athers of the Church*
66-014.506
" 1966
THE FATHERS
A NEW TRANSLATION
EDITORIAL BOARD
LUDWIG SCHOPP
Editorial Director
RUDOLPH ARBESMANN, O.S.A. ROY JOSEPH DEFERRARI
Fordham University The Catholic University of America
STEPHAN KUTTNER MARTIN R. P. McGuiRE
The Catholic University of America The Catholic University of America
WILFRID PARSONS, SJ. BERNARD M. PEEBLES
The Catholic University of America St. John's College, Annapolis., Md*
ROBERT P. RUSSELL, O.S.A. ANSELM STRITTMATTER, CXS.B.
Villanova College St. Anselm's Priory, Washington, D. C.
GERALD G. WALSH, SJ.
Fordham University
WRITINGS
OF
SAINT AUGUSTINE
VOLUME 1
SAINT AUGUSTINE
THE HAPPY LIFE
by
Ludwig Schopp
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS
by
Denis J. Kavanagh, O.S.A.
t$
DIVINE PROVIDENCE
AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
by
Robert P. Russell, O.S.A.
SOLILOQUIES
by
Thomas F. Gilligan, O.S.A.
NEW YORK
CIMA PUBLISHING CO., INC.
Copyright, 1948 by
LUDWJG SCHOPP
All rights reserved
Lithography by Bishop Litho, Inc.
Typography by Miller & Watson, /no.
U.S.A.
CONTENTS
FOREWORD 5
THE HAPPY LIFE
Introduction 29
Text 43
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS
Introduction 87
Text 103
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
Introduction 229
Text 239
SOLILOQUIES
Introduction 335
Text 343
INDEX 427
6604306
FOREWORD 1
Aurelius Augustine
His Quest for Truth and Happiness
'There is a joy, that is not given unto the wicked,
but to those who freely worship Thee, whose
joy Thou Thyself art . . .
For a happy life is joy in the truth; and this
is joy in Thee, who are the Truth**
SJMONG ALL the 'Fathers of the Church/ St. Augustine
is undoubtedly the greatest, the most original, fruit-
I ful and versatile. 3 'Different Fathers [have said] dif-
ferent things, but this [Father] said every thing with Roman
eloquence . . .' So reads the inscription under a fifth- or sixth-
century fresco 4 depicting St. Augustine. The high regard for
this Father of the Church apparently was even then wide-
1 A general introduction to St. Augustine and an extensive bibliography
by Vernon J. Bourke will be found in his translation of the Con-
fessions, in Volume 7 of The Writings of St. Augustine in this series.
Brief introductions will precede the individual translations.
2 Confessions 10.22f.
3 Cf. O. Bardenhewer, Patrologie, 2. Aufl., 435f. and A, Dyroff, Ein-
leitung in die Philosophic (Bonn 1947) 433f.
4 This fresco was discovered (1900 A.D.) by P. Lauer on a wall below
the chapel in the Lateran Palace in Rome. Cf. J. Wilpert, Romische
Mosaiken und Wandmalereien der kirchlichen Bauten (Freiburg i. Br.
1916) 1.149ff. and 2. pi. 140; and J. Sauer 'Zum Titelbild* (Grabmann-
Mausbach, Aurelius Augustinus [Koln 1930]) IXf. Sauer contends
that the fresco may have been done in the fifth century.
6 FOREWORD
spread, 5 and it flourished more during the Middle Ages/ An-
toninus ( d. 1459 ) , the saintly Bishop of Florence, could write : 7
'What the sun 8 is to the sky, St. Augustine is to the Doctors
and Fathers of the Church. The sun in its brilliance excels all
other luminaries; it is the lord of the planets, the father of
light. A delight to the eyes, its rays leave nothing untouched.
So, Augustine. He shines like a jewel. His words are like
music. The light of his mind penetrated the deepest problems.
No wonder St. Jerome said of him that he was like an eagle
soaring above the mountain tops, too lofty for lowly trifles,
but with a vision embracing heaven and earth. 5 And when
El Greco, 9 the master of mystic strokes, depicts the Saint car-
rying the Church upon his left hand, he anticipated the
opinion expressed by a scholar at the University of Notre
Dame: c ln the great African doctor we seem to have com-
bined . . . the learning and versatility of Origen, the grace and
eloquence of Basil and Chrysostom. Whether we regard him
as philosopher, theologian, as exegetist . . . the Doctor of
Grace is ever admirable, at once the glory of the Church
and the master of the ages.' 10
5 Cf. the praise for St. Augustine in the woiks of Prosper of Aquitaine
(d. after 455) , and in the De vita contcmplativa (3.31,6) of JuHanus
Pomerius (d. after 500) .
6 St. Bernaid (d, 1153) calls him 'validi&niwus malleus heretirortim,'
Peter the Venerable speaks of him, in a letter to St. Bernard, as
'the greatest teacher of Chiistiamty after the Apostles' (Epistle to
St. Bernard, among the Letters of St. Bernard. Ep. 229.13). That St.
Thomas Aquinas, the prince of the schoolmen, in points of basic Chris-
tian doctrine, 'never left the side of St. Augustine* is referred to bv
E. Gilson, 'The Future of Augustinian Metaphysics/ A Monument
to Saint Augustine (London 1915)308.
7 Cfironicon 2.8. fol. 27 (Nurnberg 1484) .
8 Ibid. 2.26. St. Ambrose, Augustine's 'teacher,' is called \stetla matntlna'
the Morning Star, that precedes the Sun.
9 The original is in the Parish Museum San Vinccnte, Toledo, Spain. A
sixteenth century libiaxy seal of the Augustinian College at Paris slums
Augustine holding the church upon his left hand and a heart in his
right.
10 J. A. Zahm, Bible, Science and Faith (Baltimore 1891) 71f.
FOREWORD 7
In St. Augustine, then, the golden age of patristic litera-
ture reached its peak.
Aurelius Augustine was born on November 13, 354, at
Tagaste, a small town in the African province of Numidia,
His mother Monica, a Christian, was the wife of the Roman
magistrate Patricius, who, until shortly before his death, re-
mained a pagan. 11 No one anticipated that the newcomer
in the small household was to become Africa's greatest son,
whose name would shine on the firmament of the Christian
Church for all centuries to come. For, who before or
after him has more effectively influenced Christian thought
and Western culture than this once wayward student of
Carthage? He is outstanding amongst those immortally great,
and his thoughts, simple and sublime as nature itself, were
not limited to his own time or to any era, nation or race,
but, ever modern, they will live as long as a single soul
is honestly struggling for truth and happiness.
These two natural drives that spring from the very depth
of the human soul the ardent desire for truth and the
never resting craving for happiness were unusually develop-
ed in this unusual youth of Tagaste. 'Truth, Truth, how
inwardly did the very marrow of my soul sigh for Thee, 312
he passionately cried out, he who 'had become a puzzle even
to himself/ who 'asked his soul for a solution that as yet
knew no answer.' 13
The reader of Augustine's life story, who follows him into
the darkness of intellectual aberrations, into the mire of his
sensual escapades that brought him almost on the precipice
of despair, 14 who watches him in his zealous struggle, per-
11 Cf. Con/. 9.9.19.
12 Con/. 3.6.10.
13 Cf. Con/. 4.4.9.
14 Cf. Contra Academicos 2.9,23.
8 FOREWORD
ceives with him the first glimmer of truth, and finally discovers
the road toward the great light to grace and to sanctity, will
undoubtedly be tenderly moved by that story.
Hardly any fictional tale is more captivating than this
great man's combat with the weakness of his own voluptuous
nature and the erroneous doctrines of his time. If Goethe's
words, 'To be human means to be a fighter/ hold true, Au-
gustine was human in the true sense of the word. This qual-
ity in his character is what awakens in man a sympathetic
response to him. We might perhaps say that everyday life
has no highway and no byway that Augustine did not tread.
Although only a few will, like him, finish the race with
such heroic salvation and breathe with him the pure air of
sanctity, some of us, at least, may join him in the earnest strife
for truth and happiness; all of us are his brothers in wretch-
edness. His achievement of self-recovery is heartening and in-
spiring; his valiant rise encourages and enlightens the sinner,
and enriches the heart of the good. He has shown man-
kind the road, changing, laborious, and thorny: a road that
led him through the morass of a mendacious, morbid Mani-
chaeism, the sandy steppes of a suicidal skepticism, and the
arid and rocky fields of philosophies that can never satisfy the
human mind and heart.
Augustine's personality is mighty and fascinating because
it demonstrates to us that the attainment of truth and con-
tentment is within our reach; that it is our goal; in fact, that
it is the property and essence of our life; that our accomplish-
ment toward perfection and the measure of our happiness
stand in proportion to the good works we do; that 'the roads
of this world are broad, well beaten,' and easy; but the path
to heaven is narrow, stony, and steep; that we must overcome
the obstacles to reach the peak; that the demands of earthly
passions by which his thoughts and will in earlier days were
FOREWORD 9
dominated are but a monotonous repetition which insa-
tiably take everything without any return, for 'every disorder-
ed soul shall be itself its own punishment'; 15 that the great
love, however, the unselfish love in the service of God, gives
everything, and in giving receives still more namely, im-
perishable gifts of eternal truth and happiness.
The development of Augustine's mental and spiritual
growth is intimately related to the expression of his personal-
ity. Seldom has a great mind searched more fervently and ar-
duously after the truth than the scholar of Tagaste. Yet,
rarely has any man so ardently loved the truth when found
or lived so wholeheartedly by it and in it, as 'The Doctor of
Christianity.' All his labors directly served his purpose to
seek the truth and to find lasting happiness. 'What else do I
desire to find but the truth,' he exclaims in his Soliloquies, 1 *
the truth that makes man free and happy, for, 'No one is
wise if he is not happy.' 17
Guided by Plato's doctrine of the primacy of the in-
telligible over the sensible world, he entered the portals of
philosophy upon the road of introspection that, according to
Rudolph Eucken, c is today as at all times the best approach
to philosophy.' The deep and masterly analysis of the inner
world of experience, its perfectly clear formulation and treat-
ment, are adequately pointed out by W. Windelband as
Augustine's original idea and most meritorious accomplish-
ment. In stressing the indubitable and undeniable certainty
of self-existence 18 as the basis for unnumerable other truths,
and in emphasizing that, without certitude of the self, there
is no other knowledge, Augustine became, long before Des-
15 Cf. Conf. 1.12. Cf. De quantitate animae 34.78.
16 Cf. Soliloquia 2.17.31.
17 De beata vita 2-14; cf. ibid. 2.10: 'We wish to be happy. Do we not?'
18 Cf. De beata vita 2.7.
10 FOREWORD
cartes, the father of modern philosophy. Tor he who says I
know I am alive, says that he knows one single thing. If he says,
then, I know that I know I am alive, there are already two , , .
and similarly he can add innumerable others. n& Even the
skeptic, pretending that the existence of any truth is doubt-
ful, must bow before Augustine's argumentation; because
'everyone who knows that he is in doubt about something
knows a truth; and, in regard to this, that he knows, he is
certain. Therefore, he is certain about a truth. 320
However, the immediate certitude of man's inner experi-
ence, which, disconnected from the world, is only of subjec-
tive value, could not satisfy the man in his search for an
extra-individual, objective, and everlasting truth. Like the
changeableness of the sensuous world, self-certainty was
merely c a stepping stone, as it were, from which he rose and
was borne up to God/ 21 the one Truth, unchangeable and
eternal, whence everything has received its truth; God, the
Alpha and Omega of all being. *God, Thou hast created man
after Thine own image, which is known by anyone who
knows himself/ 22 'Do not go outside yourself,' admonishes
Augustine, 'but return to within yourself, for truth resides in
the inmost part of man. And if you find that your nature is
mutable, rise above yourself. But when you transcend your-
self, remember that you raise yourself above the rational soul;
strive, therefore, to reach the place where the very light of
reason is lit. For, whither does every good reasoner strive,
if not to the truth?' 23
Augustine's concept of truth was already clearly formed
at Cassiciacum. Not as yet officially received into the Chris-
19 De Trinitate 15.12,21.
20 De vera religione 39.73.
21 Retractations 1.8.3.
22 Solil. 1.1.4.
23 De vera relig* 39.72; Cl De doctrine. Christiana 2.38.57.
FOREWORD 1 1
tian fold, but in soul and heart chosen to see and to acknowl-
edge the sacred mystery between God and His creation, Au-
gustine, in a unique and beautiful metaphysical prayer, thus
besieges his Creator:
*O God, the Founder of the Universe, through whom all
those things which of themselves would not exist, strive to be.
O God, who hast not willed that any but the pure should
know the True. O God, Father of Truth, the Father of
Wisdom, Father of True and Supreme Life, Father of Hap-
piness, Father of the Good and the Beautiful, Father of In-
telligible Light, Father of our Watching and our Enlighten-
ment. I call upon Thee, O God of Truth, in whom and by
whom and through whom all those things are true which are
true. O God, Wisdom, in whom and by whom and through
whom all those are wise who are wise. 324
The immovable rock, then, upon which Augustine's con-
cept of truth is firmly established, is God, the absolute reality.
His view of science and life is seen in the light of meta-
physics; the various disciplines, such as logic, psychology,
ethics, aesthetics, and the social sciences, are made to orientate
about his theodicy.
Since 'the idea of an infinite wisdom is the ultimate basis
for the most impressive creatures as well as for the smallest
material body,' 25 every being stands in a necessary relation-
ship of dependence to the Absolute Being, to God, who in
His great love has created all that is, that lives, that thinks.
No other philosopher ever brought the Creator and each
and every creature into a closer affinity. Every individual
thing participates in a divine idea. 'All is true that has being,* 26
24 Solil. 1.1.2.
25 Cf. De dvitate Dei 11.22; Cf. Con/. 7.13.19.
26 Cf. Solil. 2.5.8.
12 FOREWORD
for every reality represents a true unity, is good, beautiful,
and suitable for its place; it is a realized idea of God, through
whom the individuality of its very substance is effected and
assured. 27 A creature's nearness to God is the measure of its
perfection as well as the criterion for its reality, and its value
in the realm of universal being.
Made after God's own image, though essentially incom-
mensurable to Him, man stands in a special relationship to
Creator and creation. It is given to man by God that he 'hold
a middle place between the unchangeable Truth [God] above
him and the changeable things beneath him,' 28 that he 'should
live according to his own nature . . . namely, under Him to
whom he ought to be subject, and above those things to
which he is preferred; under Him by whom he ought to
be ruled, above the things which he ought to rule with rea-
son. 529
In defining man as a rational, mortal animal,'* Augustine
singles him out among all creatures. Man's ability to make
free use of his reason distinguishes him from the rest of
visible creation. He alone is a rational being, in contrast to
the things which, since created only by reason, should proper-
ly be called 'rationable.' 31
In his search for a transsubjective truth, it is human reason
that supplies Augustine with certain first principles^ which
are unchangeable, and constitute the prerequisites of all ob-
27 Cf. De civ. Dei 15.22: 'Hacc twi stint, bona sunt, quia Tu bonus ista
creasti.'
28 De doct. Christ. 2.38.57; cf. also De quant, an, 28.55.
29 De Trin. 10.5.7.
30 De ordine 2.11.32.
31 Seneca before, as well as Boethius after, Augustine uses rationahs
and rationabilis as convertibilia. Ad, Dyroff (Uber Form . . . p. 30)
confirms our find that only Augustine makes this sharp differentiation,
who in turn probably adopted it from a neo-Pythagoiean geome-
trician.
FOREWORD 13
jectlve knowledge and the foundation of all sciences. The
very existence of science, Augustine declares, would be
unthinkable without self-evident, true principles; because, ii
nothing would be ultimate, nothing could ever be explained,
and our definitions would be without basis and thus without
value, Augustine's postulate that the truth of science rests
on that very principle which makes it a science, 32 preceded
by centuries such statements as applied by the Pragmatisl
William James, that 'every science must take some assump-
tions' 33 or that by Arthur K. Rogers that c we can add any
number of zeros together without arriving at the numbei
one'. 34
After establishing the truth of the existence of basic, self-
evident principles in the fields of dialectics, mathematics, e-
thics, and aesthetics, Augustine proceeds to the search foi
the truth in the world around him.
In spite of his repeated admonition to return from the ex-
ternal into the inner world, 35 Augustine is far from acclaim-
ing any false idealism; he connects sound experience with his
speculations, and cherishes a proper evaluation of all visible
things. 36
Man's proper evaluation of things presupposes a propei
knowledge of things. The solution of the problem must, there-
fore, include the recognition of the realities that exist outside
man's mind. The rational acquisition of the world becomes
the object of man's search for the truth, and the questions 31
Whether a thing is; What it is; Of what quality it is
32 Cf. Solil. 2.11.20.
33 The Meaning of Truth (London 1909) 7.
34 What is Truth (New Haven 1923) 31.
35 Cf. Otf magistro 39; Solil. 1.5; Contra Acad. 1.3.
36, J, Mausbach, Die Ethik des hi. Augustinus (Freiburg i. Br. 1909) ,
37 Cf. Con/. 10,10.17.
14 FOREWORD
demand a definite answer. How is a recognition of trans-sub-
jective entities possible?
The senses can perceive only the external, singular things,
the Platonic phenomenon; they are not able to penetrate
the shell of sensible qualities and to reach the substance. To
the senses the inner core of the things remains an insoluble,
secret enigma. 38 Only the intellect, "the head and eye of the
soul,' 39 can by virtue of its own nature advance to the inner
essence of the things, to the ideas of the sensible phenomena,
even though it may be solicited and stimulated in this pro-
cess by the senses. This is illustrated by Augustine in the
conversation with his reason:
Reason: 'What about these [the line and sphere] have
you perceived them by the senses or by the intellect?'
Augustine: C I rather employed the senses in this matter as
I use a ship. For, when they had carried rne to the place which
I was going and I had there dismissed them, and when I
had been set down, as it were, on dry land and began to turn
these things over in my thought, my steps were for a long
time unsteady. Wherefore, it seems to me that one can more
easily navigate a ship on dry land than one can perceive
mathematics by means of the sense, though they do seem to
help a bit those who are beginning to learn. 340
With regard to the question: 'how the intellect gains cog-
nizance of the essence of the extra-subjective world/ it is
not of importance here whether Augustine in his epistomology
follows more Plato's idealism or Aristotle's realism. 41 Our
purpose will be served by stating that Augustine, besides cer-
tain 'truths and concepts a priori' attained by the human
38 Cf. De libero arb. 2.5.11.
39 Cf. Ibid.
40 Solil. 1.4.9.
41 Cf. Pegis, 'The Mind of St. Augustine'
FOREWORD 15
mind through divine illumination, speaks also of knowledge
derived from experience. Tar be it from us to doubt the
truth of what we have learned by the bodily senses; 42 since by
them we have learned to know the heaven and the earth, and
those things in them which are known to us, so far as He who
created both us and them has willed them to be within our
knowledge. 543
God is, then, the basis of all true thinking as well as of all
true being. He is not only the Creator and Lawgiver for the
things, the truth of the things, but also the source and guide
for man's cognition of this truth of the things. One who
sees, receives not merely what he sees [object], but also the
power of seeing.
Inherent in man is a law 44 of truth which holds him fast
with the firm and holy band of truth and constitutes the
norms for all his thinking. It is the 'law of nature,' the
'law of reason,' which resides in everyone's inner being, and
can be ignored by no one. As soon as man deviates in a
single point from this inner law, he lapses into error. 45 This
'eternal law,' these norms, according to which we must judge
things, originate, 46 therefore, in God; they are an outflow-
ing of the divine Logos, as are also the ideas that are realized
in the things.
The Creator has imprinted upon the things, with their
being, their intelligibility 47 or their ontological truth;
upon the thinking mind of man, on the other hand, he
has impressed the eternal, necessary laws of recognition
42 For a summary and a criticism of Augustine's theory of sensation
see V. J. Bourke, Augustine's Quest of Wisdom (Milwaukee 1945) 11 If.
43 Cf. De Trin. 15.12.21; 9.9.14; 12.15.25; and Con/. 7.10.16.
44 Cf. Con/. 1.2.2.
45 Cf. Sermones 1.18.
46 Cf, Solil 1.3.3f.; De ord. 2.19.51.
47 Cf. Solil. 1.7.15.
16 FOREWORD
and cogitation, or the logical truth. 48 The rationes aeternae**
are as causae, origines, formae the forms and prototypes of
being, and as lucidae cognitiones^ notitiae solidae et termi-
natae the norms of recognition and thought; there is an
evident agreement between the ontological and the laws of
cognition; for, 'the form itself of unshaken and stable truth , . .
wherein I take counsel . . . sheds in an immovable eternity
the same light of incorruptible and most sound reason, both
upon the sight of my mind, and upon the cloud of images
[visible things]/ 50
If the laws of our subjective reason were not realized ob-
jectively in nature, we should strive in vain to force them
upon it; and if the eternal and true laws of being were not
objective in each and every man, we should have no knowl-
edge of the world, 'There is an immutable truth embracing all
things that are true; a truth you cannot call yours, or mine,
or any man's, but which is present to all and gives itself alike
to all who discern the things that are immutably true, as a
light which in some miraculous way is both secret and yet
open to all. 351
As a sun, 52 God is, then, the origin of things and the source
of their intelligibility; the reason outside us and within
us. 53 In Him rests the relation between the subjective cog-
nition and the objective realities of the world. 54 It is God who
carries within Himself the entire truth-system; in Him the
causes and laws of being and thinking alike have their
foundation; He is the ultimate guaranty and code of two
48 Cf. Con/. 7.15,21.
49 Cf. P. B. Jansen, 'Zur Lehre des hi. Augustinus von dem Erkenncn
der Rationes aetexnae' (Grabmann-Mausbach, Aurelius Augustinus
K<>In 1930) 11 Iff.
50 De Trin. 6.9.11.
51 De libero arb. 2.12.35.
52 Cf, Con/. 4.16.30.
53 Cf. Con/. 7.7.11: 'forts* and 'intus.'
54 Cf, De civ. Dei 8,4.
FOREWORD 17
entitles which speak the same language. The divine essence
is the criterion, the firm and constant final test of truth, the
law of eternal truth, the eternal truth itself, whose reflection
is the world order, which is the inviolable norm of all created
development and activity.
A universal, eternal thought constitutes the norm for the
being and intelligible truth of things. This universal thought
is God, by whom, because of the identity of His essence and
His existence, knowledge and the objects of cognition are
one. Of Him it is said: 'One God, one Truth, one first
and supreme Essence. 555 When Lotze said that the last pillar
of our cognition, the law of identitY, has its seat in an
essence, which possesses the perfect identity, he expresses the
Augustinian thought, 'that in God there is no contradiction.' 56
This same thought reappears later in Leibnitz.
Since man 'holds a middle place between the unchange-
able Truth above him and the changeable things beneath
him, 3 human life is here not c a mere passive appropriation
of the world,* as in Spinoza's monistic system, where man is
absorbed into the universe, but it can be true to its defini-
tion (in which a Santayana of today still follows Aristotle)
as being 'reason in operation' for the end of a 'perfect hap-
piness.'
That only 'knowledge and action make man happy 157 is
the core of the Augustinian philosophy. This conception pre-
serves the dignity of man, who alone of all visible creatures
is capable of knowing and evaluating the world in a philo-
sophy that also prescribes for him the laws of living (ethics) ;
laws which he must obey to be really free, 'since this is our
freedom, to subject ourselves to the truth and will of God.
The soul enjoys nothing in freedom except what it enjoys in
55 De vera ret 1.1.
56 Cf. Con/. 2.25.34.
57 Cf. De agone Christiana 13.14.
18 FOREWORD
peace.' 58 This thought is well expressed by Ralph Waldo
Emerson when he says: 'Truth is the summit of being; jus-
tice is the application of it to affairs ... A healthy soul stands
united with the Just and the True, as a magnet arranges it-
self with the pole.' 59
Enabled to choose freely between adhering to God (the
divine order) and turning away from Him, man has the
duty of striving for the good. Misuse of this freedom is
unfaithfulness to his own essence; it is an alienation of his
nature; it is bondage.
Human action becomes, then, the yardstick and the test for
man's moral goodness, for his perfection, that is, his near-
ness to God and also his happiness. The better a man's ac-
tions conform to his metaphysical destiny (the natural order,
that is, the divine order), the more ethically good they are.
The more perfectly man resembles God, the greater is the
happiness he enjoys. But, should man remove himself from
this striving for the good that is God, whose image he
carries within him his actions are contrary to the goal which
has been set for him by his Creator; they are bad or evil; he
wanders from God, from home and happiness.
In this connection Augustine transports the metaphysical
concepts of 'corruption' and 'deformity' into the spiritual re-
alm of ethics, and identifies 'evil' with 'deformed.* In like
manner he readily symbolizes the difference between good
and evil in substituting metaphysico-ethical antitheses 60 as
'similar-dissimilar,' light-darkness,' 'familiar-alien,' 'free-cap-
tive,' 'perfection-defect,' 'return-depart,' all of which are to
signify either a gradual progress 61 in the imitation and simili-
58 De lib. arb. U3.16L
59 Essay on Character,
60 Ct De civ. Dei 11.18.
61 Cf. De Trin. 15.12.21; De civ. Dei 9.16ff.
FOREWORD 19
tude of God, or a gradual degradation 62 from this highest
good; a becoming greater and better or a becoming smaller
and worse, a becoming richer or poorer in true being, in
being good and in being happy. This gradual 'purifying
progress is to be looked upon as a kind of journey or voyage
to our native land. For, it is not by change of place that we
can come nearer to Him who is in every place, but by the
cultivation of pure desire and virtuous habits, 63 through
which we become 'gradually purified and made fit for last-
ing happiness. 564
Thus, 'the wise man, so far as it is given to him, imitates
God* 65 and 'is so joined to God in mind, that there is nothing
between to separate'; for 'God is Truth; and no one is by
any means wise, unless his mind comes into contact with
Truth.' 66 'He is morally good, for he adheres 67 to the highest
Good and rejoices in God, 68 in whom alone he can find final
contentment and real happiness/ 69
Setting up God as the highest good, the final goal of all
human desire, and the seat of real happiness, Augustine en-
nobles and glorifies 'the man 5 in man; he abolishes all bound-
ary lines of race and nationality, thus tending to make man-
kind one. His hero is the individual man, whoever and wher-
ever he may be. Without preference and distinction, God's
precepts are valid for beggar and prince; since 'the good
man, although he may be a slave, is free; but a evil man,
even though he may be a Mng, is a slave. 570
62 Cf. Erich. 29.113; De civ. Dei 6,12; De Trin. 5.9.
63 De doct. Christ. 1. 10.10; 1.19.18.
64 Cf. De civ. Dei 9.2.
65 De utilitate credendi 15.33.
66 Ibid.
67 Cf. Epistola 118,3.15; Enarraiiones in psalmos 75.8.
68 Cf. De civ. Dei 9.13.
69 Cf. Con/. 1.1.1; 4.4.7.
70 De civ. Dei 4.3.
20 FOREWORD
Outside of God, nothing is more precious than the soul;
in fact, there is 'nothing worth while to be known but God
and the soul. 371 The soul's return to God and union with Him
is man's only task. 'Hold thy light before me and recall me
from my straying, that with Thee as my guide I may return
to myself and to Thee.' 72 The manifold aims of a man's life
culminate in the single purpose: the salvation of his own
personal soul. Sanctity becomes the final aim of all culture,
and individual happiness and immortality grow only upon
eternal principles.
In contrast to so many other thinkers, pretending that
science and virtue must be distinct and independent, Augus-
tine recognizes the intrinsic and intimate harmony between
knowledge and moral goodness, whose union greatly enhances
each other's value. But he emphasizes that humility, simpli-
city of heart, rectitude of intention, and meekness are more
desirable than wit, eloquence, and erudition ; 'for the modesty
of a soul confessing its defect is more beautiful than the things
which I desired to learn.' 73 Therefore, let knowledge be ap-
plied ... to mount up the edifice of charity, which shall en-
dure forever even when knowledge shall be destroyed.' 74
The tension between intellect and faith, between knowl-
edge and belief, that excites in man this great inquietude
which is so desirious for peace, can be dispersed only through
the soul's fruition of God, 'because Thou has made us towards
Thee, and our hearts are not at rest, until they find peace in
Thee. 175
71 Solil. I 2.7.
72 Sotil. 2.6.9.
75 Con/. 5.7.12.
75 Cf. Con/. I.I.I.
74 Ep. 55.21.39.
75 Cf. Con/. 1.1.1.
FOREWORD 21
Anselm of Canterbury's maxim, fi l believe in order to un-
derstand' in this he followed the Church Father represents
a vital part in the soul's return to God and in the entire Au-
gustinian philosophy. 76 It is faith through which we are cleans-
ed faith, a gift of divine grace; and humility is the first
step on the way toward God and His kingdom, that is,
toward a true and happy life.
A humble man is unselfish. The advice to acquire a better
and noble personality through unselfishness is the essential
basis of Augustinian psychology; and it is the soul that is all-
important in man. 'I love my friends, because they are human
beings; I mean, because they have rational souls, which I love
even in thieves. For I can love reason in anyone, even when I
rightly hate him who makes evil use of that which I love.
Thus, I love my friends the more, the better use they make
of their rational soul, or at least according to the manner
in which they desire to use it well.' 77
By insistence upon the development of man's individuality,
Augustine does not neglect the social aspect in man, emphasiz-
ed previously by Aristotle. The intrinsic relation between the
individual and society receives a profound metaphysical in-
terpretation : There is nothing in the world so social by na-
ture as man . . . God has created him single to propagate
from him all the rest of the human race, so as to admonish
us to preserve concordant unity among its multitudes. 7S
The ethical growth of the individual man is, then, not only
the goal of all human activity and the basis for personal hap-
piness, but also the basis for a healthy social structure and
peace among men.
76 Cf. In loannis evangelium 29.6.
77 SoliL 1.2.7.
78 Cf. De civ. Dei 12.21.1.
22 FOREWORD
All knowledge becomes ethical religious knowledge, or,
better still, ethical religious conviction, lending to the soul
the foundation for its self-realization in the will as the com-
prehensive principle, in which life attains unity and is raised
to full activity. The metaphysical relation of the human indi-
vidual to the Absolute Personality, and the living bond of
brotherly likeness that is God's image and binds man to man,
unite all mankind with the Creator in an ethical religious
fellowship which finds its fullest expression and blessedness in
the soul's love of God and charity toward man for God's
sake. 79f Let religion bind us to the one almighty God, as^thcre
is no other creature interposed between our soul and Him, JHO
The entire Augustinian philosophy receives, therefore, the
character of a metaphysical and intellectual voluntarism, 81 epi-
tomized in Augustine's own words : To be wise and live in the
truth is to love God. Therefore, "thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with
thy whole mind; and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." 82
Natural philosophy is here, since all the causes of all natural
things are in God the creator. Ethics is here, since a good
and honest life is not formed otherwise than by loving, as
they should be loved, those things which we ought to love;
namely, God and our neighbor. Logic is here, since God
alone is the truth and the light of the rational soul Here,
too, is laudable security for the commonwealth; for a state
Is neither founded nor preserved perfectly save in the founda-
tion and by the bond of faith and of firm concord, when the
highest common good is loved by all, and this highest and
79 DC doct. Christ, 1.22.21: '...no man should be angered if you love
him for the sake of God.'
80 De ver. rel 55.133.
81 Cf. Con/. 1.12.19: "Nemo autem invitw bene facit, etiant st bonum est,
quod fecit. 31
82 Matt. 2.37.39
FOREWORD 23
truest being is God; when, too, men love one another in Him
with absolute sincerity, since they love one another for His
sake, from whom they cannot hide the real character of love.' 83
The profundity of Augustine's thought and the sublimity
of his genius will forever assure him an undying prestige as
philosopher, theologian, and promoter of culture of the highest
order. This thought is expressed by the scholar, Philip Schaff,
who says that St. Augustine is a philosophical genius of the
first order, dominating, like a pyramid, antiquity and the
succeeding ages. Adolf Haraack says : 'Even today we live by
Augustine, by his thought and his spirit; it is said that we are
the sons of the Renaissance and the Reformation, but both
one and the other depend upon Augustine.' 'It is perhaps not
paradoxical to say,' writes the philosopher Rudolf Eucken,
'that if our age wishes to take up and treat in an independent
way the problem of religion, it is not so much to Schleierma-
cher or Kant or even Luther or Thomas that it must refer, as
to Augustine, and, outside of religion, there are points upon
which Augustine is more modern than Hegel and Schopen-
hauer.' And Anton G, Pegis recently states: 'If we must single
out a name of overwhelming influence, then we may say
with more propriety of Augustine what has been said, in a
celebrated remark, of Plato, namely, that history is a series
of footnotes to him.'
But it is probably not so much his extraordinary erudition
as the human side, his simple honesty and sincerity, that brings
Aurelius Augustine so close to man. His Confessions and
Soliloquies, unmatched in self-observation and self-analysis,
are genuine diamonds as compared with the imitative auto-
biographies of later centuries.
Born in Numidia and endowed with all the physical vivac-
83 Ep . 137.7.5.
24 FOREWORD
ity and passion of an African, Augustine proudly called him-
self a Roman citizen. But in mind and heart he was a true
cosmopolitan.
Augustine and his spiritual growth truly belong to the
world. Thoughtful painters, depicting the great African hold-
ing his own heart in his hand, merely symbolize what he
himself has done in his works; in them he has laid bare his
soul to his fellowmen. For, the gospel of spirit is that of man's
kinship, which to St. Augustine was not an impracticable
dream, left to the discretion of an individual subjectivity,
but a fundamental law of the Father's kingdom, the City of
God, over which Christ, the King of kings, is the ruler. The
field of the master is the entire world,' since c there is only one
commonwealth of all Christian men. 3
For fifteen hundred years his soul's candor has won him
this great popularity, equal with peasant and prince, with
learned and unlearned, with agnostic and Christian. It was
the exceptionally unified incarnation of St. Paul's dynamic
zeal and sincerity and of St. John's tender love and deep
understanding that engendered in this man, repentant like
King David, the impressive uniqueness and inspiring beauty
of his personality.
'God often suffers the best of men to fall,' writes Papini,
'that they may rise again greater still, and stand as examples
before the herd of ordinary mortals.' 84
Augustine, perhaps, as no other great man, was familiar
with 'the abysmal depths of human personality. 5 He knew
well the depth and changeableness of the soul of his fellow-
man, to whom he extends the modest and sincere invitation :
'Whosoever reads these words, let him go with me, when he
is equally certain; let him seek with me, when he is equally
84 G. Papini, Saint Augustine, translated by M. Prichard Agnetti (N. V %
1930) .
FOREWORD 25
In doubt; let him return to me, when he knows his own error;
let him call me back, when he knows mine. 3
Thus, it is the privilege of any man to be Interested in
Augustine's solutions of problems, still applicable to present
times, to admire his gallant heroism, to find new, uncon-
querable hope and self-confidence in his redemption. And
when Pius XII with a warning voice recently reviewed our
atomic age in the light of Augustine's criticism on war, he,
too, drew our attention to the man whose life and gospel of
love and brotherhood were a most forceful influence for the
cultural development of succeeding centuries, whose teach-
ings portray such a rare and practical soundness that, applied
to modern problems, they would lead men and nations to
peace and happiness.
There Is no day so dark and desperate in anyone's life,
that he could not be guided by St. Augustine toward a more
hopeful, brighter tomorrow.
LUDWIG SCHOPP
THE HAPPY LIFE
(De beat a vita)
Translated
by
LUDWIG SCHOPP, Ph. D.
NIHIL OBSTAT:
F. J. HOLWECK
CENSOR LIBRORUM
IMPRIMATUR:
% JOHN J. GLENNON
ABCHBISHOP OF Sr. Louis
February 18, 1939
COPYRIGHT 1939 BY
B. HERDER BOOK Co.
COPYRIGHT 1948 BY
LUDWIG SCHOPP
INTRODUCTION
HE HAPPY LIFE (De beata vita) holds a unique place
among the works of St. Augustine. Of all his writ-
ings handed down to posterity, it was the first one
the great African completed. It is true that the Answer to
Skeptics (Contra Academicos) had been started and that,
in youthful enthusiasm, he had written a treatise On the
Beautiful and Fitting (De pulchro et apto), but the latter
book, as well as almost all memory of it, had been lost at
the time when he composed his Confessions.
Fortunately, Augustine bequeathed to us, almost at the
end of his life, his Retractationes, containing a record and
a personal critical review of his prolific literary career. He
here supplies us with the following account of De beata vita :
'It was written not after but between the books Contra
Academicos. It originated on the occasion of my birthday,
as is clearly indicated in the book itself, and was consum-
mated during a three days* conversation.' 1
The year 386 was most important for Augustine's intellec-
tual and spiritual development. Only a few months had passed
since he had been converted to Christianity in a wonderful
manner, and now he was spending the vintage vacation at
Cassiciacum, a rural retreat near Milan, generously offered
to him by his friend Verecundus, a grammarian of Milan
and his colleague there. Augustine had come to Cassiciacum
seeking hours of rest and peace to prepare himself for the
1 Retractations* 1.2. According to De beata vita (1.6) , Augustine's birth-
day fell on the 13th of November. He had then completed his thirty-
second year.
29
30 SAINT AUGUSTINE
approaching day of that great rebirth in Christ, the day on
which he was to be officially received into the fold of Christ 2
by St. Ambrose, Bishop of Milan.
Far from the tumult of the world, his mind would be free
from the cares that spring from ambition for honors, from the
acquisition of riches., and from the pursuit of pleasures. Thus,
he tried to throw off the last links that still connected his
mind and heart with the life he had lived, and his 4 infant
tongue began to prattle with his God, his true honor, his
riches, and his salvation' (Confessions).
Perhaps the best view of Augustine's personality then and
the conditions under which De beata vita was composed
may be gained from his own report : 3
'And now the day had come when I was actually released
from my professorship of rhetoric, from which I had already
been freed in my mind. Thou deliverest my tongue from
that from which Thou hadst delivered before my heart. Thus
I joyfully praised Thee, going into the country with all my
intimate friends. All I did in my writings (now, indeed, ded-
icated to Thy service, but still relishing something of the
school of pride so lately left) may be seen in the books com-
posed there [at Cassiciacum 4 ], partly [by the way] of dia-
logue 5 with those who were with me and partly with myself 6
alone in Thy presence. What passed partly between myself
and Nebridius, who was absent, appears in my letters. When
shall I find time enough to commemorate all Thy great bene-
fits bestowed upon us at that time, especially as I am hastening
now to other still greater things? For my remembrance calk
2 Easter, 387.
3 Confessions 9.4.7f; 9.5.13.
4 For the name Cassinacum and its location, see I), J. Kavanagh,
to Skeptics (New Yoik 1913) 251.
5 Rcfcib to Conini Atademuos, DC beata i>ila } and DC online.
6 Refers to his Soliloquia*
THE HAPPY LIFE 31
me back to those times, and it becomes very sweet to me to
confess to Thee, O Lord, with what inward pricks Thou
didst then break and tame me; in what manner Thou didst
make me plain and level, bringing low the mountains and
hills of my thoughts; how Thou madest straight what was
crooked in me and smooth what was wrong . . . Oh, what
voices did I send up to Thee, my God, when I read the psalms
of David, those faithful canticles, those airs of piety, free
of all proud spirit ! I was as yet but a novice in Thy sincere
love, only a catechumen in the country, on vacation from
worldly business, with Alypius equally a catechumen. My
mother was also with us, in a woman's habit, but with a
manly faith, with the security of mature age, the love of a
mother, and the piety of a true Christian. . . . When the vint-
age vacation came to a close, I gave notice to the Milanese
to provide another teacher of rhetoric for their students, since
I had resolved to dedicate myself to Thy service; moreover,
by reason of my difficulty in breathing and the pain in my
chest, I was no longer fit for that profession.'
Here, then, in the stillness and peace of the countryside,
Augustine and his companions enjoyed days of bodily rest
and of intellectual and spiritual edification. Following the
habit of ancient philosophers, the group of friends at Cas-
siciacum conversed about practical questions, discussed moral
and political problems, and interpreted the Roman classics
in a lively and at times light-hearted manner. 'The spirit
of these dialogues, 5 writes E. K. Rand, 7 'is in marked contrast
with that of the later Augustinian works. They are light and
easy in tone. There is jest and banter, and a comfortable sense
of philosophic leisure. The poets are not infrequently quoted,
7 'St. Augustine and Dante/ in Founders of the Middle Ages (Cam-
bridge, Mass. 1928) 256ff.
32 . SAINT AUGUSTINE
particularly Virgil and Terence, along with a verse of the
beloved St. Ambrose/
It is significant for the intimate relation between Augus-
tine's intellectual development, his spiritual growth, and the
expression of his inner passionate personality that, even before
completing his Contra Academicos, he grasped the first op-
portunity, the celebration of his birthday, to discuss with his
friends the most innate desire and final goal of all human
activity man's inherent craving for happiness. The theme
of the discussion in De beata vita is man's desire to be happy.
This is an issue of fundamental importance in any man's life.
Though men do not think of happiness in all their actions,
yet everything they do is related to happiness, 8 Augustine's
philosophy differs from other philosophical systems in this
respect : that it is not a neutral speculation and cold investiga-
tion of natural events or hypothetical theses and problems,
but tends to the welfare of the living man, Aurelius Augus-
tine. Thus, he pities the Manichaeans because of their 'mad-
ness' and refutes the suicidal skeptics, both unable to comply
with man's most essential desire. For Augustine, truth must
be applicable to life; wisdom, the aim of all research and
the very core of philosophy, becomes identical with beatitude.
*Do we not desire to be happy?* is merely another version of
'What else do I desire to find but the truth? Thus, the truth
he is seeking is identical with the supreme Good, the pos-
session of which alone can completely satisfy all human
searching and desire.
To find this truth and to know what to do, to become al-
ways better and to reach finally the supreme Good, man must
know himself. Since man is composed of body and soul, the
latter being the nobler and more essential part, human hap-
8 Cf. Boethius, De consolations philosophiae 3, pr, 2.
THE HAPPY LIFE 33
piness can be found only In the intellectual and spiritual
realm, i.e., in the recognition of the truth and the possession
of the highest good, which is identical with God. This is
the happy life : to recognize piously and completely the One
through whom you are led into the truth, the nature of the
truth you enjoy, and the bond that connects you with the
most perfect measure' (4.35).
In the De beata vita, then, Augustine has laid the founda-
tion for, and indicated the outline of, his great theistic-demo-
cratic program, in which man, through individual ethical
development in and for the welfare of the community, grows
and gains a temporal and afterwards a perfect, eternal, happy
life.
For this reason, eminent scholars like Etienne Gilson 9 and
Joseph Geyser 10 have acknowledged the importance of this
early work of Augustine for the understanding of his personal
development and his whole philosophy. It is in this little
work that Augustine for the first time seeks to establish the
absolute certitude of one's own consciousness as the essential
basis of knowledge (2.1), an original idea that became one
of the most meritorious of Augustine's accomplishments.
The De beata vita is one of Augustine's works in which
the title denotes a philosophical concept, that of 'a happy
life.' Departing from practical situations, the book evolves,
by dialectic argumentation and occasional application of
metaphysical concepts, a definition of this concept. The pro-
cedure, as well as Augustine's general high regard for defini-
9 Introduction d I'dtude de Saint Augustin (Paris 1943) .
10 'Die erkenntnistheoretischen Anschauungen Augii&tins zu Beginn
seiner schriftstellerischen Tatigkeit/ in Grabmann-Mausbach, Aurelius
Augustinus (Koln 1930).
34 SAINT AUGUSTINE
tion, division, and distinction/ 1 and the frequent use of syl-
logism show the formal aspect of his mind and writings.
The structure of the De beata vita, especially the sharp
separation between dedicatory prologue and the dialogue
which forms the body of the work, is derived from Cicero.
The latter's dialogue Hortensius (now lost) seems surely to
have been a determining factor for the book's content and
form. Varro, the inventor of the so-called 'bathing-house
dialogues/ 12 has through his De re rustica and De disdplinis
probably exercised some influence upon Augustine,
Augustine has added a novelty to the usual form of di-
alogue in introducing a woman, his own mother, as taking
active part in the discussion. He thus shows his conviction 13
that philosophy is not the prerogative of a chosen few, but a
common good of all mankind irrespective of sex, race, or oc-
cupation. Although Aurelius was the master of the little Aca-
demy at Cassiciacum, and as such gave his final approval to all
conclusions, his mother played an Important part in the
dialogue; and this not without good reason* While Aurelius
had just left the pagan schools of philosophy and was still a
novice in the fold of Christ, Monica was the only c true'
and experienced Christian in the group at Cassiciacum. 14
Though Aurelius undoubtedly accepted the Christian doc-
trine, he was not so firm 15 about the solution of important
problems: he was still the 'unskilled wrestler for the attain-
ment of truth, God and the soul. 316 Thus it was his mother
11 Cf. Solil. 2.1 UOf.
12 Cf. A, Dyroff, 'Ubei Form uiul Begnflsgehalt der august in ischen Sen rift
cle oidine,' in Grabmann-Muusbach, Aurclim August intts (Kolu 1930)
13 Clearly set forth in De ordine 1.11.31.
11 Cf. Con/, 9.4.8.
15 De beata vita 1.5.
16 Dyroff, in Introduction to Schopp, Aurelius Augusttnus, Sdbstgesprache
(Munschen 1938) 7. 00*
THE HAPPY LIFE 35
who here, as his spokesman, pointed to faith, hope, and
charity as the prerequisites of man's recognition of God and
the attainment of a happy life. 17
However, Thimme's 18 contention that Augustine's earlier
writings were still deeply founded upon pagan philosophy
invites criticism. Notwithstanding Thimme's fine achievement
as a pioneer in this field, we think we have discredited his
view that 'the basic thoughts of the De beata vita are essen-
tially Stoic, its conclusions and especially the tone entirely
neo-Platomc.' It is true that the doctrines of the Manichaeans
and Academics, 'the schools of pride which he had so lately
left, 519 still resounded in Augustine's mind. But he rather
'pitied 5 them 20 and endeavored to refute them upon Christian
principles, although with frequent application of words and
concepts (Platonic and Stoic) that were familiar to his
disciples. Was not 'Alypius, the brother of his heart, at first
even unwilling to have inserted the name of Thy only begotten
Son our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ'? 21
In the De beata vita, Aurelius refers even to the compari-
son of a few books of Plato with the Scriptures, and he gives
the latter preference and authority. He emphasizes that the
Son of God is true God, 22 the Redeemer of mankind, the
full measure, i.e., the highest Good. He was familiar with the
doctrine of the Holy Trinity. In elevating the knowledge
of a heart entirely devoted to God, above the philosophical
17 De beata vita 4.35. In his Soliloquies, written only a few weeks later,
he himself in most beautiful words elaborated upon these cardinal
virtues of Christianity.
18 Thimme, Augwtins geistige Entwicklung in den ersten Jahren nach
semev Rekehrung (Berlin 1908) . Surprisingly, Jon. Hessen seems to
agree with Thimme, in Augustinus, Vo?n Seligen Leben (Leipzig
1923) XXVI,
19 Con/. 9.5.9.
20 Ibid. 9.4.8.
21 Ibid. 9.4.7.
22 De beata vita 4.34; cf. also De ordine 1.10.28.
36 SAINT AUGUSTINE
theories gained by study, 23 he clearly indicates his evaluation
of faith over reason,
Friedrich Worter, 24 stating that 'Augustine's philosophical
thinking is not entirely permeated with the spirit of Chris-
tianity/ is more cautious than Thimme, but he does not cor-
rectly portray Augustine's situation at that time, since Augus-
tine's very definition 25 of a happy life is but another version
of the words of Christ: 36 C I am the way, the truth, and the
life.* Thus, after a careful examination of the works Augus-
tine wrote at Cassiciacum, Anton C. Pegis could well exclaim:
'Strange conclusion, this, for those who dream of a Neo-
platonic convert at CassiciacumP and state 'However im-
perfectly Augustine may know Christian doctrine at this
moment, his heart is Christian; and though that great heart
will discover, through the grace of God, new heights from
which to proclaim its own humility and to bewail its own
unworthiness, it is no less Christian at Cassiciacum for being
more Christian fifteen years later at Hippo/ 27
And does not Augustine himself in his dedication to Theo-
dore call De beata vita 'one of my disputations that seems to
me to have become rather of a more religious sort'? 28
Of course Aurelius utilized the knowledge he had from the
pagan philosophers. He knew them either through their
original writings or through the channels of Cicero, Varro,
Victorinus, Seneca, and others. He was also acquainted with
23 Ibid. 4.27,
24 Worter, Die Geistesentwicklung des hi. Augitstinus bis zu seiner Taufe
(Paderborn 1892) 72.
25 4.35.
26 John 14.6.
27 A. C. Pegis, 'The Mind of St. Augustine/ in Mediaeval Studies 6
(1944) 3f.
28 De beata vita 1.5.
THE HAPPY LIFE 37
the Encyclopedia of Cornelius Celsus, 29 who in six large vol-
umes collected the 'opinions' of all the philosophers of the
past. Probably, the influence of a neo- Pythagorean (like
Nicomachus of Gerasa) who knew Aristotle is, to a great
extent, responsible for the Aristotelian elements in Augustine's
earlier works.
The De beata vita, then, breathes the fresh air of Augustine's
new philosophy. 'God is the secret sun that shines within us;
thence derives the truth that we speak. 530 It is the light of
St. John's Gospel, the Word of God, that enlightened
Augustine.
The following translation of De beata vita appears in the
series, The Fathers of the Church, through the courtesy of
the B. Herder Book Co., 31 although the earlier version has
been carefully revised. Originally based upon the Latin text
in Migne's Patrologia Latina, it has, for the greater part, been
revised according to the editon of M. Schmaus, 32 especially
where the punctuation suggested a different rendition. How-
ever, the English idiom was not sacrificed in favor of
Schmaus's punctuation in general. Besides French, Ger-
man, Italian, and Spanish translations, two other ver-
sions in English are extant, one by Francis E. Tourscher,
O.S.A., the other by Ruth A. Brown.
29 CLSolil. 1.1251.
30 De beata vita 4.35.
31 L. Schopp, The Happy Life by Aurelius Augustine (St Louis 8c
London 1939)
32 Schmaus, S. Aurelii Augustini Episcopi Hipponensis De beata vita
liber. (Florilegium Patristicum, fasc. 37 Bonnae 1931) .
38 SAINT AUGUSTINE
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Texts and Translations:
J. P. Migne, 5. Aurelii Augitstini Opera Omnia (Patrohgia Latina 32
Paris 1861) .
M, Schmaus, 5. Aurelii Augustini Episcopi Hipponensis De beata vita
(Floiilegium Patiisticum, fasc. 37 Bonnae 1931).
F. Tourschcr, Saint Augustine De beata vita: The Happy LifeA
Study (Philadelphia 1937).
L. Schopp, The Happy Life by Amelias Augustine (St. Louis and
London 1939).
R, A. Brown, S. Aureli Augitstini De Beata Vita, A Translation with
an Introduction and Commentary (Washington, D.C. 1944).
M, Poujoulat et M. Raulx, Oeumes completes de Saint Augustm trad.
pour la premiere fois en fran^ais sous la direction de M. Pou-
joulat et M, L'Abbe Raulx, 3 (Paris 186t).
J. Hessen, Eine deutsche Ubersetzung des Dialogs De beata vita
(Philosophische Bibliothek 183 Leipzig 1923).
B. Neri, Delia vita beata, trad, e note (Floience 1930) .
R. Jolivet, Oeumes de Saint Augustin, IV Dialogues Philosophitjues
(Paris 1939) 215-291.
V. Capanaga, El Lihro de la Vida feliz (Qbras de San August in I,
Madrid 1946) .
Secondary Works:
J. Barion, Plotin und Augustinus (Berlin 1935) .
M. Baumgartner, Augustinus (ed. by E. von Aster, in Gross? Denker
L Leipzig 191 1)/
A. S. Boethii Opera (Patrologia Latina 53f.)
V. J. Bourke, Augustine's Quett of Wisdom (Milwaukee 1945).
C. Boyer, S. T., L'ldce de verite dans la philosophic de Saint Augustin
(Paiis 1941).
, Chris tianistne et neo-Platonisme dans la formation de Saint
Augustin (Paris 1920) .
E. Biehier, La philosophic de Plotin (Paris 1928) .
A. Dyroff, Die FMiik der alien Stoa (Berlin 1897).
1 'Dber Form und BegrilFsgehalt der augustinischcn Schiift
De ordine/ in Grabmann-Mausbach, Aurelius Augustinus (Kohi
1930) .
, Einleitung in die Philosophic (in Deus et Anima^ Archiv
fur christliche Philosophic und Dichtung, L Bd. Bonn 19 J7)
THE HAPPY LIFE 39
H. Eibl, Angustin und die Patnstik (Munchen 1923)
Augustmus Kenntn *s dei antiken Philosophic (BresJau
J. Geyser, 'Die erkenntnistheoretischen Anschauungen Aueustins zu
Begum seiner schriftstellerichen Tatigkeit/ in Grabmann-
Mausbach, Aurehus Augustinus (Kbln 1930) .
E Gilson, Introduction a I'etude de Samt Augustin (Paris 1943) .
M. Giabmann, Der gotthche Grand menschlicher Wahrheitserkennt-
ms nach Augustmus und Thomas Aquin (Minister 1924) .
--- Gott ken deS Heihgen Au S^tinus uber See'le und
--- ~"' ' Au g ustlnus Lehre vom Glauben und Wissen/ in Grabmann-
Mausbach, Auielius Augustmus (Koln 1930).
P. Guilloux, L'dme de St. Augustin (Paris 1921) .
J. Hessen, Die Begriindung der Erkenntnis nach dem hi. Augustinus
(Minister 1916) . &
--- , Die unniittelbare Gotteserkenntnis nach dem hi Augustinus
( 1J19) .
W. James, The Meaning of Truth (London 1909) ,
P. B Jansen, S. J., 4 2ur Lehie des hi. Augustinus von dem Erkennen
der Rationes aeternae,' in Grabmann-Mausbach, Aurelius
Augustinus (Koln 1930).
R. Jolivet, Saint Augustin et le neoplatonisme chretien (Paris 1932) .
B. Legewie, 'Die korperliche Konstitution und die JCrankheiten
Augustins/ in Miscellanea Agostiniana (Rome 1931) 25-21
J. Maruain, 'De la sagesse augustinienne/ Melanges Augustiniens
J. Mausbach, Die Ethik des hi. Augustinus (Freiburg i Br 1929)
P. E. Moriarty, The Life of St Augustine, Bishop, Confessor & Doctor
of the Church (Philadelphia 1879).
D. Ohlmarm, De S. Augustini Dialogis in Cassiciaco scriptis (Strass-
burg 1897) .
G - ^E 1 ^' Saint Augustine, transl. by M. Pochard Agnetti (N. Y.
A. C. Pegis, 'The Mind of Saint Augustine' in Mediaeval Studies
(1944) 6. 1-61.
E. Portalie, 'Saint Augustin/ Dictionnaire de Theoloeie Catholiaue 1
(Paris 1903) 2268-2472. * "
E. Przywara, Augustinus Die Gestalt als Gefuge (Leipzig 1934) .
E, K. Rand, 'St. Augustine and Dante' in Founders of the Middle Aees
(Cambridge, Mass. 1928) .
A. K. Rogers, What is Truth (New Haven 1923) .
L. Schopp, 'Der Wahrheitsbegriff des Boethius und seine Beziehungen
zu dern des hi. Augustinus,' in Philos. Jahrbuch der Universitat
Bonn (1. Jahrgang 1924) .
----- . Aurelius Augustmus Selbstgespriiche-Die echten Selbst-
gesprdche (Munchen 1938).
40 SAINT AUGUSTINE
W. Schulten, Augustins Lehre von Summe esse und esse creatwn
(Wurzburg 1935) .
E. T. Silk, * 'Boethius' Consolatio philosophiae as a sequel to Augus-
tine's dialogues and Soliloquia,' Harvard Theological Review 32
(1939) .
M. Simon, Gewisskeit und Wahrheit bei Augustinus (Emscietten 1938).
P. V. Sololowski, 'Dei heilige Augustin und die christhche Zivilisatiou/
in Koeniqshertrer Geiehtten Geselhchaft, Geutesu'isienschaftliche
Klasse, (Halle*; a.d. Saale 1927, Jahr 4, Heft 3) .
W. Thimme, Augustins geutige Entwicklung in den en>ten Jahren
nach seiner Bekehrung (Berlin 1908) .
1 Augustins etster Entwuif einer nietaphhischen Seelenlehre
(Berlin 1908) .
E. Troltsch, Augustin, die chtistliche Kitche und das Mittelaltcr
(Berlin 1915) .
F. Ueberweg und B. Geyer, Grundrm der Geschichte dcr Philosophic
2, Die patristische und scholastkche Philosophic (llth. ed.
Berlin 1928) .
F. Wdrter, Die Gcistesentwickelung das hL Aurelius Augustinus bis
zu seiner Taufe (Paderborn 1892) -
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
1 Dedication to Theodore. How Augustine came to the port
of philosophy. Time, setting, and participants of the
dialogue , 43
2 The discussion on the first day. Man consists of soul and
body. As the body is in need of food, so is the soul.
While no one is happy without possessing the objects
of his desire, not everyone who possesses what he de-
sires is happy. Who possesses God? The Academics
cannot be happy and, therefore, cannot be wise ... 51
3 The discussion on the second day. He who possesses God
is happy. The spirit may be called unclean in a twofold
manner .64
4 The discussion on the third day. The problem of happi-
ness further considered. The qualities of the needy,
the wretched, and the wise. Need and fullness of the
soul. Happiness and the concept of measure. God is
the Supreme Measure 70
THE HAPPY LIFE
Chapter 1
JONSIDERING that the voyage to the port of philosophy 1
from which, indeed, one enters the hinterland
of the happy life must be charted only by rational
choice, I do not think, great and noble Theodore, 2 that I
should be rash if I said that far fewer were likely to attain
it than those scattered few whom we actually see reaching
that port. For, since God or nature or necessity 3 or our own
will, 4 or a combination of some or all of these, would have
1 In Contra Acad. (2.2.4) Augustine also states that true happiness lies
in philosophy.
2 Augustine refers to Manlius Theodorus in De ord, (1.11.31) as 'a man
standing in very high esteem, excelling others by his ingenuity, elo-
quence, and pre-eminently by his spirit/ In his Retract. (1.2) Augus-
tine confesses that he is displeased with the high praise he had unduly
conferred upon Theodore in his earlier works.
3 Augustine speaks here in terms familiar to his disciples. The word
necessitas [necessity] denotes the natural development of things and
human actions according to the law of causality; it is used here
for fate. For he states in Contra Acad. 1.1.1. '. . . what is commonly
called fortune, is itself governed by a certain hidden order; and
what we call a matter of chance, may be only something whose
why and wherefore are concealed/ (Cf. Cicero, De divin. 1.125:
Fatum ordinem seriemque causarum . . .) . Later, in De civ. Dei
(5.9) Augustine derives the word fatum [fate] etymologically from
fari [to speak]. Thus, when Augustine speaks of fate, this is only
a term for God's word, i.e., the divine providence, or regarded
from the human point of view, the law of causality. It has nothing
to do with the old pagan concept of fate, that was merciless, unavoid-
able, and standing above or at least side by side with God (Cf. Seneca,
Quaest. nat. 2.35: Fata nulla commoventur prece, non misericordia
ftectuntur non gratia) .
4 Freedom of the human will. Augustine later devoted three books to
the question of the freedom of the human will.
43
44 SAINT AUGUSTINE
us founder in this world heedlessly and by chance 5 as In a
stormy sea the matter is indeed not clear, but is taken up
that you may shed light on it how few would perceive
whither to strive or where to return, unless, at some time, a
tempest, against our will and way, a tempest that to fools
would appear adverse, should thrust us, all unaware, off our
faulty course upon the land so dearly wished for.
(2) There are apparently three classes of seafarers, so
to speak, whom philosophy is able to embrace. The first is
made up of those who, having reached the full use of reason,
with but little effort and a slight stroke of the oar, go only
a little distance away. There they establish themselves in such
tranquility that they erect for as many other citizens as pos-
sible a very bright sign of their own work, and through its
enticement they extend tempting invitations to join them.
Others, unlike the class just mentioned, deceived through the
false appearance of the surface, have chosen to proceed out
into the middle of the sea and venture to journey far away
from their own homeland, which they then often forget.
Since a wind which they consider favorable has accompanied
them I know not in what hidden manner from behind
5 This portrays Augustine's opinion of the Platonic pre-exis^nce of
the soul. (Cf. Contra A d. 2.9.22; Solil. 2.20.35; De immort. an.
4.6.; De quant, an. 20.34; Epist. 7) . St. Augustine's strong inclination
toward the pre-existence of the soul in the prime period of his phil-
osophical activity finds a satisfactory explanation in the great Platonic
influence exerted upon the young African just freed from skepticism.
It is well known that Augustine in his later years expressly retracted
(Retr. 1.8.2; 4.4; and De trin. 12.15.25) this doctrine of pre-existence
and anamnesis, and presented the doctrine that the soul is under the
constant influence of the living illumination. (Cf. also Joh. Messen,
Die Begrundung der Erkenntnis nach dem hi Augustinus [1916];
L. Schopp, 'Der Wahrheitsbegriff des Boethius und seine Bexiehungen
zu dem des hi. Augustinus' in Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Uni-
versitat Bonn, L Jahrgang [1924] 9-14; and J. Barion, Plotin und
Augustinus [1935] 148 ff.) .
THE HAPPY LIFE 45
they joyfully and eagerly enter the extreme of wretchedness,
because a most treacherous calm weather of pleasure and
honors enticed them. For what, really, should they wish more
than for a misfortune in the very affairs through which they
were cast about and driven astray, or, when this is not suf-
ficient, for a raging tempest and a contrary wind to drive
them back to sure and substantial joys, even though they
whine and wail. However, many of this class, if they have
not been driven too far away, are brought back through
lighter mishaps. Such are men who through mournful trag-
edies in their fortunes or distressing difficulties in their vain
business affairs as if they had nothing else to do are driven
to the books of well-educated and wise men, and somehow
wake up in port, whence no promises of the sea with her
false smile can lure them away.
Between these two is a third class, consisting of those who,
either on the very threshold of youth or after being already
long tossed about, still perceive some familiar signs and re-
member, even amid the waves, the great sweetness of home.
Either they take the direct course, in no way deceived, and
without delay reach home again, or, most of them, either
wandering in the midst of fog, or gazing at the sinking stars,
or being held by some alluring charm, postpone time and time
again a favorable return and, straying for a longer period,
are often also imperiled. Frequently, some mishap in their
shifting fortunes, like a tempest unfavorable for their under-
takings, also forces them back home and to a most welcome
rest.
(3) However, for all these men, in whatever way brought
to the region of the happy life, find an immense mountain
standing squarely in front of the port, causing great difficul-
ties to the incoming sailors, an object of grave fear and one
46
SAINT AUGUSTINE
to be avoided with the utmost care. It has a great glamor
and is clothed with an enticing light, so that it not only offers
both those that sail in and those not in as yet a domicile with
the promise of stilling their desires for the happy life, but it
also often extends invitations to people within the port to
come out. Sometimes, it retains those who, enchanted by the
very height, take pleasure in looking down upon their fellow
men. These, however, frequently admonish newcomers not
to be deceived by hidden rocks nor to believe they can easily
climb up to them. With a great kindness they inform them
how they can enter without danger, because of the nearness
of the land. Thus, they point out to those envious of vain glory
the place of security.
For, what mountain does reason wish those that strive to-
ward philosophy, or who have already entered into it, more
to dread than the proud study of vain glory, so empty and
groundless inwardly that it submerges and absorbs the con-
ceited through the crackling, fragile ground upon which
they presently walk and throws them back into the darkness
and snatches away the home, so much desired and almost
in sight?
(4) Learn, therefore, my dear Theodore for to you
alone I look in this matter which I desire, ever admiring your
great ability learn, please, which of these three classes of
men has presented me to you, in what place I believe I am,
and what help I confidently expect from you.
From the age of nineteen, having read in the school of
rhetoric that book of Cicero's called Hortensius* I was in-
6 To appreciate the great influence of Cicero's Hortensius upon the
young Augustine, one should read Augustine's own description in
his Confessions (3.4f.) . The Hortensius is also mentioned in Corn, a
Acad. (1.1.4) . On this lost work of Cicero's Hortensius, cf. Hermann
Diels, Archiv, f, Gesch, d. Philosophic, I.f.47*.
THE HAPPY LIFE 47
flamed by such a great love of philosophy that I considered
devoting myself to it at once. Yet I was not free of those
mists which could confuse my course, and I confess that for
quite a while I was led astray, with my eyes fixed on those
stars that sink into the ocean. 7 A childish superstition deter-
red me from thorough investigation, and, as soon as I was
more courageous, I threw off the darkness and learned to
trust more in men that taught than in those that ordained
obedience, having myself encountered persons to whom the
very light, seen by their eyes, apparently was an object of
highest and even divine veneration. 8 I did not agree with
them, but thought they were concealing in these veils some
important secret which they would later divulge. After I
had shaken them off and abandoned them, and especially
after I had crossed this sea, the Academics* for a long while
steered my course amid the waves, while my helm had to meet
every wind.
And now I have come to this land; here I have learned
to know the North Star, to which to entrust myself. For I
have noticed frequently in the sermons of our priest, 10 and
sometimes in yours, that, when speaking of God, no one
7 The words labentia in oceanum astro, are taken from Virgil, Aeneid
3.515. Augustine and his friends at Cassiciacum spent many pleasant
hours reading and interpreting Virgil.
8 He is here thinking of the Manichaeans, a philosophical sect which
had been founded by the Persian Manes Augustine adhered to this
materialistic philosophy for nine full years (Cf. Confessions, Books 3,
4, and 5) .
9 The third Academy is meant. Carneades was its founder and principal
proponent (Cf. Answer to Skeptics, page 103, n.l., infra.] . Augustine
refutes their doctrine, that we should doubt even the most certain
things, in his three books Contra Academicos. He had been a follower
of this philosophical group from his twenty-eighth year up to his
conversion. Cf. Con/. 5.6.10.
10 I.e., Ambrose, Bishop of Milan (Cf. Con/. 6.3) .
48 SAINT AUGUSTINE
should think of Him as something corporeal; nor yet of the
soul, for of all things the soul is nearest to God.
I acknowledge that I did not fly quickly to the bosom of
philosophy, because I was detained by woman's charm and
the lure of honors, so that only after their attainment I
finally, as occurs only to a few of the most fortunate, rushed
with sails full set and all oars bent to that bosom where I
found rest. For, after I had read only a few books of Plato, 11
of whom, as I learned, you are particularly fond, I compared
them as well as I could with the authority of those who have
given us the tradition of the divine mysteries, and I was so
inflamed that I would have broken away from all anchors,
had not the counsel of certain men stayed me. 12 What else
was left, then, except to find aid in my dilemma from an
apparently adverse tempest. Thus, I was seized by such a
pain of the chest 13 that, not being able to keep up my onerous
profession, through which I might have sailed to the Sirens,
I threw off all ballast and brought my ship, shattered and
leaking though it was, to the desired resting place.
II Five MSS. read Plotini instead of Platonis, a reading endorsed by
most of the modem authors like Alfaric, Hcssen, Norregard, and
others. Also Adolf Dyroffs pupil, Prof. Barion (Plotin und Angus-
tinus,' in Neue Deutsche Forschungen, Berlin 1935) seems to share this
opinion. DyrofF, however, who in his analysis of De online deals with
this quotation, refers to the fact that the term paudssunis Ubris
belongs better to Plato, who wrote many books, than to Piotinus,
who wrote only one work, the Enneades. Those interested in the in-
terpretations of various writers regarding the influence of neo-Plato-
nism, especially that of Piotinus, upon Augustine's philosophical
development, may read the above-mentioned book of Baiion, pp. 36
if., and A. Dyroff, 'Ober Form und Begriffsgehalt der august inischen
Schrift De online/ (in Grabmami-Mausbach, Aurelhts Augustinus
(Koln 1930) 47ff.
12 Cf. Conf. 7.20.26.
13 Augustine also icfers to pains in his lungs in Conf. 1.9.17; De ord.
1.2.5; and Soli!. 1.9.16 (Cf. B. Legewie, 'Die korperliche {Constitution
und die Krankheiten August ins/ in Miscellanea Agostiniana (Rome
1931) 2.5-21.
THE HAPPY LIFE 49
(5) You see, therefore, the philosophy in which, as in a
port, I am now sailing. However, this port also is wide open,
and, though its largeness offers less danger, it still does not ex-
clude all error. For I simply do not know to what part of the
land that part which alone is really happy I should move
and how I should chance to reach it. What firmness do I pos-
sess? For, up to now, in my mind even the question of the
soul 14 is uncertain and changeable. Hence, I beg of you by
your virtue, by your kindness, by the ties and the familiarity
that bind our souls to each other, to give me your helping right
hand, for this means that you love me and believe also that
you are in turn loved and cherished by me. If I am successful
with this request, I shall very easily and with little effort
find access to the happy life, to which, of course, I presume
you already adhere.
That you may know what I do and how I gather my
friends at the port, and that you may more clearly understand
my soul since I cannot find any other signs through which
to reveal myself to you I have thought it well to address
to you one of my disputations that seems to me to have be-
come rather of a more religious sort and more worthy of your
standing, and indeed to dedicate it to your name.
This is certainly very fitting, for we have inquired among
ourselves about the happy life, and I do not see what else
could better be called a gift of God. 15 I am not frightened
by your eloquence, for, whatever I love, that I cannot fear,
though I may not reach it; very much less am I frightened
by the sublimity of your good fortune, which with you, how-
ever great, indeed takes merely second place, since it puts
14 Augustine is still unskilled in Christian philosophy. He still has to
wrestle with the main problems; one of them, the problem of the
soul. Cf. Con/. 9.1.1.
15 'Theodore/ a Greek name, means "gift of God/
50 SAINT AUGUSTINE
in second place those whom it dominates! But now, be kind
enough to pay attention to what I shall say.
(6) On the Ides of November fell my birthday. After a
breakfast light enough not to impede our powers of think-
ing/ 6 I asked all those of us who, not only that day but
every day, were living together to have a congenial session
in the bathing quarters, a quiet place fitting for the season. 17
Assembled there for without hesitation I present them to
your kindness, though only by name were first, our mother, 18
to whose merit, in my opinion, I owe everything that I live;
my brother Navigius; Trygetius and Licentius, fellow citizens
and my pupils; Lastidianus and Rusticus, relatives of mine,
whom I did not wish to be absent, though they are not
trained even in grammar, since I believed their common
sense was needed for the difficult matter I was undertaking.
16 He perhaps remembers the proverb: 'plenus venter nan studet liben-
ter' (one with a full stomach is disinclined to earnest study) .
17 This was not an unusual place for scholarly conversation, since 'teach-
ers would give lectures in the colonnades (porticus) connected with
temples or with libraries, and also in the withdrawing-rooms of the
baths. For the bath as well as the library was an intellectual resort;
cleanliness was next to culture' (E. K, Rand, 'The New Education,'
in Founders of the Middle Ages [Cambridge 1928] 219) .
18 Augustine, by calling Monica 'our mother/ probably wishes to indi-
cate that she was not merely the natural mother of his brother
Navigius and himself, but also the spiritual mother of all present.
Trygetius (according to De ord. 1.2) was a relative of Romanianus
and a student of history.
Licentius, a young poet, is the son of Romanianus, Augustine's
financial patron (cf. De ord. 1,2.5). He also defends the doctrine
of the Academics in De ord., I.4,10.He is usually the first to answer,
driven by enthusiasm and poetic light-heartedness.
THE HAPPY LIFE 51
Also my son, Adeodatus, 19 the youngest of all, was with us,
who promises great success, unless my love deceives me.
While all these were paying attention, I started in the follow-
ing manner.
Chapter 2
(7) 'It is clear to you that we are composed of soul and
body?'
While all gave their assent, Navigius replied that he was
not sure about it.
I asked him then : 'Do you really know nothing at all, or is
this matter just one of the things that you do not know?'
'I do not believe that I know nothing at all,' he answered.
'Can you mention one of the things you know?'
'Certainly,' he said.
'If it is not difficult,' I continued, 'let us be told.' When he
hesitated a little, I asked him: 'Do you at least know that
you are alive?' 1
'Yes/ he answered.
19 Adeodatus (Gift of God) , Augustine's son, was the issue of a fourteen-
year illicit relationship with a young woman. Augustine (Con/. 9.6)
says about him: 'We joined with us also the boy Adeodatus, carnally
bom of my sin; but Thou [God] hast made him good. He was then
about fifteen years of age, and he surpassed in wit many grave and
learned men. . . . There is a book of mine, entitled De magistro, by
way of dialogue, where he is introduced discoursing with me: Thou
knowest that all those were his own thoughts, which are spoken
by him. . . . Thou didst soon take away his life from the earth, and
with more security I now remember him.'
1 It is here for the first time that Augustine seeks to establish the
absolute certitude of one's own consciousness as the essential basis of
knowledge.
52 SAINT AUGUSTINE
'You know, therefore, that you possess life, since no one
can live without having life. 3
'This also I know/ he said,
'Do you know also that you possess a body?'
He said: 'Yes.'
'Then you know already that you consist of body and life? 5
This I know, but I am not certain whether I consist of
something more.'
'You have no doubt, therefore/ I continued, 'of the existence
of these two, the body and the soul. But you are uncertain
whether there is anything else necessary for the filling out and
completing of man.'
'Quite right,' he said.
Then I said: The character of this other element we will
examine at another time, if we are able to do so. However,
since we all now agree that man cannot exist without body
and without soul, I ask all of you: For which of the two
do we try to obtain food?'
'For the body,' said Licentius. 2
But the others hesitated and in various ways discussed
among themselves how food could appear necessary for the
body, since it was obtained for the purpose of life, and life
belongs only to the souL
At this point I asked: 'In your opinion, does not food ap-
pertain to the part that we see grow and become vigorous?'
All except Trygetius agreed. He said: 'Why, then, have
I not grown according to my greedy appetite?'
I answered : 'All bodies have by nature received a Measure
that they cannot exceed, although these measures may de-
crease by lack of food, as we notice more easily in cattle, and
2 Young Licentius is the first one to answer,
THE HAPPY LIFE 53
nobody has any doubt that through lack of nutrition the
bodies of all living things grow lean, 9
'To grow lean/ said Licentius, 'does not mean to become
smaller.'
This is satisfactory for the purpose I have in mind/ I said.
Tor the question is whether food appertains to the body. It
does so appertain, because, if it is withheld, the body becomes
lean. 9
All agreed to this.
(8) 'What about the soul? 9 I asked. 'Is there no food
proper to the soul? Or do you think that knowledge is its
nutrition? 9
'Obviously, 9 said our mother. 'I believe that the soul is not
nourished except by the understanding and knowledge of
things. 9
When Trygetius showed doubt about her statement, she
asked: 'Did not you yourself today demonstrate from what
and where the soul finds its nourishment? For, according to
your own statement, you noticed only after a certain part
of the breakfast which bowl we were using, since you had
been thinking of some other things I do not know, although
you helped yourself from that course and ate it. Where, then,
was your mind at the time when it did not pay attention to
what you were eating? From there, believe me, and by such
meals is the soul nourished, that is, by those speculations and
thoughts by which it is able to gain knowledge. 9
When there was a buzz of questioning about this point, I
asked : 'Do you not concede that the souls of wise men are by
far richer and greater, in their way, than the souls of the
uneducated? 9
This is obvious, 9 they replied.
Then we state correctly that the souls of people not sci-
,3
54 SAINT AUGUSTINE
entifically trained and unfamiliar with the liberal arts are,
as it were, hungry and famished. 3
C I believe/ said Trygetius, 'that their souls also are full,
but full of faults and worthlessness.'
There exists, believe me, 5 I said, 'a certain real sterility
and hunger of the soul For, as the body when its nutrition
is withheld is generally ill and scabious, bodily faults that in-
dicate hunger, so are souls filled with ills through which they
betray their impoverishment. Thus, according to the ancients 3
the very word nequitia [worthlessness] the mother of all
vices springs from nequicquam, that is, from that which is
a nothing. The virtue which is opposite to this vice is called
frugalitas [frugality], for, as this latter is called after the word
frux [fruit], i.e., after fructus [enjoyment], because of a cer-
tain fecundity of the souls, so is nequitia [worthlessness]
named after this sterility, i.e., after nihil [the nothing] ; nihil
[nothing] is all that flows, that is dissolved, that melts and
steadily perishes [pent]. 4 Because of this, we consider such
men lost [perditi].
'But a thing really has being when it remains, stands
firmly, and is always the same, as is the case with virtue. 5
3 For the proposed etymologies of nequitia and frugalitas, see Cicero,
Tuscutan Disputations 3.8.18.
4 Here is laid the foundation for Augustine's concept of reality, which
is derived from Plato's view of the principality of the world of ideas
over the world of sense. Cf. also Dr. WUhelm Schulten, Augustinus
Lehre von summe esse und esse creatum (1935) -
5 This is the Ciceronian concept of virtue that is a mixture of Platonic
and Stoic elements. Augustine in his Soliloquies (1.6.13) states:
'Virtue is either correct or perfect reason . , . and this is truly perfect
virtue, the reason that reaches its final goal followed by a happy
life/ Elsewhere (De civ, Dei 15.22) , he briefly defines virtue as "the
order of love. Since Augustine identifies order with reason, human
acts are virtuous when performed with reason according to the order
of the divine laxv.
THE HAPPY LIFE 55
The greater and most beautiful part of this is called tern-
perantia [restraint] and frugalitas [frugality] .'
'Although this may be too obscure for your understanding
at present, you certainly will concede, when the souls of the
uneducated are filled, that there are likewise, as for bodies,
two kinds of food for souls: one healthful and beneficial; the
other unhealthful and harmful 56
( 9 ) c On the strength of this, I think that on my birthday
I ought to serve a somewhat richer meal, not only for our
bodies, but also for our souls, since we all agree that man
consists of two things: body and soul. The quality of this
meal I will reveal, if you are hungry. For, in case I tried to
feed you against your will and taste, my undertaking would
be in vain and prayers should be said that you would be
more desirous for those meals than for the ones of the body.
This will be the case if your souls are healthy, for sick souls,
as can be seen in a diseased body, refuse their food and spit
it out.'
By the expression of their features and by their words of
approval, all said they were ready to accept and eat what-
ever I had prepared.
(10) Then I spoke again: 'We wish to be happy, do
we not?' 7
No sooner had I said this, than they agreed, with one voice.
I asked: 'In your opinion, is a person happy who does
not possess what he wants?'
They said: 4 By no means.'
6 Augustine here progresses from the physical to the metaphysical,
and then to the moral realm.
7 This question is asked in direct adherence to Cicero's Hortensius.
Augustine repeats the theme in his De Trinitate. Boethius (480-525)
deals with the same problem in his De consolatione philosophiae
(S.pr. 2 ff.) .
56 SAINT AUGUSTINE
'What? Everyone who possesses what he wants Is happy? 5
At this point our mother said: 'If he wishes and possesses
good things, he is happy; if he desires evil things no matter
if he possesses them he is wretched.'
I smiled at her and said cheerfully: 'Mother, you have
really gained the mastery of the very stronghold 8 of philosophy.
For, undoubtedly you were wanting the words to express
yourself like Tullius, who also has dealt with this matter. In
his Hortensius, a book written in the praise and defense of
philosophy, he said: "Behold, not the philosophers, but only
people who like to argue, state that all are happy who live
according to their own will. This, of course, is not true,
for, to wish what is not fitting is the worst of wretchedness.
But it is not so deplorable to fail of attaining what we desire
as it is to wish to attain what is not proper. For, greater evil
is brought about through one's wicked will 9 than happiness
through fortune." J1
At these words our mother exclaimed in such a way that
we, entirely forgetting her sex, thought we had some great
man in our midst, while in the meantime I became fully
aware whence and from what divine 11 source this flowed.
Then Licentius spoke up: 'You must tell us what a person
has to wish in order to be happpy, and what kind of things
he must desire/
Invite me,' I said, 'to your birthday party, and I will ac-
cept gladly what you serve. In this manner, please, be my
8 'Stronghold of philosophy/ a term used also in SoliL LI 0.17 to indicate
that philosophy is a stronghold that can be won and held only by
combat,
9 The importance of the will.
10 The same quotation is found inDe Trin. 13.5.8.
11 In De ordine 2.1.1 Augustine speaks of a divine inflammatio of his
mother.
THE HAPPY LIFE 57
guest today and do not ask for something that perhaps Is not
prepared. 5
When he felt sorry because of his request, though it was
modest and not out of place, I asked : 'Do we all now agree
that nobody can be happy without possessing what he desires,
and that not everyone who has what he wants is happy? 5
They all expressed their approval.
(11) e But what about this?' I asked. 'Do you grant that
everyone who is not happy is wretched?*
They had no doubt about this.
'Everyone, then,' I continued, 'who does not possess what
he wants, is miserable.'
All assented.
'But what preparation should a man make to gain happi-
ness? 9 I asked. 'For this, perhaps, is also a question to serve
up at our banquet, so that the eagerness 12 of Licentius may
not be disregarded. In my opinion, what a man possesses
ought to be obtained by him when he wants it.'
That is evident,' they said.
'It must be something,' I remarked, 'that ever remains,
and is neither dependent upon fate nor subject to any mishap.
For, whatever is mortal and transitory we cannot possess
whenever we wish it, and as long as we wish to have it.' 13
All agreed.
But Trygetius said: 'Many favorites of fortune possess
abundantly and plentifully those things which, though frail
and subject to mishaps, are pleasant for this earthly life. And
they lack nothing that they desire.'
