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\L1ST 


THE 


S  MADISON, 


[lOCQMKNT*,- 


RD  ..—    -/'  .' 


THE  FEDERALIST 

A  COMMENTARY   OH  ^ 

THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE 
UN/TED  STATES 


Br 

ALEXANDER  HAMILTON,  JAMES  MADISON, 
and  JOHN  JAY 


IDITGD,    WITH   NOTES,    ILLUSTRATIVE   DOCUMENTS. 
AND  A  COPIOUS  INDKX 

Br 

PAUL  LEICESTER  FORD 

£dair  ef  PampUtU  and  Essayi  an  tit  Censli^n!^ 


NEW  YORK 

HENRY   HOLT  AND  COMPANY 
—2 


•••■■■ 


ConrRtOHT.  iM- 

BBNRY  HOLT  A  COb 


115033 


THI  UVHKOK  COHrANT  »■». 
HAHWAV,    K.  J. 


THE   RIGHT  HONORABLE  JAMES  BRYCE,  M.  P., 

who  has  so  ablv  and  brilliantly 
continued  the  wokk  begun  by 

The  Fkdskalut, 

this  edition  13  dtoicatbd. 


ifl 


CONTENTS. 


Editor's  iNT^ooucnod vii 

'Hamilton's  Syllabus  OF  "The  FsDESAL^T,"      .        .  zliii 

Madison's  Account  or  "  Thb  Pbdualist,"     .  ,  zliz 

Editor's  Table  of  Contests  of  "  The  Federalist,."  li 

Hamilton's  Table  of  Contents  of  "The  Pedebalist,''*  budii 

Hamilton's  Preface  to  "  The  Fbdebalist,"    .  Izxvii 

The  Federalist; i-SBS 


Apfendix 

Articlib  of  Con  federation,  1781 

The  Pedekal  Constitution,  iTSr-ifB^, 

AMENDKBNTS  THERETO,  itS^-iBta 

AMENDUENTa  PROPOSED  BV  MASSACHUSETTS,  17BS, 
AMENDHIHTa  PROPOSED  BV    SOUTH  CaROUKA,    17U, 

Amehdmehts  PROfosED  Br  New  Hampshire,  17BS,    . 
Amendments  Fsoi>09ED  bv  Viroinia,  17U,    . 
Amehdhehts  Proposed  bv  New  York,  itIS, 

AHENDHENTS  proposed  bv  north  CAROUNA,  ITtt, 

Jefferson's  Opinion  oh  a  National  Bank,  1-791, 
Hamilton's  Opinion  on  a  National  Bank,  1791,  . 
Kentvcey  Resolutions  or  ij^s,        .... 

VmoiNiA  Resolutions  or  1791, 

Jefferson's  proposed  Louisiana  Ahebdnent,  itaj, 

ABSTRACT  OF  DECISION  IN  CASE  OF  UaRBURV  VI.  HADISON,  1803, 

Amendmrbts  proposed  bv  Hartford  Convention.  1S14, 

MISSOURI  Compromise,  tim. 

South  carouna  obdinahcb  or  Nuluficatioh.  iiji, 
Jackson's  Nulufication  proclamation,  igjt, 
abstract  of  Drrd  Scott  Decision.  iSjt,    . 
South  Carouna  Ordinance  of  Secession.  iB6a, 
south  Carouna  Declaration  of  Independence,  iMa, 

Crittenden's  Ahenokents,  laei 

Peace  Conference  amendments,  iUi, 
Constitution  op  the  Confedbbate  States,  iMi,    . 
act  Creating  Electoral  Commission.  1877. 
Abstract  of  Decision  in  Third  Legal  Tender  Case,  itti. 
Index 


589    i 

vA 
ta 
«3> 
SlJ 
«]3 
«U 

e» 
646 
ej. 
e»s 

<79 
M4  — 

«8e 

6H    — — 

l»7    m. 

es«  ~. 

<41    ^ 

TO*-*, 

711    — 

7" 

716*' 

718.* 

7» 

T3> 

73« 

739 


INTRODUCTION. 


. 


Tkx  constitution  of  the  UnileJ  States  has  been  the  sub- 
ject of  great  and  often  inordinate  cuiogy,  much  as  if  it 
contained  within  itself  some  potency  or  charm,  which 
gxTC  to  it  especial,  even  magical,  powers  for  the  attain- 
ing of  good  government.  As  the  Germans  worship  the 
concept  of  "the  state  "  as  something  more  and  better 
than  the  people,  so  the  constitution  has  been  accepted  as 
the  spring  of  all  our  freedom  and  success.  Ycl  a  very 
limited  study  of  history  serves  to  prove  that  liberty  and 
good  goteniment  have  been  obtained  by  certain  other 
nations  posiiessing  no  such  riimlaiiientat  contract,  ami 
that  still  others,  closely  conforming  their  constitutions 

gorerffpittpt  jp  thffiry  buLiLLyaiuiy  la.  (aa-  In  short,  a 
written  constitution  is  nothing  but  ink  and  paper,  ex- 
cept (or  what  the  people  it  nominally  controls  add  to  il.' 
Over  and  over  again  our  gQvernmcm,bas  b««»  aagedicQin 
coniplete-breafcdown  only  bv  an  absolute  disregard  of 
ibc.cumUtmlQa.-aad-niost_of  the  yery  men  who  framed 
[.hc-CPrnpacL  would  have- tcfuMxl- to  sign-it, -could_UiCJL_ 
bate  {yEcse5flLiJACVi::n(ualdc\:fiIopm.cn_i^ 

Wliat  then,  it  will  be  asked,  is  the  use  of  a  written  con- 
stitution, when  it  can  be  so  disregarded  and  so  extended? 
II  a  government  grows  atid  changes  with  the  nation 
it  pretends  to  control,  why  seek  to  bind  the  people  at 
all?  Why  attempt  to  limit  the  power  of  the  newest 
law  of  Congress  by  the  oldest  law  of  the  nation?  In 
Great  Britain  tlie  government  is  checked  only  by  public 

'  "  1  h^'li  otth  Monutquieii,  ihit  a  govcinnienl  miiil  be  iitleil  ta 
■  nailno  mucli  u  a  cnat  to  Ih*  iibliviiliiat  ;  •nd  conw|ne'<ily  tlial  what 
may  he  i^ood  ■!  Philoilctphia.  nuy  l>e  bod  at  Pari*,  and  ridknloqi  ac 
P«icnbnr^." — //umi/tim,  tjgq. 


1 


Vtll 


tNTRODUCTlOlf. 


[ 


opinion,  and  the  latest  act  of  p.-irltanieiit  is  the  Uw  of  the 
land.     Is  not  the  latter  more  free  than  the  (ormef  ? 

More  free  but  less  stable,  wc  ansircr;  more  power  to  the 
majoritjr  and  less  privilege  to  the  whole  people.  In  this 
condition  rests  the  great  distinction  of  the  constitution 
of  the  United  States.  History  has  often  recorded  the 
grant  of  rights  or  privileges  to  subjects  by  kings  or  \>J 
aristocracieti  or  by  minorities.'  liut  the  federal  compact 
was  the  first  deliberate  attempt  and  as&ent  of  a  majority  to 
tie  its  own  hands;  to  give  to  the  niinorily  guarantees 
of  fair  and  eifual  ire^ilment,  without  which  democratic 
gorcrnment  is  well-nigh  impossible,  save  when  developed 
along  the  lines  of  socialism.  Our  state  governments, 
in  which  few  such  guarantees  have  been  succe%s(ully 
cvolvcO,  have  again  and  again  oppressed  Ibc  minoriiy;- 
but,  with  hardly  an  exception,  the  national  government 
has  been  true  to  its  purposes.  Where  ihc  state  govern- 
ments have  been  unchecked  by  the  national;  where  they 
have  had  omnipotent  powers,  they  have  directly  or  indi- 
rectly robbed  classes  of  their  citiiens  for  the  brtiefit  of 
other  classes  and  committed  other  wrongs  in  the  name 
and  by  the  will  of  the  majority.  Not  long  since  New  York 
state,  one  of  the  fairest  and  leasrprone  to  discrtmlimton 
in  the  Union,  by  law  has  decreed  that  a  minority  of 
-H?"^!!?^!^  shaTTDc  maoe  to  contFIPMe.  by  trt<ai's"'t>f  an 
iilBert^nce  tag,  the  Larger  |i;irt  of  the  govcrunieni 
revenues;  so  in  Great  Britain  the  majority  have  success- 
fully, through  a  graded  succession  tax,  placed  undge 
burdens  upon  the  minority;  and  in  neither  have  the 
minority  the  slightest  recourse,  unless  that  of  expatriation 
can  be  considered    such.     But  in   otfT  lutJoBol  govern- 

taticinat  bate  beHH  li'f",  ^njl 
nic  tax  of  1H94,  the  ma\nt\\.y 

minority,    wlute    excmjutng 
annulled,  because  it  was  iincon- 


t'nJ     ment  the  most  ditttinct  linii 

TBi\  -friieii  ivimimy,  la  Ujl  ifiJTi 

'V  "endeavored    to     tax     the 
^themselves,  the  law  was  aor 


Emselves, 
stitutionaL. 
This  gnar^intee  to  the  minority  Tn  the  Tederal  i;r)nstitu 


■  InuanccJ  In  Magn*  Clutu  uiii  ibc  Ficucll  Bill  ol  Righb  at  17S9. 


I/fTRODUCTlOff. 


IX 


tion  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  examples  of  self-con- 
irol  in  history,  and  constitutes  its  chief  claim  to  prc- 
ecnineacc.  The  explanalioD  of  its  origin  can  only  be 
otjtained  by  a  history  of  the  years  preceding  its  framing. 
In  the  colonial  period  Ific  Uvr-making  power  in  the 
provinces  was  placed  in  the  hand*  of  nottular  asNemlilies; 
the  execution  of  those  laws,  or  their  negation,  in  the 
hand «  of  colonial  governors  appointed  by  Great  Uritain, 
with  a  si;<:<iHd  relo  by  the  king  in  <-ouni:il;  and  the  con- 
struing of  those  laws  was  confided  to  judges,  likewise  Tor 
1  lie' most  part  named  by  the  sovereign,  with  a  final  appeal 
from  the  local  courts  to  the  count  of  the  Privy  Council. 
Thus  the  people  were   from   early    times  accustomed  to 

t  popular  Ic^islaiicm.  ronlrollciJ  first  bya  neg^^^ye  of  their 
lucal  executive  ami  courts,  and  ultitnately  by  a  supreme 
nnlX  I ;   .    ,   i|  I  -tiirts.     The  laws  of- parliament 

urerr-xii;  a  i;>>luni<il  staiiite,  the  king's  veto  killed  a  law 
iuientidd  to  by  the  king's  governor;  and  the  courts  of  the 
Privy  Council  reversed  the  decisions  of  the  provincial 
eotwts. 
The  American  Revoltitinn  destroyed  this  system  and 

,  hrnught    into    existence  in    its    stead    government  by 
I'lpuUr  committees  or  conventions;   and  as  the  cities 
»efe    mostly  loyal   to  the  crown,  and  during  the  war 
were  largely  held  by  the  British, — ihuS  excluding  their 
utizens  from  influence  in  these  popuLir  bodies, — the  pro- 
visiimal  Rovcnunents  were  noo^rolled  bv  the  l;r;  ■n; 

classes.      Remembering  with  hatred  the  alien  i  ,1 

the  popular  will  which  the  king's  negative  and  courts  had 
so  often,  and  sometimes  with  cruelty,  imposed  on  the 
pf'iplc.  when  these  representative  bodies  came  to  frame 
new  icovernments  they  practically  lodged  all  powers  in  the 
Ir.'liii.itivi'  ilcparlificpt, — hjtbcrto  the  only  one  which 
natcd  to  the  jieople's  will,— and  made  the 
exc'.mivc  :itid  judicial  branches  its  creatures. 

Unchecked  by  the  balance  usually  supplied  by  mann* 
taijuring  or  commercial  lntcre.sis,  the  landholding 
cUft.<«s,  by  their  legislatures,  in  turn  unchccke*!  by  co- 
nrdinale  departments,  ran  riot.     Taper  money  and  tctidct 


i 


INTROOVCTlOft. 


laws  robbed  the  creditor,  rcgrating  and  anti-monopol]r  acts 
ruined  the  trader.  When  the  weak  slate  (jourts,  tnic  to  the 
principles  of  justice,  sought  to  protect  the  minoniy,  the 
le^iitlatures  suspended  their  sitting,'  or  turned  the  judges 
out  of  office.  The  itencfal  Kovernfflent,  4;;illc<l  into  csist- 
ence  by  the  articles  of  confederation^  which  had  been 
modeled  on  the  Bntavian  and  Helvetic  constitutions,'  was 
but  a  leyislativc  dependent  of  the  state  legisbi tires,  with 
scarcely  a  shadow  of  executive  or  )iiclicial  power,  and  was 
therefore  equjilly  impotent  to  protect.  For  the  moment 
a  faction  of  agriculturists  reii^ned  supreme,  and  to  the 
honest  and  thoughtful,  democracy  seemed  to  he  digging 
its  own  griivc,  through  the  ap[>arcnt  inability  of  the 
m^iority  to  control  itself. 

Fortunately  injustice  to,  and  robbery  of,  feliow-citiiens, 
eventually  injure  the  wrong-doer  as  well  as  the  wronged. 
A  time  came  when  tlic  riaims  of  the  creditors  Had  been 
liquidated  atMl  the  goods  of  the  traders  had  been  con- 
fiscated, and  the  former  refused  further  loan*  and  the 
latter  laid  in  no  new  stocks.  The  capitalist  and  the  mer- 
cbant  were  alike  ruiited  or  driven  from  business,  and  it 
wa^  the  landholder,  unable  to  sell,  to  buy.  or  to  borrow, 
who  was  the  eventual  su&crcr.  Such  was  his  plight  (hat 
he  could  not  in  many  cases  sell  eren  enough  of  his 
products  to  get  the  money  to  pay  his  annual  taxes,*  and 
this  condition  very  quickly  brought  home  to  his  own 
instruments  of  wrung. doing,  the  let;  i  statu  res,  the  evilft 
they  had  tried  to  f.istcn  on  the  minority.  Taxes  were 
unpaid,  and,  except  where  the  conditions  were  factitious, 
the  5tate  treasuries  became  empty.  Finally,  in  an 
attempt  to  collect  the  taxes  in  MasMchusetts,  a  formi- 
dable revolt  of  tax-payers  against  the  stale  government 
was  precipitated.  Everywhere  the  state  legislatures  bad 
become  objects  of  contempt  in  just  so  far  as  they  had 

<  Inuffonl  addrtB  ot  John  A'Um*,  i;^;. 

*  "  Wlitl  Diinitieii  of  £n«  caillr  hatv  rriiint«(t  tron  Ihb  rily  \H\ 
fi'ik)  In  l!i«  <i»iilry  fnr  ■rinl  nf  boyenr     Wlul  eieal   •^iwnlltiM 
lulled  ind  irtim  iTimuniM  illll  lie  OhIcu  hi  ihc  ilorr-. '     Tv,  bow  mnd 
beliin  ill*  '  ''   >•  ■«"  (0'<i   ■"•t  wlieal  -'>')  lamlier 

t»lw!l)'  t»lln  njoj,  »"  ■■  famfilth  n  /.  ^ow,"  yj. 


fNTRODUCTION. 


Zl 


finned  against  0las5es  of  citizens,  and  the  people  were 
tbrcatcnccl  with  a  breakdown  of  all  sovcrnmcnt,  by  the 

I  misuse  of  majoritjr  power.  It  Has  been  the  fashion  of 
httiorians  to  blame  the  Congres.8  of  the  Confederation 
with  the  ills  of  1781-1789,  but  that  was  an  honest,  and, 
when  possible,  a  hard-working  body,  and  the  rcj^l  culprit 
<QiL.not  the  impotent  shadow  of  national  2t>v<^'''>'»o^ 
posscssins  almost  no  powers  for  good  and  therefore 
Karccly  any  powers  for  evil,  but  the  all-ponerful  utate 
Icj-iitla tares  which  proved  Again  and  again,  as  Jefferson 
Jsscrtcd,TKSr •'  one  hundred  and  seventy-three  despots 
would  surely  be  as  oppressive  as  one."  ' 

y^  The  revolt  of  Sh^iys.  and  the  less  a([);res5ive  but  uni- 
versal discontent  against  the  state  governments  were 
protests  too  loud  spoken  not  to  warn  the  legiKlaturex  of 
their  own  peril,  and  in  a  frightened,  half-hearted  way,  they 
one  hy  one  gave  their  consent  to  the  asscmbtinR  of  3  con- 
vention to  plan  such  changes  in  the  articles  of  confed- 
eration as  should  at  least  give  to  the  >itatc  government* 

I  national  protection  from  their  own  citizens.'  Accord- 
ingly,  in  Jnnc,  1787,  a  body  of  the  most  earnest  and 
nperienccfl  mi-n  gathered  in  I'hilaili-ljiliia  and  set  about 
the  task  of  framinj;  a  new  national  {government. 

Not  a.fcw  of  the  members  of  the  federal  convention 
luid  been  sufferers  by  (he  injustice  of  state  laws,*  and 
tliejr  were  prepared  to  apply  the  knife  deeply  to  the 
nulady  of  the  body  politic.  Indeed,  those  who  had  but 
a  (cw  years  before  started  out  as  strong  democrats  had 
rc-acted.  Dread  of  the  people  and  dread  of  democratic 
government  were  felt  by  all  those  who  did  not  draw  th« 

'"NMmoii  Vit|;iiii>,~  15;. 

*  ll  VIC  (rar  thai  Shaft's  remit  would  uprvnil  to  within  die  boHcn  of 
il>  tjwa  aat«  Uut  modi!  die  New  Vcwfc  Icfpilnlure  vole  the  cill  (or  Ibc 
h>l«nl  c/iiiveiulon,  and  (he  fhcbl  It  ^aie  MuiichuwIIt  vnu  ihc  csme 
Uu  ItM  ■Mcnt  (i(  bcf  in  until)  10  witil  11  liml  Dq;ail(e>l  bul  a  few  inontlu 
brfurw. 

*  A>  an  «Kunple,  Waihinijton  had  boiuti  am)  inail(^g»  ti>  "nifh 
^lo.uuo  "  nsid  ofl  in  dtprcciucd  paip«r  monejr.  worth  at  liiiws  ai  litUe 
■1  ;  ''1  I3  tlic  (xnuiid,  and  wbcai  be  atlcndcd  the  ledcral  coiiTcntlaa.  be 

-1  lor  twii  jieati'  Uics  tliniugh  liavfiig  been  uuaUe  to  lell  the 

I I  kit  (arm*. 


I 


XII 


tlfTRODUCTIQlf. 


distinction  between  popular  control  and  majoritf  contfol, 
between  limited  and  unlimited  guTcrnmcnls. 

From  this  fear  of  pupubi^^nd  of  state  gavcrnments. 
qualified  by  the  ncccssityof  framing  a  Kovcrnment  which 
should  be  based  on  both,  came  certain  cluu&cs  of  the  con- 
stitution the  convention  framed,  which  made  it  the  instru- 
ment it  is.  The  Icsislaturc  or  Congress  was  split  into 
two  bodicK.  that  eacli  miglit  act  as  a  clieck  on  the  other, 
and  strong  P3n^i:uiive  and  iiidii-i:il  dcpaUiacntt  were 
created,  armed  against  the  legislative  by  the  once  hated 
royal  powers  of  appointinenl,  veto,  and  annutmcnt,  that 
Ihcy  mi);ht  maintain  their  independence  of  the  law-mak- 
ing branch,  and  even  limit  its  power.  Having  split  the 
Congress,  the  lower  branch  w;i5  given  to  ilie  people,  while 
the  upper  was  given  to  the  state  legislatures,  llius  oppos> 
ing  a  barrier  to  the  will  of  the  state  governments  in  the 
House  and  to  the  will  of  the  people  in  the  Senate.  Not 
daring  to  trust  either  people  or  legislatiirek  to  <-hoose  a 
president,  a  select  body  of  citifcns  was  created,  to  whom 
the  choice  of  that  official  was  assigncil,  thus  making  a 
second  defense  from  the  populace  or  state  legi»btures. 
To  the  President  was  given  the  appointment  of  the 
judiciary,  thus  removing  thai  dep-irtmeni,  by  a  second 
selection,  three  degrees  from  popular  choice  or  influence. 
Roger  Shcnixan's  plea  to  the  convention  that  "  the 
people  should  have  as  little  to  do  as  may  be  about  the 
guvernmeut"  seemed  fulfilled. 

But  the  minimizing  of  popular  control  was  only  half 
the  restraint  that  the  convention  had  to  create.  The 
power.t  of  the  state  IcgisUtures,  as  the  toots  of_^the 
majority,  muB.t  be  also  curtailed.'^r  Ihcy  would  en. 
croach  on  the  general  government  as  they  had  on  their 
own.  The  laws  of  (''■■  "^'i'"'  w.-»c  hm.!.-  i.  il.j.  ij>r|i-|. 
mcnt  laws  once  were,  -cr 

power  was  swept  (rum  Uit  .Male;.:  llity  muii!  kciiii  no 
troops  or  navy;  they  could  not  coin  money,  emit  bills 
of  credit,  or  poss  tender  laws;  they  coutd  not  enatU  hills 
of  Attainder,  tx  fcH  fatU  laws:,  or  laws  impairing  the 
obligation  of  contract.     Such  were  the  chief  limitations, 


INTRODVCTIOH.  xiii 

bot  many  minor  ones  )(ircll<r(l  the  list.     The  dread  of  the 
legislative  branch   was  so  strong  that  Congress  itseK, 
balanced  and  checked  though  it  was  to  be,  was  restrained 
iTOin  certain  legislation.     The   misuse  of  power  by  tbe\ 
uatc  iGtci&lalures  had  ended,  as  it  always  does,  in  \o&%  \ 
of  power. 

To  ask  a  majority  to  limit  their  law-making  ability,! 
both  in  their  state  and  national  legislatures,  &o  that  they 
canld  no  longer  abuse  the  minority,  and  to  aiik  them  tj> 
part  wiih  the  direct  delcg:ition  of  three-fourths  of  the 
generai  govcrnmeat,  was  a  daring  proposition.  The 
nate  officials,  as  the  creatures  of  the  Icgislatufcs,  were 
oaUintlly  oppa^STTToit;  while  nothing  but  {he  previous' 
abuses  from  which  the  country  was  still  suffering  noi^d 
e%-cr  have  made  it  possible  that  the  constitution  woulij 
have  beeu  accept29~by  the  majority;  and  even  those 
wu-e  in<iuflicicnt  to  make  the  people  take  the  new  cunsti- 
tBtion  readily.'  Much  argument  and  many  devices  were 
Medcd  in  most  of  the  states  to  obtain  its  ratification. 
To  aid  la  its  adoption  The  FederalitI  was  written,  and 
o(  that  nine-months'  campaign  it  was  a  distinct  factor. 


! 


i;       •  * 

How  far  the  government  thus  drafted  and  thus  com- 
mented upon  has  fullillcd  the  intention  of  the  men  who 
(tamed  it  In  the  federal  convention  and  the  predictions 
nf  the  men  who  analyzed  it  in  The  h'ederaiiu,  could  be 
reviewed  at  much  length,  but  only  a  few  results  need 
be  touched  upon. 

There  can  be  no  question  that  the  national  govern- 
ment lias  given  to  the  minority  a  greater  protection  than 
ft  has  eiijaycd  anywhere  else  in  the  world,  save  tn  those 
cuontrics  where  Ihe  minority  is  a  specially  privileged 
^slocracy  and  the  right  of  suffrage  is  limited.  So 
absolute  have  property  rights  been  held  by  the  Supreme 
Court,  that  it  even,  by  the  Dred  Scolt  decision,  in  effect 
made  the  whole  t:onntrf  a  land  of  slavery,  borause  the 

'  lehfl  qhtincr  A>lui»  ulil  ilui  ilie  cuHitiiulkn  ir«  "  nuutecl  ftoa 
Uu £riD>liii(  DpreHiiyof*  feludint  nallon." 


u 


XIV 


ISTRODVCTlOlf. 


slave  was  property,  ami  the  nglitg  of  property  were 
sacred.  Once  only,  by  the  third  Icgal-lcndcr  decision, 
has  the  court  markedly  failed  in  the  chief  purpose  for 
which  it  was  created,  and  this  failure  is  tlie  more  ex* 
traordinary,  for  none  knew  better  than  the  judges  that  it 
was  to  prevent  just  such  outrages  as  fiat  money  that  the 
Rational  government  was  created,  and  that  the  very 
words  "legal  tender,"  except  as  applied  to  intrinsic 
money  for  commercial  and  legal  convenience,  are  a  lie 
and  a  fraud,  through  which  someone  is  to  be  robbed. 
To  allege  that  the  "  right  to  make  notes  of  the  ((overn- 
meni  a  lega)  tender"  has  been  deemed  "one  of  the 
powers  of  tioVerei]£nty  in  other  civilt:ced  nations,"  which 
were  the  grounds  on  which  the  decision  was  based,  was 
to  place  our  natioiud  government  on  a  par  with  those 
which  have  notoriously  been  planned  for  the  benefiting 
of  some  at  the  expense  of  others,  and  to  destroy  the 
very  pledge  of  justice  that  the  majority  gave  to  the 
minority  in  i;SS.  The  prtdc  ol  ttii«  country  has  been 
that  elsewhere  the  majority  or  the  minority,  depending 
on  the  degree  of  power  enjoyed  by  each,  has  abused  the 
other,  but  that  here  they  were  e<|ual  before  the  law. 

In  its  secondary  function,  of  protecting  the  minority 
from  the  state  legislatures,  the  general  government, 
wherever  it  possessed  jurisdiction,  has  been  equally 
successful  By  the  eleventh  amendment  the  power  of 
citizens  to  sue  a  state  in  the  national  courts  was  furbid- 
dcn,  and  this  has  allowed  state  governments  to  repudiate 
and  in  other  ways  rob,  as  of  old,  but  wherever  the  juns* 
diction  of  the  Supreme  Court  has  reached,  it  bus  honestly 
and  fearlessly  protected  the  minority  from  the  majority. 
This  has  at  moments  produced  intense  feeling  against 
the  national  judiciary  hy  the  stales,  and  between  iSi8  and 
183a  a  long  scries  of  legal  conRicis  took  place,  leading 
to  many  protests  by  the  slate  legislature-!.  But  though 
the  slate  governments  successfully  resisted  in  a  few 
cases  tiic  mandate  of  the  court,  the  adv.-intage  was  only 
temporary,  and  to-day  no  «utc  dares  to  resist,  however 
much  it  may  question,  a  ilecision. 


1 


WTRORUCTtON. 


XV 


Turning  from  tlic  question  of  liow  far  the  m»n  pur- 
pose ot  the  national  KorerDRicnt  lias  been  achieved,  we 
meet  the  qocstion  of  how  far  the  constitution  has  fulfilled 
ibe  intcotion  of  its  frumers,  as  regards  tlie  government  it 
cstubUsbed. 

Tlie  object  of  the  framcrs  was  to  create  three  separate 
and  distinct  departraienls,  so  balanced  as  tu  powers  .iml 
force  that  they  should  be  safe  from  each  other.  Time 
kas  shown  that  they  suctwdcd  In  1801-03  the  Icgis- 
Utivc  and  executive  branches  united  in  an  attack  on  the 
judiciary,  retnovin){  judges  appointed  for  life,  and  even 
suspending  the  silting  of  the  Supreme  Court,  but  with- 
uut  permanent  results,  and  the  judiciary  maintained 
its  power  and  independence.  During  the  Civil  War  the 
PrcstdcDt  by  his  assumption  of  "  war  powers "  rc<luc«d 
the  power  of  Congress  materially,  but  uheii  ilie  necessity 
V4S  passed,  it  was  found  that  the  legislative  branch 
htd  lost  no  real  prerogative.  In  1867  Congress  sav- 
agely attacked  the  President,  but  the  Executive  influence 
ind  strength  suffered  no  diminution. 

By  the  division  of  the  Congress  into  two  chambers, 
Ki  that  both  a  majority  of  the  people  and  a  majority  of 
the  states  should  be  necessary  for  legislation,  it  was 
tiupcd  that  both  the  people  and  the  state  governments 
would  be  protected  from  national  encruachmeni,  and  lliis 
end  has  been  realized.  Its  secondary  purpose  of  act* 
ing  as  a  check  on  hasty  and  unnecessary  law-making 
has  likewise  been  fulfilled.  At  moments  the  diverse 
composition  of  the  two  bodies  has  resulted  in  material 
tttugrccnicnls,  which  have  produced  angry  controversies. 
Fur  tlie  time  these  have  put  one  of  the  branches  out  of 
public  favor,  and  usually  this  has  been  the  Senate— which 
vas  inevitable,  since  its  very  purpose  was  to  check  the 
will  of  the  majority  of  the  jwoplc.  Eventually,  however, 
Kcofxl  has  always  been  obtained,  and  in  looking  back 
wer  a  hundred  years  of  Congressional  legislation  the 
dingrecmcnts  are  found  to  liavc  luuJ  very  little  influence 

L     ai  Dor  history. 

I        Both    Houses  of  Congress  have  made   continual   at 


xn 


INTKODUCTIOK. 


tempts  to  rob  the  President  of  the  power  of  appointment, 
and  whenever  that  official  has  been  the  "  favuritc  son  " 
of  pohltcal  machines,  or  hati  sought  to  indiience  the 
action  of  Congress  on  legislation,  they  have  to  an  ex- 
tent succeeded;  so  far  indeed  as  to  lead  members  of 
Congress  to  this  day  to  assert  the  right  of  eelccting  local 
officials;  but  whenever  the  President  lias  been  a  man  of 
strength,  he  has  refused  to  recognize  this  claim.  Such 
action  has  usually  produced  antijuthy  in  Congress  to  the 
President,  and  the  Senate  has  sometimes,  in  irritation, 
negatived  Presidential  nominees,  but  otherwise  the  legis- 
lative department  is  helpless,  and  every  President  who 
has  selected  his  own  officials  has  added  distinctly  to  his 
popularity  with  the  (>eople,  if  not  with  the  politicians. 
Fortunately  the  steady  extension  of  the  civil-xervice 
laws  promises  shortly  to  remove  this  bone  of  contention. 

Though  the  fathers'  fear  of  a  coalition  of  the  small 
states  in  the  Senate  has  not  been  realiied,  something 
akin  to  it  lias  developed  by  the  rapid  admission  of  new 
states.  Asa  result,  by  "bolding-up"  or  "dickering" 
over  legislation,  the  senators  of  this  coalition  of  small 
stales,  though  representing  an  inconsiderable  minority  of 
the  whole  people,  have  succeeded  in  placing  laws  on  the 
statue  books  that  were  not  for  the  best  interests  of  the 
country.  This  evil  is  purely  temporary,  and  will  pass 
with  the  growth  of  population  in  the  new  states. 

A  second  defect  in  the  Senate,  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is 
a  delegated  tK>dy,  and  therefore  not  directly  responsible 
to  the  people,  has  been  its  tendency  to  extravagance, 
and  in  this  body  all  class  legislation,  whether  bounties, 
(wnslons,  protective  duties,  internal  improvements,  or 
railroad  grants,  Rnds  its  warmest  advocates,  if  not  its  paid 
attorneys.  This  has  produced  a  constantly  recurring  dis- 
cussion as  to  whether  it  would  not  be  best  to  make  it  a 
directly  elective  body  by  the  people  of  each  state. 

The  method  of  choosing  the  President  has  proved 
hopelessly  inoperative.  The  wish  nl  the  frnmrrs  was 
that  the  electoral  college  should  select  a  president  for 
the  people,  hut  the  people  would  none  of  it,  and  hare 


HfTRODVCTIOtf. 

wways  insisted  upon  voting  for  a  president  and  not  for  a 
proxy.  The  result  has  been  that  the  president,  being  the 
only  part  of  the  ){overnmeDt  for  whom  the  whole  people 
rate,  has  absorbed  by  far  the  greater  part  of  govern- 
mental popiilnrity,  and  is  to-day.  In  most  people's  minds, 
(lie  dominant  flgure  in  the  national  government.  Ccr- 
uinly  the  past  goes  to  show  that  popular  choice  has  on 
the  wlwle  been  safer  iltan  selected  ehoice  could  ever 
have  bten,  for  the  Presidents  chosen  by  the  people  have 
been  successful,  while  those  brought  forward  by  politicians 
have  been  failures.  Another  illuminating  fact  is  that  the 
Vice  President  is  always  the  choice  of  the  politicians, 
the  people  taking  little  interest  in  the  selection  of  that 
official;  and  his  almost  invariable  failure  is  equally  well 
known. 

As  the  method  of  choosing  the  President  has  proved 
wholly  inoperative,  so  too  it  has  proved  markedly  inef- 
llcient.  Twice  it  has  broken  down  to  an  extent  lliat  has 
threatened  the  safety  of  theKovernmenl,  and  twice  it  has 
placed  in  office  men  not  fairly  elected,  thus  defeating  the 
will  of  the  people.  The  Klectoral  College  hiis  loKt  its 
object,  and  only  endangers  the  country  in  every  Presi- 
dential election.  An  amendment  to  the  constitution, 
doing  away  with  it,  and  making  the  President  elected  by 
the  people,  is  the  most  necessary  revision  the  compact 
needs. 

The  President  Iia«  not,  as  even  the  convention  feared 
lie  might,  endeavored  to  make  himself  king  or  dictator; 
he  has  not  even  made  any  marked  attempt  to  perpetuate 
himself  in  office.  In  moments  of  necessity  he  has  over- 
ml'Icn  the  constitution  and  usurped  such  powers  as  he 
dermeJ  ncrtsmiry,  but  never  with  the  object  of  personal 
aggiaodizemeoi  or  injury  of  the  people.  Nor  can  there 
be  any  question  that  the  Presidents  who  have  so  acted, 
tiave  done  it  with  reluctance,  and  were  the  Hrst  to  end 
the  exercise  of  such  extra-conKtitutional  sway,  when  the 
conditions  allowed.  If  American  democracy  had  done 
nnUiiug  else,  it  would  have  proved  its  right  to  fame  by 
Iht  fact  that  il  has  choKcn  twenty  Presidents,  not  one  ot 


XVIII 


INTRODUCTION. 


vhom  has  attempted  to  subvert  the  uoveniment  or  \t> 
overrule  the  will  uf  the  people  in  any  cs&cniial  point. 
This  is  the  more  remarkable  us  five  o(  these  I'residents 
were  chosen  because  of  conspicuous  military  service. 

But  the  dixtingushing  feature  uf  the  American  gorcrn- 
ment  has  been  the  judicial  department.  At  moments  its 
jtidgcs  have  cast  impartiality  behind  them,  and  de- 
scended into  the  political  arena.  At  other  times  the 
Supreme  Court  has  shovn  indecision  or  instability.  It 
has  been  "packed"  to  secure  a  particular  verdict,  and 
has  rendered  the  desired  opinion.  It  has  put  itself  so 
out  of  accord  with  public  sentiment  that  its  decrees  were 
successfully  overriden  or  disregarded  by  the  Congress, 
by  the  President,  by  the  state  executives  and  courts,  or 
by  the  people.  It  has  been  temporarily  the  must  hated 
feature  of  our  government,  and  a  recurring  popular  cry 
has  called  for  its  curtailment  or  alteration.  But  in  the 
main  it  has  ;idmirably  fulfilled  its  purposes.  So  far  from 
graipin);  power,  it  has  constantly  soughi  to  differentiate 
federal  jurisdiction  from  that  of  the  states,  and  though 
its  influence  is  widening,  it  is  because  Uie  necessities  of 
national  development  require  iL  Because  it  is  the  one 
ultimate  court  in  the  world  which  is  allowed  to  annni  as 
well  as  to  expouiul  a  t:tw,  it  stands  as  the  greatest  pro> 
tector  of  the  minority  now  known;  and  because  this 
power  has  in  the  main  given  justice  as  well  as  legality  to 
its  decisions,  the  court  has  won  an  enviable  reputation 
for  fairness,  and  consc<|U(-ntly  a  respect  nowhere  else  ob- 
tained. No  matter  how  unpupular  its  decisions  may  be, 
they  are  submitted  to  without  question.  "  Wc  shall  abide 
by  the  decision,"  said  Lincoln,  even  in  the  heal  of  the 
Dred  Scott  excitement,  "but  wc  will  try  to  reverse  it." 

The  greatest  test  of  the  success  of  the  fnimrrs  is  in  be 
fotind,  however,  in  the  general  rather  than  in  the  govern- 
mental history  of  the  constitutional  period.  Within  that 
time  our  territory  has  been  more  tlian  tripled,  and  our 
states  have  been  mutiplied  by  over  three.  Our  popula- 
tion has  grown  fnim  three  to  seventy  million,  .inil  we 
liave  received  foreigners  in  such  numbers  that  some  of 


INTRODUCTlOiT. 


XU 


these  nationalities  now  exceed  the  whole  number  of 
AaiL-ricaos  at  the  time  the  Constitution  was  fnmed. 
We  have  fought  a  war  with  the  most  powerful  nation  of 
Europe,  and  conducted  within  our  own  borders  the 
longest  great  war  since  the  Napoleonic  epoch.  Yet  to- 
day our  people  are  a.%  free  as  they  ever  were,  our  govern- 
loent  as  eflicieni,  and  though  the  conslituiion  has  many 
times  been  overridden  or  disregarded,  with  scarcely  an 
exception  the  ending  of  the  crisis  that  led  to  such  action 
has  been  followed  by  a  contraction  of  powers  to  consti- 
tutional limits.  After  a  hundred  years  of  testing  the 
aaiional  government  stands  to-day  as  the  only  one  which 
has  existed  for  a  century  without  changes  that  were  in 
effect  revolutionary,  and  it  is  the  only  one  able  to  en- 

r force  its  laws  on  seventy  millions  of  people  without 
creating  within  itself  a  spirit  of  rcxistaiicc  and  revolt. 
Vet  the  federal  constitution  would  have  failed,  as  every 
Eovernment  must  fail,  but  for  the  faculty  of  self-govern- 
nent  inherent  in  the  people  it  nominally  governs.  Of 
what  nsc  would  cunstittitiotial  guarantees  to  the  minority 
be,  if  the  majority  chose  to  disregard  them?  Of  what 
use  would  a  supreme  court  be,  if  its  decisions  were  not 
ac(]uiesced  in?  The  constititutiun  is  alterable,  the  Su- 
preme Court  or  the  limitations  can  be  amended  at  the 
ttill  of  the  people.  The  constitution  has  been  overridden, 
the  people  have  disobeyed  the  laws.  The  success  of  our 
iBtiooal  government  is  due,  not  to  its  principles  or  struc- 
e:  it  is  due  to  the  fact  that  it  gives  to  the  majority 
ihe  right  of  governing  the  land  provided  their  laws  shalt- 
be  equal  in  operation,  and  that  with  this  degree  of  power 
the  majority  has  been  content.  It  ie,  therefore,  but  one 
exprension  of  what  \%  the  cardinal  element  of  good 
government:  a  self-controlled  people,  given  to  excess 
In  neither  law-making  nor  in  law-breaking. 

♦ 

On  September  17,  1787,  the  federal  convention,  after 
nearly  four  months  of  anxious  work,  completed  the  fram- 
'va,%  of  the  compact  since  known  as  the  constitution  of 


iJ&i 


( 


\ 


XX 


WmODVCTIO/f. 


the  Upited  Staten.  and  forwarded  it  to  the  Continental 
Congress,  accompanying  the  instrument  with  the  request 
that  the  proposed  pliin  of  government  might  be  submitted 
to  conventions  of  the  people  in  the  Tarious  stale*,  for 
their  discu^ionand  ratification  or  rejection.  The  result 
of  this  recommendation  was  almost  to  turn  the  country 
at  large  into  u  vast  debating  society,  and  for  nine  months 
public  speakers,  pamphleteers,  and  newspapers  declaimed 
and  argued.  Probably  in  no  other  time  or  country  have 
the  princijiles  of  government  ever  been  so  universally 
and  elaborately  discussed. 

Even  before  the  convention  had  made  the  result  of  its 
labors  public,  it  was  notorious  that  a  large  awl  powerful 
party  in  the  state  of  New  York  was  prepared  to  oppose 
whatever  that  body  should  submit.  In  the  instructions 
of  that  state  tu  her  delegates  to  the  federal  convention, 
an  attempt  had  l>een  made  to  insert  a  restriction  thai 
any  alterations  made  in  the  articles  of  confederation 
"should  be  not  repugnant  to,  or  inconsistent  with,  the 
constitution  of  this  state,"  *  a  motion  lost  by  but  one 
vote,  and  the  instructions  actually  adopted  only  modified 
this  limitation  to  the  extent  that  the  Nkw  Vork  delegates 
were  restricted  to  "the  sole  and  express  purpose  o( 
revising  the  articles  of  confederation.'"  When  there- 
fore the  convention,  discanling  the  old  government,  set 
about  the  framing  of  a  new  one,  two  of  New  York's  three 
delegates,  Robert  Yates  and  John  Lansing.  Jr..  with- 
drew from  the  convention  on  the  grounds  that  the  body 
had  wholly  exceeded  its  power,  and  united  in  an  open 
letter  of  protest  to  the  Governor  of  the  state,  George 
Clinton;'  and  though  the  third,  Alexander  Hamilton, 
refused  to  be  Iwund  by  their  action,  and  eventually 
signed  the  constitution,  his  act  unquestionably  tran- 
scended his  powers. 

Lines  were  therefore  already  drawn,  when  on  Septem- 
ber J7,  1787,  the  constitution  was  publi^^hed  in  the  New 


■  .Motlaa  of  Robcrti  Vatts.  lounial  ol  Senate, 

•BIIIU4,  it.  137.  i/M./..  480. 


WTRODUCTIO^V. 


Vork  press,  sod  how  well  pre[>arcd  were  the  opposition 
(nr  "Anli-fcdcralisls  "  as  tlicir  opponents  promptly  named 
(liem),  is  proved  by  the  fact  tlut,  on  the  very  day  of  its 
publication,  there  appeared  in  the  New  York  journal, 
the  organ  of  the  "slate  machine,"  a  letter  sigoed 
"Cato,"  sharply  and  ably  attacking  the  proposed  govern- 

[Ueut,  written,  as  was  very  cjuitkly  known,  by  no  lesxm^n 
than  GoTcrnor  George  Clinton  himself.  From  that  time, 
till  the  meeting  of  the  Assembly  tn  January,  1788,  gave 
otlier  occupation,  Clinton  continued  the  attack  in  a 
series  of  letters  o»cr  the  same  pseudonym."  More 
dangerous  still  was  another  series,  under  the  pen-name 
of  "Brutus,"  begun  a  little  later*  than  (hose  of  Cato 
and  far  exceeding  them  in  both  ability  and  number, 
■  liich  were  notoriously  written  by  Robert  Vatcs,  judge 
of  the  state  supreme  court,  and  one  of   the  delegates 

nwho    had    withdrawn    from     the     federal    convention. 

"These  two  writers  were  re-«nforccd  by  a  host  of  minor 
scribblers.  ^ 

Hamilton  was  too  warmly  in  favor  of  a  strong  national 
government,  w<is  too  powerfully  committed  to  the  pro- 
posed  constitution,  and  held  too  ready  a  pen,  to  allow 
these  attacks  to  go  unanswered.  But  three  days  after 
the  publication  of  the  first  letter  of  "Cato."  a  reply  to 
a,  under  the  signature  of  "Oesar,"'  appeared  in  the 
papers,  keenly  personal '  in  character,  and  virtually 
warning  the  "  A nti- federalists,*'  that  they  could  "  take  " 

[the  "  proflTercd  constitution,"  or  run  the  risk  of  seeing 
gOTcrnmcnt  forced  upon  them  by  an  array.  Furilier- 
more,  "Cato  "  was  told  that,  "  in  his  future  marches,"  he 
wauld  very  probably  be  followed  by  "Cjesar." 

The  want  of  political  tact  thus  shown,  typical  indeed  of 
Hamilton  through  all  his  life,  was  eagerly  seized  upon  by 
"  Cato,"  and  in  his  second  letter  he  cleverly  animadverted 

'  RqidMed  In  FoH'i  "  Etw;*  o"  ^^'  CoiMliiutlon.'' 

•  fftw  Yrrt  fenrtt-d.  Nonrtnbn  I,  IJ87. 

'  Rnxinted  in  Konl't  ■■  Eaap  on  the  Coortitmicm." 

*  Wulriiuion  nmipUin«l  in  Noretnlwr.  173?.  tlul  "1  Iiivb  lunUir 
•en   mc  [puliliuilionl   llial  tt  DM   tAMfcucJ   lo  ili«   |>uuaia  ol  the 


ZXII 


INTRODUCTION. 


on  these  impcnous  and  ill  advised  w^ming^.  and  closed 
by  telling  "Cxur,"  in  turn,  that  no  notice  would  be 
taken  to  whni  he  might  in  the  future  write.  To  thin 
"Cxsar,"  replied  in  a  second  letter,  in  which,  as  if 
he  had  not  done  harm  enough,  he  went  to  the  lengths 
of  writing  that  "  1  am  not  much  attached  to  the  majesty 
of  the  mHllitudt,"  and  therefore  "  waive  all  preten- 
tions (founded  on  such  conduct),  to  their  counle nance." 
Hut  even  the  author  seems  to  have  felt  lltat  he  had 
begun  his  appeal  to  the  people  amiss,  for  at  the  end  he 
gave  notice  that  "Ca;sar"  would  not  reply  further  to 
"Cato." 

This  did  not  mean,  however,  that  Hamilton  rcsifined 
the  field  to  his  adversaries,  but  merely  that  he  intended 
to  change  his  ground.  **Sim:e  my  last,"  he  wrote  a 
correspondent  (presumably  Washington),  "the  chief  of 
the  state  party  has  declared  his  opposition  to  the  govern* 
mcnt  proposed,  both  in  private  conversation  and  in  print. 
That  you  may  judge  of  the  reason  and  Jairtuss  of  his 
views  I  send  you  the  two  essays,  with  a  reply  by 
'Ctcsar'  On  further  consideration  it  was  concluded 
to  abandon  this  personal  form,  and  to  take  up  the 
principles  of  the  whole  subject  These  will  be  sent  you 
ax  published,  and  might  with  advantage  be  repuhlished 
in  your  gaieties."'  Nor  was  it  only  his  frii-nds  who 
knew  of  this  change  of  plan,  for  the  organ  of  the  Ami. 
federalists  promptly  announced  that,  "n  writer  in  the 
state  of  New  York,  under  the  signature  of  'C«sar,' 
came  forward  against  the  patriotic  'Cato.'  and  en- 
deavored to  frighten  him  from  starting  any  objei'tiiinK, 
and  threatened  that  'Cato*  would  be  follnwed  by 
'Caesar,'  in  all  his  marches;  but  wc  find  that  as  soon 
as  ever  'Cato'  came  freely  to  discuss  the  merii  of  the 
constitution,  'Caesar'  retreated  and  disappeared;  and 
since  that  a  publication  nndcr  the  signature  of  '  I'ublins ' 
has  appeared  in  that  state." 

To  write  such   a    treatise  nn    the  "prindples  uf  the 


'  See  Ford's  "  Eaap  on  the  Coonitulai,''  845. 


tffTRODUCTIOIf. 


wbole  subject,"  was  a  task  of  no  little  bbor,  but  to 
write  it  in  tlie  few  monthit  before  Uie  assembling  of  the 
New  York  state  conTention  (if  not  before  the  elections 
for  members  of  that  body),  aivd  so  that  it  might  at  once 
begin  the  work  of  counteracting  the  influence  of  "  Cato  " 
and  *'  Brutus,"  involved  a  rapidity  of  composition  to 
which  Hamilton  himself  was  unetiual.  He  therefore 
sougbt  the  assisunce  of  two  others  in  the  undertaking' 
and  secured  the  aid,  first  of  John  Jay,  then  Secretary 
of  Foreign  Affairs',  and  second  of  James  Madison,  a 
nctnbcr  of  the  Continental  Congress  from  Virginia,  who 
had  recently  distinsuishcd  himself  in  the  federal  ton- 
TciitioD  by  his  able  elucidations  of  the  general  theory  of 
fjovcrnment;  a  form  of  study  in  which  Virginians  had 
aiready  made  themselves  famous.  To  Jay  was  assigned 
the  discussion  of  government  in  its  relation  to  foreign 
affairs,  and  to  Madison  Wiis  apportioned  the  historical  and 
■  beorelical  part,  with  an  analysis  of  the  general  powers  of 
the  new  government;  Hamilton  taking  himself  the  ex- 
■iiiinatioa  of  the  defects  of  the  confederation,  and  the 
riposition  of  the  proposed  constitution  in  deUil,  for 
nth  of  which  he  was  peculiarly  fitted. 

KTcn  thus  divided,  it  was  a  dtfRcult  task  to  produce 
the  weekly  late  of  essays  alternately  published  in  the 
tmitfenJent  Journal  and  the  Dttily  AJvrrltur;  and  the 
Dere  magnitude  of  the  labor  can  best  be  understood 
Hben  it  is  noted  thai  **  Brutus,"  the  ablest  writer  in  the 
Dppo«iiion,  wrote  only  sixteen  letters,  while  eighty-five 
appeared  over  the  name  of  PubUus,  the  periods  of  publi- 
cation being  almost  identical. 

The  last  letter  of  "Cx-«ir"  was  published  on  Octo- 
twr  17,  and  on  Octuben^j;  '•  T/ie  J-'eJeralilf,  No.  i," 
addressed  to  the  "The  People  of  the  SUte  of  New 
Vork,"  over  the  pen-name  of  "  Publius,"  was  printed  io 

*"Tbe  midenaMnf  was  profMned  by  AIe»ii<lor  Hamilton  to  June* 
.  wUli  >  rti|uekt  In  )»iii  him  noA  Mr.  )t,y  in  nrtyin);  it  int» 
{AfaJiijH  in  a  ff""  f^t^ft  "  '"*'  /■'tJ^rtiHil,")     •■  U  w«« 

Uti  tall  tiv  Jay.  Ilamill an<l  mjwK.     The  inopouj  came 

flu  two  loitner.  — jt/tfjitfw  lajifftrten,  Auput  to,  ijSS. 


£y 


XXIV 


mTRODUCTlON. 


the /nJepfitJent  Journai.'  This  announced  itstlf  as  the 
initial  number  of  u  series  of  cssay»  on  tlie  pruposed  con- 
Utlution,  and  briefly  outlined  the  intended  scope  of  the 
work.  Id  eight]r-livc  letters,  published  in  the  suvcecd- 
ingjCven  months,  thi^  t^isk  was  completed. 

The  nurlccd  excellence  of  the  letters  of  "Pablius" 
attracted  insunt  attention,  and  led  to  the  republication 
of  the  earlier  numbers  in  the  larger  part  of  the  American 
pre&s,  even  the  jVrtrr  Yark  Journal,  the  organ  of  the  Anti- 
federalists,  being  finally  forced  to  print  (hem  for  a  time.' 
The'demand  indeed  was  sufficient  lo  produce  the  prompt 
advertisement  of  a  collection  of  the  scries  in  book  form, 
and  it  was  published  while  the  conxtitntion  was  still  a 
matter  of  delxite. 

That  Tht  Ftdtralht  produced  any  marked  influence 
at  the  time  in  leading  to  the  acceptance  of  the  new 
government  is  questionable,  (or  it  was  a  moment  of  pas- 
sion,  rather  than  of  reason,  and  the  followers  of  Clinton 
were  too  bound  by  scllish  interests  to  let  abstract  reason- 
ing really  influence  them.  A  good  Federalist  could  only 
say  of  the  work  of  "Publius"  that  "he  is  certainly  a 
judicious  and  ingenious  writer,  though  not  w<-ll  calculated 
for  the  common  people."*  As  for  the  A nti- federalists, 
they  made  no  pretense  of  regarding  the  arguments. 
"  'The  Federalist,'  as  he  terms  himself,"  wrote  one,  "or 
'  Puhlius,'  puts  me  in  mind  of  some  of  the  gentlemen  of 
the  lung  robe  when  hard  pressed,  in  a  bad  cause,  with  a 
rich  client  They  frc<iuciitly  say  a  good  deal  which  does 
not  apply;  but  yet  if  it  will  not  conirince  the  judge  aiid 
jury,  may  perhaps,  help  to  make  them  forget  some  part 
of  the  evidence — emturrass  their  opponents,  and  make 
the  audience  stare." ' 

The  New  York  elections  for  delegates  to  the  state 


'  tl  hu  bcvn  MUDd  by  Ri«a  rbJ  ItMine  tkat  iK«  cMfy  l«n«n  wtn 
si2n«<I  "  ACiluen  oj  hvw  Vock."  Thkit  *n  errer.  the  nalyaMnt  llw 
paeudiMfoi  bciuK  In  «•  aiivarlitaunenl  o(  th«  linL  collNUd  eiliiivii. 

'  ll  nnnlcd  Uir.c  a  peliiion  fn>ni  ihlnr  uibtcrlhen  Ihal  ibe  p«t>*f  vouM 

*.  bmiUT  14.178&, 


tUTkODUCTtOH. 


XXV 


convention  well  proved  that  "Publius"  had  written  in 
nin,  for  only  one-third  of  the  men  chosen  were  Fe(ter;il- 
ista — making  the  contest  on«  of  the  inost  crushing 
defeats  ever  experienced  by  the  Anti-CHnton  party. 
Nor  were  the  members  of  the  convention  when  met,  any 
more  open  to  persiiaston  thnn  the  people  had  been.  *'I 
■teal  this  moment,"  wrote  one,  "  while  the  Convention  is 
ia  Committee  and  the  little  Great  Man  employed  in 
repeating  over  [';irts  of  Puhlius"  to  write;  and  another, 
when  an  Anli-federalist  was  charged  with  having  "com- 
piled" bis  speech  from  the  New  York  papers,  replied 
liut  "if  so,  he  had  as  much  credit  with  me  as  Mr. 
Hamiltoa  hxA,  for  rtlailittg  in  Convention,  Publius." 

But  if  the  masses  were  held  to  the  democratic  party  in 
the  state  by  the  argumcnt»  of  "Calo"  and  "Brutus" 
and  were  deaf  to  the  reasoning  of  "  Publius,"  there  was 
a  Irmil  to  what  they  could  be  made  to  accept.  That  the 
federal  compact  robbed  them  of  power,  and  was  a 
"g'ddcd  trap,"  leading  to  consolidation  and  to  eventual 
tyranny,  they  bad  strong  reasons  for  believing,  but  when 
the  sutc  machine,  triumphant  in  «)uiping  public  opin:on 
10  this  extent,  went  one  point  further,  and  advanced  lite 
•(lea  of  separation  from  the  Union,  which  indeed  was  the 
laHtcal  outcome  of  a  rejection  of  the  constitution,  it  was 
DDt  followed  by  the  rank  and  file.  In  the  history  of  the 
United  States  disunion  has  been  often  talked  and  some- 
times attempted  by  political  leaders,  but  not  once  have 
the  masses  accepted  it.  The  onljr  serious  endeavor  _to 
liteafc  up  the  country  whktTSas  tser  twrx^tteA  wa*jnj> 
— Vim"  "here  those'>iro  dlguld  have  been  the  controlling 
ekiteM  were  chiedv  slaves,  unable  to  maliJOhc^nHucnce 
ajMiwer;  and  even  there,  in  the  mountain  re^oiBrw'i*rc 
the  plain  American  resembled  his  more  northern  coun- 
tryman, disunion  never  prospered.  From  1771I,  if  not 
earlier,  the  leaders  have  upheld  or  denounced  a  united 
ewinlry,  according  to  their  selfish  or  sectional  views,  but 
the  anspeakiiig  masses  have  felt,  what  it  took  statesmen 
rears  In  learn,  that  there  was  but  one  people  and  one 
nation,    be  tlic  states  thirteen  Of   thirty.     In   1788  the 


XXVl 


LvrxoDvcnoff. 


majoritj"  might  vote  against  »  frame  of  government;  they 
could  Dot  be  brought  to  vote  against  the  Union. 

But  another  and  more  concrete  difficulty  existed  to 
obstruct  tlie  plans  of  the  Clintoninn  IcaderK.  The  Antt- 
fedcralisis  were  a  landholding  and  therefore  an  up-state 
party,  while  New  York  City  and  its  immediate  vicinity 
were  controlled  \>y  the  commercial  and  mechanic  c)a»set, 
so  strongly  federal  in  their  feeling  that  at  this  very  elec- 
tion for  the  convention,  though  the  opposcrs  of  the  con- 
ittituttnn  had  won  nverwhctmingly  elsewhere,  j'et  in  New 
York  City  the  FcderaliHls  drove  the  Anti-federalisu  from 
some  of  the  polls  by  force,  and  even  where  this  was  not 
done  the  vote  stood  as  (en  to  one  for  their  ticket.  "  Reject 
the  constitution,"  threatened  the  federal  leaders,  and  "a 
separation  of  the  Southern  District  from  the  other  parts 
of  the  Stale  .  .  ,  would  become  the  object  of  the  Fedcr* 
alists  and  of  the  neighboring  Slate*.*"  This  would  not 
merely  exclude  the  inKind  part  of  the  state  from  the  Union, 
it  would  shut  it  out  (rom  the  sea.  Worse  still,  it  would 
lose  to  the  country  sections  their  share  of  the  large 
revenues  arising  from  the  imposts  on  the  rich  commerce 
of  New  York  City,  and  as  this  revenue  was  a  principal 
reason  for  the  refusal  to  join  the  Union  (because  of  its 
necessary  transference  to  the  general  government),  the 
certain  loss  of  it  by  a  secession  of  the  City  removed  a 
powerful  motive  of  the  Ami  federalists  for  opposing  the 
constitution. 

This  danger  of  division,  therefore,  made  the  triumph 
of  the  Clinton  party  more  apparent  than  real,  and  not 
daring  to  reject,  nor  willing  to  accept,  the  opponents  of 
the  constitution  could  only  adopt  the  policy  of  delay, 
hoping  that  enough  states  wnuld  reject  the  new  govern- 
ment to  prevent  its  orgnniEation.  Having  postponed 
the  stale  convention  as  long  as  possible,  to  gain  time,  it 
was  next  proposed  when  that  body  had  met  that  Ibey 
should  t;ikc  a  "  long  adjournment  as  the  safest  and  most 
artful  course  to  c/Tect  ilicir  final  purpose.'"  But  as  state 
after  state  ^-^ — ■■■'  ''i"  -"--•■"ition  such  action  became 


'  lUulbam  u 


*au, 


extreme,  and  in  place  of  it  a  plan  of  conditinnat 
cnUments  was  bruuglit  forward,  by  which  the  stale 
oo«iltl  later  withdraw  from  the  Union.  Rather  than  risk 
hinlicr  contest,  this  compromise  was  at  Rrst  favorably 
recetvcil  by  tlie  Pederalistn;  the  one  side  bopinjt  that  the 
new  Eovcrnmcnt  would  prove  so  great  a  failure  or  so 
hard  a  master  that  a  favorable  opportunity  would  come 
(or  rescinding  the  ralifi cation,  while  the  other  foresaw 
Uat,  a  ratification  once  obtained,  there  would  be  liltle  to 
"fear  in  the  future."  Hut  while  this  compromise  was 
siill  in  embryo  news  reiiclied  the  convention  that  both 
Kew  Hampshire  and  Virginia  had  ratified  the  constitu- 
tkm,  making  ten  states  in  all,  and  itisurinf;  the  organixa- 
uon  and  trial  of  the  new  government.  The  Federalists 
Uierefnre  became  less  yielding  and  finally  wrung  from 
liicir  opponents  an  nnconditional  ratification.  What  the 
irj^ntncntx  of  "  fublius"  could  not  bring  to  pass  had 
been  extorted  frnm  the  majority  of  Ihc  state  by  the 
majority  of  the  states  and  a  minority  of  its  own  citizens. 
But  it  TA^  Ftderaiiit  was  an  uninfluenttal  factor  in  the 
Mtual  struggle  for  ratification,  it  was  because  of  the 
Mture  of  the  contest,  and  not  from  want  of  ability.  It 
IS  true  that  serious  defccts,_duc  to  the  circumstances  of 
lis  production,  arc  obvious.  Although  intended  to  be  a 
tyMematic  work  on  republican  government,  tt  was  evcn~N 
Dtire  a  plea  far  the  adoption  of  this  particular  constitu-  f 
iKin,  and  therefore  had  quite  as  much  of  the  legal  brief 
as  of  the  phi!o*<ipliical  cummentary  on  gorcriimeu!.  j/" 
Sot  one  of  the  authors  of  Tht  FeJtrtUt'sl  entirely  approved  -^ 
of  tbe  constitution,  bnt  none  the  less  they  were  called 
upon  to  defend  i^  I'nJ^S:  _  "  In  some  parts,"  wrote  Jef- 
ferson, immediately  after  its  publication,  "it  is  discover- 
able that  ihe  author  means  only  to  say  what  may  be  best 
mid  in  d«f£nse  of  tbe  opinions  in  which  be  did  not  con- 
ear,"  '  proving  that  some  of  the  arguments  were  so  half- 

'"  TliuHiEb  cairied  <m  in  concert,  ihc  wtitcniren  not  mui unity  tctponu- 
lila  (umtitlw  hlem  af  toch  olh«r :  there  Ixine  wldom  limo  lor  even  ■ 
psiiMl  III  tin  pieces  tiy  *iij  bul  the  Htilec.  (icfoie  ihcy  were  wjnled  at 
Tkr  )ircu,  utitl  Hiiiiciinia  \uuA\y  lay  tba  wriur  liiiiiwit." — AtitdittH  u 
Jt/truM,  Augtitt  la,  ifSSs 


XXVIII 


WTftODVCTlOlf. 


hearted  that  the  author's  true  thoughts  stood  revealed. 
As  essays  intended  to  combat  the  letters  of  "  Cato  "  and 
"Brutat,"  frequent  digressions  and  repetitions  were  made 
to  disprove  such  postulates  of  those  publications  a»  were 
found  to  influence  the  people.  Written  especially  to 
influence  the  voters  of  the  slxte  of  New  York,  its  refer- 
ences to  lociti  circumstances,  ami  especially  to  the  state 
constitution,  were  constant.  Furthermore,  the  nork  was 
'written  with  tlie  utmost  haste  by  three  men,  with  lew 
opportunities  to  consult,  leading  to  frequent  duplicaiion, 
and  to  some  inconsiKiencies.  *'  The  haste,"  wrote  one  of 
its  authors,  "  with  which  many  of  the  papers  were  penned 
in  order  to  get  through  the  subject  while  the  Constitu- 
tion was  before  the  public,  and  to  comply  with  the 
arrangement  by  which  the  printer  was  to  keep  his  paper 
open  for  four  numbers  every  week,  was  such  that  the 
performance  must  have  borne  a  very  (liferent  aspect 
without  the  aid  of  historical  and  other  notes  which  had 
been  used  in  the  Convention,  and  without  the  familiarity 
with  the  whole  subject  produced  by  the  discnisiuns 
there.  It  frequently  happened  that,  while  the  printer 
was  putting  into  types  parts  of  a  number,  the  following 
parts  were  under  the  pen  and  to  be  furnished  iu  time  for 
the  press.""  "The  particular  circumstances,"  wrote 
Hamilton,  in  the  preface  of  the  first  collected  edition  of 
Tlu  FtJeraliil,  "  under  which  these  papers  have  been 
written  have  rendered  it  impracticable  to  avoid  viola- 
tiuns  of  method  and  repetitions  of  ideas  which  cannot  bat 
displease  a  critical  reader." 

Yet  despite  these  adverse  conditions,  the  Writers  of 
Tkt  Fedtraiisi  produced  a  work  which  from  the  moment 
of  publication  lias  been  acknowledged  to  be  at  once  the 
ablest  commentary  on  the  federal  constitution  and  one  of 
the  most  solid  and  brilliant  works  un  government  ever 
written.  "  It  would  be  dilliciilt,"  wrote  a  critic  '  in  1788, 
"to  find  a  treatise  which,  in  so  small  a  compass,  con- 
tains so  much  valuable  political  information,  or  in  witich 


'  Mailitnn,  In  pil'«i  ■ntttli-tl  ' 
*  h'ttib  WclMct  in  AndrifiK 


irdi,  178a. 


t.vritoDucrjotf. 

the  trae  principles  of  republican  government  are  tinfolilcd 
with  sHch  precision.*"  This  was  ecUoed  in  1S30  by  one 
of  uur  ablest  jurisls,'  urhu  declared  "There  is  no  work  on 
the  subject  of  the  constitution,  and  on  republican  and 
federal  gorernment  generally,  that  deserves  to  be  more 
thoroufchtjr  Studied.  .  .  I  icnoir  not  indeed  of  any 
work  on  the  principles  of  free  f^ovcrnmcnt  that  is  to  be 
compared,  10  instruclion,  ami  tntritisic  value,  to  tliis 
»n»all  and  unpretending  volume  of  The  FeJrratiif,  not 
rren  if  we  resort  to  Aristotle,  Cicero,  Machiavcl, 
Uimtesquieu,  Milton,  I.ocke,  or  Hurke.  It  is  equally 
•dmirable  in  the  depth  of  iu  wisdom,  the  comprehensive- 
nest  uf  its  views,  the  sagacity  of  its  rcUcctions,  and  the 
Icirlessness,  patriotism),  candor,  «implicity,  and  elegance 
with  which  its  truths  arc  uttered  and  recommended." 
Mure  ret:ent)y  the  historian  of  the  Supreme  Court,  after 
tUting  that  Tfie  Ft-ieralitl  "  has  h<?en  iteriously  and 
itferently  called  the  Bible  of  Republicanism,"  added 
"that  for  comprehensiveness  of  design,  strength,  clear- 
ncK,  and  simplicity,  the  book  h,is  no  piirallel  among  the 
■niin;i;i  of  men,  not  even  excepting  or  overlooking  those 
ut  Montesquieu  and  Aristotle."  * 

A«  certain  defects  in  Tht  FtJtralia  resulted  from  its 
hriuff  written  by  three  men,  so  this  circumstance  in  time 
l>nidur.cd  a  controversy  as  to  the  exact  share  two  of  its 
auburs  bad  borne  in  the  undertaking.  The  question 
been    needlessly  complicated  by  the   use   of  much 

terial  which  had  really  no  bearing  on  it,  or  which  was 

valueless  as  evidence.  Diso.irding  all  this,  the  dispute  is 
rptaced  to  the  problem:  did  Hamilton,  or  Madison, 
vrite  Nos.  49  to  58  and  Nos.  63  and  63? 

That  cither  ntao  should  actually  b<;)icvc  that  he  wrote 

^Jttfmnn  pro*Kiunc«i)  ti  "  ibF  t>oi  cammeoUry  nn  Ihc  priacijiln  of 
W0IM   wtiich  IlU  em  liei^n  wrilten." — Litltr  A>  Madmn.  iVVivw- 
%.  1788- 
I'J"'*"  Kent  kn  "Co)nineiilaiia~i,  a4i-     Suwy.  too.  »peikt  ol  II  ■» 
M  iaomipataUlt  cinnniciit*ry." 
'Canon'*  "  HhIwj  of  the  Su['rcnie  Cmtri." 


xxt 


IMTRODUCTION. 


twelve  essajrs  which  he  did  not  mny  at  first  sight  i*. 
impossible,  but  a  recurrence  to  the  circumstances  at  the 
time  they  were  written  proves  that  it  was  possible  for  both 
bone»liy  to  err.  The  essiiys  were  penned  by  men  who  had 
been  reading  the  same  books  and  listening:  to  the  same 
debates.  Necessarily,  therefore,  their  minds  for  the 
moment  were  saturated  with  the  ume  material.  The  air 
was  tilled  with  certain  principles  and  facts,  which  were 
UM:d  by  both  men,  as  well  as  by  many  others,  and  for 
this  reason,  any  attempt  to  argue  the  question  from  mere 
similarity  of  thought,  as  is  done  in  the  special  picas  of 
John  C.  Hamilton  in  bis  edition  of  The  t'eiieralisl  in 
behalf  of  his  father,  and  of  Professor  £.  G.  Bourne  in  the 
AmtrUaH  Hisloruai  Review  for  March,  1897.  in  behalf 
of  Madison,  are,  so  far  as  they  argue  from  mere  resem 
blance  of  idea,  valueless  as  real  evidence.  From  the 
letters  of  "Brutus,"  the  great  opponent  of  "  Publius," 
could  be  selected  a  scries  of  extracts  that  would  go  far  to 
prove  (hat  he  was  the  writer  of  the  disputed  e^sayt  of 
The  FederaiiU.  Undoubtedly,  too,  there  was  some  con- 
sultation between  the  wrif  rs  uf  "  Publius  '*  with  inevitable 
mutual  coloring,  and  the  letters  were  written  with  such 
haste  that  no  one  essay  could  especially  impress  itself  on 
the  mind  of  the  writer,  llul  an  even  grcalcr  cause  than 
this  matter  of  "stock  "  phrases  and  exchange  of  ideas. 
for  the  confusion  and  resulting  contradiction  of  the 
writers,  was  the  fact  that  both  Hamilton  and  Madison 
were  members  of  the  conventions  in  their  respective 
staicc  to  discuss  the  constitution,  and  in  their  speeches 
necessarily  went  over  the  same  points  thai  tiad  beer 
discussed  in  The  Fejeraiitt.  Mention  has  already  been 
made  of  (he  fact  that  flamilton  was  charged  with  "  retail 
ing"  Publius  to  the  New  York  state  convention,  and  a 
reading  of  Madison's  speeches  in  that  of  Virginia  shows 
that  he,  too.  m«<lc  large  drafts  on  The  FtJeraliii.  When, 
■^therefore,  the  moment  came  tJial  its  writerx  could  look 
fpver  the  collected  edition,  it  is  not  strange  that  mnch 
pf  it  read  so  familiarly  to  rarh  that  he  honestly  thought 
[jimself  the  writer.     Granting  the  possibility,  therefore, 


WTRODUCTIOif. 

tliAt  txith  men  could  be  misled,  the  question  becomes 
nuL  what  each  author  thought,  but  purely  what  other 
evidence  than  their  opinions  goes  to  prove. 

Before  tlismi&iiing  this  question  of  memory,  one  fact 
of  value  cannot  be  omitted.  Madison  set  out  for  Virginia 
three  days  after  the  last  essay  in  dispute  was  published, 
«as  quickly  engaged  in  the  heat  of  party  strife  tend- 
ing to  obscure  his  memory  on  the  question  of  author- 
ship, and  making  it  improbable  that  he  could  give  the 
volumes  of  The  FtdtraSist,  when  they  presently  appeared, 
any  careful  examination  for  some  time.  Strange  though 
it  may  appear,  Madison  apparently  possessed  no  copy  of 
the  first  edition,  having  presumjitivcly  given  away  all 
those  sent  him  by  Hamilton.  On  the  contrary,  while 
Uadison  was  engaged  in  occupations  likely  to  make  him 
forget  or  confuse  the  part  he  had  borne  tn  the  under- 
taking, Hamilton  was  revising  the  newspaper  articles 
lad  seeing  them  through  the  press  for  the  book  edition. 
There  is  not  an  essay  in  the  collected  edition  of  1788  in 
vhich  he  did  not  make  from  ten  to  twenty  verbal  correc- 
tions, implying  careful  study  of  the  text,  and  as  this 
revision  was  done  within  two  months  of  their  appearance 
~ui  the  newspapers,  and  before  Hamilton  had  confused 
Hatters  by  "  retailing "  Publiiis  in  the  New  Vork  con- 
vention, it  is  obviuus  that  he  refreshed  his  memory  in  a 
<r^  roost  certain  to  Ax  the  authorship  clearly  in  his 
■ind. 

These  facte  being  considered,  it  becomes  of  importance 
lo  find  what  is  the  earliest  date  at  which  each  of  the 
Uisputants  asserted  his  claim  of  authorship.  So  far  as  is 
known  Madison's  was  first  noted  in  a  copy  of  the  edition 
of  Tkt  FtJtraliit  printed  in  1799.  or  eleven  years  after 
the  appearance  of  the  essays.  Hamilton's  earliest  state- 
neat  was  made  to  Chancellor  Kent,  and  as  he  is  spoken 
(4  in  the  memoranda  as  "General  Hamttton  "  it  must 
have  been  made  while  he  held  that  rank,  or  in  the  years 
rj^Sor  1799.  Thus  botli  assertions  practically  rest  on 
eqoal  ground,  so  far  as  time  is  concerned. 

but  one  piece  of  evidence  deserves  mention,  because  It 


kxxii 


tNTRODUCTlOfr. 


seemed  at  one  time  to  threaten  that  Ma<]ison's  claim  was 
to  be  lost  by  default.  Humilton's  litit  w.is  ptiblisticii  in 
a  widely  read  periodical  in  i8o;,  and  the  edition  of  The 
FrderaiUf  printed  in  iSio'  gave  further  currency  and 
authority  to  Hamilton's  view  by  ascribing  the  numbert 
according  to  one  of  his  statements.  Vet  not  one  word 
of  denial  was  publicly  made  by  Madison,  or  by  any  of 
his  friends  for  him,  until  1817.  It  has  been  urged  in 
expkination  that  Madison's  official  positions  prevented 
his  entering  into  a  controversy,  but  an  adequate  reply  is 
furnished  by  the  fact  tlut  throuf;h  his  friends  t)ie  Secre- 
tary of  State  and  President  conducted  several  newspaper 
controversies  in  these  very  years. 

Another  point  worth  L-onsidering  is  the  fact  (hut  Ham- 
ilton held  by  far  the  readier  pen,  and  as  the  originator 
of  Uie  series  undoubtedly  intended  to  take  the  laboring 
oar.  Madison  was  the  last  one  of  the  three  to  join  in  tlie 
undertaking,  and  in  the  first  thirty-six  e.tsays  he  wrote 
but  two  cnitrcly  by  himself,  the  remaining  three  in  which 
he  bore  a  part  having  been  begun  as  well  by  ftamtlton. 
With  this  in  mind  let  us  consider  the  circumstances  that 
mark  a  peculiarity  in  Madison's  chief  share  in  the  work. 
At  No.  37  Hamilton  for  the  time  being  cea^ted  all  work, 
and  Madison  took  up  the  task  and  wrote  twelve  consecu- 
tive essays,  immediately  following  which  come  the  twelve 
in  dispute.  The  question  naturally  arises  why  Hamilton 
should  suddenly  transfer  to  Madison  the  continuance  of 
the  series,  throwing  upon  him  all  the  work,  and  the  reason 
is  not  far  to  seek,  No.  36  of  The  FeJtralitt,  or  the  last 
of  Hamilton's  contributions,  was  published  on  January  8. 
On  January  15  the  New  York  state  supreme  court 
began  its  winter  term,  and  Hamilton  as  a  busy  lawyer 
was  called  upon  to  attend  it.'     Furthermore,  on  January 


'Onr  fact  o\  ialrmt  in  iM*  •dkion  li  iW  ll  c>na  Havillop  u  the 
■ulhut  u(  No.  S4,  tliiu  khu*ing  tint  Ibm  rnu  ■  iUI  "  ta  bi*  um 
hiiidiiriiing"  ir:  Fiiiiencc  il  ihai  tine,  whkih  [unctinl  (lis  atnious  oior 
be  tnailc  I  >t<  IM, 

'T)ui  >:  .'.'*■  Haiiiilton  ta  nincli  *)cua|Mtloii  m  lu  (otM  hin 

to  iiiijwnu '11^  »'-''•  nil  Tki  F/ti/mtitl  i%  proved  in  ■  leori  (ram  hitn  ii> 
M*ili(on  m  April,   17S8,   when  ka  tmiM.   "U  oir  raipicioat  ut  tli* 


XXXIII 


1 1  the  New  York  state  lesislatarc  assembled,  and 
Hamilton,  who  was  a  canilidale  for  membership  of  Con- 
pvss,  wax  itiTolvcd  in  a  political  cami^atgn  akin  to  the 
mcxlera  seoatorial  election.  These  joint  occupations 
aecesnrily  made  such  drafts  npon  his  time  that  he  could 
not  continue  The  Feiieraliil,  and  that  there  should  be  no 
break  in  it  Madison  assumed  the  entire  task  of  carrying 
ti  on.  The  term  of  the  court  ended  on  January  25,  and 
iw  February  3>  Hamilton  was  elected  to  the  Continental 
Cungress.  We  therefore  have  the  choice  of  inferring  that 
Hamilton  at  once  resumed  hits  work '  on  The  Federalia 
or  else  that  he  rc&umed  it  when  Madison  went  south.* 

Turning  from  these  extraneous  facts  to  those  which 
can  he  drawn  from  the  essays  themselves,  the  first  point 
deserving  consideration  relates  to  a  condition  implied  by 
jornt  authorship.  A  moment's  thought  will  suggest  that 
swurk  produced  in  this  manner  must  force  upon  each 
■filer  a  little  difficulty  in  maintaining  in  a  nominally  con- 
Mcutive  worit  an  appearance  of  homogeneity.  Where  an 
euay  was  to  follow  one  written  by  the  same  author 
Kiguence  was  possible,  but  when  it  was  to  succeed  one  he 
I>m1  not  written  or  read,  the  task  was  not  easy.  Ncces- 
urily  then,  one  would  expect  a  certain  disjointedness  of 
nnnectiun,  and  this  is  the  very  thing  discovered  on  ex- 
unintng  the  points  where  a  new  writer  assumed  the  pen. 
Thus  No.  to,  by  hfadison,  is  an  essay  on  faction,  yet 
liiough  the  preceding  letter  was  on  the  same  subject,  it 


Madinm  begin  hit  wulli«m 


«llwt  b«  tiekl  b«  mutt  be  too  iMiich  eacB£t>l  to  make  >  rapid  progmn 
N«tul  fmuim.  The  Conn  o(  ChsnMiy  >n<]  Ibc  Ciicuii  Court  txt.  now 
uiUh.*'  TuibIiik  Io  Tkt  FtJnaliit  vir.  lind  u  lliit  ver^  point  a 
pa  at  am  1*0  tnonlttt  in  ilm  pabtkalioii  i>\  *  nnmbor. 

'  Ho.  48  <ra>  pabibhcd  on  Pcbruary  a 
imntjau  Mardh  4. 

'A  *«rT  valoible  pdece  ol  cvlilence  on  Ihti  i)YieiUa«i  o(  *uthonhip  ku 
hon  Inuitil  Iraia  "sf^t  by  tli«  niiiikkc*  oi  llamlJiun'i  iwo  cdiion  in 
■Uwliac  ■  papn  fiiinlol  in  btxh  editkinv  *i  >  "  Brier  ul  Atl^ment  on 
lA*  ConctitutioB  o(  the  Unitnl  Stata,"  though  the  manuKripl  ej  the 
W<t  Ihmc  na  beiidiog  wtuiioct-ei.  Stmdj  o(  11  xhould  hara  clearly 
■iMMail  Uui  it  ia  a  pcelimiaaiy  outline  o(  Tif  FfJfralisI  from  the 
piU  Ihal  Hamiituo  au  IniimiptMl  ill  hi*  cc«ipo«iIlaii  by  hit  le|[«]  ftnd 
pkUod  occitniiimt.  anil  it  wai  pmnniably  drawn  up  a*  a  guide  iot 
'  HadiKiB  in  Ua  couttnuMiM  d  the  t«ih.     St*/*tt. 


-Ob 


tXXtV  IffTSODUCTJOlf. 

docs  not  contiDue  the  first,  but  is  a  distinct  essay. 
Fwtlowing  this  are  three  essays  «n  tlic  defect*  of  the 
confederation,  by  Hamilton,  and  then  comes  No.  14,  by 
Madison,  which  is  really  a  continuation  of  No.  10,  and  is 
therefore  an  absolute  break  in  the  subject  of  both  the 
letters  which  precede  and  follow  iL  If  the  authorship  of 
these  six  numbers  were  not  known  it  would  be  possible 
to  decide,  from  internal  evidence,  at  what  points  a  dif* 
ferent  writer  undertook  the  labor.  Nor  does  the  obvious 
difference  between  a  man  opening  an  cs»y  which  follows 
one  by  himself  or  one  by  another,  fail  to  show  itself  at 
every  change  of  writer  that  is  known  to  have  occurred. 
By  examining  the  opening  phrases  of  Nos.  10,  14,  tS, 
ind  37,  in  which  Madison  began  his  contributions,  the 
disconnection  with  the  preceding  numbers  is  obvious, 
and  the  same  is  true  of  Nos.  >  and  64  in  which  those  by 
Jay  began.  But  most  marked  of  all  are  ilie  opening 
sentences  with  which  Hamilton  resumed  his  part,  and  as 
I  hey  arc  of  value,  in  the  present  consideration,  they  are 
quoted  here; 

6.  "  The  iMt  three  numbers  of  this  work  hare  been  ilcdicated  to 
an  enuin«raiioii  of  ilic  d^iif-en".  .  . 

1 1.  "  The  importancr  t>f  the  union  in  a  comtncricil  liKhl".  .  . 

I  J.  "In  tlw  course  of  the  preccdmg  papers,  i  have  en- 
deavored", .  . 

3t.  "  Having,  in  the  last  three  nurobers,  taken  a  summary  re- 
view"  .  .  , 

Here,  then,  in  three  cases,  are  evident  attempts  to 
attach  new  subjects  to  previous  essays  so  as  to  imply  a 
sequence  that  was  absent  in  the  subjects  and  treatment. 
With  this  as  a  clew,  if  we  nin  through  the  letters  from 
Nos.  37  to  <S3  (after  which  there  is  no  dispute^,  but  two 
natural  breaks  are  to  be  found — at  Nos,  47  and  %%,  which 
sererally  begin : 

47.  "  Having  reviewed    ilie    general    form    of    the    prapotcd 

govHTimeni"  .  .  . 
(3.  "  From  the  more  genera)  inquiries  pursued  bi  the  preceding 

four  last  papers  "... 


INTRODUCTION. 


xxnv 


I(  the  analogy  of  the  previous  openings  is  allowed  as 
evidence,  it  is  at  one  of  those  two  points,  then,  that  we 
4honld  conclude  tlut  a  new  writer  Itad  begun. 

With  these  facts  to  work  upon,  an  examination  of  the 
five  essays,  Nos.  47  to  51,  shows  them  to  be  .1  discussion 
of  the  apportionment  of  the  powers  of  government 
among  the  three  departments.  The  general  extent  of 
these  powers  had  been  already  discussed  in  the  immedi- 
ately preceding  nnmbers,  and  a  more  minute  survey  of 
their  relation  to  the  three  departments  is  the  subject  of 
the  remaining  essays  almost  to  the  end.  They  can, 
tiiercforc,  be  considered  as  t>eIonging  to  cither.  From 
Mddisnn  himself,  however,  we  get  a  clew,  for  in  No.  41 
he  distinctly  assigns  them  to  the  second  series.'  But 
whether  this  is  accepted  as  proof,  an  examination  of  tlie 
fire  forces  the  inference  that  they  were  all  written  by  one 
■nan. 

The  authorship  of  Nos.  37  to  4S  is  given  to  Madison 
by  every  known  list,  so  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  con- 
cluding that  the  apparent  break  between  Nos.  46  and 
47  *  merely  represent  the  beginning  of  a  new  subject  by 
the  same  pen,  and  not  a  change  of  writer.  Kunhcrmore 
we  have  the  excellent  authority  of  James  Kent  for  the 
(Utcment  that  "  Mr.  Hamilton  told  me  that  Mr. 
Madison  wrote  48  and  49,  or  from  Pa.  loi  to  ti2  of 
Vot   ad,"     No.    50   was  almost   surely  written    by  the 

'  "  The  connilstion  propotcd  by  Ihc  conrenlion  may  be  coniidcrcd 
■ndcr  two  (rneral  polol*  ol  viov.  The  Pint  tetilet  to  the  iium  or 
fnalltf  <A  jiowsr  which  W  vrali  iii  the  govern iiienl.  indiKlliiR  llic  cc- 
urunU  Isipuied  oa  llie  slUei.  Tli«  Secoiid,  to  ihe  patticuUt  itmcliire 
il  tfce  Korenincal,  ind  the  dultibuttoa  of  iKis  power,  ■mnag  id  >ever«l 
bnacbcL 

''  tjiidcr  (lie  Tint  view  of  the  tubject  ■<"•  Imporuint  '(imilona  srlu:  t. 
WWllwr  «)]r  poll  tA  llic  powen  InniFrtieil  l'>  llie  Kfiieral  (^vrmment 
be OHiCceMary  or  inpcoperf  3.  Whetber  (he  entite  mus  of  ihem  he 
^neetoui  to  Ihe  portion  ol  juritdit^tioo  left  in  the  ieTc^dslat«a?"— 
'One  curloui  (*et,  to  wtikb  utenlion  Ivm  never  been  ctltetl,  telhai 
trf\<x.  in  hi«  "  No  Vinw  of  lh«  Cooxiilution  (1813)"  dWidca  Ihe  a»- 
thnohip  %\  No.  46.  pving  No.  47  and  all  that  follmr  to  Hamilton.  Y«< 
tluHeh  be  wai  the  friend  awl  correipowUal  (A  Madiw>n.  and  thouEh  thii 
boaft  vaa  a  wsll-knowo  one  lo  the  lalur,  neilhei  publicly  nor  priraiely, 
•»  far  M  it  known,  dU  ktMliwci  comet  Taylof's  eonvlitiioa. 


XXXVl 


IffTSODUCTlOH. 


same  lund  which  p«nncd  No.  49f  >ncl  No,  51  vas  cer- 
tainly composed  by  the  writer  of  No.  50.  ]n  addition 
these  essays  discuss  the  powers  from  the  purely  histor. 
ical  and  theoretical  standpoiot,  views  for  which  Madison 
had  strong  predilections.  A  candid  survey  of  the  facts, 
therefore,  will,  we  think,  lead  every  unbiased  student  to 
a.uign  them  to  one  author,  and  the  balance  of  evidence 
certainly  points  to  James  Madison.' 

But  (he  same  internal  evidence  shows  that  with  No.  51, 
a  minute  and  homogeneous  examination  of  the  structure 
of  the  government  is  begun,  in  which  the  three  depart- 
ments arc  analysed  point  by  point.  That  one  man  wrote 
Nos.  5a  to  5&,  thai  a  second  contributed  Nos.  59  to  61, 
that  then  the  original  writer  resumed  his  work  in  Nos. 
'  fi<  and  63,  and  that  finally  tlie  task  was  again  assumed 
by  the  second  writer,  and  completed  by  biro,  the  essays 
themselves  give  no  evidence.  With  the  exception  of  the 
insertion  of  one  essay  (No.  64,  on  the  treaty-making; 
|tuwer  of  the  Senate,  which  was  given  to  Jay,  because  of 
his  diplomatic  experience),  it  i.s  difficult  to  resist  the  con. 
viclion  that  the  whole  remainder  of  the  letters  arc  the 
work  of  one  writer  and  one  prone  to  take  the  practical 
rattier  than  the  theurelical  view  of  things. 


'  Otic  rather  slnf  uUr  piece  of  evUence  canlradktoty  to  ike  kbore  oon- 
cliuluM  it  fnrnlUieil  t>y  the  oompanilive  length  of  th«  dJIIctciit  nun. 
When  •ii*Biinin(;  in  lt»c  ncwipipm,  ihe  i»i|>Tnal  l«il  o(  Tht  FrdrralitI 
my  Mtentioa  wai  calloil  to  the  (kI  thai  Ihe  Idien  oontribiilfd  by 
llkmilloa  rarely  OTertna  •  column  and  a  ttatf,  u-hile  lh«ae  bf  Madbon 
.  ■cldooi  Ailed  les  ibtn  three  colamni.  t  iheiefoee  c>te(ull)r  oliMaMd 
jthe  Icagiba  of  eaeh  man'a  viirk.  (i>  find  tbat  the  avenge  tcn^tk  at  the 
HUtf  MMty*  nM)M>lioaBl>)y  «rnllni  by  llamlllun  It  iSoa  wonb  ;  of  |Im)w 
nrtainly  wrillen  by  Maalbun.  jooo  wunli.  Miduoo  wrota  In  llie  un- 
doBblcd  nuinbrn  (No.  iu,  14,  37-4^.}  but  Iwo  cnayi  of  lev  lh«>  aioo 
word*,  Mtd  IlamiitoMbBloace  wrote  one  of  jooDiroadi.  cxccplinlfcelBti 
fiv«,  when  aa  evident  aUeujM  wnt  made  to  Golth  the  uriet  up  quickly. 
T««tinR  N«.  4q  to  58  and  N<h.  63  and  63,  the  avmc*  IcHfih  1>  (omid 
to  be  16OU  Honlt.  No.  47  comlainx  s;oo  iloidt ;  RO.  48,  iBoo;  No. 
'49.  l6ou  vranli :  No.  jo.  1100 words:  No. $■. iBooKordi ;  No.  51.  I7i» 
word*.  It  H  n«e>l!eu  to  aild.  10  anyone  who  hai  limbed  tlie  stitinci 
u(  the  two  men,  thu  the  diHerencei  between  tKo  two  ilyle*  In  iIim  toy 
mi'Hl  it  arnit  nollwalil*.  Maillwn  ii  wmdy  and  Memi  10  ba**  Utile 
ability  to  rtjirra  «n  idea  with  limily.  ilaniiltiNi  1*  diitcl  ami  cuiBpact 
to  au  eiteot  ahkli  nude  him  ■  faiBou&  di»(l>niaii  ■■  fab  day.  and  few 
men  have  ercr  equated  bim  111  bit  power  of  stating  «  ll>in|  Uncty. 


IN  TRODUCTION. 


xxxxw 


Examining  Nos.  5a  to  58  and  62  and  63,  in  detail,  we 
find  icvcral  small  facts  which  throir  light  on  thc»qucstion 
i?f  authorship.  In  Nos.  53.  56,  57,  58,  and  6j,  arc  cita- 
tions of  examples  In  English  history,  like  references 
beiog  numerous  in  many  of  Hamilton's  essays,  but  only 
two  passing  references  to  Great  Itritain  arc  to  be  found 
in  any  of  those  written  by  Madison.'  The  same  differ- 
cnce  is  noticeable  in  the  papers  prepared  by  the  two 
imtcrs  for  use  in  the  federal  convention — Hamilton's 
"Brief"  of  his  speech,  and  Madison's  "Notes,"  the 
&rst  citing  British  example  frequently,  the  latter  not 
once.' 

In  Nos.  53,  54,  and  56,  are  paragraphs  discussing  taxa- 
tion, and  the  first  and  last  of  these  letters  also  discuss 
(he  militia,  both  of  which  subjects  ifamilton  had  famil- 
iarized himself  with,  and  which  he  had  made  his^  own 
topics  in  the  earlier  essays. 

No.  54  is  a  discussion  of  slave  representation,  written 
inminally  from  the  Southern  point  of  vicur,  but  really 
from  the  Northern.  Not  once  did  M;idi»im  allude  to  this 
famous  clause  in  the  Virginia  convention,  but  Haniiltun 
spoke  a  r^sum^  of  this  essay  in  tliat  of  New  Vorlc.  The 
cAUse  for  this  is  obvious:  the"fedcral  number"  needed 
no  defense  in  Virginia;  in  New  Vork,  the  contrary  was 
true.  But  an  even  greater  reason  (or  Hamilton's  taking 
up  this  particular  point  was  the  fact  that  on  February 
7,  17M.  there  had  appeared  in  the  New  Vork  Journal 
a  letter  entille<l  "The  Kxprisitor,"  siivagcly  attacking 
the  »lavc  compromise  and  charging  of  Hamilton  himscll 
thai  "The  delegate  from  tliis  state  acceded  to  it  alone 
in  the  part  nf  this  state."  and  adding,  "I  cannot  help 
thinking  it  a  most  daring  insult  offered  to  the  freemen 
freeholders  of  this  State,  besides  being  an  unparal- 

]ed  departure  from  his  duties  (»  this  staleas  well  as  to 
the  United  States."    Necessarily  this  atuck  could  oot 

>  I  llMil  bc>«  Itic  r^vini^  ill  No.  47.  liciABtR  trmii  wliit  liai  •liFUir 
iJKvirn  \\vn  n'-mlHr*  cinnot  Im  poiilitfly  aurilwit  to  Madimo. 
'If  iiAry  (wlw,  |)rep»r«l  for  um  in  the  Virpni" 

cOBif  I  eiini|il«,  but  Inn  'Ktt.  kftei   TKt  FtinaX\i\ 


5 


be  disregarded,  and  the  impersonal  reply  to  it  io  No. 
54  was  published  exactly  one  week  later,  on  Febru- 
ary 14.  It  seems  almost  conclusive  under  these  cir- 
cumstances that  it  was  written  by  Hamilton.  Another 
opinion  in  thi»  number  furthers  tJiis  probability.  The 
writer  praises  the  "  federal  number,"  on  the  grouitd 
that  it  introduces  through  the  slave  a  partial  reprc- 
senution  of  properly.  This  was  a  favorite  idea  of 
Hamilton's,  for  which  he  had  spoken  in  the  federal 
convention,  and  for  which  he  praised  this  clause  in 
one  of  bis  speeches  tu  the  New  York  convention.  To 
this  idea  of  property  reprcsenution  Madison  was  abso- 
lutely opposed. 

In  No.  53  the  writer  is  in  doubt  as  to  the  term  of  office 
of  the  colonial  assembly  of  Virginia  before  the  Revolu- 
tion; a  fact  so  notorious  in  that  state  that  it  could  not 
have  been  unknown  to  Madison. 

In  No.  63  the  writer  praises  the  British  House  of 
Lords;  something  Madison  would  not  have  done.  Ham- 
ilton, on  the  contrary,  had  been  most  open  in  his  admira- 
tion of  the  British  government,  and  so  admired  iliis 
particular  branch  of  it  that  he  had  but  just  modeled  the 
Senate  in  his  proposed  constitution  ns  closely  upon  it  as 
he  could.  This  essay,  too,  devoted  a  paragraph  to  the 
Senate  of  Maryland,  which  Hamilton  had  already  noticed 
with  some  attention  in  his  "great  "speech  in  the  federal 
convention. 

In  Nos.  54  and  57  the  mention  of  local  circumstances, 
of  New  Vork  stale,  of  New  York  city,  and  n(  Allnny 
county,  points  to  the  knowledge  of  Hamilton  rather  than 
to  that  of  Mndison. 

Finally  and  most  conclusiTe.  in  the  republication  in 
t;&$of  the  letters  in  book  form,  Hamilton  inserted  in 
the  newspaper  tcit  of  No.  56  a  paragraph  relating  to  mili- 
tary aifairs,  and  as  he  was  scrupulous,  in  correcting  the 
numbers  not    written  by  himself,  his  change  tu 

merely  verbal  improvcmrots,  thi;^  .  >  .imiiunis  to  an 

assertion  of  authorship  within  two  months  of  its  writing. 
Stripgcly  cooxxgii,  in  the  edition  of  1818  in  which  "the 


INTRODUCTtON. 


XXXIX 


Kuinbcrs  written  by  Mr.  Madison  "were  "corrected  by 
himself,"  this  in&crtion  of  iiumilton's  w.is  retained. 

From  ttu;  preceding  facts,  in  which,  so  far  as  possible, 
ill  evidence  thai  is  of  valac  has  been  included,  without 
legard  to  whether  it  told  for  or  against  a  particular  man, 
it  appears  that  Madison  probably  wrote  Nos.  49  to  51, 
and  Hamilton  N'o».  51  to  5S  and  Nos.  61,  65,  of  those 
essays  of  which  we  find  their  teslimuny  in  direct  contra* 
diction.  Accordingly  they  are  in  this  edition  assigned 
as  above,  but  since  the  evidence  cannot  be  termed  con- 
clusive, a  question  mark  has  been  placed  before  the  name 
attached  to  each  disputed  number. 

But  to  whomever  the  disputed  numbers  areasugned, 
or  whether  they  arc  left  in  doubt,  the  value  and  power 
of  Tfu  Ftderalist  were  due  to  its  undertaker,  and  not  to 
his  assistants.  It  Is  asserted  that  Hamilton  requested 
the  insertion  of  the  sentence  in  the  preface  of  the  edition 
of  i8o3  to  the  cifcct  that  the  contributions  of  Madison 
»nd  /ay  were  "not  unequal  in  merit  to  those  which  arc 
tolely  from  the  pen  of  General  Hamilton."  In  this 
opinion  Hamilton  was  probably  singular,  for  the  few 
essays  of  Jay.  and  Madison's  dry-bones  on  long  dead 
canfcderacics,  and  his  "theoretic  "arguments,  would  have 
long  since  been  forgotten,  but  for  their  inclusion  in  the 
essays  written  by  Hamilton.  No  one  who  has  carefully 
fcdd  the  essays  can  fail  to  agree  with  George  Ticknor 
Curtis  when  he  asserted  tliat  "it  was  from  [HamiltonJ 
that  The  FeJeralisI  derived  the  weight  and  the  power 
which  commanded  the  careful  attention  of  the  country," 
and  with  the  Hon,  James  llryce,  when  he  wrote:  "Of 
these  writers  Hamilton  must  be  deemed  the  leading  spirit, 
oiH  merely  because  he  wrote  by  far  the  larger  number  of 
trttcrs,  but  because  his  mind  was  more  independent  and 
more  commanding  than  Madison's." 


The  FtderalisI  has  been  many  times  reprinted,  and  an 
etalinratc  catalogue  of  these  editions  is  given  in  Ford's 
"Dtbhugrdphy  and  Reference  List  of  the  Ilistory  atid 


INTRODUCTION, 

Literature  Relating  to  the  Adoption  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  i;8j-ij88/'  Briefly,  a  collected 
edition  of  the  newi[>apcr  articles,  a»  revised  by  Hamil- 
ton,  was  printed  in  178S,  and  a  reissue  of  this  was  made 
in  1799.  In  iSoi  a  new  edition  with  a  preface  by  John 
Wells,  who  was  slightly  assititcd  by  Hamilton,  was  issued, 
and  this  text  was  ag^in  priiitcd  in  iSio  and  1817,  both 
the  latter  editions  addinj;  (he  names  of  the  authors  from 
"a  private  memorandum"  in  Hamilton's  ".own  hand- 
writing." 

In  iSiS  an  edition,  with  a  preface  by  Jacob  Gideon, 
was  printed  with  Madison's  authofity,  "the  numbers 
written  by  Mr,  MiidiMtn  corrected  by  himself,"  and  with 
the  assiKtimcnt  ol  authorship  according  to  his  views. 
Other  editions  of  this  text  were  printed  in  iSai,  i8j6, 
tSjt,  1837,  1843,  1847.  1853,  and  1837.  In  the  e«litionof 
1831  a  brief  and  very  inadequate  index  was  added. 

In  1863  Mr.  Henry  B,  Dawson  reprinted  in  collected 
form  the  uriginal  newspaper  test,  to  which  he  added  a 
learned,  though  biased  introduction.  There  have  been 
several  reprints  ol  this,  but  with  the  suppression  of  this 
introduction. 

In  1864  Mr.  John  C.  Hamilton  edited  an  elaborate 
edition  of  Hamilton's  revised  text  of  1788,  with  an  intro- 
diKtion  written  from  a  Hamillonian  point  of  view;  of 
Uiis  edition  there  have  been  several  rci.i9.ues. 

In  i8$6  Mr.  Henry  Cabot  Lodge  reprinted  the  text  of 
Dawson,  with  one  or  two  slight  modifications,  and  with 
an  introduction  rather  favorable  to  Hauiiltou.  Ue  also 
Included  the  index  printed  in  the  edition  of  1831. 

The  present  edition  is  designed  primarily  (or  the  use 
of  students,  though  it  is  hoped  that  certain  new  and 
improved  features  will  make  it  the  most  serviceable 
as  well  for  the  lawyer  and  jartst.  Fur  the  first  time 
Hamilton's  prcUtninary  outline  of  The  FeJeralixt  is 
included,  and  from  the  earliest  e^lition  his  table  of  COD> 
tents  and  his  introduction,  omitted  in  recent  editions, 
have  been  added.  In  addition  a  new  table  of  contents 
lias  been  prepared,  giving  fuller  treatment,  and  this  has 


i 


rNTR0i>VCTlOX. 

Been  repented  iit  tht  beginning  of  rach  essay  to  facilitate 
quick  reference.  The  date  of  publication  of  each  nuni' 
ber,  with  the  name  of  the  newspaper  in  which  it  appeared, 
his  been  for  the  first  time  obtained  ;ind  prefixed  to  each 
essay.  Where,  in  the  edition  of  1788  the  number  was 
cfaanjced  from  the  newspaper  text,  the  latter  is  added,  in 
brackets,  that  the  endless  confusion  hitherto  arising  from 
tbis  contradiction  may  be  henceforth  avoided  or  under* 
iwod.  All  text  of  Tht  FfJeralht  which  relates  to  lh« 
pu-ety  temporary  issues  of  17S8,  and  much  of  the  histori- 
cal part,  both  of  which  are  now  of  sliKhi  value,  have  been 
printed  in  smaller  type.  Fur  the  bcnclit  of  the  student, 
the  text  bus  for  the  first  time  b<;<^n  annotated,  both  with 
I  view  to  making  obscure  allusions  plain,  and  to  the 
daddation  of  the  text  that  intervening  history  has  made 
puuible. 

To  the  text  of  Tht  Federaiist  proper  there  have  been 
added  in  the  Appendix  the  articles  of  confederal t ion  and 
the  constitution,  and  to  the  latter  arc  appended  references 
In  the  di-cisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  bearing  on  each 
tiatise,  with  three  of  the  most  important  decisions  in  an 
abridged  form.  All  important  amendments  since  pro- 
posed have  been  included  in  the  belief  that  in  them  arc 
best  expressed  the  points  of  friction  overthat  instrtinient. 
For  this  same  reason  are  included  the  opinions  of 
Hamilton  and  Jefferson  on  a  national  b^nk,  the  Virginia 
and  Kentucky  resolutions  of  1798,  the  South  Carolina 
Onlinancc  of  Nullification  and  Jackson's  Proc  lama  lion  of 
■831,  the  South  Carolina  Ordinance  of  Secession  ami 
Declaration  of  Independence,  the  constitution  of  the 
Confederate  States,  and  the  act  creating  the  lilcctoral 
Commission. 

Finally,  for  the  first  time  Tht  FederalUt  has  been 
thoroughly  indexed;  an  addition  which  leads  the  editor, 
from  personal  experience  of  the  previous  difficulty  of  con- 
sultation and  use  of  the  work,  to  believe  that  no  book 
Dtmaal  importance  has  so  needed  such  an  improvement. 

Paul  Leicester  Ford. 


SYLLABUS  OF  THE  FEDERAUST.' 


A.     t.  A  republic,  a  word  used  id  various  senses,  has 
been  applied  to  aristocracies  and  monarchies. 
I.  To  Rome,  under  the  kings, 
a.  To  Sparta,  though  a  Senate  for  life. 

3.  To  Carthage,  though  the  same. 

4.  To    United    Netherlands,    though    SUdt- 

holdcr,  hereditary  nobles. 

5.  To  Poland,  though  aristocracy  and  mon- 
archy. 

6.  To  Great  Britain,  thouji^h  monarchy,  etc. 
A^in,   great  confusion  about  words  democracy, 

aristocracy,  monarchy. 

1.   Democracy  defined  by   some,    Rousseau, 

etc.,    a   government   exercised   by   the 

collective  body  of  the  people. 

a.   Delegation  of  their  power  has  been 

made  the  criterion   of   dcmoc- 

racy. 

I  TUi  pajiCT  hai  been  (vinltd  in  both  edltjoot  o(  lh«  «-rituiB>  of  II«m- 
MM*  "  Biicf  of  Ari^menl  an  the  Coulliutlon  o(  ihe  Unllcd  SiMo." 
dynlit.  howrvni,  iiKlicxict  th*l  It  11  a  (iKlimintty  <nill!n<o(  Tit  Ftitr- 
^ilirt .  tran  No.  39  to  Ihe  end.  A>  ilreaily  mrntinncd  in  the  Ininxluction. 
IW  htfblBlns  ot  the  lern  of  ihe  New  Vurk  Saptrme  Court  o  oipelteil 
HMMJion  I*  cewe  letpporarily  hi«  work  on  Thi  Ftderiihsi\i\%ii  No.  16. 
Md  bt  ||>rabablr  drew  ibl*  up  u  a  guide  loi  MadiHin.  who  *t  thai 
fttM  aicaaiail  the  ta>ii.  ud  vho  elotoly  lotlowed  in  ilic  sui;i.-ni]m{; 
'  VMp  Ibe  leqofxcr  hne  ovilined.  Bf  mertlgr  trampwinji:  Ihe  bii  pu<- 
ttoMhcmitnl  "  Powern"  iiid  '*  MiicelUneom  Ailvanogei"  so  that  ihey 
pieoade  lh*l  heatlcd  "Renew."  we  have  Ihe  amnKeBwlit  of  Ideu 
utMfdiii  The  f'tJ/rahii.  Th«  nylloinn  i»  eM«>ci»lly  MhwWein  »leir-^ 
<d  Of  tiipete  ova  ike  BUthanhip,  lor  it  <t«ym  hem  lAaio  a  tin*  HanUl-  ) 
tn  drew  between  the  '■  Pomen"  and  (be  "  Review  *  ol  Ihc  lhi«« 
dtfarumia,  ibe  fafltar  being;  evidciillT  tioniodcied  bj  hin  w  one  *yik 
iwlc  whide.  A  oompariBon  of  No.  99  wiih  "A"  and  "B"  revrJ* 
he*  ti/jmn^\j  Madimn  absorbed  the  syllnbus  tn  IhU  numhci,  aitd  oa 
Alt  hn  been  Ihe  MMt  quoted  ol  all  Ihoae  fiQin  Madi»on's  pen,  th«> 
■EWCE  of  hU  idtai  panc»e*  unch  Inlercst. 

aliW 


xiiv 


SYLLABUS  OF  THE  FEDERALIST. 


a.  Aristocracy  has  beca  used  to  designate 
governments, 
a.  Where  an   independent   few  pot- 

seiiscd  sovcrcignt}'. 
h.  Where   the  represents (ivcs  of  the 
people  poftsesscd  it. 

3.  Monarchy,   where  sovereignty   is  in   the 

hands  of  a  single  man. 
fy*General  idea — Independent  in  his 
situation,  in  any    other  sense 
wuutj  apply  to  State   of  New 
York. 

4.  Democracy  in  my  sense,  where  the  whole 

power    of    the    gOTcmment   is  in   the 
people, 
a.   Whether  exercised  by  thcmsekes, 

or 
b-   By  their    Representatives,  chosen 
hy  ihem  either  mediately  or  im- 
mediately,  and  legally  account- 
able  to  them. 

5.  Aristocracy,   where   whole   soTereignty  is 

pcrmanenily  io  the  liands  of  a  few  for 
life  or  hereditary. 

6.  Monanrhy,    where   the    whole  soverciuniy 

is  in  tlic  hands  of  one  man  for  life  or 
hereditary. 
T.   Mixed    gdvernmetit,    where    tliese    three 
principles  unite. 
B.     I.   Conse^ttener,  the  proposed  government  a  rtprtitntn- 

t.  HouM  of  Representatives  directly  chosen 

by  the  people  fur  two  years. 
»,  Senate  indirectly  diL^en  by  them  for  six 

years. 
j.   President   indirectly  chosen  by  them  for 
four  years. 
gy*Thus  legislative   and    eieeuiirc 
representatives  of  the  people. 


SYLLABUS  OF  THE  FEDERALIST.  xl» 

4.  Judicial    power,    representatives    of    the 

people  indirectly  chosen  during  good 
behavior. 

5.  All  officers  indirect  choice  of  the  people. 

^^"Constitution  revocable  and  alter- 
able by  the  people. 
I.   This  representative  democracy,  as  far  as  is  con- 
sistent with  its  genius,  has  all  the  features  of 
good  government.     These  features: 

1.  An  immediate  and   operative  representa- 

tion of  the  people,  which  is  found  in 
the  House  of  Representatives. 

2.  Stability  and  wisdom,  which  is  found  in 

the  Senate. 

3.  A  vigorous  executive,  which  is   found  in 

the  President. 

4.  An  independent  judiciary,  which  is  found 

in  the  Supreme  Court,  etc. 

II.  b.   A  separation  of  the  essential  powers  of  gov- 

ernment. 
Ascertain  the  sense  of  the  maxim. 

I.  One  department  must  not  wholly  possess 
the  powers  of  another. 

—  Montesquieu. 

—  British  government 

III.  Departments  of  power  must  be  separated,  yet  so 

as  to  check  each  other. 
I.  Legislative. 
3.  Legislative  executive. 

3.  Judicial  legislative. 

4.  Legislative  judicial. 

fejf"All  this  is  done   in  the  proposed 
constitution. 

I,  Legislative  in  the  Congress, 
yet  checked  by  negative  of 
the  Executive. 
>.  Executive  in  the  President, 
yet  checked  by  impeach- 
ment of  Congress. 


XIW  SYLLABUS  OF   THE  FEDERALIST. 

3.  Judicial  check  upon  legisla- 

tive,   or   interpretation  of 
laws. 

4.  And  checked  bf  legislative 

through  impeachment. 
D.     I.  Can  such  a  government  apply  to  so  extensive  a 
territory? 
Exaggerated  ideas  of  extent. 
N.       45  42 

S.    ^  31 

14  II  434 


973  764J4  mean  868>^  by 

750 
Great  Britain. 
II.   Despotic  government  for  a  large  country  to  be 
examined. 

REVIEW. 

I.  Full  House  of  Representatives  chosen  every  second 

year,  etc. 
II.  Senate  for  six  years  by  Legislatures. 
Rotation  every  two  years. 
Probable  increase. 

III.  Executive.     Manner  of  appointment 
Compensation. 

Negotiation  of  treaties. 
Nomination  of  officers. 

IV.  Judicial  power.     Constitution  of  judges. 
Extent  of  powers. 

Inferior  courts. 
Trial  by  jury. 
Criminal  cases. 

POWERS. 

I.  To  provide  revenue  for  the  commoa  defense. 
II.  To  regulate  commerce. 
III.  To  declare  war. 


SYLLABUS  OF  THE  FEDERAUST. 

IV.   To  raise  and  support  armies. 
V,   Admission  of  new  states. 
VI,   Disposal  of  property. 


zlvii 


MISCELLANEOUS   ADVANTAGES. 

I.  To  prohibit  importation  of  slaves  after  t8o8. 
II.   Account  to  be  rendered  of  expenditure  of  moneys. 

III.  No  state  shall  emit  bills  of  credit  [pass  no  bill  of 

at]tainder,  tx-pesf  facto  law,  or  law  impairing  the 
obligation  of  contracts,  or  grant  title  of  nobility. 

IV.  Definition  of  treason. 

V.   Guarantee  of  Republican  government. 


MADISON'S  ACCOUNT  OF  "THE  FEDERALIST." 

The  following  memorandum  complies  with  Mr.  Pauld. 
ing's  request  of  the  i6th  instant' 

The  papers  under  the  Title  of  "  Federalist  "  and  signa- 
ture of  "publius"  were  written  by  A.  H.,j.  M.and  J.  J. 
in  the  latter  part  of  the  year  1787 — and'the  former  part 
of  the  year  1788.  The  immediate  object  of  them  was  to 
Tindicate  and  recommend  the  new  Constitution  to  the 
State  of  N.  Y.  whose  ratification  of  the  instrument,  was 
doubtful  as  well  as  important.  The  undertaking  was 
proposed  by  A,  H,  (who  had  probably  consulted  with  Mr. 
jay  and  Others)  to  J.  M.  who  agreed  to  take  a  part  in  it. 
The  papers  were  originally  addressed  to  the  people  of 
N.  Y.  under  the  signature  of  a  "Citizen  of  N.  Y."  This 
■as  changed  for  that  of  "  Publius,"  the  first  name  of 
Valerius  Fublicola.  A  reason  for  the  change  was  that 
one  of  the  Writers  was  not  a  citizen  of  that  State: 
another  that  the  publication  had  diffused  itself  among 
most  of  the  other  States.  The  papers  were  first  pub- 
lished at  N.  Y,  in  a  Newspaper  printed  by  Francis  Childs 
at  the  rate  during  great  part  of  the  time  at  least  of  four 
nombers  a  week;  and  notwithstanding  this  eicertion, 
ihey  were  not  compleated  till  a  large  proportion  of  the 
States  had  decided  on  the  Constitution.  They  were 
edited  as  soon  as  possible  in  two  small  vols,  the  preface 
to  the  ist  vol :  drawn  up  by  Mr.  H  bearing  date  N.  York 
Mar  1788 — In  a  publication  at  N.   Y.   in  1810  entitled 

'  Sent  hf  MadUon  lo  Paulding  with  the  following  letter : 

•'  MONTP".  July  33  riBiSl 
"D«Si« 

1  tetum  70UT  copr  of  Gideon's  Edition  o[  the  FedeTolist.  with  the 
WMonndam  requested  in  your  note  of  the  l6th.  I  shall  lake  a  pleas- 
uc  io  addine  any  other  circumstances  which  you  may  wish  (o  know,  and 
Intf  be  able  to  commuDicate.  •  ." — GoiTOK. 

xlia 


1      MADISON'S  ACCOUtfT  OF  THE  " FEDBRAUST." 

"the  Works  of  A.  H"  is  comprized  an  Edition  of  the 
Feditn  in  which  the  names  of  the  writers  are  erroneously 
prefixed  to  a  number  of  the  papers.  These  errors  are 
corrected  in  this  edition  by  Jacob  Gideon  j""  wViO  assigns 
to  the  several  authors  of  the  papers  their  respective 
shares  in  them.  J :  M. 

MoNTPEUKK  July  aS,  i8t8 


CONTENTS. 


(i 


HAMILTON. 


INTRODUCTION. 


DliJitjr  of  tb»  Union— loefficienc)-  o(  confeduratioii— CApftcity 
«f  ftaah  for  Mlf-garemnient— Oppusitioa  of  state  officials  to  new 
cooiliiuticiD— HuneM  differences  of  opinion— Political  into1«r- 
mot — Chorgea  and  countcr-c  ha  recti — Fiiblius  »  suppocier  of  thi* 
ro^KMcd  constitution— Outline  of  tbu  Fedenlitit—NMliana]  senti- 
MBBt  for  Uoion. i 


/ 


NO. 


■d 


THE  VALUE  OF  UXION. 


JAY, 


*y 


Necessity  of  goveroment— Theory  of  scpaiato  confederacies- 
Geomphical  and  racial  homogeneity  oi  the  United  Sutes— 
loMMlenc]?  of  the  articles  of  cDnfedcralian— The  federal  conven- 
IIm— Consideration  of  the  conMitutton — The  Coogross  of  1774 — 
Univenal  belief  in  the  necessity  of  Union— Projoct  of  »ep«rate 
MBtoderacieo. 7 

SIO-A^  JAY. 

XDVANTAGBS  AND  NRCESSITV  IN  RELATION 
TO  FOREIGN  POWERS,  q 

Safety  of  public  opin loo- Public  safety  a  common  end— Canses 
•(  war— Treaties  and  comniefci-  as  eunscs— Kflicieot  national       \i' 
fMeniment  will  ■ecwe  services  of  aWest  men— A  supreme  gov.     ..V 
•nment  necessary  in  construing  treaties— Union  a  chock  on  in-       (  \, 
;  jiliCioe  is  the  states— A  nalionnrjcovcminrnt  less  llltcly  to  alTord 

CMcaoMs  til  vrar — Indian  wars  caus4>d  by  the  &lftlt.-ii— Neigh bor- 
(  cwmlries  aiid  cunsei)ueat  border  wars — Advuulage  of  na> 
bceal  guvemment  in  n^pitiating  iritfa  foreign  pun-cis — Greater 
night  of  the  Union  likely  to  secure  belter  tcnns,        .        .      is 


»0. 


s 


RELATIONS  WITH   FOREIGN  POWERS. 


JAY. 


Hotires  of  war — Rivalry  wilh  France  and  Britain  in  fisheries 
— CcainietciBl  rivalry  «rith  Europe— China  and  India  Irnde — 
K^lry  with  F.i:rri[>rAn  c^'Innics — Exclnsion  from  Mississippi  and 
St  Lawrence — J^^iiituiy  of  RiiTO|kc — Indncemcnis  to  war— .A 
iib;^B  govnrnmuiil  uKcioary  fur  ttufcty— AdvAUlages  of  nAtional 
(mennnent^MititiaaDdnaTyuf  Greai  Briluiii— America  divided 
■te  independent  governments — Atiiiude  at  foreign  govem- 
«M». 17 


lil 


Eff/rOXS  TABLE  OF  COf/TBNrS. 


NO.  s.  JAY. 

PROJECT  OP  SSPARATB  CONPEDERACI8S  IN 

RELATION  TO  FOREIGN   POWERS. 

QuMn  Addc'*  letter  on  union  of  BngtAnd  mnA  5kaUand— 
Exampl«uf  Ufoat  Britain— DlvliiUin  of  Uh  united  StjU«»— RmuIU 
of  HcMTUtH  voufederacicd — Inuvitabl«  }enloiis]r— Tb«  "  Noilliern 
Hive  —Similar  coofc(lcr*cif*—Kolly  o4  mere  nUuinccs  ^d  tre Ki- 
tes— Coruinty  of  nppcdlft  to  Europe 91 

NO.  6.  KAMILTO>:. 

SEPARATB  CONFEDERACIES  SURE  TO  END  IN 
DISSENSION  BETWEEN  STATES,  f 

Certainlv  of  intcft>lat«  contMiU — Cauia  of  lioAiltitjr  among 
natioDii—war*  pnxliicetl  by  p«r«xinnl  ittllu«ac«— Alleged  pacilk 
genin*  of  republic*— Republics  us  much  addicted  to  war  a«  nan- 
archies — Kxnmplca  of  Sparta.  Athens,  Rome,  Carlhaicc.  Venice, 
llollanil.  and  Britain — As  many  popular  as  royal  «arti^\V«.Ta 
bvtwtwii  Prance  nud  England— No  r«naon  to  expect  cunlialiiy 
betwR'n  the  Mttles  if  Keparated— Vicinage  constitutes  nations 
natural  enemies 17 

NO,  7.  HAMILTON. 

CAUSES  FOR  DISSENSIONS  BETWEEN  STATES 

IP  SEPARATED. 

Territorial  dispute*— Public  territory — Wromini;  conlrorcnjr 
— ^Vvrnwat  dispate— Compel JtiotH  of  conin>en.e->|ii»urimlna(lug 
eomnMrcial  regulatlona— The  New  Voik  ImpoBla— The  natio«i3 
debt— Dilficnl  ties  of  appottiooing  de)>t — Laws  in  violation  of 
private  contracts— Example  of  Khodc  Island— Domestic  and 
totcign  altiancc»-^crtsinty  of  European  entanglements,    .      3) 

NO.  8.  HAMILTON. 

CONSEQUENCES   OP    HOSTILITIES    BETWEEN 

STATES. 

War  between  the  states  partleularly  disttesaiag— Lack  of  stand- 
ing armies  and  fortified  pasts— Necessary  introductioa  of  stand- 
jni;  armies— Compctilifin  tictwccn  the  states  in  armatncnis — 
Example  of  Greek  rrpublio — National  dancer  unduly  magnifies 
mllitST)'  power  at   mrii  its— Eiample   and   pecnlLnr 

felicity   of    (iri-at    ll:r  v   of   the   ttniled    States— 

NeedlcaiiH!%fi  of  cilcn-.i  .  .         ,   _..[jblishmrnts,        .         ,       41 


\ 


■^ 


HAMILTON. 
UNION  A  SAFEOUARD  AGAINST  DOMES- 
TIC DISTURBANCES,    ,- 

Example  nf  Greek  and  Italian  retmbllcs—Argumpiils  against 
repntilican  g'lvrniment  ani]  civil  lllieny— Imjinivemenls  iii  the 
art  of  goTcmmKoi — Advanlages  of  exenited  territory — Opinion 


EDfTVS'S  TABLE  OP  CO.VTE.VTS. 


Hil 


(oBtMQoleu — Nocctsity  for  stihdlvUion  iinpli«il  in  Mrmtcs- 

n^vlvw — PmloTaliinlion  ao  cxixiilienl   for  th«  cxtc union  of 

^^reninwnl— ^JnoUtion  from   Monlcwiuicu  — Innccuralo  distinc- 

Uon  bMweea  coitfedvrntion   ami   consi^idnlion—liRrtnilltiii  r>(  a, 

cnofiHlvraM  republic — Pcdcrol  character  of  prupusvd  cuDStitt)- 

Uon — Lyctan  coDfcdcracy,        .  .       .        ...      4} 

MADISON. 
"THE  UNION  A  CHBCK  ON  PACTION. 

Tendency  of  popular  jgov«nim«ots  to  faction— Complnintit  of 
iajoctiCG  and  initamlitjr  va  xUtc  KovcrnmcntK— ricfinltion  of  foe. 
liiiD — Rcmctly  nl  faction — Ccrtailnioni  of  liberty— Causes  of 
tadiou  iniiatoinmAii — Opposing  In tvrvstH — LvEi^Uition  by  muior- 
'«j  akin  to  i[itL-rcM«<l  ja'Jgmenl* — Claaa  kKi«atton— Control  of 
tactioD— .MmoHty  inrasioii  of  rijthta — A  pure  democracy  unable 
Kb  cMltral  faction  — A  remedy  in  reprcsciitntivc  covcrnmcnt — 
DiSantKa  between  a  demncincy  and  a  n-puhlir — .Xilvandigvs  o( 
a  de1egat«d  uti'itutn  b-Kty— buburiunly  of  Urge  ov«r  StniUI 
RpuMica- tiieater  prvportiOB  01  fit  charact«ir&— AilruRlofle  of 
fieatcr  number  of  electors— Nece^ty  of  acquaintance  nitli  local 
tircinnvtancM — Hupiiy  comtrination  trf  national  and  IixfAl  govcrn- 
rnaox^  in  tlic  I'niipii  Sinips— Greater  tnrrilory  and  population 
permitted  bj-  r«pultH<.aa  itian  by  democratic  Kovernnient— Km- 
bem  ewcatially  local —Ad van tn^c  of  Uoimi  orer  Stales  to-  to 
bcal  pirviadiccK  and  KlienieE  of  injuKtkcs— The  Union  a  remedy 
tor  dUMM*  most  inctdoat  to  republics,  .        .       .        .      M 

NO.fii.  HAMILTON. 

trriLITY  OF  UNION  AS  REGARDS  COMMERCE 
AND  A  NAVY.  Q 

Adreaturons  ooflinierclal  character  of  America — Comnivrclal 
faiaaxj  oJT  Europe — A  nalionai  cummerciul  policy  nevcasury  (o 
tonaler^^'  p""-.pe«n  restrictions— niscriminnUon  nxainsl  Ureiit 
Britai:i  linieDt  of  n  federal  navy— The   trnilc<l   States 

liMy  ■•■  ■  the  arbiter  of  Kuropo  in  Amoric* — Dimininn 

lartain  lu  taukn  our  commerce  a  V^Y — Separation  -will  enable 
oiarilinte  nations  to  preacribe  tlie  eonditions  of  our  political 
nid«Bcc — National  cotnmercial  nghtt  which  iritl  be  luit  by  a, 
fisolntjaa  of  the  confederacy— Tne  iMheries — A  navy  n  frreut 
■atlMia)  "lb; — ■  ^■i'-p  of  the  snitth,  middle,  and  New  RnKiaml 
•tUaaLn  iv  1  ■  »tratnc'l  intercmirse  bolwccii  the  states — 

Datikeliliodi  i-iterslate  commerce  without  nnitv— Ascend- 

iiCT  tn  Ameniau  alluir^ — Enrojwiin  domination  of  the  vroiW— 
BcBam'a  aod  Ruynal's  theory  of  degeneracy  in  America,  64 

NO.  It.  HAMILTON. 

PTIUTT  OF    UNION  AS  REGARDS  REVENUE. 

Commerce  the  ^reat  iwurce  of  national  wealth— Commerce 
Mteatial  to  asr^cullure— Tiucs  must  be  proportioned  to  the 
fnantity  nf  money-  -Small  revenues  of  Germun  empire~P<iwrty 
ntrtate  treasuries— Taxation  in  Great  Britain  ~Duliei  the  main 
di^ilraco  in  Americ*— Unpopularity  of  excise  and  direct  taxes 


liv 


BDITOKS  TABLE  OP  COKTENTS. 


—Duties  bcrt  levied  In-  general  government— Stale  imposts  will 
rc«ult  in  >.miig];linK — K«vwnu«  patrols  of  France— DBiUcftlihood 
oC  smtiggliuK  uoiler  luitional  s"VvrumcDt— LJi<iadvAiitafi«  ot 
Britain  as  rcunnjit  smuggling — State  imposts'— PreiK'b  ana  Eng* 
Usb  dutic* — Revenue  from  nnScnt  «.piritii — National  existence 
impoMible  wiihowt  rawn  tie— Necessity  ira  impMU*— Uopopu- 
Utritj  of  oxcU«6  «nd  direct  taution— Without  an  imjxwt,  t«u)S 
will  chiefly  fall  on  land ^t 

NO.  ij.  HAMILTON. 

ADVANTAGES  OF  UNION  PROM  THE  STAND- 

POINT  OF  ECONOMY. 

Smaller  expense  of  civil    list— Civil   lists  of  separate  confed- 
eracies— l^xaniplo  of  Great   Britain — ProtMble  lliius  of  dIvUiuD 
of  proponed  oonfoderacies— A  nonliem  anil  a,  Mnitbem  It 
— Potitioa   of    PennsylviiniB- Greater  economy  of  one 
eracy 


NO    n      ,  MADISON. 

OKJRCTIONS  TO  THE  EXTENT  OF  TERRITORY. 

An  tmugtoary  difficahy—Confnsion  of  a  republic  with  n  dcmoc* 
rocV'-Error  nt  celebnued  aulhor»— SliKht  value  of  example  of 
early  republics — Early  republics  only  (Icmocracieii — MechaoKal 
power  "f  reprc!«ntat>i>ii — Nntural  limit  of  a  democracy— E»- 
perieiMu  In  teprcMutatioa  uiMler  tlie  confederacy — Dinietiftiotia 
of  tbe  United  btate*— Size  of  Enropean  countries — Limited  jariit- 
diction  of  general  goremment — vnlne  of  Kuborditiate  govern- 
ment* in  reiBiion  to  «ie  of  tcrrilor)'— Bvcttttuil  f(r<iiri)i  n(  Union 
— Internal  improvements  facllitAted — I'h*  more  distant  tbe  stale 
llie  greater  the  need  u(  tiaiioaal  gm-ernment— Wanting  against 
tiiooe  wbo  favor  diiitinion, 8i 


HA>llLTON. 

DEFECTS  OF  TUB  PRESENT  CONFEDERATION 
IN   ITS  DEPENDENCE   ON    THE   STATE    A 
GOVERNMENTS, 

The  insufficiency  of  tbe  ronfedcraliOD  a  self-fivtdcnt  truth— 
Sketch  of  exUfiriK  Tintiunal  homilia lion —Con iradlctory  ctiDdnct 

of  OppOSetS  < -tit.ili.^.  — V^.,^^;y  ..f  fy  jfi^ypfumnyl  thai 

Htlil  trt  fff'  .lis— A  MnmntenI  acting  on  (be  stale 

f;oveTnn>entiii':>ri]iTi..r  uvi  an  nntance -Epidemic  rage  in  Etirop« 
at  toagnc* — A  league  vnriiii  a  confederate  govt ni  rot m  in 
Americn — riitini.ii...,  tu-rsi'^^n  &  guremrr^-""  ^■■'«^"  n''  i' ■^'ate 
and  oil-  '  '  .lis— Common  to 

obtain   ..   .      .  'vadv.     OriRii:  'O. 

triftignl  tciiflcEicy  c>i  all  v«ii:  .1  lawb  uiil  ui>t  be 

enforced   by  itaie  gnvcnir>'  n  id  the  thirteen 


etatee— ImpoteiKe 
■bOu. 


of   tbe  (-•■iiijTcM— liMi'ipi"  of 


the  variio* 
8t 


SD/TV/tS  TABIB  OF  CONTElfTS. 


It 


!«).  rt.  HAMILTON. 

DEFECT   OF  THE  CONFEDERATION  IN   ITS 

INABILITY  TO  COERCE. 

TlM  oaly  constitutioD&l  rvmcdy  Against  delinquent  st«tes  Is 
(woe-  Impoa&ibility  of  coercion— ^}-nipalliyb«twi:ea  the  UJiteti — 
PiQbaUe  appeal  oi  .itiatci  to  foreign  nations — A  probable  div 
lohitioa  of  the  Union— I.' nil kcli hood  ai  Ktatcs  xupportinK  a 
ntiotwl  Kiwemmcni — Certain  defeneration  Into  a  military 
daqtotiiin— IfflpoMititlity  of  ocrvinK  tli<^  laTS*rst*I^~M"i'''>'>' 
coercion  «  signiil  for  civil  war— Tbe  now  govemmeni  niufcl 
extend  to  citizena — State  renisuincc  of  nntioonl  law — The  dis- 
tiDctioD  iKtwcen  nnn.compIiAni.iG  and  active  Rsistaitcc — The 
nes  constitution  puts^tale  TC>>islanee  in  its  true  light — Employ. 
mtiU  of  8Ut*  ageiities  by  lutiooal  goveraineot— No  form  of  gov- 
tmaeat  safe  from  revolution t/b 


HAMILTON. 
OF  THE   ARGUMENT   THAT  A 


REFUTATION 

GOVERNMENT    BASI^D  ON    INDIVIOUAI.* 
WILL  BE  TOO  I^OWEKFUL. 

Oalikelihood  lliat  the  nn I ional  government  will  ftbsorb  the 
reiidiury  a\ith«rity— Objvtib  of  national  am bi lion— Local  con- 
Rms  not  alluring  '>bj4.-cts  of  general  jurindicti on— Easier  for  the 
Kates  to  cncroacb  on  the  natiotinl  authoritlci; — Greater  populArity 
it  (tate  givvcmmcnt — Tendency  of  mankind  to  neighiinrhooa 
lOtacliment- Lncal  juttice  tbe  moat  attractive  source  of  p^ipular 
obedieticei  and  altachoieot^Tbe  national  govemmcnl  \v»& 
IsunediaLely  connected  with  the  people -'Example  in  feu<lut 
thne* — The  straggle  between  king  and  baron- Example  of 
danahtp  in  Scotland— Stale  governments  compared  with  feudal 
tamnM»— Local  govemmonls certain  lo  posseu  tli«  confidence  of 
the  people,  loj 

XO-  i8.  HAMILTON  AND  M^piSON. 

EXAMPLES  OF  GREEK  CONFEDERACIES. 

-Tbo  Acluean 
.     log 


Ainidiiclyantc  coondl.  its  power*  in  histocy- 
"*«««w 


SO.  iq.  HAMILTON  AND  MADISON. 

EXAMPLES  OF  MRDI-F.VAL  AND  MODF.RN  CON- 

FEDERACIES. 

Tlie  German  empire— Example  of  Poland— The  Swi«s  con*' 
tedoacy.    . 114 

X(l  K.  HAMILTON  AND  MADISON. 

EXAMPLE  OF  THE  UNITED  NETHERLANDS. 

Natufe  dI  government — Hutorical  illuntrations- The  preMBt 
BWdltMB,    .         , iiq 


iTi 


ED/rOR-S  TABLE  OF  CONTEXTS. 


KO.  SI.  HAMILTON. 

SPECIFIC  DEFECTS  IN  THE  CONFEDERATION. 

No  MnctJoD  oj  laws— No  niutoiil  piaraiitve  ol  sUle  Kf>v«ni- 

national  {juaiiintce — System  of  quouw  and  its  unfairnnK— DtRi- 
Gulty  in  finding  a  baslii  of  laxation — COnipaiiMin  bciwcen  t!ic 
fiUtoft  in  respFCl  to  wciillh — Cwinplcx  Mxiront  of  wealth  aod 
taxable  ability— Inequality  of  tuxation  am*  to  d«(itroy  ubm>o— 
Tli«  tuUional  ftuvcnuneDt  muM  raiu!  its  own  t«v«tiau— Ten- 
dency at  taxntioD  to  dixlhlnite  iltclf~Taxi>«  on  nilictcs  of 
coDSiimpilon  prescribe  Iboir  own  limit— Dim i tic tinn  bclw««n 
indirect  and  dinct  laxva— Difficulties  involved  wiUi  dlroct 
tax«» taj 

KO. ».  HAMll-TON. 

DEFECT  OF  THE  ARTICLES  OF  CO.VFKDKRA- 

TION  AS  TO  COMHF.RCE.  ARMV.  STATE 

EQUALITY.  JUDICIARY.  AND  CON- 

CRESS. 

Want  of  pnwcT  to  rcjiiilntc  commerce— Commurvial  treaties 
Impowtblc— ^cMrAto  pmhihitionK  of  certain  states — Iirtlalino 
between  the  I  iiited  Stated — Commerce  of  Gcinuinv— Quotas 
of  soldten— Competition  and  teMiIIa  in  expciue  uud  l>ountie»— 
Equal  suffraKe  of  the  «tntes  a  j^at  evil— Acid  c<>nlradict»  a 
ftindatnenlnl  maxiin  of  republicali  |;ovcTTiincnt — Minority  kov> 
ernmuni— Resulting  evils  in  cuugresi — A  cIikIc  '>n  };ix>d  legisla- 
tion as  well  OS  on  wid  — R«»ult  as  to  (urci^i  nfltiuiiii— Republics 
■nbjccl  to  foreipi  corruption— One  advantage  of  muiiuiuhr — 
Example  of  United  Ptovinccn — Crowninx  delect  nf  the  confed- 
eration a  want  of  judiciary  power— Ncccwuty  for  a  supTcme 
tribune— Tltlrtevo  aepaiale  courts  an  imjKJultnlliy—Evllii  ol  a 
single  aaaembly  or  ooogieia— Tlie  con  federal  ion  ratified  by  the 

PtOt 


statei,  not  by  tnc  people, iji 

HAMILTON. 
NECESSITY    OF    A    COVERNMENT    AT    LEAST 
EQUALLY   ENERGETIC  WITH  THE  ONE 
PROP0SF.D. 

Objects  to  be  jwovided  for  by  national  Government- Annie 
and  nccts — Coailitioti  mtdcrprcDent confederation— Vain  nrojcct 
of  le£i<1ntin|[  upon  Ilie  atalcfi- Laws  must  bo  extended  to 
iodivuliiiU  cititimi^TIie  «ts«nttal  jMilnt  In  a  campnnnd  govont- 
menl  a  diw-Ttminaliuu  of  pwvet — rleeU  and  armies  froon  ibis 
point  of  view 144 

NO.  w.  HASrtlLTON. 

POWERS  CONFERRED  BY  NEW  CONSTITUTION 

IN  RERARD  TO  NATIONAL  FORCES. 

AIleKod  wont  n(  nropcr  pmrisMO  anient  the  enatenee  nf 
Mandln];  amiios  In  tima  of  peaf«— R'^  ■•(  ibc  loewlatlvo 

auibority    lu   regaids   nultiary    cat.i  >  an  nnbcaid  of 


EDITORS  TABLE  OF  CONTEXTS.  Ivii 

ptlnciplr— Where  the  on^tltiiliun  vr^ltt  c>?ntrul— Clauwa  in  lbs 
Kate  conktitnUons  in  tcgari!  lo  a  stiindin^  ormy — The  ftaine 
diBse  in  tbe  Articles  of  Confcdotntion — l>anKcr«  threatening 
AB>»ric«— NeocsKity  for  Western  gnrrisonB—Bniish  and  Sp.inith 
cdoitlM— Protocttou  of  nary  yArda  and  arwioaU,  .    ijo 

HO.  «5.  HAMILTON. 

NATIONAL  FORCES  COMl'ARED  WITH  STATE 

FORCES. 

K«c«S9lly  of  Rational  conli«>)  of  unny  and  navy— Siluatioa  <A 
tt«tc»  aa  regards  foiciKn  cncmieK — Critical  position  of  New 
Yorlc — Slate  K^vcmmcnlii  itatiinLl  rivnlH  of  the  nBtionnl— Like- 
Uipod  that  the  people  will  support  th«ir  local  fcnvcrnment —  f 
Tb*  ftateft  r«Htrainea  from  aianuing  forces — Want  of  <leliiiliioi) 
(a  proposed  Dcgativ«  on  standin};  armies— Inipossibility  of  a, 
ww^irncy  Iwiwcoa  the  esctutivc  and  the  leRislalive  depart- 
meats— Actual  effect  of  a  prohihition  on  Klanditt);  nrmies — 
laadeqaiwy  of  the  militia— Recent  experience  of  i'ennsylvanift 
■nd  HaWAdiiiMttA— Experietico  of  the  L««;ed«Mtiouiaii&.  156 

NO.  16.  HAMILTON. 

ABSURDITY  OK  RESTRAINING  THE  LEGISLA- 
TIVE  AUTHORITV  AS   TO   NATIONAL 
DEFENSE. 

Popular  revolutions  not  able  to  apportion  power  and  priv- 
flq(e— Tlw  rasli^aint  on  leKi^lnlurcs  as  to  defense  In  the  state 
coastitntious— tiencral  decision  of  America  opposed  to  snch  re- 
maint — flistory  of  tbe  rvslrictiun  on  ilandins  army  in  Great 
Bnum-  Pmcnt  condition  in  that  country— An  hereditary 
[  -l  standing  omiics  in  America — The  .tintc  cnnKti- 
tn  Peonsylvani.i  and  North  Carolina  conMitu- 
tiii;)i  -  t'<i>.'iiTiMi  appropriations  under  th«  new  CMiMitniion  for 
■my  -  Abscrdity  of  tne  peediciions  of  Uie  wbversion  of  the 
Elwity  of  Amcriui^lnipoesbility  of  greatly  aogmelitinfc  the 
trToy-^I)an);rr  from  the  executive — Danger  all  the  greater  in  ■ 
diwnlted  »tatc. lOa 

HO,  n.  HAMILTON. 

IHPOSSIBtLITV  OF  A  NATIONAL  GOVF.RSMENT 

WITHOUT  A  NATIONAL  FORCE.  ' 

AtkgMl  4ialncUqAtiML.oL-tlu  people  to  federal  nutbority— A 
pttf^S"?.!.:""'  io  a  goynfiiaieot  proportioned  to  its  good- 

Dcs^nr  lu  :  kennoSd  tlij^  the  genera)  government  will 

he  netlcr  a.....::..  ...:ed  than  thoae  of  the  Mates— Eepecial  value 
dfth*!  national  senate— Greater  power  of  tlie  nation  in  coniroll- 
mg  M-djll'in  and  fnctton — (iovenimcnt  should  bo  felt  by  citizens 
-Certainty  that  a  unhxi  will  need  to  employ  force  less  often 
(ban  setiarate  confederacies — Tlio  cenornl  ^vcrnmenl  able  10 
"  •-   iTdiiuiry  legal  proc«iiM»— Peculiar  advantage   sDjoyed  by 

iiallaws, 104 


Ifiii  EDiTOfrs  tabls  of  contents. 

NO.  aa.  HAMILTON.' 

CONDITIONS   WHICH    NECESSITATIS    A 

NATIONAL  FORCE. 

InRurrecUon*  a  auklAdr  inseparable  from  the  bodjr  politic— An 
Intuirociiod  a  duigcr  in  all  Kuvcmmeni — Esperiooce  of  Mxim- 
cbnaetls  KoA  Peacisylvsniii— ri'ew  York  vs.  Vermobt— Separnto 
confed«racies  *nbjcct  to  utme  condiiiotis  tu  the  Union— A  fuU 
anitwer  in  objection  ix  that  the  power  is  in  the  handc  of  the  repre' 
soniAttvca  of  (lie  people — CoTt*in  eucccM  of  popular  r«st«t«ncc  lo 
u&urpatiou — A(1v«iDt«);e  of  large  tetriUwy  and  ul  stalv  guvern- 
nwDls — ItnpoBibility  of  u  large  sttUKling  wnny,    ,  174 

NO.»9  [J5l.  HAMILTON. 

THE  POWER  OF  REGULATING  THE  MILITIA. 

A  naiurkl  incident  tn  common  defenie — Uniformity  in  the 
mltilia  beDoAclal — Limilcil  powers  of  national  eovernntenl  eon- 
cemias  stat«  force*— Coo t«ntioo  CMic«mliig  pent  eem/taiui— 
Abnuraity  of  the  mititia  proving  a  danger  if  contruUrd  bj 
Kcneral  {[OTCin me nt— Certain  grievance  of  frequent  mililary 
oxoTcues— AilvanMKe  of  Kclect  corpt— The  states  certain  to  imv* 
Ik  preponderant  infttiencc  over  the  m ill tta— Example  of  publtca- 
tioni  )if:a>n.it  the  coo  adtutian— Exaggerated  ■ujoE^^^ionK  con- 
ccminj;  miEUw:  of  mi li tin— Conduct  of  militia  in  case  of  at- 
tempteil  dcspotbni- The  general  government  alone  able  to 
uM  the  luilitia  to  protect  the  states. 179 

NO.Rii  (»9l.  HAMILTON. 

MNERAL  POWER  OF  NATIONAL  TAXATION. 

National  needs  for  revenue — Money  the  vital  nci^l  in  govero- 
meiii— Kvila  resiiltiiig  from  lack  of  revenue— K mi miile  of  the 
Turkish  Empire — Example  in  breakilovm  of  confpdrrntir.n — 
RevemM  tuitimited  under  Articles  of  Confederation— P. rroiM'i>iit 
prtBciples  to  that  compact — Consequenc*^  of  the  KyMeiu— A 
rvneay  in  *l>andrinment  of  quotas  and  '■  iis — The  wished- 

foe  distinction  Ixtwwo  inicroal  and  f  ■  1  vp> — Tlie  ftmda- 

mental  pnropk-  of  nattoual  govemnnruL-  i  j.t-  resoitttcs  of  a 
nation  equal  to  its  necessitieo— Proportion  to  supply  the  delitiuti' 
eics  in  eiteninl  taxes  by  rcqnisiUon— Result  of  limited  laxa- 
lion  in  times  of  «-nr— The  Rational  government  should  pussen 
an  unrestrained  power  of  taxation— The  pomr  of  taxation 
a  certain  meaiu  of  borrowing,         ......     187 

NO.  ji  (30I.  HAMILTON. 

UNLIMITED    NATIONAL    TAXATION    NOT   A 

ROAD  TO  DESPOTISM. 

Prlttclptes  of  hif^C  applied  to  the  nece««ily  of  a  genenl  power 
of  taxation — RetopituIaUiiti  of  llie  uecrsailr  of  unlimited  natljidBl 
revenne — View  hi  the  a{>poaeoift  ni  the  ooostitntmn— Ve^-MttT 
nt  revenue  for  local  adminiatratiiMa^— Pmbahle  u!  J) 

taxau>jn  by  luttioBa)  gotvrDBMfll- InprolMWlii:  :i 


BDlTOfrS  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  \\X 

Menl  aoverDincDl— Why  not  in  stale  gorernm«nte  n 
I>itpa«itiOD  of  tba  ctAt«  gowrnoivnift  to  cncroucli  on  the 

ilitii;   cnn  piwirv»  lh>  Mriiiililwiitm 
^ovcrntncDt 193 

)W.  J»  [ji],  HAMFLTON. 

DIFFERENTIATION   OP    POWERS    BETWEEN 

NATIONAL  AND  STATE  GOVERNMENTS. 

WITH    ESPECIAL    RESPECT    TO 

TAXATION. 


10.  jj  [31J.  HAMILTON. 

TAXATION   CONSIDERED  WITH    RESPECT  TO 
GENERAL  POWERS. 


I 


/ 


ttiot  the  Slates  shmild  posiesj  iDfJcpcniipnt  objects 
—The  federal  constitution  only  u  pnrliAl  union 
— Tfaee  cases  of  alieaatjoti  of  state  <iover«igiity—Exc  Insure  \«^i- 
fabaa  by  national  i^ovOTnmont — Throe  insUnces  of  such  pinvcr— 
Vvmtt  it  taxation  a  concurrent  rtKht— A  ilouble  lax  a  iiuesti»n 
li  aqwdiency  and  am  of  inability— CoDcurrcnt  jurisdiction 
nulls  fnm  tne  division  of  tbc  sowrciK"  power,  197 


I 

^1  ItwgeMTsl  clauses  sources  of  unD»cxury  alarm— Dcfimtton 
^g  M  pMwr— The  svrccpins  clatiMS  c bailable  with  tAutolof^.  but 
1^  fWectly  harmlcni— Rcnuin  for  their  introduction — The  national 
tHtTBtuent  necciuiarliy  itoown  jndg«  in  law  midclng— Supposed 
oMcimvuion  of  state  sovereignly— Nature  of  laws  considered 
■  KK«rd  to  supreme  law— A  nalional  luw  not  luprcmc  when  a 
mpuiaa— Tn«  pow«r  of  the  states  as  to  revenue.     .        .    soi 

».  M  iial  HAMILTON. 

TUE   CONCURRENT   JURISDICTION    IN  TAXA- 
TION OF  THE  STATES  AND  NATION. 

Tbc  itates  will  retain  nbandant  sourceii  of  rcvonuo — An  txam- 
Tfcrf  co-ordinate  aathoritjr  from  Roman  hwlnrj-— Th«  wanu  of 
BtitaU  will  reduce  thcmsrlves  to  very  narrow  coiupau— Neces- 
■Cf  to  prorlde  for  more  than  existing  national  exigencies  of 
Wi«Ml  The  nation  muxt  be  in  a  poiiiion  to  protect  itsolf— The 
MMw  ol  war  rciKH  in  the  human  brcAst— Wnr  cxfieiiKCti  of 
tvMoenmrvd  with  expensefi  of  civil  list — Especial  illustnitiDn 
» tilt  Britain— Example  of  Uevolutionary  debt— Amount 
^tM  for  expense  of  states— Possible  partition  of  revenue  be- 
Mw  dales  anil  nation— Ext citinl  and  internal  taxation — Con- 
niMal  liKtUoa  the  only  admiuibtc  syslem,  ao6 


^WO.  H  ())].  HAMILTON. 

H     AHSWBRS    TO    OBJECTIONS    TO    INDEPINITB 
^m  POWERS  OP  TAXATION. 

^BASniitatiion  of  taxation  will  retult  in  undue  burdens  on  portic* 
^pbob^ecta — A  restriction  to  duties  would  result  In  thctrinvrvoie 
^^1*M  U^jufioaa  ncccw— High  tlutl«B  produce  amugghng,  undue 


Ik  ED/ro/rs  table  of  co.vtbnts. 

r«varinE  of  raanufacturins;  cta«us.  and  cpprcMion  of  the  mer- 
G bant— Payment  ai  dutic«  lalU  ii|kio  both  mIIct  and  buyer— Cmi- 
Kideration  of  tho  nuwim  that  the  c^nstimer  pays  the  diilies —  Hlt;h 
dntles  Mtlain  to  be  attended  willi  iii«qualily— An  eqiudtuitiofi 
only  to  be  ubtaiDed  by  exciaei — S])eeiaJ  intcFtrKl  of  Xeyr  V«rk~- 
Tbe  deetM  for  reventMi  likely  to  limit  cxceu  in  duties— JConxidvr- 
ation  of  th«  objcctioo  that  the  Houkc  of  R«prc»cntativ«s  Is  tuO 
amoll — Actnal  reprvMotMlon  of  all  classes  purely  visionary— 
lDt«r«Ua  «f  mecluinics  and  maoufMctmers— Of  the  kutned  pn» 
fcaakMia— Of  the  landed  intemtv— Taxation  of  land— The  rci>r»- 
sentative  body  will  be  cbtctly  c<>mpo«c<l  of  landhnldcni — Mutiuil 
interest  of  all  datscs — RospoRsivcncMof  reprvMnlalivos  lopubllc 
opinion— Ex leu&ive  InfurmaUon  Deeded  in  tli«  bnaineM  of  tiun- 
tion — The  matt  productire  ayatem  oi  fioasces  ti  the  least  borth- 
raaoDM 3I> 

NO.  j6  [Mj.  HAMILTON. 

TAXATION  CONSIDERED    MORE    ESPECIALLY 

AS  REGARDS  INTBRNAL  TAXES. 

Taxaiica  for  ibu  benefit  of  indivtdtiats~-LitIlB  affinity  between 
varioiudouciof  society— A  tMTtion  ihnt  the  nation  caanotcxct- 
cIm:  the  power  of  LaxatloQ  with  BflvnntAtfc — The  uunc  power  in 
tile  slate  leg i slut urcs— Usual  method  of  uying  lues — Internal 
taxe»  divided  into  direct  and  indirect— Indirect  taxes  are  duties 
and  eadMS  on  aniicl«)i  of  eonsumptioti— In  layine  tbe«e  taxes  the 
phactpal  object  should  be  to  avoid  objects  already  taxad  by  p«r- 
licular  states— Tlie  objection  to  direU  taxes— Method  of  laying 
land  taxes— The  natiim  can  use  the  method  of  each  stale — Direct 
taxes  must  be  appottioned  by  population— The  atnue  of  direct 
taxes  Movided  against  with  };uar<tod  circiinn^pcetion — Propositwo 
that  tne  nation  shall  cutlocl  all  intoriial  Iaxck  by  requisition — 
IraponsibiUty  that  the  revenae  laws  of  nation  and  statcft  nrlU 
clash— A  small  land  tax  suSicMnt  for  lb«  states— Specters  raised 
out  of  this  pnwer  of  internal  taxation- Double  sets  of  tax  coUee- 
tors— Prr. bat. lu  Mnploymcnl  of  state  officials— Unlikelihood  of 
<loubIe  Uxalion— Poll  taxes tlq 


MADISON. 
TIES   OP   THE   CONVENTION    IN    FRAU- 


wn    17  L^l 
DlPFlCUi; 

ING    A   CONSTITUTION. 

Difficulty  of  discusaiBE  public  measures  in  the  liffiil  Ki>iril— 
Predetermined  friends  and  enemies— The  Federalist  addmssod 
to  neither,  but  to  those  who  wish  merely  the  happiness  of  the 
counlrj-— Norelty  and  dillictiltie*  of  the  worii  ]»o4nted  out — The 
consliiution  of  n«*»sity  not  perfect,  but  the  vonvention  worked 
without  pftTiy  fcclin{£,  and  all  were  finally  satisfied,     .  at? 

NO.  jB  [}7l.  MADISOS' 

INCOHERENCE  OP  THE  OBJECTIONS  TO  TUB 
CONSTITUTION,  tf 

Alt  C'  '  'n  and  consent  tillherfo  framed 

by  inoi^ :  n  in  the  new  eyvtein  ariM  (fom 


EDITOies  TABLE  OF  CO/fTEffTS. 

eipcricncc^Thp  preftcnt  slIiiAtUm  o(  Amvrica — ExtKlinR 
v'.U  Oiown.Hiid  tite  (utility  of  tti«  ot>}ectioosaiKlreinodi«S(if  tli« 
D(>{)o&iiioii 137 

j9),  MADISON. 

CONSTITUTION  STRICTLY  REPUBLICAN. 

Only  a  republican  KyxUitt  posMlilc  for  America — Tho  principles 
U  rFpublitiLH  K<>v«riimeat  ihuwu  by  examples— Tliu  prop<iM:il 
cDQ&iiEulioD  coQfurtni  to  Ui«  stuiitluril— I'ruofs  at  tbi»  from  ili« 

firovsioiuof  the  conMi tutUHi— Neither  wholly  nuiooal  nor  wboUy 
ederal 34s 

SO.  40  l3<»).  MADISON. 

THE  RIGHT  OF  THE  COSVEKTION  TO  FRAME 

SUCH  A  CONSTITUTION, 

Tbe  Mutbonty  under  which  the  conveation  acted  examined— 
Ptopcr  ev«n  to  have  cxccc<Icil  authority,  froRi  conMclciatton  of 
datf — Consiitiiiifln  merely  ii'coinmcndcd— Noitcwiily  (oraradkal 
Aug*— W bulb er  iliv  cuaveuiiuu  escevdett  its  puwcrs  docs  not 
*SmX  Ibfl  queiitiuii  of  ratlfiuition 151  ■ 


MADISON. 
BE  VESTED 


Wfew  OP  POWERS  SUPPOSED  TO 
IN  THE  UNION. 

Tbe  quality  of  power  conferred — Not  ffreater  than  it  ihotild  be 
— tWnefal  objcciinnE  oiwideicd — ^Tlic  objects  nf  the  powcrii  con- 
brt«il~DcciHriiiK  w.ir  and  Kr.iiilltig  letters  of  marouo — Provld- 
IhK  umiies  and  tleci5  —  ki.-^H latino  iind  culling  OUt  tne  militia — 
Levfing  taxes  and  borrowing  money 160 

"      4t  f40-  MADISON. 

POWERS  GOVERNING    INTERCOURSE  WITH 

POREIGX   NATIONS  AND  BETWEEN 

THE  STATES. 

Illation  of  inlcrtonrsewiib  foreign  nations — AmbaMadior*, 
»,  and  Ireulies—l'niiisJimenl  of  piracy,  felonies  on  tbe  bigb 
.  and  oSentcK  aauinat  tlie  laws  of  nations— Regulation  of 
(erreignmramerce— Tue  Minction  of  the  tlavc  trade— Objections 
« ilwt  point  coniidered — Mainiennncc:  of  harmony  and  prop«r 
iat«i«uun«  anmng  th«  ulates — InteiHtaiv  cuniinerce  and  ibo 
ladtaa  trade— Coinage  of  money— Punishment  of  count erfe iters 
— Staudanl  of  vrcignlx  and  measures — Not urnltiAtion— Bonk- 
UwH—Rutc  lor  pyoving  public  iLcis—Posiroads  and  po«t- 
.        -    *7" 


4S  l«al- 


MISCELLANEOUS  POWERS. 


MADISON. 


Icdloneowi  powers— CopyiigbtK  and  patents— The   federal 
-■Puoishmeni  of  treason- Aan 


fmission  cif  ncwstatcK — tiovcm- 


SD/rOK'S  TABLE  OF  COAfTEiVTS. 


m«nt  of  unjtoriea  aad  control  ol  public  property — tinitrantjr  to 
every  ttat«  of  u  republican  form  of  goveramenl— Protection  of 
Hate  OKwnat  inva«on  uid  i^ataxt  domestic  vial«iic«--AMUini>> 
tion  at  p«rin«tit  of  aatstAiicllnK  <Icl>tti— AtneadnMnu  t«  t&e 
coitstltutfon— Tli«  ostabilshmeDt  of  lhi«  Kovemntonl  on  tbe 
adlwivnoe  of  nine  states— Obj«Ction  tlml  this  is  u  Tiol&tMMi  of 
the  ooofedemtioin— Kctationi  Detwe«D  ratifjring  uatcs  and  tboM 
wbtcb  rcfnitc  to  nuify 380 

NO.  44  U3l-  VADISON. 

RESTRICTIVE  POWERS  ON  THE  STATES.  0 

PotbidiUnic  tbe  eitnbtishment  of  trcoties  and  alliances  between 
the  states  — iMUc  of  letters  of  marque— Coinuee  of  moncv — Issue 
of  bills  of  cTcdji— ERiabliKhmcnt  of  nny  lexiu  tender  other  tbnn 
goM  and  silvot — Hilts  of  ait-iindcr'-Kx-poBt-facta  Iaw-6 — Law* 
inipairiug  uon tracts— Till i- 3  of  nubilH)— Impoaitioo  of  duties  on 
exports  and  imports— The  power  to  make  lUl  laws  neccsiary  and 
proper  to  carry  the  precedinj;  powers  into  execution— Keccssitf 
at  Much  a  power — Prohibition  of  the  cicrciM  of  any  powers  not 
WptMaty  dekgalcd— Pusitiru  eDumeratioD  of  guurral  powers 
-  delegated — Negative  enumeration  by  specilk'ation  of  reserved 
poacTs  and  by  si lenc«— Remedy  for  an  abuse  of  this  K<"i«ntl 

t lower — Tbe  supremacy  of  the  const  itu  I  ion.  the  c<>  11  stitui  tonal 
&wa.  and  treaties— Oatli  of  state  and  federal  officers  to  supw^ 
constitution —No  port  of  tbe  powers  delegated  nnneceaswj^^H 
improper 'IP 

NO.  45  l44l-  MADISON. 

THE    WHOLE   MASS    OF   NATIONAL    POWER    IN 

RELATION    TO   THE   STATE   GOVERNMENTS. 

The  t)«w  constitution  not  dangeroua  to  the  state  sovemtatiiu 
— Tendency  in  Goufed«raci«s  is  to  weaken  ibo  central  power- 
State  governments  will  have  mure  iiUluence  among  the  people- 
State  governments  are  essential  parts  of  tbe  federal  government 
— The  officers  of  the  tJniled  States  are  less  namoTOUsjhan  those 
of  the  Ktal<M — The  reserved  powers  are  relatively  greater  than 
those  delegated — Proposed  ctiangv  consists  less  lu  giving  new 
tluui  in  strengthening  old  powers, 303 

NO.  46t4i].  MADISON. 

TUB    RELATIVE    IS-FLUESCE    OF    TUB    FEDERAL 

AND  THE  STATE  GOVERNMENTS  WITH 

THE    PEOPLE. 

* 

Federal  and  state  governments  only  different  agents  of  the 
unne  const  It  lie  uts— The  first  altacfament  of  the  peofde  will  l>e 
to  the  stitte  Kovemmonis — Popularity  will  oome  to  the  federal 
government  only  if  it  ti  better  adniinislered— Objectkxi  on  acure 
of  federal  militniy  power  anawered — Concluding  remarks  an  the 
proposition  itiat  the  powers  of  the  Union  vrilt  tie  aangeroiu  to  the 
■late  gmrern  men  ts ,    sio 


EDirOKS  TABLE  OF  COffTESTS. 


\%»\ 


SEPAB 


KIADISON. 
SEPARATION  OP  THE    DEPARTMENTS  OF 
POWER.  f;/ 

Thf  tratim  that  tb«re  should  be  icparAte  Mid  dittinct  depart- 
n;  .idcfcd— This  maxim  true — ThcDcwconntilution  docii 

11.  II    It — Tile  views  of  Mont<tsq»icu— Thv  provi&iooft  of 

Iha  vtuuMin  ttlate  coast ilutions  »a  this  [Kiint  exanined,        .    314 

jn    ■'  tirl  MADISON. 

UKANS  OP  GIVING   INDEPENDENCE   TO   THE 

DIFFERENT  DEPARTMENTS.      0 

PniTi-r*  rj  ntie  department,  it  is  coticcdwl,  should  not  be  ox- 
'  <tiwllier — Our  department  ^luuld  uot  have  an  ov«mil- 

III-  I. f  ovrr  another— Stviirily  aaainit  the  invasion  of  one 

dq>>niiHiiit  by  Hnntiief.  considcicd— The  tendency  o(  the  Icgis- 
UtivE  to  abKnrbthe  othcrdcp.'knmcnis>~Aii  itisianceof  encroach- 
nwais  in  Virginia— Exp«>rien<.-e  t>t  Peonaylvanla,  .    jjj 

SO.  ¥t  (4*]-  PI  MADISON. 

PROBABLE    EXCESSIVE    INFLUENCE    OF  THE 

LEtSISLATIVE  DEPARTMENT. 

Protpriely  t>l  a  well-defined  mode  of  appeallug  to  the  people — 
A  laSicient  remedy— Very  dangerotu  and  n»e1esi  if  too  fr«- 
qiicatty  applied— Reasons  for  Iliis— When  such  appeal*  ate 
■uoful— Renuulu  on  occAxlooal  appeals  to  the  people.       .    534 

SO.  50  [«].  PI  MADISON. 

PERIODICAL   CORRECTING    OP  INFRACTIONS 

OF  THE  CONSTITUTION. 

Tbe  meritx  and  di^udvantugeii  of  short  and  long  intervals — 
Kcaniplc  of  Pennsylvania jjV 

.].  [7]  MADISON. 

OD  OP  BALANCING  THE  DEPARTMENTS         / 
OP  GOVERNMENT 

Hades   of  obtainiiij;    niutuid    checki    and   balances — Advan-     . 
tases  oi  the  federal  Kovcniment   In  aecoiing   the  rights  of  llie   "^ 
people — Divinion   of  the  delc^Atcd   ]>owcr« — DifTetcal  iatcreits 
•moDg  tbe  people 34* 


1 


[?]  HAMILTON. 
HOUSE    OF 


"0.  w  (ii). 

QOALrPICATION    ANDeTERM   OF 
REPRESENTATIVES. 

Bteclors — Tbe  qualifications  of  tbe  members— The  tem  o( 
ttteo— Hicnnial  elections — Vulitc  of  frequent  elections — Terms  of 
Mrvfee  in  other  Rovcmnicntii— In  EnKlitnd.  Ireland,  and  in  the 
American  coloniM — Riennrul  electioDA  not  dangcrouo — Reasons 
(w  Uiia  dntwn  boax  the  uutuie  and  position  of  Coajp^ss,    .     y\i 


-    - '    ^   - 


Ixiv 


EDlTOirS  TABLE  0^  COHTBNTS. 


NO.  5J  (»»1.  n  HAMILTON. 

TERM  OF  HOUSE  OP  REPRESENTATIVKS. 

Objection  thui  when  anntial  rlwllons  riul  lyrnnnv  beKi&s. 
answ«r«il— Bknniul  «l«i:ttotift  n«c«Mary  «nd  uuful— Obj»cti»iia 
to  unduly  sh<irt  (enmi— Biunntnl  electkMW  umilul  adiI  wife,  .    jjj 


NO.  S4  [SJl. 
RATIO 


OF  REPRESENTATION 
BRANCH. 


PI  HAMILTON. 
IN  LOWER 


Numbers  tli«  proper  stArtdanl  far  represent  at  Ion — Slav*  rvpr*- 
nenlulioa— Ubjectiuii  lliut  sUvt-*  do  not  cnlcr  into  loc«i  rei>rci*D- 
tstion.conciderod— Tbcriglit  uf  rciitcMQtatiuiiof  propcTtvus  well 
as  n«r«on«— Volc«  in  ConjjtcM  iJioulil  Ixt  prMionioned  to  Uie 
wedth  of  tfa«  Males — No  indtiueroent  for  (iiNityIng  Ihe  consiM. 
u  it  i«  the  basis  of  taxatiun  as  well  as  reprtseotatiuD,        .    360 

NO.  SStMl.  I?]  HAMILTON. 

Size  OF  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES. 

ImportftiKO  attaclwd  to  thU  siibjctct— Difflcnitjr  tA  d«tenn[D- 
in^  tliu  proper  nnraber — Sninll  at^tea  require  aiuolter  ration — 
Ltmilctl  puwen  tA  Onsrvos  do  nui  denuiiiil  n  nuioerau*  repre- 
lentBtion— Voriotu  objections  conudered  and  anawcrcd— Source* 
of  dangwr  ctiDsidered jM 

NO.  j6  [sij.  PJ  HAMILTON. 

KECES.SARV     KNOWT.RDfJK    IN    THF.     REPRE- 
SENTATIVE CONSlUKKEI)  IN  RELATION 
TO  THE  RATIO  OP  REPRE- 
SENTATION. 

Objection  Ilial  Congress  will  be  loo  small  to  know  the  in- 
tcrrsu  and  wiclies  of  its  constituents,  ronsi'l-T-^  -The  reprc- 
fioiitStirc  mielit  to  Icimw  tl>c  iniercstK  of  !  iiicniH— 
Ob^ts  of  iedcral  l«(p»I«iion~A  few  n-y  ■■-.-us  wdl 
bo  t>uiricl«Dt— Taxslloa— UtlitU— TtM  Mpen«iw«  vl  GrMt 
Britain, 37s 

NO.  .7  Is5J.  PI  HAMILTON, 

UNLIKELIHOOD   THAT   THE    HOUSE    OF    REPRE- 
SENTATIVES WILL  ELEVATE  THE  FEW 
ABOVE  THE  MANY. 


Thta  nbjocthxi,  in  prinriplif.  ttrai-s 

clasw w— Sccuri tifr^  ti> 
Provisians  ivt  eleclin£  rncmifc:*,    . 
IhoM  <rf  KtAta  nAcMs— The  reUtivi 
ciM  BO  reasaa  ("■  \""'.-"al  of  stole  -.. 


nf  rtprcflUt- 
Jcen    bam  sU 


systno— Tbs  dt>' 
Bu<  Mutaiasd  b]- 
iKoa,  tbcsuto. 


*!  i!ip  root 

1  taken 

r.rs.  cmUMgrate^^- 

I  luaiiftcatians,  Uko 

•f  ibe  oonMitiMa- 


:ti«r  rMEooAbta  iwr'  «dniMiU»— I 
•  sm^as  f  iu<&  Hwose  of  Cwciwnuns 


Ei)/7V/fS  TABLE  OF  COKTEffTS. 

NO.  58  [S7l.  (?)  HAMILTON. 

FUTURE  AUGMENTATION  OF  THE  HOUSE  OF 
REPRESENTATIVES. 

The  state  constitnlions  (.■ompared  on  this  point  with  the  oa« 
ptupascil — Tb«  practice  of  the  stntc  eoi-tmmcnts — Tlicorganii- 
abOD  of  ConKTME  will  induce  wjiirhfiihM-ss— 'llic  large  slates  will 
OMttrul  the  «in«ll — Ob)ocIiunB  that  tlic  Senate  will  pievcQt  aug- 
Biititation  aiiHwercd — The  toiiilituliouul  motucc  of  rcfuriinx 
•milics  by  the  House— Kca-sons  against  a  numerous  House — 
Objection  to  a  majoTit)'  bcin|[  n  quorum,  coostdcTcd,     .  383 

KG.  sq  \ii].  HAMILTON. 

THE  NATIONAL  REGULATION  OP  ELECTIONS. 

Kreiy  govemnietil  tiiu»l  liare  the  tntJins  of  self-preierva- 
lina— IHSereut  dcpotiilarics  of  this  power  considered— Exact  , 
dwracler  and  o-ctcnt  of  this  power — If  this  power  be  not  K'vea.  ' 
ifce  fc'i  iiment  will  be  nt  Ihc  mercy  of  the  Mate  govoro- 
tMuls-  '.  uf  wK-preM'ivation  in  the  state  tfovurnments 
ttiaipairi"!— uujectioii  that  tiiepowcruf  the staieKiu  the  election 
<<*etiators  i»  equal  1  v  dunffcrous,  contidered— Reason*  for  tbi« 
iciantw«  of  power— Objection  thnt  the  interests  of  ench  state  will 
taiB  utffictoiil  Mi-unty  aKmnHt  the  nbuM  of  the  puwcr  !•>  oonlrul 
the  election  of  membcts  by  the  state  govcroments,  con- 
inkred, .    391 

SO.  6u  (wl-  HAMILTON. 

NECESSITY  OF  SUCH  NATIONAL  CONTROL. 

Otjedion  that  t>\-  this  ]>owcr  CongreM  may  pmntote  the  ctec-^' 
tiMiMa  (avorile  cLissand  exclude  others,  confddervd— Reason 
Ivdisminiiig  this  objectMn,  enumeruted J97 

KO.  61  ttoj.  HAMILTON. 

ADVANTAGE   OP   THE    POWER    IN  SECURING 

UNIFORMITY  IN  ELECTIONS. 

Obioclion  that  there  stiotdd  be  a  provision  that  all  elections 
Amu  be  held  within  the  counties  where  the  electors  live — 
Socb  a  provtsiwii  harmle**  And  oAerK  no  security— This  nrnvtsion 
ctaDpared  with  tliow  of  State  coDHtituIionft— The  probnbllity  that 
lh>  power  of  ConKTvsit  to  5x  u  uuifonn  day  f»T  i-lucllons  will  be 
»ny  important- The  want  of  an^-  pmviiioai  in  the  constiluiion 
htnKmcIi  a  day,  coiuidcicd — Concluding  renuicks  on  the  general 
•o^ect,  404 

BO.  to.  m  HAMILTON. 

THE  CONSTITUTION  OP  THE  SENATE. 

QoalificatiaiM  of  Maalor»— Appointment  of  (enatorii  bv  &ta(e 
hftilitares— Equality  of  reprcieotatioii  in  Senate — Mixeif  char- 
Kitt  u(  (adaTat  eo^-cmnieni  requires  a  mixed  representatuMi— 


Ixvi  EDITOSS  TABLE  OF  CO/fTEKTS. 


R^nal  r«pr«sen(atloii  in  Senate  a  rccognUlon  of  conifol^t^  In 
tlic  states— 'ni«  number  ot  MHuion  and  the  term  (or  whicb  tliejr 
are  elected— Need  of  Kuch  an  up|ier  botue  an  a  setuTily  agaiiut 
improper  1cgii>Uiion»Af;ain!it  uic  inlirmtty  o(  faction— Agmtut 
JKnoraot  logJHlation— Against  mniability  in  its  cnuneilK  frwn 
livqueDt  cbaagM  of  member*— Dangers  of  socb  mntnbUlty, 
enuraerated 40S 

NO.  6J.  PI  HAMILTON. 

TERM  OF  APPOINTMENT  OP  THE  SENATE. 

Prevents  a  wttnt  of  a  duo  senw  oi  national  character,  and  of  a 
due  responjiitiiiity— A  di-fense  aealnst  lemixn'ary  eiron  and 
delaiKMis— Ilisiur)-  sbovr*  no  long-lived  repubRv  wiihout  a  S«fi«ie 
—DiffiTunco  between  the  aDcitnt  republic*  nnd  the  United  Statru 
— Atlient,  Cnrttuige.  Spartit.  Kocnc.  l>ctc — Objection  that  the 
Senate  will  ncqulrv  a  d« nacrous  nro-emlneiKe,  consiiiiivd — Such 
a  reMiil  I ni possible— Senate  ot  Maty\aiuX — Britl^i  f'ailUmeui — 
SiMrtu.  RiHDv.  Curtilage— Tbe  controUiog  infinunce  o4  lb«  Houmi 
of  RcptcsentutivcK 41b 

NO.  64.  JAY. 

TREATVMAKINO  POWER  OP  SENATE. 

Tbe  treaty-mailing  ]xiin:er~linpOTiaiice  of  this  p(»rer—PTOj>ert)r 
mted  in  lae  Scnntc— A  pi>pu]nr  body  not  lit  For  thi*  paver — 
Rea)>on»'>ObtcctionH  to  Ihu>  power  in  tlic  Senate  conaideTed.  and 
rea»na  for  tJieir  rejectloB,  oQaiBorntcd- The  roaponsibltily  ol 
aeaalora. 416 

NO.  65.  HAMILTON. 

IMPEACHMENT  POWER  OP  SENATE. 

The  nppointmonl  of  public  oAKcrs — Tbe  authority  to  sit  ax  a 
court  in  the  trial  of  im|>rachmcnt«— Difflwilty  of  forming  such  a 
court— TItu  Minaie  miru  lit  for  such  a  tniiit- The  plan  otdelega- 
tinK  this  oulboiity  lu  the  supreme  ctrart.  considered  and  rejected 
—The  pri>pricty  (if  unitioK  the  Mipn:mc  court  in  this  power  with 
the  SetinSe.  corinidercd  ftiw  denied— The  propriety  ot  giving  thi« 
niilhi<rity  ('■  oilier  por»<)n«  diEcnnnccted  with  anv  dcpArlmcnt  of 
the  gi'vi-nimcnl.  cdnsiilcrcd  and  lUjnsi-d— Even  if  Ihis  power  in 
Itie  Senate  ii  not  desirable  tlie  cunstii-.ition  sIiuuliL  not  be 
rejected 433 

NO.  66.  HAMILTON. 

OBJECTION    TO     IMPEACHMENT     POWER    OF 

SENATE   BECAUSE  A  JUDICIAL  POWER. 

Objection  that  it  unites  lefcistntlve  and  Judicial  functions — 
This  same  pravisiun  in  contibluliiin  of  New  Veirk — That  it  tin- 
ilaljr  occumuUtri  w..-^-i-t'i-\  ihc  Senate,  and  tends  totlie  cxtahliab- 
ment  of  an  aris;  i.e  nenale  will  judge  too  leniently 
olBcets  f or  wbobc  11  bac  voted— Thai  the  tenatorv 
may  be  called  iipcu  lu  U)  tbemaelvvs  fotr  a  corrupt  use  ut  tbe 
tinty>nu)cing  power 4 


ED/rO/rS  TABLE  OF  COUrSAfTS.  Ixvu 

KO.  67.  HAMILTON. 

THE  EXECUTIVK  DRPARTMRNT, 

DiScoUies  in  coitstitntiun — l^xsRgerulion  u[  povnn — Miarep- 
naenUtton  conccmiDg  vocAncim  in  Senate  bf  Catn.    .        .    447 

SO,  68.  HAMILTON. 

METHOD  OP  APPOINTING  THE  PRESIDENT. 

Tlie  ooly  pari  nf  tlio  c-inxtilution  not  comlemnod  by  it*  oppo- 
Wilts — It  IS  well  guarded— Devi  tabic  to-havc  tile  sctiae  of  the 
praptc  in  Ibo  choice— Desirable  that  the  choice  should  be  mmie 
uy  competent  pcnHinK.  tui  in  the  lilectoral  CollcKC  ;  to  avoid 
tiannlt  and  diEurtlcr:  lo  uvutd  intrigue  and  corruptioo:  lu  main- 
loin  the  Presidi^ut  iiidi.-|>vuilcnt  of  all  but  the  people — Alt  thcM 
mitaaiaaci  here  combined— Choice  will  leldom  fall  on  one  dot 
qulUlM — Ttic  chotcc  of  a  Vice  Pmident  by  the  people.  coDud- 
•rtd  Mid  spjiroved,  45) 

ttO.  69  HAMILTON. 

COMPARISON    OF    PRESIDENT    WITH    OTHER 

EXECUTIVES  AS  TO  POWERS. 

A  single  penon— Cotiipiared  vritii  th«  kins  of  Ur ual  Britain  and 
the  governor  of  Nfw  York— Elected  for  Smr  yti^n.  and  i»  re- 
tlipblc — Purlbrr  coitipanii'm  wilh  the  same  executives — Liable 
bi  tmiWAchnienl.  removal  from  ollicc.  and  panishRieat  by  civil 
la«— Camparird  ufiitiii  as  above,  aod  also  with  governors  of 
Uaqrland  and  Di-bwarv— Veto  power-' Compared  again  aa 
above  and  al»u  with  tiie  tfovcmorof  Massachuielts— Commander- 
B-tfalcf  of  the  army- an<r navj- of  the  United  States— Compared 
tgain  as  abov«.  and  also  wttli  the  K'^veniors  o(  New  Hamp- 
<ktt«  and  UaMacIiD-Hjiis— Pardoning  ptJ^ver— Compared  asabora 
— Tnaty-raaking  p'tvrer — Compared  as  above— General  iwiriow 
tad  comparison  of  t-K«cntivc  jKiwcrs,      .....    457 

XO.  JO,  HAMILTON. 

ADVANTAGE  OF  SINGLE  EXECUTIVE. 

A  yigo»oii»  esecutfvc  coii&ititent  witli  republican  government— 
fflurt  cBCstitnto*  a  proper  cxeculivc — irnity— Reasons  for  (hi* — 
Vettnif;  cxecuuve  authority  in  two  or  more  magistrates— Re- 
XrataliiK  tlin  executive  by  a  council — Ob;MUons  to  plurality  and 
(MtDvl  Djr  council  cnumcraled 4fi6 

XO  71.  HAMU.TON. 

PRESIDENTIAL  TERM  OF  OFFICE. 

It  ofTerts  hit  firmness  in  action — More  interest  in  what  b 
Hnna-  -  cxccutii,-e  should  not  be  siilj«OTTl«nt  to  popular 

■npni.  I  lie  of  the  legmlalrre— lndcp«adei>c«o(  dopan- 

*Wi  "!  n'.n-'.iiiment  neceMiiry—ShortncM  of  term  wMI  lenaeii 
i*d«peiid«ave — Tbe  proposed  terra  of  four  jreara  considered.    ^^% 


Uviil  EDirOKS  TABLE  OF  CO.VTEMTS. 

NO,  71.  IIAUtLTOf 

RE-ELIGIBILITY  OP  THE  PRRSIUBNT. 

Diiralion  In  oIIIcq  affecU  stability  of  lul ministration— Head*  al 
dopiMrtrnvBt  depeD<tont  oo  ox*cuttv«  and  will  cbaag*  wttti  tilnt — 
Ke-«Ufnbility  til  oxecntiv*— I'ho  oppiMitiou  lu  it  CMialdcred— A 
limit  of  «  *ingl«  Icrrn  would  dimiaish  induce mcntii  to  gvod  be- 
havior, iiKMttSB  tcmplaliiiiis  to  miu^ondncl,  jirevcnt  experience 
in  titc  office,  deprive  tlic  cixiiilry  in  i;mcr](ciicic>  t>f  the  ncrviccs 
<rf  iho  b«at  m«n.  snd  acX  «>  a  cvnstiiiillonal  borric'r  to  Mabilily 
of  aUmiaistration— The  !iuj>poai.il  advAciiugt-H  uf  a  Hiugluierm, 
cuiuidcrcil~Tbc  pcopk-  ihould  not  be  pievcntod  from  chooctinK 
mon  of  experience 4S1 

NO.  73.  UAUILTON. 

PRESIDENTIAL  SALARV  AND  VETO. 

Without  suitable  prorision  the  i-st-coiive  will  be  at  th«  metvy 
of  the  le){iKl>tiirG,  ami  the  iiidi-piMi<ii-ncv  iif  the  executive  iboiild 
not  bo  impoirud — The  veto  pi<wcr— Ki-awwi*  for  and  ta 
eniina«taU'<l  and  cuntuder*)! — The  roto  power  im>1  absolul<>— It 
ulrend)-  exiaX^  iu  New  York  and  Musacbuwlls,  .    4S8 

NO.  74.  IIAUILTON. 

PRESIDRNTIAL   COMMAND    OP   NATIONAL 
FURCKS  AND  POWER  OF  PARDON. 

Command  over  army  and  navy  and  milrtia— Power  lo  conanlt 
executive  ofliciids— Need  of  the  paidonina  pnwcr  Special  oon- 
nideralioD  of  the  pardoning  pon-cr  a-^  rceardx  trea-ion— Adv*ii> 
Uec  of  prompt  UKe  of  pArtfoD— lnci<lcni  of  Ma«i«ac:husett« — Lew 
of  lime  if  paraoniDg  power  were  vested  In  leji^i&lature,         .    496 

NO.  7i.  HAMILTON. 

PRESIDENTIAL  POWER  IN  TREATIES. 

One  of  the  best  feature*  of  the  constitution— Object i op  thU 
II  combiner  Ibo  excctitlve  and  legli-lallve  dci>artnieni«  cvaaid- 
ered— It  is  a  prop*.T  combination— ReasuiiH  Uit  ili>» — Houite  of 
Reprwsentativm  cannot  properly  be  admitted— Objectton  to  re- 
quiring only  two'tbirds  of  Kenatorx  present.  .  .     499 

NO.  Tb.  HAMILTON. 

PRESIDENTIAL  POWER  OF  APPOINTMENT. 

Ad  excellent  feature— This  power  ■■--."—,•-•'  l-p  cxerciced  by  th* 
people  at  Istkc — II  irlll   cauM   a   Ir  .c  ol   duty  in  th« 

cxocuiive— <)b>ectloa  to  lt»  beliiK    :  '•>  the  PreatdcDt 

ulunv — Ifp  may  be  urinnilcd  t>y  tienuie-  ".v  u(  Senate 

a  cliock  vo  favDiitimi— Ubjrdion  lliat  i'  -  til  may  Ihua 

control  Senate,  i.'onudcted— Whole  bodyol  ^'('llaU-  ijuiiwt  be  cor- 
rupted—I'lotcctioa  of  vuiulilutiuu.  .....    tos 


BDrrOlf'S   TABLE   OF  CONTKNTS. 


ixix 


no.  77.  HAMILTON. 

APPOlNTMIiNT  TO  OFFICE  AND  REMAINING 

,  POWERS  OF  PRESIDENT. 

I 

«Th«  concMTTOiKC  ni  the  Senate  necessary  to  dJSpUcn  as  wfll 
ItD  app>>int — Objecttoos  M  to  undue  control  of  tliv  Scnati-  hv 
t  President,  or  iImj  rw«ne.  considerwl— C<iniputi.-d  wiili  sys- 
■  «{  appaitilnicnt  ia  New  York— A ppuin ting  power  iJiualil  be 
MrtCAlctl  to  a  council  nr  shored  in  "V  the  Ilouxe — Po«r«r  to 
■KiDniti4:at«  information  to  ConKrvnii — To  recommend  ntcamrvs 
la  CoogTCM — Tu  eoovuiir  nnv  »n-  both  branclws  (i(  Congress^ 
T*  adfoam  CungrvKi — To  nr<.-i.-ivi.>  jtinbaMUiilors  and  other  public 
niatecTs — To  ciecutc  the  laws  o(  Ihc  Union— To  commiwion  all 
44lc*n  ot  lh«  United  States — Concluding  remarks  on  the 
aacotivc, S>i 

^O    tH  _  HAMILTON. 

TENURE  OP  OFFICE  OP    JUDICIAL  DEPART- 
MENT. 

Uodv  of  appolntmcat— Tenure— Need  of  complete  independ- 
■iK<i— AutIio«ity  10  ptonoiincv  un  tbe  conatltiitioniillijr  cu  tbo 
kwi — The  legislature  itiould  be  the  judge  of  it*  own  puw«rs — 
liitsrpretatioa  trf  the  laws  the  pecaliar  province  of  the  jiidicinry — 
Need  of  indepeiidciKv  on  thi«  ;tccoiinl— Inilcpcndcncv  required 
(dc  jodtciary  kk  euaidiuut  of  tliv  coniililution  and  of  privalu 
tigfats  as  w«U— WtMlaon  oi  icqntring  good  behuviur  a>i  tlie 
ttaiir* Sf7 

HAMILTON. 
SUPPORT   AND    RESPONSIBILITY  OP  THE 
JUDICIARY. 

A  fixed  provision  for  the  support  of  the  Judiciary  iieocisarv  to 
Ukif  iftrtcpondence— Respoimbility  of  tnc  juditiarj-— Juuge* 
lislitc  to  impeachment — Cannot  be  made  removable  for  inability 
— Rtaions  for  Ihift— Comparison  willi  confttitutton  of  New 
I'o'k S»7 

NO.  to.  HAMILTON. 

EXTENT  OF  THE  POWERS  OF  THE  JUDICIAL 

DEPARTMENT, 

Tu  triutl  COMK  the  judicial  autborilv  ouj^ht  to  extend— Tc>  oJI 
tiwa  which  ariM  frnm  duly  eiuiclvd  laws  of  the  Union:  which 
MOtem  the  execution  uf  tbe  proviiuuiisof  tile  conxlilutiou;  in 
wUcb  the  United  State*  itaporty;  which  involve  the  peace  of  the 
Uniaa  in  fortttgn  relatioDR,  or  when  two  states,  or  a  slate  and  the 
(itlmuaf  anctbvrstate.  or  tbc  citixenonf  different  state«.  are 
iwrties:  which  origlnAlc  on  hlgli  soasor  ar«  f>i  Admiralty  juriMlic- 
tian:  in  which  state  tribunals  canjioi  be  suppou>d  to  be  impH- 
Cattd^To  whnt  caics  authority  of  ittdiciary  will  extend  under 
inpasnl  constitution — Statement  ol  constitationol  prov-lsions — 
IWH  piovtfltoiin  conform  1*.  what  Ihc  powere  of  the  judiciary 
«4(lit to  b»^t>roprlcty  of  dalvg:ating  vquily  jurHdiclioD.     .    jjo 


Iix 


EDITORS  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


NO.  Si.  HAMILTON. 

DISTRIBUTION  OF  THE  AUTRORITV  OF  THE 

JUDICIARY. 

Propriety  «f  estnbUshinic  one  coart  of  fltiAl  and  luprente  }it- 
rUdtCtioo— Propricly  n((lcIrg»linK}udt<;i4Uj)ulbority  ta  ndiMind 
d«paTtiiienl~ObJc^-tiurt>>  lr>  ilii»  c'utiudetml — Tl)i»  dcleijaUon  nf 
aaUiority  scvuros  more  completely  the  acpuratiini  o(  the  judkiMY 
from  tbe  legislature,  recojtiiixcs  nwirc  fullr  Ihc  principle  of  good 
behavior  lu  n  tenure,  mcutvg  scrontcr  IckqI  nbtlity,  and  removes 
the  judiciary  (rum  |i«ity  Mrife— The  oxtLmplc  oi  <«riain  of  tli« 
btatvti— Thul  »o  k-^Nlature vuii  rvL-tUy^iHVidal  nitsiakuK «xccpt 
lu  to  futiiic  at-lion.  and  the  dmiger  irf  eticronchnninU  by  the 
judiciary  nn  the IcKiiilatUTe,  connidcrcd— I'r«ipriely(]<i.onsIi(u(tttg 
inferior  courts — Kcljcf  to  miprcinc  c->urt — .State  count  not  fit  for 
thift— Advaotagp  of  dividing  Umlcd  Slater  into  judicial  districts 
— Manner  in  which  uutliority  Hhould  be  dislritniled — UrtKinol 
jnrisdictioi]  of  mipreme  court — Original  jurisdiction  of  inferior 
courtii— Appellate  jurisdiction  of  supreme  court.  .  sjS 

NO,  U.  HAJIII.TON. 

SOME  MISCELLANEOUS  QUESTIONS  REfiARD- 

ING  JUDICIARY. 

Tlie  jurisdiction  of  the  state  courts  on  federal  niieKlionK — 
The  state  cmirts  will  retain  nil  that  is  not  exclusively  d<i I CKOlcd — 
Decision  of  caiiATs  ariAing  f  loni  a  jMirticuliir  r«)(nluli<i)i  mny  be 
delegated  by  Coagrt-ss  excliuii-uly  to  supreme  court— RelatiOD 
between  stale  and  federal  courts  wlicn  they  have  concur- 
rent  jurt«diclion— An  appeal  will  lie  from  stjitb  courts  tn  th* 
supreme  court— The  appelate  jtirisdldiuo  of  the  inferior  federal 
courts. sso 

HO.  8].  HAMILTON. 

TRLKL  BY  JURY  IN   RELATION  TO  NATIONAL 

JUDICIARY. 

Objection  that  there  is  nu  provision  In  tbe  prowised  cotisH- 
lutton  (or  trial  by  jjiry  in  civil  coses  considered— Tn»c  niennitte 
ai  maxims  on  which  this  objcdioo  rests — Importance  »(  richt 
ol  trial  by  jury  considered— Criminal  i  '  '  i  .*8C8 — Jurysystem 
in  different   states — Difficiiltv   of  e-'  '   ii   ceiicrat   rule — 

Impropriety  "f  sm-h  m  Eeni>ral  mle  ;;,  .. ;.  cimc*— The  piopiv- 

Mtion  of  Mass3c)iiuett.i  -Tlic  pnivi.iions  ff  the  Ncsv  Vorii  consti- 
tution—The propntition  that  the  iury  system  shouid  be  es;ah!ished 
in  nil  coses  whatever— Concluding  remarks,  .  %%% 


NO.  84. 


HA.MILTON. 


LACK  OP  A  BILL  Of  RIGHTS. 


BUI  of  riglita— Liberty  of  the  pre**— Seat  n(  eovemmeni  lad 
remnte— More  pmvisioa  fur  delit>  ilua  to  iho  t'iiil<-<t  Stales — 
AdtUtional  ex|i«nsc»o(  nuw  systinu— CvnclmUng  rvuiuks,  .    jOf 


BDITOlfS  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  Ixxi 

SO.  fl  HAMILTON. 


CONCLUSION. 


Hasner  in  which  subject  has  been  discussed — An  appeal  to 
the  reader  to  weifffa  the  matter  carefully  and  act  coDScientiously — 
Confidence  of  Pnbliiis  in  the  arguments  which  he  has  advanced — 
Tbeconceded  imperfections  no  reason  for  delay — Extent  of  them 
euKKemted — The  constitution  not  radically  defective— Rights 
tad  interests  of  the  people  safe  under  constitution — Not  per^ct, 
bot  agoodplan — The  state  of  the  country  forbids  delay  in  vainly 
seeking  a  perfect  plan — Difficulty  of  having  another  convention— 
Easer  to  core  defects  by  amendments  after  the  adoption — No 
ptuican  be  satisfactory  to  all  the  states— Supposed  obstacles  in 
Ibe  way  of  malting  subsequent  amendments  considered — The 
M>e  with  which  a  federal  convention  may  be  called  to  make 
inendmentA — Conclnsion ,       .       •    S^' 


I 


HAMILTON'S  TABLE  OR  CONTENTS. 


t.     lotroduL-lton i 

•'II.    CoDcemiDK  dangers  from  lotciga  force  and  inJln* 

eiw* 7 

Til.     The  same  subject  onntlniiuil il 

•4V,    The  same  subi«Gt  continued 17 

■V.     The  same  subjfct  continued m 

JVI.     Concerning  dangers  from  war  between  the  state*.     17 
*VlI.     The    subject    continued    BDd    parlicillar    <-«U*M 

J  enunicriitoil jj 

VIII.     Tbe  eilui'lH  of  interital  war  in  pruduciiit;  standing 
armieii  and  other  institutions  unfriendly  to  lilv 

^  crty. 41 

jlX.    The  utllilj-  of  th«  Union  a»  a  safeguard  against 

domvslic'  fuctlon  and  insurrection.      ,  -47 

X.     The  snme  subject  continued J4 

XI.     The  utilitj-  of  the  Union  in  respect  to  Comni«rca 

and  a  navy 64 

Xll.    The  uillilyof  titc  Union  in  respect  (o  revenue,    .     7a 
XllL    TiMt   same    subject  continac<l,  with  a  view  to 

economy 79 

XIV.    An  objection  drawn  from  tlw  extent  of  country 

ansn'CTcd ti 

,XV,    Coticcrning  the  defects  of  the  [msent  confedera- 
tion, in  rclntion  to  the  principle  of  IcjpRlalioo 
for  the  statrs  in  tiieir  collective  canacitles,        .     87 
3EVI.     The   same   subject  contlnacd,  In  relation  to  th« 

sainc  princtple -96 

XVll.     Thu  subject  continued,  and  llluntrated  by  cxaro- 
ptcs  to  sfaow  the  tendency  of  federal  KOvcrn- 
ments.  mtbcr  to  nnarcbv  among  the  members 
than  iyntnny  In  the  heaa.     .....  103 

XVIII.    Tlie  subject  continued,  with  farther  etaroptes.     .  loS 

XIX.     The  sublet  continued,  with  farther  example*.      .   ti4 

XX.     The  subject  cotilinuod,  with  farther  i:xnmi>)cs,     .   119 

XXt.     Further  defects  of  the  (>r«seni  constilaiiun,  .        .  laj 

XXII.    Ttie  same  subject  continued  and  concluded.       .  131 

XXIII.  The  necCMily  of  a  government,  at  least  equally 

energetic  with  the  one  propoMd,  ,  144 

XXIV.  The  miDJoct  cnntinuctl.  with  an  answer  to  an  ob- 

jection cnncernJnt;  standing;  armies,    ,         ,        .  150 

XXV.     The  subject  continued  with  the  umv  view,   .         .  156 

XXVI.     The  ut^ect  continued  with  the  same  view,   .         .   ifri 

XXVII.    TIm  subject  continued  wKb  the  same  riew,  .        .  169 


Isziv 


xxvrii. 

-—XXIX 
-  XXX. 

xxxi. 
xxxii. 

XXXIII. 

XX  XIV. 

XXXV. 

xxxvt. 

XXXVII. 


XXXVUI. 
.   XXXI X. 


XL. 

XLII. 
XUII. 
XLIV. 

xuv. 


XL  VI. 

XLVII. 

XLVIII. 

XLIX. 

L. 

LI. 

LIL 

LIIl. 

LIV. 

LV. 

LVl. 

L\ni. 


HAMILTON'S  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Pmom 

Th«  MBi*  «ubj«ct  ooncludftd,  .       .174 

CufiMrolns  th«  niilitU IT9 

Cooceming  tJuutiiMi 167 

The  same  mbject  continued trfi 

The  Mine  subject  (xntinucd 197 

The  haino  s«bie«l  continued aot 

T\\i!  same  aubjeci  i:ciuUBti«d k>6 

The  name  subject  coBtinaed aij 

The  li^uiie  subject  concladed 319 

CoDccming  llic  difflculticH  wlikh  the  oonvenliMi 
nm^t  IiAvci  oxporioDC«)d  In  the  (ornuillon  nf  a 

proper  plan si7 

The  subject  continued,  nnd  th«  incohereiKe  of 

the  objections  to  the  plan  exjKMcd.        .         .  137 
Th»  con(<^irmily  of  the  pfnii  to  republican  priii. 
cipks ',  All  objoctton  in  rvaooci  to  th*  powers 

oTlbe  coavx-nlion.  uxaniineu 14s 

Tbe  ume  objection  furthei  examined.  .  asz 

GoiKira)  view  <4  the  powcnt  propiwed    to   be 

i-os(»d  in  the  Union Mo 

Tlio  same  vivw  continned *7i 

The  some  view  vontinn^d aSo 

The  satite  view  contmned  and  concluded.  .        .  s^ 
A  further  discustJon  ot  the  Hippomd  dMigor 
from  th«  power!  of  the  Unioa,  to  (he  state 

gnvemnMnts 303 

The  subJACt  ol  the  lust  pinper  rcmmed  ;  «ritb  an 

exunilnnllon  of  the  coinparalive  mean*  of  iti- 

fluence  of  lite  federal  and  state  gowminvnts,  jio 

The  meaning  of  the  maxim,  which  requires  a 

separatioa  of  the  clepurtmcnts  of  powers,  ex- 

uninvd  ftnd  nscertftined 314 

The  same  Mibjvct  continued,  with  «  view  to  tbe 
meana  of  giving  efficacy  in  practice  tu  that 

maxim 317 

The  siunc  subject  continued  with  tbe  «une  view,  334 
The  same  subject  ctintinued  with  Ibe  sanvc  view.  339 
The  same  anbjMtconiinucHl  with  (lie  samcvtow, 

and  caocludcd. J43 

Codceroing  the  Iluiue  of  Repmcntatives,  with  a 
view  to  tbe  qualirtcations  of  the  ckctcirs  and 
elected,  and  (he  llrao  of  service  of  Ihc  tnent- 

b««. M« 

The  same  TObjcct  continued,  with  a  view  of  the 

teem  of  service  of  the  members,  _  353 

The  same  subject  continued  with  n  view  to  tbe 

ratio  of  ivurct<:ni4(lon, jto 

The  tiame  subject  ci'iiitnued  in  relation  to  tbe 

toUl  number  of  the  body 366 

Tbe  same  tinbje«t  conttnura  iu  relation  to  Ibe 

same  point 373 

Tile  *am«  subject  continne«l  in  relation  to  the 
iin)ip<H*d  iciiilniK-y  of  Die  plan  of  the  convMi- 
Uoa  to  elvviiiu  the  few  above  tbe  many.         .  377 


ttAAItLTOffS  TABLE  OF  COKTE/fTS. 


\%xv 


LVin.     The  same  nubjccl  cnnlinued  ta  reUttoo  to  llw 

future  augmentation  at  tbc  mctnbciK,      .         .  }S) 
LIX.     Conccminj;  Uic  rcjfuljitinn  of  cicclioax.        •         •  JQi 

LX.    Ill c  Mini V  st)l))oct  uonliiiiml »7 

LXl.  The  lUiiTie  a.abjC[^t  continued  ;in<I  codctndcd.  .  404 
LXU.  Coacenijiis  the  cutiiiiiuliuti  cl  tbc  Senate,  wilb 
Kganl  10  tlic  qiialiritatiouE  of  the  mcnibcr&. 
Ih«  mitniivr  of  appoint j  11 1;  (hcni,  tttc  oifiialjly 
of  reprcMBiatKiii.  the  luimlivr  ol  Ihv  svuAinre, 
and  the  dtiiativii  of  th«irappuililmeDtit,  .  408 
LXIIl.  A  (urthiT  view  <if  the  conslilution  of  the  Senate, 
in  rcKonl  to  the  duration  of  the  oppoiniment 

of  it»  n>«iiihcrs 416 

UUV.    A  Iiiriher  view  vf  tlic  constitution  of  tlioScnJitc. 

in  n-j-iinl  to  Ihc  ytwcj  o!  tnuktng  Irealie*.      .  4J6 

LXV.     A  further  view  of  tbc  cousiilution  of  tl>c  Senate, 
in   relation  to  its  capacity  a*  a  court  for  the 

trial  of  impeach  men  Is 43) 

LXVI.    The  uni«  subject  coiiiinued 440 

LXVII.    Concerning  tlie  constitution  of  the  President : 
A  gron  attempt  to  miHcprMcnt  tliiii  port  at 

Ihc  jilBii  detected 447 

Un'lll.  Tti«  view  of  tlie  coDBtilutlon  of  the  President 
continued,  in  relation  to  tbe  mode  of  appoint- 
ment.            ...         4$i 

L.XIX.  Thi!  Mime  view  contintic-d,  with  n  mmpariEOR 
betwi^iin  tlie  Presidvui  mid  the  king  of  (Jreat 
Britain  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  governor  of 

New  York  on  the  other 4S7 

LXX.    Tlie  «amo  view  continued  in  relation  to  the 
unity  of  the  exccmlve.  and  with  on  exsmlna- 
tion  of  the  project  of  au  executive  council.     .  46^ 
LXXl.    Tbe  lutme  view  continued,  in  regard  to  tbe  dura- 
lion  of  the  ofBcc 475 

LXXIL     The  Munc  view  continued  In  regard  to  the  rc- 

eltgibillty  ot  Um  Prt-siilcnt.        ...         481 
ULXllI.    Tbe  uaan  view  continued,  in  relation  to  tli«  pro- 
vision concerning  tuppvrt.  and  the  i>owcr  of 

the  negative 48$ 

LXXIV.  Tbo  name  view  continued,  in  relation  to  tho 
commanil   of    Ihc    national  foroes,  and  ttw 

IMWer  of  pardoning 496 

LXXV-    Tbe  same  view  continued  in  relation  to  the 

power  of  mokinii;  trcaiiet 499 

LXXVL    Tlic  tam*  view  continued  in  rrlnlJon  to  the  ap- 

poiaiment  of  the  ofhcen  of  the  f;ovcraiiicflt.  joj 
LXXVII.  Tlic  view  of  the  constitution  of  Ihe  President 
concluded,  with  a  further  consideration  of  the 
power  of  appointment,  and  a  conciw:  cxarni- 
luilion  of  hh)  retti.-iininK  powers.  .  .  jii 
LXXVni.  A  view  "f  llio  coualitulioii  of  the  judicial  depart- 
ment, in  relation  to  tbe  teniiro  of  good  be- 
havior,               ,       .  jt7 


IxsTi 


HAMILTON'S  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


LXXIX.    A  further  view  of  th«  judicial  department,  inre- 
tatton  to  the  provisions  for  tne  support  and 

responsibility  of  the  judges ja? 

LXXX.    A  further  view  of  the  jadicial  departtnent,  in  re- 
lation to  the  extent  of  its  powers,     .        .         .  $30 
LXXXI.    A  further  view  of  the  judicial  department,  in  re- 
lation to  the  distrilmtion  of  its  authority,         .  %it 
LXXXII.    A  further  view  of  the  judicial  department,  in 

reference  to  some  miscellaneous  questions,    .  5SO 
LXXXIII.    A  further  view  of  the  judicial  department  in  re- 
lation to  the  trial  by  jury,         ....  S55 
LXXXIV.    Couceming  several  miscellaneons  objections,    .  569 

LXXXV.    Conclusion S8i 

Articles  of  the  new  constitution S9> 


K" 


PREFACE. 


It  is  supposed  that  a  collection  of  the  papers  which 
have  made  their  appearance  in  the  gazettes  of  this  cit3r, 
under  the  title  of  The  Federaiisl,  may  not  be  without  effect 
in  assisting  the  public  judgment  on  the  momentous  ques- 
tion of  the  constitution  for  the  United  States,  now  under 
the  consideration  of  the  people  of  America.  A  desire  to 
throw  full  light  upon  so  interesting  a  subject  has  led,  in  a 
great  measure  unavoidably,  to  a  more  copious  discussion 
than  was  at  first  intended.  And  the  undertaking  not 
being  yet  completed,  it  is  judged  advisable  to  divide  the 
collection  into  two  volumes,  of  which  the  ensuing  numbers 
constitute  the  first.  The  second  volume  will  follow  as 
speedily  as  the  editor  can  get  it  ready  for  publication. 

The  particular  circumstances  under  which  these  papers 
have  been  written,  have  rendered  it  impracticable  to  avoid 
violations  of  method  and  repetitions  of  ideas  which  can- 
not but  displease  a  critical  reader.  The  latter  defect  has 
even  been  intentionally  indulged,  In  order  the  better  to 
impress  particular  arguments  which  were  most  material 
to  the  general  scope  of  the  reasoning.  Respect  for  pub- 
lic opinion,  not  anxiety  for  the  literary  character  of  the 
performance,  dictates  this  remark.  The  great  wish  is 
that  it  may  promote  the  cause  of  truth  and  lead  to  a 
right  judgment  of  the  true  interests  of  the  community. 

Nkw  Yobk,  March  17,  ij88. 


txivii 


THE  FEDERALIST. 


INTRODUCTION. 


Hamilton. 


UtitUf  t/  ikt  Umm — Imrfiiimrf  #/  imfrdtrAtieK—CafoHlf  •/ 
tnfli  /tr  ulf-givtrHmnt — Off<>iititn  ■>/  ifdUV  afiiiAh  la  HnB  imililH' 
mtm—lhmiil  Jt^titHUi  •//  afimaii-'I'alHifdl  inliiiraHit—Charps  anJ 
ituultr  fhargtt — PttliHi  a  sufprrur  tf  tAe  frofritJ  tfHIlittitiftt—Out- 
liiu  *f  Thi  f-'tdtT^Uil—Naiifiiat  utitimint  /or  Vm»n. 

Tt  lAe  PevfU  e/  the  State  of  Neai  Yark; 

After  an  uuequivocal  experience  of  the  inefficiency  of 
tbe  subsisting  federal  government,  you  arc  called  upon 
to  deliberate  on  4  new  Conf^titutiou  for  the  United  States 
of  America.     The  subject  speaks  its  own  iropurtance;   i 

mprchcnding   in    its  cunsctiiienccs  nothing    less  than    \ 

ic  exi>itence  of  the  UNION,  the  a^ety  and  welfare  of 
parts  of  which  it  is  composed,  the  fate  of  an  empire 
in  many  respects  the  must  interesting  in  the  world.  It 
ha&  been  frequently  remarked  that  it  seems  to  huve  been 
rvcd  10  the  people  of  this  country,  by  their  conduct 
example,  to  decide  the  important  question,  whether 
ties  of  men  arc  really  capable  or  not  of  establishing 
'good  goTcmmcnt  from  rejection  and  choice,  or  whether 
they  are  forever  destined  to  depend  for  their  political 
constitutions  on  accident  and  force.  If  there  be  any 
tnith  in  the  remark,  the  crisis  at  which  we  arc  arrived 
may  with  propriety  be  regarded  as  the  era  in  which  that 
decision  is  to  be  made;  and  a  wrong  election  of  the  part 
we  «)ull  act  muy*  in  this  view,  deserve  to  be  considered 
as  the  general  misfortune  of  mankind. 

This  idea  will  add  the  inducements  of  philanthropy 
to  thoM  of  patriotixm,  to  heighten  the  solicitude  which 


\ 


^^ 


1  NATUHE  OF  OPPOSITION.  |jr«.  I 

all  considerate  and  good  men  must  feel  for  tlie  event, 
Happy  will  it  be  if  uur  choice  sliuiilO  be  directed  by  a 
judicious  estimate  of  our  true  interests,  unpcrplcxed  and 
unbiased  by  considerations  not  connected  with  the 
public  good.  But  this  is  a  thing  more  ardently  to  be 
wished  than  seriously  to  be  expected.  The  plan  offered 
to  our  deliberations  atfects  too  many  pnrlint'"  'nivr'"'i 
innovate*  upon  too  many  local  institutions,  not  to  in- 
volve in  its  discussion  a  variety  of  objects  foreign  to  it« 
merits,  and  of  views,  passions,  and  prejudices  little  favor- 
able to  the  discovery  of  truth. 

Among  the  most  formidable  of  the  obstacles  which  the 
new  Constitution  will  have  to  encounter  may  readily  be 
fM  dislinguished  the  obvious  interest  of  a  cer- 

■•.  W  tain  class  of   men   in   every  State   to   resist 

all  changes  which  may  hazard  a  diminution  of  the  [xiwer, 
emolument,  and  consequence  of  the  offices  tlicy  hold 
nnder  the  State  establishment;'  and  the  perverted 
ninbitiiin  of  anolticr  class  of  men,  who  will  either  hope 
to  aggraridtze  themselves  by  the  confusions  of  their 
country,  or  will  flatter  themselves  with  fairer  prospects 
of  elevation  from  the  subdivision  of  the  empire  into 
several  partial  confederacies  than  from  its  union  nndec 
one  govcnirocnt. 


I  No  lalxteiil  objetxion  to  the  coaolilution  plsvcd  v>  lilal  ■  p>tl  in  iha 
ilni«l«  lor  aHoiilioD  u  Ihii  oppasition  d  wiut  in  nuikni  parUim 
would  be  naltnl  ihc  vutun  MUb  "  ucfalnct."  The  Revoluilonaty  Wat 
■mt  Uic  >iiti-n|u«nl  jcan  ul  anardiy,  hyilriTinc  liit"  cillc  <ir  i  .  i  uli- 

iii)-  lliT  ):«iil[y  >n<l  ll>«  vonamcnial  i:!^*^*,  Iiad  ii:ii»lrrml  ki- 

itDJ  ia  each  iLitc  lo  tbf  miall  liadbuldon.      riiFir  f Mul 

been  Umasly  deiuociaiK  ;  inilccd  wku.  io-daT<  "v>'  i  '  'I  -  )«• 

IbiiiC  1  aoafiit  iu«ive]-caf\  bul  tivcii  liiiired  by  mii^h   i  Mi'  i   ufu. 

liuKk  a\  I»|>cr  miHwy,  htij-  niid  ImlerOawk,  nol  u^bri  t(|;il  •Ictlun 
dcxiltricil  (o  (sv>ii  llicin  ami  I»«I<1  Uirii  iiiip|<Or1  lo  Itir  ilonilnnsl  (laity. 
Thu  unjiM  Unitini'  »[  otic  doNt  at  llx  cxpttiM!  of  otbrn  (lie  tuntlilalliiB 
ucamBMl  lo  end.  an-]  wiili  ie,  of  orcvuiiy,  the  poitit  <>(  ilie  madiinB 
len'l-"-  '■-■  — ' *—       *>  "'■  •■-■■* I-   ■T'T  -..-....  ...    .1 (,...    ihoM!  {» 

(III  .o :  aiiil 

ll..<r    ■■,.  .  ,-|lil,-Uy 

hi  Ma»achUHltt,  IIbmucIi  mi  ir^ 

kii  >ui>pon  oj  Ikr  [0111411  ulitfn    \•^   r;:iirii  l"(    ll"   I  <■( 

■dtnliialMii  to  lliai  Dlike  i  wliilc  SjhiucI  AiUdu  j  .ir) 


ftialUnl 


FAIR  OPPOSITION. 


It  is  not,  howtrcr,  mjr  ilesign  to  dwell  upon  obsfrva- 
tioire  of  thU  n;tture.  I  am  well  aware  that  it  would  be 
di«n£enuous  to  resolve  indiscriminately  the  opposition 
o(  any  set  of  men  (merely  bcoiuse  their  situations  might 
tnbjcct  them  to  suspicion)  into  interested  or  ambitious 
»ic«».  Candor  will  oblige  us  to  admit  that  even  such 
men  may  be  actuated  by  upright  intentions;  and  it  can- 
not be  doubted  that  much  of  the  opposition  which  has 
made  its  appearance,  or  may  hcreafit-r  make  its  appear- 
ance,  will  :«prin(r  from  sonrces,  blamrlrss,  at  least,  if  not 
respectable— the  honest  errors  of  minds  led  astray  by 
preconceived  jealousies  and  fears.  So  numerous  indeed 
anil  so  powerful  are  ihe  causes  which  serve  to  ^ve  ft 
(lite  bias  to  the  judgment,  that  we,  upon  many  occasions,  . 
sec  wise  and  good  men  on  the  wrong  as  well  as  on  the 
right  side  of  questions  of  the  first  mas;nitude  to  soriety. 
This  circumstance,  if  duly  attended  to,  would  furnish  a 
lessou  of  moderation  to  those  who  are  ever  so  much  per- 
wailed  of  their  being  in  the  right  in  any  controversy. 
Awl  a  further  reason  for  caution,  in  this  respect,  might 
be  drawn  from  the  rellectiim  that  we  arc  not  always  sure 
(bat  ihoMe  who  advocate  the  truth  are  influenced  by  purer 
lirinciplcs  than  their  antagonists.  Ambition,  avarice, 
iwrsona)  aniniosity,  party  opposition,  and  many  other 


wii-  nil*  mmK  tl^fpttnl  In  \\tt\t  next  ttMlim*.  bol  raatnl  lo  1»  inipar> 
'•  '  I  i  1-1  I'lc  Win  irf  [>*mocr«cy  lo  poit«»  in  tSol.     la 

I  iwily,  aflCT  twelve  yean  of  pr«ilic«lly  uncnu- 
t».'-- 1  {'  <>■  I.  a.\  '.'III.-:  Iic^^  lo  wane,  wm  lorccii  lo  uw  (xudulciit  iiuait« 
It  keep  lueK  ill  jHjitet  la  l^rfl,  iiiJ  al  llic  iK«t  <)n(<oii  WM  rnlirrly 
4ltulKt.  Ill  fciiniylvaiiia  (tiR  u!lni-(lriiiM:ralic  (otly  wu  prixnpdy 
nrttkrovn.  In  Vlrcloii  I'lirkk  Hroty  wnsdrii-m  iritn  iriiremenl.  Mid 
•t  l««  (ictMii  ncicr  •Kniii  ctfTCOed  tnateiinl  poliii.nl  influence.  In 
iwl  la  ociy  lUle  ilir  jit-ic^ion  of  the  ledcint  (cmiiliiition  n)xrkc<i  iha 
■rOBpi  oiuHnh>ii  oi  ilkjij  )VMraiice  of  LCfiilii  men  liiilvdu  )inimiiiciit 
oiMtiltn.  (SwK.tJ'.  '■  K>i-iT^.™ilieC««Mliliiti'>n."]>.  i;6,iii><l"ri!nn' 
■(Inni*  aiul  llir  Kr.tmil  ( Hi^.tilnlioa."  p.  ll  )  Nci  ilid  ihk  vitil 
inil.iri.L  v  'if  niliiiiiiil  •«  i\\U  p^<lilks<fHl  nilh  thu  vuiiBC  of  the  "  Anli-< 
I*  ilie   iniHl   cenaiii   mcilkoik  In   tliU  day  ul  <l«fealin|;  in 

!!tTrfilT>F  "  li«inc  tbe  iniriXloii  inin  i  Male  polHiril  ixiiiictt 
'I  al.     Km  matt  itian  lull  of  th«  wnnurninp  of 

ti  iIkwI  lh[«ii|;li  i-okIfM-i  Xtrt  coalrol  oj  tli«  nanal 

Er'i.t.ni.'Tii.  mil  iiir  m \ie-d"iniT>int-piiity  Icjilen  of  lo-dny  JrcM  notti. 
E  »  uiucb  as  a  Oi«t)ily  fouglii  iiBtiooal  ^kciion.— EulTOK. 


LIBERTY  AND  DESPOTISM. 


or*.  1 


motires  not  more  laudable  than  thcM.  are  apt  to  openle 
as  well  upon  those  who  sup|>orl  att  tl)o»e  who  oppose  the 
right  side  of  a  question.  Were  there  not  crcn  these 
inducements  to  moileriittnn,  nothing  coutd  he  more  ill- 
judged  than  thai  intolerant  spirit  which  has,  at  all  times, 
characterized  political  parties.  For  in  politics,  as  in 
rettjpon,  it  is  e()aall)r  nhsurd  to  aim  at  making  proseljrtes 
by  fire  and  sword.  Heresies  in  either  can  rarely  be  cured 
by  persecution. 

And  yet,  however  jugt  these  sentiments  wilt  l>e 
allowed  to  be,  we  have  already  sufiicieot  indications  that 
it  will  happen  in  this  as  in  all  former  cases  of  great 
national  discussion.  A  torrent  oT  angr^  and  malignant 
passions  will  be  let  loose.  To  judge  from  the  conduct  of 
the  opposite  parties,  we  shall  be  led  to  conclude  that 
they  will  mutually  hope  to  evince  the  justness  of  their 
opinions,  and  to  increase  the  number  of  their  converts 
by  the  loudness  of  their  decUmalions  and  the  bitterness 
of  their  invectives.  An  enlightened  leal  for  the  energy 
aiKl  efficiency  of  government  will  be  stigmatized  as  the 
offspring  of  a  temprr  fond  of  despotic  power  and  hostil 
to  the  principles  of  liberty.  An  overscrupulous  jealousy 
of  danger  to  the  rights  of  the  people,  which  is  mor 
commonly  the  fault  of  the  head  than  of  the  heart,  will  U 
represented  as  mere  pretense  and  artifice,  the  stale  bait 
for  popnbrily  at  the  expense  of  the  public  g'wd.  It  will 
be  forgotten,  on  the  one  hand,  that  jealousy  is  the  usual 
concomitant  of  love,  and  that  the  noble  enthusiasm  ol 
liberty  is  apt  to  be  infected  with  a  spirit  of  narrow  and 
illiberal  distrust.  On  the  other  hand,  it  will  be  equall; 
forgotten  that  the  vigor  of  government  is  essential  to  th 
security  of  libi-rty;  that,  in  the  contemplation  of  a  Muni 
and  well-informed  judgment,  their  interest  can  never 
scpanted;  and  that  a  dangerous  ambition  mnre  nflei; 
IutVs  behind  the  specious  mask  of  leal  for  the  rights  o 
the  people  than  under  the  forbidding  appearance  of  ica 
for  the  firmness  and  efficiency  of  goverameni.  Utstor 
will  teach  us  that  the  former  has  been  found  a  muc 
ffore  cetjjjo  0»d  i"  llicimcBdwiUon  of  dcspul 


»»nt— ]  OUTLIHE  OF  FEDERALIST.  S 

the  latter,  and  that  of  those  men  who  have  overturned 
the  liberties  of  republics,  the  greatest  number  have 
began  their  career  by  piying  an  obsequious  court  to  the 
people;  commencing  demagogues,  and  ending  tyrants. 

Id  the  course  of  the  preceding  observations,  I  have 
had  aa  eye,  my  fellow-citizens,  to  putting  you  upon 
funr  guard  against  all  attempts,  from  whatever  quarter, 
to  influence  your  decision  in  a  matter  of  the  utmost 
moment  to  your  welfare,  by  any  impressions  other  than 
those  which  may  result  from  the  evidence  of  truth. 
You  will,  no  doubt,  at  the  same  time  have  collected  from 
the  general  scope  of  them,  that  they  proceed  from  a 
source  not  unfriendly  to  the  new  Constitution.  Yes,  my 
countrymen,  J  own  to  you  that,  after  having  given  it  an 
attentive  consideration,  I  am  clearly  of  opinion  it  is  your 
interest  to  adopt  it.  I  am  convinced  that  this  is  the 
safest  course  for  your  liberty,  your  dignity,  and  your 
happiness.  I  affect  not  reserves  which  I  do  not  feel.  I 
will  not  amuse  you  with  an  appearance  of  deliberation 
when  I  have  decided.  I  frankly  acknowledge  to  you  my 
convictions,  and  I  will  freely  lay  before  you  the  reasons 
on  which  they  are  founded.  The  consciousness  of  good 
intentions  disdains  ambiguity.  I  shall  not,  however, 
moltiply  professions  on  this  head.  My  motives  must 
remain  in  the  depository  of  my  own  breast.  My  argu- 
ments will  be  open  to  all,  and  may  be  judged  of  by  all. 
They  shall  at  least  be  offered  in  a  spirit  which  will  not 
disgrace  the  cause  of  truth. 

I  propose,  in  a  series  of  papers,  to  discuss  the  follow- 
ing interesting  particulars: — The  uiiiity  of  the  UNION  to 
your  polilieal  prosperity — The  insufficiency  of  the  present  Con- 
f titration  to  preserve  that  Union — The  neceaity  of  a  govern- 
*M/  at  least  equally  energetic  with  the  one  proposed,  to  the 
'Itainment  of  this  object —  The  conformity  of  the  proposed  Con- 
tlitution  to  the  true  principles  of  republican  government — Its 
nalogy  to  your  tnon  State  constitution — and  lastly,  The  addi- 
li**al  security  which  its  adoption  will  afford  to  the  preserva- 
*•*  */  that  species  of  government,  to  liberty,  and  to  property. 

Id  the  progress  of  this  discussion  I  sha.'  endeavor  to 


UTILITY  OF  VmON. 


DTfcl 


give  a  sattsfactorjf  answer  to  all  the  i>lii»;tion)i  which 
xhuU  have  made  Iheir  appearance,  Uiat  may  seem  to  have 
any  claim  to  your  attention. 

It  ntay  perhaps  be  thought  stiperfluous  to  offer  argu- 
ments to  prove  the  utility  of  the  UNION,  a  point,  na 
SwVo*.  doubi,  deeply  engraved  on  the  hearts  of  the 
Bud  IS  great  body  of  the  peo[^e  in  every  State,  and 
one  which,  it  may  be  imaijiiicd,  has  no  adversaries.  But 
the  fact  is  that  we  already  hear  it  whispered  in  the  pri- 
vate circles  uf  those  who  oppose  the  new  Constilution, 
that  tile  thirteen  States  are  of  too  great  extent  for  any 
gciieral  system,  and  that  we  must  of  necessity  resort 
to  se]>aratc  confederacies'  of  distinct   portions  of   the 


*Tliii  Iheorr  fA  <e|iaraie  contcderaclef.  an  llie  |>raaiM)  thai  ih*  ^reat 
terrHoty  tomyiivt^  in  ibe  Union  ««b  ioo  vjiit  atxl  mo  diflcrtsltf  circvm- 
uaDced  lo  nikt  a  ecuerxl  eovemnKnt  pouiblc.  noi  held  \,j  Many  men 
Kt  •  llicoiy,  who  iiuiK-  llie  l«M  w«rc  milllD);  tii  illdOfil  (he  riiicriaieiil. 
Tile  impcniilitlil)?  nai  lhcrf;(ote  lli«  ciiiilnili'in  i>f  llitn*  iri'iKnnl  lo  (be 
coiHlidiiion.  lucb  u  U<ort:e  Clinion  and  I'ltfick  Hriirjr.  nixl  Wwxt.  c*o 
be  liille  iloulit  thil  line  noulU  hare  jui,iilieil  fbcii  imJivlioti  bai  fot 
th«  L-h*ai;iMl  cnwIilHin  ctcaleil  by  ilie  rallnmt  aiul  llie  lelFj^ph.  With 
caih  wctiiHwl  CKintrotcnr  llic  )>[»(rI  Itu  [ra|>tKa[«l,  mul  Ilia  wi'lion 
tlul  liu  felt  ifX''"'^  ''^'  Ihmltnril.  or  nllriiiplnl,  la  (r^in  iIkII  into 
■  ic|iame  nail»n.  Thui  in  iSoj  nhrn  ih<  naT)(;aiion  of  ihe  MiHiiaip[>l 
mu  clowd  Ihe  Wntem  Main  Kiiouslv  plannctl  >  leptiRlioa  Uata  ilio 
Union.  Ijilf:i,  witrn  llie  iwicliaw  nl  I.oultiana  hail  iciiuvixl  ihr 
Wnltrn  i;ti»*imc-T.  lli«  New  Kn^Und  leailm  cndrari'iP'l  !■■  furni  a 
wpUktc  confctlcracy  in  llw  Nnrtli.  I1i«  Sla<r<>latrt'  (Jonvnnlino  d< 
l8s«  ihrealclioi  to  tatm  ■  Suullicm  confcdetacjr.  >  projctl  rcjliiej  leii 
y«>n.  Ulcr.  In  cubiaie  tbc  pin  itai  lli.il  ihc  icclHiiial  inicFciu  wcte 
Ion  iliMinct  lo  alliiw  ol  one  eo*'"'<nenl.  allliouch  it  tiiay  l>r  taitllr 
BUuttlcil  thai  ihv  M^-linnnl  ditlilKlitnih  in  lltr  ttntcinlurt  brrn  m  ctesler 
llun  the  KCiional  ■liffmiKot  in  f<«h  &lale.  Thr  IdciciI  irtiili  olMce* 
lion  was  »eiy  nell  ikeuhcil  by  JrHtraoii,  wben  id  1708  ho  Wrote 
"  Bal  if  on  a  lcn>p>-iify  minritorily  o(  tkc  one  paily.  tt  -  ■'.-■  i  \a 
rcwwl  lo  atciuMHi  ol   Ihi^  (inuio.  r»i  foloal  i^oiniimcni  til. 

If  10  rill  oumclvn  of  Itic  [irrMOl  rale  >il  Ma»«i-l(ii«rtl«  a:..'  '  ir.ii(. 

weliteak  the  llnion.  nil  1  the  cvilsin))  ilierc?  Su|-p»w  tWfiew  tni'lancl 
lUles  alone  cut  oft.  will  oui  naintc  be  dunged?  A r«  we  not  aaen  ulU 
to  Ihe  tuUlh  of  lli.it.  and  vllh  sti  tlir  i-dulooi  nf  men  f  I DiOKiJlaltly. 
«w  vliati  tec  a  friiiitylvania  and  a  \'itj;li-.ia  piaity  atlx  In  tl>c  trtidnair 
(onfoiUtacT,  and  llif  (inblir  mind  oill  Lvdl^nclnl  with  the  wnir  ituly 
ipirit.     VTut  a  ipime,  100.  will  ihe  one  paty  have  in  ihnr  haniii.  h.y 

e4«frjBllv  Tiirrari-ELin.-    I^i'    .-.lf>i  r  \\\\\  mhI'w  ri-r  1     <li.    <4i   npi  3  At-\    di^r  «i(l 

]• :  1 1  uad 

N..  .ih* 

Ttl'tlil'^iUliMA  >i|     li.i  .i:  l;m>  iiUlcs,  dK-l    IJiE)   H'i4  EOJ    Ljr  l.JtUillg  IlltV 

tktii  iinijileaniu." — f;i>lTO». 


CONSTITUTION  OR  DISUNION.  t 

wbolc*    This     doctrine    will,    in    all     probabilitjr,    be 
gradoally   propagated,    till   it   has    votaries   enough   to 
countenance  an  open  avowal  of  it.     For  nothing  can  be 
more  evident  to  those  who  are  able  to  take  an  enlarged 
view  of  the  subject  than  the  alternative  of  an  adoption 
of   the   new  Constitution   or  a  dismemberment  of  the 
Union.     It  will  therefore  be  of  use  to  begin  by  examining, 
the  advantages  of  that  Union,  the  certain  evils,  and  thel 
probable  dangers,  to  which  every  State  will  be  exposed] 
from  its  dissolution.     This  shall  accordingly  constitute! 
the  subject  of  my  next  address. 

FUBLIUS. 


H0>    2i  f/HdrfrndtHl Jemmal,  Oclobw  31,  1787.)  J^y- 

THE   VALUE   OF   UNION. 

