual history. This article appeared in the September
1972 issue of The Freeman.
8 / Clarence B. Carson
a journalistic habit into which many historians have fallen
to attribute an absoluteness to the views and thrusts of men
which violates both what they intend and do. Debates,
even great historical debates, can be quite misleading. Men
often advance positions with more certainty than they feel,
appear to be unalterable in their determination, yet may
shortly yield to the other side with good humor when they
have lost. Some historians appear to have no difficulty
whatever in discovering men's motives, but the fact is that
we are not privy to their motives.
The subject to be treated below is the reforms and inno-
vations made by Americans mostly in the decade after the
declaring of independence. The above prelude was made
necessary because the present writer both wishes to make
known the fact that he is familiar with the crosscurrents of
interpretation of these years by twentieth-century histori-
ans and to disavow many of the categories that have been
used. After the Americans broke from England they did
make some changes; they did sometimes differ among
themselves as to what the direction of change should be;
but there is no need to question their motives or any solid
basis for saying for certain what they were. Above all, there
is no need to push this one into that category and that one
into this, with the category being excessively large for the
matter at issue and much too confining for the man over
any period of time. More rubbish has been written about
the class positions and interests of the men of these times
than any other in American history, so far as I can make out.
The present writer has neither the space nor inclination to
spend energy upon trying to refute what has not been well
established, in any case.
The Founding of the American Republic / 9
The Main Thrust of Changes
What is established is that there were some changes
made during these years. The main thrust of these changes
is the freeing of the individual: freeing him from foreign
domination, from various government compulsions, from
class prescriptions, and for greater control of his own
affairs. And, in conjunction with these, there was an effort
to erect safeguards around him that would protect him in
the exercise of his rights. The thrust to do these things was
made along several different paths, and each of these is
worth some attention.
A primary aim of the Americans was independence.
They wanted to be independent of England, of course; that
was what the war was fought about. Many Americans had
come to believe that they could only have the requisite con-
trol of their affairs by separating from the mother country.
This was achieved, of course, by terms of the Treaty of
Paris. But Americans longed also to be independent of
European entanglements. Time after time, during the colo-
nial period, Americans had been drawn into wars that orig-
inated in Europe but spread to the New World. Americans
wanted to be free of the dynastic quarrels, the imperial
ambitions, and the trade wars which rended Europe and
shook much of the rest of the world. To many Americans,
Europe was the symbol and embodiment of corruption,
decadence, and foreclosed opportunity. To be independent
of Europe was, in the final analysis, to be free to follow
courses which had not yet, at any rate, proven to be so
laden with disaster.
Independence did not mean, nor should it be taken to
10 / Clarence B. Carson
connote, the rejection of either the English or European her-
itage. Indeed, there was little irrational rejection of either
heritage that comes to mind. Though Americans rejected
European aristocracy they did not, for that reason, change
names of places in this country derived from aristocrats.
Perhaps, the most extensive thrust of this period was to
the freeing of the individual from government compulsion.
Libertarian sentiment had been maturing for some consid-
erable while in America; it was fostered both by legal
trends and religious and other intellectual development.
Once the break from England came, Americans used the
occasion to cut away a body of restraints no longer in
accord with their outlook.
Religious Liberty
Religious liberty was widely secured within a decade or
so of the break from England. Much of it came by way of
the disestablishment of churches. The establishment most
readily dispensed with was that of the Church of England.
While the Church of England was established throughout
the South as well as in New York, it was not very popular;
many of its clergy remained loyal to England, and adher-
ents of it were outnumbered by dissenters in most states. Its
disestablishment was made even easier because it was a
national church; membership in it was tied to loyalty to the
king of England. The Church of England was everywhere
speedily disestablished. But these actions were not simply
prompted by convenience, for there was increasing belief in
religious liberty. Several states had no established churches:
namely. New Jersey, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and
Delaware. But they used the opportunity afforded by inde-
The Founding of the American Republic / 11
pendence to remove or reduce restrictions. Some of the dis-
abilities of Roman Catholics were cut away.
The established Congregational church was maintained
for several decades longer in Massachusetts, Connecticut,
cmd New Hampshire. There was, however, some liberaliza-
tion in these states. The Massachusetts constitution of 1780
affirmed that every man had the right to worship in his
own way, that no church should be subordinated to any
other, and that tax moneys could be used to support minis-
ters other than Congregationalists. However, church atten-
dance was required still, and ministers were supported
from taxes.^ "New Hampshire followed in the steps of
Massachusetts, but Connecticut held out much longer
against what its citizens regarded as the forces of iniquity.
They allowed dissenters to escape payment of taxes to the
established church if they presented the clerk of the local
church with a certificate of church attendance signed by an
officer of the dissenter's own church."^
The constitutions of New Jersey, Georgia, North and
South Carolina, Delaware, and Pennsylvania "explicitly
provided that no man should be obliged to pay any church
rate or attend any religious service save according to his
own free and unhampered will."^ But Virginia made the
greatest effort to assure religious liberty. This might have
been a reaction to the fact that Virginia had the longest
establishment and one of the most rigorous. Thomas Jeffer-
son, James Madison, and George Mason were leading
advocates of religious liberty, but they did not succeed in
getting their ideas into law until 1786. This was done by the
Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom, which proclaimed
religious liberty a natural right. An impressive preface
states the case:
12 / Clarence B. Carson
Whereas, Almighty God hath created the mind
free; that all attempts to influence it by temporal
punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations,
tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and mean-
ness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy
author of our religion
The legally effective portion of the statute reads this
way:
That no man shall be compelled to frequent or
support any religious worship, place, or ministry
whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained,
molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor
shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or beliefs; but that all men shall be free to
profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion
in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no
wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capaci-
ties.^
This was the beginning of religious liberty in America.
Freeing the Slaves
The movement for freeing the slaves reached a peak in
the 1780s which it would not soon attain again. Even before
the break from England, the slave trade was acquiring a
bad reputation in America, but such efforts as were made to
restrict it were negated by the mother country. Fiske says,
'The success of the American Revolution made it possible
for the different states to take measures for the gradual abo-
lition of slavery and the immediate abolition of the foreign
The Founding of the American Republic / 13
slave-trade."^ Nor was sentiment against slavery restricted
to states in which there were few slaves. Some of the out-
standing leaders from the South during this period, most of
them slaveholders, spoke out against slavery. Henry Lau-
rens, a leader in South Carolina, wrote in 1776: "You know
my Dear Sir. I abhor slavery . . . — in former days there was
no combatting the prejudices of Men supported by Interest,
the day I hope is approaching when from principles of grat-
itude as well [as] justice every Man will strive to be fore-
most in shewing his readiness to comply with the Golden
Rule "^ Thomas Jefferson argued in his Notes on the State
of Virginia that slavery had a bad influence on the manners
and morals of the white people as well as its devastating
effects on the Negroes. He longed for and hoped to see the
day when all slaves would be emancipated. He warned his
countrymen of the impending impact on them if this were
not done: "And can the liberties of a nation be thought se-
cure when we have removed their only firm basis, a con-
viction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the
gift of God? That they are not to be violated but with his
wrath? Indeed I tremble for my country," he said, "when I
reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever.
"7
Some states began to act almost as soon as the opportu-
nity arose. In 1776, Delaware prohibited the importation of
slaves and removed all restraints on their manumission.
Virginia stopped slave imports in 1778; Maryland adopted
a similar measure in 1783. Both states now allowed manu-
nussion at the behest of the owner. In 1780, Pennsylvania
not only prohibited further importation of slaves but also
provided that after that date all children born of slaves
should be free. Similar enactments were made in the early
1780s in New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island.
14 / Clarence B. Carson
In Massachusetts, the supreme court decided that on the
basis of the constitution of 1780 slavery was aboUshed in
that province. Even North Carolina moved to discourage
the slave trade in 1786 by taxing heavily such slaves as were
imported after that time. In order to protect free Negroes,
Virginia made it a crime punishable by death for anyone
found guilty of selling a freed Negro into slavery.^
How far sentiment against slavery had gone may well
be best indicated by the Northwest Ordinance (1787), an act
of all the states, as it were, in Congress assembled. The act
provided: "There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the pun-
ishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted " This article was passed, according to one of
its proponents, without opposition.^
Individual Liberties
The bills of rights drawn and adopted in the various
states contained provisions intended to assure individual
liberties. These bills of rights were usually drawn and
adopted along with constitutions but were frequently sepa-
rate documents. They were usually cast in the language of
natural rights theory. For example. Article I of the Massa-
chusetts Declaration of Rights states:
All men are bom free and equal, and have cer-
tain natural, essential, and unalienable rights;
among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying
and defending their lives and liberties; that of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in
fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and
happiness.^^
The Founding of the American Republic / 15
Virginia was the first state to draw both a constitution
and a bill of rights. Actually, Virginia's Bill of Rights was
adopted June 12, 1776, while the would-be state was still a
colony. It was the work primarily of George Mason, was cir-
culated among the states, and became a model for such
instruments.
The Virginia Bill of Rights guaranteed trial by jury in
both criminal and civil cases, prohibited excessive bail and
fines, declared general warrants to be oppressive, and
acknowledged freedom of the press. The protections of a
person accused of a crime were spelled out:
That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man
hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his
accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and
witnesses, to call for evidence in his favour, and to a
sf)eedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage,
without whose unanimous consent he cannot be
found guilty; nor can he be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself; that no man may be deprived
of his liberty, except by the law of the land or the
judgment of his peers.
The only specific protection of property, other than the pro-
vision for jury trial in civil cases, was the requirement that
men "cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for
publick uses, without their own consent, or that of their
representatives so elected. . . ."^^
The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780, the
work mainly of John Adams, was considerably more thor-
ough. In regard to property, it said: "No part of the property
of any individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or
applied to public uses, without his consent, or that of the
16 / Clarence B. Carson
representative body of the people. . . . And whenever the
public exigencies require that the property of any individ-
ual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive
a reasonable compensation therefor."^^ Other rights were
alluded to than those mentioned in the Virginia Bill: free-
dom from unreasonable searches, the right to bear arms,
the right of peaceful assembly, the prohibition of ex post
facto laws, the prohibition of attainders by the legislature,
as well as most of those covered in Virginia.
Northwest Ordinance
The Northwest Ordinance sums up, in Article II, what
may well be considered a contemporary consensus of the
protections of the rights of the people most needed:
The inhabitants of the said territory shall always
be entitled to the benefits of the writs of habeas cor-
pus, and of the trial by jury; of a proportionate repre-
sentation of the people in the legislature, and judicial
proceedings according to the course of the common
law. All persons shall be bailable, unless for capital
offences, where the proof shall be evident or the pre-
sumption great. All fines shall be moderate; and no
cruel or unusual punishment shall be inflicted. No
man shall be deprived of his liberty or property, but
by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land;
and should the public exigencies make it necessary,
for the common preservation, to take any person's
property, or to demand his particular services, full
compensation shall be made for the same. And, in
the just preservation of rights and property, it is
understood and declared, that no law ought ever to
The Founding of the American Republic / 17
be made, or have force in the said territory, that
shall, in any manner whatever, interfere or affect pri-
vate contracts or engagements, bona fide, and with-
out fraud, previously formed. ^^
Some recent writers have claimed that the Founders dis-
tinguished between "human rights" and property rights in
favor of "human rights." It should be clear from the above
that no such distinction can be discerned, nor has the pre-
sent writer ever seen a quotation from the original that
could reasonably be construed to show that the Founders
made any such distinction.
Property was, however, freed from various feudal
restraints during this period and made more fully the pos-
session of the individual holding title to it. The most gen-
eral encumbrance on property ownership was the
quitrent — a jDeriodical payment due to king or proprietor
on land, a payment that originated in the late Middle Ages
as money payments displaced personal servitude. Such
claims were speedily extinguished following the break
from England, and land thereafter was held in "fee simple."
Such royal prerogatives as the right of the monarch to white
pines on private land were, of course, nullified. States abol-
ished entail, also, a move which enhanced the authority of
the owner to dispose of his lands.
V\rith the Declaration of Independence, the whole edifice
of mercantilism as imposed from England was swept away.
One historian describes the impact of this as follows: "As a
result of the American Revolution, freedom of enterprise, that
is, the equal opportunity of any individual to engage in any
economic activity he chooses in order to amass wealth, and to
hold onto his wealth or dispose of it as he pleases, became a
living reality in America to a greater degree than before."^^
18 / Clarence B. Carson
Abolition of Classes
Another sort of innovation may be described as anti-
class in its character. Fixed classes are supported and main-
tained by government where they exist. Americans of this
period wanted to remove government support of classes
and prevent the growth of special privileges by which
classes are shaped. Some of the actions already described
were, in part, anti-class measures. For example, the estab-
lished Church of England was hierarchical and, in England
particularly, a major support of class arrangements. Its
disestablishment in America struck at the root of govern-
ment support of class structures. Entailment was a means
of perpetuating great estates, just as quitrents were devices
for maintaining aristocracies. Other actions were taken that
were even more pointedly aimed at removing government
from its role as class perpetuator.
One of these was the abolition of primogeniture. Primo-
geniture was the rule that the estate of one who died with-
out a will should go either whole or in larger part to the
eldest son. States abolished this rule and adopted the prac-
tice of dividing the estate equally among the children when
the father died intestate. The tendency of this was for great
estates to be broken up from time to time.
Various sorts of provisions were made in state constitu-
tions to prevent the growth of aristocratic privileges. For
example, the Virginia Bill of Rights had this provision:
That no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclu-
sive or separate emoluments or privileges from the
community, but in consideration of publick services;
which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices
of magistrate, legislator or judge to be hereditary.^^
The Founding of the American Republic / 19
The Massachusetts Declaration held:
No man, nor corporation, or association of men,
have any other title to obtain advantages, or particu-
lar and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of
the community, than what arises from the consider-
ation of services rendered to the public; and this title
being in nature neither hereditary, nor transmissible
to children, or descendants, or relations by blood;
the idea of a man bom a magistrate, lawgiver, or
judge, is absurd and unnatural.^^
The animus against titles of nobility found expression
sometimes. So strong was the animus against hereditary
positions that the Society of Cincinnati, a voluntary as-
sociation of officers who had served in the War for Inde-
pendence, found it expedient to abandon the rule that
membership could be inherited to allay the indignation
against them. Frequent elections and restrictions on the
amount of time one could serve in office were efforts to pre-
vent the emergence of a ruling class, at least in part.
The kind of equality sought by prohibitions against
govemmentally fostered classes was equality before the
law. So far as any other equality was concerned, American
opinion of the time accepted differences in wealth and
social station as inevitable and desirable results of differ-
ences in ability and effort. Undoubtedly, there were those in
that day who would have liked to have some portions of
the wealth and estates of others — who coveted what was
not theirs — as there are in any day, but they were either
inarticulate or ashamed to profess their views. Some histo-
rians have made much ado about the confiscation and sale
of Loyalist estates during the war. This is treated as if it
20 / Clarence B. Carson
were a redistributionist scheme, and there is an attempt to
give factual support to this notion by pointing out that
large estates were sometimes broken up before they were
offered for sale. This did sometimes happen, but it does not
follow that it was done with any motive of equalizing hold-
ings. Small parcels attract more bidders than large ones;
hence, the price attained for large estates was likely to be
increased by dividing them up. Moreover, large estates
were sometimes formed or added to by buying several
parcels.^''
Limitations on Government
There were some general changes in governments dur-
ing this period, changes in degree from what they had been
under British rule. The main tendency was to make the
state governments more dependent upon the popular will
than they had been during the colonial period. The new
state constitutions required that all state officers either be
chosen by the electorate or appointed by those who had.
The main impetus behind making governments depend
more closely on the electorate was a profound fear of gov-
ernment. This distrust of government was most clearly
shown in the distrust of governors and courts, those parts
of the government that had not been popularly chosen dur-
ing the colonial period. The colonists feared the legisla-
tures, too, or so the limitations on them would indicate, but
out of their colonial experience, they feared them less than
the other branches. In point of fact, Americans relied rather
heavily on a narrow and provincial colonial experience in
making their first constitutions. Probably, Massachusetts
and New York should be excepted from these strictures.
The office of governor — or whatever the executive
The Founding of the American Rqyuhlic / 21
might be called, for some states abandoned briefly that
colonial title — was stripped of much of the power and most
of the independence enjoyed by colonial chief executives.
Colonial governors had usually possessed an absolute veto
over legislation. The new executives were stripped of the
veto power in all but two of the states — Massachusetts and
New York — , and in these the power was somewhat weak-
ened, hi all the states but New York the legislatures or the
constitutions governed the assembling and dispersal of the
legislative branch. In eight of the states, the chief executive
was elected by the legislature, and he was made, thereby,
greatly dependent upon it. His tenure of office was usually
quite brief. In nine states, it was only twelve months, and
nowhere was it for a longer period than three years. To pre-
vent the growth of personal power in the hands of the gov-
ernor, most state constitutions limited the number of terms
he could serve in a given period.^^
Courts and Legislatures
The courts generally were made more dependent on
legislatures than they had been formerly. The Pennsylvania
constitution described the relationship this way: "The
judges of the supreme court of judicature shall have fixed
salaries, be commissioned for seven years only, though
capable of reappointment at the end of that term, but
removable for misbehavior at any time by the general
assembly. . . ."^^ Even so, the principle of separation of pow-
ers generally prevailed as between the courts and the legis-
lature more fully than between governors and legislatures.
The legislatures were subject to frequent elections, a
device for making them closely dependent upon the elec-
torate. In ten of the states the lower house was subject to
22 / Clarence B. Carson
annual elections; in two states their terms were only for
six months. The members of the upper house usually had
somewhat longer terms, but one state did not even have
an upper house.^^ Even so, the powers of the legislatures
were quite extensive. Thomas Jefferson complained that
in Virginia:
All the powers of government, legislative, execu-
tive, and judiciary, result to the legislative body. . . .
An elective despotism was not the government we
fought for, but one which should not only be
founded on free principles, but in which the powers
of government should be so divided and balanced
among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one
could transcend their legal limits, without being
effectually checked and restrained by the others.^^
What had been generally done was this: Americans in
establishing their state governments had sought to check
them by the electorate rather more than by an internal bal-
ance of powers. The people could, however, use their in-
fluence to abet arbitrary government as well as to check it.
There was also some extension of the franchise during
this period. In addition, several legislatures were reappor-
tioned to give inhabitants in the backcountry a more nearly
proportionate voice in government. One of the trends, in
this connection, was the movement of state capitals inland
from the coast to make them more accessible to the back-
country.
Most of these were changes of degree rather than of
kind. To call them revolutionary, as some twentieth-century
historians have, is a distortion of what happened and a
stretching of the meaning of revolution beyond reasonable
The Founding of the American Republic / 23
confines. Insofar as they were changes from what had pre-
vailed, they were culminations of trends long afoot. Ameri-
cans had been tending toward religious liberty in practice
long before they established it in fundamental law. They
had been evading, so far as they could, quitrents, primo-
geniture, and entail. Their new governmental structures
embodied much of what they had been contending with
the British for. Bills of rights, bicameral legislatures, and
weak executives, were built on the British model. The
assault on special privilege did run contrary to recent
British practice to some extent, but it was quite in accord
with what Americans had been doing almost since they
had reached the New World. If in their early enthusiasms in
government building they did not attend to a broader expe-
rience than their colonial one, this did not make their acts
revolutionary, only precipitate. They were clear enough
that they wanted to protect the individual from govern-
ment in the enjoyment of his rights; they did not at first
realize how much more this took than felicitously phrased
declarations. Weak governments do not make liberty and
property secure; that is the office of powerful governments
internally restrained. Many Americans were to learn this
lesson, and that rather quickly But just as their first ex-
f>eriments were not revolutionary in character, no more
were tlieir later alterations a counterrevolution.
1. See Merrill Jensen, The New Nation (New York: Vintage Books,
1950), p. 132.
2. Ibid., p. 133.
3. John Fiske, The Critical Period of American History (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1916), p. 78.
4. Jack P. Greene, ed.. Colonies to Nation (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1%7), pp. 390-391.
24 / Clarence B. Carson
5. Fiske, op. cit., p. 71.
6. Greene, op. cit, p. 397.
7. Ibid., p. 398.
8. See Fiske, op. cit, pp. 74-75.
9. See Robert A. Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights (New York:
Collier, 1962), p. 109.
10. Henry S. Commager, ed.. Documents of American History, I (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962, 7th ed.), p. 107.
11. Ihid., p. 104.
12. Ihid., p. 108.
13. Greene, op. cit, pp. 472-473.
14. Dumas Malone and Basil Rauch, Empire for Liberty, I (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1960), p. 196.
15. Commager, op. cit., p. 103.
16. Ihid., p. 108.
17. See Frederick B. Tolles, ''A Re-evaluation of the Revolution as a
Social Movement,'' George A. Billias, ed.. The American Revolution (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, 2nd ed.), pp. 66-67.
18. See Richard Hofstadter, et al.. The United States (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967, 2nd ed.), p. 160.
19. Greene, op. cit., p. 343.
20. Hofstadter, op. cit., pp. 159-160.
21. Quoted in Nelson M. Blake, A History of American Life and
Thought (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 100.
Madison's Answer to Machiavelli
John Wesley Young
An abiding problem in political thought, one that has
vexed the soul of many a philosopher and statesman, is the
problem of how to establish and keep order in society.
Without order, without accepted standards of civility and
right conduct, a nation will lack peace, justice, and prosper-
ity. Without order it will sink backward into barbarism and
brute existence.
The problem of order is especially complex for peoples
who live under representative governments. Dictators can
brandish the bayonet and the bludgeon to restrain and
humble their subjects, but on what can republics depend?
How can a self-governing citizenry, the repositories of
political sovereignty in a free society, rule themselves equi-
tably and with dignity? How can they live together in lib-
erty without soon abusing that liberty and butchering one
another like savages?
The answer is that to balance the blessings of order and
liberty, republics must depend upon the virtue of the peo-
ple themselves. But how to plant in the breasts of the peo-
ple those good old republican virtues — honesty, frugality,
temperance, self-sacrifice, and vigilance against tyranny —
without which they will descend into anarchy and ulti-
John Wesley Young, an educator, wrote this article for the July 1977
issue of The Freeman.
25
26 / John Wesley Young
mate despotism, the victims of an enterprising Napoleon
or Caesar?
There is one medium, important above all others, for
transmitting virtue to republican populaces: religion. As
Washington stated in his Farewell Address, "Of all the dis-
positions and habits which lead to political prosperity, reli-
gion and morality are indispensable supports." But that
suggests yet another question: What should be the legal
relation of religion to government in a republic? Broadly
speaking, among republicans there are two schools of
thought on the subject.
Two Points of View
One school, a comparatively recent development in
political thought, contends that the best approach to reli-
gion in republics is simply to make government leave it
alone. To entangle church with state, it is argued, will
surely corrupt both. The church best serves society when it
is free from interference by civil government.
The other school, a much older one, advocates using the
authority of republican government to foster and maintain
religion — that is, to "establish" it, either through outright
legal recognition and subsidization, or through less com-
prehensive forms of assistance, such as Sabbath laws or
religious tests for public office. Since virtue is necessary to
the prosperity and progress of a republic, and religion is
necessary to virtue, we ought — or so the reasoning goes —
to use the power of government to promote religion among
the citizens.
To many spokesmen for this school it does not seem to
matter so much which religion or which form of Christianity
Madison's Answer to Machiavelli / 17
is promoted as that the religion should help produce duti-
ful and patriotic men and women.
Consider the views of one of these spokesmen, Niccolo
Machiavelli of Florence (1469-1527). Better known for
having authored The Prince, a kind of handbook for intel-
ligent tyrants, Machiavelli, in a puzzling and perverse
way, was actually an ardent apologist for popular govern-
ment. His study of ancient history convinced Machiavelli
that, as he writes in his Discourses on the First Ten Books of
Titus Livius, "the observance of divine institutions is the
cause of the greatness of republics." Neglect such obser-
vance, Machiavelli warns, and a republic perishes. "For
where the fear of God is wanting, there the country will
come to ruin, unless it be sustained by the fear of the
prince, which may temporarily supply the want of reli-
gion/'^ In that case, of course, a republic ceases to be a
republic. Religion, then, is essential to republics because it
gives them cohesion and durability. The best republicans
are pious republicans.
So far, so fine. But interestingly enough, Machiavelli sin-
gles out for praise the legendary Sabine king, Numa Pom-
pilius, who took the early Romans, "a very savage people"
and taught them habits of obedience by using religion as a
social cement. Indeed, Machiavelli attributes more histori-
cal importance to Numa than to Romulus, Rome's founder;
for Numa's invention of religious forms made possible the
rise of Rome to republican greatness.^
And just how did Numa use religion as a social cement?
Machiavelli doesn't say in great detail, but we learn from
Plutarch, an ancient Greek historian, that Numa filled the
imaginations of Romans "with religious terrors, professing
that strange apparitions had been seen, and dreadful voices
28 / John Wesley Young
heard; thus subduing and humbling their minds by a sense
of supernatural fears."^
In other words, Numa exploited the superstitions of a
primitive people. Machiavelli himself notes approvingly
that, throughout the period of the Republic, religious sanc-
tions were sometimes used with great effect to inspire, dis-
cipline and direct the Roman armies "on the eve of battle
with that confidence which is the surest guaranty of vic-
tory/'^ For example, during the long siege of the city of Veil
in the fourth century B.C., when the Roman troops grew
weary and threatened to quit the campaign, their generals
told them that some of the sacred oracles had forecast the
fall of the city when Lake Albano, in central Italy, should
overflow its banks, as in fact it had recently done. Actually
the oracles had made no such forecast; but the Roman reg-
ulars did not know that. Their resolve to fight on revived
and toughened, and finally they seized the city.^
Its Use to the State
Observe that Machiavelli's concern is not for the truth of
the sacred "prophecy," which he well knows was a fraud,
but rather for its effect on the army, its utility to the Roman
state. It spurred the soldiers' spirits, brought about the
defeat of an enemy, and hence helped to make the world
safe for Roman republicanism. It worked; therefore it was
good.
And therefore everything that tends to favor religion
(even though it were believed to be false) should be
received and availed of to strengthen it. . . . Such
was, in fact, the practice observed by sagacious men
[in antiquity]; which has given rise to the belief in
Madison's Answer to Machiavelli / 29
the miracles that are celebrated in religions, however
false they may be. For the sagacious rulers have
given these miracles increased importance, no mat-
ter whence or how they originated; and their author-
ity afterwards gave them credence with the people.
Rome had many such miracles ^
Machiavelli thinks that even in modem times men, how-
ever sophisticated, can be led to believe in sham miracles
and supernatural manifestations. As proof he points to Flo-
rence, the cultured Italian city where, for a short time in the
late fifteenth century, many normally staid and stolid peo-
ple were mesmerized by the preaching of Savonarola, the
fire-breathing Dominican reformer who claimed to have
conversed with God.'^
Now the trouble with this utilitarian approach to the
problem of order, religion and republican virtue is just
that — its utilitarianism. Besides its utter contempt for truth-
fulness, the spirit of it is decidedly unrepublican. For in
picking out the Roman solution to the problem, Machiavelli
has not picked out a peculiarly republican solution. Roman
religion, in fact, was no different in its essential relation to
the state from the religions of Egypt, the Mesopotamian
kingdoms, the Seleucid Empire, or any other ancient autoc-
racy. It, too, like the other religions, proceeded downward
from the leaders to the masses. Often the leaders employed
it as a propaganda tool, a device for duping the multitude.
Machiavelli does not dwell, for instance, on the excep-
tionally cynical use made of religion in the later Roman
Republic, especially during the civil wars that climaxed
with Julius Caesar's dictatorship. Religion became in great
degree the instrument of oligarchs and demagogues. Many
important Roman statesmen of the period — Servilius, Lep-
30 / John Wesley Young
idus, Pompey, Cicero, and Caesar himself, among others —
were also priests of the state religion, and they manipulated
that religion in order to reinforce their grip on the govern-
ment.^ It is difficult to reconcile this sort of practice with the
power of free choice implicit in republicanism.
But in vain would anyone raise that objection to Machi-
avelli. For he wants utilitarian religion — ^not quite in the
form into which it degenerated in Rome, perhaps, but at
any rate an established religion, a religion that is only an
arm or extension of the state, a religion that teaches the
martial virtues. This explains Machiavelli's personal hostil-
ity to Christianity as he perceives it to be lived by men of
his age. Because of its other-worldliness, he feels, Chris-
tianity has made them too effeminate, too indifferent to
their country's liberty, too apt "to suffer than to achieve
great deeds."^ He doesn't care a jot whether religion edifies
or uplifts individuals, so long as it buoys the state.
Religion as a Social Cement
Without doubt the Machiavellian position is an extreme
one. And yet it is true that after Machiavelli's death, and
well into the modem era, most republicans continued to
treat religion, the Christian religion included, as a social
cement more than a "sovereign balm" for the soul. They
may have lacked Machiavelli's cynicism, they may even
have been devout believers, but in the matter of religion's
relation to republican government they were still Machi-
avellians after a fashion.
Think of any famous republican political philosopher
prior to about 1780, and almost certainly he will have advo-
cated in some sense the mixing of politics with formal reli-
gion. He may, like the Genevese Rousseau or the English-
Madison's Answer to Machiavelli / 31
man James Harrington, have favored toleration for most
dissenting sects, but he could not have brought himself to
call for complete severance of church from state.^^ He could
not have visualized full religious liberty — an almost
untried freedom until the eighteenth century — invigorat-
ing a republic. To abandon men wholly to their private
judgment in religion, his instincts would have told him,
would kindle social chaos and destroy the state, no matter
how well-ordered and free its purely political institutions
might be. Remove the official religious props and any pop-
ular government would crash down like the house of
Dagon.
Not for more than two centuries after Machiavelli did
any prominent republican sally forth to assault such ideas.
Significantly, the definitive refutation of Machiavelli came,
not from the continent of Europe, but from the New World,
from the pen of James Madison, quite possibly the pro-
foundest political thinker who ever lived.
Spiritual Crisis in 1780s
A bit of historical background is necessary. In the early
1780s the thirteen newly confederated republics of America
were faced with a spiritual crisis no less grave than the
political crisis which had forced them, in 1776, to cut their
connection with the British Empire. As so often happens in
the midst of war and in its aftermath, America suffered a
sort of moral depression. This is an often-overlooked aspect
of our Revolutionary history, but it was much commented-
on by contemporaries.
Political and moral corruption were reportedly prolifer-
ating and threatening to unfit the people for republican
freedom. Newspapers bemoaned the evaporation of virtue
32 / John Wesley Young
because of "the visible declension of religion, ... the rapid
progress of licentious manners, and open profanity."^^ Cler-
gymen warned of impending divine judgment upon an
impenitent people, but they were plainly not the only ones
alarmed. "Justice & Virtue," wrote George Mason to Patrick
Henry in May 1783, "are the vital Principles of republican
Government; but among us, a Depravity of Manners &
Morals prevails, to the Destruction of all Confidence
between Man & Man."^^ Mason wondered if America's
independence would prove a blessing or a curse.
What would the new republican governments do, in
these circumstances, to retrieve the disappearing virtue of
the people?
For a time they yielded, or seemed to yield, to the utili-
tarian temptation. To cite the most notable example. Article
II of the Massachusetts State Constitution, drawn up in
1780, granted freedom of worship "in the manner and sea-
son most agreeable to the dictates of [the citizen's] own
conscience"; but the very next article, declaring that "the
happiness of a people, and the good order and preservation
of civil government, essentially depend upon piety, religion
and morality," empowered the state legislature to require
local governments and "religious societies" to provide for
"public worship of GOD, and for the support and mainte-
nance of public protestant teachers of piety, religion and
morality, in all cases where such provision shall not be
made voluntarily"^^ In other words, the Massachusetts
constitution-makers were harnessing religion — in this in-
stance "protestant" religion — to the state.
Virginia Considers Tax Support of Teachers
Similarly, in 1784, a bill was introduced in the Virginia
General Assembly calling for an annual tax assessment to
Madison's Answer to Machiavelli / 33
support teachers of the Christian religion in "the general
diffusion of Christian knowledge/' knowledge which
would help "preserve the peace of society/'^^ With appar-
ent impartiality the bill would have permitted each tax-
payer to designate which Christian denomination his tax
contribution would go to. Along with many Presbyteri-
ans and the recently disestablished Episcopal Church,
honest republicans like Patrick Henry, George Washing-
ton, John Marshall, and Richard Henry Lee supported the
measure.
Legislative opponents of the assessment, among them
James Madison, managed to postpone for almost one year a
final vote on the bill. Meanwhile they launched a campaign
to work up opposition to it from the grassroots. The big gun
in their arsenal of intellectual weapons was a pamphlet by
Madison, "A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Reli-
gious Assessments."^^
In the numerous collections of American historical doc-
uments, Madison's pamphlet does not appear nearly as
often as Thomas Jefferson's more eloquent Statute for Reli-
gious Freedom, but Madison's is in truth the superior
statement on religious rights. It should be read in its
entirety, but for our purposes we may draw out of it that
thread of thought which refutes the Machiavellian thesis.
Without referring directly to the Florentine, Madison
demolishes with impeccable logic the old Machiavellian
argument that established religion is necessary to sound
civil government.
To begin with, civil society, according to Madison, is not
the highest good. Other things take precedence over it. A
man's duty to his Creator, for example, is prior to any duty
to society. Government, even with the force of majority
opinion pressed behind it, must not encroach upon man's
natural right to worship the Almighty as conscience obliges
34 / John Wesley Young
him. Obedience belongs first to God, the "Universal Sover-
eign." Civil obligations come second.
A Power to be Feared
Notice here that Madison has stood Machiavelli on his
head. The Florentine republican makes the stability of pop-
ular government an end in itself, with individual rights tac-
itly subordinated to that end. But to the Virginian any truly
popular government will respect popular rights, especially
the right of free worship. This conviction of Madison neces-
sarily determines his attitude to established religion.
Because he would protect men's rights and their power of
free choice, he must oppose the slightest suggestion of
enforced conformity to a particular religious system. Chris-
tian or non-Christian, even if the state needs the underpin-
ning of virtue that religion provides.
After all, if the state has power to grant recognition to a
religion, it has also the power to suppress other religions
and religious opinions. And that is more power than can
safely be entrusted to it, power enough to pervert the ends
for which genuinely republican government is instituted.
As to one of the arguments put forth by the friends of
establishment, that it is needed to help religion — this, says
Madison, is unhistorical nonsense. Consider the history of
the Christian church. At what point in its development was
Christianity at its purest and most vigorous — before or
after Constantine? In fact it flourished in "the ages prior to
its incorporation with Civil policy," and this in spite of
prodigious resistance to its growth.
On the other hand, fifteen centuries of establishment
have very nearly emaciated Christianity in those countries
where one or another version of it has received official
Madison's Answer to Machiavelli / 35
sanction. And if enacted, the Virginia assessment bill—
which Madison regards as in effect an establishment of reli-
gion—would actually obstruct the progress of Christianity.
It would make Virginia little different from those heathen
countries that seek to shut out the light of Christian revela-
tion, for "instead of levelling as far as possible, every obsta-
cle to the victorious progress of truth, the Bill with an igno-
ble and unchristian timidity would circumscribe it, with a
wall of defence, against the encroachments of error." That
wall would frighten away potential converts to Christian-
ity. Benefit religion? Establishment destroys it.
Prelude to Tyranny
Now if religion is better off without direct government
support, then government itself need not rest on an official
religious foundation. For if government is helped by
healthy religion, and if religion is healthiest when unbri-
dled by the state, then government ought for its own sake
to leave it be. It should not, in Madison's words, "employ
Religion as an engine of Civil policy." To do so would be
"an unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation."
In fine, legal establishments of religion plunge a people
into spiritual or political tyranny. "In no instance have they
been seen the guardians of the liberties of the people." A
just government (and to Madison "just" means republican}
"will be best supported by protecting every citizen in the
enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which
protects his person and his property; by neither invading
the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to invade
those of another."
It is important to grasp what Madison is saying here. He
is saying that republican government does itself a favor
36 / John Wesley Young
when it relaxes the political control of religion in society —
an assertion that would have shocked Machiavelli, if any-
thing could. Government interference will destroy genuine
religion and thereby thwart the supposed purpose for
interfering in the first place, which is to aid religion and
thus republican government. But relax the controls and
religion can prosper; and, as Machiavelli himself would
say, when religion prospers the state prospers.
Madison's fellow Virginians sided with him in the
debate against Machiavelli, for popular pressure brought
on defeat of the assessment measure. But when the General
Assembly proceeded to enact in 1786 Jefferson's bill for
complete religious liberty, lamentations went up elsewhere,
especially over New England. By disestablishing religion,
declared one northern critic, the Virginia legislators have
crushed "the most powerful seeds of that very virtue it
must be supposed they wish to see flourish in the state they
represent."^^
But had they? Years later, when a correspondent asked
Madison about the state of religion and morals in Virginia,
Madison replied that, contrary to some reports, religion
had not been blown to pieces by disestablishment. The
number of denominations had multiplied and, despite fail-
ure of the assessment bill to pass, knowledge of the Christ-
ian religion had increased:
Religious instruction is now diffused throughout the
community by preachers of every sect with almost
equal zeal. . . . The qualifications of the preachers,
too among the new sects where there was the great-
est deficiency, are understood to be improving. . . .
The civil government, though bereft of everything
like an associated hierarchy, possesses the requisite
stability and performs its functions with complete
Madison's Answer to Machiavelli / 37
success; whilst the number, the industry, and the
morality of the priesthood, and the devotion of the
people have been manifestly increased by the total
separation of the church from the state.^^
A prejudiced appraisal? Possibly But such evidence as
survives seems to support Madison. We know, for instance,
that among Baptists in the James River settlements there
commenced in 1785, the year of the assessment's defeat, a
revival that lasted well into the 1790s and spread through-
out Virginia to other dissenting sects. Even the old Angli-
can-Episcopal Church appears to have profited in the long
run from disestablishment.^^
Nor did the nation in general fail to profit from Vir-
ginia's experience. Largely at Madison's instigation, reli-
gious liberty became a constitutional (and republican) prin-
ciple with passage of the First Amendment, so that
Tocqueville, the astute French observer who visited Amer-
ica in the 1830s, could write:
For most people in the United States religion, too, is
republican, for the truths of the other world are held
subject to private judgment, just as in politics the
care for men's temporal interests is left to the good
sense of all. Each man is allowed to choose freely the
path that will lead him to heaven, just as the law rec-
ognizes each citizen's right to choose his own gov-
ernment.^^
Such freedom, Tocqueville believed, had animated religion
in America, causing it to hold "quiet sway" over the coun-
try while in Europe the progress of secular social revolution
was sweeping away established churches in its fury.
38 / John Wesley Young
Unanswered Questions
All this doesn't answer the question of what happens to
republican virtue when religion decays of its own accord,
when republican Christians, for instance, lose their "first
love" and lapse into vice and folly. Nor does it answer a sec-
ond question implied, perhaps, in the first: Does history
turn in cycles, making the rise and decline of religion, and
hence of republican government, inevitable? Personally
this writer sees few things inevitable in a world where the
great conditioning reality is man's freedom of will. But let
the philosophers grapple with that one.
The truth that Madison taught us, the thing which
ought by now to be burned into our brains, is that republi-
can government can do nothing to help religion except to
guard jealously the freedom of religion. And, in the final
analysis, as Madison showed, that is much. Whatever
becomes of the American Republic in the years ahead, let us
do our best to see that Madison's answer to Machiavelli is
never forgotten.
1. Machiavelli, Discourses, in The Prince and the Discourses (New
York: Modem Library, 1940), p. 148.
2. Ibid., pp. 145-148.
3. Plutarch 's Lives, trans. John Dryden, rev. A. H. Clough, 5 vols.
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1910), 1:137.
4. Discourses, p. 158.
5. Ibid., pp. 153-154.
6. Ibid., p. 150.
7. Ibid., pp. 148-149.
8. See Lily Ross Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1%1), pp. 76-97.
9. Discourses, p. 285.
10. See, e.g., Rousseau's chapter "Concerning Civil Religion" in The
Social Contract, trans. Willmoore Kendall (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.,
Madison's Answer to Machiavelli / 39
1954), pp. 148-162. On Harrington see Perez Zagorin, A History of Polit-
ical Thought in the English Revolution (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul 1954), p. 141.
11. Charleston S.C. and American Gazette, 21 January 1779, quoted in
Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), p. 417.
12. Mason to Patrick Henry, 6 May 1783, in The Papers of George
Mason, Robert A. Rutland, ed., 3 vols. (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1970), 2:770.
13. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, in The Popular Sources
of Authority, ed. Oscar and Mary Handlin (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Belknap Press, 1966), pp. 442-443.
14. Charles F. James, Documentary History of the Struggle for Religious
Liberty in Virginia (New York: Da Capo Press, 1971), p. 129. On the reli-
gious controversy in Virginia see John M. Mecklin, The Story of American
Dissent (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1934), pp. 264-283.
15. For full text see The Complete Madison, Saul K. Padover, ed. (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 299-306.
16. [John Swanwick], Considerations on an Act of the Legislature of Vir-
ginia, Entitled an Act for the Establishment of Religious Freedom (Philadel-
phia, 1786), p. 6, quoted in Wood, Creation of the American Republic, p.
427n.
17. Madison to Robert Walsh, 2 March 1819, in The Writings of James
Madison, ed. Gaillard Hunt, 9 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1908), 8:430-432. Spelling and punctuation updated here.
18. See James, Documentary History, pp. 147-149; William Henry
Foote, Sketches of Virginia, new ed. (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press,
1966), pp. 348, 412-429; George MacLaren Brydon, Virginia's Mother
Church, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Church Historical Society, 1952),
2:506-507.
19. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, J. P. Mayer, ed.; George
Lawrence, trans. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1969),
p. 397. For a classic essay on separation of church and state, and how
that principle prospered American government and religion in the
early days of the Republic, see ibid., pp. 294-301.
George Washington on Liberty and Order
Clarence B. Carson
There are truths to which the passage of time and the
gaining of new experience add luster and vitality. So it has
been, for me at least, with those contained in Washington's
Farewell Address. With each new reading of it, I have been
impressed anew with the relevance of so much that he had
to say to our own time. Often, too, I discover some new
theme or emphasis that I had not been aware of earlier.
Undoubtedly, these different impressions arise in part from
the richness of the material but also may be conditioned by
my particular interests at a given time. At any rate, the
theme of liberty and order stood out for me in my latest
reading of the Farewell Address. It seemed to me that all
the parts fitted together into a whole within the framework
of this theme.
Before getting into that, however, it may be of some aid
to place the address in a much broader historical frame.
Some observations about liberty and order more generally
will help to set the stage for his remarks.
Thoughtful men may differ about the desirability of lib-
erty, but they rarely do about the necessity for order. Also,
nations, kingdoms, and empires have differed much more
over the extent of liberty within them than of the degree of
order, over long periods of time anyway. They have ranged
from the most compulsive tyrannies to ones in which
This essay appeared in the February 1983 issue of The Freeman.
40
George Washington on Liberty and Order / 41
considerable liberty prevails. By contrast, all governments
are to a greater or lesser extent devoted to maintaining
order. But there are great differences of belief, persuasion,
and practice as to how order is to be maintained and the
proper role of government in doing so. It is the differences
on this that largely determine the extent of liberty in a coun-
try.
There have been, and are, countries in which those in
power believe that government must act to impose order in
every nook and cranny of society. The active principle in
this, if principle it be, is that if government does not impose
order then disorder and chaos will prevail. Thomas
Hobbes, English philosopher in the seventeenth century,
expressed this view with clarity and force. He declared that
if men were permitted to act according "to their particular
judgments and particular appetites, they can expect
thereby no defense, nor protection against a common
enemy, nor against the injuries of one another." There must
be a power over them, he said, and the way to get that
power is "to confer all their power and strength upon one
man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all
their wills . . . unto one will For by this authority, given
him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath
the use of so much power and strength conferred on him,
that by terror thereof, he is enabled to perform the wills of
them all. . . ."
A view similar to this of what was necessary to order
and how it could be achieved, as well as the role of govern-
ment in it, was widespread in Europe in the seventeenth
century. It was an age of royal absolutism, of claims about
the Divine right of kings, and of the assertion of govern-
ment power to direct the lives of peoples. England had an
established church; no others were tolerated. All were
42 / Clarence B. Carson
required to attend its services, contribute to its support, and
have most of the great events of life celebrated or recorded
in it. The church officials censored publications, licensed
schools, and kept watch over the doings of the people.
Mercantilism
Economic life was circumscribed and controlled by the
government under a system most commonly known as
mercantilism. The government controlled exports and im-
ports, gave subsidies, bounties, and grants to encourage
certain undertakings, prohibited others, gave patents, char-
ters, and other forms of monopolies to individuals and
companies, enforced craft regulations, and maintained
much power over the lands of the realm. Harsh penalties
were imposed for every sort of offense from blasphemy to
treason. Evidence abounded that government was making
massive efforts to impose order. As for liberties, they had
most commonly to be asserted against the grain of the pre-
vailing system.
So, too, in the twentieth century, the dominant view of
those in power in many lands is that government must
impose an all-encompassing order upon the peoples under
its sway. At its farthest reaches, this view achieves its
fruition in the totalitarian state, with its direct control over
all the media of communication, every aspect of the econ-
omy, over education, over such religion as is permitted,
over work and over play.
In other lands, where this bent toward state-compelled
order has been moderated thus far — has been kept from
going so far — it evinces itself in government intervention in
the economy, the thrust of regulation into many realms, in
redistribution of the wealth, in controls over education.
George Washington on Liberty and Order / 43
medicine, charity, and hundreds of other areas. The ideol-
ogies supf)orting this pervasive government power differ
in many particular respects from those that supported sev-
enteenth-century government power, but the notion that
government must impose an order else chaos and disorder
will prevail is common to both. Extensive liberty can hardly
be reconciled with such compulsive orders.
That George Washington held a view on how to main-
tain order and the proper role of government in sharp con-
trast to those described above is manifest in his life and
works. Moreover, a seismic change in outlook, both in Eng-
land and America and over much of Europe, had taken
place between the time when Hobbes had penned his Levia-
than and the founding of the United States. A major aspect
of that change was a shift from the emphasis upon a gov-
ernment order imposed on men toward individual liberty
2md responsibility. The shift sparked in many Americans an
awareness of the danger of government both to liberty and
to order. At the root of this shift was a different conception
of the origin and nature of order.
Belief in a Natural Order
George Washington and his contemporaries were
imbued with a strong belief in a natural order. Order, in
their view, was not something that could be arbitrarily con-
trived and imf)osed by man. The foundations of order, they
held, are in the frame of the universe, in the laws that gov-
ern it, in the nature of man and his faculty of reason, and in
the principles of relationships by which constructive activi-
ties can take place. At best, men can only act in accord with
and imitate the order that is given.
The belief in a natural law and natural order was not
44 / Clarence B. Carson
new to the eighteenth century, of course; it had been around
since the ancient Greeks and Romans, at least. But it had
come to the forefront in the century before the founding of
the United States as a result both of vigorous efforts to
revive it and of many scientific and philosophical formula-
tions of it.
Newton had persuasively set forth in mathematical
terms the laws governing the course of the heavenly bod-
ies. Thinkers were getting impressive results in their
searches for the laws and principles governing all sorts of
relationships. What struck so many in that age was the idea
of proportion, balance, harmony, and order resident in the
natural tendencies of the world about them. Most mar-
velous of all, at least to many, this order was consonant
with human liberty. Rather than frustrating man in the use
of his faculties for his benefit (and for the commonweal as
well), the natural order provided means for him to do so
most effectively. The foundations of liberty in this belief in
a natural order were in the natural rights doctrine.
In his Farewell Address, Washington did not expand
upon or elaborate on the theme of liberty. Although the
word "liberty" occurs several times in the document, it
plays mainly a supportive role in what he has to say. The
attachment to liberty is assumed, a given if you will, upon
which to hinge his arguments. Washington said as much
himself: "Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every lig-
ament of your hearts, no recommendation of mine is neces-
sary to fortify or confirm the attachment." But, he says,
from first one angle then another, if you would have liberty
you must support those things on which it depends.
For example, in recommending a united support for the
general government, he declared: "This Government, the
off-spring of our own choice, . . . adopted upon full inves-
George Washington on Liberty and Order / 45
tigation and mature deliberation, completely free in its
principles, in the distribution of its powers, uniting security
with energy, and containing within itself a provision for its
own amendment, has a just claim to your confidence and
support." To clinch the argument, he says that these "are
duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true lib-
erty." In arguing against the involvement of Americans in
foreign intrigues, he says that by doing so "they will avoid
the necessity of those overgrown military establishments
which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to
liberty. . . ."
A Sense of Order
The word "liberty" occurs frequently throughout the
address, but by my fairly careful count the word "order"
occurs only once. Even that instance is insignificant, how-
ever, for the word is used in a phrase, as "in order to" do
something or other. It occurs at one other point as part of
the word "disorders," which, while more significant, is
hardly proof of a theme. Yet a sense of order pervades the
whole document. It is there in the cadences of the sen-
tences, in the matching of phrase with phrase, in the bal-
ance of one tendency against another, in the thrust toward
discovering a common bond by piling up references to par-
ticular interests. It is clear, if one reads between the lines,
that there is an order for men's lives, an order for nations,
an order for relations among nations, an order by which
parts belong to a whole, and an order by which balance and
harmony can be maintained. Government is not the origin
of this order, but it is necessary to the maintenance of it,
even as it is ever a potential threat to it. Government is
made necessary by the bent in man to disrupt order.
46 / Clarence B. Carson
The two main sources of disorder to which Washington
alludes are these. First, there are those passions in men
which incline them to pursue their own particular and par-
tisan designs at the expense of the well-being of others.
Washington called it the spirit of party, but we might
understand it better as partisanship for causes. (He had in
mind the dangers of this to the stability of government, but
it does no violence to his idea to apply it to individuals as
well as groups.) "This spirit," he said, "unfortunately, is
inseparable from our nature, having its roots in the
strongest passions of the human mind." Among the dan-
gers of these partisan passions, he declared, are these: "It
serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble
the public administration. It agitates the community with
ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animos-
ity of one part against another; foments occasionally riot
and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and
corruption. . . . Thus the policy and will of one country are
subjected to the policy and will of another."
The other source of disorder, to which Washington
alludes, is "that love of power and proneness to abuse it
which predominates in the human heart. . . ." It is this
power hunger which makes government dangerous, for it
prompts those who govern to overstep the bounds of their
authority. "The spirit of encroachment," Washington
pointed out, "tends to consolidate the powers of all the
departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form
of government, a real despotism."
Advice and Counsel
The body of the Farewell Address is devoted to advice
and counsel about how to conduct the government so as to
George Washington on Liberty and Order / 47
maintain order and preserve liberty, and to warnings about
holding in check those partisan tendencies and the bent
toward consolidating power which endanger them. The
following were his main points: (1) Maintain the union; (2)
Keep the principles of the Constitution intact; (3) Preserve
national independence; (4) Buttress policy and behavior
with religion and morality; (5) Cherish the public credit;
and (6) Follow peaceful policies toward all nations. These
general principles are not nearly so revealing, however, as
his particular recommendations and the arguments he used
to support them.
The main device Washington employed to support his
advice to maintain the union was to invoke those things the
people had in common: the name American, their struggles
for independence, their common beliefs, and their common
interest. He surveyed the continent, from a mountaintop as
it were, and ticked off how north and south, east and west,
were bound together.
"The North," he said, "in an unrestrained intercourse
with the South, protected by the equal laws of a common
government, finds in the production of the latter great . . .
resources of maritime and commercial enterprise and pre-
cious materials of manufacturing industry. The South, in the
same intercourse . . . sees its agriculture grow and com-
merce expand. . . . The East, in a like intercourse with the
V/est, already finds ... a valuable vent for the commodities
which it brings from abroad or manufactures at home. The
VJest derives from the East supplies requisite to its growth
and comfort." This was an economic order which had its
roots in the diversities of the regions. Washington warned
against the rise of factions seeking to use political power for
partisan ends that might disrupt the union and disturb the
existing order.
48 / Clarence B. Carson
Preserve the Constitution
Washington's concern for preserving the Constitution
intact was motivated by the belief that a balance had been
incorporated in it, a balance in which the national and state
government checked one another, and the branches held
one another in check. "The necessity of reciprocal checks in
the exercise of political power," he declared, "by dividing
and distributing it . . . has been evinced by experiments
ancient and modern. . . ." "Liberty itself," he pointed out,
"will find in such a government with powers properly dis-
tributed and adjusted, its surest guardian." He warned
against two things in particular. One was the "spirit of
innovation upon its principles." The other was "change by
usurpation" of power. That was not to say that the Consti-
tution was perfect as it stood in 1796. But if something
needed correction, it should be "by an amendment in the
way which the Constitution designates." No man or body
of men should assume the power to do so, "for though this
in one instance may be the instrument of good, it is the cus-
tomary weapon by which free governments are destroyed."
Washington hoped that the United States would follow
an independent course in world affairs, that it would lend
its weight toward an order in which peace would be the
norm, but that it would not become entangled with other
nations in the quest for power and dominance. His distrust
of government did not end at the water's edge, for he
believed that foreign governments would, if they could,
use the United States for their own ends. He warned
"Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence," for "(I
conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a
free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and
experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most
baneful foes of republican government." Underlying these
George Washington on Liberty and Order / 49
fears was the belief that in the nature of things, in the nat-
ural order, each nation pursues its own interests. Hence,
"There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate
upon real favors from nation to nation." He cautioned
against constant preference for one nation and opposition
to others. "It is our true policy," Washington said, "to steer
clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign
world. . . ."
Religion and Morality
The first President had some other recommendations on
foreign policy, but before discussing them, it would be best,
as he did, to refer to the role of religion and morality. The
belief in a natural order, the hope that the American politi-
cal system had been shaped in accord with it, was not suffi-
cient, in Washington's opinion, to assure the working or
continuation of order among men. Man is a creature of
unruly passions, as already noted, and the necessary cor-
rective to these is religion and morality.
"It is substantially true," Washington commented, "that
virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular govern-
ment." And, "Of all the dispositions and habits which lead
to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispens-
able supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of
patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars
of human happiness. ... A volume could not trace all their
connections with private and public felicity." Moreover,
"let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality
can be maintained without religion."
These remarks preceded both his advice on public credit
and on peaceful relations with other nations. On cherishing
the public credit, he said: "One method of preserving it is to
use it as sparingly as possible . . ." Washington expected
50 / Clarence B. Carson
that there would be occasions for extraordinary expenses,
making war came to mind, when it might be necessary for
the government to borrow money. But he warned against
the "accumulation of debt," declaring that the way to avoid
this was "not only by shunning occasions of expense, but
by vigorous exertions in time of peace to discharge the
debts which unavoidable wars have occasioned." That way,
it should be possible to avoid "ungenerously throwing
upon posterity the burthen which we ourselves ought to
bear." Washington thought his countrymen might be the
more inclined to follow these policies if they would keep in
mind "that toward the payment of debts there must be rev-
enue; that to have revenue there must be taxes; that no taxes
can be devised which are not more or less inconvenient and
unpleasant. . . ." Not everyone may find the balanced for-
mulations of eighteenth-century sentences pleasant, but it
must be admitted that the logic in the above is impressive.
At any rate, the principles discussed in the above two
paragraphs provided the framework for his recommenda-
tions for maintaining peaceful relations with other nations.
To that end, Washington advised this: "Observe good faith
and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and har-
mony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct.
And can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it."
Above all, "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to for-
eign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to
have with them as little political connection as possible."
Any extended political connections — permanent al-
liances, for example — could only embroil the United States
in the conflicts among other nations. Otherwise, "Har-
mony, liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended
by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial
policy should hold an equal and impartial hand, neither
seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; con-
George Washington on Liberty and Order / 51
suiting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversi-
fying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing
nothing " That is surely the natural order for trade, and
a plausible hope for peace to those who knew of, when they
had not experienced, the devastating mercantile wars
resulting from the use of force in national commerce.
A Farewell Message of Timeless Truths on
Liberty and Order
George Washington reckoned that he had devoted the
better part of forty-five years to the service of his country
when he retired. He was an unabashed patriot, proud to be
called an American, a sturdy friend of the union, and none
knew better than he the struggles out of which the United
States had been bom. He was a man of his time, as are all
mortal men, spoke in the phraseology of times past, yet in
his Farewell Address he touched upon and elaborated
some timeless truths. Further experience has served only to
confirm the validity of many of his recommendations.
His thoughts on unity, on the love of power, on the
impact of partisan strife, on the importance of focusing on
our common interests, on avoiding entanglements with
other nations, on religion and morality, on the public credit,
and on freedom of trade have worn well when they have
been observed, and have brought suffering by their neglect.
The terror and tyranny of this century, the slave labor
camps and barbed wired borders of nations with their fet-
tered peoples prove once again that liberty depends upon
order, and that if order is not founded upon and in accord
with an underlying order it will tend to be nothing more
than the will of the tyrant.
John Witherspoon:
Animated Son of Liberty'
Robert A. Peterson
On July 4, 1776, the Declaration of Independence lay on
the table of Independence Hall in Philadelphia. Two days
earlier, Richard Henry Lee's resolution for independence
had been adopted, and now the time was at hand when
each delegate would put pen to paper, thus committing his
life, his fortune, and his sacred honor to a future darkened
by clouds of war. If their bid for liberty failed, those who
signed would be the first to be hung from a British noose.
Sensing the urgency of the moment, John Witherspoon
of New Jersey rose to speak:
There is a tide in the affairs of men, a nick of time.
We perceive it now before us. To hesitate is to con-
sent to our own slavery. That noble instrument upon
your table, which ensures immortality to its author,
should be subscribed this very morning by every
pen in this house. He that will not respond to its
accents and strain every nerve to carry into effect its
provisions is unworthy the name of freeman. For my
own part, of property I have some, of reputation
more. That reputation is staked, that property is
Mr. Peterson is headmaster of the Pilgrim Academy Egg Harbor
City, New Jersey This essay appeared in the December 1985 issue of The
Freeman.
52
John Witherspoon: "Animated Son of Liberty" / 53
pledged, on the issue of this contest; and although
these gray hairs must soon descend into the sepul-
chre, I would infinitely rather that they descend
thither by the hand of the executioner than desert at
this crisis the sacred cause of my country.^
Witherspoon's words gave voice to the sentiments of
the majority of delegates, and on July 4, America declared
her independence.
In his philosophy of freedom, Witherspoon was one of
the most consistent of the Founding Fathers. Leaving no
realm of thought untouched, all knowledge was his
province as he discussed money, political economy, philos-
ophy, and education, all in relation to Whig principles of
liberty. His articles and teachings on the nature of money
foreshadowed the discoveries of the Austrian school of eco-
nomics in the nineteenth century, and contributed to mak-
ing the Constitution a "hard-money document" — a fact
that has been forgotten by modern politicians.
His Influence on Others
Witherspoon never led an army into battle, nor did he
run for high national office after the war. Yet his influence
was such that in his role as President of the College of New
Jersey (now Princeton) he helped to educate a generation of
leaders for the new nation. His students included James
Madison, the young Aaron Burr, Henry and Charles Lee of
Virginia, and the poets Philip Freneau and Hugh Bracken-
ridge. Of his former students 10 became cabinet officers, 6
were members of the Continental Congress, 39 became
Congressmen, and 21 sat in the Senate. His graduates
included 12 governors, and when the General Assembly of
54 / Robert A. Peterson
the Presbyterian Church in America met in 1789, 52 of the
188 delegates had studied under Witherspoon. The limited-
government philosophy of most of these men was due in
large measure to Witherspoon's influence.^
Born in Scotland in 1723, Witherspoon was reared on
stories of the Scottish Covenanters who in years past had
stood for both religious and political liberty. In due time he
was sent to the grammar school at Haddington, and later
entered Edinburgh University at the age of fourteen.
Witherspoon received his education in Scotland at a
time when the air was filled with the kind of thinking that
led to Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. Indeed, Wither-
spoon and Smith were contemporaries, and in 1776 both
would strike an important blow for liberty — Witherspoon
with the signing of the Declaration on one side of the
Atlantic, and Smith with his publication of the Wealth of
Nations on the other. Witherspoon spoke out for political
liberty, while Smith took a stand against mercantilism and
for economic liberty. Freedom is all of a piece, and the work
of these two Scotsmen complemented and supported one
another. Political freedom and economic freedom go hand
in hand — you cannot have one without the other.
Witherspoon received his M.A. in 1743, and spent the
next two decades serving as a parish minister in the Church
of Scotland. During this period of his life he developed a
reputation for being the champion of the "Popular Party,"
which stood against patronage and pluralism in the Church
of Scotland. His fame continued to grow in both Scotland
and America, and so, when an opening occurred for the
presidency of Princeton, Witherspoon's name was brought
up and approved by the trustees. After careful negotiations
and some pleading by Princeton alumnus Benjamin Rush,
John Witherspoon: "Animated Son of Liberty'' / 55
who was studying medicine in Edinburgh, Witherspoon
accepted the call.^
Arriving in America in 1766, Witherspoon plunged into
his new task with vigor. One of his first jobs was to get the
college on a sound financial footing. Unlike many college
administrators today, who go begging at the public trough,
Witherspoon could not appeal for federal aid. Princeton
was totally supported by tuitions and voluntary contribu-
tions. Within two years, Witherspoon's fund-raising efforts
(even George Washington contributed) brought Princeton
back from the brink of bankruptcy.
Educational Reform
After laying a sound foundation for school finances,
Witherspoon turned his attention to educational reform. He
was the first to use the lecture method at Princeton. Previ-
ously, instructors had assigned readings and then quizzed
their students in class. He also set up a grammar school,
authored several works on child-rearing, introduced mod-
em languages into the college curriculum, and taught a
course on moral philosophy. Witherspoon's activities at
Princeton were brought to an abrupt halt by the outbreak of
the War for Independence. Like most Americans, Wither-
spoon was at first slow to embrace the cause of indepen-
dence, hoping instead for a reconciliation of the two coun-
tries based on the restoration of full English rights for the
colonials — in particular, the right of their own little parlia-
ments to tax them and make their laws, under the overall
jurisdiction of the king.
Witherspoon grew increasingly concerned, however,
with the attempt of the British to install an Anglican bishop
56 / Robert A. Peterson
over the American colonies.^ He viewed this as the first step
toward an ecclesiastical tyranny over the colonies, of which
the Quebec Act was also a part (the Quebec Act extended
French law, which meant no trial by jury, and Roman
Catholicism into the Ohio Valley). Witherspoon understood
that religious liberty — man's freedom to own his con-
science— was inextricably intertwined with political and
economic liberty: "There is not a single instance in history,"
he wrote, "in which civil liberty was lost, and religious lib-
erty preserved entire. If, therefore, we yield up our tempo-
ral property, we at the same time deliver the conscience into
bondage."^
When hostilities broke out, and continued for about a
year with no end in sight, Witherspoon felt that it was his
duty to set forth the issue from the pulpit. In what is p>er-
haps his most celebrated sermon, "The Dominion of Provi-
dence Over the Passions of Men," Witherspoon said:
. . . the cause in which America is now in arms, is the
cause of justice, of liberty, and of human nature. So
far as we have hitherto proceeded, I am satisfied that
the confederacy of the colonies has not been the
effect of pride, resentment, or sedition, but of a deep
and general conviction that our civil and religious
liberties, and consequently in a great measure the
temporal and eternal happiness of us and our pos-
terity, depended on the issue.^
Witherspoon went on to say that Americans would
need "pure manners," "bravery," "economy," and "frugal-
ity" if they wanted to win their independence.