12 Cf. above, where Licentius asked this question.
13 Augustine repeats here the doctrine of 'being/ already mentioned
in 2.8.
58 SAINT AUGUSTINE
To him I replied: 'In your opinion, is a person happy who
has fear? 5
'It does not seem so/ he answered.
'If, then, someone is likely to lose what he loves, can he be
without fear?'
'No/ he said.
'All those fortuitous things can be lost. No one, then, who
possesses and loves them can ever be happy.' 14
He did not refute this.
At this point, however, our mother said: 'Even if some-
body were certain that he would not lose all those things,
he still could not be satisfied with such possessions. Hence,
he is miserable because he is ever needy/ 15
'But, in your opinion would not somebody be happy/ I
asked, 'who has all these things in abundance and super-
fluity, if he is moderate in his desires, and enjoys them with
contentment properly and pleasantly?'
'In this case/ she replied, 'he is not happy through the
possession of these things, but through the moderation of his
mind/ 16
'Very well expressed/ I said. 'No better answer to my
question could be expected, and no other one from you. There-
fore, we do not have the slightest doubt that anyone setting
out to be happy must obtain for himself that which always
endures and cannot be snatched away through any severe
misfortune/
Trygetius said: 'We have already agreed to this/
'Is God, in your opinion, eternal and ever remaining?* I
asked.
14 See the same thought in Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy 3. pr, 2.
15 It is always the mother who has the final say.
16 A well-known principle in the ethics of the Stoics.
THE HAPPY LIFE 59
'This, of course, is so certain/ replied Licentius, 'that the
question is unnecessary.' All the others agreed with pious
devotion.
Therefore/ I concluded, c whoever possesses God is happy.'
(12) As they readily and joyfully agreed to this, I con-
tinued: c lt seems to me, therefore, that we have only to
inquire what man really possesses God, for he, certainly, will
be happy. It is your opinion about this that I now ask. 3
Here Licentius remarked: 'He who lives an upright life
possesses God. 3
Trygetius continued: 'He who does what God wills to be
done possesses God/ 17
Lastidianus also agreed to this opinion.
The boy, 18 the youngest of all, said, however: 'Whoever
has a spirit free from uncleanness has God. 3
Our mother approved all the answers, especially the last
one,
Navigius remained silent. When I asked him what he
thought, he replied that he was rather pleased with the last
answer.
In order that Rusticus should not appear to be neglected
in such an important matter, I asked him for his opinion,
for it seemed to me that he kept silence not so much out of
deliberation as through bashfulness. He agreed with Trygetius.
(13) Then I said: 'Now I know the opinions of all on
this most important matter. Beyond this question we have no
17 If we take God as the point of departure, Trygetius should, from
the logical point of view, have answered first. In 3.17 Augustine
corrects the sequence. It is perhaps significant for Augustine's phil-
osophy of history that Trygetius, the historian, presents an answer
in which is implied that history is but a development in creation
according to the will of God.
18 While Licentius as a poet is interested in life, Adeodatus the boy
is motivated by the youthful ideal of a pure spirit.
60 SAINT AUGUSTINE
need to inquire nor can anything be found, If only we continue
our investigation, as we began, with the greatest serenity
and sincerity. However, this investigation would be tedious
today; for the mind also in its feasts may go to excess if it
indulges too greedily in the meal in this way it digests
poorly, and the consequent discomfort is no less harmful to
the health of the mind than is hunger itself. Therefore, If
you do not object, we will rather take up this question tomor-
row, when we are hungry again. However, I wish you now
to nibble qufte freely at what suddenly enters your host's mind
to offer you. Unless I am mistaken, it is like food usually
served as dessert, made and seasoned, as it were, with scholas-
tic honey. 5
Immediately after these words, they all exhibited great
eagerness, as for an offered dish, and urged me to tell them
at once what it was.
'Do you think,* I asked, 'that the business we undertook
with the Academics is completely finished?' 19
As soon as the name was mentioned, the three who knew
of this matter arose rather promptly and, as the custom is,
tried to give a helping hand to the serving host, pointing out
most urgently that there was nothing they would more gladly
hear about.
(14) Then I proposed the matter as follows, saying:
'If it is evident that a person is not happy who does not
possess what he wants, as our reasoning has just demonstrated,
but no one seeks to find what he does not wish to find, and
19 Augustine thinks of the conversation in the first book of Contra
Academico$> which was written before the De beata vita. Since, for
Augustine, wisdom and happiness are identical, he cannot get away
from the Academics and the establishment of truth.
THE HAPPY LIFE 61
these [the Academics] strive for the truth, and so must wish
to find it, therefore they wish to possess the faculty of finding
it. But they do not find it; consequently, they do not possess
what they wish, and therefore cannot be happy. No one,
however, is wise if he is not happy. Therefore, the Academic
is not wise,' 20
Hereupon there was a general exclamation, all, as it were,
snatching up the morsel whole.
But Licentius, listening with more attention and caution,
was afraid to agree and said: 'I joined you in that snack, in
that the conclusion moved me to exclamation. However, from
now on I will swallow nothing and I will save my share for
Alypius, 21 Together with me he will then lick at it, or advise
me why it should not be touched.'
'Navigius, 1 I added, 'because of his diseased spleen, should
be a little more careful with sweets.'
To this remark he smilingly replied: 'Such things will really
cure me. For this dish you have placed before us, prickly
somehow and elaborate, is sharp in its sweetness as that
20 Augustine reasons that the doctrine of the Academics lends itself
to a self-destruction, for they are striving for the truth, which they
cannot find and without which no one can be happy and wise. Thus,
skepticism is untenable, since it cannot satisfy the innate human
desire for truth and happiness.
21 According to Contra Acad. 1.3.8, Alypius had left for Milan. His
return to Cassiciacurn is mentioned in De ord. 2.1.1.
Alypius, also born at Tagaste, was younger than Augustine. His
parents belonged to the highest ranks of the municipium. He was
related to Romanianus, Augustine's benefactor, and thus also to
Licentius. Alypius had been Augustine's very close friend since child-
hood. Thus, Augustine calls him the brother of his heart (Con/.
9.4.7.) . He had belonged to Augustine's worldly set at Carthage and
went with him to Rome to study law. Like Augustine, an adherent
of the Manichaeans, he accompanied him from Rome to Milan. There
he lived, was converted, and was baptized with him. He died as
Bishop of Tagaste.
62 SAINT AUGUSTINE
well-known writer says of Hymettic honey 22 and does not
bloat my stomach. Therefore, after a taste of it, I gladly
swallow it all. For I see no way in which this conclusion can
be refuted.'
'Indeed it cannot be, 3 agreed Trygetius. Therefore, I am
really pleased that for some time I have met them [the Ac-
ademics] with some unfriendliness. For some reason or other
perhaps by some natural impulse or, to speak more truly,
by the grace of God although I knew not how they were
to be refuted, I was greatly opposed to them.'
(15) Here Licentius 23 spoke up: 4 I do not yet abandon
them. 3
'You disagree with us, then?' asked Trygetius.
'Are you and the others in disagreement with Alypius? 5
was his reply.
Then I resumed the conversation. 'Without doubt,' I said,
'Alypius, if here, would grant this conclusion. 24 For he would
not entertain such an absurd view and believe that a person
either could appear to be happy who had not such valuable
assets of the soul which he had wished most ardently to
possess or think that these men would not like to find the
:ruth, or yet regard as wise anyone who was not happy. For
22 The 'well-known writer' (simply illc [that one] in the Latin) appears
to be Cicero, who in the Hortcnsius referred to the sharp taste
of this honey (so named from Mt. Hymettus near Athens) , The
passage is quoted and assigned to the Hortmsius by Nonius and is
frag. F.V.89 in C. F. W. Mueller's Teubner edition of Cicero. The
phrase used by Navigius to describe the intellectual sweetmeat in
question is also taken from Cicero (Academica 2-24.75) who applied
it to certain sophistic arguments.
23 Both in Contra Academicos and in De ordine Licentius sides with
the Academics.
24 'Ratiuncula,' used by Plautus, denotes in Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 2J2.29,
a short, unimportant syllogism of the Stoics.
THE HAPPY LIFE 63
these three honey, meal, and nuts are the ingredients of
the food which you are afraid to taste. 5
'Do you think/ he replied, 'that Alypius would yield to this
little lure of boys, abandoning the richness of the Academics,
by the very flood of which this brief argument would probably
be overwhelmed or be further prolonged?"
I said: 'As though we were seeking something long, espe-
cially against Alypius; for he himself would in no small way
satisfactorily prove from his own body that those small in-
gredients provide vigor and utility. But, since you base your
conduct upon his authority in his absence, which of these do
you not approve? Is it that a person is not happy who does
not possess what he wants? Or do you deny that they [the
Academics] want to find the truth, which they so eagerly
inquire after? Or do you believe that a wise man is not
happy?'
With a touch of peevish laughter, he replied: 'Certainly a
person is happy who does not possess what he wants.'
When I ordered this to be written down, he exclaimed: 'I
did not say that.'
When I again nodded that it should be written down, he
said : 'Yes, I said it.'
I had once and for all ordered 25 that every word should
be written down. In this way I held the youth in suspense
between hesitancy and constancy.
(16) While we, jesting with these words, invited him
to eat his little share, I noticed that the others not knowing,
but eager to know, what we two by ourselves were treating
of so pleasantly looked at us without smiling. They appeared
25 In using the word praeceperam, Augustine describes himself as the
leader of the discussion, the Socrates of the Platonic dialogue.
64 SAINT AUGUSTINE
like people who, as frequently happens among greedy and
Insatiable table-companions, refrain from grabbing because
of their good manners or are deterred through bashfulness.
And, since it was I who had done the inviting and you 26
have shown how to play the role of a great man (that of a
real man, to explain it fully) and how to remain the host
even at feasts of this kind the inequality and discrepancy at
our table disturbed me. I smiled at my mother. She, very
willingly offering from her own supply what they had not
enough of, remarked : 'Please inform us who these Academics
are, and what purpose they have in mind.'
After my explanation, brief but clear enough, so that no-
body had to go away uninformed, she 27 declared : 'These are
epileptics.* (This is the term commonly applied to persons
who suffer from 'falling sickness' ) . And at the same time she
arose and went away. And we others, making an end of the
conversation, also departed with joy and laughter. 28
Chapter 3
(17) When we had convened again in the same room
on the following day after breakfast, though a little later
than the day before, I began: 'You have assembled late for
the banquet. I do not think that the cause for this lies in the
overloading of your stomach, but in your anticipation of the
small number of courses. Apparently, you did not deem it
necessary to start so early, believing that you would quickly
26 Augustine appears, even if abruptly, to be again addressing Theodore,
This reading of the passage is supported by a suggestion of the
Maurists (PL 32 967 n.2) . Brown's (not wholly convincing) inter-
pretation has Monica as the subject of 'you have shown/ The
Latin text of the passage is Itself uncertain.
27 Here, as at the end of 2.9, Monica has the final say.
28 Here closes the interplay about the Academics that began in 2.14.
THE HAPPY LIFE 65
be through with the meal. Of course, there was ground for
believing that not many remnants were left, since the food,
even on the day of the feast, was served only in small quanti-
ties. Perhaps this is right. But I myself, as well as you, do not
know what is prepared for you.
'It is, indeed, somebody else who continually offers all
meals, especially such meals, for all. But we generally desist
from eating, either because of feebleness or satiety or business.
Unless I am mistaken, He is the one about whom we all
piously and firmly agreed yesterday that it is He, through
His steady presence in men, who makes them happy. For,
when our reason had demonstrated that a man who possesses
God is happy, and when none of you opposed this conclusion,
the question was asked : Who, in your opinion, possessed God.
'If I remember correctly, three opinions were expressed
on this point. The first preferred to think that one possesses
God who does His will. Others, however, thought that a per-
son who lived an upright life possessed God. Still others saw
God in those souls that are free of unclean spirits.'
(18) 'But perhaps all of you have expressed the same
opinion, only in different words. For, if we consider the first
two statements everyone who lives uprightly does what God
wills, and everyone who does what God wills lives uprightly
we see that living an upright life is the same as doing
what pleases God; unless this seems to you otherwise.'
They agreed.
'The third opinion, however, should be considered with a
little more care, because, according to the rites of the most
spotless mysteries, the impure spirit, as far as I see, is usually
spoken of in two different ways. Either it is the evil spirit
which invades the soul from the outside, perturbs the senses,
and brings on men a certain madness; to remove it, the ones
66 SAINT AUGUSTINE
who are over us are said to Impose hands or to exorcise, that
is, they expel it, adjuring it through a prayer to God. 1 Or
else, every impure soul, i.e., one defiled through vices and
sins, is called an evil spirit.
Thus, 1 ask you, boy, you who perhaps have uttered this
thought in a somewhat cleaner and more serene spirit, I
ask you: Who in your opinion has not an impure spirit? Is
it the one who has not a devil, that usually makes men furi-
ous, or the one who has cleansed his soul from vices and all
sins? 5
'I believe/ he replied, 'that the one who lives chastely has
not an impure spirit.'
'But, whom do you call chaste?' 1 asked. 'One who does
not commit any sin, or one who refrains only from illicit
intercourse?*
He replied: 'How can someone be chaste who refrains only
from illicit intercourse, but does not desist from a steady pol-
lution of his soul through other sins? One is truly chaste who
keeps God in mind and devotes himself to Him alone.*
After I had expressed the wish that the boy's words should
be written down just as he had spoken them, I said: 'Such
a one, of course, lives rightly, and whoever lives rightly must
be of such a sort. Or do you differ from me?'
Along with the others, he granted this.
'Therefore, it is one single opinion which we have ex-
pressed, 5 I said.
(19) 'Now I intend to question you, rather briefly, about
this point: whether God desires that man seek Him. 9
They said: 'Yes. 3
I also asked: 'Can we say that one who seeks God leads a
bad life?'
1 The baptismal ceremonies of the Catholic Church,
THE HAPPY LIFE 67
'By no means/ was their reply.
'Answer me yet a third question: Is an impure spirit able
to seek God? 5
They said: 'No.' Navigius, still a little in doubt, at first,
finally agreed with the others.
'If, then/ I said, 'one who seeks God obeys the will of
God, he both lives righteously and is without an impure
spirit. On the other hand, one who seeks God has not yet
found God. Nothing, then, immediately compels our belief
that whoever lives an upright life, or does what God wills, or
has not an impure spirit, has God.'
While the others laughed at the fact that they were misled
through their own admissions, our mother, stunned for a
while, requested that through an explanation I should loosen
and untangle for her the logical knot I had been compelled
to present.
After this had been done, she said : 'But nobody can attain
God without first seeking 2 Him.'
'Very well,' I replied. 'But one who is still seeking has not
yet attained God, although he lives an upright life. Therefore,
not everyone who lives a good life possesses God.'
She then said: 'I believe that everyone possesses God, but,
if one lives righteously, he has God favorable to him, and,
if wrongly, hostile.'
'Incorrectly, then,' I said, 'we conceded yesterday 3 that the
one is happy who possesses God, since every man possesses
God and yet not every man is happy.'
Therefore, add the word "favorable," ' she said.
(20) 'Are we at least certain about the conclusion, that
he is happy who has God favorable to him?' I asked.
2 One has to seek in order to find, as one has to knock before the door
is opened.
3 Cf, 2.10.
68 SAINT AUGUSTINE
<I should like to agree,* said Navigius, *but I am afraid
about the man who is still searching for God, especially for
the reason that you may conclude from this that the Ac-
ademic is happy, who, in our conversation of yesterday in
vulgar and bad Latin, but most aptly, at least in my opinion
was said to be afflicted with falling sickness [caducarius].*
Tor it is impossible for me to say that God is unfavorable
to the man who seeks Him : and 5 if it is improper to say this,
He will be favorable. But, whoever has God favorable to him
is happy. The man who seeks is, therefore, happy, although
everyone who seeks does not possess what he wants.
Thus, also, that man is happy who does not possess
what he wants, a conclusion that appeared to be absurd to us
all yesterday; whence we thought that we had dispersed the
obscure teachings of the Academics, 5 Therefore, Licentius
will triumph over us. Like a prudent physician, he will ad-
monish me that this is the penalty demanded by the delicacies
that I took against the interests of my health/
(21) At this point, when even our mother had smiled,
Trygetius said: *I do not at once concede that God is unfavor-
able to the one to whom He is not favorable. But I believe
there is a middle state/
I then asked him: 'Do you believe that such a man, to
whom God is neither favorable nor hostile, still possesses God
in some way? 3
Since he was a little reluctant, dttr mother said : To possess
God, and not to be without God, are two quite different
things.*
' Which, then/ I asked, ^ better: to possess God, or not to
be without God?*
4 C 2.16.
5 Cf, 2.13-16.
THE HAPPY LIFE 69
c As far as I can see,' she replied, 'my opinion is this: He
who lives righteously possesses God, that is, has Him propitious
to him; he who lives a bad life also possesses God, but as
hostile to him. But, whoever is still seeking God, and has not
yet found Him, has Him neither as propitious nor as hostile,
yet is not without God. 5
'Is this also your opinion?' I asked the others.
They said: 'Yes.'
'Kindly tell me,' I urged: 'In your opinion, is not God
more propitious to the one whom He favors?'
They acknowledged that it was so.
'Is God not favorable toward the man who is seeking
Him?' I asked again.
'Yes,' they replied.
'Consequently, whoever seeks God has God propitious to
him. But, everybody who has God propitious to him is happy.
On the strength of this, also, one is happy who seeks God.
But, whoever is seeking does not yet possess what he wishes to
possess. Consequently, he is happy who does not possess
what he wants to possess.'
Our mother remarked: 'According to my view, by no
means is one happy who does not possess what he wishes.'
'Then,' I said, 'not everybody is happy who has God pro-
pitious to him.'
'If reasoning demands this conclusion,' she replied, 'I
cannot deny it.'
Then I said: 'We, therefore, have to make the following
distinction: Everyone is happy who has already found God
and has God propitious to him; on the other hand, everyone
who is seeking God has God propitious to him, but is not yet
happy. Of course, everybody who, through vices and sins,
70 SAINT AUGUSTINE
goes astray from God Is not only unhappy, but Is not even
living with God's favor.' 6
(22) When this was approved by all, I continued. 'Very
well; I am afraid only that you will be vexed through a con-
clusion already agreed upon, namely, that he is miserable
who is not happy; for, thence it logically follows that that
man is miserable who 7 [has God propitious to him, since
as we have said he still seeks God and therefore is not yet
happy.] Or, indeed, should we, like Tullius, call the owners
of large estates rich, but the possessors of all virtues poor? 8
But consider whether, as it is true that every needy person
is miserable, it is also true that every miserable one is needy,
In this case, then, it will be correct to say that misery is but
poverty, a statement which, after it is made, I now approve
as you have heard.
'However, the investigation of this would take too long for
today. 9 Thus, that you may not become dismayed, I ask you
to meet again tomorrow at the same table/
As soon as all had expressed their eagerness to comply with
my request, we rose.
Chapter 4
(23) On the third day of our discussion, the morning
mist, which was keeping us in the bathing quarters, dis-
persed, and the weather gave us a very sunny afternoon. So we
6 Augustine briefly summarizes the results of their discussion.
7 The condition of the MSS. at this point indicates that there was a
fault in the archtype (cf. Schmam ad loc.) , probably the laruna noted
by Augustine, Retract, 1.2. We have given in brackets a translation of
the text adopted by the Maurist editors.
8 From the Hortensius (cf. Usenet, GMtingische Gelahrten Anzeigcn
[1892] 381) . For the sense, cf, Cicero, Paradoxa 6.2.-1H.
9 Augustine shows a fine psychological approach in his pedagogy.
THE HAPPY LIFE 71
decided to go down to the little meadow nearby. After we
were all seated In what seemed a comfortable spot, the re-
mainder of our colloquy was taken up as follows.
I began: "Almost everything which, in questioning you,
I wanted you to concede, I have received and retained. There-
fore I believe since we are finally able to distinguish our
session through a certain interval of days there will be no
need for you today to give me any answer or, at least, not
many answers. However, our mother has stated that wretched-
ness is nothing but poverty, and we are all agreed also that
all are wretched who are needy. But, whether also all who are
wretched are in need is a question which we could not explain
yesterday.
'If reason has demonstrated that this is so, then the ques-
tion "Who is happy?" is perfectly solved: it will be the one
who is not in need. For, everyone who is not miserable is
happy. Therefore, happy is the man who is without need, if
we are to say that need [egestas] is identified with misery
[miseria]*
(24) 'Cannot the conclusion that everyone is happy who
is not in need,' asked Trygetius, be drawn from the evident
fact that every needy man is miserable? I remember that
we agreed upon no middle state 1 between the miserable and
the happy.'
'In your opinion, does a middle state exist between a dead
and a living man?* I asked. 'Is not every man either alive
or dead? 5
'I grant you that here also there is no middle state,' he re-
plied. 'But to what avail is this?'
'Because,' I continued, 'I believe that you will also concede
1 Cf. 2.11.
72 SAINT AUGUSTINE
that a person is dead who has been buried for a year. 3
He did not deny it.
s But, does it follow from this that also one is still living who
has not been buried for a year?'
This does not follow/ he said.
Therefore,' I continued, 'it does not follow, from the sup-
position that everyone is miserable who is in want, that
everyone is happy who is not in want, although a middle
state cannot any more be found between the miserable and
the happy than between a living man and a dead man/
(25) Because some of them grasped this rather slowly,
I tried, as well as I could, to enlighten them by the use of
words more suited to their understanding, and I said: 'No
one has any doubt that everybody is miserable who is in want,
and we are not discouraged by certain things necessary for
the body, even of the wise. A soul in which the happy life
resides 2 is not in want of these things. For, the soul itself is
perfect, and whatever is perfect is not in want of anything.
However, it will take what it seems that the body needs, if
such is available"; if it is not available, its lack will not crush
it.
'Every wise man is strong, and the strong man entertains
no fear. The wise man, therefore, is not afraid either of bodily
death or of those pains for whose banishment, prevention, or
delay he would need all those things of which he is capable of
being in want.
2 Augustine corrects this judgment (Retract. 12) in these words: 'I
declare that it was in the time of this present life that only in the
soul of the wise man the happy life dwells (regardless of the condi-
tion of the body) , whereas the perfect knowledge of Godthat is,
the highest knowledge attainable by man is hoped for by the Apostle
in the life to come. In this life, which alone deserves to be called
happy, even the incorruptible and immortal body will be subservient
to its spirit, without any struggle and causing no vexation.'
THE HAPPY LIFE
73
'Nevertheless, he will always make wise use of them, when they
are not wanting. For there is much truth in the statement, "To
allow admittance to something you can avoid^ is foolish." 3
'He will, therefore, shun death and pain, so far as it is
possible and becoming to do so. Otherwise, that is, not taking
any precaution at all, he may be miserable, not because these
things happened to him, but because he took no care to avoid
them when he could have done so and this is certainly a
sign of folly. 4 Consequently, in not avoiding them, it is not
through enduring them that he would be miserable, but
through folly.
'But if, in spite of most earnest and worthy efforts he can-
not prevent those happenings, they will not make him miser-
able. And the following saying of the comedy is equally true :
"Since not all you wish can be done, wish only what can be
done."*
'How will anyone be wretched to whom nothing happens
contrary to his wish? For, he cannot wish anything which he
believes he cannot attain. He has thus set his will only on very
definite things; that is, in whatever he undertakes, he acts
either in conformity with virtuous duty or the divine law of
wisdom, 6 and these things can by no means be taken away
from him/
(26) 'But, now consider whether every wretched man is
also in want. To admit this is rather difficult in view of the
fact that many people live in the midst of fortune's abundant
gifts, people for whom everything is pleasant and easy; what-
ever their passion desires is furnished immediately at their
nod. Such a life, of course, is not easy to attain.
"3 Augustine seems to quote from memory thinking of Terence, Eunuch.
4.6.23.
4 Augustine takes a healthy pragmatic view of life.
5 Terence, Andria, Act. II, Scene L
6 Virtue is following the will of God.
74 SAINT AUGUSTINE
"But, let iis think of such a man as resembles Tullius 5
description of Grata. 7 Who could affirm offhand that Grata
had been afflicted with want, since he was a man of great
riches, luxuries, and delights, not lacking anything in regard
to pleasure, influence, dignity, and having a healthy constitu-
tion? Immensely rich in estates, and exceptionally blessed
with most charming friends, he had in abundance whatever
his heart desired, and all these goods in the interest of his
physical wellbeing. In a word, all his undertakings and his
every wish were crowned with success.
'Perhaps one of you may say that this man desired to have
more than he actually had. But this is unknown to us. Since
it Is enough for our purpose, let us take for granted that he
did not desire more than he had already. Do you think that
he was in want?'
Licentius answered: 'Even if I concede that he did not
desire anything further something hard to believe of a
man who Is not wise yet, assuredly, he must have been
afraid of losing all his possessions through one sudden mis-
hap, since, as it is said, he was a man of high Intelligence.
For It was not difficult to comprehend that all such things,
no matter how great, were subject to chance.'
At this point I smiled and said : 'Licentius, you see that the
brilliancy of his own mind impeded this man, exceptionally
favored by fortune, from enjoying a happy life. Through the
greater sharpness of his mind he gained a deeper realization of
7 C. Sergius Orata, wealthy epicure, was a contemporary of Cicero,
who writes of his estates in De officiis 2.16. Since Nonius quotes
from the Hortensius (Cicero frag. F.V.76 Mueller) a phrase which,
without mentioning Grata, seems to be drawn from an account in
Valerius Maximus (9.1.1) of Orata 's elaborate devices for supplying
his table with choice sea food, it is not unlikely that prominence
to the example of Orata is again imitating the Hortensius. It appears
that Orata is nowhere else mentioned by Augustine,
THE HAPPY LIFE
75
the contingency of his possessions. Therefore he was bent
down by fear, and expressed this sufficiently by a common
saying : The man without faith is prudent in his own folly.'
(27) When he and the others had smiled, I said: 'Let
us consider this a little more carefully, since he [Orata], though
imbued with fear, was not in want ; from which point rises our
question. For, to be in want consists in not possessing, not in
fearing the loss of your possessions. He was miserable because
of fear, not because of want. Consequently, not everybody
is in want who is miserable.'
With all the others, my mother also, whose opinion I was
defending, 8 approved of this. Still a little in doubt, she said:
*I do not yet quite understand how misery can be separated
from want, and want from misery. Although he had great
riches and abundance and according to your own statement
desired nothing more, he still was in want of wisdom, since
he entertained the fear of losing these things. Are we going
to consider him in want, if he be without silver and money,
and not if he should lack wisdom? 5
When, at this point, all had expressed their admiration, and
I myself was filled with joy and delight because it was she
who had uttered that truth which, as gleaned from the books
of the philosophers, I had intended to bring forward as an
imposing final argument, I said: 'Do you all see now that a
great difference exists between many and varied doctrines
and a soul that is devoted to God? 9 For from what other
source flow these words that we admire? 3
8 The opinion 'that the wretched man is needy.'
9 The divinatio of the mother. She is a child of God. Augustine (De
or dine, 2.1.1.) praises Monica's talent and the divine inspiration
that enlightens her mind. He says: Mater nostra, cuius ingenium
atque in res divinas inflammatum animum . . . perspiceram (Our
mother, whose acumen and burning desire for things divine .... I
had discerned) .
76 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Licentius joyfully exclaimed : 'Verily, no truer or more di-
vine words could have been spoken. For, there is no greater
and more pitiable want than the want of wisdom. Whoever
does not lack wisdom cannot lack anything.'
(28) 'Consequently, the want of the soul is nothing but
foolishness/ I said. It is the apposite of wisdom, as death is
the opposite of life, or a happy life is the opposite of a miser-
able one, that Is, without a middle state. For, just as every
man who is not happy is miserable, and every man who is
not dead is alive, so, manifestly, every man who is not foolish
Is wise.
'From this we may rightly conclude that Sergius Orata
was miserable, not merely because he feared losing those gifts
of fortune, but because he was unwise. Of course, he would
have been more miserable if he had been quite without fear
for those unsteady and changeable things which he regarded
as good. In this case he would have found an added security,
not through a watch kept by courage but through a mental
lethargy, and his deeper folly would have sunk him deeper
into misery. Therefore, if everybody without wisdom suffers
from a great want, it follows that foolishness is nothing but
want. Just as every fool is miserable, so every miserable man
is a fool. Thus, evidently, just as all want is Identical with
misery, so all misery is identical with want.' 10
(29) When Trygetius said that he had not satisfactorily
grasped this conclusion, I asked: 'Upon what did we agree
through logical reasoning?'
That a person is in want who does not possess wisdom/ he
answered.
'What, then, does it mean : to be in want?' I asked.
10 Herewith the question of 4.23. is finally solved. The solution is
defended against contradictions in the following section.
THE HAPPY LIFE 77
'Not to possess wisdom,' he answered.
'But, what does it mean : not to possess wisdom?' I said.
When he kept silent, I continued: 'Is it not: to possess
foolishness?'
'Yes,' he answered.
'To have want, then, is nothing but to have foolishness,'
I said; 'consequently "want" must be merely another word
for "foolishness," although I am unable to explain how we
shall say: "He has want, or he has foolishness."
'It is as though, when speaking of a place that has no light,
we were to say that it has darkness, intending only to state
that it has no light. For the darkness does not, as it were,
come or go away; but to be without light is the same as to be
dark, as to be without clothing is the same as to be naked. For,
nakedness does not depart, like something moveable, upon the
arrival of clothing. Thus, then, we say that someone has want,
as we would say that he has nakedness.
'The expression "want" is a word for "not having." There-
fore to explain what I mean as well as I can we say "he
has want," as though we said "he has not-having." If it is dem-
onstrated that foolishness is really and undoubtedly identical
with want, please consider whether the question that we have
asked is solved. For, some 11 of us were still in doubt whether
what we call misery is nothing but what we call want. But
now we have given a reason why foolishness may correctly
be called want. Since, therefore, every fool is miserable, and
every miserable person is foolish, we must acknowledge that
every person in want is miserable, and also that every miser-
able person is in want. However, if from the proposition,
every fool is miserable and every miserable person is foolish,
the conclusion must be that foolishness is identical with
11 Augustine thinks of his mother's remark in 4.27.
78 SAINT AUGUSTINE
misery, why do we not from the proposition, every person in
want is miserable and every miserable person is in want,
conclude that misery is nothing but want?'
(30) All agreed to this conclusion, and I said: 'Now
we have to inquire who it is that is not in want, for it is he
who will be wise and happy. Now, foolishness is want and a
term of want, while this word "want" usually signifies a sort
of sterility and lack. Kindly pay close attention to the great
care with which the ancients have created either all or, as
is evident, some words, especially designating those things the
knowledge of which was very necessary.
'You now agree that every fool is in want, and that every
person in want is a fool. And I think you also concede that
a foolish soul is faulty, and that all faults of the mind can be
included in that one term foolishness.
'On the first day of our discussion we said that the term
nequitia [worthlessness] is so called because it comes from
"not anything," while its opposite, frugalitas [frugality] 12
comes from frux [fruit]. Therefore, in those two opposites,
frugality and worthlessness, two things seem to. be evident,
namely, esse [to be] and non esse [not to be]. 13 Of what,
then, do we conceive as the opposite of "want," about which
we are speaking?*
While the others hesitated, Trygetius said: 'If I speak of
wealth, I see that poverty is its opposite. 3
This is almost right/ I answered. Tor poverty and want
are usually understood in the same sense. But, another word
has to be found so that the commendable side may not lack a
term. Otherwise, the one side would have two terms [poverty
12 Cf. 2,8. . .
13 These concepts are most important in the Augustmian philosophy.
Here the two metaphysical concepts are transported into the spiritual
realm of ethics, ana, are identified with good and evil.
THE HAPPY LIFE 79
and want], confronted on the other side by the one term
[wealth]. For, nothing could be more absurd than to lack
a word where one is needed in opposition to "want." '
Licentius said: 'If we may say so, the word "fullness"
[plenitude] seems to me to be the proper opposite of "want." *
(31) 'Perhaps,' I said, Sve will inquire later about this
word a little more carefully. For this is not important for the
quest of truth. Although Sallust, 14 (that most excellent weigher
of words), has chosen "opulence" as the opposite of "want,"
I accept your "fullness." Here we will not labor in dread
of the grammarians, nor will we fear that, for a careless
use of words, we will be chastised by those who have permitted
us to use their property.' 15
When they smilingly had given their approval, I said:
c While your thoughts are directed toward God, since I did
not intend to disregard your minds, as oracles, so to speak,
let us examine the meaning of this term, for I think no term
is more adapted to the truth. "Fullness" and "want," then,
are opposites. As in the case of "worthlessness" and "frugal-
ity," here, too, appear the concepts "to be" and "not to be."
'If "want" is identical with "foolishness," "fullness" will be
"wisdom." And, quite correctly, many have called frugality the
mother of all virtues. 16 Tullius also agrees with them, when,
14 Bell. Catil. 52.22. Whenever Augustine mentions Sallust he praises
him and he speaks of him (De civ. 1.5.) as nobilitate veritatis
historicus. The present characterization may be based on a phrase in
Aulus Gellius, Nodes Atticae 17.1.3.
15 Tourscher well suggests that we have here a playful reference to
the grammarian Verecundus, whose villa Augustine and his party are
now occupying (Con/. 8.6, 9.3.) .
16 Here Augustine is combining Platonism (the soul's fullness of ideas)
with Stoicism (modesty and temperance) through the metaphysical
concept of frugalitas (from frux, i.e., what we call esse) . Cicero, Tusc.
Disp. 3.8.17, regards frugality as embracing courage, justice, and
prudence.
80 SAINT AUGUSTINE
in one of his popular orations, he says: 17 "Whatever may be
others' opinion, I think that frugality, that is, moderation
and restraint, is the greatest virtue." This is very learnedly
and becomingly said, for he considered the fruit, that is, what
we call "to be," whose contrary is "not to be," But, because
of the common manner of speech, according to which "frugal-
ity" means the same as "thriftiness," he illustrates what he has
in mind by adding "moderation" and "restraint." Let us now
consider these two words more closely.'
(32) The word modestia [moderation] is derived from
modus [measure], and the word temperantia [restraint] from
ternperies [proper mixture]. Wherever measure and proper
mixture are, there is nothing either too much or too little. 18
Here, then, we have the precise sense of "fullness" [plenitudo],
which is the word we chose as the opposite of "want"
[egestas], and more suitably than if we were to use "abun-
dance" [abundantia]. For, by "abundance" is understood a
profusion and a sort of pouring forth of something excessively
plentiful.
If this happens in excess, there, also, measure is lacking,
and the thing that is in excess stands in want of measure.
Want, then, is not alien even to excess, but both "the more"
and "the less" are alien to measure. If you discuss opulence,
you will find that it also contains measure, for the word
opulentia has no other derivation than from ops [wealth].
But, how does that enrich which is too much, since this is
often more inconvenient than too little? Therefore, whatever
is either too little or too much is subject to want, since it is in
want of measure.
17 Cicero, Pro Deiotaro 9.26.
18 Thus, in his beautiful prayer (Solil. 1.1.4), Augustine says of God:
'Thou highest fullness, Thou highest life, with whom there is no
superfluity nor any want/
THE HAPPY LIFE 81
'But the measure of the soul is wisdom. Wisdom, however,
is undeniably the opposite of foolishness, and foolishness is
want, but fullness is the opposite of want. Therefore, wisdom
is fullness. Yet, in fullness is measure. Hence, the measure of
the soul is in wisdom. Hence, the very famous proverb rightly
known as the most useful principle in life: "Not anything
too much/ 5 >19
(33) 'At the beginning of our discussion today we in-
tended to call that man happy who is not in want, in case
we should find misery identical with want. This is now
found to be so. Therefore, "to be happy" means nothing
else than "not to be in want," that is, "to be wise."
'If now you ask what wisdom is our reason has also ex-
plained and developed this as far as was at present possible
the answer is that wisdom is nothing but the measure of the
soul, that is, that through which the soul keeps its equilibrium
so that it neither runs over into too much nor remains short of
its fullness. It runs over into luxuries, despotism, pride, and
other things of this kind, 20 through which the souls of im-
moderate and miserable men believe they get joy and might.
But it is narrowed down by meanness, fear, grief, passion, and
many other things through which miserable men make ac-
knowledgement of their misery,
'However, when it [the soul] beholds the wisdom found 21
and, to use the word of the boy here, devotes itself to it, and,
without being moved by mere empty vanity, is not seduced
to the treachery of images, weighed down in whose embrace
19 Terence, Andria, Act I, Scene 1.
20 The reader of Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy (&2pr,) will
recognize the description of various aims set by different people as
the goal of happiness: riches, power, fame, pleasure; the goals of
materialism.
21 He refers to 4.23, where Adeodatus speaks of God, whom Augustine
here identifies with Wisdom.
82 SAINT AUGUSTINE
it generally deserts God and finds a pernicious end, It then
fears no immoderateness, and therefore no want and hence no
misery. Thus, whoever is happy possesses his measure, that
is, wisdom.'
(34) 'But what wisdom should be so called, if not the
wisdom of God? We have also heard through divine authority
that the Son of God is nothing but the wisdom of God, and
the Son of God is truly God. Thus, everyone having God is
happy a statement already acclaimed by everyone at the
beginning of our symposium. But, do you believe that wisdom
is different from truth? For it has also been said: "I am
the Truth." 22 The truth, however, receives its being through
a supreme measure, from which it emanates and into which
it is converted when perfected. However, no other measure
is imposed upon the supreme measure. For, if the supreme
measure exists through the supreme measure, it is measure
through itself.
'Of course, the supreme measure also must be a true meas-
ure. But, just as the truth is engendered through measure, so
measure is recognized in truth. Thus, neither has truth ever
been without measure, nor measure without truth. 23
'Who is the Son of God? It has been said: The Truth,
Who is it that has no father? Who other than the supreme
measure? Whoever attains the supreme measure, through the
truth, is happy. This means, to have God within the soul,
22 John 14,6.
23 This and part of the following chapter are probably the source for
the measure -concept applied by St, Thomas Aquinas to explain
succinctly the causality of his triple conception of truth, ie., in re-
gard to God, man, and the world. In DC veritatc 10, ^he says: 'The
divine intellect measures, it is not measured; natural things are meas-
ured. But our intellect is measured and does not measure (at least
not the natural things, but only the artificial ones) /
Augustine speaks of 'measuring' also in De civ. Dei 8.4.9 L and
De gen. ad litt, f 4.4,8,
THE HAPPY LIFE 83
that is, to enjoy God. Other things do not have God, although
they are possessed by God.'
(35) A certain admonition, flowing from the very foun-
tain of truth, urges us to remember God, to seek Him, and
thirst after Him tirelessly. 24 This hidden sun pours into our
innermost eyes that beaming light. 25 His is all the truth that
we speak, 26 even though, in our anxiety, we hesitate to turn
with courage toward this light and to behold it in its entirety,
because our eyes, recently opened, are not yet strong enough.
This light appears to be nothing other than God, 27 who is
perfect without any fault. Because there is entirety and per-
fection, at the same time He is the most omnipotent God.
'But, as long as we are still seeking, and not yet satiated
by the fountain itself to use our word by fullness [pleni-
tudo] we must confess that we have not yet reached our
measure; therefore, notwithstanding the help of God, we are
not yet wise and happy.
'This, then, is the full satisfaction of souls, this the happy
life: to recognize piously and completely the One through
whom you are led into the truth, the nature of the truth you
enjoy, and the bond that connects you with the supreme
00
measure.
24 According to Solil. 1.2.7, human love is the expression of the innate
consciousness of God.
25 See Introduction, p, 16f.
26 Since God is the origin of ontological truth and the light of logical
truth, He is also the source of moral truth, i.e., the conformity of
our words with our thoughts.
27 Augustine also speaks in Solil. 1.6.13 of 'beholding God.' On Augus-
tine's doctrine of the immediate knowledge of God, see Hessen, Die
unmittelbare Gotteserkenntnis nach dem hi. Augustinus (1919) .
28 Augustine here paraphrases Christ's words: 'I am the way, the truth,
and the life' (John 14.6) . Augustine was already familiar with the
Holy Scriptures, especially with the writings of St. John, St. Paul,
and the psalms of David.
84 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Those three show to the Intelligent man the one God, the
one Substance excluding the variety of all vain and supersti-
tions images.'
Our mother, recalling here those words that still deeply
adhered in her memory, awoke to her faith, as it were, and,
inflamed with joy, uttered this verse of our priest: 29 'Help,
Trinity, those that pray.'
Then she added: 'Indeed, this is undoubtedly the happy
life, that is, the perfect life which we must assume that we
can attain soon by a well-founded faith, a joyful hope, and
an ardent love.' 30
(36) 'But now,' I said, "admonished through measure
itself to spread our symposium over a certain number of days,
1 give my deepest thanks to the supreme and true God, the
Father and Master, the Liberator of souls, and then, to you
who, although cordially invited, have generously bestowed so
many gifts upon me. You have truly contributed so much to
our discussion that I cannot deny that I have been sated by
my own guests.'
While all rejoiced and praised God, Trygetius said: 'How
deeply I wish that you would feed us every day with the
same measure.'
This measure/ I answered, 'is to be observed everywhere
and everywhere to be loved, if our return to God is in your
heart."
With these words we closed our discussion and then
departed.
29 St. Ambrose. The verse that follows is the closing line of Ambrose's
hymn Deus creator omnium, whose entire first two strophes are
quoted in a moving scene of the Confessions (9.12.32) .
30 Also in Solil 1.6.13, the three virtues, faith, hope, and love, are
the prerequisites of the recognition of truth and the attainment of a
happy life. In later years the great African wrote the Enchiridion ad
Laurentium, dealing with the same virtues.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS
(Contra Academicos)
Translated
by
DENIS J. KAVANAGH, O.S.A., S.T.M.
Good Counsel Novitiate,
New Hamburg, N. Y,
NIHJL OBSTAT:
HENRY A. CAFFREY, O.S.A.
CENSOR DEPUTATUS
IMPRIMI POTEST:
JOHN T. SHEEHAN, O.S.A., J.C.D.
PRIOR PROVINCIAL
December 10, 1942
NIHJL OBSTAT:
ARTHUR J. SCANLAN, S.T.D.
CENSOR LIBRORUM
IMPRIMATUR:
^ FRANCIS J. SPELLMAN, D.D.
ARCHBISHOP OF NEW YORK
July 25, 1943
INTRODUCTION 1
RDENT DESIRE tor truth and happiness was the funda-
mental trait of St. Augustine's thought from his ear-
liest youth. He first tried to find happiness in the
goods of the material world. But the perishable and the finite
things could not hold him. This restless soul found repose only
in God, the Supreme Truth and Good. It was from profound
practical experience that, at the end of a long errant journey,
he wrote: 'Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is
restless, until it rest in Thee. 92
At last, St. Augustine had sufficiently matured to see this
truth. He had tried several contemporary interpretations
of life and sought in their light the solution of perennial
human problems. After he had discovered that the doctrine
of the Manichaeans, who had attracted him by their clamor-
ous claim of truth, was confused and pernicious material-
ism, he became acquainted with the skepticism of the New
Academy. Like many others before and after, this young
seeker after truth may well have been occasionally tempted
to despair of- the existence of truth and a rational meaning
of the world. He himself confessed that skepticism had
threatened to rob him of his interest and energy. 3
When the turmoil in his soul gave way to calm order, and
his despair vanished before the assurance of the possibility of
1 This is the original introduction, -with a few changes, written by Rev.
Rudolph Arbesmann, O.S.A., Ph.D., for Answer to Skeptics (New York:
Cosmopolitan Science & Art Service Co., Inc., 1943) . It and the transla-
tion that follows, for reasons of uniformity also somewhat revised,
are used by permission of the copyright owner.
2 Confessions 1.1.1.
3 Contra Academicos 2.9.23.
87
88 SAINT AUGUSTINE
attaining truth, 4 his enthusiasm for this high ideal made him
take that turn in his life through which he became not only
the greatest Doctor of the Church but also one of the most
profound philosophers and most prolific writers in history.
St. Augustine was so zealously devoted to his profes-
sorial duties at Milan that, after his first two years, signs
appeared that his delicate health could not stand up for
long under the strain of his work. Besides this danger to
his health, it was, above all, the spiritual revolution within
him which made him plan to quit Milan and his post. He
informed his closest friends of his intentions, among them
his colleague Verecundus, who was a teacher of the fine
arts. Out of sincere friendship, Verecundus offered St. Au-
gustine his villa, Cassiciacum, where he might retire for rest,
leisure, prayerful meditation and reflection.
There, in the short space of five or six months, from the
autumn of 386 until early in 387, he wrote a number of
important treaties which received their notable charm not
only from content and form, but also from the circumstances
attending their composition. The refuge seems to have been
a spacious and pleasant villa, such as was the fashion among
the wealthy Romans of the empire, with wide airy rooms,
baths, a library, vine-clad pergolas, terraces, and trees to
shade the lawn. The windows provided a view of the Alps.
A small band of philosophers moved into this idyl one day
in the fall of 386. They were, besides Augustine and his noble
mother Monica, his brother Navigius, and his son Adeoda-
tus, his cousins Lastidianus and Rusticus, his friend Alypius
and his two students Licentius and Trygetius, whose instruc-
tion he wished to continue.
After an interval of thirty-five years, Augustine tells in
4 Cf. Contra Academicos 3.20.43,
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 89
retrospect that his chief need at that time was the removal
of all doubt of the possibility of finding truth : Therefore at
the beginning of my conversion I wrote three books so that
those things which blocked my way at the threshold, might
not prove, an obstacle to me. 35 The three books against the
Academics' were, then, Augustine's farewell letter to the
philosophy which he had followed last, a philosophy that
had the aim to justify doubt as to one's ultimate attitude.
Accordingly, he endeavored to raise up an unbreakable dam
against the destructive floods of skepticism, and advances
arguments appropriate to serve as 'Answer to Skeptics' at
all times. The work is dedicated to his helpful friend, Roman-
ianus.
It is characteristic of Augustine that his discussion begins,
not with an analysis of the source of knowledge, but with the
question whether the possession of truth or the mere quest
of it is necessary and sufficient for happiness. Licentius,
aided by Alypius, undertakes to defend the Academics, while
Trygetius, with the assistance of Augustine, refutes their claim.
Licentius proposes the thesis that the very search for truth
brings real happiness; for wisdom or life according to reason,
and man's spiritual perfection which are the basis of hap-
piness consist, in this life at least, not in the possession, but
in the faithful and unceasing quest, of truth. 6
5 Enchiridion 20.7. St. Augustine states also in his Retractationes that
the arguments of the Academics caused many to doubt the possibility
of real knowledge. Here, he certainly refers also to his own experience.
6 Like G. E. Lessing, many modern thinkers also declare the search for
truth to be more satisfying than its possession as the latter is thought
to mean the standstill of all intellectual activity. This, of course, is due
to a misunderstanding of what the term 'possession of truth' implies.
It does not mean the possession of the totality of all knowable truth but
the gradual discovery and combination of fragments of truth so as to
attain to an increasingly perfect knowledge without reaching an ex-
haustive grasp of its totality.
90 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Trygetius counters with a statement that the possession of
truth is indispensable for happiness, because constant search
without ever finding it is tantamount to erring. Licentius,
however, makes the distinction that error is the approval of
what is false instead of what is true: search, he declares, is
not error, but wisdom. It is, he says, the straight way of
life by which man extricates his spirit as much as possible
from the bonds of the body, rendering himself thus worthy
of the attainment of the last goal, in order to enjoy divine
happiness then as he enjoys human happiness now.
In his own contribution to the discussion, Augustine urges
that, without knowing truth, likelihood could not be had
either, because what is likely (veri-simile) can be judged
only in the light of what is actually true (verum] . Probabil-
ity fares no better, since a thing to be probable, Le> ap-
provable, must be known in its true reality. Later in the
dialogue, he remarks that nobody could be wise without
wisdom. But every definition of wisdom which omits the idea
of knowledge, and places wisdom in the mere confession of
ignorance and suspense of one's approval, is equivalent to
identifying wisdom with the unreal and the false; and it is
untenable. If, then, knowledge is an essential part of wisdom,
it is also a necessary element of happiness, because only the
wise can be truly happy. This playing with the name wisdom,
without a knowledge of truth, is sheer deception practiced on
misguided followers who always seek and never find, and
in the end curse their leaders. 7
7 In De vera religione (102) which was written a few years later (about
390) , St. Augustine argues for this position again: 'Unhappy are those
men to whom the possession of knowledge is indifferent, and who re-
joicing in novelty prefer to learn rather than to know, although
knowledge is the end of learning. Unhappy, too, are those who, hold-
ing cheap their ready art, prefer the contest to victory, although vic-
tory is the end of the contest/
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 91
For the purpose of overthrowing skepticism once and for
all, St. Augustine reviews the various fields of knowledge in
order to find truths that are immediately evident and ab-
solutely certain, truths of universal validity and practical
application. He calls these truths veritates or rationes aeternae,
because they are beyond time and are subject to no change.
Such truths St. Augustine finds, first of all, in the field of
logic or, as he calls it with Plato, dialectics. The first of these
evident truths which he mentions is the disjunctive proposi-
tion: *I am certain that the world is either a unit or not a
unit, and that, if it is not a unit, it is either finite in number
or it is infinite.' 8 c lf the elements in the world are four, they
are not five. If there is but one sun, there are not two. One
soul cannot both die and be immortal. A man cannot be at
the same time happy and miserable. It cannot be both day
and night. At the present we are either asleep or awake. What
I seem to myself to see, either is or is not a body.' 9
Even the most radical skepticism cannot undermine the
bulwark of such truths as these. 'Now these truths are respec-
tive opposites, and no one can confuse them by any likeness
to falsity.' 10 The absolute truth of these propositions rests on
their independence from all experience, bearing as they do
the reason of their validity within themselves. 'Through
dialectic I have learned that these things are true as well
as many other things, which it would be very tedious to enu-
merate true in themselves, however our senses may be af-
fected.' 11 The above quotations show that St. Augustine
especially urges the principle of contradiction against skepti-
cism. Since this presupposes and indirectly contains the other
8 Contra Academicos 3.10.23.
9 Ibid. 3.13.29.
10 Ibid. 3.10.23.
II Ibid: 3.13.29.'
92 SAINT AUGUSTINE
two logical principles the principles of identity and of ex-
cluded middle we may well say that St. Augustine defends
here the principles of logic as the inviolable foundations of
knowledge, even though they are not formulated in technical
terminology.
Side by side with logic we find the truths of mathematics.
4 If there are one world and six worlds, it is clear that there
are seven worlds, no matter how I may be affected. And,
with all due modesty, I maintain that I know this . . . , the
fact that three times three are nine, and that this is the square
of intelligible numbers: this is necessarily true, even if the
whole' human race were fast asleep. 312 All these truths are
necessarily and unconditionally true; they cannot be con-
tested. 13
Other groups of indubitable truths were discovered by St.
Augustine also in the fields of ethics and esthetics. 'Again,
will you not acknowledge that it is most true that we ought
to live most justly; that things less excellent are to be sub-
ordinate to things more excellent; that like things are to be
compared to like; that to every one is to be given what belongs
to him: and that the evidence of the foregoing is common
to me and to you and to all who see it?' 14
Here it is a question of the highest norms by which we
judge all things as good or evil. The same is true of the highest
laws of esthetics according to which things are called beautiful
12 Ibid. 3.11.25.
13 In his later writings St. Augustine emphasizes, among the principles of
mathematics, the geometrical theorems as indubitable truths of an a
priori character. Cf, Soliloquia 1.4.9: "Wherefore, it seems to me that
one can more easily navigate a ship on dry land than one can perceive
mathematics by means of the senses/ And De immortalitate animae
4.6: 'What, for instance, is so eternal as the principle [ratio] of a
circle or anything else in the arts of this kind, and is it not under-
stood that they always have been and always will be?'
14 De libero arbitrio 2.10.28.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 93
or ugly. According to St. Augustine, they are related to the
mathematical and ethical laws. Tor, wherever you turn your-
self, wisdom speaks to you by certain marks which it has
impressed upon its works; and, when you fall back upon
outward things, by the very forms of the outer it recalls you
to that which is within. So that whatever is delightful to you
in a body, and attracts through the senses of the body, you
can see is subject to number, and you can ask whence it
comes, and you can return into yourself, and you can under-
stand that you cannot approve or disapprove that which you
touch by the senses of the body unless you have in your certain
laws of beauty, to which you refer whatever things beautiful
you see without.' 15
The discovery of the a priori principles of logic and math-
ematics, ethics and esthetics means for St. Augustine the con-
quest of skepticism. He does not reach this position by lan-
guidly and resignedly assigning to authority (auctoritas) the
place of a failing reason (ratio). Both, i.e., reason aftd author-
ity, are for him equally absolute sources of knowledge sui iuris.
It is the great merit of St. Augustine that he recalls the
marvelous cognitive power of reason against prevailing skep-
ticism. Equally emphatic, however, are his statements on
reason's insufficiency to answer the deepest question of life.
Man is in need of divine instruction; reason must be aided
by faith; there are truths which man can never know apart
from revealed faith. Before God, St. Augustine professes his
humble submission to divine authority, and praises God's
providence for the appearance of the divine wisdom on earth
in Christ. This is the consoling note on which the work
Contra Academicos closes: 'And now so that you may grasp
my whole meaning in a few words whatever may be the
15 Ibid. 2.16.41.
94 SAINT AUGUSTINE
nature of human wisdom, I see that I have not yet under-
stood it. Nevertheless, although I am now in my thirty-third
year of age, I do not think that I ought to despair of attaining
it for some time; for, despising ail other things which mortals
consider good, I have resolved to devote myself to an inves-
tigation of it. And whereas the reasonings of the Academics
were seriously deterring me from this undertaking, I am now,
I believe, sufficiently protected against those reasons by this
disputation. Indeed, no one doubts that we are impelled to-
ward knowledge by a twofold powerful force the force of
authority and the force of reason. And I am resolved never to
deviate in the least from the authority of Christ, for I find
none more powerful. 516
On the question of the possibility of knowing universal and
necessary truths, St. Augustine follows Neo-Platonism. He
accepts the doctrine of the existence of an intelligible world
accessible only to the intellect, a world of ideas in the sense
of Plato, 17 with the modification that it fitted into the Chris-
tian view of God and creation; thus, he declared the rigid
world of Plato's immobile ideas as the creative thoughts of
a personal God, not of an impersonal divine intellect. The
rationes aeternae are the thoughts of the living God who
designs and decrees the nature of all created things. From the
unchangeableness and timelessness of the truths (incommu-
tabiliter vera) St. Augustine reaches the conclusion of the
16 Contra Academicos 3.20,43.
17 According to St. Augustine, the kingdom of the intelligible world
(res intdligibiles) contains the most general and fundamental con-
cepts of the sciences. In logic and metaphysics they are concepts like
truth, similarity, falsity, unity, eternity (cf. Soliloquia 1.15.27; De vera
religions 66; De diversis quaestionibus 83, qu. 23) ; in ethics: besides
the basic concept of the good (bonitas) , those of wisdom, chastity,
justice (cf. De hbero arbitrio 2-19.52; De diversis quaestionibus 83, qu.
23; in esthetics, the fundamental concept of beauty (cf. De diversis
quaestionibus 83, qu. 23) ; finally, the principles of mathematics.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 95
existence of an unchangeable or eternal essential Truth (veri-
tas incommutabilis) , i.e., God. The human mind cannot
guarantee the universality and permanency of these a priori
truths: 'Wherefore, you can in no way deny that there is an
immutable truth, containing all those things that are immu-
tably true, which [truth], you cannot say to be your own or
mine; nor can you say that it belongs to any man, but that
it is present, and in wonderful ways exhibits itself in common
as an unseen and universal light to all that discern things
immutably true.' 18 Accordingly, truth stands above the indi-
vidual, even above all rational creatures. It is, then, ultimately
established in God as the source from which its universal and
unchangeable principles flow or radiate into the human mind.
Christian philosophy has retained St. Augustine's doctrine
of God as the eternal truth. Further, his interpretation of ra-
tional knowledge as, basically, vision or seeing in the light of
God, influenced many thinkers; but this theory lost its ascen-
dancy through the rise of the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine
of abstraction.
In his analysis of the skeptic position, St. Augustine dis-
covers yet another argument, which is lacking here, but is
developed in his later writings. As it proved of fundamental
importance for his philosophical speculation, it may be well
to indicate it here briefly. The argument is based on an anal-
ysis of the implications of consciousness. Consciousness pro-
vides the irrefutable certainty of one's existence, regardless
of all other doubts and uncertainties. 19 In the Soliloquies, he
adds: 'Hence, you know you exist; you know you live; you
know you understand.' 20 In the De Trinitate, this thought is
18 De libero arbitrio 2.12.33.
19 De beata vita 2.7.
20 Soliloquia 2.1.1.
96 SAINT AUGUSTINE
expanded: 'Who ever doubts that he himself lives, and re-
members, and understands, and wills, and thinks, and knows,
and judges? Since, even if he doubts, he lives; if he doubts,
he remembers why he doubts; if he doubts, he understands
that he doubts; if he doubts, he wishes to be certain; if he
doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows that he does not
know; if he doubts, he judges that he ought not to assent
rashly. Whosoever, therefore, doubts about anything else
ought not to doubt of all these things, which, if they were
not, he would not be able to doubt anything.' 21 In De vera
religione, he says : 'Or, if you do not understand what I say,
and doubt whether this is true, consider at least whether you
do not doubt your own doubts about this matter; and, if it
is certain that you are doubting, ask yourself whence it is
certain. . . . Every man who recognizes that he is doubting
recognizes a truth, and he is certain of this fact which he
recognizes; therefore, he is certain of a truth. Therefore, every
man who doubts whether truth exists carries in himself a
truth why he should not doubt.' 22 With these arguments,
drawn from the certainty of consciousness, St. Augustine's
Si enim jailor, sum 23 has anticipated by more than a thou-
sand years Descartes' Cogito, ergo sum.
The literary form of the Contra Academicos is the dialogue.
The Christian writers accepted this literary device, which
lends itself so well to philosophical controversy, from the an-
cients and employed it for their own purposes. Thus it is to
be expected that both the structure and style of the Christian
dialogue are determined by a tradition of its predecessor. The
first of the Christian dialogues in Latin is Minucius Felix's
Octavius. Its construction and style possess a charm and
21 De Trinitate 10.10.14.
22, De vera religione 73.
23 De civ. Dei 11.26.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 97
perfection which were not again attained by its successors.
Considerable time elapsed before another Christian dialogue
in Latin was composed. Toward the end of the fourth cen-
tury, 24 in 383, St. Jerome wrote Altercatio Luciferani et Or-
thodoxi, a dialogue between an adherent of the schismatic
bishop, Lucifer of Calaris, and an orthodox believer; in 415
he produced his great Dialogus contra Pelagianos. With St.
Augustine, the Latin Christian dialogue reaches a new period
of flowering. His dialogues are distinguished by their close
contact with life. There is a personal note running through
them all, which makes them realistic and true. This raises the
question: To what extent may St. Augustine's dialogues be
classed as historical? The answer is simpler as regards the
later period. We have, e.g., the minutes of the public disputa-
tion which St. Augustine held with the Manichaean presbyter
Fortunatus at Hippo in 392. 25
This is a truthful report of an actual disputation. As to the
earlier dialogues, R. Hirzel is probably right when he says:
'They condense a number of actual conversations such as he
had, especially in Cassiciacum, into something like finished
treatises.' 26 This view does not exclude the possibility that
whole sections are verbatim transcriptions of conversations
taken down by the notarius. St. Augustine had become ac-
quainted with the tradition of the dialogue literature through
Cicero and Varro, by whom he was greatly influenced. Espe-
cially well known is the influence of Cicero's Hortensius from
the year 373 onward. But St. Augustine's genius does not slav-
24 The dialogue Symposium by Lactantius belongs probably to the pagan
period of his life and is not preserved.
25 Ada sen Disputatio contra Fortunatum, in Migne, PL 42. 111-130.
26 Der Dialog. Ein literarhistorischet Versuch (Leipzig 1895) 2 377;
cf. D. Ohlmann, De S. Augustini dialogis in Cassiciaco scrlptis (Strass-
burg 1897) , who more emphatically than Hirzel believes these dialogues
to be verbatim records of actual conversations.
98 SAINT AUGUSTINE
isfaly imitate; it is independent and creative. The reader of
Contra Acadernicos soon feels the actual contest of living inter-
locutors, which gives the exposition a dramatic character.
St. Augustine is not only a master of exposition, but also of the
word, by making language the immediate expression of his
emotions. Thus, the work also has an esthetical value which
makes it a part of the world's great literature.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Texts and Translations:
], P. Migne, S. Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia (Patrologia Latina
32 Paris 1861) .
P. Knoll, S. Aurelii Augustini Contra Academicos libri tres (Corpus
Scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 63 Vienna 1922) .
M. P. Garvey, St. Augustine, Against the Academics (Milwaukee 1942) .
R. Jolivet. Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, IV Dialogues Philosophiques
(Paris 1939) .
Secondary Sources:
P. Alfaric, Devolution intellectuelle de S. Augustin (Paris 1918) .
C. Boyer, Christianisme et Ne'o-Platonisme dans la formation de St.
Augustin (Paris 1920) .
A. Casamassa, Acta Hebdomadae Augustinianae Thomisticaeque
(Rome and Turin 1931) .
R. Hirzel, Der Dialog ein literarhistorischer Versuch (Leipzig 1895) 2.
R. Jolivet, Saint Augustin et le neoplatonisme chretien (Paris 1952) .
B. Legewic, 'Die korperliche Konstitution und die Krankheiten
Augustins' Miscellanea Agostiniana (Rome 1931) 2-5-21.
F. Meda, *La controversia sul rus Cassiciacum, Miscellanea Agostiniana
(Rome 1931) 2.49-59.
D. Ohlmann, De S. Augustini dialogis in Cassiciaco scriptis (Strass-
burg 1897).
W, Thimme, Augustins geistige Entwicklung in den ersten Jahren
nach seiner Bekehrung (Berlin 1908) .
H. van Haeringen, De Augustini ante baptisnwrn rusticantis operibus
(proningen 1917) .
A. Vega, Confessiones Sancti Augustini (El Escorial 1930) ,
F. Worter, Die Geistesentwicklung des hi. Augustinus bis zu seiner
Taufe (Paderborn 1892).
CONTENTS
BOOK ONE
Chapter Page
1 An exhortation for the study of true philosophy. . . 103
2 Whether human happiness consists in an unceasing search
for truth 109
3 The debate begins 112
4 What is error? 117
5 W r hat is wisdom? 120
6 A definition of wisdom 123
7 A discussion of that definition 126
8 The wisdom of soothsayers 128
9 Recapitulation 131
BOOK TWO
Chapter Page
1 Wisdom is not easily attained. Divine aid is needed . . 134
2 A generous benefactor. Philosophy's beauty. . . , 136
3 Philocaly, akin to philosophy. A further exhortation. . 140
4 Renewal of the discussion on Skepticism 143
5 A summary of the opinions of the ancient Skeptics . . -145
6 The cleavage between the Old Academy and the New. . 148
7 The distinctive tenet of the New Academy 149
99
8 Probability is impossible unless truth can be known. o 154
9 Augustine's state of mind with regard to Skepticism. . 156
10 The controversy is not a mere logomachy 159
11 Meaning of the terms, 'probability' and 'truth-likeness.' . 160
12 A ready, but ineffectual, answer to Skeptics 162
13 Esoteric doctrine of the Skeptics 164
BOOK THREE
Chapter Page
1 Importance of the question at issue 167
2 The influence of fortune in the life of a wise man. . . 168
3 A wise man knows something, viz., wisdom .... 171
4 A Tuscan altercation. Can any man attain wisdom? . . 174
5 Protean character of Skepticism 179
6 Protean character of truth. Divine aid is needed. . . .181
7 Cicero's commendation of Skepticism 183
8 Augustine's rebuttal 186
9 Zeno's aphorism 188
10 The two aphorisms of the Skeptics 192
11 Neither sleep nor the impairment of the senses precludes
a knowledge of truth 195
12 Augustine's notion of a wise man 199
13 The importance of logic. Truth in disjunctive propositions. 201
14 "A wise man must give assent to something, namely,
wisdom 203
15 Can we always avoid error by withholding assent? . . 206
100
16 Moral consequences of Skepticism 209
17 Why Plato's teaching became esoteric 212
18 Why the Skeptics had recourse to the 'probable' or
'truth-like.' 216
19 Harmony of Plato with Aristotle. The divine intellect. 218
20 The twofold criterion: reason and authority 219
101
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 1
BOOK I
Chapter 1
ROMANIANUS/ would that from the grasp of stub-
born fortune virtue could snatch a man fitted for
herself, just as surely as she suffers no man to be
snatched away from her by fortune. In that case she would
long ago have laid hand on you, and proclaimed you to be
1 From the fact that Plato used to deliver his discourse in the Academy
at Athens, his pupils and adherents became known as Academics. The
Academy continued after Plato's death, and his immediate successors
devoted themselves exclusively to the task of expounding the system
which he had elaborated. They were, however, incapable of under-
standing his sublime theories and they distorted them. This pro-
cess of change was gradual, but not constant: its several stages can be
distinguished. Accordingly, each notable departure from genuine
Platonism has been designated as the beginning of a new Academy.
But, since this principle of division varies according to one's view of
a departure as notable or otherwise, historians are not in complete
agreement as to the number of distinct Academies. Some enumerate
five, and designate them respectively as the Academy under: (a) Plato,
(b) Arcesilas, (c) Carneades, (d) Philo and (e) Antiochus. Others
recognized four, namely: The Old Academy, under Plato and his
successors, who contented themselves with expounding his doctrines;
The Middle Academy, beginning with Arcesilas, who was the first to
introduce questions not expressly treated by Plato: he introduced
Skepticism; The Third Academy, dominated by Carneades, who is
said to have modified the skepticism of Arcesilas; and The New
Academy, under Philo and under Antiochus, who introduced what he
falsely believed to be the teachings of Plato.
2 Father of Licentius and a fellow townsman and lifelong friend of
Augustine. At Tagaste he supplied the needed funds to enable the
youthful Augustine to pursue a course of higher studies at Carthage.
At Milan, some fifteen years later, he was foremost in promoting their
plan of a common household for Augustine and himself, and seven
or eight others, and shared his wealth in the undertaking. His con-
tinued confidence in Augustine is evident from the fact that his son
is now placed under the latter's tutorship at Cassiciacum. Romanianus
had been an adherent of Manichaeism, then of Skepticism; the pur-
pose of this disputation being committed to writing is obviously an
attempt to convert him to Christianity, through the study of Platonic
philosophy. A letter of Paulinus of Nola indicates that Romanianus
was a devout Christian in 396.
103
104 SAINT AUGUSTINE
rightfully hers. She would have led you to the possession of
,the most reliable kind of goods, and she would not have
suffered you to be a slave to transitory things even to those of
fairest promise. But, either in accordance with our own
merits or by virtue of nature's law, it is so appointed that
the divine mind indwelling in mortals 3 shall never gain entry
to the port of wisdom where it cannot be tossed about by
either a favoring breeze or an adverse gale of fortune unless
Fortune herself lead it thereto, either by manifest favor or
by seeming adversity. Wherefore, nothing remains for us in
your behalf except prayers to the God who has those things
in His care to the end that, if it is possible, we may obtain
from Him that He restore you to yourself. And in doing that,
He will readily restore you to us, also. We pray that He per-
mit your mind which has long been gasping for breath
to emerge, at length, into the pure air of true liberty. But,
perhaps what is commonly called fortune is itself governed
by a certain hidden order. What we call a matter of chance
may be only something whose why and wherefore are con-
cealed. Perhaps nothing fitting or unfitting happens in a part
which is not suited and advantageous 1 to the whole. I am in-
viting you to a philosophy which offers to demonstrate to
her true lovers this import of most copious doctrines an im-
port which has been divinely proclaimed, but which is ever
so remote from the intellect of the profane. 4 Wherefore, when
many things unworthy of your mind befall you, do not
contemn yourself; for, if Divine Providence reaches even unto
3 'The human mind, being an offshoot from the divine reason, can be
compared with nothing else than God himself, if such comparison is
allowed' (Cicero, Tusculan. Quaest. 5.1338) . Cf. idem. 1.15.33; De
fin. 2.34.114; Laelius 4.13; Cato M. 21.77. Plato calls the body a tomb
and a prison of the soul (Gorgias 493A; Cratylus 400C) ; Plotinus
represents the soul as confined in the shackles of the body. Cf.
Enneads 2.9.7; 4.8.4.
4 At this time, Augustine believed that with a few verbal emendations
Platonism could be reconciled with Christian teachings.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 105
us and, believe me, this is not to be doubted 5 it is oppor-
tune for you to be treated just as you are being treated. For
instance, notwithstanding the fact that even in your teens,
when reason's step is weak and faltering, you with that dis-
position of yours, which is such as I always admire were be-
ginning to practice philanthropy, Providence nevertheless res-
cued you from an affluence of worldly wealth, for that mode of
life is replete with all kinds of error. In fact, that affluence was
already beginning to engulf in its seductive whirlpools both
your youth itself and that mind of yours which was eagerly
pursuing what it believed to be the upright and honorable, if
those seemingly adverse gales of fortune had not snatched you
away when you were almost sinking.
(2) For, if the ever enthusiastic applause of the circus 6
were always greeting you as you were providing public ex-
hibitions of bear-baiting and spectacles never previously seen
there by our citizens; if you were being raised to the heavens
by the united and concordant voices of fools, whose uproar
is beyond all measure; if no one would dare to be your enemy;
if municipal records were to inscribe it in bronze that you
were a patron not only of the citizens but also of neighboring
peoples then, indeed, statues would be erected, honors would
be pouring in, rare privileges would be showered on you by
municipalities, sumptuous tables would be laden for daily
banquets, everyone would confidently request whatever he
needed and would devour whatever his pleasure craved, many
gifts would be showered even on those who were not seeking
them, your household would be diligently cared for by your
slaves and would display itself fit and ready for such great
5 From his childhood days, Augustine never ceased to believe in the
operations of Divine Providence (Confessions 6.5.8) . It is the theme
of his De or dine composed during an interval in the composition of
the Answer to Skeptics.
6 In his youth, Augustine was enamored of the theater, but he seems to
have always had an abhorrence of the circus. Cf. Confessions 3.7.12.
106 SAINT AUGUSTINE
expenses; meanwhile, you would be living in a most preten-
tious mansion, in the splendor of the bathing halls, in irrepre-
hensible games of chance, in huntings and in f eastings; by
the voices of clients, citizens, and the populace you would
be continually spoken of as most philanthropic, generous,
refined, and fortunate, as indeed you have been. But I ask
you, Romanianus, who would then dare to remind you of
the other happy life, the only happy life? 7 Who could then
persuade you, not only that you were not happy, but that you
were extremely miserable precisely because you believed that
you were by no means miserable? But now, the many great
misfortunes you have suffered have made it unnecessary to
admonish you at any great length, for it is not by the example
of others that you are to be persuaded how fleeting and fragile
and calamitous are all the things which mortals believe to
be good. Rather, to a certain extent at least, you have so
fully experienced it that from you we are able to persuade
others.
(3) Therefore, by those various harsh reverses, a hidden
providence has decreed to arouse that divine faculty of yours,
which, as it were, has been benumbed in you by some kind
of sleep and lethargy of this life the faculty by which you
have ever sought after beauty and goodness, by which you
have preferred to be generous rather than rich, by which
you have never yearned to be powerful rather than just, and
by which you have never yielded to misfortunes and deceits.
Arouse yourself, I pray you. Arouse yourself. Believe me, you
will be very glad that the fortunes of this life have caressed
you with scarcely any of the successes by which the unwary
are trammeled. Those very things used to sap my own strength
day by day when I was singing their praises, until a soreness
7 The subject of Augustine's The Happy Life, composed at the same
time as Answer to Skeptics.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 107
of the chest 8 compelled me to give up the bombastic profes-
sion 9 and to flee to the bosom of philosophy. 10 And now, in the
leisure which we have always desired, 11 it sustains and com-
forts me. It has completely liberated me from that superstition
into which I had thrown you headlong with myself. 12 It
teaches and rightly so that we ought to have no concern
for anything that can be discerned by mortal eyes, or reached
by any of the senses, 13 but rather that all such things are to
be disregarded. It promises to give a lucid demonstration of
the most true and distinct God; and even now it deigns to
furnish a glimpse of Him, as it were, through transparent
clouds. 14
(4) Our Licentius is most diligently living in it with me.
So wholeheartedly has he turned towards it and away from
the alluring pleasures of youth, that I can safely propose
8 This was undoubtedly a chronic ailment, probably the result of his
childhood illness. He refers to it in The Happy Life 1.4; Divine
Providence 1.2.5; and in Confessions 1.9.17; 9.2.4.
9 Augustine seldom fails to reveal a kind of resentment toward any*
thing that fostered or occasioned his youthful pride and ambition.
He seems to bewail his early success in grammar and rhetoric, and
speaks disdainfully of grammarians and rhetoricians. Cf. Confessions
1.13.22; 3.3.6; 3.4.7; 9.2,2,
10 This expression has sometimes been adduced in support of the con-
tention that Augustine was not yet a convert to Christianity, since he
says nothing about religion. As an argument ex silentio, it has no
probative value, unless Augustine ought to have mentioned his
conversion to Christianity if it had taken place. In the present in-
stance, however, he is urging Romanianus to join him in the study
of philosophy; and, quite naturally, he confines himself to that
science: he does not drag in the name of religion. But in many other
passages throughout the dialogue, he makes it quite clear that, beyond
and above Neoplatonism, religion is his guide. For instance, he hopes
that this dialogue will definitively win Romanianus away from the
skepticism of the New Academy; but that, in case he has relapsed
into Manichaeism, a later treatise on religion will dispel that super-
stition. Cf. 2.3.8. And, of course, his proviso that Neoplatonism be not
in opposition with the Sacred Scriptures is too explicit to allow of any
doubt.
11 Cf. Confessions 6.14.24.
12 Manichaean dualism. Cf. Confessions 4.1.1; 7.2-3; 7.12 ff.
13 Cf. Retractationes. 1.1.2.
14 Cf. Confessions 7.20 ff.
108 SAINT AUGUSTINE
him as a model for his father. It is indeed a philosophy from
whose breasts no age will have reason to complain that it
is excluded. And, although I am well aware of your thirst for
it, I have nevertheless decided to send you a foretaste, in order
to incite you to hold fast to it and to drink of it the more eager-
ly. I hope and, I beg you, let me not hope in vain that you
will find it most pleasant and, as it were, inviting. Accord-
ingly, I have sent you, in written form, a disputation which
Trygetius and Licentius have had with each other. Indeed,
the military service as if it had taken him away just to
purge him of his dislike for studies has restored to us a
Trygetius full of eagerness and avidity for the high and
noble arts. So, within a few days after our arrival at the villa, 15
when while I was exhorting and encouraging them towards
studies I saw that they were ready and eager even beyond
my hopes, I decided to test their abilities in proportion to their
age. A special reason for this decision arose from the fact that
Cicero's book, Hortensius seemed to have in large meas-
ure already won them over to philosophy. Then, having
15 For its name and location see D. J. Kavanagh Answer to Skeptics
Yoik 1943) 251 and F. Meda, 'La controversia sul rus Cassiciacum'
(Miscellanea Agostiniana Rome 1932) 2. 49 ft . .
16 Although it was the reading of Cicero's Hortensius that occasioned
Augustine's impassioned quest for truth, there is no reason for believ-
ing that he was in any other way influenced by Cicero. On his own
admission (Academ. 2.20.66) , Cicero was only a dilettante philosopher.
And it is worth noting that Augustine did not give even a tentative
adherence to Cicero's favorite system-the skepticism of the New
Academy-until he had despaired of Hnding the truth in any system
(Cf. Confessions 5.10.19) . In fact, he half reveals an antipathy to-
ward Cicero, when he speaks of him as a man 'whose language,
but not whose heart, almost everybody admires' (Con/, 3.4.7) . In
at least two passages of Answer to Skeptics there is still clearer in-
dication of that antipathy (2.1.1; 3.18.41) . However, it was through
Cicero's writings especially the Academic Questions that Augustine
derived his knowledge of skepticism and the arguments that had
been urged in its support. Hence, the numerous similarities of ex-
pressions in the Academic Questions and in the Answer to Skeptics.
But such similarities of expression are not to be taken as indications
of agreement in conviction or sentiment.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 109
employed a stenographer lest the winds disperse our labors/ 17
I suffered nothing to be lost. What you will find in this written
disputation are truly the ideas and opinions of those two
youths, though the words are mine and those of Alypius.
Chapter 2
(5 ) Therefore, when at my urging we were all assembled 1
at a place which seemed suitable for this purpose, I asked:
17 Virgil, Aeneid, 9.312.
1 The discussions recorded in the first book of Answer to Skeptics were
held on three consecutive days, beginning November 10, 386, and
Alypius departed for Milan on the first day (1.2.5; 4.11; 6.16). From
the end of the third day to the time in which the discussions were
resumed there was an intermission of about seven days. Then Alypius
returned; the discussions were resumed almost at once and carried
on for three consecutive days (2.4.10; 11.25; 3.1.1.). The Happy Life
(De beata t/ito)was composed on November 13, 14, and 15. The first
book of Divine Providence (De ordine) was composed during the fore-
noons of two consecutive days; no other discussions were held by
the disputants on those days; and Alypius returned to their midst a
very few days later (1.3.6; 8.26; 9.27; 11.33; 2.1.1). Both of these
dialogues were composed during an intermission in the composing of
the Answer to Skeptics, But the only long prolonged intermission
was that which occurred between the completion of the first book and
the beginning of the second.
Now, since the 13th, 14th and 15th were spent on The Happy Life,
and since the forenoons of two other consecutive days were spent on
the first book of Divine Providence, this latter could not have been
completed earlier than the forenoon of the 17th. And an interval of
'a very few days' must extend at least to the morning of the 19th.
Therefore, Alypius did not return earlier than the morning of the
19th. And, since it is now clear that no discussions on the Academics
were held since the morning of the 13th inclusive, it is equally clear
that the intermission of 'about seven days' must terminate not later
than the 19th. But the intermission began at the end of the third
day, and it was ended on the day that Alypius returned. Therefore,
we conclude that the respective dates of the discussions in the Answer
to Skeptics are November 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21. And, from the fact that
Augustine entered his thirty-third year at this time, it follows that the
year was 386.
HO SAINT AUGUSTINE
'Have you any doubt that It behooves us to know truth? 52
'None whatever,' replied Trygetlus. And by their very
countenances the others showed that they were in agreement
with him.
'But,' I continued, 'if we can be happy without under-
standing truth, do you still think that an understanding of
it is necessary? 5
At this point., Alypius said: 'I think it more prudent for
me to be a judge of this debate. Since a journey to the city
has been planned for me, I ought to be relieved of the burden
of taking sides. Furthermore, I shall be able to entrust to
some one else the role of judge more readily than that of
defender of either side. Henceforth, therefore, expect nothing
from me on behalf of one side or the other.'
When this had been unanimously granted him, and when
I had repeated the question, Trygetius said: 'Of course, we
wish to be happy: 3 but, if we can reach that objective with-
out the truth, then we need not search for the truth/
I said: 'What is that? Do all of you believe that we can be
happy without finding the truth?'
Then Licentius said : 'We can be happy if we are searching
for truth. 54
When, by a nod, I had sought the opinion of the others,
2 To indicate something true Augustine uses the term verum; to denote
truth in the abstract he employs the term veritas. ('A true thing
seems to me to be that which is' Soliloquies 2.5.8; 'If anything is
true, it is true by truth' Ibid. 1.15.27) . In this translation the word
'truth' is used as the equivalent of verum; the term 'the truth' is
used in translating veritas. For an exhaustive treatment of Augustine's
notion of truth, see C. Boyer, L'Idee de vente (Paris 1920) .
3 Cf. Cicero, Hortensius frag. 36 (Muller) ; Tusculan. Quaest. 5.10.28.
4 'The mere investigation of things that are most hidden and most
important has its delight. If we meet with anything resembling truth,
the mind is filled with a pleasure that wholly befits a man* (Cicero,
Academ. 2.41.127).
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS
111
Navigius said: 'I am impressed by what Licentius has said,
because to live happily is perhaps the very same as to live in
search of the truth/
Then define what a happy life is, 5 said Trygetius, 'so
that from your definition I may gather what answer is fitting. 5
I replied: 'What else do you think that a happy life is,
except a life in conformity with that which is the best element
in man? 5
*I shall not heedlessly spill words/ said Trygetius. *I cer-
tainly think that you ought to define for me what this best
element is. 5
I said: 'Who can doubt that the best element in man is
nothing else than that part of the mind to which it behooves
all the other parts in man to conform as to at master? And
that part lest you should request another definition may be
called the understanding or reason. 5 But, if this does not meet
with your approval, then see how you would define either a
happy life or the best element in man. 5
*I am in agreement, 5 he replied.
(6) I said: 'Now, to return to our subject, do you think
that life can be happy if truth be merely sought, but not
found?'
'I repeat that opinion of mine, 5 said Trygetius. 'It does not
seem so to me. 56
'What is your opinion? 5 I asked the others.
Then Licentius said: 'I think that it certainly can, for our
ancestors, whom we credit with having been wise and happy,
lived upright and happy lives by the mere fact that they were
searching for truth. 5
5 Cf. Retractationes 1.1.2; Cicero, De fin. 5.13.36; 14.38.
6 There is no record of his having previously expressed this opinion.
Undoubtedly, it had been expressed, but not recorded.