/ftrtttitf  »f  gtvernmmt —  Theory  ef  separate  eeH/ederaeies — Geegrafh- 
ietl  amd  ratial  ksmegituily  of  Ike  Uniied  Stales — Inefficiency  of  the 
aicUt  tf  cettftJtrBtien — Tht  Federal  Convention — Coniideralion  of  Iht 
avIitmtitH — TJU  congress  of  ITJ4 — Universal  belief  in  the  ntassily  of 
Ijiutm — Prtjett  of  separate  confederacies, 

Tt  Ikt  People  of  the  Stale  of  New  York: 

When  the  people  of  America  reflect  that  they  are  now 
called  npoD  to  decide  a  question,  which,  in  its  conse- 
qoences,  must  prove  one  of  the  most  important  that  ever 
engaged  their  attention,  the  propriety  of  their  taking  a 
nry  comprehensive,  as  well  as  a  very  serious,  view  of  it, 
will  be  evident. 

Nothing  is  more  certain  than  the  indispensable  neces- 
lity  of  government,  and  it  is  equally  undeniable  that, 
whenever  and  however  it  is  instituted,  the  people  must 
cede  to  it  some  of  their  natural  rights,  in  order  to  vest  it 
with  requisite  powers.  It  is  well  worthy  of  consideration 
therefore,  whether  it  would  conduce  more  to  the  interest 

*  The  nme  Idea,  tncini;  the  ■rpimenls  to  their  consequences,  is  held 
■■t  fd  icTaTB]  of  the  late  publicitioni  against  the  new  Constitution. — 
foBUm. 


8  SEPARATE  CONFEDESACIES.  »•.! 

of  the  people  o(  America  that  they  should,  to  all  ^nenl 
purposes,  be  one  nation,  under  one  federal  government, 
or  tlut  they  situuld  divide  tliemselres  into  separate  con- 
federacies, and  f;ive  to  the  heat)  of  each  tlie  same  kind  of 
powers  which  they  arc  advised  to  place  in  one  naiiunal 
government. 

It  has  until  latelf  been  a  received  and  uncontradicted 
opinion  that  the  prosperity  of  the  people  of  America 
depended  on  their  continuing  firmly  united,  and  the 
wishes,  prayers,  and  efforts  of  our  best  and  wisest  citizens 
have  been  cunstanlly directed  to  tluit  objecL  But  putiti* 
cians  now  appear,  who  insist  that  this  opinion  is  errune* 
ous,  and  that  instead  of  looking  for  safety  and  happiness 
in  nniiin.  wc  ought  to  seek  it  in  a  division  of  the  States 
into  distinct  confederacies  nr  sovereijjntics.  However 
extraordinary  this  new  doctrine  may  appear,  it  neverthe- 
less has  its  advocates;  and  certain  characters  who  were 
much  oppij&ed  to  it  formerly  are  at  present  uf  the  num- 
ber. Whatever  may  be  the  arguments  or  inducements 
which  liave  wrought  this  change  in  the  sentiments  and 
declarations  of  these  genilemen,  it  certainly  wuld  not 
be  wise  in  (he  people  at  large  to  adopt  these  new  politi- 
cal tenets  without  being  fully  convinced  that  they  are 
founded  in  truth  and  souikI  policy. 

il  has  often  given  mc  pleasure  to  obKctve  thai  tiuiependeni 
America  was  not  emiiiMMnI  uf  deiache*!  and  dislani  tcrritorrrs,  but 
thai  one  <smneclc(),  fcrlik.  wtdt-spreddi'ig  country  wns  tlie  por- 
tion of  our  wMtein  mki*  of  libirny.  Proviifence  hiu  in  a  p;i(iicular 
m»rni-r  blrs*nl  il  wiih  s  rariny  of  soiU  nnd  ptoiJiKlions,  and 
w.'klcrcd  il  ivilh  tnnitm»ntilc  itreanii.  lot  Ihv  ilFti)*ht  ami  acctinimo- 
H.ilinn  111  its  inh.il>iMntv  A  viCT&vnn  of  ii.ivi;;able  wjIfts  tnritit 
a  kinil  ol  chain  luumt  ill  Iwidcrt.  a*  if  to  t>iiiil  ti  ii>];rihcr  ;  witile 
■he  moti  acAi\t  rirrn  In  the  world,  tunnitic  at  convcnrriil  <li)u 
lances,  prcscnl  then)  with  hl-^hwn)'s  for  ihc  rasy  comniiinicaiiau 
ol  Iriendty  aids,  anil  the  mutual  Iranspurlallun  and  exchange  at 
thfrir  ranou*  c<immoilliic^ 

With  equal  (ileuuiF  1  \\a\t  so  often  taken  notice  Iftal  ProvW 
dence  hai  l»p»:n  |i1caml  in  girc  this  niw  ronnpcfeil  country  la  one 
uniieii  pe<>i>le— a  people  ik-sccnikd  from  (he  tame  anceiiorst 
■peakiiiK  the  siune  Unjpjage.  jfivlcnuit;  Ihc  «amo  religiMi.  alladml 


im 


NATIONAL  SENTiMBNT. 


Ill  ihe  Mine  phnttples  o(  Kovemment.  voy  similar  rn  (heir  raunncra 
and  cusiaiiM.  and  who,  by  lUcir  joint  couniels,  Atms,  anil  cfTofls. 
tgtnins  lUk  by  side  throughout  n  long  iitiil  liluudy  war.  have 
■oUy  etuhlttbcd  general  libcny  and  in<lepeiidciicc. 

This  country  und  thi»  people  seem  to  liave  hccn  made  for  each 
oihci,  and  it  appears  a*  if  il  was  the  de-sign  o(  Providence  thai  an 
feibetilaace  m  proper  and  coiivenieitl  lor  a  batid  <i(  lir«ihi«n 
■uied  to  each  other  by  the  sirongcst  lie^  should  never  l>e  split 
MO  a  number  o(  uiuocUl.  ^e^ous.  and  alien  sovereign  lies. 

SMiilar  KRlimcnis  have  hitherto  prevailed  among  all  orders  and 
ilmomirutknis  ol  men  among  its.  To  all  Eeneral  purpoMS  we 
U>e  uiufiKmly  been  one  people ;  each  individual  ciiixcn  every- 
where enjoying  the  urne national  ri};hts.  priWlc(;ev^nd  ptolccdon, 
A»  a  sUion  we  have  matlc  peace  and  war ;  as  a  nation  we  have 
nnquished  our  common  ciieiTitrs ;  us  a  nation  ivc  liAve  [orme<l 
■fiances,  and  made  treaties,  and  entered  into  viirious  compacls 
Urfoonvenlions  with  (oiet)[n  stales. 

A  strong  sense  of  the  value  and  blessings  of  union 
nducctl  tlic  peuple,  at  a  very  early  pcrioO,  to  institute  a 
fcdenl  goveriinient  to  [>rc!(erveaiid  {>cr|)etiuite  it.  They 
lonncd  it  almost  as  soon  as  they  had  a  political  exisl- 
tflce;  nay,  at  a  time  vhcn  their  habitations  were  in  flanu's. 
■hen  man]'  of  their  citixent  were  bleeding,  and  vrhen 
t>K  progress  of  hostility  and  desolation  left  little  room 
lot  th<ise  calm  and  tnatiirc  inquiries  and  reDcctiuns  which 
BUH  ever  precede  the  formation  of  a  wi&c  and  well- 
tuUnced  government  for  a  free  people.  It  is  not  to  be 
■oodered  at  that  a  government,  instituted  in  times  so 
uuuspictous,  should  on  experiment  be  found  greatly 
deiclcnt  and  inadequate  to  the  purpose  it  was  intended 
Id  answer. 

This  intelligent  people  perceived  and  regretted  these 
defects.  Still  continuing  no  less  attached  to  union  than 
ouDored  of  liberty,  they  observed  the  danger  wlitcli 
muaediatcly  threatened  the  former  and  more  remotely 
lilt  latter;  and  being  persuaded  that  ample  security  for 
U)(i)  could  only  be  found  in  a  national  government  more 
•isdjr  framed,  they,  as  with  one  voice,  convened  the  late 
ciKiTentton  at  Philadelphia,  to  take  that  important  sub 
|ca  under  coasidcraUon. 


10  PKOPOS£D  coysr/rvr/OA\ 

This  convention,  composed  of  men  who  (J^csKcd  the 
conTidcncc  of  the  people,  and  many  o(  whom  had  become 
Sat  highly    distinguished    by     their    patriotism, 

>•.«.  virtue,  and  irisdom,  in  times  which  tried  the 

minds  and  hearts  of  men,  undertook  the  arduous  task. 
In  the  mild  sea^tn  of  pence,  with  minds  unoccupied 
by  other  subjects,  they  passed  many  months  in  cool, 
uninterrupted,  and  daily  consultation;  and  Tinally,  with- 
out having  been  awod  by  power,  or  influenced  by  any 
passions  except  love  for  their  country,  they  presented 
and  recommended  to  the  people  the  plan  produced  by 
(heir  joint  and  very  iiniiniinuus  eouncils. 

Admit,  for  ko  h  live  foci,  thai  rliis  pUn  it  only  rtccmmmdfii, 
not  impo&ed.  yei  let  it  be  icincnihcred  ttiai  it  is  neither  tecom- 
nieii<te<l  to  Ninit  npprolMiioo.  nor  to  Miiu(  repTDJMl'xMi ;  hut  to 
th.ii  sedate  an<l  CJin<tid  consideration  which  tlic  nuignilude  atxl 
iniporiance  oC  the  xubjcci  (leinamt.  and  whkh  it  certainly  ouslil  to 
reccirc.  But  (hia(i!(  was  icnmilccd  in  the  [orr;;o<ng  numlfcr  of 
this  paper)  i.i  more  to  be  wishnl  ihnn  rxpcctrd.  that  it  may  1>e 
M)  coiiMiieml  nnd  examined.  fclijMrrii'nce  o%\  a  foinicr  occnsion 
leiichcs  \n  noi  in  be  loo  Mngiiinc  in  Mich  Ivopc^.  ll  a  not  yet  for* 
gotten  thai  wcll-grauoded  apiirelxnsions  o(  imniineni  donger  in- 
duced the  people  of  Atnerici  to  form  the  nicinanibic  Conj;ress  of 
I7?4.  Tluit  bixly  recommended  ceil.iin  mc.iiures  lo  their  coitttit- 
oents.  and  the  event  proved  their  wisdom :  yei  it  is  fre»h  in  our 
niemortes  Iiow  soon  tlie  press  begin  to  teem  willi  pamphlets  and 
weekly  jwpers  atpinil  ttwise  very  nieiiwirex,  Niil  only  itianyof  the 
nfficcrs  of  i>inTr>in>rnl,  who  obeyed  the  dictates  of  prnonnl  Inter- 
est, but  others,  (tijin  a  iniUaken  eSilimate  of  conscijueiKe^,  «t  llie 
undue  inRucncc  of  foitiH-r  ntt.ichmmiv  o(  uihosc  ambition  aimed 
at  objects  which  did  niH  coTre!b|Kincl  with  the  |>uhbe  y^ooA.  were 
tndefaligaMc  in  their  cffoils  to  pcrsuatic  the  pcop4e  to  rejecl  the 
adiricc  of  that  patriotic  Congress.  Many.  in<leed.  were  deceived 
and  deluded,  but  the  great  mnjority  of  the  people  tcasonnl  and 
decided  judiciously;  jnd  happy  ibey  arc  in  rellectiftg  Ihut  they 
did  so. 

Tliey  considered  ihni  lit*  Coni;rcss  was  composed  of  many  wiM 
and  eapefienced  mm.  Tli.il.  being  convened  from  lURcnnil  pari* 
of  the  couniiy,  they  hrouglii  with  them  and  comniunlcjted  to  each 
other  a  Tariety  nl  ukIuI  infurmaiiun.  Thai,  in  the  ruutse  nt  ihe 
liroe  ihcy  passe«l  Ingelhrr  in  inquiring  iiiin  and  diKusfing  the  true 
Ifllemts  tii  their  cwmtry,  tttey  must  hafc  acquired  very  acmniic 


fcll 


BELIEF  IN  UNlOtf. 


II 


kiMwtedge  on  tfut  head.  Th.il  tticy  were  hulivirluiilly  inleresied 
mihepuMiclibcriy  ADil  prospLTiiy.Aod  ihcreforelh^i  il  wsnol  less 
thai  iitclin^tton  than  th«ir  duty  lu  reciMunieitd  only  buch  iTicasui«> 
u.  alter  llie  mu&l  mature  deliberation,  ihcjr  really  ihoiighi  prudent 
and  wlvlsablc. 

Tlia«and  similar  considerations  (hen  induced  lbc[Mopleto  re1]r 
fjrMtlj  on  the  judijnienl  nnd  tiilcsrity  o(  the  Congress  ;  and  they 
Mok  itwir  advice,  net willisl ending  the  various  arU  and  ci:deavon 
UKd  Id  ileicr  litem  from  it.  But  if  ihc  people  at  Urge  liad  reason 
M  confide  in  the  men  of  llut  Coiit-rcss,  (ew  «1  whom  had  been 
hilly  tiled  or  gencrnily  known,  sliil  greater  tc.uon  have  tlicy  now  to 
lapcctlhe  )u<li(mcnl  and  advice  of  the  convention,  for  it  is  well 
Uown  tlul  some  of  the  iitott  diUingaithcd  memlicts  nf  th.-il  Con- 
(teu,«rtio  hare  been  since  liied  dnd  justly  .approved  For  patriolisni 
uA  ablHlles.  and  who  have  grown  olit  in  acqulrint;  political  Inlor- 
iLiiion,  were  at^o  inctnlicis  of  tills  convention,  and  carried  into  it 
ttttr  accii mutated  knowledge  and  experience. 

It  »  worthy  of  remark  thai  not  only  the  (Iritt,  but 
nery  t»iccee<linK  Congress,  as  well  as  the  late  cooven- 
iKrn,  have  invjrtatily  joined  with  the  people  in  thinkiii;; 
ibt  the  prosperity  of  America  depended  un  its  Union. 
To  irrcscrvc  and  perpcttiatc  it  was  the  Kfot  object  of  the 
prople  in  forming  that  convention,  and  it  is  also  the  great 
object  of  the  plan  which  the  convention  has  advised  them 
lo  adopt.  With  what  propriety,  thurefwre,  or  for  what 
{ninl  purposes,  .ire  attempts  at  this  particuLtr  period 
aaile  by  some  men  to  depreciate  the  importance  of  the 
Union?  Or  why  is  it  suggested  tlwt  three  or  fotir  con- 
Icdentde^  would  be  better  than  one?  I  am  persuaded  in 
■yovn  mind  that  the  people  have  always  thought  right 
M  this  subject,  and  that  their  universal  and  uniform 
.ittichmenl  to  the  cause  of  tlie  tJnion  rests  on  great  and 
»!^^;hty  reasons,  which  I  shall  cndc.ivor  to  develop  .icul 
eipiain  in  some  ensuing  papers.  They  who  promote  the 
Idea  nf  sulratituting  a  number  of  distinct  confederacies  in 
the  room  of  the  plan  of  the  convention,  seem  clearly  lo 
ftimee  that  the  rejcctinn  of  it  woitlil  put  the  continuance 
of  the  Union  in  the  utmost  jeopardy.  That  certainly 
VMhl  bn  the  case,  and  I  sincerely  wish  that  it  may  be  as 
tlearly  (Dre»cen  by  every  good  citizen,  thai  whenever  the 


la 


KF.SULT  OF  DISUNION. 


na.8 


<liH»olution  of  the  Union  arrives,  America  will  have 
reason  lo  exclaim,  in  Ilic  words  of  ttit  pticl :  "  Farr- 
WELL!    a    LOMC    FaREWRLL   to   all    UY    Gftr-ATMRSS." 

PIIBLIII& 


No.    3. 


ilmitff4nljfmrm*t,  Konabtt  j,  i^j.) 


Jay. 


ADVANTAGES   AND   NECESSITY   OF   UNION   IN 
RELATION    10   I'OREIGN   I'OWERS. 

Saftty  af  fnHit  tf^aiim — PuUit  to/tf^  a  i-ffnoHUi  tiut — Cumin  ff 
tt»r — TitaUtl  and  <«tHmirt<  ai  tatiui — k^dtnl  tatitttal  /^turamtm 
nil}  nturt  irrviifi  t/  »Uiit  mfa  —  A  itiprtrnt  gt'tmtmtnl  nnrnaty  m 
t^nilrtiimg  trtaliit — Vnhtimehfd  m  injitilitf  »«  tht  SluUi — A  Hiiltonat 
gatfinfuit  hit  likely  la  affant/uil  ftuiri  r/  Hiar — Indian  xnirt  tatittd 
iy  ikt  Statti — NtigkkariMg  taMntrin  and  ifnir^iml  tvriltr  -nKiri — 
AJlwIaft  f/  mMitaal  gatftrtuHtnl  in  Htgttialiitt  reilk  femgn  favftri — 
Crtaur  ntigkt  af  Iki  Uaint  likily  Is  n\ure  itlUr  ttrmi. 

7>  ike  PtfifU  of  Ikt  Siaie  k/  New  York: 

It  is  not  a.  new  observation  that  the  people  of  any 
country  {if,  like  the  AmeHoaiifl,  intelligent  and  well- 
informed)  seldom  adopt  and  steadily  persevere  for  many 
years  in  an  crnincouit  npinion  respecting  their  interests. 
ThaL<:on];iilcration  naturally  tcitds  to  create  gre.it  respect 
for  the  high  opinion  which  the  people  of  America  have  so 
long  and  unifnnnir  eniertiiined  of  itip  importance  of  their 
continuing  firmly  united  under  one  federal  Kovernmeni. 
vested  with  sufficient  powers  for  all  general  and  nalioual 
purposes. 

The  more  attentively  I  consider  and  investieaie  the 
reasons  which  appear  to  have  given  birth  to  this  opinion, 
the  more  1  bcci>mc  convinced  that  ihey  arc  cogent  and 
concluitire. 

Among  the  many  objects  to  which  a  wise  and  free 
people  find  it  necessary  to  direct  their  attention,  that  itf 
providing  (or  their  sa/etr  seems  to  be  the  first.  The 
io/tty  of  the  people  doubtless  has  relation  to  a  (treat 
variety  of  circumauncey  and  considcraiionit,  and  coa- 


hfi 


CAUSES  OF  WAJtS. 


»3 


quently  affords  great  latitude  to  those  who  wish  to 
ne  it  precisely  ami  comj)rchiM)StveIy. 
At  pre&ent  1  mean  only  lo  consider  it  as  it  respects 
security  for  the  preservation  of  peace  and  tranquillity,  as 
well  agAinst  dangers  from  /ortiga  arms  and  injiuenee,  as 
froai  dangers  of  the  Hit  Hud  arising  Trom  domestic 
Gutscs.  As  the  former  of  these  comes  first  in  order,  it  is 
proper  it  should  be  the  Rrst  discussed.  Let  us  therefore 
proceed  to  examine  whether  the  people  are  not  right  in 
their  opinion  iliat  a  cordial  Union,  under  an  efficient 
national  Kovernmcnl,  aSords  them  the  best  security  that 
can  he  devised  against  Aotti/itia  from  abroad. 

The  number  of  wars  which  have  happened  or  will 
happen  in  the  world  will  always  be  found  to  be  in  propor- 
tion to  the  number  and  weight  of  the  cruises,  n-iiclher  fro/ 
at [n-etended,  which //v;v>if'^  or  invite  them.  If  this  remark 
lie  jusi,  it  becomes  useful  to  inquire  whether  so  many 
jutt  causes  of  war  are  likely  to  be  given  by  United 
Amrriea  as  by  dimnited  .America;  for  if  it  should  turn  nut 
that  United  .-\merica  will  probably  give  the  fewest,  then 
it  wilt  follow  that  in  this  respect  the  Union  tends  most  to 
pttterve  the  people  in  a  state  of  peace  with  other 
ntiritu. 

The/*i/  causes  of  war,  for  the  most  part,  arise  cither 
(mm  violations  of  trealies  or  (rum  direct  violence. 
America  has  already  formed  treaties  with  no  less  than  six 
fareign  nations,  and  all  of  them,  except  Prussia,  are 
miritimr,  and  therefore  able  to  annoy  and  injure  us. 
She  lias  also  extensive  commerce  with  Portugal,  Spain, 
Uhl  Britain,  and,  with  respect  to  the  two  latter,  has,  in 
xlditiun,  the  circumstance  of  neighborhood  to  attend  to. 
Ii  is  of  hi^h  importance  to  the  peace  of  America  that 
4lie  ')bsen.'e  the  laws  of  nations  towards  all  these  powers, 
»»J  to  me  it  appears  evident  that  this  will  he  more  per- 
icilj  and  punctually  done  by  one  national  government 
ihiii  it  rniild  be  either  by  thirteen  separate  Slates  or  by 
'  ur  distinct  confederacie*. 

--:■-  when  oucc  an  efficient  national  government  is 
ntablished,  th«  best  men  in  the  country  will  not  onlj 


I4     ADVA}iTAGRS  Of  GF.yEXAL  GOfP.KMfMByT.    r»».1 

consent  to  serve'  but  also  will  generally  be  appointed  to 
maii;igc  it;  for,  although  town  or  country,  or  other  con- 
Itiicted  iiiAuence,  may  place  men  in  St;ite  assemblies,  or 
senates,  or  courts  ol  justice,  or  executive  department*, 
yet  more  general  and  extensive  reputation  for  talents 
and  other  qualili<-4itions  will  be  necessary  to  recommend 
men  to  offices  under  the  natioaal  government — especially 
^s  it  will  have  the  widest  field  for  choice,  and  never  cxpe> 
riencc  that  want  o(  proper  persons  which  is  not  uncommon 
in  some  of  the  States.  Hence,  it  will  result  that  the 
administration,  the  political  counsels,  and  the  judicial 
decisions  of  the  national  government  will  be  more  wise, 
systematical,  and  judicious  than  those  of  individual 
States,  and  consequently  more  satisfactory  with  respect 
to  other  nations,  as  well  as  more  nt/e  with  respect 
to  us. 

Becjiufte  under  the  national  government,  treaties  and 
articles  of  treaties,  as  well  as  the  laws  of  nations,  will 
always  be  expounded  in  one  sense  ami  executed  in  the 
same  manner— whereas  adjudications  on  the  same  points 
and  questions,  in  thirteen  States,  or  in  three  or  four  con- 
federacies, will  not  always  accord  or  be  consistent;  and 


'  For  Iho  Gni  (urtir  jon  of  national  (pvtrnincnt,  IhU  pmlictioa  wat 
wel)  t«>1a«1,  llw  ililcM  nam  at  both  partict  wllh  lorrriy  an  (icEpUnti 
banc  periMMnl  oAk«decktn  uid  officvJioMen.  Since  1830,  liowcver, 
ihc  KTMc  M  Men  hoMiuE  ol&ce  lui  \yj  no  in«aiH  rcptncniKl  ihe  blfrheu 
moral  at  liilEtkttuil  (nrce  in  (he  cMnniuiilj,  anil  ihoac  (ew  who  aai* 
wma  tTpu(aii'K)  In  iilih«r  caireorj'.  ttivo  tardjF  hrcn  tltotea  tiECsnw 
of  Uiai  totKt,  but  bale  dcicl<>|«?  il  aft(t  nkiiion.  In  Bn^'t  Am^ritan 
Cfmmvatrralii  (ii  J7)  an  iDlctrilioi;  ciliaptti  ti  derolM  10  "  Vlhf  (lie 
Bcii  Men  da  not  go  iuio  poliiici."  and  doubtleti  tad>  tcaioa  h«  bttngt 
(otBanl  lias  liad  ili  dtkiini-i  dcicncnl  iBlliiienw,  bal  ihcf  bf  no  mcana, 
cvni  In  lli«ii  li>lal.  ei[>Iain  llie  «nunial)r,  foi  crcij  ciukC  be  ftodt  <raa  M 
infliirniul  In  i;6i|,  ot  iSoi.  u  In  1997.  Other  wnicii  have  arvail  aa  Iht 
eiplanaiinn  Ih*  dei-cl'ifnicel  at  (h«  nnmiD*l>n|;  |idnttile>  and  connn* 
■iont,  coiucidt^l  with  ihe  decline  of  Ibr  Amtiican  tialtunan  U«diKm'a 
preddcwv,  1819-1837),  Uit  however  ■ppafCDtlr  M(ii.lactor]r  iliii  may 
■^ijwar.  Ine  Inltiiluciiiin  of  tliae  aiclhodi  aouaily  oieani  a  litlleHag  of 
mndilioni,  l>ir  tlia  Mnill  niHU.«c«  awl  contitye*  itiey  uiperMiltd  <r«« 
lar  more  »niet  ami  far  leu  In  be  tv«cIi*<1  ty  public  nianiuti  thm 
refslul;  (ondui'Ifd  puinurioi  anil  coniraitlioia.  atnninU  n*  wkich  arc 
publUliBl  in  itic  nevit|iipen.  Knil  mhkh  Jiaie  cren  been  coni[<ell«d  %u 
aplieat  liclore  Uic  (.i-'Uilt. 

Thut  Ibr  main  icaKin  tot  tlUt  loircnnf  of  the  lUnilanl  nuit  bi  Mni^t 


*n 


LOCAL  INPUENCRS. 


«5 


Uut,  as  well  from  th«  variety  of  independent  courts  and 
judges  appointed  by  ditTcrent  and  independent  govcru- 
mcnls,  as  from  tlie  different  local  laws  and  interests 
wliicli  may  affect  ai>d  influence  them.  The  wi^oni  of  the 
conyention,  in  committing  such  questions  to  the  jurisdic- 
tion and  judgment  of  courts  appointed  by  and  responsible 
only  to  one  national  government,  cannot  be  too  much 
commended. 

Because  the  prospect  of  present  loss  or  ndvanluge  may 
often  tempt  the  eoverning  party  in  one  or  two  States  to 
swerve  from  good  faith  and  justice;  but  those  tempta- 
tions, not  reaching  the  other  States,  and  consequently 
having  little  or  no  influence  on  the  national  government, 
tlie  temptation  will  be  fruitless,  and  good  faith  and  jus- 
tice l>e  preserved.  The  case  of  the  treaty  of  peace  with 
Ilritain  adds  jcreat  weight  to  this  reasoning. 

Because,  even  if  the  governing  party  in  a  Stale  should 
be  disposed  to  resist  such  temptations,  yet,  as  such  temp* 
^lions  may,  and  commonly  do,  result  from  circumstances 
peculiar  to  the  State,  and  may  affect  a  great  number  of 
the  inhabit.-! nts,  the  governing  p<irty  may  not  always  be 
ablr,  i(  willing,  to  prevent  (he  injustice  meditated,  or  to 
punish  the  aggressors.  But  the  national  government, 
not  being  affected  by  those  local  circumstances,  will 


in  (OHM  mora  prmMiaiM  and  anivvml  cnunlaoo.  and  Ihe  obvUnii  inRa- 
tmx  atipnn  to  b«  ihe  devclopnenl  o(  comniunicaiion.  ntilch  hu 
thanked  ilic  TeprFtFntBtiTc  agent  from  a  man  acilni;  at  iniiiec  Tur  hit 
oMiaiuiiUj  lo  tlxal  u(  1  man  merely  volliij  at  «  (iiuty  fur  his  <liiltict. 
Wbn  Ptniilciil  Wailini^loii  wit  lalloil  upun  lo  tign  or  veto  a  hill,  he 
waa  cemp«ll«d  lu  ad  wiiImiii  any  Inie  knowldgc  of  plllilii;  «|iiiiion  : 
i»^y  die  rreiHeot  tan  Hirccly  btoIiI  knouiiicthe  populai  beni.  and 
ihnau  always  tein(>tcd  lo  kt  il  lic>coi»i<lcr*liati  in  hk  autfiin.  In  171)7 
ybm  voiara  «  a  Mni^nntional  dl^icicl  knew  pntlitally  iioiliing  uf  vrlut 
lia—ptraJ  In  Cun^nw  unlil  tlmr  reprnniialive  ttluninl  Irom  ili« 
wwioa  anil  Ttpottnl  to  thcBi ;  t>ow  a  concrcuinan'i  dnk  may  lie 
KlUnd  with  prMntini;  Icttcn  ani)  ifl^erann  fiom  conililnenH  tlte  A*y 
alter  die  mcie  icpunint;  ol  a  btll.  TbU  it  la  eflwi  10  nuke  oAce- 
boMan,  like  the  iiKmbcn  ol  the  uld  Vceiieli  p«itianienl.  Ihs  nioi* 
ticinmof  e<]i('li,  nil>rr  tlian  tnnlcn  ;  and  a»  men  of  iptcial  abtlilv 
«iB  alavyt  act  imlepen'lenlly  talhei  than  re prncntu lively,  asd  as  MKM 
aUktrnereaanlriinp'ict  teparaiioiii  Ixhii  the  avcii^e  intl  ihcrrfore  (iMn 
ika  Rwjoriiy.  ibelt  lef lual  10  mcIe  ofiice  oi  theli  ntlnuon  Irhb  It,  k  a 
\a^aX  reMlL— tntroit. 


i6 


V/OtnXCE  VSVAtLY  LOCAL. 


(K«.3 


neither  be  induced  to  commit  the  wrong  themselves,  nor 
want  power  or  inclination  to  prcrcnt  or  puoish  its  com- 
mission by  others. 

So  far,  therefore,  as  cither  designed  or  accidental  viola- 
tions of  treaties  and  the  laws  of  nations  afford yir//  causes 
of  war,  they  are  less  to  be  apprehended  under  one  gen- 
eral government  than  under  scTcral  lesser  ones,  and  in 
that  respect  the  former  most  favors  the  u*ftly  of  the 
people. 

As  to  those  just  causes  of  war  which  proceed  from 
direct  and  unlawful  violence,  it  appears  equally  clear  to 
ine  that  one  good  national  government  affords  vastly 
more  security  against  dangers  of  that  sort  than  can  be 
derived  from  any  other  quarter. 

Because  such  violences  are  more  frequently  caused  by 
the  passions  and  interests  of  a  part  than  of  the  whole; 
of  one  or  two  States  than  of  the  Union.  Not  a  single 
Indian  war  has  yet  been  occasioned  by  aggreKsions  of  the 
|)resent  federal  government,  feeble  as  it  is;  but  there  are 
several  instances  of  Indian  hostilities  having  been  pro- 
voked by  the  improprr  conduct  of  individual  Stales,  who, 
either  unable  or  unwilling  to  restrain  or  punish  otitenses, 
have  given  occasion  to  the  slaughter  of  many  innocent 
inhabitants. 

The  neighborhood  of  Spanish  and  British  territories, 
bordering  on  some  States  and  not  on  others,  naturally 
confines  the  causes  of  quarrel  more  immediately  (o  the 
borderers.  The  bordering  Stales,  if  any,  will  be  those 
who,  under  the  impulse  of  sudden  irritation,  and  a  quick 
seiiKC  of  app;irent  interest  or  injury,  will  be  most  likely, 
by  direct  violence,  to  excite  war  with  these  nations;  and 
nothing  can  so  effectually  obviate  that  danger  as  a 
national  government,  whose  wisdom  and  prudence  will 
not  be  diminished  by  the  passions  which  actuate  the  par- 
tics  immediately  interested. 

But  not  only  fewer  just  causes  of  war  will  be  given  liy 
Ibe  national  governmeol,  but  it  will  also  be  more  in  ibcir 
powrr  to  accommodate  and  settle  Ihrm  amicably,  They 
will  be  more  temperate  and  cool,  and  In  that  respect,  as 


bfi         NATION  CAN  MAKE  BETTER   TERMS.  17 

well  as  in  others,  will  be  more  in  capacity  to  act  ad- 
Tisedly  than  the  offending  State.  The  pride  of  States, 
as  well  as  of  men,  naturally  disposes  them  to  justify  all 
their  actions,  and  opposes  their  acknowledging,  correct- 
ing, or  repairing  their  errors  and  offenses.  The  national 
government,  in  such  cases,  will  not  be  aflfected  by  this 
pride,  but  will  proceed  with  moderation  and  candor  to 
consider  and  decide  on  the  means  most  proper  to  extri- 
cate them  from  the  difficulties  which  threaten  them. 

Besides,  it  is  well  known  that  acknowledgments,  ex- 
planations, and  compensations  are  often  accepted  as 
satisfactory  from  a  strong  united  nation,  which  would  be 
rejected  as  unsatisfactory  if  offered  by  a  State  or  con- 
federacy of  httle  consideration  or  power. 

In  the  year  1685,  the  state  of  Genoa  having  offended 
Louis  XIV.,  endeavored  to  appease  him.  He  demanded 
that  they  should  send  their  Doge,  or  chief  magistrate, 
accompanied  by  four  of  their  senators,  to  France,  to  ask 
his  pardon  and  receive  his  terms.  They  were  obliged  to 
submit  to  it  for  the  sake  of  peace.  Would  he  on  any  oc- 
casion either  have  demanded  or  have  received  the  like 
humiliation  from  Spain,  or  Britain,  or  any  qx.\xx powerful 
oatiota?  PuBLius. 


No.  4-  UnJi/HulmlJaurMMl,  NoYimbcrr,  i;B7.)  Jay. 

RELATIONS  WITH  FOREIGN  POWERS.        ^ 

Mtthm  a/  mar — Rivalry  with  Franu  and  Britain  in  Jiihtrits — Cem- 
mrrcial  rivalry  with  Europe — China  and  India  trade — Rivalry  vrilh 
Eur^an  taloniei — Exclusion  from  Mtisisiipfi  and  SI,  Laiereiut — 
JtaUmy  ef  Eurtft — tudiufments  lo  mar — A  single  govtrnmenl  nttes- 
lary  for  safety — Advantage!  of  national  government — Afili/ia  and 
navy  if  Great  Britain — America  divided  inle  independent  governmenli — 
Allilude  tf  ftreign  governments. 

To  the  People  of  the  State  of  New  York: 

My  last  paper  assigned  several  reasons  why  the  safety 
of  the  people  would  be  best  secured  by  union  against  the 
danger  it  may  be  exposed  to  by  j'usl  causes  of  war  given 


I« 


MOTIVES  FOK  WARS. 


(KB. 


/ 


to  other  nations;  and  those  reasons  show  lliat  such 
causes  would  not  only  he  more  rarely  given,  hut  would 
also  be  more  easily  accommodated,  by  a  national  govern- 
ment than  either  hy  the  State  guvernmeiits  or  the  pro* 
posed  little  confederacies. 

But  the  safety  of  the  f>eoplc  of  America  aKainst  dangers 
Uom/^reiga  force  depciidx  not  only  on  their  forbearing 
to  give  jHtt  causes  of  war  to  other  nations,  but  also  on 
their  placing  and  continuing  themselves  in  Auch  a  situa- 
tion as  not  to  iwiu  hostility  oi  instill-,  for  it  need  not 
be  observed  that  there  atv  fretfndeJ  m  well  as  just  causes 
of  war. 

It  is  too  trtic,  however  disgraceful  it  may  be  to  human 
nature,  tliat  nations  in  general  will  make  war  whenever 
they  have  a  prospect  of  getting  anything  by  it;  nay,  ab- 
solute monarchs  will  often  make  war  when  their  natiu(» 
iire  to  get  nothing  by  it,  but  for  [lurposes  ami  objects 
merely  penuimd,  such  as  a  ihiist  fur  military  glory,  re- 
venge for  personal  affronts,  ambition,  or  private  com  pact* 
to  aggrandize  or  support  their  particular  families  or 
pariisans.  These  and  a  variety  of  other  motives,  which 
affect  only  the  mind  of  the  sovereign,  often  lead  liim  to 
engage  in  wars  not  sanctified  by  jni^lice  or  the  voi^e  and 
interests  of  his  people.  But,  independent  of  these  iu- 
ducemcnls  to  war,  which  arc  more  prevalent  in  absolole 
monarchies,  but  which  well  deserve  our  attention,  there 
are  ollters  which  aNect  nations  us  often  as  kinj{S;  and 
some  of  them  will,  on  eiamination,  be  found  to  grow  out 
of  our  relative  situation  and  circumstances. 

With  Ftjinc«  and  wllh  Briiain  wc  arc  rjcaU  in  the  fUlienes.  and 
con  sii)i|ily  their  maikt^ls  r.bcspirr  thiiu  ibcy  cjo  tlienifirlvcs.  nol- 
wiihfl.-iniliiig  .iny  rffoTts  >■>  prevent  ii  by  boumles  on  ibdr  awn  or 
dulteji  on  (uiFt^n  fisli. 
[  Willi  ilirin  niul  Wllh  most  olhrr  Eiitopcan  nxlioni  wp  air  livnll 
fin  itHvijjuhuii  (iiiij  il>e  cjitymy  irjilr ;  .ind  we  Hti.iii  ilrvctvr  oi*l- 
sdves  il  we  luppiHc  thai  any  ul  ibem  will  tcjoKe  in  lecr  ii  tloumh; 
(or.  as  OUT  catrjing  limle  rannul  incrmne  wiihowi  in  iome  degree 
itimlnMhuig  ilielra.  it  i*  mme  llicir  intcreM,  and  will  be  more  ihebr 
policy,  lo  mirata  iKiin  in  firomuir  h. 

Id  the  trade  lo  China  and  India  we  iiueiJere  with  more  lliaa 


JBALOaSY  OF  FOSFJCX  NATIONS. 


«9 


uiic  nAltofi.  inasmuch  »,%  il  enable*  uc  lo  parUkc  in  oilvAnlages 
which  Uicy  liad  in  a  tnannci  aionupolitcd,  iirld  iS  w«  llici«t>)'  sup- 
ply uiumIvcs  with  comnvoclMlcs  which  wc  uw'd  lo  purchnsc  Irom 

llieRl. 

The  culcnsion  ol  our  own  comnicrce  in  ou»  oivii  vcmcIs  cannot 
five  plcatuic  to  any  nutionx  who  pcisMss  urriiurii'ti  on  or  ncjir  thi« 
coniiaetti.  bec^utc  the  chrnpncM  \\\A  excellence  of  our  jitoduc- 
lK>i»  attdeU  lu  Uie  circmnitanL-e  of  vicinitir.  und  the  enterprise  and 
AJiJrcs^  t>J  our  mcrchaiiK  and  ii.-ivigiiioTK.Kill  |[iv«  us  a  K^euter 
Uun:  in  the  udvanlnges  wliich  lliusc  leirilorici  iiHoril,  than  con* 
w»l«  with  ihe  ivixhir\  or  policy  nf  (heir  rcrtpEclirc  luvcicrgiiv 

Spain  rliinki  ii  coiivciiienl  to  shut  the  Mississippi '  ng^iinii  us  oit 
one  si'lc.  3n<)  Dritnia  rirliidrK  ufi  (rom  the  Si.  Lavrri^iice  on  the 
g^  otticr ;  nor  nill  eilhtr  ol  ihcm  pcimit  the  other  waters 

■«.  II.  which  arc  tieiwccn  thrm  and  ux  lo  become  the  meant 

of  RuitunI  inictcoiii^e  snd  traffic. 

f  rum  ihrse  and  Mich  like  coiiinteratioii^  which  initfht,  11  con- 
tfsiciit  with  prudciKc,  be  more  amplified  4in<l  <lelailcd,  it  u  eaxy  to 
va  ihui  )F.)lousics  and  unrasincMcs  in.iy  gmdunllir  ktide  into  ihe 
mlnilt  and  cahineli  of  oilier  njliuos,  aivd  ihnl  we  aie  nut  lo  expect 
tlul  Ihcy  ihould  regard  our  advanceinciil  in  iiiiinn,  in  power,  anil 
cwunpiciice  1>y  hiod  *Xi'^  by  lea,  with  an  eye  ol  indiftcrcnce  and 
CMiKposure. 

The  people  of  America  arc  awate  ih.il  liiduccroeni^  lo  war 
may  arrjc  out  of  the»e  ciicumiianccTC.  as  well  as  (rom  uthcn  not 
aif  otifious  al  present,  and  that  whenevei  such  inducements  may 
faul  5l  llnte  anil  up|iurtui)ily  lof  operation,  pretenses  to  color  and 
iniilyilirm  will  ihx  be  winiing;.  Wisely,  ihcrefiHe.  do  Ihey  con- 
vAa  iwicni  and  a  kimkI  naiional  govcrnmciii  ai  necesinry  to  put 
uA  keep  tlKm  la  tuch  a  utni\ti,tn  as,  in^lcid  ■>(  im'ilinf;  war,  will 
•n»l  to  reprc^t  atiit  diiciiurngc  il.  Th.il  Mliialion  oniisit  in  the 
I'c  Male  of  ilrfcnsc,  and  [iect-M.iiily  dqH'nds  on  iho 
.1.  ihe  aiiitu,  and  ihe  rewurceft  of  ihe  counirj-. 


vetihe  nivigilian  of  the  MJBdaippi  wu  one  of  ihe 

■  n%  ol  polilin  [rom  17S3  iiulil  llt«  purchase  of  Louiii«na 

•An.     The  culici  il«|^  <i(  llie  ili>)>ule  *ie  lirill  wilh  in 

I  > '' L'uited  Suieii  ami  K^in  in   i;')0"  (Hmoldyii,   iSqO), 

'  '■'^■■tBlion*  ore  pren  at  larue  In  Ailami'  "  llisloty  n(  the 

i~     UncD  *t*i»  ill  naTi[;>li«nbe««ineaqu«ilion  of  national 

oj  the  tnoiivci  for  rnlMinE  the  Mceulon  o(  Ihe  Soalh  bdiift 

'  Ihc  Norlhweit  ■ouUI  be  nci:luilcil  InMii  itie  noulbetn  )iatl  of 

.     !  Ihnt  Irom  ■  {nx  rninnre  lo  lli«  Cinii  '<f  Mckiiw.  and   ncit 

'"  Lii  ,j)ituf  e  ai  iha  Contcfrntt  eiii>i)>1  Ihe  control  of  the  Miutnlpfn 

fwatd  titt  creaieu  coot«>l  of  the  Ciiil  War.— EblToa. 


I«  ADfAA'TAGE:!  OF  ffATlONAL  GOVERNMENT.  {»•.« 

As  (he  safety  of  the  whole  is  Ihc  interest  of  the  whole, 
and  c^nnui  be  provided  for  without  government,  cither 
one  or  more  or  nuny,  let  us  inquire  whether  one  good 
govcrnmenl  is  not,  relative  to  the  object  in  question, 
more  coni]>eteiit  thun  any  other  given  number  whiitever. 

One  government  can  collect  and  avail  itself  of  the 
talents  aiMl  experience  of  the  ablest  men,  in  whatever 
part  of  the  Union  they  may  be  fuuniL  It  can  more  on 
uniform  principles  of  policy.  It  can  harmonise,  assimi- 
Uite,  an<l  protect  the  several  parts  and  members,  anil 
extend  the  benefit  of  ii»  foresight  and  precantions  to 
each.  Jn  the  formation  of  treaties,  it  will  regard  the 
interest  of  the  whole,  and  the  p;irticnlar  interests  of  the 
parts  as  connected  with  that  of  the  whole.  It  can  apply 
the  resources  and  power  of  the  whole  to  the  defense  of 
any  particular  part,  and  that  more  easily  and  expeditiously 
than  Stale  governments  or  separate  confiHlcrafies  can 
possibly  do,  for  want  of  concert  and  unity  of  system.  It 
can  place  the  militia  under  one  plan  of  discipline,  and,  by 
putting  their  oflicers  in  a  projier  line  of  Kuhordinatiun 
to  the  Chief  Magistrate,  will,  as  it  were,  consolidate 
them  into  one  corps,  and  thereby  render  Ihcm  mnre 
efficient  than  if  divided  into  thirteen  or  into  three  or  four 
distinct,  independent  bodies. 

What  would  the  militia  of  Uritain  be  if  the  English 
militia  obeyed  the  government  of  England,  if  the  Scotch 
militia  obeyed  the  Rovcrnmcut  of  Scotland,  and  if  Hit 
Welsh  militia  obeyed  the  government  of  Wales?  Suppose 
an  invasion:  would  those  three  governments  (if  they 
acrccd  at  all)  be  able,  with  all  their  respective  forces,  to 
operate  against  the  enemy  so  effrclually  as  tlie  single 
government  of  Great  (tritain  would? 

Wc  have  heard  much  of  the  fleets  of  Britain,  and  the 
time  may  come,  if  wc  arc  wise,  when  the  Heets  uf  America 
may  engage  attunli'in.  But  if  one  national  government 
had  nut  so  reijulatcd  the  navigation  of  Britain  as  to  nulte 
it  a  nursery  for  seamen — if  one  national  goi-ernment  ha<i 
nni  called  forth  all  the  nalinnal  means  and  materials  fo' 
forming  fleets,   their  prowess  and  their  thunder  would 


MUTUAL  STATE  AID  SOT  P/tOBABlE. 


ruvcr  have  bccD  celebrated.  I.el  Knsland  have  its 
nvigation  and  fleet — let  Scotland  have  its  navigation  and 
leet — let  Wales  have  iu  navigaition  and  llect— let  Ireland 
hare  its  navigation  and  fleet — let  ilio«e  four  of  the  con- 
stUnent  parts  of  the  British  empire  be  under  four  inde- 
pendent governnicnis.  and  it  is  easy  to  perceive  how 
$oon  they  would  each  dwindle  into  comparative  insig- 
nificance. 

Apply  ihe^c  facts  to  our  own  case.  Leave  America 
diridcd  into  thirteen  or,  if  ynu  please,  into  three  or  four 
independent  governments— what  armies  could  they  rais* 
and  pay — what  (leels  could  they  ever  hope  to  have?  If 
QDc  was  atiitcke<l,  would  the  others  Ay  to  its  succor,  and 
tpend  their  blood  and  money  in  its  defense?  Would 
there  be  no  danger  of  their  being  Hattcred  into  neutrality 
by  its  spcciotu  promises,  or  seduced  by  a  too  great  fond- 
bKss  for  {trace  to  decline  hazarding  their  tranquillity  and 
B|r«(«ni  ufeiy  for  (he  sake  of  neighbors,  of  whom  per- 

■  lups  tliey  have  been  jealous,  and  whose  importance  they 
1  are  content  to  see  diminished?  Although  such  conduct 
I  Mould  nut  be  wise,  it  would,  nevertheless,  be  natural, 
r  The  history  of  the  statcit  of  Greece,  and  of  oiher  coun- 
tries, abounds  with  such  instances,  and  it  is  not  improb- 
able that  what  has  so  often  happened  would,  under 
cimJIjr  eircamsianccs,  happen  again. 

But  iilmil  thai  they  miifht  be  willing  lo  help  ibe  iiK-aded  Slate 
or  luiilrdrracy.  How,  nod  when,  and  in  wlui  piopnrlion  shall 
ii-(i  if  mm  and  mone)- be  aHortltHl?  Who  sli:ilt  coin  m  anil  I  he 
■'■  '.,  anil  from  which  n(  iKrin  th*ll  he  twcive  hn  onfcis? 

^'-  -nide  ihe  lerni!!  uf  (icace.  and  in  ca^<eu(  diipulcn  what 

•nipre  ihaTI  decide  belnccn  them  and  compel  ac<|ilirt<:rnce  ? 
V^ikiiu  didirullies  and  iiiCMiivnienccs  would  be  inseparable  Irmn 
Muh  a  «iuui>oii ;  wfaercit  one  govcmnient.  iiv;iiching  oi-cr  Hie 
(oicnt  and  common  inlcttsts.  and  conibinlcig  and  direcdng  the 
(■•wm  ami  res(Min:»  of  the  whole,  would  be  tree  from  all  lltese 

■  tDilurtatwiiniiv  \ni\  conduce  far  more  to  llie  wfrij-  of  the  people. 
P        But   whatever   tnay  be  our  situatiun,  whether  firmly 

tailed  under  one  national  government,  or  split  into  a 
nuobcr  of  confeileraeies,  certain  it  is  that  foreign 
ibUou  will  know  and  view  tt  exactly  as  it  is;  and  tltey 


u 


.dB&. 


IS 


CONDUCT  OF  FOREIGN  NA  TIOXS. 


Ilt«.t 


will  act  toiv;ir(l  us  accordingljr.  ]f  they  see  that  our 
natiunal  govcrtimeiit  U  L-ffii^icnt  and  well  ailminiitercd, 
our  trade  prudently  regulated,  our  militia  propcrly 
organixed  and  disciplined,  our  resuurccs  and  finances 
diiKreelly  managed,  our  credit  re-«^ull1ished,  our  people 
free,  contented,  and  united,  they  will  be  much  more  dis- 
posed  to  cultivate  our  friendship  than  provoke  our  resent- 
ment. If,  on  the  other  hand,  they  find  u&  either  destitute 
of  an  effectual  government  (each  State  doing  right  or 
wrung,  as  to  its  rulers  may  seem  convenient),  or  split 
iuiu  three  or  four  iudcfx-n'lent  and  probably  discordant 
republics  or  confederacies,  one  inclining  to  Britain, 
another  to  France,  and  a  third  to  Spain,  and  perhaps 
played  off  against  each  other  by  the  three,  what  a  poor, 
pitiful  figure  will  America  make  in  llieir  eyes!  How  liable 
would  she  become  not  only  to  their  contempt,  l)ut  to 
their  outrage;  and  how  soon  would  dear-bought  experi- 
ence proclaim  that  when  a  people  or  family  so  divide,  it 
never  fails  to  be  against  themselves. 

PtiHUUS. 


No.  5. 


tfitAftminU  JtMrtml.  Wanitf  ra>  ir*t.> 


Jay. 


PROJECT   OF  SEPARATE    CONFEDKRAriKS,    IN 
RKLATION  TO  FORKION   POWER. 


Qtitm  Annt'i  ttlltr  an  anttm  »/  KHglaiiJ  mJ  SerihtmJ—Eramftt  ■>/ 
Crrai  HrilMH — Oifiiiim  0/  the  United  SluUi — RrimUt  »/  iiftmlr  fit- 
ftdiraiui — liifvitahU  fiaiimij — T^  "  N^rt^rti  //itt" — Aani'iir  iv»- 
//Jirafifi—Ffify  0/  mtre  MUatnti  and  trratUt — Ctruinty  d/  affmli  u 
£itnft. 

To  tkt  Pffiple  0/  Iht  Stale  0/  iXew  York: 

Uucen  Aiidc.  10  lier  kller  of  (he  isi  July,  1706,  (o  the  Scotch 
P3lliiimcnt,  mjkck  some  ubMrrvutiuiii  un  the  iiiiputtance  of  Ihc 
Urn'oK  then  (ortning  hctwrrn  Rii^Uiiil  aixl  Scoit.-inil,  which  mcru 
ouf  >tt«nlkKi.  I  shall  prcicnt  Ilie  {lublic  with  one  ur  iwu  rilta^u 
from  it :  ■■  An  entire  Hnij  perfect  union  will  In-  the  soiki  found^linn 
at  huling  pc.ice:  Tt  uiU  »ccure  yuur  rrlinion.lib-nty.  anil  propcrtj; 
rrmoTe  llw  4iuiiim)lii's  jii)i>ii);M  younclvc*.  aiitl  tlic  jiudiniiia  und 


SEPAKATlOy  WILL  END  /A'  CONTESTS. 


n 


dfcrvnccs  bclwixl  our  luro  liingdoms.  It  muM  incresM  jrour 
ttrenjjih,  liches.  and  i(n<l«:  nn<\  by  ihU  union  Ihc  whole  iiUnd. 
bring  joined  in  Affection  and  free  from  all  apprcli«nsions  o(  di(* 
(ocnt  intercsi,  will  be  enaUfd  to  rtsiti  ail  its  tntmies."  "We 
OHMI  MTnrttly  leconiiiiend  lo  you  cjilmncss  and  uiianiniiiy  in  this 
(icai  an<l  wci^'ily  ^iff^iir.  ihul  the  union  may  lie  broiif;hl  to  a 
ktppy  coiKluHon,  being  ihe  only  tfffitHiif  way  to  secure  our 
piwint  and  fulurc  happinevt.  -Aa<X  ilf.s^ippoint  the  dctignt  of  our 
iiul  your  cncmiec,  wim  wrill  doubtless.  »n  litis  occasion,  mt  fktir 
alHijtt  ftideavars  to  firevrnt  or  dtlay  Ikh  um'en." 

It  was  remarked  in  the  preceding  paper,  that  weakness 
and  divisions  at  home  would  invite  dangers  from  abroad ; 
and  that  nothing  would  tend  more  to  secure  us  from 
ttietn  than  union,  sLrcngtb,  and  good  government  within 
oursclvi-s.  This  subject  is  copious  and  cannot  easily  be 
exhausted. 

The  hitiory  of  Great  Rrilam  is  the  one  with  whl(^  wc  are  In 
geneial  the  best  acijuiiinlcd.  and  it  gtvet  us  nuny  tiielul  Insonv. 
Wi"  OMV  prtifir  by  llirir  experience  wtthoui  paying  Ihc  price  whieli 
it  c-ost  iti«ni.  Alllimi^i  it  seerns  obvious  lo  common  sen m- I h at 
the  people  (A  Mich  an  inland  should  be  hjt  one  nation,  yet  we  fi>i<l 
lliat  lltey  were  (wT  age*  diritled  into  Ihree,  and  Ih.il  ihow;  three 
werealino«l  cnnslanlly  rmhroileil  in  quaireU  and  war*  with  one 
aiitiihrr.  Nulwilh standing  their  tnie  inlerrU  wiih  respect  to  the 
coMliaetual  nations  was  iMiIly  ihe  same,  yei  hy  the  aits  and  policy 
sihI  pni'iicert  o[  ihasic  natTons,  their  mutual  jealouues  were  per- 
pnnally  krpi  iiiflametl.  and  for  a  long  snies  o(  years  ihcy  were  (ar 
n|iire  inronvenieni  and  ttotiblesoiiie  than  tliey  were  useful  and 
•Mixling  lo  each  other. 

Should  (he  |ieupk  of  Aniciica  divide  I  hen  i  selves  into  three  or 
four  naIton%  n'oiihl  not  (he  !>amc  thing  happen  ?  Would  nol  sim- 
ilar ^.4l<>ii^i*->>  .-irise.  and  lie  in  tike  tiiannei  c'leiished  ?  Instead  ot 
thar  lieiiig  "  ji>rne<l  in  afleelion  "  and  free  (ron-i  all  apprehension  of 
'fltfetmi  "  inlefes>»."  envy  and  jealousy  would  s«on  extinguish 
omftdence  anil  affeedon.  and  (he  partial  ir.icrt-sit  of  each  confcd- 
naiT.  Imiead  of  ihc  general  interests  of  all  Ameiica.  would  be  the 
II  '  ■■  ol  their  policy  and  purtuils.     Hence,  like  nio*l  other 

1  I. 'lions,  they  would  always  he  either  involved  in  dispones 

anil  wai.or  live  la  the  constant  apprehension  of  them.' 


"Pk*  rrtult*  <■(  ihvlw'o  wore  well   »lirtclie>l  in  I.IbcoIo'*  insnpinl. 
ha  nfnic.  *'  Phrucally  ()<eakin|[,  *e  mnni't  Mr|>aralD.     We  ainni't 
It  reapcftm  wuimu  TiaM  each  other,  not  build  a>  impwMble 


»4 


fXBQOAUTV  OF  STATES. 


iir«.B 


The  ino»t  Mnguine  atlvocntes  fwr  Hir«  or  four  confed- 
eracies cannot  reasonablf  suppose  Ihai  (hcj  would  long 
remain  exactly  on  iin  rqiul  footing  in  point  of  strength, 
even  if  it  was  possible  to  form  thein  so  at  first;  but, 
Admitting  that  to  be  practicable,  yet  what  human  con- 
trivance can  secure  the  continiiiince  of  such  equality? 
Independent  of  tlicisc  local  circuinstanccit  n*hich  tend  to 
be][ct  and  increase  power  in  one  part  and  to  impede  itn 
progrcKS  in  another,  we  must  advert  to  the  cRccts  of  that 
superior  policy  and  good  niaitagement  which  would  prob- 
ably disiingui§li  the  government  of  one  above  the  rest, 
jind  by  which  their  relative  equality  in  strength  and 
consideration  would  be  destroyed.  For  it  cannot  be  pre- 
Humrd  that  Ihc  same  degree  of  sound  polity,  prudence, 
and  foresight  would  uniformly  be  ol>served  by  cacb  of 
these  confederacies  for  a  lung  succession  of  years. 

Whcnercr,  and  from  whatever  cause,  it  might  happen, 
and  happen  it  would,  that  any  one  of  these  nations  or 
confederacies  should  rixe  on  the  scale  of  political  impor* 
tance  much  above  the  degree  of  her  neighbors,  that 
moment  would  those  neighbors  behold  her  with  entry  and 
with  fear.  Both  those  pasKtnns  would  lead  them  to  coun- 
tenance, if  nut  to  promote,  whatever  might  promise  to 
diminish  her  importance:  and  would  also  restrain  them 
from  measures  caleulaled  to  advance  or  even  to  secure 
her  prnsperiiy.  Much  time  would  not  be  necessary  Jo 
enable  her  to  discern  these  unfriendly  dispositions.  Stw 
would  soon  begin,  not  only  to  lose  confidence  in  her 
neighbors,  hut  also  to  feel  a  disposition  equally  unfavor- 
Mc  to  them.     Oistnut  naturally  creates  distrust,  and  by 


wall  Iwlwcvn  thrtn.  A  kiivband  «nd  arite  nuy  Ik  iHiruticnl.  anil  gotial 
o(  the  imwiKe  an-l  lieTcuHl  tl«  Roch  of  eadi  och«  ;  lit  ihr  ififfMcnl 
Mill  at  mil  miintnr  >-innuit  <k>  iliK.  y-—  .-r-Tioi  hut  remaui  l*or  to 
larv  ;  ■■«1  iiitrtiniir>c,  ciii.er  Kiiilcal>:i  niM  omlimie  LetwctB 

tttnii.      It  U  iKMkilil*,  Itrm.  t»  maka  Ti  .       rignr  mm  ■dT«nta)iw)M 

e«  nnn  qilidaiiiTii  afln'  wpintiun  ihaa  bdnni  ?  Can  alirnt  vak*  ma- 
tin caiifT  ihiti  fit-'ili  lift  mile  !>in?  Csfi  irt^ii's  W  mon  fohU»1lf 
•«('ii  Sufl^He  you  po 

lo  "  Liucli  Im  on  liulh 

tjilc\,  iTiii  HI'  ;-  .  :,  1  iiu  ;r»iJ-  '![;"' i^K^ '"'  "'"lUml ipmlionaM 

la  tcmudl  tni'T  *pi»  u|iiin  f4«.~ — CnnuK. 


iff 


AUBNATlOlf  OF  STATES. 


n 


aothing  is  good-will  and  kind  conduct  more  speedily 
chanecd  than  by  invidious  jealoui^icti  and  uncamdid  tm- 
|iuut]i>ns,  wticthcr  expressed  or  implied. 

The  North  \i  generally  the  region  of  strength,  and 
many  local  circumsUuceft  render  it  probable  that  the 
mast  Northern  of  the  proposed  confederacies  would,  at  a 
period  not  very  distunt,  be  tinqucslionnbly  mure  furmi. 
dable  than  any  of  the  others.  No  sooner  would  this 
become  evident  than  the  Norlhem  Hive  would  excite  the 
same  ideas  and  sensations  in  the  more  southern  parts  of 
America  which  it  formerly  did  in  the  souihern  parts  cif 
Europe.  Nor  docs  it  appear  to  be  a  rash  conjecture  that 
its  yount;  Nwarmx  might  often  be  tempted  to  gather 
honey  in  the  more  bloominji;  fields  and  milder  atr  of  their 
luxurious  and  more  delicate  neighbors. 

Tbey  who  well  consider  the  history  of  similar  divisions 
and  confederacies  will  find  abundant  reason  to  appre- 
hend that  those  in  contemplation  would  in  no  other  sense 
be  neighbors  than  as  they  would  be  borderers;  that  they 
would  neither  love  nor  trust  one  another,  but  on  the  con- 
trary would  be  a  prey  to  discord,  jealousy,  and  mutual 
injuHey;  in  short,  that  they  would  place  uscjtactly  in  the 
situations  iu  which  some  nations  doubtless  wish  to  see 
«»,  i\%.,f0rmi<iiihle  dhif  toM<h  6ihtr.' 

From  these  considerations  it  appears  that  those  gentle- 
ncn  are  greatly  mistaken  who  suppose  that  alliances 
oflcnsive  and  defensive  might  be  formed  between  these 
confederacies,  and  would  pruducc  that  combination  and 
ttniim  of  wills,  of  arms,  and  of  resources,  which  would  be 
oci^nsary  to  put  and  keep  them  in  a  formidable  state  of 
defense  against  foreign  enemies. 


'  The  irnth  n\  Ihti  lie*  vu  well  liutlcMted  by  llie  alllluilc  ol  th«  coun- 
vj  iben  BMHI  rftvrtndilc  In  i», ibe  t'tmdi  (^vrrnmrtil  unliiig  to  il» 
ll inwii I II  agnita  u  fultnws  :  "  1  lliink  ta  you  do,  llml  ihr  prF^mlion 
*f  IW  Coa||Ttsi  oniikl  mil  ut.  but  what  pcrhjpi  iiiiu  ui  bciio  ii  ihit 
IW  Uaitcil  K<Blc<  should  not  »C(|uiie  the  giolitical  a>ii(i(lenc«  oX  Hliich 
Ihtf  >rctu»cep«lble."  (To  Fienelt  Ch*r|-^.  July  »i.  ijSj)  "  II  siiili 
Ftiacr  thai  llie  URlIed  SUtet  tlvotikl  (r<iu>ii  in  iWir  pmpnl  Mile, 
triiiui  \\  Ibpy  ihmM  aogairr  llir  political  cnnrittmcf  of  which  th«y  ite 
MwapiHib.  they  woitlil  teon  »tnuir«  a  force  or  a  powvt  which  ihry  would 
Ih  wy  Msdy  to  aboM."    (To  Mouciicr,  ScpiciBb<t  17,  ^^i',.) — Eoiios. 


s« 


BtVALRY  OF  CONTIGUOUS  STATUS. 


[*«.« 


When  did  tlie  independent  ttlales,  into  wittch  Brituin 
iivX  S])um  VTL-re  formerly  divided,  combine  in  such 
alliance,  or  unite  their  forces  agiiinst  »  foreign  enemy? 
BmITm.  The  proposed  confederacies  will  he  dUlintt 
lud  IS.  aiitWHS.  liiich  of  them  uroutd  have  its  com- 
merce with  foretgnem  lo  regulate  by  distinct  treaties;  an<] 
as  their  productions  and  commodiliejt  are  different  and 
proper  for  different  markets,  so  would  iho&e  treaties  be 
essentiiilly  dtiTiT<-nt  fiilTcrent  commercial  concerns  must 
create  different  interests,  and  of  course  different  degrees 
of  political  attachment  to  and  connection  with  different 
foreign  nations.  Hence  it  might  and  prodiubly  would 
bappcn  that  the  foreign  nation  with  whom  the  Souihfrn 
confederacy  might  be  at  war  woidd  be  the  one  with 
whom  the  Xort/um  confederacy  would bctbc  most  desir- 
ous of  preserving  peace  and  fricndslitp.  An  alliaitee  so 
contrary  to  their  immedtale  interest  woidd  not  therefore 
be  easy  to  form,  nor,  if  formed,  would  it  be  observed  and 
fulfilled  with  perfect  good  faith.' 

Nay,  it  is  far  more  probable  titat  iii  America,  as  in 
Europe,  neighboring  nations,  acting  under  the  impulse  of 
opposite  interests  anil  iinfrirmlly  passions,  would  fre- 
ipicntly  be  found  taking  different  si()e&.  Considering  our 
distance  from  Europe,  it  would  be  more  natural  for  these 
confederacies  lo  apprehend  danger  from  one  another 
than  from  distant  nalinns,  and  therefore  (hat  each  of 
them  should  be  more  desirous  to  guard  against  the  otiicrs 
by  aid  of  foreign  alliances,  than  to  guard  against  for- 
eign dangers  by  alliances  between  themselves.  And  here 
let  us  not  forget  how  much  more  easy  it  is  to  receive  for- 
eign fleets  into  our  ports,  and  foreign  armies  into  our 
rnuntry,  than  it  is  to  purxuadeor  compel  them  to  depart. 
How  many  conquests  did  the  Romans  and  others  make 


' 'Die  >|<(wah  nr  ihe  Cnnlnlenllr  Sl>lt*to  CrcM  Rttlnlii  ■nil  Fnuite 

lUltTIti:   the   <■■■:'   "■■-    -r-    ' •    ■' ■'-      -'    ■>. ■    ■■-'■ 

(>i>t»llr  mil- 

tWiwn  hy  Rii'         ,  J 

imdil  fnltow  w^a  any  tirauniiu'  hiKlconlnlcnuiciDnlhBtDnlinidt.'— 


6t1     division  leads  to  foreign  HOSr/tlT/RS.       8? 

m  the  characters  of  allies,  and  what  innovations  did  tl»cy 
ander  the  Mine  character  intr'Kluci:  into  the  governmcnt!i 
oi  those  whom  they  pretended  to  protect. 

Let  candid  men  judge,  then,  whether  the  division  of 
America  into  any  given  number  of  independent  »over- 
ci][ntic&  would  tend  to  .secure  us  agiitiisl  the  hostilities 
and  improper  interference  of  foreign  nations. 

FUBLIUS. 


No.  6. 


(/■lA'/m/'Br  Jbarm/,  Nmnbtr  14,  ittj-t 


Hamilton. 


SEPARATE  CONFEDERACIES  SURE  TO  END  IN 
DISSENSION  BETWEEN   STATES. 

C/rlntHly  af  inUritait  ttnUlU — C^mti  1/ keilility  am»ag  •tali^ni 
—  W'ari  /mfiu/J  if  fm^mtt  infilunif — AUrgtJ  ^<ifi{  gtniui  if  re- 
fniSti — ftrfiubUii  di  iaH<-il  a4Ji<u4  ta  aar  ai  m^nartMii'-'Esamflfi 
tf  Sfirta.  AlluHs.  Kamf,  Carlkagr,  fmict,  IMitirJ.  tiud  BritaiH~As 
mtmy  fffiiliir  ai  reyal  van — IVan  Amwvu  Fmact  and  Engt^ad — 
AV  uatan  la  tMfttt  irrjiidilf  i^lvitit  Iki  ilaUt  if  ttfarettd —  Viet- 
HOft  aiufUtUti  itaficHi  HtlU")!  numnt. 

T«  the  Pt^ple  of  Iht  Stalt  0/  Ntto  JVi.- 

The  three  last  numbers  of  this  paper  have  been  dcdi- 
Oled  to  un  enumer;ition  of  the  dangers  to  which  we 
iDuld  be  e.iposed  in  a  state  of  disunion,  from  the  arras 
arts  of  foreign  nations.  1  shall  now  proceed  to  dc- 
ate  dangers  of  a  diiferent  and,  perhaps,  still  more 
ming  kind — those  which  will  tn  all  probability  How 
dissensions  between  the  States  themselves,  and  from 
>)vinatic  factions  and  convulsions.  These  have  already 
En  some  instances  been  slightly  anticipated;  but  the; 
Iciervc  a  more  particular  and  more  full  investigation, 
A  man  must  he  far  gone  in  Utopian  speculations  who 
can  seriously  doubt  that  if  these  States  should  cither  be 
■ttolly  disunited,  or  only  united  in  partial  confederacies, 
the  sulnliviKions  into  which  they  might  be  thrown  would 
ftave  frequent  and  violent  contests  with  each  other.  To 
presume   a  want  of   motives   for  such  contests    as    an 


tS 


CAVSSS  FOX   WARS. 


iir«.i 


/ 


argument  against  iheir  exislcncc,  would  be  to  forget 
iliai  titcn  arc  ambitious,  vindictive,  and  rapacious.  To 
look  for  a  continuatiun  ol  liannuny  between  a  number  of 
independent,  unconnected  SQverci{;nlics  in  the  same 
neighborhood,  would  be  to  disregard  the  uniform  course 
of  human  events,  and  to  set  at  defiance  the  accumulated 
experience  of  ages. 

TIm  causes  of  houtility  among  nAlion*  are  innumerable.  There 
aie  some  nhich  h.ivc  a  i;<;ncr4l  and  ^Inio&i  coii&ljni  opcrjiibon  upon 
ihr  collective  bodia  u(  nucicty.  Of  tilts  description  are  Uiejove 
o(  power  or  ihe  dcsiic  of  pre-eminence  and  dominion^liie  jcnl- 
Du*y  oI  i)o«-*r.  or  the  ilevre  o(  equalily  and  safety.  There  arc 
others  whirh  h.ive  a  more  c  Ire  u  ill  KnEeul  bough  Jin  rqunlly  oprra- 
lire  influence  wiihiii  their  sfihercs.  Such  are  the  riv.iUhips  and 
compciltions  ol  commerce  briwecn  commercial  nations.  Atid 
there  iite  others,  not  leia  numerous  than  cither  of  the  furmet, 
which  take  their  origin  cniircly  in  piivate  pasuoiis  :  iii  ilie  attach- 
nients. enmities,  intcreMs. hn|>cs,  and  tears  of  leading  individuab in 
(he  cninmuniiies  of  which  d>c)'  are  members.  Men  (A  this  class, 
whether  the  favoriles  of  a  king  or  o(  a  j>eople,  have  in  loo  many 
Instances  abused  the  confidence  ibey  possrsted  ;  am)  ;is)>uining  the 
pretest  of  some  (ndtlic  tnuiive,  \x»ye  im>i  st^inpled  lo  sacrifice 
Ihe  nnlional  tranquillity  lo  pc(«inal  advantage  or  personal  grat- 
ilication. 

TIk  cctcbtated  Pericles,  in  compliance  with  the  reseniinenl  of  ■ 
prasiilutc,*  at  the  expense  u(  much  of  Ihe  btooij  and  ircasute  of 
hit  countrymen,  attacked,  vaivquislied,  and  deployed  tlie  city  ot 
the  Sautttint.  Ttie  same  luan.Mimulaicd  by  pciraie  pique  against 
the  Mtx-'frnsiiiHiA  another  nation  of  Greece,  or  lo  ai'oid  a 
proscciilion  with  which  be  w.it  ihiralennd  oa  an  accomplice  in  a 
suppnse<l  llied  ol  Ihe  staLuiiry  PtiidM^.!  or  lo  get  lid  ol  the  acciua- 
ttons  prep;irc<l  lo  lie  hiriiiK'il  nj^lnst  him  (or  divti|uting  the  funil* 
o(  the  stale  in  the  purchase  o(  impul.arily.i  or  from  a  coml>in:ilK>ti 
al  all  these  causes,  was  the  ptiniiiive  auihor  of  that  f.-imnus  and 
fatal  Mar,  disiinguisliol  in  the  Grecian  annab  by  the  name  o(  the 
Pthfranntsuin   war;  which,  allcr  various  vicissiluilcs,  Inicnnls- 


•  Aifual'  :  "'''  "  Pl«t«reh*»  Lite  of  Ptficlet."— PirUJVs. 

J/W.  — PLBUI*. 
J  /*iy.— f'UBUU*. 

%  UiJ.  nndiaii  wM  tiinpcApd  lo  hs»c  uolcn  Mwnt  pnblii:  eoM,  wiili 
tW  roiiniianro  nl  I'ericW.  tor  lh«  rmbclliiliiDeiit  of  iba  s1ai«c  ol 
hiinem.  —  pLSUDk. 


anriltN) 


eEXSO.VAL  INFLUEKCE  IN  WARS. 


*9 


sitMit,  and  (encM-ab.  (eimiiuiled  in  ihc  ruin  of  the  AtbenUn  cotn- 
BMMiwcalih. 

Th«  atubitiotu  cardinal  who  wai  prime  RiinistcT  (o  llmry  VIIU 
penixuing  his  vanity  to  upjrc  loihc  Iripk  crown.*  rriicrtjincd 
bopa  a(  siKcectlinic  in  l)i«  ac4|iiisiiion  ol  ilut  spkntliil  ptiie  liy 
thc  inAucnce  o(  thr  Rmpcror  Ch.irlcs  V.  To  srcurc  lite  favor  aiii) 
intnest  ol  lhi>  entcrpriving  and  powerful  (nururcli.  he  iircdpilatCTl 
Eitgland  into  »  war  wiih  t'raiicp.  contrar)  lu  the  pUin<-t.l  rliclmcs 
%i  pulley,  and  at  (he  )u£.i(d  of  ihc  s.ifciy  arid  inikpeiulcncc  u 
well  vi  the  km;;ilom  over  which  )ic  presided  by  his  counscU.  >1i  of 
Europe  in  i-eoerjiL  For  if  there  ei'cr  was  a  aoveieisn  who  bid 
laif  lo  rciUiie  ilie  profcci  of  uni<renal  inniurchy,  it  was  (he 
Kraperar  C'tarles  V..  of  whoM  intiiguct  Wolscy  was  at  once  (lie 
imlrurncnl  and  the  dupe. 

Ttir  inHucnce  whtch  the  higntryof  one  female.t  (he  petulance  of 
Mother,*  and  Ihc  <;al>al&  o(  a  third.)  tud  in  the  eonieinporarr 
policy,  trniicnis.  and  pacificjillonx.  of  a  considerable  pari  of 
Evrope,  arc  lopioii  (hat  have  been  (oo  often  descanted  upon  not  to 
bcfeiiCTally  known. 

Toinuhiply  eumplct  of  ilie  agency  ot  perirf>nal  coiiiideratioitK 
in  tlie  production  of  great  national  events,  eiiher  foreign  or 
dcnnestK,  according  (o  ilieir  direction,  would  be  an  onnecctsar)- 
w4Mc  ol  lime,  Tlione  who  have  but  a  superfidal  acquaintance 
"ilk  ihe  M>ure«s  from  which  il>ey  Jire  to  be  drawn  will  themselves 
wollect  a  variety  of  insi.itices;  and  those  who  have  a  toleral>le 
luKmledge  of  human  naitirc  will  not  Mand  in  need  of  such  lights 
lohnnihfii  opinion  eithei  of  tlic  icalily  or  extent  of  that  -iK'ncy. 
Petlapt,  liowever,  a  rcf<-rcnce  tending  lo  illu»lraic  (he  general 
|>niKiple,  may  with  prujiriely  be  made  to  a  caM  which  has 
Im  lately  happened  among  ourK-lvet.     If  Sbayt  had  noi 

*'*  been  a  detfieratt  drtlcr.  i|   is  much  lo  be    doubted 

'*Vibti  Maciiarhii-ieltii  would  have  been  plunged  into  a  ciril  war. 
But  tK>lwit)i$t;indtng  tbe  concurring  testimony  of  cx- 
ftfieoce  in  this  particular,  there  arc  still  to  be  found 
titwiury  or  designing  incn  who  stand  ready  to  advocate 
tile  paradox  of  perpetual  peace  between  the  Stittcs, 
ihuugh  dtsmemlicrcd  and  alienated  from  each  other. 
Tbe  genius  of  republics  (say  they)  is  pacific;  the  spirit 


•  Worn  hy  tli«  Pope*,— Pi'W.ttt». 
lM»r.  'ir  Mi>nlcm>».~rt:iI.litV 
jDaehesol  Mnill><>rr<u|;h.— IVUItiS. 
SUine.  de  rompadoar.— PURUVK. 


30 


REPUBLICS  NOT  PEACEFUL. 


(ir«.l 


/ 


of  commerce  hati  a  tendency  to  tioften  (he  m^nneis  of 
men,  and  to  extinguish  those  inflanimablc  humors  wbicfa 
have  so  often  kindled  into  irars.  Commercial  republics 
like  ours  will  never  be  <)isi>oscd  to  waste  themselves  in 
ruinous  contentions  with  each  other.  They  will  be 
governed  by  mutaa)  interest,  and  will  cultivate  u  spirit 
of  mutual  amity  and  concord. 

Is  it  not  (wc  may  ask  these  projectors  in  politics)  the 
true  interest  of  all  nations  tti  cultivate  the  s.imc  benevo- 
lent and  philosophic  spirit?  If  this  l>c  their  true  interest, 
have  they  in  fact  pursued  it?  Has  it  not,  on  the  con- 
trary, invariably  been  found  that  momentary  pa^sio^5, 
and  immediate  interests,  have  a  more  active  ainl  itn* 
pcrious  control  over  hum.-in  conduct  than  general  or 
remote  considcratiuuK  of  policy,  utility,  or  justice? 
Have  republics  in  practice  been  less  addicted  to  war  tlian 
monarchies?  Arc  not  the  former  administered  by  men 
as  well  a«  the  latter?  Arc  there  not  aversions,  predilec- 
tions, rivalships,  and  desires  of  unjust  acquisitionit,  that 
affect  nations  as  well  as  kings?  Arc  not  popular  assem* 
blics  frequently  subject  to  the  impulses  of  rage,  resent- 
ment, jealousy,  avarice,  and  of  other  irregular  and 
violent  propensities?  Is  it  not  well  known  that  their 
determinations  are  often  governed  by  a  few  indiviiln^ls 
in  whom  ihey  place  confulcnce,  and  are,  of  course,  liable 
to  be  tinctured  by  the  passions  and  views  of  those  in- 
dividuals? H-1S  commerce  hitherto  di>nc  anyibing  more 
than  change  the  objects  of  war?  Is  not  the  lore;  of 
I  wealth  as  domineering  and  enterprising  a  passion  as  that 
of  power  or  glory?  Have  there  not  been  as  many  wars 
founded  upon  commercial  motives  since  that  lias  bccutne 
the  prevailing  system  nf  nations,  as  were  befnre  occa- 
sinned  by  the  cupidity  of  territory  or  dominiim?  Has 
not  the  spirit  of  commerce,  in  many  instances,  adminiv 
t(re<l  new  Incentives  to  the  apjietite,  both  for  the  one 
and  for  the  other?  Let  ejiperiunt-e,  the  least  fallible 
guide  nl  human  upinioos,  be  appealed  to  fur  an  answer 
Irt  th^M-  tninitries. 
Sp.-uta,  Athens,  Rome,  «Bd  Oinh>i;e  Mere  all  tepuUicsi  twool 


HwUtM) 


CO.VMEJtCB  A  CAUSE  FOS   WAJt. 


ii 


them.  Alliens  luid  C.irth^gc,  oF  lh«  commercial  Icinil.  Yet  were 
tbcT  OA  olicn  unbailed  in  wnrs,  oSeiislve  ariil  ilvfcnsiie.  an  llie 
neighbohng  nionarcliics  of  the  &an>c  iim«^.  Spuria  wns  link 
beltei'  than  a  wclI-rfKuUted  camp:  and  Kuiiie  ttm  never  salcd  o( 
KXmn'fft  and  cnnqurxt. 

Canbage.  ihouKli  a  commercial  repubttc,  u-as  ihe  scgrcuor  in 
the  orry  war  that  ended  in  her  destruction.  iUtinit>;)l  had  carried 
ber  arms  into  l)ic  licaii  of  Italy  and  to  the  gates  o(  Rome,  before 
Sdpio,  in  turn,  gnve  him  an  ot-crthrow  in  the  icrritotiei  ol 
Carthitge,  and  made  a  conquest  of  ilic  commonwealth. 

Venice,  m  l.iler  tinier  ligiiTcd  more  thin  once  in  wars  of  am* 
IniiDn.  till,  hecomiug  ,in  nlijiTct  of  terror  lolhooUici  Italian  stairs, 
Po|>c  Jutiax  II.  found  nie-nns  lo  accoinpliiU  llut  formidable  I i!:igue,* 
Mrlitch  gave  &  deadly  blow  to  the  power  and  pndeot  this  haughty 
republic. 

The  province*  of  Hoil.ind,  till  itiey  were  overwhelmed  in  debt* 
and  lujic!).  took;  a  leading  and  con»picuou>  pad  in  the  war»  oi 
Eulopr.  They  had  furiou*  contests  with  ICn^Und  (or  the 
iloniiniun  of  the  Ma,  and  were  among  the  most  perscveiint;  and 
uiwu  Implacable  of  the  opponents  of  Louis  XIV. 

In  llie  govemmtnl  of  Britain  the  rcjiri-scnlalivei  of  Ihe  people 
compose  one  branch  of  llic  natiotinl  Irgiil.-ilurc.  Commerce  has 
been  for  agei  llie  predominant  pursuit  of  that  country.  Few 
awinoii.  acirenhclru,  h.ive  been  more  frequently  engaged  in  war ; 
»•)  the  wan  m  whicli  th;il  kingdoni  has  been  cngagrd  have,  in 
numerous  inttanccx.  proceeded  from  (lie  people. 

Tlierc  have  been,  if  I  may  so  express  it,  almost  as  many  popnlnr 
u  royal  wara.  The  cries  of  the  nation  and  the  importunities  of 
ihiir  reprc«eniative«  have  upon  various  occasions  dragf^d  their 
taonarehs  into  w.ir.  or  continued  them  in  it  cunirary  to  their 
iiKlinaltons.  and  sonKtimcs  contrary  to  the  real  intereslx  of  llie 
a.tle.  In  thai  memorable  41rut;gle  (or  tupeiiorily  between  the 
tiYil  hnu«e«  of  Austria  and  BaurtoH.  which  so  long  kepi  Europe 
flame,  it  i«  well  known  that  the  anilpaihies  of  the  En^li^h 
nst  ihc  French,  seconding  the  ambition,  or  ratlier  the  avarice. 
Vkx  hvorite  leader. t  protracted  ihe  war  beyond  the  limits  marked 
iHii  by  sounil  policy,  and  for  a  coniiderable  lime  iu  oppositton  to 
the  news  of  ihe  court. 
The  Hrara  of  tliete  two  la»t -men  tinned  nattons  have  lo  a  great 


*Tbc  l.r«(^«  of  CMibfay.  comprehending  the  Emperor,  the  King  ol 
>,  ikii  King  o(  Amgon.  >iu1  nwni  <A  tbc  Italian  princes  uiil  tlitt«. 
1inji>s. 
\  Tbc  Doke  of  Uarlboro«sh.— Pti  buv). 


3> 


STMTBS  JfOr  £XE.VPr  PROM  tVAKS. 


ur*.» 


niMisure  grown  out  of  commerei.il  c«n«i(I«rallons — ibf  <l«irt  of 
su|>|)lanling  and  ihe  (carol  beiog  uip|»lanted.  dilwr  in  pailicular 
limnchrB  of  (nflic  or  in  ihc  gcncinl  advaiiUgvs  of  ir«de  and 
itari|;ation.' 

From  this  suinmary  of  what  has  uken  place  in  olhcr 
countries,  who&e  situations  have  borne  the  nearest  resem- 
blance to  our  uwn,  what  reason  can  wc  have  to  con5de 
in  those  reveries  which  would  seduce  us  into  an  cx|>ecta< 
tiun  of  peace  and  cordiality  ttctwcen  the  members  of  the 
present  confederacy,  in  a  state  of  separation?  Have  we 
not  already  seen  enough  of  the  fallacy  and  cxtravanaace 
of  those  idle  theories  which  have  umiiNed  as  with 
promises  of  an  exemption  from  the  imperfections,  weak- 
ncsscs,  and  evils  incident  to  society  in  every  shape?  Is  it 
nut  time  to  awake  from  the  deceitful  dream  uf  a  gulden 
gye.  and  to  adopt  as  a  practical  maxfm  for  the  direction 
of  our  political  conduct  that  wc,  as  well  as  Ifac  other 
I  inhabitants  of  the  globe,  are  yet"  re  mote  from  the  happy 
'  empire  of  perfect  wiulom  and  perfect  virtue? 

Let  the  point  of  extreme  depression  to  which  our 
national  dignity  and  crcilit  liave  sunk,  let  the  inconven- 
iences felt  everywhere  from  a  lax  and  ill  adminit* 
tratioD  of  government,  let  the  revolt  of  a  part  of  the 
State  of  North  Carolina/  the  tate  menacing  disturbances 


'  In  tb«  lext  of  ibe  cdltioni  of  1801  uid  181S,  the  loJIouini;  mddltloiul 
wntoDcct  ocvui  >i  lliii  |<otni  -  "  uvi  ioatctitna,  cien  the  inotc  Oil|«IJB 
deiirc  of  ibuint;  in  thf  roinRirtl'n  of  altirr  naliont  nilhovl  llw^r  ronsrat. 
1'he  lut  WW  biit  l<ro  bclwtcn  Btilain  knd  S)«in  spnii);  from  ibc 
•ttcnipu  ul  i]i«  EnBtiib  mecchantt  10  inowralc  Mi  UlkH  timJc  nith  (he 
S|i*iiiih  M11111.  TJicte  unJuuIJialile  prnclii-c*  on  ikttr  Mrt  ptoduccJ 
wifritiet  iiB  iheiwtt  ei  llw  S)>aDt«r<ktnwan)ihF«ab)eRiim  l-re*l  Briliin 
wlitcb  <KfT  iui|  iiiaifv  iuthtilialij*-^  IvrCHJaM;  tlirv  ci«i:il<J  tlir  hiViult  tA  ■ 
]«■  teltlUliiin  bmI  uric  L-liargral<lF  u-iili  intiiinianiiy  «iul  i-iurllf .  Many 
of  tbc  Giiulitli  "bu  U'cic  lakf  II  on  lh«  Spanish  i-kmI  but  icnl  to  di|t  tu 
the  muick  ii(  PatDu ;  unil  by  Ibc  iiuul  iMiauivu  ol  n  tptril  uf  rFHtntmedl. 
Ilie  IniKKCBl  were,  attci  ■  wlillc.  coiiIouiuIhI  ii(ih  tb«  fii  '  ')^- 

criniinatu  piiinliRieni.     I'lie  c<iui|>lalai(  ci  the  innchaxi  ■ 

*iaI«M  llanie  thmngkoul  iha   ntH'--'    'I'n^  v.i.>«  ■(■«(  \m^i    .  -:  ■■-   il-* 
llosK  of   CumiBaiu,  Kliirh   ti:-  ftxoa  llinl   tHuly  lii  iha 

miiiitln-      I  itxtti  ■'■(  tti'Tiul  V. .  I  .1  wu  mtacd,  iiliidl  i* 

in  ■  ■  I  bI!  iliT  iliijr^oi  iLu  tint  twtuitf  v«an  hcfoK 

h«ii  .,i.iii(ciL|itcuUou*ol  ihniniBt  bciwtrtal fwLMj." 

— tl>|l<-K 

*Sm  Rifluaj'«  "Ancoliol  TranaB**,"  anttnriun.  tSj).— Eotro*. 


H««UtoBl    NEIGHBORHOOD  PKODUCBS  EFMITY.  33 

in    P«nns3rlvania,'    and    the    actual    insurrections    and 

rebellions  iu  Massachusetts,*  declare- -\ 

So  far  is  the  general  sense  of  mankind  from  corre- 
sponding with  the  tenets  of  those  wrho  endeavor  to  lull 
asleep  our  apprehensions  of  discord  and  hostility  betvcen 
ihc  States,  In  the  event  of  disunion,  that  it  has  from  long 
observjtiun  of  the  progress  of  society  become  a  sort  of 
aiiom  in  politics,  that  vicinity,  or  nearness  of  situation, 
cunstiiutes  nations  natural  enemies.  An  intelligent 
writer  expresses  hiniMlf  on  this  subject  to  this  effect: 
*■  Neighboring  NArroxs  (say^  he]  are  naturally  enemies 
of  each  other,  unless  their  common  weakness  forces  them 
to  league  in  a  coNrRDr.RATivK  RKfCiiuic,  and  their 
constitution  prevents  the  differences  that  neighborhood 
occasions,  extinguishing  that  secret  jealousy  which  dis- 
poses al)  stiitcs  to  aKar.iiidir.e  themselves  at  the  expense 
of  their  neighbors."  *  This  passage,  at  the  same  time, 
points  out  the  kvil  and  suggests  the  KEiiEur. 

PUBLIUS. 


No.  7, 


(/inA/riHlwr/iwf  **/,  Nftvcmbn  ir,  17(7-) 


Hamiltoiu 


CAUSES  FOR  DISSKNSIONS   BETWEEN    STATES 
IF  SEPARATED. 


Ttrnteriat  diifutu — Ptihiii  Itrriltry — Wyvming  tmtrntrty^  t'tr. 
■nf  iiipulr — Cfrfttilitni  0/  Cfinntrtt — Oiieyimiiuttiai;  nunmtnial 
ttptlanrai—  TAr  JVf»  Y«ri  im^il—  Tkf  iMA'iMm/  <htt—Dipiulliti  c/ 
•tftrtining  4thi—L4»i  in  vi*iiliim  »/ /•ritnU  tSHfratlt — JExamfJr  0/ 
fLsit  li/iimi — ff^nuttie  aitJ /ifffigH  olliaucti — Cttlatntj!  t/  Eartfte» 
"dsitilimtnU. 

/;■  tkt  Pe»fti  of  Iht  Stale  of  Nev/  Ytrrk: 

It  is  sometimes  asked  with  an  air  of  seeming  triumph 
what  induceiMcnts  could  the  States  have,  if  di^uniird,  to 
make  var  upon  each  other?     It  would  be  a  full  answer 

'Fidi"  Pilndim  dn  N^furiitiuttt,"  pii  TAbli^de  M>l>ly.— I*UliUi;i. 

'Stc  Hiti'n  "  Krtaf  of  iTitl*  in  llir  Srreiilrfii  T<>wii&lil|i»  ol  Ihc 
"■Hly  iif  LiiiL-me  ■■  (irilli  li<iiilk>|>>a)>li)r>  :   Hnrriiliiirn.  1879  — t%nlTfi>. 

'  A  Imll  lintofy  nISluri'  tcbcllion  will  )ie  fomiH  in  Minnt'ii "  Hi«1o()i 
>i  the  tBUurcOtMi  in  MEbudtuMiU"  ;  Wotcaiet,  1787.— EorrOR. 


34 


TEXX/TOJttAL  DISPUTES. 


III0.I 


to  this  question  to  say — precisely  the  !uinie  inducements 
which  have,  at  different  times,  deluged  in  blood  all  the 
nations  in  the  world.  Hut  unfurtunatcly  for  (is,  the 
question  admits  of  a  more  particular  answer.  There  are 
causes  of  differences  within  our  immediate  contcmi>la> 
tion,  of  the  tcfitleiicy  uf  which,  even  under  the  restraints 
of  a  federal  constitution,  we  have  had  sufKcienl  expert* 
cncc  to  enable  us  to  form  a  judgment  of  what  might  be 
expected  if  those  restruintx  were  removed. 

Territorial  disputes  have  at  all  times  been  found  one 
of  the  most  fertile  snurccs  of  hostility  among  nations.' 
Sm  Perhaps  the  greatest  proportiiin  of  vntf.  ihui 

Bo, ».  have  desolated  the  earth  have  sprung  frwm 

this  origin.  This  cause  would  exist  among  us  in  full 
force.  We  have  a  vast  tract  of  unsettled  lerrilory 
within  the  boundaries  of  the  United  Slates.  There 
still  arc  discordant  and  nndccidcd  claims  between 
several  of  them,  and  llie  dissolution  of  the  Union  would 
lay  a  foundation  for  similar  claims  between  them  all. 
It  is  well  known  that  they  hare  heretofore  had  serious 
and  animated  discussion  concerning  the  rights  to  the 
Iand.«  which  were  uni;ranted  at  the  lime  uf  the  Ri^vulution, 
and  which  usually  went  under  the  name  of  crown  lands. 
The  Slates  within  ihe  limtls  of  whiisc  C'ilonii>I  govern- 
uients  they  were  comj'rised  have  claimed  Ihtm  :is  llieir 
properly,  the  others  have  contendi-d  that  ihc  rights  of 
the  crown  in  this  article  devolved  upon  Ihe  Union; 
e«[»ecially  as  to  all  tliat  pari  of  the  Western  territory 
which,  cilhtT  by  .Kiiial  |>ossession,  or  through  ihr  snl*- 
mts<^ion  of  the  Indian  pruprielors.  was  snbjccied  to  ilic 
jurisdiction  of  the  King;  of  Great  Britain,  till  it  was 


'Tfi  ilt-ncuii  lnjto  Ihc  liiB|;  tlram;lc  ovur  ilur  |>ai>tii:  lomliry,  twclnning 
long  prior  tollir  Kcrolution  bwI  conliauol  nniil  thrri^l  of  lb*  Ciiil  Wa, 
wlildi  WB  in  Uulli.  UmIc  Iron  lemtKirary  iiiil  Ick-jI  ilitaciFcnxnit*,  l>y|  ■ 
«iruxt^  ol  the  vatiflui  (Fclicuix  ol  [hr  Union  In  maiiillin  1  bilnBc*  M  >ntcr> 
nl  ticltnen  llie  SufTli  uiil  Sixiih.  ur  K114  *■■<!  VV«i.  winili)  r«t|uiitlMloo 
iiiui'Ji  4)x|i:f.  An  nnlliii*  l>i*('i>T  n  lirttlUnllv  |!iwii  In  \VeII1»i:'ii  "Tha 
|jn>l  i'<Jili<*  cti  ill*  IJoilcl  SlJi  "'  'in 

Sua'*"  lluloryof  i|i«  l.ii»l  Qn  '■. 

1SS6),  anil  Biiwh  milerul  in  nl- — .  l 1  — ;  , ^ J...1.11I 

in  Duaal<lu»'»  "  IIm  PuUle  Donuiu  "  (WuhlogUiM,  tSSj)  ■— EuntM. 


HtsUUml 


FV81IC  TERSITOSY. 


35 


rdinquUhed  in  the  lr«nly  nf  peace.  This,  it  hits  been 
said,  was  at  all  events  an  acquisition  to  the  Confederacy, 
by  compact  with  a  foreign  power.  It  has  been  the  pru-. 
dent  policy  uf  Congress  to  appease  ihis  controversy,  by 
prevailing  upon  the  States  to  make  cessions  to  the^ 
United  States  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole.  This  has 
been  so  far  accomplished  as,  under  a  coiilinualion  of  the 
Union,  to  afford  a  decided  prospect  of  an  amicable 
termination  of  the  dispute.  A  dismemberment  of  the 
Confederacy,  however,  would  revive  this  dispute,  and 
would  create  others  on  the  same  subject.  At  present  a 
large  part  of  the  vacant  Western  territory  is  by  cession  at 
Icaxt,  if  not  by  any  anterior  right,  the  common  property 
of  the  Union.  If  that  were  at  an  end,  the  States  which 
made  the  cession  on  a  principle  of  federal  compromise, 
rould  be  apt  when  the  motive  of  the  grant  had  ceased, 
reclaim  the  lands  as  a  reversion.  The  other  States 
would  no  donbt  insist  on  a  proportion,  by  right  of 
re(ireseutation.  Their  argument  wguld  be  that  a  grant 
once  made  could  not  be  revoked;  and  that  the  justice 
>f  participating  in  territory  acquired  or  secured  by  the 
Mnt  elforts  o(  the  Conrederacy,  remained  undiminished. 
If.  contrary  to  probability,  it  should  be  admitted  by  all 
the  States,  that  each  had  a  right  to  a  share  of  this  corn- 
toon  Kiiict:,  there  would  still  he  a  diRiculty  to  be  sur- 
^nountcd  as  to  a  proper  rule  of  apportionment.  IJitTcrcni 
rinciplcs  would  be  set  up  by  diifercnt  Slates  for  this 
purpose;  and  as  they  would  affect  the  opposite  interests 
of  lite  parties,  they  might  not  easily  be  susceptible  of  a 
pacific  adjtistment. 

Ill  ilic  w.iie  firlil  o(  Wcstcni  tcrriiory.  llvrretore,  wc  prrccivean  | 
ample  iheaier  (nr  tioMile  jirrrrnsloits,  wilhuul  any  uiniwre  or  com- 
mon  (imIcec   la   tiilrrpoK   between    (lie  contcn'ling   paillcv     To 
m»un  ftnm  the  pail  U>  the  fulure.  we  shall  luve  [-Mid  giouml  to 
■pprrhrnil  ihal  llu;  (word  would  somciiin««  l>e  appealed  to  a>  the 
■riiiler  nf  iticir  ilifterenc«.     Tlie  tireuniiLancti  of  ibe  dlipuie 
belnrecn  Conncctkui   and  Pcnnsrlvnni:!,  respcfiing  the  land  at 
I'oiiish  u«  n«i  iki  l>e  lancuine  in  expecting  xn  osy 
I  u(  sitch  iltffrrfcicev     The  .micles  of  con(f«lriiUion 
Knidie  (Miiics  10  submit  the  nvaiici'  lo  the  decision  oJ  a  Icderal 


36  LASO  DISPUTES  BSTWEEN  STATES.       W*.* 

Cfturt.  Ttie  subiitlK^ion  was  madf,  and  ih^  crnirt  ArcHlrA  in  (avor 
o(  Pennsylvania.  Hut  ConnFCtictit  gace  Strotig  inOiculioiii  oi 
dim  i  iff  anion  wilh  that  dclermiii^itton ;  nor  tliit  «hc  njipear  lo 
be  entirely  miKiieil  lo  it.  nil,  by  negotuiiton  and  maiiogemeni, 
MRielhing  like  an  equivalent  wus  found  (or  the  Iom  she  aU|i)iOMd 
heraelf  to  liare  su&iatncd.  Nothing  here  said  i»  intcntlriJ  to  coi;- 
vey  the  ilij^lucti  censure  on  the  conduct  a(  ihul  Smie.  She  no 
doubt  atTiccrcly  believed  herself  to  huve  been  injuied  by  ilw 
decixion  :  and  .States,  like  individual,  acquiesce  wilh  great  reluct- 
ance in  dcicrniinalioiis  to  llieir  ■  I  luul  vantage, 

Thoie  who  h.id  an  oppuriuiiiiy  of  !ieein|i  the  JiiMile  of  the 
irnniaclions  which  attended   ihe  progress  of  the  conirovetsy  be- 
tween thii  State  ami  ilie  district  of  Vermont,  can  vouch  ihe  <>pjio> 
silton  we  experienced,  as  well  from  States  not  inlerrtlcd  a»  froni 
tho»e  which  were  interested  in  llie  claim  ;  arid  can  altcsl  Ihe  ilangcr 
to  which  the  pCiAce  of  the  Confetleracy  ini|{ht  have  been  exposeil,  had 
/  tlinSlaieaiicm)itcdtoasscil  itstighisby  force,    Twomoii)csi)fc- 
j  ponderatnl  in  that  oppoiiiion  :  one.  a  jealouty  entertained  of  our 
'•  (uiure  power :  ami  Ihe  oilier,  ilie  inlere«  of  cerlain  indiviitunU  i 
^  inHnrnce  in  the  neighboring  .Slates,  who  had  obtained  granil 
bnils  und'.T  llie  aciu.dgovemnien(i>f  that  district.    Even  iheSraies 
which  brought  forward  claims,  in  conlradiclion  to  on rt,  teemed 
moie  solicitous  to  ditinemlic-i  this  Stale  than  to  esljbllsli  tiKJt  owl 
pretensions.     Tlicse  were  New  Hamp^iire.  Maviachusrits,  and 
Connecticut.    New  Jersey  and  Rhode  Island,  upon  all  occasions, 
diicorered  a  warm  leal  for  the  independence  of  Vermont :  and 
Maryland,  till  aUrmed  by  tlic  Appearance  of  a  connection  beiwecB 
Ciiinada    uiid  that   Stale,   enteied    deeply   into   tlie   same   vkws. 
Tliese  being  small  Stairs,  s.iw  with  an  unfriendly  eye  the  pers|>ec- 
I  live  of  our  growing  greatness.     In  a  rcWew  o(  these  transaciioncj 
we  may  trace  some  of  the  causes  which  wuuhl  lie  likely  in  embrol 
the  Sinies  with  each  other,  if  it  should  l>c  tiMir  unpropitkMis  destiny 
to  become  disunited. 

The  coinpetitin»<t  of  commerce  would  be  another  fruit- 
ful source  of  cuntcntion.  The  States  less  favorably  cir- 
cumstanced would  be  ilcsiroiis  of  escaping  from  the 
disadvantages  of  local  situation,  and  of  .tliaring  In  Die 
advantages  of  tiicir  more  fortunate  ndgtibors.  Each 
State,  t>r  teparate  confederacy,  would  pursue  a  system  of 
curomerctal  policy  peculiar  to  itself.  Tiiis  would  occa* 
sion  distinction*,  preferences,  and  exclusions,  which 
would  beget  discontent.     The  babits  of  intercuursei  uo 


SunHsoB] 


COMMERCIAL  RESTRICTIOHS. 


the  tuiis  of  equal  privilescs,  to  which  wc  have  been  ac- 
customed since  the  earliest  settlement  of  the  country, 
would  give  a  keener  edge  to  those  <:au8es  of  discontent 
liijtn  iticy  would  naturally  have  independent  of  this  cir- 
cumstance. Wt  shoutil  ^  rfitity  to  Jenominalt  injurie%  thosf 
tJarngs  whuk  Teere  in  reality  the  jushfiabit  acts  p/  indrfendent 
Si/eereignlies  tenutiHas  a  dittiwt  iitUreit.  The  spirit  o( 
eDtcfprisc,  which  characteriies  the  commercial  part  of  J 
Amerioi,  has  left  no  occasion  oT  displaying  itself  unim- 
proved. It  is  nut  at  all  probable  that  this  unbridled 
spirit  would  pay  much  respect  to  those  regulations  of  f 
trade  by  which  particular  States  might  endeavor  to' 
secure  exclusive  benefits  to  their  own  citizens.  The 
■  nfrsciionsof  ilirsc  regulations,  on  one  side,  the  efforts 
to  prevent  and  repel  them,  on  the  other,  would  naturally 
lead  to  outra(;es,  and  these  to  reprisals  and  wars. 

Tlie  op poi tunnies  nhicli  some  Stales  wmil<l  have  of  rendering 
mFicts  tiibuiaiy  to  Ihem  by  commercial  regulations  ivould  be 
g««  impaiienlti'  subiiiillcd  to  by  the  lril>ul--iry  SUIev    Tlie 

la-lS>  relative  »ilu.tlron  of  New  Yorit,  Conrif<:iiciil,  and  New 

Jeney,  w«Nili)  aftntd  an  example  of  Iliis  fiintf.  New  Yoric  frum  V 
ihc  oecCMtlies  of  mrniic,  nuivl  Uy  duties  on  her  ImputlaiionSf 
A  grul  part  o(  xhfie  dutin  inusl  bt  puul  by  Uic  iiifiiitHliints  of 
the  t»o  other  States  in  ilie  capacity  ot  consumers  o(  wliai  we 
import.  New  York  would  ncitlier  be  willing  nor  able  to  forego 
tMt  adi'aniage,  Hl^^  citiicns  would  nut  coniciil  that  ,n  doly  puid 
hy  them  shinild  be  remitted  in  favor  of  ihe  ciiinrns  of  her  ncigh- 
hnrs;  nor  woald  it  be  practicable,  if  there  were  not  iliis  impcdi- 
inmi  In  the  way.  to  di^tingiiisli  the  ciiMomers  in  our  own  markets. 
Wouiif  C'lntirrticut  and  New  J^r^'T  '""K  submit  to  br  la»eit  hy 
Nrw  Viif  k  (or  her  exclusive  brnrfii?  ShouUI  wc  he  long  pcrmilleil 
(<i  tonun  in  ih^  <|(it«l  and  umhslurbcil  enjoymrnt  of  a  mctropoliK, 
(rnm  the  possr^ton  of  which  wc  dcriveil  an  ^ulvaiilaj^e  so  odious 
'u  uor  neiglilMrs.  and,  in  their  opinion,  so  oppressive  ?  Shmild  we 
\k  Me  to  preserve  ii  against  the  incumbent  weii;hl  of  Conitecticut 
(HI  dM*  one  side.  an<l  the  co-operating  pressure  of  New  Jersey  on 
the  other?  Ttioe  are  questions  tliat  teiaerity  alone  will  answer  in 
the  afbrmaiive. ' 


'  A  lUEe  part  of  the  Eitfopewi  caorft  e<»n<iinied  In  Ihe  northern  put  of 
)<«*  Imey,  an'l  of  llie  vnttra  p«tt(  iil  Connceiltul  and  Mauoclniieiii. 
*tn  uuportcil  l>T  No  York  menhinlit  and  tha*  paU  tlie  •lutia  Uvied 


38  PUBLIC  t)RBT.  m».1 

The  public  debt  of  the  Union  would  be  a  further  cjiise 
of  collUion  between  the  separate  Sutcs  or  conrcilvructcs. 
The  apportionment,  in  the  first  instance,  and  the  pro* 
greK*ive  extinguishment  afterward,  would  be  alike  pro. 
ductivc  of  ill-humor  and  animositjr.  How  would  it  be 
possible  to  agree  upon  a  rule  of  apportionment  satisfac- 
tory to  all?  There  is  scarceljr  any  that  can  be  proposed 
which  is  entirely  free  from  real  objections.  These,  as 
usual,  would  be  exagtl^ratcd  by  the  adverse  interest  of 
the  parties.  There  arc  even  dissimilar  views  amon^  the 
States  as  to  the  general  pniu:iple  of  discharging  the 
public  debt.  Some  of  them,  cither  less  impressed  with 
the  importance  of  national  credit,  or  because  their  citi- 
zens have  little,  if  any,  imme<liate  interest  in  the  qu(-«- 
tioo,  feel  an  indifference,  if  not  a  rcpu£uaiK!e,  to  the 
payment  of  the  domestic  debt  at  any  rate.  These  would 
be  inclined  to  magnify  the  difficulties  of  a  distribution. 
Others  of  them,  a  numerous  bwly  of  whose  citin-ns  are 
creditors  to  the  public  beyond  the  projiortion  of  the  State 
in  the  total  amount  of  the  national  debt,  would  be  strenu- 
ous for  some  equitable  and  effective  pnn-ision.  The 
jiroitrastt nations  of  the  former  would  excite  llie  resent- 
ments of  the  latter.  The  settlement  of  a  rule  would,  in 
tlie  meantime,  be  postponed  by  real  difTereiiccK  of  opinion 


br  the  Hair  of  Nrw  York.  As  ■  rmll  fl  vu  alt«gn1  ijial  New  Yutk 
drew  iMo  ill  pnlitU*  parte  rroia  ConDrditut  alone  •  fca'lT  *■><"  *«rioa«I]p 
(■llniMled  11  bdmea  fiuo.uoo  »aA  taoo.ooa.  In  tit?  •amr  nuiuier 
NcHI""! ''"ici  ■  "  tritiule  "  UH  (lie  cbleni  |>ul  M^  <"      <  Biilli 

Nt*  JoMy  toA  CnsncLiiiiit.  ihttefotf,  wrrc  "srmli   :  nl  ■mtv 

ftmofi);  llic  iinl  lo  idupl  the  CHnlitulton.  wIiiIf  ihc  S:  ^<  <ik 

and   Rhode  IiUikI  wct«  cotnMHiBdinK);  nmngl^A.  -  •> 

VaA  WH  lisBlly  lotMd  VMta  Wiltollun  bj  Ihe  ihirtit  .  i         nl 

i:!iit>ct  Ihit  illhcr  th*i)  fofCgo  Ihr  tirt<rfii>.  ij  ||ii,  tnalCi  ti-Hain  lu  \m 
kffMleJ  hy  ff.lrral  Onlict,  Ikry  wniiH  n.skr  N»Tf  Vnrii  titj  a  le^vnriv 
klaie  and  Ihnn  join  (lir  IfaiiMi :  >nil  Itho^  IiIuhI  .inly  uwiiint  alieii 
the  paBDoc  ii<  a  feikral  revenue  bill  iniamj  her  liiu  a\  ihc  irailc  ol 
OmMCtkut.  In  the  unc  nunncr  vrrj  larlfl  I>i1l  itui  hai  niailiTillr 
Mxod  one  pari  o(  Ihc  conmry  (nr  (he  lirivfn  n\  ■■■tihn  hat  alwayt 
ulrrcd  ■!>  teiHiuiul  tll>rce)iii|;  (llir  nunl  miiiMr  iT».Mi.[;  being  Ike 
•tleRi)il  of  Snuth  rarntim  to  niillily  Ihe  UrilT  n;  t>conie  lUeh 

a  losrce  of  iliwnnlenl  tn  Ihe  Sonltiem  Matei  M  '  .an  InwnloM. 

in  Ihe  conuliuiioo  i.t  ih*  Southern  Couicdencj,  ul  t.  jUL^lbltldn  ei  tfl 
jiioteoiie  tuci  on  Imjuiu, — l:i>mK. 


BuUUmI    apportionment  of  public  debt.  39 

and  affected  delays.  The  citizens  of  the  States  interested 
would  ctamor;  foretgn  powers  would  urge  for  the  satis- 
faction of  their  just  demands,  and  the  peace  of  the  States 
would  be  hazarded  to  the  double  contingency  of  external 
invasion  and  internal  contention. 

Suppose  the  difhculties  of  agreeing  upon  a  rule  sur- 
mounted, and  the  apportionment  made.  Still  there  is 
greal  room  to  suppose  that  the  rule  agreed  upon  would, 
upon  experiment,  be  found  to  bear  harder  upon  some 
States  tlian  upon  others.  Those  which  were  sufferers  by 
tl  would  naturally  seek  for  a  mitigation  of  the  burden. 
The  others  would  us  naturally  be  disinclined  to  a  revision, 
which  was  likely  to  end  in  an  increase  of  their  own 
incumbrances.  Their  refusal  would  be  too  plausible  a 
pretext  to  the  complaining  States  to  withhold  their  con- 
tributions, not  to  be  embraced  with  avidity;  and  the 
non-compliance  of  these  States  with  their  engagements 
wiiuld  be  a  ground  of  bitter  discussion  and  altercation. 
If  even  the  rule  adopted  should  in  practice  justify  the 
equality  of  its  principle,  still  delinquencies  in  payments 
on  the  part  of  some  of  the  States  would  result  from  a 
diversity  of  other  causes— the  real  deficiency  of  resources; 
the  mismanagement  of  their  finances;  accidental  dis- 
orders in  the  management  of  the  government;  and,  in 
addition  to  the  rest,  the  reluctance  with  which  men  com- 
monly part  with  money  for  purposes  that  have  outlived 
the  exigencies  which  produced  them,  anti  interfere  with 
the  supply  of  immediate  wants.  Delinquencies,  from 
whatever  causes,  would  be  productive  of  complaints, 
recriminations,  and  quarrels.  There  is,  perhaps,  nothing 
mure  likely  to  diitiurb  the  tranquillity  of  nations  than 
their  being  bound  to  mutual  contributions  for  any  com- 
Dan  object  that  does  not  yield  an  equal  and  coincident 
henefit.  For  it  is  an  observation,  as  true  as  it  is  trite, 
that  there  is  nothing  men  differ  so  readily  about  its  the 
payment  of  money. 

Laws  in  violation  of  private  contracts,  as  they  amount  t 
to  aggressions  on  the  rights  of  those  States  whose  citl- / 
UBS  are  injured  by  them,  may  be  con»dered  as  another 


40 


LAWS  VIOLATING  CONTRACTS. 


{■«.T 


probable  suurce  of  hostility.  We  are  not  authorised  to 
expect  that  a  more  liberal  or  more  equitable  spirit  would 
preside  over  tlie  k-gisladons  of  ttie  individual  Sutcs 
hereafter,  M  unrestrained  by  any  additional  checks,  than 
we  have  heretofore  seen  in  too  muny  instances  disgrac- 
ing their  several  code*.  We  have  observed  the  disposi- 
tion to  retaliation  excited  in  Connecticut,  in  consequence 
of  the  enormities  perpetrated  by  the  Legislature  of 
Rhode  Island;'  and  we  reusoiiubly  infer  that,  in  similar 
cases  under  other  circumstances,  a  war,  not  ai parthmeai, 
but  of  the  sword,  would  chastise  such  atrocious  breaches 
of  moral  obligation  and  social  justice. 

The  probability  uf  incompatible  alliances  between  the 
dlRerent  States  or  confederacies  and  different  foreign 
nations.,  and  the  effects  of  this  situation  upon  the  peace  of 
the  whole,  have  been  sufficiently  unfolded  in  some  pre- 
ceding p:ipers.  From  the  view  they  have  exhibited  of 
this  part  of  the  subject,  this  conclusion  is  to  be  drawn, 
that  America,  if  not  connected  at  all,  or  only  by  the  feeble 
tic  of  a  simple  league,  offensive  and  defensive,  wonld,  by 
the  opcr.ition  of  such  j;trriug  alliances,  he  gradiully 
entangled  in  all  the  pernicious  labyrinths  of  European 
politics  and  wars;  and  by  the  destructive  contentions  of 
the  parts  into  which  she  was  divided,  would  be  likely  to 
become  a  prey  to  the  artifices  and  machinations  of 
j>owi!rs  equally  the  enemies  of  them  all.  DiviJf  ft imf^ra  * 
must  be  the  motto  of  every  nation  tlial  either  hate*  of 
fears  us.  f  Publiits. 


'  Divide  mill  oomrauid.— PimLirs. 

f  In  orilcT  tttii  the  wlinlc  wlijci'l  if  llci*  papm  in>*  *s  uxm  *s  pool' 
bk  bp  bill  ticfKcc  iKr  piihlic.  ii  it  (■rnpntnl  tn  pahl'ith  ih*m  (om  Hmn  ■ 
wcEh — ail  TuOiLiir  in  th«  Ncv  Votk  Paittt  and  on  ThumUj'  1»  die 
Ptiify  AslttTiiitr. — Piintms, 

'  Khodc  tt-'inil,  by  (itum  tA  p«|>eT  vtimty  and  tender  Imti  of  iinu.™! 
dfnnviiy,  bad  eniuaed  t^nakiil  (wldic  and  ;i4ivate  repuiilMTM  fWZXue 
nrt^TBWw.  IVtednt,  rn>T><lcn<:r,  IJSJ.  »■'!  Ptitlct'k  "  Aacount  o(  the 
raper  M.mcy'AT'RIi-rio  l^lnril."  Pt"*i4e»Cr.  iSRo).  int  Ib  rctalUlkm 
Council icut  pUM"l   ■  Ijiiir  fmbidilinK  iti  coiiRi  to  try  (VMS  of    RbOdc 

libnil  ctcdiUtn  «£*■»(  Connecticst  deMon.— Eoiros. 


BwatM)  WARS  BETWEEN   STATES.  41 


No.    8.  (New  York /Wf^f/,  Novcmbei  ss,  1787.)  Hamilton. 

CONSEQUENCES    OF     HOSTILITIES    BETWEEN 
STATES. 

War  ktliettH  tht  sfalti  partitularh  Jitlrtiting — Ijick  of  ttfinding 
mrmiti  and  fortifitd posti^Neciisary  introduelien  of  tlattding  armits — 
Cfrnftlilien  bitvKtti  thi  statu  in  armammti — Examf let  of  Greet  refui- 
litj — NalioHal  danger  unduly  magnifiti  military  fewer  at  exfenie  af 
tivit — Exampit  and  fteuliar  felieily  ef  Great  Britain — Similiarily  ef 
tht  Unittd  Stain — NeedUssnets  af  extensive  military  establishments. 

To  tht  People  of  the  State  of  New  York: 

Assuming  it  therefore  as  an  established  truth  that  the 
several  States  in  case  of  disunion,  or  such  combinations 
of  them  as  might  happen  to  be  formed  out  of  the  wreck 
of  the  general  Confederacy,  would  be  subject  to  those 
vicissitudes  of  peace  and  war,  of  friendship  and  enmity 
with  each  other,  which  have  fallen  to  the  lot  of  all  neigh- 
boring nations  not  united  under  one  government,  let  us 
enter  into  a  concise  detail  of  some  of  the  consequences 
that  would  attend  such  a  situation. 

War  between  States,  in  the  first  period  of  their  sepa- 
rate existence,  would  be  accompanied  with  much  greater 
distresses  than  it  commonly  is  in  those  countries  where 
regular  military  establishments  have  long  obtained.  The 
disciplined  armies  always  kept  on  foot  on  the  continent 
c£  Europe,  though  they  bear  a  malignant  aspect  to  liberty 
and  economy,  have,  notwithstanding,  been  productive  of 
the  signal  advantage  of  rendering  sudden  conquests 
impracticable,  and  of  preventing  that  rapid  desolation 
which  used  to  mark  the  progress  of  war  prior  to  their 
iotrodaction.  The  art  of  fortification  has  contributed  to 
the  same  ends.  The  nations  of  Europe  are  encircled 
with  chains  of  fortified  places,  which  mutually  obstruct 
invasion.  Campaigns  are  wasted  in  reducing  two  or  three 
frontier  garrisons,  to  gain  admittance  into  an  enemy's 
country.  Simitar  impediments  occur  at  every  step,  to  ex- 
banst  the  strength  and  delay  the  progress  of  an  invader. 


4»  SAFETY  A  DiRECTOROF  NATIONAt.  CONDUCT.    fWa,  ■ 


Formerly,  an  invadinK  army  would  pcm*irate  iiiiu  tlw 
heart  of  a  neighboring  country  almost  as  soon  as  iiUetli- 
gence  of  its  approach  could  be  received;  but  now  n  com- 
paratively small  force  of  disciplined  trotipN,  acting  nti  the 
defensive,  with  the  aid  of  posts,  is  able  lo  impede  aud 
filially  to  fniKtrale  the  enterpriscK  of  one  much  more 
considerable.  The  history  of  war,  in  that  quarter  of  iltc 
globe,  is  no  longer  a  history  of  nations  subdued  and 
empires  overturned,  but  of  towns  tukcn  and  n-ukcn;  of 
battles  that  decide  nothing;  of  retreats  more  beneficial 
than  victories;  of  much  effort  and  little  acquisition. 

In  this  country  the  scene  would  be  altogether  rcvcr&cd, 
The  jealijusy  of  military  establishments  would  {Mistpone 
Ihcm  as  long  as  possible.  The  want  of  forlilications, 
leaving  the  frontiers  of  one  State  open  to  another,  would 
facilitate  inroads.  The  populous  States  would,  with  little 
difficulty,  overrun  their  less  populous  neighbors.  Con- 
quests would  be  as  easy  to  be  made  as  difficult  to  be 
retained.  War,  therefore,  would  be  desuliiiry  and  pred- 
atory. PLUKoeit  and  devastation  ever  march  in  the 
train  of  irregulars.  The  calamities  of  individuals  woDid 
make  the  principal  Rgure  in  the  events  which  would 
characterize  our  military  expluiis. 

This  picture  is  not  too  highly  wrought;  though,  I  con- 
fess, it  would  not  long  remain  ».  just  one.  Safety  from 
external  danger  is  the  most  powerful  director  of  national 
conduct.  Kvcn  the  ardent  love  of  liberty  will,  after  a 
lime,  give  way  lo  its  dictates.  The  vinleni  de.tirurtion 
of  life  and  property  incident  to  war,  the  continual  effort 
and  alarm  attendant  on  a  slate  of  continual  danger,  witi 
compel  nations  the  most  attached  to  liberty  to  report  for 
repose  and  si-curity  to  institutions  which  have  a  tendency 
to  destroy  their  civil  and  political  rights.  To  be  more 
safe,  they  at  length  become  willing  to  run  the  risk  of 
being  less  free.* 


'Tlir  prctcnt  irmanienli  oF  E]uit<[ic  «ie  «  poinlci]  iBtuncc  of  Ibe  Initli 
of  thit  iJn.  aiii)  II  l>  la  tic  iiiHeil  Ihil  ocry  aiUtlltoii  lo  Ihein  U  lirn^hl 
■Iwilll.  mil  through  ■ny  Inciriatti  |itobiiliilil)>  nl  Hit,  Iml  rnlinlj'  ihriiu|*li 
nuiuil  cnuUlioa.     Tbc  ti»th  am  tiaa  be  prurcd  [icj^iiiveljr  \if  die  |«ct 


HwUlM)  SrAA'/>/A'G  AKMIES.  43 

ThcfnsiKulions  chiefly  nllutleit  lo  ate  staxiunc.  akmies  and 

Ihe  ct>rn3fior»iicnt  oppetidagcs  of  mililniy  csublishnicnls.     Stanil- 

^_      --      i"g  ariiile*.  It  ib  Mid.  are  nol  provided  ag.iinsl  111  the 

U,M,41,      "^^  CunMiluiion  :  »nA  \\  is  llierclure  iiiferrrd   tI1.1t 

•4,71.  ilicf  nuy  exist  under  it."    Their  exi.tiencc.  howevei, 

from  the  i^ry  tettns  cH  ihc  propociiion.ls,  at  mou.  prohieniaticnl 

ami  unceTUtiii.'     iltit  sundiiig  armies,  it  may  be  replied.  muM 

laeviMhly  fcxhIi  troti)  a  diuoluiion  ol  the  CanCedetiicy.    f'(et|ueiil 

mu  anil  coosiaiil  ajuprehension.  which  require  a  st;iie  of  as  coti- 

luni  prepLariirHm,  will  infalhhiy  produce    them.      The  weaker 

Slater  ur  tun (olcractes  would  first  h;ive  recourse  lo  tliem.  to  |)iii 

tilem»lveA  upon  an  equality  with   their  inoic   poleni   neighbors. 

Thry  wuukt  ritiic.ivot   to  supply  the  liifcilorily  of  popul.ilion  and 

retourecs  by  a  more  icKular  and  effcciivc  tysirm  »l  defense,  by 

■bstiplrncd  troops,  and  by  forlificjitiotis.     They  woulit.  at  Ihe  tame   | 

time.be  necessitated  tu  iilrenglheii  the  cxcciilii-c  arm  of  g(n<err.' 

mmi,  in  doing  whidi  iheir  const iluiiotis  wraultl  acquire  a  pn>- 

gnuire  liircciion  toward  iiiunaichy.     It  is  of  (he  nnture  of  war  lo 

.dcnxK  the  oicetltive  at  the  e«pensc  o(  the  lesbUlivc  uulhotity. 

The  cxpe(|i<'nit  which  have  been  mentioned  would  soon  f;it«  ihe 
StMo  or  eofifcdcracics  that  made  useol  iliem  a  superiortly  over 
Ur  ndglibtin.    StnaU  Mates,  or  slaiei  of  leu  natural  urenglh. 


Ibalihe  Itiiileil  Slslo  army  in  17115.  when  we  vcre  ineaoccilliy  ttrong 
vfritnrtlf  p^^'f-fntiicnU  piivtchhAii^  I'aniblii  ami  )-riiii>ijuii,  wai  nearly 
1'"  —  --i  -r-iimmly  wie  wiMiet  («  every  1  JOo  «f  itilmbrtanlv.  while  in 
I  .  ICC  vtth  Canada  aiialmmt  <«rl>in  factc-i.  and  uilli  the  luli- 

"I  1  "enk  power  on  our  southern  (roniicr.  tmr  ainiy  nunibrieirl 

'«-.  is.ouOi  or  apprciiimalcly  one  10  ei>ery  3S00  nf  liiliiliiiaiiix.  And 
iW  iiiii  ilnreaio  o(  ntlio  it  not  nicnrly  dnc  lo  "nr  Inininll.nniii  poiition 
»>k««B  by  Ihe  umiev  <A  the  taps  Him  lu  Ihe  loulli  ol  \vt.  nhiie  domci- 
■■'■adlareienpeare  arc  far  leu  lecuie.  Tho»  Moiiio  Mi  cbIIc<I  upon 
■a  ■liitaln  ( iS^)  an  amy  tA  over  50.000  men  actually  K-rvinc,  wilh 
MIC  than  dnahlE  that  numlici  in  her  cnnlivc  rrtctvc.  anil  Hiaiil  |l8'/>) 
Uan  aitny  of  nearly  aj.ooo  ni«n  willi  a  rrw-fvc  "(  cjii.-il  mk.  Nolli. 
•■{  CM  hetter  prove  Ifint  lh«  ilan'linc  armtei  of  tn^day  are  jii  do  )eni.e 
Ik  icbJi  of  paiiieulnr  fotat  oJ  )t>>*erninent,  hut  are  merely  the  kacn- 
fa  •>(  tj;lven  aai-Miil  of  nuiihcKMl  in<I  inouey  by  each  coiinlty.  in  abuilule 
nintntlie  inlrrim  ao-l  rileiifir<laiii;eti  wilh  which  cuh  ik  ilirratenrrl,  in 
<''ct  Ibal  life.  piio|>«fty,  and  wnimeKe,  may  hare  their  neiTrary 
•"ariiy.— EtMtoa. 

*Thl«  ntifcclUin  wlU  be  fully  eiatnincd  in  itt  proper  place,  and  (1  «UI 
WitKTon  thai  llie  only  oatatsl  prccaulloa  which  could  have  Iven  taken 
^  iltii  rihircl  hak  Ircea  taken  ;  anil  a  much  heitci  ooc  llian  ii  lo  be 
'  ironuilnti"n  lh*[  hu  lieen  heretnfiptr  framed  in  Amelka, 

a  II  eontnin  no  |-Tiiird  at  all  on  ihii  object. — I^tni.tl'i. 

Ill 'Tir  (rii  o(  irto3  :  "  Ihu  inference,  from   the  vefy   form   ot   ihe 
inpMuion,  ti,  at  bett.  proUonatival  awl  unictiaiu.'' — Euirot. 


/ 


44  IKDUST&Y INCQMPATiaLE  WtTtt MIUTAKISM. 


under  rigorous  goirc*nmcnt«.  and  wilh  Ihcassistanrc  of  dlsciplintd 
armies,  have  often  Iritimptieil  over  large  stales,  or  stiles  o(  graaler 
jutural  strength,  which  have  hccn  (ksiiiuic  t)j  ihckr  ailvanljign. 
Neither  the  pride  nor  ihi;  safciy  of  the  nvorc  impoitani  Staien  or 
confederacies  would  permit  tliem  long  lo  submit  to  thi«  monifying 
and  advenitiious  »iipcrioi'iiy.  They  would  quickly  resmt  to  mean* 
limiUr  to  (hose  by  which  it  h;>d  l>een  effected,  to  rcintiair  ihcm- 
sclvcs  in  their  lost  prc*cin<nenc«.  Thus  we  sliouhl,  in  a  link  lime. 
tec  eslJiblished  in  every  putt  of  Ihis  country  the  i-ime  engines  of 
despoiiMD  which  hHvc  been  the  scourge  of  the  Old  WoiM.  Tliu 
al  least,  would  be  the  natural  course  of  (hiiigs ;  an<l  our  reasonings 
will  be  the  more  likely  to  be  just,  in  proportion  as  tliej'  )ue  accom- 
moibted  (o  this  stand  a  rI. 

These  arc  not  vague  inlerenc*"*  drawn  from  supposed  or  specti- 
latiic  (lefecls  in  a  ConMituiioii  the  whole  power  of  which  b  lodged 
in  the  hands  of  a  people,  or  their  rcpresirniatives  and  delegates, 
but  tbey  are  solid  conctiuions  drawn  from  llie  nalural  and  neces- 
sary progress  of  human  .iSairs. 

It  may  peili.tps  be  ^ked  by  way  o(  obfecikm  to  tliis.  why  did 
tlOl  standing  armies  spnng  up  out  o(  the  contentions  which  so 
«ften  dblcatiied  the  ancient  repulitics  of  Gieece?  Different 
answers,  nqually  satisfactory,  may  he  given  to  this  queHton.  The 
kndasltious  habits  of  the  people  of  the  [ireseiit  day.  absorlted  in  (he 
pursuits  of  gain,  and  dcrolcd  to  the  inipiovemrnts  of  agricnliurc 
and  comnttrcc,  are  iucocnpaiibte  with  the  condition  o(  a  iiatt»n  of 
soldiers,  whkh  was  the  tiue  condition  ol  llie  people  of  ihOM 
republics.  The  means  of  revenue  which  hare  been  so  greatly 
multiplied  by  the  increase  tA  gold  and  silver  and  of  the  arts  of 
industry,  and  t'le  science  of  finance.  whMh  (s  the  offspiing  tA 
modern  tiii>es,  concurring  with  the  habits  of  nations,  have  pro- 
duceil  an  entire  revolution  in  the  s)i.iein  o(  war,  and  have  ictiilcicd 
ilisciplined  armies,  distinct  from  the  body  Of  ibe  ciliiens,  the 
insepiinbic  companions  of  fmnieni  lioslility. 

There  is  a  wide  difference,  also,  between  military 
esuibliihincnl&  in  a  country  seldom  exposed  by  ilssitaatlon 
to  internal  invasions,  and  in  one  which  is  often  subject 
to  them,  and  nlways  apprehensive  of  thetn.  The  rulers  of 
(he  former  can  have  nn  gond  [>releil,  i(  Ihcy  are  ever  v> 
inclined,  (o  keep  on  foot  arinics  so  numerous  as  must  of 
necessity  be  maintained  in  the  latter.  These  armies 
being  in  the  first  case,  rarely,  if  al  all,  called  into  actiritjr 
for  interior  defense,  the  people  ar«  in  no  danger  of  beti^ 


BFILS  OF  MILITARY  SUPHEMACY. 


45 


bruken  to  military  suborclination.  The  laws  are  DOt 
accustomed  to  relaxaiioits  in  favor  or  mill tury  exigencies; 
tbc  civil  state  tcotains  in  full  viicor,  neither  corrupted 
nor  confounded  with  the  princti>Ie$  or  propensities  of  the 
other  Ht^tc.  The  ftmaUnefts  of  the  unny  renders  the 
aaturai  strength  of  the  communiiy  an  overmatch  for  it; 
and  the  citizens,  not  habitnated  to  took  up  to  the  oiililary 
power  for  protection,  or  to  submit  to  its  opprosKions, 
neither  love  nor  fear  the  soldiery;  they  view  them  with 
•  ipirit  of  jealous  acquiescence  in  a  necessary  evil,  and 
stand  ready  to  resist  a  power  which  they  suppose  m»y  he 
exerted  to  the  prejudice  of  their  rights.  The  army 
nndcr  such  circumstances  may  usefully  aid  the  magistrate 
10  suppress  a  small  faction,  or  an  occasional  mob,  or 
insurrection;  but  it  will  be  unable  to  enforce  cncroaeh- 
vents  against  the  united  efforts  of  the  grejtt  body  of  the 
people. 

In  a  country  in  the  predicament  last  described,  the 
contrary  of  all  this  happens.  The  perpetual  mcnac- 
ints  uf  danger  oblige  the  government  to  he  always  pre- 
pared to  repel  tt;  its  armies  must  be  numerous  enough 
tor  mstant  defense,  The  continual  necessity  for  their 
Rfirices  enhiinccK  the  importance  of  the  soldier,  and 
propunionably  degrades  the  condition  of  the  citiwn.' 
The  military  state  becomes  elevated  above  the  civil. 
Thr  inliabit^rils  of  territories  often  the  theater  of  war 
Jie  nnavotdalily  subjected  to  frequent  infringements  on 
Iheir  rights,  which  serve  to  weaken  their  sense  of  those 
ti^ts;  and  by  degrees  the  people  are  brought  to  con- 
siikr  the  soldiery  not  only  as  their  protectors,  but  as 
Iheir  superiors.  The  transition  from  this  disposition  to 
ttii  of  considering  them  masters  is  neither  remote  nor 
4iftc«ll;  but  it  is  very  difficult  to  prevail  upon  a  people 
onder  such  impressions  to  make  a  bold  or  effectual 
tnutance  to   usurpations,  supported    by    the    military 

P«Cf. 


'Thf  leLitbia  of  ikc  (o)<l>rr  t«  lh«  cillto  In  Getmtny  M  praeni  ii  > 
■**»  poof  of  thb  theory  — Eoitob. 


45       IXSVLATED  SITUATIOff  AN  ADVAffTACE, 


The  kiMcdoin  o(  Great  Bril.tin  l.*1t<i  u-itlitn  the  fh^l  ilc»L-n|)tini 
An  insubr  nitiialtoTi.  anil  a  putvctful  mnriiie.  gu.Kdinc  H  in  a  f,^v^.\ 
mr.tsiire  against  t(ic  (louibtlitir  u(  foreign  iiivxviun.  superscile  ll: 
neceuity  of  a  numcroiu  atmy  within  ilic  kingdom.  A  luffii 
(orct  to  make  head  against  a  &u<)ilen  deSccDl,  nil  the  mlliiia  oou 
have  lime  to  tally  aix!  emboily,  b  all  that  hiu  l>ccn  dceni 
reipiiiite.  No  motive  ol  national  policy  ha^  tlciiiandcd.  nof  won 
public  o|>iiiion  have  loleialed.  a  larger  number  of  iioojn  upon  i: 
domestic  csial>ti'ihii)cnis.  'Diete  has  been  fof  a  long  tunc  pa: 
lilile  luom  for  (henpetnlion  o(  tlie  oIIkf  cause^i  which  have  bceii 
rnuineraied  as  Ihc  convtxiuenccs  of  intcriMl  war.  This  p«cuHm 
felicity  of  siiuiilion  has,  in  a  greui  de^rre.  contributed  lo  presci 
Ihc  liberty  which  thai  counir>-  lo  Ihrs  day  eiijoyt,  in  spile  of  th 
ptevaleni  voialily  aitd  cotruplion.  tf.vn  the  cuntr^iry,  Ilritain  hai 
been  situa led  on  ibc  continent,  and  Iiad  been  compelled,  as  il: 
vtnuhl  Imvc  been,  by  thai  silualtoit.  lo  make  l»er  militar}'  e»iabliUh 
roenlsat  borne  cocilcnsivc  wiih  iltoscof  (he  olhcr  great  powers i 
Europe,  abe,  like  ihcm.  would  in  all  ptul>:ibitily  tK.  at  this  day, 
victim  lo  ihe  absolute  power  of  a  Siingle  man.  Tis  pos&ilfli 
though  not  eaiy.  thai  ihe  |>e»ple  of  that  islaiMl  may  Ifc  cnxlavet 
from  other  caii<«s  ;  but  it  cannot  be  by  iIk  prowess  of  an  army 
inconsideiablc  at  Ihal  which  has  been  usually  kept  up  wrilhin  llw 
kingdom. 

Itwcare  wise  enough  to  pr<:scrve  tl>e  Union  wc  may 
for  ages  enjoy  an  advantage  Minilar  to  that  of  an  tiisulated 
•uttutioiL  Europe  is  at  a  great  distance  from  us.  H 
colonics  in  our  vicinity  will  Ik  likely  to  continue  toi 
mtirh  ili«pru|>urtioned  in  strcntcti  to  be  able  to  gire  D 
any  daiiKcroiis  annoyance.  Exten&ivc  military  cstaliltah 
menis  cannot,  in  this  position,  be  necessiiry  tu  oa 
iterurity.  Bui  tf  wc  should  be  (Iii.untted,  and  the  integra 
parts  should  either  remain  separated,  or,  Hhitb  is  mos 
probable,  should  be  thrown  together  into  two  ur  ihi 
confederacies,  we  should  be,  in  a  short  course  of  time,  i 
Ihe  predicament  of  the  continental  powers  of  tvurope— 
our  liberties  would  be  u  prey  to  the  means  of  defendin 
ourselves  against  the  ambition  and  jcalonsy  of 
other. 

This  is  an  idea  not  superficial  or  futile,  but  solid  an 
weighty.  It  deserves  Ihc  must  seriotis  and  mature  coo 
sidcraUuD  of  ever^  prudent  and  lioockt  man  u(  whatev< 


il        A   BAKktEk  AGAINST  FACTtOtf.  47 

party.  If  such  men  will  make  a  firm  and  solemn  pause, 
and  meditate  dispassionately  on  the  importance  of  this 
interesting  idea;  if  they  will  contemplate  it  in  all  its 
attitudes,  and  trace  it  to  all  its  consequences,  they  will 
not  hesitate  to  part  with  trivial  objections  to  a  Constitu- 
tion the  rejection  of  which  would  in  all  probability  put  a 
fioal  period  to  the  Union.  The  airy  phantoms  that  flit 
before  the  distempered  imaginations  of  some  of  its  ad- 
versaries would  quickly  give  place  to  the  more  substan- 
tial forms  of  dangers,  real,  certain,  and  formidable. 

FUBLIUS. 


No.  9.  ItmdiftiUnI  Jtnml.  NomnlKrii,  i;!?.)  Hamilton. 

THE  UNION  A  SAFEGUARD   AGAINST    DOMES- 
TIC DISTURBANCES. 

Examfif  ef  Gritk  and  Italian  refuilirt — Arguattnts  against  rtpubli- 
m  gntrHmtHi  and  civil  libiTly — Improvtments  in  the  art  ef  govern- 
mim—Adoantagei  ef  txtendfd  Urritory — Opinion  ef  Montesquieu — 
Neattitj  fer  lubJivisien  implied  in  MenUsquieu't  view — Fedtralixatien 
ttitpeibtnt  fsr  the  extension  ef  govern  men  I — Quotation  from  Mon- 
tefuien — Inatcurate  distinetien  ieltaeea  confidfration  and  consolidalien 
—Defatilien  tfa  eenfedtratt  republic — Federal  character  of  proposed  con  • 
iiiiidiem — Ljeiam  confederacy. 

Te  Ike  People  of  the  State  of  Neiv  York: 

A  firm  Union  will  be  of  the  utmost  moment  to  the 
peace  and  liberty  of  the  States,  as  a  barrier  against 
domestic  faction  and  insurrection.  It  is  impossible  to 
read  the  history  of  the  petty  republics  of  Greece  and 
lUIj  without  feeling  sensations  of  horror  and  disgust  at 
thedistractions  with  which  they  were  continually  agitated, 
and  at  the  rapid  succession  of  revolutions  by  which  they 
*ere  kept  in  a  state  of  perpetual  vibration  between  the 
eitremes  of  tyranny  and  anarchy.  If  they  exhibit  occa- 
sional calms,  these  only  serve  as  short-lived  contrasts  to 
the  furious  storms  that  are  to  succeed.     If  now  and  then 


48 


SCIENCE  OF  POUTICS  PROGKtSSfVE. 


[iro.1 


inl«rvah  of  fdidtjr  open  tu  \\t.vi,  we  behold  tbem  with  a 
mixture  of  tc^rci  arising  from  the  reSection  ihat  tbe, 
pleasing  scenes  before  as  are  soon  to  be  overwhelmed  hj  I 
(he  teinpeiituduit  waves  of  sedition  nnd  {mny  rage.  IfJ 
momentary  rays  of  glory  break  forth  from  the  gloom, 
while  they  dazzle  us  with  a  transient  and  ficeting  bril-J 
liancy,  they  at  the  same  time  admonish  us  to  lament  th;tt| 
ihc  vices  of  government  should  pervert  the  direction  and] 
larnish  the  luster  of  those  bright  talents  and  exalted' 
endowments  for  which  the  favored  soils  that  produced] 
them  have  been  so  justly  celebrated. 

From  I  he  (lisuTilen  that  disfigure  ilie  annals  of  ihose  trpublie 
the  advocatrt  of  drpalivn  have  drawn  atgumenIK,  nol  only  ag^iiiutl  I 
ihe  (oims  of  republicjin  g0VFrninci>t.  bul  agairiM  the  very  |inrict-| 
pies  ol  civil  litiedy.  Tlicy  hare  lierricd  all  free  governn>cnl  a»] 
uiconsisieni  with  thcofdcr  of  Mcicty.and  have  imlulged  ibcni^vtil 
in  maliciuiu  nultaiioii  ovirr  in  (ricndi  un<l  |urtiuft>.  Ila|>ptly  tori 
inankitid.  uu[)«i<louk  f;ibric«  rrai^  on  the  tuitis  of  'Cihniy,  whicliJ 
have  flourished  for  ages.  Iiave.  in  a  few  glorious  iiiMances,  (ciutedj 
their  i;k>oiTiy  fophism^  Aii«l,  I  trust.  America  wilt  be  the  braa 
anil  sittid  founiUiInn  of  otiicr  ediftces,  not  leu  roagniliceiit,  which^ 
Will  be  equally  peinuineiii  inonurneiils  of  their  errors. 

But  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  the  portraits  ihcy  hdvcl 
sketched  i»f  republican  government  were  U>"  just  copies] 
of  the  originals  from  which  they  were  taken,     If  It 
been  found  impracticable  to  have  devised  models  of  al 
ronre  perfect  structure,  the  enlightened  fnemis  tu  libertyl 
would  have  been  obliged  to  abandon  the  cauw  of  ihacj 
6t>eeies  of  government  as  indefensible.     The  sricnce  of 
political,  however,  like  most  other  sciences,  has  receire4j 
great  improvement.     The  efficacy  of  various  principles  ia 
now  well  understood,  which  were  either  not  known  at  all.] 
or  imperfectly  kimwo  to  the  ancients.     The  regular  dl«- 
tM  tribiition  of  power  into  distinct  departments; 

>«.  4T.  tite  introduction  of  legislative  balances  at»i 
checks:  the  institution  of  courts  composcil  of  )udf 
holding  their  "Hires  during  good  behavior;  the  rcpre- 
1^  sentatidii  nf  the  people  in  the  legi:datitre  by 

Hoi.  ftS  n.    depDties  of  their  own  cicctiiio:  these  are  whtfDj 
new  discoveries,  or  have  made  Ihtir  principal  pntjj 


AfOATTESqUIEU  OX  SMALL  REPUBLICS.         49 


tuwnrilfi  perfection  in  modern  times.     They  :ire  oie.nn*, 
A(ul|>owerfiil  mcan^tiy  which  thcL-sccllcncesof  republican 
sorernment  nutyberciitinetland  iis  iraperfcctit>ntilcssi-nc<I 
or  avoided.     To   this  catalo);uc  of   circtiiiiNtniices   tbat 
tend  to    the  amelioration   of   popular  systems   of  civil 
fovernment,  I  .thnll  venture,  however  novel  it  may  appear 
to  some,  to  add  one  more,  on  a  prim-iplc^  whirh  has  been 
made  the  foundation  of  an  objection  to  the  new  Constitu- 
tion;  I   mean   the   khlakgkmknt  of   ttie  okbit   within 
which  such  systems  are  to  reroh-e,  either  in  respect  to 
the  dimensions  ofasinttte  State,  or  to  the  consolidation 
tel«^        of  several  timallcr  States  into  one  great  Oon- 
Uta<14.      federacy.      Th«  latter  \%  tliai   which   imme* 
dntcly concerns  the  object  under  consideration.     It  will, 
however,  be  of  use  to  examine  the  principle  in  its  appli- 
cation to  a  single  State,  which  shall  be  attended  to  in 
mother  place. 

The  utility  of  a  Confederacy,  as  well  to  suppress 
fxtion  am!  to  f^uard  the  internal  tranfinillity  of  States,  as 
M  inrrcasc  ihcir  cxiernal  force  and  security,  is  in  reality 
noiancwidcu.  It  has  been  practiced  upon  in  different 
mvntriea  and  ajjes,  and  has  received  the  sanction  of  the 
■unapproved  writers  on  the  subjects  of  politics.  The 
opponents  of  the  plan  proposed  have,  with  great  assiduity, 
dud  and  circulated  the  observ^ilions  of  Moiilesquieu  on 
(he  Qecesstty  of  a  contracted  territory  for  a  republican 
gonnment.'     But  they  seem  not  to  hare  been  apprised 

'Thit  iin'l<'>il>lr<lly  km  itnij^ril  at  ■  xjJy  lu  nn  ('tm{;i  fi»iii  Uoiiim- 

fiio  la  Ihf  ihinl  l«lt«r  of  Cnlo  (Gtot"?  CUntonl  |iul>luhr<l  hi  tlit  Ntut 
"A  /wuriM/,  Ociobw  i;.  1787  (FonTi  "*  Etuiyt  on  tli«  Conttitulion,** 
p.  ii6|  where  M<iaicw|iiiFu  it  qootoj  M  uyine.  "  I<  >*  iMiinil  U>  •  rt> 
pl>lc  In  lime  oaK  a  tmiil  temuity,  ■'■IhrrnKc  ll  cinnot  long  nib>l>I; 
ni  kirec  •rrio.  Ilicrc  am  ninn  ol  lir^r  fnrtunr*.  ini(  L-isittcxiuenlly  uF  Icui 
^liMlion;  thcTT  If*  loo  greal  <[«i>oi\i(»  lo  irnx  in  Ihp  ti«ii't»  ol  ■  linulc 
■a  ■mbitiout  p«non  soon  brooiDB  i«i>ti>>l<  ihat  h«  nny  he 
,  ,-:'ul.  iiiii  clurtout  by  oppreHlng  hii  (ellow-ciiiicnii.  and  IhM  I* 
'  10  i;niiilRit',  "ll  (he  tniiti  of  lilt  cmintry.  In  tii^ 
I.  cijoJ  II  t>rii&ce>t  in  *  ih'iiiunil  rltun;  in  •  \m.M 
I  '>!  ibn  piiKliT  U  emily  jMneii-td.  tfller  unilcrelood.  »i<l 
'le  mach  oil  wvrf  diiicn:  alxttei  Iiiit«  ■  If»  eMent.  ■nrl  0/ 

iu>  i.^  Ileal ecUd— lie  alw  tbawi  you.  iIirI  ibe  duniton  of  (h« 

'^>Mv  oi  ;t|ia(ta  irn  cmlng  iii  >|h  bavin];  raiiilnued  irlili  Ihe  UMe  «■- 


50     SUALLKBSS  OF  TERltlTOHY  UNDEStRASLE.  Oh,! 

of  the  scnliments  of  that  great  man  expressed  in  unulhci 
part  of  his  work,  nor  to  have  adverted  to  the  coose 
quencGS  of  the  principle  to  which  they  subscribe  with 
such  rcadjf  acquiescence. 

When  MuntcK()Uteu  reconimendii  a  snuUI  extent  (or 
republics,  the  standards  he  had  in  view  were  of  dimen* 
sioas  far  short  of  the  limits  of  almost  every  one  of  these 
States.  Ndtlier  Virginia,  Massaehusettii,  Pennsjrlvaniar 
New  York,  North  Carolina,  nor  Georgia  can  by  any 
means  be  compared  with  the  models  from  which  he 
re^isoned  and  to  which  the  terms  of  his  description  apply. 
If  we  therefore  lake  his  ideas  on  this  point  as  the  crite 
rion  of  truth,  we  shall  be  driven  to  the  allcrnalivc  cither 
of  taking  refuge  at  once  in  the  arms  of  monarchy,  ur  of 
3pliltin|{  ourselves  into  an  infinity  of  little  jealous,  clash 
ing,  tumultuous  commonwealths,  the  wretched  nurseries 
of  unceasing  discord,  and  the  miserable  objects  uf  uni- 
versal pity  or  contempt.  Some  o(  the  writers  who  have 
come  forward  on  the  other  side  of  the  question  M-era  to 
have  been  aware  of  the  dilemma;  and  have  even  been 
bold  enongh  to  hint  at  the  division  of  the  larger  State 
as  a  desirable  thini;.  Such  an  infatuated  policy,  sucti 
a  desperate  expedient,  might,  by  the  multiplication  ot 
pcity  offices,  answer  the  views  of  men  who  pf»sscss  not 
qualifications  to  extend  their  influence  beyond  the  narrow 
circles  of  personal  intrigue,  but  it  could  never  promote 
the  grir;ilneiLs  or  hapi<ineK*i  of  (he  people  uf  America. 

Referring   the  examination  of   the  principle  itself  tu 


Icnl  o\  tetiilory  alln  ill  \%\  wsn:  «iul  thai  Ihe  amliMMin  of  Albeoi  xaX 
\»nAxniim  In  cHanuiiil  nsil  ilii«cl  ihe  union,  Imi  lh«fn  tbclt  lil>«rtic* 
■nilcarif  ilieia  «  iBuiuichy."  Thou)^  tlie  lut  hunilfiJ  ircan  hai  nuile 
AtiT  iliKUtuon  of  the  Uiew)'  uniicccauj.  yet  il  tt  ialrroiliiig  in  ot«  %n 
nptnkm  >it  Jdlsnon't.  wriUcn  \atmtAiMt\f  alKr  Itw  Inniajik  of  ilcnuc- 
n<7  In  iHoi,  when  hr  wtu4c.  "  It  (umnlm  a  new  proof  o(  Ihe  (•l>ehooil 
uf  Montm(ui«ii't  ilixtiine.  Ih>l  >  republic  »n  be  |ireutt<-<l  ..^iv  in  • 
■mall  i«niiory.     TIm  reTcne  ii  the  Initli.     Hail  nui  ini  •vcn 

a  ihinl  onlf  iA  whu  h  i>.  ve  wei«  cone.     Duiwhilr  (rrn:'>  ,i  » 

llkeui  e|iKli.-niic.  ipuned  ccrutii  tmilt.  l)ic  khi'Iiip  nmnii.uJ  *auiij  aa4 
niilovctml ,  ■ii'l  belli  un  till  ibeir  lnriliTm  toalil  rctoret  fioin  the  ten- 
piirirT  delaiioii;  and  thai  dicuiaitance  haa  gi^m  me  Qica)  uoailan.'' 
— EmiOK. 


■MlItMl 


A    COSPEDERATB  REPUBLIC. 


5» 


anoilicr  [ilacc,  as  has  been  already  mentioned,  it  will  be 
sulncicnt  to  remark  here  that,  in  the  sense  of  the  author 
who  has  been  most  emphatically  quoted  upon  the  occasion, 
it  would  only  dictate  a  reduction  of  the  size  of  the  more 
coosiderablc  ueubers  of  the  Union,  but  would  not  mili- 
tate against  their  being  all  comprehended  in  one  con- 
federate gorerninGot.  And  this  is  the  true  (]ue$tion,  in 
the  discussion  of  which  we  are  at  present  interested. 

So  far  are  the  suggestions  of  Montesquieu  from  stand- 
ing in  opposition  to  a  general  Union  of  the  States,  that 
he  explicitly  treats  of  a  Confederate  Repl'blic  as  the 
npedient  for  extending  the  sphere  of  popular  govern- 
incot,  and  reconciling  the  advantages  of  monarchy  with 
those  of  republicanism. 

"  ll  IS  very  jKobaUe  "  (says  he"),  "  that  mankind  would  have 
been  obliged  al  Icnxlh  lo  hi*e  coDXtanlly  umk-r  tlK  gDVcrnmcnl  of 
a  nnglc  person,  had  ihry  nol  contrivecl  a  kiii<l  of  consiilulwii  ihat 
bu  all  ihe  inienul  ailvaiiiages  uf  a  [cpiihlJcan,  tagctli«T  with  the 
cuetiul  fofce  of  a  monarchical  goveinmeitt.     I  mean  a  CON- 

nSKJtATC  RKfUBLrC. 

"Thkt  form  of  govcmnveni  Is  a  convention  by  which  several 
uiull«T  UaUt  ut-'Tce  (o  become  meinbetx  nf  a  larger  ant,  which 
they  tntcnd  to  form.  It  is  a  kiml  of  assemblage  of  sucicika  ihat 
cooslilule  a  new  one.  capable  of  mcreuiing,  try  means  of  new 
UMcutioas,  till  lltcy  arrive  lo  sucti  a  degree  of  power  as  to  be 
able  10  provide  (or  i)ic  siccurity  of  llw  uniletl  body. 

"A  republic  of  iKiK  kind.  al>lc  lo  withstand  an  cxtenial  force, 
my  soppon  itself  wvtituui  any  intemul  corrupiions.  Tbc  form 
•I  tliH  society  prevents  al)  inanitcr  of  tnconvciiirnces, 

*  If  D  singk  member  should  atieiiipi  to  usurp  the  supreme 
authority,  he  could  nm  be  supposeil  lo  hnvc  an  equal  authority 
Mil  credit  in  all  the  confcderale  stxtc^  Were  Ik  to  have  loo 
gmi  inlluence  over  une.  this  would  alarm  the  res).  Were  he  to 
nbdue  a  p^iit,  thai  which  would  still  remain  free  iniglit  oppoie 
bim  with  lurccs  indejiendenl  of  thiue  which  Ive  bad  usurped,  and 
wtrpowcr  hini  before  Ike  could  t>c  settled  in  his  usuipatiun. 

"  StumUl  a  |>i>pulsr  insurrection  happen  in  one  of  the  confr<l«r- 
«e  stales,  the  oihcnt  are  able  lo  i)ucll  il.  Should  abuses  creep 
into  one  pirt,  ibey  arr  reformed  by  those  that  remain  sound.  The 
uaie  nuy  be  destroyed  on  one  ude,  and  not  on  the  other ;  the  con- 


'  "  Spirit  of  Law*,"  vol.  t.  book  \x.  clMp.  i.— I'ijbuvs, 


s» 


A    CO/fFBDEKACV  DBFINBD. 


tv*.* 


federacy  may  be  <linio1vetl.  and  l1i«  confcderites  {xesen'e  (hrit 
sovereignty. 

*■  A*  ihij  govetnmenl  \i  compoted  of  small  rcpublbct,  it  enjo)-* 
the  iniernal  happiness  of  each  ;  and  with  respect  la  its  eilemal 
Btuaiion,  tl  is  posscued.  by  means  of  the  Msocialion,  of  lUI  the 
ulrantaget  of  ixttgt  monaichies." 

I  hiive  thought  i(  propec  to  quote  at  length  ihcK  intemiine 
pnMaget.  becauM  ihey  contain  a  luminous  abridgment  of  the  prin 
cipal  arguments  in  forof  of  the  Unioo.  and  must  effectually  n- 
roove  the  false  impressions  which  a  mis.ippticaiiun  of  other  pans 
tA  the  work  was  calculated  to  make.  They  hare,  at  the  saiiM! 
time,  an  intiinate  connection  with  the  more  immeili.ite  dMt|;n  >>l 
this  paper;  which  te.  lo  illDtiraie  the  teniJency  of  ilie  Union  to 
repress  domestic  faction  and  insurrection. 

A  distmction,  more  subtle  than  accurate,  haft  been 
raised  between  a  Conftderaty  and  a  tonsoHdaiion  of  the 
States.  The  essential  characteristic  of  the  first  i>  said  to 
be  the  restriction  of  its  authority  to  the  tnembers  in 
their  collective  capacities,  without  reaching  to  the  indi- 
Tidiiats  of  whom  they  are  composed.  It  is  contended 
that  the  national  council  oagbi  to  have  no  concern  with 
any  object  of  internal  administration.  An  exact  equalitjr 
of  siiffnge  between  the  members  has  also  been  insisted 
npon  as  a  leading  feature  of  s  confederate  government 
These  positions  are,  in  the  main,  arbitrary;  they  an 
8upportc<l  neither  by  principle  nor  precedent  It  has  in. 
deed  happened  that  governments  of  this  kind  have  gen- 
erally operated  in  the  manner  which  the  distinction, 
taken  notice  of,  supposes  to  be  inherent  in  their  nature; 
but  there  have  been  in  most  of  them  extensive  exceptions 
to  the  practice,  which  serve  to  prove,  as  far  as  cxampl 
will  go,  that  there  is  no  ativilute  rule  on  the  subject. 
And  it  will  be  clearly  shown,  in  the  course  of  this  inves- 
tigation, that,  as  far  as  the  principle  contended  for  ba: 
prevailed,  it  has  been  the  cause  of  Incurable  disorder  am 
imbccilily  in  the  government. 

The  definition  of  a  CanftJtratt  Rtfuhiii  seems  simply  li 
b«  "  an  assemblage  of  societies,"  or  an  association  of  twD 
or  more  sUles  into  one  state.  The  extetit,  modifies' 
tiotis,  and   objects   of   the   federal  authority  are    mei 


lutltMl  LYCIAN  CONFEDERACY.  S3 

matters  of  discretion.     So  long  as  the  separate  organiza- 
tioa  of  the  members  be  not  abolished;  so  lung  as  it  exists, 
bf  a  constitutional  necessity,  for  local  purposes;  though 
it  should   be   in   perfect   subordination   to   the  general 
authority  of  the  union,  it  would   still  be,  in  fact  and  in 
theory,  an  association  of  states,  or  a  confederacy.     The 
proposed  Constitution,  so  far  from  implying  an  abolition 
of  the  State  governments,  makes  them  constituent  parts 
of  the  national  sovereignty,   by  allowing  them  a  direct 
representation  in  the  Senate,  and  leaves  in  their  posses- 
sion certain   exclusive  and  very  important  portions  of 
sovereign   power.      This    fully    corresponds,    in    every 
rational  import  of  the  terms,  with  the  idea  of  a  federal 
governmenL 

lo  the  Lycian  confederacy,  which  consisted  of  twenty-three 
OTiEs  or  republics,  the  largest  were  entitled  to  three  votes  in  the 
COUMON  COUNCIL,  those  of  the  middle  class  to  fvio,  and  the 
,  unallesi  to  one.  The  Co.itMON  COUNCIL  had  the  appointment  of 
all  the  judges  and  magistrates  of  the  respective  CITIES.  Tliis 
was  certainly  the  most  delicate  species  of  interference  in  their 
iniemal  administration ;  for  if  there  be  anything  that  seems  ex- 
cluiiret)'  appropriated  to  the  local  jurisdictions,  it  Is  the  appoint- 
mnt  of  their  own  officers.  Yet  Montesquieu,  speaking  of  tliis 
uuciation  says  :  "  Were  I  to  give  a  model  of  an  excellent  Con- 
federate Republic,  it  would  be  that  ol  Lycia."  Thus  wc  perceive 
that  the  distinctions  insisted  upon  were  not  within  Ilie  coniempla- 
■ioQ  of  this  enlightened  civilian  ;  and  we  shall  be  lead  lo  conclude, 
that  they  are  the  novel  refinements  of  an  erroneous  theory. 

PUBLIUS. 


54 


POPULAK  GOV&KNMENTS  FACTIOUS.      fBo.  ID 


No.   10-  (A'^KMt/lai^jlAirrfAM-.Hot.H,  DtT.)  MadiSOa 

THE  UNION  A  CHECK  ON  FACTION. 

Tmdmiy  *f  f9ftUar  gavirmiHiHli  If /iiitira — Crmflaiali  t/  im/uifitt 
hkJ  iailaiililx  i-  Staff  trtvrHmfnli — lir^nitiaa  t/ /illijH—llfmtJjr  aj 
/tutian—Ciirtaitrntat  •>/  liirr/) — Cauttii'J  f^HtH  inuaU  in  mam^O/- 
ffiiitg  iHl/rti/i—f,ffiilaliiiit  fy  mf/fritjr  airn  U  mttriiU'i  jidgmtmh 
— Chii  tt^ilatisit'^CaHlTei  !•/  /oilifti—MaJfrily  (unfiMM  ef  rigkb — 
A  fart  Awnraty  mmahU  bt  ifntrtl  fatO^it — A  rtmrJy  in  rtprtttnlutivr 
toPtrHmtHi — Difrrmrf  itttarfn  a  drtoirary  dm/  a  rrfitilii — A»t*»m, 
lagft  g/  a  Jilfg<Ut^  tkfitn  Mfy — &Hptti»rily  g/lat[t  evrr  imtUrtfuHiu 
—Greatrr  frtftrtifin  «/ /il  tkarailirs^AJviiiiUgt  a/  greater  HHmttr  tf 
tittles — Utititity  ff  Mi/maiuiiiHft  wilk  tftnl  iirtHmilancti — Hnffj 
(vmhimatUii  ■>/"  ualifiai  and  lt<a{  f;rx*Tnmfmi  in  tki  UnilrJ  S*atr> — 
GrralfT  Wrriltry  amj  ftfiiUlimt  frrmilltJ  ty  rtpnibian  iham  itfmacralic 
gvtKrmuunt — Faiti^n  tiimliaJfy  t»tal — Advanlagi  0/  t/Hifn  mrr  SiaUi 
»t  t»  l»t«t  frrjudieti  atbi  uhtmii  »f  injaitiifi — Tht  t'mam*  rtmt^  ftr 
diu»sn  Hunt  iHtiMnl  U  rtftMitt. 

To  tht  Ptople  *»/  Ihe  Sl^U  of  NeVf  York: 

Among  the  numcruus  udvunUges  promised  by  a  wcll- 
construcied  Uniou,  none  deserves  to  be  more  accurately 
dcvdupcii  th3n_its  tendency  to  break  and  cootrot  tite 
violence  oC^uciion)  The  friend  of  popniar  goverutnenis 
TiffVerTindsnTniscIf  so  mucli  aUrmcd  for  ihdr  character 
and  fate  as  when  he  coniempUlc'i  their  pnipenxity  (o 
this  dangerous  ticc.  He  will  not  fail,  therefore,  to  set 
a  diic  value  on  any  plan  which,  without  violating  the 
principles  to  which  he  is  nttaclied,  provides  a  proper 
cure  for  it.  The  instatHlity,  injustice,  and  confusion 
introduced  into  the  public  councils,  have,  in  Inilh,  heca 
the  mortal  diseases  under  which  popular  icoremments 
hare  everywhere  perished;  as  they  continue  to  be  the 
favorite  and  fruitful  topics  (rum  which  the  adversaries  to 
liberty  derive  their  most  specious  declumatiuns.  The 
valuable  improvements  mndc  by  Ihe  American  coosUto- 
tlomon  the  popular  models,  both  ancient  and  modem, 
cannot  certainly  be  too  much  admired;  but  it  would  be 
an  unwarrantable  partiality  lo  cuittend  Uial  they  have 
as  effectually  ubvialetl  the  danger  on  this  tide  as  wu 


1     OVERBBARIXG  RVLB  OF  MAJORITIES. 


55 


wished  and  expected.  Complaints  arc  ererywhcre 
licattl  [rumour  most  <:onsUterute  AnA  virtuous  citizens, 
equally  the  rtitnils  of  public  and  private  faith,  and  of 
pablic  and  personal  liberty,  that  uur  {{overDincnts  are 
too  unfttubic,  that  the  public  good  ts  disregarded  in  the 
conflicts  of  rival  parties,  and  that  measures  are  too  often^ 
decided,  not  according  to  the  rules  of  justice  and  the 
rights  of  the  minor  party,  but  by  the  sugieriiir  force  of 
an  interested  and  ovcrlicaring  majority.!;  However 
anxioasly  wc  may  wish  that  these  complaints  had  no 
(oondatiim,  the  evidence  of  known  facts  will  not  permit 
OS  to  deny  tliat  they  are  in  some  degree  true.  It  will  be 
found,  indeed,  on  a  candid  review  of  our  Riluation,  that 
tome  of  the  diMtrcuieit  under  which  we  lal>ur  have  been 
erroneoDsly  charged  on  the  operation  of  our  goTem- 
ownts;  but  it  wdl  be  found,  at  the  same  time,  lliat  other 
causes  will  not  alone  account  for  many  of  our  heaviest 
tmsfortunes;  and,  pjirticularly,   for  that   prcvaitins  and 


'  Tbii  «M  the  •bnoM  unii-oul  defect  of  the  State  covemiDcntt  prlo*  to 
M>  aiojHliNi  of  the  Federal  CoiiMiiution,  knil  led  iLUilttnii  to  Kuert  Uiat 
"i«  m»  0>«aninw>il  ihc  r«iil  |-i«Tr  Im  in  itie  nujariijr  u!  ibv  torn- 
■uiMy  awl  like  iniawon  ol  ,  .  .  t>H)ili  it  ■.hirfly  to  ■>«  n(>|irtht^iiled, 
K(  itom  ihe  uls  of  Govenimenl  conltity  lu  ihe  unie  of  ilt  cimitiliwfits, 
feu  (rhd  Ihe  uu  ID  which  Ibc  CwrerriMitni  b  the  meie  initnimeot  of 
ikt  9»\fa  ouiulier  ol  tbc  conMilDcnu."  'I'lie  fntt  ))■  ihe  inaic  ciIniot< 
tMti\  a  wvotal  of  the  Skatn  IkKl  ailo|)leii  hilii  iil  li^jhlo  nrhlch  UnwM 
tc•■■■^<lJ  pralecli^cl  lli«  tife  and  prDjierljr  of  the  mhiorrly.  Nulatile  ii 
iW  npctleaoe  ot  ViiEinia,  which  embodied  in  iii  conuiiution  the  e)«bi>. 
Ob  Kill  .J  ....1.1.  tf)a,ol  l^titoi^e  Maiou,  jfel  in  abwiute  canttnvcntlon 
<•  i-t  the  lci;nlaluic  at  iii»n>ei>lk  |>(MlUally  <eiiterei]  all 

I'  ■  liiodv      Thry  Mi-prmUtl  Ihe  iiiilnt;H  'i  tbc  i-mirts.  de- 

■*!»■)  Ikmi  omii  ■inotuni  u>  at  lu  place  llie  ttgiklalWo  pomr  in  the  hand* 
■tf  a  miiuinly  «1  ■  niBJonir ;  twice  altcmpled  to  nniiul  all  conitltulionnl 
Wknrilr  by  appoiniiiisfl  JiciAioi;  liniicd  the  InnchUc ;  enacted  tender 
wl  Qihet  tx  fait  /ittr.t  Ltut ;  and  aitainlcd  >  inan  ol  hl)£h  inawit 
*mI  itnlsieij  hH  life  ((wlnltd  without  nmccu  n\  law.  Such  comlucl 
fotaced  ■  dinciaK  vtoteil  fiom  Jeaefson  (tcr  quotalion  in  TAf 
f'Jmlhl.  No.  4»).  No*  till  the  adoplion  o(  the  Fedetal  CanMitnliDO 
*ilh  lt«  mtntinti  on  -Stile  |towcn  and  <  SaiKemc  Court  to  cnlorce  thean, 
v«  Ihere  an*  irue  check  (inn  to  the  Slate  le)c''lal>ite>  <»  irae  Jitolectloii 
(mm  li  ■■-■■  tl  it  In  be  nutcil  llval  acvcril  ol  the  South  American 

i^htio  .111  it   rifliU  and  iiipnoie  cvuiti  to  enfurca  ihcm, 

**knil  Die  ir»;  .iiliitiing  the  same  rruilti.  while,  to  lh«  conlfmtf.  in 
Oical  Bnuin.  "here  ihc  leniijtlivc  aulhorllv  ii  pratlirallr  omnipolerl, 
tta  Bito'iritT.  ••  a  •>  h<.-le,  bat  been  lairif  dealt  iiith  ia  ibe  latl  hundred 
jwia.— torroB, 


56 


LIBERTY  AND  FACT/OS'. 


Dl». 


increasing  distrust  of  public  engjigemcnts,  and  alafm  for 
private  eights,  which  arc  echoed  from  one  end  of  th 
continent  to  the  other.  These  must  be  chiefly,  if  notJ 
wholly,  effects  of  the  unste;i(1tnefi9  and  injuslicf  with 
— -  which  a  factious  spirit  has  tainted  our  public  adnirnis- 
_^  Irattons. 

By    a   faction.    I   understand  a    number  of    citizens, 
whether  amounting  to  a  m^ijority   or  minority  of   the 

whole,    arhn    :irf    ^)nilfi1    :it)<1    :ii;tH;it<?d    *'Y   f"1|ir   ■'"■"""■'' 

j of  Other  citiiiins.  or  to  the  permap^"*  ""■'  aprpfra' e 
(interests  of  the  community. 

Thprn^re    twn    mfthndit  ijt   eiiriog    the   mischiefs   of 
faclEnT^c  one,  by  removing  its  c»uw«;  the  othec>J)y 
I  controlling  its.e^:ts. 


I  here  arc  again  two  methods  qf  fcmnving  "■"  '■i— iffi 
offarrlnn;  the  one,  by  dcstrg.yJng  the  liliertjf  which  is 
essential  to  its  existctKc;  the  other,  by  ^Jvint'  to  eT^fifV 
citizen  the  same  opinions,  the  same  pas&ions,  and  the 
same  interests. 

It  could  never  be  more  truly  said  than  of  the  first 
remedy,  that  it  was  worse  than  the  disease.  Liberty  is 
to  faction  what  air  is  to  fire,  an  aliment  without  which  it 
instantly  expires.  But  it  conld  not  be  lefts  folly  ta 
abolish  liberty,  which  is  essential  (o  political  life  because 
it  nourishes  faction,  than  it  would  be  to  wish  the  annihi- 
lation of  air,  which  ts  essential  to  animal  life,  became  >t 
imparts  to  fire  its  destructive  agency. 

The  •iff'^  i-tpj-dii-nt  U  as  imjirii-li<-aliU  .1*  JJie,  first 
would  be  ^nwLsc.  As  long  as  the  reason  of  m.in  con- 
tinues  fallibtr^  anil  he  is  at  liberty  to  cicrcise  it.  dJITercnl 
opinions  will  be  formed.  As  l<>ng  as  Lbe  cunnertion 
subsists  between  his  reason  and  his  self-love,  his  upinions- 
and  his  passions  will  have  a  reciprocal  influence  on  cacli 
other;  and  tlic  former  will  be  olijecis  \«  •;«■ 

will  attach  themselves.     The  diversity  in  s  of 

men,  from  which  the  rights  of  property  onginalc,  is  not 
less  an  insuperable  obstacle  tit  a  unirnrrally  "f  inieresta. 
Tbc  protection  of  these  faruUies  is  the  first   object  ul 


1      PJtOFe.KTr  A  CAUSE  OF  FARTIES. 


57 


cnvernment.  From  the  protection  of  diUcrent  and  iin>A\ 
equal  (acuities  of  acquiring  property,  the  possession  of  ]  \ 
different  degrees  and  kinds  of  property  immediately/  I 
resalts;  and  from  the  influence  of  these  on  the  senti-  f' 
acQts  and  views  of  the  respective  proprietors,  cdsucs\  / 
a  dirision  of  the  society  into  different  interests  antly 
pinies.  I 

Ttlc  menrcailSW  M  faCTton   arc  thus   sown    in   the . 
nature  of  tnanTand  we  sc'c-tticm  everywhere  broucht  int<i 
different  degrees  of  activity,  according  to  the  different  cir-  _ 
cnmstances  of  civil  society.     A  zeal  for  different  opinions 
concerning  religion,  concerning  government,  and  many 
other  points,  as  well  of  speculation  as  of  practice;  an 
attachment  to  different   leaders  ambitiously  contc^oding  — 
tor  pre-eminence  and   power;  or  to  persons  of  other 
ilescriptions  whose  fortunes  hare  been  intereslins  to  the   - 
tinman   passions,   have,  in  turn,  divided   mankind   into 
parlies,  intlamed  tliem  with  mutual  animosity,  and  ren- 
dered them  much  more  disp>^>scd  to  vex  and  oppress  each 
I  Other  than  to  co-opcrpte  for  their  common  good.     So  > 
strong  is  this  propensity  of  mankind  to  fall  into  mutual 
■Biiao«ities  tlvat,  where  no  substantial  occasion  presents/ 
itwlf,~lhc  mr>st  frivolous  and  fanciful  distinctions  Iiavc| 
been  suOi^:icnt  to  kindle  their  unfrieniily  passions  and 
eulfe  their  moat  violent  conflicts.     But  the  must  com 


% 


r-urce  of  factlops-has  l)ceinBrff5rious  T  ~"^ 

lit^lpn   tlf  prflprrty.       Those    who  liold 


anil  ihusc  who  arc  without  property  have  ever  formed 
lUstinct  interests  in  society.     Those  who  are  cre^litors, 
and  those  who  are  debtors,  fall  under  a  like  discrimina- 
tion.    A   landed   interest,   a   manufacturing  interest,  a 
mercantile    interest,   a   moneyed    interest,    with    m.iny 
lesser  interests,  grow  up  of  necessity  in  civilized  nations, 
anil  divide  them  into  different  classes  actuated  by  dif- 
ferent sentiments  and  views.     The  regulation_of_Jheje^- 
--   and    interfering   JT^t^ri-o^    fnr>"'i    the   principall 
t"    modern    legijilaiionj,  ami    involves  the  spirit    of  \ 
pirty  and  (artion  in  the  necessary  and  ordinary  opera-/^ 
♦tons  of  the  government. 


S8 


LEGtSLATOXS  AS  PARTISANS. 


Ute.lO 


/ 


Mo  nun  is  allovred  to  be  a  judse  in  Ms  own  cauM,  be- 

^^  cause  his  interest  would  certainly  bia&  his  iudgmcnt  and, 
not  improbably,  coirupt  lits  integrity.  With  v<iiial.  nay 
with  greater  reason,  a  body  of  men  are  unlit  to  be  iM>tli 

,1-,  judges  and  parties  at  the  same  time;  yet  what  arc  many 
of  the  most  important  acts  of  legislation  but  so  many 

-—judicial  deterniiiiatioii.4,  nut  indeed  concerning  the  righlik 
of  single  persons,  but  concerning  the  rights  of  large 
bodies  of  citizens?  And  what  arc  the  dillercnt  classes 
of  Icgtaljitor*  hut  iiilvi»'?it»w  und  p.iriipt  iJi  ihi>  f:*)m^a 
wKich  they  determine?  Is  a  law  proposed  concerning 
pnvate  debts?  It  is  a  question  tn  which  the  creditors 
are  partieit  <in  one  side  and  the  debtors  on  the  other. 
Justice  ought  to  hold  the  balance  between  them.  Yet 
the  parties  arc,  and  must  be,  themselves  the  Juilgcs;  and 
the  most  numerous  piirty,  or,  in  other  words,  Jhe  most 
iiQWcrful  factiop.  nyist  t»c  rxoertcd  to  arcvanT  knal I 
uome<lic  manufactures  be  encouraged,  and  in  what 
degree,  by  rc^irictions  on  foreign  manufactures?  are 
questions  which  would  be  differently  decided  by  the 
landed  and  the  manufacturing  classes,  and  probably  by 
neither  with  a  sole  regard  to  justice  and  the  public  good. 
The  apportionment  of  taxes  on  the  various  descriptions 
of  property  is  an  act  which  seems  to  require  the  most 
exact  impartiality;  yet  there  is,  perhaps,  no  legitilative 
act  in  which  greater  opportunity  and  temptation  are 
given  lo  a  predominant  parly  to  trample  on  the  rules  of 
justice.  Every  slulling  with  which  they  overburden  the 
inferior  number  is  a  shilling  saved  to  their  own  pockets. 
/  It  is  in  vain  to  say  thiit  enlightened  staie^nKn  will  be 
fable  to  adjust  these  clashing  interests,  and  render  them 
lall  sutKcrvicnt  to  the  public  good.     Enlightened  states- 

-|  men  will  not  always  be  at  the  helm.  Nor  in  many  cases 
can  such  an  adjustment  be  made  at  all  without  taking 
into  view  indirect  and  remote  considerations,  which  will 
rarely  prevail  over  tlie  immediate  iiiureitt  which  «qe 
party  may  find  in  disregarding  the  rights  ai  another  or 
the  good  of  the  whole. 
/     The  inference  to  wbicb  wc  are  brought  i»  Utat  the 


i]  ffOCU/tErOFACr/OfflA'FVKBD/iMOCRACy.  59 


)n  i.oiisistS  ol  Ic^s  tliiiii  ;i  nt.ijurity,  nrlicf  is/ 
the  repiilrfican  principle,  which  enables  the/ 
iefcjit  its  sinister  views  by  rccular  vote.     Itl 


>t  be  removed,  and  that  rclicl 
the  means  of  i  ciitrolling  \\s  fffedt. 


1(  a  faciiu 
pplinl  by  the 
najarity  to  defcjit  its  sinister  views  by  rcgiil 
may    clog    the    administration,    it    m*y    uonvulsc    the 
society:  but  it  will  be  unable  to  execute  and  mask  its  — 
Tiolence  under  the  forms  of  the  Constitution.     When  a 
tujority  is  ■n<:ludcd  in  a  faction,  the  form  of  popular 

irernmcnt,  un  the  other  hand,  enables  it  to  sacrifice  ~ 
lo  its  ruliiif;  passion  or  interest  both  the  public  good  and 
the  rights  of  other  citixens.     Tt>  s;:r»r^  Hiy  piiMi<-.  ptntl-V 

tliiri   l"-"'^"''  ^igh^^   ^giM"-"    llu-.^Lmfprj-   i\i   gnfh  Ji  fartinnjy 
lIlP  tarn.-  time  tn  prrsffyf  t\\^  npirit  and  thft  fnrirl 

'  "■  CV^T'"!'"'''-!  '3i  ll"'"  'I"'  W^"'  "bj'*!  t  t't  vrhii"!] 

1'        i.iriea  arc__dir'"'""'      Let  mc  add  that  it  is  the 

great  desideratum  by  which  this  form  of  government  can 
he  rescued  from  the  opprobrium  under  which  it  has  so 
long  labored,  and  be  recomnieudcd  to  the  esteem  and 
adoption  o(  mankind. 

By  what  means  ifi  \\}]^  object  attainable?     Kvidcntly  by 
one    of  ^wo  only:    Eitlirr   the   e»isteni;;f   »l"  tV-  aj""* 
sion  or  interest  in  n  r'^i"'-i'y  ■'  ■'>■'  ■■■■■"«  t;n.>-mLitr 
nreventfld.   or    the    muiijrily.  -luvijn;  ;;iii  It  <i»rxistcnt 


tpportitnity  be  suffered  to  coincide,  wc  well  know  that 
Pseither  moral  nor  religious  nxnives  can  be  relied  on  as 
u)  aile()uate  control.  They  are  not  found  to  be  such  »n 
the  injustice  and  violence  of  individuals,  and  lose  their 
efiicacy  in  proportion  to  the  number  combined  together, 
Uui  ta,  if)  proportion  as  their  efficacy  becomes  needful. 

From  this  view  of  the  subject  it  may  be  concluded 
lluit  a  pure  demoCTyv.  by  which  I  mean  a  society  con- 
siviing  nf  a  small  numltfr  OT  J?HizJ;fta,  wlio  aait^pgaiig 
afflWtsTPr  tflf  gfU'i'FiiSicftl  In  pcrMH; 


V 


isioD  or  interest,  must  be  rendered,  by  their  number 
[)<)  local  situation,  iinablc  lo  concert  and  car^v  into 
jfect   schemot   oi    opprysiim.      v\   the   im[>ulse  and   the 


admit  id-jut 


HlffBff  the  LuisLtTtrfyoOacBon-     A  common  passion  or 
btrrcst  Will,  in  almost  every  case,  be  felt  by  a  majority 


6o 


DEMOCSACV  AKD  KtPUBUC. 


fira.lO 


of  the  whole;  a  communication  and  concert  result  from 
the  form  of  government  ilscK;  and  there  \%  nothing  to 
check  the  inducements  to  sacrilice  the  weaker  party  or  an 
ohnoxtouft  individual  Hence  it  is  that  such  democracies 
have  ever  been  spectacles  of  turbulence  and  contention; 
have  ever  been  found  incompatible  with  personal  security 
jjr  the  ri^hlsofproperty;  and  have  in  general  been  as 
short  in  'their  lives  as  they  have  been  violent  in  their 
deaths.  Thuorclic  pojiiiciajis,  who  have  patronized  this 
'  species  of  government,  have  erroneously  supposed  that 
I  by  reducing  mankind  to  a  perfect  equality  in  their  politi- 
I  cal  rights,  they  would,  at  the  same  time,  be  perfectly 
\  equalized  and  assimilated  tn  their  possessions,  their 
|. opinions,  and  their  passions. 

l/i   A  republic,  by  which  I  mean  j  gff'-'^'''"r"'m  if  ■'''''•** 

jlih r  "''hrni'^  of  representation  takes  place ,  opens  a  dilTcre n t 

I  pr^apccU  and  promises^  the  cure  for  wh  i  cHwc  are  -se*k  i  n  g. 

I  Let  us  examine  the  points  In  wliich  It  varies  from  pure 

democracy,  and  we  shall  comprehend  both  the  nature  of 

the  cure  and  the  efhcacy  which  it  must  derive  from  the 

. .  Union. 

The  two  great  pointsof  difference  between  a  demQcra<;v 


anil  w  ~|iLiMii:  arc:  Jirsti  the  dclyyjf^ion  of  the  govern- 
ment, in  the  latter,  to  a  small  number  of  citizens  etectrd 
by  the  rest;  ScConilt^,  the  grcMtrr  nnif^htf  "f  ^itij^na^ 
and  greater  sphere  ol  country,  over  which  the  latter  may 
be  oxtcnded. 

The  effect  of  the  first  difference  is,  on  the  one  hand, 
to  refine  and  enlarge  the  public  views,  by  passing  them 
through  the  medium  of  a  chosen  body  of  citizens,  whose 
wisdom  may  best  discern  the  true  interest  of  tbcircountry, 
and  whose  patriotism  and  love  of  justice  will  be  least 
likely  to  sacrifice  it  to  temporary  or  partial  considera- 
tions. Under  such  a  regulation,  it  may  well  happen  that 
the  public  voice,  pronounced  by  the  representatives  of 
the  people,  will  be  more  consonant  to  the  public  good 
than  if  pronounced  by  the  people  themselves,  convened 
for  the  purpose.  On  the  other  hand,  the  effect  may  be 
inverted.     Men  of  factious  tempers,  of  local  prejudices, 


ADVANTAGE  OF  MANY  ELECTORS. 


6i 


odintMer  deM];ns,  may,  by  intH);ue,  by  corruptiun, 
turbjr  otbcr  means,  first  obtain  the  AufTfai{e»,  and  then 
'bttriylhc  interest,  of  the  people.     The  giicsiioq^rciult- 
wheUier  small  or   entcnsive  rcpiihhs:<,  ;irr  ia»rf 
I'llf    Ki    rh^    rlrLtion    n\    prnppr    f;iiarilianit    lA    y^\r 
«al;  aiwl  it  is  clc;irly  <leciilc<l  in  favor  of  the  luttcr 
trim  obvious  coniideratluns: 

la  itit  first  place,  it  is  to  be  remarked  that,  however  i 
uuU  the  rcpiiulic  may  be,  the  representatives  must  be 
rued  to  a  certain  number,  in  order  to  guard  ugainNt  the/ 
few;  and  thai,  however  large  it  mjy  be,  llicyl 

imited  to  a  geriaTtTn umber,  in  order  to  guard) 

ipiniEHie  confusion  of  a  multitude.  Hence,  the  num-j 
*ci  ol  representatives  in  the  two  cases  not  beinj;  in 
frtfortion  to  thjt  of  the  two  constituents,  and  being 
profQrtiunally  greater  in  the  smalt  rt-puhlir,  it  lullows 
llui,if  the  proportion  of  &1-iJi»«jjj <  r^  |>r  nut-JyM-Ju  the 
hf|tj|ittn  in  thf  1Tint*'-'-p"''''J'|  '^■''  f»r|npr~wiTrprpxrnt  a 
T-,  aad  cooseqaeBily  a  greater  prulmlMhty  of 


!n  \\\K  iK'st  place,  as  each  representative  will  be  chosen 
^racruter  number  of  cititens  in  the  hirge  tluin  in  the 
null  republic,  it  will  be  more  difficult  for  unworthy 
andidiies  to  practice  with  success  the  vicious  arts  by 
■hicbelectionVare  too  often  carried;  and  the  suffrages 
■^  ihe  jieoi>lc,  being  more  free,  will  be  more  likely  to 
ttnier  in  men  whO^KTSseS^the  most  attractive  merit  and 
lilt  most  diffusive  and  entablislied  chiiracicH,' 

Ufflusi  be  confessed  tliat  in  this,  as  in  most  other  cases, 
*««  is  a  mean,  on  both  sides  of  which  inconveniences 
■iilbc  found  to  lie.  By  enbirging  Ion  mu4:h  the  number 
of  dteiors.  you  render  the  representative  too  little 
■Vquigied  with  -all  their  local  circumstances  and  lesser 
'ntowtt;  as  by  r«lacing  il  too  mui:h,  you  render  him 
<">toly  attached  to  these,  and  too  liiUe  fit  to  comprehend 
udponne  great  and  national  objects.     The  federal  Con- 

'1*iUi(nnc)iiu«  Mailhon  nct-kcloil  to  eonxliIcT  (he  caiiTenc  of  Ki» 
Ptwiaii.  ih4t  III*  enviR  ibe  numbtT  n(  clcnon.  the  (ewet  tlien 
**iHbi  aho  covlil  pcnonaTly  know  the  cniiditlale. — totrofc       —^ 


k 


DEMOC/lACr  AKD  RtPVBUC. 


[Rs.19 


of  the  whole;  a  communication  and  concert  result  from 
the  form  of  government  itself:  and  there  i«  nothing  to 
check  the  inducements  tciacrtfice  the  weaVer  party  or  an 
obnoxious  individual.  Hence  it  is  that  such  democracies 
have  ever  been  spectacles  of  turbulence  and  contention; 
have  ever  been  found  incompatible  with  pcr&onal  security 
or  the  rights  of  property;  and  have  in  general  been  as 
short  in  tlitir  lives  as  they  have  been  violent  in  their 
deaths.  Theoretic  politicLuis,  who  have  patronined  this 
'  species  of  government,  have  erroneously  sup^scd  thai 
I  by  reducing  mankind  to  a  |>crfcct^c5}ualily  in  their  politi- 
I  cal  rights,  they  would,  at  the  game  lime,  be  [>crfeetly 
I  equalized  and  assimilated  in  their  possessions,  their 
1  iOpinion5,  and  their  pasiti'ms. 

A  republic,  by  which  I  mean  .i  [f^r^rnm^ni  in  wlii.-h 
of  representation  takes  place,  opens  j  different 
projfpect,  and  proniiist^  the  cure  rorwhicirKcarc.sc»J(ing. 
I<et  us  examine  the  points  in  which  it  varii:»  from  pure 
democracy,  and  we  shall  comprehend  both  the  nature  of 
the  cure  and  the  efficacy  which  it  must  derive  from  the 
Union. 

The  two  great  p« i nta^of  difference  between  a  democracy 
ano  a  republic  arc:  hrsu  ihc  dclcy^^tion  of  the  govern- 
menij  in  the  latter,  to  a  sm.-ill  numt>er  of  cittiens  elecled 
by  the  rest;  MconHf^,  the  greater  numbly  nf  yitigens^ 
and  greater  sphere  ol  connlry,  over  which  the  latter  may 
be  fvxii'nded. 

The  effect  of  the  first  difference  is,  on  the  one  hand, 
to  rdtne  and  enlarge  the  public  views,  by  passing  them 
ihronjch  the  medium  of  a  chosen  hwly  of  ciiiMns,  whoM 
wisdom  may  best  discern  the  true  interest  of  theirconnlry, 
and  whu»«  patriotism  and  love  of  justice  will  be  lca»t 
likely  to  sacrifice  it  lo  temporary  or  |>artiat  considera- 
tions. Under  sacb  a  regulation,  it  may  well  happen  that 
the  public  voice,  pnmounced  by  the  rrji-  '.vcs  of 

the  people,  will  be  more  consonant  In  i  <  <     good 

than  if  pronounced  by  the  people  themselves,  convened 
for  the  purjinse.  On  the  other  hand,  the  effect  may  be 
inverted.     Men  of  factious  (emiwrs,  of  lucal  prejudices, 


ADVANTAGE  OF  MANY  ELECrORS.  6i 

o(  sinister  designs,  may,  by  intrigue,  liy  corruption, 

by  other  means,  Trrst  obiain  the  sulTrai^o,  and  then 
ciray  the  intcrc&t,  of  the  pfoplc.  Tlic  qUL-sitoii  result- 
ing ip.  yht^ther  Knmll  or  oxttrnsivi:  rtfjuihlir^  .in;  liiiirr 
**^ffil''*''  '"  '^*^  flpftion  of  prniirr  g"^""-"""  "'  }}■•' 
j>ublig,gcal;  aitd  it  is  clearly  decided  in  favor  of  the  latter  - 
by  two  (ibviotiK  considerations: 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be  remarked  that,  however 
small  the  re pn line  may  be,  the  representatives  muiit  l)C 
raised  to  a  certain  number,  in  order  to  guard  against  tlie, 
cabals  of  a  few;  and  thai,  however  large  it  may  be,  they 
must  Tic  Timt  led  to  a  ccrtaTn  number,  in  order  to  guard 
a^iniit  the  confuition  of  a  multitude.  IIcn<:e,  the  num-j 
ber  of  representatives  in  the  two  cases  not  bein^  i 
proportion  to  lliat  of  the  two  constituents,  and  being 
pniporlioiially  j;roaler  in  the  ^malt  repiiblir,  it  fulluws 
that,  if  the  proportion  o f ■JU-i^lMra^JxrsJtcJat- l«fc*- J u  the 
Uixc_lliaa-iJUiie.«»wilhrep«bUc^c.torou:c"wiir present  a 
gTMt-r  '■'••i'.n,  and  <;<>H)Kxt*w«UliLa  greater  utababiliiv  of 
afii 

In  the  next  place,  as  each  representative  will  be  chosen 
by  a  greater  number  of  eili/cns  in  the  large  than  in  the 
small  republic,  it  will  be  more  diflicult  for  unworthy 
candidates  to  practice  with  success  the  vicious  arts  by 
which  clection^T?  too  often  carried;  and  the  Kutftages 
of  t&e.  iiEi>ple,  being  more  free,  will  be  more  likely  to 
center  in  men  wlib  pfVBseHsthc  most  attractive  merit  and 
the  mo«l  diffusive  and  establitthed  chiiractew.' 

It  must  be  confessed  that  in  this,  as  in  most  other  cases, 
there  is  a  mean,  on  both  sides  of  which  inconveniences 
will  be  found  to  lie.  By  enlarging  too  niU4:h  the  number 
ot  electors,  you  render  the  representative  too  little 
icquainlcd  with  nil  their  local  circumstances  and  lesser 
inlercstit;  as  by  reducing  it  too  much,  you  render  him 
unduly  attached  to  these,  and  too  little  fit  to  comprehend 
and  ptirsuc  great  and  national  objects.     The  federal  Con. 


'  In  ihW  coocIiMJO!!  MadiKRi  ikqIccihI  to  conniler  the  conncne  of  liii 
(irr^nsiijun,  Unl  llie  Kicaler  lli«  number  at  electors,  lli«  fewer  there 
■Mid  be  wIk)  (irald  f>nvon»llr  Icnuo  iIk  c*iMtiiUlc.'~^UiT«K^ 


6a 


LOCAL  NATURE  OF  FACTION. 


mo.  10 


stitti^iyji  foriTiB  a  hamir  comhiiwtinn  in  this  rgspcct:  Iti^ 
itiKfots    \\vinv    r.-rcrn:<l     ti>    the 


■■"iiiiiilil-'K^ 


j; rtM  I    :uul  

IJJtIOIialj  the  h>fTl   ^"'1  pjriii  iif^ir  rii  1 

r  'I'lic  Other  point  uf  difference  !s,  tfit  grc5lCr  number" o( 
citizens  iimj  ext<!iit  of  territory  which  may  tw  tirousfit 
Vm1Ih>V  within  the  cotnpa&s  of  republican  than  of 
Hi  14-  democratic  government;    and   it  is    this  cir- 

V  "irr  It'"" 'i[|'''v  whicli   n-'tulfr-i  [-nrlnn^  r'liiiiHy- 


Tis  k-^s  lo  I'l:  ili'-.jilril  ill  ihr  furnifr  than  iii  ihftja tier. 
The  sm.Tllcr  the  society,  the  fewer  probal^ly  will  be  tlic 
distinct  parties  and  interests  composing  it;  tlie  fewer  the 
distinct  parties  and  intcrAK^  the  tnoULjccqucntly  will 
a  niiijority  be  found  of  the  same  p^irty;  and  the  smaller 
the  number  of  individuals  compoMnf;  a  majority,  and 
the  smaller  tlie  compass  within  which  they  arc  placed,  the 
more  easily  will  they  concert  and  exectilc  their  plans  of 
oppression,  ^xtcnd  the  sphere.  and_you  tajte  -n  a  ytt'T 
^jaricty  of  parties  and^intc  rests;  you  make  it  less  probable 
thai  a  majority  of  the  whole  will  have  a  commoD  motive 
to  invade  the  rights  of  other  ciliiensi  or,  if  such  a  com- 
mon motive  exists,  it  will  be  more  difficnlt  for  all  who 
feel  it  to  discover  their  own  strength  and  to  act  in  uniso 
with  each  other.  Besides  other  impedimenls,  it  may 
remarked  that  where  there  is  a  consciousness  of  unjHt 
or  dishonorable  purposes,  communication  is  always 
checked  by  dixtrust  in  proportion  to  the  number  whose' 
concurrence  is  necessary. 

Hi-im^^^ilrariy  .iniinrii  ''■"  ''■■*  ■^-  — "  "-*VtinliU;T 
Willi  li  J  republic  has  ovi-r-i  di-mnfrilt  y  in  i'\fiHf'^liTiir  Htf 
ell^tts  y]  f^rrl'""i  is  enjoyed  Jty.  a  large  over  a  small 
republic,  is  crijoycd  hv  thi^  Unimi  fiy^r  ■!■» 'Jt  .t—  .i..n- 
pAilBg  ft.  Does  the  advantaee  txinsist  in  the  substitu- 
"iion  of  representatives  whose  enlightened  views  and 
virtuous  sentiments  render  them  superior  to  local  proj- 
udiccs  and  to  schemes  of  injustice.*  It  will  not  be 
denied  that  the  representation  ol  the  Union  will  be  most 
likely  to  possess  these  requisite  endowments.  Does  it 
consist  in  the  greater  security  atTnrded  by  a  greater 
variety  of  parties  againtt  the  event  ol  any  "tme   part)' 


/ 


VNWN  cures  POUTlCAt  DISEASED 


H 


I 


H^iUe  to  outnumlicr  awX  njiprcss  the  rcstf  In  an 
cquil degree  (Iocs  the  increased  variety  of  parties  com* 
pratd  within  the  (Jnioo  increase  this  security.  Does  it, 
in  6iit,  consist  in  the  greater  obsi^iclcs  opposed  to  fKF 
oracm  and  accomphnlimcnt  of  the  secret  wishes  of  an 
■  NDJnMaml  interested  mnjority?  Here,  again,  the  Client 
[olthe  Union  gives  it  the  most  palpable  advuntnge. 

Tbe  influence  of  factious  leaders  may  kindle  a  flame 
vilhin  their  particuUr  States,  but  will  be  unable  to 
>pnad  a  general  conlLigration  through  ttic  other  States. 
.A  iiiigious  sect  may  degenerate  into  a  pcilitical  faction  in 
i|»itof  the  Confederacy;  but  the  variety  of  sects  dis- 
persed over  the  entire  face  of  it  must  secure  the  national 
noscils  atjaiiist  any  danger  from  that  source.     A  rage 

tfAt[upcr  money,  for  an  abolition  of  debts,  for  an  cqua 
ffmiion  of  property,  or  for  any  other  improper  or  wicked 
prft)«l.vill  be  less  apt  to  pervade  the  whole  body  of  the 
I'niuii  than  a  particular  member  of  it;  in  the  same  pro- 
innion  as  such  a  malady  is  more  likely  to  taint  a  |i«ir- 
bcobr  county  or  district  than  an  entire  State. 
In  tfae  extent  and  proper  structttre  of  the  Union, 
thntfore;  we  behold  a  republican  remedy  for  the  dis- 
«!<»  most  incident  to  reimhiican  government.  And 
*«onliog  to  the  decree  of  pleasure  and  pride  we  feel  in 
tnit  republicans  ought  to  be  our  zeal  in  cherishing  the 
|s?<ntaiKl  supporting  the  character  of  Federalists.^-^ 

PtJULIUS. 


\ 


6<     A.VEK!CA   COMMBMCIALLY  ADVBXrVRt)i!&.    I>«.11 


No.  IZ-  jtadi^itAml/tMrma/.  Itanm^H  tt,  tt^>.  Hamilton. 

UTILITY  OF  UNION    AS    REGARDS  COMMERCE 
AND   A    NAVY. 

A-ttvH/iMnni  ^mmmiaf  tiaratltr  ef  Amerira — Ctrnmertial ftalnay 
ef  /iHnift — A  tmtiiMUil  ctmaifrtial  fality  ntctitary  ta  t^uHttraH  Ettr^ 
^fu»  rtttritlt**il^DuirimiHatia  n^iitll  O^^^f  BrttdlH — Kilittliihmml 
0/  a  l-'fJirat  mty — /'A/  l/nirtJ  Milts  liMt  />■  tttgmt  Ikt  ar^iltr  »f 
RHifft  in  Amt'ira — DiiuuitH  itrMtH  Iv  wd^  mr  inHmrrit  a  frfj — 
Stfaralwn  tfilt  faaUe  mariliitt  nafUai  la  frticnlv  fht  ifmfilinn  af  »ur 
falilital  iiiilnuf — fifaHntal  (nammial  rijfhtt  ■aikiik  tailt  tt  tail  ty  a 
JiiitluHatt  af  tlu  Can/rJ/raty —  7'Ar  fiiktrtit — A  lavy  a  grtal  maltaaaX 
aifttt — Sk-ireaf  llu  Saul*.  MiJJlt.aaJ  /tWivEiielamJ  SlaUiiii  a  mn-jr~ 
UarttlraiaeJ  iHUriimrtt  ^tlivtrH  tif  Slalei — UntHrlH^ af  frtr  i»ltr, 
itaU  €aanii/Ti/  avftiiiil  utiify-~AiitnJf>»y  m  Amfriean  affairt — Eun- 
ffaitilamiaaliim  0/  Ihf  vftU — Bifftn'i  anj  Haptal't  tktarj  a/Jtgtntraej 
in  Aaurita. 

To  the  Pea^e  */  Ike  Stalt  0/  Nnv  York; 

The  iraportanoe  of  tbe  Uoioa,  in  a  commercial  lixhl.  is 
one  uf  those  points  about  which  there  is  least  room  to 
entertain  a  ditferL-ncc  uf  opinion,  iind  which  hat,  in  fact, 
commanded  the  most  general  assent  of  men  who  have 
any  actjiiaintance  with  the  subject.  This  a[>plics  as  well 
to  our  intercourse  with  foreign  countries  as  wiUi  eadi 
other. 

TiMtre  ine  appearances  to  auihorite  a  su|>posiiim  that  the 
advenliiruui  i|hrii  which  diuingiiisltcs  the  iToinn>cici.il  e\\a,tM.wt 
of  Ammt.t  has  AittAf  excticil  uneuy  senxiiltniis  in  wvct^t  ul  llie 
liiarititnr  puM'^rt  o(  Kuropc.  Tbcy  scrm  to  Iw  apprehensive  tA  our 
too  %rcM  interference  In  llut  cairyinn  \\xiAf  wliich  t&  the  5U^ 
piMi  (A  ilxrir  iMirt|;:iltun  and  tlie  fnund.ilion  tA  their  lural  tlienglh. 
Tlvoic  of  thrm  which  have  coVoni«  in  America  look  Iniwatil  li> 
what  0>i«  coiintty  i«  cap.ible  a%  liecarning.  with  piiinfut  solicitude. 
Tlicy  (uiFsee  the  dangrn  ihjt  may  thrcaicn  their  American 
domintons  front  (tie  iiciKhboiltooil  of  Stiiic!>  u'hicli  have  all  lite 
disposilions,  and  U'milil  jioi^scu  all  ihc  nirjins,  retjunile  to  the 
ctealion  of  a  poweiful  nijirmc.  Imptc^sium  ul  litis  kind  will 
naturally  intlicaie  the  policy  <A  foslning  dii-ivionfi  aninitt;  iw,  anil 
of  depriving  us,  u  \at  a\  pouiililc.  of  an  AO'lvtt  COMMKXCK  in  our 
own  bottoms.    This  would  answer  llie  threefold  purpow  of  pfv- 


luailtMl 


PROHIBITORY  SEGVLATIONS. 


TcntJoK  Mir  intcrfcTcnce  in  ihdr  navigation,  o(  monopoliting  the 
profit!  vi  (itir  irndr,  anil  i>l  c1i]>|nng  the  ninj;^  by  aKicIi  we  might 
Mur  to  a  dnngcrous  gieaiiica^.  Uiit  not  |KU(ience  lotbid  the 
dcUiL  h  would  ivM  be  iliRiciiU  to  trace,  by  (ucls.  the  workings  o( 
iIm  policy  to  the  cflbtii«i»  o(  mintsicr*. 

If  we  coniinuc  united,  we  may  coutilcraci  a  policy  v>  undiciicDy 
to  (Hir  prcnpcfity  in  a  variety  of  ways.  Uy  prohibilory  Tcgiilaiions 
txEcniling  ^1  the  same  time  throughout  the  Stales,  we  inny  Dbll^e 
lureigit  countries  to  bid  ajjainsi  each  other  for  the  privileges  of  our 
maikcl*.  This  assertion  will  nol  appear  chimeriCiil  to  those  who 
are  Able  to  appreciaie  the  iinporuncc  of  the  marlcelK  of  three  mil- 
beat  of  people— increasing  in  rapid  progresiion.  (or  the  iuo»l  part 
euluwvcty  addiciei)  to  Agriculture,  and  likely  from  local  circuni- 
nmces  to  remain  so—to  iiny  mnnudcinring  nuiion ;  and  the 
Knincnse  difference  there  would  be  to  the  trade  and  navigation  of 
Mich  a  nation.  beiAeen  a  direct  coiniiiunication  in  ii&  own  ships, 
mil  an  indirect  ci>iivcy;>i)Cc  of  its  products  and  returns,  to  and 
iiDoi  Arnehcii,  in  the  ships  of  another  country.  Suppose,  (or 
auaiicc,  we  hod  a  government  in  America  cap.-ible  of  excluding 
Great  Britain  (with  whom  ure  have  at  pretieiii  no  treaty  of  cnin- 
nerce)  (lom  all  otir  ports:  what  would  be  the  proh.ilile  operation 
(fihitstep  upon  her  |>olitic*?  Would  li  not  enable  us  to  negoii- 
Im  ate.  wiih  the  fairest  prospect  of  success,  (or  coinnicr- 

I».a.  cial  privileges  of  the  most  valuable  anri  eitcnsive  kind 

n  the  dominions  of  that  kingdom  ?  When  these  questions  have 
been  asked  upon  culler  occasions,  they  have  tcceivc<l  a  plausible. 
bal  aol  a  solid  or  sali!i(.-iclO(y  answer,  ll  has  tieeti  said  ihm 
poliibiitont  on  our  pan  would  produce  no  clunge  in  the  s)-slem 
>(  Britain,  because  she  could  prosecute  her  ir^dc  with  us  ihiough 
t)ie  n>rdiiim  of  the  Dutch,  who  would  be  her  immedi.ile  cunluiners 
4nd  payrnasicrs  (or  those  articles  whicli  were  w.intcd  for  the 
lapply  of  our  markets.  But  would  nol  her  n;ivigaIion  be  niateri- 
illy  injumi  by  the  lossof  the  Important  advantage  of  being  her 
son  carrier  in  that  tra<le  ?  Would  nol  the  principal  part  o(  M« 
profits  be  hiierceplexl  by  the  Dutch.  M  Ji  contpenution  for  iheir 
tgency  and  risk  ?  Would  not  the  mere  circumstance  ol  (rciglil 
KUsiDn  a  considerable  deduction  ?  Would  not  xo  circuitous  an 
■niercourte  (acUiiaic  ihc  compeliiions  o(  other  nations,  by  enluncing 
■he  ptice  of  B(il>sh  caniino(]iite«  in  our  markets,  and  by  transfer- 
rini;  [o  uihci  hands  Uie  managefneni  o(  t)iis  Iniettsting  branch  of 
ibe  Iltiiish  commerce  ? 

A  mature  consideraiuon  of  ihe  objects  suggested  by  thew  que*- 
Ituns  will  iustify  a  belief  that  the  real  disadvantages  lo  Britain 


FEDERAL  KaVY. 


iir«.n 


from  such  a  slate  of  ihingt.  conspiring  with  th«  (KcposscMloas  of 
a  great  piu-t  of  ilie  iiaiioa  in  fararot  (he  Ameiican  trailc.  and  with 
tti«  iinpunuciiiiM  of  the  WcM  IndiA  IslaiKk.  wouM  produce  « 
relaxation  in  her  pre&ent  system.  ui>d  would  tel  us  into  the  enioy- 
ment  of  privileges  in  ilic  niarkcts  of  ihotc  Ulantls  and  eltewticrc. 
from  which  our  irAtle  would  derive  ttie  most  sul»untUl  bensfiis. 
.Sucfi  a  point  gaitml  from  the  Briiish  government,  and  which  cmitd 
nol  be  cxpeclcil  without  .tn  equivalent  in  exemptions  aiid  tmmuni- 
lies  in  our  tn.irkcli.  would  be  likely  to  have  a  eorrctponijcnt  effect 
on  (he  conduct  of  other  nations,  who  would  nM  be  inclined  to  sec 
(liemsclvcs  aitogelliec  supplanted  in  our  trade. 

A  further  resource  for  influencing  the  conduct  of  Euro- 
pean nations  toward  us,  in  this  respect,  would  arise  from 
the  cstahlishment  of  a  federal  navy.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  thai  the  continuance  of  the  Union  under  an  eRi- 
cicnt  government  would  put  it  in  our  power,  at  a  period 
not  rery  distant,  to  create  a  nary  which,  if  it  could  not 
vie  with  ll»o«e  of  the  great  maritime  powers,  would  at 
least  be  of  respectable  wci(;ht  if  thrown  into  the  scale  of 
cither  of  two  contending  parties.  This  would  be  more 
peculiarly  the  case  in  relation  to  operations  in  the  We»t 
Indies.  A  few  ships  of  the  line,  sent  opportunely  to  the 
reinforcement  of  cither  side,  would  often  be  sufficient  to 
decide  lh<^  fate  of  a  campaign  on  the  event  of  which 
interests  of  the  greatest  magnitude  were  suspended. 
Our  position  is,  in  thi»  re«p«ct,  a  most  commanding  one. 
And  if  to  this  consideration  we  add  that  of  the  usefulness 
of  supplies  fr»m  this  country  in  the  prosecution  of  mili- 
tary opcraliwi*  in  the  West  Indies,  it  will  readily  be  per- 
ceived  that  a  situation  so  favorable  would  enable  us  to 
bargain  with  great  advantage  for  commercial  privileges. 
smRo.  ^   price   would   be    set   not  only   upon    our 

ll.pMt.  friendship,  but  upon  our  neutrality.  By  a 
steady  adherence  to  the  Union,  we  may  hope,  ere  long,  to 
become  the  arbiter  of  Europe  in  America,  and  to  be  able 
to  incline  (he  tMilance  of  European  competitions  in  tltis 
part  of  the  world  as  our  interest  may  dictjite. 

But  in  the  reverse  of  this  eligible  situation,  we  shall 
discover  that  tlie  rivatships  of  the  parts  would  make 
them  checks  up<Hi  each  oUier,  and  would  frustrate  all  the 


■wuum]  liisufitotiRKTAii.s  Passive  commescb.    67 

tempting  advantages  wlitch  nature  bas  kindly  placed 
within  our  reach.  Id  a  state  so  insigniScant  our  com- 
nerce  would  be  a  prcf  to  the  wanton  internieddlinKs 
o(  all  nations  at  war  with  each  other;  who,  having  noth- 
ing  to  (ear  from  us,  would  with  tittle  scruple  or  remorse 
supply  their  wants  by  depredations  on  our  property  as 
often  as  it  fell  in  their  way.  The  rights  of  neutrality 
will  only  be  respected  when  they  are  defended  by  an 
adequate  power.  A  nation  despicable  by  its  weakness 
forfeits  even  the  privilege  of  being  neutral.* 

Under  a  vigorous  national  govcrnmenl.  ibe  nalurnl  titcngih 
•lid  renourcen  of  (lie  couiili)-.  dirccu-d  lo  a  common  iiiien:si. 
WOaU  baffle  all  the  combine  I  ioni;  of  European  jcalouty  lo 
rairain  our  growih.  Tliit  siiuHtiuii  would  even  take  away  the 
motive  to  mcIi  combin-itiunt.  by  inducing  An  impraclicabilily  ol 
viffrtti  An  active  ornmercc,  an  eitun^ivc  iiavigalion.  and  a 
nourishing  miiine  wouUI  Ihen  be  tlic  ofliipriiii;  ol  moral  and 
physical  necr&siiy.  We  might  defy  Ihc  lilllc  arts  of  ihe  little 
po^iicjans  lo  control  or  vary  (he  irresistible  and  unchangeable 
warse  of  nalarc. 

But  in  a  Male  of  disunion  llvese  combinallonx  might  exist  and 
nUKhi  operate  with  succms.  It  would  be  in  the  power  of  the 
nuntime  nations,  availing  ihenuclrcs  uf  our  uniremal  impotence, 
lo  piesciibc  the  conditions  ol  out  poiiiicnl  existence  ;  and  as  they 
luve  a  common  inlercM  in  beiiit;  our  cairii;n.  ami  stilt  inaie  in 
(■tci'rnliii);  our  becoming  ihcirs.  thny  would  in  all  probability  com- 
bine to  cmbatrnM  our  navigation  in  such  a  iiMiincr  as  would  in 
tffeict  destroy  It,  and  conlioe  us  to  a  rASSIVK  couuEftCB.  We 
dioutd  Iheii  be  compelled  10  content  ourselves  with  the  flrsi  price 
tA  our  commodiltes,  and  la  see  (he  profit*  of  our  trade  snatched 
tram  ui  to  enrich  our  enemies  ai>d  persecutors.  1'hat  unequaled 
(pint  of  cnlrrpTLte  which  nignaliics  the  gcniu.i  of  the  American 
iiictiilunts  and  navlj^aturs,  and  winch  Is  in  Itself  an  inexhaustible 
mine  (if  national  neatth,  would  t>e  MiHcd  aii4l  lost,  and  poverty 
■oil  disgrace  would  oveispread  a  country  which,  with  wisdom, 
mi^t  inahe  herself  the  admiration  and  envy  of  the  world. 

There  are  rights  of  great  moment  to  the  trade  of 
America  which  arc  rights  of  the  Union — I  allude  to  the 
ftsberics.  to  the  navigation  of   the   Western  lakes,   and 

'Tlib  tnitti  «M  ijuickly  provnl  by  the  conne  o4  EijElsad  bdiI  Fntnce 
tmn  17^  nnii)  ilie  Wu  tA  iSta,  (or  duilac  that  period  ow  commerce 
«M  a  ptey  whenever  clilwr  cIiom. — Cniron. 


\ 


6S 


NAVV  A  NATIONAL  OBJECT. 


Uto-U 


to  that  of  the  Kli&sissippi.     The  dissolution  of  the  Con 
fc<lcracy  would   give  room  for  dclicute  questions  con 
cerning  the  futuft!  existence  nf  ihe&c  rights;  whitb  tlie 
interest  of  more  powerful  partners  would   hardly  fail  to 
solve  to  our  diftadv»ntage.     The  disposition  of   Spain 
§a,  with  regard  to  the  MiMissippi  needs  no  com- 

!••■*-  mcnL     France  and  Britain  arc  concerned  with 

us  in  the  fisheries,  and  view  them  as  of  the  utmost 
moment  to  their  navigation.  They  of  course  would 
hardly  remain  long  indifferent  to  th^t  decided  mastery 
of  which  experience  lias  xhown  us  to  he  possessed  in  this 
valuable  branch  of  traffic,  and  by  which  we  are  able  to 
undersell  those  nations  in  their  own  markets.  What 
more  natural  than  that  they  should  he  disposed  to  ei 
elude  from  the  lists  such  dangerous  competitors? 

This  branch  of  trade  ought  not  to  be  considered  as  a 
l>artial  benefit.  All  the  navigating  States  may,  in  dif 
ferent  degrees,  advantageously  participate  in  it,  and 
under  circumstances  of  a  greater  extension  of  mercantile 
capital  would  not  be  unlikely  to  do  it.  As  a  nursery  of 
seamen  it  now  is,  or,  when  time  shall  have  more  nearly 
assimilated  the  principles  of  navigation  in  the  scrersl 
States,  will  become,  a  univers.il  resource.  To  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  navy  it  must  be  indispensable. 

To  this  great  national  object,  a  navv,  union  wilt  con- 
tribute in  various  ways.  Every  institution  will  grow  and 
flourish  in  proportion  to  the  <)uaQlity  and  extent  of  tin 
means  concentered  toward  its  formation  and  support.  ^ 
navy  of  the  United  States,  as  it  would  embrace  tin 
resources  of  all,  is  an  object  far  less  remote  than  a  navy 
of  any  single  Stale  or  [lartial  confederacy,  which  would! 
only  embrace  the  resources  of  a  single  parL  It  happens, 
indeed,  that  different  portions  of  confederated  ,\merica 
possess  each  some  peculiar  advantaj^c  for  this  csseottal 
establishment.  The  more  southern  States  furnisli  in 
greater  abundance  certain  kinds  of  naval  stores — lar, 
pitch,  and  turpentine.  Thdr  wo<»d  for  the  construction 
of  ships  is  also  of  a  more  solid  and  lasting  texture.  The 
dltference  in  the  duration  of  the  ships  of  wbltdi  the  navy 


BMUual 


COMMBKCE  BRTWEEA'  STATES. 


«9 


might  be  composed,  if  chiefly  constructed  of  Southern 
vofid,  would  I>c  of  signal  imporuincc,  either  in  the  view 
of  naval  strength  or  of  national  economy.  Some  of  the 
Soaihcrn  and  of  the  Middle  States  yield  it  greater  plenty 
of  iron,  and  of  belter  tiu.ility.  Seamen  must  chiefly  be 
drawn  from  the  Northern  hire.  The  necessity  of  navai 
prutection  to  external  or  mnrttime  commerce  does  not 
require  a  particular  elucidation,  no  more  than  the  coD- 
tlDcivencss  of  that  species  of  commerce  to  the  prosperity 
of  a  nary. 

An  unrestrained  intercourse  between  the  States  them* 
wires  will  advance  the  trade  of  each  by  an  inlcrchanjce 
<rf  their  respective  productions,  not  only  for  the  •cupi>ly 
of  reciprocal  wants  at  home,  but  for  exportation  to 
foreign  markets. '  The  reins  of  commerce  in  every  part 
■ill  be  replenished,  and  will  acijutre  additional  motion 
»nd  Tigor  from  a  free  circulation  of  the  commotlilies  of 
every  parL  Commercial  enterprise  will  have  much 
crater  scope,  from  the  diversity  in  the  productions  of 
different  States.  When  the  staple  of  one  fails  from  a  bad 
turvest  nr  unproductive  crop,  it  can  call  to  its  aid  the 
suple  id  another.  The  variety,  not  less  than  the  value, 
«f  pntducts  for  exportattim  contribute*  to  the  aeltvity  of 
foreijin  commerce.  It  can  be  conducted  upon  much 
belter  terms  with  a  large  number  of  maleriab  of  a  xiven 
•alup  than  with  a  smaller  numlier  of  materials  of  the 
UniF  value,  atising  from  Ihe  competitions  uf  trade  and 
from  the  lluctaations  of  markets.  Particular  articles  may 
be  in  great  demand  at  certain  periods,  and  unsalable  at 
others;  but  if  there  be  a  variety  of  articles,  it  can 
itarcely  happen  that  (hey  should  all  be  at  one  time  in  the 
btier  predicnmeni,  aitd  on  this  account  the  operations  of 
the  tBcrchant  would  be  less  liable  to  any  considerable 
obstruction  or  stagnation.  The  speculative  trader  will 
U  once  perceive  the  force  of  these  observations,  and  will 
icknowlcdgc  that  the  ag^cgatc  balance  of  the  commerce 

i.ilily  no  (inck  rlciuent  hu  ta   much  caiilribulr^   In  Hir  pro*- 

'I   111*  Ualleil  hliict  n  llic  l*ct  llmi  il  ii  pruiically  llie  hri;nl 

^tajiaj  ia  the  woild  la  sfaicb  luimliktrJ  inilc  b  pcimlitcd.— EniTOL 


76 


COMMERCIAL   UNITY. 


m«.ii 


of  llie  UniU<]  Sutes  would  iMtl  fair  to  be  much  more 
favorable  than  that  of  the  thirteen  States  without  anion 
or  with  partial  unions. 

It  mil)'  ]>crhaps  be  replied  to  this  that,  whether  the 
States  are  united  or  disunited,  there  would  still  be  an 
intimate  intercourse  between  them  which  would  answer 
the  siime  ends;  but  this  intercourse  would  he  fettered, 
interrupted,  and  narrowed  by  a  multiplicity  of  causes, 
which  in  the  course  of  these  papers  have  been  amply 
detailed.  A  unity  of  commercial,  as  well  as  political, 
interests,  can  only  result  from  a  unity  of  Koverument. 

There  arc  other  points  of  view  in  which  this  subject 
might  l>e  placed,  of  a  striking  and  animating  kind.  But 
they  would  lead  us  too  far  into  the  regions  of  futurity, 
and  would  involve  topics  not  proper  for  a  newspaper  dis- 
cussion. I  shall  briefly  observe  that  our  situation 
smHo.  11,  invites  and  our  interests  prompt  us  to  aim  at 
**••■  an    ascendant    in   the    system    of  ,  American 

affairs. '     The  world  may  politically,  as  well  as  geographic- 


'  In  thti  idea  U  lo  be  (ouml  an  ci[lvci|muio«  of  vhtl  hu  lincr  cone 
lA  tie  lixHcly  lenncil  Ihe  Mnciioe  IhxiiTiie.  Kut  anipmllonalil/  thu 
vrnr  «l«iltG  principlr,  whicli  U>  Ifait  Avf  has  n«Tor  liocn  pMdMljr 
■lemieil.  U  in  linili  mcrrty  nne  eiiimuon  of  •  &ieil  con*Klioa  is 
ihr  lai][<'  p*n  of  (he  peo|>]e  of  the  lJnile<l  Suici  (hat  Europenii  powcn 
thall  eveiii<i*Ur  lie  whoJIj'  exclnclol  fioni  ihe  i«a  coaiiiicnii  of  AnterUa. 
Ill  1733  Fmikltn  «i|:e<l  uixm  the  llitinh  iwai^-enniyt  ilie  ceilisg  of 
C-uitiila  inil  No**  Scntu  In  the  Unili-tl  Slain,  rni  Ibc  gmiindt  Ihm  «ll 
lni«  ni)ipn>chenMtil  between  (he  iwo  caunlrin  iroutd  be  iBipotiilile  to 
lunR  ai  tboie  tcrtiioctn  were  Tclaiucd  bf  EnglaiKl,  and  time  nai  pimcd 
■ill  view,  fat  llioa|;K  himlrtJ  in  bli>xl  uitK  ui,  awl  with  iuteiettt  alnuNl 
iilenileal.  Cjieat  Itiiiaia  it  to^ay  in  |>ii|<iiUr  eMiiiiali^iii  iwr  graatni 
oneinjp.  Scanolf  tns  ulions  b  the  feHioe  aipiimt  !>|>aiD,  «hkh  Iron  Ika 
linl  hai  b««n  of  all  Earopean  pmren  the  one  (i>  nhicli  we  owe  (be  moit 
(avDn,  ycl  (onanl  which  wc  have  >cle(l  in  a  nunnei  tni)ilrinc  pcipeliMl 
oUtonat  eanuiy.  Watm  u  llie  luttonat  (crlini;  lia%  lieeit  toitard  FnUKe. 
we  aiitnl  Si.  Ilomingo  |u  obtain  iti  fcteituna  by  «ttty  )kmuI>1(,  II  Mr- 
itplilioui  deoke  ;  ibe  moment  newi  iru  r«c«iT«<l  ol  Napohym't 
acquiiition  of  LnuiiJana.  Jeilerson  announced  thai  "  i(  ii  impotulile  thai 
Fraace  anil  the  Unlleit  S(am  can  couliniae  lone  friemU.'  and  Ihe  Ul- 
feelin)' b«T  oecupuluu  of  Meiii:ii  (VirJm'cil  it  tlill  iarnioi:i' I  'rtii. 

IleRnnnA  ptcilwbly  viiinil,  anil  cnntHiun  lo  viiue  Ihe  isttir  .   uf 

lit  couBl rynen  when  h*il«<l»tr'i '' ■■'  "  ■""  r .."(,. i-r»fy am ^  ,  .  ,,   ,. ^I  » 
Ihe  nmltam  which  all  Atbtii  lobepaofikd."  anJ 

■hat  "  Iheobjcci  of  bodi  ninti        '  (cas  ikflBcni-e  f(om 

lilt*  hnmlti'liaiK."     lie  iiarrlcil  bu  umi-yl  w  lu,  Indccii,  a*  vim  la 


HuUlMl 


EUROPEAX  SUPREMACY. 


»• 


>Uy,  be  divided  into  four  parts,  each  tUTing  a  distiDct  set 
of  interests.  Unhiippily  for  the  other  three,  Europe,  by 
her  arms  and  by  her  negotiations,  by  fvrce  and  by  frutid, 
bas,  in  diRerent  dej(rce!(,  extended  her  dominion  over 
tbcni  alL  Africa,  Asia,  and  America  have  successively 
felt  her  domination.  The  superiority  she  has  long  main- 
utned  has  templed  her  tu  plume  herself  as  the  Mistress 
of  the  World,  and  to  consider  the  rest  ot  mankind  a& 
created  (or  her  bcnclit.  Men  admired  as  profound 
philosophers  l»ave  in  direct  terms  attributed  to  her 
inhabitants  a  physical  superiority,  and  have  tiravcly 
usertcd  that  all  animals,  and  with  them  the  human 
ipecie*,  degenerate  in  Americii— that  even  don;*  cease  to 
bark  after  having  breathed  a  vfhilc  in  our  atmosphere.* 
Facts  have  loo  long  supported  these  arrogant  pretensions 
of  the  European;,  [l  belongs  to  us  to  vindicate  the 
hiaor  of  the  human  race,  and  to  teach  tliat  assuming 

"  btfwch  the  \Ar*  ibai  w«  consid«T  the  whole  Giilf  Siicain  m  of  our  iraterx, 
ia  alikfa  hokiitiim  anil  ctulkiiii;  at  in  lie  (iduiikI  upon." 

How  far  (bt«  |KiliL-]r  n  fdivmsblc  ii  not  t-jtily  dccideil.  On  III*  One 
krad,  U  is  ubvioBi  that  the  Amotion  (ctnlnikt  ttill  lirlil  Xiy  Euroiwaii 
Maen  uv  fa>  belter  and  mure  prj(«(ully  guvcrnnl  l)iiiii  llimc  whjcli 
•tw  «dl■cv^d  ind«pcn<iencf.  To  ihe  (orl'miy,  it  ii  ccilain  that  Futopc 
klai  nusm  liable  lu  wan  of  matcnnl  imi>oiUncc ;  lliat  tlic  cit«n>ioii  of 
Iboic  Ban  lo  llic  wnlnii  hxli  ai  llie  wiiilit  l«  altnoM  inevilalik  tn  Ion); 
«  thaflialcl  tctiilorit?  tbctrin  ;  aiici  lli.nl.  iiii'ieui-ci.  thrirtolanictare  ihe 
neat  potCBI  CBiHcol  f  rid  ion  liclwcen  llir  C'lU'iIrir-i  liclOiiig  I  hem  and  ibe 
UnlMd  Sutct  (initaii<,cil  in  llic  Fitherict  oioA  ilrhtint;  S«a  ditiiulei,  ivllli 
Cnil  fkiuls,  and  lhrC«l>auillllitiiUict  with  Squill)-  [>  iioliviuuhihal.  in 
More  Uioa  tin*  view,  Kwnifx'Kii  ffouicitkiifu  of  Anicrican  tcrttlory  cutiAli* 
Mo  a  neBicr  lo  Ihr  pCMClul  pclity  t,\  ilii;  tlmicil  S4Htn. 

Il  la  to  be  reEiHIcI,  in  view  of  lliii  policy,  lliiil  Krt-iidciil  Cleveland 
boad  lin  liilcffciciiec  in  tl«  Venejiielaii  contpm-ny  oti  Ihe  clound  of 
dwfn  to  iciiiil'lii.'an  imlttiiltiiiii>.  lor  tlic  aunmption  nppealeil  iicillicr  In 
nor  lo  huinaaily.     Had  )ic.  iii  (iluc  of  Ihik  {nclol.  laktrn  the 


pOBIMn  that  lh«  United  Stalei  wnnld  tiercnftni  iiihiil  lliat  all  diiputu 
nawcrti  Europe  and  America  muit  be  arlrilnlnt,  and  llial  in  no  tn-e 
■nsLl  Ibe  United  Suicollaw  Ruropcan  maifnte  l»  rilmd  lo  thi>  liall  iit 
IW  wnfld.  lie  wKiikl  han  lakea  a  far  moie  tenable  (khiikxi,  hat* 
Blnnceil  Ihe  inletr*!-!  of  llie  I'oilf'l  Slatr..  and  have  done  •  ijreat  >tr*ke 
to  bunauilj.  That  ihii  potilioii  »  ineiiublr.  ami  it  in  (act  to.  much  to 
the  iiKeroi  ot  Europe  ai  America,  Kemi  a1rca<ly  Mllln)  in  thcoiy,  mu) 
iW  PiciliJcni  who  fciiallj  ciiablhhei  it  u  a  piaclice  will  laiili  hit  name 
ki{h  In  AmerViaii  hitiory. — Knnoa. 