John Witherspoon: "Animated Son of Liberty" / 57
Limited Government
In his concept of political economy, Witherspoon
believed that good government was limited government,
wherein "faction" checked "faction" so that no person or
group of persons could gain unlimited power. Thus, he
believed in a system of checks and balances — a system
that found its way into the United States Constitution
through the influence of one of his favorite students,
James Madison/ Ashbel Green, who would follow in
Witherspoon's steps as a president of Princeton, said that
the aging statesman approved of the Constitution "as
embracing principles and carrying into effect measures,
which he had long advocated, as essential to the preserva-
tion of the liberties, and the promotion of the peace and
prosperity of the country."^
Witherspoon put his views on civil government into
practice when he served in Congress from 1776 to 1782.
Always active, he served on over one hundred committees
and preached to members of the Continental Congress on
Sundays while in Philadelphia. The British showed that
they realized the significance of Witherspoon's contribu-
tion when they burned him in effigy along with George
Washington during the occupation of New York City.
The war left Nassau Hall in ruins, as the British particu-
larly singled out Presbyterian institutions for destruction.
Undaunted, Witherspoon left the Continental Congress in
1782 to rebuild his beloved Princeton. He still found time to
comment on the problems which confronted the new
nation — particularly economic problems. An economist, or
moral philosopher, of the first rank and an advocate of hard
58 / Robert A. Peterson
money, Witherspoon had seen firsthand the effects of the
inflationary "Continentals." In his "Essay on Money,"
which in many ways presaged the writings of the Austrian
school of economics, Witherspoon wrote:
I observe that to arm such bills with the authority of
the state, and make them legal tender in all pay-
ments is an absurdity so great, that it is not easy to
speak with propriety upon it ... It has been found,
by the experience of ages, that money must have a
standard of value, and if any prince or state debase
the metal below the standard, it is utterly impossible
to make it succeed. Why will you make a law to
oblige men to take money when it is offered them?
Are there any who refuse it when it is good? If it is
necessary to force them, does not this system pro-
duce a most ludicrous inversion of the nature of
things?^
Witherspoon was also mindful of the tremendous pro-
ductive capacity of the free society, not only in the physical
realm but in the other fields of human action as well. In a
textbook he wrote for his students, he concluded: "What
then is the advantage of civil liberty? I suppose it chiefly
consists in its tendency to put in motion all the human
powers. Therefore it promotes industry, and in this resf)ect
happiness — produces every latent quality, and improves
the human mind. — Liberty is the nurse of riches, literature,
and heroism."^^
Contracts Are Important
The contract, so essential to capitalism, also loomed
large in Witherspoon's thought: "Contracts are absolutely
John Witherspoon: "Animated Son of Liberty" / 59
necessary in scKial life. Every transaction almost may be
considered as a contract, either more or less explicit/'^^ And
in what constituted an intellectual "end run" around the
classical economists, Witherspoon touched upon the dis-
covery that value is essentially subjective, determined not
by the amount of labor that goes into a product or by gov-
ernment decree, but by individuals freely acting in the mar-
ketplace. "Nothing has any real value unless it be of some
use in human life, or perhaps we may say, unless it is sup-
posed to be of use, and so becomes the object of human
desire. . . ."^^
Besides writing, Witherspoon spent his last years build-
ing up Princeton and his church. Two accidents left him
blind the last two years of his life. His light spent, he con-
tinued to preach and teach, relying upon the vast store of
knowledge that he had husbanded away through years of
diligent study.
At the age of seventy-one, having crammed several
careers into one lifetime, Witherspoon passed away and
was buried in the President's Lot at Princeton. Two hun-
dred years later, Witherspoon's great contributions in help-
ing to lay the foundations of American freedom are still
only darkly understood. There have been those in the past,
however, who have recognized the magnitude of Wither-
spoon's life and thought. John Adams, for instance, noted
in his diary that Witherspoon was "as hearty a friend as any
of the Natives — an animated Son of Liberty."^^ One of his
students, Philip Freneau, wrote:
His words still vibrate on my ear.
His precepts, solemn and severe.
Alarmed the vicious and the base.
To virtue gave the loveliest face
That humankind can wear.^^
60 / Robert A. Peterson
It was through the influence of men like John Wither-
spoon that a new nation gained a constitution that repudi-
ated interventionism, fiat currency, and embraced the idea
of hard money. He was a pastor, educator, statesman, econ-
omist, and political theorist. He was, and still remains, "an
animated Son of Liberty."
1. John Witherspoon, quoted in Charles Augustus Briggs, Ameri-
can Presbyterianism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1885), p. 351.
2. Charles G. Osgood, Lights in Nassau Hall (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1951), pp. 12-13.
3. Lyman H. Butterfield, John Witherspoon Comes to America
(Princeton: Princeton University Library, 1953).
4. Carl Bridenbaugh, Mitre and Sceptre: Transatlantic Faiths, Ideas,
Personalities, and Politics 1689-1775 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1962).
5. John Witherspoon, The Works of John Witherspoon, 9 vols. (Edin-
burgh: 1804-1805) Vol. ii, pp. 202-203.
6. Ibid.
7. James H. Smylie, "Madison and Withersf>oon: Theological
Roots of American Political Thought/' Vie Princeton University Library
Chronicle, Vol. xxii. No. 3 (Spring, 1961), MS, Presbyterian Historical
Society.
8. Ashbel Green, quoted in Smylie, p. 130.
9. Works, Vol. iv, p. 223.
10. John Witherspoon, An Annotated Edition of Lectures on Moral Phi-
losophy, Jack Scott, ed. (Newark, Del.: University of Delaware Press,
1982), p. 147.
11. Lectures on Moral Philosophy, p. 168.
12. Lectures on Moral Philosophy, p. 178.
13. Martha Lou Stohlman, John Witherspoon: Parson, Politician,
Patriot (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976), p. 15.
14. Philip Freneau, quoted in Mary Weatherspoon Bowden, Philip
Freneau (Boston: Twayne Pub., 1976), p. 17.
Education in Colonial America
Robert A. Peterson
One of the main objections people have to getting gov-
ernment out of the education business and turning it over
to the free market is that "it simply would not get the job
done." This type of thinking is due, in large measure, to
what one historian called "a parochialism in time,"^ i.e., a
limited view of an issue for lack of historical perspective.
Having served the twelve-year sentence in government-
controlled schools, most Americans view our present pub-
lic school system as the measure of all things in education.
Yet for two hundred years in American history, from the
mid-1600s to the mid-1800s, public schools as we know
them today were virtually nonexistent, and the educational
needs of America were met by the free market. In these two
centuries, America produced several generations of highly
skilled and literate men and women who laid the founda-
tion for a nation dedicated to the principles of freedom and
self-government.
The private system of education in which our forefa-
thers were educated included home, school, church, volun-
tary associations such as library companies and philosoph-
ical societies, circulating libraries, apprenticeships, and
private study. It was a system supported primarily by those
who bought the services of education, and by private bene-
factors. All was done without compulsion. Although there
This essay appeared in the September 1983 issue of The Freeman.
61
62 / Robert A. Peterson
was a veneer of government involvement in some colonies,
such as in Puritan Massachusetts, early American educa-
tion was essentially based on the principle of voluntarism.^
Dr. Lawrence A. Cremin, distinguished scholar in the
field of education, has said that during the colonial period
the Bible was "the single most important cultural influence
in the lives of Anglo-Americans."^
Thus, the cornerstone of early American education was
the belief that "children are an heritage from the Lord."^
Parents believed that it was their responsibility to not only
teach them how to make a living, but also how to live. As
our forefathers searched their Bibles, they found that the
function of government was to protect life and property.^
Education was not a responsibility of the civil government.
Education Began in the Home and the Fields
Education in early America began in the home at the
mother's knee, and often ended in the cornfield or bam by
the father's side. The task of teaching reading usually fell to
the mother, and since paper was in short supply, she would
trace the letters of the alphabet in the ashes and dust by the
fireplace.^ The child learned the alphabet and then how to
sound out words. Then a book was placed in the child's
hands, usually the Bible. As many passages were familiar to
him, having heard them at church or at family devotions,
he would soon master the skill of reading. The Bible was
supplemented by other good books such as Pilgrim's
Progress by John Bunyan, The New England Primer, and Isaac
Watts' Divine Songs. From volumes like these, our founding
fathers and their generation learned the values that laid the
foundation for free enterprise. In "Against Idleness and
Education in Colonial America / 63
Mischief/' for example, they learned individual responsi-
bility before God in the realm of work and learning/
How doth the busy little bee
Improve each shining hour.
And gather honey all the day
From every opening flower.
How skillfully she builds her cell.
How neat she spreads the wax
And labours hard to store it well
With the sweet food she makes.
In works of labour, or of skill,
I would be busy too;
For Satan finds some mischief still
For idle hands to do.
In books, or work, or healthful play
Let my first years be passed;
That I may give for every day
Some good account at last.
Armed with love, common sense, and a nearby wood-
shed, colonial mothers often achieved more than our mod-
em-day elementary schools with their federally funded
programs and education specialists. These colonial mothers
used simple, time-tested methods of instruction mixed
with plain, old-fashioned hard work. Children were not
ruined by educational experiments developed in the ivory
towers of academe. The introduction to a reading primer
from the early nineteenth century testifies to the impor-
64 / Robert A. Peterson
tance of home instruction.^ It says: "The author cannot but
hope that this book will enable many a mother or aunt, or
elder brother or sister, or perhaps a beloved grandmother,
by the family fireside, to go through in a pleasant and sure
way with the art of preparing the child for his first school
days."
Home education was so common in America that most
children knew how to read before they entered school. As
Ralph Walker has pointed out, "Children were often taught
to read at home before they were subjected to the rigours of
school. In middle-class families, where the mother would
be expected to be literate, this was considered part of her
duties."^
Without ever spending a dime of tax money, or without
ever consulting a host of bureaucrats, psychologists, and
specialists, children in early America learned the basic aca-
demic skills of reading, writing, and ciphering necessary
for getting along in society. Even in Boston, the capital city
of the colony in which the government had the greatest
hand, children were taught to read at home. Samuel Eliot
Morison, in his excellent study on education in colonial
New England, says:^^
Boston offers a curious problem. The grammar
(Boston Latin) school was the only public school
down to 1684, when a writing school was estab-
lished; and it is probable that only children who
already read were admitted to that. . . . they must
have learned to read somehow, since there is no evi-
dence of unusual illiteracy in the town. And a
Boston bookseller's stock in 1700 includes no less
than eleven dozen spellers and sixty-one dozen
primers.
Education in Colonial America / 65
The answer to this supposed problem is simple. The
books were bought by parents, and illiteracy was absent
because parents taught their children how to read outside
of a formal school setting. Coupled with the vocational
skills children learned from their parents, home education
met the demands of the free market. For many, formal
schooling was simply unnecessary. The fine education they
received at home and on the farm held them in good stead
for the rest of their lives, and was supplemented with Bible
reading and almanacs like Franklin's Poor Richard's.
Some of our forefathers desired more education than
they could receive at home. Thus, grammar and secondary
schools grew up all along the Atlantic seaboard, particu-
larly near the centers of population, such as Boston and
Philadelphia. In New England, many of these schools were
started by colonial governments, but were supported and
controlled by the local townspeople.
In the Middle Colonies there was even less government
intervention. In Pennsylvania, a compulsory education law
was passed in 1683, but it was never strictly enforced.^^
Nevertheless, many schools were set up simply as a
response to consumer demand. Philadelphia, which by
1776 had become second only to London as the chief city in
the British Empire, had a school for every need and interest.
Quakers, Philadelphia's first inhabitants, laid the founda-
tion for an educational system that still thrives in America.
Because of their emphasis on learning, an illiterate Quaker
child was a contradiction in terms. Other religious groups
set up schools in the Middle Colonies. The Scottish Presby-
terians, the Moravians, the Lutherans, and Anglicans all had
their own schools. In addition to these church-related
schools, private schoolmasters, entrepreneurs in their own
right, established hundreds of schools.
66 / Robert A. Peterson
Historical records, which are by no means complete,
reveal that over one hundred and twenty-five private
schoolmasters advertised their services in Philadelphia
newspapers between 1740 and 1776. Instruction was
offered in Latin, Greek, mathematics, surveying, naviga-
tion, accounting, bookkeeping, science, English, and con-
temporary foreign languages.^^ Incompetent and inefficient
teachers were soon eliminated, since they were not subsi-
dized by the State or protected by a guild or union. Teach-
ers who satisfied their customers by providing good ser-
vices prospered. One schoolmaster, Andrew Porter, a
mathematics teacher, had over one hundred students
enrolled in 1776. The fees the students paid enabled him to
provide for a family of seven.^^
In the Philadelphia Area
Philadelphia also had many fine evening schools. In
1767, there were at least sixteen evening schools, catering
mostly to the needs of Philadelphia's hard-working Ger-
man population. For the most part, the curriculum of these
schools was confined to the teaching of English and voca-
tions.^^ There were also schools for women, blacks, and the
poor. Anthony Benezet, a leader in colonial educational
thought, pioneered in the education for women and
Negroes. The provision of education for the poor was a
favorite Quaker philanthropy As one historian has pointed
out, "the poor, both Quaker and non-Quaker, were allowed
to attend without paying fees."^^
In the countryside around Philadelphia, German immi-
grants maintained many of their own schools. By 1776, at
least sixteen schools were being conducted by the Mennon-
ites in Eastern Pennsylvania. Christopher Dock, who made
Education in Colonial America / 67
several notable contributions to the science of pedagogy,
taught in one of these schools for many years. Eastern
Pennsylvanians, as well as New Jerseyans and Marylan-
ders, sometimes sent their children to Philadelphia to fur-
ther their education, where there were several boarding
schools, both for girls and boys.
In the Southern colonies, government had, for all practi-
cal purposes, no hand at all in education. In Virginia, edu-
cation was considered to be no business of the State. The
educational needs of the young in the South were taken
care of in "old-field" schools. "Old-field" schools were
buildings erected in abandoned fields that were too full of
rocks or too overcultivated for farm use. It was in such a
school that George Washington received his early educa-
tion. The Southern Colonies' educational needs were also
taken care of by using private tutors, or by sending their
sons north or across the Atlantic to the mother country.
Colonial Colleges
A college education is something that very few of our
forefathers wanted or needed. As a matter of fact, most of
them were unimpressed by degrees or a university accent.
They judged men by their character and by their experi-
ence. Moreover, many of our founding fathers, such as
George Washington, Patrick Henry, and Ben Franklin, did
quite well without a college education. Yet for those who so
desired it, usually young men aspiring to enter the min-
istry, university training was available. Unlike England,
where the government had given Cambridge and Oxford a
monopoly on the granting of degrees,^^ there were nine col-
leges from which to choose.
Although some of the colonial colleges were started by
68 / Robert A. Peterson
colonial governments, it would be misleading to think of
them as statist institutions in the modem sense.^'' Once
chartered, the colleges were neither funded nor supported
by the state. Harvard was established with a grant from the
Massachusetts General Court, yet voluntary contributions
took over to keep the institution alive. John Harvard left the
college a legacy of 800 pounds and his library of 400 books.
"College corn," donated by the people of the Bay Colony,
maintained the young scholars for many years.^^ Provision
was also made for poor students, as Harvard developed
one of the first work-study programs.^^ And when Harvard
sought to build a new building in 1674, donations were so-
licited from the people of Massachusetts. Despite the
delays caused by King Philip's War, the hall was completed
in 1677 at almost no cost to the taxpayer. ^^
New Jersey was the only colony that had two colleges,
the College of New Jersey (Princeton) and Queens (Rut-
gers). The Log College, the predecessor of Princeton, was
founded when Nathaniel Irwin left one thousand dollars to
William Tennant to found a seminary.^^ Queens grew out of
a small class held by the Dutch revivalist, John Frel-
inghuyson.^^ Despite occasional hard times, neither college
bowed to civil government for financial assistance. As
Frederick Rudolph has observed, "neither the college at
Princeton nor its later rival at New Brunswick ever received
any financial support from the state. . . ."^ Indeed, John
Witherspoon, Princeton's sixth president, was apparently
proud of the fact that his institution was independent of
government control. In an advertisement addressed to the
British settlers in the West Indies, Witherspoon wrote: "The
College of New Jersey is altogether independent. It hath
received no favor from Government but the charter, by the
particular friendship of a person now deceased."^"*
Education in Colonial America / 69
Based on the principle of freedom, Princeton under
Witherspoon produced some of America's most "animated
Sons of Liberty." Many of Princeton's graduates, standing
firmly in the Whig tradition of limited government, helped
lay the legal and constitutional foundations for our Repub-
lic. James Madison, the Father of the Constitution, was a
Princeton graduate.
Libraries
In addition to formal schooling in elementary and sec-
ondary schools, colleges, and universities, early America
had many other institutions that made it possible for peo-
ple to either get an education or supplement their previous
training. Conceivably, an individual who never attended
school could receive an excellent education by using
libraries, building and consulting his own library, and by
joining a society for mutual improvement. In colonial
America, all of these were possible.
Consumer demand brought into existence a large num-
ber of libraries. Unlike anything in the Old Country, where
libraries were open only to scholars, churchmen, or gov-
ernment officials, these libraries were rarely supported by
government funds. In Europe, church libraries were sup-
ported by tax money as well, for they were a part of an
established church. In America, church libraries, like the
churches themselves, were supported primarily by volun-
tarism.
The first non-private, non-church libraries in America
were maintained by membership fees, called subscriptions
or shares, and by gifts of books and money from private
benefactors interested in education. The most famous of
these libraries was Franklin and Logan's Library Company
70 / Robert A. Peterson
in Philadelphia, which set the pattern and provided muc±i
of the inspiration for libraries throughout the colonies.^
The membership fee for these subscription libraries varied
from twenty or thirty pounds to as little as fifteen shillings
a year. The Association Library, a library formed by a group
of Quaker artisans, cost twenty shillings to join.^^
Soon libraries became the objects of private philan-
thropy, and it became possible for even the poorest citizens
to borrow books. Sometimes the membership fee was com-
pletely waived for an individual if he showed intellectual
promise and character.^^
Entrepreneurs, seeing an opportunity to make a profit
from colonial Americans' desire for self-improvement, pro-
vided new services and innovative ways to sell or rent
printed matter. One new business that developed was that
of the circulating library. In 1767, Lewis Nicola established
one of the first such businesses in the City of Brotherly
Love. The library was open daily, and customers, by
depositing five pounds and paying three dollars a year,
could withdraw one book at a time. Nicola apparently
prospered, for two years later he moved his business to
Society Hill, enlarged his library, and reduced his prices to
compete with other circulating libraries.^ Judging from the
titles in these libraries,^^ colonial Americans could receive
an excellent education completely outside of the school-
room. For colonial Americans who believed in individual
responsibility, self-government, and self-improvement, this
was not an uncommon course of study. Most lawyers, for
example, were self-educated.
Sermons as Educational Tools
The sermon was also an excellent educational experi-
ence for our colonial forefathers. Sunday morning was a
Education in Colonial America / 71
time to hear the latest news and see old friends and neigh-
bors. But it was also an opportunity for many to sit under a
man of God who had spent many hours preparing for a
two-, three-, or even four-hour sermon. Many a colonial
pastor, such as Jonathan Edwards, spent eight to twelve
hours daily studying, praying over, and researching his ser-
mon. Unlike sermons on the frontier in the mid-nineteenth
century, colonial sermons were filled with the fruits of
years of study. They were geared not only to the emotions
and will, but also to the intellect.
As Daniel Boorstin has pointed out, the sermon was one
of the chief literary forms in colonial America.^^ Realizing
this, listeners followed sermons closely, took mental notes,
and usually discussed the sermon with the family on Sun-
day afternoon. Anne Hutchinson's discussions, which later
resulted in the Antinomian Controversy, were merely typi-
cal of thousands of discussions which took place in the
homes of colonial America. Most discussions, however,
were not as controversial as those which took place in the
Hutchinson home.
Thus, without ever attending a college or seminary, a
churchgoer in colonial America could gain an intimate
knowledge of Bible doctrine, church history, and classical
literature. Questions raised by the sermon could be
answered by the pastor or by the books in the church
libraries that were springing up all over America. Often a
sermon was later published and listeners could review
what they had heard on Sunday morning.
The first Sunday Schools also developed in this period.
Unlike their modem-day counterparts, colonial Sunday
Schools not only taught Bible but also the rudiments of
reading and writing. These Sunday Schools often catered to
the poorest members of society.
Modem historians have discounted the importance of
72 / Robert A. Peterson
the colonial church as an educational institution, citing the
low percentage of colonial Americans on surviving church
membership rolls. What these historians fail to realize,
however, is that unlike most churches today, colonial
churches took membership seriously. Requirements for
becoming a church member were much higher in those
days, and many people attended church without officially
joining. Other sources indicate that church attendance was
high in the colonial period. Thus, many of our forefathers
partook not only of the spiritual blessing of their local
churches, but the educational blessings as well.
Philosophical Societies
Another educational institution that developed in colo-
nial America was the philosophical society. One of the most
famous of these was Franklin's Junto, where men would
gather to read and discuss papers they had written on all
sorts of topics and issues.^^ Another society was called The
Literary Republic. This society opened in the bookbindery
of George Rineholt in 1764 in Philadelphia. Here, artisans,
tradesmen, and common laborers met to discuss logic,
jurisprudence, religion, science, and moral philosophy
(economics). ^^
Itinerant lecturers, not unlike the Greek philosophers of
the Hellenistic period, rented halls and advertised their lec-
tures in local papers. One such lecturer, Joseph Cun-
ningham, offered a series of lectures on the "History and
Laws of England" for a little over a pound.^^-^
By 1776, when America finally declared its indepen-
dence, a tradition had been established and voluntarism in
education was the rule. Our founding fathers, who had
been educated in this tradition, did not think in terms of
Education in Colonial America / 73
government-controlled education. Accordingly, when the
delegates gathered in Philadelphia to write a Constitution
for the new nation, education was considered to be outside
the jurisdiction of the civil government, particularly the
national government. Madison, in his notes on the Conven-
tion, recorded that there was some talk of giving the federal
legislature the power to establish a national university at
the future capital. But the proposal was easily defeated, for
as Boorstin has pointed out, "the Founding Fathers sup-
ported the local institutions which had sprung up all over
the country."^ A principle had been established in America
that was not to be deviated from until the mid-nineteenth
century. Even as late as 1860, there were only 300 public
schools as compared to 6,000 private academies.^^
A Highly Literate Populace
The results of colonial America's free-market system of
education were impressive indeed. Almost no tax money
was spent on education, yet education was available to
almost anyone who wanted it, including the poor. No gov-
ernment subsidies were given, and inefficient institutions
either improved or went out of business. Competition
guaranteed that scarce educational resources would be
allocated properly. The educational institutions that pros-
pered produced a generation of articulate Americans who
could grapple with the complex problems of self-govern-
ment. The Federalist Papers, which are seldom read or under-
stood today, even in our universities, were written for and
read by the common man. Literacy rates were as high or
higher than they are today^ A study conducted in 1800 by
DuPont de Nemours revealed that only four in a thousand
Americans were unable to read and write legibly.^^ Various
74 / Robert A. Peterson
accounts from colonial America support these statistics. In
1772, Jacob Duche, the Chaplain of Congress, later turned
Tory, wrote:
The poorest labourer upon the shore of Delaware
thinks himself entitled to deliver his sentiments in
matters of religion or politics with as much freedom
as the gentleman or scholar. . . . Such is the prevail-
ing taste for books of every kind, that almost every
man is a reader; and by pronouncing sentence, right
or wrong, upon the various publications that come
in his way, puts himself upon a level, in point of
knowledge, with their several authors.^
Franklin, too, testified to the efficiency of the colonial
educational system. According to Franklin, the North
American libraries alone "have improved the general
conversation of Americans, made the common tradesmen
and farmers as intelligent as most gentlemen from other
countries, and perhaps have contributed in some degree to
the stand so generally made throughout the colonies in
defense of their privileges."^^
The experience of colonial America clearly supports
the idea that the market, if allowed to operate freely, could
meet the educational needs of modern-day America. In
the nineteenth century, the Duke of Wellington remarked
that "the Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields
of Eton and Cambridge." Today, the battle between free-
dom and statism is being fought in America's schools.
Those of us who believe in Constitutional government
would do well to promote the principle of competition,
pluralism, and government nonintervention in education.
Years ago, Abraham Lincoln said, "The philosophy of the
Education in Colonial America / 75
classroom will be the philosophy of the government in the
next generation."
1. Bertrand Russell, quoted in: Tim Dowley, ed.. The History of
Christianity (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdman's Pub. Co., 1977), p. 2.
2. Clarence B. Carson has emphasized this point in his The Ameri-
can Tradition (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Foundation for Eco-
nomic Education, Inc., 1964).
3. Lawrence A. Cremin, American Education: The Colonial Experi-
ence, 1607-1789 (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row,
1970), p. 40.
4. Psalms 127:3.
5. Romans 13.
6. Elizabeth McEachem Wells, Divine Songs by Isaac Watts (Fairfax,
Va.: Thobum Press, 1975), p. ii.
7. Ibid., p. 42.
8. Eric Sloane, The Little Red Schoolhouse (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972), p. 3.
9. Ralph Walker, "Old Readers," in Early American Life, October
1980, p. 54.
10. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Intellectual Life of New England
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1%5), pp. 71, 72.
11. Carson, p. 152.
12. Louis B. Wright, The Cultural Life of the American Colonies (New
York: Harper and Row Pub., Inc., 1957), p. 108.
13. Ibid.
14. Wright, p. 109.
15. Carl and Jessica Bridenbaugh, Rebels and Gentlemen (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 36.
16. Ibid., p. 39.
17. Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University (New
York: Random House, A Vintage Book, 1962), pp. 15-16.
18. Morison, p. 39.
19. Morison, p. 37.
20. Morison, p. 39.
21. Archibald Alexander, The Log College (London: Banner of Truth
Trust, 1968; first published, 1851), pp. 14-22.
76 / Robert A. Peterson
22. William H. S. Demarest, A History of Rutgers College, 1766-1924
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1924), p. 45.
23. Rudolph, p. 15.
24. John Wither spoon, "Address to the Inhabitants of Jamaica and
Other West-India Islands, in Behalf of the College of New Jersey,"
Essays upon Important Subjects, Vol. Ill (Edinburgh, 1805), pp. 312-318,
328-330.
25. Max Farrand, ed.. The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin (Berke-
ley, Cal., 1949), p. 86.
26. Bridenbaugh, p. 87.
27. Bridenbaugh, p. 99.
28. Bridenbaugh, p. 91.
29. Wright, pp. 126-133.
30. Daniel Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial Experience (New
York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1958), pp. 10-14.
31. This later became, of course, the American Philosophical
Society.
32. Bridenbaugh, pp. 64-65.
33. Bridenbaugh, p. 65.
34. Boorstin, p. 183.
35. Richard C. Wade, et ai, A History of the United States with Selected
Readings, Vol. I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966, 1971), p. 398.
36. Rousas John Rushdoony, The Messianic Character of American
Education (Nutley N.J.: The Craig Press, 1%3, 1979), p. 330.
37. Ibid.
38. Bridenbaugh, p. 99.
39. Farrand, p. 86.
Reasserting the Spirit of 76
Wesley H. Hillendahl
A fresh spirit of change is in the air. It has swept into the
Office of President a man who, as the Governor of Califor-
nia, has shown his dedication to the principles of limited
government. It has carried into ascendancy in the halls of
Congress men who by their records have demonstrated
their commitment to support constitutional principles
which were designed to protect individual liberty.
Let us seek the roots of that spirit. Perhaps we may find
the key to curing what the late Dean Clarence Manion
termed "Cancer in the Constitution."^
An examination of the Declaration of Independence
will produce several important clues: "(Men) are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights . . . among
these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." "... to
secure these rights governments are instituted . . . deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed." Gov-
ernment is to be founded on principles and its powers
organized in such form "most likely to effect safety and
happiness."
Men capable of expressing thoughts such as these had
of necessity developed an inbred sense of self-reliance.
They were God-fearing, Bible-reading people who were
accustomed to taking responsibility for their own actions.
The late Mr. Hillendahl was a banker and long-time member of
FEE'S Board of Trustees. This essay appeared in the March 1981 issue of
The Freeman.
77
78 / Wesley H. Hillendahl
Whence would they likely receive guidance for these ideas
of liberty? We know they invariably looked to the Bible as
the source of inspiration and direction. So let us follow their
steps.
James, the president of the church at Jerusalem, was elo-
quent in translating the spirit of the Old Testament law into
Christianity. In Chapter 1:25 he wrote: "But whoever looks
into the perfect law of liberty and abides in it is not merely
a hearer of the word which can be forgotten, but a doer of
the work, and this man shall be blessed in his labor."^ In
Chapter 2:11, James admonished those who have broken
the commandments: "You have become a transgressor of
the law ... so speak and act as men who are to be judged by
the law of liberty."^ This clearly denotes that individuals
are to be held responsible for their choices and actions. Irre-
sponsible actions are to be judged accordingly.
Paul wrote from Corinth encouraging the Galatians to
maintain Christian liberty. Chapter 5:1, "Stand firm there-
fore in the liberty with which Christ has made us free, and
be not harnessed again under the yoke of servitude." In
Romans 8:21 we find that servitude is the bondage of cor-
ruption. Then in Galatians Chapter 5:13 and 14, "For my
brethren you have been called to liberty, only do not use
your liberty for an occasion to the things of the flesh, but by
love serve one another. For the whole law is fulfilled in one
saying that is: You shall love your neighbor as yourself."
Underlying liberty is freedom of choice. We are admon-
ished to make only responsible choices. Our actions should
focus on service rather than on the accumulation of wealth
as an end in itself. To live within the laws of the Command-
ments also includes the prohibition of making laws which
institutionalize greed, envy, lust, or coveting of property. So
herein is the spirit of the law.
Reasserting the Spirit of 76 / 79
The Purpose of Law
As to the purpose of law, we may turn to the great Eng-
lish judge. Sir William Blackstone, who said "The principal
aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of
those absolute rights which were vested in them by the
inrunutable laws of nature The first and primary end of
human laws is to maintain and regulate those 'absolute'
rights of individuals."^ The Frenchman, Frederic Bastiat, in
his pamphlet on The Law wrote: "We hold from God the gift
which includes all others. This gift is life — physical,
intellectual and moral life. . . . Life, faculties, production —
in other words, individuality, liberty, property — this is
man. And in spite of the cunning of artful political leaders,
these three gifts from God precede all human legislation,
and are superior to it
"Life, liberty and property do not exist because men
have made laws. On the contrary, it was the fact that life,
liberty, and property existed beforehand that caused men to
make laws in the first place The law is the organization
of the natural right of lawful defense. It is the substitution
of a common force for individual forces. And this common
force is to do only what the individual forces have a natural
and lawful right to do; to protect persons, liberties, and
properties; and to maintain the right of each, and to cause
justice to reign over us all."^
Constitutional Law — Power to the People
In the United States Constitution we find a codification
of the Biblical laws. It provided for the protection of life, lib-
erty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. It provided for
the freedom of choice of individuals with implied self-
80 / Wesley H. Hillendahl
responsibility for their actions, and the protection of indi-
viduals against those who would abridge or infringe those
rights. A society wherein individuals are free to choose
requires a government supported willingly by the consent
of the governed. Individuals who choose to be free must be
willing to support laws which protect the rights of all oth-
ers who choose to be free. This constitutes a free and open
society wherein each can choose to serve God and mankind
in the ways of his own choice, free from the will of others.
At the same time, the men who drafted the Constitution
accepted the fact that individuals are corruptible. They are
subject to temptation; they can be envious, and greedy;
they may steal, or covet property. As someone has said,
each man has his price, and it is indeed a rare individual
who is totally incorruptible, given the opportunity to gain
power. So their principal concern was how to develop a
legal framework that would prevent corruptible individu-
als or groups from acquiring power to infringe on the rights
of other individuals. The key word is power. The division
of power, fragmentation of power, and the checks and bal-
ances of power extend through the entire fabric of the Con-
stitution. A horizontal division of power was provided in
the form of legislative, executive, and judicial separation. A
vertical division of power appears in the form of the fed-
eral, state, and local governments. The goal was to limit
opportunities to concentrate powers taken from the people.
Limiting the Government
The Bill of Rights includes a set of specific "thou shalt
nots" which were designed to constrain the federal govern-
ment from infringing on specific individual rights. In sub-
stance, the Constitution is a document which was designed
Reasserting the Spirit of 76 / 81
to hold in chains the powers and authority of the federal
government along with those who would use government
to further their own ends.
For such a system to survive requires a continual effort
toward maintaining the distribution and balance of power
at all times. During a speech in Ireland on July 10, 1790,
John Curran warned, "The condition upon which God hath
given liberty to man is eternal vigilance."
The guarantees of "freedom to" — to choose, to try and
to fail — can only be made under a government which is
restricted from interfering with individual choices. In con-
trast, the constitution of the Soviet Union and the United
Nations charter are vehicles of unlimited power. Their
goals of "freedom from" — from war, disease, want, unem-
ployment and the like— can only be enforced by an unlim-
ited central authority and bureaucracy.
Being aware that neither the Constitution nor statutory
law can ever change the nature of man, nor force him to be
what he cannot or will not be, we may ask how successful
were the framers of the Constitution. We live in an imper-
fect world. It is an imperfect Constitution, and we are
imperfect individuals. Yet for nearly two centuries with
freedom of opportunity the people of the United States
increased their standard of living more rapidly than did
those of any other nation in the world. Given the choice, the
acid test is whether one would rather live in the United
States or somewhere else in the world. The vast influx of
legal and illegal aliens speaks for itself.
The Problems of Government— Man Was Made Vain
Yet we are troubled today; inflation, unemployment,
economic instability, housing shortages, high taxes, high
82 / Wesley H. Hillendahl
interest rates, are but a few of our problems. How do the
conditions underlying the problems of today compare with
the concerns and grievances of the Founding Fathers? Let's
look again at the Declaration of Independence. The signers
were concerned about "relinquishing the rights of repre-
sentation in the legislature." Today we are concerned about
centralized government and administrative law.
In 1776 they were concerned about being "exposed to
dangers of invasion from without and convulsions from
within." Increasing numbers are concerned about our
defense posture today and the problems of internal unrest.
They complained that "judges were dependent on the
will (of the King) for tenure of their offices." Today's judges
are political appointees who, to a significant extent, legis-
late according to their ideologies rather than seek precedent
for decisions.
The Founders were concerned about "a multitude of
new offices," and we are concerned about burgeoning
bureaucracy.
They were concerned about "imposing taxes without
our consent." Who isn't concerned today about high taxes,
consent or otherwise?
They were concerned about "deprived . . . benefits of
trial by jury." Today administrative law has gone a long
way to the same end, and has altered fundamentally the
forms of government.
They complained about exciting "domestic insurrec-
tions among us." Today who is not concerned about crime
and personal safety? The very survival of our system is
threatened by the encroachment of a totalitarian ideology.
Are we not faced again today with the problems of 200
years ago? We are in fact encountering an ageless collision
with a destructive ideology. Paul wrote in his letter to the
Reasserting the Spirit of 76 / 83
Romans 8:20,21, "For man was made subject to vanity . . /'
(Definitions of vanity include, "inflated pride of one's self/'
or "emptiness, worthlessness." We may ponder the signifi-
cance of this polarity of meaning.) "For man was made sub-
ject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who gave
him free will in the hope that he would choose rightly.
Because man himself shall be delivered from the bondage of
corruption into the glorious liberty of the Children of God."
Or perhaps more clearly, man (of) himself shall be deliv-
ered . . . Man only by his own choice of responsible
thoughts and actions can achieve the soul growth that is
required to achieve grace, and entrance into the Kingdom
of God.
But in fact, has he chosen "rightly"? In spite of the com-
mandment "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's property,"
we have permitted laws to be passed which, taken all
together, confiscate almost half of our neighbor's property
via taxes in the vain concept of doing good. These vain
thoughts manifest in a number of syndromes:
• The "welfare" syndrome which enforces the privilege
of the few at the expense of the rights of the individuals
who constitute the body politic.
• The "free lunch" syndrome which looks on dollars
sent from Washington as free. If we don't get them, some-
one else will.
• The "meddling in the affairs of others" syndrome in
which individuals feel compelled to attempt to solve the
problems of others rather than minding their own business
and concentrating on solving their own problems.
• Similarly, the "let George do it" syndrome considers
today's problems to be too complex to be solved equitably
at the state or local level — they must be sent to Washington.
84 / Wesley K Hillendahl
• The "exploitation" syndrome in which the producers
in society are held to have victimized those less stationed.
Therefore the producers must be chained with regulations
and their ill-gotten profits must be taxed away.
• The "victims of society" syndrome maintains that crim-
inals are the innocent victims of society — they cannot be held
responsible for their crimes or misdeeds; therefore they must
be pampered and "rehabilitated" rather than punished,
while many live in fear that they may be the next victims.
• Finally, the "homogenized milk" syndrome which is
destroying all natural affinity groups and is forcing all peo-
ple to live and work together on the basis of a "social
adjustment" formula of equality based on race, color, creed,
or whether one fancies dogs, cats, horses, or white rats.
These syndromes are all manifestations of an ideology
that is anathema to liberty. They reflect the attitude of those
who lack faith in the ability of each individual to solve his
or her own problems; hence, a forced redistribution of soci-
ety is necessary to overcome maladjustments.
The thermometer of a redistributive society is what?
Inflation. Inflation is a measure of the maldistribution of
wealth via government — no more, no less. The underlying
motivating forces and the mechanics of inflation are com-
plex and widely misunderstood. Yet no one in good con-
science can deny the necessity to help those who are in a
condition of misfortune. However, today much redistrib-
uted wealth is going to those who have established vested
positions of privilege. The consequence is that regardless of
how legitimate a given cause may be, the total burden of
aggregate causes on the nation has exceeded the carrying
capacity of its productive resources to the point where
inflation is an unavoidable condition. The problem goes far
Reasserting the Spirit of 76 / 85
deeper than any transient federal administration, its roots
extend back through decades, hiflation is the manifestation
of vain thoughts and ideas applied cumulatively since the
Civil War. It represents the misapplication of free will and
an accumulation of a vast number of wrong choices.
The Redistribution of Power
What have been the mechanics of change wherein these
false doctrines have gained ascendancy?
Dr. Cornelius Cotter, Professor of Political Science at the
University of Wisconsin, appeared before a special Senate
committee in April, 1973.^ He remarked: "You know. Sena-
tor Mathias, it has been said — and, 1 think wisely so — that if
the United States ever developed into a totalitarian state we
would not know it. We would not know that it had hap-
pened. It would be all so gradual, the ritualism would all be
retained as a facade to disguise what had happened. Most
people in the United States, in official position, would con-
tinue to do the sorts of things that they are doing now. The
changes would have all been so subtle although so funda-
mental that p>eople generally would be unaware."
Senator Church res|X)nded, "That is the way it hap-
jDened in Rome, is it not?"
Dr. Cotter: "Indeed."
Senator Mathias: "No Roman was more deferential than
Augustus."
Dr. Cotter: "Exactly"
Senator Church: "And kept the Senate happy, although
the Senate had lost its power."
So this age-old collision of ideas is producing very sub-
tle changes in the power structure of the United States. The
mechanism of change involves power, its balance and the
86 / Wesley H. Hillendahl
concentration. Four simultaneous flows have been under-
way for a century: (1) Power from the Congress to the Exec-
utive Branch, (2) power from the Congress to the Supreme
Court, (3) power from the states to the federal government,
and (4) power from individuals to the government.
Judicial Abuses
Let's examine some of these flows of power. First, the
Supreme Court. The Bill of Rights expressly forbids the fed-
eral government to interfere with the fundamental personal
liberties of individuals in this society. That's clear enough.
As an outfall of the Civil War, the 14th Amendment was
adopted in 1868. This amendment forbids the states to
interfere with the rights of the people. However, it had a
devious intent, namely to give Congress control over the
people of the South. But in 1873 the Supreme Court
thwarted that intent in the "Slaughterhouse Cases." For
half a century an ideal situation prevailed in which both the
federal government and the states were constrained by the
Constitution and its amendments from interfering with the
liberties of the people.
However, in more recent years a subtle but profound
change has been effected by the Supreme Court. Dean
Clarence Manion wrote, ". . . . For the 32 years of service
together on the Supreme Court, Justices Black and Douglas
have been repetitiously citing each other as authority for a
gross and gratuitous misconstruction of the First and 14th
Amendments."''
"The accumulation of these malignant constitutional
misconstructions of the first eight amendments with the
14th has placed a cancer near the heart of our constitu-
Reasserting the Spirit of 76 / 87
tional system which is proliferated with each successive
term of the United States Supreme Court."^ Essentially,
today the Court has legislated its jurisdiction over the
rights of j)eople by effectively merging the Bill of Rights
into the 14th Amendment and reversing its position in
1873.
The specific consequences of the Black and Douglas
decision were highlighted in an editorial which appeared
in the San Diego Union: "The United States Supreme Court
has returned three more decisions drastically altering the
pattern of American life.
"For more than 15 years now the Court has been
steadily rewriting the laws and reinterpreting the Constitu-
tion to suit the ideological bias or judicial whims of its
members . . .
"In recent days the Supreme Court has ridden over
states' rights abolishing residency requirement for relief,
sidestepped a ruling in a case of burning the American
Flag, and placed further restrictions on law enforcement by
freeing a convicted rapist because the police took his fin-
gerprints in some legal hocus-pocus . . .
". . . Court majorities in those 15 years have returned
more than 30 decisions . . . have brought about basic and
often demoralizing changes in the fields of politics, crimi-
nal procedure, religion, race relations, subversion and com-
munism, cmtitrust laws and obscenity.
"The Court has told the states how they are to portion
their legislatures, granted avowed Communists the run of
defense plants; made a criminal's confession almost impos-
sible to use; approved even secondary school demonstra-
tions against the South Vietnam war; banned prayers or
reading of the Bible in public classrooms; ruled that pass-
88 / Wesley H. Hillendahl
ports cannot be withheld from Communists just because
they are Communists; and held that deserters from the
armed forces, even in wartime, cannot be stripped of citi-
zenship. . . .
"In the notorious Keylishian case, a majority opinion
held that a college professor may not be dismissed for
teaching and advocating, in college, or anywhere, the over-
throw of our government by force and violence . . .^ The
Court, once the ultimate in both prudence and jurispru-
dence, is now the darling of the liberal radicals; it has done
for them what the Congress has refused to do."^^
This is a most concise summary of the consequences of
the Court's abrogation of states' rights and the jurisdiction
of Congress.
Courts Take Charge as Congress Forfeits Control
At this point, the more perceptive will grasp the real
issue which underlies the polarization of the Nation con-
cerning the Equal Rights Amendment. Under the facade of
women's rights, the real objective is to deliver the jurisdic-
tion for defining the rights of all individuals into the hand
of a Congress which has already defaulted its jurisdiction
to the legislative whims of the Supreme Court. At the heart
of the opposition to ERA are those who recognize its pas-
sage would give validity to the Supreme Court's abridge-
ment of the Bill of Rights, and encourage further intrusions
into the private affairs of individuals.
As a curtain over these actions, a myth has been erected
which holds that Supreme Court decisions are the "Law of
the Land." It presumes that once the Court takes a position
on a case, every similar case would be adjudged that way.
In actuality, each ruling is the "law of the case." It is possi-
Reasserting the Spirit of '76 / 89
ble for a court, made up of the same or different justices, to
arrive at a different interpretation if it were to rule on a sim-
ilar case.
Under a second myth, the prevailing belief is that Con-
gress has no control over the Supreme Court, hence. Con-
gress has no way to redress the sorties of the Court into the
legislative arena. Such an alleged lack of control is far from
fact. Congress enacted the first Federal Judiciary Act in
1789 and this act has been employed to apply its unques-
tioned constitutional power over the jurisdiction of all fed-
eral courts.
The Congress by a wide margin recently voted to deny
the Supreme Court the right to spend appropriated funds
to conduct hearings into school busing cases, in effect,
denying the court jurisdiction.
Dean Clarence Manion of Notre Dame held that a major
step will be taken toward rectifying the consequences of the
Court's unconstitutional decisions when the Congress
restricts, abolishes or controls selected types of appellate
jurisdiction of both the Supreme Court and all other federal
courts." A federal court system comprised mainly of judges
and justices who are committed to upholding the original
tenets underlying the Constitution, can do a great deal to
curb the judicial misuses and excesses which have pre-
vailed in recent years.
Legislative Abuses
For many decades the Supreme Court routinely struck
down as unconstitutional various acts passed by Congress
which infringed on the Bill of Rights. However, over the
last two decades the Congress, taking its cue from the
Black-Douglas Supreme Court decisions, has enacted a
90 / Wesley H. Hillendahl
number of bills which have intruded ever-increasingly into
those rights which were originally held to be out of bounds.
These intrusions are being felt by the public in their oppor-
tunities for employment, work environment, on the high-
way, in the air, while shopping and banking, in schools,
among family relations and in the home. While obviously
accomplishing some benefits, the bulk of this legislation
has been undertaken in response to the highly vocal, some-
times rowdy, pressure of special-interest groups. In the
main, these intrusions have caused vast numbers of people
to become outraged, resentful, and rebellious.
In its attempts to legislate social justice and equality, the
Congress has cut to the core of the mores of the incredibly
complex but generally balanced and tolerant American
society.
The wisdom of those who insisted on including the Bill
of Rights in the Constitution is gradually seeping into the
subconscience of all but the most hardheaded advocates of
reform by coercion. It would be a wise Congress indeed
that undertook to reverse or modify these unconstitutional
intrusions which prior congresses have made over the
years.
Executive Abuses
The scope of the powers of the executive branch has
been expanded enormously, particularly in recent years.
Authority of the office of the President has increased while
departments, commissions, boards, and agencies have pro-
liferated.
Professor Cotter and Professor J. M. Smith determined
that the powers entrusted by Congress to the Executive
Branch can be grouped in four categories: (1) powers over
Reasserting the Spirit of 76 / 91
fjersons, (2) powers to acquire property, (3) powers to regu-
late property, and (4) control of communications.^^
Executive Orders: The President normally employs Exec-
utive Orders to implement the efficient conduct of the daily
routines of the office.^^ However, several presidents have
employed Executive Orders to conduct international rela-
tions and to effect legislation.
For example. President Roosevelt used an Executive
Order in 1933 to establish diplomatic relationships with the
Communist regime in Russia at a time when it was unlikely
that such action by Congress would have been supported
by a consensus of the people.
Under the pressure of time, the President has employed
emergency orders properly in the declaration of national
emergencies. However, one would believe that matters as
basic as the legal framework for the conduct of government
under such national emergencies would be given extensive
examination by the Congress in the process of passing suit-
able laws. Such is not the case.
President John F. Kennedy issued a series of Executive
Orders in 1%2 which established a comprehensive legal
framework to deal with any national emergency as defined
by the President or the Congress.^"* On its face, this would
appear to have constituted an unwarranted intrusion into
the legislative process.
On October 11, 1966, President Lyndon Johnson issued
Executive Order 11310 which continued the process by
transferring the authority granted under the emergency or-
ders from the Office of Emergency Planning to the Depart-
ment of Justice.
President Richard Nixon also gave attention to updat-
ing the emergency orders while in office.
Early in the 1970s Congress became sufficiently con-
92 / Wesley H. Hillendahl
cerned about the existence of national emergencies that the
Senate established a Special Committee on the Termination
of the National Emergency.^^ This led in 1976 to the passage
of the National Emergencies Act.^^ This act terminated all
existing declared emergencies and established procedures
and limits for the declaration of future national emergen-
cies.
The matter took on new impetus when, on July 20, 1979,
President Jimmy Carter issued two new Executive Orders:
(1) E.O. 12148 Federal Emergency Management, which
authorized a thorough overhaul of both civil and war emer-
gency procedures and placed them under a newly created
Federal Emergency Management Council.
(2) E.O. 12149 Federal Regional Councils, which estab-
lished councils for ten standard federal regions, their prin-
cipal function being to implement federal programs.
Taken separately or together these Executive Orders
provide wide-ranging ramifications when analyzed from
the point of view of the powers delegated to these Councils.
While these structures may be thought of as logical provi-
sions for the implementation of federal policy, increasing
numbers of states are taking the position that Regional
Councils constitute a major intrusion into their autonomy.^^
Such widespread reaction would lead one to conclude
that a deep rift has developed in the power structure as a
consequence of the thrust underlying these Executive
Orders. As a consequence of these and other Executive
Orders, a broad review by Congress of their use and abuses
should lead to establishing guidelines which define appro-
priate uses of Executive Orders by the Executive Branch.
Administrative Law: The myriad of statutes, regulations,
and codes by which the various departments and bureaus
of government administer their operations under the
Reasserting the Spirit of 76 / 93
Executive Branch constitute administrative law. In large
part they are established to implement details of the broad
language of the acts of Congress. These regulations are es-
sential to the smooth and orderly functioning of govern-
ment.
Nevertheless, the structure of departments which com-
bines executive, legislative, and enforcement or judicial
functions, provides a concentration of power and authority
which lends itself to potential bureaucratic abuses. Among
many possible examples, congressional hearings have
revealed that the detailed statutes developed in administer-
ing the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) went
far beyond the intent of the act, and provided the basis for
executive abuses and deliberate harassment, in particular
of small business. Many are aware of instances in which the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, using the
charge of conspiracy and restraint of trade, has imposed
fines and/or jail sentences though the accused firms and
their officers were innocent. These firms chose to make
payment under a plea of nolo contendere because the legal
fees required to establish their innocence would exceed the
fine.
Administered proi:)erly, government agencies should
facilitate trade and commerce, and protect the various
interests of the people. At best, administrative law can only
regulate, prohibit, or constrain individuals or groups from
imposing on the rights of others. However, in increasing
numbers of cases the bureaucracy has gone far beyond its
legitimate functions. One may find dozens of magazine
and newspaper articles reciting wasteful or counter-pro-
ductive bureaucratic activities, and arrogant abuses of
power. Today the friction and costs to society of the bureau-
cracy have reached destructive proportions. These excesses
94 / Wesley H. Hillendahl
must be brought again under control. The implementation
of reforms is too broad a subject to address here. A
comprehensive report by the Heritage Foundation^^ has
recommended a broad platform of reforms to President-
Elect Reagan "to roll back big government." Included are
specific recommendations concerning Executive Orders
and administrative law. Implementation of these recom-
mendations should go a long way in restoring a prof)er bal-
ance of power.
Revitalizing the American I>ream
The foregoing are but a few examples of the restructur-
ing of power which has been achieved during the last cen-
tury. They have been selected to illustrate the vast depar-
ture from the spirit in which the Constitution was written
some 200 years ago. As a consequence, people in all walks
of life — both the providers and the recipients of govern-
ment aid — are hurting as they have never hurt before. The
thermometer — inflation — shows that the waters of our eco-
nomic and political environment are approaching the boil-
ing point. Not one amongst us is immune to the heat.
In the face of these adversities, a new spirit is emerging
in the land. The new religious revival extending from
neighborhoods to nationwide television is a new expres-
sion of the old Spirit of '76. People are going back to basics.
They are thinking, questioning, and organizing.^^
The overwhelming choice by the electorate of a new
administration dedicated to redressing these abuses of
power is a manifestation of the revival of the spirit.
The retirement of many congressmen who have aided
and abetted this misdirection of power, together with the
election of other congressmen who affirm the original pre-
Reasserting the Spirit of 76 / 95
cepts of the Constitution are further manifestations of the
spirit.
Yet this is only a beginning. We must not expect mira-
cles from any administration, nor can any of us escape the
painful process of readjustment. We are presently in a posi-
tion to achieve a victory in this battle. But the foes in the
ageless war for the minds of men are not to be easily van-
quished. It will require years of unrelenting effort to over-
come the damages which have been incurred by the Repub-
lic.
We know in our hearts that cold, impersonal welfare
will never succeed loving charity. Government can never
provide security to replace self-reliance. No government
can accomplish those things we must do for ourselves if our
souls and spirits are to expand. If we are to restore the
American dream we must never again become complacent
and allow ourselves to be overridden by those who are in a
vain quest for false goals.
Let us again restore the balance between spiritual and
material values. The institutions of church and state are
inseparable, they are as inseparable as two ends of a rope,
each is a manifestation of the spirit and substance of soci-
ety.^ We may recall that the spirit of liberty was heralded
from every pulpit during our Revolutionary War. I main-
tain that Spirit of '76 has never really disappeared, we have
simply allowed it to become encrusted with false doctrine.
Paul offered words of encouragement: "Stand firm
therefore in liberty with which Christ has made us free. Be
not harnessed again under the yoke of servitude. ... the
bondage of corruption." James urged us: "So speak and so
act as men and women who are to be judged by the law of
liberty." Let freedom-loving individuals prevail by reas-
serting the Spirit of '76.
96 / Wesley H. Hillendahl
1. Clarence E. Manion, Cancer in the Constitution (Shepherdsville,
Ky.: Victor Publishing Company, 1972).
2. Holy Bible, trans. George M. Lamsa (Philadelphia: A. J. Holman,
1957). This version is translated into English from the Aramaic, the lan-
guage of Jesus and is recognized for accuracy and clarity of expression.
3. The law of liberty within the context of Bible usage expresses
freedom of choice with consequences. All thoughts and actions cause
reactions for which we are to be held accountable. The law of liberty is
the Christian counterpart of the Sanskrit term, karma.
4. James Mussatti, The Constitution of the United States, Our Charter
of Liberties (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1960), p. 9.
5. Frederic Bastiat, The Law, trans. Dean Russell (Irvington-on-
Hudson, N.Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, 1950), pp. 5, 6, 7.
(The Law was first published as a pamphlet in June 1850.)
6. U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee on the Termination of
the National Emergency, National Emergency, Part 1 Constitutional Ques-
tions Concerning Emergency Powers, Hearings before the Special Com-
mittee of the Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., April 11, 12, 1973, p. 29.
7. Manion, p. 33.
8. Ibid., p. 35.
9. As a consequence of this Supreme Court decision, by 1975 an
estimated 2,000 campus "radical economists" who "respect the point of
view of Mao" and who believe in "a socialism of affluence" were mem-
bers of the Union of Radical Political Economists. (Los Angeles Times,
December 21, 1975J.
10. San Diego Union, April 28, 1%9.
11. Manion, p. 27.
12. C. P. Cotter and J. M. Smith, Pozvers of the President During Crises
(Washington, D. C: Public Affairs Press, 1960).
13. Executive Orders are issued by the President, reviewed by the
Office of Legal Counsel and published in the Federal Register. They
become law unless rescinded by Congress within a specified period of
time.
14. Executive Orders including numbers 10995, 10997,10998, 10999
and 11000, 11001, 11002, 11003, 11004, 11005 and 11051 define proce-
dures during war, attacks or other emergencies for executive control of
communications, energy, food and farming, all modes of trans-
Reasserting the Spirit of 76 / 97
portation, civilian work brigades, health, education and welfare func-
tions, housing, public storage and so on.
15. VS. Congress, Senate, National Emergency.
16. National Emergencies Act, U.S. Code, vol. 50, sec. 1601- 51 (1976).
17. Extensive hearings on regional governance have been con-
ducted by legislative committees in a score of states. The proceedings of
these hearings appear in bulletins published by the Committee to
Restore the Constitution, Inc., P.O. Box 986, Fort Collins, Colorado
80522.
18. Charles Heatherly, ed.. Mandate for Leadership (Washington,
D.C.: HeriUge Foundation, 1980).
19. For an example of grass roots organization see "The Pro-Family
Movement: A Special Report" in Conservative Digest 6 (May/June 1980).
20. Into the artfully contrived rift between church and state has
been driven the wedge of Humanism. According to the book The
Assault on the Family, "As a religion. Humanism demands the end of all
religions that are God-oriented, and the abolition of the profit-moti-
vated society, so that a world Utopian state may be established which
will dictate the distribution of the means of life for everyone." See "Our
Last Opportunity" in Don Bell Reports, November 13, 1980.
Faith of Our Fathers
Clarence B. Carson
History, it has been said, is a seamless cloth. The
thought is apt. You cannot clip a thread within it and
attempt to extricate it without unraveling the whole. There
have been efforts to tell the history of the United States with
the role of religion either excised from it or altered within it.
One common alteration occurs in those textbooks which
claim that the Pilgrims and Puritans came to America for
freedom of religion.
They did not. They came in order to be able to practice
their religion. The difference is by no means merely a quib-
ble. Freedom of religion, as it is now understood, is a secu-
lar concept. It is probably even more highly valued by those
who have no religious faith than by active believers. To be
able to practice one's faith is only of value to him who has a
faith to practice. It is a sacred, not a secular, value. The Puri-
tans at the time of settlement could no more conceive of the
desirability of freedom of religion than Treasury officials
today can conceive of the desirability of freedom of
counterfeiting.
My point is that books on American history often either
secularize religious values, treat them as alien, or leave
them out of account. Yet, without these religious founda-
tions there could have been no United States as it was and
This essay was published in the December 1976 issue of The Free-
man.
98
Faith of Our Fathers / 99
is. There is no knowing American history without grasping
its underpinnings in Judeo-Christian faith. America as it
was and is cannot even be successfully imagined without
the thread of faith woven into the cloth of history.
Biblically Based and Christian Settlement of America
American history cannot be imagined without the pow-
erful evocative phrases of the King James Version of the
Bible, or without the story of our origins in Genesis:
In the beginning God created the heavens and the
earth. The earth was without form, and void; and
darkness was on the face of the deep. And the Spirit
of God moved upon the face of the waters.
Genesis 1:1-2.
Or, without the account of man's place in the creation:
And God said. Let us make man in our image, after
our likeness: and let them have dominion over the
fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over
the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every
creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.
So God created man in his own image, in the
image of God created he him; male and female cre-
ated he them.
Genesis 1:26-27.
The fundamental character of all proper law is revealed
in the Ten Commandments. Though two of them do com-
mand appropriate affirmative action, the remainder are
prohibitive in nature. They are brief, concise, and are read-
100 / Clarence B. Carson
ily understood. A United States without the Ten Com-
mandments in its background would have been a United
States without transcendent law upon which to build:
1. Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
2. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image.
3. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God
in vain.
4. Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.
5. Honour thy father and thy mother.
6. Thou shalt not kill.
7. Thou shalt not commit adultery.
8. Thou shalt not steal.
9. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy
neighbor.
10. Thou shalt not covet.
Excerpted and numbered from Exodus 20: 3-17.
Most of those who settled in the New World were Chris-
tian, nominally or devoutly as the case might be. Their atti-
tude toward life had been winnowed through and condi-
tioned by the Christian perspective. This meant many
things, but one of its meanings is never to be ignored by the
historian: That good ultimately triumphs over evil, that life
is not necessarily tragic but that it is potentially triumphant
when it is in accord with God's will. America without the
assurance of this Revelation could not have been as it has
been:
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was
with God, and the Word was God. He was in the
beginning with God; all things were made through
him, and without him was not anything made that
Faith of Our Fathers / 101
was made. In him was life, and the life was the light
of men. The light shines in the darkness, and the
darkness has not overcome it.
John 1:1-5 (RSV)
This assurance comes through in the beautiful promises of
the Beatitudes:
Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the
kingdom of heaven.
Blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be
comforted.
Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the
earth.
Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for
righteousness, for they shall be satisfied.
Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain
mercy.
Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see
God.
Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be
called the sons of God.
Blessed are those who are persecuted for right-
eousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
Blessed are you when men revile you and perse-
cute you and utter all kinds of evil against you
falsely on my account.
Rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in
heaven, for so men persecuted the prophets who
were before you.
Matthew 5: 3-11 (RSV)
102 / Clarence B. Carson
Roman Catholicism
The Christian religion was for a thousand years of its
history represented primarily by the Roman Catholic
Church. Within that fold many doctrines were shaped and
many great preachers and teachers held forth. While the
Catholic Church was suspect to some of the Founders of the
United States, it is nonetheless the case that the Faith of Our
Fathers found many of its underpinnings in that faith. Here
is a statement from the monastic ideal of the Middle Ages:
This treasure, then, namely Christ, our God and
Lord, who was made for us as both redeemer and
reward. He Himself both the promiser and the prize,
who is both the life of man and the eternity of the
angels — this, I say, store away with diligent care in
the recesses of your heart. On Him cast the anxiety
of any care whatsoever. In Him delight through the
discourse of zealous prayer. In Him refresh yourself
by the nightly feasts of holy meditation. Let Him be
your food, and your clothing no less. If it should
happen that you lack anything of external conve-
nience, do not be uncertain, do not despair of His
true promise in which He said "Seek ye first the
kingdom of God, and all things shall be added unto
you. . . ."
Peter Damiani (Eleventh Century)
Protestant Reformation
Even more, however, is the United States inconceivable
without the Protestant Reformation. Most of the colonies
were settled by one or more offshoots of this movement.
Faith of Our Fathers / 103
The emphasis upon reason. Scripture, and decision by the
individual — hallnnarks of the Reformation — was never
more dramatically stated than by Martin Luther at the Diet
of Worms in his refusal to recant:
Since your Majesty and your lordships ask for a sim-
ple reply, I shall give you one without horns and
without teeth; unless I am convinced by the evi-
dence of Scriptures or by plain reason ... I am bound
by the Scriptures I have cited and my conscience is
captive to the Word of God. 1 cannot and will not
recant anything, for it is neither safe nor right to go
against conscience. I can do no other.
Martin Luther (Diet of Worms, 1521)
The tendency in Protestant lands, however, was to have
one established church. Those who did not want such an
establishment, or wanted a different one, were often perse-
cuted in their home lands. Some of these sought refuge in
America. The Pilgrims were the first of such English groups
to do so. The character of the faith of one of their leaders,
William Bradford, comes through in this selection from his
writing:
What could now sustain them but the Spirit of God
and His grace? May not and ought not the children
of these fathers rightly say: "Our fathers were Eng-
lishmen which came over this great ocean, and were
ready to perish in this wilderness; but they cried
unto the Lord, and He heard their voice and looked
on their adversity," etc. "Let them therefore praise
the Lord because he is good: and His mercies endure
forever." Yea, let them which have been redeemed of
104 / Clarence B. Carson
the Lord, shew how He hath delivered them from
the hand of the oppressor. When they wandered in
the desert wilderness out of the way, and found no
city to dwell in, both hungry and thirsty, their soul
was overwhelmed in them. Let them confess before
the Lord his lovingkindness and His wonderful
works before the sons of men.