1 1 2 SAINT AUGUSTINE
I said: 'I am thankful for your having appointed me a
judge together with Alypius, and I confess that I had begun
to envy him. But, at the present moment, since one of you
thinks it possible to attain a happy life by a mere searching
for the truth, while the other thinks it can be attained only
by the finding of it and a moment ago Navigius showed
that he was inclined to go on your side, Liceritius I am
very anxious to see what kind of defenders of your opinions
you may be. The question in debate is a matter of the utmost
importance : it is worthy of diligent discussion.'
'If it is a matter of great moment, 5 added Licentius, 'it
calls for men of great abilities.'
I said: 'Do not try to find especially at this villa what
can hardly be found anywhere on earth. Rather, explain the
why and wherefore of your believing what has been and
not unwisely, I believe proffered by you. For, when matters
of great moment are inquired into by men of little ability, they
usually make them men of great ability.'
Chapter 3
( 7 ) He said : 'Because I see that you are strongly urging
us to debate with each other, and since I am confident that
you wish it for our own good, I ask why a searcher for truth
cannot be happy, even though he does not find it. 5
'Because,' replied Trygetius, 'we require that a happy man
be perfect, a sage in all respects. But, whoever is still search-
ing is not perfect. Therefore, I utterly fail to see how you
can call him happy.'
'Could the authority of our ancestors have any weight with
you?' asked Licentius.
'Not that of every one of them/ replied Trygetius.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 113
c Of which of them, then?' asked Licentius.
'Of those only who were wise men,' replied Trygetius.
'Do you not think that Carneades was a wise man?' asked
Licentius.
'I am not a Greek/ replied Trygetius. 'I do not know who
that Carneades was.'
'Well, what about our own Cicero?' asked Licentius. 'At
any rate, what do you think of him?*
After a long pause, Trygetius said: 'He was a wise man. 9
Therefore/ said Licentius, 'his opinion on this matter has
some weight with you?'
'It has,' replied Trygetius.
'Then hear what it is, for I think it has escaped you. Our
Cicero was of the opinion that a man who is searching for the
truth, even though he be unable to attain to its discovery, is
nevertheless happy.' 1
'Where has Cicero said that?' Trygetius asked.
Licentius rejoined: 'Who does not know that he has force-
fully asserted that nothing can be understood by man, that
nothing remains for a wise man but a diligent search for the
truth, and that, if he should give assent to doubtful things
and in a wise man this fault is the greatest of all he could
not be free from error, even if those things should happen to
be true? 2 Wherefore, if we must believe that a wise man is
necessarily happy, and, if a mere search for the truth is the
whole function of wisdom, why should we hesitate to believe
that a happy life can be attained by the mere search for the
truth?'
1 Hortensius frag. 101 (Muller) .
2 'And that nothing is more discreditable than for assent and approba-
tion to precede knowledge and perception' (Cicero, Academ. 1.12.45) .
Ct Ibid. 2.20.66; 21.67.
114 SAINT AUGUSTINE
(8) Then Trygetlus said: 'Is it in any way permitted to
revoke what has been thoughtlessly conceded? 5
At this juncture I interposed: That concession is not
usually granted by those whom boyish vainglory and not
the desire of finding the truth incites to disputation. There-
fore, not only is that permission granted, but especially since
you are to be reared and educated at my residence 1 want
you to regard it as one of your rules that it behooves you
to return to the discussion of any points which you may have
incautiously conceded. 5
Licentius said: 'I consider it no small progress in philo-
sophy when victory is disregarded by a disputant for the sake
of finding the right and the true. Therefore, I gladly comply
with your precept and conform to your sentiments. I allow
Trygetius to return to what he thinks he has unwisely con-
ceded, for the matter is within my competency/
At this point Alypius said: 'You, as well as I, are aware
that the function of the role undertaken by me has not yet
been performed. But, because my previously arranged depar-
ture compels me to interrupt it, my fellow judge will not
decline the twin power of my office until my return; for I
see that this contest of yours is going to continue for a long
time. 5
After the departure of Alypius, Licentius said: 'Bring for-
ward what you had heedlessly conceded.'
Trygetius said: 'I had heedlessly conceded that Cicero was
a wise man.'
'But, then, was Cicero not a wise man? he by whom
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 115
philosophy was begun and brought to completion in the Latin
language! 53
'Even though I grant that Cicero was a wise man/ said
Trygetius, 'I nevertheless do not agree with everything he
wrote. 5
'But you must refute a great many other opinions of his 5
lest you seem brazenly to impugn the one that is being
discussed. 5
Trygetius said : 'But, what if I am prepared to prove merely
that he held an erroneous opinion on this point. In that case,
as far as I can see, your only concern is with regard to the
weight of the reasons which I offer for what I believe we ought
to maintain.'
'Go ahead, 5 said Licentius. 'Indeed, what could I venture
against one who avows himself an opponent of Cicero? 5
(9) Then Trygetius said: 'I wish that you, our judge,
would direct your attention to the way you defined a happy
life a moment ago. For, you said that the man is happy who
lives in harmony with that part of the mind which fittingly
governs the other parts. And, Licentius, I wish that you would
now concede to me that a man who is still searching for the
truth is not perfect; for, by virtue of the liberty into which
philosophy promises most assuredly to lead us, I have thrown
off the yoke of authority.'
After a long pause, Licentius said: 'I do not concede it.*
3 Cicero elaborated no distinctive system or school of philosophy: he
was an eclectic. But he endeavored to imbue the Romans with a
love for philosophy, and he made the teachings of the several Greek
schools available to the Romans in their own language. He appropriated
common Latin words and made them philosophic terms, e.g., approba-
tio, perceptio, assensio, etc. In other cases he adopted the Greek
terms, explained them, and, as it were, latinized them (Tusculan.
2.2.4; Academ. 1.1.3; 7.25). In this sense only could it be said that he
began philosophy and brought it to completion in the Latin language.
116 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Then Trygetius said: 'Why? Give us an explanation, for I
am most eager to hear how a man can be at the same time
perfect and still searching for the truth? 3
Licentius then said: 'I admit that the man who has not
reached his goal is not perfect. But I think that God alone
knows the truth or perhaps the mind of man after it has
departed from the body, its dark prison. However, man's goal
is to search for the truth perfectly. We are indeed seeking a
perfect man, but a man, nevertheless.'
'Consequently, man cannot be happy,' said Trygetius. Tor,
how can he be happy while he is unable to reach what he so
ardently desires? But, a man can live happily precisely because
he can live in harmony with that part of the mind which ought
to be the governing power in man. Therefore, he is capable of
finding truth. Otherwise, let him restrain himself : let him not
yearn for truth, lest he be inevitably miserable, since he would
be unable to reach it.'
'But,' said Licentius, 'man's happiness is precisely this : that
he be makiftg a thorough search for the truth. This is truly the
attaining of the end beyond which he is unable to go. There-
fore, whoever is seeking the truth less earnestly than it behooves
him does not attain his end. On the other hand, whoever strives
to find the truth insofar as a man can and ought to such a
man is happy even though he does not find it, for he is doing
all that man was bom to do. And, if the finding is not accom-
plished, the defect is merely something which nature did not
bestow. 4 Finally, would it not be utter folly to call a man
miserable, who through days and nights is incessantly seeking
the truth insofar as he is able? But, since a man must be either
happy or miserable, he will, therefore, be happy* And so, that
4 'Is that our fault? Blame nature, because she has hidden truth' (Cicero,
Academ. 2.10.32) .
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 117
definition is, I believe, far more favorable to me. For, if a
man is happy as indeed he is who is living in harmony
with that part of the mind which rightly governs all his other
parts, and if that part is called reason, then, I ask, is a man
living in discordance with reason if he is making a thorough
search for the truth? If this is absurd, then why do we hesitate
to say that a man is happy by the mere search for the truth?'
Chapter 4
(10) 'Whoever is in error,' said Trygetius, 'seems to me
to be neither happy nor living according to reason. And,
whoever is always seeking and never finding is in error. Hence,
you must prove at least one of these two statements : namely,
either that a person in error can be happy, or that he who
never finds what he is seeking is not in error.'
C A happy man cannot be in error,' said Licentius. And
then, after a long silence, he added: 'But he is not in error
while he is making a search, because he is making a thorough
search so as not to be in error.'
And Trygetius said: 'Certainly, he is searching in order
not to be in error, but he is in error whenever he is not find*
ing. You thought that his unwillingness to be in error would
be an argument in your favor, just as if no one were unwill-
ingly in error, or as if anybody were in error except un-
willingly.*
At this point, because Licentius was hesitating a long time
as to what answer ho should give, I interposed: 'You ought
to define what errdr is. You can very easily discern" its bound-
aries, for you hve already entered its area.'
'I am not capable of defining anything, 9 said Licentius,
'although it may be easier to define, error than to confine it.*
118 SAINT AUGUSTINE
*I shall define it, 3 said Trygetius. 'It is most easy for me
easy, not by reason of talent, but for the very best of
reasons. To be in error is to be forever seeking and never
finding.*
Licentius said: If I could easily refute that definition, I
should not have been so long a failure in defending my case.
But, because the matter is either really or seemingly difficult,
I beg of you that, if I cannot find the answer today although
I am sedulously revolving it the question be postponed
until tomorrow.'
Since I was of the opinion that this request ought to be
granted, and since the others voiced no objection, we arose
to go for a walk. And, while we were conversing on many
subjects, he remained apart, fixed in cogitation. When he saw
that this availed him nothing, he decided to relax his mind
and to join our conversation. Afterwards, when it was already
twilight, they resumed the conflict, but I put an end to it and
persuaded them to allow it to be postponed to another day.
Then to the bathing halls.
(11) On the following day, 1 when we had been seated
together, I said : 'Resume what you began yesterday/
Then Licentius said: 'Unless I am mistaken, we postponed
the discussion at my request, because the definition of error
was extremely difficult for me.'
I said: 'On this point you certainly are not in error. And
I should like this to be for you an omen with regard to all
the other points/
Then/ said he, 'hear what I should have proffered even
yesterday if you had not intervened. It seems to me that error
is the approval of the false for the true. And nobody falls
into this if he thinks that our search for the truth must be end-
1 November 11, 386.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS lib?
less. For, whoever accepts nothing as true cannot accept the
false for the true; therefore, he cannot be in error. But, he can
most assuredly be happy. For to be concise if we could
always live as it was granted us to live yesterday, I see no reason
why we should hesitate to call ourselves happy. We lived in
profound mental tranquillity, entirely free from the fever of
inordinate desires, keeping the mind free from every bodily
taint and devoting ourselves to reason insofar as that is pos-
sible for a man. In a word, we were living in harmony with
that part of the mind which is divine. And it was definitively
agreed among us yesterday that this is the happy life. Yet,
in my opinion, we discovered nothing new: we were merely
searching for the truth. Therefore, even though man be
absolutely unable to find the truth, his life can be happy by a
mere search for it. Furthermore, see how readily your defini-
tion is refuted by common opinion. You have said that "to
be in error is to be forever seeking and never finding." But,
if it should happen that some one is not searching for any-
thing, and is asked, for instance, whether it is now daytime,
and if he should at once casually believe and say that it is
nighttime, would he not seem to you to be in error? And yet,
your definition did not include this very extensive class of
error. Moreover, if it actually included some who are not
in error, could any definition be more faulty? Now, if it
should happen that some one is seeking Alexandria and is
traveling directly toward it, I believe you could not say that
he is in error. And if he should be impeded for one reason
or another, and should spend a long time on the journey, and
should even be overtaken by death during that journey's
course, was he not forever seeking and never finding? Never-
theless, he was not in error.'
'He was not forever seeking,' Trygetius said.
120 SAINT AUGUSTINE
(12) 'You give a correct answer and a good suggestion/
said Licentius, 4 for now your definition is utterly beside the
point. I did not say that a man who is forever seeking the
truth is happy. In fact, he could not be forever peeking the
truth; for, in the first place, a man does not live forever;
again, since age impedes him, he cannot be searching for
truth from the very moment that he becomes a man. And,
even if you think that he ought to be regarded as forever
seeking, provided that he allow no time to be lost in which
he is able to prosecute the search even in that case, you
must come back to Alexandria. Suppose that a man begins
that journey at the very first moment in which, by reason of
age or occupation, he is permitted to make a journey, and
suppose that as I have already said although he never
deviates, he nevertheless reaches the end of his life before he
reaches his destination. Notwithstanding all this, you would
be greatly in error if you thought him to be in error, even
though he did not cease to seek whenever he could and was
still unable to find what he was seeking. Wherefore, if my
definition be true and, according to that definition, whoever
is making a thorough search, even though he be not finding
the truth, is not in error; and he is happy precisely because
he is living in conformity with reason your definition is
rendered worthless. Even if it were not, I may ignore it com-
pletely if my contention is sufficiently established by the defini-
tion I have given. Why, therefore, I ask, is our dispute not
already settled?'
Chapter 5
(13) Trygetius rejoined: 'Do you grant that wisdom is
the right way of life?'
'Yes, certainly,' replied Licentius. 'But I wish you would
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 121
define wisdom for me, so that I may know whether both of
us have the same notion of it.'
Trygetius answered: 'Do you not think it already defined
by the very question you have been asked? And you have
agreed to my contention, for, if I am not mistaken, wisdom
is correctly called the right way of life.'
'To me,' said Licentius, 'nothing seems more ridiculous
than that definition.'
Terhaps,' said Trygetius. 'Nevertheless, proceed cautiously,
I beg you, so that reason may precede your laughter, for,
nothing is more detestable than laughter which well deserves
to be laughed at.'
*At any rate,' said Licentius, 'do you not admit that death
is the opposite of life?'
C I do,' Trygetius replied.
'Therefore,' said Licentius, 'it seems to me that the way of
life is nothing else than the way which every one takes in order
to avoid death.'
Trygetius agreed.
Licentius continued: 'Therefore, if some traveler would
shun a bypath because he heard it was frequented by robbers,
and would continue along the right road and would thus
escape death, would he not be following the way of life and
the right way? Yet, no one calls it wisdom. How, then, can
every right way of life be wisdom? Of course, I have agreed
that it is wisdom, but not wisdom exclusively. A definition,
however, ought to include nothing that is foreign. So, please
define again what you think wisdom to be.'
(14) Trygetius was silent for some time. Then" he said:
'Yes, I shall defmt it again if you are determined never to con-
fine it. Wisdom is the right way that leads to the truth.'
*And this,' said Licentius, 'is likewise refuted. For, accord-
122 SAINT AUGUSTINE
ing to Virgil, while this was said to Aeneas by his mother
Just travel on: direct thy step along the path that leads thee 1
he, following that path, reached what had been mentioned:
in other words, he reached truth. Maintain, if you will, that
this can be called wisdom, wherever he placed his step while
traveling. But, I should be very foolish to try to batter down
that definition of yours, because no definition could be more
helpful to my case. You have said that wisdom is not the
truth itself, but that it is the way which leads to the truth. Of
a certainty, therefore, whoever is using his way is using wis-
dom, and, incontestably, whoever is using wisdom is wise.
Therefore, whoever will have made a thorough search for the
truth, even if he will not have reached it, will, nevertheless, be
wise. For, in my opinion, no better way to the truth can be
conceived than a diligent search for the truth. Consequently,
any man who is using this way alone will be already wise.
Now, no wise man is miserable. But, every man is either miser-
able or happy. Therefore, not only the finding of the truth,
but even the mere search for it, will make a man happy. 5
( 15 ) Then, with a smile, Trygetius said : 'Deservedly has
this befallen me, since I airily agreed with my opponent on a
point of no necessity just as if I were a great definer or as
if I should consider anything a mere trifle in a debate. But,
when would this end, if I should insist that something be de-
fined again and again by you, and if I should pretend to
miss your meaning, and should demand that the terms of that
definition and all its logical consequences be defined one by
one? And yet, if a definition of wisdom is rightly demanded
of me, then why may I not rightly demand the definition of
something already most clear? Indeed, of what word has
nature intended a clearer notion in our minds than of the
1 Aeneid 1.401,
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 123
word wisdom. But, when that notion floats away, as it were,
from the harbor of our mind, and spreads, so to speak, the
sails of words, 2 I know not how the submerged hulks of a
thousand fallacies dash against it. Wherefore, either let no
definition of wisdom be demanded, or let our judge deign
to step down to her defense. 3
At this point I postponed the debate to another day, be-
cause darkness was making it difficult to use the stylus and
because I saw that an entirely new and important subject
of discussion was arising. Indeed, it had been well toward
sunset when we began our discussion, because almost the
whole day had been spent in attending to chores at the villa
and in reviewing the first book of Virgil.
Chapter 6
(16) Then, as soon as it was daylight, 1 the pending ques-
tion was at once brought forward, for on the preceding day
matters had been so arranged that there would be ample
leisure.
Then I said: 'Yesterday, Trygetius, you asked me to step
down from my office of judge and to come to the defense of
wisdom as if wisdom would suffer anybody to be her op-
ponent in your debate, or as if, although some one was already
defending her, she were finding herself in such straits that
she had to implore additional help. But, in your dispute, the
only problem that has arisen is this: What is wisdom? And
in this neither of you is assailing wisdom, because each of you
is desirous of her. But, even if you believe that you have not
2 *unfold the sails of eloquence' (Cicero, Tusc. 4.5.10) .
1 November 12, 386.
124 SAINT AUGUSTINE
succeeded in defining wisdom, you must not on that account
abandon the defense of the rest of your position. For that
reason you will receive from me nothing more than a defini-
tion of wisdom a definition which is not mine and which is
not new. It has been given by ancient philosophers, and I am
surprised that you do not recall it. Not for the first time are
you hearing that wisdom is a knowledge of divine and of
human things.' 2
(17) I had expected that, after this definition, Licentius
would ask what he ought to say.
But straightway he countered: Then, I want to know why
we do not name as wise that utterly iniquitous man whom we
all well know to be habitually debauched with countless
harlots. I mean that Albicerius, who for many years at Car-
thage has been giving clear and wonderful responses to those
who consult him. I could give innumerable instances, were
1 not speaking to those who themselves have witnessed this.
So, let a few instances suffice for my present purpose: When
a spoon was missing at our home, and at your bidding (he
was addressing his remarks to me) 3 Albicerius was consulted
about it, did he not promptly and accurately tell not only
what was being sougKt, but also whose it was and where it
was to be found? And likewise in my presence to say nothing
about the fact that he made absolutely no mistake with re-
gard to the matter on which he was being consulted when
the boy who was carrying the money stole a certain portion of
it while we were on our way to Albicerius, the latter even
before he saw the coins or heard from us how much was being
brought to him, compelled the boy to count all of it in his
2 Cicero, De officiis 2.2.5; Tuscul Quaest. 4.26.57.
3 For Augustine's attitude toward astrologers and soothsayers, see
Confessions 4.2,3.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 125
presence and before our own eyes, and made him restore what
he had taken/
( 18 ) 'What of the fact that we have heard from you that
Flaccianus, a very learned and illustrious man, used to be
astonished because, when he had spoken about buying a farm,
he referred the matter to that soothsayer to see if the latter
could tell him what he had done. And Albicerius at once
stated not only the nature of the transaction, but also and
Flaccianus really cried out in astonishment at this the very
name of the farm, although it was such a queer name that
Flaccianus himself scarcely remembered it? But I can never
repress my astonishment when I relate the fact that, when
our friend, your pupil, in order to disconcert Albicerius, ar-
rogantly demanded that he tell what he was silently revolving
in his mind, Albicerius replied that the questioner was think-
ing of one of Virgil's verses. And when the astonished ques-
tioner could not deny it, and proceeded to ask what verse it
was, then Albicerius, who scarcely eve( had had even a pass-
ing glance at any grammarian's school, recited aloud the
line of poetry without the slightest hesitation, but with the
utmost assurance. Now, would you say that those matters on
which he was consulted were not human things? Or did he,
without any knowledge of divine things, give such correct
and unambiguous answers to those who consulted him? Each
of these suppositions is absurd, for human things are nothing
else than affairs of men, such as the silver and the coins and
the farm and even the very act of thinking. And who would
not regard as divine those things through which divination
accrues to a man? Therefore, Albicerius was a wise man, if
by that definition we concede that wisdom is a knowledge
of divine and of human things.'
426 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Chapter 7
(19) Trygetius now said: 'In the first place, under the
term, "knowledge" [scientia], 1 do not include that in which
its possessor may be wrong at times. Indeed [this kind of]
knowledge does not consist of things merely comprehended:
it consists of things comprehended in such manner that one
is never wrong in his knowledge of them; and he should
never waver, no matter by what adversaries he may be as-
sailed. By some philosophers, therefore, it has been rightly
said that this kind of knowledge can be found only in a wise
man, and that he must have not only grasped what he main-
tains and follows, but most also hold it as unquestionable. 1
But, as for the man you have mentioned, we know that he has
often spoken many falsehoods. I know it, not merely because
others have told me, but because I myself have witnessed it
at times. Now, despite the fact that he has spoken many
falsehoods, should I nevertheless call him a wise man, although
I would not call him wise if he had spoken truths in a falter-
ing manner? And you are to understand that in all this I am
speaking of haruspices, augurs, all kinds of astrologers, and
oneirocritics. But, bring forward, if you can, some man of this
sort who has never hesitated about his answers when he was
consulted, or even one who has never given answers that were
false. But I believe I do not have to trouble myself about
oracles : they reveal the thoughts of some one else. 3
(20) 'Moreover, although I concede that human things
are affairs of men, what possessions do you think we have
which chance could not give to us or take away? And when we
speak of knowledge of human things, do we mean the knowl-
edge by which some one knows the number or the kind of
1 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 2.9.27.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 127
farms we have, how much gold or silver we have, or even
what part of some one's poems we are thinking of? Knowledge
of human things is the knowledge which knows the light of
prudence, the glory of temperance, the strength of fortitude,
and the sacredness of justice; 2 these are possessions which we,
without fearing any vicissitudes of fortune, may rightly dare
to call our own. And, believe me, if that Albicerius had known
them, he would never have lived such a dissolute and shame-
less life. As to his having told what line of poetry that client
of his was thinking of, I do not think that this ought to be
numbered among our possessions not that I would deny that
the very honorable arts are a portion of our mental posses-
sions, but because it has been given even to the most unlearned
to recite and declaim another's line of poetry. So, when such
things rush into our memory, it is no wonder if they are
sensed by some most worthless animals of the air, which are
called demons. It is no wonder that this is accomplished in
some way or other which is far remote from our senses, for
1 admit that we can be surpassed by them in cunning and in
keenness of the senses. However, I deny that they are superior
to us in reason. For, even if we are astonished because the
tiny bee through some kind of keenness of sense in which
it surpasses man flies from any direction whatever to where
it has deposited honey, we must not on that account estimate
it as superior or even equal to ourselves.'
(21) 'And so, I should rather wish that this Albicerius
had taught versification itself whenever he was asked by one
who desired to learn, or that, urged by some client, he had
composed verses of his own on a subject suddenly proposed
2 In Cicero's definition of wisdom the term divine things signifies nature,
physics; the term human things comprises morals. Trygetius, is
insisting on this denotation of the terms, while Licentius is trying to
extend it.
128 SAINT AUGUSTINE
to him. And you are wont to mention that Flaccianus himself
often said this, inasmuch as he with great depth of under-
standing used to deride and despise this sort of divination.
And to some kind of puny soul that is what he used to call
it he used to attribute the fact that Albicerius was ac-
customed to give those answers, after he was informed and
inspired by a quasi spirit. And of those who were in astonish-
ment at such answers, that very learned man used to inquire
whether Albicerius could teach grammar or music or geome-
try and who that knew Albicerius would not confess that
he was totally ignorant of all those arts? Therefore, Flaccianus
would most earnestly exhort those who had learned those
branches, to the end that they would unhesitatingly value their
minds more highly than divination. He would urge them to
endeavor to build up and strengthen their minds by means of
those branches of learning whose virtue it is to soar above
that airy nature of invisible animals.'
Chapter 8
(22) 'But, since divine things are universally conceded to
be higher and nobler than human things, how was he able to
reach those things, since he knew not what he himself was? Or
perhaps you think that the stars, which we contemplate every
day, are something great in comparison with the must true
and only God. Of God, perhaps the intellect gets an occasional
glimpse, but the senses never behold Him. On the other hand,
the stars are before our very eyes, and, therefore, they are not
the divine things of which alone wisdom professes to have
knowledge. And the other things which those nondescript
diviners abuse for the sake of ostentation or emolument those
are of baser nature than the stars. Therefore, Albicerius pos-
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 129
sessed no knowledge of divine and of human things; con-
sequently, to no avail has our definition been assailed by you
in this fashion. Finally since we ought to regard as wholly
worthless and negligible whatever is outside the realm of
divine and of human things in what things, I ask you,
could that wise man of yours seek the truth?'
'He could seek it in divine things,' replied Licentius, 'for
even in man there undoubtedly is a divine power. 51
'Then, did Albicerius already know that which your wise
man will be forever seeking?' asked Trygetius.
'He had a knowledge of divine things, 3 replied Licentius,
*but not a knowledge of the things that must be sought by
a wise man. Indeed, who would not subvert our entire mode
of speaking, if he would concede him divination, but deny
him a knowledge of divine things, from which the word, divin-
ation, is derived? Hence, unless I am mistaken, that definition
of yours includes something or other which does not pertain
to wisdom.'
(23 ) Trygetius said: 'The man who advanced that defini-
tion will defend it if he so desires. But, just now I want you to
answer me, so that at length we may come to the question
under discussion.'
'Here I am,' said Licentius.
'Do you admit that Albicerius had a knowledge of truth?'
Trygetius asked.
'I do,' replied Licentius.
'Then, he is better than that wise man of yours,' said
Trygetius.
'By no means,' said Licentius, 'because neither that silly
soothsayer, nor even the wise man himself while he is living
in this body, reaches the kind of truth which the wise man is
1 Cf. Cicero, De fin. 2.34.114.
130 SAINT AUGUSTINE
seeking. And, so true is this, that it is really nobler to be
forever seeking the latter kind of knowledge than to be some-
times finding the former.'
'In my straits/ said Trygetius, 'that definition must come
to my aid. And, if to you it seemed faulty because it included
a man whom we cannot call wise, I ask whether you would
approve it If we should call wisdom the knowledge of those
divine and human things which pertain to a happy life.*
Tes, that is wisdom,' said Licentius, 'but wisdom is not
merely that. Consequently, the former definition trespasses
on another's domain; this definition surrenders some of its
own. Therefore, the former can be accused of avarice; this,
of folly. But, to express my own idea by way of definition, it
seems to me that wisdom is not merely the knowledge but
also the quest of those divine and human things which per-
tain to a happy life. And in case you wish to analyze this defini-
tion, its first part which mentions knowledge refers to
God; the second part consisting of quest pertains to man.
Therefore, God is happy by the first part; man, by the second/
'I wonder how you could say that your wise man is labor-
ing in vain,' said Trygetius.
'How could I say that he is laboring in vain,' said Licen-
tius, 'while he is making such a profitable search? For, by
the very fact that he is making a search, he is wise; by being
wise, he is happy. He is happy, because, to the utmost of
his power, he is extricating himself from the entanglements
of the body and devoting himself to sheer introspection; be-
cause he is not allowing himself to be torn asunder by inor-
dinate desires, but is always tranquilly directing his mind
toward itself and toward God; 2 and because he is doing all
2 Cf. Soliloquies 2.1.1.: 'O God, who are forever the same, let me know
myself, let me know Thee/
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 131
this in order to make a thoroughly good use of reason at the
present time and it has been agreed among us that a happy
life is precisely this and so that on the last day of his life
he may be found prepared for what he has been longing to
obtain, and so that he may rightly enjoy divine happiness
after he has made a thoroughly good use of the happiness
that is human.'
Chapter 9
(24) Now, because Trygetius was a long time trying to
find an answer, I interposed: I think, Licentius, that this
boy would not lack arguments if we should permit him to
make a leisurely search. Was he ever at a loss for an answer?
At first because there arose a question about the happy
life he inferred that only a wise man can be happy, since
even fools agree that folly is miserable ; that a wise man must
needs be perfect; that he is not perfect who is still trying to
find out what truth is; and, consequently, that he is not
happy. When you hurled the massive weight of authority
against this stronghold, he was indeed for a moment un-
happily disconcerted by the name of Cicero. But he straight-
way regained his courage, and with a certain mettlesome
steadfastness he leaped into the whirlpool of liberty and re-
covered what had been violently struck from his hands. Then
he asked you if you thought that any one who is still seeking
something is perfect. His purpose was to return to the original
point If you would acknowledge that such a man is not per-
fect, and to show if he could do it through that definition
that a man who regulates his life by the law of the mind is
a perfect man; and that, consequently, only a perfect man
can be happy. Although you had with more circumspection
132 SAINT AUGUSTINE
than I was expecting avoided that trap, and were saying
that a most diligent searcher for the truth is a perfect man,
yet, because you had combated too unguardedly and with too
much reliance on the definition in which we had said that
a happy life is one that is governed according to reason, he
got around you completely, and he captured your fortress.
You were completely repulsed, and you would have lost the
mastery if the truce did not restore your strength. Now, where
else than in the definition of error have the Academics, whose
position you are defending, located their citadel? Although
you yourself had mentioned this very thing in expounding
Cicero's opinion, you would have had no answer to give, if
it had not returned to your mind during the night perhaps
through a dream. Then we agreed on a definition of wisdom,
although you were trying to weaken it with such cleverness
that not even your helper, Albicerius, could fully see through
your stratagems* With what alertness and vigor he resisted
you! How very close he came to entangling and upsetting
you ! But you finally protected yourself by your new definition:
you said that a search for the truth is human wisdom, and
that a happy life results from this search by reason of mental
tranquillity. Trygetius will make.no reply to this claim, es-
pecially if he is going to ask that a favor be granted him in
adjourning even for the remaining part of the day. 3
(25) 'But, lest we prolong the matter unduly, please let
this discussion be brought to an end at once, for I deem it
excessive to linger on it any longer. Indeed, as regards the
task that was undertaken, the matter has been sufficiently dis-
cussed. It could be entirely finished in a very few words, were
it not that I wish to explore your assiduity and perseverance,
for which I am deeply solicitous. As soon as I decided to ex-
hort you most earnestly toward a search for the truth, I began
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 133
to elicit from you how much importance you would attach
to it; all of you have attached to it as much importance as I
would desire. But, since we are longing for happiness
whether it demands the actual finding of the truth, or only
a diligent search for it we must at any rate subordinate
everything else and make a thorough search for truth, if we
wish to be happy. Therefore, as I have said, let us put an end
to this disputation. And, Licentius, let us send a written record
of it to your father, especially; for I have long been steer-
ing his mind toward philosophy, but I am still seeking the
stroke of fortune that would give him admittance. Perhaps
he will be enkindled to glowing desire for those studies when
he learns not only by hearing it, but also by reading those
notes that you are now living this kind of life with me, and
that you are zealously devoted to those studies. But, if you
agree with the Academics and I feel that you do then
provide yourself with better equipment, for I am resolved to
arraign them myself. 3
When this had been said, announcement was made that
the midday meal was ready; and we ended the session.
BOOK II
Chapter 1
|F, IN THE COURSE of the search for wisdom, the dis-
covery of its art and science were as inevitable as is
the fact that a wise man cannot be without it, then
all the craftiness and stubborn persistence of the Academics
or, as I sometimes believe, the entire characteristic culture
of the age would have been buried with that same era,
buried with the very bodies of Carneades and Cicero. How-
ever, Romanianus, it is a fact that knowledge but seldom
grows into wisdom, and only for the few. This is due either to
the manifold turmoils of this life, in which case you present
yourself as an outstanding example; or to a certain languor,
sloth, or dullness of sluggish minds; or to despair of discovery,
since the star of wisdom does not rise before the mind as
easily as this light appears to the eyes; or to an error that is
common to all peoples, namely, a false assurance of having
already found the truth. Hence it happens that, if men make
any search at all, they do not make a diligent search, and they
acquire an aversion toward learning. 1 Consequently, when
one comes to handgrips with the Academics, their weapons
seem invincible and almost Vulcanian 2 not only to the me-
diocre, but even to those of acumen and erudition. Against
those tides and tempests of fortune, not only must one struggle
with the oars of all available powers, but most especially
must one implore divine aid with all devotion and piety, so
that the ever constant aim of good endeavors may steer its
course, and so that no mishap may buffet it to such degree
1 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 2.15,46.
2 Virgil, Aeneid 8.535; 12.739.
134
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 135
that the very safe and delightful port of wisdom may not
give it entry. This is your initial step. Hence, I am anxious
about you; hence, I desire you to be liberated; hence, in my
daily devotions I do not cease to pray for prosperous winds
on your behalf if, indeed, I be worthy to obtain my peti-
tions. But then, I am beseeching the very power and wisdom
of the most high God, for what else is He whom the Mysteries
reveal to us as the Son of God? 3
(2) But, you will be of great help to me while 1 am
making supplication for you, if you will not despair of our
being able to be heard, and if you will in co-operation with
us strive vigorously not only by yearnings but also by good
will and by your natural high-mindedness, on account of
which I seek to win you, in which I take singular delight, and
which I am constantly admiring. But, alas ! in you it is con-
cealed a thunderbolt, so to speak in those clouds of domes-
tic affairs; it remains hidden from many persons, and, in
fact, from almost everybody. But it cannot escape the notice
of your intimate friends myself and one or two others who
have often not only attentively listened to your rumblings
but also beheld your numerous strokes of brilliancy, which
were more like flashes of lightning. Who, indeed to confine
myself to one instance for the time being, and not to mention
the others who, I ask, ever emitted such a sudden thunder-
ous sound and flashed with such a stroke of intelligence that,
with a single roar of reason and a certain flash of temper-
ance, sensuous desire that raged so violently the day before
died within him in a single day? Consequently, will that power
not burst forth some day and change into dread and amaze-
3 1 Cor 1.24. At this period in his life Augustine usually employs the
terras mysteria and sacra to designate the Sacred Scriptures. Cf. below
3.20.43.
136 SAINT AUGUSTINE
ment the jeens of many who now despair? And, having shown
on earth some signs, as it were, of things to come, will it not
hasten back to heaven 4 when the burden of the entire body
will have been cast off? Would you say that Augustine has
mistakenly said this about Romanianus? He to whom I have
dedicated my entire self and of whom I now begin to have
a little knowledge He will not permit it.
Chapter 2
(3) Therefore, enter upon philosophy with me. There is
in it everything that is wont to arouse you in your frequent
spells of doubt and anxiety. To be sure, I have no misgiving
with regard to either indolence of disposition or slowness of
wit on your part, for, who has ever shown himself more alert
and keen than you in our conversations, whenever you were
afforded a short relief from anxiety? Shall I not return you
a favor? Or perhaps I am slightly indebted to you? When I
was a poor boy, pursuing studies that were not available in
our own town, you provided me with a home, with funds,
and with something even better courage. 1 When I was be-
reaved of a father, you consoled me with your friendship, rous-
ed me with your encouragement, and aided me with your re-
sources. By your favor and friendship, and by the sharing of
your home with me, 2 you made me almost as renowned and
prominent a personage as yourself in otir town. And when I
was returning to Carthage for the sake of a more illustrious
profession, 3 and had revealed my plan and prospect to you
4 For a similar expression, see 9.22.
1 Cf. Confessions 2.3.
2 Cf. Ibid. 3.11.
3 Cf. Ibid. 4.7.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 137
alone, and to no member of my own family, you, indeed, hes-
itated for a while by reason of your innate love of homeland,
because I had already begun to teach there. Nevertheless, by
a marvelous tempering of good will, you became a helper in-
stead of a dissuader when you were unable to subdue the
yearning of a young man striving for what seemed to be better
things: you furnished my journey with everything it needed.
And you, who had tended the cradle or, as it were, warmed
the nest of my earliest studies in that city you now again
supported my first faint efforts when I dared to fly. And when,
in your absence and without your knowledge, I had sailed
away, you were by no means angry because I had not inform-
ed you as I was wont to do. Suspecting anything but obstinacy,
you continued steadfast in friendship. And the pupils deserted
by the teacher were not more plain before your eyes than the
inmost recesses of our mind and its innocence of guile.
(4) Finally, it is you who have inspired, advanced, and
effected whatever peace I am now most freely enjoying: the
fact that I have escaped from the chains of excessive desires;
that I have laid aside the burdens of deadly cares, and am
again breathing easily, recovering my senses, and returning
to myself; that I am most earnestly engaged in the quest for
the truth, and have already begun to find it; and that I am
confident of reaching even the ultimate measure. 4 Up to the
present time, however, I- have grasped by faith, more than
I have comprehended by reason, Him whose minister you
have been.
For, when I had, face to face, disclosed to you my inner
mental perturbations, and when I repeatedly asseverated
that to me no fortune seemed favorable unless it afforded
leisure to apply oneself to philosophy; that no life was a happy
4 'The measure of the mind is wisdom* (The Happy Life 4.32) .
138 SAINT AUGUSTINE
one except insofar as it was lived in philosophy; but that I
was held back by so great a burden of kinsfolk whose very
life depended on my occupation and by various expenses
that were occasioned either by my own false shame or by
the wretched distress of my relatives on such occasions you
used to be so elated with gladness and so inflamed with a holy
ardor for this kind of life that you used to say you would
break all my chains by sharing even your own patrimony
with me, if you were in any way freed from the shackles of
those troublesome litigations. 5
(5) And, although you had taken your departure after
the kindling had been placed beside us, we never slackened
in our yearning for philosophy and for the mode of life
which won favor among us, and we agreed to make no other
plans whatever. We were aiming at it steadily, but less eager-
ly. Yet, we thought that we were doing enough. Because we
were not yet beside the blaze that was to seize upon us at its
height, we thought that the flickering flame by which we were
being warmed was the greatest possible fire. But, behold! as
soon as certain plenteous books, as Celsinus 6 says, exhaled
sweet Arabian fragrance over us, as soon as they shed a very
few tiny drops of most precious perfume on that diminutive
flame, they at once enkindled in me such a conflagration
that incredible, Romanianus, truly incredible; and perhaps
beyond even your belief in me: what more can I say? I
could scarcely believe it of myself. What importance did I
then attach to any honor? Was I affected by human pomp?
5 Cf. Confessions 6.14.
6 Cf. A. Casamassa, in Ada Hebdomadae Augustinianae-Thomisticaeque
(Turin 1931) p.* 89. In Soliloquies 1.12.21, Augustine mentions Cor-
nelius Celsus, 'who says that wisdom is the supreme good.' In his
preface to De haeresibus, he refers to Celsus, 'who had compiled, in
six books, the tenets of all the founders of distinct philosophic
schools/
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 139
by a craving for empty fame? or, in fine, by the bond and
bondage of this mortal life? Truly, I was fast returning com-
pletely to my senses. And, as if returning from a journey, I
but beheld again I avow it that religion which had been
implanted in us in our boyhood, and which had been, as it
were, interwoven with the very marrow of our being. But,
that religion was drawing me to itself, although I knew it
not. Trembling, irresolute, and impatient, I snatched up
[the writings of] Paul the Apostle. For, I say, surely those
men could not have accomplished such great things, and
could not have lived in such manner as they manifestly did
live, if their writings and their reasons were in opposition with
so great a good. I read the whole book with the greatest
attention and care. 7
(6) Then, philosophy's countenance, howsoever dim the
light that was cast upon it, revealed itself to me. It was such
a countenance that, if I had been able to describe it to
that adversary of yours ( I shall not say 'to you,' for you have
always been ardently desirous of it, although as yet unknown
to you; but 'to that adversary of yours': and I know not
whether you are being more exercised than impeded by him)
then would he forsake and relinquish the seashore resorts,
the beautiful parks, the delightful and elegant banquets, the
private theatrical exhibitions. In fine, he would shun every-
thing that is strongly inciting him toward any pleasures what-
soever, and, as a fond and pious lover, he would fly to its
beauty as the object of his admiration, the aim of his desire,
and the end of his longing. For, we must admit that he has
a certain mental adornment, or rather the seed, as it were,
of such an adornment. While it strives to sprout into true
beauty, it produces twisted and misshapen leaves amid the
7 Cf. Confessions 7.9.21; The Happy Life 1.4.
140 SAINT AUGUSTINE
rough thickets of vices and errors. 8 However, It is incessantly
producing leaves, and to the few who peer insofar as that
is permitted intently and diligently into the dense entangle-
ments, it continues to be plainly visible. Hence, that kindli-
ness; hence, the many relishes of refinement at banquets;
hence, the extreme elegance; hence, the splendor and the
most orderly arrangement of all things and the charm of
a reflected beauty everywhere, adorning everything. 9
Chapter 3
(7) This is commonly called philocaly. Do not scom this
name, just because it is of common usage, for philocaly and
philosophy have very similar surnames. They would seem to
be truly, they are of the same family, so to speak. In
fact, what is philosophy? It is love of wisdom. And what is
philocaly? It is love of beauty. Consult the Greeks on this
point. But, what is wisdom? Is it not the true beauty itself?
Therefore, those two are assuredly akin, begotten of the same
parent. 1 But, philocaly was enticed from her lofty height
by the allurement of wanton desires, and was pent up in a
common cage. Nevertheless, she retained the similarity of
name, in order to admonish her captor not to despise her.
Consequently, the sister that soars without restraint often
recognizes this wingless and squalid and needy one. But, she
seldom sets her free, for it is only philosophy that knows
whence this philocaly derives her lineage. Of this entire
fable, Licentius will give you a more agreeable rendering in
poetic form: he is almost a perfect poet, and I have suddenly
8 'the thickest of the Stoics' (Cicero, Academ. 2.35.112).
9 He is referring to the Stoics. Cf. Cicero, De fin. 1.18-19.
1 Cf. Retractationes 1.1.3.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 141
become an Aesop. But, if that lover of this false beauty could
with eyes restored to health and with the blindfolds re-
moved a little gaze upon the true beauty, then with what
transports of delight would he cuddle up in the lap of philo-
sophy! How he would embrace you when he had recognized
you there as a true brother! Are you surprised at this? Or
perhaps you laugh? What if I could explain those things as
I wanted to? What if at least the voice of philosophy herself
could be heard, even though her face cannot as yet be seen
by you? Then you would be truly surprised but you would
not laugh, or abandon hope. Believe me, we should not aban-
don hope for anybody and especially for such men as these.
These are merely examples. Birds of this kind easily fly forth,
and easily fly back to the great surprise of many who re-
main encaged.
(8) Now, Romanianus, to return to ourselves. Let us, I
say, apply ourselves to philosophy. I should like to thank
you: your son has already begun to apply himself to philo-
sophy. But I am restraining him, so that he may be first well
drilled in the prerequisite branches of learning, and then
wax strong and vigorous. As for yourself, you are "to have no
fear that you are destitute of those arts. If I know you well,
I wish you nothing else than favorable breezes. But, what
shall I say about your talents? Would that they were not so
rare in men, as they are distinguished in you. There are,
however, two vicious hindrances to the finding of truth; with
regard to them, I have no great fear for you. Nevertheless,
I have a fear that you underrate yourself and that you de-
spair of ever finding it, or that you confidently believe you
have already found it. But, if you happen to have the first
142 SAINT AUGUSTINE
of those two hindrances, 2 perhaps this disputation will relieve
you of it. For, you have very often been enraged at the
Academics indeed, all the more violently in proportion to
your lack of erudition, but all the more wholeheartedly be-
cause you were captivated by love of the truth. With your
favor, therefore, I shall debate with AJypius and I shall easi-
ly persuade you to accept my views only with probabil-
ity, however, for you will not see truth itself unless you enter
into philosophy with your whole being. As to that other hin-
drance, namely, your presuming, perhaps, that you have
found something although you were seeking and doubting
when you departed from us if any part of the superstition
has rolled back into your mind, it will be straightway cast
out, either when I send you one of our own disputations on
religion or when I discuss many points with you face to face.
(9) At present, I am doing nothing but cleansing my-
self from vain and pernicious opinions. Consequently, I have
no doubt that I am better off than you. In only one thing
do I envy your good fortune, namely, that all by yourself
you are enjoying the company of my Lucilian. Perhaps you,
in turn, are jealous because I have called him mine. But what
else have I called him except your Lucilian and the Lucilian
of all of us who are one. And why should I ask you to come
to the relief of my longing for him? Rather, ask you that
favor of yourself, insofar as you know that you owe it. I now
say to both of you: Beware lest you think that you know
anything except what you have learned at least in the manner
2 The two hindrances are Skepticism and Manichaeism. He fears that
Romanianus may have returned to the Manichaean superstition, al-
though he was an adherent to the New Academy, 'seeking and doubt-
ing/ when he departed from Milan. This disputation was to disabuse
him of Skepticism. Approximately four years later, Augustine composed
the treatise, The True Religion, and dedicated it to Romanianus. He
devotes all of the ninth chapter to a refutation of Manichaeism.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 143
in which you know that one plus two plus three plus four is
ten. And, likewise, beware lest you think either that in philos-
ophy you will not gain a thorough knowledge of the truth, or
that truth can by no means become known in this manner.
Believe me or rather, believe Him who says: 'Seek, and
you shall find 53 that knowledge is not to be despaired of,
but that it will be even more manifest than those numbers.
Let us now come to the purpose. In fact, I have begun to
fear rather late, to be sure that this foreword is exceeding
due measure. And this is nothing trivial, since moderation
is undoubtedly godlike, but it escapes notice while it gently
leads. I shall be more cautious when I have become wise.
Chapter 4
(10) After the initial disputation which we have com-
piled into the first book we discontinued the discussion for
about seven days, since we were engaged in reviewing the
second, third and fourth books of Virgil, and in discoursing
upon them as seemed fitting at the proper time. In this exer-
cise, Licentius became so passionately attached to poetry
that he seemed to me to to be in need of some restraint, for he
was unwilling to be called away from this preoccupation to
anything else. At length, however, while the excellence of
philosophy was being extolled by me to the best of my ability,
he willingly joined in the renewed discussion on the Academ-
ics. And it happened that the day 1 had dawned so calm and
clear that it seemed better suited for nothing else than for
calming and clearing our minds. So we arose from our beds
3 Matt. 7.7.
1 November 19, 386.
144 SAINT AUGUSTINE
earlier than usual, and spent a very short while with the farm
hands, because time was pressing.
Then Alypius said: 'Before I hear you discoursing on the
Academics, I should like to have read to *ne that discourse
of yours, which, you tell me, was finished during my absence;
otherwise, since the occasion of the present discussion arises
from that discouse, I cannot help but misunderstand some
things, or at least experience difficulty in understanding you.'
When this had been done, and since we saw that almost
the entire forenoon had been spent in doing it, we decided
to return home from the field where we were strolling. And
Licentius said: 6 I beg you not to refuse to sum up the entire
teaching of the Academics, by expounding it to me before
lunch, lest I overlook some point in it which would be of
help to my side.'
I said: 'I shall do that, and all the more willingly because
you will eat very little while you are thinking on this matter.'
'Be not at ease on that score,' he replied, 'for I have
frequently noticed that many persons, and especially my
father, are all the more eager for food the more they are filled
with anxieties. And you have never noticed me thinking on
those meters in such manner that the table would be beyond
my attention. Indeed, I often wonder why it is that we crave
for food persistently when we are holding our attention fixed
on something else. Or why does the mind become more
masterful when we are preoccupied with our hands and teeth?'
I said: Tay attention to what you had asked about the
Academics, lest I have to endure you not only eating beyond
measure while you are pondering on those poetic measures,
but also raising measureless questions. And, if I keep some
point hidden for my side, Alypius will reveal it.'
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 145
'Good faith is demanded of you,' said Alypius. Tor, if we
are to fear that you are concealing some point, then I believe
that I cannot easily expose him from whom as all my
acquaintances well know I have learned all those points:
it is demanded especially because, by revealing truth, you
will be no more mindful of victory than of your own purpose.'
Chapter 5
(11) I said: e l shall act with good faith because you
prescribe it justly. The Academics were of the opinion that
certain knowledge [scientia] cannot accrue to a man with
respect to those things precisely which pertain to philosophy
indeed, Carneades used to say that he was paying no at-
tention to the other things; that a man can nevertheless be
wise; that the role of a wise man is completely developed in
a diligent search for truth as was minutely discussed also
by you, Licentius, in that discourse of yours; that, con-
sequently, a wise man gives assent to nothing at all, for, if
he were to give assent to things uncertain he would inevitably
fall into error which is something abominable for a wise
man. 1 They not only claimed that all things are uncertain,
but they also strengthened that claim by a most copious supply
of arguments. However, it is from the definition by Zeno
the Stoic that they seem to have seized the aphorism that
truth cannot be apprehended, 2 for he says that that truth
could be apprehended which would be so impressed on the
mind from the source whence it proceeded as it could not be
1 'To approve the false for the true is very disgraceful' (Cicero, Academ.
2.20.66) .
2 'We say that this was most correctly defined by Zeno' (Ibid. 2.6.18) .
146 SAINT AUGUSTINE
impressed from a source whence it did not proceed. 3 This
is more briefly and intelligibly expressed by saying that truth
can be recognized through those marks which the false can-
not have. They made strenuous efforts to establish the convic-
tion that such a thing could not be found. Thenceforth, dis-
sensions of philosophers, illusions of the senses, dreams and
deliriums, sophistries and sorites, flourished in defense of that
contention. 4 And, because they had it from the same Zeno that
nothing is more disgraceful than to form opinions, they very
ingeniously concluded that if nothing can be known and if
opinion is most disgraceful, then a wise man ought never to
accept anything as certain.' 5
(12) 'For this reason, a great deal of animosity was
aroused against them, for it seemed to follow as a logical con-
sequence that a man who accepts nothing as certain must
refrain from all activity. 6 Because the Academics believed
that their wise man accepts nothing as certain, they seemed
to describe him as a man always inactive and shirking all
duties. 7 Now, bringing forward a certain kind of probability,
which they termed "truth-like" they maintained that a wise
man is by no means neglectful of duties, since he has some-
thing to guide him, although the truth lies hidden, buried,
or confused either on account of a certain natural obscurity
or on account of the similarity of things. 8 Moreover, they
3 Almost verbatim as found in Cicero, ibid.; not so briefly expressed as
by him in Academ. 2.24.77.
4 These facts and fallacies are mentioned by Cicero, ibid. 2.15-16; 25-26;
48; et passim. The term sorites did not then have its present-day
meaning. 'They call them sorites which make a heap by adding a grain
a most faulty and captious kind of argument' (Cicero, Academ.
2.16.49) .
5 Cf. Ibid. 2.18.59.
6 Cf. Ibid. 2.19.61; 33.108.
7 Cf. Ibid. 2.8.25.
8 Cf. Ibid. 2.31.99.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 147
claimed that the very act of withholding, as it were, or curb-
ing assent was a great exploit on the part of a wise man. 9
'Now, I believe, I have expounded the whole system briefly,
as you wished, and that I have not fallen short of your injunc-
tion, Alypius that is, I have acted with good faith, as they
say. For, if I have stated something incorrectly or if I have
omitted anything, I did not do so intentionally. Therefore,
to the best of my knowledge, good faith has been maintained.
It ought to be clear that a man deceived is to be instructed,
and a deceitful man is to be shunned. Of these two cases, the
first demands a good teacher; the other, a cautious pupil, 9
(13) Then Alypius said: 'I am thankful that a sufficient
explanation has been given to Licentius, and that you have
relieved me of the burden imposed on me. Indeed, you had
no more reason to fear that you might omit something by
way of putting me to the test: how else could it happen?
than I had, if it became necessary to expose you in anything.
Wherefore, let it not bore you now to expound that which
is wanting not so much to the question as to the questioner
himself, namely, the difference between the New Academy
and the Old.'
I said: 'It does utterly bore me, I confess. Accordingly,
you will confer a favor if you consent to differentiate those
names in my presence and to outline the case of the New
Academy, while I take a brief rest. I cannot deny that what
you mention is very pertinent to the question.'
*I should believe,* he said, 'that you wished to keep me
also away from lunch, if I did not think rather that you had
been frightened by Licentius a little while ago, and if his
request had not prescribed for us that every complication of
this question be disentangled for him before lunch.'
9 Cf. Ibid. 2.34.108.
148 SAINT AUGUSTINE
While he was endeavoring to continue, my mother for
we were now in the house began to push us toward the
lunch in such manner that there was no opportunity for
further talking.
Chapter 6
(14) Then, when we had partaken of sufficient nourish-
ment to stay our hunger, and had returned to the lawn,
Alypius said: 'Let me comply with your desire; nor would I
dare to refuse. And, if nothing happens to escape me, I shall
thank both your learning and my own memory. But, if I
happen to make a mistake on any point, you will correct it,
so that henceforth I may not greatly fear an assignment of
this kind. I believe that the schism of the New Academy was
not so much devised against the Old Academy as it was
aroused against the Stoics. Indeed, it ought not to be re-
garded as a schism, in view of the fact that the occasion
demanded a discussion and a refutation of the new question
introduced by Zeno. For, although the theory of non-percep-
tion occupying the minds of even the ancient Academics
was agitated by no clashing arguments, it was nevertheless
decorously pondered. This is easily proved by the authority
of Socrates, Plato, and all the other ancients. For, although
they did not introduce any special discussion of the matter into
their schools, and although no express inquiry was made by
them as to whether or not the truth could be perceived, they
believed that they could be guarded against error only insofar
as they refrained from rashly giving assent. But, Zeno had
introduced this undigested novelty, and was contending that
nothing could be known except what was true in such manner
that it would be distinguished from the false by their marks
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 149
of dissimilarity, and that conjecturing ought not to enter the
mind of a wise man. When Arcesilas heard this, he maintained
that nothing of this kind could be found by man, and that
the life of a wise man ought not to be entrusted to the dS-
tructive hazards of opinion. Consequently, he concluded also
that assent ought not to be given to anything.'
( 15 ) 'Yet, although this controversy was of such a nature
that the Old Academy seemed to be strengthened rather than
attacked, Antiochus, a pupil of Philo, made his appearance
and more desirous of glory than of truth, as many believed
brought the teachings of the respective Academies into a
bitterness of opposition. He said that the New Academics had
attempted to introduce something unusual and most remote
from the teaching of the Ancients. And, on this matter, he
pleaded for trust in the ancient cosmologists and other great
philosophers, while he opposed even those Academics who
maintained that they were following the "truth-like," although
they admitted that they did not know truth itself. He ac-
cumulated many arguments, but I believe they may be passed
over for the nonce. There was nothing he defended more
vigorously than the thesis that a wise man can know truth.
I think that this was the controversy between the Old Academ-
ics and the New. However, if the matter is otherwise, then,
on behalf of both of us, I beg you to inform Licentius most
fully. But, if it is as I have been able to express it, then go
ahead with the discussion already begun/ 1
Chapter 7
(16) Then I said: 'Licentius, how long are you going
to be silent in this discussion of ours a discussion that is
1 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 1.4.13-18; 12.46,
150 SAINT AUGUSTINE
more protracted than I was expecting? Have you heard
what kind of men your Academics are? 5
Smiling ruefully, and somewhat perturbed by this mild
rebuke, he replied : I regret that I have so vehemently main-
tained against Trygetius that a happy life consists in a search
for the truth; this question disquiets me so much that I can
scarcely help being unhappy. And, if you have any human
kindness, I must certainly seem deserving of your pity. But,
why foolishly torture myself? Or why be afraid, sustained
by such a worthy cause? I shall yield to absolutely nothing
but the truth,'
I said : 'Do the New Academics meet with your approval?'
'Most decidedly/ he replied.
Then, do you think they speak truth? 5
Although he was about to answer 'yes' a * this point, he
hesitated for an instant, rendered more cautious by a smile
from Alypius. Then he said: 'Repeat that little question/
I said: 'Do you think that the Academics speak truth?'
And after a long period of silence, he again answered:
'Whether it be truth, I know not; but it is probable. And I see
nothing better for me to follow.'
I said : 'Do you know that by them the probable was also
called the "truth-like"?'
'So it seems/ he replied.
I said: 'Therefore, the teaching of the Academics is
"truth-like." '
It is/ he replied.
I said: 'Now, please pay very close attention. If someone
who does not know your father should happen to see your
brother, and should say that he is like your father, would
he not seem to you to be insane or foolish?'
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 151
He then remained silent for some time, and finally said:
That does not seem absurd to me.'
(17) 'Wait a moment, please/ he exclaimed when I had
begun to reply to him. Then, smiling faintly, he continued:
Tell me, I beg you, are you already sure of your victory?'
Then I said: 'Suppose that I am sure. You ought not on
that account to abandon your case, especially since this dispu-
tation of ours has been undertaken for the sake of giving
you practice and of arousing you to cultivate the mind.
'Have I ever read the Academics? 5 he asked. 'Or am I
trained in as many branches of learning as you are provided
with when you confront me? 5
I replied: Those by whom that tenet was first defended
had not read the Academics. Even if you lack erudition
and a wealth of preliminary instruction, your native talent
should nevertheless not be so weak that without any counter
attack on your part you would succumb to a very few
words and questions from me. I had indeed begun to fear
this very thing, namely, that Alypius would take your place
sooner than I wish; with him as an opponent, I shall not
stride along so tranquilly.'
Then, would that I were already vanquished, 5 said he,
'so that I might now hear both of you discussing the subject,
or what is even better see you doing it. Nothing more
pleasing than that spectacle could be presented to my view.
Of course, since you prefer to decant your arguments rather
than pour them widespread, it will be possible to read them
afterwards if indeed you snatch them with the stylus as they
are bursting forth from the mouth, and do not allow them
to fall to the ground, as the saying goes. But, somehow or
other, when our eyes are gazing at those very persons who
152 SAINT AUGUSTINE
are actually engaged in the thrust and parry of a dialogue, 1
a lively disputation perfuses the mind with greater delight,
at least, if not with greater profit. 5
(18) I said: 'We are grateful. But those sudden joyous
transports of yours have occasioned the incautious utterance
of that sentence in which you said that no more pleasing
spectacle could be presented to you. Now, no one would
quaff philosophy more eagerly than your own father after
such a prolonged thirst. So, what if you will see him inves-
tigating those matters and discoursing on them with us? In
view of the fact that I shall never consider myself more
fortunate, what, indeed, does it behoove you to think and
say?'
He then shed some tears, and, when he regained his voice,
he stretched out his hand, gazed upward, and said: 'And
when, O God, shall I see this? But there is nothing that we
should despair of obtaining from Thee. 3
By this time, nearly all of us had begun to be distracted
from the intended debate, and were sinking into tears. Then,
hardly composing myself with a difficult struggle, I said:
"Come, come collect yourself. I had long ago admonished
you, as a future defender of the Academy, to increase your
strength by every means at your disposal. I do not believe that
"Fear has sapped the warrior's strength, before the trumpet's
call" 2 Neither do I believe that you wish to be so soon a
captive, just because you hope to see others fight the battle/
Trygetius, as soon as he saw that our countenances were
again serene, said: 'But, why should he not have hope? such
a saintly man that God has granted him his wish before he
1 Cf. Terence, Heautontimorumenos 242.
2 Virgil, Aeneid 11.424.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 153
asked for it! Rather, have faith, Licentius, for, since you can
find no reply to make, and are nevertheless hoping to be
vanquished, you seem to me to be of little faith.'
We laughed. Then Licentius retorted: Talk away, happy
fellow happy, however, not by finding truth, or at least not
by seeking it.'
(19) When we had become rather joyous at the boys'
hilarity, I said: 'Pay attention to the question, and come back
to the point with less fickleness and more energy, if you can.'
'I am as attentive as I can,' he said. 'But, as to that man
who has seen my brother what if he had learned by hearsay
that he is like my father: Would he be insane or silly if he
believed it?'
I said: 'At any rate, may he not be called foolish?'
'Not necessarily,' he replied, 'unless he maintains that
he knows it. He cannot be accused of rashness if he follows
as something probable that which an extensive rumor has
spread.
Then I said: 'Let us consider this matter for a moment;
let us place it, as it were, before our eyes. For instance, sup-
pose that this someone or other whom we are describing
be here with us now. Your brother arrives from somewhere;
and this other man asks: "Whose son is this boy?" He re-
ceives this answer: "He is the son of a certain Romanianus."
And straightway he exclaims: "How closely he resembles his
father! How accurately had rumor made this fact known to
me!" And if you or some one else would then ask: "My good
man, do you know Romanianus?" and if he would reply:
"No, I do not know him; but to me, this man seems exactly
like him," could anyone refrain from laughter?'
'Certainly not,' he replied.
I said: 'Therefore, you see what follows,'
154 SAINT AUGUSTINE
'I have been seeing it all along/ he replied. 'Nevertheless,
I am anxious to hear that conclusion from you, for you ought
to begin to foster the child you have adopted.'
I said: 'Why should I not draw a conclusion? The ex-
ample itself proclaims that the Academics are to be likewise
laughed at, for they assert that in life they are following what
resembles the true, although they do not know what truth
itself is. 3
Chapter 8
(20) Trygetius then said: 'To me, the precaution of the
Academics seems very different from the silliness of the man
you have described. 1 By methods of reasoning, they reach
what they call the "truth-like"; but that half-wit followed
rumor whose authority is of the least possible value.'
I said : 'Just as though he would not be more witless if he
were to say: "I do not know his father at all, nor have I
learned from rumor how much this boy resembles his father.
Nevertheless, I think he resembles him." '
'More witless, certainly/ he replied. 'But, what of that?*
I said: 'Of the same character are those who say: "As
a matter of fact, we do not know truth, but the thing we see
is just a thing we do not know/ 1 *
They call it probable/ he said.
I asked him : 'Just why do you say that? Do you deny that
they call it "truth-like"?
And he replied: 'I wished to say it for precisely this
reason : to eliminate that likeness. It seemed to me that rumor
had brazenly rushed into the question, for the Academics
do not believe even human eyes; still less do they believe the
1 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 2.11.35.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 155
thousand but monstrous eyes of rumor, as poets portray. 2
At any rate, what kind of defender of the Academy am I?
Or do you envy my secureness in this question? Behold ! you
have Alypius, whose arrival will, I beg you, afford us respite,
and whom you have, we believe, been soundly fearing for a
long time.'
(21) In the silence that followed, both of them directed
their gaze toward Alypius, who then said: 'If your omen
were not for me an occasion of fear, I should indeed be
willing to render to the best of my ability at least some
assistance to your side. However, if hope does not deceive
me, I should be able to banish that fear rather easily, for I
am at the same time encouraged by the fact that the present
assailant of the Academics will have almost taken on him-
self the onus of the vanquished Trygetius, and that now
as you admit it is probable that he will be the victor. Yet,
I have a more appalling fear lest I be unable to escape both
the reproach of having abandoned an office and the effrontery
of usurping one, for I am sure that you have not forgotten the
fact that the office of judge had been conferred on me. 9
'That office is one thing, but this is something else,' said
Trygetius. 'Therefore, we beg you to acquiesce in your being
without office for a moment.'
'Even if I were averse to that,' said Alypius, 'and even
if I were not anxious to avoid not only effrontery but neg-
ligence also, I should nevertheless fall into the snares of
pride and nothing is more loathsome than that vice if I
should continue, any longer than you permit it, to hold the
honor that you have bestowed upon me.'
2 Cf. Virgil, Aeneid 4.181 ff.
156 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Chapter 9
(22) 'So, my dear prosecutor of the Academics, I should
like you to disclose your official position to me. In other
words, in whose defense do you attack them? For I fear that,
while refuting the Academics, you may wish to prove that
you are an Academic.'
I said: 'You are well aware, I believe, that there are two
kinds of prosecutors, for even though Cicero very modestly
said that he was a prosecutor of Verres in such manner that
he was really a defender of the Sicilians 1 it is not necessary
that whoever prosecutes some one should be defending some
one else/
'Have you not,' he asked, 'at least some definite point
on which your opinion rests?'
I replied: 'This question is easily answered, especially by
me, for it is not a sudden one. I have already canvassed all
this with myself, and have pondered it deeply for a long
time. Wherefore, Alypius, now hear what, I believe, you
know very well already; namely, that I do not wish this
disputation to be undertaken just for the sake of debating.
Let us put an end to our prelude with those boys, wherein
philosophy herself, as it were, joyfully joined in our jesting.
Therefore, let those childish tales be placed beyond our reach.
The present question concerns our life, our morals, and the
soul, which destined to return to heaven 2 when rendered
more secure, now returning, as it were, to the region of its
or igin presumes that it will overcome the opposition of all
deceptive appearances; that, when it will have comprehended
the truth, it will subdue inordinate desires; and that, when
1 In Verrem 2.4.82.
2 Cf. Retractationes 1.1.3.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 157
it will have thus become wedded, as it were, to temperance,
it will exercise sovereign power. 3 Do you understand what
I am saying? Let us at once fling those trifles away from us:
"For an eager warrior, weapons must be forged."* Never
have I had less desire for anything than for the occurrence of
something that would occasion any kind of conflict among
those who have lived with me so long and have engaged in
frequent discussions with me. Nevertheless, because memory
is an unreliable custodian of our reasonings, I was anxious
to have our frequent disputations committed to writing, so
that those boys might learn to apply their minds to those
questions and might attempt to attack and pursue them.'
(23) 'And do you not know that as yet I have nothing
which I can regard as certain, but that, on account of the
arguments and disputations of the Academics, I am hindered
from searching for it? 5 Somehow or other, they have elaborated
3 Cf. Plotinus, Enneades 4.8.3.
4 Virgil, Aeneid 8.441.
5 Because Augustine says that as yet he has learned nothing which he
can regard as certain, somelike Thimme, in Augustins geistige Ent-
wicklung (Berlin 1908) , and Alfaric in U Evolution intellectuelle de
saint Augustin (Paris 1918) have concluded that he retained the
skepticism of the New Academy. As a rule, those writers maintain that
his conversion at Milan a few months previously was a conversion to
Neoplatonism and not to Christianity. Separated from its context,
Augustine's expression would obviously convey that meaning, but
sentences are not to be understood or interpreted from their context,
immediate or remote. In the present instance, it is necessary to bear
in mind, that, in the course of the dialogue, Augustine frequently
changes from the role of debator to that of moderator or teacher.
This is wholly in keeping with the expressed purposes of the debate,
namely, to dismiss the Academics' arguments from his mind and to
test the abilities of his two pupils. Consequently, when he says that
as yet he has no certitude, the 'as yet' may indeed mean 'up to the
present moment in my life,' or it may mean *up to the present moment
in this debate.' In other words, he may be expressing a real doubt
or a mere methodic doubt. If one kind of doubt would be in complete
harmony with the context, and if the other would entail contradic-
tions, it is obvious that the harmonious interpretation is the correct
one. In the present instance, methodic doubt is in complete harmony
158 SAINT AUGUSTINE
in my mind some kind of probability to use their own term
that man is unable to find truth. Consequently, I had
become lazy and utterly indolent; for I had not the courage
to make a search for that which the most ingenious and
learned men were unable to find. So, unless I first become just
as convinced that truth can be found, as they are convinced
that it cannot, I shall not dare to make the search. And in
that case, I have nothing to defend. Therefore, please with-
draw that question. Rather, let us discuss between ourselves
and as wisely as we can the question as to whether truth
can be discovered. And I think that I have on my side many
arguments on which I am trying to rely in my opposition to
the theory of the Academics. Meanwhile, the only difference
between them and me consists in the fact that to them it
seemed probable that the truth could not be found, while
to me it is probable that it can be found. If they are only
pretending, then ignorance .of truth is peculiar to me; other-
wise, it is common at least to them and to me.'
with the context, for it incites the pupils to apply their minds to
the question, and it tests their abilities. On the other hand, an ex-
pression of real doubt would involve several contradictions, for
(a) He has just said (22) that he had pondered the question
deeply and for a long time. Therefore, it is not now that he is forming
his opinions or convictions.
(b) He says (24) that he 'will take up arms against the Academics,
if they earnestly maintained the tenets which we read in their writings/
Why would a Skeptic take up arms against Skeptics?
(c) In their next session on the following day he is glad that
Alypius adheres to the skepticism of the New Academy, because, other-
wise, Alypius and he himself would be in complete agreement, and could
not have a satisfactory debate (25) .
(d) At first, he used to laugh at the Skeptics; later, he used to loathe
their abominable teachings (3.34) .
(e) Most of the third book is devoted to his refutation of Skepticism.
Even as regards Platonism, or Neoplatonism, he employs methodic
doubt. After he describes a theory of the Platonists, he adds: 'Perhaps,
it is among these we shall find the wise man we are seeking' (3.26) .
As a searcher for truth, he is convinced that he has found his wise
man among them. As a moderator of the discussions, he sees that the
debate has not yet reached that point.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 159
Chapter 10
(24) Alypius then said: 'Now I shall proceed without
fear, because I see that you will be a co-operator rather than
an opponent. First of all, I earnestly entreat that we be on
our guard, lest from this question in which I seem to have
taken the place of those who have yielded to you we lapse
into a mere verbal controversy. For, on your own intimita-
tions from the authority of Tullius, we have often admitted
that such a controversy is most unseemly. 1 Yet, if I am not
mistaken, when Licentius said that he approved the Academ-
ics' theory on probability, you at once asked him another
question, to which he gave an affirmative answer; you asked
him if he knew that by the Academics this same probability
was called "truth-likeness." And, just as it is from you that
1 have learned the tenets of the Academics, so I know that,
were it not for you, I would not know them. So, I know not
why you are carping at words when, as I have said, those
tenets are firmly fixed in your mind.'
I said: 'Believe me, this important controversy is not one
of mere words; it deals with realities. Certainly, I do not think
that the Academics were men who did not know how to
designates things by their correct names. Rather, it seems to
me that they chose those names for the twofold purpose of
concealing their theory from sluggish minds and of reveal-
ing it to the keen-minded. 2 I shall explain how and why I
have come to believe this, but I shall first discuss the arguments
that are commonly believed to have been advanced by those
men, as foes of human knowledge. Therefore, I am very glad
1 Cf. De oratore 1.1 L47.
2 'Therefore, I wish to see what they have discovered. "We do not/' says
he, "usually reveal that." ' (Cicero, Academ. 2.18.60) .
160 SAINT AUGUSTINE
that today our discussion has advanced so far that the ques-
tion between us is now sufficiently definite and manifest.
Truly, it seems to me that those men were absolutely serious
and circumspect. Accordingly, if there is anything that we
shall now discuss, it will be against those who believe that
the Academics were opponents to the finding of the truth.
And do not think that I am afraid, for I shall willingly take
up arms against the Academics themselves if they earnestly
maintained the tenets which we read in their writings that
is, if they expounded those theories, not to conceal their
doctrine, but so that certain mysteries of the truth would not
be rashly divulged to men of polluted and profane minds, so
to speak, I should do it today, if the setting sun were not now
compelling us to return to the house.'
To this point only, the discussion proceeded on that day,
Chapter 11
( 25 ) Although the following day 1 was no less enticing and
tranquil, we were nevertheless hardly disengaged from domes-
tic occupation, for we had spent a great part of it especially
in the writings of letters. Yet, although there were scarcely
two hours remaining, we went to the meadow, for the extreme
serenity of the heavens was inviting us, and we decided not
to suffer the loss of even the little time that remained.
When we had arrived at our accustomed place beside the
tree, and had stopped there, I said: 'Young men, since we
cannot attack any matter of great importance today, I wish
you would refresh my memory as to the manner in which
Alypius yesterday answered the trifling question that had
upset you. 3
1 November 20, 386.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 161
Licentius said: 'It is so brief that there is no trouble in
remembering it; as to how trifling it is that is for you to
see. At any rate, I think it stopped you from raising a question
about words, when the substance of the matter was clear
and certain. 5
I said: 'Have both of you attentively noted that point,
what it is, and what it implies? 5
He answered: 'I think I see what it is. But, please explain
it briefly, for I have often heard from you that it is shame-
ful for disputants to linger on a question of mere words,
whenever there remains no controversy as to the realities.
This question, however, is so subtle that an explanation of
it cannot rightly be demanded of me. 5
(26) I said: 'Let both of you hear what it is. "Probable"
or "truth-like" is the term which the Academics employ to
designate whatever can incite us to act, without our accept-
ing it as true. 2 I employ the phrase "without our accepting it
as true,' 5 inasmuch as we do not suppose that what we are
doing is true, but we do it, nevertheless. For example, last
night when the sky was so bright and clear, if some one had
asked us whether such joyous sun would rise today, I think
we should have replied that we did not know, but that it
seemed so. The Academic says: "Of this character, it seems
to me, are all the things which I think ought to be called
probable or truth-like. 55 But, if you wish to designate them by
another name, I have no objection. For me it is sufficient
that you understand what I am saying, namely, that you
know to what things those names are to be attached, for it
behooves a wise man to be a searcher for reality, not a deviser
of words. 3 Now, have both of you sufficiently understood
2 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 2.10.32; 31.99.
3 Cf. Cicero, Academ. frag. 19 (Muller) .
162 SAINT AUGUSTINE
how those toys with which I have been arousing your interest
have been stricken from my hands? 3
Now, when both of them had replied that they understood,
and were showing by their very countenances that they were
desirous of a response from me, I asked: 'What do you think?
Do you think that Cicero and those words are his had
such a scanty knowledge of the Latin language that he would
give inappropriate names to the things of which he was
treating?'
Chapter 12
(27) Then Trygetius said: 'Since the matter itself is
clear, we prefer not to quibble with regard to words. So,
concern yourself rather with finding an answer to make to
him who has relieved us, against whom you are aroused,
and upon whom you are attempting to rush again.'
But Licentius said: 'Wait a moment, please. For I have
a glimmer of something or other by which I see that such a
strong argument ought not to be so quickly snatched away
from you. 3 Having remained fixed in thought for some time,
he resumed: *By your leave, I think that nothing is more
absurd than that a man should say that he does not know
what truth is, but that he is following what is like truth.
However, that similitude of yours does not disconcert me,
for if I, who do not deny that I know some truth, were asked
whether no rain for tomorrow is being condensed from the
atmosphere in its present condition, I should rightly answer
that it is like truth [likely]. I know that this tree cannot
just now become silvery, and, with all due modesty, I say
that I know many truths of this kind. And I see a similarity
between them and the things I call "truth-like." But you,
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 163
Carneades or any other Greek pest, to say nothing about our
own compatriots why indeed should I hesitate to change
sides, and to go on the side of him to whom I belong by
right of victory? since you say that you have knowledge of
no truth, how can you say you are following this "truth-
like" thing? For, at any rate, I cannot give it another name.
But then, why should we dispute with a man who does not
even know how to talk?'
(28) 'Deserters will never frighten me/ said Alypius.
'How much less will they frighten that Carneades, against
whom you impelled by boyish or childish levity, I know
not which believed that invectives rather than a spear should
be hurled? However, for corroborating this theory which
was always based on something at least probable this will
easily suffice for him against you: namely, the fact that we
are so remote from the finding of truth that you can be a
great argument against yourself. For, by one little question
you have been so shaken from your position that you have
not the faintest notion as to where you ought to stand. But,
let us postpone those matters, and also that knowledge of
yours which, a little while ago, you claimed to be imprinted
on you with regard to this tree. Despite the fact that you
have chosen another role, you must nevertheless be carefully
taught what I voiced a short while ago, for we had not yet,
I believe, reached the question as to whether truth can be
discovered. But, at the very threshold of my defense where
I found you weary and prostrate I prescribed that the ques-
tion be limited to this point; whether a search ought not to
be made for that which the Academics claim to be sufficient
for them, namely, truth-likeness, or probability, or whatever
else it may be called. But, if you consider yourself a very
proficient truth-finder, that is of no concern to me. If you
164 SAINT AUGUSTINE
are not ungrateful for my pleading In your defense, you will
perhaps teach me those same things later/
Chapter 13
(29) Because Licentius was now shamefacedly wilting
before this attack of Alypius, I said: 'Alypius, you have pre-
ferred to say everything rather than how we are to dispute
with those who know not how to talk. 5
Alypius replied: Tour rhetorical skill has long been well
known to me and to everybody else. Your present profes-
sion evinces the fact that you still possess that skill. There-
fore, I wish you would first explain the purport of the ques-
tion asked by Licentius. If his question is to no purpose and
I think it is purposeless then an answer to it would be
even more senseless. But, if it should seem to you to be an
apt question, and one which cannot be unraveled by me,
then let me by earnest request prevail on you to accept the
role of teacher.'
I answered: 'You remember that yesterday I promised to
treat of those words later. And now that sun in the heavens
is admonishing me to replace in the bag the playthings which
I displayed to the boys all the more so because I am dis-
playing them as ornaments rather than as merchandise. But
before darkness, the usual protectress of the Academics,
descends upon our pen I desire unanimous agreement as
to the question we should take up for explanation in the
morning. Accordingly, I ask you to please answer this ques-
tion: Do you believe that the Academics held a definite
theory on the truth, a theory which they wished to keep con-
cealed from ignoble or unpurified minds; or rather that their
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 165
convictions on the matter were just the same as their disputa-
tions read?' 1
Alypius answered: 'I shall not rashly affirm what it is
that they had in their minds, for, insofar as it can be gathered
from their writings, you are better informed as to how they
used to express their theory. But, if you are asking me about
my own views, I believe that truth has not been discovered.
I also add what you were asking with regard to the Academ-
ics that I think it cannot be found. I so think, not only
by my own ingrained opinion which you have nearly al-
ways censured but also by reason of the authority of great
and pre-eminent philosophers, to whom either our own
incompetence or their sagacity somehow -or other compels us
to bow our heads, and we must believe that nothing higher
than that authority can be found. 5
I said: 'That is what I wanted. I feared that, while you
and I were holding the same views on the question, our
debate would remain incomplete, since there would be nobody
on the other side to contest our position, so that it would be
thrashed out to the best of our ability. Consequently, if that
had happened, I was going to ask you to defend the Ac-
ademics' position, just as if you thought that they not only
contended that truth could not be understood, but that they
really felt that it could not. So now, the question between us
is this: Whether, by virtue of their arguments, it is probable
that nothing can be perceived, and that assent should be
given to nothing. If you carry this point, I shall gladly yield
to you. But, if I am able to prove it to be far more probable
that a wise man can reach the truth, and that assent is not
1 'Why do you conceal your theory, like something shameful?* (Cicero,
Academ. 2.18.60) .
166 SAINT AUGUSTINE
always to be withheld, then you, I believe, will have no reason
for refusing to change over to my opinion,'
When he and the others had agreed on this, and the
shades of evening had already covered us, we returned to the
house.
BOOK III
Chapter 1
j N THE NEXT DAY 1 after the discourse which the second
book contains, when we had assembled in the bath-
ing hall for the weather was too inclement to in-
vite us to the lawn I opened the discussion in this way :
'I believe that you have clearly noted the subject that we
have mutually agreed on for today's discussion. But, before
I come to my particular assignment, which is that of eluci-
dating the question, listen willingly, I beg you, to a few obser-
vations that are not inappropriate to the subject observations
on hope, on life, and on our plan of life. I believe that a
thorough search for the truth is neither a trifling nor a need-
less occupation for us, but rather a necessary and important
one. On this point there is complete agreement between
Alypius and me, for, with the exception of the Academics,
all the philosophers believed that their own respective wise
men had already found it. Even the Academics proclaimed
that -it is to be found by their wise man through a supreme
effort ; that he is zealously making such effort ; but that in prac-
tical affairs because the truth is either completely hidden
beneath the surface, or indistinguishly confused he is follow-
ing what presents itself as probable or truth-like. All of this
was settled in your initial discussion, for, although one of you
maintained that a man becomes happy by finding the truth,
and the other claimed that he becomes happy by a mere
diligent search for it, none of us has any doubt as to the fact
that we must deem nothing more desirable than this occupa-
tion. Wherefore, I ask, what kind of day do you think we
1 November 21, 386.
167
168 SAINT AUGUSTINE
spent yesterday? Both of you were free to follow your Inclina-
tions: you, Trygetius, reveled in the poems of Virgil,^ and
Licentius had leisure for composing verses. So smitten is he
with love for poetry that it was especially on his account I
thought it advisable to bring up this discussion, so that
philosophy and now is the time for it might gain and
retain a larger share of his affection than poetics or any
other branch of learning.'
Chapter 2
(2) 'But, I ask you, have you had no pity on us? On the
previous evening, we had so arranged matters before retir-
ing to sleep that we should, on arising, occupy ourselves with
absolutely nothing but the question that had been postponed.
Yet, so many domestic affairs demanded immediate attention
that, wholly occupied with them, we had scarcely the last
two hours of the day in which to breathe freely. After all,
it has always been my opinion that nothing is needful for
a man who is already wise, but that fortune is most needful
for a man to become wise. 1 Perhaps Alypius holds a different
opinion/
Then Alypius said: 'As yet, I am not sure how much
prerogative you attribute to fortune. But, if you think that
fortune is necessary in order to contemn fortune herself, then
I join you in that opinion. If, however, you are assigning to
fortune nothing else than the things which cannot suffice
for the needs of the body unless fortune be propitious, then
I do not agree with you. For, even though fortune be un-
propitious or adverse, a man although he be not yet wise,
but desirous of wisdom may nevertheless make use of the
1 Cf. Retractationes 1.1.1; Cicero, De fin. 1.19.63.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 169
things which we confess to be necessary for the body. Other-
wise, we must admit that fortune dominates the entire life
of a wise man, since even a wise man cannot help but need
the things that are necessary for the body/
(3) I said: 'Therefore, you say that fortune is necessary
for a man who is desirous of wisdom, but not for a man who
is already wise. 5
He answered: 'It is not pointless to repeat what has been
already said. Accordingly, I now also ask you: Do you
think that fortune is of any aid toward the contemning of
herself? If you think so, then I say that fortune is very
necessary for a man who is desirous of wisdom.'
I said: 'Yes, I do think so, for it is through the aid of
fortune that he will be the kind of man who will be able to
contemn her. This is not absurd, for, when we were babes,
we had need of woman's breasts, through which it is brought
about that afterwards we are able to live and grow strong
without them.'