*  [Oe  I'aua'i)  "  K«t>ri<1ici  )>hjIOKiphi<|uea  uir  In  AntmcaiHa."— • 
PliaLit't.  Fur  a  reply  Iiy  JtSciKrii,  lee  "  Nolci  on  VirQinia  "(Brookljiv 
'»MJ  Y-  «.— Eonoa. 


COMMERCE  AND  REVENUE. 


[iro.u 


brother  moderation.  Union  will  enable  tis  to  do  it 
Disuniun  will  niltt  another  victim  to  his  triumphs.  Let 
AmGricanti  ditidain  to  iie  the  instruments  of  European 
greatness!  Let  ihc  thirteen  States,  bound  together  in  a 
strict  and  indissoluble  Union,  concur  in  creeling  one 
great  American  system,  superior  to  the  control  n\  all 
transatlantic  force  or  inHuence,  and  able  to  dictate  the 
terms  of  the  connection  between  the  old  and  the  new 
world!  PuBLiua. 


No.  12.  (.v/v  Yttk  Piktt,  SwmUt  (T.  iftr.)  Hamilton. 

UTILITY  OF   UNIONS  AS   REGARDS  REVENUE. 

Cimmfnt  Iht  grfnt  ttmrtt  »f  uativmil  VMllk—Cnimn'a  nitnlM  If 
agrifm/tuTf — T-tifi  miut  tf  affsirli,-afj  If  tkt  ^laittily  9/  misfijt — SttMt 
Ttvrimtt  »/  Gtrman  Emfirt—  Prtvrly  a/  ilatt  Imiuriti —  TiU-tHfit  im 
Grtat  BritmH — DhIUi  lir  main  Jffwi/tiK*  in  Am*nta—Umf^mUri$f 
tf  txdu  tttd  Jirtil  laxii — Hutitt  frit  UtiitJ  ty  gemtrtt  ffvemmtf^— 
Sf-tU  in/fiO  VvH  niutl  in  imttaiHnf — Rrvtntv  ftlreU  af  framtr — 
UHtiiiUkofit  a/  $mi4ggliKg  timJer  rtaliiivtt gwtmmtMl — OiuiJotHfafr  0/ 
Brihtin  <■>  rtgttrdi  tmHtgiiiif—Stil/r  imf<ub — Frrntk  and  /ingiitA 
itulifi — Rnvnue  /rtm  anient  ifiriti—'Nalinnttriiitimtimp&iiiNe  uiilh- 
tut  n-EvMH/ — Nitiiiilr  frr  imffiti — t/if/ifH/arily  rf  fxiitt*  aitd  Mrttl 
UxafifM — IVilAtitl  .»H  imffit,  taxft  will (klrfiy /aU  mt  Umt. 


Tt>  the  Peopie  of  thf  Sl-ile  of  Nen;  York: 

The  effects  of  Union  Upon  the  commercial  prosperity 
of  tlie  States  have  been  scifficiently  delineated.  Its  ten- 
dency to  promote  the  interests  of  revenue  wilt  be  the 
subject  of  onr  present  inquiry. 

The  prosperity  of  commerce  is  now  perceived  and 
acknowledged  by  idl  enlightened  statesmen  to  be  the 
most  useful  as  well  as  the  most  productive  source  of 
national  wealth,  and  has  accordingly  become  a  primary 
object  of  their  political  cares.  Dy  muliiplyinK  tlic  means 
of  gntiiication,  hy  promoting  Ihc  introduLtinn  and  cirtni- 
lation  of  Uic  prerions  metals,— I lurte  darlinfr  objects  of 
human  avarice  and  enterprise,— it  serves  to  vivify  and 


iBdtlOB) 


COMMERCE  AND  AGRICULTURE, 


73 


invigorate  the  channels  of  industry,  and  to  make  them 
Ruw  with  greater  activity  anil  copiousness.  The  assid- 
uous merchant,  the  laborious  husbandman,  the  active 
RKchanic,  am)  the  industrious  maoufacturcr— al!  orders 
of  (KO— look  forward  with  eager  expectation  and  growing 
abcrity  to  this  pleasing  reward  of  their  toils.  The  often- 
i^aied  question  between  agriculture  and  commerce  has, 
from  indubiubie  experience,  received  a  decision  which 
\m  silenced  the  rivalship  that  once  subsiiitcd  between 
ibnn,  and  has  proved,  to  the  satisfaction  of  their  friends, 
(hit  their  interests  are  intimately  blended  and  inter- 
vixen.  It  has  been  found  in  various  countries  tltat,  in 
proportion  as  commerce  has  flourished,  land  has  risen  in 
nlue.  And  how  could  it  have  happened  otherwise? 
Cuold  that  which  procures  a  freer  vent  for  the  products 
<f  the  earth,  which  furnishes  new  incitements  to  the  ciil- 
ihaiionof  land,  which  is  the  most  powerful  instrument  in 
iocreasing  the  (|uantity  of  money  in  a  state — could  that  in 
fine,  vhich  is  the  faithful  handmaid  of  labor  and  industry, 
ia  erery  shape,  fail  to  augment  that  article,  which  is  the 
frotilic  parent  of  far  the  greatest  part  of  the  objectti  upon 
Vliitti  they  arc  exerted?  It  is  astonishing  that  su  simple 
atmih  should  ever  have  had  an  adversary ;  and  it  is  on«, 
UBOng  a  multitude  of  proofs,  how  apt  a  spirit  of  ill- 
Uonncd  jealousy,  or  of  too  great  abstraction  and  relinc- 
■mt,  is  to  lead  men  astray  from  the  plainest  truths  of 
Kuon  and  conviction. 

The  ability  of  a  country  to  pay  taxes  must  always  be 
proportioned,  in  a  great  degree,  to  the  rjuantity  uf  money 
■nIml  ><i  circulation,  and  to  the  celerity  with  which 
*"*  it    circulates.      Commerce,    contributing    to 

Mh  these  objects,  must  nf  necessity  render  the  payment 
■'taxes  easier,  and  facilitate  the  requisite  supplies  to  the 
•fciMry.  The  hereditary  dominions  of  the  Kmperor  of 
Geraany  contain  a  great  extent  of  fertile,  cultivated,  and 
lopohtus  territory,  a  large  proportion  of  which  is  situated 
in  mild  and  luxuriant  climates.  In  some  parts  of  this 
territory  are  to  be  found  the  best  gold  and  silver  miocs 
ia  Kurope.     And  yet,  from  the  want  of   the  fostering 


u 


DIJtaCT  TAXSS  UNPOFULAR. 


tlb,lt 


influenceofcummerce,  that  monarch  canboastbut  slcuder 
revenues.  He  haa  several  times  bren  <:umi>cllcd  to  owe 
obligations  to  the  {xicuniury  succors  of  other  nations  for 
the  preservation  of  his  essential  interests,  and  is  unable, 
upon  the  strength  of  bis  own  resources,  to  sustain  a  long 
or  continued  war. 

Uvit  il  is  not  in  (his  nspcct  of  the  subject  alone  thai  Union  will 
be  »cen  (o  cooduce  to  the  |>urj>cisc  o(  teveiiue.  There  arc  oilier 
points  ol  view,  in  which  its  influence  will  Appear  m«rc  immediate 
and  deci»ire.  It  is  evidenl  from  tlie  state  u(  ihe  couiilry,  (loni  the 
habits  of  llie  people.  \\ott\  the  expetience  we  Itare  ha«l  on  the 
point  itKcir,  that  it  b  impracticable  to  raise  any  very  considerable 
sums  by  direct  taxation.  Tax  law*  have  in  rain  been  niuliiplkil : 
new  melliods  tci  enforce  the  coltcclion  have  in  vain  been  tried ; 
the  public  expectation  lus  been  unilormly  <lisappuinlc<l.  and  (he 
treasuiie»of  the  States  h.ive  rcntaine<l  empty.  The  popular  sys- 
tem ol  admiiiixiralion  inherent  in  (lie  nature  ul  po|Milar  govern* 
mem.  coinciding  with  the  real  scarcity  of  money  Incident  to  a 
Ungiiiil  and  mulilaicil  slate  of  trade,  has  hitherto  defeated  every 
Gxpeiiuient  for  cxiensire  collections,  and  ha:>  at  length  taught  the 
different  tegi-'datuTcs  the  (otly  of  attempting  them. 

No  person  acquainted  with  what  happens  in  other  countries  will 
be  suTpriscd  at  ihrt  circumstance.  In  so  opulent  a  nation  as  that 
of  Britain,  where  direct  taxes  from  superior  wealth  must  be  much 
more  loicrahlc.  and  from  Ihe  vigor  of  ilie  Kovcniincnt  much  more 
practicable,  than  in  America,  far  the  greatest  pjn  of  lite  nattoiial 
revenue  is  derived  from  (axcn  of  the  iiidiiect  kind,  from  imposts, 
and  from  excises.  Dutks  on  imported  artklcs  form  a  Urge  branch 
of  tliiK  Utter  desciipliun. 

In  America  it  is  evident  thai  we  mu«t  a  loitg  linu;  depend  for 
Ihe  means  of  revenue  chiclly  oii  such  duties.  In  most  pans  of  tl, 
excises  must  be  confined  within  a  narrow  compau-  The  genius 
of  the  people  will  ill  brook  the  inquisitive  and  peiemptoiy  spirit  of 
excise  Uws.'    The  pockets  of  ilic  farmerv.  on  the  otiter  hand,  will 

'  So  DOpopnlo'  >»  ■>  nciHi  tax  in  Ibe  lul  nntury  that  onlv  tbrae  of 
Ihe  cotoniei  hud  levkd  il  in  ealonia)  ii«iet,  and  not  omb  diie  nad  dated 
lo  lueim  a  tovtceoJ  rcvcMue  tn  Ihe  period  Iroin  1774  lo  1787.  In  (he 
New  Vork  conmbMi  whkti  n\\iitA  ihcixniuiiaiiiin  il  wa*lvti«  aiinrvdlo 
iCTlnin  wlivlly  ihiE  national  ^nrrn'Dxix  from  (hit  torn  of  lautioa.  awl 
iKo  oJ  the  italca,  in  tbeir  tuegnltd  •nieiulnieiiu.  wiiked  all  excises  ta 
be  appovtiooed  on  tbe  uata.  tcBving  to  etich  ifce  qimtHiD  bow  lo  raite 
its  pTopoRioD.  The  reasan  nJ  this  unpoiwlarily  vu  dm  lo  the  circuBi- 
Uanca  of  (he  tax  bdnf  pncll^Ilv  the  im\f  one  wMcli  IdI)  on  (be  prod- 
net   ol   ifcc  wnall  fatmcr,  lo   abinn  issJ;  manej   wu  al«ap  a  ran 


bBtltoBl       STATE  IMPOSTS  IMPRACTICABLE. 


rrluctanlty  )-ield  but  scanty  supplies,  m  tlie  unwelcome  shape  o( 
inptMliiaiis  on  lltcii  Iiouscsand  Unils;and  peiMinal  property  m 
100  precarious  anil  lnvisit>1c  a  fund  to  be  Uid  hold  of  in  any  otbcr 
■Af  (ban  by  the  tmperceptibte  af^eiicy  of  taxe«  on  cuiiiurnpiion. 

U  iheK  remarks  have  any  foundation,  ihat  state  of  things  which 
win  best  enable  xa  to  iinprore  and  extend  so  valuable  a  resource 
mini  be  l>csi  Mlapteil  to  our  political  welfare.  And  it  cannot 
admit  of  a  serious  doubt  that  this  suic  of  tliiiij{S  muil  rest  on  the 
bttis  of  a  gciKral  Union.  As  f.ir  as  this  would  lie  conducive  to 
the  mtercsis  of  cocnuierce,  so  (nr  it  must  tend  tu  the  cutcniiion  ul 
the  revenue  to  be  ■Ir.tiATi  fiom  that  source.  As  far  at  it  would 
contiibule  to  rendering  rctjuUtions  fur  the  collection  of  the  duties 
marc  simple  and  efTicacimi^  so  f.ir  it  mutt  *erve  to  answer  the  pur- 
poses of  milking  the  same  rate  of  diitie<>  more  productive,  and  of 
pinii^it  into  the  pourer  of  the  goveriinicnt  to  increase  the  rale 
mImuI  prejudice  to  ttadc. 

The  relative  situation  of  these  States;  the  number  of 
nrcis  iritfi  which  tlicy  arc  inlerscctctl,  nnd  of  bays  that 
■s-th  their  sfaurev;  the  facility  uf  communication  in 
every  direction;  the  affinity  of  language  and  manner*: 
the  familiar  habits  of  intcixroursc; — all  these  are  cir- 
Cttmstanccs  that  would  conspire  tu  render  an  illicit 
trade  between  Ihcin  a  matter  of  little  difficulty,  and 
voold  insure  frequent  evasions  of  the  commercial  retcula- 
lions  uf  each  other.  The  separate  States  or  confedera- 
cies would  be  neceuiiated  by  mutual  jealousy  tu  avoid 


pWiMJon.  kll  Dilict  laxev  on  contumpliofi  being  levied  on  the  mciMnlile 
duMs,  who  cuily  oontniiinc!«il  ihe  euh  advance  whicJi  (he  («■  cniaileil. 
AlnuM  with  (lie  iawoAtWtm  tA  tlic  tuliiiiiKl  );<)vciunienl,  lliiiiillon  id- 
rscated  attil  ntitiinrd  ■■<  civi>ir  ii>,  wliiiti  i'l  turn  priHliiiti)  Ihe  Whinky 
Ktbttlinn.  An  excite  vai  inililutrd  in  the  War  of  i£ia  uid  alKi  in  the 
Civil  War;  the  tatter  hecame  ^rnimcnl.  und  now  prodncn  alniMt 
half  the  goieniiBem  revenues.  IhiLl  it  ii  no  iDHQcr  an  uii|i<i|iiii*r  (ax  ik 
dot  to  tlir  (act  thai  Ihe  |i>iiiluclkin  a\  tfiiTilt.  t>ecr,  anil  ti>)iiv>.'u  ■»  noiv 
coolrailcd  by  crrat  maciulaclurinR  enr^ioratixns,  wiiivli  hate  no  dlSitully 
in  coaiaasDding  ind}'  money.  Wheie  the  ume  conditiom  ilill  cxiil 
whidi  (onnerly  made  ihe  tax  unpopular  (the  nioomhine  dttiillcriet  of  (he 
SoMbem  mouKUlas),  it  it  at  much  haled  m  crti.  Sec  atliclct  o(  K.  C. 
JamM  on  Kxcltea.  and  W.  C.  Koid  un  Inlenul  Kcvmue.  in  Lalor'a 
"  CrclopK'lia  uf  Politkal  Siirnce."  The  laine  change  in  public  oinnion 
kuoccum^  in  Cleat  Biilain.  Johnaon,  in  hiiOieilonarv,  denned  Eiciw 
■•"■balelul  lax  levied  upon  conmoitillci.  and  Bdiuiicod  not  by  ihe 
nMmaa  J>d|^  o(  properly,  but  wreiche*  tiircil  liy  lho»c  \o  whiim 
ewba  i*  paid,  «UIe  oow  tlie  hcer  lax  ii  the  one  iuvanaUy  uud  to 
tMnd  001  the  yearly  bod^oL— EnrrOR. 


7*         SMUGGLlXa  CONTROLLABLE  BY  VKlOff.    tBffclJ 

the  temptations  to  tliat  kind  of  trade  by  the  lowncss  of 
iheir  duties.  The  tcmjtcr  of  our  governments,  for  a 
long  lime  to  come,  would  not  permit  those  rigorous  pre* 
cautions  by  which  the  European  nations  guard  the  ave* 
nues  into  their  respective  countries,  as  well  by  land  as 
by  water;  and  which,  even  there,  are  found  insufficient 
obstacles  to  the  adventurous  straugems  of  avarice. 

In  France,  tlietc  U  an  anny  of  jntroli  (aji  they  are  called)  con- 
sianttf  emplov'd  to  secure  their  fiwal  rcKuUlions  agsinn  Ibe 
iiinxKli  of  the  ilealerx  in  conEinlKinil  Iraite.  Mr.  Neckar  computes 
the  nunihcr  of  these  patroK  at  iipw.trds  of  iweiiiy  ih4xi!tnn<).  This 
should  the  immense  ilifficully  in  preveniing  tlut  species  o(  IrafKc, 
where  there  is  an  inbnil  communic.tiion.  and  places  in  a  strong 
hgh(  the  dn.iil vantages  with  which  the  collection  of  duties  m  this 
country  would  lie  encuniltered.  K  by  disunion  the  Slates  should  be 
place<l  in  a  siiuaiion,  with  rcsjiect  to  each  other,  rcscntbling  ihai 
of  Fr^ince  with  respect  to  lier  neighbors.  The  arbilraiy  and  vexa- 
tious powers  with  which  the  patrols  are  necessarily  arm«]  would 
be  intoIrr^tMc  In  i  free  counliy. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  there  be  but  one  government  per- 
vading all  the  States,  there  will  be,  as  to  the  principal 
part  of  our  commerce,  but  okk  bide  to  guard— the 
Atlantic  coast.  Vessels  arriving  directly  from  foreign 
countries,  laden  with  valuable  cargoes,  would  rarely 
choose  to  hazard  themselves  to  the  complicated  and  criti- 
cal perils  which  would  attend  attempts  to  unlade  prior  to 
their  coming  into  port.  Tbcy  would  hare  to  dread  both 
the  dangers  of  Ihe  coast,  and  of  detection,  as  well  after 
as  before  their  arrival  at  (he  places  of  their  Tinal  destina- 
tion. An  ordinary  degree  of  vigilance  would  be  com|>e< 
tent  to  the  prevention  of  any  material  infractioits  upon 
the  rights  of  the  revenue.  A  few  armed  vessels,  judi- 
ciously stationed  at  the  entrances  of  our  ports,  might  at  a 
small  expense  be  made  u.scfiil  sentinels  of  the  laws.  And 
the  government  having  the  same  inicresl  to  pi:ovlde 
against  violations  everywhere,  the  co-operation  of  its 
measures  in  each  State  would  have  a  powerful  tendency 
to  render  them  cffccltial.  Here  also  we  should  preserve, 
by  Union,  an  advantage  which  nature  hulds  out  to  09, 
and  wbicb   vuuld   be  rcliitqutsbed  by  sejiaratton.     The 


SiaUun] 


REVBNVE  FROM  SPIRITS. 


77 


t'uitcd  States  lie  at  a  great  distiince  from  Europe,  and 
it  a  considerable  distance  Iroin  all  other  places  with 
which  they  would  have  extensive  connections  of  foreign 
trade.  The  passage  from  them  lt>  us,  in  a  few  hours,  or 
in  a  single  night,  as  between  the  coasts  of  France  and 
Britain,  and  of  other  neighboring  nations,  would  be 
impracticable.  This  is  a  prinligious  security  against  a 
diKct  contraband  with  foreign  countries;  but  a  circui- 
lODs  contraband  to  one  State,  through  the  medium  of 
lOiKlier,  would  be  both  easy  ami  safe.  The  ditference 
between  a  direct  tmiiortation  from  abroad,  and  .in  indirect 
iapurUlion  through  the  channel  of  a  neighboring  State, 
in  small  parcels,  acconling  to  time  an<l  «pportunity>  with 
the  additional  facilities  of  inland  communication,  must 
be  palpable  to  every  roan  of  discernment. 

It  is  therefore  evident  that  one  national  gorcrnmcnt 
wnid  be  able,  at  much  less  expen.te,  to  extend  the  duties 
01  imports,  beyond  comparison,  further  than  would  be 
pnaicable  to  the  States  separately,  or  to  any  partial 
toofederacies.  Hitherto,  I  believe,  it  may  safely  be 
iMcned  that  these  duties  have  not  upon  an  average 
MKoied  in  any  State  three  per  cent.  In  France  they 
>fc  tstimaie^  to  be  about  Rfteen  [>cr  cent.,  and  in  Britain 
Ihey  excee«1  this  proportion."  There  xcems  to  be 
noihinj!;  to  hinder  their  being  increased  in  this  country 
to  at  least  treble  their  present  amount.  The  single 
vticle  i)(  anient  spirits,  under  federal  regulation,  might 
If  made  to  furnish   a  considerable   revenue.     Upon   a 

'i'  '"  the  impi»rtatton  into  this  State,  the  whole  qnan- 
,i(i'iried  into  the  United  States  may  be  estimateil  at 
lillions  of  g.-)llons:  which,  at  a  shilling  per  gallon, 
-lint  produce  two  hundred  thousand  pounds.  That 
irticle  would  well  t>ear  this  rate  of  duty;  and  if  it  should 
■end  to  diminish  the  consumption  of  it,  such  an  effect 
»nuld  be  equally  favorable  to  the  agriculture,  to  the 
KOBooiy.  to  the  morals,  and  to  (lie  health  of  the  societjr. 
Thu'e  i«,  perhaps,  nothing  so  much  a  subject  of  national 
etiraraifance  as  ihi-so  spirits. 

*  U  my  Mcnwy  b«  richl  Ihcy  aoMnini  la  twenty  p«r  cent.^Puujm. 


78 


BXCtSSS  UNPOPULAK. 


i]r».u 


Whitt  will  be  the  con  sequence,  if  we  xcc  not  able  to 
avail  (>iirNelvc»  iif  ilie  resource  in  question  in  its  full 
extent?  A  nation  cannot  long  exist  without  revenues. 
Destitute  of  this  essential  support,  it  must  rcsiKO  it» 
inilcpeiidcncc  anU  tink  into  the  degraded  condition  uf  a 
province.  This  is  an  extremity  to  which  no  sovernmeni 
will  of  choke  accede.  Revenue,  therefore,  must  be  had 
at  all  events.  In  this  country,  if  the  principal  part  be 
not  drawn  from  commerce,  it  mui^t  fait  with  oppressive 
weight  upon  land.  It  has  been  already  intimated  that 
excises,  in  their  true  signiTication,  arc  too  little  in  unison 
with  the  feetinj;!t  of  the  people  to  admit  of  great  use 
bcitiK  made  of  that  mode  of  taxation;  nor,  indeed,  in 
the  States  where  almost  the  sole  employment  is  agri- 
culture, are  the  objects  proper  for  excise  suffiuieutly 
Dutocrous  to  permit  very  ample  collections  in  that  way. 
Personal  estate  (as  has  been  before  remarked),  from  the 
difficulty  in  tracing  ii,  cannot  be  subjected  to  large  con- 
tributions by  any  other  means  than  by  taxes  on  con 
sumption.  In  populous  cities,  it  may  be  enough  the 
subject  of  conjecture  to  occasion  the  oppression  of  indi- 
viduats  without  much  agt{rcp:ate  benefit  to  the  State;  but 
beyond  these  circles  it  must,  in  a  great  measure,  escape 
the  eye  and  the  hand  of  the  tax-gatherer.  As  the  neces- 
sities of  the  State,  nevertheless,  must  be  satisfied  in 
some  mode  or  other,  the  defect  of  other  resources  must 
throw  the  princifKil  wetKhl  of  public  burdens  on  the  p»s- 
scssors  of  land.  And  as,  on  the  other  hand,  the  wauls 
of  the  government  can  never  obtain  an  nde<iuate  supply, 
unless  all  the  sources  of  revenue  are  open  to  its  demands, 
the  finances  of  the  community,  under  such  embarrass- 
meniK,  cannot  he  put  into  a  situation  can<iistcnt  with  its 
respectability  or  its  security.  Thus  we  shall  not  even  have 
the  consolations  of  a  full  treasury  to  atone  for  the  oppres- 
sion of  that  valuablcclassof  the  citizens  who  are  emphiyed 
in  the  cultivation  of  the  soil.  But  public  and  private 
distress  will  keep  pace  with  each  other  in  gt"itmy  concert: 
and  unite  in  dcploriD]{  the  infatualiuu  of  those  counsels 
whicb  led  to  disunion.  Pusuva. 


NATIONAL  CIVIL  LIST. 


79 


No.  13.  U*^f*dlmlJ*»r»^.'Soi*mhttti.tlfil,) 


Hamilton. 


ADVANTAGKS  OF    UNION  FROM    THE    STAND- 
POINT  OF  ECONOMY. 

Smtllrr  txpratt  ff  tit-U  list — CimI  tiilt  ej  ttfaratt  t^nfttUrafin — 
tamf^  r/  li'f^l  Britain —  PniaUt  tintl  tf  JiniioH  e/  frififitJ  ttn- 
ffirinn — A  NirrtlurH  anJ  d  S^utiem  Jnlg«e—Pfiiti,Ht  »f  Peam/t- 
tui*    Grtaltr  aea^my  d/Mtr  itaft-itraif. 

71  tht  People  of  tht  SiaU  ff  A'lW  Y^rk: 

Ai  cannectcil  wiihtlie  suhjeclof  icvcnuc.we  nwy  willi  propriety 
coMtdcr  iImi  o(  ecunoitiy.  Tlie  money  saved  frnni  one  nbjrct 
nuy  be  uwally  applied  lo  anoihcr.  antt  iherc  will  be  sa  much  tlie 
leu  10  be  drawn  (ruin  Ihc  puckets  of  ihe  pcujite,  tf  ihc  Sinics  are 
•Med  under  one  govenimenl.  ihcrc  will  be  but  one  national  civil 
bit  10  support  -,  if  llicy  are  divided  inlu  several  confedetacicK.  then: 
«ill  be  as  many  different  n.iiioiial  civil  lists  to  be  provided  for — 
iml  eodi  o(  (tiera,  us  (u  the  principal  deparlinents,  coexicii:iive 
■itb  Hat  whtcli  would  be  necessary  Tor  a  f.'overnmerit  of  llie  whole. 
IH  The  entire  sc|»ration  of    ihc  States  into  ihittceii 

1*-H.  uitconnecled  sovetcigmicsis  a.  pio)cct  too  exliava^-Aiit 

Hid  too  replete  with  dantrcr  lu  have  nuny  advocaict.  The  idea* 
d  men  who  specuUie  upon  (he  dismember m cut  o(  the  empire  ^ccin 
tncndly  turned  taw.irdi  three  cimfi'dcracicn — one coniixiing of  (he 
(Our  Narlhern.  another  «l  the  (our  Miilille.  and  .1  third  ol  ihe  Rve 
SoAhem  States.  There  is  little  piobiibiliiy  thai  there  would  be  a 
prner  number.  According  to  this  disliihiition,  each  confederacy 
VmiliJ  comprtv  an  extent  of  territory  larger  than  thai  of  llic  king' 
tiA«  <rf  Great  ttriisin.  No  well-informed  man  will  suppose  thai 
(he  ailaira  o(  wch  a  confedetiicy  can  be  properly  regulated  by  a 
govemmeDt  l«s  comprehensive  in  itsorg.msor  inMilutions  than 
ihst  which  has  been  proposed  by  the  Coiivenlion,  When  lite 
duMiwiuns  of  a  .Stale  uliain  lu  a  certain  inaKiiilude.  it  requires  llie 
umc  energy  of  ([UTCinincnl  and  the  tkime  forms  of  adniiiiiMration 
frhich  arc  reiguiiilc  in  one  n(  much  Kieater  extent.  This  idea 
kclmiis  not  of  precise  demons! rAl ion.  because  there  Is  no  rule  by 
V'bicK  ore  can  roea»urc  the  momentum  ul  civil  power  tieccuary 
lo  llir  govrrnmeni  of  any  given  number  of  indivitluals :  but  when 
IK  consider  llial  lite  island  of  Britain,  nearly  comincDsuraie  with 
och  ti  (he  suppov^  confeilcracie:!.  contains  about  eight  millions 
(<  pcuple.  and  wlicn  we  reflect  upon  llic  degree  of  nuilHifiiy 
rtqufacd  to  direct  the  piissioas  of  so  lar^c  a  society  lu  ilie  public 


So 


PROBABLE  LEAGUE  DlVtSWNS. 


([ooil,  we  iihall  tw  no  rrafton  to  <loubl  ihal  the  like  porli» 
piiwcT  would  he  sufFiririii  to  jietfornt  ihc  Mm«  (.i»k  in  «  mm 
far  more  numernui.  Civil  pow«r,  piaperly  orgniiiici}  and  exci 
is  cjipitlile  ol  ihfTti«iiig  its  force  loa  very  gicui  cxiem:  and  cai 
a  m.inncr.  reproduce  iUelf  in  evciy  part  of  a  great  em jiire 
judicious  arrangemenl  of  sulwi'dinale  instiiuiioas. 

Tlie  suppiMtliuii  iliai  tnch  confciteracy  into  which  the  Si 
would  l>e  likely  to  be  divided  would  require  a  govcmment  not 
comprehcuHivir  llian  the  uiic  prupriMi).  »il1  b«  &lmif-lhcncil 
nnorhrr  siippo%iiion.  more  prob.ihle  than  that  which  prrvetils 
Willi  liirec  tociftclcr.icics  as  the  -iltcrrialivr  lo  a  grneral  Uniiin, 
S«iIIot.  wc  attend  carefully  lo  geoj-raphical  and  commcr 

lands.  consiilerallnn!>,  in    conjiinction   niih   the   h;il>ilt  i 

prejudices  of  the  iliflei^nt  -Sralcs,  we  tlinll  ht  led  to  conclude  I 
in  c^kfw  ol  disunion  ihcy  vvill  innst  naturally  league  iheniwl 
under  two  {[ovi-tnnients.  The  (uur  E^Mern  Stales,  ttoni  all 
causes  i><al  form  the  link*  of  national  sympathy  and  cuiiiiecti 
may  with  ccriainiy  be  cxpccied  tu  unite.  New  York,  sit ualetl 
sJic  i«,  would  nevet  lie  unwise  enoujjh  to  oppnse  a  feeble  i 
unaupporied  Rank  to  the  weight  of  Tliat  confeiJerncy.  There 
olher  obvious  reasons  lliat  would  (ncililale  her  accession  la 
New  Jersey  is  too  small  a  Siaie  to  think  nf  being  a  frantier 
opposition  tolhissiill  more  {>owerfu1  combination;  nor  do  ih 
appear  lu  be  any  ohsiaclrs  lo  her  a<linission  into  it.  E 
Pennsylvania  would  have  strong  inducements  lo  join  the  Notth 
lcA)jue.  All  active  foreign  commerce,  on  the  basis  o(  her  C 
iiaviKation,  is  her  true  policy,  and  coincides  wiih  the  opinions  % 
dispositions  of  her  ciiiieii«.  The  more  Southern  States,  (i 
various  circuinxlaiices.  may  not  itiink  themselves  much  inteie4 
in  Ihe  encouragemeni  of  naviKaiion.  They  may  prefer  a  sysi 
which  would  jfive  unlimited  scope  tu  all  nations  to  be  the  carr 
as  W4-II  as  llic  purchasers  of  ibrir  commadiries.  Pennsylvs 
may  nut  choose  to  confound  her  interests  in  a  connection 
adverse  lo  her  policy.  As  she  must  at  all  events  be  a  tioni 
she  may  dccni  It  most  consistent  with  Iier  safety  to  have 
exposed  side  turned  towards  the  weaker  power  of  ihc  Soutti 
rnlhcr  than  towards  the  stronger  power  of  the  Noiihern  ConI 
eracy.  This  would  give  her  the  f.iirest  chance  to  avoid  lieinj; 
Flanders  of  America.  Whatever  may  be  the  detennlnation 
Pennsylvania,  if  ilie  Northern  Confederacy  includes  New  Jeri 
there  is  no  likelihood  of  more  than  one  confederacy  lo  the  south 
that  Si-iie. 
Nothing  can  be  more  evident  than  that  the  ihittcea  StatMW 


J 


EXTEf/T  OF  TBUmrOftV. 


8i 


beal>1e  lo  siippoil  »  national  govcmnieiil  bcittr  (linn  nnr-h.ilf,  or 
■-ihircl,  or  any  nimitict  lew  Ihnn  ihe  whole.  This  reflection 
have  great  weight  in  ohviating  tlint  objection  to  the  prtinoted 
,  which  is  [otindnl  on  the  principle  of  expense  :  un  objec'iion, 
r,  which  when  we  come  to  iflke  a  nearer  view  of  U.  wiil 
Appear  in  ever^r  lis'il  to  stand  on  mistaken  ground. 

[  in  addition  lo  the  con v deration  of  n  pliiniliiy  of  ciril  lists,  we 
into  view  llie  nuinl)er  o(  persons  wJio  must  iieccuanly  be 
I  10  guard  the  inUnd  com municji linn  hclnccn  thediHeient 
cies  aipiinst  illicit  irulc.  ;ind  uho  in  lime  will  infalliMy 
Iftinf;  up  nut  of  ihe  nrcc^sitics  i>f  revenue :  and  if  we  aUo  take  into 
(irw  the  niilii.'try  c«iab]i»hment»  which  ii  has  been  shown  would 
■lavnidatily  result  from  the  jtMlmi*ici  and  conflicts  of  llie  sei'enl 
utinitt  Intii  whkh  Ihe  Stales  would  be  diviiled.  we  «hall  clearly 
dacuTcT  llial  a  se|Mratton  would  be  not  less  injurious  to  the 
tcDnomy.  ilton  to  the  tranquillity,  commcTce,  revenue,  and  liberty 
rf  ewiy  part.  Puui-lUS. 


No.  14. 


(A-m  Vfi  PtiM.  KovtmlKi  yt.  i;lT.) 


Madison. 


OBJECTIONS  TO  THK  EXTENT  OF 
TERRITORY. 

Ah  tvd/iiuO'  di^iitttf—Cntfti^gH  ej  <  r/fiuhlit  nili  a  itmstr^y-^ 
f.mr  a/ifMr\UfJ  d/mxratiti — MfektlKUai  f»n>rr  !•/  rtprtifiiUtieti — 
_Ktim'al  iimit  ef  d  JimMroty — HxptriaMt  in  nfrtifulalicm  inJtr  Ikr 
mftJfi-aiy — Di'^iiirai  af  ikt  Unttttl  Sluttt — A'a  */  Etirfftam  cevn- 
iii—tiaiiliJjMriiJitlii>«  af  gtntra!  f-roiTHiamt — Volm  t/  lut^rJi- 
■  ptitmmrHli  in  riialifn  A»  liu  sf  Itriiltry—EvtulMl  gttvth  e/ 
Vtifn^-lnlttHal tMf-ifVfmtith  faiililalfJ—Tif  marr  iHitaat  Ikt  Slnff 
'tr  ^'ruUr  Ikt  nfeJ  tj  natitaal  gtiftrnmtnl —  Warning  againti  Ikttf 
^Xrfavr  Jiinnifn. 

n  tht  People  0/  tJu  Slate  of  Nao  Y^rk: 

Wc  hare  seen  the  necessity  of  the  Union,  as  our  bul- 
wark U]!3insl  foreign  danger,  as  the  conservator  of  peace 
iiDring  oiirselvCK,  its  the  guar<lian  uf  our  commerce  and 
other  rummon  iniercsts,  as  the  only  substitute  for  those 
military  establishments  which  have  subverted  the  liber- 
i  of  the  Old  World,  and  as  the  proper  antidnie  for  the 
lex  of  faction,   which  hare   proved  (uiul  to  other 


Sa 


SEPUBUC  AND  DEMOCRACY  DEFINED. 


popular  governments,  and  of  which  alnrming  symptoms 
have  been  betrayed  l>y  our  own.  All  tlut  remains 
within  this  branch  of  our  inquiries  is  to  take  notice  of 
ftn  objection  that  may  be  drawn  from  the  great  extent 
of  country  which  the  Union  embraces.  A  few  obser- 
vations on  this  subject  will  be  the  more  proper,  as  it  is 
perceived  that  the  adversaries  o(  the  new  Constitution 
are  availing  themselves  of  the  prevailing  prejudice  with 
regard  to  the  practicable  sphere  of  republican  admiais- 
tration,  in  order  to  supply  by  imaginary  difficulties  the 
want  of  those  solid  objections  which  they  endeavor  in 
vain  to  find. 

The  error  which  limits  repiiUican  government  to  a 
narrow  district  has  been  unfolded  and  refuted  in  preced- 
SmITm.  >»S  papers.  I  remark  here  only  that  it  sccma 
BkDdiO.  to  owe  its  rise  and  prevalence  chicDy  to  the 
confounding  of  a  republic  with  a  democracy,  applying  to 
the  former  reasonings  drawn  from  the  nature  of  ihe 
latter.  The  true  distinction  between  these  forms  was 
also  adverted  to  on  a  former  ucc^sion.  It  is  that,  in  a 
democracy,  the  people  meet  and  exercise  the  government 
in  person:  in  a  republic,  they  assemble  and  administer  it 
by  iheir  representative!!  and  agents.  A  democracy,  con* 
s«quently,  will  be  confined  to  a  small  spot.  A  republic 
may  be  extended  over  a  large  region. 

To  this  accidental  source  of  the  error  may  be  added 

the  anificc  of  some  celebrated  authors,  whose  writings 

have  h,^d  a  great  share  in  forming  the  moilern  standard 

of  political  opinions.     Being  subjects  either  of  an  ah- 

solote  or   limited   monarchy,  they  have  endeavored   to 

heighten  the  advantages,  or  palliate  the  evils  of  thost 

tforms,  by  placing  in  comparison  the  vices  and  defects  of 

Ithc  rcpnbtican.  and  by  citing  as  specimens  of  the  latter 

Itlve  turbulent  democracies  of  ancient  Greece  and  modern 

I  Italy.     Under  the  confusion  of   names,  it  has  been  an 

'easy  laM:  to  transfer  tu a  republic  observations  applicable 

to  a  democracy  only;  and  among  <ilher«,  the  observation 

that  it  can  never  be  established  but  among  a  small  numtKr 

ot  Ifec^ile,  living  within  a  small  compass  of  territory. 


fOlMDl 


.VATV/lAl.  UAf/r  OF  REPVBUC. 


«3 


Such  a  fallacy  may  have  been  tlie  less  perceived,  as 
most  of  the  popular  governments  of  antiquity  were  of 
Im  llie  democratic  species;  and  even  in  modern 

■fcH  Europe,  to  which  we  owe  the  great  principle 

of  representation,  no  example  is  seen  of  a  government 
•bolly  popular,  and  founded,  at  the  same  lime,  wholly  on 
ihai  principle.*  If  Europe  has  the  merit  of  discovering 
iha  great  mechanical  power  in  jtovcrnmcnt,  by  the 
vmple  agency  o(  which  the  will  of  the  largest  political 
budy  may  be  concentered,  and  its  force  directed  to  any 
object  which  the  public  good  requires,  America  can  claim 
tl\f  merit  of  making  the  discovery  the  basis  of  unmixed 
uul  cxlcnsive  republics.  It  is  only  to  be  lamented  that 
uy  of  her  citizens  should  wish  to  deprive  her  of  the 
additional  merit  of  displaying  its  full  efficacy  in  (he 
tstablisbmcDt  of  the  comprehensive  system  now  under 
her  consideration. 

As  the  natural  limit  of  a  democracy  is  that  distance 
(roQ  the  Central  point  which  will  just  i>ermit  the  most 
Knote  citizens  to  assemble  as  often  as  their  public  func- 
tioDs  demand,  and  will  include  no  greater  number  than 
tan  join  in  those  functions;  so  the  natural  limit  of  a^ 
rcpuhlic  is  that  distance  from  the  cenier  which  will] 
lardy  allow  the  representatives  to  meet  as  often  as  may 
be  necessary  {or  ilic  .idministration  of  public  affairs. 
C»  It  be  said  that  the  limits  of  the  United  States  exceed 
ihii  distance?  It  will  not  be  said  by  those  who  recollect 
tW  the  Atlantic  coast  is  the  longc&t  side  of  the  Union, 
that  iJuring  the  term  of  thirteen  years  the  representatives 
b1  the  States  have  been  almost  continually  assembled, 
i«I  that  the  memhers  from  the  most  distant  States  are 
not  chargeable  with  greater  intermissions  of  attendance 


"uU  tx!  illSicull  la  (Ulr  ninrr  HriHr  tlutn  Km  b«en  done  bv 

kK.  (n  •!■«  fint  vhipltr  ol  hii  "  Uc^inaiitgi  of  New  EnijUnd, 

■»■  i.ni,  .-,  ,  .'j«ai«iivF  (■oreTHiBpnt.     ttrkfljr,  he  onllina  wh>i  he 

'"»    I  I'Eiul  idei.   ot  "caiw]itc«i   vlihoui   Incnfpotaliun " ; 

^JL  At  a-..,.,.,    .  ird,   or   "  ixiiujuett  milti  incuninnlion.   Iiul    vilhoul 

^^^^HwBUbun  "  :  'Bit  )iL  ilie  'IViitanic  or  Engliih  hlei,  in  which  repre- 

^^Vuh«  *u  su  ackDoiiV^i-ol  righi. — Eoiros. 


«4 


t)lM£.VSTONS  OF  UNITED  STATES. 


i1h.U 


T 


than  those  frooi  the  States  in  the  neighborhood  of  Con- 
gress. 

Tim  we  nutyform  a  Juster  eslimate  urilh  regard  lo  this  interest 
ing  subjecl,  lee  ui  man  lo  (he  actual  dimension*  of  (lie  Union. 
The  limii*  as  fiied  by  the  treniy  of  peace,  are :  on  the  <att  the 
AiUniic.  on  (he  sou(h  Die  hlitnde  of  ]l  desren.  on  the  wett  Ih 
Mississippi,  ami  on  the  north  an  irregular  line,  running  in  some 
instances  bcyonil  the  4;tli  ilqiree.  in  others  falling  as  tuw  as  th« 
421I.  The  southern  shore  of  Lake  Erie  lies  bctow  thai  latitude. 
ComputioK  the  distance  between  lite  jist  and  4S(h  degrees, 
amount!!  to  973  common  ntilet;  computing  it  from  31  lo  41 
degrees  to  764^  miles.  Tiiking  the  mean  for  the  distance,  thi 
amount  will  be  868V  miles.  Tlie  mean  distance  from  the  Attanlic 
10  the  Mississippi  does  not  probably  exceed  7^  miles.  On  a  com- 
pnrison  of  (hi*  extent  with  (hat  of  several  counlr>es  in  Euro|)e.  the 
piaciic.tbilitjr  of  rendering  our  sysieni  commensurate  to  ii  appears 
to  be  deinoiiMrabte.  It  is  aol  a  great  deal  liirxer  than  Cernuiny,' 
where  a  diet  representing  ibc  whole  empire  is  continually  assen)' 
Med ;  or  than  I'olani)  before  llie  late  disn.ieml>ertnent.  where  ana(hei 
national  diet  was  the  depository  of  ilie  supreme  juMver.  Pai&ing 
by  CraiKe  and  Sjiain,  we  find  tlul  in  Great  Britain,  interior  as  it 
nuy  be  in  siie,  the  representatives  of  the  nonhern  extremity  of  the 
island  have  as  lar  (o  travel  lo  tlie  national  council  as  will  be 
requireil  of  thoie  of  the  most  remote  parts  nf  the  Union. 

Favorable  as  this  view  of  the  sulijcct  inny  be,  some 
observations  remain  which  will  place  it  in  A  light  ftill 
more  satisfactory. 

L  i\k  the  first  place  it  ie  to  be  remeinbercd  that  the  gen- 
cfal  government  is  not  to  be  charged  with  the  whole 
power  of  making  and  administering  laws.  Its  jurisdic- 
tion is  limited  to  certain  enumerated  objects,  which  con- 
cern all  the  members  of  the  republic,  but  which  are  not 
to  be  attained  by  the  separate  provisions  of  any.  The 
subordinate  governments,  which  can  extend  ihclr  care  to 
all  those  other  objects  which  can  be  separately  provided 
for,  will  retain  their  due  aotbority  and  activity.  Were  it 
proposed  by  the  plan  of  the  Convention  to  abolish  the 
governments  of  (be  particular  States,  its  adversaries 
would  have  norac  ground  for  their  objection;  though  it 
would  not  be  difBcult  In  show  thai  if  they  were  abolithed 
the  general  government   would  be   compelled,   by   the 


EVENTUAL  GROWTH  OF  USIOM. 


H 


principle  of  self. preservation,  to  reinstate  them  la  their 
proper  jurisdiction. 

A  second  observation  to  be  made  U  that  the  itomcdi-^  - 
ate  object  of  the  federal  Constitution  is  co  secure  tl»e 
anion  uf  the  thirteen  priinttire  Suites,  which  we  know  to 
be  practicable;  and  to  add  to  them  such  other  States  asi 
may  arise  in  their  own  bosoms,  or  in  their  neighbor-i 
hoods,  which  we  cannot  doubt  to  be  equally  practicable. 
The  arrangements    that    may   be   necessary   for  those 
angles  and  fractions  of  our  territory  which  lie  on  our 
north  western    frontier    muitt   be    left  to  those    whom 
further  discoveries    and    experience  will   render   more 
equal  to  the  task. 

Let  it  be  rematked,  in  the  third  phicc,  that  the  inter^|^ 
cuurse  throughout  the  Union  will  be  facilitated  by  new] 
improve  me  Dts.  Roads  will  everywhere  be  shortened,' 
aad  kept  in  better  order;  accommodations  for  travelers 
will  be  multiplied  and  meliorated;  an  interior  navigation 
oo  our  eastern  side  will  be  opened  throughout,  or  nearly 
throughout,  the  whole  extent  of  (he  thirteen  States. 
The  communication  between  the  Western  and  Atlantic 
districts,  and  between  different  parts  of  each,  will  be 
rendered  more  and  more  eiisy  by  those  numerous  canals 
with  which  the  tKneficence  of  nature  has  intersected  our 
country,  and  which  art  finds  it  so  little  diflicult  to  connect 
and  complete. 

A  fourth  and  still  more  important  consideration  is 
that,  as  almost  every  State  will,  on  one  side  or  other,  be  y 
a  frontier,  and  will  thus  Hnd,  in  a  regard  to  its  sifely,  an 
mduccment  to  make  «nmc  sacrifices  for  the  sake  of  the 
{cncral  protection;  so  thcStatcs  which  lie  at  the  greatest 
distance  from  the  heart  of  the  Union,  and  which,  of 
coarse,  may  partake  least  of  the  ordinary  circulation  of 
its  benefits,  will  be  at  the  same  time  immediately  conttg- 
Bous  to  foreign  nations,  and  will  consequently  stand,  on 
[Kirticuhir  occasions,  in  greatest  need  of  its  strength  ind 
resources.  It  may  be  inconvenient  for  Georgia,  or  the 
States  forming  our  western  or  northeastern  borders,  to 
send  their  representatives  to  the  seat  of  jovernmenti 


86 


DISUNION  SEP  ROB  A  TED. 


nt^r 


but  tliey  wnuld  Tinti  it  mnrc  %a  to  straKgle  alone  again&C 
an  invading  cDcm}\  or  even  to  sup(mrt  ;ilon«  the  whole 
-  expense  »(  those  precautions  which  may  be  dictated  bjr 
the  neighborhood  of  continual  danger.  If  Ibcy  should 
derive  less  benefit,  therefore,  from  the  Union  in  some 
respects  than  the  less  distant  States,  they  will  derive 
greater  benefit  from  it  tn  other  respects,  and  thus  the 
proper  equilibrium  will  be  maintained  throughout. 

I  sulniiit  to  you.  tny  fellow-citizm^.  ihrse  consiil«raiioiis,  in  (nil 
conlt<Ici>cc  liut  ihc  gitnil  «.-n»c  which  h^x  »u  olieii  marked  your 
decoiont  will  jIIow  ihcni  their  <luc  woglx  .mil  cHrci :  i^ind  ilut  j-ou 
will  never  xuRcr  (iiSiciillJcK,  hawcvcr  [ciTiniiUblc  in  ap|>car;iiic4r.  or 
hnw<-vcr  r^iihion.iblc  the  error  on  which  ihcy  may  be  luunOctl,  to 
drive  yiiu  into  (he  gloomy  and  periloui  icenc  iolo  whkh  the  advo- 

Icntcs  (or  diMnion  would  conduct  )xiu.  Huirhen  nol  lo  the 
unnaluml  voice  which  tells  you  ih.it  the  people  a(  America,  knit 
logedicr  at  (hey  arc  by  so  niany  cords  of  affection,  can  no  longvf 
live  losclhcr  a«  nirmhrrs  ol  Ihe  same  family :  can  no  longer  cnn^ 
tinue  die  mutual  K^srdUni  o(  their  tiiuiual  happiness;  can  no 
longer  lie  fcllovr-eitiiens  of  one  );rrai,  respectable  and  RourUtiing 
eniprre.  Hearken  not  to  ihc  vincc  whKh  pi;(uUndy  tells  you  thai 
ihc  (orm  of  govrmment  recommcti<l«l  (or  your  adoption  is  x 
novelty  in  Ihe  poKtical  world  :  that  it  lias  itevrr  yet  Ivad  a  place  In 
the  ilieuries  ol  (lie  wililot  projector* ;  thai  it  rashly  aliempt* 
what  it  is  impossible  lo  accomplish.  No,  my  CMinlrymen.  shut 
yoar  ears  against  this  unhallowed  language.  Shut  your  hearts 
against  the  poison  which  It  conveys  ;  the  kindred  blooil  which  Aowi 
in  the  veins  ol  American  ciiiieni,  llie  mingled  blood  which  (hey 
have  sbcil  in  iic(cnse  o(  their  sacred  rights,  consecrate  their 
Union,  and  excite  horror  at  the  idea  of  their  becomiiis  aliens 
rivnis.  enemies.  And  if  novelties  arc  to  be  shunned,  Ixlirve  ran 
be  nmsi  alarming  ol  all  novdiies,  the  moat  wild  o(  all  projects,  ilM 
St  rash  of  all  aiierapts,  is  that  of  tending  us  in  pieces,  in  oidei 
I  preserve  our  libeilies  and  promote  our  happiness.  But  why  ii 
ibe  experiment  oi  an  extended  republic  to  be  rejecled.  merely 
because  it  may  comprise  what  is  new  ?  Is  it  not  the  glory  of  the 
pcO|>le  of  America,  that,  whilst  they  have  paii)  a  decent  regard  to 
the  opinions  of  former  times  and  nihcr  nitions.  they  have  no! 
suffered  a  bhnd  venenlion  for  antiquity,  (or  cntiom.  or  (or  names, 
to  nvemitc  Ihe  siijjgestinns  of  thru  oivn  goixl  snise.  the  knosvlrilgl 
tA  ihcir  own  situation,  and  die  lessons  ol  their  own  ciprricnce  \ 
To  this  iBBtdy  spirit,  posterity  wilt  be  indd>tcd  lor  the  pouenion 


KESUtr  OF  THE  RayQLVTlQU. 


«7 


will  iSc  wurlU  (or  ilti-  example,  of  ihc  numerous  innovations  dli- 
plijtd  on  ihc  Ainericaii  Uitattr,  in  fav-oi  of  |>iivaic  righis  and 
fuhlic  lu{>(Hnni.  Had  no  iiiipDi'inni  >icp  l>ci:n  ukcn  by  ilie 
kiiUra  o(  ilic  RevoluiKin  fur  Mtitcli  a  |)ii:c«lcn(  couM  not  be  dis- 
cormd.  no  guvcmincnt  dtablislietl  o[  vrliich  un  ciiicl  model  did 
DM  ptoeni  Kielf.  Ilie  pcupk- of  the  United  Slam  might,  at  llils 
moment,  have  been  nuniliercd  amoriK  llie  niclatichuty  rictiias 
«( Briiguiittd  counciU,  niu^i  Jt  bcM  Itai'c  been  laboring  under  tlie 
■ciKlit  of  some  of  thotc  lonn*  which  tuve  cru!ilic<l  ilic  Ubalica  of 
ihc  lot  of  mankind,  litppity  for  America,  tiappily,  we  Inisl,  (or 
Hw  whole  huin.tn  race,  ihcy  pursued  a  ii«w  and  ntore  noble  course. 
Thty  jocoaijiiiiihcd  a  revolution  whicli  Ims  no  parallel  in  the  annals 
•I  Iniinaa  locicly.  They  tcarcil  the  {^brlci  of  KovcniincniN  wliieh 
hm  no  nxntel  on  ilte  f^cc  of  (he  globe.  Ttiey  formed  the  design  • 
id  ■  |[iat  Confcdom<:y.  which  it  ii  incuniticiit  on  ilicir  succeuors 
•B  mi|irovv  aitd  iicrpeiuiUc.  U  their  works  bciray  int  perfect  ion », 
>t  Hundcr  at  ihc  (cwnesH  of  llieni.  \{  they  erred  nimt  in  the 
'ruciure  of  ilie  Union,  this  was  the  work  most  difficult  lo  be 
occiucd  :  this  is  (he  work  which  hat  been  new  niuilelcd  hy  the  act 
ttl  four  Convention,  mid  it  b  tlut  iict  on  winch  you  nre  now  to 
■kibcnilc  and  to  decide.  1>U&I.IUS. 


No,  IS. 


itmdtftmfm  Jf9HMl,  DKcnUr  1. 1]47.> 


Hamilton. 


UKFECTS  OF  THE  PRKSKNT  CONFF-DKRA- 
TION  IN  ITS  DEPENDENCE  ON  THE  STATE 
GOVERNMENTS, 

TW  inmjitituer  «•/  '*f  ifm/fdirali&it  a  utf-n-iJtut  truti—XitUJk  »J 
iBili»x  nttii-nal  hamilintifH — CmlmJitlriy  tonJml  «f  tf-f.-utt  <>/  Ike 
•^ttitmHtit — Xtttuily  t/a  gvirrnoitHl  that  ittiUtUI  en  iuMvidn-tU^A 
fr/THwifttt  tilling  iu>  /V  italf  gvt^mintnfi  iwf^nr/-  *«/  an  aUitiHtt — 
F.fHtm*t  ragt  In  Earaft  frr  Itagnri — A  liai:ut  wriut  n  teaftJ/ralt 
fisrmmiitl  ia  Amfriia — Dilltiittiaii  ititma  a  pntmrntal  acting  tn  a 
l>Ut  and  a»t  ^tHitg  it  iii£tiiltiali—'Cami*f»  ittnrit  imtffr<liial  /■> 
(#Mn  ektiintn  fa  tit  Utien — Ori^a  af  g^itnminl—C*»tri/utiil  Im- 
iiiu]/  rf  all  tfn/i4tTit(Up^Niili«tia(  ittpi  mil  nti  tf  m/tre/i/  fy  ilafi 
tntfWHfini —  J*j>i-ii>(u  attira  ef  ikt  ikirttta  italti — Imf*teme  «•/  llu 
Cat^nit—  KxamfU  ff  tki  vnriatu  iMti. 

T.1  tAe  J'eapie  of  Ihe  State  </  New  York: 

In  tlie  ciiurse  of  the  preceding  papei^  I  have  enilraTored.  my 
hUuw-ciliscn*.  to  pl,tM  Itefwre  you  in  a  clear  and  convincing  liglii. 


88 


CONFEDERATION  iNSUFFlCtENT. 


I]t«.Ift 


iIm  importance  of  Union  to  your  pi>liiic-il  safety  nnd  happincM. 
have  unfoUlcd  to  you  a  coniplicaiion  ol  (Uitgcfft  to  which  you 
would  be  exposed.  Hhoiild  you  jtetmil  that  ucted  knot  which  binds 
Ihe  people  of  America  logrlh^r  lo  be  sewrcit  or  diHOtved  by 
ambttion  or  by  ar.irice.  by  jentoiity  or  i>y  minrepreKntaiian.  In 
the  scqitel  o[  Ihe  inquiry  through  which  I  proprw*  lo  nccom|Mny 
you.  ihe  ttTiths  intFiide<l  lo  be  inculcated  will  receive  (nriher  con- 
firntatioD  from  facts  and  Aiguincnts  hitherto  unn<>liccil.  If  thi 
lOitd  over  which  you  will  »lili  hate  lo  [ia»>  sliould  in  some  p(ace« 
appear  lo  you  tedious  or  irkcome,  you  will  recollect  Ih^il  you  are  iu 
quest  o(  iiilorinjiion  on  A  subject  ihc  niosl.nMMitcntuus  which  can 
engage  llie  attention  o(  a  free  people,  tlut  Ihe  field  through  which 
you  have  lo  irarcl  i»  in  ii»e(l  spacious,  and  that  the  diSiculiies  o( 
Ihe  journey  hare  been  iinnecessiiirily  increased  by  Ihe  maies  with 
which  soplii&ity  has  beset  the  way.  It  wdt  b«  my  airn  lo  remove 
the  obf tacle«  from  ymir  proKrcti  in  as  compendioa*  a  manner  as  Jt 
can  be  done,  without  soctificlng  utility  to  dispatch. 

In  pur&uaiKC  uf  the  plan  which  1  have  laid  down  for 
the  discussion  of  the  subject,  the  point  next  in  order  to 
be  examined  is  the  "iiixulTiL-icncy  of  the  present  Con 
federation  lo  the  preservation  of  the  Union,"  It  may 
perhaps  be  asked  what  need  there  tsof  reasoning  or  proof 
to  illustrate  a  position  which  is  not  either  cunlroverted  or 
doubted,  to  which  the  undcrsiandings  and  feelings  of  all 
classes  of  men  assent,  and  which  in  substance  is  admitted 
by  the  opponents  as  well  as  by  the  friends  of  the  new 
Constitution.  It  must  in  truth  be  acknowledged  that, 
howcrer  these  may  differ  in  other  re^peicts,  they  in 
genera)  appear  to  harmonixe  in  this  sentiment,  at  least, 
that  there  are  material  imperfections  in  our  national  sys- 
tem, ami  that  something  is  iiet:essary  lo  be  dune  to 
rescue  us  from  impending  anarchy.  The  facts  that  sup- 
port this  opinion  are  no  longer  objects  of  speculation. 
They  have  forced  themselves  upon  the  sensibility  of  tbi 
people  at  large,  and  have  at  length  extorted  from  thos< 
wliose  mistaken  policy  has  had  the  principal  share  in  pre- 
ciptiating  the  extremity  at  which  we  are  arrived,  . 
reluctant  confession  of  the  reality  of  those  defects  in  th 
scheme  of  our  federal  government,  which  have  been  Ion, 
pointed  out  and  regretted  by  the  intelligent  friends  of  the 
Union. 


JfATlOffAL  UUMtUATlON. 


«9 


Wc  nuy  tndeml  with  proprieiy  be  said  lo  have  readied  almost 
■he  lui  sta^e  ol  njilioiMl  huniiliaiion.  Thcic  is  scsrcety  any- 
thing ihat  can  wouikI  llie  piidc  oi  degrade  the  character  of 
an  iiKtcpmikni  nation  which  wc  do  not  cupericncc.  Are  (here 
mgageinents  to  the  peTforiniiiice  of  which  we  are  held  by  cvccy  lie 
rdpectaMc  nmonK  men  ?  ThcK  are  the  lubjects  of  coniUnt  and 
iiabhohlag  vwlalMHi.  Do  we  owe  debts  lo  lorcigncra  and  to  our 
ti<*n  dbMni  contracted  in  n  limc  of  imminent  petil  (or  Ihc  procr- 
raiioa  of  uur  pohilcal  existence  f  ThcM  rcitijiin  w  ithoul  any 
proper  or  utufactory  proviiioii  for  iheir  ditch^irKe.  Hare  wc 
valuable  Inriloria  and  inipotiant  posts  in  the  pokt<M^ion  o(  a 
(ofc^  power  which,  by  express  stipulations,  ought  long  since  lo 
have  been  Mitfendeied  ?  'I'tieic  are  siitl  retained,  to  (he  prejudice 
of  our  inleresls.  not  teis  Uun  of  our  ii{;h(s.  Arc  we  in  a  condition 
lo  Trwni  Of  lo  repel  ihe  aggression  ?  W'c  have  neither  iioops,  nor 
Irieasurj',  nor  gorcmnwnt.*  Arc  we  even  in  a  condition  lo  leiiiuii- 
Mraic  with  dignity?  The  fuM  imputations  on  our  own  failh,  in 
respect  to  the  same  (rejiiy,  ought  liist  to  be  lemuvcd.  Ate  we 
entiltcd  by  nalutc  and  compact  lo  a  free  lunicipation  in  the  navi> 
gation  of  (he  Mississippi?  Spain  cxcluiies  us  from  it.  Is  public 
credit  an  indispensable  resource  in  time  ot  public  danger  t  Wc 
seem  to  have  abandoned  its  cause  as  de«pera(e  aiitl  irrclrievable. 
I»  commerce  of  importance  lo  national  wealth  ?  Ours  is  at  ihe 
lowrst  point  of  drclcnston.  Is  re*prctability  in  the  eye*  of  foreign 
powers  a  safeguard  aKaitiiU  (orei]jn  encroa<hnieiii»  ?  The 
imbccihly  of  our  goremmeiK  even  forluds  ihcm  lo  (real  with  us. 
Oar  am1>assadon  abnxad  aic  the  mere  p.igeants  o(  nitiiifc 
soTctrtgniy.  Is  a  violent  anil  unnatural  decrease  in  ihc  value 
ul  land  a  symptom  of  national  <hvliete  *  'I'lie  price  ol  iiiipiufcij 
buHl  in  most  pans  of  the  country  is  much  lower  than  can  be 
accounted  for  by  (he  quantily  ol  w^stc  land  at  maikel,  and  can 
only  be  fully  explained  faylh.K  want  of  private  and  public  confi- 
dence, which  is  so  alarmingly  prevalent  antong  all  tanks,  and 
which  has  a  <lirecl  (endency  to  itepteciaie  properly  of  every  kind. 
Is  private  crc<l<(  the  friend  and  patron  of  industry?  Thni  most 
mefol  kind  which  retalcs  (o  bonnwing  and  lending  is  leduccd 
within  the  narrowest  limits,  and  this  still  mote  from  an  opinion  of 
insecurity  than  from  the  scarcity  of  nrnney.  To  shorten  an 
cnnnctalian  of  patliculais  which  can  afford  ndther  pleasuic  nor 
iwiracfion.  it  may  in  general  be  demanilcd.  what  indication  is  there 
•f  nalional  disortlrr,  poverty,  and  insignificance  that  couUI  Irefatl  a 
coauaimity  so  pectiKarly  Messed  with  naiut^d  advantages  as  we 

*  "  I  mean  (m  the  Union."— PuBLI Vs. 


90 


IMPHRlUSi  IN  iUPBRlO, 


[ao.u 


are.  which  does  mM  lonn  a  part  of  the  dark  catalogue  oJ  our  publk 
mis(otiuncs  ? 

'ibis  is  the  melancholx  Mluution  lo  whkh  w-c  tiitvc  been  brought 
b]r  those  v-ery  maxtins  and  council*  which  would  now  <klcr  u» 
ftan>  adopling  the  propojed  Coiiviiiution  :  aoii  nlncli,  not  content 
with  having  conduclrtl  u»  lo  llic  brink  o(aprecipke,  »ccin  resolved 
to  pluiige  us  into  the  abjru  that  aw^ita  ui  below.  Here,  nvf 
couniryiiien,  impelled  by  every  motive  th;il  ought  to  influeficc  an 
enlightened  people,  let  us  make  a  fiiin  stumi  for  oui  safety,  out 
iranquilliiy,  our  dignity,  our  reputation.  I^t  us  at  lasi  bt«ak  the 
Utui  chaim  which  )i4S  too  long  seduced  u>  fioai  ttie  paths  ol 
felicity  and  pra»prriiy. 

It  is  true,  us  has  been  before  observed,  that  facU,  too 
KtubtMrn  to  be  resisted,  have  produced  a  specie*  of 
general  assent  to  the  abstract  proposition  that  there 
exist  materiiil  (icfe<:ti>  iit  our  national  system:  but  the 
osefuliiess  of  the  coiiccs»>inii,  on  the  part  of  the  old 
adversaries  of  federal  measures,  is  destroyed  by  a  stren- 
uous opposition  to  a  remedy,  upon  the  only  principles 
that  am  give  it  a  chance  of  success.  While  they  iidmit 
(hat  the  goveinment  of  the  United  States  is  destitute  of 
energy,  they  contend  against  conferring  upon  it  those 
powers  which  are  requisite  to  supply  that  energy. 
Tbejr  seem  still  to  aim  at  thinjjs  repugnant  and 
irreconcilable;  at  an  augmentation  of  federal  authority, 
without  a  diminution  of  St.ite  authority;  at  sovereignty 
in  (he  Union,  and  complete  independence  in  the  mem- 
bers. They  still,  in  fine,  seem  to  cherish  with  blind 
devotion  the  political  monster  of  an  imprrium  in  imfitn^. 
This  renders  a  full  display  of  the  principal  defects  of  the 
Confederation  necessary,  in  order  to  show  that  the  evils 
we  experience  do  not  proceed  from  minute  or  partial  im- 
perfections, but  from  fundamental  errors  in  tlic  structure 
of  the  building,  which  cannot  be  amended  otherwise  than 
by  an  alteration  in  the  first  principles  and  main  pillars  of 
the  fabric. 

The  great  and  radical  vice  in  the  construction  of  the 
existing  Confederation  is  in  the  principle  of  I.F.GISLA- 
TION  for  STATES  or  GOVERN .MENTS,  in  their  COR. 
PORATE    or   COLLECTIVE    CAPACITIES,  and  as 


MmUIob} 


AIUAAC£S  Br    TitEATV. 


9" 


contradistinguished  from  the  INDIVIDUALS  of  whicli 
l/icy  consist.  Though  this  principle  does  not  nm  through 
aJI  the  powers  delegated  to  the  Union,  yet  it  pervades 
and  xoTcrns  those  on  which  the  efficacy  of  the  rest 
dcncoils.  Except  as  to  the  rule  of  apportionment,  the 
tJmtn)  Siiites  has  an  indcrinite  discretion  to  make 
requisitions  for  men  and  money;  but  they  have  no 
authority  to  raise  either  by  rcgulation-t  rxteii<linj{  to  the 
indtvidual  citizens  uf  America.  The  consequence  of  this 
is  that,  tliotigh  in  theory  their  resolutions  concerning 
itbose  ubjccts  are  taws  constitutionally  binding  on  the 
tnemtiers  of  the  Union,  yet  in  practice  they  are  mere 
rccommendatiuns  which  the  States  observe  or  disregard 
at  their  option. 

It  is  a  singular  instance  of  the  capriciousness  of  the 
homan  mind  that,  after  alt  the  admonitions  we  have  had 
frum  experience  on  this  headi  there  shutiUI  sttll  lie  found 
mea  who  object  to  the  new  Constitution  for  deviating 
tmm  a  principle  which  has  been  found  the  hanc  of  the 
old,  and  which  is  in  itself  evidently  incompatible  with 
the  idea  of  uovr-KsuKNT;  a  princi[)le,  in  short,  which,  if 
it  is  to  be  executed  at  all,  must  substitute  the  violent  and 
sanguinary  agency  of  the  sword  for  the  mild  influence  of 
tlm  magistracy. 

There  is  nothing  absurd  or  impracticable  in  the  idea  of 
a  league  or  alliance  between  independent  nations  for 
certain  defined  puq>oses  precisely  stated  in  a  treaty 
regulating  all  the  detaiU  of  time,  place,  circumstance, 
and  quantity;  leaving  nothing  to  future  discretion;  and 
depending  for  its  execution  on  the  good  faith  of  the 
parties.  Compacts  of  this  kind  exist  among  all  civitizerl 
nations,  subject  to  the  usual  vicissitudes  of  peace  and 
war.  of  observance  and  non-observance,  as  the  interests 
Of  passions  of  the  contracting  powers  dictate.  In  the 
early  part  of  the  present  century  Uicrc  was  an  epidemical 
mgc  in  Europe  for  this  species  of  compacts,  from  which 
the  politicians  of  the  iimc«  fondly  hoped  for  benefits 
which  were  never  realized.  With  a  view  to  establishing 
the  equilibrium  of  power  and  the  peace  of  that  part  of  the 


9>       NATlOlfAL  AVTHORITY  OVEtt  C/TIZE.VS.     IHo-K 


vrorld,  all  (he  rexoufces  of  negotiation  irere  exhausted, 
aad  triple  and  quadruple  alliances  were  formed;  but  they 
were  scarcely  formed  before  tlicjr  were  broken,  giving  an 
instructive  but  afHirting  lesion  to  m.inkind,  how  little 
dependence  is  to  be  pbccd  on  treaties  which  ha»c  no 
other  sanction  than  the  obligations  of  good  f.iith,  and 
which  oppose  general  considerations  of  peace  and  justice 
to  the  impulse  of  any  immediate  interest  or  passion.' 

If  the  parliciilar  States  in  this  country  are  disposed  to 
stand  in  a  similar  relation  lo  each  other,  and  to  drop  Uie 
project  of  a  general  DiscReriONAitY  svpekintendenck, 
the  scheme  wouhl  indeed  be  pernicious,  and  would  entail 
upon  us  all  the  mischiefs  which  have  been  enumerated 
under  the  first  head ;  but  it  would  have  the  merit  of  being, 
at  least,  consistent  and  practicable.  Abandoning  all 
views  towardsaconfederate  government,  this  would  bring 
us  to  a  simple  alliance  offensive  ami  defensive;  and  would 
place  us  in  a  situation  to  be  altL-rnutivc  friends  and 
enemies  of  each  other,  as  our  mutual  jealousies  and  rival- 
ships,  nourished  by  the  intrigues  of  foreign  nations, 
should  prescribe  to  us. 

Uul  if  we  arc  unwilling  to  be  placed  in  this  perilous 
situaiitm;  if  we  still  will  adhere  to  the  design  of  a  national 
government,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  of  a  superin- 
tending power,  under  the  direction  of  a  common  councd. 
we  must  resolve  to  incorporate  into  our  plan  those 
ingredients  which  may  be  considered  as  fonning  the 
cliaractcrislii:  difference  between  a  league  and  a  govern- 
ment; we  must  extend  the  authority  of  the  Union  lo  the 
persons  of  the  citixcns — the  only  proper  nbjecu  of 
government. 

Government  implies  the  power  of  making  laws.  It  is 
rssential  to  the  idea  of  a  law  that  it  lir  attended  with  a 
sanction;  or,  In  other  words,  a  penalty  or  punishment  for 


'  An  Mlramc  enrnfle  of  the  Ml»eo(  ttr«l>e«  i»  firniaheil  In  Xhr  nc«nl 
Tcnlalioni  n(  Dikoiatch,  \ty  wlikLh  li  m%\  U-<'wa  tkti  ihc  Oemiku  Em|iiie, 
M-liHe  \irmni  liy  th*  Droil'iiiiil  l<>  Auuto  *f>:I  UtXy.  \\»A  m  l!ie  uiait  lira* 
■  wcrri  Itraiy  u-ith  Kxwa.  vhich  nnllUiwI  itw  (nu«l  aucBliil  prmitioni 
of  llie  compatrl. — Eihion. 


bafllM) 


BXFOKCEMEXT  OA  LAO'S. 


93 


ilisobeOtence.  If  there  be  no  penalty  annexnl  to  dis- 
obeditrnre,  the  reKulutiuns  or  coinniamls  which  [irctcnO 
to  b«  laws  will,  in  (act,  amount  tu  nuthing;  more  ttian 
advice  or  recommendation.  This  penalty,  whatever  it 
nujr  be,  can  niily  be  inllicted  in  two  ways:  by  the  agency 
of  the  courts  and  ministers  of  justice,  or  by  military  force; 
by  the  cokkcion  of  the  magistracy,  or  by  the  coercion' 
of  armt.  Tbe  firitt  kind  can  evidently  apply  only  lu  men; 
the  last  kind  must,  of  necessity,  be  employed  a([ainat 
bodies  politic,  or  communities,  or  States.  It  is  evident 
tliat  tliere  ix  no  process  of  a  court  by  which  the  observ- 
ance of  the  laws  can,  in  the  last  resort,  be  enforced. 
Sentences  may  be  denounced  against  them  for  violations 
of  their  duty;  but  thc^e  sentences  can  only  be  carried 
into  execution  by  the  sword.  In  an  association  where 
the  general  authority  is  confined  to  (he  collective  bodies 
nf  tbe  communities  that  compute  it,  every  breach  of  the 
laws  must  involve  a  state  of  war;  and  military  execution 
mu^t  become  the  only  instrument  of  civil  obedience. 
Such  a  state  of  things  can  certainly  not  deserve  the  name 
of  government,  nor  would  any  prudent  man  choose  to 
commit  his  happiness  to  it. 

There  was  a  lime  when  we  were  told  that  breaches  by 

the  States  of  the   regulations  of   the   federal  authority 

were  not  to  be  expected ;  that  a  sense  of  common  interest 

wtMikl  preside  over  the  conduct  of  the  respective  meiit- 

Lbcrs,  and  would  bcftet  a  full  compliance  with  all  the  con- 

fstitutional  requisitions  of  the  Union.     This  language,  at 

the  present  day,  would  appear  as  wild  as  a  great  part  of 

what  we  now  hear  from  the  same  quarter  will  be  thought, 

when  wc  shall   have  received  further  lessons  from  that 

L  best   oracle    of    wisdom,   experience.      It  at   all    times 

flMtraycd   an   ignorance   of   the    true   springs   by   which 

humao  conduct  is  actuated,  and  belied  the  original  in- 

ilucenients  to  the  estahlt»hment  of  civil  power.     Why  has 

government  been  instituted  at  all?     Because  the  passions 

III  mm  will  not  conform  to  the  dictates  of  reason  and 

jasiice,    without  constraint.      Has  it  been   found   that 

bodies  of  men  act  wKh  more  rectitude  or  greater  disin- 


M 


CENTRIFUGAL    TENDEXCIES. 


Wa.lS 


teresteilness  than  iiKlividual.'.?  The  contrary  of  Uiis  li;ts 
bcea  inferred  by  all  accurate  observers  of  the  conduct  of 
nMnkitid;  and  the  inference  is  founded  upon  obvious 
rvatuns.  Kf;g;ird  tu  rc|>uiaiioti  liiis  a  leis  active  inlluencc 
wlien  the  infamy  of  a  bad  action  is  to  be  divided  among  a 
number,  than  when  it  is  to  fall  singly  upon  one.  A  spirit 
of  faction,  which  is  apt  to  mingle  its  poixon  in  the  deliber- 
ations of  all  bodies  o(  men,  wilt  often  hurry  the  persons 
of  whom  tlicy  arc  composed  into  improprieties  and  ci- 
cesKS  for  which  they  would  btuAh  in  u  private  cajMcity. 

In  addition  to  all  this  there  is  in  the  nature  of  suvercitin 
power  an  impatience  of  control,  that  disposes  those  who 
are  inve«tetl  with  the  exen:i«e  of  it  to  look  wilh  an  evil 
eye  upon  all  external  attempts  to  restrain  or  direct  its 
operations.  From  this  ii|)irit  it  happens  that,  in  every 
political  a»»ociittion  which  is  formed  u[>»n  the  principle 
of  uniting  in  a  common  interest  a  number  of  lesser 
sovereignties,  there  will  be  found  a  kind  of  eccentric 
tendency  in  the  subordinate  or  inferior  orbs,  by  the 
operation  of  which  there  will  be  a  p«r|MMual  effort  in  each 
to  lly  off  from  the  commua  center.  This  tendency  is  not 
difficult  to  be  accounted  for.  ft  has  its  origin  in  the 
love  of  power.  Power  controlled  or  abridged' iit  almost 
always  (he  rival  and  enemy  of  that  power  by  which  it  is 
controlled  or  abridged.  This  simple  proposition  will 
teach  us  how  liitle  reason  there  is  to  expect  that  the 
persons  intrusted  with  the  administration  of  the  afitairs 
of  the  particular  members  of  a  confederacy  will  at  all 
times  be  ready,  with  perfect  good-hunior  and  an  unbiasetl 
regard  to  the  public  weal,  to  execute  the  resolutions  or 
decrees  of  the  general  authority.  The  reverse  uf  this 
results  from  the  constitution  of  human  nature. 

If,  therefore,  the  measures  of  the  Confederacy  cannot 
be  executed  without  the  intervention  of  the  particular 
administrations,  there  will  be  little  prospect  uf  their 
being  executed  at  all.  The  rulers  of  the  respective 
members,  whether  ilicy  have  a  constilutiuual  right  lo  do 
it  or  not,  will  undertake  to  judge  of  the  propriety  uf  tlie 
measures  themselves,     'i'hey  will  consider  the  cunforuiity 


BuBUloal 


SrA  TES  DELA  V  LEGISLA  TWtf. 


95 


of  the  ihinK  propoecd  or  required  to  their  immediate 
interests  or  aims;  the  momentary  conveniences  or  in- 
conveniences that  woutd  attend  its  adoption.  All  tliis 
will  l>c  done;  and  in  a  spirit  of  interested  and  suspicious 
scrutiny,  without  that  knowledge  of  national  circum- 
sunoes  and  reasons  of  slate  which  is  essential  to  a  right 
judgment,  and  with  that  strong  predilection  in  favor  of 

r local  objet^ts  which  can  hardly  fail  to  mislead  the  de- 
cituon.  The  same  process  must  be  repeated  in  every 
member  of  which  the  body  is  constituted;  and  the  execu- 
tion of  the  plans,  framed  by  the  councils  of  the  whole, 
wilt  always  fluctuate  on  the  discretion  of  the  ill-informed 
aiul  prejudiced  opinion  of  every  part.  Those  who  have 
been  conversant  in  the  proceedings  of  popular  assem- 
blies; who  have  seen  ho;w  difficult  it  often  is,  where 
there  is  no  exterior  pressure  of  circumstances,  to  bring 
them  to  liarmonious  resolutions  on  important  points,  will 
readily  conceive  how  impossible  it  must  be  to  induce  a 
namber  of  such  assemblies,  deliberating  at  a  distance 
from  each  other,  at  dilferent  times,  and  under  different 
impressions,  long  to  co-operate  in  the  same  views  and 
pursuits. 

In  our  case,  the  eoocurtcnce  of  ihiiteen  distrnei  sovereign  wills 
is  requiuie,  under  lire  CinfRlftalion,  to  ihc  comptcic  exccuiiiin  a( 
every  important  measure  I h At  proceeds  from  llic  Union.     It  lias 
happmeil  as  was  to  have  been  fotescen.    The  measures  of  the 
Jiiion  have  not  been  executed ;  the  delinquencies  of  the  St.ites 
have,  sifp  by  step,  malured  themselves  to  an  exireme,  which  has 
ii  lenpb  .iireiird  \\\  the  wheels  o(  the  national  goveramcnt  and 
iiEht  tlicm  lo  an  awful  stand.     Congress  at  thi*  lirne  scarcely 
cs  the  means  ol  keeping  up  the  forms  of  administration,  till 
he  Suies  ean  have  lime  to  agree  upon  a  tnoic  substantial  subsii- 
rtatc  (or  tiie  present  shadow  of  a  federal  govemmcni.    Things  di<l 
not  come  to  this  desperate  extremily  at  once.    Tlie  causes  which 
K»vc  been  ^)ecified  produced  al  firsi  only  unequal  atui  dispropor- 
tinnaie  drgrces  of  compliance  will)  the  requisitions  ol  live  Union. 
The  greater  deficiencies  of  some  States  furnished  the  ptciesl  of 
wnmpl^  ami  the  teinpiaiion  of  intcresc  to  the  complying  or  lo  the 
1  iqucnl  Slaie*.     Why  shouh)  we  ilo  more  in  proportion 

I  <     r-  who  are  embadccd  with  us  in  the  same  political  voyage  ? 

Wti|  shook!  we  oonseni  to  bear  hmmc  than  our  proper  share  of  the 


COffFEDERACIES  OF  ANTIQUITY.  Wo.  W 


common  Inirilen  ?  T^vne  were  «i^»lionf  whkli  Iniinan  tidflsh* 
ncss  could  not  withstand,  and  wlikh  even  &p«cul4livc  men.  who 
looked  forward  To  remote  contequences,  coaUl  no:,  wilhoul  besila* 
lion,  combat.  Exch  State,  yielding  to  the  persuasive  roicc  of 
immediate  interest  or  convenience,  h*%  succcstiveljr  wiltidiawn  its 
siippon.  till  tlie  (tail  ami  tottering  edifice  seems  ready  to  (all  ujmd 
out  heads  and  to  cnuh  us  beneath  its  ruins. 

PttBLfOS, 


No.  l6.  (JVfW  IV4 /1i>-ivf,  UMrnliir.  «,  ijlf.)  Hamilloo. 

DEFECT    OF    THE     CONFEDERATION    IN    ITS 
INABILITY   TO    COERCE. 

Tht  fnly  i^mililutiaital  rrnidy  agaiml  dttiiifiUMi  iMri  ii  forct — 
/mfiitiUlitjf  »/ iMrciaH — SyiifalAy  ttlaytn  Ikt  ttaitt — Pfttailt  affrti 
ff  lUM  ta  foreign  nathm — A  fritatU  JiitttmH»n  gf  tkr  Uuini — 
OnAlttiiiMJ  ef  itatii  inffrrtiag  a  •Mii&nalgtvtrnirul—Cfriaiutxrf 
<i//;e/uratiffn  inU  a  mmlary  i//iftli$m — fmfviiiUltly  efftfrrilg  tie  targtf 
ilaM — Military  larrtiea  a  ngnal  Jgr  lin'l  xui- —  7'ir  Hfw  gfitrtimttti 
mttit  titmJ  tit  filttmi — Slair  rfiditoiut  r/ lutitiial  latp —  Tit  Jistiiulirm 
tilavfti  HV»-i^mf/iaaie  itiiJ attiit  riiiilatut—  Tiki  nitr  tfnilitulttn  fult 
ilaUmUumt  in  ill  trtu  lighl—Bm^yniHi  of  itate  agrnfiii  ty  H*tinul 
gevtyiimrHl — Na  frriH  tf  gtvttnmtnl  la/t  /rtta  m^itliat. 

To  tht  Peopie  of  the  Slate  0/  New  Yark: 

The  icndencjr  of  the  principle  ot  legislation  for  States, 
nr  roinmunilif X,  in  their  political  ('.uj>;icitie$,  as  tl  has 
l)£cn  exemplified  by  the  expcrtiuent  we  have  made  of  it, 
is  equally  attested  by  the  events  ivhich  have  bcfallcD  all 
other  governments  of  the  eonfederate  kind,  uf  which  we 
have  any  account,  in  exact  proportion  to  its  prevalence 
in  those  syMem«.  The  cnnfirmalions  of  Ihitt  fact  will  b« 
worthy  nf  a  distinct  an<)  p;irticular  examination.  I  sliall 
ujntcnt  myself  with  barely  observios  here  that,  uf  all 
la,  the  confedprai-it-s  of  aniiqin'ly   which  history 

Rn.lt,  has  h;)ndcd  down  tou:^  llie  l.ycian  ;ind.\chKan 

leagues,  as  far  .is  there  remain  vestiges  of  ihcm,  appcir 
to  hai'e  been  most  free  from  the  fetters  of  that  mistaken 
principle,  and  were  accordingly  iboM  wluch  have  best 


i      COK/tao.V  OF  STATES  DIFFICULT, 


9T 


ddcnred,  and  have  most  liberally  received,  the  applaud* 
ins  uRrsgcs  of  political  writers. 

Hit  exceptionable  principle  may,  as  truly  as  emphat- 
iuiif,  be  styled  the  parent  of  anarchy:  it  hav  been  seen 
thitdeiiiiqueDcic&  io  the  members  of  the  Union  are  its 
lutuTjland  nccc&sary  offspring;  and  that,  whcneTcrthey 
tupiicD,  tile  only  conxtituiioiial  remedy  is  force,  and  the 
lamMliate  effect  of  the  use  of  it,  civil  war. 

It  remains  to  inquire  how  far  so  odious  an  engine  of 
Eovemment,  in  its  application  to  us,  would  even  be  capa- 
We  of  answering  its  end.     U  there  should  not  be  a  large 
ana)r  constantly  at  the  disposal  of  the  national  goTcrn- 
omt,  it  would  cither  not  be  able  to  employ  force  at  all, 
0'.  wlien  this  could  be  done,  it  would  amount  to  a  war 
'•«t*MH  parts  of  the  Confederacy  concerning  the  infrac- 
tions of  a  league,  in  which  the  strongest   combination 
"tialJ  tic  most  likely  to  prevail,  whether  it  consisted  of 
ihotc  who  supported  or  of  those  who  resisted  the  general 
SPtiiorily. '    It  would  rarely  happen  that  the  deli iK|ucm:y 
lobe  redressed  would  be  confined  to  a  single  member, 
■nJ  if  there  were  more  tii.in  one  who  had  neglected  their 
'lit]',  similarity  nf  situation  would  induce  tlieiu  tu  unile 
lOr  common   defense.     Independent   of  this  motive  of 
TVjKilliy,  if  a  large  and  inHuential  Slate  should  happen 
Iv  be  the  aggres:iing  menit>er,  it  would  cutninonly  have 
'eight  enough  with  its  neighbors  to  win  over  some  of 
Ibcm  as  associates  to  its  cause.     Specious  arguments  of 
ilaagcr  tu  the  common  liberty  could  easily  be  contrived; 
I>l'"'!>it>le  excuses  for  the  deficiencies  of  the  party  could, 
viiti'iul  diHi  :ulty,  be  invented  to  alarm  the  apprehensions, 
inSame  the  passions,  and  conciliate  the  good-will,  even 
of  those  States  which   were  not  chargeable  with   any 
violation  or  omission  of  duty.     This  would  he  the  more 
iikely  tu  take  pUce  as  the  delinquencies  of  the  larger 
iBeiahers  might  be  expected  sometimes  to  proceed  from 
an  ambitious  premeditation  in  their  rulers,  with  a  view 
t'>  getting  rid  of  all  external  control  upon  their  designs 
i>l  personal  aggrandisement;  the  better  to  effect  which 
it  it  presumable  they  would  tamper  beforehand  with  lead* 


UKlOft  ffOT  SVPPOKTED. 


m«ti« 


iiig  tndividunis  in  Uie  adjacent  States.  U  associutcs 
could  not  be  found  at  home,  recourse  would  be  had  to 
the  aid  of  foreign  powers,  who  would  seldom  be  disin- 
clined to  encouraging  the  diftitenitionx  of  a  Confederacy 
from  tile  firm  union  of  which  itiey  had  so  much  to  fear. 
BMiiot*t«  When  the  sword  is  once  drawn,  the  passions 
■«■*•  of   men   observe   no  iMundtt  of  moderation. 

The  susgestions  of  wounded  pride,  the  insiigalions  of 
irritated  resentment,  would  be  apt  to  carry  the  Stales, 
af^ain.tt  which  the  arms  of  the  Union  were  exerted,  10 
any  extremes  necessary  to  avenge  the  affront  or  to 
avoid  the  disgrace  of  submission.  The  first  war  of  this 
kind  would  probably  terminate  in  a  diiwolulion  of  the 
Union. 

This  may  be  considered  as  the  violent  death  of  the 
Confederacy.  Its  more  natural  death  U  what  we  now 
seem  to  be  on  the  point  of  expcriencinK,  if  the  federal 
system  be  not  speedily  renovated  in  a  more  substantial 
form.  It  is  not  probable,  CMinsidcnng  the  genius  of  this 
country,  that  the  complying  Slates  would  often  be  in- 
clined to  support  the  authority  of  the  Union  by  engaging 
in  a  war  against  the  non-complying  States.  They  would 
always  be  more  ready  to  pursue  the  milder  course  of  pul- 
ing themselves  upon  an  equal  footing  with  the  delinquent 
members  by  an  imitation  of  their  example.  And  the 
guilt  of  all  wijuhl  thus  become  the  security  of  all.  Dor 
past  experience  has  exhibited  the  operation  of  this  spirit 
in  its  full  light.  There  would,  in  fact,  be  an  insuperable 
difilicully  in  ascertaining  when  force  could  with  propriety 
be  employed.  In  ihc  article  of  pecuniary  contribuUuo, 
which  would  be  the  most  usual  source  of  delinquency,  it 
would  often  1^  impoKKtble  to  decide  whether  It  had  prt^■ 
ceded  from  disinclination  or  inability.  The  pretense  of 
the  tatter  would  always  beat  hand.  And  the  case  must 
be  very  itagr^nt  in  which  its  fallacy  could  be  delected 
with  suRicicnt  certainly  to  justify  the  harsh  cxpcdienl  of 
compulsion.  It  is  eacy  to  see  that  this  problem  alone, 
as  often  as  it  should  occur,  would  open  u  wide  field  for 
the  exercise  of  factious  riews,  of  partiality,  attd  of  op- 


iUaillMl 


LARGER  STATES. 


99 


DO,  in  the  majority  tliat  Iiapiicned  to  prevail  in  the 
itional  coanvil. 

Jt  seems  ta  require  no  paint  to  prove  that  the  States 
tht  QOt  to  prefer  a  national  Coii&titution  which  couM 
MJybe  kept  in  motion  by  (he  instrumentality  of  a  large 
ttigy,  continually  on  foot  to  execute  the  ordin^iry  rec|ui&i- 
iwos  or  decrees  of  the  government.  And  yet  this  is  the 
H><o  alternative  involved  by  those  who  wish  to  deny  it 
(he  power  of  extendin);  its  oper:ition$  to  individuals. 
Snch  a  scheme,  if  pf;icticablc  at  all,  would  instantly  dc- 
perate  into  a  military  despotism;  but  it  will  be  found 
every  light  impractieablc.  The  resources  of  the 
moo  would  not  be  equal  to  the  maintenance  of  an 
'\f  considerable  enough  to  conhnc  the  larger  States 
HthiQ  the  limits  of  their  duty;  nor  would  the  means  ever 
furnished  of  forming  such  an  army  in  the  first  in- 
ftnce.'  Whoever  considers  the  populousncss  and 
Urengtii  of  several  of  these  States  singly  at  the  present 
juaetnre,  and  looks  forward  to  what  they  will  become, 
cTtn  at  the  distance  of  half  a  century,  will  at  once  dis- 
■Bits an  idle  and  visionary  any  scheme  which  aims  at  reg- 
■ibting  their  movements  by  laws  to  operate  upon  them 
in  their  collective  capacities,  and  to  be  executed  by  a 
coercion  applicable  to  them  in  the  same  capacities.  A 
pni^a  of  (his  kind  is  little  less  romantic  than  the  mon- 
s<«r't)cniiig  spirit  which  is  attributed  to  the  fabulous 
heroes  and  demi-gods  of  antiquity. 
Kren  in  those  confederacies  which  have  been  com- 
of  members  smaller  than  many  of  our  counties, 
principle  of  legislation  for  sovereign  Stales,  sup- 
by  military  coercion,  has  never  been  found  ef- 
It  has  rarely  been  attempted  to  be  employed 


t  Suonf  inil  Bavirii  «rcre  Hriujilly  furcpil  to  befome  memben  of 
(Unuoa  EiDjiiie.  knil  lo  tUt  diy  ii  it  que>tlanabl«  wbttlicr,  M  die 
4iif  tint  Kiiigiite,  PnHiii,  were  iiKccufnlly  allacVcd  by  Riiuia  or 
•ft,  Havana  wiiilil  nut  iHipt*(pia  ■I'ilr  ilwtf  >rilli  Aiiktiia. — Kmior, 
A  <xtt  not  iltotttlber  unlike  tb»  cooililion  ii  to  be  (cmiid  lo  trrland. 
■Wm  tnwiia  uid  ■  lai^c  i«>al  conitabuUrT  have  viih  diflicully  bc«n 
•'■bhnuinaUy  \o  majiitain  tlK  lawt  maile  ioi  it  by  ruliunsnt  in  Ui« 
'u  Uiiec  hunilniil  ycart.— KoiIoR. 


tm 


NATIONAL  ariZEffSHlP. 


tVo.  IS 


but  against  the  w«aVer  in«mb«r!t;  and  in  most  instaines 
attempts  to  coerce  the  refractory  arui  disobedrcnt  linve 
been  the  signals  uf  bloody  wars,  in  which  unc  half  o(  the 
confederacy  has  displayed  its  banners  against  the  other 
half. 

The  result  of  these  observations  to  an  intelligent  mind 
must  be  clearly  this,  that  if  it  be  possible  at  any  rate  to 
construct  a  federal  government  capable  of  rcgnlating  the 
common  concerns  ami  preserving  the  general  tr.in<|uillity, 
it  must  be  founded,  as  to  the  objects  committed  to  its 
care,  upon  the  reverse  of  the  principle  contended  for  by 
the  opponents  of  the  proposed  Constitution.  It  must 
carry  its  agency  to  the  persons  uf  the  citizens.  It  must 
stand  in  need  of  no  intermediate  legislations;  bat 
must  ilMrlf  lie  emjwwcrcd  to  employ  the  arm  of  the  ordi- 
nary magistrate  to  execute  its  own  resolutions.  The  maj- 
esty of  the  national  authority  must  be  tnanifestcd  through 
the  medium  of  the  courts  of  justice.  The  government 
of  the  Union,  like  that  of  each  St.ite,  mnst  br  :ible  to 
address  itself  immediately  to  the  hopes  and  fears  of  in- 
dividuals; and  to  attract  to  its  support  those  passions 
which  have  the  strongest  influence  ti|>on  the  haman 
heart.  It  must,  in  short,  possess  all  the  means,  and 
have  a  right  to  resort  to  all  the  methods,  of  executing 
the  powers  with  which  it  is  intrusted,  that  are  poskesscd 
and  exercised  by  the  governments  of  the  particular 
States. 

To  this  reasoning  it  may  perltaps  \x  objected  thai,  i( 
any  Sute  should  be  disaffected  to  the  authority  of  the 
Union,  it  could  at  any  time  obstruct  the  execution  of  its 
laws,  and  bring  the  matter  to  the  same  issue  of  force 
with  the  necessity  of  which  the  opposite  scheme  is  re- 
proached. 

The  plausibility  of  this  ohjection  will  vanish  the  mo- 
ment we  advert  to  the  essential  diflercncc  between  a 
mere  NoK-coMpi.iANci:and  a  ihrect  and  altivr  xesi»t- 
ANCK.'     If  the  interposition  of  the.  Suie  I  he 

•  TW«  •tinliiuriion  hw  lirpn  jiiiliftnl  lo  «  trniariMil'-  '"■•':• '  '"  ir«i-ity 
Ikfon  lli>  ailoplion  of  ibr  (•iltral  conitilalion  lli«  ttam  by  ourtljr  pa*- 


BXECUTlOlf  OF  LAWS. 


lOI 


tiecesury  to  give  effect  to  a  measure  of  the  Union,  thejr 
kire  oQljr  NOT  TO  ACT  or  xa  ACT  KVASiVELY,  aod  the 
(nmute  is  dcfeatiKl.  This  neglect  of  duty  may  be  dis- 
Euneil  under  alfccted  bnt  unsubslantidl  provisions,  so  as 
nM  to  appear,  and  of  course  not  to  excite  any  alarm  in 
the  people  for  the  safety  of  the  Constitution.  The  State 
luilffs  may  even  make  a  merit  of  their  Kiirreptitiuux  in- 
Tasioosgf  it  on  the  (troun<J  of  some  temporary  conveni- 
tiKf,  exemption,  or  ^dv^intagc. 

But  if  the  execution  of  the  laws  of  (he  national  jjovern- 
"lent  should  not  require  (he  intervention  of  the  State 
'tfiildtures,  if  they  were  to  pass  into  immediate  opera- 


I^Wian  nalliRnl  tuch  lulional  lawt  and  crcn  trcAtin.  ■*  itiry  <)iiitit ; 

Jj*nlb  ItM  crcilian  rA  ■  govemnieni  aclinc  dir«llj'  on  ihc  jie-iiilc.  and 

''"tlMr  rcqiiifiiig  aaivc  mikunce,  the  >itein|itt  i<i  ickiu  ilie  iiaiionil 

I*  ^  put  or  llie  Male  |;uvr[nniciilt,  liavc  licvn  frw  tii<l  luve  Ml<ii>in 

■**•  luihcil  lu  0))vii   iriiiunce.     In  th?   Ulmiiii-ail    ca»    (iSoq)  (In 

PWbh  ol  Pcniuylviiiiu  onlticii  ool  ihc  mililin,  «nd  succcafully  rc' 

*>*eil a  prooest  of  Ihc  Supreme  Couci,  aiiil  in  ilic  I'leek  aiuI  ('lierokec 

''*4lw(l83S-'^J'>).  ''"■  ■'■■''«  "f  Gc<iij"iii  wat  ei|iia11jr  Micicudil   ill  0|J. 

pj»(  by  (nrCT-  llio   '.'"Wrt'i  ilii-im.      It  ii  to  lit   nolfil.  Iiowcvict.  lliat 

™k  UMn  niallil&calkiiis  ncie  directed  ■gainil   the  juilicial  deiwtliuciil, 

■Ud  iKOMMriljp  isbAiaiicrcd  iii  in  |H>k(cn>  hy  it*  bciiie  compel J«>j   lo 

(■If  tpon  ibe  oAciil*  ol   aiiolhrc    <lc|iuitiiiciil    loi  an    aititiil   cnforijc- 

Xiit      No  auam|)t  rA  %  ilair  i^vornni«n(  or  cwmontiiin  !■>  nollilTH  1»«. 

*Ueli  wa*  llw  dotir  ul  the  exei-iitii«  ilr  pan  merit  to  fieciite.  lint  crer  siil'- 

(•tW.     |p   177?.  IhoqgU  VirijiiiiB  Weill  lo  the  leiijilh  o(  jiiiichaiiiia 

Mai.  her  reuiiancc  u  ■  poliiitnl  lioily  ta  the  Alien  mid  Seiiitioii  lann 

*u  kmiled  to  tbc  patiine  of  Uuitliiivc  icMiliiitunt  :  ai»l  ihoiii^h  in  iHji 

bovlb  Carolina  acibuMy  ciiiliixlicd  l(L>i>pv.  the  vhiioKiuuft  lariff  Uwh  itcre 

WTtr  lor  a  iBiiRtrnl 'lU^(>elldc<l,     iV  thin)  type  of  nullilicitiuo. — the  re- 

■iiunr*  to  UniicI  SiatFi  lawi,  not  ilirough  the  interveniiun  o£  the  mte 

txvtamcntt.  bal  through  popular  tciitinwnl, — haa  succccilol  bcti.     For 

■lu«e  f«^i%  the  exciie  Uw  uf  I7i>t  wa«  (uci-cvifiilly  mltteil  in  Wrttdn 

Pmnylvaola-     t!>*^  Haniilloii'i  Wntki.  lii.  S7f-)    Tlic  enibarco  lawt 

(rf  1808   wcrr  vncanalally  mittcl  in  New  I^iii-lni«l,  liecinie  the  local 

moll  and  Jariei  woald  nnl  cvniiil  llioie  who  broke  the  law.      Tlic  Fusi- 

U*p  iflave  law  wat  Uri«ly  imltiAcd  ia  the  Konhern  itaict.  and  the  at- 

■napled  ciirorocmeni  of  it  inuu  cvciiliially  lure  ticeii  abaniloneil,  haij 

(bcCitU  Wat  not  intetvcii^ii.     The  lainc  ililhcully  ctitd  |c>-<l>y  in  the 

Jilll«"  ii>hi>.ky  tei'liuiM  uf  the  Smith,  u-hiro  it  is  almoit  impot- 

■c  coavitliont  under  the  naiioml  levrnne  lawi.  from  Jutim 

tliu.     The  most  tenuikable  incident,  however,  it  (i)rnr>hcil  by 

:  ai  (Jalifoinii.  wh«rc  ibc  prcMutc  of  pubiii:  opinioii  duclni;  th« 

ir  W9^  --"  ^FM.-i^  that  the  tiniled  Staves  ^^reenbackK  vcTcnrvrral* 

•eJInnr'  .  ile  Ibeir  l<<inga  toKnl  te'i^ler,  (hat  Mate  retnain- 

Ita  aB<'^Li     '  'ghioui  the  war^  ■nd  loihit  day.  though  the  paper 

'toouey  uuouMien  au  rtsiuancc,  ibe  uM  of  H  a  very  ancomnKiD.  — EotTon, 


lO) 


CONTHOL  OF  SEDITION, 


Ota.  16 


lion  upon  the  citiiins  themselves,  the  lurlicalar  govern- 
ments could  not  interrupt  their  projfrcss  without  an  open 
and  violcni  exertion  of  an  unconstitutional  power.  No 
omi&sions  nor  evasions  would  answer  the  end.  Thejr 
would  be  obliged  to  act,  and  in  such  a  manner  as  would 
leave  no  doubt  that  they  had  encroached  on  the  national 
rights,  An  cxpcnment  of  ttii.t  nature  would  always  be 
liaiardous  in  the  face  of  a  constitution  in  any  degree 
competent  to  its  own  defense,  and  of  a  people  enlight- 
encd  enough  to  distinguish  between  a  legal  exercise  and 
an  illegal  u«urp;ttioit  of  authority.  The  success  of  it 
would  require  not  merely  a  factious  majority  in  the  legis- 
lature, but  the  concurrence  uf  the  courts  of  justice  and 
of  the  body  of  the  people.  If  the  judges  were  not  em- 
barked in  a  conspiracy  with  the  legislature,  ihcy  would 
pronounce  the  resolutions  of  ttuch  a  majority  tu  be  con- 
trary to  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  unconsiitational 
and  void.  If  the  people  were  not  tainted  with  the  spirit 
of  their  State  representatives,  they,  .is  the  natural  guard- 
ians of  the  Coustitutiiin,  would  throw  their  weight  into 
the  national  scale  and  give  it  a  decided  prcpondcrancy  in 
the  contest.  Attempts  of  this  kind  would  not  often  be 
made  with  levity  or  rashness,  because  they  could  seldom 
be  made  without  danger  to  the  authors,  unless  in  cases 
of  a  tyrannical  exercise  of  the  federal  authoniiy, 

U  opposition  to  the  national  government  should  arise 
from  the  disorderly  conduct  of  refractory  or  seditious  in- 
dividualK,  it  could  he  overcome  by  the  same  means  which 
are  daily  employed  ag.^inst  the  same  evil  under  the  Slate 
governments.  The  m.igistracy,  being  Cfjually  the  minis- 
ters of  the  law  of  the  land,  from  whatever  source  It 
might  emanate,  wouhl  doubtless  be  as  ready  to  guard  the 
national  as  the  locvil  regulaiionit  from  the  innuds  o( 
private  licentiousness.  As  to  those  partial  commotions 
and  insurrections  which  sometimes  disquiet  society,  'rum 
the  intrigues  of  an  Inconsiderable  faction,  or  from  suiltlen 
or  occasional  ill-humors  tliat  do  not  infect  the  great  bod^ 
of  the  communiiy,  ihr  general  government  could  com- 
Riatid  moru  (intensive  resources  far  Uie  suppression  o( 


''KantMl      LEGISLATION  FOR  tSDI^IDIJALS. 


iti^tirba fierce  of  that  kind  titan  would  be  in  tbc  power  ot 
any  single  member.  And  us  those  mortal  fends  which, 
ii  certain  conjunctures,  spread  a  confiagraliun  tlirtjagh  a 
wWlc  nation,  or  through  a  very  large  proportion  of  it, 
proei'cdiiig  either  from  weighty  tauses of  disconleiit  given 
I7  tbe  Kavcriimcnt  or  from  the  coiilagjon  of  some  violent 
popular  paroxysm,  they  do  not  full  withid  any  ordinary 
nksof  ealculutiitii.  When  they  happen,  they  commonly 
lAouDt  to  revolutions  and  dtstnemberincnts  of  empire. 
Nu  (wtm  of  government  can  always  either  avoid  or  con- 
trol lliem.  It  is  in  vain  tu  hope  (u  guard  against  events 
Joo  miKhty  for  human  foresight  or  precaution,  and  it 
voulil  be  idle  to  object  to  a  govcrtimetit  because  it  could 
tiotperrurm  im]>ussibiH(icK. 

PUBLIUS. 


No.  17. 


Itmttf4»dni  /mrmai,  UeccmbeT  «,  rjtj.t 


HatniltoQ. 


XBFUTATIOM  OF  THE  AROUMKNT  THAT  A 
GOVERNMENT  BASED  ON  INDIVIDUALS  WILL 
BE  TOO  POWERFUL. 


UmUttlilmJ  littl  Iht  mtliatial  gWfrnuirHl  trili  iiAwri  lAr  mii/uary 

tulttnly — iM/t<l4   if  »i\U:mttl  amUtttn—ljtAl  ameintt  not  allwiaj^ 

^jitti  tf  griurmS  Juriijutim — Eaiiir  ftr  Iht  itatii  U  tHtroiKi  m   lie 

atitnal  auti^rilia — GreaUr  fofKljriiy  tf  ilau  grhrritmeni—  TfmJtnty 

( KantinJ  t*  HfigMtrifisI  .tfUtAitfHi — Linal  juiiitt  Iht  mrst  altrattiw 

want  aj  ftfular  tieJiemt  unit  iiIIm  imril — 7'**  Md/i^nu/  grrtrHmtnl 

I  immJiaUly  (tnitrtlrJ  nu/4  lit  fittfiti — Kinaif/t  in  fnulttl  timtt — 

'  't^Hgt^t  ifiun/u  tin/!  and  txtrrn—Exampii  *f  tlamikip  in  StaHaiut 

igtMmmrHli  itrnfaral  nvM  /tinUI  iarvmtt—Lrtal  gavtmntntt 

'imtaui  t»  f^tusi  t>^  tttfidtntt  ff  Iht  ftfflt. 

Ta  the  Pfff-le  0/  the  Slate  of  New  York: 

An  objection  of  »  nature  dtllerent  from  tliat  which  has 

cen  slated  and  answered  in  my  last  address,  may  pcr- 

ips  he  likewive  urged  ^igainst  the  principle  of  legislation 

the  individual  citizens  of  America.     It  may  be  said 

It  it  would  tend  to  render  the  government  of  the  Union 

too  powerful  and  to  enable  it  to  absorb  those  residuary 


I04 


KO  EyCJtOACHMF.Xr  Oy  STATES. 


a*.  IT 


;iutliorilies  which  it  might  be  judged  .proper  to  leave  with 
the  Stales  for  local  purposes.  Allowing  the  utmost  lati- 
tude to  the  love  of  power  whiijh  any  reasonable  man  can 
require,  I  confer*  I  am  m  a  loss  to  discover  what  tempta- 
tion the  persons  intrusted  with  the  administration  uf  the 
general  government  could  ever  feel  to  divest  the  States 
of  the  authorities  of  that  description.  The  regulation  of 
the  mere  domestic  police  of  a  State  appears  to  me  to  hold 
out  filcmlt-r  allurement  to  ambition.  Commerce,  Rnance. 
negotiation,  and  war  seem  to  comprehend  all  the  objects 
which  have  charms  for  minds  governed  by  that  passioo; 
and  all  the  powers  necessary  to  those  objects  ought,  in 
the  first  instance,  to  be  lodged  in  the  national  depository. 
The  administration  of  private  justice  between  the  citi- 
zens of  the  same  state,  the  sii[>ervision  of  agriculture'  and 
of  other  concerns  of  a  similar  nature — all  those  things,  in 
short,  which  are  proper  to  be  provided  for  by  local  lejji*- 
lation — can  never  be  desir.-iblc  cares  of  a  general  jiirisdio- 
tion.  It  is  therefore  improbable  that  there  should  exist 
a  disposition  in  the  federal  councils  to  usurp  the  powers 
with  which  they  are  connected,  because  the  attempt  b> 
exercise  those  powers  would  be  as  trouhlc^oine  us  it  would 
be  nugatory;  and  the  possession  of  them,  for  that  reason, 
would  contribute  nothing  to  the  dignity,  to  the  impor- 
tanre,  or  to  the  splendor  of  the  national  government. 

But  let  it  be  admitted  for  argument's  sake  that  mere 
wantonness  and  hist  of  dominattnn  would  he  ^iiRicicnt  to 
beget  that  (lisjMtsilion,  still  it  may  he  safely  affirmed  that 
the  sense  of  the  constituent  body  of  the  lutional  repre- 
sentatives, or,  in  other  words,  the  people  of  the  several 
States,  would  control  the  indulgenee  of  so  extravagant  an 
appetite.  It  will  alirays  be  far  more  easy  for  the  Slate 
aia  goTcmmcnts  to  encroach  upon   the   national 

l»4l.  authorities,  than  for  tlie  national  government 
to  encroach  upon  the  Slate  authorities.  The  proof  vt 
this  proposition  turns  upon  the  greater  degree  of  inHfl* 


'RmmHtoti  •cancly  (ortMW  ihs  crMtioa  ol  a  DvporiBWiU  of  A|)t> 
cullui«.— EiNio*. 


LOCAL  AJ'TAa/itENT. 


lOJ 


tm.t  irhicli  the  State  governments,  if  they  adminUter 
ihcir  affairs  with  upnglitnesg  and  prudence,  will  genen 
xllf  possess  over  the  people;  a  circumsunce  which  at  the 
<UK  time  teaches  iiii  that  there  is  an  inherent  and 
iolriasic  weakness  in  alt  federal  constitutions,  and  that  too 
moch  pains  cannot  be  taken  in  their  organization  to  give 
thta  all  tiic  force  which  is  compatible  with  the  principles 
of  liberty. 

The  superiority  of  influence  in  favor  of  the  particular 
SDVcniments  would  result  partly  from  the  difluEivc  eon- 
itniction  of  the  nationiil  goTernment,  hut  chiefly  from 
llif  nature  of  the  objects  to  which  the  attention  of  the 
Stiie  administrations  would  be  directed. 

it  is  a  known  fact  in  human  nature  that  its  affections 
anciMDiDonly  weak  in  proportion  to  the  distance  or  dif- 
'miTeacss  of  the  object.  Upon  the  same  principle  that 
In  a  man  is  more  ;itiached  to  his  family  ttian  to 

B^tt.  his   neighborhood,    to   his   neighborhood    than 

lo  the  community  at  large,  the  people  of  each  State  would 
Ixapt  to  feel  a  stronger  bias  towards  their  locnl  govcrn- 
•enu  Uian  towards  tht;  government  of  the  Union,  unless 
tht  force  of  that  principle  should  be  destroyed  by  a  much 
ter  iulmimstraliun  of  the  latter. 

This  strong  propensity  of  the  human  heart  would  find 
pntverfnl  atuiliaries  in  th^  objects  of  State  regulation. 

The  variety  of  more  minute  interests,  which  will  ncccs- 
unly  fall  under  the  superintendence  of  the  local  adminin- 
Ultons,  and  which  will  form  so  many  rivulets  of  influence 
nnning  tluough  every  (wrt  of  the  suciety,  cannot  be 
particularized  without  involving  a  detail  too  tedious  and 
anintercsting  to  compensate  for  the  instruction  it  might 
■fford. 

There  is  one  transcendent  advantage  belonging  to  the 
province  of  the  State  governments  which  alone  suffices  to 
place  the  matter  in  a  clear  and  Siiiikfaclory  light— 1  mum 
the  ordinary  administration  of  criminal  and  civil  justice. 
This,  of  all  others,  is  the  most  powerful,  most  universal, 
ind  most  attractive  source  of  popular  ul>edience  and 
■Itaclimcnt.     It  is  that  which,  being  the  immediate  and 


SATIOSAL  INTRK&STS  CRKERAt..         Wtt" 


visible  guardian  of  life  and  property,  having  its  benefits 
and  its  terrors  in  constant  activity  before  the  public  ejre, 
resulating  all  those  personal  interests  and  familiar  ccm- 
cerns  to  wliicU  the  sensibility  of  individoals  i»  more 
immediately  Awake,  contributes  more  than  any  other  cir- 
cumstance to  impreiising  upon  the  minds  of  ilic  people 
affection,  esteem,  and  reverence  towards  the  government. 
This  great  cement  of  society,  which  will  diffuse  itself 
almost  wholly  throuffh  the  channels  of  the  particular  guv> 
cniments,  independent  of  all  other  causes  of  influence, 
would  insure  them  so  decided  an  empire  over  their  re- 
^ective  citizens  as  to  render  tliemat  all  times  a  complete 
counterpoise,  and,  not  unfrequcntly,  dangerous  hvuU  to 
the  power  of  the  Union. 

The  operations  of  the  national  government,  on  the  other 
hand,  falling  less  immediately  under  the  observation  of 
the  mass  of  the  citizens,  the  benefits  derived  from  it  will 
chieHy  be  perceived  and  attended  to  by  specubiivc  men. 
Relating  to  more  general  interests,  they  will  be  less  apt 
to  come  home  to  the  feelings  of  the  people,  and,  in 
proportion,  less  likely  to  inspire  an  habitual  sense  of 
obligation  and  an  active  sentiment  of  atlacliment. 

The  reasoning  on  this  head  lias  been  abundantly  exem- 
plified by  the  experience  of  all  federal  constitutions  with 
which  we  are  acquainted,  and  of  all  others  which  hare 
borne  the  least  analogy  to  them. 

Though  the  ancient  feudal  systems  were  not,  strictly 
speaking,  confederacies,  yet  they  partook  of  the  nature 
of  that  species  of  association.  There  was  a  commiwi 
head,  chieftain,  or  sovereign,  whose  authority  extended 
over  the  whole  nation;  and  a  number  of  subordinate 
vassals  or  feudatories,  who  h.-id  large  pontons  of  land 
allotted  to  them,  and  numerous  trains  of  inferior  vassals 
or  retainers,  who  occupied  and  cultivated  that  land  upan 
the  tenure  of  fealty  or  obedience  to  the  persons  of  whom 
[hey  held  iL  Each  principal  vassal  was  a  kind  of  sover- 
eign within  his  p.-iriicular  demesnes.  Tliecoiiseijuencesof 
this  situation  were  a  continual  opposition  to  authority  u( 
tlie  sovereign,  and  frecjuent  wars  between  the  great  baraiw 


I 


iMBMil 


FEUDAL   BASOAWES. 


TOJ 


or  chief  (eudatoriGS  thcm<ielvc3.  The  power  of  the  head 
nf  the  nation  was  commonly  too  wc<ik,  ciihrr  to  preserve 
the  public  pfuce  or  to  |>rol«(-t  the  )>eo))le  against  the 
opprei.»ionfl  of  their  immediate  lords.  This  period  of 
European  affairs  Is  emphatically  styled  by  historians  the 
limes  o(  [eudal  anarchy. 

Wlicn  llie  MucrtiK"  lujipcneil  to  be  amait  of  vigorous  and  war- 
like temper  iinil  (i(  lujicnur  abililiei.  lie  would  acquln;  n  prnniuil 
•ciEhtJAil  iiillucDCc  winch  ai)!>wctTd.  (or  llic  time,  ttic  puifiosek 
"I  a  more  rcKuUr  nutlioriiy.  Bui  in  gencru],  the  power  of  the 
turons  iftuinphcd  over  thai  o(  the  ptmcc:  antl  in  iii.ioy  instances 
lui  tluminion  was  cniitely  thrown  <ifl,  and  the  Kid  fi^'*  were 
nntn)  inioindrp^mlrnipiincip-ililicsor  sinics.  lit  those  instances 
in  Mhkh  tlie  monarch  Iin:i1ly  prevailed  over  hiii  vasdalx.  Iiii  suc- 
(nstnu  chiefly  owing  la  the  lyr;<niiy  i>f  lliovc  vassaU  ovri  their 
■bptmlcnts.  The  lurons,  or  ii<ibk%  equally  the  enemies  of  liie 
t<mrcit:n  and  the  opprcsM)rs  of  (he  common  pcojilc.  wrre 
ili«adcil  aiMl  dciCHted  t>y  boili;  till  mutual  danger  and  mutual 
inkieil  eSecled  a  union  between  ihem  fatal  to  the  power  of  tlie 
*rii«eiacy.  Had  the  itobles,  by  a  cunOuci  of  clemency  and  jus- 
tict.  preserved  the  fidelity  and  devotion  of  their  retainers  anil  fol- 
lowers, the  contests  between  them  and  the  prince  tnusi  almost 
atntfi  have  ended  In  tliclr  favor,  and  in  the  abridgment  or  »ub- 
nniM  of  the  royal  autliorliy. 

Tins  I*  not  an  axscrlion  founded  merely  in  speculation  or  con- 
itiuie.  Among  ottier  illusiralions  of  its  truth  which  might  be 
"ItiJ,  Srnlland  will  furnish  a  cogent  example.  The  spirit  rA  dan- 
l6ip  nhich  W3*.  at  an  e.jrly  d.«y,  inlroilireed  into  that  ItinKdoni, 
Ukiin);  (he  noblea  and  their  d«penilenla  tiy  lies  equi»*alfnl  to  those 
M  4>ndre<t,  rendereiJ  the  arislociacy  a  constant  ovcrmaicli  for  the 
power  of  the  tnonaich.  till  the  mcmporaiion  with  England  sub- 
<Kd  Its  Rerce  anil  ungovemabtc  spirit, and  reduced  it  within  those 
nilcs  of  ftuborilitialion  which  a  ntore  rational  and  more  energetic 
w.>inn  of  ciril  polity  had  previously  established  in  the  latter 
Lingdoiii. 

The  separate  governments  in  a  confederacy  may  aptly 
becompariHl  with  the  feudal  baronies;  with  this  advantage 
in  iheir  favor,  that,  from  tlie  reasons  already  explained, 
they  will  geacrally  possess  the  confidence  and  good  will 
the  people,  and  with  so  important  a  support  wilt  be 
He  cffecluaHy  to  oppose  all  encroachmcntii  of  the 
iiatiooal  goTcrnmcnt.     It  will  be  well  if  they  are   not 


loS 


CR£EK  CONPEDBRACIES. 


UTtt.  It 


able  10  counteract  its  legitimate  anil  ncct-ssary  authority. 
Ttic  points  of  similitude  consist  in  the  rivaiship  of 
power  applicable  to  both,  aod  in  the  concentration  of 
liirge  poritnns  of  the  strength  of  the  community  into 
particular  dkposjts,  in  one  c^se  at  the  disiioK;il  of  indi- 
viduals, in  the  other  case  at  the  disposal  of  political 
bodies. 

A  concise  review  of  the  events  (hat  have  attended  con- 
federate governments  will  further  illustrate  tht»  impor- 
tant doctrine,  an  inattention  to  which  has  been  the  great 
source  of  our  political  mistakes,  and  has  given  our  jeaU 
outty  a  direction  to  the  wrong  side.  This  review  shall 
form  the  subject  of  some  ensuing  p;ipers. 

PtTRLItrS. 


No.  18.'     (.Vn.  Ytrk  /wfar.  !>«.  j,  ■}•}.)     Hamilton  and  Madison. 

EXAMPLES  OF  GREEK  CONFEDERACIES. 

A»^Metj9mit  tammU,  lit  fttMri  im  kUttrf — Tkt  AftUiAH  Itogat^ 

To  tht  Ptople  of  Iht  Stale  a/  New  Ytirk: 

Among  (he  confeileracicc  of  nniiquii)',  the  most  considerable 
wattliat  of  thcOtrcun  repuhhcs  auociatcd  umkr  ihc  Amphk- 
fl,  tyoiiic  council.     Frwn  the  be«i  account*  Iransmiited 

iro.  la.  oj  this  celebrated  Insiilulion,  il  bore  a  very  iiiMiuc- 

''■  ■  The  iubje>rt  o(  thi»  ami  (he  l«™  roiltwini;  nmolwi'  •  '  10 

1w  loicn  up  \ij  tmth  Mt.  II.  Knit  M(.  M.     Wlut  hal  !.«  .  Lt 

Ml-  H..  liao  liX'l  enlcrcd  muic  bFicD)'  lulu  tlic  iiubjo;!,  •>.'■.  I'l;  vUti 
Mr,  hi.  OH  lu  *{>|>Cii(ii>i;  lll*l  llic  t.itti-'r  ua>  mj;*)^  In  It.  wllh  lar^r 
miilFriil*.  ■•(!  with  «  vkv  ti>  ■  ■iioic  |irr>*iw  ilrliiimtiim  ;  siiJ  Irom  ui 
pen  III  the  Ullet,  (he  xienl  p>pen  m-ni  10  the  I*m«.'  " 

"  The  at«ve  note  (inm  the  pen  of  Mr.  MidiMMi  w»»  wrilten  00  ifce 
niir|>in  n!  the  leaf,  i-MnmMi<:ln{;  niih  Ihe  pinent  lutmliet.  In  (he  tapij 
of  the  Foletaliii  lnscicU  \<y  liiin  tii  (lie  puUilthet."— A'«jy  in  lit  n/i/im 
»ftSiS. 

"  No.  tS  il  ■Krilwile')  to  Mt.  IHmilton  wd  Mr.  Mo^iton  juintlT'  A. 
H.  li»rt  ilnini  up  loniethiBt  on  the  nibjeiUioft'"- 1  v  ■  <^-'  -'-■'  'i'-  -wo 
■tt(  Not  (19  and  lay.     On  fiiuliiie  thai  ).  M.  ■<  ih 

|ui;r>  nislrilaH.  aoil  with  a  new  ti  a  <iti>te  jr.  ud 

whil  he  tiail  wri'i«n  Int"  tile  lMni)t  i-f  J.  M.      li  t-.  (hi-mI-  ">• 

re«oUeaed,  that  KWicthini-  in  Lha  (ttaaQhi  ma;  hart  beer,  .lul 


H.UdX.1 


AMPHICTYOIVIC  COUNCiL, 


109 


iifc  juutogy  lo   the  prcseni   Confederaiion   <A   U»e  American 
Suies.* 

The    TncmbcM    rctjiined    the    character    t>\    independent    And 

«ovcrci)^  Kiiitci.  anil  had  cqu.it  voteii  in  the  fcdcriil  council.    Thb 

council  lia<l  a  general  ^uthor>t)  to  ptn[)osc  and  resolve  whatever  it 

iudj[ctl  necessity  lo<  the  coinmon  wcllatc  of  Greece ;  to  declare 

and  carry  gn  war;  lo  decide,  in  the  laM  retort,  all  controversies 

between  Ihe  members ;  to  line  llic  iimfreasing  parly ;  lo  employ 

the  whole  force  of  the  confederacy  ngjiinst  the  ditobcdieni ;  lo 

admit  New  tnembett.    Tlie  AmphicIyunN  weie  the  guardians  of 

rdigion  aiKl  of  the  inimeiise  riches  belonging  to  the  tcniple  <rf 

DdphiM.  where  they  ha<l  the  right  of  jurisdiction  in  conirovei*ies 

between  the  iiihahitantf  and  those  who  cantc  ta  consult  the  oraclr. 

Adfurthet  provision  Jor  the  efficacy  of  the  federal  powers,  they 

took  an  oath  miiiually  to  defend  and  protect  the  united  cities,  to 

pDiiiih  llie  vioUlorv  of  thi«  oath,  jnd  lo  inflict  vengeance  on 

ucril^gioQs  ilcspoilcfK  of  the  tcniple. 

la  theory  and  upon  paper,  this  apparatus  of  powers  seems 
Mnplf  luflicient  for  all  geiieinl  purposes  In  xcveial  material 
inuancts  they  Mceed  ihe  powers  enomeialed  in  ihe  articles  of 
MnfedentKXi.  The  Amphiciyon«  had  in  their  haitdt  ihe  Kupersii- 
l"»e*  theiitne*.  oneof  the  piincipal  engines  by  which  govern- 
BCMwu  then  maintained  ;  they  had  a  decUred  anlhority  lo  use 
McKioii  against  refractory  cities  and  Here  bound  by  oailt  lo 
enri  Ihit  jtilltorily  on  the  necessary  occasions. 

Verf  different.  nevcrilielcM.  wai  the  eiperinienl  from  lliciheory. 
"Hk  powers,  like  iha)«  ol  the  present  Congress,  were  adminiitemt 

iM  ihe  Aumhers  oi  pdnied  :  bin  it  wu  ecriaJnly  not  of  ■  nature  01 
MotM  lo  slltitt  ibc  iiiiprcukiii  left  on  lh«  niliiil  of  I.  M.,  from  whotc 

Elbe  jupcn  "<iil  ti>  the  ptrn,  IliM  tliey  «ci«  n\  th»  cUkx  "rillto  by 
Ai  the  hi^Imic  nuteriaiii  of  A.  II..  u  far  ai  llirv  wrnt,  were 
dnMos  timiUr  or  the  Mme  with  thme  provided  by  J.  (il..  nnd  ni  » 
ttt  ipplioiioM  of  them  piohably  DCcnired  lo  both,  >n  impreiiiioa  ini|;hl 
bkfl  iHi  llie  ninil  ul  A,  H.  that  the  Nim.  in  ijuetlion  wcte  wnlleii 
i><llf,  Th«^  icmaiks  ire  nude  *<>  veil  lo  octnunt  fur  ■  ililciornl  In 
hi  rSnt.  it  nuile  by  A.  II..  aik  in  juslice  lo  J.  M..  who.  aloiyi  rt|>»rtl- 
i>Cihen  in  >  diScrenl  light,  h»d  to  slated  Ihem  lo  ftn  inquiring  friniil. 
I«|  befoie  it  wu  known  or  (appotwd  that  a  dilTcreoi  imprcuion  ciiiied 
■T^bei*."     MailiuMi'i  MalciDiml  in  paper  entitled   'flu  /•'t^rraiiii. — 

EltT(l», 

'  la  Ihe  "  Leilen  and  Other  Writinn  o(  /amei  Madison,"  i86{  fi.  393). 
<>pnnicd  ■  |»pei  eoiitlcd  "Nofes  of  Ancient  and  Modem  Confederm- 
on.''  umI  from  tlut  p«f«r  tlie  folloirine  accounts  were  drawn.  Tile 
Udorr  ol  llm  fiteeli  conleiUraciCk  it  \rM  at  leii):ll>  in  R.  A.  Ficeman'i 
"Hiiloey  M  f«^l<r*t  Gowmnmit  (mm  the  Fnuml.iiion  ijf  (he  Achalaii 
laague  toihe  Uitnption  of  the  United  States,"  a  wurk  which.  lotobviont 
■oMot,  mm  never  ooioplcied. — EDfroK. 


I  lo  JEALOUSIES  OF  CKF.RR  STA  TES,  Of*.  » 

by  deputies  a{ipoinie<l  wholljr  by  ihc  diics  in  tlicir  |>o1ittcnl  »paci-l 
tie».  and  cxK<:i»«<l  over  thvni  in  Uie  SAine  cajUL-iticti.     Iletice  the 
wcnkncu,  the  disordcrt,  and  6nally  ihe  (Icsiniciion  ol  iIk  con- 
(tderacy.     Tlie  more  ]K>wct(ul  meinben.  innlKul  ol  brin^  kcpi  inj 
awe  and  &uborilmation,  i)ritiii)ited  tucccSMVcty  over  all  ilw  i»L 
A(Ii«ni.  as  we  Icim  Irom  Dciiiohlhenes.  wiis  tlie  uiblltt  of  GtT«f«I 
scveniy-iliTcc  yeais.     Tl'c  L-tcciljemonians  ivc xl  govrfiiiil  it  lwc«i)-J 
nine  yenr^ ;  ai  4  xubtcqiKiit  pcnod,  aftei  the  iMttlc  of  Leuclr; 
the  Tbcbiins  had  their  (urii  of  dninlnation. 

ll  h.i|>i)eii«(l  but  Iiio  often,  ai'conlinK  to  llukireh,  thai  ihel 
deputies  of  (he  &lroiige&i  cities  auvd  and  corrupicil  itiose  of  (hcl 
weaker,  and  llul  judsineni  went  rn  favof  u(  llic  niosi  pownful^ 
pany. 

Even  In  itic  inidnl  of  de{en»ir«  aim)  djuKerous  wais  with  Penti 
and  Macedon.  the  nictnbeis  no-cr  acted  in  conc«-n,  and  wetr^ 
nxwp  or  fen-er  «( them,  etemally  ilic  dupes  or  the  hiielin>-<i  of  ihK| 
conimon  ei>emy.     The  intervals  o(  fotcign  war  wctc  filled  up  by 
doinutic  vicisMiudev  coiivulMons,  and  ciinsKe. 

Afier  ihe  conclusion  of  the  war  with  Xerxes,  il  apport  thai  it>«| 
LacedxTOonians  required  tlut  a  nunil>er  u(  tlie  cities  kliould 
lumcd  out  of  the  confederacy  for  the  iitif.nthfii)  part  ihcy  lud 
acted.  The  Athenians.  Gnding  thai  the  LaeedatinonUns  wouh 
lose  (ewer  panitHns  by  tiich  a  mcasiii^  than  iltcinulws,  «a<S\ 
would  becvnte  inosicra  of  il>c  public  del Iberat ions,  visorouly 
opposed  and  <h-featrd  the  aitcmpi.  Thti  piece  of  hbiory  pr 
At  once  the  inelficiency  of  the  union,  tlie  and>>IMin  and  Jealousy 
its  movt  powerful  mcmbcni,  And  the  dependent  ami  iteKracIird  eon- 
dKion  ol  the  test.  The  sni.iller  nietnlicrs.  tlvoiigli  rniiilnl  by  ihe 
theory  ol  their  sy:i(em  to  revolve  in  equal  ptide  and  tnayeiiy  aioundJ 
the  eotniiion  ceti'.cr,  had  become,  in  fact,  satellites  of  the  orbs 
primary  magnliude. 

Had  Ihe  Greeks,  says  the  AbM  Miloi.  been  as  wise  as  thcjr ' 
courageous.  ll>ey  would  have  1>ecn  admonished  by  ex|>cr>enoe 
Ihe  necessity  of  a  closer  tiniori.  and  would  have  availed  themselv 
of  the  pence  svliich  followed  llitir  succctti  aKtiinsi  the  Persian  arms 
to  establish  such  a  reforninllon.     Instead  of  this  obvious  policjrJ 
Athens  and  Sparta,  inftateit  with  the  >'iciones  and  ihe  glory  ih 
had  acquired,  became  lir;>(  nvili  and  then  enemies,  and  dill  each 
other  inlinitdy  niorc  mcKliiel  ilwin  ihey  had  suRrrril  from  Xenc 
Their  mutual  jcalouues.  (ears,  hatreds,  and  injuries  ended  in 
celefanite<l  re}oponnesian  war,  whkh  lt«etf  ended  ia  the  ruin 
slarery  q(  (he  Alhcirians  who  lud  begun  ll. 

As  a  weak  goTcmment.  when  not  at  war.  <■  crcr  a){italed 


K.uda.1 


ACfl.aAX  LRACUB. 


Ill 


inwnu)  lUtMnsiofit.  so  ihrte  ncrcr  fail  to  bring  on  (rnh  calamitlca 

bum    alnuud.     The   Pliocians  having  plowtril  up  nomc   conse- 

CTalcd ground  belAnging  to  thetem|ileo(  Apollo,  ihc  Amphiciyonic 

councD,  accotding  lo  ibc  -lupeiMilioii  of  Hie  uge.  int posed  a  fiii« 

oM   the   ucnlegious  oflcndcis.     The   Phocians,  being  Rt>«ted  by 

Ailten3  and  Sfiurta.  reluicd  to  ubmil  lo  (he  decree.    Tlie  Theban». 

with  others  of  ibc  citicx.  undcitool:  <a  maintain  the  auihority  ■>( 

ilic  Amphictyoiu,  and  lo  avenge  the  viuluicd  god.    Tlie  latter. 

Iidag  the  weaker  party,  invited  the  aui«tancc  of  I'liilip  of  Mace- 

dod,  whohad  secretly  fostered  the  content.    Plidip  gladly  ieiinl 

til*  opportunity  oJ  executing  the  tlcxii^n!!  lie  had  long  planned 

>KaiR»l  lh«  liberties  o(  Greece.    By  his  intrigues  and  brSbei  he 

won  over  10  (lis  interests  the  popular  leaders  of  several  cities;  by 

ihdr  inducnce  and  votes  gainrd  adniisMon  Into  the  Amphictyotiic 

CDUBcil ;  and  by  liis  arts  and  his  arms  made  liiiiiself  master  of  the 

nmledenicy. 

Sucli  were  the  coiuequcnccs  of  tlie  fallacious  principle  on  which 
ihis  int cresting  ctiabliihrncnt  was  fouiidcd.  WnA  Greece,  s.iys  a 
pdiciout  ob&civei  on  her  (ate,  been  united  by  a  stricter  confedera- 
tion, and  pervei'crcd  in  her  union,  she  would  never  have  worn  Ihc 
chaifuuf  Macedofl,  and  might  Itave  proved  u  barrier  to  the  vast 
prajecu  nf  Ramc. 

The  Acha>an  league,  as  it  is  called,  was  another  society  of 
Cnoui  rcptildics  which  supplies  us  with  vAluable  inslriiciion. 

Tlie  union  here  was  far  more  iiititnale,  and  Its  organisation 
Mch  wiser  than  in  ih«  prcceiling  instance.  1(  will  accordingly 
ippur  that,  though  not  exempt  (ruin  a  similar  catastrophe,  il  by  no 
avan*  equally  deserved  it. 

Tic  ritiM  mn<p04ing  this  IragiM  retaine«l  tlieir  municipal  juris- 
diction, ajipainied  thdr  own  oRicers.  and  eiijoyr^l  .1  perfect  equality. 
TIk  wnaie.  in  which  they  were  represented.  Iiad  the  sole  and 
tuhiitre  right  of  pcuce  and  war;  of  sending  and  receiving 
■aknuijors  ;  of  enicririg  into  treaties  and  alliances  :  of  appointing 
■  tliid  magistrate  or  pnttor,  as  lie  was  called,  who  commanded 
iWir  annie*,  and  who,  wiih  the  advice  and  consent  of  ten  of  the 
■cwion.  not  only  administered  the  government  in  the  receM  of 
At  Kiialc,  but  had  a  great  share  in  its  deli betui ions,  when 
■■nnbled.  According  lo  the  primitive  constitution,  there  were 
liB|irairnni  a^soci.tlcd  in  the  administration  :  but  on  trial  n  single 
■  ■  ■  r-m-il. 

ih.tt  the  cities  had  all  the  sanve  laws  and  etitioms.lhe 
**»«  we^;Jit4  and  mejismes,  and  the  sante  money.  But  how  far 
<lui  rflcci  proceeded  from  the  aulhorily  of  the  federal  council  ia 


IIS 


D/SSOLVTIOff  OP  lEAGUE. 


rva-it 


left  in  uncrrlainly.  Tl  i«  said  Aniythat  ihe  ciliM  were  in  a  mannrr 
compclltd  lo  receive  ihe  siiinc  Uws  and  usages.  When  UiccdvmDn 
wai  brought  into  the  league  l>y  Phili>paemen,  it  was  aiicn<ln]  with 
an  sbolition  of  ilte  Insiiiuiions  and  laws  ol  Lycurgus.  and  an  u<toj>> 
lion  of  those  o(  the  Achieans.  The  Ampliiclyonic  ciinfedcracf, 
of  which  she  had  been  a  member.  )e((  her  w  the  full  eterclM  of 
htx  ^veniiiient  and  her  legislation.  Thb  ciicumslance  alone 
provct  a  very  nuietal  <liffercnce  in  the  genius  <A  the  two  systems. 

It  is  much  to  be  ref^rettcd  that  such  tmpeifect  monuments 
rem.iin  of  lhi«  curious  political  fabric.  Could  ils  interior  structurr 
and  regular  II  per  at  ion  be  a«i:rcriain«l.it  b  probable  that  mure  Itghl 
would  he  ihrnwn  bf  it  on  the  Kcience  of  frdrr,)!  govrnimrni  tKan 
by  any  o(  (he  like  ex|>erimeni«  wtih  which  we  ate  .tciguainicd. 

One  important  fact  trems  to  be  wilnected  by  all  the  hixtoriann 
who  lake  notice  o(  Achaf-an  afTdir«.  Ii  is  llut,  a«  wdl  after  the 
renuiMiioti  of  lite  Icsiuue  by  Aratus  xa  before  its  cliviolulion  by  the 
arts  of  Maccdnn.  there  was  infinitely  mofc  of  ntotkratiofi  and 
justice  in  the  ailni in isl  ration  of  its  ^vernmenl,  and  less  uf  viulntce 
and  flcdition  in  the  people,  than  were  lo  be  fouiitl  tn  any  of  the 
ciliet  exeicivng  'iigfy  alt  Ihe  pienifplires  of  sorereignty.  The 
AbW  MaWy,  in  his  ohscrratlons  on  Greece,  wy^  thai  ilw  popular 
govcrtimenl,  which  W.is  so  (ernpcatuoiis  elsewhere,  raii!iF(l  no 
d>sortI<-i9  In  the  nirnibers  nf  llic  Achirjn  republic,  kffausf  tl 
ttMi  Ikeri  lemptrtti  by  Iht  gtntrat  anlketily  and  la%'i  of  Ikf 
e&n/tdffaey. 

Wc  are  not  to  conclude  too  hastily,  liuwcver.  thai  (action  did  not. 
ill  a  ceit.)in  degree,  agitate  (he  panicotar  cities  ;  much  les«  that 
due  subordination  and  harmony  ret};i>ed  in  ilie  general  s)'steiD, 
Tlu;  contrary  is  sufficiently  displ.iycd  in  the  vicisailudes  and  fate  ul 
the  republic. 

Whilst   the  Amphiclyonic  confederacy  renuitned,  thai  ol  ihi 
Acbsans,  which  comprel>rn<le<l  the  less  impon^nl   citir*  nnty. 
ma<le  li((le  figure  on  (he  theater  of  (Ireecc.     When  the  former 
l>ecame  a  viclim  to  Macedon.  the  Uliir  was  sparrrt  hy  llw  (itilic 
ol  Philip  and  Alexamler.     Uiviler  the  Micceswui  ol  lliese  prtnen, 
liowev«r.  a  difdrrcnt  policy  preiailcd.     The  ans  of  dirision  wi 
praclicetl  among  the  Achxans.    Each  ciiy  w.is  wluced  into  i 
•eparate  intcreti  ;  rhe  union  was  dissolrcd.     Sotnc  ol  the  chk' 
felt  under  (he  tyranny  o(  M.icedonian  garHsofis :  others  tintlrr  III. 
ol  usurpers  tpringing  4Mt  of  their  own  confusions.     Sharne  ami 
oppress^n  errlnng  awakened  Ihelr  loi-e  of  lllwny,     A  few  eiiii 
reunited.    Their  example  wac  followed  by  odicrs.  aa  opp»itunili< 
were  found  ol  cutting  of)  their  lyranU.    The  leagirrMiun  cnibraixd 


SUBJUGA  TIOX  OF  ACIIAIA. 


113 


ilnxnl  the  whole  Pcloponnenui.     Mncedon  mw  iti  prosTCM,  btit 

»ra»  hiwkrcd  by  Inicnwl  ilrtsensions  (torn  stopping  ii.    All  Girec* 

caught  the  enlhutusm  and  seemed  tcaily  to  tinile  in  one  confeiler- 

acy.  when  Ittc   )iMlausy  and  enry  in  Spnna  nnd  Aihens,o(  ihc 

ruing  {[loTy  of  the  Achxmii.  threw  a  fuinl  ilnnip  on  llic  enterprise. 

Tncdf«ul  of  I  he  MaceiJoni.in  power  indiiceii  the  k^iguc  tocoun 

Ihe  ilhnnce  of  Hie  \iii\-£i  ol  Egypt  and  Syria,  who.  ui  HUCCeMOiH  of 

Aleuflder.  were  riv.ils  of  the  king  of  Mnceilon.     This  policy  w;is 

'kfci'rd  by  Cleoniencs.  king  <i[  Sjiaita,  who  was  leU  by  hi*  ainlii- 

iiun  lo  make  nn  iinprovokcil  ;ilUi:kon  his  n'ighlinrs.  the  Ach.-raiiK. 

mil  who.  .u  an  enemy  lo  Maceilon.  Ii.id  inlernt  enough  wilh  the 

£|[>p<an  and  Syrian  p«ince«  to  effect  a  tncach  of  their  engage- 

tnentt  with  the  league-     'llic   Aclixaiis  weic  now  re<!uci-i1  tu  the 

lUleiiiBHaf  submitting  lo  CIcomcncs.  or  ut  supplicating  (lie  aid  of 

HactdMi,  its  fomter oppressor.    The  latter  expcitieiit  wjis  adopted. 

Ttie  contei'ts  of  the  Creeks  always  jRoiilcil  a  pleiuing  opportunity 

Ml  llul   powerful  neighbor  of  iiiteiiiieiMlmg  in  their  affjirs.     A 

Miftdonian  army  (|u>ckly  appearcit.     Cleuiiicnei  wax  van<|ui»hcd. 

Tiie  Aclioean^  noon  experienced,  as  often  hapjwns,  that  a  riciorioos 

lul  powerfnl  ally  ix  but  anothrr  ii.itiie  (or  a  master.     All  that  their 

■ou  ab^i  compliances  could  oliiaiii  from  him  was  j  tukratiun 

c4 iW exerciM  ol  thcirlawii.     Philip,  who  was  now  on  the  throne 

(f  Haccdon.  soon  provoked  liy  hi«  tyrannies  fresh  combinattoiM 

unMg  the  Greeks.     The  Ach;trjnH.  though  weakened  by  tntemal 

^tMniuoos.  antl  by  the  revolt  of  Mi^Ksrne,  onrof  its  nien>hcrs,hemg 

)Med  by  the  ,^toliJin»  and    Alhenidna,  erected   tlie  standard  uf 

<fp(ttiIi(M.     Frndintl  thernM^li't-s.  though  tliu^  iiippnrtcd,  unetjnal 

■•tile  uadertaking.  they  once  more  had  recour;ie  tu  the  dangcious 

■'■:.i,-nt  of  intriKlucingthe  succor  of  foreign  artni.     The  Romans, 

■■  "iiMn   the  inviuiion  was  mjidc,  e-4gerly  embiaced  it.      Philip 

*u  coiiquacd ;  Macrdun  subdued.     A  new  crisis  ensued  lo  the 

le^ue.     L>issensM)ns  broke  out  atnnng  its  members.    These  the 

Rwuas  fostered.    Callicrates  and  other  popular  leaders  became 

mercenary  bistramcnis  for  inreigling  their  countrymen.    The  more 

dtcauatiy  to  nourish  disconl  anil  disorder  the  Kon>ans  liad.to  the 

aiumifhinent  nf  ihoxe  who  confided  in  their  sinccrily.  alica<ly  pro- 

diiioed  univemal   liberty*   througboul  Greece.     With  the  same 

iavdkiaB  news,  they  now  seduced  the  memtiCTS  fmrn  the  league. 

by  (epnswnltng   to  llicrr  pride  the  vioNition  il  eominilted  on  their 

WTTTTignty.      Dy  these  arts  thii  union,  tlie  laU  hopi^  of  Greece,  the 

lul  ho|«  of  ancient  liberty,  was  torn  into  pieces,  and  &uch  inibe- 

I  but  another  name  moic  ipecioui  for  the  independence  of 
the«a>l>Rvon  ibc  federal  bc»d.—Pi;BUUS. 


114 


CBRMANiC  BODY. 


10.10 


cili(]r  and  dislraciion  ImroJuccd.  that  tlie  nrms  af  (tome  (ound 
little  (tifiicultf  in  comiilciin^  llie  ruin  wbicK  their  att»  had  com- 
menced. The  Achxniia  wctc  cut  (o  pieces,  and  Acliaia  hmdcd 
with  chains,  umlcr  which  ii  in  gr(i;iniiig  al  this  hour. 

I  bave  thought  it  nut  supcrHuous  \o  give  tlw  outltites  of  this 
important  portion  of  hintoty  ;  both  because  it  leaches  more  than 
one  lesson,  and  bcrviuM'.  as  a  supplcnicni  in  the  tn;iiine«  of  the 
Achxan  cunttiiutiun,  it  onpliulicalljr  illuMraie%  ll>e  leiidcncy  of 
letleia)  bodies  rather  to  anarchf  among  the  members,  than  to 
tyranny  in  tlw  head.  FlJBUUih 


No.  19.  Umj,ffnJntjt<i'mai,t>*e.  I.  >rir-t  HamiUunand Mafli 


lison  I 

i 


EXAMPLES  OF  MEDI-«VAL  AND  MODERN 

CONFEDERACIES. 

Tht  Grman  rmfirt—Eramfie  efPtUmJ—Tkt  Smii  ttnfrJtr, 

Tfi  the  People  *•/  the  State  e/  yV«w  Yfirh: 

Tlie  examples  u(  anctcni  confedL-raciet.  ciied  in  my  laM  paper, 
have  not  ethaiixtcd  the  source  ol  expciimcnlal  inttiuclion  on  ibi* 
subject.  Tltcrc  are  existing  iniliiutions,  founded  on  a  similar 
[ttinciplc,  which  merit  particular  contiilenuioa.  The  6rsi  which 
j>n»enls  ilicif  Is  the  Germank  body. 

Ill  llic  r.irly  ngef,  o(  Chriitiaiiiiy,  Germany  wa*  occupinl  by 
seven  diuinct  iiation^.  who  had  no  common  ditef.  Tlie  Pranks. 
one  of  the  number.  h.ivinK  conquered  the  (iauls,  esubhshed  ihe 
kingdom  which  has  i^tken  its  name  front  ihcm.  In  Ihe  nuiih  cen- 
tury, Chariema);tie,  its  warlike  monaruh,  cairied  his  vxriurious 
arms  in  every  iliiection,  and  Germany  became  a  pan  of  his  Ta»l 
dominions.  On  ihe  disincmbeTineni,  which  took  place  under  his 
sons,  (his  pan  vim  erectc<l  inio  a  separaic  and  independeiii  empire. 
Chailnnnsne  and  his  immediate  ilriccnilanis  pcnsessrd  ihe  rrtHlf , 
as  well  at  the  ensigns  and  rtigniiy  o(  imperial  power.  Rat  Ihe 
principal  vasvits,  whose  fiefs  had  become  hriediiary,  and  who 
composeal  the  national  die  it  which  Charlemagne  had  nni 
abolished,  t;(;iduiitl)-  threw  ofl  (he  yoke  and  advanced  lo  •o«er- 
eijjn  juriHltcliun  and  independence  The  (oicc  o\  imperial 
sovereignly  was  tniufliGieni  lo  rrstmin  such  powerful  depriulmis. 
or  to  preserve  the  unity  and  tnuK|tultiiy  of  the  empLte     Tbe  most 


l.uiM.1 


POWERS  OF  THE  DIET. 


"S 


(utioM  prirBte  win,  accnmpantrd  with  n-cry  species  o\  calamity. 
*fte  rarriwl  on  bclwcpn  llie  difltrrciil  priiKCS  and  stales.  The 
irapeiial  aulhorily,  unaUtc  to  mniiiLiin  tiic  public  nrdci.  decline*) 
b)r  degrees  till  U  wns  ulmust  ntinci  in  ilie  anarchy  which  agiiaicd 
like knj!  Interval  between  the  dcith  iif  tiic  last  cmpcior  of  the 
Swbmi,an<l  (he  accession  ol  tlic  first  cmpeior  o[  the  Austrian 
Ihms.  In  the  dcrcnih  century  the  einpcrots  cnjin-cd  full  sover- 
apirf;  in  the  liliccmh  ihcy  had  liiilc  more  than  the  symbols 
u4  tleeonllon!!  o(  power. 

Oulol  this  feudal  syslein.  which  has  itself  many  (A  the  Important 
Icxuitt  of  a  cunfedctucy.  hax  grown  t)ie  federal  lyileni  wliich 
niuliliiic»  the  r.rrnianic  empire.  Its  powers  arc  vcsicd  in  a  diet 
nftoenting  (he  component  mernbers  of  the  confc<l(^nicy :  in  the 
cDipctOT,  vbo  is  the  oiecniiifc  magistrate,  with  a  iicKstive  on  the 
•traces  of  the  diet ;  m\A  in  the  imperial  chamber,  and  (he  aulic 
ocuncil,  two  jiHJIciaiy  tribunals  having  supreme  jurisdiction  in 
0Miiv\«nic9  wliicti  concern  ihe  empire,  or  which  happen  among 
itsniciiibcrv 

The  diet  posseuei  til e  general  power  of  leei!>Iaiiiig  foi  the  cm- 
pte;  of  nuLinc  war  and  peace;  coiiiraciing  a!!iartce«:  assessing 
qwias  of  iriKips  and  money:  conMruciing  furlresacs:  regulating 
<*n;  admithng  new  memberiii ;  and  subjecting  ditobe<licrit  mem- 
i«n  tu  the  ban  ol  (he  empire,  by  which  the  patty  i*  degraded 
UDm  hift  lovereign  rights  anil  his  possessions  forfeited.  The 
14  ol  Ihe  coriledeiacy  arc  expreasly  restricted  fiom  enlering 
lalo  compacts  prejudicial  to  the  empire;  from  impa.iing  toIU  and 
4aUe«  Ud  their  mutual  iniercourse,  without  the  consent  of  the 
eaperor  ottd  ilicl;  from  altering  the  value  of  money ;  Irum  doing 
iejuslice  to  one  another :  or  from  affording  assistarxe  or  teircni 
to  ilisturbers  of  the  public  peace.  And  the  ban  it  denounced 
«|akist  MKh  as  shall  violate  any  of  ()ies<  reitriclions.  The  mem- 
bers of  the  diet.  a»  such,  ate  subject  in  all  cases  to  be  judged  by 
ihermjtcror  and  diet,  and  in  their  private  capicrties  by  Ihe  aullc 
Gouacil  and  imperuil  chamber. 

The  prciogaiivet  o(  Ihe  emperor  are  numerous.  The  tnost  \vn- 
pottant  of  ibem  are :  his  exclusive  right  to  make  propositions  to 
ibe  dirt  :  lo  negative  its  resolutions ;  to  name  ambassadors ;  lo 
canfer  dignities  and  titles;  to  I'tll  vacant  electorates;  to  found 
unlTri^ities ;  to  grant  privileges  nol  injurious  to  the  stales  of  the 
empire:  to  receive  and  apply  the  public  revenues;  and  generaity 
to  walcb  over  the  public  s.-ifety.  In  certain  cases,  the  electors 
(am)  a  council  to  him.  In  quality  ol  emperor,  he  posse^tr^  no 
tnrirfury  within  ilie  empire,  nor  receives  any  (evcnue  for  his  ftupporU 


Ii6  FEUDS  OF  GEKMANY.  »».  IB 

Bui  Ills  revenae  and  itominionc.  in  olhi^r  qualities,  conitllliitc  hi'm 
one  ot  the  moil  powerful  piinccs  »ii  Europe. 

FTUrn  such  a  pantile  of  cunvliiutionat  powers,  in  IIk  repn^tcnta- 
lives  nnd  head  of  this  confrderiicy.  ihe  niilural  suppositiim  would 
be  that  ii  must  form  an  excepiion  10  the  |[ci>«Tal  cKxrncicr  which 
belont!s  to  its  kindred  sy^icniv  Nothing  would  be  (urihcr  Irom 
(he  reality.  The  fundamental  principle  on  whK-h  il  tests.  \\\»X  the 
cmpiR!  is  a  community  of  sovere^s.  tliai  the  diet  is  a  rcprcMnta- 
tlon  of  sovCTelgns.  and  that  the  laws  aie  addrcsaed  lo  soveragns. 
rcndcra  the  empire  a  nerveless  hod)-.  incapaMe  ol  reguLiilng  Its 
own  niemhen.  insecure  ag.ilnst  external  dangers,  and  ai^tated 
ivitli  urici-iuiiiK  feniiemaiioiis  in  its  own  bowels. 

The  history  of  Germany  is  a  hi«ory  of  war*  hetwcert  the  emperor 
and  the  piinces  and  stales ;  ol  wan  amonx  the  jirincei  and  stales 
tltenuclvc:( :  of  the  liccntiotisness  of  the  strong,  and  Ihc  oppm- 
siofi  of  the  w«aV  :  of  (oicit;n  inlru&iont.  and  fomjin  intriKties ;  ul 
rcquisilioni  of  men  and  money  dtsrci^rdcd,  or  partially  com* 
plied  with ;  of  aticinpts  to  enforce  thcin,  aitogcihcr  abonire,  or 
atteiuled  with  sliiughlcr  and  desolation,  involving  the  innoccnl 
with  the  guilty  :  of  sencrai  imbecility,  confuuon.  and  miier}-. 

In  the  sistcenth  reniury.  ihe  emperor,  with  one  part  of  the  rrn- 
pire  on  his  side.  wa&  wen  en^aj;'''  ag->i"si  ■'>«  other  princes  and 
stales.  In  one  of  the  coniticis.  the  emperor  himself  was  put  to 
fJTglii  and  very  near  being  made  prisoner  by  the  elector  ol  Saxony. 
Tlic  Inle  kinK  <>f  Cruuia  was  more  than  otice  pilled  against  liis 
imperial  sovereign  :  aitd  commonly  proveil  an  nvcrmalcb  for  tiim. 
Conirmersiesand  wars  among  the  mcmliers  ihenuelrcs  have  been 
so  common  thai  the  Cerman  annak  are  crowded  with  ibe  bloody 
pages  which  deKribc  diem.  Previous  lo  the  peace  of  Wesiptialia. 
Ciermany  w.-u  dcsnlnie'l  by  a  war  of  thirty  years,  in  which  Ihe 
rmptror.  with  one  hall  of  (he  empire,  was  on  one  sjite.  and  Sweden, 
with  ihe  oihrr  half,  on  Ihe  oppoMte  side.  Peace  was  at  tengtb 
ncgoiiairit.  and  dictated  by  foreign  powers ;  and  the  ariiclcs  of  il. 
In  which  foreign  po»-crt  arc  parties,  made  a  fandamenlal  pan  of 
ihn  Germanic  consiiiuiion. 

If  lite  nation  happens,  on  any  emergency,  to  be  more  nniied  by 
the  nccei^iiiy  of  self-ileleiise.  ill  situation  is  still  deplorable 
Military  preparations  must  be  preceded  by  SO  many  tedious  d»> 
citsnoni.  arising  from  the  jealousie*.  pride,  separate  views.  aiMl 
clashing  prrlenuona  of  M>vcreign  bodiev.  tlist  hrforc  llie  dirt  can 
settle  the  arrangements,  the  enemy  are  In  the  fiekl ;  and  bffnre 
llvD  federal  troops  ant  ready  to  lake  \\.  are  rctiriag  into  winter 
quarters. 


t.udii.1 


MtUTARV  CQBltaON. 


»«7 


Tlie  unall  hml)'  of  niiional  troops,  which  has  been  judged 
iimSKUy  in  lime  of  pcice.  is  defeclively  kepi  up.  Indly  piiid. 
inlrtted  wilh  locjil  prrjuOices,  and  gupponed  by  irrcguUr  and 
■iBpoporliunale  cwitributiuni  Iv  (lie  Iceaiury. 
Pie  impDuibtlily  of  niiiinuming  order  and  dupenting  jii&iice 
iiMot;  iheM  Mveiei^n  aubji-cU  produced  ihe  cipeniiii'nt  o{ 
ing  ihc  etnpirc  iiiio  nine  or  len  circles  or  dbiiicit;  of  giving 
interior  ot^nniiaiiuii,  .iiiil  o[  charging  Ihem  wilii  itie 
ndiiMy  execuiMm of  the  Uwt  againM  dclinqiiem  ami  coniumacioux 
■ncfitets.  This  experiment  lias  only  lervcil  lu  deinonMraic  more 
f«Uf  Ike  radical  vice  ol  the  consiiluiion,  Each  circle  Is  the  minia- 
tvtpklure  o(  the  deformities  of  ihn  pulnical  nioiiairr.  Thej' 
Bifkt  (ail  to  exccuie  Itielr  conimissions.  or  Ihcy  do  it  uilh  ull  the 
ilniMaliuii  mill  carnage  of  ciril  Wiir.  Somen iiie^  whole  circles 
an  ddauliers;  and  then  ihey  incicate  ihc  miKtiicf  which  iliey 
»trt  iruiiiuicd  to  remedy. 

We  niayforin  M>me  juitgrncnl  of  this  ichcnic  of  military  coercion 
fntn  a  umplc  given  by  Thiunus.  In  Donawenh.  a  free  and  im- 
pcritldiy  of  the  circle  of  Suabia.  the  Abb^  de  St.  Croix  enjoyed 
lin  unmuiiitics  which  had  been  rr»erved  to  him.  In  the  cxet' 
of  these,  on  some  public  occ.i^ions,  outrages  were  committed 
hl«i  by  iltc  people  of  the  city.  The  consequence  was  tliat  the 
ijr  was  put  uivder  the  ban  of  ihc  empire,  anil  the  Duke  vt 
fiivatia,  thuugh  director  of  ;tnoihcr  circle,  obtained  an  appoinl- 
IKnl  to  enforce  it.  Ite*oon  ai)|>c.-ur<l  before  ihc  cily  with  a  corps 
alien  ihou«^nd  iroopv.  and  liniling  ■'  ^  1^'  occasion,  as  he  had 
tardly  inieiuled  from  ihe  beginning,  lo  rm'ive  an  antiquated 
(laim,  on  the  pretext  that  his  ancestors  h.id  suffered  the  place  to 
le  ilismenilietetl  from  hia  territory.*  he  look  pusMssion  of  it  in  hit 
own  name,  disarmed  and  punished  the  inliabiiaois,  and  reanncxed 
<^  city  to  his  domaiivs. 

U  may  be  askefl.  pei  h.ips.  wlut  has  so  long  kept  (his  dls^intetl 
niacbine  from  falling  entirely  lo  pieces  }  The  answ-er  is  obvious. 
The  weakncM  o(  most  of  the  mcmlicr?.  who  arc  unwilling  10 
tipuse  themsdvea  to  Ihc  mercy  of  (otcian  powers;  I  he  weakness 
of  nmtl  of  the  principal  members,  compared  wilh  lh«  (ormliUhlc 
(Kiwcis  all  aiound  the:m  ;  the  vast  weight  and  inlliience  which  ihe 
empcrar  derives  from  his  sep.-irate  and  hereditary  dominions ;  and 
inirrcst  he  feels  in  prcscniug  a  sysieni  with  wlitch  his  family 
is  connected,  ami  which  constitutes  him  the  6rsl  prince  in 


^■ahli 


'nedd,   "Voind  Abr^.  Chronol.  de  I'llUl.,  elc.  d'AUenugne," 
1  the  ptKleit  ■m  In  LniktaaKy  biraicU  fur  Ihc  cipcnw  uf  tli«  exptdt 
Am.— POMJU*. 


ii8 


Sff/SS  CA.VTOXS. 


iha.  i« 


Kuro|H-;— lltn^  c.iii^K  «iipporl  a  IccNc  nnd  prvcariouK  Union; 
whilsl  l\\c  rcj)Flknt  <ju:ility  inciitirTtt  It>  tli<-  luiturc  of  sotrreij^iny. 
.iiul  which  time  con  I  i  1111.-111)'  ittrenijihcnt,  ]»cvenlt  any  rcrotm 
wliiitevcT,  fouiideil  on  a  proper  GonM>lict3iion.  Nor  U  H  10  be 
im^ncd,  if  tlii«  olMtaclc  could  be  »urminintcti.  that  the  netKhbor* 
iitg  powers  would  suffer  «  revotoiion  lo  i^ihc  pl«cc.  which  woutd 
f;ivc  (o  the  cinpiie  the  fotce  and  pre-eininence  10  whkh  ll  b  entiileil. 
Foreign  luiions  have  long  considered  llwmsetvcs  ns  inierested  in 
(lie  clianKcs  nude  hy  events  in  lliii  conslilution ;  and  have,  on 
v-irious  occusions,  betrayed  Iheir  policy  of  |>crpeiualing  il&  anarchy 
and  weakncu. 

If  ntoie  direct  examples  were  wjnijng.  Poland,  as  a  gOTrnitneni 
over  local  sovereign!!,  migtit  not  iniptupcily  be  taken  notice  of. 
Nor  coutd  any  prool  more  striking  be  given  of  ihc  cal.imitK-s  How- 
ins  from  sucii  tiiUtlutiuns.  Equally  until  tor  setf-governnient  and 
self-defense,  il  has  long  been  at  itic  nirrcy  of  ii«  jmwriful  neigh- 
bun  ;  who  have  bicly  ha<t  the  mercy  lo  diiiburdcit  tl  of  one-thiid 
of  its  people  and  tcnilorirj. 

The  connerlion  among  llie  Skim  canloni  iicarcely  amount!  toa 
conteder.icy  :  though  il  is  »omctim<-t  ciicd  as  nn  in-Umce  of  the 
stability  of  Mich  invlituliunv 

They  have  no  common  itciwiry  ;  ivo  common  iroopi  cvcfi  in 
war :  no  continon  coin ;  no  common  judicaiory,  nor  any  Mhcr 
common  mark  of  Koverdgniy. 

Tlvey  are  kepi  tOKelhei  by  the  pwuliarliy  «f  ihrir  lopogTaphiCal 
position ;  by  Iheir  i(i<livi4lual  w«akncM  ami  insigrilAcancy  ;  \yy  llie 
(ear  of  poweiful  neighbors,  to  one  of  which  ihcy  weie  lotnterly 
subfccl  ;  hy  ihc  few  sources  of  conienliun  among  a  peoplr  of  xuch 
simple  and  iMinogcneous  m.inners :  by  ihrir  joini  ininrM  in  ilxir 
dcpcndciil  pov^eisiuns :  hy  the  mutual  3i<l  llivy  stand  in  nerd  of. 
(or  suppressing  iniUftcclioos  -ind  rrbHli«n«. an  aid  e^pmsly  Ml]ni- 
lated.  and  often  required  and  afforded  :  and  by  itie  neceuliy  of 
some  reg<i1ar  .ind  permanent  proviswm  for  accoinmrMlatlng  de- 
putes among  lite  cantons.  TIte  provition  is,  that  ilie  parltes  at 
variance  xhall  each  choose  four  juilges  out  of  (Itc  neutral  onnionK. 
who.  til  case  of  ilisagreemeni,  chouse  an  umpire.  This  triltutMl. 
uiulcran  oath  of  impartiality,  pronounce*  cteTuiiiive  seniencc  which 
all  llic  c.inioiis  arc  bound  lo  enforce.  The  comprtency  ol  ihi<i 
rvjulatiun  m;iy  he  eilimated  by  a  clause  in  tlwir  Ireaiy  of  1683, 
wlih  Victor  Amaili^iis  of  Siivoy,  in  which  he  obliges  hiinsetf  ii> 
interpose  as  medialor  in  iliiputes  )>eiwcen  the  caoloiu,  and  M 
employ  force,  il  nccmary.  ng;iintt  tlx  coniumacious  {wny. 

So  far  as  ihe  peculiarily  of  Ihdr  case  will  adniii  of  comjuuixm 


"""'^ 


KniU  UNITED  NETHERLANDS.  "9 

itith  that  of  the  United  Slates,  it  serves  to  confinn  the  principle 
intended  to  be  established.  Whatever  efficacy  the  union  may 
tuTe  had  in  ordinary  cases,  it  appears  that  the  moment  a  cause  o[ 
diBereace  sprang  up,  capable  of  trying  its  strength,  it  [ailed.  The 
controversies  on  the  subject  of  religion,  which  in  three  instances 
have  kindled  violent  and  bloody  contests,  may  be  said,  in  fact,  to 
have  severed  the  league.  The  Protestant  and  Catholic  cantons 
hate  since  had  their  separate  diets,  where  all  the  most  important 
concerns  are  adjusted,  and  which  have  left  the  general  diet  little 
other  business  than  to  take  care  of  the  common  bailages. 

That  separation  had  another  consequence  which  merits  atlen- 
lion.  It  produced  opposite  alliances  with  foreign  powers:  of 
Beme,  at  the  head  of  the  Protestant  association,  with  the  United 
f^vlnces :  and  of  Luzerne,  at  the  head  of  the  Catholic  association, 
Willi  France.  Pt/BLius. 


No,  20.    iNtw  YsrkPaektt,  Dec  >i,  i;!;.)     Hamilton  and  Madison. 
EXAMPLE  OF  THE  UNITED  NETHERLANDS. 
Ntlure  Bf  govtrnmiHt — Hisleriial  illuilralieut — The  priunt  con- 

Td  Ike  people  of  the  State  of  New    York- 

The  United  Netherlands  are  a  confederacy  of  republics,  or 
raiher  of  aristocracies  of  a  very  remarkable  texture,  yet  confirm- 
mg  all  the  lessons  derived  from  those  which  we  have  already 
retlewed. 

The  union  is  composed  of  seven  coequal  and  sovereign  stales, 
and  each  state  or  province  Is  a  composition  of  equal  and  inde- 
pendent cities.  In  all  important  cases,  not  only  the  provinces  but 
the  cities  must  be  unanimous. 

The  sovereignty  of  (he  union  Is  represented  by  the  Slales-Gen- 
fial,  consisting  usually  of  about  fifty  deputies  appointed  by  the 
provinces.  They  bold  their  seats,  some  for  life,  some  for  six, 
three,  and  one  years;  from  two  provinceslhey  continue  in  appoint- 
ment during  pleasure. 

The  States-General  have  authority  to  enter  Into  treaties  and 
alliances;  to  make  war  and  peace:  to  raise  armies  and  equip 
fleets;  lo  ascertain  quotas  and  demand  contributions.  In  all 
these  cases,  however,  unanimity  and  the  sanction  of  their  con- 


POIVESS  OF  THE  STADTHOLDER. 


no.  M 


stiluenls  are  reqiibite.  They  have  auiliuriiy  to  appoiitl  and 
recclvR  amhDi«M(tors ;  to  execiiic  lmtic«  arxj  alluncn  alreaily 
lorrneil;  W  ptovide  (or  ihe  colleclion  o(  tlulies  oii  impurls  and 
ripons;  to  rcguUlc  the  mlnr,  with  a  saving  to  the  |>iovinc»l 
righlJi ;  lu  gcnfirn  as  wvcicigiis  the  dcpcnilmt  tciHtones.  The 
provinces  arc  mir»i»cil,  unlns  with  ilic  geimal  coritcni.  from 
entering  into  (orriKn  ircaticK ;  from  eKi.iUlUhtiiic  impost*  injutioux 
10  others,  or  charging  ihrir  neighbors  with  higher  dtii>c»  l)uit 
their  own  (ubjectn.  A  council  of  >tale,  a  chamber  of  accounts, 
with  five  colleges  of  admiralty,  aid  aiul  fontfy  (h«  fcdcnl  ulitiini>- 
Imfion. 

The  executive  magistrate  of  (he  tinion  i«  the  SladltioWer.  wlio  I* 
now  an  hercdiut}-  prince.  Hi»  princi|Kil  wi-ii;lit  and  intiueiite  (fl 
the  republic  arc  derived  from  thi%  indr|>cnitent  title;  Itom  lilt 
great  patrimonial  estates:  (roin  hii  litiiiily  conitccttons  wiih  sonic 
«( the  chief  potrnUies  of  Ivurope :  and,  more  than  ii\,  perhain,  from 
his  being  siadlhuldei  iit  the  so-eral  pfovineca.  as  wHl  as  for  the 
union ;  in  which  provincial  (|iulity  he  has  the  appntnlmciil  uf  town 
magislniies  umtcr  certain  legulaiions,  c»ecuie5  provinctal  ileciees. 
presides— when  heplcaM^— in  the  piovinci.il  iribunab,  and  hat 
(hroiighoui  the  puwci  of  panton. 

As  St.idlliuider  ci(  the  union,  he  has,  howevef,  considerable  pte> 
roga  lives. 

In  his  political  capacity  be  h,Tt  authority  to  settle  disputes 
liettvcen  tlie  provinces,  when  other  nvcihods  fail :  to  assist  at  ll»e 
deliberations  of  IIm:  Stales-General,  and  at  their  particular  cunler- 
ences;  to  give  audiences  to  foreign  ambassadoTs,  and  to  kcr|i 
:^[enl*  lor  his  particular  alTaits  at  (oreign  courts. 

In  his  military  capicity  he  cnmmands  the  federal  troops,  pio- 
rides  for  garriKins,  and  in  gencr;il  regulates  inililary  affairs  ;  div 
poscii  of  all  appoinlmcnis.  from  colonels  to  ensigns,  and  of  ibe 
guveinnientt  and  posts  of  forlilicd  towns. 

In  his  marine  capacilv  he  is  Admiral  General,  and  superintends 
and  (Urects  eveiythtng  relative  to  nat-al  foices  and  oilier  natal 
affairs:  presides  in  the  admiralties  in  person  or  by  proxy  :  appoints 
lietitenani  admirals  and  other  olTiceta :  and  establishes  cotincils  ol 
war.  whose  sentences  are  no)  executed  till  he  approves  them. 

Hb  revenue,  exclusive  of  his  ininte  Income,  amounts  lo  ibm 
hundred  thou.-iiinil  florins.  The  st.inding  array  which  lie  com- 
maniU  consists  of  about  foity  thouMnd  men. 

Such  is  the  nature  oI  the  ccleliraleil  Belt^tc  confederacy,  as 
iWlineated  am  pnrchmeni.  What  are  il>c  duracten  which  pirao 
ikc  lias  stamped  upon  it  t    Imbedliiy  iit  the  govern  mail ;  dbcwil 


■.MtlU 


TUE  STATES^GENERAL. 


191 


anmg  (he  |tcovince* :  foreign  inRucnce  and  Jndignitia ;  a  prccarl- 
onaiKcnce  b)  peace,  and  peculiur  caUmilieit  from  wnr. 

It  vu  hmg  ago  frmarketl  by  Croliux  thai  nothing  but  the 
haind  o(  hn  countrymen  to  the  Houvr  ol  Austria  kcpi  ihem  from 
kciif  rtiiMd  hf  ibe  vices  of  theii  constitution. 

The  iraion  of  Utrecht,  sajs  another  r«pecta)>te  writer,  reposes 
•njuUioritf  in  the  Staicx'(rt:nctal.  seemingly  suiriciciii  to  secure 
lunnony.  but  ilie  jc;iluuiy  in  each  province  i'eii(IciD  ilie  piaciice 
*t)7  iliftcreni  from  the  theory. 

TVe  Kune  instrutncnt,  s^ys  another,  obliges  cncli  province  to 
Injrccrtain  conltibulionit ;  but  Iliit  article  never  coulil,  aii<l  profa* 
aMf  Km  wilt  be  executed,  bcc.iuv;  the  knland  provinces,  wlw 
h»c  Utile  comineice.  cannot  pay  an  equal  quota. 

In  mallets  of  contribution,  it  is  llic  practice  lo  waive  the  anklM 
ofthecon.ititulion.  The  danger  ol  delay  obliges  the  conncnting 
|*niKts  to  furnish  their  quotas  without  waiting  (or  the  others, 
aid  iben  to  obtain  rcirnbunteinenl  from  the  oiheis  by  depulatjuiu 
*li>cli  arc  (rc(|ueni,  or  otherwise,  as  Ihry  can.  The  great  wealth 
■•>'  Influentx  of  the  ptovinvc  ol  llullaiid  enable  her  to  eflecl  both 
Ihae  iiuipmei. 

tl  ka«  more  than  once  happened  that  the  ilcficicncirs  had  to  be 
k'lan.Kely  collected  al  the  point  of  the  bayonet ;  a  thing  pracllca- 
Uc  lliiM|{h  dreadful,  in  a  confederacy  where  one  of  the  mcmbeni 
tmedf  in  force  at)  ihc  rest,  am)  where  several  of  them  arc  too 
mall  to  meditate  resistance :  but  utterly  impracticable  in  one 
conposed  of  ineinben  xevcral  of  which  arc  wiiial  lo  each  olher 
n  itten(;ih  and  rctiources,  and  equal  singly  to  a  vigorous  and 
ptrievtring  ^Icfcnic. 

Kofeign  ministers,  says  Sir  William  Temple,  who  w:is  himself 
a  foreign  niiiiiiiter,  elude  tnattm  taken  ad reftreHdnm,  by  tam- 
(Kring  with  the  pTovinees  and  cities.  In  1736  tlie  treaty  of  I^an- 
«*cr  was  delayed  by  these  means  a  whtde  ycir.  Inst.inccs  of  a 
ilce  nature  arc  rtumermis  and  notorious. 

In  critical  eirtetjjcocies  the  States-General  are  often  compelled  10 
merlcjp  their  const  it  uiioiuil  bounils.  In  ■'■SS  they  concluded  a 
Irealy  of  iheniieJves  at  tl>c  risk  of  iliirir  heads.  T)ie  treaty  of 
Wvslphalia.  in  1&4S.  by  which  their  independence  was  formally 
and  fvnally  recogi>iie<t.  waa  coitclmled  w*itliout  the  consent  of  Zea> 
bnd.  Even  ax  recently  as  the  Ian  treaty  irf  peace  with  Great 
Uritab),  the  constitutional  principle  of  unanimity  was  departeil 
liotn.  A  weakconMitution  titunt  neccsMrily  terminate  in  dissolii- 
lion,  for  want  of  proper  powers,  or  tlie  usurpation  of  powers 
m|iihite  toe  llie  public  safety.     Whether   the  iiturpalion.  when 


■  33 


DtSSBKSlOKS  IK  THE  NETHERLANDS.    IIMO 


oiicc  begun,  will  stop  ni  llie  Kilutary  fioint.  or  %a  forward  lo  itie 
■langnuus  cilreine,  iiitist  (lc|itii<l  mi  tlir  coiiirnj-ciicm  o(  ibe 
momcitl.  Tyrannjf  hnn  pcrlinpt  oflcnct  grown  nut  of  ihe  *iSMm^ 
lions  o(  power,  called  fur,  on  pre&ung  exigencies,  by  a  tkleclive 
consiiluiion,  than  oui  tA  the  full  exercise  of  tlie  Urgest  coristitu- 
tlonal  autharliie». 

NoiwithKniiKlin);  the  calnmilies  produced  by  iKc  StadthoUer- 
dilp.  11  liiu  been  Huppu&cd  that  urilhuul  hi»  influence  in  lite  indt- 
vidual  piovihccs,  the  cauKs  i>l  anarchy  inanileit  in  ihe ciHiIcdcncy 
would  lonj;  a^u  have  dl^i9l<'Cll  it.  "  Under  such  a  Kovemtncnl." 
lays  liic  Abbi  Mably.  "ilie  union  could  ncvet  hnvc  subniitcd,  if 
the  pruT>ncc4  hail  not  a  ^pniig  within  thf-nisdveTt.  capable  of 
quickeniiii;  ilicir  lardinevt,  and  compelliiiK  ibcm  to  ihe  aanir  way 
of  ihinking.  This  spring  i^  ll)c  Suiilholdcr."  It  is  rrmatkcd  by 
Sir  William  Tcinpte. "  that  in  the  iiilenniurann  ol  the  Siaillhoklet- 
ship.  Holland,  by  her  riches  and  her  auihoniy.  which  drew  the 
others  jiiio  n  son  of  dependence,  supplied  the  ptice." 

These  are  not  the  only  ci  renin  Glances  whicli  liave  controlled  the 
tendency  to  anarchy  and  dbsoliitjoii.  The  surrounding  powers 
impoM  ail  alisiiliile  nneftsity  o4  union  lo  a  certain  dcKiec,  at  the 
same  time  that  th«y  nouri.ih  by  their  intrigues  iJic  consiitmiotiil 
t'icei  which  keep  the  republic  in  some  degree  alwajrs  at  (lieir 
mercy. 

The  true  patrioi&  have  long  Iwwailcd  the  fatal  tendency  of  these 
vices,  and  hare  made  iio  less  than  four  regular  expcitments  hy 
tXiriMriit'Hiiry  aswMifi.  convened  for  llic  sfecial  purpose,  to 
apply  a  remedy.  As  iiiaiiy  limes  lias  iheif  lauilable  (eal  luund 
it  iinlMMsiblc  lo  uiHt  ikt  fiuMt  tuinncils  in  rcfiKining  (he  knoikti. 
ilic  acknowledged,  the  f  jtal  evils  of  ihc  exiling  conMiiniion.  Let 
us  pause,  my  fdlaw-ciliieni.  Un  one  inoinriil.  over  this  iiteUn- 
choly  and  mofiiioty  Ictisuii  uf  hinioiy ;  and,  with  live  tear  that  drops 
for  the  calnmilics  braught  on  mankind  by  their  ndrcrsc  opinions 
and  sclftvh  pauMXis.  lei  our  graiiiude  iningte  ah  ejaculation  to 
Heaven  tor  the  proiiitious  concord  which  lus  dislingablied  the 
consultations  for  our  political  happiness. 

A  dnagn  was  also  conceived  ol  establishing  a  general  tax  to  be 
MlmEnistcfed  by  Ihe  fcdctnl  authority.  This  also  liad  its  julvu- 
sarin  and  (aileit 

This  unhappy  prople  srem  10  be  now  suflrting  frmn  popvUr 
OMTTiUions.  (loni  dissensions  among  iIk-  Suies.  and  (mra  Ihe 
actUitl  invasion  nf  fuieixii  ,\nns.  ll»c  cnsin  u(  thrlr  ilrxliny.  All 
nations  havi-  their  eyes  hicil  on  iliv  nwfut  spectacle.  The  first 
wish  prompted  by  humanity  ia  that  lliis  severe  trial  may  issue  in 


MuMm]        DerSCrS  /.V  CO^fFEDEttATIOS.  i»i 

MKh  A  ttvolalion  ol  their  gavemment  as  will  eslablisJi  ibcir  union. 
ud  ratdcT  (I  ihr  pofcni  ol  irtnquiUilf,  (rrcdom,  and  happincu; 
tht  oeu,  thai  the  asylum  uodei  wliici).  we  liust.  the  enjoynKnt 
at  liicM  blcsfings  will  «pmlily  be  Hccurrd  in  iliis  ratinirjr.  may 
Rtiiic  anil  conMt«  llwni  [oc  ilie  cai:i»tn>j>he  <A  their  onn. 

I  mike  no  apaloin'  lor  having  dwelt  »o  long  on  the  conlempla- 
lioti  ol  thwe  (cdeial  preceJtnu.  Ex))«ieiicc  is  the  oracle  of 
Imlb;  ami  whcrr  Iti  rmiMintrt  srr  ui>ci)ui vocal,  ihry  ought  to  be 
cwkIumkc  and  sacml.  The  imporlani  truth,  which  it  iinccnii»i>« 
eaHy  proaounces  in  Ibc  present  eate,  i*  that  n  sovereignty  over 
tocenigns.  ^i  govcmmeni  orer  Koteniineiits, »  legutaiioii  I<w  com- 
nunilia  as  contra<li«iingui<hc«l  from  individuals,  as  it  U  a  solw- 
nw  in  theory,  so  in  practice  it  ii  sutitTntive  o(  the  order  aiw!  ends 
*iijn\  polity,  by  subitituiing  vMetut  in  place  of  law,  or  the 
ttntntniie  (wrctoit  ol  the  svMrti  in  place  of  the  mild  and  s:itutaty 
tHrtitaot  the  mugistrticy.  Publics. 


Na  21.  OmJt^m^mlJnra^.  OM««b*t  •>,  lAO  HailliltOn. 

SPECIFIC  DEFECTS  IN  THE  CONFEDERATION. 

A'luatli^H  tf  lavti — tfo  mttlital  gvoranty  tf  itaU gntrmiunit — Daa- 
fffai  fiUiMUly  9f  Jrifrliim — Ai/t'Onljj;/!  ef  a  Halintal gtaianly — 
Syikm  «/  fiMfffai  and  ill  tmf<ii'Hiii — lyiJSiutlr  in  finJiiif;  a  itfiii  a/ 
JItwCww-  Companion  teltnttn  lk<  ilatei  iw  rts/inl  U  xva/li — Csntfttx 
tnriri  rf  wtaitk  ami  M-taHi  ttilily — latfitalily  t/  lajanim  tun  lo 
iativy  Unimt—  Tk4  nalisna!  gitfrumeiil  mail  raiit  ill  SMm  TtvritMi 
—  Ttmjnuy  t/  Ittitilifn  h  i/ulriiult  ilirl/ —  Tatti  tn  nrliilii  tf  ii^- 
tmt»flif»  frtKritt  tiiir  fton  limit — I>iiliiulign  Mteffit  iinlirttt  aitJ 
Urtcl  lasts— iHfiitittin  iHKehttd  mlk  Jiml  Itxet. 

n  tkf  Pe^fit  0/  tht  Stale  ef  New  York: 

Having  in  the  three  last  numbers  taken  a  summary 
re»icw  ti(  itie  principal  circumslancvs  and  events  which 
have  depicted  the  Rcnlus  and  fate  of  oihor  confederate 
IDvcrnmcntti.  I  shall  now  proceed  in  the  cnumera- 
tjoo  of  the  oiosl  important  of  those  defects  which  have 
hitherto  disappuinted  our  hopes  from  the  syftletn  estab- 
tiaheil  amonj;  ourselves.  To  form  a  safe  and  satisfac- 
torjr  jtKlgmeni  of   the   proper  remedy,  it  is  absolutely 


134 


wjyr  OP  SAtfcrioN  to  laws. 


!«•.« 


necessary  tlint  we  sliottiti  be  well  acquaiotcd  with  tbe 
extent  and  malignity  of  the  disease. 

The  next  most  palpable  defect  of  the  subsisting  Con- 
federation  is  the  total  want  of  a  sanction  to  its  laws. 
The  United  States,  as  now  composed,  have  no  powers  to 
exact  ul>e<li«ncc,  or  punish  disobedience  to  their  re»o1a> 
tions,  either  by  pecuniary  mulcts,  \>j  a  suspension  or 
divestiture  of  priTilcscs,  or  by  any  other  constitutional 
mode.  There  is  no  ex|}re$N  delegntinn  of  jtulhurtty  to 
them  to  use  force  against  delinquent  members;  and  if 
Ach  a  right  should  be  ascribed  to  the  federal  head,  as 
resulting  from  the  nature  of  the  social  compact  between 
the  States,  it  must  be  by  inference  and  construction, 
in  the  face  of  that  part  of  the  second  article,  by  which 
it  is  decbred,  "  that  each  State  shall  retain  every  power, 
jurisdiction,  and  right,  not  txpretsly  delegated  to  the 
United  Slates  In  Congress  assembled."  There  is, 
doubtless,  a  striking  alraiirdily  in  snpposing  that  a 
right  of  this  kind  does  not  exist,  but  we  are  reduced 
to  the  dilemma  cither  of  embracing  that  supposition, 
preposterous  as  it  may  seem,  or  of  contravening  nr 
explaining  away  a  provision  which  has  been  of  bte  a 
repeated  theme  of  the  eulogies  of  those  who  oppose 
the  new  Constitution;  and  the  want  of  which  in  that 
plan,  has  been  the  subject  of  much  plausible  animadver- 
sion and  severe  criticism.  If  we  are  uitwilling  to 
impair  the  force  of  this  <i|ip)aiided  provision,  we  shall  t>e 
obliged  to  conclude  that  the  United  States  afford  the 
extraordinary  spectacle  of  a  government  destitute  even 
of  the  shadow  of  constitutional  power  to  enforce  the 
execution  of  its  own  laws.  It  will  appear,  from  the 
specimens  which  have  been  cited,  that  the  American 
Confederacy,  in  this  particular,  stands  discriminated 
from  every  other  institution  of  a  similar  bind,  and  ex- 
hibits a  new  and  unexampled  phenomenon  in  the  political 
world. 

The  want  of  a  mutual  guaranty  bf  the  State  govern- 
ments  is  annlhcr  capital  iniperfcction  in  the  federal  plan. 
There  is  nnthing  of  this  kind  declared  in  the  articles  lltat 


BisillM] 


CASS  or  tfASSACffUSETTS. 


"5 


cnniposc  it:  and  to  imply  a  tacit  guaranty  from  coiisi<l> 
cniivns  of  utility  would  be  a  still  aiore  flagrant  (lefKtrturc 
Iroiii  the  clause  which  has  been  mentioned,  than  to  imply 
a  tacit  power  uf  cocrciun  from  the  like  cuniiideratiunti. 
The  want  of  a  giiarunty,  tliough  it  might  in  its  cons«> 
4l«enc«  endanger  the  Union,  docs  not  so  immediately 
atbck  its  existence  as  the  want  of  a  cuiitrtiluttonal 
unction  to  its  lawx, ' 

Without  a  guaranty  the  assistance  to  be  derived  from 
the  Union  in  repelling  those  domestic  dangers  which 
OUT  MimetimeK  threattn  the  existence  of  the  St:ttc  con* 
ttitations,  musi  be  renounced.  Usurpation  may  rear  its 
crat  in  each  State,  and  trample  upon  the  liberties 
>)(  the  people,  while  the  national  tC'vernmetit  could 
leplly  do  nothing  more  than  behold  its  encroach- 
nunts  with  indignation  and  regret.  A  successful  faction 
ny  erect  a  tyranny  on  the  ruina  of  order  and  law,  while 
nn  nccor  could  consiitultonalty  be  afforded  by  the 
UiMBto  the  friends  and  supporters  of  the  government. 
Tkc  tempestuous  situjition  from  which  .Miiss.~i(*hvi»etts 
lus  scarcely  emerged  evinces  that  dangers  of  this  kind 
tm  arc  not  merely  speculative.     Who  can  deter- 

*••  mine  what  might  have  been  the  issue  of  her 

Utt  convulsions,  i(  the  malcontents  had  been  headed  by 
*  Ocur  or  by  a  Cromwell  ?  Who  can  predict  what  effect 
a  despotism,  establiithed  in  Massachusetts,  u<iuld  have 
■pon  the  liberties  of  New  Hampshire  or  Rhode  Island,  of 
Oiaaecticut  or  New  Vork? 

The  inordinate  pride  of  State  importance  has  sng- 
i£oted  to  some  minds  an  objection  to  the  principle  of  a 
faranty  in  the  federal  government,  as  involving  an 
■Scions  interference  in  the  domestic  concerns  of  tlie 
oeabcrs.  A  scrnpic  of  this  kind  would  deprive  us  of 
"le  of  the  principal  advantages  to  be  expected  from 
'inion,  and  can  only  flow  from  a  misapprehensiun  of  the 


TtwConpewof  lb«  Coa  federal  ion  1ia4  taken  oiw  iteptovud  tudi  % 
p>nnl«  by  inwnins  iii  the  Oiiliiuince  for  llie  (inTcriiineiil  ot  the 
^nA.We4  IVctttnrjr,  >  <)iiiim  i^nHninlociai;  ■  (V^iiitilinii  govcmmoDl 


136 


IKADEQUACy  OF  QUOTAS. 


ai«.ii 


nature  of  the  provision  itself.  It  could  be  no  impeili- 
mcnt  to  reforms  of  the  Sutc  constituiioits  by  a  nujurit/ 
of  the  peojile  in  a  legal  iind  peaceable  mode.  This  right 
would  remain  undiminished.  The  j>uarunty  could  only 
operate  against  changes  to  be  effected  by  violence 
Toward  the  prevention  of  cidamtlics  of  this  kind,  too 
many  cliecks  cannot  be  provided.  The  peace  of  society 
and  the  stability  of  tjovcrnnicnt  depend  absolutely  on 
the  efficacy  of  the  precautions  adopted  on  this  head. 
Where  the  whole  power  of  the  government  is  in  Die 
hands  of  tfic  people,  there  is  the  less  pretense  fur  tlie  um: 
of  violent  remedies  m  partial  or  occasional  distempers  of 
the  State.  The  itaiural  curt!  for  an  ill-ailmtnistralion, 
in  a  popular  or  representative  consiiiuiion,  is  a  change 
of  men.  A  guaranty  by  the  national  authority  would  be 
as  much  leveled  against  the  usurpations  of  rulers  as 
against  the  ferments  and  outrages  of  faction  and  sedition 
in  the  community. 

The  principle  of  regulating  the  contributions  of  the 
Stales  to  the  common  treiisury  by  qvoia^  is  another 
fundamental  error  in  the  Confederation.  Its  repug- 
nancy to  an  adequate  supply  of  the  national  exigencies 
ha»  been  alrcikdy  j)ointed  out,  and  has  sufficiently 
appeared  from  the  trial  wb'ch  has  been  made  of  it.'  1 
speak  of  it  now  solely  with  a  view  to  equality  among  ibe 

*  Th«  hiuory  of  ihe  t«uil(t  of  the  (|iKila  tyitem  wak  il«Ictied  by 
llaicillan.  in  hu  tpntb  on  Uw  K«N>rl,  u  foUowi : 

"  I'be  uBiicTUl  ilc1m<|eency  oi  (h«  Stitct  iliiiiiiti:  ihe  <**i  >k>l)  be 
paaed  om  u-lth  the  ImR  mciitiun  u(  It.  'I'lie  imiIiIk  cm<>uiaXBiral> 
wtr«  ■  ptMuUc  aiHil^T  (or  iliil  drli mi •«■<■} ;  ani  it  na*  hajml  the  pcK* 
wDvId  nar«  priKluted  gieaicr  fiunilnaliif.  Tht  ctptrionil  bu  ilitajt. 
pointed  lhil1iop«  lo  a  dctiec  which  cohIoumU  the  koal  ta^pilne.  A 
coraparaltie  ficw  of  the  umipliuMa  oi  llic  icversi  Suua  for  ih*  hw 
Uxi  rtan  will  liimUli  a  tiiihinf;  teuitl. 

"  t>iiring  thai  iwtHxI.  m\  nfy^titt  h;  a  nuicment  on  oiii  fit«.  New 
Hampihiie.  Nofin  Carolina.  S'nilk  Camliiia.  and  Ccoi];ia  ha*e  p*aJ 
MMhiliS.  I  Hy  DdChinf.  heuUK.  Ihc  only  OLtnial  )ia]riDciii  b  ihc  litlltli( 
uam  111  about  ttven  ihouunil  .(..llnii  liy  Ntu  lliiiu|n.liice.  Siiiilli  Cam- 
tllu  Imlecd  liah  ctnliU,  lial  tlicke  aic  innr  >  •<•  ..■-••■  •  .liMi-nul  on  (ba 
MPfiBo*  lumnlml  li^hm  iluTiDK  >W  nu,  '  I  hrl  |i«cullu 

nulciiap  and  «mli«ii  whiW  (he  iaiiwUi.i  ' 

"  Contmticul  and  DehiraTc  hare  |iai<l  atnj.ii  <.i>E-il>ii>i '.  i  iit 

tioM;    Hauadiiuctu,  RbuUa    laUiid,  aiul   Miiylaul.  a)  .U, 


'BMDlMt 


lAMDS  A.VD  FOPULATIO.V. 


"J 


lales.  Those  who  have  been  accustomed  lo  contem- 
iaxe  the  circumttanircs  which  produce  niid  constitute 
lutional  wealth,  must  be  satialicd  thai  there  is  no  com- 
utoQ  !(tandar<l  or  barometer  by  which  the  degrees  of  it  can 
be  awertained.  Neither  the  value  of  Inndc  nor  the 
numbers  of  the  people,  which  have  been  successively 
firopoied  as  the  rule  of  State  contributions,  has  any  pre- 
(enaon  to  being  a  just  representative.     If  we  compare 

I  the  vealth  of  the  United  NelhcHaods  with  that  of  Russia 
•r  Germany,  or  even  of  Krance,  and  if  we  at  the  s:ime 
line  compare  the  total  value  of  the  lands  and  the  a(i:t{re- 
{ite  population  of  that  contracted  district  with  the 
lAial  value  of  the  lands  and  the  aggregate  popniation  of 
ttw  immense  rei;ion<i  of  either  of  ths  three  la^t-men- 
ticacd  cnuiitrics,  we  shall  at  once  discover  that  there  is 
no  comparison  between  the  proportion  of  either  of  these 
t>i>  objects  and  that  of  the  relative  wealth  of  Uiose 

'■'");■■><■  >bout  ihrec-liftliv :  [^nntylviiila  nearly  Ihe  whole ;  Rnd  Ncir 
Wk  motv  iluii  Iwi  <|iiata, 

"'tlieaB  |>ri'i><itti<in«  uc  ukra  on  ihe  iprcir  requisrlioni :  ih*  indent* 
bra  Inm  *ety  paitially  ptiil,  and  in  llicii  iiFcttnt  ttalc  ue  o(  little 
WEuaM. 

"  The  (inymcnlt  (nia  the  Pcdent  Ireuury  have  ilectined  rapidly  cKh 

yttt.    The  wbiile  iBioiint  fiv  llicrc  vnn  Msl.  in  ^|";l;ie,  lii»  nol  tifcedeil 

ll.4aD.0uj.  14  wlikh  Nfw  Vmk  lim  r-iid  one  liuiiilied  )>rt  ttnt.  mure 

pfo[>f<rlion.     Thi»  inm,  lilllc  more  lh«n  $400,000  a  vear.  it 

be  cun(eiT«il.  hat  been  eihauilcii  in  Ihe  luppoil  oi  ihe  civil 

■It  ui  ihe    lliiuiii    iiid  Ihe  nei-eVNliy   |;ii.-inli  atid    |>«ri«tii( 

mciulk.  and  on  IliP  (mnlieti ;  trilhonl  ni>y  iiirplii*  lot  |>a]r< 

|ian  •>(  III*  iletil.  foreign  ot  domtMk.  principal  or  iniereM. 

Ii^i  ar«  tDniiniiflllgr  growine  vorte  :  the  UtI   year  in  pariicular 

pnhced  leu  lliui  floo.ooo,  and  thai  from  only  lua  ur  three  .Sut«. 

Sneial  M  (be  States  kivc  been  vi  I'int;  unacrnMomrd  lii  |>«y.  ll'al  lliey 

«™  iin  tuii|;ci  tiniiTiiicI  (Ten  alioul  ihp  ap^virancn  "f  <yini|>lian'.'e, 

"<  iiTTr-rrlkul  anil  N'ew  Jency  have  nlnioil   (ormally  declined  I'^ying 

Tli«  iBtcn^iblc  niAiive  ii.  the  non-conciitfcncc  of  ihii  Slaie 

t  lyiicni.      Ike  re-jl  nne  niual  lie  conjectured  from  Ihe  fwt. 

i.jt'.iLL,  il  I  uiiiii-r^fjiit^l  th«  HEV|>r  u\  tuunic  late  reAolaliona. 

111!  lUr  inieirit  ihi?  pap  apon  her  annmptiiiii  III  her  own 

I.    1^1  !i  cnt«  iherc  wilJ  li«  little  coining  from  het  to  the  tJfiitcil 

rti-.  uitu%  lo  be  biiiiging  mitlers  lu  a  criMk 

P'  I  iijiiji)'  kuppoat   of   the  ftiteii]  ijoi'eriiRienI  hai  of  lale  de- 

]  eallrety  uiani  I'ciiniylvaKia  and   New  Viitk.      If   fcnniyU 

.  lo  cimliona  li«(  air),  shat   will  be  Ibe  lilualiun  of   New 

An-  we  willinc  lo  be  ifae  Atlu  of  the  Unton  ?  m  ue  wo  willing 


L--     .1  - 


\"<%.  I 


to  tm  a  {wiUb  ?  ■'— Bwroit. 


I3S 


CAUSES  OF  XATIOA'Al    WEALTH. 


rva.« 


nations.  ]f  the  like  parallel  were  to  be  nia  between 
several  of  the  American  States,  it  would  (arnisfa  a  like 
result.  Let  Virginia  be  contrasted  with  North  Carolina, 
Pennsylvani.i  willi  Connecticut,  or  Maryland  with  New 
Jersey,  and  wc  shall  be  convinced  that  the  respective 
abilities  of  those  States,  in  relation  to  revenue,  bear 
little  or  no  analogy  to  their  comparative  stock  in  Inndt 
or  to  their  comparative  population.  The  position  may 
be  equally  illustrated  by  a  similar  process  between 
ttie  cijtintiex  of  the  sume  State.  No  man  who  is 
acquainted  with  the  State  of  New  York  will  doubt 
that  the  active  wealth  of  Kings  County  bears  a  much 
greater  proportion  to  that  of  Montgomery,  than  it 
would  appear  to  be  if  we  should  take  cither  the  total 
value  of  the  lands  or  the  total  number  of  the  people  as 
a  criterion! 

The  wealth  nf  nations  depends  upon  an  inRnitc  variety 
of  causes.  Situation,  soil,  climate,  the  nature  of  the 
productions,  the  nature  of  the  government,  the  genius 
of  the  citixens,  the  degree  of  information  they  possess, 
the  state  of  commerce,  of  arts,  of  industry — these  cir- 
cumstances and  many  more,  too  complex,  minute,  or 
adventitious  to  admit  of  a  particular  specification,  occa* 
sion  differences  hardly  conceivable  In  the  relative 
opulence  and  riches  of  different  countries.  The  conse- 
quence clearly  'm  ()>at  there  can  be  no  common  measure 
of  national  wealth,  and,  of  course,  no  general  or  station- 
ary rule  by  which  the  abitity  of  a  Slate  tu  pay  uxes 
can  be  determined.  The  attetnpt,  therefore,  tci  rc£ulate 
the  contributions  of  the  members  of  a  confederacy  by 
any  such  rulr  c:mnot  fail  to  be  productive  of  glaring 
inequality  and  extreme  oppression. 

This  inequality  would  of  itself  be  stiGlicient  in  America 
to  work  the  eventual  destruction  of  the  Union,  if  an; 
mode  of  enforcing  a  compliance  with  its  requisitions 
could  be  devised.'    The  suffering  States  would  not  long 

I  An  •mn|ila  nl  Ikl*  Inrlh  vn  lliv  altcoiitml  nalljficaliua  \rf  KoBtti 
Caiolina  III  llif  i>roltrtire  Uriffl  "I  iS.iJ.  which  (rom  Iwn  [point  ol  Weir 
pl(Md  uiJali  bunWni  «■>  Ike  Sonili  fot  (lie  bcDB&l  ol  Ihe  North.     Mon 


^pUtMl      ADJUSTMENT  OF  mBQUAUTIBS.  "9 

^Busctit  to  remain  sssociatcd  upon  »  principle  which  dis- 

^Rbutes  the  public  burdens  with  so  unequal  a  hand,  and 

^which  was   calculated   lo   impoverish   and   oppress   the 

citizens  of  some  States,  white    those   of   others  would 

Karccty   be  conscious  of   the  small  proportion   of  the 

■right  Uiey  were  required  to  sustain.     This,  however,  is 

M  eril  inseparable   from   the   principle  of  quotas  and 

raiuisitions. 

There  is  no  method  of  steering  clear  of  this  inconven- 

but  by  authorizing  the   national  government  to 

Q  revenues  in  its  own  way.     Imposts,  excises, 

leral,  all  duties  upon  articles  of  consumption, 

nuy  be  compared  to  a  fluid  which  will,  in   time,  find  its 

rcl  with  the  means  of  paying  them.     The  amount  to 

contributed  by  each  citiicn  will  in  a  degree  be  at  his 

m  option,  and  can  be  regulated  hy  an  attention  to  his 

lunrces.     The  rich  may  be  extravagant,  the  poor  can 

Ik  frugal;  and  private  oppression  may  always  he  avoided 

a  judicious  selection  of  objects  proper  for  such  impo- 

ioia.     If  inequalities  should  arise  in  some  States  from 

[nttcson  particular  objects,  these  will,  in  all  pmbability, 

coonterbalanccd  by  proportional  inequalities  in  other 

tet  from  the  duties  on  other  objects.     In  the  course 

lime  and  things,  an  equilibrium,  as  far  as  it  is  attain- 

^le  in   so   complicated   a   subject,  will  be   established 

cvtrywhere.     Of  if  inequalities  should  still   exist,   they 

^^cvld  neither  be  so  great  in  their  degree,  so  uniform  in 

^^beir  operation,  nor  so  odious  in   their  appearance,  as 

^BUk  which  would  necessarily  spring  from  quotas,  upon 

^poy  scale  that  can  possibly  be  devised. 

"■■"iV-  the  EatI  wit  >liniM<  n  unaniRtoui;  in  opponn^  what  tt  deemeil 
■tBletwir  uf  the  Wtvl  anil  Souih  lo  shill  an  undue  ihme  of  Una- 
*>M  apon  Uw  fonaer  Mclio*.  in  the  intomc  tai.  and  though  rctUiancc 
'■fctto  wa*  only  iwcnly  tlmwii  in  the  cuuili,  (hire  can  lin  iiu  iloiil>l 
1^  a  lapft  porttoii  of  ihuie  h  h<>  wctr  1  ialil*  lo  pay  ihflm  were  (jiiil*  ■» 
■'I'imIiibI  ii>  nnllKf  l)i<  law  by  evaiiuni  ea  aclunl  fnliilicallon,  as  (be 
^^■kCaniliniini  wrtc  in  \iyi.  Ihe  Hile  iiifl«crite  beina  in  lUe  <hanite 
"Mlhodi  BUlde  nemuiy  by  tlie  inieneninj;  ycaii.  Both  tnclilenU  go 
Uiknvbdlwabtolultty  fulllc  il  i>  <ui  iinr  kvik.ii  l>>  icck  ti>  i<ii|>cHciliiF 
^^gMiMtinc  '"■"lo*  '>■>  anoihvT.  (ur  it  diihI  riiU  nilxt  in  rnniun  of  tii* 


I  JO 


TAXES  Off  COXSUAtPnOff. 


!»•. 


It  is  a  signal  advantage  of  taxes  on  articles  uf  eon- 
sumption  that  ihcy  conuin  in  their  own  nature  a  sccurity 
agaiost  excess.  They  prescribe  their  own  limit,  vliich 
cannot  be  exceeded  without  deTeating  the  end  proposed, 
that  ia,  an  cxtcn&ion  of  the  revenue.  When  applied  to 
this  object,  the  saying  is  as  just  as  it  is  wilty,  that  "in 
political  nrithnietic,  two  and  two  do  not  always  make 
bm  four."    If  duties  arc  too  high,  they  lessen  the 

iro. 3ft.  consumption;   the  collection   is   eluded;   and 

the  product  to  the  treasury  is  not  so  great  as  wlicn  they 
arc  cualined  within  proper  and  moderate  bounds.  This 
forms  a  complete  barrier  against  any  material  oppression 
of  the  citizens  by  taxes  of  this  class,  iind  is  itself  a 
natural  limitation  of  the  power  of  impo.sing  them.' 

Impositions  of  this  kind  usually  fall  under  the  denomi- 
nation of  indirect  taxes,  and  must  for  a  long  time  con- 
stitute the  chief  part  of  the  revenue  raised  in  this 
country.  Those  of  the  direct  kind,  which  principally 
relate  to  land  and  buildings,  may  admit  of  a  rule  of 
apportionment.  Either  the  value  of  land  or  the  number 
of  the  people  may  serve  as  a  standan).  The  state  of 
agriculture  and  the  populuusness  of  a  country  have  been 
considered  as  nearly  connected  with  each  other.  And, 
as  a  rule,  for  the  purpose  intended,  numbers,  in  the  view 
of  simplicity  and  certainly,  are  entitles)  to  a  preference. 
In  every  country  it  i<  a  herculean  task  to  obtain  a  valua- 
tion of  the  land;  In  a  country  imperfectly  settled  and 
progressive  in  improvement,  the  difficulties  are  increased 
almost  to  impracticability.  The  expense  uf  an  accurate 
valuation  is,  in  alt  situations,  a  formidable  objection.  In 
a  branch  of  taxation  where  no  limits  to  the  discretion 
of  the  government  are  to  be  found  in  the  nature  of  things, 
the  establishment  of  a  lixcd  rule,  not  incompatible  with 
the  end.  may  be  attended  with  fewer  inconveniences  than 
to  leave  that  discretion  altogether  at  large. 

PtlBLIIJS. 


'  Itanriltain  Ktitelj  cosccivctl  lhi>  IXMai;*  fA  h  uriR  MU  tnniait  pur. 
poscty  "(iB  ittt  trdnClliHi  ol  irvmur  liy  nun^  of  lurfl  cieaAi**  ram 
nf  dulvM  B>  III  rnliKV  llir  itn^wnaliiHti  la  a  Biinimuia, — CurrtML. 


KKCVLATIOfl  OF  CO.VAl£flC£. 


IJl 


No.  22. 


(JKr*  r*n  Paiktt,  DfetBOrtt  M.  ti»ti 


Uamiltoa 


DEFECT  OF  THE  ARTiri.ES  OF  CONFEDERA- 
TION AS  TO  COMMKRCE,  ARMY,  STATE 
RQUAI.ITY,  JUDICIARY,  AND  CONGRESS. 

VJH/  •//esurr  O  rtfMhlt  nmmiTtt—Cfmmtrtial  trttliti  imfniiHt — 
Stftttti  frekiUH^ai  o/ttrtatH  tiatff — Irrilaliim  itlmrn  Iki  Haiti  af  Iht 
Uiiii  Statn — C'Btmettt  tf  Gtrmauy — (Jnf^Mi  b/  laiJitrs — Citmftlitifn 
W  Tiimiti  in  ttftmt  anJ  imntifi — t-fiial  luffwaic  of  tkl  itjUi  a  grial 
mi~And  ffHtradiilf  a  /uHJummlnI  ma-cin  tf  TifHbtiien  gn^tummt 
—MiKfiity  g^vtrn'ttM — SimttiMg  trili  fit  Cmgrtii — A  eiftt  em  gfpJ 
liguttiSm  «i  wf/l  at  «•  kiJ^RtitiU  at  la  /e'tign  Halitit—KffiMiti 
latfia  li  ftrttin  ttfrmflitn — Oai  Jidvamtafr  */  mtnariky — Bxamfb 
ff  Omt<4  Prifttniti — Crgxenini'  itftti  »/  lit  t»H/rtttTiiti»i»  a  tMMl 
•/  jmdiiiary  fts^r-^Xftfiiily  fer  a  iitfrnnf  IrttHHt —  Thirlm  uf^~ 
™<r  tttirli  an  t-iftiiifilHy — Still  af  a  litlglt  atunHy  er  cftigrttt — 
Tit  mfiitratian  ralifitJ  hy  iht  ilatet,  ittt  ty  ike  ftafit. 

n  thf  Peofle  cj  the  State  of  New  York: 

In  addition  to  the  defects  already  eaumerated  in  the 
uiiting  federal  sjrsteiii,  there  arc  others  of  not  less 
importance,  which  concur  in  rcndcrring  It  ;iltogettier 
anfit  for  the  adminiKtrution  of  the  alfairs  of  the  Union. 

The  want  of  a  power  to  rej[ubte  commerce  Ik  bf  all 
(urties  allowed  to  be  of  the  number.  The  utility  of  such 
a  |»wer  has  been  anticipated  under  the  first  head  of  our 
■m(tiirics;  and  for  this  reason,  as  well  ta  from  the  uni- 
Tfrsiil  conviction  entertained  upon  Ihc  subject,  little 
Bt^  be  added  In  this  jtlacc.  It  is  indeed  evident  on  the 
ouiit  superficial  view  (hat  there  is  no  object,  either  as  it 
rcs{ii-ctK  the  interests  of  trade  or  finance,  that  more 
uronjcly  tiemands  a  federal  superintendence.  The  want 
•A  It  has  already  operated  aw  a  bar  to  the  formation  of 
beneficial  treaties  with  foreign  powers,  and  has  given 
"ccasionib  of  dissaiisf^tction  between  the  Stat<-B.  No 
Biitton  acquainted  with  the  nature  of  our  political  asso- 
LUti'm  would  be  unwise  enough  to  enter  into  stipulations 
•itbibe  United  States,  by  which  they  conceded  privileges 


I3» 


CONS/STEf/CV  NEEDBD. 


(I«.«l 


of  any  importance  to  them,  while  they  were  apprised  that 
ihe  eng^agements  on  the  part  of  tlie  Union  might  at  any 
moment  be  violated  by  its  members,  and  white  they 
found  from  cxpcriciw^c  that  they  might  cnjuy  cverj- 
advant:tge  they  desired  in  our  markets,  without  erantinj; 
us  any  return  but  such  as  their  momentary  convenience 
might  suggest.'  It  is  not,  therefore,  to  be  wondered 
at  that  Mr.  Jcnkinson,  in  uHhcrinK  into  the  House  of 
Commons  a  bill  for  regulating  the  temporary  intercourse 
between  the  two  countries,  should  preface  its  inlrnduc* 
tion  by  a  declaration  that  similar  provisions  in  former 
bills  had  been  found  to  answer  every  purpose  lu  the 
commerce  of  (ire;it  [Iritain,  and  that  it  would  he  prudent 
to  persist  in  the  plan  until  it  should  appear  whether  the 
American  government  was  likely  or  not  to  acquire 
greater  consistency." 


'Thn*.  H  newly  m  I  out  recoOect.  wm  tlie  miuc  tA  hi*  *p«cch  on 
lotradaunc  ilie  lui  liill. — I't:*i.ti:t, 

■  la  177$  htrliaiiieiii  loicil  in  tniirc  cetulion  o(  irsde  u-ith  lb«  n- 
ToUvd  colonin,  biiiI  ihmc  laws  irera  ia  (om  when  the  Inst;  ol  ptwe 
WH  lijpied  ID  1783.  In  thM  TMr  Pill  inlroilaced  ■  bill  to  "  adiMit  ifae 
Amencftni  into  the  beneibol  EaclitK  <««iMcn«  on  UmH  «(  eqwilit; 
with  tlM  EngNah  lulijett."  A*  llie  iiiilul  tle|i«rti>re  (rniii  the  "  bimcui- 
lil«  ti]r»t(in  "  of  Gnal  Britain,  it  tncniiHitmJ  lite  ino%i  olniiBUr  t*m»- 
•nce,  and  prodeced  (ram  Lonl  Sli«fii«l<l  hit  abl*  "  OI-OTiratHim  on  iW 
Connmcrce  tl  ih«  American  St>le»,"  Thi«.  (0|2«(h«>  willi  th«  <l{iiinit«d 
iclion  o(  the  vaiion*  mtci,  pnvred  in  the  Itciliili  |;cneriiinent  that  thef 
could  CAJoy  ihg  <oin<ncrt;c  of  III*  Uaiicd  M;tir>  witltnoi  niikini:  n\j  cob- 
ceniani  wtntwrer.  vnA  (ur  mire  than  Incite  yean  llie  trial*  aat 
"  proviiicinallT  **  r«t^1at«l  by  nrdrrs  in  coiiacil.  In  a  report  iit  a  Com- 
mlilee  of  Ike  l-ordi  n(  the  I'riv^  Council  on  (he  Trwlc  ut  Gmi  Britain 
wfth  ihc  United  Stalei,  tTi)l  < Wubin);i>iB.  iSSS).  thn  rcry  iiuBliou  o[ 
the  prMlkalily  o(  pjoltil'ili'int  ami  mtraJnta  from  ibe  lliinih  i>Uai)- 
point  vtrn  ttAnit^rrl.  aii<t  decitV^vl  al;a■l^^t,  n  trrtaiii  to  ic^tilt  Iti  a  loat  <A 
trade  t»  Ihe  mliicliii^  tyinnlTy  e<|Bal  it>  ihc  injury  ilonr  l<i  the  muBliT 
diicriminiUe-l  acnimt.  In  Amerin  alter  the  otj^nniialin*!  ol  the  natkuu) 
wivemnieoi.  lUmilton  wi|>p(Mieil  an  efjnally  cnltchiened  policy,  hut  \ti- 
lenon,  la  hii  report  no  I'LinitncrcE  (I?-))),  ndioealed  a  conlrkty  itHem. 
whiclj  MailivM  alteni|ile>l  tti  oirry  out  in  (Cnn^rr^n  hj  hii  rv«»litl»oaa 
kA  Janiuiy  ■>..  ITq^.  Fmni  that  day  ihrie  lia>  (reipentfy  niWeil  ■ 
ttrongly  iiiii-Biitiili  party  in  Cantjien  wliiih  hai  lou^ht  to  fon-e  ip«<al 
prliilegei  from  our  grcaleu  mttnim-)  by  lecblaiion  unlrietidly  lu  her 

Cflinmetce  antt   .l.ij--- •        Mir  rniivl  rrxnl  iL>nr — ' c- I'l-  ■•■— .imn 

hare    lieen   lo  liij.  :  .nn]   ij.i«   on    1:  trtx 

Britain    ipl'ipti   at"  Koney,  ami  jd.  i,         <    1    -  .     n.  i^.hhU 

iMt  bapotlcd  in  Aaiencan  tklp<.'-Ei>mit. 


BunUlM)    CONFLICT  OF  STATE  REGULATIONS. 


IM 


m^ 


III  I 

i 


Several  States  have  endeavored,  by  separate  protiibu 
tions,  restrictions,  and  exclusions,  to  influence  the  con- 
■h  iJuct  of  that  kingdom  in  tltis  particular,  but 

■fcU.  the  want  o(  concert,  arising  from  the  want  of 

a  general  authority  anO  from  clashing  and  dissimilar 
lixm  in  tlic  State,  has  hitherto  frustrated  every  cxperi- 
acot  of  the  kind,  and  nill  continue  to  do  so  as  long  as 
same  obstacles  to  a  uniformity  of  measures  continue 
etist. 

The  inlcrfcrinK  and  unncighborly  regulations  of  some 
Stitcs,  contrary  to  the  true  spirit  of  the  Union,  Iiave.  in 
In  ilillcrcnt  instances,  given  just  cause  of  uni* 

■»'l-  brage  and  complaint  to  others,  and  it  is  to  be 

frared  that  examples  of  this  nature,  if  not  restrained  by 
i  ratiotial  control,  would  be  multiplied  and  extended  till 
ll«y  became  not  less  serious  sources  of  animosity  and 
•Ittcord  than  injurious  impedimrnts  to  the  intercourse 
betireen  the  different  parts  of  the  Confederacy.  "The 
commerce  of  the  (icfnian  empire*  is  in  continual  tram- 
nds  from  the  multiplicity  of  the  duties  which  the  several 
prinrcK  and  states  exact  upon  the  mercliandises  passing 
Ihroasb  their  territories,  by  means  of  which  the  fine 
Dreams  and  navigable  rivers  with  which  licrmanyissu 
happily  watered  arc  rendered  almost  useless."  Though 
the  genius  of  the  people  of  this  country  might  never  per- 
mit this  description  to  be  strictly  applicable  to  us,  yet 
we  may  reasonably  etpcct,  from  the  gradual  conllicis  of 
State  regulations,  that  the  citizens  of  each  would  at 
length  come  to  be  considered  and  treated  by  the  others 
in  no  better  light  than  that  of  foreigners  and  aliens. 
The  power  of  raising  armies,  by  the  m"st  obvious  con- 
uctinn  of  the  articles  of  the  Confederation,  is  merely 
luwer  of  making  requisitions  upon  the  States  for  quotas 
men.  This  practice,  in  the  course  of  the  late  war,  wns 
found  replete  with  obstructions  to  a  vigorous  and  to  an 
economical  system  of  defense.  It  gave  birth*  to  3  com- 
petition  between   the   States  which   created    a  kind   of 


*  Eacydo^U,  anldo  "  Eininic'—PuBUVt. 


134 


STATE  LEVIES  OF  TROOPS. 


Ula.n 


auction  for  men.  In  order  to  furni&h  the  quuia»  re<|iiirciJ 
of  them,  they  outbid  cacit  other  till  bounties  srow  lo  an 
enormous  and  insui>i>ortable  sine.'  The  hope  of  a  still 
ftirther  increase  alfunl«:d  an  inducement  to  those  who 
were  disposed  to  serve  to  procrastinate  their  enlistment, 
and  disinclined  them  from  engaging  for  any  considerable 
periods.  Hence  slow  and  scanty  levies  of  men  in  the 
mostcriticid  emergencies  of  our  affairs;  short  enlistments 
at  an  unparalleled  expense;  continual  Ructuaiions  in  the 
troops,  riiinuuK  to  their  discipline  »nd  fnbjceting  the 
public  safety  frequently  to  the  perilous  crisis  of  .1  dis- 
banded army.  Hence,  also,  those  oppressive  expedients 
for  niistng  men  which  were  upon  several  occasions  prac- 
ticed, and  which  nolhing  but  the  enthusiasm  of  liberty 
would  have  induced  the  people  to  endure. 

This  method  uf  raising  troops  is  not  more  unfriendly 
to  economy  and  rigor  than  it  is  to  an  e(|ual  distribution 
of  the  burden.  The  States  near  the  seat  of  war,  inHucnced 
by  motives  of  self-preservation,  made  efforts  lo  furnish 
their  quotas,  which  even  exceeded  their  abilities;  while 
those  at  a  distance  from  danger  were,  fur  the  most  pan, 
as  remiss  as  the  others  were  diligent  in  their  exertions. 
The  immediate  pressure  uf  this  inequality  was  nut  in  thin 
case,  as  in  that  of  the  contributions  of  money,  alleviated 
by  the  hope  of  a  final  liquidation.  The  States  which  did 
not  pay  their  proportions  of  money  might  at  least  be 
charged  with  their  deficiencies;  but  no  account  could  be 
formed  uf  the  deficiencies  in  the  supplies  of  men.  We 
shall  not,  however,  see  much  reason  to  regret  the  want 
of  this  hope,  when  we  consider  how  little  prospect  liiere 
is  that  the  most  delinquent  States  will  ever  be  able  to 
make  eompenK;it!on  for  their  pecuniary  failures.  The 
system  of  quotas  and  requisitions,  whether  it  be  applied 
to  men  or  money,  is,  in  every  view,  a  system  of  imtKcility 
In  the  Union,  and  of  incqoaUty  and  injustice  among  the 
members. 

The  right  of  equal  suffrage  among  the  Stales  Is  annther 


>Tbe  wnc  nnl  *w  miiKeUod  In  Uw  Cliil  War— Eomw. 


■i^lUri 


MAJORITY  OF  STATES. 


»3S 


Hoc 

i 


ciccptionable  part  of  the  Confederation.     Every  i^Iea  of 
pro|x»niua  and  every  rule  uf  fair  representation   con- 
In  spire  to  condemn  a  principle   which  gives  to 
■••'*■  Khodc  Istiind  4n  cquiil  weight  in  the  scale  of 
po»cr  with  Massachusetts,  or  Connecticut,  or  New  York; 
oKltu  Uclairarc  an  equal  voice  in  the  national  delibcra- 
tioesvilh  Pennsylvania,  or  Virginia,  or  North  Camlifla. 
is   operation   contradicts  the    fundamental   maxim   of 
pnklican  jcovernmeuc,  which  requires  that  the  sense  of 
majority  should  prevail.     Sophistry  may  reply  that 
KiTcrei];Ms  arc  equal,  and  that  a  majority  of  the  votes  of 
die  States  will  be  a  majority  of  confederated  America. 
Hut  this  kind  of  logical  legerdemain  wilt  never  counter- 
KX  the  plain  »U[rs;e^tioiis  itf  justice  and  common-gense. 
Ii  may  happen  that  this  majority  of  Slates  is  a  small 
waority  of  the  people  of  America;*  and  two-thirds  of 
die  people  of  America  could  not  long  be  persuaded,  upon 
tbe  credit  of  artilicial  distinctions  and  syllogistic  subtle* 
tics,  to  submit  their  interests  to  the  m.inagemcnt  and 
disposal  of  one-third.     The  larger  .Slates  would  after  a 
while  revolt  from  the  idea  of  receiving  the  law  from  the 
Mnaller.     To  acquiesce  in  such  a  privation  of  their  due 
uaportance  in  the  political  scale  would  he  not  merely  to 
be  insensible  to  the  love  of  power,  but  even  to  sacrifice 
the  desire  of  equality.     It  is  neither  rational  to  expect 
tile  first,   oor  just   to   require    the    last.     The  smaller 
States,  considering  how  peculiarly  their  safety  and  wel- 
fare depend  on  union,  ought  readily  to  renounce  a  pre- 
tension which,  if  not  relinquished,  would  prove  fatal  to 
its  duration. 

It  may  be  objected  to  this,  that  not  seven  but  nine 
States,  or  two-thirds  of  the  whole  number,  must  consent 
to  the  most  important  resolutions;  and  it  may  be  thence 
inferred  tiiat  nine  States  would  always  comprehend  a 
majority  of  the  Union,  liut  this  does  not  obviate  the 
impropriety  of  an  equal  rote  between  States  of  the  most 


'N««  llunfnblie,  Rhode  l*laad,  N«w  Jcncj,  Delaware,  Gtori^, 
ulh  CtrallM,  anil  Uirylanil  ur  ■  niajivily  n(  ihr  irli-Jc  nnniber  tA 
tin  MUn,  but  llirj  ilu  not  contiio  onc-lUinl  ot  the  peo|>lc, — PitnLitis. 


'i6 


JfECATtV£  OF  MINORITY. 


nrp.  Bi 


unequal  dimcnitions  and  populousness;  nor  is  the  Infer- 
ence accurate  in  point  of  fact;  fur  we  can  enumerate 
nine  States  which  conuin  less  than  a  majorily  of  the 
people;*  and  il  is  constitutionally  possible  that  lliese 
oinc  may  give  the  vote.  Ucsides,  there  ,-irc  matters  of 
considerable  moment  determinable  by  a  lure  majnrity; 
and  there  arc  others,  concerning  which  doubts  have 
been  entertained,  which,  if  interpreted  in  favor  of  the 
saHieiency  of  a  vote  of  seven  States,  would  extend  its 
operation  to  interests  of  the  first  magnitude.  In  addi- 
tion to  this,  it  is  to  t>c  observed  that  there  is  a  proba- 
bility of  an  increase  in  the  nun)t)cr  of  Stales,  and  no 
provision  for  a  proportional  augmentation  of  the  ratio 
votes. 

But  this  is  not  all:  what  at  first  sight  may  seem' 
remedy  is,  in  reality,  a  poison.  To  give  a  minority  a 
negative  upon  the  majority  (which  is  always  the  ease 
where  more  than  a  majority  im  retjuisite  to  ■*  decision)  is, 
in  its  tendency,  to  subject  the  sense  of  the  greater  num- 
ber to  that  of  the  lesser.  Congress,  from  the  non-at- 
tcmlance  of  a  few  States  have  been  frerjuently  in  the 
situation  of  a  Polish  diet,  where  a  single  vote  lias  been 
suiiicient  to  put  a  stop  to  ail  their  morcmenls.  A  sixtieth 
]>art  of  the  Union,  which  is  about  the  proportion  nf 
Delaware  and  Rhode  Island,  has  several  times  been  able 
to  oppose  an  entire  bar  to  its  operations,  'i'liis  is  one  of 
those  relinements  which,  in  practice,  has  an  effect  the 
reverse  of  what  is  expected  from  it  in  theory.  The 
necessity  of  unanimity  in  public  bodies,  err  t'f  some* 
thing  approaching  toward  it,  has  been  founded  upon  a 
supposition  that  it  would  contribute  to  security.  But  its 
real  operation  is  to  embarrass  the  administration,  tu- 
destroy  the  energy  of  the  government,  and  to  substitute 
the  pleasure,  caprice,  or  arlilices  of  an  insignifiranl,  tur- 
bulent, or  corrupt  junto,  to  the  regular  d el ilicra lions  and 
decisions  of  a  respecuble  majority.     In  those  ementeo- 


"  A'M  New  \faV  ami  Countciicni  hi  iW  (««p>it>i;  Mrm,  MiJ  ihqr 
will  be  IfB  than  >  m%fit\%f. — FDHJUS. 


OBSTRUCTiVE  LEGISLA  TJO.V. 


137 


duora  nation,  in  which  the  goodness  or  badness,  the 
vnkne&s  or  strenf^th  of  its  government,  is  of  ilie  greatest 
iaiponancc,  there  is  commonly  a  necessity  for  action. 
Tike  public  business  must,  in  some  way  or  other,  go  for- 
*ud.  If  a  pertinacious  minority  can  control  the  opinion 
Ola  majority,  respecting  ihc  best  mode  of  conducting  it, 
tbe  majority,  in  order  (hnt  somclhing  may  be  dune,  most 
coDform  to  the  views  of  the  minority;  and  thus  the 
KoM  of  the  smaller  number  will  overrule  that  of  the 
tmicr,  and  give  a  tone  to  the  national  proceedings. 
HtKe  tedious  delays;  continual  negotiation  and 
ioiriguc;  contemptible  compromises  of  the  public  good. 
Aad  yet,  in  such  a  xyMeni,  tt  is  even  happy  when  such 
Aimpromiftes  can  take  place;  for  upon  some  acf4MonN 
things  will  not  admit  of  accommodation;  and  then  the 
■easures  nf  government  nuist  be  injuriotixly  sus]>ende<l, 
or  fatally  defeated.  It  is  often,  by  the  impracticability 
of  (^Haining  the  concurrence  of  the  necessary  number  of 
*otes,  kept  in  a  state  of  inaction.  Its  situation  must 
always  savor  of  weakness,  sometimes  border  uixni 
anarchy. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  discover  that  a  principle  of  this 
kind  gives  greater  sco]>e  to  foreign  corruption,  a.%  vrclt 
as  to  domestic  faction,  than  that  which  permits  the 
sense  of  the  majority  to  decide;  though  the  contrary  of 
this  has  been  presumed.  The  mistake  has  proceeded 
from  not  attending  with  due  care  to  the  mischiefs  th<it 
may  be  occasioned  by  obstructing  the  progress  of  govern- 
ment at  certain  critical  seasons.  When  the  concurrence 
ni  a  large  number  is  required  by  the  Constitution  to  the 
ilutng  of  any  national  act.  we  are  apt  to  rest  satisfied 
that  all  is  safe,  because  nothing  improper  will  be  likely 
l^ttJane:  but  we  forget  how  much  good  may  be  pre- 
vented, and  how  much  ill  may  Iw  produced,  liy  the  power 
of  hindering  the  doing  what  may  be  necessary,  and  of 
keeping  affairs  in  the  same  unfavorable  posture  in  which 
thejr  may  happen  tn  stand  at  |>:iriteutar  periods. 