William Bradford,
Of Plymouth Plantation,
The Great Awakening
At the outset, many of those who settled in the New
World were divided from one another by religious differ-
ences. The fact that most of them were Protestant served at
first more to divide than to unite them. Over the years, doc-
trinal antipathies moderated. Perhaps the single most
important of the moderating influences was the Great
Awakening. In the middle of the eighteenth century a great
revival spread through the colonies. Though it did provoke
some divisions within denominations, its tendency was to
shift the emphasis from points of doctrine to the experience
of conversion and a spiritual attitude toward life. Denomi-
nations continued to proliferate but their differences
became more a matter of modes of organization and tastes
as to ritual than of dogma and doctrine. The Great Awak-
ening provided a widely shared evangelistic base for
Protestant Christianity. The tenor of this evangelism
appears in this excerpt from a sermon by Jonathan
Edwards:
1 invite you now to a better portion. There are better
things provided for the sinful miserable children of
Faith of Our Fathers / 105
men. There is a surer comfort and more durable
peace: comfort that you may enjoy in a state of safety
and on a sure foundation: a peace and rest that you
may enjoy with reason and with your eyes wide
open; having all your sins forgiven . . . ; being taken
into God's family and made his children; and having
good evidence that your names were written on the
heart of Christ before the world was made
Jonathan Edwards
The God of Creation
In the great documents of the American Revolution
there is often an explicit reliance upon natural law and an
implicit underlying dependence on the inherited religious
faith. The God of nature and the God revealed in Scripture
was the same God. There were, however, differences in the
interpretation of Scripture, differences which did not
extend to the natural law. Hence, the appeal in the Declara-
tion of Independence was to the God of Creation:
When in the Course of human events, it becomes
necessary for one people to dissolve the political
bands which have connected them with another, and
to assume among the Powers of the earth, the sepa-
rate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature
and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to
the opinions of mankind requires that they should
declare the causes which impel them to the separa-
tion.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
106 / Clarence B. Carson
among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness
Declaration of Independence, 1776
The practice of having a written constitution is Ameri-
can in origin. It was grounded in their British heritage and
colonial experience, but it was particularly informed by
their Christian and Protestant religion. The Founders were
people of the Book, the Bible, the recorded word. As Protes-
tants mainly, they attached an unusually high importance
to Scripture and to its careful exposition. It was, to them,
the highest authority. The United States Constitution
became for them, out of this tradition, the highest authority
within the country. It was written, precise, and was to be
carefully interpreted and observed.
A Subtle Parallel
One part of the Constitution has been especially revered
over the years. It is the first ten amendments, commonly
called the Bill of Rights. Some of its antecedents are gener-
ally understood to be the Magna Carta and the English Bill
of Rights. But its most profound antecedent is usually
ignored. It is more difficult than it may at first appear to
imagine that the First Ten Amendments have played the
role they have without the prior position of the Ten Com-
mandments in the Judeo-Christian religion. It is not just
that each of them numbers ten, though they do. It is con-
siderably more. They are similar in form. The Ten Com-
mandments usually begin with "Thou shalt not." The first
Ten Amendments are equally prohibitive in their lan-
guage:"Congress shall make no law . . . , No Soldier shall
. . . , shall not be violated . . . , Excessive bail shall not be
Faith of Our Fathers / 107
required . . . /' and so forth. More, the Ten Commandments
forbid individuals to do acts that would be harmful to any-
one. The First Ten Amendments forbid government to do
acts arbitrarily detrimental to our life, liberty, and property.
The Ten Commandments proceed from our Maker to us.
The First Ten Amendments proceed from the makers of
government to it. Can it be doubted that they draw subtle
force from the parallel?
The Faith of Hamilton
The Founding Fathers were not particularly renowned
for their piety. But the springs of religious faith often ran
deep within them, to break forth only on extraordinary
occasions. So it was with Alexander Hamilton. It was his
fate to meet his death in a duel with Aaron Burr. Perhaps
"fate" is the wrong word; he took a course which exposed
him to such a death if Burr so chose. Hamilton believed that
dueling was wrong and knew that it was against the law.
Yet, when challenged he felt that he must participate. The
last note to his wife written on the night before the duel
contained these thoughts, among others:
. . . The scruples of a Christian have determined me
to expose my own life to any extent, rather than sub-
ject myself to the guilt of taking the life of another.
This much increases my hazards, and redoubles my
pangs for you. But you had rather I should die inno-
cent than live guilty. Heaven can preserve me, and I
humbly hope will; but, in the contrary event, I
charge you to remember that you are a Christian.
God's will be done! The will of a merciful God must
be good
108 / Clarence B. Carson
On the day of the duel both Hamilton and Burr raised
their pistols to the ready position on command. Burr then
aimed and fired directly at Hamilton. Hamilton fired into
the air, as he had said he would do. Hamilton died from the
wounds inflicted on him. It is difficult to imagine America
without men devoted to principles founded upon their
faith.
Washington's Farewell
Nor should we imagine an America without the guid-
ance of Washington's Farewell Address. Nor would that
address have been the same without its references to reli-
gious underpinnings:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to polit-
ical prosperity, religion and morality are indispens-
able supports. In vain would that man claim the trib-
ute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these
great pillars of human happiness — these firmest
props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere
politician, equally with the pious man, ought to
respect and cherish them. A volume would not trace
all their connections with private and public felicity.
Let it simply be asked. Where is the security for
property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of reli-
gious obligation desert the oaths which are instru-
ments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us
with caution indulge the supposition that morality
can be maintained without religion. Whatever may
be conceded to the influence of refined education on
minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience
Faith of Our Fathers / 109
both forbid us to expect that national morality can
prevail in exclusion of religious principle.
George Washington, Farewell Address
But then, the United States of America could hardly be
conceived without the Faith of Our Fathers.
II. A BIBLICAL VIEW
Jeremiah's Job
Gary North
Sooner or later, those who are interested in the philoso-
phy of liberty run across Albert J. Nock's essay, "Isaiah's
Job." Taking as an example two Old Testament prophets,
Isaiah and Elijah, Nock makes at least two important
points. First, until society seems to be disintegrating around
our ears, not many people are going to listen to a critic who
comes in the name of principled action. The masses want to
get all the benefits of principled action, but they also want
to continue to follow their unprincipled ways. They want
the fruits but not the roots of morality. Therefore, they
refuse to listen to prophets. Second, Nock pointed out, the
prophet Elijah was convinced that he was the last of the
faithful, or what Nock calls the Remnant. Not so, God told
the prophet; He had kept seven thousand others from the
rot of the day.
Elijah had no idea that there were this many faithful
p)eople left. He had not seen any of them. He had heard no
reports of them. Yet here was God, telling him that they
were out there. Thus, Nock concludes, it does no good to
count heads. The people whose heads are available for
counting are not the ones you ought to be interested in.
Whether or not people listen is irrelevant; the important
thing is that the prophet makes the message clear and
Dr. North is president of the Institute for Christian Economics in
Tyler, Texas. This essay apj:)eared in the March 1978 issue of The Free-
man.
113
114 / Gary North
consistent. He is not to water down the truth for the sake of
mass appeal.
Nock's essay helps those of us who are used to the idea
that we should measure our success by the number of peo-
ple we convince. We are "scalphunters/' when we ought to
be prophets. The prophets were not supposed to give the
message out in order to win lots of public support. On the
contrary, they were supposed to give the message for the
sake of truth. They were to witness to a generation which
would not respond to the message. The truth was therefore
its own justification. Those who were supposed to hear,
namely, the Remnant, would get the message, one way or
the other. They were the people who counted. Lesson: the
people who count can't be counted. Not by prophets, any-
way.
A Sad Message
The main trouble I have with Nock's essay is that he
excluded another very important prophet. That prophet
was Jeremiah. He was a contemporary of Isaiah, and God
gave him virtually the same message. He was told to go to
the highest leaders in the land, to the average man in the
street, and to everyone in between, and proclaim the mes-
sage. He was to tell them that they were in violation of basic
moral law in everything they did, and that if they did not
turn away from their false beliefs and wicked practices,
they would see their society totally devastated. In this
respect, Jeremiah's task was not fundamentally different
from Isaiah's.
Nevertheless, there were some differences. Jeremiah
also wrote (or dictated) a book. He was not content to
preach an unpleasant message to skeptical and hostile peo-
Jeremiah's Job / 115
pie. He wanted to record the results of their unwillingness
to listen. His thoughts are preserved in the saddest book in
the Bible, the Book of Lamentations. Though he knew in
advance that the masses would reject his message, he also
knew that there would be great suffering in Israel because
of their stiffnecked response. Furthermore, the Remnant
would pay the same price in the short run. They, too, would
be carried off into captivity. They, too, would lose their pos-
sessions and die in a foreign land. They would not be pro-
tected from disaster just because they happened to be
decent people who were not immersed in the practices of
their day. He wrote these words in resix)nse to the coming
of the predicted judgment: "Mine eye runneth down with
rivers of water for the destruction of the daughter of my
people" {Lam. 3:48). He knew that their punishment was
well deserved, yet he was also a part of them. The destruc-
tion was so great that not a glimmer of hope appears in the
whole book.
What are we to conclude? That everything is hopeless?
That no one will listen, ever, to the truth? That every society
will eventually be ripe for judgment, and that this collapse
will allow no one to escape? Is it useless, historically speak-
ing, to serve in the Remnant? Are we forever to be ground
down in the millstones of history?
One key incident in Jeremiah's life gives us the answer.
It appears in the 32nd chapter of Jeremiah, a much-neglected
passage. The Babylonians (Chaldeans) have besieged
Jerusalem. There was little doubt in anyone's mind that the
dty would fall to the invaders. God told Jeremiah that in
the midst of this crisis, his cousin would approach him and
make him an offer. He would offer Jeremiah the right, as a
relative, to buy a particular field which was in the cousin's
side of the family. Sure enough, the cousin arrived with just
116 / Gary North
this offer. The cousin was "playing it smart." He was selling
off a field that was about to fall into the hands of the enemy,
and in exchange he would be given silver, a highly liquid,
easily concealed, transportable form of capital — an interna-
tional currency. Not bad for him, since all he would be giv-
ing up would be a piece of ground that the enemy would
probably take over anyway.
Long-Range Planning
What were God's instructions to Jeremiah? Buy the field.
So Jeremiah took his silver, and witnesses, and balances
(honest money), and they made the transaction. Then Jere-
miah instructed Baruch, a scribe, to record the evidence. (It
may be that Jeremiah was illiterate, as were most men of his
day.) Baruch was told by Jeremiah to put the evidences of
the sale into an earthen vessel for long-term storage. "For
thus saith the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel; Houses and
fields and vineyards shall be possessed again in this land"
(32:15).
God explained His purposes at the end of the chapter.
Yes, the city would fall. Yes, the i:)eople would go into cap-
tivity. Yes, their sins had brought this upon them. But this is
not the end of the story. "Behold, I will gather them out of
all countries, whither 1 have driven them in mine anger,
and in my fury, and in great wrath; and I will bring them
again unto this place, and I will cause them to dwell safely:
And they shall be my people, and I will be their God"
(32:37-38). It doesn't stop there, either: "Like as I have
brought ail this great evil upon this people, so will I bring
upon them all the good that I have promised them. And
fields shall be bought in this land, whereof ye say. It is des-
Jeremiah's Job / 117
olate without man or beast; it is given into the hand of the
Chaldeans" (32:42-43).
What was God's message to Jeremiah? There is hope for
the long run for those who are faithful to His message. There will
eventually come a day when truth will out, when law will
reign supreme, when men will buy and sell, when contracts
will be honored. "Men shall buy fields for money, and sub-
scribe evidences, and seal them, and take witnesses in the
land of Benjamin, and in the places about Jerusalem, and in
the cities of Judah, and in the cities of the mountains, and in
the cities of the valley, and in the cities of the south: for I
will cause their captivity to return, saith the Lord" (32:44).
In other words, business will return because the law of God
will be understood and honored.
God had told them that they would be in captivity for
seventy years. It would be long enough to make certain that
Jeremiah would not be coming back to claim his field. Yet
there was hope nonetheless. The prophet is not to imagine
that all good things will come in his own day. He is not to
be a short-term optimist. He is not to conclude that his
words will turn everything around, making him the hero of
the hour. He is told to look at the long run, to preach in the
short run, and to go about his normal business. Plan for the
future. Buy and sell. Continue to speak out when times are
opportune. Tell anyone who will listen of the coming judg-
ment, but remind them also that all is not lost forever just
because everything seems to be lost today.
The Job Is to Be Honest
The prophet's job is to be honest. He must face the laws
of reality. If bad principles lead to bad actions, then bad
118 / Gary North
consequences will surely follow. These laws of reality can-
not be underestimated. In fact, it is the prophet's task to
reaffirm their validity by his message. He pulls no punches.
Things are not "fairly bad" if morality is ignored or
laughed at. Things are terrible, and people should under-
stand this. Still, there is hope. Men can change their minds.
The prophet knows that in "good" times, rebellious people
usually don't change their minds. In fact, that most reluc-
tant of prophets, Jonah, was so startled when the city of
Nineveh repented that he pouted that the promised judg-
ment never came, making him look like an idiot — an atti-
tude which God reproached. But in the days of Elijah, Isa-
iah, and Jeremiah, the pragmatists of Israel were not about
to turn back to the moral laws which had provided their
prosperity. It would take seven decades of captivity to
bring them, or rather their children and grandchildren,
back to the truth.
Invest long-term, God told Jeremiah. Invest as if all
were not lost. Invest as if your message, eventually, will
bear fruit. Invest in the face of despair, when everyone is
running scared. Invest for the benefit of your children and
grandchildren. Invest as if everything doesn't depend on
the prophet, since prophets, being men, are not omniscient
or omnipotent. Invest as if moral law will one day be
respected. Keep plugging away, even if you yourself will
never live to see the people return to their senses and return
to their land. Don't minimize the extent of the destruction.
Don't rejoice at the plight of your enemies. Don't despair at
the fact that the Remnant is caught in the whirlpool of
destruction. Shed tears if you must, but most important,
keep records. Plan for the future. Never give an inch.
A prophet is no Pollyanna, no Dr. Pangloss. He faces
reality. Reality is his calling in life. To tell people things are
Jeremiah's Job / 119
terrible when they think everything is fine, and to offer
hope when they think everything is lost. To tell the truth,
whatever the cost, and not to let short-term considerations
blur one's vision. The Remnant is there. The Remnant will
survive. Eventually, the Remnant will become the masses,
since truth will out. But until that day, for which all
prophets should rejoice, despite the fact that few will see its
dawning, the prophet must do his best to understand real-
ity and present it in the most effective way he knows how.
That is Jeremiah's job.
Ezekiel's Job
Ridgway K. Foley, Jr.
Basic distinctions often prove elusive. Whether by
virtue of inattention, human resistance, lack of comprehen-
sion, or some indefinable perversity of life, we human
beings often fail to grasp and act upon the most central dif-
ferences both of concept and deed. As a result, all manner
of disappointing and disturbing events take place, inas-
much as one misstep at the outset of a journey can foreor-
dain an unexpected destination.
Consider one such essential distinction: personal belief
and action premised upon a set moral code versus the coer-
cive imposition of one's moral strictures upon another,
unwilling human being. The dissimilarity is fundamental
and not particularly obscure; yet, the blurring and commin-
gling of these two very different precepts (and their atten-
dant activities) have vexed men and women across time.
Ezekiel provides insights into this common and f)er-
plexing situation. Of course, it is not "with it" to relate
modern problems to some old fellow who lived long ago
and far away; in the skeptical and intolerant climate of
today, so lacking in the civility of open thought, it just does
not meet the modern dictates of intellectual exclusivity to
refer to the Bible, to Christianity, or to any traditional reli-
gion— particularly one with established attitudes of "right"
Mr. Foley lives in Prescott, Arizona, and practices law in Portland,
Oregon, with Greene & Markley, PC. This essay appeared in the Sep-
tember 1990 issue of The Freeman.
120
Ezekiel'sjob / 121
and "wrong." Yet the Book of Ezekiel lays a firm foundation
from which all of us, no matter our religious persuasion,
may investigate the differences between proper belief and
prop>er respect for the beliefs of others. After all, the essence
of the human condition remains unchanged despite the
passage of centuries.
Recall the backdrop of history. The Jewish people
received the gift of insight into the very marrow of the indi-
vidual— the ability to choose, to evaluate, and to select
among alternatives, and in so doing to affect not only the
actor's destiny but also the course of a lineal world history:
"... I have set before thee this day life and good, and death
and evil. ... I have set before you life and death, blessing
and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy
seed shall live. . . ."(Deut. 30:15,19)
These ancient men and women displayed the same fea-
tures and failings as we do. At times they made venal,
undesirable, and unwise choices, and as a result suffered
the inexorable consequences which flowed from their con-
duct. As a nation, ancient Israel waxed and waned: Things
worked out well when the people adhered to the Deca-
logue, and bad times followed their evil exploits. God
endowed men with freedom, even the freedom to forsake
Him and to choose wrongly, for freedom necessarily entails
the freedom to fail. Although the ineluctable law of cause-
and-consequence foretold unpleasant sequels from inap-
propriate acts, the Jews of old seemed hell-bent on the eter-
nal folly of trying to beat the house.
Now and then, when the Hebrew nation deviated suffi-
ciently from the proper standard of behavior, God sent a
prophet, a man assigned to remind His flock of the rules of
the game and to warn them of the inevitable lunacy of try-
ing to avoid responsibility for their wickedness. Sometimes
122 / Ridgzvay K. Foley, Jr.
the body politic listened; more often, the people ignored,
joshed, or abused the prophet.
Enter Ezekiel
Ezekiel was one of the major prophets, a chap God
called forth 26 centuries ago during one of those troubled
times for Israel. Prophets were role players; they were
given a part to play without a thought of the consequences.
They spoke to largely hostile audiences. They faced uncom-
fortable, and sometimes dangerous, situations. They for-
sook popularity, credibility, status, and wealth. In return,
they knew that somewhere, somehow, a dutiful Remnant^
would hear and heed the words they uttered as God's inter-
mediary.^ Ezekiel fit right into this tapestry of history and
role of prophet. God instructed him and he, in turn, carried
the message to those of the multitude who chose to listen.
And, it is that critical message recorded in Ezekiel 33:1-11
which edifies us specifically as to the dichotomy between
personal commitment and coerced orthodoxy.
Ezekiel 33:1-11 imparts threefold tidings. First, God tells
His people "I have sent thee a watchman" {Ezek. 33:7) and
He outlines the obligations of the watchman. Second, He
advises the Remnant of the duties laid upon those who hear
His watchman. Third — and most saliently for our present
purpose — He answers the ageless inquiry of the listeners,
"How should we then live?" {Ezek. 33:10)
How should we then live? Distinguish between the
encompassed relativism of a humanistic "man is the mea-
sure of all things" precept and an understanding that
imperfect individuals will profess different beliefs. It is one
thing to ascertain for oneself how the moral life is to be
lived; it is quite another matter to impose that particular
EzekieVsJob / 123
view upon an unwilling neighbor. The Christian may think
it great folly for each man to live according to his internal
moral code oblivious to God's law ("ye shall be as gods/'
Gen, 3:5), or "each individual's innate sense of truth and
justice"; does this profession of faith necessarily or properly
vest in the practicing Christian the right to compel all oth-
ers to accept his creed? Or rather, doesn't the modem theo-
crat — ^be he religious, atheistic or agnostic — confuse subjec-
tive value with moral absolutes?
Thus, the Remnant through Ezekiel asked God, "How
should we then live?" and received a simple and direct
mandate: "As I live, saith the Lord." (Ezek. 33:11) Yet, sim-
ple declarations may cloak deeper lessons. Surely, reflective
men and women in the sixth century before Christ, as now,
wondered how the Lord did live. And, for the Jew of 2,600
years ago, as for the Christian in the late twentieth century,
the answer appears in the recorded reports of eyewitnesses
to history.^
God's Answers
God often provided sound answers to this secondary
inquiry (How does the Lord live?) for Old Testament fol-
lowers. For example, in the entire passage from Deuteron-
omy abstracted heretofore, God directed His people to fol-
low His statutes and laws (see Deut. 30:15-19), a message
often repeated but seldom heeded. He condensed His rules
of conduct in the Decalogue {Ex. 20:1-17), a precise sum-
mary not dissimilar from the essential teachings of most of
the world's great religions, and not wholly unlike the
alleged inbred "innate moral sense" so popularly presup-
posed in current lore to reside in all individuals.
Somehow, the content of these simple yet exact rules of
124 / Ridgway K. Foley, Jr.
order either escaped most folks or suffered the serious ame-
lioration of convenience. Hebraic law became burden-
somely formal and uselessly coercive, smothering the
essence in arid dust. People became baffled: How did God
live? Was it as some neighbor declared? Or according to the
local prophet, general, or rabbi? Couldn't these restrictive
commandments be modified just a bit to fit a particular case
which coincidentally happened to be of personal interest to
the inquirer? Didn't modem times mandate more modem
and less archaic solutions? And so the waxing and waning
of the Old Testament travails continued unabated long after
Ezekiel departed.
For the Christian, a remarkable and unprecedented
event occurred 2,000 years ago: God answered the sec-
ondary inquiry (How does the Lord live?) in a unique and
direct way. God became Incarnate, sending His Son in the
form of a man, to live among witnesses, to encounter and
suffer the range of human events and emotions and, inci-
dentally, to show us just how the Lord does live.
In the examination of Jesus' life, set against the back-
drop of the Old Testament law, we see not only how the
Lord lives but also the stark distinction between principled
personal belief and the mandate to respect the beliefs (no
matter how dissimilar or possibly erroneous) of others.
Simply put, Jesus lived a life of pristine purity: He adhered
to the essence of the Ten Commandments and eschewed
sin and evil. He built no monuments to His reign; He
assembled no mighty army to strike down the soldiers of
Satan; He accepted no patronage; He granted no special
favors; He left no estate of substance. In short, Jesus lived
quite unlike any human being, ruler or ruled, in all of
human history.
Did Jesus ever force anyone to believe, to chant His
Ezekiel'sjob / 125
praise, to recite His creed, to follow Him? Did He ever box
the ears of an unreceptive and hooting audience and charge
them to "be Christians and do exactly as I say and do or I'll
whomp you"? Did He ever ostracize or humiliate those
who declined His offers? There is absolutely no evidence of
such behavior.
Peter presents the perfect counterpoint, the epitome of
demonstrative evidence. Once Peter figures out who his
Master is he immediately suggests building a grand temple
{Matt. 17:4-9); he admonishes Jesus that He must avoid His
trip to Jerusalem and His destiny on the cross {Mark
8:31-33); and, in the garden, he slices off the ear of the ser-
vant of the high priest {Matt. 26:51-52). In every instance,
Peter's actions earn stem rebukes, for Peter behaves as men
do, not as the Lord does.
Abundant Lessons
Layers of lessons abound in the Lord's answer to
Ezekiel's question, and each layer offers guidance for
believer and nonbeliever alike.
First, Ezekiel and his counterparts must adhere to prin-
ciple in a sea of challenge, doubt, and seduction. Absolutes
in the form of correct choices and proper principles do
exist; consequences flow from all choices, results that must
be endured, events that beget future choices. Selection
between alternatives may be made randomly, thought-
lessly, malevolently, or may rest upon the basis of the
actor's understanding of, and adherence to, fundamental
principle. The principled individual is charged to live
scrupulously, to make the right choice at each and every
opportunity, be he Christian or Jew, atheist or agnostic; the
distinction exists in the standard.
126 / Ridgway K. Foley, Jr.
When the moral individual refuses to soften this quest
for perfection, he is often met with derision, enticement, or
compulsion. In this regard, scant differences separate the
doctrinaire libertarian and the overzealous Christian. There
appears a natural human tendency to challenge the beliefs
of others, first through shunning and scorn, last by force
and fraud. Those most inflexible in principle seem to suffer
the greatest assaults, possibly because the traducers implic-
itly recognize the propriety of the upright and seek to
wrench them down to their level.
Disorderly man occupies an orderly sphere and setting.
Gifted with the power to choose, flawed mankind necessar-
ily makes poor choices on occasion, for freedom encom-
passes the power and the right to be wrong. The Christian
is called only to be a faithful steward, not a perfect one. Per-
fection is our goal; it is not within our grasp. A sentry at
Buckingham House, two-and-one-quarter centuries back,
put it artfully: "But, Sir, if GOD was to make the world
today, it would be crooked again tomorrow.'"* Intolerance
of human failings — of self or others — often eclipses the
quest for betterment; this inherent intolerance leads
directly to the second layer of understanding and the
dichotomy between principle and force.
Second, then, Jesus' answer to Ezekiel's inquiry aptly
illustrates the difference between holding and practicing a
belief and demanding adherence by others to that ideal.
While men are flawed, God is not; yet Jesus did not com-
mand obedience to His banner although He knew it to be
true. Nor should men. Indeed, since men — unlike God — do
not inevitably know that they hold proper principles and
exhibit correct behavior, they ought not compel others to
accept and adopt a possibly flawed precept.
EzekieVsJob / 127
Ample manifestations of the impermissible blurring of
principle and command appear upon reflection: the reli-
gious zealot who seizes the machinery of government,
establishes a state religion de facto or de jure, enacts blue
laws, and orders compulsory chapel; the arid libertarian
who, intolerant of any suggestion that others might reach
similar results from dissimilar bases, mocks his Christian
counterpart out of the discussion; the well-meaning sophis-
ticate concerned about the homeless, the young, the irasci-
ble, or the disabled, who induces the county commission to
use tax revenues to pay for shelters and rehabilitation cen-
ters; the illiberal liberal who concocts false testimony con-
cerning, and selectively applies state legal sanctions
against, disliked religious persons or groups who hear a
different voice and dare to speak out. Sadly, the list appears
endless: For religious and agnostic alike, the concept of
"witness" has all too often transmuted proper belief and
the quest for moral excellence into an evil charade replete
with clever rationalizations, as each individual seeks to
impose his agenda upon all others, to limit the discussion
to prescribed topics, and to foreordain all solutions, hence
circumscribing human action with his own finite bound-
aries in the name of his "truth."
Third, Ezekiel reveals the role assigned to the commit-
ted: They are called to be watchmen {Ezek. 33:1-10). Watch-
men perform specific tasks: They search out the truth, live
out the truth, and speak out the truth, in order that others
may hear and assimilate. No one expects a watchman to
battle those about him. Watchmen cry out; they sound the
tocsin; they raise the alarm; but Ezekiel does not suggest
that the watchman's obligations include compelling any-
one to believe, to profess, or to act in any discrete manner.
128 / Ridgway K. Foley, Jr.
Instead, God's watchmen provide knowledge and oppor-
tunity, a palpable form of due process, to any and all who
choose to consider the message.
The watchman directive applies to the nonreligious
believer by a parity of reasoning. Leonard E. Read devoted
many of his adult years to the study and explication of the
appropriate methodology of freedom. He repeatedly
reminded his readers and listeners that one who truly
espouses the freedom philosophy could not coerce others
to adopt those premises, since to attempt to do so would
constitute the most startling contradiction in terms. He
admonished us that the "end preexists in the means," "the
bloom preexists in the rose." If we improve our own self
and live according to right precepts, others will observe
and be drawn to the proper path by the flame of attraction.
Leonard Read's adjurations do not differ in essence from
God's admonition to Ezekiel and echoed in Matthew 16:5 to
"Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your
good works, and glorify your Father which is in Heaven."
In this fashion, the Ezekiel passage makes it manifest
that committed individuals are duty-bound to honor their
commitment, but they are not to coerce others to follow
their opinions or mimic their precepts. They should seek
the truth, follow the right, improve the self, and never stray
from fundamental principle. In the timeless truth of the
redoubtable F. A. Harper, "A principle can be broken, but it
cannot be bent." Concomitantly, committed men and
women should attract others by the light of their words and
the propriety of their deeds, never by the exercise of com-
pulsion, aggression, fraud, manipulation, or malevolence —
with or without the sanction of the state.
Further, Ezekiel offers us a fourth lesson. Those who
hear the watchman must heed his warning or suffer the
EzekieVsJob / 129
ineluctable consequences. Remember, one need not accept
or act favorably upon a warning, but God makes it clear
that the listener disregards the sound of the tocsin at his
own peril. Once more, this passage accords with the funda-
mentals of freedom. Force and freedom are inimical: Free-
dom includes the freedom to fail, to make choices that seem
wrong to legions of observers, to act meanly or intolerantly
or foolishly, to go against the crowd. The essence of man
resides in his power to make meaningful choices that will
affect not only his life but also the lives of others here and
hereafter. Deprivation of this power of creative choice, for
whatever reason, not only limits that man's array of selec-
tions but also diminishes him as a person. "To enslave" is
much too light and lax a verb to describe such oppression,
for the person restricted is thereby lessened as a human
being, stunted in his potential, and cut down in his moral
growth.
God's watchman must speak out fearlessly and his lis-
teners must act accordingly, or both will suffer inevitable
consequences of their respective breaches of duty. But
nowhere does the message provide that disagreeing men
should either thwart the warning or forestall the reaction
by destructive means. Just so the observant nonbeliever
may deny the existence of the law of gravity, but when he
leaps from an airplane without a parachute he pays the
inexorable price for his sincere if incorrect intellectual
position.
Limiting Human Action
What limits then restrain human action? The rules and
order of the universe and the civil sanctions against aggres-
sion. The nature of man and the consequential constraints
130 / Ridgway K. Foley, Jr.
of the world permit growth but preclude perfection. The
civil or positive law — no less than the essential Biblical
code — ought to deter and punish the employment of fraud
and the initiation of aggression; after all, if Ezekiel demon-
strates that proper belief does not include the coercive
imposition of that belief upon an unwilling other, the lesson
must also implicitly disparage the use of force for lesser
purposes as well.
Most compulsion develops facially as a quest for
"good" and as an affray against evil. B wishes to protect A
from his folly. B "knows" that he knows better what ought
to be done under the circumstances by virtue of his exper-
tise, his beliefs, or his prominence, so he substitutes his
moral, aesthetic, political, or economic judgment for that of
his fellows. After all, if left to their own devices and desires,
"they will make bad choices." On the surface, B's outward
clamor is always for good, justice, and protection. In fact,
the Bs of the world seek glory, patronage, and power, and
their conduct displays the most heinous intolerance and
cant. Those who seek to "do good" by coercive means
accomplish great evil by depriving their subjects of their
primary human trait. These dictators great and small live as
men do, not as God.
Commitment to Christianity and to the free society are
one and the same. The sole difference of note lies in the
choices made by freely choosing individuals once all recog-
nize the fundamental difference between commitment to
principle and the use of compulsion to impose that princi-
ple upon others.
1. See, for example, Isaiah 1:9; Nehemiah 1:3.
2. Albert Jay Nock, "Isaiah's Job," available as a reprint from The
Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York.
EzekieVsJob / 131
3. It is confusing and amusing to consider the reluctance of some
individuals to credit the notable — if not inspired — eyewitness accounts
of ancient men and women, when those same individuals voraciously
grasp as gospel the silly and demonstrably unsupported reports of
modem ideologues and charlatans. For further insight, consider G. K.
Chesterton, The Ex}erlasting Man (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company,
1925), and Charles Mackay, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Mad-
ness of Crowds (London: Richard Bentley, 1841).
4. James Boswell, Boswell's London Journal, edited by Frederick A.
Pottle (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), entry of December 22, 1762, p.
100.
The Road to Jericho
HalWatkins
One of the most famous stories Jesus told is the parable
of the Good Samaritan as recorded in Luke 10:25-37. It con-
cerns a tragic incident on the road from Jericho to
Jerusalem, a distance of about 20 miles. Part of the road was
very steep and rugged; some of it was quite smooth. It illus-
trates the common road over which all of us must travel;
sometimes it is steep and rugged, and other times it is quite
smooth. It's every man's road.
A number of characters appear on the Jericho road, just
as they do on the road of life. By examining them we will be
able to identify with some of them and perhaps learn some
lessons.
The first to demand our attention is the lone man. By
common consent the road was open to the public, so this
lone man had every right to be on it without fear or hin-
drance. Each of us has a God-given right to travel the road
of life without being hindered or molested. Even though
we enjoy various types of companionship along the way, in
a sense we are traveling the road of life alone. We will be
influenced more or less by family, church, school, co-
workers, business, government, and some predators, but
the final decisions, for the most part, devolve on each of us
individually.
The Reverend Mr. Watkins, editor and publisher of The Printed
Preacher, wrote this article for the June 1978 issue of The Freeman.
132
The Road to Jericho / 133
As a lone man I have a right to expect non-threatening
treatment from all my fellowmen. If any other man finds
himself in a circumstance where he feels he must act
toward me, he should do only that which helps rather than
hinders. This, of course, is also my obligation toward him.
A lone man (woman or child) is vulnerable to harm of var-
ious kinds, and also to help.
The next characters to appear in this drama of life are
the cruel men, the robbers who recognized no God but their
animalistic desires. They took advantage of the lone man,
stealing his goods, his time and his well-being. The motiva-
tion in the hearts of these men was the Satanic principle
that "might makes right," or "what's yours is mine — if I can
get it." Such evil men add nothing of value to the lives of
the people they contact along the way, but they will take
everything they can get by fair means or foul. Their own
advantage is their only consideration. They wound, bruise,
and rob. It may be money, reputation, or even characters —
they don't care.
The thieves in the parable probably ambushed the lone
man as he came around a blind corner, but some of their
counterparts are more sophisticated or subtle in our day.
They might feign distress along the freeway, beg a ride to
the next town and rob the benefactor en route. Or, they
might put out a plea in favor of the "disadvantaged" and
ask the government for help, but since the government has
nothing to give, it must first steal the funds from its taxpay-
ers. This might even involve a conspiracy between those
desiring the aid, the group pleading their cause and the
government agents (legislators, etc.). The whole problem
may become difficult to sort out, trying to determine just
who are the sincere agents and who are the thieves. But the
apparent difficulty should not be allowed to obscure the
134 / Hal Watkins
problem: the lone man has been robbed; his freedom and
his very life have been threatened. In what we like to call a
"free society," can we shrug it off by saying that each man
will have to hire his own army or police force? Perhaps we
would do better to examine a system that threatens and
crushes the individual and rewards thieves and their
accomplices.
On the road of life, within the framework of a "Christ-
ian" society, there surely must be some protection for the
lone man from the depredations of thieves, the "minus"
men who would live solely at the expense of others.
On the road to Jericho there were also other men, selfish
men who saw the plight of the abused traveler but had no
concern for him or the problem. They were religious men
too, but their religion — at least as they practiced it — did not
consider the misfortunes or even the rights of their fellow
human being. They, of course, would never steal from a
lone traveler in the manner practiced by the bandits, but
they didn't want to get involved. "Tough exf)erience for the
poor devil. Should have known better than to be traveling
alone. Hope someone moves him off the road."
True Christianity is in the world today, but there are
many counterfeits. Many of the alleged followers of Christ
occasionally express concern for the plunder taking place
along the road of life, but they don't lift a finger to expose
or solve the problem. The New Testament writer, James, is
quite blunt in his description of them: "To him therefore
that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin"
(4:17). The attitude of these "zero" men is: "We were not
robbed, so it's no concern of ours. What we have we will
keep."
Fortunately, on the road to Jericho, there came another
man who was not a disappointment but rather a delightful
The Road to Jericho / 135
surprise. He had a pure Christian philosophy: "What is
mine is yours, and in your misfortune I will share it/' He
gave of himself and his means. He was the compassionate,
unselfish man. This type is also on the road of life today.
Not only would he steal nothing from his fellows, but he
adds much to their general welfare.
The Good Samaritan did not wait beside the stricken
traveler until another victim came along, beat and plunder
him, then give the proceeds to the first victim. He was not a
first-century Robin Hood who robbed others to help the
poor, but he gave of his own means. He didn't run for polit-
ical office as a cover to conduct his robbery "legally," then
give to the poor. Jesus certainly pictured him as a concerned
man, one who was not content to pass by on the other side
as though nothing had hapf)ened. He saw a fellow human
being in distress, and he visualized himself as part of the
solution to the problem. This was a mandate from his con-
science to DO SOMETHING. He was not a "minus" man,
or even a "zero" man. He was a "plus" man. And Jesus
forced his hearer to admit that the Samaritan was moti-
vated by love.
Within the Christian context we are not here to wound,
crush, rob, or even to ignore. We are here to heal, lift,
encourage and contribute of our talent and energy to the
end that others too may, if they so desire, enjoy the same
blessings we have. This truth has been around long enough
to be axiomatic, and Jesus said, "Ye shall know the truth,
and the truth shall make you free" (John 8:32).
What the Bible Says
About Big Government
James C. Patrick
Evidence is mounting that government programs fail to
accomplish all that their advocates had promised. After
dipping for a while, crime statistics are climbing again.
Confidence in the institution of government has sagged.
Some people wonder whether government has bitten off
more than it can chew. They suspect that Henry Hazlitt
came close to the mark when he wrote, "The more things a
government undertakes to do, the fewer things it can do
competently."^
What do the Hebrew and Christian scriptures have to
say on the subject of government power and functions?
News reports about clergymen's public statements and
actions often reveal the men of the cloth on the side of big
government — favoring more handouts, more interven-
tion, more regulation. Does the Bible support that posi-
tion? Or should the clergy take a closer look at what the
scriptures disclose? Answers to these questions could be
illuminating.
First, however, just what is government? Some of the
thinkers who helped lift Western civilization into the mod-
em era had pondered the question deeply but it is doubtful
Mr. Patrick, a retired banker and Chamber of Commerce executive,
resides in Decatur, Illinois. This article is reprinted from the March 1976
issue of The Freeman.
136
What the Bible Says About Big Government / 137
that most people ever gave it a thought, either then or now.
A look at what students of the subject have written should
provide an answer.
The Essence of Big Government
In a stark cemetery at Mansfield, Missouri, stand two
identical gravestones side by side, separated by about six
feet of sod. Carved in large letters in the brown granite of
one is the name Wilder, of the other. Lane. One marks the
graves of Almanzo James and Laura Ingalls Wilder, the sec-
ond the grave of their daughter. Rose Wilder Lane.
Almanzo Wilder died in 1949 at the age of ninety-two. His
wife lived till 1957 when she was ninety. Rose was almost
eighty-two when she died in 1968.
A mile east of Mansfield on a pleasant hillside rests the
modest white frame house that Almanzo Wilder built for
Laura at the turn of the century, using building materials
produced on the farm. Here Rose grew to womanhood and
here in 1932 her mother began to write the "Little House"
books that have charmed a generation of Americans with
their picture of pioneer life in the second half of the nine-
teenth century and have now been adapted for television.
Drawing on a descriptive talent developed as a girl when
she served as the eyes for her scarlet-fever-blinded sister,
Laura wrote the series of books in longhand on tablet
paper, using both sides of the sheet to avoid waste and
writing with a pencil.
Rose, too, became a writer and her best-known book. Let
the Hurricane Roar, is in part a retelling in fiction of the pio-
neer experiences of her mother's family. But her most influ-
ential book is The Discovery of Freedom, published in 1943. It
takes nothing from Rose Wilder Lane to point out that the
138 / James C. Patrick
book reflects viewpoints and attitudes that are evident in
her mother's writing.
The Discovery of Freedom was the inspiration for Henry
Grady Weaver's The Mainspring of Human Progress,
described by Leonard Read, President of the Foundation
for Economic Education, as probably the best introduction
to freedom ideas available in a single volume. Mainspring
has multiplied the outreach and the influence of Rose
Wilder Lane's thought.
Today and for two generations there has been abroad in
the land a naive faith in government as the solution to all
problems — a belief in the ability of legislation to satisfy any
need. Events in the last decade, when that trust reached its
zenith in the Great Society programs, have dealt several
stinging blows to the faith but it had become so deeply
ingrained that it yields slowly to opposing evidence.
Weaver and Mrs. Lane did not share the popular belief.
Instead, they took a very different view which Rose Wilder
Lane expressed in these words: "What they (men in gov-
ernment) have is the use of force — command of the police
and the army. Government, The State is always a use of
force . . ? and "Buck" Weaver wrote, "In the last analysis,
and stripped of all the furbelows, government is nothing
more than a legal monopoly of the use of physical force —
by persons upon persons."^
What Authorities Say
Although most Americans today seem never to have
thought of it, this idea was not new. Numerous other writ-
ers, representing differing shades in the political spectrum,
have expressed a similar view, both before and since Mrs.
Lane and "Buck" Weaver wrote.
What the Bible Says About Big Government / 139
"The civil law ... is the force of the commonwealth,
engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and possessions of
those who live according to its laws, and has power to take
away life, liberty, or goods from him who discbeys." (John
Locke)
"Government is not reason, it is not eloquence — it is
force. Like fire it is a dangerous servant and a fearful mas-
ter . . ." (George Washington)
"Law is the common force organized to act as an obsta-
cle to injustice." (Frederic Bastiat)
"... penal sanction ... is the essence of law . . ." (John
Stuart Mill)
"The essential characteristic of all government, what-
ever its form, is authority. . . . Government, in its last analy-
sis, is organized force." (Woodrow Wilson)
"The state belongs to the sphere of coercion. It would be
madness to renounce coercion, particularly in the epoch of
the dictatorship of the proletariat." (Nikolai Lenin)
"A government may be freely chosen, but it is still not
all of us. It is some men vested with authority over other
men." And democracy "... is a name for a particular set of
conditions under which the right to coerce others is ac-
quired and held."^ (Charles Frankel)
"The State is the party that always accompanies its pro-
posals by coercion, and backs them by force."^ (Charles A.
Reich)
It should come as no surprise to students of the Bible
that the scriptures analyzed the ultimate nature of govern-
ment much earlier than any of the writers cited. Christians
sometimes wonder what Jesus had to say about the role of
government, and theologians normally reply that he said
very little on the subject. The principal relevant statement
recorded in the gospels is his response to a question as to
140 / James C. Patrick
whether it was proper to pay the head tax imposed by
Rome. The tax amounted to about twenty-five cents a per-
son and was regarded as a mark of servitude to Rome.
In ancient times the authority of a ruler was symbolized
by the circulation of his coinage and coins bearing the
ruler's image were considered his property, in the final
analysis.^ When Jesus requested that his questioners show
him one of the coins used to pay the tax, a coin was brought
and he asked, "Whose likeness and inscription is this?"
They replied that it was Caesar's. Jesus then said, "Render
therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God
the things that are God's." The account is told in Matthew 22
and in parallels in the gospel according to Mark and accord-
ing to Luke,
While Jesus said little about the power of government
and what government should or should not do, two other
New Testament writers came down solidly on the side of
respect for the civil authorities and obedience to law. One of
these was the Apostle Paul. Of Paul a respected New Testa-
ment scholar wrote a few years ago, "It is evident from
many allusions in his writings, that the thought of Rome
had strongly affected his imagination. He associated the
great city with all that was most august in earthly power.
He believed that it had been divinely appointed to main-
tain order and peace among the contending races."^
In his letter to the Romans, St. Paul offered the follow-
ing admonition: "Let every person be subject to the govern-
ing authorities. For there is no authority except from God,
and those that exist have been instituted by God."
Pay your taxes and give respect and honor to whom
they are due, said Paul. Conduct yourself properly and you
will have no reason to fear an official. "But if you do wrong,
be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain."^
What the Bible Says About Big Government / 141
And St. Peter wrote:
Be subject for the Lord's sake to every human insti-
tution, whether it be to the emperor as supreme, or
to governors as sent by him to punish those who do
wrong and to praise those who do right. For it is
God's will that by doing right you should put to
silence the ignorance of foolish men. Live as free
men, yet without using your freedom as a pretext for
evil; but live as servants of God. Honor all men.
Love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honor the
emperor.^
The statements are brief because the writers were not
primarily concerned for man's relation with the authorities
but for his relation with God and his fellow man. But the
statements are definite. And they provided the scriptural
foundation for what some students have considered Martin
Luther's exaggerated reverence for the State. Luther's atti-
tude supplied the philosophical substructure for the
authoritarian character German governments have dis-
played more than once.
"When studied with any degree of thoroughness, the
economic problem will be found to run into the political
problem," wrote Irving Babbitt, "the political problem
into the philosophical problem, and the philosophical
problem itself to be almost indissolubly bound up at last
with the religious problem."^^ In short, what we believe or
do not believe about man and about God determines what
kind of society we will have and how our society will gov-
ern itself.
While there is support for paying taxes, obedience to
law, and respect for civil authority in the New Testament,
142 / James C. Patrick
no detailed analysis of the nature of government or the
proper functions of government is to be found there. There
is, however, ample guidance for the individual conduct of
government officials. They are human beings, so they will
be fair, as all humans should be. They will deal justly with
the people. Tax collectors will not steal because nobody
should steal.
Another Biblical View
In the Old Testament, the writer of the books of / Samuel
and // Samuel draws a definite contrast between limited
government and the all-powerful State. The writer of the
two books drew on earlier sources, some of which probably
went back as far as 1000 B.C. or earlier and all of which had
been completed by about 600 B.C.^^ For generations the
Jewish people had been led by officials called Judges, of
whom at least one, Deborah, was a woman. Best known of
the judges to modem readers is Gideon, because his name
is carried by the organization recognized for its practice of
distributing Bibles in hotels and motels. The judges com-
bined civil, military, and religious functions in their office.
They led the Jewish people in battle against their enemies,
settled questions of law, administered justice in disputes
between individuals, and functioned as priests and
prophets. To the enemies of Israel they often showed no
quarter and in some of their judicial decisions they may
have been arbitrary but their leadership of their own peo-
ple was apparently rather mild. The writer of the book of
Judges reports, in chapter 17 and again in his concluding
verse. Judges 21:25, "In those days there was no king in
Israel; every man did what was right in his own eyes."^^
Gideon did not even want to be king. After he had led
What the Bible Says About Big Government / 143
the men of Israel successfully against their enemies, they
asked him to rule over them but he replied, "I will not rule
over you, and my son will not rule over you; the Lord will
rule over you/'^^
After the death of Gideon one of his sons, Abimelech,
seized power briefly and killed all of his brothers except
one, the youngest, Jotham, who hid himself and escaped.
When Jotham was told what his brother had done, he
related a parable, recorded in Judges 9, about the trees going
forth to anoint a king over themselves. The olive tree, the
fig tree, and the vine all declined to abandon their produc-
tive pursuits to become king, so the trees then turned to the
bramble and the bramble accepted.
The Worst on Top
In The Road to Serfdom, Professor Friedrich A. Hayek, for
somewhat different reasons from those cited in Jotham's
parable, reached a conclusion that resembles the parable of
the trees and the bramble. Professor Hayek describes how
kakistocracy arises in a chapter entitled, "Why the Worst
Get on Top." ^^
Samuel was the last of the series of prophet-judges. He
administered justice in his own city of Ramah, a few miles
north of Jerusalem, and traveled a judicial circuit that took
him annually to Bethel, Gilgal, and Mizpah. When senility
approached, Samuel made his two sons judges but the
scripture records that they lacked their father's honorable
character and "turned aside after gain . . . took bribes and
perverted justice."^*
The Jewish people were still engaged in the prolonged
effort to conquer the land they had occupied. Recurring
wars threatened their security. Such enemies as the
144 / James C. Patrick
Philistines were better organized and better equipped than
the people of Israel who retained their loose tribal structure
and had not yet fully abandoned the nomadic life. So the
elders of Israel came to Samuel with a request: "Behold,
you are old and your sons do not walk in your ways; now
appoint for us a king to govern us like all the nations."
The request displeased Samuel, and he prayed to the
Lord who admonished Samuel to heed their request, "for
they have not rejected you, but they have rejected me. . . ."
But Samuel was directed to tell them what it would be like
to have a king. He did so in words recorded in / Samuel 8:
These will be the ways of the king who will reign
over you: He will take your sons and appoint them
to his chariots and to be his horsemen, and to run
before his chariots; and he will appoint for himself
commanders of thousands and commanders of
fifties, and some to plow his ground and to reap his
harvest, and to make his implements of war and the
equipment of his chariots. He will take your daugh-
ters to be perfumers and cooks and bakers. He will
take the best of your fields and vineyards and olive
orchards and give them to his servants. He will take
the tenth of your grain and of your vineyards and
give it to his officers and to his servants. He will take
your menservants and maidservants, and the best of
your cattle and your asses, and put them to his work.
He will take the tenth of your flocks, and you shall
be his slaves. And in that day you will cry out
because of your king, whom you have chosen for
yourselves. . . .
The people refused to listen to Samuel, however, and
insisted that they wanted a king to govern them and fight
What the Bible Says About Big Government / 145
their battles. Their wishes prevailed. They got big govern-
ment.
The king who was selected was Saul, of the tribe of Ben-
jamin. Many years before, when Moses explained to the
people of Israel the law that he had delivered to them, he
told them what kind of person to choose as king when the
time came. His counsel is recorded in Deuteronomy 17:
When you come to the land which the Lord your
God gives you, and you possess it and dwell in it,
and then say, "I will set a king over me, like all the
nations that are round about me ' you may indeed
set as king over you him whom the Lord your God
will choose. One from among your brethren you
shall set as king over you; you may not put a for-
eigner over you, who is not your brother. Only he
must not multiply horses for himself, or cause the
people to return to Egypt in order to multiply
horses, since the Lord has said to you, "You shall
never return that way again." And he shall not mul-
tiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away; nor
shall he greatly multiply for himself silver and gold.
In a book based on his research at the Hoover Institution
on War, Revolution and Peace of Stanford University, Alvin
Rabushka wrote, "Governments take resources from the
public but use them to maximize their own welfare."^^ Both
Moses and Samuel recognized this propensity and warned
about it. To modem taxpayers the tenth part of their grain
and vineyards and flocks, that Samuel said the king would
require, must appear mild indeed but in time the burden
became onerous to the people. Samuel's prophecy that one
day they would cry out because of their king was not real-
ized immediately. Then, as now, persons with the vision to
146 / James C. Patrick
foretell the consequences of certain popular choices and
actions could only tell what would occur as a result, not
when it would occur.
David and Solomon
David succeeded Saul as king, united the people of
Israel under his rule, defeated their enemies, pushed the
borders of his domain south to the Gulf of Aqaba, an arm of
the Red Sea, and by treaty with vassals extended his control
north and eastward to the Euphrates River.^^
Thrusting aside an attempt of an older brother to
become king, Solomon followed David, his father, on the
throne. His reign was marked by lavish construction pro-
grams and public works projects. An extensive bureaucracy
was established to man the elaborate governmental struc-
ture Solomon created. Twelve administrative regions were
defined and each was to provide the taxes and other re-
sources to support the king and his government for one
month of each year. Solomon took as one of his wives a
daughter of the Egyptian Pharaoh and built her a luxurious
residence. He also built a temple at Jerusalem to be the cen-
ter of worship for the entire nation. He was described as
having "wisdom and understanding beyond measure, and
largeness of mind like the sand on the seashore. . . ."^^ At
the same time, however, the scripture speaks repeatedly of
Solomon's use of forced labor and it tells of the hundreds of
wives and concubines that he took. History casts doubt on
the wisdom of a ruler who burdens his people with oppres-
sive taxation and encumbers them with the upkeep of a
sprawling bureaucracy and a parasitic court.
Like the Roman Catholic popes of the fifteenth and six-
What the Bible Says About Big Gaoemment / 147
teenth centuries, Solomon mulcted the people of the
resources to build imposing structures and create works of
art.^^ The popes left great paintings and sculpture, as
Solomon left a temple that stood for four centuries, but the
exactions of the popes brought schism to the Church and
those of Solomon brought rebellion in the kingdom when
his son, Rehoboam, succeeded him.
After the death of Solomon the people who assembled
for the coronation of Rehoboam came to the new king with
a plea: "Your father made our yoke heavy. Now therefore
lighten the hard service of your father and his heavy yoke
upon us, and we will serve you." Rehoboam sent them
away for three days while he consulted first with the elders
who had advised his father and then with his youthful
associates. In the end he rejected the counsel of the elders
that he accede to the people's wishes. Instead he took the
advice of his contemporaries and when the people returned
for his answer, he told them, "My father made your yoke
heavy, but I will add to your yoke; my father chastised you
with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions." Their
appeal rejected, the people cried out, "To your tents, 0
Israel!" And the historian records in / Kings 12, "So Israel
has been in rebellion against the house of David to this
day."
The scriptures say that Saul and David and Solomon
each reigned for forty years. So one hundred twenty years
passed, or approximately four generations, from the time
when the people abandoned limited government until the
time when their descendents did "cry out" because of the
king they had chosen. By 600 B.C. or earlier the people of
Israel had learned, however, that government is indeed
force — a dangerous servant and a fearful master.
148 / James C. Patrick
The Role for Government
If government is force, as the serious students of the
subject have agreed, what kinds of things should govern-
ment do? The answer is obvious: Government should do
those things that can be properly done by the use of force.
The question follows: What are the proper uses of force
among responsible adults?
Nobody has answered that question more clearly than
the nineteenth century French statesman, Frederic Bastiat:
"Every individual has the right to use force for lawful self-
defense. It is for this reason that the collective force — which
is only the organized combination of the individual
forces — may lawfully be used for the same purpose; and it
cannot be used legitimately for any other purpose."^^
Government, therefore, is to be used to defend, to pro-
tect, to prevent violence, fraud, and other predatory acts.
Other endeavors are to be left to the initiative and the
choices of people acting voluntarily, either jointly or as
individuals. In short, government should do what the
judges of Israel did. Beyond that every man should do what
is "right in his own eyes."
Obviously, that is not the direction Americans have
been moving for the past two generations. Instead, as noted
earlier, a naive faith that government can solve all problems
has taken root and persists in spite of the repeated failures
of government social programs. But it makes no difference
that large numbers hold a wrong view. Right is not deter-
mined by majority vote. As Anatole France stated, "If fifty
million people say a foolish thing, it is still a foolish thing."
And Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland said, "A
foolish law does not become a wise law because it is
approved by a great many people."^^ Right, like truth, is
What the Bible Says About Big Government / 149
usually discerned first by a minority, often in the beginning
a minority of one.
Everybody Is Responsible
Everybody has a stake in preventing the unprincipled
members of society from committing acts of violence or
fraud upon peaceful persons, and should help pay a part of
the cost of the police and defense mechanism necessary to
protect people in their peaceful pursuits. Government is
society's mechanism for protecting and defending; it prop-
erly collects taxes to pay for these services. But when it
takes from some persons what belongs to them and gives it
to other persons to whom it does not belong, government
commits an act of plunder. One person who uses force or
the threat of force to take from another what has been hon-
estly earned or built or created, commits an immoral act
and a crime. Two or more persons banding together do not
acquire any moral rights that they did not have as individ-
uals. When government provides benefits for one citizen at
the expense of another by doing what the citizen himself
cannot do without committing a crime, it performs an act of
plunder.^^
Not only is governmental plunder immoral, it reduces
the general well-being of the people. It does so by taking
away from some people what they have produced but are
not permitted to use. It reduces well-being by distributing
to other people what they have not been required to pro-
duce. Both the producers and the receivers are thus
deprived of incentive. And government reduces the gen-
eral well-being by creating an unproductive administrative
bureaucracy to do the taking away and the distributing.
Society needs the productivity of all its able members.
150 / James C. Patrick
Shifted to producing goods and services that can be
exchanged in the marketplace, the legions of bureaucrats
could add materially to human well-being.
How is the situation to be corrected that has been
allowed to develop? Rose Wilder Lane points the way:
"The great English reform movement of the 19th century
consisted wholly in repealing laws."^ What is needed in
the United States is to repeal laws, not to pass new ones.
Repeal laws that vest some men with authority over other
men. This is not to set the clock back, it is to set it right.^
As Samuel warned the people of Israel when they chose
big government, various prophets have warned the people
of America. Prophets can only tell what to expect, however,
not when to expect it. More than a century of suffering
passed before the people of Israel rose to throw off the yoke
from their necks.
1. Life and Death of the Welfare State, (La Jolla, Cal.: La Jolla Rancho
Press, 1968), p. 52.
2. The Discovery of Freedom (New York: Amo Press, 1972), p. 27.
3. The Mainspring of Human Progress (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.:
Foundation for Economic Education, 1953), p. 71.
4. Charles Frankel, The Democratic Prospect (New York: Harp>er &
Row, 1964), p. 136 and p. 30.
5. Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (New York: Bantam
Books, 1971), p. 350.
6. The Abingdon Bible Commentary (New York and Nashville, Term.:
Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1929), p. 988.
7. E. F. Scott, The Literature of the New Testament (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1936), p. 156.
8. Romans 13:1-7. All scriptural quotations are from the Revised
Standard Version of the Bible (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons,
1952).
9. ZPefer 2:13-17.
What the Bible Says About Big Government / 151
10. Quoted by Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Company, I960), p. 482.
11. Robert H. Pfeiffer, Introduction to the Old Testament (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1941), pp. 20-22.
12. Judges 8:23.
13. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1944), Chapter X.
U.I Samuel 7:15^:5.
15. Alvin Rabushka, A Theory of Racial Harmony (Columbia, S.C.:
University of South Carolina Press, 1974), p. 93.
16. E. W. Heaton, Solomon's New Men (New York: Pica Press, 1974),
Chapter 2.
17. /Kings 4:29.
18. Irving Stone, The Agony and the Ecstasy (New York: Doubleday &
Company, 1%1; Signet edition).
19. Frederic Bastiat, The Law (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Founda-
tion for Economic Education 1956), p. 68.
20. Address as President of the American Bar Association, at the
ABA annual meeting, Saratoga Springs, N.Y, September 4, 1917.
21.Basrtat,op. ci7., p. 21.
22. Loc, d/., p. 239.
23. Wilhelm Roepke, A Humane Economy (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1960), p. 88.
A Judeo-Christian Foundation
Hans E Sennholz
Many voices in education and the media do not tire of
denouncing and slandering the private-property order.
They indict it for being heartless, merciless, cruel, inhuman,
selfish, and exploitative, and, branding it "laissez-faire cap-
italism," condemn it roundly and loudly. Popular college
textbooks of economics often set the tone. They devote
many pages of friendly discussion to the writings of Karl
Marx and other champions of socialism, but they dismiss,
with a few lines of utter contempt, the ideas of "laissez-faire
capitalism" and call its defenders ugly names (e.g., Paul
Samuelson, Economics, all editions).
If capitalism nevertheless is alive and advancing in
many parts of the world, the credit belongs not only to a
few fearless defenders, but also to the visible failures and
horrors of the command system and its economic and
moral inadequacy Despite all the slander and abuse that
may be heaped on private property, its order offers more
amenities of life even to its poorer members than the com-
mand system provides for its privileged members, and in
contrast to the command system, it creates conditions of
human existence that are most conducive to virtuous living
and a moral order.
Dr. Sennholz is the President of The Foundation for Economic Edu-
cation. This essay is an excerpt from his booklet. Three Economic Com-
mandments (1990).
152
A Judeo-Christian Foundation / 153
The private-property system rests on individual freedom,
nonviolence, truthfulness, reliability, and cooperation. If every-
one is free in his dealings with others, it is well nigh im-
possible to cheat, shortchange, or short-weight another. If
customers and businessmen are free to choose, they are free
to shun fraud and deception; goods and services must be
satisfactory and priced right or they cannot be sold. A busi-
nessman who deceives his customers will lose them. If he
mistreats his suppliers, they refuse to sell. If he abuses his
workers, they will leave. It is in everyone's interest to be
peaceful, honest, truthful, and cooperative.
Capitalism is no anarchism which rejects all forms of
government for being oppressive and undesirable. The
market order does not invite the strong to prey on the
weak, employers to exploit their workers, and businessmen
to gouge their customers. On the contrary, it is the only sys-
tem that allocates to each member whatever he or she con-
tributes to the production process. It alone provides the
means for and gives wide range to all forms of charity,
enabling man not only to satisfy his own desires, but also to
assist other men in theirs. Yet its critics do not tire in charg-
ing that capitalism best serves selfish individuals ever
searching for the greatest possible advantage. To the de-
tractors, capitalism is synonymous with "maximizing prof-
its," which they condemn as unrealistic and selfish.
This charge, too, misses the mark. In voluntary
exchange, every individual prefers to buy the desired mer-
chandise at the lowest possible price — unless he or she
means to engage in charitable giving. Even rabbis, priests,
and ministers choose to pay the lowest possible price for
the automobile of their choice — unless they decide to make
a gift to the dealer. They generally sell their old cars at the
highest possible price — unless they choose to make a gift to
154 / Hans F. Sennholz
the buyer. They seek to maximize their gains on the pur-
chase or sale, which permits them to allocate the savings to
the satisfaction of other needs.
A businessman is a man engaged in the production of
economic goods and the rendering of economic services.
He is the servant of consumers whose whims and wishes
guide him in his production decisions. As they prefer to
buy their goods in the most favorable market, so must he
buy them at the lowest possible price. He cannot grant
favors to suppliers at the expense of his customers; he can-
not pay wages higher than those allowed by the buyers. If
he does pay higher wages, he distributes his own property
to his workers. In time, he is likely to face a bankruptcy
judge who will dissolve his business. Surely, a businessman
is free to spend his own income as he pleases. Motivated by
various notions and impulses, he may buy his goods at a
charity sale, paying higher prices, or sell his goods there for
pennies or even give them away. His economic consider-
ations do not differ from those of the rabbi, priest, and min-
ister.
The private-property order is not lawless as its detrac-
tors so loudly proclaim. On the contrary, its very existence
depends on honesty, integrity, and peaceful coopjeration. Its
bedrock is economic virtue. Its complete and reliable guide on
practical questions are the Ten Commandments, especially the
second table with ethical standards for every area of life. The sec-
ond table is a solid foundation of all economic ease and
comfort, and the guidepost to prosperity for all mankind.
Even agnostics and atheists, Hindus, Buddhists, and
Taoists, Confucianists and Shintoists who reject the first
table governing man's relationship with God must live by
the second table governing man's moral choices in his rela-
tionship with others, if they set out to thrive and multiply.
A Judeo-Christian Foundation / 155
There is no other way, in this world of scarce resources and
limited energy.^
The second table affirms the general principle of justice
or righteousness for the organization of society. It is no
command "to do good/' but instead an order "to restrain
evil." It does not propose a state that would create a good or
great society, but directs man to abstain from evil. In order
to avoid the bad, it merely says: abstain from coercion; do
not commit adultery; do not lie; do not steal; do not covet.
Aside from these admonitions, you are free to pursue your
own interests.
The commandments call for a decent society that inter-
acts voluntarily, a contract society rather than a coercive
society, a peaceful society rather than a violent society. They
do not elevate some men to be the rulers and lords over
other men, nor do they commission some to manage the
economic lives of others. On the contrary, the command-
ments set out to do very little — to restrain evil. Yet they ac-
complish so much by unleashing the creative energy of
men fired on by their self-interest, but without harm to
other men.
The private-property order rests on the solid foundation
of the ethical commandments. It relies on the state and its
instruments of force to restrain and punish the violators. It
does not, however, call on the state to enforce the first table
commanding man's relationship with God. (Thou shalt
have no other gods before me; thou shalt not make any
graven image; thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy
God in vain; remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.)