He said: 'It is clear to me that our opinions are in har-
mony, unless our expression of them is faulty, that is, unless
perhaps it must be made clear to everyone that a certain
something else and not fortune or the breasts makes us
contemners of fortune and the breasts.'
I said: 'It is not hard to find another analogy. For in-
stance, no one crosses the Aegean Sea without a ship or some
other means of transport, or so that I may not fear even
Daedalus 2 without any suitable equipment or some kind
of occult power. Yet, when he had crossed over provided,
of course, that he have no other purpose than to reach the
shore he is ready to throw away and to contemn all the
2 Daedalus supplied himself with artificial wings.
170 SAINT AUGUSTINE
means by which he was borne. I believe that, in like manner,
fortune is necessary for any man who wishes to reach the
port of wisdom and, as it were, the steadfast and pleasant
country. For, to say nothing about other defects, if a man
happens to be blind and deaf and that is something which
lies within the power of fortune he cannot attain the object
of his desire. But, when he has attained it, although he is
to be regarded as needing certain things that pertain to the
well-being of the body, yet it is obvious that he needs them,
not in order to be wise, but so that he may live among men.'
'Nay, more/ said Alypius, 'if he be blind and deaf, he
will, 1 believe, contemn both the acquiring of wisdom and
even life itself, for whose sake wisdom is sought 9
(4) I said: c Yet, since life itself, as we live it here, is in
the power of fortune, and since only a living man can be wise,
must we not admit that we need fortune's favor in order to
be drawn to wisdom?*
He replied: 'But although it is only living persons that
have need of wisdom, and although there is no desire for
wisdom if life be wanting I have absolutely no fear of fortune
in the matter of conserving life. I desire wisdom, because I
am living; it is not because I desire wisdom that I wish to
live. Hence, if fortune deprives me of life, it deprives me also
of my reason for seeking wisdom. Therefore, in order to
become wise, I have no reason either to desire fortune's favor
or to fear her opposition unless, of course, you bring forward
some other reasons.'
I said: Then, if a man be desirous of wisdom, you do not
think that fortune can prevent his arriving at wisdom, unless
it deprives him of life?'
*I do not think so,' he replied.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 171
Chapter 3
(5) I said: *I wish you would give me at least some
notion as to what you think to be the difference between a
wise man and a philosopher.' 1
He replied: 'I think that there is no difference between a
wise man and a man desirous of wisdom, except that in
the man desirous of wisdom there is only an eagerness for
those things of which the wise man has a constant possession/ 2
I said: 'And indeed, what are those things? To me, the
only thing that seems to differentiate those two is the fact
that one of them knows wisdom, and the other desires to
know it. 5
He said: 'If you confine the term knowledge within mod-
erate limits, you have expressed the matter very plainly.'
I said: 'Howsoever I may confine it, all agree that there
can be no knowledge of false things.' 3
He said: 'I thought it well to interpose a demurrer at
that point, lest, by a too ready agreement on my part, your
plea might go prancing over the ground of the principal
question.'
I said: 'Obviously, you have left me no ground on which
to prance. If I am not mistaken, we have already reached
the objective itself something I have been long trying to
do. For if, as you have said with nicety and truth, there is
no difference between a wise man and a man desirous of
wisdom, except that the former has a knowledge of wisdom
and the latter has a love for it and hence, you have not
1 The term philosopher means lover of wisdom.
2 Since the disputants invariably cite Cicero as authority, we translate
the term habitus according to Cicero's definition of it. Cf. De inven-
tions rhetorica 1.25.36.
3 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 2.24.77.
172 SAINT AUGUSTINE
hesitated to coin its very name : you have called it a constant
possession then, a wise man knows truth. For, no one who
has learned nothing can have knowledge in his mind, and
the man who knows nothing has learned nothing, and no
one can know the false. Therefore, a wise man knows the
truth, for, by your own admission, he has a knowledge or
a constant possession of wisdom in his mind. 3
He said: 'I know not what my impudence would be, if
I should deny my having confessed that a wise man has a
constant possession of the inquiry into divine and human
things. But I do not see why you should think that there is
no constant possession of things that have been discovered
as probable.*
I asked: 'Do you concede that no one knows fake things?'
'Very readily,' he replied.
I said: Then, maintain if you can that a wise man
does not know wisdom/ 4
He replied: 'But, why do you restrict everything within
such a narrow limit, that it cannot seem to him that he has
comprehended wisdom?*
I said: 'Let us shake hands. You remember that yesterday
I promised to prove this very point. I am happy now, not
because it has been conclusively proved by me, but because
it is freely conceded by you. I said that there was only one
point of difference between the Academics and myself:
namely, that to them it seemed probable that the truth could
not be comprehended, while to me it seemed that although
it had not yet been discovered by myself it could be dis-
covered by a wise man. And now when you were being
pressed by my interrogations as to whether a wise man does
4 Cf . Ibid. 2.8.24.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 173
not have a knowledge of wisdom you said that it seems
to him that he does.'
'And what of that? 5 he asked.
I replied : 'It follows that if it seems to him that he knows
wisdom, it does not seem to him that a wise man can know
nothing. Of course, if wisdom is nothing, I wish you would
say so.'
(6) He said: C I would indeed believe that we have
reached our final goal. But, just as we were clasping hands,
I suddenly see that we are very far apart, and that we have
gone beyond the limits of the question. For, when you took
the affirmative side yesterday and I took the negative, it
seemed to me that the only question assigned for debate was
this: whether a wise man can acquire an understanding
of truth. And I now think that I have conceded nothing
more than that it can seem to a wise man that he has
acquired a wisdom of things that are probable. But I am
sure that neither of us has any doubt that I limited that
wisdom to the investigation of divine and human things.'
I said: 'You are not extricating yourself by complicating
matters. In fact, I think you are disputing merely for the
sake of exercise. But, if I may say so, you are taking undue
advantage of the ignorance of the judges. You know very
well that those boys are as yet unable to discriminate acute
and subtle arguments; consequently, if nobody objects, you
may say whatever you please. Now, just a little while ago
when I asked you whether a wise man knows wisdom you
said that it seems to a wise man that he knows wisdom. But,
to whom it seems that a wise man knows wisdom, to him
it certainly does not seem that a wise man knows nothing
at least, no one could think so, unless he be ready to assert
that wisdom is nothing. Hence, it follows that your opinion
174 SAINT AUGUSTINE
on this matter is now the same as mine, for it seems to me
that a wise man does not know nothing. And so, I believe,
it seems to you as well, for you agree that it seems to a wise
man that a wise man knows wisdom. 5
He said: S I believe that I am no more anxious to exercise
my talents than you are. And I am surprised at that, because
you have no need of any such exercise. Perhaps I am still
blind; at any rate, it seems to me that there is a difference
in meaning between "it seems to him that he knows" and
"he knows." And I also believe that the truth is not identical
with wisdom, for the latter is wholly occupied with investigat-
ing the former. And I do not see how those terms correspond
when we employ them respectively. 5
Although we had now been called to lunch, I said : 'I am
not at all displeased that you oppose me so strenuously, be-
cause, perhaps, neither of us understands what the other is
saying, and certainly one or the other of us fails to under-
stand it. In the first case, we must strive to escape that re-
proach, and, even in the other case, it would be no less
reproachful to neglect or abandon the question. We shall
meet again this afternoon, for, just when it semed that we
had reached the end, you exchanged blows with me. 5
When they had laughed at this, we withdrew.
Chapter 4
(7) When we had returned, we found Licentius eagerly
striving to compose verses. But Helicon would never have
relieved him of his thirst, for although only one course was
served at our lunch he had quietly withdrawn when we
had reached about the middle, and he had drunk nothing.
I said to him: *I wish that some day or other you would
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 175
master that poetics, since you have become so ardently at-
tached to it: not that this kind of perfection would afford
me any great pleasure, but because I see you have become
so eager for it that you can be alienated from it only by
disgust, and this readily happens after perfection has been
reached. Furthermore, since you are quite musical, I should
prefer to have you inflict your own verses on our ears, rather
than have you like the little birds we see enclosed In cages
singing words you do not understand in those Greek
tragedies. But I advise you to go for a drink, if you have
any regard for Hortensius and philosophy. In fact, in that
disputation between yourself and Trygetius, you have al-
ready offered her your first fruits as a most pleasing Iibation 3
and she, far more than poetics, has enkindled in you a glow-
ing desire for the knowledge of great and truly profitable
things. But, while I wish to invite both of you back to the
arena of those intellectual exercises that impart refinement
to the mind, I fear lest it become a labyrinth for both of you.
And 1 almost regret to have checked you, Licentius, from
your decided inclination. 5
Licentius blushed, and went for a drink. He was indeed
very thirsty. Furthermore, he was now furnished an occasion
for escaping me, for I might say more and perhaps harsher
things to him.
(8 ) When he had returned, and all had become attentive,
I began in this way: 'Alypius, is it really true that you and I
are still in disagreement on a matter which, in my opinion,
is very manifest? 5
c lt is not surprising, 5 he replied, 'if that be obscure to
me which you assert to be within your grasp, for many
obvious things can be more obvious to some people, and
some obscure things can likewise be more obscure to many
176 SAINT AUGUSTINE
others. Now, even if this matter is truly manifest to you,
believe me that there is someone else to whom what is
manifest to you is still more manifest, and that there is yet
some other person to whom that is more obscure which is
obscure to me. But, lest you continue to consider me unduly
contentious, let me entreat you to give a more manifest
explanation of this manifest thing.'
I said: 'Please pay careful attention, and, for a moment
at least, discard all worry about having to frame a rebuttal.
Indeed, if I well know myself and you, then a little effort
will suffice to clarify what I am saying. After that, one of us
will quickly convince the other. At all events, did you say
or was I deaf at the moment? that it seems to a wise man
that he knows wisdom?'
He agreed that he had said it.
I said: 'Let us disregard that wise man for the moment.
As to yourself, are you a wise man, or are you not?'
'By no means/ he replied.
I said: 'Nevertheless, I wish you would tell me what is
your real conviction with regard to the Academic wise man.
Does it really seem to you that he knows wisdom?'
He rejoined: 'Do you think that the question "Does he
seem to know?" is the same as the question "Does he know?"
or rather that it is something different? For I fear lest this con-
fusion should provide a subterfuge for either of us.'
(9) I said: This is what is usually called a Tuscan alter-
cation a sort of wrangling in which the answer to a pro-
posed question seems to be supplied, not by its solution, but
by the injection of another question. Our own poet to ac-
commodate myself somewhat to the ears of Licentius in a
Bucolic poem, fittingly adjudged it to be something rustic
or plainly pastoral, when one man asked the other where it
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 177
was that the whole expanse of the heavens was, no more than
three ells in width, and the other man rejoined:
"Tell me, in what regions do we see those wondrous things:
Flowers abursting unto life, inscribed with names of kings?" 1
But, Alypius, please do not think that such mode of dis-
putation is allowed to us at this villa. At least, let these
little baths make us somewhat mindful of the decorum of
the Gymnasia. 2 So, please answer the question I am asking:
Does it seem to you that the Academics' wise man knows
wisdom?'
He replied: 'Lest we become prolix by mere verbal re-
petition, it seems to me that it seems to him that he knows it/
I said: 'Does it seem to you, then, that he does not know
it? I am asking you, not what it seems to you that it seems
to the wise man, but whether it seems to you that the wise
man knows wisdom. You can, I suppose, give an unqualified
affirmative or negative answer.'
He said: 'Would that it were either as easy for me as
it is for you, or as difficult for you as*it is for me. You would
not then be so insistent, nor would you be expecting anything
from me in those matters. For, in order to guard against
either rashly asserting that I knew, or not less rashly assert-
ing that he knew, I replied when you were asking me what
it seemed to me with regard to the Academic wise man
"that it seemed to him that he knew wisdom." '
I said: *I beg you, as a distinct favor to me: in the first
place, that you deign to answer the question which I am
asking you, and not the one that you are proposing to your-
1 Virgil, Eclogues 3.105-7.
2 Where philosophers frequently held their disputations. Possibly, he
is referring to Cicero's dialogues only. He afterwards (16.35) men-
tions the gymnasium at Cumae and the one at Naples, Cicero calls
Plato's Academy 'a second Gymnasium' (Academ. 1.4.17) .
178 SAINT AUGUSTINE
self; then, that you momentarily disregard my expectation
in the matter, which I know for certain to be of no less
concern to you than your own assuredly, if I ensnare my-
self by this line of questioning, I shall quickly change over
to your side; and we shall put an end to the controversy
finally, that you dispel that solicitude of some kind with
which I see you to be affected, and pay very strict attention,
so that you may easily understand what question of mine
I want you to answer. Now, an unqualified "yes" or "no"
is the only kind of answer demanded by my question. But,
you said that you did not give such an answer, lest you
should rashly assert that you. knew something which you
did not know just as if I had asked what you know, and
not what it seems to you. Now, I frame the question more
plainly if indeed it can be expressed more plainly: Does
it seem to you that a wise man knows wisdom, or does it not?'
He replied: 'If there could be found the kind of wise
man that reason describes, he could seem to me to know
wisdom.'
I said: Therefore, reason shows you that a wise man is
the kind of man that is not ignorant of wisdom. And that
is correct, for it would ill become you to hold any other
opinion. 5
(10) 'Accordingly, I now ask whether a wise man can
be found. If he can be found, he can know wisdom; in that
case, the whole question between us is solved. But, if you
say that he cannot be found, then the question will be, not
whether a wise man can know something, but whether any
one can be wise. And, if it is established that some one can
be wise, we shall have to part company with the Academics,
and the question must then be threshed out with you, inso-
far as we are able. For they have agreed or rather, it
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 179
seemed to them that a man can be wise, but that knowledge
cannot accrue to any man. Wherefore, they maintained that
a wise man knows nothing. But it seems to you that he
knows wisdom and certainly, that is not to know nothing.
Furthermore, you and I as well as all the Ancients, the
Academics included agreed that no one can know false
things. 3 Hence, the only remaining alternative is this: either
to maintain that wisdom is nothing, or to admit that reason
does not recognize the kind of man described as wise by the
Academics. 9
Chapter 5
(11) "Without further argument on these points, please
consent to our investigating whether wisdom, such as reason
reyeals it, can accrue to a man. For we should not nay,
we could not call anything else wisdom.'
He replied: 'Even if I should concede what, I see, you
are earnestly striving for that wisdom is known by a wise
man, and that we have thus found something which a wise
man is able to discern, the main contention of the Academics
does not seem to me to be weakened in any way, for I
descry a rather redoubtable defense position reserved for
them, where they are not cut off from the withholding of
assent. That argument by which you think them to be
vanquished will not force them to abandon their position
altogether. With regard to their two aphorisms, namely,
"that nothing is understood" and "that assent is not to be
given to anything," they will say that these aphorisms are
of such a nature that, although the first one has been wrested
from them by your siege of their stronghold, yet the force
3 Cf, Cicero, Academ. 2.32.103.
180 SAINT AUGUSTINE
them from their position. For, whether that argument be
invincible by virtue of its inherent cogency or by reason
of your attack could not then and cannot now dislodge
of my stupidity, and even if it has deprived them of the
first of their two aphorisms an aphorism which nearly all
generations down to your own had accepted as probable
they still can boldly continue to proclaim their other aphor-
ism, namely, "that assent is not to be given to anything."
Furthermore, they will say that perhaps some day they
themselves or some one else may discover a subtle argument
that can be urged with probability against this aphorism as
well, but that meanwhile their own reflected image, so to
speak, is to be seen in Proteus. He is represented as being
usually captured precisely when his capture was to be least
expected. In fact, it is said that his pursuers never laid hold
on him unless some deity was directing them toward him. 1
Now, if that deity be with us, and show us that truth which
is of so much anxiety to us, then I shall admit that the
Academics are vanquished, even if they should still continue
to resist but I do not believe they would.'
(12) I said: That is well said. I desired absolutely
nothing more. And so, I now ask all of you to note the many
signal blessings that have come upon me. In the first place,
the Academics are declared to be so completely vanquished
that nothing remains for them by way of defense, except
something that is impossible. For, who could ever understand
or believe that a conquered man would vaunt himself a
victor precisely because he is conquered? Moreover, if there
remains any conflict with them now, it arises, not from their
saying that nothing can be understood, but from their in-
sisting that assent is not to be given to anything. Therefore,
1 Virgil, Georgia 4.388 if; cf. Divine Providence, 2.15.43.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 181
they and I are now in agreement, for now it seems to them
as it also seems to me that a wise man knows wisdom.
They admonish us to refrain from assent, for they say that
this merely seems so to them, but that they do not know
it by any means. As if I were professing to know it! Why,
I also say that it merely seems so to me. And, just as they are
unwise if they know not wisdom, so, also, am I. Neverthe-
less, I think we ought to accept something as true; we ought
to accept the truth as true. I ask them whether they deny
this in other words, whether they are of the opinion that
assent ought not to be given to the truth. Of course, they
will never say that they are of that opinion, but they wil
assert that the truth is not being found. Consequently, I
am in considerable agreement with them on this point also,
for it is not contrary to their opinion or to mine and,
therefore, it is in accordance with it that assent ought to
be given to the truth. "But who will show us the truth?"
they ask. I shall decline to discuss that point with them, for
it is enough for me that lest they be forced to profess
the greatest absurdity, namely, either that wisdom is nothing,
or that a wise man does not know wisdom it is no longer
probable that a wise man knows nothing.'
Chapter 6
(13) 'But, Alypius, you have told us who it is that is able
to show us truth, and I must sedulously endeavor not to
disagree with you. Alike with brevity and piety, you have
said that only some kind of deity is able to show a man
what truth is. 1 Wherefore, in this discussion of ours, I have
1 'If I had not sought Thy way in Christ our Saviour, I would have ar-
rived at destruction instead of instruction' (Confessions 7.20.26) .
182 SAINT AUGUSTINE
heard nothing more pleasing, nothing more weighty, nothing
more worthy of approval, and if, as I trust, that deity
be present nothing more true. For, with what depth of
understanding, with what fixation of attention on the very
best kind of philosophy, has the famous Proteus been men-
tioned by you! That Proteus so that you, boys, may see
that poets are not to be entirely disregarded in philosophy
-is portrayed after iht image of the truth. In poems, I
say, Proteus portrays and personates the truth, which no one
can lay hold on, if he is deceived by false images, and
loosens or loses his hold on the nodes of understanding. For,
even when the truth is being grasped and, as it were, held
in our hands, those images strive in the usual manner of
corporeal things to deceive and delude us through the very
senses which we use for the needs of this life. Therefore,
this is a third blessing that has come to me, and I deem
it inestimable: my most intimate friend is in accord with
me, not only on the question of probability in human affairs,
but also on religion itself; 2 this is the most manifest sign
of a true friend, inasmuch as friendship has been rightly
and piously defined as "a friendly and affectionate agree-
ment on human things and on divine." ' 3
2 As yet, Augustine had given no definition of religion. We may assume
that he was in agreement with Cicero as to the derivation of the
word religio, from relegere (De natura deorum 2.28.72). About three
years later, however, he says that the word is thought to be derived
from religare (De vera religione 55.111); and, still later, he believes
it to be derived from religere (De civ. Dei 10.3.1) . In his De diversis
quaestionibus (qu. -30.1) , he defines religion as 'that which advances
the love and veneration of a certain superior nature, which they call
divine.'
3 Cicero, Laelius 6,20.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 183
Chapter 7
(14) 'Yet, so that the arguments of the Academics may
not seem to envelop us in some kind of fog, and so that
we ourselves may not seem arrogantly to resist the authority
of very learned men and among them is Tullius, who can-
not but deeply impress us I shall first give a few arguments
against those who think that those disputations are opposed
to the truth. Then I shall show what, in my opinion, was
the reason why the Academics sought to conceal their theory.
Wherefore, Alypius, although I see that you are now un-
reservedly on my side, I nevertheless ask you to defend their
side for a little while, and to reply to me.'
Alypius said: 'Because you have, as they say, proceeded
prosperously today, I shall not impede your complete vic-
tory. And because their defense has been assigned to me
by you, I shall undertake it all the more fearlessly. But, as
to the plea, which you show that you are about to make
by way of cross-examination if you should prefer to mold
it into an uninterrupted discourse, and if it suits you to do
so, then let me not, like a stubborn captive foeman, be tor-
tured by you with those little darts, for that would be en-
tirely out of keeping with your kindness of character.*
(15) And then, because I saw that they were expecting
me to adopt his suggestion, I began, as it were, another
exordium. I said: C I had presupposed that, after my fatigue
in the school of rhetoric, I would have considerable rest here
in light armor, because I had planned to prosecute those
matters by interrogating rather than by discoursing. Still,
since we are so few that it will not be necessary for me to
shout that would be bad for my health, and it was for
the sake of my health that I wished to make the stylus the
184 SAINT AUGUSTINE
herald and, as it were, the moderator of my discourse, lest
I should be carried along more animatedly than my physical
weakness renders advisable I shall comply with your wish.
Therefore, since you desire it, hear my views, expressed
in an uninterrupted discourse.
'But, first of all, let us examine the nature of that which
is made the chief boast of those who ardently defend the
Academics. In the works which Cicero composed in de-
fense of their case, there is a certain passage which, in my
opinion, is seasoned with admirable urbanity, and which,
in the opinion of very many, is also strengthened with con-
sistency. Certainly it would be hard for anyone to remain
unmoved by what is stated in that passage, 1 namely, "that
the Academic wise man is unanimously adjudged second
best by all those of the other sects who deem themselves
wise, while each one of them necessarily claims first place
for himself; and that, from this, it can be argued with
probability that the Acad'emic is right in judging himself
to be first, since he is second in the estimation of all the
others." '
(16) ' "Suppose, for example, that the Stoic wise man be
present, for it is especially against the Stoics that the genius
of the Academics was enkindled. So, if some one inquires as
to who is the wise man, Zeno or Chrysippus will reply that
a wise man is the man whom he himself has described.
Epicurus or some other adversary will contradict this, and
will contend rather that the most skillful snatcher of pleasure
is the wise man. Hence, the altercation! The whole Stoic
school is in tumult: Zeno is shouting that man is born for
nothing else than virtue; that virtue offers absolutely no
1 Cicero, Academ. frag 20 (Miiller) .
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 185
other reward than herself that she does not pander for
hire, so to speak, but attracts minds by her very splendor;
that the Epicurean pleasure is common to all beasts and
to beasts only; 2 and that it is abominable to push a man
and especially, a wise man into their companionship. To
oppose this, Epicurus now calls to his aid, so to speak, a
turbulent mob of drunken men from the vineyards. With
distorted countenances, these men rave in Bacchic fury, in
frantic search of some one to tear to pieces with their un-
dipped claws. 3 And, with the mob's approval, Epicurus is
elevating the name of pleausre to that of refinement and
repose. He is impassionately insisting that it seems no man
can be happy except through pleasure. But, if an Academic
should happen to stumble into their quarrel, he will hear
both parties trying to drag him to their respective sides.
And if he yields to either party, the other will call him
stupid, ignorant, and rash. Consequently, if he is asked his
opinion after he has listened to both parties, he will reply
that he is still in doubt. Now, ask the Stoic this question:
'Which is the better Epicurus, who is shouting that every
Stoic is out of his wits, or the Academic, who says that he
must deliberate further on such an important matter?* No
one doubts that the Academic will be preferred. Then, turn
your attention to Epicurus, and ask him which one he esteems
more highly: Is it Zeno or Arcesilas? Zeno calls him a
beast, but from Arcesilas he gets this response: 'Perhaps
what you say is true, but I shall examine it more carefully.*
Is it not plain that to Epicurus the whole Stoic school seems
stupid, and that, in comparison with the Stoics, the Ac-
ademics seem to be modest and circumspect men?"
2 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 2.45.139.
3 Cf. Cicero, Tusculan. Quaest. 3.21.50.
186 SAINT AUGUSTINE
*In this fashion, and with almost the same wealth of
material with regard to all the sects, Cicero presents, as it
were, a lively representation to his readers. He shows that,
although it is inevitable that each sect award first place to
itself, yet there is none of them which does not declare
that it awards the second place to the man whom it finds
to be, not in opposition, but in doubt. I shall not object to
that; I shall take none of their glory away from them. To
whomsoever it pleases, let it seem that in that passage Cicero
was not joking, but that he wished to follow up and to col-
lect certain vain and vacuous rantings, because he abhorred
the levity of the puny imitators of the Greeks/ 4
Chapter 8
(17) 'But, if I should wish to oppose this vanity, what
hinders me from showing how much worse it is to be un-
teachable than to be untaught? When this boastful Academic
will have presented himself as a pupil to each sect in turn,
and when all of them will have been unable to persuade him
to accept what they respectively think they know, it happens
that afterwards he will be laughed at by all of them in
marvelous unison. For, while each one of them will think
that none of his own adversaries has ever learned anything, all
of them will believe that the Academic is unable to learn.
Consequently, he will be thrown out of all their schools, not
by the ferule this would be a humiliation rather than a
4 Cicero was by no means contemptuous of the great Greek philosophers.
His own eclecticism was culled from their teachings. In his opinion,
Aristotle was almost peerless in philosophy, and both Aristotle and
Plato were divine geniuses. But he seldom conceals his contempt for
'certain insignificant philosophers* and especially for those who make
use of specious arguments, Cf. Academ. 2.16.49; 43.132; De fin.
1.3.7; Cato M. 23.85.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 187
punishment but by the spiked cudgels of those who wear
the pallium, for it will not be difficult to get some help from
the Cynics, as a kind of Herculean aid against a common
nuisance. 1 But, if one should wish to contend with the
Academics for that paltry glory, what can they proffer in
rebuttal? And very readily ought I to be allowed to contend
with them, for I am indeed applying myself to philosophy,
but I am not yet become wise. So, let us suppose that an
Academic and myself have rushed into the litigations of
those philosophers; that, insofar as time permits, they give
a brief exposition of their respective theories; and that Gar-
neades is questioned as to his views. He will say that he is in
doubt. And, consequently, each of them will prefer him to
the others. Therefore, all of them will prefer him to all of
them! A high honor, forsooth, and a great glory! Who
would not want to imitate him? Accordingly, when I am
interrogated, I shall give the same answer, and I shall receive
just as much praise. Does a wise man rejoice in a glory in
which a fool is his equal? And what if he easily surpasses
him? Is he devoid of shame? Now, I shall stop that Ac-
ademic as he is leaving the courtroom, since folly is most
avid for this sort of victory. Therefore, keeping a tight hold
on him, I shall disclose to the judges what they do not
know. I shall address them in this way: "My good men,
I have one thing in common with this man, namely, that
he doubts which one of you is following the truth. However,
he and I have our own distinct theories, and I petition that
you adjudicate upon them. As to myself, although I have
heard your doctrines expounded, I am nevertheless uncertain
as to where the truth is to be found, but my uncertainty
1 The pallium was the distinctive gown of the Greek philosophers; the
Cynics were usually represented as carrying cudgels.
188 SAINT AUGUSTINE
is due to the fact that I do not know which one of you is a
wise man. But as to this Academic why, he denies that
even a wise man can know anything whatever, even wisdom
itself; whence he is called a wise man." What manner of
man would not see at once who it is that gets the palm of
victory in this case? For, if my adversary really holds the
opinion that I ascribe to him, I shall surpass him in glory;
if he blushingly admits that a wise man knows wisdom, I
shall win the decision.'
Chapter 9
(18) 'Let us now withdraw from that litigious tribunal
to some place where no mob will molest us. And would
that we could retire to the very school of Plato, which is
said to have received its distinctive name because it was
remote from the multitude. But, even here, let us, to the best
of our ability, discourse among ourselves, not on glory
which is something trivial and puerile but on life itself,
and on whatever happiness of mind we may dare to hope
for. The Academics say that nothing can be known. But,
most zealous and learned men, how do you come to believe
that? "Zeno's definition leads us to it," they reply. And
why? I ask. For, if that definition be true, then whoever
knows it knows something that is true; if it is false, it should
not move men who are of the utmost constancy. But, let
us see what Zeno says. He says that a sense datum can be
known and understood, if it has no marks in common with
what is false. 1 Now, my dear Platonist, did that move you
to strive with all your might to draw zealous men away
from the hope of learning, so that since some kind of deplor-
1 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 254.77.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 189
able mental torpor was aiding in the same direction they
would totally abandon their occupation with philosophy?'
(19) 'But if nothing of this character can be found, and
if a thing cannot be understood unless it be of this character,
how could that fact have failed to trouble Zeno himself?
If such be the case, then it were more logical to say that
wisdom cannot fall to the lot of man, rather than say that
a wise man does not know why he is living, or how he is
living, or whether he is living, or and it would be impos-
sible to say anything more flagrantly senseless and silly than
this that he can be at the same time wise, and ignorant of
wisdom. Truly, which is the harder to conceive: that a man
cannot be wise, or that a wise man does not know wisdom?
When the question is propounded in that way, if it does
not furnish its own answer, there is no use in discussing it
further. But, then, if it were propounded that way, perhaps
men would become wholly averse to the study of philosophy,
whereas they ought now to be lured by that most sweet
and holy name of wisdom yes, lured in such a manner that
in later life, because they will have learned nothing in their
wasted youth, they will vent the most violent execrations
on you, for, when they had abandoned at least the pleasures
of the flesh, you led them unto torments of the mind.'
(20) 'But through whom are they the more deterred
from philosophy? Let us see. Is it through the man who will
say: "Listen, friend. It is not wisdom itself that is called
philosophy; it is the zeal for wisdom. And, even if you apply
yourself to it, you will not be wise as long as you are living
here below; wisdom is with God, and it cannot reach man.
But, when you will have sufficiently exercised and cleansed
yourself with this kind of study, then after this present
life, or, in other words, when you will have ceased to be a
190 SAINT AUGUSTINE
man your mind will easily enjoy wisdom"? Or is it through
the man who will say this: "Mortal men, come to philos-
ophy, for it offers great advantage. What is more dear to
a man than wisdom? Come, therefore, that you may be
wise without knowing wisdom"? "But," says he, "I shall not
express it that way." Then you are deceiving, for nothing
else will be found in your sect. If you would express it that
way, they would shun you as a madman; if you would
entice them in any other way, you would make madmen
out of them. But, let us suppose that, equally on account of
the one theory and the other, men are unwilling to devote
themselves to philosophy. Even then, my dear friend, if Zeno's
definition compelled the saying of something destructive to
philosophy, ought a man to be told something that would
induce him to bewail himself, or something that would make
him laugh at you?'
(21) 'However, insofar as our folly permits it, let us
discuss what Zeno has defined. He says a sense datum can
be understood, if it reveals itself with such marks as a false
thing could not have. 2 It is clear that nothing else can be
understood. "But," says Arcesilas, "I also see that. And,
precisely because I see it, I teach that nothing is understood,
for it is impossible to find anything of that character." Per-
haps it is impossible for you and for other fools. But why is
it impossible for a wise man? Of course, if this fool should
ask you to confute Zeno's definition, and to show that even
that definition can be false, I am convinced that, notwith-
standing your remarkable acumen, his challenge could not
be successfully met. However, if you cannot confute that
definition, then you have something which you can under-
2 Cf. Ibid. 2.34.112.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 191
stand, namely, that definition itself; if you can confute it,
then you no longer have it as an obstacle to your under-
standing something. I myself do not see that it can be con-
futed; in fact, I judge it to be entirely true. Therefore, since
I know that definition although I am unwise I know
something. But, suppose that it yields to your acumen. I shall
now use a very sound dilemma. That definition is either true
or false. If it is true, I understand it correctly; if it is false,
then there is something which can be understood, even if it
has marks in common with something that is false. 3 "How
can it?" Arcesilas asks. Well, if it cannot, then Zeno has
given a very true definition; consequently, whoever agrees
with him is not in error. Shall we attribute but little worth
and merit to a definition which in opposition to those who
would advance many arguments to show that nothing can be
understood designates the character of what can be under-
stood, and also shows that it is itself of such a character?
So, with respect to comprehensible things, it is at once a
definition and an example. Arcesilas now says: "I do not
know whether that definition is true, but I follow it because
it is probable. Precisely because I am following it for that
reason, I am showing that there is no such thing as what
it pronounces capable of being understood." Perhaps you
are showing that there is no such thing, except that defini-
tion itself, for I believe you see its implications. Even if we
are uncertain about that definition, we are not entirely
without knowledge regarding it, for, even in that case, we
know that it is either true or false. Therefore, we know
something about it. Although it will never make me uneasy,
yet I unreservedly regard that definition as entirely true,
for, either false things can be known, or and the Academics
3 Ibid. 2.200.11,35.
192 SAINT AUGUSTINE
have a dread of this; and it is really absurd things that
resemble the false cannot be known. Hence, it follows that
this definition is true. But let us consider the rest of their
system.*
Chapter 10
(22) 'If I am not mistaken, those observations suffice
for gaining the victory, but they are insufficient for a com-
plete rout of the adversary. We resolved to contravene, to
the best of our ability, the two aphorisms of the Academics:
namely, "that nothing can be perceived" and "that assent
ought not to be given to anything." 1 As regards the latter,
more later, but we shall at once make a few observations
on the former. Do you say that absolutely nothing can be
perceived? At this point, Carneades awoke from slumber
none of those men dozed more lightly than Carneades and
carefully examined the evidence of reality. I believe that
then soliloquizing, as men sometimes do he asked him-
self: "Now, Carneades, are you really going to say that you
do not know whether you are a man or an insect? Or is
Chrysippus 2 going to triumph over you? Well, let us say that
the things we do not know are those things which philos-
ophers investigate, and that the other things are of no con-
cern to us. Then, if I stumble in the ordinary everyday
light, I can take refuge in that which is a region of darkness
for the inerudite a region where only certain godlike eyes
can see. And, if they see me tottering and falling, they can-
not reveal it to the blind especially to the arrogant and
1 Cicero, Academ, 2.18.59. . ^ . * *
2 The Stoic who is said to have written more than 700 treatises. Against
the Academics, he defended the validity of sense perception. Cf. Ibid.
254.75.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 193
those who are too proud to be taught anything." O, Grecian
craftiness, you come forth neatly girded and equipped, but
you overlook the fact that this definition is itself the inven-
tion of philosophy. And if you attempt to chop it, the double-
edged axe will strike back against your shins, for, if that
definition is weakened, not only can something be under-
stood, but also unless you venture to remove it completely
one can understand a thing that is very similar to some-
thing false. That definition is your lurking place, from which
you rush forth furiously, and spring upon unwary passersby.
But, just as Hercules strangled the half-wild Cacus in
the latter's cave, and crushed him beneath its ruins, 3 so,
too, will some one strangle and crush you, while he teaches
that there is in philosophy something which you cannot
render doubtful by showing that it is similar to something
false. Of course, I was hastening on to other points. But,
whoever would urge me to do that now, would cast great
reproach on you, Carneades, for he would be considering
you as no more capable than a dead man against my assaults
anywhere and from any angle. On the other hand, whoever
does not think this is merciless, if he forces me to abandon
the ramparts everywhere and to engage in combat with you
on the plain. When I had begun to descend to combat, your
name alone filled me with terror, and I at once retreated.
But I hurled some kind of missile from the heights. Whether
it reached you, or what effect it produced that is some-
thing to be decided by those under whose scrutiny we are
now contending. Yet, although I ain incompetent, why
should I be afraid? If I remember correctly, Carneades, you
are dead. And Alypius is no longer rightfully contending as
3 Virgil, Aeneid 8.194 ff.
194 SAINT AUGUSTINE
proxy for your corpse. God will readily give me aid against
your ghost. 3
(23) 'You say that in philosophy nothing can be under-
stood. And, in order to spread your utterance far and wide,
you ridicule the quarrels and dissensions of philosophers.
And you think that those quarrels and dissensions supply
you with arms against the philosophers themselves. 4 How,
for instance, are we going to adjudicate the contest between
Democritus and the earlier cosmologists as to the oneness
or the incalculable multiplicity of the world, inasmuch as it
was impossible to preserve agreement between Democritus
himself and his heir, Epicurus? That voluptuary was glad to
grasp atoms in the darkness and to make those little bodies
his handmaids, but he dissipated his entire patrimony through
litigation when he allowed them to deviate from their respec-
tive proper courses and to diverge capriciously into one
another's paths. 5 Of course, this is no affair of mine, but,
if it pertains to wisdom to know anything about those mat-
ters, a wise man cannot be unaware of that fact. I myself
am as yet far from being even almost wise. Nevertheless, I
know something about those matters of cosmology, for I
am certain that either there is only one world or there are
more worlds than one. I am likewise certain that if there
are more worlds than one, their number is either finite or
infinite. Carneades would teach that this notion resembles
a false one. Furthermore, I know for certain that this world
of ours has its present arrangement either from the nature
of bodies or from a foresight of some kind. I am also certain
that either it always was and always will be, or it had a
beginning and will never end, or it existed before time and
4 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 2.41.127-8.
5 Cf. Ibid. 1.2.6; De fin. 1.6.17; De nat deorum 1.25.69; De fato 10.21 ff.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 195
will have an end, or it had a beginning and will not last
forever. 6 And I have the same kind of knowledge with regard
to countless cosmological problems, for those disjunctives
are true, and no one can confuse them with any likeness to
falsity. "Now," says the Academic, "assume the truth of
either member of the disjunction." I refuse to do that, for
it is the same as saying: "Quit what you know, and say
what you know not." "But," says he, "your notion is now
hanging in suspense." Very well: better hanging in suspense
than falling to the ground. While it is hanging, it is at least
in plain view, and it can be pronounced either true or false.
Because I know that it is either true or false, I say that I
know it as a proposition. Now, since you do not deny that
these matters pertain to philosophy, and since you neverthe-
less maintain that nothing can be known about them, I ask
you to show that I do not know them. In other words, say
either that these disjunctives are false or that they have
something in common with falsity some characteristic which
renders them absolutely indistinguishable from something that
is false.'
Chapter 11
(24) * "But," says he, "if the senses are deceptive, how
do you know that this world exists?" 1 Your reasons will
never be able to refute the testimony of the senses to such
extent as to convince us that nothing is perceived by us. In
fact, you have never ventured to try that, but you have
strenuously exerted yourself to convince us that a thing can
be something other than what it seems to be. So, by the term
6 Cf. De nat. deorum 1.8.19; Academ. 2.38.119.
1 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 2.24.59.
196 SAINT AUGUSTINE
world, I mean this totality which surrounds us and sustains
us. Whatever its nature may be, I apply the term world to
that which is present to my eyes, and which I see to be hold-
ing the earth and the heavens, or the quasi earth and the
quasi heavens. If you say that nothing appears to me, then
1 shall never be in error: the man that is in error is the
man who rashly accepts as true whatever appears to him.
Indeed, you yourselves say that to sentient beings a false
thing can appear to be true, but you do not say that nothing
can so appear to them. You are anxious to gain a victory
in this dispute. But, if we know nothing, and if nothing
even appears to us as true, then the entire reason for our
dispute will vanish. And if you maintain that what appears
to me is not a world, then you are disputing about words
only, for I have said that I call it a world.'
(25) 'But, you will ask me: "Is it the very same world
that you are seeing, even if you are asleep?" 2 I have already
said that I am using the term world to designate whatever
appears as such to me. But, if you think that the term ought
to be restricted to that which appears to those who are awake
and of sound mind, then contend if you can that sleeping
men and deranged men are not in this world while they are
asleep or deranged. 3 My only assertion is that this entire mass
and frame of bodies in which we exist is either a unit or not
a unit, and that it is what it is, whether we be asleep or
awake, deranged or of sound mind. Point out how this no-
tion can be false. If I am now asleep, it is possible that I have
said nothing at all, but if as happens occasionally words
have escaped my lips during sleep, it is possible that I was not
talking here, that I was not thus seated, and that I was
2 Cf .Ibid. 2.200.15-16.
3 Cf. Ibid. 15.48.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 197
not talking to these listeners. In any case, it must be true
that the world is what it is. Of course, I am not saying that
I perceived the same thing that I would perceive if I were
awake, but you can say that what I perceive when I am
awake could appear to me also when I am asleep. There-
fore, it can be very similar to something false. However, if
there are one world and six worlds, it is clear that there are
seven worlds, no matter how I may be affected. And, with
all due modesty, I maintain that I know this. Then, show
that either this dilemma or the aforesaid disjunctives can be
false by reason of sleep, or mental derangement, or the un-
reality of sense perception. And then, if I remember it when
I am awakened, I shall admit that I am vanquished. But,
I regard it as already sufficiently plain that the things which
are seen awry through sleep or derangement are things that
pertain to the bodily senses, for, even if the whole human
race were fast asleep, it would still be necessarily true that
three times three are nine, and that this is the square of
intelligible numbers. Furthermore, I see that, on behalf of
the senses, one could urge many arguments which we do not
find reprehended by the Academics. In fact, I believe that
the senses are not untrustworthy either because deranged
persons suffer illusions, or because we see things wrongly
when we are asleep. If the senses correctly intimate things
to the vigilant and the sane, it is no affair of theirs what
the mind of a sleeping or an insane person may fancy for
itself. 94
( 26 ) Inquiry is still to be made as to whether the senses
report the truth whenever they report anything. Well, sup-
pose that some Epicurean would say: "I have no complaint
to make about the senses, for it would be unfair to demand
4 Cf. Ibid. 257.88; 7.19-22.
198 SAINT AUGUSTINE
of them anything beyond their power. And, whatever the
eyes can see, they see that which is true. 35 Therefore, as to
what they see with regard to an oar in the water is that
true? 5 It is absolutely true. In fact, since there is a special
reason for the oar's appearing that way, I should rather
accuse my eyes of deception if it appeared to be straight
when It is dipped in the water, for, in that case, they would
not be seeing what ought to be seen. But what is the need
of many examples? The same can be said about the motion
of towers, the wings of birds, and countless other things.
"Nevertheless," says some one or other, "I am deceived if
I give assent." Restrict your assent to the mere fact of your
being convinced that it appears thus to you. Then there is
no deception, for I do not see how even an Academic can
refute a man who says: "I know that this appears white to
me. I know that I am delighted by what I am hearing. I
know that this smells pleasant to me. I know that this tastes
sweet to me. I know that this feels cold to me." 6 Tell me,
rather, whether the oleaster leaves for which a goat has a
persistent appetite are bitter per se. O, shameless man! Is
not the goat more moderate? I know not how the oleaster
leaves may be for flocks and herds; as to myself, they are
bitter. What more do you wish to know? Perhaps there is
even some man for whom they are not bitter. Are you con-
tending for the sake of annoyance? Have I said that they
are bitter for everybody? I have said that they are bitter for
me, but I do not say that they will always be so. What, if at
different times and for diverse reasons, something be found
to taste sweet at one time, and bitter on some other occa-
sion? This is what I say: that when a man tastes something,
5 Cf. Ibid. 2.200.7, 25.
6 Cf. Ibid. 2.24.76.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 199
he can In good faith swear that it is sweet to his palate or
that it is not, and that by no Greek sophistry can he be
beguiled out of this knowledge. If I am relishing the taste of
something., who would be so brazen as to say to me: "Per-
haps you are not tasting it: it may be only a dream"?
Would I discontinue? Why, that would afford me pleasure
even in a dream. Wherefore, no resemblance to falsity can
confuse what I have said that I know. Perhaps an Epicurean
or the Cyrenaics would make far greater claims for the
senses. And I have heard that nothing has been said in rebut-
tal by the Academics. 7 But, what is that to me? Let the Ac-
ademics refute those claims if even with my aid they are
able and willing to do so, for their arguments against the
senses do not hold against all philosophers. There are some
philosophers who profess that an opinion can be engendered
by what the mind receives through a bodily sense, but
maintain that no certain knowledge [sdentia] can be thus
engendered. They hold that such knowledge is contained in
the intelligence, far remote from the senses. 8 Perhaps it is
among those philosophers that we shall find the wise man
we are looking for. 9 But, we shall discuss that later. Let us
now proceed to the other points. In view of what has been
already said, we shall if I am not mistaken exhaust those
remaining points in a few words. 3
Chapter 12
(27) 'Now, to what extent does a bodily sense help or
hinder a man who is in search of moral principles? But if,
even in the case of those who posit man's supreme good in
7 Cf. Ibid. 2.7.19-22.
8 Plato's theory. Cf. below, 17.37; also Cicero, Academ. 2.46.142.
Q He was convinced of that. Cf. below, 20.43.
200 SAINT AUGUSTINE
pleasure, neither the dove's neck, nor the uncertain voice,
nor the burden that is both heavy and light with regard
to men and to camels respectively 1 if neither these nor
six hundred other things prevent those men from saying that,
by the mere fact of their being delighted or displeased, they
know that they are being delighted or displeased, neither
will they occasion any difficulty for one who confines man's
supreme good within the limits of the mind, 2 Which of those
opinions do you embrace? If you ask for my opinion, I
judge that man's supreme good is in the mind. 3 At present,
however, we are inquiring about knowledge. Accordingly,
seek information from a wise man, for he cannot be ignorant
of wisdom. But, even to me, although I am a dullard and
unwise, it is granted meanwhile to know that either there is
no supreme good of man where life's happiness abides or
it is either in the mind or in the body, or in both. Convince
me, if you can, that I do not know this, but of a certainty,
your stock arguments do not convince me of it. And, if you
cannot do it because you will be unable to find any falsity
which it resembles shall I hesitate to conclude that, since
I .myself already know so many truths in philosophy, the wise
man rightly seems to me to know everything in it that is true?'
(28) "But, perhaps he fears that he will choose his
supreme good while he is asleep. 4 There is nothing dangerous
in that, for, if he disapproves it when he awakes, he will
reject it, and he will retain it if he likes it. And who will
1 According to Cicero, these and several other examples of apparent
sense-deception were proposed and feebly refuted by Chrysippus,
the Stoic. Carneades developed them further, and used them ingeniously
but ineffectively against the Stoics, and the Epicureans, who 'posit man's
supreme good in pleasure/ Cf. Academ. 2.27.87-88.
2 Cl Cicero, Academ. 2.42.129; De fin. 2.3 ff; 3.9:30:
3 Cf. Retractationes LI. 4; Cicero, Academ. 2*42,129.
4 Cf, Cicero, Academ. 2.17.52.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 201
rightly censure him for having seen something fake while
he was asleep? But, perhaps he fears that he will lose his
wisdom, if he approves something false while he is asleep?
Why, not even a sleeping man would dare to dream such
a thing as to say that some one is wise while he is awake,
but unwise while he is asleep. These same observations could
be made also with regard to mental derangement, but our
discourse is hastening on to other matters. However, I am
not quitting this topic without leaving a very safe conclusion.
It is this. Either wisdom is lost by derangement, or knowl-
edge [scientia] remains in a man's intellect even though
the other part of his mind be picturing the sense datum as if it
were receiving it in a dream; if wisdom is lost by derange-
ment, then he will not be a wise man when you proclaim
him to be ignorant of truth. 9
Chapter 13
(29) 'Dialectic remains to be discussed. 1 Unquestionably,
a wise man has a thorough knowledge of it, and no man
can know something that is false. 2 On the other hand, how-
ever, if the wise man does not know dialectic, then a knowl-
edge of it does not pertain to wisdom, for he was able to
be wise without such knowledge. In that case, we are need-
lessly inquiring whether it is true or whether it can be under-
stood. And now, some one may say to me: "You have the
habit of foolishly displaying your knowledge. Have you not
been able to know anything about dialectic?" Truly, I know
more about dialectic than about any other part of philos-
ophy. In the first place, as regards all the propositions that
1 Cf. Ibid. 2.200.28-30.
2 Cf. Ibid. 2.1&40.
202 SAINT AUGUSTINE
1 have enunciated just now, it is dialectic that has taught me
that they are true. Furthermore, through it I have learned
many other truths as well. Estimate their number, if you can.
If the elements in the world are four, they are not five. If
there is but one sun, there are not two. The same soul cannot
both die and be immortal. A man cannot be at the same
time happy and miserable. It cannot be nighttime while the
sun is shining. At the present moment we are either asleep or
awake. What I think I see, either is or is not a body. Through
dialectic I have learned that these and many other things
which it would be very tedious to enumerate are true,
true in themselves, howsoever our senses may be affected.
And, with regard to the matters which I have propounded
in the form of a condition, dialectic has taught me that, if
the antecedent of any one of them is assumed, it necessarily
entails the assumption of the consequent. But, with regard
to the propositions expressed in the manner of contrariety or
disjunction, it has shown their nature to be such that, if one
or several parts are removed by negation, there remains
something that is confirmed by that removal. Dialectic has
also taught me that there ought to be no dispute regarding
mere words whenever there is agreement on the matter which
they are intended to signify, since words are used merely for the
sake of signifying; that whoever disputes on mere words in
such a contingency is to be shunned if he does it through
malice; that he is to be taught, if he does it through ignor-
ance; that, if he cannot be taught, he ought to be admonished
to do something else, rather than waste time and effort on
needless matters; and that, if he does not comply, he is to be
entirely disregarded. As to arguments that are petty, cap-
tious, and fallacious, there is a concise maxim: If they are
occasioned by an unwarranted concession, the conceded
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 203
points ought to be again discussed; if truth and falsity are in
conflict in the same conclusion, we are to accept what we
understand, and to reject the rest. But if in some matters
the criterion lies completely hidden from man, a knowledge
of that criterion is not to be sought. 3 It is from dialectic that
I have learned all this, as well as a great deal more that
need not be mentioned now. Nor ought I to be uneasy, for
the wise man neglects all this entirely unless dialectic is it-
self the science of the truth. But, if it is such a science, then
he knows that science so well that, by sheer pitiless disregard,
he starves to death that most captious sophism of theirs : "If
it is true, it is false; and if it is false, it is true." I think that
we have now spoken at sufficient length on the topic of perceiv-
ing, for the entire matter will be sifted again when I shall have
begun to discuss the act of assenting.'
Chapter 14
(30) 'Now, let us come at once to that point wherein
Alypius seems to be still in doubt. First of all, Alypius, let
us attentively examine the nature of that which so keenly
impresses you, and makes you so cautious. You have said that
the Academics' theory the theory that a wise man knows
nothing is strengthened by many cogent arguments. But you
have just now discovered that it is far more probable that
he knows wisdom. Now, if this new discovery of yours
weakens that theory of the Academics, it follows that assent
is merely to be withheld. This makes it very clear that nothing
can be advocated by whatsoever keen and copious argu-
ments which cannot be controverted just as keenly or per-
haps even more keenly, unless the opponent lacks ingenuity.
3 Cf. Ibid. 2.30.95.
204 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Hence it happens that an Academic wins, even when he is
vanquished. And, oh, that he be vanquished ! By no Pelasgic
artifice 1 will he ever bring it to pass that he be both victor
and vanquished when he departs from me. Of course, if we
could find nothing further to say against those sophisms, I
would freely admit that I am vanquished, for we are dis-
coursing, not for the sake of gaming glory, but for the pur-
pose of finding the truth. It is a matter of indifference to
me how I cross that cliff which confronts those who would
enter the region of philosophy the cliff whose darkening
defiles portend an equally deep darkness throughout the entire
realm of philosophy, and preclude all hope of finding any
light whatever within its borders. But, I have nothing fur-
ther to desire just now, if it is already probable that a wise
man knows something; our only reason for believing that
it was truth-like for him to withhold assent was the fact that
it seemed truth-like that nothing could be understood. That
assumption is now disclaimed, for it is conceded that a wise
man understands wisdom at least. Therefore, there is no rea-
son why he should not give assent to wisdom at least, for it
is unquestionably more monstrous for a wise man not to ap-
prove wisdom than not to know wisdom.'
(31) 'Now, if you please, let us try to visualize for a
moment such a spectacle as a quarrel of some kind between
a wise man and wisdom. The only claim that wisdom makes
is that she is wisdom. But, her oppenent says: "I do not be-
lieve it." Now, who is it that says to wisdom: "I do not
believe there is wisdom?" Who, indeed, but a man with
whom wisdom has been able to converse, and with whom she
has deigned to abide in a word, a wise man? Now, try to
1 Virgil, Aeneid 2.152.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 205
find me as the one who is contending against the Academics !
Why, you have indeed a novel contention here: a wise man
and wisdom are in mutual combat; the wise man is in dis-
agreement with wisdom. And, like yourself, I am calmly
awaiting the outcome, for who would not believe that wisdom
is invincible? Nevertheless, let us fortify our own position with
a dilemma of some kind: In this contest, either the Academic
will vanquish wisdom, or he will be vanquished by her. In
the first case, he will then be vanquished by me, because he
will not be a wise man. In the other case, we shall teach that
a wise man gives assent to wisdom. Therefore, either the Aca-
demic is not a wise man, or a wise man will give assent to
something unless, of course, the man who was ashamed to
say that a wise man is ignorant of wisdom will not be ashamed
to say that a wise man disagrees with wisdom. But, if it now
seems true that a wise man can reach an understanding of
wisdom, it must also seem true that he will give assent to
wisdom, for surely there is no reason why we ought to refuse
assent to what can be understood. So, I see that my conten-
tion seems true the contention that a wise man will give
assent to wisdom. And, if you ask me where he can find wis-
dom, I shall answer: He will find it within himself. If you
say that he is unaware of its presence within him, you are
going back to that same absurdity, namely, that a wise man
is ignorant of wisdom. And, if you maintain that a wise man
cannot be found, then we shall have a new dispute with you
whoever you are who hold that view. But, this new dis-
pute will not be with the Academics, for, whenever they debate
this point, they straightway assume the existence of a wise
man. Cicero admits that he himself is very much given to
forming opinions, but he says that he is inquiring as to what
206 SAINT AUGUSTINE
a wise man does, 2 And if you, boys, are still unaware of this,
you have at least read in his Hortensius : "Therefore, if there
is no certainty, a wise man will not form opinions: he will
never accept anything as true." 3 Hence, it is clear that, in the
disputations against which we are contending, the Academics
are inquiring about a wise man.'
(32) Therefore, I judge that a wise man has discerned
wisdom. In other words, I believe that he understands wis-
dom. 4 And precisely for this reason I judge that whenever he
gives assent to wisdom, he does not form an opinion; for he
would not be a wise man unless he understood that to which
he gives assent. In fact, the Academics do not maintain that
every man ought always to withhold assent: they say that
assent ought not to be given to things that cannot be under-
stood. 5 But, wisdom is not nothing. Therefore, whenever a
wise man knows wisdom and gives assent to it, he is neither
knowing nothing nor giving assent to nothing. What more do
you wish? Or are we inquiring about the error which they
claim to be entirely avoided if assent inclines the mind to-
ward nothing? They say that one errs if he approves, not
only something false, but even something doubtful that may
happen to be true. 6 I myself find nothing that may not be
doubtful, but, as we have said, a wise man find wisdom at
least.'
Chapter 15
( 33 ) Terhaps you now wish me to digress from this topic?
When we are dealing with very crafty men, we should not
2 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 2.20.66.
3 Cf. Ibid. frag. 100 (Muller) .
4 Cf. Ibid. 2.9.27.
5 Cf. Ibid. 2.21.67,
6 Cf. Ibid. 2.21.68.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 207
lightly quit even the things that are most secure. Nevertheless,
I shall comply with your wishes. And yet, what shall I say?
What? Yes, what shall I say? Of course, we have to mention
the source of the Academics' arguments, even though it be an
ancient source. But, since you are pushing me forth from my
own camp, what shall I do? Shall I implore the aid of more
learned men, so that if I am unable to gain the victory it
will be less shameful to be overcome together with them? So,
I shall hurl a spear with all my might, a jagged and a black-
ened spear, to be sure, but if I am not mistaken a very
effective one, namely : "Whoever accepts nothing as true can
perform no act." 1 O, loutish fellow! And where is the prob-
able? Where is the truth-like? That is what you are expecting.
Do you hear how those Grecian shields resound? We have
taken up something very weighty indeed. But with what force
have we hurled it? So far as I can see, we have inflicted no
wound, although these helpers of mine furnish me with noth-
ing more effective. So, I shall turn my attention to whatever
aid the villa and the farm may afford, because those rather
weighty weapons are more burdensome than helpful.'
(34) 'I have long and leisurely pondered how the prob-
able and the truth-like could defend our acts from error
within the confines of this villa. At first it seemed to me to be
neatly protected and fortified, just as it used to seem when
I myself was vending those arguments. 2 But, when I had in-
spected it more carefully, I came to believe that I had dis-
covered an entry where error might rush upon the unwary.
For I believe that a man is in error, not only when he is fol-
lowing the wrong path, but also when he is not following the
right one. Accordingly, let us suppose that two travelers are
1 Cf. Ibid. 2.33.108; 47.146.
2 Cf. Confessions 9.2.2,4.
208 SAINT AUGUSTINE
journeying to the same place; that one of them is very cred-
ulous, and that the other has resolved to believe nobody. When
they arrive at a crossroad, the credulous man says to a shep-
herd or a rustic of some kind, who happens to be there: "Hey,
my good man, which is the right road to that place?" He
receives this answer: "If you travel by this road, you will not
go astray." Then he says to his companion: "This man is
telling the truth: l?t us go this way." The latter smiles, and
very facetiously ridicules him for having assented so readily.
Then, while the one proceeds on his journey, the other stands
still at the crossroad until his prolonged delay begins to occa-
sion him embarrassment. Now, behold ! from another branch
of the highway a neatly dressed and urbane man on horseback
comes into view, and our man rejoices because this stranger
is approaching. He greets the new arriva^ informs him of
his purpose, and makes inquiry about the road. Esteeming
this man more highly than the shepherd, and wishing to win
his favor, he tells him the reason of his delay. But the horse-
man happened to be one of those who are commonly called
Samardacs, 3 and the rascal spontaneously followed his usual
practice: "Go this way," he said, "for I am now coming from
that place." He deceived his inquirer, and went away. But
how could that inquirer be deceived? "I do not," he says,
"accept that information as something true: I accept it as
truth-like. And, since it is neither fitting nor profitable to be
here idle, I shall take the road." Meanwhile, the other trav-
eler has been already refreshed at the place for which they
had set out, although he had erred by giving assent when he
3 Samardac is a word of unknown origin meaning a juggler. It was of
common usage in Africa, and was incorporated into Greek and Latin.
St. John Chrysostom uses it at least once, and immediately gives its
Greek equivalent (Horn. 17, in Epist. ad Ephes.) .
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 209
so readily believed that the words of the shepherd were true.
But this one is now wandering around a forest of some kind,
although he has avoided error by following the probable. In
fact, he has not yet found anyone who even knows the place
to which he had purposed to go. Let me tell you truly that,
when I was pondering those arguments of theirs, I could not
refrain from laughter. According to the Academics' own
words, it happens somehow or other that a man is in error
when he follows the right path by mere chance, but that a
man who was led by probability seems to be free from error,
even though he was led through trackless mountains and never
found the place he was seeking. To censure the practice of
assenting rashly, it is more fitting to say that both those men
were in error than to say that the latter avoided it. Conse-
quently, I became more wary with regard to the assertions
of the Academics, and I began to reflect on the actions
and customs of men. Then I discovered so many capital
arguments against the Acamedics that I was no longer laugh-
ing at them; I was loathing them and bewailing the fact that
such learned and ingenious men had fallen headlong into
such abominable and shameful opinions.'
Chapter 16
(35) 'Although, perchance, not every one who falls into
error commits a sin, it is conceded that every one who sins
falls into error or something worse. Therefore^ when some
young man hears those men saying: "To err is shameful;
therefore we ought not to give assent to anything. But, when
one follows what seems probable 1 to him, he commits neither
a sin nor an error. Let each one remember this only: that we
1 I.e. f approvable.
210 SAINT AUGUSTINE
are not to accept the truth of anything that presents itself to
the mind or to the senses" when the young man hears this,
suppose he plots against the chastity of another's wife? Now,
I am consulting you you, Marcus" Tullius. We are dealing
with the life and morals of young men : and all those writings
of yours have been diligently directed toward the instituting
and fostering of morality. What else would you say but that
to you such an act is not probable for a young man to at-
tempt? To him, however, it is probable. And, if we are to
regulate our lives in accordance with what is probable to
someone else, then you ought not to have administered the
government of the state, for it seemed to Epicurus that it
ought not to be done. So, that young man will commit adul-
tery with another's wife. And, if he is arraigned, where will
he find you to defend him? And, even if he should find you,
what would you say? Of course, you would enter a denial.
But, what if the fact is so clear that your denial would be to
no purpose? Undoubtedly, you will advance a persuasive plea
as you would do in the gymnasium at Cumae or at Naples
that he committed no sin, nay, that he was not even in
error. For, as to the precept that adultery is not to be com-
mitted he was convinced that this precept is true, but the
probable came to his mind, and he followed it: he committed
adultery/ Or, again, perhaps he did not commit it; perhaps
it merely seemed to him that he committed it. And the hus-
band, that silly fellow, is throwing everything into turmoil by
litigation, invoking the law to vindicate the honor of his wife
the wife with whom perhaps he is now sleeping, but does
not know it. If the judges understand all this, either they will
ignore the Academics and punish it as a real crime, or they
will yield to them and convict the man as probably guilty
in a truth-like manner. This defense attorney will then abso-
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 211
lutely not know what to do. And yet, he cannot be incensed
against anybody, for all of them will say that, since they did
not give assent, they did not err: they did merely what seemed
probable. So, he will divest himself of the character of defense
attorney and will don that of a consoling philosopher. He
will easily persuade the young man who has already become
quite proficient in the Academy to regard himself as one
convicted in a dream. But, perhaps you think that I am speak-
ing in jest. Well, if no sin is committed by anybody who does
whatever seems probable to him, then I am ready to swear
by everything holy 2 that I do not see how that young man
committed sin. I do not see it, unless they say that sin and
error are entirely different things, and that they have for-
mulated their precepts to preserve us from error, but that they
regard sin as of minor importance.*
(36) I am saying nothing about homicides, parricides,
sacrileges, and all the villainies and crimes that can be per-
petrated or imagined. And worse still, these crimes and vil-
lainies are defended in the courts of even the wisest judges,
and their defense is expressed in those few words: "I gave
no consent; therefore I did not err. And at any rate, how
could I help doing what seemed probable?" Whoever thinks
that such defense cannot be plausibly advanced by probable
arguments, let him read Catiline's oration. 3 In that oration
he plausibly defends parricide of the fatherland, a crime in
which all other crimes are included. Furthermore, they say
that in all their actions they follow nothing but the probable;
nevertheless they are busily searching for the truth, 4 although
they think it probable that the truth cannot be found. Who
2 Cf. Retractationes 1.1.4; cf. Terence Eunuchus 331.
3 Sallust, In Catilinam 20.
4 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 2.3.7.
212 SAINT AUGUSTINE
would not laugh at that? O, marvelous monstrosity ! But, let
us skip it: it does not concern us, it does not pertain to the
importance of life or the hazards of fortune. The next, how-
ever, is a capital error. It is dreadful, abhorrent to every up-
right human feeling. It involves the consequence that, if the
Academic theory is probable, then anybody may not only
without incurring the reproach of wickedness, but even with-
out occasioning the blame of error commit every heinous
crime whenever it seems probable to him that such an act
ought to be performed,, provided that he accept nothing as
true. And what of this? Did those men not see this conse-
quence? Nay, with the utmost skill and discernment they saw
it very clearly. Of a certainty, I would not be so arrogant as
to claim that I have inherited the industry, alertness, genius,
or learning of Marcus Tullius. And yet, when he said that a
man cannot know anything, he would have no way of refut-
ing an objector if only this retort were made to him, namely:
"I know that it seems so to me." '
Chapter 17
(37) Then, why were such great men willing to contend
so incessantly and with such persistence to make it appear
unlikely that a knowledge of truth falls to the lot of any man?
Listen a little more attentively, not to what I know, but to
what I think. I have saved this to the last, so that I might
explain if I can what seems to me to have been the sole
purpose of the Academics. Plato, the wisest and most erudite
man of his day, 1 spoke in such a manner that importance at-
tached to whatever he said, and he spoke such things as
would not be unimportant no matter how he spoke them. He
1 Cf. Retractationes 1.1.4; cf. Cicero, Academ. 1.4.17,
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 213
is said to have received still further knowledge from the Pyth-
agoreans after the death of his master, Socrates, whom he
loved with a singular affection. But, Pythagoras himself had
been dissatisfied with Greek philosophy, for at that time it
was almost nil, or, at any rate, very occult. Convinced by the
disputations of Pherecydes, a philosopher from Skyros, 2 he
had come to believe in the immortality of the human soul.
And then, journeying far and wide, he listened to the dis-
courses of many wise men. To the Socratic charm and pre-
cision which he had mastered in ethics, Plato joined the skill
in the natural and divine sciences which he had diligently
acquired from the men I have mentioned. Then he added
dialectic, which he believed to be either wisdom itself or at
least an indispensable prerequisite for wisdom, and which
would synthesize and determine those components. Hence, he
is said to have elaborated a complete philosophic science. 3
But we have no time to treat of this at the present moment.
For my present purpose, it is sufficient that Plato held the
following theories: that there are two worlds an intelligible
world in which the truth itself resides, and this sensible world
which it is manifest that we perceive by sight and touch;
that consequently the former is a true world, and the present
world is truth-like made unto the image of the other; that
the truth emanates from the intelligible world, and is, as it
were, refined and brightened in the soul which knows itself;
that with regard to the present world, opinion but not
knowledge [scientia] can be engendered in the minds of the
unwise; that in this sensible world there are political virtues,
namely, powers similar to other true powers that are known
2 The word Syri in the Latin text may be a copyist's error for Scyri.
Pherecydes, the teacher of Pythagoras, was from Skyros, an island in
the Aegean Sea.
3 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 1.4.17; 2.28.91.
214 SAINT AUGUSTINE
by only a few wise men; and that whatever is represented by
these political virtues can be called nothing more than truth-
like. 5
(38) 'It seems to me thai these and other theories of this
kind were preserved among his followers, and insofar as it
was possible guarded as secrets. 4 For, on the one hand,
either such theories are not easily understood, except by those
who cleanse themselves from all imperfection and adopt a
mode of life that is more than human; or, on the other hand,
whoever knows these theories, and is willing to teach them to
all kinds of men, is not thereby guilty of a grievous offense.
Now, when Zeno, the founder of the Stoic School, had heard
and accepted some of the teachings, he came to the school
which had been founded by Plato, and which Polemon was
then conducting. It is my opinion that he was held suspect
there. I believe he did not seem to be the kind of man to whom
those Platonic and sacrosanct teachings ought to be disclosed
and entrusted at least, before he had unlearned what he
had received from other schools and had brought with him
to this school. Polemon dies. He is succeeded by Arcesilas,
4 Cf. Ibid. 1.9.10. Long before Augustine's day there was considerable
uncertainty as to whether Arcesilas and others of the New Academy
really held the opinion which they taught publicly. Certainly, Cicero
gives an intimation of his own doubt in that regard, when he represents
Lucullus as saying: 'Therefore, I wish to see what they [the Academ-
ics] have discovered. "We do not usually reveal it," he says. Then,
what are those mysteries? Or why do you conceal your opinion like
something shameful?' (Academ. 2.18.60) . Diocles of Cnidus says
that Arcesilas assumed the pose of a Skeptic in order to escape the at-
tacks of the embittered foes of dogmatism (Eusebius, Praep. evang.
6.6) . According to Sextus Empiricus, the Academics' skepticism was
merely a means of testing the fitness of their pupils for admittance
to their mysteries. (P., 1.234) .
In the Retractationes, he adverts to his having said that the Academ-
ics had a knowledge of truth, whose likeness they used to call truth-
like (1.1.4).
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS ' 215
who was Indeed a fellow student with Zeno, but under the
tutorship of Polemon. At this time, Zeno was fascinated by
a certain theory of his own regarding the world, and especially
with reference to the soul in whose regard true philosophy
is ever vigilant. According to his theory, the soul is mortal,
there is nothing beyond this sensible world, and in this world
there is no operation except the corporeal. 5 In fact, he be-
lieved that God was fire. In view of the fact that this per-
nicious theory was becoming widespread, I believe that Ar-
cesilas very prudently and ingeniously concealed the complete
doctrine of the Academy, and cached it as a golden treasure
to be discovered some day by posterity. But the populace is
rather prone to rush into false opinions, and, through fa-
miliarity with bodies, a person very readily but very dan-
gerously, as well comes to believe that all things are cor-
poreal 6 Consequently, that ingenious and erudite master re-
solved to disabuse those whose miseducation distressed him,
rather than to teach those whom he considered unteachable.
Hence, the origin of all those teachings that are attributed
to the New Academy, for the earlier Academics had had no
need of them.*
(39) 'And, if Zeno had but come to his senses when he
was maintaining that nothing but bodies exists and that noth-
ing can be understood except the kind of thing he was de-
scribing, and if he had but seen that such a thing cannot be
found in bodies, then every disputation of this sort which
had inevitably burst into conflagration would long ago have
become extinct. But, as the Academics believed and I share
their view in this he was deceived by the seeming con-
stancy in corporeal operations. At any rate, he was persistent,
5 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 1.11.40; Tuscul. Quaest. 1.22.79.
6 Cf. Confessions 4.15.24.
216 SAINT AUGUSTINE
and that pernicious belief in bodies continued as best it could
down to Chrysippus, who as he was well able to do en-
dowed it with the power of diffusing itself widely. 7 Cameades,
however, was more keen and vigilant than all those whom I
have mentioned/ and he opposed this theory so masterfully
that I marvel at its having had any further acceptance. In the
first place, he discarded what might be called the impudence
of quibbling, for he was aware that Arcesilas had brought
himself into serious disrepute by this mode of disputation. But
his real purpose was to convulse and overthrow the Stoics and
Chrysippus.' 9
Chapter 18
(40) 'And from all sides opponents arose to harass him
with the objection that, if assent were to be given to nothing
whatever, a wise man would have to refrain from all activ-
ity. 1 O, marvelous Carneades! And yet, not so marvelous,
but a limpid stream from Platonic springs. At any rate, he
wisely noted what kind of actions those objectors were ap-
proving as true, and he saw that they bore a resemblance to
some kind of true actions. Therefore, he denominated as truth-
like whatever he would follow in his actions in this world. He
prudently concealed the nature of that truth-like model
which he also called probable although he had complete
and accurate knowledge of its nature; whoever contemplates
the exemplar readily approves the representation. But, how
could a wise man approve the truth-like, or how could he
7 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 2.24.75.
8 Cf. Ibid. 1.12.46.
9 For a parallel, but by no means identical, exposition of the same
topic, cf. Ibid. 1.4-11; 2.20-47.
fa. Ibid. 2.12.39; 33.108.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 217
follow it, as long as he did not know what truth itself was? 2
Therefore, those men knew what truth was, but they ap-
proved false things in which they recognized a laudable imita-
tion of true things. 3 But, because it was neither easy nor fitting
to reveal it to the uninitiated, they left to posterity and to
whomsoever they could, in their own day a certain token
of their doctrine, but, by insult and derision, they prevented
the dialecticians from raising questions about their terminol-
ogy. Hence it is that Cameades is said to have been the
founder and chief of a third Academy. 5
(41) 'That conflict continued down to our own Tullius.
Of course, by this time it was plainly in the decrepit stage, but
it was destined to bloat Latin literature with its last breath,
for to me nothing seems more bloated than for a man to ex-
press copiously and ornately so many things that he does not
believe. And yet, in my opinion, that Platonic straw man,
Antiochus, 4 was completely demolished and blown away by
those same windy blasts, for the Epicurean herds are wont
to depend on voluptuous minds for their open stables. 5 But,
Antiochus had been one of Philo's pupils. And, to the best
of my judgment, Philo was a most circumspect person. He
2 Cf. Ibid. 2.11.33.
3 Cf. Retractationes LI .4.
4 Antiochus of Ascalon was one of Cicero's intimate and esteemed friends.
Like Cicero, he had studied under the celebrated Academic, Philo of
Larissa, and had embraced that teacher's exposition of Plato's doctrine.
But, unlike Cicero, he later rejected Philo's tenets and argued bitterly
against them. In the Academic 'Questions, Lucullus is presented as the
expositor and defender of the theories of Antiochus, while Cicero
defends the doctrine of Philo, and shows that Antiochus is, not a
faithful interpreter of Plato, but a pseudo-Platonist a Platonic straw
man (Cf. Academ. 2.4-19, 20-47; 43.132; 46.143.)
5 Because of the materialism of their system and the reputed character of
their supreme good, Epicureans used to be called beasts*. Horace
characterized himself as 'a swine of the herd of Epicurus' (Epist.
1.4.15) . Cf. Cicero, Academ. 1.2.6; 2.45.139; also, frag. 20 (Muller) .
218 SAINT AUGUSTINE
had begun both to open the gates, so to speak, for his yielding
adversaries, and to lead the Academy and its principles back
to the authority of Plato. Of course, that had been previously
tried by Metrodorus, who is said to have been the first to
confess that the Academics did not approve the principle
that nothing can be perceived : he said they had been forced
to take up that kind of weapon against the Stoics. And so,
as I had begun to say, when Antiochus had heard the discourse
of Philo the Academic and of Mnesarchus the Stoic, he
stealthily in the guise of a helpful citizen entered the Old
Academy, for at this time it was ungarrisoned, so to speak,
and entirely undefended against any foe. And, from the
ashes of the Stoics, he brought with him some kind of evil
which profaned the portals of the Academy. But Philo
wrested those weapons from him, and resisted him as long
as he lived. And our own Tullius buried all his remains, for
throughout his entire life Tullius could not tolerate the under-
mining or contamination of anything he loved. Shortly after-
wards, when all the persistent sophistry was dead, and when
the clouds of error has been dispelled, then Plato's counten-
ance which is the cleanest and brightest in philosophy
suddenly appeared, especially in Plotinus. Indeed, this Platon-
ist philosopher has been adjudged so like to Plato that they
would seem to have lived together, but there is such a long
interval of time between them that Plato is to be regarded
as having relived in Plotinus.'
Chapter 19
(42) Thus it is that today we see scarcely any philoso-
phers except Cynics or Peripatetics or Platonists. We have the
Cynics, just because a certain libertine and licentious kind of
life delights them. But, as regards erudition and doctrine and
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 219
morality by which the interests of the soul are consulted, a
system of philosophy the truest philosophy, in my opinion
has been crystallized through multifarious disputes through-
out many centuries, because the times did not lack men of
the utmost discernment and industry who, in their disputa-
tions, continued to teach that Aristotle and Plato blend and
chord in such a manner that to the inattentive and unskilled
they seem to be out of harmony. 1 For, it is not the philosophy
of this world the philosophy which our sacred mysteries
rightly detest. 2 It is of the other world, the intelligible world
a world to which even the most acute reasoning would
never lead souls blinded by the multiform darkness of error
and smeared with so much grime from the bodies. Human
reason would never lead such souls to that intelligible world
if the most high God had not vouchsafed through clemency
toward the whole human race to send the authority of the
divine intellect down even to a human body, and caused it
to dwell therein, so that souls would be aroused not only by
divine precepts but also by divine acts, and would be thus
enabled to reflect on themselves and to gaze upon their father-
land, without any disputatious wranglings.'
Chapter 20
(43) 'At one time or another, I have become convinced
insofar as I was able that this is probably true with regard
to the Academics. And, even if it is false, I need not care,
for I am satisfied so long as I do not believe that the discovery
of the truth is beyond the reach of man. But, whoever thinks
that the Academics were of this opinion, let him hear Cicero
1 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 1.4.17 ff.; 2.5.15,
2 Cf. Col. 2.8.
220 SAINT AUGUSTINE
himself. For he says that it was their practice to conceal their
theory, and that they usually did not disclose it to anybody
unless he had continued with them up to his old age. 1 Of
course, I do not know exactly what their theory was, but I
think it was Plato's theory. And now that you may grasp
my whole meaning in a few words whatever may be the
nature of human wisdom, I see that I have not yet under-
stood it. Nevertheless, although I am now in the thirty-third
year of my life, 2 I do not think that I ought to despair of
understanding it some day, for I have resolved to disregard
all the other things which mortals consider good, and to
devote myself to an investigation of it. And, whereas the rea-
sonings of the Academics used to deter me greatly from such
an undertaking, I believe that through this disputation I am
now sufficiently protected against those reasonings. Certainly,
no one doubts that we are impelled toward knowledge by a
twofold force: the force of authority and the force of reason.
And I am resolved never to deviate in the least from the
authority of Christ, for I find none more powerful. But, as
to what is attainable by acute and accurate reasoning,
such is my state of mind that I am impatient to grasp what
truth is to grasp it not only by belief, but also by compre-
hension. Meanwhile, I am confident that I shall find among
the Platonists what is not in opposition to our Sacred
Scriptures/
(44) At this point, they saw that I had brought my dis-
course to an end. Although it was now nighttime in fact,
some of the discourse had been inscribed on the tablets after
a lamp had been fetched the boys were nevertheless watch-
1 Cf, Academ. frag. 21 (Miiller); also 2.18.60.
2 He had reached his thirty-third year one week previously.
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 221
ing most intently to see whether Alypius would promise to
reply, even some other day.
And then Alypius spoke: C I am ready to avow that nothing
more agreeable has ever happened to me than the fact that I
have been vanquished in this disputation. And I believe that
this joy ought not to be exclusively mine. Therefore, I gladly
share it with you, my fellow disputants, or if you will
our judges. And I do this all the more gladly, because perhaps
the Academics themselves hoped to be thus vanquished some
day by their own descendents. And what could be offered or
experienced more delightful than the pleasantry of the satire,
more nicely pondered than the import of the sentiments,
more plainly evident than the good will, more apt than the
doctrines? I am absolutely unable to give fitting expression
to my admiration of the fact that unpleasant matters have
been treated with such good humor; difficult matters, with
such forcefulness; proved points, with such moderation; and
obscure points, with such clearness. Wherefore, fellow dis-
putants, change that expectant longing of yours, by which
you were trying to provoke me to a rebuttal. Exchange it
for the better hope of becoming fellow disciples with me; for
we now have the kind of leader that, under God's guidance,
will bring us to the secrets of the truth.' 3
(45) With a certain boyish eagerness, the youths were
now showing by their countenances that they considered them-
selves cheated, as it were, because Alypius would make no
reply.
Then, with a smile, I said: 'Are you envious because 1
receive such praise? From now on, I have absolutely no fear
of Alypius, for I have no misgivings as to his constancy. But,
3 Cf. Cicero, Academ. 1.12.43.
222 SAINT AUGUSTINE
so that you also may have reason to thank me, I shall provide
you with arms against him, since he has disappointed you of
your fond expectations. Read the Academics. And, when you
discover that in those writings Cicero has demolished all this
nonsense of mine, then let Alypius be compelled by you to
defend this discourse of mine against those irrefutable argu-
ments. 4 And this, Alypius, is the bitter recompense I am
making to you for the undeserved praise you have bestowed
on me.'
Then they laughed, and we brought this important debate
to an end. Whether our conclusion is a well-founded one, I
know not; at any rate, the debate ended with greater modera-
tion and dispatch than I had expected. 5
4 Of the four books that comprised Cicero's Academicae Quaestiones, only
the fourth and portions of the first are extant.
5 The pertinent passages of the Retractationes which treat of Contra
Academtcos are:
(1) 'And, therefore, when I had given up both what I Kad acquired
and what I used to wish to acquire in the ambitions of this world, and
although not yet baptized had betaken myself to the peace of a
Christian life, my first written work was against the Academics, or
about the Academics, for their arguments used to disquiet me. In
many minds those arguments engender despair of finding truth, for they
make it difficult to give assent to anything. The Academics forbid a
wise man from regarding anything as clear and certain, for they hold
that everything is obscure and doubtful. For this reason, I wrote
in order to dismiss those arguments from my mind with the best
counter-arguments I could discover. Through the merciful aid of
the Lord, this was accomplished.
(2) 'But I regret that in those three books I made such frequent
use of the word fortune. Of course, I did not intend that term to be
understood as designating some goddess; I employed it to designate
a fortuitous issue of circumstances in good things or in evil, whether
they be of our own bodies or outside them. For, although no religion
forbids us to employ the words, perchance, mayhap, peradventure,
haply, perhaps, yet the total event is to be attributed to Divine
Providence. In fact, I did not entirely neglect to refer to this, for I
said: "But, perhaps what is commonly called fortune is itself governed
by a certain hidden order. And, what we call a matter of chance is
perhaps only something whose cause and explanation are concealed"
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS
223
[I.I.I]. Although I made that observation, I nevertheless regret the
fact that in those books I made such frequent mention of fortune, for
I see that men are woefully accustomed to say: "Fortune has decreed
this," when the expression ought to be: "God has willed it." And, in
a certain passage, I said: "It is so appointed, either in accordance with
our own merit or by virtue of nature's law, that the port of wisdom
will never give entry to the divine mind that dwells in mortals, etc/'
[Ibid.]. Now, those two phrases ought to have been omitted, because
the sense would be complete without them; at any rate, it would have
been sufficient to say "in accordance with our own merits," since
misery is truly derived from Adam. In any case, I ought not to have
added "or by virtue of nature's law," because the dire necessity of
our nature has arisen as a punishment for the iniquity that preceded
it. And also, with regard to my saying in those books "that whatever
can be discerned by mortal eyes, or whatever any o the senses can
reach, is to be of no concern, but rather that all of it ought to be
disregarded" [1.1.3] with regard to that expression, additional words
should have been used, so that the passage would read thus: "what-
ever any of the senses of a mortal body can reach"; for there is also
a sense of the mind. But I was then speaking in the manner of those
who say that there is no sense except the bodily senses, and no sensible
things except the corporeal. Consequently, wherever I have spoken in
that fashion, ambiguity has not been avoided, except with respect
to those whose customary mode of speech is of that character. And
I also said: "Why do you think that to live a happy life is anything
else than to live in conformity with that which is the very best
element in man?" And, shortly afterwards, explaining what I had
pronounced to be the very best element in man, I asked this question:
"Who can doubt that the very best element in man is nothing else
than that part of the mind to which it befits all the other elements
in man to conform as to a master? And, lest you should request another
definition, that part can be called mind or reason" f 1.2.5]. Of course,
this is true, for, insofar as man's nature is concerned, there is in him
nothing superior to mind or reason. Nevertheless, whoever wishes to
live a happy life ought not to live in accordance with this element.