Suppose,  for  instance,  we  were  engaged  in  a  war,  in  con- 
junctiun  with  one  foreign  nation,  against  another.     Sup 


"3« 


FOK£lG.V  COR&UPTiOlt. 


»«.! 


posv  the  neceKsity  of  our  situation  dcmanclcd  pcacc,an<J  tbc 
interest  or  aiubitiun  of  our  ally  tcO  him  to  »cck  tfic  prwiccu- 
tiOD  of  t)ie  war,  with  views  that  might  justify  us  in  nulc* 
ing  separate  terms.  In  such  a  state  of  things,  this  ally 
of  ours  would  evidentty  find  it  mucli  easier,  by  his  brilics 
■wKo.  Bi^  intrigues,  to  tie  up  the  hands  of  govera- 

Bfc  mcnt  from  makingi;  peace,  where  two-thirds  of 

all  the  votes  were  requisite  to  that  object,  than  where  a 
simple  majurity  would  suRice.  In  the  fir^t  case,  he 
would  have  to  corrupt  a  smaller  number;  in  the  last,  a 
greater  number.'  Upon  the  s^mc  principle,  it  wonid  be 
much  easier  for  a  foreign  power  with  which  we  were  at 
war  to  perplex  our  councils  and  embarrass  our  exertions. 
And,  in  a  commercial  view,  we  may  be  subjected  to 
similar  inconveniences.  A  nation  with  which  we  might 
have  a  treaty  of  commerce  could  with  mucb  greater 
facility  prevent  our  forming  a  connection  with  her  com- 
{Kiiior  in  trade,  ihougii  such  a  connection  should  be  ever 
so  beneficial  lo  ourselves. 

Evils  of  this  description  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as 
imaginary.  One  of  the  weak  sides  of  republics,  among 
their  numerous  advuntuKcs,  !&  thai  they  afford  too  eaity 
an  inlet  to  foreign  corruption.  An  hereditary  monarch, 
though  often  disposed   to  sacrilicc  his   subjects  to   bis 

'  'I'hii  tttrad  of  ihe  inllnoim  n(  fiircign  ):(>i>nn<nfih(>  w*t  \iy  an  meant 
■ntrasonable,  nunng  ihc  Kerolulkmaiy  Wat  tl>«  Ktpnrh  miiintn  (le- 
queotly  intctfcrnl  1»  ioHnciK-E  l^ng'ciaioiiiil  utioa.  ind  nicd  ictm  utrv- 
iut  IbiiiIi  la  c<:>ciu|il  tMilh  ciHictciAmea  auil  ll»c  prcu.  tccuiini;  fit  faM 
OtHMiliy.  anioni;  irflm  riiipodaql  Ailtnul^^^rt,  uti  iiblriii^tt»fl  Xt\  vm  y^K^ 
envoyt  wA  !■>  ■gm  !■>  a  Irmly  with  firval  ibilitn  u-likh  <tIJ  nol  satui* 
t''ratK»,  Ml  in^iULitDii  aliich  foftunatrl^  uni  ditrt-^anlvJ.  In  1793.  if 
ih«  ptitdic  (IU|Kiii:h«  c4  (*cn^  arr  to  be  bcUt^vr-^  Jrflcrwiii,  i<i  Iti^ 
rnlhiKium  fnc  Ktam.*.  wai  M>p|>)yiii);  liim  wilh  lh«  nnu  cimlideiiltal 
wi'rcu  fA  ihc  nl'inri.  anil,  a  y«t  laict,  ih*  t'icnch  nuiiMier  wrote  hK 
plvv>iiiii«al  llial  l<aM'V>l[<li.  Ihv  S«-'rFTaiy  of  SUlc.  Inraitbdl  him  with 
"  prcdom  "  informalton  awl  riitmllr  oiknl  ("(  nio>n«y.  Daring  ihii 
fierioi)  Cnai  Britain,  Franc«,  and  Sfwin  eaik  had  tti  pirtkwlu  wrttcn 
and  {uamali  in  ibli  cauntry,  in  '    '  '     '   '    ii;xi  in  ihc  Wm,  thr 

Fc*ur:h  niinittci'k  threat  \a  ai  .  1  in  ilii  |mii|>fs.  inJ 

tiis  inlnlfcieiKC  in  lliv  Ptril'li       .  ,  ;T,   ■'■■'     .:."^i--)iai 

lalM,  th«  Brilith  tntitKiMo  in   Sfw  -.)!  tmi   "  iinr 

ll|[IUt]r  nalioaal  KBliurnl  wai  lirlii   '  1  mltal  part  '  -yW. 

A  loielgn  tiarrlei  of  thai  time  nMn  iii  liiu  vojntij  llial  "  llri'i*  wcncJ 
10  1m  nnauf  l^i;luli,  iiuuy  FiEmii,  hut  lew  Ainciicuii.''     Aflcr  tin  anil 


SBTSAYAL  OF  TKUSr, 


'39 


afflbition,  has  so  ^enl  a  |>crftonaI  interest  in  tlie  govern- 
amtand  in  the  external  glory  of  the  aacton,  that  U  is  not 
tatf  (or  a  foreign  power  to  give  him  an  equivalent  for 
whit  he  would  sacrifice  by  treachery  to  the  i.tate.  The 
»<nM  has  accordingly  been  witness  to  few  examples  of 
tlai  ipcctes  of  rnyal  prostitution,  though  there  have  b«cn 
aboAdant  specimens  of  every  other  kind. 

In  republics,  persons  elevated  from  the  mass  of  the 
coBmunity  by  the  suffrages  of  their  fclluw-cittiens,  to 
Uatkias  of  great  pre-eminence  and  power,  may  find  com- 
poaations  for  betraying  their  trust,  which,  to  any  btit 
miadt  animated  and  gnided  by  superior  %'irtue.  may 
ip^r  to  exceed  the  proportion  of  interest  they  have  In 
the  common  stock,  and  to  overbalance  the  obligations  of 
doty.  Hence  it  itt  that  history  furnishes  tis  with  so  many 
•ortifying  examples  of  the  prcvalency  of  foreign  corrup- 
lK>n  in  republican  governments.  How  much  this  contrib- 
nteil  to  the  ruin  of  the  ancient  commonwealths  has  been 
ilrtady  delineated,  (t  is  well  known  that  the  deputies  of 
Ihe  United  Provinces  have,  in  various  instances,  been 
|>ircliascd  by  the  emissaries  of  the  neighboring  kingdoms. 
Th(  Earl  of  Chesterfield  (if  my  memory  serves  me  right), 
ma  letter  to  his  court,  intimates  that  his  success  in  an 
important  negotiation  must  depend  on  his  o]>laining  a 


«  <be  Wir  of  iBit,  which  nurkcil  Ihc  tcrniiiiiilinn  of  mir  vital  inlrmi 
*Ewititin  po)i(in.  Ihe  pditital  ()U«klioni  bcciniF  chieHy  inlcrniil.  Uid 
■lib  ibtin  tm*  introdiKiion  oJ  (ord^^n  influence  diu[j|'eaKJ.  vf  ly  ohkIiIj' 
)*jh«ri  b]P  •  rcMtion  to  Ihe  other  eilreinc  ol  inleiikc  ittiA  iil  lottig^n 
■MWb  Tntetiir  ilii*,  ainud  onlir  >l  jwrlicular  Daliuiii.  mil  <lu«  lo 
'^^tuj  inciilvnis,  bad  alrevlj  hrvn  shown  b^  Ihc  vintrlmenl  of  ib« 
Alinltv  ol  I7<lS,  ind  by  an  anli-ilicn  clautc  ol  the  imenilmFiiU  !□  th* 
^ANituioa  pro|K»«]  bj  the  1  IuiIofiI  conwiiion.  Bm  ike  Eie.il  ciprct- 
''M  d  11  (ound  veil!  in  the  "  Ainoricsii  "  i>r,  muic  cmiiiiunlj  tpMk!ii|;, 
*'"Kbow  NolMiiig"  |arly.  wliiih  htgan  almul  iSjs.  ami  with  varyit>i; 
•'■w  nanifcileiJ  ittinf  ■mil  th«  outbrrak  of  the  Civit  Wir.  A  tecumnoB 
"Jlfc (wling  «ipr«Me>  tlielf  lo-ilaj  in  ihe  A.  P.  A.  It  n  to  b«  noted, 
oWtm.  that  theie  Uter  mflvcnienu  ^ive<l  mote  or  leu  ni  cloalu  to  the 
'AuHiMtmpoulbleKlientfluintnHluCf  rr1ii;>oii>  inlnleniiice  into  Ameri- 
^PQUc*.  The  OMitl  recent  ialrwIiKtion  ol  Ihc  qut^li'iii  <ii  luvrien  in- 
'mm  ma  due  to  m  <ery  hirmlcu  p4i>ate  letter,  «riilen  by  Ihe  iFrititli 
"WtferjBtbe  cainpal|[no(i$SH.  whidi  pitxlaccd  an  ouiburil  of  indiij. 
■■■■M  nftcienl  to  induce  l^  Prr>i<l«iit.  (or  nartibtn  lather  ihui 
dlpleinuic  f«aMn*.  to  rc^ufM  Hw  ici^l  (rf  Il»l  iniaittct.— EnrroK. 


140 


O.VE  S(;P/tEME   TRIBUNAL. 


\%^tk 


majar'i  coniini»jiion  for  one  of  those  deputies.  And  In 
Sweden  the  parties  were  alternately  bought  by  France 
and  England  in  so  biircfacixl  and  notorious  a  manner  that 
it  excited  univer&at  disijust  in  the  nation,  and  wni  a 
principal  cause  that  the  most  limited  monarch  in  Europe, 
in  a  single  day.  without  tumult,  Tiolencc,  or  opposition, 
became  one  of  the  mo<ii  ab-intute  and  uncontrolled. 

A  circumstance  which  crowns  the  defects  of  the  Con- 
federation remains  yet  to  be  mentioned — the  want  of  9 
(4,110,  judiciary  power.  Law.t  are  a  dead  letter  with- 
■"■  out  courts  to  expound  and  define  their  true 

meaning  and  operation.  The  treaties  of  the  United 
States,  to  have  any  force  at  all,  must  be  considered  as 
part  of  the  law  of  the  land.  Their  true  import,  as  far  as 
respects  indt\'iduals,  must,  like  all  other  lavs,  be  ascer- 
tained by  judicial  determioationft.  To  produce  uniform- 
ity in  these  determinations,  they  ought  to  be  submitted, 
in  the  last  resort,  to  one  supreme  tribitnau.  And  this 
tribunal  ought  to  be  instituted  umlcr  the  same  authority 
which  forms  the  treaties  themselves.  These  ingredients 
arc  both  indispensable.  If  there  rs  In  each  State  a  court 
of  final  jurisdiction,  there  may  be  as  many  different  final 
determinations  on  the  same  point  as  there  are  courts. 
There  arc  endless  diversities  in  the  npintuns  of  men. 
We  often  see  not  nnly  different  courts,  but  the  judges  of 
the  same  court  differing  from  each  other.  Tu  avoid  the 
oonfusion  which  would  unavoidably  result  from  the  con- 
tradictory decisions  of  a  number  of  independent  judi- 
catories, all  nations  have  found  it  necessary  to  establish 
one  court  paramount  to  the  rest,  possessing  a  general 
stipcrintendence,  and  authorized  to  settle  and  declare  in 
the  last  resort  a  uniform  rule  of  civil  justice. 

This  is  the  more  necessary  where  the  frame  of  tlie 
government  is  so  compoumlrd  thnt  the  laws  of  the  whole 
are  in  danger  ot  being  contravened  by  the  laws  of  the 
parts.  In  this  case,  if  the  panicular  tribunals  are 
invested  with  a  richt  af  ultimate  jurisdJctioR,  besides  the 
contradictions  to  be  expected  from  difference  of  opininn, 
fftrrc  will  be  miti;h  tu  [far  from  (hr  liia«  of  local   views 


VA/t/ABLE  LECrSlATlO.V. 


»4< 


»nd  prejudices,  and  from  the  interference  of  local  rcgola- 

tioos.     As  often  as  xuch  un  interference  was  to  hut>pcn, 

tb«e  vonld  be  reason  to  apprehend  that  the  provisions 

oj  the  particular  laws  might  be  preferred  to  those  of  the 

Kcoeral  laws;   for  nothing   i^  more  natural  to   men  in 

office  than  to  look  with  peculiar  deference  toward  thai 

nihority   to   which   they   owe   their    official   existence. 

The  treaties  of  the   United   Slates,  under  the  present 

Cautituiion,  are  liable  to  the  infractions  of  thirteen  dif- 

hreoi  legislatures,  and  as  many  different  courts  of  final 

ftnidtcttun.  acting  under  the  authority  of  those  legisla- 

The  faith,  the  reputation,  the  peace  of  the  whole 

'dion,  arc  thus  continually  at  the  mercy  of  the  preju- 

thc  passions,  and  the  interests  of  every  member  of 

it  is  composed.     Is  it  possible  that  foreign  nations 

either  respect  or  confide  in  such  a  government?    Is 

potsible  that  the  people  of  America  will  longer  consent 

trunt  their  honor,  tlitur  liappincss,  their  safety,  on  so 

precarious  a  foundation? 

In  this  review  of  the  Confederation,  1  have  confined 
■yself  to  the  exhibition  of  its  most  material  defects; 
^^■ssing  over  those  imperfections  in  its  details  by  which 
^^Ben  a  great  part  of  the  power  intended  to  be  conferred 
^^voQ  it  has  been  in  a  great  measure  rendered  abortive. 
^Hmiist  be  by  this  time  evident  to  all  men  of  reflection 
^frho  can  divest  iliemselves  of  the  prepoMes^Jons  of  pre- 
^Mwceived  opinions,  that  it  is  a  system  so  radically 
liciiKig  and  unsound  as  tu  admit  nut  of  amendment 
but  by  an  entire  change  in  its  leading  features  and 
cbiraciers. 

The  organixation  of  Congress  is  itself  utterly  improper 

for  (he  exercise  of  those  powers  which  are  necessary  to 

deposited  in  the  Union.     A  single  assembly  may  be  a 

r  receptacle  of  those  slender,  or  rather,   fettered 

ics,  which  have  been  heretofore  delegated  to  the 

'ederal  head;  but  it  would  be  inconsistent  with  all  the 


'  rts  il,r  intifoct  ot  infrKliont  nt  ibe  British  TntVj  of  i  J$J  bf  At 
..  ktc  llamoioMi'*  aoid  Jc([rnion*scii<T»poadciiee  (*' Anicri- 
.•,tt»,  fuicifii  Rd»tio«t,"  i.  193).— ICuiTOK. 


"4»  UiilTATtONS  OF  CONGRESS.  (■•. » 

principles  of  good  govvrnmcnt  to  intrust  it  villi  those 
»Oilition;il  puwera  which,  even  itic  moderate  and  more 
ralional  adversaries  of  the  proposed  Cun&tituliun  admit, 
ought  to  reside  in  the  United  Slates.'  If  tlial  plan 
sliould  not  be  adopted,  and  if  the  necessity  of  the  Union 
should  be  alile  to  withstand  the  ambitious  aims  of  those 
men  who  may  indulge  magiiifnent  schemes  of  personal 
aggrandisement  from  its  dissolution,  the  probability 
would  be  that  ire  should  run  into  the  projctt  of  confer- 
ring supplementary  powers  upon  Coni^ress,  as  they  are 
now  conittiluted;  and  either  the  machine,  from  the 
intrinsic  feebleness  of  its  structure,  will  miilder  into 
pieces,  in  spite  of  our  ill-judged  efforts  to  prop  it;  or,  by 
succesMve  augmentations  of  its  force  and  energy,  as 
necessity  might  prompt,  wc  shall  finally  accumulate,  in  a 

'  The  Conlliienitl  Ca>i|;teM  hiil  iltuunicl  the  cviti  ill  •  wiigk  IcghU- 
ItTI  bcxly.  fniiiiEiitly  it  hid  JilopldJ  rrwlnlioni  only  lo  rrpeal  |I|«M 
the  neii  A*,i.  and  in  Mt-ml  i-i%n  hsd  rriccinl,  KcnAtidcted.  anil 
•dopltd.  anil  asaiii  i«ject«(l  in  tbe  couitc  ul  •  nccli.  ilw  <din«  niolloa  ; 
the  ckin)^  being  iue  to  the  anival  iw  'kguilnic  nl  nicmlian,  nwl  li>  (be 
lack  of  any  <lt«i;k.  A  wuel  o'  tlnliitily  htiil  liki'witr  tirrii  ^ll•l>■n  ia 
Ibe  sinel*  aneinlily  liody  of  I'trniiyhinU.  ihe  hiuoty  of  which  liwl  l>««> 
marked  by  «iireni«lv  iapuUire  and  v«tiiitil«  IcfiUalian.  1  be  tkIik  ol 
■  diial-bmlicd  IcBitlalivc  power  tccniK  nol  nwtcly  to  conuil  in  ihc 
ulililioiiil  ch«k  iM  hatly  IcuUlution  •'tik'h  tlic  iMay  rX  M{>*m«  co«- 
aiiUntion  nvcruanly  invulm,  liul  in  a  ilili  ^rcalrr  iltjgfM',  ia  tbe 
tiicnuble  (omptliliDD  in  which  Ihey  hecoiiM  invnli-rd.  Boih  tcrk 
public  fsTor.  ooil  ifiry  (tierefiArc  IhecniBe  riTnlt.  Nccemrlly  a  nwtuuic 
url|['n4teil  lij  one  encounlen  in  (lie  other  •  ilcrn  vriltctini.  aixl  ilm  It  tn 
keen  llial  Ii»|ueally  cull  h'lme  ^rc|Hiiei  it»  ■><'n  hill,  ami  toiiag  done 
w>,  aillieiet  t"  tl  wtlh  a  tHniili-en»a  tlial  hat  omii-rlUil  \\tr  tnlrodsclkHi 
ol  ■  •ew  legnlntitr  ctrni«ni  in  Ibi*  «lia|<f  «f  >  third  or  union  diaaibtr. 
iivnll)'  l<tmed  >  C€iafa*«M  commiiieo,  wade  u)i  al  ui  njual  nunba-  of 
memlieni  Irum  llie  luii  UMlri.  wbiiw  joint  atllna  in  |>ia<.ti(«  hn  |p«xna>r 
&lnMMI  illvUlorial.  Thr  leiKteni.-r  the  wntlil  ntct  fin  ik):ilr  ol  Conf-rtv 
■ional  ado)<lion  u(  llir  "  innvjuiik  i)nmiiin"  and  Ihv  laili.itncaliur  inirn- 
diKtion  ol  '*  cknurt,"  lo  t-tir  ttulhin*  •)[  s  Mtadily  iucirauii);  povei  ovct 
kgiiUlira  aclioa  mnied  to  |>rtsi>liBe  oAMnl  ii  to  make  le|;iiiUilou 
ilovct  and  Mhrrwiie  ninr«  dlllinli.  While  ihii  may  haTc  in  a{i|aiE»l 
■htftdvaMaf^  it  U  iwolxible  thai  llic  jmblK  i^aln  (ii  niiire  itun  t!«-y  |iwi, 
Tor  It  ih  L-cila(n  tlul.  lo  ibaq'ly  ciitK-al  m<>niml<>,  (.'i  n  itill  ad 

with  thv  Krcatrtl  iTlrritv  (notably  <n  tlitft  *ota  of  ih  lallvd  by 

the  Vtiieiaelao  mctuj^),  anil  the  otdiiury  dclar  ■>»  i  .  >  li.icv  mun 
ti«e  for  coeuKletalion.  b«l  even  prerenU  muvh  li.x"''>tt<'n.  1'be  itit- 
uhilion  of  each  Concreat  b  a  i:T*t«  lo  iuu>y  tlioiihand  lilllt,  wliith  wmilil 
ha*«  hcen  pute<l  liul  ibry  bttt  l>ecn  leaihcl  bi  Ilia  inAioa ;  Ibiti  um- 
knuata  it  well  jiiuim  by  MbxigiMnl  cienls.— Ciiicon. 


HMdlMal      POPULAR  COXSEXT  A    TRVE  BASIS. 


'45 


single  body,  all  the  most  important  preroEntives  of 
sovereignty,  and  thus  cnl^il  ti[)on  oiir  posterity  one  of 
the  tnoftt  execratilc  Torms  of  government  thnt  human 
infatuation  ever  contrived.  Thus  we  should  create  in 
reality  that  Tcry  tyranny  which  the  adversaries  of  the 
nev  Conititulton  either  are,  or  afTect  to  be,  solicitous  to 
avcrL 

It  has  not  a  tittle  contributed  to  the  infirmities  of  the 
existing  feileral  system  thnt  it  never  had  a  r,iliAc»linn  by 
the  peopte.  Resting  on  no  better  foundation  ihnn  the 
consent  of  the  st-vcral  lri;is!»tures,  it  has  been  csposed  lo 
fre(|uent  and  intrirjite  questions  concerning  the  validity 
of  its  powers,  and  has,  in  some  instances,  i;iven  birth  to 
the  enormous  doctrine  of  a  right  of  legislative  repeat. 
Owing  iu  ratificatiori  to  the  law  of  a  State,  it  has  been 
contended  that  the  same  authority  nii)|;ht  repeal  the  law 
by  which  it  was  ratified.  However  gross  a  heresy  it  may 
tie  to  maintain  that  afarty  lo  a  (empaft  has  a  right  to 
revoke  that  tempaet,  the  doctrine  itseUha*  had  respectable 
advocates.  The  possibility  of  a  question  of  this  nature 
proves  the  ncc^-ssily  of  laying  the  foundations  of  our 
national  Kovcriiment  deeper  th.-in  in  the  mere  sanction 
of  delegated  authority.  The  fabric  of  .American  empire 
oufht  to  rest  on  the  sohd  basis  of  dir  conskkt  or  thk 
PKOPLR.  The  streams  of  national  power  ought  to  flow 
iflsmediatcly  from  that  pure,  orij^nal  fountain  of  all 
tegiljoiate  authority.  Puulius. 


144 


IfEED  OF  A  CO/fSriTUriOff. 


No.  23.  (-Vw  Vtri  /«nia/,  Doccnba  it.  tjh^ 


[10.21 


Hamilton. 


NECESSITV  OF  A  GOVKRNMENT  AT  LEAST 
EQUALLY  ENERGETIC  WITH  THE  ONE  PRO- 
POSED. 

Oiitttt  it  tif  fravUtJ far  Sfmatijwalgavermmttil—Armw  omJJIetli^' 
CuhOtim  fitd/r  freunt  fpn/rJtrati^n — I'-/ih  frejttt  »f  Ugiilatimx 
ufvn  Ikt  St-itfi — Lam  mttil  it  ixlrmdni  «  iaJiviJujl  ciiiwui — 7'** 
minlial  fmHl  in  a  itrnpcmttJ f'fvtrunrnt  a  diitrimiu-itira  a/fvntr-— 
Fhtit  and  armiti  /rem  fAii  feiM  »/  m<ik. 

r*  (he  Pffff/e  of  the  Stale  0/  New  YorJt: 

TIic  necessity  of  a  Constitution,  at  least  etjiially  ener- 
getic with  the  one  proposed  to  the  prettervatiun  of  the 
Union,  is  the  point  at  the  examination  of  which  we  are 
now  arrived. 

This  inciuiry  will  naturally  divide  itself  into  three 
branches:  the  objeciti  to  be  provided  fur  by  the  federal 
government,  the  quantity  of  power  necessary  to  the  ac- 
complishment of  those  objects,  the  persons  upon  whom 
that  power  onght  to  operate.  Its  distribution  and  organ- 
ization will  more  properly  claim  our  attention  under  the 
succeeding  head. 

The  principal  purposes  to  be  answered  by  union  are 
these:  (he  cuminuii  defense  of  ilie  roemlwrs;  the  preser- 
vation of  the  public  peace,  as  well  against  internal  con- 
vulsions as  esf^rnal  atLtcbs;  the  regulation  of  commerce 
with  otiier  nations  and  between  the  States;  the  superin- 
tendence of  our  intercourse,  political  and  comracrcial, 
with  foreigfn  countries. 

""  V'<M«riI»y  Ihc  iiianuKti|M  ciypy  of  ibc  nibsequcal  w»  tomiintBicat*>l 
to  tItB  cititiH'.  with  (n  4aurancc  ihat  hit  pmi  k1losl4  In  pmferra).  in 
future,  tot  llie  linl  oihnini;  Into  pnlilic  (iew  the  ui-cecilliii;  numlwre. 
I(  the  jiulitic  are  |>leakcil  to  «ll|^MUe  ilie  cdtlor  M  a  parllat  printer.  Ill 
IIm  fu«of  liii  leiicnilol  nuenion)  of  'bdnf  inlteeiKcd  by  nune.' whal 
iBore  Clin  l>«  uid  '.  Tbii  itJi^nu  he  prcrcn  to  tint  ol  •  alaviili  eopjiit ; 
ooii*«i|Binlly,  unl<*i  niBiiii>i,-ti|.|i  ni*  conrnunlmtnl,  ho  o-ill  {«  cun- 
(tialMd  (lnmeTcr  ieiailicinuii)  <>lill  lii  eruach  nixter  iW  ixiicliiv  rhir^D  ol 

pankUty."— .Vfwi  Yetk^JnuHtt,  tfnemttr  iS,  1787. 


auKihnl 


NATIONAL  AVTHORITV, 


US 


Tlw  autboritlca  essential  lo  tlie  common  defense  are 
Uwse:  10  raise  armies;  to  build  and  equip  ficcts;  to  pre- 
scribe rules  for  the  government  of  both;  to  direct  their 
npemions;  to  provide  for  their  support.  Theite  powers 
oagbt  ttt  exist  without  limitation,  hetaute  it  it  imp^stible  lo 
fntu* or  litfint  tht  txUni  and  tiftitly  oj  mUioHoJ  fxigearia, 
«'  iMe  terrespQndtnt  txlent  and  variety  of  Ikt  means  «'>iuh 
majit  Hf^ettary  tn  tatitfy  thtm.  The  circumstances  that 
cadanger  the  safety  of  nations  are  infinite,  ;ind  for  this 
reuon  no  constitutional  shackles  can  wisely  be  imposed 
00  the  power  to  which  the  care  of  it  is  committed.  This 
power  ought  to  be  coextensive  with  alt  the  possible 
oambinatioas  of  Aucb  circumstances;  and  ought  to  be 
<nder  the  direction  of  the  same  councils  which  are 
splinted  lu  preside  over  the  common  defense. 

Tliis  is  one  of  those  truths  which,  lo  a  correct  and 
Dnprejadiccit  mind,  carries  its  own  evidence  along  with 
■i;  lad  may  be  obscured  but  cannot  be  made  plainer  by 
ucumcnt  or  reasoning.  !t  rests  upon  axioms  as  simple 
Mthcyarc  universal;  the  mtans  ought  to  be  proportioned 
to  the  M^,'  the  persons  from  whose  agency  the  attainment 
uf  sny  end  is  expected  ought  to  pn^Kess  the  mtam  by 
■hich  it  is  to  be  attained, 
^(lielher  there  ought  to  be  a  federal  government  in- 
sted  witli  the  care  of  the  common  defense  is  a  ques* 
D'"!,  In  the  first  instance,  open  for  discussioti;  but  the 
nomcnl  it  i*  decided  in  the  aHirmutivc,  it  will  fulluw  that 
It  government  ought  to  be  clothed  with  all  the  powers 
fD()uisite  lo  complete  execution  of  its  trust.  And  unless 
Icia  be  shown  that  the  circumstances  which  miiy  affect 
w poblii:  safciyarc  rctlucihle  withincertain  determinate 
'"OjIs;  unless  the  contrary  of  this  position  can  be  fairly 
I  rationally  disputes),  it  must  be  admitted,  as  a  ncces- 
ry  Dunscrjucncc.  that  there  can  be  no  limitation  of  tbal 
sihntity  which  is  to  provide  for  the  defense  and  pro- 
*<Clii>n  of  the  community,  in  any  matter  essential  to  its 
**acy — tliat  is,  in  any  matter  es&ential  lo  the  forma- 
*••.  Jirtditm,  or  wpport  of  the  national  fokces. 

DCtivcas  the  present  Confederation  has  been  proved 


146 


COAfMOa  DEFE/fSE  AND   WELFARE.       Wfc  M 


to  be,  this  principle  appears  to  have  been  fiilly  rrcognizcd 
by  the  framcrs  of  it;  though  tlicy  have  not  miiile  proper 
or  adequate  provision  for  its  exerciHe.  Congress  have 
an  unlimited  discretion  to  make  requisitions  of  men  and 
money:  t<i  govern  the  anny  and  navy;  to  direct  their 
operations.  As  llicir  requisitions  are  made  constitu- 
tionally binding  upon  the  States,  who  arc  in  fact  under 
the  most  solemn  obligations  to  furnish  the  supplies 
required  of  them,  the  intention  evidently  was  that  the 
United  St.itcs  should  command  whatever  resources  were 
by  them  judged  requisite  to  the  "common  defense  and 
general  welfare."  It  was  presumed  that  a  sense  of  their 
tnie  interests,  and  a  regard  to  the  dictates  of  good  faith, 
would  be  found  sutHcietit  pledges  for  the  punctual  per* 
formance  of  the  duty  of  the  nicmbcrs  to  the  federal  head. 

The  experiment  has,  however,  demonstrated  that  this 
expectation  was  ill-founded  and  illusory;  .tnd  the  obser- 
vations made  under  the  last  head  will,  1  imagine.  Iiave 
sufficed  to  convince  the  impartial  and  discerning  that 
there  is  an  absolute  necessity  for  an  entire  change  in  the 
first  principles  of  the  system;  tital  if  we  are  in  earnest 
about  giving  the  Union  energy  and  duration,  we  must 
abandon  the  vain  project  of  legislating  upon  the  States 
in  their  colle4:iive  capacities;  ne  must  extend  the  laws 
of  the  federal  government  to  the  individual  cilizens  of 
America;  we  must  discard  the  fallacious  scheme  uf  quotas 
and  requisitions,  as  equally  impracticable  and  unjust. 
The  result  from  all  this  is  that  the  Union  ought  to  be 
invested  with  full  power  to  levy  rroops;  to  build  and 
equip  fleets;  and  to  raise  the  revenues  which  will  be 
required  for  the  formation  and  support  uf  an  army  and 
navy,  in  the  customary  and  ordinary  modes  practiced  io 
other  governments. 

If  the  circumstances  of  o»r  country  are  such  as  to 
demand  a  compound  instead  of  a  simple,  a  confederate 
instead  of  a  sole,  government,  the  essential  point  which 
will  remain  tu  be  adjusted  will  be  to  dis<:riminaic  the 
OBJECTS,  as  far  as  it  can  be  done,  which  shall  appertain 
to  the  different  provinces  or   departments   of  po««rj 


&irfH«l  EFFECTIVE  POlfE/fS.  I47 

illowing  to  each  the  most  ample  authority  fur  fulfilling 
the  objects  commiite*)  tu  its  charge.  Shall  the  Union  be 
constituted  the  guardian  of  the  common  safety?  Are 
leeu  and  armies  and  revenues  necessary  to  this  pur[)osc? 
The  government  of  the  L'nion  must  he  empowered  to 
pass  all  laws  and  to  make  all  regulations  which  have 
relation  to  them.  The  same  must  be  the  case  in  respect 
to  commerce  and  to  every  other  matter  to  which  its 
jurisdiction  is  permitted  to  extend.  Is  the  ad  mi  11  iM  ra- 
tion of  justice  between  the  citizens  of  the  same  State  the 
proper  department  of  the  local  governments?  These 
must  possess  alt  the  autliorilies  which  arc  connected  with 
this  object  and  with  every  other  that  may  be  allotted  to 
their  particular  cognixance  and  direction.  Not  to  confer 
in  each  case  a  degree  of  power  commensurate  to  the  end 
would  be  to  violate  tlir  most  obvious  rules  of  prudence 
and  propriety,  and  improvidcntly  to  trust  the  great 
interests  \>i  the  nation  to  hands  which  are  disabled  from 
managing  them  with  vigor  and  success. 

Whoso  likely  to  make  suitable  provisions  for  the  public 
defense  as  that  biMly  to  which  the  guardianship  of  the 
public  safety  is  confided;  which,  as  the  center  of  infor- 
mation,  will  best  understand  the  extent  and  urgency  of 
the  dangers  that  threaten;  as  the  representative  of  the 
WKOLC,  will  feet  itself  most  deeply  interetited  in  the 
preservation  of  every  pari ;  which,  from  the  responsibility 
implied  in  the  duty  assigned  to  it,  will  be  most  sensibly 
impressed  with  the  necessity  of  proper  exertions;  and 
which,  by  the  extension  of  its  authority  throughout  the 
Stales,  cjin  alone  estatilish  uniformity  and  concert  in  the 
plans  and  measures  by  which  the  common  safety  is  to  be 
Mcure<l?  Is  there  not  a  manifest  inconsistency  in  devolv- 
ing upon  the  federal  government  the  care  of  the  general 
defense,  and  leaving  in  the  State  governments  the  tfft<tive 
powers  by  which  it  is  to  be  provided  for?  Is  not  a  want 
of  co-operation  the  infallible  consequence  of  such  a 
^stem?  And  will  not  weakness,  disorder,  an  undue 
distribution  of  the  burdens  and  calamities  of  war.  an 
unnecessary  and  intolerable  increase  of  expense,  be  its 


itfL 


146 


COUMO.V  DEFEf/SE 


'STS. 


(Bo.  U 


i 


I 


to  be,  this  principle  appears! 
by  the  framcr*  of  it ;  though 
or  adequate  provi-itoii  for 
an  unlimited  discretion  to 
money;  to  govern  the  a' 
operations.     As   their  r 
tionally  binding  upon  t' 
the   most  solemn   obti 
required  of  them,  thr 
United  States  should 
by  them  judged  reo 
general  welfare." 
true  interests,  and 
would  be  found  * 
formance  of  ihe  i 
The  eiperime 
expectation  wa- 
vations  made 


HaT«  we  nut  li-id 
'  i-ourse  uf  the 


t 


-<  ^;tndid  io- 

is  that  it  is 

■  ::ra\  govern- 

I  tlioGc  objects 

It  will  indeed 

.ittcntion  of  the 

<   Mich  a  manner  as 

j    with   the  requisite 

.\    been    or    may   be 

I'M  not,  upon  a  di!t|>av 

I  Mirer  this  description. 

.■.riimcnl,   the  constito- 

.lit  to  be  trusted  with  all  the 

"(M  t0  ilflegiite  /<»  iiaygtverH- 

.il  improper  depositary  of  the 

Utu-rcvcr  thk^f.  can   with  pro* 

>r  cuinciOent  powers   may  safrljrj 

•■■:■>   is   the  true   result  of  all   jus 

liijecU     AtKl  the  adrcrurics  of  th( 

.  ihe  convention  ought  to  have  corKj 

I  sliowing  that  the  internal  structui 

>;uvernmcnt  was  such  as  lo  render  it 

.c  confidence  of  the  people.     They  ought 

A  iii'lcrcd   into   inflammatory  dcclaroationtl 

',:  (avils  about  the  cxlt-nt  of  the  powers.  { 

.ire  not  too  extensive  for  tltc  objects  oI 

riittration,  or,  in  other  words,  fur  the  man-' 

Mt  KATioNAi.  iN'TKRXSTS;  nor  Can  any  sAtis- 

mcnt    be   framed   to   show    tliat    they   are 

with  such  an  excess.     If  it  be  true,  as  has 

noated  by  some  of  the  writers  on  the  other  side, 

difficulty  arises  from  the  nature  of  the  thing, , 

t  the  extent  of  the  country  wdl  not  permit  us  w 

■i   government  in   which   such  ample  powers  can 

be  reposed,  it  would  prove  that  we  ought  to  con- 

OQr  views  and  resort  to  the  esprdient  of  separate 


sufRccd   to  c 

there  is  an  a 

first  princip 

about  givi 

abandon  t 

in  their 

of  the  ' 

Amerii 

and    r 

TIh: 

inve 

equ 

re* 

n.' 

11 


SFFECTIVE  POU'BXS. 


147 


■Homing  to  each  the  most  ample  authority  for  fulfilling 
ihe  objects  committnl  to  ils  chiirgc.  Shall  the  Union  be 
coBttituted  the  guardian  of  the  common  safetjr?  Are 
Ints  and  armies  and  revenues  necessary  to  tins  purpose? 
The  government  of  the  Union  must  be  empowered  to 
put  all  laws  and  to  make  all  regulations  which  have 
relation  to  them.  The  same  must  be  the  case  in  respect 
10  commerce  and  to  every  other  matter  to  which  Us 
jmisdictiun  is  permitted  to  extend.  Is  the  administra- 
Imo  of  justice  between  the  ciliKcns  of  ihc  same  State  the 
proper  department  of  the  local  governments?  These 
Muat  possess  all  the  authorities  which  arc  connected  with 
ttis  object  and  with  every  other  that  may  be  allotted  to 
ilieir  particubr  cognizance  and  direction.  Not  to  confer 
iacach  case  a  degree  of  jwwer  commensurate  to  the  end 
VQuld  be  to  violate  the  most  obvious  rules  of  prudence 
lod  propriety,  and  improvidcntly  to  trust  the  great 
interests  of  the  nation  to  hands  which  are  disabled  from 
■tanaging  them  with  rigor  and  success. 

Who  so  likely  to  make  suitable  provisions  for  the  public 
itefense  as  that  body  to  which  the  guardianship  of  the 
public  safety  is  confided;  which,  as  the  center  of  infor- 
mation, wilt  best  understand  the  extent  and  urgency  of 
(He  dangers  that  threaten;  as  the  representative  of  the 
WHOLK,  will  feel  it»clf  roost  deeply  interested  in  the 
preservation  of  every  part;  which,  from  the  responsibility 
implied  in  the  duty  assigned  to  it,  will  be  most  sensibly 
impressed  with  the  necessity  of  proper  exertions;  and 
■hicli,  by  the  extension  of  its  authority  throughout  the 
States,  can  alone  establish  uniformity  and  concert  in  the 
plans  and  measures  by  which  the  common  safety  ix  to  be 
secured?  Is  there  not  a  manifest  inconsistency  in  dcvolv. 
:upon  the  federal  government  the  care  of  the  general 

tfeiise,  and  leaving  in  the  State  governments  the  effedive 

lowers  by  which  it  is  to  be  provided  for?  Is  not  a  want 
^t  co-operation  the  infallible  consequence  uf  such  a 
em?     And   will    not   weakness,  disorder,  an   undue 

Buribution  of  the  burdens  and  calamities  of  war,  an 
HOnecessary  and  intolerable  increase  of  expense,  be  its 


U8 


SATiONAL  ttCTERESTS. 


[1F«.U 


nalural  and  inevitable  cuncoiniLiiitx?  Have  tvc  nul  liad 
uocquivocal  cxiicficncc  of  its  effects  in  the  course  of  t)ie 
revolution  which  we  have  just  accomplished? 

Ever/  view  we  may  take  of  the  subject,  as  candid  in- 
quirers after  truth,  will  serve  to  conrincc  us  that  it  is 
both  unwise  and  dangerous  to  deny  the  federal  govern 
ment  an  unconlincd  authority,  as  to  all  those  objects 
which  arc  intrusted  to  its  management.  It  will  indeed 
deserve  the  most  vigilant  and  rareful  alt<r»tion  of  the 
people,  to  sec  that  it  be  modeled  in  sucli  a  manner  as 
to  admit  of  its  being  safety  vested  with  the  requisite 
powers.  If  any  plan  which  has  been  or  may  be 
offered  to  our  consideration,  should  not,  upon  a  dispas- 
sionate inspection,  be  found  to  answer  this  description, 
it  ought  to  be  rejected.  A  government,  the  consliiu- 
tion  of  which  renders  it  unfit  to  be  trusted  with  all  the 
powers  which  a  free  people  ou^hl  to  deltgaU  to  attygmtra- 
ment,  would  he  an  unsafe  and  improper  depositary  of  the 
NATIONAL  (NTr-Rf-sia.  Wherever  these  can  with  pro- 
priety be  confided,  the  coincident  powers  may  safely 
accompany  thein.  This  is  the  true  result  of  all  jnxt 
reasoning  upon  the  subject.  .■Vnd  the  adversaries  of  the 
plan  promulgated  by  the  convention  ought  to  li.ive  con- 
lined  themselves  to  showing  that  the  interna)  structure 
of  the  proposed  government  was  such  as  to  render  it 
unworthy  of  the  confidence  of  the  people.  Tlicy  ought 
not  to  have  wandered  into  inflammatory  declamations 
and  unmeaning  cavils  about  the  extent  of  the  powers. 
The  MWK«s  are  not  too  exlcnsire  for  the  oejRcw  of 
federal  administration,  or,  in  other  words,  for  the  man- 
agement of  our  NATIONAL  iKTF.KESTs;  nor  ciin  any  satis- 
factory argument  be  framed  to  slmw  that  they  are 
chargeable  with  such  an  exceu.  If  it  be  true,  as  has 
been  insinuated  by  some  of  the  writers  on  the  other  side. 
t]iat  the  difficulty  arises  from  the  nature  of  the  thing, 
and  that  the  extent  of  the  country  will  not  permit  us  to 
form  a  government  in  which  such  ample  powers  Can 
safely  be  reposed,  it  would  prove  that  we  ought  to  con- 
tract our  views  and  resort  to  the  expedient  of  separate 


HtallUal       SIZE  AN  AKGVMENT  FOR  US'lOff. 


M9 


coiifeilenicics,  which  will  move  within  more  practicable 
^ihcrcs.  For  the  absurdity  must  ctintinually  stJire  us  in 
the  face  of  confiding  to  a  govcrnnieni  the  direction  of 
the  most  csftential  national  interests,  without  daring  to 
trust  it  to  the  authorities  which  arc  indispensable  to 
their  proper  and  efficient  managctneni.  Let  us  not 
attempt  to  reconcile  cuntradictioos,  but  firmly  embrace 
a  rational  alternative. 

I  trust,  however,  that  the  impracticability  of  one 
(reueral  system  cannot  be  shown.  I  am  greatljr  mistaken 
if  anything  of  weight  has  yet  been  advanced  of  this  tend- 
ency; and  1  flatter  myself  that  the  observations  which 
have  been  made  in  the  course  of  these  papers  have 
served  to  place  the  reverse  of  that  position  in  as  clear  a 
tight  as  any  matter  still  in  the  womb  of  time  and  experi- 
ence can  be  susceptible  of.  This,  at  all  events,  must  be 
erideni,  that  the  very  difHcnlty  itself,  drawn  from  the 
txtcnt  of  the  country,  is  the  strongest  argument  in  favor 
of  an  energetic  government:  for  any  other  can  certainly 
never  preserve  the  union  of  so  large  an  empire.  11  we 
enbrace  the  tenets  of  those  who  oppose  the  adoption  of 
the  proposed  Constitution,  as  the  standard  of  our  politic 
cal  creed,  we  cannot  fail  to  verify  the  gliximy  doctrines 
*)iich  predict  the  imprjclicability  of  a  national  system 
pervading  entire  limits  of  the  present  Confederacy. 

PuDUua;. 


•50 


STA/i'Dt.VC  A/IVIES  I.V  PSACE. 


No.   24.  C//<w  ytriJtKr-ti,  UwtnWi  14.  •]•}.) 


IK«.ff 


Hamtltun, 


POWERS  CONE-ERRRD  BY  NEW  CONSTITUTION 
IN  RECAKO  TO  NATIONAL  lORCES. 

AIUg{.i  xani  9f  fteftr  fnrviiinii  agatmt  lAt  tsitlmtt  tf  ilimjimg 
iirmiii  in  limf  */  ptmr — Riilriilitn  of  tkj  ItgtiUlivt  Autk-trily  at 
rtfarJt  miHlATy  ritaktitkmtnU  am  unintrJ-v/  friiinftr — Wirrr  lit 
tamiilutiea  tttit  tatilrvJ — t'lauits  in  Ikt  ilaU  lonililHlitrii  in  rrgarJ 
la  thutdittg  armf—The  i^m*  (iaust  im  Ikt  artulri  »/  <aHjtJfrali»H-^ 
Oamgfri  tkrtauniaf  Amfrktt  —  Nfftiiity  /«•  miltrn  gurrinmt— 
Briliih  atiJ  Spamih  tohniti — frvietlifm  f/  tavjt yarJi  luni  •trumalt. 

T»  tkr  J'tfffle  e/  the  State  tf  A'rw  Yari: 

To  tlie  powirrs  proposed  lu  be  conferred  upon  the 
Tederal  government,  in  respect  to  ilie  crwiiiim  ami  direc- 
tion uf  the  nalionul  forces,  I  have  met  willi  hut  one 
speciRc  objection,  which,  if  I  understand  il  right,  is  ttiii 
l„  — that  proper   provision  has   not  been   made 

Vn.  ■•  ag^iiiiKt  the  exisleiice  of  staiuliii^   ^irmics  in 

time  of  peace;  an  objection  which  I  shall  iiuvr  emieax'or 
to  show  rests  on  weak  and  unsubstantial  fuundjtioos. 

It  has  indeed  been  brouRhl  forward  in  the  mtwt  ngne 
and  f!cncr;il  form,  supported  only  by  bold  assertionx, 
without  the  appearance  of  argument;  without  even  ihc 
ttanotioi)  of  theoretical  opinions;  in  contra di<:tton  to  the 
practice  of  other  free  nations  and  to  the  general  geuic 
of  Amerira  aK  expressed  in  most  uf  the  existing  con- 
stitutions. The  propriety  of  this  remark  will  appear 
the  moment  it  is  recolleclcd  that  the  objection  under 
consideration  turns  upon  a  sitppused  necessity  of  restrain- 
ing the  LRaiSLATive  authority  of  the  nation,  in  the 
article  of  military  establishments;  a  principle  unheard 
of,  except  in  one  or  two  of  our  State  constitutions,  and 
rejected  in  all  the  rest. 

A  stranger  to  our  politics  who  was  to  read  our  nevft- 
papers  at  the  present  juncture,  without  having  pre- 
viously inupcctcd  the  plan  ri-poned  by  thi-  conveniiim. 
WDUld  be  naturally  led  to  unc  of  two  runclusiuns:  either 


LEGISLATIVE  AVTHOKITY. 


iSi 


I: 


it  contained   a   positive   injunction  that  sliiitding 

■Dies  fbould  be  kept  up  in   time  of  peace;  or  th^t  it 

Wed  ia  the  EXBCUTivK  the   whole  power  of  levying 

UDops  without  Bubjccting  liis  di&cretion,  in  any  shape, 

to  the  control  of  the  legislature. 

if  be  came  afterward  to  peruse  the  plan  itself,  he 
nulil  be  surpri&cd  to  discover  that  neither  the  onv  nor 
Ikoiberwas  the  case;  that  tlic  whole  power  of  raising 
iratieswas  lodged  in  the  Lef^isiature,  not  in  the  Extta- 
Or;  tliat  this  legislature  wd«  to  he  a  popular  body,  con- 
tiuingiuf  tlic  representatives  of  tht:  people,  periodiciilly 
dectcil;  and  that  instead  of  the  provision  he  had  sup- 
po«d  in  favor  of  standing  armies,  there  was  to  be  found, 
in  respect  to  tlii.i  object,  un  important  (lu^liricutiun  even 
of  Uie  legislative  discretion,  in  that  clause  which  forbids 
■lie  appropriation  of  money  for  the  support  of  an  army 
for  any  longer  period  thiin  two  years — a  precaution 
■tich,  upon  a  nearer  view  of  it,  wilt  appear  to  he  a  great 
and  real  security  against  the  keeping  up  of  troops  with- 
itil  evident  nc<.'cssity. 
Disappointed  in  his  first  surmise,  the  person  I  have 
ijiposcd  would  he  apt  to  pursue  his  conjtcturcs  a  little 
•tinhcr.  Mc  would  miturally  Kay  to  himself,  it  is  impos- 
sible that  all  this  vehement  utid  puttietii;  dcclamutiim  can 
Ek  without  some  colorable  prctcxL  It  must  needs  be 
t^  ihis  people,  so  jealous  of  their  liberties,  have,  in  all 
"<<  precetling  modeiN  of  the  constitutions  whirh  they 
have  established,  inserted  the  most  precise  and  rigid 
aiions  on  this  point,  the  omission  of  which,  in  the 
w  plan,  has  given  birth  to  all  this  apprehension  and 

lor. 

Ifi  under  this  impression,  he  proceeded  to  pass  in 
'eview  the  several  Suie  constittitiuns.  how  great 
*^Dld  be  his  disappointment  to  find  that  tmo  only  of 
Ihta*  contained  an  interdiction  of  standing  armies  in 


^1*111(1 


,  1^  iliilancnl  at  Hie  nuKet  ii  taken  from  th)  |iriiiled  cDlkclion  of 
Tilkins.  rcniiijrWania  anj  Ninth  Cumllna  nre  ihe  two 
III  llie  InlelJitTliiiii  ii)  Ibne  wonh:  "  Ak  MafHltii]*  kmiic*  lii 

liae  »i  jKue  ut  ibiiiccnMi*  l«  llbcily,  THRV  OUCIir  x^>t  lo  Ire  kql 


<s» 


MIUTARY  ESrABUSHMEXrS. 


nr«.M 


time  of  peape;  t!iat  the  other  eleven  had  cither  observed 
a  profound  silence  on  the  ^uhje^^'t,  or  had  in  express 
terms  admitted  the  right  uf  Ihc  Legislature  to  authorize 
their  existence. 

Still,  however,  he  would  be  persuaded  that  there  must 
t>G  some  plausible  foundation  for  the  cry  raised  on  this 
head.  He  would  never  be  able  to  imagine,  while  any 
toarct  of  information  remained  unexplored,  that  it  was 
nothing  more  than  an  experiment  upon  the  public  cre- 
dulity, dictated  either  by  a  detiberate  intention  to 
deceive  or  by  the  overflowings  of  a  zeal  too  intemperate 
to  be  ingenuous  It  would  probably  occur  to  him  that 
he  would  be  likely  to  find  the  precautions  he  was  in 
search  of  in  the  primitive  compact  hetwe<rn  the  Slates. 
Here  at  length  he  would  expect  to  meet  with  a  solution 
of  the  enigma.  No  doubt,  he  would  observe  to  himself, 
the  existing  Confederation  mmx  contain  the  nicest  explicit 
provisions  aj;ainit  military  establishments  in  time  of 
peace;  and  a  departure  from  this  model,  in  a  favorite 
point,  has  occa^cioned  the  discontent  which  appears  tu 
influence  these  political  champions. 

If  he  should  now  apply  himself  to  a  careful  and  critical 
survey  of  the  articles  of  (*onfederj1ion,  his  iisiontshment 
would  not  only  be  increased,  but  would  arquirc  a  mixture 
of  indignation  at  the  unexpected  discovery  that  these 
artictem  instead  of  containing  the  prohilttlion  he  looted 
for,  .ind  though  they  had,  with  je.itous  circnmspcction, 
restricted  the  authority  of  the  State  legislatures  in  this 
particular,  had  not  imposed  a  single  restraint  on  that  of 


up."  Thb  U.  in  imh.  ratkcr  a  cAOTKHt  iluin  a  PROiiiniTiaM.  New 
llimmlilic.  MuMclintciri.  [leliirtu,  anrf  MnirUiid  hnvr.  in  »sch  nt 
llirir  mlU  of  K;);hls.  a  cliiiu  in  Ihii  effect :  "  Sun'tin);  armivt  nn  (lan> 
|[cioai  to  llWrlT.  and  nii(;lii  not  ro  b«  nuKtl  or  kept  up  witii-ilt  the 
CUN^KS^  or  the  Lt^mu-HTUiiK  "  ;  which  U  a  lornul  ■liniLviI.jn  of  llie 

sutlioritr  of  ibc  T.f-  -I  '•■!•'       ^^fw  Voilf  tiM  nn  bilk  at  r-  ■'■ ■'  her 

MMlitutlon    My*    r  ■    alwil    Ihr    tiulttT,      No  i  ^htj 

a|1)«>r  anneiTO  to  ;■  ■  liiHii  ol  lt>e  o:bci  Slalci.  ' '  '       '"tr- 

)n>lii|;,  Rixl  Ibtit  twitiiliiiii'i*  xtt  rtpaWj  v\mt.  I  >ni  li>M.  tiuwcTCr. 
iliBl  iin«  ot  1*0  SiAin  hiire  Mlh  cS  r^hu  which  du  not  injicar  in  Ihh 
culleciloli  I  Ifnt  thai   ihotc  atu>  r«a|[mu   the  right  o(   Ibc   le][iUaIlv« 


tnmm 


EXCESS  or  COXF/DBXCE. 


>53 


the  United  Stat«s.     If  he  tiappened  to  be  a  man  of  quick 
KDsiUlity  or  ardent  temper,   he  could  now  no  longer 
rtfraia  from  rcganling  (hcsc  clamors  as  the  dishonest 
utillces  of  a   sinister  and   u»priiii:i|iled   opposition   to 
aplu  which  ought  at  least  to  receive  a  fair  and  camlid 
examination  from   all   sincere   lovers  of   their  country! 
Hod  else,  he  would  say,  could  the  auttiors  of  them  have 
been  tempted  to  vent  such  loud  censures  upon  that  plan, 
about  a  p4>int  in  which  it  seems  to  have  conformed  itself 
to  the  general  sense  of  America  as  declared   in  its  dif- 
ttmx  forms  of  Kovcrnmcnt,  and  iu  which  it  has  even 
wpcradded  a  new  and  powerful  guard  unknown  to  any 
uf  them?     If,  on  the  contrary,  he  happened  to  be  a  man 
of  calm  and  dispassionate  feelings,   he   would    indulge 
a  sigh  for  the  frailty  uf  human  nature,  and  would  lament 
ihil,  in  a  matter  so  inieresting  to  the  happiness  uf  mil- 
lions, the  true  merits  of  the  question  should  he  perplexed 
irxl  entangled  t>y  expedients  so  unfriendly  to  an  impar- 
lul  and  right  delermination.     Even  such  a  man  could 
hardly  fortwar  remarking  that   a  conduct  of  this  kind 
has  too  much  the  appearance  of  an  intention  to  mislead 
the    people    by   alarming    their    passions,    rather    than 
to   convince   them    by  arguments    addressed    to   their 
EDderstandioKS. 

But  however  little  this  objection  may  be  countenanced, 
even  by  precedents  among  ourselves,  it  may  be  satisfac- 
tory to  take  a  nearer  view  of  its  intrinsic  merits,  From 
a  dose  examination  it  will  appear  that  restraints  upon 
the  discretion  of  the  legislature  in  respect  to  military 
establishments  in  time  of  peace  would  be  improper  to 
be  imposed,  and  if  imposeil,  from  the  necessities  of 
society,  would  be  unlikely  to  be  observed. 

ThoDgii  a  wide  ocean  separaiM  the  Unitcl  Stales  from  Europe, 
yM  there  Are  rarioui  consideratiou  iliai  warn  lu  against  an 
ocess  of  confidence  or  security.  On  one  side  of  us,  anil  stretch- 
tag  lax  Into  our  rear,  are  growing  settlemcnrs  subject  to  the 
domifuon  of  Britain.  On  the  other  side,  and  exlendinj;  to  meef 
(he  Bniisb  settlemenis,  arc  colonies  »»<]  csiahti^hmrni'i  siil)i«-cl  lo 
1^  itootlBion  a(  Spain.  This  situation  antl  (he  vicinity  o\  ilie 
Wesl  ladia  Islands,  belonging  to  ihcse  two  powers,  create  between 


1S4  H'ESTER/f  CAKSlSO/fS.  !■•,  SI 

Iheffl,  tn  icspcct  (o  their  Amciic^n  posscMiou  and  in  nljilkm  lo 
ti!i.  u  coninion  interest,  Tlic  lavage  tritie»  <m  our  Western  Ir«n- 
ticr  ought  lo  be  rrg.iiilcil  a&  niir  natural  enemies,  their  rulural 
allies,  becauM;  (hey  have  inust  tu  (ear  frmn  ws.  anil  tiioM  to  Im^ 
from  them,  The  imprnvcmeiiis  in  the  art  of  lutvigaiioii  have,  u 
to  the  facihiy  of  com n;ii nicotian,  rendem]  distant  nations,  in 
a  grc-jt  measxire,  neiglitnrk  Ilritaiii  and  S|)aiii  are  among  the 
principal  m.iniinie  [lowrcrs  o(  Europe,  A  future  cimccri  of  views 
l)cl\veen  tliesc  nations  ought  iicK  to  lie  regiirikd  a*  iinpro)>ab!e, 
'I'hc  increasing  TcmoIencM  of  roii.%an);uinity  is  ever)'  d^)'  iliinintsh- 
ing  the  lotte  of  tlie  faniily  coni|uict  between  Fiance  and  Spain. 
And  poliljcians  have  ever,  with  |{rcal  reason,  considered  the  tics  of 
blood  as  feeble  and  piecartous  links  of  i>ulitical  connection.  Tlwse 
circumstances,  combined,  ailinontsh  lu  not  lt>  be  loo  suinguine  in 
considering  ouncNe*  3&  entirely  out  of  iIk  mch  of  danger. 

Previous  to  the  Revolution,  and  ever  since  Ihc  peace, 
there  has  been  a  constant  necessity  for  keeping  small 
E-irrit-ons  on  our  Western  frontier.  No  person  can  d(ii]t>t 
that  these  will  continue  to  be  indispensable,  if  it  &hotild 
only  be  against  the  ravages  and  depredations  of  the 
Indians.  These  garrisons  must  cither  be  furnished  by 
occasional  detachments  from  the  militia  or  by  petnianent 
corps  in  the  pay  of  the  government.  The  first  is  imprac- 
ticable; and,  if  practicable,  would  be  pernicious.  The 
militia  would  not  long,  if  at  all,  submit  to  be  dragged 
from  their  occupations  and  families  to  perform  that  most 
disagreeable  duty  in  limes  of  profound  peace.  Ai»d  jf 
they  could  be  prevailed  npon  or  compelled  to  do  it,  the 
increased  expense  of  a  frequent  rotation  of  service,  and 
the  logs  of  labor  and  disconcertion  of  the  industrious 
pursuits  of  individuals,  would  form  conclusive  obje<;ttons 
to  the  scheme.  It  would  be  as  burdensome  and  injurious 
to  the  public  as  ruinous  to  private  ciltiens.  The  latter 
resource  of  permanent  corps  in  the  pay  of  the  guvcm- 
ment  amounts  to  a  standing  army  in  time  of  peace; 
a  small  one.  Indeed,  but  not  the  less  real  for  being  snalL 
Here  is  a  simple  view  of  the  subject,  that  shows  us  at 
once  the  impropriety  of  a  constitutional  interdii  lion  of 
such  eslablishmeuts  and  the  neceKxity  of  leaving  the 
ntalter  to  the  discretion  and  prmlcncc  of  the  Icgislsture, 


Busllua) 


A'Arr  A  NECESSiTY. 


"55 


III  proportion  (o  our  increase  fn  slren|[th,  t(  is  probable,  nay,  h 
in:i)r  be  said  ccrljiii,  (h.il  Britiiin  and  Sp.iiii  would  Jiu^iiit.'iit  Iheir 
miliiary  csUblithmi^ts  in  our  nei(;hl)orliooil.  If  we  should  not  be 
williiijc  to  be  expused.  in  a  nitltrd  and  defenseless  condition,  lo 
llieif  inKulls  anil  encroach  men  is,  we  sliotild  find  il  expedient  to 
increaLse  our  (roniicr  gariisoiis  In  some  ralio  to  ihe  force  by  wliicli 
ouf  Wettein  scttlcnienis  mij^i  be  annoyed.  There  are,  and  will 
be,  pjiiicuW  posi»,  ihc  poMcssion  of  which  will  include  the  com- 
mand of  Urge  dislriclt  of  Icrritury,  and  facilitate  future  invasions 
of  the  tem.iinder.  I(  mny  be  added  ih,it  some  of  those  pnstt  will 
be  keys  lo  the  trade  with  the  Indian  nalionv  Can  any  nun  tliink 
•I  MTOuld  be  wise  lo  Ic.ive  ttich  posls  in  a  silunlion  lo  hr  »l  nny 
inilant  sei/cd  by  one  at  the  other  of  iwo  nei);1i boring;  and  (orinida- 
ble  powers?  To  aci  (his  pan  would  be  (o  desert  all  ihe  utusl 
inaxinis  of  prudence  and  policy. 

If  we  mean  lo  be  a  commercial  people,  or  even  to  be 
secure  on  our  Atlantic  side,  wc  must  endeavor,  as  soon 
as  possible,  to  have  a  navy.  Tn  this  purpose  there  must 
bedockyards  and  arsenals;  and  for  the  defense  of  these, 
fortifications  and  probably  garrisons.  When  a  nation 
lias  become  so  powerful  by  sea  that  it  can  protect  its 
dockyards  by  its  fleets,  this  supersedes  the  necessity  of 
garrisons  for  that  purpose;  but  where  naval  establish- 
ments  arc  in  their  infancy,  moderate  garrisons  will,  in 
all  likelihood,  be  found  an  indispensable  security  against 
descents  for  ihc  destruction  of  the  arsenals  and  dock- 
yards, and  sometimes  of  the  licet  itself.  Puhlius. 


'56 


No.  25. 


fftOTECTJOy  TO  STATES.  [Ho.  M 


(Vn.  Vtrt /rtintMi.  P™tn  »i.  t|*T.)  Hamilton. 


NATIONAL   FORCFS   COMPARED   WITH    STATE 
FORCES. 

Nuttiily  tf  nalienat  Mtttrrt  tf  army  mttd  mtaf —  Sillulien  *f  itattt  at 
rtgardi  fcriigtt  tatftiti — Critiftil  fnitirn  r/  Xnp  Ytrt — SMr  grrrrn- 
rSfHti  nalural  rixuli  tf  tk*  nalMHal — Ai'irA'ioW  tkat  Ikt  fffii  tttlt 
ttifftrl  tkrir  h{*t  p>'etrnmtnt~Tkt  iMri  nstraiMeJ  from  ilmtJing 
frnti —  fVanI  */  drfirtilii/n  im  fnfvitd  affntivf  im  ilanJiHg  »rmifi— 
/mpfitiHaty  ■>/  a  ttntfiirtuy  htttfttn  tht  tsttttlivt  aid  iht  lfgiil»Hvt 
lUftTtrntHlt — AiltKtl  tffttt  tf  a  P'thitiltea  »n  ilamJutj;  armirj — inailf- 
ftt^iy  «/  flu  mittlia — Ktttal  tuftrimti  e/  PfntUjr/naHta  and  Maua^ 
thntttti — Exftrinut  t/ tht  LiutJi*m9ui*iu. 

7>  the  P(^e  of  the  Slate  of  New  York: 

It  may  ptirhnps  be  urged  that  the  objects  enumerated 
in  llie  pretcdtng  number  ought  to  be  proviilptl  for  by  the 
State  t;i>^ci''>">(^"ts,  under  the  direction  of  the  Union. 
But  this  would  be  in  reality  an  inversion  of  the  primnry 
principle  uf  our  polilicat  as-vKiation,  as  it  would  in  prac- 
tice transfer  the  care  of  the  common  defcuse  from  the 
federal  head  to  the  individual  members:  a  project  op- 
pressive to  some  Slates,  dangerous  to  all,  and  baneful 
to  the  Confederacy. 

The  letritoricK  of  Briiain,  Spnin.  nn<l  of  the  Indian  n.itions  In 
our  ne>ghlH>rhoMl  ilo  rtoi  border  on  p>xriictiUi  Sialrs.  hui  encircle 
the  Unnio  Jrum  M.iine  (u  (icurgj^i.  TItc  il.inKer, though  in  differ- 
ent  degrees,  is  ihcrcfoie  common,  nnd  llw  nw-Jins  o(  giutdmg 
■{•.-linM  it  oughl.in  like  manner,  10  be  (he  obfccta  of  conunan 
counciU  and  of  4  common  treasury.  Il  happens  ihal  come  Stales, 
Ifom  local  siluaition,  arc  more  dirMlly  expascd.  New  Vurk  is  of 
tlib  claiK.  Upon  ihe  plan  of  srp.arntc  provtoions.  New  York 
woul<l  have  to  suuain  ilie  whole  weij^ht  of  (be  esiahli-ihrnrnU 
requUile  to  her  imrnedi.tie  kafrty.  anil  in  the  medUte  or  iiltmiaie 
proireiion  of  her  neighbors.  This  would  neither  l>e  rquiijibte  as 
it  mjjccleil  New  Yortt.  nor  »alc  as  it  respected  Ihe  otiicr  Slate*. 
Various  iiicnnvcnienccs  would  attend  such .«  system.  The  Stales 
to  whose  lol  it  nii);ht  f.itl  to  support  the  nccessar)'  establish  menu 
would  he  a*  llllle  able  as  wJlUng.  Tor  a  considernble  time  lo  come, 
to  bear  the  burden  of  compeicnt  prurisloiis.    The  sectirily  of  idl 


SAFETY  IN  NATIONAL  FORCES. 


'57 


would  thm  be  subjected  to  the  parsimony,  improvidence,  or  iiu- 
Ulty,  ol  «  part.  If  the  resources  of  sucli  pan  becoming  more 
^unilanl  nnil  extensive,  ila  proviMUtit  sliuiilit  be  proportiin.ibly 
tn[>rgnl.lbi:a<herSlat«  would  quickly  lake  the  alnim  al  seeing 
1  he  « hole  iniliiarjr  foice  d  ilie  Union  in  ilie  lianils  of  two  or 
IhcKof  jti  menibrni.  and  thone  probably  amnngst  the  mo»i  pnwcr- 
iui.  They  would  cacfa  choose  to  have  sume  cuunteqioine,  and 
fctlniKi  could  e.uily  be  contrived.  In  (hiK  silti:iI>on.  niililaty 
euliltihincnis.  noun&lied  by  iiiuiiul  jcduusy.  wuulil  be  up)  to 
iwcll  beyond  iheir  natural  or  proper  Nile ;  .mil  liring  .ni  the  sepa- 
rate ifiipos.il  of  llw  members,  they  woulil  be  tnjjine*  (or  ihe 
abndjnieni  or  deinoliiion  of  the  naliun;d  ;iuihc)rity. 

Rrugfis  have  been  already  jftveti  to  induce  n  stipjxjsi* 
lion  that  the  State  Rosernmcnts  will  too  tiaturally  be 
prone  to  a  rivalsbip  with  t)i»t  uf  the  Union,  the  fouiida- 
tioaof  which  will  be  the  love  of  [xiwer;  :ind  that  in  any 
coMest  bel'wcco  ihc  federal  head  and  one  of  its  members 
ibe  people  will  be  most  apt  to  imite  with  their  local 
EOTeranient.'  If,  in  addition  to  tliisimmen<;e  advantage, 
(^  ambition  o(  the  members  should  be  stimulated  by  the 
wpante  and  independent  possession  of  military  forces, 
Hvosld  afford  too  strong  a  temptation  and  too  great  a 
fwilitjr  to  thera  to  make  enterprises  upon,  and  Anally  to 
sulwert,  the  constitutional  authority  of  the  Union.  On 
ike  other  hand,  the  liberty  of  the  people  vronld  belesft  safe 
oilhif  state  of  things  than  in  tliat  which  left  (he  national 
'orccG  in  the  hands  of  the  national  government.  As 
^**  ai  an  army  may  be  considered  as  a  dangerous  weapon 
*"f  power,  it  had  better  be  in  those  hands  o(  which  the 
People  arc  most  likely  to  be  jealous  than  in  those  of  which 
(hey  arc  Icjist  likely  to  be  jealous.  For  it  is  a  truth 
■liich  the  experience  of  ages  has  attested,  that  the 
people  are  always  most  in  danger  when  the  means  of 
injuring  their  rights  are  in  the  prissev.tion  of  those  of 
»hom  they  cntcruin  the  least  suspicion. 

_  'Ttil*  WR(  prntol  in  iin  cxtnonUnVT  dosite  at  the  outbrrak  oF  lh« 
L'iiil  \Vm.  UiiS  irli»!  vraa.  prxtiou Miuty.  Ihe  people  of  roth  Hale 
"Ihereil  to  iheir  mtion.  «in<I  eien  national  oRice-holilcii  *ni1  ihe  army 
■nil  iMTynAcvn  of  dir  South  mrdy  \MtA,  dtiMi|:)i  lliry  uimcliilKS  heil- 
Citeil.  lo  violate  ih«ir  |«*Tiuasly  lakm  aa\\\\  \A  nllrciaiice  to  lli« 
Iwwd  Slotod.— Editos. 


■58 


UAlNTENANCB  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE,       ««. » 


The  franicrs  of  the  existing  Confcdcratioo,  fully  aware 
of  the  danger  to  the  Union  from  the  separate  possession 
of  military  forces  by  the  States,  have,  id  express  terms, 
prohibited  them  from  having  either  ships  or  troops, 
unless  with  the  consent  of  Congress.'  The  truth  \% 
that  the  existence  of  a  federal  government  and  military 
eslahliiihmcntx  under  State  authority  arc  not  less  at  vari> 
ence  with  each  other  than  a  due  supply  of  the  federal 
treasury  and  the  system  of  quotas  and  requisitions. 

There  are  other  lights,  besides  those  already  taken 
notice  of,  in  which  the  impropriety  of  restraints  on  Uie 
discretion  of  the  national  legislature  will  he  equally 
manifest.  The  design  of  the  objection  which  lias  been 
mentioned  is  to  preclude  standing  armies  in  time  of 
peace,  though  we  have  never  been  informed  how  far  it  is 
designed  the  prohibition  sliuuld  extend:  whelhcr  tu  rais- 
ing armies  as  well  as  to  kefpiHg  them  up  in  a  season  of 
tranquillity  or  not  If  it  be  confined  to  the  latter,  it  will 
have  no  precise  signification  and  it  will  be  inelTectual  for 
the  purpose  intended.  When  arraii-s  are  once  raised, 
what  shall  be  denominated  **  keeping  them  up,"  contrary 
to  the  sense  of  the  Constitution?  What  time  shall  be 
requisite  to  ascertain  the  violation?  Shall  it  be  a  week, 
a  month,  a  year?  Or  shall  we  say  they  may  be  continued 
as  long  as  the  danger  which  ucuisioncd  their  being  raised, 
continnes?  This  would  be  to  admit  that  they  might  be 
kept  up  in  lime  vf  petitf,  against  threatening  or  impending 
danger,  which  would  Ih:  at  once  to  deviate  from  the  literal 
meaning  of  the  prohibition,  and  to  introduce  an  exten- 
sive latitude  of  construction.  Who  shall  judge  of  ilie 
continuance  of  the  danger?  This  must  undoubtedly  be 
submitted  to  t)ie  national  government,  and  tlie  matter 
would  then  be  brought  to  ihb  issue,  that  the  national 
government,  to  provide  against  apprehended  danger, 
might  in  the  first  insunce  raise  trooju,  and  might  after- 
ward keep  them  on  foot  as  long  as  they  supposed  the 
peace  or  safety  of  the  community  was  in  any  degree  of 

■  None  ihe  ka.  .Soutli  C«inlina  In  iSm  ralMxl  tweltc  ibauwnil  "  mlan* 
teen  "  in  her  ptc|itu-aiiaiu  to  tmlkt  the  jtcnci«l  )[uTri»ni»iL — EimiMi 


MVrVAL  DBFES'SELESSSESS. 


«5» 


iMpardy.  It  It  easy  to  perceive  that  a  discretion  ho  lati- 
ludin^ry  as  tliis  would  afford  ;iinplc  room  for  eluding  the 
force  of  the  provision. 

The  «up[>oiied  utility  of  a  proviilon  of  this  kind  can 
uoly  be  fuuDdcd  od  the  supposed  probability,  or  at  leaat 
puvsibilit)*,  of  a  combination  between  the  executive  aiul 
the  legislative,  in  »»mc  Kohemc  of  uKitrpalion.  Should 
this  at  any  time  happen,  how  easy  would  it  be  to  fabri- 
cate pretenses  of  approaching  danger!  Indian  hostilities, 
instigated  by  Spain  or  Itritain,  wnuUl  always  he  at  hand, 
IVuvocjlions  to  produce  the  desired  appearances  might 
evrn  1m;  given  to  some  foreign  power,  and  appeased  again 
by  timely  conccssiuns.  If  we  can  reaxon^ibly  preniime 
soch  a  contbinaiion  to  have  been  formed,  and  that  the 
enterprise  is  warranted  by  a  sufficient  prospect  of  suc- 
cess, the  army,  when  once  raised,  from  whatever  cause, 
uron  whatever  pretext,  may  be  applied  to  the  execution 
*A  the  project. 

If,  to  obviate  this  consequence,  it  should  be  rcso'ved 
to  extend  the  prohibition  to  Uie  raiting  of  armies  in  lime 
of  peace,  the  United  States  would  then  exhibit  the  most 
extraordinary  spectacle  which  the  world  has  yet  seen — 
that  of  a  nation  inca|)acitated  by  it*  Constitution  to  pre- 
pare for  defense  before  it  was  actually  invaded.  As  the 
lercmony  of  a  formal  denunciation  of  war  has  of  late 
(alien  into  disuse,  the  presence  of  an  enemy  within  our 
territories  must  be  waited  for,  as  the  legal  warrant  to  the 
Eovernmrnt  to  begin  its  levies  of  men  fur  the  protection 
of  Uic  State.  We  must  receive  the  blow  before  we  could 
even  prepare  to  return  it.  All  that  kind  of  policy  by 
which  nations  anticipate  distant  danger  and  meet  the 
gathering  storm  must  be  abstained  from  as  contrary  to 
the  genuine  maxims  of  a  free  government.  We  must 
expose  our  property  and  liberty  to  the  mercy  of  foreign 
invaders  and  invite  them  by  our  weakness  to  scixe  the 
naked  and  defenseless  prey,  because  wc  arc  afraid  that 
rs,  created  by  our  choiirc.  dependent  on  our  will,  might 
inger  that  liberty  by  an  abuse  of  the  means  necessary 
s  preservation. 


MIUTIA  INADEQUATE. 


(■•.« 


Here  I  expect  wc  shall  be  told  that  the  militia  of  the 
Gountrjr  is  its  natural  bulwark,  utid  would  he  at  uU  times 
equal  to  the  national  defense.  This  doctrine,  in  sub- 
stance, had  like  to  have  lost  us  our  independence.  It 
cost  millions  to  the  United  Slates  that  might  have  been 
saved.  The  factK  which,  from  our  own  experience,  for- 
bid a  reliance  of  this  kind  arc  too  recent  to  permit  us  to 
be  the  dupes  of  such  a  suggestion.  The  steady  opera- 
tions of  war  uj;ain»t  a  reitubr  and  disciplined  army  can 
only  be  successfully  conducted  by  a  force  of  the  same 
kind.  Considerations  of  economy,  not  less  than  of  sta- 
bility and  vigor,  confirm  this  position.  The  American 
militia,  in  the  course  of  the  late  war,  have,  by  their  valor 
on  numerous  occasions,  crn^ted  eternal  mnnumcnls  to 
their  fame;  but  the  braves.t  of  them  feel  and  know  tliat 
the  liberty  of  their  country  could  not  have  been  estab- 
lished by  their  efforts  alone,  however  great  and  valuable 
they  were.  War,  like  most  other  things,  is  a  science  to 
be  acquifed  and  perfected  by  diligence,  by  perseverattce, 
by  time,  and  by  practice. 

All  viuki;!  jiolicy,  as  il  Is  conltary  to  the  natural  and  eiperi- 
mccil  cnuric  oi  human  .-iR.-ufK,  ilefcatt  ilscU.  Pmn!()'iranla,  at  this 
jnsiani,  ufli>iils  aii  cxjinpk  o(  ihe  ttuih  of  iliis  reiiijirk.  The  Bill 
i>l  Rigtits  of  ihni  St^le  decl.iret  (liiit  M.imlini;  atmiK  are  (Uii|^- 
oiit  to  liberty  and  ouglii  not  lo  he  kept  up  in  limr  of  peace, 
reiinvyl Villi i^i.  ncvciilickss.  in  a  lime  of  proftniTiil  jicacc,  from  the 
cxiMcnce  af  pnriijl  diMKkrs  in  one  ni  two  of  her  couniirs,  has 
resolved  lo  raise  a  bo>ly  u(  troops:  and  in  all  probulnlily  will  keep 
litem  up  at  long  ai  there  is  any  appenranec  tA  danger  lo  the  public 
peace.'  The  conduct  of  MassacJiusclUi  affords  a  Il-smm  on  ilic 
»ani«  subject,  (hough  on  different  gromul.  Thai  State  (wiihuul 
waiiint;  for  ilie  Mnciion  of  Conijicss.  as  the  ankksof  ihe  Con- 
leclcralion  rc(|uiiir|  w.is  cornttclled  lo  rai«T  lr(K>|«  to  ijuell  a  ilonies- 
Itc  insuriectiuii.  and  xtili  kn-ps  ;i  cotp«  in  p.'ky  lo  picvrnl  a  rcviial 
of  the  spirit  ofrrvoll.*  The  t>uiticulat  conslilulKifl  of  Ma>sacliU' 
seits  opposed  no  obtlacle  la  ifie  measure :  but  the  instance  'v.  «ill 
of  lue  lo  inviruct  \\\  ih.ii  cases  aie  likely  lo  occur  under  our  gov- 
crament,  as  well  aa  under  llmie  of  oilier  oaiions.  which  will  some- 


'  Tfce  Wywmlne  . 
*  To  lu|>|ireb  bt 


■  —  RotrnB. 
nm,— EoiroE. 


^&^ 


HtmaMo) 


SUBrEKFVGES. 


t6t 


limn   rcnikr  a  milit.iry  force  in  time  of  pc.ice  eswnliiil  lo  the 
wcuriiy  ol  t))c  VKwXy.  and  tlul    it  1^  ihefefnrc  iinprnprr  in  this 
■v>|>eci  to  control  the  legiiUiii-c  di«cteiioii.     1(  aliu  tF.ichM  us,  iili 
Its  applk.ilion  to  (he  United  Si.iirs.  how  little  (he  nuhls  of  a  (ceblel 
{ovemntcnt  arc  likely  to  be  raped cd.  e>-en  bj- its  own  consiltu-j 
enlf.     And  it  teKhes  us,  in  addiiion  to  the  rest,  how  unequal 
parchment  proviitiMis  are  lo  a  sttu^gte  with  pulilic  iiec«»il)r. 

It  vtxi  a  (uniUmcnial  maxim  of  the  l^ccdj-nionian  common* 
wealth  that  the  puit  of  admiral  nhuutd  nui  be  cuiifciicd  twice  on 
the  same  perwn.  The  Peloponnesi.in  con(cdcral«.  haring;  *ii(. 
fercd  A  severe  defeat  .i(  Ken  froni  the  Aihctilans.  denmnded 
Lysniidcr,  who  had  before  trrvrtt  wiih  siicccn  in  ihat  capacity,  lo 
c<Knmind  the  cmnbined  fleeli.  The  Lacnla^iiionians.  lo  (jrallfy 
IlKir  allies,  and  ycl  preserve  the  scmblanee  of  an  adherence  10 
ihcir  ancient  itiuiiuiions,  had  iecour»«  to  the  Himsy  sublerfiigc  of 
Inrettiitg  Lysamlcr  with  ihe  real  power  of  admiral,  under  (lie 
iKxninal  liik  of  vice  admiral.  This  instance  is  selected  from 
iinon%  a  multitude  Ihat  roighl  be  cited  ta  conlinii  llic  tiulh 
alre.iily  advanccil  an<l  dtusiiaieil  by  doftie«iic  examples:  wliich  iS. 
ihal  naliont  pay  little  reganl  lo  rule*  and  maiim«  tulcirUted  in 
llirir  ifety  nalui'e  to  run  conntcr  to  the  i>eeessitie*of  tocieiy.  Wiw 
politicians  will  he  cauliuui  ^boul  fclletiiig  the  t;<fvernment  with 
lesliiclion*  that  cannot  he  obsei'ved,  because  they  know  thai  every 
breach  of  the  fundamental  laws.  thoiiKh  tliclaled  by  necessity. 
Impairs  (hat  sncred  reverence  whi<rh  ouKhi  lo  be  maintained  in  Ihe 
brextt  of  rulers  lowant  the  coiisiiiution  of  a  country,  and  forms  a 
precMlcni  for  ulher  breaches  where  Ihe  same  plea  of  necessity 
■loes  not  exbl  at  all,  or  ialcst  urgent  and  palpable. 


l6»  POWER  AND  PRlViLBGS.  »•■  •• 


No.  26.  <.lm^ft-Jtmt /*i,rn»l,  Dt<«nbMH,  »«f.)  HaiuiUoil. 

ABSURDITY  OF    RESTRAINING   THE    I.GUISLA- 
TIVK    AUTHORITV    AS     TO     NATIONAL     DE- 

FKNSE. 

Pi^uiar  mvtutimi  Ktff  aMf  A>  *fprtH»»  f»ntr  atd  frivUegi —  The 
Tttlftiil  0n  UgitlMartt  if  1  A>  Jt/ttiM  ia  M'  'Ai"  ifmfi/ulijHi — Ctnttal 
J/iiiitn  t/  Amerim  rffvifJ  liitaA  rttlraiM-~fiiil»ry  9/ lit  rtttiitlutt 
w*  itait-dni!  armf  I'a  Uirjt  B'tlaim — Prrutil  ttaJiliim  in  thai  <»»atry— 
Ah  ktrejitary  frijt,Ji<t  tf  ilaiiJi»i  atmiri  in  Amerutt-^Tkt  iiAttiamtilm- 
tiiini — ChKU  11  tsMifitHtifnM  f/  Ptitftyhitiiii end  Xtrlli  C^tvUua — Bitn. 
mial  affrrfriathnt  tin4tr  Ihi  tttt*  triililuti^a  f»r  army — AiimrJily  */ 
ihf  frrJUliont  cf  tki  iicts</rnim  n/  Amfruan  liiiifly — /mfmiMl/y  e/ 
gif4Hly  HMgnrriliiig  tkt  army — Daugrr  Jitm  Ikt  txrtaliit— Danger  all 
tkt  grtatir  in  »  Jiiitnilni  ilalt. 

Ta  the  Petfflt  of  the  Slaft  ef  New  York: 

II  was  a  thing  hardly  to  be  cx|H?ticd  that  in  a  popular 
revolution  tli«  mitid^  uf  men  kIwiuUI  Mop  at  thai  h.ippy 
mean  which  marks  the  salutary  boundary  between  rowKR 
ami  PRivri-ROK,  and  coinhincs  the  energy  of  government 
with  the  security  of  private  rights,  A  failure  in  this 
delicate  and  important  point  is  the  great  source  of  the 
inconveniences  we  experience,  and  if  we  ure  not  cautions 
to  avoid  a  repetition  of  the  error  in  our  future  attempts 
to  rectify  and  amcliuratc  our  system,  we  miiy  travel  from 
one  <:liimerii:;il  project  to  another;  we  may  try  change 
after  change;  but  we  shall  never  be  likely  to  make  any 
mnteriid  change  for  the  better. 

The  idea  of  reslraininK  (he  leeistatire  authority  In  the 
mean;  of  providing  for  the  national  defense  is  one  of 
those  refinements  which  owe  their  origin  to  a  leiil  for 
liberty  more  ardent  than  enlightened.  We  have  seen, 
however,  that  it  ha«  not  had  thus  far  an  extenNive  prev- 
alency:  that  even  in  this  country,  where  it  made  its 
first  ap)>rur;ini:e,  Pennsylvania  and  North  Carolina  are 
the  only  two  States  by  which  it  has  been  in  any  degree 
patronized ;  and  tnat  all  the  others  have  refused  tu  givi 


ItBiMm) 


DANGEROUS  EXTREMES. 


i«3 


it  the  least  countenance;  wisely  judging  that  confidence 
must  be  placed  somewhere;  that  the  necessity  of  doing 
it  is  implied  in  the  very  act  of  delegating  power;  and 
thai  it  is  better  to  hazard  the  abuse  of  that  confi'dcncc 
than  to  embiiiraiis  the  govcrniiient  and  endanger  the 
public  safety  by  Impolitic  restriction x  on  the  legislative 
authority.  The  opponents  of  the  proposed  Constitution 
comtKii,  in  this  rrspcct,  the  general  decision  uf  America; 
and,  iuslead  of  beinj^  taught  by  e>:i)erience  the  propriety 
ofwrreclingany  extremes  into  which  vfc  may  have  here- 
lotote  run,  they  appear  disposed  to  conduct  us  into 
others  still  more  dangerous  and  more  extravagant.  As  if 
the  tone  of  ffovcrnmcnl  had  been  found  too  high  or  too 
rigid, the  doctnncs  they  ttach  arc  calculated  to  induce  us 
to  depress  or  to  relax  it,  by  expedients  which,  upon  other 
uttaiiofts,  have  been  condcmntd  or  forborne.  It  may  be 
aftrmed,  without  the  imputation  of  invectii'c,  that  if  the 
pfvciples  they  inculcate  on  various  points  could  so  far' 
■^■D  as  to  become  the  po|)ular  creed,  they  would  utterly 
uaii  the  people  of  this  country  for  any  species  of  govern- 
■Dent  whatever.  Uut  a  danger  of  this  kind  is  not  to  be 
apprehended.  The  citiirns  of  .America  have  too  much 
^■Kernmcnt  to  be  argued  into  anarchy.     And  1  am  much 

Kilakcn,  if  experience  has  not  wrought  a  deep  and 
<Miui  conviction  in  the  public  mind  thai  greater  energy 
tecrnment  is  essential  to  the  welfare  and  prosperity 
K  community. 

It  may  not  be  umtss  in  this  place  concisely  to  remark 
('■e  origin  and  progress  of  the  idea  which  aims  at  the 
^Illusion  of  military  establishments  in  time  of  peace, 
fhough  in  specnlativc  minds  it  may  arise  from  a  con- 

Muplatiun  of  the  nature  and  tendency  of  such  instttu* 
m^  fortified  by  the  events  that  have  happened  in  other 
es  and  countries,  yet  as  a  national  sentiment  it  must 
l>e  traced   to  those  habits  of  tliinktug  which  we  derive 
'foin  the  nation  from  whom  the  inhabitants  of  these 
l*iUies  have  in  general  sprung. 

bi  England,  fnf  a  (nng  lime  ;ificf  llie  Norman  Cnoquesi,  lh« 
iriiy  ol  ibe  monarch  was  almost  uidiiniled.     Inroad*  were 


.64 


STANDING  ARMIES  IN  ENGLAND 


no.M 


gradually  m^Af  upon  Ibr  p rcrog.it ive.  in  fnvor  ol  lil^rly.  fir^i  by 
Ihe  iMroiis.  nnil  all e runt iK  by  the  pcoplt,  iill  the  Ki«,itr>i  [Mfi  of 
its  mo<st  fonniiUhle  pr<rlcn«an«  hccnmc  extinct.  But  it  was  nol 
titl  ihe  rcvotuiinn  in  168II.  which  ctevAtcd  the  Prince  of  Orange  10 
the  throne  ai  C.xtxi  Itriiain,  that  Enjjliih  lil>eny  was  completely 
(riuitiph^nl.  A«  iiictilcnt  to  (he  un<kf)nrd  power  of  making  war. 
an  acicnowlcdKcd  prcroKative  of  the  crown.  Chailes  11.  hiul  by  bis 
own  authority  Itept  on  foot  in  ticne  of  peace  *  body  of  five  llrau- 
aand  rcguUr  iroap«.  And  this  number  Jume*  tl.  iiicre^ued  to 
ihiity  tlvou3.>iid.  wlio  were  paid  out  of  his  cti'il  Msi.  At  the  revo- 
lution, to  abutixih  Ilie  uercine  of  so  d-ingerout  an  nuihority.  it 
became  an  Jiilicle  of  \\ie  Rill  o(  Rights  ihcii  (ramed.  that  "the 
(aitin)!  or  keejiini;  a  tlandiii];  «iniy  within  the  kiiif;iloni  in  time  of 
)>eAce.  Htlrtt  tcilA  Iht  (OHtrnl  0/  l'.trtiitmtnl.  w.i*  .)g.iin«t  hw." 

In  that  kin|{iIoni,  when  tlie  pulse  of  liberty  nas  iil  lt«  highc&l 
|>ileh,  no  security  ngainM  ihr  djni{c«  of  »lamlin|;  armies  wa» 
thought  ret|uinite.  bejoiid  a  prohibition  of  ilieir  licins  i^aised  or 
kepi  up  by  the  men:  authority  of  the  executive  m.igi*irate.  The 
palrioiti  who  eflecled  ihtit  mcmonblc  revolution  were  too  Inn- 
|M:rjte,  too  well  iiiformed.  lo  think  of  any  icstrixiiil  on  the  Icglslalirc 
iliscrclion.  They  were  .iwarc  th.it  a  ccrt.iia  number  ol  troops  for 
guaiiK  and  j[arTi.%ons  were  indispen«;d>le :  that  no  prrcine  buunda 
eould  be  lel  10  liie  national  exigencies  :  th.1l  a  power  r<)ual  10 
erery  possible  contingency  iituvt  exist  soinewlieie  in  the  govero* 
mcni :  and  that  when  they  referred  the  exercne  ol  that  power  10 
llie  liidgmeni  of  the  legislature,  they  had  arrived  at  the  ultimate 
point  of  ixecaution  which  wax  rccoiKilable  with  Ilie  safety  of  (tie 
community. 

From  (lie  same  source,  the  people  of  America  majr  be 
5.ii<l  to  have  derived  an  hereditary  imprcKsion  of  danger 
to  liberty  from  slandius  armies  in  time  of  peace.  The 
ctrcumstani:cs  of  a  revolution  quickened  the  public 
sen>it>illty  un  every  point  connected  wiiK  the  ftecuriif  of 
popular  rights  and  in  some  instances  raised  the  warmth 
of  nur  Mai  beyond  the  degree  which  conMsted  with  the 
due  temperature  of  the  body  |>utitic.  The  attempts  of 
two  of  the  States  to  restrict  the  autlioritf  of  the  legisla- 
ture, in  the  article  of  milit.^ry  eitaliHshmenls,  are  of  the 
number  of  these  instances.  The  principles  which  bad 
uught  us  lo  be  jealous  of  the  power  of  an  hcretlitary 
monarch  were,  by  an  injudicious  exi^eso,  extended  tu  tlie 
representatives  of  the  people  in  their  popular  assemblies 


I«»aM«l    S/LEXCE  OF  STATE  LEG  I  SLA  TV  It ES 


'6S 


Evtn  in  some  of  the  Stales  where  this  error  was  not 
tdopted  we  find  uniiccesKary  decUnitioiis  tliat  standing 
irmies  ought  not  to  be  kept  up  in  time  of  peace,  with- 
out   THK    CONSENT    Of    tllK    LEGISLATUKK.       1    Call    them 

OD necessary,  because  ilie  reason  which  had  introduced  a 
similar  provision  into  the  English  Bill  of  Rights  is  not 
applicable  tn  any  of  the  State  constitutions.  The  power 
of  raising  armies  at  all,  under  those  constitutions,  can  by 
no  construction  be  dccmeJ  to  reside  anywhere  else  than 
in  the  legislatures  themselves;  and  it  wiis  superfluous,  if 
not  absurd,  to  declare  that  a  matter  should  not  be  done 
without  the  consent  of  a  body  which  alone  had  the 
power  of  doing  it.  Accordingly,  in  some  of  those  con^ 
stilutions,— and,  among  others,  in  thai  of  this  State 
of  New  York,  which  has  been  justly  celebrated  both  in 
Europe  and  America  as  one  of  the  best  of  the  forms 
of  government  established  in  this  country,— there  is  a 
total  silence  upon  the  subject. 

It  is  remarkable  that,  even  in  the  two  States  which 
seem  to  have  meditated  an  interdiction  of  military  eslab- 
lisfameots  in  time  of  peace,  the  mode  of  expression  made 
use  of  is  rnthcr  caiitionjry  than  prohibitory.  It  is  not 
takl  thatstanding  armies  f^ii//'(cV^<r  kept  up,  but  that  they 
wghtwt  to  be  kept  up,  in  time  of  peace.  This  ambiguity 
of  terms  appears  to  have  been  the  result  of  a  conflict  be- 
tween jealousy  and  conviction;  between  the  desire  of 
excluding  such  establishments  at  all  events,  and  the  per- 
suasion that  an  absolute  exclusion  would  be  unwise  and 
unsafe. 

Can  it  be  doubted  that  such  a  provi»on,  whenever  the 
Utoation  of  public  affairs  watt  understood  to  require  a 
departure  from  it,  would  be  interpreted  by  the  legisla- 
tare  into  a  mere  admonition,  and  would  be  matte  to 
jicid  to  the  necessities  or  supposed  necessities  of  the 
State?  Let  the  fact  already  mentioned  with  respect  to 
1^  Pennsylvania  decide.     What  then  (it  may  lie 

■••M.  asked)  is  the  use  of  such   a   provision,  if  it 

(ca»c  to  operate  the  moment  there  is  an  inclination  to 
■Iisregard  it? 


t66        pj/or/sroA's  fok  m/iitaxv  forces.    ili«.»» 

I-el  us  cicimine  whether  there  be  any  comparison,  in 
point  of  efficacy,  between  the  provision  alliulcd  to  and 
that  which  is  contained  in  the  new  Constitution,  for 
restraining  the  appropriations  of  money  for  military  par- 
poses  to  the  period  of  two  yeant.  The  former,  by  aim- 
ing at  too  much,  is  calculated  to  effect  nothing;  the 
latter,  by  steering  clear  of  an  imprudent  extreme  and 
by  beinjc  perfectly  compatible  with  a  proper  provision 
for  the  exigencies  of  the  nation,  will  have  a  salutary  and 
powerful  operation. 

The  legislature  of  the  United  States  wilt  be  oNigeJ,  by 
this  provision,  once  at  least  in  every  two  years,  to  delib- 
«ratc  upon  the  propriety  of  keeping  a  military  force  on 
foot;  to  come  to  a  new  resolution  on  the  point;  and  to 
declare  their  sense  of  the  matter  by  a  formal  vote  in  the 
face  of  their  constituents.  They  are  not  at  libtrty  to 
vest  in  the  executive  department  permanent  funds  for 
the  support  of  an  army,  if  they  were  even  tucautiuus 
enough  to  be  willing  to  repose  in  it  so  improper  a  con- 
fidence. As  the  spirit  of  i>arty  in  different  degrees 
must  be  expected  to  infect  all  political  bodies,  there  will 
be,  no  doubt,  persons  in  the  national  legislature  willing 
enough  to  arraign  the  measures  and  criminate  the  views 
of  the  majority.  The  provision  for  the  support  of  a 
military  force  will  always  be  a  favorable  topic  for  dccla- 
matiuR.  As  often  as  the  question  comes  forward,  the 
public  attention  will  be  roused  and  attracted  to  the  sub- 
ject by  the  party  in  opposition;  and  if  the  majority 
should  be  really  disposed  to  exceed  the  proper  limits, 
tlic  community  will  be  warned  of  the  d.ingtr,  and  will 
have  an  opportunity  of  taking  measures  to  guard  against 
it.  Indepciulcnt  of  parties  in  the  national  legislature 
itself,  as  often  as  the  period  nf  discussion  arrived,  the 
State  lc;!islatures,  who  will  always  be  not  only  Ttgilant 
but  suspicious  and  jcalom  ;;uarilians  of  the  rigtits  o(  the 
citizens  agiiinst  rncroaclinicnts  friim  the  federal  govern* 
ment,  will  constantly  have  their  attention  awake  to  ibe 
conduct  of  the  national  rukrs,  and  will  be  ready  enough, 
if  anything  impniper  appears,  to  sound  the  alarm  to  the 


CO.VSF/JtACy  IMPROBABLE. 

people,  and  oot  only  to  be  the  voiCK,  but,  if  necessary, 
thcAKM  uf  discontent. 

Schemes  to  subvert  the  liberties  of  a  great  community 
rtfairetifK  lo  mature  them  for  execution.  An  army  so 
Iju'ge  as  seriously  to  menace  those  liberties  could  only 
be  formed  by  progressive  augmentations;  which  would 
suppose,  nut  merely  a  tempurary  combination  between 
the  legislature  and  executive,  but  a  continued  conspiracy 
for  a  scries  of  time,  Js  it  probable  that  such  a  corabina- 
iion  would  exist  at  all?  Is  it  probiiblc  that  it  would  be 
[icrscvercd  in,  and  transmitted  alon^  through  all  the 
successive  variations  in  a  representative  body,  which 
biennial  elections  would  n^iturally  (iroduce  in  both 
houses?  Is  it  presumable  that  every  man,  the  instant 
he  took  his  scat  in  the  national  !ien;tte  or  House  of 
Re{)res«ntativi;K,  would  commence  a  traitor  to  his  con- 
stituents and  to  his  country?  Can  it  be  supposed  that 
there  would  not  be  found  one  man  discerning  enoURh 
to  delect  so  atrocious  a  conspiracy,  or  bold  or  honest 
enough  to  appiisc  his  constituents  ol  their  danger?  If 
such  presumptions  can  fairly  be  made,  there  ought  at  once 
lu  be  an  end  of  alt  delegated  authority.  The  people 
should  resolve  tn  recall  all  tlie  powerit  they  have  here- 
tofore parted  with  out  of  their  own  hands,  and  to  divide 
themselves  into  as  many  States  as  there  are  counties,  in 
order  that  they  may  be  able  to  manage  their  own  con- 
cerns in  person. 

If  such  suppositions  Qould  even  be  reasonably  made, 
still  the  concealment  of  the  design  for  any  duration 
would  be  impracticable.  It  would  be  announced  by  the 
very  circumstance  of  augmenting  the  army  to  so  great 
40  extent  in  time  of  prwfuund  peace.  What  colorable 
reason  could  be  assigned  in  a  country  so  situated,  for 
tnch  vast  augmentations  of  the  military  force?  It  is 
inpostible  that  the  people  could  be  long  deceived;  and 
the  destruction  of  the  project,  and  of  the  projectors, 
would  quickly  follow  the  discovery. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  provision  which  limits  the 
■ppropriation  of  money  for  the  support  of  an  army  to 


|6S 


DANGSS  GREATER  IN  DISUS'IOX. 


tB«.H 


the  pericKj  of  two  years  would  be  unavailing,  because  the 
Executive,  when  once  possessed  o(  a  force  large  ctiouch 
to  awe  the  people  into  submission,  woultl  lim]  resources 
in  that  very  force  sufficient  to  enable  him  to  dispense 
with  supplies  from  the  acts  of  the  legislature.  But  the 
question  aj^ain  recurs,  upon  wliat  pretense  could  be  be 
put  in  possession  of  a  force  of  that  magnitude  in  time  of 
peace?  If  we  suppose  it  to  have  been  created  in  conse- 
(]UGDCe  of  some  domestic  insurrection  or  foreign  war, 
then  it  becomes  a  case  not  within  the  principles  of  the 
objection;  for  this  is  leveled  against  the  power  of  keep- 
ing up  troops  in  time  of  peace.  Few  persons  will  be  sn 
visionary  as  seriously  to  contend  that  military  forces 
ought  not  to  he  raiiied  to  quell  a  rebellion  or  resist  an 
invasion;  and  if  the  defense  of  the  community  under 
such  circumstances  should  make  it  necessary  to  have  an 
army  so  numerous  as  to  hazard  its  liberty,  this  is  one  of 
those  calamities  for  which  there  is  neither  preventative 
nor  cure,  ft  cinnot  be  provided  against  by  any  possible 
form  of  government;  it  might  even  result  from  a  simple 
league  offensive  and  defensive,  if  it  should  ever  be  neces- 
sary for  the  confederates  or  allies  to  form  an  army  for 
common  defense. 

But  it  is  an  evil  infinitely  less  likely  to  attend  us  in  a 
united  than  in  a  disunited  state;  nay,  it  may  be  safely 
asserted  that  it  is  an  evil  altogether  unlikely  to  ntleml 
us  in  the  latter  situation,  ft  is  not  easy  to  conceive  a 
possibility  that  dangers  so  formidable  can  assail  the 
whole  Union  as  to  denuind  a  force  cimsidrr.ible  enough 
to  place  our  liberties  in  the  least  jeopardy,  especially 
If  we  take  into  our  view  the  aid  to  be  derived  from  the 
militia,  which  ought  always  to  be  counted  upon  as  a 
valuable  and  powerful  auxiliary.  But  in  a  state  of  dis- 
union (as  hiis  been  fully  shown  in  another  place),  the 
contrary  of  this  supp<^)sition  would  become  not  only 
probable,  but  almost   unavoidable. 

rUBLtUK 


ALLEGED  FOPVLAH  DtSAFfUCTION.  169 

K0.27.  (/f,~Kw»/!«i«,i>«B.b.r.(,ii*j.>         Hamilton. 

IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  A  NATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 
WITHOUr  A  NATIONAL  i-ORCE. 

AUigrd  JiiiiKtiM4iMti  af  Ike  pr^e  t»  frJerai  «utA^ly — A  pnftt'i 
»MitM€t  It  a  fnttHmtitt  fraforiiamJ  t«  ill  gtmfntij  sr  tadntn—I.iMi- 
kmd  1^1  /*/  gtntral  gavetttmtnl  will  tt  itUir  adminiiUnJ  Ikin  lit 
j^-^rnutnth  9/  Iht  tt^lii—Eipteial  i\ilHfo/  tkr  n/tti^nal  tfuatf '^Greater 
fnnr  p/  Ikt  x-iAVii  in  aalrelHii:  itJilifn  anil  /atliut — C<rtrtriimml 
titmU  it  fill  by  iilii/iii~Crrliiiniy  't-tl  1  umea  teill  Hitd  la  iKiflt-f 
first  leu  »ften  Ikan  le/^ralt  lottfttleTiiiiis —  Tie  genital  ffvermmnl  aiU 
It  use  9t4inarji  legal  prteetut — Pitutiar  ii,itnirilagt  e»/>ytJ  iy  iiliomit 
Asm. 

TV  the  Peffle  0/  the  Stale  cf  New  York: 

It  has  been  tirgcd.  in  ditTcrcnt  shapes,  that  a  Constilu- 
tiion  of  the  kind  proposed  t)/  the  convcntinn  cannot 
operate  without  the  aid  of  a  military  force  to  execute  its 
laws.  This,  however,  lilcc  most  other  things  that  have 
Iwrn  .illcgcd  on  that  side,  rests  on  mere  general  assertion 
nniuppurted  by  any  preciite  or  intelligible  designation  of 
ihc  reasons  upon  which  it  is  founded.  As  far  an  I  hare 
Iteen  able  to  divine  the  latent  mriinmg  of  the  objectors, 
il  seemit  to  originate  in  a  pri^suppOKttiun  that  the  people 
will  be  disinclined  to  the  exercise  of  federal  authority  in 
any  matter  of  an  internal  nature.  Waiving  any  exception 
that  might  be  taken  to  the  inaccuracy  or  inexplicitness  of 
the  distinction  between  internal  and  external,  let  us 
in<|uire  what  ground  there  is  to  presuppose  that  disin- 
clination in  Ihc  people.  Unless  wc  presume  at  the  same 
lime  that  the  powers  of  the  general  government  will  be 
worse  administered  than  those  of  the  State  govfrnmcnt, 
there  seems  to  he  no  room  for  the  presumption  of  ill  will, 
tlisaSection,  or  opposition  in  the  people.  1  believe  it 
nuy  be  laid  down  as  a  general  rule  that  their  confidence 
in  and  obedience  in  a  government  will  commonly  be 
proportioned  to  the  goodness  or  badness  of  its  adminis- 
tration. It  must  be  admitted  that  there  are  exi:eptions 
to  this  rule;  but  these  exceptions  depend  so  entirety  on 


i;o         V.V/O.V  TO  BE    %VELL  ADMtSlSTBRHD.     (■•.  IT 

accidental  causes  that  they  cannot  be  considered  as 
having  any  relation  to  tl)c  intrinsic  merits  or  demerits  of 
a  constitution.  These  c^in  only  be  judged  of  by  t-cneral 
principles  and  maxims. 

Various  reasons  have  been  suggested,  in  Ibc  course  of 
those  p:ipers,  to  induce  a  probability  that  the  general 
government  will  be  better  administered  than  the  particular 
governments:  the  principal  of  which  reasons  arc  Ihat  the 
extension  o(  the  spheres  of  election  will  present  a  greater 
option  or  latitude  of  choice  to  the  people;  that  through 
the  medium  of  the  State  legislatures — which  are  select 
bodies  of  men,  and  which  arc  to  appoint  the  members  of 
the  national  Senate— there  is  reason  to  ex|>ect  Ihat  this 
branch  will  generally  be  composed  with  peculiar  care  and 
judgment;  that  these  circumKlunces  promise  greater 
knowledge  and  more  extensive  information  in  the  national 
councils,  and  that  they  will  be  less  apt  to  be  tainted 
by  the  spirit  of  faction^  and  more  out  of  the  reach  of 
those  occasional  ill  humors,  or  temporary  prejudices  and 
propensities  which,  in  smaller  societies,  frequently  con- 
taminate the  public  councils,  beget  injustice  and  oppres- 
sion of  a  part  of  the  community,  and  engender  schemes 
which,  though  they  gratify  a  momentary  inclination  or 
desire,  terminate  in  general  distress,  dissatisfaction,  and 
disgust.  Several  additional  reasons  ufconsiilcrabic  force 
to  fortify  that  probability  will  occur  when  we  come  to 
survey  with  a  more  critical  eye  the  interior  structure  of 
the  ediltce  which  we  are  invited  to  erect.  It  will  be 
sufficient  here  to  remark  that,  until  satisfactory  reasons 
can  be  assigned  to  jostify  an  opinion  that  the  federal 
government  is  likely  to  be  administered  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  render  it  odious  or  contemptible  to  ilie  people, 
there  can  be  no  reasonable  foundation  for  the  supposi- 
tion that  tile  laws  of  the  Union  will  meet  with  any  greater 
obstruction  from  them,  or  wdl  stand  in  need  of  any  other 
methods  to  enforce  Utcir  execution,  than  the  laws  of  the 
particular  members. 

The  hope  of  impunity  is  a  strong  incitement  to  sedition; 
the  dread  o(  punishment,  a  proportionably  strong  dis- 


R 


■•■Ul^l    RESPECT  FOR  NATIONAL  AUTHORITY.     I?' 

conrascnicnt  to  it.  Will  not  the  goTcrnmcnt  of  the 
Union — wliicli,  if  )»o»scmu;<1  uf  s\  due  degree  of  power,  can 
ult  to  lift  aid  the  collective  reftourues  of  the  whole  Con- 
federacy— be  mort  likely  to  repress  Xhc  farmer  sentiment 
and  to  ins[>ire  the  latttr,  than  that  of  u  single  Sliitc,  which 
can  only  command  the  resources  within  itself?  A  turbu- 
lent faction  in  a  State  may  easily  suppose  itself  ahle  to 
contend  with  the  friends  to  the  government  in  that  State; 
but  it  can  hardly  be  so  infatuated  as  to  imagine  itself  a 
■natch  for  the  combined  efforts  of  the  Union.  If  this 
reDcction  be  jnst,  there  is  less  danger  of  resistance  from 
irreifulur  combinations  of  individuals  to  the  authority  of 
the  Confederacy  than  to  that  of  a  single  member.* 
1  will  in  this  place  luix^rd  an  observation  which  will 
Dt  be  the  less  just  because  to  .some  it  may  ai>pcar  new: 
rbich  is  that  the  more  the  operations  of  the  national 
authority  are  intermingled  in  the  ordinary  exercise  of 
government,  the  more  the  citizens  are  accustomed  to 
meet  with  it  in  the  common  occurrences  of  their  political 
^fc;  the  more  it  is  familiarized  to  their  sight  and  to  their 
Jeetingiv;  the  further  it  enters  into  those  objects  which 
'll{giieh  the  most  sensible  chords  and  put  in  motion  the 
iiiost  active  springs  of  the  human  heart;  the  greater  will 
be  the  probability  that  it  will  conciliate  the  respect  and 
attachment  of  the  community.  Man  is  very  much  a 
creature  of  habit.  A  thing  that  rarely  strikes  his  senses 
will  generally  have  but  little  influence  upon  his  mind. 
A  government  continually  at  a  distance  and  out  of  sight 

'  Ttiu  hu  hwn  ntrioiiily  ihovii  by  tlie  'lulinclion  in  llic  puhlic  mind 
between  "  RefuUn  "  «nd  ■'  Mililia."  In  l>oih  the  g'"'  railtuid  iiiiku 
of  1877  ami  1S94  llie  noten  rctiilnl  billerly  llie  ImaI  roililis.  hut  with 
lit*  kMNainiuc  ■)(  Uniicil  .Statci  tnHiph,  lbuiit>h  ihcy  iiunilieicil  i>ii  niEiie 
ikui  tbc  tnilii'i.  aclii*]  tc<»tiiiicr  cvuceI.  TIic  urns  citcuinttaiKit  wu 
ihovn  in  the  Lomlofi  "  un«mplo)-c<t-tioli "  of  18SS,  wh«n  lli«  fcelln)[ 
of  lite  inol>  <o"ird  the  police  vu  cxcccdinsly  billcT  ;  but  the  moincni 
Ik  l<i' '  -teA.  ihe  ».Biff  ilolcrt  tieijio  10  joke  uith  them.     The 

■fch-i  iTcare  Ix'lwcen  mmllng  loral  uliuinitintlon  and  rMiit. 

U(  the  ri>ii{in  »  cnornaoiu,  fur  ihc  Ifat  «  man  knuwi,  Iho  more  he  ia 
govemed  h]r  bit  imiginatjon.  So  long  ai  Mtcuion  w«t  under  ditcuuion 
M  ■  cniuliiuiMiul  i|ne>tlon,  the  ina»»  could  lake  no  part,  bnl  when 
iht  lUg  vai  nitnl  ini,  ilicy  uJDiknUiod  ihe  i»ae  men  clearly  than  many 
•till*  (Mdetv— £di roB. 


171 


/.ESS  NEED  OF  FOKCS  BY  UfftOft. 


[■•.  »T 


tan  hardly  be  expected  to  interest  the  sensatioMof  the 
people.'  The  inference  il  that  tlie  authority  o(  the 
Union,  and  the  afTections  of  the  citizens  toward  it,  will 
be  strengthened  rather  than  weakened  by  its  extension 
to  what  are  called  mutters  of  ititern.i1  concern;  and  will 
have  less  uccnsion  to  recur  to  force,  in  proportion  to  the 
familiarity  and  comprehensiveness  of  its  agency.  The 
more  it  circulates  through  those  chininek  and  currents  in 
which  the  passions  of  mankind  naturally  l!ow,  the  less 
will  it  require  the  aid  of  the  violent  and  perilous  expedi- 
ents of  compulsion. 

One  thing  at  all  events  must  be  evident,  that  a  govern- 
ment like  the  one  proposed  wouid  bid  much  fairer  to 
avoid  the  necessity  of  nsing  force  than  that  species  of 
league  contended  for  hy  most  of  its  opponents,  the 
authority  of  which  should  only  operate  upon  the  States 
in  their  political  or  collective  cajMirities.  It  has  been 
bm  shown  that  in  such  a  Confederacy  there  can 

Mo.  IS.  be  no  sanction   for  the   laws   but  force;  that 

frequent  delinquencies  in  the  members  arc  the   natural 


'  Thit  menial  >llTtni(«  Tqinnhn  the  IpxI  Io  nnr  of  ih*  nml  bvfllianl 
wclioni  of  Itif^hni'i  "  Eii^IhK  Contlitulion,"  in  nhjcli  he  poi*t>  oM 
llul  ttM  Kovcinmenl  ol  Eii]{Und  tiiliial.  pouaunga  "  iliiitiifiecl  pavt"  aail 
im  ''  cffi^iCMt  |iaR  ":  the  (iiriiier  tvinu  mjifilrrit  liv  ilic  tuiernun.  4i>il  llit 
tjtltvr  l^y  llic  wnTltin;^  ^mtiiiktralKin.  Tlir  'Ir^nifinl  pvl.  Yvr  miiititaint. 
GomiMiiKb  thai  In^'lly  ■o'l  ravmncv  hjr  wliich  alon«  ilia  In)^  part 
of  Ibe  people  ii  •.-unlrollcd  ;  ihe  lack  o(  Ihis  lie  coiisidm  ■  groU 
defccl  l>  Pictiilcnlial  navetninviit.  Vet  the  caainple  of  lic^il  Uriuin 
lUtdf  duriBi;  Ihe  Coinmnuiraillli.  if  nni  n(  Fruice  and  (lie  Ciiiteil 
Stam,  (iMnU  tiare  tliotm  liiiu  thai  alial  |r«ly  cflonnimla  tbc  lojiliy  aiHl 
rcrcTtnc*  <A  a  peujfle  n  tlie  i«al  nalioiialily  of  irhttli.  ia  K'>cla<"l,  IIib 
kDveiri)^  liippeni  Io  be  ih«  nnoM  olinnui  nrreiuon.  ''^-'Ift  iu  hi* 
"  Life  of  Sicin  "  iltitrt  Ilic  •liitincllon  llial  Nagvilcon  n  <  i;*!!^)^ 

to  mniucr  luly.  Getnunf.  and  Awdila  bneauke  there  .  c  <oii»- 

tiioiU  dial  time,  no  ttuc  WA**  f>\  nalloaalltj  ;  Inil  in  ^1|»1r^  .imi  Knula, 
where  the  contrary  wn  true,  Nii)in)«on  faittd  iq^allr.  Vet  nil  tliew 
coiiniriea  wrnr  ei^nally  equipped  with  royally-  Ho*  the  feiiK  of  loyally 
bai  groirti  in  ihe  Uniiccl  Smicii.  doi  ihrD*|;)i  Tcrenoce  fur  •  AjmehMiI, 
but  ihroQgfa  ■  greatei  an<f  eieiter  ronwIoqiacM  of  actual  BMl(WtUly,  b  a 
BiOM  ialemttne  uu-ly  \tm  Hnlu  nunwlii  at  Ihe  oiitiinnl  ril  "  •nnUp 
of  tlic  aintliliitioii  "  wlikh  i)Frcto)>e(l  almiHt  with  its  aJii|-ti')n,  anil  noir* 
■ibyt  Iherv  i*  nrach  ntiikal  initin)*  about  the  Matitnenl  tor  "  llir  Hic". 
7*1  each  form  t^  loyally  it  \m\.  a  lurtacv  eijweukiu  of  a  far  •leepcr  lEclino. 
com^NioAini;  eiactly  to  what  Ba^cchoc  luperiUlally  betloed  t'> !«  metrly 
a  leverciux  lor  i&c  (Juecn.— EMioa. 


il 


olF&prin£  of  the  very  frame  of  the  government;  and  that 
as  often  as  these  happen,  they  can  only  be  redressed,  if 
at  all,  by  war  aiid  violence. 

The  plan  reported  by  the  convention,  by  extending  the 
authority  of  the  federal  head  to  the  individual  citizens  of 
the  several  Sutes,  will  enable  the  government  to  employ 
the  ordinary  magistracy  of  each  in  the  execution  of  its 
laws.  It  is  easy  to  perceive  that  this  will  tend  to  destroy, 
in  the  common  apprehension,  all  distinction  between  the 
sources  from  which  they  might  proceed;  and  will  give 
the  federal  government  the  same  advantage  for  securing 
a  due  obedience  to  its  authority  which  is  enjoyed  hy  the 
guvernnient  of  each  State,  in  addition  to  the  influence  on 
public  opinion  which  will  result  from  the  important  con- 
sideration of  its  having  power  to  call  to  its  assistance  and 
support  the  resource*  of  the  whole  Union.  It  merits 
particular  attention  in  this  place,  tliat  the  laws  of  the 
Confederacy,  as  to  the  tnumtraitii  and  ItgUimate  objects 
of  its  jurisdiction,  will  become  the  sufKKMK  law  of  the 
land,  to  the  observance  of  which  all  officers — legislative, 
executive,  and  judicial,  in  each  State— will  be  bound  by 
the  sanctity  of  an  oath.  Thus  the  legislatures,  courts, 
and  miigistrate«  of  the  respective  members  will  be  in- 
corporated into  the  operations  of  the  national  goveriimrnt 
at  far  as  its  just  and  {omtHuthna!  authority  extrmh,  and 
will  be  rendered  auxiliary  to  the  enforcement  of  its  laws.* 
Any  man  who  wilt  pursue  by  his  own  reflections  the  con- 
sequences of  this  situation  will  perceive  that  there  is 
good  ground  to  calculate  upon  a  regular  and  peaceable 
execution  of  the  laws  of  the  Union,  if  its  powers  are 
administered  with  a  common  share  of  prudence.  If  we 
«tll  arbitrarily  .luppose  the  contrary,  we  may  deduce  any 
inferences  we  please  from  the  supposition;  for  it  is  cer- 
Uinly  possible,  by  an  injudicious  exercise  of  the  authori- 
ties  of  the  best  government  tluit  ever  was,  or  ever  can  be 
instituted,   to  provoke  and   precipitate  the  people  into 

*  Ths  MpAiIflry  which  hu  bMit  «nip1o):td,  to  Hh«w  ikil  thit  wil!  i«nd 
to  lh»  dntnini'm  o(  tho  State  ^venmievt*.  will,  in  its  jiropBr  pUi*,  be 
lally  aeteeted.— PVKjua. 


'74 


MALADIES  OF  BODY  POUTIC. 


f>«.M 


the  wildest  excesses.  But  tliough  the  acIvcrKirics  of  ihc 
proposed  Constitution  «liould  presume  that  the  nvtioiul 
rulers  wuutd  be  inisensiblc  to  the  motives  u(  public  ^u-iA 
or  to  the  obligattnns  of  duty,  1  would  slill  ask  tlicm  liuw 
the  interests  of  ambition  or  the  views  of  encroacbment 
can  be  promoted  by  sugh  a  conduct? 

TUBLIUS. 


No.    28.  </BA/^W>a(/»anM/,  Itecndbnit.  tr«r,> 


HamiltotL 


CONDITIONS   WHICH    NECESSITATE   A 
NATIONAL   tOKCE. 

ttiurrtttitHi  a  miiaJy  iiutfanMt  frtm  tkt  k»iji  ftlitU — An  ititmr- 
Titian  a  d»ngtr  I9  all  ^Pitrn'n/ilt — Eiif<riiiKt  9/  Mjiiaikuitlli  anj 
Peaiuj/iatiia — AVm  York  tmui  I'rrmeHt — Sip^'aU ien/tJtra{»ti  tntfetl 
U  tAmt  Hnjiliftii  dJ  tkt  Uniitn—A  /nil  aHitatr  If  fkjitliaH  ii  that  Ikt 
ffmer  n  in  lit  hunJi  (■/  iIk  rtfrtitalafivti  o/ikefvofU — CrrUin  intan 
'/  /v/k/i»-  rtiutoHU  ti  nsitrf^alifti — A-tv^nl'gt  «/  t-"gt  ItrrU^ty  vti 
*/  ttiiU  grptrnrnfMl—imfr/iuitlilf  t/  a  taegr  itaaJmg  nrnty, 

J>  tht  Peo^t  0/  tke  Slate  0/  New  York: 

That  there  may  happen  cases  in  which  the  national 
government  may  be  necessitated  to  resort  to  force,  can- 
not be  denied.  Our  own  experience  lias  corrotMjrated 
the  lessons  taucht  by  the  examples  of  other  nations; 
that  emergencies  of  this  sort  will  sometimes  arise  iu  all 
societies,  liuwever  constituted;  that  ftcditions  and  insur- 
rections arc,  unhappily,  maladies  as  inseparable  from  the 
iKKJy  politic  as  tumors  and  eruptions  from  the  natural 
body;  that  the  idea  of  governing  at  all  times  by  the  sim- 
ple force  of  law  (which  we  have  been  told  is  the  only 
admissible  principle  of  republican  government)  baa  no 
place  but  in  the  reveries  of  tlii>se  political  doctors  whose 
sagacity  disdains  the  admunitinns  »(  experimental 
instruction. 

Should  such  emcrgrencies  at  any  time  hapjit-n  under 
(he  national  government,  there  could  be  no  remedy  tiut 
force.    The  meaiu  to  be  emplujrcd  must  be  prupartioaed 


IhiIUm] 


locAt  Msi/xfiEcnoy. 


'7S 


to  the  extent  of  the  mischief.  If  it  should  be  a  slight 
comiDoiion  in  a  small  part  of  a  State,  the  iiitUtia  of  the 
residue  would  be  adequate  to  its  suppression;  and  the 
■atural  presumption  is  that  they  would  be  ready  to  do 
their  duty.  An  iusurrei-tion,  whatever  may  be  its  imme- 
diate  cause,  eventually  endangers  all  government.  Re- 
gard to  the  pubhc  peace,  if  not  to  the  rights  of  the  Union, 
VMJd  engage  the  citixens  to  whom  the  contagion 
had  not  communicated  itself,  to  oppose  the  insurgents; 
mil  if  the  general  government  should  be  found  in  prac- 
tice conducive  to  the  prosperity  and  felicity  of  the 
people,  it  were  Irrational  to  believe  that  they  would  be 
dUinclincd  to  its  support. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  the  insurrection  should  pervade  a 
whole  State,  or  a  principal  part  of  it.  the  employment  of 
adiScrcnt  kind  of  force  might  become  unavoidable.     It 
appears  that  Massachusetts  found  it  necessary  to  raise 
ttoops  for  repressing  the  disorders  within  that  State; 
Ifcat  Pennsylvania,  from  the  mere  apprehension  of  cora- 
■ottons  among  a  part  of  her  citizens,  has  thought  proper 
to  have  recourse  to   the    same    measure.      Suppose    the 
Slate  of  New  York  had  been  inclined  to  re-eslabtish  her 
'wt  jurisdiction  over  the  inhabitants  of  Vermont,  could 
sbc  liavc  hoped  tor  success  in  such  an  enterpnse  from 
the  efforts  of  the  militia  alone?    Wuuld  she  not  have 
ixea  compelled  to  raise  and  to  maintain  a  more  regular 
force  for  the  execution  of  her  deitign?     If  it  must  then 
l>e  admitted  that  the  necessity  of  recurring  to  a  force 
didcrcnt  from  the  militia,  in  cases  of  this  extraordinary 
Mlure.  is  applicable   to   the  State  governments  them- 
«!«»,    why   sliould    the   possibility   that    the    national 
government  might  be  under  a  like  necessity,  in  similar 
otremitifs,  be  made  an  objection  to  its  existence?    Is  it 
not  surprising  that  men  who  declare  an  attachment  to 
(he  Union  in  the  abstract  should  urge  as  an  objection 
to  the  proposed  Conslilutiim  what  applies  with  tenfold 
vcighl  to  the  plan  for  which  ihey  contend;  and  what,  as 
(kr  as  it  has  any  foundation  in  truth,  is  an  inevitable  con- 
sequence of  eivil  society  upon  an  enlarged  scale?     Who 


174  MALADIES  OF  BODY  FOUTIC.  [»«.  M 

tlie  wildest  excesses.  But  though  tbe  adversaries  of  the 
proposed  Constitution  sliuuld  presume  that  the  natioaal 
rulers  would  be  inseniiible  to  tlie  mutives  uf  public  gu<Kl 
or  to  the  obligations  of  duty,  I  would  still  ask  thcin  how 
the  interests  of  ambition  or  the  views  of  encroach  meat 
can  be  promoted  by  such  a  conduct? 

PUBLIUS. 


No.  28.         </«rf«ifiiA<ir/fBmi/.  i>Mmb*rx,i|ff.)         Hamilton. 

CONDITIONS   WHICH    NECESSITATE   A 

NATIONAL    t-OKCE. 

lni»rrtttie»i  d  mataiiy  tmiefaraUi  from  lit  tody  ftlilU — An  iMinr. 
rttlifH  a  Jatgi'  la  all  gmtntmfHl — /CiftrHiut  c/  J/JinuAuu/ti  and 
J'tnntyii'am.i — AVic  ytrt  ffmufrrmeal — SffaraUimi/ti/ltradfiiiUjftI 
It  lamr  itnJili*m  ai  tkt  l/ntft — A  fitU  aiuvitr  In  tijttluM  it  lisl  fAr 
foc/tr  U  in  lh<  kartJt  a/  Iki  rtfristnlalivts  »/ Iht ptafU — Ctrt^n  nifittt 
e/  fefular  riiuiiuuf  is  nmrfialUu — Aitivnlaj-r  <■/  litfp  Urril^rf  ami 
e/  ilatt  gavtrumtHl — /m/viiiMiIyi'/  »  Urgt  iliiHiiiu{  armj. 

To  the  PeopU  0/  the  Slate  oj  New  York: 

That  there  may  happen  cases  in  which  the  national 
([overnmcnt  may  be  necessitated  to  resort  to  force,  can- 
not be  denied.  Our  own  experience  has  corroborated 
the  lessons  tiiuglit  by  the  examples  of  other  nations; 
lliat  emergencies  of  this  sort  will  sometimes  arise  in  all 
societies,  however  constituted;  that  seditions  and  insur- 
rections are,  unhappily,  maladies  as  inseparable  from  the 
l>ody  politic  as  tumors  and  eroptions  from  the  naturni 
body;  that  the  idea  of  governing  at  all  times  by  the  sim- 
ple force  of  law  (which  we  have  been  told  is  the  only 
admissible  principle  of  republican  government)  has  no 
place  but  in  the  reveries  of  those  political  doctors  whose 
sagacity  disdains  the  admonitions  of  experimental 
iiisiniction. 

Should  such  emergencies  at  any  time  happen  under 
the  nation^tl  government,  there  could  be  no  remedy  but 
force.    Tbe  meoas  to  be  employed  must  be  proportioned 


BunittoBi  LOCAL  /A'sa/ffiscrJOM,  17s 

to  (he  extent  of  the  mischief,  If  it  should  be  a  slight 
commotion  in  a  small  part  ol  a  ^t;itc,  the  militia  of  the 
miilue  would  be  adequate  to  its  suppression:  ^nO  the 
natural  presumption  is  that  thvy  would  be  ready  to  do 
their  duty.  An  insurrection,  whatever  may  be  its  imme- 
diate cause,  eventually  endanf[ers  all  govern nieiit.  Re- 
gard to  the  public  peace,  if  not  to  the  rights  of  the  Union, 
would  engage  the  citizens  to  whom  the  contagion 
had  not  communicated  itself,  to  oppose  the  insurgents; 
and  if  the  general  government  should  be  found  in  prac- 
tice conducive  to  the  prosperity  and  felicity  of  the 
people,  it  were  irrational  to  believe  that  tliey  would  be 
disinclined  to  its  support. 

If.  on  the  contrary,  the  insurrection  should  pervade  a 
whole  StJite,  or  a  principal  part  of  it,  the  employment  of 
a  different  kind  of  force  might  become  unavoidable.  It 
appears  that  Massachusetts  found  it  necessary  to  raise 
troops  for  repressing  the  disorders  within  that  Stale; 
that  Pennsylvania,  from  the  mere  apprehension  of  com- 
motions among  a  part  of  lirr  citizens,  has  thought  proper 
to  have  recourse  to  the  same  measure.  Suppose  the 
State  of  New  York  had  been  inclined  to  re-establish  her 
lost  jurisdiction  over  the  inhabitants  of  Vermont,  could 
she  have  hoped  for  succe**  in  such  an  enterprise  from 
the  efforts  of  the  militia  alone?  Would  she  not  have 
been  compelled  to  raise  and  to  maintain  a  more  regular 
force  for  the  execution  of  her  design?  If  it  must  then 
be  admitted  that  the  necessity  of  recurring  to  a  (urce 
different  from  the  militia,  in  cases  of  this  extraordinary 
nature,  is  applicable  to  the  State  governments  them- 
selves, why  should  the  possibility  that  the  nuiiunal 
government  might  be  under  a  like  necessity,  in  similar 
extremities,  Itc  made  an  objection  to  its  existence?  Is  it 
not  surprising  Itiat  men  who  declare  an  attachment  to 
the  Union  in  the  abstract  should  urge  as  an  objection 
to  the  proposal  Constitution  what  applies  with  (enfold 
weight  to  the  plan  for  whiirh  they  contend;  and  w)ut,  as 
far  as  it  lias  any  foundation  in  truth,  is  an  inevitable  con- 
sequence of  civil  society  upon  an  enlarged  scale?    Who 


176 


msuFFfCiet/CY  of  militia. 


tl«bM 


would  not  prefer  that  pouibtttty  to  the  anceating  .tgitit- 
lioDS  and  (requcnt  rcvoluiiona  which  arc  the  cootinual 
scotirgcs  of  petty  republics? 

I^t  us  pumue  this  examination  in  another  IlghL  Sup- 
pose, in  Ilea  of  one  general  system,  two,  or  three,  or 
even  four  Confederacies  were  to  be  formed,  would  not 
the  same  difficulty  oppose  it&elf  to  the  operations  of 
either  of  these  Confederacies?  Would  not  each  of  them 
be  exposed  to  the  same  casualties;  and  when  these  hap- 
pened, be  obliged  to  hare  recourxe  to  (he  same  expedi- 
ents (or  upholding  its  authority  which  arc  objected  to  in 
a  government  for  all  the  States?  Would  the  militia,  in 
this  suppuitition,  be  more  ready  or  more  able  to  support 
the  federal  authority  than  in  the  case  of  a  general  union? 
All  candid  and  intelligent  men  must,  upon  due  considera- 
tion, acknowledge  that  the  principle  of  the  objection  is 
equally  applicable  to  either  of  the  two  cases;  and  that, 
whether  we  have  one  government  for  all  the  States,  or 
dilTercnt  governments  for  different  parcels  of  them,  or 
even  if  there  should  be  an  entire  separation  of  the  Suites,' 
there  might  sometimes  be  a  necessity  lo  make  use  of  a 
force  constituted  differently  from  the  miliits,  to  preserve 
the  peace  of  the  community  and  to  maintain  the  just 
authority  of  the  laws  against  those  violent  invasions  of 
them  which  amount  tu  insurrections  and  rt^bellions. 

Independent  of  all  other  reasonings  upon  the  subject, 
it  is  a  full  answer  to  those  who  require  a  more  peremp- 
tory provision  against  military  estahlishmcnis  in  lime 
of  peace,  to  say  that  the  whole  power  of  the  proposed 
government  is  to  be  in  the  hands  of  the  representatives 
uf  the  people.  Tliis  is  the  essential,  and,  after  all,  only 
efficacious  security  for  the  rights  and  privileges  of  the 
people  which  is  altainaUc  in  civil  society.* 

If  the  representatives  of  the  people  betray  their  con- 
stitoenti,  there  is  then  no  resource  left  but  in  the 
exertion  of  that  original  right  of  sclf-<lefcnse  which  is 

*  111  loll  cflicur  "ill  he  eumiiwil  liet«*rieT.  — t'u«jt<». 
I  In  lh«  leu  n{  thi>  nlltinn  of  l8oj.  "  ttt  If  Xhnt  iht-nild  bv  n  oUiiy 
nartRacctnl  gmmunclil*  u  Uiere  arc  Statet."— £l>rTOK. 


OuBitWal 


VSUXPSJtS  /y  SMGLS  STATE. 


•77 


paramount   to  all   positive   forms   of  government,   and 
whicb  ajjainst  the  usurpations  of  the  national  rulers  may 
be  cxcrtcO  wiih  inriniicly  better  prospect  o(  auccetis  than 
ugainst  those  o(  the  rulers  of  an  individual  state.     In  a 
single  state,  if  the  persons  intrusted  with  supreme  power 
become  usurpers,  the  different  parcels,  subdivisions,  or 
districts  of  which  it  consists,  having  no  distinct  govern- 
ment in  each,  can  take  nu  regular  meaxurex  for  defense. 
The  citizens  must  rush  tumultuously  to  arms,  without  con- 
cert, without  system,  without  resource — except  in  their 
courage  and  despair,     '['lie  usurpers,   clothed   with  the 
forms  of  Icjtal  authority,  can  too  often  crush  the  opposi* 
tian  in  embryo.     The  smaller  the  extent  of  the  territory, 
the  inure  difficult  will  it  be  for  the  [leople  to  fonn  a  regu- 
Urorsysiemaiic  plan  of  opposition,  and  the  more  easy  will 
it  be  to  defeat  their   early  efforts.      Intelligence  can  be 

^mo^e  !i|>eedily  obtained  of  their  preparations  and  more. 
oKnts,  and  the  military  force  in  the  possession  of  the 
wurpers  can  be  more  rapidly  directed  against  the  part 
■here  the  opposition  has  begun.  In  thiit  situation  there 
Biiu  be  a  peculiar  coincidence  of  circumstances  to  insure 
"Kcess  to  the  popular  resistance. 
The  obstacles  to  usurpation  and  th«  facilities  of  resist* 
ttce  increase  with  the  increased  extent  of  the  slate, 
proriilcd   the  citizens  understand   their  rights  and  arc 

Iifeposcd  to  defend  tliem.  The  natural  strength  of  the 
pMple  in  a  large  community,  in  proportion  to  the  arti- 
kial  strength  of  the  government,  is  greater  than  in  a 
mall,  and  of  course  more  competent  to  a  struggle  with 
like  attempts  of  the  government  to  establish  a  tyranny. 
Bat  in  a  confederacy  the  people,  without  exaggeration, 
■nay  be  said  to  be  entirely  the  masters  of  their  own  fate. 
l*o*er  being  nlmost  always  tlir  rival  of  power,  the 
general  government  will  at  all  times  stand  ready  to 
check  the  usurpations  of  Ihc  state  governments,  and 
these  wit)  have  the  same  disposition  towards  the  general 
tovcrnment.  The  people,  by  throwing  themselves  into 
either  Kale,  will  infallibly  make  it  preponderate.  If 
their  tights  arc  invaded  by  either,  they  can  make  use  of 


178 


EXTENT  OP  NA  TlO/f  A  SECUHITY. 


(»•. « 


the  other  as  the  instrument  of  redress.  How  wise  will 
it  be  in  them,  by  cherishing  the  union,  to  preserve  to 
themselves  an  advantage  which  can  never  be  too  highly 
prized ! 

It  may  safely  be  received  as  an  axiom  in  our  political 
system  that  the  State  governments  will,  in  alt  possible 
contingencies,  afford  complete  security  against  invasions 
of  the  public  liberty  by  the  national  authority.  Projects 
of  usurpation  cannot  be  masked  under  pretenses  so 
likely  to  escape  the  penetration  of  select  bodies  of  men 
as  of  the  people  at  large.  The  legislatures  will  have 
better  means  of  information.  They  can  discover  the 
danger  at  a  distance;  and  possessing  all  the  organs  of 
civil  power,  and  the  confidence  of  the  people,  Ihcy  can 
at  once  adopt  a  regular  plan  of  op[>'>silion,  in  which  they 
can  combine  all  the  resources  of  the  community.  They 
can  readily  communicate  with  each  other  in  the  different 
States,  and  unite  their  common  forces  for  the  protection 
of  their  common  liberty.' 

The  great  extent  of  the  country  is  a  further  security. 
We  have  already  experienced  its  utility  against  the 
attacks  of  a  foreign  power  .\nd  it  would  have  preci«ely 
the  same  effect  against  the  enterprises  of  ambitious  rulers 
in  the  national  councils.  If  the  federal  army  should  be 
able  to  quell  the  resistance  of  one  State,  the  distant 
Slates  would  have  it  in  their  power  to  make  head  with 
fresh  forces.  The  advantages  obtained  in  one  place 
must  l>e  abandoned  to  subdue  the  opposition  in  others; 
and  the  moment  the  part  which  had  been  reduced  to  sub- 
mission was  left  to  itself,  Its  efforts  wouM  be  renewed, 
aiw]  its  resistance  revive. 

*  TbU  htt  tMon  diipnnvd  hi  hittofr.  In  ihc  hif>h  tM«  of  (r<lw«tiwi 
Stdjprkk  noted  ihu  lh«  il«aiocnt(  were  "gcllios  ih«  Siile  Uorii 
lalo  (Ivcir  hindt  lo  play  Ihcin  like  tiuicrio  OB  (ke  U.  S.  ^0*1." 
bol  no  nntlc^  Mtioii   u>uM   be  ucurcd.     FrcqiMsl)>     '  '.f    Icfb- 

Uiont  h*ve  protntcJ  >i;iiliitt  (lie  acilua  u(  Ui«  lu  :  runenl, 

■R'l  fc»vp  (utthfitiiwr.  wlKti  tbi-ir  o"n  intrmh  wftr  1;   ,ji  hi  lliv 

Cnek  tvit).  not  u:ru|itrd  lo  ofipciu*  hy  forcr  the  will  ul  Ihr  natioiial 
[aTcriimeBt  Bui  nol  oai«  has  •  iiai«  come  lo  (h«  aiil  of  knolba 
oduallr  ledilii^;  ilie  iiaiioiial  avllioritjr  while  tlill  hoMiag  IImII  m  nem- 
Iwr  of  Ui«  Unioii.—Etiti-olt. 


hiAi 


i^ai 


HtmilUal 


LAHGF.  AKMY  IMPOSSIBLE. 


«?9 


We  should  recollect  tliat  the  eitent  uf  tlie  military 
force  mnil,  at  all  events,  be  regulated  by  the  resources 
of  the  country.  l''or  n  long  time  to  come  it  will  not  be 
possible  to  maintain  a  large  army;  and  as  the  means  of 
doing  this  increase,  the  population  and  natural  strength 
of  the  community  will  proportiunably  increase.  When 
will  Che  time  arrive  that  the  federal  ](<'vernment  can  rabe 
aiid  maintain  an  army  capable  of  erecting  a  despotism 
urer  the  great  body  of  the  people  of  an  immcntic  empire, 
who  are  in  a  situation,  through  the  medium  of  their 
State  governments,  to  take  measures  (or  their  own  de- 
fense, with  all  the  celerity,  regnUriiy,  and  system  of 
tndepemJent  nations?  The  apprehension  may  be  con- 
sidered as  a  disease,  for  which  there  can  be  found  no 
care  in  the  resources  of  argument  and  reasoning. 

PUBLItlS. 


No.  29t35l'      (/-^•/^■A"'/'*'"-'^. J^u'Tt-tiwi      Hamilton. 
THE   POVVER   OF  REGULAIING   THE    MILITIA. 


A  na/Mni/  imiJtni  M  ifmrnnt  dtfmst — Uniformity  in  the  milifia 
Imt/tml—IJiiiilfii  pavtrt  vf  >uri<>iu/  gatrrrHmtiil  tiHKfming  il-ilr 
[trtei^CmUHlWn  tominHiif  faist  tvaiiumi — AtsH'<lity  tf  tkt  milili« 
framMg  1  Jan^tr  if  ttnlr-illfJ  ty  gt»tral  gfivriimeHi — Cirlain  gritvatut 
//  ft/fH/nl  mtUlary  rxtrtiifi — AifcvHU(r  ff  utui  tetfi—Tht  ilatti 
lauin  lo  Adtv  •>  frtfjitdtraHt  iafiatate  9r*r  tht  mitilia — Bxam^f  9f 
fttHMfitMi  a£,iiaillifefiiitilufi''a—EiiaggeriilrJin^f$ti»niiomrrniiif 
mttiut  ff  •Hililia — Cru4tul  tfmilitM  in  (att  ef  atltmftti Jtr^lim — Tht 
tiiHni gtmrraMfiU  aiomf  aUt  Iff  aie  Hi  miiitiit  It  prttal  tit  ttalti. 

Ta  tht  Piople  of  the  SlaU  ff  New  York: 

Tlic  power  of  regul.iting  the  militia,  and  of  command- 
ing its  services  in  times  of  insurrection  and  invasion,  arc 

'Thte  CiMr  *pf«*n:d  M  No.  XXXV.  Inlh«  origiMi  nubUniion  In 
iW anr^WptlV  ■<1<I  >>  ttifltct<it«  Ixrr  nin|]lM<d  i,-liiaii<;Ji:u>tal]ir.  la 
n.eollOFkBd  cdilkin  of  17^-*.  ItoH'cvet.  it  it  urinlcil  a«  N<i.  XXtX.. 
^!.i.  ..i_»  jt  it,  |ito|>cr  i>lnc«  aiZLurling  In  nibjCki,  ■■(!  for  tliii  rcacon 
''  '   the  liiM   ciiiiiou  liM  l«cn   (olIi>ired.     Ilenccfottk  ninilu 

<.  .  ill  tic  iioinl  uatiurc. — Edituk. 


i8o 


VSlFOKMlty  OF  MILITIA. 


(SAttisn 


natural  incidentit  lo  the  duties  of  superintending  llic 
common  defense,  and  oE  watching  over  the  Jntcroal 
peace  of  the  Confederacy. 

It  requires  no  skill  in  the  science  of  war  to  ditcem 
that  uniformity  in  the  organiiation  and  discipline  o(  the 
militi.-i  would  be  attended  with  the  most  bcnclicial  effects, 
whenever  they  vere  called  into  Mrvice  for  the  public 
defense.  It  would  enable  them  to  discharge  the  duties 
of  the  camp  and  of  the  field  with  mutual  intelligence  and 
conccrt^an  adrantagc  of  peculiar  moment  in  the  opera- 
tions of  an  army:  and  it  would  (it  them  much  sooner  to 
acquire  the  degree  of  proficiency  in  military  functions 
which  would  be  essential  to  their  usefulnei<t.  This  de- 
sirable uniformity  can  only  be  accomplished  by  conftding 
the  regulation  of  the  militia  to  the  direction  of  the 
national  authority.  It  is,  therefore,  with  the  most  evi* 
dcot  propriety  that  the  plan  of  the  convention  proposes 
to  empower  the  Union  "to  provide  for  organizing,  arm- 
ing, and  disciplining  the  militia,  and  for  governing  such 
part  of  them  as  may  be  employed  in  the  service  of  the 
United  States,  rfstrving  to  thf  Statrt  rftpfdhfly  Iht  a/tpoinl- 
mfil  o/  Iht  o0ifrf,  an  J  Ihf  aulharily  of  trainini;  Iht  mi/ilia 
atiording  to  iHe  disdpiiHt  frturilnJ  by  Coi^rrtf." 

Of  the  different  grounds  which  have  l>een  taken  in  op- 
position to  tlie  plan  of  the  convention,  there  is  none  that 
was  so  little  to  have  been  expected,  or  is  so  untenable  in 
itself,  as  the  one  from  which  this  particular  provision 
has  been  attacked.  If  a  well-regulated  militia  be  the 
most  natural  defense  of  a  free  country,  il  ought  certainly 
to  be  under  the  regulation  and  at  the  disposal  of  that 
body  which  is  constituted  the  guardian  of  the  national 
security.  If  standing  armies  arc  dangerous  to  liberty, 
an  efficacious  powerover  the  militia,  in  the  Iwdy  to  whose 
care  the  protection  of  the  Slate  is  committed,  ought  as 
far  as  possible  to  take  away  the  inducement  and  the  pre- 
text to  sucii  unfriendly  institutions.  If  the  federal 
government  can  command  the  aid  of  the  militia  in  those 
emergencies  which  call  for  the  military  arm  in  support 
of  the  civil  magistrate,  it  can  the  better  dispense  with 


A 


HfemCuiil 


J>OSSE  COUITATUS. 


i8i 


the  employment  of  a  dil7er«nt  kind  of  force.  If  it  cannot 
arait  itself  of  the  former,  it  will  be  obliged  to  recur  to 
the  latter.  To  render  .in  army  unnecessary  wilt  be  a 
more  certain  method  of  preventing  its  existence  than  a 
thousand  prohibitions  upon  paper. 

In  order  to  cast  an  odium  upon  the  power  of  calling 
forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  it  has 
been  remarked  tli.it  there  is  nowhere  any  provision  in 
the  proposed  Constitution  for  calling  out  the  ros^it  comi- 
TATOS,  to  assist  the  magistrate  in  the  execution  of  his 
duty;  whence  it  h.ix  Iwen  inferred  that  military  force 
was  intended  to  be  his  only  auxiliary.  There  is  a  strik- 
ing incoherence  in  the  objections  which  have  appeared, 
and  sometimes  even  from  the  same  quarter,  not  much 
calculated  to  inspire  a  very  favorable  opinion  of  the  5in- 
cerity  or  fair  dealing  of  their  authors.  The  same  prrsons 
who  tell  UB,*in  one  breath,  that  the  powers  of  the  federal 
government  will  be  despotic  and  unlimited,  inform  us,  in 
the  next,  that  it  has  not  authority  sufficient  even  to  call 
out  iJie  posse  coMtTAToa.  The  latter,  fortunately,  is  as 
much  short  of  the  truth  as  the  former  exceeds  it.  It 
would  be  as  absurd  to  doubt  that  a  right  to  pass  all  laws 
"w^KtffjurW/'-i'/Vr  to  execute  its  declared  powers  would 
include  (hat  of  reciuiring  the  assistance  of  the  citizens  to 
the  officers  who  may  be  intruKlcd  with  the  execution  of 
those  laws,  as  it  would  be  to  lielieve  that  a  right  to  enact 
laws  necessary  and  proper  for  the  imposition  and  collec* 
tinn  of  taxes  would  involve  that  of  varying  the  rules  of 
descent  and  of  the  alienation  of  landed  property,  or  of 
abolishing  the  trial  by  jury  in  cases  relating  to  it.  It 
being  therefore  evident  that  the  supposition  of  a  want  of 
power  to  require  the  aid  of  the  rnssR  courxATUs  is 
entirely  destitute  of  color,  it  will  follow  that  the  conclu- 
sion which  h.is  been  drawn  from  it,  in  its  application  to 
ttie  authority  of  the  federal  government  over  the  militia. 
is  as  nncandid  as  it  is  illogical.  What  reason  could 
there  be  to  infer  that  force  was  intended  to  be  the  sole 
iiurniment  of  aulhorliy,  merely  because  there  is  a  (lower 
III  make  use  of  it  when  necessary*    What  shall  we  think 


t8> 


D/SCIPUXE  OF  JUIUTIA. 


(Ita.  M  cUi 


of  the  motives  which  could  induce  men  of  srnse  to  re^sun 
in  thi«  nunncr?  How  shall  we  prevent  »  conflict  between 
charily  and  judicincnl? 

By  a  curious  refinement  upon  the  spirit  of  republican 
je.ili)usy,  we  ;ire  even  taught  to  apprehend  danger  from 
tlic  militia  itticlf,  in  the  hands  of  the  federal  government. 
It  is  observed  that  select  corps  may  be  formed,  com- 
posed of  the  young  and  ardent,  who  may  he  rendered 
subsenrient  to  the  views  of  arbitrary  power.'  What  t>Un 
for  the  regulation  of  the  militia  may  be  pursued  by  the 
national  government  is  impossible  to  be  foreseen.  But 
so  far  from  viewing  the  matter  in  the  same  light  with 
those  who  object  to  select  corps  as  dangerous,  were  the 
Constitution  ratified,  an<l  were  1  to  deliver  my  sentiments 
to  a  member  of  the  federal  legislature  from  this  State  on 
the  subject  of  a  mihiia  establishment.  I  shunid  hold  to 
him,  in  substance,  the  following  discourse: 

"The  proj«:tofdisiap]iningall  the- militia  of  the  United 
States  is  as  futile  as  it  would  be  injurious,  if  it  were  capa* 
bic  of  being  carried  intu  execution.  A  tolerable  «Kperl> 
nexs  in  military  movements  is  a  business  that  rcqnirca 
time  and  practice.  It  is  not  a  day,  or  even  a  week,  that 
will  suffice  fur  the  attainment  of  it.  To  obli}>e  the  great 
body  of  the  yeomanry,  and  of  the  other  classes  of  the 
citizens,  to  be  under  arms  for  the  purpose  u(  going 
through  miliury  exercises  and  evolutions,  as  often  as 


'  [n  iSoj  JclT<rwin  pio|><>v:>l  thin  nty  mIkiiic  ot  %  danir>c'l  inililU, 
■ihI  wiaso  ni;er  tot  it  Ihnl  hr  draflcd  ahill,  anit  ^nil^.irotnl  lo  fort*  It 
(hruiIKh  CoiKjrnt  |k*  '"  Wrilinji  of  JelfFnoo,"  Fonl'i  wlitiori,  viii.  WA, 
(luI  II  ITU  itcfeuni  by  liii  own  paily.  Ilituvi;!)  (cU  of  I)if  UkCh  li>  WBlck 
tbc  "  youni:  :ii>J  SKtriit "  nii);hl  Ire  |<ul.  Tlic  ■iii|»>|>uliiity  ot  iha  a-ar 
of  t8i3  Hivnl  liffjaly  lo  mak*  tHlkuliim  ai"l  htr^k  ilnn-n  Ih*  tilil 
mililB  lim.  nhicli  cooipHlnl  animnal  drill  outre  <it  lo-ior  a  ytu  -,  anil 
■hi*  loiiling  (lowly  rilcndoJ  tkracbnut  ihc  i.-auiilnr,  unlit  al  the  l>q;u>- 
nmtc  o(  the  Ciail  Wu  linle  wai  left  oJ  tli«  oU  iilci  of  ■  iiunhouU  ouUiis. 
Finally  (lie  olitn  oiclhixl  lin^  t«en  enllTcly  iu)>«tcilcil  by  •  volitiitrat 
luililia  nude  up  almml  «huill)'  ut  iIm  "  yuuii);  ami  aidcnl.''  aiiJ  with  llli* 
ilevelopmenl  hn  tonic  Ihc  vriy  impruvoiDriit  horr  Hicgclol.  (or  tbc  new 
NaliOBil  UiMnl,  miliktr  iht  old  nnnti}'  militia,  have  lipcnme  not  ment* 

cipcl  IrOOfM.  Iral   luic.  I .u-.nii.  ..>  i..  ilinr  iii..iiiivi'.l  <'iu  Lj.lii.r    utiii 

thiii  "  local "  ficwk  '  ..)c 

the  li«al  d  thon  a.'.  .  .if 

llMU  an  Del^hbatluiwU.— LuttuJt. 


A 


pSutUtra]      SUBSTITUTE  FOR  STANDING  ARMY.        i?3 

might  be  nccctisary  to  acquire  the  degree  of  perfection 
which  would  entitle  them  to  ihcchanictcr  of  ii  well-rejju- 
tatwl  militia,  wuuld  be  a  real  grievance  to  the  people, 
aod  a  serious  public  inconvcoicncc  and  loss.  It  would 
form  an  annual  deduction  from  the  productive  lahnr  of 
the  country,  to  an  amount  which,  calculating  upon  the 
present  numbers  of  the  people,  would  not  fall  far  short 
of  the  whole  expense  of  the  oivil  estuhlishmtrnlft  of  all 
the  Slates.  To  attempt  a  thing  which  would  abridge  thc 
mass  of  labor  and  industry  to  so  considerable  an  extent 
would  be  unwise:  and  the  experiment,  il  made,  could  not 
succeed,  because  it  would  not  long  be  endured.  Little 
m-jre  c.in  reas<»nably  be  aimed  at.  with  respect  to  the 
[teople  at  large,  th;in  lo  havi;  them  properly  armed  and 
equipped;  and  in  order  to  sec  ihat  this  be  not  neglected, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  assemble  them  ome  or  twice  in 
the  Cour»e  of  a  year. 

"  But  though  the  scheme  of  dii^iptiiiing  the  whole 
nation  must  be  abandoned  as  mischievous  or  impractica> 
ble:  yet  it  is  a  matter  of  the  utmost  imporutncc  that  a 
well-digested  plan  should,  as  soon  as  possible,  be  adopted 
for  Itie  proper  estabhshmcnt  of  the  militia.  The  atten- 
tion of  the  government  ought  particularly  to  be  directed 
tu  the  formation  ol  a  select  corps  of  moderate  extent, 
upon  such  princjples  as  will  really  lit  them  for  service  in 
case  of  need,  liy  thus  circumst^ribint;  tlic  plan,  it  will  be 
poHsiblc  to  have  an  excellent  body  of  well-trained  militia, 
ready  to  take  the  licld  whenever  the  defense  of  the  Stale 
shall  reqnirc  it.  This  will  not  only  le*iscn  the  call  for 
military  establish mcnts,  but  if  circumstances  should  at 
any  time  oblige  the  government  to  form  an  army  of  any 
m;ignitude,  that  army  can  never  be  formidable  to  the 
liberlies  of  the  people  while  there  is  a  large  liody  o( 
ritizens,  little,  if  at  all,  inferior  to  them  in  discipline  and 
the  use  of  arms,  who  stand  ready  to  defend  their  own 
rights  and  those  of  their  fellow- citizens.  This  appears 
to  me  the  only  substitute  that  can  be  devised  for  a  stand- 
ing army,  ami  the  best  possible  security  against  it,  if  it 
should  exist." 


|84 


APFOINTMENT  OF  OFFtCEKS.        Wo.  » '«' 


Thus  differently  Trom  the  adversaries  of  ttic  proposed 
Constitution  shuuld  1  r<;a»on  oii  the  »ame  suhjoct, 
deducing  arguments  of  safety  from  the  very  satirccs 
which  Ihey  represent  as  fraught  with  danger  and  perdi- 
tion. But  how  the  national  le)(i«l.-iiure  may  reason  on  the 
point,  is  a  thing  which  neither  they  nor  1  can  foresee. 

There  is  something  so  far  fetched  and  so  extravagant 
In  the  idea  of  danger  to  liberty  from  the  militia,  that  one 
is  at  a  loss  whether  to  treat  it  with  gravity  or  with 
raillery;  whether  to  consider  it  as  a  mere  trial  of  skill, 
like  the  paradoxes  of  rtietofictaits;  aft  a  disingenuouK 
artifice  to  instill  prejudices  at  any  price;  or  as  the  serious 
oOspring  of  political  fanaticism.  Where,  iii  (he  name  of 
common  sense,  arc  our  fears  to  end  if  we  may  not  trust 
our  SODS,  our  brothers,  our  neighbors,  our  fellow-citizens? 
What  shadow  of  danger  can  there  be  from  men  who  arc 
daily  mingling  with  the  rest  of  their  countrymen,  and 
who  parttcipiite  with  them  in  the  same  feelings,  senti- 
ments, habits,  and  interests?  Wh:it  reasonable  cause  of 
apprehension  can  be  inferred  from  a  power  in  the  Union 
to  prescribe  regulations  for  the  militia,  and  to  command 
its  services  when  necessary,  while  the  particular  States 
are  to  have  the  j^e  aitJ  exdusipt  app^iHtmetit  fi/  Ihe  offiterst 
If  It  were  possible  seriously  to  iiKlult;r  a  jealousy  of  the 
militia  upon  any  conceivable  establishment  ut>dcf  the 
federal  government,  the  circumstance  of  the  oficen 
being  in  the  appointment  of  the  States  ought  at  once  tu 
extinguish  it.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  this  cir- 
cumstance will  always  secure  to  them  a  preponderating 
influence  over  the  militia. 

In  reading  many  of  the  publications  against  the  Con- 
stitution, a  man  is  apt  to  imagine  that  he  is  perusing 
some  ill-written  tale  or  romance,  which,  instead  of 
natural  and  agreeable  images,  exhibits  to  the  mind  nnth- 
ing  but  frightful  and  distorted  shapes — 

"  CotigiMt,  lir<1fm>,  amt  chim*ns  dire  "; 

discoloring  and  disfigvring  wtiatever  it  represents,  and 
traniforming  everything  it  touches  into  a  monster. 


iAm^* 


MfSUSE  OF  MILITIA. 


A  sample  of  this  is  to  be  observed  in  tlie  ex.ig:geratcd 
and  improbable  suggestions  which  have  taken  place 
resticcting  the  power  of  calling  fur  the  scrvicn  of  the 
siiliiisL  That  of  New  Hampshire  is  to  be  marched  to 
Georgia,  of  Georgia  to  New  Hampshire,  of  New  York  to 
Kentucky,  »nd  uf  Kentucky  t<i  l^ikc  Champlain.  Nay, 
the  debts  due  to  the  Fret>ch  and  Dutch  are  to  be  paid  in 
militiamen  instead  of  louis  d'ors  and  ducats.  At  one 
moment  there  is  to  be  a  large  army  to  Uy  prostrate  the 
lihiTiies  of  the  people;  at  another  moment  the  militia  of 
Virginia  arc  to  be  dragged  from  their  homes  five  or  six 
hundred  miles  to  tame  the  reptihitcitn  contumacy  of 
Massachusetts;  and  that  of  Massachusetts  is  to  be  trans- 
ported an  equal  distance  to  subdue  the  refractory 
haughtiness  of  the  .iriittotratic  Virginuins.  Do  the  per- 
sons who  TAWC  at  this  rate  imagine  that  thctr  art  or  their 
eloquence  can  impose  any  conceits  or  absurdities  upon 
the  people  of  Amerii-a  fur  infallible  truths? ' 

If  there  should  he  an  army  to  be  made  use  of  as  the 
agiiic  of  despotism,  what  need  of  the  miUtia?  If  there 
sboald  be  no  army,  whither  would  the  militia,  irritated 
liy  being  called  u{>on  to  undertake  a  distant  and  lioi>eless 
expedition  for  the  purpose  of  riveting  the  chains  of 
ilavery  upon  a  i>art  of  their  countrymen,  direct   their 


'  TXte  hiilory  oF  our  nililin  hxi  thown  how  ludpn  i(  it  to  employ  ihrni 
t>  liny  obfect  of  wfaich  (bey  do  not  approve.  In  17114  ihc  Goicrnur  of 
PfBatrl'aBi'  Dolificil  tlie  rmiileni  thtl  it  uxiiilil  be  impouiMc  to  criuJi 
the  wliUky  latiinccllan  with  the  local  milltii,  (or  they  t-xt  kirniii;ly 
ifBtpollillCil  with  Ihe  RinTcmeiil  t'>  l>c  Irntlecl  to  <)iicll  JI.  Tlir  >afu««l 
«\  the  mililia  of  Nrir  York  to  invade  CKnida  in  i3ia,  snil  (hr  whole 
nnncoftheXrvEncUnd  inTlitia<tnrineihc  war  of  tSia.  were  siillmorc 
•trAlRC.  In  1S61.  while  certain  norlhciii  itale*  volu'itmilyoffcml  their 
whule  niitlllkt  to  tlie  nalionil  goveiiimeat,  the  I'letlilcnt't  mil  ujion  Ihe 
MUnfor  ieveiity-fne  tlmiitai"!  men  drove  cetlsiii  >.lale»  which  had  liiihrr- 
lii  rttnaineil  pattivg  iiiln  v^c«vIi»D.  and  thiuch  cvtiaiii  Iionlei  ititti  ifiil 
nt4  lake  thi>  eiiteoK  action,  they  paid  no  heed  to  the  oH.  and  it  i>  to  be 
qtotiooni  if  ihii  wn*  any  lau  In  ilie  eliecnMf  Mnncth.  As  alrecdy 
Ml«il.  the  new  Natkina)  Uiiaid  \\  far  ten  Influenced  by  local  tentlment ; 
tal  thai  Mmc  of  the  oh)  virtut  xlill  linuen  in  •.-ectiln  wctlona  wot  thiiwn 
k  Ihc  great  inilruoil  strike  ol  1S94,  wlieo  Ecrtnin  Califutoia  rei;iin«ul». 
ollcirt  out  lo  protevt  ili«  eitrvmely  unpouular  Southern  Pacific  KaSruaH. 
■M  inctcly  nqfkcled  to  defend  the  toad.  nui.  it  iru  even  alleged,  acliially 
killed  Iha  auUen  iu  the  detuuction  «l  jitoiieiiy. — Eoiioa. 


i8« 


MUTUAL  SVCCOR  TO  STATES.        llffcWfflS- 


COtirsc,  hut  to  the  scat  nf  the  tyrant*  who  had  mediuttil 
BO  fooliiili  as  well  as  so  wicked  a  project,  to  crush  them 
in  their  imagined  intretichmcnls  of  power,  and  to  malte 
Ehem  an  example  of  the  just  vengeurKre  of  an  abused  and 
ioccnsnl  people?  Is  this  the  way  in  irhich  usurpers 
stride  to  dominion  over  a  numerous  and  enlightened 
nation?  Do  they  begin  by  exciting  the  detestation  of 
the  very  instruments  of  [heir  intended  usurpations?  Do 
they  iisnally  i^mmcnce  their  ciirecr  by  wanton  and  tlis- 
Kusiful  acts  of  power,  calculated  to  answer  no  end  but 
to  draw  upon  themselves  universal  hatred  and  execra- 
tion? Are  sttppirsitionx  of  this  sort  the  sober  admont* 
tions  of  discerning  patriots  to  a  discerning  people?  Or 
are  they  the  inHiimmatory  ravings  of  incendi;ifies  or 
distempered  cn(hti«i:i«ts?  If  we  were  even  to  xuppoiie 
the  national  rulers  actuated  by  the  most  ungovernable 
ambition,  it  is  impossible  to  believe  that  they  would 
employ  such  preposterous  means  to  accomplish  their 
designs. 

In  times  of  insurrection  or  invasion,  it  would  be 
natural  and  proper  that  the  militia  of  a  neighboring  State 
should  be  marclietl  into  another,  to  reiiist  a  common 
enemy,  or  to  guard  the  republic  aj^atnst  the  violence  of 
faction  or  sedition.  This  was  frequently  the  case,  in 
r«spect  to  the  Tirst  object,  m  the  course  of  the  late  war; 
and  this  mutual  succor  is,  indeed,  a  principal  end  of  our 
political  association.  If  the  power  of  atTording  it  be 
phced  under  the  direction  of  the  Union,  there  will  lie  no 
danger  of  a  supine  and  listless  inattention  to  the  dangers 
of  a  neighbor  till  its  near  approach  had  superadded  the 
incitements  of  self-preservation  to  tlie  too  feeble  im- 
paiMs  of  duty  and  sympathy, 

PDkUtJS. 


.SkSXItM) 


NAT/O.VAL  KEVENVE  KEEDED. 


187 


No.  30  [29!-      i.v«»'w*/'«*tf.DnM.b»rje.ij87.>        Hamilton. 
GENERAL  POWER  OF  NATIONAL  TAXATION. 

ffttifai  uitA  ftr  revtiue — AfiHtt/  tie  t-ifa/ refuiiitt  in  ^rttriimrtil 
— Stifi  rftutfiif  frtm  itti  0/  rtefnttr — /ix-imflf  of  lit  Turkiih 
mfirt — ExatfU  in  tntatJuspa  if  i^nfrJirMtfa — fitttaut  unUmittJ 
mmitr  arlUUi  tf  ttn/titration — Rrr^ntsiu  frimifitt  in  Ikal  tcmfail — 
CtmufitfHitj  p/  lit  tyif/m—A  rimidy  in  a^ndfnmtai  of  fitetai  and 
riftaiitteiii —  7'At  >ritiiJ-/rr  Jtiniuti^n  itlnvtn  inltTrml  ami  tsttmiit 
bMit-^  Thf  fmtJaHuntai  priiuifJe  f/  iMtiniinJ  j^ertern'fuvtl'^  l^hi  rafiunit 
^  a  mi/un  ryiij/  la  ill  lUttiutUi — Prt^tilitti  It  ivffJ/  lit  dtfiiiftuUi 
la  aUrtlal  lam  by  rfjuiulUit^Rnull »/  limiteil  Immtim  in  timti  ej 
mar'^Tht  naliiitat gvttrnmtnl  tkttild ftmst  a»  unrrilraintJ ftistr  »/ 
luatini —  Tie  /awer  «•/  bi.id/iiiii  d  ctrtain  menni  p/  i^rivannf. 

7>  Ue  Ptef>!e  of  <ht  Slate  of  A'rtc  York: 

It  has  been  already  ot>t>ervcil  that  the  federal  gox'crn- 
menl  ought  lo  possess  tlie  pnwer  of  prwvuhnK  for  the 
support  of  the  national  forces;  in  which  proposition  vns 
intended  to  be  ingludcd  the  expense  of  raising  troops,  of 
burlding  and  e<)uipping  fleets,  and  all  other  expenses  in 
any  wise  connected  vrith  tnilit.iry  arrant^cments  and 
operations.  But  these  are  not  tho  only  objects  to  which 
the  jtirisdictiuii  of  the  Union,  in  respect  to  revenue, 
oust  necessarily  be  empowered  to  extend.  Il  must 
enbrace  a  provision  for  the  support  of  the  national  civil 
TiK;  for  the  payment  of  the  national  debts  contracted, 
or  that  may  be  contracted;  and  in  general,  for  all  those 
matters  which  will  call  for  disbursements  out  of  tliv 
aitional  treasury.  The  cnncliision  is  that  there  must  be 
tntcrwoTcn  in  the  frame  of  the  government  a  general 
power  of  taxation,  in  one  shape  or  another. 

Money  is  with  propriety  considered  as  the  vital  prin> 
ctple  of  the  body  politic;  as  that  which  sustains  its  life 
and  motion,  and  enables  it  to  perform  its  most  essential 
functions.  A  complete  power,  therefore,  to  procure  a 
regular  and  adequate  supply  of  it,  as  far  as  the  resources 
of  the  community  will,  permit,  may  be  regarded  as  an 
iMlispemable  ingredient  in  every  constitution.     From  a 


■88 


COXFEDBRATION  JifADBQUATE.     Ul*.  M  iSBi 


deficiency  in  this  particular,  one  of  two  evils  must  ensue: 
eitlier  tlic  p«»plc  tnnst  lie  subjected  to  coiitiiiuul  plunder 
»s  a  substitute  for  a  more  eligible  mode  of  supplying;  the 
public  wants,  or  the  government  must  sink  into  a  fatal 
atrophy,  and,  in  a  short  course  of  time.  [>emh. 

In  the  Ollonian  or  Turkish  empire,  the  sovereign, 
though  in  other  respects  absolute  master  of  the  lives  and 
fortunes  of  his  subjects,  lias  no  ri;;ht  to  impose  a  new 
tax.  The  conseijucnce  is  that  he  permits  the  bashaws  or 
governors  of  provinces  to  pillage  the  people  witlioul 
mercy;  and,  in  turn,  squeezes  out  of  them  the  sums  of 
whtt:h  he  stands  in  need  to  satisfy  his  own  exigencies  and 
those  of  the  slate.  In  America,  from  a  like  cause,  the 
government  of  the  Union  has  gradually  dwindled  into  a 
state  of  decay  approaching  nearly  to  annihilation.  Who 
can  doubt  that  the  happiness  of  the  people  in  both  coun- 
tries would  be  promoted  by  competent  authorities  in  the 
proper  hands,  to  provide  the  revenues  which  tbe  neces- 
sities of  the  pnbtic  might  require? 

The  present  Confederation,  feeble  as  it  is,  intended  to 
repose  in  the  United  States  an  unlimited  power  of  pro- 
viding for  the  pecuniary  wants  of  the  Union.  But 
proceeding  upon  an  erroneous  principle,  it  has  been  done 
in  such  a  manner  as  entirely  to  hare  frustrated  the 
intention.  Congress,  by  the  articles  which  compose  that 
compact  (as  has  already  been  stated),  arc  authorized  tn 
ascertain  and  call  for  any  sums  of  money  necessary,  in 
rhcir  judgment,  to  the  service  of  the  United  Sutcs;  and 
their  requisitions,  if  comformablc  to  the  rule  of  apportion- 
ment, arc  in  every  constitutional  sense  obligatory  npon 
the  Sutea.  These  have  no  right  to  question  the  propriety 
of  Ihc  demand;  no  discretion  beyond  that  of  devising  the 
ways  and  means  of  furnishing  the  sums  demanded.  But 
tltough  this  be  strictly  and  truly  the  case;  though  the 
assumption  of  such  a  right  would  be  an  infringement  of 
the  articles  of  Union;  though  il  may  seldom  or  never 
have  been  avowedly  claimed,  yel  in  practice  it  lias  been 
constantly  exercised,  and  would  continue  to  be  so,  as 
long  as  the  revenues  of  the  Confederacy  should  reoiain 


SudlUsI 


THfORtl-.S  OP  TAXATION. 


189 


dependent  on  the  intrrmcdintc  agency  of  its  members. 
Wlut  Ihc  conscqucnccK  of  tlii.t  syNlem  huvc  been  is 
within  the  knowledge  of  every  man  the  least  conversant 
in  our  |iublic  uffairs,  and  has  l»ecn  amply  unfolded  in  dif* 
ferent  part^  of  these  inquirie*!.  It  is  this  which  has 
chiefly  contributed  to  reduce  us  to  a  situation  which 
aflonis  ample  cunse  bi>th  of  moi'tilication  to  Ourselves 
aid  of  triumph  to  our  enemies. 

What  remedy  can  there  be  for  this  situation,  but  in  a 
chtnge  of  tlie  system  which  has  produced  it— ina  change 
o(  (be  fallacious  and  delusive  system  of  quotas  and 
nifnintions?  What  substitute  can  there  be  imagined  for 
this^MK  /atttut  in  rin-inec,  but  that  of  permitting  the  na- 
tional government  to  raise  its  own  revenues  by  the  ordi- 
nary methods  of  taxation  authorixcd  in  every  well-ordered 
cnnuituttati  of  civil  government?  Ingenious  men  RUiy 
<ittUim  with  plausibility  on  any  subject;  but  no  human 
ingenuity  can  point  out  any  other  expedient  to  rescue 
Ut  from  the  inconveniences  ami  emt>;irrassments  naturally 
rtiwlting  from  defective  supplies  of  the  pulilic  treasury. 

The  more  intelligent  adversaries  of  the  new  Constitu- 
tion admit  the  force  of  this  reasoning;  but  they  qualify 
Ibtir  admission  by  a  distinction  between  what  they  call 
'(/»«/  and  fxltiNot  taxation.  The  former  they  would 
'tserve  to  the  State  governments;  the  latter,  which  ihey 
ttfiiin  into  commercial  imposts,  or  rather  duties  on 
■mported  articles,  they  declare  themselves  willing  to  con- 
™)e  to  the  federal  head.  This  distinction,  however. 
«oulil  violate  the  maxim  of  good  sense  and  sound  policy 
■Wch  dictates  that  every  powkr  ought  to  be  in  propor- 
•ioa  to  iia  object;  and  would  still  leave  the  general 
([■Xernment  in  a  kind  of  tutelage  to  the  Slate  govern- 
"•wtB,  inconsistent  with  every  idea  of  vigor  or  efficiency, 
'"ho  Can  pretend  that  commercial  imposts  arc.  or  would 
^  aWnc  cqoal  to  the  present  and  future  exigencies  of 
'"<  Cnion?  Taking  into  the  account  the  existing  debt, 
'irciKn  and  domestic,  upon  any  plan  of  extinguishment 
"liichaman  moderately  impressed  with  the  importance 
^'  public  justice   and   public  credit  could  approve,   in 


igo  KEQUisirroys  upojv  states,     cm*,  icaft 

addition  to  tlie  esUblishments  which  all  parties  vill 
acknowledge  to  be  necessary,  wc  cnuld  not  rcaeonably 
flatter  otirselreft  tliat  tliia  resource  alone,  upon  (be  most 
improved  scale,  would  even  suffice  for  iu  pTc»«nl  neces- 
sitietL  Its  future  necessities  admit  not  of  calculation 
or  limitation;  and  upon  the  principle,  more  than  once 
adverted  to,  the  power  o(  making  provision  dir  them  «« 
they  ari&e  ought  to  be  equally  unconfnied.  T  believe  it 
maybe  regarded  as  a  position  warranted  by  the  history  of 
mankind,  that,  ia  the  usual  prcgrets  a/  iJiingi,  the  ne<essilin 
of  a  nation,  in  eterj  ifage  e/  tti  existenee,  mill  bt  fvuiiJ  ut 
least  ffittil  til  its  rtsour(ti. 

To  say  that  dcfiriencies  may  he  provided  (or  by  recioisi- 
tions  upon  the  States  is  on  the  one  hand  to  acknowledge 
that  this  system  cannot  be  depended  upon,  and  on  the 
other  hand  to  depend  upon  it  for  everything  beyond  a 
certain  limit.  Those  who  have  carefully  attended  to  its 
vices  and  deformities,  as  they  have  been  exhibited  by 
experience  or  delineated  in  the  course  of  these  papers, 
must  feel  invincible  repugnancy  to  trusting  the  itatiunal 
interests  in  any  degree  to  its  operation.  Its  inevitable 
lenilency,  whenever  it  is  brought  into  activity,  must  be  to 
enfeeble  the  Union  and  sow  the  seeds  of  discord  and  con- 
tention between  the  federal  head  and  its  memberx,  and 
between  the  members  themseivcs.  Can  it  be  eipected 
that  the  deAcicncies  would  be  better  su|ip1icd  in  tins 
mode  than  the  total  want«  of  the  Union  have  heretofore 
been  supplied  in  the  same  mode?  It  ought  to  be  recol- 
lected that  if  less  will  be  required  from  the  States,  they 
will  have  proporlionably  less  means  to  answer  the 
demand.  If  the  opinions  of  those  who  contend  (or  tlie 
distinction  which  lias  been  mentioned  were  to  be 
received  as  evidence  of  truth,  one  would  be  led  to 
conclude  that  there  was  some  known  point  in  the 
economy  of  national  affairs  at  which  it  would  be  safe  lo 
stop  and  to  say:  Thus  far  the  ends  o(  public  happiness 
will  be  promoted  by  supplying  the  wants  of  govrrntncnl, 
and  all  beyond  this  is  unworthy  of  our  care  or  ansicty. 
How  ts  it  possible  that  a  govcmmcnt  half  snpplied  and 


BmIUmI 


HEVENUE  tN  CA<i£  OP  tVAK. 


191 


alwap  necessitous  can  fulfill  the  purposes  of  its  instilu* 
tion,  can  provide  for  the  security,  advance  the  pros- 
perity, or  support  the  rcputittiun  uf  the  commonwealth? 
How  can  it  ever  possess  cither  enerf^y  or  stability, 
J'gnity  or  credit,  confidence  at  home  or  respectability 
Abroad^  How  can  its  administration  be  anything  else 
tlun  a  succession  of  expedients  lempori/ini;,  impotent, 
ili^graccful?  How  will  it  be  able  to  avoid  3  frequent 
saciiTicc  of  its  engagements  to  immediate  necessity? 
Hnw  t:xn  it  undertalce  or  execute  any  l)t>eral  or  enlarged 
plana  uf  public  good? 

Ut  as  attend  to  what  would  be  the  effects  uf  this 
situation  in  the  very  first  wur  in  which  we  should  liappen 
to  be  engaged.  We  will  presume,  for  argument's  sake, 
that  the  revenue  arising  from  the  impost  duties  answers 
'^poiposcH  of  u  provision  for  the  public  debt  and  of  a 
pc^e establishment  forthe  Union.  Thus  circumstanced, 
a  var  lircaks  out.'  What  would  be  the  probable  conduct 
o'  the  tEi'Tcrnnient  in  such  an  emergency?  Taught  by 
"ipcficncc  that  proper  dependence  could  not  be  placed 
•^n  Ibc  success  of  requisitions,  unable  by  its  own 
auihorily  to  lay  hold  of  fresh  rCKources,  and  urged  by 
contidcrattuns  of  national  danger,  would  it  not  be  driven 
tu  the  expedient  of  diverting  the  funds  already  appro- 
P''iatt<]  from  their  proper  ulijci:!*  to  the  defense  of  the 
^VxiKi  It  is  not  cjsy  to  see  how  a  step  of  this  kind  could 
l*c  avoided;  and  if  it  should  be  taken,  it  is  evident  that 
Ll  Ouuld  prove  the  destruction  of  public  credit  at  the 
'tfyraoraL-nt  that  it  was  l>ccomin£  essential  to  the  public 
*^'eiy.  To  imagine  that  at  such  a  crisis  credit  might  be 
■'itfctised  with,  would  be  the  extreme  of  infatuation.  In 
die  modern  system  of  war  nations  the  most  wealthy  are 
utilised  to  have  recourse  to  large  loans.  A  country  so 
lillle  opulent  as  ours  must  (eel  this  necessity  in  a  much 
tlninger  degree.     But  who  would  lend  to  a  government 

'Thit  w»  ultll  |!Mvnl  by  ihr  *M  "I  iSu,  when,  crmiag  (u  (lie  lnt«. 
"fwq  of  coinniTKe.  anil  Fipn:ia11^  10  ihv  Mockailc.  tli«  imfHirli  [cil  alT 
^'Uci  ui  eiicnl  u  awlc  Ihc  dullct  uliolly  iiiaiii>t|iiite  10  ike  ontinarr 
"Imna  lA  govcroncpt.  Ut  moie  iiia(let|UJile  to  tlitac  enutlcd  b;r  >  lUle 


I»)    POWER  TO  TAX  A  MBAffS  TO  BOXROiV.    Wa-SOiM) 

tlut  prcf;ice<i  its  overtures  for  borrowing  by  an  act  which 
(Icmonst rated  that  no  rclinnde  could  be  placed  on  (he 
steadiness  of  its  measures  for  paying?  Tbc  loans  it 
might  be  able  to  procure  would  be  as  limited  in  their 
extent  as  htirdentome  in  their  conditions.  They  would 
be  made  upon  the  same  principles  that  usurers  commonly 
leud  to  bankrupt  and  fraudulent  debtors — with  a  sparing 
hand  and  at  endrmoiiit  premiums. 

It  m.iy  perhaps  be  imatiined  that,  from  the  scantiness 
of  the  resources  of  the  country,  the  necessity  of  divert- 
ing the  eKiahltHlicd  funds,  in  (he  case  supposed,  would 
«xist,  though  the  national  fcovernment  should  possess  an 
unrestrained  power  of  taxation.  But  two  considerations 
will  serve  to  ({uiet  all  apprehension  on  this  head:  one  is 
that  WG  are  sure  the  re^iources  of  the  community,  in  their 
full  extent,  will  be  brought  into  activity  for  the  benefit  of 
the  Union;  the  other  is  that  whatever  deficiencies  there 
may  he  can  without  difhciilty  be  supplied  by  loans. 

The  power  of  creating  new  fun<ls  upon  new  olijects  of 
taxation,  by  its  own  authority,  would  enable  the  national 
government  to  borrow  as  far  as  its  necessities  might  re- 
((uire.  Foreigners,  as  welt  as  the  ciiiiens  of  America,  could 
then  reasonably  repose  confidence  in  its  engagements; 
but  to  depend  upon  a  guTcrnment  that  must  itself  depend 
upon  thirteen  other  gofernmenis  for  the  means  of  fulfilling 
its  contracts,  when  once  its  situation  is  clearly  understood, 
would  rciiiiire  a  degree  of  credulity  not  often  to  be  met 
with  in  the  pecuniary  transactions  of  mankind,  and  littl<! 
rcconciliibtc  with  the  usual  sharp-stghtedness  of  avarice. 

Reflections  of  this  kind  may  have  trifling  weight  with 
men  who  hope  to  see  realized  in  America  the  halcyon 
w:encs  of  the  poetic  or  fabulous  age;  but  to  those  who 
believe  we  are  likely  to  experience  a  common  portion  of 
the  vicissitudes  and  calamities  which  have  (alien  In  the 
lot  of  other  nations,  they  must  appear  entitled  to  serioos 
attention.  Such  men  mii«t  IicIkiM  the  ni  ttial  Mtuatiun  of 
their  country  with  painful  solicitude,  and  deprecate  the 
evils  which  ambition  or  revenge  might,  with  ttw  much 
facility,  inflict  upon  it.  t'uiiLiUB- 


■fc*^ 


POLITICAL  Axioms. 


193 


No.  31  [30I.  ifrm  Vtwk  P*rlm,  Janiuty  1,  itH.)  HamillOa 

UNLIMITED   NATIONAL   TAXATION  NOT  A 
ROAD  TO  DESPOTISM. 


Primiftn  •/  hgU  tfflitd   to  Ik*  nttttiity  b/  gmrral  prwtr  »/  tax- 
fltcafilHhlitii  tf  tht  nfiiiiity  r/  tmlimiM  italitnitt  rttrtmiti—' 
»f  tkt  ff^'ntitti  ef  tkt  (enititHtii»t — yttiiiily  e/ rtvtnat  f»r  Uial 
timimilrutim-'P^tiaHe  attarflmi  a/ all  laxafien  ty  nutifmal  gevtrH- 
mas — IntfrttakiUtjofnsurpiilioiit  by  1^  /tdrml gPtrfmrnrnt — H'ky  nfl 

rthvt  <■■  ilu  Vnitn — Suit  fjtvmuttnlt  rriil ^rekiU/  faiitii  ntfil  injlu' 
nil  ttvr  fffft/^  Tin  f*fflt  akin  tan  frrurvr  tkt  rfia'titriii'it  ittwriit 
lit  £rtt/fj/  an  J  itatt  got^mmrHt. 

Tf  Ike  Pe^f/f  0/  Ike  Stale  ef  Nevi  Vtiri  .■ 

in  (li&quisiiioiH  o(  every  hind  ihcrc  are  certain  primary  Inths 
«  brtl  (Krinciples.  upon  wliich  all  subsequent  reuonin|p  mutt 
drpend.  These  contain  an  inu-fnal  evkkiicc  which,  anlrccilcnt  10 
allrclkciion  or  comtrinaiiOJi,  <:oiiitnanil»  the  assent  of  ihu  mind. 
Where  il  (itoiIikcs  not  this  cffrct,  tt  rinisi  proceed  either  finm  some 
iltttcl  or  tti»OT(ler  in  ihe  ori;ans  of  pciceptiun,  ur  fioin  the  influ* 
dice  of  soiive  wrong  inlercW.or  passion,  or  prritMlicc.  0(  this 
nuure  are  the  inaxnnsin  Hcometry,  thai  "  ihe  whole  i&  greater  than 
nt  pan  :  things  nitial  to  the  san>c  arc  cqiinl  to  one  another ;  two 
(ttii|[hl  lines  cannot  inclose  a  s|Mce;  and  all  tif;hi  angles  aie 
tqual  to  each  olhpr."  OF  the  lume  n.iture  ate  tlic»c  other  nuiimt 
n  elhiC9  and  pulilict,  that  iherr  ciinnot  be  an  effect  willtoul  a 
cuoe ;  th.1l  the  means  ought  to  l>c  proportioned  to  Ihe  end  ;  lliat 
nny  powcf  ouf ht  to  be  commensurate  with  iit  object ;  ilist  ihcic 
miehi  10  l>e  no  limilaliun  of  a  power  destined  to  effect  a  purjiose 
wUcli  is  Itself  incapable  of  Umiialion.  An^l  there  are  other  truths 
lo  ihe  Iwo  laller  sciences  which,  it  they  cannot  pretend  to  rank  in 
(he  class  of  aiioms.  are  yel  such  ilirect  inferences  from  them,  and 
10  obvious  in  iheniM^lvei.  and  so  agreeable  to  the  nntuiid  and 
HMophistkated  diclalps  ai  rornnion  sen«e.that  they  challenge  the 
aueni  of  a  sound  and  unbiaml  mind  with  a  degree  o(  force  and 
tnnTKtion  almost  equally  irre«L«tible. 

The  objects  of  geomeitical  inquiry  are  so  entirely  abunicied 
from  ihiMe  pursuits  ivhidi  Mir  up  and  put  in  motion  the  uniuly  pas- 
>>ona  of  the  huiiMii  hean.  that  manLind.  without  difliculiy.  adopt 
B*i  only  the  more  simple  iheorems  of  Ihe  science  but  eren  those 
ikbiiniie  paradoxes  whicl).  however  they  may  appear  suKeptible 


194 


C£A-£X.I/.  POIfEX  OP  TAXATIOff.       lll«.ll">0> 


of  (kiDoiiii  rill  ion.  arr  ai  vmiince  with  ikc  natural  concrpiions 
whicit  the  iniiiil.  wiihoui  the  aid  of  pliiUnophy,  would  be  ted  to 
enicn^iii  upon  ilie  !>iib)cci.  The  infikite  divisihiliiv  oI  mai- 
ler, or.  in  other  words,  the  inPINITk  divixibillly  o(  a  PIHtTS 
thing,  extcndmg  cv«ii  to  iIh  minutest  atom,  Is  a  point  aigrenl 
anivng  ((eoiiielriciniis.  Ihougjh  not  less  tncomprcbensibk  to  coni- 
iiioii  x«nM  ihjiit  any  o(  those  niysterics  in  rehgion  HgAinst  wltich 
ili«  b.iiierie»  of  idlidchly  hive  been  to  iiKliuirioualy  leveled. 

Bui  in  the  sciences  of  mncitls  and  politics  men  are  found  far  less 
ln\ci»hlc.  To  a  certain  degree  il  ii  right  and  useful  that  ihb 
should  be  the  cue.  Ouiicin  and  invcsligalion  arc  a  Pcccssaiy 
»,imn%  agxiiiit  erroi  and  imposition.  But  this  uoiraciablenchs  may 
be  carried  too  far.  and  may  degeiterale  into  obiiinacy,  pervenenes*. 
or  disingciiuily.  Though  il  caiinoi  be  pretended  that  the  principles 
•A  mural  and  political  knowledge  linrc.  in  general,  lite  tanie  decree 
of  crnainty  with  those  of  the  ntatheiitnlics,  yet  ihey  lure  muirh 
better  cUinu  in  this  respect  ihan,  lo  judge  from  llw  conduct  of 
men  in  pnnicular  siiuaiioiu.  wc  should  be  disposed  to  allow  ilvcm. 
Tiie  ub»curiiy  is  much  oftener  in  ihc  paisioos  and  prejudiccii  of 
ibe  reasonrr  than  in  ibc  subject.  Men.  U|ion  too  many  occasions, 
do  nol  give  llieir  own  undeniandings  fair  play;  I>ul,  yiehling  lo 
uimc  untoward  bias,  they  entangle  Ihemselves  in  words  and  con- 
fuund  ihernseire*  in  sublleliea. 

How  else  could  it  happen  (if  we  admit  the  objectnn  lo  be  tin- 
cere  In  ilicir  opposition)  that  positioni  so  clear  as  tliose  which 
in^mifest  the  necessity  of  a  general  power  of  taxation  in  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  Union,  should  have  to  eitcouniet  any  adveruiics 
anumg  nien  ul  diseernmcnl .'  Tbuugh  these  posiliuns  have  been 
elsewhere  fully  slalctl,  they  will  pcrlups  not  be  impri>|>crly  letapii- 
utaled  in  this  place,  as  inlroduclory  to  an  euininaliun  of  wlut 
may  have  been  offered  by  way  o(  objection  lo  them.  They  are  in 
^ubttaitcc  as  follows ; 

A  government  ought  to  contain  in  itself  every  power  requliile 
to  the  full  accomplishment  of  the  objects  committed  to  lis  care, 
and  to  the  complete  execution  of  the  tnuli  for  which  it  is  resptm- 
tibte,  free  from  every  other  coiiirol  but  a  regard  10  the  public  good 
and  lo  the  sense  of  tliv  people.  * 

As  the  duties  of  supcrimemling  the  national  drfrnse  aiMl  of 
securing  the  publtc  gieace  ai,-jinsi  foreign  or  domestic  violence 
involve  a  provision  lur  casualties  and  dangers  lo  wliieh  no  passihte 
limits  can  be  asugncd.  the  power  of  making  that  pruTtsion 
ought  to  know  no  uilici  bounds  than  llie  exigencies  uf  the  nalinn 
uwl  Uie  resources  ul  the  community. 


n 


il     OPPOffE/^rS  OP  NATIQSAL  rAXATIO.V.      195 

Airmnne  !■  the  MScniut  engine  by  wliicli  (he  means  oran- 
tnring  the  nntionni  exlKcncks  mml  be  procur«it,  (he  power  ol 
procunng  ihat  aiiiclc  in  its  full  extent  must  itecessniily  be 
cosfrehended  in  thai  of  providing  fur  ihuie  ex^encies. 

At  theory  and  practice  conspire  to  prove  iImi  the  power  of 
IMOninng  retreoue  is  unavailmx  when  eieiciwMi  over  tlie  States  In 
Udr  collective  upaciiie*.  the  fnlcinl  government  m\\%\  of  necetsiiy 
U  uivesicd  with  an  unqualified  power  ol  lauuioo  In  tlie  unlinaty 
emla. 

Did  not  experience  evince  the  contrary,  it  would  be  nattiral  to 
caKltde  Ihai  the  prD|>rieiy  of  a  genctnl  power  of  taxation  in  (he 
■ilioiMt  govetntneiii  im^lii  talcly  be  permitted  to  rest  on  the  eri- 
dnKC  ol  ihdc  ptxipoutionn.  unauit^tcil  by  ^ny  addltjanal  ar^- 
Miut  or  illustriattons.  Btit  we  And.  in  f^ci.  ilut  ihe  antagoni^is 
•I  lie  ptopoied  ConMitution.  >o  far  fron)  ac<|iiicNCinK  in  tlieii 
jwtncu  or  iTuih.  Kem  to  make  iheir  pnncipal  and  moKi  tealoux 
<ft>n  against  (hit  pan  of  t)ie  plan,  tl  may  therefore  be  saiisfac- 
■^toanalyie  llie  argumcnl«  with  which  ihey  comhnt  II. 

tlutc  of  ihcin  which  have  been  most  Ijboicd  will)  thai  ricw. 
Wm  n  «ulMiance  to  amount  lo  this:  "  It  i«  not  true,  h^cniise  tht^ 
nipBcies  of  (he  Union  may  not  be  susccpiibli-  of  lrmit:itiott.  that 
m  pr)wa  of  laying  taxes  ought  lo  be  mironfined.  Revenue  i»  a» 
■vquitiie  lo  ific  purposes  of  ihc  tocat  ailiiiinis(i;itions  as  those  of 
Ihc  Union :  and  ihe  (onocr  are  at  least  of  cqii.il  impnriance  willi 
Ihelwtn  to  the  happiness  of  (he  people.  It  is,  therefore,  as  nec- 
tSMtj  thai  the  Stale  govetninents  should  be  able  to  command  the 
■**»«  ol  supplying  their  warns  ns  ihat  ihc  national  government 
^'uy  puuess  (he  like  faculty  in  rctpecl  to  the  wants  of  tlie 
UvoQ.  But  an  imlehnite  power  of  taxation  in  the  lalter  might 
tiid  probably  would,  in  dine,  deprive  the  f^rmtr  ol  the  means  of 
Pending  for  their  own  necesiilicit ;  and  would  suhjeel  them 
'■■■■lely  (o  tlie  mercy  of  the  national  legislature.  A«  the  laws  of 
Ifce  Union  ate  lo  l>ecoine  the  supfemc  law  of  the  land,  as  tt  is  to 
•twe  power  to  p*ss  all  laws  that  may  be  ^EC^•-tSARV  (or  carrying 
i"ia  eiecutton  the  aathoriljes  with  which  il  is  proposed  to  vest  it. 
1^  national  gorcrnment  might  at  any  time  abolish  the  (axes 
"tpMed  for  Slate  ohyects  upon  the  preiense  of  an  interlereitce 
*«i  lis  own.  It  might  allege  a  necewity  o(  doing  this  in  order  to 
("wtflieacy  to  the  n^iiional  revenues.  And  thus  all  the  tesoutces 
*■  laution  might  l)y  deerees  l>ecome  (he  tuhjccli  d(  federal 
'*'*<>poly.  lo  the  euiite  exclusion  and  dtntiuctioii  of  the  State  gov- 
ts." 

Thia  iBodi-  of  reasoning  appears  somdinics  (o  turn  upon  (he 


(96 


EyCHOACHMENTS  OF  STATES.        [KfcJftttli 


suppoiilkm  o(  uvirpatiofi  in  (be  nalional  goveramenl ;  at  other 
times  ll  sccrnt  (o  be  dntgitrrl  only  as  »  dcducdon  front  the  contti- 
lutioiut  oper.iiion  ot  ill  Intcnikd  powcnL  it  it  only  in  the  Inner 
light  that  it  can  hr  iiJmiKcd  to  luvc  any  prelensions  10  faimeu. 
The  moment  we  launch  into  conjectures  about  the  usurpiiioDs  ol 
■he  icderal  ^vetnment,  we  get  into  an  unfiihotiiablc  ab^-ss.  «m1 
(sifly  put  ourselves  out  o(  tlie  leach  ol  all  reaMKiing.  Imagini^ 
lloii  may  langc  n  pleasure  till  it  kcIs  bewildered  ainuUl  Ihc  labjF* 
rinlhs  of  an  cnehaiiicil  castle,  and  knon's  not  on  which  side  to 
turn  (o  extricate  iltcif  from  the  pctplexiiic*  into  which  il  h»*  so 
rashly  Advent  jTcd.  Whatever  m-ay  be  (he  limiis  01  mmliiicjiions 
of  tl»e  powi^ni  oE  the  Union,  it  is  euy  to  Imagine  an  enilte»  Irsin 
of  pouibte  dangers;  and  by  indulging  an  excess  ol  fcsloiisy  and 
limiility.  we  may  bring  ourselves  to  a  itair  nl  abM>tule  ilcepticiMn 
and  irrcsoJudon.  [  repeal  here  what  1  liave  observed  in  f  ubsiance 
m  anoilter  ptacc  that  all  obnervationx  foumled  upon  the  ilanger  of 
usurpation  ought  to  be  refetred  to  the  compoaition  and  structure 
o(  the  guvernmeiil.  not  (o  the  nature  or  extent  o(  Its  powers.  The 
Stale  govcTiimcni*.  by  their  origiiiiil  conftltuiion*.  are  imreKicd 
with  complete  wvereignty.  In  wh:>t  does  our  sectiniy  consist 
ogainti  iiitir|uiion  from  thai  quarter?  Doubtless  in  the  mannrt 
of  their  formation,  anil  In  a  due  dependence  of  those  who  arv  to 
admiuixier  ihem  upon  ihe  people.  If  the  piYiposcd  construaion 
ol  lite  fc«Ieral  government  be  found,  upon  an  tmpaitul  cxjmina- 
liun  of  il.  to  be  such  as  to  afford  to  a  proper  extent  the  same  spe* 
cics  of  Kecuriiy,  all  apprehensions  oa  the  score  of  usiirpiaiion 
ought  to  be  discarded. 

Il  should  not  Ite  forgolien  that  a  disposition  in  tlir  State  govefiw 
menu  lo  encroach  upon  the  rights  oi  the  Union  is  quite  as  proln- 
Sm  Me  nt  a  disposilion  in  the  Unkin  lo  rncnuch  upon  the 

Vd.  45.  rights  of  the  State  governments.  What  shIc  would  he 
likely  lo  prevail  in  such  a  coollici.  intltl  drpend  00  ihe  means 
which  tlie  contending  parties  could  employ  lourard  secunivg 
wccesv  A«  in  republics  urcngth  Is  always  on  the  siile 
o(  the  people,  and  as  there  arc  weighty  reasons  to  imluce 
a  belief  thai  the  State  goremmenis  will  commonly  poness 
mou  iflddi^ce  over  ih«R),  (lie  natUTBl  conclusMn  is  that  «iich 
conlesta  wilt  be  most  apt  to  end  to  the  iUKadranta|[e  ol  the 
UiiKMi:  anil  thai  there  is  greater  probahdlly  of  cncnuclf 
ments  liy  the  members  opmi  Ihe  federal  brut  than  by  the  (edrral 
head  upon  the  members.  Bill  ll  ktrvid'ml  that  all  cnnjccturesol 
this  kind  mint  be  exltemely  vngite  and  Iallil4e  r  and  thai  il  is  by 
fat  Ihc  ufesi  course  to  lay  litem  atlogeOicr  aside,  and  to  coniinc 


H»ailM«l      JNDEPE.VDEXT  STATE  REFEXUES. 


I« 


our  ailcnijon  wholly  to  Ihr  Ralnre  and  extmt  lA  iKe  powera  U 
ihcyaiv  delinealed  in  ihe  Congiiiuiion.  Evcr^ihing  beyond  l!ii» 
miMt  b«  k(t  10  (hr  prudence  >nd  6rmii«si  of  Ihe  people :  who,  a> 
thof  will  tioUl  lli«  scalM  in  thrir  own  hjnds.  i1  is  to  be  hoped, 
will  alwajr*  lake  care  to  preMrve  ihe  coiiiiiiuiionut  ciiuilibfium 
bawRi)  the  seiteral  ami  the  Siaie  Ko^'crnmcnis.  Upon  thi* 
((Donil,  which  14  evidently  iltc  (nic  one,  ii  will  not  be  (lifficdtt  to 
obraie  ibe  objection*  which  h.tve  been  nude  to  an  indelintie 
power  oi  Uxaiiofi  in  the  United  States.  PUfeLiUS. 


H.. 


32  \yX\,        lfad,ffjU,*tJrurmal.Jtai'tTr:  iftSJ       HamUtOD. 


niFFERENTrATION  OF  POWF.RS  BETWKF.N 
NATIONAL  AND  STATli  OOVFKNMKNiS 
WITH  ESPECIAL  KKSCECT  TO  TAXATION. 


Ktlntilj  ikal  Ikt  tl*ttt  tkeutd  foittit  ittJtftaJtttl  tt/tiU  »f  tr»tHtttt~- 
Tit  fiJirai  naililulwn  »nfy  a  furital  nrntn — 7'Artt  taui  a/ alitnatiiiH 
tf  lUtr  i»vtrfignU — Hxtlmivt  It^iiljluvi  tyitolinuil gtveTHmtnl^Tirtr 
tlUmn  ff  iM<k  /#ii¥J — Pi'irtr  r/  l.ixali>m  J  t^nftirriitl  rigkl — A 
4mUi  Kn  a  ftitilitn  tf  fxftdinuy  mtj  utt  tf  iHahlilj — CttNttrrtitl 
IntiJittUH  rtitdtt  frtm  tlu  Jitviitit  a/  IMi  lavtrrifn  fviarr. 

Tj  Ikr  PenftU  of  tkf  UlaU  of  New  York  ■ 

Alili'»i;jii  I  urn  uf  opinion  thdl  lliere  would  be  no  real  tlanger  of 
Ihe  ci>n«c(|upnci!<  >v)iieh  seem  to  lie  .ipprrhc-niled  to  the  Slate  %»■<' 
Trnmr'Hs  from  ji  power  in  the  Union  to  cuiiiiul  ihein  in  the  levies 
of  money.  liec.-iiiM  I  am  prrtuadril  lfi.i(  the  wm-c  of  the  people, 
(he  entremr  h.iuni  of  piXivobitig  t)ie  reMnlincrits  of  the  State  gov- 
tminents,  nml  a  conviction  of  the  utility  and  neccufty  ol  tociil 
id<nmi«I rations  for  local  pitq)oscs.  would  be  a  complete  barrtrr 
ifaiiut  the  uppreinve  ute  of  such  a  power ;  yd  I  am  willing  here 
to  allow,  in  ilt  full  extent,  the  juMness  of  the  reasoning  which 
ii^iiirr*  tlut  the  imlivHlu.ll  States  ihoulii  pos»t-*s  an  imlependtnt 
ir.il  iiiicontioiUble  .liilltoiily  to  rai^  tlirir  own  revenues  for  llie 
ii'liiily  It!  ilicir  own  wanii.  And  makin)[  thii  concetiion.  1  aflitm 
tlial  (With  the  vile  exception  of  duties  on  imporli  and  export*) 
ihey  would,  under  the  plan  of  llie  convention,  retim  (liat  authority 
I*  th«  tnoii  absolute  and  iinipialilted  ien«e;  .ind  ih.it  an  allenipl 
<Mi  ilie  pan  of  the  naiion.il  goverinitcni  to  ahiidge  then)  la  the 


198  MXCLVStVE  DBLSGATlOfl.  Wfc«««l» 

cxeiL'ise  <A  it  would  be  a  violeni  aMumpiIon  of  power  unwamnlcil 
by  any  ankle  or  clause  o[  its  Coiuiiiuiion, 

An  eniirr  con«>lid<iiion  of  the  Sum  inlo  one  complete  national 
soveretgniy  woulil  imply  an  enllr;  Mitiordinationof  the  pnrii;  afxl 
wli  "ever  powci*  might  rcnuin  111  ihcm  wouUI  l>c  altogether 
dependent  on  the  general  nill.  But  a»  Ibe  |iUn  ol  llie  convention 
.iim»  only  at  a  panial  union  or  con^iolidation,  the  Slate  govern* 
ments  would  clearly  retain  all  tlie  iisUt>  ol  sovereignty  which  they 
before  had.  anil  which  were  not.  by  that  act.  fxcluih-ffy  delegaical 
to  the  United  Stales.  This  exclusive  <lclcj;aiion,  or  rather  ilia 
alienation,  of  Slate  "overcignij-.  would  only  exist  in  ihrcc  cases : 
■vherc  the  Coi»iituiioii  in  express  terms  granted  »i\  exclusive 
aiitlioriiy  to  the  Uniin ;  where  it  };ranleil  in  one  iiiMance  an  author- 
iiy  to  tlie  Union,  and  in  aiiotlier  pruliihiled  the  Slates  from  exer- 
cising the  like  aulliorily:  and  wht-rc  it  granted  an  authority  10  (be 
Union,  to  which  a  siindar  authority  in  [lie  Si.ttcs  would  be  abw- 
luiely  and  lot.ill/  conlradiclaiy  and  repn^Hiinr.  I  use  these  Icmik 
to  distinguish  this  last  c-usc  from  another  which  might  appear  10 
resemble  it.  hut  which  would,  in  fact,  be  esscniially  dilTerent :  I 
mc.in  where  the  exercise  of  a  concurrent  jiirisdiciion  inighi  be  pr»- 
iluctive  of  occasional  interferenees  in  the  patky  o(  any  branch  of 
attminisiraiion.  I>iii  would  nn|  imply  any  iliieci  contradiction  or 
repugnancy  in  point  of  con'iiiiuiioiial  authority.  These  three 
cases  of  exclusive  jurisdiction  in  the  [edcr.1l  government  may  b« 
exeinphfied  by  the  following  insunces:  The  last  clause  but  one 
in  (he  eighth  section  of  the  tirst  article  provides  expressly  that 
Congiess  shall  exercise  "  ^ri'/w^/w  Ifghlatiitit"  ota  the  dUtikl 
to  be  appropi'Uled  as  the  seat  of  Koveminetil.  This  aiuwers  to 
the  lirst  case.  The  first  clause  of  the  same  section  rmpower* 
Congress  ■•  la  lay  and  colUcI  laxet,  dulits,  impostt,  and  txtiut "-, 
nnd  ilic  second  clause  of  (he  Icmh  section  of  (he  tame  aritcle 
decl.iret  that  '■  n^  Slate  i4ii//,  without  the  consent  of  Congress. 
Uy  nHy  I'llfiin/I  vr  dHliti  an  Imfiorls  or  fx/ntrit,  except  for  (be 
purpose  of  executing  its  iiisppclion  laws."  Hence  would  result  an 
exclusive  power  in  (he  Union  to  I.iy  du(i«san  imports  and  exports, 
with  the  particular  exception  meniioncd :  but  this  power  is  abf  idj^l 
by  annihef  clatue.  which  declares  that  no  lax  or  duty  shall  be  biiit 
on  articles  exported  from  any  Slate ;  in  consequence  of  which 
qualilication.  ii  now  only  exiciuls  to  the  ttuliet  on  imparls.  This 
answers  to  ih«  second  case.  The  third  will  he  found  in  thai 
clause  which  declares  that  Congress  shall  have  power  "  to  estab- 
lish an  UNIFORM  Ki;i.Eo(  iMtura ligation  ihrnu^huul  the  Unrieil 
Stales."     This  must  ivecessartly  be  cxclusit-c.  because,  if  each 


H«aUtn»1     A   COXCl/XREXT  POWF.Jt  OF  STATUS.         199 

Slate  luid  power  lo  prescribe  a  blSTlHCT  KULK.  lliore  could  \«H 
beaoNiroRU  rule. 

A  case  which  in.-iy  |>crti;ipt  l>e  thought  10  rcsembk  ihc  \a\\tr, 
bal  whkh  b  m  (aci  wtikly  diflerenl.  iiflccls  ilic  qu»(ion  tmmedt- 
ately  under  cnniidcnition.  I  mean  ihc  power  oi  imposing  taxes 
o%\  all  arhclcft  olhcr  llian  ci|]t>rls  iiiiil  im|iurl-i.  This,  I  conlcmt.  Is 
iR3i»Icslly  a  concurrent  :ind  coequal  auihorily  in  the  United  Slates 
and  In  llic  tntlindual  Sutcs.  There  is  plainly  no  ei|>Teiiuon  in  the 
Kranling  clauM  which  makes  that  power  tx^lMsiirt  In  the  Union. 
There  b  no  initepcndent  clause  or  Mntmoe  which  prohibits  (he 
Slntes  (foin  exeicisia];  it.  So  far  it  thix  from  tffing  ihc  caK  that 
a  plain  and  conclusive  argument  to  the  contrary  i.i  to  1>e  deduced 
front  titc  nslmint  laid  upon  the  Stam  in  relation  lo  duties  on 
tmporls  and  eiportii.  Tlii»  revtiiciiun  imjilics  an  adinlHion  iliai. 
il  It  were  not  ini'-'rted,  ihe  Stalci  would  |>«Me»*  tlie  power  i1 
excludes  ;  anil  il  implies  a  further  admiMion  lliat.  as  to  all  other 
t.ilirs.  iheaalhonly  o(  llw  States  rctnaiin  undiniiniihed.  In  any 
□ihcr  ricw  it  would  l>c  l>olh  iinncccssary  and  dangerous;  it  would 
tie  UBneceMdty.  because  if  ihe  ^rani  (u  ilie  Union  of  Ihe  ponder  of 
laying  xuch  diitic»  im|>]ied  the  exclusion  of  the  Stales,  or  even 
tlieir  subuntiiution  in  tliui  particular,  (here  could  he  no  need  of 
Mich  a  rrtlriclion ;  it  wmiUl  be  d-mijcrons,  because  the  introitucliOB 
al  It  Irads  <Uivctly  to  Ihc  coiiclusn^n  which  hai  bt^t-n  raenlioiied, 
and  wfiich,  il  the  reaiionin);  of  the  objectors  be  jusi,  couM  not 
ha(-chc«n  inlend«<l;  I  mean  that  ihc  States,  in  all  cases  to  winch 
Ihc  Ttstncitwn  did  not  apply,  would  have  a  cnncuirent  power  <i( 
lualion  with  ilie  Union.  The  icsincttoii  in  question  amounts  to 
what  lawyers  call  a  NKOariVE  phecnaNT— (hat  is.  a  itfgaii«it  of 
□ae  thins,  and  an  •i^w<i<>*'f  of  another  1  a  negation  of  the  buiImm- 
■ly  of  iIk  Slates  lo  hnpoM  taxes  on  imports  and  expoKs,  and  an 
affirmance  of  llteir  aulhoiily  to  impo«c  tfiem  on  nil  other  ariiclrs. 
I1  would  tie  mnc  sophistry  to  aigue  that  it  was  meant  to  exclude 
lltetn  aksoiulely  trutn  the  imjiosilion  of  taxes  of  (he  fonner  kind. 
and  to  leave  il>em  at  liheny  lo  lay  oihcis  iahjttl  /■>  tkr  t^nlraf  'A 
the  national  legislature.  The  lestraining  or  prohibitory  ct.iu.ie 
only  Kxys  thai  ihcy  shall  not,  vrilkout  ikt  (tmtfftl  »/  Congrtti,  lay 
such  duties:  and  it  we  are  to  undeiitiand  this  in  Ihe  sense  last 
meniiiMied,  the  Consiiiuiion  would  then  be  ma<l«  10  introduce  a 
("iinil  provision  for  the  sake  of  a  very  alisurd  cwiclusioni  which  is, 
lltal  (be  Slaiei.  sc//4  tke  tenstnt  of  Ihc  national  legislature,  might 
tax  tinporit  and  cx|>oiis ;  and  that  they  m>Kbt  lax  every  other  atii- 
a\t..anUtt  •-aiilml/rJ  \rf  the  t-ime  body.  If  thb  w.i.i  the  intention, 
wiiy  nni  leave  ii  in  the  tiist  instance,  to  what  is  allcjjcd  lo  be  llic 


lOO 


CONSTITUTIONAL  SEPUGNANCY.      lIi».M<»ll 


nalural  operation  of  th«  orif^iuil  cUuse,  canfening  a  general  power 
of  tnution  upon  the  Union?  It  b  ev»<I«nt  thjit  iltii  could  not 
have  been  (he  intention,  and  that  it  vrill  not  l>ear  a  cotutnictkm  of 
the  kind. 

As  lo  a  mtppoviiion  <A  tepui^ancy  between  the  power  of  taxa> 
lion  in  the  States  anil  in  \\\r.  Union,  it  cRnnot  be  supporieil  in  dial 
itenM;  which  would  be  requiMic  to  work  an  exclusion  i>l  tlra  States. 
It  o,  indeed,  possible  that  .1  t-ix  might  b«  Uid  on  a  purticukr 
ailicle  by  a  Slate  which  might  render  it  iHtxpeJienl  (hjt  ihut  a 
further  tnx  should  be  bid  on  the  Mine  article  by  l\w-  Union  \  i>i]t  it 
would  not  iin[>ly  a  cunitttutiiNial  inability  to  inipoM  a  furihei  tax. 
The  qunniiiy  of  the  impiMttian,  the  cupedicncy  or  itiMpedicncy  of 
anincrenae  on  cither  ude.  would  be  muittally  qvotloiis  of  pni* 
dence:  but  there  would  be  invi>lved  no  direct  can(r;idietifl(i  of 
power.  Ihc  pxnicoUr  policy  of  tli«  luiiianal  and  of  the  Stale 
systems  ol  riiiancc  yn\^\\  now  and  then  nol  eiictly  coincide,  and 
might  lequire  iccipiocal  foittcjir>incev  It  i&  not.  Iwwei'Cr,  a  mere 
pouibiUly  of  iiiconvcnieiKC  in  the  exetcisc  of  powers,  but  an 
inimedinie  coiiuituiionHt  rcpogn-tiivy  ilut  can  by  iniplrcition 
alienAle  and  rxlingiiish  a  pre-eiisting  right  of  »(ivrre>gnly. 

The  necessity  of  a  concurrent  furiulictian  iu  certain  case«  reMilu 
from  (he  division  of  the  sovvretgn  power ;  and  ibe  rule  that  all 
■othoiitin  of  which  the  Si.ile>>  are  not  explrcitly  divested  in  (aror 
of  the  Union  remain  with  them  in  full  vigor,  is  not  a  theoreiical 
coiiM(|uence  of  iliJii  ilivision.  hut  is  clearly  admilird  by  the  whole 
tenor  of  the  instrumi^nt  which  coni.iin.i  the  articles  o(  (he  proposed 
Coristilulion.  We  there  IiikI  that,  nntwillitlaiiding  the  -illirmntive 
grititi  of  general  authorities,  there  h;i«  been  the  most  jKiiiilcd  care 
in  those  cases  where  Jl  was  deemed  improper  thai  the  like 
authorities  should  mide  in  ilie  States,  to  irucri  negative  clauses 
pcohibifing  (hr  exercise  of  them  by  the  States.  The  tenth  section 
of  the  first  article  coniisis  altogeilter  of  such  provisions.  This 
dmimsianoo  ii  a  clear  indication  of  (he  sense  rA  the  cwiveniinn. 
and  furnishes  a  rule  of  interpretation  oui  i>(  the  body  i<l  (he  net 
whkh  jtiuilies  ihe  position  I  have  advanced,  and  refutes  eveiy 
liypotbcib  to  Uk  conuwr.  Pu  HU  vs. 


niattlMl       AI^RM  OVER  GENERAL  CLAUSES, 


30I 


No.  33  l3»].         itmdttnUfmlJtmrmt.  JM-Hiy  ».  t»«W         HaOliltOa 

TAXATION  CONSIDF.RED  WITH  RESPECI"  TO  . 
GENKKAl.  I'OWIiKS. 

Tht  grnrral  ihtmi  a  imret  af  nmnetiitary  alarm — ptfintlitH  tf 
ftwtr^T%t  itBfffing  ihnus  tharftitUt  talM  UMlalfgy,  hut  ftrftiltf 
l»rmllii-'Kiai«n  far  tkrir  iHlr«dtuti0m~-T*f  HatidKalgettrHmtal  hk- 
t$iarify  itt  vtem  jitdgt  in  latr-miiihng — Suffieird  (aiti  vf  tHfiiian  r/sMU 
mtrrijpil/ — Natnrr  a/bmt  imtidrrrd  iti  rrga'J  l»  tt^rtmt  lovf — A  "a- 
tMmalUmmtl  lUprruu  wktm  a  lll]ur/^ifUH — Tit  fitutr  r/ lit  IfaUt  ai 
Urtvttmt. 

To  the  P<0pU  «/  the  State  ef  New  York: 

[The  residue  of  the  argument  against  the  provisionsof 
IheConstituttun  in  respect  tu  taxation  is  ingrafted  upon 
the  following  clause.]  *  The  last  clause  of  the  eighth 
icction  of  the  first  article  of  the  plan  under  consideration 
luthorizcs  the  national  legislature  "to  make  alt  laws 
which  shall  he  nettaary  ixni  prober  fur  carrying  into  exe- 
cution ihe  fowen  by  that  Constitution  vested  in  the  gor- 
tnimcnt  of  the  United  States,  or  in  any  department  or 
olScer  thereof ";  and  the  second  clause  of  the  sixth  arti- 
cle declares  "  that  the  Constitution  and  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  made  in  punuana  thtrtof,  and  the  treaties 
made  by  their  authority,  xhall  be  \\\t^  supreme  law  ot  tht 
laod,  anything  in  the  constitution  or  laws  of  any  State 
to  the  contrary  notwithstanding." 

These  two  clauses  have  been  the  source  of  much  viru- 
lent invective  and  petulant  declamation  against  the  pro- 
posed Constitution,  They  have  been  held  up  to  the 
people  in  all  the  exafft^rated  colors  of  misrepresentatinn 
as  the  pernicious  engines  by  which  their  local  govern- 
ments were  to  be  destroyed  and  their  liberties  exterini- 
luted;  as  the  hideous  monster  whose  devouring  jaws 
would  spare  neither  sex  nor  age,  nor  high  nor  low,  nor 

<  In  llie  ori^Hil  DFinptpet  pobtjaitiaa  this  No.  XXXIII.  wat  p«rt  ol 
prvcnllnf  number.  l>iii  In  die  collected  «dliion  ll  wm  dJviilH  u 
e.  anil  ihc  partloe  of  lbs  Tint  (Mtagnpfa  In  bnicliei«  wat  aildDd.— 

DiTOB. 


302  XECtSSAXY  AiVD  PKOPER  LAtfS.     OO.Mai) 

»ucred  nor  profane;  and  yet,  strange  as  it  nujr  ap|>ear 
after  all  this  clamor,  to  those  who  may  not  hare  !»(>■ 
pencd  to  contemplate  Ihcm  in  the  same  light,  it  may  be 
affirmed  with  perrcct  coiifidence  that  the  const itutiuiial 
operation  of  the  intended  guvernmciit  would  be  precisely 
the  same,  if  these  clauses  were  entirely  obliterated,  as  if 
lliey  were  repeated  in  every  article  They  are  -only  de- 
claratory of  a  truth  wiiiuh  n-ould  have  resulted  by  neces> 
sary  and  unavoidable  implication  from  the  very  act  of 
coHxtituting  a  federal  government  and  vesting  it  with 
certain  specified  powers.  This  is  so  clear  a  proposition 
thai  moilcration  itscH  can  scarcely  listen  to  the  railings 
which  have  been  s<>  uopiously  vente*!  against  this  part  of 
the  plan,  nitliout  cinnttons  that  disturb  its  equanimity. 

What  is  a  power,  but  the  ability  or  faculty  of  doing  a 
thing?  What  is  lite  ability  to  do  a  thing,  but  tlie  power 
of  employing  tlic  meant  necessary  to  its  execution? 
What  is  a  legislative  power,  but  a  power  of  making 
LAWS?  What  are  the  mtans  to  execute  a  i.euislativk 
power,  but  LAWS?  What  is  the  power  of  laying  and  collect- 
ing taxes,  but  a  lej^hlalii-t  fvwer,  or  a  power  of  mn/tiug 
laws,  to  lay  and  collect  taxes?  What  are  the  proper  means 
of  executing  such  a  power,  but  lutestarj  and  fm/nr  laws? 

This  simple  train  of  inquiry  furnishes  us  at  once  wilb 
a  test  by  which  to  judge  of  the  true  nature  of  the  clause 
complained  of.  It  conducts  ux  to  \\n%  palpable  trallt, 
that  a  power  to  lay  and  collect  taxes  must  be  a  power  to 
pass  all  laws  lueessary  and  fio^r  for  the  execution  of  that 
power;  and  wtiat  does  the  unfortunate  and  calumniated 
provision  in  question  do  more  than  declare  the  same 
truili,  to  wit,  that  the  national  legislature,  to  whom  the 
power  of  laying  and  collecting  taxes  liad  treen  previously 
given,  might  in  the  execution  of  that  power  pass  all  laws 
meefttary  ^nA proper  to  carry  it  into  effect?  I  have  ap- 
plied these  observations  thus  particularly  to  tlic  power  of 
taxation,  ber^iiise  it  is  the  immediate  subject  under  con- 
sideration, and  because  it  is  tite  most  important  of  the 
authorities  proposed  to  be  conferred  apon  the  Union. 
But  the  same  process  will  lead  to  the  same  result  in  r» 


llUnl     UNION  JUDGE  OF  ITS  OlfN  POWEKS.       to$ 


r 


lation  to  all  other  powers  declared  in  the  Constitution. 
And  It  is  txprtitiy  to  execute  these  pt^wcrs  that  the  sweep- 
ing tbuK,  as  it  his  been  jtlfcctcdl)-  c;(lled,  authurir.es  ihe 
national  legislature  to  pass  all  neftsiary  and  proper  laws. 
If  there  is  anything  exceptionable,  it  must  be  sought  for 
ia  the  specific  poweritupon  which  this  general  declaration 
is  predicated.  The  declaration  itself,  though  it  may  be 
chargeable  with  tautology  or  redundancy,  is  at  least  per- 
lectly  harmlesR. 

But  SUSPICION  may  ask,  Why  then  was  it  introduced? 
The  answer  is   that  it  could  only  have  been  done  for 

eater  caution,  and  to  guard  against  all  caviling  rclinc- 
^euts  in  those  who  might  hereafter  feci  a  disposition  to 
curtail  and  evade  the  legitimate  authorities  of  the  Union. 
Tlie  convention  probably  foresaw  wliat  it  has  been  a  prin- 
cipal aim  of  these  paperx  to  inculcate,  th;it  the  danjuier 
which  most  threatens  our  political  welfare  is  that  the 
Slate  governments  will  finally  sap  the  foundations  of  the 
Union;  and  might  therefore  think  it  necessary,  in  so 
cardinal  a  point,  to  leave  nothing  to  construction.  What- 
ever may  have  been  the  inducement  to  it,  the  wisdom  of 
the  precaution  is  evident  from  the  cry  which  has  been 

ised  against  it;  as  that  very  cry  betrays  a  disposition 

question  the  great  and  essential  truth  which  it  is  mani- 
festly the  object  of  that  provision  to  declare. 

But  it  may  be  again  asked.  Who  is  to  judge  of  the 
luitstiiy  Anti prefrifty  of  the  laws  to  be  passed  for  enecut- 
ing  the  powers  o(  the  Union?  I  answer,  first,  that  this 
luestion  arises  as  well  and  as  fully  upon  the  simple  grant 
q(  those  powers  as  upon  the  declaratory  clause;  and  I 
answer,  in  the  second  place,  that  the  national  govern' 
mcnt,  like  every  other,  must  judge,  in  the  first  Instance," 
of  the  proper  exercise  of  its  powers,  and  its  constituents 
>D  the  last.  If  the  federal  government  should  overpass 
the  just  bounds  of  its  authority  and  make  a  tyrannical 
;iB«  of  its  powers,  the  people,  whose  creature  it  is,  roust 
ippe^tl  to  the  standariTthey'  have  formed,  and  take  such 
measures  to  redress  the  injury  done  to  the  Constitution 
IS  the  exigency  may  suggest  and  prudence  justify.     The 


»<H  A  lAW  J.VVOLVES  SUPRE.VACY.      [■•-MiJli 

propriety  of  a  law,  in  a  constitutional  liglit,  must  always 
be  dcterminciJ  t>y  the  nature  of  the  powers  upon  which  it 
19  (oumled.  Suppose,  hy  some  forced  constructions  of 
its  authority  (which,  indeed,  cannot  easily  be  imagined), 
the  federal  Icgfislature  should  attempt  to  rary  the  law  of 
descent  in  any  State,  would  it  not  he  evident  that,  in  mak- 
ing such  an  attempt,  it  had  exceeded  its  jurisdiction,  and 
infringed  upon  that  of  the  State?  Suppose,  again,  that 
upon  the  pretense  of  an  interference  with  its  revenues,  it 
should  undertake  to  abrogate  a  land-tax  imposed  by  the 
authority  of  a  State;  would  it  not  be  equally  evident  that 
ititswasan  invasion  of  that  concurrent  jurisdiction  in 
respect  to  this  species  of  tax  which  its  Constitution 
plainly  supposes  to  exist  in  the  State  governments?  If 
there  ever  should  be  a  doubt  on  this  head,  the  rrcdit  of 
it  will  be  entirely  due  to  those  reasoners  who,  in  the  im- 
prudent «al  of  their  animosity  to  the  plan  of  the  cooven- 
tioD,  fiavc  labored  to  envelop  it  in  a  cloud  calculated  to 
obscure  the  plainest  and  simplest  truths. 

But  it  is  said  that  the  laws  of  the  Union  are  to  be  the 
supreme  latt'  of  the  land.  But  what  inference  can  he  drawn 
from  this,  or  what  would  they  amount  to,  if  they  were 
fM  not  to  be  supreme?     It  is  evident  they  would 

■«.44.  amount   to   nothing.     A     law,   by   the   very 

meaning  of  the  term,  includes  supremacy.  It  is  a  rule 
which  those  to  whom  it  is  prescribed  are  bound  to  ob- 
serve. This  results  from  every  political  association.  If 
individuals  enter  into  a  state  of  society,  the  laws  of  that 
society  must  be  the  supreme  regulator  of  thctr  conduct 
Ua  number  of  political  societies  enter  into  a  larger  politi. 
cal  society,  the  laws  which  the  lattermay  enact,  pursuant 
to  the  powers  intrusted  to  it  by  its  constitution,  must 
necessarily  t>e  supreme  over  those  societies  and  the  in- 
dividuals of  whom  they  are  composed.  It  would  other- 
wise be  a  mere  treaty,  dependent  on  the  good  faith  of  the 
parties,  and  not  a  government,  which  is  only  aaothrr 
word  for  political  powf.b  ash  srvRKMACV.  But  it  wifl 
not  follow  from  this  doctrine  llwt  acts  of  the  larger  *od- 
ety  which  are  mal  fvrnntft  to  its  constitutional  powers, 


tflAI 


■Udhttl     L4 IV  .VO  r  SOPKUME  IF  A  USURP  A  TtON.     lOJ 

but  which  are  invasions  of  the  residuary  authorities  of 
t!ic  sfDxIler  societiv*,  will  become  tlie  supreme  law  of  the 
hnd.  These  will  be  merely  acts  of  usurpation,  and  will 
deserve  to  be  treated  as  such.  Hence  wc  perceive  that 
the  claii&v  which  declares  the  sii|iretiiacy  of  the  laws  of 
the  Union,  like  the  one  wc  have  just  before  considered, 
only  declares  a  truth  trhich  flows  immediately  and  nec- 
essarily from  the  institiitiuii  of  a  federal  govcrnmcnL  It 
■ill  not,  1  presume,  have  escaped  observation  that  it 
txprtuly  confines  this  supremacy  to  laws  made  punuant  t» 
the  Cotilitulhn ;  which  I  menlion  merely  as  an  tn»iai)ce  o( 
caution  in  the  convention;  since  that  limitation  would, 
have  been  to  be  understood,  though  it  had  not  been 
expressed.' 