Such an extension of the state would integrate or syndicate
church and state. Government officials would reign
supreme in the religious affairs of the people, denying re-
ligious freedom and generating bitter religious conflict, and
156 / Hans F. Sennholz
church officials would labor to gain power over the state, or
at least to exert great influence over the religious affairs of
the state. The European experience with church and state
affiliation throughout the centuries has been rather dis-
heartening.
The state and its instruments of force receive their sole
justification from their use and employment against antiso-
cial individuals who would steal, rob, and otherwise dis-
rupt the peaceful cooperation of society. As a guardian of
the peace, the state is a very beneficial institution that
deserves the support of every peaceful individual. Yet its
coercive powers must be limited to the ethical command-
ments, the protection of which constitutes the very raison
d'etre and the first and only duty of the state.
Unfortunately, government never comes up to ideal
standards. Governments the world over are enforcing some
parts of the table while they sanction and even encourage
the disregard of others. They may even lend their instru-
ments of force to obvious violations of ethical laws, which
puts every individual on the horns of a dilemma: if the poli-
cies of the state and the ethical commandments conflict
with each other, what is he to do? Is he to obey the state or
obey the commandments? Most people choose to obey the
state because it readily and brutally enforces its laws. A few
individuals who choose to live by God's commandments
rather than man's unethical laws pay dearly for their defi-
ance. They face armed sheriffs and jailers who unhesitat-
ingly punish the resisters.
All ten commandments have a bearing on economic
affairs;^ three constitute the visible pillars of the private-
property order: thou shalt not kill; thou shalt not steal; thou
shalt not bear false witness. To violate any one of them is to
do evil and do economic harm.
A Judeo-Christian Foundation / 157
1. R. J. Rushdcx)ny, The Institutes of Biblical Law (Nutley, N.J.: Craig
Press, 1973); also The Foundations of Social Order: Studies in the Creeds and
Councils of the Early Church (Fairfax, Va.: Thobum Press, 1968; 1978);
Gary North, The Sinai Strategy (Tyler, Tex.: Institute for Christian Eco-
nomics, 1986); Lord John E.E.D. Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power
(Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1948); also A Study in Conscience and Poli-
tics (The University of Chicago Press, 1%2); T. N. Carver, Essays in Social
justice (Harvard University Press, 1915); Gordon H. Clark, A Christian
View of Men and Things (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1952).
2. The first commandment proclaims the sovereign power of God,
who calls on man to submit to His law-order, including His eternal and
inexorable laws of economics. The second commandment prohibits
man from worshipping the works of man, esj:)ecially the state and its
institutions. The third commandment exhorts man to act judiciously
and reverently in every area of life, including his economic life. The
fourth commandment has numerous economic implications as to pro-
duction and distribution, sabbath legislation, regulation, and enforce-
ment. The fifth commandment exhorts children to honor their fathers
and mothers — spiritually and financially — so that they may prosper for
generations to come. The seventh commandment protects the family
and safeguards social peace and economic productivity. Cf. R. J. Rush-
doony. The Institutes of Biblical Lau\ ibid.; also The Foundations of Social
Order: Studies in the Creeds and Councils of the Early Church, ibid.; Gary
North, The Sinai Strategy, ibid.
III. THE RIGHTS OF MAN
Freedom, Morality, and Education
George C. Roche III
To fully appreciate the shortcomings of our present edu-
cational framework and face realistically the task of
rebuilding it requires a careful and complete understand-
ing of the concepts we value in society — a "thinking
through" of our own first principles. What kind of educa-
tional goals do we really desire?
To Plato, proper education of the young consisted in
helping them to form the correct mental habits for living by
"the rule of right reason." But, how do we define right rea-
son?
An important part of education centers on the attempts
of society to transmit its culture to the rising generation.
What are the accomplishments of past generations? What
have been the goals and values by which society has lived?
What guidelines should be available to the rising genera-
tion as it faces its own inevitable problems?
Still, education must be far more than the mere indoctri-
nation of the young into the methods of the past. A hall-
mark of Western civilization is its educational focus upon
the development of the individual's capacity to function as
an individual, tempered by recognition of the common
characteristics imposed upon all civilized communities by
the unchanging aspects of human nature. In this sense, the
Dr. Roche is president of Hillsdale College. This article appeared in
the November 1968 issue of The Freeman.
161
162 / George C. Roche III
proper goal of education is everywhere the same: improve
the individual as an individual, stressing the peculiar and
unique attributes each has to develop, but also emphasiz-
ing the development of that "higher side" shared by all
men when true to their nature. This educational goal might
be described as the quest for "structured freedom," free-
dom for the individual to choose within a framework of val-
ues, values universal to all men simply because they are
human beings.
A Framework of Values
Education in this best sense requires no elaborate para-
phernalia. It is characterized, not by elaborate classrooms
or scientific "methods," but by an emphasis upon the conti-
nuity and changelessness of the human condition. The
effort to free the creative capacities of the individual, to
allow him to become truly himself, must recognize the val-
ues which past generations have found to be liberating,
asking that each new generation make the most of inherited
values while striving to enrich that heritage. True education
is society's attempt to enunciate certain ultimate values
upon which individuals, and hence society, may safely
build. The behavior of children toward their parents,
toward their responsibilities, and even toward the learning
process itself is closely tied to such a framework of values.
Thus, in the long run, the relationship we develop
between teacher and pupil, the typ)e of learning we encour-
age, the manner in which we organize our school systems,
in short, the total meaning we give to the word "educa-
tion," will finally be determined by our answers to certain
key questions concerning ultimate values.
Freedom, Morality, and Education / 163
Those who built the Western World never ques-
tioned this continuity of our civilization nor
attempted to pluck out the threads that run through
its fabric. Ever since the Hebrews and Greeks made
their great contributions to Western thought, it has
been taken for granted that through the life of the
mind man can transcend his physical being and
reach new heights. Self-realization, discipline, loy-
alty, honor, and devotion are prevailing concepts in
the literatures, philosophies, and moral precepts
that have shaped amd mirrored Western man for cen-
turies.^
The necessity for such an underlying value system has
been well established in the work of such eminent social
critics of our age as C. S. Lewis and Richard Weaver. The
case for such an underlying system must not depend upon
the whims of debate with the relativistic, subjectivist
spokesmen who today dominate so much of American edu-
cation and thought. Those who hold that certain civilized
values are worthy of transmission to the young, that some
standards are acceptable and others are not, are on firm
ground in their insistence that such values and standards
must be the core of any meaningful educational frame-
work.
Truth
The late C. S. Lewis, an urbane and untiring critic of the
intellectual tendencies of the age, used the word Tao to con-
vey the core of values and standards traditionally and uni-
versally accepted by men, in the Platonic, Aristotelian,
164 / George C. Roche III
Stoic, Christian, and Oriental frameworks. The Tao assumes
a fixed standard of principle and sentiment, an objective
order to the universe, a higher value than a full stomach. As
such, the Tao presupposes standards quite incompatible
with the subjective, relativist suppositions of "modem"
man. We are told by the relativists that the Tao must be set
aside; the accumulated wisdom of centuries, the values of
East as well as West, of Christian and non-Christian, the
striving of the past to discover the higher side of man and
man's conduct, must not stand in the path of "progress."
Thus, the "revolt" of the "Now Generation."
Advances in technology account in part for the denial of
our heritage. Since scientific and technological knowledge
tends to accumulate (i.e., be subject to empirical verification
as correct or incorrect, with the correct then added to the
core of previously verified knowledge), many people
assume that man's scientific progress means he has out-
grown his past and has now become the master of his own
fate. Moral questions are of a different order. Wisdom, not
science or technology, points the way for progress here. For
an individual to be inspired by the wisdom and moral rec-
titude of others, he must first make such wisdom his own.
This is education in its finest sense.
Plato's "Rule of Right Reason"
To grasp the accumulated moral wisdom of the ages is
to become habituated to such concerns and to their claims
upon one's personal conduct. At that point, the rule of right
reason, the goal which Plato set for education, becomes the
guiding light of the individual.
This rule of right reason could provide the frame of ref-
erence so lacking in today's society. Many modem existen-
Freedom, Morality, and Education / 165
tialists complain that the world is meaningless and absurd.
It is not surprising that the world no longer has meaning
for those who recognize none but materialistic values. The
world of reason and freedom, the real world in which it
matters a great deal what the individual chooses to do, is
revealed only in the spiritual quality of man that so many
modems deny. It is this higher spiritual quality of the indi-
vidual, evidenced in his creative capacity to choose, which
alone can give meaning to life and transform the world of
the individual. This is the recognition of those higher val-
ues that lead to Truth. Such an awareness on the part of the
individual, such a rule of right reason, will be, in
Berdyaev's words "... the triumph of the realm of spirit
over that of Caesar. . . ." This triumph must be achieved
anew by each individual as he strives for maturity . . . and
his struggle for maturity constitutes the educative process.
A Higher Law
Despite our vaunted "modern breakthroughs in knowl-
edge," it is doubtful that anyone now alive possesses more
wisdom than a Plato, an Epictetus, a Paul, or an Augustine.
Yet much of what passes for "education" in our time either
denies this accumulation of past wisdom or belittles it in
the eyes of the student. Truth, after all, is a measure of what
is, a measure of an infinite realm within which the individ-
ual is constantly striving to improve his powers of percep-
tion. As the individual draws upon his heritage and applies
self-discipline, he comes to recognize more and more of
that truth and to understand it. The individual is thus able
to find himself and his place in the universe, to become
truly free, by recognizing a fixed truth, a definite right and
wrong, not subject to change by human whim or political
166 / George C. Roche III
dictate. The individual can only be free when he serves a
higher truth than political decree or unchecked appetite.
Such a definition of freedom in consonance with a
higher law has its roots deep in the consciousness of civi-
lized man.
In early Hinduism that conduct in men which can be
called good consists in conformity to, or almost par-
ticipation in, the Rta — that great ritual or pattern of
nature and supemature which is revealed alike in
the cosmic order, the moral virtues, and the ceremo-
nial of the temple. Righteousness, correctness, order,
the Rta, is constantly identified with satya or truth,
correspondence to reality. As Plato said that the
Good was "beyond existence" and Wordsworth that
through virtue the stars were strong, so the Indian
masters say that the gods themselves are bom of the
Rta and obey it.
The Chinese also sp^eak of a great thing (the
greatest thing) called the Tao. It is the reality beyond
all predicates, the abyss that was before the Creator
Himself. It is Nature, it is the Way, the Road. It is the
Way in which the universe goes on, the Way in
which things everlastingly emerge, stilly and tran-
quilly, into space and time. It is also the Way which
every man should tread in imitation of that cosmic
and super-cosmic progression, conforming all activ-
ities to that great exemplar. "In ritual," say the
Analects, "it is harmony with Nature that is prized."
The ancient Jews likewise praise the Law as being
"true."2
Thus, the Christian insistence that man must order his
affairs according to a higher law is far from unique. Such a
Freedom, Morality, and Education / 167
view has been held in common by all civilized men. Our
own early institutions of higher learning were deeply com-
mitted to the transmission of such a heritage. The nine col-
leges founded in America in the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries, (Harvard, Yale, Brown, Dartmouth,
Columbia, Princeton, Pennsylvania, Rutgers, and William
and Mary) were all of religious origin. Such was the early
American view of education.
Human Freedom and the Soul of Man
There is a measure of truth in the Grand Inquisitor's
assertion that many people do not wish to be free. Freedom
can be painful, and someone like the Grand Inquisitor usu-
ally is at hand, quite willing to take over the chore of mak-
ing decisions for others. Those civilizations which have
prospered, however, have been peopled by those who
appreciated the transcendent importance of their individu-
ality and who valued the freedom necessary for its expres-
sion and fulfillment. "Education is not, as Bacon thought, a
means of showing people how to get what they want; edu-
cation is an exercise by means of which enough men, it is
hoped, will learn to want what is worth having."
Education is an exercise by which men will learn to
want what is worth having. This is a recurrent idea among
Western thinkers. Aristotle wrote that the proper aim of
education was to make the pupil like and dislike the proper
things. Augustine defined the proper role of education as
that which accorded to every object in the universe the kind
and degree of love appropriate to it. In Plato's Republic, the
well-educated youth is described as one . . .
who would see most clearly whatever was amiss in
ill-made works of man or ill-grown works of nature.
168 / George C. Roche III
and with a just distaste would blame and hate the
ugly even from his earliest years and would give
delighted praise to beauty, receiving it into his soul
and being nourished by it, so that he becomes a man
of gentle heart. All this before he is of an age to rea-
son; so that when Reason at length comes to him,
then, bred as he has been, he will hold out his hands
in welcome and recognize her because of the affinity
he bears to her.
What is this higher side of human nature which can be
cultivated, this higher side of man which will learn to want
what is worth having? According to the standards of West-
ern civilization, it is the human soul.
If we seek the prime root of all this, we are led to the
acknowledgment of the full philosophical reality of
that concept of the soul, so variegated in its connota-
tions, which Aristotle described as the first principle
of life in any organism and viewed as endowed with
supramaterial intellect in man, and which Christian-
ity revealed as the dwelling place of God and as
made for eternal life. In the flesh and bones of man
there exists a soul which is a spirit and which has a
greater value than the whole physical universe.
Dependent though we may be upon the lightest acci-
dents of matter, the human person exists by the
virtue of the existence of his soul, which dominates
time and death. It is the spirit which is the root of
personality."*
Freedom, Morality, and Education / 169
Our Choices Affect Our Lives
Some of those who espouse the idea of freedom are
quick to declaim such terms as soul, God, or Higher Law,
feeling that such "mysticism" denies the individual the
capacity to freely choose since it binds him to a higher
Authority. This is a groundless fear. In fact, the whole idea
of a higher law and a God-given capacity for individual
free choice only opens the door into a world in which man
is constantly remaking the world as he modifies and
expands his own horizons. It is precisely the fact that the
soul of the individual derives from a higher order of nature
that allows man to constantly remake the world and his
own life according to his own understanding and his own
perception. This is the source of the self-discipline which
produces honor, integrity, courage, and the other attributes
of civilized man. This is the source of the framework within
which all meaningful, civilized choice takes place.
Still, the existentialists may be right about one point. It
is true that man finds himself encased within a body and a
material existence which he did not choose. It is also true
that he finds himself limited by the ideas peculiar to his
time. Even if he chooses to fight such ideas, the very nature
of that choice and struggle is determined by the ideas he
finds around him. This is why man is at once the molder
and the molded, the actor and acted upon of history. We are
all a part of an existential situation that is, and yet is not, of
our own making. In a very real sense of the word, we are
shaped by generations long past, yet have a role to play in
the shaping process for generations to come. It is this capac-
170 / George C Roche III
ity to choose, limited by the framework we have inherited,
which man must come to understand and deal with if he is
to be truly "educated."
In principle, therefore, it does not matter whether
one generation applauds the previous generation or
hisses it — in either event, it carries the previous gen-
eration within itself. If the image were not so
baroque, we might present the generations not hori-
zontally but vertically, one on top of the other, like
acrobats in the circus making a human tower. Rising
one on the shoulders of another, he who is on top
enjoys the sensation of dominating the rest; but he
should also note that at the same time he is the pris-
oner of the others. This would serve to warn us that
what has passed is not merely the past and nothing
more, that we are not riding free in the air but stand-
ing on its shoulders, that we are in and of the past, a
most definite past which continues the human tra-
jectory up to the present moment, which could have
been very different from what it was, but which,
once having been, is irremediable — it is our present,
in which, whether we like it or not, we thrash about
like shipwrecked sailors.^
Unless he seeks only the freedom of shipwrecked
sailors, freedom to drown in an existential sea, the individ-
ual desperately needs to recognize that his truly liberating
capacity to choose is hinged upon a moral framework and
certain civilized preconditions which at once limit and
enhance his choice. It is this recognition that constitutes civ-
ilization.
Freedom, Morality, and Education / 171
Civilized Man
What is it then, that civihzed man comes to value? One
possible answer is given by Harold Gray, the creator of Lit-
tle Orphan Annie and of the equally delightful Maw Green,
Irish washerwoman and homey philosopher par excellence.
In one of Gray's comic strips, he confronts Maw Green with
a slobbering, unkempt, aggressive boob, who shouts, "I got
rights, ain't I? I'm as good as any o' those big shots!
Nobody's better'n me\ I say all men are bom equal! Ain't that
right?"
Maw Green maintains her boundless good humor and
agrees that all men are indeed bom equal, but she turns
aside to confide to the reader, "But thank Hiven a lot of
folks outgrow it!"
Perhaps that civilizing task of "outgrowing it" is how
the educative process can best help the individual. Yet in a
time of collapsing standards, of "campus revolts," such a
task for the educative process seems impossible of fulfill-
ment. If so, Mario Savio and Mark Rudd may be samples of
things to come, of tomorrow's torchbearers upon whom
our civilization depends.
Surely, such a prospect is frightening to most of us. If we
are to avoid such a fate, the underlying problem must be
faced squarely: Does a proper definition of the nature of the
universe and the nature and role of man within the uni-
verse presuppose the existence of a fixed standard of value,
universally applicable to all men at all times? To accept
such a view is to challenge directly the root assumption of
the modem world ... a world unwilling to accept the disci-
pline inherent in such a fixed value system, a world finding
self-congratulation in its illusory man-made heaven on
172 / George C. Roche III
earth, a heaven blending equal portions of subjectivism and
relativism.
Man Must Be Free to Choose
There have been among us those men of intellect and
integrity who have challenged the dominant mentality of
the age, warning that man must be free to choose and yet
properly instructed in the making of his choice. They have
insisted that proper values can emerge and be defined by
the passage of time and the accumulation of human experi-
ence. This accumulated wisdom, this framework of values,
thus provides an enhancement of meaningful choice, not
limiting but rather clarifying, the individual's power to
decide. Such individual choice, plus the framework within
which that choice takes place, is a reflection of higher val-
ues than society itself:
Freedom of the human personality cannot be given
by society, and by its source and nature it cannot
depend upon society — it belongs to man himself, as
a spiritual being. And society, unless it makes totali-
tarian claims, can only recognize this freedom. This
basic truth about freedom was reflected in the doc-
trines of natural law, of the rights of man, indepen-
dent of the state, of freedom, not only as freedom
within society, but freedom from society with its lim-
itless claims on man.^
To a maverick like Berdyaev, freedom was the key word,
but even he admitted that man was a spiritual being and
that nature had her own laws demanding respect from the
individual as he made his choices.
Freedom, Morality, and Education / 173
Many others in the civilized tradition of individual free-
dom and a fixed moral framework have perceived that the
individual must be not only free, but sufficiently educated
in the proper values to permit intelligent choice. Albert Jay
Nock, for instance, believed that
. . . the Great Tradition would go on "because the
forces of nature are on its side," and it had an invin-
cible ally, "the self-preserving instinct of humanity."
Men could forsake it, but come back to it they
would. They had to, for their collective existence
could not permanently go on without it. Whole soci-
eties might deny it, as America had done, substitut-
ing bread and buncombe, power and riches or expe-
diency; "but in the end, they will find, as so many
societies have already found, that they must return
and seek the regenerative power of the Great Tradi-
tion, or lapse into decay and death."''
Nock was not alone in his insistence upon such stan-
dards for the education of future generations. He stood in
the distinguished company of such men as Paul Elmer
More, T. S. Eliot, C. S. Lewis, and Gilbert K. Chesterton, to
name but a few of the defenders of the Great Tradition.
These have been the civilized men of our age.
With Canon Bernard Iddings Bell, the distinguished
Episcopal clergyman who saw so clearly the tendency of
our times, we might ponder our future:
I am quite sure that the trouble with us has been that
we have not seriously and bravely put to ourselves
the question, "What is man?" or, if and when we
have asked it, we have usually been content with
174 / George C. Roche III
answers too easy and too superficial. Most of us
were trained to believe — and we have gone on the
assumption ever since — that in order to be modem
and intelligent and scholarly all that is required is to
avoid asking "Why am I?" and immerse oneself in a
vast detail of specialized study and in ceaseless
activity. We have been so busy going ahead that we
have lost any idea of where it is exactly that we are
going or trying to go. This is, I do believe, the thing
that has ruined the world in the last half century.^
We have lost our philosophic way in the educational
community. We have often forgotten the moral necessity of
freedom, and have usually forgotten the self-discipline
which freedom must reflect if it is to function within the
moral order. As parents, as human beings, as members of
society, we must insist that our educational framework pro-
duce neither automatons nor hellions. The individual must
be free to choose, yet must be provided with a framework
of values within which meaningful, civilized choice can
take place. That two-fold lesson must lie at the heart of any
renaissance of American education.
1. Thomas Molnar, The Future of Education, p. 30.
2. C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man, pp. 27-28.
3. ''Science and Human Freedom/' Manas, February 28, 1968, p. 7.
4. Jacques Maritain, Education at the Crossroads, p. 8.
5. Jos^ Ortega y Gasset, Man and Crisis, pp. 53-54.
6. Nicholas Berdyaev, The Realm of Spirit and The Realm of Caesar, pp.
59-60.
7. Robert M. Crunden, The Mind & Art of Albert Jay Nock, p. 134.
8. Bernard Iddings Bell, Crisis in Education, p. 162.
Morals and Liberty
E A. Harper
To many persons, the welfare state has become a symbol
of morality and righteousness. This makes those who favor
the welfare state appear to be the true architects of a better
world; those who oppose it, immoral rascals who might be
expected to rob banks or to do most anything in defiance of
ethical conduct. But is this so? Is the banner of morality,
when applied to the concept of the welfare state, one that is
true or false?
Now what is the test of morality or immorality to be
applied to the welfare state idea? 1 should like to pose five
fundamental ethical concepts, as postulates, by which to
test it. They are the ethical precepts found in the true Chris-
tian religion — true to its original foundations; and they are
likewise found in other religious faiths, wherever and
under whatever name these other religious concepts assist
persons to perceive and practice the moral truths of human
conduct.
After teaching at Cornell University for several years. Dr. Harper
(1905-1973) joined the staff of The Foundation for Economic Education
during its inaugural year of 1946. In 1961, he founded the Institute for
Humane Studies, Inc., now located in Fairfax, Virgiiua. This article
appeared in the July 1971 issue of The Freeman.
175
176 / F. A. Harper
Moral Postulate No. 1
Economics and morals are both parts of one insepara-
ble body of truth. They must, therefore, be in harmony
with one another. What is right morally must also be right
economically, and vice versa. Since morals are a guide to
betterment and to self-protection, economic policies that
violate moral truth, will, with certainty, cause degeneration
and self-destruction.
This postulate may seem simple and self-evident. Yet
many economists and others of my acquaintance, including
one who was a most capable and admired teacher, presume
to draw some kind of an impassable line of distinction
between morals and economics. Such persons fail to test
their economic concepts against their moral precepts. Some
even scorn the moral base for testing economic concepts, as
though it would somehow pollute their economic purity.
An unusually capable minister recently said that only a
short time before, for the first time, he had come to realize j
the close connection and interharmony that exist between
morals and economics. He had always tried to reserve one j
compartment for his religious thought and another sepa-
rate one for his economic thought. "Fortunately," he said, in
essence, "my economic thinking happened to be in har-
mony with my religious beliefs; but it frightens me now to
realize the risk 1 was taking in ignoring the harmony that
must exist between the two."
This viewpoint — that there is no necessary connection j
between morals and economics — is all too prevalent. It
explains, I believe, why immoral economic acts are toler-
ated, if not actively promoted, by persons of high repute
who otherwise may be considered to be persons of high
moral standards.
Morals and Liberty / 177
Moral Postulate No. 2
There is a force in the universe which no mortal can
alter. Neither you nor I nor any earthly potentate with all
his laws and edicts can alter this rule of the universe, no
matter how great one's popularity in his position of power.
Some call this force God. Others call it Natural Law. Still
others call it the Suj:>ematural. But no matter how one may
wish to name it, there is a force which rules without surren-
der to any mortal man or group of men — a force that is
oblivious to anyone who presumes to elevate himself and
his wishes above its rule.
This concept is the basis for all relationships of cause
and consequence — all science — whether it be something
already discovered or something yet to be discovered. Its
scope includes phenomena such as those of physics and
chemistry; it also includes those of human conduct. The so-
called Law of Gravity is one expression of Natural Law. Sci-
entific discovery means the unveiling to human perception
of something that has always existed. If it had not existed
prior to the discovery — even though we were ignorant of
it — it could not have been there to be discovered. That is the
meaning of the concept of Natural Law.
This view — there exists a Natural Law which rules over
the affairs of human conduct — will be challenged by some
who point out that man possesses the capacity for choice;
that man's activity reflects a quality lacking in the chem-
istry of a stone and in the physical principle of the lever. But
this trait of man— this capacity for choice— does not release
him from the rule of cause and effect, which he can neither
veto nor alter. What the capacity for choice means, instead,
is that he is thereby enabled, by his own choice, to act either
wisely or unwisely — that is, in either accord or discord with
178 / f. A. Harper
the truths of Natural Law. But once he has made his choice,
the inviolate rule of cause and consequence takes over with
an iron hand of justice, and renders unto the doer either a
prize or a penalty, as the consequence of his choice.
It is important, at this point, to note that morality presumes
the existence of choice. One cannot he truly moral except as there
exists the option of being immoral, and except as he selects the
moral rather than the immoral option. In the admirable words of
Thomas Davidson: "That which is not free is not responsible, and
that which is not responsible is not moral." This means that free
choice is a prerequisite of morality.
If I surrender my freedom of choice to a ruler — by vote
or otherwise — I am still subject to the superior rule of Nat-
ural Law or Moral Law. Although I am subservient to the
ruler who orders me to violate truth, I must still pay the
penalty for the evil or foolish acts in which I engage at his
command.
Under this postulate — that there is a force in the uni-
verse which no mortal can alter — ignorance of Moral Law
is no excuse to those who violate it, because Moral Law
rules over the consequences of ignorance the same as over
the consequences of wisdom. This is true whether the igno-
rance is accompanied by good intentions or not; whether it
is carried out under the name of some religion or the wel-
fare state or whatnot.
What, then, is the content of a basic moral code? What
are the rules which, if followed, will better the condition of
men?
Moral Postulate No. 3
The Golden Rule and the Decalogue, and their near
equivalents in other great religions, provide the basic
Morals and Liberty / 179
moral codes for man's conduct. The Golden Rule and the
Decalogue are basic moral guides having priority over all
other considerations. It is these which have guided the con-
duct of man in all progressive civilizations. With their vio-
lation has come the downfall of individuals and civiliza-
tions.
Some may prefer as a moral code something like: "Do as
God would have us do/' or "Do as Jesus would have done."
But such as these, alone, are not adequate guides to conduct
unless they are explained further, or unless they serve as
symbolic of a deeper specific meaning. What would God
have us do? What would Jesus have done? Only by adding
some guides such as the Golden Rule and the Ten Com-
mandments can we know the answers to these questions.
The Golden Rule — the rule of refraining from imposing
on others what I would not have them impose on me —
means that moral conduct for one is moral conduct for
another; that there is not one set of moral guides for Jones
and another for Smith; that the concept of equality under
Moral Law is a part of morality itself. This alone is held by
many to be an adequate moral code. But in spite of its
importance as part of the moral code of conduct in this
respect, the Golden Rule is not, it seems to me, sufficient
unto itself. It is no more sufficient than the mere admoni-
tion, "Do good," which leaves undefined what is good and
what is evil. The murderer, who at the time of the crime felt
justified in committing it, can quote the Golden Rule in self-
defense: "If I had done what that so-and-so did, and had
acted as he acted, I would consider it fair and proper for
someone to murder me." And likewise the thief may argue
that if he were like the one he has robbed, or if he were a
bank harboring all those "ill-gotten gains," he would con-
sider himself the proper object of robbery. Some claim that
180 / K A. Harper
justification for the welfare state, too, is to be found in the
Golden Rule. So, in addition to the Golden Rule, further
rules are needed as guides for moral conduct.
The Decalogue embodies the needed guides on which
the Golden Rule can function. But within the Ten Com-
mandments, the two with which we shall be especially con-
cerned herein are: (1) Thou shalt not steal. (2) Thou shalt
not covet.
The Decalogue serves as a guide to moral conduct
which, if violated, brings upon the violator a commensu-
rate penalty. There may be other guides to moral conduct
which one might wish to add to the Golden Rule and the
Decalogue, as supplements or substitutes. But they serve as
the basis on which others are built. Their essence, in one
form or another, seems to run through all great religions.
That, I believe, is not a happenstance, because if we
embrace them as a guide to our conduct, our conduct will
be both morally and economically sound.
This third postulate embodies what are judged to be the
principles which should guide individual conduct as infalli-
bly as the compass should guide the mariner. "Being prac-
tical" is a common popular guide to conduct; principles are
scorned, if not forgotten. Those who scorn principles assert
that it is foolish to concern ourselves with them; that it is
hopeless to expect their complete adoption by everyone.
But does this fact make a principle worthless? Are we to
conclude that the moral code against murder is worthless
because of its occasional violation? Or that the compass is
worthless because not everyone pursues to the ultimate the
direction which it indicates? Or that the law of gravity is
made impractical or inoperative by someone walking off a
cliff and meeting death because of his ignorance of this
principle? No. A principle remains a principle in spite of its
Morals and Liberty / 181
being ignored or violated — or even unknown. A principle,
like a compass, gives one a better sense of direction, if he is
wise enough to know and to follow its guidance.
Moral Postulate No. 4
Moral principles are not subject to compromise. The
Golden Rule and the Decalogue, as representing moral
principles, are precise and strict. They are not a code of con-
venience. A principle can be broken, but it cannot be bent.
If the Golden Rule and the Decalogue were to be
accepted as a code of convenience, to be laid aside or mod-
ified whenever "necessity seems to justify it" (whenever,
that is, one desires to act in violation of them), they would
not then be serving as moral guides. A moral guide which
is to be followed only when one would so conduct himself
anyhow, in its absence, has no effect on his conduct, and is
not a guide to him at all.
The unbending rule of a moral principle can be illus-
trated by some simple applications. According to one Com-
mandment, it is wholly wrong to steal all your neighbor's
cow; it is also wholly wrong to steal half your neighbor's
cow, not half wrong to steal half your neighbor's cow. Rob-
bing a bank is wrong in principle, whether the thief makes
off with a million dollars or a hundred dollars or one cent.
A person can rob a bank of half its money, but in the sense
of moral principle there is no way to half rob a bank; you
either rob it or you do not rob it.
In like manner, the law of gravity is precise and indivis-
ible. One either acts in harmony with this law or he does
not. There is no sense in saying that one has only half-
observed the law of gravity if he falls off a cliff only half as
high as another cliff off which he might have fallen.
182 / f. A. Harper
Moral laws are strict. They rule without flexibility.
They know not the language of man; they are not conver-
sant with him in the sense of compassion. They employ no
man-made devices like the suspended sentence —
"Guilty" or "Not guilty" is the verdict of judgment by a
moral principle.
As moral guides, the Golden Rule and the Decalogue
are not evil and dangerous things, like a painkilling drug,
to be taken in cautious moderation, if at all. Presuming
them to be the basic guides of what is right and good for
civilized man, one cannot overindulge in them. Good need
not be practiced in moderation.
Moral Postulate No. 5
Good ends cannot be attained by evil means. As stated
in the second postulate, there is a force controlling cause
and consequence which no mortal can alter, in spite of any
position of influence or power which he may hold. Cause
and consequence are linked inseparably.
An evil begets an evil consequence; a good, a good con-
sequence. Good intentions cannot alter this relationship.
Nor can ignorance of the consequence change its form. Nor
can words. For one to say, after committing an evil act, "I'm
sorry, I made a mistake," changes not one iota the conse-
quence of the act; repentance, at best, can serve only to pre-
vent repetition of the evil act, and perhaps assure the repen-
ter a more preferred place in a Hereafter. But repentance
alone does not bring back to life a murdered person, nor
return the loot to the one who was robbed. Nor does it, I
believe, fully obliterate the scars of evil on the doer himself.
Nor does saying, "He told me to do it," change the con-
sequence of an evil act into a good one. For an evildoer to
Morals and Liberty / 183
assert, "But it was the law of my government, the decree of
my ruler," fails to dethrone God or to frustrate the rule of
Natural Law.
The belief that good ends are attainable through evil
means is one of the most vicious concepts of the ages. The
political blueprint. The Prince, written around the year 1500
by Machiavelli, outlined this notorious doctrine. And for
the past century it has been part and parcel of the kit of
tools used by the Marxian communist-socialists to mislead
people. Its use probably is as old as the conflict between
temptation and conscience, because it affords a seemingly
rational and pleaseint detour around the inconveniences of
one's conscience.
We know how power-hungry persons have gained
political control over others by claiming that they somehow
possess a special dispensation from God to do good
through the exercise of means which our moral code iden-
tifies as evil. Thus arises a multiple standard of morals. It is
the device by which immoral persons attempt to discredit
the Golden Rule and the Decalogue, and make them inop-
erative.
Yet if one will stop to ponder the question just a little, he
must surely see the unimpeachable logic of this postulate:
Good ends cannot be attained by evil means. This is
because the end pre-exists in the means, just as in the bio-
logical field we know that the seed of continued likeness
pre-exists in the parent. Likewise in the moral realm, there
is a sinular moral reproduction wherein like begets like.
This precludes the possibility of evil means leading to good
ends. Good begets good; evil, evil. Immoral means cannot
beget a good end, any more than snakes can beget roses.
The concept of the welfare state can now be tested
against the background of these five postulates: (1) Har-
184 / F. A. Harper
mony exists between moral principles and wise economic
practices. (2) There is a universal law of cause and effect,
even in the areas of morals and economics. (3) A basic
moral code exists in the form of the Golden Rule and the
Decalogue. (4) These moral guides are of an uncompromis-
ing nature. (5) Good ends are attainable only through good
means.
Moral Right to Private Property
Not all the Decalogue, as has been said, is directly rele-
vant to the issue of the welfare state. Its program is an eco-
nomic one, and the only parts of the moral code which are
directly and specifically relevant are these: (1) Thou shalt
not steal. (2) Thou shalt not covet.
Steal what? Covet what? Private prof)erty, of course.
What else could I steal from you, or covet of what is yours?
I cannot steal from you or covet what you do not own as
private property. As Dr. D. Elton Trueblood has aptly said:
"Stealing is evil because ownership is good." Thus we find
that the individual's right to private property is an unstated
assumption which underlies the Decalogue. Otherwise
these two admonitions would be empty of either purpose
or meaning.
The right to have and to hold private property is not to
be confused with the recovery of stolen property. If some-
one steals your car, it is still — by this moral right — your car
rather than his; and for you to repossess it is merely to bring
its presence back into harmony with its ownership. The
same reasoning applies to the recovery of equivalent value
if the stolen item itself is no longer returnable; and it applies
to the recompense for damage done to one's own property
by trespass or other willful destruction of private property.
These means of protecting the possession of private prop-
Morals and Liberty / 185
erty, and its use, are part of the mechanisms used to protect
the moral right to private property.
Another point of possible confusion has to do with cov-
eting the private property of another. There is nothing
morally wrong in the admiration of something that is the
property of another. Such admiration may be a stimulus to
work for the means with which to buy it, or one like it. The
moral consideration embodied in this Commandment has
to do with thoughts and acts leading to the violation of the
other Commandment, though still short of actual theft.
The moral right to private property, therefore, is consis-
tent with the moral codes of all the great religious beliefs. It
is likely that a concept of this type was in the mind of David
Hume, the moral philosopher, who believed that the right
to own private property is the basis for the modern concept
of justice in morals.
Nor is it surprising to discover that two of history's
leading exponents of the welfare state concept found it nec-
essary to denounce this moral code completely. Marx said:
"Religion is the opium of the people." And Lenin said:
"Any religious idea, any idea of a 'good God' ... is an
abominably nasty thing." Of course they would have to say
these things about religious beliefs. This is because the
moral code of these great religions, as we have seen, strikes
at the very heart of their immoral economic scheme. Not
only does their welfare state scheme deny the moral right to
private property, but it also denies other underlying bases
of the moral code, as we shall see.
Moral Right to Work and to Have
Stealing and coveting are condemned in the Decalogue
as violations of the basic moral code. It follows, then, that
the concepts of stealing and coveting presume the right to
186 / f. A. Harper
private property, which then automatically becomes an
implied part of the basic moral code. But where does pri-
vate property come from?
Private property comes from what one has saved out of
what he has produced, or has earned as a productive
employee of another person. One may also, of course,
obtain private property through gifts and inheritances; but
in the absence of theft, precluded by this moral code, gifts
come from those who have produced or earned what is
given. So the right of private property, and also the right to
have whatever one has produced or earned, underlies the
admonitions in the Decalogue about stealing and coveting.
Nobody has the moral right to take by force from the pro-
ducer anything he has produced or earned, for any purpose
whatsoever — even for a good purpose, as he thinks of it.
If one is free to have what he has produced and earned,
it then follows that he also has the moral right to be free to
choose his work. He should be free to choose his work, that
is, so long as he does not violate the moral code in doing so
by using in his productive efforts the prof>erty of another
person through theft or trespass. Otherwise he is free to
work as he will, at what he will, and to change his work
when he will. Nobody has the moral right to force him to
work when he does not choose to do so, or to force him to
remain idle when he wishes to work, or to force him to
work at a certain job when he wishes to work at some other
available job. The belief of the master that his judgment is
superior to that of the slave or vassal, and that control is
"for his own good," is not a moral justification for the idea
of the welfare state.
We are told that some misdoings occurred in a Garden
of Eden, which signify the evil in man. And I would con-
cede that no mortal man is totally wise and good. But it is
Morals and Liberty / 187
my belief that people generally, up and down the road, are
intuitively and predominantly moral. By this I mean that if
persons are confronted with a clear and simple decision
involving basic morals, most of us will conduct ourselves
morally. Most everyone, without being a learned scholar of
moral philosophy, seems to have a sort of innate sense of
what is right, and tends to do what is moral unless and until
he becomes confused by circumstances which obscure the moral
issue that is involved.
Immorality Is News
The content of many magazines and newspapers with
widespread circulations would seem to contradict my
belief that most people are moral most of the time. They
headline impressive and unusual events on the seamy side
of life, which might lead one to believe that these events are
chciracteristic of everyday human affairs. It is to be noted,
however, that their content is in sharp contrast to the local,
hometown daily or weekly with its emphasis on the folksy
reports of the comings and goings of friends. Why the dif-
ference? Those with large circulations find that the com-
mon denominator of news interest in their audience is
events on the rare, seamy side of life; widely scattered mil-
lions are not interested in knowing that in Centerville, Sally
attended Susie's birthday party last Tuesday. It is the rarity
of evil conduct that makes it impressive news for millions.
Papers report the event of yesterday's murder, theft, or
assault, together with the name, address, age, marital sta-
tus, religious affiliation, and other descriptive features of
the guilty party because these are the events of the day that
are unusual enough to be newsworthy. What would be the
demand for a newspaper which published all the names
188 / f. A. Harper
and identifications of all the persons who yesterday failed
to murder, steal, or assault? If it were as rare for persons to
act morally as it is now rare for them to act immorally, the
then rare instances of moral conduct would presumably
become the news of the day. So we may conclude that evil
is news because it is so rare; that being moral is not news
because it is so prevalent.
But does not this still prove the dominance of evil in
persons? Or, since magazines and newspapers print what
finds a ready readership in the market, does not that prove
the evilness of those who read of evil? I believe not. It is
more like the millions who attend zoos, and view with fas-
cination the monkeys and the snakes; these spectators are
not themselves monkeys or snakes, nor do they want to be;
they are merely expressing an interest in the unusual, with-
out envy. Do not most of us read of a bank robbery or a fire
without wishing to be robbers or arsonists?
What else dominates the newspaper space, and gives us
our dominant impressions about the quality of persons out-
side our circle of immediate [Dersonal acquaintance? It is
mostly about the problems of political power; about those
who have power or are grasping for power, diluted with a
little about those who are fighting against power. Lord
Acton said: "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power
corrupts absolutely." This dictum seems to be true, as his-
tory has proved and is proving over and over again. So we
can then translate it into a description of much of the news
of the day: News is heavily loaded with items about per-
sons who, as Lord Acton said, are either corrupt or are in
the process of becoming more corrupt.
If one is not careful in exposing himself to the daily
news — if he fails to keep his balance and forgets how it con-
trasts with all those persons who comprise his family, his
Morals and Liberty / 189
neighbors, his business associates, and his friends — he is
likely to conclude falsely that people are predominantly
immoral. This poses a serious problem for historians and
historical novelists to the extent that their source of infor-
mation is the news of a former day — especially if they do
not interpret it with caution.
To Steal or Not to Steal
As a means of sp^ecifically verifying my impression
about the basic, intuitive morality of persons, 1 would pose
this test of three questions:
1. Would you steal your neighbor's cow to provide for
your present needs? Would you steal it for any need rea-
sonably within your expectation or comprehension? It
should be remembered that, instead of stealing his cow, you
may explore with your neighbor the possible solution to
your case of need; you might arrange to do some sort of
work for him, or to borrow from him for later repayment,
or perhaps even plead with him for an outright gift.
2. Would you steal your neighbor's cow to provide for a
known case of another neighbor's need?
3. Would you try to induce a third party to do the steal-
ing of the cow, to be given to this needy neighbor? And do
you believe that you would likely succeed in inducing him
to engage in the theft?
I believe that the almost universal answer to all these
questions would be: "No." Yet the facts of the case are that
all of us are participating in theft every day. How? By sup-
porting the actions of the collective agent which does the
stealing as part of the welfare state program already far
advanced in the United States. By this device, Peter is
robbed to "benefit" Paul, with the acquiescence if not the
190 / F. A. Harper
active support of all of us as taxpayers and citizens. We not
only participate in the stealing — and share in the division
of the loot — ^but as Us victims we also meekly submit to the
thievery.
Isn't it a strange thing that if you select any three funda-
mentally moral persons and combine them into a collective
for the doing of good, they are liable at once to become
three immoral persons in their collective activities? The
moral principles with which they seem to be intuitively
endowed are somehow lost in the confusing processes of
the collective. None of the three would steal the cow from
one of his fellow members as an individual, but collectively
they all steal cows from each other. The reason is, I believe,
that the welfare state — a confusing collective device which
is believed by many to be moral and righteous — has been
falsely labeled. This false label has caused the belief that the
welfare state can do no wrong, that it cannot commit
immoral acts, especially if those acts are approved or toler-
ated by more than half of the people, "democratically."
This sidetracking of moral conduct is like the belief of
an earlier day: The king can do no wrong. In its place we
have now substituted this belief: The majority can do no
wrong. It is as though one were to assert that a sheep which
has been killed by a pack of wolves is not really dead, pro-
vided that more than half of the wolves have participated
in the killing. All these excuses for immoral conduct are, of
course, nonsense. They are nonsense when tested against
the basic moral code of the five postulates. Thievery is
thievery, whether done by one person alone or by many in
a pack — or by one who has been selected by the members
of the pack as their agent.
Morals and Liberty / 191
"Thou Shalt Not Steal, Except. . . ."
It seems that wherever the welfare state is involved, the
moral precept, "Thou shalt not steal," becomes altered to
say: "Thou shalt not steal, except for what thou deemest to
be a worthy cause, where thou thinkest that thou canst use
the loot for a better purpose than wouldst the victim of the
theft."
And the precept about covetousness, under the admin-
istration of the welfare state, seems to become: "Thou shalt
not covet, except what thou wouldst have from thy neigh-
bor who owns it."
Both of these alterations of the Decalogue result in com-
plete abrogation of the two moral admonitions — theft and
covetousness — which deal directly with economic matters.
Not even the motto, "In God we trust," stamped by the
government on money taken by force in violation of the
Decalogue to pay for the various programs of the welfare
state, can transform this immoral act into a moral one.
Herein lies the principal moral and economic danger
facing us in these critical times: Many of us, albeit with
good intentions but in a hurry to do good because of the
urgency of the occasion, have become victims of moral
schizophrenia. While we are good and righteous persons in
our individual conduct in our home community and in our
basic moral code, we have become thieves and coveters in
the collective activities of the welfare state in which we par-
ticipate and which many of us extol.
Typical of our times is what usually happens when
there is a major catastrophe, destroying private property or
injuring many persons. The news circulates, and generates
192 / F. A. Harper
widespread sympathy for the victims. So what is done
about it? Through the mechanisms of the collective, the
good intentions take the form of reaching into the other fel-
low's pocket for the money with which to make a gift. The
Decalogue says, in effect: "Reach into your own pocket —
not into your neighbor's pocket — to finance your acts of
compassion; good cannot be done with the loot that comes
from theft." The pickpocket, in other words, is a thief even
though he puts the proceeds in the collection box on Sun-
day, or uses it to buy bread for the poor. Being an involun-
tary Good Samaritan is a contradiction in terms.
When thievery is resorted to for the means with which
to do good, compassion is killed. Those who would do
good with the loot then lose their capacity for self-reliance,
the same as a thief's self-reliance atrophies rapidly when he
subsists on food that is stolen. And those who are ref>eat-
edly robbed of their property simultaneously lose their
capacity for compassion. The chronic victims of robbery are
under great temptation to join the gang and share in the
loot. They come to feel that the voluntary way of life will no
longer suffice for needs; that to subsist, they must rob and
be robbed. They abhor violence, of course, but approve of
robbing by "peaceful means." It is this peculiar immoral
distinction which many try to draw between the welfare
state of Russia and that of Britain: The Russian brand of
violence, they believe, is bad; that of Britain, good. This ver-
sion of an altered Commandment would be: "Thou shalt
not steal, except from nonresisting victims."
Under the welfare state, this process of theft has spread
from its use in alleviating catastrophe, to anticipating cata-
strophe, to conjuring up catastrophe, to the "need" for lux-
uries for those who have them not. The acceptance of the
practice of thus violating the Decalogue has become so
Morals and Liberty / 193
widespread that if the Sermon on the Mount were to appear
in our day in the form of an address or publication, it
would most likely be scorned as "reactionary, and not
objective on the realistic problems of the day." Forgotten, it
seems, by many who so much admire Christ, is the fact that
he did not resort to theft in acquiring the means of his mate-
rial benefactions. Nor did he advocate theft for any pur-
pose— even for those uses most dear to his beliefs.
Progress of Moral Decay
Violation of the two economic Commandments — theft
and covetousness — under the program of the welfare state,
will spread to the other Commandments; it will destroy
faith in, and observance of, our entire basic moral code. We
have seen this happen in many countries. It seems to have
been happening here. We note how immorality, as tested by
the two economic Commandments, has been spreading in
high places. Moral decay has already spread to such an
extent that violations of all other parts of the Decalogue,
and of the Golden Rule, have become accepted as common-
place— even proper and worthy of emulation.
And what about the effectiveness of a crime investiga-
tion conducted under a welfare state government? We may
question the presumed capability of such a government —
as distinct from certain investigators who are admittedly
moral individuals — to judge these moral issues. We may
also question the wisdom of bothering to investigate the
picayune amounts of private gambling, willingly engaged
in by the participants with their own money, when untold
billions are being taken from the people repeatedly by the
investigating agent to finance its own immoral program.
This is a certain loss, not even a gamble.
194 / F. A. Harper
Once a right to collective looting has been substituted
for the right of each person to have whatever he has pro-
duced, it is not at all surprising to find the official dis-
pensers deciding that it is right for them to loot the loot —
for a "worthy" purpose, of course. Then we have the loot
used by the insiders to buy votes so that they may stay in
power; we have political pork barrels and lobbying for the
contents; we have political patronage for political loyalty —
even for loyalty to immoral conduct; we have deep freezers
and mink coats given to political or personal favorites, and
bribes for the opportunity to do privileged business with
those who hold and dispense the loot. Why not? If it is right
to loot, it is also right to loot the loot. If the latter is wrong,
so also is the former.
If we are to accept Lord Acton's axiom about the cor-
rupting effect of power — and also the reasoning of Profes-
sor Hayek in his book The Road to Serfdom, about why the
worst get to the top in a welfare state — then corruption and
low moral standards in high political places should not be
surprising. But when the citizens come more and more to
laugh and joke about it, rather than to remove the crown of
power and dismantle the throne, a nation is well on its way
to moral rot, reminiscent of the fall of the Roman Empire
and others.
Nor should we be surprised that there is some juvenile
delinquency where adult delinquency is so rampant, and
where the absence of any basic moral code among adults
precludes even the possibility of their effectively teaching a
moral code that will prevent delinquency in the young. If,
as adults, we practice collective thievery through the wel-
fare state, and advocate it as right and good, how can we
question the logic of the youths who likewise form gangs
and rob the candy store? If demonstration is the best
Morals and Liberty / 195
teacher, we adults must start with the practice of morality
ourselves, rather than hiring some presumed specialist to
study the causes of similar conduct among the youngsters;
their conduct is the symptom, not the disease.
Thievery and covetousness will persist and grow, and
the basic morals of ourselves, our children, and our chil-
dren's children will continue to deteriorate unless we
destroy the virus of immorality that is embedded in the
concept of the welfare state; unless we come to understand
how the moral code of individual conduct must apply also
to collective conduct, because the collective is composed
solely of individuals. Moral individual conduct cannot per-
sist in the face of collective immorality under the welfare
state program. One side or the other of the double standard
of morals will have to be surrendered.
Appendix: The Welfare State Idea
The concept of the welfare state appears in our every-
day life in the form of a long list of labels and programs
such as: Social Security; parity or fair prices; reasonable
profits; the living wage; the TVA, MVA, CVA; federal aid to
states, to education, to bankrupt corporations; and so on.
But all these names and details of the welfare state pro-
gram tend only to obscure its essential nature. They are
well-sounding labels for a laudable objective — the relief of
distressing need, prevention of starvation, and the like. But
how best is starvation and distress to be prevented? It is
well, too, that prices, profits, and wages be fair and equi-
table. But what is to be the test of fairness and equity?
Laudable objectives alone do not assure the success of any
program; a fair appraisal of the program must include an
analysis of the means of its attainment. The welfare state is
196 / F. A. Harper
a name that has been substituted as a more acceptable one
for communism-socialism wherever, as in the United
States, these names are in general disrepute.
The welfare state plan, viewed in full bloom of com-
pleteness, is one where the state prohibits the individual
from having any right of choice in the conditions and place
of his work; it takes ownership of the product of his labor;
it prohibits private property. All these are done ostensibly
to help those whose rights have been taken over by the wel-
fare state.
But these characteristics of controlled employment and
confiscation of income are not those used in promotion of
the idea of the welfare state. What are usually advertised,
instead, are the "benefits" of the welfare state — the grants
of food and housing and whatnot — which the state "gives"
to the people. But all these "benefits" are merely the other
side of the forfeited rights to choose one's own occupation
and to keep whatever one is able to produce. In the same
sense that the welfare state grants benefits, the slave master
grants to his slaves certain allotments of food and other
economic goods. In fact, slavery might be described as just
another form of welfare state, because of its likeness in
restrictions and "benefits."
Yet the state, as such, produces nothing with which to
supply these "benefits." Persons produce everything which
the welfare state takes, before it gives some back as "bene-
fits"; but in the process, the bureaucracy takes its cut. Only
by thus confiscating what persons have produced can the
welfare state "satisfy the needs of the people." So, the nec-
essary and essential idea of the welfare state is to control
the economic actions of the vassals of the state, to take from
producers what they produce, and to prevent their ever
Morals and Liberty / 197
being able to attain economic independence from the state
and from their fellow men through ownership of property.
To whatever extent an individual is still allowed free-
dom in any of these respects while living under a govern-
ment like the present one in the United States, then to that
extent the development of the program of the welfare state
is as yet not fully completed. Or perhaps it is an instance of
a temporary grant of freedom by the welfare state such as
when a master allows his slave a day off from work to
sj>end as he likes; but the person who is permitted some
freedom by the welfare state is still a vassal of that state just
as a slave is still a slave on his day off from work.
The Idea of Equality
Jarret B. WoUstein
It is doubtful if any social concept in the entire history of
man has been more fervently championed, more fiercely
denounced, more misunderstood, more poorly defined, or
more misrepresented than the idea of equality.
Many Christians proclaim all men "equal in the eyes of
God." The United States was founded on the principle of
"equality of rights." The basis of modem Western jurispru-
dence is "equality before the law." The rallying cry of the
French Revolution was "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." A
central goal of communism and socialism is "economic
equality." The American Civil Rights Movement seeks
"equality of opportunity." And the modem women's
movement champions "equal rights for women" and
"equal pay for equal work."
While the meaning and compatibility of this multitude
of "equalities" is far from clear, it is obvious that they do
not all mean the same thing. Just what does equality mean?
What Is Equality?
For two things to be equal means for them to be identi-
cal in some respect. Thus if two trees are both precisely six
feet tall, they are equal in height. If two men both earn pre-
Mr. Wollstein is a founder of the Society for Individual Liberty and
author of Society Without Coercion. This article is reprinted from the
April 1980 issue of The Freeman.
198
The Idea of Equality / 199
cisely $9,500 a year, they are equal in income. And if two
people both have the same chance of winning a lottery, they
have (in that respect) equality of opportunity.
However, while two things may be identical with
respect to one or a limited number of attributes, no two
physical objects can ever be identical with respect to all
attributes. For example, all atoms differ in position, direc-
tion, and history. And all human beings differ with respect
to anatomy, biochemistry, temperament, knowledge, skills,
goals, virtue, and a thousand other characteristics.
Here we will primarily be concerned with three types of
equality:
1. Political equality, a major goal of both the American
and French revolutions, has traditionally meant equality of
individual rights and equality of liberty. Stated simply,
political equality means that the individual's right to life,
liberty, and property is respected and that government
abstains from conferring any special advantage or inflicting
any special harm upon one individual (or group) in distinc-
tion to another. Clearly, political equality is at best only
approximated and never exists completely.
2. Economic equality means in essence that people have
the same income or total wealth.
3. Social equality generally means either (a) equality of
social status, (b) equality of opportunity, or (c) equality of
p treatment. Social equality is also increasingly coming to
mean (d) equality of achievement.
Equality and Liberty
A little reflection will quickly demonstrate that eco-
nomic and social equality can only be achieved at the
expense of political equality. Because people differ in abil-
200 / Jarret B. Wollstein
ity, drive, intelligence, strength, and many other attributes
it follows that, with liberty, people also will differ in
achievement, status, income, and wealth. A talented singer
will command a higher income than a ditchdigger. A frugal,
hardworking man generally will accumulate more wealth
than an indolent spendthrift. A brilliant scientist will com-
mand more respect than a skid row bum.
Nor are all of these differences of social and economic
achievement the result of environment. Because people are
individuals — genetically, biochemically, anatomically, and
neurologically — differences in strength, intelligence, ag-
gressiveness, and other traits will always exist. While envi-
ronmental factors can and do exaggerate physical and men-
tal differences between people, diversity and non-equality
remain the natural biological order and hence are the nat-
ural social and economic order.
There is only one way to make all people even approxi-
mately economically or socially equal, and that is through
the forcible redistribution of wealth and the legal prohibi-
tion of social distinction.
As Dr. Robert Nozick, of the Harvard Philosophy
Department, has pointed out in Anarchy, State, and Utopia,
economic equality requires a continuous and unending
series of government interventions into private transac-
tions. Even if people's incomes are made equal once, they
will quickly become unequal if they have the liberty to
spend their own money. For example, many more people
will choose to pay $10 to hear Linda Ronstadt sing than will
pay $10 to hear me sing, and Linda Ronstadt will very
quickly become far wealthier than I am.
Economic equality can thus only be maintained by total-
itarian control of people's lives, and the substitution of the
The Idea of Equality / 201
decisions of a handful of state authorities for the free
choices of milHons of men and women.
Pohtical equality is fundamentally inimical to economic
and social equality. Free men are not economically equal,
and economically equal men are not free. Because the
achievement of social and economic equality inherently
requires the forcible interference with voluntary choice, I
will subsequently refer to the doctrine that social or eco-
nomic equality should be imposed upon a society as coer-
cive egalitarianism.
Equality as an Ethical Ideal
In reality people are unequal: Americans are — on aver-
age— far wealthier than Russians, doctors tend to earn
more than garbage collectors, and so on. But should people
be unequal?
At its root, egalitarianism is an ethical doctrine. It is
often asserted that "ethics is just a matter of opinion" and
that "one moral system is just as good as any other." But in
fact any ethical code can be judged by at least three criteria:
(1) is it logical? — have the basic concepts of the doctrine
been meaningfully defined and are the arguments for it
valid; (2) is it realistic? — is it a doctrine which human
beings can live by, or does it require that people act in a
way which is fundamentally contrary to their nature; and
(3) is it desirable? — are the consequences of adopting the
doctrine what are claimed, or would they be something
entirely different; and if people adopt this doctrine will it
lead to the creation of a society in which they are happy
and fulfilled, or will it lead to a society of hopelessness,
repression, and despair?
202 / ]arret B. Wollstein
Let us now apply these criteria to the doctrine of coer-
cive egalitarianism.
1. Is coercive egalitarianism logical? Egalitarianism states
that all people should be equal, but few coercive egalitari-
ans define "equality."
As stated previously, complete equality between people
is an impossibility, so it can be rejected at once. But we are
hardly better off when we speak of social or economic
equality. Does "economic equality" mean equal income at a
given age, for a given job, for a certain amount of work, or
for a particular occupation? Does "equal wealth" mean
identical possessions, possessions of identical value, or
something entirely different? Does "social equality" mean
equal status, equal popularity, equal opportunity, equal
treatment, or what? All of these concepts of economic and
social equality are distinctly different, and until they are
defined, the doctrine of egalitarianism is illogical.
2. Is coercive egalitarianism realistic? People are different
and have different values. To some happiness requires
many material possessions, to others material ix)ssessions
are relatively unimportant. To some people intelligence is a
great value, to others strength or beauty are far more
important. Because people differ both in their own charac-
teristics and in the way in which they value traits in others,
people will naturally discriminate in favor of some i:>ersons
and against others.
Since variety and distinction are natural parts of the
human condition, by demanding that people abandon such
distinctions, coercive egalitarianism is contrary to human
nature.
3. Is coercive egalitarianism desirable? Coercive egalitari-
anism, the doctrine of complete social and economic equal-
ity of human beings, logically implies a world of identical.
The Idea of Equality / 203
faceless, interchangeable p)eople. Such a world sounds
much more like a nightmare than a dream, and indeed it is.
Perhaps no nation on earth has come closer to complete
economic and social equality than Pol Pot'c Cambodia.
Under Pol Pot's regime entire populations were forcibly
marched out of cities and everyone, regardless of age, sex,
skills, or previous social status, was forced to labor with
primitive agricultural implements on collective farms. In
Pol Pot's Cambodia, everyone had to think, work, and
believe the same; dissenters were killed on the spot.
In northern Cambodia stands the remains of one of Pol
Pof s "model villages." The houses are neat, clean, and
completely identical. Nearby sits a mass open grave with
hundreds of human skeletons — the pitiful remains of those
who displayed the slightest individuality. The village and
mass grave are a fitting symbol of the fruits of coercive
egalitarianism.
While coercive egalitarianism masquerades as an ethi-
cal doctrine, in fact it is the opposite. Ethics presumes that
one can make a distinction between right and wrong for
human beings. But coercive egalitarianism demands that
we treat people equally, regardless of their differences,
including differences in virtue. To demand that virtuous
and villainous i:>eople — for example, Thomas Edison and
Charles Manson — be treated equally, is to make ethical dis-
tinction impossible in principle.
In summary, coercive egalitarianism is illogical because
it never defines precisely what "equality" consists of; it is
uiuiealistic because it requires that we deny our values; and
it is undesirable because it ultimately requires a society of
human insects.
While coercive egalitarianism fails as an ethical doc-
trine, many contentions based upon coercive egalitarianism
204 / Jarret B. Wollstein
nevertheless remain emotionally compelling to many peo-
ple. Let us now examine some of those contentions.
Myths of Egalitarianism
1. Social and economic inequality are a result of coercion, an
accident of birth, or unfair advantage. Let us consider these
contentions one at a time.
It is certainly true that some inequality is a result of coer-
cion in such forms as conquest, theft, confiscatory taxes or
political power. But it is hardly true that all inequality is a
result of coercion. A person can, after all, become wealthy
or popular because he or she is highly talented or extremely
inventive, and talent and invention coerce no one.
Being born wealthy certainly constitutes an advantage,
but hardly an insurmountable or unfair one. Sociological
studies in the United States and Eurof>e show tremendous
mobility between lower, middle, and upper classes, despite
advantages and disadvantages of birth. Except for all but
the greatest fortunes, one's parents' wealth and success are
no guarantee of one's own wealth or success. And there is
nothing immoral about helping out one's own children as
much as possible. Such aid takes away nothing to which
anyone else is entitled.
Last, there is the argument that being bom with below-
average intelligence, or strength, or attractiveness consti-
tutes an "unfair disadvantage." Here egalitarianism reveals
itself to be (in the words of Dr. Murray Rothbard) "a revolt
against nature." We can either act rationally and rejoice in
our diversity and make the most of the abilities we do have,
or we can damn nature and hate everyone who is in any
way better than we are and attempt to drag them down to
our level. I leave it to you which is the more rational and
humane policy.
The Idea of Equality / 205
2. If people would only share the world's bounty equally, there
would be enough for everyone, and no one need starve or be seri-
ously deprived. This contention is based upon two false
assumptions: (a) that wealth is a natural resource, so one
person's gain is another's loss; and (b) that if the world's
wealth were equally redistributed it would remain con-
stant.
Wealth in fact is a product of human productivity and
invention. Some people are poor not because others are
wealthy, but because the poor are insufficiently productive
(often because of authoritarian political systems).
Any attempt to redistribute the world's wealth by force
would also greatly diminish the total wealth in existence
for at least three reasons: (a) large-scale redistribution
would disrupt the world's productive machinery, (b) con-
fiscation of wealth would destroy the incentive to produce
more (why bother producing if it's going to be taken from
you anyway), and (c) the process of redistribution would
require an enormously costly and essentially parasitic
bureaucracy. (Not to mention losses from shooting people
who resist, and starvation from bureaucratic inefficiency
and mistakes.)
The cure for poverty is more productivity, less state eco-
nomic intervention, and an end to barriers to trade. The
cure is not redistribution of wealth.
3. It is better that everyone be poor than for some to have more
than others. Better for whom? For the middle class and
wealthy stripped of their property? For the poor robbed of
the possibility of ever improving their lot?
The production and accumulation of wealth is the
benchmark of human progress. Wealth in the form of better
communications systems, environmental control, pest con-
trol, improved transportation, better medical care, more
durable and attractive clothing, more comfortable housing.
206 / Jarret B. Wollstein
and so on, ad infinitum, improves the quality and increases
the quantity of human life and makes possible leisure, sci-
ence, and art. To attack wealth is to attack an essential con-
dition for the achievement of virtually every human value
from the fulfillment of physiological needs, to safety, to the
pursuit of beauty and truth.
This argument reveals the ultimate and ugly motive of
many egalitarians: A hatred of human ability per se. By that
hatred they betray their human heritage and would con-
demn men to exist at the level of barbarians.