If he lives according to this element, he lives according to man; where-
as, in order to be able to reach happiness, life must be regulated
according to God. And for the sake of attaining happiness, our mind
ought not to be content with itself: it ought to be subjected to God*
Ajid in another passage, replying to one of the debaters, I said: "On
that point, you certainly are not in error. And I should like this to be
for you an omen with regard to all the other points" [1.4.11]. Although
this was spoken in jest and was not intended as a serious assertion, I
should prefer not to have used the word omen. I should like to have
omitted it, precisely because I do not recall having read that word
either in our Sacred Scripture or in a discourse of any ecclesiastical
224 SAINT AUGUSTINE
expositor, although the word abomination-wliicb. is derived from it
-is found in several passages of the Divine Scripture,
(3) 'And in the second book there is an absolutely silly and absurd
quasi fable about philocaly and philosophy, to the effect that they
are akin, begotten of the same parent" [2.3.7]. Now either the so-
called philocaly is concerned with trifles and can, therefore, be in
no way akin to philosophy; or-if the name be taken at its face value,
because in our language it means love of beauty; and the beauty of
wisdom is the true and supreme beauty-philocaly and philosophy
are identical in incorporeal things. In neither case can they be re-
garded as sisters. In another passage, where I was treating of the
mind, I said that "rendered more secure, it would return to heaven"
[2.9.221. I would have rendered my meaning more secure if I had said
that the mind "would go," rather than that it "would return," for
there are those who think that human souls have fallen from heaven,
or that-in punishment for their sins they have been cast out of
heaven and are imprisoned in those bodies of ours [Cf. City of God
10.30; 12.26). But I had no misgiving about expressing it that way,
for, in saying that it would return to heaven, I meant to say that
it would return to God, its Author and Creator. In fact, the blessed
Cyprian did not hesitate to say that "since we possess the body from the
earth and the spirit from heaven, we are truly earth and heaven." And
in the Book of Ecclesiastes [12.7] it is written: "before the spirit return
to God, who gave it." Of course, this is to be understood in such manner
as not to contradict the Apostle, who says that thqse not yet born have
not done aught of good or evil [Rom. 9.11]. Indisputably, then, God
Himself is, in some manner, the original region of happiness for
the soul not that He begot it of Himself, but because He created it
from nothing else, just as He created the body and the whole earth.
But, with regard to the origin of the soul how it comes to pass that
it is in the body, namely, whether it is derived from the one man who
was first created when man was made into a living soul, or whether
each man is likewise made with an individual soul that is something
which I did not know at that time; nor do I know it now.
(4) 'In the third book, I said: "If you ask my opinion, I believe
that man's highest good is in the mind" [3.13.27]. I would have
expressed it more accurately by saying that it is in God, for, to be
happy, the mind enjoys Him as its highest good. Nor am I pleased
with this expression of mine: "I may swear by everything holy" 3.16.35].
And also what I said about the Academics was not correctly stated,
namely, that they had a knowledge of truth whose likeness they used
to call truth-like, and that the verisimilar thing which they used to
approve was false [3.18.40]. That statement is incorrect, for two
reasons: (a) because in that case, whatever was in any way similar to
something else would itself be false, whereas it is actually something
true in its own genus; (b) because I said that they used to accept as
true the false things which they used to term verisimilar, whereas they
ANSWER TO SKEPTICS 225
used to accept nothing as true, and used to claim that a wise man
would accept nothing as true. But 1 came to say that about them
because they used to call the verisimilar a probable thing. Moreover,
I was displeased and not without reason by the praise with which I
extolled Plato and the Platonic or Academic philosophers far more than
was fitting for irreligious men; for it is against their gross errors that
Christian teaching must be especially defended. And the following,
also, though spoken in jest and manifest irony, ought to have been
left unsaid, namely, that, in comparison with the arguments which
Cicero used in his writings on the Academics, my arguments by which
I refuted them in decisive fashion were merely trifles [3.20.45].
DIVINE PROVIDENCE
AND
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
(De or dine)
Translated
by
ROBERT P. RUSSELL, O.S.A., Ph.D.
Villanova College
NIHIL OBSTAT:
HENRY A. CAFFREY, O.S.A.
CENSOR DEPUTATUS.
IMPRIMI POTEST:
VERY REV. JOHN T, SHEEHAN, O.S.A., J.C.D.
PRIOR PROVINCIAL.
NIHIL OBSTAT:
JOSEPH A. M. QUIGLEY, J.C.D.
CENSOR LIBRORUM.
IMPRIMATUR:
gg HUGH L. LAMB
AUXILIARY BISHOP OF PHILADELPHIA.
February 4, 1942
INTRODUCTION
|N THE HISTORY of human thought and achievement
St. Augustine occupies a special place. His intel-
lectual development is intimately connected with
the personal circumstances of his eventful life. It would, in
fact, be difficult to find throughout the vast history of human
thought a personality in whom the bond between mind and
life has been more dominant and decisive.
It is not surprising, therefore, that traces of Augustine's
arduous and impassioned quest for truth should be clearly
discernible in his first philosophical writings after his conver-
sion. His Answer to Skeptics (Centra Academicos)* is a sound
refutation of universal skepticism, the last and most serious
error which he encountered since the desire of immortal wis-
dom had been first awakened in him by the reading of Cicero's
Hortensius. Similarly, in The Happy Life (De beata vita)
Augustine examines the vital problem of man's longing for
that perfect happiness which can be found only in God, the
highest Good.
De ordine, too, receives much of its inspiration from the
saint's personal history. While the dualistic solution of the
problem of evil contributed in no small measure to Augus-
tine's adherence to the Manichaean sect for nine years, it
was his abiding belief in a provident God that alone sustained
him when disappointment and disillusionment had all but
made him despair of finding the truth. Little wonder, then,
that as a catechumen at Cassiciacum he should have made
Divine Providence and the fact of evil the respective themes
1 The Contra Academicos was the first o these works to be begun,
but De beata vita and the first book of De ordine were written before
its completion.
229
230 SAINT AUGUSTINE
of one of his earliest works and should have vindicated therein
the existence of a divine and universal order which embraces
both good and evil,
De ordine, divided into two books, was written in the year
386, the year of Augustine's conversion to Christianity. It
comprises the third of four dialogues composed while he was
living in seclusion at the villa of Cassiciacum, whither he had
retired shortly after his wonderful conversion at Milan.
The purpose and plan of the dialogue, as well as several
interesting circumstances connected with its composition, are
to be found within the work itself. That information is sup-
plemented by the following from the Retractationes the
general review of his own works which Augustine wrote
shortly before his death in 430. 'During the same interval/
he writes, 'and in the course of composing the books Contra
Academicos, I wrote also two De ordine. In these books is
treated the important question of whether the order of God's
providence embraces everything good and everything eviP
(1.3).
De ordine is dedicated to a friend, Zenobius, at whose re-
quest and insistence Augustine planned it in a definite form.
The points of discussion converge on the problem of order
in the world; they had emerged from previous conversations
which Zenobius and Augustine had held on the same subject.
Augustine had failed to satisfy him during those conversa-
tions, either on account of the inherent difficulty of the prob-
lem, or, as it seems more likely, because of lack of time
(otiosus) for sufficient explanation. To allay the disquietude
of his friend, Augustine had promised a more thorough treat-
ment of the subject. The fulfillment of this promise is the
present work, De ordine.
For several reasons De ordine holds a prominent place
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 231
among Augustine's works. Written during the very year of
his conversion to the Christian faith, it is invaluable for the
intimate revealment of his way of thinking during that crit-
ical period of his life, the Christian character of which was
at one time the subject of a serious controversy. 2 Probably
no other work belonging to this period gives a truer picture
of the directive influences in Augustine's intellectual develop-
ment or determines more clearly the mutual relation of these
same influences. For, notwithstanding the presence of elements
that suggest a Platonic or neo-Platonic origin, thoughts dis-
tinctly and exclusively Christian are not only clearly discern-
ible, but predominate throughout the entire dialogue.
However, De ordine possesses much more than a mere
historical value as a landmark in the personal development
of this great thinker. Within its narrow limits Augustine has
succeeded in laying the foundation of a grand philosophical
structure a structure that has been in great part the inspira-
tion and guarantee of subsequent Christian speculation. Al-
though the subject of order constitutes the central theme of
the entire dialogue, basically, at least, De ordine contains the
elements of the entire Augustinian philosophy. 3 For, in it one
is introduced to Augustine's doctrine on such fundamental
points as: (a) the nature and scope of philosophy; (b) the
sources of human knowledge; (c) the two main objects of
philosophy: God and the soul; (d) the mutual relation of
Reason (ratio] and Faith (auctoritas] \ (e) the metaphysical
principles of aesthetics.
2 Cf. C. Boyer, Christianisme et Neo-Platonisme dans la formation de
S. Augustin (Paris 1920) .
3 Boyer has referred to De ordine as containing. the principles (semina)
of Augustine's philosophy. Cf. also A. Dyroff, 'Uber Form und Begriffs-
gehalt der augustinischen Schrift De ordine/ in Grabmann-Mausbach,
Aurelius Augustinus (Koln 1930) 15-62.
232 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Since the fact of evil presents the chief difficulty, it, also,
receives ample treatment. The existence of evil is reconciled
with a universal order, established and maintained by Divine
Providence, The place of evil in that order is adequately ex-
pounded. Thus, De ordine provides for the solution of this
intricate problem the basic principles which Augustine, as
occasion requires, will develop and apply in later works, not-
ably in De libero arbitrio and in the anti-Manichaean writings.
The form of the discussion recorded in De ordine evinces
Augustine's finest pedagogical sense a gift which enables
him to present abstruse subjects in a manner accommodated
to the capacity of his hearers. A striking example of the apt
use of this gift is to be found in the latter portion of the work.
Here, Augustine, becoming aware of difficulties in the treat-
ment of the subject, transfers the discussion from the meta-
physical level to the more familiar plane of his hearers'
everyday experience the existence of order in the several
branches of study. A final point of special interest is Augus-
tine's insistence on the necessity of intellectual discipline as
a prerequisite for sound philosophic speculation.
Augustine's work on the subject of order is particularly
opportune at the present time. In our day, as in his, the
magnitude of evil forces in the world is a source of perplexity
even for many believing and God-fearing men. Fifteen hun-
dred years ago, Augustine, the enlightened catechumen, faced
the same problems and solved them with consummate mas-
tery. His principles and methods are still available. What he
expounded for Zenobius is of priceless value for troubled
minds today.
The present translation of St. Augustine's De Ordine, the
first to appear in English, was previously published in 1942,
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 233
Through the courtesy of the copyright owner, the Cosmopoli-
tan Science & Art Service Co., it is now reproduced, with some
minor changes, in this series. In the choice of a Latin text., the
translator has preferred the Benedictine text reproduced by
Migne (Patrologia Latina 32), to the later critical edition of
P. Knoll in the Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinor-
urn 63 (Vienna 1922).
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Texts and Translations:
Sancti Augustini Hipponensis episcopi Opera I (Paris 1689) 315-352.
Maurist Edition reproduced with few variants by J. P. Migne in
Patrologia Latina 32: 977-1020.
P. Knoll, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 63 (Vienna
1922) 121-187.
V. Capnaga, O.R.S.A., De La Vida feliz, Del Orden, with Latin text
(in Biblioteca De Autores Cristianos, Obras De San Augustin 1
Madrid 1946).
R. Jolivet, Du Bonheur, De L'Ordre, with Latin text, in Oeuwes De
Saint Augustin, Dialogues Philosophiques I (Paris 1939) 215-291;
302-459.
P. Keseling, Des Augustinus Zwei Bucher von der Ordnung-Gottes-
Weltregiment (Regensburg-Miinster 1940) .
A. Moschetti, Dell' Ordine f Prima Traduzione Italiana, in Biblioteca
Agostiniana 16 (Florence 1940) .
Secondary Works:
V. J. Bourke, Augustine's Quest of Wisdom (Milwaukee 1945) .
C. Boyer, S.J., L'Idee de verite dans la philosophic de Saint Augustin
(Paris 1941).
t Christianisme et neo-platonisme dans la formation de Saint
Augustin (Paris 1920) .
234 SAINT AUGUSTINE
F. Ca^re*: Initiation a la philosophie de Saint Augustin (Paris 1947) .
A. DyrofF, 'Ober Form und Begriffsgehalt der augustinischen Schrift
F.
A. DyrofF,
De ordine,' in Grabmann-Mausbach, Aurelius Augustinus (Koln
1930) .
E. Gilson, Introduction a I* etude de Saint Augustin (Paris 1943) .
B. Legewle, 'Die korperliche Konstitution und die Krankheiten
Augustins/ in Miscellanea Agostiniana (Rome 1931) 2.5-21.
B. L. Meulebroek, Metriek en rhythmiek in Augustinus' -Cassisiacum-
Diologen (Nijmegen 1942) .
D. Ohlman, De S. Augustini dialogis in Cassiciaco scriptis (Strassburg
1897) .
H. Van Haeringen, De Augustini ante baptismum rusticantis operibus
(Groningen 1917) .
F. Worter, Die Geistesentwicklung des hi. Aurelius Augustinus bis zu
seiner Taufe (Paderborn, 1892) .
CONTENTS
BOOK ONE
Chapter Page
1 Apparent conflict between the notion of Divine Providence
and the existence of evil. Perplexity and fascination
of the problem. Self-knowledge a prerequisite for
sound speculation 239
2 The soul's desire for unity. Dedication of work to
Zenobius. Participants in the dialogue 241
3 Occasion of discussion on order. Licentius' defense of
order 244
4 An exhortation to pursue wisdom and truth. Nothing
occurs without a cause 248
5 Method of inquiry. Restatement of position that all things
are subject to order 250
6 Order is all-embracing. Order and error 253
7 Order originates in God. God loves order, but not the
evil embraced by order. This treatise on order, the ful-
fillment of a promise made to Zenobius 255
8 Licentius' enthusiasm for philosophy. Training in the
liberal arts a valuable asset in the search for truth . . 259
9 Order a pathway leading to God 264
10 Licentius' definition of order. Licentius censured by
Augustine for questioning the divinity of Christ.
Licentius and Trygetius reprimanded by Augustine for
levity 265
11 Monica's views solicited by Augustine. Women have a
place in philosophy. Meaning of true philosophy . . 269
235
BOOK TWO
Chapter Page
1 Licentius' definition of order further explored . . . .273
2 Explanation of the expression 4 to be with God.' How
the wise man abides in God and is unmoved. How the
wise man makes use of memory 276
3 How unwisdom is present to God. Analogy between sense
and intellectual vision 282
4 Human disorders not outside the divine plan. Evils not
opposed to the harmony of the universe 286
5 Evidence of order in the branches of learning. Existence
of evil, a source of perplexity. Philosophy employs
reason and authority. Liberal education and the pursuit
of philosophy 289
6 How the wise man remains unmoved in mind. Bodily
movement not incompatible with immobility of mind 293
7 Elucidation of the expression 'to be without God.' Divine
justice and evil. Order and the origin of evil . . . 295
8 Wisdom imposes moral precepts and norms of instruction
upon her aspirants. Enumeration of moral precepts . 301
9 Authority and reason in attainment of knowledge. Mutual
relation of authority and reason. Pre-eminence of divine
authority 303
10 Inconsistency in moral life. Difficulty of recognizing
moral transformation 305
11 Reason defined. Distinction drawn between the terms
'rational' (rationale) and 'reasonable' (rationabile) .
Reason reflected in sense objects and works of art . . 308
236
Chapter Page
12 Threefold application of term 'reasonable.' Reason, the
originator of language and history 313
13 Origin of dialectics and rhetoric 315
14 Origin of poetry and music 316
15 Origin of geometry and astrology 318
16 Speculation on God and the soul should follow training
in the liberal arts 320
17 Tribute to Monica's power of discernment. More abtruse
problems of philosophy not to be undertaken pre-
maturely 321
18 Importance and function of unity. The twofold object of
philosophy: God and the soul. The soul's tendency to
realize unity 323
19 Man's essential superiority over the brute. The timeless
character of truth. Moral perfection of the soul and the
vision of God 326
20 An exhortation to a life of virtue. A tribute to Pythagoras 329
237
BOOK ONE
Chapter 1
j o PERCEIVE and to grasp the order of reality proper
to each thing, and then to see or to explain the
order of the entire universe by which this world is
truly held together and governed that, Zenobius, 1 is a very
difficult and rare achievement for men. Moreover, even if
one had this power, he is not thereby enabled to find an
audience fitted for such divine and hidden things, either by
personal worth or by an acquired habit of learning. And
yet there is nothing that the most gifted minds search out
more eagerly, nothing that those who, with heads uplifted
as much as they may, still see the rocks and storms of this
life below there is nothing that these are more desirous
of hearing and learning than how it is that God has a care
for human affairs, and nevertheless perversity is so serious
and widespread that it must seem unattributable not only to
God's governance, but even to a hireling's management, if
indeed such management could be entrusted to a hireling.
Wherefore* those who ponder these matters are seemingly
forced to believe either that Divine Providence does not reach
to these outer limits of things or that surely all evils are
committed by the will of God. Both horns of this dilemma
are impious, but particularly the latter. For, although it is
unsound and most perilous to the soul to hold that anything is
beyond God's control, yet even among men no one is blamed
for what he could not do or prevent. The imputing of
1 Our only sources of information regarding Zenobius are the references
to him in De ordine and in two letters. In 386 Augustine wrote a
letter to Zenobius (Ep. 2) ; another, from a certain Dioscorus to
Augustine, in 410 (Ep. 117) , conveys the information that Zenobius had
been made a magister memoriae, i.e., a secretary in the imperial
government.
239
240 SAINT AUGUSTINE
negligence is indeed much more pardonable than the charge
of ill will or cruelty. Reason, therefore, not unmindful of
piety, is in a manner forced to hold that things of earth cannot
be governed by powers divine or that they are neglected and
unnoticed, rather than to hold that they are governed in
such wise that all complaining about God is inoffensive and
blameless.
(2) But who is there so dull of mind that he will hesitate
to attribute to divine power and divine government what-
ever there is of order in corporeal operations, apart from
human arrangement and will? Unless, perhaps, by some play
of nonsense we shall have the hardihood to hold [one of three
hypotheses] : ( 1 ) that the most accurately measured and fit-
ted organic parts of the smallest animals are the result of
chance; (2) that what one admits to be not the work of
chance can in any way not be the effect of design; or (3)
that what we find marvelous in every single thing throughout
the universe, arranged in a manner surpassing the utmost
efficiency of human power, belongs not to the hidden control
of divine majesty.
Yet, here is a point suggestive of even more questioning:
that the organic parts of a flea are marvelously fitted and
framed, while human life is surrounded and made restless
by the inconsistency of countless disorders. On this line of
reasoning, if one were examining the details in an inlaid
pavement, and if his searching eye could grasp no more than
the outline of one little cube, he might censure the artificer
for lacking skill of arrangement and order. On this account
he might think the uniformity of the little stones disarranged,
just because the drawn lines, harmonizing into one integral
form of beauty, could not be seen and examined all at once.
Something very similar to this is found in the case of un-
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 241
Instructed men, who, on account of their feeble mentality,
are unable to grasp and to study the integral fittingness of
things. They think that the whole universe is disarranged if
something is displeasing to them, just because that thing is
magnified in their perception.
(3) The chief cause of this error is that man does not
know himself. Now, for acquiring this self-knowledge, he
needs a constant habit of withdrawing from things of the
senses 2 and of concentrating his thought within himself, and
holding it there. This they alone succeed in doing who
definitely mark out in solitude the impressions of opinion
which the course of daily life has made, or correct them by
means of the liberal branches of learning.
Chapter 2
When the soul has returned to itself in this manner, it
understands what is the beauty of the universe; this term is
evidently derived from the word unum (one). Wherefore,
the beholding of oneness is not granted to that soul which
wanders toward many objects and eagerly pursues mental
beggary, which, though it does not know it, can only be
avoided by keeping aloof from the multitude; and I mean,
not just the multitude of men, but of all things that the
senses reach.
Do not marvel, therefore, that the soul experiences want
so much the more as it endeavore more to grasp separate
things. For, as in a circle, whatever its size, there is one mid-
dle point, which geometers call the center and to which all
sectors converge, and though the parts of the whole circum-
ference can be cut times without number, yet there is nothing
2 Cf. Retractationes 1.3,2.
242 SAINT AUGUSTINE
but this one center by which the other parts are mutually
measured: it rules over all, as it were, by a kind of law of
equality. But if you wish to pass from the center to any part
of the circle,. the whole is lost sight of in proportion as many
parts are traversed. In like manner, the soul spreading out
from itself is battered by a kind of immensity and worn out
in the quality of a beggar, because its nature forces it to seek
everywhere that which is one, and the multitude does not
permit it to find unity.
(4) But you, my dear Zenobius, will surely comprehend
what is the worth of the things I have said, and what stands
out as the cause of the error of souls, and also how it is that
all things harmonize into one design and are perfect, and
that, notwithstanding all this, sins are still to be abhorred.
For so is your character known to me a gifted mind, en-
amored of beauty in every form, without the excesses of lewd-
ness and its defilement. And, in virtue of divine law, that
token of future wisdom in you prescribes that, with reference
to sordid desires, you abandon not the cause, drawn away by
false desires; nothing more shameful or dangerous could be
found than such a defection.
Believe me, then, you will attain to these things when you
will have given attention to learning, by which the mind,
heretofore in no way fitted for a divine planting, is cleared
and cultivated. Now these discourses, precious to us by rea-
son of their association with your name rather than by the
satisfaction of our own work, will, I am sure especially if
you will have the good will to co-operate and make yourself
a part of this very order of which I am writing to you suffi-
ciently show you what is the nature of all this clearing and
planting, and what mode of procedure it demands, and
what it is that reason promises to those who study and are
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 243
good, and also what manner of life we, your dearest friends,
are now leading, and what fruit we are gathering from a
generous leisure.
(5) Indeed, as you well know, when pains of the chest 1
had compelled me to give up school work, I was already
planning, even apart from that emergency, to betake myself
to philosophy. I then went directly to the villa 2 of our dear
friend, Verecundus. 3 Need 1 say that it was to his great joy?
You well know both his kindheartedness toward all and his
special benevolence toward us.
At that villa we used to conduct among ourselves what-
ever discussions seemed useful. Of course, we used to em-
ploy the writing instrument, so that all our discussions would
be recorded, I saw that this would be conducive to my
health, for no intemperate wrangling intruded on our dis-
cussions, although I was slowed by a carefulness of expres-
sion. At the same time, the writing instrument was used so
that, if it should be decided to make a permanent record of
1 The dolor stomachi refers to a chronic ailment of the lungs. Direct
reference also is made to it in De beata vita (1.4), Contra Academicos
(1.1.3) , and, in more detail, in the Confessions (9.2.4) : 'my lungs
began to weaken and respire with difficulty, and through pains of
the chest to show that they were impaired and would not sustain clear
and prolonged speaking.' For an interesting account of this aspect of
Augustine's life see B. Legewie, 'Die korperliche Konstitution uhd die
Krankheiten Augustins/ in Miscellanea Agostiniana (Roma 1931)
2.5-21.
2 This was Cassiciacum, found as Cassiacum in some documents of the
ninth and tenth centuries. Until the middle of the nineteenth century
it was assumed that Cassiciacum was to be identified with the modern
Cassago in Brianza, some forty miles northeast of Milan. But in 1843
the novelist, Alessandro Manzoni, sought to prove that it was the same
as the present-day Casciago, situated about eight miles north of Milan.
Manzoni's arguments appear inconclusive, however, and the tradition
in favor of Cassago still prevails.
3 Verecundus, a native of Milan and a grammarian by profession, was
not yet a Christian at the time of Augustin's conversion. He received
baptism later, at Rome, where he died. Cf, Confessions 9.3.5.
244 SAINT AUGUSTINE
anything we said, there would be neither the need of saying
it in another form nor the effort of remembering. Treating of
these matters with me were Alypius, 4 my brother Navigius,
and Licentius, 5 who of a sudden had become much devoted
to poetry. The military service had given us back Trygetius 6
also, who loves history like an old soldier. And already we
had quite a little entered in the notebooks.
Chapter 3
(6) Then, one night when, as was my wont, I had
awakened from sleep and was silently revolving what was
entering my mind somehow or other for, in the love of
finding the truth, this had turned into a habit with me to
such a degree that, awake throughout almost the first half
of the night, if such cares remained, or certainly during the
second half, I would think over something. And I did not
permit the schoolwork of the boys to take me away from my-
self, because they also were doing so much during the whole
day that it seemed to me excessive to have them employ any
part of the night as well in the work of study. This, indeed,
was the instruction they had received from me : that conver-
sation between them should be on some subject aside from
their books, and that they should train the mind to be at
home with its own thoughts. I was awake, therefore, as I
said, when the sound of water flowing past at the rear of
the baths came to my ears, and it was noticeably louder
4 Alypius was, like Augustine, a native of Tagaste. After his mother,
it is to Alypius that Augustine refers most affectionately.
5 Licentius, pupil of Augustine, was the son of the latter's benefactor,
Romanianus. Endowed with a poetic bent which occasionally found
expression in sentiments of a worldly sort, Licentius is a source of
anxiety to his master throughout the dialogue.
6 Trjgetius, also a pupil of Augustine, was another native of Tagaste.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 245
than usual. To me it seemed very strange that the sound of
the same running water was at one time quite clear, and
again less audible. I began to ask myself what was the
cause. I acknowledge that no explanation occurred, when
Licentius, striking his bed with a piece of wood nearby,
frightened some troublesome mice, and thus showed that
he was awake.
'Licentius,' I asked 'for I see that your muse 1 has given
you a light by which to work at night have you noticed
how irregular is the sound of that water drain?'
'That,' he answered, 'is nothing new to me at this time;
for, awakened from sleep at times, and desirous of quiet, I
have hearkened to learn whether it were pouring rain when
that water was doing just what it is doing now.* Trygetius
confirmed that statement. He, too, was lying awake in his
bed in the same room, although we knew it not, because
we were in darkness; in Italy, this is almost a necessity even
for the wealthy.
( 7 ) Therefore, when I saw that our school as much as
was left of it, for Alypius and Navigius had gone to the city
was not in slumber even at that hour, the running of the
waters reminded me to say something on the subject.
'What,' I asked, 'seems to you the reason why this sound
varies in that manner? Certainly we do not think that at
this hour some one disturbs the stream each time by cross-
ing it or by washing something.*
'What do you think,' said Licentius, 'but that leaves of
some kind, which continue to fall in abundance in the au-
tumn, block the narrowness of the channel by their volume,
and that at times they are dislodged and yield to the pressure
1 Cf. Retractationes 1.3.2.
246 SAINT AUGUSTINE
of the current, and again they accumulate to stem the flow;
that, or something else, caused by the irregular fall of the
floating leaves, which has the force to check the flow at one
time, and again to release it? 5
Having no other solution, I deemed the explanation prob-
able, and, praising his ingenuity, I acknowledged that, though
I had long sought the reason, I had not found why it was so.
(8) Then, after a brief pause, I said: 'You had no good
reason, I say, to marvel, and you were musing on Calliope. 3
'Quite rightly/ he replied, but now you have certainly
given me something to think about/
'What is that/ I asked?
'That you marvel at these things,' he replied.
'Whence, then, 3 I asked him, 'does marveling arise, or
what is the source of this defect, 2 but something unusual and
apart from the evident order of its causes? 3
'Apart from the evident order, 3 he replied, 'I admit that;
but, it seems to me, nothing is done apart from order. 3
Here I became aroused by a greater expectation than is
my wont when I question them on something; for only yes-
terday, and quite on a sudden, had the boy's mind, turning
to these things, noticed this so important a point [on order],
although the problem on these points had never been brought
up between us.
'Very good/ I said. 'You have understood very well; you
have attempted a great deal. Take my word for it, you rise
far above Mount Helicon 3 to whose summit you are striving
to ascend, as though it were reaching heaven. But I should
2 Cf. ibid.
3 The present mountain range of Zagara in Boeotia, sacred in ancient
times to Apollo and the Muses.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 247
like you to stand by your opinion, for I shall endeavor to
weaken it. 5
'Let me alone now/ he said, 'for I have my mind intently
fixed on another subject.'
Here, fearing that his running to extremes on poetics might
take him away from philosophy, I said: 'I am vexed some-
what because, singing and crooning in all kinds of meter,
you pursue that verse-making of yours which may be erecting
between yourself and reality a wall more impenetrable than
they are trying to rear between your lovers (Pyramus and
Thisbe), for they used to sigh to each other through a tiny
natural crevice. In fact, Licentius had begun to recite a poem
about Pyramus.' 4
(9) Because I had said this in a tone of voice more stern
than he was expecting, he kept quiet for some little time.
And I, being unwilling to waste energy while he was intent
upon another matter, had returned to myself, when he
exclaimed:
The verse, '7, on my own confessing, wretched as a
mouse/' was not more appropriately spoken by Terence 5
than by me now. But at least the bitter ending may be com-
pletely reversed, for, although he says "I'm lost today/' per-
haps today I shall find myself. For, unless you scorn the
soothsayers' practice of divining the future from mice, then
if by my clatter which revealed my wakefulness to you I
reminded that mouse or shrew to go back to its bed and to
rest if it has any sense, why may I also not be admonished
by the sound of your voice to study philosophy rather than
4 A complete account of this ancient love theme Is found in the fourth
book of Ovid's Metamorphoses.
5 The verse is from the Eunuchus, V, 6: Egomet meo indicto miser
quasi sorex hodie peril.
248 SAINT AUGUSTINE
to compose poems? For philosophy as I have begun to
believe you as you prove it day by day is our true and
tranquil abode. Wherefore, if it is not a burden to you, and
if you think it fitting, ask whatever questions you will. For
my part, I shall, to the best of my ability, defend the order
of things, and I shall maintain that nothing can take place
outside the range of order. To such a degree indeed have
I imbibed it and become intent upon it that, even though
some one were to worst me in this debate, I should attribute
even that fact to the order of things, and not to reasonless
chance. For, it is not the matter itself that will be vanquished;
it is Licentius. 3
Chapter 4
(10) Rejoicing over this, I gave my attention to them
again. Then I said to Trygetius: 'What is your opinion on
this subject?'
'I incline very much toward order/ he replied, 'but I am
not yet fully convinced, and I am eager to have so important
a problem very carefully discussed. 3
'Go ahead/ I said, 'and take that side. Your indecision
is, I believe, shared by Licentius and myself.'
%' said Licentius, c am thoroughly convinced of this opinion.
And as for the wall that you mentioned, why should I hesitate
to tear it down even before it is completely built up? Poetry
surely cannot turn me away from philosophy as much as dis-
trust of finding truth/
Then Trygetius exclaimed in gleeful tones: 'Now we have
something more important, namely, that Licentius is not a
theoretic skeptic, for he used to defend them insistently/
Tray, do not mention that now/ said Licentius, 'lest this
cunning, captious something distract me and tear me away
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 249
from a matter, I know not what a divine thing, which
begins to reveal itself to me, and on which I am much intent.'
Then I, seeing my joy more abounding than I dared even
occasionally to desire, exultingly recited this line: * "Thus may
the sire of the gods now bestow, and the lofty Apollo ' n And
provided that we follow, then He who now gives promise
and gently enters our mind will lead us whither He com-
mands us to go and where to fix our abode. 2 But Apollo is
not lofty Apollo, who, aroused by the odor of incense and
by the distress of flocks and herds, sates the insane in caves,
on mountains, and in groves. There is, however, another, or
rather the other, lofty and truth-speaking, and why quibble
with words? Truth itself, whose prophets are all those who
can be wise. Therefore, Licentius, let us press onward: wor-
shippers strengthened by piety, let us stamp out with our
footsteps the stifling fire of pernicious desires.*
(11) Tlease question me, then,' he said, 'to see whether
I can explain this something or other by your words and
mine.'
Then answer me this, I said: 'In the first place, how is it
that this water seems to you to be flowing in this manner,
not without design, but in accordance with order? That it
glides over wooden channels and is brought here for our
use that, certainly, can belong to order, for it was done by
men using reason, so that by its one course they might drink
and wash, and the producing of this effect was consequent
on favorable conditions of place. But, that those leaves fall,
as you say, in such manner that what we marveled at came
1 Virgil, Aeneid 10.875: Sic pater ille deum faciat, sic altus Apollo.
2 The thought and much of its expression is borrowed from the Aeneid
(3.88-89) : Quern sequimurf quove ire jubesf ubi ponere sedes? Da,
pater, augurium, atque animis illabere nostris.
250 SAINT AUGUSTINE
to pass by what order of things, I pray you, rather than
by chance, shall we believe that this occurred? 3
'As if, indeed, 5 he replied, 'that to anyone who sees very
clearly that nothing can be done without a cause, it could
seem they should and could have fallen otherwise. What!
Will you have me go on, then? What about the location of
the trees and their branches, and the very .weight of the
leaves, in so far as nature has determined it? How about
the movement of the air where they glide along, or the gentle-
ness of their descent, or their intermittent falling by reason
of conditions of the air, their weight and shape, and other
causes numberless and unknown? Why should I investigate?
Those things are hidden, completely hidden, from our senses.
Yet this one point at least, namely, that nothing is done with-
out a cause this point is somehow or other not hidden to
the mind. And that is enough for the problem proposed.
But a captious questioner may proceed to ask what caused
the trees to be planted there. I shall answer that men fol-
lowed the fertility of the soil. And what if they are not fruit-
bearing trees, and if they sprang up by chance? Then I shall
reply that we see very little, but that nature, which produced
them, is never fortuitous. Why more? Either let me be shown
that something is done without a cause, or admit that nothing
is done but by a fixed order of causes.*
Chapter 5
(12) To him I replied: 'Although you call me a captious
questioner indeed I, who have forced you to give up your
talk about Pyramus and Thisbe, can scarcely help being
such I shall continue to question you. That nature which
you think is to be regarded as conformed to order for
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 251
what purpose did it produce those very trees that bear no
fruit, not to mention countless other things?'
Then, while he was thinking what to say, Trygetius inter-
posed: 'Is the benefit of trees to men limited to fruits alone?
How many other advantages come in the way of shade and
firewood? And finally, what of the foliage?'
'Don't, I pray you, give that answer to his questioning/
said Licentius. 'Indeed, numberless things can be mentioned
from which there is no usefulness to men, or it is so hidden
or so slight that it cannot be discovered or defended by men,
particularly by us. Rather, let him show us how anything
can be done for which a cause has not gone beforehand/
'We shall see these points later on,' I replied. 'For, there
is no further need for me to be the teacher, despite the fact
that you have not yet taught anything to me, though I am
very eager to learn and am, therefore, watchful by day and
by night. Yet, you have professed to be certain about such
an important matter.'
(13) 'Whither are you sending me?' he asked. 'Or is it
that I follow you more capriciously than those leaves follow
the wind by which they are thrown into the running water?
For them, indeed, falling does not suffice unless they are
also carried along. And how else will it be when Licentius
teaches Augustine even the things that are the very heart of
philosophy?'
'Pray, do not underrate yourself so much,' I replied, 'or
overestimate me, for in philosophy I, too, am a boy. And
when I ask questions, I do not care very much through
whom He answers who daily heareth my lamentations, and
whose herald you, I believe, some day, will be and perhaps
that "some day'' is not far distant. Yet, others as well,
although quite remote from such pursuits, can teach some-
252 SAINT AUGUSTINE
thing when, by certain ties of questioning, they are drawn to
the fellowship of those engaged in discussions. And that
"something" is not nothing. For, do you not see that those
very leaves which are driven by the wind and float on the
water (1 shall gladly use your own illustration), sometimes
withstand [the wind] driving them into the stream, and that
they make men aware of an order of things at least, if
what is defended by you is true?'
(14) At this point, Licentius, bounding from his bed for
joy, exclaimed: 'Who, O great God, can deny that Thou
rulest all things in order? How conjoined are all things!
How in fixed successions are they moved to their proper
correlations! How great and how numerous are the facts
that warrant our saying this! How great the things that are
made, that we may find Thee! For, the fact that we were
awakened, that you noticed this sound, that you asked your-
self about its cause, that you did not find the cause of such
a trifling thing whence all this, unless it flows from the
order of things and is derived from it? Even the field mouss
comes out, so that I may be revealed as awake. Finally, your
own spoken word is and perhaps without forethought on
your part, for no one can wholly predetermine what should
come into his mind somehow or other so framed that it
tells me what answer to make to you.
'Now, I ask you, if these things that have been spoken
by us become somewhat more widely known among men
when committed to writing, as you have arranged, will not
the matter itself be seen to be of such import that, had some
great seer or Chaldean astrologer been consulted about it,
he ought to have given the answer long before it became a
reality? And, if he had foretold it, would he not have been
so deified and extolled by all men that no one would make
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 253
bold to ask him why a leaf fell from a tree or whether a
stray mouse was troublesome to a man In bed? But, has any
one of them ever of his own accord foretold such things?
Has he ever been constrained by a questioner to foretell
them? And yet, if he were to foretell the composition of
some book, some noteworthy book, and were he to see it as
eventuating necessarily and, of course, in no other way
could he divine the future then, unquestionably, anything
that the flutter of leaves causes in a field or anything that a
tiny animal does in a house is just as inevitable in the order
of nature as is this literary composition. For it is made up
of those words which, apart from those aforesaid lowliest
things, could not even come into the mind, or be spoken by
the mouth, or recorded for posterity. So now, I say, let no
one question me as to why anything is done. It is enough
that nothing is done, nothing originated, which some cause
has not originated and moved.'
Chapter 6
(15) 'Young man, 5 I said, 'it now becomes clear that you
do not know how much has been said against divination,
and by what kind of men. But, at any rate, tell me not
whether anything is done without a cause, for I see you are
resolved not to give that answer but whether order, which
you have undertaken to defend, seems to you to be some-
thing good or something bad. 3
Then he [Licentius], murmuring in an undertone, said:
'You have not framed the question in such manner that I
can reply to either alternative, for I see here a kind of
middle course: to me order seems to be neither a good thing
nor a bad.*
254 SAINT AUGUSTINE
'At all events/ I said, 'what do you think is the opposite of
order?'
'Nothing/ he replied. 'How, indeed, can anything be op-
posed to that which has seized and held the whole? For,
whatever is opposed to order must of necessity be apart from
order. But, I see that nothing is apart from order. Therefore,
it must be maintained that nothing is opposed to order.'
Therefore,' Trygetius asked, 'is error not opposed to
order?'
'Not at all/ Licentius replied, 'for I see that no one goes
wrong without a cause. Moreover, the series of causes is
contained in order. And error not only arises from a cause,
but it gives origin to something else of which it is itself the
cause. Wherefore, insomuch as it is not apart from order,
so neither can it be opposed to order. 5
(16) Then, when Trygetius had become silent, and
while I could scarce contain myself for joy because I saw that
the youthful son of my very dear friend 1 was becoming a son
to me as well and not only this, but that he was advancing
and strengthening in his friendship also toward me; and
that he, of whose zeal for even the lower branches of learn-
ing I had already lost hope, was now coming full force
into the very heart of philosophy, regarding it, so to speak,
as his own peculiar possession while I am silently marveling
1 The reference Is to Romanianus, a native of Tagaste, the father of
Licentius, and generous benefactor of Augustine. Through his muni-
ficence Augustine was enabled to complete a brilliant course of studies
at Carthage. During his early years in the Manichaean sect, Augustine
had enticed both Romanianus and the latter's kinsman, Alypius, into
the same error. Trom a letter to Paulinus of Nola (Ep. 32 inter
Augustinianas) , written on the occasion of Augustine's, elevation to the
episcopacy in 395, it appears that Romanianus was at that time a
Christian of good repute. Two of Augustine's earlier works, the
Contra Academicos and the De vera religione, are dedicated to
Romanianus.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 255
at this, and becoming enraptured, Licentius suddenly, as
if carried away by an idea, exclaimed: 'Oh, if I could say
what I want to say ! Words, where are you now? I ask. Come
to my aid! Both good things and bad are in order. Please
take my word for it, because I know not how to explain it/
Chapter 7
(17) I was amazed and said nothing. Trygetius, how-
ever, as soon as he saw that the man had become somewhat
affable and composed, almost as if a fit of drunkenness had
just passed off, declared: 'What you say, Licentius, seems
to me absurd and completely foreign to the truth; but, I
beg of you, be a little considerate of me, and do not discon-
cert me by your shouting. 5
'Say what you please,' Licentius replied, 'for I have no
fear that you can take away from me what I see and fairly
hold/
'Would that you were not so far astray,' Trygetius said,
'from that ofder which you defend, and that you were not
so heedlessly (to put it mildly) borne against God. Indeed,
what more impious statement could be made than that evil
things themselves are comprised in order, for surely God
loves order/
'Of course, He loves it,' Licentius replied. 'From Him it
comes, and with Him it is. And if anything can be more
fittingly said of a thing so exalted, think it over by yourself,
I say, for I am not competent to teach you such things now/
'Think over what?' Trygetius remarked. 'I am taking
exactly what you say and in that there is enough that I
understand. Of a certainty, you said that evils are comprised
in order, and that order itself comes from God supreme,
256 SAINT AUGUSTINE
and that it is loved by Him. Whence it follows that evils are
from the supreme God, and that God loves evils.'
(18) With regard to this conclusion, I had fears for Licen-
tius. But he, breathing heavily because of the difficulty of
finding words, not searching at all for what to answer, but
just how to frame the answer, replied: 'God does not love
evils, and for no other reason than that it does not belong to
order that God should love evils. And He greatly loves order,
precisely because by it He loves not evils. But how can evils
themselves be "not in order, 55 although God does not love
them? Now this itself is the order of evils: that they be not
loved by God. And does this order of things seem to you un-
important: that God loves things good and does not love
things evil? And thus evils, which God does not love, are
not apart from order, and nevertheless He does love order
itself. This very thing He loves: to love good things, and not
to love evil things and this itself is a thing of magnificent
order and of divine arrangement. And because this orderly
arrangement maintains the harmony of the universe by this
very contrast [between good and evil], it comes about that
evil things [lesser goods] must need be. In this way the beauty
of all things is in a manner configured, as it were, from anti-
theses, that is, from opposites: this is pleasing to us even in
discourse.'
(19) After this he was silent for a little while. Then, sud-
denly standing erect where Trygetius had his bed, he said:
C I am asking you now : Is God just?' Trygetius said nothing,
frightened and, as he related later, marveling at the words of
his fe^ow student and companion words suddenly evoked
by a new inspiration.
As he was remaining silent, Licentius continued thus: *I
you, who but a short time ago were reproving me for
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 257
impiety, make the answer that God is not just, then beware
what you are doing. On the other hand, if God is just as
we are taught, and as we feel by the inevitable fact of order
itself then He is just by giving to each thing its own. But,
what apportionment can be mentioned where fhere is no dis-
tinction? And what distinction, if all things are good? And
what can be found apart from order, if by the justice of God
its own is rendered to each thing according to the merits of
the good and the evil? Now, we all acknowledge that God is
just. Therefore, everything is comprised in order.'
When those words had been spoken, he again cast himself
on the bed. And then, in more gentle tones, since no one was
saying a word to him, he asked me: 'Will you give me no
answer you who have driven me to say these things?"
(20) To him I replied: 'An unexpected streak of con-
scientiousness has, I grant, come over you. But, during the
day, which now seems to be dawning unless that is the moon-
light coming in through the windows I shall give you the
answer that will seem proper. But, Licentius, we must get to
work at once, lest oblivion swallow up those excellent argu-
ments of yours. And when, indeed, would our written notes
not demand that those points be consigned to them?
'I shall tell you plainly what I think. I shall take up the
arguments against you as well as I can. For, if you overcome
me, no greater triumph can be mine. On the other hand, if
your weakness which, because it is not nourished by erudi-
tion and training, may perhaps be unable to uphold so great
a God should yield to cleverness or to some sophistic error
of men whose role I shall endeavor to play, then that very
fact will show you what strength you must acquire in order
to return to Him with added vigor: and at the same time,
because I wish this disputation of ours to eventuate as some-
258 SAINT AUGUSTINE
thing rather elaborate; for I am indebted to a man of refine-
ment. In fact, our friend Zenobius often discussed many points
with me concerning the order of things, but when he asked
hard questions I could not quite satisfy him, either on account
of the lack of time or by reason of the obscurity of the matters
themselves. Indeed, so impatient was he over the many delays
that, in order to incite me to reply with considerable care and
completeness, he tried to arouse me with a poem a good
poem, for which you may the more admire him. However, it
could not be read to you at that time, because you were quite
averse to any study of those matters. And it cannot be read to
you now, because his departure was so sudden and so disturbed
by that tumult 1 that none of those problems could come into
our minds. But he had decided to leave it for me to answer,
and many reasons now concur why this dialogue should be
sent to him. First of all, because it is due to him; in the next
place, because it is fitting that our present mode of life be
made known to a man of such benevolence toward us; and
finally, because he is second to none in rejoicing over your
fair promise. Indeed, when he was with us, through friendship
for your father, or rather for all of us, he was uneasy lest
certain sparks of genius in you which he had carefully noted
1 Most probably this was the tumult created in Milan when the Arians
sought forcibly to seize one of the Catholic basilicas during the spring
of 386. To render the seizure impossible, Catholics-St. Monica play-
ing a prominent role remained within the basilica day and night; to
sustain their fervor, they chanted hymns and psalms during the pro-
longed vigil. From this episode the practice of congregational singing
soon became universal in the Western Church. That St. Augustine
was deeply impressed by this historic event is evident from his refer-
ence to it in the Confessions (9.7.15): 'The devout populace kept
continuous vigil in the church, ready to die with their bishop, thy
servant. There my mother, thy handmaid, taking a leading part in
the solicitude and vigils, lived wholly in prayer. And we, though
not yet warmed by the fire of Thy Spirit, were nevertheless aroused
to enthusiasm by a city terrified and tumultuous/
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 259
be not so much fanned to flame by my industry as quenched
by your heedlessness. And, when he learns that you are de-
voted to poetry, he will be so happy that I imagine I see him
exulting/
Chapter 8
(21) Truly, you will do nothing more pleasing to me, s
he replied. 'But, whether you will smile at it as my boyish
levity and fickleness or whether it is being effected in us by a
divine bidding and order, this I will not hesitate to declare to
you : I am suddenly become quite averse to those poetic mat-
ters. Something, I know not what, has flashed to me by an-
other light a far different light. Philosophy, I avow, is more
beautiful than Thisbe, than Pyramus, than that Venus and
Cupid, and all such loves of every kind.' Then, with a sigh,
he gave thanks to Christ.
I heard these words with delight, shall I say? Or, rather
what shall I not say? Let each one take it as he will, but
my only anxiety is that perhaps my rejoicing was beyond due
measure.
( 22 ) Meantime, in a little while the dawn unfolded. They
arose, and I, shedding tears, spent much time in prayer.
Then I heard Licentius joyously and with gusto singing that
verse of the Prophet: 1 'O God of hosts, convert us, and show
Thy face; and we shall be saved' After supper on the pre-
vious day, when he had gone out for needs of nature, he
chanted this a little more loudly than our mother could bear
such words to be repeatedly chanted in that place. For he
kept repeating nothing else, as he had but recently caught
the rhythm of the chant, and, as usual, he liked the new
1 Ps. 79.8.
260 SAINT AUGUSTINE
melody. Monica, a most pious lady, as you know, reproved
him precisely because the place was unbecoming for chant.
Then he replied, jestingly: c As if, should some enemy confine
me here, God would not hear my voice P
(23 ) On this morning, then, when he had returned alone
both of them had gone out for the same reason he came
to my couch, and said: 'So let it be with us as you will, but
tell me what you think of me. 3
Then, taking the boy's hand, I said: 'You see and believe
and understand what I think of you. And I do not regard as
fruitless your long continued chanting yesterday that the God
of Hosts show Himself to you already converted. 5
Then, remembering with astonishment, he said : 'You speak
a thing important and true. For I am indeed impressed by
the fact that just now I was so reluctantly drawn away from
those trifles of that poetry of mine, and already I loathe them
and am ashamed to return to them, so completely am I borne
above to things great and marvelous. In very truth, is not this
a conversion to God? Moreover, I rejoice that a pious scruple
was thrown at me to no avail, because I was chanting such
things in such a place.'
That also/ I replied, c is not displeasing to me. And that we
say something on that very point is, I believe, quite in accord-
ance with order itself, for I see that the place itself by which
Monica was offended, and the night also, have a fittingness
with reference to that chant : for what, indeed, do you think
that we pray to be converted to God and to see His face, if
not from a certain uncleanness of the body and its stains, and
likewise from the darkness in which error has involved us?
And what else is the process of conversion but to uplift oneself
wholeheartedly by virtue and temperance from the excess of
vices? And what else is the face of God than the truth for
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 261
which we yearn and for which, as the object of our love,
we make ourselves clean and beautiful?'
'It could not be more aptly expressed, 3 he exclaimed. Then
in a lower tone, almost in a whisper : 'See, I pray you, what
lofty thoughts have come to our minds, so that I believe some-
thing has been accomplished in our regard by a rather pro-
pitious order! 5
(24) If you have a care for order, 5 I replied, 'you must
return to those verses, for instruction in the liberal arts, if only
it is moderate and concise, produces devotees more alert and
steadfast and better equipped for embracing truth, Licentius,
so that they more ardently seek and more consistently pursue
and in the end more lovingly cling to that which is called
the happy life. 2 And, when that is mentioned, all men bestir
themselves and gaze at your hands, as it were, to see whether
you have anything to give to the needy and to those suffering
under maladies. But, when wisdom begins to admonish these
to bear with the physician and to permit themselves to be
healed, they return to their rags; languid in the ever increas-
ing warmth of those rags, they prefer to scratch the scab of
itchy voluptuousness rather than to bear with and submit
to the physician's injunctions painful indeed for a little while,
and burdensome to bodily ills and be restored to the health
of sound men and to the light. Wherefore, content with the
name of the most high God, and with their sense faculty, as
though it were an alms, they live wretched but they live.
But, that Spouse, supremely good and beautiful, seeks other
men or? to speak with greater precision, other souls, as long
as they animate a body worthy of His abode, souls for whom
it is not -enough merely to live, but to live a happy life. For the
2 Cf. Retractationes 1.3.2.
262 SAINT AUGUSTINE
present, therefore, return to the Muses. And yet, do you know
what I would have you do? 3
c Ask whatever you like/ he replied.
*At that point where Pyramus destroyed himself/ I said,
"arid she slew herself over his half-dead body as you were
about to relate there, in that very anguish where it is proper
that your poem should reach its highest flight, you have a
golden opportunity: satirize the curse of that unclean lust and
those burning passions by which those deplorable things come
to pass. Then soar aloft with all your power in praise of pure
and genuine love love wherein souls endowed with knowl-
edge and adorned with virtue are, through philosophy, united
to understanding, and whereby they not only escape death,
but moreover enjoy a life most happy.'
Then, weighing the matter in silence for some time, he
nodded his head and withdrew.
(25) Thereupon, I also arose. And, when our daily
prayers to God had been said, we began to go to the baths,
for that place was comfortable and suitable for our disputa-
tion, whenever we could not be in the field because of incle-
ment weather. Suddenly, we noticed barnyard cocks begin-
ning a bitter fight just in front of the door. We chose to watch.
For what do the eyes of lovers [of truth and beauty] not en-
compass; where do they not search through to see beauteous
reason signaling something thence? reason which rules and
governs all things, the knowing and the unkowing things, and
which attracts her eager followers in every way and wherever
she commands that she be sought. Whence indeed and where
can she not give a signal? as was to be seen in those fowls:
the lowered heads stretched forward, neck plumage distended,
the lusty thrusts, and such wary parryings, and, in every
motion of the irrational animals, nothing unseemly precisely
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 263
because another Reason from on high rules over all things.
Finally, the very law of the victor: the proud crowing, the
almost perfectly orbed arrangement of the members, as if in
haughtiness of supremacy. But the sign of the vanquished:
hackles plucked from the neck, in carriage and in cry all
bedraggled and for that very reasqn, somehow or other,
beautiful and in harmony with nature's laws.
(26) We asked many questions: Why do all cocks behave
this way? Why do they fight for the sake of supremacy of the
hens subject to them? Why did the very beauty of the fight
draw us aside from this higher study for a while, and onto
the pleasure of the spectacle? What is there in us that searches
out many things beyond the reach of the senses? And, on the
other hand, what is it that is grasped by the beckoning of the
senses themselves?
We were saying to ourselves: Where does law not reign?
Where is the right of commanding not due to a superior be-
ing? Where is there not the shadow of consistency? Where is
there not imitation of that beauty most true? Where is there
no limit? And, thus admonished that there should be a limit
to our watching the chickens, we went whither we had pur-
posed to go, and there, as best we could, we garnered into this
part of the notebook all the points of our nocturnal discussion
carefully indeed, for the points were recent; and at any
rate, how could such striking things escape the memory of
three diligent inquirers? In order to spare my strength, nothing
more was done by me that day, except that it was my custom
to go over half a book of Virgil with them before the evening
meal. And we were everywhere giving careful attention to
moderation, which no one can fail to approve. But, to observe
it when one is pursuing something eagerly is extremely difficult
and rare.
264 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Chapter 9
(27) Early In the morning of the next day we came to-
gether in the usual place, ready for work, and we seated our-
selves there. Then, as both were looking at me, I said: 'Li-
centius, give me your undivided attention just as well as you
can, and you too, Trygetius. The subject of discussion is no
small matter: we are inquiring about order. Why do I now,
in language full and fair, commend order to you, as if I were
still engaged in that school from which I am glad that I have
in some measure escaped? 1 Take notice of this, if you are will-
ing yeSj even make yourselves willing. For nothing, in my
opinion, can be said more concisely in praise of it or more
truly concerning it than this: Order is that which will lead us
to God, if we hold to it during life; and unless we do hold to
it during life, we shall not come to God. 2 And if I am not de-
ceived by my affection for you, we now believe and hope that
we shall come to God. Most carefully, therefore, ought this
question to be revolved and worked out by us.
'I would, indeed, that the others were here who are asso-
ciated with us in these problems. 3 I would have here not only
them, but, if it were possible, at least all our close friends,
whose mental gifts I always admire, and whom I now should
wish to have with me and as keenly interested as you are. Or,
at any rate, I would have Zenobius himself here with me,
whom I have never been able to receive with the leisure com-
1 The school in Milan in which Augustine used to teach rhetoric.
2 Augustine treats of order from an ethical or moral point of view,
viz., that the observance of order is a necessary condition for man's
final happiness. In De civitate Dei (19.13.1) , he gives a more meta-
physical expression of the notion the one so familiar to subsequent
Christian writers: Order is an arrangement of similar and dissimilar
things, assigning its proper place to each one.
3 The reference is to Alypius and Navigius, who had gone to Milan.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 265
mensurate with the magnitude of the problem, when he was
grappling with so important a matter.
'But, because this desire is not realized, they shall read our
written records, for we have already arranged not to lose the
words spoken on these problems, and to tie together the things
that tend to drop out of memory by the bond of writing, so
to speak, by which they can be retrieved. And the very order
which procured their absence was, perhaps, arranging it this
way, for surely you attack such an important problem with a
livelier interest because it is committed to ourselves alone for
solution. And, when they for whom we are most solicitous
will have read these records, if anything will provoke them to
disagree, then this disputation of ours will engender other dis-
putations, and the very series of discussions will engraft itself
into the order of teaching. Now, however, I shall as I had
promised, and as far as the matter allows oppose Licentius,
who has already built up almost the entire case, to see if he
is able to fortify his position by a strong and firm wall of
defense.'
Chapter 10
(28) Then when by their silence, their countenances,
their eyes, and the intense rigidness of their bodies, I saw that
they were sufficiently aroused by the importance of the sub-
ject and that they were inflamed with a desire to hear then
I said: 'Now Licentius, if you please, concentrate every power
within you, sharpen whatever acumen you have, and then
express by a definition what order is.'
Thereupon, when he heard that he was being forced to
frame a definition, he drew back as if doused with cold water.
Then, gazing at me with ruffled countenance and, as happens,
simpering in utter trepidation, he asked:
266 SAINT AUGUSTINE
'What on earth is this? What do you think I am? Or do
you really believe me to be filled by some spirit or other from
above? 3 Then, suddenly taking heart, he added: 'Or perhaps
there is something with me. 3 He remained silent for a little
while, so that whatever notion he had with regard to order
might be condensed into a definition. And then, straightening
up, he said: 'Order is that by which are governed all things
that God has constituted.'
(29) 'What about God Himself,' I asked? 'Does He not
seem to you to be governed by order? 5
'Of course He does/ he replied.
'Therefore, God is governed, 5 Trygetius said.
'What of it?' he replied. 'Do you not admit that Christ is
God, who came to us by way of order, and says that He was
sent by God the Father? If, therefore, God sent us Christ by
way of order, and we admit that Christ is God, then God
not only governs all things, but is Himself governed by order/
Then Trygetius, somewhat perplexed, said: 'I know not
how I should take that But, when we say "God," it is not
Christ that occurs to the mind, so to speak : it is the Father.
On the other hand, Christ occurs when we say "Son of God." '
'A fine thing you're doing,' Licentius said. 'Shall we, there-
fore, deny that the Son of God is God?'
At this point, though it seemed hazardous for him to answer,
Trygetius nevertheless forced himself, and replied: 'Yes, He is
God, but, properly speaking, we call the Father "God." *
'Control yourself better/ I said to him, 'for the Son is not
improperly called God.'
Now, when Trygetius, moved by reverence for God, was
unwilling that his words be recorded, then Licentius after
the fashion of boys, or rather after the fashion of men, and
alas! of nearly all men was insisting that they remain re-
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 267
corded, as though the question were being debated among us
for the sole purpose of winning glory. While I was rebuking
his propensity rather harshly, he blushed, and I noticed that
Trygetius was grinning and gleeful at his abashment.
Then I said to both of them: 'Is this the way you act? Does
not the fact that we are overburdened by the weight of per-
verse habits of life and encompassed by the obscurities of
ignorance trouble you? Is this your so recent intentness and
ascent toward God and the truth, at which I was foolish
enough to rejoice? Oh, that you could see, even with as bleary
eyes as mine, in what dangers we lie, and what heedlessness
of ills this laughing indicates! Oh, if you were to see, then
how quickly, how instantly, and how much more persistently
would you change it into weeping! Unhappy boys, do you
now know where we are? To have their minds immersed in
darkness that is the common lot of all the foolish and
unlearned; but it is not in one and the same way that wis-
dom extends a helping hand to the sunken. There are some
believe me who are called to rise high; others are let fall
to the depths. Do not, I entreat you, redouble my miseries:
let my own wounds suffice for me. That they may be healed,
I beseech God with weeping almost every day. But with pain-
ful certainty I often show myself that I am not worthy to be
healed as quickly as I long to be. Do not redouble my miseries,
I beg you. If you owe me anything of love, anything of
kindness; if you understand how much I love you, how highly
I esteem you, how much the care for your behavior worries
me; if I deserve not to be disregarded; if, finally, as God is
my witness, I say truly that I desire nothing more for myself
than I desire for you then, return the favor. And if from
your hearts you call me master then pay me the fee: be
good/
268 SAINT AUGUSTINE
(30) At this point, when tears put an end to my saying
more, Licentius, extremely perturbed because everything was
being consigned to writing, said; 'Well, what have we done,
I ask you?'
'Don't you even acknowledge your fault as yet?' I asked.
'You do not know that I used to be sorely vexed in that
school 1 because boys were motivated, not by the advantage
and beauty of learning, but by love of paltriest praise so
much so that some of them were not even ashamed to pla-
giarize the words of others, and would receive applause (O
dreadful bane ! ) from those very ones whose words they were
which they were reciting. So both of you, although you have
never, I believe, done such a thing as that, are nevertheless
trying to introduce and to implant the pest of enfeebling
jealousy and empty boasting the lowliest of the pests, to be
sure, but even more pernicious than all the others into that
philosophy which I rejoice to have made my own. And, be-
cause I frighten you away from this disease of vanity, you
will, perhaps, be less eager for the pursuit of learning; with-
drawn from the burning desire for vainglory, you will perhaps
grow cold unto the drowsiness of inaction. Unhappy I, if even
now I shall have to endure such as those from whom defects
cannot depart without the coming of other defects in their
stead P
'You shall see how much improved we shall be,' Licentius
said. This only we ask now: that, for the sake of everything
you love, you pardon us, and order all those records to be
deleted, so that you may at the same time save the tablets,
because there are no more. Indeed, of the many points dis-
1 The school of rhetoric at Milan mentioned at the beginning of the
session.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 269
cussed by us, nothing has as yet been transcribed to the note-
books.'
'Not at all/ said Trygetius. 'Let our penalty remain re-
corded, so that the very same vainglory which allures us may,
by its own sting, deter us from the love of it. But we shall
take great pains that these records become known only to our
friends and close acquaintances. 9
Licentius agreed.
Chapter 11
(31 ) In the meantime, mother also came in and inquired
what progress we had made, for the problem was known to
her as well. But, when I had ordered that, in accordance with
our custom, record be made of her entrance and her question,
she said :
'What are you doing? In those books which you read,
have I ever heard that women were introduced into this kind
of disputation?'
To her I replied: "I care but little about the judgments of
proud and ignorant men, who rush to the reading of books
in the same way they rush to greet men. They consider, not
what kind of men these are, but what kind of clothes they
wear and how conspicuously they shine in the pomp of
worldly wealth. In books they pay little heed either to the
why of a question or to the purpose of the authors or even
to what is fully explained and proved by them. However,
among these there are found some not to be looked down
upon, for they are sprinkled with some smattering of culture,
and are easily brought through decked and gilded portals to
the sacred inner courts of philosophy; for them our forebears
whose books I see are known to you, whenever we read
them have amply provided.
270 SAINT AUGUSTINE
'And, not to mention others, Theodore, 1 whom you well
know a man pre-eminent by reason of his genius and learn-
ing and by the very distinctions and favors of fortune, and,
most important of all, by reason of his character is doing
it so well these days that neither now nor in the future may
any class of men rightly complain about the literature of
our times.
'If my books shall fall, perchance, into the hands of some
who, upon seeing my name, will not say "Who is that per-
son?" and throw the book aside, but rather, being curious or
very much given to study, will disregard the lowliness of the
doorway, and proceed to enter these will not take it amiss
to find me studying philosophy with you; and perhaps they
will not despise any one of those whose speech is mingled
with my writings. For they are not only freemen which is
a requirement, not only for philosophy, but for any branch
of the liberal arts but they are men born in high station
among their fellows. Now the writings of the most learned
men include shoemakers versed in philosophy, and those from
much lowlier classes of society. And these have so shone by
the brilliance of their talents and virtue that, even if they
could, they would not under any condition exchange their
own blessings for any nobility of this kind. 2 Believe me, then,
there will not be lacking a class of men to whom the fact that
you converse with me on the subject of philosophy will be
more pleasing than if they were to find here something else
of pleasantry or seriousness. Moreover, in olden times, women,
1 Theodore Manlius, to whom Augustine dedicated the De beata vita,
where he called him 'a great man and most refined.' In the review of
the work some forty years later he acknowledged that his praise of
Theodore had been excessive (Retractationes 1.2) .
2 Cf. Retractationes 1.3.2.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 271
too, have worked on the problems of philosophy. And your
philosophy is very pleasing to me. 5
(32) 'Then, mother, so that you may not be uninformed,
the Greek word from which the term, philosophy, is derived
is in the Latin tongue called love of wisdom. Wherefore, the
divine Scriptures themselves which you so heartily embrace
command, not that all philosophers, but the philosophers
of this world, be avoided and esteemed for nought. 3 But, there
is another world utterly remote from these eyes of ours, a
world which the intellect of a few sound men beholds. This,
Christ Himself indicates clearly enough. He does not say:
"My kingdom is not of the world"; He says: "My king-
dom is not of this world." 4 Indeed, whosoever thinks that all
philosophy is to be avoided wishes nothing else than that we
do not love wisdom. Now, if ;ou had no love whatever for
wisdom, I would utterly disregard you in my writings; if,
however, you had just ordinary love for it, I would not en-
tirely disregard you; and much less if you were to love wis-
dom as much as I love it. And now, seeing that you love it
even more than you love me, and knowing your great love
for me, and seeing that you have made such advance in it
that you are not frightened by the dread of any chance dis-
comfort or even death itself a most difficult attainment for
even the most learned, and a position which all acknowledge
to be the stoutest stronghold of philosophy in view of all
3 Col. 2.8.
4 John 18.36; cf. Retractationes 1.3.2,
272 SAINT AUGUSTINE
this, shall I not gladly entrust myself to you even as a
disciple?' 5
(33) At this point, when she had gently and piously said
that I had never uttered so much that is untrue, and when
I saw that we had voiced so many words that they had to
be written down, and that the limit of a book was already
reached, and that there were no tablets left, then it was de-
cided that the question be deferred, so that I might at the
same time spare my chest. For the things which, it seemed
to me, had to be said scoldingly to those youngsters had
strained it more than I should wish.
When we had begun to go out, Licentius said : 'Remember
how many and what important things are furnished us, even
without your knowing it, by that most unseen and divine
ordtr things to be taken up by you in our behalf.'
'I see, and I am not ungrateful to God,' I replied. 'And I
expect that both of you, who note the fact, will for that very
reason be better.'
That was my only work for the day.
5 Throughout this dialogue, as well as in the De beata vita, Augustine
pays beautiful tribute to his saintly mother. While the others marvel
at Monica's intellectual discernment and wisdom, Augustine does not
hesitate to suggest that the source of her enlightenment is far beyond
the acquired learning of the pagan schools: 'She voiced those things
in such manner that we, wholly unmindful of her sex, would feel that
some great man was seated with us. Meanwhile, I became aware, as far
as I could, from what source yes, from how divine a source those
things flowed' (2.10) .
BOOK TWO
Chapter 1
IFTER a very few days, Alypius returned. And a very
clear sun having risen, the brightness of the skies and
the warmth of the air insofar as was possible in
these localities in the winter season invited us out to the
lawn, which we used freely and frequently. Our mother, too,
was with us. By long intimacy and diligent attention I had
by this time discerned her acumen and burning desire for
things divine. It was particularly on the occasion of a rather
important disputation which I had held on my birthday with
my companions, and which I have compiled into a little
book, 1 that her mind had been revealed to me as so rare
that nothing seemed more adapted for true philosophy. Ac-
cordingly, I had determined to do my best that she be not
absent from our conversation, for she had plenty of leisure.
This, however, was known to you 2 in the first book of this
work.
(2) When, therefore, we were seated together as com-
fortably as possible in the place mentioned, I said to the
two boys: 'Although I have been incensed with you because
you were treating important problems in boyish fashion,
yet the fact that, in the discourse in which I was trying to
draw you away from levity of that sort, so much time was
consumed that the all-important matter itself seems to have
been postponed for the arrival of Alypius to me it seems
that this, through the favor of God, has happened not with-
out order. Wherefore, since I have already made the question
1 De beata vita (The Happy Life) .
2 Zenobius, to whom the dialogue is dedicated and to whom, a written
record of the disputation is to be sent.
273
274 SAINT AUGUSTINE
known to him most thoroughly, and have shown Mm how
far we have proceeded with it, are you ready, Licentius, to
defend the case which you have undertaken to defend the
case arising from that definition of yours? I believe I remem-
ber that you said that order is that by which God governs
all things.'
'I am ready/ he replied, 'in so far as I am able/
'Then, in what manner does God govern all things by
order?' I asked. 'Is it in such manner that He governs even
Himself by order? Or rather that, outside Himself, all things
else are by Him governed by means of order?*
'Where all things are good/ he replied, 'there can be no
order, for equality which in no way requires order is supreme
there. 5
'Do you deny/ I asked, 'that all things with God are good?*
*I do not deny/ he replied.
'Then it follows logically/ I said, 'that neither God nor all
things with God are governed by order/
He granted that.
'What? 3 I asked. 'Do all good things seem to you to be
nothing?'
'No, indeed/ he answered. They truly exist/
'What, then/ I said, 'about that saying of yours: that all
things which are, are governed by order, and that there is
nothing whatever which is separate from order?'
'But there are evil things also/ he replied, 'through which
it has come about that order includes good things as well.
For, good things alone are not governed by order, but the
good things and the evil things together. And when we say
"all things that are/' we certainly do not say "good things
only/' Whence it follows that all things together which God
governs are governed by order/
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 275
(3) To this I said: 'Do the things that are arranged and
governed seem to you to be moved, or do you think that
they are immovable? 3
'I acknowledge, 5 he replied, 'that those things which are
in this world are moved.'
'Do you maintain/ I asked, 'that the others are not moved? 9
Things that are with God/ he replied, 'are not moved.
All the others are moved, I believe.'
'When, therefore, you think that the things that are with
God are not moved, but grant that the other things are moved/
I said, 'then you declare that all the things that are moved
are not with God. 5
'Say that again, a little more clearly,' he said.
To me he seemed to have wanted this done, not by reason
of any difficulty of understanding, but through need of seek-
ing time in which to find what answer to make.
'You said,' I replied, 'that the things which are with God are
not moved, but that the other things are moved. Now, if
the things that are moved would not be moved if they were
with God since you say that all things that are with God
are not moved it follows that the things that are moved
are aside from God.'
He still remained silent, even after this was said. Then, at
last, he said: 'It seems to me that, if things are not moved in
this world, they are, nevertheless, with God.'
That is not to the point for me/ I said. 'For you acknowl-
edge, I think, that not all the things that are in this world
are not moved. From this it follows that not all things of this
world are with God.'
'I acknowledge/ he said, 'that not all things are/
'Therefore, something is without God. 5
'No/ he replied.
276 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Therefore, all things are with God.'
'I beg pardon/ he now added, after some delay. 'I should
not have made that statement that there is nothing without
God, for, of a certainty, all the things that are moved seem
to me not to be with God. 5
Then the sky, which no one doubts to be moved, is with-
out God,' I said.
The sky,' he said, c is not without God.'
Therefore, there is with God something which can be
moved.'
C I am not able,' he said, 'to explain what I mean, as I
should like to explain it. But I ask that, without waiting for
my words, you understand with your own sagacity, if you
can, what 1 was endeavoring to say. For nothing, it seems
to me, is without God; on the other hand, whatever is with
God, seems to remain unshaken by change. Yet, I cannot
say that the sky is without God, not merely because I think
that nothing is without God, but because I think that the
sky has something which is not moved, and that something
either is truly God or it is with God, though I have no doubt
that the sky is being turned and moved.'
Chapter 2
(4) 'Please define, therefore,' I said, 'what is to be with
God, and also what is not to be without God. For, if this
controversy between us is one of words, it will be readily passed
over, provided we see the thing itself that you have in mind.'
'I don't like to define,' he said.
'What, then, shall we do?' I asked.
'You frame the definition, please/ he said, 'for it is easier
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 277
for me t_o see what I do not approve in another's definition
than to explain anything well by a definition of my own.'
'I shall accede to your wish/ I replied. "Does that seem to
you to be with God which is ruled by Him and governed?'
'I was not thinking of that/ he replied, 'when I said that
the things that are moved are with God. 3
Then see/ I said, 'whether this definition meets your ap-
proval : Whatever understands God is with God.'
'I grant that/ he replied.
'Then, what follows? 3 I asked. 'Is it not evident to you that
a wise man understands God?'
'It is evident/ he answered.
'Therefore, since wise men are moved not only within the
same house or city, but also through unmeasured spaces of
regions by traveling on land or sea, how will it be true that
whatsoever is with God is not moved?'
'You have made me laugh/ he said. 'As though I had
said that what the wise man does is with God. However, that
which he knows is with God.'
'Does the wise man not know his own book, his cloak, his
coat, his furniture, if he has any, and other things of this
kind, which the unwise also very well know?' I asked.
*I acknowledge/ he replied, 'that to know one's coat or
to know one's cloak is not to be with God*
(5) 'Therefore/ I said, 'y u are making this assertion:
that not everything which the wise man knows is with God,
but that whatever of the wise man is with God, that the wise
man knows.'
'Very good/ he said. 'For, not whatever he knows by the
mere senses of the body, but what he perceives by the soul,
is with God. I should perhaps be presumptions to say any
278 SAINT AUGUSTINE
me be corroborated or corrected: Whoever knows only those
things which the senses reach seems to me to be not only not
with God, but not even with himself. 5
At this point, because I had noticed that Trygetius was of
such expression of countenance that he seemed to wish to say
something but to be restrained by shyness from rushing into
another's post, so to speak, I gave him the opportunity to say
something if he wished, while Licentius was still silent.
'But to me/ he said, 'no one at all seems to know those
things that pertain to the senses of the body. For, to perceive
by the senses is one thing, but to know is something else.
Wherefore, if we know anything, I think it is contained in
the intellect alone, and by it alone can it be grasped* Whence
it follows that, if what the wise man knows by understand-
ing is with God, then the entire thing which the wise man
knows can be with God. 3
When Licentius had approved this, he added another point,
which I could by no means ignore.
'A wise man,' he said, c is certainly with God, for a wise
man understands himself. This is the logical inference, both
from what I have heard from you: that whatever understands
God is with God; and also from what has been said by us:
that what is understood by a wise man is with God. But, as
to that part of him by which he uses those senses of his, I
admit that I do not know or ev^n surmise of what sort it is,
for I do not think it is to be reckoned when we designate a
man as wise.'
(6) Then, 5 I said, y u are asserting not only that a wise
man does not consist of a body and a soul, but even that he
does not consist of an integral soul, for only a senseless person
would say that the part by which he uses the senses does
not pertain to the soul. It is not the eyes and ears that per-
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 279
ceive, but something or other that perceives through the eyes.
Now, if we do not attribute sense perception to the intellect,
we do not attribute it to any power of the soul. It follows,
then, that it must be attributed to the body. But to me nothing
seems to be more absurdly said than this/
The soul of a wise man/ he replied, 'thoroughly cleansed
by acts of virtue and already cleaving to God, merits the
name of wise, and it is unfitting that any other part of him
be called wise. Nevertheless, certain soiled and cast-off gar-
ments, so to speak of which he has divested himself and
from which he has, as it were, withdrawn unto himself
still serve that soul; or, if such a soul ought still to be pro-
nounced integral, they certainly subserve that part of the
soul which alone is fittingly called wise; they are in subjec-
tion to it. And I believe that memory itself resides in this
subordinate part. A wise man therefore treats this part of
the soul almost like a slave, so that at first he gives it re-
peated commands, and then, when it has become well trained
and submissive, he imposes on it this limit as a law and a
command: that, as long as it is using those senses for things
that are needful, not for the wise man, but for itself, it must
not dare become insolent or haughty toward its master;
furthermore, that even the things that are its own, it must
not dare to use indiscriminately or immoderately. To the
least noble part can certainly pertain the things that lightly
come and go. And, indeed, for what is memory needful but
for the things that are transitory and, so to speak, fugitive?
But a wise man embraces God, and finds his joy in Him
who abides forever, for whose presence there is no waiting
and of whose absence there is no fearing, because, by the
very fact that He truly ir, He is always present. Though the
wise man remains immovable, he nevertheless exercises a
280 SAINT AUGUSTINE
certain kind of care over his slave's peculium, 1 so that, like
a prudent and diligent servant, he may conserve it well and
use it sparingly. 3
(7) Pondering over this declaration of his with admira-
tion, I recalled that on a former occasion I had expressed the
same thought in his hearing. 2 With a smile, I then said:
'Licentius, thank this slave of your memory. For, if he had
not supplied you with something from his own peculium,
perhaps you would not have what you now express. Now,
if memory belongs to that part of the soul which, like a
servant, submits itself to be ruled by a good rnind, then, be-
lieve me, you have now been aided to say what you have
said. But at any rate, before I resume with order, does it
riot seem to you that a wise man needs memory for such
things as these, namely, the worthy and necessary branches
of learning?'
'What need of memory/ he rejoined, 'since he has and
holds all his objectives present? Even in sensation itself we
do not call memory to our aid with regard to that which is
before our eyes. Therefore, I ask, what need is there of
memory for a wise man, who has everything in front of the
interior eyes of the intellect, or in other words, who gazes
fixedly and immovably on God Himself, with whom are all
the things that an intellect can see and possess? But, inas-
much as I had need of it in order to retain what I had heard
from you, I am not as yet that servant's master; rather am
I at times his servant. At other times, however, I try not to
serve him, and I almost venture to claim my rightful liberty.
And if I sometimes give commands and he perhaps obeys
1 A term to designate the portion of property alloted by masters to their
servants.
2 During a previous dialogue on the subject of skepticism. Cf. Contra
Academicos L8.22.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 281
me and makes me think that I have gained the mastery, yet
in other matters he becomes so haughty that I grovel discon-
solate at his feet. Wherefore, whenever we are looking for
a wise man, I will not have you mention me.'
'Nor me,' I added. 'On the other hand, can that wise man
forsake his fellow men? And at any rate, as long as he con-
trols the body in which he holds that servant bound by his
own law, can he by any means shirk the duty of bestowing
benefits on whom he can, especially and this is most in-
sistently demanded of him the duty of teaching them wis-
dom? And when he is doing that, in order to teach properly
and to be himself less unfitted, he frequently prepares some-
thing which he will deliver and discuss systematically. And,
unless he commits this to memory, it will surely be lost.
'Therefore, either you will maintain that a wise man has
no obligations of benevolence or you will acknowledge that
some of a wise man's store is conserved by memory. In fact,
does he not entrust some of his treasure something need-
ful, not for himself, indeed, but for his fellow men to the
servant of safekeeping, in order that he, thrifty, as it were,
from the master's excellent training, may safeguard exactly
what the master will have enjoined on him to be kept safe,
and not just what is needed for bringing the unwise to
wisdom?'
'And I,' he replied, 'think that nothing at all is entrusted
to him by a wise man. For, a wise man, whether silent or in
converse with men, is always intent upon God. However,
the well-trained servant carefully keeps something to furnish
to his master when engaged in discoursing, something to make
his service pleasing to that most considerate master under
whose authority he sees that he himself is living. And he
282 SAINT AUGUSTINE
does this, not by his own reasoning, so to speak, but because
the supreme law and supreme order has prearranged it.'
'Against your opinions/ I replied, 'I say nothing now, so
that what we have taken in hand may be completed. Some
other time, however, when God Himself will have rendered
it opportune in accordance with order, we shall diligently
observe how the matter stands on this point, for the question
is not one of minor importance, or one that is exhausted by
such a brief discussion.'
Chapter 3
(8) 'What to be with God means has been now defined.
And, when I had said that whatever understands God is with
God, you added something else as well, namely, that what-
ever things are understood by a wise man are also with God.
In this matter it much disturbs me how suddenly you have
placed unwisdom with God. For, if whatsoever things a wise
man understands are with God, and he cannot avoid un-
wisdom unless it is understood, then that source of mischief
impious to say will also be with God.'
Puzzled by this conclusion, they held themselves in silence
for a while. Then Trygetius spoke: 'Let him upon whose
timely entrance into this discussion we, not without good
reason, I believe, congratulated ourselves let him give the
answer/
'May God prosper us, 5 cried Alypius. 'Up to now, was it
not such great silence of mine that was highly prized? But
now my peace is broken. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost
to comply with this request, after I have first provided for
the future and have obtained from you the promise that you
will insist on nothing more from me than this answer.'
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 283
'Alypius, 5 I said, 'it ill becomes your good will and kindness
to deny your eagerly desired voice to our discussion. But,
for the nonce, go ahead and finish what you have begun.
Other points will unfold according as order has already
disposed.'
'By me/ he said, 'better things are rightly to be expected
from that order in whose defense you have decided to make
me a substitute for a while. Now, unless I am mistaken, in
your conclusion you thought that unwisdom was linked to
God by these two boys because they said that whatsoever a
wise man understands is with God. To what extent this is
to be accepted I do not now discuss. But, note that reason-
ing of yours for a moment. You said precisely this: "for, if
whatsoever things a wise man understands are with God,
and he cannot avoid unwisdom unless it is understood"
just as if it were not clear that he is not to be accounted
worthy of the name , of wise man until he has escaped un-
wisdom; and it has been said that the things understood by
a wise man are with God. When, therefore, one understands
unwisdom for the purpose of escaping that same unwisdom,
he is not yet wise. But, when he will have become wise,
unwisdom is not to be counted with the things he under-
stands. Therefore, since the things which a wise man under-
stands are united with God, then unwisdom is rightly dis-
cerned apart from God/
(9) 'As is your wont, Alypius,' I said, 'you have answered
keenly, but like a man pushed into another's straits. How-
ever because you deign, I believe, to be classed with my-
self as unwise what shall we do if we find some wise
man who by instruction and disputation would willingly free
us from an evil so great? My first request or at least I
think so now would be that he show me what unwisdom
284 SAINT AUGUSTINE
is: what is its nature and what are its qualities. As to you s
I would not readily make any pronouncement; as to myself,
unwisdom holds me fast just as much and just as long as
it is not understood by me. But, according to you, he would
say; "For me to teach you that, you should have come to
me when I was unwise. But now you can be your own mas-
ters, for I no longer understand unwisdom." Now, if I were
to hear that from the man, I should not hesitate to advise
him to become our co-disciple, so that all of us together
might seek another master, for, although I do not fully under-
stand what unwisdom is, yet I see that nothing is more
unwise than that answer. But, perhaps he will be ashamed
either to desert us or to follow. And then he will discourse
at great length and exaggerate the evils of unwisdom. And
we, carefully on our guard, to be sure, will listen attentively
to a man who knows not what he is saying, or we shall be-
lieve that he knows that which he does not understand,
or, after all, unwisdom is linked to God by the reasoning of
those clients of yours. Now, of these three suppositions,
neither one of the first two can, I see, be maintained. There-
fore, there remains only the third, which you are unwilling
to admit.'