Though  a  law,  therefore,  laying  a  tax  (or  the  use  of  the 
United  States  would  be  supreme  in  its  nature,  and  could 
not  legally  be  opposed  or  contrtdlcd,  yet  a  law  for  abro* 
sating  or  preventing  the  collection  of  a  tax  laid  by  the 
anthoriiy  of  the  State  (unless  upon  imports  and  ex- 
ports) would  not  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  but  a 
Qturpation  of  power  not  granted  by  the  Constitution. 
As  far  as  an  improper  accumulation  of  taxes  on  the  same 
object  might  tend  to  render  the  collection  difHcult  or 
prerarious,  this  would  be  a  mutuiil  inconvenience,  not 
arising  from  a  superiority  or  defect  of  power  on  cither 
side,  but  from  an  injudicious  exercise  of  power  by  one  or 
the  other,  in  a  manner  equally  disadvantage  mis  to  both. 
It  is  to  be  hoped  and  presumed,  however,  that  mutual 
intereKt  wonid  dictate  a  concert  in  this  respect  which 
irouid  avoid  any  material  inconvenience.  The  inference 
(rotn  the  whole  is  that  the  indiviilual  States  would,  under 
tile  proposed  Constitution,  retain  an  independent  and 
uncontrollable  authority  to  raise  rcvenueto  any  extent  of 
which  they  may  stand  in  need,  by  every  kind  of  taxation, 
except  duties  on  imports  and  exports.  It  will  be  shown 
in  the  next  paper  that  this  concurkknt  jurisdiction  in 


'See  die  BbriHgmcnt  a(  Utxthall't  ophiiaii  In  Mubuty  vs.  M»disoii, 
b  Appeadix. — EurroR. 


ic6     SIATES  iCBTArx  AMPLE  AUTHORITY.  lir«.«'«l. 

the  article  of  taxation  wag  the  onlf  admissible  substitute 
fur  an  entire  subordination,  in  respect  to  thi&  br;inch  of 
power,  of  the  State  authority  to  that  vf  the  Union. 

PUBLIUS. 


No.  34  {32].  (Wnr  Krr«  Atdrf,  JontuirT  4.  iltt)  Hamilton. 

THE  CONCURRENT  JURISDICTION  IN  TAXA- 
TIO.M  OF  THE  STATES  AND  NATION. 

Tkt  ilittit  irtU  tHaiit  ittunttant  laurtti  9/  nvtnue-'An  tJKiatfit  tf 
h-<tJiimU  aulh^rtty  frem  RfviaH  Aiit-vf —  Tir  uMBti  rf  lh<  itatfi  will 
rrJiKf  ikrmitltvs  fit  vfj  tiarrt'jf  cm^iis—Niitnity  fit  frtvidt  far  mort 
than  txiiliig  BftliffHtit  txigimciti  ff  rtvtnnt — Tlu  mtifm  mint  l*  im  a 
feiili*n  tt  fifUtl  itttif — Tkt fJUtisHi  o/rnir  rrign  m  tkr  Auantiirtatt— 
War  ix^nsti  ef  Eiitvpt  (fiHftrtd  vitk  riftam  a/  tnit  liit — Etftn«i 
iiiuifrttliei  in  <7rt<U  ffriMin — Hxamfili  ff  rrx-altUifnary  Jt^ — Ammnt 
nirJtJ  ftr  ixfrnit  tf  iMfi-~-Poiiitlf  furiitinH  «/ ret^ai  Mtoetn  ttatn 
taiJ  Halie»~EMlerital  luiJ  iHlfriral  laJMlifn — CmtHrreml  ttMoIitn  iti 
tHty  aJniiiitlf  ijritrm. 

To  the  Peof^t  ef  tht  State  cj  Ntw  York: 

I  flatter  myturlf  it  has  been  clearly  shown  in  my  last 
number  that  the  particular  States,  under  the  proposed 
Constitution,  would  have  cokqual  authority  with  the 
Union  in  the  article  of  rercnuc,  except  as  to  duties  on 
imports.  As  this  leaves  open  to  the  States  farthci[reat> 
est  part  of  the  resources  of  the  communily,  there  can  be 
no  color  fur  the  assertion  that  they  would  not  possess 
means  as  abundant  as  could  be  desired  for  the  supply  of 
their  own  wants,  independent  of  all  external  control. 
That  the  field  is  sufTicienily  wide  will  more  fully  appear 
when  we  come  to  advert  to  the  inconsiderable  share  of 
the  public  expenses  for  which  it  will  fall  to  the  tut  of  tlie 
State  governments  to  provide. 

To  argue  upon  abstract  principles  that  this'  "    ite 

authority  cannot  exist  is  to  set  tip  supposition        .  ry 

against  fact  aud  reality.     Uuwcver  proper  sacb  rcaAuo- 


JtOMA.V  CO-ORDINATE  AUTMOKITV. 


J07 


ings  ntight  be  to  show  that  a  thing  i^u^'A/  no(  Id  exist,  ihey 
^are  wholly  tr»  be  rejected  when  tlicy  •ir«:  made  use  of  to 
prove  tJiai  it  does  not  exist,  contrary  to  the  cvi^Icnce  o( 
the  fact  itself.  It  is  well  known  that  in  the  Roman  re- 
public  the  legislative  authority,  in  the  last  resort,  resided 
(or  agc4  in  two  different  political  bodiex— not  a^branchcK 
nf  the  same  legislature,  but  as  distinct  and  independent 
leijislatures,  in  each  of  which  an  opposite  interest  pre- 
Tdiled:  in  one,  the  patrician;  in  the  other,  the  plebeian. 
Many  arguments  might  have  been  adduced  to  prove  (he 
unfitness  of  two  such  Bcemiiiglyroniradictory  authorities, 
each  having  power  laannutot  rc/^ti/ the  acts  of  the  other. 
But  a  man  would  have  been  regarded  as  frantic  who 
itiould  have  attempted  at  Rome  to  disprove  their  exist, 
eoce.  It  will  be  readily  understood  that  I  allude  to  the 
COMITIA  CKNTURiATA  and  the  coMrriA  tributa.  The 
former,  in  which  the  people  voted  by  centnnes,  was  so 
arranged  as  to  give  a  superiority  to  the  patrician  inter- 
est; in  the  latter,  in  which  numbers  prevailed,  the  ple- 
bc^ian  interest  had  an  entire  predominancy.  And  yet 
Ihese  two  legislatures  coexisted  for  ages,  and  tbe 
Koman  republic  attained  to  the  utmost  height  of  human 
treat  n  ess. 

In  the  case  particularly  under  consideration  there  is  no 
such  contradiction  as  appears  in  the  example  cited ;  there 
is  no  power  on  either  side  to  annul  the  acts  of  the  other. 
And  in  practice  there  is  little  reason  to  apprehend  any 
inconvenience;  twcaitse,  in  a  short  course  of  lime,  the 
wants  of  the  States  will  naturally  reduce  themselves 
wilhin  a  very  narratv  tompait;  and  in  the  interim  the 
United  States  will,  in  all  probability,  (indit  convenient  to 
abstain  wholly  from  those  objects  to  which  the  particular 
Slates  would  be  inclined  to  resort. 

To  form  a  more  precise  judgment  of  the  true  merits  of 
tliit  iiuestion,  it  will  be  well  to  advert  to  the  proportion 
t)elween  the  objects  that  will  require  a  federal  provision 
in  respect  to  revenue,  and  tluMe  which  will  require  a  State 
provision.  We  shall  discover  that  the  former  are  alto- 
gether unlimited,  and  that  the  latter  are  circumscribed 


30$ 


FVTUKR  CONTINGENCIES. 


iv«.udai 


within  very  moderate  bounds.  In  pursaing  this  inquiry, 
wc  must  bear  in  mind  that  wc  arc  not  to  confine  our  view 
to  the  present  period,  but  to  look  forward  to  remote 
futurity.  Constitutions  of  ciril  government  are  not  to 
be  framed  upon  a  calculation  of  exbtiogcxiscncies,  but 
upon  a  combination  of  these  with  (he  prob:iUte  exigencies 
of  ages,  according  to  the  natural  and  tried  course  of 
human  affairs.  Nothing,  therefore,  can  be  more  falla. 
ctous  than  to  infer  the  extent  of  any  power,  proper  to  be 
lodged  in  the  national  government,  from  an  estimate  of 
its  immediate  necessities.  There  ought  to  bea  capacity 
to  provide  for  future  contingencies  us  ihcy  may  happen; 
and  as  these  arc  illimitable  in  their  nature,  it  is  impossi- 
ble safely  to  limit  that  capacity.  It  is  true,  perhaps,  that 
a  computiitiun  might  be  made  with  sufficient  acciinicy  to 
answer  the  purpose  of  the  quantity  of  revenue  requisite 
to  discharge  the  subsisting  engagements  nf  the  Union 
and  to  maintain  those  establishments  which,  for  some 
time  to  come,  would  suffice  in  time  of  peace.  But  would 
it  be  wise,  or  would  it  not  rather  be  the  extreme  of  folly, 
to  stop  at  this  point,  and  to  leave  the  government  in> 
truKtetl  with  the  care  of  the  national  defense  in  a  state  of 
absolute  incapacity  to  provide  for  the  protection  of  the 
community  against  future  invasions  of  the  publit'  peace, 
by  foreign  war  or  dumcstic  convulsions?  If,  on  the  con. 
trary,  we  ought  to  exceed  (his  point,  where  can  we  stop^ 
short  of  an  indefinite  power  of  providing  fur  emergencies 
ax  they  may  arise?  Though  it  is  easy  to  assert.  In  gen* 
iTal  terms,  the  possibility  of  forming  a  rational  judgment 
of  a  due  provision  against  probable  dangers,  yet  we  may 
safely  challenge  tliose  who  make  the  assertion  to  bring 
forward  their  data,  and  may  affirm  that  they  would  bo 
found  as  vague  and  uncertain  as  any  that  could  be  pro 
duccd  lo  establish  the  probable  duration  of  the  world. 
Obscrvatiiins  conliDcd  to  tJie  mere  prospects  of  internal 
attacks  can  deserve  no  weight,  though  even  these  will 
admit  of  no  satisfactory  calculation:  but  if  wc  mean  lo 
be  a  commercial  people,  it  must  form  a  part  of  our  policy 
to  be  able  one  day  to  defend  that  commerce.     The  sup- 


J 


^AalltM]  tfAff  ALWAYS  A  POSStB/UTY.  '©9 

port  of  a  navy  and  of  naval  wars  would  involve  conlia- 
agencies  ihat  must  baffle  all  the  «lTorU  of  political 
arithmetic. 

Admitting  that  we  ought  to  trjr  the  novel  and  absurd 
ciperinient  in  politics  of  tying  up  the  handit  of  govern- 
ment from  offensive  war  founded  upon  reasons  of  state, 
yet  certainly  we  ought  not  to  disable  it  from  guarding 
the  community  against  the  ambition  or  enmity  of  other 
nations.  A  cloud  has  been  for  some  time  hanging  over 
the  I%uro|)ean  world.  If  it  should  bretk  forth  into  a 
storm,  who  can  insure  us  that  in  its  progress  a  part  of  its 
(iiry  would  not  be  Spent  upon  us>  No  reasonable  man 
Would  hastily  pronounce  that  we  are  entirely  out  of  its 
reach.  Or  if  the  combustible  materials  thai  now  seem  to 
be  rullecting  should  be  dissipated  without  coming  to 
maturity,  or  if  a  llainc  »hiiulit  l>e  kindled  without  cxleiid- 
ing  to  us,  what  security  can  we  have  that  our  tranquillity 
will  long  remain  undisturbed  from  some  other  cause  or 
from  »iime  other  (juarter?  Let  us  recollect  that  peare 
or  war  will  not  always  be  left  to  our  option;  that,  how- 
ever moderate  or  unambitious  wc  may  be,  we  cannot 
count  upon  the  moderation,  or  hope  to  extinguish  the 
ambition,  of  others.  Who  could  have  imagined  at  the 
conclusion  of  the  last  war  that  France  and  Britain, 
wearied  ami  exh;iusted  as  they  both  were,  would  so  soon 
have  looked  with  so  hostile  an  aspect  upon  each  other? 
To  judge  from  the  history  of  mankind,  ire  shall  be  com- 
pelled to  conclude  that  the  fiery  and  destructive  passions 
of  war  reign  in  the  human  breast  with  much  more  power- 
ful sway  than  the  mild  and  bcncliccnt  sentiments  of 
peace;  and  that  to  model  our  political  systems  upon 
speculations  of  lasting  tranquillity  is  to  calculate  on  the 
weaker  springs  of  the  human  character. 

What  are  the  chief  sources  of  expense  In  every  govcrn- 
meot?  What  has  occasioned  that  enormous  aci'umula- 
tion  of  ilubts  with  which  several  of  the  European  nations 
ore  oppressed?  The  answer  plainly  is,  wars  and  re- 
bellions; the  support  of  those  Institutions  which  are 
necessary  to  guard  the  body  pohtic  against  these  two 


3ie 


It^JJl  DEBTS  OF  CJtEAT  BittTAItf.     IH«.M'M| 


most  morul  disuses  of  society.  The  expenses  arisins 
from  those  institutions  which  arc  relative  to  the  mere 
domestic  police  of  x  state,  to  the  supp4>rt  of  itn  legisla- 
tive, executive,  aod  judicial  departments,  with  their 
different  appcndngcs,  and  to  the  encouragement  of  agri- 
culture and  manufactures  (which  will  comprehend  almost 
all  the  objectft  of  state  expenditure),  are  insignificant  in 
comparison  with  those  which  relate  to  the  national 
defense.  * 

In  ttie  kingiiom  of  Great  Britain,  where  all  llic  oslcniJlMHi* 
apparatus  o(  munntchy  is  to  be  proviileil  (or,  nor  above  a  tldeenih 
|>arl  of  the  annual  Incaineof  the  nation  Is  appropiutcd  to  theclats 
ot  expenses  Um  mentioned ;  the  other  fourteen*  fifteen  I  hs  are 
4b3utbed  in  the  paynieni  of  the  intereU  ol  dcblK  contr;icicd  for 
carrying  on  ihc  wAr>  iii  wtiich  iliat  country  has  been  ciigjged.  and 
in  Ihe  niaiiiicnance  of  fleets  and  armies.  If,  on  lite  otic  hand,  it 
should  be  observed  ihai  lite  expenses  incurred  in  the  pro«ccuiion 
of  Ihe  ainbiliuus  enter[ii'i»cs  and  rat ii glorious  |iursiiils  i>l  a  mon- 
archy are  not  a  proper  8t;iiidjrd  by  which  to  judge  of  those  wliich 
miglil  l>e  necev-uity  in  a  rrpuhlic.  ii  uughi,  on  (he  other  hand,  to 
be  remaiked  (hat  there  should  be  as  great  a  ilitproponton  between 
Ihe  profusion  and  cx(rai'iiifaiice  of  a  wealiliy  kingdom  m  its  domes- 
iic  adminisiraiion,  anil  the  fnigaliiy  and  economy  ivhich  in  that 
parllcuiar  becvine  Ihe  loixlesi  siriiplicity  of  rei>ublican  gorcra- 
meni.  If  wc  ItaUncea  proper  deduction  from  one  side  agaiiut 
that  wliici)  it  IS  supposed  ought  to  be  made  fioin  the  other,  the 
praponioA  may  still  be  considered  ai  holding  good. 

But  let  us  advert  to  the  targe  debt  which  we  have  our- 
selves contracted  in  a  single  war,  and  let  us  only  calcu- 
late on  a  common  share  of  the  events  which  disturb  the 
peace  of  nations,  and  wc  shall  instantly  perceive,  without 
the  aid  of  any  clatMratc  illustration,  that  there  must 
always  be  an  immense  disproportion  between  the  objects 
of  federal  and  Slate  expenditures.  It  is  true  that  several 
of  the  States,  separately,  arc  encumbered  with  coDsider- 


■*niis  vas  u>  true  in  I7ft9.  when  tlut  wu  vritien.  ittM  TaAmm 
("  Wrilinn,"  V.  ii  j)  Miknuly  Brgnctl  llial  DMtnni  liknulil  (w  aMulMlstf 
prijlil  biltil  (rum  btxroiriiM  nKincy.  Thonyfa  aiilitu^  xn<l  natal  exuentn 
■!«  iilll  \\w  ^f^an  cuue*  of  fiublic  debt,  ret  m  the  denuKntimiion  of  mad 
cm  nalions  there  is  more  and  uwce  teoileKT  K>  eaiploy  the  piihlle  u«>lll 
(iw  public  wofhi  aoJ  impravement,  anil  ihia  cluui|;e  it  B|iuUJly  nuAtil 
ill  AliKll'd, — Kliitiik. 


EunUtAnl 


EXPENSE  OF  STATES. 


ill 


ililc  debts,  which  arc  an  excrescence  of  the  late  war. 
But  this  catinul  happen  a^ain,  il  the  prupDScil  system  be 
adopted; '  and  whrii  these  dcrbtx  arc  (lisctiarged,  ilic  only 
call  for  revenue  of  any  consequence,  which  the  State 
^vemments  will  continue  to  experience,  will  be  for  the 
mere  support  of  their  respective  civil  liatu;  to  which,  if 
wc  add  all  contingencies,  the  total  amount  in  every  State 
coght  lo  fall  considerably  short  of  two  hundred  thousand 
pounds. 

In  framing  a  government  for  posterity  as  well  as  our> 
selves,  wc  ought,  in  those  provisions  which  are  designed 
to  he  permanent,  to  CiihniLite,  not  im  tempumry,  but  on 
permanent  causes  of  expense.  If  this  principle  be  a  just 
one,  our  attention  woidd  be  directed  to  a  provision  in 
favoir  of  the  State  governmentft  for  an  annu;d  sum  of 
about  two  hundred  thousand  pounds;  while  the  exicen- 
cie»  of  the  Union  could  be  susceptible  of  no  limits,  even 
In  Imagination.  In  thi«  view  nf  the  subject,  by  what 
logic  can  it  l>e  maintained  that  the  local  governments 
ou{;hi  to  command,  in  perpetuity,  an  Kxci.usive  source  of 
revenue  for  any  sum  beyond  the  extent  of  two  hundred 
thousand  pounds?  To  extend  its  power  further,  in 
txtluthn  of  the  authority  of  the  Union,  would  be  to  lake 
the  resources  of  the  community  out  of  those  hands  which 
Stoo4l  in  need  of  (hem  for  the  public  welfare,  in  order  to 
put  them  into  other  hands  which  could  huve  no  just  or 
proper  occasion  for  them. 

Suppose,  then,  the  convention  had  been  inclined  to 
proceed  upon  the  principle  of  a  repartition  of  the  objects 
of  revenue  betwecu  the  Union  and  its  members,  in/''i» 
portion  to  ilieir  com{wrative  necessities;  what  particular 
fund  could  have  been  selected  for  the  use  of  the  States 
that  would  not  cither  have  been  too  much  or  too  little — 


'  Nme  the  \t»,  tlie  aillonki  Mvcmment  •«■  in  «uh  ilnUt  ilttrjni; 
the  irar  tA  «Si»  itmi  ib«  ^iiIf<  oTNrw  V'irk  and  reniniflv«»iii  a.lvmnf il 
•I  MHUly  ■  million  and  i  halt  <iullBn  ;  uid  •lutin);  Ihc  Civil  War  niott 
at  the  Bonhmi  ilitci  incuntd  "wot  del'li."  Ihnt  of  New  Yotk  alon« 
baine  hi  exMs  of  iwcnijr-ievcn  million  dollarv  Rui  iliii  Ullcr  wat  to 
graau)'  "Ut  of  propoTiuHi  lu  the  ilcbit  al  ilx  other  ualc*  Ihat  rcually 
■lie  Ut£ei  pAit  wat  rrtandtd  liy  Iho  naiioiiai  guvetnmeDi. — Editok. 


%ti 


COffCUKSEifT  TAXATIOy. 


We.Mctti 


too  liillc  for  their  present,  too  much  for  Iheir  future 
wints?  As  to  tbc  line  of  separation  between  external 
and  internal  taxes,  thin  wonM  leave  lo  the  Stiites,  at  a 
rough  coiu,)Utation,  the  command  of  two-thirds  of  the 
resources  of  the  community  to  defray  from  a  tenth  to  a 
twentieth  part  of  its  expenses;  and  to  the  Union  one- 
third  of  the  resources  of  the  community  to  defray  from 
nine-tenths  to  nincteen-twcntieths  of  its  expenses.  If 
we  desert  this  boundary,  and  content  ourselves  with  leav- 
ing to  the  States  an  exclusive  power  of  taxing  houses  and 
lan<Is,  there  would  still  be  a  great  disproportion  bctwircn 
the  mtans  and  the  end;  the  possession  of  one-third  of  the 
resources  of  the  community  to  supply,  at  most,  one-tenth 
of  its  wants.  If  any  fund  could  have  been  selected  and 
appropriated,  equal  to  and  not  greater  than  the  obji-rt, 
it  would  have  been  inadequate  to  the  discharge  of  the 
existing  debts  of  the  particular  States,  and  would  have 
left  them  dcperKlcnt  on  the  Union  for  a  provision  for 
this  purpose. 

The  preceding  train  of  observation  will  justify  the 
position  which  has  hcen  elsewhere  l.iid  tlown,  that  "  A 
coNcuRRFNT  jUBisDicTiON  in  thc  article  of  laxaiiun  was 
the  only  admissible  suhstitutc  for  an  entire  suhorili nation, 
in  respect  to  this  branch  uf  power,  of  Slate  aulhunly  to 
that  of  the  Union."  Any  separation  of  the  ohjccis  of 
revenue,  that  could  have  been  fallen  upon,  would  have 
amounted  to  a  sacrifice  of  the  great  intrhf^t^  of  thc 
Union  to  the  power  of  the  individual  States.  The  con- 
vention thought  thc  concurrent  jiirisdiilion  prpfrrable  to 
tlut  subordination;  and  it  is  evident  that  it  has  at  least 
the  merit  of  reconciling  an  indefinite  constitutional 
|H)wer  of  taxation  in  the  Federal  gorcrnmcnt  with  an 
adequate  and  independent  jKtwer  in  tbc  States  to  provide 
for  their  own  necessities.  There  remain  a  few  other 
lights,  in  which  this  important  subject  of  iaxat>t>n  mil 
claim  a  further  consideration. 

PUfiULS. 


maam 


1 


^f*'  35  [33I'      ('-^/'•^•ryM'u/,  Juiwy },  «]4s.)       Hamilton. 


ANSWERS    TO     OUJECTIONS    TO     INDEFINITE 
POWERS   OK   TAXATION. 

A  Smilalian  tf  laxatiea   tall  tnJ  in  ttndiu  turJemi  vh  farlitular 

et/fili — 4  rrilrijlioti  la  JuHtt  tvi/l  riiiiU  in  Ihtir  kting  tarritJ  A>  an 

tHJitriMit  ixitn — Htgk  dtttitt  prtJmt  mugxliax.  Hnjuf  favtimg  aj 

t^aiifailitrini  itatfti,  anJ  epprittitn  »f  Ike  miiietjnl — Pjijuhtki  t/ 

JulifS  faili  mp*»  Mk  itllrr  aiiJ  tayer—CeaiiJtralifit  ef  ikt  MdjVm  lk4l 

lit  fiTHiuntir  f-ifs  Ikt  dalitt — High  Julitt  €rrltin  Is  ti  allmdid  walk 

iofiftuililt — An  lyHjAM/ffu  enly  I9  if  attainftl  ty  rxfiin — Sftcint inie>'- 

[*(/  af  Srai  Virk —  Tht  Jttire  frr  rrs-rnut  Hktly  10  Umil  rxcris  ia  dHtiri 

~~C»ntiJtralUH  ef  Ikt  t^itelitn  Ikal  iht  fft-'vu  «/  SrfirruHUIifri  ii  lae 

imail^Ailit^t  rifriitmlMian  *f  all  elaiiti  ftirtty  viiianary— Inltrttli 

gf  miiktmUi  anj  mamu/mliirin—O/ Ikt  ItarntJ  prafumm — Of  Ikt 

tandtJ  inttrttli — Taxalitn  tf  laiiJ — Tkt   rrfreitnlalivt  tidy  viiU  tt 

l-tkttjly  ivnfrittti  of  LiaJifUfri — ifuluitl  inlmil  of  all  ituiri — /ftif,-n- 

I  Httntu  »/  rtfriunlalnti   l-i  fniiit    tpinitn — Etitntivi   informalitn 

\nttJrd  in   ikt  taiineit   of  tataliMi—rke  mtit  prediulivl  ijnttm  »/ 

I  Jlnamti  ii  lilt  Itail  iurJtnwmt. 

Ta  Ike  People  o/  Ike  State  ef  New  York: 

Before  wc  proceed  to  examine  any  other  objections  to 
an  inilcfinite  power  o(  taxation  in  the  Union,  I  sh;ill 
make  one  general  remark;  which  iti  that,  if  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  luilional  government,  in  the  article  of  revenue, 
should  be  restricted  to  particuUr  objects,  it  irniild 
naturally  occasion  an  undue  proportion  of  the  public 
burdens  to  fall  upon  those  objects.  Two  evils  would 
spring  from  ihix  source:  the  oppression  of  particular 
branches  of  industry;  and  an  unequal  distribution  of  the 
taxes,  as  well  among  the  several  States  as  among  the 
citizens  of  the  same  Sute. 

Suppose,  as  has  been  contended  for,  the  federal  power 
of  taxation  were  to  be  confined  to  duties  on  imports,  il 
it  evident  that  the  government,  for  want  of  bein);  able  to 
command  other  resources,  would  frequently  be  tempted 
to  extend  these  duties  to  an  injurious  excess.  There  are 
l.persons  who  imagine  lh.n  they  can  never  be  carried  to 
IflW^reat  a  length;  since,  the  higher  they  arc,  the  more 


114  HIGH  DUTIES  AND  SMVGCUNC.      iVa^UtWi 

it  is  allcf^cd  they  will  tend  to  discour^ige  an  rxtravagant 
confitimiitiun,  to  jjroduce  a  lavornbl«  Uibnte  of  trade, 
and  to  ()romote  domestic  manufactures.  But  all  cstreincs 
ar«  pernicious  in  various  ways.  Exorbitant  dtittrs  on 
imported  articles  would  beget  a  general  spirit  of  smug* 
gling,  which  is  always  prejudicial  to  the  fair  trader  and 
eventually  to  the  revenue  itself;  they  tend  to  render 
other  classes  of  llie  community  tributary,  in  an  improper 
degree,  to  the  manufacturing  classes,  to  irhoro  they  give 
a  premature  monopoly  of  the  markets;  they  sometimes 
force  iniliutry  out  of  its  more  natural  channels  into 
others  in  wliich  tt  ttovrs  with  less  advantage;  and,  in 
the  last  place,  they  oppress  the  merchant,  who  is  oftco 
obliged  to  pay  them  himself  without  any  retritiution  from 
the  consumer.  When  the  demand  is  equal  to  the  quan- 
tity of  goods  at  market,  the  consumer  generally  jwys  the 
duty;  but  when  the  markets  happen  to  be  overstocked, 
a  great  proportion  falls  upon  the  merchant,  and  some- 
times not  only  exhausts  his  profits,  but  breaks  in  upon 
his'Capilal.  1  am  apt  to  think  that  a  divi^iun  of  the  duty 
between  the  seller  and  the  buyer  more  often  happens 
than  is  commonly  imagined.  It  is  not  always  possible  to 
raise  tlie  price  of  a  commodity  in  exact  proportion  to 
every  additional  imposition  laid  upon  it.  The  merchant, 
especially  in  a  country  of  small  commercial  rapilal,  is 
often  under  a  necessity  of  keeping  prices  down  in  order 
to  a  more  expeditious  sale. 

The  maxim  that  the  consumer  is  the  payer  is  so  much 
oftcocr  true  than  the  reverse  of  the  proposition  that  it 
is  far  more  equitable  that  the  duties  oa  imports  should 
go  into  a  common  stock  than  that  they  should  redound 
to  the  exclusive  benefit  of  the  importing  States.  But  it 
is  nut  so  generally  true  as  to  render  it  equitable  that 
those  duties  should  form  the  only  national  fund.  When 
they  are  paid  by  the  merchant  ihcy  operate  as  an  addi* 
tional  tax  npon  the  importing  State,  whose  citizens  pay 
(heir  proportion  of  them  in  the  character  of  consumers. 
In  this  view  they  arc  productive  of  inequality  among  the 
Stales;    witich  inequality  would  be  increased  with  the 


idli 


LBkntOtral     EQUAUZATIOX   THROUGH  EXCISES.  JI5 

increased  extent  of  the  duties.  The  confinement  of  tlie 
Batiorul  revenues  to  tliis  species  uf  tmpuKts  would  be 
attended  uiiti  inequality,  from  a  dilTerent  cause,  between 
■he  manufacturing  and  the  non-manufacturing  States. 
The  States  wliich  citn  ^o  furthest  toward  the  supply  ol 
their  own  wants  by  their  own  manufactures,  will  not, 
iiccording  to  their  numbers  or  wealth,  consume  so  greiit 
a  proportion  of  imported  articlcit  as  those  States  which 
arc  not  in  the  same  farorahic  situation.  They  would  not, 
therefore,  in  this  mode  alone  contribute  to  the  public 
treasury  in  a  ratio  to  tliuir  abilities.  To  make  them  do 
this  it  is  necessary  that  recourse  be  had  to  excises,  the 
{iropcr  objects  of  whii;h  are  parlicular  kitiils  of  manu- 
factures. New  Vork  is  more  deeply  interested  in  these 
rnosidcrations  than  such  of  her  citizens  as  contend  for 
liintting  the  power  of  the  Union  to  c:ttcrnal  taxation  may 
lie  aware  of.  New  York  is  an  inipurtinx  Slate,  and  is  tiot 
likely  speedily  to  be  to  any  Rrcat  extent'  a  manufactur- 
ing Slate.  She  would,  of  course,  suifcr  in  a  double  tight 
from  restraininfC  the  jurisiliciion  of  the  Union  to  com- 
mercial imfmsts. 

So  far  as  these  obscr^'ations  tend  to  inculcate  a  dnngerof 
1I1C  im)iort  duties  being  extended  toati  injurious  extreme, 
It  may  )>c  observed,  conformably  to  a  remark  made  in 
jnolher  |wrt  of  these  )«pers,  that  ihe  interest  of  the  rev- 
1^  enue  itself  would  be  a  sufficient  guani  against 

X0.BI.  such  an  extreme.     1  readily  admit  that  this 

would  be  the  ease  as  long  as  oihcr  revources  were  open; 
hui  if  the  avenues  to  thcin  were  closed,  hope,  stimulated 
by  necessity,  would  beget  experiments,  fortified  by  rigor> 
out  precautions  and  additional  penalties,  which  for  a  time 
would  have  the  intended  effect,  till  there  had  been  leisure 
to  contrive  expedients  to  elude  these  new  precautions. 
The  first  success  would  be  apt  to  inspire  false  opinions, 
wUch  it  might  require  a  long  course  of  subsequent 
experience  focorrecL     Necessity,  especially  in  politics 


'In  the  iciIofriiFcililiaaof  iSwa. 
(ICM  esl«»l. 


irti  ui  \nr  ruiiauB  uk  iDVA.       and  Irvxn  x  j^tnlCT  niifiropoilKHi 

l«i*mi  \tet   |>o|iuliiii<>ii  and  tcnilory  ii  uDtikclj'  ipccdilv  10  be,  to  any 
i«.  —  Ki>n"«. 


»l6       WEAL  REPKESF.NTATlOif  VJSJOS'ARVM»-t»<W> 

oftco  occastoiis  fal&e  hopes,  fxl«c  reusonjn^s,  und  a  sys- 
tem or  measures  corrcspondifif;ly  crruncous.  But  even 
if  tliis  supposed  cxcesii  should  not  be  at  consequence  of 
the  limitation  of  the  federal  povcr  of  taxation,  the 
inequalities  spoken  of  would  still  ensue,  though  not  in  the 
»ame  degree,  from  the  other  causes  that  hare  been 
noticed.  Let  us  now  return  to  the  examiualion  of 
objections. 

One  which,  (f  we  rnny  fudge  from  the  frequency  of  ila  reperhion. 
seems  niost  to  he  relinl  on.  is  (hat  the  Hotiic  of  R#pre«cntalive( 
Sh  is  not  sufficiently  numerous  for  the  rvcrpiion  of  bII 

■».  St.  thi!  <lilifeiFn<  cla%tei  of  ciiitcni,  in  onlet  to  comtHiie 

live  interests  tuid  feelings  of  cvefy  paft  of  the  ■.-ommui'iiy  ii>d  to 
produce  a  due  syTnp.iihy  between  (he  teprc»entuUvc  body  an<l  it* 
constituents.  This  jvgument  presents  itself  under  a  veiy  ipeciriuf 
and  leducinic  furrn ;  and  is  well  calculated  la  lay  hold  of  t)ie 
prejudices  of  iliose  to  Mhoin  it  is  addressed.  But  when  we  come 
to  dissect  il  with  iitientioii.  it  wilt  appc.ir  li>  be  Tna<le  up  <>l  nothing 
but  fjiir-soiinding  worxis.  The  object  tl  seems  (o  aim  hi  is.  in  the 
6r4t  place,  impraclieahle,  and  in  the  ien*e  in  which  il  is  contended 
for  is  unn<^rtur)-.  1  reserve  lot  .-mother  pUce  the  discufsiofi  of 
the  <|u«ili(>ii  which  frUtes  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  rrpresetilative 
body  in  lespcct  to  numliets.  aitd  sliall  content  mywif  with  cKam- 
inins  hefc  the  panlciilai  use  winch  )ws  been  nvade  of  a  contrary 
su|»)iositiaii  in  reference  to  the  immediate  subject  of  out  inquiries. 

The  idea  of  an  actual  representation  of  nil  classes  of  the  people 
by  persons  of  each  class  is  nltofrether  risionary.  Unless  it  were 
eipressly  proviiled  in  the  Constiiution  (hat  each  diftcirnl  occupa- 
tion should  send  one  or  more  membef^,  the  thinj;  vrinild  never 
take  place  in  practice.  Mccluinles  aivd  nuinu(acturrr«  will  always 
he  Inclined,  with  few  exccplion<i.  tu  ]^ve  llieir  votes  to  inerchanis 
in  preference  to  persons  of  their  own  ptofrt^ni  oi  tcadrs.  TboM 
discerning  cilitensare  well  aware  lliat  (he  ntechanic  and  manufac- 
luring  arts  lurnish  (he  materials  of  mercantile  cnierprifie  and 
in<lustry.  Many  of  (hem.  indeed,  arc  imtncdiately  connccteil  with 
the  operations  of  commerce.  They  know  Ifiat  the  merchant  is  their 
natural  palron  and  friend ;  and  ihcy  are  aware  iliat.  howevcT  greal 
the  confidence  they  may  justly  feel  in  their  own  pood  sense,  their 
interests  can  he  more  eflcctualty  pronKXetl  by  the  mercbanl  than 
by  themselves.  They  are  senslMe  (h.it  their  liabiis  in  life  have  nM 
been  such  a*  to  give  them  those  ac<{Uirr<l  enilowinenis  wlihoul 
which,  in  a  deliberalive  assembly,  the  [rreaiest  natural  abilities  are 


StmUtonl 


TAXES  Oit  LAND. 


917 


(of  the  most  patl  uselm :  aixt  tliaC  lltf  influence  and  weiglit  anil 
superior  acqulicmrnts  of  llic  mcrchanis  rcndet  lli«n  more  rqual 
lnacont«<  with  any  spiril  which  might  liapprn  to  infuxe  ilielf  into 
the  puhtic  couneiK  unfricni)ly  lolhe  man u (a during  and  tradinn 
mirmift.  These  coovxIrraiionH.  anil  many  othirs  that  might  be 
mcniioneil.  prove,  and  experience  cnnfitms  it.  tlut  attivtiis  aitd 
manufActurcra  ^wllt  conimoni}'  lie  ilispuscd  to  bestow  llieir  ram 
npon  merchants  and  ihuic  wliam  they  rccommcnil.  We  miiM 
therefore  ennt-ider  ntcrchaiits  as  the  natural  representatives  of  all 
ibne  clasMt  of  Die  com  in  unity. 

With  nrgaril  to  the  trarned  professions  little  need  he  observed ; 
they  Irwiy  (onn  no  divtnct  interest  in  society,  ami.  accordii>f;  lo  their 
silualion  and  lalcnit.  will  be  imiiscriminalely  (he  objecis  of  Ibc 
eonlidence  ami  chuice  o(  each  other,  and  o(  other  [taris  o(  tlie  conn- 
munily. 

Nothing  remains  but  the  laitdcd  interest :  and  tl>is.  in  a  political 
ew.  and  jMriicularty  in  relation  to  taxes.  I  take  In  be  perfectly 
nii«l,  from  the  wealthiest  l.tmllord  down  to  the  poorest  tenant. 

I  tax  can  be  laid  on  land  whicli  will  not  itfTecl  tlie  |mf|ftie1or  of 
niOionx  of  acres  a«  well  as  the  proprietor  of  a  single  acre.  F.vrry 
bndhohter  will  iheTefore  have  a  common  inlereU  to  keep  the  taxes 
on  land  as  hyw  as  possible:  and  common  interest  may  always  be 
reckoned  upon  as  the  surest  bowl  of  sympathy.  But  if  la-e  even 
could  suppose  a  distinciion  o(  inlemi  between  the  o|mlem  land- 
tinliler  and  the  middling  fanner,  what  reason  is  there  lo  conclude 
that  the  first  msMild  xl.md  a  l>eltcr  chance  of  beint;  deputed  lo  tlie 
national  kgislalure  than  the  last?  If  we  take  lact  as  our  goidc, 
»nd  took  into  our  own  Scnnle  and  Auemlily.  we  shall  find  thai 
nxidrrate  pmprirtoni  of  land  prevail  in  both  ;  nor  is  this  less  the 
cue  in  llir  Senile,  which  consists  of  a  sm:tlteT  number,  th^tn  in 
(he  AsfieniMy.  which  is  composed  of  aKrcaIrr  nondier.  Where  the 
quaBticallons  of  the  electors  are  the  SJinie.  whether  they  have  to 
diofiKe  a  vnall  or  a  large  number,  their  voles  will  fall  u|>on  those 
in  whom  Ihcy  have  most  confMleiice.  whether  these  happen  to  be 
men  a(  targe  lortunes,  or  of  moderate  property,  or  of  no  pn>perty 
at  all. 

It  is  said  to  be  necessary  (hat  all  clasu^  o(  citiient  stiould  Itave 
_  pmc  of  their  own  number  in  (he  representative  body  in  order  (hat 
Ihar  feclini-s  and  inteiesls  may  t>e  the  better  understood  and  a(- 
tended  (o,  itui  we  have  seen  that  ihit  will  never  happen  under  any 
atrangemenl  that  leaves  the  vole*  of  (he  people  free.  Where  this 
it  the  case,  the  representative  body,  with  too  few  exceptions  lo 
hate  an)'  inAwnKe  on  the  spirit  of  the  govemnMni.  will  be  com- 


ai8         TAXATIOS  RP.qUHtF.S  KNOWLEDGE.    IIh.»(M> 


poMil  of  landholdctf,  merchaBts,  aiu!  men  o(  the  leatncd  piafc»- 
sions,  Bm  where  is  ilie  tUngtr  ilial  ili«  intFrcsts  atiil  (rcliiiK*  of 
ihe  ilitfcieiil  rlastct^  of  citticns  will  not  l>c  unclcmooif  ot  ntlcnilcd 
lo  l>>-  ihcsc  lliicc  ()cscrij>lion!>  of  men?  Will  not  the  Uiiilholder 
know  »ii<l  fcnl  wlintrvct  will  promutc  ot  iiiiurc  tlie  iiilcrcsl  of 
Undcd  pro|>cr(]r  f  Anil  will  lie  not.  Iroin  his  own  inicir&i  in  Uiai 
KpccicK  of  propetiy,  be  suflkienllj'  ptonv  lu  texoA  evety  alicmpi  to 
prejudice  or  eiicuniber  ii?  Will  not  the  merchanl  unilcretjnO  and 
be  dispoied  lo  cullivnte,  a>  far  as  may  be  ]MU|ier,  the  iiilcrcxlk  of 
the  mechiinic  and  minur^tciuriiig  aita.  lo  whicli  his  cofiiinctcc 
i*  so  ncjitly  allied?  Will  nol  llie  man  of  the  teuined  prufctxion, 
who  will  (eel  a  nctilrnliiy  lo  ihe  liv^Uhips  bctwcxn  the  difFcTcnt 
branclie*  of  induitiy.  be  tikcly  to  prove  ait  iiii|iartial  arbiter 
between  them ;  ready  to  promote  cither.  «o  far  as  it  sh.ill  appe^ir  lo 
him  conducive  lo  llie  general  ititeiesls  of  the  UKicly  ? 

If  wc  takcinio  ibeaccauni  the  ninmcntnt]- humors  or  dt»pos>tioiii 
which  nvty  luppcn  lo  prevail  in  patticutar  pant  of  the  wciety,  muI 
to  which  a  wise  ad iii in i^l ration  will  never  l>e  inalleotivc,  it  the  man 
wlioiic  Miuaiiun  lead*  to  extcnsii-c  inquiiy  and  inlorniaiiun  teM 
likdy  to  be  a  compeieiil  jodge  of  ilieit  iiauiie,  ettent.  and  (oiinda- 
liun  lliaii  one  whose  obH-iialion  dot>  not  travel  bej^nd  lite  circle 
of  hi»  neighbors  and  ac<|ii.iintancc«  ?  Is  il  not  natural  itiat  a  man 
wlio  tka  candidate  for  the  favor  ol  <hr  iieofili;.  and  wIm  is  depeiKl- 
ent  on  the  stitfi.iKn  »f  hiit  fellmv-ciliieiu  (oi  llic  continuaocp  ok 
Ilia  public  lioixxs,  should  lake  caic  to  inform  liimirll  of  iIkIi 
dispoiiiiont  and  inc)inalii>n*.  ami  sbuuUI  Ik  willing  to  allow  iIkoi 
tlieir  proper  degree  ol  tiiDiicnce  upon  hi&  cooditci  i  'I'hK  depend- 
ence, xnA  Ihe  necessity  ol  being  bouiitl  liiitinell.  and  liix  pouierity, 
by  Ihe  lawK  to  which  he  gives  his  aucni,  are  the  true  and  ilicy  are 
ihe  slronicdiords  of  sympathy  between  the  rcptci^nUlivx  and  llie 
constituent. 

Tlieie  is  no  pan  of  the  administr.ttion  of  gnvenitneni  that 
requires  extensive  information  and  a  lliornujjh  koowlrdap  o(  the 
pnnciplctof  political  economy  vo  tnuch  a«  the  bitMiies»  of  taaaiion. 
The  man  who  undcntandi  those  principles  bc*l  uill  be  least 
likely  to  report  to  opiKessirc  eipcdienis  or  to  vacnticeany  panlcu- 
lar  class  of  citizens  u>  llw  procurement  ol  revenue.  It  mixlu  be 
demonuralcd  ihai  the  most  piodiiclive  system  of  5iuncc  wiV 
always  tie  the  least  Iwideiisome.  There  c»i  be  no  duobt  ilul  h 
order  to  a  iuilicioii^  esejrisc  o(  llie  power  ot  l.iialinn,  il  i»  neces- 
sary that  the  person  in  whose  liands  11  tt  should  be  Koquiiinieil 
wilh  ihegrnei.il  genius,  habii«.  and  modes  ol  thinking  [<le 

at  large,  and  with  lite  icbouitcs  ol  (he  cuuntiy.    A>'  A\ 


1 


B«UtOR) 


MTUKF.SrS  OF  C1.ASSF.S. 


319 


V 


ihAt  can  be  TO.isomiWy  incnnl  by  *  knowleilgc  o(  th*  intcic»l»  and 
ItcJiii]^  □(  tiK  pcD|>le.  In  any  otli«r  »ei)»e  t)i«  ptopiuilian  has 
riltier  no  meaning  or  an  absurd  om.  And  tii  ihai  sense  lei  every 
teasiderale  cilieeii  Ju<l{;c  (or  hiiuMlI  wliere  tlie  requisJIe  quidificu- 
UPn  Is  most  lUicly  10  be  found. 

I'UBLIUS. 


No.  36  (34).     uv<w  i'lrt  Piin.  janiunr  >.  -ii*-)  HamiUoD. 

TAXATION    CONSIDERED    MORE    ESPECIALLY 
AS   REGAkUS   INTERNAL  TAXES. 

Tamlitn  /*r  tit  ktaifil  »/  individtiati — tSllli  afittitj  iitwttn 
paridMj  tiiiiin  e/  irtUty — Asirrliim  Ikal  lie  HBlim  (ainitl  etrrtiit  Ikt 
frmtr  •/  lajialieu  miih  luttAiiii^t —  Tit  tame  /vtutr  im  lit  linU  tt£i>t<t' 
iMitt —  Vinal ntthfJ rf  i^y*iS  '•>"'< — Intimal  taxtt  dividtd  iale  aiittt 
taJ  iitJirHl — lnJinitttxii  art  dHliti  and  txtiiti  tH  ttrlitUn/  tfnttimf. 
txtn-^lt  lajtni  Ihtu  Ihjiii  lit frimiful  titjal  mIkhIJ tt  It  awiJ  cfjt^li 
^tajf  l.iMtJ  tf  ftirttiutar  ilalfi —  Tbt  rfJttlinHi  ta  dirnl  laxfi — MttAnf 
r/  bjiKx  laud  laxti  ~  Tht  iMtifia  tjn  uit  lit  mtH.ti  rf  t«th  ttaU — 
Oirtil  taxet  utuil  if  af/vrtifiti/  ff  /v/u/atitit^  TAt  «#iiir  e/  dirttl 
*ufi  frvindtd  agaiHii  inii  gmardid  lirtntifttliMt — Fn-/viilifri  lAul 
lit  nalifH  ik.ill  crllt<t  atl iultrrtal  Mxti  ^y  ttfmiilieu — ImpeiiiHlitf  Ihal 
Itt  rnvituf  Utri  of  mlifti  and  ilaitt  teill  tlaii — A  imaU  land  Mm 
n/utml  /ft  tie  ilatn — Xjfntfri  raiind  en/  ■•/  tkit  pevrtr  cf  in/frual 
Htatiea — DimUt  trii  e/  f*ir  tMtiten — Prt^^Mt  imftefBiml  tf  lUlt 
tfitiali  —  UiitiMihtvJe/dmHi  ijxjiiiui — FM  taxii. 

Tf  the  Picpie  of  tht  State  0/  Nefo  York: 

We  Imvc  sccti  xhM  ific  Trt-till  of  the  olMMv-jiiiaiiB  lo  which  ibe 
b(c][<nng  nuiiil>vr  lias  been  principally  (tcvoled  is  iImi  from  lite 
■Ulan)  o|)CT3lioa  of  llic  diSvrcni  inlclesi»  3,n(\  views  ul  llic  v.iiioii« 
tUues  ol  like  comiiiuniiy,  wliethcr  the  rejifi-M-ntiilion  ut  llir  fimple 
be  more  of  less  nunmmit.  it  will  coitsisi  aintnst  witirely  i>( 
proprietor  of  land,  of  madianis.  and  of  meinbers  of  the  tentned 
professions,  who  will  truly  repreietit  all  those  tliffcrcin  inlcr«iift 
M»d  riews.  I(  It  shouUl  be  objected  that  we  luive  seen  other 
destripiiona  of  men  in  the  local  IcgiiiUtares.  1  .in%n-cr  (hat  it 
H  iflmitled  thcte  arc  cxccplioru  10  the  rule,  but  n»t  in  suflidenl 
nwnlicr  to  influence  ific  general  conipleaion  oc  chnrncicr  ol 
ihr  gavcrdijinit.  Tlirrr  flre  sliong  minds  tn  every  Wiillt  of 
life  that  will  rise  tupciior  to  lire  db^ulTania^-es  of  situalion,  and 


tiO 


CO,VFUCT  OF  REVENUE  LAWS.      SStt-^'Ui 


witi  command  the  tribute  due  lo  iheir  merit,  not  only  tram  the 
cliksSM  to  which  ihry  p.trticiibtlj-  hclonf;,  Itui  (nwn  l)ie  Mckty  in 
Krneral.  The  door  ouglit  to  be  oqualt)'  open  to  all ;  ami  1  trust. 
(or  the  credit  of  hum;in  naliirc.  that  w«  tlial)  ure  rxamptes  of  such 
vigototu  plants  llouiisFiiii^-  in  l)ic  \a\\  t>\  federates  well  m  o(  State 
legisUiion ;  but  dCcaKicmal  instances  of  this  sofi  will  not  render 
the  reasoning  loundcil  upon  lli«  general  course  of  llilng;s  lei» 
concliHivc. 

The  subject  might  be  ptaccJ  in  several  other  tigblt  that  woulil 
all  lead  lo  the  same  r«Milt ;  and  in  pariicul.ir  it  might  h«  asked. 
Wliui  greatef  afftniiy  or  reUiion  of  iiiterest  can  be  conceived  lie* 
twecn  the  carpenter  aiul  hlocksititlh,  and  the  linen  inanufactura'  or 
■toe knig- weaver,  than  between  the  mcrcliani  and  either  of  them  ? 
It  K(  notorious  (hat  tliere  are  often  as  ([real  rivalships  tielween 
different  branches  of  (he  ntecbanic  or  manufacturing  aMs  as  tlierc 
are  between  any  vA  the  deparlniciils  of  labor  and  imiutlry;  so 
thai,  Uidess  the  reprcsentalivr  body  were  lo  be  (al  more  numeroul 
than  wouki  lie  consilient  « illi  any  idea  of  regularity  or  wiwlom  in 
its  deliberations,  it  b  impaMiblc  that  what  scents  lo  )te  the  ipini 
of  the  objection  we  liave  1>een  consideiinf;  should  ei-er  be  realiied 
fn  practice.  But  1  forl>cAr  to  dwell  any  longer  on  a  matter  witich 
has  hitherto  worn  too  loose  a  garb  to  admit  ereii  of  an  accurate 
taspeclion  o(  its  real  «luipe  or  tendency. 

There  is  another  objection  of  a  somewhat  more  precise 
nature  that  claim»  our  attention.  It  lias  been  asserted 
that  a  power  of  internal  taxation  in  the  national  lejcisla- 
tttrc  could  never  be  exercised  with  advantage,  as  wetl  from 
the  want  of  a  sufficient  knowledge  of  local  circunisUnceit, 
as  from  an  interference  between  the  revenue  laws  of  the 
Union  atid  of  the  particntar  States.  'I'he  siippnsitiKn  of 
a  want  of  proper  knuwle<lge  teems  to  be  entirely  deslt- 
tat«  of  foundation.  If  any  question  is  depending  in  a 
Stjite  legislature  respecting  one  of  the  (-onnitc?,  whldi 
demands  a  Icnowledjce  of  local  detail^  l>ow  is  it  acquired? 
No  doubt  from  the  information  of  the  members  of  the 
county.  Cannot  the  like  knowledge  be  obtained  in  the 
national  legi«laturc  from  the  representatives  of  each 
State?  And  is  it  not  to  be  presumed  that  the  men  who  will 
generally  be  sent  there  will  be  possessed  of  the  necessary 
degree  of  intelligence  to  be  able  to  comaiunic4ite  thai 
information?    Is  iheknowledgcuf  local  turcumstanccs, as 


lunilUBl      INTERtfAL   TAXES  OF  TWO  K/.VDS. 


771 


applied  to  taxatian,  a  minute  topoi^raphical  acquiintance 
with  all  tfic  mountains,  rivers,  streams,  highwa'.'s,  and 
bjrpaths  in  ucli  State;  or  is  it  a  general  aci|iiniiitan<re 
viih  its  situation  and  resources;  with  the  state  of  its 
agriculture,  commerce,  manufactures;  with  the  nature 
of  its  products  and  c>n»Hmplt«ns;  with  the  diHcrcnt 
degrees  and  kinds  of  its  wealth,  property,  and  industry.* 

Nations  in  general,  even  under  governments  of  the 
more  popular  kind,  usually  commit  the  administration  of 
their  finance*  to  single  men  or  to  tioards  composed  of  a 
few  imlividtials,  who  digest  and  pre|varc  in  the  first  in- 
stance the  plans  of  taxation  which  arc  afterwards  [KiKSed 
into  laws  t>y  the  authority  of  the  sovereign  or  legislature. 

Inquisitive  and  enlightened  statesmen  arc  deemed 
vcrjrwhcrc  best  qualifted  to  make  a  judicious  selection  of 
ohject*  i>roper  fxr  revenue;  which  is  a  clear  indica* 
tion,  as  far  as  the  sense  of  mankind  can  have  weight  in 
^thc  question,  of  the  species  of  knowledge  of  local  circum- 
lances  requisite  !■>  the  purposes  of  taxation. 

The  uixe*  intended  to  be  comprised  under  the  general 
denomination  of  internal  taxes  may  be  subdivided  into 
■m  thOM  of  the  direet '  and  those  of  the  imtirect 

lot.  13,91.  kind.  Though  the  objection  be  made  to  both, 
jret  the  reasoning  upon  it  seems  to  be  confined  to  the 
former  branch.  And  indeed,  as  to  the  Utter,  by  which 
must  be  aoderslood  duties  and  exci&es  on  articles  of  con> 
sumption,  one  is  at  a  loss  to  conceive  what  can  be  the 
nature  of  the  difficulties  a(>prehended.  The  knowledge 
relating  to  them  must  evidently  be  of  a  kind  thai  will 
either  be  suggested  by  the  nature  of  the  article  itself,  or 
can  eaUly  be  procured  from  any  well-informed  man,  espe- 

■  li  U  (M^milni;  (i>  iiM*.  Is  eofinM-ilnn  with  the  recent  mnddle- 

lMdailn<^t  ••  I"  Ihr  iti9«itn«  t>Pl«c»ii  ilirecl  mid  nutirttt  liim,  Ihal 
iamihcKi,  in   7'ke    IiJftaiiit.  inii  ihe  clrimt   <Nslin':tii'n  ;   liul  laMr, 

icn  the  |[oTeniiii«al  Kmghl  lo  prcn'c  ihit  ■  tai  on  csiiitRct  w»  inrii. 

t.  hi*  tificf  VIS  llie  irKunent  whicli  k<1  the  courl  In  Ulie  Ihil  liew. 
Hid  the  }iii|>tTiBe  t.'onit  Uld  aittlc  ihe  ilcliBltlun*  t^  "illretl"  Isioi 
(rna  hy  ihr  i1icii<w)iiy  md  liy  ihc  |>olilicil  ccononiiiii.  it  rfim  noi  wen 
fOHJlile  thai  Ihey  miil'l  hivf  been  \ane,  >n  ilflnhl  at  In  vhat  an  incm»* 
ut  nil  aodtt  Ike  c»ntii<iiikin  ;  and  Ibey  wonid  mtiely  have  atmt  to 
tkcir  fint,  lodeciwin,  and  lo  the  dhciedilaUIe  revcnal  nhich  foU»ir«d  w 


laa 


LASD   TAXES. 


CH«.  M  IMf 


cially  of  ihe  mercantile  clau.  Tlic  cifcuni!itaiice»  thai 
may  clistingutsh  its  situation  in  one  State  from  its  situa- 
tion in  anotlivr  must  i>c  few,  sim)>lc,  and  easy  to  be  com- 
prc!)eii<leii.  Tlie  [}rini-i|Ml  thinj;  to  be  atleiido]  to  would 
be  to  avoid  tlio&c  articles  whicli  had  been  previously  ap- 
propriated to  the  use  of  a  particular  Stale;  and  there 
could  be  n»  difficulty  in  ascenaintnjjc  the  revenue  system 
of  each.  This  could  always  be  known  from  ihc  respective 
codes  of  laws,  as  well  as  from  the  information  of  ilic  mem- 
berk  from  the  several  States. 

The  objeirlion,  when  applied  to  real  property  or  to 
houses  and  lands,  appears  to  liavc.  at  first  sight,  more 
(cnmdalion,  but  even  in  this  view  it  will  not  be;ir  a  close 
ciaminatioH.  l-tnd  \at\c%  are  commonly  laid  in  one  of 
two  modes,  cither  by  atttuU  valuations,  permanent  or 
[>erio<lical,  or  by  <vc>fw>«tf/a!(«essnients,  at  the  discretion, 
or  according  to  the  best  judf-mcnl,  of  certain  officers 
whose  duty  it  is  to  make  (hem.  In  cither  case,  (he  t.xv.' 
CUTIOK  of  the  business,  which  alone  rc(|uircs  the  knowl- 
ed^  of  local  details,  must  be  devolved  upon  discreet 
person*  in  the  charai:lcr  of  commisaioiwrs  or  assessors, 
elected  by  ihc  people  or  appointed  by  ihe  government  fur 
the  purpose.  All  that  (be  law  can  do  must  be  to  name 
the  per.tons  or  to  prescribe  the  manner  of  their  election 
or  appointment,  to  fix  their  numbers  and  qualifications, 
and  to  dr^w  the  general  outlines  of  their  powers  nml 
duties.  .-Vnd  what  is  there  in  all  (his  that  cannulas  well 
be  performed  by  the  national  Icgishiturc  as  by  a  State 
legislature?  The  attention  of  either  can  only  reach  to 
general  principles;  local  details,  as  already  observed, 
must  be  referred  to  those  who  are  to  execute  the  plan. 


'Iiriukly  M)<no  it.  A*  nvllincl  in  lli«  inlKxIiKlMiii,  llic  natluiial  CKafacI 
tm  a  ploJf  (•  of  hit  dMlinj;  id  iKo  inin<nii]r>  I'b*  "  'litTcl "  lu  cIm«>* 
n-jH|Kit  «i  lhik<i»reuii(.  in  uconluicc  siih  thr  iiiicnii'.in  uf  ihi-  Iiamcn 
thu  xij  !■!  whkk  could  h«  terial  unclumr-r  trnuMin,  ft  mntlivr  woriti, 
Ihal  txxi  Ui  wlikth  omIiI   lie  mcil   •llki:rtni  i   <  Il-iu 

nil   tc>iii«   «ntl   liol  on  iitlKn>.  Uiualil   lie    '  to 

iwerenl  thii  vtrty  <liu.*t<>ninali'>ii.     Oiion  il..^  .-  ....■.;   !-■■■  ..:.ii)« 

<|iieMHi»  it  niercljr  "  li  the  inconiB  tax  a  liu  kviF'l  liy  a  nixi-f>axin|; 
■■■ajnniy  oil  Uic  iniiuiTlty  ^"  aodiu  cDoMitutioiul  upcn  it  oIitkiu. — 
Umvok. 


1 


BuUlioBl 


aKiFo/m/ry  or^  iuposts. 


«a3 


But  there  is  a  simple  point  of  view  in  which  this  matter 
may  be  placed  that  must  be  altogether  saltKfucior)'.  The 
n;ilt(in;il  l<:gi«l:iture  euu  mulcc  u»e  uf  the  system  c/  each 
State  witfiiu  that  Stale.  The  method  of  Laying  and  col- 
lecting this  species  of  taxes  in  each  State  can,  i»  alt  its 
pans,  be  adopted  and  employed  by  the  federal  gov- 
ernment. 

Let  it  be  recollected  that  the  proportion  of  these  taxes 
is  not  to  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  national  legisla- 
tore,  but  is  to  be  determined  by  the  numbers  of  each 
State,  as  described  in  the  second  section  o(  the  first  arti- 
cle. An  actual  census  or  en uine ration  of  the  people  muKt 
furnish  the  rule;  a  circumstance  which  effectually  shuts 
(lie  door  to  partiality  or  oppression.  The  abuse  of  this 
|Mj«cr  of  taxation  seems  to  have  been  provided  ai^ainst 
■ith  guarded  circumspection.  In  addition  to  the  pre- 
caution just  mentioned,  there  is  a  provision  that  "  all 
duties,  imposts,  and  excises  shall  be  umfokm  throughout 
the  United  States." 

It  has  been  rery  properly  observed,  by  different 
speakers  and  writers  on  the  side  of  the  Constitution,  that 
if  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  internal  taxation  by  the 
Union  should  be  discovered  on  experiment  to  be  really 
iiieonrenient,  the  federal  government  may  then  forbear 
the  use  of  it  and  have  recourse  to  reiiuiNitions  in  its 
stead.  By  way  of  answer  to  this  it  has  been  trium- 
phantly asked,  Why  not  in  the  first  instance  omit  that  am- 
biKuous  power,  and  rely  upon  the  latter  resource?  Two 
sulid  answers  may  be  given.  The  first  is  that  the  excr- 
cUe  uf  th;it  power,  if  convenient,  will  be  preferable 
bci::au9c  It  witl  bc  morc  ellcctual;  and  it  is  impossible  to 
prove  in  theory,  or  otherwise  than  by  the  experiment, 
that  it  cannot  be  advant:ig;eou8ly  exercised.  The  con. 
trary,  indeed,  appears  most  probable.  The  second 
answer  is  tliat  the  existence  of  such  a  power  in  the  (^on* 
stilution  will  have  a  strong  inDuencc  in  giving  efficacy  to 
requisitions.  When  the  States  know  that  the  Union  can 
apply  itself  willioul  ihcir  agency,  It  will  be  a  powerful 
rauiirc  for  exertion  on  their  part. 


a»4  SPECTES  OF  DOUBLE   TAXATION.      tHo.M.a* 

As  to  the  inWrference  of  the  revenue  laws  of  the 
Union  and  of  its  members,  wc  have  already  seen  that 
there  c^n  he  no  cbithing  or  repugnancy  of  authority. 
The  laws  cannot,  therefore,  in  a  legal  sense,  interfere 
with  each  other;  and  it  is  far  from  impossihle  to  avoid 
an  interference  even  in  the  policy  of  their  different  sys- 
tems. An  efTcctual  expedient  for  this  purpose  will  be, 
mutually  to  abstain  from  those  objects  whieh  either  side 
may  have  first  had  recourse  to.  As  neither  can  tontrol 
the  other,  each  will  have  an  obvious  and  sensible  interest 
in  this  reciprocal  forbearance.  And  where  there  is  an 
immediaU  common  interest,  we  may  safely  count  upon  its 
operation.  When  the  particular  debts  of  the  States  are 
done  away,  and  their  expenses  come  to  be  Umited  within 
their  natural  compass,  the  possibility  almost  of  inter* 
Terence  will  vanish.  A  small  land-tax  will  answer  the 
purpose  of  the  States,  and  will  be  tlieir  most  simple  and 
most  fit  resource. 

Many  specters  have  lieen  raised  out  of  litis  power  of 
internal  taxation  to  excite  the  apprehensions  of  the 
people:  double  sets  of  revenue  officers,  a  duplication  of 
tiietr  burdens  by  double  Uxations,  aiul  the  frightful 
forms  of  odious  and  oppressive  poll-taxes,  have  been 
played  off  with  all  the  ingenious  dexterity  of  political 
legerdemain. 

As  to  the  first  point,  there  are  two  cases  in  which  there 
can  be  no  room  for  double  sets  of  of&cers:  one,  where 
the  right  of  imposing  the  tax  is  exclusively  vested  in  the 
Union,  which  applies  to  the  duties  on  imports;  the  other, 
where  the  object  has  not  fallen  undc^r  any  State  regula- 
tion or  provision,  which  may  be  applicable  to  a  variety 
of  objects.  In  other  cases,  the  probability  is  that  the 
United  States  will  either  wholly  abstain  from  the  objects 
preoccupied  for  tocil  purpotes,  or  will  make  use  of  the 
State  officers  and  State  reguLaliuns  for  collecting  the  ad' 
ditional  imposition.  This  will  best  answer  the  views  4( 
revenue,  because  it  will  save  expense  In  the  collection, 
and  will  best  avoid  any  occasion  of  disgust  to  the  State 
governments  and  to  the  people.     At  aJl  «vents>  here  (■ 


BuUlMl 


COMMEKCtAt  /.t/fOSrS. 


"S 


a  practicable  expedient  for  avoiillnf;  such  an  inconveni- 
ence; and  nothing  more  can  be  required  than  to  show 
tliat  evils  predicted  do  not  necessarily  result  from  the 
plan. 

As  to  anjr  argument  derived  from  a  supposed  system  of 
influence,  it  is  a  sulhcicnt  answer  to  s»y  that  it  ought  not 

be  presumed;  but  the  supposition  i»  susceptible  of  a 

lore  precise  answrcr.  If  such  a  spirit  should  infest  the 
councils  of  the  Union,  the  most  certain  rond  to  the  ac- 
complishment of  its  aim  would  be  to  employ  the  .State 
officers  as  much  as  possible,  and  to  attach  Ihcm  to  the 
Union  by  an  accumulation  ol  their  cmoluineiiis.  This 
Would  serve  to  turn  the  tide  of  State  influence  into  the 
channels  of  the  national  government,  instead  of  making 
federal  influence  flow  in  an  opposite  »nd  adverse  current. 
But  all  suppositions  of  this  kind  arc  invidious,  and  ought 
to  be  banished  from  the  consideration  of  the  great  iiues- 
tiun  before  the  people.  They  <;>in  answer  no  other  end 
than  to  cast  a  mist  over  the  truth. 

As  to  the  suggestion  of  double  taxation,  the  answer  is 
plain.  The  wants  of  the  Union  arc  to  be  supplied  in  one 
vay  or  another;  if  to  be  done  by  the  authority  of  the 
federal  government,  it  will  not  be  to  be  done  by  that  of 
ihc  State  government.  The  t|uantity  of  tases  lu  be  paid 
by  the  community  must  be  the  same  in  cither  case;  with 
this  advantage,  if  the  provision  is  to  be  made  by  the 
Union — that  the  capiul  resource  of  commercial  imposts, 
which  is  the  roost  convenient  branch  of  revenue,  can  be 
prudently  improved  to  a  much  greater  extent  under 
federal  than  under  Sutc  regulation,  and,  of  course,  will 
render  it  less  necessary  to  recur  to  more  inconvenient 
methods;  and  with  this  further  advantage,  that  as  far  as 
diere  may  be  any  real  difScuIly  tn  the  exercise  o(  the 
power  of  internal  taxation,  it  will  impose  a  disposition  to 
greater  care  in  the  choice  and  arrangement  of  the  means; 
and  must  naturally  tend  to  make  it  a  lixed  point  of  policy 
in  the  national  administration  to  go  as  far  as  may  be 
I'ractirable  in  making  the  luxury  of  the  rich  tributary  to 
the  public  treasury,  in  order  to  diminish  the  necessity  of 


2)6 


POt.L.TAXhS. 


IV».H<3<) 


those  ini|>ositiuns  which  might  create  dis&ntisfaction  in 
the  |)oi)rer  and  inost  numerous  classes  of  (he  society. 
Happy  it  is  when  the  interest  which  the  guvvrnmcnt  has 
in  llic  prcsrrvatiwn  uf  its  uwu  power  cunci(li-s  with  a 
proper  (Jitiriliutioii  of  the  public  burdens,  and  tends  to 
gfuard  the  least  wealthy  part  of  the  community  from 
oppression ! 

Ak  tt>  poll  taxes,'  I  wiihoMt  scruple  confess  my  dt<uip- 
probatiou  «( (hem;  aoiJ  (hough  ihey  have  prevailed  from 
an  early  period  in  those  States  *  which  have  uniformly 
been  (he  most  tenacious  of  their  rights,  I  should  lament 
to  sec  ihem  introduced  into  practice  under  the  national 
govcrnmcni.  Dot  docs  it  follow,  bcrHiuse  there  is  a 
power  to  lay  them,  that  they  will  aciiially  be  laid?  Every 
State  in  the  Union  has  power  to  impose  taxes  of  this 
kind;  and  yet  in  several  of  them  they  are  unknown  in 
pniciice.  Arc  the  State  jjoveritments  to  be  sligmaliired  at 
tyrannies  becauite  they  pusscM  this  power?  If  they  are 
not,  with  wliat  propriety  can  the  like  power  justify  such 
a  charge  against  the  nnlional  goTcrniDcnt,  or  even  be 
urge<l  as  an  obstacle  to  its  adoption?  As  little  friendly 
39  I  am  to  the  species  of  imposition,  I  still  feel  a  thoroufih 
conviction  that  the  power  of  having  recourse  to  it  uoght 
to  exist  in  the  federal  governmeiil.  There  are  certain 
emergencies  of  nations,  in  which  expedients,  Ihai  in  i!ic 
ordinary  state  of  things  ought  to  be  fortwrne.  become 
essential  to  the  public  weal.  AihI  the  government,  from 
the  possibility  of  such  emergencies,  ought  ever  to  have 
Ihr  option  of  making  use  of  (hem.  The  real  scart-i(y  of 
objects  in  this  country,  which  nwy  be  considered  as  pro- 
duc(iTc  sources  of  revenue,  is  a  reason  peculiar  to  itself 
for  not  abridging  the  discretion  of  the  national  councils 
in  tht!t  respect.  There  may  exist  certain  critical  and 
tempi'stiions  conjunctures  nf  the  Stale,  in  which  a  pi-'H'- 
tax  may  become  an  inestimable  rovource.  And  as  I  hnoir 
oothinK  to  exempt  this  portion  of  ihe  globe  from  the 

'St*  ankle  oil  l-oll  tu.  hj  W  C.  FwJ.  In  [.akit'a  "  Cyclo|Mdu  U 
PuDUnl  Sdra^"— BbiiOK. 


MUbsnl        PIFFICVLTIES  OF  COXfeyr/OX. 


common  L-jlamitics  that  hare  I)«f;illi;n  i»tlicr  parts  uf  it,  I 
acknowliNlgf  my  aversion  to  every  projcti  that  is  calcu* 
laled  to  tltsarm  tlic  guvcrnniciit  ut  a  single  weapon  which, 
in  any  possible  coniintccncy,  might  be  u)»:[ulty  employed 
far  the  general  defense  and  security, 

1  have  now  gone  through  the  examination  of  such  of 
the  powers  proposed  to  be  vested  in  the  United  Stjites 
ffhich  may  be  considered  as  having  an  immediate  relation 
to  the  energy  of  the  government;  and  have  endeavored 
lu  answer  the  principal  objections  which  have  been 
made  to  them,  i  have  passed  over  in  silence  Ibose  minor 
authorities  wlitcli  ;ire  either  too  inconsiderable  to  hare 
been  tliouKht  worthy  of  the  liosiiliiics  of  the  opponcntH 
of  the  Constitution,  or  of  too  manifirst  propriety  to  admit 
»if  controversy.  The  mass  of  judiciary  power,  however, 
iniKhi  liaveclaimed  aa  investigation  under  this  head,  had 
it  not  been  for  the  conntderation  that  its  organization 
ind  its  extent  may  he  more  advantageously  considered  in 
connection.  This  has  determined  me  to  refer  it  to  the 
branch  uf  uur  itiquiricfi  upon  which  we  sliatt  next  enter. 

Publics. 


No.  37  I36).        iO^lly AJnrttirr. imian  ir.trO.) 


Madison. 


DIFFiCUI.TIKS   OF    TIIK    CONVKNTION    IN 

FRAMING   A   CONSTITUTION. 


Dificmltf  tf  itittHinng  fiiHir  ifamrri  in  Iki  rigkl  $firi$~^Prf 
ittirmiHlJ  frinni$  and  furmitl — 7''tf  FlJfntllll  <iJJrtlttJ  tf  mtilhtt, 
hit  A>  tkjtr  Mfka  \riik  mtrtSy  Ikt  iapfiiarn  •>/  tkf  manlry — Xrtvlly 
n/  •Bfii<tiltirt  tf  Ihf  tfork  ptintfJ  out —  Thf  tuftitilutmt  «/  Htttiiity 
tut  pnfrit,  t«l  Ikt  tmntnli^H  nvrtfJ  teitiimt  farfy  fetttHg,  am/  alt 
^rrtJiHaHy  tafiiJltJ. 

Totkt  Ptpfieoftht  RMeof  New  Yark: 

In  reviewing  the  defects  of  the  existing  Confederation, 
and  showing  that  ihry  rannol  be  supplied  by  a  govern- 
nent  of  less  eflcruy  than  that  before  the  public,  several 
of  the  most  important  principles  of  the  latter  fell  of  course 


ai8  SPIKir  OF  MODERATIOft.  «•.«»» 

under  consideration.  But  as  the  iiltimnte  object  of  iheM 
papers  is  to  determine  clearly  and  fully  the  merits  of  (his 
Constitution,  and  the  expediency  of  adopting  it,  our  plan 
cannot  be  complete  witbuut  taking  a  more  critical  and 
thorou}:h  survey  of  the  work  of  (he  convention;  without 
examining  it  on  all  its  sides,  comparing  it  in  all  its  parts, 
and  calculating  its  probable  elfcctK. 

That  this  Tcmaining  ta^  may  be  ciccutrfl  uiifter  impreSHiont 
conducive  loajuil  hikI  fair  mull.  M>int?  irtlFCUuDJ  muM  (II  lhi» 
place  be  indulged,  which  canilor  pterioiuly  suggc«l>. 

ll  is  a  luislonunc  inseparable  front  human  aflahs  thai  public 
measures  are  tardy  invetiigaicd  with  iliai  &|>int  af  moderation 
wliich  is  evscntial  to  a  just  mimaic  uf  iherr  real  icndeikcy  lo 
adrance  or  olMlrucI  the  public  good  :  and  Ihoi  ihut  spirit  is  moie 
api  la  be  diminlslu-d  than  promoted  l>y  those  occasions  which 
lequtre  an  unuiaal  exercise  of  tl.  To  those  who  have  been  led  by 
experience  lo  allcnd  )o  t!ii»  consideration,  ii  could  not  appear  stir- 
prtsinK  that  the  act  of  the  conventHui,  which  rccomnicnds  so  many 
inipori.mt  changes  and  iniiovaiions,  which  may  tie  viewed  in 
so  many  tighls  and  relations,  and  which  touches  ihe  sprinf^  n(  «o 
inaoy  pj>.«ions  anil  fnieresls.  »liout'l  liitd  oi  ricilc  divpo^ilions 
unfriemil)'.  boili  un  one  miIc  and  on  the  other,  la  a  l:tir  iliscusiuon 
and  nccuntic  judgntent  of  its  merits.  In  some  it  hss  been  loo 
evidenl.  front  their  own  ptdtlicatMtis,  that  they  hare  scanned  the 
proposcti  Const ilHlion.  not  only  with  a  piedt^posiikm  lo  cenwit. 
but  with  a  predetcmiination  to  condemn  :  as  ilic  language  hetil  by 
others  betrays  nn  opposite  predeicrtni nation  or  bias.  «hich  must 
render  their  apiniuni  atio  ul  little  momeni  in  lite  ijurstion.  In 
placing,  however,  these  diffrreni  chainclri!;  on  a  trvrt.  wiih  respect 
to  the  vreight  ol  their  opinron*,  1  nish  not  lo  inainu^it^  ilui  ilieie 
m»y  not  lie  ■  niateTi.il  diffrrenc*'  in  the  purity  of  ihrtr  inteniioos. 
ll  (1  ImiI  ;uu  tu  iimi.irk.  in  favor  of  ilie  I.ilter  description,  thai  as 
our  situation  is  uiiivcTullyailmillcd  to  bn  prculinrly  critical,  and  la 
require  nxlitipFnuihly  that  sotocthing  should  b«  doite  foi  our  letiel, 
the  predetermined  p^ition  rA  wh.ii  hn»  hrrn  aciunlly  done  may  hare 
taken  his  bias  (rotn  the  weight  of  these  consider al  ions,  as  well 
as  from  conSMkralions  of  a  simMcr  nrtiure.  The  prprlpiertnlned 
ailversary,  on  ihe  other  hand,  csn  have  been  gmeriicil  by  no 
Ten>.^l  motive  whatever.  The  inicntiuns  ol  Ihe  linii  may  lie  up- 
right. »»  ihey  may.  on  the  lonirary,  be  Cidpahle.  Tl>«?  views  of 
the  Ust  cannot  br  uiiriKhl,  .imt  niiiit  b<r  culpahk.  But  the  inith 
M  Ihal  these  papers  are  not  3.iiAxe\\et\   In  |u-iM>n»  fjltntg   nii 


ENERGY  IN  GOVERNMENT. 


>I9 


titbcr  of  (hne  c)ur:icten.  Thcf  solicit  the  altcniioo  of  ihotK  only 
who  add  to  a  sincere  t»l  (or  the  luppincu  ol  itirir  country  a 
icinper  (Hvoiahlc  Co  s  juwl  Mlimale  of  the  racaos  of  pTomoIin);  it. 

fenion«  ol  this  chitMier  will  proceed  to  an  eiitmiitalion  o(  the 
pUn  Bubniiiied  by  ihe  coni-ention.nol  only  wiihuut  s dUposiiion  to 
find  or  to  magnify  fjulit.  but  will  see  the  propiiciy  ol  icflccimg 
ikit  a  faultiest  j>Uri  wai  not  to  be  expected.  Nor  will  ttiey  biuvly 
make  allourancci  lor  ihc  errors  which  may  be  ciiargc.iblc  on  ihc 
Uilibility  to  which  the  convention,  an  a  body  u(  men.  n-eic  lUble  ; 
InU  will  kce^i  in  mind  thai  they  themselves  also  arr  but  tiK-n  and 
oaghi  not  to  auuine  iin  inlatlibilily  in  rejudgiog  tlic  hlliblc 
opinions  ol  others. 

With  equal  readiness  will  it  be  pnceived  that,  besides  thne 
nihicententa  to  cindor,  many  allowance;*  ought  to  be  miide  lor  the 
difficulties  inherent  in  the  very  naiurc  ol  the  undcrtahing  referred 
to  the  convention. 

The  novelty  o(  the  undeiiaking  immediaicly  strikes  us.  It  has 
been  shown  in  the  course  of  Ibc^e  papers  that  the  existing  Cun- 
Icderaiion  is  founded  on  principle  which  are  fallacious:  that  we 
must  consequently  chanj^e  this  lintt  foundation,  and  with  il  ihe 
supcrstiuciurc  icfting  upon  it.  li  has  been  shown  that  the  other 
confedemcies  which  could  be  consulted  as  precedents  hare  lieen 
vitiated  by  titc  sNn>c  erroneous  principles,  and  cnn  therefore  furnish 
■to  aiber  lijihl  than  th.tt  of  be.icons.  which  give  warning  of  the 
coane  10  be  shunned  wtihout  pointing  out  thai  which  ought  to  be 
pursued.  The  incMi  that  the  convention  could  do  in  such  a  situa- 
tion was  to  at-oid  the  orrora  suggested  by  the  past  experience  ol 
Oikcr  countnes.  as  well  as  ol  our  own  ;  and  to  provide  a  convenient 
mode  of  rectifying  their  own  cirois.  as  future  experience  may 
•iiilold  then), 

Amuns  the  difficulties  eiKOuntcrcd  by  the  convention 
a  very  important  one  must  hare  lain  in  combining  the 
i«)utsiti^  stability  ami  energy  in  covcrnmenl  with  the 
inviobbk  altentton  due  to  liberty  and  to  the  republican 
form.  Without  substantially  3(.x»ni {dishing  this  part  of 
tbeir  utKlertaking,  they  woultl  liave  very  itupcrfectly  ful- 
filled the  object  o(  their  appointment  or  the  expectation 
r  ol  the  public;  yet  that  it  could  not  be  easily  acco.n- 
I  plishcd  will  be  denied  by  no  one  who  is  unwilling  tn 
I  betray  his  ignoraace  of  the  subject.  Energy  in  govcm- 
I  ment  is  essi^ntial  to  that  security  against  external  and 
1 ^internal  danger,  and  to  that  prompt  and  salutary  exci  U' 


330  MUTABLE  tf.GlSLATlOM  ODIOUS.      iKo.W^Mi 

tion  of  tlic  laws  which  enter  into  the  very  definition  of 
good  government.  Stability  in  government  is  essential 
to  national  character  and  to  the  adrantagcs  annexed  to 
it,  as  well  as  to  that  repose  and  confidence  in  the  minds 
of  the  people,  which  are  among  the  chief  blcs»intfs  of 
civil  society.  An  irregular  and  mutable  legislation  is  not 
more  an  evil  in  itself  tlian  it  is  odious  to  the  people;  and 
it  mity  be  pronotincetl  with  assurance  that  the  people  of 
this  country,  enlightened  as  they  are  with  regard  to  the 
nature,  and  interested,  as  the  great  body  of  (hem  are,  in 
the  effects  of  good  government,  will  never  be  satisfied  till 
some  remedy  be  applied  to  the  vicissitudes  and  uncer- 
tainties which  characterize  the  State  administralions. 
On  comparing,  however,  these  valuable  ingredicnl) 
with  the  vital  principles  of  liberty,  we  must  perceive 
at  once  the  difficulty  of  mingling  them  together  in  tbeii 
due  proportions.  The  genius  of  rcpuhtican  litwriy 
seems  to  demand  on  one  side,  not  only  that  all  power 
should  be  derived  from  the  people,  but  that  those 
intrusted  with  it  should  be  kept  in  dependence  on  the 
people,  by  a  short  duration  of  their  appointmentx;  and 
that,  even  during  this  short  period,  the  tru^t  should  be 
placed  not  in  a  few  but  a  number  of  hands.  Stability, 
on  the  contrary,  retiuires  that  the  hands  in  which  power  is 
lodged  should  continue  for  a  length  uf  time  the  same.' 

'  Bj^hoi  ("  The  Enelith  Can«iitut!oii.''74)  »];uc«  ihx  *'"  ■•-'■illtj 
li9*olr«ci  in  ■  lixrd  term  iil  office  it  a  i:rnl  d«(«t  in  llir  1  ^'-n 

|;vrciiiin«ni,  u  comiMml  wilb  \\\aX  of  U«iit  Onliiii.  wImt^  .tiy 

cia  be  tumeil  oul  at  luy  inomcRl.  aixl  *.  ocw  I'ailiaiMrDt  ubiamni.  A* 
S  ■itllet  oJ  l*i'l,  the  twii  vjiktemi  urn  iia«  w>  (u  oiml  ia  prartiiv  ih  the/ 
uc  lu  |iWii>;i|ile.  f'»  Ihc  AiiMri-:ai<   r«-,itrw"l»tin.  I.?  ti--;  ire 

RCpiwiire  lo  publk  opinion,  an.  in  iiDjr  iTiliial  muioriit.  I  .">n 

loaoconl  with,  gt  al  kait  wit  U>opp«te,  the  tiron|;I|r  nivf"-  i  -  m  ■■\  [i« 
co«Mitiical«.  Uwt  even  ErsMi(i|f  ilui  (be  AmerKan.  ihioueh  hit  hied 
lena,  ii  nioic  liidc«nileiii  ot  tke  nitar  llun  blk  KmuIiA  tr-Jthi,  a  oot* 
r«ti|i»niliii|;  )-aiii  n  hri  )-mtar  iwteiwiiiilaitc*  in  nllivr  miKL-U.  Il 
»  veli  knoirn  Ihii  Ihe  miniiin'  in  Enslantl  can  "  wlijii '  mmlien 
Oif  their  own  panj  into  siip|>aTtin|:  itnluIeFBl  meaHire*  Iil  the  thraal 
of  )>uttlii|;  IbnE  nentlien  In  l)ic  ei^icnie  aia.!  rUk  t>l  a  e<^iienl  drc- 
liMu  More  ttiikinj;  nlilL  it  i!jr  li^t  \h%\  Ih^*  <nlfii\lrv  to  ilrraJ  Uiih  p*4tl< 
hiXilf  lA  bei»i;  viiteil  mil  ol  oflit*etbit  lh*yciMiil*iill)r  yiold  pninli  n^nd 
ibetr  amn  oonatukini.  lo  the  cxicat  ctch  oI  ontUihliiq^  the  tnuram  at  lh« 
oy^otiajt  ^tij.  m»  (of  iiiuaucc  nheo  die  Mtt  eileiuUHMut  iJie  Inndilwr 


IMIml 


DURATION  OF  POWER. 


aji 


A  frequent  cliangc  of  men  will  result  fruin  a  frequent 
retuiD  of  elections,  and  a  (re(|ucnt  change  of  measures 
frgm  a  frequent  change  of  mcp;  whilst  energy  in  govern- 
ment requires  not  onljT  a  certain  iluration  of  power,  but 
tbc  execution  of  it  by  a  itingte  hand. 

How  far  the  convention  may  have  succeeded  in  this 
part  u(  their  work,  will  better  appear  on  a  more  accurate 
view  of  it.  From  the  cursory  view  here  taken,  it  must 
clearly  appear  to  have  been  an  arduous  part. 


In  Grol  Britain  were  MfMd  Xtj  ih«  CoiiMrratlvc  piuty,  nol  broiiw 
"h  tp|]iiii«it  (hc(n.  l>ut  (locauM  llii*  irrranl  tlie  iiiily  '■'•y  of  relsininj" 
cc.  KiDiii  lliitfcrin  u(  pulilioi  ilouUlc.dcaliiif-  AiimHcui  pirtinhava 
'II  vcrf  ficc;  and,  while  "  Eniriiuii^g  "  plnlEormk  is  A  frequent  <lcvicc, 
party  liu  et«  ticen  <it>le  lo  win  orlice  lijf  iiiiliif  jiiig  ili  tnis  opinion. 
In  llie  few  caut  i>i  wliidi  prnticn  liivc  liicil  lu  leveiie  llitii  pulley,  ilietr 
prompt  (slittCtivil  •>  im^-rUiil  flcturi  list  aluayi  miillcil. 
Atide  (roni  Ihtv  qii«iiion  ol  prompt  ruponiB  to  I'cw  opitiiom  mil  <Dn> 
itionx.  tberc  <aa  be  no  doulii  ihoi  ilie  two  lyiicmi  arc  nol  widely 
Ivctf^enl.  ilDce  lh«  average  Iciictli  u(  a  Partia-iiicnt  liat  been  iihuwn  la 
le  four  frarn.  wliich  implin  thit  Ihe  Itrtliih  i«lcr  am!  hit  Ainrriinn 
brotttec  attain  '>tty  much  the  unie  mulu  by  difleient  methoJi.  Itut 
kcre  a  cuiioot  diverifciicc.  ulilch  dcierv<i>  rco^nilioii.  revealt  iltell. 
I^iiltanxiitary  mniinl.  uiicr  itii;.  luu  been  lUicrilMi!  at  a  ice-«a«,a  new 
nrty  tsLini;  Ike  iciiiv  aflct  nrjtly  every  grntral  election.  Kul  in  lh« 
United  SlBtei  |iiiti<«  have  held  the  pteude ncy  continuoutly  for  ptrioda 
o(  iwciili'tonr,  lK«aiy,  eighteen,  txA  lodve  ycBtt.  or  in  oih«t  werdi, 
liarisj;  l It rec -quartets  of  uui  national  hiMoty  ue  have  had  but  Ihtee 
ch*ncr>  ol  cootitil.  TIic  reason  lor  ihi»  reMfc  in  ihi*  veiy  teim  of  office, 
which  kMM  once  il>  advanla^ei  and  ilindvsntagea.  I>  Ijnal  Kfilaln. 
wheB  ft  mtnuin  ii  TMed  oul  of  oOke  on  a  sin^e  nwaaure.  Ih«  wvix,  can 
Merer  be  in  doalri,  and  thus  an  Knf-liih  general  election  ii  in  ilin 
majocily  ol  anrs  t<m);ht  i»  a  liiwk  i)iieslt«".  1b  ihc  United  Slate*,  how. 
ever,  a  nnlional  elccliom  usually  iniolve>  tlir  impottant  iuue)  of  the 
precpdiii£  (our  years,  and  tbe  mnit  muil  in(riiii>>!>  be  a  letailnKlv*  in- 
ilKaliunul  the  publk  mind.  In  the  one  cate.  ihe  i^ltm  amonnli almoti 
la  a  rrlcnnitunonapatricnlu  bill.  lutbeo4ker,  ilfortcanot  ancaptu- 
liM  OB  any  wni-to  n>eaMtro,  but  on  tlie  general  jioJicy  of  a  |i«t(y.  The 
rnler  in  Gr«al  Urilain.  to  eiprrn  bii  iliMi-prorat  of  a  nicature.  very  oflen 
••Xei  fo(  men  to  white  t^enetal  polky  lie  it  opposfid;  the  voter  in  Aniriiea 
iwalbma  what  he  ttulikei  and  heept  hit  pariT  in  oiTice.  The  iht-it 
t<riO(l  of  odiM-tioMiik|;  in  Miig^lanil  ami  the  long  period  in  America  are 
the  logical  TTwItt.  When  Ihf  mua  i*  pr«unled  clean-cut,  and  iu  the 
iCMt  of  sreatai  ciciicnieiii.  the  eleciut  volm  a^ainU  ihe  mcaaute  ainl 
narily  aitaiaii  hit  i>i[ly.  When  the  iiiue  are  tnaay.  and  tbe  Rnl 
rirvt  «u(h  a>  an  >liklike<l  baa  had  time  to  («al.  Ib«  efeetor  conlinvm 
blul  l»  hi*  parly.  1 1  wmld  be  ilifhciilt  tu  tay  which  iy«emb«t  lulfilli 
will  ul  tbe  elector,  II  th«  eiperieixe  <>1  Kraiue  i>  a  fair  one  to  i:ilc. 
it  ItrridenllhaKbcpowrr  to  VD<emiuiilrieto«l  of  oR^  leadt  lo  boiwleii 
kMabllKy.  ontnB  ilial  power  ii  balanced  by  a  alabiliiy  in  Ihs  iDpnamia* 
Uft  Unly  or  ia  tbe  eleuor.— CoiTOK. 


23' 


PARTITION  OP  AVTffOKITY. 


(V«.  ST  -Wt 


Not  less  arduous  muitt  have  been  the  task  of  roafkinf( 
the  proper  line  of  partition  between  the  authority  of  ihc 
Im  genera)  and  that  of  th«  State  governments. 

R».iA.  B very  man  wilt  he  sensible  of  this  dilTicuIiy, 

in  proportion  as  he  has  been  accustomed  to  contemplate 
and  discriminate  objects  extensive  and  complicated  in 
th«ir  nature.  The  faculties  of  tlie  njiml  itself  have  never 
yet  been  distinguished  and  defined,  with  satisfactory  pre- 
cision, by  all  the  efforts  of  Ihc  most  acute  and  meta- 
pliysica)  philosophers.  Sense,  jwrrcplion,  judgment, 
desire,  volition,  memory,  imagination,  are  found  to  be 
separated  by  such  delicate  shades  and  minute  gradations 
that  their  boundaries  have  eluded  the  most  subtle  investi- 
gations, and  remain  a  prcj^nani  sourtre  of  ingenious  dis- 
quisition and  controversy.  The  boundaries  between  the 
great  kingdom  of  nature,  and,  still  more,  between  the 
various  provinces  and  lesser  portions  into  which  they 
are  subdivided,  afford  another  illustration  of  the  same 
important  truth.  The  most  sag-icious  and  laborioas 
naturalists  have  never  yet  succeeded  in  tracing  with  cer- 
tainty the  line  which  separates  the  district  of  vegetable 
life  from  the  neighboring  region  of  unorganized  matter, 
or  which  marks  the  termination  of  the  former  and  the 
commencement  of  the  animal  empire.  A  still  greater 
obscurity  lies  in  the  distinctive  characters  by  which  the 
objects  in  each  of  thi-se  great  departments  o\  nature  have 
been  arranged  and  3««oried. 

When  we  pass  from  the  works  of  nature,  in  which  all 
the  delineations  arc  perfectly  accurate,  and  appear  to  be 
otherwise  only  from  the  imperfcrtion  of  the  eye  whidi 
surveys  them,  to  the  institutions  of  man,  in  which  the  ob- 
scurity arises  as  well  from  the  objrct  iiscif  as  from  the 
organ  by  which  it  is  contemplated,  we  must  perceive  the 
necessity  of  moderating  still  further  our  expectations  and 
hopes  from  the  efforts  of  human  sagacity.  Experience 
lias  instructed  uk  that  no  skill  in  the  science  of  govern- 
ment has  yet  been  able  to  discriminate  and  define,  with 
sufficient  certainly,  its  three  great  provinces — the  legisla- 
tive, executive,  and  judiciary;  or  even  the  privileges  and 


lyrit/CAC/ES  OF  jurisdiction.  >33 

powers  of  the  diScrent  Icgislalive  branches.  Questions 
daily  occur  in  the  course  of  practicf,  which  prove  the 
obscurity  which  reiKns  in  these  Hubiectx,  and  which 
puzzle  the  greatest  adtpls  in  political    science. 

The  experience  of  ages,  with  the  continued  and  com- 
bined labors  ef  the  m»st  eiiliKhteii«d  lej^iitlators  and 
jurists,  has  been  equally  unsuccessful  in  delineating  the 
xever;il  objects  ami  limits  of  different  cikIks  of  law*  and 
different  tribunals  o(  justice.  The  precise  extent  of  the 
common  )aw,  and  the  statute  law,  the  maritime  law,  the 
ecclesiastical  I  law,  the  law  of  corporations,  and  other  local 
Uws  and  custum^,  reiuaitis  still  to  t>e  clearly  and  rmally 
established  in  Great  Briuiin,  where  accuracy  in  such  sub- 
jects bus  been  more  industritiusly  pursued  than  in  any 
other  pari  of  the  world.  The  jurisdiction  of  her  several 
courts,  general  and  local,  of  taw,  of  equity,  of  admiralty, 
etc.,  i^  mil  less  a  source  of  frequent  and  intricate  <li»:us- 
sions,  sufficiently  denoting  the  indeterminate  limits  by 
whicb  they  are  respectively  circumscribed.  All  new 
taws,  though  penned  with  the  greatest  technical  skill,  and 
passed  on  the  fullest  and  most  mature  deliberation,  are 
considered  as  more  or  less  obscure  and  equivocal,  until 
Uieir  meaning  be  liquidated  and  ascertained  by  a  scries 
of  particubr  discussions  and  adjudications.  Itesides  the 
obscurity  arising  from  the  complexity  of  objects,  and  the 
imperfection  of  the  human  faculties,  the  medium  thmugh 
which  the  conceptions  of  men  are  conveyed  to  each 
other  adds  a  fresli  embarrassment.  The  use  of  words  is 
to  express  ideas.  Perspicuity,  therefore,  requires  nut 
only  that  the  ideas  should  he  distinctly  formed,  but  that 
ihcy  should  be  expressed  by  words  distinctly  and  exclu- 
sively appropriate  to  them.  But  no  language  is  so 
copious  as  to  supply  words  and  phrases  for  every  complex 
idea,  or  so  correct  as  not  to  include  many,  equivocally 
denoting  different  ideas.  Hence  it  must  happen  tliat, 
however  accurately  objects  may  tie  discriminated  in 
i themselves,  and  however  accurately  titc  discrimination 
'may  be  considered,  the  definition  of  them  maybe  ren- 
rrfcrcd  inaccurate  Ijy  the  inaccuracy  of  the  terms  in  which 


•44 


EQUALITY  OF  STATEH. 


tif  0. » (W 


it  is  delivered.  And  thU  unavoidable  iiuiccuracy  muu 
be  greater  or  less,  accurdinj;  to  the  complexity  and  nov- 
elty of  the  objects  defined.  When  the  Almighty  himself 
condescends  to  address  mankind  in  tlieir  own  language, 
his  meaning,  luminouii  as  it  must  be,  is  rendered  dim 
and  doubtful  by  the  cloudy  medium  through  which  it  is 
communicated. 

Here,  then,  are  three  sources  of  vague  and  incorrect 
dclinittons:  indistinctness  of  the  object,  imperfection  of 
the  organ  of  conception,  inadec|u;itene)>s  of  the  veiii<^Ie  of 
ideas.  .\ny  one  of  these  must  produce  a  certain  degree 
of  obscurity.  The  convention,  in  delineating  the  buand- 
ary  between  the  federal  and  State  jurisdictiunft,  must 
have  experienced  the  lull  effect  of  them  all. 

To  the  difRcultics  already  mentioned  may  be  added  the 
interfering  pretensions  of  the  larger  and  smaller  States. 
■at  We  cannot  err  in  supposing  that  the  former 

Bo.  a.  would  contend  for  a  participation  in  the  gov- 

ernment fully  proportioned  to  their  su[>erior  wealth  and 
inipiirlance;  and  that  the  latter  urould  itoi  l>e  le»H  tena- 
cious of  the  equality  at  present  enjoyed  by  them.'  We 
may  well  suppose  that  neither  side  would  entirely  yield  to 
the  other,  and  conseipienily  that  the  struggle  could  be 
terminated  only  by  compromise.     It  is  extremely  prob- 

■  Thk  eijualttf  of  the  tlain  conailnled  ihc  imKt  ■IIAi-ali  ptohlen  nt 
Ihoi*  unioii.  In  Ilia  I'oiiuimof  I7;j  it  hm  rlic  bn(  i|«ri>li<Hi  raiwd.  aiiil 
thoMch  ibc  Urgvr  colmiio  linilly  L-uiKrilfit  lli.-il  llie  pruvirK^t.  tbliuukl  \m 
Ct(liuin<rotinc,  hwni  vtilh  a  ilrilU<1«nlt]i  on  the  journal  thai  '  i-rcccdenl 
ilioold  Moi  ibcrch)r  l>e  oinbltkhcl.  'Ilie  ijactlion  wiu  aciiiii  ttarmlf 
cnnmicit  lathe rtlxawiontol  ilic  aiikloi of  cotiltdenliuo.  m  ' 
Ibr  mnall  rfnln  wttc  »bixx%»(oI  in  i.-»r]r>n(;  'Ikii  |>oii>l.  Ih-"  . 
tniliic  KiRttnliKl  the  pOMlrililr  of  ovr-lhitil  of  llie  |>Topk  ^  ..  -^  „ 
for  the  vbole  couairy.  it  u-u  Mip«Ui«ii  ilut  «1)  rcvulnilmu  niBki  reccoe 
the  TOin  (A  nine  iltlH ;  an  luliiliiiioo  n  liKh  liait  )t(  )«n>llr  <>«  ■»  act) 
■* idvanli^e  to  the  larce  ttalrx.  lor  liy  tlicii  Ut^cf  il«ln;alinet  tlir*  sna 
mora  c<iii>i»nilif  tcpfiT.rii[fil  in  ilie  OMiRiot.  JcHotwm  teimii  hnl  lo 
have  hit  upun  ihc  •ipolk-nt  finally  >cccp«cil.  wli«ii  lie  iu|(j;mcd  in  17IU 
that  a  vf\Xvai  iboiilcl  h«  ailoMcfl   by  wh>dh   "  niiy  piopositinn  ml|;hl  H 

■ccaiircil  \tj  the  reprcicnt»il»«»  o(  a  laajonly  ol  i( .-..r.li.  -.(  ABorrka, 

o(  of  a  oujorily  oj  tlic  citlunick  ol  Aiariita.       1 1.  -s  tba 

krijcr.  the  laiiir  tSit  minllri  tuJii'iicv"     li  w«»  cu  1.  iniot 

ratioui  pny;vnit>a«a  of  K>«'t'<l|ih.  Dickintnn.  JcAiuon.  siU  l^ciij  in  I'lr 
feiltnl  owivrnliofi.  Ilia)  Ihe  ]>Fn|,le  aaril  Ihe  ilAlea  were  lei-Hally  it|irc- 
•cnMil  iu  ibo  upp«f  iDil  lovcf  hnino  ol  Ciwcteui.'-BlMlnK. 


LOCAL  JEALOUSIES. 


«35 


able,  also,  that  after  the  ratio  of  rcprcscntalioDliaO  been 
■(tjiistcO,  this   very  com|>rumise  must  have  produced  a 

Urekh  struggle  between  the  same  partiea^  to  t;Jve  such  a 
turn  to  the  organization  of  the  government,  and  to  the 
distribution  of  its  |>uwcrs,  us  would  iticrcusc  the  impur- 
lancc  of  tlie  branches,  in  forming  which  they  had  respect- 
ively obtained  the  greatest  share  of  influence.  There 
arc  (eiilures  in  the  Constitution  which  uitrniut  each  of 
these  suppositions;  and  as  far  as  either  of  them  is  well 
founded,  it  shows  that  the  convention  muet  have  been 
onipelled  to  sacrifice  theoretical  propriety  to  the  force 
of  extraneous  considerations. 

Nor  could  it  have  been  the  large  and  small  States  only, 
which  would  marshal  themselves  in  oppositiim  to  each 
other  on  various  points.  Other  combinations,  resulting 
from  a  difference  of  loi^d  position  and  policy,  must  have 
created  atklitional  difficulties.  \%  every  Slate  may  be 
diviilcd  into  different  districts,  and  its  citizens  into  ditfcr- 
cnl  classes,  which  give  birth  to  contending  interests  and 
locuil  jealousic).,  so  the  different  )Mirts  of  the  United  States 
arc  distinguished  from  each  oilier  by  a  vari<!ty  of  circum- 
stances,  which  produce  a  like  effect  on  a  larger  scale. 
And  althuutclt  this  variety  of  interests,  for  reasons  suffi- 
ciently c;iplaincd  in  a  former  paper,  may  have  a  salutary 
inDucnce  on  the  administration  of  \\m:  government  when 
formed,  yet  everyone  must  be  sensible  nf  the  contrary 
influence,  which  must  have  been  ctpcricnced  in  the  tusk 
of  forming  it. 

Would  it  be  wonderful  if,  under  the  pressure  of  all  these 
ditlicullie^,  the  conveniion  should  have  been  forced  into 
some  deviations  from  that  artificial  structure  and  regular 
symmetry  which  an  abstract  view  of  the  subject  might 
lead  an  ingenious  theorist  to  bestow  on  a  Constitution 
planned  in  his  closet  or  in  his  imagination?  The  real 
wonder  is  that  so  many  diRicuItiGS  should  h;ivc  been  sur> 
mounted,  and  surmounted  with  a  unanimity  almost  as 
unprecedented  as  it  must  have   been  unexpected.     It  is 

^impossible  for  any  m.in  of  candor  to  reflect  on  this  cir- 
iQistance  witliout  partaking  of  the  astonishment.     It  is 


n^ 


mail  ANIMUS  OF  CONVENTION.       !»•.  S7  (3«< 


impossible  for  the  man  of  pious  reflection  not  to  [wrcciTc 
in  it  a  linger  of  tliai  Alinij|rhty  hand  which  has  been  so 
freciuencly  and  Hi^nally  extended  to  our  relief  in  the  criti- 
cal stages  of  the  revolution. 

We  had  occasion,  in  a  former  paper,  to  take  notice  of 
the  repeated  trials  which  have  been  unsuccessfully  made 
in  the  United  Netherlands  for  reforming  the  baneful  and 
notorious  vice«  ctf  their  constitution.  The  history  of  al- 
most ail  the  K^cat  councils  and  consultations  held  aroonf; 
mankind  for  reconciling  their  discordant  opinions, 
assuaging  their  mutual  jealousies,  and  ixljustiiig  thrir  re- 
spective interests,  is  a  history  of  factions,  contentions, 
and  disappointments,  and  may  be  classed  among  the  most 
dark  and  degnided  pictures  which  display  the  infirmities 
;ind  depravities  of  the  human  character.  If,  in  a  few 
scattered  instances,  a  brighter  aspect  is  presented,  they 
serve  only  as  exceptions  to  admonish  us  of  the  general 
truth,  and  by  their  luster  to  darken  the  gloom  of  the 
adverse  prospect  to  which  they  arc  contrasted.  In  re- 
volving the  causes  from  which  these  exceptions  result, 
and  applying  them  to  the  particular  instances  twfore  us, 
we  are  necessarily  led  to  two  important  conclusions.  The 
first  is  that  the  convention  must  have  enjoyed,  in  a  very 
singuhir  degree,  an  evemption  from  the  pi^sttlential  influ- 
ence of  party  animosities — the  disease  most  incident  to 
deliberative  bodies,  ami  most  apt  to  conUiminate  their 
proceedings.  The  second  conclusion  is  that  all  the  depu- 
tations composing  the  convention  were  satisfactorily 
accommodated  by  the  final  act,  or  were  intl need  to  accede 
to  it  by  a  deep  conviction  of  the  necessity  of  sacriAcIng 
private  opinions  and  partial  interests  to  the  public  good, 
and  bjr  a  despair  of  seeing  this  necessity  diminished  b]r 
delays  or  by  new  experiments. 

PUBLIUI. 


S»dlHa] 


F0i-4VDEXS  OF  ANTIQUITY. 


y 


No.  38  t37]-    i.ii^'p'i^i'M  Jt*r»»i,  juuurib  n«<.)        Madieoa 

INCOHERENCE  OF    THE   OBJECTIONS  TO  THE 
CONSTITUTION. 

All  gwpfrmmtnli  •/  JthfiTatim  anJ  evHitnl  kithtrla  /ramtA  ly 
iiuiixitJttdlr — Btamflti — Hrreri  in  Ikr  nnp  tytUm  ariir  from  laiJt  t/ 
txprrtrtut — Tht  frtifnl  liltuilifti  f/  Aoifrka—RiutiHg  n-ili  ik^mi, 
aiul  tht  j'lttilily  a/  ihi  »i/tclMHi  artJ  rtntJitS  e/  lAt  ^/•/tiiltiui. 

Tc  the  Pcopie  of  iki  !UaU  0/  New  York  : 

U  a  not  a  Milk  tvin.-irk.-itil?  th.il  Jn  every  cue  rcpoited  by  indent 
htiiory,  in  which  government  Iws  been  esi.iblistied  tviih  deliben- 
tion  and  cotiKnl,  ihe  task  ol  (raming  it  has  not  been  comniriled 
to  »Ti  a&KiTibly  of  men.  but  h»s  hc^n  performed  by  tome  tadtvidnsj 
citiicn  ot  pte-emrnent  wisdom  and  ajiproved  integrity. 

MiiHM.  we  tCArri.  witi>  the  ptimilive  fotimlrrof  the  eovernment  of 
Crete,  ii»  Za1eucu!i  was  ol  that  o(  tlic  L')c<  mns.  Tliescus  lirst,  and 
a/ler  him  Draco  and  Solon.  inMituted  Ihe  govcrninenl  ot  Athens. 
Lycurgua  was  tlie  U»'j;ivei  of  Sp:irla.  Tlic  (oundalion  ol  the 
original  govrrnmcnl  of  Rome  was  laid  by  Romulus,  anil  the  work 
compleiH  by  two  ot  his  c1e<:l<vc  successors.  Kunin  itnd  Tullius 
Ho«iilitit.  On  tb<:  abolition  of  royally  Ihe  canmilar  .-id m i  11  ixi ration 
was  substittiled  by  Brutus,  who  stepped  forward  with  »  project  for 
inch  a  TCtorni,  which,  he  alleged,  had  been  prejMred  by  Tullius 
HoBlilius.  and  to  which  his  address  ohT.iined  the  assent  and  ratifica- 
lion  ol  the  senate  And  peuple.  This  remark  ii  applicable  to  con- 
fnleralc  governments  al.^o.  Amphiciyon,  wr  ar>:  told,  was  Ihe 
author  ot  th^it  which  bore  his  name.  The  Acha>ari  league  reccit'ed 
its  first  birth  (rout  .-Vchiciis.  and  Jis  second  from  Araius. 

What  degYce  of  agency  thrte  tepuieil  l.twgirers  might  have  in 
llieir  respective  niablishntents.  or  how  (.ir  Ihey  might  be  clolhed 
Wilh  the  legitimate aiilhority  of  ibe  people,  r.m not  in  oer)' instance 
be  aseeilainwl.  In  some,  howei-er,  the  proceeding  was  strictly 
regular.  Dt^co  apfxars  to  have  been  intru.ste<l  hy  ihe  people  of 
Athens  wilh  Indefinilc  power*  10  reform  its  government  and  laws. 
And  Solon,  according  to  Pluiarrh,  was  in  a  manner  compelled,  by 
(be  univcrsat  suffrage  of  his  fellow  ■citizens,  to  take  upor)  him  the 
•ole  and  absolute  powFf  of  new-modeling  the  constitution.  The 
]wocccdifflgS  under  Lyctirgus  were  less  regular :  hut  as  far  as 
llie  aitvDcates  for  a  regular  reform  could  prevail,  they  all  turned 
Ilieir  ryes  toward  the  single  eRoiis  of  that  celebrated  patriot  and 


'38 


GREAT  LAiyCiVh/tS. 


IHo.  M  iTT) 


mge.  iiisictul  of  seeking  lo  biing  ^tlwul  a  temlulion  by  tlic  iiiiet* 
vetiijun  <i(  ;i  (Iclibtrilift;  boily  i>(  tiliicnv 

Whence  could  il  have  pioccctletl  ihat  a  penpte.  jealous  a.i  ihe 
Greeks  were  «(  their  liberty,  shoulil  &a  (ar  iib.iiulun  itie  Tuks  ol 
cnutioi)  .IS  lo  pl.ice  their  detiliny  in  ibc  hanilt  of  n  xingle  citixen  ? 
Whence  could  il  hure  prucecilcd  that  il)c  Ailietiijtig,  a  peojrle 
who  would  not  iiifTcr  iin  army  (o  be  cominandcil  by  fewer  llun 
icii  geiicials.and  vlIio  required  no  other  (iioof  of  diinget  to  their 
llbciiies  than  l)ic  illuMrioiu  inciil  of  a  fellow-ciliten,  should  eon- 
iider  oiic  illustiious  ciiiieii  d&  a  more  e1it;iblc  tlc|>o)iiar]r  of  the 
fortunes  of  tliemiiclvcs  a»d  their  posterity  than  a  »clect  bvdy  o( 
citUeiit,  ((Oil)  whose  cominon  delibcrjtloi>»  mure  t^i&dom.  us  w-cll 
as  more  safety,  mijfht  have  been  expected  ?  These  qucslians  can- 
not be  fully  answered  willraut  bUp|>asing  llui  itic  fciirt  of  diiconi 
iind  disunion  anivitg  a  number  u(  counselors  exceeded  Ihe  appro- 
IteivMon  of  Uc^chcty  or  incap-icily  in  .1  ;iinglc  indtvidunl.  I-liaiary 
infoims  us,  likewise,  of  tbc  dilftculiics  with  which  IIicm:  celebrated 
icfonncrf  h.id  to  contend,  as  well  as  the  enpedienis  which  they 
weie  obliged  to  employ  in  order  to  c;irry  llieir  tcfurms  iriio  tflecl. 
Solon,  who  seems  10  have  indulged  a  more  tenipciii/iii(;  puhcy. 
confessed  ihni  he  h;id  not  given  to  his  countrymen  (he  govcinmeDt 
best  suited  10  their  Itappincu  but  mosi  tolcr.ibie  to  tlKii  prejudices. 
Anil  Lycurgus,  more  true  to  hit  object,  was  under  (he  necessity  ol 
mixing  a  portion  of  violence  with  the  aullkoiiiy  of  superMiiion.and 
of  securing  his  final  success  by  a  voluntary  renunciation,  first  of 
hts  country,  and  then  of  his  life.  If  lliese  lessons  teach  ii»,  on  one 
hand,  to  iidniiie  the  improccinenl  made  by  America  on  llic  iincicnt 
mode  of  prc|  1:1  ting  and  cslabhfching  regul.ir  pbins  of  govemnienl, 
they  serve  not  less,  on  ihe  oilier,  Itiudnioiiisb  us  of  llie  lijiiaidsaiid 
•  lilTicuIttrs  iiicidenl  to  uch  rsj<eriniriits  and  o4  the  gical  impru- 
(IciKc  of  unnecesviiily  muUipljniji  lliein. 

Is  il  an  unicasonable  conjecluie  that  the  errors  which  luny  tic 
contained  in  the  plan  of  the  cunvcntioa  are  such  as  have  lesullol 
rather  from  tite  defect  of  aiiteceilcni  cspetience  on  litis  complicated 
and  diRicuU  siibjeci  than  from  a  want  of  .iccuracy  or  care  lo  Ui< 
inresligalion  of  il ;  and.  cflns«<|iiently,  such  as  will  nol  be  ascci- 
taincd  until  nn  aclual  trial  slall  hare  poinied  Ihctn  oiii  ?  Thia 
conjecture  b  lendeied  piobabfe,  not  only  by  many  considerations 
of  a  general  naiuic.  but  by  the  pariiculai  case  of  ihc  Aniclcs  of 
Confederal  loo.  It  is  observable  that  among  llie  numerous  objec- 
tions and  ametidinents  »uggektcd  by  itie  tcreral  States,  when  tlioe 
niticIcH  were  subniitled  for  their  raliAcatiun,  nol  one  is  touod 
which  alludes  to  ilic  jrcai  and  radical  error  which  on  acttial  Uiol 


1     AMERICA    COMPARED    TO  A   PATIENT. 


n^ 


^ 


haft  iliRcovrred  iiulf.  And  if  wc  tt.ft\n  lltr  ohsrrr.iiinns  whicli 
New  Jersey '  w^s  fcrf  lo  make,  niilier  by  her  local  siiiuition  than 
by  her  peculiar  forcKi];ht,  it  may  be  <jii«.iioiu-rt  wbi-ihci- .n  single 
sugK^ilion  was  ol  suAidcnl  iDumenl  to  jusiify  a  rcvisiun  u(  the 
lysicni.  There  \%  nlnimUnt  mson.  ncvenhelcss.  lo  suppose  thai, 
imitiaienAJ  as  these  objeciiaiis  were,  ihey  woulil  hare  been  adhered 
(i>  with  a  vety  dangerous  inflexibility  in  some  Siaies,  had  noi  a 
*e,ij  for  Ibfii  upiniuns  ami  siip|K>scd  Interests  been  stilled  liy  llie 
more  [inticiful  icniimcni  of  sell- preservation.  One  Slate,'  we  may 
leincinliei,  persbteU  (or  several  yean  In  refusing  her  concurrence, 
alibough  iIh!  enemy  reniaiiied  the  whole  period  ril  our  gates,  or 
rjithei  in  tlic  very  bowels  o(  our  coutitry.  Nor  was  her  pliancy  in 
llie  end  effected  by  a  Icm  motive  than  the  fc;ir  of  being  chaigeable 
with  prulr.Kliiig  the  public  caUmilieS  and  endangering  the  event 
of  ihcironicM.  Every  caiuliil  reader  will  make  the  proper  reHcc- 
itons  on  ihMC  Impoiiaiii  facts. 

A  patient  who  finds  his  disorder  daily  growing  worse,  nnil  ih.tt 
aitdficacious  rciiicily  can  no  longer  he  deluyeil  wilhout  cxtieiiie 
ilangvr.  after  coolly  revolving  his  siliiation  and  the  charaelers  of 
tkllercnl  physiciuiu.  selects  and  calls  in  such  of  litem  as  be  judges 

lost  capable  of  ail  ministering  relief  and  h»t  entitled  lo  his  conli- 
dcncc.  The  {fhysiclans  attend  ;  the  case  of  the  paiieni  is  carefully 
esamined:  a  consull.ilKlii  is  held;  they  an;  unanimously  agreed  (hat 
the  syitiploms  are  critical,  but  that  the  c;ise.  willi  (iroper  and  timely 
relief,  is  m  far  from  being  desperate  that  it  may  be  m;tdc  to  issue 
in  an  improvement  of  his  cnnsiiiution.  They  arc  equalty  unani- 
Rioin  in  prescribing  the  remedy  by  which  this  happy  (fli-cl  is  to  be 
producol.  The  prescription  is  no  sooner  made  knnwn.  however, 
ihan  a  Dumber  of  persons  inier[Kise.  and,  wiihuul  <lrnying  the 
reality  or  danger  of  the  ditordee.  assure  the  paticrit  thai  the 
picscriplion  will  l>e  poison  to  his  consiiiulion,  aiwl  forbid  him, 
■lukr  pain  <rf  certain  death,  lo  make  use  of  il.  Might  not  the 
IMtient  (eaMmably  demand,  licfore  he  ventured  to  follow  this  advice, 
ibal  the  authors  ol  il  should  at  least  agree  among  ihemsetves  on 
MliC  other  remedy  lo  he  sulmilutcd^  Ami  if  be  found  iheni 
diScTing  as  much  Iruin  one  unuiher  as  froin  his  first  counselors. 


'  New  JeiMj  hill  iiisitlol  llisl  cnntml  uf  enmnierce  wat  a  nalionsi 

allait.  and  thil  H  sb<>iilil,  wilh  Iti  nmillini;  [Knatrs  «(  latation.  be  mlcil 

Lin  the  C'ongreu  ol  di<  Confcdcriiion.     See  "Sciiei  Journals  of  Con* 

■•"  '■  3S9-    The  iiMilivc  tot  tbis  deanaiid  \\  given  at  t>,  J7.  infra. — 

ElUTOB. 

'  Miryliixl.  ('<r  rraMits  recorded  in  ibo  "  iicciel  Journals  of  Congress.* 
L  417,  — EitiluL 


340 


CONeVSION  AMONG  ADVISERS.      «•.«•(«) 


woulcf  h«  not  act  prwknllr  in  Inring  the  rxperimrni  unnnitnouftljr 
recommended  by  the  inller.  ralhec  tlian  Ik  iKaikening  to  those  who 
could  nriilter  deny  ihe  DMcssiiy  of  a  ipcolj'  rcnmly  nor  agree  in 
propoiinK  one  ? 

Such  a  pniirni  and  inMich  asilu;<lion  Ji  Ani«rica  ai  this  n>oment. 
She  hu  been  Miiiibic  u(  bcr  nuiUdy.  SIk  Ims  obuincd  a  reguUr 
and  unaninuiuii  advice  (rain  men  of  her  own  dcJJbcratc  choice. 
And  she  ■&  wanie«l  by  Dt)i«ra  a^ainu  (ollowiitg  tht&  advice  u&der 
pain  ol  the  mou  fatal  consequences.  tXi  the  moniton  deny  ihc 
reality  of  li^-r  danger  ?  No.  Do  (hey  deny  ihc  necessity  of  mhac 
speedy  and  powcrlul  remedy  ?  No,  Are  tbey  n(^ed.  are  any 
two  of  iheni  agreed,  m  their  objections  to  the  remedy  projwsed.or 
HI  ttie  |>rupct  ont?  lo  lie  subililuleil  ?  Let  (bem  speiik  lor  Ihem- 
xclvcs.  This  one  tells  UB  that  the  proposed  Conslitulinn  ought 
to  be  Tcjrcied.  licciuM:  it  U  noi  a  confederation  ol  tlie  Si:ite&  UiE  a 
({ovcrnmcnl  oi'er  individuals.  Another  admits  lluit  il  otighl  lobe 
3  gotcinrtient  over  iixlividuals  lo  a  i.eitain  exicnl,  but  by  no  ntcans 
to  (he  extent  prajKncd.  A  third  does  not  object  to  the  govemnienl 
over  itulividuals.  or  to  tlic  eitcat  prupoied.  but  to  the  want  ol  a 
bill  of  rights.  A  fourth  concun  in  the  absolute  necessity  of  a  Irill 
of  rigUls.  but  conicnils  that  il  oujfht  to  l>e  declarator}-,  not  of  the 
persona]  rights  of  iiKliviilunls.  hut  of  the  lighis  reM-rvoi)  to  the 
Stales  in  llierr  political  capncily.  A  filth  i«  of  opinion  that  a  lull 
of  lights  of  any  sort  would  Ik  siipeitluoiis  and  mitplacrd.  and  that 
(he  plan  wouki  be  uiiexccpliomiMe  but  (or  the  fatal  power  of 
reg)iblii>g  the  limes  and  |iiaccsof  election.  An  obfrclorin  alaige 
State  cxclati  11 »  loudly  againU  ilic  unreasonable  equality  ol  rc[itc< 
seniaiiun  in  (he  Senate.  An  objector  in  a  small  Stale  b  equally 
loitd  against  (he  dangerous  tncqu.iliiy  in  ihe  House  of  Kep't<- 
senta(ivcs.  From  (his  qiiar(er,  w-e  are  alanned  with  the  amaunf 
expense  Iron)  the  number  of  persons  who  are  to  adminislcr  Ihe 
new  goveinmeni.  Front  anoihei  tfoarter.  and  soineiimcs  from  (he 
same  qiurlrr.  on  another  occasion,  the  cry  is  thai  the  CongTCM 
will  be  but  a  ahadow  o(  a  repr»«nlatiitii.  and  llui  (he  }:;avcminenl 
would  be  (af  less  objcctiooablc  i(  live  niiinhcT  nn<l  the  expense 
were  diHibk-il.  A  palrioi  in  a  StJte  thai  doe:*  not  iiiipott  or  export 
diKcrns  in^upi^r^ble  objections  against  the  fiower  oldire<:t  taia* 
lion.  The  |Mlrio(ic  advetsary  in  a  State  ol  Kreat  cx|kitIs  sod 
Imports  is  iioi  less  ditsaiisfiwi  that  the  whote  bunlcn  ol  tarns  may 
he  thrown  on  (wnsumpilon.  This  politician  discovers  In  the  Con- 
slllutUin  a  direct  and  irruisiible  tendency  (o  monarchy  ;  (hat  is 
equally  sure  it  will  end  in  arisiocracy,  Ano(hei  (s  ptirikd  lo  My 
wych  o(  these  shapes  It  will  ultimately  assume,  but  lees  clearly  it 


I 


VARIANCE  AS  TO  FUtfCTlONS. 

mutt  be  one  or  utiver  o(  ihcm  ;  whilst  a  fourth  is  not  w-.nniing,  wlw 
with  no  less  confitlence  affirms  ihai  (be  Consiiitiiion  is  so  f»r  from 
havingt  >  tHiii  (o»';iiit  eitlier  c(  ^lle^c■  (htiifiTS  tlial  the  weight  on 
thai  siile  will  not  be  sufficient  lo  keeji  it  upnglir  anil  firm  n^-iinit 
it»  oppoMie  propensities.  With  aiiolliet  class  ol  ncivrriai  its  to  the 
Caa3(ilutK>n  the  ln>>gu^i|;c  is  llint  the  IcgisUlive,  executive,  nnd 
judiciary  (leparliiienli  4ic  irilciiiiixed  in  such  a  iii:iiLiii-r  as  10  Ctin- 
iridtct  :tll  iheiilena  of  reguliii  gore tnmeni  and  all  the  Tcqui«iie 
jirecauliunii  in  hvor  □[  liberty.  Whilst  this  objection  ciiculnies  iii 
vague  an<l  general  ex|ireMions.  there  arc  but  a  (cw  who  lend  iheir 
sanction  to  il.  Let  CAch  one  come  (oiWAtd  willi  his  particular 
rii>l.-iiiaiian.  and  licarcc  any  two  ate    exactly   at^n-cd  upon   the 

ihjcct.  In  the  eyes  of  one  the  junction  of  the  Scniite  with  the 
.idem   in  the  rcsponubic  function  of  appointing  to  uffices, 

isteail  of  veiting  this  execultve  power  in  the  Executive  ali>ne.  is 
'ihc  viciou*  ]>art  of  the  oi|;anixation.  Tu  anulher.  the  exclusion  ul 
the  House  ol  Kepi escnt^i lives,  whose  numbers  atone  could  be  a 
due  security  against  carrut)lion  and  pailiaHiy  in  llie  exercise  of 
iuch  a  power,  is  dqually  obnoxious.  With  another,  the  admission 
d(  ihc  President  into  any  share  of  a  jioner  wliich  ii;u»t  ever  be  a 
da[i;;erous  engiitc  in  the  hands  of  the  executive  tn.i^isKate  is  an 
.nn  pan  tollable  violation  of  llie  maxims  of  republican  jealousy.  No 
jlpari  of  tbe  arr«ngen*cnt,  aeenrdnig  to  some,  is  ntoie  Inadmissible 
than  the  trial  of  impeach  men  t«  by  the  Senile,  which  is  alternately 
T  member  both  of  the  Irgislittve  and  executive  depaitmenls,  when 
ihii  power  so  eviilenlly  beloni^ed  lo  the  judiciary  drparliiieul, 
"We  concur  fully."  reply  others,  "in  the  obje-clion  to  i In*  pan  of 
the  plan,  but  we  can  never  a|[ree  that  a  reference  of  impeach  men  is 
lothr  judiciary  anlboriiy  would  bean  amcndnient  of  the  crro«. 
Out  principal  dishke  to  the  oiKanizalion  arises  from  the  extensile 
powers  .tlicady  tiulgeil  in  thai  department."  Even  among  ibe 
teilous  lutronsof  acouncilof  state  the  most  irreconcilable  variance 
ii  discovered  concerning  the  mode  in  which  it  ought  to  be  con- 
siiiuied.  The  demand  of  one  gentleman  Is  that  ibe  council  should 
coBsisi  of  a  small  nnmhcr.  to  be  appointed  Ity  the  most  numerous 
branch  of  tbe  teglslaluie.  Anoiher  would  prefer  a  larger  number, 
and  considers  it  as  a  fundamental  comdition  that  the  appointment 
should  be  made  by  ihc  Presiiieni  himself. 

As  tl  can  give  no  umbrage  to  the  writeis  against  the  plan  of  the 
rat  Constitution,  let  us  suppose  that,  na  they  ate  the  most 
loDs.  so  ibey  are  also  the  most  sagacious,  of  those  who  think 
ilk  laic  cnnvenliion  were  uiiri)iial  to  the  t.isk  ouigned  them,  unit 
thai  a  wiser  and   better  plan   might  and  ought  lo  be  subsliiulcd. 


«4»       CONSTITUTION  WOHTIIY  OF  TRIAL.      Wo-Mdll 


l.ct  UK  further  ntippoie  llut  Ihdr  country  should  coticur,  bolh  in 
IhiH  (jivonblc  opinion  of  (h«ir  mvr>i&.  nn<l  in  Ihrir  unfjiroralite 
u|)iniDn  or  the  convention  ;  and  should  accnrilinnly  ptucreil  to 
form  iliem  into  a  second  convention,  wiih  full  juiucts  ikhI  for  the 
express  purpose  o(  reminE  am!  renioUlin];  the  work  of  ihc  fini. 
\S'ere  il>c  Mpcriineni  (o  be  seriously  inailc.  though  tt  TccjuimI 
some  effurt  to  view  it  seriuusty  ei-en  in  fiction,  t  leave  ii  la  be 
dcci(l«l  by  itie  »dni|rfe  of  opinions  jusi  exhibitnl,  whcibci,  wiili  aII 
their  enmity  to  their  pretlccesiors,  they  woutil,  In  any  one  point, 
drp.in  so  widely  from  ibrlr  exnmpk  as  in  the  discord  and  (eimeni 
thill  woutil  mark  their  own  deiil>rtaIiom ;  and  nbether  tli«  Con* 
stittilinn  now  before  the  public  would  not  M^nil  us  fair  a  rbance 
(or  tinmurtiilily  3s  LyciiiKUx  ^nw  to  ihnl  u(  S|)3tia.  by  milking  its 
change  to  depend  on  his  own  retiiii)  from  e<ilc  and  itrnth,  ifil 
were  to  be  iminedialely  adopted,  and  were  to  continue  in  force;  ttoi 
until  o  SKTrCK.  but  until  AKOTliKK  »bould  be  agivcd  upon  by 
ibis  new  asjembly  of  lawgivsrt. 

It  is  a  matter  both  of  wotMler  and  regret  that  tbow 
who  raise  so  many  objections  ag:ainst  the  new  Constitti- 
tion  should  never  call  to  mind  the  (]i:fcct)>  of  thai  which 
is  to  be  exchuiigeJ  for  it.  It  iit  nut  neces&ary  iliai  ttie 
former  should  be  perfect:  it  is  sufRcient  that  the  latter  is 
more  imperfect.  No  man  would  refuse  to  give  brass  for 
silver  or  gold,  because  the  latter  had  some  alloy  in  iL 
No  mail  would  refuse  to  quit  a  shaiicrcd  aod  lotlcriog 
habitation  for  a  firm  and  commodious  building,  because 
the  latter  hail  not  a  por<^h  to  it,  or  beeau«e  some  u(  the 
rooms  vn\^\K  be  a  lilllc  larger  or  smaller,  or  the  ceiling  a 
little  higher  or  lower,  than  his  fjncy  would  have  planned 
them.  But  waiving  ilhistr;ilitins  (if  this  sort,  i»  it  nut 
manifest  that  most  of  the  capital  abjections  argcd  against 
the  new  system  lie  with  tcnfr>ld  weight  agaitist  the  exist- 
ing tlonfeder^lton?  Is  an  iiidertiiite  power  tu  raise  money 
dangerous  tn  the  hands  of  the  federal  government?  The 
present  Congress  can  make  requisitions  to  any  amount 
they  please,  and  the  SL-iteit  are  constitutionally  iMiund  lu 
furnish  them;  they  can  emit  bills  of  credit  as  lung  as 
they  will  p,iy  for  the  paper;  they  can  borrow,  both 
abroad  and  at  home,  as  long  as  a  shilling  will  be  lent. 
Is  an  indefinite  power  to  raise  troops  dangerous?  The 
Confederation  gives  to  Congress  that  power  also;   and 


Kt^Msl        POt^ERS  OF  CO.VG/IESS  UFStESS. 


ihcy  have  already  bcgiia  to  make  use  of  it,  U  it  im- 
proper and  unsafe  to  intermix  the  ditferent  powers  of 
government  in  ilie  *ame  body  uf  men?  Congress  a  single 
body  of  men,  are  ihc  sole  depositary  of  all  the  federal 
powers.  Is  it  particularly  dangerous  to  give  the  keys  of 
the  treasury,  and  the  comm.ind  of  the  army,  into  the 
same  hands?  The  Confederation  places  them  both  in 
the  hands  of  Congress.  Is  a  bill  of  rights  essential  tu 
liberty?  The  Confederation  has  no  bill  of  rights.  Is  it 
an  objection  against  the  new  Constitution  that  tt  cm- 
powers  Ihc  Senate,  with  the  concurrence  of  the  Execu- 
tive, to  make  treaties  which  are  to  be  the  laws  of  the 
land?  The  existing  Congress,  without  any  such  control, 
can  make  treaties  which  they  themselves  have  declared, 
and  mnst  of  the  States  have  rccognixed,  to  be  llie  supreme 
law  of  the  land.  Is  the  importation  of  slaves  permitted 
by  the  new  Constitution  for  twenty  years?  By  the  old  it 
is  permitted  forever. 

I  shall  be  told  that,  however  dangerous  this  mixture  of 
powers  may  be  in  theory,  it  is  rendered  harmle&s  by  the 
dependence  of  Congress  on  the  Stales  for  the  means  of 
carrying  ihcm  into  practice;  that.  Imwcverlarge  the  m.iss 
(if  powers  may  be,  it  in  in  fact  a  lifeless  mass.  Then,  say 
I,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  Confederation  is  chargeable 
with  the  Slill  greater  f<dly  of  declaring  certain  prtwers  in 
the  federal  govcrnmcni  to  be  absolutely  necessary  and 
at  Ihc  same  lime  rendering  them  absolutely  nugatory; 
and,  in  the  next  place,  that  if  the  Union  is  to  continue, 
and  no  better  governmcui  be  substituted,  effective 
powers  must  either  be  granted  to,  or  assumed  by,  the 
existing  Congress;  in  either  of  which  evi-nt«,  ihe  con- 
trast just  Slated  will  hold  good.  But  this  is  not  all. 
Out  of  Ihts  lifeless  mass  has  already  grown  an  excrescent 
power,  which  tends  to  realii^e  alt  the  <langerK  that  can  be 
apprehended  from  a  defective  construction  of  the  supreme 
gOTcrnment  of  the  Union.  It  is  now  no  lunger  a  point 
of  specalation  and  hope  tliat  the  Western  territory  is  a 
mine  of  va&t  wealth  to  the  United  States;  and  althou<th 
It  is  not  of  &ach  a  nature  as  to  extricate  them  (rum  their 


^ 


344      AUrUORlTV  ASSUMED  BY  CONGRESS.    Wo.  St  t>7l 


present  distresses,  or,  for  some  time  to  come,  lo  yicUI 
any  regular  RU[>|)1ie»  for  the  public  expenses,  yet  must  It 
Bm  hereafter  be  able,  under  proper  management, 

Va.T.  both  to  cUTect  a  gradual  di&ch^rge  of  the  do- 

mestic debt,  and  to  furnish,  for  a  certain  period,  libera] 
tributes  to  the  federal  treasury.  A  very  large  proportion 
of  this  fund  has  been  already  surrendered  by  individual 
States;  and  it  may  with  reason  be  expected  that  the 
remaining  States  will  not  persist  in  withholding  similar 
pruofsuf  their  eiiuityand  generosity.  We  may  calculate, 
therefore,  that  a  rich  and  fertile  country,  of  an  area  equal 
to  the  inhabited  extent  of  the  United  States  will  soon 
become  »  natiomil  stock.  Congress  have  assumed  the 
administration  of  this  stock.  TUcy  have  begun  to  render 
it  productive.  Congress  have  undertaken  to  do  more: 
they  have  proceeded  to  form  new  States,  to  erect  tem- 
porary governments,  to  appoint  officers  for  them,  and  to 
prescribe  the  conditions  on  which  such  States  shall  be 
admitted  into  the  Confederacy.  All  this  has  been  done; 
and  done  without  the  least  color  of  constitutional 
anthortty.  Yet  no  blame  has  been  whispered;  no  alarm 
has  been  sounded.  A  ckcat  and  tN-Dt:Pif.vi»ENT  fund  of 
revenue  is  passing  into  the  hands  of  a  sinclk  body  of  men, 
who  can  raise  troops  to  an  i.ndk>'imte  number,  and 
appropriate  money  to  their  support  for  an  iNUKriHlT* 
PEKioD  or  Tiur„  And  yet  there  are  men  who  have  not  only 
b-'tn  .•lilcnt  spectators  of  this  prospect  but  who  arc  advo- 
cates for  the  system  which  exhibits  it;  and,  at  the  same 
time,  urge  against  the  new  system  the  objections  which  we 
have  heard.  Would  they  not  act  with  more  consistency 
ill  urging  the  cstabli^thment  of  the  latter,  as  no  less  nee- 
cflsary  to  guard  the  Union  against  the  future  powcra  and 
resources  of  a  body  constructed  like  the  existing  Con- 
gress tlian  to  save  it  from  the  dangers  threatened  by  the 
present  impotcncy  of  that  Assembly? 

I  mean  not,  by  anything  here  said,  to  throw  censure 
on  the  measures  which  have  been  pursued  by  CongresiL 
I  am  sensible  they  could  not  have  done  otherwise.  The 
public  interest,  the  necessity  of  the  case,  imposed  npun 


M>akoa]        Kf.PUBUCA/f  FORM  ACCEPTABLE.  HI 

them  the  task  of  overleaping  their  constitutional  limits. 
But  is  not  the  fact  an  alarming  proof  of  the  danger 
mulling  from  a  government  which  does  not  pu&scM 
rcEular  powers  commensurate  to  its  objects?  A  dissolu- 
tion or  usurpation  is  the  dreadful  dilemma  to  which  it  is 
continually  exposed. 

PUBUUS. 


No.  39  [38].       (/■./^■^■ryMr-M/.  juury  tb,  ifU.)       kladisoo. 

THE  CONSTITUTION    STRICTLY   REPUBLICAN. 

Only  c  rt/nMiian  lyittm  fntiUi  /*r  AMtrita—Tit  friaiifti  of 
TifutHtn*  gntrttntui  sk-trtn  tytLttH^tfi — Til  frefatrJ ttnilitulitn  tim- 
furmt  If  tin  tUn.hr J~Prta/i  nf  Ikil  f'tm  ik*  frrriliami  9/  tkt  <4»fH- 
tution-^^Ntilhir  wA*Uf  iMtiimaJ  mrr  uiMty  /tdtrat. 

Ttf  the  Ptoflt  of  Iht  State  of  New  Yerk: 

The  last  paper  having  concluded  the  observations 
which  were  meant  to  introduce  a  candid  survey  of  the 
plan  of  giivernment  reported  by  the  convention,  we  now 
proceed  to  the  execution  of  that  part  of  our  undertaking. 

The  first  question  that  offers  itself  is  whether  the 
general  form  ami  aspect  of  the  (tovcrnmcnt  be  strictly 
republican.  It  is  evident  that  no  other  form  would  be 
reconcilable  with  the  K*^niHfi  nf  the  people  of  America; 
witli  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  Revolution;  or 
with  that  honorable  determination  which  animates  every 
votary  of  free<lom  to  reKt  all  our  puliltcal  ex{>eriments 
on  the  capacity  of  mankind  for  seK-jjovernment.  If  the 
plan  of  the  convention,  therefore,  be  found  to  depart 
from  tlie  republican  character,  its  advocates  must  aban- 
don it  as  no  longer  defensible. 

What,  then,  are  the  distinctive  characters  of  the  re- 
piiblic^tn  form?  Were  an  answer  to  this  (|uestion  to  be 
sought,  not  by  recurring  to  principles;,  but  in  the  applica- 
tion of  the  term  by  political  writers  to  the  constitutions  of 
(lifTcrent  Sutct,  no  iHttisfactory  one  would  ever  be  found. 


34'' 


DEFINITION  OF  REPUBLIC. 


[Vo.  SA  <»> 


ItutlamJ,  in  which  no  particle  of  the  saprcme  authority 
is  derived  from  the  people,  has  p-isxed  almojtt  untversully 
Ditdcr  the  (Icnoraiiialiun  of  a  republic.  The  same  title 
has  b«n  bestowed  on  Venice,  where  absolute  power  over 
the  ereat  body  of  the  people  is  exercised,  in  the  rao&i 
absolute  manner,  by  a  small  body  of  hereditary  nobles, 
['oland.  which  is  a  mixture  of  aristocracj'  and  of  mon- 
archy in  their  worst  forms,  has  been  dignified  with  the 
same  appellation.  The  xovcrnment  of  Englaitd,  which 
has  one  republican  branch  only,  combined  with  an  hered- 
it.-iry  aristocracy  and  muiuirchy,  has,  with  »)ual  impro- 
priety, been  frequently  placed  on  the  list  of  republics. 
'I'hcsc  examples,  which  arc  nearly  as  dissimilar  to  each 
other  as  to  a  genuine  republic,  show  the  eitrenic  inae- 
curacy  with  which  the  term  has  been  u&ed  in  political 
dis(|utsilions. 

H  we  rexorl  for  a  criterion  to  the  different  principles 
on  which  different  forms  of  government  are  eMablished, 
we  may  define  arepublk  to  be,  or  at  least  may  bestow 
that  name  on,  ^  gnvprnpn-nt  which  d<.rivc^  all  its  powers 
dlrfi;'tly  nr  jniHr<'illy-  froin  tht'  i;rf;il  liinly  ilf  tile  pgnple, 
aira   is   adroinistcrcd    by    persons    hDldiiig"  tlieir   otBCA 

'nirriTTed  linwHt.    UL'  mu'liiij   gwwl 

It  i<t  eaenlia}  to  «iicii  a  governnri'irf  tlldl  It'bc 
derived  from  the  great  body  of  the  society,  not  from  an 
inconsiderable  proportion,  or  a  favored  class  of  It;  other- 
wise a  handful  of  tyrannical  nobles,  exercising  ttteir 
oppressions  by  a  delegation  of  their  powers,  might  aspire 
to  the  rank  of  republicans  and  claim  (or  Ihi-ir  jjorcmment 
the  honorable  title  of  republic.  It  ts  tuffidtnt  fur  such 
a  government  that  the  persons  administering  it  be 
appointed,  cither  directly  or  indirectly,  by  the  people; 
and  that  they  hold  their  appointments  by  cither  of  the 
tenures  just  spccifii-d;  otherwise  every  govcrnmrnt  in 
the  United  States,  as  well  as  every  other  popular  goveni* 
ueat  that  has  been  or  can  be  well  organized  or  wdl 
executed,  would  be  degradrd  from  the  republican  charac- 
ter. Aix:ordtng  to  the  constitution  of  every  State  in  the 
Union,  some  or  oUier  of  the  officers  of  govcrament  are 


Ki 


XadiMBl        TE.VUItES  UNDER  CONSTITUTION.  »47 

appointed  indirectly  only  by  the  people.  According  to 
most  of  them,  the  chief  magistrate  himself  is  so  appointed. 
And  according  to  one,  this  mode  of  appointment  is  ex- 
tended to  one  of  the  co-ordinate  branches  of  the  legisla- 
turc.  According  to  all  the  constitutions,  also,  the  tenure 
of  the  highest  oliices  is  extended  to  a  derinitc  period,  and 
in  many  instances,  both  within  the  legislative  and  execu- 
tive departments,  to  a  period  of  years.  Ac<:ording  to  the 
provisions  of  must  of  the  constitutions,  ^giiin,  ;ik  well  aa 
according  to  the  most  respectable  and  received  opinions 
on  the  subject,  the  members  of  the  judiciary  department 
are  to  retain  their  ofBces  by  the  firm  tenure  of  good 
behavior. 
_Qn  cointiatitig  ihe  (^iwirtilulion  i>Ia.nne<l  1>v  the  conveiuion  willi 

the  SI.ITi'l.il')  li'-n-  funi,  wi~|n-i.  1-1  vr  .i'  nra  r  'tiit  il  n  in  tli>.  mnti 
lignj  >fn!^.  rc>mLHTiiiili)i:  tiril.  1  li'j  llfU5C  ol  RtpiriCiilalircs. 
lirdhnlAI  aw  ri^;iiicli~l  least  of  all  llie  Stair  lecisbttiTr;..  is 
rlKled  inimcitUit^ly  liy  ihc  ^nM  boily  of  ihc  people.  The  Senate, 
like  the  present  C<Mi);ress  itnd  the  Senate  of  Mitrylanit,  dfiivea 
its  Appmiilinviil  ini|iri-cit|'  (tnin  llic  people.  I'hc  rrcsidcnl  lit 
IncUrecily  dcrlt-cil  fiuiu  ti>c  ehoice  ol  il>c  people,  accorilnig  (o  the 
ciiimplc  in  inosl  ol  the  SlatM.  Ki-eo  llie  juilnes,  willi  all  oilier 
officers  of  llie  Union,  will,  ns  in  llic  wvctal  Stairs,  bp  llie  choice, 
lliough  a  reiiiDle  diuicc.  ol  (he  [KOpIe  ll)Clll^cllret.  "'"^"'  (llinlf''"1 
ol  the  ^i^ll;>«^n^"'■•^n^  it  wmalW  yiiifftnuablr  ID  the  rcpilWican 
ManiUrd  ani<  tu  llie  mridel  of  Simile  conslilu lions.  The  House  ol 
Reprcsenlalik'cs  i%  periodk^lly  elective,  as  ill  all  ibe  Stales;  aitd 
for  ll»e  period  lA  two  yean,  as  in  ilie  State  of  South  Carolina. 
The  Senate  is  cleeiirc,  for  the  period  of  six  years;  which  i:i  but  one 
yeat  more  than  ilie  peiiuti  of  tl»c  Senate  of  Maryland,  and  but  iwu 
more  than  thai  of  the  Senates  of  New  Yu«k  .nnd  Virginia.  Tlic 
IVeudent  is  (o  continue  in  uflicc  for  the  pciiod  of  four  years ;  as 
in  New  York  and  De1an*are  the  chief  magistrate  is  elected  lor 
three  yeais.  aitd  in  South  Catoiina  for  two  years.  In  the  other 
Stales  the  election  is  annual.  In  teveral  ol  ilie  Stato,  liowever, 
noconstiiulional  piovitton  is  made  for  the  impcachmeni  of  ihe 
chief  magitlrale.  And  in  Delaware  and  Viripiiia  he  is  not 
impeachable  til)  oat  of  oflice.  The  Presiilent  of  the  Uniied  Slates 
b  trapeachatile  at  any  lin>c  during  liis  conlinuaiKe  in  uflice.  The 
tenure  by  wlikh  thr  judge.s  are  to  hol<l  their  platxs  is.  as  il 
unqncslionalily  ou];hl  lo  be.  tlul  i>l  [;""d  bchatioi.  Tile  tenuie 
of  llic  niinbtciul  oBiccs  geneially  will  be  a  subject  of  legal 


»4« 


KEAt.  CHARACTER  OF  UNION.        UI».»(Mt 


Kgulslion,  CDiirormablr  to  the  reason  ol  llie  cue  nn<l  \\x  cutnple 
of  llw  Stale  constitutions. 

Could  any  (urtlier  proof  be  fequireil  of  the  TepuUlion  compkiEion 
of  lh>B  system,  die  most  decisive  one  might  l>c  found  in  its  jbMtate 
ptoliibition  of  tlik's  of  notiility,  liotli  uiiikr  the  (etlcral  an<l  the 
Stale  governments  :  and  in  its  express  giijtraniy  of  llie  rcpvUican 
lurm  (u  each  of  the  Ulter. 

"But  it  was  not  sufficient,"  say  the  adversaries  of  the 
proposed  Constitution,  "for  the  convention  to  adhere 
to  the  republieiin  form.  The/  ought,  with  etiuiil  care, 
lo  have  preserved  the  ffJtral  fortn,  which  rvjranls  lite 
Union  as  a  CoHftJeraty  of  soverclRil  states;  instead  of 
which,  they  have  framed  a  nafwnal  government,  which 
regards  the  Union  as  a  ttmsoiidatieit  of  the  States."  And 
it  is  asked  by  what  authority  this  bold  and  radical 
innovation  was  undcrlakenp  The  Iiandle  which  has  been 
made  of  this  objection  requires  that  it  should  be  esani> 
incd  with  some  precision. 

Without  inquiring  into  the  accuracy  of  the  dislinctioo 
on  which  the  objection  is  founded,  it  will  he  necessary  to 

a    just  estimate    of    its    force,  firtt     in    J^-irtain    |[n»    n>al 

character  of  the  povcrnmcnt  in  (|ucsliiin;  secondly,  to 
inquire  how  far_thc  convention  tfei'c  authorized  lo  pro- 

~'poieMii.ti  .1  tjOVernmeni;  and  thirdly,  how  far  the  duty 
iTiey  owed  to  their  country  could  supply  any  deject  of 
rcuular  authority! 

l-lrit. — In  order  to  ^■tf'-t^in   th^.  r<-al  rS\ati\rMrr  r^{   (he 

»■  government,  it  may  be  considered  in  relation  lo  the 
foundation  on  which  it  is  to  t>c  estahiished ;  to  the  sources 
from  which  its  ortlinary  powers  are  to  be  drawn;  to  the 
operation  of  those  powers;  to  the  extent  of  them;  anil 
to  the  authority  hy  which  future  changes  in  the  govern- 
ment are  to  be  introduced. 

On  examining  the  first  relation,  it  appears,  on  one 
hand,  that  the  Consiitution  is  to  he  foutidcd  on  the 
assent  and  ratification  of  the  people  of  America,  given 
by  deputies  elected  for  the  spcri^d  purpose;  hut,  on  the 
other,  that  this  absent  and  ratification  is  to  be  given 
by  the  people,  not  as  individuals  composing  one  etttirt 


IbdiMii] 


COffSTtTUTION  is  FEDERAL. 


149 


pation,  but  a«  composing  the  distinct  iind  independent 
States  to  which  they  respectively  lielong.  It  'vt  to  be 
the  assent  and  ratificatioD  of  the  several  Stales,  derived 
(rwfn  the  supreme  authority  tii  cjicIi  State — the  authority 
of  the  people  themselves.  The  act,  therefore,  t:$t»l>- 
lishiHf;  the  Constitution,  wjll   not  br  a^ni^ftiuil    \\\i   ■. 

in-al  art. 

That  it  will  be  a  feder;il  and  not  a  niitimial  net,  as 
these  terms  arc  understood  by  the  objectors — the  atl  o( 
the  people,  as  forming  so  many  independent  States,  not 
as  forming  one  a.%^xc^A\^  nation^s  obvious  frnm  this 
single  consideration,  th;it  it  is  to  reiull  neither  (rum  the 
decision  of  a  majority  of  the  people  of  the  Union,  nor 
from  that  of  a  m^tjurity  of  the  States.  It  must  result 
from  the  unanimoui  ai-wiW  of  the  several  Sutes  tliat  arc 
parties  to  it,  differing  no  otherwise  from  their  urtltiiary 
assent  than  in  its  being  cipressed,  not  by  the  legislative 
authority,  but  by  that  of  the  people  themselves.  Were 
llie  people  regarded  in  this  transaction  as  forming  one 
nation,  the  will  of  the  majority  of  the  whole  people  of 
(he  United  St.ites  would  bind  the  minority  in  the  same 
manner  an  the  majority  in  each  State  mu»t  bind  the 
minority;  and  the  wdl  of  the  majority  must  be  deter- 
mined, either  by  a  comparison  of  the  individnal  votes, 
or  by  considering  the  vill  of  the  majority  of  the  Stales 
as  evidence  of  the  will  of  .1  majority  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States.  Neither  <)f  these  roles  h;i»  been  adopted^ 
Rach  State,  in  ratifying  the  Constitution,  is  considered  as 
a  sovereign  body,  independent  of  all  others,  and  only  to. 
be  bound  by  its  own  vdlunlary  act.  In  this  relation,  then,' 
the  new  Constitution  will,  if  establislied,  be  a  federal 
and  not  a  natianal  constitution. 

The  next  relation  is  to  the  sources  from  which  the  onfT" 
nary  powers  of  f^oveniment  are  to  be  derived.  The 
House  of  Representatives  will  dcrivr  jl-j  [■'■■"-"  tr.^tr,  t^f 
ji^nplr  a^  *IW^7C3;  jnrt  Ttic  prii[>if  will  be  represented  in 
(¥c  same  proportion,  and  on  the  same  principle,  as  they 
are  in  the  legislature  of  a  particular  State.  So  far  \^ 
•  govcfnmgH^  is  tfatioaa/,  not  federal.     The  Senate,  on  the 


=50 


OPEXATWiV  IS  yATlONAL. 


(Ro.  »(»> 


I  other    hand,  will    derive    its   DOWCnt    tram    tin-    Slatri,    jt 

Ipulitical  and  cucqual  societies;  und  thoe  will  be  rcpre- 
^semed  on  the  principle  of  equality  io  tl>c  Senate,  as  tliey 
low  arc  in  the  existing  Cungress,  So  tay^TT-  r'"^'''""- 
jiifiu  is  f(-utal.  n»t  national.  The  executive  (xiwer  will 
be  derived  from  a  very  compound  source.  The  Lmmcdi- 
ite  election  of  the  ['resident  is  to  b«  made  liy  the  States 
in  their  political  character*.  The  votes  allotted  u>  ihcm 
are  in  a  compound  ratio,  which  considers  them  partly  as 
distinct  and  cuctjual  societies,  partly  as  unequal  members 
of  tlic  same  society.  The  eventual  election,  again,  is  to 
be  made  liy  that  hrancli  of  the  legislature  which  consists 
of  the  national  representatives;  but  in  this  |>articular  act 
tliey  arc  to  br  thrown  into  the  form  of  individual  dcle- 
Igatioiix,  from  no  many  distinct  and  coequal  Iwdics  politic. 
Wroo)  this  aspect  of  the  government  it  appears  to  be  of 
li  mixed  <:h;iractcr,  nrLiij^ntiijg  at  least  as  many  feJ^^al  slj 
yihitiiimil  ic^i  I L  re  s. 

The  difference  between  a  federal  and  national  govern- 
ment, as  it  relates  to  ilie  o^raiian  of  ^ke  f-aifritfiriit  !■ 
supposed  to  consist  in  this,  that  in  the  former  the  powers^ 
operaie  on  the  pohlical  bodies  composinj;  the  Confedcr* 
acy,  in   their  political  capacities;  in  tlic  tatter,  on   the 
individual  citlicens  compoj-ing  the  nation,  in  tbeir  indi-. 
vidu^l   capacities.      On  trying  the  Constitution  by  ttiii^ 
.■■■:i,..H.|.^    „    f.iU    MTiiIrr    tin.;    m(ti'n\ti,    ""'    ""'  ,'■■ '''■,>' 


character;  tlion^th  pcrhajis  not  »o  compleiely  as  has  been 
understood.  In  several  cases,  and  particularly  in  the 
trial  of  controversies  to  which  States  may  be  parties,  they 
miirit  he  viewtrd  and  proceeded  uKainst  in  their  rollrciive 
and  ptiliticul  L-apucities  only,  iio  far  the  national  cuunie< 
nance  of  the  government  on  this  side  seems  to  be  dts- 
rii;ured  by  a  few  (ideral  features.  Kut  this  blemish  is 
perhaps  unavoidable  in  any  plan;  and  the  operation  vi 
the  government  on  the  people,  in  tlirir  individual  caps* 
cities,  iu  its  ordinary  and  most  csscuiial  prucecdinss,* 
may,  on  the  whole,  designate  it,  ID  tliis  relatiun,  a  nation^ 
government. 
But  if  the  government  be  itatlooal  with  regard  in  tlic 


£XT£XT  OF  /,'ATIOA'AL  POWERS. 


251 


operation  of  its  powers,  it  changes  its  aspect  again  when 
we  contcnipliitc  it  in  rcli|tiM»  to  tin:  rxUni  of  iis  pw wc rs. 
The  idea  of  u  mitioiial  Kuvcrnmcnt  involves  in  it  not 
ouly  an  authority  over  the  individual  citizens,  but  an 
indefinite  supremacy  over  all  persons  and  things,  so  far 
a>  they  are  objects  uf  lawful  government.  Among  a 
people  consolidated  into  one  nation,  thi»  supremacy  i> 
completely  vested  in  the  national  legislature.  Among 
communities  united  (or  particular  purposes,  it  is  vested 
partly  ia  the  general  and  partly  in  the  municipal  legisla- 
tures. ]n  the  former  case,  all  local  authorities  arc  sub- 
ordinate to  the  supreme;  and  may  tie  controlled,  directed, 
or  abolished  by  it  at  pleasure.  In  the  latter,  the  local 
or  municipal  authorities  form  tlistinct  and  independent 
portions  of  the  )iu|>reiiiacy,  no  more  subject,  within  their 
respective  spheres,  to  the  general  authority  than  llie 
general  authority  is  subject  to  them  within  its  own 
sphere.  Ifl  itl''  ■— '-'■""!  "■— |  't-n  pTiipniH  gpyrnm^nr 
canni'i  be  dt!cmed  a  nalj-^—'i  '■■"■'  >-i—  -  ii«  )iiciHli<;tioii 
extends  to  ccrt.-iin  enumerated  objects  only,  and  leaves 
tnTTir  >.PVri.il  .^lalr^i  a  rf,ii|ii^iry  ;imiI  ■nvi^JlaMc  sover- 
eignty over  :ill  "tl'^f  fihji-i'tt  It  i^  true  lliai,  in  contro- 
versies relating  to  the  boundary  between  the  twd 
jurisdictions,  the  tribunal  which  ts  ultimately  to  decide 
i»  to  be  tAlahlisihed  under  the  general  government.  But 
this  docs  not  change  the  principle  of  the  case.  The 
decision  is  (»  be  impartially  nude,  according  to  the  rules 
of  the  Constitution;  and  all  the  usual  and  most  effectual 
precautions  are  taken  to  secure  this  impartiality.  Some 
such  tribunal  is  rlearly  essential  to  prevent  an  appeal  to 
the  sword  and  a  dissolution  of  the  compact;  and  that  it 
ought  to  be  established  under  the  general  rather  than 
under  the  local  g«>vernnietit«,  or,  to  speak  more  properly, 
that  it  could  be  safely  established  under  the  first  alone, 
is  a  [lositi'in  nut  likely  to  be  combated. 

1  f  nry  tr^.tJic  Constitution  by  its  last  relation  to  the 
authority  by  which  amendments  are  to  t^  ni;>dc.  wc  find 
it  ncitlicf  wholly  national  nor  wholly  /tdii.il.  Were  it 
wholly 'tutiooal,   the   supreme  and   ultimate  'authority 


»S'         KIGHT  TO  PRAMS  CONHTlTVTWft.    til*.  «KWi 


would  reside  in  the  wa/i^fltof  the  people  of  the  Union; 
und  thi&  authority  ffBliTJ  be  competent  at  all  times,  like 
lh.ll  of  n  majority  of  every  national  society,  to  alter  or 
abolish  its  cstaMishcd  g'^^'crnmcnt.  Were  it  wlmlly 
federal,  on  the  other  hand,  the  concurrence  of  each  Stale 
in  the  Union  would  be  exuentinl  to  every  alteration  that 
would  be  trinding  on  all.  The  mode  provided  by  the 
plan  of  the  convention  is  not  founded  on  cither  of  these 
principles.      In  ■-■t.(.iii-ir...  ;[[^-  than  a  nmi'trily,  and   par- 

\^icularly  in  computinn;  ly  |)ifjijw.rti<in  liy  Shiiri^  not  hy 
Cj^ns,  it  ri^p,;irt-i  f«ini  'hi  iiiirtjHa/.iiiil  jiIl. .M^nt^ards 
the  ftJeral  cliiiQit'''";  Jj*->:ainli,Tin^  tt 
less  than  the  wliuk-tiLitiilmr  nt  i>tau»- 
again  inr  f'^ffg'  iinil  |firmlii  i  i  f  llir  ififi'i  iii^  i  linrTrl 
The  proposed  Constitution,  Ihcrefure,  is,  in  slritinrss, 
^  neither  a  national  nor  a  federal  Constitution,  t.m  ■,  ^t^it,. 
fliosition  of  both.  In  its  foundation  it  is  fede^,  not 
national;  in  the  sources  from  which  the  ordinary  powers 
of  the  government  are  drairn,  it  is  partly  federal  and 
partly  national;  In  the  operation  of  these  powers,  it  is 
national,  not  federal;  in  the  extent  of  them,  again,  it  is 
federal,  not  niitiiinnl;  and,  finidiy,  in  the  atiihorliaiive 
mode  of  iniroducins  amendments,  it  is  neither  wholly 
federal  nor  wholly  national. 

PUBLIUGL 


_.tll1' 


No.  40  [39].  <#rw  K*r« /•a.m.  JMWIT  ■«.<;«.)  MadlSOfl, 

THE  RIGHT  OF  THE  CONVENTION  TO  FRAME 
SUCH  A  CONSTITUTION. 

Tht  autkeriiy  mnJtr  nhkk  Ihe  ttKVenlUm  atuJ  txamiittJ—Pr^^ 
tvm  le  Attiv  rifff-M  aulkffily.  frrm  tomiiJfrUitm  mf  Jmi* — Cuuli/»- 
tim  Hurtlf  rttammrit^til — Xtitirity  f»r  a  raJital  ttimgt —  H'ielktr  the 
imitmiint  txttfici  ill  ffmrn  lUrt  itl  nfftft  tMt  furili*H  «/  raJiJlaithm. 

To  tht  Pe^f-lt  t>/  tht  State  0/  New  JV/-*.- 

Tkn  ufvtid  [lolnt  to  be  exarnlncti  is,  witeihn  the  convenlion 
net?  .)utl»>n7rd  10  (time  aitJ  pruptnc  \\>n  trn  iiiiitii>it. 

The  powcis  of  Uic  convcniion  ou^hi.  in  sn  >  he  deter- 


■I 


fiaCO.VMEXDA7-0/tY  ACTS. 


»Si 


'  mined  by  an  initpccikin  of  ()i«  cmnmlsslniis  glreii  lo  the  memlicTs 
hy  xh/eit  mpixlive  const itueiits.  A<  -ill  a(  ilii;sc,  Imwcver.  hiiil 
rcfffcncc.  eilhc*  lo  itw  recomiiK-ndaiion  Irom  ilie  nicclin^  M 
Anna|>uta.  in  Seplcinber,  (785.  ot  to  thai  froin  Ccngicss,  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1787.  ii  will  br  suffi<:icni  to  recur  to  ihesc  p.iiiic-uiur  act*. 
Tlic  act  (roni  Anna|>olis  rccoinmenits  the  "  appiiiiitmcnl  o(  cnn»- 

■  intuionen  tu  take  into  coii^iiieratiori  the  sltuatton  of  (he  UiiitL-d 

'Sutcs;  10  iicvii/c  iitcA/ur/Afr  fir,>fiti>int  ;is  nhiill  n|)|KMr  to  tlicin 
Mcccnary  lo  render  llie  Cuiiitilulion  oi  tlie  (c<le'ra1  govciritiiL'nt 
adejitalf  fa  (he  txi^twiei  of  Ihe  Vnian:  aii<l  lo  nrport  sgcli  an 
«ct  for  t)i4t  purpose,  lo  the  United  Statu  in  Coogrrss  aMcmlilcd. 
u  when  agreed  10  by  tlKin.  iind  aficrwjnis  con  tinned  by  the  lirgis- 

llAture  of  r.vcry  Slate.  Mill  cffcctuidly  providr  fni'  the  s-iiiie." 

The  rrs'ommcndalnry  act  of  Congress  ■«  in  ttie  wotiU  fotlowii));: 
"  WheiF^iK.  there  b  provision  iti  the  arlklcit  of  Cni>foc1ri;itii}ii  .ind 
p«ipciaal  Union,  (or  making  alieinlloii^  therein,  by  the  assent  of 
a  Congteu  o(  the  United  States  nticl  of  the  legisl.tlurcs  <i(  ihe 
several  Slatrs;  and  whereas  cKpciience  hath  ccinced.  Ih.il  lhri« 
are  defects  in  the  present  Confederation;  as  a   mean  lo  renicily 

bwhich,  Mvcral  of  ihc  Slates.  ani]  parlieiilitrly  Iht  Slate  0/  .VfW 
Vori,  by  eiptens  instruction*  to  iheir  i)eleg.-iies  in  Congre»,  have 
stSBfsitdJi  convention  (or  ihe  purposes  ex presM-d  in  Ihe  (ollnw- 
ing  re*olutK>n ;  and  such  coniYntion  appejiring  to  he  ihe  niinit 
probable  mean  of  esublishing  in  these  States  a  firm  Halittnal 
fmftrnmtMl : 

Resof)/ed,—J\aa.  in  the  opinion  o(  Congress  it  is  cximlient, 
lh:il  on  the  second  Moml.iy  of  May  next  a  convention  "f  deles^ite*, 
wlw  Uiall  have  been  nppoinird  by  the  jci'eral  Slxics.  he  held  at 
I'hiladeliiliia,  (or  Ihe  sole  and  exj>re3S  pgrposc  ef  reviu'ng  Ihe 
articiti  0/  C<M/riiermiiH,  and  rcponiDg  lo  CoiigreM  and  (he 
9C*crail  leglsUtor«  swch  alUratitmt  and  previtiam  therein,  as 
shall,  when  aKrecd  lo  in  Congress,  and  confirmed  by  the  Stalw, 
rvitrter  Ihe  (cderal  Consiituiron  adequate  lo  the  txigenda  0/ 
gmrrrnmeni  and  Ihe  /treservalieti  ef  the  UnUn." 

From  these  two  *cts.  it  appear^  1st,  lliai  ihe  object  of  Ihe  con- 
vention <vas  lo  eslablisli,  in  these  Slates,  a  firm  naltimal  gm/erti- 
mtni:  id,  ih.ti  this  government  was  to  he  such  as  wouki  lie  ade- 
yttale  lo  Ihe  exigeneiet  of gm-ernmeul  and  the  pretet^^tltan  ef  Ihe 
Unton;  3d,  ihjit  these  purposes  were  lo  be  effected  by  alleralions 
and pravitJOHi  it  the  arlieles  fif  Cenfederaliois,  as  it  is  exprewc<l 
in  the  act  nf  Congress,  or  by  }vtk  ftirlher  froviu'ons  as  should 
appear  neeeiseiry.  as  It  siands  in  the  recommendatory  act  from 
Aiuiapolb:  4lti,  liut  lh«  aliemiinns  and  provisions  were  to  be 


»54   ADEQUATE  COVERXMENT DEMANDED.    OTo-tSOU 

repotted  to  Congttss.  aiij  lo  the  Siaics.  in  otder  10  be  iigiced  to 
by  the  former  and  confirmci]  by  the  Uiirr. 

From  a  compariMn  acitl  fair  consliuclion  of  thtic  jevcral  nxxlet 
of  expression  b  to  be  deduced  ihe  authority  under  which  the  con> 
vcntton  acted.  They  were  to  (ranw  a  nalivnal  govrrHmtmt,  ade- 
quate to  the  exigeitcies  of  gavemmtnl,  and  ef  Ik*  Uhi^h;  and  to 
reduce  the  articles  of  Confedetailon  into  such  lomi  as  to  acconi- 
pibh  these  putpi»es. 

There  are  two  lulcs  of  con  it  ruction,  dictated  by  plain  rca&on.  »% 
well  v  founded  un  le);a)  axii>iii!i.  The  one  it  that  every  pan  of 
the  ciprcMion  ought,  if  possible,  to  br  allowed  vom^  meanmg.  and 
be  made  to  conspire  to  sontv  coinnion  end.  Tlic  other  b  that 
where  the  ierrral  pari*  cannot  be  made  la  ciincide,  the  leu 
important  should  give  way  to  the  mure  important  part ;  the  means 
should  be  t-tcrilked  to  the  end  rather  than  the  end  to  the  meant. 

Suppose,  then,  that  the  expressions  delinmg  the  authority:  of  llie 
convention  were  irreconcilably  a<  variance  with  each  other  i  that 
a  tutlianal  and  aJt^uale  girvntment  coahl  nut  positbly,  in  llie 
JMdjiinent  of  the  convention,  be  eftrcted  by  aiUratwnt  and  ^i^ 
visions  \n  tlie  iirlitltt  of  Con/fiitraliim;  which  part  of  the  dcbni- 
lion  ought  to  have  been  ef>ilincrd.  and  which  rejected?  Which 
was  the  more  important,  which  Ihe  Wss  impottant  part?  Wliith 
the  end :  which  (he  means  ?  \m  ihc  mml  scrupulous  exposiiors 
of  (letegated  powers;  let  tlie  most  invricraic  objectors  againu 
lho«  exercised  by  the  convention,  answer  the*e  quaiions.  Let 
them  declare  wlieiher  it  was  i>l  moM  importance  to  the  liappincu 
o4  the  people  of  America  that  the  articlek  of  Confederation  shuilU 
be  diiregarded,  and  an  ade<|Ujiie  );iiveTniiH.'ht  be  prorlded.  and  the 
Union  pfcscrved;  or  that  an  adequate  gnvcrnmeiu  should  lie 
omitted,  and  the  attrcle*  o(  Con  federation  prcsencd,  Let  them 
declare  whether  IIk  preservation  of  these  arlicks  was  the  end 
fur  secuniij;  which  a  reform  of  Ihe  governiiimt  was  lo  l>c  intro- 
duced a*  the  means;  or  whether  the  eslabtlihmeni  al  a  goTeni* 
nieni.  adc<|uatc  to  the  national  happiness,  was  ibc  end  at  which 
these  articles  themselves  oriipnatly  aimeit,  and  lo  which  lliey 
ought,  as  invufbcient  means,  to  have  been  sacrificed. 

Uul  is  it  necessary  lo  suppose  that  these  expressions  ate  abso- 
lutcly  irreconcilable  lo  each  oihei ;  that  no  alltralitms  or  pra- 
visiani  in  lAt  arlicUs  of  IMe  Canfe.ifratii<H  could  possibly  nwld 
ihem  into  a  national  and  aileqiiaie  govcmmeni;  iniu  xucli  a 
government  as  has  been  proixn^d  by  the  coriicnlvon  ? 

No  Ktrcts,  U  is  pfcsunml,  will,  in  ifab  case,  be  laid  on  Ihe  ttlh; 
«  change  of  that  could  never  be  dccincd  an  eMrci»c  ol  ungrantetl 


/.VDir /DUALS. 


»55 


power.  Alleratiotu  in  itie  body  of  the  inKiruineni  me  expreuly 
auihofitnl.  Nmr prmitioHi  OieiL-i(i  are  alw  FX|>rcsBl>*  uulliorJied. 
Here  iheti  n  a  (lowcr  to  change  ihc  littc ;  !■>  inscn  new  arlicles : 
(o  alter  old  owes.  Must  It  of  ncccuiiy  be  ;i<lrnil(ci]  that  this 
power  U  inftingeiJ.  so  long  ma  pan  of  ihc  oltl  .inicles  remain? 
Those  who  mBiniJiin  ihc  sffiimaiivi:  ou^ht  at  least  to  mark  Die 
boundur>' beiweeo  aull>otii«d  and  usurped  innovaiionK;  between 
■hai  degree  of  change  which  ties  within  the  couip^&s  ol  alleralhnt 
and/nrlhrr  prvtiisifni.  und  llint  wtiicli  amounts  to  a  Iratismula- 
lion  of  Ihc  gnvernincni.  Will  it  be  Ulid  that  the  altcraliofii  ought 
not  to  have  touched  the  &ul»tance  ol  the  Confederation?  The 
States  would  never  h.ivc  appointed  a  convention  mith  so  much 
soleinnit)-.  nor  described  Its  objects  with  so  much  latitude,  if  some 
lubitantial  reform  hail  not  been  in  contemplation.  Will  \\  be 
said  tlial  1.\k  /HnJamfiUal  priHu'pUi  ol  the  Conlcdemtiun  were 
not  within  llie  purview  nf  the  convention,  and  ought  not  (o  have 
been  varied  ?  I  ailc.  What  aic  these  piinci{ites  ?  Do  they  rctiuire 
ihai.  in  the  estalilishmcnt  of  the  Consiiiuiion.  the  States  should 
be  regarded  as  diMinct  and  inilepeiKleni  sovereigns?  Tliey  are 
to  regarded  li)- the  ConMiluiion  projinscd.  Do  ihcy  tcquire  that 
the  members  of  the  goremint^nt  should  derive  iheir  appoinlment 
fiom  the  Irgisblures,  not  from  the  people  ol  the  Slates?  One 
branch  o(  the  new  govcrnnient  is  to  be  ninioinlcd  liy  these  legisla- 
tures ;  and  under  the  ConfciJcialion,  the  dele^alrs  to  Cungiess 
tnay  ail  be  appoininl  ininiediaieiy  by  the  people,  and  in  (wo 
States*  arc  actually  so  appointed.  Do  ihcy  leqobe  that  ihc 
powers  of  the  go>-cmn>cnt  should  act  on  the  Slates,  and  nut  un- 
mediately  on  individuals?  In  some  inst.inccs.  as  has  been  shown, 
the  powers  of  the  new  goveimncnt  wil!  act  on  the  Slates  in  their 
collective  ehnraclera.  In  some  instances,  also.  lhor>c  of  ihc  exist- 
ing government  aet  immediately  on  individuals.  In  CJSCS  of 
capture;  of  piracy :  of  the  iiost  olfice;  of  coins,  weighlk.  and  mea^ 
ures:  of  trade  with  (he  Indians:  of  claims  under  grants  of  land 
by  diHerenI  Sialics :  and.  above  all.  in  the  c.ise  of  tri.-ds  by  courts* 
martial  in  the  army  and  iMvy,  by  which  death  may  be  inflicted 
wilfaont  the  intervcnttoii  of  a  jury-,  or  even  of  a  civil  mngittnite — 
in  all  ibesc  c.ises  the  powers  of  the  Confederation  operate  inime- 
dUlety  on  the  persons  and  interests  of  individual  ciiiieivs.  Do 
thcK  fundainental  principles  require,  |>arlicularly,  that  no  lax 
slwuld  be  levied  without  the  inlei mediate  agency  o]  the  Stales? 
Tlir  Con  fell  era  lion  itself  aulhoriies  a  direct  lax.  to  a  certain 
citenl,  on  the  post  ol&ce.    The  powet  of  coinage  has  been  socoo* 

'  Connecticut  anil  Rhode  Island.— PuULttfS. 


ass 


POPULAR   CONFIRMATION. 


iiro.40il») 


sliu«cl  by  CoTigiesi  iu  to  IcTy  a  (ribute  im)i>cclulcly  from  Uul 
source  at«n.  Dui  prclrcmitiing  throe  inm.incn,  was  it  not  an 
acknowledged  object  of  lite  convention,  and  the  uiiivwMl  cxpecU- 
lion  of  lh«  |ico|>Ic.  ilui  (he  regulation  oi  trade  ihould  be  mbinilted 
lo  the  general  i;m'eniinent  in  such  a  (otm  as  would  ietid«r  it 
an  immciliatr  source  o(  gcnriAl  revenue?  Had  not  Congm* 
rcpcateilty  recommended  litis  measure  as  not  iiicoiisisiieni  with  ilie 
fundamental  princip1c«  of  the  Confederation?  tl;id  not  every 
Siaie  but  one.  bad  not  New  York  lierKlf,  so  far  complied  v>iih 
the  |)lan  <A  Con};m^  as  lo  recn^niie  the  prtHcipU  of  the  innova- 
tion ?  Do  lliese  principles,  Ln  tine,  rexgulre  that  the  powers  of  the 
general  |;overnment  should  be  limited,  and  thai,  beyond  ihU  bmit. 
the  Slates  should  be  left  in  possession  of  their  sovereignty  and 
independenci;  ?  We  have  seen  lliat  in  the  new  |;oveniment,  as  in 
the  old,  Ihe  general  powers  arc  limiteil  ;  and  that  the  State*,  in  all 
unenumeraieit  cases,  are  left  in  lite  enjoyment  ol  lltcir  sovereifn 
and  inde|>cmleat  jurisdiction. 

The  trtith  is  th.it  the  great  principles  of  the  Conslilulion  pri- 
|)USFd  by  the  convention  may  be  consiiletcd  leu  ai  absolutely  new 
than  as  the  expansion  ol  principles  which  aie  found  in  lite  articles 
of  Confederation.  The  misfortune  under  the  latter  system  has 
been  that  these  pimciples  are  so  feeble  and  contiiied  as  to  juslrfy 
all  the  charges  of  inefficiency  which  have  been  urged  against  it, 
and  to  require  a  degree  of  cnlargcmcnl  which  gives  to  tite  ikw 
system  Ihe  aspect  of  an  entire  Irantfoimation  of  the  old. 

In  one  particular  it  is  admitted  that  the  convenllon  have  de- 
parted from  the  tenor  of  llieir  commiviion.  Iniiieail  o(  reporlinc 
a  plan  requiting  the  conlirmation  ef  Ihe  ItgisLtlHrti  I'f  all  Ihi 
Sl/iUi,  they  liave  leiwrted  a  plan  which  is  lo  be  conArmed  by  the 
pfttfiie,  aiul  may  he  canie<l  into  effect  by  lUHf  StaUt  only.  It  is 
worth)'  o4  remark  that  this  objection,  thougli  the  most  ptausiUc, 
h.-ts  I>een  the  least  urged  in  the  publications  which  have  swarmed 
against  the  convention.  The  (otbeaiance  can  only  have  pioceedeit 
(runi  an  irreiislible  conviclion  of  the  absurdity  nl  subjectitig  the 
fate  of  twelve  Slates  to  the  perverseness  or  corruption  of  a  iblr- 
leenlh;  from  the  example  of  inflexible  oppoNilion  given  by  a 
mitjarHj  of  one  xixiielh '  of  lite  people  of  America  to  a  measure 
H[i{iroved  and  chilled  for  by  llie  voice  of  twelve  Sl-iles.  comprising 
fifty'nine  sixiicihs  of  the  people—an  example  still  fm.h  in  the 
memnr)'  and  inilii^n.ition  »l  every  cillicn  who  h.ts  felt  tor  llie 
wounded  homir  iind  prmpeiily  uf  his  country.     As  this  olijection. 


'  Rhode  lilaad  refoaed  to  semi  delegates  to  Ibe  Icdcnl  coavemioit.^ 
KDrro*.  ~ 


«*««ml       SOlElfX  PURPOSE  OF  CO!fVENT!ON.         »S7 

Ihi^reforc,  has  been  In  a  manner  waive*!  by  those  who  linve  cHlU 
eli«(t  rhc  powert  of  ilie  convcniion,  1  (liKiniu  ii  without  turlher 
obcerv.itlofl. 

The  lAirti  point  lo  be  inqaited  into  it.  how  far  canvideration*  of 
duly  arising  out  of  the  cam  itself  could  have  sii[>plicd  any  defect 
of  regular  aulhoriljr. 

la  the  preceding  inquiries  the  potvcr»  of  (he  convention  have 
been  aiiiilyted  an<l  tried  wlllt  the  same  rigor,  and  l)y  tlie  uiiie 
nilci.  as  if  ihcy  liad  been  real  and  final  powers  for  the  esiablish- 
nicnt  of  a  Coniiitotion  (or  the  United  Stales.  We  liave  seen  in 
wrh.ll  m.innrr  ihry  hnvr  borne  the  trial  e\'en  on  Ihnt  siipposilioQ. 
li  ii  trm<'  now  to  recutlect  thai  the  powers  were  merely  advisory 
anil  recommrndaloiy  ;  Uial  tiiry  were  sn  mean)  hy  llie  State*  and 
so  UMtemood  by  ili«  convention  :  and  (hat  the  Utter  have  acvoid- 
ingly  planned  ami  proposed  a  Conttitutton  which  i«  to  he  of  no  mare 
consequence  than  iIk  paper  on  which  it  n  written,  unless  it  be 
tiainpcfl  with  lite  approbation  of  thotc  to  whom  it  is  addrrued. 
This  reflection  places  the  subject  in  a  point  of  view  altogether  dif- 
ferent. a.nd  will  enable  us  to  judge  with  propriety  of  the  course 
I.) ken  by  the  convention. 

Let  us  view  (he  grmind  on  which  the  ccinrrntion  stood.  It  may 
be  collected  from  their  proceedings  that  iliey  were  deeply  and 
unanimously  impressed  with  the  crisis  which  had  led  their 
country  almost  with  one  voice  to  make  90  singular  and  solemn  an 
experiment  for  correcting  the  errors  of  a  system  by  which  this 
crisis  had  been  produceil;  that  they  were  no  less  deeply  and 
unanimously  convinced  that  such  a  reform  uh  they  have  proposed 
wn»  niMOfulHy  neceswry  (o  eftect  the  purposes  of  their  appoint- 
ment, II  cotild  not  be  unknown  to  thcin  tli:it  the  hupet  and 
ctpectaiions  of  the  gre.1l  body  of  ritlzrns  throughout  this  great 
empire  were  turned  urith  the  keenest  unxicty  tu  the  event  o(  their 
dFlDicr.iiions.  They  h.id  ei'rry  reason  to  liclieve  that  the  contrary 
srniiments  agitated  the  minds  and  boMtins  o(  every  external  and 
internal  foe  to  the  tlberiy  and  protipcriiy  of  the  United  States. 
They  had  seen,  in  the  origin  and  progress  of  the  experiment,  the 
alacrity  with  which  the  propotilioH  m.idc  by  a  single  Stale 
(V'^gini.i)  toward  a  partial  amendment  of  the  Contnleraiion  had 
been'Vitendcd  lo  and  promoietl.  They  had  seen  the  liberty 
ittitime/t  by  a  very/tw  <lcp(ities  from  a  very  fevr  Slate*,  convened 
at  Anna|>o]is,  of  recommending  a  great  and  critical  object,  wholly 
foreign  10  their  ci>mniinlon,  not  only  jusiilied  by  the  public 
opinion  but  actually  carried  into  effect  by  twelve  out  of  ihe 
tliirlcen  Stales.    They  had  seen,  in  a  variety  of  instances,  assutnp- 


*S*       CONVENTIOtf  ACTED  RESPONSIBL  Y.    »o.  «  (W 

lions  bjr  Confims.  not  only  ef  recommendatory,  Iwit  of  oprraliv*. 
poni'^rs,  wjirTaniciI,  in  the  public  catimaiioii.  by  occision*  anil 
objects  infinitely  less  urgent  than  iboic  by  which  titeir  conduct 
wm  (o  br  govcincd.  They  inuU  have  rclkcinl  thai,  in  all  ercai 
chjinitea  o(  establiihccl  t;(it-cmtncnta.  lorm«  ought  to  grve  way  to 
sutnlancc  ;  itul  a  ri^iit  adherence  In  Hich  c(uc»  to  the  furmct 
would  rendei  nominal  and  nu{[aiory  the  tranacendeiii  and  pre- 
cious right  of  the  people  lo"aboli()i  or  alter  ilveir  ]{ovetnment5 
BS  to  them  shall  seem  mint  likely  to  ellect  titeir  taiely  and  Itappi- 
nest."*  xincc  it  i«  impoMible  for  the  people  spontaneously  and 
universally  to  iiim-c  in  concert  tuwani  llwrir  object ;  and  ti  is  there- 
fore CMcntiol  that  Kuch  cfianget  be  inttttuted  by  sotne  iHfarmal 
and  utiauiboriitd  prcpatifioHt,  in.tite  by  some  |utriotic  and 
rripectabk  ciiiien  or  numl>cr  oi  citizens.  Tlicy  must  have  recol- 
lected that  it  was  by  this  irreiiul.ii  and  aHun)i:d  privilege  «f  pro> 
poi4iig  to  itic  people  plans  for  their  safety  and  hui>piiic&&  that  the 
Stales  were  first  untied  against  the  danger  with  which  lltey  were 
ihtculcnciJ  by  their  aivcicnl  guvernmcnl ;  that  cummiltecs  and 
congieuett  were  forincil  for  cone nni rating  their  eRorti  and  defend- 
ini;  iheir  rlnhti ;  aiMl  thai  evnvfnfiotn  were  tiKleJ  in  the  trveral 
Sld/ei  fur  csiablishing  the  conultuiions  under  which  ihcy  are  now 
goveriietl :  nor  could  it  hare  Ikcii  forEollen  that  no  link  Ut-lHned 
MDiples.  no  /eal  for  adhering  10  ordinary  forms,,  were  anywhere 
wen.  excqn  in  those  who  wished  lo  indulge,  under  iheM  ma^s. 
their  secret  enmity  to  the  substance  conieiulcd  for.  They  must 
liavc  borne  m  aiind  (hat,  a»  ihe  pliin  to  be  framed  and  propwieJ 
was  to  Ik  su1)milml  to  tie  pioftit  Iheinith'ei,  the  disapprobaium 
of  this  iiuptcnie  iiutliority  would  destroy  it  forever ;  its  ai>p<ubai>oi) 
blot  out  antcc«lent  crroi»  aivd  irregutaritirs-  It  might  even  have 
occurmi  to  ihcm  (hat,  where  a  disiHisition  (o  cavil  pterailcd,  iheit 
ncgteci  to  execute  llie  degiee  of  power  vested  in  them,  and  stiU 
more  their  rocommendation  of  any  meauire  whatever,  noi  wnr- 
ranied  by  ihcir  commisuun,  n-ould  not  less  excite  nnimadverrsion, 
than  a  rcconimrndatioo  at  once  oj  a  measure  fully  commensurate 
lo  the  national  exigencies. 

Had  the  convention,  under  all  these  imprrvsions  and  In  the 
midst  of  all  these  consideratious.  iiiMe^id  of  eierciitng  a  manly 
conhdcnce  in  iht-ir  cixintly.  by  whose  confidence  they  had  l>rrD  so 
prculi.trly  disiinguiiliod.  and  o(  pointing  oul  a  system  capaUc.  In 
thetr  judf;nienl.  ul  securioK  its  happiness,  taken  (lie  colli  and  uillen 
rcsolniion  ofdistppniniing  111  anient  hopes,  of  saolficing substance 
to  forms,  of  committing  tlie  dearest  inlerestsof  (heir  country  to  the 

*  Dcdaruioii  ol  Imlepciiilaicc.— I'vBi.itn. 


■ailHBl 


KA  TIPICA  TtOy  JUSTIFIABLE. 


259 


anccrUinlin  v(  delay  and  the  haiani  of  ci-ents.  let  m«  ask  the 
man  who  Mn  raise  his  mind  10  one  elevated  concrpiion,  who  c-in 
awaken  in  hb  bo«>in  one  p.-tlriatic  emoiinn.  wtut  judgmenl  ought 
to  have  l»cco  pronounced  by  ihc  Imp.iiti.il  woild,  by  the  friends  of 
mankind,  by  e>ety  viituuut  citiun.  on  Ilie  coiiducl  and  chamclcr 
of  this  asscml>ly  ?  Or  if  ihcre  be  a  man  whose  projieiiilly  to  con> 
dcmn  i«  Misccpiible  of  no  control,  kl  mc  then  :i>ik  what  st-nicncc 
lie  bai  in  reserve  for  the  IweUe  Stales  wlio  uiurped  Me  pt/s.vr  o( 
)icn<ling  deputies  10  the  oonTcotion.  a  body  uticily  unknourn  to 
their  constilulions ;  for  Con^rcu,  who  recommended  the  appoinl- 
mcnt  of  ihin  bo<ly.  equally  unknown  to  the  Confederation  ;  and  for 
the  Stale  of  New  Vork.  in  pariicuUr,  which  (Mt  tirsed  and  then 
complied  i«ilh  this  unauihonicd  inltrpn^ition } 

But  thai  the  objccloia  may  be  disarmetl  of  every  piciexl.  it  shall 
be  granted  for  a  moment  ihai  the  rnnvrntion  were  neither 
aulhoriied  by  their  cominisxiun.  nor  jusiiFicd  by  circunisunccs  in 
proposint;  a  Cons.iitutian  (or  ihcir  rouniry  :  Aacf.  it  follow  that  the 
Consiiluiion  ou^jhi,  (or  that  rcjion  alone.  10  be  rcjt'Cted  ?  U. 
according  to  Ihc  not>le  precept,  it  he  lawful  to  accept  good  advice 
even  from  an  enemy,  ahall  we  *et  the  ignoble  example  of  refusing 
such  advice  even  when  it  is  oRercd  by  our  friends  ?  The  prwlenl 
Inquiry,  in  all  casein  ought  surely  to  be,  not  m  much  /r«m  wM&m 
the  advice  comrs.  as  whether  ihr  advice  hego^. 

Tli«  sum  <A  what  has  l>een  here  a<lva(tced  and  proved  is  that  Ihe 
thaiQC  aKniitii  the  convention  of  exceeding  their  puwers,  except  in 
OIK  inslunce  little  urf;ed  by  (he  objectors,  has  nn  fi>un<Iati«n  to 
support  it;  ihal  if  they  had  exceeded  their  puwer».  ihcy  weie  not 
only  wartaiiicd.  but  required,  as  the  confidentijil  sciv.inis  of  their 
country,  by  the  drcumtlaoee*  in  which  they  were  placed.  10 
twrctie  (he  II bcny  which  they  assumed;  and  ih.nt  rinally.  if  they 
hail  violated  both  lh«ir  powers  and  their  obligations,  in  proposing 
a  Conslitiilion.  this  ought  ne^Yrthclrts  to  he  embraced,  if  it  lie 
calculated  lu  aecornplbh  the  views  and  bappint-ss  of  ihc  people  of 
America.  How  far  I hi«  character  it  due  10  (he  Constilutioti  is  the 
inbjecl  undcj-  invcsii^ation.  PUULIUS. 


i6d 


ACGKEGATE  POWER  COA'FEMKED.       ara.«li4«i 


No.  41  I40I.       </iufr/r*/Hr/Mru/.jMHnrif.ii«.»     Madison. 

Tllli;   OKNKKAL    VIKW   OF  THK    POWERS   SUP- 
POSEIJ    TO    BE    VESTED    IN    THE    UNION. 

TAt  quality  ef  fivnr  tfinftrnd- — Nel  gnaltr  fimi  it  liirutd  it — 
Ctntral  ft/teiii>nl  tftiudt'tJ —  Tkr  ahftitt  ef  Iki  fviiirtt  ettiferrtd— 
t>n[aring  war  and  frantiHt  Irtlm  t/  maefiu — frrvitliif  iirmiti  and 
JImIi — Hfgulatiitg  ain/tal/iut  fful  Ikt  militia— Ltvftng  uxti  anJ  trr. 
reteing  minty.         . 

Te  Iht  Pe^^e  ef  the  Statt  af  New  York: 

The  Constitution  proposed  bjr  the  convention  may  be 
considered  under  two  general  points  of  view.  The  riKST 
relates  to  the  sum  or  quantity  of  power  which  it  vests  in 
the  government,  including  the  restraints  imposed  on  the 
States.  The  second,  to  the  particular  sirncture  of  the 
government,  and  llic  dtstribution  ot  this  power  among  its 
several  branches. 

Under  the  /'x/  view  of  the  subject,  two  important 
questions  arise:  1.  Whether  any  part  of  the  powers 
transferred  (o  the  general  government  be  unnecessary 
or  improper?  a.  Whether  the  entire  mass  of  them  be 
dangerous  to  the  portion  of  jurisdiction  left  in  the 
several  States? 

Is  the  aggregate  power  of  the  general  governiDcnt 
greater  than  ought  to  have  been  vested  in  it?  This  is 
the  yft-f/ question. 

It  cannot  have  escaped  those  who  tiave  attended  with 
candor  to  the  arguments  employed  against  the  extensive 
powers  of  the  government,  that  the  anthors  of  them  have 
very  little  considered  Iiow  far  these  powers  were  neces- 
sary means  of  attaining  a  necessary  end.  They  have 
cirosen  rather  to  dwell  on  the  inconvcniencns  which 
must  be  unavoidably  Ucndcd  with  all  political  advantages; 
and  on  the  possible  abuses  which  must  be  incident  to 
every  (Mwrrr  or  trust  of  which  a  benericial  use  ran  be 
made.  Tliis  method  nf  handling  the  subject  cannot 
impose  on   the  good  sense  of  the  |>cople  of  Amcfica. 


I 


■•JiMBl  fASlOUS  CLASSES  OF  POH'Eft.  afil 

It  may  digpU;  the  subtlety  of  tbe  writer;  it  may  open  a 
boandless  field  for  rhetoric  and  dcclumation;  it  may 
inflame  the  pa&siona  of  the  unthinking;,  and  may  confirm 
the  prcjudii-cB  of  ihc  misthinking:  but  cool  and  candid 
people  vill  at  once  reflect  that  the  purest  of  huiiuiii 
blessings  must  have  a  portion  of  alloy  in  them;  that  the 
choice  must  always  be  made,  if  out  of  the  lesser  ctiI,  at 
least  of  the  creatf.k,  nut  the  i'KKFRCT,  good;  and  that, 
in  every  political  inslitutioii,  a  power  to  advance  the 
public  happiness  involves  a  discretion  which  may  be  mis- 
applied and  abused.  They  will  see,  therefore,  that  in  all 
cases  where  power  is  to  be  conferred,  the  point  first  to 
be  decided  is,  whether  such  a  power  be  necessary  to  the 
public  good;  as  the  next  will  be,  in  case  of  an  affirmative 
decision,  to  guard  as  effectually  as  possible  against  a 
perversion  of  the  power  to  the  public  detriment. 

That  wc  may  form  a  correct  judgment  on  this  subject. 
It  will  be  proper  to  review  the  several  powers  conferred 
<jn  the  government  of  the  Union;  and  that  this  may  be 
the  more  conveniently  done,  they  may  be  reduced  into 
different  classes  as  ibi-y  relate  to  the  rollowiuj;  diETerent 
objects:  I,  Security  agjirist  foreign  danger;  i.  Kegula* 
tion  of  the  intercourse  with  foreign  nations;  3.  Mainte- 
nance of  harmony  and  proper  intercourse  among  the 
States;  4.  Certain  miscellaneous  objects  of  general 
utility;  5.  Restraint  of  Ihe  Stales  from  certain  injnnons 
acts;  6.  Provisions  for  giving  due  cfHcacy  to  all  these 
powers. 

The  powers  (ailing  within  the  firjl  class  are  those  of 
declaring  war  and  granting  letters  of  marque;  of  provid- 
ing armies  and  Hcets;  of  regulating  and  calling  forth  the 
militia;  of  levying  and  burrowing  money. 

Security  against  foreign  danger  is  one  of  the  primitive 
objects  of  civil  society.  It  is  an  avowed  and  essential 
object  of  lite  American  Union.  The  powers  requisite 
for  attaining  it  must  be  effectually  confided  to  the  federal 
councils. 

Is  the  power  of  declaring  war  necessary?  No  man  will 
answer  this  question  in  the  negative.     It  would  be  super 


3$1 


PftOVfSIOyS  FOX   tVAR. 


uro.u<«) 


HuOlu,  therefore,  to  enter  into  n  proof  of  tlie  affirnuitive. 
Tbe  existing  Confcderatiun  establishes  ihi&  power  in  the 
most  ample  form. 

Is  ttie  ]>ower  of  riiising  armies  and  equipping  fleets 
necessary?  This  is  involved  in  the  foreguitig  power.  It 
is  involved  in  the  power  of  self-defense. 

But  w;ts  it  necessary  to  give  an  indbfinite  i-ower  of 
raising  troops  as  well  as  providtiig  fleets;  and  of  main- 
taining both  in  PEACE  as  well  as  in  war? 

The  answer  to  these  (luestions  has  been  too  far  antici- 
pated in  another  place  to  admit  an  extensive  discussion 
Sm  of  them    in   this  place.     The   answer  indcetJ 

I***-  seems   to   he    so  obvious  and   conclusive  as 

scarcely  to  justify  such  a  discussion  in  any  place.  With 
what  color  of  propriety  could  the  force  necessary  lor 
defense  be  limitetl  by  those  who  cannot  limit  the  force 
of  offense?  If  a  fi^eral  Constitution  cuiild  rhain  the 
ambition  or  set  bounds  to  ihc  exertions  of  all  other 
nations,  then  indeed  might  it  prudently  chain  the  dis- 
cretion of  its  own  government,  and  set  bounds  to  the 
exertions  for  its  own  safety. 

How  vuuld  a  reailineix  (or  war  in  time  of  peace  l>e  ufcly  pro- 
hibilvtl,  iiiilrss  we  coiilij  prahibil.  in  lihe  mannn.  the  pteparaiiont 
and  c«iabl»liment!t  <i(  cvrr^r  hostile  iialwin?  I'hc  means  al 
lecuiiiycaii  only  l>c  trgulnicd  bj- ibe  means  and  the  danger  of 
ailavk.  They  will,  in  lact.  be  ev«r  detemiined  by  llir!>c  rules  anil 
Ify  no  oihcTK.  It  i*  in  vain  to  opiMse  canstiiuiional  iMnien  to  the 
im]MilK  of  self-preservation.  It  n  woisc  tlun  in  tsiii :  bccaitse  M 
(ilnnls  in  llic  Conttltulion  ilxlf  ncceu;iry  uiuq>atHins  u(  power 
every  preeeileni  ol  which  is  a  germ  of  uniiKcsv.kr>'  and  mutii|i[|r«l 
repciitionv  If  one  nation  inoininiiu  conjtuntly  a  dUciplinc^ 
army,  rea'ly  for  the  srrflee  of  ambition  or  revenge.  It  obliges  llie 
riKnt  pacitic  n3lion<i  who  may  be  wiiliin  the  reach  of  ilt  enter- 
priitrs  to  take  corrriporrfing  precaultons.  The  fihcenlli  cenltiry 
waa  the  unhappjr  elioch  ol  military  establisliments  in  the  lime  4iil 
peace.  TItcy  were  introditccd  by  Charles  VII.  of  France.  AU 
Europe  has  tollou'cO,  ur  been  forced  into,  the  example.  Had  ttie 
rxaniptc  not  been  fallowed  by  oilier  nations,  all  Europe  must 
long  ago  have  wofn  il>e  chains  of  a  univeisal  monnrch  Wne 
rrery  nalion  rxcepl  France  now  to  dobani)  its  peace  esubllsh- 
menis.  the  same  oent   might   follow.     The  releran   le^i^ns  ol 


MullMal  UNION  A   DBFEXSE   IN  ITSELF.  363 

Rome  wrerc  ^n  ovmnatch  [ot  the  miilisciplincil  ntlor  of  all  oilier 
nuifltu  and  rendered  her  ihe  mitlmsoC  tlie  world. 

Not  the  )cs6  true  is  il  thai  the  lihcrlies  of  Rome  provcil  ihc 
bnai  vicliin  to  her  niililary  tnumplis;  and  tint  ihe  liFierlJcs  oi 
Europe,  as  (ai  as  Ihey  ever  exiMcd,  have,  wiih  (cw  cicrptions. 
been  ihe  price  o(  her  tnililary  eslidtlishnienls.  A  Mmidin);  lorce, 
therefore,  is  a  ilnnKerous,  al  ihc  same  time  thai  il  may  be  a  neces- 
sary, piovision.  Oil  lite  &malle»i  ti-ute  il  h^is  il»  incanvciiietiota. 
On  in  exicntivc  snie  iis  coii3«(|iienccx  luny  l>e  filial.  On  ajiy 
scale  U  is  ait  objcci  of  laudable  ciicumspcciion  anit  piecauiioD. 
A  wise  nation  will  combine  all  ilicsc  coi»idcrai>ons :  and,  whilsl  it 
docs  Boi  laslily  preLlud*.-  iiiclf  Iroiii  any  lesource  whiL-h  may  be- 
come csMiitial  to  ill  safety,  will  eicrl  all  its  ptixtcncc  in  diminish- 
tug  boili  il>e  necessity  anil  the  il.mi'crof  resorting  10  one  winch 
may  be  inauipicious  lu  its  liberties. 

The  cicnresi  marks  ol  ihis  prudence  are  Stamped  on  ihe  pro- 
posed CoiiMilutwii.  Tlie  Uritun  itself,  which  il  ccmetiU  anil 
secures,  dcMrnys  creiy  pretext  for  a  niililaty  csublishineiii  whicli 
could  1>c  dani;crous.  Ameticn  united,  with  a  handful  of  Iiuups, 
orwilltout  a  single  soldier,  exhibits  a  more  foibiddlng  poslurc  to 
fotciKK  aiobiiioii  ihan  Americ.i  disunilcd.  with  a  hundred  thuuund 
veterans  rr.idy  for  coinKii.  It  was  remarked  on  a  foiiiicr  occa> 
siun  that  lite  want  of  this  pretext  had  saved  the  liberlies  of  one 
nation  in  Europe.  BeinK  reiiilercil  by  liei  insuUr  siluation 
and  her  marilin»e  tcsource^  iiiiprej^iialile  lo  iJie  attnies  o(  her 
neiyhbiir^,  ibc  luleis  of  (irc-at  Itnlain  hare  never  been  able,  by 
teal  or  aitilKial  ddi»gcr»,  to  chcai  ibc  public  into  an  extenxii-e 
(leace  establishment.  The  diitaiice  of  ilie  United  Stales  from  the 
powerful  nalioDs  oJ  the  world  gives  them  llie  sanw  ha|>i>y  secunty. 
A  dangerous  esUblishmcnt  can  never  be  necessary  or  plausible, 
so  long  as  ll>ey  continue  a  unilcd  people.  Tlui  let  il  never,  foe  a 
inornent,  be  forgotten  tlut  lliey  arc  indelilcil  fur  thii  advantage  to 
the  Union  alone.  The  momcm  of  its  dissolulion  will  be  ihc  d;ile 
of  a  new  order  of  things.  The  (ears  o(  Ihe  weaker,  or  the  arnhilion 
of  the  sirongcr,  Stairs  of  Ci>nfc<leracies,  wdl  sel  the  same  example 
In  tJie  New.  a.s  Charles  VU.  did  in  Ilie  Old  World.  The  example 
will  be  followed  here  from  the  same  motives  which  ptoduced 
univctsal  tmiiaiHMi  iheie.  Instead  of  deriving  from  otir  situation 
Ihe  precious  iKlvanlage  whii'.h  Great  Britain  has  derived  from  hers, 
the  face  of  Ameoca  will  be  but  a  copy  of  iliat  of  the  continent 
of  t^urope.  Il  will  pieient  liberty  everywhere  cnislied  lieiwectt 
uandinj;  armies  ami  perpcliial  laics.  The  fortunes  of  disunited 
Amenca  will  be  even  more  disastrous  Itian  those  i>f  Eurofw.    The 


*64 


UMIT  OF  RBVENUE  FOR  ARMY.      Hl«.«(«t 


sources  of  evil  in  ilic  blier  arc  conGned  lu  her  own  limits.  No 
su|>ctior  power*  of  nnothcr  qunricr  of  xhv  globe  intrigue  anions 
Iter  nvfll  nntluiii.  Liillxnu-  llicii  muluitl  aninwvtities.  and  rcndff 
them  the  inslnimrnts  at  foreign  ;)ml>itian,  jealousy,  and  revmt^. 
In  AinoicA  (lie  miscrict  s^MmsinK  Itoni  her  iniciiMl  jeal«ti&kt. 
cuiiiFnilans.  and  w.int.  woulil  fiitni  a  part  only  of  her  lot.  A 
pkntlfilt  .idititiOM  of  evili  would  h^tvc  llictr  source  ici  (li.il  rrUlion 
m  ^vliich  Europe  Mamix  to  this  quarter  tA  (he  earth,  and  v>-luch  no 
oiher  quarter  o(  (he  ejirlli  beiirs  (o  Europe. 

Tliin  picture  of  (be  conseq-jences  of  disurtion  cannot  be  loo 
highly  colored  or  loo  often  exhibited.  Every  man  who  lovet 
peJice.  eterr  man  who  lores  his  country,  rveiy  man  who  toro 
liberty,  ought  10  Imvr  it  eirrr  licfore  his  eyes.  Iliai  he  may  cherith 
til  his  heiiri  a  due  attachment  to  tlte  Union  of  America,  and  he 
able  10  set  a  due  value  oii  ihe  meant  of  pTr«-rring  it. 

Next  to  (he  efTcclu.tl  e»tJib1i»hn)en(  of  lite  Uiitoii.  the  be«l  ]>o«>i- 
l>1e  precaution  .ij^^tiiitt  danger  from  sl.-mding  armieK  i*  a  limtlnllon 
of  the  term  for  which  retxinic  may  be  appropriiited  (o  tWir  sup- 
port. Thii  precaution  l)ie  Constitution  lias  pruilenily  adilcd.  t 
will  not  repeat  here  iIk  otMeri'aiioiis  which  1  flatter  mysHf  hate 
placed  llus  subject  in  a  jiitt  and  Mtisfaciory  llghi.  Hul  it  may 
not  be  Improper  to  t.ike  itoiice  tA  an  argument  again»i  this  pan  of 
the  Omsiiltilion  which  has  lieen  drawn  from  (he  policy  and  prac- 
tice of  Great  Bntain.  Ii  is  s^id  that  the  continuance  o(  an  array 
in  that  kinj^iloin  nrquircs  an  annual  vote  ol  the  Irgialature;  wbems 
the  American  Consmution  has  Iciigthrncd  this  ciiitcal  period  io 
two  years.  This  is  (he  fonn  in  which  tlie  cunt|>ariM)n  i»  miutly 
statml  (o  Ihe  pul>lic  :  but  is  il  a,  just  form  ?  Is  it  A  fair  compaii- 
MM).'  Dues  Ihe  Brilisli  Constitution  resirain  ilie  parliamentary 
discreiton  to  one  year?  Docs  the  American  impose  on  the  Can- 
grets  apprt^wiatioiis  (or  two  years?  On  ilw  coolrary,  it  latimot 
he  unknown  to  the  auihore  of  the  fallacy  themselves  ihat  ihe 
Utiiish  Constitution  fixes  no  limil  wiMicver  to  ihe  •tiscrclkm  of 
the  legislature,  and  that  the  Anteric.-in  ties  down  the  legulalure  (■> 
two  fcara,  as  the  longest  adinissibk  term. 

Had  Ihe  argamcni  from  the  Uriiiili  ex^imple  bei^n  truly  staled, 
il  would  hare  stood  thus :  The  term  for  w  hid'  siit>|ities  may  he 
appropri.iictl  to  the  army  est.ili4ishmeiit.  tliuuch  iiiitiMii[e<l  by  the 
British  Const  il  til  i'>n.  ha«  nevrrlhrless,  in  ptHclice.  I«ccn  limited  liy 
parlUraeniary  discieiion  10  a  single  war.  Now,  if  In  Gnat 
Britain,  where  the  l]nase  of  Commons  Is  elected  for  term  years; 
where  so  great  a  proporiton  <rf  the  members  arr  elected  byw 
(null  a  proportion  of  Ihe  penile ;  wliete  Ihe  electors  are  to  cur- 


■mdUott) 


I^ECESSITY  FOR  A  yAVY. 


ids 


nipled  by  ilw  rrpn»i^nta(ires,  an<l  the  rcpruentaitves  »o  curniiilcd 
by  the  Ctown,'  iV  feprc«eitlR(ivc  body  c.-iii  piutrss  n  pntvpi  In 
tn.-ilce  appropnations  to  the  «tfny  (or  an  indetinili"  Ictin.  willnmt 
desiring  nr  without  (Uriiif;  to  extend  the  lerm  tieymid  n  Kindle 
year. ouglil  not  suspicion  lienelf  to  l>lu»lt.  iii  piclendTii):  that  the 
i?pTr«:nlalii-cs  of  the  Uiiitci)  Stal».  elected  FKKKI.V  by  llie 
WHOLK  ViO\  ot  the  |H-opk  «»'ery  ivxoVD  year,  caiiiiol  be  salely 
jiitnutedurith  the  ditciielioii  ovet  >uch  appioptjaiions,  cxptessiy 
Uiniled  (o  the  short  period  o(  two  Vkars  ) 

A  bad  cause  seldom  tails  to  betray  ilnelf.  Of  this  truth,  the 
managemeni  of  the  opposition  lo  ihe  fcilcral  govcmnicnt  Is  nn 
nnvancd  exernplilicaiiun.  Bui  ^intori^  alt  the  bluiidera  whidi  have 
been  commitiwt,  none  is  more  stnking  th*ii  ilic  aiiempt  lo  ciilml 
on  that  »iile  Ilie  piuileol  jealousy  Fnterlainnt  by  tlie  people,  of 
KUiidiiig  affiiicv  Tlie  attempt  has  ^iwakenril  fully  ihc  public 
aile'ilioii  tu  that  impotlanl  Mlbjcct ;  and  has  led  tu  invcsligallons 
which  must  tem)inalc  In  a  tlio(ou>;h  and  iiiiivctsal  convlclioo,  nul 
only  that  the  CoiiiUtuiioii  has  proridud  ilic  muM  efteciual  guaids 
nj^inst  danger  from  that  <iuarlcr.  tiut  that  nolhlng  short  n(  a  Coi(- 
stiiuiioii  fully  aitcquate  lo  the  national  defense  and  t!ie  pri-%en-ao 
lion  of  ihe  Union  can  save  America  from  at  many  ^landing  armies 
as  it  may  be  split  into  Stales  or  Con fede nicies,  and  from  such  a 
progrcssire  auKmenialion  of  the«?  esl:ib1ishmcnl)i  in  each  a«  will 
tender  iJicm  as  burdensome  to  the  properties  and  ominous  to  Ihc 
hberlici  of  Ihe  peof)le  as  any  establish  men  I  that  can  become 
nec«»sary.  under  a  united  and  cfticient  government,  niusi  be 
loterabic  to  the  former  and  safe  lo  ihc  lailcr. 

The  palpable  necessity  of  the  power  to  provitlc  anil 
maintain  a  navj-  has  protected  that  part  of  the  Constitu- 
tion against  a  spirit  of  censure  which  has  spared  few 
other  parts.  It  must,  indeed,  he  numbered  among  the 
greatest  blessings  of  America  that,  as  her  Union  will  be 
the  unljr  source  of  her  maritime  strength,  so  this  will  be 
a  principal  source  of  her  security  against  danger  from 
abroad.  In  this  respect  our  situation  bears  another 
likeness  to  the  insular  advantage  of  Great  Britain.  The 
Iratteries  most  capable  of  repelling  foreign  enier]>rise8  on 
our  safety  arc  happily  sticb  as  can  never  be  turned  by  a 
perfidious  government  against  our  liberties. 

'The  extent  tn  wtikb  Ihe  Gn^liih  kinj  cotruntvd  P«rfUment  t*  well 
ihown  In  the  tenth  Report  of  the  Brilith  llUlarlol  UiM.  Conunluloi^ 
ri.  pp.  7-11.— Eoiro«. 


The  inhabitants  of  the  Atlantic  frontier  are  all  of  them 
deeply  interested  in  tliis  provision  for  naval  protection, 
and  if  tlicy  have  hitherto  been  suffered  to  sleep  quietly 
in  Iticir  beds;  if  their  property  has  reinntned  safe  against 
the  predatory  spirit  of  licentious  adventurers;  if  tlicir 
maritime  towns  have  not  yet  been  compelled  to  ransom 
themselves  from  the  terrors  of  a  conHagration,  by  yield- 
ing to  the  exactions  of  daring  and  sudden  invaders  these 
instances  of  good  fortune  arc  not  to  be  ascribed  to  the 
capacity  of  the  existing  government  for  the  protection 
of  those  from  vrhom  it  claims  alleKiance,  but  to  causes 
that  arc  fugitive  attd  fallacious.  If  wc  except  perltaps 
Virginia  antl  Maryland,  which  are  peculiarly  vulnerable 
on  their  eastern  frontiers,  no  part  of  the  Union  ought  to 
feel  more  anxiety  on  this  subject  than  New  Vork.  Her 
sea-coast  is  extensive.  A  very  important  district  of  the 
State  is  an  island.  The  State  ilscif  ts  penetriiicil  by  a 
large  navigable  river  for  more  than  hfty  leagues.  The 
great  emporium  of  its  commerce,  the  great  reservoir  of 
its  wealth,  lies  every  moment  at  the  merry  of  events,  anil 
may  almost  be  rcg.irdcd  as  a  hostage  for  ignominious 
compliances  with  the  dictates  of  a  foreign  enemy,  or 
even  with  the  rap:tcioug  dcmamls  of  pirates  and  bar- 
barians. Should  a  war  be  the  result  of  the  preotrtous 
situation  of  European  affairs,  and  all  the  unruly  passions 
attending  it  be  let  loose  on  the  ocean,  our  escape  from 
insults  and  depredations  not  only  on  that  element,  but 
every  part  of  the  other  bordering  on  it,  will  be  trnly 
miraculous.  In  the  present  condition  of  America,  the 
States  mure  immediately  exposed  to  these  calamities 
have  nothing  to  hope  from  the  phantom  of  a  general 
government  which  now  exists;  and  if  their  itingle  re- 
sonrccs  were  c<iual  to  the  task  of  fortifying  themselves 
against  the  danger,  the  objects  to  be  protected  would 
l>e  almost  consumed  by  the  means  of  protecting  t|)cm.' 


\\,i.. 


..h  <i., , 


'  TTie  t«<rene  of  Ihb  hu  been  Ihe  eifwiont" 

ci(i»  tooiiibotc  cnomoiuljr  to  ilie  diUobiI  tevi  i  ■  ^ 

rerekuei  »n  cottltvlted  bf  ike  central  ilatei  h^  4n 

a<ln|uati  luilinealioa.     So  culy  u  iSoO.  wbcn  New  VuuL.  Cii;  |xU- 


KftdbOBl 


HXrUKXAL    TAXATION. 


267 


: 


The  power  of  regulating  and  calling  forth  the  militia 
has  been  already  sufficicntl):  vindicated  and  explained. 

The  power  u(  levying  :tnd  borrowing  money,  tieins;  the 
sinew  oi  Diat  which  is  to  be  exerted  in  the  national 
Bm  defense,   is  properly   thrown   into  the   same 

In.  30  3*.  cUis»  with  it,  Thi«  power,  also,  has  been 
examined  already  with  much  attention,  and  has,  1  trust, 
been  clearly  shown  to  be  necessary,  both  in  the  extent 
and  form  given  to  it  by  the  Constitution.  1  will  address 
one  additional  reflection  only  to  those  who  contend  that 
the  power  ought  to  have  been  restrained  to  external 
taxation — by  which  they  mean  taxes  on  articles  imported 
from  other  countries.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  this 
will  always  be  a  valuable  source  of  revenue;  that  fur  a 
comiderable  time  it  must  be  a  principal  source;  that  at 
this  moment  it  is  an  essential  one.  But  we  may  form 
very  mistaken  ideas  on  this  subject,  if  we  do  not  call  to 
mind  rn  our  cidcutations,  that  the  extent  of  revenue 
drawn  from  foreign  commerce  must  vary  with  the  varia- 
tions, both  in  the  extent  and  the  kind  of  imports;  and 
that  these  variations  do  not  correspond  with  the  progress 
of  jMjjiulalion,  which  must  t>c  the  general  measure  of  tlie 
public  wants.  As  long  as  agriculture  continues  the  sole 
field  of  labor,  the  imporution  of  manufactures  must  in- 
crease as  the  consumers  multiply.  As  soon  as  domestic 
manufactures  are  begun  by  the  hands  not  called  for  by 
agriculture,  the  imported  manufactures  will  decrease  as 
the    numbers  of   people   increase.     In  a   more    remote 


tranvd  Cotifivti.  anil  detcribed  in  unprotMled  condition,  Jefferson 
ari«d  upon  that  body  ihii  ibe  "  Ailasiic  (roniicr.  ftmn  numbcn.  WMlih. 
wtd  exponte  lo  potent  cocmi**,  luve  ■  piopoiiioiiale  Tti;bl  lo  be  ilcfeiuUd 
wtlh  lite  WeUcift  (ronller.  (or  wb<>cn  «c  kccgi  tip  ihrc«  ihoUMnd  nisa." 
During  ihs  war  ot  iSll.  New  Yixi.  tkiiton,  »i\i  Ni<i«|>nrt  ««r«  farotd 
lo  lort>[]>  thaaiwlm  tirE^'T  ■'  ihiiiown  Fi|xn(c.  white  the  general  gov- 
BBiBcnt  even  rwluscd  tcoupi  iq  New  EncUnd.  The  Uil  app**!  lo  Con- 
j:mi  10  protect  iU  giealcd  loaice  ol  revenue  w<*  from  Samuel  J. 
I  itilen.  In  aa  open  Iclter  tu  ihe  tpeaket  ol  llic  Houtc  o(  KeptcKmtalii<c* 
<  Higcluw'*  *'  I'ililes,"  ii.  yjb).  in  which  lh«  caub«  »(  111*  oumm^rcitl  citio 
■«  admintblr  Mated.  ll*d  New  York  rttciinp'i  poiicuton  ol  the 
impokt  fioiB  tevmuet  ceiiltiing  in  her  poit.  Ihcce  would  \a-Asj  be 
Icwcr  iroblk  buildings  in  Wctlern  loiriu,  uiJ  mae  f  uAt  p««Icclirf  her 
Ittibar.— EoiTOK. 


s68 


*t/SCOACaPTIOKS  AS  TO    TAXES.     Ut«.41tW} 


SLige,  tl)c  imports  may  consist  in  a  considerable  part  of 
raw  matcridl»,  whii:h  will  be  wrought  intu  articles  for 
exportation,  antl  will,  therefore,  require  rather  the  en- 
couragement of  bounties  than  to  be  loaded  with  dis- 
couraging duties.  A  system  uf  government  meant  for 
duration  ought  to  contemplate  these  revolutions,  and  be 
able  to  accommodate  itself  to  them. 

Some,  who  have  not  denied  the  necessity  of  the  power 
of  taxation,  have  grounded  a  very  fierce  attack  against 
the  Constitution  on  the  language  in  which  it  is  defined. 
It  has  been  urged  and  echued,  that  the  power  "to  lay 
and  collect  taxes,  duties,  imposts,  ami  excises,  to  pay  the 
debts,  and  |)rovidc  for  tlic  common  defense  and  gencrnl 
welfare  of  the  United  Stales,"  amounts  to  an  unlimited 
commission  to  exercise  every  power  which  may  be  alleged 
to  be  necessary  for  the  common  defense  or  general  wel- 
fare.' No  stronger  proof  could  be  given  of  the  distress 
under  which  these  writers  labor  for  objections  tlian  their 
stooping  to  such  a  misconstruction. 

Hud  no  other  enumeration  or  dclinition  of  the  powers 
of  the  Congress  been  found  in  the  Constitution  than  the 
general  expressions  just  cited,  the  authors  of  the  objec- 
tion might  have  had  some  color  for  it;  though  it  vouM 
have  been  diRicult  to  find  a  reason  for  so  awkward  a  form 
of  describing  an  authority  to  legislate  tn  all  possible  cases. 
A  power  to  destroy  the  freedom  of  the  press,  the  trial  by 


■  li  it  BMdIcu  lo  Mjr  ihM  ihit  pow«r  to  "  provide  for  the  ooniNion 
defenv  anil  gcnciil  vcUrtc"  hu  been  Ihc  bMtMgriHUiil  of  aldkou  ewj 
(|U««l)on  ol  national  |wltlicM>  [lum  tlie  Mtoplinn  ol  Ibe  contthtitioa  tu  tb* 
imMDt  Axy.  AlnuiilM  jnlin<>ioii  i;i>cii  w>  fu  a*  \o  My  thai  alt  Imimi 
liol  l»Md  on  (hit  qunltun  "haic  liccn  cillic*  local  ■nd  iFinuenfy, 
or  Klfikli  (nd  niiit*«^in(;.  ai><)  Ihc  s*'"^'"'  a(tc)>t*nr(  of  any  isUi  pMly 
diff««RCV  woutH  mark  an  unfoitunate  decline  in  ikr  |iolilir«l  intellipAc* 
of  the  p«opk."  The  Bjiio*  view,  hrit  ciiteiMd  bv  ''-  '  ■  ha  b«ld 
(wliQicnily.whiIi;  m  iIh  op'^HHtliini.      Il  Iii3l  louod  ifr i  -•'jon  in 

Jellcnoe'i    "Opinion  on  llie  Cnmliluilnnnllty  uf  iti  Elaak  ' 

fijqi):  MaKiliAn't  ni<Riler-afilsl(Mi  on  tl>r  um-  iv  t^i  ihii  dajp 

roniMlefcd  tbu  ahtnl  ai^mtnl   f"r  '1-<-  l.ntrt  .  .  nt   f-oliil    af 

vieir.     (S«f  Apiimdit.  y.  6s( )      ■        '  -ro 

ihcofttioill;  in  (aim  of  »iikl  ■  'rn 

talira  as  Miposlle  potilinn.     l-ni    yr,:iy    n<  \--r    >  m.r.i    -imri   hn 
kfaov*  vftriahilitjr  on  Ihi*  polk;,  tnlcljr  aciw(tiii|-  to  whdbct  ii  held  tha 


KliUOBl 


PARTICULAR  POWERS. 


«69 


jury,  or  even  to  regalatc  the  course  of  descents,  or  the 
forms  of  conveyances,  must  be  vcrjraingulariy  exprcfiscd 
by  the  tcriim  "to  nuite  nmney  for  the  geiicrji!  welfare." 

But  what  color  cjr  the  objection  have,  when  a  specifi- 
cation of  the  objects  alluded  to  by  these  general  tcrnis 
imntediittely  follows,  and  is  not  even  tepanited  by  a 
longer  pause  than  a  semicolon?  If  the  different  parts  of 
the  same  instrument  ought  to  be  so  expounded  as  to  give 
meaning  to  every  part  which  will  hear  it,  shall  one  part 
of  the  same  sentence  be  excluded  altORcthcr  from  a  stiare 
in  the  meaning;  nnd  sh.ill  the  more  doubtful  and  indefi- 
titte  lermii  be  ret.ijned  in  their  full  extent,  and  the  clear 
and  precise  expressions  be  denied  any  signification  whsl. 
soever?  For  what  purpose  could  the  enumemtion  of 
particular  powers  be  inserted,  if  these  and  all  otber«  were 
meant  to  be  includeil  in  the  preceding  general  power? 
Nothing  is  more  natural  nor  common  than  first  to  use  a 
general  phrase,  and  then  to  explain  and  qualify  it  by  a 
recital  of  particulars.  But  the  idea  of  an  enumeration 
of  particiibrs  which  neither  explain  nor  quality  the  general 
meaning,  and  can  have  no  other  effect  than  to  confound 
and  mislead,  is  an  absurdity,  which,  as  we  are  reduced  to 
tlic  dilemma  of  charging  either  on  the  authors  of  the 
objection  or  on  the  authors  of  the  Constitution,  we  must 
take  the  liberty  of  supposing  had  not  its  origin  with  the 
latter. 

The  objection  here   it  the   more  extraordinary,  as  it 


raimot  povCT,  nt  wMMilnifln  ihe  oppcnllion.  Thu*  Ihc  «ncifliK'liiDmti 
ornlW'  ii»»aiiipiinin  "(  "e«i  power  cui  be  diviikil  with  r<riin«vi  nmoiig 
«nr  tmtitkal  pari  in.  Tim  KnlvniliKtii  cli»lciivl  thp  tJnilcd  Slitci  Sank  : 
Ihe  |}cinixrati  tmiight  Louiuinn.  <onil  rucl«d  >  nAlionoJ  xo»A.  on<l  onj-i' 
luucl  (ll«  Artl  "  t-rolccltve "  IfciiUilon  anil  inlental  im|iTO*cin«nU  ; 
Ibc  Wlil|pi  cftriint  Ibe  ptotecllve  ihcury  to  ■»  ntrMnv,  uid  mHvucitltiJ 
[fr«r  anil  bBttMir  lRi[iMvciiM-nU  ;  IliC  Kciiut:1icuii:i'lraoti«dBOveni  mental 
tmiMing  oF  railrriaiK.  ciiacUid  the  diatt.  >nil  ttFiltd  the  irfal  lender; 
the  Demixriti  fnr«d  Ihp  cmtton  ot  thf  eletloral  conniiuioti.  %iu\  were 
rctpaiiijlite  lor  ihe  fint  inilltalion  of  bounlict  by  Ihe  i^ilrci  ixitchita  Uwi : 
the  Kc|iii1jtii:u)k  Mleoipteil  to  Iei[i»lne  itAtxtX  iiilcitereocc  in  eleclioot. 
pauvH  iht  iiiicniitt  coiiineri;*  Uir,  ami  ([cniitrd  Imuniics  in  direct  lermi : 
ihe  ttcnncrali  vjii*^!  to  make  anjncantrlai  an  rndirecl  (m.  iind,  ij;iiln>t 
the  p«ol(sl  of  n  SUie  BO««nuneot.  lued  Ibe  federal  lullionty  to  criwii 
iniufTMllon*. — EuirOK. 


77°  COMMON! DEFEKSEFAtFLYC0KS7'RVED.  IKo.ll'Mi 

appears  that  the  lang:uag«  uR«d  by  the  convention  is  a 
copy  from  the  articles  of  Confederation.  The  objects  of 
the  Union  among  the  St.itcs,  as  described  in  article  third, 
are,  "their  common  defense,  security  of  iheir  libcrlies, 
and  mutual  and  general  welfare."  The  terms  of  article 
eighth  arc  still  more  identical;  "All  charges  of  war  and 
all  other  expenses  that  shall  be  incurred  for  the  common 
defense  or  general  welfare,  and  allowed  by  the  United 
States  in  Congress,  shall  be  defrayed  out  of  a  common 
treasury,"  etc.  A  similar  language  again  occurs  in  artieJe 
ninth.  Construe  either  of  these  articles  by  the  rules 
which  would  justify  the  construction  put  on  the  new 
Constitution,  and  they  vest  in  the  existing  Congress  a 
power  to  legislate  in  all  cases  whatsoever.  But  what 
would  have  been  thought  of  that  assembly,  if,  attaching 
themselves  to  these  general  cspressions,  and  disregard- 
ing (he  specifications  which  ascertain  and  limit  their 
import,  they  bad  exercised  an  unlimited  power  of  provid- 
ing for  the  common  defense  and  general  welfare?  I 
appeal  to  the  objectors  themselves,  whether  ilicy  would 
in  that  case  have  employed  the  same  reasoning  in  justi- 
fication of  Congress  as  they  now  make  use  of  against  the 
convention.  How  difKcult  it  is  for  error  to  escape  its 
own  condemnation! 