Free and Unequal vs. Coercive Egalitarianism
Equality of rights and equality under the law are pre-
conditions for any just and humane society. But such polit-
ical equality is the very antithesis of coercive egalitarian-
ism.
Coercive egalitarianism asserts that people ought to be
made equal hy force, and that ability and virtue should be
ignored or punished to bring all people down to the lowest
common denominator.
The disabilities of others should evoke our compassion.
But those disabilities do not justify the forced looting of the
productive or the obliteration of liberty in the name of some
undefined concept of equality.
The natural order of human society is diversity, variety,
and inequality. The fruits of that natural order are progress,
productivity, and invention. In the final analysis, virtue and
compassion can only flourish in a world of men and
women free and unequal.
Justice and Freedom
Leslie Snyder
The administration of a republic is supposed to be
directed by certain fundamental principles of right and
justice, from which there cannot, because there ought not
to, be any deviation; and whenever any deviation
appears, there is a kind of stepping out of the republican
principle, and an approach toward the despotic one.
— Thomas Paine
Justice is the only foundation upon which a society of
free and independent people can exist. Justice is a concrete,
recognizable, and objective principle. It is not a matter of
opinion.
In our day and age the word justice is rarely used in
political and economic discussions. The entire reason for
the existence of communities, laws, governments, and
court systems has been forgotten. But if life and property
are to be protected and secured, which is the purpose of
society, then justice must be the rule. To quote Paine
again, "A republic, properly understood, is a sovereignty
of justice."
According to a 1931 Webster's dictionary, justice is the
This article, which appeared in the March 1980 issue of The Free-
man, is excerpted from Ms. Snyder's book Justice or Revolution (1979).
207
208 / Leslie Snyder
"quality of being just; impartiality." Just is "conforming to
right; normal; equitable." A 1961 Webster's dictionary says
justice is "The principle of rectitude and just dealings of
men with each other — one of the cardinal virtues. Adminis-
tration of law. . ." A 1975 edition of a Grolier Webster dic-
tionary says justice is "Equitableness; what is rightly due;
lawfulness. . . ."
Since 1931 a new meaning of the word justice has been
added, that of lawfulness, which is not only erroneous, but
deceitful and misleading. Justice is not based on law; rather,
law ought to be based on justice. It is only common sense,
for men lived and worked together before laws were
formed. Generally laws are passed to formalize what has
preceded under common practice, what has stood the test
of time as being just and equitable. Laws are common prac-
tice put down in black and white for all to see and know.
The ancient philosophers said that justice is speaking
the truth and paying your debts, giving to each man what
is proper to him, doing good to friends and evil to enemies.
Therefore, there must be something more basic, more fun-
damental than laws on which to found justice. In fact, the
French jurist Charles de Montesquieu (1689-1755) ably con-
tended that "before laws were made, there were relations of
possible justice. To say that there is nothing just or unjust
but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is
the same as saying that before the describing of a circle all
the radii were not equal."
Minding One's Own Business
The Greek philosophers had the simplest definition of
justice. To Plato (c. 428-348 B.C.), in Tfie Republic, Book IV,
justice is simply "doing one's own business, aind not being
]ustice and Freedom / 209
a busybody. ... A man may neither take what is another's,
nor be deprived of what is his own This is the ultimate
cause and condition of the existence of all" other virtues in
the state, "and while remaining in them is also their preser-
vative."
In Book XII of Plato's Laws, the conclusion is drawn that
"by the relaxation of that justice which is the uniting princi-
ple of all constitutions, every power in the state is rent
asunder from every other." In other words, without justice
the threads of society unravel and society disintegrates into
barbarism.
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) in Nicomachean Ethics, Book V,
gives greater perception to what justice is. It "is found
among men who share their life with a view to self-suffi-
ciency, men who are free. . . . Therefore ywsf/ce is essentially
something human/' (Emphasis added.) In other words, free
men may choose to be just or unjust. Justice, as an ethical
term, is voluntary; "... a man acts unjustly or justly when-
ever he does such acts voluntarily" When wrong is done
and done voluntarily, it then becomes an act of injustice. In
short, "All virtue is summed up in dealing justly," said
Aristotle.
More concretely, Aristotle claims, in Rhetoric, Book I,
"Justice is the virtue through which everybody enjoys his
own possessions in accordance with the law; its opposite is
injustice, through which men enjoy the possessions of oth-
ers in defiance of the law." There is the problem of using the
law to legalize theft and to redistribute the property of one
group to another group, but for the time being, we must
assume Aristotle means the use of laws that are rightful and
just. For when he says "justice has been acknowledged by
us to be a social virtue, and it implies all others," he has laid
the foundation of a just societ}^
210 / Leslie Snyder
Furthermore, Aristotle maintains that "legal justice is
the discrimination of the just and the unjust." And, "Of
political justice part is natural, part legal — ^natural, that
which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by
people's thinking this or that." Natural justice must pre-
cede law and form the basis of law thereon.
Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), in his Essays, elo-
quently said: "The justice which in itself is natural and uni-
versal, is otherwise and more nobly ordered, than that
other justice, which is special, national, and constrained to
the ends of government." He continues, "There cannot a
worse state of things be imagined, than where wickedness
comes to be legitimate, and assumes with the magistrate's
permission, the cloak of virtue. . . . The extremest sort of
injustice, according to Plato, is where that which is unjust,
should be reputed for just."
Hobbes on Natural Justice
In Thomas Hobbes' (1588-1679) Leviathan, further
ground is laid on which to base natural justice. The names
just and unjust, says Hobbes, when they are attributed to
men's actions, signify conformity or nonconformity to rea-
son. Therefore, "Justice ... is a rule of reason by which we
are forbidden to do anything destructive to our life, cind
consequently a law of nature."
Then Hobbes leads beautifully into the virtue of just
actions: "That which gives to human actions the relish of
justice is a certain nobleness or gallantness of courage,
rarely found, by which a man scorns to be beholding for the
contentment of his life to fraud, or breach of promise. This
Justice and Freedom / 211
justice of the manners is that which is meant where justice
is called a virtue; and injustice, a vice."
Earlier it was established that justice is the social virtue
on which a just society is constructed. Hobbes adds to this
not only by tying virtues to the laws of nature, but to moral
philosophy as well. "Now the science of virtue and vice is
moral philosophy; and therefore the true doctrine of the
laws of nature is the true moral philosophy. . . . For moral
philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good
and evil in the conversation and society of mankind."
Thus, Hobbes establishes the fact that a just society is a
moral society.
Saint Augustine (354-^30) in The City of God, Book XIX,
declares "Where, therefore, there is no true justice there can
be no right. For that which is done right is justly done, and
what is unjustly done cannot be done by right." Hence, jus-
tice precedes "rights."
Joseph Joubert eloquently phrased justice as truth in
action.
Since practicing the virtue of justice is voluntary, man
ought to have the courage to stand up and fight for what is
right and against what is wrong. Cato the Younger said it
this way: "... a man has it in his power to be just, if he have
but the will to be so, and therefore injustice is thought the
most dishonorable because it is least excusable."
Another way to consider what justice is, is to compare it
with injustice. For example, in Utilitarianism, John Stuart
Mill (1806-1873) states that "... it is just to respect, unjust
to violate, the legal rights of any one." Second, "... injustice
consists in taking or withholding from any person that to
which he has a moral right." Third, "It is universally consid-
ered just that each person should obtain that (whether good
212 / Leslie Snyder
or evil) which he deserves." Fourth, "It is confessedly unjust
to break faith with any one: to violate an engagement,
either expressed or implied. . . ." Fifth, "It is, by universal
admission, inconsistent with justice to be partial."
A Moral Issue
Mill, too, sees justice as a moral issue. He concludes:
"Whether the injustice consists in depriving a person of a
possession, or in breaking faith with him, or in treating him
worse than he deserves, or worse than other people who
have no greater claims, in each case the supposition implies
two things — a wrong done, and some assignable person
who is wronged. Injustice may also be done by treating a
person better than others; but the wrong in this case is to his
competitors, who are also assignable persons. . . . Justice
implies something which it is not only right to do, and
wrong not to do, but which some individual person can
claim from us as his moral right."
Thomas Paine's Dissertations speak about justice where
the public good is concerned. He maintains that, "The foun-
dation-principle of public good is justice, and wherever jus-
tice is impartially administered, the public good is pro-
moted; for as it is to the good of every man that no injustice
be done to him, so likewise it is to his good that the princi-
ple which secures him should not be violated in the person
of another, because such a violation weakens his security,
and leaves to chance what ought to be to him a rock to
stand on."
The great American constitutional lawyer of the nine-
teenth century, Lysander Spooner, wrote a pamphlet enti-
tled: Natural Law, or The Science of Justice, which succinctly
summarizes what justice is:
Justice and Freedom / 213
The science of mine and thine — the science of jus-
tice— is the science of all human rights; of all a man's
rights of person and property; of all his rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
It is the science which alone can tell any man
what he can, and cannot, do; what he can, and can-
not, have; what he can, and cannot, say, without
infringing the rights of any other person.
It is the science of peace; and the only science of
peace; since it is the science which alone can tell us
on what conditions mankind can live in peace, or
ought to live in peace, with each other.
These conditions are simply these: viz., first, that
each man shall do, towards every other, all that jus-
tice requires him to do; as, for example, that he shall
pay his debts, that he shall return borrowed or stolen
property to its owner, and that he shall make repara-
tion for any injury he may have done to the person
or property of another.
The second condition is, that each man shall
abstain from doing to another, anything which jus-
tice forbids him to do; as, for example, that he shall
abstain from committing theft, robbery, arson, mur-
der, or any other crime against the person or prop-
erty of another.
So long as these conditions are fulfilled men are
at peace, and ought to remain at peace, with each
other. But when either of these conditions is vio-
lated, men are at war. And they must necessarily
remain at war until justice is re-established.
Through all time, so far as history informs us,
wherever mankind have attempted to live in peace
with each other, both the natural instincts, and the
214 / Leslie Snyder
collective wisdom of the human race, have acknowl-
edged and prescribed, as an indispensable condi-
tion, obedience to this one only universal obligation:
viz., that each should live honestly towards every
other.
The ancient maxim makes the sum of man's legal
duty to his fellow men to be simply this: "To live hon-
estly, to hurt no one, to give to every one his due. ..."
Never has such a complex subject as justice been treated
so clearly and simply. To summarize justice thus far: Justice
means that each must be accountable for his own actions,
entitled to the reward of his labor, and responsible for the
consequences of his wrongdoings.
The love of justice should be instilled in every man,
woman, and child — all should wish to see justice done. For
without justice the rule of men (dictatorship), not of law,
assumes power. Without justice, society disintegrates into
barbarism, where courts of law are administered by favor
and pull instead of objective law, and without objective
laws, the individual is at the mercy of the ruling power and
its agents. The ancient atrocities return, such as no trial by
jury, confiscatory taxes on life and property, the purchasing
of judges, legislators, and sheriffs; all previous forms of the
prior administration of justice become part of the current
machinery which administers not justice, but injustice or
tyranny.
In short, all that is good rests on justice. Where there is
no justice, there is no morality — no right or wrong — any-
thing goes and usually does. Justice is a social virtue to be
practiced by individuals. Justice demands that the individ-
ual reward or recognize good and condemn evil. To prac-
Justice and Freedom / 215
tice justice one should know a man for what he is and treat
him accordingly, whether he be honest, dishonest, friend,
or thief. The good should be rewarded, the bad punished.
The Highest Goal
Society cannot place before it a higher or nobler goal
than the administration of justice. Thus, here is a bit of
advice from Conversations with Goethe, March 22, 1825: "A
great deal may be done by severity, more by love, but most
by clear discernment and impartial justice."
Once the meaning of justice has been established, next
comes the understanding of freedom and liberty, which are
crucial because only under freedom can the individual
achieve his highest potential and pursue his happiness.
To speak of liberty and freedom is to speak first of nat-
ural laws or the right of nature. Hobbes lays an excellent
foundation of natural laws or rights. He affirms that the
right of nature is the liberty each man has to use his own
power for the preservation of his own life, and his own
judgment and reason are the best means for achieving it.
The first law of nature, according to Jean Jacques
Rousseau (1712-1778), results from man's nature. "His first
law is to provide for his own preservation, his first cares are
those which he owes to himself; and, as soon as he reaches
years of discretion, he is the sole judge of the proper means
of preserving himself. . . ."
Therefore, if man's first obligation is to provide for his
own life, he must live under the proper conditions in which
to sustain his life, namely, liberty. By liberty is understood
the absence of external impediments, the absence of oppo-
sition.
216 / Leslie Snyder
Liberty Benefits All
In The Constitution of Liberty, Nobel-Prize winner
Friedrich A. Hayek points out that liberty is a negative con-
cept like peace. "It becomes positive only through what we
make of it. It does not assure us of any particular opportu-
nities, but leaves it to us to decide what use we shall make
of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. . . ." He
continues, "Liberty not only means that the individual has
both the opportunity and the burden of choice; it also
means that he must bear the consequences of his actions
and will receive praise or blame for them. Liberty and
responsibility are inseparable." (Emphasis added.)
To expound further. Mill explains that one cannot take
away another's freedom no matter how sincerely one tries
to protect another Only by our own hands can any positive
and lasting improvement in our lives be worked out. And
through "the influence of these two principles all free com-
munities have both been more exempt from social injustice
and crime, and have attained more brilliant prosperity, than
any others. . . ."
Further, "... any restriction on liberty reduces the num-
ber of things tried and so reduces the rate of progress. In
such a society freedom of action is granted to the individ-
ual, not because it gives him greater satisfaction but
because if allowed to go his own way he will on the average
serve the rest of us better than any orders we know how to
give."
In short, liberty is the only object which benefits all alike
and should provoke no sincere opposition. Liberty "is not a
means to a higher political end. It is itself the highest polit-
ical end," says Lord Acton. It is required for security in the
pursuit of the highest objects of private life and civil society.
Justice and Freedom / 217
Morality Requires Freedom
If liberty is to live upon one's own terms and slavery is
to live at the mercy of another's, then it follows that to live
under one's own terms means the individual has a choice
of actions. He can be virtuous or not; he can be moral.
Therefore, morality requires freedom. Thus, only free men
can be just men!
In his The Road to Serfdom, Hayek ties liberty to morality.
Since morals are of necessity a phenomenon of individual
conduct, to be moral one must be free to make choices.
Where man is forced to act by coercion, the ability to choose
has been preempted. Only under liberty and freedom can
man be moral. As a result, only "where we ourselves are
responsible for our own interests . . . has our decision moral
value. Freedom to order our own conduct in the sphere
where material circumstances force a choice upon us, and
responsibility for the arrangement of our own life accord-
ing to our own conscience, is the air in which alone moral
sense grows and in which moral values are daily recreated
in the free decision of the individual. Responsibility, not to
a superior, but to one's conscience, the awareness of a duty
not exacted by compulsion . . . and to bear the consequences
of one's own decision, are the very essence of any morals
which deserve the name."
The facts have been established thus far that man must
live under liberty to become as productive, as noble, and as
just as he can, since liberty is the condition under which
morality thrives. Also, only the individual knows what is
best for himself. And finally liberty does not provide
opportunities, but leaves the individual free to choose
those actions which he thinks will best suit him and to bear
the consequences of those actions.
218 / Leslie Snyder
The Price of Freedom
There is one more thing to consider about freedom and
liberty — the price. Tocqueville remarked, "Some abandon
freedom thinking it dangerous, others thinking it impossi-
ble." But there is a third reason. Some abandon freedom
thinking it too expensive. Freedom is not free. "Those who
expect to reap the blessings of freedom, must, like men,
undergo the fatigues of supporting it," noted Paine.
"Freedom is the most exacting form of civil govern-
ment— it is, in fact, the most demanding state of all for man.
That is because freedom demands — depends upon — self-
discipline from both the governed and the governing. The
foundation of freedom is self-government and the founda-
tion of self-government is self-control," explains author
Rus Walton, of One Nation Under God. Freedom requires
more, however. It requires a strong and vigilant defense.
"The greater the threat of evil, the stronger that defense
must be. That which is right does not survive unattended;
it, too, must have its defenders. . . ."
Is liberty worth the effort? According to Frederic Bastiat,
all you have to do is look at the entire world to decide. That
is, which "countries contain the most peaceful, the most
moral, and the happiest people? Those people are found in
the countries where the law least interferes with private
affairs; where government is least felt; where the individual
has the greatest scope, and free opinion the greatest influ-
ence; where administrative powers are fewest and sim-
plest; where taxes are lightest and most nearly equal, and
popular discontent the least excited and the least justifiable;
where individuals and groups most actively assume their
responsibilities, and, consequently, where the morals of . . .
human beings are constantly improving; where trade.
Justice and Freedom / 219
assemblies, and associations are the least restricted;
where mankind most nearly follow its own natural inclina-
tions; ... in short, the happiest, most moral, and most
peaceful people are those who most nearly follow this prin-
ciple: although mankind is not perfect, still, all hope rests
upon the free and voluntary actions of persons within the
limits of right; law or force is to be used for nothing except
the administration of universal justice."
What this means to us today is that our society, so filled
with government regulations and laws, has taken away
many of our liberties. For example, we cannot go into some
businesses without being licensed, taxed, and regulated.
We are presumed guilty (of dishonesty) until proven inno-
cent (which is impossible). Our reputations are continually
under attack and, for the most part, stand for nothing. Hon-
esty and integrity, once the backbone of our society, have
been replaced by government regulations and promises.
Under this system of injustice all of us are losing our liber-
ties, wealth, and happiness.
What better way to summarize the spirit of liberty and
freedom and justice than to quote Tocqueville, who said, "I
should have loved freedom, I believe, at all times, but in the
time in which we live I am ready to worship it."
On Liberty and Liberation
Bruce D. Porter
For at least half a century now the word liberty has been
declining in popular usage and the word liberation has
been advancing. Today in the United States the word lib-
erty has all but disappeared from public discourse, while
liberation has become a fashionable term, enthusiastically
invoked in political oratory, in everyday conversation, and
in respected works of scholarship.
This is not a mere case of linguistic drift. The decline of
liberty and the rise of liberation reveal the extent to which
doctrinal myths and political folly have come to dominate
our age. Americans are forgetting the meaning of liberty in
pursuit of a phantom liberation. Over two centuries ago at
Buckinghamshire Edmund Burke observed that, "The peo-
ple never give up their liberties but under some delusion."
With mad abandon contemporary Americans are jettison-
ing many of their once-cherished freedoms and values as
they seek an impossible form of liberation — from moral
restraints, self-discipline, responsibility, work, necessity,
competition, struggle, inequality, natural law, and the con-
sequences of their own behavior. It is a senseless, tragic
course which can lead only to subservience, dependency,
and decadence. It is a delusion.
An imperative prerequisite to our survival as a free
This article appeared in the April 1980 issue of The Freeman. At the
time he wrote it, Dr. Porter was a Research Fellow of Harvard Univer-
sity's Center for International Affairs.
220
On Liberty and Liberation / 111
nation is that we recapture — in our hearts and minds, as
well as in our politics — an understanding of the true nature
of liberty. A love of liberty and a clear comprehension of the
foundations upon which it rests will quickly dispel every
attraction of the false ideologies of liberation.
Liberty is a divine gift, one of the most priceless of
God's bequests to man, and the natural, inalienable right of
every person who enters the world. In simplest terms lib-
erty may be defined as the freedom of the individual to
shape his own destiny and to govern his own affairs. Of
necessity this implies the freedom to choose one's associa-
tions, loyalties, beliefs, opportunities, and economic rela-
tionships, as well as the freedom to exercise control over the
fruits of one's own labors.
Though liberty is God-given, mortal efforts are required
to sustain and preserve it. Human institutions do not grant
liberty, but they often usurp it. Individuals are born free,
but they can willfully sell, abandon, or reject that birthright.
For these reasons, liberty is never free. When not defended,
it will not survive; when not exercised, it will atrophy.
Essentials of Liberty
Liberty can only endure when certain conditions are
met. First, there must be an absence of coercive actions
intended to impede the free exercise of will or to rob indi-
viduals of their labors and investments. Coercive force is
justified only when it is imperative to the defense of liberty,
i.e., when exerted to prevent a yet greater coercive act.
Criminals and tyrants of every form stand ready to destroy
human freedom, to rob the property of others, to impose
their will upon whole societies. Their influence must be
checked if liberty is to prosper.
222 / Bruce D. Porter
A second necessary condition for the survival of liberty
is that individuals possess and are free to acquire the posi-
tive means needed to pursue rational ends. These means
include material resources, talent, initiative, knowledge,
energy, discipline, and a love of progress and freedom. Lib-
erty does not consist of undirected, impotent, and senseless
expressions of the human will; rather, it thrives as the indi-
vidual acquires power to act and to focus his efforts in
meaningful directions. Liberty requires power — not power
over others, but power to effect personal progress, to
change one's circumstances for the better.
Thirdly, the preservation of liberty requires that individ-
uals manifest moral commitment and self-restraint in the
choice and pursuit of their goals. Liberty means the absence
of coercive restraints, but it does not mean the absence of all
restraints. We cannot escape the consequences of our own
behavior The unrestrained pursuit of power means
enslavement to ambition, the unrestrained pursuit of
wealth means enslavement to avarice, the unrestrained
pursuit of pleasure means enslavement to passions.
Without moral limits liberty degenerates into license
and license turns inevitably toward destructive ends. The
moral authority which sets limits on the scope of an indi-
vidual's actions must flow from within him, the product of
conscience and reason; when imposed by a higher author-
ity, however well-intentioned, moral laws are transformed
into instruments of coercion and domination.
A Constitutional Structure
Keeping these conditions in mind, it is instructive to
inquire into the kind of social structure which will foster
liberty. In order to insure the first condition of liberty, a con-
On Liberty and Liberation / 223
stitutional and legal framework must be erected and
upheld, its principal end being to guard against all coercive
challenges to f>ersonal liberty — whether from individuals,
institutions, foreign armies, or from the state itself.
The threat to liberty of the state itself should be empha-
sized, for unless such a constitutional system is strictly self-
limiting its administrative apparatus will grow in size and
power until it comes to dominate the entire society accord-
ing to its own vested interests. Consensus and consent are
fundamental to the establishment and operation of a free
government, but the goal sought is not so much "govern-
ment of the people" — for this can imply that majorities
deserve coercive power — ^as a government of laws, adminis-
tered as impersonally and fairly as possible.
By itself alone a constitutionally limited government
will never suffice to insure the survival of human liberty.
This is because government cannot bring about the second
and third conditions of liberty discussed above — the power
and means necessary for positive action and the moral lim-
its within which liberty operates. Government can be an
arbiter, but it can never be a provider. It can enforce protec-
tive laws, but it cannot produce virtuous people or act as a
higher moral authority.
A cycle of futility results whenever the state attempts to
provide the resources and human energy necessary for
progress. Every resource a government provides to the
individuals in a society must first be taken from those indi-
viduals. Because the process of injecting them back into the
society will always incur a net loss, the result over time
will be economic stagnation, declining initiative in society
as a whole, depletion of real resources, debasement of cur-
rency, decline in productive capital, and the disintegration
of social cohesiveness. The end of this cycle of futility is the
224 / Bruce D. Porter
dependency of the people on the government and the
death of liberty. Liberty is certain to perish in any society
which relies solely on government to create the conditions
of liberty.
No matter how carefully structured and well-defined
are the legal rights, checks, and balances of a constitutional
system, this cycle of futility will at some point ensue unless
the citizens of the commonwealth possess a strong spirit of
independence and self-reliance, and the moral sensibilities
to recognize true liberty when they see it. When the moral
will and independence of the majority of a p>opulation
decline, the checks and balances of any system will erode.
No constitutional system can long endure if its legislators
are not devoted to higher principles, if its judiciary is cor-
rupt, if its administrators do not place integrity above all
other qualities.
Moral Foundations
The constitutional framework of liberty must rest upon
a firm foundation: the love of independence in the hearts of
a people, their moral commitment, and the vast human and
material resources which they possess and independently
control. The institutions which transmit this foundation
from generation to generation are almost all private: fami-
lies, churches, corporations, firms, associations, publishers,
newspapers, and the like. (Schools can also play a key role
if they are under the control of those who pay for them,
rather than under the central government.) Standing inde-
pendent from the state, these institutions are the founda-
tions of a society's liberty. If the state encroaches upon their
domain and subsumes their functions, liberty declines. But
so long as a people cherish the moral and material
On Liberty and Liberation / 225
resources which give them the power to be independent
and so long as the state is a strictly limited constitutional
government of laws, liberty will prosper.
The increasingly difficult and unfortunate circum-
stances in which America finds itself today may be traced
in large part to a general decline in liberty. Genuine free-
dom continues to diminish even as large numbers of Amer-
icans are seduced by the muddle-headed mythology of lib-
eration, believing that it will somehow make them freer.
Quite the opposite consequence will result, for the doctrine
and practice of liberation constitute a direct assault on the
conditions and structure of liberty.
In order to discern the destructive potential underlying
the multitude of contemporary theories and programs
advocating liberation, it suffices simply to ask: liberation
from what? We learn, to begin with, that we are to be liber-
ated from "artificial" self-restraints and moral limits — from
the third condition of liberty discussed above.
Proponents of liberation preach that freedom is an unre-
strained, limitless, spontaneous expression of the human
will, ignoring the reality that meaningful progress can only
be made when disciplined efforts are rationally directed.
Liberty is not a bundle of whims and passions. In order to
promote this doctrine it is necessary to attack all the tradi-
tional and independent sources of morality: religion, family,
private property, private schools, local control of education,
corporate independence, and so forth. In this manner liber-
ation seeks to undermine the very foundation of liberty.
''Effortless Abundance"
This is only the beginning. We are also to be liberated
from work, want, necessity, and struggle. Thus, liberation
226 / Bruce D. Porter
ignores the second condition of liberty: that individuals
must possess and acquire the positive instruments of action
in order to be free. The assumption is that freedom — the
power to act, choose, and progress — can somehow exist
without effort and investment.
In the pursuit of this chimera goal of an effortless world
of abundance for all, the advocates of liberation seek natu-
rally to use the coercive power of the state in order to
extract resources from others. In this manner liberation
becomes a predatory doctrine which can only accomplish
its ends by dismantling the constitutional checks of limited
government and replacing it with an all-powerful bureau-
cracy devoted to central planning, income redistribution,
economic dictatorship, and totalitarian control over indi-
vidual lives. And thus perishes the first condition of lib-
erty— the absence of coercive power.
Liberation is a delusion which cannot lead to real free-
dom because it is based on principles and values funda-
mentally contradictory to true liberty. The consequences of
the decline of liberty and the rise of liberation in America
have never been described more eloquently than by
William Simon:
There has never been such freedom before in Amer-
ica to speak freely ... to publish anything and every-
thing, including the most scurrilous gossip; to take
drugs and to prate to children about their alleged
pleasures; to propagandize for bizarre sexual prac-
tices: to watch bloody and obscene entertainment.
Conversely, compulsion rules the world of work.
There has never been so little freedom in America to
plan, to save, to invest, to build, to produce, to
invent, to hire, to fire, to resist coercive unionization.
On Liberty and Liberation / 227
to exchange goods and services, to risk, to profit, to
grow.
. . . Americans are constitutionally free today to
do almost everything that our cultural tradition has
previously held to be immoral and obscene, while
the police powers of the state are being invoked
against almost every aspect of the productive
process.^
It is not difficult to discern the logical end of this trend:
America will be liberated of its liberty.
Prior to the American Revolution the world was
imbued with the notion that liberty was dangerous and
irresponsible, that its establishment could lead only to
anarchy, indolence, and the breakdown of society. The birth
of the American republic and the astonishing release of
human energy and productivity which resulted shattered
this myth forever. America was both free and stable; it pos-
sessed both liberty and order.
The liberty of America became the cherished ideal of
oppressed peoples everywhere. Liberty suddenly acquired
a respectable name. Never thereafter was it possible for the
enemies of freedom to attack it frontally. The most bitter
opponents of genuine liberty came to portray their policies,
programs, and ideologies as pathways to freedom.
Instead of liberty, however, the favorite watchword
became liberation. Under this banner march the tyrannies
of our time, from Soviet Russia with its wars of national lib-
eration to the kaleidoscope of coercive political programs in
America which invoke the mirage of liberation. The twenti-
eth century has been a century of liberation — of a war on
freedom fought in the name of freedom.
The irony of America's present course is that in the
228 / Bruce D. Porter
name of freedom from restraints, every source of indepen-
dent power and morality is being undermined; in the name
of freedom from work, want, and scarcity, the constitu-
tional framework of liberty is being dismantled, attacked,
and perverted past recognition. Beyond the irony stands
the very real tragedy that in the name of freedom we are
being led inexorably toward oppression and slavery.
1. William Simon, A Time for Truth (New York: Berkely Press edi-
tion, 1979), p. 251.
The Case for Economic Freedom
Benjamin A. Rogge
My economic philosophy is here offered with full
knowledge that it is not generally accepted as the right one.
On the contrary, my brand of economics has now become
Brand X, the one that is never selected as the whitest by the
housewife, the one that is said to be slow acting, the one
that contains no miracle ingredient. It loses nine times out
of ten in the popularity polls run on Election Day, and, in
most elections, it doesn't even present a candidate.
I shall identify my brand of economics as that of eco-
nomic freedom, and I shall define economic freedom as
that set of economic arrangements that would exist in a
society in which the government's only function would be
to prevent one man from using force or fraud against
another — including within this, of course, the task of
national defense. So that there can be no misunderstanding
here, let me say that this is pure, uncompromising laissez-
faire economics. It is not the mixed economy; it is the
unmixed economy.
I readily admit that 1 do not expect to see such an econ-
omy in my lifetime or in anyone's lifetime in the infinity of
years ahead of us. 1 present it rather as the ideal we should
strive for and should be disappointed in never fully
attaining.
Dr. Rogge (1920-1980) was Dean and Professor of Economics at
Wabash College in Indiana and a long-time trustee of FEE. This essay
appeared in the February 1981 issue of The Freeman.
229
230 / Benjamin A. Rogge
Where do we find the most powerful and persuasive
case for economic freedom? I don't know; probably it has-
n't been prepared as yet. Certainly it is unlikely that the
case I present is the definitive one. However, it is the one
that is persuasive with me, that leads me to my own deep
commitment to the free market. I present it as grist for your
own mill and not as the divinely inspired last word on the j
subject.
The Moral Case
You will note as I develop my case that I attach rela-
tively little importance to the demonstrated efficiency of
the free-market system in promoting economic growth, in
raising levels of living. In fact, my central thesis is that the
most important part of the case for economic freedom is not its
vaunted efficiency as a system for organizing resources, not its
dramatic success in promoting economic growth, but rather its
consistency with certain fundamental moral principles of life
itself \
I say, "the most important part of the case" for two rea-
sons. First, the significance I attach to those moral princi-
ples would lead me to prefer the free enterprise system
even if it were demonstrably less efficient than alternative
systems, even if it were to produce a slower rate of economic
growth than systems of central direction and control. Sec-
ond, the great mass of the people of any country is never
really going to understand the purely economic workings
of any economic system, be it free enterprise or socialism.
Hence, most people are going to judge an economic system
by its consistency with their moral principles rather than by
its purely scientific operating characteristics. If economic
freedom survives in the years ahead, it will be only because
The Case for Economic Freedom / 231
a majority of the people accept its basic morality. The suc-
cess of the system in bringing ever higher levels of living
will be no more persuasive in the future than it has been in
the past. Let me illustrate.
The doctrine of man held in general in nineteenth-cen-
tury America argued that each man was ultimately respon-
sible for what happened to him, for his own salvation, both
in the here and now and in the hereafter. Thus, whether a
man prospered or failed in economic life was each man's
individual responsibility: each man had a right to the
rewards for success amd, in the same sense, deserved the
punishment that came with failure. It followed as well that
it is explicitly immoral to use the power of government to
take from one man to give to another, to legalize Robin
Hood. This doctrine of man found its economic counterpart
in the system of free enterprise and, hence, the system of
free enterprise was accepted and respected by many who
had no real understanding of its subtleties as a technique
for organizing resource use.
As this doctrine of man was replaced by one which
made of man a helpless victim of his subconscious and his
environment — responsible for neither his successes nor his
failures — the free enterprise system came to be rejected by
many who still had no real understanding of its actual
operating characteristics.
Basic Values Considered
Inasmuch as my own value systems and my own
assumptions about human beings are so important to the
case, I want to sketch them for you.
To begin with, the central value in my choice system is
individual freedom. By freedom I mean exactly and only
232 / Benjamin A. Rogge
freedom from coercion by others. I do not mean the four
freedoms of President Roosevelt, which are not freedoms at
all, but only rhetorical devices to persuade people to give
up some of their true freedom. In the Rogge system, each
man must be free to do what is his duty as he defines it, so
long as he does not use force against another.
Next, I believe each man to be ultimately responsible for
what happens to him. True, he is influenced by his heredity,
his environment, his subconscious, and by pure chance. But
I insist that precisely what makes man man is his ability to
rise above these influences, to change and determine his
own destiny. If this be true, then it follows that each of us is
terribly and inevitably and forever responsible for every-
thing he does. The answer to the question, "Who's to
blame?" is always, "Mea culpa, I am."
I believe as well that man is im{:)erfect, now and forever.
He is imperfect in his knowledge of the ultimate purpose of
his life, imperfect in his choice of means to serve those pur-
poses he does select, imperfect in the integrity with which
he deals with himself and those around him, imperfect in
his capacity to love his fellow man. If man is imperfect, then
all of his constructs must be imp>erfect, and the choice is
always among degrees and kinds of imperfection. The New
Jerusalem is never going to be realized here on earth, and
the man who insists that it is, is always lost unto freedom.
Moreover, man's imperfections are intensified as he
acquires the power to coerce others; "power tends to cor-
rupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely."
This completes the listing of my assumptions, and it
should be clear that the list does not constitute a total phi-
losophy of life. Most importantly, it does not define what I
believe the free man's duty to be, or more specifically, what
I believe my own duty to be and the source of the charge to
The Case for Economic Freedom / 233
me. However important these questions, I do not consider
them relevant to the choice of an economic system.
Here, then, are two sections of the case for economic
freedom as I would construct it. The first section presents
economic freedom as an ultimate end in itself and the sec-
ond presents it as a means to the preservation of the
noneconomic elements in total freedom.
Individual Freedom of Choice
The first section of the case is made in the stating of it, if
one accepts the fundamental premise.
Major premise: Each man should be free to take whatever
action he wishes, so long as he does not use force or fraud
against another.
Minor premise: All economic behavior is "action" as
identified above.
Conclusion: Each man should be free to take whatever
action he wishes in his economic behavior, so long as he
does not use force or fraud against another.
In other words, economic freedom is a part of total free-
dom; if freedom is an end in itself as our society has traditionally
asserted it to be, then economic freedom is an end in itself to be
valued for itself alone and not just for its instrumental value in
serving other goals.
If this thesis is accepted, then there must always exist a
tremendous presumption against each and every proposal
for governmental limitation of economic freedom. What is
wrong with a state system of compulsory social security? It
denies to the individual his freedom, his right to choose
what he will do with his own money resources. What is
wrong with a govemmentally enforced minimum wage? It
denies to the employer and the employee their individual
234 / Benjamin A. Rogge
freedoms, their individual rights to enter into voluntary
relationships not involving force or fraud. What is wrong
with a tariff or an import quota? It denies to the individual
consumer his right to buy what he wishes, wherever he
wishes.
It is breathtaking to think what this simple approach
would do to the apparatus of state control at all levels of
government. Strike from the books all legislation that
denies economic freedom to any individual, and three-
fourths of all the activities now undertaken by government
would be eliminated.
I am no dreamer of empty dreams, and I do not expect
that the day will ever come when this principle of economic
freedom as a part of total freedom will be fully accepted
and applied. Yet I am convinced that unless this principle is
given some standing, unless those who examine proposals
for new regulation of the individual by government look on
this loss of freedom as a "cost" of the proposed legislation,
the chances of free enterprise surviving are small indeed.
The would-be controller can always find reasons why it
might seem expedient to control the individual; unless
slowed down by some general feeling that it is immoral to
do so, he will usually have his way.
Noneconomic Freedoms
So much for the first section of the case. Now for the sec-
ond. The major premise here is the same, that is, the
premise of the rightness of freedom. Here, though, the con-
cern is with the noneconomic elements in total freedom —
with freedom of sp)eech, of religion, of the press, of j>ersonal
behavior. My thesis is that these freedoms are not Ukely to
The Case for Economic Freedom / 235
be long preserved in a society that has denied economic
freedom to its individual members.
Before developing this thesis, I wish to comment briefly
on the importance of these noneconomic freedoms. I do so
because we who are known as conservatives have often
given too little attention to these freedoms or have even
played a significant role in reducing them. The modem lib-
eral is usually inconsistent in that he defends man's
noneconomic freedoms, but is often quite indifferent to his
economic freedom. The modem conservative is often in-
consistent in that he defends man's economic freedom but
is indifferent to his noneconomic freedoms. Why are there
so few conservatives in the struggles over censorship, over
denials of equality before the law for people of all races,
over blue laws, and so on? Why do we let the modern lib-
erals dominate an organization such as the American Civil
Liberties Union? The general purposes of this organization
are completely consistent with, even necessary to, the truly
free society.
Particularly in times of stress such as these, we must
fight against the general pressure to curb the rights of indi-
vidual human beings, even those whose ideas and actions
we detest. Now is the time to remember the example of
men such as David Ricardo, the London banker and econo-
mist of the classical free-market school in the first part of
the last century. Bom a Jew, married to a Quaker, he
devoted some part of his energy and his fortune to elimi-
nating the legal discrimination against Catholics in the
England of his day.
It is precisely because I believe these noneconomic free-
doms to be so important that I believe economic freedom to
be so important. The argument here could be drawn from
236 / Benjamin A. Rogge
the wisdom of the Bible and the statement that "where a
man's treasure is, there will his heart be also." Give me con-
trol over a man's economic actions, and hence over his
means of survival, and except for a few occasional heroes,
I'll promise to deliver to you men who think and write and
behave as I want them to.
Freedom of the Press
The case is not difficult to make for the fully controlled
economy, the true socialistic state. Milton Friedman, in his
book Capitalism and Freedom, takes the case of a socialist
society that has a sincere desire to preserve the freedom of
the press. The first problem would be that there would be
no private capital, no private fortunes that could be used
to subsidize an antisocialist, procapitalist press. Hence,
the socialist state would have to do it. However, the men
and women undertaking the task would have to be
released from the socialist labor pool and would have to
be assured that they would never be discriminated
against in employment opportunities in the socialist appa-
ratus if they were to wish to change occupations later.
Then these procapitalist members of the socialist society
would have to go to other functionaries of the state to
secure the buildings, the presses, the pa|:)er, the skilled
and unskilled workmen, and all the other components of
a working newspaper. Then they would face the problem
of finding distribution outlets, either creating their own (a
frightening task) or using the same ones used by the offi-
cial socialist propaganda organs. Finally, where would
they find readers? How many men and women would
risk showing up at their state-controlled jobs carrying
copies of the Daily Capitalist?
The Case far Economic Freedom / 237
There are so many unlikely steps in this process that the
assumption that true freedom of the press could be main-
tained in a socialist society is so unrealistic as to be ludi-
crous.
Partly Socialized
Of course, we are not facing as yet a fully socialized
America, but only one in which there is significant govern-
ment intervention in a still predominantly private enter-
prise economy. Do these interventions pose any threat to
the noneconomic freedoms? I believe they do.
First of all, the total of coercive devices now available to
any administration of either party at the national level is so
great that true freedom to work actively against the current
administration (whatever it might be) is seriously reduced.
For example, farmers have become captives of the govern-
ment in such a way that they are forced into political align-
ments that seriously reduce their ability to protest actions
they do not approve. The new trade bill, though right in the
principle of free trade, gives to the President enormous
power to reward his friends and punish his critics.
Second, the form of these interventions is such as to
threaten seriously one of the real cornerstones of all free-
doms— equality before the law. For example, farmers and
trade union members are now encouraged and assisted in
doing precisely that for which businessmen are sent to jail
(i.e., acting collusively to manipulate prices). The blind-
folded Goddess of Justice has been encouraged to peek and
she now says, with the jurists of the ancient regime, "First
tell me who you are and then Til tell you what your rights
are." A society in which such gross inequalities before the
law are encouraged in economic life is not likely to be one
238 / Benjamin A. Rogge
which preserves the principle of equality before the law
generally.
We could go on to many specific illustrations. For
example, the government uses its legislated monopoly to
carry the mails as a means for imposing a censorship on
what people send to each other in a completely voluntary
relationship. A man and a woman who exchange obscene
letters may not be making productive use of their time, but
their correspondence is certainly no business of the gov-
ernment. Or to take an example from another country
Winston Churchill, as a critic of the Chamberlain govern-
ment, was not permitted one minute of radio time on the
government-owned and monopolized broadcasting sys-
tem in the period from 1936 to the outbreak in 1939 of the
war he was predicting.
Each Step of Intervention Leads to Another
Every act of intervention in the economic life of its citi-
zens gives to a government additional power to shape and
control the attitudes, the writings, the behavior of those citi-
zens. Every such act is another break in the dike protecting
the integrity of the individual as a free man or woman.
The free market protects the integrity of the individual
by providing him with a host of decentralized alternatives
rather than with one centralized opportunity. As Friedman
has reminded us, even the known communist can readily
find employment in capitalist America. The free market is
politics-blind, religion-blind, and, yes, race-blind. Do you
ask about the politics or the religion of the farmer who
grew the potatoes you buy at the store? Do you ask about
the color of the hands that helped produce the steel you use
in your office building?
The Case for Economic Freedom / 239
South Africa provides an interesting example of this.
The South Africans, of course, provide a shocking picture of
racial bigotry, shocking even to a country that has its own
tragic race problems. South African law clearly separates
the whites from the nonwhites. Orientals have traditionally
been classed as nonwhites, but South African trade with
Japan has become so important in the postwar period that
the government of South Africa has declared the Japanese
visitors to South Africa to be officially and legally "white."
The free market is one of the really great forces making for
tolerance and understanding among human beings. The
controlled market gives man rein to express all those blind
prejudices and intolerant beliefs to which he is forever sub-
ject.
Impersonality of the Market
To look at this another way: The free market is often said
to be impersonal, and indeed it is. Rather than a vice, this is
one of its great virtues. Because the relations are substan-
tially impersonal, they are not usually marked by bitter
personal conflict. It is precisely because the labor union
attempts to take the employment relationship out of the
marketplace that bitter personal conflict so often marks
union-management relationships. The intensely personal
relationship is one that is civilized only by love, as between
man and wife, and within the family. But man's capacity for
love is severely limited by his imperfect nature. Far better,
then, to economize on love, to reserve our dependence on it
to those relationships where even our imperfect natures are
capable of sustained action based on love. Far better, then,
to build our economic system on largely impersonal rela-
tionships and on man's self-interest— a motive power with
240 / Benjamin A. Rogge
which he is generously supplied. One need only study the
history of such Utopian experiments as our Indiana's Har-
mony and New Harmony to realize that a social structure
which ignores man's essential nature results in the dissen-
sion, conflict, disintegration, and dissolution of Robert
Owen's New Harmony or the absolutism of Father Rapp's
Harmony.
The "vulgar calculus of the marketplace," as its critics
have described it, is still the most humane way man has yet
found for solving those questions of economic allocation
and division which are ubiquitous in human society. By
what must seem fortunate coincidence, it is also the system
most likely to produce the affluent society, to move
mankind above an existence in which life is mean, nasty,
brutish, and short. But, of course, this is not just coinci-
dence. Under economic freedom, only man's destructive
instincts are curbed by law. All of his creative instincts are
released and freed to work those wonders of which free
men are capable. In the controlled society only the creativ-
ity of the few at the top can be utilized, and much of this
creativity must be expended in maintaining control and in
fending off rivals. In the free society, the creativity of every
man can be expressed — and surely by now we know that
we cannot predict who will prove to be the most creative.
You may be puzzled, then, that I do not rest my case for
economic freedom on its productive achievements; on its
buildings, its houses, its automobiles, its bathtubs, its won-
der drugs, its television sets, its sirloin steaks and green sal-
ads with Roquefort dressings. I neither feel within myself
nor do I hear in the testimony of others any evidence that
man's search for purpose, his longing for fulfillment, is in
any significant way relieved by these accomplishments. I
do not scorn these accomplishments nor do I worship them.
The Case for Economic Freedom / 241
Nor do I find in the lives of those who do worship them any
evidence that they find ultimate peace and justification in
their idols.
I rest my case rather on the consistency of the free mar-
ket with man's essential nature, on the basic morality of its
system of rewards and punishments, on the protection it
gives to the integrity of the individual.
The free market cannot produce the perfect world, but it
can create an environment in which each imperfect man
may conduct his lifelong search for purpose in his own
way, in which each day he may order his life according to
his own imperfect vision of his destiny, suffering both the
agonies of his errors and the sweet pleasure of his suc-
cesses. This freedom is what it means to be a man; this is the
Godhead, if you wish.
I give you, then, the free market, the expression of man's
economic freedom and the guarantor of all his other free-
doms.
The Moral Premise and the
Decline of the American Heritage
Paul L. Adams
Man in his very nature has need of a major premise — a
philosophical starting point or Prime Mover, as it were, to
give reason for his being, direction and order to his think-
ing, and initiative and impetus to his actions. With the
Christian, this basic assumption stems from the belief that
God, by Divine fiat, created man as a moral, rational being
with freedom of choice, and that exercise of will and choice
in both the moral and physical frames of reference is an
awesome but unavoidable fact of existence.
Man's choice to partake of the "forbidden fruit" pro-
vided him with the promised knowledge of good and evil,
but along with it came an incalculable complication of his
circumstances. Nature became a challenge to his physical
existence. Other people constituted to him a confused com-
plex of variant relationships that ranged from love on one
hand to virulent hatred on the other. God faded from his
consciousness, and with that loss went also the meaning of
man's struggle. Man was thus lost in the only sense in
which he could be really lost, and the need was therefore
critical for a major premise which promulgates for man a
The late Dr. Adams was president of Roberts Wesleyan University,
North Chili, New York, and was a trustee of The Foundation for Eco-
nomic Education. This article is reprinted from the March 1968 issue of
The Freeman.
242
The Moral Premise and the Decline of the American Heritage / 243
supreme purpose for life, a purpose which justifies the
physical hardship, the social conflicts, the spiritual strug-
gle, and the disappointments with which life is filled. Only
such a premise delivers life from the insanity it sometimes
appears to be — struggle without hope, achievement with-
out happiness, victory without exaltation, death without
resurrection.
Man, himself, throughout the concourse of his history
has given ample evidence of his longing and need for an
all-embracing purpose. He knows so little that is perfect,
yet he always looks for perfection — a seminal response
which derives from the moral image in which he was orig-
inally created and the perfection of the environment in
which he found himself. Though corrupt by his own choice,
he still yearns for the ideal, like some earthling wandering
in a cosmic wasteland dreaming of the green hills of earth.
Basically, he seeks a society which will fulfill his demands
on nature, ameliorate his relationship with his fellow man,
and provide the ultimate reason for existence. In the search,
man's thinking has led him, inevitably, into metaphysical
and ontological problems, to a consideration of the first
principles of all existence.
It would be presumptuous, indeed, for me to attempt a
definitive statement of the major premise with its detailed
ramifications, and presumption is, among college profes-
sors, a sin of great magnitude. Perhaps, however, one might
conclude that within such a premise are these parts: Man is
a spiritual being, created by God and endowed with the
freedom and responsibility of moral choice; his purpose in
living is to glorify God by exercising his reason toward
those ends that his highest moral nature urges, and his task
is to refine his intelligence, develop his creativity, discipline
his conscience, and clothe himself in robes of righteousness.
244 / Paul L Adams
The Moral Premise — Like a Golden Thread
Man has never been without some first principle, some
major premise, sometimes consciously, more frequently
unconsciously, held up before him. It runs in some form
like golden thread through man's history, and it may be
noted in various efforts and forms that mark man's societal
action. The Israelites had in Jehovah God the source of law
in the observance of which was life. The Greeks promul-
gated Natural Law as an absolute reference point for man's
excursions into lawmaking. The Romans embraced Sto-
icism and with it the Natural Law concept which, in the
Western world, yielded place to the Divine law of Chris-
tianity. This is clearly seen in the Gelasian theory which
placed absolute value on the sword of spiritual power.
All of these systems with their varied premises failed to
produce the ideal society. The Hebrew system ended,
oppressed by evil and corrupt kings. The Greek system,
even in the Golden Age of Pericles, was marked by corrup-
tion, vice, weakness, and personal lust for power. The
Roman could observe the cruelty and injustice of his state,
and he suffered from tyrants who plundered the poor to
lavish wealth on the idle, sensual, and effete nobility. The
slight amelioration that feudalism supplied was due chiefly
to the fact that there was less economic distance between
master and serf — for goods were fewer, even in this pater-
nalistic social order, and pillaged more frequently by inces-
sant warring. Certainly, there was little understanding of
nature, no mastery of production, and a very low level of
social justice. Seemingly, man was destined to a perpetual
slavery only thinly disguised in an embracing paternalism
that left him without hope.
Christian Europe was not without hoi:>e, however, for
The Moral Premise and the Decline of the American Heritage / 245
the sixteenth century saw a rebirth of the idea that man was
free, must be free. Dramatically stated first in theological
terms, the fuller implications in nontheological terms were
soon asserted, and Europe began a long and costly march
toward freedom. Costly, for human liberty has never been
secured or maintained without sacrifice, and it was our
own Jefferson who said, "Every so often the tree of liberty
must be watered by the blood of patriots — and of tyrants."
The American Foundation
With all of the foregoing in mind, it can be assumed that
those who raised a new nation on this continent had a
wealth of history on which to draw. The responses of our
forefathers were partly the product of a vicarious intellec-
tual empiricism and partly the intuitive conclusions of lib-
erty-loving men playing it by ear. What these men gave to
America and the world was the moral premise embedded
in a philosophy of moral absolutes. It was shaped and nur-
tured in the minds and hearts of people who recognized in
it the last, best hope of man. These forebears of ours were of
the breed of men who count not their own lives dear unto
themselves; they were prepared to die for America and for
freedom. Need I remind you that it was a young man not
yet twenty-two who said in a last magnificent moment of
life, "I only regret that I have but one life to give to my
country"?
These great men espoused a moral absolute which
accepted God as creator, as ultimate Truth, and they
believed man to be a moral creature, responsible to God,
and capable of discharging that responsibility only through
freedom of choice. It logically follows, then, that freedom is
more than just another attribute. It is so essential that life
246 / Paul L.Adams
without it loses significance. These Founding Fathers saw
in freedom and liberty the only perfection a human society
can know, for in freedom's house the individual can shape
his own perfections and follow his noblest aspirations. The
exercise of freedom, then, is for man the perfecting of his
humanity — ^not that the exercise will ever be perfect, but
the continuing exercise represents a constant affirmation of
the eternal principle that man can find himself only in God.
Limited Government
These men of great vision clearly understood that the
only real threat to liberty and freedom is government, for
men assign a sanctity to government not accorded to indi-
viduals and groups. But government is a faceless thing and
can hide the predators who lurk behind its facade and exer-
cise its function; and governments assume, quite naturally
it seems, government's right to a monopoly of physical
force. Fearing government, and the natural tendency of
power to beget power, these men established a constitution
which attempted to assure man's freedom by limiting the
sphere of government to a workable minimum. The clear
intent was to magnify the responsibility of the individual
and subordinate government to its primary function of
serving freedom's cause.
Even among its most ardent devotees, there was never
any suggestion that this Constitution was a panacea for all
the social ills to which man is heir. There was no guarantee
of identical status for individuals or groups. There was no
promise of material rewards. There was only the implicit
assumption that freedom and liberty were their own
rewards and worth any sacrifice. The Constitution
promised only the system itself, but under it liberty and
The Moral Premise and the Decline of the American Heritage / 247
freedom were to be nurtured. It was Benjamin Franklin
who saw the only flaw, and he stated it in simple terms
when he suggested that perhaps the people might not keep
what they had acquired. It was George Washington who
stated in eloquent prose that liberty is guaranteed only by
the eternal vigilance of those who share its vision.
These architects of nation were men of great faith — faith
in the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things
not seen — faith in their vision of a vast land and great peo-
ple— faith in the triumph of truth over error, of justice over
injustice, of right over tyranny, of knowledge over igno-
rance, of reason over prejudice, and the ultimate triumph of
eternal values over the temporal. Faith in such a vision
together with comnnitment to the program for its fulfill-
ment constituted in their thinking an irresistible force that
would shake the world — and it did. In addition, it gave rise
to a compelling spirit of national mission.
Eternal Vigilance
It is a truism that tragedy lurks close to the surface of all
enterprises of great pith and moment. George Bernard
Shaw suggested that there are two great tragedies in life.
One is to not get your heart's desire; the other is to get it.
The observation is so applicable to the American scene that
it arouses almost a response of sharp physical pain. Amer-
ica had her great dream, her grand design. History pro-
vided her with the opportunity to realize it. So she avoided
the first of the tragedies that Mr. Shaw suggested. The alter-
nate tragedy was left to be realized, for tragedy must follow
the failure to understand the tremendous demand such a
society places on the individual. It calls for enormous self-
discipline in behalf of freedom's preeminent claim; it
248 / Paul L.Adams
requires a conscious articulate sensitivity to freedom's cli-
mate; and it mandates a firm dedication to freedom's meth-
ods and goals along with a determination to live with the
results.
It is not debatable that we have had an imperfect and
uneven performance in this regard. The student of Ameri-
can history recalls the demarche of the Federalist party into
unconstitutionalism to retain power. It can hardly go unno-
ticed that there were those who were blind to the implica-
tions of education for a substantial segment of our society,
including women. Even more compelling shortly after the
centennial year of Appomattox Court House is the thought
that there were those who insisted on the immediate attain-
ment of their ends and refused to recognize longer that the
Constitution provided a certain, if slow, mechanic for
resolving great inequities and injustice. This impatience
sent men to graves like beds and finally resulted in the
slaughter of more Americans than World War I and World
War II combined.
Unhappy though these examples be, we note with satis-
faction that the Federalist returned to make the great right
decision in 1800, and that educational opportunity has
approached universality in this nation. We could even say
that although the larger lessons of the so-called irrepressible
conflict were lost on us, we have at times demonstrated our
belief that the nature of our system cannot be defined in
terms of any appeal to the doctrine that might and right are
inseparable.
With liberty and freedom identified in the Constitution
and accepted as the norm for human action, we demon-
strated a vitality and creativity that produced achievement
which first caught the attention of the world and then beck-
oned her disinherited millions to the "lifted lamp beside
The Moral Premise and the Decline of the American Heritage / 249
the golden door." We enlarged individual opportunity,
secured religious toleration, and established the basis for
political diversity and cultural pluralism. We educated the
masses, refurbished the concept of individual justice and
charity, and we took over leadership of the revolution in
communication, transportation, and production. Our free
market led the world in the production and distribution of
goods for the benefit of all classes. Somewhere along the
line, too, we began to develop a distinct literature of merit
and other artistic forms. Finally, and without great fanfare,
we assumed world leadership in moral idealism as a nat-
ural concomitant of our commitment to principles based in
the eternal verity of the moral law.
Obstacles to Be Overcome
Such have been the fruits of the American system, and
such a nation or system, meeting as it did man's age-old
search for an ideal society, should fear no challenge. Nature
had been transformed into an ally; a beginning had been
made toward a solution of the omnipresent problem of
human relationships; and man's right and need to know
and experience God had been left unrestricted. We who
received such a heritage should fear no challenge, yet we
are alarmed by a challenge of so great a magnitude that we
seem unable to plot its dimensions. Wisdom and intelli-
gence, however, as well as the instinct for survival dictate
that the problem must be stated, understood, and attacked.
There are those, undoubtedly, whose disquiet is solely
in terms of the problem posed by nuclear physics. These
people might think beyond it, but the possibility of a
nuclear war produces in them a trauma that makes further
rational thought on their part impossible. Those of whom
250 / Paul L.Adams
this is descriptive tend to view the great ultimate catastro-
phe as physical death, forgetting that the great moral
premise assigns little significance to the fact of mere physi-
cal existence. They would establish a new commandment
which may be simply stated, "And now abideth the mind,
the spirit, the body, these three, but the greatest of these is
the body/' It is not to be expected that those who hold such
a belief could or would give rise to any inspired resolution,
for that which they treasure most is most easily subject to
threats and force.
Then there are those who react to the problem in mate-
rialistic terms. These have altered the supreme moral prin-
ciple to read, "Man shall live by bread alone." The member
of this group is quite likely to attach himself to any of the
several simplifications which this group has institutional-
ized in policy: the answer to any domestic problem is gov-
ernmental spending to raise everyone's material standard
of living; neutralists such as Tito will be won to our side if
our gifts are large and continuous; the communist will
soften his attitude toward the United States and the non-
communist world if we allow them the trade advantages of
our productive system.
Again, there is a class we could call passivists, and, like
some of their medieval forebears who went into monastic
seclusion, they seek to escape the world of decision and
action. A tendency of the members of this class is to rely on
discussion, fruitless though it may be, and on a complete
negation of decisive action. Discussion becomes for them
not a means but an end, and failure is not failure, for non-
productive discussion guarantees the need of still further
discussion. No international conference is a failure, in this
light, as long as it ends without definitive commitment.
There is some truth in the assertion that protracted dis-
The Moral Premise and the Decline of the American Heritage / 251
cussion on a point at issue often results in a blurring of the
thought of both parties, but it logically follows that in such
a situation, the party with commitment to a principle and a
concomitant course of action stands in the least danger.
Detoured by Relativism
None of those in the classes just mentioned sees the
challenge to the American heritage in its true dimensions,
and obviously they have little understanding of the re-
sources necessary to meet the challenge. The basic problem
is the failure of Americans to dedicate and rededicate them-
selves to the great moral premise— freedom under God. As
dedication to that premise built the American heritage,
decline from it has given rise to the problems that appear in
the guise of insecurity — the fear of physical extinction, the
compensation of materialism, and indecision.
The decline was initiated by the introduction of a phi-
losophy of relativism with its inherent negation of moral
absolutes. This philosophy relieves man of all respon-
sibility; it erodes his moral standards, for morals, it says,
are a product of man's own thinking and are therefore sub-
ject to change. Further, it has no fixed reference point;
rather it has a multitude of reference points, discoverable
only by a process of expediency which itself becomes the
criterion for judgment. Such thought canonizes Niccolo
Machiavelli, who baldly and boldly asserted that the end
justifies the means. In such a philosophy, man is not free; he
is rather a pawn of history, and he has significance only as
he participates in great mass movements. In action, the phi-
losophy is expressed in positivism which denies any super-
natural standard and acclaims any law as valid if there is
sufficient force in the lawgiver to enforce it. Such a philoso-
252 / Paul L.Adams
phy does not produce Nathan Hales. It is more apt to pro-
duce those who seek the undisciplined refuge of mass
anonymity and mass conformity. The end of such a system
is pictured in Orwell's 1984, in which he describes a society
where Big Brother decides what is truth for the unresisting
masses. Orwell doesn't say it, but the tragedy is that under
such a system, life doesn't really matter.
Improper Methods
The increasing acceptance of such a philosophy has
spawned an incredible number of value standards and
courses of action not consistent with our original premise
and the institutionalizing of liberty. Time forbids a discus-
sion of them, but some of the more dangerous may be
listed. There are those who change or pervert the Constitu-
tion to gain the ends they desire, and the ends are presented
as good ends to justify the action. It was for good reasons
that the Gracchi started the process of violating the Roman
constitution. The end of the process was the destruction of
liberty in Rome, for each succeeding constitutional vio-
lation takes less explanation and less and less justification.
Eventually the constitutional image is lost, and the term
itself becomes a shibboleth.
Then, there are those who forget that material wealth is
a happy by-product of our pursuit of a morally legitimate
goal, and they relentlessly pursue the materialistic largess
of nature as an end in itself. It is again the old story of sell-
ing the birthright for a mess of pottage. The goal of this
philosophy is ever greater materialism with less and less
effort. This idea seems to offer a built-in contradiction, but
still the belief persists that we have invented a slot machine
which pays off for everybody.
The Moral Premise and the Decline of the American Heritage / 253
Again, there are those who pervert the definition of
freedom to mean an absence of fear, of individual responsi-
bility, of self-discipline, and they include within its context
the strong presumption of egalitarian doctrines. These find
the answer to all of our problems in the increase of central,
bureaucratic government. Washington is their Mecca. They
do not, perhaps, make a pilgrimage to Washington, but
well they might, for not only is their money there, it is fast
becoming a repository of the American soul. In interna-
tional relations, these people have a naive faith in the
United Nations, assign to it a supernatural aura, and claim
for it a practical success not demonstrable in logic or actu-
ality.
A Time for Rededication
Finally, there are those who are totally oblivious to the
fact that the American forefathers, like the early Christians,
were men whose vision and faith were such that they
intended to turn the world upside down — and did so. We
have lived in the golden heritage of their dedication to a
great moral principle and the abundant life it provided.
That we have grown insensitive to such a principle
presages failure where they succeeded. We cannot escape
the fact that the virility of communism stems from the fact
that the communist is committed totally to the belief that it
is necessary to change the world — and as an individual he
is prepared to give himself to realize such an end. We can-
not change the form or substance of the communist move-
ment or threat. We can, however, reclaim, revive, and
renew the American heritage as the eternal answer to those
who would, under any guise, enslave the free spirit of man.
The innumerable paths of history are thick with the dust
254 / Paul L Adams
of decayed nations that knew the passing radiance of a glo-
rious moment. Khrushchev and communism promised to
bury the American heritage because it no longer serves his-
tory's purposes. For me, I fear no physiced threat com-
munism can offer. I do fear the retreat from our heritage. I
do not fear Khrushchev's judgment. I fear the inexorable
judgment of God's law which has ordained man's freedom.
Should this nation so blessed by God forget His ordinance,
then we have no valid claim to existence. We will have
failed those who lived and died that we might be free as
well as the serf of the future who will not long remember
our moment of history. As Americans we can, as one has
said, "spend ourselves into immortality" in freedom's bat-
tle or we can make our way carelessly to nameless graves
and be part of the dust of history's passing parade.
IV. THE CRISIS OF OUR AGE
Moral Criticisms of the Market
Ken S. Ewert
According to an author writing in a recent issue of The
Nation magazine, "The religious Left is the only Left we've
got." An overstatement? Perhaps. However, it points to an
interesting fact, namely that while the opposition to free
markets and less government control has declined in recent
years among the "secular left," the political-economic
views of the "Christian left" seem to remain stubbornly
unchanged.
Why is this so? Why are the secular critics of the market
mellowing while the Christian critics are not?
Perhaps one major reason is the different criteria by
which these two ideological allies measure economic sys-
tems. The secular left, after more than half a century of
failed experiments in anti-free-market policies, has
begrudgingly softened its hostility towards the market for
predominantly pragmatic reasons. Within their camp the
attitude seems to be that since it hasn't worked, let's get on
with finding something that will. While this may be less
than a heartfelt conversion to a philosophy of economic
freedom, at least (for many) this recognition has meant tak-
ing a more sympathetic view of free markets.