'I had never known you to be resentful/ he remarked.
'But if, as is usually done, I had taken any fee from these
clients, as you call them, I would now be compelled to return
it to them, as long as you are so exceedingly tenacious of this
line of reasoning. Wherefore, either let them be content with
the fact that by my contending with you I have afforded
them considerable time to think, or if they are willing to
take advice from an advocate who has indeed been worsted,
but through no fault of his own let them yield to you in
this, and let them be more on their guard for the future. 5
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 285
(10) 'I shall not,' I replied, 'overlook the fact that
Trygetius was, in turn, noisily impatient to say something or
other in your defense. And, with your kind permission, I shall
make it a point to hear them patiently, as I had begun to do,
while they themselves plead their case without your advocacy.
For, since you have but lately intervened in this case, perhaps
you have not been well informed.'
Licentius being absent at this point, Trygetius remarked:
'Take it as you please, 3 he said, 'and laugh at my unwisdom.
But that by which unwisdom itself is understood does not
seem to me to be rightly called understanding, for unwisdom
you have not been well informed.'
'I do not readily refuse to accept that, 3 I replied. 'But, al-
though it agitates me how anyone can rightly teach what
kind of thing that is which he himself does not understand,
and how great an injury is caused to one's mind by that
which he is unable to see with the mind and Alypius also
felt this; for, having it in mind, he did not dare take up the
defense of what you have said, although the theory was well
known to him from teachers' books nevertheless, I am led
to assert that, with reference to a bodily sense, no one can
see darkness. Now, the soul makes use of that same sense,
and that is the only comparison of any sort with the intellect.
Wherefore, if understanding is to the mind what perceiving
is to the sense and no one, even with clear and healthy
eyes wide open can see darkness then it is not absurd to
say that unwisdom itself cannot be understood, for it alone
is what we call darkness of the mind. And from now on it
will no longer agitate me how unwisdom can be avoided as
long as it is not understood. For, just as we shun darkness
with our eyes by the very fact that we are not willing not
to see, so likewise, whoever shall desire to escape unwisdom
286 SAINT AUGUSTINE
let him not try to understand it; rather, let him regret that
on account of it he does not understand the things that can
be understood, and let him bear in mind that it is present
with him, not in proportion as he the better understands
it, but according as he has a lesser understanding of other
things.*
Chapter 4
(11) 'But let us get back to order, for Licentius may at
any moment be returned to us. For the present, I ask you
this question: Does it seem to you that the unwise man acts
according to order, no matter what he does? But, mark what
snares the question contains. If you say that he acts accord-
ing to order, then, if even the unwise man always acts ac-
cording to order, what will become of that definition: Order
is that by which God governs all things that are? And, if
there is no order in the things that are done by the unwise
man, then there will be something which order does not
embrace. But you are not willing to accept either alternative.
See to it, I beg you, lest in your defense of order you throw
everything into disorder/
At this point Trygetius answered again, for the other boy
was still absent:
'It is easy, 5 he said, c to reply to this dilemma of yours.
For the moment, however, I cannot call to mind an analogy
by which my opinion ought, I know, to be declared and illus-
trated. I shall simply state my impression, for you will do
what you did a little while ago. Certainly that mention of
the darkness has brought us a great deal of light on what
has been put forward very obscurely by me. Indeed, the
entire life of the unwise, although it is by no means con-
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
287
sistent and by no means well regulated by themselves, is,
nevertheless, necessarily included in the order of things by
Divine Providence. And, certain places having been arranged,
so to speak, by that ineffable and eternal law, it is by no
means permitted to be where it ought % not to be. Thus it
happens that whoever narrow-mindedly considers this life by
itself alone is repelled by its enormous foulness, and turns
away in sheer disgust. But, if he raises the eyes of the mind
and broadens his field of vision and surveys all things as a
whole, then he will find nothing unarranged, unclassed, or
unassigned to its own place. 3
(12) 'What great and wonderful responses does not God
Himself and, as I am more and more led to believe, also
that unfathomable order of things send to me through
you! Verily, you speak things of such import that I cannot
understand either how you discern them or how they can be
spoken unless they are discerned. And for that reason I be-
lieve that they are both true and from on high. Now, you
were looking for just one or two illustrations for that opinion
of yours. To me there already occur countless illustrations
which bring me to complete agreement. What more hideous
than a hangman? What more cruel and ferocious than his
character? Yet he holds a necessary post in the very midst
of laws, and he is incorporated into the order of a well-
regulated state; himself criminal in character, he is never-
theless, by others' arrangement, the penalty of evildoers.
What can be mentioned more sordid, more bereft of decency,
or more full of turpitude than prostitutes, procurers, and
the other pests of that sort? Remove prostitutes from human
288 SAINT AUGUSTINE
affairs, and you will unsettle everything because of lusts; 1
place them in the position of matrons, and you will dishonor
these latter by disgrace and ignominy. This class of people
is, therefore, by its own mode of life most unchaste in its
morals; by the law of order, it is most vile in social condition,
'And is it not true that in the bodies of animals there are
certain members which you could not bear to look at, if you
should view them by themselves alone? But the order of
nature has designed that because they are needful they shall
not be lacking, and because they are uncomely they shall not
be prominent. And these ugly members, by keeping their
proper places, have provided a better position for the more
comely ones. What more agreeable to us because it was
quite an appropriate sight for field and farmyard than
that contest and conflict of the barnyard cock, which we
have related in the preceding book? But, what have we ever
seen more abject than the deformity of the vanquished one?
And yet, by that very deformity was the more perfect beauty
of the contest in evidence. 5
( 13 ) 'So it is, I think, with all things, but they have to be
seen. Poets have found delight in what they call solecisms
and barbarisms. But, by a mere change of name, they chose
to call them tropes and metaplasms, rather than refrain al-
1 Here Augustine merely states what, in his opinion, would be an
Inevitable consequence of the total abolition of prostitution in his
day. In this text he makes no pronouncement on the moral aspect of
the question. In the Contra Faustum (22.61) , written about fourteen
years later, Augustine is more explicit on the malice of prostitution,
but he does not touch the question of whether or not prostitution may
ever be tolerated for the purpose of avoiding greater evils. In that
work he writes: 'The prostitution of women who offer themselves, not
for the begetting of offspring but for the sating of lust, is condemned
by the divine and eternal law/ To illustrate the principle that human
legislators may at times permit certain evils for the purpose of avoiding
greater ones, Saint Thomas has cited the above passage from the
De ordine. Cf. Summa theologies 2 a 2 ae , q. 10. a; 11. c
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 289
together from the use of such manifest blunders. Remove
these from poems : we shall be wanting their delightful relish.
Crowd a great many of them into one passage : I shall loathe
the whole passage as sour, malodorous, and rancid. Carry
them over into familiar and forensic speech: who will not
bid them flee and retreat to the theater? Because order di-
rects and restrains them, it does not suffer them to be in
excess in their proper place, or to be anywhere out of place.
Unpretentious and seemingly inelegant diction, interspersed
in a discourse, brings into bolder relief the fancy flights and
the ornate passages. If it is ever by itself alone, you throw
it out as worthless. On the other hand, whenever it is lack-
ing, those adornments are not conspicuous they are not
dominant, so to speak, in their own provinces and realms;
they are a hindrance to themselves by their own brilliance,
and they confuse the whole design. 3
Chapter 5
'We ought to be truly grateful for the fact of order. Who
has not a fear of fallacious arguments or those which, by
understatement or overstatement, lead imperceptibly to false
judgments? Who does not despise them? And yet, when
placed in their proper positions in certain disputations, they
have such force that somehow or other deception through
them becomes pleasant. And in this, too, will not order have
the credit? 5
(14) 'Now in music, in geometry, in the movements of
the stars, in the fixed ratios of numbers, order reigns in such
manner that if one desires to see its source and its very
shrine, so to speak, he either finds it in these, or he is un-
erringly led to it through them. Indeed, such learning, if one
290 SAINT AUGUSTINE
uses it with moderation and in this matter, nothing is to
be feared more than excess rears for philosophy a soldier,
or even a captain, so competent that he sallies forth wherever
he wishes and leads many others as well, and reaches that
ultimate goal, beyond which he desires nothing else, beyond
which he neither ought nor can seek anything. Now, from
that point, while he is held by human affairs, he reviews
and discerns all things in such manner that it by no means
troubles him why one man desires to have children and has
them not, while another is worried over the excessive fecun-
dity of his wife; or why he who is ready to bestow gifts
lavishly is in need of money, while the mean and mangy
money-lender sleeps over his buried treasure; or why extrav-
agance spends and wastes an ample inheritance, while the
tearful beggar hardly gets a coin all the day; or why un-
deserved honor exalts a man, and a blameless life passes un-
observed in the crowd/
(15) These and other things in human life drive many
men to the impious belief that we are not governed by any
order of Divine Providence. Others, however, upright and
good, and endowed with splendid mentality men who can-
not bring themselves to believe that we are abandoned by
God are so confused by the great obscurity and maze of
affairs, so to speak, that they cannot see any order. Seeking
to have the most hidden causes laid bare to them, even in
poems 1 they frequently bewail their errors. Now, who will
easily give them the answer if they should ask only this:
Why do the Italians always pray for mild winters, while our
own poor Gaetulia 2 is parched with heat, or where will any
1 Zenobius, through the medium of a poem, had revealed his perplexity
on the subject of order. Ci above, p. 258,
2 A region lying south of the Atlas mountain range.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 29 1
trace of that order be found among ourselves? For my part,
if I can give an advice to my own, insofar as I can see, and
incline to an opinion, I think that they are to be instructed
in all branches of learning. 3 By no other means can these
things be so thoroughly understood that they become clear
as day. But, if those men are too slothful or preoccupied
with other affairs or dull of understanding, let them provide
for themselves a stronghold of faith, so that He, who suffers
no one that rightly believes in Him through the mysteries to
perish, may by this bond draw them to Himself and free
them from these dreadful, entangling evils. 5
(16) 'When the obscurity of things perplexes us, we fol-
low a twofold path: reason, or at least, authority. Philosophy
sends forth reason, and it frees scarcely a few. By itself it
compels these not only not to spurn those mysteries, but to un-
derstand them insofar as they can be understood. The philo-
sophy that is true the genuine philosophy, so to speak has
no other function than to teach what is the First Principle of
all things Itself without beginning, and how great an
intellect dwells therein, and what has proceeded therefrom
for our welfare, but without deterioration of any kind. Now,
the venerated mysteries, which liberate persons of sincere
and firm faith not indiscriminately, as some say; and not
harmfully, as many assert these mysteries teach that this
First Principle is one God omnipotent, and that He is tri-
potent, Father and Son and Holy Spirit. Great, indeed,
though it be that so great a God has for our sake deigned
to take up and dwell in this body of our own kind, yet, the
more lowly it appears, so much the more is it replete with
3 Cf. Retractations 1.3.2.
292 SAINT AUGUSTINE
clemency and the farther and wider remote from a certain
characteristic pride of ingenious men. 94
(17) 'But, whence does the soul have its origin, and what
are its powers here below? In how much does it differ from
God, and what has it of its own that reacts to both natures?
How far is it subject to death, and how is it proved to be
immortal? To the end that these truths may be learned, of
what great moment do you not consider order to be? Of
great moment indeed, and indubitable. We shall briefly speak
about that later, if there be time. But for the present, I would
have you accept this from me: that, if anyone dares rashly
and without due order of the branches of learning to rush
to the knowing of these things, he becomes, not a man of
study, but a man of cares; not a man of learning, but a man
of credulity; not a man of discretion, but a man ready to
discredit everything. Wherefore, while I am forced to ac-
4 Probably certain Platonists, some of whose teachings are openly
antagonistic to revealed truths of Christianity. One such point was
expressed in the dictum found in Plato (Symposium, ed Firann-
Didot 1.23) , and later repeated by the African Platomst, Apulems
of Madaura (De Deo Socratis, e*L Hildebrand, 2.124) , that God does
not mingle with man. *_.,,.
It is evident that this notion precluded not only the jact but even
the possibility of the Incarnation, according ,to which the Son of God
assumed a complete human nature in the unity of His Divine Person.
In this connection, it may be observed that the profession of Platonism
made by Augustine shortly after his conversion was conditioned by one
important reserve, viz., its conformity to revealed truth. In Contra
Academicos (3.20.43) , he writes: Tor the present I am confident
that I shall find among the Platonists what is not in opposition to our
mysteries of faith.'
In addition to the above-mentioned Platonic assumption, other points
generally identified with the Platonic school were seen to be incompat-
ible with revealed truth and were accordingly repudiated by Augus-
tine. Chief among these errors, were the following: (a) that the
world came into being necessarily and by a process of emanation;
(b) the doctrine of the transmigration of souls; (c) the eternal
duration of the world.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 293
knowledge that you have just now answered my questions
correctly and aptly, yet I wonder how you have done it. But,
let us see how far your unseen powers of mind can go.
'Now let the words of Licentius be repeated to us, for,
occupied with some matter or other, he has been a stranger
to this discussion for such a long time that I think he will
have to read these points just the same as those friends of
ours who are not living with us. Come back to us, Licentius,
I beg you, and strive to give undivided attention, for I am
speaking to you. You indeed accepted my definition, in which
it was declared what "to be with God" means, and, as far as
I can get your meaning, you wished to teach that the mind
of a wise man remains immovable with Him.'
Chapter 6
(18) 'Now, this point troubles me: How is it that, since
the wise man is undeniably in a body so long as he, lives
among men, how is it that, although the body wanders
hither and thither, the mind remains immovable? In this
manner, indeed, you could say that, when a ship is moved,
the men who are on the ship are not moved, even though we
acknowledge that the ship is held and controlled by them.
And, even if they were to control it by thought alone and
make it go where they would, they who are aboard cannot
remain unmoved when it is moved.'
'The, soul/ said Licentius, 'is not in the body in such
manner that the body holds empire over the soul.'
'And I am not saying that,' I replied. 'But neither is the
rider on the horse in such manner that the horse holds empire
over him; although he drives the horse where he wants to
294 SAINT AUGUSTINE
go, yet, when the horse is moved, it must be that the rider is
moved.*
'He can sit immovable/ he replied.
'You force us/ I said, 'to define the meaning of "to be
moved," and I would have you do it, if you can.'
'Please let your favor continue/ he remarked, 'for my re-
quest still holds. And do not ask again whether I am pleased
to frame a definition. When I am able to do that, I myself
shall make announcement. 5
When this was said, the boy to whom we had assigned
this task ran from the house to us and announced that it
was the hour for dinner. 'This boy/ I said, 'does not compel
us to define what "to be moved" means; he forces our eyes
to see it. Let us go, therefore, and let us pass from this place
to another, for, if I am not wrong, then "to be moved" is
nothing else than that. And, when they had smiled at this,
we went away.'
Second Disputation
(19) Then, when we had taken refection for the body,
we withdrew to our accustomed place, the bathing hall, for
the sky was overcast. And I began: 'Do you grant, Licentius,
that movement is nothing else than a passing from place to
place?'
'I do/ he replied.
'Do you grant, then/ I asked, 'that no one is in that place
where he had not been, and has not been moved?'
'I do not understand/ he replied.
'If something/ I asked, 'had been in some place a short
time ago, and is now in another place, do you grant that that
thing has been moved? 5
He agreed.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 295
'Could the living body, therefore, of some wise man be
here with us now, while his soul is not present? 5
'It could/ he answered.
'Even though,' I added, 'he were talking with us and were
teaching us something? 5
'Even if he were teaching us wisdom itself,' he answered,
6 I would not say that he is with us, but that he is with him-
self. 5
'Not, therefore, in the body?' I asked.
'No,' he replied.
To which I rejoined: 'Would you not acknowledge that
the body which is without a soul is dead, whereas I had pro-
posed a living body?'
'I know not how to explain,' he replied, 'for I see that
the human body cannot be living if the soul is not in it;
and, wherever the body of a wise man may be, I cannot say
that his soul is not with God.'
'I may help you to explain that,' I replied. Terhaps, be-
cause God is everywhere, then, wheresoever the wise man
goes, there he finds God, with whom he can be. So it follows
that we can at the same time affirm that the wise man passes
from place to place which is "to be moved" and yet that
he is always with God. 5
'I admit,' he said, 'that the body makes a transition from
place to place, but I deny that the mind itself, to which the
name of wisdom is given, makes such transition.'
Chapter 7
(20) C I yield to you for the moment,' I replied, 'lest a very
obscure point, which requires prolonged and careful treat-
ment, impede our problem now in hand. But, since what
296 SAINT AUGUSTINE
"to be with God" means has already been defined by us, let
us see this: namely, whether we can know also what "to be
without God 53 means, although I judge that to be clear now.
But to you, I believe, it seems that they who are not with
God are without God.'
'If words could be at my command/ he said, I would,
perhaps, say what would not displease you. But, bear with
my stammering, I beg of you, and by an alert mind, as be-
comes you, anticipate my meaning. To me, indeed, they seem
to be not with God, and yet they are sustained by Him.
Accordingly, I cannot say that they whom God sustains are
without God, and likewise I do not say that they are with
God, for they do not possess God. But, a while ago, in
that very delightful disputation which we held among our-
selves on the occasion of your birthday, it was agreed that
"to possess God" is nothing other than to enjoy God. 1 Yet
I admit that I fear those contraries: how anyone may be
neither without God nor with God.'
(21 ) 'Let not those things disturb you,' I said. Tor, when
there is agreement as to the reality, who would not disregard
words? Wherefore, let us get back finally to that definition
of order. You said that order is that by which God governs
all things. But, there is nothing, as far as I can see, that God
does not govern, and on this account it seemed to you that
nothing can be found apart from order.'
'My opinion stands, 5 he replied. 'But I already see what
you are going to say: whether God governs those things which
we confess are not well governed.'
'Very well, 5 I replied. 'You have seen my thought per-
fectly. But, as you have seen what I was going to say, so
likewise, I beg you, see what answer is given.*
1 'Hoc est ammo Deum habere, id est Deo frui f (De beata vita 4.34) .
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 297
Then, shaking his head and shoulders, he said: 'We are in
trouble.'
And here, mother happened to come in upon our ques-
tion. Then, after some time in silence, he requested that the
same question be asked by me again. He had not noted at
all that the answer to his point had been previously given by
Trygetius. 2
Then I replied: 'What should I repeat for you? And why?
"What is done, do not do," they say. Wherefore, I advise
you rather to take care to read what has been said before,
if you were not able to hear it. I, indeed, have patiently
borne your absence of mind during our discourse, and I
have so long endured your habit of distraction that I might
not place anything in the way of those matters which you,
remote from us and meditating with yourself, were doing
by yourself, and so that I might get on with those points
which this written record would not permit you to lose.*
( 22 ) 'Now, I ask this question, which we have not yet tried
to solve by careful reasoning, for, when some order or other
first brought forth this question of order, I remember that
you said that that is the justice of God which discriminates
between good and evil, and gives to each its due. And, to
the best of my judgment, there is no clearer definition of
justice. Therefore, I would have you answer whether it seems
to you that God was ever not just.'
'Never,' he replied.
'If, therefore, God has always been just, 3 I said, c then good
and evil have always been.'
'I see absolutely nothing else that can follow/ said mother,
'for, when evil was not, judgment of God was not; and He
2 See p. 286 above.
298 SAINT AUGUSTINE
cannot appear to have been just, whensoever He did not
render to the good and to the evil what belonged to each one. 8
Licentius said to her: 'You therefore think that we must
say that evil always was.'
'I do not venture to say that,' she replied.
Then, what shall we say?' I asked. 'If God is just, precisely
because He judges between the good and the evil, then, when
there was no evil, He was not just/
At this point, while they were silent, I noticed that Try-
getius wished to answer, and I gave him leave. Then he
declared: 'God was absolutely just, for He could have
discerned good from evil if they existed. And, from the fact
that He could, He was just. When we say that Cicero pru-
dently investigated the conspiracy of Catiline, that temperately
he was corrupted by no favor to spare the wicked, that he
justly condemned them to death by the authority of the
Senate, and that he bore with fortitude all the darts of enemies
and, as he himself says, the burden of their hatred when we
say this, it is not as if those virtues would not have been in
him unless Catiline had prepared such enormous destruction
for the State. Virtue is to be considered in itself, and not
through some deed like this, in reference to man. How much
more so with reference to God? if indeed in the inadequacy
of our thoughts and speech it is permitted to compare the
one class with the other in any way. For so that we may
understand that God was always just with the rise of evil,
which He would distinguish from good, He did not delay
giving to each one its due. Justice did not then have to be
learned by Him, but rather the justice which He always had,
was then to be put into practice.*
(23) When both Licentius and mother, in complete
agreement, had approved this, I said: 'What are you saying,
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 299
Licentius? Where is that which you so strenuously asserted:
that nbthing is done apart from order? For, the fact that evil
had a beginning is surely not brought about by the order of
God, but, when it had become a fact, it was included in God's
order.'
Then Licentius, surprised and chagrined because a good
case had so suddenly slipped from his hands, replied: 'I say
that order had its beginning precisely from where evil had its
beginning.'
Therefore,' I said, if order has had its beginning after
evil arose, then the fact of evil was not brought about by
order. But, with God, order always was. And, whether there
always was the nonentity which is called evil, or whether
it is found to have had a beginning sometime, there never
was and there never will be anything without order. For,
order either is itself something good or it is from something
good. Although something or other more apt came to my
mind, it escaped me because of that tendency toward forget-
fulness; and I believe that this happened in accordance with
order, and conformably with merit, degree or manner of life.'
*I know not how a sentence has escaped me which I now
reject,' Licentius responded. 'I should not, indeed, have said
that order had its origin after evil began to be, but that, in
the same manner as the justice, on which Trygetius dis-
coursed, so also was order with God, although it did not
come into use until after evils began to be.'
'You will fall back to the same position,' I said, 'for, that
which you by no means wish to grant still stands; for, whether
order was with God, or whether it began to be from time
when evil began, yet the evil arose apart from order. If you
grant this, you acknowledge that something can be done
apart from order, and this weakens your case, and cuts it
300 SAINT AUGUSTINE
down. But, If you do not grant it, then evil begins to appear
to have had its origin by the order of God, and nothing oc-
curs to me more detestable than that sacrilege. 5
When I was explaining this and repeating it again and
again to him, while he either was not understanding it or
was pretending not to understand it, he had nothing to say,
and gave himself to silence.
Then mother said: 4 I think that nothing could have been
done aside from the order of God, because evil itself, which
has had an origin, in no way originated by the order of God;
but that divine justice permitted it not to be beyond the
limits of order, and has brought it back and confined it to
an order befitting it.'
When I saw that all, each one according to his ability,
were now most earnestly seeking God, but that they were
not keeping to that very order of which we were treating,
and by which one comes to a knowledge of His ineffable
majesty, then I said:
(24) c If, as I see, you greatly love order, then I beg you
not to allow us to become preposterous and out of order.
Even though innermost reason does promise to prove that
nothing takes place outside the divine order, yet if we were
to hear some schoolmaster trying to teach syllables to a boy
to whom no one had yet taught the alphabet, I do not say that
he ought to be ridiculed as a fool, but we would think that he
ought to be bound with fetters, as a madman and for no
other reason, as I see it, than because he was not observing
order in teaching. But, no one doubts that the unskilled
do many things such as are reprehended and mocked by the
experienced, and that the demented do things which do not
escape the judgment of fools. Yet, there is a certain exalted
branch of learning which is far removed from even the sur-
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 301
mise of the generality of mankind, but, to zealous minds that
love only God and souls, it promises to show that even all
the things which we acknowledge to be evil are still not out-
side the divine order and to show this so clearly that even
in the addition of numbers we could not have greater
certitude.'
Chapter 8
(25) 'Now, this science is the very law of God, which,
ever abiding fixed and unshaken with Him, is transcribed,
so to speak, on the souls of the wise, so that they know they
live a better and more sublime life in proportion as they
contemplate it more perfectly with their understanding and
observe it more diligently in their manner of living. Accord-
ingly, this science imposes a twofold order of procedure on
those who desire to know it, of which order one part per-
tains to the regulating of life, and the other pertains to the
directing of studies. Youths devoted to this science ought
so to live as to refrain from all wantonness, from the entice-
ments of gluttony, from excessive care and adornment of the
body, from silly practices of games, from the dullness of sleep
and sloth, from jealousy, detraction, and envy, from the am-
bition for honor and power, and also from the unrestrained
desire for praise. Let them be convinced that love for money
is an unfailing poison for all their hopes. Let them do noth-
ing half-heartedly, nothing rashly. In case of faults of their
associates, let them either cast out all anger, or so restrain
it that it will be like anger dismissed. Let them hate no
one. Let them not be unwilling to correct vices. Let them
take care especially not to be excessive in vengeance or stint-
ing in forgiveness. Let them punish only what can be im-
302 SAINT AUGUSTINE
proved, and favor nothing that may become worse. Let them
regard as their own fellow men all those over whom authority
has been given to them. Let them be so obedient that it
would be embarrassing to give them commands, and let them
rule so considerately that it becomes a pleasure to obey them.
Over the faults of others, let them not be troublesome to
one who is reluctant. As for enmities, they are to avoid
them most carefully, bear them most patiently, and end them
most speedily. In every covenant and dealing with men it
is enough to observe this one familiar proverb: Let them
not do to anyone what they would not have done to them-
selves. Let them not wish to undertake the administration
of the State unless they are matured, but let them hasten to
become mature either within the senatorial age, or certainly
before middle-age. And whoever turns himself to these studies
late in life, let him not think himself bound by no precept:
in fact, he will all the more easily observe those things in
mellowed age.
'Furthermore, in all circumstances of life, in every place
and at all times, let them have friends or earnestly seek to
have them. Let them be well disposed toward the deserv-
ing, even toward those who do not look for it. For the
proud, let them be less concerned; and by no means are they
to become proud themselves. Let them live in a fitting and
decent manner. Supported by faith, hope, and love, let them
have God the object of their worship, their thinking, and
their striving. Let them desire tranquillity and a definite course
for their own studies and for those of all their associates;
and for themselves and for whomsoever else such things are
possible, a good mind and a quiet life. 5
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 303
Chapter 9
. (26) 'It remains for me to declare how instruction is to
be imparted to the studious youths who have resolved to
live after the manner described above. Likewise, with regard
to the acquiring of knowledge, we are of necessity led in a
twofold manner: by authority and by reason. In point of
time, authority is first; in the order of reality, reason is prior.
What takes precedence in operation is one thing; what is
more highly prized as an object of desire is something else.
Consequently, although the authority of upright men seems
to be the safer guide for the uninstructed multitude, reason
is better adapted for the educated. Furthermore, since no one
becomes learned except by ceasing to be unlearned, and since
no unlearned person knows in what quality he ought to present
himself to instructors or by what manner of life he may be-
come docile, it happens that for those who seek to learn great
and hidden truths authority alone opens the door. But, after
one has entered, then without any hesitation he begins to fol-
low the precepts of the perfect life. When he has become do-
cile through these precepts, then at length he will come to
know: (a) how much wisdom is embodied in those very pre-
cepts that he has been observing before understanding; (b)
what reason itself is, which he now strong and capable after
the cradle of authority follows and comprehends; (c) what
intellect is, in which all things are, or rather, which is itself the
sum total of all things; 1 (d) and what, beyond all things, is
1 The thought and expression are neo-Platonic. In the triad of Plotinus
the intellect (nous) is produced by One (t6 Hen) , and is itself the
source of other existences. In the Plotinian scheme the intellect contains
everything, as a genus includes the species, or the whole its parts
(Cf. Plptinus, Enneades 5.9.6; 2.2; 5.3) . Augustine identifies this sub-
sisting intellect of the Platonists -with the eternal Wisdom, the Word,
begotten eternally by the Father (Cf. De beata vita 4.34) .
304 SAINT AUGUSTINE
the source of all things. To this knowledge, few are able to
arrive In this life; even after this life, no one can exceed it.
'As to those who are content to follow authority alone and
who apply themselves constantly to right living and holy
desires, while they make no account of the liberal and fine
arts, or are incapable of being instructed in them I know
not how I could call them happy as long as they live among
men. 2 Nevertheless, I firmly believe that, upon leaving the
body, they will be liberated with greater facility or difficulty
according as they have lived the more virtuously or otherwise/
(27) 'Authority is, indeed, partly divine and partly hu-
man, but the true, solid and sovereign authority is that which
is called divine. In this matter there is to be feared the won-
derful deception of invisible beings that, by certain divina-
tions and numerous powers of things pertaining to the senses,
are accustomed to deceive with the utmost ease those souls
that are engrossed with perishable possessions, or eagerly
desirous of transitory power, or overawed by meaningless
prodigies.
'We must, therefore, accept as divine that Authority which
not only exceeds human power in its outward manifestations,
but also, in the very act of leading a man onward, shows
him to what extent It has debased Itself for his sake, and
bids him not to be confined to the senses, to which indeed
those things seem wondrous, but to soar upward to the in-
tellect. At the same time It shows him what great things It
is able to do, and why It does them, and how little importance
It attaches to them. For, it is fitting that by deeds It show
Its power; by humility, Its clemency; by commandment, Its
nature. And all this is being delivered to us so distinctly and
2 Cf. Retractationes 1.3.2.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 305
steadily by the sacred rites into which we are now being
initiated : therein the life of good men is most easily purified,
not indeed by the circumlocution of disputation, but by the
authority of the mysteries.
'But human authority is very often deceiving. 3 Yet it
rightly seems to show itself at its best in those men who pro-
pose various proofs for their teachings, insofar as the mind
of the unlearned can grasp them, and who do not live other-
wise than how they prescribe that one ought to live. If certain
goods of fortune accrue to these men, they reveal themselves
great men in the use of those things, but still greater in their
contempt of them; and then it is most difficult to lay blame
on anyone who puts trust in those men when they enunciate
principles of right living. 5
Chapter 10
(28) At this point, Alypius commented: 'A grand view of
life, a succinct but complete view, has been placed before
our eyes by you. And, although we daily hang upon your
teaching, today you have inflamed us with greater eagerness
and zeal for that life. And I would that not only we, but
also, if it were possible, all men were already arrived at that
3 It is not Augustine's intention to underestimate the value of human
authority as a source of true and certain knowledge: he but stresses the
absolutely infallible character of divine authority. In the De Trinitate
(15.12.21) , he upholds the validity of human testimony as a valid and
abundant source of human knowledge, representing it as an extension
of personal sense cognition by which one can avail himself of the sense
knowledge of others: 'But far be it from us to doubt the truth of those
things which we have learned through the corporeal senses And
far be it from us to say that we do not know the things which we
have learned by the testimony of others. ... It must be acknowledged
that not only our own corporeal senses, but also those of others,
have added very much to our knowledge.'
306 SAINT AUGUSTINE
manner of life and were attached thereto, so that what is so
marvelous to hear might, by universal example, be likewise
easy to practice. But truly, I cannot understand how the hu-
man mind and far from us be such an anomaly once
it has, by believing those heavenly maxims, proclaimed them
to be divine and absolutely true, can nevertheless behave so
otherwise in its inclinations: and for that reason I am thoro-
oughly convinced that men either are themselves divine or
must have divine assistance to live the kind of life you have
outlined.'
To him I replied: 'You know very well, Alypius, that those
rules of life which now,, as always, you receive with deligjit
are not of my invention, although they have been ex-
pressed in my words here and now in keeping with the
circumstances. Indeed, the books of men illustrious and al-
most divine are replete with them. Not on your account,
however, have I thought it necessary to make this observa-
tion, but for the sake of these boys, lest they condemn the
authority in those precepts as if it were mine. In fact, I do
not want them to believe anything whatever from me, ex-
cept insofar as I am teaching and giving a reason. And I
believe that you, too, interjected your observation for the
purpose of arousing them to the importance of the problem.
For, those rules are not difficult of observance for you, who
have taken hold of them with such eagerness and have en-
tered into them with all the zest of your admirable nature
that, though I am your teacher of words, you, on the other
hand, have become for me the exemplar of their practical
content. Indeed, there is neither cause nor occasion for pre-
tense at this time for I do not imagine that you become
more zealous by false praise and here present are those who
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 307
know both of us, and this dialogue will be sent to one to
whom neither of us is unknown.'
(29) 'Now, if you do not think otherwise than you have
spoken, I judge that you are of the opinion that men who are
good and devoted to right living are fewer than seems likely
to me. But many men are totally unknown to you. And, of
many who are not unknown, the qualities that are admirable
remain hidden, for they reside in the soul, which cannot be
perceived by any of the senses. As long as a man wishes
to conform to the converse of wicked men, he generally says
things which he may seem to approve or desire. Likewise,
he does many things reluctantly either to avoid the ill will
of men or to escape their jests. And, when we hear and see
these things, it is only with difficulty that we judge differently
than the senses report. Thus it happens that we judge many
not to be such as they are in their own eyes, or as their
intimate friends know them. I would have you persuaded
of this from certain great qualities of mind in our own
friends, which are known to us alone. Now, this mistake
arises from the fact and by no means an inconsequential
one that many persons are all of a sudden converted to
a good and edifying life, but, until they become notable by
some outstanding deeds, they are still believed to be what
.they used to be. Without going any further, who that has
known these youths, Licentius and Trygetius, would readily
believe that they were now so zealously in quest of sublime
truths and that they have suddenly and at this time of life
declared such antagonism to worldly pleasures? Let us, then,
dismiss this notion from our minds, for that divine assistance
to which, as was fitting, you made such reverent reference
towaxd the end of your remarks that divine assistance ful-
fills its office of mercy in favor of all peoples, and more
308 SAINT AUGUSTINE
abundantly than many imagine. But, if it is agreeable to you,
let us return to the order of our discussion, and since sufficient
has been said about authority, let us see what is the meaning of
reason/
Chapter 11
(30) 'Reason is a mental operation capable of distinguish-
ing and connecting the things that are learned. But, only a
rare class of men is capable of using it as a guide to the
knowledge of God or of the soul; either of the soul within
us or of the world-soul. 1 This is due to nothing else than
the fact that, for anyone who has advanced toward objects
of sense, it is difficult to return to himself. Wherefore, although
men strive to act entirely with reason in those things which
are liable to deceive, yet only a very few know what reason
is, or what its qualities are. This seems strange, but that is
how the matter stands. For the present, however, it is enough
to have said that much, for, even if I should wish to expound
the matter to you as it should be understood, my incompetence
would be equaled by my arrogance if I should profess that
I myself have grasped it already. Nevertheless, insofar as
reason has deigned to reveal itself in the things that appear
familiar to you, let us now examine it to the best of our ability,
1 A more direct and explicit reference to the Platonic theory of the
world-soul is made in the De immortalitate animae (15.24) : 'Hence
the body subsists through the soul and exists by the very fact that it
is animated; whether universally, as is the world; or individually, as
each and everything that has life within the world' (Cf. De musica
6.14.44.) . In the Retractationes, Augustine neither approves nor
rejects the theory of the world-soul. He does, however, acknowl-
edge that he has been rash (temere) in accepting as true something
not proved by reason or by faith: 'not because I can affirm this to be
false, but because I do not understand it to be true that the world
is something living' (1.11.4).
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 309
in accordance with the demands of the discussion we have
undertaken.'
(31) 'And first of all, let us see in what connection this
word which is called reason is wont to be used. Of particular
interest to us ought to be the fact that man has been defined
thus by the ancient philosophers: Man is an animal, rational
and mortal. In this definition, when the genus which is called
animal has been given, then we notice that two distinguish-
ing notes are added. And by those distinguishing notes, man,
I believe, was to be admonished both whither he is to return
and what he ought to flee, for, just as the soul's forward
movement has fallen down to the things that are mortal, so
ought its return be to reason. By the one term, rational)
man is distinguished from brute animals; by the other term,
mortal, he is distinguished from God. Therefore, unless it
holds fast to the rational element, it will be a beast; unless it
turns aside from the mortal element, it will not be divine.
'But, because very learned men are wont to distinguish
keenly and ingeniously between the rational [rationale] and
the reasonable [rationabile], such distinction is by no means
to be ignored in view of what we have undertaken. They
designate as rational whatever uses reason or possesses the
faculty of reasoning, but, whatever has been done or spoken
according to reason, that they call reasonable. Accordingly,
we could call these baths or our discourse reasonable; but,
him who constructed the baths, or ourselves who are now
discoursing, we could term rational. Reason, then, proceeds
from a rational soul into reasonable things which are done
or spoken.'
(32) 'I see, therefore, two things wherein the faculty and
power of reason can even be brought before the senses:
namely, the works of man which are seen and his words
310 SAINT AUGUSTINE
which are heard. In each case the mind uses a twin messen-
ger, the eye and the ear, according to the needs of the body.
Thus, when we behold something formed with well-fitting
parts, not absurdly do we say that it appears reasonably
[fashioned] . In like manner, when we hear a melody harmon-
ize well, we do not hesitate to say that it sounds reasonably
[harmonized], But, anyone would be laughed at if he should
say that something smells reasonably or tastes reasonably or is
reasonably tender, unless, perchance, in those things which
for some purpose have been contrived by men so to smell,
or taste, or glow, or anything else. For instance, if someone,
considering the reason why it was done, should say that a
place whence serpents are put to flight by pungent odors
emits smells reasonably; or that a potion which a physician
has prepared is reasonably bitter or sweet; or that the bath
which he ordered regulated for a sickly person is reasonably
warm or tepid. But no one, entering a garden and lifting a
rose to his nose, would venture to say: "How reasonably
sweet it smells!" No, not even if a physician should order him
to smell it indeed in that case, it is said to have been pre-
scribed or offered reasonably, but not to smell reasonably
and still not, because that odor is a natural one. And, even
though food be seasoned by a cook, we still may say that it is
reasonably seasoned. But, in accordance with accepted usage,
it is not said to taste reasonably, whenever without any extrinsic
cause it satisfies a momentary craving. But, if he to whom
a physician has given a potion should be asked why he ought
to think it sweet, then something else is implied as the reason
for his thinking so, namely, the nature of his illness, which
is not in the sense, but is otherwise present in the body. On
the other hand, if one is licking something because he is
incited by the stimulus of the palate if he should be asked
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 311
why it is sweet> and if he should reply: "Because it is pleasant"
or "Because I like it," no one will call it reasonably sweet
unless, perhaps, its delight is necessary for something, and
what he is chewing has been sweetened for that very purpose/
(33) 'In so far as we have been able to investigate, we
now detect certain traces of reason in the senses, and, with
regard to sight and hearing, we find it in pleasure itself.
Other senses, however, usually demand this attribute, not
because of the pleasure they afford, but because of some-
thing else, for a purposeful act is the characteristic of a
rational animal. With regard to the eyes, that is usually called
beautiful in which the harmony of parts is wont to be called
reasonable; with regard to the ears, when we say that a
harmony is reasonable and that a rhythmic poem is reasonably
composed, we properly call it sweet. But, we are not wont to
pronounce it reasonable when the color in beautiful objects
allures us or when a vibrant chord sounds pure and liquid,
so to speak. We must therefore acknowledge that, in the
pleasure of those senses, what pertains to reason is that in
which there is a certain rhythmic measure.'
(34) 'Wherefore, considering carefully the parts of this
very building, we cannot but be displeased because we see
one doorway . toward the side and another situated almost,
but not exactly, in the middle. In things constructed, a pro-
portion of parts that is faulty, without any compelling neces-
sity, unquestionably seems to inflict, as it were, a kind of in-
jury upon one's gaze. But, the fact that three windows inside,
one in the middle and two at the sides, pour light at equal
intervals on the bathing place how much that delights
and enraptures us as we gaze attentively is a thing already
manifest, and need not be shown to you in many words. In
their own terminology, architects themselves call this design,
312 SAINT AUGUSTINE
and they say that parts unsymmetrically placed are without
design.
'This is very general; it pervades all the arts and creations
of man. Who, indeed, does not see that in songs and we
likewise say that in them there is a sweetness that pertains
to the ears rhythm is the producer of all this sweetness?
But when an actor is dancing, although a certain rhythmic
movement of his limhs may indeed afford delight by that
same rhythm, yet, since to the attentive spectators all his
gestures are signs of things, the dance itself is called reason-
able, because it aptly signifies and exhibits something over and
above the delight of the senses. And, even if he should represent
a winged Venus and a cloaked Cupid, how skillfully so ever
he may depict it by a wonderful movement and posture of
the body, he does not seem to offend the eyes, but through
the eyes he would offend the mind, to which those signs
of things are exhibited. The eyes would be offended if the
movements were not graceful, for that pertains to the sense,
in which the soul perceives delight precisely because it is
united with the body.
Therefore, delight of the sense is one thing; delight through
the sense is something else. Graceful movement delights the
sense, but the timely import of the movement delights the
mind alone through the sense. This is more easily noticed
in the case of hearing: whatever has a pleasing sound, that
it is which pleases and entices the hearing itself. What is
really signified by that sound, that is what is borne to the
mind, though by the messenger of our hearing. And so, when
we hear these lines "Why do the suns in the winter rapidly
sink in the ocean? What is the hindrance that holds back late-
coming nights in the summer?"* our praise of the meter is
2 Virgil, Georgics 2.481-482.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 313
one thing, but our praise of the meaning is something else.
Neither is it in the same sense of the term that we say: "It
sounds reasonable" and "It is spoken reasonably." *
Chapter 12
(35) There are, then, three classes of things in which
that "something reasonable" is to be seen. One is in actions di-
rected toward an end; the second, in discourse; the third, in
pleasure. The first admonishes us to do nothing without pur-
pose; the second, to teach correctly; the last, to find delight
in contemplation. The first deals with right living; the other
two, with those branches of learning which we are now con-
sidering. Now, that which is rational in us, that which uses
reason and either produces or seeks after the things that are
reasonable saw that names, or meaningful sounds, had to
be assigned to things, so that men might use the sense almost
as an interpreter to link them together, inasmuch as they
could not perceive one another's minds. For reason was held
fast by a certain natural bond in the fellowship of those with
whom it possessed reason as a common heritage, since men
could not be most firmly associated unless they conversed
and thus poured, so to speak, their minds and thoughts back
and forth to one another. But, they could not hear the words
of those not present. Therefore, reason, having carefully noted
and discriminated all the sounds of the mouth and tongue,
invented letters. But, it could have done neither of these, if
the vast number of things seemed to extend endlessly without
any fixed limit. Therefore, the great utility of enumerating was
brought to mind by its very necessity. When these two dis-
coveries had been made, then arose the profession of copyists
and calculators the infancy of grammar, so to speak, which
314 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Varro calls liter atio. What it is called in Greek, I do not recall
just now/
(36) 'When reason had gone further, it noticed that, of
those oral sounds which we used in speaking and which it
had already designated by letters, there were some which by
a varied modulation of the parted lips flowed clear and pure
from the throat without any friction; that others acquired a
certain kind of sound from the diversified pressure of the
lips; and that there were still other sounds which could not
issue forth unless they were conjoined with these. Accord-
ingly, it denominated the letters in the order of their ex-
position: vowels, semivowels, . and mutes. In the next place,
it took account of syllables. Then, words were grouped into
eight classes and forms, and their entire evolvement, purity,
and articulation were skillfully and minutely differentiated.
Furthermore, not unmindful of numbers and measure, it di-
rected the mind to the different lengths of vocal sounds and
syllables, and thereby it discovered that of the time-intervals
through which the long and the short syllables were extended,
some were double and others were simple. It noted these
points as well, and reduced them to fixed rules.
(37 ) The science of grammar could now have been com-
plete. But, since by its very name it proclaims that it knows
letters 1 indeed on this account it is called "literature" in
Latin it came to pass that whatever was committed to
letters as worth remembering necessarily pertained to it. And
in this way history was added to this science. For, its name
is one, but its subject matter is undefined and many-sided,
and is filled more with cares than with enjoyment or truth,
and more burdensome to grammarians than to the historians
themselves. Who, indeed, would tolerate the imputing of
1 Grammar, derived from grapho, to write, and gramma, meaning letter.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 315
ignorance to a man who has not heard that Daedalus flew,
and not the imputing of mendacity to the man who invented
the fable; folly to anyone who believed it, and impudence to
him who questions anyone about it? Or the case in which
1 always feel great pity for those of our household who are
accused of ignorance if they cannot answer what the name of
the mother of Euryalus 2 was, since they, in turn, would not
dare to call their questioners vain, absurd, or unduly in-
quisitive? 5
Chapter 13
(38) 'When the science of grammar had been perfected
and systematized, reason was then reminded to search out and
consider the very power by which it produced art, for, by
definition, division, and synthesis it not only had made it
orderly and syntactical, but also had guarded it against every
subtle encroachment of error. How, therefore, would it pass
on to other discoveries, unless it first classified, noted, and
arranged its own resources its tools and machines, so to
speak and bring into being that discipline of disciplines
which they call dialectics? This science teaches both how to
teach and how to learn. In it, reason itself exhibits itself,
and reveals its own nature, its desires, its powers. It knows
what knowledge is; by itself, it not only wishes to make men
learned, but also can make them so. Yet, because in the
pursuit of the things which are rightly commended as useful
and upright, unwise men generally follow their own feelings
and habits rather than the very marrow of truth which
indeed only a very exceptional mind beholds it was necessary
that they not only be taught to the extent of their ability, but
2 Cf. Virgil, Aeneid 5.294 ff.
3 1 6 SAINT AUGUSTINE
also frequently and strongly aroused as to their emotions.
To the portion of itself which would accomplish this a por-
tion more replete with lack than with enlightment, its lap
heaped high with charms which it would scatter to the crowd
so that the crowd might deign to be influenced for its own
good to this portion, it gave the name of rhetoric. And so,
the part which is called reasonable in discourse has been
advanced to this point by the liberal arts and disciplines. 3
Chapter 14
(39) Trom this point, reason wished to be straightway
transported to the most blessed contemplation of things
divine. But, lest it fall from on high, it sought steps of ascent
and devised an orderly path for itself through the slopes
it had already won. It longed for a beauty which it alone
could behold by itself without these eyes of ours; but it was
impeded by the senses. Therefore, it turned its gaze slightly
toward those senses, for they, shouting with noisy impor-
tunity that they possessed truth, kept calling it back when
it fain would hasten to other things. And it began with the
ears, because they claimed as their own the very words from
which it had fashioned grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric. But
reason, being endowed with the keenest powers of discern-
ment, quickly saw what difference there was between sound
itself and that of which it was a symbol. It saw that to the
jurisdiction of the ears pertained nothing more than sound,
and that this was threefold: sound in tide utterance of an
animate being, or sound in what breath produces in musical
instruments, or sound in what is given forth fey percussion.
It saw that to the first class pertained actors of tragedy and
comedy or stageplayers of this kind, and in fact all who give
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 317
vocal renditions; that the second class was restricted to flutes
and similar instruments; and that to the third class were
attributed the cithara, the lyre, cymbals, and everything that
would be tonal on being struck/
(40) 'Reason saw, however, that this material was of very
little value, unless the sounds were arranged in a fixed meas-
ure of time and in modulated variation of high and low
pitch. It realized that it was from this source that those ele-
ments came which it had called feet and accents, when, in
grammar, it was treating of syllables with diligent considera-
tion. And, because in words themselves it was easy to notice
the syllabic longs and shorts, interspersed with almost equal
frequency in a discourse, reason endeavored to arrange and
conjoin them into definite series. At first it followed the sense
of hearing itself in this, and superimposed measured link-
units, which it called segments and members. ''Then., lest the
series of feet be carried further than its discernment could
continue, it set a limit at which reversion to the beginning
should be made, and, precisely on this account, called it
verse. But, whatever was not restricted by a definite limit,
and yet ran according to methodically arranged feet that,
it designated by the term rhythm. In Latin this can be called
nothing other than number. Thus, poets were begotten of
reason. And, when it saw in them great achievements, not in
sound alone, but in words also and realities, it honored them to
the utmost, and gave them license for whatever reasonable
fictions they might desire. And yet, because they took origin
from the first of the liberal disciplines, it permitted gram-
marians to be their critics.'
(41) 'Reason understood, therefore, that in this fourth
step of ascent whether in particular rhythm or in modulation
in general numeric proportions held sway and produced
318 SAINT AUGUSTINE
the finished product. With the utmost diligence It investi-
gated as to what their nature might be, and, chiefly because
by their aid it had elaborated all the aforesaid developments,
it concluded that they were divine and eternal. From then
onwards, it most reluctantly endured their splendor and seren-
ity to be clouded by the material stuff of vocal utterances.
And, because whatever the mind is able to see is always pres-
ent and is acknowledged to be immortal, numeric proportions
seemed to be of this nature. But, because sound is something
sensible, it flows away into the past and is imprinted on the
memory. By a reasonable fiction it was fabled that the Muses
were the daughters of Jupiter and Memory. Now, with reason
bestowing its favor on the poets, need it be asked what the
offspring likewise contained? Since this branch of learning
partakes as well of sense as of the intellect, it received the
name of music'
Chapter 15
(42) 'From this stage, reason advanced to the province
of the eyes. Scanning the earth and the heavens, it realized
that nothing pleased it but beauty; and in beauty, design;
and in design, dimensions; and in dimensions, number. It
asked itself whether any line or curve or any other form
or shape in that realm was of such kind as intelligence com-
prehended. It found that they were far inferior, and that
nothing which the eyes beheld could in any way be com-
pared with what the mind discerned. These distinct and
separate realities it also reduced to a branch of learning, and
called it geometry.
The movement of the heavens also aroused and invited
reason to consider it diligently. And there, too, because of
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 319
the most constant alternations of the seasons, as well as the
fixed and unerring courses of the stars and the regulated
spacing of distance, it understood that nothing other than
dimension and number held sway. Linking these, also, into
an orderly whole by definition and division, it gave rise to
astrology a great subject for the God-fearing, but a tor-
ment for the curious.'
(43) 'In all these branches of study, therefore, all things
were being presented to reason as numerically proportioned.
And they were all the more clearly visible in those dimen-
sions which reason, by reflection and contemplation, beheld
as most true; but it used to recall rather the shadows and
vestiges of those dimensions in the things that are perceived
by the senses. Then, reason gained much courage and pre-
conceived a great achievement; it ventured to prove the soul
immortal. It treated diligently of all things. It came to feel
that it possessed great power, and that it owed all its power
to numerical proportions. Something wondrous urged it on.
And it began to suspect that it itself was perhaps the very
number by which all things are numbered, or if not, that
this number was there whither it was striving to arrive. And
he of whom Alypius made mention when we were treating
of the Skeptics, 1 grasped with all his might as if Proteus 2
were in his hands this number which would be the dis-
closer of universal truth. But, false images of the things which
we number drift away from that most hidden something
by which we enumerate, snatch our attention to themselves,
and frequently make that hidden something slip away even
when it has been already in our grasp.*
1 Cf. Contra Academicos 3.5.11.
2 The sea-god who was considered capable of assuming various forms.
320 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Chapter 16
(44) 'If a man does not yield to these images, and if he
reduces to a simple, true, and certain unity all the things that
are scattered far and wide throughout so many branches of
study, then he is most deserving of the attribute learned.
Then, without being rash, he can search after things divine
not merely as truths to be believed, but also as matters to
be contemplated, understood, and retained. But, whoever is
still a slave to his passions, or is keenly desirous of perishable
goods, or even though he flee from these and live a virtuous
life, yet if he does not know what pure nothing is, what form-
less matter is, what a lifeless informed being is, what a body
is, what species in a body is, what place and time are, what
in a place and at a time signify, what local motion is, what
non-local motion is, what stable motion is, what eternity
is, what it is to be neither in a place nor nowhere, what is
beyond time and forever, what it is to be nowhere and nowhere
not to be, what it is to be never and never not to be anyone
who does not know these matters, and yet wishes to question
and dispute about even his own soul let alone investigating
about the Most High God, who is better known by knowing
what He is not 1 such a one will fall into every possible error.
1 In this passage as well as in Chapter 18, Augustine outlines a sane
and legitimate middle course between the extreme of ontologism and
agnosticism in the problem of the knowledge of the Divine Nature,
His description of this negative knowledge of God corresponds with
the celebrated via negationis sen remotionis of the Scholastics, which,
as St. Thomas declares, constitutes the principal source of our knowl-
edge of the nature of God: 'The method of negation is to be chiefly
used in the consideration of the Divine Substance' (Contra Gentiles
1.14) .
In De Trinitate (8.2.) , Augustine stresses the usefulness of negative
knowledge of God as a kind of preliminary dialectic to a more
direct notion of the Divine Nature: 'If, before we are able to know
what God is, we are yet able to know what He is not that is a part
of knowledge which is not unimportant.'
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
'But then, whoever has grasped the meaning of simple a'nd
intelligible numbers will readily understand these matters.
Furthermore, anyone of good talents and leisure through
the privilege of age or any kind of good fortune if he be
eagerly devoted to study and if he follow the above-mentioned
order of studies in so far as is required, will certainly compre-
hend such numbers. But since all the liberal arts are learned
partly for practical use and partly for the knowledge and con-
templation of things, to attain the use of them is very difficult
except for some very gifted person who even from boyhood
has earnestly and constantly applied himself.'
Chapter 17
(45 ) 'But I pray you, mother, let not this immense seem-
ing forest of things deter you, just because we have need of
some of them for what we are investigating. Out of all of
them, certain ones will be selected, few in number, but fore-
most in importance. For many persons, to be sure, they are
difficult to learn. But for you, whose talents are brought
home to me anew every day and I know that your mind,
far removed from all frivolity, both by reason of your age
and because of your remarkable moderation, and now rising
above the abject misery of the body, has already risen to
great heights within itself for you, those matters will be
as easy as they are difficult for duller souls who live most
wretchedly. Of course, if I should say that you would easily
acquire a mode of expression that would be free from defect
of pronunciation and diction, I would indeed misrepresent
the truth. Even I, for whom a thorough study of these mat-
ters has been a dire necessity, am nevertheless censured by
the Italians for my pronunciation of many words; they, in
322 SAINT AUGUSTINE
turn, are taken to task by me with regard to pronunciation
itself. The assurance that comes from theory is one thing;
that gained by nativeness is quite different. And it is likely
that any learned man, giving careful attention, would discover
so-called solecisms in my speech. For, there was not wanting
a man who very skillfully convinced me that Cicero himself
committed many blunders of this sort. In fact, such a variety
of barbarisms has been discovered in our day that even that
oration 1 of his, by which Rome was saved, now seems barbar-
ous. But you, disregarding these and other irrelevant or puerile
matters, grasp the almost heavenly power and nature of
grammar, and with so much discernment that you seem to
have taken hold of its very soul, and to have left its body
for the eloquent.'
(46) 'And, of course, I could say this also about the other
studies of this kind. And if, perchance, you despise them
completely, I advise you in so far as I may, as your son,
presume to do so, and to the extent that you permit to
preserve steadfastly and carefully that faith of yours, of which
you have a mental grasp through the sacred mysteries; further-
more, I advise you to continue in this way and habit of life
with constancy and vigilance. But, concerning matters that
are most abstruse, and yet pertain to God (a) how so many
evils come to pass, although God is omnipotent, and effects
nothing evil; (b) for what purpose did He make the world,
though He had need of nothing; (c) whether evil always was,
or began in time; (d) and if it always was, then was it under
God's control; (e) and if it was, then whether this world also,
wherein that evil is curbed by divine order, always was;
(f ) but if the world had a beginning sometime, how was evil
held in check by divine power before that time; (g) what
1 In Catilinam.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 323
need was there to construct a world in which evil, which
divine power had already controlled, was included for the
punishment of souls; (h) if, however, there was a time when
evil was not under God's dominion, what suddenly happened
which had not happened before throughout the eternal years?
Now it would be most absurd to say nothing about the
impiety of it to assert that in God there has ever been a
change of mind. But, if we say that evil had been trouble-
some and, as it were, antagonistic to God as very many
think no learned man will repress his laughter, and every un-
learned man will be indignant. What harm, indeed, could
that indescribable nature of evil do to God? If they say that
it could do none, then there will be no reason for the creation
of the world, but if they say that it could do some why, it
is an inexpiable crime to maintain that God is subject to
injury, or that He has not at least provided by His power
that His nature should suffer no injury. In fact, they acknowl-
edge that a soul suffers punishments here, although they would
have it that there is absolutely no difference between the sub-
stance of God and that of the soul. 2 But, if they say that
this world was not made, to believe this would involve both
impiety and ingratitude, lest this consequence ensue: that
God has not made it. So, any investigation concerning these
and similar matters is to be made according to that order or
not at all.'
Chapter 18
(47) 'And, lest anyone think that we have embraced
something very extensive, I 'say this plainly and in a few
2 The reference is to the Manichaean doctrine that human souls are
homogeneous members and parts of the substance of God, (Cf.
Contra Faustum 22.98) .
324 SAINT AUGUSTINE
words: that no one ought to aspire to a knowledge of those
matters without that twofold science, so to speak the science
of right reasoning and that of the power of numbers. And, if
anyone thinks that this is indeed a great deal, let him master
either numbers alone or only dialectics. But, if even this seems
limitless, let him merely get a thorough understanding of
what unity in numbers is, and what its import is not yet
in that supreme law and order of all things, but in the things
that we think and do here and there every day. The science
of philosophy has already adopted this learning and has dis-
covered in it nothing more than what unity is, but in a manner
far more profound and sublime.
To philosophy pertains a twofold question : the first treats
of the soul; the second, of God. 1 The first makes us know
ourselves; the second, our origin. The former is the more
delightful to us; the latter, more precious. The former makes
us fit for a happy life; the latter renders us happy. The first
is for beginners; the latter, for the well instructed. This is the
order of wisdom's branches of study by which one becomes
competent to grasp the order of things and to discern two
worlds and the very Author of the universe, of whom the
soul has no knowledge save to know how it knows Him not.'
(48) The soul, therefore, holding fast to this order, and
now devoted to philosophy, at first introspects itself; and as
soon as that mode of learning has persuaded it that reason
either is the soul itself or belongs to it, and that there is in
reason nothing more excellent or dominant than numbers,
or that reason is nothing else than number soliloquizes thus:
1 Augustine's terse statement of the twofold object of philosophy is
repeated several times in, his next work, the Soliloquies (L2*7) , where
God and the soul are made the principal themes: 'I long to know
God, and I long to know my soul. Nothing more? Absolutely nothing'
(Cf. Ibid. 2.U) .
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 325
"By some kind of Inner and hidden activity of mine, I am
able to analyze and synthesize the things that ought to be
learned; and this faculty of mine is called reason." As a matter
of fact, what ought to be analyzed except what is reputed
to have unity, but either has no unity whatever or has less
of it than it is believed to have? And, likewise, why must
something be synthesized, unless in order that it become one,
in so far as it is capable? Therefore, both in analyzing and in
synthesizing, it is oneness that I seek, it is oneness that I love.
But when I analyze, I seek a homogeneous unit; when I syn-
thesize, I look for an integral unit. In the former case, foreign
elements are* avoided; in the latter, proper elements are
conjoined to form something united and perfect. In order
that a stone be a stone, all its parts and its entire nature
have been consolidated into one. What about a tree? Is it not
true that it would not be a tree if it were not one? What
about the members and entrails of any animate being, or
any of its component parts? Of a certainty, if they undergo
a severance of unity, it will no longer be an animal. And,
what else do friends strive for, but to be one? The more they
are one, so much the more are they friends. A population
forms a city, and dissension is full of danger for it: to dissent
[dis-sentire] what is that, but to think diversely? An army
is made up of many soldiers. And is not any multitude so
much the less easily defeated in proportion as it is the more
closely united? In fact, the joining is itself called a coin, a
co-union, as it were. What about every kind of love? Does
it not wish to become one with what it is loving? And, if it
reaches its object, does it not become one with it? Carnal plea-
sure affords such ardent delight for no other reason then be-
cause the bodies of lovers are brought into union. Why is
sorrow distressful? Because it tries to rend what used to be
326 SAINT AUGUSTINE
one Therefore, It is troublesome and dangerous to become
one with what can be separated. 3
Chapter 19
(49) 'Out of several pieces of material hitherto lying
around in scattered fashion and then assembled into one
design, I can make a house. If, indeed, I am the maker and
it is made, then I am the more excellent, and the more excel-
lent precisely because I am the maker. There is no doubt
that I am on that account more excellent than a house. But,
not on that account am I more excellent than a swallow or
a small bee, for skillfully does the one build nests, and the
other construct honey-combs. I am, however, more excellent
than they because I am a rational creature.
'Now, if reason is found in calculated measurements, does
it follow that the work of birds is not accurately and aptly
measured? Nay, it is most accurately and aptly proportioned.
Therefore, it is not by making well-measured things, but by
grasping the nature of numbers, that I am the more excel-
lent. What then? Have the birds been able to build care-
fully constructed nests without knowing it? Assuredly, they
have. How is this shown? By the fact that we, too, accom-
modate the tongue to the teeth and palate by fixed measure-
ments, so that letters and words rush forth from the mouth,
and, when we are speaking, we are not thinking of the oral
movement by which we ought to do that. Moreover, what
good singer, even though he be unskilled in the art of music,
would not, by that same natural sense, keep in his singing
both the rhythm and the melody known by memory? And
what can become more subject to measure than this? The
uninstructed man has no knowledge of it. Nevertheless, he
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 327
does it by nature's doing. But, why is man superior to brute
animals, and why is he to be ranked above them? Because
he understands what he does. Nothing else ranks me above
the brute animal except the fact that I am a rational animal/
(50) 'Then, how is it that reason is immortal, and I am
defined as something both rational and mortal at the same
time? Perhaps reason is not immortal? But, one to two, or
two to four, is a ratio in the truest sense. That ratio was no
truer yesterday than today, nor will it be truer tomorrow
or a year hence. Even if the whole world should fall in
ruins, that ratio will always necessarily be: it will always
be such as it is now. Contrariwise, what the world has today
it did not have yesterday and it will not have it tomorrow.
In fact, not even for the course of an hour during this very
day has it had the sun in the same position. And so, since
nothing in it is permanent, it does not have anything in the
same way for even the shortest interval of time.
Therefore, if reason is immortal, and if I who analyze and
synthesize all those things am reason, then that by which I
am called mortal is not mine. Or if the soul is not the same
as reason, and I nevertheless use reason, and, if through rea-
son I am superior, then we ought to take flight from the
lesser good to the greater, from the mortal to the immortal.
The well-instructed soul tells itself all this and more besides,
and ponders over them. But I prefer to attend to them no
further now, lest, while I am longing to teach you order, I
myself should exceed moderation, the parent of order. In-
deed, it is not by faith alone, but by trustworthy reason, that
the soul leads itself little by little to most virtuous habits
and the perfect life. For, to the soul that diligently considers
the nature and the power of numbers, it will appear mani-
festly unfitting and most deplorable that it should write a
328 SAINT AUGUSTINE
rhythmic line and play the harp by virtue of this knowledge,
and that its life and very self which is the soul should
nevertheless follow a crooked path and, under the domina-
tion of lust, be out of tune by the clangor of shameful vices.*
(51) 'But, when the soul has properly adjusted and
disposed itself, and has rendered itself harmonious and beauti-
ful, then will it venture to see God, the very source of all
truth and the very Father of Truth. O great God, what kind
of eyes shall those be! How pure! How beautiful! How
powerful! How constant! How serene! How blessed! And
what is that which they can see! What is it? I ask. What
should we surmise? What should we believe? What should
we say? Everyday expressions present themselves, but they
have been rendered sordid by things of least worth. I shall
say no more, except that to us is promised a vision of
beauty the beauty through whose imitation all other things
are beautiful, and by comparison with which all other things
are unsightly. Whosoever will have glimpsed this beauty
and he will see it who lives well, prays well, studies well
when will it ever trouble him why one man, desiring to have
children, has them not, while another man casts out his own
offspring as being unduly numerous; why one man hates
children before they are bora, and another man loves them
after birth; or how is it not absurd that nothing will come to
pass which is not with God and, therefore, it is inevitable
that all things come into being in accordance with order
and nevertheless God is not petitioned in vain?
'Finally, how will any burdens, dangers, scorns, or smiles
of fortune disturb a just man? In this world of sense, it is
indeed necessary to examine carefully what time and place
are, so that what delights in a portion of place or time may
be understood to be far less beautiful than the whole of which
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 329
it is a portion. And furthermore, it is clear to a learned man
that what displeases in a portion displeases for no other
reason than because the whole, with which that portion
harmonizes wonderfully, is not seen, but that, in the intelligible
world, every part is as beautiful and perfect as the whole.
'These matters will be discussed at greater length if, as I
earnestly advise and hope, your zeal will have decided to
follow either that order mentioned by us or perhaps another
order more concise and appropriate but, at any rate, a
right order and will have seriously and consistently held it.*
Chapter 20
(52) 'In order that this be granted us, our greatest ef-
forts should be for a life most virtuous; otherwise, our God
will not be able to hear us. 1 On the other hand, He will
most readily hear those whose lives are upright. Let our
prayers not be, therefore, that wealth or honors or any fleet-
ing and changeful things of that sort come to us things
that quickly pass away, no matter who may strive to hold
them. Rather, let us pray for what will make us virtuous
and happy. And, mother, to the end that these petitions be
most observantly made, we enjoin the charge on you, through
whose prayers I unhesitatingly believe and proclaim that God
has given me this resolve: to prize nothing more highly than
the finding of truth, to wish for, to think of, to love nothing
else. And I furthermore believe that through your petition-
ing we shall obtain the great blessing which through your
meriting we have come to desire. But as for you, Alypius,
why should I give either exhortation or advice? Indeed, the
only reason why you are not already overzealous is that love
1 Cf. Retractationes 1.3.3.
330 SAINT AUGUSTINE
for such things as these, be it ever so great, can never be
rightly called excessive; rather, can it always perhaps be
called deficient.'
(53) Then Alypius said: 'You have truly brought it to
pass that we, by reason of daily consideration and the ad-
miration which we have for you at the present time, not
only do not regard as doubtful the memory of very learned
and great men which at times, in view of the magnitude
of their achievements, seemed incredible but rather that
we are now able to affirm it by oath, if need be. And what
has been disclosed almost to our very eyes by you today?
Is it not that venerable and almost divine teaching which is
rightly attributed to Pythagoras 2 in fact, proved to be his?
You have indicated both the rules of life, and not so much
the paths of knowledge as its broad fields and limpid seas
themselves, and what rightly wins admiration for that man
where the very shrines of truth are, what they are like,
and what kind of people seek to find them. And you have
done all this with such brevity and completeness that, al-
though we suspect and believe that you know truths still
more hidden, yet we could not but believe ourselves rude if
we thought that anything further should be exacted from
you/
(54) C I gladly accept that,' I replied. e lt is not so much
your words which are not true as the genuine affection in
your words that delights and comforts me. And it is well
that we have decided to send these records to a man who
usually takes great delight in telling many untruths about us.
And, even if others perchance read them, I have no fear that
they will be angry with you: who, indeed, would not most
willingly pardon a devotee's error of judgment?
2 Cf. Ibid.
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 331
'But that you mentioned Pythagoras I truly believe it
came to your mind through that unseen divine order, what-
ever it may be. For I had entirely overlooked a very im-
portant point, which, if we ought to believe anything from
history and, after all, who would not believe Varro? I
am wont to admire in Pythagoras, and, as you well know,
to proclaim by almost daily praise; namely, that he taught the
science of government last of all, taught it to disciples al-
ready learned, of mature years, already wise and happy. He
indeed saw the political tempests to be of such magnitude
that he was unwilling to commit anyone to them except a
man who, in governing, would almost like a god avoid
destructive rocks, and who, if all things failed, would him-
self become, as it were, a rock against the waves. Of the
wise man only can it be truly said: " Calmly he stands, like
a motionless rock in the turbulent sea-surge"* and the othei
things which have been expressed in splendid verses on this
point/
Here the discussion was brought \o a close; and when a
night lamp had been fetched, we dismissed the meeting, while
all were filled with joy and abundant hope. 4
5 Virgil, Aeneid 7.585.
4 The several references to the Retractationes in the footnotes need
further explanation. In the forty-five years after his sojourn at Gas-
siciacum, Augustine's mind became more mature and he came to see
the need of modifying several of his initial efforts in philosophy. In
the Retractationes, or revisions, he comments as follows on De ordine:
'When I saw that the subject difficult indeed to understand could
not by disputation be brought to the comprehension of those with
whom I was dealing, I preferred to talk about an Order of Study }
by which advance can be made from corporeal things to the incorporeal.
'In these books, too, I am displeased (a) with the frequent intrusion
of the word, fortune; (b) with the fact that I did not add the term
corporeal, when I mentioned the bodily senses; (c) because I attributed
a great deal to the liberal arts, of which many saintly men are much in
ignorance, and with which many who are not saintly are thoroughly
conversant; (d) because I referred to the Muses, though by way of
332 SAINT AUGUSTINE
pleasantry, as goddesses of a kind; (e) because I called wonderment a
*. ~ . ,n i . ~ r _i._j._ j kU *. _iu ;i/~i<*,nvt.l-i.ckY>e> xrl-r lor-lr <"rnp k rM<pfv \AT(*rf
teaching of Plato or the Platonic philosophers, but as my own, as if
the Lord Himself wished to indicate this, because He does not say: My
kingdom is not of the world/' but "My kingdom is not of this world/*
although the saying can be found in some utterance of His [John 18.36 1.
But, even if another world was indicated by Christ the Lord, it could
the more fittingly be understood as that one in which there will be
a new heaven and a new earth, when that has been accomplished for
which we pray when we say, "Thy kingdom come." Yet, if we will
but attend to Plato's real meaning rather than to the word a word
which, certainly in ecclesiastical usage, is not employed in that con-
nectionPlato was really not in error just because he affirmed the
existence of an intelligible world. The eternal and unchangeable
Wisdom Itself by which God made the world that he called the
intelligible world. Now, if anyone denies the existence of this eternal
Wisdom, then logically-if a plan of creation was not present to
God he must hold that without any plan God made what He made,
or that, either when He made it or before He made it, He did not
know what He made or would make. However, if a plan was present
with God, as indeed it was, then Plato seems to have called that the
intelligible world. We would not have employed that term, however,
if we had been sufficiently instructed in ecclesiastical writings.
'Neither am I pleased by the fact that when I had said, "Our greatest
efforts should be for a most virtuous life/* I added, "For otherwise
our God will not be able to hear us; but He will most readily hear
those whose lives are upright/' This was said in such a way as to imply
that God does not hear sinners. A certain character in the Gospel
did indeed say that, but it was the man who had not yet come to
know Christ by whom he had just been restored to bodily sight. Nor
does it please me that I lavished on the philosopher Pythagoras so
much praise that whoever hears or reads it could believe I thought
there were no errors in the teachings of Pythagoras, whereas there are
many, and they are fundamental/
(Soliloquia]
Translated
by
THOMAS F. GILLIGAN, O.S.A., M.A.
Villanova College
NIHIL OBSTAT:
HENRY A. CAFFREY, O.S.A.
CENSOR DEPUTATUS.
IMPRIMI POTEST:
VERY REV. JOHN T. SHEEHAN, O.S.A., J.C.D.
PRIOR PROVINCIAL.
NIHIL OBSTAT:
JOSEPH A. M. QUIGLEY, J.C.D.
CENSOR LIBRORUM.
IMPRIMATUR:
j% D. CARDINAL DOUGHERTY
ARCHBISHOP OF PHILADELPHIA.
Philadelphia, June 9, 1943
INTRODUCTION
j HE LONG AND DIFFICULT ROAD of Augustine's Struggle
to the faith of his mother Monica ended at last
in the garden at Milan. There, as he describes it
for us in one of the most poignant scenes in all the literature
of conversion, he took up and read the Book of the Apostle
Paul at the bidding of the voice of an unseen child. 'Instantly,
as by a clear and constant light infused into my heart, the
darkness of all former doubts was driven away.*
This was in mid-summer, 386. He would not, however,
be baptized until he had passed some time as a catechumen.
In fact, it was only at Easter of the following year that the
Bishop of Milan, St. Ambrose, poured on him the saving
waters of the sacrament. In the meantime he devoted himself
to study and prayer. He was, during these days, in wretched
health. The heat of the summer and his arduous teaching
schedule had exhausted him. He was suffering from a malady
of the lungs which made speaking difficult and enabled him
to retire gracefully from a profession which had grown dis-
tasteful to him. His teeth, too, caused him such constant
pain that at times he could scarcely read or think. Fortunately,
at this time a good friend of his, Verecundus, who was him-
self not yet of the faith, but who had a Catholic wife, offered
him the use of his villa in the hills outside Milan.
To this pleasant and cool country retreat at Cassiciacum,
Augustine repaired with a few chosen friends. Monica, his
saintly mother, rejoicing by this time in the marvel of her
son's conversion, accompanied him. With him also went
Alypius, his dearest friend; Navigius, his brother; two cousins,
335
336 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Lastidiaims and Rusticus; his son, Adeodatus; and the two
pupils, Licentius and Trygetius. With these well-beloved kins-
men and friends Augustine passed many serene and happy
days. Here, in the clear, cool air of the mountains, his health
soon improved and a great peace of soul comforted him. The
burden of management of the estate which fell upon Augus-
tine himself took some of his time, but was not demanding
enough to interfere with his chosen pursuits. He read and
reread, rejoiced and wept over the Psalms of David, He
prayed and glorified God for the grace of his conversion. He
wrote a few letters, chiefly to his friend Nebridius. But, what
he liked most of au was to gather around him his dear
friends at the villa for a discussion of the great problems of
philosophy and religion. For him, as he tells us in the Solilo-
quies, this was one of life's choicest blessings: to have his
friends -around him 'so that we can all at the same time
and in unity of heart seek our souls and God.'
The fruit of these various philosophical discussions is con-
tained in the dialogues of Cassiciacum, which give abundant
evidence of the excellence of this method of learning and
teaching. In the form of dialogue, as used before him by
Plato and Cicero, we have the most fundamental questions
of his own day and of all time debated for us by a masterful
teacher and his brilliant and admiring disciples. The problem
of knowledge, the vindication of the mind's ability to acquire
certitude, are presented to us in the Contra Academicos. In
the De beata vita we find an excellent study of happiness,
man's yearning for it, and the final satisfaction of that yearn-
ing in God, the supreme Good, The problem of evil and
Divine Providence is treated in the De ordine. Finally, in the
two books of the Soliloquies the Saint discourses on God and
the soul. Thus, in his Cassiciacum writings, we have a kind
SOLILOQUIES 337
of ground-plan of Christian thought. Augustine would touch
upon these topics again; they were the themes which con-
stantly throughout his life would stir his deepest cogitation.
As he grew older, the tide of his heavenward thought grew
deeper and broader, but it was the same stream which had
begun in the seclusion of Cassiciacum. Comparing his early
dialogues with his later reflections on the same subjects, we
realize that his thoughts did not so much change as develop.
His later writings did not correct previous errors so much as
they expanded and extended the conclusions which had al-
ready been formed in the dialogues. This does not mean, how-
ever, that there was no progress in his mental development.
There was, indeed, a steady progression in his thought from
first to last, but this is a result of a growing mellowness of
judgment which came naturally from a constant discipline of
study, meditation, and prayer.
There are in these dialogues, as one would expect, some
traces of Platonism or neo-Platonism. The brilliant mind
which had so lately embraced Catholicism was a mind which
had been trained in eclectic stages from Manichaeism through
Skepticism, and, most recently, in neo-Platonism. In the
Soliloquies, for example, there are some ideas suggestive of
neo-Platonic notions. But the remarkable thing about these
early dialogues of the young catechumen is that they are so
profound, so well reasoned, and so right.
The last of the so-called Dialogues of Cassiciacum, and the
one which St. Augustine himself liked best, was the Soliloquies.
This little work of two books was written in late 386 and early
387. It is not really a dialogue at all, since there are no partners
in the discussion. The author represents the c ego* and 'ratio*
as the speakers. For such a device he invents the name 'solilo-
quies* 'a name which is, to be sure, a new one and perhaps
338 SAINT AUGUSTINE
an awkward one, but one which is suitable to Indicate its
purpose/
After a sublime opening prayer of considerable length,
Augustine immediately sets down the purpose of his inquiry.
It is no less than the knowledge of God and the soul, a rather
broad scope for so smail a work. Indeed, it would be wrong
to seek here for all the answers, or even for all of Augustine's
answers, to the problems arising from a study of God and the
soul. We know the nature of God best through the soul, that
creature which most resembles its Creator. We know the soul
best through a study of its operations. Its most characteristic
operation is cognition, so, naturally, the best method of pro-
cedure is through the study of the problem of cognition. The
role of the senses, the nature of truth and falsity, the origin
of intellectual knowledge, and the soul's indestructible nature
all these are presented to us in logical sequence and with
that beauty of language which is so characteristic of Augus-
tine the rhetorician.
The step from the soul to God is not such a wide one,
since, even for man's intellectual activity, God is the source
and the light through which the soul sees. He is the 'Intelligible
Light/ analogous to that light in which the vision of the eyes
performs its function. It is this appreciation of the soul's
dependence upon God for its knowledge which is the amalgam
for this study of God and the soul. It is, too, a concept which
is typically Augustinian: it is a first principle upon which is
based the development and perfection of his thought.
For the student whose interest lies in Augustine the man
and the saint, rather than the philosopher or theologian, there
are enlightening glimpses into the character of this fourth-
century Doctor of the Church. We see in /occasional passages
of the Soliloquies traits which the self-revelation of the Con-
SOLILOQUIES 339
fessions has led us to expect. We see a kindly and genial friend,
patient and sweet-tempered; a soul whose God-orientated
elan is thwarted at times by his very human trials and tempta-
tions. We see, in short, the beginnings of a Saint whose sanctity
began with self-conquest.
The Soliloquies, unfortunately, are not as well known as they
deserve to be. Curiously enough, there is a spurious work of
the same name which seems to enjoy greater repute than the
genuine one. This is frequently found bound with the equally
spurious Manuals and Meditationes S. Augustini, many edi-
tions of which are available. For the Latin text of the
Soliliquiorum Libri Duo, it has, until recently, been necessary
to go to the great collections of the complete works. It is now
possible to obtain this separate text. 1
The Latin text used for the present translation is that of the
Benedictine edition as reproduced by Migne in the Patrologia
Latina 32 (Paris 1861) 869 ff.
In English there have been two translations : one by Charles
C. Starbuck in the Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers (1st ser., ed. Schaff, vol. 7, 1888) ; the other by Rose
Elizabeth Cleveland, published in 1910. One other English
version deserves mention. That is the Anglo-Saxon rendering
of King Alfred the Great. This has great importance in the
history of our language, though its value as a translation is
impaired by the fact that Alfred was not content merely to
translate; three-fourths of the work consists of his own inter-
polations. Yet, the fact that the pious and learned king chose
to translate the work into his native tongue is no small tribute
to the merit of Augustine's little treatise.
1 New York, Cosmopolitan Science & Art Service Co., Inc., 1943 through
the courtesy of which the following English translation appears in
this series.
340 SAINT AUGUSTINE
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Texts and Translations:
J. P. Migne, S. AureUi Augustini Opera omnia (Patrologia Latino, 32,
Paris 1861).
Ch. C. Starbuck, Soliloquies of St. Augustin (Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers 1st. Series ed. Schaff, vol. 7 1888) .
R. E. Cleveland, The Soliloquies of St. Augustine (Boston 1910) .
L. Schopp, Aurelius Augustinus-Selbstgesprache (Munchen 1938) .
P. Be Labriolle, Sohloques (Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, vol. 5 Dia-
logues Philosophiques Paris 1939) .
V. Capanaga, Los Solttoquios (Obras de San Augustin } vol. 1 Madrid
1946) ,
Secondary Sources:
M. L Bogan, The Vocabulary and Style of the Soliloquies and
Dialogues of St. Augustine (Washington 1935) .
C. Boyer, Christianisme et Neo-Platonisme dans la formation de S.
Augustin (Paris 1920).
, Le "Cogito" dans baint Augustin,' in Revista di Filosofia Neo-
Scolastica (Supl. 19 [1937] 79ff.) .
A. Casamassa, 'Le Fonti Soliloquia della Filosofia di S. Agostino/ in
Acta Hebdomadae Augustmianae Thomisticaeque (Rome and
Turin 1931).
F. Cayre 1 , Patrologie et Histoire de la Theologie (Paris 1938) .
E. Gilson, Introduction d V Etude de S. Augustin (Paris 1929) .
R. Jolivet, Saint Augustin et le neoplatonisme chretien (Paris 1932) .
CONTENTS
BOOK ONE
Chapter Page
1 A prayer to God 343
2 The objects of our love 350
3 The knowledge of God 352
4 The knowledge which is certain 354
5 The similar or equal knowledge of dissimilar things . . 357
6 The faculties of the soul through which God is known . 358
7 The need for faith, hope and charity 360
8 Things which are necessary to know God 361
9 Of the love of ourselves 362
10 The love of things of the body and of the
things outside us 364
11 External comforts may be accepted but not desired,
not for their own sake but on account of
other true goods 367
12 Nothing is to be desired except what leads us to the
Supreme Good, nothing to be dreaded but what
draws us away from it 369
13 The ways and means of acquiring wisdom. True love . . 372
14 Wisdom itself heals the eyes that it may be seen . . . 374
15 The manner in which the soul is known. Of trust in God . 377
341
BOOK TWO
Chapter Page
1 Man's immortality 381
2 Truth which abides forever 384
3 The soul will exist forever, if falsity will always be,
and if falsity cannot exist without the senses . . . 385
4 Whether the soul's immortality can be proved
from the everlasting life of falsity and truth . . .387
5 The nature of truth 389
6 The origin and present state of falsity 391
7 The true and the similar. The name 'Soliloquy' . . . 395
8 The origin of the true and the false 397
9 The false, the fallacious, and the fabulous 399
10 That some things are true because false 401
11 The truth of learning. The nature of a fable.
The nature of grammar 402
12 Some things are in other things in diverse ways . . . 406
13 The proof of the soul's immortality 408
14 Continuance of this reasoning 410
15 The nature of the true and the false 412
16 Whether inferior things can bear the names applied
to superior things 415
17 Whether a thing is wholly true or false 417
18 Whether a body truly exists 418
19 That the immortality of truth proves the immortality
of the soul 420
20 The true things we believe; those we remember;
those we grasp by reason and not by sense or
phantasy 421
SOLILOQUIES
BOOK ONE
Chapter 1
JHILE i WAS turning over in my mind many and divers
matters, searching ceaselessly and intently through
many a day for my very own self and my good, and
what evil should be avoided, all at once a voice spoke to me
whether it was myself or another inside or outside of me I
do not know, for that is the very thing I am endeavoring to
find out. Reason thereupon spoke to me as follows:
Reason. Now then, suppose you had discovered something,
to what would you consign it, in order that you might pro-
ceed to other matters?