PLtBU(;&, 


FORBIG.V  lyrERCOVRSB. 


No.  42  [41].       {firm  Vtrk  Pnkn.  }K»»Ti  n.  ii&.'i 

POWKRS  GOVERNING  INTERCOURSK  WITH 
FOREIGN  NATIONS  AND  BETWEEN  THE 
STATES. 

Kffutatioa  »f  imltrtauru  tuilk  /arrign  aaliftii — AmiaiiaJort,  taniuti, 
jhJ  irtiuui — PuHiiAMtritt  a/  plroiy,  fttanui  *■»  Ihi  hi^k  iioi,  aad 
effiHsii  •ipsinit  Ikt  iAset  0/  Htiliani — /tigiilalhit  f/ftrd^tttfiHmrrtt—' 
Tht  lanilifiH  af  Ikr  slat^f  IrnJt — OJyrtlian  t>i>  Ikal  ftfal  teitiiJrrtJ — 
M.iiMUnA'tct  tf  hurmtanj  and  fri-^  inlfrtaHrtf  a»i9ng  tht  thtl/i — Inltr. 
ilalt  ttmmrrtr  anJ  Ihf  /nJiitn  triult — Ceinagr  af  netity — Fttmihmtnt  0/ 
t»iaitrr/riU*t — Stand^'d  ef  vui^kli  a»d  nt^iurtt' — NaMraiitatwti — 
SaaMruftty  laun~fiiiU  /or  f-r»viiiiti£  putiit  atli — Pait  rtoAi  aitdfut 


Tc  the  Ptopit  of  tht  Stittf  of  New  York: 

The  second  clas*  yf  powers  lodged  in  (he  general 
government  consists  of  those  which  regulate  the  inter- 
eourse  with  foreign  nations,  to  wit:  to  make  treaties;  to 
send  and  receive  umbassadorit,  other  public  ministers,  and 
consuls:  to  define  and  panish  piracies  and  felonies  com- 
mitted on  the  high  seas,  and  offenses  against  the  law  of 
nations;  to  regulate  foreign  commerce,  incliidinga  power 
10  prohibit,  after  the  year  1808,  the  importation  of  slaves, 
and  to  lay  an  intermediate  duty  of  ten  dollars  per  head, 
as  a  discouragement  to  such  importations. 

This  class  of  powers  forms  an  obvious  and  essential 
branch  of  the  federal  administration.  If  wc  are  to  be  one 
nation  in  any  respect,  it  clearly  ought  to  be  in  respect  to 
other  nations. 

The  powers  to  make  treaties  and  to  send  and  receire 
ambassadors  speak  their  own  propriety.  Both  of  them 
are  comprised  in  the  articles  of  Confederation,  with  this 
difference  only,  that  the  former  is  disembarrassed  by 
the  plan  of  the  convention  of  an  exception,  under  which 
treaties  might  be  substantially  frustrated  by  regulations 
of  the  States ;  and  that  a  power  of  appointing  and  rcceiv* 
ing  "other  public  ministers  and  consuls,"  is  expressly 
and  Tery  properly  added  to  the  former  provision  coo- 


*7»  ADMISSION  OF  CONSULS.  W* «  <41l 

crrning  ambassadors.  The  term  ambassador,  if  taken 
strictly,  aw  sccins  to  be  re<iuired  by  the  second  of  i)te 
articles  of  Confederation,  coniprehends  the  highest  grade 
only  of  ^lublic  ministers,  and  excludes  the  grades  wliich 
the  United  States  will  he  must  likely  to  prefer,  where 
foreign  embassies  may  be  necessary.  And  under  no 
latitude  of  constnictiun  will  the  term  comprehend  con- 
suls. Yet  it  has  been  found  expedient,  and  lias  been  the 
practice  of  Congress,  to  employ  ilie  inferior  grades  of 
public  ministers,  and  to  send  .ind  receive  consuls. 

It  is  true  that  where  ireatieit  uf  commerce  stipulate  fur 
the  mutual  appointment  of  consuls,  whose  functions  are 
connected  with  commerce,  the  admission  of  foreign  con- 
suls may  fall  within  the  power  of  makintt  commercial 
treaties;  and  that,  where  no  such  treaties  exist,  Uie 
mission  of  American  consuls  into  foreign  countries  may 
ptrkapi  be  covered  under  the  authority,  given  by  the  ninth 
article  of  the  Confederation,  to  appoint  all  such  civil 
officers  as  may  be  necessary  for  managing  the  general 
affairs  of  the  United  Slates.  But  the  admission  of  cun< 
suls  into  the  United  States,  where  no  previous  treaty  has 
stipulated  it,  seems  to  have  been  nowhere  provided  fur. 
A  supply  of  the  umission  is  one  of  the  lesser  instances  in 
which  the  convention  have  improved  on  the  model  before 
them.  But  the  most  minute  provisions  become  important 
when  they  lend  to  obviate  the  necessity  or  the  pretext 
for  gradual  and  unobserved  usurpations  of  power.  A 
list  of  the  cases  in  which  Congress  have  been  betrayed, 
ur  forced  by  the  defects  of  the  Confederation,  into  viola- 
tions of  their  chartered  authorities,  would  not  a  little 
surprise  those  who  have  |Kiid  no  attention  lu  the  subject; 
and  would  be  no  inconsiderable  argument  in  favor  of  the 
new  Constitution,  which  seems  to  have  provided  no  less 
studiously  for  the  lesser  than  the  more  obvious  and 
striking  defects  of  the  old. 

The  power  tn  define  and  punish  piracies  and  felonies 
committed  on  the  high  «eas,  and  offenses  against  the  law 
of  nations,  belongs  with  equal  propriety  lu  the  general 
government,  and  is  a  still  grcittcr  improvement  oo  tJie 


^■11 


fELOMY  OM  TBE  ttrCR  SEAS. 


^irticlcs  of  CoDfedcration.  These  articles  contain  no 
prorision  for  the  case  of  offenses  against  the  law  of 
nations;  and  consequently  leave  it  in  the  [>ower  of  any 
indiscreet  member  to  embroil  the  Confederacy  with 
foreign  nations.  T!ie  provision  of  the  federal  arlicles 
on  the  subject  of  piracies  and  felonies  extends  no  further 
than  to  the  establishment  of  courts  for  the  trial  of  these 
offenses.  The  definition  of  piracies  might,  perhaps  with- 
out inconveiiiency,  be  left  to  the  law  of  nations;  though 
a  legislative  definition  of  them  is  found  in  most  municipal 
codes.  A  definition  of  felonies  on  the  high  sens  is  evi- 
dently requisite.  Felony  is  a  term  of  loose  signilicBtioii, 
even  in  the  common  law  of  England;  and  of  variotis 
import  in  the  statute  law  of  that  kingdom.  Hut  neither 
the  common  nor  the  statute  law  of  that,  or  of  any  other 
nation,  ought  tu  be  a  standard  for  the  proceedings  of 
this,  unless  previously  made  its  own  by  legislative  adop- 
tion. The  meaning  of  the  term,  as  defined  tn  the  codes 
of  the  several  ijiates,  would  be  as  impracticable  as  the 
former  would  be  a  dishonorable  and  illegitimate  guide. 
It  is  not  precisely  the  &amc  in  any  two  of  the  States;  and 
varies  in  e^ch  with  every  revision  of  its  criminal  Uws. 
For  the  sake  of  certainty  and  unilormity,  therefore,  the 
power  of  defining  felonies  in  this  case  was  in  every 
respect  necessary  and  proper. 

The  regulation  of  foreign  commerce,  having  fallen 
within  several  views  which  have  been  taken  of  this  sub- 
bm  ject,   has   Ijeen   too  fully  discussed   to   need 

K«.  11.  additional  proofs  here  of  its  being  properly 
submitted  to  the  federal  administration. 

Jt  were  doubtless  to  be  wished  th.it  the  power  of  pro- 
hibiting the  importation  of  slaves  had  not  been  post- 
poned until  the  year  t&oS,  or  rather  that  it  had  been 
suffered  to  have  immediate  operation,'     But  it  is  not 

'TbcttavB-lrxle  cUuw  wu  iher«4ii1l  otn  «ini|ir<»n1ke.  irillioul  itltidi 
die  conuinilioa  would  iu[(«)y  hue  •:i>Tniii]in-lr<l  ilir  viiirt  uC  ■  niajortty 
o((Kp  rivnvM.tion  a-tiRh  fninirit,  iiiucli  l<Ti»  "t  Ihr  lUtci;  which  nl't^ed 
It.  Tlnit  aii'l  (InorcU  hn^l  Iml  >   inr^  yKtl  of  thrlc  dn'ci  hy 

Bri  '  rmu  durini;  the  rciolulioo.  uDd  )i<i»utinG  lw|;c  tt«cu  nf 

inmlittaied  Uni).  thty  iiiikcd  to  nuikeUlw«ucheapuj-auihlcb7|Mr 


SIA^B   TKADE. 


r«o.U'4i> 


difficult  to  account,  either  for  this  r«slriction  on  thr 
general  s;ovcrnmenl,  or  for  ihe  manner  in  which  the 
Bm  whole  clause  is  expressed.     It  ought  to  be 

S4.U.  considered  as  a   great  point  gained  in  faror 

of  humanity  that  a  period  of  twenty  years  may  terminate 
forever,  within  these  States,  a  traffic  which  has  so  long 
and  so  loudly  upbraided  the  barbarism  of  modern  policy; 
that  within  that  period  it  will  receive  a  considerable  dis- 
couragement from  the  fe<]eral  government,  and  may  be 
totally  abolished,  by  a  concurrence  of  the  (cw  States 
which  continue  the  unnatural  traffic,  in  the  prohibitory 
example  which  has  been  given  by  so  great  a  majority  of 
the  Union.  Happy  would  it  be  for  the  unfortunate 
Africans  if  an  equal  prospect  lay  before  them  of  being 
redeemed  from  the  oppressions  of  their  Kuropcan 
brethren! 

Attempts  have  been  made  to  pervert  this  clause  into 
an  objection  against  the  Constitution,  by  representing  ii 
on  one  side  as  a  criminal  toleration  of  an  illicit  practice, 
and  on  another  as  calculated  to  prevent  voluntary  and 
beneficial  emigrations  from  Buropc  to  America.     I  men- 


Biiltins  the  free  importalioa  oE  ne|[Toet.  Uailed  w^th  then  ia  ihi 
lieiltc  la  maintain  llie  dan  iraite  were  MkuachlnelU  and  Rb«lc  liUinL 
/lit  111  llieitc  tl.itn  ll<r  lar);rr  |iaii  «l  lliit  (XolilaLle  liaiKe  centernl.  The 
aid  n(  \\i»  iXhcT  New  En^and  italn  wm  Mcuced  lir  (he  claatc  e>''inC  '° 
Congmspawer  lopusa  iwvi^Kin  act  bjauiniiteniafMrUr.  and  ihynby 
lh«  vol«  of  the  tocit  Nev  Enclftnil  stale*  and  o(  tl>«  thre«  KMithcrw  alaln, 
ai:ninii  ihe  Toie*  of  Nc*  fti^y,  Pcnntjlvanii.  Dclawnre,  and  Vit^»a 
(Near  York  anfejircMninl  iii  ih<  tnnvriiiMin),  ihe  alave  Irxle  mtt  fait«ied 
upon  tk*  coutiirr  (or  iweiily  ynn;  IkiiI  (or  ihit  it  ia  ('tolialilc  thai  tbr 
alSTiry  qiietli>jii  woul^l  hanlly  hiiTe  aHnmrd  llie  tcrimit  |>n>|;ur1  hmt  Ihll 
It  pvpntualhr  itprfloMd.  Alreuly.  knwevet,  both  Virjpnia  and  Miff' 
Und  were  nadine  tM  bnodiDH  «(  alnrat  for  the  wniheta  nuuket  a 
*o>im  □(  pntlii.  inil  to  ifaU  lact.  mure  than  to  any  Inie  humaailatiaa 
lenlimcnl,  nsh  iliic 'hrrr  illilu'fr  on  (hit  qixilion  ;  ('<(  til*  rn>tln)[  oJ  ikc 
*larr  Irsdr  nieaiil  a  liigher  iirice  for  nc^ruet.  and  llicrrliire  ■  create 
p«alil  (roa  Ihoni.  InAneiiceil  by  ihu  ileure  doi  to  cIom  a  tiiarliel  wtlk- 
oat  her  own  bonniliriei  foe  tbe  slavet  almdy  Hnjti'>*il>lilr  Ifr  mgri- 
cultural  iiuqHHei;,  Virginia  in  I79t  ^'"t"!  >i:*'<i't  ihe  11  "t 

'  frnm  all  tlvr  oeticm  iciriinry.     I'ltr  enormoiik  |>ri>£l<  '  -> 

I  later  lefnie.!.  tUrt  the  Mojiping  ■>(  ihe  ilaie   liatlc.  ii  ..i.i.-^  ... ,;.  *« 
\  flic  111'  in  Ihe  oiith  and  well,  thfw  (hit  they,  quite  ai  modi  ai  lh«ii 
innre  wwibrni  Dei|[iibori  and  the  New  EngltM  Ualo,  wen  ratine  lor 
what  leewied  their  Imc  intcieitt,  rega/dltM  of  caonl  aMuldetuloaa.— 
Eiil7oa. 


MifflMB)  mTBR-STATE  KEGULATfOXS  S7S 

tiiin  these  misconstructions,  not  with  a  virw  to  give 
them  an  ansircr,  fur  they  (t<;servc  none,  but  as  specimens 
of  tfie  manner  and  spirit  in  which  some  have  thought  fit 
t«  coniluct  their  opposition  to  the  proposed  government. 

The  powers  included  in  the  M/r</ class  are  those  which 
provide  for  the  harmony  and  proper  intercourse  among 
the  States. 

Under  this  head  might  he  included  the  particular  re- 
strjints  imposed  on  the  authority  of  the  States,  and  cer- 
tain powers  of  the  judicial  department;  but  the  former 
are  reserved  for  a  distinct  clasit,  and  the  latter  wdl  be 
particularly  examined  when  we  arrive  at  the  structure 
and  organisation  of  the  government.  I  shall  confine 
myself  to  a  cursory  review  of  the  remaining  powers  com- 
prehended under  this  thifxl  description,  to  wit:  to  rcgu- 
hile  commerce  among  the  scvenil  Stales  and  the  Indian 
tribes;  to  coin  money,  regulate  the  value  thereof,  and  of 
foreign  coin;  to  provide  for  the  punishment  of  counter- 
feiting the  current  coin  and  securities  of  the  United 
States;  to  fix  the  standard  of  weights  and  me;isures;  to 
establish  a  uniform  rule  of  naturalization,  and  uniform 
laws  of  bankruptcy;  to  prescribe  the  manner  in  which 
the  public  acts,  records,  and  judicial  proceedings  of  each 
State  shall  be  proved,  and  the  effect  they  shall  have  in 
other  States;  and  to  establish  post  officesand  post  mads. 

The  defect  of  power  in  the  existing  Confederacy  to 
regulate  the  commerce  between  its  several  members  is 
in  the  number  of  those  which  have  been  clearly  pointed 
out  by  experience.  To  the  proofs  and  remarks  which 
former  papers  have  brought  into  view  on  this  subject,  it 
may  be  added  tliat,  without  this  supplemental  provision, 
the  great  and  essential  power  of  regulating  foreign  com- 
merce would  have  been  incomplete  and  ineffectual.  A 
very  material  object  of  this  power  was  l!ie  relief  of  llie 
States,  which  import  and  export  through  other  Slates, 
from  the  improper  contributions  levied  on  them  by  the 
latter.  Were  these  at  liberty  to  regulate  the  trade 
between  State  Ani\  Stale,  it  must  be  foreseen  that  ways 
would  be  found  out  to  load  the  articles  of  import  and 


S76 


TRAt>E  OF  CONFEDERATE  STATES.      lK<i.U.U> 


export,  OuritiK  tl'c  pa&sattc  through  their  jurisdiction, 
vith  duties  which  would  f;ill  un  the  makers  of  (he  Utter 
and  the  cunnumers  of  the  foraier.  We  may  be  assured 
by  pa&t  experience  lltat  such  a  practice  would  be  iDtro- 
duced  by  future  contrivances;  and  both  by  that  and  ;i 
common  knowledge  of  human  affair»,  that  it  woiiM 
nourish  unceasing  animosities,  and  not  improbably  ter- 
minate in  serious  interruptions  of  the  public  tranquillity. 
To  those  who  do  not  view  the  question  through  the 
medium  of  passion  or  of  interest,  the  desire  of  the  com- 
mercial States  to  collect,  in  any  form,  an  indirect  revcnur 
from  their  uncommercial  neighbors,  must  appear  not  lcs^ 
impolitic  than  it  is  unfair;  since  it  would  stimulate  the 
injured  party,  by  resentment  as  well  as  interest,  to  resort 
to  less  convenient  channels  for  their  foreign  trade.  Hut 
the  mild  voice  of  reason,  pleading  the  cause  of  an  en- 
larged and  permanent  interest,  is  but  tuu  often  drowned, 
before  public  bodies  as  well  jw  individuals,  by  the  clamors 
of  an  impatient  avidity  for  immediate  and  immoderate 
gain. 

The  necessity  of  a  superintending  authority  over  the 
reciprocal  trade  u(  confederated  iStaiea^  lias  been  illns> 
trated  by  other  examples  as  well  as  our  own.  In  Switzer- 
lantl,  where  the  Union  is  so  very  slight,  each  c;«nion  is 
obliged  to  allow  to  mcrchaiMlises  a  |>askage  through  iis 
jurisdiction  into  other  cantons,  without  an  augmentattun 
of  the  tolls.  In  Germany  it  is  a  law  of  the  empire  that 
the  princes  and  states  shall  not  lay  tolls  or  customs 
on  bridges,  rivers,  or  passages,  without  the  consent  of 
the  emperor  and  the  diet;  though  it  appears  from  a  citio- 
tation  in  an  antecedent  paper  that  the  practice  in  this, 
as  in  many  other  instances  in  that  confederacy,  has  not 
followed  the  law,  and  has  produced  there  the  mischiefs 
which  have  l>een  foreseen  here.  Among  the  restraints 
imposed  by  the  Union  of  the  Netherlands  on  its  meni> 
bcrs,  one  is  that  they  shall  nut  establish  imposts  ilUad- 
vant^geous  to  tbcir  neighbors,  without  the  geocnt 
permission. 

The  regulation  of  commerce  with  the  Indian  tribes  is 


K*<baBi 


POWER   TO  COIN  MONEY. 


277 


very  properlj^  imfetteretl  from  two  limitations  >n  the 
articles  of  Coafederation,  vriiich  remlcr  tlie  provision  ob> 
scurc  and  contradictory.  The  power  is  there  restrained 
to  Indbos,  not  members  of  anjr  of  the  States,  and  is  not 
to  violate  or  infringe  the  legislative  right  of  any  State 
within  its  own  limits.  What  description  of  Indians  arc 
to  be  deemed  memt>ers  of  a  State  is  not  ycl  settled,  and 
has  been  a  question  of  frequent  perplexity  and  conten- 
tion in  the  federal  councils.  And  how  the  trade  with 
Indians,  though  not  members  of  a  State,  yet  rciiiding 
within  its  legislative  jurisdiction,  can  be  rctiulatcd  by 
an  extermil  authority,  without  so  far  intruding  on  the 
internal  rights  of  legiKlaiton,  iti  al>M>lute1y  incumprehen- 
sible.  This  is  not  the  only  ease  in  which  the  articles  of 
Confederation  havt?  inconsiderately  endeavored  to  ac- 
complish impossibilities;  to  reconcile  a  partiiil  sover- 
eignty in  the  Union  with  complete  sovereignty  in  the 
States;  to  subvert  a  mathematical  axiom,  by  taking 
away  a  part  aivd  letting  the  whole  remain. 

All  that  need  be  remarked  on  the  power  to  coin  money, 
regulate  the  value  thereof  and  of  foreign  coin  is  that, 
by  providing  for  this  last  case,  the  Contititutiun  has  sup- 
plied a  material  omission  in  the  articles  of  Con  federation. 
The  authority  of  the  existing  Congress  is  restrained  to 
the  regulalioa  of  coin  struek  by  their  own  authority  or 
that  of  the  respective  States.  It  must  be  seen  at  once 
that  the  proposed  uniformity  in  the  value  of  the  current 
coin  might  be  destroyed  by  subjecting  that  of  foreign 
coin  to  the  different  regulations  of  the  different  States. 

The  punishment  of  counterfeiting  the  public  securities, 
as  well  as  the  current  coin,  is  submitted  of  course  to 
tftat  authority  which  is  to  secure  the  value  of  both. 

7'he  regulation  of  weights  and  measures  is  transferred 
from  the  articles  of  Confederation,  and  is  founded  on 
like  considerations  with  the  preceding  power  of  regulat- 
ing coin. 

The  dissimilarity  in  the  rules  of  naturalization  has 
long  been  remarked  as  a  fault  in  our  system,  and  as  lay- 
ing «  foundation  for  intricate  and  delicate  questions.     In 


,j8 


NA  rUKALlZA  TION. 


tRo,  4S  (« 


thfl  fnurlli  arliilff  of  lUe  Confederation  it  is  (le<:Iarr(l 
••  that  the  fret  infiahifonts  of  each  of  these  Slates,  paupers, 
ragalionds,  and  fugitives  from  justice  excepted,  shall  be 
entitled  to  all  privileges  and  immunities  of  /ret  eilictnt 
in  the  several  States;  and  the  people  of  each  State  shall, 
in  CTcry  other,  enjoy  all  the  privileges  of  trade  and  com- 
merce," etc.  There  is  a  confusion  of  bncuage  here, 
which  is  remarkable.  Why  the  terms  frte  inhahitatih  are 
used  in  one  part  of  Ihc  iirtiele,  free  tiiiseut  in  another. 
hxA  ffeofle  in  another;  or  wtiat  was  meant  by  su|>eraddin;,' 
to  "all  privileges  and  immunities  of  free  dtixens,"  "all 
the  privilege*  of  trade  and  commerce,"  cannot  easily  be 
determined.  It  seems  to  be  a  construction  scarcely 
avoiduble.  however,  that  those  who  come  under  the 
dcnominalton  of  free  inhabilanft  of  a  State,  alUiough  not 
citizens  of  such  State,  arc  cntitlH,  in  every  other  State, 
to  all  the  privile-jes  of  free  {iliuns  of  the  latter:  that  is. 
to  greater  privileges  than  they  may  Ik;  i-ntitled  to  in  their 
own  State;  so  that  it  may  he  in  the  power  of  a  |>articHtar 
State,  or  rather  every  State  is  laid  nnder  a  necessity, 
not  only  to  confer  the  right«  of  citiienvhip  in  other 
States  upon  any  whom  it  may  admti  to  such  ri);hts  within 
itself,  but  upon  any  whom  it  may  allow  to  become  in- 
habitants within  its  jurisdiction.  Rui  were  an  exposition 
of  the  term  "inhabitants"  to  be  admitted  which  would 
confine  the  stipulated  privileges  to  citizens  alone,  the 
difficulty  is  diminish(*d  only,  not  removed.  The  very 
improper  power  would  still  be  retained  by  each  Stale  of 
naturalizing  aliens  in  every  other  Stale.  In  one  Stale, 
rei«idcnce  for  a  short  term  confirms  alt  the  rights  of 
citizenship:  in  another,  qualifications  of  greater  impor- 
tance are  reiiuired.  An  alien,  therefore,  legally  inr.a[ur- 
itated  for  certain  rights  in  the  latter  may,  by  previous 
residence  only  io  the  former,  elude  his  incapacity;  and 
thus  the  law  of  one  State  Iw  preposterootty  rendered 
[Mramount  to  the  law  of  another,  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  other.  We  owe  it  to  mere  casualty  that  very  scr. 
ious  eml)iarra.4«ments  on  this  subject  have  been  lullierto 
eseaped.     By  the  laws  uf  several  States,  certain  descrip- 


MUiMnl 


PUBUC  ACTS  AND  RECORDS. 


*79 


(ions  of  aliens,'  who  had  rcadercO  themselves  obnoxious, 
were  taut  umler  interdicts  inconsistent  nut  only  with  the 
rights  of  citizenship  but  with  the  privilet;e  of  rcNicJciice. 
What  would  have  been  the  consequence  if  such  persons, 
hjr  residence  or  otherwise,  had  acquired  the  character  of 
ttitixens  under  the  laws  of  another  State,  and  then  asserted 
their  rights  as  such,  both  to  residence  and  citiicnship, 
within  the  State  proscribing  them?  Whatever  the  legal 
<:on»^qucnces  mi^lit  have  been,  other  consequences  would 
probably  have  resulted  of  too  serious  a  nature  not  to  be 
provided  against.  The  new  Constitution  has  accord- 
ingly, with  ^xtaX.  propriety,  made  provision  against  them, 
and  alt  others  proceeding  from  the  defect  of  the  Con- 
federation on  this  head,  by  authorixing  the  general 
government  to  establish  .1  uniform  rule  of  luturalixation 
throughout  the  United  States. 

The  power  of  establishing  uniform  laws  of  bankruptcy 
is  so  intimately  connected  with  the  regulation  of  com- 
merce, and  will  prevent  so  many  fr^tuds  where  the  piirties 
or  their  property  may  lie  or  be  removed  into  different 
Stales,  that  the  expediency  of  it  scenis  not  libcly  to  be 
dr:iwn  into  question. 

The  power  of  prescribing  by  general  laws  the  manner 
in  whivh  the  public  acts,  records,  and  judicial  pruceed- 
ings  of  each  Slate  shall  be  proved,  and  the  efTvci  they 
shall  have  in  other  States,  is  art  evident  and  valuable 
improvement  on  the  clause  relating  to  this  subject  in  the 
articles  of  Confederation.  The  meaning  of  the  latter  is 
extremely  Indeterminate,  and  can  be  of  little  importance 
under  any  interpretation  which  it  will  bear.  The  power 
here  established  may  be  rendered  a  very  convenient 
instrument  of  justice,  and  b«  particularly  beneficial  on 
the  borders  of  contiguous  States,  where  the  elTecis  liable 
to  justice  may  be  suddenly  and  secretly  translated,  in 
any  Stage  of  the  process,  within  a  foreign  jurisdiction. 

The  power  of  establishing  post  roads  must  in  every 
vi«»  be  u  liamiless  power,  wid  may  perhaps  by  judi- 


'Tbt  k>;r*liib.— Gbnoit. 


cious  management  become  productive  uf  great  public 
convcnicncy.  Nuthing  wtiicli  tends  tu  facilitate  the 
intercourse  between  the  States  can  be  deemed  unworthy 
of  the  public  care.'  PiiBLitrs. 


No.  43  [42].      (/MV>^hf.*f/MnMA  juHi-y  li.  iju.}       Mudtson. 

MISCELLANEOUS    POWERS. 

AfisttllamviH  fwrert—Ci'pyrighlt  amJ  f<timlt-~T%i  ftdnvt  lilf— 
Pnmfkmt'tt  r/  tmtioft — Admittitm  tf  at-w  tIaUt — C-ntrpiHtml  tf  Urri- 
Uriti  awi  irHlrtI  fj ftthlii  frtftrljr — Cuariutljr  A>  rvtrr  ilalt  ef  a  rtfmt' 
hrtM  /rrm  r/  gurtrumml — Fi«lulir»  »/  Halt  iii'iiliiu/  tntmcn  aiJ 
txtiail  Jomfilif  virtrmt — Aiiamftim  uf  fayiKfHt  n/  cnlilatiJing  dttti 
— A  mfnJmtnri  u  lit  ti-nililtili-.'m — Tii  titaHiikmtnf  t/  Ikii  giturr*- 
mm!  i«i  /if  .iMfrrmtf  tf  mint  ttatii — Otjfttwn  Ikul  Ihi  ii  ti  mXrAim 
e/  tif  (fimftJrralifn — ttrlnlifm  tflmcrn  rvtifyimg  itatei  ami  Ikttt  wlutk 
rt/mt  ta  ratify. 

T«  tike  Peofie  0/  the  State  0/  jVejf  York  : 

Tht/ffurlh  class  comprises  the  following;  miscellaneous 
powers: 

t.  A  power  "to  promole  the  progrcu  of  science  nnd 
useful  arts,  by  securing,  for  a.  limited  time,  to  authors 


'  'rhtt  <[■!*! Ion  ol  (lulilk  or  inlcnul  imprmeitnt.  here  m>  lirtfA)' 
Iniii-hal  u|<oa.  )»•  l>«ii  oat  nl  l]ic  pmvcM  quetlioai  ot  t<*rt)r  pnlttin  in 
iinlimsl  hntorjr.  mni]  |'r"l>*)<ly  hnt  >I>"iie  nun  to  JiKlrau  iW  iKmi  o( 
Ihf  general  cmrctamcnl  llun  tttj  Mbt-r  kin^la  t*ctoc  >n  onr  itrtglniHlwML 
1'hi>  ii  oiHiiic  to  the  f»ci  that  the  n«iii«r  ttam  hate  gcncnllt  hm  ihow 
In  wbkh  th«  Use  ikiniicrAIic  ifuril  vmt  dniAEcM.  ;r(  ubiih  by  ibeir 
ml  (•iiTity  were  tkc  nii»l  tscci  In  )uv«  pu)i)ic  lini'<>'>imi(&l>  lunlti- 
Islrci  t^y  Ilia  [cncntl  ^nctBOWsl,  ihuk  l*n!''f  nrutniuiiit;  tl>rii  oalan) 
jcil'-uit  uf  mliwul  ■uani)>(ii>n  04  inwrr.  Tli*  liot  tivr  itcfi  la 
Ihu  ditcilioa  vat  thr  untlntaking  iW  Ihc  CnnlmriaBd  road,  a  mcaCKK 
nurlrd  b^  tlw  wmler-i  I>cmi-<r«t  tn  iSo9  irmf  a^ipfwH  tn    (cflcnin. 

SoJiHWC'ii  ■=•*?    'O 

tiiiml  l»'  antri- 

laklBJC  pJi  ' '  n'k^Jt    iLL«n,  iKuiiFi^  ■Tilt  4Li[  i\  iThiTiri  ■::  i^cnv-it  ]<■■  .it^L   ixntUIIVf ' 

neai  aa  il  mn  ha  llwntlii  prafier  ~  (ib<«|^  h*  Ui^luel  tkai  ihia  ahnsld 

lie  preCVdril    Itv  Mn  ■iB^nitineiM  to  lh<  o>cmJ1iML'knl     ^•\'\    Kit  '^h  irlarv  ij 

IIIb  Tica>"  retUMiaaeuited  in  '  - « 

I"«  tire  •"  !■'  prMtr  rmrf-  « 

fMnocratk  in  kuupiaa  aft'  iitlia^iMi  imi  <4  U^rii  >«■» 

ricndentt  (Nafiaoa  «»J  j  th«  fioi  ap|nf«i«UM  lot 


KXlwml 


COPVfltCHT  AND  PATENTS. 


>Si 


and  iiiTcnKir*.  the  exclu&Jvc  rigfit  lo  iheir  respective 
writings  and  discoveries," 

The  utility  or  this  power  will  scarcely  be  questioned. 
The  copyright  of  auchorx  has  been  sulemnly  adjudged, 
in  Great  Britain,  to  be  a  right  of  conimon  law.  The 
risht  to  useful  inventions  seems  with  ctitial  reason  to 
belong  to  the  inventors.  The  public  good  fully  coincides 
in  both  cases  with  the  claims  of  individuals.  The  States 
cannot  separately  in;ike  effectual  provision  for  either  of 
the  cases,  and  most  of  them  have  anticipated  the  decision 
of  this  point  by  laws  passed  at  the  instance  of  Congress. 

S:  <*To  exercise  exclusive  legislation,  in  alt  cases 
whatsoever,  over  sucti  district  (not  exceeding  ten  miles 
square)  as  may  by  cession  of  particular  States  and  the 
acceptance  of  Congress,  become  the  seat  of  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States;  and  to  exercise  like  authority 
over  all  places  purchased  by  the  consent  of  the  legisla- 
tures of  the  Stales  in  which  the  same  shall  be,  for  the 
erection  of  fortK,  magaxines,  arsenals,  dockyards,  and 
Other  needful  buildings." 


harbor  tmproifcaatnt  wu  MrrJcil.  am)  iKc  n«xt  year  «  bill  ulhoriiing 
tiirv«Ts  (or  ■  nuionnl  aaiii  wu  |>jv.r<l.  Willi  ihe  aiTCufnii  tif  Jackmn 
Ihe  tDOTvmcnl  cnciiitnlcrcil  «ii  •i|i|iiiiietil  wli'i  rlicckcil  tl«  f  utlh«r  progrcw 
foreigtil  jrcai*.  Sevrtal  <i>-cr  aiii)  tiarbur  bills  wert  ptissci]  b^  luccred- 
ImC  CooEmiei.  only  lu  l)c  vciocrl  by  ilic  rrcudent  hoMine  office.  Filtlns 
im  ihii  Uleinpl  U  cilcntion  ihc  Dcniociittc  ponr  ttwU  to  Allnin  Ihe 
withe*  ol  lu  nuMt*.  without  complclcly^  tiiihlfymi;  Ittcnncciit  ■>(  nillniial 
poircn.  I>y  lUtlrlliuiiii);  lo  ilie  4iaio  tutpliis  trrtnuc.  Ihal  public  im- 
pcowiMBU  mtghl  W  niBilr  hy  Ihom.  A  furllifr  tipnntion  tnme  in  iSso 
with  the  staniotpwUiclaiitlitoentourageihe  building  of  Tiibondi ;  ihii 
Wta  <)uickllr  f olloocd  by  ihc  F.ovciiiiiicHUl  lUivcy  ai  a  iciad  in  the  P»dli<, 
\vf  tike  deciatailim  in  buih  paity  ptniioTiiiK  iliut  hikIi  » imltajul  vh-iiiM  lie 
bniU  by  Ihe  i;(ivcrniiicnt.  xml  by  Ihc  viilinj;  of  Ihe  ii.iliim'i  rrtdil  to  liclji 
^•■ild  it.  In  1870  a  riv«r  ami  bnrlKir  bill  wai  made  i  law  ;  and  ihougli 
that  baa  b«c<»i*t  an  annual  bill,  it  11  itill  likely  lo  \,t  i-ctiicil,  nol 
beouiac  itx  cmiUitutioiiiLliiy  is  lon^^r  debatable,  but  becatiw  of  Ihe 
"Jofat"  ll  cmhadiea.  t'liially.  lbrou|;b  Iliio  vrry  "  piMit-nwl "  clauae. 
liqietlMr  with  Ihc  |Kiwct  li>  re;;iiIaED  commrcit.  Ihc  gortrnniml  b]r  Ihc 
tccMll  JMtanlatc  oommeti'v  Iaw  liai  practically  eitendrd  iti  conlml  lo  all 
raflrr^'**  'f»r  the  (eiidency  lq  coniLilidile  small  n»Ai  into  pt%\  lystcmt 
w  -.}    p«l  IbciH  all  ihoiUy  uiidci  iKe  intertlate    law).     Hoir 

a<>v  power  hat  become  U  kIidwii  by  the  lair  "  j^ivrrii incut  by 

tnJDnrtioa".  by  the  stc  n|  todoral  (nxipa  lo  pr^rd  taitniwlk:  am)  by  ihv 
ronuniiag  ut  Ibe  inii  Inul  law  no  ai  to  ciwlral  ih«  liaffk  ai^cnaent*  ol 
tbc  railraada.— EPiTva. 


>8a 


S£.ir  OF  GOy£Jt.\M£NT. 


org.  u  .4s> 


The  iadisptnsable  necessity  of  complete  authority  at 
the  scat  of  government  carries  its  own  evidence  with  it. 
It  is  u  piJWKr  cjcrriscd  I>y  every  legiKlatitrc  i>f  IIh:  Union, 
I  miglit  suy  uf  the  world,  by  viriui;  of  \\%  fteitenil  suprem- 
acy. Without  it,  not  only  the  public  authority  might  be 
insulted  »nd  its  proce<;tIiii]j:s  interrupted  with  impunity; 
but  a  dependence  o(  the  members  o(  the  general  govern- 
ment on  Ihc  St;itc  comprehending  tlir  sciit  of  the  govern- 
ment, for  prutectiun  in  the  exerci>c  of  their  duty,  might 
bring  on  the  national  councils  an  imputation  of  awe  or 
influence,  equally  dishonorable  to  the  government  and 
disHstisfactury  to  the  other  members  of  the  Confederacy. 
This  consideration  has  the  more  weight,  as  the  (jr-uhul 
accumulation  uf  public  improvements  at  th«  statioitary 
residence  of  the  government  would  be  both  too  great  a 
public  pledge  to  be  left  in  the  hands  of  a  single  State, 
and  would  create  so  many  obstacles  tu  a  removal  of  the 
government  as  still  further  to  abridge  us  necessary  in- 
dependence.' The  extent  of  this  federal  district  is  suSi- 
cicntly  circumscribed  to  satisfy  every  jealousy  of  an 
opposite  nature.  And  as  it  is  to  br  appropriated  to  this 
U4.e  with  the  consent  of  the  Slate  ceding  it;  as  the  Stale 
will  no  doubt  provide  in  the  compact  for  the  rights  and 
the  conKCnl  of  the  citixens  inhabiting  it;  as  the  inhabit- 
ants will  find  sufficient  inducements  of  interest  to  t»e- 
come  willing  parties  tn  the  cession;  as  they  will  have 
had  ihcir  voice  in  the  election  of  the  governracut  which 
is  to  exercise  authority  over  them;  as  a  municipal 
legislature  for  local  purposes,  derived  from  their  own 
»uffrages,  will  uf  course   be  allowed  them;*  and  as  the 


'  The  eipcnnin  of  th«  Congmt  ot  tbp  Co«ifo(lerttian  pnvvd  Olft 
cvili  of  ■  tax  in  a  tilj  onr  which  il  hxl  no  jiirttrliclinn.  fo>  wImi 
•  mull  pul  of  the  rcunirlvaniB  luililia  mulinird  in  iTSj.uid  thrRatcntil 
(TiMiKrcu  with  ri»lcni«.  llic  t'cikiikj  tvania  CuuiKil  itlattA  Id  dm  force  ID 
•iU|it'rni  ihr  uililirn,  iBil  ounipcIkO  tZ(iii)p<H  Is  KJl-i>cain:Uoa  liiiidjutm 
t"  iVittiBlon. — BC'lrOR. 

'A»  ■  f»ci.  the  hiitoijp  of  tt»'  P  "  •  '  ■'  •  I'libainn  bm  varyiU- 
fctcn).  ['■.iiici(->»  )ii»ln>:  fiuiiMvl  1'  capital  mantim^Mt 

eieiiiluMi  tluili'vct  ih«  irirlt»iic  ,    --  i!ic  y««»  rlyi-M.  wlioa 

A  "l«iril<iri>r'  (iq-fcv  of  luaU  »rU'|;incmiiiaui  »m  aUowcd  to  II,  whldi 


rsEjtso/f. 


authDritjr  of  the  legislature  of  llie  StAte,  and  of  the  tn- 
hubiUnts  of  ilic  c«ilc<i  part  o(  tl,  lo  coiKur  in  the  ccs- 
Muu,  will  t>c  derived  from  tlic  whole  people  of  the  State, 
in  their  3(lt^>tiuii  of  the  Constitution,  every  imaginable 
objection  seems  to  be  obviated. 

The  necessity  of  a  like  auttiority  over  forts,  magazines, 
etc.,  cstablisbcd  t>y  the  general  gnvcrnmcnt,  is  not  less 
evident.  Tlie  public  money  expended  on  such  placeii, 
and  the  public  property  deposited  in  them,  require  that 
they  stKJuld  be  exempt  from  the  authority  of  the  parlicu- 
bir  Stitte. '  Nor  would  it  be  proper  (or  tlie  places  on 
which  the  security  of  the  entire  Union  may  depend,  to 
be  in  any  degree  dependent  on  a  particular  member  of  it. 
All  obiections  and  M:ruple!(  are  here  also  obviated  by 
requiring  the  concurrence  of  the  States  concerned  in 
every  such  estatihshmcnt. 

3.  "To  declare  the  punishment  of  treaKon,  btit  no 
attainder  of  treason  shall  work  corruption  of  blood,  or 
forfeiture,  except  (Uiring  the  life  of  the  person  at- 
tamtcd." 

As  treason  may  be  cnmmitled  against  the  United 
States,  the  authority  of  the  United  States  ought  to  be 
enabled  to  punish  it.  Hut  as  newfangled  and  artifiiial 
treasons  have  been  the  great  engines  by  which  violent 
(ai:tions,  the  natural  offspring  of  free  governnicnl,  have 
usually  wreaked  their  alternate  malignity  on  eai:h  other, 
tlic  convention  have,  with  great  judgment,  opposed  a 
tiarncr  to  ibis  peculiar  danger,  by  inserting  a  constitu- 
tional definition  of  the  crime,  fixing  the  proof  necessary 
(or  conviction  of  it,  and  restraining  the  Congress,  even 


wlM  la  the  Mtndkl*  ot "  Bom  "  Sticpti«nl.     Sa  fai  from  being  allowed 
MMwKl  ihtjr  nwB  (■■nrnimnit.  Im  mjilcnts  ur  gtunlcd  no  •oi<e  in 
nMMiM]  Dkctiont  onkn  Ihejr  diim  rendcncc  niid  1i»«  [onucrly  notcil 
ikeirtiere  ;  in  iliat  cate.  ibcr  may  tclum  to  Ibai  place  and  catl  ihdr< 
rota. — EliiTUK. 

■  Ii  u-u  ihii  nalional  ouincnJiip  o4  lon%  ithkh  allownl  Budunuu  to 
nmlfy  ibe  .Soiilli  Caioliiu  wsalois  llial  fori  SuiMcr  "  Ivtongcd  la  the 
DfiiirrI  Siaio.  .  .  aixl  if  auaiilltJ  bylbe  antliDtilM*  of  Souih  Caintlaa, 
DO  ihrm  >nnild  rM  lb«  tidiuivc  icipoauiliDiir  of  comucncln):  ditl  war," 

— £lll  lUK. 


»«4 


NEW  STATES. 


(■•.Uittl 


in   punishing  it,   from   extending  the  consequences  of 
guilt  Iteyuml  the  person  of  it»  autlior. 

4.  "To  admit  new  States  into  the  Union;  but  no  new 
State  shall  t>c  formed  or  erected  withiii  the  jurisdiction 
of  an/  other  St-ite;  nor  any  Sute  b«  formed  by  tlie 
junction  of  two  or  mure  States,  or  parts  of  States,  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  legislatures  of  (he  States  con- 
cerned, »8  well  as  o(  tlie  Congress."  ' 


'  lender  Ihc  liraljr  ai  17BJ  a  UrKc  tract  of  tinil  tmiuidal  b;  ihe  Gnat 
lain.  Ihir  Mivii»tpj>i,nn<I  |iinilcl  ]■',  uioooiifitnKil  ("the  I'nilrilSlilei. 

tcuion  vuthiitCDinplicnlHl  by  uiinllktiitc  rljiimt.  anil  rvcn  b]r  lli«  •»«• 
(lull  iif  cciuin  ilato  ihit  llieic  Unds  Uiily  |jeIoii):cil  lu  lb«  BUloa  uid 
nul  lo  Ihc  itiHivl'loal  tlaln,  'II10  •lilliiullT  tun  Imaltr  kCMkd  bv  eauh 
Mate  cnliiig  !■>  Ill*  nalJun  it>  riebli  Knd  tliiinn  oinililmn&l  on  llie  Inri- 
lorf  bciii^  civniualjip  made  Into  liiatei  anJ  altownl  to  join  ihr  Udiou. 
Tliit  poTliculat  clitiw  wai  iiunteil  in  Ibe  coniitilulian,  tltal  Ibne  roo' 
dltloni  mtchi  be  lulfiEleiL 

TlKttauM  relatinj'  to  |K»\Mile  ilimion  of  tli«  oM  Mats  **■>  aiidoubl- 
edly  forctfl  on  ibc  Iruncn  liv  ilit  friincnl  in  Kentucky  M  thii  lime.  ifaM 
seclion  tieinc  then  psti  «(  Viivlinia.  altbnuich  (or  lour  Tran  il  Kad  been 

Krlirinninu  trtiii);mt  loi  •tlalrliunl.  S».  !<■■.  tin-  woKni  Icmlory  of 
urili  Carulinuhvl  rvTiilicil  f mm  llic  )iut-nl  S<alf.  an-1  liud  tcl  ill>  ■  wps- 
tXit  ilatebtKHl  undf  r  the  lilk  n(  "  Franklin.'  Vcrinoftl  abo  had  xonc'l 
iu  ini!c|>cn<)Fncc  from  New  Votl.  In  each  c*tc  tbe  lepilalOK  ol  ilie 
paicnl  tule  <ra>  Ixuuelit  10  coiiwkI  Io  mkIi  wpantion,  and  thit  wu  latu 
tmi' in  the  crMllon  of  ili«  time  of  Maine. or l|>tiially  a  |iait  (il  Hataa 
thntelli.  ]l  truulil  hare  Iwen  difficult,  in  vi«K  i>f  (lindane.  fnr(>>nf>ma 
end  the  tuprcnac  cmilt  to  nw«(  lh«  pouihie  thmlennt  diviuon  ol  Ne* 
VorV  slate  (lee  p.  mvi);  but  prnuinably  ili«  lIciiLilily  of  our  coverDincat 
miutd  liarc  faurM  viine  mtaiikof  Cd'Oi:  "vci  IhccanMJtnlloattl  illftcalty. 
Tli»  crvatiun  of  tbe  Male  iif  VVnl  Vrijpiiia  .luring  lli«  Cliil  War  ■■• 
made  cmiiiiiialii>n.il  by  ilie  rnvcntion  uf  a  legal  fidkin.  The  forly 
irrttem  or  "iner-llic-lDonnijiiii  connl(e«,"  ufaich  wvtt  ilrongly  anionjil. 
voltd  aealntl  (he  aRcuioii  ol  tbe  alalc  in  ibe  Vircini*  convcntioa  of 
1B61.  aiid  ulicu  tbr  (unvcnltoa  |uiuol  Ihc  temiiun  ordlMnce,  tbn 
called  anoiher  connoiii;*  and  rvpvakit  it.  Tliey  ihcn  tieelanil  Ihefr 
MrfUisliMi  friiin  ciulpm  Viri;in>a.  franwtl  a  contliluliiHi.  and  asLcil  rrcnc. 
nitkin  by  Ihe  Unioa.  Though  ihit  wai  Ihe  very  diviuoa  f  iiarded  aealnil 
by  ihit  diuie.  ihc  ilreu  ei  mu  ImcoJ  a  TctaCDitioo,  wliKh  waa  j^itca 
on  tbe  qiiibWc  llitl  ihe  lej;iil»liife  of  WeMcm  Virginia  wai  iKe  iejjal 
ICRnlature  ul  Vii|:inn.  Keraaiid'i  Wncnl'ii  plopoiition  in  )Mii  thai  Ne" 
York  city  tbi'uld  trcede  troni  the  tliiion  and  aaike  tlxil  a  Irce  city. 
<Mct'lirrwni'i  "  Hiitnty  of  the  Rebellion,"  p.  41),  hardly  filli  wiiliin  lb* 
(ondilioiM  of  Itir  cliuae.  for  h  bu  eiienlially  liatcil  on  •  fiijbt  of 
force  and  not  ol  law.  I'lie  more  recent  luno  ralKil  I'y  lire  MUocacy 
of  a  ne*  ilate  made  up  of  tbe  ^ivrallc.I  Ne*  Vork  '■  mrlinfioliian  di»- 
trirt,"  hourvet.  cmtin  within  tbe  tinrniiun  ol  tbe  daiiie.  aoil  may  po*- 
tilbly  prodocc  a  cnnuitalional  qiMMKin  in  Ihe  fiilnre. 

to  Ibia  ctavM  tbe  liamen  Miade  no  provitiou  (ut  tbe  acqvbhiim  ol  to- 


Mtdiani      ADMISSION  OF  BRITIStt  COLONIES. 


In  the  articles  of  Confederation,  no  provision  is  found 
on  this  impormnt  subject.  Omaila  wr.it>  to  b«  admitted 
of  right,  on  her  joining  in  the  measures  of  the  United 
Sutcs;  and  the  other  <^onUs,  bjr  which  were  evidently 
meant  the  othrr  llritish  colonies,  at  the  discretion  of 
nine  States.  The  eventual  establishment  of  new  Stattt 
seems  to  have  been  overlooked  by  the  compilers  of  that 
instrument.  We  have  seen  the  inconvenience  of  this 
omission,  and  the  assumption  of  power  into  which  Con* 


rtlOTy  by  ifce  Ualoe,  ukI  iliit  kinncc  oveni);lii  ciu>«>l  JdlmMin  i^nM 
tiiib«nu*flisn1  wbm  (h«  pucrliiut  n?  IjniiiiHii.-i  w^i  nrrani^.  for  in  hU 
ovn  vonlt.  M  amle  "  nitilc  paper  "  of  (he  co^^li1llIioIl.  nnd  lip  wrni  lo 
fit  M  lodrafl  *n  juntniimrnl  to  Ihp  con*lilulion  (wc  Api-cmlii  [>.  686). 
•lollBG  with  uhil  be  ui*l  inLv  "  (he  i^vc  «(  a  i^uifilmn.  ^nvotinjj  the 
iiirin«y  <>f  hit  wiril  \ii  puri'liitin^  mi  Titiixirr^inl  3r3|:ii'riit  Irtrifnry  ;  lAving 
10  him  mkeii  'A  figf.  '  I  di<l  llin  for  ymir  i;i""l:  [  iirrtrml  lo  ncv  rifjhl  lo 
bind  your  ^u  nuy  diuirov  ni«."'  Some  of  ihc  noriherrn  lilies,  which 
liW  In  Ihii  ■dititioii  o(  lemlory  n  dcitniclioii  of  hB)iiiii:e  belwftii  tlie 
nritth  aii'l  wiilh.  iinilnlril  nj^xin'il  the  ai''{iiiiiiliiiii ;  liul,  »\  »  fad.  it  oat 
frvptii  the  Itrrit'iry  v<  tccntnl  lh«t  (hdW  lllHt'l'^t'^^^^ll  iitin  wrn  crtalcd 
which  veic  ereiituAlly  (o  ^ivr  political  Mipmrmry  lo  the  nonh  in  the 
wclioiia]  itotnal  iSici-iabu.  In  lime  Ihe  wutll  <«mc  lo  tc«Iui!  IhU. 
*nil  valiiljr  hmeIM.  t>y  the  Mriicxn  fat  aaiX  l>y  the  progioteit  |<iir^A<>c  ol 
Culi^i,  ti>  cMtnltfFtCt  the  rr-Hiilt,  Siiit:r  Uic  ai^rpiKi1i<)n  of  l..n(ii>iiHna.  con- 
ttant  ■'Milion*  hare  bnrn  iiiii<tc  (•>  uur  Irrritory.  Ill  by  {<«rmittiii|;  faiejgn 
cooniriH  to  b«cunie  ^ai«  (Texas) ;  (1)  by  conqucil  (CalilorniB.  etc.); 
(•d(Ohy  (lunhaie  (Aliika). 

A  iu  );iavcr  conitilulkinal  difficulty,  for  which  Ihe  (ninrn  likririM 
■Hi  no  conttilidiniul  pmiiiion,  w  the  'liiiini'l  (ulinr  |<m\i  hi  lily  that 
Ihmogh  Ml  uniurrrvidil  war  thrir  may  c'ime  n  necrtiily  lor  the  ccdinc 
ol  lerritoty.  Gteal  Britain  allcmpleH  to  nhuin  this  in  1S14,  by  demand- 
ini;  nol  ncrely  the  cieaiion  of  a  neiitml  Indian  leniloiy  in  the  itM.  but 
CTOi  tlie  joining  to  Caniula  of  p«n>  it  Maine  and  New  York.  Vrl  Imlh 
ibna  lalirt  iccliunt  wcc*  th«  |tro|<crly  ol  ihv  *tnle\,  and  nnl  if  Ihe  nntion. 
and  therefore  it  b  dilKcull  to  lee  bow  nny  cenion  uf  ihem  could  have 
bt«B  made  by  treUJ,  Aould  our  necrttitiei  have  compelled  the  Mccpt- 
•nee  of  tbe  lemi.  A*  yei  we  tlill  poueu  leiiiinry  owned  Iiy  ihe  naiimt. 
■hlch  mtgfcl  lie  legally  albrnaleit,  Inil  lite  time  ik  nnl  fat  iliunnl  nhon  all 
the  imitiviet  will  he  ttalrt.  l'r*Kuniplit-ely.  Ihe  nntioit  coaU  llieii  only 
■ect  a  demand  foe  ktritntiil  ceaiion  117  illowing  the  foreign  country  Id 
take  posBmion  of  Ihe  lerrilory.  leaving  il  solely  to  (he  Male  lo  protect 
ilicll,  much  at  New  England  wai  Icfl  to  %ecii[e  iltetl  in  llie  War  •>!  iHig. 
T¥ro  alg^nllicant  fact*  are  (he  claiite  in  the  arllilo  '>(  Cnninlrcaliim 
""  thai  nn  ilaie  tlialt  lie  dtpriroilof  tcrriKiry  fiT  thir  hcnrfil  if  tlie  United 
Sutet."*bich  wai  omit  led  in  the  federal  conttitution.  and  the  agreement 
istheAthbunofi  treaty o4  tS4J  rMpeciine  the  diiputcdbnnndnty  between 
Itnttih  Amerk*  and  Maine,  by  which  land  claimed  by  the  latter  waieon- 
lirnRl  In  Gnat  Rritain,  and  Maine  wat  pecuniarily  liidcninilieil  foi  (tie 
Im*.— EMTOIt. 


986 


IVESTESN  TEKRtrokY. 


grcss  have  b«n  led  by  iL  Wiih  great  pnipriciy,  ihcre- 
fftre,  has  the  new  system  siijipltcd  llie  defect.  The 
general  precaution  that  iio  new  States  shall  be  formed, 
without  the  coDcurrcRCc  of  the  federal  autboriiy  and 
thAt  of  the  States  concerned,  is  conHonant  to  the  prin- 
ciples which  ought  to  ^[overn  such  traosactiona.  The 
particular  precaution  against  the  erection  of  new  States^ 
by  the  ])artition  of  a  State  without  its  consent  quiets  the 
jealou^y  of  the  larger  Slates,  as  iliat  of  the  intaller  is 
quieted  by  a  like  precaution  against  a  junction  of  States 
without  their  consent.* 

5.  "To  dispose  of  and  make  all  needful  rules  and 
regulations  respecting  the  territory  or  other  property 
belonging  to  the  United  States,  with  a  proviso,  that 
nothing  in  the  Constitution  shall  be  so  construed  as  to 
prejudice  any  claims  of  the  United  Stales,  or  of  any  par- 
ticular State." 

This  is  a  power  of  very  great  importance,  and  required 
by  considcnitions  simitar  to  those  which  show  the  pro- 
priety of  the  former.  The  proviso  annexed  is  proper  in 
itself,  and  was  probably  rendered  absolutely  necrssarjl 
by  jealousies  and  (juestions  concerning  Uic  Western 
territory  sufficiently  known  to  the  public. 

6.  "To    guarantee   to  every  State   in   the   Union  a 


*  In    1799  Aleunder   HsmiltoM,  in  nMliaivE  aliat  be  thauglil  (he 
Fn1vrali%i  pulky  tltouM  be,  «nilc :  "  «ap|^  nonUI  il  l>c  Jl  a  cluas*" 
cniiM  Im  nidn]  lo  lh«  cmitliliilixn.  •twblin]'  ConptB,  on  ilic  ii)-|ill<'Aiii<i»  \ 
of  lay  ransiilctahl*  pnitioa  of  a  il>l«  CDSUuning  nol  len  lliui  a  howlml 
llioaund  pertuns.  (o  crrct  n  inio  ■  >c|MirBic  Mate,  on  lh«  cMiiliiina  <A 
■iiini;  ihc  ijwoia  of  conlribmiont  which  n  iball  mtkc  Knranli  aniccolenl 
ilcbra,  l(  aiif  th«n  iJuiU  lie,  ivwtrvinK  lo  Confcm*  il>c  uilintliy  lu  levy 
wilhia  vpcli  Male  llic  (nxn  acvenajy  lo  the  psTment  »(  such  rgiola.  ta 
i-u«  lA  iwf;l«i:i  on  Ihe  put  uk  ibc  tiaie.     The  nibiliviiMii  al  Uie  errU  . 
ttAi«  it  indispciiuhle  lo  ibe  aecviitr  or  Uie  ii«*enl  xm-ernnienl.  aadJ 
wiltt   il  of  llie   Union.     Omi   ttaln  wiil  al*ar*  ''c'  *  'irabhip  «tlh  1 
lh«  cuiiunuM  licail,  mill  oltcn  be  Mip)H»cil  lo  iiia<:Iiiii9lc  acunu  il.  auil  la  < 
i«itain  liliutkirtt  ullt  t>r  al't*  lo  •!"  il  "itli  ilniilTC  edixl.     l*li>  tut'-  ' 
ilivision  of  Htih  tUtn  »<iehl  to  h«  a  laHins)  |<<iant  in  lliir  (nifnl  foliiT  \ 
•ixltaull  tialos  aic  iloubllai  ailililed  (»  llir  piupoiM  of  liini]  triptlallm 
■lid  lo  tlic  picsrtvalioa  of  llic  rT|iublitaii  tpirii.      Tliu  uibie'm 
cvef,  n  mctclr  tkrnwa  onl  for  cooiUciallna.      Il  i>  (p*rM  tb-  1 

ba  faicxpeUenl  au-l  even  ilauiictuai  i»  pn,|>oac,  al  Uia  tine,  -■'  .»iti.i,u- 


■idimol 


MONARCHICAL  INKOVATIONS. 


a, 


republktan  form  of  government;  to  proU'ct  racli  of  Ihcm 
aguin!^!  invasion;  and  on  a|i{>lir.*itiun  uf  ttic  I i;{;i stature, 
ur  of  the  Gxccaiive  (when  the  Icgisliiiure  cannot  be  con- 
vened), against  liomcslic  violence." 

In  a  coiifcOeracy  founded  ou  republican  prim^iples, 
and  con)p4>!icd  of  republican  members,  the  itupcrinlcud- 
ing  government  ought  clearly  to  possess  authority  to 
defend  the  system  against  aristocratic  or  m(in<irctiical 
innovalionSu  The  mure  intimate  the  nature  of  such  a 
union  may  be,  the  greater  interest  have  the  members  in 
the  pohltcal  tnstilutiiins  of  ciich  other:  and  the  greater 
rit:h(  to  insist  that  the  formt  of  governmeul  under 
which  the  compact  was  eniercd  into  should  be  lud- 
itantially  maintained.  But  a  right  implit's  a  remedy; 
and  where  else  could  the  remedy  be  deposited  than 
where  it  is  dcjiosited  by  the  Constitution?  Govcrn- 
mentt  of  diMimilar  jKinciples  and  forms  have  been 
found  lesft  adapted  lu  a  federal  coalition  of  any  sort 
than  those  of  a  kindred  nature.  "As  the  confederate 
republic  of  Cjcrmany,"  says  Montesquieu,  "consists  of 
free  cities  and  petty  slates,  subject  to  diflcrcnt  princes, 
experience  shows  us  that  it  is  more  imperfect  than 
lh;it  of  Holland  and  Switzerland."  "Greece  was 
undone,"  he  ailds,  "as  soon  as  the  king  of  Macedon 
obtained  a  seat  among  the  Amphictyons."  In  the  latter 
case,  no  doubt,  ilie  disproporiiunate  force,  as  well  as  the 
monarchical  form,  of  the  new  confederate,  had  its  share 
of  influence  on  the  events.  It  may  possibly  be  asked, 
what  need  there  could  be  of  such  a  precaution,  and 
whether  it  may  not  become  a  pretext  (or  ulteralions  in 
the  State  governments,  without  the  concurrence  of  the 
Slates  themselves.  These  questions  admit  of  ready 
answers.  If  llie  interposition  of  the  general  government 
should  not  be  needed,  the  provision  for  such  an  event 
will  be  a  harmless  sopcrHuity  only  in  the  Constitution. 
But  who  can  say  what  e.'ipcriments  may  be  produced  by 
Itie  i3ipricc  of  particular  States,  by  the  ambition  of  enter- 
(trising  leaders,  or  by  the  intrigues  and  influence  of 
foreign   powers?    To  the  second    question   it   may   b« 


I 


PBDBXAL  PROTECTtON.  Ubk4ICU> 

answered  that,  if  tlie  general  K^vernracnt  iilioulil  inter* 
fiose  by  virtue  of  this  constitutional  authority,  it  will 
be  of  course  bound  to  pursue  the  uuthority.  But  the 
authority  extends  no  further  tlun  to  a  guaranty  of  a 
republican  form  of  government,  which  supposes  a  pre- 
existing government  of  the  form  which  is  lo  be  guaran- 
teed. As  lonj;,  therefore,  as  the  existing  republican 
forms  arc  continued  by  the  States,  they  are  guaranteed 
by  the  federal  Constitution.  Whenever  the  States  m^y 
chouse  to  substitute  other  republican  forms,  tJiey  have 
a  ri(;ht  to  do  so,  and  to  claim  the  federal  guaranty  for 
the  latter.  The  only  restriction  impoMd  on  tlicm  is 
that  they  shall  not  exchange  republican  for  anii-republi* 
can  constitutions;  a  restriction  which,  it  is  presumed, 
will  hardly  be  considered  as  a  grievance. 

A  protection  against  invasion  is  due  from  every  society 
to  the  parts  composing  it.  The  latitude  of  the  expression 
here  used  teems  to  secure  each  State,  not  only  against 
foreign  hostility,  but  against  ambitious  or  vindictive 
enterprises  of  its  more  powerful  iteighbors.  The  history 
botii  of  ancient  aiul  modern  confederacies  proves  that 
the  weaker  members  of  the  union  ought  not  to  be  insensi- 
ble to  the  policy  of  (his  article. 

I'rntcction  against  domestic  violence  is  added  wit)) 
equal  propriety.  It  has  been  remarked  that,  even  among 
the  Swiss  cantons,  which,  properly  speaking,  are  not 
under  one  government,  provision  is  made  for  this  object; 
and  the  history  of  that  league  informs  us  that  rauinal  aid 
is  frequently  claimed  an<l  alforded;  and  as  well  by  the 
must  democratic  as  the  other  cantons.  A  recent  and 
well-known  event  among  ourselves  has  warned  us  to  be 
prepared  for  emergencies  of  a  like  nature.' 

At  first  view,  it  might  seem  not  to  square  with  llie 
republican  theory  to  suppose  either  that  a  majority  have 
not  the  right,  nr  that  a  minority  will  have  the  force  to 
subvert  a  government;  and  consequently,  thai  the  federal 
interposition  can  never  be  required  but  when  it  would 

*  Shiyt'*  RibeltJon.— CnrroR. 


MadiMM] 


STKENGTH  OF  MINORITY. 


.89 


be  improper.  But  theoretic  r«a3onin£,  in  this  as  in  most 
other  cases,  must  be  qnalifirif  \iy  the  lessuns  of  practice. 
Why  muy  nut  ilhcit  combiiuiion.s  lor  purposes  of  vio- 
leuce  be  formed  as  well  by  a  majority  of  a  State,  especially 
a  small  State,  as  by  a  majority  of  a  cimnty,  or  a  district 
of  the  same  State,  and  if  the  authority  of  the  Stale  ought, 
in  the  latter  case,  to  protect  the  local  magistracy,  ought 
not  the  feilcnil  authority,  in  the;  former,  to  support  the 
Stale  authority?  Besides,  there  are  certain  parts  of 
the  State  constitutions  which  arc  so  interwoven  with  the 
federal  Cionstitution  that  a  violent  hloiv  tannot  be  given 
to  the  one  without  communicating  the  wound  to  the 
other.  Insurrections  in  a  State  will  rarely  induce  a 
federal  intcrjiosttion,  iiiilea;<  the  number  concerned  in 
them  bear  some  proportion  to  ihc  friends  of  government. 
It  will  be  much  better  that  the  riutcncc  in  such  cases 
should  b«  repressed  by  the  superintending  power  than 
that  the  tnajnrity  should  be  ]eft  to  maintain  their  cause 
by  a  bloody  and  obstinate  contest.  The  existence  of  a 
right  to  interpose  will  generally  prevent  the  necessity  of 
exerting  it. 

Is  it  true  that  force  and  right  arc  necessarily  on  the 
same  side  in  republic^m  governmi;nis?  May  not  the 
roinur  party  possess  such  a  superiority  of  pecuniary 
resources,  of  military  talents  and  experience,  or  of  secret 
succors  from  foreign  powers,  as  will  render  it  superior 
also  in  an  appeal  to  the  sword?  May  not  a  more  com- 
pact and  advantageous  position  turn  the  scale  on  the 
same  side,  against  a  superiitr  number  sn  situated  as  to  be 
less  capable  of  a  prompt  and  collected  exertion  of  its 
strength?  Nothing  can  be  more  chimerical  than  to 
imagine  that,  in  a  trial  of  actual  force,  victory  may  be 
calculated  by  the  rules  which  prevail  in  a  census  of  the 
inhabitants,  or  which  determine  the  event  of  an  ctectiont 
May  it  not  happen,  in  fine,  tluit  the  minority  nf  ciTizsris 
may  become  a  majority  of  pf.ksons,  by  the  accession  of 
alien  residents,  of  a  c.isual  concourse  of  adventurers,  or 
of  those  whom  the  constitution  of  the  State  has  not 
admitted  to  the  rights  of  suUrage?     I  take  no  notice  of 


99« 


QVELUMG  msujtJtEcrtoy. 


r>«.4a<49> 


an  untiappif  specieti  of  population  abounding  in  &omc  u( 
the  States,  who,  (luring  the  calm  of  regular  guvrrnmcnt, 
3r«  sunk  I)ctow  thr  Irvvl  of  men;  l>ut  wlm,  in  ttir  tem- 
pestuous scenes  of  civil  violence,  may  ciner£e  into  the 
human  character  and  give  a  superiont)-  of  strength  to 
any  p:irty  n-iih  which  thoy  may  astociate  themselves.' 

In  ta>es  where  it  may  be  doubtful  on  which  side  justice 
lies,  what  better  umpires  could  be  drsired  by  two  violent 
fiicliiins,  flying  to  arms  and  teiirtuK  a  State  to  pieces 
than  the  representatives  of  confederate  Stales,  not  heated 
by  tlir  local  flame?  To  tite  impartiality  of  judges,  they 
woulil  unite  the  affection  of  friends.  Happy  would  it  t>e 
if  such  a  remedy  for  its  infirmities  could  be  enjoyed  by 
all  free  governments;  if  a  project  equally  effectual  could 
be  established  for  the  univental  peace  of  mankind! 

Should  it  be  asked,  what  ia  to  be  the  redress  (or  an 
insurrection  pervading  all  the  States,  and  comprising  a 
superiority  of  the  entire  force,  though  not  a  constitutional 
right?  the  answer  must  be  that  such  a  case,  as  it  would 
be  without  the  compass  of  human  remedies,  so  it  is  for- 
tunately not  within  the  compass  of  human  protnbilily: 
and  th^t  it  is  a  sufficient  recommendation  of  the  federal 
Constitution  that  it  diminishes  the  risk  of  a  calamity  for 
which  no  possible  constiltitton  can  provide  a  cure. 

Among  the  advantages  of  a  confederate  republic 
enumerated  by  Montesquieu  an  important  one  is,  "  that 
should  a  popular  insurrection  happen  tn  one  of  the  States, 
the  others  are  able  to  quell  iL  Should  abuses  creep 
into  one  part,  they  are  reformed  by  those  that  remain 
sound." 

7.  "To  consider  all  debts  contracted,  and  engagements 
entered  into,  before  the  adoption  of  this  Constitution,  ts 
t>eing  no  less  valid  against  the  United  Stales,  under  tins 
Constitution,  than  undtr  the  Confederation." 

This  can  only  be  considered  as  a  declaratory  proposi- 
lion;  and  may  have  been  inserted,  among  other  reasons 
for  the  satisfaction  of  the  foreign  creditors  of  the  United 


'AaaUiuion  tolhv  loathera  >!■«««. — Euitos 


A 


3  AAfEXOMEXTS.  49' 

Stat<rs,  who  rannot  b«  strangers  to  the  prctcndcj  doctrine 
that  J  change  in  the  political  (onn  of  civil  society  has  the 
rnagical  effect  of  dis^olvins  its  moral  obligations. 

Among  the  lesser  criticisms  which  have  been  exercised 
on  th«  ComtitutiAii,  it  has  been  remarked  that  the 
validity  of  entiaiiccments  ought  to  have  been  asserted  in 
favor  of  the  United  States  as  well  as  against  them;  and 
in  the  spirit  which  usually  characterizes  little  critics,  the 
omission  has  been  transformed  and  magnified  into  a  plot 
against  the  national  rights.  The  authors  of  this  discov- 
ery may  be  I'lld,  what  few  others  nerd  to  be  informed  of, 
that,  as  engagements  arc  in  iheir  nature  reciprocal,  an 
assertion  of  their  validity  on  one  side  necessarily  involves 
a  validity  on  the  other  side;  and  that,  as  the  article  is 
merely  declaratory,  the  establishment  of  the  principle  in 
one  case  is  sufficient  for  every  c,isc.  They  may  be  further 
told  that  every  constitution  must  limit  its  precautions  to 
danfrertt  that  are  not  altogether  imaginary;  and  that  no 
real  danger  can  exist  that  the  government  would  dabh, 
with  or  even  without  this  constitutional  declaration 
before  it,  to  remit  llie  detits  justly  due  to  the  public,  an 
the  pretext  here  condemned. 

8.  "  To  provide  for  amendments  to  be  ratified  by  three- 
fourths  of  the  States,  under  two  exceptions  only." 

Th.it  useful  alterations  will  be  suggested  by  experience 
could  not  but  be  foreseen.  It  was  rcijuisite,  therefore, 
that  a  mode  fur  introducing  them  should  be  provided. 
The  mode  preferred  by  the  convention  seems  to  be 
stamped  with  every  m.irk  of  propriety.  It  gviards  etjually 
against  that  cxtrnmi;  facility  which  would  render  the 
Constitution  loo  mutable,  and  that  extreme  difficulty 
which  might  perpetuate  its  discovered  faults.  It,  more- 
over, equally  enables  the  general  and  the  State  govern- 
ments to  originate  the  amendment  of  errors,  as  they  may 
be  pointeil  out  by  the  experience  on  one  iiide  or  on  ilie 
other.  The  exception  in  favor  of  the  equality  of  suffrage 
in  the  Senate  was  probably  meant  as  a  palladium  to  the 
residuary  suvi^reignty  of  the  Slates,  implied  and  secured 
by  that  principle  of  representation  in  one  branch  of  the 


«9« 


RA  riFlCA  Tiotr, 


aM.4St«fl 


legislature;  and  was  probably  insisted  on  by  the  Stairs 
particularly  attached  tu  that  cqiialily.  The  other  excep- 
tion must  hare  been  admitted  on  the  same  considerations 
which  produced  the  privilege  defended  by  it." 

9.  "The  ratilicatioR  of  the  convention  of  nine  States 
(hall  t>e  KiifRcieiit  for  the  establishment  of  this  Constiiu* 
tion  between  the  States,  ratifying  the  same." 

This  article  speaks  for  itself.  Tbe  expreits  authority 
of  the  people  alone  could  give  due  validity  to  the  Consti- 
tution. To  have  required  the  unanimous  ratilicalion  of 
the  thirteen  States  vrould  have  subjected  the  euentia) 
interests  of  the  whole  to  the  caprice  or  corruption  of  a 
single  member.  It  would  have  marked  a  want  of  fore- 
sight in  the  convention  which  our  own  experience  would 
have  rendered  inexcusable. 

Two  questions  of  a  very  delicate  nature  present 
themselves  on  this  occasion:  i.  On  what  principle  the 
Cnnfedemtion,  which  stands  in  the  solemn  form  of  a 
.  compact  amonK  the  State*,  can  be  superseded  without  tbe 
unanimous  consent  of  the  ^rtics  to  it.>  i.  What  rcla- 
tifin  is  to  subsist  between  the  nine  or  more  States  ratify- 
ing the  Constitution  and  the  remaining  few  who  do  not 
become  parlies  to  it? 

The  first  question  is  answered  at  once  by  recurring  to 
the  absolute  necessity  of  the  case:  to  the  jcreat  principle 
of  self-preservation;  to  the  transcendent  law  of  oatare 
:ind  of  tuiture's  God,  which  declares  lluit  the  safety  and 
happiness  of  society  arc  the  objects  at  which  all  political 
institutions  aim,  and  to  which  all  such  institutions  must 
be  sacrificed.  PiiKilArs,  also,  an  answer  nuiy  be  found 
withoat  .learchinjc  beyond  the  principles  of  the  compact 
itself.  It  has  been  hereto/ore  noted  among  the  defects 
of  the  Confederntion  that  in  many  of  the  States  it  bad 
received  no  higher  sanction  than  a  mere  IcgisLaiivc  ratifi- 
cation. '    The  principle  of  reciprocality  seems  to  require 


'  A  hnlory   a(    the  vnrioii-  1  -   ^flll    RitcmpW    hi 

ftmeihl  ili«  [oii^iiiutioii  wlJI  F-uni'B 

''Die  1*1:11  o(  aBrlinrily  t>l  mr  .mr  jr^-ninLn.-n  :•!  jjiif.i  Uie  arllriM 
4il   coulcJcrallou  wtlhtHil  uilmuliiiB  ihrm  In  Uic  (wupla  wat  diie  u{ 


MjUiMnl 


VAUDtTY  OF  COMPACT. 


193 


that  its  obligation  on  the  other  Slates  should  be  reduced 
tij  tile  «;iine  sdindard.  A  compact  between  indepen- 
dent  Mivercicrut,  founded  on  ordirary  acts  o{  legisla- 
tive  authority,  can  pretend  to  no  hishcr  validity  than  a 
league  or  treaty  between  the  parties.  It  is  an  estab> 
bshed  doctrine  on  the  subject  a(  treaties,  that  all  the 
articles  are  mtitually  conditions  of  each  other;  that  a 
breach  of  any  one  article  is  a  breach  of  (he  whole  treaty; 
and  that  a  breach,  committed  by  either  of  the  parties, 
absolves  the  others,  and  authorizes  them,  if  they  please, 
to  pronounce  the  comi>act  violated  and  void.  Should  it 
unhappily  be  necessary  to  appeal  to  these  delicate  truths 
(or  a  jiistilication  for  dispensing  with  the  consent  of  par- 
ticubr  States  to  a  dissolution  of  the  federal  pact,  will 
not  the  complaining  parties  find  it  a  difficult  task  to 
answer  the  Mt;i.TiPLit:D  and  iupuktant  infractions  with 
which  they  may  be  confronted?  The  time  has  been  when 
it  was  incumbent  on  uft  all  to  veil  the  ideas  which  this 
paragraph  exhibits.  The  scene  is  now  changed,  and 
with  it  the  part  which  the  same  motives  dictate. 

The  second  question  \&  not  less  delicate;  and  the 
flattering  prospect  of  its  being  merely  hypothetical  for- 
bids an  over-curious  disrussion  i>i  it.  It  is  one  of  those 
cases  which  must  be  left  to  provide  for  itself.  In  general 
it  may  be  observed  that,  although  no  political  relation 
eun  subsist  between  the  assenting  and  dissenting  States, 
yet  the  moral  relationit  will  remain  uncanceled.  The 
claims  of  justice,  both  on  one  side  and  on  the  other,  will 
be  in  force  and  must  be  fulfilled;  the  rights  of  humanity 
must  in  all  ca&es  be  duly  and  muinuily  rt^spected;  whilst 
considerations  of  a  common  interest,  and,  above  all,  the 
remembrance  of  the  endearing  scenes  which  are  past* 


ihc  liindiBiFuta]  ohfcctlaii*  niEwd  ainon);  ihr  ihouKhtdil  in*ii  nf  ihs 
llin*.  Aiul  v>  crarral  wh  Ibe  i«ic>it;n<tion  lh«i  ■  ttilr  IccUlainra 
coalil  ni«  ulufil  or lerminiiti!  ihc  txlcr  Icdriil  coinpacl.  (hal  South  Cjiro- 
lias  in  |8;1  and  i860,  tnd  ill  ihc  olher  umlhcm  ililn  which  wMdrd, 
dMiiml  tcieiiion  tlimush  cnevcntkins  of  Ibe  peojile  -  ihui  my  (fffClD- 
tii)  ilttiirnfiiiE  whal  they  were  tlieii  Ityiii]-  10  niaiiitain.  tbal  Ihe  Uilv 
(■uvarnnMiati  were  Hivcrri)-!!, — EnirOK. 


and  liir  .inlicipatinn  of  a  spcrdf  trtampit  over  the 
obstacles  to  reunion,  will,  it  is  hoped,  not  urge  in  vain 
uoDKKATiON  un  ouc  Side,  and  prudckce  on  the  other.' 

PUBLIl't. 


No.  44  [43].    (.VtwVirtnKirt.fao^^ttu.)  Madison. 

RESTRICTIVE  POWERS  ON  THE  STATES. 

fpriijjinf  Ihi  iilaMitimm  »f  Irt^liti  aaJ  alliaiutt  htt^ttn  Ihi 
ilatti — tiiuti  tf  Itltrri  tf  manfut — Cn'Ma^  ef  nitwf — llint  ef  iillt  e/ 
trrJil — Krtahliiimtitl  a/  any  legal  tttidtr  tthtr  than  g»U  a»J  tiltfr — 
BiUi  a/  atlaindtr — Kx  fmt  /atla  laan—Lttwi  imfaihmt  tpHtratli — 
7YA!ri  0/  itftiAty- — /mfciitiim  »/  ifHiui  on  ri/vrli  and  im^vrli —  Tht 
f^mr  t»  matt  all  lawt  mtfiiarf  ohJ  piaftr  la  tartj  Ikt  frt<t<Smt 
psTttri  inU  txtetitiaif—h'tiemiyafttKk  afatrtr'^PifhtHlitii  »/ lit 
extnitt  afoHj-  fatftrf  m/l  fxprtiify  dtttgatrd — P»rilivf  tnunfralitit  »f 
pntral  fotetri  JeltgaltJ^Nrpitivt  fHumtralian  i*  tfrtifitafian  a/  '*• 
ttrvtit  fawm  aini  if  liltittt — Rrairdy  far  am  atmr  ef  tkit  gfirral 
favcrr — Thf  lufirrmaiy  af  Ikt  tatuMuHam,  ikf  taattilulitnal  latrt.  and 
triti/irt—OiUi  tf  iMU  and  /tJeraJ  cffifttt  la  lufpatt  latutituliam — ^a 
fart  af  tki  fiiKri  dtligatiJ  uaa^^aiary  ar  iiafn^r. 

Ta  tit  People  of  Iht  State  of  New  York: 

A  fifth  class  of  provisions  in  favor  of  the  feilcral 
authority  consists  of  the  following  restrictions  on  the 
aiiihoritjr  of  the  several  States: 

I.  "  No  State  shall  enter  into  any  treaty,  alliance,  or 
confederation;  grant  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal;  coin 
money;  emit  hilh  of  credit;  make  nnylliiiie  Imt  golO  and 
silver  a  legal  tender  in  payment  of  debts;  pass  any  bill 
of  attainder,  rx  fwsl  faete  law,  or  bw  impairing  the  obli- 
4{alion  nf  <:ontrart«;  or  grant  any  title  of  nubility." 

The  prohibition  against  treaties,  alliances,  and  con- 


'  N«nh  CiroliM  U1I  Rhixfe  hlaad  did  n'li  adopl  iIm  rriltrB)  oMUUft- 
linn  until  llieiiew  t^vcnuncol  lud  henivimc  months  hn>p*m'"it  ri»H  im» 
IlicrH'itP,  i*i.linwiil!»  kjiiTililue.  (<it  umr  time  «l  ol  thp  IJr.i.m,  Th« 
I                                          ;  '     111  In  \ift  fd'ol  I"  *  I  .  '  !'     '    '  to  ili«- 

111  <'ilt»BKV1KTIJ    AX   liT    '  I  iiim|ilc 

...    :.,., k       „^    be  d iuneiubcictl    aiul   , —    .•^   -..Mie   t«HI 

(lain.— Eul  TOR. 


STATES  AND  COINAGE. 


»95 


federations  makes  a  part  of  the  existinf;  articles  of  Union ; 
and  for  reasons  which  need  no  explanation,  is  copied  into 
the  new  Oinsiitutiun.  Tlic  prohibition  o(  letters  of 
marque  is  another  part  of  the  old  system,  but  is  some* 
what  extended  in  the  new.  According  to  the  former, 
Ivtters  of  inarque  could  he  granted  by  the  Slates  after  a 
declaration  of  war;  accordinf;  to  the  latter,  these  licenses 
must  be  obUiined,  as  well  during  war  as  previous  to  its 
declaration,  from  the  government  of  the  United  States. 
1'his  alteration  is  fully  justified  by  the  advantage  of  uni- 
formity in  all  points  whi<:h  relate  to  foreign  powers;  and 
u(  immediate  retpoiisibility  to  the  nation  in  all  thuM  for 
whose  conduct  the  nation  itself  is  to  be  responsible. 

The  right  of  coining  money,  which  is  here  taken  from 
Uie  .States,  was  left  in  their  hands  by  the  Confederation, 
as  a  concurrent  right  with  that  of  Congress,  under  an 
exception  in  favor  of  the  exclusive  right  of  Congress  to 
regul.ile  the  allny  and  value.  In  this  instance,  also,  the 
new  provision  is  an  improvement  on  the  old.  Whilst  the 
alloy  and  value  depended  on  the  general  authority,  a 
right  of  coinage  in  the  particular  States  could  have  ntt 
other  effect  than  to  multiply  expensive  mints  and 
diversify  the  forms  and  weights  of  the  circulating  )>icccs. 
The  latter  inconvenicncy  defeats  tine  purpose  fur  whii'h 
the  power  was  originally  submitted  to  the  federal  head; 
and  as  far  as  the  former  might  prevent  an  inconvenient 
remittance  of  gold  and  silver  to  the  centra)  mint  for  re- 
coinage,  the  end  can  be  as  well  attained  by  local  mints 
Cktalilis^ed  under  the  general  authority. 

The  extension  of  the  prohibition  to  bills  of  credit  mu.ti 
give  pleasure  to  every  citiicn,  in  proportion  to  his  love 
of  justice  and  his  knowledge  of  the  (rue  springs  of  public 
prosperity.  The  loss  which  America  h.is  sustained  since 
the  peace,  from  the  pestilent  effects  of  paper  money  on 
ilie  necessary  confidence  between  man  and  man,  on  the 
necessary  confidence  in  the  public  councils,  on  the  in- 
,  dustry  and  morals  of  the  people,  and  on  the  chamclcr  of 
'rcpubticfin  i;uvernnient,  constitutes  an  enomiuus  debt 
against  tlic  States  chargeable  with  this  unadvised  measure^ 


196 


STATES  AND  PAPER  MOXEY. 


t>a.M;Ui 


whiuh  must  long  remain  ti  nsattsfied ;  or  rather  anaccumu- 
Utioo  of  guilt,  wliich  can  be  expiated  no  otherwise  ttian 
bjr  a  Tolanlary  lacrince  on  the  altar  »f  justice  of  the 
power  which  hai  been  the  insirumcnt  of  ii.  In  addition 
to  these  persuasive  considerations,  it  majr  iic  observed 
that  the  same  rcnxons  which  show  the  necessity  of  deny- 
ing to  the  Slates  the  power  of  regulating  coin  prove 
with  equal  force  that  they  ought  not  to  be  at  liberty  to 
substitute  a  paper  mediuin  in  the  place  of  coin.  Had 
every  State  a  right  to  regulate  the  value  of  its  coin, 
there  might  be  as  many  diRercnt  currencies  as  States, 
and  thus  the  intercourse  among  them  would  l>c  impeded; 
retrospective  alterations  in  its  value  might  be  made,  and 
thus  the  citizens  of  other  States  be  injured,  and  animosi- 
ties be  kindlf.d  among  the  Slates  themselves.  'I'he  sub- 
jects of  foreign  powers  might  suffer  from  the  same  cause, 
and  hence  the  Union  be  discredited  and  embroiled  by 
the  indiscretion  of  a  single  member.  No  one  of  these 
mischiefs  is  1e«s  incident  to  a  power  in  the  States  to 
emit  paper  money  than  to  coin  gold  or  silver.  The 
poirer  to  make  anything  t>ut  gutd  and  stiver  a  tender  in 
payment  of  debts  is  withdrawn  from  the  States,  on  the 
same  principle  witli  that  of  issuing  a  jiapcr  currency. ' 

Bills  of  attainder,  *x  p«st  Jaeto  l.iws,  and  laws  impairing 
the  obligation  of  contracts,  arc  contrary  to  the  first 
principles  of  the  social  compact  and  tu  every  principle 
of  sound  legislation.  The  two  former  are  expressly  pro- 
hibited by  the  declarations  prefixed  to  some  of  the  State 
constitutions,  and  all  of  them  are  prohibited  by  the 
spirit  and  scope  of  these  fundamental  charters.  Our 
own  experience  has  taught  us,  nevertheless,  that  addi- 
tional fences  against  these  d.-ingers  ought  not  to  be 
omitted.  Very  properly,  therefore,  have  the  convention 
added  this  constitutional  bulwark  in  favor  of  personal 
security  and  private  rights;  and  I  am  much  deceived  if 
they  have  not,  in  so  doing,  as  faithfully  consulted  the 


■  Sm  UuiFTDd't  "  ries  tot  Ike  t^iuiltotlM  "  fo*  *  Utlory  of  UOi  of 


iJffl 


b<b<ml 


SrA  TBS  AKD  IMPOSTS. 


a97 


genuine  sentiments  as  the  undoubted  interests  of  their 
constituents.  The  sober  people  of  America  arc  weiiry 
of  the  fluctuating  puticy  whirh  has  directed  the  public 
coancJIs.  They  have  seen  with  regret  and  indignation 
that  sudden  changes  and  legislative  interferences,  in 
cases  affecting  |)urso(t;d  rights,  become  jobx  in  the  hands 
of  enterprising  and  influential  speculators,  and  snares  to 
the  more  industrious  and  less  informed  part  uf  the  com- 
niunit)r.  They  have  seen,  too,  that  one  lejEisiaiive  inter- 
ference is  hut  the  first  hnk  of  a  long  chain  of  repetitions, 
every  subsequent  interference  being  natunilly  prudiiced 
by  the  eSectsof  the  preceding.  They  very  rightly  infer, 
therefore,  that  some  thorough  reform  is  wanting,  which 
will  banish  speculations  on  public  measures,  inspire  a 
general  prudence  and  industry,  and  give  a  rcRular  course 
to  the  business  of  society.  The  prohibition  with  respect 
to  titles  of  nobility  is  copied  from  the  articles  of  Con- 
federation, and  needs  no  comment. 

a.  "No  Slate  shall,  without  the  consent  o(  the  Coi»- 
grcss,  lay  any  imposts  or  duties  on  imports  or  exports, 
except  what  may  be  absolutely  necessary  for  executing 
its  inspection  laws,  and  the  net  produce  of  all  duties  and 
imposts  laid  by  any  State  on  imports  or  exports,  shall 
be  for  the  use  of  the  trea.'iury  of  the  United  States; 
and  all  such  laws  shall  be  subject  to  the  revision  and 
control  of  the  Congress.  No  State  shall,  without  the 
consent  of  Congress,  lay  any  duty  on  tonnage,  keep 
troops  or  ships  of  war  in  time  of  peace,  enter  into  any 
agreement  or  compact  with  another  Stale,  or  with  a 
foreign  power,  or  engage  in  war  unless  actually  in* 
raded,  or  in  such  imminent  danger  as  will  not  admit  of 
delay." 

The  restraint  on  the  power  of  the  States  over  imports 
and  exports  is  enforced  by  alt  the  arguments  which  prove 
the  oeressity  of  submitting  the  regulation  of  trade  to  the 
federal  councils.  Il  i«  needless,  therefore,  to  remark 
further  on  this  head  than  that  the  manner  in  which  the 
restraint  is  (|u.-)lirir<l  Keem»  well  calculated  at  once  to 
secure  to  the  States  a  reasonable  discretion  in  providing 


ElfABLmC  CLAUSE, 

for  the  ronvcnicDcy  of  (heir  imports  and  exports,  and  tc 
tbe  United  Statcit  a  reasunnblc  check  against  the  abui 
of  this  discretion.  The  rcmainiitg  |Mrticiit:irs  "f  this 
clauu  (all  within  reasonings  which  are  cither  mi  oUrious, 
or  have  been  su  fully  developed,  that  ihey  may  be  passed 
over  without  remark. 

The  ii»fh  and  last  class  consists  of  the  several  iwwcrs 
and  provisions  by  which  eRii^cy  is  given  to  alt  the  rest. 

I.  Of  these  the  first  is  the  "power  to  mate  all  laws 
which  shall  be  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  into 
execution  the  foregoing  powers  and  all  other  powers 
vested  by  this  Constitution  in  the  guvernntrnt  of  the 
United  States,  or  in  any  department  or  officer  thereof," 

Few  parts  of  the  Constitution  have  been  assailed  with 
more  inieinpL'rance  than  this;  yet,  on  a  fair  investigation 
iif  it,  no  part  can  appear  more  completely  invulnerable. 
Without  the  suf-itaHif  of  this  power,  the  whole  Constitu- 
tion would  be  a  dead  letter.  Those  who  object  to  the 
article,  therefore,  as  a  part  of  tbe  Constitution,  can  only 
mean  that  the  /otfi  of  the  provision  is  improper.  But 
have  they  considered  whether  a  better  form  could  have 
been  substituted.* 

There  arc  four  other  possible  methods  which  the  Con- 
stilulinn  might  have  taken  on  this  subject.  They  might 
have  copied  the  second  article  of  the  existing  Coiift^dera*^ 
lion,  which  would  have  prohibited  the  exercise  of  any 
power  not  i-jr/fru/r delegated;  Ihcy  might  have  allempled 
a  positive  enumeration  of  the  powers  comprehended 
under  the  general  terms  "  necessary  and  proper":  they 
might  have  attempted  a  negative  enumeration  of  them, 
by  specifying  the  powers  excepted  from  the  general 
definition;  they  might  have  been  altogether  silent  on  Ihr 
subject,  leaving  these  necessary  and  proper  powers  tn 
construction  and  inference. 

Had  the  convention  taken  the  first  method  of  adopting 
the  second  article  of  Confederation,  it  is  evident  that  the 
new  Congress  would   be  continually  exposed,  as   theirj 
predecessors  have  been,  to  the  alternative  of  vnnstnitni 
|hc  term  *'  exfrttily "  with  SO  mach  rigor  as  to  disarm 


ENUMERATtOff  OF  POWERS. 


399 


ifae  gOTernmcnt  of  all  real  aitlhnrity  witalcver,  or  with 
&o  tniich  latitude  as  to  destroy  ulto^ether  ihe  force  of 
the  rcBtrictioo.  It  would  be  easy  to  show,  if  it  were 
uecessar)-,  thut  no  imporlant  power,  dclcgnted  by  the 
articles  of  Confederation,  has  been  or  can  be  executed 
by  Congress,  without  recurring  more  or  less  to  the  doc- 
trine of  (onitrHflhH  or  imjtlteatwm.  As  the  powers  dele- 
gated under  the  tvcw  system  are  more  extensive,  the 
government  which  is  to  administer  it  would  find  itself 
xttll  more  di»tres!ted  with  the  aliernattve  of  helT;iying  the 
public  interests  by  doint;  nothing,  or  of  violating  the 
Constitution  hy  exercising  powers  indispensably  neces- 
sary and  proper,  but,  at  the  same  time,  not  txpreuly 
granted. 

Mad  the  convention  attempted  a  positive  enumeration 
of  the  powers  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  their 
other  powers  into  effect,  the  attempt  would  have  involved 
a  complete  digest  of  laws  on  every  subject  to  which  the 
Constitution  relates;  accommodated,  too,  not  only  to  the 
existing  state  of  ihings,  but  to  all  the  possible  changes 
which  futurity  may  produce;  for  in  every  new  application 
f>f  a  general  power.  \he  parli,ufar  fimfrt,  which  arc  the 
means  of  attaining  the  ah/eft  of  the  general  power,  must 
always  necessarily  vary  with  tlwt  object,  and  be  often 
properly  varied  while  the  object  rem.-iins  the  same. 

Had  they  attempted  to  enumerate  the  particular 
powers  or  means  not  necessary  or  proper  for  carrying 
(he  general  powers  into  execution,  the  task  would  have 
been  no  less  chimerical;  and  would  have  been  liable  to 
this  further  objection,  that  every  defect  in  the  enumera- 
tion would  have  been  e<|uivalcnt  to  a  puttiiive  grant  of 
authority.  If,  to  avoid  this  consequence,  they  had 
attempted  a  partial  enumeration  of  the  exceptions,  and 
described  the  residue  by  the  general  termfi,  not  neettsary 
or  proper,  it  must  have  happened  that  the  enumeration 
would  comprehend  a  few  of  the  excepted  powers  only; 
tltat  these  would  be  such  as  would  be  lea^t  likely  to  be 
assnincd  or  tolerated,  because  the  enumeration  would 
of  cotrne  select  such   as  would   be  least   necessary  or 


300 


NISCONSTRVCTiON  OF  POWERS.        [■•.44<«) 


proper:  atid  thai  the  unnecessary  and  improper  powers 
in<:1udc<l  in  the  resiiliiiim  would  he  lesx  rurtiUljr  ex- 
cepted than  If  no  partial  enufncration  had  been  made. 

(lad  the  Constitution  been  silent  on  this  head,  there 
ctM  lie  nu  (tuubl  thut  ull  the  purticiilur  powerit  re(|Uisite 
as  mcjins  of  executinff  the  general  powers  would  have 
resulted  to  the  government,  by  unavoidable  implication. 
No  axiom  is  more  cleiirly  exlahlished  in  law,  nr  in  reuun, 
than  that  wherever  the  end  is  required,  the  means  are 
autliorizcd;  wherever  a  general  power  to  do  a  thing  is 
given,  every  |Kirtii;uliir  [Kiwer  nc<re»9jiry  for  doing  it  is 
included.  Kad  this  last  method,  thcrerore,  been  pursued 
by  the  convention,  every  objection  now  urged  against 
their  plan  would  remain  in  all  ttd^  plausibility;  und  the 
real  inconvcnicncy  would  be  incurred  of  not  removing 
a  pretext  which  may  be  sciied  on  critical  occasions  for 
drawing  into  question  the  essential  powers  of  the 
Union. 

If  it  be  askc<l  what  is  to  be  tlie  consequence,  in  case 
the  Congress  shall  iniscon»lruc  this  piirt  of  the  Cunslito- 
tioD,  and  exercise  powers  not  warranted  by  its  true  roe»n- 
ing,  1  answer,  the  same  as  if  they  should  misconsinic  or 
enlarge  any  other  power  vested  in  them;  as  if  the  general 
power  had  been  reduced  to  particulars,  and  any  one  nf 
these  were  to  be  violated;  the  same,  in  short,  as  if  the 
State  Ivgisliitures  should  violate  their  respective  constItU' 
tional  authorities.  In  the  first  instantc,  the  success  of 
the  usurpation  will  de^iend  on  the  executive  and  judiciary 
departments  which  are  to  expound  and  give  effect  to 
the  legislative  acts;  and  in  the  last  resort  a  remedy 
must  l)c  obtained  fn>ni  the  people,  who  can,  by  the  elec- 
tion of  more  faithful  represenLitivcs,  anntd  the  acts  of 
the  usurpers.  The  truth  is  that  this  ultimate  redress 
may  be  mnrc  confided  in  against  unconstitutional  acts  of 
the  federal  tlian  of  the  State  legislatures,  for  this  plain 
reason,  that  as  every  such  act  of  the  former  will  be  an 
invasion  of  the  rights  of  the  latter,  ihcte  will  be  ever 
ready  to  mark  the  innovation,  to  sound  the  alarm  to  the 
people,  and  to  exert  tlieir  locsl  influence  in  efia:iui|  a 


1U«M«) 


COysTITUTIOS  SUPREME  LAW. 


301 


cliatiKe  of  federal  representatives.'  There  being  no 
such  iatermeOiatc  buily  between  the  Suite  tegJKtatiires 
and  the  people  ioteresled  in  watching  the  conduct  of  the 
former,  violations  of  the  State  constitutions  arc  more 
likely  to  remain  unnoticed  and  unreilreised. 

>.  "Tilts  Cuiutiiution  and  the  laws  of  the  United 
States  which  shall  be  made  in  pursuance  thereof,  nnd  all 
treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be  made,  nnder  the  auihor- 
ity  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  the  supreme  law  of 
the  land,  and  the  judges  in  every  SLite  shall  be  bound 
thereby,  anythinfc  in  the  constitution  or  taws  of  any 
State  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding." 

The  tndi.-Kreet  xeal  of  the  adversaries  to  the  Constitu- 
tion has  betrayed  them  into  au  attack  on  this  part  of  it 
Im  also,  without  which  it  woiiht  have  been  evi- 

Ho.St.  dently  and   radically  defective.     To  be  fully 

sensible  of  this,  we  need  only  suppose  for  a  moment  that 
the  supremacy  of  the  Slate  constitutions  had  been  left 
complete  by  a  Mving  ilausc  in  their  favor. 

In  the  first  place,  as  these  constitutions  invest  the 
State  legislatures  with  absolute  sovereignty,  in  all  cases 
not  excepted  by  the  exiKtirig  nnic]e&  of  Confederation, 
all  the  authorities  contained  in  the  proposed  Constitu- 
tion, so  far  as  they  exceed  those  enumerated  in  the 
Confederation,  would  have  been  annulled,  and  the  new 
Congress  would  have  been  reduced  to  the  same  impotent 
condition  with  their  predecessors. 

In  the  next  place,  as  the  con«tttatton«  of  some  of  the 
States  do  not  even  expressly  and  fully  recognize  the 
existing  powers  o(  the  Confederacy,  av,  express  saving  of 
the  supremacy  of  the  former  would,  iu  .^udi  Slates,  have 
brought  into  question  every  power  contained  in  the  pro- 
posed Constitution. 

In  the  third  place,  as  the  constitutions  of  the  Slates 
differ  much  from  each  other,  it  might  happen  that  a 
treaty  or  nationat  law,  of  great  and  equal  importance  to 

'  (If  [«  Mailiu-n  pnijioifil  Ihr  vprjr  counc  pvruiH  by  the  Vrrcinti  iikI 
KcnlDckT  iFcUlmliim  ill  i;')S-^.  and  by  the  Coiuiecunl  aiu  Musa- 
dMMti*  IcgitlMiiret  la  iSit-14. — Eorroit, 


■ 


30"  SUPPORT  OP  CONSTlTUTIOlf.  IIto.M<4S» 


the  SUttrs,  woutil  interfere  with  some  and  not  with  ollirr 
const  it  til  ions,  and  would  conticciucntly  be  valid  in  some 
of  the  State!),  at  the  ume  time  that  it  would  have  no 
effect  in  others. 

In  line,  the  world  would  have  seen,  for  the  first  time, 
a  system  of  government  founded  on  an  inversion  of  the 
fundamental  principles  of  all  government;  it  would  have 
seen  the  authority  of  the  whole  society  everywhere  sul>- 
ordinatc  to  the  authority  of  the  parts;  il  would  have 
seen  a  monster,  in  which  the  head  was  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  mKmt>er!i. 

3.  "  The  Senators  and  Representatives,  and  the  mem- 
bers of  the  several  State  let^isLttures,  and  all  executive 
and  judiciiil  oflicers,  both  of  the  United  Sl.ile»  and  the 
several  States,  shall  be  bound  by  oatli  or  aflirmatioD  to 
support  this  Constitution." 

it  has  been  asked  why  it  wag  thought  necessnry  that 
the  State  magistracy  should  l>e  bound  to  support  the 
federal  Constitution,  and  unnecessary  that  a  like  oath 
should  be  im{>osed  on  the  officers  uf  the  United  States, 
in  favor  of  the  State  constitutions. 

Several  reasons  mi^ht  be  assigned  for  the  distinction. 
I  content  myself  with  one,  which  is  obvimis  and  com  lu- 
sire.  The  members  of  the  federal  government  will  have 
no  agency  in  carrying  the  State  constitutions  into  clleci. 
The  members  and  officers  of  the  Stste  governments,  on 
the  contrary,  will  luve  an  essential  agency  in  giving 
effect  to  the  federal  Constitution.  The  election  of  tlie 
President  and  Senate  wilt  depend,  in  all  cases,  on  the 
legiitlaiures  of  the  several  States.  And  the  election  of 
the  House  of  Reprcscotalivcs  will  equally  depend  on  the 
same  authority  in  the  first  instance;  and  will,  probably, 
forever  be  conducted  by  Uie  officers,  and  according  t" 
the  laws,  of  the  States. 

4.  Among  the  provisions  for  giving  efficacy  to  the 
federal  powers  might  be  added  iliose  which  bching  to  the 
executive  and  judiciary  departments;  but  as  these  are 
reserved  for  particular  examination  in  another  place,  1 
jiASS  tbem  over  in  this. 


NATIONAL  POWER  AND  STATES. 


30J 


I 


We  have  now  revicwcti,  id  detail,  all  the  arlicies  com- 
{>t>siDg  the  sum  or  quantity  of  power  dclegiitcd  hy  the 
proposed  Constitution  to  the  federal  government,  and 
are  brought  to  this  undeniable  conclusion,  that  no  part 
uf  the  power  is  unnecessary  or  improper  for  accomplish* 
in{[  the  necessary  ot>}ects  of  the  Union.  The  question, 
therefore,  whether  this  amount  of  power  shall  be  grunted 
or  not,  resolves  itself  into  another  question,  whether  or 
not  a  covernment  commensurate  to  the  exigencies  of  the 
Union  shall  be  established;  or,  in  other  words,  whether 
the  Union  itself  sliall  be  preserved.  Publiuii. 


No.  45  [44].  t-V*-  l'*r*>W4.(,;.i.u«y.t,itl«.) 


Madison. 


THE   WHOLE   M.ASS   OF   N.^TIONAL    POWER   IN 
REL.\TION  TO  THE  STATE  GOVERNMENTS. 


Tkt  titvuenttitttlitn  iM  daageivui  If  tk/  ilalf  gevrrnmmlt — TVjhA 
tnty  in  tfnfrJtrMian  it  It  OfatfH  Ik/  intlral  ^hmt — Slatt  grv/m. 
nieittt  aril!  k^vf  »r#nr  inJlutHti  anting  Ikt  pttflt — Stalt  gn^rnmtnli  art 
tiintlial  fiarti  0/  Ikt /ftUral  gtvfrnmnl — Ojfittri  a/  lAt  liniliJ  Slatrt 
art  Uii  ntimtrmt  than  th»u  af  Ikr  ttairt — KtttrvtJ pttat/t  art  ttialittfy 
grater  iMan  iluu  JtUgalei^Pivftsid  thangi  (miiiti  ttii  in  giting  urn 
/Aam  in  slrrHglt/niHg  M frtver$. 

T«  Ike  P«iplf  0/  thf  Stuff  0/  Nfw  York: 

Having  «howii  iliat  no  one  of  the  powers  transferred 
to  the  federal  government  is  unnecessary  or  improper, 
tJie  next  question  to  be  considered  is  whether  the  whole 
mass  of  them  will  be  dangerous  to  the  portion  of  author- 
ity left  in  the  several  States. 

The  adversaries  to  the  plan  of  the  convention,  instead 
of  considering  in  the  first  place  what  degree  of  pciwer 
was  absolutely  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  the  federal 
government,  have  exhausted  themselves  in  a  secondary 
inquiry  into  the  possible  consequences  of  the  proposed 
degree  of  [tower  to  the  gorcrnraents  of  the  particular 
States.     But  if  Uie  Union,  as  has  been  shown,  be  cssen- 


3M 


FALSE  IMPOkrANCE  OF  STATES.      llto.ttlM) 


tial  to  the  xecurity  of  the  people  of  America  against 
foreign  daoger;  if  it  be  CMenlial  to  their  sccurity 
against  contentions  and  wars  among  the  dilfercnl  States; 
if  it  be  essential  to  gruard  them  iigainst  those  violent  and 
oppressive  factions  wbich  embitter  the  blessings  ot 
liberty,  and  against  those  miliiary  establishments  wbich 
must  gradually  poison  its  very  fountain;  if,  in  a  word, 
the  Union  be  essential  to  the  happiness  of  the  people  of 
America,  is  it  not  prcfwstcrotis  to  urge  sk  an  obje^rtion 
to  a  government,  without  which  the  objects  of  the  Union 
cannot  be  attained,  that  such  a  gorcrnmcnt  may  dero- 
gate from  the  importance  of  the  governroenis  of  the 
individual  States?  Was,  then,  the  American  Revolution 
effctlcd.  was  the  American  Confederacy  formed,  was  the 
precious  blood  of  thousands  spilt,  and  the  hard-earned 
substance  of  millions  lavished,  not  that  the  people  of 
America  should  enjoy  peace,  liberty,  and  safety,  but  that 
the  government  nf  the  individna)  States,  that  particular 
municipal  rslablisbmenix,  might  enjoy  a  certain  extent 
of  power,  and  be  arrayed  with  certain  dignities  and 
attributes  of  sovereignty?  Wc  have  heard  of  llie  impious 
doctrine  in  tlie  Old  \Vo«-ld  ilui  the  i>eoplc  were  made 
for  kings,  not  kings  for  the  people.  Is  the  wnx:  iloc- 
trinc  to  be  revived  in  llic  New,  in  another  shape — that 
the  solid  happiness  of  the  people  is  to  be  sacrificed  to  the 
views  of  political  inslilulions  of  a  difTerenI  form?  It  is 
too  early  for  politicians  to  presume  oti  our  fo«^«tng 
tliat  the  public  gotxi,  the  real  welfare  of  the  Rrcat  body 
of  the  |«eople,  is  llie  supreme  object  to  be  pursm-d;  and 
that  no  fonii  of  government  whatever  has  any  other  value 
than  as  it  may  be  6tted  for  titc  attainment  of  this  object 
Were  the  plan  of  the  convention  adverse  to  the  public 
happiness,  my  voice  would  be.  Reject  the  plan.  Were 
the  Union  itself  inconsistent  with  tlie  public  happiness, 
it  would  be,  Abolish  the  ITnion.  lo  lice  manner,  as  far 
as  the  sovereignty  of  the  Stales  rannot  be  reconciled  to 
(he  happines.*  nf  tlve  p«>(»lc.  the  voice  of  every  good  ctli- 
len  must  be.  Let  the  former  be  sacrificed  lo  thf  latter. 
How   far   the   sacrifice    is   necessary   lias   been   showti. 


MMlIIMt 


BALAKCB  OP  UNJOK. 


30s 


Hovr  far  the  unsacriliced  residue  will  be  endangered  is 
tile  question  before  us. 

Several  important  considerations  bavc  been  touched 
in  tlic  course  of  these  papers,  which  discounicnanue  the 
suppotiition  that  the  operation  of  the  federal  };ovcrnnicnt 
will  by  degrees  prove  fatal  to  the  Stale  governments. 
The  more  1  revolve  the  subject,  the  mure  fully  1  am 
persuaded  that  the  balance  is  much  more  likely  to  be  dis- 
turbed by  the  prcpondcrancy  of  the  last  than  of  the  hrst 
scale. ' 

We  have  seen,  in  all  the  examplet  nf  ani:i«^il  and  modrrn  coiw 
(e<leracies.  the  strongest  lefxleiiry  cotiiinuatly  heiraying  itscll  In 
Sm  llie  nieinbcTs  to  (le»|KHl  the  j'''"^'^'  govetnnicnl  of  its 

■a.  tT-  iiuiliohtiics.  wiih  a  very  ineffectual  cnpacity  in  the 

latter  10  defend  iiielf  :iKajnsl  (he  encroachments.  Aldicu];li.  in 
m«sl  of  these  ruamplrs.  the  ^ysicm  hns  heen  so  riiMimtlsr  from 
that  under  consHleiniioii  as  ((realty  to  wfealten  any  inference  con- 
eernlng  ihe  Utter  (roni  the  fate  of  the  ftmner,  yrl,  as  ihc  States 
will  retain,  under  the  proposed  Conaiiluiioii,  a  ver)-  cxteniivc  por- 
tion of  active  sovereignty,  the  inference  ought  not  10  be  wholly 
distCKanled.  In  Ihe  Achxan  teajiue  it  is  probnhle  (hat  the  federal 
head  had  a  degree  and  species  of  power  which  gave  it  a  con- 
sideralrfe  likeness  to  the  cuveinineot  framed  l>y  tlve  convention. 
The  Lycian  Confederacy,  as  far  as  its  piinciple«  and  form  arc 
Iranunilled.  niuit  have  home  a  still  j-ieater  analof;y  to  it.  Yet 
history  docs  not  iiifot'in  us  thai  either  nf  llicm  cvrr  degenerated, or 


'All  muter  of  (id  the  lulsnce  between  the  ttiteiand  the  nalmo 
hat  been  admirablr  iiuiii mined.  While  Ihe  natioiiaJ  govetnniCDt  has 
■Miuned  maay  aiUilkiiial  |ui>m  whkh  the  ctimlh  of  communlcilinn 
has  tnailc  it  pooihle  (or  It  tocnloriY,  ycl  relslivrlr  the  otiilr  i:iwcriimcnlii 
hare  iwiDr  tohc  nwrc  iin|<urtaBl  rioiietils.  aiitoin>|iareil  wiih  ihr  imtiiiniil 
(W)t(UBUnli  than  in  ISOO.  Thti  iion-ing  chicllf  lalhedrciKiiilancr  Ihfll 
reluilWS  w«lll  fateitpi  c<ntnlii«— ihe  i;iealHl  (uni-Iion  ol  llic  £<-'<>'">' 
furcnment — kive  become  (ar  leu  «i(*l,  ulth  the  crouin|>  icnilciicy  to 
peace:  (or  luch  fiurii^n  rrlalliiiit  a<-  innrriiu  aiechicAycoiiiiiiriciiil,  nnd 
iiy  Ihe  iwaclical  ilexlnu-ii'ici  ■«(  Anieriran  thijifiinB  hare  been  rerliurii  tn 
lillle  mom  (ban  ((oe^linn^  of  tatifl\.  The  importance  of  inletn*!  aflain. 
IjDO.  haiilecliMd  Kilh  IhcmlHiiX  and  eitinclinooif  the  Indian  nnd  wilh 
the  •lc«ly  Umeiiliii;  of  jMibtlc  leidwry-  Ceiinin  ilcvciupiuciili  have,  of 
counte.  aically  idiledtolbe  nalinnal  lollarnco.  uH>  »  Ihe  |;icaler  Impoi- 
lanco  uf  iKb  |iu\I  oHice,  the  umainuciital  cixtlnil  met  railroail^  Ihe 
cr«)tian  tX  natimsl  ti«nk>  and  the  power  Ko  tKf  >liat  la  money,  tho 
Irvjiiic  ol  prateetire  tatid  and  the  trantiaR  of  boaiuici,  the  pi^cy  of 
Iniemal  ianproTeuenl.  and  tcvetil  other  niiierlal  (ictori-  Rut  with  ihe 
ile*el<i|ifltcntof  aaUona]  (uBUiunk  bu  (ume  a  |;ieallf  Uicreaaetl  impotiancc 


■   ■  •lent.' 

jrencM  "f  ywrwBMl  lutliBMi^  «:  .ie  mil 

powen  rgipeeo-Tety  TvMcn  >a   i&eai:  to 

.trnttf  'if  rMaiiyami  £ntttn»- 


■jju—iill-     TW  laiiii  iJ>—M  In  cMfHi  miHs  aaiL  o*^- 
..uB  pMn  Bi«  ■  Toai  pvc  i»  die  iUs  .ii  »«t  iitf. 

imF  JmlopM  a  BilitiKte  out  «C 

~ii«  twi  euMnd   >4   lie 


— Ikr  muilla  «hI  ■umkJ|Mli»B»      i»  > 
'  '•(onra  nl  ilw  oUiaa  «•  tta  ■ 
•  hh  «■».  In*  'Umdki^ 


MUiMD) 


DEPEA'DEXCB  ON  STAISS. 


307 


and  essentia)  parts  of  the  federal  gavcrnmcnt ;  whilst  tlic 
bttcr  U  nowise  csscntiul  to  the  upenitimi  or  <>rj>imizattun 
of  the  former.  Withiiut  the  inttrvcntiun  of  the  St^tc 
lc([itilatures,  the  PresiOcDt  of  the  United  Stales  cannot 
be  elected  at  all.'  They  must  in  all  cnscs  linve  a  great 
^ share  in  his  appointment,  an<J  will,  perhaps,  in  most  cases, 
of  (hcmsclvcs  determine  it.  The  Senate  will  be  elccleil 
absolutely  and  exclusively  by  the  Slate  legisl^iturctt. 
Even  the  Hou«e  of  Representative^  though  drawn 
immediately  from  the  people,  will  be  chosen  very  much 
under  the  influence  of  that  class  of  men  whose  influence 
over  the  people  obtains  for  tliemiuilvcs  an  election  into 
the  State  lexislaturcs.  Thus,  each  of  the  principal 
branches  of  the  federal  government  will  owe  its  esiatence 
more  or  less  to  the  favor  of  ihc  State  Eovernmenls,  and 
must  consequently  feel  a  dependence  which  is  much 
more  likely  to  beget  a  disposition  too  obseiiuious  than 
loo  overlKariiig  towards  ihctii.  On  the  other  side,  tlic 
component  pans  of  the  State  {governments  will  in  no 
instance  be  indebted  for  their  appointment  to  tlie  direct 
atftncy  of  the  fetleral  guverniuent,  and  very  little,  if  at 
all,  to  the  local  influence  of  its  members. 

The  number  of  individuals  employed  under  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  will  be  much  smaller  than 
the  number  employed  under  the  particular  Slates.  There 
will  consequently  be  less  of  personal  influence  on  the  side 
of  the  former  than  of  the  latter.  The  members  of  the 
lejcislalive,  executive,  and  judiniary  de|)artments  of 
thirteen  and  more  Stales,  the  justices  of  peace,  officers 
of  militia,  ministerial  oRiccrs  of  justice,  with  all  the 
county,  corpora  lion,  and  town  officers,  for  three  millions 
and  more  of  people,  intermixed,  and  having  particniar 
acquaintance  with  every  class  and  circle  of  people,  must 


I 


'  la  the  lint  teatf  yctn  lh«  prMldenrUI  elector*  were  Miially  n^intea 
\rt  Uie  (tsle  Icjfltlilatm.  »iiJ  Soulli  Can'lim  fven  miinl.iiiieil  (hit  iTklcta 
(111  lS49.  Ill  lSl3  a  numlnT  dI  (liv  nIMci  lIiom  ibcir  vlci:t<in  Uy  nifaiii 
if  p9jju]ir  ivilri.  1  i^leiii  lahkh  \\%i  i-incr  brcoiiiv  univcrul.  aitd  uh^ii 
\n  ikiiv  cirlwlcil  (he  le£Hlaturc«  (rom  all  pulicipaiian  in  ihc  clecllon 
uf  tlic  rioiUeni.— Ui>iToa. 


3o6  ADVANTAGE  WITH  STATES.        nr«.«<Hi 

iciiitcd  (o  itcgrnenite.  Into  one  consolidxttd  government.  On  Ihe 
contmtjr.  we  know  (h^l  ihc  ruin  n(  one  of  them  jirncecitcfl  frotnlhc 
mcapacily  of  tlic  fedenl  atiihoniy  to  (iierenl  lite  i)is»L-nskin»,  and 
linally  Uie  disunion,  of  the  iiilioriliniie  authoriiJes-  These  use* 
«rc  the  more  wonliy  of  our  ikircntion.  as  the  excriul  catises  \tf 
wtikh  the  com  pen  eat  parts  were  presMd  together  were  much  man 
numerous  anil  powerful  lh.in  in  OUrCAse;  tinil  con s>rquei illy  leis 
(jowerful  lij;ument!i  within  would  be  sufficient  to  bind  the  membcts 
to  the  head  and  to  each  oilier. 

In  (he  feiitlal  system  we  have  seen  a  similar  peopeiuiljr  exempb- 
lied.  Nolwiihstamling  the  warn  of  proper  sympathy  in  every 
iiistiuice  between  the  local  soireiei{;iis  and  the  people,  und  ihe 
sympathy  in  lomc  inuancct  l>elwren  tlw  general  sovereign  and 
the  latter.  It  UMjIly  happened  iliat  (he  local  Mvereii^ns  preraded 
in  the  rival.ihip  for  cue  roach  men  tt.  Hod  no  external  dnngert 
enforced  Iniental  harmony  and  sul>(>i<linjtion,and  paMicul;iily.  had 
(he  local  H>vEtei^n«  possessed  the  ^inrctiuns  of  the  peo|ile.  tlic  great 
kingdoms  in  Ruropc  wx>uld  at  (hit  time  cofisisi  oJ  as  many  iiid 
])ciHl«nl  princes  as  llierc  were  fomterly  fcuilalory  barons. 

The  State  gorcrnments  will  tijiee  the  advantage  of  the 
federal  government,  whether  wc  compare  ihetn  in  respect 
to  the  immediate  dependence  of  the  one  on  the  other; 
to  the  weiglil  of  peruiiial  Influence  vrhit-h  each  side  will 
pos!ie«s;  lo  the  powers  respectively  vested  in  them;  to 
the  predilection  and  probable  support  of  the  people; 
to  the  disposition  and  faculty  of  resitting  and  frustrate 
ing  the  measures  of  cjch  other. 

The  Statcgovernments  maj'  be  regarded  as  constituent 


tA  the  itale  MvcrameoU.  The  Mcra  power  lo  charier  diki  and  cotp»- 
niilitm.  whk*  now  pkyi  ndi  a  Tilal  pail  in  die  lite  of  every  cibten. 
pivbalilr  iiiiire  iMknoMkll  ih«  aiMMiinikl  pnwcrvhilhcno  Hiiimeil  liyihc 
gcnml  eiivrnimDiil.  Furlhamun,  tin lUln  hirc*ecBrnlcuii>|Jelecan' 
Irul  •?>¥!  piiMic  eilimtion,  ha*e  <I«T«lapttl  ■  ailliiia  lar  tnl  uf  )<n>pottiuu 
(o  iliB  reeulat  anny.  anil  hive  niaed  enoonomly  in  (h«  pomi  of  (uatna. 
t)irMi|^«uch  Mcsni  at  ulrtiif  public  fi|tkt*,  and  inhcntance  and  iacon* 
laies.  In  ific  lUlly  Itfir  nl  Out  cttiu«.  the  nealioa  and  contnil  of  tk 
■nachineiy  im  lupnlyinc  him  wiib  Inncl.  waiei.  jtih.  iriaa|io(latkiH.  anil 
tidiicaliuo  :  for  aiilin^  him  in  ijtfcnes.  in  poTniy.  or  ii>  intaniiy  :  anil  lu' 
protecting  him  frooi  rioknce  anil  £rr.  from  'liteiie.  (rum  virc.  and  (n>n< 
fraud,  all  >eit — wilh  eiocivtiiint  •circitly  o-.-irlh  s  menlioo — in  the  Wale 
ftonranteBii.ar in(h<j(.-'--'  -  ■'  -  -,uBiicten>lr---  r---.  -ia.  Asa 
reuill  ii  h  prufaaUa  ikit  >r  ul  Ihc  i>  >i-  nalleaal 

ItnTcmmml.  uconpairij  'i  liit  ilatn.  I>p-  j) 

isihn  Lbaa  tn«iea»M,  in  (li«  laM  hnad>«d  ycon. — EDiroK. 


lUdiMa) 


DEPEXDEXCB  ON  STATES. 


3«7 


and  essential  partsof  the  federal  government;  vliilst  tlic 
latter  is  uontftc  essential  to  the  operation  or  organization 
o{  the  former.  Without  the  intervention  of  the  btate 
legislatures,  the  Presiileiii  of  the  United  States  cannot 
.be  elected  at  all.'  They  must  in  all  cases  have  a  great 
.share  in  his  appointment,  and  will,  perlia|):(,  iti  most  cases, 
of  themselves  determine  it.  The  Scnati;  will  be  elected 
absolutely  and  cxclitsiveiy  by  the  State  legislatures, 
l^vcn  the  House  of  Representatives,  though  drawn 
immediately  from  the  people,  vfill  be  chosen  very  much 
under  the  influence  of  (hat  class  of  men  whose  iiilJiicnce 
over  the  people  obtains  for  themselves  an  election  into 
the  State  legitdaiures.  Thus,  each  of  the  principal 
branches  of  the  federal  government  will  owe  its  esisteucc 
more  or  less  to  the  favor  of  the  Stale  governments,  and 
must  consequently  feel  a  dependence  which  is  much 
more  likely  to  beget  a  disposition  too  obsequious  than 
too  overbearing  towards  thcni.  On  the  other  side,  ihe 
cumponent  p;irts  of  the  Slate  governments  will  in  no 
instance  be  indebted  fur  their  appointment  to  the  direct 
iigency  uf  the  federal  government,  and  very  little,  if  at 
all,  to  the  local  inlluence  uf  its  members. 

The  number  of  individuals  employed  under  the  Con- 
ttilution  of  the  United  States  will  be  much  smnller  than 
the  number  employed  under  the  particular  States.  There 
will  consequently  Iw  less  of  personal  influence  on  the  side 
of  the  former  than  of  the  tatter.  The  members  of  the 
legislative,  executive,  and  jddiciary  departments  of 
thirteen  and  more  States,  the  justices  of  peace,  officers 
l^f  militia,  ministerial  officers  of  justice,  with  all  the 
county,  corporation,  and  town  officers,  for  three  millions 
and  more  of  people,  intermixed,  and  having  particular 
acquaintance  with  every  class  and  circle  of  people,  mnst 


'  tit  tliF  find  forty  ycim  th*  [irir^idpnlUI  riertore  wm  tnuall^  ttiown 
hy  the  >lal«  IcpiUlnrci.  tni  soiiili  Citutiiu  tntn  nuintninptl  (h»  lyttpm 
■ill  ts66.  In  I$i3  a  uuiulwr  uf  ilie  i.iai«  chose  ihcir  i:lciUm  by  nicala 
of  pu)iiil>r  T«4ei.  *  aj-ilciii  hMcIi  bak  'Jiti.-c  licunne  ui>It<iuI.  *ii>t  ulti<ii 
bi>  iliat  cu'ImIoI  tb«  tcfiMlaiiirn  from  >U  paiik-!)>ati<>n  >■■  llir  cltLiiuii 
<dtkc  Pi<maein,— Kw-nifc. 


308  NATIONAL  AND  STATE  OFFICEKS.    ll«  «  1*4) 

eicced  beyond  all  proportion,  both  in  number  and  in 
inlltienc«,  those  of  every  description  vbo  will  be  employed 
in  the  administration  of  the  federal  system.  Compare 
the  members  of  the  three  great  dep;irtments  of  the 
thirteen  States,  exeludinf;  from  the  judiciary  department 
the  justices  of  peace,  with  the  members  of  the  corre- 
sponding departments  of  the  single  gorernmcnt  of  the 
Union;  eomi>.-ire  the  militia  oflicers  of  three  millions  uf 
people  with  the  military  and  marine  officers  of  any 
establishment  which  is  within  the  compass  of  probability, 
or,  I  may  add,  of  possibility,  and,  in  this  view  :iliine,  we 
may  pronounce  the  advantage  of  the  States  to  be  decisive. 
If  the  federal  gitrrrnmunt  is  to  have  collectors  of  revcnnc. 
the  State  Kovcrnments  will  have  theirs  also.  And  as 
those  of  the  former  will  be  principally  on  the  sea-coast, 
and  not  very  numerous,  whilst  those  of  the  luilcr  will  be 
spread  over  the  face  of  the  country,  and  will  be  very 
numerous,  the  advantage  in  this  view  also  lies  on  the 
same  side.  It  is  true  that  the  Confederacy  is  to  posseKit, 
and  may  exercise,  the  power  of  collecting  internal  as  well 
as  external  taxes  throughi)ut  the  Siatrs;  but  il  is  probable 
that  this  power  will  not  be  resorted  to,  except  for  sup- 
plemental purposes  of  revenue;  that  an  option  will  then 
be  given  to  the  States  to  Supply  their  quotas  by  previous 
collections  of  ihcir  own;  and  thai  tlic  eventual  collection, 
under  the  immediate  authority  of  the  Union,  will  generally 
be  made  by  the  oflicers,  and  according  to  the  rules, 
appointed  by  the  several  States.  Indeed  it  is  extremely 
prrdiable  that  in  other  instances,  particnlarly  in  the 
organization  of  the  judicial  power,  the  olBcers  of  tlie 
Sutes  will  be  clothed  with  the  correspondent  authority 
of  the  Union,  Should  it  happen,  however,  that  separate 
collectors  of  internal  revenue  should  be  appointed  under 
the  federal  government,  the  influence  of  the  whole  num- 
ber would  not  bear  a  cumparison  with  that  of  the  multi- 
tude of  State  officers  in  the  opposite  scale.  Within  every 
district  to  which  a  federal  collector  would  be  allotted, 
there  would  not  be  less  than  thirty  or  forty,  or  even  morcv 
officers  of  different  descriptions,  and  many  of  thctn  per- 


Ibikonl 


JVKtr  A/iD  OKIGtKAt  POWERS. 


309 


s<'>n5  nf  character  nnd  weight,  whole  influence  would  lie 
OH  the  side  of  the  State, 

The  powers  delegated  by  the  pruposed  Oiiistitution  to 
the  federal  government  arc  few  and  (lefincd.  Those 
which  are  to  remain  in  the  State  governments  are 
numerous  and  indcfintte.  The  former  will  be  exercised 
prtiK^ipally  on  external  objects,  as  war,  peace,  negotia- 
tion, and  foreign  commerce;  with  which  last  the  power; 
of  taxation  will,  for  the  most  part,  be  cotinected.  The ' 
powers  reserved  to  the  several  States  will  extend  to  all 
the  objircis  which,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  affairs,  cun- 
ccri)  ilii^  livev,  liberties,  and  properties  of  the  people,  and 
the  internal  order,  improvement,  and  prosperity  of  the 
State. 

The  operations  of  the  federal  govemmcnl  will  be  most 
extensive  and  important  in  limes  of  war  and  danger; 
those  of  the  State  governments,  in  times  of  peace  and 
security.  As  the  fnrmcr  periods  will  probably  bear  a] 
small  proportion  to  the  latter,  the  State  governments  will 
here  enjoy  another  advantage  over  the  federal  govern- 
ment. The  more  adeijuatc,  indeed,  the  fefleral  powers 
may  be  rendered  to  the  national  defense,  the  less  frequent 
will  be  those  scenes  of  danger  which  might  favor  their 
ascendency  over  the  governments  of  ilie  particular  Sutes. 

I(  the  new  C«n!iiiitiiion  be  ci.iminMl  tvitli  j^cfwravj  and  candor,^ 
It  will  be  found  tktl  l)ic  cliang«  wlikli  it  pri>i)oses  coiisi&li  much 
leu  in  (be  adiliiion  vl  NEW  i-owf.rs  10  ihc  Union  ih;in  in  ilie 
invigocation  d(  its  Oric.inai.  powers.    Tim  rcgiiUiion  of  com- 
merce. It  is  true,  is  a  new  power;  but  ihai  M«m9  lu  be  an  addi- 
tion which  few  oppiMe.  ami  from  which  no  .ipprehentions  ate  en- 
trnained,    The  powers  rrUiing  loWHraml  peace,  armies  .iml  flecl*,. 
treaties   and  finance,  wilh  the  olhei   mote   considerable   powtti,! 
nre  all  vested  in  ihr  Misting  Congrrts  hy  die  nnicles  of  Con- 
federation.    The  ptoposeil  ch^nuF  doct  nM  entance  tlieie  powen; 
i|  only  substilules  .t  more  rffcciual  mode  of  ailminislrrinK  thrm. 
The  change  relating  to  taxation  may  be  reganlcil  xi  the  most  irn- 
poTtaol :  and  yet  the  pretenl  Congrcu  hive  ns  complcle  .lUthoniyj 
10  REtjUiBE  ol  the  Slates  indctinitc  supplies  of  money  Vat  the' 
coromon  defense  and  general  welfare  as  the  fuluTc  Congress  will 
tuvc  to  requhc  thcnt  of  iivdivhluiU  ciiiicns ;  and  the  latter  will  be 


3'o 


POPULAR  SUPPORT. 


(V*.U'U) 


no  more  houTid  llMn  Ihe  Statu  themselvw  \\.vee  l»**u  to  pay  ilie 
quoiai  rf«|iectivrly  inxnl  on  llicin.  Had  ihe  Slairt  (onipli^ 
punctually  Willi  ihe  anides  ol  Coiitedemion,  or  could  ilieir  coin- 
pliancc  hare  been  etifqrccd  by  at  peocealilc  mean*  at  may  be  iisril 
with  «uccri«  low.irds  single  [icrfioiis.  our  \i»s\  rxiviictice  is  very  far 
(roo)  couiiten:incin|[  an  optnion  that  ilie  Slaie  f;"'"'^'"'''^"'*  would 
have  I<Mt  llic-ircniisliluliona!  pow«r^  and  h.tvr  graiiually  uriilrrgiinc 
an  rnlir«  consolidation.  To  maintain  tliat  such  an  ci-enl  would  have 
eniiued  would  be  to  My  at  once  ihal  ibr  cxittrnce  of  the  SWIe 
goi-ernineni«n  incoinpaiihle  with  any  lyitcin  whaiever  thataccom- 
pliahex  the  csscniUl  puiposts  of  the  Union. 

PUBLIUa. 


No.  46  J45I.    (y™  IV*  «w*rf.  jmiM.7  •».  'rtM 


Madison. 


THE  RELATIVE  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  FEnERAL 
AND  THE  STATE  GOVERNMENTS  WITH  THE 
PEOPLE. 

FfJtral  aitJ  tialt  gnvrnmmli  mfy  Jifftrtat  at;fnlt  'f  Ihr  mmr  fn- 
iHlufBti—TAe  JSril  a/Uekmiml  af  ikt  froftt  ittlt  tr  I- tit  italt  g^vtnt- 
mtttlt — Pffiitarily  trtil  t^tmr  t*  lit  /t^ral  grpfiinimr  Mitj  1/  It  ti 
ttllrr  aJmtHhltrti—Oh/tilitMi  »tt  uo't  »/  feJtral  militn'y  famtr 
ttHiwer/J—CiimllJiiixrtmiiriietitktfrt^iilifa  thai  tit  f^utri  vf  ik* 
Union  wiit  it  Jamgenmt  ta  tht  ilalt  fpitrnnmli. 

To  tht  Ptoplf  Pf  the  State  of  New  Vort: 

Resiiming  the  xul}jc<!t  of  the  last  pspcr,  I  proceed  to 
inquire  whether  the  federal  government  ur  Ihe  Stale 
govern  me  nts  will  have  the  iidvaniage  wtih  repiril  to  ihc 
l>red(leoiii)n  and  support  of  the  people.  Notwithslandini; 
th«  different  modes  tn  which  they  are  appointed,  «c 
n)U«t  <:on«tder  both  of  them  as  sulMtanllally  dependent 
on  the  great  hody  of  the  eitlxcns  of  the  United  States 
I  assume  this  p4>S)tinn  here  as  it  rcspert«  the  first,  re- 
serving the  proofs  for  another  place.  The  federal  and 
State  (Tovernmeiits  are  in  fact  bnt  different  aj{cnis  and 
trustees  of  the  people,  ennstituted  with  different  powers, 
and  designed  for  different  purposes.  The  advcrj^ariesof 
the  Constitution  seem  l>i  have  lost  sight  of  (he  people 


Madliaal        THE  PEOPLB  ATTACHED   TO  STATES.     311 

altogether  in  their  reasonings  on  this  subject;  and  to 
have  viewed  these  different  establishments  dot  only  as 
mutual  rivals  and  enemies,  but  as  uiicuntrollcd  by  any 
common  superior  in  tlieir  efforts  to  u»urp  the  authorities 
of  each  other.  These  gentlemen  must  here  be  reminded 
of  their  error.  Thcjr  must  be  told  that  the  ultimate 
authority,  wherever  the  derivative  may  be  fouml,  resides 
iu  the  people  alone,  and  that  it  will  not  depend  merely 
un  the  comparative  ambition  or  address  of  the  different 
l^overnmenis,  whether  either,  or  whii.h  of  them,  will  be 
able  to  enlarge  its  sphere  of  jurisdiction  at  the  expense 
of  the  other.  Truth,  no  less  than  decency,  requires  that 
the  event  in  every  case  whould  be  supposed  to  depend 
on  the  sentiments  and  sanction  of  their  common 
constituents. 

Many  considerations  besides  those  snggcstcd  on  a 
former  occasion  seem  to  place  it  beyond  doubt  that  the 
first  and  most  natural  attachment  of  the  people  will  be  to 
tbe  governments  of  their  respective  States.  Into  the 
administration  of  these  a  greater  number  of  individuals 
will  expect  to  rise.  From  the  gift  of  the^ie  a  greater 
number  of  ofRccs  and  cmuliimcnts  will  flow.  By  the 
superintending  care  of  these,  M  the  more  domestic  and 
personal  interests  of  the  people  will  be  regulated  and 
provided  for.  With  the  affairs  of  these,  the  people  will 
he  more  familiarly  and  minutely  conversant.  And  with 
the  members  of  these,  will  a  greater  proportion  of  the 
people  have  the  lies  of  personal  acquaintance  and  friend- 
ship,  and  of  family  and  |Kirly  atiarhmcnts;  on  the  side 
of  thesC)  therefore,  the  popular  bias  may  well  l>e  expected 
most  strongly  to  incline. 

Kxperieiice  speaks  the  same  language  in  this  case. 
The  federal  administration,  though  hitherto  very  defec- 
tive in  comparison  with  what  may  be  hoped  uitder  a 
better  system,  had.  during  the  war,  and  particularly 
whilst  the  independent  fund  of  paper  emissions  was  in 
•credit,  an  activity  and  importance  as  great  as  it  can  well 
have  in  any  future  circumstances  whatever.  It  was 
engaged,  too,   in  a  course  of  measures  which  had   for 


3>»        POPULAR  CONftDENCE  IS  JiATIOS.     Ui«k«)4l> 

their  objci;t  the  prutection  of  everything  lltat  vasUear, 
and  the  acquisition  of  cvcfytbiiiK  tliat  could  l>c  dcsirahlc 
to  the  people  at  large.  It  was  nevertheless  itivariably 
found,  after  the  transient  cnthusiu»m  for  the  e;trly  l.!nn- 
l^ressca  was  over,  that  the  alteiilion  and  attachment  i)f 
the  people  were  turned  anew  to  tiieir  own  particular 
govcrnmenis;  that  the  federal  council  was  at  no  lime 
the  idol  of  popular  favor;  and  that  opposition  to  pro- 
posed enlargements  of  its  powers  and  importance  was 
the  side  usuallj'  taken  by  the  men  who  wished  to  build 
their  political  coniMrquencc  on  the  preposseMiont  of 
their  fellow-citizens. 

If.  therefore,  as  has  l»een  clstwherc  remarked,  the  peo- 
ple should  in  future  hecoine  mure  partial  to  the  federal 
Sm  than  to  the  Slate  governments,  the  change 

lle.4B.  can    only    result    from     such     manifest    and 

irresistible  proofs  of  a  better  administration  at  will 
overcome  all  their  antecedent  propensities.'  And  in 
that  case  the  people  ought  not  surely  to  be  precluded 
from  giving  most  of  their  confidence  where  they  may 
discover  it  lo  Km:  most  due;  but  even  in  that  case  the 
Stale  sovernmcnts  could  have  little  to  apprehend,  be- 
cause it  is  only  within  a  certain  sphere  that  the  federal 
power  can,  in  the  nature  of  things,  b«  advantageously 
administered. 

The  rcmaininK  points  on  which  I  propnu  to  compare 
the  federal  and  State  governments  arc  the  disposition 
and  the  faculty  they  may  respectively  possess,  to  resist 
and  frustrate  the  measures  ol  e.tch  other. 

It  has  been  already  proved  that  the  members  of  the 
federal  will  be  more  dependent  on  the  memben  ol  the 
State  governments  than  the  latter  will  \te  on  the  former. 
It  has  appeared,  also,  that  the  prepossessions  of  tbc 
people,  on  whom  both  will  depend,  will  b«  more  on  the 


'Swli  luaboen  i1m  hMory  o(  Ike  HWUl)'  ennrtli  ill  ri^pKl  for  Ihv 
nwkiiHl  i;<>vgriMn«iil,  and  it  UtiLilnln  tUipknt't  |iri>d|ile  iliai  "Bverr 
coiulilnliuB  mitti  firai  gaim  ■mhixity.  dixl  itien  nxt  aulhiHil)' ;  U  niut 
itit  wia  ilie  In^lir  aiKt  raniiileniK  n(  mankind,  aaJ  ibcn  cntplof  dial 
bonu^  in  rli«  wmIi  of  gM«tMi|«ai."— I^nok. 


IbdlMM) 


lOCAC  SPlRfT  m  COKCRESS. 


3'3 


side  of  ihc  State  governments  than  of  the  federal  govern- 
ment. So  far  :iK  ihc  ilisixisttiou  of  each  tow.mls  the 
other  may  be  inftuenced  by  these  causes,  the  Slate 
Sovernmcnts  must  clearly  have  the  advantage.  But  in  a 
distinct  ami  very  tmport;int  point  of  view,  the  advantage 
will  lie  on  the  same  side.  The  pre  possess  ions,  which 
the  members  themselves  will  carry  into  the  federal 
government,  will  generally  he  favorable  to  the  States; 
whilst  it  will  rarely  happen  that  the  members  of  the 
State  governments  will  carry  into  the  public  councils  a 
bias  in  favor  of  the  general  government.  A  local  spirit 
win  infallibly  prevail  much  more  in  the  members  of  Con- 
gress than  a  national  spirit  will  prevail  in  the  legisla- 
tures of  the  particular  Staleii.'  Everyone  knows  that  a 
great  proportion  of  the  errors  committed  by  the  State 
legislatures  |)roceeds  from  the  disposition  of  the  members 
to  sacrilice  the  comprehensive  and  permanent  interest  of 
the  State  to  the  particular  and  separate  views  of  the 
counties  or  districts  in  which  they  reside.  And  if  tliey 
do  not  sulficienily  cnl.irge  their  poIic:y  tn  embrace  the 
collective  welfare  of  their  particular  State,  how  can  it  be 
imagined  that  they  will  make  the  aggregate  prosperity 
of  the  Union,  and  the  dignity  and  respect.-ihility  of  its 
government,  the  objects  of  their  affection*  and  consulta- 
tions? For  the  same  reason  that  the  members  of  the 
Slate  tegi»latures  will  he  nnttkcly  to  attach  themselves 
sufficiently   to   national   objects,   the    members   of    the 


'Thfa  bw  I>ccn  «)Mu-n  In  a]l  wcli'initl  (■miroTvrsrn  •ludi  »  lli« 
tU*n7.  taiill.  luliaji,  oinag*,  anil  otbct  imiei.  Ani}.  iii  k  imillcr 
lente,  id  vnrf  ii«nlton  •>{  inicmal  improvciicnl  tht  u<ne  ipiril  ii  mani. 
fated ;  «*ch  nicBibcr  i>f  the  legidaiivF  'tmiy  diikinj;  aII  thouuhl  «( 
HUio«ul  ICMkI  in  ihc  Uteinp<  l«  |^  "lOineihiiiu  "  tat  li»  ntrii  iminc<tiitle 
dialtkl  ot  ULMe.  Rollillir  Rinr  ami  Hidiot  )i<tl  iim!(!irlii1l»i'[iropti!ir. 
in(  inansir  for  p«l>lic  biiiMin^s  h*vf  come  lo  be  v«i(  "  Hirken."  in  whkli 
nni  repiwwBtatrre  or  lenaiotwcuKs  "  wmelhinit"  for  hiiconilitumu, 
t>)r  prcMiBiif!  tiii  voce  to  hi*  fellow- mcobcra  fir  The  apiirDiiritlJoni  for 
theft  loMlltla.  Much  of  the  jobbery  could  pcihapa  be  remedied 
bj  ■  power  criMed  lo  ilie  Pr«»i(l«nt  lo  rou  KMnic  il«in»  oj  a  bill, 
knilcai]  d[  rc<]iimnc  hiia  lo  rttuor ■pptovp  ihc  hill  ai  a  vholv.  Many  of 
Ihe  apiprotiriiliiHn  ue  tltia|>f>rii*ecl  hy  the  uujorily  ofCongrea.  uiil  are  only 
put  into wcure«noa|;h<rotnIc> pais  the  mcMUie,  caii«c(]u«Bilytbct«t<HiiK 
e^K)«me  items  wonMnuelyreuili  in  alicmpu to  repast  ihcra.— EuiTOft. 


314 


PAK7ISAX  LEClSLATlOlir. 


lSv.4e<tf> 


federal  legislature  will  be  likely  In  attacli  tlicmsclvrs  ton 
much  to  local  objects.  The  Stales  will  be  to  the  latter 
what  counties  and  towns  arc  t'}  the  former.  Measures 
wilt  too  often  be  deddei!  acconling  to  their  probable 
effect,  not  on  the  national  prosperity  and  Itappineax,  but 
on  the  prejudices,  interests,  and  pnrsuits  of  the  govern- 
ments  ;ind  people  of  the  individual  Stale*.  What  is  the 
spirit  that  has  in  general  ch;iraetefijtcd  the  procecdinj^s 
of  Congress?  A  pcrosal  of  their  journals,  as  well  as  the 
candid  acknowledgmcnu  of  such  35  have  had  a  seat  in 
that  assembly,  will  inform  us  that  the  members  have  but 
too  frequently  displayed  the  character  rather  of  partisans 
of  their  respective  States  th:tn  of  impartial  gtutrdians  of 
a  common  interest;  that  where  on  one  occasion  improper 
sacrifices  have  been  made  of  I0c.1l  considerations  to  the 
ag^^tndixirmenl  of  the  federal  KovernmL-ut,  the  great  inlcr- 
ests  of  the  nation  have  suffered  on  a  hundred  from  an 
undue  attention  to  the  local  prejudices,  interests,  aikd 
views  of  the  (larticutar  States.  I  mean  not  by  these  reRec- 
tions  to  insinuate  that  the  new  federal  gi>vernnicnt  will 
not  embrace  a  more  enlarRed  plan  of  policy  than  the  ex- 
isting government  may  have  pursne^l;  much  less,  tttat  its 
views  will  he  ok  confined  as  those  of  the  State  legisb' 
tures;  hut  only  that  it  will  partake  sufficiently  ii(  the 
Spirit  of  both  to  be  disinrlitied  lo  invade  the  rights  of 
the  individual  St:ites  or  the  prerogalives  of  their  govern- 
mcnts.  The  motives  on  the  part  of  the  State  jjovern- 
raenis  to  augment  their  prerogatives,  by  defaltations 
from  the  federal  ijrovernment,  will  be  overruled  by  no 
reciprocal  predispositions  in  the  members. 

Were  it  Bilmitied,  however,  that  the  federal  govern- 
ment may  feet  an  e(|tiat  disposition  with  the  State 
governments  tn  extend  its  power  beyond  the  due  limits, 
the  latter  would  still  have  (he  adv.inlage  in  the  means  of 
defeating  such  encroachments.  If  an  act  of  a  |>art>cular 
State,  (hough  onfrieodly  to  the  natinnal  government,  be 
generally  popular  in  ihat  State,  and  shuuh)  ni)l  too 
grossly  violate  tlie  oaths  of  the  State  ofEcers,  it  is  exe- 
cuted immediately  and,  of  course,  by  means  on  tlie  fpot 


lb4lMal 


OBSTRUCTIVE  POWER  OF  STATES. 


3«5 


and  dcpcndin];;  on  the  State  alone.  The  opposition  of 
the  federal  government,  or  the  interposition  of  federal 
officers,  would  but  inflnme  the  zeal  of  all  parties  on  the 
side  of  ihe  State,  aod  tlic  evil  could  not  be  prevented  or 
repaired,  if  at  all,  without  the  employment  of  means 
which  must  always  be  resorted  to  with  reluctance  and 
difficulty.  On  the  other  hand,  shotild  an  unvrurrantabic 
measure  of  the  federal  government  be  unpopular  in  par- 
ticular States,  which  would  seldom  fail  to  be  the  case,  ur 
even  a  warrantable  meaiiure  be  so,  which  may  »omelimcs 
be  the  case,  the  means  of  opposition  to  it  are  powerful 
and  at  hand.  The  ilisquictudc  of  the  people;  their 
repugnance  and,  perhaps,  refusal  to  co-operate  with  the 
officers  of  the  Union;  the  frowas  of  the  executive  magis- 
tracy of  the  Slate:  the  embarrassments  created  by  legis- 
lative devices,  which  would  often  be  added  on  such 
occasions,  would  oppose,  in  any  Stale,  difficulties  not  to 
be  despised;  would  form,  in  a  large  State,  very  serious 
Impediments;  and,  where  the  sentiments  of  several  ad- 
joining Slates  happened  to  be  in  unison,  would  present 
obstructions  whith  the  federal  government  would  hardly 
be  willing  to  encounter. 

But  ambitious  encroachments  of  the  federal  govern- 
mcnt  on  the  authority  of  the  Slate  governments  would 
not  excite  the  opposition  nf  a  single  State  or  o(  a  few 
States  only.  They  would  be  signals  of  general  alarm. 
Every  government  would  espouse  the  common  cause. 
A  correspondence  would  be  opened.'     Plans  of  resistance 


L 


'IneimyiUmii'l  io<>|ipoiparlinlytlM»titec(ivetnmenlit>>thc  nminnnl 
Mnrrnnenl  ihii  hiu  hceii  th?  mclhoa.  isd  proEiibly  nolUnc  btttcr  pkivh 
IM  nndctlyinic  icnte  of  (he  Inie  naiKNulHy  of  ihe  (Jnion.  cntt  aiwt  tjatl 
Ikdii  any  enaitllHUiMuil  compact,  than  the  fact  that  (he  Icailcn  <il  slalr 
•cmrvicntr  '■■'"  ■■"bji  anp(aJc>l  (or  tnpport  In  the  nllitr  hlaln.  m  in 
reality  lo  Ibc  m»oii1j  of  Ibvpeopteor  lution.  in  ihrir  rndnvun  taorrf 
fide  the  acu  ol  the  (cdtral  [«*enini«iil.  Tbe  Vitginia  and  KeniiKiy 
Tcutuiloni  nie  in  [cility  nolhintc  bat  a  requccl  toth«"co-tl&t«i"  lor 
■BplMrt.  Tlie  llanfoct  cnnieiatton  tndetl  In  a  prcnodllofi  la  amcnJ  lh« 
oonalittMien,  wlitcti  wat  Inil  a  ny  ot  atkin^  lh«  Mhn  iil«tn  to  aM  New 
SBg>Un>ltn  tlsntypoBliontotliecenetal  ijoTetBnictil.  Tbe  South  Carolina 
conrMiHonaf  tSJaisneil  an  aiMrra  to ilie  "p«»|>le"oriheU«(w.  aflHrn- 
ing  thai  in  tkii  "  ottis  ~  thow  itaic*  cannol  "  heulUe  in  accntiBK  lo 
lila  atruigvinol."     Utnt  klluMialifc  ot  all,  boneict,  aaa  the  B|ii>cal 


3«6       gEPXESEXrAriFES  VE/tSUS  PEOPLE.  Ot».«l«> 

nouM  be  concerted.  One  spirit  woulO  anituate  and  coo- 
duct  the  whole.  The  same  combinations,  in  shurt,  would 
result  from  un  »p]}rehension  of  the  federal  as  was  pro- 
duced by  the  dread  of  a  foreign  yoke;  and  unless  llic 
projected  Innovations  should  be  voUintaril)^  renounced, 
the  s^me  appeal  to  a  trial  of  force  would  be  made  iu  the 
one  case  as  was  made  in  the  other.  But  what  degree  of 
madness  could  ever  drive  the  federal  government  to  such 
iin  e^itrcmity?  In  the  contest  with  Great  Britain,  one 
part  of  the  empire  wa.i  employed  againil  the  other.  The 
more  numerous  part  invaded  the  rishts  of  the  )cs& 
numerous  part.  The  attempt  was  unjust  and  unwise; 
but  ii  was  not  in  itpeculation  absolutely  chimerical.  But 
what  would  be  the  contest  in  the  case  we  are  supposinj;.' 
Who  would  he  Ihc  parties?  A  few  representatives  of  the 
people  would  be  opposed  to  the  people  ihemselres;  or 
rather  one  set  of  representatives  would  be  contending 
against  thirteen  sets  of  representatives,  with  the  whole 
body  of  their  common  coniilitucnis  on  the  side  of  the 
latter. 

Tlie  only  refage  led  foi  those  wlio  p»i>pti«y  the  downUti  of  tlie 
Stale  gnvcrnmeiilt  i«  ibn  vlxu>Ti;iry  xoppasitktn  that  tlic  IcfU-ral 
{.'oienimenl  m«y  previoiiiily  sicfuniutjir  a  iiiilitaiy  fiMcc  for  tha^ 
projecis  of  ainliition.  The  tcavMiin};^  ciinl;iiiYi:il  iii  llieie  p^f 
niusi  have  l)een  einplojeil  to  liiile  purpose  iitdrrd.  (f  il  coulil  he 
necessary  now  ia  (litprove  the  reality  of  ihi>danf>eT.  That  Ihe 
people  and  llie  States  sliouM.  for  a  &iittic>ri)i  (x-rtod  of  lini^,  eirci 
an  tininterrupled  uicccMlon  of  men  ready  10  betray  both ;  tlial  ib^ 
traiiora    should,    throughout    this    period,    uniformty    aitd    lyi 


of  Samh  CarolW.  tn  iS6i.  by  «n  aAAtva  of  i(t  conttattoa  in  * 
iwofile  of  the  tU>c-hi>)iIiii|;  tialo,"  in  ithklk  il   iru  aiinauMced 
"SuulhCjit'>lMi>(ieti[niio<le>i<njr  ■qnme  (root  yiMr«,"u>ilM»hiM  l||ti_ 
to  "  i'liti  u»  i'l  fiwmini;  ■  cnnfrdrtacy  of  tl»ir-h«Jdin|;  Matet."     TIhU  ■ 
•late  which  ha;)  jiut  aotfted  iii  cxKitnoe  ai^  >  free  and  wvcrciitn  rouMiy 
ahonU  at  uiHC  aik  lo  t«  nude  juil  of  ano«h«f  iiapticil  a>  Irtilc  tn 
lenw   cA   ihr   MKn«  of  nati<niBlity   «t   if   lh«  ibirtecn  eokiaia,   ttli 

dedarJae  inAeytaAeiKC  In  177(1,  hid  pellllon— '   '■■  if  ■ -'   "^  '■— >'«^ 

orSfiaia.     tn  iIm  Hhudc  litauty  i>l  the  Uni  i 

to  crnU*  ■>  aCtBil  u>i«rr>uiily  >a  tlalrhwoJ, 

ttpti  Ihc  will  ■>!  the  CO  >latrv  wu  atyti  nnn  nlliiiiplnl.      Vt4  *ill< 

abaohie  imtrrandinice  ffm  each  aDcl  cveiy  iribri  <iai«,  ctilc  i 

«a»  Rccesuiiiiy  a  pure  fiaioa  waA  iiallity,— Ei>rtu«. 


KUllMBi 


MIUTJA  SUPERIOR   TO  ARMY. 


3'? 


i 


iFtnalic.tUy  puisne  some  fixrd  plan  (nr  ihc  extension  of  ihr  iiiililniy 
ntabbkhineiii :  thii  the  );'>veiiinienls  und  ihe  people  ol  ilie  Sixles 
sliouki  Ulenllf  anil  palienll)*  behold  ihr  gaihering  sloim,  niul  con- 
linue  to  Mit»ply  the  nialeTj.-ih.  until  it  »liould  be  piepiiicd  (o  burst 
on  their  own  bcaiU,  mu%t  appear  to  everyone  more  like  ilic  in- 
i-oherent  drniiiis of  u  deliiious  ic;itou<iy.  or  l)ic(ni:ijud|{e<lex^>;^i''>' 
lton«  of  ,1  counlcrfeil  ze.il.  iliin  like  ihc  soI>cr  ;l|l|)^rll«n^)o^)^  of 
genuine  ^tiiudun.  £xirrf<ji)-.iiil  ■■«  llir  »U|)pu»iliun  is,  let  it,  liotv- 
rvcr.  Ix:  miulc.  I.el  a  lejfular  ;i(in}-  fully  cqujl  (o  the  fcsuurcck  vf 
the  country  lie  formed,  Ani\  ki  ii  be  entirely  at  Ihe  devotion  o( 
the  federal  (toverninenl  ;  Mill  il  wouki  not  be  going  loo  (nr  to 
s^y  thai  the  Sl-ile  govern rnrnt'^,  with  the  people  on  their  side, 
would  be  able  to  repel  theitanser.  Tlie  Iiii;hesi  niiinber  lowhielt, 
according  tn  ihc  hcM  com  pill  at  Jon.  a  M-inding  .irmy  cnn  be  urrwl 
in  any  country,  doea  not  exceed  oiic  liundreiiih  purt  of  ilie  whole 
number  of  souU ;  or  one  Iweoiy-tifih  p,in  of  the  number  able  to 
bear  arms.  Thin  proportion  would  nui  )  icid.  in  the  United  Sute», 
■n  army  of  more  than  twrnly-fire  nr  thirty  thomani)  men,  To 
'IheM  would  be  opposed  a  nntilia  ainouiiiing  to  near  h.iU  a  million 
of  ciiticns  with  arms  in  their  h.-iml.s,  olTicercd  by  men  choirii  liom 
aniooK  lhefn»elre».  figbliiij;  for  llieir  coniiiion  lilfcrlics.  anil  uiiiteil 
aixl  CAMliKted  by  governments  povieiMng  their  nffeclions  and 
con6itence.  Il  may  well  be  doubted  whether  a  militia  lhu»  cii- 
cumstanced  could  eivr  be  conquered  by  such  n  jKoporiion  of 
regular  lroo|M.  lliose  who  are  be^  acqiininied  with  the  last 
succHsftd  resistance  of  Ihii  country  a){ain!i(  the  Hiilinh  iiinii,  wdl 
be  ni'ni  iivclined  la  deny  the  |iostibdiiy  of  il.  He^tdrs  ihe  advan- 
tage cA  being  armnl.  (vhkb  the  Anieritiins  powesi  ovi'r  ihe  people 
ol  almost  every  other  n.tlion,  ihe  existence  of  sijlioidinnlr  govern- 
mcnis  to  which  Ihe  people  arc  aliiLcheil,  .nnd  by  wliich  ihe  militia 
officerB  ate  appointed,  forms  a  b.irrier  agaiiwt  the  enterprises  of 
ambilion  moee  inturmoun table  ihan  .my  which  a  simple  govern- 
n»eni  of  any  (nrm  can  admit  of.  Notwiihutanding  the  military 
catabluhmcnta  in  Ibe  several  klagdonis  at  Europe,  winch  aic 
carried  M  far  as  the  public  resources  will  be-ir.  the  gm-cnimenis 
are  afraid  li>  trust  the  people  will)  aims.  And  il  is  not  certain 
thai,  with  this  aid  alone,  they  whhiUI  not  be  able  to  shake  oR  their 
)-okes.  But  were  the  |>coplc  to  pMsess  the  additional  advantages 
of  local  governtnents  chosen  by  tbeniieWci.  who  could  collect  the 
national  will  anil  direct  the  national  fnrce.  and  of  officers  appointed 
out  of  (he  mitiiia.  by  tbese  goi' em  men  is.  and  aliached  both  to  them 
am)  lo  the  militia.  JI  may  be  nfRrmed  with  the  greatnt  assurance 
thai  Ok  throne  of  cverjr  tyranny  <n  Europe  would  be  spc<edily 


3i8     FEDERAL  POWERS  XOT  F0R3^tDABl£.  Ill«.«'«8' 

ovcrttirned  in  spite  «l  the  legions  wliieli  surrouiKl  It.  Lei  us  not 
Insult  the  free  and  galUnt  citit«i>s  «<  America  with  the  ^mptcion 
IliM  ihey  would  be  less  able  lo  delenil  the  fights  <A  whkh  they 
would  be  in  actual  poMcuion  than  the  debaoed  subjects  ol 
BrbilriTf  power  would  he  lo  rescue  ihelis  (rom  the  hands  o(  iheit 
oppressors.  Let  as  rather  no  lonKci  iniall  ihein  with  ihe  sup- 
position that  they  cm  ever  reduce  ihenistK'cs  to  tlie  itecrisiiy  o( 
making  the  ex|ierimenl.  by  a  blind  a.nA  lante  submission  to  ihe 
longtrdinofin^idinus  mcavuirs  which  musl  piecetlc.tiiil  producett. 

The  argument  under  the  present  head  may  be  put  into 
a  very  concise  form,  which  appears  altogether  conclusiTc. 
Either  the  mode  in  which  the  federal  government  is  to 
b«  constructed  will  render  it  siifticientljr  dependent  on 
the  people,  or  it  will  nut.  On  the  first  supposition,  it 
will  b«  re&trained  by  that  dependence  (ram  forming 
schemes  obnoxious  to  their  constituents.  On  (he  other 
Kupposilioii,  it  wilt  not  possess  the  Confidence  of  the 
people,  and  its  schemes  of  usurpation  will  be  easily 
defeated  by  the  State  governments,  vlio  will  be  sup- 
ported by  the  people. 

On  summing  up  the  <X)nsideraiiont  stated  in  Ibis  and 
the  last  paper,  they  seem  to  amount  to  the  most  convinc- 
ing evidence  ihai(ihe  powers  proposed  to  be  lodged  in 
the  federal  government  arc  as  little  formidable  to  tttose 
reserved  to  the  individnal  .States  as  they  are  indispens- 
ably necessary  to  accomplish  the  purposes  of  the  Union;  : 
and  that  all  those  alarms  which  have  been  sownded,  of  a 
meditated  and  consequential  annihilation  of  the  Stale 
governments,  must,  on  the  most  favorable  inierprctalioD, 
be  ascribed  to  the  chimerical  fears  of  the  authors  of 
them.  I'ljiiuus. 


KUiMBl 


DtSTHIBUTlOlf  OP  POWERS. 


3'9 


SEPARATION  OF  THK  DEPARTMENTS  OF 
POWER. 

Tki  maiim  iJkal  Ihrrr  ikautJ  Ar  tifaialt  aid  Jiitiml  drfartmtnti 
tetttijtrtd —  Tkii  maxim  Irat — Tin  nev  ifniiitiitim  Jfti  nfft  vi^l^U  11 — 
r**  Wyw  */  Mmltiquittt—  The  fravimii  of  ihe  vantm  lUU  tmiHIti- 
Ii'mu  #m  Ikitftinl  ejcamimJ. 

To  the  Pea/flf  of  Ihe  Statref  S'np  York: 

Hiivtiig  ri;view<;(I  (he  general  fnrm  of  live  proposed 
ffovcrumeo^ud  the  Ki^ncral  m.^s^  uf  power  a11'>ttcd  to  it, 
i  procrrd-flVVk-^ininc  Llie  pi(rtli;ular  slracture  of  lliis 
govemiiitnL  knd  Ihe  distribution  Of  lllii  vaas^  of  power 
ani"!  itucnt  pifts. 

('  irijul  fibjcr  v.uw-.  ii.i.ilcated  by  the  more 

iCsi  :  ict    li>  tite   Constitution  is  its  sup* 

....  .J.  ilic  political  maxim  that  the  te};i<ila- 
re,  and  jmliciary  ilepartmcnls  ought  to  be 
nd  distinct.  In  the  Kiructure  of  the  fedc^ral 
ent,  DO  regard,  it  is  said,  seems  to  have  been 
is  essential  pre<;autton  in  favor  of  liberty.  The 
\  departments  of  power  are  distributed  and 
d  in  such  a  manner  as  at  once  to  destroy  all  sym- 
aiid  beauty  of  form,  and  to  expose  some  of  the 
ntial  |>arts  of  (he  edifice  to  the  danger  of  being 
islii^  by  the  disproportionate  weight  of  other  piirts. 
No  politii-'at  truth  is  certainly  of  greater  intrinsic 
'aluc,  or  is  stamped  with  the  authority  of  more  en- 
lightened patrons  of  liberty,  tlian  that  on  which  the 
bjcciion  is  founded,  •The  accumulation  of  all  powers, 
legislative,  cxectttire,  and  judiciary,  in  the  same  hands, 
hether  of  one,  a  few,  or  many,  and  whether  hereditary, 
iaelf -appointed,  or  elective,  may  justly  be  pronounced  the 
try  definition  of  tyranny.'  Were  the  federal  Constitu- 
lon,  therefore,  realty  ehargeable  with  the  accumulation 
if  power,  or  with  a  mixture  of  powers,  having  a  dangcr- 
Mia  tendency  to  such  an  accumulation,  no  further  argu- 


jao 


uoyrssQuiBU's  theory. 


IXo.  <7  («' 


ments  would  bi-  neircssary  to  insi>irc  a  universal  rcpruba- 
tion  u[  the  system.  I  persuade  myscU,  hovcTcr,  thai  it 
will  be  made  apparent  to  everyone  that  the  charge  can- 
Cm  nut   be   supported,  aod    that   the  tnaxiin    on 

Ro.flS.  which  it  relies  has  been  totally  misconceived 

and  misapplitid.  In  order  to  rorm  correct  ideas  on  this 
important  subject,  it  will  be  proper  to  investigate  the 
sense  in  which  the  preservation  of  liberty  requires  that 
the  three  jrreat  departments  of  (wwer  should  be  sejurale 
and  distinct.' 

The  oracle  who  is  always  consulted  and  cited  on  this 
subject  is  the  celebrated  Monte«t|uiHI.  If  he  be  not  the 
author  of  this  invaluable  precept  in  thvictcQc^of  politics, 


tfll  rerommend- 


Rieaniiig 


he  has  the  tnerii  at  least  of  dis|>^-< 
ing  it  most  effectually  to  the  aitt 
us  endeavor,  in  the  first  place,  \'-- 
on  this  point. 

The  British   Constitution    was  to    \'    nirtqtrien     t'lat 
Homer  has  been  to  the  didactic  writers  unHf' 
As  Ihc  latter  have  considered  the   work  of  tbr 
bard  as  the  perfect  model  from  which  the  princ' 
rules  of  the  epic  art  were  to  be  drawn,  and   by 
similar  works  were  to  be  judged,  so  this  great 


'  Thii  Ibraty  of  ihe  iti*tiia«i  or  cppanHiMi  oF  i^oTcrnniaaul  \ 
wKicb  h>i  reached  iti  hi|^vm  nprmiiia  in  our  consliliilkin.  nrul 
ii.rte.t    \ij   AiitlDtlc.  hill   wji   (irM   leriouily   iliKiiucd    by   txicke 
•■  Tnxtuc  tut  Cui!  tlovernmcni."     It  'n^  M<>iitru|iiieu,  bowcver,' 

lini   •IcmuKximci)   llinl  the  Nr|ianilinn  iW  |>(>vci ebuI   |>uaen  ' 

k)I"lil>*^.  V'**"!!"- 'O^  i'»l>'^l.  wiih  rich  w>  t     '   I        ' 

rnivl   tlic   FiKiooclnncnlt  ol  \\\r   other  l«ro.  v-'  •!! 

liliertr.  *nil  ffniu  hii  "  Eiptit  (tn  Ij)«i"  tbe  fu.n^ 

ultuliniit  <ircw  Ihc  pnncijit«s  cBitxnlitil  iii  the  viciout  lUie  and  liiir 
toil  111  ilnli'iii.  A«  UihDiOS  h«r  ulncivci.  Monlcwjiiieu  lu  kit  <uuiii)i|i 
uJ  Grr*l  ftiiuiii  nk  a  iwxlrl  of  mn-li  >lilIririilUllnu.  OHiistiVL'loI  an  |4m 
mniMiiiiiavallh  mlhei  IIimi  dncnlvil  thn  Ittiliili  [■■»>< i mm  nl  of  lii«  dsf. 
Biecliot.  after  mnklBt:  metry  ovrr  iKii  c»imr[ilion  o/  ihe  EngliMl 
lontlltutloii,    »»wil»   ilmt    ihr   "  clEctnit   iccitt "   of   flie   ijilem   U 

"  clewc  miwi",  lii<  m-i-    :-i r_i..  (..,:,-.    ,,(   (h,   cieculWe  •nil   Iq;' 

iWcpowOTv"    ("Tm  "  W.ulu- i»  ^l.M.l    See 

Puior**.  "'The  Tin  .-nen*."' NVw  Vurt  ^   iftOg; 

IhtVis')   "  Amcticin   i.un*liliiiiuii> ;  liic   KclMioiia  ol  ihc  TliiM  II 
■nenit  u  iiA\ifAeA  tj  >  Cemury,"  lUllimon:    1S&5.  utl  W. 
"  The    8c|Mntloo    ot    Gorcmaiiciiia)    Fomrt,"    New   Vuik  .    1 
Cniro*. 


lt«dl«Mll 


BRlTISti  CONSTITVTIOtf. 


3>" 


critic  a|ipears  to  liave  riewed  the  Constitulion  of  Eoe< 
lanil  as  (he  slanJard.  or  to  use  his  own  cxprcssiun,  as  the 
mirror  of  pMtitic^l  liberty;  and  to  tiAVc  delivered,  in  the 
form  of  clemenury  truths,  the  several  oharucteriiitic 
principles  of  that  particniur  system.  That  wc  may  be 
sure,  then,  not  to  mistake  his  meaning  in  this  case,  let  us 
recur  to  the  source  from  which  the  maxim  was  drawn. 

On  the  slijihlcsl  view  of  the  British  Coosiitulion,  wc 
must  perceive  that  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judiciary 
department!)  are  by  no  means  totally  separate  atid  dis- 
tinct from  each  other.  The  cxecuiivc  maRistrate  forms 
an  integral  part  of  the  legislative  authority.  He  atone 
ba«    the    prerogative  of    making   treaties   with   foreign 

overeifcns,  which,  when  made,  have,  under  certain  limi- 
tations, the  force  of  legislative  acts.  At)  the  members  of 
the  judiciary  department  are  appointed  by  him,  ciin  be 
removed  by  him  on  the  address  of  the  two  Houses  of 
Parliament,  and  form,  when  he  pleases  to  consult  them, 
one  of  his  constitutional  councils.  One  branch  of  the 
legislative  department  forms  also  a  great  constitutional 
council  to  the  executive  chief,  as,  on  another  hand,  it  is 
the  sole  depositary  of  judicial  |>ower  in  cases  of  impeach- 
ment, and  is  invested  with  the  supreme  appellate  juris- 
diction in  all  other  cases.  The  judges,  again,  are  so  far 
connected  with  the  legislative  department  as  often  to 
attend  and  participate  in  its  deliberations,  though  not 
admitted  to  a  legislitire  vote. 

From  these  facts,  by  which  Montesquieu  was  guided, 
it  may  clearly  be  inferred  that,  in  saying  "There  can  be 
no  liberty  where  the  legislative  and  executive  powers  arc 
united  in  the  same  person,  or  body  of  magistrates,"  or, 

"if  the  power  of  judging  be  not  separated  from  the 
legtfth live  and  executive  powers,"  he  did  not  mean  that 
these  departments  ought  to  have  no  partial  agrtfj  in,  or 
no  tfintr^  over,  the  acts  of  each  other.  His  meaning,  as 
his  own  words  import,  and  still  more  concluuvcly  as 
illustrated  by  the  example  in  his  eye,  can  amount  to  no 
more  than  this,  that  where  tiie  r-Ao//  power  of  one  de- 
partment is  exercised  by  the  same  hands  which  possess 


a*.4r(4»i 

the  tnW<r  poircr  of  another  depart  men  t,  ihe  fumlamental 
pnnciplcii  of  a  free  constitution  arc  subverted.  This 
would  have  been  the  case  in  the  coBStitution  examined 
by  him,  if  the  king,  who  n  the  sole  executive  magistrate, 
had  possessed  also  the  complete  legislative  power,  or  the 
supreme  administration  of  justice;  or  if  the  entire  legis- 
lative body  had  possessed  the  supreme  judiciary,  or  the 
supreme  executive  authority.  This,  however,  is  not 
among  the  vices  of  that  constitution.  The  magistrate  in 
whom  the  whole  executive  power  resides  cannot  of  him- 
self make  a  law,  though  lie  can  put  a  negative  on  every 
law;  nor  administer  justice  in  person,  though  lie  has  tlie 
appointment  of  those  who  do  administer  it.  Tlie  judges 
can  exercise  no  executive  prerogative,  though  they  are 
shoots  from  the  executive  stock;  nor  any  kxislative 
function,  though  they  may  be  advised  with  by  the  Icgis- 
lative  councils.  The  entire  legislature  can  perfom  no 
judiciary  ad,  though  by  the  joint  act  of  two  of  its 
branches  the  judges  may  be  removed  from  Uicir  ofliccs, 
and  though  one  of  its  brancheii  is  possessed  of  the  judicial 
piiwer  in  the  last  resort.  The  entire  legislature,  again, 
can  exercise  no  executive  prerogative,  though  one  of  its 
branches  constitutes  the  supreme  executive  magistracy, 
nnd  another,  on  the  impeachment  of  a  third,  can  try  and 
condemn  all  the  subordinate  officers  in  the  executive 
department. 

The  reasons  on  which  Montcsfjuieu  grounds  his  maxim 
arc  a  further  demonstration  of  his  meaning.  "  When  the 
legislative  and  executive  powers  are  united  in  the  same 
person  or  body,"  says  he,  "  there  can  be  no  liberty, 
because  apprehensions  may  arise  lest  /ie  mwc  monarch  or 
senate  sliould  rwA*/  tyrannical  law^  to  /xfcutt  them  in  a 
tyrannical  manner."  .\gain:  "  Were  the  piiwcr  of  judg- 
ing joined  with  the  legislative,  Ihe  life  and  liberty  of  the 
subject  would  tw  exposed  to  arbitrary  control,  for  ikfjuJge 
would  then  be  iht  leghhUr.  Were  it  joined  to  the  execu- 
tive power,  thejudgf  might  behave  with  all  the  violence  of 
an  effreiur."  Some  of  these  reasons  are  mure  fully  Ci- 
plained  in  other  passages;  but  bricHy  stated  as  tliey  are 


MkdliMi    DEfAttrS/EiVrS  SEPARATE  /X  STATES.      iiS 

here,  they  sufficiently  cslabli<;li  the  meaningwhich  wchavc 
put  on  this  tele br:i ted  maxim  of  this  celebrated  author. 

II  wc  look  info  ihe  conslimiions  of  ihr  srviTi.il  Sistci  we  fins' 
ihal.  notwilluUmliiiic  ilie  emphaiicat  anil,  In  some  instances,  the 
unquililieiil  termf  In  which  ihit  aitotn  hat  been  Iniil  down,  there 
in  not  *  single  instance  in  wliich  the  several  ttepaiimenls  tA  power 
have  been  kept  ibKoIiiiely  tcpiirntc  and  disiincl.  New  Mampj>hire, 
whose  constitution  was  the  last  loinied.  sccins  to  havv  bcirn  lully 
Aware  of  ihc  im|>.i«til>i)ii)'  ^nd  tnc^xpcdicncy  «f  avoidinjc  any 
mixture  whatever  o(  these  depanments.  jiiid  has  t)ua]iticil  the 
doclrine  by  dcelarinf;  "  thai  the  IcKislniivc,  executive,  and  judiciary 
powers  ought  to  be  kept  as  sr^arate  Itoni.  and  in'lcpirndont  of, 
each  olfier  ai  tkt  itaturf  of  a /ret  guT^crHoienl  will  admit ;  of  iis 
If  eoHiUUHl  tifitk  ihal  tkttin  of  caniueliaH  that  hinds  the  vrh^r 
faerie  of  Ihe  caHilitalian  in  one  iuMisitluile  A^itJ  of  unity  itud 
amity."  Her  eon«titiition  accordingly  mixes  these  ilEpnrtmenIs 
in  several  resprets.  The  Senate,  which  is  Ji  branch  of  the 
legisl.-iiive  de|)arlincnt.  is  also  a  judicial  tribunal  for  the  Irini  of 
imjicaclimcnti.  TIm;  Preiident,  who  is  the  head  of  the  cucciiitvc 
■le|Mnn>Rnl.  is  the  prrMtliiig  menihci'  3U0  of  the  Scn.ilc;  and. 
besides  an  e<|ual  vote  in  all  eases,  has  a  cisiing  vote  tn  cusc  o(  a 
tic.  Tbc  executive  head  is  htinsdf  eventually  elective  every  year 
hy  the  leglsUiivr  depaitnieni.  anct  his  council  is  every  )rar  chosen 
tiy  and  from  Ihe  meinbeis  of  the  same  d«|>artmeni.  .Several  of 
llic  officers  of  stale  ate  also  appointed  by  the  legislature.  Aim) 
tlie  roerabcrs  o(  the  judiciary  de|uriincnt  arc  .ippointed  by  the 
rxectilive  ilepflrtmeni. 

The  constitution  of  Massachusetts  has  observed  a  sufficient 
though  less  pointed  caution,  in  ri[>iesMn)>  thi«  fundamental  article 
of  hberiy.  It  doclates  "tlMit  the  lej;islatire  department  slull 
never  cxetcnc  the  executive  anil  jmllcial  powers,  or  cither  of  them; 
the  executive  shall  never  exeicise  the  legislative  and  judicial 
|M>wers.  or  eillier  of  them  :  the  judicial  sh.-ill  never  cxerci.sc  the 
Ic^stalive  and  esccutlvc  powers,  or  either  of  them."  This  decla- 
ration cotiesponds  pieciiely  with  Ihe  doctrine  of  Montev|uieu,  as 
it  has  been  explained,  and  is  not  in  a  single  point  ritjaicil  by  the 
pUnof  the  convention.  It  gOM  no  farther  titan  to  prfihil>it  any 
OIK  ol  (he  mlire  departrnents  from  exercising  the  powers  «f 
another  depjMinent.  In  tlie  ver]'  conslituiwn  to  which  It  is 
preltxcil.  a  partial  mixture  nl  powers  has  l>een  ailmilled.  The 
etccativt:  ■•>a};ihir4le  has  a  <|u.tlilie<l  nef;atlve  on  the  tegistaiive 
body,  anil  ilie  Smaic.  which  is  a  part  ol  the  trgi^ilalure,  is  a  court 
of  impeachment  for  members  both  ol  the  executive  and  judiciary 


3^4 


BLBNDING  OF  POWKKS  IN  STA  rf.S.  I>fl.  47  <M> 


ilcpjrtmmls.  The  mcmfMTS  o(  (he  judkiary  depart  men t,  again, 
are  appainlattle  bjrilie  executive  de|iarimetii,  and  temovable  by 
ihe  same  AiKhohly  on  the  nddreu  of  the  iwa  legislative  branches. 
Lastly,  a  nuiii'icr  of  ilic  offtcen  of  goveinmcnt  arc  anniuLly 
3[ipoinle<i  liy  the  legislative  ilcjartmcnt.  As  the  appointment  to 
ofTices,  )iai(iculariy  executive  ollicr».  Is  in  Its  naiuie  an  executive 
lunction,  ilic  compilers  of  the  conxillutlon  have,  in  this  last  point 
'  at  least,  violated  ilic  rule  established  by  thenisclccs. 

I  pass  over  the  constitutions  of  Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut, 
bccauw  ihry  were  foirncd  prior  to  the  Revolution,  and  even  brfoir 
Ihe  priiieipte  under  cxaininallon  had  become  an  object  of  polilical 
atiEntion.' 

The  consiituiion  of  New  Yotk  contains  no  dectaralion  «in 
(his  sul>jcci,  but  appears  very  clearly  to  have  been  framed  with 
an  eye  to  (he  dangi^r  o(  iin|>f  operly  blending  (he  different  depart* 
ments.  It  gives,  nevertheless,  to  the  executive  magisirnie,  a 
partial  control  over  the  Icgislnilve  (Icpartmeni;  and,  whai  is  more, 
gives  a  like  control  to  the  judiciary  department ;  and  even  blends 
llic  executive  and  the  judiciary  departments  in  the  exercise  of  (his 
control.  In  its  coimcil  of  appointrncn(  nvembers  of  the  le^sbltve 
arc  associ.ited  with  the  executive  authoiiiy.  in  the  uppointment  of 
ofBcers,  both  cxcciilire  and  judiciaty.  And  its  court  for  the  trial 
of  impeachnients  and  conrction  of  errors  h  to  consist  of  one 
branch  of  the  Icgi!iUtare  and  the  principal  members  of  the 
judiciary  dep-irtmcnt. 

The  con^itution  of  New  Jersey  has  blended  the  diflerebt 
iwwers  of  govcrriment  more  tfwn  any  of  the  preceding.  The 
governor,  who  is  (he  executive  miigi-urate.  is  appointeil  by  the 
leg isUt lire ;  is  chancellor  and  ordinaiy.  or  siini>i;aie  of  ihe  Slate: 
is  ;i  member  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Appeals.  ^>ih1  prestitont.  with 
a  r.iuing  votp.  of  one  of  (be  legistsiive  branches.  The  lame 
Icgisbtivc  hranch  acts  again  as  executive  council  of  ihr  governor, 
ami  with  him  constitute  the  Couit  of  A(>t>eals,  The  ntemltera  of 
the  judiciary  department  ate  appointed  bj*  the  icgiilntive  depart- 
nicnt.  and  remorable  by  one  branch  of  il,  on  the  impeachment  ol 
tlie  other. 

According  (o  (he  eonsttiution  of  Pennsylraola.  ihc  prttldetit. 
who  is  the  liead  of  the  executive  department,  is  annuaHy  elected 
by  a  vote  in  which  (he  legislative  depiirttnrfii  prc<Iominates.  In 
conjunctuin  with  an  executive  council,  he  appoints  the  members 
o(  the  jtiiliciary  depAriment  and  forms  a  court  o{  (mpeachmttii 

'  Rhixk  Island  and  Conncctital  mafntabed  (W  royal  clmiiers  granlsd 
tbero  i«i  ths  MTentcrBlli  centuy.^EoiTOR. 


ULJk. 


MMUMni     POIfEKS  DIST/XCT  IN  SOME  STATES.       3'5 

(or  irinl  of  all  oRiceni.  judiciiiry  as  vrell  as  executive.  Tl>e  judge* 
o(  tilt  Supreme  Coun  nnd  jii«iicc«  of  ihe  peace  seem  aUo  to  be 
removiiWc  by  Ihe  lcic»l>lure  ;  and  ilic  exccuiive  power  o(  patdoti- 
ing  in  ccruiiii  cises,  to  he  I'rfeneil  lo  the  vimc  dcpattnienl.  Tlie 
members  o(  the  cxevuiive  council  flic  made  EX  orriCiO  justices 
of  pejicc  ihii>ugli<iu[  the  Sutc, 

In  Dcliiwiire  (tie  chici  executive  maglsirAU  is  annually  elected 
by  the  lrgi(.[»iive  tlc|urtmciit.  The  ipcakent  o(  the  ttvo  lFKist«tive 
branclx'!!  are  vice  presidents  in  the  cxecutii'e  dep.iiimrnt.  The 
exeoiiive  chief,  with  «x  oihem.  ;i]>poinie<l,  three  Ity  e.ith  of  the 
legiil.ilivc  liMOchcs,  «in«itiilrs  the  Siipicme  Court  of  Appeals: 
he  is  joiiiC'l  xvith  the  lc|tiil.itive  (li!|iarliiiviil  in  the  jppuintriicnt  of 
the  other  )u<l(;[''S.  Thioiigliont  Ihr  States  it  atipe.in  that  Ihe  mem- 
bers ol  ilic  Ugislxiure  'rnty  at  the  same  time  be  justices  of  the 
peace:  m  thi%  State  the  membcrx  of  oi^e  branch  of  it  arc  kx 
orriCIO  justtce»  of  llie  peace  i  j»  aie  alstt  the  iiicntbeis  of  the 
executive  council.  The  principal  oHieera  of  Ihe  executive  depad- 
ment  ate  appointetl  by  (lie  legislative;  and  one  l-(anch  of  the 
latter  lormt  a  couit  uf  impFaehiiR'nls.  All  ulBiicrs  may  be 
removed  on  address  of  the  legisl.iture. 

Maryland  ha<  adopted  the  maxim  in  (he  moil  unqualified 
terms;  ileclaiini:  Ih.X  <he  legislative,  execulive.  and  judicial 
powers  of  ^vemiiienl  ought  to  be  foreiYr  separate  an<l  dintinct 
from  each  oiher.  Her  const  iiiitioit.  not  withstanding,  makes  the 
executive  inai[isltate  appoiniabic  Ity  the  1e][iilaiive  (le|>artmcnt ; 
and  the  menibcvs  of  the  judiciary  Ity  ihe  executive  dcpariment, 

Tlie  language  of  Vir]-ini4  ii  ittll  aiore  {loiiiied  on  this  subject. 
Her  conMilulion  ilecUres  "that  tlie  lrgi$lativc,  executive,  and 
judiciary  de)iaitments  shxil  be  se|i3iiJ1e  and  distinct:  SO  titat 
neither  exercise  the  powers  pro|«:tly  beUiiiging  to  the  other;  nor 
shall  any  prison  nxrrcifce  the  powers  of  iiioic  than  one  of  ifiein  at 
the  «»me  lime,  except  thai  the  jmtieci  of  county  courts  shall  he 
eligible  lo  eitl>ci"  Hoiiw  o(  A^scmhly."  Yet  we  lind  not  only  this 
express  exception,  with  rcsjircl  to  Ihe  members  of  Ihe  inferior 
couni,  I>ui  thai  ihe  cliicf  nugisitatc.  with  his  executive  council, 
are  appointdlilc  b)-  thu  leglsUture :  that  two  ritrndicrs  of  the  latter 
ate  iricnnially  disi>l.tccd  at  the  pleasure  of  the  legislature ;  and  that 
all  tl>e  ptincipal  offices,  b»lh  execulive  .«iul  judiciary,  are  filled  by 
the  same  department.  The  eiecuiive  prerogative  of  pardon,  also, 
is  in  nne  case  vested  in  tlie  |F|;iil.iiJre  department. 

The  conslitiiiiiHi  ol  North  Carolina,  which  rieclarex  "that  the 
itrgotttive.  rvrcui've.  and  supreme  ^dicial  fKiwers  uf  f;ovemment 
^ouglil  to  be  forever  separate  anil  distinct  from  each  other."  refers, 


3>6 


JAffE/tfECr/OXS  ADMITTED. 


IRe.  47  (4«) 


at  ih<:  umft  time,  to  ihe  kpstniive  drpanmml  the  )ii>]wtiainml 
not  onlf  of  the  eiecutit'e  chief,  but  all  the  jtrinciiial  oIKcers  within 
both  thni  and  the  judicinfy  itepiiTtmcnl. 

in  South  Carolina  lli«  co>i«iiiiiiioii  makes  the  necnih-e  masii- 
tncy  eligilile  by  \\\r.  I«gislali<rc  itnpartnirnl.  It  RiveK  In  ihr  bitrr. 
alio.  lh«  .t|i|ioinliii?nl  o(  the  incmticrs  o4  llic  JudiL-ury  ilF|iarimcni, 
inclactiiif;  ei'cn  }u>Iicu  of  tlic  pc.icc  and  xhrriffs  ;  anil  ihe  appoint- 
mcnl  of  ofiicm  in  ihc  executive  <lep.triinent,  down  to  captains 
in  the  army  and  navy  irf  the  State. 

In  the  consiiiuiion  of  Cforgi.i.  whrTc  [|  \%  decbrrd  "ihll  the 
legisUtive.  exectttire.  and  it)<liciary  depaTlmenIs  sh:ill  be  leparate 
and  (litiiinct.  to  that  neither  «xciciM  lite  powctR  properly  belong- 
ing lo  ill*  other."  we  And  that  the  executive  tlepantocnt  b  to  be 
tilled  by  .ipitoiiitinentt  of  the  Irijidaiure;  anit  the  eiecuiii'e  pre- 
ro^aiii-c  of  |>.ir<ioii  tu  be  finality  exerciseil  by  iIm.-  Mine  auitioriiy. 
£vcn  juilke*  ol  Ihc  peace  are  lu  l>r  ap|Kiinl<.-d  by  llic  k^itUture. 

In  citing  tliesft  case:*,  tn  which  llic  Icgintativr,  cxcca- 
tivc,  and  judiciarjr  departments  have  not  b<:eii  kepi 
tuUlly  separate  and  distinct,  1  wish  not  to  be  rcj:ardcd 
jis  nn  adv04:ale  fur  the  particular  urganizatiuns  of  ibc 
several  Stale  (("^''^''"■"■^nts.  1  am  fully  aware  that, 
among  the  many  excellent  principles  which  they  ex- 
iMni»lify,  they  carry  strong  marks  of  the  hastv,  and  still 
stronger  of  the  inexperience,  under  which  Ihey  were 
framed.  It  is  but  toit  obvious  that  in  some  instances 
the  fundamental  principle  under  cunsideratiun  has  I>cen 
violated  by  too  sreat  a  mixture,  and  even  an  actual 
consolidation,  of  the  different  powers;  and  liiat  in  no 
instance  lias  a  competent  pmvi.tiun  bi^en  made  for  main- 
taining in  practice  the  separation  delineated  on  paper. 
What  I  have  wished  tu  evince  is  that  the  charge 
brought  against  the  proposed  Constitution,  of  violaiinf 
the  sacred  maxim  of  free  government,  is  warrantetl 
neither  by  the  jkhX  me^aning  annexed  to  that  tnaxim  by 
il«  author,  nor  by  the  sf nse  in  nhich  it  has  hitherto  tieea 
understood  in  America.  This  interesting  subject  will  bc 
resumed  in  the  ensuing  paper.  PuBUtn. 


l.VDhFE\DEA'CE  TO  D£PAX  I  At£,vrS.        3«7 


No.  48  [47!*  <-Vn  Kar*  I^tJM,  Ftknurr  •.  ttni  MadisOO. 

MEANS    OF   GIVING    INDEPENDENCE  TO  THE 
DIFFERENT    DEPARTMKNTS. 

P*mtn  tf  «it  Jeftirlmnil,  il  it  nmttiM,  ik*uU  nW  tt  txtreiuJty 
antlAir—OHf  Jifarlmtni  it&utf  nM  kavt  an  ^f^rmtiitg  ihJIikihi  »ver 
anelktr — Srturily  a^tinil  lit  invaiiirn  <■/  »iu  il/pa'ImtHi  by  isnflkrr 
ifmiiArrJ — Tir  UtnUmy  aj  Iht  Usitiatitrt  I*  atiftt  fMi  flktt  Jtfnrf. 
m/Kti — Htiii^ni  far  Ikit — An  iattitatt  i</  faitfmimtnti  in  firgima — 
Bsfrritme  ia  FtHmylamia. 

Ta  Iht  People  of  Iht  State  of  New  York: 

it  vas  shown  in  llic  last  paper  that  the  pohtical 
apottieKia  there  examinct)  does  not  require  that  the 
lesiglativc,  executive,  and  ju<Iit:iary  dep;trtiiicfils  should 
be  wholly  unconnected  with  each  other.  1  shall  under- 
take, in  the  next  place,  to  show  that  unless  these  dcpart- 
nients  he  xo  Tar  cuiium:tcd  and  hlftil'— '  "*  '"  g'" 
each  a  constitutional  control  over  the  others,  the  decree 
uf  separation  winch  the  inaxfrn  requires,  as  essential  to 
a  free  guvcrinnt:nt,  can  never  in  practice  be  duly  main- 
tained. 

it  is  affTCcd,  on  all  sides,  that  the  powers  properly 
hclonging  tn  one  "(  the  departiiienis  ought  not  to  he 
directly  and  completely  administered  hy  either  of  the 
other  dcpartmeals.  It  is  equally  evident  that  none  of 
ihcm  ought  to  possess,  directly  or  indirecUy^  an  over- 
rultn]{  inducnce  over  the  others,  in  the  admtitt.'ilration  of 
their  respective  powers,  it  will  not  be  denied  that  power 
is  of  an  encroaching  nature,  and  tluit  it  ought  to  he 
effectually  restrained  from  passing  the  limits  assigned  to 
it.  After  discriminating,  therefore,  in  theory,  the  several 
cUsses  of  power,  as  they  may  in  their  nature  be  legisla- 
tive, executive,  or  judiciary,  the  next  and  most  difficult 
task  is  to  provide  some  practical  security  for  cafh 
againit  the  invasion  »!  Jae_9ihet^  Wiat  this  security 
ought  to  he,  is  the  great  prohtctn  to  be  solved. 

Will    it    I)e    sufficient    tu    mark    with    precision   the 


idcr-      . 


3»8 


LEGISLATIVE   VSVKPATIOK. 


[Va.  «•  (4T) 


bounOarics  of  these  departments  in  the  constitution  of 
tlic  government,  und  tu  tru>t  lo  \\\ta,c  prctiinciil  harriers 
against  the  encroaching;  spirit  of  power?  This  is  the 
se<:urity  which  atipcare  to  have  been  principally  relict) 
on  by  the  coniftilers  of  most  of  the  .American  consti- 
tutions. But  experience  assures  us  that  the  t-Hitary 
of  the  provision  tias  been  greatly  overrated,  and  that 
some  more  adequate  defetiiw  is  imlispcnsibly  necessary 
for  the  more  feeble,  against  the  mure  powerful  members 
of  the  government.  The  Icgisliitivc  clcpjrtmciU  is  every- 
where exlctKling  the  BllHl'I'e  of'Jts  jclivity,  and  drawing 
alrpowcr  IlltH  Irs  llllWHIuiE^vortox.  ~ 

Icrs  ol  our  republics  liarc  so  much  merit  for 
the  wisdom  which  they  have  displayed  thiit  no  task  can 
be  less  pleasing  than  that  of  pointing  out  the  errors  into 
which  they  have  fallen.  A  respect  for  truth,  however, 
obliges  us  to  remark  that  they  seem  never  for  a  moment 
to  have  turned  their  eye«  from  the  danger  to  liberty  from 
the  overgrown  and  all-grasping  prerogative  i>t  an  hered- 
itary magistrate,  supported  and  fortified  by  an  hereditary 
branch  of  the  legislative  atithoriiy.  They  seem  never 
to  have  recollected  the  danger  from  legislative  usurpa-| 
tions,  which,  by  assembling  all  power  in  the  same  tund»,f 
must  lead  to  the  same  tyranny  as  is  threatened  by  execu- 
tire  usurpations.' 


>  I'hM  the  Iq^nlxivr  dcptrtmenl  hu  muglit  ptniilPiKty,  ■■■■I  lo  • 
C«<tiJ(i  chiCMt  Mttxc^mlly,  li-t  cntitmLli  uii  llir  imwcr  til  lliv  cinuCiv^ 
(■((atlniCBl.  hiMocy  t>u  (lUrntf  •ho'^n.  Tbc  niiMl  mMirt'.-il  nvinniHH'ii* 
haT«  l>««n  iboH*  LOnnri-lt.i  wiih  ihr  ikoin  ti  tbc  EiciiiIkt.  wilh  liti 
poBM  ol  apiioiiimcnl,  wilb  hi*  veto  |i«n«T,  asd  ruially  witl>  Ike  Imtf  ■ 
making   poucr. 

It  wn  ihe  <nicii<kiii  i>l  ilw  tntnen  fA  ihc ciHHiUuikiii  llui  i1i«  etnliinl 
eolhsc  (houlil  cIkhkv  the  I'mMciii  mtd  iImi  C(<at;>Gt»  t!>i<u)il  han  no 
toncern  in  his  clectioa  I'eyond.lhT  n>ctF  fotnxl  raoniipf;  if  ih'  •'n'rtinil 
the  «naoi>n«rni«l  of  ibe  rciiill.      Willi  nbtul at c   u  ■■\ 

by  ];railiinl  uioipatlon  Ciwi|^e»   hiu  rilcndcil  ii  i 

claim  tbc  iichi    tu  i;-'   >— >!■-  i    ■!—    -■■■ ■  i 

chooan,  llioi  iiiadii.. 

hanli;  thii  powct  ii  in 

will   \rf  cii-inrline   \\»ia  i>jlii.c  llic  I'fcMilcsl  ociuall*  rlciicd.      J>Mitil] 

te^reluMc  ■■!  ih«  uiImi  ol  tlic  mpieiiM  mhiti,  f<>r.  In  (tUcc  ol  mtnlt 

!■>)■  ihit  >uuni|>Ii»u  o|  {'iiii);m->\.  iIid  iniiil  i  ! '  iriirll  a  \x*t\s  i 

thn  mm)  higli-haniled  |>tKcclili|[,  ubdi  cctt.  ..i.icd  *4  mnBlH 


MldiHS] 


EXECUTIVE  INTRICUR. 


339 


In  a  government  where  numerous  and  extemive  pre- 
rogatives arc  placed  in  the  hands  of  an  hereditary  monarch, 
the  executive  department  is  verjr  justljr  regarded  as  the 
source  of  danger,  and  watched  witjiall  the  jeulous^  which 
a  teal  for  liberty  ought  to  inspire.  In  a  democracy, 
where  a  multitude  of  people  exercise  in  person  the  legis- 
lative funcltonB,  and  are  continually  eipoaed,  liy  their 
incapacity  for  regular  deliberation  and  concerted  meas- 
ures, to  the  ambitious  intrigues  of  their  executive  mag- 
t»tr;ite«,  tyranny  may  well  be  apprehended,  on  sumc 
favorable  emergency,  to  start  up  in  the  same  quarter. 
But  jp  fl  [■yprf-;fnt:itigf  ^rptllll^|-,  whrre  tllC  executive 
magistracy  tx  carefully  limited,  both  in  the  extent  iind 
the  'auration  of  "its  power;  an3  where  the  legislative 
poarer  is  exercised  bv  an  assembly,  Vliich  is  inspired,  by 


«{ Ikeflcctonl  commiisiuii.  Nor  ii  thit  gru|iot  [louieT  ilie  cmlr  ■llempt 
Cangttst  hat  raitdc  U  interfere  in  Ihe  deciion  of  Pretidciit.  Tlie  rati/ 
CongiDMtof  the  Union  n.'niinicil  (lie  Tt^\  to  nomliialc  Ihe  Pmi'lenl.  aii'l 
for  Iliii1]r  vran  turcmfully  f'jrcci)  vi{i»n  ihc  jt«o|ile  iranilidkles  (or 
PraideM.  The  tt^tUlivn  enmtiy  to  Jickinn  in  1^14  led  10  (he  noiaiu*- 
tfon  of  ■iMlher  wui.vheii  the  popalsr  bent  of  the  people  haJ  declmcil 
(or  Jad^uyn  ;  and  ulnn  Jackton  in  ihat  yeai  reteii't^  a  phititity  ihuii];h 
not  ■  majoiily  of  the  elei:tcira1  culkce.  ConiJieu.  when  tlic  elocIi'Mi  oinc 
before  it.  rlertwl  Ailanis  in  \\\^  Meail.  By  ll'ii  «t.  in  the  wotiU  of  (he 
conmitinn  of  Maryland.  "  the  wiil  of  a  majiiiiy  of  the  iintei  ai  well  ai 
of  the  jicople  of  (be  Union  hai  been  defeaied.  and  tu<ih  a  uorm  aiote 
at  to  hveep  lackMn  into  power  tx  the  neit  election.  I'he  people 
nnuned  lh«  r^hl  nf  nomlnatton  \\f  nicaiit  of  |H>|)ii1ar  ccinn-nlinnit  ami 
fofcver  eoilecl  Ihc  po>H«r  ttl  Con|[rtn  to  nominate  the  i*reudenl  of 
■h«  Vai(«l  States.  Il  is  to  be  wiihed  thnl  some  eqoallv  unpopular 
action  in  the  future  will  reiull  la  the  people  lakioc  from  conijie"  the 
udooDMitalioaal  fancllon  o(  canvaating  the  re(urii«  nf  ihc  electoral 
Mlle^ 

The  lecond  clnia  of  anoraptiont  hai  eoniiTiled  in  ■  peniilent  endeavor 
•opia  (r«Mcr  control  ovetapiyiiDiniciiU.  llie  ficit  evidence  of  thii  wai 
an  atMK|:4  to  detiJe  on  the  grade  of  oIKce  of  the  i\n\  diplomatic  ncimlna- 
tloM,  but  Wathin([tan  refuted  to  allow  Ihc  Smile  any  powec  in  the  iiial- 
tti.aave  ihaiof  confirmaiion  or  rejection.  (See  JeBeronS  ■■  WHlingn," 
r.  l6l.)  A  locnnd.  and  recurring,  invauon  hai  been  n  demand  for 
docuneott  on  vrhkh  nomineei  irere  selected,  fiitt  made  aa  Wadiincion. 
•ad  Imi  on  Cleveland,  and  alwara  refuted.  Htn  ihe  n»vi.t  utinuslorm 
ha*  b«ea  the  Inthtenceof  menihen  of  both  hootetdiat  Ihey  lie  allowed  in 
■SUM  lh«  ImcbI  ufliciala.  which  hat  hven  leiiiled  cnly  by  the  tlrong^ett 
anil  most  bonot  rreatdesti.  and  which  hai  done  nore  to  corrujit  both  the 
ieetilalire  and  cucvtive  bMOchet  of  out  (oreinment  than  any  other  one 
forre. 

Th<  thin)  da*>  of  auampilont  hat  boa  in  (be  direction  o(  teaatnlni;  ihe 


4 


3JO      LF.GlSr^TiVE  POnEXS  EXTEJ/StyE.        [»•.«(«• 

a  supposed  influence  over  the  people,  witb  an  inti-eptd 
confidence  in  its  own  strength;  which  is  sufficiently 
mimerous  lu  (eel  all  the  piisuiinN  which  actuate  »  multi- 
tude, yet  not  so  numerous  as  to  be  incapable  of  pursuing 
the  objects  of  its  p.iBsions,  by  means  which  reason 
)>re»oril)es;  It  ix  against  the  enterprising  umhition  of  this 
depariment  that  the  people  ought  to  indulge  all  Iheir 
jcaluusy  and  cKliaust  all  their  prec^tutions. 

The  legislative  dc]wrtniciit  <lerive»  a  superiority  in  our 
governments  from  other  circumstances.  Its  constitu- 
tional powers  being  at  once  more  extensive,  and  leas 
«usceplible  of  precise  limits,  it  can,  with  the  greater 
facility,  mask,  under  complicated  and  indirect  measures, 
the  cncroacUmerits  which  ii  nukes  on  the  co-ordinate 
depart  incuts.  It  is  not  unfrequently  a  question  of  real 
nicety  in  legislative  bodies,  whether  the  operation  of  a 
particnlar  measure  uill,  or  will  nut,  extend  beyond  the 

ra1u«  of  Ihc  Pmii^Eiilul  vfIo,  b;  atUchi*)*  what  iro  ntled  **  rMen'  to 
apptoiiriiiinn  oi  odifi  liUK  Bi  a  nitllHKl  of  cuiapcllin^  iheninwm  of  the 
Pictiilt^l  lo  nhal  lie  wulii  cfcoiMe  to  vtio.  Thus,  tn  l8(>7.  in  tttc  am- 
flicl  lielwrrii  lli«  Kio-Mlml  uiil  Coi>i>io>i.  lh«  Utlcf  MIulIici)  (o  lb(»»)r 
appropriitii'ti  tiill  MtUiiM^  uvlnullr  •icpiiriu);  llic  I'IcmiIcbI  (■(  (bo  OMi- 
msnd  of  ihf  ntTny,  ami  Juhnii<t>.  Ili<nigh  (VDIolint;.  Ftll  ■.vin|Kll«l  W 
i>ii:n  niihet  ihui  i-tio  the  vholt  IhI).  Harn,  wiih  mart  reuilutkin. 
MtcMulrely  vcKicil  lite  >p|ifo|>riiiiioD  bills  onyini;  liilcn.  am)  tlttf 
>  luns  ttinu;'!^  ('■•i>;;icvt  ylcLIcd,  Dolh  Ciaiil  »iiil  A'llml  in  llwir 
ncssi4;c«  ol  DiKvn>t«r  I.  lS;j.  iiiiil  nnenlci  5,  iHSi.  iiiigeJ  •  CDoMinh 
rinnni  ■■nentlniFni.  whidi  tbuiil't  p«rr«nl  lli«  <til,  liibFr  by  reqviriiiB 
llmt  eiery  bill  be  liiiiiuJ  (u  mc  objnt.  ot  llul  •  itlo  of  sepuale  IIcim 
l>«  prmiliir-l. 

\jm\y.  ilir  Iloaw  fi\  RqweicnUlivct  h*s  Mnvnl  liino  •oogbl  lo 
«>>Uin  »  \h\rv  in  Irfnly-mikii'E:.  If  snorliiijt  ■  i-oiiiiiil  nvcr  all  lieatiei 
wliirh  invnlvril  rjitcsIioDs  of  rrvrniie.  Aft((  InO);  <lt<l>a>F,  lh'>  ilaim  <"■• 
ileoitKl  in  tbc  cnnu^ertirian  ai  the  Jay  treaty  of  t;9<.  IihI  iW  inirin|[r- 
iimhI  wai  kuiteixIctRil  lo  lh«  reficieiilltiiei  by  Ticuileiit  JcAtiion 
in  ihr  cinxt'lciaiiun  of  the  l.anlL;iiia  ir«aiy  «f  1803.  «hI  [toin  that 
limv  \'K<i  l<ecn  frequently  )>rtiiiitl«it,  'Hie  iniM  notablr  oiw  iru  tha 
Jlancaiiao  miptociiy  ttvaly  aX  1176.  which  contaitinl  the  diatliKl 
|>r«viuaa  tlut  it  ihoulil  nc4  tike  rlT«i  ontil  Congrcu  tbould  pass  ut 
ai.-l  10  rarrf  out  tfriuiii  u(  its  pTovuinat.  So,  loo.  CotMjtHt  bas  pio* 
»o  (»i  u  tn  s'lf ■■■-■■••  -.-.i— -  '..  .•.■..•-  «  1(1  i«(jS,  when  th«  FniKJk 
imiy  <'^'<  'Ic'  r  Bii  ail.  and  by  U«s  «an- 

ttaireiirn;  CK'i  "~ti   Ihey   (rlnlrd   to  iatmul 

coiwem :  an4  itii*  i>ciii  nas  been  a|iiniit  by  lire  iJccUioM  of  tbe  coorlt. 
A  (itaaoumsd  eumple  «a*  Itir  dunese  ciduBoa  ad.  viXikh  RitiKJf 
KDMnvcnal  out  imtjr  with  Chi>a.— Emios. 


KkdiMB] 


EXAMPLE  OF  yiRGlXlA. 


331 


xeculive 

■y  bein^l 
•iects  o7" 


legislutive  sphere.  On  the  uther  side,  the  executive, 
power  being  restrained  within  a  narrower  compass, 
being  more  simple  in  its  nature,  and  the  judiciary 
described  by  landmarks  still  less  uncertain,  projects 
usurpation  by  either  of  these  departments  would  iinme< 
diately  betray  and  defeat  themsdves.  Nor  is  this  all: 
as  the  legislative  de;>artmcnt  alette  lias  access  to  the 
pockets  of  the  people,  and  has  in  some  constitutions  full 
discretion,  and  in  all  a  prevailing  influence,  over  the 
pecuniary  rewards  of  those  who  fill  the  other  depart- 
mcuts,  a  dependence  is  thus  created  in  the  latter  which 
^vcfi  still  greater  facility  to  encroachments  of  the 
former, 

I  have  appealed  to  our  own  cxp«iencc  (or  the  iroth  of  what  I 
advance  on  (his  suhject.  W«e  il  nccns.i'y  (o  verify  ihis  F:iperi> 
tntr.  by  particul.ir  proofs,  the)-  miRhl  he  muhiplied  wllhout  rnd, 
I  niighi  find  a  witness  In  every  eiiiEtrn  who  has  shared  in,  or  l)ecn 
attenilve  lo.  ihc  cotine  of  puhlic  adminUi rations.  I  miKht  collect 
vouthew  in  atMiTiiUnce  (toiii  the  tcc«nl»  and  archives  o(  c»-irry 
Sialc  in  the  UniMi.  Ilui  as  a  more  concise,  and  at  the  same  lime 
equally  satkdactoiy  evidence,  I  will  refer  to  Ihe  cxainple  of  two 
Slates,  attested  by  two  unexceptionable  auihoiitics. 

The  Itrst  example  Is  itiat  of  Vlr<Einia.  a  State  whicli,  as  we  have 
seen.  ?ias  exprestly  decUrcd  in  ill  coii«litiition  lliat  Ihe  three  great 
dcpannwnlK  r)U(;ht  onl  to  be  inieimiied,  Theauthoiity  in  sup- 
port of  it  is  Mr,  Ji-fferson,  >vho,  besides  hi«  other  advantajres  for 
remarkin;;  the  o^ieiatton  of  Ihe  sovernnient.  was  litrnseK  the  chtef 
magistrrite  of  It.  In  order  to  convey  fully  Ihe  itica.i  with  which 
his  experience  had  impressed  him  on  this  subject,  tl  will  be  neces- 
sary 10  quote  a  parage  of  some  kngth  from  his  very  inteiestiiii; 
"  Notes  on  the  State  of  Virginia,"  ]>.  195.  "  All  the  powers  of 
government— l«)!i»talive,  executive,  and  jadiciarj — result  to  the 
hgislaltve  bo<ly.  The  concrniraiing  these  in  the  same  hands  is 
precisely  tlie  definition  of  tleipotlc  government.  It  will  be  no 
alteviaiion  thai  these  powers  will  be  exercised  by  a  pluraliiy  of 
hands,  and  not  by  a  single  Mie.  One  hundied  and  seventy-three 
despots  would  turcly  be  ax  oppreuive  as  one.  L.ei  those  who 
doubt  it  turn  iheir  eyes  on  the  republic  i>f  Venice.  As  little  will 
ii  avail  us  ihai  ihcy  are  chosen  by  ourselves.  An  tUclive  ■/»- 
p»lism  was  not  the  government  we  (ought  for.  but  one  which 
sliould  nol  only  be  (ouniled  on  free  principles,  hut  in  which  Ihe 
powers  of  gnvernaieiit  should  be  so  divided  and  balanced  among 


«*. 


33* 


COVffClL  OF  C£ffSOKS. 


iir«.«(«) 


tevcfnl  boilies  of  magisirncy  as  thai  no  one  could  trsntc^mt  their 
lct:al  limit)  wiihoul  bcriis  cflcctually  checked  and  nslraincrf  l)y 
ihe  others.  For  (Kis  rcxson.  (hat  conventton  which  iusmiI  ihe 
oiiliiiance  o(  t;uvcriiiiient  laht  itj>  (ouiwlation  on  ihb  h*M.  (hat 
Ihe  Icgiitiiiivc.  cxecuiire.  and  judiciary  dcpitrimrnit  ttiouki  be 
»C|>*rate  and  <1iti(iiicl, so  thai  no  pason  should  exeteikeibe  poweis 
of  more  tli.tn  one  of  lliciii  ai  Ihe  same  lime.  Bui  «i»  barrtfr  wai 
pr-n'idal  ivinveH  /■**■«  irtfral  p^OMti.  The  judiciaiy  ami  the 
occuiive  meiiihcrs  we-re  left  (kpcndcnt  on  Ihe  Icgisl.iliTr  (or  their 
fubsLMencc  in  office,  aiitl  Mine  ol  ihcfn  for  their  continuance  in  tl. 
If.  therefore,  the  Icgistatiire  auunic*  execulire  and  jodiciarf 
jioirven,  no  opposition  ia  likely  to  be  made ;  nor.  it  made,  eari  be 
cITcclual :  because,  in  that  ca.ie,  they  may  put  their  procecdinf^s 
into  Ihe  form  of  acts  ol  AsM-mMy.  which  will  rcn<ler  ihctii  obbf>a- 
lory  on  the  other  brandies.  They  lure  accord iiiKly,  in  many  in- 
WAnce^.iUeiJfd  rights  which  should  have  been  left  \ojit4i(t«ry 
(anlr^utrty,  mut  M*  tiirtclUn  «/  Iht  txtcutn-e,  during  tht  vMt 
timt  0/  tktir  ituion.  ii  beco«iiag  habitual  and  familiar." 

Tlie  Other  Stale  which  I  ^luli  lake  (01  an  example  is  i'ennsyl- 
vania ;  and  the  other  authority,  the  Council  ol  Censors,  which 
Mieinbtetl  in  the  years  1783  and  17S4.  A  part  of  (he  duly  of  (Hi 
body,  as  marked  out  by  the  consiiiuikm,  was  ~  to  inquire  wheiher 
(he  conitilulioo  lud  been  presctred  inviolate  in  every  part ;  and 
whether  Ihe  )rgisl;ilit*c  and  executive  branched  of  gmcrnnienl  had 
peifuinied  llieir  duty  a&  guanlians  of  (he  |>eople.  or  asMtmcd  to 
themselves,  or  cxctcitetl.  other  or  greater  powers  than  they  are 
entitled  to  by  the  consiiiuifun."  In  the  execution  of  this  trust  iha 
council  were  necesaaiily  led  (o  a  cotniurison  «(  both  the  leglHUiirQ 
and  executive  pruccc^lings,  wilh  (lie  const i(u(ional  power»  ul  tliese 
dcpadmenis ;  and  from  the  facis  enumerated,  and  to  ihe  irulh  ol 
most  of  which  both  sides  in  llw  council  subscribed,  it  appears  thai 
Ihe  constitution  had  been  flagramily  violated  by  the  k^isUiare  in  a 
variety  ol  im|>OTtant  instances. 

A  greal  number  ol  laws  had  been  passed,  notating.  without  any 
apparent  necessity,  the  rule  recjuiiing  iliat  all  bills  of  a  public 
nature  shall  be  previously  printed  for  the  c on sidr ration  of  (lie 
peopk  1  although  this  is  one  ol  the  piecautlons  chietly  )clie<l  on  by 
tl>c  constiluliun  against  improper  acts  ol  (he  Icgistalure. 

The  constitutional  iri.il  by  jury  had  been  violated,  and  powcn 
assumed  which  had  not  been  delegated  by  (he  constitution. 

Cxecuiire  powers  had  been  usurped. 

The  salaikt  of  ihe  judges,  which  (he  constitulion  expressly  r«- 
4iiurca  to  be  6xcd.  Iiad  bcim  occas*oaally  raricd :  and  cases  belimg- 


KaAlMHl 


Pe/tKSYLVA.\IA  EXECUTIVE, 


333 


ing  to  ihc  jmlici.-iry  department  frequently  Or^wn  within  rgijialivc 
cognioincc  ani)  iletcrinriialion. 

Thtwe  who  with  to  »ce  the  levctal  p^rttcuUrs  fallini;  iin<ler 
each  o(  iKcse  hejtU  may  consult  iHc  jomn.il&of  ilic  council,  which 
are  in  ptini.  Some  i>l  Ihein.  it  will  be  [ouii<l.  may  he  ttn|iiiiahl«  lo 
peculijr  circiims<Anc«t  connected  with  the  war ;  but  the  greater 
pan  o(  them  may  be  contidetcd  iii  the  spoiilaneoits  shoots  oltin 
ni-cuiistiiuied  govern  me  I)  I. 

It  appeals.  alM),  tliil  the  CKecutive  department  had  hut  been 
innocent  o(  tieqiiciii  briMchcs  of  the  coitstiiutioii.  There  are  three 
DhieiYaliuni,  however,  which  oujihl  'o  be  made  on  tliii  hrad :  first, 
a  grtal  proportion  o(  the  instances  were  either  iinmoili-Ucly  pro- 
duced by  the  necenitiei  o(  the  vow.  or  leeoinmended  hy  ConjjrcM 
01  the  commander-in-<:hiet ;  st<0H/Uy,  in  most  of  the  other  inManccs, 
they  conformetl  eithei  to  the  decl.iretl  or  the  known  itentimcntv  of 
the  legislative  (iep.-irlmcnt:  tkirMy,  the  cxeculii'e  departnient  o( 
I'eTiniylvania  is  dlstinguiiihed  from  tliat  o(  the  other  Stales  by  the 
niimhcT  of  mcinhers  ronipiuing  it.  In  this  rctvpecl.  it  lias  as  inildl 
affinity  to  a  legisUtirc  »sscrnl>ly  as  to  an  executive  council.  And 
being  M  once  riempt  fmin  the  restraint  of  an  ir>ilindual  rcsponsi- 
biliiy  foe  the  .ictiol  the  body,  and  derivinj;  confidence  from  mutual 
example  and  joint  influence,  im.iulhniiied  meavires  wnuld.  of 
course,  be  more  freely  haunled  than  where  the  ejccuirve  depart- 
raent  is  administered  hy  a  single  hand,  or  t>)'  a  few  hamU. 

The  concliiMon  whti'h  i  nm  warntnted  in  <!rawing  from 
these  observations  is  thai  -Tmrr^,  ilcmarration  on 
parchmem   of  the  const itm^fn,i|   umitt   nf  thr   irTT-Til, 

"department)!  is    tw^t    ^   ffi^ffirient jTimrd   ;^yaiii<t    ^hogc 

e ocroachmcnts  wbic:h  l<;pd  f"  a  tj-Tanniiai  ronr'''"^^''"n_ 
of  all  the  powers  tjf  governmr"*  ■"  '''^  camo  lumie 


APPEAL    rO   THE  PEOPLE. 


No.  49 I48I.     </-*/»•*«(/•—«/.  rtfcnuiT  *.  iiM.)     Madison  (?) 

PROBABLE  EXCESSIVE  INFLUENCE  OF  THB^ 
LEGISLATIVE  DEPARTMENT. 

nwtfdy^  Vtry  daHgermi  ami  ntiltii  t/tta  /rt^iuntlf  uff-HfJ—Hnufiti 
fer  Ihit —  Wkm  ttuk  afftali  art  tiif/al — A/narti  m  grtaiiMtat  itffitall 

7>  /*«■  P/vfiU  of  the  Stale  «/  A'ew  Ym-k: 

The  author  ol  the  *'  Notes  on  the  State  of  Virginia," 
quoted  in  the  last  paper,  has  stibjoinccl  to  tiMt  valuatile 
work  the  draiiglii  of  a  constitution  which  hati  been  pre- 
pared in  order  to  be  laid  before  a  convention  expected  to 
be  called  in  1  jSj,  by  the  legislature,  for  the  establishment 
«if  a  ci)n»titution  for  that  comniunwciillh,  The  plan, 
like  cverifthing  from  the  same  pen,  marks  a  turn  nf  think- 
ing, original,  comprehensive,  and  accurate;  and  is  the 
more  worthy  of  attention  as  it  equally  displays  a  fcrTciit 
attachment  to  republican  government  and  an  enlightened 
view  of  the  dangerous  propensities  against  nhich  it  ought 
to  be  guarded.  One  of  the  precautions  which  he  pro- 
pones, and  on  which  he  appears  ultimately  lc  rely  as  a 
palladium  to  the  weaker  departments  of  power  againtt 
the  invasions  of  the  stronger,  is  perhaps  altogether  Itis 
own,  and,  as  it  immediately  relates  to  the  subject  of  our 
present  inquiry,  ought  not  to  be  overlooked. 

His  proposition  is  "  that  whenever  any  two  of  the 
three  branches  of  government  shall  coucur  in  opinion, 
each  by  the  voices  of  two-thirds  of  their  whole  number, 
that  a  convention  is  necessary  for  altering  the  conslilu- 
tion,  or  eo'reeting  ireaehes  oJU,  a  convention  shall  lie  tailed 
for  the  purpose." 

As  tlie  people  are  the  only  legitimate  fountain  of 
power,  and  it  is  from  them  that  the  constitutional  charter, 
under  which  the  several  branches  of  government  huld 
their  |K>wt:r,  is  derived,  it  seems  strictly  consonant  tu 
the  republican  theory  to  recur  to  the  same   original 


M«di*a*f1>1       OHjeCTIONS  TO  XECUJtffEXCE.  335 

authority  not  only  whenever  It  may  be  necessary  to 
enlarge,  diminish,  or  new-model  the  powers  of  the  govcrn- 
mcni,  but  also  whcncverany  unc  of  the  (fcpartments  may 
commit  encroachments  on  the  chartered  authorities  of 
the  others.  Ttic  several  departments  bciuj;  perfectly 
co-ordinate  by  the  terms  of  their  common  commission, 
none  of  them,  it  is  evident,  can  pretend  to  an  exritisire 
or  superior  rijhi  of  settling  the  boundaries  between  their 
respective  powers;  and  how  arc  the  encroachments  of 
the  stronger  to  be  prevented,  or  the  wrongs  of  the 
weaker  to  be  redressed,  without  an  appeal  to  the  peo- 
ple themselves,  who,  as  the  grantors  of  the  commission, 
can  alone  declare  its  true  meaning  and  enforce  its  ob- 
scrrancc? 

1'here  is  certainly  great  force  in  this  reasoning,  and  it 
must  be  all<)we<l  to  prove  that  a  constitutional  road  to 
the  decision  of  the  people  ought  to  be  marked  out  and 
kept  open  for  certain  great  and  extraordinary  occasions. 
But  there  appear  to  be  insuperable  objections  against  the 
prnpoiccd  reourrenee  to  the  people  as  a  provision,  in  all 
cases,  for  keeping  the  several  departments  of  power 
within  their  constitutional  limits. 

In  the  first  place,  the  provision  does  not  reach  the 
case  of  a  combination  of  two  of  the  drpartmcnts  against 
the  third.  If  the  legislative  authority,  which  possesses 
so  many  means  of  operating  on  the  motives  of  the  other 
departments,  should  be  able  to  gain  to  its  interest  either 
of  the  others,  or  even  one-third  of  its  memlwrs,  the 
remaining  department  could  derive  nu  advantage  from 
its  remedial  provision.  I  do  not  dwell,  however,  on  this 
objection,  because  it  maybe  thought  to  be  rather  against 
the  modification  of  the  principle  than  against  the  princi- 
ple itself. 

In  the  next  place,  it  may  be  considered  as  an  objection 
inherent  in  the  principle  tliat,  as  every  appeal  to  the 
IM  people  would  carry  an  implication  of  some 

lt*.W.  defect  in  the  government,  frequent  appeals 

would  in  a  great  measure  deprive  the  government  o( 
that  veneration  which  time  bestows  on  everything,  and 


336 


D/STUKBAXCS  OF  TRAXQUILLITY.     tll«.«««) 


without  which  pcrhnfus  the  wisest  and  freest  gavcromvnU 
waiilO  nut  pussess  llic  requisite  stubilit}'.  If  it  br  trtic 
that  all  ijovernmenu  rest  on  opinion,  it  is  no  Ici-s  truc 
that  the  strength  of  opinion  in  each  inttividaal,  and  its 
practical  influence  on  hts  conduct,  depend  much  on  the 
numher  which  he  supposes  to  have  entertained  the  tame 
opinion.  The  reason  of  man,  like  man  himself,  is  timid 
and  cautious  when  left  alone,  and  acquires  rirmness  and 
confidence  in  proportion  to  the  number  with  whicli  it  is 
associated.  When  the  examples  which  fortify  opinion 
are  atuitnt  as  well  as  ntmerout,  they  are  known  to  have  a 
double  efTect,  In  a  nation  of  philosophers,  this  coii> 
sidcration  ought  to  be  disregarded.  A  reverence  for  the 
laws  would  be  sufTicienily  inrulcatcil  by  the  roicc  of  an 
enlightened  reason.  But  a  nation  of  philosophers  is  as 
little  to  be  expected  as  the  philosophical  race  of  kings 
wished   (or  by  Plato,      And  in   every  other  nation  the 

roiost  rational  government  will  not  find  it  a  superSuous 
advantage  to  have  the  prejudices  of  the  community  OD 
its  side. 

The  danger  of  disturbing  the  public  tranquillity  |iy 
interestin);  too  strongly  the  public  passiuns  is  a  still 
more  serious  objection  against  a  frequent  reference  of 
constitutional  questions  to  the  decision  of  the  whole 
society,  Not  withstanding  the  succcks  which  hasattrnded 
the  revisions  of  our  established  forms  of  government. 
and  which  docs  so  much  honor  to  the  virtue  and  intelli- 
gence uf  the  people  of  America,  it  must  be  confessed  that 
the  experiments  are  of  loo  ticklish  a  nature  to  be 
unnecessarily  multiplied.  We  arc  to  recollect  th.ii  all  the 
existing  consiitulioiut  were  formed  in  the  midst  uf  a 
danger  which  repressed  the  passions  most  unfriendly  to 
order  and  concord;  of  an  enihusiaslir  confulrnce  uf  the 
people  in  their  patriotic  leaders  which  Milled  the 
ordinary  diversity  of  opinions  on  great  national  qacs- 
tiuns;  of  a  universal  ardor  for  new  and  opposite  forms, 
produced  by  a  universal  resentment  and  Indifniation 
against  the  ancient  government;  and  whilst  no  spirit  of 
parly  connected   with  the  changes  to  be  made,  or  tlie 


Mftdl»kin|    COftST/TUTlOXAl  EQUILIBRIUM.  3j7 


abuses  to  be  reformed,  coultl  mingle  its  leaven  in  Die 
operation.  The  future  sttautinns  in  which  wc  inu»t 
expect,  tu  be  usually  placed,  do  not  present  any  equivalent 
security  against  the  danger  which  is  apprehended. 

But  the  greatest  objection  of  all  is  that  the  decisions 
which  would  probably  result  from  such  appeals  would  not 
answer  the  purpose  of  maintaining  the  con^^titulional 
equilibrium  of  the  government.  We  have  seen  that  the 
tendency  of  republican  governments  is  to  an  aggrandize- 
ment  tif  the  k-gislative  at  the  expense  of  the  other 
departments.  The  appeals  to  the  people,  therefore, 
would  usually  be  made  by  the  executive  and  judiciary 
deparlmcnts.  But  whether  made  by  one  side  or  the 
other,  would  each  side  enjoy  equal  advantages  on 
the  trial?  Let  us  view  their  different  situations.  The 
members  of  the  executive  and  judiciary  departments 
are  few  in  number,  and  can  be  personally  known  tu  a 
sm^ll  part  only  of  the  people.  The  latter,  by  the  mode 
of  their  appointment,  as  well  as  by  the  nature  and 
permanency  of  it,  are  too  far  removed  from  the  people 
to  share  much  in  their  prepossessions.  The  former  are 
generally  the  *>bjccts  of  je-:dou«y,  and  their  administra- 
tion is  always  liaoi^  to  be  discolored  and  rendered 
unpopular.  The  members  of  the  legislative  department, 
on  the  other  hand,  .ire  numerous,  They  arc  distributed 
and  dwell  among  the  people  at  large.  Their  connec. 
tions  of  blood,  of  friendship,  and  of  acquaintance  em- 
brace a  great  proportion  of  the  most  influential  part  of 
the  society.  The  nature  of  their  public  trust  implies  a 
personal  influence  among  the  people,  and  that  they  arc 
more  immediately  the  confidential  guardians  of  the  rights 
ind  liberties  of  the  people.  With  these  advantages,  it 
can  hardly  be  supposed  that  the  adverse  party  would 
have  an  equal  chance  for  a  favorable  issue. 