However, within the Christian camp the leftist intellec-
Mr. Ewert is the editor of U-Turn, a quarterly publication address-
ing theological, political, economic, and social issues from a biblical
perspective. This essay appeared in the March 1989 issue of The Free-
man.
257
258 / Ken S. Ezvert
tuals seem to be much less influenced by the demonstrated
failure of state-directed economic policies. They remain
unimpressed with arguments pointing out the efficiency
and productivity of the free market, or statistics and exam-
ples showing the non-workability of traditional interven-
tionist economic policies. Why? One likely reason is that
the criteria by which these thinkers choose to measure cap-
italism are fundamentally moral in nature, so much so that
socialism, despite its obvious shortcomings, is still pre-
ferred because of its perceived moral superiority. In their
eyes, the justness and morality of an economic system are
vastly more important than its efficiency.
If indeed the Christian critics of the market are insisting
that an economic system must be ultimately judged by
moral standards, we should agree and applaud them for
their principled position. They are asking a crucially im-
portant question: is the free market a moral economic sys-
tem?
Unfortunately, these thinkers have answered the ques-
tion with a resounding "No!" They have examined the free
market and found it morally wanting. Some of the most
common reasons given for this indictment are that the mar-
ket is based on an ethic of selfishness and it fosters materi-
alism; it atomizes and dehumanizes society by placing too
much emphasis on the individual; and it gives rise to tyran-
nical economic powers which subsequently are used to
oppress the weaker and more defenseless members of soci-
ety.
If these accusations are correct, the market is justly con-
demned. But have these critics correctly judged the moral-
ity of the free market? Let's re-examine their charges.
Moral Criticisms of the Market / 259
I. Selfishness
The market, it is suggested, is based on and encourages
an ethic of selfishness. According to critics of the market,
mere survival in this competitive economic system requires
that we each "look after Number One." Individuals are
encouraged to focus on the profit motive to the exclusion of
higher goals and as a result selfishness becomes almost a
virtue. And this, it is noted, is in stark contrast with the self-
sacrificial love taught by the Scriptures. Instead of reward-
ing love, compassion, and kindness towards others, the free
market seems to reward self-orientation and self-indul-
gence. Instead of encouraging us to be concerned about our
neighbor, the free market seems to encourage us to be con-
cerned about ourselves. Individuals who might otherwise
be benevolent, according to this view, are corrupted by the
demands of an economic system that forces them to put
themselves first. In the thinking of these critics, the market
is the logical precursor to the "me generation."
However, this charge is superficial and misleading in
several respects. It is important to remember that while the
free market does allow "self-directed" economic actions, it
does not require "selfish" economic actions. There is an
important distinction here. It should be obvious that all
human action is self-directed. Each of us has been created
with a mind, allowing us to set priorities and goals, and a
will, which enables us to take steps to realize these goals.
This is equally true for those who live in a market economy
and those who live under a politically directed economy
The difference between the two systems is not between self-
directed action versus non-self-directed action, but rather
260 / KenS. Ewert
between a peaceful pursuit of goals (through voluntary
exchange in a free economy) versus a coercive pursuit of
goals (through wealth transferred via the state in a
"planned" economy). In other words, the only question is
how will self-directed action manifest itself: will it take
place through mutually beneficial economic exchanges, or
through predatory political actions?
Clearly the free market cannot be singled out and con-
demned for allowing self-directed actions to take place,
since self-directed actions are an inescapable part of human
life. But can it be condemned for giving rise to selfishness?
In other words, does the free market engender an attitude
of selfishness in individuals? If we define selfishness as a
devotion to one's own advantage or welfare without regard
for the welfare of others, it is incontestable that selfishness
does exist in the free economy; many individuals act with
only themselves ultimately in mind. And it is true, that
according to the clear teaching of Scripture, selfishness is
wrong.
But we must bear in mind that although selfishness
does exist in the free market, it also exists under other eco-
nomic systems. Is the Soviet factory manager less selfish
than the American capitalist? Is greed any less prevalent in
the politically directed system which operates via perpet-
ual bribes, theft from state enterprises, and political
purges? There is no reason to think so. The reason for this is
clear: selfishness is not an environmentally induced condi-
tion, i.e., a moral disease caused by the economic system,
but rather a result of man's fallen nature. It is out of the
heart, as Christ said, that a man is defiled. Moral failure is
not spawned by the environment.
It is clear that not all self-directed action is necessarily
selfish action. For example, when I enter the marketplace in
Moral Criticisms of the Market / 261
order to earn wealth to feed, clothe, house, and provide
education or medical care for my children, I am not acting
selfishly. Likewise, if you or I want to extend charity to a
needy neighbor or friend, we must first take "self -directed"
action to create the wealth necessary to do so. Such action is
hardly selfish.
The point is this: the free market allows individuals to
peacefully pursue their chosen goals and priorities, but it
doesn't dictate or determine those priorities. It does not
force an individual to focus on his own needs and desires,
but leaves him or her at liberty to be self-centered or benev-
olent. My ultimate goal may be self-indulgence, or I may
make a high priority of looking after others — the choice is
mine. As to which I should do, the market is silent. As an
economic system, the market simply does not speak in
favor of selfish or unselfish priorities.
However, the free market, while not touching the heart
of a man or eliminating selfishness, does in fact restrain
selfishness. It channels self-centered desires into actions
that are beneficial to others. This is so because in order to
"get ahead" in the free economy, we must first please other
people by producing something which is of use and value
to them. In other words, the market disciplines each of us to
look outwards and serve others. Only by doing so can we
persuade them to give us what we want in exchange.
We will return to this theme later, but for now the point
is that in a very practical sense, the workings of the market
persuade even the most self-indulgent among us to serve
others and to be concerned about the needs and wants of
his neighbor. True, the motivation for doing so is not neces-
sarily pure or unselfish, but as the Bible so clearly teaches,
it is only God who can change the hearts of men.
Furthermore, the free market, because of the incredible
262 / Ken S. Ewert
wealth it allows to be created, makes living beyond our-
selves practicable. In order to show tangible love toward
our neighbor (minister to his or her physical needs) we
must first have the wealth to do so.
We sometimes need to be reminded that wealth is not
the natural state of affairs. Throughout most of history the
majority of people lived under some sort of centrally con-
trolled economic system and were forced to devote most of
their energies to mere survival. Often all but the wealthiest
individuals lacked the economic means to look much
beyond themselves and to aid others who were in need.
But the productivity spawned by economic freedom has
radically changed this. In a free market, we are not only
able to choose unselfish values amd priorities, but we are
also able to create the wealth necessary to fulfill them prac-
tically.
II. Materialism
Another moral indictment of the market, closely
related to the charge of selfishness, is the belief that the
market fosters materialism. The example most often used
to demonstrate the market's guilt in this area is the per-
ceived evil effect of advertising. It is contended that
advertising creates a sort of "lust" in the hearts of con-
sumers by persuading them that mere material posses-
sions will bring joy and fulfillment. In this sense, the mar-
ket is condemned for creating a spirit of materialism and
fostering an ethic of acquisitiveness. The market in gen-
eral, and advertising specifically, is a persistent temptress
encouraging each of us to concentrate on the lowest level
of life, mere material goods.
This charge can be answered in much the same manner
as the charge of selfishness. Just as allowing free exchange
Moral Criticisms of the Market / 263
doesn't require selfishness, neither does it require material-
ism. It is true that when people are economically free, mate-
rialism is possible, and certainly there are materialistic peo-
ple in market economies. But this hardly warrants a
condemnation of the market. Materialism, like selfishness,
can and will occur under any economic system. It is obvi-
ous that a desire for material goods is far from being unique
to capitalism. Witness, for example, the response of shop-
pers as a store puts out a new rack of genuine cotton shirts
in Moscow or a shipment of fresh meat arrives in a Krakow
shop.
Although the role of advertising has been much
maligned, it in fact provides a vital service to consumers.
Advertising conveys information. It tells consumers what
products are available, how these products can meet their
needs, cmd what imjxjrtant differences exist among com-
peting products. The fact that this is a valuable function
becomes apparent if you imagine trying to buy a used car in
a world without advertising. Either your choice of cars
would be severely limited (to those cars you happen to
stumble upon, i.e., gain knowledge of) or you would have
to pay more (in the form of time and resources used in seek-
ing out and comparing cars). In either case, without the
"free" knowledge provided by advertising, you would be
much worse off.
But the economic role of advertising aside, does adver-
tising actually "create" a desire for goods? If it does, why
do businesses in market-oriented economies spend billions
of dollars each year on consumer research to find out what
customers want? Why do some advertised products not sell
(for example, the Edsel) or cease to sell well (for example,
the hula hoop)? In the market economy consumers are the
ultimate sovereigns of production. Their wants and pri-
orities dictate what is produced; what is produced doesn't
264 / Ken S. Ewert
determine their wants and priorities. Many bankrupt busi-
nessmen, left with unsalable (at a profitable price) products
wistfully wish that the reverse were true.
Moreover, the Bible consistently rejects any attempt by
man to ascribe his sinful tendencies to his environment. If I
am filled with avarice when I see an advertisement for a
new Mercedes, I cannot place the blame on the advertise-
ment. Rather I must recognize that I am responsible for my
thoughts and desires, and that the problem lies within
myself. After all, I could feel equally acquisitive if I just saw
the Mercedes on the street rather than in an advertisement.
Is it wrong for the owner of the Mercedes to incite my
desires by driving his car where I might see it? Hardly.
Just as God did not allow Adam to blame Satan (the
advertiser — and a blatantly false advertiser at that) or the
fruit (the appealing material good) for his sin in the Garden,
we cannot lay the blame for materialism on the free market
or on advertising. The materialist's problem is the sin
within his heart, not his environment.
If we follow the environmental explanation of material- j
ism to its logical conclusion, the only solution would
appear to be doing away with all wealth (i.e., eliminate all
possible temptation). If this were the appropriate solution
to the moral problem of materialism, perhaps the moral
high ground must be conceded to the state-run economies
of the world after all. They have been overwhelmingly suc-
cessful at destroying wealth and wealth-creating capital!
III. Impersonalism and Individualism
Another common criticism of the market economy is its
supposed impersonal nature and what some have called
"individualistic anarchy." According to many Christian
critics, the market encourages self-centered behavior and
Moral Criticisms of the Market / 265
discourages relational ties in society. The non-personal
market allocation of goods and services is seen to be anti-
thetical to the seemingly higher and more noble goal of a
loving and interdependent community. Because of the eco-
nomic independence that the market affords, the individual
is cut off from meaningful relationships with his fellow
human beings and divorced from any purpose beyond his
own interests. In short, the free market is accused of breed-
ing a pathetic and inhumane isolation.
But does the market encourage impersonal behavior?
Certainly not. It is important to understand that the pres-
ence of economic freedom does not require that all transac-
tions and relationships take place on an impersonal level.
For example, many people have good friendships with
their customers, suppliers, employees, or employers. While
these relationships are economic, they are not merely eco-
nomic and they are not impersonal.
Furthermore, while the market leaves us free to deal
with other people solely on the basis of economic motives,
we are not required nor even necessarily encouraged to do
so. We are completely free to deal on a non-economic basis.
Suppose that I am in the business of selling food, and I find
that someone is so poor that he has nothing to trade for the
food that I am offering for sale. In the free market I am com-
pletely free to act apart from economic motives and make a
charitable gift of the food. I have in no way lost my ability
to act in a personal and non-economic way.
Community Relationships
So the market is not an inherently impersonal economic
system. Nor is it hostile to the formation of community
relationships.
An excellent example of a community which exists
266 / Ken S. Ewert
within the market system is the family. Obviously I deal
with my wife and children in a non-market manner. I give
them food, shelter, clothing, and so on, and I certainly don't
expect any economic gain in return. I do so joyfully, because
I love my family and I value my relationship with them far
above the economic benefits I forgo. Another example is the
church. I have a non-economic and very personal rela-
tionship with people in my church. And there are countless
teams, clubs, organizations, and associations which I can
join, if I choose. If I want, I can even become part of a com-
mune. The market economy doesn't stand in the way of, or
discourage, any of these expressions of community.
But now we come to the heart of this objection against
the market: what if people will not voluntarily choose to
relate to each other in personal or community-tyi:)e rela-
tionships? What if they choose not to look beyond their
own interests and work for some purpose larger than them-
selves? The answer to this is the rather obvious question:
Who should decide what is the appropriate degree of rela-
tionship and community?
True community, I submit, is something which must be
consensual, meaning it must be voluntarily established.
Think of a marriage or a church. If f)eople do not choose to
enter into these relationships when they are free to do so,
we may judge their action to be a mistake, but by what
standard can we try to coerce them into such relationships?
Even if there were some objective standard of "optimum
community," it is not at all clear that we would create it by
robbing people of their economic freedom. There is no rea-
son to believe that individuals living under a system of eco-
nomic "planning" are less isolated or have more commu-
nity by virtue of their system. The fact that individuals are
forced into a collective group hardly means that a loving
Moral Criticisms of the Market / 267
and caring community will result. Love and care are things
which cannot be coercively extracted, but must be freely
given.
Moreover, the free market actually encourages the for-
mation and maintenance of the most basic human commu-
nity— the family. As the Utopian socialists of past cen-
turies— including Marx and Engels — recognized, there is a
vital connection between private property and the integrity
of the family. Destroy the one, they reasoned, and the other
will soon disintegrate.
Their motives were suspect but their analysis was cor-
rect. When the state fails to protect private property and
instead takes over the functions traditionally provided by
the family (such as education, day care, health care, sick-
ness and old-age support), the family unit is inevitably
weakened. Family bonds are undermined as the economic
resources which formerly allowed the family to "care for its
own" are transferred to the state. There is little doubt that
the disintegration of the family in our country is in large
part due to state intervention. Instead of turning toward
and receiving personal care from within the family, indi-
viduals have been encouraged to turn toward the imper-
sonal state. The result has been the disintegration of family
bonds. It is state economic intervention — not the free-mar-
ket system — which is inherently impersonal and antitheti-
cal to true human community.
rv. Economic Power
The objection to the market on the grounds of imper-
sonalism is based on the same fallacy as were the previ-
ously discussed charges of selfishness and materialism.
Each of these claims indicts the market for ills which in fact
268 / Ken S. Ewert
are common to all mankind — faults that would exist under
any economic system. Impersonalism, selfishness, and
materialism are the consequence of the fall of man, not the
fruit of an economic system which allows freedom. If these
sinful tendencies are an inescapable reality, the question
that must be asked is: "What economic system best
restrains sin?"
This brings us to a fourth moral objection to the market
which is often espoused by the Christians of the left: that
the market, which is often pictured as a "dog-eat-dog" or
"survival of the fittest" system, leaves men free to oppress
each other. It allows the economically powerful to arbitrar-
ily oppress the economically weak, the wealthy to tread
upon and exploit the poor. According to this view, wealth is
power, and those with wealth will not necessarily use their
power wisely and justly. Because the nature of man is what
it is, this "economic power" must be checked by the state
and restrained for the public good.
But does the market in fact allow individuals to exploit
others? To begin with, there is a great deal of misunder-
standing about this thing called "economic power." The
term is in fact somewhat of a misnomer. When we speak of
power, we normally refer to the ability to force or coerce
something or someone to do what we desire. The motor in
your car has the power to move the car down the road; this
is mechanical power. The police officer has the power to ar-
rest and jail a lawbreaker; this is civil power. But what of
economic power? If 1 possess a great deal of wealth, what
unique ability does this wealth confer?
In reality what the critics of the market call economic
power is only the ability to please others, and thus "eco-
nomic power" is not power in the true sense of the word.
Regardless of a person's wealth, in the free market he can
Moral Criticisms of the Market / 269
get what he wants only by pleasing another person through
offering to exchange something which the other deems
more valuable. Wealth (assuming it is not used to buy polit-
ical power) doesn't bestow the ability to apply force to or
dominate another individual.
Take for example the employer of labor, an individual
who is often considered to be the embodiment of economic
power and an exploiter of those less powerful than himself.
It is often forgotten that an employer can get what he
wants— employees for his business — only by offering
something which pleases them, namely a wage which they
consider better than not working, or better than working
for someone else. He has no power to force them to come
and work for him, but only the power to offer them a better
alternative.
What ensures that he will want to make them a pleasing
offer? The fact that doing so is the only way to get what he
is interested in, namely their labor, provides a very strong
incentive. But suppose the prospective employee is in very
desperate straits and almost any wage, even one which
seems pitifully low, will please him enough to work for the
employer. In this situation, it seems as if the employer can
get away with paying "slave wages" and exploiting the
economically weaker employee.
This scenario, however, ignores the effects of the com-
petition among employers for employees. In the market
economy, employers are in constant competition with other
employers for the services of employees. They are "disci-
plined" by this competition to offer top wages to attract
workers. Because of competition, wages are "bid up" to the
level at which the last employee hired will be paid a wage
which is very nearly equivalent to the value of what he pro-
duces. As long as wages are less than this level, it pays an
270 / Ken S. Ewert
employer to hire another employee, since doing so will add
to his profits. Economists call this the marginal productiv-
ity theory of wages.
But what if there were no competing employers? For
example, what about a "one-company town"? Without
competition, wouldn't the employer be able to exploit the
employees and pay "unfair" wages?
First of all, it is important to remember that in the free
market, an economic exchange occurs only because the two
trading parties believe that they will be better off after the
exchange. In other words, all exchanges are "positive sum"
in that both parties benefit. Thus if an employee in this one-
company town is willing to work for low wages, it is only
because he or she places a higher value on remaining in the
town and working for a lower wage than moving to
another place and finding a higher paying job. The
"power" that the employer wields is still only the ability to
offer a superior alternative to the employee. In choosing to
remain and work for a lower wage, the employee is likely
considering other costs such as those of relocating, finding
another job, and retraining, as well as non-monetary costs,
such as the sacrifice of local friendships or the sacrifice of
leaving a beautiful and pleasant town.
Moreover, this situation cannot last for long. If the
employer can pay wages that are significantly lower than
elsewhere, he will reap above-average profits and this in
turn will attract other employers to move in and take ad-
vantage of the "cheap labor." In so doing, these new
employers become competitors for employees. They must
offer higher wages in order to persuade employees to come
and work for them, and as a result wages eventually will be
bid up to the level prevailing elsewhere.
Moral Criticisms of the Market / 271
Economic Ability to Please
What is true for the employer in relation to the
employee is true for all economic relationships in the free
market. Each individual, though he may be a tyrant at
heart, can succeed only by first benefiting others — ^by pro-
viding them with an economic service. Regardless of the
amount of wealth he possesses, he is never freed from this
requirement. Economic "power" is only the economic abil-
ity to please, and as such it is not something to be feared.
Far from allowing men to oppress each other, the free mar-
ket takes this sinful drive for power and channels it into
tangible service for others.
It is also important to consider that the only alternative
to the free market is the political direction of economic
exchanges. As the Public Choice theorists have so convinc-
ingly pointed out in recent years, there is no good reason to
suppose that people become less self-interested when they
enter the political sphere. In other words, to paraphrase
Paul Craig Roberts, there is not necessarily a "Saul to Paul
conversion" when an individual enters government. If he
was power-hungry while he was a private-market partici-
pant, he likely will be power-hungry after he becomes a
"public servant."
But there is an important difference. In contrast with
economic power, political power is truly something to be
feared because of its coercive aspect. The power-seeking
individual in government has power in the true sense of the
word. While in the market he has to please those he deals
with in order to be economically successful, the same is not
true, or is true to a far lesser degree, in the political sphere.
In the political sphere he can actually abuse one group of
272 / Ken S. Ewert
people but still succeed by gaining the favor of other
groups of people.
A classic example is a tariff. This economic intervention
benefits a small group of producers (and those who work
for or sell to the producers) at the expense of consumers
who have to pay higher prices for the good in question. The
politician gains in power (and perhaps wealth) because of
the significant support he can receive from the small but
well-organized group of producers. Other examples of the
use of political power that clearly benefit some individuals
at the expense of others are government bail-outs, subsi-
dies, price supports, and licensing monopolies. The fact
that these types of legislation continue despite the fact that
they harm people (usually the least wealthy and most
poorly organized) demonstrates the tendency of mankind
to abuse political power.
In fact, virtually every state intervention into the econ-
omy is for the purpose of benefiting one party at the
expense of another. In each of the cases mentioned above,
some are exploited by others via the medium of the state.
Therefore, if we are concerned about the powerful oppress-
ing the weak, we should focus our attention on the abuse of
political power. It, and not the so-called "economic power"
of individuals acting within the free market, is the true
source of tyranny and oppression. Our concern for the
downtrodden should not lead us to denigrate economic
freedom but rather to restrain the sphere of civil authority.
V. Conclusion
The free market is innocent of the charges leveled at it
by its Christian critics. Its alleged moral shortcomings turn
out to be things which are common to mankind under both
Moral Criticisms of the Market / 273
free and command economic systems. While it is true that
the free market restrains human sin, it makes no pretense of
purging people of their selfishness, materialism, individu-
alism, and drive for power. And this, perhaps, is the true sin
in the eyes of the market's critics.
The market is explicitly non-utopian. It doesn't promise
to recreate man in a new and more perfect state, but rather
it acknowledges the moral reality of man and works to
restrain the outward manifestations of sin. In this sense the
free market is in complete accord with Biblical teachings.
According to Scripture, man cannot be morally changed
through any human system, be it religious, political, or eco-
nomic, but moral regeneration comes solely through the
grace of God.
If the Christian critics of the market expect an economic
system to change the moral character of people, they are
sadly mistaken. Such a task is clearly beyond the ability of
any human institution or authority. We must be content to
restrain the outward expression of sin, and this is some-
thing which the free market does admirably.
The Psychology of Cultism
Ben Barker
Cults are not a new phenomenon: they may be as old as
man — or even animal herds. Cults may form around an
individual, an object, an animal, or a concept. Invariably,
the members of the cult ascribe magical powers to their
object of worship — powers to manipulate the environment
to protect the cult members against evil spirits, the devil,
natural disasters, bankruptcy, illness, or whatever.
The core concept in cultism is a followership dependent
upon someone or something outside itself to assist it in cop-
ing with a threatening external environment. The more
inadequate and inferior the follower feels himself to be, the
more magical and mystical the omnipotence projected onto
the leader. However, it is a mistake to focus on the leader or
object of veneration. The leader is usually merely a
resourceful individual perceptive enough to recognize the
varied types of helplessness in those about him who offers
to take away those feelings. That his offer is frequently
overstated and illusory is beside the point. The point is that
the followers willingly take the bait — hook, line, and sinker.
Many were shocked by the submissive, dependent,
compliant followers of Charles Manson who carved x's in
their foreheads and chanted on the Los Angeles County
Ben Barker, M.D., a physician specializing in psychiatry and emer-
gency medicine, originally presented these ideas in a speech for med-
ical staff personnel. It was published in the April 1980 issue of The Free-
man.
274
The Psychology of CulHsm / 275
Courthouse steps. They were even more shocked to learn
that some men and women had brutally annihilated other
human beings on Manson's satanic command. Then there
were the ill-fated followers of Jim Jones whose beliefs led
them to a rotting death in the steamy jungles of Guyana.
Numerous other examples could be cited. Where do they
all come from? We shake our heads and wonder, while
physicians and other societal leaders continue to reinforce
exactly the type of behavior that will produce more cultists.
The Roots of Dependency
What are the roots of dependency in human behavior?
The answer should be obvious. Each of us began life as a
totally dependent parasite encased in a constant-tempera-
ture liquid environment with our nutritional needs satis-
fied effortlessly.
Through some miracle, the maternal host does not set
up an appropriate foreign body rejection reaction and the
fetus enjoys this total dependency state for some 40-odd
weeks before expulsion.^
It is presumptuous to assume that this experience pre-
cedes awareness. Single-cell living forms demonstrate
avoidance behavior to noxious stimuli. Are they aware? If
they are, then is it not reasonable to suppose the fetus to be
at least as aware? For me, though, the strongest evidence
that the intrauterine life is experienced as pleasurable is the
sustained effort adults make to recreate a similar experi-
ence through environmental manipulation. "To be waited
on hand and foot" by spouse, servant, child, and others has
long been associated with "all the things money can buy."
Once expelled from the uterus, the infant must struggle
to meet some of his own needs. The struggle is multifac-
276 / Ben Barker
eted, beginning with an immature autonomic nervous sys-
tem which must stabilize his internal environment in the
face of a shifting external environment. Mother assists in
this process by attempting through appropriate nurturing
techniques to minimize the fluctuations of heat, cold, air
circulation, and the like upon the infant. He remains
extremely dependent upon her even though the biological
umbilical cord has been ruptured. A more profound attach-
ment persists which defies logical analysis.
In a slow, incomprehensible, years-long process, mother
gradually weans the infant from his dependence on her.
One of her tools is to promote his interaction with other
adults, siblings, and peers. Obviously, no two parents
accomplish this task in exactly the same way nor do any
two individuals react identically to the same stimulus.
However, there are cultural similarities in the process which
conspire to create more than surface similarities in the same
generation of offspring.
Herein rests the central point of my thesis: the cultural
factors which have produced so many dependent, submis-
sive followers among our youth are also behind the decline
and fall of the United States as a force of geopolitical signif-
icance. Excessive dependency is endemic in our society and
those who are in positions of power and prestige — includ-
ing many in my profession — encourage and perpetuate this
dependency.
An Age of Specialization
We live in an age of specialization so extreme that most
of us are truly helpless outside our specialties. Our "sys-
tem" thus has become an incredibly complex web of inter-
acting specialties which provides great comfort when all is
The Psychology of Cultism / 277
going well but reduces us to extreme helplessness in times
of crisis. Examples abound: Supermarkets are very conve-
nient unless trucks stop delivering. Automobiles are a nice
way to get around unless there is no gasoline. Washing
machines are dandy unless yours breaks down and the
repairman has a two-week waiting list.
The trade-off in our age of technological marvels is this:
We gain convenience and security but may sacrifice self-
reliance smd independence. For example, antibiotics are
available over the counter in many countries and individu-
als are free to take the responsibility for the management of
their own illnesses. But here in the United States, we do not
have that freedom. In fact, patients here have been so pro-
grammed to depend upon physicians that we must take
responsibility for all their bumps, bruises, and sniffles —
hardly leaving us with adequate time to care for those who
truly require our skilled services.
Our cult of dependency medicine has been so successful
that disenchanted followers are literally suing us out of
business. They are impatient and demanding that all dis-
eases be cured — and cured now! In turning over the
responsibility for their health to us, they gave us an illusory
omnipotence. Our fallibility crushes this illusion and their
response is vindictive anger. Discredited cult leaders are
adjudged harshly by their disappointed followers.
The Drug Cult
Perhaps the largest cult of all that our profession has
had a hand in is the drug cult. By that, I don t mean the
"Superfly" white El Dorado Cadillac jockey who drives his
exotic automobile through Harlem or Watts nor do I refer to
the Mafia Godfather, the French Connection mystery men.
278 / Ben Barker
or the Colombian cocaine millionaires. I'm talking about
the "drugstore cult" — the widespread dependence of
American citizens on the soothing syrups and pills avail-
able on the shelves of drugstores, supermarkets, news-
stands, and elsewhere. It is the cult that has pushed Valium
into the number one all-time best-seller spot.
Our undergraduate, professional, and postgraduate
medical education is drug-oriented and drug-saturated,
hence our primary weapon against illness is, of course,
pharmacological. Was it not fitting and symbolic that so
many at Jonestown were put out of their misery by an injec-
tion from a doctor? They trusted him to do the right thing.
Not only medicine but many other careers and skills
have enthroned science and the scientific technique. Our
educational systems perpetuate the myths of science ad
nauseam. How much of the science and math shoved down
your throats in high school, college, and medical school
were really useful to you either in specialty training or in
practice? Admit that much of your schooling is pure ritual
and you will see that "education" itself has become a cult.
College graduates enter the real world with magical expec-
tations, waving their hard-earned degrees in the wind.
When their skills are not snapped up, they are disillusioned
and angry.
Schooling as Religion
In attempting to achieve power over the environment,
students have literally endowed the schooling process with
the status of religious veneration and plugged themselves
into it. The teachers and professors are the high priests and
the process is supposed to mystically and mysteriously
protect the follower from risk or harm if the prescribed rit-
The Psychology of Cultism / 279
uals are followed. Believe it or not, many who educate
themselves into overcrowded fields simply return to school
for another degree. Others of the educated cultists simply
change cults.
Basically, then, we see that the psychology of cultism is
simply the persistence of the parent/ child relationship
beyond an appropriate time. Followers or members feel
helpless or overwhelmed by an environment they perceive
as threatening and respond to this feeling by embracing a
concept or leader to whom they ascribe magical power.
This is a sign of excessive dependency; and excessive
dependency in a society can come either from inadequate
parental directing toward self-reliance, individual rejection
of such directing, or programming from external sources
which directs towards dependency. Additionally, the envi-
ronment may become truly so threatening that dependency
upon an authority or higher power source may be appro-
priate, in war, say, or in specific subcultures as depicted in
the film, "The Godfather." Modern technology also shares
the guilt, for it has contrived to capture a formerly active
and mobile social order and transformed it into a sedentary
spectator society.
The principal villain in this transformation process is
television. By and large, it is a dehumanization process
which tends to dull the senses and produce emotional zom-
bies who respond primarily to subliminal and repetitive
advertisement slogans. What then occurs is much akin to
disuse atrophy: the spirit within dwindles like melting wax
and the mind dulls. The products of this process suffer
endemic obesity and emotional indifference to their actual
environment.
What Jim Jones and his ilk have offered to these unfor-
tunates is an antidote to the poisonous, dehumanizing
280 / Ben Barker
processes induced by the age of technology. Few who leap
for the bait really care that the antidote itself is toxic, for
what they have been experiencing is a living death and any
escape hatch is acceptable, even if it leads into an endless
maze. The visible result is the phenomena of cults so alive
in the land today.
In a society of people programmed almost from birth to
foUow-the-leader, it is inevitable that some will fall into the
clutches of mad leaders. That is but one of the many conse-
quences of the loss of self-reliance and of independent
judgment in American citizens. Before joining in an emo-
tional condemnation of "cults," perhaps it would be best to
understand that a cult is but a system of worship or ritual.
It is a system of belief gone pathological, to be distin-
guished from religious beliefs which inculcate indepen-
dence.
Freedom of Worship
The freedom to worship God after your own manner of
belief is as valuable to the spirit of independence as is free-
dom of speech. These freedoms, guaranteed by the First
Amendment to the Constitution, are about all we have left
of the dream of the Founding Fathers and should not be
carelessly dismissed.
Genuine religious beliefs have the special quality of sat-
isfying intellectual and emotional needs simultaneously.
They account for unequal life fates, promise release from
illness and suffering, and offer hope for a better life. They
are, indeed, a special, poorly understood, potentially adap-
tive set of ego defense mechanisms. Do we psychiatrists
have a socially sanctioned right to intervene in religious
The Psychology of Cultism / 281
beliefs, particularly when we know so little about the influ-
ence of religion on psychopathology?
If we deprive someone of his religion, what substitute
do we have for him? And ought we to impose such a sub-
stitute? Physicians for years have ignored nutrition, exer-
cise, and relaxation as techniques for combating or prevent-
ing illnesses. Indeed, we have ignored preventive medicine
itself. We are, for the most part, disease-oriented high
priests in a cult of science and technology which is leading
us all into a fate which appears particularly unattractive.
Chronic stress-related diseases plague both us and our
patients (hypertension, strokes, heart attacks, colitis, ulcers,
asthma, and so forth), yet we persist in disregarding the
spiritual element in man and rely solely upon chemical
potions and invasive techniques to combat diseases.
Perhaps God does exist. Perhaps He was around before
Plato and Aristotle. Perhaps He spoke to Moses and Paul
and many others. Perhaps His Holy Spirit is within each
human being and resists the sadness of a mechanized,
depersonalized, technological social order. Media manipu-
lators who sensationalize the fates of unfortunate cultists
cannot destroy the source of all life which beats within each
of our breasts and breathes freely of the air that His plants
provide.
The psychology of cultism is but one indication of an
intrinsic desire in each of us to offer veneration to the Cre-
ator. This process becomes pathological only if the surro-
gate leader is mad, as with Jim Jones, or when the path fol-
lowed leads into a blind maze, as with scientific technology
Almost every day another "accepted" scientific fact is dis-
credited in yet another laboratory experiment. It appears,
then, that science offers no final solutions or ultimate
282 / Ben Barker
explanations. Is our own worship of the microscope and
the wonders of microbiology, neurochemistry, and physiol-
ogy as misplaced as the blind faith that Jones's followers
had in him?
Blind Departures from Basic Principles of Freedom
This nation was founded upon principles taken from
the Judeo-Christian ethic and as long as these prevailed, we
grew and prospered. Now, there is no prayer in the schools
and unionized, socialist teachers insidiously program our
youth. Mindless violence and senseless trivia beam at us
from the television, our newspapers are full of lies and
scantily clad females posing for underwear ads. Heroin is
the opiate of the ghetto, alcohol of the middle-class com-
munity, and cocaine of the wealthy. Valium, which we sup-
ply, is abused by all social classes.
We correctly perceive the sea as a dangerous, hostile
environment for man and few would attempt to navigate it
for any significant distance without the benefits of a buoy-
ant and protective superstructure. What many fail to realize
is that man's journey on dry land is at least as hazardous. In
neglecting the spiritual asf>ects of our own existences, and
of our patients' as well, we are up a creek without either
boat or paddles.
Cults, worthless dollars, gasoline shortages, and depen-
dent patients are the long-term consequences of too many
of us learning to rely on Big Brother. The processed foods
we eat and drink are as suspect as the poisoned potion was
in Guyana — it simply takes longer for them to kill us.
Erich Fromm tells us that all human beings are religious
in one way or another, religion being "any system of
thought and action which . . . gives the individual the frame
The Psychology of Cultism / 283
of orientation and object of devotion he needs/'^ The psy-
chology of cultism is all around us, as men elect to place
their faith and trust in other men, their machines or their
technological products.
As long as we pass on shallow values to our youth and
let them see us worshipping at the altar of science, or the
government, or the dollar, or gold — they will do likewise.
As long as we promote dependency in our patients, we
are reinforcing the psychology of cultism. The white coat
and the stethoscope are counterproductive when used as
talismans in a cult of science. We should learn and teach
self-reliance and preventive medicine principles, for when
these attitudes and values are mixed with genuine faith in
the Creator, we may return to being a nation of healthy and
sane individuals rather than a society of drugged, depen-
dent sheep and we may finally reverse the decline of the
United States as a force of geopolitical significance.
1. Cf. S. Ferenczi, "Stages in the Development of the Sense of Real-
ity/' Outline of Psychoanalysis, by J. S. Van Tesslar, p. 112.
2. Ashok Rao, M. D., and Jennifer A. Katze, M. D., "The Role of Reli-
gious Belief in a Depressed Patient's Illness," Psychiatric Opinion, June
1979, pp. 39-43.
The Disease from Which Civilizations Die
John K. Williams
Saint Augustine once lamented that he knew precisely
what he meant by the word "time" until asked to state what
he meant. I sympathize with the saint. I know full well
what I mean by the noun "civilization," but pinning down
the word is a singularly frustrating exercise. Webster's New
World Dictionary of the American Language — a work some-
what inordinately given to using the term et cetera — tells me
that "civilization" is related to "social organization of a
high order, marked by the development and use of a writ-
ten language and by advances in the arts and sciences, gov-
ernment, etc." and thus indicates "the total culture of a par-
ticular people, nation, period, etc." and "countries and
peoples considered to have reached a high stage of social
and cultural development." This helps — particularly the
reference to the "development and use of a written lan-
guage" and "advances in the arts and sciences, govern-
ment, etc." — but 1 am still dissatisfied: 1 know not a few
men and women deeply involved in government, and not
completely ignorant of the arts and sciences, whom 1 hesi-
tate to describe as "civilized." It is, as the King of Siam re-
marked to Anna, "a puzzlement."
The Reverend Dr. John K. Williams, popular author, lecturer, and
philosopher, served FEE as a resident scholar. He continues to carry the
banner for liberty in his native Australia. This essay appeared in the
September 1985 edition of TJie Freeman.
284
The Disease from Which Civilizations Die / 285
Non-dictionary definitions of and comments about
"civilization" and the "civilizing process" compound con-
fusion. Martin Crombie asserts that "the alchemy of civi-
lization transforms vicious animals ruled by instinct into
human beings governed by reason," but Eric Berne tells us
that "we are bom princes and the civilizing process turns
us into frogs." Jose Ortega y Gasset insists that "civilization
is nothing else but the attempt to reduce force to being the
last resort/' but Will Rogers wryly observes that no one can
"say that civilization doesn't advance, for in every war they
kill you in a new way." On the one hand, Winston Churchill
affirms that "to fight for the preservation of civilization is to
fight for the survival of the human race," but on the other
hand Ralph Waldo Emerson insists that "the end of the
human race will be that it will eventually die of civiliza-
tion." When these conflicting utterances are blended, and
are spiced by the suggestion of Calvin Coolidge that "civi-
lization and profits go hand in hand" and the observation
of Alan Coult that "the flush toilet is the basis of Western
civilization," the search for a definition of civilization
begins to look like an exercise in futility.
Civilizations Die But a Continuity Remains
For all this, while no one of us may be able precisely to
say what he or she means by "civilization," all of us under-
stand, even if we do not agree with, the assertion that civi-
lizations seem to die. Civilization itself may continue, and
much that past civilizations have achieved may be
absorbed by new civilizations and thus conserved, but par-
ticular civilizations, like individual men and women, are
seemingly destined to be bom, to grow, to flourish, to fade,
and to die.
286 / John K. Williams
While it is easy to concede that such a process has char-
acterized civilizations of yesteryear, it is not so easy to
believe that this is also true of our own civilization. And
yet, the cosmos of which we are a part, and thus human his-
tory itself, are vital and dynamic, not lifeless and static.
Change is thus inevitable. Since change is of the very
essence of reality, no particular state of affairs, and hence no
particular form of civilization, are forever. And that is not
terrible: rather, it is ground for hope. Tomorrow is not pre-
destined to be a rerun of today. A world more prosperous,
more peaceful, more committed to liberty than is our
world, is a real and exciting possibility.
I have been unable, alas, to identify the reference, but an
observation I noted in a desk calendar and wrote down
says it all. "Civilization is a stream with banks. The stream
is sometimes filled with blood from f>eople killing, stealing,
shouting, and doing things historians usually record, while
on the banks, unnoticed, people build homes, make love,
raise children, sing songs, write poetry, and even whittle
statues. The story of civilization is the story of what hap-
pened on the banks. Historians are pessimists because they
ignore the banks for the river." The words are those of Will
and Ariel Durant, but where in their writings they are
found I do not know.
What happens on the banks is marked by continuity.
One generation inherits and builds upon what previous
generations have achieved. In this sense, the insights and
discoveries of particular civilizations last. And in this sense,
what is great and glorious about our civilization can last.
Hence my willingness to affirm that "the American Way"
can last and will last. In so speaking I am not, incidentally,
seeking to flatter you. The "American Way" has a long his-
The Disease from Which Civilizations Die / 287
tory. Insights and ideals for which innumerable people over
millennia fought and died came, perhaps by an accident of
history, the defining characteristics of "the American Way"
Your nation, after all, is unique in that it was "conceived in
liberty."
What can last and what, 1 believe, will last, are the prin-
ciples so many for so long sought to establish, and which in
this new nation "became flesh." What can and will last is,
so to speak, the ringing affirmation that "all men are cre-
ated equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with cer-
tain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty,
and the pursuit of Happiness."
While we cannot pretend that our civilization as it is
shall endure until the end of human history, the way to pre-
serve and pass on to those who follow us what is magnifi-
cent and awesome about the American Way is to defend all
that is excellent in our civilization as it is. Being human —
being material creatures living in a spatio-temporal, physi-
cal world — we cannot defend an abstraction called "civi-
lization itself." Just as the only way to serve an abstraction
called "humanity" is to serve particular flesh-and-blood
human beings, so the only way to further the cause of civ-
ilization as such is to cherish and conserve a particular civ-
ilization.
We serve civilization as such, and can only serve civi-
lization as such, by serving the best in our own civilization.
And one way to do this is to ask what it is that we can do to
combat the forces that weaken, that undermine, that erode
a particular civilization. Hence the title of my address and
the question I wish to explore: What is the disease from which
civilizations die?
288 / John K. Williams
Thucydides
In using the word "disease" I am borrowing a meta-
phor, an image used some two-and-a-half millennia ago by
a Greek historian named Thucydides.
Thucydides loved the city-state of Athens. His devotion
was not to the buildings and environment one could point
to, but to a way of life which Athens in the fifth century B.C.
embodied. In words Thucydides ascribes to a great Athen-
ian leader named Pericles, that way of life is thus described:
Our constitution is called a democracy because
power is in the hands not of a minority but of the
entire people. When it is a question of settling pri-
vate disputes, everyone is equal before the law. . . .
And, just as our political life is free and open, so is
our day-to-day life in relation to each other. We do
not get into a state with our next-door neighbor if he
enjoys himself in his own way, nor do we give him
the kind of black looks which, though they do no
real harm, still do hurt people's feelings. We are free
and tolerant in our private lives; but in public affairs
we keep to the law. This is because [the law] com-
mands our deep respect . . . especially . . . those
unwritten laws which it is an acknowledged shame
to break. It seems just as natural to us to enjoy for-
eign goods as our own local products . . . and our
city is open to the world. . . . We regard wealth as
something to be properly used, rather than some-
thing to boast about, and as for poverty, no one need
be ashamed to admit it. The real shame is not in
being poor, but in not taking practical measures to
escape from poverty. Here each individual is inter-
The Disease from Which Civilizations Die / 289
ested not only in his own affairs, but in the affairs of
[Athens] as well.^
Now it must be confessed that this description of the
Athenian way is not a httle idealized. The institution of
slavery was a reality in Athens, just as it was in all Greek
city-states of the fifth century B.C. Again, power in Athens
could be said to be "in the hands ... of the entire people," if
and only if women did not count as people. Yet for all this,
Thucydides' description accurately captures something of
what was so magnificent about his beloved Athens, a civi-
lization that gave birth to thinkers, writers, and artists
whose insights and works still live, having become part of
"civilization itself." Yet the civilization that was Athens did
not live. It died.
Early in the work from which I have quoted, Thucy-
dides describes a mysterious plague which swept through
Athens, elaborating in detail the symptoms those suffering
from the disease displayed. At one level this section of his
history is simply history, a painstaking record of a signifi-
cant event which most certainly did occur. Yet more than a
simple description of what happened is intended. Thucy-
dides uses this description as a controlling symbol for his
entire work. Athenian civilization itself suffered, he asserts,
from a "disease," a disease characterized by particular
symptoms. This disease, which in the case of Athens
proved fatal, is the disease all men and women of good will
must fear. For it is the disease from which civilizations die.
Human Beings and Human Nature
Thucydides frequently uses the phrase, "human nature
being what it is" and similar phrases. By so speaking, he is
290 / John K. Williams
indicating at least two realities, two constants about men
and women. First, human beings are rational. Men and
women are capable of thought. They can formulate goals
and rationally seek out ways to realize these goals. They
can recall, consider, and learn from the past and thereby
plan for the future. They can envisage not simply an imme-
diate and given present, but a distant and possible future.
Human nature is rational.
Now rationality dictates, insists Thucydides, the rule of
law. Long-term objectives can be realized by an individual
if and only if he or she can count upon other people behav-
ing in an essentially predictable way. By this is meant not
that the individual cannot or should not be spontaneous
and creative, and thus unpredictable, but that some rules and
conventions governing the way people relate to each other must
exist and must be respected. Rule by a tyrant's whim or a
mob's caprice is undesirable, apart from anything else, pre-
cisely because such rule is erratic and unpredictable, pre-
cluding cooperative, long-term endeavors. What is permit-
ted today might be forbidden tomorrow; undertakings
made in the present might not be fulfilled in the future.
Social coordination and cooperation demands, insists
Thucydides, the rule of law. And as rational beings, men
and women can perceive that this is so.
The Rules of Law
Like many of his contemporaries, Thucydides divides
"laws" broadly defined into four groups or sets. First, and
perhaps weakest, are the rules signified by the word man-
ners. People breaking these rules tend to be regarded as
somewhat uncivilized and uncouth, but that is all. Ill-man-
The Disease from Which Civilizations Die / 291
nered people may not be invited to dinner parties, but they
are not perceived as "bad'' people.
Then come the rules signified by the word morals. These
rules are significantly stronger than the rules we call "man-
ners." People breaking these rules are perceived not simply
as irksome, antisocial irritants but as evil people.
Third come the rules making up the written laws of a
community. These rules, stronger than both manners and
morals, are the rules which, if broken, incur a penalty
imposed by a court. While some "immoral" actions may
also be "illegal" actions, not all are. Thus the sexual license
so uproariously depicted in the plays of the Athenian
comedian, Aristophanes, while certainly not illegal, was no
less certainly regarded as immoral. The sphere of morality,
and the sphere of legality, were not perceived by the Greeks
as identical.
Manners. Morals. The written laws. And a fourth set of
rules: the "unwritten laws which it is an acknowledged shame to
break. " These laws were perceived as so basic, so fundamen-
tal, so important, that they did not need to be written down.
For the Greeks, these laws were two: honor the dead, and
honor the gods, including the gods of others. In a sense,
these two laws reduce to a single imperative: respect other
people as people, possessing a worth in and of themselves,
and resj)ect the values other people hold, even if those val-
I ues are other than one's own. In more contemporary lan-
guage, we might define the "unwritten laws" as what some
philosophers call reciprocal respect for autonomy, a respect for
the personhood of other people and their capacity to for-
mulate and strive to realize their own peaceful, noncoercive
visions of the "good life." The "unwritten laws."
Rationality, then, dictates obedience to these laws. It is
292 / John K. Williams
in one's own interest that one is part of a community where
certain expectations can be held and long-term goals can be
pursued. To be sure, one cannot, given these rules, do
exactly what one might wish at a given moment, but nei-
ther can anyone else. There is thus an incalculably valuable
payoff, a payoff more than compensating for the irksome
restraint of not always being able to behave with impunity.
So affirms reason. So asserts the rationality that is part of
human nature.
Alongside rationality is found a second characteristic of
"human nature": a drive to seek immediate, here-and-now plea-
sure. Men and women resent whatever curbs their freedom
to seek such pleasure. Regardless of the dictates of sweet
reason, they chafe at the bit. Thus if a person can acquire
the power to defy the rules social cooperation and coordi-
nation demand, that person will defy them. If a person can
acquire the power to defy the rules and get away with it,
that person will, asserts Thucydides, tend to do precisely
that.
The first rules to go are usually manners. Then morals
bite the dust. Then the written laws are defied. Finally, the
"unwritten laws" are forgotten. Resentment and envy are
fostered, the powerless detesting the powerful. Factions
proliferate. Barbarism reigns.
A Tyrant Is Born
And then, asserts Thucydides, comes the end, in one of
two forms. A social order without coordination is power-
less to defend itself against the disciplined onslaughts of an
external power. Or — and more frequently — a people sink-
ing into the chaos of barbarism panic. They cry out for
someone — anyone — who will restore some semblance of
The Disease from Which Civilizations Die / 293
cohesion and order. And invariably that someone emerges.
He promises to give the people what, in desperation, they
are grasping for. He promises to restore social order and the
rule of law. But at a price. In exchange, men and women
must surrender their liberty. In this way, the tyrant is born.
Thucydides describes in great detail the symptoms
observable as this disease — the disease from which civiliza-
tions die — inexorably works its way toward its terrible end,
progressively eroding the structures and practices that are,
so to speak, the central nervous system of a civilized com-
munity. I quote him at some length.
"Revolutions broke out in city after city, and in places
where the revolutions occurred late, the knowledge of what
had happened previously in other places caused still new
extravagances ... in the methods of seizing power and . . .
unheard-of atrocities in revenge. To fit in with the change of
events, words, too, had to change their usual meanings.
What used to be described as a thoughtless act of aggres-
sion was now regarded as the courage one would expect to
find in a party member; to think of the future and wait was
merely another way of saying that one was a coward. . . .
Fanatical enthusiasm was the mark of a real man . . . ; [any-
one] who held violent opinions could always be trusted;
anyone who objected to [such opinions] became a suspect.
. . . Family relations were a weaker tie than party member-
ship, since party members were . . . ready to go to any
extreme for any reason whatever. These parties were not
formed to enjoy the benefits of the established laws, but
simply to acquire power. ..."
Continues Thucydides: "Love of power . . . was the
cause of all these evils. . . . Leaders of parties in the cities
had programs which appeared admirable — on the one side
equality for the masses, on the other side safe and sound
294 / John K. Williams
government by an aristocracy. Yet by professing to serve
the public interest, party leaders and members in truth
sought to win . . . prizes for themselves. . . . [With] the con-
ventions of civilized life thrown into confusion, human
nature, always ready to offend even where laws exist,
showed itself in its true colors . . . , repealing general laws of
humanity which . . . give a hope of salvation to all."^
Thus the symptoms. Then the end. Whether externally
imposed or internally generated, tyranny and despotism
triumph. Liberty dies, and with it a civilization. The joy-
ous songs of a free and civilized people are silenced. The
disease from which civilizations die has worked its way to
its end.
Here endeth a brief and sketchy lesson from a volume
penned by a genius whose name is never heard by many
students. They prefer, you see, "relevant" books and con-
temporary names. And those of us who should know better
capitulate, fearful of incurring our children's wrath. We
proffer amusing mini-courses about ephemeral interests
instead — then wonder why it is our young know little
about the heritage that is rightly theirs.
Moral Decline
As a preacher, I might be expected to point to the break-
down in Western societies of moral rules. Clearly, all is not
well. In his monumental volume. Modem Times: The World
from the Twenties to the Eighties,^ Paul Johnson documents
the rise in the West of moral relativism and moral subjec-
tivism. More and more, moral rules are perceived either as
arbitrary prescriptions and proscriptions relative to a par-
ticular society, having no rootage or grounding in the
nature of things, or as expressions of personal taste, a dif-
1
The Disease from Which Civilizations Die / 295
ference over the merits of cruelty for its own sake being
akin to a difference over the merits of a particular flavor of
ice cream.
Yet in spite of this, I suggest that anyone tempted to
assert that our civilization has sunk to hitherto depths of
moral depravity, read some history. The eighteenth-century
writer, Tobias Smollett — author of that ever-delightful
work. The Expedition of Humphrey Clinker— describes the
highways of his day as being "infested with violence and
assassination" and the cities of his age as "teem(ing) with
the brutal votaries of intemperance and lewdness." London
in 1839 boasted 933 brothels and 844 houses of ill-fame to
serve a population of some two million people. Hooligan-
ism is no more rampant in New York City today than it was
in nineteenth-century London, where gangs such as the
"Bucks" and "Corinthians" perfected traditions of sheer
terrorism elaborated by their eighteenth-century predeces-
sors, the notorious "Mohocks." Consider this description of
the Mohocks: "Nobody who was alone was safe from their
cowardly assaults. They attacked at random any unarmed
person who was out after dark. They assaulted unprotected
women; they drove their swords through sedan-chairs;
they pulled people from coaches, slit their noses with
razors, stabbed them with knives, ripped the coach to
pieces, and then . . . killed."^
The barbaric behavior of English soccer fans which
recently shocked a disbelieving world has its parallels in
the eighteenth century, the major difference being not the
mindlessness of the behavior but the fact that, today, we at
least are shocked.
The situation is complex. There is something depraved
about an age witnessing self-styled world leaders applaud-
ing a speech delivered by Idi Amin on October 1, 1975, at
296 / John K. Williams
that cabal of tyrannies laughingly described as the United
Nations. There is something profoundly disturbing about a
generation of adults that seemingly has lost its moral nerve,
leaving the young to improvise their manners and morals
as best they can. Yet to assert that we are experiencing an
unprecedented moral decline is to go beyond the evidence.
Suffice to suggest that, if we take seriously Thucydides'
claim that a disregard of the rules we call manners and
morals is indeed symptomatic of the disease from which
civilizations die, we cannot be complacent with impunity.
The Rule of Law
What is beyond dispute is that we today have largely
departed from the rule of law. "When it is a question of set-
tling private disputes, everyone is equal before the law, " asserts
Thucydides. Citizens of Western nations not so long ago
could echo this assertion. Today they cannot.
The Founding Fathers of this nation meant by "equal-
ity" precisely what Greeks such as Thucydides meant by
the term isonomia — namely, equality before the law. There are
to be no special laws for special classes or castes or elites,
laws privileging some but disadvantaging others. Indeed
rules which do single out particular individuals or particu-
lar sets of individuals were not, for the Greeks, properly
called laws at all, but "edicts" or "decrees." Even when
such rules are backed by the majority, they remain other
than laws proper, "the decrees of the demos — the people —
correspond(ing)," as Aristotle puts it, "to the edicts of the
tyrant."
This truth was clearly and unambiguously perceived by
those who in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
defended the political philosophy of classical — classical —
The Disease from Which Civilizations Die / 297
liberalism, and was no less clearly perceived by your
Founding Fathers. They established a republic, not an unre-
stricted democracy; they advocated not the absolute rule of
any majority but the constitutionally defended liberties of
minorities, even minorities of one; they defended not rule
by any principles securing majority approval, but by prin-
ciples of conduct equally applicable to all. Justice was por-
trayed as a blindfolded figure. She did not see who stood
before her. That did not matter, for whoever you were —
rich or poor; Catholic, Protestant, Jew, or "Infidel"; edu-
cated or unlettered — your "rights" were the same.
This understanding of the "rule of law" is utterly vital
for a free and civilized community. Rules which single out
special classes, castes, or elites breed the factionalism and
scheming Thucydides laments, foster the envy Thucydides
deplores, and precipitate the civil strife and dissension
Thucydides fears. No matter what impressively high-
minded terms are appealed to as justification for any depar-
ture from the rule of law properly understood — "social jus-
tice" or whatever — the outcome remains the same. And
that outcome is disaster for a free and civilized society.
And let us not delude ourselves. In recent decades West-
ern civilization has witnessed a departure from the rule of
law, classically defined. Justice is no longer blindfolded,
supremely indifferent as to who it is standing accused
before her. She peeks! "Tell me who you are," she asserts,
"and then I shall tell you your rights." The notion that all
enjoy absolutely equal "rights"— essentially the "right" to
formulate and strive to realize any vision of the "good life,"
given only that such striving and such visions are peaceful,
and that all are to be protected by government from vio-
lence, theft, and fraud— has been unspeakably attenuated.
"Equality of rights" and "equality before the law" have sue-
298 / John K. Williams
cumbed to a different vision of "equality" — an egalitarian
sameness secured by edicts and decrees which advantage
some but disadvantage others.
The very nature of government thus changes. No longer
is government given the vital but limited task of enforcing
a single set of rules, protecting all from actual or threatened
violence, theft, and fraud, and thereby ensuring that all are
equally free to formulate and strive to realize their own
visions — their diverse but noncoercive visions — of the "good
life." Rather, government becomes the means whereby one
group of people seeks favors and advantages at the expense
of rival groupings of people. A massive redistributive appa-
ratus proliferates zero-sum games whereby some gain and
others lose. Factionalism is encouraged, envy is increased,
and government becomes not the protector of all but what
Frederic Bastiat, the great French classical liberal thinker,
called "the fictitious entity by which everyone seeks to live
at the expense of everyone else."^ And according to Thucy-
dides, this eroding of the rule of law signifies the presence
of the disease from which civilizations die.
The Family
I make no apologies for drawing your attention to
Thucydides' specific reference to the weakening of family ties
as a further symptom of the disease from which civiliza-
tions die. Indeed I would urge you to read a singularly
scholarly volume penned by the courageous Russian dissi-
dent, Igor Shafarevich, entitled The Socialist Phenomenon,^
While a mathematician by training — indeed until recently
Shafarevich was a professor of mathematics at Moscow
University — he displays in this volume an utterly awesome
historical knowledge, and he uses that knowledge to docu-
ment with compelling thoroughness the hatred statists and
The Disease from Which Civilizations Die / 299
collectivists invariably have had for the family unit. It
would seem to be the case that opposition to individual lib-
erty inevitably leads to opposition to the family.
Because I am committed to the rule of law, I cannot and
do not advocate laws specifying the family unit and delib-
erately seeking to foster and favor the family unit. I must, in
the name of the rule of law, oppose all rules the objective of
which is the realization of some particular vision of the
"good life" — save, of course, visions involving the actual or
threatened coercion of people not sharing those visions.
What I oppose in the name of the rule of law is the per-
haps unintentional weakening of the traditional family by
welfare schemes which in practice encourage a breakdown
of the family unit. It would be impertinent for me to refer to
the situation in your nation. But I can refer you to Charles
Murray's devastating critique of American social welfare
policy. Losing Ground/
All I ask is that governments mind their own business
and get out of the way as individuals organize their social
relationships. The traditional family is, in my judgment, so
grounded in biological and emotional reality that it can look
after itself. The only further suggestion I make is that indi-
viduals caring about strengthening the traditional family,
involve themselves in voluntary organizations assisting fam-
ilies in trouble — financial assistance, counseling, and so on.
Be that as it may, the undermining of the family is, as
Thucydides perceived so long ago, a symptom of the dis-
ease from which civilizations die.
Individual Integrity
Finally, according to Thucydides, the disease from
which civilizations die afflicts the "best" members of a soci-
ety, not simply the "worst." Given immoral social institu-
300 / John K. Williams
tions, the "best" are tempted to compromise their princi-
ples. By so yielding, however, those who should know bet-
ter become infected cells carrying the disease, rather than
healthy antibodies fighting the invader.
Some lines of George Meredith say it all:
In tragic life, God wot.
No villain need be. Passions spin the plot:
We are betrayed by what is false within.
I know the alibis, being extremely gifted in the less than
noble art of rationalization. I am robbed, say, by a pick-
pocket. At some future date, I acquire some clout over the
pickpocket. Is it not proper that I retrieve all or some of
what rightly is mine? Similarly, is it not right that I join in
the scramble to the government trough, retrieving what has
been taken from me, at least in part? But the analogy is
flawed. We are not retrieving from the pickpocket what is
ours; we are rather sending him out to pick other pockets —
including those of our children and our children's chil-
dren— and sharing in the loot. We are partners in crime, not
victims enjoying a measure of restitution.
I am not referring to forms of involvement in a less than
ideal system that cannot be avoided. In my nation, the only
way I can opt out of a socialized medical system is to seek
out some ex-doctor, struck off the lists, and negotiate an
undisclosed cash payment; and frankly I'm not prepared to
entrust my physical well-being to some probably incompe-
tent rogue. I go to the ballet, even though I know that
money coercively extracted from football fans and movie
buffs (for the most part less affluent than am I), is subsidiz-
ing my extravagant tastes. Total disengagement with a less
than ideal system is acquired only by opting out, and, with
The Disease from Which Civilizations Die / 301
like-minded souls, seeking a deserted island on which to
set up a Utopia— but such islands are few and the pioneer-
ing spirit is not, alas, mine.
I am, however, referring to an involvement we could
avoid if we were willing to pay the price. Many of those who
state that they value liberty, and a politico-economic system
informed by liberty, tolerate in themselves a measure of
involvement with statist structures that is not necessary,
and which makes their professed values ring hollow. In this
sense we are, in Meredith's words, betrayed by "what is
false within," becoming carriers of the disease from which
civilizations die.
Conclusion
No person with eyes to see, and certainly no person
with eyes alert to the symptoms detailed by Thucydides of
the disease from which civilizations die, can entertain the
fantasy that all is well with our civilization. Yet 1 am utterly
convinced that our situation is far from hopeless, and that
the "disease" can be curbed and conquered.
I believe the American inheritance is the greatest inheri-
tance ever given to any nation: "A new nation, conceived in
liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are cre-
ated equal." In this land the dream of the ages was earthed,
and became the very foundation upon which a people
began to build. The revolution that gave you birth was
unique. Other revolutions ended in terror or Napoleonic
empire. Your revolution challenged at its beginning, and
has challenged ever since, all dominations and tyrannies,
all prejudices and bigotries, all predatory institutions
enslaving and debasing the free spirit of humanity. Your
revolution enshrined and still enshrines the cry that people
302 / John K. Williams
are not chattels, not pawns on a planner's chessboard, not
divided by "nature" into lords and serfs. It is therefore sac-
rilege to enslave them, infamous to engineer them, criminal
to degrade them and seek to smother the liberty that bums
in their being.
And that is your strength. For the liberty upon which
this nation was and is built is not merely a value created by
or equal to a taste some of us happen to have acquired. It is
grounded in the very nature of human reality. In the absence
of private property rights, the absence of changing relative
money prices in a market economy — in the absence, to put it
bluntly, of economic and individual liberty — a community
literally cannot use what it has to acquire what it wants, and
the hungry will not be fed, the naked will not be clothed, the
destitute will not be sheltered.
More, there is in the human spirit a yearning that can
never utterly be silenced, a yearning for freedom to formu-
late one's own vision of the "good life" and seek to realize
that vision. I know that there is another voice and another
yearning — a voice that whispers fearfully of the risks and
responsibilities freedom involves, and a yearning to be car-
ried through life. Yet the voice that says, "Stand on thy feet,
take up thy bed and walk," has the last word, for it is
stronger than the voice which, in the name of an illusory
security, lures us toward the collective grave of statism.
You and I are on the side of life. Yes, we must act as
though everything depended upon the labors of our hands,
the intensity of our thinking, the devotion of our hearts. Yet
if liberty is written into the very structure of our individual
and social being, victory in the end is sure. If only we stop
compromising; if only we as educationalists and adults do
what A. N. Whitehead said we must do, and expose our
children to the "habitual vision of greatness" by telling
The Disease from Which Civilizations Die / 303
them the story of humanity's struggle toward freedom; if
only we stop apologizing or indulging in neurotic guilt, and
stand tall at mention of the "American Way" as I have
defined and as your forefathers defined it and not as foolish
rabble-rousers define it. If only we do this the victory shall
be ours. Of course there will be setbacks. Of course there
will be disappointments. Since when has the long, slow
journey from the slavery of Egypt to the promised land of
freedom been other than through a wilderness? Yet that
"wilderness and the solitary place shall be made glad, and
the desert shall rejoice; it shall blossom abundantly and
rejoice even with joy and singing."
1. ThucydideS/ The Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (Har-
mondsworth: Penguin Books, 1954), pp. 145-146.
2. Ibid., pp. 242-245.
3. Paul Johnsoa Modem Times: The World from the Twenties to the
Eighties (New York; Harper and Row, 1983).
4. Cited by J. Hemming, Individual Morality (London: Nelson, 1969),
p. 6.
5. Frederic Bastiat, "The State," trans. S. Cain, in Selected Essays on
Political Economy, George B. de Huszar, ed. (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.:
Foundation for Economic Education, 1968), p. 144.