Augustine. To memory, of course.
R. Is memory of such virtue that it well preserves all that
has been thought out?
A. That is difficult; in fact, it is impossible.
R. It must be written down, then. But, what are you going
to do now that your poor health 1 shirks the task of writing?
These matters ought not to be dictated, for they demand
real solitude.
A. You speak the truth. Wherefore, I really do not know
what I am to do.
1 St. Augustine refers again (1.15.27) to 'his present condition' and also
to the toothache (1.12.21) which is tormenting him. Reference to his
poor health is also made in Contra Academicos and De beata vita.
343
344 SAINT AUGUSTINE
R. Pray for health and assistance in order to attain what
you desire, and commit this to writing, so that you may be
the more heartened by your achievement. Afterwards, sum
up what you discover in a few brief conclusions. Nor should
you now concern yourself about winning a host of readers;
these notes will be enough for a few of your fellows.
A. That is what I shall do.
(2) O God, the Founder of the Universe, grant me first of
all that I may fittingly supplicate Thee; next, that I may so
act that I may be worthy of a hearing from Thee; finally, I
beg Thee to set me free.
O God, through whom all those things, which of themselves
would not exist, strive to be.
O God, who dost not permit to perish even that which is
self-destructive.
O God, who from nothing hast created this world which
every eye sees to be most beautiful.
O God, who dost not cause evil, and who dost cause that
it become not most evil.
O God, who, to those few who have their refuge in that
which truly is, dost show that evil is nothing.
O God, through whom the universe, even with its sinister
side, is perfect.
O God, by whose ordinance the uttermost discord is as
naught, since the less perfect things are in harmony with the
more perfect. 2
O God, whom everything loves which is capable of loving
whether knowingly or unknowingly.
O God, in whom are all things and yet the shamefulness
2 In the De ordine, composed shortly before the Soliloquies, St. Augus-
tine discussed at length the problem of evil, universal order, and
Divine Providence.
SOLILOQUIES 345
of every creature does not shame Thee, their wickedness does
not harm Thee, nor does their error deceive Thee.
O God, who hast not willed that any save the pure should
know the True. 3
O God, the Father of Truth, the Father of Wisdom, Father
of True and Supreme Life, Father of Happiness, Father of
the Good and the Beautiful, Father of Intelligible Light,
Father of our watching and our enlightenment, Father of
the covenant by which we are admonished to return to Thee.
(3) I call upon Thee, O God the Truth, in whom and by
whom and through whom all those things are true which
are true.
O God, Wisdom, in whom and by whom and through
whom all those are wise who are wise.
O God, True and Supreme Life, in whom and by whom
and through whom all those things live which truly and
perfectly live.
O God, Happiness, in whom and by whom and through
whom all those things are happy which are happy.
O God, the Good and the Beautiful, in whom and by
whom and through whom all those things are good and
beautiful which are good and beautiful.
O God, Intelligible Light, in whom and by whom and
through whom all those things which have intelligible light
have their intelligible light.
O God, whose domain is the whole world unknown to
sense. 4
O God, from whose realm law is promulgated even in these
regions.
3 Cf. Retractationes 4.2.
4 Cf. Ibid.
346 SAINT AUGUSTINE
O God, from whom to turn away Is to fall, to whom to turn
is to rise again, in whom to abide is to stand firm.
O God, from whom to depart is to die, to whom to return
is to be revived, in whom to dwell is to live.
O God, whom no one loses unless deceived, whom no one
seeks unless admonished, whom no one finds unless he is
purified.
O God, whom to abandon is to perish, whom to heed is to
love, whom to see is to possess.
O God, to whom Faith moves us, Hope raises us, Charity
unites us.
O God, through whom we overcome the enemy, Thee do I
pray.
O God, through whom we obtain that we do not altogether
perish.
O God, by whom we are admonished to be ever watchful,
O God, through whom we discern the good from the evil.
O God, through whom we flee evil and follow after good.
O God, through whom we are not overcome by afflictions.
O God, through whom we fittingly serve and fittingly rule.
O God, through whom we learn that that is alien to us
which once we thought was meet for us, and that is meet
which we used to think was alien.
O God, through whom we cling not to the charms and lures
of evil.
O God, through whom deprivations do not abase us.
O God, through whom what is better in us is not under the
dominion of our lower self.
O God, through whom death is swallowed up in victory.
O God, who dost convert us, stripping us of that which is
not and clothing us with that which is.
O God, who makest us worthy to be heard.
SOLILOQUIES 347
O God, who strengthenest us; who leadest us into all truth.
O God, who speakest to us of all good things ; who dost not
drive us out of our mind, nor permittest that anyone else
do so.
O God, who callest us back to the way; who leadest us to
the gate; who grantest that it is opened to those who knock.
O God, who givest us the bread of life.
O God, through whom we thirst for the cup, which when it
is drunk we shall thirst no more.
O God, who dost convince the world of sin, of justice, and
of judgment.
O God, through whom we are not shaken by those who
have no faith.
O God, through whom we denounce the error of those who
think that the merits of souls are naught before Thee.
O God, through whom we do not serve weak and beg-
garly elements.
O God, who dost cleanse us, who dost make us ready for
divine rewards, graciously come to me.
(4) Whatever I have said, come to my aid, Thou, the one
God, the one, eternal, true substance in whom there is no
strife, no disorder, no change, no need, no death; where there
is supreme harmony, supreme clarity, supreme permanence,
supreme fullness, supreme life; where there is no deficiency
and no excess; where the One begetting and the One begotten
is One. 5
O God, who art served by all things which serve, who art
obeyed by every good soul.
O God, by whose laws the poles revolve, the stars follow
their courses, the sun rules the day, and the moon presides
over the night; and all the world maintains, as far as this
5 Cf. Retractationes 4.3.
348 SAINT AUGUSTINE
world of sense allows, the wondrous stability of things by
means of the orders and recurrences of seasons: through the
days by the changing of light and darkness, through the
months by the moon's progressions and declines, through the
years by the successions of spring, summer, autumn, and
winter, through the cycles by the completion of the sun's
course, through the great eras of time by the return of the
stars to their starting points.
O God, by whose ever-enduring laws the varying move-
ment of movable things is not suffered to be disturbed, and
is always restored to a relative stability by the controls of the
encompassing ages.
O God, by whose laws the choice of the soul is free, and
rewards to the good and chastisements to the wicked are meted
out in accord with inexorable and universal destiny.
O God, from whom all good things flow even unto us, and
by whom all evil things are kept away from us.
O God, above whom, beyond whom, and without whom
nothing exists.
O God, under whom everything is, in whom everything is,
with whom everything is.
O God, who hast made man to Thine image and likeness, a
fact which he acknowledges who knows himself.
Hear, hear, O hear me, my God, my Lord, my King, my
Father, my Cause, my Hope, my Wealth, my Honor, my
Home, my Native Land, my Salvation, my Light, my Life.
Hear, hear, O hear me, in that way of Thine well known to
a select few.
(5) Thee alone do I love; Thee alone do I follow; Thee
alone do I seek; Thee alone am I ready to serve, for Thou
alone hast just dominion; under Thy sway do I long to be.
SOLILOQUIES
349
Order, I beg Thee, and command what Thou wilt, but heal
and open my ears, so that with them I may hear Thy words.
Heal and open my eyes so that with them I may perceive
Thy wishes.
Banish from me my senselessness, so that I may know Thee.
Tell me where I should turn that I may behold Thee; and
I hope I shall do all Thou hast commanded me.
Look, I beseech Thee, upon Thy prodigal, O Lord, kindest
Father; already have I been punished enough; long enough
have I served Thine enemies whom Thou hast beneath Thy
feet; long enough have I been the plaything of deceits. Receive
me Thy servant as I flee from them, for they took me in a
stranger when I was fleeing from Thee.
I realize I must return to Thee. Let Thy door be open to
my knocking. Teach me how to come to Thee. Nothing else
do I have but willingness. Naught else do I know save that
fleeting and perishable things are to be spurned, certain and
eternal things to be sought after. This I do, O Father, because
this is all I know, but how I am to reach Thee I know not.
Do Thou inspire me, show me, give me what I need for my
journey.
If it is by faith that they find Thee who have recourse to
Thee, give me faith; if it is through virtue, give me virtue; if
it is by knowledge, give knowledge to me. Grant me increase
of faith, of hope, and of charity.
O how marvelous and extraordinary is Thy goodness.
(6) To Thee do I appeal, and once more I beg of Thee
the very means by which appeal is made to Thee. For, if Thou
shouldst abandon us, we are lost; but Thou dost not abandon
us, because Thou art the Supreme Good whom no one ever
rightly sought and entirely failed to find. And, indeed, every
one hast rightly sought Thee whom Thou hast enabled to seek
350 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Thee aright. Grant that I may seek Thee, my Father; save
me from error. When I seek Thee, let me not find aught else
but Thee, I beseech Thee, Father. But, if there is in me any
vain desire, do Thou Thyself cleanse me and make me fit to
look upon Thee.
With regard to the health of this my mortal body, so long
as I am ignorant of its usefulness to me or to those whom I
love, I entrust it to Thee, O wisest and best of Fathers, and I
shall pray for it as Thou shalt in good time advise me. This
only I shall ask of Thine extreme kindness, that Thou con-
vertest me wholly to Thee, and that Thou allowest nothing to
prevent me when I wend my way to Thee. I beg Thee to com-
mand, while I move and bear this my body, that I may be
pure, generous, just, and prudent; that I may be a perfect
lover and knower of Thy Wisdom; that I may be worthy of
Thy dwelling place, and that I may in fact dwell in Thy most
blessed kingdom. Amen. Amen.
Chapter 2
(7) Augustine. Lo, I have prayed to God.
Reason. Now what do you want to know?
A. All those things which I prayed for.
J?. Sum them up briefly.
A. I desire to know God and the soul. 1
R. Nothing more?
A. Absolutely nothing.
R. Begin, then, to search for them. But first explain how,
if God is demonstrated to you, you will be able to say that it is
enough.
1 See, above, Divine Providence 2.18.47, p. 324.
SOLILOQUIES 35 1
A. I do not know how He would have to be demon-
strated to me so that I could say it is enough, for I do not
think I know anything as I want to know God.
JS. What are we to do, then? Do you not think you ought
to know. first how you can have a sufficient knowledge of God,
so that when you arrive at it you may search no further?
A. I do indeed think so, but I do not see how this can be
accomplished. For, what did I ever know like to God, so that
I might say that I wish to know God as I know this?
jR. How do you, who do not yet know God, know that you
know nothing like God?
A. Because, if I knew anything like God, I would doubtless
love it, but up to now I love nothing except God and the soul,
neither of which I know.
R. Do you not love your friends, then?
A. How can I not love them and love the soul?
R. Do you love fleas and insects in this same way?
A. I said I love the soul the anima not animals.
jR. Either men are not your friends or you do not love them,
for, every man is an animal, and you said you do not love
animals.
A. They are men and I do love them, not because they
are animals but because they are men; I mean, because they
have rational souls, which I love even in thieves. For, I can
love reason in anyone, even when I rightly hate him who
makes evil use of that which I love. And so, I love my friends
all the more, the better use they make of the rational soul, or
at least according to the manner in which they desire to use
it well.
352 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Chapter 3
(8) Reason. I accept that, but, if someone were to say to
you, 'I will make you know God just as you know Alypius,'
would you not be grateful and say that is sufficient?
Augustine. I would certainly be grateful, but I would not
say it was enough.
R. Why, pray?
A. Because I do not even know God as I do Alypius, and
yet \ do not know Alypius enough.
jR. Take care, lest it be rash of you to want to know God
enough you who do not know Alypius enough.
A. That does not follow. For, compared with the stars,
what is more insignificant than my dinner? Yet, I do not know
what I am to have for dinner tomorrow, but I avow without
conceit that I know in what sign the moon will appear.
R. Is it, then, enough for you to know God as you know in
what sign the moon will have its course tomorrow?
A. It is not enough, for this latter fact I experience by my
senses. I do not know, however, whether God or some un-
known natural cause may suddenly change the disposition and
course of the moon. If that should happen, all that which I
had taken for granted will be false.
R. And do you believe that this can happen?
A. I do not believe so, but I am searching for what I am
to know, not what I am to believe. Everything which we know,
we are also, perhaps correctly, said to believe; but we are not
said also to know everything that we believe.
SOLILOQUIES 353
R. Do you, then. In this case, reject all testimony of the
senses? 1
A. I certainly do.
J?. What about that friend of yours whom you said you still
do not know: do you want to know him by sense or by In-
tellect?
A. Whatever \ know of him by sense if anything can be
known by sense is of no account, and is sufficiently known.
But that part of him by which he is my friend, namely, his
soul that I want to know by intellect.
jR. Can he not be known in any other way?
A. In no other way.
jR. Do you dare to say, then, that this friend of yours, this
intimate comrade, is unknown to you?
A. Why should I not dare say so? For, I submit that that
law of friendship is most just by which it is ordained that
one should love a friend neither less nor more than one loves
oneself. Accordingly, since I do not know myself, what shame
can I possibly inflict on a friend when I say he is unknown to
me, especially when as I believe he himself does not know
himself?
R. If, therefore, these things which you desire to know be-
long to that class of things which the intellect attains, when
I said that you were rashly desirous of knowing God whereas
you did not know Alypius, you should not have offered your
dinner and the moon to me as examples, if these things be-
long, as you have maintained, to sense.
1 Augustine's reflections on the value of sense knowledge present an
interesting illustration of his true intellectual development. His earliest
statement of the problem, in which there is the tendency to deny
certitude to the senses, manifests a strong Platonic influence. (Cf.
Contra Academicos 3.11.26) . But the De Trinitate, a work of maturity,
contains his definitive teaching on the subject. In this work (15.12.21)
Augustine attacks the philosophers of the Academy for having 'prated*
(garrierunt) against the senses, and he upholds the objective validity
of sense knowledge within its proper limits.
354 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Chapter 4
(9) [Reason}. But what is that to us? Now, then, answer
this question: If those things which Plato and Plotinus 1 said
about God are true, is it enough for you to know God as they
knew Him?
Augustine. If those things which they said are true, it does
not of necessity follow that they knew them. For many people
speak at length of things they do not know, just as I myself
said I desired to know all those things for which I prayed.
I would not desire them, if I already knew them. Was I not
able, nonetheless, to speak of them? Indeed, I spoke, not of
those things which I grasped with my intellect, but of the
things which I had gathered from many sources and com-
mitted to memory, the things which I believed as much as I
could. But to know that is something else.
jR. Tell me, please, if you at least know what a line is in
geometry.
1 in his Confessions (7.10,20) , Augustine testifies to the influence of the
thought of Plato upon his own. He also describes the insufficiency of
that thought for one who has found the truth of Christianity. In the
De cwitate Dei he says of the Platonic philosophers that 'none come
closer to us than they do' (8.5) , and 'they are nearer the truth than
any others' (11.5). In Contra Academicos (3,20,43), he says: 'I am
so minded that I impatiently desire to grasp the truth not only by
believing but also by understanding, and I have confidence that I
shall find in the Platonic philosophers that which is not contrary to
our mysteries.' Again in the same work he speaks of Plotinus: 'That
doctrine of Plato which is the purest and most brilliant in philosophy,
has shown forth especially in Plotinus, with the clouds of error blown
away. This Platonic philosopher has been considered so like his
master that one must think the two of them lived at one time, or
rather, since they lived at such an interval of time, that Plato lived
gain in Plotinus' (3.18.41) . An interesting brief account of the Platonic
influence on Augustine is contained in the article of P. Antonio Casa-
massa, O.S.A. 'Le Fonti della Filosofia di S. Agostino,' in Ada Hebdo-
madae Augustinianae : Thomisticae (Rome 1931) .
SOLILOQUIES 355
A. That I clearly know.
R. When you say this, are you not afraid of the Academi-
cians? 2
A. Not at all. They do not want the wise man to make a
mistake, but I am not wise. Hence, I still am not afraid to
claim knowledge of those things which I know. But if, as I
desire, I arrive at wisdom, I shall do what wisdom teaches me.
R. That I do not deny. But, what I had begun to ask you
was this: That ball which they call a sphere, do you know that
as you know a line?
A. I do.
R. Do you know them both equally, or do you know one
more or less than the other?
A. Equally, of course, for in neither can I be mistaken.
R. What about these have you perceived them by the
senses or by the intellect?
A. I rather employed the senses in this matter as I use a
ship. For, when they had carried me to the place to which I
was going and I had there dismissed them, and when I had
been set down, as it were, on dry land and began to turn these
things over in my thought, my steps were for a long time un-
2 Before his conversion, Augustine had inclined toward the view of these
philosophers. Tor the thought grew upon me that those philosophers
who are called the Academics are wiser than the rest, because they
held that one must doubt about everything, and they maintained that
no truth can be comprehended by man; they seemed to me clearly
to have thought thus, as is commonly believed, though I did not yet
understand their meaning' (Confessions 5.10.19) . 'And so, in the
manner of the Academics or as they are reputed to do doubt-
ing about everything and wavering in the midst of everything, I
determined that I should have to abandon the Manichaeans, judging
that, even in the time of my doubt, I ought not to continue in that
sect to which I now preferred many of the philosophers. Yet I ab-
solutely refused to entrust the healing of my soul's languors to those
philosophers, for the reason that they lacked the saving name of
Christ' (Confessions 5.14.25) .
356 SAINT AUGUSTINE
steady. Wherefore, it seems to me that one can more easily
navigate a ship on dry land than one can perceive mathematics
by means of the senses, though they do seem to help a bit those
who are beginning to learn.
R. Then, learning in such things, if you have any, you do
not hesitate to call knowledge?
A. No, if the Stoics allow, who attribute knowledge only
to the wise man. I do not deny that I have understanding of
these things which they concede even to the foolish. But I
am not afraid of those fellows. All the things, about which
you asked, I grasp with my knowledge. But, go on; I want to
see where these questions are leading.
R. There is no hurry; we are at leisure. Only listen care-
fully so that you may not yield something without thinking.
I am trying to make you joyful about things in which you
may dread no reverse; will you tell me to hurry on as if it
were a matter of slight importance?
A. May God grant as you say. Therefore, question me as
you will, and, if anything like it happens again, rebuke me
more severely.
(10) R. Is it evident to you, then, that a line can in no
way be divided into two lengthwise?
A. That is evident.
R. How about crosswise?
A. What else, but that it can be divided indefinitely?
JR, What about a sphere: Is it equally clear that it cannot
have two equal circles on any one side of the center?
A. That is likewise clear.
J?. The line and the sphere, then, do they seem to you to
be one and the same thing, or is there some difference between
them?
A. Who does not see that they differ greatly?
SOLILOQUIES 357
R. But, if you know both equally, and yet, as you confess,
they differ greatly, then there is a knowledge of different things
which does not differ?
A. Who ever denied that?
J?. You did, a while ago. For, when I asked you in what way
you desire to know God so that you could say it is enough,
you answered that you could not describe it because you hold
nothing perceived as you wish to perceive God, because you
know nothing like unto God. Well, then, are the line and
sphere alike?
A. Who would say that?
R. But I had sought not what you know like to God, but
what you know as you desire to know God. Thus, you know
a line as you know a sphere, even though a line is not like a
sphere. Therefore, tell me whether it would be enough for
you to know God as you know this geometric sphere, that
is, to have no doubt about God as you have none about it.
Chapter 5
(11) Augustine. If you please, no matter how forcibly you
press and prove, I still dare not say that I want to know God
as I know these things. For, it seems to me that not only the
objects, but the knowledge itself is different. First, because a
line and a sphere are not so different but that the knowledge
of both is contained in one branch of learning; no geometer,
however, has claimed that he teaches a knowledge of God.
Secondly, if the knowledge of God and of these things were
the same, I would rejoice over knowing them as much as I
anticipate my joy in the knowledge of God. But, on the con-
trary, in comparison with Him I have such a low opinion of
them that it sometimes seems to me that if I ever know Him
358 SAINT AUGUSTINE
and, if I ever see Him in the way in which He can be seen,
all these things will vanish from my consideration. Even
right now, by reason of the love I have for Him, they scarcely
come into my mind.
Reason. You should rejoice more, much more, for knowing
God than for knowing these things, but the difference lies in
the things known, not in the manner of knowing them, unless,
perchance, you gaze upon the earth by one kind of vision and
upon the placid sky by another kind of vision, even though the
sight of the latter is much more charming than that of the
former. But, unless the eyes are deceived, I believe that if you
were asked whether it is as certain that you see the earth as
it is that you see the sky, you would have to answer that it is
just as certain to you, even though you are enraptured by the
beauty and splendor of the heavens rather than by that of the
earth.
A. This comparison, I must confess, sways me and I am
inclined to agree that the true and certain proofs of the
sciences are as different from the intelligible majesty of God,
as, in their own order, the earth is different from the heavens.
Chapter 6
(12) Reason. It is well that you are so moved. Reason,
which is speaking with you, pledges to make God known to
your mind just as the sun is shown to the eyes. The senses of
the soul are, as it were, the mind's own eyes; those things,
moreover, which are most certain in the sciences are like the
things which the sun shines upon that they may be seen
such as the earth and all things earthly: but it is God Himself
who does the illumining. Yet, I Reason am in minds as the
act of looking is in the eyes. To have eyes is not the same as
SOLILOQUIES 359
to look, and to look is not the same as to see. Therefore, the
soul needs three distinct things: that it have eyes which it
can properly use, that it look, and that it see. The mind is
like healthy eyes when it is cleansed of every taint of the body,
that is, detached and purged of the desires for earthly things
which cleansing it obtains, at first, only by Faith. As long as a
thing cannot be demonstrated to it because it is unhealthy and
defiled by vices for it cannot see unless it is healthy it will
have no regard for its own health unless it believes that, other-
wise, it will not see. But, if it does indeed believe the case is
thus, and that it would so see if it could, yet despairs of ever
being able to be cured, would it not despise and utterly
abandon itself and disobey the commands of the physician?
A. That is indeed so, especially because the one who is sick
must needs feel that these commands are harsh.
R. Therefore to Faith, Hope must be added.
A. So I believe.
R. What if the mind believes that all these things are so
and also hopes that it can be healed, yet it does not love nor
have any desire for the enlightenment which is promised,
and, furthermore, it judges that it should be, for the present,
satisfied with its darkness, which by long habit has grown
pleasant will it not resist that physician just as much?
A. That is certainly the case.
jR. Therefore, Charity is the third requirement.
A. There is surely nothing so necessary.
R. It follows, then, that without these three [Faith, Hope,
and Charity] no soul can be healed so that it can see that is,
know its God.
(13) But, once it has healthy eyes, what more is needed?
A. That it gaze at its object.
360 SAINT AUGUSTINE
R. Reason is the gaze of the soul, but, since it does not
follow that everyone who gazes at an object sees it, correct
and perfect gaze, of the kind which is followed by vision, is
called virtue; for, virtue is correct and perfect reason. But,
even though it may have healthy eyes, the gaze itself [i.e., of
the soul] cannot turn them toward the light unless these three
things endure, namely: Faith, by which it believes that the
thing on which the gaze is to be fixed is of such a nature that
when it is seen it will beget happiness; Hope, by which it
trusts that it will see, if only it gazes intently ;Charity, by which
it yearns to see and to enjoy. At length, the gaze is followed
by the very vision of God, who is the final end of our gazing,
not because the gaze no longer exists, but because it has noth-
ing further toward which to strive: and this is truly perfect
v i rtue reason arriving at its end, after which the blessed life
follows. However, this vision itself is the understanding which
is in the soul, brought forth by the one who understands and
that which is understood just as in the eyes, what is called
'seeing 3 consists of the sense itself and the thing sensed, either
of which being withdrawn, nothing can be seen,
Chapter 7
( 14) [Reason] . Therefore, when the soul shall succeed in
seeing, that is, knowing God, let us see whether these three
things are still necessary. Why should Faith be needed, since
now it sees? Why Hope, since it already possesses? But, with
regard to Charity, not only will nothing be subtracted, but
there will be even a great increase. For, when the soul shall
have seen that unique and true beauty, it will love all the more,
and, unless it has fastened its eye with surpassing love and has
never withdrawn its gaze, it will not be able to continue in that
SOLILOQUIES
361
most blessed vision. Yet, as long as the soul is in this body, even
though it may most completely see, that is, know God, never-
theless, since the senses of the body also make use of their
proper function, even though unable to deceive, they have,
however, the power to lead one astray, and so, that can still
be called Faith by which we resist them and believe something
else rather to be true. Similarly, since in this life the soul
labors under many bodily hardships, even though it is already
happy in the knowledge of God, 1 it needs the hope that all
these trials will not endure beyond death. Hence, Hope does
not leave the soul as long as it is in this life. But, when the soul,
after this life, unites itself wholly to God, Charity will remain
to keep it there. It cannot be said that it has faith that these
things are true, since it is not lured by any admixture of
falsehood, nor does anything remain to be hoped for, since it
rests in the secure possession of everything. There are, then,
three things which are of importance to the soul : ( 1 ) that it
be healthy; ( 2 ) that it gaze ; ( 3 ) that it see. The three others
Faith, Hope, and Charity are always necessary for the first
and second of the above three ; for the third, however, all three
are necessary in this life, but, after this life, Charity alone is
needed.
Chapter 8
(15) [Reason]. Now consider, as far as it is required for
the time being, something concerning God Himself drawn
from that comparison of sensible things, which I will now
teach you. God is, of course, intelligible, as those principles of
the sciences also are intelligible, yet there is a great difference
between them. The earth is visible and light is visible, but
1 Cf. Retractationes 4,3.
362 SAINT AUGUSTINE
the earth cannot be seen unless it Is brightened by light. So,
likewise, for those things which are taught in the sciences and
which everyone understands and acknowledges, without any
cavil, to be most true one must believe that they cannot be
understood unless they are illumined by something else as by
their own sun. Therefore, just as in this sun one may remark
three certain things, namely, that it is, that it shines, and that
it illumines, so also in that most hidden God whom you wish
to know there are three things, namely, that He is, that He
is known, and that He makes other things to be known. In
order that you may know these two things yourself and
God I am going to undertake to teach you. But, tell me,
how do you assent to these things as probable or as true?
A. As probable, of course. And, I must say, I gave rise
to a hope for better than that, for, with the exception of
those two points about the line and the sphere, there is nothing
that you have said which I would dare to say I know.
J?. No wonder, for nothing up to now has been so described
as to demand comprehension on your part.
Chapter 9
(16) [Reason]. But why do we delay? We must be on
our way. Let us see and this is the first consideration
whether we are sound [in mind].
Augustine, This you should see for yourself, if you can look
for a while at yourself or at me. As for me, I shall answer your
questions, if there is anything I notice.
R. Do you love anything besides the knowledge of yourself
and God?
A. I might answer that, in my present frame of mind, I
love nothing else, but it would be more cautious to say I
SOLILOQUIES 363
do not know. For it has often happened to me that, when I
thought that nothing else could disturb me, something never-
theless came into my mind which affected me much differently
than I had expected. Similarly, although something may not
have bothered me at all when it merely came into my thoughts,
yet when it did actually happen, it annoyed me more than I
had anticipated. At present, however, I think that I can be
disturbed by only three things : the fear of losing those whom
I love, the fear of pain, and the fear of death.
R. Then you love the life you and your companions spend
together, you love your good health, and your life itself in this
body; otherwise, you would not fear the loss of these.
A. That is true, I must confess.
R. Therefore, the very fact that not all your friends are with
you and the fact that your health is somewhat impaired brings
some sorrow to your soul for I see that that is a correct
inference.
A. You see correctly and I cannot deny it.
R. But, suppose you suddenly had the feeling and assurance
of bodily health, and suppose you were to see all those whom
you love enjoying in unison with you a noble leisure, would
you not be quite carried away with joy?
A. Yes, to a certain extent; especially if these things were
to happen, as you say, suddenly, how should I contain myself,
how could I be allowed to conceal joy of this kind?
JR. So, then, you are still perturbed by all the ills and dis-
orders of the soul. How shameful it is for such eyes to want
to see that sun.
A. You have drawn this conclusion as though I did not fully
realize how my health has improved, or which of my maladies
has left me, or how many of them remain. Assume that I
concede that point.
364 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Chapter 10
(17) Reason. Do you not notice how those eyes of the
body, even though they are healthy, are frequently repelled
and turned aside by the light of this sun, and how they take
refuge in their own gloom? But, you keep thinking about what
advances you have made and you do not give thought to
what you desire to see. Just the same, I am going to discuss
. with you this very thing, namely, the progress you think we
have made. Have you no desire for riches?
Augustine. These are not at present my first desire. For,
now that I am thirty-three years old, it is almost fourteen
vears since I ceased to desire riches. 1 If, perchance, they were
offered to me, I thought no more of them than as a necessary
livelihood and the decent use of them. In fact, one book 2 of
1 In the Confessions (6.6,9) , Augustine describes himself 'gaping after
riches, wealth, and wedlock, and Thou didst laugh at me/ He, com-
pares the misery which he received from these vain desires with the
simple joy of the beggar he met in the streets of Milan.
2 This was the Hortensius, which has not survived. The reading of this
work was one of the most important events in the life of the Saint,
as he testifies in the Confessions (14.7,8) : "In the usual order of study
I came upon a book by a certain Cicero, whose tongue almost all
men admire though not his heart. This work of his contains an ex-
hortation to Philosophy and is called Hortensius. The book quite
changed my disposition and turned my prayers to Thyself, O Lord,
and altered my intentions and desires. Suddenly all vain hope grew
vile to me and I longed for deathless wisdom with an unbelievable
fervor of heart, and I began to rise that I might return to Thee. I
used that book, not for the whetting of my tonguean art which I
seemed to be buying at my mother's expense, since I was now nineteen
years of age and my father was two years dead I used the work, I say,
not for the whetting of my tongue, but it persuaded me of what it
said rather than of the manner of its saying it. ... At that time, as
Thou knowest, O Light of my heart, since these apostolic writings
were not yet known to me, I took delight in that exhortation for
this sole reason that I was moved and enkindled and inflamed by that
discourse to love and seek and find and hold and embrace, not this
or that sect, but Wisdom itself, whatever it might be. In so great a
SOLILOQUIES
365
Cicero readily convinced me that riches were in no wise to be
coveted, but, if they were to befall us, they were to be man-
aged most wisely and carefully.
U. How about honors?
A. I avow that it is only now, in fact very recently, that I
have ceased to desire them.
jR. What about a wife? Would you not be delighted by a
fair, modest, obedient wife, one who is educated or whom
you could easily teach, one who would bring along just enough
dowry so that she would be no burden to your leisure (I say
this because you despise riches) would you not be delighted
by such a one, especially if you had reason to hope that you
would suffer no inconvenience on her account?
A. No matter how much you choose to portray and endow
her with all good qualities, I have decided that there is nothing
I should avoid so much as marriage. I know nothing which
brings the manly mind down from the heights more than a
woman's caresses and that joining of bodies without which
one cannot have a wife. Thus, if it is part of a wise man's
duty (and this is something which I have not yet discovered
for certain) to devote himself to children, the man who takes
a wife for this sole reason can seem to me worthy of admira-
tion, but not of imitation. It is, indeed, more hazardous to
attempt this than it is fortunate to be able to do it. On this
account, for the sake of the freedom of my soul, I have en-
delight one thing alone discouraged me, that the name of Christ
was not there. For this name, O Lord, through Thy mercy, this name
of my Saviour Thy Son, my infant heart had piously imbibed and
carefully treasured in the very milk of my mother. Whatsoever lacked
that Name, no matter how learned or elegant or true, did not entirely
win me/
366 SAINT AUGUSTINE
joined myself with due justice and good reason, I think not
to covet, not to seek, not to marry a wife. 3
J?. I am not at present interested in what you have decided,
but I want to know whether you are still struggling or
whether you have by this time overcome lust itself. For this
concerns the health of your eyes.
A. I do not seek nor do I desire anything of this kind, and
it is with dread and distaste that I even recall it. What more
do you want? And this boon grows on me day by day, for
the more my hope increases of seeing that Beauty which I so
long for, the more is all my love and delight turned toward
Him.
R. What about the enjoyment of food, of what concern is
that to you? 4
3 Shortly before this was written, when he had not yet been converted,
Augustine and Alypius had a debate on this subject of marrying. In-
deed, it was Alypius who kept me from taking a wife, complaining
that, if I were to do this, we could by no means live together in a
secure leisure for the love of wisdom, as we had for a long time
desired. . . . But I cited to him the examples of those who, though
married, had revered wisdom, had pleased God, had held steadfastly to
their friends and loved them, though I was, indeed, far beneath such
men in greatness of spirit. Thus, bound fast with the disease of the
flesh and its deadly sweetness, I dragged my chains after me, in fear
that they might be loosed, and, as though my wound were chafed
thereby, repelling the words of my good counselor as I would the hand
of one who would unfetter me' (Confessions 6.12.21) .
4 'This hast Thou taught me: that I must come to take my food as I
would medicine. But, when I am passing from the pangs of hunger
to the comfort of satiety, the snare of concupiscence lies in wait for
me in that very passage, for the passage itself is a pleasure and there
is no other way to go by than that which necessity forces us to go.
And, since one's health is the reason for eating and drinking, a danger-
ous pleasure accompanies it like a handmaid and sometimes tries to
go before it, with the result that I eat for pleasure when I say I am
eating or want to eat for health's sake. Nor is there the same measure
for both, since what is enough for health is not enough for pleasure,
and often it is not certain whether it is the necessary care of the
body which seeks its sustenance or whether the voluptuous deceit
of gluttony is proffering its service. On account of this uncertainty
SOLILOQUIES 367
A. The things which I have decided not to eat do not
bother me at all. I confess, though, that I take pleasure, when
they are before me, in those things which I have not curtailed;
in such a way, however, that, even though I have seen and
tasted them, they can be taken away without any disturbance
to my soul. Furthermore, when they are not in my presence,
the appetite for them dares not intrude as a hindrance to my
thoughts. But, you are not to ask anything further about food
and drink or about bathing or any other bodily pleasure. I
have only such appetite for them as can contribute to my
health.
Chapter 11
(18) Reason. You have made much progress, but what
yet remains is a great hindrance to the vision of that light.
Now, though, I am going to try something which I think is
easily demonstrated, namely, that either nothing remains for
us to overcome, or that we have not advanced at all and the
plague of all those things which we thought overcome still
remains. For I am asking you this question : If you were con-
vinced that you could not live with your many intimate
friends in the pursuit of wisdom unless abundant wealth were
able to supply your necessities, would you not desire and
prefer riches?
Augustine. I would.
j?. Suppose it should become evident that you would win
over many to wisdom if only your authority were increased
my unhappy soul is glad and finds in it the protection of an excuse,
rejoicing that it is not evident how much is needed for a healthy
diet, so that it hides the business of pleasure under the guise of
health. Every day I try to resist these temptations; I ask the aid of
Thy right hand and I confide my trials to Thee, for I am as yet not
fully resolved in this matter' (Confessions 10.31.44) .
368 SAINT AUGUSTINE
by means of honors; and suppose, too, that your friends could
not restrain their desires and convert themselves wholly to
the quest for God unless they likewise were given honors; and
suppose, furthermore, that they could not acquire these ex-
cept through your honors and high office should not these
honors be desired and should not their acquisition be vigorously
solicited?
A. It is as you say.
R. Now, I am not going to argue about a wife, for perhaps
there can be no such necessity for marrying one. Yet, if it
were certain that her bountiful inheritance could support all
those whom you want to live leisurely in one place with you
(supposing that she were heartily in agreement with this
plan) ; and if, above all, she enjoyed such family position that
through her you could easily obtain those honors which you
have already conceded to be necessary in such a case I do
not know whether it would be your duty to spurn these things.
.4. When should I dare to hope for the like?
(19) R. You say that as if I were at present asking you
what you hope for. I am not inquiring about what does not
delight you when you are denied it, but what would delight
you if you were offered it. It is one thing for a sickness to be
overcome, quite another thing for it to be merely lulled to
sleep. In this connection, there is worth in what some learned
men have said: all fools are mad, just as all filth stinks, yet
you do not notice it all the time, but only when you stir it. 1
It makes a great deal of difference whether passion is covered
over with the soul's despair or is driven away by healthfulness.
A. Although I cannot answer you, you will, nevertheless,
never convince me that, in the state of mind in which I know
1 Cicero, Tuscalanae Disputationes 4.24: 'Nunc autem ita disserunt, sic
se dicere, omnes stultos insanire.. ut male olere omne coenum. At non
semper. Comove, sen ties.'
SOLILOQUIES 369
that I now am, I might judge that I have made no progress.
R. I believe that this seems so to you because, though you
might possibly desire them, yet they seem to be desirable,
not for their own sake, but on account of something else.
A. That is what I wanted to say: for, when I used to desire
riches, I desired them that I might be rich; I wanted those
honors, the craving for which I said I have only recently
overcome, because I was dazzled by a certain indescribable
glitter about them. Always, when I craved a wife, I craved
only that she might, in good repute, bring me sensual satisfac-
tion. At that time there used to be in me a real desire for such
things, but now I spurn them all. If, however, it is only
through such things as these that I may pass to the things
which I now desire, I do not seek them as something to be
cherished, but I submit to them as something to be tolerated.
R. Very good indeed: I do not think that we should call
it desire with regard to things which are sought for the sake of
something else.
Chapter 12
(20) [Reason] . But, I ask you, why do you want the men
you love to live or to dwell in your company? 1
1 It is evident from the Confessions, the Letters, and various other writ-
ings that Augustine was a master of the art of friendship. Tor, indeed,
I could not have been happy without friends, even in the opinion
that I then had, no matter how abundant the carnal pleasures I
enjoyed. I loved those friends for their own sake, and I felt that I
was loved by them in the same way' (Confessions 6.16.26) . See also
the beautiful Letter (258) to Martianus in which he gives a Christian
interpretation to the definition of friendship by Cicero: 'Amicitia
est rerum humanarum et divinarum cum benevolentia et caritate
consensio' (Laelius, 20) . Friendship was to Augustine no impediment
in his search for God and Truth. Indeed, the chief purpose of friend-
ship was *ut animas nostras et Deum sirnul concorditer inquiramus.'
At the time he wrote the Soliloquies he was living at the villa of
Verecundus with his mother Monica, Alypius, Navigius, Licentius,
and Trygetius. In the dialogues written at the time we are able to
observe Augustine and his friends striving to achieve this blessed end
of a noble friendship.
370 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Augustine. So that we can all at the same time and in unity
of heart seek our souls and God. In this way the one who first
makes the discovery easily leads the others thither without
any toil.
R. Suppose they do not want to seek such things?
A. I will induce them to want to.
R. But, what if you are not able to do so, either because
they think they have already found them, or because they
think they cannot be found, or because they are deterred by
anxieties about and the desire for other things?
A. I shall sustain them and they me, as far as we are able.
J?. But, what if their very presence hampers your quest?
Will you not be distressed and, if they cannot be different,
prefer that they be not with you, rather than that they be
like this?
A. It is as you say, I confess.
R. Therefore, you desire their life or their company, not for
its own account, but for the discovery of wisdom?
A. I agree entirely.
R. What of your life itself? If you were certain that it were
an obstacle to you in the acquiring of wisdom, would you want
it to last?
A, I should surely flee from it.
R. What if you were to be shown that, whether you had
quit this body or continued to dwell in it, you could attain
to wisdom just the same, would you care whether you were
to enjoy what you love here or in another life?
A. If I knew that I would endure nothing worse which
would draw me back from the point to which I have progres-
sed, I would not care,
R. Therefore, you now fear to die lest you be swallowed
SOLILOQUIES
371
up by some greater evil which will deprive you of divine
knowledge?
A. If, indeed, I have learned anything, I not only am afraid
lest it be taken away, but I also fear lest my access to those
things which I long to know should be blocked off, though
1 do think that what I already know will abide with me.
R. Therefore, you wish this life to continue, not for its own
sake, but for the sake of wisdom.
A. That is right.
(21 ) R. There remains, then, bodily pain 3 which perhaps
affects you by its power.
A. That, too, I dread for no other reason than this, that
it hinders me in my quest. Even though I have been tormented
within the last few days by a severe toothache, 2 and was not
permitted to meditate on anything save what I had already
perchance learned, and although I was completely prevented
from studying for which I need all my mind's attention
nevertheless it seemed to me that, if the light of truth had
appeared to my faculties, I would not have felt that pain,
or, at least, I would have borne it as though it were nothing.
Yet, because I often think of the more serious ills that might
2 'When shall I remember all that took place in those days of our
retirement? But neither have I forgotten, nor shall I keep silent the
sharpness of Thy scourge and the wonderful swiftness of Thy mercy.
At that time Thou didst torment me with the toothache, and when
it had grown so violent that I was unable to speak, it came into my
heart to request all my friends present to pray in my behalf to
Thee who art the God of every kind of health. I wrote this on the
waxen tablet and gave it to them to read. Immediately, just as soon
as we had bent our knees, the pain went away. But what kind of
pain was it, and how did it leave me? I confess I was frightened, my
Lord and my God, for I had never felt the like in all my life. In the
depths was Thy will thus made known to me, and rejoicing in faith
I praised Thy name. That faith also did not permit me to be secure
about my past sins, which had not as yet been remitted unto me by
Thy Baptism (Confessions 9.4.12) .
372 SAINT AUGUSTINE
befall me, even though I have not at any time suffered any-
thing more painful than this, 1 am constrained at times to
agree with Cornelius Celsus, 3 who says: The supreme good
is wisdom, and the supreme evil is bodily suffering. Nor does
his reasoning seem to me ridiculous. Since, he says, we are
composed of two parts, namely, mind and body, the first
of which the mind is the superior part, and the body the
inferior part, the highest good is what is best in the superior
part and the highest evil is what is worst in the inferior part.
Now, the best thing in the mind is wisdom, and the worst
thing in the body is pain. Therefore, the conclusion may be
drawn without falsehood, I think that man's supreme
good is to be wise, his supreme evil is to suffer.
R. We shall see about those things later. The very wisdom
which we are striving to attain will perhaps convince us other-
wise. If, however, wisdom will show us that this is true, we
shall with no hesitation hold on to this judgment about the
supreme good and the supreme evil.
Chapter 13
(22) [Reason]. Now, we are trying to discover what kind
of a lover of wisdom you are : that wisdom which you desire
to behold and to possess with purest gaze and embrace, with
3 Cornelius Celsus, the Roman encyclopedist, best known for his writ-
ings on medicine. The philosophical part of his work has been lost.
It consisted of a collection of the thoughts of the great philosophers
rather than original work of his own. Augustine refers to his work
in the foreword to the De haeresibus: 'The opinions of all the phil-
osophers who founded various schools up to his own time (more than
that he could not do) have been assembled in six sizable volumes by
a man named Celsus. He does not attack any of them, but only shows
what they held, and this he does with such economy of words that he
uses only enough to disclose and point out their opinion without
praising, blaming, assenting or defending.'
SOLILOQUIES 373
no veil between and, as it were, naked : such as wisdom allows
to very few and these the most chosen of its lovers. If you were
inflamed with the love of some beautiful woman, would she
not rightly refuse to give herself to you if she discovered that
you loved anything but herself? And will the purest beauty
of wisdom reveal itself to you unless you burn for it alone?
Augustine. Why, then, am I unhappily held back and why
am I delayed by this wretched torture? Surely, I have shown
that I love nothing else, since that which is not loved for
itself is not really loved. I do love wisdom alone and for its
own sake, and it is on account of wisdom that I want to have
or fear to be without other things, such as life, tranquillity,
and my friends. What limit can there be to my love of that
Beauty, in which I not only do not begrudge it to others, but
I even look for many who will long for it with me, sigh for it
with me, possess it with me, enjoy it with me; they will be
all the dearer to me the more we share that love in common.
(23) J?. That is just how lovers of wisdom should be.
Such lovers does that wisdom seek whose communion is pure
and without any defilement. But there is more than one road
to wisdom. 1 In fact, each one grasps that unique and most
true good according to his health and endurance. There is a
certain unspeakable and incomprehensible light of minds.
Our common light may teach us, as far as is possible, how
that light operates. There are some eyes so healthy and
vigorous that they can fearlessly turn toward the sun as soon
as they are opened. For such as these light itself is health; it is
not a teacher that they need, but only, perhaps, some caution.
It is enough for them to believe, to hope, and to love. Others,
however, are dazzled by the very lustre which they so ardently
desire to behold and, not seeing it, they gladly return to the
1 Cf. Retractationes 4.3.
374 SAINT AUGUSTINE
darkness. To these, even though they now are such as might
rightly be called healthy, it is dangerous to want to show what
they are as yet incapable of seeing. They are, therefore, first
to be trained, and, for their own good, their love is to be
restricted and nourished. First, they should be shown some
things which do not shine with their own light, but which
may be seen only by means of light, such as a garment or a
wall or something of that kind. Then, they should be shown
something which, though it does not shine with its own light,
yet glitters more fairly by means of that light, such as gold,
silver and the like, which yet are not so radiant as to hurt
the eyes. Then, perhaps, this earthly fire should be carefully
shown them, then the stars, then the moon, then the brightness
of the dawn and the splendor of the whitening sky. It is
through these things that, each one according to his strength
growing more proficient, either through all the steps or leav-
ing out some of them, sooner or later he will behold the sun
without flinching and with immense delight. Some such thing
is what the best teachers do for those who are most desirous of
wisdom, but who, though indeed they see, do not see clearly.
For, it is the duty of good education to arrive at wisdom by
means of a definite order; without order this is a matter of
chance hardly to be relied upon. But, we have written enough,
I think, for today. We must spare our health.
Chapter 14
(24) Augustine. On another day I say: Please give me
that order if you are now able. Lead me, drive me, where you
will, through what means you will, how you will. Demand
from me whatever difficult and arduous tasks you choose,
through which I may with certainty reach the goal of my
desires, provided that these tasks are in my power.
SOLILOQUIES 375
Reason, There is only one thing that I can command you
I know no more. These things of sense must be forsaken
entirely, 1 and, as long as we bear this body, we must have
care lest our wings be entangled by their sticky lime, as we
need whole and faultless wings to fly from this darkness to
that light. For, that light does not even deign to show itself
to those who have been shut up within this prison of the body,
unless they are strong enough, after breaking and destroying
their prison, to take wing into their own lofty realm. And so,
when you shall have become such a man that no earthly thing
whatever delights you, believe me, at that very moment, at
that point of time, you will behold what you desire.
A. And when will that be, I pray you? I do not think that
these things can become for me objects of utter contempt until
I shall have seen that in comparison with which these things
grow vile.
(25 ) R. In the same way this bodily eye might say: When
I shall have seen the sun, I will not love darkness. And this
seems also to be in accordance with order, but it is far from
it, for the eye prefers darkness because it is not healthy it
cannot see the sun unless it is healthy. In this the soul is often
mistaken, that it believes that it is healthy and boasts of the
fact, and, since it cannot see, it complains as if it has a right
to do so. But, that Beauty knows when to reveal itself. It
performs the office of a physician and it knows which ones are
healthy better than they themselves do who are being healed.
We think we see how much of an advance we have made,
but it is not granted to us to imagine or know how deep we
had sunk or how far we had risen, and so, by comparison
with more serious sickness, we think that we are in health.
1 Cf. Retractationes 4.3.
376 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Are you not aware how confidently we had announced yes-
terday that we are now liberated from all defilement, that
we love nothing but wisdom, and that we seek or desire other
things only for wisdom's sake? How vile, how detestable, how
shameful, how dreadful did we consider the embrace of a
woman, when we were making an inquiry between ourselves
concerning the desire for a wife ! Yet, that same night while we
were lying awake and going over these things once more in
our minds, 2 you realized how differently from your claims
those imagined caresses and their bitter sweetness excited
you, far, far less than they were wont to do, but also far differ-
ent from what you had expected. It was thus that that most
hidden physician pointed out to you two things, namely:
what you have escaped under his guidance, and what it is that
remains yet to be healed.
(26) A. Be quiet, I beg you, be quiet. Why do you
torment me; why do you probe so deeply; why do you go down
so low? Now, I cannot restrain my tears any longer; from now
on I make no promises, I make no claims, as long as you do
not question me about such things. You have said with truth
that the very One whom I long to see will know when I am in
health. Let Him do as He wills. May He show Himself when
it pleases Him. I now commend myself wholly to His kindness
and guidance. Once and for all, I believe that He never ceases
to help up those who are thus disposed toward Him. I shall
make no claim about my soundness until I shall have looked
upon that Beauty.
R. You should do nothing else. But now, restrain your
tears and control your feelings. You have certainly wept
much and surely your weak chest supports this with difficulty.
2 See above, Divine Providence 1.3.6, p. 244.
SOLILOQUIES
377
A. Do you want to set a limit to my tears, whereas I see
no end to my misery? Or do you command me to have regard
to my bodily health when I myself am eaten away with
disease? I beg you, if you have any power over me, try to
lead me along by some short cut so that, by reason of the
nearness of that light which, if I have made any progress at
all, I can bear, I shall be ashamed to turn my eyes back to
that darkness which I have forsaken if, indeed, you can call
those things forsaken which still dare to allure my blindness.
Chapter 15
(27) Reason. Let us conclude this first book, if you please,
so that in the second we may follow some approach which
seems suitable. For, in your present condition, you should not
give up working with moderation.
Augustine. I will not permit this treatise to be concluded
until you reveal to me a little something about the nearness
of that light toward which I am aiming.
J?. The physician complies with your request. For, I know
not what beacon leads me on and guides me whither I am
to lead you. Therefore, listen carefully.
A. Lead me, I beg you, and transport me whither you will.
R. Do you say with certainty that you desire to know the
soul and God?
A. That is my only desire,
jR. Nothing else?
A. Absolutely nothing.
J?. What? Do you not want to know Truth?
A. As if I" could know these except through its means!
R. Therefore, that is first to be known through which the
other things can be known.
A. I do not gainsay that.
378 SAINT AUGUSTINE
J?. Let us, then, first see this: Since 'truth' and 'true' are
two words, do two things seem likewise to be signified by
these two words, or just one?
A. They seem to be two things. For, just as 'chastity' is
one thing and 'chaste 5 another and there are many things
in like fashion so I think 'truth' is one thing and what is
called 'true 3 is another.
R. Which of these two do you think is the more excellent?
A, I think truth is. Chastity is not caused by one who is
chaste, but one who is chaste is made so by chastity; so, also,
if anything is true, it is through truth that it is true,
(28) R* How about when a chaste person dies, do you
think chastity also dies?
A. Not at all.
R. Therefore, when something which is true perishes, truth
does not perish.
A. But how does something true perish? I do not see that.
R. I am astonished that you ask that. Do we not see a
thousand things perish before our very eyes? Perhaps you
think that this tree is indeed a tree but not a true one, or else
that it cannot perish. Even though you do not put faith in the
senses, and might answer that you do not know whether it is
a tree, yet, if it is a tree, I think you will not deny that it is a
true tree. This judgment is made by the intellect, not by
sense. If, in fact, it is a false tree, it is not a tree; if it is a tree
it must needs be true.
A. That I grant.
R. What about this further point: Do you not admit that
a tree is of that class of things which are born and die?
A. I cannot deny it.
R. Then, the conclusion is that something which is true
dies.
SOLILOQUIES
379
A. I do not dispute it.
R. What about this: Do you not see that truth does not
die when true things die, just as chastity does not die when a
chaste man dies?
A. That, too, I grant, and I am waiting anxiously to see
what you are trying to do.
R. Pay attention, then.
A. I am listening.
(29) R. Does this judgment seem true to you: Whatever
exists must exist somewhere?
A. There is nothing which demands my assent as that
does.
R. Do you admit that truth exists?
A. Yes, I do.
R. Then, we must inquire about where it exists, for it
does not exist in a place unless, perchance, you think that
anything but a body exists in a place or that truth is a body.
A. I do not think either of these.
J?. Where, then, do you think it exists? For, what we have
acknowledged to exist cannot exist nowhere.
A. If I knew where it exists, I would surely not inquire
further.
R. At least you are able to know where it does not exist?
A. I may perhaps be able to do so if you will make
some suggestions.
-JR. Its existence is certainly not in mortal things. For, what-
ever exists in some thing cannot endure unless that endures
in which it exists. But, we have just granted that truth en-
dures even when true things pass away. Therefore, truth does
not have its existence in mortal things. But truth does exist
and it does not exist 'nowhere. 5 There are, therefore, things
which are immortal. But, nothing is true in which truth does
380 SAINT AUGUSTINE
not exist. Therefore, it is settled that things are not true ex-
cept those which are immortal. Any tree which is false is not
a tree, false wood is not wood, false money is not money,
and, generally, whatever is false has no existence. But, what-
ever is not true is false. Therefore, nothing is properly said
to exist except things immortal. Consider carefully this brief
line of reasoning so that you may see if there is anything
which you should not admit. For, if the reasoning is valid, we
have almost finished the whole affair, and this will become
more apparent, perhaps, in the next book.
(30) A. I give you thanks, and, when we are in silence,
I will energetically and carefully go over these things with
myself and with you, if only those shadows of temptation do
not assail and entice me with their charms, as I so awfully
dread.
R. Believe steadfastly in God and, as far as you can, en-
trust yourself wholly to Him. Do not choose to be, so to
speak, your own master and under your own dominion, but
proclaim yourself the servant of Him who is our kindest and
most helpful Lord. For, if you do this, He will not cease to
lift you up to Himself, and He will allow nothing to happen
to you which is not for your good, even though you do not
know it.
A. I hear, I believe, and, as far as I am able, I obey; I
pray very much to God Himself in order that I may accom-
plish very much. Or, do you want anything further of me?
R. It is well enough for the time being. Later on, when
you have beheld Him, you will do whatsoever He commands
you.
BOOK TWO
Chapter 1
guR LABOR has been interrupted long enough, and love
is impatient, nor will there be surcease of tears until
love is granted the object of its love. Let us begin,
then, our second book.
Reason. Let us start.
A. May we believe that God will be with us!
R. May we surely believe that, if it is in our power!
A. He Himself is our power.
R. Pray, then, as briefly and perfectly as you are able.
A. O God, ever the same; may I know myself, may I
know Thee. That is my prayer,
R. Do you, who wish to know yourself, know that you
exist?
A. I know it.
R. How do you know it?
A. I do not know.
R. Are you conscious of yourself as simple or composite?
A. I do not know.
jR. Do you know that you are moved?
A. I do not know.
R. Do you know that you think?
A. That I know.
381
382 SAINT AUGUSTINE
jR. Therefore, it is true that you think. 1
A. It is true.
R. Do you know that you are immortal?
A. I do not know.
R. Of all those things which you said you did not know,
which do you prefer to know first?
A. Whether I am immortal.
R, Do you love life, then?
A. I confess I do.
R. Well, will it be enough when you have learned that
you are immortal?
A. It will surely be a great thing, but too little for me.
j?. Just the same, how much will you enjoy this which is
so little?
A. Very much.
R. Will you, then, not weep for anything?
A. Not a thing.
1 The reasoning of St. Augustine at this point of the work is very
suggestive of the same form of argumentation employed later by
Descartes in the Discours de la Methods. It is the judgment of some
scholars that Descartes' famous Je petise, done je suis (Cogito, ergo
sum) was anticipated by Augustine. To prove this contention they
cite various passages from the works of the holy Doctor, besides this
from the Soliloquies: De beata vita 2.7; Contra Academicos 3.9.18,19;
De libero arbitrio 2.3.7; De Trinitate 15.12.21; De civitate Dei 11.26.
On this subject one might read Gilson, Introduction a L'Etude de S.
Augustin (Paris 1929) 49 ff. For another view of the question, however,
see Abercrombie, Saint Augustine and French Classical Thought, ch. 3.
Charles Boyer, S.J., has an interesting study of the subject in the
Revista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica (Suppl. vol. 19 [1937] 79-83) , entitled
*Le "Cogito" dans Saint Augustin/ The author considers the place
and function of the cogito in Augustine's philosophy. He indicates
that the Doctor of the Church came upon the cogito } not a I'aventure,
as Pascal suggested. At the same time he is careful to note the essential
differences that characterize the respective attitudes of Augustine and
Descartes on the cogito. For Augustine the cogito is but one of
several undeniable truths; for the French philosopher, the 'cogito is
the first and most fundamental truth.
SOLILOQUIES 383
R. What if that life is discovered to be such that in it you
will be permitted to know no more than you already know,
will you control your tears?
A. On the contrary, I shall weep so much that it will be
no life at all.
R. Therefore, you love life, not for the sake of living, but
for the sake of knowing.
A. I grant your conclusion.
J?. What if that same knowledge of things were to make
you unhappy?
A. I believe that that can in no wise happen. But, if it is so,
no one can be happy, for even now it is by reason of my
ignorance of things and for no other reason that I am un-
happy. But, if the knowledge of things makes one unhappy,
then unhappiness is everlasting.
R. I see, now, all that you desire. Because you think that
no one is unhappy by reason of knowledge, it is by this token
probable that understanding makes one happy. But, no one
is happy unless living; no one lives unless he exists. There-
fore, you wish to exist, to live, and to understand, but to
exist that you may live, to live that you may understand.
Hence, you know you exist; you know you live; you know
you understand. But, what you want to know is whether these
things will always endure or whether none of them is to en-
dure; whether some of them will remain forever and some
perish; and whether, if all are to continue, they can be in-
creased or decreased.
A. That is so.
R. If, then, we have proved that we shall live forever,
it follows that we shall also exist forever.
A. That follows.
384 SAINT AUGUSTINE
R. There will then remain an inquiry concerning under-
standing*
Chapter 2
(2) Augustine. I observe in the above the most evident
and most compact order.
Reason. Be on the alert, then, so that you can answer me
carefully and with certainty when I question you.
A. I am right here.
J?, If this world will endure forever, is it true that the
world will endure forever?
A. Who would doubt it?
J?. But, if it will not endure, is it not likewise true that it
will not endure?
A. I do not gainsay that.
R. When it shall have passed away supposing that it is
to pass away will it not then be true that the world has
passed away? For, as long as it is not true that the world has
perished, it has not perished. It is, then, absurd that the world
should have perished and yet it be not true that the world has
perished.
A. That I grant, too.
R. What about this: Does it seem to you that something
true can exist and truth not exist?
A. Not at all.
R. Truth, therefore, will exist, even if the world ceases to
exist.
A. I cannot deny that.
jR. Suppose truth itself should perish, will it not be true
to say that truth has perished?
A. Who would deny that?
SOLILOQUIES 385
R. But, something true cannot exist if truth does not exist.
A. I have already granted that a while ago.
jR. Truth, therefore, in no way will cease to exist.
A. Go on as you have begun, for nothing is more true
than this conclusion.
Chapter 3
(3) Reason. Now I want you to tell me whether the soul
or the body seems to you to have sense perception.
Augustine. Obviously, the soul.
j?. Does understanding seem to you to belong to the soul?
A. It seems to, certainly.
R. Does it belong to the soul alone or to something else?
A. I see nothing but the soul with the exception of God
in which I believe understanding exists.
R. Let us consider this. What would you think if someone
were to say that that wall is not a wall, but were to call it
a tree?
A. I would think that his sense or mine were mistaken,
or that he called a wall by such a name.
R. Suppose it had for him the appearance of a tree and for
you that of a wall: could not both of these be true?
A. By no means, for one and the same thing cannot be
both a tree and a wall. For, even though it may seem to each
of us individually to be two distinct things, one of us must
have suffered from a mistaken appearance.
R. What if it is neither a wall nor a tree, and you are both
mistaken?
A, That might, indeed, be so.
R. Therefore, that is one possibility that you passed over
previously.
A. I admit that.
386 SAINT AUGUSTINE
R. What If both of you acknowledge that it appears to you
otherwise than it is in reality, will you not both be mistaken?
A. No.
JR. Then, that which is seen can be false and yet the one
who sees may not be mistaken?
A. That may be.
jR. Therefore, it must be admitted that one who sees some-
thing false is not mistaken, but rather the one who gives assent
to what is false.
A. That evidently must be admitted.
R. What about this thing which is false : why is it false?
A. Because it is different in reality from what it seems.
R. Then, if there is no one to see it, nothing is false.
A. That follows.
R. Therefore, error is not in the things themselves, but in
the sense, and he who does not assent to something false is
not mistaken. It has been proved, then, that we are one thing
and sense is another, if it is true that we may not be mistaken
when one of our senses is mistaken.
A. I have no way of denying that.
R. But, when the soul is mistaken, do you dare say that
you yourself are nevertheless not mistaken?
A. How could I dare say that?
R. But, there is no sense without the soul and there is no
error without some sense being involved. Therefore, either
the soul acts in error or it gives assistance to error.
A. What we have already said compels my assent to this.
(4) R. Answer me this now: Does it seem possible to you
that error might at any time not exist?
A. How can this ever seem so to me, since there is so much
difficulty in discovering truth that it would be more ridiculous
SOLILOQUIES 387
to say that error is able not to exist than it would be to say
that truth may not exist.
R. Do you think that one who is not living can use the
senses?
A. That cannot be done.
R. That the soul lives forever has now been proved.
A. You are hurrying me too quickly toward bliss; please
move forward step by step.
jR. If all these things have been correctly admitted, I do
not see that there need be any hesitation in the matter.
A. It is too hasty, I repeat. Thus, I am more readily per-
suaded to judge that I have admitted something without good
reason than I am that I have by this time been set at ease
regarding the immortality of the soul. At any rate, unravel
this conclusion and show how it has been deduced.
jR. You said that error cannot exist without the senses and
you also said that error is not able not to exist; therefore, the
senses always exist. Furthermore, there is no sense without a
soul; therefore, the soul is everlasting. Nor is it able to sense
unless it is living; therefore, the soul lives forever.
Chapter 4
(5) Augustine. What a worthless weapon that argument
is ! You could conclude that man is immortal if I had granted
to you that this world could not exist without man and that
this same world is eternal.
Reason. You are certainly very much on your guard. None-
theless, what we have proved is no light matter, namely, that
the universe cannot exist without the soul unless, perhaps,
there will be a time when falsity will not exist in the universe.
A. I acknowledge that that is a proper deduction. But I
think that we should now discuss further whether what has
388 SAINT AUGUSTINE
been above conceded is riot rather uncertain, for I see that
we have indeed made considerable progress toward the im-
mortality of the soul.
R. Have you given sufficient thought lest you may have
made some rash concession?
A. I have considered it sufficiently, but I see no reason to
accuse myself of rashness.
R. Therefore, it is proved that the universe cannot exist
without a living soul.
A. Yes, it is proved, but to this extent only, that in their
turn some souls are born and others die,
R. Suppose that falsity were removed from the universe:
would the result not be that all things are true?
A. That follows, I see.
R. Tell me: How is it that this wall seems to you to be a
true wall?
A. Because I arn not deceived by its appearance.
R. In other words, because it really is what it seems to be.
A. Exactly.
R. If, therefore, something is false because it seems other-
wise than it is, and if it is true because it really is what it
seems, then, if you take away the one seeing, there is nothing
which is either true or false. Yet, if falsity does not exist in
the universe, all things are true, and, furthermore, nothing
is seen except by a living soul. Therefore, whether falsity can
or cannot be removed, the soul continues in the universe.
A. I see that what we had already concluded has now been
made more secure, but we have made no progress by this
contribution. For, there still remains this difficulty which
causes me great concern, namely, that souls are born and
die, and that the fact that they are always in the world re-
sults, not from their immortality, but from their succeeding
one another.
SOLILOQUIES
389
(6) R. Does it seem to you that some corporeal, that is,
sensible things, can be grasped by the intellect?
A. It does not seem so.
jR. Well, then, does it seem to you that God uses senses to
perceive things?
A. I dare not say anything about this matter without care-
ful thought, but, as far as one may conjecture, God in no
way makes use of senses.
R. Therefore, we conclude that only the soul can have
sense perception.
A. For the nonce, make whatever conclusion you may
consider probable,
R. What about this: Do you grant that this wall is not a
wall, if it is not a true wall?
A. There is nothing which I would grant more readily.
J?. And do you grant that nothing is a body unless it is a
true body?
A. That also is so.
jR. Therefore, if nothing is true unless it is what it seems to
be, and if something corporeal can be seen only by the senses,
and if only the soul is able to use sense perception, and if a
body does not exist if it is not a true body if all these things
are so, then a body cannot exist unless a soul had existed
before it.
A. You are driving me too quickly, and I have not the
wherewith to resist you.
Chapter 5
( 7 ) Reason. Pay closer attention to these things.
Augustine. I am with you.
jR. This surely is a stone and it is a true one if it is in reality
390 SAINT AUGUSTINE
no different from what it is seen to be; moreover, it is not a
stone if it is not true, and only by the senses can it be seen.
A. That is right.
R. Then, there are no stones in the hidden depths of the
earth or anywhere whatsoever where there is no one to use
the senses. Furthermore, even this stone would not exist if we
did not see it, and it will not be a stone when we shall have
moved away and there is no one present to see it. What is
more, if you shut your coffers tight, no matter how much you
pack inside them, you will have nothing. And, in fact, wood
itself is not wood on the inside, for whatever is in the depths
of a nontransparent body eludes all the senses and hence is
forced not to exist. For, indeed, if it existed, it would be true.
Nothing is true unless it is as it is seen to be. But, that is not
seen. Therefore, it is not true. Perhaps, though, you have
some answer to this.
A. I see that all this is derived from those things which I
have conceded, but it is so absurd that I would deny any
one of them rather than concede that this is true.
JR. I have no objection. Therefore, consider which you
choose to say: that corporeal things can be seen only by the
senses, or that only the soul has sense perception, or that this
is a stone or something else but it is not true, or that the true
itself must be defined differently.
A. Let us examine this last, I beg you.
(8) R. Define 'true,' then.
A. That is true which is in reality as it is seen by the one
perceiving, if he wishes and is able to perceive.
R. Then, will that not be true which no one is capable of
perceiving? Furthermore, if that is false which seems other-
wise than it is, what if this stone seem to one person to be a
SOLILOQUIES 391
stone and to another a piece of wood will the same thing
be true and false?
A. What you said first is of more concern to me, namely,
how it is that, if something cannot be perceived, it is by that
very fact not true. I am not too much concerned by the fact
that one thing is true and false at the same time. In fact, I
see that one thing measured against other things is at the
same time greater and smaller. But, it is from this very fact
that it comes about that nothing is, of itself, greater or lesser.
These words are expressions of comparison.
jR. If you say that nothing is true of itself, are you not
afraid that it might follow that nothing exists of itself? For,
by the same reason that wood is what it is, it is also true
wood. It cannot happen that it be wood of itself, that is,
without a perceiver, and yet not be true wood.
A. Then, here is what I say and thus I define it and I
am not afraid that my definition may be attacked on the
grounds that it is too brief. It seems to me that the 'true 5 is
that which exists.
jR, Then, nothing will be false, for, whatever exists is true.
A. You have driven me into great straits and I find nothing
whatever to answer you. Hence, it happens that, though I
am unwilling to be taught in any other way than by this ques-
tioning, I nevertheless fear to be questioned.
Chapter 6
(9) Reason. God, to whom we have entrusted ourselves,
brings help unfailingly, and He sets us free from such diffi-
culties as these, if only we believe and pray most devoutly
to Him.
Augustine. There is nothing which I would do more gladly
at this moment, for never have I experienced such obscurity.
392 SAINT AUGUSTINE
O God, our Father, who dost admonish us to pray, and who
dost grant us that which we ask of Thee, since in truth, when
we pray to Thee, we live better and we are better: hear me,
quivering in this darkness, and stretch forth Thy right hand
to me. Send forth Thy light unto me, call me back from my
wanderings, and may I by Thy guidance return to myself and
to Thee. Amen.
R. Stay with me, now, as much as you are able and be
most carefully attentive.
A. Tell me, please, lest we perish, if anything has occurred
to you.
R. Be on the alert.
A. 1 am now at your command and I am doing nothing
else.
(10) J?. First of all, let us study over and over again
what 'false' is.
A. I wonder if it will be anything but this: that which is
not in reality what it seems to be.
R. Listen, rather, and let us first question the senses them-
selves. Certainly, that which the eyes see is not called false
unless it has some likeness to the true. For example, a man
whom we see in our dreams is, of course, not a true man;
he is false for the very reason that he bears a resemblance
to a true one. Who, indeed, would see a dog in a dream and
correctly state that he has dreamed of a man? Therefore, that
is also a false dog from the very fact that it is similar to a
true one.
A. It is as you say.
R. What if a person who is awake sees a horse and thinks
that it is a man he sees: is he not mistaken precisely because
a certain likeness of a man appeared to him? For, if nothing
SOLILOQUIES 393
appears to him but the likeness of a horse, he cannot judge
that he sees a man.
A. I certainly grant that.
R. Similarly, we speak of a false tree which we see in
a picture, a false face which is reflected in a mirror, a false
movement of the towers as seen by seafarers, a false break
in an oar. All these we call false for no other reason than that
they resemble the true.
A. I acknowledge that.
R. In the same way we are deceived regarding twins, eggs,
the individual seals impressed by the same signet ring, and
other things of this kind. 1
A. I follow you exactly and I concede it.
R. Therefore, that resemblance of things which pertains
to the eyes is the mother of falsity.
A. That I cannot deny.
(11) R. But, all this forest of things which resemble
each other can, if I am not mistaken, be divided into two
classes, for it consists partly of things which are equal, partly
of inferior things. They are equal when we say that one thing
is equal to another and that that other is equal to the former,
as is said of twins or the impressions of the signet ring. The
resemblance is said to exist in inferior things when we say
that something which is inferior is similar to a superior thing.
For, who would look in a mirror and rightly say that he re-
sembles that image instead of saying that it resembles him?
This class of resemblances arises in part from that which the
soul experiences and in part from the objects which are seen.
But, what the soul experiences it experiences either through
1 These examples of things which resemble each other are familiar
illustrations in the literature of Skepticism. Cf. Cicero, Disputationes
Academicae 2.126.
394 SAINT AUGUSTINE
one of the senses, such as the movement of the tower, which
does not actually take place; or it may experience it within
itself, because of what it has received from the senses; and
of this kind are the fantasies of dreamers and perhaps also
of the insane. Furthermore, those resemblances which appear
in the things which we see are portrayed and fashioned, some
by nature, others by living beings. Nature produces inferior
resemblances either by begetting them or by reflecting them:
by begetting them as when offspring are born like to their
parents; by reflecting them, as in the various kinds of mirrors.
Even though it is men who produce most of the mirrors, they
nevertheless do not form those images which are reflected in
them. On the other hand, the resemblances effected by living
beings are in pictures and various productions of this kind
in which class also can be included those (if there are any
such) which are produced by demons. It must not be denied,
however, that the shadows of bodies belong to the domain of
the eyes, since it is not too far from the truth to say that they
are similar to the bodies and, as it were, false bodies. It is
fitting to place them in that category of resemblances which
is produced by nature by reflection. For, every body exposed
to light reflects and produces a shadow on the side opposite
to it. Does some of this seem to you to merit denial?
A, No part of it does, to me. But I eagerly wait to see in
what direction these things are tending.
(12) R. We must contain ourselves patiently until all
the other senses inform us that falsity dwells in this re-
semblance to the true. In the sense of hearing, for example,
almost as many types of resemblances occur: as, when we
hear the voice of someone we do not see, we judge it to be
someone else whose voice is similar. Likewise, in the class of
inferior resemblances : the echo is a case in point, or the ring-
DIVINE PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
ing of the ears, or a certain imitation of the blackbird or the
crow in clocks, or the sounds which dreaming persons or
the insane think they hear. It is unbelievable how closely
falsetto voices, as they are called by musicians, bear witness
to this truth as will later become evident. It is enough for
the present to say that they are not without a resemblance to
the voices which are called true. Do you follow this?
A. With the greatest of pleasure, for I find no difficulty
in understanding it.
R. Not to delay, then. Does it seem to you that it is possible
with no difficulty to distinguish by smell one lily from another,
or to distinguish by taste between the honey from different
hives, or to distinguish by touch the softness of swan's feathers
from that of goose feathers?
-4. It seems not.
R. What about when we dream that we smell or taste
or touch such things: are we not mistaken by the resem-
blance of the images, which resemblance is all the more im-
perfect as it is less lifelike?
A. What you say is true.
R. It is evident, then, that in all our senses we are deceived
by a tawdry resemblance both in things which are equal and
in those which are inferior. Even if we are not deceived,
because we withhold our assent or discern the difference,
nevertheless we call those things false which we perceive to
be similar to true things.
A. I cannot doubt that.
Chapter 7
(13) Reason. Pay attention, now, while we go over these
same things once more, so that we may have a clearer view of
what we are trying to show.
396 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Augustine. I am here; say what you wish. I have made
up my mind once and for all that I would bear with this
roundabout course, nor shall I grow tired of it so great is
my hope of reaching the end toward which I think we are
striving.
R. You are well advised. Now, consider whether it seems
to you that, when we see identical eggs, we can correctly
say that anyone of them is false.
A. By no means, for all of them, if they are eggs, are true
. .
j?. What about when we see an image reflected in a
mirror: by what marks do we recognize that it is false?
A. By the fact that it cannot be touched, it makes no
sound, it does not of itself move, it does not live, and by
signs without number which would require too much time to
mention.
J?. I see that you are loath to delay and your haste must
be complied with. So, not to repeat all of them, if those men
whom we see in dreams were able to live, to speak, and to
be touched by those who are awake, and if there were no
difference between them and the men whom we see and speak
to when we are awake and in our right minds, would we call
them false?
A. How could we rightly say that?
J?. Therefore, if they were true for the reason that they
seem exactly like to the true, and because there is no differ-
ence between them and true ones, and if, moreover, they
would be false if they were proved to be dissimilar because
of these and other differences, is not, then, similarity the
mother of truth and dissimilarity the mother of falsity?
A. I have nothing to Say and I am ashamed of my previous
too hasty assent.
SOLILOQUIES 397
(14) R. It is nonsensical for you to be ashamed, as
though we had not chosen this manner of discussion for this
very reason. Because we are speaking to ourselves alone, I
chose to call it by the title of Soliloquies, 1 a name which is, to
be sure, a new one and perhaps an awkward one, but one
which is quite suitable to indicate its purpose. Since, on the
one hand, truth can not be better pursued than by question
and answer, and since, on the other hand, hardly any one can
be found who is not ashamed to be defeated in an argument,
with the result that it almost always happens that a subject
for discussion which is well begun is driven out of mind by
the unruly noise of self -opinion, accompanied also by wounded
feelings which are usually concealed but at times evident
for these reasons, it was my pleasure to seek the truth with
God's help in peace and propriety by questioning and answer-
ing myself. Hence, if you have committed yourself rashly
upon any point, you must not fear to return to the question
and unravel it; otherwise, one cannot escape.
Chapter 8
(15) Augustine. You are right, but I do not see clearly
what it is that I have unwisely conceded except, perhaps,
when I said that that was correctly called false which bears
some resemblance to the true, though nothing else worthy of
the name of false occurs to me. On the other hand, I am
forced to admit that false things are so called because they
differ from the true, and from this one concludes that it is
dissimilarity itself which is the cause of falsity. So I am
mixed up, for I can think of nothing offhand which is pro-
duced by opposite causes.
1 Cf. Retractationes 4.1.
398 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Reason. What if this is the one instance and the only one
of its kind in the universe? Are you not aware that, if you
survey the innumerable categories of animals, the crocodile
is the only one you will find which moves the upper jaw when
chewing? What is more, do you not know that scarcely any-
thing can be found which is so similar to another that it is
not in some respect also dissimilar?
A. I do indeed see this, but, when I consider that what we
call false contains something like and something unlike the
true, I am unable to decide for which of these it should merit
the name of false. If I should say that it is because it is
dissimilar, there is nothing which cannot be called false,
since there is nothing which is not dissimilar to something
which we acknowledge to be true. If, on the other hand,
I were to say that it should be called false because it is
similar, not only will those eggs object which are true because
they are most similar, but also will I be at the mercy of some-
one who would force me to admit that all things are false,
since I cannot deny that in some respect all things resemble
one another. Suppose I were to dare say this : both similarity
and dissimilarity share in causing something to be properly
called false what means of escape will you offer me? I shall
be constrained, just the same, to declare that all things are
false, since, as we have said above, all things partly resemble
and partly differ from one another, I would then have no
recourse left but to say that the false is that which is in reality
different from what it seems. If I said that, I would be terri*
fied by all those monsters which I thought I had just steered
clear of. Once more I am tossed about by a sudden gust, so
that I call true that which is in reality what it seems. If I say
that, the result is that nothing can be true unless someone
perceived it, and in that case I have to beware of shipwreck
SOLILOQUIES 399
by unseen rocks -which are true even if they are not ob-
served. Moreover, If I should say that the true is that which
exists, one may conclude that the false nowhere exists, which
anyone will deny. And so my troubles return, and I do not
see that I have made any progress, in spite of my forbearance
of your slow pace.
Chapter 9
(16) Reason. Pay attention, rather, for I will never be
convinced that we have asked God's help in vain. I see that,
after examining everything to the best of our ability, there
remains nothing that can with justice be called false, unless it
would be that which either feigns to be what it is not, or tends
to exist and does not succeed. The former classification of the
false is either fallacious or fabulous. That is correctly called
fallacious which includes the desire to deceive someone, and
this desire cannot be conceived without a soul, though it acts
partly through reason and partly by nature. It acts through
reason in rational animals such as man; through nature, in the
beasts such as foxes. On the other hand, what I call the
fabulous kind of falsehood is the kind which is committed by
those who tell fables. The difference between deceivers and
fabulists is this: every deceiver wants to deceive, but not
everyone who tells a fable has the desire to deceive. For,
farces and comedies and many poems are full of fables whose
purpose is to give pleasure rather than to deceive, and almost
everyone who tells a joke tells a fable. But, that one is rightly
called fallacious or deceiving whose sole aim is to deceive
someone. Those, on the contrary, who make something up,
but do not do it in order to deceive, no one hesitates to call
fabulists, or, if not that, tellers of fables. Perhaps, though, you
have something to say against these assertions.
400 SAINT AUGUSTINE
(17) A. Please continue. Maybe you have now begun
to teach me something, which is not itself false, about false
things. Now I am waiting to hear about that class of the false
of which you spoke, that is, the kind which tends to be and
yet is not.
R. And why should you not wait? They are of the same
class as the various examples we mentioned above. Is it not
evident to you that your image in a mirror desires, so to
speak, to be you, and yet is false precisely because it is
not you?
A. Truly, that seems to be so.
R. Do not all pictures and portraits and all things of that
kind produced by artists strive to be that in whose likeness
they are made?
A. I am entirely convinced that they do.
R. And those things by which sleeping persons and the
insane are deceived you will admit, I feel sure, that they are
in this class.
A. They especially are, for nothing has so great a tendency
to be just like the things which waking and sane people
perceive; yet they are false for the simple reason that they
cannot be what they tend to be.
-R. Shall I say anything more about that movement of the
towers or about the oar in the water, or the shadows? I think
it is obvious that they are to be estimated by this rule.
A. That is most evident.
jR. I will say nothing about the other senses, for, anyone
who studies the problem will find that, among the things
we perceive by sense, we call that false which tends to be
something and is not.
SOLILOQUIES 401
Chapter 10
(18) Augustine. What you say is correct. I wonder,
though, why you should think that those poems and jokes and
other things that are not true ought not to be included in
this class of false things.
Reason. Because it is one thing to want to be false; it is
quite different to be unable to be true. So, we can group
the works of men, like comedies, tragedies, farces, and other
things of that type with the works of painters and sculptors.
A man in a painting cannot be as true, even though it tends
toward the appearance of a man, as those things which are
written in the works of the comic authors. Such things do not
choose to be false nor are they false, through their own desire
to be so, but they are compelled by a kind of necessity to con-
form as much as they are able to the artist's will. On the other
hand, the actor Roscius 1 was by choice a false Hecuba on
the stage, though, by nature, a true man; he was by choice a
true tragedian in that he fulfilled his purpose, and a false
Priam because he played the part of Priam though he was
not Priam. From this fact arises something remarkable, which
nevertheless nobody denies is a fact.
A. 'What is that?
J?. What else do you think but that all these things are
in some respect true precisely because they are in other re-
spects false. To establish their truth, the only thing in their
favor is that they are false in some other regard. Hence, they
never succeed in being what they want or ought to be, as
long as they refuse to be false. How could that man I just
mentioned be a true tragedian, if he were unwilling to be a
1 Quintus Roscius Callus was one of the greatest of Roman actors,
especially famous for his portrayal of roles in comedy. A friend of
Cicero, he was defended by him in a lawsuit: Pro Q. Roscio Comoedo.
402 SAINT AUGUSTINE
false Hector, a false Andromache, a false Hercules, and others
without number? Or how would it be a true picture, if the
horse in it were not false? How could it be a true image of a
man in a mirror, if it were not a false man? If, therefore, in
order to be something true it is to the advantage of some
things that they be something false, why should we have such
a dread of falsities and desire truth as if it were a great good?