Hut  the  legislative  party  would  not  only  be  able  to 
plead  their  cause  most  successfully  with  the  people. 
They  would  probjibly  be  constituted  themselves  the 
judge*.  The  same  inHuencc  which  had  gained  them  an 
election  into  the  legislature,  would  gain  them  a  seat  in 


338 


rOPUlAg  REASO/f  A/fD  PASSIONS.    liro.«f«> 


the  (convention,  if  this  shoaM  not  be  the  rase  vith  all. 
It  woultl  probably  he  the  aise  wiih  many,  ami  pretty 
certainly  with  those  leading  characters  on  whom  every- 
thing depends  in  such  bodies.  The  convention,  in  short, 
would  be  compDud  chiefly  of  men  who  had  been,  who 
actually  were,  or  who  expected  to  be,  members  of  the 
dc[><irtmcnl  whose  conduct  was  arr.nigned.  They  would 
consequently  be  [parties  to  the  very  question  to  be  decided 
by  them. 

It  might,  huwevej-,  somelinics  happen  that  appeals 
would  tw  made  tinder  circumstances  l«s  adverse  to  the 
cxcculive  and  judiciary  departments.  The  usurpations 
of  the  legislature  might  be  so  flagrant  and  so  sudden  as 
to  admit  o(  no  speciouit  Coluring.  A  strong  party  among 
themselves  might  take  side  with  the  other  branches. 
The  executive  power  might  be  in  the  hands  of  a  peculiar 
favorite  of  the  people.'  In  such  a  posture  of  thingv,  the 
public  decision  might  be  le«s  swayed  by  prepossessions 
in  favor  of  the  legislative  party.  But  still  it  could  never 
be  expected  to  turn  on  the  true  merits  of  the  question. 
It  would  inevitably  be  connected  with  the  spirit  of  pre- 
existing parties,  or  of  parties  springing  out  of  the  ques- 
tion itself.  It  would  be  connected  with  persons  of 
distinguished  character  and  extensive  influtitce  In  the 
community.  It  would  be  pronounced  by  the  very  men 
who  had  t>cen  agents  in,  or  opponents  of,  the  measures 
tn  which  the  decision  would  relate.  The/ii/i/i'W,  there- 
fore, not  the  rtasft.  of  the  public  would  sit  in  judgment. 
Uut  it  is  the  reason,  atone,  of  the  public,  that  ought  to 
control  and  regulate  the  government.  The  passinos 
ought  to  be  controlletl  and  regulatri)  by  the  govrrnmrnt. 

We  found  in  the  Ia«t  paper,  that  mere  declarations  in 
the  written  constitution  arc  not  sufficient  to  restrain  the 
several  dejiartmenls  within  their  legal  rights.  It  appean 
in  this  that  occ:asional  appeals  to  the  people  wuuld  be 


'  Mr.  RrfM,  wMli    adiainbl^  dHmntlnitina.  annU   llol 
tbv  Ptni-lFDl  n  trnk  ■■"'  '    <npeB  b«bi  to  t>v|Mnin(0R 

Ike    Eic<uiivc   Chiel.  a  ffOKOuiAj  (Uuii^  ha  MR 

Lee])  the  tx£:ibtutc  at  l»i      -  l.i.->iua.. 


MtilimD)    /.VFRACTIO.VS  OF  COXSTJTUTIOX. 


339 


neUli«r  a  proper  nor  an  effectual  provUion  for  that  pur- 
pose. How  far  thr  provifiions  of  a  diffL-rcnt  nature  con* 
twined  ill  the  plan  atxive  quoted  might  be  4(lei|iiute,  I  do 
not  eiamine.  Some  of  thcra  arc  uiMiuestionably  lounded 
on  sound  political  principles,  and  all  of  Ihcoi  arc  framed 
with  singular  ingenuity  and  precision.  l*t;DLiiJ& 


To.  50  [49].      t-vw  r*r»ys,ttt.  Ptkuwy  5. ifW.)       Madison  (?) 

PKRIOniCAL  CORRKCTINO    OF  INFRACTIONS 
OF  THE  CONSTITUTION. 


Tht  mtriti  and  JuaJvamlagti  */  i^rt  mml  Unf  inltrmU — Bxamplt  */ 
Piumxlsinia. 

Ta  the  Ptaffe  of  Ike  Stale  0/  AVw  Yark: 

It  niay  be  oontemled,  perhaps,  that  instead  of  0(«tshial 
appcaU  to  the  people,  whith  arc  liable  to  the  objections 
urged  againttt  them,  ffiiiK/ual  a|>pcals  arc  the  proper  and 
ude(|uate  nieanH  ol  firevenling  and  eorrtding  in/racthni  of 
fke  Conslitulwn.* 

It  will  be  attended  to  that,  in  the  examination  of  these 
expedienlii,  I  confine  myself  to  thetr  aptitude  fur  tnfare- 
ing  the  Constitution,  by  keeping  the  several  departments 


'  AJlhoDgli  BO  «(>«ciai  proviHon  (or  peiiodlol  r«iition  o(  ili«  cooditik- 
don  »a«  prorided  in  ihM  intimincnl.iippMU  (or  a  coHvenlioH  to  rt^*pe 
liie  j;i>i>emnc«l  b(Ve  been  tc4iiirE<it  iitlh  cocli  «(>|i«Enl  uiitit.  tlrin 
li«f»««  <bc  ■cl'ipr^'ci  i>l  like  foJi-(«J  coii'ililHiifXi.  iX\  c]('|u.i»cutt  utgrd  the 
<aUia|'  111  *  oniirnliiKt  in  tviit«  il  Ivc  1-^  I'.  Siiiilli'i  "  Th«  Morelncnl 
lovutli  ■  Scconi)  Cmiitrlulmnnl  Cnnvvnlion  in  17SS~  |ln  Jamcwin't 
"EusT^  in  tiKConMiliilioiul  llitiurrol  the  UniicdMun."  lUq] ).  In 
Iheconinttd  cIcciiMiiif  I  So  I.  the  KcpiiMioii*  ilitcirrncil  lu  "  invilo  "  a 
<QnvcnIK)n  vKkh  "  wiiol.l  lnvr  rCMircil  tli«  (^onitlituliuii  wh*re  il  WM 
•Irfrctive  an')  ornntA  il  tip  ij^ain. '  >i<<l  l!io  (tar  o(  whnl  in  cvlnlvi^l 
lioily.  oiifiBMinc  frooi  >u<h  ■  call,  night  do  to  ihe  (r>ine  at  KOvcrnmcM. 
pfoduccd  a  proAipl  urrcnder  on  the  pan  of  Ihc  Fedcialiiti.  Tlie  Hail- 
iiird  ooavcnllam,  ia  iSt^.  fcmnunondod  a  tcvulon  al  (he  conHilulion. 
Ttl«  Squtli  Ciiiilina  rtinieeliiXi  ui  IS^I.  m  ili  kIiIctu  (v  ibc  tlato, 
annlnl  that  thv  oidy  atlcniaiit-r  to  ■  mtHlititaliQn  of  the  laiifl  wonld  be 
"  ihr  call  for  ■  fenctal  coflvrntion  oi  ill  Ihe  ital»."  In  1861  the  Peace 
<a(i(ercnce.  called  h;  the  bo<det  il*l«.  Irancd  a  tctiei  ol  araeadntnlt 
tu  Uic  coiiulluiion  (tec  AppcnUli). — Eiiiiua. 


340 


PERIODICAL  REVISION. 


Ula.M(M: 


of  power  within  their  due  bounds,  without  particuUirly 
considering  tlicm  as  provi^ii^ns  fur  altering  the  Constitu- 
tion ilSL-lf.  It)  the  first  view,  jppeals  tii  the  jicuplc  aX 
fixcil  periods  appear  to  be  nearly  as  inelisibie  ait  appeals 
on  puTticular  occasions  as  they  emerge  If  the  pcriodh 
be  separated  by  short  intervals,  the  measures  to  be 
reviewed  and  rectified  will  have  been  of  recent  date,  ami 
will  be  connected  wiih  all  the  circumstances  which  tend 
to  vitiate  and  pervert  the  result  of  occasional  revisions. 
If  the  periods  be  distant  from  each  other,  Ute  same 
remark  will  be  applicable  to  alt  recent  measures;  and  in 
proportion  u»  the  remoteness  of  the  others  may  favor  a 
dispassionate  review  of  them,  this  advantage  is  inse|>ara- 
blcfrom  inconveniences  which  seem  to  counterbalance  iL 
In  the  first  place,  a  distant  prospect  of  public  censure 
would  be  a  very  (eehle  restraint  on  power  from  those 
excesses  to  which  it  might  be  urged  by  the  force  of 
present  motives.  Is  it  to  be  imagined  titat  a  Icsislative 
assembly,  consisting  of  n  hundred  or  two  huttdrrd 
members,  caijerly  bent  on  some  favorite  object,  and 
breaking  thruugh  the  rcstrainls  of  the  Constitution  in 
pursuit  of  it.  wonid  be  arrested  in  their  career,  by  too- 
LSiderations  drawn  from  a  censorial  revision  of  their  con- 
duct at  the  future  distance  of  ten,  filteen,  or  twenty 
years?  In  Ihc  next  plare,  the  abuses  would  often  have 
completed  thetr  mischievous  effects  before  the  remedial 
provision  would  be  applied.  And  in  the  last  place,  where 
this  might  not  be  the  case,  they  would  be  of  Inni;  stand- 
ing, would  have  taken  deep  root,  and  would  not  easily  be 
extirpated. 

The  scheme  of  revising  d)c  consiilution.  in  order  In  cotreel 
recent  breacltes  <A  it.  a*  well  as  for  Mlier  j>ui{iuscs.  Ims  been 
Hciiiall)-  tiini  in  one  <rf  the  Siaies.  One  of  Ihc  objects  of  the 
Council  of  Censor*  whkh  met  in  l>cnn!irlvaiiia  In  1783^1x1  n%^ 
wn».  a*  we  Uxn  %eeu.  to  inquire  "  whether  (be  cauuitutiiMi  bail 
bent  vioUleil.  ant]  whether  the  legitbOfr  finil  exrcuiive  dcpail- 
mcnt*  hill  cncriMchecl  uii  encli  otlicr."  Tliii  iiupunant  aint  nurd 
eji|>ctiineni  in  puUlici  merits,  in  iievcr4l  poiiio  of  vinv.  vrtj 
paiticular  aiicniian.  Id  some  of  them  it  may.  itcth.-iju 
rtjit-ilntrni.  niaJt  under  elrcura«a»cr«   nomcwkii  p-  ■       .1- 


MidiMndjI       COUI/CIL  f/Or  HARMONtOUS.  34t 

ihuught  lo  b«  not  absoiu(«ly  codcIusjvc.  Bui  a»  applied  to  the 
CUR  uniler  con  uil  en  lion,  il  involves  some  f.icls.  which  I  venture  lo 
remark,  at  »  compkic  and  aaiisbciory  illuatratioa  of  the  reasoning 
which  I  have  employe*!. 

Firil.  Il  appears,  from  Ihe  names  o(  itic  gcnllemcn  who  com- 
posed tlic  council,  that  some,  M  IcAti.  of  iiK  most  active  and  le;id- 
111^  niemlicr&  had  also  bc«ii  active  and  leading;  chatactcisjn  the 
parlie*  which  pfe-eiialed  in  the  Slate. 

Sri^niify,  It  appcati  that  the  same  active  and  leading  members 
of  the  council  had  been  active  and  intlucntial  members  of  ilie 
legislative  and  executive  branches,  within  the  period  to  be  reviewed. 
;inil  even  patiuni  Of  opponent*  of  the  very  measures  to  be  ihus 
brought  to  the  icsl  ol  the  Consliiuiion.  Two  of  the  nicmbers  had 
iKcn  vice  pre>>ideoli  o(  ihe  Stale,  and  several  others  members  of 
live  eieculive  council,  within  the  seen  prcceilitig  years.  One  of 
them  had  been  speaker,  and  a  number  of  others  dislinHubhcd 
mi:ml>rr^.  of  the  leeiflalivc  astemhiy  within  the  xamt^  period. 

TkirJfy.  Every  page  ol  iheir  p(oceeding»  witnesie*  the  effect 
of  all  these  circumsiance«  on  the  temper  of  their  de  libera  I  ions. 
Thrmighoui  tlic  continuance  of  the  council,  it  waa  split  tnio  two 
filed  and  violent  parties.  The  fact  is  »cknowledged  and  lamented 
by  tlw-mMlves,  Had  this  not  been  ihc  case,  the  face  of  tlieir  pro- 
ceedings exhibits  a  proof  equally  Mtisfactor}'.  In  .ill  qiiesi ions, 
however  uninipurlaTil  in  ihemielvcs,  or  unconnected  with  each 
Other,  the  same  n.imrt  al.ind  invariably  contrasted  on  the  opposite 
culum'i«.  Evr-iy  unbiased  observer  may  infet.  without  danger  of 
mixiakc.  and  at  the  fiante  time  without  mc.-ining  to  icflect  on  either 
parly,  or  any  liulivnluals  of  either  parly,  that,  unfortunately, 
paitiam,  not  reaion.  mu»l  have  presided  over  their  decisions. 
When  men  eccrcise  their  reason  coolly  and  (reely  on  a  vaiiely  of 
ilislinci  qtieitioni.  they  inevitably  fall  into  different  opinions  on 
some  of  them.  When  ihey  are  governe^l  by  a  common  passion, 
ibeir  opinions,  if  they  are  so  to  be  culled,  will  be  ibe  same. 

Faurlkfy.  It  is  at  lensi  problematical  whrlher  the  decisions  o( 
this  Imdfi  do  not.  in  several  instances,  niiscunslrue  llic  limits 
prescribed  for  the  lc|{isla!ivc  anil  eiecutivr  deparlmenis,  instead  of 
leduciivg  aitd  Inniiing  ihem  within  their  constitutional  places. 

Fifthly.  I  have  never  understood  thai  ihe  decisions  of  the 
council  on  const  iiutional  questions,  wliether  lightly  or  erroneously 
formed,  have  had  any  effect  in  varying  the  practice  foundeil  on 
legiUalivc  consinKtIoas.  Il  even  appears,  if  I  mistake  not.  that 
in  one  instance  the  contemporary  legislature  dcnieil  the  construc- 
tions of  the  council,  and  actually  prevailed  m  the  contest, 


M» 


BALAXCE  OF  DE PA KT. WESTS.        flTo.ftKkl) 


Ttiis  cfflsorial  body,  tlierefote.  provs  aX  the  same  lime,  by  '«% 
reMAfchi!s.  (hi;  cxisirncc  of  tlic  illscate,  and,  b)r  lis  rxainple.  ihr 
incfficaiy  <i(  the  reiii«ly. 

This  conclusion  cannot  be  iniat'itaicit  by  allrging  iKai  th«  Statr 
in  wliich  the  exjieiiincnt  wax  mnde  was  at  thai  crisU.  ami  li»d 
b«en  for  a,  long  time  before.  vJolcnily  heated  nml  ditlncierf  \tf  the 
rage  of  juirty.  Is  ii  to  be  presumed  ttut,  at  any  future  septennial 
eprwh,  the  s.imc  Slnte  will  be  free  froru  pnrtW?  Is  ll  to  he  pic- 
*umeil  lliiil  any  other  Stale,  at  the  »»ine  or  any  other  given  penud, 
wllHic  exempt  from  them?  Siicli  in  ceenl  ought  to  lie  neither 
•lumeil  nor  desirciJ  ;  ber^use  an  extinction  otpailiei  neceiuatily 
hnplic^  cither  a  tmivcrt-tl  alarm  for  the  puUic  tafety.  or  an  abso- 
lute eitinctioh  of  libefty. 

Were  the  precaution  taken  of  excludin£  from  the 
assemblies  elc<;te(l  by  the  people  to  revise  the  preceding 
adniiiiiNlriitton  of  tlir  government,  all  (>:rrtiirnK  who  should 
have  been  concerned  witi)  the  government  wiiliin  ihe 
given  period,  the  difficulties  would  not  be  ubviulcd. 
The  important  task  would  probably  devolve  un  men, 
who,  with  iitferiur  oipaeitieit,  would  in  other  respects  l>c 
little  belter  qualified.  Although  ihcy  might  not  have 
been  personally  concerned  in  the  administration,  atHl 
therefore  not  immediately  agents  In  the  measures  to  Iw 
examined,  they  would  probably  have  been  involved  in 
the  parties  conncctrti  with  these  measures,  and  have 
been  elected  under  their  auspices. 

Pt'BUUS. 


No.  51  I50].     (/j>AyfW>-f/wHi/.F(knMry«,  ■)««.)    Kfatlison  (?) 

MKTIIOD  OK   BALANCING  THE  DEPARTMENTS 
OF  GOVERNMENT. 

MfJti  f/  M^im'i'x  "uitaJ  ikfttt  inJ  htJtiKtt—Ai/itamU/cej  of  Ik 
JtJtml gvprmmtiil  in  if.ttriiig  tkt  riflUi  ef  Ik/  fffk — Ihviiitn  rf  tk» 
dfltgalrd ptvtri—DifftrtHi  iattretit  amoaf  iktftefli. 

Ta  Ike  Pri'ph  of  ihr  Staff  0/  Xev  Yi^rk: 

To  what  exjietlient,  then,  shall  we  finally  resort,  (or 
saini.iining  in  practiee  the  necessary  partititm  of  p^.iwer 
imong  the  Mveml  departments,  as  laid  down  in  the  Cou> 


ll»lbcn.M  FSKEDOM  OF  EACH  DEFARTMEXT. 


343 


stiuititiii?    The  only  answer  that  can  be  given  is,  that  a* 
all  these  exterior  provisions  art"  found  to  be  inadc<]liaI(^ 
the  defect  must  be  su|){)licc],  by  so  conirivin);  tlic  intcHoA 
structure  oi   tht;   government  as   that   Iia   several  oun-1 
gutuent  j>arts   may,  by  their   qiiitual   rflation-t,  ye   tbcj 
niffSns  of   keeping  <l^\   other  in   their   propt-r   places.  1 
WifRont  presuming  to  undertake  a  fnll  development  ofl 
thiK  im[>orlant  idea,  1  will  haxard  a  few  general  observa- 
tions, which  may  perhaps  place  it  in  a  clearer  light  and 
enable  us  to  form  a  more  correct  jmlgmenl  of  the  prin- 
ciples and  siruelare  of  the  govcrnmeni  planneil  by  th^ 
conventioD. 

In  order  to  by  a  iltic  foundation  for  that  separate  and 
<Ii»lin<:t  exercise  of  the  dilferciil  powers  of  govcrnmeni, 
which  to  a  certain  extent  is  adniiltcil  on  all  kinds  to  be 
essential  to  the  preservation  of  liberty,  it  is  evident  that 
each  department  should  have  a  will  of  Jls  own,  and  cOn- 
scfprentiy  sliimlti  he  s<i  constitutpl  that  the  ip^^bcrs  ijT 
cacti  should  have  as-JittIc  ajjency  a*  pu9_si]}lc  in  the 
anpoi^twicnt  of  the  mcinbers  of  the  others.  Were  this 
plTni'iple  rigorously  adTiereil  to,  it  wuuhl  require  that 
all  the  appointments  for  the  supreme  executive,  le^ift- 
lative,  and  jadiciary  m^gislracies  should  be  drawn  from 
the  same  fountain  of  authority,  lJl<r^^^*-'>  through 
channels  havinj;  no  communication  whatever  with  one 
another.  I'crliaps  such  a  plan  of  consiruiling  the  several 
dt:|>arimen(s  would  lie  le.-u>  diflicull  in  practice  tiun  il 
may  in  contemplation  appear.  Some  difficulties,  however, 
and  some  additional  expense  would  attend  the  cxceuli<m 
of  it  Some  deviations,  therefore,  from  the  principle 
mu!(t  be  admitted.  In  the  constitution  of  the  judiciary 
dcpartrocot  in  particular,  it  might  be  inexpedient 
to  insist  rigorously  on  the  principle:  lirst,  because 
peculiar  qualification*  being  essential  in  the  members, 
the  primary  consideration  ought  to  be  to  select  that  mode 
of  choice  which  best  secures  these  qualifications;  sec- 
ondly, because  the  permanent  tenure  by  which  the  appoint- 
ments arc  held  in  that  department,  must  soon  destroy  all 
sense  of  depcadeace  on  the  authority  conferring  them. 


ENCKOACHUBSr  OX  PfeRHOCATiVE.     UlftSl  (M) 

It  is  equally  evident  tliiU  the  rocmlxrit  <jf  ca<:li  depart; 
mcpt  Sliould  l>e  as  mile  clepcniJent  as  po^sibh:  on  those 
of  the  others  for  the  emoluments  ^annexed  to  their 
ofliccs.  Were  the  cxeeulivc  magistrate,  or  the  jucl]{e&, 
fRTr*tn(lct>endeHt  of  the  legisluturc  in  this  particular, 
their-  independence  in  everj  other  would  be  merely 
Siotninal. 

Uut  the  great  security  against  a  gradual  conccnlration 
of  the  several  jxiwers  in  the  »anic  de^rtmcnt  con* 
»ists  ill  giving  to  thuse  wl>n  adminj^jyr  each  Oej;^rt- 
mcnt  the  necessary  constiiutional  means  aiMJ  personal 
iinHIVcs  to  resist  encroachments  of  the  others.  The 
provision  for  defenite  niiist  in  this,  as  in  all  other  cases,  be 
made  corainenstiratc  to  the  danger  of  attack.  _Ambitiop 
must  be  made  to  counteracl  ambition,  'flic  interest  of 
dT^  iiiati  muttt  be  connected  with  the  consiiiuiiiroafTlghta 
dI  the  place'  It  may  be  a  reflection  on  human  nature 
that  such  devices  siiould  be  necessary  to  control  the 
abuses  of  government.  Hut  what  is  government  itself, 
but  the  greatest  of  alt  reHections  on  human  nature.*  If 
men  were  angels,  no  government  would  be  necessary.  If 
angels  were  to  govern  men,  neither  external  nor  internal 
Controls  on  government  would  be  necessary.  In  framing 
3  government  which  is  to  be  admhiislered  by  men  over 
men,  the  great  difficulty  lies  in  this:  you  mtiiti  first  en- 
able the  government  to  control  the  governed;  and  in 
the  next  place  oblige  it  to  control  itself.  A  dependence 
on  the  people  is,  no  doubt,  the  primary  control  on  tlrt 
g'lvirrnment;  hut  experience  has  taught  mankind  Ihe 
necessity  of  auxiliary  precautions. 

This    policy    of    supplying,    by    opposite    and    rival 


■  TbI*  ImilniiT  of  iIm  uttM-hoUw  H  iwlx  sncnxuhntiU  nn  hU  Mra 
ptEroguiKs,  nai  to  eaitl«RVM  1o  iDcnili*  ku  "irn  innxi .  n  »•  unii*ml 
lh»l  11  icMreelT  ncnl*  JllwiliMion.  TVwfh  JeBerwii'  i«nir  ("  I'lr  nr^- 
Jencv  pledjpfl  lo  mliKc  In  powcn,  (ionvcmeiit  Mwri*  \i-  i 

In  (mm  iKe  ^itiilMlnlily  of  bik  "  illumtiliiiE  "  ptmcr,  "  Wr  rr-.i .  ' 

iliK  Ami'clkin  whitli  iprkiOffier,  loth"' 

•Bil  litnt!  pnwc'l  liii  torrvclBpn.  For  -  ^ 

aiUpil  tu  tne  infliKKMoI  ihc  ft«ultrc.  111:1  u?  oiicri  :i[v<rTi(kc>i  iij  iiiifc* 
fen  in  the  tcfiilttiTt  ukI  juJiciiJ  dcjKUtmeuit. — Euiii^K. 


£ 


BtdUwttlH       PREOOMINANCB  OF  LEGISLATURE.       345 

intercEts,  the  <lefc(;t*-t)f  better  motives,  might  be  traced 
through  itie  irliule  sj-Mem  of  tiuiiuin  ulfairx,  prtvale  as 
well  as  public,  Wc  see  it  particularly  displayed  in  all 
the  subordinate  distributions  of  power,  whcrv  the  con- 
stantaim  \%  to  divide  and  arrange  ttie  several  offices  in 
such  a  manner  as  that  each  may  be  a  check  on  the  other 
— that  the  private  interest  of  every  individual  may  be  a 
sentinel  over  the  public  rights.  Tlteite  invrntiniix  of 
prudence  cannot  be  less  requisite  in  the  distribution  of 
the  supreme  powers  of  the  State. 

Uut  it  is  not  possible  to  give  to  each  department  an 
equal  power  of  self-defense.  In  r^|^);hlican  i-nvi-rnmrin, 
the  legislative  aiH>">riiy  r-— -— ^■:--'-iiy  pi-^t^^imt-, — 4- 1, ,. 
remedy  for  this  incorivciiji^ncv  j^  ',"  rliyiilr-  iln-  i<-]Tt«]^.|tiii-^ 
t^l"  ilillercnt  brjnc[fca:  and  to  render  them,  by  different 
modes  of  election  and  different  principles  of  action,  as 
little  cohnecied  with  each  other  3.*.  the  nature  of  ihejr 
common  fancilons  and  their  common  dai>eiidence  on  the 
society  will  admit.  It  may  even  be  necessary  to  guard 
against  dangerous  encroachments  by  still  further  pre- 
cautions. As  the  weight  of  the  legislative  authority  re- 
quires that  it  should  be  thus  divided,  the  weakness  of  the 
executive  may  require,  on  the  other  hand,  that  it  should 
be  fortified.  An  absol'itc  nn:T'vr  "n  the  legislature  ap- 
pears, at  first  view,  to  be  tn"  lunural  defense  with  which 
llic  executive  magistrate  should  be  armed.  But  perhaps 
it  would  be  neither  altogether  safe  nor  alone  sufRcienl. 
On  ordinary  occasions  it  might  not  )>e  exerted  with  the 
requisite  firmness,  and  on  extraordinary  occasions  jt 
might  be  perfidiously  abused.  May  not  this  defect  of  an 
.ibsotute  negative  be  supplied  by  some  ^ij:^lirie<l  rt>qpis-- 
tion  between  this  wr^lfif  cl<-pi>rtiiir'fit  unA  \\^^  wi-^^r^ 
branch  ')!  the  stro^pcr  fl<-]i;irrinrni,  jiy  whirh  the  latter 
may  be  led  to  support  the  consiitutioiuil  rights  of  the 
former,  without  being  too  much  detached  from  the  rights 
of  its  own  department? 

If  the  principles  on  which  these  observations  are 
founded  be  just,  as  I  persuade  myself  they  are,  and  they 
be  applied  as  a  criterion  to  the  several  State  constitu- 


*\ 


SiCffTS  OP  MiXOK/TV, 


UI«.Sli»ft 


lions,  and  (o  the  ('^;]lf^al  rmmit.ni»n  it  will  be  [uund 

thai  if  the   Utter  docs   ni>t   perfectly  currespand   with 

^^      them,  the  former  are  intinilely  ies§  itblc  to  bear  such  a  test. 

There  are,  lU'ireovcr,   two  conoid  era  tiims  iMtrliriilarlv 

applicable  to  the   fcd^''^'^    system  of  ^nirrir:>,   tt-hi.  I|  Qltttrr 

that  system  in  a  very  interesting  puint  of  view. 
~  t-irsi.  In  a  single  repiniTic,  M  the  power  surrendered 
I*  by  the  people  is  submitted  to  the  administration  uf  n 
single  government;  iind  the  usurpations  are  guarded 
agitiiist  by  a  division  of  the  j{overninciit  into  distinct  and 
separate  departments.  In  the  compound  republic  of 
America,  the  power  surrcndcrt-d  by  the  people  is  firsl 
divided  between  two  drxtinct  governments,  and  tlien  the 
/  portion  allotted  to  each  subdivided  amon£  distinct  and^ 
separate  dcp,irtmcnts.  Hence  a  double  security  aris 
Ni  ^}ii-.  riyiils   iif  yhe  pi-iipli*.       The  dllfi-retlt   ^;Mvrrnq7fnl< 

'^"||  I' "I  '•'■;|t  othpr,  at  [til-  -■>».»  tin...  ii...^  rn''*\  wit 

be  controlled  t|y  vt scl f . 

Secnitt/.    U  is  of  great  importance  in  a   republic  not' 

only  to  guard  the  wiciety  aj^ain^t  the  oppression  «f  its 

rulers,  but  to  guard  one  part  of  the  society  against  the 

injustice  of  the  other   part,      Iliffrjm)   intrrnits  ncrcy 

sardy  exist  in  dilfercnt  clashes  of  citiacns.      If  a  miiioHlyJ 

it.be  iiniteil  by  a  c<)mnion  interest,  the  rights  of.  Uie 
miiiijiity  will  be  insecure.  There  arc  but  two  methixls  of 
providing  against  this  evil;  the  one   by   creating  a  wiO 

■  in  the  community  tmlependent  of  the  majority — tliat 
is,  ol  the  society  itself;  the  other,  by  comprchemling 
in  the  sf>ciciv  ■^(^jii.-inY  ti-paratc  descnpiiims  i>f  tiii^cn^ 
as  will  reniier  an  unjust  rombinalion  uf  a   ni.tinritT  "f 

ll      not     imprifJiratili-         Thc 

all  governments  possessing 
an  hereditary  or  self-appointed  authority.  'I'hi«,  at 
best,  is  but  a  precarious  se<!urity;  becaosc  a  power 
independent  of  ihc  society  may  as  well  cspuuic  Utc 
iinjnst  views  uf  the  major,  as  the  rightful  interests  of 
(tie   minor   party,  and   may  possibly  be   turnc<I  ' 

both  parties.     The  second  mclh(«l  will  be  cxemi  ■ 

the  federal   republic  of  the   Uniied  States.     Whilst  ati 


*  first    method    prevails    in 


■ 


MkdlHBiDI     JUSTICE    THE  END  OP  SOCIETY.  34? 

aulhurity  in  h  will  be  derived  from  and  dcp«ndL-nt  on  the 
society,  the  society  itself  wilt  be  broken  into  so  in.iny 
parts,  lOlcresls,  and  eb^cs  of  ^ili/cns  tli.il  Ihc  riKhl»  ~ 
of  individnul^  or  of  tlic  minority,  will  be  in  litlle  d.iujfer 
from  interested  cumbinatiuns  of  the  mujority.  In  a  free 
government  the  security  fur  civil  rights  must  be  the 
Mine  »*■  th;iL  for  rclixioun  ri^bts.  It  consists  in  the  one 
case  in  the  multiplicity  of  interests,  and  in  the  other  in 
the  muUi  pi  icily  of  sects.  ''"'—  dnj-^ir"  tif  ■^n'"'^''V  '"  ^'"'h 
gases  will  (Icptrnd  on  the  nuinbcr  of  mti  T^;;^^^  .^m]  m:(  is: 
diid  this  nuiy  lit-  iirt^Minied  to  drjiciul  im  iIil-  extent  of 
roiintry  anil  number  of  people  Lompri.-heiuki.l  qpdpr  thij 
%.ittii-  gnvi-riiiii<-ij.  I  Ins  vicn-  iil  the  subject  must  par- 
tiLUIai'ly  r<:>:onimend  a  |>ropi;r  federal  sy.tlem  to  all  the 
sincere  and  considerate  friends  of  republican  ijovcrn- 
ment,  since  it  shuirs  that  in  cxaet  proportion  as  the 
territory  of  the  Union  may  be  formed  into  more  circum- 
scribed Confederacies,  or  Slates,  oppressive  a>inbina- 
tions  of  3  majority  will  be  facilitated;  the  best  sveiiriiy, 
under  the  republican  forms,  for  the  rights  of  every  class 
of  citiitcns  will  be  diininii^hed;  and  consequently  the 
stability  and  independence  of  some  member  of  the 
government,  the  orily  other  security,  must  be  propor- 
tionally increased.  ^Justice  is  the  end  of  government. 
It  is  the  end  of  civil  societyj  It  ever  ha*  tieen  and  ever 
will  be  pursued  until  it  be  obtained,  or  until  liberty  be  ' 
Inst  in  the  pursuit.  In  a  society  under  the  forms  of  which 
the  stronger  faction  can  readily  unite  and  n|)preKS  the 
weaker,  anarchy  may  as  -truly  be  said  to  rciKii  as  in  a 
st^ie  of  niiture,  where  the  wc.-iker  individual  is  not 
secured  against  the  violence  of  the  stronger;  and  as, 
in  the  latter  stale,  even  the  stronger  individuals  are 
prompted,  by  the  uncertainty  of  their  condition,  to  sub- 
mit to  a  government  which  may  protect  the  weak  as  well 
as  themselves;  so,  in  the  former  state,  will  the  more 
powerful  fiM^tions  or  parties  be  gradually  induced,  by  a 
like  motive,  to  wish  for  a  government  which  will  protect 
■II  parties,  the  weaker  as  well  as  the  more  powerful.  Ji 
can  be  little  doubted  that  if  the  State  of  Rhode  Island 


«8 


HOUSE  OF  HEPKESENTATIVES.        IB*.  Bl  < 


was  separated  from  the  Cu n fed e racy  and  \ti\  to  itself, 
the  insecurity  of  riijhis  under  the  popular  funn  of 
governmetit  within  such  narrow  limits  would  be  dis- 
played by  such  reiterated  oppressiunx  of  factious  ma- 
joriticK,  that  some  power  alioijethcr  independent  nf  the 
people  would  w>on  be  called  for  by  the  voice  of  the  very 
factions  whose  misrule  had  proved  the  ne<.'cssity  of  it. 
Ill  the  entendcd  reimblic  i>f  the  irmtt;d  St;itr«,  aivil  amflug 
the  great  variety  of  intgit^sis,  parties,  and  sects  which  it 

,  qWtrHccs,  a  cialiliMii  of  a  mi^jnritv  of  ihc  whole  society 
ciiuld    seldom   take  place   on  anv  otht-r  pntirnik-s  than 

-t<>o]ic'fff  limtice  ami  the  gencfal  good :  whiUi  there  being 
thus  less  danger  to  a  minor  from  the  _will  of  a  nnjor 
parly,  there  must  be  less  pretext,  also,  to  provide  for  the 
security  -of  the  former,  by  intrtMJucing  into  the  govern- 
ment a  will  not  dependent  on  the  latter,  or,  in  other 
words,  a  will  independent  of  the  society  itself,  II  is  no 
less  certain  than  it  is  important,  notntifistanding  the 
contrary  opinions  which  have  been  entertained,  that  tlic 

ilargcr  the  society,  provided  it  lie  within  a  practical 
ppherc,  the  more  duly  c^ipabte  it  will  be  of  sclf-govcrn- 
gent.  And  happily  fur  the  rrpuhiitan  cautty  the  pmclic- 
able  sphere  may  be  carried  to  a  very  great  extent,  by 
a    judicious   modification    and    mixture  of    the   ftderat 

printipU.  PtJRUt]!^ 

No.  52  [51].     <A'f>  Yr't  Putrt.  Ftbnifyi.  >tmj       Hamilton  (>) 

QUALIFICATION    ANO    TERM    OF    HOUSE     OF 
REPRESENTATIVES. 

ElMfrj — Tie  fUdA/rd/^t  «/  /if  memhtri—Tkt  term  »f  tpO— 
Bitnitiiti  /littimi  —  I'li/ut  rf  frtqutnt  tiiiiipii—Ttrmt  ej  mr*<*  *» 
ifikiT gnrrniuHli^fn  gtiflauj,  ir/lamJ,  aitJiii  tit  Aniriiannimia— 
Bimiaai  tbiitrti  itrt  lAiHx'/rdiu — Sfaiitni  Jtr  tkit  itrattn  Jrtm  Ut 
tuturt  and  f^itlirrt  ef  Canj;rta. 

To  the  Ptopie  *./  the  State  0/  New  V^rk: 

Frum  the  more  general  inquiries  pursued  In  the  four 

last  papers,  I  pass  on  to  a  more  particular  esamiualion 

of  the  several  parts  of  the  govcrnmcnL     I  shall  bcfin 

.with  iJlC  H'iu*»r  "(  Kr)iri'-.r'iir.ilivi-s. 


irtil    QVALlFlCATIOiVS  OF  ELECTORS,  349 

The  first  view  to  b«  taken  of  this  part  of  the  govern- 
ment relates  to  the  qualifications  of  the  electors  and  the 
elected. 

Those  of  the  former  are  to  be  the  same  with  those  of 
the  electors  of  the  most  ntimeroiis  branch  of  the  State 
Icsi  statu  res.  The  defintium  of  the  right  of  suffnige  is 
very  justly  reg-.irded  as  a  fundamental  article  of  rcpubli* 
can  jEovcrnment.  It  was  inciimbrnt  on  the  convention, 
therefore,  to  tk-fine  and  establish  this  right  in  the  Con- 
stitution. To  have  left  it  open  for  the  occasional  regula> 
tion  of  the  Congress  would  have  been  improper,  for  the 
reason  just  mcntionetl.  To  have  submittal  it  to  the 
legislative  discretion  of  the  States  would  have  been  im- 
proper for  the  same  reason;  and  for  the  additional  reason 
that  it  would  have  rendered  ton  dependent  on  the  State 
governmenft  that  brani:h  of  the  federal  government 
which  ought  to  be  dependent  on  the  people  alone.  To 
have  reduced  the  different  qualificatTons  in  the  different 
States  to  one  uniform  rule  would  probably  have  been  &s 
dissatisfactory  to  some  of  the  Stales  as  it  would  haveV 
been  difficult  to  the  convention.  The  provision  made  by 
the  convention  appears,  therefore,  to  ha  the  best  that 
lay  within  their  option.  It  must  be  satisfactory  to  every 
State,  because  it  is  comformable  to  the  standard  alrc^ady 
established,  or  which  may  Iw  established,  by  the  State 
itself.  It  will  be  safe  to  the  United  States,  because,  be- 
ing fixed  by  the  State  constitutions,  it  is  not  alterable  by 
the  State  governments,  and  it  cannot  be  feared  that  the 
ipcople  of  the  States  will  alter  this  part  of  their  constitu- 
'tiuns  in  such  a  manner  as  to  abridge  the  rights  secured 
to  them  by  the  federal  ConsiitDtion. 

The  qualifications  of  the  elected,  being  less  carefully 
and  properly  defined  by  the  SMte  constitutions,  and  be- 
ing at  the  same  time  more  susceptible  of  uniformity,  have 
been  very  properly  considered  and  regulated  by  the  con- 
vention. A  representative  of  the  United  States  must  be 
ri(  the  age  of  twenty-live  years;  must  have  been  seven 
years  a  citizen  of  the  United  States;  must,  at  the  time 
of  his  election,  be  an  inhabitant  of  the  State  he  is  to 


35" 


FSKQUEMCr  OF  ELSCT/OA'S. 


1>*.BS(S1> 


represcni;  and,  durmx  tlic  time  of  his  service,  aiiist  t>c 
in  no  office  under  the  United  StutcH.  Under  tliese  rca- 
tnniitilr  liinitiitiiiits,  tlie  dour  nf  lIiU  pan  of  ihc  federal 
go?ernfi)eril  ti  open  to  merit  of  every  Ucscriplion,  whether 
native  or  ;idoptivc,  nhctlter  yoting  or  old,  ami  without 
reganl  to  poverty  or  we;ilth,  ur  to  any  parlicuUr  prufex- 
&ion  of  reliK>"U!t  faith. 

The  term  for  which  the  rcprcscnlativM  arc  to  be 
elected  fulls  umlcr  it  second  view  which  may  he  tjken  of 
this  branch.  In  order  to  decide  on  the  propriety  of  this 
article,  two  questions  must  he  considercdt  first,  whether 
biennial  electinnH  will,  in  this  rase,  he  sale-,  sccunilly, 
trhclher  tlicy  be  necesiiiry  or  u&efiil. 

/•'inf.  As  it  is  essential  to  liberty  that  the  soveru- 
ment  iii  general  should  have  a  common  interest  with  the 
people,  so  it  is  particularly  eSNCiitial  that  the  brum  h  of 
it  under  considerati'm  should  have  an  immediate  depend- 
ence on.  and  an  intiin;itc  sympathy  with,  Ihc  people. 
Frv4]iicnt  elections  arc  um|ticstionahly  the  only  policy  hy 
which  this  depeitdence  and  sympathy  can  he  elTtctually 
secured.  But  what  [Kirticiilar  degree  of  frequency  may 
be  absolutely  necessary  for  the  purpose  does  not  appear 
to  be  susceplitile  of  any  precise  rah-ulation,  and  must 
depend  on  a  variety  of  circumstances  with  whiili  it  inav 
be  connected.  Let  us  consult  experience,  Ihc  guide  that 
nui;ht  always  to  he  fnUowcd  whenever  it  c;m  he  found. 

Tl>c  (chcine  nf  rrpmrnlAtion,  m  s  Kiihtlitnte  toi  n  meetmg  of 
thp  ciiitens  in  iktmmi,  Ixing  at  mint  but  very  inqicrfeelly  hnawn 
Bl,  to  ancient  polity,  il  i«  in  tnon  raodcm  limes  only  iliiU 

V*h  li.  we   alc   to   csprcl  iiulrartive   cKampttv.     Anil  n-cn 

here.  In  oe<ter  to  nWm)  a  rrwjirch  mo  v.igu*-  ami  itiffwsive.  ii  will 
be  proper  t«  conSne  ouritclvcs  to  the  (cw  «.irnpks  w^lICh  at*  ti«»l 
kiiiiwn,  itnti  wliirti  bear  1l^  grrair«l  jmntoj^  In  our  pan. 
The  lint  it>  whi^h   ihu  ch.iraclrr  oughi  to  tie  appliril  >%  .^ 

of  Commons  in  Great  Britain.  The  htelory  of  this  btnnch  at  tlw 
Engfiih  CoostituliiHi,  anterxx  to  ihe  dale  of  Maipu  Oiaila,  n  bM 
oIhcutv  10  yield  (iittniclion.  The  very  ritttnirc  uf  il  hai  Iwm 
made  n  question  among  pntilirat  anliquarielk.  Tlie  earlint  recnrrfs 
of  subsequent  dale  prove  ih«  patUamcnis  were  U>  tit  only  e»ery 
year;  no4  ihat  tbcy  were  to  be  tStittd  every  year.    Aim!  crai 


HMillM  it)  1        LES'GTlt  OF  PARUAMENTS. 


35* 


thnc  .timunl  KCKsiont  wvk  leri  so  much  at  ihr  ilUnriion  of  the 
iiioiMH-h  ihni,  uii'l^T  vaiiuus  ]>ri'tctis,  tvry  long  anil  i)aiigct»us 
micnniSKJonii  were  often  contrircd  by  tnynl  ambiijon.  Tn  ictncily 
tilts  (grievance,  tt  was  proniled  by  a  staiuic.  in  ih«  Tci«ii  of  Chartcs 
II.,  ih.-it  the  inicTn)i»ion»  should  not  be  prolr.iclnl  bcfond  a 
p«iiud  ol  Ihrcc  years.  On  tIi«  accession  ol  Williaiii  (II..  wliena 
icvoliiiinn  iiHik  place  in  the  i;i>vnnment,  itie  Mibject  w.rt  siill  more 
ftctiuuslr  tesutned.  ;inil  ii  was  declared  to  be  among  the  liiiid.i- 
rurni.il  rit-liu  of  the  |kco[>k  Ihul  pailUinenii  ought  to  be  held 
frf^utHlfy.  Bf  anoihci'  st^tuic.  u  Nidi  pi,iss«d  a  (cw  years  later  In 
Ike  same  rei}!'>>  the  lent)  "  ftequenlly,"  which  )ui)  alludcil  to  the 
irienaial  p«riod  sailed  in  ihc  limc  of  Ch.irks  II,.  is  reduced  la  A 
precise  me:anin|; ;  it  being  expressly  cnucted  ib^t  n  new  ]>atliain«il 
sitnil  be  called  wiihin  ihrce  yean  afier  the  icrmiii»>on  of  the 
lariner.  Tlie  lu!>l  cbunge,  from  three  l<i  seven  yemr*.  is  well 
fciiDven  to  hivc  hccn  iiiiinduccil  prcliy  cntly  in  the  prcscol  ceniurj'. 
mulcr  an  ^Ucrii  (or  ilie  Huiioverian  succesiion.  From  these  facts 
ii  .ipprjrs  (h.il  the  grmlcst  frequency  of  elrclioni  which  has  been 
iltvined  neccsury  in  tli.it  kiiigdoin.  fur  binding  the  icpicicnlatives 
to  tlicir  conslilucriis.  dors  not  exceed  a  tiictinial  relurn  of  lliem- 
And  if  wc  may  argue  (roin  live  tlegree  o(  lilxrly  retained  even 
under  sepientii^l  elections,  and  all  Ihe  otiier  vicious  ingtedienls  in 
ihe  parlijineniary  conUilniiot),  wc  cannot  doubi  thai  a  redticlion 
of  the  [lefiuil  from  seven  to  llirec  years,  with  ihe  other  nec«miry 
lefornis,  would  so  f.>r  extendi  the  influence  <A  the  people  over  iliciT 
lepiifienlulivei  ai  to  sali>ly  ui  Ihal  biennial  elecliuns.  under  the 
lrdrr.ll  systeni,  caniiol  potMbly  be  d.ingrroils  to  the  requisite  de- 
[icniknce  of  llie  Houie  o(  KeprtncrilatJvoi  on  iheir  constituents. 

Blirclions  in  (rcland,  till  of  Ulc.  were  regulated  entirely  by  the 
discrtliun  of  the  crown,  and  were  seldom  repeated,  except  on 
ihe  acci^ssion  of  .1  new  prince,  or  some  other  ronlingcnl  event, 
Th«  p.irlMnicni  which  commenced  with  George  II.  was  conlinue<l 
throughout  hit  whole  reign,  a  period  of  about  tbiriy-liVF  years. 
Tlic  only  <lcpcndcnce  ol  the  reprrscniativc^  on  the  people  con- 
sisted in  Ihe  right  ol  the  latter  lo  supply  prr.x^ional  vacancies,  by 
the  election  of  new  members,  and  in  the  chance  of  some  event 
wliich  might  produce  a  general  new  election.  The  ability  also  fit 
Ihe  Irish  parliament  to  maintain  the  rights  of  their  conitiluenls.  iiO 
(ar  as  llic  disposition  might  exist,  was  extremely  tliacklcd  by  the 
control  rA  ihe  crown  over  Ihr  subfrrts  of  llieir  deli beiat ion.  0{ 
Ulc.  ibcse  shackles,  if  1  mistake  nut.  Iiave  been  broken ;  and  octen- 
nial parliamenit  have  b«udes  been  eaiablished.  What  rffeci  may 
be  pnxliKcd  by  ibis  partial  reform  must  be  led  10  (under  eiperi- 


«* 


COLONIAL  »BPHESEh'TATlON. 


Ilo.  U  lU) 


ence.  The  example  of  iKland.  from  lliis  riew  ol  tl,  can  ihrow  Inil 
liiil«  lighi  till  the  ^ijl)]f<;t.  As  far  .is  we  tMii  dmw  any  roncluston 
from  il.  il  mtiiil  he  that  if  (he  people  o(  lllut  vounlry  have  been 
»hlc  under  all  these  disadvnniaget  lo  reuin  any  libniy  whatciw. 
the  uilvan(a|{e  uf  biennial  deviiotiii  wuulU  mkuic  Iu  ihcni  eirry 
degree  »(  libcriy  which  mighl  depend  on  a  <ii>e  conneciton  between 
their  representalivei  and  (heinaclves. 

Let  u&  bring  our  inquiries  nearer  home.  The  example 
of  these  States,  when  British  culuntcs,  cbims  particular 
attentiun,  ;it  tlie  surae  time  that  it  is  so  well  known  at  tu 
require  iitlle  to  be  said  on  i(.  The  principle  of  rcpre- 
Kentation.  in  one  branch  of  Ihe  legisbtureat  least,  was 
est-iblislicd  in  all  of  them.  But  the  periods  of  election 
were  different.  They  varied  from  one  to  seven  years. 
Have  we  any  reasun  to  infer,  from  the  spirit  and  con- 
duct of  the  representatives  of  the  people  prior  lo  itie 
Revolution,  that  biennial  vkclions  would  have  been 
dangerous  lo  the  public  liberties?  The  spirit  wbi<-h 
everywhere  displayed  itself  at  the  commencement  of  the 
strugifie,  and  which  vanquished  the  ob^acies  to  inde- 
pendence, is  the  best  of  proofs  that  a  sufficient  portion 
of  lilieriy  had  been  everywhere  enjuyet!  to  in>pire  both  a 
sense  of  its  worth  and  a  zeal  for  its  proper  enlargement. 
This  remark  holds  good,  as  well  with  regard  to  the  then 
colonies  whose  elections  were  least  fre<iuent  as  tu  thoK 
whose  elections  were  most  frequent.  Virginia  was  the 
colony  which  stood  first  in  resisting  the  parliamentary 
osui^ations  of  Great  Hritain;  it  was  the  first  also  to 
espousing,  by  public  act,  the  resolution  of  independence. 
In  Virginia,  ncvcnhcless,  if  I  have  not  been  misinformed, 
elections  under  the  former  (government  were  scpteniiiaL 
This  particular  example  is  brought  into  view,  not  as  a 
proof  of  any  peculiar  merit,  for  the  priority  in  those 
instances  was  probably  accidental;  and  still  less  of  any 
advantage  in  leptftnial  elections,  for  when  compared  wilh 
a  greater  frequency  they  are  adini^sible;  but  men-ty  a»  a 
proof,  and  I  conceive  it  to  be  a  very  substantial  proof, 
that  the  liberties  of  the  people  can  be  in  no  danger  frwn 
hiennial  elections. 

The  conclusion  rcsultiag  from  these  ciamplcs  will  be 


EuiUtaXril 


TeKU  OP  THE  HOUSE. 


353 


not  a  little  strenjitliencd  by  recotlcclinx  three  circum- 
stuDMS.  The  first  is  that  the  federal  legislature  will 
possess  a  part  only  of  that  supreme  legislative  authority 
which  is  vested  completely  in  the  British  Parliament; 
and  which,  with  a  (cw  exceptions,  was  exercised  by  the 
colunial  assemblies  and  the  Irish  legisluitire.  It  is  a 
received  and  well-founded  maxim  that,  where  no  other 
cin-umstanccs  affect  the  case,  the  greater  the  power  is, 
the  shorter  ought  to  be  its  duration;  and  conversely,  the 
smaller  the  power,  the  more  safely  may  its  duration  be 
protracted.  In  the  second  place,  it  has  on  another 
occasion  been  shown  that  the  fl^deral  legislature  will  not 
only  be  restrained  by  iis  dependence  on  the  people,  as 
other  Icgtsbtive  bodies  are,  but  that  it  will  be,  moreover, 
watched  and  controlled  by  the  several  colUttcral  legisla- 
tures, which  other  legislative  bodies  are  not.  And  in  the 
third  place,  do  comparison  can  be  made  between  the 
means  that  will  be  possessed  by  the  more  permanent 
branches  of  the  federal  gi>vernnie"t  (nr  nedming.  if  they 
should  be  disposed  to  seduce,  the  House  of  Kepresenta> 
tives  from  their  duly  to  the  people,  and  the  means  of 
influence  over  the  popular  branch  possessed  by  the  other 
branches  of  the  government  above  cited.  With  less 
power,  therefore,  to  abuse,  the  federal  representatives 
can  be  le^^x  tempted  on  one  side,  and  will  be  doubly 
watched  on  the  other. 

PUBLIUS. 


No.  53  [53].   (/-A^Mtf-f/^'— /.  reiiMwy*.!?*!.)   Haniilion  (?) 
TKRM  OF  HOUSK  OF  REPRESENTATIVES. 


Ohjdlhni  tint  Bihtn  anniKit  tU'litmi  t^  tyraiitj  $ffiin,  amivrrnt — 
Htmnial  rUilitm  mttniarr  and  tiu/iil^Oi}tili*in  /*  MtJulf  ik*T{ 
t*tmt''Sita»ial  tlttliant  mr/ul  aaJ  la/r. 

7>  Ihf  Ptflpie  of  Ike  Stale  0/  A'eu'  JV/-*.- 

1  shall  here,  perhaps,  be  reminded  of  a  current  obser- 
vation, "that  where  annual  elections  end,  tyranny 
beginft."     If  it  be  irue,  as  has  often  been  remarked,  that 


354     ElMCTIOff  OF  STATE  LBGtSLATVRES.     lir».B8.M> 

sayings  which  become  proverbial  arc  genrrally  foondi-d 
in  reason,  it  in  not  tc&«  tru«  that,  whcrn  otu^e  «stal>lislte<], 
they  are  often  applied  to  caaeit  to  vliich  the  reason  of 
thtm  docs  not  extend.  I  need  not  loot:  for  a  proof 
lieyiind  the  aisc  hcfore  \\%.  Wh;it  \%  the  reaKoii  on  which 
this  priivert>i3l  obicrvalion  is  founded?  No  man  will 
subject  himself  to  the  ridicule  of  pretending  that  any 
natural  connection  siihsists  between  the  sun  or  the 
seasons  and  the  period  within  which  human  virtue  un 
bear  the  temptations  of  power.  Happily  for  mankind, 
liberty  is  not,  in  thi«  respect,  conrmcd  to  any  single 
point  of  time;  but  lies  within  extremes,  which  afford 
KuRtcicnt  latitude  for  all  the  variations  whirh  may  be 
retiuired  by  the  various  situations  and  circiini^iancei.  of 
civil  society.  The  election  of  magistrates  might  be.  if  it 
were  found  expedient,  us  in  some  instances  it  actually 
tiaii  been,  daily,  weekly,  or  monthly,  as  well  as  annual; 
and  if  circumstances  may  require  a  deviation  from  Ihe 
rule  on  one  side,  why  not  ^Iso  on  the  other  side?  Turn- 
ing our  attention  tn  the  periiKis  eKiat>li«hed  among  our- 
selves for  the  election  of  the  most  numerous  branches  of 
the  State  legislatures,  we  find  ihcmby  no  means  coinciding 
any  more  in  thi$  instance  than  in  ilie  ele<'tions  of  other 
civil  mat;istratc9.  In  Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island  the 
periods  are  half-yearly.  In  the  other  States,  South 
Carolina  excepted,  they  are  annual.  In  South  Carolina 
they  are  biennial— as  is  proposed  in  the  federal  govern- 
ment. Here  is  a  difference,  as  four  to  one,  between  the 
Iont;est  and  shortest  periods;  and  yet  it  would  be  out 
easy  to  show  that  Connecticut  or  Rhode  Island  is  better 
governed,  or  enjoys  a  greater  share  of  rational  liberty, 
than  South  Carolina;  or  that  cither  the  one  or  the  other 
of  these  States  is  distinguished  in  these  respects,  and  by 
these  causes,  from  the  States  whose  election*  are  didereat 
from  both. 

In  searching  for  the  grounds  nf  this  doclrim-  I  can 
discover  but  one,  and  that  is  wholly  inapplir^ihle  to  our 
case.  The  important  distinction,  so  well  understood  in 
America,   between   a   Constitution    establisheil    by  the 


HwUtwdl]       PAttUAMENTARY  DAS'GKKS,  355 

people  sful  unalterable  by  the  government,  and  a  law 
eKtiiljti>h<Ti]  by  ilic  t;»veriii»ent  and  alterable  by  (he 
government,  seems  to  have  been  little  understood  and 
less  observed  in  ;iny  other  country.  Wherever  the 
supreme  power  of  tegi«Iutton  has  resided,  lias  been 
supposed  to  reside  also  a  full  power  to  change  the  form 
of  the  government.  i%ven  in  Gr«it  Itritaiii,  where  tlic 
principleN  of  political  and  civil  liberty  have  been  most 
discussed,  and  where  we  hear  most  of  the  rights  of  the 
Constitution,  it  is  maintained  that  the  authority  of  the 
Parliament  is  trunvt^endcnt  and  un(:i>ntrollat;le,  as  well 
wUb  regard  to  the  Constitution  as  the  ordinary  objects 
of  legislative  provision.  They  have  accordingly,  in  sev- 
eral instances,  actually  changed,  hy  legislative  acts,  some 
of  the  most  fundamcnt.ll  articles  of  the  government. 
Tbcy  have  in  particular,  on  several  occasions,  changed 
the  period  ul  election;  and,  on  the  last  occasion,  not 
only  introduced  septennial  in  place  of  Irienntal  elections, 
but  by  the  same  act  continued  themselves  in  place  four 
years  Ik yo ml  thr  term  (or  which  they  were  elected  by 
the  people.  An  atteniiun  to  thrse  dangerous  practices 
has  produced  a  very  natural  alarm  in  the  votaries  of  free 
goveniment.  of  which  frequency  of  elections  is  the  cor- 
ner stone;  and  has  led  thcni  to  kccIc  for  some  security 
to  liberty  against  the  danger  to  which  it  is  c.tposed. 
Wfiere  no  constitution,  paramount  to  the  government, 
either  existed  or  could  be  obtained,  no  constitutional 
security,  similar  to  that  established  in  the  United  States, 
was  lo  be  attempted.  Some  other  security,  therefore, 
was  to  be  sought  for;  and  what  lietter  security  would 
the  case  admit  than  that  of  selecting  and  appealing  to 
»ume  simple  and  familiar  portion  of  time  as  a  standard 
for  mi^hurinc  tht-*dan);er  of  innovatiouN,  for  I'txing  the  na- 
tional sentiment,  and  for  uniting  the  patriotic  exertions? 
The  must  simple  and  familiar  portion  of  time,  applicable 
to  the  subji!ct,  was  that  of  a  year;  and  hence  the  doctrine 
lias  been  inculcated  by  a  laudable  2cal,  to  erect  some 
barrier  against  the  gradual  innovations  of  an  unlimited 
gOTeriimcni,  that  the  advance  toward  tyranny  was  lo  be 


LEGISLATOR  ttEEOS  EXFEklENCE.     I»«.»l(«) 


ulciilaled  by  the  distance  of  tiepitrture  from  the  lixc<I 
|>(»tnt  of  annual  elections.  But  what  necessity  can  there 
be  of  applying  this  expedient  to  a  government  limited,  as 
tl>e  fc<l<;r;il  government  wilt  be.  by  the  authority  of  a  para- 
mount Constituijon?  Or  who  will  pretend  that  the  liber- 
ties uf  the  pcuplc  of  America  will  not  be  more  secure 
under  biennial  elections,  unalterably  fixed  by  siieh  a  Con- 
siiiulion,  than  those  of  any  other  nation  would  be,  where 
elections  were  annual,  or  even  more  frctjuent,  but  subject 
to  alteration)!  by  the  ordinary  power  of  tJie  government? 

The  second  question  staled  is,  whether  biennial  elec- 
tions be  necessary  or  useful.  The  propriety  of  answer- 
ing this  question  in  the  affirmative  will  appear  from 
several  very  obvious  considerations. 

No  man  can  be  a  competent  legislator  who  docs  not 
add  to  an  upright  intention  and  a  sound  judgment  a  ccr- 
Sae  tain  degree  of  knowledge  of  the  subjects  on 

R«.flS.  which  he  is  tole^inlate      A  part  of  this  knowl- 

edge may  be  acquired  by  means  of  information  which  lie 
within  the  compass  uf  men  in  private  as  well  as  public 
stations.  Another  part  can  only  be  attained,  oral  least 
thoroughly  attained,  by  actual  experience  in  the  station 
which  requires  the  use  of  it.'  The  perind  of  service 
ought,  therefore,  in  all  i>uch  cases,  to  bear  some  propor-!! 
tion  to  the  extent  of  practical  knowledge  requisite  to  the 
due  performance  of  the  service.  The  period  of  legisla- 
tive service  established  in  most  of  the  States  for  the  more 
numerous  branch  is.  as  we  have  seen,  one  year  The 
question  then  may  be  put  into  this  simple  form:  does 

'  With  ih«  ditappe«n»oe,  vt  ruber  (utmeixcoct,  of  nmtrf»«io«wl  < 
lory  am]  ikc  iiicrcMcd  ixxnpllculiMt  of  It^Ulaiivc  mekturei,  a  tern  I 
Concrat  bsi  btcumr  iJnunt  u  iicc«<ul)r  Imfocr  aiiy  fiiCBibci  can  aaaV 
hit  Inrtunncn  tinxif;!)'  (dl.  1'1kin«  Mal«i.  (hmforr.  whitli  hare  ■  ttad- 
ciw;  (u  ic-*tcti  ihe  mux  men  uc  apt  lo  i«ciir«  ■  ^lishilr  ^rriirt  miln- 
«IK(  on  lf][il!ilion.  ucomj«icd  oilh  ibcHC  mibkli  frfiJU'  T 

fvprwntBtivei.  l>ccu>e  llie  ittircunlalli'n  o(  llw  (otii<< 
kiioiaioil|ge  oJ  coiiicrD«*i<inal  j<rjrltrr,  and  alhi  bocauia  \V^\  ubvicit.^  i  rin; 
chancnof  uuniltlnicHU  iin  cuitimiltM^.     1 1  nalliroaE't  thr  conitai't  ir- 
■Icnion  ol  cfajr.  Calbnua.  anil  Wrin:'  i    'n  tii,  ic  than  By  tbrlt  v.-^i.  'i«, 
thai  ilieic  nwiitanie  tnwKlJltici  llil.     Ti>-<  ■- 

a  nwsilKt  <)i|  CiMicreu  i>  kixiuii  • ,  uiiitu  lie  i  i 

moM  ihau  on*  tcrM  In  ibal  IhnI; .  ~  L-iiiiua. 


H4mUt<ni  (1)  ] 


AFFAIRS  OF  THE  STATES. 


557 


the  period  of  two  j^ears  bear  no  greater  proportion  to  the 
knowledge  requisite  for  federal  legislation  than  one  jcar 
does  to  th«  knowledge  rectuisitc  for  State  legislation? 
The  verjr  statement  of  the  question,  in  this  form,  sug> 
gests  the  »n*wcr  that  ought  to  be  given  to  it. 

In  a  single  State  the  requisite  knowledge  relates  to 
the  eiisiing  laws,  which  arc  uniform  throughout  the 
St^ite,  and  with  which  all  (he  cliixens  are  more  or  less 
conversant;  and  to  the  general  3fFair§of  the  State,  which 
lie  within  a  small  compass,  are  not  very  divcrsififd,  and 
occupy  much  of  the  attention  and  conversation  of  every 
class  of  people.  The  great  theater  of  the  United  States 
presents  a  very  different  scene.  The  laws  are  so  far 
from  being  uniform  that  they  vary  in  every  State;  whilst 
the  public  affairs  of  the  Union  are  spread  throughout  a 
very  extensive  region,  and  arc  extremely  diversified  by 
the  locdl  alTairs  connected  with  them,  and  can  with  diffi- 
culty be  correctly  learnt  in  any  other  place  than  in  the 
central  councils,  to  which  a  knowledge  of  them  will  be 
brought  by  the  representatives  of  every  part  of  the 
empire.  Vet  some  knowledge  of  the  affairs,  and  even  of 
the  laws,  of  all  the  States,  ought  to  be  possessed  by  the 
members  from  each  of  the  Slates.  How  can  foreign 
trade  be  properly  regulated  by  uniform  laws,  without 
some  acquaintance  with  the  commerce,  the  ports,  the 
usages,  and  the  regulations  of  the  different  States? 
How  can  the  trade  between  the  different  Slates  be  duly 
rcgolatcd,  without  some  knowledge  of  their  relative 
situations  in  these  and  other  respects?  How  can  taxes 
be  iudiciouily  imposed  and  effectually  collected,  if  they 
be  not  accommodated  to  the  different  laws  and  local 
circumstances  reUiting  to  these  objects  in  the  different 
States?  How  can  uniform  regulations  for  the  militia 
be  duly  provided,  without  a  similar  knowledge  of  many 
internal  circumstances  by  which  the  States  arc  dis- 
tinguished from  each  other?  These  are  the  principal 
objecu  of  federal  legislation,  and  suggest  most  forcibly 
the  extensive  information  which  the  representatives 
ought  to  acquire.     The  other  interior  objects  will  require 


35*        KS'OWLK0GE  OF  fOREIGS  AFFA/KS.       I»«.4S;«) 

a  |>ropurtionul  degree   uf  infurination   irilh   regard   to 
them. 

It  is  true  that  all  these  difficulties  will,  hjr  decrees, 
be  very  much  diminished.  The  most  Ubofious  task  will 
be  the  proper  inauguration  of  ih«  governniem  and  the 
primeval  formation  of  a  federal  code.  Improvements  on 
the  first  draughts  will  every  year  become  both  easier  and 
fewer.  I*a»t  transactions  of  the  sovernmenl  will  be  a 
ready  and  accurate  source  of  information  to  new  mem- 
bers. The  affairs  of  the  Union  will  become  more  and 
more  objects  of  curiosity  and  conversation  aroonx  the 
citizens  at  large'  And  the  increased  intercourse  among 
those  of  different  Slates  will  contribute  not  a  little  to 
diffuse  a  mutual  knowledge  of  their  affairs,  as  this  again 
will  contribute  to  a  general  assimilation  of  their  manners 
anil  laws.  But  with  3)1  these  abatements,  the  business  of 
federal  legislation  must  continue  so  far  to  exceed,  bulh 
in  novelty  and  difficulty,  the  lefpslative  business  of  a 
single  State,  as  to  justify  the  longer  period  of  service 
assigned  to  those  who  are  to  transact  it. 

A  branch  of  knowledge  which  l>clong9  to  the  acquire* 
rocnts  of  a  federal  representative,  and  which  has  not 
been  mcntioncil,  is  tliat  of  foreign  affairs.  In  regulating 
our  own  commerce,  he  ought  to  be  not  only  acquainted 
with  the  treaties  between  the  United  States  and  other 
nations,  but  also  with  the  commercial  policy  and  laws  of 
other  nations.  He  ought  not  to  be  .itiogether  ignorant 
of  the  law  of  nations;  for  that,  as  far  as  it  is  a  proper 
object  of  municipal  legislation,  is  submitted  to  the 
federal  government.  And  although  the  House  of  Repre* 
seniativcs  is  not  immediately  to  participate  in  foreign 
negotiations  and  arrangements,  yet  fn>m  the  necessary 
Connection  between  the  several  hrancheti  of  putilic  affairs, 
those  particular  branches  will  frequently  deserve  attcn- 


I II  oax  pran  b  •  (kir  excaifiUr.  die  ttitnc  ol  thii  U  irae.  In  VJtf), 
nr  in  184a.  ihe  Brii>|a)«7t  ilrn>rcO  (ininanioatDy  Ixr  more  tpue  i<i 
nalUnal  )hilitl<-a  llm  thny  ^t^  iii  lSg7.  Wlul  it  yrt  mnTO  Unl-iuc.  Aey 
rerrty  |>uil  miirli  ImO  Ui  ilatv,  *iu|  ■lai»^  mini  !■■  I'a-il  |>illtir*.  failli  i>f 
whKti  ■■'-■liT  mvJTc  u  ckM  RMEiitioa  loid  ■>  unith  i^act  as  ilu  ),-«BrnJ 
yuiUin, — bull  u«. 


HMlltw(ll)        RE.BLBCriON  OF  MEMBERS.  359 

tion  in  the  ordinary  coiir»e  uf  legislation,  and  will  some- 
times (Icmund  jurticutar  Icj^iKliitivc  jaticlion  and  CO 
npcration.  Some  portion  of  this  knowledge  may,  no 
doubt,  be  acc|uired  in  a  man's  closet;  but  some  of  it  also 
can  only  be  derived  from  the  public  sources  of  informa- 
tion; and  all  of  it  will  be  acquired  to  best  effect  by  a 
practical  attention  to  the  subject  during  the  period  of 
actual  service  in  the  lenislature. 

There  are  other  considerations, — of  less  importance, 
perhaps, — but  which  arc  not  unworthy  of  notice.  The 
distance  vrhich  many  of  the  representatives  will  be  obliged 
to  trarcl,  and  the  arrangements  rendered  necessary  by 
that  circumsunce,  might  be  much  mor«  seriuui  objeo 
tions  with  fit  men  to  this  »rvice,  if  limited  to  a  single 
year,  than  if  extended  to  two  years.  No  argument  can 
be  drawn  on  this  subject  fmm  the  case  of  the  delegates 
to  the  existinf;  Conjjresa.  They  arc  elected  annually,  it 
is  true;  but  their  rc-elcction  is  considered  by  the  Ic^s- 
lativc  assemblies  almost  as  a  matter  of  course.  The 
election  of  the  representatives  by  the  people  would  not 
be  governed  by  the  same  principle, 

A  few  of  the  members,  as  happens  in  all  such  assemblies, 
will  possess  superior  talents;  will,  tiy  frequent  re-elec* 
iM  tions,  become  members  of  long  standing;  will 

Ha.BS.  be  thoroughly  masters  of  the  public  business, 

and  perhaps  not  unwilling  to  avail  themselves  of  those 
advantages.  The  greater  the  proportion  of  new  members, 
and  the  less  the  information  of  the  bulk  of  the  members, 
the  more  apt  will  they  be  to  fall  into  the  snares  that  may 
be  laid  for  Uiem.  This  remark  is  no  less  applicable  to 
the  relation  which  wilt  subsist  between  the  House  of 
Rej)rc«cnt,itivcs  and  the  Senate. 

It  is  an  inconvenience  mingled  with  the  advantages  of 
our  frequent  elections,  even  in  single  States,  where  ihey 
are  large,  and  hold  but  one  legislative  session  in  a  year, 
that  spurious  electionn  cannot  he  tnve«tigaied  and  an- 
nnlled  in  lime  for  the  decision  to  have  its  due  effect.  If 
a  return  can  he  obtained,  no  matter  hy  what  unlawful 
means,  the  irregular  member,  who  takes  his  seatof  course, 


3«o 


RATiO  W  naPHtSHUVATtON.       lITo.MtH) 


Is  sure  of  holding  it  x  siiRicient  time  to  answer  his  pur- 
poses. Mencc,  a  very  pernicious  eac<)ur.'i|;eincnt  \^^  given 
to  the  use  ol  unlawful  means  for  obiainin){  irregular 
returns.  Were  elections  for  the  federal  legislature  lo  be 
annual,  this  practice  might  become  a  very  serious  abuse, 
particularly  in  the  more  distant  i^tatcs.  l^ch  House  is, 
as  it  iieccsMrily  mu»t  t>e,  the  judge  of  the  elections, 
qualih  cat  ions,  and  returns  of  its  members;  und  whatever 
improvements  may  be  suggested  by  cipenencc  for  sim- 
plifying and  accelerating  the  priicc$«  in  disputed  cases, 
so  great  a  portion  of  a  year  would  unavoidably  elapse 
before  an  illegitimate  member  could  be  dispossessed  of 
his  »cat,  that  the  prospect  of  such  an  event  would  be 
little  check  to  unfair  and  illicit  means  of  ohtaining  a  scaU' 
All  these  considerations,  taken  together,  warrant  us  in 
affirming  that  biennial  elections  will  be  as  useful  to  the 
affairs  of  the  public  as  we  have  seen  tlutt  they  will  be 
safe  to  the  liberty  of  the  people.  Publius. 


No.  54  [53].    I^'*  v»tp»iM.  rtbnun  i>.  ■]««.)       Hamilton  (?) 

RATIO  OF   REPRESENTATION    IN    LOWER 
BRANCH. 

Nimier$  llu  fr^r  lUmAtrd  frr  rtfrtittiloHen — Slavt  rffrrirnuiitn 
—Oi/tilifK  lHnl  liavti  ib  •»/  rnl/r  imtt  lM*l  rtfrtuaUtttm  titmiidirnt — 
T/u  'ighl  <>/  itfrtuHUItiHi  rj  prtf<rfy  ai  mil  11  ftntns —  V*ltt  in  Cut- 
grttt  t/ifuif  tt  fmfi^iiifnt^  In  Ike  tutaltk  <•/  lie  tiatn — ff»  iuJtutmiHl 
fer  /aliifyiHg  Ua  cemimi,  iti  it  it  lit  huit  oflaiatitn  at  wrQ  at  c/  rrfrr- 

Tp  the  Pe<f/<lt  c/  the  Statf  of  New  York: 

The  next  view  which  I  sh.-ill  inkenl  Ihe  Hou**  of  Representative* 
rc<n(n  to  ihc  appoinlment  of  its  mnnlwrs  10  the  several  5>ialn. 
wliich  i»to  be  rieierrnincit  by  ibc  same  rale  wiihllui  of  direci  uxr^ 

I  till  Ion  uiuicly,  the  IXomt  at  KspmaitatiiFM.  «•  l«i  li..m   .ti,-.;,rJJl 
ii*^  t"  ni«ke  "  iin()e(rt-tinciil» " in  the  lyileni  of  j«dginj!ili>i"i'r  ■ 
hu  thoi»  (mty  *n  n^^ncu  10  tui  ittoc  dainuiiu  wW  ii 

Mfljr  Tien.      Thii  IrmlcntT  »   luUj  tet   fortli  in   ilw   "  llittiuf  of 
Dnpuled  Ek<lloni-"~Eiirro«. 

*T1>1>  a>iue  hat  bt««  K>  nodilM  by  lln  XlVik  AaitnAmtia  w  to 
nuke  Ibu  osnttMr  piircl;  hiiioricaL— Eiiitva. 


Budltaail)]      /tEPRBSEHfTArJOX  OF  SLAVES.  361 

Ii  is  not  conlendol  ihal  the  number  of  people  in  e.icli  Stile 
oiighl  nai  10  be  llie  siamt^ud  lor  rr(;ut.iiin){  ()ie  pcoi)0«ion  of  ihose 
who  arc  lo  rcpicsenl  llie  people  of  c^icli  Suie.  The  ntahli^liincnt 
of  the  same  rule  for  ilic  Appoiiiirnciit  of  taxes  will  proli;tb]y  he  as 
lillle  conlcxted  :  ihough  the  rule  itscll  in  llil«  cjue  is  l)y  no  ineuns 
louniled  wi  ilic  s^iitc  pniiciple.  In  (he  former  cabc  the  rule  jk 
tiiulcrsiooil  to  rcfc>  ii>  tlie  jiccsonjl  righli  of  the  people,  with  wliich 
it  h^s  II  naiur^l  itnd  univcrs.d  connection.  In  the  lailer.  ii  Ii-as 
refeteitce  lu  the  piupunion  of  wealth,  o4  which  it  is  in  no  cum  a 
preciic  mcMitic,  ^ml  in  ordinary  cases  a  vciy  until  one.  But  not* 
wlthst.indiitti  the  inipcrlection  of  the  lule  a»  applied  to  the  rcUlive 
wenllh  and  contributions  of  the  Stales,  it  is  evidently  the  le^xt 
ohjeclioii^blc  among  the  pr^iclicable  ruks,  add  hJid  too  recently 
oblaineil  the  eenenil  unction  of  Arncrica.  not  la  have  found  a 
ready  picfercoce  nith  lh«  toni-eniion. 

All  ihifi  l«  Hdinitird,  it  will  pcrh.ipt  hr  said  :  but  does  it  follow, 
from  an  xdniiMinn  of  nuiiitizis  for  I  lie  meauire  of  ie|ircsentaiion. 
or  of  slairet  combined  with  free  cliiicns  a.t  a  ratio  rA  taxation,  that 
sUves  ought  to  be  included  in  the  numerical  rule  of  reprcMnta- 
tion  ? '  Slai-cs  arc  coii.iidered  as  property,  not  as  persons,  They 
ought  tlicrefofe  10  be  coiiipicheiid»l  in  eMiiTuiiesof  taxution  which 
are  foumled  on  properly,  and  to  be  excluded  from  re  present  at  Inn 
which  is  regiitaied  by  a  census  of  peison».  This  is  the  objectimt. 
as  1  understand  it,  it.iled  in  its  lull  force.  I  shall  hr  ec|iially  can- 
did in  staling  th«  reasonmg  which  may  be  offered  on  live  opposite 
side. 

■■We  uib^cribc  lo  the  doctrine."  mi>;ht  one  o(  our  Southern 
bietbrcn  ob%eii-e.  "  that  repicieolatiun  iclaics  more  immcdintely 
(M  '<*  peivins  and  taxation  more  immediately  to  prop- 

>«.<&.  erty,  and  we  join  in  iIk  .ipplication  of  this  distinctiori 

to  the  ca«e  of  our  slaves.  But  we  must  deny  the  (act  tli.ti  slaves 
are  eoniWered  merely  as  property,  and  In  no  lestiect  whatever  as 
persons.  The  true  sialc  of  the  case  Is  that  they  partake  ot  l>oih 
these  ({ualitiri :  being  euvisidered  by  our  laws,  in  lome  respects,  as 
penoiu,  and  in  other  rrspects  as  property.  In  being  compdlcl  lo 
labor,  not  (or  himsell.  bul  fur  a  master ;  in  being  vendible  by  one 
matter  to  another  master ;  and  in  being  subject  at  all  times  to  be 

'On  the  nbjict  of  what  hn  |>an(il  into  history  as  (he  "  Fedtial 
Namtier,"t«« "'  Slave  Rcptctomiion.by  Borcni."  l8u :  Carey's  "  l^lnt 
AdilrcM  to  the  Pco|'lc  a\  the  Euicru  States  on  the  Subjecl  ol  the  K««K- 
■catatKin  o<  SUre*.'*  1814.  nvl  ihe  aiiirn<lineiitk  piopewKl  by  the  llan- 
(old  DOnrKnlio'i  in  titc  A|>|i'iu!i>, — E01IOR, 

*  Sra  liJii  lln'Bihnii's  tiicRh  in  ibe  New  York  oonvcDlion  (Elliot's 
"pebaMs,"  ii.  jjj).— Ediiok, 


SLAFES  AS  PMRSOJfS  AND  PJfOPSJUi      iIfo.6l'W> 


mtraiiKHl  in  hblibniy  and  chasiiseil  inhuboily.  hy  tliri:;<)iiiL'kii» 
will  of  nnotliPt,  llip  slaw  may  apficar  lo  l>c  <ltgi-.nl«l  friuii  the 
liutnuri  rank.  -iikI  d.wwl  tvilli  tlwrac  in:itii>iul  aiiim.-iK  wlitrh  (ntl 
Uiulcr  the  legal  itcnomination  of  ptoiierty.  In  (lemj;  piolrctnl  on 
(he  olhet  liiin<l.  in  his  h(e  ;iii(l  in  his  Imilw.  ni^ainu  )hr  viotritce  of 
nil  oih«rs,  even  the  matter  of  hiit  Ulwr  and  his  hberly  ;  and  in 
beitif;  (Minishahte  himM^U  lor  all  viulirnce  c«n)rni«rd  ni^tn\l  mImts 
— ihc  sUvc  t«  no  iesi  eriilenlly  rcjjjrdrd  by  ihc  law  ai  »  ni«mb«' 
o(  the  Micicty,  nM  as  a  pan  of  tli«  iiraliunal  creation :  m  m  nKwal 
prison,  nol  as  »  men  article  of  profWtljr.  The  fetler.il  Contililtt- 
lion,  therefore,  dcciilcs  wild  greHI  pioprirly  on  the  ca^e  o<  our 
sIjic*.  when  it  views  (hem  in  the  nii\rd  rh.iracter  of  jiriinni  and 
of  properly.  This  is  in  facl  (Iieit  Inie  character.  It  n  the  rhnrac- 
(rr  bcsiixwed  on  them  l>y  the  laws  iindrr  which  ihry  Mi*;  and  il 
will  nol  be  (lenitd  tlijit  these  are  the  |>roper  criterion  :  bcc.liive  il 
Is  only  under  the  prrtext  that  lite  Uvra  h.tve  irAiisfnnned  il>e 
negroes  intu  siil>Je«:ls  «>f  propeily  ihal  >  place  ii  dujiuleil  litem  in 
tl<c  computaiion  ni  numlicis ;  nntl  II  \*  BitmiUed  lh.il,  Il  the  bm 
were  lo  restoic  the  mkIiis  wrliicti  luve  liecn  taken  nway,  thr 
nei^oes  couhl  no  lon);cr  he  refuwd  nn  cqtial  slureof  repteitenta- 
tion  wilh  the  olhi'r  inha)>Tlant*. 

"  This  qiteslion  m-iy  be  ptacei!  in  anotlirr  Hght.  It  Is  ft;p«c4l  an 
all  vdes  Ihal  iinriiber*  are  ihe  best  scale  o(  wealth  and  l.-iiation. 
as  lltey  are  I  he  only  proper  scale  of  te|KPscntaiion.  Would  Ihe 
convention  have  hetn  Mn|)ar1ial  in  consiMenl.  if  Ihey  hail  rcjedril 
Ihc  slaves  from  ihe  list  o)  MihabiianU  when  the  »ham  o(  reprc* 
fteniatlon  were  to  he  eakulaied.  and  inserted  (hem  on  the  liut 
when  lh«  (anil  ot  (SMilrilHitinnv  vtxk  lo  be  »d)ust<^l  f  CouM  il  be 
reasonably  «pcc ted  Ihat  (he  Souihem  State*  wonlil  concur  in  a 
system  which  coitsi'tcr««l  ihrir  sUvrt  in  sonic  ile{;rt<e  iis  ntrii 
when  btirtlens  «ferc  to  be  imposeil,  but  refused  lo  consider  Ihem  in 
the  same  %'"'  when  aitv.inlsje*  were  to  be  cnnferred  ?  Mrehl 
not  vome  Mirprisc  .ilso  he  expmsnl  that  (hose  wlni  rrjtioach  Ihc 
Soulltern  Stales  with  Ihe  barbatniis  polky  of  ronsiifrtiriK  as  P'OIH-J 
eny  a  pan  of  ihrir  human  bi^lhren.  should  tticniscK'cs  contend  i 
titat  tite  governmenl  to  which  all  the  Stairs  are  (o  be  parties 
onfthl  (o  coiuiiter  this  unfortunate  mce  ninre  coniptetely  in  lh« 
ininaiutal  l^ht  of  pio|>etiy  than  llic  very  laws  of  which  Ihiijr 
cmmplain? 

"  It  may  l>c  rcplini,  perhaps,  ikai  sUvei  are  noi  included  in  ilte 
estmi.tle  Iff   i>-prcuiiUTii-ea  in  any  i>l  ihe  Stales  {•■•■ 
Ttiey  ni-ilhei  voir  ilirmsHvrs  nor  incrc.-ne  lite  vuli 
Icrs.    Upon  what  princtpic,  llicn,  au^hl  ihey  ro  be  uLcn  tulw  ilia 


Hk^lm  (t)  1     THRBE-FIFTUS  AProRTlOSMEfTT. 


ZH 


(edcriil  minute  of  rcpresmiliiikM  ?  {n  rejecting  thwn  aliog«tlicr, 
(hr^  CofiHtiiution  woutil.  in  thiv  rvs|)eci,  hai'r  rullownl  the  vciy  laws 
which  h»ve  been  nppealcil  to  as  the  proper  jjiriilc. 

'■  This  ohjccliun  is  repelled  l>y  ;>  single  oliservalion.  It  is  a  (un- 
tl.imenlAl  principle  of  ihc  proposed  Coiiitiludon  (h.it.  as  the  a^grc- 
);ntc  numtiet  of  re|tfcsen(ntives  allorieil  to  the  seveial  StMc»  Is  to 
be  ileterininecl  \yf  *.  (cHcr;il  rxiie,  fuund(.-cl  i>n  Ilic  ag^"-'): '><<-'  number 
of  iiih.iliiiiiiiis.  so  the  ri);hi  of  cliuosiiig  tins  iillottcil  iiuinber  in 
each  State  ii  to  lie  cKercised  )iy  «uch  pail  of  the  inli»l>itatii«  a»  the 
Slate  ittetf  may  design.tic.  The  qii.-ilificjtioii&  on  which  the  right 
of  iiiffra2<!  clcjierul  are  not.  perhaps,  the  !iati)«  in  any  two  States, 
lit  somi-  iA  th«  Stares  the  <liffcrrtice  is  very  inaierii^l.  In  e»-cry 
Slate  a  certain  praportioii  of  inhabitant}  arc  (leinifeil  ul  this  it(;hl 
by  the  eofiMidili'X)  of  llir  Sl.ile  who  will  be  inclodcd  in  the  census 
by  which  the  leiler^il  Cunilitutioti  apportioii»  the  re)>ie<>('nta lives. 
In  this  t"'"'  "f  >*i^'V  the  Southern  Slaiei  nii);l)l  report  (he  rom- 
plaiiii.  by  insiailinK  tti.it  the  principle  Ui<l  down  Ity  the  conreiiliun 
reifuireil  that  no  reKanl  shiiiili)  lie  li.-iil  to  the  |Kilicr  »f  parliculai 
State)  toward  their  lywn  inhabitants;  .tnil,  consequently,  thai  ili« 
ftlavn,  as  inhn)Htant«,  shogbl  hav«  lieen  aitiniited  into  the  ccnsiK 
dCcnnlin^  to  tlieir  full  nuinber,  in  like  mnnivcr  with  other  inhabit- 
.nnts.  who.  by  the  pohcy  of  other  Slater,  are  not  admitted  to  all 
the  riji'its  of  eittiens.  A  rigorous  adhercnw,  however,  to  this 
principle  «  WMiveil  hy  those  who  would  he  jatnert  by  it.  All  that 
they  aiV  is  ih.ti  eqii.il  moderation  be  shown  on  the  other  sidt. 
I.ei  the  caw  o1  the  slaves  he  corisiilered.  as  it  is  in  truth,  a  jieculiar 
one.  Ler  the  compromising  expedient  of  the  Const  it  ill  ion  be 
mutnaily  atlopteil,  which  regards  them  ai  inltabiianls.  but  as 
debased  liy  sefvilmk  below  the  c<|iial  lerci  o(  (rce  inli.ibitaiit»: 
whkh  re}>ards  the  «/.rtv  as  divoied  of  two*tifths  of  ilie  maH> 

'Since  the  freeini;  anil  admilltng  of  the  ilave  to  Hliten^ip.  thii  iwiy 
fifllii  mIfI  hu  of  connc  ciitlrely  ih tup; < cared,  and  llie  ne)[[o  ■>  vounteii 
•>  ft  fall  arm,  lly  Ihc  XlV'tli  .^I1lcn<lmctll.aMy1llle  ilepiitlTij;  llic  freed- 
Timn  erf  hn  TOle  hiM  a  Ctirre4]rfi(idi[ij*  ■f'i'rre  n|  reprf^'nlJlll<>l1 ;  the 
lli«nry  being  that  ihii  would  xcur*  to  the  nrf^ro  hit  riglitt  of  diiie*thip. 
becaa^  tZie  boulhcm  itiles  would  iml  <:hoiJ4e  1o  fore^^o  the  large  Iosa  of 
repmeiiiiiiun  whti-ti  hik  ditfrini:hiieiiiciit  woulil  iiimlve.  The  tanlh 
uljtuitb  the  voine  rr:MitI,  houriec.  firvi  liy  ih«  t>iipj>reui»ii  "f  the  tiecro 
viite.  an-l  nrare  Uiely,  with  Ipm  co'npletenen  l>nt  aith  greater  nominal 
faimnv  hy  ihe  iiitrodticiioo  uf  eil  iicaltana)  reMtictioni  which  ibe  clec- 
liin  oSiren  ni«  lo  eaclnile  the  balloti  of  ncBToei.  The  whole  hitiory  of 
the  (eitcral  ■iltmplii  to  lolvc  the  nc|^  prnbleio  for  the  uiiith  is  a  hit- 
lory  '■(  the  liJiy  i<(  Dilloiial  xEleiii{>li  to  dnltuy  tlir  huiiie  rule  principle 
■bkh  «  cw*nlially  the  thenrv  of  Amcrimii  imlitiition*.  fur  from 
achicTinc  any  good,  MKti  effort*  hiVE  nianifeitly  made  ih«  problem  iaot« 
diiBcull. — Eui  rolu 


SH       PROPERTY  AND  SEPRBSFMTATION.     UtftMiH} 

"  After  all,  may  not  aiioilwr  ground  be  taken  on  which  this 
article  of  the  Conslitutton  will  adniit  of  nxtill  more  rcaily  (Icfriue ^ 
We  hnrc  hiilicrio  proceeded  on  < he  idea  ilui  rcpiCMntaiiun  related 
to  persoiti  onl)'.  am)  not  at  all  to  propcny.  Dut  i»  it  a  juni  rdea  ? 
Covcrnineni  is  insliluied  no  Tcm  for  proccclion  o(  itic  property, 
than  o(  the  jivrauiix,  of  imliriduals.  The  <mc  as  well  as  the  other, 
thcrelurc,  iiuijr  be  considered  Mi  reprrsi-nred  by  Ihote  mIio  are 
chatKeil  Willi  the  cuvciiimeni.  Upuii  iliiik  prmdple  it  is  thai  in 
several  a{  the  Slater,  and  particul.irly  in  tlic  Stale  til  New  Yolk, 
one  branch  of  tlie  {juvernineiit  b  iiilrndtd  iiiorc  especially  lu  be  the 
guardian  of  properly,  and  i»  accordingly  elt-ctrd  l>y  that  pari  ol  ibe 
stKJety  wliich  i»  mot>i  inieteMnl  in  this  object  uf  };aveniinent.*  lo 
llie  federal  Condiiuiinn,  ihix  policy  (lim  not  prevail.  The  rights 
of  property  are  commitieil  into  ihe  Kinie  hamls  with  the  pergonal 
righli.  Sonic  allenlioii  ought,  ihcrefore,  ID  be  paid  lo  property  In 
lite  choice  of  those  hands. 

"  For  another  rcawm.  lite  volei  allowed  in  the  federal  lej^tlalurc 
to  ibc  people  of  each  Slate  uu);ht  lo  bear  Mime  progiortiun  lo  Ihe 
comparative  we.illh  of  ihe  Stales.  Slates  have  not,  like  iii<livid- 
uaU,  Jii  iTifluence  over  each  oilier  arbing  from  superior  advantage* 
of  fortune.  If  the  law  allows  an  o|Hdrni  cilUen  hut  a  tingle  vole 
ill  the  chwce  of  his  re]Hesenl alive,  the  (cspecl  and  cunsequeoce 
which  he  derives  from  his  lortimate  siiuaiion  very  fiequenily 
guide  lite  voie&  o(  others  to  the  objects  of  his  choice;  and  through 
this  imperceptible  channel  the  right*  nf  propeny  arc  convpyed  Wtn 
the  iniklic  reiHesenlaltun.  A  Stale  jxisseues  no  such  influence 
over  otiier  Stales.'  It  is  not  praUible  thai  the  richest  .Stair  in  Ibe 
Confederacy  will  ever  influence  ihc  choiceof  a  single  iepre*entative 
in  any  other  Siaie,>    Nor  will  the  represenuiives  oj  the  larger  and 

'  The  ijutU Ileal  iixi  tA  Ihe  inicmhcrs  of  ihc  Seiiale  of  New  Vock.  \>f  the 
ConMiliilinn  of  17;?.  wn  ■  (rtabulil.  anil  tbcy  woixjcctm]  cdly  Uy  votcit 
having  a  ftteboltl  of  IIm  nJue  <A  jf  100  oitr  and  above  all  dehit  chafftd 
ih«t«on. — Ei>iT  OK. 

'Thisiiqiiiictruc,  it  wolaaply  consider  th«  Miles  as  ttsits,  Buiahli 
ihc  |[rowlli  (i(  |:Kal  cimmenlil  and  maaufniliiiiiii;  iciilcn  tlurc  hai 
CMBc  u'hst  \\*  liillciiiUcival.  1*)m- c<illntiun  oJ  vati  taii»<>l  Rumey  (mai 
tacti  leclioni  ii  New  England  and  Pcnoaylvuili.  whto^nr  a  i-aiopaien 
hivolvine  ■  tariff  iuue  it  lo  the  frunl.  k  not  merely  mallei  of  pvUiG 
knoitlcdce.  but  cteti  of  iHMua  nilh  ihc  |xir1y  Icvlcrt  ulio  sit  lodabnnc 
Ihc  rarruplioa  fiiM  in  the  "dittiliiful "  ktaiev  Inio  ttw  umr  iiiTgny 
tail  Ihe  riioTiiir  ■.  ciillecltd  in  iSqb  from  all  Ilia  n>'  i'ti 

111  ll(ht  lh«  tih  <h«  Kiuih  and  west.     A  niiMe  i.\,  >.< 

Mill  wai  thai  iiMir:  lu  >ii>  >.ollc<fed  in  ibe  east  and  south  hy  i;ic  1-  .  ^ital 
fofcei  of  ab^tlltlon  and  slimy  lu  i^rt  im  ikc  txrwg^t  fiu  iB|neiuacy  hi 
ibe  •lays  of  "  blndtoK  Kaosu."— Ki>i-ii>a, 

'  ll  WM  a  brai;  ol  the  csucinc  piuiaillrt  tuteiesi  thai  by  •  Ubend  m« 


Ku*UUa<:t>l      REPRESBNTATlVtS-  VOTES  EQUAL.     365 

richer  Suin  pos»ns  any  oiher  adranUge  in  llie  federal  IcgHlalure, 
over  the  (eprctenUtives  n\  oihcr  Sialex.  Ihan  wh;a  may  r«ull  ttom 
tbcir  tuperior  number  atone.  As  (<tr.  itterefnre,  as  ihetr  stiperior 
wealth  anil  wvighl  m.iy  jutlly  enlitle  Ihem  to  any  ndrantaKC,  it 
ought  10  be  secured  to  ihcm  by  a  &upcriur  share  oF  representaijnn. 
The  newCunnlilulionU.  in  this  respeci,  maleriully  difTcrerit  from  the 
exiting  Confodention,  as  well  ns  from  thai  ot  the  United  Neihrr- 
landi  .-uid  other  sitnilur  confederacies  In  each  of  the  latter  the 
efficacy  of  the  feilerAJ  resolutions  depends  on  the  suhscquciit  and 
TOlunlary  rcMiluliotis  of  tlie  Klaie*  i:ani|>uiing  llic  union.  Hcnte 
the  stales,  (hougli  possessing  an  equal  vote  in  the  public  (ounriU, 
have  ail  unc<iual  iiifliierice.  cofieipoiiJing  with  the  unequal  inii>or- 
ncc  of  ihcsc  subsequent  and  voluni.iry  resolutions.  Undet  the 
propotcd  Conititution.  the  federal  acts  will  take  effect  without  the 
necessary  interi-eniion  oi  the  individual  Suies.  They  will  depetid 
merely  on  the  majonly  of  i-olei  in  the  federal  legislature,  and  ton- 
sequeiilly  each  vote,  whether  procccdinR  from  a  larger  or  smaller 
State,  or  a  State  more  or  lew  wealiliy  or  powerful,  will  have  an 
equal  weight  and  cffictcy,  in  the  sainr  mjimcr  as  the  rotes  in> 
:ividually  given  in  a  Si.ite  legiitalure.  by  the  rep' e*enta live*  of 
[uiiequjl  counties  or  olber  dislticls.  have  each  a  precise  etpiility  o( 
ue  and  effect ;  or  it  there  he  any  difference  in  the  case,  it  pro- 
iceeits  from  the  diffrrence  in  ihe  personal  character  nf  the  iiidiTidual 
representative  rather  lhan  from  any  regard  to  the  eilent  o(  (he 
district  from  which  he  comes." 
Such  is  live  tejsofiuig  which  an  advocate  for  the  SoiilhcrD 
teresis  might  employ  on  (hit  subject;  and  aliliou(;h  it  may 
pear  to  be  a  little  siiai'ied  in  some  points,  yci.  o<i  the  whole.  I 
muii  confns  that  it  fully  rccondles  mc  to  the  scale  of  rcpiesenta* 
lion  which  il>e  convention  have  Gsi.iblrshed. 

n  one  respect,  the  establishment  of  a  common  measure  for 
reseniaiioo  and  taiaiion  will  have  a  very  saloiary  rffirel.  As 
accuracy  of  the  census  to  tie  oblaine<l  by  the  Congre«  will 
lecenarity  depend,  in  a  considerable  degree,  on  (he  disposition,  if 
not  on  the  co-operatkin.  o(  the  Stales,  it  is  of  great  importance 
tliat  the  Stales  shouUI  feel  as  lillle  bias  as  possible  to  swell  or  to 
reduce  the  amount  of  their  numbers.  Were  their  share  of  repre- 
sentation alone  to  be  governed  by  this  rule,  they  would  have  an 
interest  m  eiag|{eT.-itiiig  their  inhabitants.  Were  titc  rule  to  decide 
tbcir  share  of  taxation  alone,  a  contrary  temptation  would  peevaiL' 

of  money  llier  ilefuieit  the  n^.(lrc(ioii  nl  Wilwci  of  West  Vlrsinia,  be- 
ORue  of  hit  laarc  in  die  \Vib«n  tniiil  liill  of  lS<)4.— EniTOB. 

'  It  wM  chugcd  thai  the  oMioiul  census  o(  1S90  nstcrially  nndeirsteiJ 


Kf  ctftn<Hns  llic  tv}r  to  boih  objrais  rhc  States  will  havr  opgrnilc 
inierciiit.  which  will  control  and  baUnce  each  ol  Iter  and  ptnituc« 
the  reqtiitntc  iniparliallly.  Puhlius. 


No.  55  [54].  ifi-J'ff^t<-tj'M,—/.r*i«arj .i.,ju->   Hamilton  (?) 

SIZE  OF  THE   HOUSE  OF   REPRESENTATIVES. 

tmfiirlaiut  atl.tthtJ  U  Ikii  $iitJttl'~Difimtly  n/  ilelirminiHg  tilt 
frtftr  uMmier — Small  itatii  rt^uirt  imnlttr  ratii-i — Umitfit  f^xttrt  rf 
CtHgrta  J»  fttt  tttmand  a  aautemut  rtpmrntalirn — Vari^Ht  etjntttmt 
tvntUittd  and  amnrfrnt —  S^nrefi  v/  4ati£tr  t«mi4trtd. 

T«  tkt  Pr»f>U  of  tht  Slitte  of  Nm  York: 

The  numb^T  of  which  the  House  «C  Rcprcwntalivw  is 
to  consist  format  another  itnil  a  very  mltireiitlns  p4>inl  of 
view,  under  which  thi&  branch  of  the  federal  legislatore 
roar  ^  contemplated.  Scarce  any  article,  indeed,  in  the 
whole  Constitution  seems  to  be  rcndcrcil  more  worthy 
of  attention,  t>y  the  weight  of  character  and  the  afi^rcnt 
force  of  arj[umcDt  with  which  i(  has  been  assailed.  The 
charges  exhibited  against  it  arc,  first,  that  so  small  a 
number  of  representatives  will  be  an  unstalc  depoMtary 
iif  the  paMic  interests;  secondly,  that  they  will  not  po». 
sess  a  proper  knowledge  of  the  litcal  eircumstances  of 
their  numerous  congiitacnts;  thirdly,  that  they  will  be 
taken  from  that  das£  of  citizens  which  will  syiDpatliise 
least  with  the  feelings  of  the  mass  of  the  people,  and  be 
most  likely  to  aim  at  a  pernianenl  elevation  o(  the  (car 
on  the  depression  of  the  many;  fourthly,  that  defective 
aa  the  number  will  be  in  the  first  instance,  it  will  be 
more  and  more  disproportionate  by  the  increase  uf  tlie 
people  and  the  obstacles  which  will  prevent  a  curre- 
spondcnt  increase  of  the  representatives. 


•lit  itfljioUli'M  n(  New  Yotlt  dfy,  lhf«»  iFiIwriBf;  li»t  i\n(*%  iil  i*Twnni>- 
lim    ><•  the  Ft^uBS  nf  Rcprc<mi>tiTn.      S    .    "   -  imkb*- 

ilillHr  adf nrinl   mmril  lo  pr>m    the  1 .  -:»   *«• 

KhuttI  iin>le<  ttcf-ublKsn  ■ugiiirc   uhI   T ^..^  ^^.  tliin|;lf 
lecntk,  (he  jwftbu  oUJea  was  olivWn,— Enroa. 


Huniltond)]     SIZE  Of  STATE  lEC/SLATt/SSS. 


ifii 


In  general  it  nuijr  be  remarked  on  this  subject  that  no 
pul'ilicul  i>rtit)leHi  is  leits  su«cc]>l'>ble  of  a  precise  sulutJun 
than  that  which  relates  to  the  uumber  most  convenient 
(or  a  representative  legisluturc;  nor  is  there  ^ny  point  on 
which  the  policy  of  the  several  St;itos  is  more  at  variance, 
whether  we  coRi|iare  their  legislative  assemblies  directly 
with  each  other,  or  consider  the  proportions  which  they 
respectively  bear  to  the  number  of  their  constituents. 
Pai>»iiig  over  the  deference  bctn-cen  the  smallest  and 
largest  States,  as  Delaware,  whose  most  numerous 
branch  consists  of  twenty-one  representatives,  and 
MassachusetlSL,  where  it  amounts  to  between  three  and 
four  hundred,  a  very  considerable  difference  is  observ- 
able among  States  nearly  equal  in  population.  The 
number  of  representatives  in  Pennsylvania  \s  not  more 
than  one-Tifth  of  that  in  the  State  last  mentioned.  New 
York,  whose  pupnlation  is  to  that  of  South  Carolina  as 
six  tt>  five,  has  litllc  more  than  onc-lhir<i  of  ibe  number 
of  representatives.  As  ;[reai  a  diNi>ai'tty  prevails  be- 
tween the  Sutcs  of  Georgia  and  Delaware  or  Rhode 
Island.  In  Pennsylvania  the  representatives  do  not  bear 
a  (greater  proportion  to  their  constituents  llian  of  one 
for  every  four  or  five  thousand.  In  Rhode  Island  they 
bear  a  proportion  of  at  least  one  for  every  thousand. 
And  accordiniE  to  ihc  constitution  of  tieorgia,  the  pro- 
portion may  be  carried  to  one  to  every  ten  electors;  and 
must  unavoidably  far  exceed  the  proportion  in  any  of 
the  other  States. 

Another  general  remark  to  be  made  is  that  the  ratio 
between  the  representatives  and  the  people  ought  not  to 
be  the  same  where  the  latter  are  very  numerous  as  where 
they  arc  very  few.  Were  the  representatives  in  Virginia 
to  be  regulated  by  the  standard  in  Rhode  Island,  they 
would,  at  this  time,  amount  to  between  four  and  fire 
hundred;  and  twenty  or  thirty  years  hence,  to  a  ihou- 
Hand.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ratio  of  Pennsylvania,  if 
applied  to  (he  State  of  Delaware,  would  reduce  the 
reprrscntativc  assembly  of  ilic  latter  to  seven  or  eight 
members.     Nothing  can  be  mure  fallacious  than  to  found 


u      roemuers. 


368 


UUMBEK  OF  KEP/iESEXrATlt'ES.      \V».W<Mi 


our  political  calculations  on  arithmetical  principles. 
Sixty  or  seventy  men  may  be  more  properly  trusted  with 
a  given  degree  of  power  than  six  or  seven.  But  it  dues 
not  follow  that  six  or  sewn  hundred  would  be  propor- 
tionately a  better  depositary.  And  if  we  carry  on  llie 
supposition  to  six  or  seven  thousand,  the  whole  reason- 
ing ought  to  be  reversed.  The  truth  is  that,  in  all 
eases,  a  certain  number  at  least  teems  to  be  neccssarj- 
to  secure  the  benefits  of  free  consultation  and  discussion, 
and  to  guard  against  too  easy  a  combination  for  improper 
purposes;  as,  on  the  other  hand,  the  niinit>cr  ought  at 
most  to  be  kept  within  a  ceriatn  limit,  in  order  to  avoid 
the  confusion  and  intemperance  of  a  multitude.  In  all 
very  numerous  assemblies,  of  whatever  character  com- 
posed, passion  never  fails  to  wrest  the  scepter  fnim 
reason.  Had  every  Athenian  citizen  been  a  Socrates, 
every  Athenian  assembly  would  still  have  been  a  mob. 

It  is  necessary  also  m  recollect  here  the  observations 
which  were  applied  to  the  case  of  biennial  elections. 
For  the  same  reason  that  the  limited  powers  of  Ihc 
Congress,  and  the  control  of  the  State  lecislalures, 
justify  less  fretiueni  elections  than  the  public  safety 
might  otherwise  require,  the  members  of  the  Congress 
need  be  less  numerous  than  if  they  possessed  the  whole 
power  of  legislation  and  were  under  no  other  than  the 
ordinary  restraints  of  other  legislative  bodies. 

With  Ihde  ^ci>pni1  idc;is  in  our  niiiids.  Icl  us  weigh  llie  objec- 
tions which  h-ivr  been  suied  n|;:iinil  Ihe  number  u(  members 
proposetl  for  the  House  of  RcpiesetiUiivrs.  Ii  it  shiiI.  Io  the 
Ant  pUce,  (hat  so  somU  a  number  cannot  be  Saiely  trusted  wilb 
BO  much  power. 

Tlie  nuinlier  of  wfakh  this  ItrMch  of  iIm  IcfpiUiuie  is  to  consiH 
01  the  ouisci  of  ll>c  gmcrninenl  wfll  Im  sUiy-livc.  Wiihin  lluee 
years  a  census  U  to  be  iJiken,  wlien  the  number  muy  be  augmented 
IO  one  fix  evrT;  ihiny  thoiiund  inhnlMtnnt*  ;  and  within  every 
sucmsive  jieiiiyl  of  ten  years  the  ceniua  is  to  tie  rniewnl,  uid 
augmentaiionx  may  continur  to  be  niiule  uniler  ihe  abiti-c  limU>> 
tion.  It  will  not  be  thoughl  an  nirav.ignni  con^iure  that  the 
fira  crnHii  will,  at  the  rate  of  une  for  everf  Ihiilx  llmusaDd.  nise 
Ihi  number  of  rep*cKnlatives  Io  at  teut  one  hunilrcd.     Ebilnwi- 


K*nu)t>w(t)l    PEtfXeSS  OF  UF.MBERS  !^0  rtAXCeH.     3*9 

in|{  the  nesT0«5  in  the  pfoponion  <i(  tlirfc-fiflhi,  it  can  scarcely  be 
(iDubtrd  thai  Ihc  |>opiilnlk>n  nf  llir  Unitnl  Sl;i[cf  will  by  Ihat  lime, 
if  it  (loen  nol  atcead)'.  amount  to  three  millions.  At  the  expiiation 
of  twcniy-fin;  ycArt,  acconliitg  to  the  compiiicil  rate  of  increase , 
I  he  number  «1  repreienlaiivcs  uiill  .imuiini  lo  tw-o  hun<lied  ;  and 
of  riily  fcAit,  la  tour  huiiilred.     This  is  a  number  which.  I    pre- 

I  aiuue,  will  put  An  end  to  ill  feji's  arising  lioni  ihc  siiuIIiicsk  of  the 
body.     I   Cake   (or  granted   itcte   wlnit   1  nhull.  ill  .iniweiiii];  ihe 

'  (uuilh  objcciion.  hereafter  show,  lh:it  the  njinhcr  of  represeiiia- 
tive«  will  be  aiigmcnicd  from  time  to  lime  in  Ihc  mrinncr  piuvi<leil 
by  ilie  Coiisiiiuiion.  On  a  coniriitry  supposition.  1  siioutil  atlmit 
Ihe  objeciion  to  have  rery  Rreal  weiRht  indeed. 

The  (rue  qiM^iion  to  be  decided  chm  is.  whether  the  smallncss 
of  the  numlier,  as  a  (empoiacy  re^uiaiion.  be  dangerout  lo  the 
public  liberty  ?  Whether  siity-live  inciithrrs  for  a  few  years,  and 
hundred  or  (wo  huiidied  (or  a  few  more,  be  a  safe  depositary  for 
A  limited  ami  well-guarded  power  of  legislaliiig  for  the  UnilciJ 
iitates  ?  I  iiiuM  own  llial  I  could  not  (jive  a  negative  answcl  Id 
Ihif  quc^lKHi.  without  liisi  obliler.tting  every  iinpic.v%iiin  which  I 
have  r<^cc>ved  with  regard  lo  the  piescnt  genius  of  ihe  people  of 
America.  Ihe  spiiit  which  actuates  the  Sulc  Irgi^lntures.  and  ihc 
prmciptes  which  are  ii>cori>oraled  with  the  jTotitical  character  of 
every  cla«9  of  ciliicns.  1  am  unable  to  conceive  that  the  people 
of  America,  in  their  present  temper,  or  urxler  any  circumstances 
which  can  «fieodlly  happen,  will  choote,  and  m-ery  second  year 
repeat  the  choice  oJ,  sixty- hve  or  a  hundred  men  who  would  be 
(liKpoMTil  tp  form  and  purtuc  a  scheme  of  lyr^miy  or  treachery,      I 

'  ain  unabtc  tu  conceive  that  the  Slate  k-giilatures.  which  must  fee) 
so  m»ny  ntoiives  lo  watch,  ,-ind  which  posievs  su  many  means  o( 
couiileraciing  the  federal  legislature,  would  tad  either  lo  detect 
or  to  defeat  a  conspiracy  of  the  l.ittcr  against  the  liberties  of  Ihrlr 
common  consittucrtis.  I  ant  etjually  unable  to  conceire  thai  there 
are  ai  this  iitn«,  or  can  be  in  any  short  time,  in  the  United  St.itet. 
any  nxty-hre  or  a  hundred  men  cnpable  of  rccomrn ending  lhcm> 
selre»  lo  the  choice  ol  ihe  people  at  large,  who  would  either  desire 
UT  dare,  wiibin  the  .nhott  space  of  two  years,  to  belray  the  solemn 

^  irusteil  committed  lo  them.  What  chance  of  circuniMances.  time, 
and  a  fuller  population  uf  our  counlry  may  prailucc.  requires  a 
prophetic  ipirii  lo  declare,  which  makes  no  part  of  my  prcicnsion*. 
Bill  iiulging  from  the  circmnslanccs  now  before  us,  and  from  the 
protMhIe  mate  ol  ihem  wliliin  n  nuKleratc  period  of  lime,  I  muH 
pronouacc  thai  the  libeiiies  of  America  cannai  be  unsafe  in  Ihe 
■yntber  of  hands  proposed  hy  ihe  federal  Cansiitutton. 


37* 


COA'STITl/TIOXAl.  COXCSeSS.        (■•.HfMl 


From  what  quarter  can  ttie  danger  proceed?  Are  we 
afraid  of  foreign  gold?  If  forcigo  gold  could  so  ea&ily 
corrupt  our  fcder^il  rulers  and  enable  them  lu  ensnare 
and  betray  their  constituents,  how  has  it  happened  (hat 
we  are  at  this  time  a  free  and  independent  nation?  The 
Congress  wliicli  cowtiirtcd  ns  tlirougli  the  Revolution  was 
a  less  numerous  body  Ihun  their  surxessors  will  be;  they 
were  not  chosen  by,  nor  responsible  to,  their  fctlow- 
citizcns  at  large;  though  appointed  from  year  tu  year, 
and  recallable  ;it  pleasure,  they  were  goiurally  continued 
for  three  years,  and,  prior  to  the  rjiificdiion  of  the 
federal  articles,  for  a  still  lunger  term.  'I'liey  held  their 
consultations  alway^t  under  the  veil  of  serrecy;  tliey  had 
the  sole  transaction  of  our  affairs  with  foreign  nations; 
through  the  whole  course  of  the  war,  they  had  the  fate 
of  their  couniry  more  in  their  hands  liian  it  is  to  be 
hoped  will  ever  be  the  case  with  our  future  representa- 
tives; and  from  the  greatness  of  the  prize  at  stake,  and 
the  eagerness  of  the  (Mrly  which  lost  it,  it  may  well  be 
supposed  that  the  use  of  other  mcaits  iltan  force  would 
not  have  been  scniplcd.  Vet  we  know  by  happy  experi- 
ence that  the  public  trust  was  not  betrayed;  nor  has  the 
purity  of  our  public  councils  in  this  particular  ever  suf- 
fered, even  from  the  whispers  of  calumny. 

Is  the  danger  apprehended  from  the  other  hrancbei  of 
the  federal  government?  But  where  are  the  means  to  be 
III  found  by  the  President,  or  the  Senate,  or  both? 

Ha.  78.  Their  emolumenLt  of  ulfice,  tt  is  to  be  pre- 
sumed, will  not,  and  without  a  previous  corruption  of  the 
Mouse  of  Reprcsentaiives  cannot,  more  than  suffice  for 
very  different  purpos*^*;  their  private  fortunes,  as  tliey 
must  all  be  Amcricjan  citizens,  cannot  possibly  be  sources 
of  daHger.  The  only  means,  then,  which  they  can  pos- 
sess will  be  id  the  dispensation  of  appointments.  Is  it 
here  that  suspicion  rests  her  charge?  Sometimes  wc  are 
told  that  thi"  fuml  of  corruption  is  to  be  exhausted  by  the 
President  in  sulxluinf;  the  virtue  of  the  Senate.  Now,  the 
fidelity  of  the  otbcr  House  is  lu  be  the  victim.  The  im- 
probability of  such  a  mercenaryand  perRdiaoE  cmnbina* 


«mJU0D'1)|     MEM8EKS  CAX.VOT  HOLD  OFFICE.        y,\ 

liuii  of  the  scvtral  members  of  govcmmtiit,  slaiiUini;  on 
as  different  foundatiuns  as  republican  principles  will  well 
admit,  anti  at  th«  same  lime  accountable  to  the  society 
over  which  they  are  placed,  ought  alu»e  lo  quiet  this 
apprehension.  Bui,  fortunately,  the  Constitution  has 
pruvideO  a  stit)  further  safeguard.  The  members  of  the 
Congress  are  rendered  ineligible  to  any  civil  ofnccs  that 
P,,  may  be  created,  or  of  which  the  emolucu«nt» 

lto.T7.  may  be  increased,  during  the  term  of  their 
election.  No  ofliccs,  therefore,  can  be  dealt  out  to  the 
existing  members  but  such  as  may  become  vacant  by 
ordinary  casualties;  and  to  suppose  that  these  will  be 
sufficient  to  purchase  the  guardians  of  the  people, 
selected  by  the  people  Ihcmsplves,  is  to  renounce  every 
rule  by  which  events  ought  to  be  calculated,  and  to 
substitute  an  indiscriminate  and  unbounded  jealousy, 
with  which  all  reasoning  must  be  vain.  The  sincere 
friends  of  liberty  who  give  themselves  up  to  the  cxtrav- 
''  aganeie*  of  this  passion  arc  not  aware  of  the  injury 
they  do  their  own  cause.  As  there  is  a  degree  of  de- 
pravity in  mankind  which  ret|uircB  a  certain  degree  of 
circumspection  and  distrust,  so  there  are  other  qualities 
in  human  nature  which  justiliy  a  certain  portion  of 
esteem  and  confidence.  Kcpublican  government  presup- 
poses the  existence  of  these  qualities  in  a  higher  degree 
than  any  other  form.  Were  the  pictures  which  have  been 
drawn  by  the  [wUtical  jealousy  of  some  among  us,  faithful 
likenesses  uf  the  human  character,  the  inference  would 
be  that  there  is  not  sufficient  virtue  among  men  for 
self-);overnment,  and  that  nothing  less  than  the  chains 
of  despotism  can  restrain  them  from  destroying  and 
devouring  one  another. 

PuuutiS. 


37«       KNOWLEDGE  IN  REPSESENTATiVES.  {■4.M(«> 


No.  56  [55]-    if'^t/fmdttl/mrmH.Ftiimuiii.imi    HamiltOD  (?) 

NECESSARY  KNOWLEDGE  IN  THE  REPRE- 
SENTATIVE CONSIDEKKU  IN  RELATION  TO 
THE  RATIO   OF  KEPkESKNTATlON. 

MJftlitn  lA^I  Cmigrtii  tnit  h  to*  imatl  ta  inwv  lit  lateniU  ami 
tiiikti  s/  ill  tvaitilututt  tiraiiJtrfJ—TIU  tffrtittiUtitt  fiugkl  la  titm 
lAr  inltrtili  »f  his  tintliftuHli — Oijtits  ej  fudtrai  Itgiilatiim — A  frw 
rifrrttalativti  vitt  it  lufintml —  TaxaHfa — Atilili* —  Tki  ixftrimtt  tf 
Ctial  Jirluiit. 

To  Iht  Pe^e  0/  Ike  Staff  0/  AVw  Vori: 

The  luond  cli^rgc  against  the  Houiie  of  Repr«xenl3- 
tivcs  is  that  it  will  be  too  small  to  possess  a  due  Icnowl- 
ed{^«  of  the  interests  of  its  constituents. 

As  this  objection  evidently  proceeds  from  a  compari- 
son of  tlie  proposed  number  of  representatives  with  tlie 
great  extent  of  the  United  States,  the  number  of  their 
inliabii;tnts,  and  the  diversity  of  their  interests,  without 
taking  into  viev  at  die  ftame  lime  tlie  circumstances 
which  will  distinguish  the  Congress  from  other  Icgisla- 
Uitive  bodies,  the  best  answer  lh»t  can  be  given  lu  it  will 
be  a  brief  explanalion  of  these  peculiarities. 

It  is  a  sound  and  important  principle  that  the  rcpre- 
senlative  ought  to  be  ac(|uainted  with  the  interests  and 
circumstances  of  his  constituents.  But  this  principle  can 
extend  no  further  than  to  those  circumstances  and  inter- 
ests to  which  the  authoritj-  and  care  of  the  representa- 
tive relate.  An  iftnorance  of  a  variety  of  minute  and 
particular  objects,  which  do  not  lie  within  the  compass 
of  legislation,  is  consistent  with  every  attribute  necessary 
to  a  due  performance  of  the  legislative  irusL  In  deter- 
mining the  extent  of  information  required  in  the  exer- 
cise  of  a  particular  authority,  recourse  then  must  be  liod 
to  the  objects  within  the  purview  of  that  authority. 

What  are  to  be  the  objects  of  federal  Icgislaliun,' 
Those  which  are  of  m'(«t  importance,  and  which  ftccm 
most  to  require  local  knowledge,  arc  commerce,  taxation, 
and  the  militia. 


HtnUlua  l}>  I        TAXA  TIQN  AND  THE  STA  TBS. 


373 


■^ 


A  proi>er  regulation  of  commerce  re(|U)rcs  much  infor« 
matiun,  as  has  been  ciscvhcrc  remarked;  but  as  far  as 
this  information  rdiiirs  to  the  lavrii  and  local  situation  uf 
«ach  individual  State,  a  very  few  representatives  would 
be  very  sufficient  vehicles  of  it  to  the  federal  councils. 

Taxation  will  consist,  in  a  great  measure,  of  duties 
which  will  be  involved  in  the  regulation  of  commerce. 
So  far  the  preceding  remark  is  applicable  to  this  object. 
As  far  as  it  may  consist  of  internal  collections,  a  more 
dinfusive  knowltrdge  of  the  circumstances  of  the  State 
nuy  be  necessary.  Bui  will  not  this  also  be  possessed  in 
sufficient  degree  by  a  very  few  intelligent  men,  diffusively 
elected  within  the  State?  Divide  the  largest  Sutc  into 
ten  or  twelve  districts,  and  it  will  be  found  that  there 
will  be  no  peculiar  local  interests  in  either  which  will  not 
be  within  the  knowledge  of  the  representative  of  the  dis- 
trict. Besides  this  source  of  information,  the  laws  of 
the  State,  framed  by  representatives  from  every  part  of 
it,  will  be  almost  of  themselves  a  sufhcicnt  guide.  In 
very  State  there  have  been  made,  and  must  continue  to 
made,  regulations  on  this  subject  which  will,  in  many 
cases,  leave  little  more  to  be  done  by  the  federal  Icgisla* 
ture  than  to  review  Ihe  dilfirrent  laws  and  reduce  them 
in  one  general  act.  A  skillful  individual  in  his  cloxct, 
with  all  the  local  codes  before  him,  might  compile  a  law 
on  some  subjects  of  taxation  for  the  whole  Union  with- 
out any  aid  from  oral  ioformalioR,  and  it  may  be  ex- 
pected that  whenever  internal  taxes  may  be  necessary, 
and  particularly  in  casen  requiring  uniformity  through- 
out the  Sutes,  the  more  simple  objects  wilt  be  preferred. 
To  be  fully  sensible  of  the  facility  which  will  be  given  to 
this  branch  of  federal  legislation  by  the  assistance  of  the 
State  codes,  we  need  only  suppose  for  a  moment  that 
this  or  any  other  State  were  divided  into  a  number  of 
parts,  each  having  and  exercising  within  itself  a  power 
of  local  legislation.  Is  it  not  evident  that  a  degree  of 
local  information  and  preparatory  labor  would  be  found 
in  the  several  volumes  of  their  proceedinj^s  which  would 
very  much  shorten  the  labors  of  the  general  legislature, 


374 


MtUTIA  A.yi>   THE  STATES.         WoBa-M 


and  render  a  much  smaHer  number  of  roembcrfs  sufficient 
for  it? 

The  federal  oouncits  will  derive  great  advantage  from 
another  circumstance:  The  representatives  of  each  State 
win  not  only  bring  with  them  a  consideniblc  knowledge 
of  itft  laws,  and  a  local  knowledge  of  their  rc&{>ecttve 
districts,  but  will  probably  in  all  cases  have  been  mem- 
bers, and  may  even  at  the  very  time  be  members,  of  the 
State  legislature,  where  all  the  local  taforination  and 
interests  of  the  State  are  assembled,  and  fnim  whence 
they  may  easily  be  conveyed  by  a  very  few  hands  iniu 
the  legislature  of  the  United  States. 

The  observations  made  on  the  subjr<;t  of  taxation 
apply  with  greater  force  to  the  case  of  the  militia.  For 
however  different  the  rules  of  discipline  may  be  in  differ- 
ent States,  they  arc  the  same  ihroughuiit  each  particular 
State;  and  depend  on  circumstances  which  c;in  differ  but 
little  in  different  parts  of  the  same  State.' 

The  attentive  reader  will  discern  that  the  reasoning 
here  used,  to  prove  the  sufficiency  of  a  moderate  number 
f)^  of  representatives,  does   not  in  any  respect 

ji».*8.  contradict  what  was  urged  on  another  occa- 

•lion  with  regard  to  the  extensive  tnfomuitiun  which  the 
representatives  ou^ht  to  pos&ess,  and  the  lime  that 
might  be  necc&sary  for  acquiring  iL  This  information, 
so  far  as  it  may  relate  to  local  objects,  is  rendered 
necessary  aitd  difficult,  not  by  a  difference  of  laws  and 
local  circumstances  within  a  single  State,  but  of  those 
among  different  States.  Taking  each  Slate  by  itself,  its 
laws  are  the  Kime,  and  its  interests  but  little  diversified. 
A  few  men,  therefore,  will  possess  all  the  knowlctlge 
requisite  for  a  proper  representation  of  them.     Were  the 


'  In  Ihe  Irtt  of  Ihe  coIlcclFd  citition  of  17AS  llln  |»4n|;n|ih  rcaill ; 
"Whli  rvi^ri]  to  tli«  rc^uUlion  of  tbe  mitiiik.  \Xim  xn  ■nrcrl]'  any 
drcnlttitanOH  in  rc(«mc«  lo  whlJl  loci)  kofmkdf^  cM  be  uiH  to  W 
iwceMwy.  The  c'ner*!  t*<«  ot  tlie  tiiualiy.  labeiher  nuiiiniiJDCnu  or 
level,  nntt  fil  fn  (h*  oi'criliiHi*  of  iaflntir  u>  i>»try,  i>  (Imnif  ibc 
ool;  cnnikliliialuin  of  thu  naluie  Itol  nn  occat.  T)i«  uH  -J  mi  rtvhM 
imKial  riindpki  at  orgBtiiiuiiX).  OHveinnit,  ■.■»)  'Iiiitpline.  mhil 
■ppl}'  ■nirnully."— EuLtms, 


HkiBlltoatll  1    /yCXe^SE  OF  MEMBERS  fOKBSREif.      y,% 


ititercstK  and  affatrft  of  each  individual  State  perfectly 
simple  and  uniform,  a  knowledge  of  thciii  in  one  part 
would  involve  a  knuwiedgc  u(  them  in  every  other,  and 
the  whule  State  might  lie  competently  represented  by  a 
single  member  taken  from  any  part  of  it.  On  a  com- 
parison of  tliv  different  Stales  together,  we  5nd  a  great 
dts'similarity  in  their  laws,  and  tn  many  utiier  circum- 
stances connected  with  the  objects  of  federal  legislation, 
with  all  of  which  the  federal  representatives  ought  to 
have  xome  acqtuiintance.  WhiUt  a  few  repre.ienta lives, 
therefore,  from  each  State,  may  bring  with  them  a  due 
knowledge  of  their  own  State,  every  representative  will 
have  mucli  information  to  acquire  concerning  all  the 
other  States.  The  chanfjcs  of  time,  as  was  formerly  re- 
marked, on  the  comparative  situation  of  the  different 
States,  will  have  an  assimilating  ePtceL  The  effect  of 
time  on  the  internal  affairs  of  the  States,  taken  singly, 
will  be  just  the  contrary.  At  present  some  of  the  States 
are  little  more  than  a  society  of  husbandmen.  Few  nf 
ihcm  have  made  much  pfo^rcss  in  those  branches  of 
industry  which  give  a  variety  and  complexity  to  the 
aff.iirs  of  a  nation.  These,  however,  will  in  all  of  them 
be  the  friiittt  of  a  more  advanced  population,  and  will 
require,  on  the  part  of  each  State,  a  fuller  representation. 
The  foresight  of  the  convention  has  accordingly  taken 
care  that  the  progress  nf  population  may  be  accomfKimcd 
with  a  proper  increase  of  the  representative  branch  of 
ibc  government. 

The  experience  of  Crrat  Riiuin.  which  presents  lo  munbind  to 
n>.iny  pililieal  lessoii».  botli  of  llie  monitory  and  exemplary  kiml, 
nnfl  which  has  been  fre(|ucntl)r  con^ulieil  in  the  cmiisc  of  these 
inquiries,  corrotforates  the  tesutt  of  the  lefleeiions  which  we  have 
Just  made.  The  number  o(  inhAhilanls  in  the  two  kingdoms  of 
England  an^l  Scotland  cannot  be  staled  at  less  than  i.foosoo. 
The  rcpmenl.itivex  of  Ilieie  8,000.000  in  the  llouu:  oi  Cummoiis 
aniouni  lo  sjil.  Of  (his  iiumbcr.  onc-niuili  aie  elected  by  364 
|K(»oiis,  aivd  onc-hiuf  by  57^3  persunt.*  It  cannot  be  Mipgmtcd 
lliat  the  half  thus  elected,  an<l  who  do  not  even  reside  among  the 

•  !hiri!tt't  '•  PuKliea!  Ditiiilvtlior*."— Pirsi.iv*. 


^    •■■'^•-- 


376 


BttiriS//  XEPKhSEiVTAlIOM, 


no.  M  iWi 


people  41  laigc,  can  add  .inyihing  eiihcr  to  th«  Mcuriiy  o(  the 
peDj>le  against  ihe  govcnimcni,  »i  to  ili«;  ktK)wl««lt;c  (4  ihcir  cir- 
cgmsuaca  and  interests  in  llie  Icg'slalive  counuN.  On  the 
conlnuy.  tt  U  noloriout  that  they  nic  iDore  fm|uenily  the  repie- 
tcnlittivcs  and  insirumcnts  ol  ih>:  cxrcutirc  mflgisiraie  ttijin  the 
guardiaat  and  Mlvocutec  of  ibe  popular  ri|[hii.  They  might, 
ilierefofe.  with  great  propriety,  be  cen^idercil  as  >oineiliii>K  more 
llidn  a  mere  dctluclioo  (rutii  lli«  ml  rcpresenlatiees  ol  lite  nation. 
We  will.  Iiowercr.  coDMiier  ihetD  in  tliis  lig)il  alone.  ai>d  wilt  not 
extend  the  dcduclion  to  a  considctat>le  number  o(  uiliers.  wlio  do 
mil  rcKidc  among  tlieir  constiiucnls.  nie  frry  faintly  nonne^ed 
with  them,  and  have  very  link  |Kiriicular  knowlnlge  ol  ihcii 
aRairs,  With  all  ihrM  concrsMnnv.  279  pefMinn  only  wilt  t>e  ihe 
depositary  of  the  safely,  inieresi.  and  happitieu  of  8.000.000— thai 
islosay.  there  vrill  he  onereprMeniativconly  to  m.-iini.iiniheriKbit 
and  explain  the  situation  of  Ivenly-eiahl  Ihauum^  Ux  humdrtd 
anJteofnty  constituent*,  in  an  n.vetnl)ly  cxposeil  to  the  whole  force 
of  executive  influence,  and  cxtciMiing  its  authority  loei'cry  obieci  ol 
le^islalion  within  a  nation  wHom;  aRairs  arc  in  l)i«  highest  degm 
dttersifwd  and  complicated.  Vel  il  is  very  certain,  not  only  that 
a  vnlual^e  portion  of  lTce<lom  ha«  Ifecn  preserved  under  all  these 
ciiictimsiances.  but  thai  the  defects  in  the  British  co<le  are  charge- 
able, in  a  very  t mat)  proportion,  on  the  ifri>orance  of  Ibe  le^sla- 
blure  concerning  the  circu instances  of  (he  people.  Allowing  to 
this  case  the  weight  which  is  due  to  il.  and  comparing  it  with 
that  ol  the  Hnii»e  ot  Kepreseniaitvcs  as  above  expUtiird.  il  scetm 
10  give  the  fultesl  assurance  that  a  representative  (or  e^'eiy  Ihirtf 
thauttulJ  inkaiiianU  will  rea<ler  the  latter  both  a  safe  and  com- 
petent guardian  of  the  interests  whicti  will  be  coiilided  10  It 

POBLIOS. 


Hulhrnimi    HOUSE  AS  PRBTEA'DED  OLIGARCHY.     377 


No.  57  [56].     f^t*  VtrtPuM.  Fibnunr  ■v.ttM.)     Hamilton  (?) 

UNl.IKKIJHOOD  THAT  THE  HOUSE  OF  REP- 
RESEN  lATIVES  WILL  ELEVATE  THE.  I-'EW 
ABOVE  THE  MANY. 

Till  ahft^ritH.  in  friHtiflt.  ilrii^t  at  Ihf  rvtt  of  'fpTtttnlalitrt  gtvtrn- 
mtHf^ihmitrt  <lrttrA  ijr  and  tatru  frsm  all  tIaii/t—Sitiiritiri  Ir 
ituHTf  fid/lilT  tf  mimkrs  ntamtratiJ — Prteiiioai  fet  tittlimg  ntmitri, 
atJ  liar  i/iult/lialient,  tikt  Ikiti  cf  lUUt  ffiirri^-  Tkt  rr/iiiht  nunteri 
ef  Iht  <»HilHiKH€iri  iM  r«««/iw  affrfailv/ilalraHdJiiiiff-ivraltf 
ftSrral  tyiUm —  Tht  dtetrint  utilhtr  naion-tUt  b«t  aJuiiniUt — //  n  nvi 
$uttaiHtJ  fy  fttth—Ext'nfUt  /rem  Hettit  (•/  Commem  and  /r«m  tkt 
ilalet. 

Te  tht  Pfifle  of  Iht  Slatt  of  Ntv>  York: 

The  MtVi/i^tiargc  against  ihe  House  of  Representatives 
is  that  it  will  be  taken  from  that  class  of  citizens  which 
will  have  least  sympMtiiy  with  the  maits  of  the  people  and 
be  most  likely  to  aim  aX  un  ambitions  sacrifice  of  the 
manf  to  the  a^KT^nilizement  of  the  few. 

Of  atl  the  objections  which  have  been  framed  against 
the  federal  Constitution,  this  is  perhaps  the  most  extra- 
ordinary. Whilst  the  objection  itself  is  leveled  against  a 
pretended  oligarchy,  the  principle  of  it  strikes  at  the 
very  root  of  rcpuhliciin  government. 

The  aim  of  every  political  constiiation  is,  or  ought  to 
he,  first  to  obtain  for  rulers  men  who  possess  most 
wisdom  to  discern,  and  most  virtue  to  pursue  the  com- 
mon good  of  the  society;  and  in  the  next  place,  to  take 
the  most  effectual  precautions  for  keeping  them  virtuous 
whilst  they  continue  to  hold  tlieir  puhlic  trust.  The 
elective  mode  of  obtaining  rulers  is  the  characteristic 
policy  of  republican  government.  The  means  relied  on 
in  this  form  of  government  for  preventing  their  degener- 
acy  are  numerous  and  variou-s.  The  most  effectual  one 
Is  such  a  limitation  of  the  term  of  appointments  as  will 
maintain  a  proper  responsibility  to  the  people. 

Let  me  now  ask  what  circumstance  there  is  in  the 
constitution  of  the  House  of  Representatives  that  violates 
tbe  principles  of  republican  government,  or  favors  the 


elevation  of  the  few  on  the  niins  of  the  ntany?  Let  me 
ask  whether  every  circumstmice  i«  not,  on  the  contnirjr. 
strictly  confurmabic  to  these  principles,  and  scrupulously 
impartial  to  the  rights  and  prctensiuits  of  every  class  aiul 
description  nf  <:itizens? 

Who  arc  to  be  the  electors  of  the  federal  representa- 
tives? Not  the  rich  more  than  the  poor;  noi  the 
learned  more  than  llie  ignorant;  not  (lie  liaugtity  heir* 
of  distin{uished  names  more  than  the  humble  sons  of 
obscurity  and  unpropitioiis  fortune.  The  electors  are  to 
be  the  great  IxKly  of  the  peuple  of  the  United  States. 
They  arc  to  be  the  same  who  exercise  the  rixbi  in  every 
State  of  electing  the  corresponding  branch  of  the  legis- 
lature of  the  State. 

Who  are  to  be  the  objects  of  popular  choice?  Every 
citisen  whose  merit  may  recommend  him  to  the  esteem 
and  confidence  of  his  country.  No  qualirication  of 
wealth,  of  birth,  of  relij;ious  failh,  or  of  civil  profeiision 
is  permitted  to  fetter  the  judgment  or  disappoint  the 
inclination  of  the  people. 

If  we  consider  the  situation  of  the  men  on  whom  the 
free  suffrages  of  their  (ellowr-citizens  may  confer  the 
representative  tnist,  we  shall  find  it  involving  every 
xecurity  which  can  be  devised  or  desired  for  their  fidelity 
to  their  constituents. 

In  the  first  place,  as  they  vill  have  been  distinguished 
by  the  preference  of  their  fellow-citisent,  we  are  to  pre- 
sume that  in  general  they  will  be  somewhat  distinguished 
also  by  those  qiuilitics  which  entitle  thcin  to  it,  and  which 
promise  a  sincere  and  scrupulous  regard  to  Die  nature  of 
tbeir  engagements. 

In  the  second  place,  they  will  enter  into  the  public 
service  under  cin:um"itance$  which  cannot  fail  to  produce 
a  temporary  affection  at  least  to  their  constituents. 
There  is  in  every  breast  a  sensibility  to  marks  of  honor, 
of  favor,  of  esteem,  and  of  confidence,  which,  apart  from 
all  considerations  of  interest,  '*<<  some  pledge  fur  gr.^lefnl 
and  benevolent  returns.  Ingr^tliliide  is  a  commitn  topic 
of  declamation  against  human  nature^  and    it  must   be 


Huniltea  (t)  ] 


XESTRMfXrS  ON  MEMBEKS. 


379 


confetiKd  tliat  insUnces  of  it  :irc  but  too  frequent  un<l 
fl3){ranl,  both  in  puhlic  and  in  private  life.  But  the 
universal  and  extreme  indign^tik^n  whicli  it  inspires  is 
itself  a  proof  of  tli«  cncrg)'  and  prevalence  of  the  con- 
trary sentiment. 

Jn  the  third  place,  those  tics  which  bind  the  rcprescnta' 
live  to  his  consiituenls  are  strengthened  hy  motiTcs  of  a 
more  sellish  nature,  tli.s  pride  and  vanity  attach  him  to 
a  form  of  government  which  favors  his  pretensions  and 
gives  him  a  sh:ire  in  its  honors  and  distinctions.  What- 
ever hopex  or  projects  might  be  entertained  by  a  few 
aspiring  characters,  it  must  generally  happen  that  a  great 
proportion  of  the  men  deriving  their  advancement  from 
their  inftiience  with  the  people  would  have  more  to  liope 
from  a  preservation  of  the  favor  than  from  innovations 
in  the  government  subversive  of  the  authority  of  the 
peiiple. 

All  these  securities,  hovevcr,  would  be  found  very 
insufficient  without  the  restraint  of  frequent  elections. 
Hence,  in  the  f<iurlh  place,  the  House  of  Representatives 
iK  so  constituted  as  to  support  \n  the  members  an  habitual 
recollection  of  their  dependence  on  the  people.  Before 
the  sentiments  impressed  on  their  minds  by  the  mode  of 
their  elevation  can  be  effaced  by  the  exercise  of  power, 
they  will  be  compelled  to  anticipate  the  moment  when 
their  power  is  to  cease,  when  their  exercise  of  it  is  to  be 
reviewed,  and  when  they  must  descend  to  the  level  from 
they  were  raised;  there  forever  to  remain  unless  a  faith- 
ful discharge  of  their  tnist  shall  have  established  their 
title  lo  a  renewal  of  it. 

1  will  add,  as  a  fifth  circumstance  in  the  situation  of 
the  House  of  Representatives,  restraining  them  from 
oppressive  measures,  iltat  they  can  make  no  law  which 
will  not  have  its  full  operation  on  themselves  and  their 
friends,  as  well  as  on  the  great  mass  of  the  society. 
This  Ims  always  been  deemed  one  of  the  strongest  bonds 
by  which  human  policy  can  connect  the  rulers  and  itie 
people  togi-lher.  It  creates  between  them  that  com- 
munion of  interests  and  sympathy  of  scnlinicnls  of  wliicb 


JM  KBLA  r/OXS  TV  COSSTtTVEXTS,      IM*  K  4* 

few  gorernments  ture  fumtibcd  esaraptes,  bat  vitb* 
oat  vhicb  every  goremoieDt  degenente*  into  tyraaajr. 
K  it  be  asked  what  b  to  restrain  the  House  of  Reprc 
sentativFS  from  otaking  legal  diwhniDattons  in  favor 
of  tbemvelves  aotl  a  particular  clau  of  ibe  soektjr.  I 
aoswer:  the  genius  of  ibc  irbole  sjstctn:  tbe  natare  of 
just  and  constitutional  laws;  and  above  all,  Ibe  vigilant 
and  tnanljr  spirit  which  actuates  the  people  of  America 
—a  spirit  which  nourishes  freedom,  and  in  rctvra  \% 
nourished  by  it. 

If  this  spirit  shall  ever  be  so  far  debased  as  to  tolerate  a 
taw  not  obligatory  on  tbe  legislature,  as  well  as  on  the 
people,  the  people  will  be  prepared  to  tolerate  anything 
but  liberty. 

Such  will  be  the  relation  between  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives and  their  constituents.  Duty,  graiitude. 
interest,  ambitit^n  itself,  are  the  cords  by  which  they 
will  be  bound  to  fidelity  and  sym|>uthy  with  the  great 
mass  of  the  people.  It  is  possible  that  these  may  all 
be  insufficient  to  control  the  caprice  and  wickedness  of 
man.  Rut  arc  they  not  all  thai  government  will  admit 
and  that  human  prudence  can  devise?  Arc  they  not  the 
genuine  and  the  characteristic  means  by  which  republi- 
can government  provides  for  the  liberty  and  happiness 
of  the  people?  Are  they  not  the  identical  means  en 
which  every  State  gorcrnmcnt  in  the  Union  relies  for  the 
attainment  of  these  important  ends?  What,  then,  are  we 
to  understand  by  the  objection  which  this  paper  has 
combated?  What  are  we  to  say  to  the  men  who  profess 
the  most  flaming  leal  for  republican  government,  yet 
boldly  impeach  the  fundamental  principle  of  it;  who 
pretend  to  he  champions  for  the  right  and  the  capacity 
of  the  people  to  choose  their  own  rulers,  yet  maintain 
that  they  will  prefer  those  only  who  will  immediately  and 
infallibly  betray  the  trust  commiltcd  to  them? 

Were  the  objection  to  be  read  by  one  who  had  not  seen 
the  mode  prescribed  by  the  Constitution  for  the  choice 
of  representatives,  he  could  suppose  nothing  less  than 
that   some  unreasonable  qualification  of  property   was 


* 


N 


owuiMaii 


WISE  CHOICE  PROBABLE. 


38i 


^ 


annexed  to  the  rif^ht  of  suffrage;  or  that  the  right  of 
eligibility  vras  limited  to  persons  of  pariicular  families  or 
fortunes;  or  at  least  that  the  mo<lc  prescribed  by  the 
State  constitutions  w:is,  in  some  respect  or  other,  very 
grossly  departed  from.  We  have  seen  how  far  such  a 
supposition  would  err,  as  to  the  two  first  points.  Nor 
would  it,  in  fact,  be  less  erroneous  as  to  the  last.  The 
only  difference  discoverable  between  the  two  cases  is 
that  each  representative  of  the  United  States  will  be 
elected  by  five  or  tix  thousand  citizens;  whilst,  in  the 
individual  States,  the  election  of  a  ri:presentalivc  is  left 
to  about  as  ni^iny  hundreds.  Will  it  be  pretended  that 
this  difference  is  sufficient  to  justify  an  attachment  to  the 
Slate  Kovernmenls,  and  an  abhorrence  to  the  federal 
government?  [f  this  be  the  point  on  which  the  objec- 
tion  turns,  it  deserves  to  be  examined. 

Is  it  supported  by  rt-xionf  This  cannot  be  said  with* 
out  maintaining  that  live  or  six  thousand  ciliecns  arc  less 
capable  of  choosing  a  fit  representative,  or  more  liable  to 
tfC  corrupted  by  an  unfit  one,  than  five  nr  six  hundred. 
Reason,  on  the  contrary,  assures  us  that  as  in  so  i;rcat 
a  number  a  fit  representative  would  be  most  likely  to  be 
found,  so  the  choice  would  be  less  likely  to  be  diverted 
from  him  by  the  intrigues  of  the  ambitious  or  the  bribes 
of  the  rich. 

It  the  eontequemt  from  this  doctrine  admissible?  If  we 
say  that  five  or  six  hundred  citizens  are  as  many  as  can 
jointly  exercise  their  right  of  suffrage,  must  wc  not 
deprive  the  people  of  the  immediate  ctinice  of  their  pub- 
lic servants,  in  every  instance  where  the  administration 
of  the  government  docs  not  require  as  many  of  them  as 
will  amount  to  one  for  that  number  of  citizens? 

U  ihc  doctrine  wamnteil  by  /actsT    It  WiU  «hown  in  the  last 
paper  that  the  re.^1  repmenuiiion  in  ihp  British  Huuie  of  Com- 
mons very  litlle  exceed*  the  propotiion  of  one  for  every  Ihlrty 
thousand  inliabllants.     Brsides  a  vaticly  of  powerful  cat" 
exislinK  here,  and  which  favor  in  that  country  the  preta 
rank  aitd  wealth,  no  person  is  eligible  as  a  rcprew^ial 
cniinly  unless  he  poucM  real  estate  of  the  clear  vnlue  of 
died  pounds  sterling  per  year ;  nor  of  a  city  or  borough,  u 


383  STATE  ELECTORAL  DISTRICTS.  IVatAII 

pOSMM  Ji  lik<:  csi.tic  of  half  tint  annual  v;ilue.  Ti>  lliik  ()uatific«- 
tiim  on  the  pari  of  the  county  repmcnuiiccs  is  added  jiiiuiIim  mi 
the  pan  of  (lie  comity  eleciors,  which  resiraidit  the  lisht  of  u(- 
(raKC  10  persons  h^tvi'ng  a  frcrhoUl  ettAtc  of  the  annual  value  of 
more  (han  tvreniy  pounds  sterling,  accoiilriif;  to  (he  preieni  lale  of 
money.  Nut  with  stand  in^  IhcM:  unfavDtnbie  circutntlanccs,  nnd 
fiat  with  standing  some  v«ry  unequal  lavra  m  the  Utituli  code,  it 
c^uinot  Ik-  ^d  thai  the  rcprc«:ntaliir«s  of  ilie  nation  have  dcvaud 
the  (cw  on  the  rums  of  the  niany. 

But  wc  nrccl  not  renoti  to  lutei>;n  ex|>ci'icncc  on  this  suhjcct. 
Our  own  i&  cxjilicit  and  itccisive.  The  dutiicik  an  New  tlatnpshiie 
in  wliicli  the  M^alors  >re  chosen  i  mined  lately  by  the  people  ore 
nearly  as  tatgc  as  will  be  necrssaiy  for  her  TCVK^fnlaiive^  in  the 
CoDtcms.  Th<Me  of  Max^ncliiiielts  nre  Urfret  than  wilt  be  nccei- 
sary  for  that  purpose ;  and  those  o(  New  Vortt  stdl  more  »o.  In 
the  Uit  Stale  the  ineinhersul  AKSFinbly  fur  the  cities  and  counties 
of  New  Vork  anil  Albany  are  elected  tiy  very  itearly  as  many  roters 
a»  will  heenliileil  to  a  repreMiilalivc  in  the  Consrem.  calculatinK 
on  Ihc  number  of  si\iy-tivc  repre^ten  la  lives  only.  It  makes  no  dif- 
ference (hat  in  these  senatorial  dUtricii  and  counties  a  number  of 
represenlative*  are  voted  (or  by  each  cicclof  at  ili«  um«  lime.  II 
the  same  electors  al  the  same  lime  arc  capable  of  clioostni;  (oitr  or 
five  representatives,  iliey  cannot  be  incapable  of  choosing  one, 
Prnnsylvania  is  an  addiliorial  etninplc  Some  ol  her  counties, 
which  elect  lier  Slate  feprrsenialiccs.  arc  almost  a%  large  MB 
her  districts  will  \w.  tiy  which  bet  (cileral  reptcseiiialives  vrtlt  he 
elected.  The  city  el  l^hiladelpliia  is  supposed  10  coiiuiii  briwcoi 
tifty  and  sixiy  IhouiAnd  souls.  Il  will  ihcrefuie  lurni  nearly  l*a 
districts  lor  ibc  choice  of  federal  repcrMiiL-iitvrs.  It  fomi«,  how- 
ever, but  one  county,  in  which  every  elector  voles  for  each  ol  Us 
represen  tat  ires  in  the  Slate  lrj;islature.  Anil  what  may  appear  to 
be  still  mure  directly  (o  our  purt>osc.  the  whole  diy  actually  etccts 
a  sit^U  mtmhrr  lor  (he  execmiv«  council.  This  is  the  case  in  all 
tlic  other  counties  ol  (he  Slate. 

Are  not  (lirse  facts  the  most  saliifactory  proofs  of  (he  fallxcy 
wUich  has  been  employfll  agains.!  the  bi-aivch  of  (he  federal  gov- 
eriiincnl  umlcr  considrr.ition?  Ha«  it  appeared  on  (rial  that  (be 
senators  u(  New  Hampshire,  Missachusetls.aml  New  Yorh.  or  llie 
executive  council  of  Pennsylvania,  or  the  roeml>ets  of  (he  Assembly 
in  (he  two  lasi  Slates,  have  licirayed  any  |Mcid<ar  dt«jHisitinn  (e 
stcrlfioe  ihe  many  10  the  (cw,  or  are  in  any  respect  less  worthy  uf 
(licit  places  than  the  rcprcKnlniivo  and  magisiraleB  apfiointed  in 
Qlbcr  Slalca  by  very  sniall  divisions  of  tli«  ya»^\ 


HtmltuaOII        FUTURE  INCREASE  OF  HOUSE.  3*3 

But  iImk  arc  caws  or  a  sirongcr  cmnptrxion  tli:in  any  whidi  I 
have  yet  quolcd.  Cite  bmncli  ut  ibe  Ir^isUlurc  of  Cuniirclictit  is 
so  conuuutcd  itiai  cncli  mciiibct  of  it  i»  cicclcil  by  llie  \vhuk  Slate. 
So  In  ihc  goveinur  ol  iIiaI  Hl;ilc,  o(  ftlius.-icliusclts.  and  of  lliis 
Siaic.  ftnd  llir  |iicxi<lcnl  of  New  ll.iinpshire.  I  Ic^tvc  every  niun  10 
deckle  wliclher  ibu  rcsull  of  any  oiii:  of  these  KXpe-iiiiicms  can  lie 
stid  to  cnuiilen-iiicc  n  suspicii>ii  ih.tl  a  ilifftixii'e  Riode  of  chuitilig 
iifpreienliitives  lA  i)ie  peopk  tends  to  cleviic  tiaitois  and  to  under- 
mine  the  public  liberty.  Fublius. 


No.  58  [57).  ('ih/</r*A>r/f<rr<M/.  r*bniw]ri>.i]«.}   Hatnilton  (?) 

FUTURE  AUGMKNTATION  OF  THE  HOUSE  OF 
RKi'RKSlCNIATIVES. 

Tkr  ilate  iffniiilulL/ni  rtmfttrrJ  Mt  liit  f^nt  tvilA  Ikt  »tu  prtfttti 
—  Tht  frattict  0/  Iht  italt  gfotrniDtnti — TAr  orgmtimtwa  tf  Cmgriil 
mliiiJitte  VHiuh/alntn—Tkt la'gt  ildtti  swtf  ifnlnl  Ikr  imiil—O^- 
jtrtioHi  th-U  IMi  Sinah  mil  freiMHl  augmtHlaiiaH  aMtvtreJ^TAt  (fit- 
iMuliimt/  rfS9HTtt  rf  rt/niing  ivppliti  ty  Iht  llttii* — Stattus  agatatt 
a  tmrntrtut  H*utt — Otjitlim  It  a  <KttJfriif  hing  a  fu^ritm,  f/  vfiuA  a 
mnjirrtly  itn  /nail  iani,  ffHiiJfrtJ^ 

Ta  tile  IWf>!e  ef  lite  Stale  e,f  JVew  Yerk: 

The  remaining  charge  against  the  Eluuec  of  Represent^ 
atives  which  1  :im  to  ex»ntitic  ik  ^uiinded  on  a  su|>|>0> 
siiion  that  the  number  0/  members  will  not  be  augmented 
frum  time  Co  tinac,  as  the  progress  of  population  may 
dcntund. 

It  has  been  admitted  that  this  objection,  if  well 
supported,  would  have  great  weight.  The  following 
(ibttervations  will  »hov  tlut,  like  taut.t  other  olijci'lion^ 
against  the  Constitution,  it  can  only  proceed  from  a 
partial  view  of  the  subject,  or  from  a  jealousy  which  dis- 
colors and  disftgures  every  object  which  is  beheld. 

I.  Those  who  urge  the  objection  seem  not  to  hate 
recollected  th.it  the  federal  Constitution  will  not  suffer 
by  a  comparison  with  the  St^le  consiiiutiun*,  in  tlie 
secnrity  provided  for  a  gradual  augmentation  of  the 
number  of  representatives.  The  number  which  is  to 
prevail  in  the  brst  instance  is  declared  to  be  temporary. 


384 


LARGE  STATES    WAXT  JSCXEASE.     1»».M(T) 


Its  duration  is  Itniited  to  tlie  short  term  of  three  y«arsn 
Within  evcrjr  successive  term  of  ten  yean  a  census  oE 
inliabiunts  is  to  be  repeated.  The  unequivocal  objects 
of  these  regulations  are,  tirsi,  to  readjust  from  time  to 
time  the  api>urttonment  of  representatives  to  the  num- 
ber of  inhabitants,  under  the  single  exception  that  each 
St;)te  sh;tll  have  one  representative  at  least;  secondly,  to 
augment  the  number  of  representatives  at  the  sav 
periods,  under  the  sole  limitation  that  the  whole  numbei 
shall  not  exceed  one  for  every  thirty  thousand  inhat 
itants.  If  we  review  the  constitutions  of  the  several'^ 
Slates,  wc  shall  Rnd  that  some  of  them  contain  no 
determinate  regulations  on  this  subject,  that  others 
correspond  pretty  much  on  this  point  with  the  federal 
Constitution,  and  that  the  most  effectual  security  io  any 
of  them  is  resolvable  into  a  mere  directory  provision. 

1.  As  far  as  experience  has  taken  place  on  this  subject, 
a  gradual  increase  of  representatives  under  the  State 
constitutions  has  at  least  kept  pace  with  that  of  the  con- 
stituents, and  it  appears  that  the  former  have  been  at 
ready  to  concur  in  such  measures  as  the  latter  have  been 
to  call  for  them. 

3,  There  is  a  peculiarity  in  the  federal  Constitution 
which  insures  a  watchful  attention  in  a  majority  both  of 
the  people  and  of  their  representatives  to  a  constitutional 
augmentation  of  the  latter.  The  peculiarity  lies  in  this, 
that  one  branch  of  the  legislature  is  a  representation  of 
citizens,  the  other  of  the  States;  in  the  former,  conse- 
quently, the  larger  States  will  have  most  weight;  in  the 
latter,  the  advantage  will  be  in  favor  of  the  smaller 
■States.  J-'rom  this  circumstance  it  may  with  certainly  be 
inferred  titat  the  larger  States  will  be  strenuous  advo, 
caies  for  increasing  the  number  and  weight  of  tliat  pat 
of  the  IcgisUlurc  in  which  their  influence  prediitninatm 
And  it  so  happens  that  four  only  of  the  largi^sl  will  have 
a  majority  of  the  whole  vote  in  the  House  of  Keprcsenla- 
tivrs.  Should  the  representatives  or  people,  therefore, 
of  the  smaller  Slates  oppose  at  any  lime  a  reasoiuiblc 
addition  of  members,  a  coalition  of  *  very  few  States  will 


ADVANTAGE  ACCRUING  TO  HOVSE.      iH 

be  sufficient  to  overrule  ttic  opposition :  a  coalition  which, 
[not withstanding  the  nvn)shi|>^ml  local  prcjiiiliccs  which 
inii^ht  prevent  it  on  ordinary  occasions,  would  not  fail  to 
take  place,  when  not  merely  prompted  by  common  inter- 
est, but  JHstined  by  equity  and  the  principles  of  the  Con- 
stitution. 

It  may  be  allcgetl,  perhaps,  that  the  Senate  would  be 
prompted  by  like  motives  lo  an  adverse  coalition;  and  as 
ttieir  concurrence  would  be  indispensable,  the  just  and 
constitutional  views  of  the  other  branch  might  be  de> 
(eated.  This  is  the  diffictdiy  which  has  probably  created 
the  most  serious  apprehensions  in  the  jealous  friends  of 
a  numerous  representation.  Fortunately  it  is  among  tite 
ilifficulties  which,  existing  only  in  appearance,  vanish  on 
a  close  and  accurate  inspection.  The  following  reflec- 
tions wilt,  if  I  mistake  not,  be  admitted  to  be  conclusive 
and  satisfactory  on  this  point, 

Notwithstanding  the  equal  authority  which  will  subsist 
between  the  two  houses  on  all  legislative  subjects,  except 
the  originating  o(  money  bills,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that 
the  House,  com{>oscd  of  the  greater  number  of  members, 
when  supported  by  the  more  powerful  Stales,  and  speak- 
ing the  known  and  determined  sense  of  a  majority  of  the 
people,  will  have  no  small  advantage  in  a  question  de> 
pending  on  the  comparative  firmness  of  the  two  houses. 

This  advantage  must  be  increased  by  the  consciousness 
felt  by  the  same  side  of  being  supported  in  its  demands 
by  right,  by  reason,  and  by  the  Constitution;  and  the 
conitiiousness.  on  the  opposite  side,  of  contending  against 
Ihc  force  of  all  these  solemn  considerations. 

It  is  farther  to  be  considered  that,  in  the  gradation  be- 
tween the  smallest  and  largest  States,  there  arc  several 
which,  though  most  likely  in  general  to  arrange  them- 
selves among  the  former,  are  too  little  removed  in  extent 
and  |K)pu1atiun  from  the  latter  to  second  an  opposition 
to  their  just  and  legitimate  pretensions.  Hence  it  is  by 
no  means  certain  that  a  m,'ijority  of  votes,  even  in  the 
Senate,  would  be  unfriendly  to  proper  augmentations  In 
the  number  of  representatives. 


3« 


POWER  OP  SMALL  STATES. 


!>».»•  .371 


It  will  not  be  luokins  too  far  to  add  that  the  senalurs 
from  all  the  nc;w  States  may  be  gained  over  to  the  juRt 
views  of  the  House  of  Rci>resenlativcs  by  an  cxiKtIieiii 
too  obvious  to  be  overlooked.  As  these  Slates  will,  for 
a  great  length  <if  lime,  advance  in  |>ii)>iilatii)n  wiiJi  pccuU 
tur  rapidity,  they  will  lie  interested  in  frcquCDt  reap- 
portionments of  the  representatives  to  the  number  of 
inhabitants.  The  large  States,  therefore,  wlm  will  pre- 
vail in  the  House  of  Representatives  will  have  nothin|[ 
to  do  but  to  make  reapportionments  and  augmentations, 
mutually  conditions  of  eaeh  other;  and  the  seitators 
from  all  the  most  growing  States  will  be  bound  to  eon- 
tend  for  the  latter  by  the  interest  which  their  States  will 
feel  in  ihc  former. 

These  considerations  seem  to  afford  ample  sccnriiy  on 
this  subject,  and  ought  alone  to  satisfy  all  the  doubts  and 
fi-ars  whirh  have  been  indulged  with  regard  to  it,  .Ad- 
milting,  however,  that  thry  should  all  be  tnstifBi  ient  tn 
subdue  the  unju-it  policy  of  the  smaller  States,  or  their 
predominant  inRncnce  in  the  councils  of  the  Senate,  a 
lonstittttional  and  inf.illible  resource  still  remains  with 
the  larger  States,  by  whielt  they  will  be  able  at  all 
times  to  aceomplish  their  just  purposirs.  The  House  of 
Representatives  cannot  only  refuse,  but  they  alone  ran 
propose,  the  supplies  requisite  for  the  supfwrt  of  govern- 
ment.'     They,  in  a  word,  hold  the  purse— that  (luwefful 

'  To  n.iininr  ■■  IriiiJIh  llic  \'n\n\\  on  whkh  llw  Smutr  itHl  ll'iiM  h""- 
ilivigrM^  iroiild  Iw  in«l«».  Bui  a  («w  »(  tlie  i)ii»iiont  nia^  ''•  brirfy 
uoficnl.  ihil  Himc  i>Ua  mvf  be  t;iicn  uf  ihc  arliiil  vaIuc  (J  llw  IkBiMC. 
t>n«h  a<>  achcvli  >n>l  ■!  ■  (lo);  to  l)ke  inoiE  piijulnr  :i(<i-Mi  of  lh«  tlouW. 
to  17^  llw  lliiuv  fliicrniirni  |»  )>ri^lt>il  In<tc  u-iih  tt'i^^tiiiul.  Iwl  llw 
^tnolBlim  wn  m-KaiiTnl  hv  lbs  Sriiale.  Tlic  Liilri  rtlilinl  Ihn  Jay 
Trralir,  wliiih  Uir  '  -  r .  dniiy  iip|»^.  1 11  iSl.)  I  lie  Ili«>f  viilPil  (or 
thp  amni'Icniint  Miuoirri  n»  >  (rpr  •lifr.  mJ  il.r  Soiulc  le- 

jfrlcd  il :   ■  vcf;,        tian   acciiniiv;   in    iBlu.      In    llie  -■.me  yi«T 

(iSiijl  the  ((Kmct  piMBl  ■  imilntiic  i»il5,  which  "b»  im;:»li»nl  Lj  tlir 
\u\n.  ami  In  iBsfc  lh«  Sciialr  ili-tc-itr-l  «  1i>M  nt  ewn  iMmiT  v>«<»»1i*r 
lri,i!cni:y       In  I?;;  Ili»  Sciialr  "  «■>".-       .   I   '  f  Teon. 

Im  ihc  timivc  rediMd  lo  cofit-nr,     {\\  'Ur  iva 

hriiliti  on  tlie  l>m  (ot  an  Iiiil«|wn-leiii     1  i<  >- <  —   '*•' 

'  .Wijmot   provito,  am)   lu  proEolypet.  vn\  ^rt'rtal  ti»'  'r 

'  SeiMle.  Iml  (lial  tinlir  was  nnfamrable  lo  ttie  alDciHlnn  <  \'-e 

MIIiBiloreJ  lo  III*   HoUae  iu  Ibc  Ltll  ui|^lti^  Ibc  Icmliitic*  u(  he* 


Bkalltnmi 


MOt/SE  AND  SENA  TE. 


387 


instrument  \>y  which  we  behuld,  in  the  liiitory  u(  the 
British  Constitution,  an  infunl  and  humble  representa- 
tion of  ihc  people  gradually  enlarging  the  sphere  of  its 
activity  and  importance,  and  finally  reducing,  us  far  as 
it  seems  to  lutve  wished,  all  the  overgrown  prerogatives 
of  the  other  br;inchc5  of  the  goveroment.  This  power 
over  the  purse  may,  in  fact,  be  reg;irdcd  as  the  most 
complete  and  eCTeetual  weapon  with  which  any  constitu- 
tion c^iti  arm  the  immediate  representatives  of  the  people, 
for  obtaining  a  redress  of  every  grievance,  and  for  carry- 
ing into  effect  every  just  and  salutary  nicaxiire. 

But  will  niit  the  (Ihukc  of  Kepreseiiiatives  be  as  much 
interested  as  the  Senate  in  maintaining  the  government 
in  its  proper  functions,  and  will  they  not  therefore  be 
unwilling  tu  stake  its  existence  or  its  reputation  on  the 
pliancy  of  the  Senate?  Or,  if  such  a  trial  of  firmness  be- 
tween the  two  branches  were  tiaxardcd,  would  nut  itie 
one  be  as  likely  first  to  yield  as  the  other?  These  ques- 
tions  will  create  no  ditlicnity  with  those  who  reflect  that 
in  aU  cases  the  smaller  the  number,  and  the  morcperma- 


Moxtcu  anit  California  in  1S43.  Tlie  itrngglc  over  th«  KuiiovNebruha 
di<ficulti«  wu  long  awl  llic  iliutgrecinciit*  lici|Nriil;  Ihc  Senile  twine 
cunuueiilly  fmoratile  tn  lite  rilciiMnn  <>l,  or  iiiiii-intrc(r(cii<;c  with 
klaVRv.  aiiJ  |l>e  Hoiiv:  Hocliinliiif;  ill  '\X\  oltiluOe.  Ill  iSb]  lite  S«nal( 
pawfO  *  ci)nililulii>nil  auiriidount  aboliihiiiu  ilavtty.  (nil  it  failcil  lo  yet 
ihe  ntttnavf  tatn  in  Ihc  Hoiitc.  Tlic  mini  recent  diuc'ccmeiilt  o( 
moiuenl  have  been  on  Ihe  to-i^leii  "  (oice  bill."  ■■■■.1  uii  the  uliti  (lui- 
chaie  law.  m  bixli  %A  wliicli  llic  SrnaU'  bu  •tmwn  iUrll  ■  cuiiiervalit* 
(un.'V,  but  iHi«  ulli'iialrljr  tiri)v>ii-.ivr  in  |<ul>lic  uptnian. 

"  Thii  iniKh.  howevct.  mvf  be  tlaimrd  fi>r  il,  dial  it  has  been,  and  b, 
no  iHo  >bule.  a  tleadying  anj  inoderiilinK  powei.  One  uiiinot  tay,  iu 
(he  laiigimge  i4  Eudipcdn  jmlitict,  lliat  il  liai,  letiioeiilnl  aiiiliitralic 
piiiici^jM,  (>r  a^ili'ihifiiifAr  priticiplcH.  iir  even  coritrrvalivr  priricipln. 
l^ach  <A  the  K***'  liiiiuiic  )>atliFi  Imi  in  luiii  coinniamleil  »  majorily  in 
il.  ami  the  diSerence  tcln-eeu  ibefi  klieiigih  ha«  duiiiig  (be  last  decade 
tiren  h>i(  dight.  0«  none  ol  lite  urCLiI  iitiiea  ihal  lia<e<Uvi(ledilicn«lIoii 
bai  tt»e  Senafe  bee*,  (ai  any  long  jiciiml.  itn-ldMlly  oji|toMd  to  itie  iillier 
II1HIM  lA  C-j'iK'cvi.  It  -ihtiwciT  va  more  (a)acily  ihaii  Ilit  llouvt  (or 
l[ii|<|>1iB[;  wiih  ibv  iiioblemt  of  tUnry  ritenHon.  Il  wu  H'artely  Icib 
n*A<i  iKin  ihr  IlouM  lo  iiiain  ihe  ConMiIulion  by  roppoKing  Limxiln  in 
llw  exerciu;  o(  llie  to^ialled  usi  jxiwen,  01  aabicquenlly  bycMllne  down 
|»m>(ci>tlal  aiilhoiity  >»  Ibc  tlitij^^le  Iwlweeii  LJiiiKCCtiund  Andrew  John- 
■«'■.  All  ill*  Burl  mix  1111  <>(  puhlii-  'ii-iiiioii  ItII  u|Hin  il,  nur  docs  il  vca> 
Iwe.  aay  ntoro  ihao  tbe  ltoiii«.  lo  conlninl  a  popular  iaipalsv,  because 
it  ik,   equally   with   tlM    liuote,   Mbject   10  ibe  coutiol  ^  the  (tc«l 


KESlSTAXr  h'ORCB  OF  HOUSE.        OTfcM  i57) 


ncnt  and  conspicaous  the  station,  of  men  in  power,  tlie 
stronger  must  be  the  intureitt  wliicli  Ihey  will  individiiall]r 
feel  in  whatever  concerns  the  j[ovcrnmcnt.  Those  who 
represent  the  dignit]^  of  their  country  in  the  eyes  of  other 
nations  will  be  i>urticuUrly  xensible  to  every  prospect  of 
public  danger  or  of  dishonorable  stagnation  in  public 
affairs.  To  those  causes  we  are  to  ascribe  the  continual 
triumph  of  the  Uritish  House  of  Commons  over  the  other 
bninclies  of  the  government,  whenever  the  engfne  of  a 
money  bill  has  been  employed.  An  absolute  infiexibility 
on  the  side  of  the  latter,  although  it  could  not  have 
failed  to  involve  every  department  of  the  state  in  the 
general  confusion,  has  neither  been  apprehended  nor  ex- 
perienced. The  utmost  degree  of  ririnnr«  that  tan  be 
displayed  by  the  federal  Senate  or  President  will  not  be 
more  than  equal  to  a  resistance  in  which  they  will  be  sup- 
purtetl  by  constitutional  and  patriotic  principles. 

In  tlii»  review  nf  the   constitution  of  the   House   of 
Representatives,  I  have  paitsed  over  Uie  circumstances  of 


liARla,  vhLch  MCk  to  nte  while  1IM7  olx;  the  duwlauit  fnulnwM  fif 
tile  hour. 

"  But  the  HiKtualkmi  ot  opinicin  tclloii  itlcHcncrgeliollrlhanoMiW 
llouKof  KeprcKiiianTn.  Tttcy  n«cti  llslou-ly  •od  i[i«idiullr,  owing 
tu  tlic  vf-fAtta  wliith  rcimtK  II  by  ooc^fainl  cwiy  McMiilTear.  k>  ihal  tl 
Kiiiwtinict  lMfi|)(n»  tlul  twfotv  Ibc  lidr  bat  n'van.  10  tlic  loji  of  lli«  5uuil 
in  lb«  S«dMc  h  has  ■tmdjr  brgun  t»  «bb  in  the  cuunlrjr.  Thv  Smalc 
hut  b«cn  ■  iXaaXet  bulwarh  «£■>'"<  ■citation,  not  ■•rirljr  Ixcanie  a 
majattly  o\  ittc  tcnaioti  have  aFwaii  four  yt«n  ol  iDclnbenhip  betom^ 
Itwrn,  wiihia  uliiib  gxriiHl  public  Itellof  may  i:hui|;e,  but  itu)  hecattM* 
ll>«  irnalun  haic  born  indiTiilMJly  ilruogat  meit  Ibin  Ibo  ic|>mcntalim. 
IhsT  UF  l<i>  democratic,  nol  in  ofiinioin.  Iiul  in  Ifoiht.  bttaunr  th*y 
have  mure  wtf-conlidenve.  ticcavw  Uiey  have  n»lc  10  lute.  Iietaste  el- 

CciiuiKC  hu  laii|;hl  (hen  how  flcclla|;  ■  thUg  uuimlar  leniinicfli   ii,  and 
uw  niefiil  a  (hfn);  ptnliRiiily  in  iKilk7  il     Tlir  '    :       .; 

uinally  k(i|4  iit  h««H  b«nvr  (ban  the  Homo  of  Kr;  * 

vxpmiH  naorv  adeiinalely  the  jiuljpiKtil.  ■%  cuoln..^.  . 
(i|  the  iialioii.      In  Ihit  teiuc  II  iloet  iy>oililUtc  a  'cheek  and  luLinrr  ' 
the  Feilcral  covcrnDieni,     Ul  th«  (brec  Krcal  (iiiKllona  iibkh  ll>e  Falhei 
iij  th<  Coo^lilntloii  meant  il  to  pcrfofM.  Ibe   Itrnl.  iJkat   uf  *ci--fitinj;   tfi 
rit:hlK  nf  the  unallfr  Slalei,  \n  no  lon(jri  in>i>"«»nt.  li«a»w  Ihr  mlinl  • 
Sul«  i>|-hli  faat  been  now  wcU  aelllcd  .  <t.  ihat  vl  iila 

HiK  Q*  uoiUroUiiif  ihe  Eaecuili-e  lu  ai  >  l[  ni  is  Irtai. 

bwt  Biven  riic  lo  cvllt  ^:' ■  ■■■ '<■  ■-'■'-       \'-"  ■' 

iMrdduiy  It  hiill  well  I 

MHMeniua  aitcBilily  i"  i      ,  ,    >- 

Mou '  ia  leilniucd."—  Btyca'a  *'  AmdicHi  Cwuuuo«waalilt>  ' — UwiUK. 


■ 


■unUlMmi  POWEK  OF  f-Ety  ItV HIG  AUSKMBUES.     389 

economy,  witich,  in  tlie  present  slate  of  uiTuim,  might 
huve  had  some  eSect  in  Ic&sening  the  temporary  number 
of  representatives,  and  a  disregard  of  which  would  prob- 
ably have  been  as  rich  a  theme  of  dectamalion  against 
llie  Constitution  as  has  been  shown  by  the  smallness  of 
the  number  proposed.  1  omit  also  any  remarks  on  the 
difliculty  which  mii;lit  be  found,  under  present  circum- 
stances, in  engaging  in  the  federal  service  a  large  number 
of  such  characters  as  (he  people  will  probably  elect. 
One  observation,  houxver,  I  must  be  permitted  to  add  on 
this  subject  as  claiming,  in  ray  judgment,  a  very  serious 
attention.  It  is,  that  in  all  legislative  assemblies  the 
greater  the  number  coniposinj^  them  muy  be,  the  fewer 
will  be  the  men  who  will  in  fact  direct  their  proceedings. 
Sm  in   the  first   place,  the   more    numerous    an 

Ko.  ss.  assembly    may    be,   of    whatever    characters 

composed,  the  greater  is  known  to  be  the  ascendency  of 
pasMon  over  reason.  In  the  next  place,  the  larger  the 
number,  the  greater  will  be  the  proportion  of  members 
of  limited  information  and  of  weak  capacities.  Now,  It 
is  precisely  on  characters  of  this  description  tliat  the  elo- 
quence and  address  of  the  fen-  arc  known  to  act  with  all 
their  force.  In  the  ancient  republics,  where  the  whole 
body  of  the  people  assembled  in  person,  a  single  orator, 
or  an  artful  statesman,  was  generally  seen  to  rule  with  as 
complete  a  sway  a*  if  a  scepter  h.id  been  placed  in  his 
single  hand.  On  the  same  principle,  the  more  multitu- 
dinous a  representative  assembly  may  be  rendered,  the 
more  it  will  partake  of  the  inflrmities  incident  to  collect- 
ive meetings  of  the  people.  Ignorance  will  be  the  dupe 
of  cunning,  and  passion  the  slave  of  sophistry  and  dec- 
lamation. The  people  can  never  err  more  than  in  sup- 
posing that  by  multiply  in  jiT  their  rejiresentatives  beyond 
a  certain  limit,  they  strengthen  the  barrier  against  the 
government  of  a  few.  Experience  will  forever  admonish 
them  that,  on  the  contrary,  a/ltr  securtDg  a  tuffUUat  nuof 
itr  for  tkt  pur^ui  of  tafety,  of  /Mtz/  iaformalien,  and  «f 
diffuavt  sym^thy  with  the  wholf  society,  Xhcy  will  counter* 
act  their  own  views  by  every  addition  to  their  represent- 


MAJORITIES  AND  QUORUMS.         IKo.  M  <571 


atives.  Tlie  countenance  of  the  KovvrDintrnt  may  bcuotDe 
nmrc  tlvmorratic,  litit  the  soul  lliat  nntmntcs  il  will  be 
mure  oligiifchic.  The  macliine  will  l>e  enlarged,  but  the 
fewer,  and  often  the  more  secret,  will  be  the  springs  bjr 
which  its  motions  arc  directed. 

Aft  connected  with  the  objection  agntnst  the  number 
of  representatives,  may  properly  be  here  noticed  that 
which  has  been  suggested  against  the  number  made 
competent  for  legislative  business.  It  hu  been 
said  that  more  than  a  majority  ought  to  have  been 
ref)»ired  for  a  quorum ;  and  in  (Kirticubr  cases,  if  not 
in  atl,  more  Itian  a  majority  of  a  quorum  (or  a  deci- 
sion. That  some  advantages  might  have  rcsulied 
from  such  a  precauiinn  cannot  be  denied,  ll  might 
have  been  an  additional  shield  to  some  particular 
interests,  and  another  obstacle  generally  to  hasty  and 
jiariial  measures.  But  these  considerations  are  out- 
weighed by  the  inconveniences  in  the  opposite  scale.  In 
all  cases  where  justice  or  tbc  general  good  might  require 
new  laws  to  be  passed,  or  active  measures  to  be  pursue 
the  fundamental  principle  of  free  government  would 
reversed.  It  would  be  no  longer  the  majority  that  would 
rule:  the  power  would  be  transferred  to  the  minority.' 
Were  the  defensive  privilege  limited  to  particular  cases, 
an  interested  minority  might  ukc  advantage  of  it  In 
screen  themselves  from  equitable  sacrifices  to  the  general 
weal,  or,  in  particular  emergencies,  to  extort  tinrrason- 
able  iiululgcnccs.     lastly,  it  would  facilitate  and  foster 

'  This  had  been  (aocenfully  aoeoiupliihed  in  177^  in  ihc  Auemblir  <4 
PeansylnuiM.  wliere  •  MJntiiilT  ok  Ihe  rcprcicsiaiira  hul.  by  witb> 
dnwiB);.  •leilioTcd  a  i)iiutuni.  %\%A  ihut  iwneHIcd  all  IckiiIbIuil  Thr 
uune  nmuarc  km  Mlnniitdl  in  I7S7  l>y  III*  liiiliurlly  oi  die  uiiir  Aueiik 
I'lv.  lo  |ir**»nt  the  tnlliti);  ot  a  cvni'rnlKiii  10  cnniiiin  iW  ftdrral  i.-uiixlt* 
'ulinn.  l>ul  hkil  been  TDcteswfnlly  <le(c*(«d  (hmigh  tkt  iiirnrc  of  ■ 
fliiUiUlpliia  mob,  which  ogitareil  arnie  ol  the  Mvcdcrt  ami  bruii£hl 
Ibem  hf  forte  to  ihe  Auetsbty,  wiicte  ibef  were  cuunloi  lo  make  a 
anomB.  km)  llie  ai;t  |iaH«il.  K|icakar  HecilN  l-vnir  ii-intn)  uilb  lh« 
^tanoc-'niU  nf  ttin  Ifixrir  of  Rcftetinitaltvet,  vrhcs  Tliry  relu^rU  Itk  ftnivef 
Ijhe  mll-irkll  in  nriler  to  block  all  kjn^lalion  \rf  a  n»niinal  latk  »l  i(uiinni>, 
An<l  his  refmal  lu  ulmil  llieti  caiitentiua,  b  lltt  lunl  nxrnt  ■llnntjrt  ol 
the  miiioiity  tu  |iicveiii  Coaiifeu  (iiwa  petfariiuii£  iu  ilutiu.  by  UdiN 
ol  lu  uuru  mcnabun. — EorTOR. 


HMinhml  RBCVLATtON  OF  ELECTtONS.  i9" 

che  Ijiincful  practice  of  secessions;  a  practice  which  has 
stiuwii  itsttf  even  in  Sutes  wrhere  a  iti:ijorit>-  only  is 
required;  a  practice  subversirc  of  all  the  principles  of 
order  and  regular  government;  a  practice  which  leads 
more  directly  to  public  convulsions  and  the  ruin  of 
popular  governments  than  any  other  which  has  yet 
been  displayed  amons  us.  Fuulius. 


No.  S9  [S^]-       ^''"'  *""*  *'"***<  Fcbrusrr  *>.  in»)      Hamilton. 

THE  NATIONAL  REGULATION  OF  ELECTIONS. 

JStrtry  g»Krtimtni  muit  Ativrttt  mf*m  of  ui/-prtstrvatitn — Difftrtnt 
Jtpeiiuriti  »f  Ikii  fowtr  tfaiiiUitJ — ExatI  (karMltr  hhJ  tiUnI  of  Iku 
fetetr — //  Ikii  f'fVKrit  Htt  givtit.tht  faUr^! govtrnnual  itill  ttal  lif 
mtriy  tf  Iht  slaU  ^ovftl'ttah —  Tkt  right  af  ulf-friitrvatitH  in  tht 
ilali  gntrwmteitli  UHimf>,urf.t — tMyertiva  einl  lAt  fettfr  rf  Ikt  itnttt  in 
ihf  fUftim  tf  tt^alfrs  it  t^tt/tUyJat^tivin,  mttHtrtt^ — Riaitnt  f»r  tldi 
rttritlifH  of  fiwer — Oi/rflift  lialliriii/fr/iln'ftmAilalttviiliraiiifi- 
litnl  itturily  aj^-tinil  thi  alimt  of  ikt  fvrotr  I*  lotUivi  ikt  tlutt^n  tj 
mlm^i  iy  Ihi  al^U  gntfnatiHli,  <aniidtrtd. 

T9  Ihe  PeaffU  of  the  Sialt  t>/  New  York: 

The  natural  order  of  the  subject  leads  us  to  consider, 
in  tills  place,  that  provision  of  (he  Conxlittitiun  wliii:h 
autboriiECs  the  national  lejtislaturc  to  regulate,  in  the  last 
resort,  the  election  of  its  own  mctnbcrs, 

It  is  in  these  words:  "  The  limet,  plates,  and  manner  of 
holding  elections  for  senators  and  representatives  shall 
be  prescribed  in  each  State  by  the  legislature  thereof; 
but  the  Congress  may,  at  any  time,  by  law,  make  or  alter 
suefi  rtgulathnt,  except  as  to  the  plates  of  choosing  sena- 
tors."* This  provision  has  not  only  been  declaimed 
against  by  those  who  condemn  tlie  Constitution  in  the 
gross;  but  it  has  been  censured  by  those  who  have 
objected  with  less  latitude  and  greater  moderation;  and, 
in  one  instance,  it  has  been  thought  exceptionable  by  a 
gentleman  who  has  declared  himself  the  advocate  of 
every  other  part  of  the  system. 

'  m  cknM,  4lli  (oction. «(  Uw  tU  artfeU.— PtiMJUI. 


39'  FSDSRAL  DISCRETION  PROPER.        IHe.W'W 

I  nm  greatlj  mistaken,  notwithstanding,  if  th«rc  be 
any  article  in  the  whole  pluii  more  completely  dcfeuubit 
than  this.  Its  propriety  rests  upon  the  evidence  of  lhi»^ 
plain  j>ropo«tiun,  that  eitry  gottrnmrnt  ought  Co  (»nt<iin  m 
iltelf  Ike  means  of  its  ^wh  freserralitiit.  Every  Just  rca- 
soner  will,  at  first  sight,  approve  an  adherence  to  this 
rule,  in  the  work  of  the  convention;  and  will  disapprove 
every  deviation  from  it  which  may  not  appear  to  have 
been  dictated  by  the  necessity  of  incorporating  into  the 
work  some  particular  ingredient  with  which  a  rigid  con- 
formity to  the  rule  wa»  inconiputible.  Even  in  this  case, 
though  he  may  acquiesce  in  the  necessity,  yet  he  will  not 
cease  tu  rcg;ird  and  to  regret  a  departure  from  so  ftitMla- 
mental  a  principle  ait  a  portion  of  imperfection  in  the 
system  which  may  prove  the  seed  of  future  weakness, 
unU  perhaps  anarchy. 

It  will  not  be  alleged  that  an  election  law  could  have 
been  framed  and  inserted  in  the  Constitution  which 
would  have  been  always  applicable  to  every  prnbable 
change  in  the  situation  of  the  country;  and  it  will,  there- 
fore, not  be  denied  ttiat  a  discretionary  power  over 
elections  ought  to  exist  somewhere.  It  will,  I  presume, 
be  as  readily  conceded  that  there  were  only  three  ways 
in  which  this  power  could  have  been  reasonably  modified 
and  disposed:  that  it  roust  either  have  been  lodged 
wholly  in  the  national  legislature,  or  wholly  in  the  Stale 
legiKlature^,  or  primarily  in  the  latter  and  ultimately  in 
the  former.  The  last  mode  has,  with  reasiin,  btcn  pre- 
ferred by  the  convention.  They  have  submitted  llw 
reguUition  of  elections  for  the  federal  government,  in  the 
first  instance,  to  the  local  administrations;  which,  in 
ordinary  cases,  and  when  no  improper  views  prevail,  may 
be  l>oth  more  convenient  and  more  satisfactory;  but 
they  have  reserved  to  the  national  authority  a  right  to 
interpose,  whenever  extraordinary  circumstances  might 
render  that  interposition  necessary  to  its  safety. 

Nothing  can  be  more  evident  than  that  an  exclusive 
power  of  regulating  elections  for  the  national  guvem- 
mcot,  in  the  hands  of  the  Stale  legislatures,  would  leave 


Hinilual      STATE  ELECTiOXS  /yDEPEJVDEXT. 


393 


tlie  existence  of  the  Union  entirely  at  their  mercy. 
They  could  at  any  moment  annihilate  it  by  ncglcciing  to 
provide  for  the  choice  of  persons  to  administer  its  affairs. 
It  b  to  little  purpose  to  say  that  a  neglect  or  omiuion 
of  this  kind  would  not  be  likely  to  take  place.  The 
constituiional  possibility  of  the  thing,  irithout  an  equiva- 
lent for  the  risk,  is  an  unanswerable  objection.  Nur  has 
any  satisfactory  reason  been  yet  assigned  for  incurring 
that  risk.  The  extravagant  surmises  of  a  distempered 
jealousy  can  never  be  dignified  wiih  that  character.  If 
we  are  in  a  buinor  to  presume  abuses  of  power,  it  is  as 
fair  to  presume  them  on  the  part  of  the  State  govern- 
ments as  on  the  part  of  the  general  government.  And 
as  it  is  more  consonant  to  the  rules  of  a  just  theory  to 
trust  the  L'nion  with  the  care  of  its  own  existence  than 
to  transfer  that  care  to  any  other  hands,  if  abuses  of 
power  are  to  be  hazarded  on  the  one  side  or  on  the 
other,  it  is  more  rational  to  hazard  them  where  the  power 
would  naturally  be  placed  than  where  it  would  unnatu- 
rally be  placed. 

Suppose  an  article  had  been  introduced  into  the  Con- 
stitution  cmpowcrins  the  United  States  to  rcf;ulate  the 
elections  for  the  i>arlicular  Slates,  would  any  man  have 
hesitated  to  condemn  it,  both  as  an  unwarrantable  trans< 
position  of  power,  and  as  a  premeditated  engine  for  the 
destruction  of  the  State  governmentsf  The  violation  of 
principle.  In  lhi.t  case,  would  have  required  no  comment; 
and,  to  an  unbiased  observer,  it  will  not  be  less  apparent 
in  the  project  of  subjecting  the  existence  of  the  national 
government,  in  a  similar  respect,  to  the  pleasure  of 
chc  State  governments.  An  impartial  view  of  the  mat- 
ter cannot  fail  to  result  in  a  conviction  that  each,  as 
far  as  possible,  ought  to  depend  on  itself  for  its  own 
preservation. 

As  an  objection  to  this  position  it  may  be  remarked 
that  the  constitution  of  the  national  Senate  would  involve, 
in  its  full  extent,  the  dani^er  which  it  is  suggcslcd  might 
flow  from  an  cxclasive  power  in  the  State  legislatures  to 
regulate  the  federal  elections.     It  may  be  alleged  that, 


394        FO*VE/t  OF  STATES  OVER  SEXATE.     !■*  MiH> 

by  declining  the  appointment  of  senators,  tlicy  ui^ht  at 
any  time  give  a  fatal  blow  to  the  Union;  ami  from  this  U 
may  be  inferred  thai.  :i!i  it»  existence  urnuUl  be  thui.  ren- 
dered dependent  upon  tticnt  in  so  essential  a  poini,  there 
can  be  no  objection  to  ininisting  ihcm  with  il  in  the  par- 
ticular case  under  consideration.  The  interest  of  each 
State,  it  may  be  added,  to  maintain  its  representation 
in  tlic  njition;il  councils,  would  be  a  complete  security 
against  an  abti&e  of  the  trust. 

This  argument,  though  specious,  will  not,  upon  exam- 
ination, be  fvand  solid.  It  is  certainly  true  thai  the 
State  I (!];i statures,  by  forbearing  the  appointment  of 
senators,  may  destroy  the  national  government.  But  it 
will  not  follow  iliiit,  because  they  have  the  power  to  do 
this  in  one  instance,  they  ought  to  hare  it  in  ever)'  other. 
There  are  cases  in  which  the  pernicious  tendency  of  such 
a  power  may  be  far  more  decisive,  without  any  motive 
e(|ually  cogent  with  that  which  must  have  regulated  the 
conduct  of  the  convention  in  respect  to  the  formation  of 
the  Senate,  to  recommend  their  admission  into  the  system. 
So  far  as  that  construction  may  expose  the  I'niun  to  the 
possibibty  of  injury  from  the  State  legislatures,  it  is  an  evil, 
but  it  is  an  evil  which  could  not  have  been  avoided  without 
excluding  the  States,  in  their  political  ea)>aciiies,  wholly 
from  a  place  in  the  orgaiiizatinn  of  the  national  govern- 
ment. If  this  had  been  done,  it  would  doubtless  have 
been  interpreted  into  an  entire  dereliction  of  the  federal 
principle;  and  would  certainly  have  deprived  the  State 
governments  of  that  absoUite  safeguard  which  they  wilt 
enjoy  under  this  provision.  But  however  wise  it  may 
have  been  to  have  submitted  in  this  instance  to  an  in- 
convenience for  the  attainment  of  a  necessary  advantage 
or  a  greater  good,  no  inference  can  be  drawn  from  thence 
lo  favor  an  accumulation  of  the  evil,  where  no  nccctsiiy 
urges  nor  any  greater  good  invites. 

It  may  be  easily  discerned  also  that  the  national  gov- 
ernment would  run  a  much  greater  risk  from  a  power 
in  the  State  leRistatures  over  the  elections  of  it*  House 
of  Representatives,  tliun  from  their  power  of  appointing! 


HuBlltoa]        INJUXY  TO  SENATE   UNUKBLY. 


395 


the  members  of  its  Senate.  The  senators  are  to  be 
cho§cn  for  the  pcrtiHl  of  six  years;  tliere  is  to  be  u  rota- 
tion, l)y  wliicli  the  scats  of  a  third  part  of  them  arc  to  be 
vacated  and  replenished  every  two  years;  and  no  Slate 
is  to  be  cotitled  to  more  than  two  senators;  u  quorum  of 
the  body  is  to  consist  of  sixteen  members.  The  joint 
result  of  these  circumstances  would  be  that  a  temporary 
combination  of  a  few  States  to  intermit  the  appnintinent 
of  senators,  cunUl  neither  annul  the  existence  nor  impair 
the  activity  of  the  body;  and  it  is  not  from  a  general 
and  permanent  combination  of  the  Sl.ites  that  we  Ciin 
have  anything  to  fear.  The  first  mi;,:ht  proceed  from 
sinister  designs  in  the  lcadin£  m!:m1>crs  of  a  few  of  the 
State  legislaiurcs;  the  last  would  suppose  a  fixed  and 
rooted  diH^ifTection  in  lite  great  body  of  the  people,  which 
will  either  never  exist  at  all,  or  will,  in  all  probability, 
proceed  from  an  experience  of  the  inaptitude  of  the 
llfeneral  gorernnicnt  to  the  advancement  of  their  hardi- 
ness—in  whidt  event  no  good  citizen  could  desire  its 
continuance. 

But  with  reg<ird  to  the  federal  House  of  Representa- 
tives there  is  intended  to  be  a  general  election  of  mem- 
bers once  in  two  years.  If  tlie  State  legislatures  were  to 
be  invested  with  an  exclusive  power  of  regulating  these 
elections,  (-very  period  of  making  them  would  be  a  deli- 
cate crisis  in  the  national  situation,  which  miglit  issue  in 
a  dissolution  of  the  Union,  if  the  leaders  of  a  few  of  the 
must  tmportiint  Slates  should  )>uve  entered  into  a  previous 
conspiracy  to  prevent  an  election. 

I  shall  not  deny  that  there  is  a  degree  of  weight  in 
the  observation  that  tlie  interests  of  each  State,  to  be 
represented  in  the  federal  councils,  will  be  a  security 
Cm  against  the  abuse  of  a  power  over  its  elections 

>•'  !•  in  the  hands  of  the  State  legislatures.     But 

the  security  will  not  be  considered  as  complete,  by  those 
who  attend  to  the  force  of  an  obvious  distinction  between 
the  interest  of  the  people  in  the  public  felicity  and  the 
interest  of  their  local  rulers  in  the  power  ami  conse- 
quence of  their  offices.     The  people  of  America  may  be 


39*     FOSS/BLE  WEAPONS  AGAINST  UtfJON.    IBfcftttiMi 

warmly  attached  to  the  governmcDt  of  the  Union,  at 
tiiiiCN  when  (lie  particiil.tr  rulers  of  partiiular  States, 
siiinulatctt  by  the  iiutural  rivalnhip  of  power,  and  by  the 
hopes  of  personal  aggrandizement,  and  supported  by  a 
strong  faction  in  each  of  those  States,  may  be  in  a  very 
opposite  temper.  This  diversity  of  sentiment  bctsreen  a 
majority  of  the  people  and  the  individuals  who  have  the 
greatest  credit  in  their  councils  is  excmpliTicd  in  some 
of  the  Slates  at  the  present  moment,  on  the  present 
question.  The  scheme  of  separate  confederacies,  which 
will  always  multiply  the  chances  of  ambition,  will  be  a 
never-failing  tKiil  to  ;dl  such  influential  characters  in  the 
State  administrations  a«  arc  capable  of  preferring  their 
own  emolument  and  advancement  to  the  public  weal. 
With  so  efl'ectual  a  weapon  in  their  hands  as  the  exclusive 
power  of  regulating  elections  for  the  national  govern- 
ment, a  combination  of  a  few  such  men,  in  a  few  of  the 
most  considerable  States,  where  the  temptation  will 
always  be  the  strongest,  might  accomplish  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Union,  by  seising  the  opportunity  of  some 
casual  dissatisfaction  among  the  people  (and  which  per- 
haps they  may  themselves  have  excited),  to  discontinue 
the  choice  of  members  for  the  federal  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives. It  ought  never  to  be  forgotten  that  a 
gg,  firm  union  of  this  country  under  an  etitcicnt 

Ro.  tl.  government  will   probably  be  an    increasing 

object  of  jealousy  to  more  than  one  nation  of  Europe; 
and  that  enterprises  to  subvert  it  wdl  sometimes  origi- 
tute  in  the  intrigues  of  foreign  powers,  and  will  seldnm 
fail  to  be  patronized  and  abetted  by  some  of  them.  Its 
preservation,  therefore,  ought  in  no  case  that  can  be 
avoided  to  be  committed  to  the  guardianship  of  any  but 
those  whose  situation  will  uniformly  beget  an  immediate 
interest  in  the  faithful  and  vigilant  perlormancc  of  the 
trust. 

PuBLiua. 


HuBllMBl     NECESS/TV  OF  NAT!0\'AI.  CONTROL.       397 


No.  60  [59].    V'dtfnjfi /tmrvi.  Febnury  i|.  •jn.)     Hamilton. 

NECESSITV  OF  SUCH  NATIONAL  CONTROL 
CtmiJiralitii  c/  Ikt  ttjttlifi  Ikal  iy  Ihii  ftwr  Cmgrets  maf  frtmtU 
Ijttt  ttjtttim  mumtrattd. 

To  the  People  of  the  Slate  of  New  York: 

\Vc  have  seen  that  an  uncuntfollablc  power  over  the 
elections  to  the  (cderal  government  could  not,  without 
haxard.  be  committed  to  the  Slate  legislatures.  Let  as 
now  see  what  would  he  the  danger  on  the  other  side; 
that  is,  from  confiding  the  ultimate  right  of  regulating 
its  own  elections  to  the  Union  itself,  It  is  noi  pretcniletl 
that  this  fisht  would  ever  be  used  for  tlie  exclusion  of 
any  Stale  from  its  share  in  the  representation.  The 
interest  of  all  would,  in  this  respect  at  least,  be  the 
security  of  all.  But  it  i»  alleged  that  it  might  be 
employed  in  such  a  manner  as  to  promote  the  election  of 
some  favorite  class  of  men  in  exclusion  of  others,  by 
confining  the  places  of  election  to  (nrticular  districts, 
and  rendering  it  impracticable  to  the  citizens  at  large  to 
partake  in  the  choice.  Of  all  chimerical  suppositions 
this  seems  to  be  the  most  chimerical.  On  the  one  hand, 
no  rational  calculation  of  probabilities  would  lead  us  to 
imagine  that  the  disposition  which  a  conduct  so  violent 
and  extraordinary  would  imply  could  ever  find  its  way 
into  the  national  councils;  aitd  on  the  other,  it  may  be 
concluded  with  certainty  that,  if  so  improper  a  spirit 
should  ever  gain  admittance  into  them,  it  would  display 
itself  in  a  form  altogether  different  and  far  more  decisive. 

The  improbability  of  the  attempt  may  be  satisfactorily 
inferred  from  this  single  reflection  that  it  could  never  be 
made  without  cauMog  3,vi  immediate  revolt  of  the  great 
body  of  the  people,  headed  and  directed  by  the  State 
governments.  It  is  not  diflicult  to  conceive  that  this 
characteristic  right  of  freedom  may,  in  certain  turbulent 
and  factious  seasons,  be  violated,  in  respect  to  a  particular 


39» 


Dtt'ERSlTY  OF  PAflTS  OF  UNION.      llto.OOiMi 


class  of  citizens,  hj  a  victorious  and  overbearing  oiajur- 
ity;  but  thai  so  (undamciitui  a  privilege,  in  a  country  so 
situated  anil  enlighle»ed,  should  !>e  invaded  tu  the  prej- 
udice of  the  K''^^'  mass  of  the  people  bjr  the  deliberate 
policy  uf  the  Kovcrninciit,  without  occasioning  a  popular 
revolution,  is  altogether  inconceivable  and  incredible. 

In  addition  to  this  general  rellection,  there  are  con- 
siderations of  a  more  precise  nature  whii^h  forbid  all 
apprehcnsiun  on  the  subject.  The  dissimilarity  in  the 
ingredients  which  will  compose  the  national  government, 
and  still  more  in  the  manner  in  which  they  will  be  brnvghl 
into  action  in  its  various  branches,  must  form  a  powerful 
obstacle  to  a  concert  of  views  in  any  partial  sclicme  of 
elections.  There  is  sufficient  diversity  in  the  state  of 
property,  in  the  genius,  manners,  and  habits  of  ibe 
people  of  the  different  parts  of  the  Union,  to  occasion  a 
material  diversity  of  disposition  in  their  representatives 
toward  the  different  ranks  and  conditions  in  society. 
.\nd  though  an  intimate  intercourse  nnder  the  same 
gnvernnicnt  will  promote  a  gradual  assimilation  in  some 
of  these  respects,  yet  there  arc  ciuscs,  as  well  physical 
as  moral,  which  may,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  per- 
manently nourish  difTerent  propensities  and  inclinations 
in  this  respect.  But  the  circumstance  which  will  be  likely 
to  have  the  greatest  inBoence  in  the  mailer  wil!  be  the 
dissimilar  modes  of  constituting  the  several  component 
parts  of  the  government.  The  House  of  Representatives 
being  to  be  elected  immediately  by  the  people,  tlie  Senate 
by  the  State  legislature*,  the  President  by  L-lcctors  chosen 
for  that  purpose  by  the  ptrople,  there  wiiulil  be  little 
probability  of  a  common  interest  to  cement  these 
different  branches  in  a  predilection  for  any  particular 
class  of  electors. 

As  to  the  Scn,-ite,  it  is  impossihtc  that  any  regulation 
of  "  time  and  manner,"  which  is  all  that  is  proposed  to  be 
submitted  to  tlie  national  government  in  respect  to  that 
body,  can  affect  the  spirit  which  will  direct  the  choice  of 
Its  members.  The  collective  sirnse  of  the  State  Icjps- 
Utures  can  never  be  influenced  by  extraneous  drcum- 


HwbUwbJ    PAHTlALITy  in  national  COUNCILS.     399 


Stances  of  that  sort;  a  consideration  which  alone  ought 
to  .satisfy  us  that  the  discriini nation  apprehended  wuuld 
never  be  attempted.  Fur  what  inducement  could  the 
Senate  have  to  concur  in  a  preference  in  which  itself 
would  not  be  included?  Or  to  what  purpose  would  it  be 
established  in  reference  tu  one  branch  of  the  Icgisl.iture, 
if  it  could  nut  be  extended  to  the  other?  The  composi- 
tion  of  the  one  would  in  this  case  counteract  that  of  the 
otlicr.  And  we  can  never  suppose  that  it  would  embrace 
the  appuinlment^  to  the  Senate,  unless  we  can  at  the 
same  time  suppose  the  vohinlary  co-operation  of  the  Slate 
Icgisbturcs.  If  we  make  the  latter  supposition,  it  then 
bet'oinu  immaterial  where  ihe  povrcr  in  question  is 
placed — whether  in  their  hands  or  in  those  of  ihc  Union. 

But  what  is  to  be  the  object  of  this  capricious  partialitjr 
in  the  national  counoiU?  Is  it  to  be  exercised  in  a  discrim- 
ination between  the  different  departments  of  industry, 
or  between  the  diffL-rcnt  kinds  of  property,  or  between 
the  different  degrcvs  of  properly?  Will  it  lean  in  (avor 
of  the  landed  interest,  or  the  moneyed  interest,  or  the 
mercantile  interest,  or  the  manufacliirinK  interest?  Or. 
tu  speak  in  the  (ashinnablc  language  uf  the  adversaries 
tu  the  Constitution,  will  it  court  the  elevation  o(  "the 
wealthy  and  the  wcll-born,"  to  the  exclusion  and  debase- 
ment of  all  the  rest  of  the  society? 

If  this  partiality  is  tu  be  exerted  in  favor  of  those  who 
arc  concerned  in  any  particular  description  of  industry  or 
property,  I  presume  it  will  readily  be  admitted  that  the 
competition  for  it  will  lie  between  landed  men  and  mer- 
chants. And  I  scruple  not  to  affirm  that  it  is  infinitely 
less  likely  that  either  of  them  should  gain  an  ascendant 
iu  the  national  councils  than  that  the  one  or  the  other  of 
them  should  predominate  in  ;ill  the  local  councils.  The 
inference  will  be  th.it  a  conduct  lending  to  give  an  undue 
preference  to  cither  is  much  less  to  be  dreaded  from  Uie 
former  than  from  the  latter. 

The  several  States  are  in  various  degrees  addicted  to 
ajjrricullurcand  commerce.  In  most,  if  not  all  of  tliera, 
aKricuKiirc  is  prcdominanL     In  a  few  of  them,  however, 


400 


LANDED  INTEREST. 


ai«.M(M) 


commefce  nearly  divides  its  etnpire,  and  in  most  of  tliom 
has  a  coasidcrable  share  of  ittflucDcc.  In  proportion  as 
either  prcv;L)ls,  it  will  be  conveyed  into  the  national 
representation;  and  (or  the  very  reason  ilut  this  will  be 
an  cmaiiaiion  from  a  greater  variety  of  interests,  and  in 
much  more  various  proportions,  than  are  to  be  foaod  in 
any  single  State,  it  will  be  much  less  apt  to  espouse  cither 
uf  them  with  a  decided  partiality  than  the  representation 
of  any  single  State, 

In  a  country  consisting  chiefly  of  the  cultivators  of 
land,  where  the  rules  of  an  equal  representation  obtain, 
the  landed  interest  must,  upon  the  whole,  preponderate 
in  the  (government.  As  Imig  as  this  interest  [ircvails  in 
most  of  the  State  legislatures,  so  long  it  must  maintain 
a  correspondent  superiority  in  the  national  Senate,  which 
will  jnenerulty  he  a  f;iithfiil  copy  of  the  majorities  of  those 
assemblies.  It  cannot,  therefore,  be  presumed  that  a 
sacrifice  of  the  landed  to  the  mercantile  class  will  ever 
be  a  favorite  object  of  this  branch  of  the  federal  legis- 
lature. In  applying  ttius  particularly  to  the  Senate  a 
general  observation  suggested  by  the  situation  of  the 
country,  I  am  governed  by  the  consideration  ttiat  the 
credulous  votaries  of  State  power  cannot,  upon  their  own 
principles,  suspect  that  the  State  legislatures  would  be 
warped  from  their  duty  by  any  external  influence.  But 
in  reality  the  same  sitwiiion  must  have  the  same  eiTect, 
in  the  primitive  composition  at  least  of  (he  federal  House 
of  Representatives;  an  improper  bias  toward  the  mercan- 
tile class  is  as  little  to  be  expected  from  this  quarter  as 
from  the  other. 

In  order,  perhaps,  to  give  countenance  to  the  objection 
at  any  rate,  it  miiy  be  asked,  is  there  not  danger  of  an 
opposite  bias  in  Uie  national  government,  which  may  dis- 
pose it  to  eodearor  to  secure  a  monopoly  of  the  federjl 
admintKtratiun  to  the  l.indcd  class?'     As  thcrr  k  little 


ih« 


'Tkit  btltlc  bCKKCii  UiG  two  intercut  liu  beci> 
very  lounduluii  <>(  ih«  govcrnoivBt.  l.>n>lci  ittc  Fciicjm.i  k-^hhc  .lioi- 
iiu-nv  uiil  iBannfiutam  were  ibonghl  \>f  ihr  UiKlfanUlac  claw  )u  kiiv 
licm  «Bci>an>|;<il  ti  their  etp«H«.  tmX  lb«  itiiunpli  uJ  Jtflnwm  «•>  Ibdr 
|KOMti,     UnilM  tlie   Oenocniic  pwqr  Uie  tomwerdal  cU>im  latam 


h^buwbi    commhrce  as  souhce  of  revenue.    401 


likelihood  that  the  supposition  of  such  a  bias  will  have 
any  terrors  for  those  who  would  be  immediately  injured 
bir  it,  a  labored  auswcr  to  tM<i  question  will  be  dispensed 
with.  It  will  he  sufficient  to  remark,  ftrNt,  that  for  the 
reasons  elsewhere  assigned,  it  is  less  likely  that  an^ 
decided  partiality  should  pret'ail  in  the  councils  of  the 
Union  than  in  those  of  any  of  its  members.  Secondly, 
that  there  would  be  no  lemptation  to  violate  the  Consti- 
tution in  favor  of  the  landed  class,  because  that  class 
would,  in  the  natural  course  of  things,  enjoy  as  great  a 
preponderancy  as  itself  could  desire.  And  thirdly,  that 
men  accustomed  to  investigate  the  sourcL-s  of  public 
pr<i>:pentyupun  a  large  scale,  must  be  loo  well  convinced 
of  the  utility  of  commerce  to  be  inclined  to  inllict  upon 
it  so  deep  a  wound  as  would  result  from  the  entire 
exclnsion  of  those  who  would  tiest  understand  its  interest 
from  a  share  in  the  management  of  them.  The  inipor* 
tance  of  commerce,  in  the  view  of  revenue  alone,  must 
effectually  guard  it  against  the  enmity  of  a  body  which 
would  be  continually  importuned  in  its  favor  by  the 
uf;[ent  calls  of  public  necessity. 

I  the  rather  consult  brevity  in  discussing  the  prob- 
ability of  a  preference  founded  upon  a  discrimination 
between  the  different  kinds  of  industry  and  property, 
b<.-causc,  as  far  as  I  understand  the  meaning  of  the  object- 
ors, they  contemplate  a  dis<;rimination  of  another  kind. 
They  appear  to  have  in  view,  as  the  objects  of  the  prefer- 
ence with  which  they  endeavor  to  alarm  us,  those  whom 
they  designate  by  the  description  of  "the  wealthy  and 

Kaer1«4  thai  they  wtie  Mcrific«<]  (o  ihc  Unded  inteicil  bjr  Ihc  rmbar- 
eif  ■nd  wii  of  iSri.  l.'i»l«i  ilic  uiifl  o(  ili24  onte  more  itie  Und* 
hoJiUif  (cit  lliat  llicy  orrc  iiijutnl.  an  injury  wliirh  I'liinlly  (iiiiiiil 
fjfrriii'  eI|ln^^ioll  in  inrrnpltil  nnllificjilioii.  '\\%v  tlsvcry  cli(il«t  inil 
Rfhrtliofi  iiibni(Tj>Ml  the  'liHrrcnm.  bul  with  Ihe  pusinn  of  the  iuuc* 
■  hbch  Ihey  iDroIrn],  tbe  lullle  bit  been  KDCWtil  in  ihf  IBiiff  eIiu);i;1c  of 
iSSS-i  J47,  iiiit,  la  k  certUd  eitriit.  i»  Ihc  Ail-niuficy.  lil'ci.  *%vi  Incotne- 
Ux  tMiut.  .V  l»r  *evfT*r  Ponlcil  bcrlirT«D  the  l«o  tiiI«rD»tk  hJit  t.ikcii 
piacp  in  t^umfm,  irilli  no  nmlvtint  lots  to  ihc  Undhoidiin  in  Fniit« 
•nd  Gnnany ;  but  in  C>i«al  Briiuii  the  i^wth  of  the  commerciil  clauet 
hu  been  MKh  >i  to  letiire  i»  them  nn  ovcibearine  iiilluence  in  le|(iil>- 
lliM,  iriileh  ha«  reutltctl  iii  the  entice  tatiilice  of  thir  l!iii>.tri  cliueti, 
— I^DITcMt, 


U 


40X 


n-EAirnY  classes  diffused 


nio.«o<M> 


llie  well-born."  T1)C»c,  it  seems,  arc  In  be  exalted  to  aa 
odiuus  pn; -eminence  over  llie  rest  of  tlicir  fdluw-citiiene. 
At  one  time,  liowcvcr,  their  elevation  is  (o  be  a  necctiury 
consequcnce  of  tl)c  smalliics!>  of  the  rcprcsciitalivc  body; 
at  anotlicr  time  it  is  to  be  cRcctcd  by  depriving  the 
people  nt  turge  of  the  opportunity  of  exercising  their 
riKht  of  sulTraKc  in  the  choice  of  that  body. 

Dul  upon  what  principle  is  the  discrimination  of  the 
places  of  election  to  be  made,  in  order  to  answer  the  pur- 
pose of  the  meditated  preference?  Arc  "the  wealthy 
and  the  well-burn,"  as  they  arc  called,  confmed  tu  partic- 
ular spots  in  the  several  States?  Have  they,  by  some 
miraculous  in-.tinct  or  foresight,  set  apart  in  each  of 
them  a  common  place  of  residence?  Arc  they  only  to  be 
met  with  in  the  towns  or  cities?  Or  are  they,  on  the 
contrary,  scattered  over  the  face  of  the  country  as 
avarice  or  chance  may  have  happened  to  cast  their  own 
lot  or  that  of  their  predecessors?  If  the  latter  is  the 
case  (as  every  intelligent  man  knows  it  to  be*),  is  it  nut 
evident  that  the  policy  of  confinins  the  places  of  election 
to  particular  districts  would  be  as  subversive  of  its  own 
aim  as  it  would  be  exceptionable  on  every  other  account? 
The  truth  is  that  there  is  no  method  of  securing  to  the 
rich  the  preference  apprehended,  but  by  prescribing 
qualificattonK  of  property  cither  for  those  who  may  elect 
or  be  elc<;ted.  Gut  this  forms  no  part  of  the  power  to  be 
conferred  upon  the  national  government.  Its  authority 
would  be  expressly  restricted  to  the  regulation  of  the 
timet,  the/>/»(-^t,  the  mamifr  o(  elections.  The  qualifica- 
tions of  the  persons  who  may  choose  or  be  chosen,  as  has 
been  remarked  upon  other  occasions,  arc  defined  and 
fixed  in  Uic  Constitution,  and  are  unalterable  by  Ihe 
legislature. 

Let  it,  however,  be  admilled,  for  argument  sake,  that 
the  expedient  sugifcstcd  might  be  successful,  and  let  it 
at  the  same  time  be  equally  taken  for  gr.inted  that  alt 
the  scruples  whicli  a  seose  of  duty  or  an  apprchetuioo  of 


■  PanicaUrljr  in  llw  Soutbera  StUa  and  in  dri»  Stue— PunjtK. 


fl 


Hunllioa)    VIOLATION  OF  El.ECTiOS'S  t/XLlA'SLV.     403 

the  (Jangfer  of  the  experiment  miKht  ins[>irc,  were  over* 
cumc  in  the  breasts  of  the  national  rulers;  &till  I  imagine 
it  will  hardly  he  pretended  that  they  conUl  ever  hope  to 
carry  such  an  enterprise  into  esecution  without  llie  aid 
of  a  military  force  sufficient  to  subdue  the  resistance  of 
the  grv;it  body  of  the  people.  The  improbability  uf  the 
existence  of  a  force  e<|ual  to  that  object  lias  been  dis- 
cusscd  and  dcmonstrjted  in  different  parts  of  these 
pipHrs;  but  that  the  funlily  of  ihc  objection  muler  cun- 
sideration  may  appear  in  the  Mrons;eM  light,  it  shall  be 
loncedcd  for  a  moment  that  such  a  force  might  exist, 
and  the  national  government  shall  be  supposed  to  be  in 
the  actu.tl  po»>eHsion  of  it.  What  will  be  the  conclu- 
sion? With  a  disposition  to  invade  the  essential  rights 
nf  tlie  commnnity,  and  with  the  means  of  gratifying  that 
disposition,  is  it  presumable  that  the  persons  who  were 
actuated  by  it  would  amuse  themselves  in  the  ridiculous 
task  of  fabric^iting  election  laws  for  securing  a  preference 
to  a  favorite  class  of  men?  Would  they  not  be  likely  to 
prefer  a  conduct  better  adapted  to  their  own  immediate 
aggraniliiemcnt?  Would  they  not  rather  boldly  resolve 
to  perpetuate  themselves  in  oflioe  liy  one  decii^ive  act  nf 
usurpation  than  to  trust  to  precarious  expedients  which, 
in  spite  of  all  the  precautions  that  might  accompany 
them,  might  terminate  in  the  dismission,  disgrace,  and 
ruin  of  their  aulhors?  Would  they  not  fear  tliat  citizens, 
not  less  tenacious  than  conscious  of  their  rights,  would 
flock  from  the  remote  extremes  of  their  respective  States 
to  the  places  of  election,  to  overthrow  their  tyrants,  and 
to  substitute  men  who  would  be  disposed  to  avenge  the 
violated  majetty  of  the  people?  Puslius. 


4«4 


PLACE  OF  BLBCTlOffS. 


IVo.  «1  ita< 


No.  6l  [60].       (Vw  fwA/wiat,  r>bnurT*«,iiat.>      Hamilton. 

ADVANTAGF,    OF    POWER    IN    SECURING    UNI- 
t.ORMlTV  IN  ELECTIONS. 

Ot/fttiim  liat  tkiTt  ihtnU  ti  a  fr^vUift  thai  all  ttrttitm  $h»aU  it 
iMtettUit  tit  ttUHliti  tnkitr  tkt  tttttsn  htf — Smi  a  frnvii^n  harm- 
bi$  OhJ  tffrri  nw  inmiily —  Tkii  prot/iii^m  <mipart4  stili  li^ir  t/  ilAtt 
lenitilHlifni—  7'h*  f-rvioHllly  tia/  tit  fvwrr  r/  Coagnii  I*  fix  »  uai/frm 
it-ty /irr  tlttlirmi  will  it  wry  im/vrlanf — T^  will  r/ any  fr^-iiiaiu  in 
lit  itMililiMlu-M  fixing  ituk  a  day  ttiuidrrtJ — CtnttuJiuf  rtmarla  »» 
lit  gtnttal  lat/nl. 

To  Iht  Pfopir  9f  Ike  State  0/  A'ew  Vifrk: 

The  more  cun<]i(l  opposers  of  che  provision  respecting 
elections  contained  in  the  plan  of  the  convention,  when 
pressed  inargumcnt,  will sometimesconcGde  the propricfy 
of  that  provitiion:  with  this  qualification,  however,  that 
it  ought  to  have  been  acconi|>anie(J  with  ;i  declaration 
that  all  elections  should  be  had  in  the  counties  where 
the  electors  resided.  This,  say  they,  was  a  necessary 
precaution  against  an  abuse  of  the  power.  A  declaration 
of  this  nature  would  certainly  have  been  harmleiis;  so 
far  as  it  would  have  had  the  effect  of  quieting  appre- 
hensions, it  might  not  have  been  undesirable.  But  it 
would,  in  f;ict,  have  aflordcd  little  or  no  additional  MCUf 
iiy  against  the  danger  apprehended;  and  the  want  of  \t 
will  never  be  considered  by  an  impartial  and  judicious 
examiner,  as  a  serious,  still  less  as  an  insuperable  objec- 
tion to  the  plan.  The  different  views  taken  of  the  subject 
in  the  two  preceding  papers  must  he  suflident  to  satisfy 
alt  dispassionate  and  discerning  men  that,  if  the  public 
liberty  should  ever  be  the  victim  of  the  ambition  of  the 
national  rnlers,  the  power  under  examination,  at  least, 
will  be  guiltless  of  the  sacrifice. 

If  ihoM  wIm  iiie  ini'linetl  lo  consuh  theit  jcitlousy  only  wotilil 
exrrcue  it  io  a  c.ireful  inKpcciion  of  the  several  Slate  co<iMtluth>ni, 
tUey  would  liii<l  litik  kss  room  for  diuguiciuilc  and  aUm)  (rmn 
Ilic  Utifuile  which  most  ol  them  allow  in  rctpccl  lo  elntiuns  Uian 
from  itic  l.iiiiiidc  whkh  ii  pro|KiMd  to  br  .illowri)  la  iIk  naiionnl 
govcriiincnl  in  iIm  same  respect.    A  niview  u(  Uielr  siiualion.  iu 


■tniliOBl        ELSCriOKS  W  NB^r   YORK  STATS.        40S 


iMs  parttcuUr.  wnuM  i«*i(l  grently  to  rcraovw  any  ill  impressinnx 
which  miy  rein^iiii  in  rctjurd  to  ihis  mntier.  Bill  at  llini  vicfw 
wouUI  lead  inio  long  anil  tmlioiis  dL-uils.  I  shall  cuntenl  myself 
with  tile  sintfle  example  uf  llie  .Slate  in  which  I  write.  The  con- 
Blituiion  ol  New  York  makes  no  other  provision  for  locality  of 
elections  than  llut  tlie  members  of  ibe  Asseaibt)'  shall  he  elected 
in  the  cauHtiet;  those  of  the  Senile,  in  the  great  dJtiricts  into 
which  tlm  State  i»  oi  may  be  ili»iilc<l :  llioe  at  present  are  (our  in 
numl>er.  and  comprfhem)  cich  from  iwn  to  six  cntinlie^.  Il  may 
readily  be  [xrccived  that  it  would  not  be  mor«  difficult  to  the 
legixliturc  nf  New  York  to  dcfcnt  the  Kuffrngcc  of  the  citiien*  of 
New  York,  by  conAning  elections  to  particular  places,  than  for 
tile  Icfptlalure  of  the  United  Stales  to  defeat  llie  suffrages  of  the 
citiiciis  of  the  Union  by  the  like  expniicnt.  Suppose,  for  instance, 
the  city  of  Albany  was  to  be  appoiiiicd  the  sole  place  of  election 
(or  the  country  and  district  o(  which  it  ts  a  part,  would  not  the 
in  habitants  of  that  ciiy  speedily  become  the  only  eleclurs  of  the 
membetf  both  ol  ilie  Senate  and  Attcmbly  for  thai  county  and 
district  ?  Can  we  imagine  ih.it  the  electors  who  reside  in  the 
rentote  subdivisions  of  the  counties  of  Albany,  Saratoga,  Cam' 
Ikridgc.  etc.,  or  in  any  part  at  the  county  ol  Monlgomety,  woald 
take  the  iroobk  to  come  in  the  city  of  Albany,  to  give  iliclr  voles 
for  niend>crs  of  the  Assembly  or  Senate,  sooni^r  than  they  woutil 
repair  to  the  city  of  New  York,  to  panicipaic  in  the  choice  of  the 
members  of  the  federal  House  ol  Represent  all  ves  7  The  alarming 
indilfcreitcc  discoverable  in  the  excrcJM  of  so  invaluable  a  privi- 
lege under  the  existing  Uws.  which  afford  every  lacdity  to  it,  fur- 
nishes a  mdy  answer  to  this  question.  And.  abstracted  from  any 
eii|»eriencc  on  ihc  subject,  wc  can  be  at  no  loss  to  determine  that, 
when  the  place  of  election  is  .il  an  ineonweaient  diUaiuc  from  ihe 
elector,  live  effect  upon  his  conduct  will  he  the  same  wJielher  that 
distance  be  twenty  mile*  or  twenty  thousand  miles.  Hence  il 
must  appear  that  objeciiuns  to  the  particular  mollification  of  the 
federal  power  of  regulating  eleclions  will,  in  substance,  apply  with 
equal  force  lo  ilie  modiiicaiion  of  ibe  like  power  in  the  constitution 
of  this  Slate ;  and  for  this  reason  il  will  he  inipovcibic  lo  acquit 
the  one  and  to  oondetnu  ihc  oihcr.  A  similar  companson  would 
lead  to  the  same  coiKlusion  in  respect  to  Ihe  constitutions  of  most 
of  Ihe  other  States. 

If  if  should  be  said  that  delects  in  ihe  Slate  constitutions  furnish 
no  apology  (or  tliose  which  arc  to  be  found  in  the  pLin  proposed, 
I  anjwer  that,  as  the  former  have  never  been  thousht  chargeable 
Wtlh  inattention  to  ihe  Mcuiily  ol  libcrly,  where  the  iinputaiiMis 


4o6     UHtFOUMITY  tS  TI.VB  Of  eitCriOXS.  (Ko.OliaOi 

ihiuwn  oa  the  latter  can  be  shown  to  be  applicable  In  Iheni  ak(>, 
ibc  pic^uinptioin  is  iliai  lliey  an:  nlher  llie  cjiviliiig  trlitieiiKnis  ol 
a  pred«icnninc<l  ofipoution  than  the  well-loan<I<f(l  inferences  of  a 
cantlUI  research  nlier  iruih.  To  those  wlm  arc  ilisposed  lo  con- 
sulcr  as  innocent  otiiiisians  in  the  Stale  const itultond  what  tliey 
re^JLfd  as  unjMrilonable  blemishes  in  the  plan  of  the  conrrniinn 
nothing  can  be  said ;  or.  at  must,  tli«ir  can  wily  be  aibed  lo 
assign  some  subsianiijil  tcason  why  the  reprctcnta lives  of  lh« 
people  in  a  single  State  should  be  more  iniprexnable  to  the  lust  ul 
power,  or  other  sinlsier  ntulii-es,  than  the  representatives  o(  the 
people  of  the  Uniteil  Stales.  1(  the>'  cannot  do  this,  the>-  ought 
at  Jeut  to  prm-c  to  un  that  it  U  caucr  to  sohvprt  the  libeii>r« 
u(  three  millions  of  people,  vrith  the  advantage  of  Ioc-aI  gowrn- 
ntents  to  he;id  llicit  ap|MKUiuin.  than  of  two  hundml  ihoucnnd 
people  who  arc  destitute  of  that  ailfaiiiage.  And  in  relation  to 
iIk  |Kiinl  immcdUlely  umlet  cniiMilrration.  they  ought  to  coni'inc« 
us  thai  it  is  It^s  probable  that  a  ptcilominant  faction  In  a  single 
Stale  sivuutd,  in  order  to  maintain  Its  supcriitriiy,  iitcline  la  a 
preference  of  a  paniciilar  class  ol  eleciors  iltiin  iliai  a  siinHar 
s|Nr>l  shouki  take  pnuession  al  the  representatives  of  thtrleen 
Slates.  sprniU  over  a  vast  region,  and  in  several  respects  tlis- 
tinguUhablr  (r»m  each  otticr  by  »  dtvcrsily  of  local  drcuinstances, 
prejudices,  and  interests. 

Hiiherio  my  nbservalions  have  »i)ly  nimed  .->(  a  vindi- 
cation of  the  provision  in  question  on  the  ground  of 
tlicorctic  propriety,  on  that  of  the  danger  of  placing  the 
power  ekeivhere,  arul  on  that  of  the  safely  of  placing  tt 
in  the  manner  proposed.  But  there  remains  to  be  tnet>- 
tioned  a  positive  advantage  which  will  rcsull  (rtim  tliift 
di»pnsitioR,  and  which  conld  tint  as  well  tuve  been  ob- 
tained from  any  other:  I  allude  to  the  circumstance  of 
uniformity  in  the  time  of  clirctions  for  the  federal  House 
of  Representatives.  It  is  more  than  poMiible  thjt  this 
aniformity  may  be  found  by  experience  to  be  of  great 
importance  to  the  public  welfare,  both  as  a  security 
a^inst  tlie  perpetuation  of  the  same  spirit  in  the  body, 
aitd  as  a  cure  for  the  diitease<t  of  faction.  If  each  Stnie 
may  choose  its  own  time  of  election,  it  is  possible  there 
may  be  at  least  as  many  different  periods  as  there  arc 
months  in  the  year.  Thi?  linit^s  of  election  in  the  several 
States,  as  they  arc  uow  rstablishcd  fur  local  pnrp<weN, 


BtttUUal         CONVBNtBSCE  OF  ELBCTIOSS.  4<»7 

viiry  between  extremes  as  wide  3»  March  and  November. 
The  consequence  of  this  diversity  would  be  itiat  there 
coald  ncrcr  h.ippcn  a  ti>t»l  dissutiition  or  renovation  of 
the  body  ut  one  time.  If  an  imiiropcr  spirit  of  any  kind 
should  happen  to  prevail  in  it,  that  spirit  would  be  apt 
to  infuse  itself  into  the  new  members,  as  they  come  for- 
ward in  succession.  The  mass  would  be  likely  to  remain 
nearly  the  same,  assimilating  constantly  to  itself  its 
gradual  accretions.  There  is  a  contagion  in  example 
which  few  men  have  sufficient  force  of  mind  to  resist.  I 
am  inclined  to  think  that  treble  the  duration  in  office, 
witli  the  condition  of  a  tot^il  dissolution  of  the  body  at 
the  Kimc  time,  niiglil  be  less  formidable  to  liberty  than 
one-third  of  that  duration  subject  to  gradual  and  suc- 
cessive alterations. 

Uniformity  in  the  time  of  elections  seems  not  less 
requisite  for  executing  the  idea  of  a  refnilar  rotation  in 
the  Senate,  and  for  conveniently  assembling  the  legis- 
t.'itiirc  at  a  stated  period  in  each  year. 