6. Igor R. Shafarevich, The Socialist Phenomenon (New York: Harper
and Row, 1980).
7. Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980
(New York: Basic Books, 1984).
A Moral Order
Edmund A. Opitz
The Pilgrims and Puritans who settled along the north-
east coast of this country during the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries had sailed across the rugged Atlantic seek-
ing a piece of land where they might put their deepest
religious convictions into practice. They were called Dis-
senters or Separatists; they were estranged from the doc-
trines and practices of the government church of the nation
from which they fled. For their faith they had suffered
various hardships and some persecution. Alexis de
Tocqueville, writing of the men and women who estab-
lished Plymouth Colony observed: "... it was a purely
intellectual craving that exiled them from the comforts of
their former homes; and in facing the inevitable sufferings
of exile their object was the triumph of an idea." That idea
was conveyed by a motto that Thomas Jefferson used on his
personal seal: "Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God."
These early settlers were not peasants or serfs; they
were clergymen and teachers, farmers and men of business.
Many had degrees from Cambridge University. The late
Samuel Eliot Morison, a Harvard professor specializing in
early Massachusetts history, declared that there was a
The Reverend Mr. Opitz served on the senior staff of The Founda-
tion for Economic Education for 37 years. This essay apj:>eared as a
Foreword to a 1996 FEE publication, A Moral Basis for Liberty, by Robert
A. Sirico.
304
A Moral Order / 305
higher percentage of Ph.D/s in the Puritan population in
the 1640s than in any time since, in this country!
The "idea" referred to by Tocqueville had been spread-
ing in England even before the Reformation; it bears
directly upon the English people having, for the first time,
the Bible in their own tongue. The idea of a new common-
wealth, fired by reading in the Old Testament of "the
people of the covenant," launched in America what
Tocqueville described as "a democracy more perfect than
antiquity had dared dream of." John Cotton, who has been
rightly called the patriarch of New England, served as min-
ister of The First Church of Boston from 1633 until his death
in 1653. Cotton Mather wrote that John Cotton "pro-
pounded to them an endeavor after a theocracy, as near as
might be, to that which was the glory of Israel, the 'peculiar
people/ "
The Puritan regime, taken by itself, might seem to us a
pretty rigorous affair. But these people were in what might
be termed a fortress-under-siege situation. The first order
of business was survival under conditions more primitive
than they had experienced in England. Most survived,
more people arrived from abroad. They had an educated
ministry in every town; they were readers; they had regular
news sheets and engaged in vigorous pamphleteering. All
towns had a large measure of self-government; they
learned about self-government by practicing it in local
town meetings. And there were, in the pulpits of the time,
vigorous and articulate spokesmen for liberty. Here, for
instance, is Reverend Daniel Shute of the Second Parish in
Hingham, in 1759: "Life, Liberty, and Property are the gifts
of the Creator." And again: "Mankind has no right volun-
tarily to give up to others those natural privileges, essential
to their happiness, with which they are invested by the
306 / Edmund A. Opitz
Lord of all; for the improvement of these they are account-
able to Him." (I had the privilege of serving in Dr. Shute's
pulpit two centuries later.)
The difficulties and dangers of travel in early New Eng-
land forced each village to generate its own resources. The
colonists hunted and fished, grew their own food, and
traded with the Indians. Early on the Pilgrims practiced
communal farming, putting all crops into a common ware-
house from which all shared. But if every member of a com-
munity gets an equal share from unequal productivity it is
inevitable that production will slow down. This happened
in Plymouth, and the rules were changed. Under the new
order each family worked its own plot of land and worked
harder knowing that what they produced belonged to
them, and would not be turned over to nonproducers or
inefficient workers. As a result the general level of pros-
perity rose.
The local churches in New England shared the same
creed and were perforce independent of one another; there
was no ecclesiastical body to supervise them. A small group
of ministers met in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1648 and
drew up a document that came to be labeled The Cam-
bridge Platform, affirming that the exigencies of the New
England situation at the time dictated that each local
church must take charge of its own affairs. This polity was
called "congregational," and the churches which practiced
it were Congregational Churches. This denomination
played an important role in American history, not only in
New England but in other parts of the continent as the West
was settled.
The early settlers on these shores, whom we've dis-
cussed briefly, did not improvise or invent the ideas they
brought with them. These people were the heirs of sixteen
A Moral Order / 307
centuries of cultural, intellectual, and spiritual develop-
ment of one of the world's great civilizations: the culture
called European Civilization, or Christendom. There are
several other great civilizations, of course, and it is not to
disparage them to say that we are the heirs of Western Civ-
ilization, which is in some ways unique. It is, in the first
place, our civilization, and American Civilization was
launched from it as a base.
By the fourth quarter of the eighteenth century there
were thirteen colonies. The population was approximately
3,000,000. They were a literate people, knowledgeable in
history and apt to quote from Cicero and other Romans; not
fond of Plato with his Utopia and its "guardians." They
were industrious: farmers, merchants, craftsmen, teachers,
writers. Paraphrasing Sir Francis Bacon, they acted on the
premise that we work for two reasons: for the glory of God,
and for the improvement of Man's estate. A job was a call-
ing. Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations came out in two vol-
umes in 1776 and hundreds of copies were sold in the
colonies. And no wonder; Smith gave his readers a ratio-
nale for what they were already doing. And he was a free
trader, which the British were not; the British interfered
with trade and treated the colonists as if their main purpose
was to give King George some extra income.
The nations of Europe had national churches operating
under government funding and control. The colonists had
been working toward the idea that churches should be free
and independent, and eventually— with the Constitution—
the idea became fact. Their way of life demonstrated that
the town did not need a government to tell the people what
to do; the Bible told them what to do, and what not to do.
The Commandments forbade murder, theft, false witness,
adultery: The Law is needed to deter those who might wan-
308 / Edmund A. Opitz
tonly kill a human being, and to punish the culprit who has
taken another's life. Private property is a sacred trust; the
thief who steals what belongs to another, or the arsonist
who bums his home, deserves punishment. False witness
may be slander or libel; more importantly it is breach of
contract, which is to go back on one's word. "Life, Liberty,
and Property" was the popular slogan.
These rules and others come to us in our Bible as the Ten
Commandments. And they are also graven into the very
nature of things in terms of the way this universe works;
general obedience to these Commandments is necessary if
we are to have a society, and some society is our natural
environment. Only within some society is the full potential
of our nature realized.
Imagine a town with a population of 10,000. Two of its
inhabitants are dimwitted and spaced out from time to
time. They find life pretty dull. They watch lurid videos
and read weird magazines and decide to become satanists,
just the two of them. The town soon learns that it has a cou-
ple of "serial killers" in its midst. The town panics after
three bodies are found on three successive days. The police
are pressured to get tough; gun shops are sold out; houses
are double-bolted, alarm systems installed; armed vigilante
groups form spontaneously. Suspicions are rife. The town
has ceased being a civic organization and turns into an
armed camp — all because a tiny fraction of one percent of
its population has turned to murder. We have here a cause-
and-effect sequence as convincing as a lab test: this uni-
verse has a moral order as an integral part of its natural
order, simply awaiting discovery by wise men and seers,
and its practice by the rest of us.
The moral order is the Natural Law, an important con-
cept rooted in Greek and Roman thought, and part of the
A Moral Order / 309
intellectual equipment of European thinkers until recent
times. It was a central element in the legal philosophy of
our Founding Fathers. It was also referred to as the Higher
Law, and as such is part of the title of Edwin Corwin's
important little book of some sixty years ago. The ''Higher
Law" Background of American Constitutional Theory. Positive
Law, in contrast to the Natural Law, is the kind of law
enacted by legislators, or decreed by commissions. The
Natural Law is discovered; a positive law is good law if it
accords with the Natural Law; bad law if it runs counter to
the Natural Law.
The Founding Fathers appealed to Natural Law argu-
ment in their attacks on restrictive legislation that impaired
their rightful liberties. Jefferson declared that God had
made the mind of man free, implying that any interference
with men's peaceable actions, or any subordination of one
man to another is bad law; it violates the fundamental
intent of Nature and Nature's God.
Thus they conceived the idea of a separation of powers
in government — Executive, Legislative, and Judicial — plus
a retention of certain prerogatives in the several states. This
was the purpose of the remarkable group of men who met
to forge an instrumentality of government in conformity
with the Natural Law, based on the widely held conviction
that God is the Author of Liberty. In short, our political lib-
erties were not born in a vacuum; they emerged among a
people who believed in their unique destiny under God —
the God whose nature, works, and demands they gleaned
from the Old and New Testaments. The eighteenth-century
New England clergymen were learned men and often
spoke along these lines. Many sermons made their way into
print and Liberty Press has favored us with a mammoth
one-volume collection of them. Such messages contributed
310 / Edmund A. Opitz
much to the mental climate of the time, which Jefferson and
his committee drew upon to compose the immortal words
that give our Declaration of Independence its enduring
influence.
The Declaration is the first of the documents upon
which this nation was founded, the others being the Arti-
cles of Confederation, the Constitution, and the Northwest
Ordinance.
Let's examine the opening words of the Declaration:
''We hold these truths to be self-evident. . . ." The Declara-
tion did not say that "these truths are self-evident," or that
all men hold them to be such. This is not true. Were it possi-
ble for us to cross-examine the "We" who offered the Dec-
laration, they might explain that "We" are speaking, first,
for those of us here gathered; and second, for the generality
of our fellows whom we judge to share our view as deter-
mined by the clergy they admire, the pamphlets they write
and circulate, the Committees of Correspondence, and the
documents emanating from the legislators of the thirteen
colonies. "We" are the end result of long exposure to the
Bible, which teaches us that we are created beings and not
the accidental end result of a chance encounter of atoms;
and that we belong on this planet, earth, which was created
to teach us what we need to know in order to grow, train
our characters, and become the mature men and women we
have it in us to be. God has given us reason and free will,
which we often misuse so as to cause a breach between God
and ourselves, and for our sins Christ died on the cross —
not just for some of us but for all of us. It is in this sense that
"all men are created equal," male and female, master and
bondsman. They are unequal and different in other
respects, as common observation convinces us. Richard
Rumbold, convicted in England because of his beliefs.
A Moral Order / 311
ascended the scaffold in 1685 and uttered these immortal
words: "none comes into the world with a saddle on his
back; neither does one come booted and spurred to ride
him." Jefferson quoted these words in one of his letters; it's
a fair surmise that they had an effect on his own thinking
and writing.
A group of extraordinary men assembled in Philadel-
phia and gave us a Constitution. In 1789, after much
debate, it was accepted by the required number of states
and the United States of America took its place among the
nations of the world.
While the Constitution was being debated and argued
out, 1787-1789, three very able public men who were also
philosophers — ^James Madison, John Jay, and Alexander
Hamilton — presented the case for adoption in the public
press, 85 essays in all. The essays were gathered in book
form as The Federalist (or sometimes The Federalist Papers),
which has long assumed its place as a major work of politi-
cal philosophy, certainly the finest exposition of the nature
and requirements of a republican form of government. It is
an indispensable treatise and rationale for the governmen-
tal structures essential to equal freedom in a civilized social
order, as envisioned by the men we refer to as the Founding
Fathers. My suspicion is that in today's colleges few politi-
cal science majors are exposed to it.
The Declaration opens with a theological statement,
asserting that our rights are Creator-endowed. This plants
the idea of a political order rooted in the Transcendent,
designed to maximize individual liberty in society, and
incorporating the great "Thou Shalt Nots" of the Ten Com-
mandments. The citizens were already earning their daily
bread by working along free-market economy lines even
before they discovered The Wealth of Nations. Thus our
312 / Edmund A. Opitz
threefold society: religious-moral; legal-political; and eco-
nomic-commercial. These three sectors interact and mutu-
ally implicate one another, supporting one another as well.
People tend to act out their beliefs, and our characters
are shaped by our deepest and most firmly held convic-
tions. As we believe, so will we become; and as we are so
will our societies be. The religious, moral, and political con-
victions of our late eighteenth-century forebears were not
improvised on the spot; they were supported by eighteen
centuries of Western experience in religious, ethical, and
political matters. History has its ups and downs, its gigan-
tic swings, and some historians find major changes about
every five hundred years from the beginning of the Christ-
ian era. The modem age might find its pivotal point at the
time of the Renaissance, Reformation, and Counter Refor-
mation. Christendom was sharply divided; minor sects
proliferated. It was a time of exploration; the West came to
realize that there were other civilizations, far more ancient
than Christendom, with religions of their own, including
sacred scriptures. A few Western philosophers began to
realize that there is no reason why the God they believed in,
the God of the Bible, should limit his attention to one nar-
row part of the world, and a relative newcomer at that, on
the world scene. Well, we do have something to learn from
Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism, as well as from Taoism
and Confucianism. And they have a lot to learn from us.
But that's another story.
Most of us do not create the ideas and assumptions
which guide our everyday actions; we borrow from
thinkers of the past whose names we may not know. Joseph
Wood Krutch taught at Columbia University and was a
well-known drama critic with the mind of a philosopher.
Here's his thumbnail description of how the modem mind
A Moral Order / 313
was formed, the assumptions we habitually act upon: ''The
fundamental answers which we have on the whole made,
and which we continue to accept, were first given in the
seventeenth century by Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes,
and Rene Descartes, and were later elaborated by Marx and
the Darwinians." He lists these items in chronological
order:
1. The most important task to which the human
mind may devote itself is the "control of nature"
through technology. Knowledge is power. (Bacon,
1561-1626)
2. Man may be completely understood if he is
considered to be an animal, making predictable reac-
tions to that desire for pleasure and power to which
all his other desires may, by analysis, be reduced.
(Hobbes, 1588-1679)
3. All animals, man excepted, are pure machines.
(Descartes, 1596-1650)
4. Man, Descartes notwithstanding, is also an
animal and therefore also a machine. (Darwin,
1809-1882)
5. The human condition is not determined by
philosophy, religion, or moral ideas because all of
these are actually only by-products of social and
technological developments which take place inde-
pendent of man's will and uninfluenced by the "ide-
ologies" they generate. (Marx, 1818-1883)
These observations are tendentious, of course. But there
does seem to be a warped streak in the philosophies of the
past four or five centuries as they wander away from com-
mon sense. An observation from University of Glasgow
314 / Edmund A. Opitz
professor C. A. Campbell seems pertinent: "As history i
amply testifies, it is from powerful, original and ingenious
thinkers that the queerest aberrations of philosophic theory
often emanate. Indeed it may be said to require a thinker
exceptionally endowed in these respects if the more para-
doxical type of theory is to be expounded in a way which
will make it seem tenable even to its authors — let alone to
the general public."
Some modem philosophers seem to have given up on
man, and even distrust their own reason. Here is the bril-
liant Bertrand Russell, for example, from his celebrated i
essay entitled Free Man's Worship. "Man," he writes, "is the
product of causes which had no prevision of the end they
were achieving; his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears,
his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental
collocations of atoms." Russell has just stated one of his
beliefs which, on his own showing, is the result of an acci-
dental coming together of some atoms, to which the cate-
gories true and false do not apply. He continues: "Brief and
powerless is man's life; on him and all his race the slow,
sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil,
reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its
relentless way." Matter is simply inert, until the mind of
some human decides to use it to further some human pur-
pose. Omnipotent, indeed! To Russell's credit he does
admit that "good" is real and so is "evil." Obviously we
cannot be blind to that which is not there!
Russell has done brilliant work in mathematics, and
also in the philosophy of science. But if Man is in such a
sorry state as Russell thinks, then ordinary humans need a
keeper. Enter the humanitarian with a guillotine! Actually,
the record shows that human beings play a variety of roles,
both good and evil. We know the horrors of twentieth-cen-
A Moral Order / 315
tury totalitarianism and collectivism, but also the glories of
Periclean Athens, Florence at its peak, Elizabethan Eng-
land, the late eighteenth-century colonists who laid down
the political structures of a free society. Nearly every person
has untapped skills and strengths, drawn upon only when
urgently needed. We needed them in the 1780s and 1790s,
and they gave us the legal framework for a market econ-
omy. The market operated here more freely than ever
before — or since. There were government interventions all
the way along, of course, increasing after the Civil War. But
even then the market was so open and free that, of the
thirty million immigrants who came to these shores during
the last three decades of the nineteenth century, nearly
every one got a job. Looking back we would be shocked by
some of the working conditions; but the workers compared
their present employment to the much worse situations
back in the old country. Here, at least, they could work their
way up the ladder and they were confident that their chil-
dren would fare better than they.
In aristocratic England rural poverty did not attract
much attention, but when these poor folk flocked into the
cities, poverty became a concern of many well-intentioned
folk. We know something of the slum scene in mid-eigh-
teenth-century London as depicted in William Hogarth's
drawings. Things were not much better a hundred and fifty
years later, according to Jack London, who spent some time
exploring slum life in London and wrote up his findings in
his People of the Abyss. There's something of a novelist's
embellishments in the book but there's no doubt that many
men, women, and children lived miserably What is the
cause of poverty, and the remedy?
A poor society is one saddled with low productivity
and low productivity means a low ratio of capital to labor.
316 / Edmund A. Opitz
i.e., few tools and little machinery. Poverty has been the fate
of most people who've ever lived on this globe. We began
to move in the direction of prosperity when people in our |
section of the planet began to till their own plots of land
and then enjoy the full fruits of their labor. Human ingenu-
ity was turned loose, resulting in more and better tools pro-
vided by increasingly skilled workers in various crafts. The
concept of private property was redefined and people
began to trade more freely.
A few men had speculated about economics before
Adam Smith, but he made of it a new science, inspiring
scholars for the next two centuries. We now know how to
create the conditions for optimum economic well-being. It
is now possible to have a free and prosperous common-
wealth. First, operate within the political order envisioned
by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution;
this gives us the Rule of Law — one law for all persons alike
because we are one in our essential humanness. Secondly,
put into practice the truths of economics gleaned from the
classic treatises from Adam Smith to Ludwig von Mises,
and other scholars of today. Third, there is the moral factor.
We have in our time suffered from loss of touch with the
transcendent aspect of human experience, although we are
intimately involved with it, in the case of our own minds.
The mind transcends the body, but they interact with one
another. The mind-body problem is as ancient as philoso-
phy. We know that they interact although how they interact
is something of a puzzle. The body is an object in space and
time, compounded of the common chemicals found in the
earth's crust. The body can be weighed and measured; it
can be looked at and touched. But the mind has no such
characteristics. It is immaterial but it can affect the material
A Moral Order / 317
body, guide its actions, generate certain illnesses, or
enhance its wellness.
Your mind transcends your body, and yet is also acting
in it and with it. Analogously, it might be suggested that
God, conceived as Spirit, transcends this universe and yet is
immanent within it. This is a mystery, of course, but hardly
more of a mystery than how your mind interacts with your
body. From this perspective the idea of the Natural Law or
the moral order as a real part of this mysterious universe
falls into place.
But a new religion emerged in the West during the nine-
teenth century to challenge Christianity: socialism. This is a
pseudo-religion, really, but during the first several decades
of the nineteenth century it aroused a moral fervor compa-
rable to that of the early Christians. In 1848 a movement
was launched by two Church of England clergymen,
Charles Kingsley and F. D. Maurice, called Christian social-
ism. Their aim was to vindicate for "the Kingdom of
Christ" its "true authority over the realms of industry and
trade," and "for socialism its true character as the great
Christian revolution of the 19th century."
The year 1848 also saw publication of The Communist
Manifesto, which referred to its socialist rival in derisive
terms: "Christian Socialism is but the holy water with
which the priest consecrates the heartburnings of the aris-
tocrat."
The movement spread in England, and into the United
States where its common name was the Social Gospel. A
popular slogan was: "Christianity is the religion of which
Socialism is the practice." Well-known theologians con-
tended that, "To be a Christian and not a Socialist, is to be
guilty of heresy!"
318 / Edmund A. Opitz
Socialists of all stripes have, from the beginning, spoken
as if they had a monopoly of all the virtues; only socialists
strive for justice in society, peace between nations, and help
for the poor. As a matter of fact, all men and women of
good will want to see other people better off; better fed,
clothed, and housed; better educated; healthier and benefit-
ing from skilled medical care; peace among the nations and
just relations within the nation.
Socialists would endorse these goals, to which they
would add a Utopian vision. But the means the socialist
employs is at odds with his goals. The socialist would
structure his society along the lines of a chain of command
all the way to the masses at the bottom. The operational
imperatives of a socialistic society cancels out the socialist
dream. No society organized socialistically has been able to
provide sufficient goods and services to raise its masses
above the poverty level; and the citizenry are not free men
and women. For a century and a half it was a religion that
dominated the lives of millions; it is now revealed as a "reli-
gion" whose god has failed. The failure of this false deity
offers us a clue: turn in the opposite direction to find the
true God and His moral order.
Not all proponents of the free-market economy, private
property order are theists, and they do have a concern for
an ethic compatible with capitalism, referring to "enlight-
ened self-interest" as the guide to right conduct. This is not
a sound theory, in my view, nor is it an accurate reading of
the ethic appropriate to a capitalist economy.
Enlightened self-interest as a moral principle has its
advocates, but it exhibits some logical difficulties. The term
has no referent, or else it has as many referents as there are
selves. And each self's interest may differ from day to day.
Continuity is lacking because no enduring principle can be
A Moral Order / 319
deduced from any multiple of private inclinations. Further-
more, if a person is urged to pursue his own interest he can-
not be denied the right to decide what that interest is. For, if
A is allowed to decide for B what B's self-interest is then B
will be acting out A's interest and not his own! There's no
norm or standard transcending both A and B by which we
might be able to determine who might be right and who
wrong.
So, "Do your own thing" is the rule, and the weak doing
their thing are at the mercy of the strong doing theirs. The
clever and unscrupulous doing their thing have the rest of
us at a disadvantage. If every individual merely pursues
his own interest or pursues his private advantage, it is
impossible from this starting point to arrive at any sort of a
general rule, or principle or ethical norm. Mr. B might call
something a norm or principle, but only because his self-
interest dictates that he do so. And if there are no moral
rules, why should Mr. B., having been told to pursue self-
interest, refrain from fraud or theft or aggression when his
self-interested calculation of costs and benefits determines
that the benefits accruing to him outweigh the costs. When
all is said and done, there is no substitute for the time-
tested code built into the nature of things, whose mandates
form the necessary foundation of a good society: Don't
murder; Don't steal; Don't assault; Keep your word; Fulfill
your contracts.
Furthermore, the self-interest ethic does not represent
an accurate rendering of the capitalist ethos, although most
defenders of capitalism have adopted it. In the market
economy the consumer's needs, wants, and desires are sov-
ereign; entrepreneurs wishing to maximize profits obedi-
ently accept the dictates of the market. No one is forced to
become an entrepreneur, but if he does assume that role he
320 / Edmund A. Opitz
must subordinate his own desires to the demands of his
customers.
Let Ludwig von Mises show just how much self-abne-
gation the entrepreneur must practice. "In the market soci-
ety," he writes, "the proprietors of capital and land can
enjoy their property only by employing it for the satisfac-
tion of other people's wants. They must serve the con-
sumers in order to have any advantage from what is their
own. The very fact that they own means of production
forces them to submit to the wishes of the public. Owner-
ship is an asset only for those who know how to employ it
in the best possible way for the benefit of the consumers. It
is a social function" (Human Action, p. 684).
Mises also said: "For in an unhampered market society
the consumers daily decide anew who should own and
how much he should own. The consumers allot control of
the means of production to those who know how to use
them best for the satisfaction of the most urgent wants of
the consumers. . . . [The owners] are mandataries of the
consumers, bound by the operation of the market to serve
the consumers best" (p. 683).
Such is the free-market extension of the Good Samaritan
Ethic; to which one can only say Amen!
Freedom and Majority Rule
Edmund A. Opitz
The publisher of the London Times came to this country
a few years after the First World War. A banquet in his
honor was held in New York City, and at the appropriate
time Lord Northcliffe rose to his feet to propose a toast. Pro-
hibition was in effect, you will recall, and the beverage cus-
tomarily drunk by Northcliffe in his homeland was not
available here. So Northcliffe raised his glass of water and
said: "Here's to America, where you do as you please. And
if you don't, they make you!"
Here, in this land of the free, "we" as voters had
amended the Constitution to punish conduct which
"we" — as consumers — had been enjoying. If you point out
that the Eighteenth Amendment had been inserted into the
Constitution by majority vote, and that therefore "we" had
done it to "ourselves," you need to be reminded that the
"we" who did it were not the same people as the "our-
selves" to whom it was done!
The Eighteenth Amendment was annulled in 1933.
Shortly thereafter another prohibition law was passed, this
one a prohibition against owning gold. Under the earlier
dispensation you could walk down the street with a pock-
etful of gold coins without breaking the law; but if you
were caught carrying a bottle of whiskey you might be
arrested. Then the rules were changed, and you could carry
This essay appeared in the January 1977 issue of The Freeman.
321
322 / Edmund A. Opitz
all the whiskey you wanted, but if you had any gold in your
pocket you could be thrown in jail!
Our scientists are exploring outer space looking for
intelligent life on other planets. I hope they find some,
because there's none to spare on planet earth! With how lit-
tle wisdom do we organize our lives, especially in the areas
of government and the economy!
The fundamental issue in political philosophy is the
limitation of governmental power; it is to determine the
role of law, the functions appropriate to the political agency.
The basic question may be phrased in a variety of ways:
What things belong in the public domain? What things are
private? What tasks should be assigned to Washington or
some lesser governmental agency, and in what sectors of
life should people be free to pursue their own goals? When
should legal coercion be used to force a person to do some-
thing against his will? In view of government's nature,
what is its competence? What are the criteria which enable
us to distinguish a just law from an unjust law?
These are questions we cannot avoid. It is true that we
don't have to debate them, or even think about them; but
we cannot help acting on them. Some theory about govern-
ment is the hidden premise of all political action, and we'll
improve our action only as we refine our theory.
What Functions Are Appropriate?
In the light of government's nature, what functions may
we appropriately assign to it? This is the question, and
there are two ways to approach it. The approach favored
today is to count noses — find out what a majority of the
people want from government, and then elect politicians
who will give it to them! And believe me, they've been giv-
Freedom and Majority Rule / 323
ing it to us! The party that wins an election is "swept into
office on a ground swell of public opinion/' as popular
mythology has it; and of course the winners have "a man-
date from the people." That's spelled Peepul
I do not accept this approach to political philosophy,
and will offer some reasons for rejecting it. Neither did our
forebears accept this approach. Every political thinker in
the West from Plato down to modem times has taken a dif-
ferent tack. Now the mere fact that something is enshrined
by tradition is no reason for accepting it; we accept some-
thing because we believe it to be true. But anything which
is both tried and true has a lot going for it. Let me try to
sketch briefly the way our forebears went about the intel-
lectual and moral problem of trying to figure out what gov-
ernment should do, and how we determine whether or not
a law is just.
The backbone of any legal system is a set of prohibi-
tions. The law forbids certain actions and punishes those
who do them anyway. The solid core of any legal system
therefore, is the moral code, which, in our culture is con-
veyed to us by the Mosaic Law. The Sixth Commandment
of The Decalogue says: "Thou shalt not commit murder"
and this moral imperative is built into every statute which
prescribes punishment for homicide. The Eighth Com-
mandment forbids stealing, and this moral norm gives rise
to laws punishing theft.
There is a moral law against murder because each
human life is precious; and there is a moral law against
theft because rightful property is an extension of the per-
son. "A possession," Aristotle writes, "is an instrument for
maintaining life." Deprive a person of the right to own
property and he becomes something less than a person; he
becomes someone else's man. A man to whom we deny the
324 / Edmund A. Opitz
rights of ownership must be owned by someone else; he
becomes another man's creature — a slave. The master-slave
relation is a violation of the rightful order of things, that is,
a violation of individual liberty and voluntary association.
The Gift of Life
Each human being has the gift of life and is charged
with the responsibility of bringing his life to completion.
He is also a steward of the earth's scarce resources, which
he must use wisely and economically. Man is a responsible
being, but no person can be held responsible for the way he
lives his life and conserves his property unless he is free.
Liberty, therefore, is a necessary corollary to life and prop-
erty. Our forebears regarded life, liberty, and property as
natural rights, and the importance of these basic rights was
stressed again and again in the oratory, the preaching, and
the writings of the eighteenth century. "Life, Liberty and
Property are the gifts of the Creator," declared the Rev-
erend Daniel Shute in 1767 from the pulpit which I occu-
pied some 200 years later. Life, liberty, and property are the
ideas of more than antiquarian interest; they are potent
ideas because they transcribe into words an important
aspect of the way things are.
Our ancestors intended to ground their legal and moral
codes on the nature of things, just as students of the natural
sciences intend their laws to be a transcription of the way
things behave. For example: physical bodies throughout
the universe attract each other, increasing with the mass of
the attracting body and diminishing with the square of the
distance. Sir Isaac Newton made some observations along
these lines and gave us the law of gravity. How come grav-
Freedom and Majority Rule / 325
itational attraction varies as the inverse-square of the dis-
tance, and not as the inverse-cube? One is as thinkable as
the other, but it just happens that the universe is prejudiced
in favor of the inverse-square in this instance; just as the
universe is prejudiced against murder, has a strong bias in
favor of property, and wills men to be free.
Immanuel Kant echoed an ancient sentiment when he
declared that two things filled him with awe: the starry
heavens without, and the moral law within. The precision
and order in nature manifest the Author of nature. The Cre-
ator is also the Author of our being and requires certain
duties of us, his creatures. There is, thus, an outer reality
joined to the reality within, and this twofold reality has an
intelligible pattern, a coherent structure.
This dual arrangement is not made by human hands;
it's unchangeable, it's not affected by our wishes, and it
can't be tampered with. It can, however, be misinter-
preted, and it can be disobeyed. We consult certain por-
tions of this pattern and draw up blueprints for building a
bridge. If we misinterpret, the bridge collapses. And a
society disintegrates if its members disobey the configura-
tion laid down in the nature of things for our guidance.
This configuration is the moral order, as interpreted by
reason and tradition.
We're in fairly deep water here, and this is as far into
theology as I shall venture. The point, simply put, is that
our forebears, when they wanted to get some clues for the
regulating of their private and public lives, sought for
answers in a reality beyond society. They believed in a
sacred order which transcends the world, an order of cre-
ation, and believed that our duties within society reflect the
mandates of this divine order.
326 / Edmund A. Opitz
Take a Poll
This view of one's duty is quite in contrast to the
method currently popular for detennining what we should
do; which is to conduct an opinion poll. Find out what the
crowd wants, and then say "Me too!" This is what the
advice of certain political scientists boils down to. Here is
Professor James MacGregor Bums, a certified liberal and
the author of several highly touted books, such as The Dead-
lock of Democracy and a biography of John F. Kennedy. Lib-
erals play what Bums calls "the numbers game." "As a lib-
eral I believe in majority rule," he writes. "I believe that the
great decisions should be made by numbers." In other
words, don't think; count! "What does a majority have a
right to do?" he asks. And he answers his own question. "A
majority has the right to do anything in the economic and
social arena that is relevant to our national problems and
national purposes." And then, realizing the enormity of
what he has just said, he backs off: "... except to change the
basic rules of the game."
Bums' final disclaimer sounds much like cin after-
thought, for some of his liberal cohorts support the idea of
unqualified majority rule. The late Herman Finer, in his
anti-Hayek book entitled Road to Reaction, declares "For in a
democracy, right is what the majority makes it to be"
(p. 60). What we have here is an updating of the ancient
"might makes right" doctrine. The majority does have
more muscle than the minority, it has the power to carry out
its will, and thus it is entitled to have its own way. If right is
whatever the majority says it is, then whatever the majority
does is O.K., by definition. Farewell, then, to individual
rights, and farewell to the rights of the minorities; the
Freedom and Majority Rule / 327
majority is the group that has made it to the top, and the
name of the game is winner take all.
The dictionary definition of a majority is 50 percent plus
1. But if you were to draw up an equation to diagram mod-
em majoritarianism it would read:
50 percent + 1 = 100 percent;
50 percent - 1 = ZERO!
Amusing confirmation comes from a professor at Rut-
gers University, writing a letter to the Times. Several years
ago considerable criticism was generated by the appoint-
ment of a certain man to a position in the national govern-
ment. Such criticism is unwarranted, writes our political
scientist, because the critics comprise "a public which, by
virtue of having lost the last election, has no business
approving or disapproving appointments by those who
won." This is a modem version of the old adage, "To the
victor belong the spoils." This Rutgers professor goes on to
say, "Contrary to President Lincoln's famous but mislead-
ing phrase, ours is not a government by the people, but
government by government." So there!
The Nature of Government
What functions may we appropriately assign to the
political agency? What should government do? Today's
answer is that government should do whatever a majority
wants a government to do; find out what the Peepul want
from government, and then give it to them. The older and
tmer answer is based upon the belief that the rules for liv-
ing together in society may be discovered if we think hard
328 / Edmund A. Opitz
and clearly about the matter, and the corollary that we can
conform our lives to these rules if we resolve to do so. But I
have said nothing so far about the nature or essence of gov-
ernment.
Americans are justly proud of our nation, but this pride
sometimes blinds us to reality. How often have you heard
someone declare, "In America, 'We' are the government."
This assertion is demonstrably untrue; "We" are the society,
all 215 million of us; but society and government are not at
all the same entity. Society is all-of-us, whereas government
is only some-of-us. The some-of-us who comprise govern-
ment would begin with the president, vice president, and
cabinet; it would include Congress and the bureaucracy; it
would descend through governors, mayors and lesser offi-
cials, down to sheriffs and the cop on the beat.
A Unique Institution
Government is unique among the institutions of society,
in that society has bestowed upon this one agency exclusive
legal control over the weaponry, from clubs to hydrogen
bombs. Governments do use persuasion, and they do rely
on authority, legitimacy, and tradition — but so do other
institutions like the church and the school. But only one
agency has the power to tax, the authority to operate the
system of courts and jails, and a warrant for mobilizing the
machinery for making war; that is government, the power
structure. Governmental action is what it is, no matter what
sanction might be offered to justify what it does. Govern-
ment always acts with power; in the last resort government
uses force to back up its decrees.
Freedom and Majority Rule / 329
Society^s Power Structure
When I remind you that the government of a society is
that society's power structure, I am not offering you a novel
theory, nor a fanciful political notion of my own. It is a tru-
ism that government is society's legal agency of compul-
sion. Virtually every statesman and every political scien-
tist— whether Left or Right — takes this for granted and
does his theorizing from this as a base. "Government is not
reason, it is not eloquence;" wrote George Washington, "it
is force." Bertrand Russell, in a 1916 book, said, "The
essence of the State is that it is the repository of the collec-
tive force of its citizens." Ten years later, the Columbia Uni-
versity professor, R. M. Maclver spoke of the state as "the
authority which alone has compulsive power." The English
writer, Alfred Cobban, says that "the essence of the state,
and of all political organizations, is power."
But why labor the obvious except for the fact that so
many of our contemporaries — those who say "we are the
government" — overlook it? What we are talking about is
the power of man over man; government is the legal autho-
rization which permits some men to use force on others.
When we advocate a law to accomplish a certain goal, we
advertise our inability to persuade people to act in the man-
ner we recommend; so we're going to force them to con-
form! As Sargent Shriver once put it, "In a democracy you
don't compel people to do something unless you are sure
they won't do it."
In the liberal mythology of this century, government is
all things to all men. Liberals think that government
assumes whatever characteristics people wish upon it—
330 / Edmund A. Opitz
like Proteus in Greek mythology who took on one shape
after another, depending on the circumstances. But govern-
ment is not an all-purpose tool; it has a specific nature, and
its nature determines what government can accomplish.
When properly limited, government serves a social end no
other agency can achieve; its use of force is constructive.
The alternatives here are law and tyranny — as the Greeks
put it. This is how the playwright Aeschylus, saw it in The
Eumenides: "Let no man live uncurbed by law, nor curbed
by tyranny."
The Moral Code
If government is to serve a moral end it must not violate
the moral code. The moral code tells us that human life is
sacred, that liberty is precious, and that ownership of pro-
perty is good. And by the same token, this moral code sup-
plies a definition of criminal action; murder is a crime, theft
is a crime, and it is criminal to abridge any f)erson's lawful
freedom. It becomes a function of the law, then, in harmony
with the moral code, to use force against criminal actions in
order that peaceful citizens may go about their business.
The use of legal force against criminals for the protection of
the innocent is the earmark of a prop)erly limited govern-
ment.
This is an utterly different kind of procedure than the
use of government force on peaceful citizens — whatever
the excuse or rationalization. People should not be forced
into conformity with any social blueprint; their private
plans should not be overridden in the interests of some
national plan or social goal. Government — the public
power — should not be used for private advantage; it
Freedom and Majority Rule / 331
should not be used to protect people from themselves.
Well, what should the law do to peaceful, mnocent citi-
zens? It should let them alone! When government lets John
Doe alone, and punishes anyone who refuses to let him
alone, then John Doe is a free man.
In this country we have a republican form of govern-
ment. The word "republic" is from the Latin words, res and
publica, meaning the things or affairs which are common to
all of us, the affairs which are in the public domain, in sharp
contrast to matters which are private. Government, then, is
"the public thing," and this strong emphasis on public
serves to delimit and set boundaries to governmental
power, in the interest of preserving the integrity of the pri-
vate domain.
What's in a name?, you might be thinking. Well, in this
case, in the case of republic, a lot. The word "republic"
encapsulates a political philosophy; it connotes the philos-
ophy of government which would limit government to
the defense of life, liberty, and property in order to serve
the ends of justice. There's no such connotation in the
word "monarchy," for example; or in aristocracy or oli-
garchy.
A monarch is the sole, supreme ruler of a country, and
there is theoretically no area in the life of his citizens over
which he may not hold sway. The king owns the country
and his people belong to him. Monarchical practice pretty
well coincided with theory in what is called "Oriental
Despotism," but in Christendom the power of the kings
was limited by the nobility on the one hand, and the
Emperor on the other; and all secular rulers had to take
account of the power of the Papacy. Power was played off
against power, to the advantage of the populace.
332 / Edmund A. Opitz
Individual Liberty
The most important social value in Western civilization
is individual liberty. The human person is looked upon as
God's creature, gifted with free will which endows him with
the capacity to choose what he will make of his life. Our
inner, spiritual freedom must be matched by an outer and
social liberty if man is to fulfill his duty toward his Maker.
Creatures of the state cannot achieve their destiny as human
beings; therefore, government must be limited to securing
and preserving freedom of personal action, within the rules
for maximizing liberty and opportunity for everyone.
Unless we are persuaded of the importance of freedom
to the individual, it is obvious that we will not structure
government around him to protect his private domain and
secure his rights. The idea of individual liberty is old, but it
was given a tremendous boost in the sixteenth century by
the Reformation and the Renaissance.
The earliest manifestation of this renewed idea of lib-
erty was in the area of religion, issuing in the conviction
that a person should be allowed to worship God in his own
way This religious ferment in England gave us Puritanism,
and early in the seventeenth century Puritanism projected a
political movement whose members were contemptuously
called Whiggamores — later shortened to Whigs — a word
roughly equivalent to "cattle thieves." The king's men were
called Tories — "highway robbers." The Whigs worked for
individual liberty and progress; the Tories defended the old
order of the king, the landed aristocracy, and the estab-
lished church.
One of the great writers and thinkers in the Puritan and
Whig tradition was John Milton, who wrote his celebrated
plea for the abolition of Parliamentary censorship of printed
Freedom and Majority Rule / 333
material in 1644, Areopagitica. Many skirmishes had to be
fought before freedom of the press was finally accepted as
one of the earmarks of a free society. Free speech is a corol-
lary of press freedom, and I remind you of the statement
attributed to Voltaire: "\ disagree with everything you say,
but I will defend with my life your right to say it/'
Adam Smith extended freedom to the economic order,
with The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776 and warmly
received in the thirteen colonies. Our population numbered
about 3 million at this time; roughly one-third of these were
Loyalists, that is, Tory in outlook, and besides, there was a
war on. Despite these circumstances 2,500 sets of The Wealth
of Nations were sold in the colonies within five years of its
publication. The colonists had been practicing economic
liberty for a long time, simply because their governments
were too busy with other things to interfere — or too ineffi-
cient— and Adam Smith gave them a rationale.
The Bill of Rights
Ten amendments to the Constitution were adopted in
1791. Article the First reads: "Congress shall make no law
respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof . . ." The separation of church and state
enunciated here was a momentous first step in world his-
tory. Religious liberty, freedom of the press, free speech and
the free economy are four departments of the same liberat-
ing trend — the Whig movement.
The men we refer to as the Founding Fathers would
have called themselves Whigs. Edmund Burke was the
chief spokesman for a group in Parliament known as The
Rockingham Whigs. In 1832 the Whig Party in England
changed its name to one which more aptly described its
334 / Edmund A. Opitz
emphasis on liberty. It became the Liberal Party, standing
for free trade, religious liberty, the abolition of slavery,
extension of the franchise, and other refonns.
Classical Liberalism is not to be confused with the thing
called "liberalism" in our time! Today's "liberalism" is the
exact opposite of historical Liberalism — ^which came out of
the eighteenth-century Whiggism — which came out of the
seventeenth-century Puritanism. The labels are the same;
the realities are utterly different. Present-day liberals have
trouble with ideas, as ideas, so they try to dispose of
uncomfortable thoughts by pigeonholing them in a time
slot. The ideas of individual liberty, inherent rights, limited
government and the free economy are, they say, eighteenth-
century ideas. What a dumb comment! The proper test of
an idea is not the test of time but the test of truth!
You may be wondering why I have not yet used the
word "democracy," although I've spoken of monarchy, oli-
garchy, and liberalism. Well, I'll tell you. Our discussion has
focused on the nature of government, and we have discov-
ered that the essence of government is power, legal force.
Once this truth sinks in we take the next step, which is to
figure out what functions may appropriately be assigned to
the one social agency authorized to use force. This brings us
back to the moral code and the primary values of life, lib-
erty, and property. It is the function of the law to protect the
life, liberty, and property of all p>ersons alike in order that
the human person may achieve his proper destiny.
Voting Is Appropriate for Choosing Officeholders
There's another question to resolve, tied in with the
basic one, but much less important: How do you choose
personnel for public office? After you have employed the
Freedom and Majority Rule / 335
relevant intellectual and moral criteria and confined public
things to the public sector, leaving the major concerns of life
in the private sector . . . once you've done this there's still
the matter of choosing people for office.
One method is choice by bloodline. If your father is
king, and if you are the eldest son, why you'll be king when
the old man dies. Limited monarchy still has its advocates,
and kingship will work if a people embrace the monarchi-
cal ideology. Monarchy hasn't always worked smoothly,
however, else what would Shakespeare have done for his
plays? Sometimes your mother's lover will bump off the
old man, or your kid brother might try to poison you.
There's a better way to choose personnel for public
office; let the people vote. Confine government within the
limits dictated by reason and morals, lay down appropriate
requirements, and then let voters go to the polls. The candi-
date who gets the majority of votes gets the job. This is
democracy, and this is the right place for majority action. As
Pericles put it 2,500 years ago, democracy is where the
many participate in rule.
Voting is little more than a popularity contest, and the
most popular man is not necessarily the best man, just as
the most popular idea is not always the soundest idea. It is
obvious, then, that balloting — or counting noses or taking a
sampling of public opinion — is not the way to get at the
fundamental question of the proper role of government
within a society. We have to think hard about this one,
which means we have to assemble the evidence; weigh, sift,
and criticize it; compare notes with colleagues, and so on.
In other words, this is an educational endeavor, a matter for
the classroom, the study, the podium, the pulpit, the forum,
the press. To count noses at this point is a cop-out; there's
no place here for a Gallup Poll.
336 / Edmund A. Opitz
To summarize: The fundamental question has to do
with the scope and functions of the political agency, and
only hard thinking — education in the broad sense — can
resolve this question. The lesser question has to do with the
choice of personnel; and majority action — democratic deci-
sion— is the way to deal with it. But if we approach the first
question with the mechanics appropriate to the second, we
have confused the categories and we're in for trouble.
"Democratic Despotism"
We began to confuse the categories more than 140 years
ago, as Alexis de Tocqueville observed. His book Democracy
in America, warned us about the emergence here of what he
called "democratic despotism," which would "degrade
men without tormenting them." We were warned again in
1859 by a professor at Columbia University, Francis Lieber,
in his book On Civil Liberty and Self-Government: "Woe to the
country in which political hypocrisy first calls the people
almighty, then teaches that the voice of the people is divine,
then pretends to take a mere clamor for the true voice of the
people, and lastly gets up the desired clamor." Getting up
the desired clamor is what we call "social engineering," or
"the engineering of consent."
What is called "a majority" in contemporary politics is
almost invariably a numerical minority, whipped up by an
even smaller minority of determined and sometimes
unscrupulous men. There's not a single plank in the plat-
form of the welfare state that was put there because of a
genuine demand by a genuine majority. A welfarist govern-
ment is always up for grabs, and various factions, pressure
groups, special interests, causes, ideologies seize the levers
Freedom and Majority Rule / 337
of government in order to impose their programs on the
rest of the nation.
Let's assume that we don't like what's going on today in
this and other countries; we don't like it because people are
being violated, as well as principles. We know the govern-
ment is off the track, and we want to get it back on; but we
know in our bones that Edmund Burke was right when he
said, "There never was, for any long time ... a mean, slug-
gish, careless people that ever had a good government of
any form." Politics, in other words, reflects the character of
a people, and you cannot improve the tone of politics
except as you elevate the character of a significant number
of persons. The improvement of character is the hard task
of religion, ethics, art, and education. When we do our
work properly in these areas, our public life will automati-
cally respond.
Large numbers are not required. A small number of men
and women whose convictions are sound and clearly
thought out, who can present their philosophy persua-
sively, and who manifest their ideas by the quality of their
lives, can inspire the multitude whose ideas are too vague
to generate convictions of any sort. A little leaven raises the
entire lump of dough; a tiny flame starts a mighty confla-
gration; a small rudder turns a huge ship. And a handful of
people possessed of ideas and a dream can change a
nation — especially when that nation is searching for new
answers and a new direction.
You Can't Sell Freedom to a Starving Man
Ridgway K. Foley, Jr.
Of all the cliches denigrating liberty, the most perni-
cious consists of the comment, designed in any of its vary-
ing forms to terminate the conversation entirely, that "your
ideals and ideas may be laudable, but you can't talk liberty
to a man with an empty belly or whose children want for j
food and clothing." This essay proposes to investigate the
validity of that response.
Freedom consists of the absence of organized, coercive
restraint against individual human action.^ It is indivisible
in two respects: (1) restraint in one aspect of life affects cre-
ative action in other categories; (2) restraint of one member
of society adversely affects all other men.
Consider the first postulate. One cannot enjoy meaning-
ful liberty of association or freedom of speech while suffer- |
ing under economic or political bondage. Freedom of
speech or press offers an illusory value if the potential
speaker or writer cannot purchase air time on radio or tele-
vision, or a soap box, or newsprint from the govemmen- j
tally controlled factory, or a sound truck, either because of ^
restrictive regulatory laws preventing free entry into the
market, or by virtue of discriminatory norms against pro- \
This essay appeared in the December 1976 issue of The Freeman.
338
You Can't Sell Freedom to a Starving Man / 339
ducers by means of economic controls, or because of
debasement by means of state monopoly of the medium of
exchange. The right to vote means little if the government
apparatus counts results for but a single candidate, or if the
state limits the access to the polling booth or ballot box by
enactment and enforcement of civil and criminal penalties.
Recur to the second proposition. Simply put, my freedom
depends on yours. Deprivation of the rights of the slave
affects the master in several discrete ways.
• First, the predator must expend a portion of his cre-
ative energy in the destructive pursuit of constraining his
fief. Absent coercion, he could devote his entire energy
resources to creative endeavors. Wars provide an apt exam-
ple of squandered creativity: Witness the millions of barrels
of oil (which could have heated homes and propelled auto-
mobiles) wasted in recent violence.
• Second, looters lose the chance to thrive upon the cre-
ated value which the slave, if free, would produce and
trade for other goods, services, and ideas. The material
well-being of any society depends upon the aggregate of
creative output from each member, the proficiency of each
individual producer, and the velocity of exchange (a factor
of the voluntary channels of communication). Slaves pro-
duce only the amount necessary to maintain life in a barely
acceptable station and to avoid or reduce pain.
• Third, masters lose qualitatively, since the quality of
output diminishes with the introduction of compulsion. A
coercive society enjoys fewer goods, begrudging services
and less exciting ideas and culture than a free society.
• Fourth, and perhaps most saliently, a slave state loses
moral force as well as material largess, a subject discussed
hereafter.
We may define liberty, then, in Leonard Read's felici-
340 / Ridgway K. Foley, Jr.
tous phrase, as the absence of man-concocted restraints
upon creative human action.^ At the ideal, each man should
be entitled to manage his own life and to seek his own des-
tiny as he sees fit, so long as he observes the equal and rec-
iprocal freedom deserved by every other man. Such a con-
cept limits the role of the state — the official restraining force
imposed upon society — to prevention of aggression and
coercive settlement of disputes by rules of common justice.
The Morality of Theft
Observation of the passing scene reveals many
instances of looting and theft. One unschooled in the phi-
losophy of freedom might immediately conclude that such
a statement refers to the rapid increase in violent or deceit-
ful crimes such as forgery, robbery, burglary, obtaining
money by false pretenses, and shoplifting penalized by the
several state or national governments. In fact, I refer to the
unpenalized, officially sanctioned, state-favored instances
of theft which appear in guises too numerous to mention.
Every occasion when the state takes property from an
unwilling donor and gives it to some other individual
affords an example of legalized plunder. Food stamps, sub-
sidies to Perm Central and Lockheed Aircraft, social secu-
rity, inflation, mandatory automobile insurance, civil tort
rules which "diffuse" risks by imposing liability without
fault — the list is truly endless, limited only by the ingenuity
of men abusing power conferred upon them by the political
system. Appellations of "transfer payments," "negative
income taxation," "redistributive liability," and the like
cannot cloak the true nature of the act: Theft.
Why decry the concept of theft, if performed by the
pure of heart for a commendable purpose? After all, most
You Can't Sell Freedom to a Starving Man / 341
proponents of these many and varied legislative or judicial
enactments seek grand and deserving goals of preventing
hunger, illness, and alienation or providing "necessary"
goods and services. Few of them, despite their arrogance
and predilection to power, really exemplify consummate
evil.
The answer to the moral question lies in contemplation
of ends and means. Few men of virtue and good will dis-
pute the ideal of dispelling poverty, illness, and loneliness,
or of providing everyone with food for thought and body.
Most observers agree upon goals — they diverge upon the
means to the end. Those imbued with the freedom philoso-
phy recognize that the end pre-exists in the means,^ that
filthy means will defile innocent and praiseworthy ends.
Theft deserves disdain because it conflicts with funda-
mental morality, with the right to life, and with the precept
of justice. A seminal moral rule commands treatment of
individual human beings as ends, not as means — as per-
sons of worth, not as objects to be molded. The thief treats
the victim as a means to his own ends. The legally protected
thief performs a greater iniquity, for he refuses to acknowl-
edge the moral opprobrium necessarily attached to his
crime; he treats the victim as unworthy to manage his own
affairs.
Again, theft contradicts the concept of a human being's
right to live his life in accordance with the dictates of his
conscience. Property consists of the value which man cre-
ates by the application of his being and his talents to nat-
ural resources; it can only be viewed rationally as an exten-
sion of a life. One lives by creating; one dies by stagnating.
Thus, deprivation of property amounts to a partial taking
of human life. Moreover, the act of thievery devastates the
fundamental precept of justice: Respect for free individual
342 / Ridgway K. Foley, ]r.
choice.^ Approval of the power to forcibly or deceitfully
deprive another of a part of his life necessarily contradicts a
respect for the human right to choose between alternatives.
In essence, comprehension of the moral questions asso-
ciated with theft devolves to an inquiry: Why doesn't might
make right? Theft, after all, can only be accomplished by
the application of stealth and trickery or by employment of
personal or political force. The fact and the scale of legally
sanctioned plunder renders this inquiry no mere philoso-
pher's debating point. It is all too real and affects each of us
in striking and personal fashion.
Immanuel Kant^ provided some insight into the moral
question of whether "might makes right" when he sug-
gested the "silver rule" as a measuring rod: Individuals
should shun actions which they would not will as universal
rules of conduct. Few rational beings would voluntarily
choose to live in a world governed by force, without moral
constraint of any kind. Chaos necessarily reigns; personal
planning becomes impossible; life terminates early and
after an unpleasant duration. Such conditions would fore-
stall even rudimentary exchange or growth of capital, rele-
gating mankind to the cave and the forests from which it so
recently and hesitatingly emerged. Merely imagining a
world where theft, or rape, or murder occurred on a daily
basis without official reprisal registers shock on the minds
of most human beings. Such conduct would invite retalia-
tion in the form of blood feuds, vigilante justice or civil war.
One could refute the contention that "might makes
right" on three bases,^ any one of which would serve as suf-
ficient justification for a contrary rule.
• First, experience dispels any necessary correlation
between force and propriety. Recorded history imparts
example after example of the use of violence to accomplish
You Can't Sell Freedom to a Starving Man / 343
improper goals — propriety measured by the subjective val-
ues of those deprived of life/liberty, or property. The neigh-
borhood bully may be stronger than you, but that doesn't
mean he possesses any greater native intelligence, charm,
wit, cultural accomplishments or other attributes more or
less universally desirable. Indeed, the contrary is more
often true: The bully, be he individual, corporate, or
national in scope, often possesses a low, mean, and not par-
ticularly endearing character.
• Second, a related pragmatic reason flows from the
Kantian silver rule: Force and power tend to breed more
aggression, and man cannot exist as well (or at all) spiritu-
ally or materially in a chaotic world regularly visited by
coercion. Might-makes-right just plain fails to work as well
as the alternative. A better material and spiritual life with
happier men and more abundant goods and services flows
from cooperation, not coercion.
• Third, common morality, denoted as natural law, the
theory of natural rights, Christianity, rationality, or some
other similar phrase suggests that men should not treat
other men inhumanely. All three reasons interrelate, but the
third or moral concept differs from its siblings in one
important respect: It constitutes an appeal to faith rather
than provable, empirical fact. However, this feature does
not deprive the tenet of validity. History manifests a grow-
ing recognition that each individual human being pos-
sesses inalienable natural rights merely because of his
humanity, and that no other individual should trespass
upon such rights in the absence of prior personal aggres-
sion. If this precept be relegated to the status of a mere
value judgment, it certainly has gained ascendency in
recent years although it still falls far short of universal
acceptance. Since theft of private property involves the
344 / Ridgway K. Foley, Jr.
deprivation of an extension of one's life — our essential
humanity derives in part from the value we create — theft
violates the principle of common morality or natural rights.
Therefore, one can say with the confidence undergirded
by logic and natural law that theft in general constitutes an
immoral act because might does not make right and power
tends to deprive men of a portion of their life. It remains to
consider whether theft can ever be justified under any cir-
cumstances. The admonition, "you can't sell freedom to a
starving man," possesses two root assumptions denying
the universality of the normative rule that theft constitutes
immorality. If freedom varies, directly or inversely, with the
visceral satisfactions of the human being, it follows that
(1) hungry people need not abide by rules of common
morality while productive people must follow such rules
and, (2) freedom cannot provide the precondition neces-
sary to prevent want and poverty. Neither assumption can
withstand rigorous analysis.
The Universality of Moral Conduct
No accepted ethical or religious code exempts starving
men from adherence to established or accepted standards
except if that code be based upon the doctrine of might-
makes-right. The Marxian tenet "from each according to his
ability, to each according to his need" presupposes a social
agency which will forcibly compel transfer from "produc-
ers" to "needy," as well as perform the concomitant func-
tion of determining "ability" and "requirement." Every
other system dependent upon transfer payments or social
redistribution of income relies upon force. Only these sys-
tems justify the use of violence by hungry, ill-clothed, or
other "needy" folk in order to satisfy their wants. Contrast
You Can't Sell Freedom to a Starving Man / 345
the known axiological precepts handed down through his-
tory: Do the Judeo-Christian heritage, the Islamic tradition,
Hindu teachings, or the Hke differentiate between produc-
ers and consumers insofar as their normative conduct is
concerned? Merely to state the question elicits a negative
response.
One should not confuse the assertion that the poor as
well as the producer should obey the same rules with the
question of whether the creator of goods, services, and
ideas should share his abundance with others less fortunate
on an individual and voluntary basis. The two concepts,
while related, state two entirely different principles: (1) all
men regardless of status should respect the lives, liberties,
properties, choices, and subjective values of all other indi-
viduals who do not commit aggression; (2) one blessed
with a surfeit of material or spiritual goods should share
with less fortunate individuals on a mutually satisfying
voluntary basis. A violation of the first axiom deserves
human reprisal to revenge the breach, protect others simi-
larly situated, and deter like conduct. No human sanction
should attend a violation of the second axiom because no
human being possesses the right, the insight, or the ability
to enforce their ethical norm since the norm itself depends
upon subjective views of the Eternal Truth of the Universe.
Unjustifiable Intervention
In essence, the suggestion that hungry men cannot
appreciate liberty results from a confusion of these two sep-
arate postulates. Similarly most justification of government
intervention into private lives stems from a perversion of
these two distinct rules, each touching a specific aspect of
human action. The canard that an ill-fed individual cannot
346 / Ridgway K. Foley, Jr.
comprehend freedom springs from a belief that it is proper
to invade or destroy the human rights of others in order to
secure a "good" end, such as the prevention of poverty or
ill health.
In simple words, one should not destroy another's right
to choose except where that actor would not willingly select
the course of action which would lead to sharing with oth-
ers whom the party possessing power perceives as appro-
priate beneficiaries. This commingling of the two moral
precepts renders each of them nugatory. The first axiom
suffers because the exception guts the entire meaning. The
second axiom falls because voluntarism becomes coercion
and thus obviates the entire concept. A sense of wrongdo-
ing clouds the whole transaction, leaving producer-victim,
the transferring power, and poor recipient-beneficiary each
with a pervasive recognition of evil inherent in their affair
which does not accord with moral law.
In like manner, the belief that moral rules need not be
universally applied partakes of the corruption of the two
separate axioms: You can't sell freedom to a starving man
because he is first justified in invading the rights of others
in order to satisfy his wants because they ethically should
assist him.
Several reasons, each sufficient alone, support the
proposition that moral conduct applies universally.
• First, separate treatment betrays the egalitarian ideal,
the subject of so much current prattle. Yet it is in this precise
context that equality deserves meaning, for true juristic
equality means equality before the law — equal rights, equal
responsibilities.
• Second, relative morality, on whatever basis, necessar-
ily results in disillusionment, bitterness, hatred, envy, and
You Can't Sell Freedom to a Starving Man / 347
Other unlovely human attributes: In short, such a
dichotomy will bring the sinister side of human nature to
the fore. The taker will take even when the justification dis-
appears, coming to believe that taking constitutes a per-
sonal right; the victim will resent this invasion of his life
and fight back in many and myriad ways including the use
of force and cunning, the production of shoddy goods, or a
transfer to the taker class. Power and violence naturally
tend to breed similar offspring.
• Third, definition of terms renders application of the
distinction impractical if not impossible. Who shall define
"production" cmd "need" (or who "starves"), and how
shall these terms be defined? Starvation and need vary by
the minute; they represent highly subjective decisions, for
almost every individual "needs" something he does not
possess, given a world full of insatiable subjective wants
and blessed with limited resources. Acceptance of a dual
standard dependent upon hunger pangs would reduce
morality to an ephemeral and transitory discipline subject
to endless debate and a chaotic result: Victims who hon-
estly believe that they fall within the taker class will take
umbrage; they may even fight back, leading to unending
aggression.
Thus, common sense makes manifest that moral rules
must apply in an evenhanded manner. Starving men pos-
sess no right to invade the persons or property of others,
nor are they justified or exempt from ethical rules preclud-
ing such action. Freedom attaches equally to all men: It
includes the freedom to fail as well as succeed. Life's losers
cannot vent their spleen on those who are more successful,
and thereby receive moral approval.
348 / Ridgway K. Foley, Jr.
Freedom Dispels Want
One who claims that "you can't sell freedom to a starv-
ing man" really means "freedom is all right in its place, but
these people are starving and they will receive sustenance
only if I coerce you into giving them food." This proposi-
tion fails on two counts.
• First, the near-universal acceptance of the second
axiom (the obligation to share) and mankind's natural
empathy for fellow human beings in trouble virtually
guarantees that no one shall starve in a free society.
Strangely enough, the acceptance of the second axiom and
man's sympathetic response become heightened the more
open society becomes; statism and compulsion cultivate
ugliness, alienation, and a lack of camaraderie. The guaran-
tee against starvation does not insure against want of mate-
rial things; mankind will always experience unfulfilled
desires, given his nature of a being possessing insatiable
wants in a world of limited resources.
• Second, the statement seems to contend that a free
society cannot produce and distribute those goods, ser-
vices, and ideas required to alleviate starvation. The con-
verse is true. A free market, operating without restraints
upon human creative output, produces a greater abun-
dance of material value than any other method known to
mankind because the free market or voluntary exchange
system accords with the basic nature of man. The market
reflects the competing subjective values of each member of
society and thus more nearly approximates the sum of all
those desires.
This assertion of the material productiveness of the
market does not rest merely upon unproved theory; it gains
support from empirical and historical fact. The freer the
You Can't Sell Freedom to a Starving Man / 349
culture, the better clothed, fed, and housed its citizens. The
rapid improvements in the standard of living of all Ameri-
cans during the nation's first century derived from the rela-
tive freedom of the citizenry. Compare the average life span
in medieval England (5 years) v^^ith that of the present-day
United States (70 years) and one immediately perceives
that we heard relatively little about the "starving man" in
history because he died so young. Few of the wealthy in
merrie olde England lived as well as the average high
school dropout today.
Stripped to its essence, the cliche "you can't sell free-
dom to a starving man" exemplifies a brazen demand by
the one uttering the response that he be accorded the power
to impose his will upon unwilling human beings — all in the
good name of the elimination of poverty. Logic, common
sense, empirical fact, and history demonstrate that just the
contrary effect will take place, that coercion results in fewer
individuals enjoying fewer goals which they subjectively
value.
The Curse of Gradualism
One can interpret the phrase under discussion in yet
another manner. It could mean that a hungry man will not
listen to, or understand, the esoteric discussion of liberty
and will voluntarily choose an aggressive society to allevi-
ate his suffering. Thus, runs the argument, someone in
power must appease the voracious masses before educat-
ing them to the virtues of liberty.
Insofar as the question depicts a communication prob-
lem, believers in liberty must hone their tools of expression
to fit every need. Relative freedom helped restore conflict-
ravaged West Germany after the Second World War; the
350 / Ridgway K. Foley, Jr.
Germans, hungry as they were, accepted the ideas and
responsibilities of freedom from Mr. Erhard. The concept of
freedom and its relation to prosperity bear retelling because
all of us need constant reminders, but conveyance of the
idea to everyone, hungry or not, does not present difficult,
let alone insolvable, problems.