A. That I do not know, and 1 will be very much surprised
if it is not because I find in these examples nothing worthy
of imitation. To the end that we may be true to our nature,
we should not become false by copying and likening our-
selves to tl^e nature of another as do the actors and the
reflections in a mirror and the brass cows of Myron. 2 We
should, instead, seek that truth which is not self -contradictory
and two-faced so that it is true on one side, false on another.
jR. The things which you require are great and divine.
Yet, if we find them, shall we not admit that it is from these
that Truth itself is derived and, as it were, fused that Truth
from which everything which by any title is called true gets
its name?
A. I agree willingly,
Chapter 11
(19) Reason. What do you think of this, then: Does the
science of argumentation seem to you true or false?
Augustine. Who would doubt that it is true? But, grammar
is true, too.
R. Is it as true as the other?
2 Myron was the Greek sculptor noted for his statues of athletes and
lifelike animals. His Discobolos is perhaps his best known work. Some
of the epigrams of the poet Ausonius celebrate this resemblance to the
real in the statue of the cow which was first placed in the market
place at Athens.
SOLILOQUIES 403
A. I do not see that there is anything more true than what
is true.
J?. That is surely more true which has nothing false in it.
Examining this a little while back, you were shocked by
those things which, in some unknown way, could not be true
unless they were false. Are you not aware that all those fables
and obviously false things pertain to grammar?
A. I realize that, but I think that it is not through grammar
that they are false, but through grammar they are shown to
be what they are. A fable is a fiction composed for entertain-
ment or instruction. Grammar is the branch of learning
which preserves and regulates the spoken word, and by virtue
of its office it must assemble all the works of human language,
even the fictitious, which have been committed to memory
or to writing. Grammar does not make them false, but it
teaches and presents a certain true method of treating them.
R. What you say is certainly correct, but at the moment
I do not care whether you define and distinguish these things
properly. What I want to know is whether it is grammar
itself or that science of argumentation which shows this to
be so.
A. I do not deny that the ability and skill of defining through
which I tried to divide these things is attributed to tke art
Of argumentation.
(20) R. What about grammar itself: if it be true, is it
hot because it is a branch of learning that it is true? The
expression 'branch of learning 3 is derived from the word
learn/ and no one who learns and holds on to what he
learns can be said not to know. Moreover, no one knows
the false. Therefore, every branch of learning is true.
A. I see nothing rash at all in assenting to this brief ex-
ample of reasoning. Nevertheless, I am anxious lest anyone
404 SAINT AUGUSTINE
conclude therefrom that those fables also are true because
we learn them and remember them.
R. Did our teacher not want us to believe and to know
the ones which he taught us? 1
A. More than that: he earnestly insisted that we know
them.
jR. Did he ever insist that we believe that Daedalus had
flown?
A. That he never did. But, if we did not hold on to the
fable, he certainly fixed it so that our hands could not hold
on to anything.
R. Do you deny, then, that it is true that this fable exists
and that this is the way the story of Daedalus is told every-
where?
A. I do not deny that that is true.
R. Then you do not deny that you learned something
true when you learned these things. For, if it were really true
that Daedalus had flown, and children accepted and recited
it as a fabulous invention, then they would be learning some-
thing false by the very fact that what they recited was true.
In this way, what we were previously astounded at comes
about, namely, that it could not be a true fable about the
flight of Daedalus if it were not false that Daedalus had flown.
1 Augustine describes how, as a boy, he disliked the elements of gram-
mar and preferred the fables he was required to learn: 'Moreover, if
I should ask which of these two things might be forgotten with greater
inconvenience to our life: how to read and write, or those poetical
fictions, who does not see what any one would answer who has not
entirely lost his wits? When I was a boy, I therefore sinned when I
preferred these vain things to those more useful ones; or rather, I
hated the former and loved the latter. At that time "one and one
make two, two and two make four" was a hateful song to me, but
the wooden horse full of armed men, the burning of Troy and the
ghost of Creusa these were to me a most delightful spectacle of
vanity' (Confessions 1.13.22).
SOLILOQUIES 405
A. I grasp that now, but I am waiting to see what pro-
gress we shall make from that point.
JR. Nothing less than this: that the reasoning is not false
whereby we concluded that a branch of learning cannot be
a branch of learning unless it teaches things which are true.
A. And what is the point in that?
& It is that I want you to tell me why grammar is a
branch of learning, since it is true for the very reason that it
is a branch of learning.
A. I do not know how to answer you.
R. Is it not clear to you that it could not be a branch of
learning if it contained no definitions and no divisions and
distinctions of classes and kinds?
A. Now I understand what you want to say, and I can
think of no kind of a branch of learning in which definitions,
divisions, and reasoning do not perform their functions in
defining the nature of a thing, in assigning to everything
its proper place without any confusion of parts, in excluding
nothing germane to the subject, in including nothing which
does not belong there, in doing all that for which it is called
a branch of learning.
R. Therefore, in doing all that for which it is called true.
A. I see that that follows.
(21) jR. Tell me now which branch of learning it is
which embraces the principles of definition, division, and
distinction?
A. It has already been noted above that these are con-
tained in the Jaws of argumentation.
R. Therefore, grammar as a branch of learning and as
a true one springs from the same art which you have already
vindicated of the charge of falsity. And I may draw this con-
clusion, not only of grammar, but of all branches of learning.
406 SAINT AUGUSTINE
For, you said, and said truly, that you could think of no
branch of learning in which the law of definition and divi-
sion was not what made it a branch of learning. But, if they
are true for the same reason that they are branches of
learning, will anyone deny that that is Truth itself through
which all branches of learning are true?
A. 1 am close to perfect agreement with you. But, I am
concerned about the fact that we also enumerate the science
of argumentation among these branches of learning. Hence
I consider, rather, that that is Truth by which this science
is true.
R. Very well done, and most alertly. But, I think you
do not deny that it is true for the same reason that it is a
branch of learning.
A. Indeed, that is what bothers me, for I observed that
it is a branch of learning and for that reason is called true.
J?. Well, then. Do you think it could otherwise be a
branch of learning, if everything in it were not defined and
divided?
A. I have nothing else to say.
R. If that is the province of the science of argumentation,
it is through itself that it is a true branch of learning. Who,
then, will think it strange if that by which all things are true
is through itself and in itself the true Truth.
A. There is nothing to prevent my advancing directly
toward this view.
Chapter 12
(22) Reason. Pay attention, then, to what little there is
left.
Augustine. If you have anything, show it to me; if only
SOLILOQUIES 407
it Is something I can understand, I shall readily admit it.
R. We are not unaware of the fact that one thing is said
to be in another in two ways. In the first way, it is so in
such a manner that it might be removed and be somewhere
else, as, for example, this wood is in this place or as the sun
is in the east. In the second way, a thing is in a subject in
such a manner that it cannot be separated from it, as the
form and appearance which we see in this wood, as light is
in the sun, as heat is in fire, as learning is in the soul and
any other things there may be of this kind. Does it seem
otherwise to you?
A. To us these facts are time-honored, perceived and
known with the greatest of diligence from our earliest youth.
Hence, when I am asked about them, I cannot but admit
them without any reflection.
J?. What about this question: Do you not grant that
whatever is inseparably in a subject cannot continue if its
subject does not continue?
A. I see that this, too, necessarily follows. For, anyone
who examines the matter carefully knows that, even when the
subject continues, it is possible that that which is in the sub-
ject may not continue. Thus, the color of the body can
change with the condition of one's health or with age, even
though the body itself may not yet have died. This is not
equally true in all cases, but only in those cases in which the
things which are in subjects co-exist with them without being
necessary for the existence of the subjects. For a wall to exist
it need not have the color we see in it, since, even if it were
to grow black or white or change to some other color, it
would still remain and be called, nonetheless, a wall. But,
contrariwise, if fire were to be without heat, it would not be
fire, and we can call. snow only that which is white.
408 SAINT AUGUSTINE
Chapter 13
(23) [Augustine]. But, as regards your question, who
would admit or who would deem it possible that that which
is in a subject remains when the subject has passed away?
It is surely preposterous and far from the truth to say that
something which would not exist unless it existed in a sub-
ject might exist when the subject has ceased to exist.
Reason. Then, what we were seeking has been found.
A. What are you telling me?
J?. Just what you hear.
A. It is now clearly established that the soul is immortal?
JR. Very clearly, if what you have admitted is true, unless
possibly you maintain that the soul, even if it might die, is
still a soul.
A. I would certainly never say that, but I do say that,
from the very fact that it perishes, it results that it is not a
soul. And I am not swayed from this opinion by the fact
that great philosophers 1 have declared that the thing which
supplies life wherever it is cannot admit death within it.
For, although light brightens whatever it can penetrate, and,
thanks to that well-known rule of contraries, cannot receive
darkness within itself, yet it is extinguished; when this hap-
pens the place is darkened. Thus, that which was wont to
resist the darkness and in no wise admitted darkness with-
in itself, by dying gives way to the darkness as it could also
have done by withdrawing. So, also, I fear lest death befall
1 This seems to refer to Plato and his school. The soul is proved im-
mortal because it is essentially life and the principle of self-motion.
Cf. Plato, Phaedrus (ed. Didot) 711-712, n. 24. Tor whatever is left
by life -and is said to be dead, is understood to be left by the soul. But
since that life which leaves those things that die is the soul and since
it does not leave itself, the soul does not die* (De immortalitate
anirnae 9.16) .
SOLILOQUIES 409
the body as darkness does to a place, sometimes through the
departure of the soul from the body, sometimes through its
extinction, in the body, as happens with light. As a result of
this we do not have certainty about every bodily death, but
some form of it is desirable, as when the soul is conducted
unharmed from the body and is brought to a place (if there
is such a place) where it cannot be extinguished. But, if this
is impossible and the soul is in the body like an enkindled
lamp and is unable to dwell outside the body, and every death
is a certain extinction of the soul or life in the body, then some
way of life should be chosen, as far as one may, in which the
life he has to lead may be spent in confidence and peace. I do
not know, though, how this can be done, if the soul does die.
happy exceedingly are those who are persuaded, whether
by themselves or someone else, that death is not to be dreaded
even if the soul perishes! But wretched as I am, no philosophi-
cal reasoning, no books, have availed to persuade me.
( 24 ) J?. Do not be downcast. The human soul is immortal.
A. How do you prove it?
J?. From what you have already with considerable caution,
1 think, admitted.
A. I do not remember making any unwary concessions
to you when you questioned me. But now, sum- it all up,
I beg you. Let us see how far we have progressed after so many
detours, and I wish you would not ask me any more ques-
tions. Once you have briefly outlined the points which I have
yielded, why should you want me to answer again? 1$ it to
delay for no good reason my joy for having, perhaps, accom-
plished some good?
R. I shall do what you evidently desire, but pay the strictest
attention.
A. Speak now; I am attentive. Why do you vex me?
410 SAINT AUGUSTINE
i?. If whatever is in a subject endures forever, the subject
itself must of necessity endure. Every branch of learning is in
the soul as in a subject. If, therefore, learning endures for-
ever, then the soul must endure forever. But, learning is truth,
and, as reason showed in the beginning of this book, truth
abides forever. Therefore, the soul endures forever; if it died,
we would not call it the soul. Consequently, only he can
reasonably deny the immortality of the soul who proves that
some point in the above reasoning was granted illogically.
Chapter 14
(25) Augustine. Now I am eager to give way to joy, but
I am restrained somewhat for two reasons. The first thing that
worries me is that we used such a roundabout way, following
some inexplicable chain of reasoning, when the whole subject
of the discussion might have been demonstrated briefly, as
it now is. For this reason, I am concerned because your words
wandered about for so long a time, as though bent on laying
snares. Secondly, I do not see how a branch of learning, par-
ticularly that of argumentation, exists always in the soul,
whereas so few know of it, and whoever does know of it was
for a long time from childhood on unaware of it. For, we can-
not say that the souls of the unlearned are not souls, or that
there can be in the soul learning of which they are not
conscious. However, if this is awfully absurd, it remains that
truth is not always in the soul or else that that branch of
learning is not truth.
(26) Reason, You see how it was not in vain that our rea-
soning has taken such indirect ways. For, we were seeking to
discover what truth is, and I see that we have, even at the pres-
ent time, not been able to search it out in this forest of things,
after having explored almost all the bypaths. What are we
SOLILOQUIES 411
to do? Are we to cast aside what we have begun and wait
until some unheard-of book comes into our hands which, will
answer this question satisfactorily? I think that many books
have been written before our time, and these we have not
read. In our own day, not to express opinions about what
we do not know, we are positive that books have been written
on the subject in prose and in verse. They have been written
by men whose works cannot be unknown to us, and we know
their talent is such that we cannot despair of finding what we
want in their writings. I say this especially, because we have
here before our eyes that man 1 in whose person we see that
eloquence, which we mourned as dead, living again in all its
perfection. Will he, who has taught us in his writings the
right manner of life, allow us to be without a knowledge of
the nature of that life?
A. I certainly do not think so, and I hope for much on
this account. One thing, however, I regret, and that is that
we are not able to show him, as we would like to, our devotion
1 St. Ambrose. Of the eloquence of Ambrose Augustine gives testimony
in the Confessions: 'I came to Milan to the Bishop Ambrose, a man
of outstanding fame all over the world and a devout worshipper of
Thine. His discourse plentifully dispensed to Thy people the fatness
of Thy wheat, the gladness of Thine oil and the sober delights of
Thy wine. To him I was led by Thee unknowingly, that through
him I might be led to Thee knowingly. That man of God received
me like a father, and like a true bishop gave his approval to my
coming. ... I listened carefully to him when he preached to the
people, not with the intention which I should have had, but, as it
were, studying his eloquence to see whether it equalled his reputation
and whether it was greater or less than was reported. I hung upon
his words attentively, though I was indifferent and contemptuous
regarding the matter of his preaching. I was delighted with the
sweetness of his discourse which, though more scholarly than that of
Faustus, was less pleasing and winning. Regarding the matter there
was no comparison, for Fau&tus wandered through the Manichaean
fallacies, whereas Ambrose taught salvation most soundly. Salvation
is far from sinners such as I then was, yet gradually I drew near it,
though I knew not how' (Confessions 5.13.23).
4 1 2 SAINT AUGUSTINE
to himself and to wisdom. For he would immediately take
pity on our thirst and would give us abundantly to drink
more speedily than he now does. He is secure because he is
already completely persuaded of the soul's immortality; per-
haps he does not know that there are those who have known
full well the misery of such ignorance and whom it would be
cruel not to help, especially when they ask for it. That other
man, 2 however, surely knows our fervor intimately, but he
is so far away and we are at present so situated that we are
scarcely able even to send him a letter. I believe he has by
now, in his transalpine leisure, finished a poem in which the
fear of death is cast out by an incantation, and the soul's
torpor and coldness, hardened by its long-standing desolation,
is driven away. But, in the meantime, until these things which
are not in our power come to pass, is it not disgraceful to
waste our time while all our soul hangs suspended on account
of this doubtful judgment?
Chapter 15
(27) [Augustine]. Where are the things we asked and
continue to ask of God? We did not ask him for riches, for
the pleasures of the body, or for popular dignity and honor,
but only that He might make known the way for those who
search for their souls and for Himself. Is it thus that He
abandons us or is abandoned by us?
Reason. That He should abandon those who long for such
gifts is farthest from His will, and, by the same token, it
should be far from our intention to abandon such a leader.
Therefore, if it so please you, let us go over again briefly the
manner in which these two propositions have been proved,
2 Zenobius. See above, Divine Providence 1.7.20, p. 258.
SOLILOQUIES 413
namely, that truth remains forever and that the science of
argumentation is the truth. For these, you said, are so weak as
to prevent us from being completely satisfied about the whole
argument. Or should we rather examine how learning can
exist in an unskilled mind, which yet we cannot say is not a
mind? It was about this question that you seemed upset, so
that you found it necessary to doubt once more about the
things which you had conceded.
A. Let us, rather, discuss first the above two propositions
and afterwards we shall look into the nature of this last point.
In this way, I think, nothing will be left to debate.
R. Let us so proceed, but give me your entire and most
careful attention. I know what happens to you when you are
absorbed in a question. While you are too much concerned
about the conclusion, hoping to have it deduced right away,
you concede what you are asked without mature deliberation.
A. What you say may be true, but I shall strive manfully,
as well as I can, against this form of weakness. But begin
questioning me right away so that we may not waste our time
n petty things.
(28) R. As I remember it, we concluded that truth can-
not perish for the reason that, if not only the whole world, but
even truth itself were to perish, it will be true that the world
and truth have perished. But, nothing is true without truth.
Therefore, truth in no way perishes.
A. I acknowledge these points and I shall be quite amazed
if they are shown to be false.
J?. Let us, then, examine the other one.
A. Permit me to reflect awhile, please, so that I may not
for my shame come back to this subject again.
jR. Will it not be true, then, that truth has perished? If it
will not be true, then truth has not perished. If it will be true,
414 SAINT AUGUSTINE
how will it be true, once truth has passed away, since now no
truth exists?
A. I have nothing more to ponder and consider; go on to
the other point. Surely, we shall do what we can to have these
discussions read by learned and wise men. They will correct
our lack of caution, if any there be. For, as far as I am con-
cerned, I do not think that I can detect anything now or at
any future time which can be alleged against this.
(29) R. Is truth, then, said to be anything other than that
by which whatever is true, is true?
A. In no way.
R. Is anything correctly said to be true except that which
is not false?
A. Surely, to deny that would be folly.
R. Is not the false that which is adequate to resemble some-
thing, without, however, being that which it seems to resemble?
A. I see nothing which I would more readily call false. Yet,
that is also often called false which is far from a resemblance
to the true.
jR. Who denies it? Yet, it has some sort of imitation of the
true.
A. In what way? For, when we say that Medea took flight
with a team of winged serpents, this does not in any way
imitate the true, since it does not exist in reality; a thing
which is absolutely nonexistent cannot imitate anything.
-R. What you say is correct, but you overlook the fact that
what is absolutely nonexistent cannot be called false. For, if
it is false, it exists; if it does not exist, it is not false.
A. Are we not, then, to call that unspeakably monstrous
fable about Medea false?
R. Of course not, for, if it is false, how is it monstrous?
A. I observe something very strange. When I hear the
SOLILOQUIES 415
words, 'I bridle the team of huge winged serpents,' am I not
to call it false?
R. You surely do so call it, for there is something in it which
you may call false.
A. What is it, pray?
R, The judgment which is expressed by that verse.
A. And what imitation of the truth does that contain?
jR. Because it would be expressed in the same way even if
Medea had in truth done that. A false judgment, therefore,
imitates true judgments by the very form of its expression. If
it is not believed, it imitates the true only in the similar man-
ner in which it is worded, and it is false only and not falsify-
ing. But, if it elicits faith, then it imitates the truths which one
has believed.
A. Now I understand that there is a great difference between
what we say and the objects about which we say something,
and, therefore, I agree with you. One thing alone restrained
me, namely, the statement that what we call false is not
properly so called unless it bears an imitation of something
true. Who would not justly be ridiculed if he were to say a
stone is false silver? Yet, if one were to say that a stone is
silver, we say that he has said something false, that is, he has
expressed a false judgment. We call zinc or lead false silver,
and, I think, not without reason, because the thing itself re-
sembles silver. Our judgment is not false on that account,
but that about which the judgment is made is false.
Chapter 16
(30) Reason. You understand it well. But, consider this:
Can we properly apply the name of false lead to silver?
Augustine. It is not to my liking.
R. Why not?
416 SAINT AUGUSTINE
A. I do not know. I perceive, though, that it is very much
against my will that it be so called.
J?. Is it possibly because silver is more perfect and it would
be called such in disdain, as it were? It is a sort of honor, on
the other hand, for lead to be called false silver.
A. You have explained it precisely as I wished. For the
same reason, I believe we justly esteem those men, disreputable
and without certain rights before the law, who array them-
selves in womanly garb. I do not know whether I should style
such as these false women or false men. We can, nevertheless,
without hesitation call them true actors and truly infamous.
But, if they are not detected since one calls something dis-
reputable only on account of ill repute in that case, we call
them, not without truth, I think, truly wicked.
R. We shall have another occasion to discuss these matters,
for many things are done which seem shameful as they appear
to the people, yet they are shown to be decent because of a
praiseworthy motive. It is quite a question whether a man, for
the purpose of liberating his fatherland, is obliged to deceive
the enemy by clothing himself in a woman's dress, and, per-
haps, thus becoming more truly a man by the very fact that
he is a false woman. Another question is whether a wise man
who knows for certain that his life is in some way necessary
for humanity should prefer to die of cold rather than to clothe
himself in feminine garments when no others are available.
But about this, as I have said, we shall see elsewhere. You
perceive, in fine, how much investigation is needed to deter-
mine how far these things may be allowed to go in order not
to fall into inexcusable indecency. Now, I think, it is suffi-
ciently evident for our present inquiry and cannot be doubted
that nothing is false except by some imitation of the true.
SOLILOQUIES 417
Chapter 17
(31) Augustine. Proceed to the points which remain, for
I am well convinced of this matter.
Reason. I want to know, then, whether, in addition to the
branches of learning through which we are taught and
among these it is proper to count the study of wisdom itself
we can discover anything which is so true that it is not, like
a stage Achilles, false in one respect that it may be true in
another.
A. Many such are found, it seems to me. For, this stone
does not belong to any branch of learning, nor does it, in
order to be a true stone, imitate something else and deserve
on this account to be called false. When I mention this one
example, you may note the vast number which immediately
occur to thinking persons, but which we must omit.
R. I see that, of course. But, do you think that they are all
included in the one name of body?
A. They would seem so if I considered it certain that the
void 1 is nothing, or if I judged that the soul was counted
among corporeal things, or if I even believed that God was
something corporeal. If all these things exist, I do not see that
they are true or false in imitation of anything.
R. You are sending us on a long journey, but I shall use,
as far as I can, a short cut. Of course, what you call the void
is quite different from what you call Truth.
A. Very different. What would be more void than myself if
I were to think that Truth is something void or if I were so
ardently to desire something void? For, what else is there that
I desire to discover but Truth?
1 The Latin is inane: *Et inanitas non est aliquid, sed locus ubi corpus
non est, inanis dicitur' (De genesi contra Manichaeos 2.4.7) .
418 SAINT AUGUSTINE
R. Therefore, you may perhaps grant this: Nothing is true
which is not made true by Truth.
A. That was made clear some time ago.
J?. Do you doubt that nothing is void except the void itself,
or at least that a body is not void?
A. I do not doubt that at all.
R. I judge, then, that you think truth to be some kind of
body.
A. Not at all
R. What about: in a body?
A. I do not know. It is not to the point, for I think you
know that the void, if it be void, is rather more so where
there is no body.
JR. That, surely, is evident.
A. Why, then, do we delay?
J?. Does it seem to you that truth made the void or that
something true can exist where truth does not exist?
A. It does not seem so.
R. Therefore, the void is not true, because it cannot be
made void by that which is not itself void. Moreover, that
which lacks truth is evidently not true. Furthermore, that
which is called void is so called because it is nothing. Then,
how can that be true which does not exist, or how can that
exist which is absolutely nothing?
A. Come now, let us leave the subject of the void, as it is a
void subject.
Chapter 18
(32) Reason. What do you say about the rest?
Augustine. What do you mean?
R. I mean that which you see me insisting upon so very
much. For, the soul and God remain, and, if both are true for
SOLILOQUIES 419
the reason that truth is in them, no one doubts about the im-
mortality of God. The soul, however, is believed to be
immortal, if truth, which cannot perish, is proved to be in the
soul. Hence, let us now examine this last point, namely,
whether a body is not truly true, that is, whether, though
truth is not in it, there is in it some sort of an image of truth.
For, if we find in the body, which quite certainly suffers death,
something true in the same way as it is in the branches of
learning, then the science of argumentation will not necessarily
be that truth by virtue of which all branches of learning are
true. For, the body is true, and the body does not seem to be
formed by any principle of argumentation. If, on the other
hand, a body is true by reason of a certain imitation, and on
this account not completely true, then, perhaps, there will be
nothing to prevent us from teaching that the science of argu-
mentation is truth itself.
A. In the meantime, let us make our study concerning the
body, for I see that, even when this point has been established,
the argument will not yet be ended.
R. How do you know what is God's will? Listen, then. I
believe that the body is maintained in a certain form and
appearance. If it did not have this form and appearance, it
would not be a body. If it had a true form and appearance, it
would be a soul. Or should one think otherwise?
A. I agree in part, but about the rest I have my doubts.
I agree that it is not a body unless it has a certain form, but I
do not quite see how, if it had a true one, it would be a soul.
R. Do you not remember the beginning of the first book
and that geometry of yours?
A. It was well you reminded me. I remember very well and
most gladly.
4:20 SAINT AUGUSTINE
R. Are such figures found In bodies as that science
demonstrates?
A. No, Indeed; it is unbelievable how much Inferior they
are shown to be.
R. Which of them, then, do you think are true?
A. Please do not think that I have even to be questioned
about this. Who, indeed, is so mentally blind as not to see
that those which are taught in geometry abide in Truth or
the Truth abides in them; whereas, the forms of a body, be-
cause they appear to tend toward the geometric forms, have
a kind of imitation of the truth and are therefore false. Now
I understand all that you were trying so hard to explain.
Chapter 19
(33) Reason. What need have we now, therefore, to ex-
amine further into the science of argumentation? For, whether
those geometric figures exist in Truth or Truth in them, no
one disputes that they are contained in our soul, that is to
say our intelligence; hence, truth also is, perforce, in the soul.
But, if any learning is in the soul in this way, inseparably con-
joined to a subject, and if truth cannot die, why then, I beg
you, do we have any doubt about the unending life of the
soul doubt arising, as it does, from some certain familiarity
with death? Does that line or that squareness or roundness
have other things which they must imitate in order that they
may be true?
Augustine. I can in no way believe that, unless, perchance, a
line is something other than length without width, and a
circle is something other than a line drawn round, equidistant
at all points from a center.
SOLILOQUIES 421
J?. Why, therefore, do we delay? Does truth not exist where
these things are?
A. May God prevent such madness!
R. Is learning not in the soul?
A. Who would say that?
J?. But, perhaps, what is in a subject can continue to exist
when the subject has perished?
A. How could I be so persuaded?
R. One possibility remains that Truth may perish.
A. How can that be?
jR. The soul is, therefore, immortal. Believe now your rea-
sons; believe the Truth. It proclaims that it dwells within
you, that it is immortal, that its dwelling place can be taken
from it by no death of the body. Turn away from your shadow,
return to yourself; there is no death for you unless you lose
sight of the fact that you cannot die.
A. I hear; I regain my wits; I begin once more to remem-
ber. But, I beg you, settle quickly what remains, that is, how
learning and Truth are considered to exist in the soul of an
ignorant person for we cannot call such a soul mortal.
JR. That question requires another book, if you want it
discussed thoroughly. I see, too, that the questions we have
studied as well as we could ought to be reviewed by you, be-
cause, if there is no doubt about any of the points conceded,
I think we have accomplished a great deal, and we can inquire
into the remaining questions with no little confidence.
Chapter 20
(34) Augustine. It is just as you say, and gladly do I obey
your commands. I will ask just one thing, however, before you
decide to close the volume. It is that you explain briefly the
difference between a true figure which is contained in the
422 SAINT AUGUSTINE
intellect and the figure which the act of thinking fashions for
itself, and which is called in Greek the phantasy or phantasm.
Reason. What you seek is something which can be seen only
by one who is most pure, and you are poorly trained for th
vision of such a thing. We have labored for no other purpose
in these digressions but your own training, so that you may be
capable of seeing this. Nevertheless, I am going to explain
in a few words how it can be shown that there is a great
difference between them. Suppose you have forgotten some-
thing, and other men desire, as it were, to recall it to your
memory. They say, therefore, is it this or that, offering you
things different from it as though they were similar. But you
do not see what you are desirous of remembering, yet you
see that it is not what they say. When this happens, does it
seem that you have entirely forgotten? The very caution by
which you are advised not to admit to their false suggestions
is a part of remembrance.
A. It seems so.
j?. Such persons, therefore, do not yet see the true, but they
cannot be deceived or misled, and they know sufficiently what
they are seeking. But, if someone told you that you laughed
a few days after you were bom, you dare not say it is false;
if the one who tells you is worthy of belief, you will not remem-
ber, but you will believe. For, all that time is for you buried in
a most complete oblivion. Do you think differently?
A. I agree absolutely.
R. This kind differs very much from the former kind of
forgetfulness, which is, however, an intermediate type. There
is another kind, closer and more like to remembrance and
recollection of the truth. Such a type of forgetfulness occurs
when we see something, recognize for certain that we have
seen it at some time, and declare that we know it. But, where
SOLILOQUIES 423
or when or how or in whose company It came to our attention,
we struggle to review and remember. As, for example, if this
were to happen to us in the case of a man, we ask him where
it was we made his acquaintance. When he has reminded us
of it, all at once the whole affair floods back to our memory
like a light and we no longer have difficulty in remembering.
Is this kind unknown to you or hard to understand?
A. What is more evident or what is there that happens to
me more frequently?
(35) R. Those who are well trained in the liberal arts
are like this. They bring to light in the process of learning
knowledge that undoubtedly is buried in oblivion within
them, and, in a way, they disinter it. 1 Moreover, they are not
content and they cannot contain themselves until they behold
in all its breadth and fullness the whole countenance of Truth,
whose splendor already glows in a certain measure in those
arts. But, from these arts certain false colors and forms pour
1 As he notes in the Retractationes (4.4) , Augustine repudiated the
Platonic doctrine of reminiscence at greater length in the treatise on
the Trinity. 'Hence that noble philosopher Plato tried to persuade
us that the souls of men lived here even before they bore these
bodies; and, therefore, what things soever are learned are remembered
as something previously known rather than known as something
new. . . . But, one must rather believe that the nature of the in-
tellectual mind is so constituted that it perceives in a certain incorpo-
real light of its own those things which, by the disposition of the
.Creator, are joined to the things which are intelligible in a natural
order, just as the eye of the body sees those things which lie near it
in this bodily light for which the eye was created capable and fitted.
For, it is not because it already knew these things before it was
created in this flesh that the eye of the body distinguishes black from
white without a teacher. Furthermore, why is it only of intelligible
things that this can be done, namely, that anyone who is properly
questioned can answer correctly regarding any branch of learning
even though he is ignorant of it? Why is it that no one can do this
with sensible things except those which he sees, while dwelling in this
body, or which he believes when others tell him what they know by
writing or the spoken word? 1 (De Trinitate 12.15) .
424 SAINT AUGUSTINE
themselves, as it were, into the mirror of thought, and they
often mislead truth-seekers, and deceive those who think that
what they know or seek to know is everything. Such imagina-
tions as these are to be shunned with great precaution. Their
falsity is detected when they vary with the varying so-called
mirror of thought, whereas the countenance of truth is ever
one and changeless. Thus, for example, thought depicts to
itself and, so to speak, displays before the eyes squares of
varying size. But, that inner mind which desires to see the true
rather turns aside, if it is able, toward that vantage whence it
judges that they are all squares.
A. What if someone tells us that the mind judges according
to what it is wont to see with the eyes?
JR. Why, then, does it judge, if, indeed, it is well instructed,
that a true sphere of any size whatsoever is touched by a true
plane at only one point? What thing of this kind does the eye
ever see or can it see, when nothing like it can be pictured
even by the imagery of thought? Do we not prove this when-
ever we describe by the mind's imagining the tiniest circle and
draw lines from it to the center? For, when we have drawn
two lines, between which one can hardly insert a needle, we are
unable to draw, even in our imagination, other lines between
them in such a way that they will reach the center without
touching each other. Yet, reason asserts that lines without
number can be drawn, and that, in these unbelievably narrow
spaces, the lines can meet only in the center, so that in every
space between the lines a circle can be described. Since the
phantasy is incapable of doing this, and since it fails more than
the eyes themselves because it is through the eyes that the
phantasy is imposed on the mind it is evident that the phan-
tasy is far different from the Truth, and, as long as it is seen,
the Truth is not seen.
SOLILOQUIES 425
(36) These things will be treated with greater care and
subtlety when we begin to discuss the understanding, which
has been suggested to us as a part of the discussion, when we
explain and discuss in detail, as far as we are able, all that
concerns the life of the soul 2 For, I do believe that you have
no little dread lest human death, even though it may not kill
the soul, may yet bring with it oblivion of all things, even of
Truth itself if we have discovered any.
A. One cannot sufficiently emphasize how much this evil
is to be feared. What kind of eternal life will that be or what
death ought not to be preferred to it, if the soul so lives as we
see it living in a newly born infant, not to speak of the life
which goes on within the womb, for I do believe there is life
there.
jR. Be of good heart! As we already know, God will aid us
in our quest, and, after this body He promises us what is most
blessed, abounding in Truth, and free from all deception.
A. May it be as we hope! 3
2 De immortalitate animae was written by Augustine shortly after this,
when he had gone to Milan to prepare for baptism. Augustine intended
this brief work as a commonitorium to finish the incompleted
Soliloquies.
3 The pertinent section of the Retractationes (ch. 4) , which treats of the
Soliloquies, follows in full:
(1) Prompted by my eager love for the quest of truth, I also wrote
at -this time two other books. In them I question and answer myself
about those truths which I was especially eager to know, as if there
were two of us Reason and I whereas I was by myself. For this
reason I gave the work the name of Soliloquies, but it has remained
unfinished. Nevertheless, it is so arranged that the first book takes
up and shows quite clearly what kind of man he ought to be who
desires to grasp wisdom a wisdom, indeed, that is perceived, not by
the bodily sense, but by the mind. Toward the end of this same
book it is logically established that truly existing realities are im-
mortal. In the second book the question of the soul's immortality is
discussed at length, but it is not carried to completion.
(2) In these books I do not approve of what I said in the prayer:
426 SAINT AUGUSTINE
*O God, who hast willed that none save the pure should know the
truth' [1.1.2]. It might be retorted that there are many, even of those
who are not pure, who know many truths; for no definition was given
here of that truth which only the pure can perceive, and the nature
of knowing was left undefined. Furthermore, I do not approve of the
statement made there: *O God, whose domain is the whole world
unknown to sense/ [1.1.3]. If it is God who is to be understood as
'unknown to sense/ then words should have been added so that it
might read: 'unknown to the senses of the mortal body.* On the other
hand, if it is the world of which it is said that it is 'unknown to
sense/ one correctly judges that to mean the world which is to exist
in the new heaven and earth. But, in that case, too, those words should
have been added to make it read: 'the senses of the mortal body/ How-
ever, I was still employing that manner of expression wherein that is
called sense which is moie pioperly the bodily sense. What I have
said above need not be repeated over and over again, but it should
be recalled whenever this form of expression is found in my writings.
(3) Moreover, where I said of the Father and Son: 'the One
begetting and the One begotten is One' [1.1.4], I should have said are
One, as the Truth Itself clearly says in the words: 'I and the Father
are One' (John 10,30). Nor do I approve of my statement [1.7.14]
that in this life the soul is already happy in the knowledge of God
except perhaps through Hope. Likewise, that statement of mine, 'there
is more than one road to Wisdom* [1.13.25], does not sound right:
as if there were any other Way than Christ, who has said: *I am
the Way' (John 14.6) . This offense to pious ears should have been
avoided, even though that universal Way is one thing, and the ways
of which we sing in the Psalm are quite other: 'Show, O Lord, Thy
ways to me and teach me Thy paths' (Ps. 24.4) . And in that sentence
which is there pronounced: 'these things of sense must be forsaken
entirely [1.14.24], one must be careful not to think that we hold that
opinion of the false philosopher Porphyry, in which he says, 'Every
body is to be shunned/ I did not say all things of sense, but these,
that is,, the corruptible things of sense. However, this should have been
added: 'For such things of sense will not exist in the new heaven and
earth of the world to come/
(4) I said likewise in one place [2.20.35] that 'people well trained
in the liberal arts bring to light in the process of learning, knowledge
that undoubtedly is buried in oblivion within them, and in a way
they disinter it/ But I reject this notion, too, for it is more credible
that even those who are untaught, upon being properly questioned,
give correct answers from certain branches of learning because the
light of eternal reason is, according to their capacity, present in them,
by which they can descry these ageless truths; not because they once
knew these things and forgot them, as Plato or the Platonic philosophers
believed. Against their opinion I have written, in the 12th Book on
the Trinity, as much as was warranted by the work I there undertook.
This work begins with the words: 'While I was turning over in my
mind many and divers matters/
INDEX
Abercrombie, N., 382 n. 1
Abomination, 224
Abstraction, the Aristotelian-
Thomistic doctrine of, 95
Abundantly definition of, 80
Academics, the, 35, 47, 50 n.
18, 60ff.; Augustine's argu-
ments against, 61 n. 20, 62
n. 22, 89, 154 and passim;
The three books against ,
Augustine's farewell letter
to materialistic philosophies,
89; 132, 134, 142f.; dark-
ness, the protectress of, 164;
two aphorisms of, 179;
teachings of, 222 n. 5; 353
ff.
Academy, the Third, 47 n. 9;
skepticism of the New, 87,
107 n. 10; the different
Academies, 103 n. 1
Achilles, 417
Action, good and bad the
yardstick for man's perfec-
tion, 18; knowledge and ,
the basis for happiness, 17f.;
when virtuous, 54 n. 5
Activity, the growth of indi-
vidual man, goal of all hu-
man, 2 1
Adam, 223
Adeodatus, son of Augustine,
51, 88, 336 and passim
Adversity, the value of, 104,
106
Aegean Sea, 169
Aeneid, 249, 315, 331
Aesop, 141
Aesthetics, 13, 92
Africa, 7, 24, 84 n. 30, 208 n. 3
Agnetti, M. Prichard, 24 n. 84
Albicerius, 124ff.
Alexandria, 119f.
Alfaric, P., 48 n. 11, 98, 157
n. 5
Alfred the Great, 339
Altercatio Luciferani et Ortho-
doxi (of St. Jerome), 97
Altercation, Tuscan, 176
Alypius, closest friend of
Augustine, 31, 35, 6 Iff., 88f.,
109 n. 1 and passim
429
430
INDEX
Ambrose, St., 6 n. 6, 30, 32,
47, 84 n. 1, 335, 411 n. 1
Analogy, 169
Anamnesis, 44 n. 5
Ancients, words cover concept
in, 78
Andromache, 402
Anselm of Canterbury, 21
Antiochus, the skeptic, 103,
149, 217
Antithesis, use of, 18f.
Antoninus, Bishop of Florence,
6
Apollo, 249
A priori principles, 14ff., 92 n.
13, 93, 95
Apuleius of Madaura, 292 n. 4
Arbesmann, R., 87 n. 1
Arcesilas (Arcesilaus), 103,
149, 185 ; his theory of sense-
knowledge, 190f., 214
Argumentation, science of,
402fT
Arians, 258
Aristotle, realism of, 14; 17, 21,
37; Cicero's opinion of, 186;
Plato and, 219
Art, truth in, 401ff.
Ascalon, 217
Astrologers, 124 n. 3, 126
Astrology, origin of, 321
Athens, 62 n. 22
Atomic age, 25
Attica, 62 n, 22
Augurs, 126
Augustine, Bishop of Hippo,
St., adherent of Academic
position, 47 n. 8; adherent
of Manichaeism, 47 n. 8;
Africa's greatest son, 7 ; Aris-
totelian elements in thought
of, 37; at Cassiciacum, 10,
29f., 335ff., 369 n. 1, 371;
baptism of, 335; Cicero's
Hortensius, influence of, on,
229, 364; conversion of, 335;
creative genius, 98; creator
and creature, how related in
philosophy of, 11; date of
birth of, 7 (cf. 364) ; death,
*s teaching on, 370; de-
picted by painters, 5 n. 4,
6, 24; dialectics, 's high
regard for, 33f.; dialogues
of, their structure and style,
97; Doctor of Christianity,
9; Doctor of Grace, 6; epis-
temology of, 14; fables, 's
teaching on, 404; first mod-
ern man, 98; food, *s
teaching on, 366; friendship,
's teaching on, 35 Iff., 363
369ff.; glory of the Church,
6; God, knowability of, 's
teaching on, 320; greatest
Church Father, 5; greatest
Doctor of the Church, 88;
health of, delicate, 48, 88,
INDEX
431
107, 335f., 343, 371, 376;
high regard for, 6, 23;
honors, 's teaching on,
365, 368; human personali-
ty, *s knowledge of, 24;
human soul, origin, 's
opinion of, 224; intellectual
development of, 331; jour-
ney to the bosom of philoso-
phy, 's, 46ff.; Latin clas-
sics, their influence on, 36f.;
like the sun, 6; marriage,
*s teaching on, 365, 366,
368, 369, 376; master of
exposition, 98; master of the
ages, 6; metaphysical and
intellectual voluntarism of,
22 ; metaphysical concepts
transferred into ethics by,
18; metaphysical prayer of,
11, 346fT.; mother, St. Mon-
ica, 's esteem for, 272; one
of the most profound philo-
sophers, 88; pain, 's teach-
ing on, 371 ; peak of patristic
literature, 7; personality of,
why fascinating, 8; philoso-
pher, theologian, exegetist, 6 ;
philosophy, *s love for, 47;
philosophy of, its core, 17;
philosophy of, its principle
objects, 231, 324; philosophy
of history, 5 s concept of,
59 n. 17; physical vivacity
of, 23; Platonic doctrines,
*s opposition to certain,
292; Platonic influence on,
9, 231, 336, 337, 353, 354;
Plotinian influence on, 48
n. 5; popularity of, 24;
practical aspect of 's phil-
osophy, 25, 32; 's, prag-
matic view of life, 73; pro-
fessor at Milan, 88; psycho-
logical approach of, 70 n. 9;
psychology of , its basis 21 ;
purpose of 's life, 9; puz-
zle to himself, 7; reality, 3 s
concept of, 54 n. 4; reality,
*s proper evaluation of,
13; relation of science and
virtue, 's teaching on, 20;
religion 's guide, 107 n.
10; rhetorical skill of, 164;
riches, 's teaching on, 366 ;
Roman citizen, 24; self-
analysis of in his
Confessions, 23 ; sensation,
J s teaching on, 15; simpli-
city and sublimity of *s
thoughts, 7; teacher of
Christianity, greatest after
the Apostles, 6 n. 6; teach-
ing methods of, 373, 397;
theatre, *s interest in, 105
n. 6; theis tic-democratic
program of 's philosophy,
33; true cosmopolitan, 24;
truth, 's concept of, 12;
truth, existence of,
tempted to despair of, 87;
truth and happiness, *s
432
INDEX
quest for, 5ff., 87; turmoil of
*s soul, 87; Varro's influ-
ence on, 34; virtue, *s con-
cept of, 54 n. 5; war, 's
criticism on, 25; western cul-
ture, 's influence on, 7, 25 ;
world-soul, 's theory of,
308
His Works:
Confessiones, 5 n. 12, 7 n.
llfL, 9n. 15, 11 n. 25, 13 n.
37, 15 n. 43, 16 n. 48,
52f., 17 n. 56, 19 n. 69, 20
nn. 73, 75, 22 n. 81, 30 n.
3, 34 n. 14, 35 nn. 19fT., 46
n. 6, 47 n. 8, 48 n. 12L, 51 n
19, 60 n. 19, 61 n. 21, 79 n.
15, 84 n. 29, 87 n. 2, 105 n.
5, 105 n. 6, 107 nn. llff.,
108 n. 16, 124 n. 3, 136 nn.
Iff., 138 n. 5, 139 n. 7, 181
n. 1, 207 n. 2, 215 n. 6,
243, 338, 354 n. 1, 355 n. 2,
364 n. 1, 366 nn. 3f., 369 n.
1, 371 n. 1, 404 n. 1,411 n.
l;
Contra Academicos, trans-
lated, 85-225; 7 n. 14, 9 n.
15, 13 n. 35, 30 n. 5, 43 n.
1, 43 n. 3, 44 n. 5, 46 n. 6,
47 n. 9, 61 n. 21, 87 n. 3, 88
n. 4, 91 nn. 8ff., 94 n. 16;
its structure and style, 96f.;
the aesthetical value of, 98;
106 n. 7, 108 n. 16; date of
109n. 1; 229, 243, 254, 280
n. 2, 292 n. 4, 319 n. 1, 336,
343 n. 1, 353 n. 1, 354 n. 1,
382 n. 1
Contra Faustum, 288 n. 1,
323 n. 2;
De agone Christiano* 17 n.
57;
De beata vita, translated,
27-84; 9 nn. 17f., 29 n. 1;
date of, 29; circumstances of
its origin, 30f. ; the purpose
of, 30f.; structure of, 33f.;
34 n. 15; outlines Augus-
tine's theistic - democratic
program, 33; a Christian di-
alogue, 35ff.; editions of, 37;
37 n. 30; dedication of,
49; 60 n. 19, 95 n. 19, 106 n.
7, 107 n. 8, 109 n. 1, 137 n.
4, 139 n. 7, 229, 243, 272,
273 n, 1, 296 n. 1, 303 n. 1,
336, 343 n. 1, 382 n. 1;
De civitate Dei, 11 n. 25, 12
n. 27, 16 n. 54, 18 nn. 60f.,
19 nn, 62, 64, 68, 70, 21 n.
78, 43 n. 3, 54 n. 5, 82 n. 23,
96 n. 23, 182 n. 2, 264, 354
n. 1, 382 n. 1;
De diversis quaestionibus, 94
n. 17, 182 n. 2;
De doctrina Christiana, 10
n. 23, 12 n. 28, 19 n, 62, 22
n. 79;
De gene si contra Manichae-
05,419;
De genesi ad litteram, 82 n.
23;
INDEX
433
De haeresibus, 372 n, 3;
De immortalitate animae, 44
n. 5, 92 n. 13, 308 n. 1, 408
n. 1, 425 n. 2
De libero arbitrio, 14 nn.
38f., 16 n. 51, 18 n. 58,92 n.
14, 95 n. 18, 232, 382 n. 1,
425 n. 2
De magistro, 13 n. 35, 51 n.
19;
De musica, 308 n. 1 ;
De ordine, translated, 227-
332; 12 n. 30, 15 n. 46, 30
n. 5, 34 n. 13, 43 n. 2, 48 n.
13, 50 n. 18, 56 n. 11, 75 n.
9, 107 n. 8, 109 n. 1, 180 n.
1, 336, 344 n. 2, 350 n. 1,
376 n. 2, 412 n. 2;
De pulchro et apto, 29 ;
De quantitate animae, 44 n.
5;
De Trinitate, 10 n. 19, 12 n.
29, 15 n. 43, 16 n. 50, 18 n.
61, 19 n. 62, 44 n. 5, 55 n.
7, 56 n. 10, 96 n. 21, 305 n.
3, 320 n. 1, 353 n. 1, 382 n.
1, 423 n. 1 ;
De vera religione, 10 n. 20,
10 n. 23, 17 n. 55, 22 n. 80,
90 n. 7, 94 n. 17, 96 n. 22,
142 n. 2, 182 n. 2; 254;
De utilitate credendi, 19 n.
65;
Enarrationes in psalmos, 19
n. 67;
Enchiridion, 19 n. 62, 84 n.
30, 89 n. 5;
Epistolae, 19 n. 67, 20 n. 74,
23 n. 83, 44 n. 5, 239, 254,
369- n. 1 ;
In loannis evangelium trac-
tatus, 21 n. 76;
Retractationes, 10 n. 21, 29
n. 1, 43 n. 2, 44 n. 5, 72 n. 2,
89 n. 5, 107 n. 13, 111 n.
5, 140 n. 6, 156 n. 2, 168 n.
1, 200 n. 3, 211 n. 2, 212 n.
1, 214 n. 4, 217 n. 3, 222 n.
5, 230, 241, 245, 261, 270,
271,* 291 n. 3, 304 n. 2, 329
n. 1, 331 n. 4, 345 nn. 3f.,
347 n. 5, 361 n. 1, 373 n. 1,
375 n. 1, 397 n. 1, 423 n. 1,
425 n. 3;
Sermones, 15 n. 45;
Soliloquia, translated, 333-
426; 9 n. 16, 10 n. 22, 11,
12 n. 26, 13 n. 32, 14 n.
40, 15 nn. 46f., 20 nn. 7 If.,
21 n. 77, 30 n. 5, 34 n. 11,
37 n. 29, 44 n. 5, 48 n. 13,
54 n. 5, 80 n. 18, 83 nn. 24,
27, 84 n. 30, 92 n. 13, 95 n.
20, 110 n. 2, 130 n. 2, 138,
n. 6, 324 n. 1, its name
3371; 344 n. 2; time of its
composition, 337
Ausonius, 402 n. 2
Authority (auctoritas), rea-
son (ratio) and, 93, 231; di-
vine, 93; of Christ, 94;
434
INDEX
philosophy and, 115; force
of., 220; divine and human
, source of knowledge,
291, 303; human, value of
305 n. 3
Bacchic fury, 185
Barbarisms, 288, 322
Bardenhewer, O. 3 5 n. 3
Barion, J., 38, 44 n. 5, 48 n.
11
Basil, St. 6
Bathing-house dialogues, 34
Baumgartner, M., 38
Beatitude, wisdom identical
with, 32
Beauty, the basic concept of,
94 n. 17; true and false,
141; based upon opposites,
256; source of created
beauty, 263, 328
Being, God the absolute, 11;
every is true, 12; every
is one, good and beauti-
ful, 12
Bernard,, St., 6 n. 6
Body, as prison of mind, 116
Boeotia, 246 n. 3
Boethius, 12 n. 31, 32 n. 8,
38, 55 n. 5
Bonitas (the good), the basic
concept of, 94 n. 17
Bourke, V. J., 5 n. 1, 15 n, 42,
38, 233
Boyer, C., 38, 98, 110 n. 2,
231, 382
Brehier, E., 38
Brianza, 243 n. 2
Brown, R, A., 38
Cacus, 193
Caducarius, 68
Calliope, 246
Capanaga, V., 38, 233
Cardinal virtues, 35
Carneades, 47 n. 9, 103, 113,
134, 145, 163, 187, 192f.,
200 n. 1, 216f.
Carthage, 7, 61 n. 21, 103 n.
2, 124, 136
Casciago, 243 n. 2; see Cassici-
acum
Cassago, 243; see Cassicia-
cum
Cassamassa, A., 98, 138, 354
Cassiciacum, 10, 29, 31, 34,
36, 47, 61 n. 21, 88, 97, 103
n. 2, 108 n. 15, 229, 243 n. 2
331 n. 3, 335fT., 369 n. 1,371
Catiline, 211, 298, 322
Causae, 16
Cause, an intellectual notion,
250; nothing done without,
250, 253
Causality, law of, 43, 250
Celsus, Cornelius, 37, 372
Certainty of self-existence, 9f.
INDEX
435
Chaldean astrologer, 252
Chance, 43, 104, 250
Character, essay on, by R. W.
Emerson, 18 n. 59
Charity, the edifice of, 20; 35,
359, 360, 361
Chastity, concept of true, 66,
94 n. 17
Choice, rational, basis for hap-
py life, 43
Christ, the King of Kings, 24,
36; truly God, 82; authority
of, 94; our Saviour, 181,
220, 259, 271; true Son of
God, 266; the Way to Wis-
dom, 426; see also Jesus
Christian dialogue, the struc-
ture and style of, 96; its de-
pendence upon the ancients,
96; the first Latin, 96
Christian teachings, Platonism
and, 104 n. 4
Christianity, Neoplatonism
and, 157 n. 5
Chrysippus, 184, 192, 200 n. 1,
216
Chrysostom, St., 6, 208 n. 3
Cicero, 34, 36, 43 n. 3, 46,
54 n. 3; his concept of
virtue, 54 n. 5; 55 n. 7, 70
n. 8, 74, 97, 104 n. 4, 108,
111 n. 5, 113; an eclectic,
115 n. 3; coined philoso-
phical terms, 115; 123 n. 2,
124 n. 2, 13 If,; his relation-
ship to Greek philosophers,
186; his writings have moral
purpose, 210, 229, 298, 322,
336; Hortensius, 364; Lae-
lius } 369; Disputationes Ac-
ademicae, 393; Pro Q. Ros-
cio Comoedo, 401; Tuscu-
lanae Disputationes, 368 n.
1 ; and passim
Circle, principle (ratio] of, 92
Circus, 105
City of God, 24
Classics, Latin, 31
Cleveland, Rose E., 339
Cogency, inherent, 180
Cogito y ergo sum, Descartes*
382 n. 1
Colossians, epistle to, 271
Commonitorium, 425 n, 2
Commonwealth, security for,
22
Concepts, a priori: see Princi-
ples; words and, 78
Consciousness of self, an irre-
futable certainty, 51 n. 1, 95
Contradiction, principle of, 91
Contra Gentiles (of St. Thomas
(Aquinas), 320 n. 1
Cosmologists, 149, 194
Cosmopolitan, Augustine a
true, 24
436
INDEX
Courage, 79 n. 16
Creusa, 404 n. 2
Crossroad, man at the, 208
Culture, aim of all is sanc-
tity, 20
Cumae, 177 n. 2, 210
Cynics, 187, 218
Cyprian, St., 224
Cyrenaics, 199
Daedalus, 169, 315, 404
Darkness of mind, 285
David, King, 24; psalms of,
31, 83 n. 28
Death, fear of, 363, 370, 408
Deception, sense , 200
De disciplinis (Varro's), 34
Definition, requisites of, 121;
its place in philosophy, 193
Deformity, as evil, 18
Democritus, 194
Demons, animals of the air as,
127
Derangement, mental, 197
De re rustica (Varro's), 34
Decartes, the father of modern
philosophy, 9f., 96, 382 n. 1
Despair of existence of truth,
Augustine tempted to, 87
Dialectics, 13, 91, 201f., origin
and scope of, 315
Dialogue, Christian, 96; Cas-
siciacum dialogues, date of
their composition, 109 n. 1;
dialogues of Cicero, 177 n.
2
Dialogus contra Pelagianos (St.
Jerome's), 97
Diels, H., 46 n. 6
Diocles of Cnidus, 214
Dioscurus, letter to Augustine,
239
Disciplina, truth of, 403; defi-
nition of, 405
Discours de la Methode, (Des-
cartes') 382 n. 1
Disjunctives, truth and vali-
dity of, 195
Divination, 128, 253
Domestic affairs, practical ap-
proach toward 168
Doubt, real and methodic, 157
n. 5, 382 n. 1
Dreams, 146, 198ff.,
Dualism, Manichaean, 107 n.
12
Dyroff, A., 5 n. 3, 12 n. 31,
34 n. 12, 34 n. 16, 39, 231
Earthly goods, the possession
of alone brings no happi-
ness, 57f.
Egestas (need), 71, 80f.
Eibl, H., 39
INDEX
437
El Greco, 6
Eisner, G., 39
Emerson, R. W., 18
Enneades, (Plotinus 5 ) 38 n. 11,
303
Epicurean, 217
Epicurus, 184f., 200 n; 1, 210
Error, truth and, 117; defini-
tion of, 118f; twofold of
man, 207; sin and, 210; a
capital, 212; origin of, 241
Esoteric doctrines, 214
Esse, opposite of is non-
esse, 78; concept of, 78
Eternity, 94 n. 17
Ethics, 13; the laws of, 17, 22,
92, 94 n. 17
Eucken, R., 9, 23
Eunuchus (of Terence), 247
n. 5
Euralyus, 315
Evil, concept of, 18; problem
of, 229f., 232; Manichaean
solution of, 229; not from
God, 300, 322f., 346fL; lack
of perfection, 299
Evaluation, based upon know-
ledge, 17
Fables, 399, 404ff.
Fabulous, 399, 402
Faith, the preference of to
knowledge, 20, 35f.; a
gift of grace, 21; , hope,
charity, importance of, 35;
the tension of intellect and,
20; reason needs aid of, 93;
reason and, 231; 358fT.
Fallacious, 399ff.
Falling-sickness, 64
False things, no knowledge of,
179
Falsity, definition of, 392, 397;
distinction between false,
fallacious and fabulous,
399ff.; exists forever,
385ff.; of judgment, 415;
origin of, 39 Iff.; 397fL;
things true because false,
40 Iff.
Fame, empty, 139
Fate, Divine Providence and,
43 n. 3; pagan concept of,
43 n. 3 ; see Fortune
Fear, the product of, 75
Flaccianus, 125ff.
Folly, miserable, 131
Food, two s for the soul, 55 ;
enjoyment of, 366
Foolishness, wisdom is con-
trary to, 77
Formae rerum, 16
Fortitude, strength of, 127, 300
Fortunatus, Manichaean, 97
438
INDEX
Fortune, 43, 57, 103f.; 168f.;
necessary to reach wisdom,
170; Augustine's meaning of,
222 n. 5; 33 1;*** Fate
Fragrance, sweet Arabian, 138
Freedom, real, 18; of will,
348
Free will, advantage and re-
sponsibility of man's, 18; 43
n. 4
Friendship, 35 Iff., 363, 369
Fructus (enjoyment), 54
Frugalitas (frugality), 54f. 5 78
Frux (fruit), 54, 78
Fullness, as opposite of want,
80
Gaetulia, 290
Garvey, M. P., 98
Gellius, Aulus, 79 n. 14
Genus, 305 n. 1
Geometry, origin and scope of,
318, 354ff., 419f.
Georgics, 312
Geyer, B., 40
Geyser, J, 33, 39
Gilson, E., 6 n. 6, 33, 39, 382
Glory, vain, basis for unhappi-
ness, 46
God, the absolute reality, 11;
as a sun, 16; the ultimate
guarantee of all truth, 16f;
the identity of His essence
and His existence 17; no
contradiction in, 17; is in
every place, 18; the seat of
real happiness is, 19; Word
of, 37; 43 n. 3; nothing
corporeal, 48; is eternal
58f.; grace of, 62; always
present in man, 65; without
the soul's end pernicious,
82; the Son truly, 82; the
supreme Measure, 82; the
Alpha and Omega, 10; Fa-
ther and Master, 84; Lib-
erator of souls, 84; man's
fruition of, 20; light of logi-
cal truth, 15f.; origin of
ontological truth, 15f . ;
source of moral truth, 15;
infinite Wisdom, 11; the
source of truth, 95; the
eternal truth, 95; a fire
according to Zeno, 215; or-
der and, 266; conversion to,
260f.; governs everything in
order, 274ff.; negative
knowledge of, 320; how at-
tained by soul, 324; not sub-
ject to sense preception,
277f.; possession of, defined,
296; primary object of hu-
man inquiry, 231, 324; Son
of God, true God, 266;
Augustinian proof of exis-
tence of, 384fT.; Intelligible
Light, 345, 358, 361, 373;
knowledge of, 352ff, 361ff.;
INDEX
439
object of philosophy, 350;
prayer to, 344ff,; 381; 391;
trust in, 380; 412
Goethe, 8
Good, concept of, 18
Goodness, moral, attainable by
faith and reason, 327
Grabmann, M., 5 n. 4, 16 n.
49 and passim
Grammar, 402, 404 n. I
Grecian shield, resounding of,
207
Greeks, 186
Guilloux, P., 39
Gymnasia, 177
Habitus^ Cicero's definition of,
171 n. 2
Happiness, the possession of
earthly goods alone does not
bring 57f.; moderation of
mind able to bring, 58; the
possession of God brings, 59 ;
different goals of, 81 n. 20;
to enjoy God is, 83; truth
and, 87ff.; essential part of
wisdom, 90; object of all
human striving, 261
Happy life, definition of, 84;
wisdom and, 130
Harnack, A., 23
Haruspices, 126
Health, love of, 363
Hector, 402
Hecuba, 401
Hegel, 23
Helicon, 174, 246
Herculean aid, 187
Hercules, 193, 402
Hessen, J., 35 n. 18, 38, 39, 44
n. 5, 48 n. 11, 83 n. 27
High-mindedness, natural, 135
Hirzel, R., 97, 98
History, origin of, 314
Holy Trinity, 35
Honey, scholastic, 60; Hymet-
tic, 62
Honors, desire for, 365, 368
Hope, 35, 359ff. see Faith
Horace, 217 n. 5
Hortensius (of Cicero), 34, 46
55 n. 7, 62 n. 22, 70 n. 8,
74 n. 8, 94, 108, 110 n. 3,
175, 206, 229, 364
Human, action, the yard-
stick for perfection of man,
18; life, definition of, 17;
purpose of, 22; things,
knowledge of, 126f.
Humility, value of, 20; first
step to happiness is, 21
Hymettus, Mt, 62 n. 22
Illumination, divine, 15, 44, 83
440
INDEX
Immortality, 20; of man,
381ff.; of soul, 387ff.,
408ff.; 421; of Truth,
378fj. _ O f Truth proves
immortality of soul, 420ff.
Inane, 417ff.
Incarnation, and pagan philo-
sophy, 29 If.
Individuality of man, 19
Intellect, the tension between
faith and, 20; 303 n. 1
Intelligible world, of Plato, 9,
94; 329, 332
Intelligibiles, res, 94 n. 17
Intention, rectitude of, 20
Introspection, 9
James, W., 13, 39
Jansen, B., 16 n. 49, 39
Jerome, St., 6, 97
Jesus Christ, Redeemer of man-
kind, 35; the full measure,
35
John, St., 24; gospel of, 37, 83
n. 28, 271, 332
Jolivet, R., 38, 39, 98, 233
Judgment, 417
Julianus Pomerius, 6 n. 5
Justice, 18, 79 n. 16, 94 n. 17;
the sacredness of, 127; de-
fined, 297
Kant, 23
Kavanagh, D. J., 30 n. 4, 108
n. 15
Knowledge, of self, basis for
all knowledge, 52; food of
the soul is, 53; charity above,
20; essential part of wisdom
is, 90; the end of learning is,
90; inviolable foundation of,
92; 171, negative of God,
320; sense , distinguished
from intellectual, 278; two-
fold source of, 231, 291,
303.; certain, 354ff.; makes
one happy, 383; of God,
352ff.; 361ff.; self, 381;
sense 345, 352f., 358ff.,
375, 385ff., 389, 392ff.; simi-
lar of dissimilar things,
357; theory of, 42 Iff., 426,
Lactantius, Symposium of, 97
n. 24
Laelius (of Cicero), 369
Larissa, 217
Lastidianus, 50, 88, 336
Lateran Palace, 5
Lauer, P., 5
Law, of truth, 15; of
nature, 15; of reason, 15;
s of ontological and logi-
cal truth are identical, 16;
INDEX
441
s of ethics, 17; of cau-
cality, 43 n. 3, 250; ori-
nates in God, 15f.; mathe-
matical and ethical., 93 ;
of beauty, 93
Learning, branches of, 403
Legewie, B., 39, 48 n. 13, 98
Leibnitz, 17
Lessing, G.E., 89 n. 6
Liberal Arts, difficult to ac-
quire, 321; as prepara-
tion for philosophy, 291,
292; utility of, 241, 261,
320L, 331
Liberty, the whirlpool of, 131
Licentius, friend of Augustine,
50, 88ff., 103 n. 2, 107ff.
(passim), 336, 369
Life, the definition of human,
17; single purpose of hu-
man, 20; definition of a
happy, 36; interpretations
of, 87; the happy, 106; defi-
nition of, 111; plan of, 167;
peace of Christian, 222 n. 5
Liter atio, 314
Literature, origin of, 314
Logic, 22, 91; principles of,
92, 94 n. 17
Logomachy, 99
Logos, divine, 15
Lotze, 17
Love, human, basis for, 83, 22;
objects of our, 351; of
food, 366; of friends, 351,
352, 353, 363, 369; of
honors, 365, 368; of life,
363, 370; of riches, 364,
367, 369; of self, 362ff.
Lucifer of Galaris, 97
Lucullus, 214
Luther, 23
Magister memoriae, 239
Man, definition of, 12, 309; re-
lationship of to God and
creation, 12; dignity of, 12,
17; search of for the
truth, 13 ; law of truth inher-
ent in, 14; divine illumina-
tion of, 15; bondage of, 18;
the duty of, 18; human ac-
tion yardstick for perfection
of, 18; the metaphysical des-
tiny of, 18; wisdom of, 19;
before God no difference of
s s race, nationality occu-
pation, status in life, 19; the
desire of for peace, 20;
soul is more important in
than the body, 21, 32; social
aspects in, 21; composed
of soul and body, 32, 51, 55;
in need of faith, 93 ; mind
best element in, 111; wise ,
Cicero's opinion of, 113;
mind governing power in,
116; a perfect, 131; twofold
error of, 207; superior to
brute animals, 326f.
442
INDEX
Manes, 47
Manichaeans, 32, 35, 47, 61 n.
21 and passim
Manichaeism, 8; confused and
pernicious materialism, 87 ;
103 n. 2, 107, 142; Augus-
tine's adherence to, 229; so-
lution of problem of evil of,
229; theory of soul of, 323
Mankind is one, 19
Manuale S. Augustini^ 339
Manzoni, A., 243
Maritain, J., 39
Marriage, 365, 366, 368, 376
Materialism, goals of, 81 n. 20
Mathematics, 13, 92; the prin-
ciples of, 94 n. 17
Mausbach, J., 5 n. 4, 13 n. 36,
16 n. 49, 34 n. 8, 39, 48 n.
11
Measure, concept of, 82f.;
truth and supreme, 82
Meda, F., 243
Medea, 416
Meditationes S. Augustini, 339
Memory, unreliable, 157 ; func-
tion of, 28 If.; useful for
teaching, 281, 343, 42 Iff.
Metamorphoses, 247
Metaphysics, 94 n. 17
Metrodorus, 218
Milan, 29, 88, 103 n. 2, 109 n.
1, 142 n. 2, 157 n, 5, 230,
243
Mind, human, enlightened by
God, 95; governing power in
man, 116; God the author
and creator of, ,24
Minucius Felix, 96
Miscellanea Agostiniana, 29,
and passim
Miseria, 71
Mnesarchus, 218
Moderation ( modestia), the
greatest virtue, 80; difficult
to observe, 263; source of
order, 327
Modus (measure), 80f.
Monica, mother of St. Augus-
tine, 7, 50; 's part in the
discussion, 34; divinatio of,
75 n. 9, 88, 269ff., 258, 272,
335, 369
Moriarty, P.G., 39
Mueller, J., 62 n. 22, HOn. 3,
113 n. 1, 184 n. 1, 206 n. 3,
217 n. 5, 220 n. 1
Muses, 245, 262, 318, 331f.
Music, derivation of, 318
Mysteria, sacra, 135 n. 3
Mysteries, the, 135; of
truth, 160; sacred, 219
Myron, 402 n. 2
INDEX
443
Naples, 177 n. 2, 210
Natural philosophy, 22
Nature, law of, 104; not
fortuitous, 250
Navigius, brother of Augustine,
50, 88, 244, 245, 335, 369
Nebridius, friend of Augustine,
30, 336
Necessitas, 43
Neoplatonic, 35 and passim
Neoplatonism, 94, 107 n. 10,
157 n. 5, 337, 354
Neo- Pythagorean, 12 n. 31, 37
Nequitia (worthlessness), 54,
78
Neri, B., 38
New Academy, 87, 107 n. 10;
difference between Old and,
147
Nicomachus of Gerasa, 37
Nodes of understanding, 182
Non~esse 3 opposite of esse, 78
Norregard, 48 n. 11
Nonius, 62 n. 22
North Star, 47
NotariuSj 97
Notre Dame, Univ. of, 6
Nous (Plotimuf), 303 n. 1
Number, 317, 326
Numidia, 23
Oar in the water deceptive to
the senses, 198
Object, twofold, of philosophy,
231, 324
Octavius (of Minucius Felix),
96
Ohlmann, D., 39, 98
Old Academy, 147ff.
Omen, 223
One, the (Plotinus), 303 n. 1
Oneirocritics, 126
Ontologism, 320
Opulence, opposite of want in
Sallust, 79
Orata, G.S., 74ff.
Oracles, 126
Order, passim; world , a re-
flection of eternal truth, 17;
divine, 18; virtue and, 54 n.
5; Providence and, 229L;
definition of, 264, 266, 274,
286, 296; includes good and
evil, 274; in relation to God,
273fL; perception of, aim of
wisdom, 324; of the uni-
verse, 344fL, 347
Origin, 6
Origines, 16
Ovid, 247
Pain, fear of, 371, 372
Pallium, 187
Papini, G., 24, 39
444
INDEX
Pascal, 382 n. 1
Passions, earthly, punishment
of, 9
Patricius, father of Augustine,
7
Paul, St., 24, 83 n. 28; the
Apostle, 139
Paulinus of Nola, 103 n. 3", 254
Peace, joy of, 18; man's desire
for, 20; basis for among
men, 21
Peculium, 280
Pegis, A.G., 14 n. 41, 23, 36,
39
Perception, difference between
intellectual and sense, 199
Peripatetics, 218
Peter the Venerable, 6 n. 6
Phaedrus, 408
Phantasm, 422
Phenomenon, Platonic, 14
Pherecydes, 213
Philanthropy, danger of, 105
Philo, 103, 149, 2171
Philocaly, 140; philosophy and,
140, 224
Philosopher, difference be-
tween a wise man and a,
171; dissensions of s, 146
Philosophy, common good of
all mankind, 34; the port of,
43f.; three classes of people
can embrace, 44; bosom of,
107; authority and, 115;
philocaly and, 140; the voice
of, 141; faith and, 291; love
of wisdom 271, true de-
fined, 291 ; twofold object of,
231, 324; God and soul in,
350, 377; method of teach-
ing, 373, 397
Pius XII, 25
Plato, 9, 14, 23, 48, 54 n. 4,
91; his world of ideas, 94;
148, 219; Academy of, 177
n. 2; Cicero's opinion of,
186; the school of, 188; the
wisest man of his day, 212f.,
217f.; 225, 292, 332, 336,
337, 354, 408, 426
Platonic pre-existence of the
soul, 44 n. 5, 54 n. 5, 217,
42 Iff., 426
Platonism, 14, 79 n. 16; Chris-
tian teachings and, 104 n. 4;
157 n. 5; Augustine influ-
enced by, 231; Augustine's
adherence to, 292; errors of,
292
Platonist, pseudo, 217 n. 4, 218
Plautus, 62 n. 24
Pleasure, Epicurean, 185
Plenitudo (fullness), want is
opposite of, 79
Plotinus, 48, 104 n. 3, 157; re-
garded as Plato, 218; 303,
354
INDEX
445
Poem, Bucolic, 176
Poetic license, 317
Poets, Latin, 31
Polemon, 214f.
Porphry, 426
Portalie, G., 39
Possidius, friend and biograph-
er of Augustine, 98
Poujoulat, M., 38
Prayers, value of, 104; of
Augustine, 344ff., 381, 391
Priam, 401
Principle, the most useful, 81;
s, a priori, 14fL; of
contradiction, 91; of
identity and of excluded
middle, 92; s, self-evident,
13; s, eternal, 20
Probability, truth and, 90;
theory of, 159
Probable, the, truth-like and,
207
Proposition, disjunctive, 91
Prosper of Aquitaine, 6 n. 5
Prostitution, 290 n. 1
Proteus, 180ff., 319
Providence, Divine, 104, 105 n.
5, 222 n. 5; problem of,
229f., 232, 239ff.
Prudence, 79 n. 16; the light
of, 127
Przywara, E., 39
Pyramus, 247, 250, 259
Pythagoras, 213, 330L, 331 n.
4, 332
Rand, E.K., 31, 39
Rationabile, defined, 309 ;
where apparent, 313
Rational and 'rationable,* dif-
ference between, 12
Rationale, defined, 309
Rationes aeternae, 16, 91; as
creative ideas of a living
God, 94
Ratiuncula, 62 n. 24
Raulx, M., 38
Real, what is, 53f .
Realities, words and, 159, 161
Reason (ratio], order, vir-
tue, 54 n. 5; authority (auc-
toritas) and, 93; needs
aid of faith, 93 ; the best ele- '
ment in man is, 111; force
of, 220; defined, 308,
324f.; astrology and, 318;
dialectics and, 315; faith
and, 231, 303; geometry
and, 318; grammar and,
313f.; history and, 314; lan-
guage and, 313; literature
and, 314; rhetoric and,
315f.; how is hindered by
the senses, 316; in sense
objects, 309ff.; unity, ten-
dency of, 325; as the gaze of
the soul, 358
446
INDEX
Rectitude of intention, 20
Reformation, 23
Religion, 107 n. 10; inter-
woven with the very marrow
of our being, 139; definition
of, 182 n. 2
Reminiscence, 42 Iff., 426
Renaissance, 23
Resemblance, begets error, 392
ff. ; _ begets truth, 396;
kinds of, 393
Res intelligibiles, as fundamen-
tal concepts, 94 n. 17
Rhetoric, origin of, 315f.
Rhythm, defined, 317f. 1;
source of delight, 311
Rogers, A.K., 13, 39
Romanianus, benefactor of Au-
gustine, 50 n. 18, 61 n. 21,
89, 103 n. 2, 106, 107 n. 10,
134, praise for, 136; 153 and
passim, 254
Rome, 61 n. 21
Roscius Callus, Q., 401 n. 1
Rusticus, a relative of Augus-
tine, 50, 88, 336
Sallust, 79, 211 n. 3
Samardacs, 208
Sanctity, aim of all culture, 20
Santayana, G., 17
Satire, pleasantry of, 221
Sauer, J., 5 n. 4
Schaff, Ph., 23
Schleierraacher, F.,, 23
Schmaus, M., 38, 70 n. 7
Schopenhauer, A., 23
Schopp, L., 34 n. 16, 38, 39, 44
n. 5, 340
Schulten, W., 40, 54 n. 4
Science, foundation of, 13; re-
lationship of to virtue, 20;
fundamental concepts of, 94
n. 17
Scientia, 199, 201, 213
Scriptures, Holy, 22 n. 82, 35,
83 n. 28, 107 n. 10, 135 n. 3,
220, 223f.;
John, 82 n. 22, 83 n. 28
Matthew, 22 n. 82, 143 n. 3
Paul, 135 n. 3
Psalm 79, 259
Seafarer, symbol of man, 44
Search for truth, Augustine's
5ff., Ill
Self-existence, certainty of, 9,
33, basis of all knowledge is,
51; 96
Seneca, 12 n. 31, 36, 43 n. 3
Sensation, the soul and, 278f.;
distinct from memory, 280
Senses, perception of, 14, 195;
as ship, 14; illusions of, 146;
trustworthiness of, 197, 198
Sense knowledge, 345, 352,
353 n. L, 358fL, 375, 385ff.,
389, 392ff.
INDEX
447
Sextus Empiricus, 214 n. 4
Sicilians, 156
Silk, E.T., 40
Similarity, 94 n. 17
Similitude, 162
Simou, M., 40
Sin and error, difference of,
209
Sirens, 48
Skepticism, 8; Augustine's ar-
guments against, 10, 32, 87,
91; its analysis and refuta-
tion, 95; 103 n. 1; super-
stition of, 142 n. 2; 157 n.
5; Augustine's adherence to,
229; and passim
Skeptics, foes of human knowl-
edge, 159 ; 2 14 n. 4, 229, 248
Skyros, 213
Social aspect in man, 21
Socrates, 63, 148; Plato's love
for, 213
Solecisms, 288, 322
Sololowski, P.V., 40
Sorites, 146
Son of God, 135, 292 n. 4
Sophistries, 146
Soul, the, when is a healthy,
18; the most precious being
after God is the, 20; the 's
return to God, 20; salvation
of own personal is man's
real purpose in life, 20; Pla-
tonic pre-existence of, 44 n.
5; nearest to God, 48;
knowledge, food of the, 53;
sterility of, 54; two foods for,
55; wisdom the measure of,
81; equilibrium of, 81; mor-
tal according to Zeno, 215;
Augustine's opinion about
origin of, 224; distinct
from God, 323; knowledge
of, 320, 324; object of phil-
osophy, 231, 324, 350, 377;
problems concerning the,
292; relations of to the
body, 293f . ; exists forever,
387ff., 408ff., 421; faculties
of through which God is
known, 358; manner in
which known, 377
Sound, threefold, 316f.
Species, 303 n. 1
Spinoza, monistic system of, 17
Starbuck, C.C., 339
Stoicism, 79 n. 16
Stoics, 35, 54 n. 5 ; syllogism of,
62 n. 24; 140 n. 8, 148, 184,
192 n. 2, 200 n. 1; 214,
192 n. 2, 200 n. 1, 214,
216fL, 356
Suffering, 373, 374
Summa theologica, 290
Superstition, 107
Symposium, 294
448
INDEX
Tagaste, birthplace of Augus-
tine, 7, 9, 103 n. 2
Temperance, the glory of, 127
Temper antia (restraint), 55;
the greatest virtue, 80
Temperies (proper mixture),
125
Terence, 32, 73, 81 n. 19, 152
n. 1, 211 n. 2, 247
Theatre, 105 n. 6, 139
Theodicy of Augustine, 1 1
Theodore, Manlius, 43 n. 2,
46, 270
Thimme, W., 35, 36, 40, 98,
157 n. 5
Things, intelligibility of, 15;
human, divine and, 128
~Thisbe, 247, 250, 259
Thomas Aquinas, 6 n. 6, 23,
82, 288, 320
Toothache, suffered by St. Au-
gustine, 335, 343, 371
Tourscher, F., 38, 79 n. 15
Tragedies, Greek, 175
Triad., the, in Plotin, 303 n. 1
Trinity, Holy, 84
Troltsch, E., 40
Troy, 404 n. 1
Truth, and happiness, quest
of, 5fL; Augustine's concept
of, 12; God the fountain of,
83; ontological, 15; logical,
16; the summit of being,
18; immutable, 16; God the
ultimate guarantee of all, 16;
must be applicable to life,
32; makes man free, 23;
relation of justice to, 18;
St. Thomas' concept of, 82
n. 23; Augustine's search
for, 87; possession of, 89;
happiness and, 89; probabil-
ity and, 90; truths of uni-
versal validity, 91, 94 n. 17;
error and, 117; two vicious
hindrances to, 141; myster-
ies of, 160; search for im-
portant and necessary, 167;
finding man becomes
happy, 167; wisdom not
same as, 174; dissimilarity
and, 395ff.; similarity and,
395fT.; definitions of, 389ff.;
exists forever, 378ff., 384,
387, 420; love of, 377; na-
ture of, 389ff., 414; of
art, 401; of geometry,
418, 424; of grammar,
402 ff. ; of judgment, 415;
of learning, 402f. ; origin
of, 397; things true because
false, 401ff.
Truth-like, the, 146ff., 159ff;
the probable and, 207, 216;
Augustine's criticism of, 224
Trygetius, friend of Augustine,
50; 88fL, 108 and passim;
336, 369
INDEX
449
Tullius, 159, 210ff., 217L, see
Cicero
Tuscan altercation, 176
Tusculanae Disputationes, 368
Ueberweg, F., 40
Unity, 94 n. 17; being and,
325; not discernible by
senses, 24 If.; object of
rational activity, 325
Unselfishness, basis for noble
personality, 21
Usener, 70 n. 8
Valerius Maximus, 74 n. 7
Value, subjective and objec-
tive, 10
Van Haeringen, H., 98
Vanity, fragile price of, 46
Varro, 34, 36, 97, 314, 331
Vega, A, 98
Verecundus, friend of Augus-
tine, 29, 79 n. 15, 88, 243,
335
Veritas incommutabilis (the
eternal essential Truth), 95
Veritates, truths of universal
validity, 91
Verres, 156
Verum, and verisimile (the
true and likely), 90; and
veritas, difference of, 110
Vice, opposite of virtue, 54;
thickets of, 140
Victorinus, 36
Victory, the goal of contest is,
90 n. 7
Virgil, 32, 47 n. 7, 125, 134 n.
2, 143, 155 n. 2, 157 n. 4,
168, 177, 180 n. 1, 249, 263,
312, 315, 331
Virtue, the relationship of sci-
ence to, 20; cardinal s, 35;
Ciceronian concept of, 54 n.
6; order and, 54 n. 5; oppo-
site of, 54; Augustinian con-
cept of, 73 n. 6 ; fortune and,
103; Stoic, 184; concept of,
298; difficult to perceive, 307
Void, 417ff.
Voluntarism, 22
Vulcanian, 134
Want, definition of, 78; full-
ness as opposite of, 80
Wealth (ops), 80; dangers of,
105; desire for, 364, 367, 369
Wife, desire for, 365, 366, 368,
376
Wilpert, J., 5 n. 4
Windelband, W., 9
Wisdom, beatitude identical
with, 32; foolishness con-
trary to, 77; the measure
of the soul, 80; fullness is,
81;
450
INDEX
truth and, 8 If., 174; defini-
tion of, 90, 94 n. 17, 120f.,
124; Cicero's definition of,
127; delightful port of, 135;
the steadfast and pleasant
country of, 170; life before,
170; holy name of, 189; is
with God, 189; not attain-
able by senses, 278; duty of
teaching of, 281; how is
acquired, 301f., 372;
heals eyes that it may be
seen, 374
Wise, only a living man can be,
170; difference between a
philosopher and a man,
171
Wonderment, Stoic view of,
retracted, 334
Word, of God, 37; concept
and, 78
Words, realities and, 159, 161
Worter, F., 36, 40, 98
World, intelligible, of Plato,
9; intelligible, 94; multipli-
city of, 194; as totality that
surrounds us, 196
World order, the, a reflection
of the eternal truth, 17
World-soul, theory of, 308
Zagara, 246 n. 3
Zahm, J. A., 6 n. 10
Zeno, the Stoic, 145f., 148,
184; theory of sensation of,
188f., 214f.; soul mortal ac-
cording to, 215
Zenobius, friend of Augustine,
230, 232, 239, 242, 258, 264,
273, 290, 412 n. 2
I 3
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