Insofar as the inquiry poses a question of consistency,
libertarians must remain steadfast against the importun-
ings of gradualism which would betray the ideal by impos-
ing coercive tactics as a means of filling stomachs "tem-
porarily"^ The "temporary" in this situation tends to
become ingrained and immutable, misleading the unknow-
ing into the assumption that coercion (1) has always been
there and (2) is necessary to accomplish the end. The result:
an inefficient and uneconomic United States Postal Service
which has never been able to compete with private enter-
prise save for its monopolistic protections, which con-
stantly raises rates and reduces the quality of service, and
which has incurred budget deficits almost every year for
the past two centuries. It requires little imagination to
appreciate the results if "feeding starving men" were left to
the tender mercies of compulsive bureaucracy: The nation
would perish within five years!
1. For a detailed discussion see Ridgway K. Foley, Jr., "Individual
Liberty and the Rule of Law/' The Freeman, June 1971, pp. 357-358; and
Ridgway K. Foley, Jr., ''A Rationale For Liberty," The Freeman, April
1973, pp. 222-229.
2. Leonard E. Read, "Justice versus Social Justice," in Who's Listen-
ing? (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Foundation for Economic Educa-
tion, Inc., 1973), p. 93 et seq.
3. See Leonard E. Read, "The Bloom Pre-Exists in the Seed," in Let
Freedom Reign (Irvington-on-Hudson, N. Y.: The Foundation for Eco-
nomic Education, Inc., 1%9), pp. 78-86.
You Can't Sell Freedom to a starving Man / 351
4. Ridgway K. Foley, Jr., "In Quest of Justice/' The Freeman, May
1974, pp. 301-310.
5. Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals
(New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1949), p. 21.
6. Obviously, this essay does not purport to deal with the questions
of why might does not make right or with the nature and scope of an
alternative postulate for mcinkind in great detail. Such an undertaking
requires more extensive development than is requisite for the topic
under discussion.
7. Leonard E. Read, "Right Now!", Notes from FEE (Irvington-on-
Hudson, N.Y.: The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc., May
1975), discusses the problems inherent in gradualism.
The Roots of " Anticapitalism''
Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn
In many minds, "capitalism" has come to be a bad
word, nor does "free enterprise" sound much better. I
remember seeing posters in Russia in the early 1930s
depicting capitalists as Frankenstein monsters, as men with
yellow-green faces, crocodile teeth, dressed in cutaways
and adorned by top hats. What is the reason for this wide-
spread hatred for capitalists and capitalism despite the
overwhelming evidence that the system has truly "deliv-
ered the goods"? In its mature stage it indeed is providing,
not just for a select few but for the masses, a standard of liv-
ing cordially envied by those bound under other politico-
economic arrangements. There are historic, psychological,
and moral reasons for this state of affairs. Once we recog-
nize them, we might come to better understanding the
largely irrational resentment and desire to kill the goose
that lays the golden eggs.
In Europe there still survives a considerable conservative
opposition against capitalism. The leaders of conservative
thought and action, more often than not, came from the
nobility which believed in an agrarian-patriarchal order.
They thought workers should be treated by manufacturers
as noblemen treated their agricultural employees and
household servants, providing them with total security for
Dr. Kuehnelt-Leddihn is a philosopher, linguist, world traveler,
and lecturer whose home is in Austria. This essay apf>eared in the
November 1972 issue of The Freeman.
352
The Roots of "Anticapitalism" / 353
their old age, care in the case of illness, and so forth. They
also disliked the new business leaders who emerged from
the middle classes: the grand bourgeois was their social com-
petitor, the banker their disagreeable creditor, not their
friend. The big cities with their smoking chimneys were
viewed as calamities and destroyers of the good old life.
We know that Marx and Engels in the Communist Mani-
festo furiously attacked the aristocratic social movement as
a potential threat to their own program. Actually, most of
the leading minds of Christian anticapitalist thought
(equally opposed to socialism) were aristocrats: Villeneuve-
Bargemont, de Mun, Liechtenstein, Vogelsang, Ketteler.
Bias Against Capitalism Not of Worker Origin
Armin Mohler, the brilliant Swiss-German neo-conserv-
ative, has recently explained that one of the weakest points
of contemporary conservative thought, still wrapped in the
threads of its own obsolete agrarian romanticism, is its hos-
tility against modem technology. How right he is! The
exception might have been Italy with its tradition of urban
nobility and of patricians who, even before the Reforma-
tion, engaged in trade and manufacture. Capitalism,
indeed, is of North-Italian origin. It was a Franciscan, Fra
Luigi di Pacioli, who invented double-entry bookkeeping.
Calvinism gave a new impetus to capitalism but did not
invent it. (Aristocratic entrepreneurs in Italy? Count Mar-
zotto with his highly diversified business empire of textile
plants, paper mills, hotel chains, and fisheries is a typical
example. His labor relations are of a patriarchal nature
involving substantial fringe benefits which also character-
ize Japanese business practice.)
The real animosity against free enterprise did not origi-
354 / Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn
nate with the laborers. Bear in mind that in the early nine-
teenth century the working class was miserably paid, and
this for two reasons: (1) the income from manufacturing was
quite limited (true mass production came later) and (2) the
lion's share of the profits went into reinvestments while the
typical manufacturers lived rather modestly It is this ascetic
policy of early European capitalism which made possible
the phenomenal rise of working class standards. Seeing that
the manufacturers did not live a life of splendor (as did the
big landowners) the workers at first viewed their lot with
surprising equanimity. The Socialist impetus came from
middle class intellectuals, eccentric industrialists (like
Robert Owen and Engels) and impoverished noblemen
with a feeling of resentment against the existing order.
As one can imagine, the artificially created ire then was
turned first against the manufacturer who, after all, is noth-
ing but some sort of broker between the worker and the
public. He enables the worker to transform his work into
goods. In this process he incurs various expenses, such as
for tools, and a part of the costs of marketing. He hopes to
make a profit from these transactions in order to render his
efforts worthwhile. Curiously enough, his responsibility
toward the enterprise is of far greater scope than that of
many workers. No wonder that the interest, once centered
on accidents in the factories, is shifting more and more to
the manager diseases. The entrepreneur sacrifices not only
his "nerves" but also his peace of mind. If he fails, he fails
not himself alone; the bread of dozens, of hundreds, of
thousands of families hangs in the balance. The situation is
not very different in a stock company. There, the stockhold-
ers sometimes make profits in the form of dividends — and
sometimes they do not. The worker always expects to be
paid. The bigger risks are thus at the top, not at the bottom.
The Roots of "Anticapitalism" / 355
Yet, how well the worker is paid depends on several fac-
tors, the first of which is the readiness of consumers to pay
for the finished goods a price high enough to warrant high
wages. Here we come to the brokerage side of the capitalist.
Secondly, there is the decision of the entrepreneur (some-
times the stockholders) how much of the gross profits will
be distributed (as dividends, bonuses, and the like) and
how much should be reinvested or laid aside. It is evident
that the enterprise, being competitive, has to "look ahead"
in a far more concrete way than does the often improvident
worker. The business usually must be planned years ahead.
It not only has to adopt the best means of production
(which means the purchase of new expensive machinery),
but also needs financial assets as reserves. Finally, the
wages have to be in a sound relationship to the marketing
possibilities, and also to the quality of the work done, the
sense of duty of the workers and employees. Virtue enters
the picture. Even the net profits paid out are not necessarily
a "loss" to the workers, because a profitable enterprise
attracts investors; what is good for the enterprise obviously
is good for its workers.
There is a commonality of interests which can be
gravely upset by either side. Needless to say, the most com-
mon way to upset the applecart is through excessive wage
demands which, if yielded to, tend to eliminate the profits
and to make the merchandise unmarketable. Politically
organized workers also may pressure governments into
inflationary policies. Strikes cancel production for a given
period and mean economic loss. The inability to sell due to
excessive wages and prices or to protracted strikes can
bankrupt the economy.
This mutual relationship between costs of production
and purchasing power is frequently overlooked— espe-
356 / Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn
dally in the so-called "developing nations." The insistence
on "a living wage," often by well-meaning Christian critics,
in many cases cannot be met without pricing the products
out of the market. Such critics forget that workers might
prefer to work at a low wage rather than not to work at all.
Saving Begins at Home
One thing is certain: nascent industrial economies have to
start on an ascetic, a Spartan level. This is true of all
economies, free or socialistic. The apologists of the USSR
can well use this argument in the defense of Soviet
economies in their initial stage, but only up to a point: the
introduction of socialism in Russia effected immediately a
tremendous decline of working-class, peasant-class, and
middle-class living standards which, compared with 1916
levels, have improved only in spots. Large sectors still are
worse off than before the Revolution. A microscopic minor-
ity, however, lives very well indeed.^ In the meantime, free
economies have made such enormous strides that the gap
between Russia and the West is greater than in 1916. There
are two reasons for this state of affairs. First, the Eastern
Bloc with the exception of Soviet-occupied Germany,
Latvia, and Estonia, completely lacks the famous "Protest-
ant Work Ethic." Secondly, free enterprise is basically more
productive than state capitalism because of: (a) the snow-
balling of millions of individual ambitions into a huge
avalanche, (b) the element of competition based on free
consumer choice which improves quality and efficiency,
(c) the strictly nonpolitical management based on efficiency
and responsibility.
So, whence comes the wave of hatred directed against
The Roots of "Anticapitalism" / 357
free enterprise? Dissatisfied intellectuals designing Utopias
and decadent noblemen do not account entirely for the
phenomenon. Though nascent capitalism has not yet "de-
livered the goods" (children can only show promise, no
more) mature capitalism has proved that it can provide.
Empirically speaking, capitalism has justified itself in com-
parison with socialism (for the existence of which we have
to be grateful in this one respect).
The assaults against free enterprise are launched with
the help of theories and of sentiments, sometimes working
hand in hand. Frequently these attacks are made indirectly,
for instance, by criticizing technology. This critique might
be genuine, but often serves as a detour. Much of the cur-
rent antipollution campaign is subconsciously directed at
capitalism via technology. (This particular problem is less
acute in the Socialist World only because it is less industri-
alized; it is nevertheless amusing to see the Left embracing
all the idle dreams of the old conservative agrarian roman-
ticism.) However, if we examine closely the attack against
free enterprise, we find the following elements:
•1. The charge that business cycles are the consequence
of freedom rather than political intervention, though proof
to the contrary is well established.
•2. The attack against the man-consuming, soul-killing,
slave-driving forms of modern production. In this domain,
however, the main culprit is the machine rather than the
human factor. Technology per se is strictly disciplinarian. In
this respect, socialism or communism would not bring the
slightest alleviation. On the contrary! Let us remember the
ideal of the Stakhanovite, the absence in socialist countries
of genuine labor unions, the limitless means the totalitarian
state has for coercion, regulations, and controls. We must
358 / Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn
bear in mind that the free world also has a competitive
labor market. Man can choose the place and conditions of
his work.
•3. The critique of "monopoly capitalism," shared in a
milder way by the "Neo-Liberal" school, is opposed to all
forms of bigness. Still, in the free world we find that most
countries have legislation against monopolies in order to
keep competition alive, to give the consumer a real choice.
Any criticism of monopolies by a socialist is hypocritical,
because socialism means total monopoly, the state being
the only entrepreneur.
Deeper Resentments
Yet these attacks are frequently only rationalizations of
much deeper resentments. At the very roots of anticapital-
ism we have the theological problem of man's rebellion
against Original Sin or, to put it in secular terms, his vain
protest against the human condition. By this we mean the
curse to which we are subject, the necessity to work by the
sweat of our brow. The worker is in harness, but so is the
manager and so is everybody else. For this uninspiring,
sometimes unpleasant state of affairs, the average man will
stick the guilt on somebody; capitalism serves as the conve-
nient scapegoat. Of course, work could be greatly reduced
if one were willing to accept a much lower living stan-
dard— which few people want to do. Without the opportu-
nities free enterprise provides for highly profitable work,
the living standards would go down to early medieval lev-
els. Still, the resentment against this order is directed not so
much against an abstraction — such is human nature — as
against persons. Thus, the culprit is taken to be the "Estab-
lishment"— of the "capitalists."
The Roots of "Anticapitalism" / 359
This gives us a hint as to the nature of the anticapitalism
which has more and more surfaced since the French Revo-
lution and the decline of Christianity: envy. Ever since 1789,
the secret of political success has been the mobilization of
majorities against unpopular minorities endowed with cer-
tain "privileges"— particularly financial privileges. Thus,
in the nineteenth century, the "capitalist" appeared to be
the man who enjoyed considerable wealth though he
apparently "did not work" and derived a vast income from
the toil of the workers "who have to slave for him." Apart
from the incontrovertible fact that they mostly "slave for
themselves," there is some truth to this.
The Entrepreneurial Role
Almost every worker will usually contribute in a
minor way to the income of the entrepreneur or of the
stockholders. This is perfectly natural because a broker
must always be paid; and an entrepreneur, as we have
said before, is actually a broker between the worker and
the consumer by providing the former with the necessary
tools and guidance in production. (The merchant is a sub-
broker between the manufacturer and the public.) It is
also natural to pay for borrowed tools for the simple rea-
son that their value is diminished by use. (Thus the travel-
ing salesman will have to pay for a rented car, the com-
mercial photographer for a rented camera, and so forth.)
Beyond this, the entrepreneur (who is, as we have seen, a
broker as well as a lender) takes the risk of failure and
bankruptcy. This situation also may be encountered in the
USSR where anyone can get an "unearned income" for
money he puts into a savings bank or where he can buy a
lottery ticket. The purchase of such a ticket is based on an
360 / Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn
expectation (i.e., to make a profit) but also entails a risk
(i.e., not to win anything).
Risk characterizes all of human existence: to make an
effort without exactly foreseeing its success. Thus, a writer
starting a novel or a painter putting the first lines on his
canvas is not sure whether he can transform his vision into
reality. He might fail. Often he does. The farmer with his
crop is in the same boat. But the typical worker entering the
factory can be certain that he will be paid at week's end. It
should be noted here that in Austria and Germany, for
instance, the industrial laborer works an average of 43
hours a week (the 40-hour week is in the offing), while the
self-employed put in an average of 62.5 hours a week. In
other words, the rule within our mature economy is this:
the "higher up," the greater the work effort — and the
higher, too, the work ethics; the slack employee cheats the
employer but the slack employer only cheats himself.
Facts and Fiction
The trouble, as Goetz Briefs once pointed out, is that the
current notions about the profits of the capitalists are
totally out of touch with reality.^ The reason for these
wrong ideas is partly mathematical! Let us look at some
statistics. Too many people think that a radical redistribu-
tion of profits would truly benefit "the little man." But
what do the figures tell us? According to the Economic
Almanac, 1962, published by the National Industrial Con-
ference Board (page 115), of the national income in the
United States, the compensation of employees amounted
to 71 percent; the self-employed earned 11.9 percent, the
farmers 3.1 percent. Corporation profits before taxes were
9.7 percent of the total national income (after taxes only 4.9
The Roots of "Anticapitalism" / 361
percent) and dividends paid out were 3.4 percent. Interest
paid to creditors amounted to 4.7 percent of the national
income. Yet, were the recipients of these dividends and in-
terest payments all "capitalists"? How many workers,
retired farmers, widows, benevolent associations, and
educational institutions were among them? Would this
sum, evenly divided among all Americans, materially
improve their lot? Of course not.
In other parts of the world the situation is not much dif-
ferent. According to earlier statistics (1958), if all German
incomes were to be reduced to a maximum of 1,000 Marks
(then $250.00) a month and every citizen given an even
share of the surplus, this share would have amounted to 4
cents a day. A similar calculation, expropriating all Aus-
trian monthly incomes of 1000 dollars or more, would in
1960 have given each Austrian citizen an additional IVa.
cents a day!
But, let us return to corporate profits. The 13 largest Ital-
ian companies composed in 1965 a full-page advertisement
which they tried to place in the leading dailies of the Penin-
sula. This statement told at a glance what the dividends
had been in 1963, what they were over a 10-year period,
what salaries and wages were paid, how much industry
contributed to social security and old-age pensions. The
relationship between the dividends and labor cost was
roughly 1 to 12. The companies added that the estimated
number of shareholders (obviously from many walks of
life) was over half a million — double the number of the
employees. Interestingly and significantly enough, two of
the dailies refused to carry the paid advertisement: one was
the Communist Unita, the other the Papal Osservatore
Romano whose excuse was that it was published in Vatican
City, which means outside of the Italian State.
362 / Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn
Rooted in Envy
To the advocate of equality, the fact that certain individ-
uals live much better than others seems to be "unbearable."
The internal revenue policies which try to "soak the rich"
often have their roots in man's envy. It seems useless to
demonstrate that a redistribution of wealth would be of no
advantage to the many or that an oppressive tax policy
directed against the well-to-do is self-defeating for a coun-
try's economy. One usually will get the reply that in a
democracy a fiscal policy which might be economically
sound could be politically unacceptable — and vice versa.
Pointing out that the spending of wealthy persons is good
for the nation as a whole may bring the snap reaction that
''nobody should have that much money." Yet, people who
earn huge sums usually have taken extraordinary risks or
are performing extraordinary services. Some of them are
inventors. Let us assume that somebody invents an effec-
tive drug against cancer and thereby earns a hundred mil-
lion dollars. (Certainly, those who suffer from cancer would
not begrudge him his wealth.) Unless he buries this sum in
his garden, he would help by lending to others (through
banks, for instance) and by purchasing liberally from oth-
ers. The only reason to object to his wealth would be sheer
envy. (I would add here that had it not been for the liberal-
ity of monarchs, popes, bishops, aristocrats, and patricians
it would not be worthwhile for an American to pay a nickel
to see Europe. The landscape is more grandiose in the New
World.)
Still, it is significant that one of the few outstanding
Christian sociologists in Europe, Father Oswald von Nell-
Breuning, SJ, not noted for conservative leanings, has
recently (Zur Debatte, Munich, February 1972) taken a firm
The Roots of "Anticapitalism" / 363
Stand against the myths of the beneficent effects of the
redistribution of wealth. As one of the architects of the
Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno he emphasized that Pius XI
was thoroughly cognizant with this incontrovertible fact
but that, in the meantime, this knowledge has been nearly
lost and that therefore demagogical ideas have largely
invaded Catholic sociological and economic thinking.
Especially in the domain of "Third World" economic prob-
lems, the learned Jesuit hinted, the hue and cry for "distrib-
utive justice" has done a great deal of mischief.
It has become fashionable to attack free enterprise on
moral grounds. There are people among us, many of them
well-meaning, idealistic Christians, who freely admit that
"capitalism delivers the goods," that it is far more efficient
than socialism, but that it is ethically on a lower plane. It is
denounced as egotistic and materialistic. Of course, life on
earth is a vale of tears and no system, political, social, or
economic, can claim perfection. Yet, the means of produc-
tion can only be owned privately, or by the state. State own-
ership of all means of production certainly is not conducive
to liberty. It is totalitarianism. It involves state control of all
media of expression. (In Nazi Germany private ownership
existed de jure, but certainly not de facto.) The remark of
Roepke is only too true, that in a free enterprise system the
supreme sanction comes from the bailiff, but in a totalitar-
ian tyranny from the hangman.
The Christian insistence on freedom— the monastic
vows are voluntary sacrifices of a select few— derives from
the Christian concept that man must be free in order to act
morally (A sleeping, a chained and clubbed, a drugged per-
son can neither be sinful nor virtuous.) Yet, the free world,
which is practically synonymous with the world of free
enterprise, alone provides a climate, a way of life compati-
364 / Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn
ble with the dignity of man who makes free decisions, en-
joys privileges, assumes responsibilities, and develops his
talents as he sees fit. He is truly the steward of his family.
He can buy, sell, save, invest, gamble, plan the future, build,
retrench, acquire capital, make donations, take risks. In
other words, he can be the master of his economic fate and
act as a man instead of a sheep in a herd under a shepherd
and his dogs. No doubt, free enterprise is a harsh system; it
demands real men. But socialism, which appeals to envious
people craving for security and afraid to decide for them-
selves, impairs human dignity and crushes man utterly.
1. See ''Free Enterprise and the Russians/' The Freeman, August
1972, pp. 461-470.
2. Das Gewerkschaftsproblem gestem und heute (Frankfurt am Main:
Knapp, 1955), p. 98.
Higher Education: The Solution
or Part of the Problem?
Calvin D. Linton
My title may strike you as odd, whimsical, even wrong-
headed. Surely education is a "good thing." It is by its very
nature beneficial, not harmful; Promethean, not Mephis-
tophelean; our savior, not our destroyer. The more of it the
better.
But every one of these popular beliefs is doubtful. It all
depends on what kind of education we are talking about,
and what kind of people receive the education.
Let me say at once, therefore, that I am speaking of that
kind of education which is secular, largely technological,
and chiefly aimed at teaching people how to do things. This
is, I believe, the public image. Every member of a liberal
arts college has at one time or another confronted bewil-
dered or irate parents who demand to know what, after an
expensive liberal arts education, their newly furnished off-
spring are trained to do — what kind of a job can they get? It
is difficult to convince them that the purpose of a liberal
education is to develop mental powers, to sensitize one's
response to beauty and goodness, to expand and lengthen
one's outlook, to teach civilized emotions, and the rest. (It is
Calvin D. Linton is Professor Emeritus of English Literature and
Dean Emeritus of the College of Arts and Sciences of George Washing-
ton University, Washington, D.C. This article appeared in the June 1968
issue of The Freeman.
365
366 / Calvin D. Linton
particularly difficult because, in all conscience, these jobs
have often not been done by the liberal arts college. But that
is another story.)
The menace of modem education is quite easy to define:
Never have so many people, groups, and nations been able,
because of education, to do so many things — and we are all
afraid that they will now start doing them! To narrow it a
bit: The menace is that of incalculable power (the product
of knowledge) in the hands of bad or foolish men. The ago-
nizing question now is not whether we can possibly learn
how to do this or that, but which of the things we have the
tools to do we should, by an act of will, choose to do. The
question, in short, is one of conduct, not of knowledge.
With this, education, to its own peril, has little to do.
And yet it is the most anciently recognized of problems.
Adam faced it, and chose wrong. His problem, like ours,
was not knowing how but knowing what. And the corrective
was early stated: "Thou shalt do that which is right and
good in the sight of the Lord: that it may be well with thee
. . . {Deut. 6:18). With the spirit of this commandment, mod-
em education has even less to do. Education's answer to
man's problems is more education — as if Hitler would have
been made a better man if he had taken a degree or two
from some good university.
I submit that modem education presents increasingly
the fearful aspects of Frankenstein's monster because of the
prevalence of five fallacies or myths.
1. The Myth of Automatic Human Progress
The general tendency of ancient thought was that man
had fallen from high estate, whether from some Golden
Age or from the bliss of Eden. Not until the eighteenth cen-
Higher Education: The Solution or Part of the Problem? / 367
tury and the rise of that strangely irrational epoch called
the Age of Reason were doctrines of inevitable human
progress widely disseminated. Partly, this was the result of
a sort of provincial complacency, and partly ignorance of
history. How easily in eighteenth-century writing flow the
condescending remarks about the barbarism of the ancient
world, the primitive grotesqueness of gothic cathedrals, the
ignorance and ineptitude of Shakespeare!
But it remained for the nineteenth century and the rise
of theories of evolution for the views to become the dogma
that all environments tend inevitably toward perfection.
Why this is so was never clearly stated. There simply is
faith that the universe is so constituted. "Chance" will see
to it. But chance is simply a nonterm, identifying the absence
of reason, purpose, intention, and will; it is odd that reason
should put its faith in that which is, by definition, nonrea-
son.
Reasonably or not, however, the cult of inevitable
progress has, in education, placed improper emphasis on
novelty, change for its own sake, the gimmick. True, in the
world of technology the view that the latest is the best is
usually sound — we properly prefer the up-to-date type-
writer, automobile, washing machine. But technology
advances automatically, so long as we do not forget the
practical lessons of past experimenters. Every engineer
begins at the point where the last one left off. Advancement
is due not to any improvement in the human brain, but to
the mere accumulation of experience. The ancient brains
that measured the diameter of the earth, that worked out
the basic principles of force, leverage, hydraulics, and con-
struction, were almost undoubtedly greater brains than our
age possesses. But the modem technologist stands at the
topmost height of achievement of all previous craftsmen.
368 / Calvin D. Linton
He may himself be a dwarf, but he can see farther than they,
for he sits on their shoulders.
Not so in the area of human conduct. Here it is not tech-
nology but wisdom that governs. No man becomes virtu-
ous because of the virtue of another. He may be inspired by
the wisdom and virtue of others, but he must make that
wisdom his own possession. He cannot start out as wise as
they simply because they have recorded their wisdom.
Every human being, as a moral creature, begins from
scratch. Not the novel but the true controls here.
Julian Huxley once observed that evolution seemingly
has not worked in recorded history. Even within the view
of evolutionary progress, therefore, there is no ground for
believing that the wisdom residing in the most ancient
minds was not as great as that held by the latest recipient of
a Ph.D. Indeed, in all honesty, most of us would agree that
there probably is not alive this day any human being whose
wisdom can match that of a Moses, a Job, a Paul, a Marcus
Aurelius, an Aristotle, a John — make the list as long as you
wish.
And it is precisely this storehouse of ancient wisdom
that the Cult of the New denies to the student. How they
flock to the latest course presenting results of "an unstruc-
tured learning experience bearing upon upward mobility
desires in terms of motivational elements in adjustment to a
work situation" — but how few choose a course in the ethi-
cal teachings of Jesus.
And yet, as we have seen, it is precisely in the matter of
choosing wisely what we should do, not in mastering
more tools of power, that our future security — if any —
consists. Bertrand Russell has written: "If human life is to
continue in spite of science, mankind will have to learn a
discipline of the passions which, in the past, has not been
Higher Education: The Solution or Part of the Problem? / 369
necessary. . . ." In other words, the upward curve of virtue
must parallel that of knowledge.
Professor Ginsberg of the University of London in his
book The Idea of Progress, correctly states that progress can-
not be defined in terms independent of ethics. One can
scarcely call it progress if a murderous maniac is progres-
sively handed a stick, a club, a sword, a pistol, a cannon,
and finally an H-bomb.
Education must deal with that which has never changed:
the human heart, its passions, and ideals. There are the well-
springs of human well-being or human catastrophe. In an
address to the Royal Society, Laurence Oliphant, Aus-
tralia's top atomic scientist, declared: "I can find no evi-
dence whatever that the morality of mankind has improved
over the 5,000 years or so of recorded history."
II. The Myth of the Natural Goodness of Man
This is a delicate subject. One sometimes feels that this
dogma is simply a corrective to the reverse obnoxious doc-
trines of extreme puritanism (the sort seen in medieval
asceticism and seventeenth-century extremism) that every
impulse of man is totally and inherently evil. (In passing,
some even conceive this to be the Presbyterian doctrine of
total depravity. Actually, of course, the view declares that
the total man was touched by sin, that no part of his being
remained unaffected. It does not attribute total evil to every
impulse.)
But the cult of sensibility, as the eighteenth century
termed it, is not a corrective; it is an extreme, untenable,
and unreasonable dogma that shows up in modern educa-
tion all the way from first grade to graduate school.
Simply, it may be called the philosophy of "doing what
370 / Calvin D. Linton
comes naturally." At the intellectual level, for example, it is
held that there is some magic value in the uninhibited and
uninformed opinion if freely expressed. And so discussion
groups are held in the grade schools and the high schools
on such subjects as "What do you think about the atom
bomb?" or "teenage morality" or "banning Lady Chatterley's
Lover" or "implementing freedom among underprivileged
nations" or what not. The poor little dears have scarcely a
fact to use as ballast. But no matter. The cult of sensibility
believes that continuing, free, uninhibited discussion will
ultimately release the inherent goodness of natural instincts
and impulses. The fad for "brainstorming" has passed, but
not the philosophy behind it.
Now, of course, we must encourage discussion. The
young need to be encouraged to think and to speak — the
former, anyway But the deadly assumption underlying this
sort of thing is that goodness is not a difficult matter of
study, discipline, learning, mastery of tough masses of fact,
but just a kind of game. It's fun to do what comes naturally.
(On reading about the uninhibited conduct of certain grade
school classes, with free discussion, finger painting, group
games, or whatever the youngsters want to do, an older
man said: "That's not a new feature of education. They had
that when I was a boy. They called it 'recess.'"
Ultimately, this view of ethics believes that there is no
objective standard of morality or ethics. If there were, then
what one wanted to do would be either right or wrong
according to whether it reflected or violated the absolute
standard. Rather, it is the view of the cult that society deter-
mines morality. The vote of the majority determines the eth-
ical value. To refer to Bertrand Russell again, one remem-
bers his assertion that there is no rational basis for
Higher Education: The Solution or Part of the Problem? / 371
determining ethics. Man, as the random product of an eter-
nal flux of atoms, feels certain things— chiefly, that he
exists; or rather, he experiences an experience he arbitrar-
ily names "existence." Thus, what are "ethical standards"
to one may be unacceptable to another. There is no objec-
tive basis for deciding between them. One can only hope,
therefore, that he lives in a society in which the majority of
the people happen to like the same ethical standards one
does oneself.
The idea that man is basically good and infinitely capa-
ble of self-improvement has ramifications in every area of
modem life. It is ardently preached by Freudian psycholo-
gists, to whom restraint of any natural desire is bad; by
dreamy-eyed social and political theorists who believe that
"freedom" is the sovereign remedy for the ills of every
primitive tribe and nation; by aesthetic theorists who teach
that art is an unplanned eruption occurring when the
"artist's biography makes contact with the medium of the
art"; and by educationists who teach that what Johnny
wants to do is what he must be permitted to do. No concept
is more widespread, more taken for granted by millions
who have never troubled really to think about it.
It is important to realize that members of the cult of nat-
ural goodness believe primarily in the goodness of the non-
rational faculties — instinct, emotion, impulse, subrational
urges. They are not so strong on the natural goodness of the
intellect. (The high priest of the cult is D. H. Lawrence.)
There is, consequently, a prevalence of anti-intellectual-
ism in educational circles that manifests itself in a mar-
velous jargon largely incomprehensible to the rational
intelligence. Jacques Barzun gives a fine analysis of this
malady in The House of Intellect
372 / Calvin D. Linton
III. The Myth of Egalitarianism
This is an even more delicate subject. To seem to ques-
tion the equality of men is to raise questions about one's
attitude toward home and mother and the American way
of life. Actually, of course, the situation is not hopelessly
complicated. It is simply a matter of identifying those areas
in which all men are equal and those in which they are not.
To the Christian, every soul is equal before God. All have
sinned and come short of the glory of God; all need grace;
none is good before God. None can claim social status,
investments, political office, or ecclesiastical affiliation to
separate him from his absolute equality with all other
human souls.
To the believer in the Western tradition of rule by law,
every man is also equal before the law. The protection of the
law, the responsibility for obeying the law, and the duty of
understanding the law are equal in distribution and force,
without regard to any circumstances save legal age.
But to declare that all men are equally gifted, equal in
force of character, equal in abilities and talents, equally
deserving of a share of the world's goods, equally deserv-
ing of esteem, respect, and admiration, equally deserving
of rewards, equal in cultural heritage and contribution —
this is irrational nonsense.
No concept has had a deadlier effect upon modem edu-
cation than this. It has hindered the identification and
encouragement of the exceptionally gifted; it has lowered
educational standards to a point where no one, no matter
how dull, can fail to hurdle them; it has confused the right
of every man to seek an education with the fallacious belief
that every man has a right to receive a degree. It has stifled
initiative by refusing to grant exceptional reward to ex-
Higher Education: The Solution or Part of the Problem? / 373
ceptional effort. It has encouraged mediocrity by withhold-
ing the penalty of mediocrity.
An illustration: A university with which I am very
familiar undertook a program to encourage better English
in the high schools of the city. The basic idea was competi-
tion— the best writers, the most skilled in grammar, the
clearest thinkers would be singled out through public con-
tests for reward.
The professional secondary school counselors were hor-
rified. This clearly amounted to ''discrimination" — it dis-
criminated between the able and the unable student! In the
modem doctrine this is the deadly sin. In sum, the univer-
sity was permitted to put into effect only a watered-down
plan that carefully provided rewards for everyone. Need-
less to say the program was of only modest effectiveness.
Needless to say, too, that high school graduates come to us
scarcely sure whether writing is the white or the black part
of a page.
I was recently told by a professional educator colleague
that the terrible alternative to belief in complete equality in
all dimensions is the inculcation of an inferiority complex.
From that, he told me, come resentment, insecurity, antago-
nism, maladjustment, psychoses of various kinds, rebel-
lion— in short, a wrecked society.
This, too, is nonsense. The thing works both ways.
Almost everyone has some talent or ability that could be
developed beyond the average level. If he properly receives
acknowledgment for this superiority, he will be willing to
grant superiority in other fields to other people. Is this not
inherent in life itself? Do we feel resentful or guilty because
we have not the mental equipment of a Pascal or an Ein-
stein? Physically inferior because we cannot bat home runs
like Mickey Mantle? Artistically inferior because we cannot
374 / Calvin D. Linton
play the piano like Rubinstein or Richter? On the contrary,
one of the keenest pleasures of life is to be in the presence of
a superior person — and to be very still.
That sort of pride which cannot, without infinite
anguish, acknowledge the superiority of any other living
being is quite literally Satanic. From it flowed all our woes.
IV. The Cult of Scientism
Again, careful qualification is needed. No one can, in
the first place, be other than grateful for the marvelous
strides science has made in increasing human comfort, con-
trolling disease, providing relief from soul-killing labor.
Nor, in the second place, can anyone doubt the validity and
effectiveness of the scientific method — in its proper place.
What I refer to is the religion of scientism, complete with
dogma, faith, ethical system, and ritual.
"Science" is a wonderful word. It means "knowledge."
Thus the old term for what we today call "science" was
"natural philosophy." The study of nature — physical; per-
ceived by the senses; capable of instrumentation. Indeed,
modern science may be called the application of instru-
ments to matter for the purpose of gaining understanding
of material forces and thus of gaining control over them for
our own purposes.
The cultic aspect arises when (1) science is viewed not as
one way man has of knowing things (and a sharply limited
one) but as the way that embraces everything man can, at
least respectably, come to know; and (2) when the teachings
of its priests are accepted without question by a faithful
congregation.
These cultic aspects are perhaps most perceptible in the
development of "mysteries" of the faith, open only to the
Higher Education: The Solution or Part of the Problem? / 375
initiated, not to be comprehended by nonscientists. Writes
the great Norbert Wiener: "The present age of specializa-
tion has gone an unbelievable distance. Not only are we
developing physicists who know no chemistry, physiolo-
gists who know no biology, but we are beginning to get the
physicist who does not know physics." As a consequence,
the mysteries known only to the specialists are accepted
without question by those without the necessary knowl-
edge to judge for themselves.
Anthony Standen, distinguished British chemist who is
editor of a huge encyclopedia of chemistry, writes: "What
with scientists who are so deep in science that they cannot
see it, and nonscientists who are too overawed to express
an opinion, hardly anyone is able to recognize science for
what it is, the great Sacred Cow of our time" (Science Is a
Sacred Cow, Dutton, 1950).
"Is the universe," he continues, "to be thought of in
terms of electrons and protons? Or ... in terms of Good and
Evil? Merely to ask the question is to realize at least one
very important limitation of [science]."
The biologists, he says, try to define "life," with ludi-
crous results. "They define stimulus and response in terms
of one another. No biologist can define a species. And as for
a genus — all attempts come to this: 'A genus is a grouping
of species that some recognized taxonomic specialist has
called a genus ' "
The scientist, says Standen, has substituted is for ought.
"That is why," he concludes, "we must never allow our-
selves to be ruled by scientists. They must be our servants,
not our masters."
The cult has many imitators, all of them injurious to true
education. The ritual words of the worship services have
been adopted by areas of knowledge where no physical
376 / Calvin D. Linton
instrumentation is possible: psychology, sociology, aesthet-
ics, morality. When the modem psychologist asks, "What
motivational elements predominated in this behavioral
manifestation?" he is still simply asking, "Why did he do
it?" And the real answer lies far beyond the reach of the
cleverest electronic computer or microscope.
In general, the attitude fostered in modem education
toward science is unthinking worship. As a consequence, as
Martin Gardner states in his recent book Fads and Fallacies in
the Name of Science, "The national level of credulity is almost
unbelievably high."
The menace of this scientific gullibility obviously goes
far beyond the classroom. It is the malady of our age, and
one of which we may perish. But my immediate point is
simply that an environment of anti-intellectual materialism
has seriously hampered the development of students'
awareness of the moral and spiritual stature of man, by
which alone he stands erect.
Most paradoxical is the cult's dogma that there is no
room for faith in any true search for truth. The notion is pal-
pably false. Let me quote Warren Weaver, vice-president for
the natural and medical sciences of the Rockefeller Founda-
tion: "I believe that faith plays an essential role in science
just as it clearly does in religion." He goes on to list six basic
faiths of the scientist, including the faith that nature is
orderly, that the order of nature is discoverable to man, that
logic is to be trusted as a mental tool, that quantitative
probability statements reflect something true about nature,
and so on ("A Scientist Ponders Faith," Saturday Review,
January 3, 1959). In sum, he says: "Where the scientist has
faith that nature is orderly, the religionist has faith that God
is good. Where the scientist believes that the order of nature
Higher Education: The Solution or Part of the Problem? / 377
is discoverable to man, the religionist believes that the
moral nature of the universe is discoverable to man."
Dr. Weaver rejects the well-known aphorism of Sir
Richard Gregory:
My grandfather preached the Gospel of Christ,
My father preached the Gospel of Socialism,
I preach the Gospel of Science.
But many others accept it with fervor. "God has ceased
to be a useful hypothesis," writes Julian Huxley. The prob-
lem of the nineteenth century, says another, was the death
of God; that of the twentieth, the death of man.
Any humanist who speaks in these terms must be
extremely careful, lest he fall into mere carping, deeply
tinged by envy of the prominence and prosperity of sci-
ence. Nothing could be more foolish — or more ungrateful.
The lament over the low estate of the humanities in the
public mind would be more touching if those responsible
for the preservation and dissemination of humanistic stud-
ies had something of positive value to say, if they had a
Path, a Way of Truth to declare.
V. The Cult of Biologism
I admit that this is a poor term, and perhaps the topic
itself were better considered a subheading of the previous
one. Essentially, this cult is an outgrowth of materialism,
the faith that man is only biology, that he not only has
glands but is glands.
As a consequence, whole segments of educational the-
ory consider man precisely as a physicist considers an
378 / Calvin D. Linton
atom — one purely objective item among others of its kind,
clothed with identity only as it is part of a group, the prop-
erties and motions of which are to be determined statisti-
cally, in terms of average behavior. (Years ago, Irving Lang-
muir, speaking of the "burden of irrationality" in science,
pointed out that the laws, say, of the expansion of gases tell
us how a mass of molecules behave under certain condi-
tions of heat and pressure, but that no one can predict how
a single one of the molecules will behave.)
To treat man merely as a capacity for response to stim-
uli, as totally the product of the forces that impinge upon
him, without will or conscience, is to divest him of person-
ality, individuality, and dignity. But the whole science of
human engineering is based, more or less, on this concept.
The only variation is the difference of opinion among the
practitioners as to whether there remains in man some
slight indeterminate center of being, inviolate to stimulus
or statistical confinement, or whether he is totally suscepti-
ble to manipulation.
Among the many ramifications of this cult let me men-
tion only two. First, the dogma that all human actions are
social in their implications, to be judged purely by their
effect on society. And, second, the dogma that emotions,
feelings, are not essentially moral in their nature, nor the
product of individual, unique, and sovereign personality,
but are merely the conditioned reflexes of quivering biology.
The first, the social dogma, conceives of the individual
as the physician thinks of the cells of the body — part of an
organic whole, subject totally to the welfare of the organic
unit (the state, in the social and political parallel), smd to be
excised through surgery if a cell rebels.
It is within this belief that a nationally prominent psy-
chologist has defined education as "the engraving of desir-
Higher Education: The SoluHon or Part of the Problem? / 379
able behavior patterns." Through conditioning, teaching
machines, Pavlovian devices of various kinds, the individ-
ual is created in the desired image. Undesirable behavior
patterns are to be eradicated by a form of brainwashing and
a new engraving superimposed. Dismissed as utterly out-
moded is the view of each human being as a living soul,
created in the image of God, with primary responsibilities
as an individual to the God of his creation.
And who is to determine what kind of behavior pattern
is "desirable"? That's the hitch. The persons who most
ardently would like to impose their own behavior patterns
on me are the very ones whose patterns I would least like to
have engraved.
At worst this view of human existence is both irrational
and evil. It is irrational because it must believe that those
who impose the patterns of desirable behavior must be as
totally the product of external influence, as completely a
consciousness-produced-by-environment, as those who are
to be manipulated. It is evil because it denies human dig-
nity and reduces the individual to a cipher.
The second menacing product of the cult of biologism is
the belief that emotions and feelings are as purely biologi-
cal as the purely physiological activities of man. In other
words this view denies that the quality of a person's feel-
ings is a measure of his moral stature, of his culture, of his
civilization. It denies that the teaching of right feelings is a
vital part of true educahon.
The "natural" emotions of a child are pretty fearful,
until they have been civilized, associated with moral val-
ues, enriched with culture. Most notably, the child— and
the savage— is instinctively delighted by cruelty. A child
will pull the wings off a fly A recent account of life among
certain savage South American Indians describes the plea-
380 / Calvin D. Linton
sure of the community at the antics of chickens plucked
alive, with perhaps a leg or wing pulled off for good mea-
sure.
This may be the "natural" feeling of sin, and it may be
an instinctive expression of the savage as biology. But it is
the work of civilization, of culture, and above all of religion,
to eradicate it. "Natural" man must learn the right emo-
tions— what to laugh at, what to smile at, what to frown at.
Show me what makes a man laugh, what makes him
weep, and I know the man. It is ultimately a matter of
morality, not biology. Education divorced from moral val-
ues cannot teach right feeling.
The deepest and most significant emotion of all, the one
this world most desperately needs to be taught, is compas-
sion— the emotion most readily associated with the love of
God for sinful man. "The tender mercies of the heathen are
cruel," says the Bible. Commandments that we deal gently,
forgivingly, tenderly with each other are "unnatural" in
biology. They are natural only to the regenerated spirit.
Now, this is a broad indictment. I do not pretend that I
have said anything new, or that these problems are peculiar
to education. They are maladies of our age. They break into
dozens of major subheadings, scores of topics, hundreds of
subject headings, thousands of instances.
True Education
But the correction is magnificently simple: True educa-
tion, as Milton said three centuries ago, is to releam to
know God aright. Education divorced from God is capable
of infinite and endless complexities and confusions. He
alone is the motionless Center that gives meaning to all
Higher Education: The Solution or Part of the Problem? / 381
motion. What he is, not what man is, determines what
should be and shall be.
Let me end with a quotation from that rough-mannered
philosopher, Carlyle (Sartor Resartus, Chapter IX):
"Cease, my much respected Herr von Voltaire," thus
apostrophizes the Professor: "shut thy sweet voice;
for the task appointed thee seems finished. Suffi-
ciently hast thou demonstrated this proposition,
considerable or otherwise: That the Mythus of the
Christian Religion looks not in the eighteenth cen-
tury as it did in the eighth. Alas, were thy six-and-
thirty quartos, and the six-and-thirty thousand other
quartos and folios, all flying sheets or reams, printed
before and since on the same subject, all needed to
convince us of so little! But what next? Wilt thou
help us to embody the divine Spirit of that Religion
in a new Mythus, in a new vehicle and vesture, that
our Souls, otherwise too like perishing, may live?
What! thou hast no faculty in that kind? Only a torch
for burning, no hammer for building? Take our
thanks, then, and — thyself away."
Somewhat modified, these words might be addressed
to the kind of dangerous education I have been describing.
Index
Abundance, 225-226, 345
Academies, 73
Acton, John E. E. D. (Lord Acton),
188, 194, 216
Adams, John, 15, 59
Adams, Paul L., 242-254
Administrative law, 82, 92-94
Advertising, 262-264
American heritage, decline of,
242-254
American Revolution, 12, 17, 105,
227
Anarchism, 153
Anglican church, 55-56, 65
Anticapitalism, 352-364
Aristotle, 167-168, 209-210, 281,
2%, 323
Atheists, 154
Athens, 288-289, 315
Bacon, Francis, 167, 307, 313
Barker, Ben, 4, 274-283
Bastiat, Frederic, 79, 139, 148, 218,
298
Bible, 62, 78, 99, 106, 115, 120,
136-151, 236, 261, 264, 305, 307,
310, 312, 380
Biblical laws, 79
Bill of Rights, 80, 86-90, 106, 333
Bill of Rights (English), 106
Bill of Rights (Virginia), 15, 18
Biologism, 377-380
Blackstone, Sir William, 79
Boston, 64-65, 305
Brackenridge, Hugh, 53
Bradford, William, 103-104
Buddhists, 154
Bunyan, John, 62
Burke, Edmund, 220, 333, 337
Burr, Aaron, 53, 107-108
Businessmen, 153-154, 237,
264
Caesar, Julius, 29-30
California, 77
Cambodia, 203
Cambridge (England), 67, 74, 304
Cambridge (Mass.), 306
Capitalism, 58, 152-153, 236, 258,
263, 318-319, 352-354, 356-358,
363
Carson, Clarence B., 7-24, 40-51,
98-109
Charity, 43, 95, 153-154, 249, 261
Children, 13, 18-19, 83, 103-105,
118, 162, 195, 204, 226, 261, 266,
286, 294, 300, 302, 315, 338, 357
Chinese, 166
Christian socialism, 317
Christianity, 26, 30, 33-36, 1%,
99-100, 102, 104, 106-107, 113,
120, 123-127, 130, 134-135, 139,
164, 166, 168, 198, 242, 244, 253,
257-258, 264, 268, 272-273, 312,
383
384 / Index
317, 343, 353, 356, 359, 362-363,
372, 381
Church of England, 10, 18, 317
Churchill, Winston, 238, 285
Civil Rights movement, 198
Civil War, 85-86, 315, 342
Civilization, 136, 161, 163, 168,
170-171, 284-303, 307, 332,
379-380
Classes, 4, 18-19, 204, 249, 251,
282, 296-297, 353, 370
Colleges, 67-69, 167, 311
Colonial America, education in,
61-76
Colonists, 2, 20, 306-307, 315, 333
Columbia University, 312, 329,
336
Communists, 87-88
Community, 4, 18-19, 36, 46, 174,
191, 265-267, 282, 291-293, 297,
302, 306, 380
Competition, 73-74, 220, 269-270,
356, 358, 373
Compromise, 181, 300
Confucianists, 154
Congregational churches, 306
Connecticut, 11, 13
Constitution, 1, 11, 14-15, 21, 32,
47-48, 53, 57, 60, 69, 73, 77,
79-81, 86-^7, 89-90, 94-95, 106,
216, 246, 248, 252, 280, 288, 307,
310-311, 316, 321
Constitutional Law, 79
Continental currency, 58
Contracts, 17, 58, 117
Cotton, John, 305
Courts, 20-21, 88-^9, 108, 214,
328
Cults, cultism, 4, 274-283,
367-371, 374-379
Dartmouth, 167
Declaration of Independence, 2,
17, 52, 77, 82, 105-106, 310, 316
Delaware, 11, 13, 74
Dependency, 220, 224, 275-277,
279
Despotism, 22, 26, 46, 331, 336
Drugs, 226, 240
Edison, Thomas, 203
EducaHon, 42, 53, 61-76, 108, 138,
152, 161-174, 195, 225, 242, 248,
261, 267, 278, 304, 336-337,
365-381
Egalitarianism, 201-204, 206, 372
Eighteenth Amendment, 321
Elijah, 113, 118
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 285
England, 8-10, 12, 17-18, 36, 41,
43, 62, 64-65, 67, 235, 30S-306,
309-310, 315, 317, 332-333, 349
Entrepreneur, 319-320, 354-355,
358-359
Envy 78, 188, 292, 297-298, 346,
359, 362, 377
Hpictetus, 165
Episcopal Church, 33
Equal Rights Amendment, 88
Equality, 19, 84, 90, 179, 198-206,
235, 237-238, 293, 2%, 298, 346,
362, 372-373
Ethics, 201, 203, 209, 337, 360,
369-371
Europe, 9, 31, 37, 41, 43, 69, 204,
244-245, 307, 352, 362
Index I 385
Ewert, Ken S., 257-273
Executive Orders, 91-92
Exploitation, 4, 84
Ezekiel, 120-131
Faith, 3, 50, 84, 98-109, 123, 138,
148, 193, 212, 247, 253, 282-283,
304, 343, 367, 374, 376-377
Family, 62, 64, 66, 71, 90, 105, 115,
132, 137, 188, 225, 239, 266-267,
293, 298-299, 306, 364
Federalist Papers, 73, 311
Foley, Ridgway K., Jr., 120-131,
338-351
Founding Fathers, 1-4, 53, 62, 67,
72-73, 82, 98-109, 246, 280,
296-297, 309, 311
Franklin, Benjamin, 65, 67, 69, 72,
74, 247
Freedom, 3, 11, 16-17, 31-33, 37,
51, 53-54, 56, 59, 61, 69, 74,
78-79, 81, 98, 121, 126, 128-129,
134, 137-138, 141, 153, 155,
161-174, 178, 197, 207-219,
225-228, 229-241, 242-243,
245-248, 251, 253-254, 257, 262,
265-266, 268, 272, 277, 280, 282,
292, 302-303, 311, 321-337,
338-351, 357, 363, 370-371
Freneau, Philip, 53, 59
Fromm, Erich, 282
Garden of Eden, 186
Georgia, 11
Germany, 349, 350, 356, 360, 363
God, 2-3, 12-13, 27, 29, 32, 34, 63,
71, 79^1, 83, 99-103, 105, 107,
113-118, 121-124, 126, 128-130,
133, 140-141, 145, 154-156,
168-169, 177, 179, 183, 185, 191,
198, 211, 218, 221, 242-246, 249,
251, 254, 261, 264, 273, 280-281,
300, 304, 307, 309-310, 312,
317-318, 332, 372, 376-377,
379-380
Gold, 145, 283, 321-322
Golden Rule, 13, 178-184, 193
Good Samaritan, 132, 135, 192,
320
Government, 1-2, 9-10, 18-20, 22,
26-27, 30-37, 41^3, 45-50, 57,
59, 61-62, 64-65, 67-69, 73-75,
77, 80-82, 84, 86, 88, 91-95, 107,
127, 132-133, 136-151, 153,
155-156, 183, 191, 193, 197,
199-200, 210, 218-219, 223-226,
229, 231, 234, 237-239, 246, 253,
257, 271-272, 283-284, 294,
297-298, 307, 309, 311, 315,
322-323, 327-332, 334-337, 339,
345
Gradualism, 349-350
Grand Inquisitor, 167
Great Awakening, 104
Greeks, 44, 163, 244, 291, 296, 330
Hamilton, Alexander, 107-108,
311
Harper, F. A., 128, 175-197
Harvard University, 220
Hayek, Friedrich A., 143, 194,
216-217
Hebraic law, 124
Henry, Patrick, 32-33, 67
Hillendahl, Wesley H., 77-97
Hinduism, 154, 166, 312
386 / Index
Hobbes, Thomas, 41, 43, 210-211,
215, 313
Honesty, 25, 154, 219, 368
Hoover Institution, 145
Huxley, Julian, 368, 377
Immorality, 175, 187, 193, 195, 344
Impersonalism, 264, 267-268
Independence, 2, 8-9, 17, 19, 21,
32, 47, 52-53, 55-56, 72, 77, 82,
105-106, 197, 224-225, 265, 277,
280, 310, 316
Individualism, 264, 273
Jefferson, Thomas, 11, 22, 33, 304
Jeremiah, 113-119
Jericho, 132-135
Jesus, 124-126, 132, 135, 139-140,
179, 368
Jewish people, 142-143
Johnson, Lyndon B., 91
Johnson, Paul, 294
Judeo-Christian faith, 3, 99,
152-157
Judicial abuses, 86
Justice, 13, 15, 25, 32, 50, 56, 79,
90-91, 93, 108, 123, 130, 139,
142-143, 155, 178, 185, 207-219,
237, 244, 249, 297, 318, 331,
340-342, 363
Justice Department, 93
Kant, Immanuel, 325
Kennedy, John R, 91, 326
King Philip's War, 68
Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik von,
352-364
Lane, Rose Wilder, 137-138, 150
Laurens, Henry, 13
Lee, Charles, 53
Lee, Richard Henry, 33, 52
Legislatures, 20-22, 87
Lewis, C. S., 163, 173
Liberalism, 297, 334
Liberty, 2, 10-12, 15-16, 23^25,
30-31, 36-37, 40-51, 52-61, 69,
77-79, 81, 83-^, 95, 106-107,
113, 139, 175-197, 198-200, 206,
213, 215-228, 245-248, 252, 261,
284, 286-287, 294, 299, 301-302,
304-305, 308-309, 311, 324,
330-334, 336, 338, 343, 345, 349,
363
Libraries, 61, 69-71, 74
Lincoln, Abraham, 74, 327
Linton, Calvin D., 365-381
Loyalists, 333
Luther, Martin, 103, 141
Lutherans, 65
Machiavelli, Niccold, 27-31,
33-34, 36, 38, 183, 251
Madison, James, 11, 25-39, 53, 57,
69, 73, 311
Magna Carta, 106
Manion, Clarence, 77, 86, 89
Manson, Charles, 203, 274
Market, 61, 65, 74, 153-154, 188,
238-239, 241, 249, 257-273, 302,
315, 319-320, 348, 356, 358
Marshall, John, 33
Marx, Karl, 152, 185, 267, 313, 353
Maryland, 13
Mason, George, 15, 32
Massachusetts, 11, 14-15, 19-21,
32, 68, 306
Index I 387
Materialism, 3, 251-252, 258,
262-264, 267-268, 273, 376-377
Mather, Cotton, 305
Media, 42, 152, 281, 363
Mennonites, 66
Merccintilism, 17, 42
Mill, John Stuart, 139, 211-212,
216
Milton, John, 332, 380
Mises, Ludwig von, 316, 320
Montesquieu, Charles de, 208
Moral conduct, 179-180, 188, 190,
Moral order, 304-320
Moral postulates, 175-184
Morality, 26, 32, 37, 47, 49-51,
108-109, 113, 118, 161-174, 175,
178-179, 189, 195, 214, 217, 225,
228, 231, 241, 258, 291, 340-341,
343^44, 346-347, 369-370, 376,
380
Morals, 13, 32, 36, 175-197,
217-218, 251, 291-292, 2%, 335
Moravians, 65
Morison, Samuel Eliot, 64, 304
Moses, 145, 281, 368
Murray, Charles, 299
National emergencies, 91-92
Natural Law, 43, 105, 172,
177-178, 183, 212, 220, 244,
308-309, 317, 343-344
Natural order, 43-44, 49, 206, 308
New England, 36, 62, 64-65,
305-306,309
New Hampshire, 11, 13
New Jersey, 10-11, 52-53, 68
New Testament, 134, 140-141
New York, 10, 20-21, 57, 242, 295,
321
Nixon, Richard, 91
Nock, Albert Jay, 113-114, 173
North, Gary, 113-119
Northwest Ordinance, 14, 16,
310
Nozick, Robert, 200
Numa, 27-28
Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 93
Old Testament, 113, 123-124, 142,
305
Opitz, Edmund A., 304-320,
321-337
Order, 1, 3, 14, 17, 25, 29-30, 32,
40-51, 91, 98, 114, 124, 127, 129,
140, 145, 152-157, 164, 166, 169,
174, 200, 206, 217, 225-227, 242,
244, 261-262, 270-271, 279, 281,
284, 292-293, 304-311, 313,
315-320, 324-325, 330-334, 337,
344, 346, 352, 354, 358, 376
Ortega y Gasset, Jose, 285
Owen, Robert, 240, 354
Paine, Thomas, 207, 212, 218
Patrick, James C, 136-151
Pennsylvania, 10, 13, 21, 65-66,
167
Pericles, 244, 288, 335
Peterson, Robert A., 52-60, 61-76
Philadelphia, 52, "ol, 65-66, 70, 73,
311
Philanthropy, 70
Philosophical societies, 61, 72
Pilgrims, 98, 103, 304, 306
388 / Index
Plato, 161, 164-167, 208-210, 281,
307, 323
Plunder, 134-135, 149, 340, 342
Plutarch, 27
Plymouth Colony, 304
Pol Pot, 203
Porter, Bruce D., 220-228
Power, 2-3, 21, 26, 30, 34, 41^3,
46-i8, 51, 57, 73, 79-81, 85-«6,
89, 92-94, 126, 129-130, 136,
139-140, 143, 156, 172-173, 177,
182, 188, 194, 204, 209, 211,
214-215, 222-223, 225-226, 228,
231-232, 237-239, 244, 246, 248,
267-273, 276, 278-279, 288-289,
292-293, 313, 322, 326, 328-331,
334, 340-344, 346-347, 349, 366,
368
Presbyterians, 33, 54, 57, 65, 369
Press, 15, 234, 236-237, 268, 309,
311, 333, 335, 338
Primogeniture, 18, 23
Princeton University, 53-55, 57,
59, 68-69, 167
Prophet, 113-114, 117-119,
121-122, 124
Psychology, 4, 274-283, 376
Public choice, 271
Puritans, 98, 304
Reformation, 102-103, 305, 312,
332, 353
Relativism, 122, 172, 251, 294
Religion, 12, 25-39, 42, 47, 49-51,
72, 87, 98, 102, 106, 108, 134,
175, 178, 185, 225, 234, 238, 278,
281-282, 313, 317-318, 332-333,
337, 374, 376, 380-381
Religious liberty, 10-12, 23, 31,
36-37, 56, 333-334
Remnant, 113-115, 118-119,
122-123
Renaissance, 174, 312, 332
Resentment, 56, 292, 354, 358, 373
Rhode Island, 10, 13
Ricardo, David, 235
Roberts, Paul Craig, 271
Roche, George C, III, 161-174
Rogers, Will, 285
Rogge, Benjamin A., 229-241
Roman Catholicism, 11, 56, 102,
235, 297, 363
Romans, 27, 44, 140, 244, 307
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 91, 232
Rothbard, Murray, 204
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 215
Russell, Bertrand, 314, 329, 368,
370
Rutgers University, 327
Quakers, 65
Quitrent, 17
Rabushka, Alvin, 145
Read, Leonard E., 128
Rededication, 253
Redistribution, 84-85, 200, 205,
226, 344, 360, 362-363
Saint Augustine, 211, 284
Samuelson, Paul A., 152
Savonarola, 29
Schooling, 65, 69, 278
Scientism, 374
Scotland, 54
Selfishness, 258-263, 273
Senate, 53, 85, 92
Index I 389
Sennholz, Hans R, 152-157
Sennholz, Mary, 1-4
Sermons, 70-71
Shaw, George Bernard, 247
Shintoists, 154
Simon, William, 226
Slaves, 12-14, 144, 196, 339
Smith, Adam, 54, 307, 316, 333
Snyder, Leslie, 207-219
Social Gospel, 317
Solomon, 146-147
South Africa, 239
Soviet Union, 81
Specialization, 276, 375
Spooner, Lysander, 212
Subjectivism, 172, 294
Sunday Schools, 71
Supreme Court, 14, 21, 86^9, 148
Taoists, 154
Teachers, 4, 32-33, 66, 102, 278,
282, 304, 307
Technology, 164, 279-281, 313,
353, 357, 367-368
Ten Commandments, 99-100,
106-107, 124, 156, 179-180, 308,
311
Theft, 13S-134, 185-187, 189,
191-193, 204, 209, 213, 260,
297-298, 307, 319, 323, 330, 332,
340-344
Thucydides, 288-290, 292-293,
296-299, 301
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 37,
218-219, 304-305, 336
Treaty of Paris, 9
Tyranny, 25, 35, 51, 214, 247, 272,
294, 330, 363
United Nations, 81, 253, 296
Vigilance, 25, 81, 247
Virginia, 11, 13-15, 22, 25-39, 53,
67
Virginia Statute of Religious Free-
dom, 11
Voluntarism, 62, 69, 346
Walton, Rus, 218
Washington, George, 26, 33,
40-51, 55, 57, 67, 108-109, 139,
247, 329, 365
Washington's Farewell Address,
40, 108-109
Watkins, Hal, 132-135
Watts, Isaac, 62
Weaver, Henry Grady, 138
Weaver, Warren, 376
Welfare, 83, 95, 135, 145, 175, 178,
180, 183-186, 189-197, 260, 299,
336, 378
Welfare state, 175, 178, 180,
183-186, 189-197, 336
Whig principles, 53
Whigs, 332-333
Wilder, Laura Ingalls, 137-138
William and Mary, College of, 167
Williams, John K., 284-303
Witherspoon, John , 52-60, 68-
69
Wollstein, Jarret B., 198-206
Worship, 11-12, 32-34, 219,
240-241, 274, 280, 282, 314, 332,
375-376
Yale University, 167
Young, John Wesley, 25-39
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to explore in greater depth the moral case for a free society:
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An anthology of essays and articles on the freedom movement
throughout American history.
212 pages
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The Conquest of Poverty
Capitalist production, not government programs, has been the real con-
queror of poverty.
240 pages
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ples required for voluntary social interaction.
388 pages
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property order.
212 pages
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A powerful analysis of the connection between liberty and virtue.
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failure of public administration.
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market economics.
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tion.
243 pages
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an almoner of gifts to the people, but a necessary instrument of social
order.
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A devastating critique of our propensity to live beyond our means.
1 79 pages
Robert A. Sirico
A Moral Basis for Liberty
A brilliant essay on first principles.
68 pages
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IE
LL
D
God-given natural rights were the guiding light of the Founding Fathers.
The stirring closing paragraph of the Declaration of Independence was
not only the formal pronouncement of independence, but also a
powerful appeal to the Creator of all rights: "We, therefore, the Representativ es
of the United States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to
the Supreme Judge of the worid'for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the
Name, and by authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish
and declare, that these United Colonies are and of Right ought to be free and
independent States." In the final sentence of defiance they appealed to the
Almighty for His Protection: "And for the support of this declaration, with a
firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to
each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our Sacred Honor."
The moral precepts and the self-evident truths that guided our Founding
Fathers may not be fashionable in our time, but they are as inescapable and
inexorable as they have been throughout the ages. We are free to ignore and
disobey them, but we cannot escape the rising price we must pay for defying them.
"The serious reader will find Faith of Our Fathers revealing and exciting. It
tells the story^ of the formation of the United States of America, how it became a
great nation, a happy and prosperous commonwealth, and how we may
preserve the great blessings of liberty. The greatness of America was built on
the central religious convictions of its founders who assured their descendants
the protection of their God-given natural rights. Here are some of the very best
essays and articles from a journal that for nearly fifty years has brought us
'Ideas on Liberty^ 'from some of the country s deepest thinkers."
— The Reverend Dr. Norman S. Ream
Pastor Emeritus
The First Congregational Church, Wauwatosa, Wisconsin
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