It  may  be  asked.  Why,  then,  could  not  a  time  hare 
been  fixed  in  the  Constitution?  As  the  most  zealous 
adversaries  of  thi?  plan  of  the  convention  in  this  State 
are,  in  general,  not  less  zealous  admirers  of  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  State,  the  question  may  be  retorted,  and  it 
may  be  asked,  Why  was  not  a  lime  for  the  like  purpose 
fixed  in  the  constitution  of  this  Slate?  No  better  answer 
can  he  given  than  that  it  wasamattcr  which  might  safely 
be  intrusted  to  le)ip»lative  discretion;  and  that  if  a  time 
had  been  appointed,  it  might,  upon  experiment,  have 
been  found  less  convenient  tlian  some  other  time.  The 
same  answer  may  be  j;iven  to  the  question  put  on  the 
other  side-  AntI  it  may  be  added  that  the  supposed 
ilangerofa  gradual  clian^e  being  merely  speculative,  it 
would  have  been  h^tntiy  advisable  upon  that  speculation 
to  establish,  as  a  fundamental  point,  what  would  deprive 
several  States  of  (lie  convenience  of  having  the  elections 
for  their  own  governments  and  for  the  national  govern- 
ment at  the  same  epochs.  Pt'ULius. 


408 


Qt/AUfiCATlONS  OF  SENATORS.      OlMitn) 


I 


No.  62  [6l].  (/■^/'■■''iiryMM-iui;.  Ptbrawf  ■^  irH.)   Hamilton  (?) 

THE   CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  SENATE. 

Qua/ifitati^m  ef  itmal^n — Affeimtmrnf  */  lemttrt  ty  ilatt  Ifgiib- 

gevemmmi  rtfuirti  a  mixtJ  rtfrtunlatt^tt — AyMi/  rtfrettnliiUfn  tu 
$en»lt  a  ruvgnitiaH  tf  m!<Ttiitily  m  lie  itahi —  Tht  Mumier  vf  itnatfti 
»n4  Ikt  titm  fgr  rekitk  Ikty  art  fiittfj — KftJ  «f  sittk  an  Hfp*r  k»Hir 
ai  a  itturily  agiimil  imfrt-fifr  Ifgiilalirn — Agaiiirl  tkt  iitfirmity  */ 
yiu/uHt — j1j;-umi{  ignnriHl  Irgiilalien — Agaiuil  mmliitilitf  in  iti  nwJi- 
tili  /rvm  /rtftKnt  ikatt^n  «/  mtmttri — Daiigtrt  »/  tilth  maUMilf 
tniamtaiti. 

To  the  Pto^e  0/  tht  Siait  0/  Hrw  York: 

Having  examined  the  con&tituiion  of  the  House  of 
Represent ii lives  and  answered  such  of  the  objections 
against  it  as  ftecmed  to  merit  notice,  I  enter  next  on  t]ie 
examination  of  the  Semite. 

The  heads  into  which  this  member  of  the  government 
may  be  considered  are:  I.  The  quulilicalions  of  senators; 
\\.  Thca|>|iointment  of  them  by  the  State  legislatures; 
HI.  The  equality  of  representation  in  the  Senate;  IV. 
The  number  of  senators,  and  the  term  for  which  they  are 
to  be  elccte<l;  V.  The  powers  vested  in  the  Senate. 

1.  The  i|ualit)ca lions  proposed  for  senators,  as  distin- 
guished from  those  of  representatives,  consist  in  a  more 
advanced  age  and  a  longer  period  of  ciiixenship.  A 
senator  roust  be  thirty  years  of  age  at  least,  as  a  repre- 
senLitive  must  be  twenty-five.  And  the  former  must 
have  been  a  cttixen  nine  years;  as  seven  years  are 
required  for  the  latter.  The  propriety  of  these  distinc- 
tions is  explained  by  the  nature  of  ihe  senatorivil  trust, 
which,  requiring  greater  extent  of  information  and 
stability  o(  cliaracler,  requires  at  (he  samr  time  that  the 
senator  should  have  rirached  a  period  of  life  most  lihcty 
to  supply  these  advanuges;  and  which,  participating 
immediately  in  transactions  with  foreign  nations,  ought 
to  be  exercised  by  none  who  are  not  thoroughly  weaned 
from  the  prepossessions  and  habits  incidenl  tu  ftireign 


Bftmllua'D]    ArtOlfiTlltE.flT  BY  LRGISMTURRS.       4»9 

birth  and  education.  Th«  term  of  nine  years  appears  to 
be  a  prudent  mediocrity  between  a  total  exclusion  of 
adopted  citizens,  whose  merits  and  talents  may  elatm  a 
share  in  the  public  confidence,  and  an  indiscriminate  and 
liafity  admission  of  titcm,  which  might  create  a  channel 
fur  foreign  inlluence  un  the  national  councils. 

II.  It  is  equally  unnecessary  to  dilate  on  (he  appoint- 
ment of  senators  by  the  State  legislatures.  Among  the 
various  modes  which  might  have  been  devised  fur  cum 
siituting  this  branch  of  the  government,  that  which  has 
been  proposed  by  the  convention  is  probably  tlic  most 
congenial  with  the  public  opinion.*  It  is  recommended 
by  the  double  advantage  of  favorinn  a  select  appointment, 
anil  of  giving  to  the  Slate  governments  such  an  agency 
ill  the  form.ilion  of  the  (cileral  government  as  must 
secure  the  authority  of  the  former  and  may  form  a  con- 
venient link  between  the  two  systems. 

III.  The  ef|u»lity  of  repreBcntattuii  in  the  Senate  is 
another  point  which,  being  evklently  the  result  of  com- 
promise between  the  opposite  pretensions  of  the  large 
and  the  smaller  Slates,  does  not  call  for  much  discussion. 
If  indeed  il  be  right  that,  among  a  people  thoroughly 
incorporated   into  one  oadon,  every  district  ought   to 


'  Atlrr  the  te\t  o(  oiin  liiimlnii  ytart,  il  \\  poviililr  l"  stkmmloJjie 
Ihil  lh«  iiiHHiitiiwiil  of  Miinlon  l>y  the  itate  Irpil.-iturfi  1mi  t>y  no 
meani  KCiired  (o  Ibc  nilion  to  HitiMiiClory  >  mtnll  oi  wuiild  hare  MVD 
Dlilaincd  bj  popular  clctllon.  Originally  frainc<d  (or  Ihit  very  piir- 
p<rt«  o(  tci.iitiui;  n  "  «lttt  »|i|i.>inlm"it  "  it  \\»\.  Iti  itt  icnilti,  cii-lol  in 
^mint;  ihc  nriiih  l>y  vrhitli  voilr^  iiitctr^lvnimt  c^iilvohlain  v%  infliirnce 
III  oiii  c'lvtmaiaiil.  At  lliii  KionKTil  wrtain  itriialon  arc  uii'lrrtlijiid  lo 
i«(iir:>r[i(  <a);M.  M  ulrei,  ox  ilnrl.  or  niltoxls.  and  tliiii  a.  due.  ai  baliily 
e\picivHl  in  a  r«Matk  (Tuliied  lo  Jay  Gould,  lo  Ihc  (bci  (h.-ii  it  it 
chea(ier  lo  buj  a  lecblatiue  than  it  it  (n  buy  a  |ico{>k,  ^xt\\  lIi«(e(ore  Ihiii 
lirancb  ot  am  iiontiiaarxl  i*  at  hiko  llm  clicajml  and  raiiml  iiicaoh  by 
which  k|>c<ul  iBlmMMnajt  tecnre  repmentalion.  But  I'lijihrr.  nnit  rrtti 
|[r«atrr  «vil,Ma(  (oBceiml  by  the  fnancn^  haiaiiipn  from  Ihc  p.-ii(  which 
Un  eUclioA  of  *  icnalocplayt  In  itale  pobliu,  ami  the  influence  which  it 
kt*  on  le|[likliv«  pr«ceedlnu*.  V«ry  often  the  klale  lc|[iilatiirr  l>  \.tf\, 
kiniicT  la  wMlea  la  akd  a  wnalor  than  la  ra*a  ciitrciit  1<KikIa|i'in,and 
Mil  inlmueolly,  where  itale  iisan  have  ha<l  ihcqr  pr«|>ti  innuciice.  tlw 
)>ulili(.-i  •■!  Ihe  tenolo*  ate  ihe  eiaci  o|>fiowlc  of  ihe  ncw-i  of  the  ilale  as 
tbown  bj-  ibe  lole  (or  Pmidrnt  or  for  repr«enlati«-ei,  Th*  defcctt  o* 
tbc  ijiiem  aie  veil  iniHlcaltil  in  Haynei't  "  I'ojiuLir  Lleclion  ol  United 
SUUa  S«*MU>t»,"  199).— ElHTUK, 


4'0     EQUAL  REPRESENTATION  IN  SE.VATE.  !»*.Mi«lt 

have  a  propotiioual  share  in  the  government,  and  that 
among  imit-pcndtnt  and  sovcrciRn  SuU'S,  tM>und  together 
l>y  a  iiiiii[ik^  t<'»gue,  tlit  pjirtivs,  however  unequal  in  size, 
ought  to  have  an  e^ual  share  in  the  common  councils,  it 
docs  not  iSppear  to  be  without  some  reason  llial  in  a  com* 
pound  republic,  fiiirl.iking  lioth  of  llic  national  and 
federal  clmt-actcr,  the  ijovcrnmcnt  ought  to  he  friumled 
on  a  mixture  of  the  princijttcs  of  proportional  and  equal 
reprcsenlalion.  But  it  is  sU|>erfluous  to  trjr,  by  the 
standard  of  theory,  a  part  of  the  Constitution  which  t« 
allowed  on  all  hamlti  to  be  the  result,  not  of  theory,  but 
*'of  a  S)>iHi  of  amity,  and  iliut  mutttal  deference  and  con- 
cession which  the  peculiarity  of  our  poltlical  Nituation 
rendered  imlispen5.iblc."  A  common  government,  with 
powers  C(|ti;it  to  its  llt>j(■<^l^(,  is  called  for  hy  ihc  voice,  and 
still  more  loudly  by  the  political  situation,  of  America. 
A  government  founded  on  principles  more  consonant  to 
the  wishes  of  the  larg^cr  States  is  nut  likely  to  be  ob- 
tained from  the  smaller  States.  The  only  option,  then, 
for  the  former,  lies  between  the  projwscd  government  and 
a  government  still  more  objectionable.  Umler  this  alter- 
native, the  advice  of  prudence  must  be  to  embrace  the 
lesser  evil;  and,  instead  of  indulging  a  froitU'ss  antici- 
pation of  the  poK^ible  mischiefs  which  may  ensue,  to 
contemplate  rather  the  advantag;cous  consequences  which 
may  (gualify  the  sacrifice. 

In  this  ^irti  it  may  )>c  remarked  that  the  equal  vote 
allowed  to  each  State  is  at  once  a  constitutional  recogni- 
g^  tion  of  the  portion  of  sovereignty  remainioK 

Ho.  SI.         in  the  imiivitlual  States,  and  an  instrument  for 
preserving    that    residuary    sovereignty.'     So    far    the 

•  Tfce  Hvaltf.  in  BjMlt  ot  llic  innniiilirir  i)l  wpiTtrniill'.n,  U»vc  in  ibc 
niaiii  Ixmi  arlnitnlitc.  So  fat  from  (kvaloiiaiis  ixuliinio  >4  iobII 
ilal*« ilragntil  '"  i''"'  \\ir  will  oj  rhc  nujonlf.  ihc  Siuti  lia*  nirelf 
tliinn  iHhrr  l.ii  i-n  ih»ii    iliiHc  wfckh  hnvp  tim  Hiivlcil  ihi 

II«»c  of  Itrp^i  tiiil  ilii»i;li  i(  \t%\  occwJoimIIt  iippowi  (h* 

vlcwint  llul  iiu.ir  jK^iilar  l»l]f.  thr  ojifMitiliiin  liai  nei«  liteii  lo  jut- 
•i>tcnt  ■•  B.il  In  pfMiKi?  nltimniF  •j^mmn'l.     Crtalwl  l<l  (iroriil  unilut 

■  LUp,  And  lo  rlirrk   any  nMmifriwI 

L>  Kired  Lhc  piupnic*  tot  which  If 

■'■ 1. -i -,   .....^.umic     A«  >  lepUjUiTT  ot  iiuttaliiB 


XantitaaaM 


CHECK  O.V  LECISLATIOU. 


4" 


equxlity  ohj^IiI  to  be  ro  lets  ucccpuble  to  the  targe  than 
to  Ihc  sm^ll  Suti-S;  since  they  are  not  less  solicitous  to 
j!;uard.  by  every  pussiiile  expedient,  againbt  an  improper 
cnnsolithttion  of  the  States  into  one  sinsle  republic. 

Amnlier  advantage  accruing  from  this  ingredient  in 
the  constitution  of  the  Senate  is  the  additional  inipeOi- 
ment  it  must  prove  against  improper  4Cts  of  legislation. 
No  law  or  resolution  can  now  be  passed  without  the  con- 
currence, first,  of  a  majority  of  the  people,  and  then 
of  a  majority  of  the  States.  It  must  be  acknowledged 
that  this  complicated  check  on  legi.slatioa  may  in  some 
tDStanccs  be  iajnrious  as  well  as  beneficial;  and  that 
the  peculiar  defense  which  it  involves  in  favor  of  the 
smaller  States  would  be  more  rational  if  any  interests 

mmon  to  them,  and  distinct  from  those  of  the 
bther  Stales  would  otherwise  be  exposed  to  peculiar 
danger.  But  as  the  larger  States  will  always  be  able,  by 
their  power  over  the  supplies,  to  defeat  unreasonable 
exertions  of  this  prerogative  of  the  lesser  States,  and  as 
the  facility  and  excexs  of  lawmaking  seem  to  be  ^M  \ 
diseases  to  which  our  governmenis  arc  most  liable,'  it  is\  , 

ffirre  It  h»  ihown  lilllr  abillljr.  Inil  u  a  nt^livD  power  Iti  lnllnenc«  fa** 
hrcn  iinty  wcoD'I  i<>  lliai  u(  lh«  »u|jTTino  coiitl.     A(  prr'wml  il  i>  lli«  tub- 

i'ect  of  utad.  btcauw  of  it>  plutocratic  tendencX'  o"'  ''■'*  "*  the  vcrjr 
lOpe  of  the  men  who  fram«d  l1i«  prnvnianu  (liac  cicalcci  it.  and  intra- 
iJueei  biln  lh«  cmcmmcnl  thai  rcpiestntnlion  nl  propccljr  which  (he 
(ranicrv  irihtinl,  tint  ayaV\  not  Mi:coiii|itl(h. — EDITOR. 

'  Uf  Toc|iirv>l  le,  in  hit  "  Driiiocravjr  in  America."  oIe<I  ai  one  of  its 
lcf«ctiaii  iiiiiabiliiy  in  Itfiilmion.  bul  sn  sood  an  obicnvrai  Mr  Itryce 
pruumu  Ihm  hii  coiBpatisoii  wm  with  Irance.  ■■  where  Ihe  CoJe  lini. 
1eillc);''l-ul'>'i";3n'lh«ii'l<ti  thm  in  "Ihc  lui  Ihiriy  tciui>|(r<>in  t8&7| 
X  have  timi  in.'rr  im|Htffjitil  <)uii]EC4  in  vTilitinry  lji>  ;iijEiLiA!Ly  mailv 
hy  (hr  EiiRlish  i'ulLimenl  llisn  by  mvnt  Anicruaii  lej;i'il.il»rti.''  Till* 
can  he  citrn'tH  t»  inclu'lr  Coiigrcn  ns  wvll.  and  broAiIly  ipcnkinu  is 
line  of  llw  l«|tnlation  o(  the  laM  hnmlrnl  fian.  fm  the  American  ol 
-day  it  i;ine(BC<J  \\f  Uvi  wUich  have  hccn  tiriMileiirit  nthcr  \\\%\\ 
anj^il  fniin  lh<nc  whleh  Kiivcriieil  hit  );riniirilhei.  whtl<-  in  England 
ibe  graoral  body  of  lavrt  hni  nni5«r{n>ns  maajr  and  radical  <liangn. 
Tlu*  «  partly  to  be  acnrnntoJ  f'lr  by  Iho  (acl  (hat  the  Cfowd'  <A  lUmoc- 
ncy.  altMHt  e<ivil  in  both  coimtriB.  found  in  ihe  tinilcd  Suiei  If^l 
Cnwltlion*  already  t>l*i-te<l  la  It,  wlilte  in  (ireat  Ittllain  ■  ticor  aytiKni 
h*d  \a  tic  dr>ela|ieil.  Slill  (uithTr.  Ihe  irhnrk  on  Ihr  tri;i>>l>li«e  pnwrr  in 
iht  I'ntteil  Slitri.  firil  liy  llic  Klo,  .niid  1.1»I  by  the  luf-teme  court, 
ikmlilf  tend*  (n  dhcoiitai^  le^ialinn  ;  while  in  Great  Britun,  when  the 
{lOKct  of  TclohiM  been  (oil,  where  Pwlianwalliai  ]iiavlicdlly  come  to  \m 


4i« 


SEKATE  A  S£CC'K/ry. 


iao.as.«' 


ttot  impossible  lliat  tliis  part  of  tfae  ConstiiulJun  may  b« 
more  coovcniciit  in  practice  than  it  appears  lo  maoy  in 
contemplation. 

IV.  The  number  uf  senators,  .ind  the  duration  of  their 
appointment,  come  next  to  be  considered.  In  order  tu 
form  an  accurate  judgment  on  both  these  points,  it  will 
be  proper  to  intiuirc  into  the  purposes  which  arc  tu  be 
answered  by  a  senate;  and  in  order  to  ascertain  these,  it 
will  be  necesMry  to  review  the  inconveniences  which  a 
republic  mu.tt  xiifTer  from  the  w^nt  of  such  an  institution. 

firsf.  It  is  a  misfortune  incident  to  republican  govern- 
ment, though  in  a  less  degree  than  to  other  governments, 
that  those  who  administer  it  m;iy  forget  iheir  obligations 
to  their  constituents  and  prove  unfaithful  to  their  impor- 
tant trust.  In  this  point  of  view,  a  senate,  as  a  second 
branch  of  the  Iefi;isbttve  assembly,  distinct  from,  .nml 
dividing  the  power  wjili,  a  first,  must  be  in  all  cases 
a  salutary  check  on  Ihc  government.  It  doubles  the 
security  to  Uic  people,  by  requiring  the  concurrence  of 
two  distinct  bodies  in  schemes  of  nsurpaiion  or  perfidy, 
where  the  ambition  or  corruption  of  one  would  otherwise 
lie  sulliirienl.  This  is  a  precaution  foumltd  on  such  viear 
principles,  and  now  so  well  understood  in  tlic  United 
Stales,  that  it  would  be  more  than  superlluous  to  enlarge 
(in  iu  t  will  barely  remark  that,  an  the  ini|>r»t»aliilitir  of 
sinister  combinations  will  be  in  projiortion  to  tlic  dissimi- 
larity in  the  genius  of  the  two  bodies,  it  must  be  politic 
to  distinguish  them  from  each  other  by  every  circun* 
stance  which  will  consist  with  a  due  harmony  in  all  proper 
measures  and  with  the  genuine  principles  of  republican 
giivernment. 

StionMy.  The  necessity  of  a  senate  is  not  less  indicated 
by  the  propensity  of  all  single  and  numerous  assemblies 
to  yield  to  Ihc  impulse  of  sudden  and  violent  passions, 
and  lo  be  seduced  by  factious  leaders  into  intemperate 
«nd  |>eniicioas  resolutions.     Examples   on  this  subject 


lupanraf  r«dniu).  m  opp^ltv  IMJcacr  »  lubcubacnrot.  — kull— 


HulUUii  rt)  I 


LECt&LATtVE  ERRORS. 


An 


might  be  cited  without  number;  and  from  proceedings 
wiihin  the  United  Suites,  as  well  as  from  the  history  of 
other  nations.  But  a  position  that  will  not  be  contrji- 
dieted  need  not  be  proved.  All  that  need  be  remarked 
tK  that  a  body  which  i»  to  correct  this  infirmity  ought 
tlself  to  be  free  from  it,  and  cui)Mei|Ucntly  ou^ht  to  be 
less  numerous.  It  ought,  moreover,  to  possess  great 
firmness,  and  consequcnlly  ought  to  hold  its  authority 
by  a  tenure  of  consideridite  duration. 

Thirdly.  Another  defect  to  be  supplied  by  a  senate  lies 
in  a  want  of  due  acquaintunce  with  the  objects  and 
principles  of  legislation.  It  is  not  possible  that  an  as- 
g„  scinhly  of  men  called  fur  the  most  part  from 

Ho.aa.  |>ur!^uil»  of  a  private  nature,  continued  in  ap- 

pointment for  a  short  time,  and  led  by  no  permanent 
motive  to  devote  the  intervals  of  put>lic  occufKitinn  to  a 
study  of  the  laws,  the  affairs,  and  the  comprehensive  in* 
tercsts  of  their  country,  should,  if  left  wholly  to  them, 
selves,  escape  a  variety  uf  important  errors  in  the 
exercise  of  their  Icj^slative  trust.  It  may  be  affirmed, 
on  the  best  grouiKis,  that  no  small  share  of  the  present 
cniharrassments  of  America  is  to  be  charged  on  the 
iilunders  of  uur  gnvernni<;n(s;  and  that  thi-si;  have  pro- 
ceeded (rom  the  beads  rather  than  the  hearts  of  most  of 
the  authors  of  them.  What  indeed  arc  all  the  repealing, 
explaining,  and  amending  laws,  which  fill  and  disgrace 
our  voluminous  codes,  but  so  m;iny  monuments  of  de- 
ficient wisdom;  so  many  impeachments  exhibited  by  each 
succeedinj;  against  each  preceding  session;  so  many 
admonitions  to  the   people  of   the   value  of  those  aids 

r which  m;»y  be  expected  from  a  well-constituted  senate? 
K  good  government  implies  t«'i)  things:  first,  fidelity 
to  the  object  of  government,  which  is  the  happiness  of 
the  people;  lecondly.  a  knowledge  of  the  means  by  which 
th.U  object  can  be  best  attained.  Some  governments  are 
deficient  in  both  these  qualities;  most  governments  arc 
deficient  In  the  lirst.  1  scruple  not  to  assert  that  in 
American  governments  too  little  attention  has  been  paid 
lu  the  last.     The  federal  Constitution  avoids  this  error; 


4H 


DANCERS  OF  UUTABIUTY. 


[iro.«S(U) 


and  what  merits  purttcalnr  notice,  it  provides  for  the  last 
in  a  mode  which  increases  ihc  security  (or  the  first. 

Fourthly.  The  mutability  in  the  |iul>tJc  councils  anaiRg 
from  a  nipid  snecesxion  of  new  members,  however  qnal- 
ilicd  they  maybe,  points  out,  in  the  stronfucat  manner, 
the  necessity  of  some  stable  institution  in  the  govcrt)- 
mcni.  Every  new  election  in  the  States  is  found  lo 
change  onc-hatf  of  the  representatives.  From  this 
change  of  men  must  proceed  a  chan;^  of  opinions;  vnA 
from  a  change  of  opinions,  a  change  of  measures.  Bnt  a 
continual  chanfte  even  of  good  measures  is  incunsisteut 
with  every  rule  of  prudence  and  every  prospect  of  success. 
The  remark  is  verilied  i»  private  life,  and  becomes  more 
just,  as  well  as  more  important,  in  national  transactions. 

To  trace  the  mischievous  effects  of  a  mul.ible  govern- 
ment would  fdl  a  volume.  I  will  hint  a  few  only,  each 
of  which  will  be  perceircd  to  be  a  source  of  innumerable 
others. 

In  the  first  place,  it  forfeits  the  respect  and  confidence 
of  other  nations  and  all  the  advantages  conncctt^d  with 
national  character.  An  individual  who  is  observed  to  be 
inconstant  to  his  plans,  or  perhaps  to  carry  on  his  afbirs 
without  any  plan  at  atl,  i«  marked  at  once,  by  alt  prudent 
people,  as  a  speedy  victim  to  his  own  unsteadiness  and 
folly.  His  mure  friendly  ncif;hbors  m.iy  pity  him,  but  all 
will  decline  to  connect  their  fortunes  with  his;  and  not  a 
few  will  seize  the  opportunity  of  making  their  fortunes 
out  of  his.  One  nation  is  to  another  what  mie  individual 
is  to  another;  with  this  melancholy  di^iinction  perliaps, 
that  the  former,  with  fewer  of  the  benevolent  cmntinns 
than  the  latter,  arc  under  fewer  restraints  also  from  tak> 
ing  undue  advantage  from  the  indiscretions  of  each 
other.  Every  nation,  consequently,  whose  affairs  betray 
a  want  of  wisdom  and  stability,  may  calccilatc  on  every 
loss  which  can  be  sustained  from  the  more  systematic 
policy  nf  their  wiser  neighbors.  But  the  best  instractinn 
on  this  subject  is  unhappily  conveyed  to  .\mcrii-a  by  the 
example  of  her  uwn  siiiiation.  She  finds  Ihal  <ilie  is  held 
in  no  respect  by  her  friends;  tliat  she  is  the  derision  of 


lUmiltonmi     V.VDVa  Al>yA.\TACK  TO  THE    FF.W.     J15 

her  en<rnites;anU  that  slic  is  a  prey  i«  every  naiiun  which 
has  an  interest  in  speculating  on  her  fluctuating  councils 
and  embarrassed  affairs. 

Tht-  int(;rn;il  t.-(re<:ts  of  a  mutalile  potiey  are  »lill  more 
calamitous.  It  poisons  the  blessing  of  liberty  itself. 
It  will  be  of  little  avail  to  the  people  that  the  laws  are 
miule  by  men  uf  their  own  choice  if  the  bws  be  so  volu- 
minous that  Ihcy  cannot  be  read,  or  so  incoherent  that 
:  thry  cannot  be  understood;  if  Ihcy  be  repealed  or  revised 
[before  they  arc  pruniulgateil,  or  underj^o  such  incessant 
changes  that  no  man  who  knows  wtut  the  law  is  to-day 
can  guess  what  it  will  be  t<>-morrow.  Law  is  defined  to 
be  a  rule  of  action;  but  how  can  that  be  a  rule  which  is 
little  known  and  icss  fixed? 

Another  effect  of  public  instability  is  the  unreasonable 
ndvanLige  it  gives  to  (hr  sagacious,  the  enter{>ri»ing,  and 
the  moneyed  few  over  the  industrious  and  uninformed 
mass  of  the  people.  Every  new  regulation  concerning 
commerce  or  revenue,  or  in  any  manner  affecting  the 
value  of  the  different  species  uf  property,  presents  a  new 
harvest  to  those  who  watch  the  change  and  can  trace  its 
'con«e()uences:  a  harvest  reared  not  by  themselves,  but 
by  the  toils  and  cares  of  the  great  body  of  their  (ellow- 
riti);ens.  This  is  a  state  of  things  in  which  it  may  be 
said  with  some  truth  that  laws  are  made  for  the /<■«'.  not 
for  the  many.* 


'Very  recent  cvcnti  linie  proved  ilu  uulh  of  (liii  princi|>le.  L'n- 
icnipaioiHiDcnibcriof  Congrcia.  and  iheihrewiki  tpecuUtun.  have  lolieii 
„adv«nlii2e  of  ihc  pultllc  meakuici  (u  so  cilciil  whiiJi  hat  ciutcd  gficitl 
|^iih:4.i.ul.tlk-  Tlif  iaiter  pQcil  IxiujfliF  Un^O  (jliickb  "\  litvQf  ih  J  [irvlim- 
I  |n4.ry  li>  liar  ]i(«>ni;  uf  Ihc  itltar  purcbmc  law.  1'he  buyinc  of  tTigirt 
I  trtiil  it'ick  jutl  priof  (•>  Ihr  v^itliiig  of  llic  liiScrenlJAl  duljr  of  the  Urifl 
|«f  iSi)4  pni  \itice  mmi  of  moncv  inlo  Ihc  jkoulieli  oi  tli«  vcty  men  wlio 
l-aiTinicrd  the  rair  ;  ami  ttilt  \an%.  Ij;r  'he  incroitcd  ux  on  tpiriit.  en- 
kd  Ibc  wliikky  tiu-il  1(1  imkc  a  larco  antoniil.  So,  jubt  |irrvi<ii|i  to  ihc 
"ifgi  c4  ihf  prciFnl  (lSg7)  Uiifl.  <n  view  of  ilic  new  larift  ichcdulei, 
■nMHiniii  'if  RH:rchari(fi>c  ncte  fiiirricil  inio  tlic  country,  lo  be  vM 
on  (he  baiB  dJ  Ihc  ncT  dultn.  Thui  each  upccU!  inlFmi  U 
nabled  lliriMigit  lc(;ti!jiii'e  ibanmn  lo  make  undue  |iruliu.  whdc  llic 
vjjolilicaJ  ur  tiiicixnEiuntil  nun.  |w  Iwr  rich  t>t  |tOijf ,  u  fv  ffnni  rccciv- 
;  a  than),  it  Invarialilj^  Ibp  one  who  pif*  Ihe  proht;  (hui  clfecluall<r 
;  ITooiillon's  atiuEnnKnl  of  unstable  hgiilaiion  b«cauie  thereby 
I  (nr  the  mmf" — F.ditoi. 


i/it 


4i6      rFKU  OP  APPOIXTMENT  OF  SENATE.    IBo-MfW 

In  anotlier  point  of  view,  great  injury  results  from  au 
unstable  government.  The  want  of  confidence  io  the 
l>ul>li(;  councils  (liim|>R  «very  useful  undertaking  the  suc- 
cess and  prolii  of  which  may  depend  on  a  continuance  o( 
existing  jrrunf;cmcnts.  What  prudent  mcictunt  will 
hazard  his  fortunes  in  any  new  branch  of  commerce  whcit 
he  knows  not  but  that  his  plans  may  be  rendered  unlaw- 
ful before  they  can  be  executed?  What  farmer  or  manu- 
facturer will  lay  himself  nut  fur  the  encouragement  given 
to  any  particular  cultivation  or  establishment,  when  he 
can  have  no  assurance  tiiat  his  preparatory  labors  and 
advances  will  nut  render  him  a  victim  to  an  inconstant 
government?  In  a  word,  no  ^tt^M  improvement  or  laud- 
able enttTprisc  can  go  forward  which  requires  the  aus- 
pices of  a  steady  system  of  natiunal  policy. 

But  the  roost  du-plorablc  effect  of  all  is  that  diminuiioa 
of  attachment  and  reverence  which  steals  into  the  hearts 
of  the  people,  towards  a  political  system  which  betrays  so 
many  marks  of  infirmity,  and  dj&:ipp<jints  so  many  of  tlicir 
flattering  hopes.  No  sovernroent,  any  more  tliao  an  in- 
diridnal.  will  long  lie  rcspccled  without  being  truly  re- 
spectable; nor  be  truly  respectable  without  piHsexning  a 
certain  portion  of  order  and  stability.  Pt/BUt;s. 


No.  63  [62].    V'Jti*mJnt/tar^i.iKardi  a.  tr««j     Hamilton  (?) 
TERM  OF  APPOINTMENT  OF  THE  SENATE. 

Pmitmli  -  »>■/  »/j  Jf  ifHir  *f  mtluna/  .i^rjitrr^  tf  a  dmt  rttftm- 
tikibn.  aiJ if  •!  Jf/tmtr  a^ml  lrmf«f»ry  ttr^i  JmJ  Jtliut*iti — jVit. 
Ury  ]*,■»>  i"  buf-ZiprJ  rrftMit  attknil  a  S/miii — OifrrtKit  Atfwmm 
tUt  a»iirnt  wrfuM.-]  ami  l*r  f'aiW  Statu—  4litni.  Crrti:^,  Jj^vnk, 
K^mf,  CrrU — OtJHlim  lk*t  IJki  Srmati  trtll  uyiun  a  dtiufwrnt  pn- 
*minfn<t  natidrrfilStKi  a  retmll  ra^in'Aii — Sr^alr  af  Maryta^ 
Bnliii  ParbAmtul—Sf^ru,  Kamt,  Cirlidtr—rtt  tamtralM^  t»f»- 
rmt  *f  tkt  Uaum  af  Xtfmmuiimtt, 

Ts  tlkf  Ptmftr  »flkt  .Stefr  »f  Nr»  )>«.• 

A  fiflh  dexiderralum,  MliutratiJie  the  oiJUty  of  a  Scaait^ 
is  the  want  of  a  due  sense  of  nalionat  character.    Wiih- 


HuillMDlIt]  SEXATE  AND  JVATIOXAL  CflARACTEK.     4>7 

out  a  select  and  stable  member  of  the  government,  tlie 
esteem  nf  Toreij^n  powers  witi  not  only  be  forfeited  by  an 
unenliKblcncd  and  variable  policy,  procccdinjc  from  the 
causes  already  mentioned,  but  the  national  councils  will 
not  possess  tlut  »en-«ibiliiy  to  the  ;)]>iiiion  of  the  world 
which  is  perhaps  not  less  necessary  in  order  to  merit, 
than  it  is  to  obtain,  its  respect  anil  confidence. 

An  attention  to  the  Judgment  of  other  nations  is  im- 
portant to  every  sovernmcni  for  two  reasons:  the  one  is 
that,  independently  of  tlic  merits  of  any  particular  plan 
or  measure,  it  is  desirable,  on  various  uccuunts,  that  it 
should  appear  to  other  nations  as  the  on'spring;  of  a 
wise  and  honorable  policy;  the  second  is  that  in  doubt- 
ful cases,  iMrticularly  where  the  national  councils  may 
be  warped  by  some  strong  passion  or  momentary  inter- 
est, the  presumed  or  known  opinion  of  the  impartial 
world  may  l>e  the  best  guide  that  can  be  followed. 
What  has  not  America  lo<it  by  her  want  of  rharacter 
witli  foreign  nations;  and  how  many  errors  and  follies 
would  she  not  have  avoided,  if  the  justice  and  propriety 
of  her  measures  had,  in  every  instance,  l»e«n  previously 
tried  by  the  light  in  which  they  would  probably  appear  to 
the  unbiased  part  of  mankind? 

Vet  however  requisite  a  sense  of  national  character 
may  be,  it  is  evident  that  it  can  never  be  sufficiently 
possessed  by  a  numerous  and  changeable  body.  It  can 
only  he  found  in  a  number  so  small  that  a  ^nsilile  degree 
of  the  praise  and  blame  of  public  measures  may  be  the 
portion  of  each  individual;  or  in  an  assembly  so  durably 
invested  with  pabtic  trust  that  the  pride  and  conse- 
quence of  its  members  may  be  sensibly  incorporated  wiih 
the  reputation  and  prosperity  of  the  community.  The 
half  yearly  representatives  of  Rhode  Island  would  proba- 
bly have  been  little  a&cctcd  in  their  deliberations  on  the 
iniquitous  measures  of  that  State  by  arguments  drawn 
from  the  lijiht  in  which  such  measures  would  be  viewed 
by  foreign  nations,  or  even  by  the  sister  States;  whilst  it 
can  scarcely  l>e  doubted  tliat  if  the  concurrence  of  a  select 
and  stable  body  had  been  necessary,  a  reg'ard  to  national 


4i8     i/{KESPo,vs/Biurv  OF  s/foier  rexj/s.  i»*cs  n 

character  alone  would   have   prevented   the    caUmiiics 
under  which  that  mi^j^iiided  people  is  now  latMring. 

1  add,  as  a  n'xfA  defect,  the  want,  in  some  important 
cascK,  of  a  due  responsibility  in  the  government  to  the 
people,  arising  (roinihat  fre<)ucncy  of  elections  which  in 
Other  cases  produces  this  resp.-nsihility.'  This  remark 
will,  perhaps,  appear  not  only  new,  but  paradoxical.  It 
miiflt  nevcrlheleu  be  acknowledged,  when  eiplaiocd,  to 
be  as  undeniable  as  it  is  itnportanL 

Responsibility,  in  order  to  be  reasonable,  must  be 
limited  to  objects  within  the  power  of  the  respoauble 
party,  and,  in  order  to  be  effectual,  must  relate  to  tarna- 
tions of  that  power,  of  which  a  ready  and  proper  judg- 
ment can  he  formed  by  the  constituents.  The  objects  of 
government  may  be  divided  into  two  ceneral  classes:  the 
one  depending  on  measures  which  hare  singly  an  Imme- 
diate and  sensible  operation;  the  other  depending  do  « 
;siicre<c4ion  of  wclI'Chosen  and  well  connected  meastires, 
rhich  have  a  gradual  and  perhaps  unobserTcd  operation. 
The  importance  of  the  latter  description  to  the  collective 
;ind  permanent  welfare  of  every  country  needs  no  ex- 
planation. And  yet  it  is  evident  that  an  as&embly  elected 
for  so  short  a  term  as  to  be  unable  to  provide  m"re  than 
One  or  two  links  in  a  chain  of  measures,  un  wlitch  the 
general  welfare  may  essentially  depend,  ought  not  to  be 
answerable  for  the  Rnal  result,  any  more  than  a  steward 
or  tenant,  engaged  for  one  year,  could  be  justly  made  to 
answer  (or  pbces  or  improvements  which  cotUd  not 


*  One  flvinml  nf  ikU  irmpianniilitr  i«  ihir  to  >  rnunin^ 
wKith  mt  ctediou  law*  ham  pnxliuird.  Emr  t*n  yr»n  •  ar*  Hi 
o(  RcfKocaluins  a  rhatrm  ■■  Nonmbcr,  liiu  (/irr  ihr  main  nt  Ike 
clea«i»>  ate  knon,  ila  Cin^nru  declcd  Ion  vuti  IvfMc  Imhb  «■• 
nton  unKtoa  Iwtan  ■)  t'  -•<  l-r  the  ne«  tioiir.      In  sxiimajtit^€»  i 

lliu.  WMBc  uf  the  i*t<<'  : 'I   •Rulun  Lb.mi  \htt  lh»j  w*  ki 

ool  ol   aficv.  anil,    rr-r^rt^•■m   ''nn{   aa  luu^w    pnaaUlc,   arc 
of  fmliDc  ofiiKla*.     Wiih  hndly  ■■  nsvptMO,  tiw  "  bold' 
vl  CiM>miM  wr  maAnt  by  aa  —nwit  odlivni  ol  nMi 
Itctf,  aail  *)>rt-ul  IrjClUsltua.      Thr  ikfea  coald  euilf  W 
Mdi  dune*  rltbn  nf  tim  itato  ut  rhctton,  or  ol  ibv  awljae  ol  C^ 
(ICB.  that  M  Miitiiakil  Cimfrra  rtmM  li^tlatr.      In  twKh  Crrsl  Hnc 

and  Fnve  a  nev  clectiaa  ol  the  nwrwntxiw  liody  ai  hh  «n*  i 
»na  of  that  kithtnn  baUwg  «Sw  — 4^t«K. 


Bu&UtWfPl      DSFE.VSE  AGAIHST  DELU&IOh'S. 


419 


K 


accomplished  in  less  tlian  half  a  dozen  years.  Nor  is  it 
possible  for  the  people  to  estimate  the  shart  of  influence 
whrrh  their  annual  assemblies,  may  re* jicc lively  have  on 
vents  resuitinj;  from  the  mixed  transactions  of  several 
years.  It  is  sufficiently  difhcult  to  preserve  a  personal 
rcsponBtbility  in  llic  members  of  a  numerous  bo<ly  for  stich 
a<!ts  of  the  body  a»  have  an  immediate,  detached,  and 
palpable  operation  on  its  constituents. 

The  proper  remedy  for  this  dcld^t  mtisc  be  an  addi- 
tional body  in  (he  lei^islative  department,  which,  having 
sufficient  permanency  to  provide  for  such  objects  as  re- 
quire a  continued  attention,  and  a  train  of  measures,  may 
be  justly  and  effectually  answerable  for  the  attainment  of 
those  objects. 

Thus  far  I  hare  considered  the  circumstances  which 
point  out  the  necessity  of  a  well-constructed  Senate  only 
as  they  relate  to  the  representatives  of  the  people.  To 
a  people  as  little  blinded  by  prejudice  or  corrupted  by 
flattery  as  those  whom  I  address,  1  shall  not  scruple  to 
add  that  such  an  institution  may  be  sometimes  necessary 
as  a  defense  to  the  people  against  their  own  temporary 
errors  and  delusions.  As  the  cool  and  deliberate  sense 
of  the  community  otig;hl,  in  all  governments,  and  actually 
will,  in  all  free  governments,  ultimately  prevail  over  the 
views  of  its  rulers;  so  ilicrc  arc  particular  moments  in 
public  affairs  when  the  people,  stimulated  by  some  irreg- 
ular passion,  or  some  illicit  advantage,  or  misled  by  the 
artful  misrepresentations  of  interested  men.  may  cjill  for 
measures  which  they  themselves  will  afterwards  be  the 
must  ready  to  lament  and  condemn.  In  these  critical 
moments,  how  saltitary  will  be  the  interference  of  some 
temperate  and  respectable  body  of  cilizens.  in  order  to 
check  the  misguided  career,  and  to  suspend  the  blow 
meditated  by  thi:  people  against  themselvi-u,  until  reason, 
justice,  and  truth  can  regain  their  auiiioriiy  over  the 
public  mind?  Wiat  bitter  anguish  would  not  the  people 
uf  Athens  have  often  escaped  if  their  j^orernment  had 
contained  so  provident  a  safeguard  against  the  tyranny 
of  their  own  passions?     Popular  liberty  might  then  have 


410     BKDURING  REPUBLICS  HAD  SENATES.  IHfcttittl 


escaped  the  iiulcliblc  reproach  of  decreeing  to  the  ume 
citizens  the  hcml'xk  on  one  day  and  sUtiics  on  the  next. 

It  may  lie  suggested  that  a  people  spreud  over  an  ex- 
tensive region  cannot,  like  the  crowded  inhabiunts  of  a 
8m  Km.  small  district,  be  subject  to  the  infct:tion  of 
S  and  4T,  vitilent  passions  or  to  the  danger  of  combin* 
ing  in  pursuit  of  unjust  measures.  1  am  far  from  deny- 
ing that  this  is  a  distinction  of  peculiar  importance.  1 
have,  on  the  contrary,  endeavored  in  a  former  paper  to 
show  that  it  is  one  of  the  principal  recommendations  of 
a  confcdi-ruted  republic.  At  the  same  time,  this  advan- 
tage ou);ht  not  to  be  considered  as  superseding  the  use 
of  auxiliary  precautions.  It  may  even  be  remarked  that 
the  same  extended  situation  vhich  will  exempt  the  peo- 
ple of  America  from  some  of  the  dangers  int-idcnt  to 
lesser  republics  irill  expose  them  to  the  inconveniency 
of  remaining,  for  a  longer  time,  under  the  inflncnce  of 
those  misrepresentations  which  the  combined  industry 
of  interested  men  may  succeed  in  distributing  among 
them. 

Il  adds  no  small  wcighl  to  all  ihrse  considerations  to  recollect 
ihiti  hbtory  informt  \t%  of  ito  loitg^liveil  (cpubfic  whkh  had  not  a 
scnitle.  Sparta,  Rome,  and  Cariluige  arc.  in  fact,  t)ic  only  uaics 
to  whom  that  character  can  be  applied.  Id  each  of  the  two  Arsi 
there  wu  a  senate  (or  life.  The  coouiiuiion  of  ihr  senate  in  itic 
laii  U  less  known.  Cireumstantial  rviOence  makes  ii  prab^ile 
lltat  it  was  nol  didcfrnl  \a  this  particular  from  the  two  Mhcrv  II 
is  at  teasi  ccrtiiiii  thai  il  hnd  some  quality  or  other  which  rendered 
it  on  anchor  against  popular  (hiclmtions :  and  thai  ■  HBaBcr 
council,  drawn  om  of  the  senate,  was  appointed  not  oatly  fov  Mr, 
htil  (illnl  lip  vacancies  itself.  These  ciampln.  ibotigh  as  wnfit  for 
l)ie  imitadon  ai.  lliey  are  rrpu^anl  to  the  grfiiu«  of  Anwr^ca.  are. 
nniwithslandin^,  when  compared  with  the  fuf^iiv«  and  lurtwlenl 
existence  of  other  aocieni  rrpuhlics,  vety  iiMruclirc  proots  of  tfec 
neccssily  of  some  iciMitatKM  lltai  will  blend  sutiUliy  wnh  lAoty. 
I  am  not  unaware  ul  Ibc  ctteumstancrs  which  ilJiiii^alih  the 
American  (n>iii  other  popatar  pnvniinniii.  a»  w«| 
DimlerD;  artd  which  render  r-  ^n  n 

msiNiing  (nim  tliconeca«r  '.  "rr  al 

a  cimudcT3i iRtnl 


w«ghl  1 1 

an  many  poinis  uf  stmi]<i 


^umpJrs  WM  WW- 


HwnilWXt))    KEPRESEA'TATIOX  I.V  CMBECE. 


431 


worthy  of  otir  nlieniion.  Many  of  tli«  ile(«ct4.  «s  we  have  aeen. 
which  can  only  besupplicft  hy  n  scnaiorijil  Insiiiuiion,  .ire  common 
to  a  nurneroux  ;i»scn)l>1y  (irqiienily  elected  by  the  I>e«p1e,  aii<l  to 
the  people  lUciTiseWe*.  Tlierc  are  Olhers  pccqliar  10  the  former, 
which  (equite  the  control  o(  sucli  an  m&litulion.  The  people  can 
never  nilifuHy  liclrny  their  own  intcrctls,  hut  thry  iriAy  post^ihlj'  be 
beirayeil  by  ibe  rcpiescnlii lives  o(  Hie  people ;  ami  the  (Linger  will 
b«  evidently  greater  where  the  whole  lej^tiblive  liusi  i(  lodp^ed  in 
Ihe  lundi  ulone  body  of  men  than  where  the  coiioufieiicc  o(  sep- 
Krale  and  diMJmil.ir  bodies  ix  requited  in  :very  public  nel. 

The  diSeience  mn»i  relied  on.  between  the  American  and  other 
republics,  consists  in  the  ]>Tiiiclple  of  (epresenlation :  which  ii  the 
gM  pivoi  on  which  the  former  move,  and  which  ii  sup- 

Ke.  14.  puted  lo  Iwve  been  unknown  to  the  latter  or  at  least 

to  the  aticicnt  p*n  of  ibcm.  The  use  whicii  has  hfcii  made  of 
this  dillcrence  in  tciiodings  contained  in  funnel  papen  will  have 
shown  thai  I  am  dispoicil  nnlher  lo  deny  its  existence  nor  lo 
uiiilci I'ilue  its  iiupotlance.  I  (eel  [lie  less  reWraiiit,  iherefore,  In 
obteiviiif;  that  the  posilion  concerning  (he  ignorance  of  the  ancient 
governrnents  oti  the  subject  of  reprcscnialjon  is  by  no  nieanii  pre- 
cUety  true  in  the  latitude  commonly  given  to  it.  Without  enteilng 
into  >  diii|iibtlian  vrhich  here  would  be  mispUced,  I  will  refer  to  *. 
few  known  f^^cts  in  suppoit  of  whftt  f  ^idvance. 

In  Ihe  most  pure  dcniocraciei  ■>!  Greece,  many  of  the  eiKVUtiTe 
funciions  were  perb.i inc<l,  iioi  hy  the  people  (hemschei*.  but  by 
olbceis  elected  by  the  jieople,  and  rcprtseHting  ihe  people  in  their 
txttulmt  capstciiy. 

Prior  to  the  reform  of  Solon  Athens  wras  goi-erncd  by  nine 
Archons.  annually  eltcttd  ly  the  fi^op/f  at  i-irgi.  The  degree  of 
power  delegateil  to  them  scemi  to  be  left  in  great  obscurity.  Sub- 
sequent (o  that  perMxl,  ive  fin<i  *n  aisemhiy,  first  of  four,  and  afiet- 
ward  of  ux  hundred  mernbers.  annu.-illy  etrttnt  by  tlu ptopU ;  and 
fartiittfy  representing  them  in  their  /^tifa/itv  CAjiaciiy.  since  Ihcy 
were  not  only  associated  with  Ihe  people  in  the  (uncllon  ot  making 
Uws,  but  hod  llie  exclusive  right  of  originating  Ic^iUalive  propo«i- 
lions  to  the  people.  The  Bcnale  of  Carlhagc.  also,  whalei'cr  rnighl 
be  its  poivei,  or  the  duration  of  lis  appoiiilnicnl.  appe.irt  to  h^iVe 
been  tUtlivt  hy  the  &iiff(jgC6  of  ihc  people.  Similar  inslaiices 
might  be  traced  in  mast,  if  not  all  the  popular  gov  cm  menti  of 
antlquiiy. 

Lastly,  in  Sparta  ttc  meet  with  the  Ephoii,  and  in  Rome  with 
Ihc  Tribunes:  two  bodkw,  small  indeed  in  numbers,  hui  annually 
tttettJ  by  tht  tvka/f  tMly  sf  the  teobU,  and  cimsidcred  as  ihe 


451 


AMKRICAM  PI.AX  SVPElffOS.        Oto-M.tt' 


rtprtuHtitSivti  ol  (he  people,  almasi  in  \\yi\t  ptfttip^'lentiaty 
capacity.  The  Cosmi  ol  Crele  vrere  alio  annually  r/rt/t-t  by  tit 
ptopU,  and  hai-R  bcm  ci>n«i(lcird  hy  some  auihors  as  an  intthu- 
llon  aiMkt^ous  lo  \\vmx  or  SjMria  and  Kome.  with  thi<  HifTrrrnfc 
only,  ihal  in  ihc  cicciioii  ol  thai  rfptcsrmaiive  lioily  ihe  nj;lit  o( 
suRiag«  was  oiiiiniuniculcil  lo  a  |Mrl  uiily  of  lite  people. 

From  ilinc  f.icts,  lo  which  m.-iny  others  niiglii  tic  atldnl,  ii  b 
clear  thai  llir  priiiciplr  ot  rrprescnlaliori  vras  nctllxT  unknown  10 
the  ancieiit<  nor  wholly  oirrrtiKikrd  in  tbri*  poliliul  conMilutiont. 
The  (rue  diuinciion  between  these  and  ilie  American  t^nvtrnmentf 
lies  /«  ike  Maltxclusicn  ef  th* peaftir,  in  thrir  et^lftlrtv  eapatily. 
from  any  slure  in  x'nt  hUUr,  ami  not  in  the  Mai  extln!i<>fi  «f  Ikr 
rrpretentathfetpf  Ihe  ftefpif  Irom  (he  aHniiniUraiion  o(  tlie/.wii«iT. 
The  clislinctlon.  however,  thus  qualified,  iiiusi  be  adiniiinl  toleAre 
n  mosi  advanlaKeoux  Kuperiohly  in  fai*o«  of  the  United  Stales.. 
Bu(  to  insure  to  litis  ad^-aiilage  its  full  eflect.  Me  inuil  be  caicful 
nol  to  separate  ii  from  the  oiher  >i)v4nla{;e.  of  an  extensive  itni- 
lory.  For  it  CAnnot  be  beliei'cil  that  any  lonn  u(  represent alhe 
govemmeDl  could  have  succeeded  within  the  nairon-  limits  occn- 
pinl  \vj  the  democracies  o(  Greece.' 

' "  But  (edeialitiii.  with  t\\  \iac\&f  iin|>)icKilont,  <m  not  Mi  inanition 
of  the  Tealoiiic  iniiiiJ,  'Dir  iiln  wm  Inmilinr  i»  llie  tily  mininnniltn 
of  ■ticjcni  Greece,  whicli.  ilnnf;  niih  llicir  intetne  love  of  telf-piverB- 
■nciit.  felt  ihe  nmi  of  cnmhined  anion  lor  Hirdintf  oil  cdctiial  atUck. 
Ill  ihrir  Ailininn  unil  Aiioliiii  lea|pMs  the  CrccksMk-lc  bt>ll'*nl  iillenipii 
tuwurd  fuuniliiij:  a  tmliim  ■ii'oii  w:iine  hij-her  )>riiici|>le  limn  thnl  nf  merr 
cnnijueil.  ind  lli<  hisiofv  <>(  tbeie  altemfils  h  rtneilincly  inleteitinE  >iHf 
iimlriiclive.  They  failed  lor  lack  sA  ibe  principle  of  iei>m«nulM«. 
wliicli  wM  iiraclically  nnknoirn  to  the  woilit  until  uitiiHlixed  by  Uw 
Triitonii- ciilimirert  of  tl>c  Ronun  empire.  Until  the  hIf*  i>r  {luvn 
dele(;iiteil  by  Ihe  |ienf>le  h»d  bceflcne  fsmillir  Ii>  iim't  mintU  in  ill  pac 
lic*l  )<esiiTii:i,  it  wat  iiBgioiutite  to  i.-rrilr  i  i;rt-*l  Biliua  wtlliool  cnuMBf 
out  the  jiclitKiil  life  in  wme  of  id  piriv  Some  nnice  u(  power  mm 
Mire  i«  ibtoib  ill  ihc  ptililind  life,  and  ^tow  at  the  ci|)e»c  of  tUc  o«. 
lyine  paitt.  iiDtll  the  rewalt  wm  a  tentmliied  deipoiim.  Ilencc  It  nme 
lo  be  one  of  lh«  cuiniano|)lacc  amimpliont  of  pohhcjl  vrlim  that  n- 
publia  nutt  be  small,  tkal  lr<«  i^vanncnt  W  (inuiiuitile  ooly  )m  •  con- 
fined ue*.  and  that  the  only  UroiiK  (ml  ilnmble  i;i>ircmincBt,  catiahle  ol 
aiainlaiiunit  firdci  throughoul  a  van  Imiloty.  U  lomc  fora  of  abwiiliM 
moBaitrhy.  It  wjrt  iiiiile  (Jilnml  thai  unfile  ihould  fi>riiirilv  (.■v^  hrlj 
this  opinion.  anJ  it  it  imleeil  i»i.t  yrl  .(iiile  ohtntele.  1  i-« 

will   become  wote   and  iinw*   apiiBrvnl   a»  Ann-tn  wn 

UMilcnliMxI.     Our  eipetieace  hit  nuw  to  Xv  \.i.am* 

Ihal  ilnfmliun  i>  nul  the  ttronceil  balvrcll--  r  (uib  ai 

Bnvniin>ent ;  llial  cenlialitri  •daiinkliadonti  ii>c   iiim    .':  '  riH 

empire,  haie  laDrn   tn  |>i«i.-et.  ncrt   iKiaiite  of  loo  hiikIi,  I  .  ul 

loo  little  freedom  .  anJ  ikai  I  lie  only  penhitsble  (pmniii..  ..:   ;  !>■ 

that  whifii  sDccceiB  in  adiiering  naiional  unity  on  •  ^jnmA  tinle,  •Hfiiml 


aiMllto«mi     ARISTOCHATtC  TENDENCIES, 


4«J 


In  answer  to  all  these  arguments,  saggcstcd  by  reason, 
illustrated  by  c.iamplcs,  and  crifurced  by  our  own  expert- 
entc,  the  jealous  adversary  o/  ilic  Conslitutiim  will 
probably  content  himself  wiili  repeating  thdt  a  senate 
appointed  not  tniinediately  by  the  people,  and  for  the 
term  of  six  years,  must  gradually  atquire  a  daii];er»us 
pre-cmiricnre  in  the  government,  and  finally  transform  it 
into  a  tyrannical  aristocracy. 

To  this  general  answer  the  general  reply  ought  to  be 
sufficient  that  liberty  may  be  endangered  by  the  abuses 
o(  liberty  as  well  as  by  tlie  abuses  of  power;  that  there 
arc  numerous  instances  of  the  former  as  well  as  of  the 
latter;  and  that  the  former,  rather  than  the  latter,  are 
;ipliarently  mOKt  to  be  apprehended  by  the  (United  States. 
But  a  more  particular  reply  may  be  given. 

Before  such  a  revolution  can  be  effcctnl  (he  Senate,  it 
is  to  be  observed,  must  in  the  first  place  corrupt  itself; 
must  nest  corrupt  ihe  State  legislatures;  must  then 
corrupt  the  House  of  Representatives;  and  must  finally 
corrupt  the  people  at  large.  It  is  evident  that  the  Senate 
must  be  first  corrupted'beforc  it  can  attempt  an  establish- 
ment of  tyranny.  Without  corrupting  the  State  legisb< 
turcs,  it  cannot  prosecute  the  attempt,  because  the 
pcriodic.il  change  of  members  would  oiherwike  regenerate 
the  whole  body.     Without  exerting  the  means  of  corrup* 


wtkkciiIiiK  the  Mate  of  pertund  txtA  lood  tnd«|ieiidenc«.  For  rn  Ihe 
body  iiolitic  ihlk  *)><»(  <A  Irreikiiii  it  *t  l!ie  red  coqiii3>cle«  in  the  blood  ; 
it  cirrir^  the  life  willi  il.  Il  niikr«  the  •llflerence  lielween  %  hciciely  of 
icll-rrtjwtlini;  men  an't  vomen  an<l  a  tocioly  of  piipptti.  Your  niliuii 
nuy  have  (il.  poetry.  ■n4  tcicncc.  all  tli«  rclincmentt  uf  civiliitd  life,  all 
Ihc  cumfniU  tixl  iaf();uaitii>  thai  bumiin  in^«niii>)'  c«n  device  ;  but  if  il 
kse  thii  ipini  nf  |<<nrin(l  anil  Incd  iiiilcpciiilence,  il  i»  doomed  and  >1c- 
lerret  iti  iknm.  A*  I'mi'lral  CkvcUiid  lion  well  Mid,  Il  it  iMil  the 
bniincu  of  a  Eorerniaent  to  tii[>p"(t  il>  (>c"|>)e,  but  of  the  pcufile  (» iiip- 
perl  their  coictuineel  :  an<l  once  lo  Inic  '■&'>(  of  Ill's  'TH3^  truth  is  as 
dangefint  n  tn  liille  iviiJi  tonw  kteilihv  mirtotic  poison.  Of  the  Iwo 
oppoote  petilt  wtiich  have  |ir(|xtiii.t1)'  itireaienciliae  welfare  of  political 
tncieiT — atianrhj  on  the  one  liind.  luvi  of  tell-gowviMmrnt  on  Ihe  other 
— Jctfcrvon  wiis  ngbl  in  inaiataininE  lint  Ihe  lallei  ii  rcxlly  Ihe  nior* 
lube  drejdcil  beujic  itt  iieginiiiiii;^  aie  to  t«rTil>1y  iiiii-tioui.  Many 
■rill  unileriU"' I  wh^l  it  nieiiil  by  a  thecal  of  acceisKHi.  nhere  feo  loko 
heed  of  the  Uuirfid  imii-;i|ile  iuvolied  In  ■  Texot  SocdbilU"— Fiskc's 
"  Uiyliuiings of  Nc*  Ln-latid." — EuiroK. 


494 


SSf/ATE  OF  MARYLAKD. 


»«.  63  •«■ 


tion  with  ef)aal  success  on  ihc  House  of  Represcn  la  lives, 
the  opposition  of  that  coequal  branch  of  the  gorernmcni 
would  inevitably  <lefrat  the  attempt;  and  without  cor- 
ruptins;  tbe  people  themtivlvcs,  a  aucce»&ion  of  new  rep. 
resentativcs  would  speedily  restore  all  things  to  their 
pristine  order.  Is  there  any  man  who  can  seriously  per- 
suade hiiiiNelf  itiat  the  proposed  Senate  can,  by  nuy  pos- 
sible means  within  the  compass  o(  human  address,  arrive 
at  the  object  of  a  Uwtess  ambition  through  all  these 
obstructions? 

if  reason  condemns  the  suspicion,  the  s.ime  sentence  is 
pronounced  by  expt^rience.  The  conslitiili'in  of  Miiry- 
land  furnishes  the  most  apposite  example.  The  Senjtte 
of  that  Stale  is  elected,  as  the  federal  Senate  will  be,  in- 
directly by  the  people,  and  (or  9  term  less  by  one  year 
only  than  the  federal  Senate.  It  i.s  distinguished,  also, 
by  the  remarkable  prerogative  of  fdting  up  its  own  vacan- 
cies  within  the  term  of  its  appointment,  and,  at  rhe  same 
time,  iH  not  umler  the  control  of  any  such  rotation  as  rs 
provided  for  the  federal  Senate.  There  arc  some  other 
lesser  distinctions,  which  would  expose  the  former  to 
colorable  objection*  that  do  not  lie  against  the  latter. 
If  the  federal  Senate,  therefore,  really  contained  the 
danger  which  has  been  so  luudty  proclaimed,  some  symp- 
toms at  least  of  a  like  danger  ought  by  this  time  to  have 
been  betrayed  by  the  Senate  of  Maryland,  but  no  such 
symptoms  have  appeared.  On  (he  contrary,  the  jealousies 
at  Rrst  entertained  by  men  of  the  same  description  with 
those  who  view  with  terror  the  correspondent  part  of  the 
federal  Constitution  h^vc  been  gr;idually  extinguished 
by  the  progress  of  the  experiment,  and  tbe  Maryland 
constitution  is  daily  deriving  from  the  salutary  operation 
of  tliis  part  of  it  a  repui;ttion  in  which  it  will  probably 
not  be  rivaled  by  thai  of  any  State  in  tbe  Union.' 

■AImom  ilune  u(  ll>e  >Uln.  Mvx'-i'i''  !>■>'  teluv  '  .,.r.t 

■naty  •ficr  Ihr  Rcroliiiimi,  ■  tcdihal  iluc  itlUirdy  lo    '  i  h 

twin  ncRalivrd  i  lull  |ib<io1  liy  (lit  \..«r-<  l.ii,<ip.     Tl.  ,i 

•itned  in  "  The   IVrunI  !>U1«  ii(    *<'  :» 

Peojile,"  Ballimorr.  1796.  which  wnn.  -tii 
decUniaiiont  li-uiul  the  naltoiul  SenaUi  fix  U*  intuUiicc  Ui  Uut  HtU  «l 
tko  pwplt.— H&IIUR. 


HMUtimtl)]        lOKDS    YIELD  TO  COMMONS. 


An 


I        '* 
'        in 


But  if  anything  could  silence  the  jealousies  on  ihis  stib- 
jccl,  it  ought  lo  be  the  British  cxnmplc.     The  Senate 
cre,  instead  of  being  elected  for  a  term  of  six  years, 
nd  of  being  unconfincd  to  particular  families  or  fortunes, 
;in  hcrcdit.nr)'  assembly  of  opulent  nobles.     The  House 
of   Representatives,   instead   of  being    elected    for   iwfo 
and  by  the  whole  body  of  the  people,  is  elected  for 
icven  years,  and,  in  very  great  proportion,  by  a   very 
mall  proportion  of  the  people.     Here,  unquestionality, 
ujjht  to  be  seen  in  full  display  the  aristocratic  usurpa- 
tions and  tyranny  wliich  are  at  some  future  period  lo  be 
'Cxemphfied  in  the  United  States.     Unfortunately,  how- 
ever, for  the  anti-federal  argument,  the  British  history 
informs  us  tliat  this  hcrediury  assembly  has  not  been 
tble  to  defend  it^lf  against  the  continual  encrouclmirntii 
of  the  House  of  Representatives;  and  that  it  no  sooner 
lost  the  support  of  the  muuarch   than  it  was  actually 
crushed  by  the  weight  of  the  popular  branch.' 

A*  far  iu  aniiquiiy  can  iiisiruct  us  on  this  sul>)ec(.  its  PxaiiipW 
suppon  ihc  rc:i.toning  which  wc  have  cmploynl.  In  SpaiU  llic 
;phori.  th«  annuiil  iFprdpniAtii'es  of  U)e  t<eople.  vrerr  (ounii  an 
iWennaich  (orihcienaie  (ortife.ronlinunlly  gainnlon  iisniiihority. 
an<l  lintlly  drew  all  power  mio  Ihcir  own  hands.  The  TrihuiiFs 
of  Ronw.  who  were  Ihe  tepreteitUtivet  of  ihc  people,  prcvailril.  it 
is  well  known,  in  almost  every  contest  wiili  llic  senate  for  life,  anil 
in  the  end  gained  ihe  most  coinplele  iiiunt|>li  ever  il.  Tlie  fnci  is 
the  mure  rcin:irkjihle  as  unanimity  w.is  require:]  in  c^vry  aci  ol  ilic 
■Trihunei.  even  alter  their  nuinlier  was  augnienteil  lo  ten.  Il 
vei  llie  irresisllblc  force  possessed  by  thai  branch  o(  a  (rce 
government  which  has  ihe  people  on  ils  side.  To  iheie  eiampips 
rotKhl  be  added  ihai  of  Carthiij;e.  whose  senate,  according  lo  ihe 
Icsiimony  ol  Poiybiu*.  Instead  ol  drawing  all  power  into  its  vortex, 
had,  at  Ihe  commencement  of  the  second  I*unic  War.  lost  almost 
the  whole  ol  its  original  poriJOD. 

Besides  the  conclusive  evidence  resulting  from   this 
emblagc  of  facts  that  the  federal  Senate  will  never  be 


I  la  B*ceh<><'*  "  Bnifliih  ConMitatioa''bedbou(«t  at  vome  f(ii|>lh  Ihe 

ueUion  m  the  time  ii  which  th«  Hoiuc  o(  Lords  "  aiust  yicM  "  lo  the 

•moDB.  awl  rtnchet  the  ttn£nlarly  Mvllifyinc  conchiiion  In  hfi  main 

_iimeiii  thai  tl  it  "  «hen««ci  the  ofilnlon  of  inc  CoanMiu  li  alto  th« 
pinitm  of  the  nalkm." — El>nos. 


J 


4^6       TA-EA  TY-MAKIXC  POU'EK  OF  SEXA  T£.   !»•.  M  '«3 

able  to  transform  itself  by  gradual  usurpalions  \aut  an 
initcpcntlcnt  and  aristocratic  body,  hc  arc  warraatcd  in 
bclJvving  that,  if  such  a  rcvolntion  xhoulil  ever  bapprn 
from  cau&cs  which  the  foresight  of  man  cannot  guard 
against,  the  House  of  Rc|>rc^ntativcs,  vith  the  |>copleoa 
their  side,  wilt  at  at)  times  Ih:  able  to  bring  back  the  Con- 
stitution to  its  primitive  form  and  principles.  Against 
Ihtt  force  of  the  immediate  representatives  of  the  people, 
notliing  will  b«  able  to  maintain  even  the  const itational 
authority  of  the  Senate  but  such  a  display  uf  enlightened 
(wlicy  and  attachment  to  the  public  good  as  will  diridc 
wttli  that  branch  of  the  legiKtalure  the  aScctions  and 
support  of  the  entire  body  of  tlie  people  thcmselvet. 

PUBUttS. 


No.  64  163).  <-V«  r-ri  iWfcf.  U4K\>  T.  IjKJ 

TRF.ATV-HAK1NG  POWER  OF  THE  SENATE. 

TTte  I'ralf-maiiag  fptBf — fmfrrtamt  vf  lUi  fvatr—fr^trtr 
■A  fht  SntaU^A  p»fiitar  Mf  m#/  fit  f"  tku  fo^arr—Kraiamt  QIja- 
lirnt  If  Ikit  frwtr  in  lit  Stuau  aitndfrrd,  aad  rMtpmi  ftr  tttir  rgtL. 
fliiflt  iHWHTttltd — Tit  rripttitiMilj!  tfitmattri. 

T«  tkt  Peofif  ef  Ikf  Stale  of  A'fw  IV*.- 

It  is  a  just  and  not  a  new  observation  thai  enemies  to 
particular  persons,  and  opponents  to  particular  mcasnres, 
seMiim  confine  their  censures  to  such  thing's  only  in  either 
as  are  worthy  u(  bl.imc.  linlcss  on  this  pnnrjple,  it  is 
difficult  to  explain  the  motives  of  their  conitua  vha 
condemn  the  proposed  Constitmioo  in  the  amn^nate  ami 
treat  with  seventy  some  of  the  roost  nnexceptionjiblc 
articles  in  it. 

The  second  section  gives  power  to  the  Prwideoi,  "  if 
anJ  H'itk  the  a^t€  mini  emueni  of  the  Senatr,  tv  malu  tfwgtta, 
l-ROVtDeD  TWO-TH1KIM  or  THK  SENATORS  riUtST  COH- 
Ct'R." 

The  power  of  making  treaties  is  an  important  one, 
upectally  as  it  relates  to  war,  peace,  and  ruttuoerev; 


'•»» 


Case  in  choicb  of  sf.ma  roxs. 


4*7 


and  it  should  not  be  delegated  but  in  such  a  mode,  and 
with  such  precautions,  as  will  afford  the  highest  security 
ihat  it  will  he  exerciicd  hy  men  the  best  tjuahfied  tut  the 
purpose  and  in  the  manner  most  conducive  to  the  public 
good.  The  convention  appears  to  have  been  attentive  to 
both  these  points:  they  have  directed  the  I'rcsident  to 
be  cho&en  by  select  bodies  of  electors,  to  be  deputed  by 
the  people  for  that  express  purpose;  and  they  have  com- 
mitted the  appointment  of  senators  tu  the  State  legis- 
latures. This  mode  hus  >"  such  cums,  v^itly  the 
advantage  of  elections  hy  the  people  in  their  collective 
capacity,  where  the  activity  of  party  zeal,  taking  advan- 
tage of  the  supinene^K,  the  ignorance,  and  the  hopes  and 
fears  of  the  unwary  and  interested,  often  places  men  in 
office  by  the  votes  of  a  small  proportion  of  the  electors. 

As  the  select  assemblies  for  choosing  the  President,  as 
welt  as  the  Slate  legislatures  who  appoint  the  senators, 
tM  will    in   general    be   com|)osed    of    the    must 

Xo.  oa.  enlightened  and  respectable  citiicns,  there  is 
reason  to  presume  that  their  attention  and  their  votes 
will  he  directed  to  those  men  only  who  have  become  the 
most  distinguished  by  their  abilities  and  virtue,  and  in 
whom  the  people  perceive  just  grounds  for  conhdcncc. 
The  CoHxlitution  manifests  very  particular  attention  to 
this  object.  By  excluding  men  under  thirty-five  from 
the  first  office,  and  those  under  thirty  from  the  second. 
It  conlinex  the  electors  to  men  of  whom  tlie  people  have 
had  lime  to  form  a  judgment,  and  with  respect  to  whom 
they  will  not  be  liable  to  be  deceived  by  those  brilliant 
appearancesofgeniu.t  and  patriotism  which,  like  transient 
meteors,  sometimes  mislead  as  well  as  dazzle.  If  the 
observation  be  well  founded  that  wise  kings  will  always 
be  served  by  able  ministers,  it  is  fair  to  argue  that,  as  an 
assembly  of  select  electors  possess  in  a  greater  degree 
than  king*  the  means  of  extensive  and  accurate  informa- 
tion relative  to  men  and  characters,  so  will  their  appoint- 
ments bear  at  least  equal  marks  of  discretion  and 
discernmenL  The  inference  which  naturally  results 
ffotn  these  considerations  is  this,  that  the  President  and 


4i8 


NEEO  OF  ABLE  A.VD   TRIED  MEN.     [■«-«;» 


senators  so  chosen  will  always  be  of  the  nambcr  of  those 
who  bcsl  underiiunil  our  national  interests,  whether  con* 
sidcrcJ  in  relation  to  the  several  Slates  or  to  foreign 
natiuns;  who  are  best  able  to  promote  those  interests, 
and  whose  reputation  for  integrity  inspires  and  rncrils 
confidence.  With  such  men  the  power  of  making  treaties 
may  be  safely  lodged. 

Although  the  absolute  necessity  of  system,  in  the 
conduct  of  any  business,  is  universally  known  and 
acknowledged,  yet  the  high  importance  of  it  in  national 
affairs  has  not  yet  become  suflicicnlly  imprest«U  on  the 
public  mind.  They  who  wish  to  commit  the  power  under 
oonsideratioQ  to  a  popular  assembly,  composed  of  mem- 
bers cunst;intly  coming  and  going  in  quick  succession, 
seem  not  to  recollect  that  such  a  body  must  necessarily 
be  inadequate  to  the  attainment  of  those  great  objects 
wItEcfa  require  to  be  steadily  contemplated  in  all  their 
relations  and  circumstances,  and  which  can  only  be 
approached  and  achieved  by  measures  which  not  ottly 
talents,  but  also  exact  information,  and  often  much  time; 
are  necessary  to  concert  and  to  execute.  It  was  wise, 
therefore,  in  the  convention  to  provide,  not  only  that 
the  power  of  making  treaties  should  be  committed  to 
able  and  honest  men,  but  also  that  they  should  continue 
in  place  a  sufficient  time  to  become  perfectly  acquainted 
with  our  national  concerns  and  to  form  and  introduce  a 
system  for  the  management  o(  them.  The  duration 
prescribed  is  such  as  will  give  them  an  opportunity  of 
greatly  extending  their  political  information,  and  nl  ren- 
dering ihcir  accumulating  experience  more  and  more 
beneficial  to  their  country.  Nor  has  the  convcntioo 
discovered  less  prudence  in  providing  for  the  frequent 
elections  of  senators  in  such  a  way  as  to  obviate  the 
inconvenience  of  periodically  transferriii^  those  great 
affairs  entirely  to  new  men;  for  by  leaving  a  considerable 
residue  of  the  old  ones  in  place,  uniformity  and  order,  as 
well  as  a  consuot  succession  of  official  information,  will 
be  pre«rved. 

There  are  a  few  who  will  not  admit  that  the  affairs  of 


J*yi 


SECRECY  tff  MAKING  TREATIES. 


4*9 


trade  and  navijcation  shoald  be  regulated  by  a  system 
cautious!/  formed  and  steadily  pursticd,  and  that  both 
our  treaties  and  our  tattx  should  corresiiDtid  nilti  and  he 
made  to  promote  it.  It  is  of  much  consequtncc  that 
this  correspondence  and  conformity  be  cnrefully  main- 
tained; and  tliey  irho  as.tent  to  the  truth  of  this  poM- 
tion  will  see  and  confess  that  it  is  well  provided  for  by 
making  concurrence  of  the  Senate  necessary  both  to 
treaties  and  to  laws. 

It  seldom  happens  in  the  negotiation  of  treaties,  of 
whatever  natnre,  but  that  perfect  turuy  and  immediate 
dhpalch  are  sometiiiies  requisite,"  There  are  cases  wliere 
the  most  useful  intelligence  may  be  obtained,  if  the  per- 
sons possirssing  it  can  be  relieved  from  apprehensions  of 
discnvery.  Those  apprehensions  wilt  operate  un  those 
persons  whether  they  are  actuated  by  mercenary  or 
friendly  motives;  and  there  doubtless  are  many  of  both 
descriptions  who  would  rely  "n  the  secrecy  of  the  Presi- 
dent, but  who  would  not  confide  in  that  of  the  Senate, 
and  still  less  in  that  of  a  large  popular  Assembly.  The 
convention  have  done  welt,  therefore,  in  so  disposing  of 
the  power  of  making  treaties  that  although  the  President 
must,  in  forming  them,  act  by  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate,  yet  he  will  be  »b1c  to  manage  the  business  of 
intelligence  in  such  a  manner  as  prudence  may  suggest. 

They  who  have  turnctl  (heir  attention  to  the  affairs  of 
men  must  have  perceived  that  there  are  tides  in  them; 
tides  very  irregular  in  their  duration,  strength,  and 
direction,  and  seldom  found  to  run  twice  exactly  in  the 
s;)me  manner  or  measure.  To  discern  and  to  profit  by 
these  tides  in  national  affairs  is  the  business  of  those  who 
prenide  over  them;  and  they  who  have  had  much  experi- 
ence an  this  head   inform  us   that  there  frequently  are 

■Tothh  day  irMttei  an  dlccUMcd  tn"»tcrcttettfon,"  ahhnugh  ilw 
lima  haa  loii|;  xinc*  i-a'iR  liy  when  ili|>1i)macr  irifiiicod  any  ctlfsorainaij 
lecrecy,  Baeclioi  ttiiK'x-s  the  SriinEc  for  tciainin^  Ihii  ijiicm.  inil 
■MMU  that  EngUn>]  woiiM  "  hav«  •  mantier  and  plainer  way  of  dealing 
Willi  fnreifa  polk^  if  >riini*t«r«  were  abliral  to  explain  rlmrlr  ilirir 
fond)^  coDlracIt  before  lltey  ir«fe  nJld,  ^1  ■•  liiev  hirr  la  raplain 
Ihslt  daBntic  prapoMlt  before  the;  can  bfcinnc  lawv  — Editok. 


43« 


DISPATCH  OFTEN  REQUIRED.        IB*.  OHO* 


occasions  whcD  days,  nay,  even  when  hours,  are  preuiout. 
T^ic  liffis  of  a  battle,  l))c  dcalli  of  a  prince,  the  removal 
»(  u  minUter,  or  other  circunistancea  intervening  tr> 
change  the  present  posture  and  aspect  of  alTairs,  m;iy 
turn  the  must  favorable  tide  into  a  course  opposite  to  our 
wishes.  As  in  the  field,  so  in  the  cabinet,  there  ar« 
moments  to  be  seized  as  they  pass,  and  they  who  pre- 
side in  cither  should  be  left  in  capacity  to  improve  them. 
So  often  and  so  essentially  have  wc  heretofore  sulfercil 
from  the  want  of  secrecy  and  dispatch  that  the  Constttu- 
tion  would  have  been  inexcusably  defective  if  no  atten- 
tion had  been  paid  to  those  objects.  Those  matter* 
which  in  ncgolialions  usually  require  the  most  secrecy 
and  the  most  dispatch  are  those  preparatory  and  auxiliary 
measureit  which  are  not  otherwise  important  in  a  national 
view  than  as  they  tend  to  facihtalc  the  attainment  of 
the  objects  of  the  negotiation.  For  these  the  President 
will  find  no  diffmtilty  to  provide;  and  should  any  circum- 
stance occur  which  requires  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate,  he  may  at  any  time  convene  them.  Thus  we 
see  that  the  Constitution  provides  that  our  negotiations 
for  treaties  shall  have  every  advantage  which  can  be 
derived  from  talents,  information,  integrity,  and  deliber- 
ate investigations,  on  Die  one  hand,  and  from  secrecy 
and  dispatch,  on  the  other. 

But  to  this  plan,  as  to  most  others  that  have  ever 
appeared,  objections  are  contrived  and  urged. 

Some  are  displeased  with  it,  not  on  account  of  any 
errors  or  defects  in  it,  but  because,  as  the  treaties,  when 
made,  are  to  have  the  force  of  laws,  they  should  be  made 
only  by  men  invested  with  legislative  authority.  These 
gentlemen  seem  not  to  consider  that  the  judgments  of 
our  courts,  and  the  commissions  constitutionally  given 
by  our  governor,  are  as  ~lid  and  as  binding  on  all 
persons  whom  they  concern  as  the  laws  passed  by  our 
legislature.  All  constitutional  acts  of  power,  whether  in 
the  executive  or  in  the  judicial  department,  have  as  much 
legal  validity  and  obligation  as  if  they  proceeded  from 
the  legislature;  and  therefore,  whatever  name  l>e  given 


3icr\  Bixorxc  .vatvue  of  treaties.  431 

to  the  power  o(  making  Irraties,  or  however  obtlgatorj 
they  may  be  when  made,  cerLiin  ll  is  that  the  people 
way  with  much  propriety  commit  the  power  to  a  dis- 
tinct body  from  the  Iegisl;ilure,  the  execiUivc,  or  the 
judicial.  It  surely  does  not  follow,  that  beo:tuse  they 
have  aiven  the  power  of  making  laws  to  the  lc)[is!alure, 
that  therefore  they  should  likewise  give  them  power  to 
du  every  other  act  of  sovereignty  by  which  the  citixens 
are  to  be  bound  and  affected. 

Others>  though  content  that  treaties  shonlil  be  nlade  in 
the  mode  proposed,  are  averse  to  their  being  the  supreme 
laws  of  the  land.  They  insist  and  profess  to  believe  that 
treaties,  like  acts  of  as^^embly,  should  be  rcpcalutilc 
at  pleasure.  This  idea  seems  to  be  new  and  peculiar 
to  this  country,  but  new  errors,  as  well  as  new  truths, 
i>fte»  appear.  These  gentlemen  would  do  well  to  reflect 
thut  a  treaty  is  only  another  name  for  a  bar;;ain,  and  that 
it  would  be  imiiossibte  to  6nd  a  nation  who  would  make 
any  bargain  with  us  which  should  be  binding  on  them 
abieliiUlj,  but  on  us  only  so  long  and  so  far  as  we  may 
think  proper  to  be  bound  by  it.  They  who  make  laws 
may.without  doubt,  amend  or  repeal  them;  and  it  will  not 
be  disputed  that  they  who  make  treaties  may  alter  or  cancel 
them;  but  still  let  us  not  forget  that  treaties  arc  made, 
r^t  by  only  one  of  the  conlragting  parties,  but  by  both; 
and,  con:te<)ticnity,  that  as  the  consent  of  both  was  essen- 
tial to  their  formation  at  lirst,  so  must  it  ever  afterward 
be  to  alter  or  cancel  them.  The  proposed  Constitution, 
therefore,  has  not  tn  the  least  i-stended  the  obligation  of 
treaties.  They  arc  just  as  binding,  and  just  as  (ar  beyond 
the  lawful  reach  of  legislative  acts  now,  as  they  will  be  at 
any  future  period  ur  under  any  form  of  government. 

However  useful  jealousy  may  be  in  republics,  yet  when, 
like  bile  in  the  natiir.it,  it  abounds  too  much  in  the  body 
politic,  the  i^yes  of  l>oih  bccumc  very  liable  to  be  deceived 
by  the  delusive  appearances  which  that  malady  casts  on 
surrounding  objects.  From  this  cause,  probably,  proceed 
the  (ears  and  apprehensions  of  some  thai  the  President 
and  Senate  may  make  treaties  without  an  equal  eye  to  the 


A 


43* 


CORRUPTION  IMPROBABLE. 


[B0.64I8S) 


intercuts  of  all  the  States.  Others  suspect  that  two-Uiir<l» 
will  oppress  the  remiiiniiig  third,  an<t  ;i!ilc  whether  thoie 
gentlcmea  arc  made  sufficiently  responsible  for  iheir 
conduct;  whether,  if  they  act  corruptly,  they  can  be 
punished;  and  if  they  make  dtiiadvanl;igeous  treaties, 
how  are  we  to  (cct  rid  of  those  treaties? 

As  all  the  Statfs  are  equally  represented  in  the  Senate, 
and  by  men  the  must  able  and  the  most  wilting  to  pro. 
mote  the  interests  of  their  constituents,  they  will  all 
have  an  equal  degree  of  influence  in  that  body,  especially 
while  they  continue  to  be  careful  in  appointing  proper 
persons  and  to  insist  on  their  punctual  attendance.  In 
proportion  as  the  United  Slates  assume  a  national  form 
and  a  national  character,  so  will  the  good  nf  the  whole  be 
more  and  more  an  object  of  attention,  and  the  govern- 
nirnl  must  be  a  weak  one  indeed,  if  it  should  forget 
tliai  the  good  of  the  whole  can  only  be  promoted  by 
advancing  the  good  of  each  of  the  parts  or  members 
which  compose  the  whole.  It  will  not  be  in  the  power  of 
the  President  and  Senate  to  make  any  treaties  by  which 
they  and  their  familicw  and  esitates  will  not  be  equally 
bound  and  affected  with  the  rest  of  the  community;  and, 
having  no  private  interests  distinct  from  that  of  the 
nation,  they  will  be  under  no  temptations  to  neglect  the 
latter. 

As  to  corruption,  the  case  is  not  snpposablc.  He 
must  either  have  been  very  unfortunate  in  bis  intcrconrse 
with  the  world,  or  possess  a  heart  very  susceptible  of 
such  impressions,  who  can  think  it  proliable  tliat  the 
Prexidcni  and  two  thinls  of  the  Senate  will  ever  be  capa- 
ble of  such  unworthy  conduct.  The  idea  is  too  gro«l 
and  too  invidious  to  be  entertained.  But  in  such  a  ca»e, 
if  it  should  ever  happen,  the  treaty  so  obtained  from  us 
would,  like  all  other  fraudulent  contracts,  l>e  null  and 
void  by  the  law  of  nations. 

With  respeoi  to  their  responsibility,  it  is  difficult  lo 
conceive  how  it  could  be  increased.  Every  conxidera* 
tion  that  can  influence  the  htini^in  mind,  such  as  hnuor, 
oaths,  ri!puiiitions,  conscience,  the  love  of  country,  And_ 


itOBl 


IMPF.ACMMF.S'T  POWF.H. 


433 


faniiljr  afTections  and  attachmeniR,  afTord  securitjr  for 
tlictr  fi<lc)ity.  In  short,  as  the  Constitution  has  taken 
the  uttnosL  cart  that  they  shall  be  men  of  talents  and 
itegrity,  we  have  reason  to  be  persuaded  that  the 
treaties  they  make  will  be  as  advantageous  as,  all  cir- 
cumstances considered,  could  lie  maile;  and  so  far  as  the 
fear  of  punishment  and  disgrace  can  operate,  that  motive 
to  i^oud  behavior  is  amply  aflfordcd  by  the  article  on  the 
subject  of  impeach  n:ents. 

PtIBLtUS. 


No.  6$  [64).       CA'w  Ytrk  F*€tH.  uutb  j.  t^ei)       Hamilton. 
IMPEACHMENT  POWER  OF  THE  SENATE. 

Thf  a^^itlmftit  ef  ftMk  *fitfrs — The  oulhirily  If  lit  ai  attrmrl  in 
tie  trial  ef  i'riftaihmtnU — Oigkmltygf  ffrmingtmk  t  fturl —  Tkt  Sm. 
mte  mini  /ll  /rr  lUtli  a  trtitt — Tkf  pl-^n  tf  Jtligating  Ikit  attthrtitji  IV  Iht 
tttfrtmt  iruti  liKtiditid  iinJ  rifnttJ —  Tkt  frifmly  tf  uniltng  Ikf 
lufrtmt  (iftirl  111  thii  fiftrtr  trifA  tAi  Stnalt  (ttiiiJertJ  aitJ  Jfninl — 
7'A/  ftt'pruly  */giyine  thh  auikrritje  to  tlhrr  ftriftis  diuffiiuilfJ  ut'lJi 
uof  dtparimfnl  ■>/  Ike  guivmnrat  renttJerei/  atnf  •/rniti/ — f  tvH  1/  Ikii 
fetrer  in  ttf  Senate  ii  ntl  Aiiraiir,  Ike  t^mtilmlifm  tk«ttlJ  ittt  ie  rejetted. 

To  the  Feo^e  *»/  the  St-ite  0/  A'ear  York: 

The  remaining  powers  which  the  plan  of  the  conven- 
tion allots  to  the  Senate,  in  a  distini't  c»[>acity,  are  com- 
prised in  their  participation  with  the  executive  in  the 
appointment  to  offices,  and  in  their  judicial  character  aa 
a  court  for  the  trial  of  imEH:achmrnts.  As  in  the  busi- 
ness of  appointments  the  executive  will  be  the  principal 
agent,  the  provisions  relating  to  it  will  most  properly  be 
discussed  in  the  examination  of  that  dcrpartment.  We 
will,  therefore,  conclude  this  head  with  a  view  of  the 
judicial  character  of  the  Senate. 

A  well-constituted  court  for  the  trial  of  impeachments 
is  an  ubjct'l  nnt  more  to  be  desired  than  difficult  to  b« 
obtained  in  a  government  wholly  elective.  The  subjects 
of  its  jurisdiction  are  those  offenses  which  proceed  fnim 
the  misconduct  of  public  men,  or,  in  other  words,  from 


434 


POUTlCAl.  OFFENXF.X 


IV».U<H> 


the  abuse  or  violation  of  some  public  ln>sl.  Tticf  are  of 
a  nature  which  may  with  peculiar  proprictjr  be  denutni- 
natett  poLiTrcAt,  as  chcy  rt-latc  ebiefly  to  injuries  done 
immediately  to  the  society  itself.  The  prosecution  of 
tlicm,  for  this  reason,  will  seldom  fail  to  agitate  the  pas- 
sions of  the  iriiulc  community,  nnd  to  divide  it  into 
parties  more  or  less  friendly  or  inimical  to  tlie  accMed. 
In  many  cases  it  will  connect  itself  with  the  pre-existing 
factions,  and  will  enlist  alt  their  antmosiiie«,  p^rlialitirs, 
influence,  and  interest  on  one  side  or  on  the  other;  and 
in  such  cases  there  will  always  be  the  greatest  danger 
that  the  derision  will  be  regulatrd  more  by  the  compan> 
tivc  sircnj^h  of  parties  than  by  the  real  deroonstratioos 
of  innocence  or  guilt.' 

Tlic  dclitiicy  and  magnitude  of  a  tru«t  which  *o  deeply 
concerns  ihe  political  reputation  and  existence  of  every 
man  engaged  in  the  administration  of  public  affairs 
speak  for  themselves.  The  difficulty  of  placing  it  rightly 
in  u  government  resting  entirely  on  the  basis  of  periodi- 
cal elections  will  as  readily  be  perceived,  when  it  is  con- 
sidered that  the  most  conspicuous  characters  in  it  will, 
from  that  oircumstanee,  be  too  often  the  leaders  or  the 
louls  of  the  most  cunning  or  the  most  numerous  faction, 
and  on  this  account  can  Itardly  be  expected  to  possess 
the  requisite  neutrality  towards  those  whose  conduct  may 
I>e  the  subject  of  scrutiny. 

'  I'hc  liittnry  of  impM<htneot  hu  proved  thh  to  ■  dcplofsltle  (lc|p«v. 
Of  lh«  i«*«n  iupcachnienl  triah  •dnally  cuikIucIiiI  by  ikr  SamUi  tiKI 
Iwo  ciiiii'iLliniH  hue  multnl.  ilul  of  |i>'t|;e  tlunif^liivti  in  lS6>  ami 
<■(  Juilijc  I'ii.-krTiiii:  In  iSnj.  la  the  utter  ca<e  t)ic  t»ct  U  tnunliy 
Fn!m  »  ■  niiticatini:  friliire.  to  ihe  <*it  □(  iUount,  in  I7i|7,  iW 
Sonat?  iu^tdiin«<)  tbc  pl«a  of  roamel  lt»l  IU>iuiit.  hating  l«cn  »pcUcd 
From  (lie  SF'tolr.  wai  im-I  tiibjcct  to  Ihp  prm-in  iil  imi'rsrtitiieal.  Id 
every  ■liempicl  iiBpcachmrnt  iiivaltin^  poJiiical  qiiFiiimi*,  ibr  mnai 
Inlciiw  (luly  licau  havi!  Iweii  uooj^tl.  and  on ine  lotliLilhc  lm>-Ulil^ 
«Me  lucmuir}  lo  cnntkl  lui  never  l-acn  (JiutiBcil,  Hic  poact  kaa 
rrMntljr  lirrn  likenrH  In  a  "iinnrH  niMfl  in  tt»  Mutilviid,"  (<ul  Mil*  b 
an  onnlatemmt.  If.  at  yet.  ibere  kat  Iwen  an  eroai  etr  ol  tl>i  iiower. 
il  it  due  nwirc  to  the  lortanalc  tack  of  occuian  ih.in  I'l  any  Inw  a< 
lnh«T«Bi  [kricncy.  Tlie  drenil  of  Impoachmeai,  uti-i-irlv  F-li  Viv  rvrry 
pntilii:  hDkvt.  raiitl  al*o  h«  rreliimoil  in  ai  •  s  Thr 

whirilp   bifttoiT  u4   nallunal  ini|>cai;haieal   iriati  .jitn  ia 

Rugsr  FotCcr  1   '  ComsiBntarioi  un  Ih*  Cunkltlaiiw,"  i,  ^uf- — tniroa. 


RkmlllMl         SF.fTATB  A    PROPER    TRIBU.VAL. 


■435 


Tbe  convention,  it  appears,  thought  the  Senate  the 
most  fit  depositary  of  this  import-inl  trust.  Those  who 
can  best  discern  the  intrinsic  difliciilt/  of  the  thing  will 
be  lea«l  hasty  in  condemning  that  opinion,  ;ind  wilt  be 
most  inclined  to  allow  due  weight  to  the  arfjumcnts  which 
may  be  supposed  to  have  produced  it. 

What,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the  true  spirit  of  the  institu- 
tion itself?  Is  it  not  designed  as  a  method  of  national 
iMcjUKST  into  the  conduct  of  public  men?  If  this  be  the 
ilesi(;n  of  it.  who  can  so  properly  be  the  inquisitors  (or 
the  nation  aa  the  representatives  of  the  nation  them- 
selves? It  is  not  disputed  that  the  power  of  originat- 
ing the  i(if)iitry,  or,  in  other  words,  uf  pn-fcriing  the 
iinpL-achmenl,  ought  to  be  lodged  in  the  bands  of  one 
branch  of  the  legislative  body.  Will  not  the  reasons 
which  indic.ite  the  propriety  of  thisamngemenl  strongly 
plead  for  an  admission  of  the  other  branch  of  that  body 
to  a  sh^rc  of  the  inquiry?  The  model  from  which  the 
idea  of  this  institution  has  been  borrowed  pointed  out 
that  course  to  the  convention.  In  Great  Britain  it  i» 
the  province  of  the  House  of  Commons  to  prefer  the 
inipe;ichmcnt  and  of  the  Mouse  of  ].ords  to  decide  upon 
iL  Several  of  the  State  constiiiiiions  have  followed  the 
example.  As  well  the  latter,  as  the  former,  seem  to 
have  regarded  the  practice  of  impeachments  as  a  bridle 
in  the  hands  of  the  legislative  body  upon  the  executive 
servants  of  the  government.  Ik  not  this  the  true  light 
in  which  it  ought  to  be  regarded? 

Where  else  than  in  the  Senate  could  liavc  been  found 
a  tribunal  sufficiently  dignified  or  Kutliciently  independ- 
€Dl?  What  other  body  would  be  likely  to  feci  eonfideiMe 
tnaugh  in  its  &ti"t  situatien  to  preserve,  iinawcd  and  unin- 
llueuced,  (he  necessary  impartiality  between  an  indmdual 
accused  and  Ihe  rtprtftnUUiitt  of  tht  pfufJe,  Ait  atfuserst 

Conid  the  Supreme  Court  have  been  relied  upon  as 
answering  this  description?  It  is  much  to  be  doubted 
whether  the  members  of  that  tribunal  would  at  all  times 
Ik  endowed  with  so  eminent  a  jmrtion  of  fortitude  as 
would  be  called  (or  in  the  execution  of  so  difficult  a  task; 


43^     SUPMUME  COURT  AVD  IMPEACHMENT.   IW».»(«> 

and  it  is  xiill  more  to  be  daubtcd  whether  they  would 
possess  the  degree  o(  credit  mid  auihority  which  might, 
on  ccrt<iii)  occasions,  be  indispen&ablc  towards  reconciling 
the  people  to  a  decision  ihnt  should  happen  to  clash  with 
an  accusation  brought  by  their  immediate  representa- 
tlres.'  A  deficiency  In  the  first  would  be  fatal  to  the 
accused;  in  the  last,  diingerous  to  the  public  iranquiU 
lity.  The  haxard,  in  both  these  respects,  eoutd  only  be 
avoided,  if  at  all,  by  rendering  that  tribunal  more  numer- 
ous than  would  consist  with  a  reasonable  attention  to 
economy.  The  necessity  of  a  numerous  court  for  the 
trial  of  impeachments  is  equally  dictated  by  the  nature 
of  the  proceeding.  'I'his  ain  never  be  tied  down  by  such 
strict  rules,  either  in  the  delineation  of  the  oflcnse  by 
the  prosecutors,  or  in  the  construction  of  it  by  the 
judges,  as  in  common  cases  serve  to  limit  the  discretion 
of  courts  in  favor  of  personal  security.  There  will  be 
no  jury  tu  stand  between  the  judges  who  arc  to  pro- 
nounce the  sentence  of  the  taw  and  the  party  who  it  lu 
receive  or  su^er  it.  The  awful  discretion  which  a  court 
of  impeachments  must  necessarily  have,  to  doom  to 
honor  or  to  infamy  the  most  confidential  and  the  most 
distinguished  characters  of  the  community,  forbids  the 
commitment  of  the  trust  to  a  small  number  of  persons. 

These  considerations  seem  atone  sufhcient  to  authoriEe 
a  conclusion  that  the  Supreme  Court  would  have  been 
an  improper  substitute  for  the  Senate,  as  a  court  of 
impeachments.  There  remains  a  further  consideration, 
which  will  not  a  little  strengthen  this  conclusion.  It  is 
this:  The  punishment  which  may  be  the  consequence  of 
conviction   upon   impeachment  is  not  to  terminate   the 


■  Tlili  maka  xlBgnlar  nading  hi  vlfru  of  the  procnl  publk  ottMUIdn  of 
Ike  suprtiiw  caun.  and  llw  uncqiulei)  vIxJiancc,  inth  or  wilhoon  nx7«ct. 
Bcconlcil  lu  ill  ilnitiom.     VpI  nn  ■  inntxlrnilioa  ul  tlHaii.  >( 

tbe  court  after  ix  had  httn  feiknlltnl.  whn  il  tciidpn<d  iV  ii 

dmiioa,  and  t«eiiTly.  ■ben  u  wu  niLuktd  in  the  jiUifomi  m  n  ixii/ 
wklchtfUt  tctvral  inillino  vo(a.  ii  li  olivlooi  ihu  the  introdBCtioii  inlo  H, 

at  alitailf  lulicaUKl. '><  ''t'l^  '■■••^'-  i»'i*i'v 'ti.  paciy  r]««nton*,  by  fiv- 
toe  tl**  court  iIm  pni-  oilChl  har*  (Wm  tat  la 

dcUny  ike  toy  obcoi'  i        <>k. 


EunlttftB)        IMPEACHED  SUBJECT  TO   TRIAL. 


437 


I 


chastisement  nf  the  o^cnder.  After  h.nving  been  srn* 
need  to  a  ))er[>etuiil  ostracism  from  the  esteem  and 
confidence,  and  honors  and  emoluments  of  his  counlr):, 
he  will  still  be  liable  to  prosecution  and  punishment  in 
the  ordinary  course  of  law.  Would  it  be  proper  that  the 
persons  who  had  disposed  of  his  fame  and  his  most 
valuable  rights  as  a  citizen  in  one  trial  should,  in 
another  trial  for  the  ftamc  otfensc,  be  also  the  disposers 
of  his  i)fc  and  his  fortune?  Would  there  not  be  the 
jrreatest  reason  to  apprehend  that  error  in  the  first 
sentence  would  be  the  parent  of  error  tn  the  second  sen> 
tence?  That  the  strong  bias  of  one  decision  would  be 
apt  to  overrule  the  intlueiice  of  any  new  lights  which 
might  be  brought  to  vary  the  complexion  of  anollier 
decision?  Those  who  know  anything  of  human  nature 
will  not  hesitate  to  answer  these  i|uestions  in  the  aHirma- 
live,  and  will  be  at  no  loss  to  perceive  that,  by  making 
the  same  persons  judges  in  hoth  ca>^es,  those  who  might 
happen  to  be  the  obJ!;ctsof  prosecution  would  in  a  great 
measure  be  deprived  of  the  double  security  intended 
them  by  a  double  trial.  The  loss  of  life  and  estate 
would  often  be  virtually  inchided  in  a  sentence  which  in 
its  terms  imported  nothing  more  than  dismission  from  a 
present,  and  disqualification  for  a  future,  office.  It  may 
be  said  tltat  the  interrcntiun  of  a  jury  in  the  second 
instance  would  obviate  the  danger.  But  juries  are  fre- 
quently influenced  by  the  opinions  of  judges.  They  arc 
sometimes  indncetl  to  find  Special  verdicts,  which  refer 
the  main  question  to  the  decision  of  the  court.  Who 
would  be  witling  to  stake  his  life  and  his  estate  upon  the 
verdict  uf  a  jury  acting  under  tlie  auspices  of  judges  who 
tiad  predetermined  his  guilt? 

Would  it  have  been  an  improvement  of  the  plan  to 
have  united  the  Supreme  Court  with  the  Senate,  in  the 
formation  of  the  court  of  impeachments?  This  union 
would  certainly  have  been  attended  with  several  advan- 
tages; but  would  they  not  hare  been  overbatapced  by 
tlte  signal  disadvantage,  already  stated,  arising  from  the 
agency  uf  the  satnc  judges  in  the  double  prosecution  to 


43*      DISTIKCT  COURT  OF  fMPEACHMENT.    !■•,  «  i«> 

which  ihc  offender  wodW  be  liable*  To  a  certaiD  »lcnt 
ilie  bcnclitK  of  that  union  will  be  obtained  from  making 
the  chief  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  the  president  of  ihc 
court  of  impeachments,  as  is  proposed  to  be  done  in  the 
plan  of  the  conrentiun:  while  the  inconveniences  of  an 
entire  incorporation  of  the  former  into  the  Utter  will 
be  substantially  avoided.  This  was  perhaps  the  prudent 
mean.  I  forbear  to  remark  upon  the  additional  prelcit 
for  clamor  against  the  judiciarj^  which  so  conicidcrable 
an  augmentation  of  its  authority  would  have  afforded. 

Would  it  have  been  desirable  to  liavc  composed  tlie 
court  for  the  trial  of  impeachments  of  persons  wholly 
distinct  from  the  other  dcparimcnls  of  the  Kuvemmcnif 
There  arc  weighty  arguments,  as  well  against,  as  in  favor 
of,  such  a  plan.  To  itome  minds  it  will  not  appear  a 
trivial  objection  that  it  could  tend  to  increase  the  com- 
plexity of  the  political  machine,  and  to  add  a  new  spring 
to  the  government  the  utility  of  which  would  at  best  be 
questionable.  But  an  objection  which  will  nut  be  ihnagbt 
by  any  unworthy  of  attention  is  this:  a  court  formed 
upon  such  a  plan  would  either  be  attended  with  a  heavy- 
expense  or  might  in  practice  be  subject  to  a  variety  of 
casualities  and  inconveniences.  It  must  cither  consist 
of  permanent  officers,  stationary  at  the  sent  of  govern- 
ment, and  of  coarse  entitled  to  fixed  and  regular  <(tipends, 
or  of  certain  officers  of  the  State  governments,  to  be 
called  upon  whenever  an  impeachment  was  actually 
depending.  It  will  not  be  easy  to  imagine  any  third 
mode  materially  different,  which  could  rationally  be  pro- 
posed.  As  the  court,  for  reasons  already  given,  ought 
to  be  numerous,  the  first  scheme  will  be  reprobated  by 
every  man  who  can  compare  the  extent  of  the  public 
wants  with  the  means  of  supplying  them.  The  second 
will  be  espoused  with  caution  by  those  who  will  scriintsly 
consider  the  difficulty  of  collecting  men  dispersed  over 
the  whole  Union;  the  injury  to  the  riuiiicent  fnim  the 
proct^stinatcd  determination  of  the  charges  which  tntght 
be  brought  against  them:  the  advantage  to  the  guilty 
from  the  opportunities  which  delay  would  afford  to  In- 


HUBlltOB] 


coMsr/ruTJO.v  a'ot  inpauble. 


439 


triguc  and  corruption;  and  in  some  cases  the  detrinient 
to  the  Slate  from  the  jirolongcd  inaction  of  men  whose 
firm  anil  f;iithful  ex«:ciitiun  uf  their  duty  mi^ht  have 
exposed  them  to  the  persecution  of  an  intemperate  or 
designing  majority  in  the  House  of  Representatives. 
'J'hciiigh  this  Utter  sujiposilion  may  seem  harsh,  and  might 
not  be  likely  often  to  be  verified,  yet  it  ought  not  to  be 
forgotten  that  the  demon  of  faction  will,  at  certain  sea- 
sons, extend  his  scepter  over  all  numerous  bodies  of 
men. 

But  though  one  or  the  other  of  the  substitutes  which 
have  been  examined,  or  some  other  that  might  be  devised, 
should  be  thou;i>ht  prefer;ible  to  the  plan,  in  this  respect, 
reported  by  the  convention,  it  will  not  follow  that  the 
Constitution  ought  for  this  reason  to  be  rejected.  If 
mankind  were  to  resolve  to  agree  in  nn  institution  of 
government  until  every  part  of  it  had  been  adjusted  to 
the  most  exact  standard  o(  perfection,  society  would 
soon  become  a  general  scene  of  anarchy  and  the  world  a 
dewrt.  Wliere  is  the  standard  of  perfection  to  be  found? 
Who  will  undertake  to  unite  the  discordant  opinions  of  a 
whole  community  in  the  same  judgment  of  it;  and  to 
prevail  upon  one  conceited  projector  to  renounce  hik  (»• 
faUibU  criterion  (or  the  fallible  criterion  of  his  more  <on- 
iiiud  luigA^rt  To  answer  the  purpose  of  the  adversaries 
of  the  Constitution  they  ought  to  prove,  not  merely  that 
particular  provisions  in  it  are  not  the  best  which  might 
have  hc«n  imagined,  but  that  the  plan  upon  the  whole  is 
bad  and  pernicious. 

PUBLIQ& 


44* 


JVD/CIARV  POWE/t  OF  SE/fATE.    !»•.■•«» 


No-  66  [6s].       Um4fftvint  /Hrraw.  M*nha.tr«8.>       ilamitton. 

OBJECTION  TO  THE  IMPEACHMENT  POWER  OP 
THE  SENATE   BECAUSE  A  JUDICIAI.  POWER. 

Ot/rrtun  tkal  it  ttnilti  ItghUtivt  anJ  jaJiiial  fundifnt — Tkit  tamt 
frniiitn  in  tfmlitulitn  sf  /i'mr  Verk  wAui  rffifiilitn  aJmxrt —  T^at 
it  itnditfy  ttitaatutalft  prtvtt  in  tMf  Htnatt.  amJ  tim/i  U  tit  ttl^Hhk- 
mtnlefan  ariitttratji — Thai  thf  irialr  mtit  jitdgt  t*«  iTiiittliji  ajutri 
ftr  vhetf  nnfirmalian  il  hat  tvt/J —  Thnl  Ikt  ttujtert  may  it  t«Ufd 
Mf9n  la  try  tktmuhsti  far  a  lorrufl  itM  »/  IMt  Irtalj-maktng  faster. 

To  tk<  PeofU  of  the  State  of  NtVf  York  : 

A  review  uf  the  principal  tibjcctions  titat  have  appeared 
iigainst  the  proposed  court  for  the  trial  of  imprachmcnls 
will  not  improbably  eradicate  the  remains  of  any  unfuvor- 
ablc  impressions  which  may  still  exist  in  regard  to  this 
matter. 

The  fnt  of  these  objections  is  that  the  provision  in 
question  confounds  legislative  and  judiciary  authorities 
Im  <o   the   same   twdy,  in  violation  of  that  im- 

ICV.4T.  porta nt  and  wcl]-e>talilished  maxim  which  re- 

quires a  separation  between  the  diRcrcnt  dep-irtmcnts 
of  power.  The  true  meaning  of  this  maxim  has  been 
discussed  and  ascertained  in  another  place  and  has 
been  shown  to  be  entirely  compatible  with  a  parital 
intermixture  of  those  departments  for  special  purposes, 
preserving  them,  in  the  main,  distinct  and  unconnected 
This  partial  intermixture  is  even,  in  some  cases,  not  only 
proper,  but  necessary  to  the  mutual  defense  of  the  several 
members  of  the  government  against  each  other.  An 
absolute  or  qualified  ocKative  in  the  executive  upon  the 
acts  of  the  legislative  body  is  admitted  by  the  abtcsl 
adepts  in  political  science  to  be  an  indisiK unable  barrier 
against  the  encroachments  of  the  latter  upon  the  former. 
Aitd  it  may,  perhaps,  with  no  less  reason,  be  contended 
that  the  powers  relating  to  impeachineois  are,  as  LeXore 
intimated,  an  essential  check  in  the  hands  of  ihat  body 
upon  the  encroachments  of  Ihc  executive.  Thr  dirtiion 
of  them  lietween  the  two  branches  o(  the  legislature— 


lilim) 


CASE  OP  NEW   YORK  SENATE. 


44* 


issigning;  to  one  the  risht  of  accusing,  to  the  other  the 
rifihl  oC  judging — avoids  the  inconvenience  of  making  the 
'^Satnc  persons  l>oth  accusers  and  jmlgcs.  and  guiirds 
against  the  danger  of  persecution  from  the  prcvalcncy 
of  a  factious  spirit  in  cither  of  those  branches.  As  the 
concurrence  of  two-thirds  «f  the  Senate  wi!l  he  requisite 
to  a  condemnation,  the  security  to  innocence  from  this 
additional  circumstance  will  be  as  complete  as  itself  can 
desire. 

It  is  curious  to  observe  with  what  vehemence  this  part 
of  the  plan  is  assailed  on  the  principle  here  taken  notice 
of,  by  men  who  profess  to  iidmire,  without  exception,  the 
constitution  of  this  State;  while  that  constitution  makes 
the  Senate,  together  with  the  chancellor  and  judges  of 
the  Supreme  Court,  not  only  a  court  of  imj>eachments, 
but  the  highest  judicatory  in  the  Stale  in  all  causes,  civil 
and  criminal.  The  proportion,  in  point  of  numbers,  of 
the  chancellor  and  judges  to  the  senators  is  so  incon- 
sidcruliie  that  the  judiciary  authority  of  New  York,  in  the 
last  resort,  may  with  truth  be  said  to  reside  in  its  Senate. 
If  the  plan  of  the  convention  be  in  this  respect  charge- 
able with  a  departure  from  the  celebrated  maxim  which 
lias  been  so  often  mentioned,  and  seems  to  be  so  little 
understood,  how  much  more  culpable  must  be  the  con- 
stitution of  New  Vnrk!* 

A  se<ond  objection  to  the  Senate  as  a  court  of  impeach- 
ments is  that  it  contributes  to  an  undue  arcumiiblion 
of  power  in  that  l>ody,  tending  to  give  to  the  govern- 
ment a  countenance  too  aristocratic.  The  Senate,  it  is 
observed)  is  to  have  concurrent  authority  with  the  tixecu- 
tivc  in  the  formation  of  treaties  and  in  the  appointment 
to  offices:  if,  say  the  objectors,  to  these  prerogatives  is 
added  that  of  deciding  in  all  cases  of  impeachment,  'it 
will  give  a  decided  predominancy  to  senalorbl  infiuencc. 
To  an  objection  so  little  precise  in  itself  it  is  not  easy 


*  Ifl  tti*t  «(  N«w  Jency.  dto,  llw  final  JHitlclary  Mthority  U  bi  « 
ll  <rf  thf  In^tlalura.      In  Nw  HimEnliiiv.  M«>UL-liawl(*.  CenAtyl- 
,  uiii  Sonth  Caroltiu.  o*e  branch  oi  the  Icgiilalurt  b  Uio  muit  lut 
Ihc  IfUl  of  iMpMclunenit. — rvauvs. 


442      WKICftr  Of  SEXATE  NOT  TOO  GREAT.    IBfcMiWi 


to  find  a  very  precise  answer.  Where  is  the  measure  or 
criterion  to  wliicti  we  can  ajipeiil  f«r  tletermining  Vfhat 
will  give  ilif  Senate  too  much,  too  litHc,  or  barely  chc 
proper  degree  uf  influence?  Will  it  not  be  more  safe,  as 
well  as  more  simple,  tii  dismitis  iiu<;h  rngue  un<t  uncertain 
culcul.-itiuns;  to  examine  each  power  by  itself;  and  to 
decide,  on  generul  principles,  wliere  it  may  be  deposited 
with  most  advantage  and  Iciist  i  neon  vent  eiice? 

If  vc  take  this  course,  it  will  lead  to  a  more  inteJHgible, 
If  not  to  a  more  certain  result  The  disposition  of  the 
Sm  power  of  making  Ireiitics,  which  has  obtained 

■a.  84.  in  the  plan  of  the  convention,  will  then,  if  1 

mistake  not.  appear  to  be  fuUy  justified  by  the  considera- 
tions stated  in  a  former  number,  and  by  OLliers  which  will 
sn  Sm.  occur  under  the  next  head  of  our  inquiries. 
liSud  7J.  'I'hc  expediency  of  the  jiinciiun  of  (he  Senate 
with  the  Executive  in  the  power  of  apiwinting  to  nfRccs 
will,  I  trust,  be  placed  in  a  light  not  less  satisfactory,  in 
the  clis(]uistttons  under  tbc  same  head.  And  1  flatter 
myself  the  observations  in  my  last  paper  must  have  gone 
x»>  inconsiderable  way  toward  proving  that  it  was  not 
easy,  if  practicable,  to  find  a  more  fit  receptacle  for  Ilie 
power  of  dcterminin-;  impeach  men  is  than  that  which  has 
been  chosen.  If  this  be  Irnly  the  case,  the  hypothetical 
dread  of  the  too  great  weight  of  the  Senate  ought  to  be 
discarded  from  our  reasonings. 

but  this  hypothesits  such  a*  it  is,  has  already  been 
refuted  in  the  remarks  apphed  to  the  duration  in  office 
presoribed  for  the  senators.  It  was  t>y  them  shown,  as 
well  on  the  credit  of  historical  examples  as. from  the 
reason  of  the  thing,  that  the  most  papaUr  branch  of 
every  government  partaking  of  the  rcpuhlican  genius, 
by  being  generally  the  favorite  nl  the  pcuple,  will  be  as 
generally  a  full  m^tch,  if  not  an  uverm.iich,  for  evcjrj 
other  member  of  the  govcrnmenL 

But  independent  of  this  must  active  and  operative 
principle,  to  secure  the  equilibrium  of  the  national  House 
of  Representatives,  the  plan  of  the  convention  lias  pm- 
vided  in  its  favor  several  important  counlerpuises  tu  the 


•ft 


POWER  OF  SEiVA  TE  l.V  AVPOIXTMENTS.     44j 

additional  authorities  to  be  conferred  upon  the  Senate. 
The  exclusive  privilege  of  originating  money  t>ilU  will 
belong  to  the  House  of  Representatives.  The  same 
house  will  possess  the  sole  ri|;!it  of  instituting  impeach- 
ments: is  not  this  ;i  complete  counterbalance  i<>  that  of 
determining  them?  The  same  house  will  be  the  umpire 
in  all  elections  of  the  President  which  do  not  unite  the 
suffrages  of  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  electors; 
A  case  which  it  cannot  be  doubted  will  sometimes,  if  not 
fretiucnily,  happen.  The  constant  possibility  of  the 
thing  must  be  a  fruitful  source  uf  inAucncc  to  that  body. 
The  more  it  is  contemplated,  the  miwe  important  will 
appear  this  ultimate  though  contingent  power  of  decid- 
ing the  competitions  of  the  most  illiisiriotis  citizens  of  the 
Union  for  the  6rst  office  in  it.  It  would  not  perhaps  be 
rash  to  predict  that,  as  a  mean  of  influence,  it  will  be  found 
to  outweigh  all  the  peculiiir  attributes  of  the  Senate. 

A  Mi></ objection  to  the  Senate  as  a  court  of  impeach- 
ments is  drawn  from  the  agency  they  are  to  have  in  the 
appointments  to  office.  It  is  imagined  that  they  vould 
e  too  indulgent  judges  of  the  conduct  of  men  in  whose 
cial  creation  they  bad  participated.  The  principle  of 
this  objection  would  condemn  a  practice  which  is  to  be 
seen  in  nil  the  Slate  governments,  if  not  in  all  the  gov- 
ernments with  which  we  are  acquainted:  I  mean  that  of 
rendering  those  who  hold  offices  during  pleasure  de- 
pcnilcnt  on  the  pleasure  of  those  who  appoint  them'. 
With  equal  plausibility  might  it  be  alleged  in  this  ca»e 
thai  the  favoritism  of  the  latter  would  always  be  an 
asylum  for  the  misbehavior  of  the  former.  Dut  that 
practice,  in  contradiction  to  this  principle,  proceeds 
upon  the  presumption  that  the  responsibility  of  those 
who  appoint  for  the  fitness  and  competency  of  the 
persons  on  whom  they  beatow  their  choice,  and 
the  interest  they  will  have  in  the  respectable  and 
prosperous  administration  of  affairs,  will  inspire  a 
sufficient  disposition  to  dismiss  from  a  share  in  it 
all  such  who  by  their  conduct  shall  have  proved 
themselves    unworthy    of    the    confidence    rcposwl    in 


444 


SEXATF.  CAN  O.VIV  KATIFY.        IlU.i»(» 


them.  Though  facts  may  not  always  conrspond  with 
this  [>rcsiimi>tiun,  yet  if  it  be  in  the  mniri  juti,  it  must 
destroy  the  •opposition  that  the  Senate,  who  will  merely 
sanction  the  choice  of  the  Executive,  should  feel  a  bias 
towards  the  objects  of  that  choice  strung  enough  to 
blind  them  to  the  evidences  of  guilt  so  extraordinary  as 
to  have  induced  the  representatives  of  the  nation  to  be> 
come  its  accascrs. 

If  any  further  arguments  were  necessary  to  evince  the 
improbability  of  such  a  bias,  it  might  be  found  in  the 
nature  of  the  agency  of  the  Scnutc  in  the  business  ol 
appointments. 

It  will  be  the  oflice  of  the  President  to  nominate  and, 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  to  apptfint. 
8m  'I'hcre  will,  of  course,  be  no  exertion  of  thout 

>».  7*.  1)11  the  part  o(  the  Senate.  They  may  defeat 
one  choice  of  the  Executive  and  oblige  him  to  make 
another;  but  they  cannot  themselves  i-Awti*— they  can 
only  ratify  or  reject  the  choice  of  the  President.  They 
might  even  entertain  a  preference  to  some  other  person 
at  the  very  moment  they  were  assenting  to  the  one  pro- 
posed, because  thrre  might  be  no  positive  ground  of 
nppo.iiiiim  to  htm;  and  they  could  not  I)c  sure,  if  they 
withheld  their  assent,  that  the  subsequent  nomination 
would  fall  upon  their  own  favorite,  or  upon  any  othcr 
person  in  their  estimation  more  meritorious  than  the 
one  rejected.  Thus  it  could  hardly  happen  that  the 
majority  of  the  Senate  would  feci  any  other  com- 
placency towards  the  object  of  an  appointment  than 
such  as  the  appearances  of  merit  might  inspire  and 
the  proofs  of  the  want  of  it  destroy.' 

KJourik  objection  to  the  Senate,  in  the  capacity  of  a 


'Hamiltoa  did  not  fonsee  luch  ft  tondition  ai  ihe  nncaioaof  Van 
Bum  u  minittet  to  En^laoJ  in  iS ja  by  k  roce  aiiini^cil  ir>  lutkr  ■  tM 
■nihaiVkue  Pmhlrnt  CKl)i<:nti>  tuuy  Btakc  kit  railing  viic  a  puIItiuI 
I'cmmal  "  vi>iiccan<.'c  "  a|^iiii>  ilir  F'rt^Hluil.  Niir  i!><:l  llamltuD  I  wren  ■ 
iIk  clcvelopment  <ii  the  v>-i-iiII(mI  "trrminrial  (.'ouitn^.*'  Iif  nw«»  u( 
which  lenaion  bive  been  able  lo  obtaia  lite  rtjeciinn  hj  ihe  Scnle  of 
niaiiy  ijifxilalincaU,  aolel;  li«:autc  (he  aualaoe  vu  tlUukcd  or  iip|Mani 
to  the  (fnalor  <il  liU  Male.  — Coiiox. 


HuBiltonl 


JOINT  AGENCY  A  PLEDGE. 


445 


court  nr  Unpen  c  h  in  en  1 3,  is  derived  from  iU  union  with 
the  Executive  in  tlic  power  of  making  treaties.  This,  it 
has  been  s^td,  wmiUl  ronKtiliite  the  sen:iturs  their  own 
judges,  ii)  every  case  of  a  corrupt  ur  perfidious  execution 
of  that  tnist.  After  having  combined  with  the  Executive 
in  bctr.iying  the  interests  of  the  nalion  in  a  ruinous 
treaty,  what  prospect,  it  is  asked,  would  there  be  of  their 
being  made  lo  suffer  the  punishment  they  would  deserve, 
wiien  they  were  ttiem*elte*  to  decide  upon  the  accusa- 
tion broujfht  asainst  thcin  for  the  treacherjr  of  which 
they  have  been  guilty? 

This  objection  lias  been  circulated  with  more  earnest- 
ness and  with  greater  show  of  reason  than  any  other 
which  lias  appeared  against  this  part  of  the  plan;  and  yet 
I  am  deceived  tf  il  does  not  rest  upon  an  erroncuus 
fonndaiion. 

The  security  essentially  intended  by  the  Constitution 
against  corruption  and  treachery  in  the  formation  of 
treaties  i«  to  be  souf;ht  for  in  the  numbers  and  char- 
acters of  those  who  arc  to  make  them.  The  joint 
AUENCY  of  the  Chief  Magistrate  of  the  Union,  and  of 
two-thirds  of  the  meml>er»  of  a  body  selected  by  the  col- 
lective wisdom  of  the  legislatures  of  the  several  States, 
is  designed  lo  be  the  pledge  for  the  fidelity  of  the 
national  councils  in  this  particular.  The  convention 
might  with  propriety  have  meditated  the  punishment  of 
the  Executive  for  a  deviation  from  the  instructions  of 
the  Senate,  or  a  want  of  integrity  in  the  conduct  of  the 
negotiations  committed  (o  him;  they  mi^ht  also  have 
had  in  view  the  punishment  of  a  few  leading  individuals 
in  the  Senate,  who  should  have  prostituted  their  in- 
Ruence  in  that  body  as  the  mercenary  instruments  of 
foreign  corruption:  but  they  could  not,  with  more  or 
with  equal  propriety,  have  contemplated  the  impeach- 
ment and  punishment  of  two-thirds  of  the  Senate,  con- 
■enting  to  an  improper  treaty,  than  of  a  majority  of  that 
or  of  the  other  branch  of  the  national  legislature  con- 
senting to  a  pernicious  or  unconstitutional  law — a  prin- 
ciple which,  I   believe,  has   never  been   admitted   into 


446       SSA'jrS  SEADY  TO  t'U.VlSH  ABUSES.   IK1.W1W) 

any  goverittnent.  How,  in  fact,  could  a  majority  In  the 
House  o(  Rcjir^winliiiivt*  ini|i<;uch  thi-msvlTcs?  Not 
better,  it  is  evidciil,  than  two-thirds  of  the  Senate  might 
try  thcOTselres.  And  yet  wh^t  reason  is  there  that  a 
majiirity  of  the  House  of  Re|>rc«eniative«,  snrnficing  the 
ii)tcres(<i  of  the  society  by  an  unjust  and  tyraiinirnl  act 
of  legislation,  should  escape  with  impunity  more  than 
two-thirds  of  the  Seiiutc,  sacrificing  the  same  interests  in 
an  injurious  treaty  with  a  foreiifn  pmverl  The  tntth  is 
that  in  all  such  cases  it  is  essential  to  the  freedom  and 
to  the  neccsbury  independence  of  the  deliberations  of 
the  body,  that  the  memliers  of  it  should  be  exempt 
from  punishment  for  acts  done  in  a  collective  rapacity; 
an<!  the  security  to  the  society  must  depend  on  the  care 
which  is  taken  to  cunfide  the  trust  to  proper  hands,  to 
make  it  their  interest  to  execute  it  with  fidelity,  and  to 
make  it  as  difficult  as  possible  for  them  to  combine  in 
any  interest  opposite  to  that  of  the  public  good. 

So  far  M  might  concern  the  misbehavior  of  the  execu- 
tive in  perverting  the  instructions  or  contravening  tlie 
views  of  the  Senate,  we  need  not  be  apprehensive  of  the 
want  of  a  dispoxilion  iu  that  body  to  punish  the  abuse  of 
.their  confidence  or  to  vimlicatc  their  own  authority. 
We  may  thus  far  count  upon  their  pride,  if  not  upon  their 
virtue  And  so  far  even  as  might  concern  the  corrDp< 
tion  of  leading  members,  by  whose  arts  and  influence  the 
majority  may  have  been  inveigled  into  measures  odious 
to  the  community,  if  the  proofs  of  that  cfrruptiim  should 
be  satisfactory,  the  usual  propensity  of  human  nature  will 
warrant  us  in  conclnding  that  there  would  be  commonly 
no  defect  of  inclination  in  the  body  to  divert  the  pub> 
lie  resentment  from  themselves  by  a  ready  sacrifice  of 
the  authors  of  their  misoianagcmcDt  and  disgrace. 

^  PU'SUUS. 


EXTHA  VAGANT  FEASS  OF  EXECUTIVE. 


IVt^  fir*  /Wi*r.  UiKh  i>.  uU-) 


Mumil 


[Ko.  67  166]. 

THE  EXECUTIVE  DEl'AKTMENT. 


titn  itmttrtiiat  VMaiieiti  im  SrMatt  ijr  Cal*. 

To  iht  Pfoplt  <t/  Ike  St,iU  of  New  York: 

The  constitution  of  the  executive  department  of  the 
prupu»ct]  government  claims  next  our  attention. 

There  is  h;trdly  any  pan  of  (he  system  vhich  could 
have  bccQ  attended  with  greater  difficulty  in  the  arrange- 
ment of  it  than  this;  and  there  is,  perhaps,  none  which 
^K>ias  been  inveifched  aj^ainst  with  less  candor  or  criticised 
^Bvith  U-ss  judgment. 

r  Here  the  writers  against  tlie  Constitution  seem  to  have 

I  taken  pains  to  »ignaliic  their  talent  of  misrepresentation. 
I  Calculating  upon  the  aversion  of  the  people  to  monarchy, 
^Kthcy  have  endeavored  to  enlist  all  their  jealousies  and 
^^B apprehensions  in  oppuKition  to  the  intended  President  ul 
the  United  States;  not  mcruly  as  the  embryo,  but  as  the 
full. grown  progeny,  of  that  detested  parent.  To  estab- 
lish the  pretended  affinity,  they  li.ive  not  scnipled  to 
draw  resources  even  from  the  regions  of  fiction.  The 
authorities  of  a  magistrate,  in  few  instances  greater,  in 
some  instances  les.«,  than  tlinte  of  a  governor  of  New 
York,  have  been  magnified  into  more  than  roya!  preroga- 
tives. He  lias  been  decorated  wilh  attributes  superior  in 
dii;niiy  an<]  splendor  to  tliote  of  a  king  of  Great  Britain. 
He  lias  been  shown  to  us  with  the  diadem  sparkling  on 
his  brow  and  the  imperial  puq>lc  flowing  in  his  train.  He 
hai  been  seated  on  a  tlironc  surrounded  with  minions  and 
mistresses,  giving  audience  to  the  envoys  of  foreign 
potentates,  in  all  the  supercilious  pump  of  majesty.  The 
images  of  Asiatic  despotism  and  volupiuoiiHneHS  have 
scarcely  been  wanting  to  crown  the  e.vaggcratcd  scene. 
We  have  been  tauglil  lo  tremble  at  ihe  terrific  visages  of 
murdering  janizaries,  and  to  blush  at  the  uuveiled  mys- 
teries of  a  future  seraglio. 


443        PXMSWE^Cr  VNJUSTLV  ASSAILED.    IKs-OTtSO 

Attempts  so  extravagant  as  these  lu  Oisfigure  or,  it 
miglit  rather  b«  Kutt],  to  metamorphose  the  object,  render 
it  necessary  to  t^ke  an  accurate  view  of  its  real  nature  and 
form;  in  order  as  well  to  ascertain  its  true  asprtt  and 
genuine  iippearunce  as  to  unmask  the  disingi-ouity 
and  expose  the  fallacy  of  the  counterfeit  resemblaoces 
which  have  been  so  insidiously,  as  well  as  industrionsly, 
pro]>ii  gated. 

In  the  execution  of  this  task,  there  is  no  man  who 
would  not  6nd  it  an  arduous  effort  cither  to  behold  wilh 
moderation  or  lu  treat  with  seriousness  the  devices,  not 
less  weak  than  wicked,  which  tiave  been  contrived  to  per- 
vert the  public  opinion  in  relation  to  the  subject.  They 
so  far  exceed  the  usual  though  unjustiliable  licenses  of 
party  artifice  that,  even  in  a  disposition  the  most  candid 
and  tolerant,  they  must  force  the  sentiments  which  favor 
an  indul^frnt  construction  of  the  conduct  of  political  ad- 
versaries to  give  place  to  a  voluntary  and  unreserved  in- 
8m  dignation.     It  is  impossible  not  to  bestow  the 

II».e9.  irnpuUtion  of  deliberate  imposture  and  decep* 

tion  upon  the  gross  pretense  of  a  similitude  between  a 
king  iif  Great  Britain  and  a  magistrate  of  the  character 
marked  out  for  that  of  the  I'restdenl  of  the  United  States. 
It  is  still  more  impossible  to  withhold  that  imputation 
from  the  rash  and  barefaced  expedients  which  have  been 
employe<l  to  give  success  to  the  attempicil  impiiKition. 

In  one  intlancc,  which  I  Ctic  as  a  Mmple  of  ihc  |;i;nna]  *{>tril. 
the  leineriiy  haa  proceeded  so  (ar  as  to  iiscribe  to  Die  I'mklcnt  o( 
the  United  Slates  a  power  whkh  by  ihe  ln«(rument  reporicd  is  ts- 
Prfttl/  allollml  to  the  Exeeuiitxs  of  llic  indivnlu«l  Stales.  I  mean 
the  power  of  Hlling  cjtiul  vacancies  in  rhe  Scn.ilc 

This  bold  expciiinmi  upon  itic  disc('M>iiieni  of  tiis  eounlryii»N 
has  been  hni;inlp(l  by  a  wriler  who  (wh.itr>'fr  may  be  hi*  rcjl 
mrrii)  has  had  no  iiiconiiilc ruble  shaiv  In  ihr  applauses  of  kit 
party:*'  and  wlio.  upan  ilm  (atte  and  unfounded  Kuggestiun.  tut 
built  Ei  series  of  ohMrrvatiuEis  equally  fabe  and  unfminded.  Lei 
hint  now  be  coiilrouied  wlih  the  evidcnoe  o4  the  tact,  and  lei  him. 


•SmCato.  No.  v.— Pwai-ios. 

■S«€  Fofd'k  "  EjwtytMlkeCuiHiiiutionj"  p.  >68.— Euiios. 


HuniltMl 


VACANCIES  /.V  SENATE. 


«9 


if  he  be  able,  {uiiify  or  exieiiualf  the  *liamc(ul  outage  he  has 
uflcred  lo  ihr  diclntr^  of  tnilh  and  la  tlic  rules  i>f  f.ijr  dcitlng. 

Th«  i«cu>iid  cliuie  o(  ihe  second  section  of  the  sccoitd  ariirle 
empuweis  the  PtcKidcni  of  the  United  Suics  "  to  nominnte.  and 
by  and  with  (he  advice  nnd  conieni  ot  the  Senate,  to  appoint  am- 
baasjulora,  other  public  miniitcrt  and  consuls.  jtidg»  of  the  Su- 
preme Coutt.  and  all  other  offiteri  of  the  IJnilnl  States  uhose 
appoinimenia  ate  not  in  the  Constitution  clherwise  pFoiiiJtd  for, 
and  whiik  ikiill  hf  tifahlithtit  by  la-ai."  Imniediaiely  after  this 
cl.nuic  follow*  another  in  these  words  :  "  The  President  shall  have 
powei  to  fill  up  all  i-acancituhax  inny  h»ppen  during /A  f  mvti  0/ 
the  Senate,  by  j-ranirng  cominiUions  which  shall  <-i//>.ri»/M^  enit 
of  their  next  teitiaa."  I1  itfroin  (hi*  laxl  provisioi)  thai  the  pre> 
tended  power  o(  ihe  President  to  fill  vacancies  in  tiie  Senaie  has 
hern  dctiiccd.  A  slight  attention  lotlie  connection  of  (he  clausni, 
and  to  the  obvious  iiicvtning  of  ihc  tcrn^s.  will  satisfy  us  thai  (he 
deduction  is  no(  even  colorable. 

The  lir3[  of  ilieie  (wo  clauses,  it  is  clear,  only  provides  ■  mode 
for  sppoiniint;  such  ofTiceni.  ■'  whose  appotnlnients  aie  koI  ether' 
vriu Pr^mMeJ f«r  in  ihc  Conuilulion.  and  which  shall  be  eslab- 
liiheJ  by  fiiw."  Of  course  it  cannot  extend  lo  (heappoininientsof 
senators,  whole  api>oiiilment»  are  flhenviif  prot-iiiett  far  in  the 
Coostiiuiion.*  and  who  are  etlablitked  by  the  CoHilitulion,  anil 
will  not  require  a  future  csiablishmenl  by  law.  This  position  will 
hardly  be  contMte<l. 

The  last  of  iltesc  iwo  clauses,  i(  is  equally  clear,  cannot  be 
iimlenttoui)  to  comprehend  the  power  of  f\\Xm,%  vacancies  in  the 
Sciiaie.  for  the  following  re.»soos:  First.  The  relation  in  which 
that  clause  Uanils  lo  (lie  ollitr,  which  declares  the  general  mode 
of  appointing  oflicers  of  the  United  States  ilcnoici  it  10  be  nothing 
mure  than  a  supplement  (olheother  (or  thepurpoif  of  cslablithing 
an  auxiliary  n)elho<l  of  appointment  in  cases  to  which  (he  general 
method  was  inadequate.  The  orilin.iry  power  tA  appointmenl  is 
confined  to  the  Prcsiilent  and  Senate /i>/«//c.  and  can  therefore  only 
I>e  exercised  duitng  (he  session  of  ihe  Sena(e  :  hu(  as  it  would  have 
been  impiiipcr  to  oblige  this  body  (o  he  continually  in  session  (or 
the  appui  lit  [Dent  of  ofticers.  and  as  vacancies  ini^hl  happen  in 
Iktir  $'ecest.  which  it  might  be  neceuury  for  the  public  service  lo 
fUl  willioul  deby,  the  succee^ling  clauM  is  evidently  intended  to 
aulhotuethe  Presklenl.  r/'nx*^.  to  make  Icmporar)-  appointments 
"  during  Ihe  recc»  of  the  .Senate,  by  granting  commissions  which 
^ull  expire  U  the  end  of  their  next  Mssioo."    Sttmelfy.  If  thti 

*Af1kk  I.  foctioa  },  clauM  I.— PtmiOT. 


4S<»        "VOr  TO  BE  FUELED  B  f  PKES/IfEXT.    «*«(«> 


cUUM  is  10  Ik  consi<l«re<l  as  m|>pJetnrnlary  lo  (he  tmt  whkh  |ir«> 
cedes,  (he  vatancUi  o(  which  it  spcnks  muii  he  consirw^l  to 
relate  to  t)ic  "  ofliceni "  descrihed  in  Die  iwccc<liiig  vik  ;  3diI  ihis, 
*■«  have  wen.  excludes  from  its  dcscripiion  the  nwml»cr«  of  ihe 
Senate.  Thirdly.  The  lime  within  which  the  power  is  to  operate, 
"  during  the  tcccM  <A  the  Settaic,"  aitd  the  durHiKMi  of  the  a|>- 
pointmenit^.  "lo  the  end  ol  (he  nut&«UK>n"of  that  bad)r.  con - 
cpire  lo  elucidate  the  sense  of  the  pioi-ition  whkb.  if  il  had  been 
iiitcrKlcJ  to  comprehend  ieialoti.  would  niturally  have  tefeired 
the  temporary  pon-ero(  filling  vacancies  lo  the  recess  of  llic  State 
Irgisiaiures.  wJM  arc  to  rnakc  the- permanent  appoiDinkcnts.  and 
not  to  the  recess  o(  (he  na(ion.il  Senate,  who  are  to  have  no 
concern  in  tho^e  nppninlmenl6;  and  would  have  extended  the 
duration  in  oRice  of  the  lempoiary  senators  to  the  nest  session  of 
the  leKifUliirc  of  the  Slate,  in  whiMe  rep  resent  a  lion  llie  vacancies 
had  iiappened,  iniitead  of  making  il  lu  expire  at  the  end  ol  the  en- 
suing session  of  the  national  Senate.  TItc  circumstances  of  the 
body  auihoiiied  to  make  the  pcrnianent  apjKiintments  would,  al 
course,  have  governed  tlie  motlilicalton  of  a  power  which  rcUlcd 
to  the  (eni|Mtary  appointments ;  and  as  live  national  Senale  is  ibe 
body  whose  situation  h  alone  contemplated  in  the  clause  U]<on 
which  (he  suggestion  under  naniinaiion  has  been  founded,  the 
nicnncics  to  which  II  flllu<lc(  can  oiiljr  he  deemed  to  tcspcct  lho«e 
officers  in  whote  appoiotntent  (hat  body  lus  a  coiKUirent  ai^ency 
with  (h«  Presideni,  DttI  iattly.  the  first  and  second  clauses  oj  the 
third  seclioa  of  the  firsl  article  not  only  obviate  all  pobsibihly  ill 
doubt,  but  destroy  the  pretext  of  misconception.  The  (unacr 
provides  thai  "  the  Senate  of  the  United  Stales  shall  tie  composcil 
of  two  Senators  from  each  Stale,  choicii  *)-  Ikt  Itghlattire  iktrt- 
ofXat  MK  years":  and  the  Utter  directs  that,  "if  v.icincies  in 
that  body  sho<ih)  happen  by  restsnaikm  or  Otherwise,  duriitg  ikt 
rutst  of  the  Ifgittalurt  of  Wt  STATE,  ihe  Eaecultve  THinEOr 
m.ijf  make  iem]ior.iry  appoinlinmis  until  the  ntsl  mttliif^  af  Ikt 
Itghlalurt.  which  shall  then  fill  such  vacancirs."  Here  is  on 
rxpreii  jiower  given  in  clear  and  unanihiguoiis  terms  to  the 
Slate  Extcuiivr«.  to  hit  i-auu1  vac.-tnciea  in  the  Seiiair  by  It^m- 
jKirary  appoiotmeiils:  which  nol  only  invalid.itcs  the  vujipostitiai 
that  the  clauw  before  considered  could  Itave  been  inlcnikil  In 
eoiiler  that  po^er  upon  the  PreddeiM  of  the  Uoitnt  Siatcv  but 
proves  that  this  supposiliiMi.  deslilule  U  it  is  even  ol  the  nietil 
of  ptausniiltiy.  mii«t  have  urtginaictl  in  an  inleniMB  tu  deceive  the 
people,  loo  palpahte  to  be  utuctntd  by  sophistry,  tun  aliociaus 
to  be  palUaie<i  by  \vfsacTixj. 


ItmltUB)       APFOl.V/WE/fT  OF  PSf.SJDF.XT. 


4SI 


I  hdve  taken  ih«  p.iins  lo  telm  thi»  instance  ok  migrrprcscnin- 
lion.  and  id  pt»ce  it  in  a  cte.-tr  and  Mrnn^  Mf.'ax.  nit  an  iinequirocal 
|)TOO(  o(  the  un<v3iTJ<i table  uils  wlncli  Aie  [iiAcytctA  to  prevrni  a 
lir  and  inipaitjal  juilKtncni  of  ilic  teal  merits  of  (he  Coiiitilulion 
■ubmilied  lo  ihc  considciution  of  the  people.     Nor  have  1  scru- 
alctl.  in  so  flAicraiil  a  coie.  to  allow  myself  a  sevciiiy  of  aniniad- 
fverslon  liltle  congenial  with  the  general  >|«iit  o(  (heac  papers. 
I  lioiiaie  not  (o  sulimii  it  to  the  deni&ion  of  any  candid  and  honcDt 
iKdtTrtary  o(  ihc  proposed  goveniineni.  whether  lanK'iJiE'^  can 
liurni^h  c|Hlhe(>i  of  luo  much  asperity  for  so  «hnmc)rs«  and  %a  pros- 
titute an  attempt  to  impose  on  the  citixens  of  America. 

PUBUUS. 


No.  68  [67I.       wdttf4m/t—-ai.  Mjnti. ».  >]M.t      Hamilton. 
METHOD  OF  APPOINTING  THE  PRESIDENT. 

Thi  e*ij  fati  e/  tht  e&Hililatimt  itvl  lonJ/nHfJ  if  ill  pffanfuti^  It  it 
tvtll  fturJtJ—DtsiraH/  lo  have  tht  ifnie  af  the  pe^fU  in  ilu<hma — 

DfiirMt  litt  lir  thmtf  ht  modt  by  ttmfelrHl  ftrifni,  ai  iw  Iht  tiKlmal 
•Hfff  :  I*  mvU  Iu-hhII  hkJ  JittrJ/r;  lo  aveiJ  inttigtu  and  torraftioa; 
nit   Ikt  PrruJtnt  iaJif^mimt  af  all  hut  Ihi  ft^U — AU  Ihii* 
itLtf/t  ktrt  twfiiiifii—Cioiie  ifMii  tr/JiiH  /all  tn  oat  ncl  fHaJi^eJ-^ 
r  liaiftv/a  Virt  frriijenl  fy  Iht  fetpU  <taiiJtrf/t  aiU  affrowit. 

To  the  Peopie  «/  the  State  of  New  Y^rk: 

The  mu<ie  of  ap{>(iiiitmei)t  of  (he  Chief  Magigtrale  of 
Ihc  United  Slates  is  almost  tlic  only  part  of  the  system, 
of  any  consequence,  which  has  escnpetl  without  severe 
licensure,  or  which  has  received  the  slighteitt  mark  of  ap- 
[trobation  from  its  opponents.  The  most  plausible  of 
hesc  who  has  appeared  in  print  has  even  Ocigncd  to 
Idmit  that  the  eteirlion  of  the  President  is  pretty  well 
Hiardcd.* '  I  venture  somewhat  further,  and  hesitate  not 
^1o  affirm  that,  if  the  manner  of  tt  lie  not  perfect,  it  is  at 
least  excellent.  It  tinilcs  tn  an  eminent  degree  all  the 
ailvantages  (he  union  of  which  was  to  be  wished  for.* 

•  ViJi  VtXVLKW,  rAKU>:l(.--l*tlIlMU>. 

•  .See  Fotil'k  "  ^^>3l|•ll!<tl.  i«i  ihc  CoiiMiniilMi."  p.  277. — Rnrrns. 

'  Slr»nerl*  cboii|{Ii  \\m  ihiiM>  Iiih  oi-lnxDy  iwoiTil  iiwlf  "no  of  ths 
weakcsi  ill  prxtic*.  an.  I  linvpr^cipiinimlihc  tnoti  (oriiii>lnbie  a'nn  wliidi, 
Ami  of  aciiul  nhelliaa,  lua  coane  lo  our  |[civetnineaL     Even  helore  iu 


4S«     Et.ECTOKS  SHOULD  BE  FE  IF  AND  ABLE.    (»«-  ••  i«Ti 

It  was  desifable  that  the  sense  of  the  people  should 
operate  in  the  choice  of  the  person  to  whom  so  impurtntit 
sm  *  trust  W3K  to  be  confided.     Thiti  end  vill  be 

H0.SI.  answered  by  coromitting  the  right  of  making 
it,  not  to  any  pre-established  body,  but  to  men  chosen  bjr 
the  people  for  the  special  purpose,  and  at  the  particular 
conjuncture. 

It  was  equally  desirable  that  the  immediate  election 
should  be  made  by  men  most  capable  of  analytiug  tlie 
qualities  adapted  to  the  station,  and  acting  under  circun- 
sianccs  favorable  to  deliberation,  and  to  a  judicious  conv- 
bination  of  all  the  reasons  and  inducements  which  were 
proper  to  govern  their  choice.  A  small  number  of  per- 
sons, selected  by  their  fcllow-citiiens  from  the  general 
mass,  will  be  most  likely  to  possess  the  information  and 
discernment  requisite  to  such  complicated  investiga- 
tions.' 


defeclinneu  liail  \itta  indicati4  th«  cUn»  wu  (>(ler  ihe  idopllon  of  ik 
fim  imendinriits)  ihr  McontI  iioinl  ia  abicli  aatcnJnwfil  >iu  wnyimfnl 

Both  in  1797  (J<^"">'  o*  I'-  «'  ^"  ■■-  ^4»-  "^  '"  'T^  (JoanHl«( 
StiMtc,  ii.  430).  Diotiont  were  made  ia  Congtos  to  modifr  il.  Anolfcet 
wrics  of  «aMindin«Blt  wu  uffcrad  on  Novonbt*  ai.  iBoo.  vtA  oa  Uib 
■  commiltM  nude  an  unravoralil*  reiiofl  on  \nmAtj  aa.  iSoi,  On 
Febniaty  19,  i8<w,  Mitchell  of  New  YoA  faitrwliiiTiI  tmuJuiiiHu,  sod 
II*ialltoa)("\Viukt,"  i*.  jji)  reconimcoiled  ibr  KtJtralnts  lo  Tote  fat 
(hem.  Pinilly.  in  tSa4,  1^  Xllfh  Aiucndmcnl  wu  made  ■  pan  of  iW 
cooiiituikm.  but  il  unly  rcBimlted  •  cun|i*nitli<l)>  minca  mailer;  (mm 
UuU  Unie  cooiuni  atlempit  )■■•■  !>««■  naide  lu  amciid  llio  urmM 
clastc.  and  a  detailed  Bccount  of  lime  efloili  it  given  in  lohnaon'* 
afttrlc  oil  "  Klttion  "  in  LaIot*!  *'  Cfdopeilia  of  Tolilical  Sdeooe.'— 

EOITOK. 

'  No  oikr  lingle  miurarriage  of  ibc  Iitlcailna  of  Ibc  federal  c<ia*eMlM 
ei)a«U  ih«  failure  tA  the  electoral  co1kc«  i«  malx'  iurll  an  rlettlnv  ^ 
place  of  a  mere  n^blennc,  bodf.  The  co]Ie||;e  wa»  tiiccmlully  depri  ^ 
tA  ihik  electoral  paner  ihroujh  the  uuimptiun  by  the  Houie  vA  Kep^^ 
MBlilii-not  iliciichlof  iioininatini: the girnidcnlial oivlidam, — •  piiwer 
Uler  taken  from  the  Utter  bmly  I'J  the  peop*r,  bm  wiilioul  rslartng  »o 
lll«  cleclon  the  (rredoiD  of  (twice  urigiHilly  titlcitilcd.  In  the  tttt  am- 
lal  all  llic  ciccton  cut  ihtii  t«tn  t<ir  Wa«lt<ngIon.  Inl  licm  UiurOOKhlf 
Ih^  were  ^ireparcd  to  uk  tktit  rigkl  of  judemmt  wa  Aowa  b^  ttair 
VMC*  for  Vice  f  imideiit,  whkk  were  caa  tot  nu  leu  ihaa  ttreen  mm. 
In  tbc  oln-lion  of  iTgJ  foul  eanctlilMet  (or  the  Vice  IVetkleBCf  lecdved 
vattfi,  ihoagli  but  iw<i  iMrtin  nitieil.  The  r>iie  of  th«  collei;*  wat 
dMikd  in  tTQ&on  thirteen  csn<luliile\.  aiHl  tn  iSooun  tii^  '  '-'  t>ii 
ticcM  dill  CitBiiiknd  hii  tvtr  inr  ttAi  tikirwn  in  iSu*  hf  1  '* 

ta)cfloivjnulIcrlii|;hbnMe  loihe  i*rei>ilenlin  mam  (or  ar.    '  0* 


BuIIUBl     CHOICE  TO  BE  fRER  FROM  CABAL. 


453 


It  w»  also  pecDitarljr  desirable  to  afford  as  little  op- 
poriuntty  as  possihk  to  tumult  and  disorder.  This  evil 
was  not  least  to  be  dreaded  in  the  election  of  a  magis* 
trate  who  was  to  bare  so  impurtanl  an  agency  in  the  ad< 
ministration  of  the  government  as  tbc  President  of  the 
United  States.  Hut  the  precautions  which  have  been  so 
happiljr  concerted  in  the  system  under  connideralion 
promise  an  ellcctual  security  against  this  mischief.  The 
choice  of  sevtral,  to  form  an  intermediate  budy  of  electors, 
will  be  much  les«  apt  to  couvuUc  the  community  with  any 
extraordinary  or  violent  movements  than  the  choice  of 
(H<^  who  was  himst-lf  (o  be  the  final  object  of  the  public 
witshes.  And  m  the  electors,  chosen  in  each  State,  are  to 
assemble  and  vote  in  the  State  in  which  they  are  chosen, 
this  detached  and  divided  situation  will  expose  them 
much  te\<  lo  heals  and  fermentK,  which  might  be  com* 
muntcatcd  from  ihcm  to  the  people,  than  if  they  were  all 
to  be  convened  at  one  time  in  one  place. 

Nothing  was  more  to  be  desired  than  that  every  practi- 
cable obstacle  should  be  opposed  to  Ciibat,  intrigue,  and 
corruption.  These  most  deadly  adversaries  of  republican 
government  might  naturally  have  been  expected  to  make 
their  approaches  from  more  Uian  one  (|uarter,  but  chiefly 
from  the  desire  in  foreign  powers  to  gain  an  improper 
ascendant  in  our  councils.  How  could  they  better  gratify 
this  ihiin  by  raiiting  a  creature  of  their  own  to  the  chief 
magistracy  of  the  Union?  But  tbc  convention  have 
guarded  against  all  danger  of  this  sort  with  the  most 
provident  and  judicious  attention.     They  have  not  made 


last  «it^  >A  iixlrfirnckncc  <nu  In  iSTil.  whaii  the  dulli  of  Grf«le)r  <!«. 
priveil  the  OemocTiilk  clcdon  of  (lis  c>iidi<U(c  f<ir  whom  IIkj  ime 
haumJ  lf>  vote,  and  \tA  (hem  \t\  ^ntlci  Ihcir  voCet  ai  mch  tipctoi  «:hotr. 
When,  In  1S76.  ll  iru  cciwrallj  beliri'cJ  thnl  Tildcn  aiu  eleclol. 
thnafh  the  Mixcfiled  etcetonl  luie  itoiitt  u  (65  tu  1S4  (11  l*vu  of 
H>To.  it  WW  ramorfol  IhRI  Mi.  )xtRv\  Kitnell  l-owr11.  wli>i  «u  « 
repuhlluB  eledor  foi  Masachii-.(iti.  intended  to  pnirni  fmuil  \rf  rcting 
ioTDdcn.  But  H  ihotoDithly  had  (he  ptindplcof  ihe  f.ilhen  lieen  Intt. 
m\  w  uvlm  «  tilth  wh«crh»<l  (li«cDllei;e  lieoume,  that  ci^cn  *  nun  <A  » 
■inch  pnvjul  >»'!  I^'^ty  trailciienclcnce  ft*  .'klr.  Ij^inll  ixiiikl  nnt  liimtly 
brinf  litaucK  to  fulhil  Ih*  very  |>ui|>aie  foi  which  u  ■  inrBibn  of  lk« 
body  ho  Itail  been  <lio»«ti.— EutiUK. 


4S4 


F.LECTOKS  FUSE  OF  SfXiSTF-K  B/AS.  moi«<tn 


llie  apfwfintment  of  the  President  %n  ilepend  nn  anj  pre- 
ciiBtinn  bodies  of  men,  iriio  ini|[ht  be  lamt^rcd  with 
beforehand  id  prostitule  their  votes;  but  they  bare 
referred  it  in  the  first  inMniine  to  an  immedtiite  net  of 
the  people  nf  America,  (o  be  exerted  in  the  choice  of 
persons  for  Ihe  temporary  and  sole  purpose  of  making 
the  appointment.  And  ihej*  have  excluded  from  elifi- 
bilily  to  thit  trust  all  those  who  from  situjition  might 
be  suspected  of  too  great  devotion  to  the  I'resident  in 
office.  No  ftenntor,  representative,  or  other  person  hotd- 
ins:  a  place  of  trust  or  profit  under  the  United  States,  can 
Ik  of  the  numbers  of  the  electors.  Thus  without  cor- 
riiptingt  the  hody  of  the  people,  the  ininu'dtate  uRents  In 
the  election  will  at  teaitt  enter  upon  the  task  free  from 
any  sinister  bias.  Their  transient  existence,  ami  thdr 
detached  situation,  already  taken  notice  of,  afford  a 
s.ttisfaciury  prospect  of  their  conlinuinji  so  to  the  con- 
clusion of  it.  The  business  of  corruption,  when  it  is  to 
embrace  so  considerable  a  number  nf  men,  requires  lime 
as  well  as  means.  Nor  would  it  be  found  easy  suddenly 
to  embark  (hem.  dispersed  as  they  would  be  over  thir- 
teen States,  in  any  combinations  fnunitrO  upon  motive* 
which,  tlwugh  they  could  not  properly  be  dennniinaled 
corrupt,  might  yet  be  of  a  nature  to  mislead  them  from 
their  duty. 

Anothrr  and  no  less  important  desideratum  was  that 
the  Kxecuiive  should  be  independent  for  his  continuance 
In  oSic«  on  all  but  the  people  ihrmselrcs.  He  might 
otherwise  be  H'mpted  tn  wcrifice  hi«  doty  to  his  com- 
plaiuncc  for  lho*r  whose  favor  was  necessary  to  the 
ituratioo  of  his  offirul  consequence.  ThiK  adrnntaKe  will 
also  be  secured  by  making  hi«  re-election  to  depend  a« 
a  special  bwly  of  rcpn»entattTes,  depaicd  bj  the  aoeieij 
for  the  «in|[lc  pnrpose  of  m.ikine  the  important  ehwi^ 

AH  these  adrann^rs  will  KappUy  lumltioe  in  ifar  plM 
devised  by  the  cunrention;  which  is  that  the  pmydk  U 
each  Stale  shall  rhootr  a  onralurr  of  pcTStms  »•  -1— -*.-fl^ 
rqaal  til  the  number  tit  vetutor*  ackiJ  reprrsi'  <$ 

%mA  Slslc  in  the  oatioaal  cnwrniciw,  wlw«haL . 


BHtUlMJ      PKOBABtS   VIRTUE  OF  PRESIDENT,         455 

within  t]ie  State  and  vote  for  some  fit  person  as  Presi- 
dent. Their  votes,  thus  given,  are  to  be  transmitted  to 
the  scat  of  the  national  Rovcrnmcnt,  and  tlic  person  who 
may  ha]>()en  to  have  a  itiiijority  n(  the  whole  iiuinlwr  of 
votes  will  he  the  President.  But  as  a  majority  of  the 
votes  might  not  always  happen  to  center  in  one  man, 
and  as  it  might  be  onsafc  to  permit  less  than  a  majority 
to  be  concluiiive,  it  is  provided  that,  in  such  a  contin- 
gency, the  House  of  Representatives  shall  select  out  of 
the  candidates  who  shall  have  the  five  highest  number  of 
votes,  the  man  who  in  their  opinion  may  be  best  qualified 
for  the  office.' 

The  process  of  election  affords  a  moral  certainty  that 
the  office  of  Proident  will  never  fall  to  the  lot  of  any 
man  who  is  not  in  an  eminent  degree  endowed  with  the 
re<]iii>ite  qualifications.  Talents  fur  low  intrigue,  and 
the  little  arts  of  {>opuiarity,  may  alone  stiffice  to  elevate 
a  man  tu  the  first  honors  in  a  lingle  State;  but  tt  will 
require  other  talents,  and  a  different  kind  of  merit,  to 
establish  him  in  the  esteem  and  confidence  of  the  whole 
Union,  or  of  so  considerable  a  portion  of  it  as  would  be 
necessary  to  make  him  a  successful  candidate  for  the 
distinguished  office  of  President  of  the  United  Sutes. 
It  will  not  be  too  strong;  to  say  tliat  there  will  be  a 
constant  probability  of  sceinK  the  station  filled  by 
characters  pre-eminent  for  ability  and  virtue.  And  this 
will  be  thought  no  inconsiderable  recommendation  of  the 
Constitution,  by  those  who  are  able  to  estimate  the 
-ihare  which  the  executive  in  every  government  must 
necessarily  have  in  its  good  or  ill  administration. 
Though  wc  cannot  acquiesce  in  the  political  heresy'  of 
the  poet  who  says: 

■•  For  fonn*  of  Kovernmcnl  lei  (oolt  contert,— 
Tlial  vtiivh  t>  licit  oiJininiitered  U  bctl," — 

yet  we  may  safely  pronounce  that  the  true  test  of  a  good 


M  iiomf  excrciicil  ititM  limrv  twice  for  Pmidenl  (iBoi  >ni)  l9i|) 
■wl  ttrnx  for  VicT  Pmi'ltni  (183;). — KonoR. 
'  'llib  siaiiM  bad  jiut  tMcn  i|iMie<l  In  ■  letter  of  Dralnk— EDtToa. 


4$0        APPOINTMENT  OF  VICE  PRESJDEXT.  ON.W.W 

(oferiiRicnl  i>  its  aptitude  and  tcodency  to  produce  ■< 

%oiA  administration. 

Tlic  Vice  I'rcsidcnl  is  to  be  cboten  in  l>ie  rame 
munner  with  the  President;  with  this  diffefcDce,  that 
(lie  Semite  is  to  do,  in  respect  to  the  former,  what  is  to 
lie  (lime  by  the  House  of  Kepre^cntjitivcs,  in  resp«t:t  lo 
the  latter. 

The  appuinlmeni  of  an  eitraordinary  person  as  Vice 
rrcNJilent  hiis  Iwcn  ubjecteil  to  hs  sii{N.-rRiious,  i(  not 
ffllikL'hicvous.  It  has  twcn  allcKcd  that  it  would  have 
been  preferable  to  have  authorized  the  Senate  to  elect 
nut  of  their  own  body  an  officer  answering  tltat  destrip- 
liiin.  Hut  two  caiisidctaiitiii!)  seem  to  justify  the  ideas 
of  the  convention  in  this  respect.  One  is  that,  to  secure 
at  all  times  the  possibility  of  a  definite  rescJution  of  the 
body,  It  is  necessary  that  the  President  should  have  only 
a  casting  vote.  And  to  take  the  senator  of  any  Stale 
from  his  scat  as  senator,  to  place  him  in  that  of  Presi- 
dent of  the  Senate,  would  be  to  exchanfre,  in  regard  to 
the  State  (rum  which  he  came,  a  consi^inl  for  a  contiiH 
Kt'nl  vole.  1'hc  other  consideration  is  that,  as  the  Vice 
President  may  occasionally  become  a  subvtitute  for  the 
President  in  the  supreme  exccutire  inasistncy,  all  tlie 
reasons  whk'h  recommend  the  mode  of  election  pre- 
9cnl>cd  for  the  one  apply  with  sreat  if  not  with  equal 
furoe  to  the  manner  nf  appointing  the  other.  It  is 
remarkable  that  in  this,  as  in  must  other  instances,  tbc 
objection  which  b  made  would  lie  aicatnsi  tbe  cooMil»> 
lion  u(  this  State  We  hare  a  Licntenant  Coreraoc; 
c  ho»en  by  tbe  pc^iple  at  large,  whii  prradcs  in  the  Scmie 
and  is  the  con*titutioiul  substitute  fur  tbe  Gitvenkor,  in 
casualiics  similar  to  those  which  vnald  antlKiroc  ihE 
Vice  Presidenl  Xsi  exercise  tbe  aatbontio  xaA  dackmie 
Ih*  duties  o(  tb«  PrcsidenL  Pc«uc» 


HMuitwl  PKESIDENT  AND  OTHER  SXECUnVES.     457 


No.  69  |68].       (ATjv  K*r« /\Ktir/.  Uirth  u.  t|M.i  Hamilton. 


V 


COMPARISON   OF   THE    PRESIDENT   WITH 
OTHER  EXECUTIVES  AS  TO  POWERS. 


A  itMgii  fen^M — Cam^rtd  vnik  ih*  Hug  pf  Gtttti  Btiiain  atii  lit 
gavrmtr  *f  tfrat  Y«rk — EUdtd  far  ffttr  yean,  atd  rt-eligiH^~- 
Fttrtkir  ttmforiifn  (piM  M*  tamt  rxtmlivti — LiatU  I*  imftitiiiiiUHt, 
rtvtaz'al  /rvsn  ^fitf.  ttnJ  prtnithitunl  Ayr  civit  la«^^C^<mfitrfit  aj^ttit  at 
iiAisv,  hmJ  alia  mik  gfrtrrtan  if  Maryland  and  l>tlfmarr^Vtl» 
fvw^r—C^mfi^rid  again  tts  ahinv^  and  alia  iviik  1^  governor  ff  Af*ftta' 
<kmttlU~-C4'Kmaaderm-tkiif  of  <ht  army  and  itaiy  of  Ikt  L'mlfd 
SUtUi — Camfarnf  agaii  ai  aiovr.  and  alio  tm'ti  Ikf  gnynvri  ef  ,Vttr 
Hantftllin  ttiJ  .Vaittctmitli — Pardsntng  f^^rti  — C^mfarrd  a$  af>rpf — 
Trtaly-maMtig  fettrr — Cemp/lrtJ  ai  atavt—CiMifai  rn-ifte  and  tam- 
farii*H  vftxttulitM  f^nieri. 

To  Ihf  Peopif  0/  the  Stale  <»/  Xfw  Kw*.- 

I  pr(Ke«(l  iiiiw  to  trace  tli<  real  cliaracters  of  the  pro- 
posed Executive,  as  tliey  are  marked  out  in  the  plan  of 
the  convention.  This  will  serve  to  place  in  a  strong 
light  the  unfairness  of  the  representations  which  have 
been  made  in  regard  to  it. 

The  first  thing  which  strikes  our  attention  is  that  the 
executive  authority,  with  few  exceptions,  is  to  b«  rested 
in  a  sins'c  magistrate.  This  will  scarcely,  however,  be 
considered  as  a  point  upon  which  any  comparison  can  be 
grounded ;  for  if,  in  this  particular,  there  bea  resemblance 
to  the  king  of  Great  Etrilaiii,  there  is  not  less  a  re$«m- 
blance  to  the  Grand  Seignior,  to  the  khan  of  Tartary,  to 
the  Man  of  the  Seven  Mountains,  or  to  the  governor  of 
New  York. 

That  magistrate  is  to  be  elected  iox  four  years;  and  is 
to  be  re-eligible  as  often  as  the  people  of  the  United 
States  shall  think  him  worthy  of  their  conliOcnce.  In 
these  circumstances  there  is  a  total  dissimilitude  between 
lam  and  a  king  of  Great  Britain,  who  is  an  hertditary 
monarch,  possessing  the  crown  as  a  patrimony  descend, 
ibie  to  his  heirs  forever;  but  there  is  a  close  analogy 
between  him  and  a  governor  of  New  York,  who  is  elected 
for  thrt4  years,  and  is  re*eligible  without   limiiaiion  or 


458 


KJXG  OF  QRtA  T  BHITAIN. 


[Va.  60  'fli' 


intermission.  If  wc  cunsider  how  much  less  time  woold 
b«  re(|uisitc  fur  establishing  a  tUngcrotis  influence  in 
a  sint^Ic  Suite  than  for  cslabtishiiig  a  like  influence 
ihroughout  the  United  States,  we  must  conclude  that  a 
diiralion  ai /pur  yc;irs  (or  llic  Chief  M.igistmtc  of  the 
Uniun  i&  a  ifegrce  of  permanency  far  less  to  he  dreadeil 
in  that  offi.c  than  a  duration  of  lArte  years  for  a  cor- 
responding iiffice  in  a  single  State. 

The  Prc&idcnt  of  the  United  States  would  be  liable  to 
be  impeached,  tried,  and  upon  conviction  of  treason, 
bribery,  or  other  high  crimes  or  misdemeanors,  remored 
from  office;  and  would  afterwards  be  liable  to  prosecution 
and  punishment  in  the  onlinary  course  of  law.  The  per- 
son of  the  king  of  Great  llnlain  is  sacrod  and  inviolable; 
there  Is  no  constilutiunal  tribunal  to  which  he  is  amen- 
able; no  punishment  to  which  he  can  be  subjected  witb- 
ont  involving  the  crisis  of  a  nation;il  revolution.  In  (his 
delicate  aiwl  Important  circumstance  of  personal  respon- 
i^ibiiity,  the  Pi'csidcnt  of  Confederated  America  would 
stand  upon  no  better  ground  than  a  governor  of  New 
York,  and  upon  worse  ground  than  the  governors  of 
Maryland  and  Delaware. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  is  to  have  power  to 
return  a  bill,  which  shall  have  |>assed  the  twu  bninchu  ai 
the  legislature,  for  reconsideration;  and  the  bill  so  re* 
turned  is  to  become  a  law,  if,  u[>on  that  reconsideration, 
Bm  it  ''<^  approved  by  two-tliirds  of  both  houses. 

Ko. 73.  'liie  king  of  Great  Britain,  on  his  part,  ha«  an 

Absolute  negative  upon  the  acts  of  the  twu  houses  nf 
Parliament.  The  disuse  of  that  power  for  a  considerable 
lime  piist  d<>es  noi  affect  the  reality  of  its  existence,  and 
is  to  be  ascribed  wholly  to  tlic  crown's  having  found  the 
means  of  substituting  influence  to  authnrity,  or  the  art 
(if  gajnius  a  majority  in  one  or  the  other  of  the  twn 
houses  to  the  necessity  of  exerting  a  prerogative  which 
rould  seldom  be  exerted  without  h.^iarding  some  degree 
of  national  agitation.'     The  qualified   negative  of  the 

■  Ac<onliii)- 10  Hr.  Brrn,  As  Ucl  iMIMiea  ''«t  i)m  nw  nl  lha**«M 
power'  in  EnsLuad  wm  uy  Quecu  Aiwc  iuiTojimabeauk  luiUiit  liUL" 


HaalltdBl 


COMPARISON  OF  POWER. 


4S9 


Presutcnt  differs  widely  from  this  absolute  negative  of 
the  Britixli  sovereign,  and  talties  exactly  whli  the  re- 
visionary  authority  of  the  coiiDcil  of  revision  of  this 
State,  of  wtiich  tlie  governor  is  a  constituent  |>urt.  In 
this  respect  the  power  of  the  PreMdcnt  would  exceed  that 
of  the  governor  of  New  York,  because  the  former  would 
possess  singly  what  the  latter  slurcs  with  the  chancellor 
and  judges;  but  it  would  be  precisely  the  s;ime  with  that 
of  the  governor  of  Massachusetts,  whose  constitution 
as  to  this  article  seems  to  have  been  the  original  from 
which  the  convention  have  copied. 

The  President  is  lo  be  the  "commander-in-chief  of  the 
army  and  navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  militia 
of  the  several  States,  when  called  into  the  actual  service 
of  the  United  States.  He  is  to  have  power  to  grant 
reprieves  and  pardons  for  offenses  against  the  United 
States,  txitft  in  tasfs  of  imptachmtnt;  to  recommend  to 
the  consideration  of  Congress  such  measures  as  he  shall 
judge  necessary  and  expedient;  to  convene,  on  extraor- 
dinary occasions,  both  houses  of  the  legislature,  or 
either  of  them,  and,  in  case  of  disagreement  between 
them  viUh  resfut  to  the  time  of  adjournfKat,  to  adjourn 
ihcm  to  such  time  as  he  shall  think  proper;  to  take  care 
that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed;  and  to  commission 
all  officers  of  the  United  States,"  In  most  of  these  j>ar- 
ticulars  the  power  of  the  President  will  resemble  equally 
that  of  the  king  of  Great  Britain  and  of  the  governor  of 
New  York.  The  most  material  pi^ints  of  difference  arc 
these:  Fint.  The  President  will  have  only  Ihc  occa- 
sional command  of  such  part  of  the  militia  of  the  nation 
as  by  legislative  provision  may  be  called  into  the  actual 
service  of  the  Union.  The  king  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
governor  of  New  York  have  at  all  times  the  entire  com- 
mand of  all  the  militia  within  their  several  jurisdictions. 
In  this  article,   therefore,  the   power  of  the  President 


In  To<M'i  "  PiilitmceUn'  nofrmmcnt  in  Eni^JAnd  "  lh«  kutluir  layi 
lllil  In  l8|!B  cliuii;M  in  ^  ^riialr  t^iilwiijr  tiill  were  oampelle'l  ■•)'  »t>  inli- 
■nallon  li>  lu  |iraiiiui«tii  tk*i.  il  lho>«  ckiiiitti  xeic  iiu(  made,  (lie  royal 
fann  of  rrjntiuii  wuultl  bt  ixtrsbwi.— EPtlXi*. 


460 


POIVEKS  OVER  ARMY  AND  KAVY.     Wo-eiiifc 


would  be  inferior  to  that  of  cither  the  munarch  or  the 
governor.  Sttoadiy.  The  President  is  to  l>e  coramander- 
in-chief  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States.  In 
this  respect  his  authorit)*  would  be  nominally  the  same 
with  that  of  the  king  of  Great  Britain,  but  in  substance 
much  inferior  to  it.  It  would  amount  to  notlitng  more 
than  the  supreme  command  and  direction  of  the  mtltt^iry 
and  naval  forces,  as  first  General  and  admiral  of  the  Con- 
federacy; while  that  of  the  British  king  extends  to  tlir 
tleilan'ng  of  war  and  to  the  raising  and  regulalii^  of  Beets 
and  armies;  all  of  which,  by  the  Consittulion  under  con- 
sideration, would  appertain  to  the  legislature.*  The 
governor  of  New  York,  on  the  other  hand,  is  by  the  con- 
stitution of  the  State  vested  only  with  the  commaitd  of 
its  militia  and  navy.  But  the  constitutions  of  several  of 
the  States  expressly  declare  their  governors  to  be  com- 
manders-in-chief as  well  of  the  urmy  as  navy;  and  it  may 
well  be  a  question,  whether  those  of  New  Hampshire  and 
Ma&sachusctts,  in  particular,  do  not,  in  this  instance, 
confer  larger  powers  upon  their  respective  governors 
than  could  be  claimed  by  a  President  of  the  United 
States.  TAtrJ/y.  The  power  of  the  President  in  rcsped 
to  pardons  would  extend  to  all  cases  exteft  tk«se  »/ 
imfeatAment.  The  gotemor  of  New  York  may  pardon  in 
all  cases,  even  in  those  of  impeachment,  except  for 
treason  and  murder.  Is  not  the  power  of  the  govcroor 
in  this  article,  on  a  calculation  of  political  consequences, 
greater  than  that  of  the  President?  All  conspiracies 
and  plots  against  the  government  which  bare  not  been 


*  A  writer  id  a  PeanrWonU  \»po,  unikr  xht  licaMBi*  at  T4I«M(T. 
has  MMitMl  llua  lb*  kinc  of  Gml  Bnuda  own  hh  pniMC*Un  ■>  oib- 
iBaiiilec-!n-«hitI  to  an  uinul  matiajr  bill.  The  Iralb  b, «■  (W  VM/Utrj, 
llwt  ku  ptvroKKtiTV.  hi  tku  nspcd,  n  bBBonorial.  aad  *^  v»At  ™^ 
pDted,  '*coMniT  to>It  ivuiiai  ukI  |i(«<«(ie«ii.''  «■  Bl^trtiT.  vd.  i.  p. 
■te,  utprcwa  (I.  I>}  ttM  LAn|[  {^Uuwmt  nt  Ouilo  I.;  Xua.  trf  d«  «■•• 
M«  •)•'  ■  "^  "'  Cluitn  II..  (kap.  6.  II  *■»  ihUairi  lu  t«  tm  (Iw  h»v 
•tc"i  iliF  tol«  wptvai*  «u>«iu— lit  Mid  ii^i—wit  tt  (In  wltm 

wti>r  ritT'i  mtnu  ajxl  doaninkim,  m»A  of  aU  Utnw»  hjr  ^m  aarf 

lanl.aaJ  .u  *i  plans  nl  tumcth,  ivsa  wa>  awn  u  ihcaa- 

rwlii  inly   ami  hit    rofti    pmloirsacv    >iati    aail 

I  al  EagUs'i,  uii   ilvu  Mh  rt  dUwi  bouc  o(  r»ilW«i»l  1 


•a|ihl  to  |»siTS>l  tu  llbc  HBC — Pv  «!«•. 


PUffiSHMENT  OF  TXBASOff. 


461 


matured  Into  actual  treason  may  be  screened  from  pun- 
ishment of  every  Wind,  by  the  interposition  of  the  prerog- 
ative of  pardoning.  Ifagovcrnorof  New  York,  therefore, 
should  be  at  the  head  of  any  such  conspiracy,  until  the 
design  had  been  ripened  into  actuul  hostility  he  could 
insure  his  accompltceft  and  adherents  an  entire  iniiiuiiity. 
A  President  of  the  Union,  on  the  other  hand,  though  he 
may  even  pardon  treason  when  prosecuted  in  the  ordi- 
nary course  of  law,  could  shelter  no  offender  in  any 
degree  from  the  effects  of  impeachment  and  conviction. 
Would  not  the  prospect  of  a  total  indemnity  fur  all  the 
preliminary  ste[>s  he  a  greater  temptation  to  undertake 
and  persevere  in  an  enterprise  against  the  public  liberty 
than  the  mere  pnMpect  of  an  exemption  from  death  and 
conl'iKcaiion,  if  the  final  execution  of  the  design,  upon 
an  actual  appeal  to  arms,  should  miscarry?  Would  this 
last  expectation  have  any  inflaencc  at  all,  when  the  prob- 
ability was  computed  thai  the  person  who  was  tn  afford 
that  exemption  might  himself  be  involved  in  the  conse- 
quences of  the  measure  and  might  be  incapacitated  by 
his  agency  in  it  from  affording  the  desired  impunity?  The 
better  to  judge  of  this  matter,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
recollect  that  by  the  proposed  Constitution  the  offense 
of  treason  is  limited  "  to  levying  war  upon  the  United 
States,  and  adhering  to  their  enemies,  giving  them  aid 
andcomfort,"  and  that  by  the  laws  of  ^fcw  York  it  is  con- 
fined within  similar  bounds.  FiMirtily.  The  President 
can  only  adjourn  the  national  legislature  in  the  single 
case  of  disagreement  about  the  time  of  adjournmcnL 
The  British  monarch  may  prorogue  or  even  dissolve  the 
Parliament.  The  governor  of  New  V'ork  may  also  pro- 
rogue the  legislature  of  this  Slate  for  a  limited  lime;  a 
power  which,  in  certain  situations,  may  be  employed  to 
very  important  purposes. 

The  President  is  to  have  power,  with  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate,  to  make  treaties,  provided  Iwo- 
Sm  thirds  of  the  senators  present  concur.     The 

■•.M.  king  of  Great  Britain  is  the  sole  and  absolute 

representative  of  the  nation  in  all  foreign  transactions. 


462 


CROtfN  CA/f  MAKE  TREATIES.        (Ho.  63  . Mi 


He  can  of  his  own  accord  mukc  treaties  of  peace,  com- 
merce, alliauce,  and  of  every  other  dcHcriplion.  It  hits 
been  insinuated  that  his  authority  in  this  respect  is  out 
conclusive  and  that  his  conventions  nith  foreign  puwers 
arc  subject  to  the  revision,  and  stand  in  need  of  the  rail* 
ftciition  of  Parliament.  But  I  believe  this  (lm:trine  was 
never  heard  of  until  it  was  broached  u|K>n  the  present 
occasion.  Every  jurist*  of  that  kinRdoni,  aad  every 
other  man  acquainted  with  its  Constitution,  knows  as  an 
eitahliitlied  fact  that  the  prerrij;r:itive  of  making  treaties 
exists  in  the  crown  in  its  utmost  plcntitudc:  and  that  the 
compacts  entered  into  by  the  royal  authority  have  the 
most  complete  legal  validity  and  perfection,  independent 
of  any  other  sanction.'  The  I'arliament,  it  is  true,  is 
sometimes  seen  employing  itself  in  altorin);  the  cxistini; 
laws  to  conform  them  to  the  stipulations  in  a  new  treaty,' 
and  this  may  have  possibly  given  birth  to  the  imagita- 
tion  that  its  co>operation  was  necessary  to  the  obligatory 
efficacy  of  the  treaty.  But  this  parli^iincntary  interposi- 
tion proceeds  from  a  different  cause:  from  the  neceksity 
of  adjust!  Dg  a  most  artificial  and  intricate  system  of  rev- 


•W-fr  B1iicV*tomc'«  •'  Cftnimenlarict."  vol.  L  p.  iS7.— P'BUi.v 
'  "  Kncnt  ilrti'uuiiinH  liive  »\\o  lidnchl  Intu  ciinnus  prominence  in* 
Mbcr  )i*ii  \A  the  ointtituliua.  1  uid  in  lltit  iMMik  tliM  il  vvM  nr; 
much  luipriw  pco|>te  if  thirf  ocre  <ii>lf  loM  h"**  totny  ttijaK*  thi 
qiiccn  couM  do  uriihoiit  mnuittint!  Pitlumenl.  and  tt  rcttitnix  bh  to 
proved;  (of  B-hea  the  queen  aliiilulieit  purcluse  Ib  the  ami;  t>7  aa  an  rf 
prcroGKtiTe  (illct  the  l.or<l>>  haul  icjixIcnI  (lie  bill  fur  dniii^  uij,  then  wu 
a  crml  anil  |;msml  ■>tiiiii>ilii»r'ir.  Hiir  ibii  n  nulliliii;  In  vthal  llm  i|Nim 
van  \rf  law  do  villioul  niiitaltinf;  I'arlianMDl.  Xui  ii>  menljon  othat 
Ihinp.  ihe  could  diiband  tlK  nrmy  (l>y  taw  ihc  rannol  enKiKC  more  thaa 
a  mlain  number  of  men.  I>ul  she  i»  not  oMi|[cd  lo  vnf^i;'  any  i»cn];  <ift 
could  dUmiu  all  the  oftcen,  (n>in  the  KaierarcoiBni«niUtig-lB.ckkf 
downwufd;  )ibc  ciiuU  ditviiin  all  Iho  kalkin.  \.oa;  khe  I'luU  kII  irfl  all  mn 
(hi|M-ot>war  awl  all  our  Bival  tloreti  il<«  could  make  a  nruc  1>;  lb«  aac- 
rilicp  of  Conioall,  and  becio  a  oar  for  the  coaqM-M  of  llrtllanjr.  Sba 
cTutd  make  every  ddien  in  the  United  Kinodom.  mole  or  loinKk.  a 
|>ecri  ihc  coukl  uukecTety  paiioli  in  tlie  Utiitcd  Kia|;<lii<^i  >  '  .^ruvi-niiV; 
ahe  K<m\A   dliRiiM  miHl  of   llie  eivil  •ctv*n<>>:  >Jie  <  <  t- 

(eniUn.     tn  a  woi^l.lhe  queeatxiuld  liy  iKtiDC'thr  '.  % 

of  Eiril  ;;oini(nncnl  wilkin  the  conmnKnt.  cwl  7 

a  bad  war  or  tvace.  akd  couM.  by  di^lianding  t-.  <  "« 

■n,  leave  lU  iWnitfleu  aeslaal  (orcipt  oatwna.   --l-  r  n[;iuk 

CoQitUulion."—  I^OITOR. 


A 


iltonl 


AJUSASSAl^OXS  A.VD   .V/.V/Sr/CAS. 


463 


cnuc  and  commercial  I.iws  to  Hip  chaiigt^*  m.itlc  in  llietn 
|})'  the  openituii  (j(  the  treaty,  and  ■>(  adapting  new  pro- 
visions and  precautions  to  the  new  state  of  things,  la 
keep  the  machine  frum  running  into  diininler  In  this 
respect,  iheredire,  there  is  110  comparison  bctircen  the 
intended  power  of  the  President  and  the  actual  power  of 
the  Uritish  sovereign.  'Ihc  one  can  perform  alone  what 
the  other  can  do  only  with  the  concurrence  of  a  branch 
of  the  legislature.  It  must  be  admitted  that  i»  this 
instance  the  power  of  the  federal  E.tecutivc  would  ex- 
ceed that  of  anjr  State  F.iecutivc.  Kut  this  arisen  nat. 
urally  from  the  sovereign  power  which  relates  to  treaties. 
If  the  Confederacy  were  to  be  dissolved,  it  would  become 
a  question  whether  the  Executives  of  the  several  Slates 
were  not  solely  invested  with  that  delicate  and  important 
prerogative. 

The  President  is  also  to  t>c  authurixed  to  receive 
ambassadors  and  other  public  ministers.  This,  ihoug;h 
it  has  been  a  rich  Iheme  of  declamation,  is  more  a  matter 
of  dignity  than  of  authority.  It  is  a  circumstance  which 
will  be  without  consequence  in  the  administration  of  the 
government;  and  it  was  far  more  convenient  that  it 
should  be  arranged  in  this  manner  than  that  there 
sliould  be  a  no^essily  of  con\-ening  the  legislature,  or 
one  of  its  branches,  upon  every  arrival  of  a  foreign 
minister,  though  it  were  merely  to  taJie  the  place  of  a 
departed  predecessor. 

The  President  is  to  nominate  and,  vi/A  the  aJvUt  and 
(omtut  of  the  Semite,  to  appoint  ambassiidors  ami  other 
public  ministers,  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  in 
general  all  officers  of  the  United  States  established  by 
law,  and  whose  apf^ointments  are  not  otherwise  proviikd 
for  by  the  Constitution.  The  Icing  of  Great  Britain  is 
rmphalically  and  truly  styled  the  fountain  of  honor.  He 
not  only  appoints  to  all  offices,  but  can  create  offices. 
He  can  confer  titles  of  nobility  at  pleasure,  and  has  the 
disposal  of  an  immense  number  of  church  preferments. 
There  is  evidently  a  great  inferiority  in  the  power  of  the 
President,  in  this  particular,  to  that  of  the  British  king; 


4&f     P0W£/fS  OF  GOVERNOR  OF  N&W  YORK.  (■•••iWi 


nor  is  it  equal  to  that  of  the  goremor  of  New  Vork,  if 
we  arc  to  interpret  the  nieanin];  of  the  constitution  of 
the  Statv  bf  the  practice  which  has  obui(iet)  under 
it.  The  puwer  uf  appointment  is  with  us  lodged  in  a 
council  com|H>!lcd  of  the  govcnior  ;ind  (our  nicmticrs 
of  the  Senate,  chosen  by  the  AsscniWy.  The  governor 
elaimt.  And  has  fretiaeiitly  txtrcited,  the  right  of  Domi- 
nation, and  is  entitled  to  a  casting  vote  in  the  appoint- 
ment.' If  he  really  h^s  the  right  of  noroinaltng;,  his 
authority  is  in  this  r»t>cet  c<|iiul  to  thai  of  the  I'rrsi- 
dcnt,  and  exceeds  it  in  the  article  of  the  canting  vote. 
In  the  national  government,  if  the  Senate  should  be 
divided,  nu  a|)|>oiiiinient  could  be  made;  in  the  govern- 
ment of  New  Vofk,  if  the  council  should  be  dividtd,  the 
governor  can  turn  the  scale,  and  confirm  his  own  nom- 
ination.* If  we  comjiare  the  publicity  which  must 
necessarily  attend  the  mode  of  appointment  by  the 
President  And  an  entire  branch  of  the  national  legislature 
with  the  privacy  in  the  mode  of  appointment  by  the 
governor  of  New  York,  closeted  in  a  secret  ajuirtmeni 
with  at  most  four,  and  frequently  with  only  two  t>crsons; 
and  i(  we  at  the  same  time  consider  huw  much  more 
easy  it  must  be  to  inllucnce  the  nniall  nuinl>er  uf  which  a 
council  of  appointment  consists  than  the  considcrabtc 
number  of  which  the  national  Senate  would  consist,  we 
cannot  hesitate  to  pronounce  that  the  powEt  of  the  chief 
ni.iKistrate  of  this  State,  in  the  disposition  uf  offices, 
must  in  practice  be  greatly  superior  to  that  o(  the 
Chief  M.iRtitirate  of  the  Union. 

Hence  it  appears  that,  except  as   to   the  concurrent 
authority  of  the  I'resident  in  the  article  of  treaties,  it 


'Caiuliv,  liomm.  (Umandi  an  acknowMgwwiil  iKat  I  >lit  nnt  iMak 

the  claim  of  thr  cnvcm -i  I'}  t  riclu  ol  neatnalio*  h^  tiNHiilod.     Vft 

iklwaV'  'ii>iB  the  prankc  ol  •  ctHrenatMBi.  i3l 

1  pni|iii''  iiiUi  ijarillnKod.      AjmI  iiulcpcikkal  el 

\  claim,  nviii  I  .    I  I  i^m  ill*  nlhvT  (nntUcniltom,  kB>l  pttu* 

[HmBi  llinMfli  ai  -n|>nic«s.  ■•  diall  Xnt  tiKllBBd  ta  Jn*  ^mA 

Van  w—  •■•■'■■  '■■  ■■■■ 

'    \  itOfid   o(    Bp|. 


Hkmiltaa] 


rXESlDElfr  AND  KING. 


46s 


wogid  be  difficult  to  (Ictcrmine  whether  that  magistrate 
would,  in  the  aggregate,  possess  mure  or  less  ptiurer 
thao  the  governor  o(  New  Vork.  And  it  apt>cars,  yet 
more  uncquivociilly,  Ittat  there  is  no  pretense  lor  the 
parallel  which  has  been  attempted  hetween  him  and  the 
king  of  Great  Britain.  But  to  render  the  contrast  in 
this  respect  still  more  striking,  it  may  l>e  of  use  to  throw 
the  principal  circumstances  of  dissimilitude  into  a  closer 
group. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  would  be  an  officer 
elected  by  the  people  for  four  years;  the  king  of  Great 
Britain  is  a  perpetual  and  fiereJiUry  prince.  The  one 
would  be  amenable  to  pergonal  ptini^hmt^nl  and  disgrace; 
the  person  of  the  other  is  sacred  and  inviolable.  The 
one  would  have  a  ir«o^'i/&'' negative  upon  the  acts  of  the 
legislative  body;  the  other  has  an  ahiolutt  negative. 
The  one  would  have  a  right  to  command  the  military 
and  naval  forces  of  the  nation;  the  other,  in  addition  to 
this  right,  possesses  that  u(  Jtelaring  war  and  uf  raiting 
and  reguialiag  fleets  and  armies  by  his  own  authority. 
The  one  would  have  a  concurrent  power  with  a  branch 
of  the  legislature  in  the  formation  uf  treiities;  the  other 
is  the  sole potuitor  uf  the  power  of  making  treaties.  The 
one  would  have  a  like  concurrent  authority  in  appoint- 
ing to  ollires;  the  other  is  the  sole  author  of  all  appoint^ 
inenis.  The  one  can  confer  no  privileges  whatever; 
the  other  can  make  denizens  of  aliens,  noblemen  of 
commoners;  can  erect  corporations  wtlh  all  the  rights 
incident  to  corporate  bodies.  The  one  can  prescribe 
no  rules  concerning  the  commerce  or  currency  of  the 
nations;  the  other  is  in  several  respects  the  arbiter  of 
commerce,  and  in  this  capacity  can  establish  markets  and 
fairs,  can  regulate  weights  and  measures,  can  lay  em- 
bargoes for  a  limited  time,  can  coin  money,  can  authorise 
or  prohibit  the  circulation  of  foreign  coin.  The  one  has 
no  partirle  of  spiritual  jurisdiction;  the  other  is  the 
supreme  head  and  governor  of  the  national  church! 
What  answer  shall  we  give  to  those  who  would  persuade 
OS  that  things  so  unlike  resemble  each  other?    The  same 


466        ENEKGY  WANTED  fX  EXECUTIVE.      I««.T0<»( 

that  otiglit  to  be  given  to  those  who  tell  a«  that  a  covern- 
ntent,  the  whole  power  of  which  would  be  in  the  handi 
of  the  elective  and  periodical  servants  of  the  people,  is 
an  aris(ocrac)',  a  monarchy,  and  a  despotism. 

PUSLIUS, 


No.  70  |69|.      c/«^>»iiM'/>wM'.  Hath  15.  ••«.)      Haroiltan. 

ADVANTAGE   OF  A   SINGLB   EXECUTIVE. 

A  vignrnu  Emflivr  muisttnt  wili  rtfrnHictm  gttitrmttnf—  WU 
itmtlilmttt  a  fr^tr  Einativt — Unity — RrMtant  far  IhU — Viitiug  nm»- 
tivt  atHuritf  ia  liiv  er  mrif  magiilnUri — RtifraiHiat  tkt  Ktnttttvttj 
ttantil^-M/fitiini  tt  ftnr»Uty  attJ  fvativl  ty  tttoi/il  tnimnalitl, 

T«  tht  Peaffle  of  tkt  Staff  0/ Ntte  York: 

There  is  an  idea,  which  is  not  without  its  adTocates, 
that  a  vigorous  Executive  is  inconsistent  with  the  gcoiu 
of  i^publican  goveniraent.  The  enlightened  well-withen 
10  this  species  of  government  must  at  least  hope  that  the 
supposition  is  destitute  of  fi'imdation;  since  thcjr  can 
never  admit  its  truth,  without  at  the  Siame  time  admit- 
ting the  irundcmnation  of  their  own  principles.  Energy 
in  the  Exerotivc  is  a  leading  character  in  the  definitinn 
of  good  government.  It  is  essential  lo  the  prtitecttoa 
of  the  community  ag^tinst  foreign  attacks;  it  is  not  less 
essential  to  the  steady  a*) ministration  nf  the  laws;  10  the 
protection  of  property  against  those  irregular  and  high, 
handed  comhinatiuns  which  somctimrs  iniemipl  tlic 
ordinary  rmtrsc  of  justice;  t<i  the  secuniy  of  liberty 
against  the  enterprises  and  assaults  of  ambition,  of  fiu- 
tion,  and  of  anarchy.  Ever>-  man  the  least  coaversKBt  ta 
Roman  story  Icnnws  how  nlien  that  rvpuhlir  wat  nUifed 
tn  t^r  rrfuge  in  the  absolute  power  of  a  single  nmA, 
untlrr  the  formidable  title  of  Dtctalnr,  as  wrll  agan«t 
the  inihgnrs  of  ambitions  individoals  whu  atpirett  Iv  Ittt 
tyranny  and  the  veilitioiu  of  whole  classes  of  tkeoo*- 
munitr  whose  cooduci  threatened  the  «ai«raee  «(  •■ 


J 


H«mlItOBl      /XCXEDiHAtTS  FOR  A!f  EXECUTIVE.        4^7 


government,  as  ag^iiiitit  the  invasions  of  external  ene. 
mies  wlto  meniiced  ilic  conquest  and  ileiitructibn  of 
Rome. 

There  can  be  no  need,  however,  tu  multiply  argnments 
or  examples  on  (his  tieail.  A  (ee)>le  Executive  Unplicit  a 
feeble  execution  of  the  sovcrnmcRt.  A  feeble  etcculion 
is  but  another  phrase  for  a  bud  execution;  and  a  gov- 
ernment ill  executed,  whatever  it  iiiay  be  in  theory,  must 
be  in  practice  a  bad  government. 

Taking  it  for  grantcti,  therefore,  that  all  men  of  sense 
will  agree  in  the  necesxit)-  of  an  energetic  Executive,  it 
will  only  remain  tu  inquire,  What  arc  the  ingredients 
which  constitute  this  energy?  flow  far  can  Ihey  be 
combined  with  those  other  ingredients  which  constitute 
safety,  in  the  republican  sense?  And  how  far  docs  this 
combination  characteriKC  the  plan  which  has  been  re- 
ported hy  the  convention? 

The  ingredients  which  constitute  energy  in  the  Exec* 
utivc  are,  first,  unity;  sccundiy,  duration;  thirdly,  an 
adequate  proviniun  for  its  support;  fourthly,  competent 
powers. 

The  ingredients  which  constitute  safety  in  the  republi- 
can scnxe  are,  first,  a  due  <]e(>endence  on  the  people; 
■ccondly,  a  due  responsibility. 

Those  politicians  and  statesmen  who  have  been  the 
must  celebrated  fur  the  Miundne^s  of  their  principles 
and  for  the  justice  of  their  views  have  declared  in  favor 
of  a  single  Executive  and  a  numerous  legislature.  They 
have,  with  great  propriety,  considered  energy  as  the  most 
necessary  qualificjtiun  of  the  former,  and  have  regarded 
this  as  most  applicable  to  power  in  a  single  hand;  while 
they  have,  with  equal  propriety,  contiidered  the  latter  as 
best  adapted  lo  deliberation  and  wisdom,  and  best  calcu> 
lated  to  conciliate  the  confidence  of  the  people  and  to 
secure  their  priviJeges  and  interests. 

That  unity  is  conducive  to  energy  will  not  be  disputed. 
Decision,  activity,  secrecy,  and  dispatch  will  generally 
characterize  the  proceedings  of  one  man  in  a  much  more 
eminent  degree  than   the  proceedings  of  any  greaici 


4fiS     fLVRALlTY  m  EXECUTIVE  UKW/SE.    lB».TOi« 


numb«r;  and  in  proportion  as  llie  number  is  increa: 
these  qualities  will  be  tliminishcd. 

This  unity  may  be  destroyed  in  two  ways:  cither  by 
vesting  the  power  tn  two  or  inure  uiajfistratcs  of  etjuul 
dignity  and  authority;  or  by  vesting  it  ostensibly  in  one 
nian,  subject,  in  whole  or  in  part,  to  the  control  antl 
eo-operation  of  others,  in  the  capacity  of  counselors  to 
htm.  Of  the  first,  the  two  Consuls  of  Rome  may  serve 
as  an  example;  of  the  last,  we  shall  find  exanijiles  in  the 
constitutions  of  several  of  the  States.  New  York  and 
\  New  Jersey,  if  I  recollect  right,  arc  the  only  Stale* 
which  have  intrusted  the  executive  authority  wholly  to 
single  men.*  Both  these  methods  of  destroying  the 
unity  of  the  Executive  have  their  partisans;  but  (lie 
votaries  of  an  executive  council  are  the  most  nMmcroot. 
They  arc  both  liable,  if  not  to  equal,  to  siniihr  objec- 
tions, and  may  in  most  lights  be  examined  inconjtinctiim. 
The  experience  ol  olher  natiimi  will  iiHurd  lilik  lostrudlon  i>m 
Ihb  bead.  A«  fiir,  howRver,  as  il  teaches  anyihiiif;.  it  teaclie*  nf 
not  lo  b«  eiviirnoreil  of  pturalKy  in  ilic  Exrciiiu'e.  We  have 
thai  (lie  Achxans,  on  an  experiment  a(  two  Prailors,  were  indund 
lo  abolish  one.  The  KontAii  history  recorils  m.ixy  Instances  of. 
miicliicfs  to  IIk  republic  Uom  Uir  tliucinHms  bclwecn  llie  Co* 
t-uls.  and  betsvccn  the  military  Tnbiines  «Ik>  were  ai  iin>et  sub- 
Miluteil  tot  the  Com>uli.  Bui  U  girei  ui  no  specimens  of  any 
pfculi.ir  advantages  dcriifed  lo  ibc  Siaie  (mm  ihe  ciicii instance  cS 
the  plur.ililj-  of  those  ii>;tKiilTnte«.  Thjl  the  di&seiiSKnis  iKlwem 
ihem  were  not  moic  fr(s)ucnt  or  more  (ii.il  »  ntniier  oj  ntionidi- 
mcni.  unlit  we  advert  to  ilie  singuUf  position  tn  which  ilie  rrpnlilic 
was  aintosi  coniinualty  placed,  and  to  ihe  pradeni  policy  poinitd 
out  by  ihecircumstaiiecsot  the  State,  and  ptirsued  hy  ilic  Consuls 
of  making  a  diviikin  of  Ihe  guvemmcBt  between  Ihem,  The 
pa  I  nci.iDS  engaged  in  a  pcrpelunl  struggle  wilh  the  plehetins  hff 
llie  praervatlon  of  their  ancient  aulliorities  und  dixniiies;  iht 
Consuls,  who  ifcrt  generally  rhosen  ooi  o(  like  (omici  boily.  wrre 
comnvonty  utnlcd  by  the  perj<iniil  iiilerest  llie)'  hail  in  the  defenss 
of  ilicprifilegesofilteirnnler.    In  addition  la  this  mulive  uluiAin. 


'  Nrir  *'  -<  y-.t  nocawn4)  except  for  Ihe  tisf  )e  pnipaM  of  wgf^n- 
Uc  lo  "  Jcncv  hai  a  i-iiuKil  viIikid  (kn  fvntim  IW  P^' 

(ull.     i   1  >,  (ruin  lbs  Utmiiir  lh«  cutiiiliulkuk,  IhtW  nM&Uiat 

do  Ml  tiind  taiiB.— f^isuus. 


HMdltMl        CAUSES  1*10(50X41  BMULATtOS. 


4«9 


after  ihe  arms  of  the  republic  luil  consiileiably  expanded  (he 
bounds  of  its  e(H]>lrr,  it  Iwcaine  an  esiahtislicil  cusimn  willi  the 
Consuls  to  divide  lire  adminisiraiion  bciwecn  themselves  by  lot- 
one  of  ihcm  rcm.-iininf;  at  Rome  to  E»verii  the  city  und  it»  envU 
roni.  the  other  taking  llii;  coiiim.ind  in  the  more  disl.inl  provinces. 
This  cxpc<l)cnt  mu«.  no  doubt,  h.ive  had  great  inlluence  In  pre- 
venting iImmc  cuilUtons  aiul  lii'alships  which  might  oiherwvte  have 
cnibri>ile<l  the  {icacc  of  tile  tcpiiblk. 

Bui  qiiittint;  tite  Uim  light  of  historical  research,  attaching  our- 
sclvct  purely  to  the  dictates  of  reanon  und  good  ten^e,  »>«  &hfill 
discover  rnuch  greater  cause  to  reject  than  to  approve  the  idea  of 
plurality  in  the  Eiecutive,  under  any  modificaiion  whatei'er. 

Wherever  two  or  more  persons  arc  engaged  in  any 
common  enterprise  or  pursuit,  there  is  always  danger  of 
difference  of  opinion.  If  it  be  ■&  public  iru«i  or  office,  in 
which  they  are  clothed  with  equal  dignity  and  authority, 
there  is  peculiar  danger  of  personal  emulation  and  even 
animosity.  From  either,  and  especially  from  alt  these 
causes,  the  must  littler  dissensions  are  apt  to  spring. 
Whenever  these  happen  they  lessen  the  respectability, 
weaken  the  authority,  and  distract  Ihe  plans  and  opera- 
tion uf  (hose  whom  they  divide.  If  they  should  unfor- 
tunately assail  the  supreme  executive  magistracy  of  a 
country,  consisting  of  a  plurality  of  persons,  tliey  might 
impede  or  frustrate  the  most  imporlarji  measures  of  the 
Eovcrnment,  in  the  most  critical  emergencies  of  the 
State.  And  what  is  still  worse,  they  might  split  the 
community  into  the  most  violent  and  irreconcilable  fac- 
tions, adhering  differently  to  the  different  individuals 
whncomp4)sed  the  magistnicy.' 

Men  often  oppose  a  thing  merely  becatise  they  have 
had  no  agency  in  planning  it,  or  because  it  may  have  been 
planned  by  those  whom  ihey  dislike     But  if  they  hav« 


'  The  fr>in«nh*<l  liail  *  reccfil  olijecl  le»on  u(  »  plural  txecnlive  in  a 
•d-olUd  "  Conimiltce  of  Mitn,"  onr  of  JclTFrton'i  jirDJects,  which  con- 
tittnl  of  (MM  dtlegilc  from  each  state.  lo  til  between  tile  uiuon*  tA  ih« 
CoAli»enl>l  Congreu  awl  raaaagfc  cctuin  u(  lii  aflaira.  An  account  of 
ikli  cannillec  U  in  Jeffertoa't  "  Writine»  "  (■■  76).  wlMie  ■  ilmilai  cipc- 
ricni-c  id  the  Ptencli  (iliml  cxeoiti're  n  also  nuliceH.  Pnliapi  ikr  mwl 
«lrilE>nK  niixlim  insianoe  tA  iti  ciiU  ii  to  be  «ec«  in  the  so-wllrd  b>- 
partUMi  Uninlt  of  our  local  politia.— Euitok. 


470        D/SXexJUOfi'  m.vDF.JfS  EXKCUTIVH.      Ill*  TO'Wl 

been  corisult«;«I  and  have  li,i[>|>c»cd  m  tli)ui|t|ir<ivr,  oppo 
sition  then  becomes,  hi  (licir  t;&timuliuti,  ati  ttidLtp^^nsable 
duty  of  scIf'IoTC.  'rficy  seem  tu  think  tlicinsctvcs  bound 
in  honor,  and  by  all  lh<;  motives  of  persiinal  inrallibilitr. 
to  defeat  the  success  of  what  has  been  resolved  upon 
contrary  to  tticir  sentiments.  Men  of  upright,  benevo- 
lent tampers  have  too  many  opportimilieK  of  rrmnricing 
with  horror  to  what  desperate  lengths  this  disposiiiua 
is  sometimes  CArried,  and  how  often  Ihc  great  intcre&is 
of  society  are  sacrifired  tu  the  vanity,  lu  the  comcit,  and 
to  the  obstinacy  of  individuals,  who  have  credit  cnungli 
(»  make  their  passions  and  their  caprices  intcrcstin|[  lo 
mankind.  Perhaps  the  question  now  before  the  puhlir 
nay,  in  its  consequences,  afford  melancholy  proufs  uf 
ihc  effects  of  this  despicable  frailty,  or  rather  dctestatilc 
vice,  in  llie  human  character. 

Upon  the  principles  of  a  free  government,  inronven- 
icnccs  from  the  source  just  mcniiuucd  must  neccs&arily 
be  submitted  to  in  the  formation  of  the  legislature;  but 
it  \%  unnecessary,  and  therefore  unwise,  to  inlrudtice 
them  into  the  constitution  of  the  Kiccutive.  It  is  here, 
too,  that  they  may  he  most  pernioious.  In  llit-  IcgisU- 
lure  pronipiitudi?  of  decision  is  oftener  a»  evil  than  a 
benefit.  The  differences  of  opinion,  and  the  jarrings  of 
parties  in  that  department  of  the  government,  though 
they  may  sometimes  obstruct  sabitary  plans,  yet  otieii 
promote  deliberation  and  circumspection  and  serve  lir 
check  excesses  in  the  majority.  When  a  resolution,  ton, 
is  once  talcen,  the  opposition  must  be  at  an  end.  That 
resolution  is  a  law,  and  resistance  to  it  ininishable.  But 
no  favorable  circumstances  |>:dliaie  or  alone  for  tlic  *lt»- 
advantages  of  dissension  in  the  executive  department. 
Here  they  are  pure  and  unmixed.  There  is  no  putnl  at 
which  they  cease  to  operate.  They  serve  to  cmbarmu 
am)  weaken  the  execution  of  the  plan  or  measure  to 
which  they  relate,  from  the  first  step  to  the  final  cuncln- 
sion  of  it.  They  constantly  counteract  those  i(uallt|es  tn 
the  Executive  which  are  the  most  necessary  inurrdirntt 
in  ilscompositiun,— vigorand  expedition,— and  ihisvnt!»- 


out  any  counterbatancing  good.  In  the  conduct  of  war. 
in  which  the  energy  of  the  ICsecHtivc  is  ttie  bulwark  uf 
the  nationjil  security,  everythini;  would  be  to  be  a|)i>re> 
hended  from  its  plurality. 

It  must  be  confessed  that  these  observations  apply 
with  prinui^l  weight  tu  the  first  cn«e  supposed — that  is, 
to  a  plurality  of  magistrates  of  equal  dignity  and  authority; 
a  scheme,  the  advocates  for  which  arc  not  likely  to  form 
a  numerous  sect;  but  they  apply,  though  not  with  ecjual, 
yet  with  considerable  weight  to  the  project  of  a  council 
whose  concurrence  is  made  constitutionally  necessary  to 
the  operations  of  the  ostensible  Executive.  An  artful 
cabal  in  that  council  would  be  able  to  distract  and  to 
enervate  the  whole  system  of  administration.  If  no 
such  cabal  should  exist,  the  mere  diversity  of  views  ami 
opinions  would  alone  be  sufficient  to  tincture  the  exercise 
of  the  executive  authority  with  a  spirit  of  habitual  feeble- 
ness and  dilatoriness. 

Hut  one  of  the  weightiest  objections  to  a  plurality  in 
the  Executive,  and  which  lies  as  much  against  the  laM  as 
the  first  plan,  is  that  it  tends  to  conceal  faults  and 
destroy  respimsibility.  Rcsponsihttity  is  of  two  kinds — 
to  censure  and  to  punishment.  The  first  is  the  more 
important  of  the  two,  especially  in  an  elective  office. 
.Man,  In  public  trust,  will  much  oftener  act  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  render  him  unworthy  of  being  any  longer 
trusted  than  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  him  obnoxious 
to  legal  punishment.  Hut  the  iniilti)itication  of  the  Ivx- 
ecutivc  adds  to  the  difficulty  of  detection  in  either  case. 
It  often  becomes  impossible,  amidst  mutual  accusations, 
to  determine  on  whom  the  blame  or  the  punishment  of 
a  pernicious  measure,  or  series  of  pernicious  measures, 
ought  really  to  fall.  It  is  shifted  from  one  to  another 
with  so  much  dexterity,  and  under  such  plausible  appear- 
ances, that  the  public  opinion  is  left  in  suspense  about 
the  real  author.  The  circumstances  which  may  have  led 
to  any  national  mixearri.ige  or  mi'.fiirtone  are  sometimes 
so  complicated  lliat,  where  there  are  a  number  of  actors 
who  may  have  bad  different  degrees  and  kinds  of  agency. 


472       CASE  OF  GOVERli'OR  OF  A£»-    I'OKK.    OI».TOiMi 


though  we  mB]^  clearly  see  upon  the  whole  that  there  has 
been  mismanagement,  yet  it  may  be  impracticable  tt> 
pronounce  lo  whose  account  the  evil  which  may  havp 
been  incurred  is  truly  ch<irgc<ilile. 

"1  was  ovefTuted  by  my  council.  The  council  wen 
so  divided  in  ihcir  opinions  that  it  ivas  impossible  to 
obtain  any  better  resolution  on  (he  point."  These  and 
ftimiLir  pretexts  are  constantly  at  band,  whether  true  or 
false.  And  who  is  there  that  will  cither  take  (he  trouble, 
or  incur  the  odium,  of  a  strict  scrutiny  into  the  secret 
springs  of  the  transaction?  Should  there  be  found  a  citi- 
tcD  zealous  enough  to  undertake  the  unpromising  task, 
if  there  happen  to  be  collusion  between  the  parties  con- 
cerned, how  easy  it  is  to  clothe  the  circumstances  with 
so  much  ambiguity  as  to  render  it  uncertain  what  was 
the  prpcisc  ciinduci  of  any  of  those  parlies! 

In  the  single  instance  in  which  the  guvernor  of  this 
Slate  is  coupled  with  a  council— that  is,  in  the  appoint- 
SodBm.  ment  to  offices — we  have  seen  the  mischiefs 
68  and  74.  of  it  in  the  view  now  under  consideration. 
Scandalous  appointments  to  important  ofltces  have  been 
made.  Some  cases,  indeed,  have  been  so  flagrant  that 
ALL  PARTIES  have  agreed  in  the  impropriety  of  the  thing. 
When  inquiry  has  been  made  the  blame  has  been  laid  by 
the  governor  on  the  members  of  the  council,  who  on 
their  part  have  charged  it  upon  his  nomination:  while 
the  people  remain  altogether  at  a  loss  to  determine  by 
whose  influence  their  interests  have  been  committed  to 
hands  bo  unqnaliTied  and  so  manifestly  improper.  In 
tenderness  to  individuals,  I  forbear  to  descend  to  par- 
ticulare, 

II  is  evident  from  these  considerations  that  the  plu- 
rality of  the  Executive  tends  to  deprive  the  people  of  the 
two  greatest  »ei-tirtties  they  <-an  liave  for  the  faithful 
exercise  of  any  delegated  power:  fint,  the  restraints  ol 
public  opinion,  which  lose  their  efficacy,  as  well  on 
account  of  the  division  of  the  censure  attendant  on  bad 
measures  among  a  number  as  on  account  of  the  unce^ 
tainty  on  whom  it  ought  to  fall;  and,  ttt^mUy,  the  uppnr 


HuBlltonI 


COUNCtL   rO  EXECUTIVE. 


473 


tunity  of  diKOvering  with  facility  and  clearness  the 
misconduct  of  (he  persons  ihcy  trust,  in  order  either 
to  their  removal  from  office  or  to  their  actual  punish- 
ment in  <:aKes  which  admit  of  it. 

In  England  ihc  king  it  a  |>c-rpciu;il  magiMralc :  «nd  il  it  a 
maxitn  which  ha»  obifliiicd  (or  t)i«  sa\x  <A  (he  public  peace,  ihat 
he  is  unaccountable  (or  his  adminntialion.  nn'l  Ills  person  sncml. 
Nufliing,  iheiefore.  can  be  wisct  in  thJti  kingilom  ih^nti>>nncx 
■o  the  king  a  cotiuilulional  council  who  ma)'  be  tMponsibte  to  the 
naiiun  (or  the  advice  (hey  give.  Withau(  this,  there  wouM  he  no 
ro.ptHi»l>ilily  whilever  in  the  execulire  ilcpxrlineiil — an  i<Ica  in- 
admissible ii>  a  (tee  govcrnmcnl.  Biil  rven  there  the  king  is  not 
bound  bif  ilie  ruolutluns  of  hli  cuvincil.  though  (bey  are  answer- 
able for  ihe  advice  thry  give.  He  i»  llir  nhsolulc  m.iiwicr  d(  his 
own  comluct  in  the  exercise  o(  his  onicc.  vtrti]  ntiiy  oliserve  or  <li$- 
reg.ird  ihe  council  gi«-n  li>  him  at  his  sole  diicrelion. 

Hul  in  il  refiublic,  wlierc  ftry  maj^istrate  ought  To  be  ptrsori- 
aliy  responsible  (or  his  behavior  in  office,  the  reuon  which  in  the 
Biilish  ConstKution  diciates  the  piopticty  o(  a  council  not  only 
ceases  lonppJy.bul  turns  against  llie  in«iilution.  In  ihe  monarchy 
of  Great  Biilain  it  (urnishcs  a  substitute  (or  the  prohihiied  respon- 
sibility r>(  the  chief  ni.)gistrate,  which  series  in  sonic  degree  as 
3  hostage  to  the  nalioo;))  justice  (or  his  good  l>ehavior.  In  the 
American  republic  it  would  serve  to  destroy,  or  would  greatly 
diminish,  (he  intended  and  necess.iry  responsibility  of  the  Chief 
Magistrate  hiinscll. 

The  idea  of  a  cotincil  to  the  I%]tecntive,'  which  has  so 
Kcneraily  obtained  in  the  State  consiiiutionx,  has  been 
derived  from  that  maxim  of  republican  jealousy  which 
considers  power  a»  safer  in  the  hands  of  a  number  of  men 
than  of  a  single  man.  If  the  maxim  should  be  admitted 
to  be  applicable  to  the  case,  1  should  contend  that  the 
advantage  on  ihat  side  woiihl  not  counterbalance  the 
aumcrous  disadvantaj^cs  on  the  opposite  side.  But  I  do 
not  think  the  rule  at  all  applicable  to  the  executive  power. 


'  Ths  nm*  t*mIi,  to  fu  a*  all  its  adranta^ei  go.  williout  ihe  di«d- 
vaiil«eeo(  lonirf  indi*icliwli«cp<M»ibiIiif.  hu  been  ■Itained  bjihepieti. 
dMtiu  cabinet,  now  «  recogntied  if  cilri.can\llltilioii>l  p*rl  of  our 
cnvMnnent.  Wuhlngton,  wh«  inatltulol  it.  trin!  in  iniike  the  Vice 
Prmiilmt  a  incnihcr  at  well.  Cmm  the  lli1Mn^il>nl  in  the  cihinrii  of 
WaAtngtoa.  Juhii  Aitami,  and  Jacksnn.  Ihe  reiull  of  a  council  Inde- 
pcMdeal  oi  the  President  can  be  iofeired.— Ei>itok. 


474 


VNiTY  OF  EXECUTIVE  SAFER.        IK*  70.69' 


I  clearly  concur  in  opinion,  in  this  particuhir,  witb  a 
writer  whom  the  celehrated  Junius  pronounces  to  be 
"ileep,  solid,  and  ingenious,"  that  "  tlic  executive  power 
is  more  cosily  contined  when  it  is  oke  ";  *  that  it  is  far 
more  safe  there  should  be  a  single  ohject  for  the  jealousy 
and  watchfulness  of  the  people;  and,  in  a  word,  that  all 
multiplication  of  the  Executive  is  rather  dangerous  than 
friendly  to  liherty, 

A  little  consideration  vill  satisfy  us  that  the  speciea  of 
security  sought  for  in  the  multiplication  or  the  Executive 
is  unattiiinahte.  Numbers  mu«i  be  so  great  as  to  render 
combination  difficult,  or  tlicy  arc  rather  a  source  of  dan- 
ger than  of  security.  The  united  credit  and  inllucncc  of 
several  individuals  must  be  more  formidable  to  liberty 
than  the  credit  and  influence  of  either  of  them  separately. 
When  power,  therefore,  is  placed  in  the  hands  of  so  small 
a  number  of  men  as  to  admit  of  their  interests  and  views 
being  easily  combined  in  a  common  enlerpri<.e  by  an 
anful  leader,  it  becomes  more  liable  to  abuse,  and  more 
dangerous  when  abuseO,  than  if  it  be  lodged  in  the  hands 
of  one  man;  who,  from  the  very  circuinklance  of  his 
being  alone,  will  be  more  narrowly  watched  and  more 
readily  suspected,  and  who  cannot  unite  so  great  a  mass 
of  inlluence  ax  when  he  is  associated  with  others.  The 
r>ccemvirs  of  Rome,  whose  name  denotes  their  numbcr.t 
were  more  to  be  dreaded  in  their  usurpalion  than  any 
ONK  of  tliera  would  lukve  been.  No  person  would  think 
of  proposing  an  Executive  much  more  numerous  than 
that  body:  from  six  to  a  dozen  have  been  suggested  for 
the  number  of  the  council.  The  extreme  of  these  num- 
bers is  not  too  great  for  an  easy  combination;  and  from 
such  a  combination  America  would  liave  more  to  fear 
than  from  the  ambition  of  any  single  individual.  A 
council  to  a  magistrate  who  is  himself  rrKponsible  for 
what  he  docs  are  generally  miUiing  better  than  a  dog 
upon  his  good  intentions,  are  often  the  instrnmmis  and 
accomplices  of  his  bad,  and  arc  almost  always  a  cloak  to 
his  faults. 


•  I>e  Ltdoe.— fOBUVs. 


t  TcB.— ruaun 


■\ 


TERM. 

I  forbear  to  dwell  upon  the  subject  of  expense;  though 
he  evkleiit  that  if  the  council  nliuuld  ht;  numerous 
EDough  to  aniiwcr  the  principal  end  aimed  at  by  ihc  insti- 
tution, the  salaries  of  the  members,  who  must  be  drawn 
frnm  their  homes  to  reside  at  the  seat  of  government, 
would  form  an  item  in  the  catalogue  of  public  expendi- 
tures too  serious  to  be  incurred  for  an  object  of  equivocal 
utilit)^.  1  will  only  add  that,  prior  to  the  appearance  of 
the  Constitution,  I  rarely  met  with  an  intelligent  man 
from  any  of  the  Status  who  did  not  admit,  as  the  result 
of  experience,  that  the  UNITY  of  the  executive  of  this 
State  was  one  of  the  best  of  the  distinguishing  features 
of  our  constitution. 

PUBLIUS. 


No.  71  [70I.        (-*«•  iv-i/wiw.  M.«ii  It.  .rt».)        Hamilton. 

THE   PRESIDENTIAL   TERM  OI-'  OFFICE. 

/(  iiffiiU  JiriHHUi  in  adifH — .\f*rt  iaitml  it»  mkal  it  ftmantnl — 
Tht  Ennulitv  ikiuU  It!  ir  sukurvifHI  lo  fafltlar  imfHlui  W  U  thait  ff 
the  ttgittalMri-—  IndtfTHiifmt  tf  JtfartmtttU  af  gtvirmntnl  Ht(t»«rj— 
SktrtHtatf  term  ^ti/i  Uittn  indtfenJtmt — Tkt  profeu4  Itrm  «f  fttiT 
yMTi  tantidtrti. 

Te  Ike  Pfafif  «/  tAf  Siatr  n/  .V<w  IV/-*.- 

Duration  in  office  liax  been  mentioned  as  the  second 
requisite  to  the  energy  of  the  executive  authority. 
This  luw  rrUlion  to  two  objects:  to  the  personal  firm- 
ness of  the  Executive  Magistrate  in  the  em|)htymenl  of 
his  constitutional  powers;  and  to  the  stability  of  the 
system  of  administraiton  which  may  have  been  adopted 
under  his  auRprccs.  With  regard  to  the  first,  it  must  be 
evident  that,  the  longer  the  duration  in  office,  the 
greater  will  be  the  probability  of  obtaining  so  important 
an  advantage.  It  is  a  general  principle  of  human  nature 
that  a  man  will  be  interested  in  whatever  he  possesses, 
in  proportion  to  the  finnnesB  or  prccarirmsness  of  the 
tenure  by  which  he  holds  it;  will  be  less  attached  to 
what  he  holds  by  a  momentary  or  uncertain  title  than  to 


476 


PLIASCY  Of  BxeCUTtVB. 


(H».  Tl  •Tt.i 


what  be  enjoys  bjr  a  dnrable  or  certain  title;  and,  of 
course,  will  t>e  willing  to  mk  more  Tor  the  take  o(  the 
one  than  for  the  sake  of  the  other.  This  remark  in  uot 
le^fl  applicable  to  a  political  privilege,  or  honor,  or  trust 
than  to  any  article  of  ordinary  property.  The  inference 
from  it  is  that  a  man  acting  in  the  capa<;it}-  of  chief 
magistrate,  under  a  consciousness  that  in  a  very  shun 
time  he  tHHtt  lay  down  his  office,  will  be  apt  to  feel  him- 
•elf  too  little  interested  in  it  to  hax-^rd  any  material 
censure  or  perplexity  from  the  independent  exertion  «( 
his  powers,  or  from  encountering  the  ill-humors,  how- 
ever transient,  which  may  happen  to  prevail,  either  in  a 
considerable  part  of  the  society  itself  or  even  in  a  pre- 
dominant fartiun  in  the  legislative  body.  If  the  case 
should  only  be  that  he  might  lay  it  down,  unless  con- 
tinued by  a  new  choice,  and  i(  he  should  be  desirous  of 
being  continued,  his  wishes,  conspiring  with  his  fears, 
would  tend  still  more  powerfully  to  corrupt  his  integrity 
or  debase  his  fortitude.  In  either  case,  feebleness  and 
irresolution  must  be  the  characteristics  of  the  station. 

There  arc  some  who  would  be  inchncd  lo  regard  the 
servile  pliancy  of  the  Executive  to  a  prevailing  current, 
either  in  the  community  or  in  the  legislature,  as  its  best 
recommendation.  But  such  men  entertain  very  crude 
notions,  as  well  of  llie  purposes  for  which  governmeai 
was  instituted,  as  of  the  true  means  by  which  the  public 
happiness  may  be  promoted.  The  rcpul>lican  principle 
denuinds  that  (he  deliberate  sense  of  the  community 
should  govern  the  conductor  those  to  whom  they  intrust 
the  management  of  their  allatrs;  but  it  does  not  rctjuirc 
an  unqualified  complaisance  to  every  sudden  breeze  of 
passion,  or  to  every  transient  impulse  which  the  people 
nay  receive  from  the  arts  of  men  who  flatter  their  prej- 
udices to  betray  their  interests.  It  is  a  just  ubservatiuo 
that  the  people  commonly  in/rfiJthc  puplic  ooon.  This 
often  applies  to  ihcir  very  errors.  But  their  good  scnK 
would  despise  the  adulator  who  should  pretend  that  they 
always  rrasoH  rigit  about  the  mratu  of  promoting  it. 
They  know  from  experience  that  ihey   someumcs  err; 


toMiHonl     FIRMtVESS  TOWARD  LBGISLATII'E. 


477 


and  the  wonder  ts  that  thej  so  seldom  err  as  they  do, 
beset,  as  they  conttnually  are,  by  the  wiles  of  parasites 
and  sycophants,  by  the  snares  of  the  ambitious,  the 
avaricious,  the  desperate;  hy  ilie  artifices  of  men  who 
possess  their  conAdence  more  than  they  deserve  it,  and 
of  those  who  seek  to  possess  rather  than  to  deserve  it. 
When  occasions  present  themselves  in  which  the  inter- 
ests of  the  people  are  at  variance  with  their  inclinations, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  persons  whom  they  have  appointed 
to  be  the  guardians  of  those  interests  to  withstand  the 
temporary  dehision,  in  order  to  (rive  them  time  and 
opportunity  for  more  cool  and  sedate  reflection.  In- 
stances mig^ht  be  cited  in  which  a  conduct  of  this  kind  has 
saved  the  people  from  very  fatal  conse<}uences  of  their 
own  mistakes,  and  has  procured  lasting  monuments  of 
their  gratitude  to  the  men  who  had  courage  and  mag- 
luinimity  enough  to  serve  them  at  the  peri!  of  their  dis- 
pleasure. 

But  however  inclined  we  might  be  to  insist  upon  an 
unbounded  complaisance  in  the  Executive  to  the  inclina- 
tions of  the  people,  we  can  with  no  propriety  contend  for 
a  tike  complaisance  to  the  humors  of  the  legislature. 
The  latter  may  sometimes  stand  in  opposition  lo  the 
former,  and  at  other  times  the  people  may  be  entirely 
neutral.  In  either  supposition,  it  is  certainly  desirable 
that  the  Executive  should  be  in  a  situation  to  dare  to  act 
his  own  opinion  with  vigor  and  decision. 

The  same  rule  which  teacher  the  propriety  of  a  parti- 
tion between  the  various  branches  of  power  teaches  us 
likewise  that  this  partition  ought  to  be  so  contrived  as  to 
render  the  one  independent  of  the  other.  To  what  pur- 
pose separate  the  cxccctive  or  the  judiciary  from  the 
legislative,  if  both  the  executive  and  the  judiciary  arc  so 
constituted  as  to  be  at  the  absolute  devotion  of  the  legis- 
lative? Such  a  separation  must  be  merely  nominal  and 
incapable  of  producing  the  ends  for  which  it  was  estab- 
lished. It  is  one  thing  to  be  subordinate  tn  the  laws, 
and  another  tn  be  dependent  on  the  legislative  body. 
The  first  comports  with,  the  last  violates,  the  fundamcn- 


47*  JA'DEPEyOENCE  OF  £X£CU7/rE.       (MoTiaOi 

tal  principles  of  good  gnvcriinient;  ami,  wliaievcr  n»]r 
he.  the  forms  of  the  CunatUution,  unit«&  all  power  in  ibe 
So,  same  hands.     Tlic  tendency  of  the  legislative 

iTo-  47.  authority  to  al>sorb    every    other  has   been 

(utiy  displayed  ami  illustrated  by  examples  in  some  pre- 
cedirtg  numbers.  In  governments  purely  republican, 
this  tendency  is  almoiit  irresistible.  The  representatives 
ol  the  people  iu  a  popular  assembly  seem  sometimes  to 
fancy  that  they  are  the  people  thcmsctvcs,  and  betray 
strong  symptoms  of  impatience  and  disgust  at  the  least 
sign  nf  oppoxitiun  from  any  other  quarter;  as  if  the 
exercise  of  its  rights,  by  either  the  executive  or  judiciary, 
were  a  breath  o(  their  privilege  and  an  outrage  to  tJieir 
dignily.  They  often  appear  disposed  to  exert  an  imperi- 
ous control  over  the  other  de|>.irimenis:  and  as  they 
commonly  have  the  (Wople  on  their  »ide,  Ihey  always  act 
with  such  momentum  as  to  make  it  very  difiicult  for  Ihc 
other  members  of  the  gorcrnmcnt  to  mainlam  the  bal- 
ance of  the  Constitution. 

It  may  perlwps  he  aslced  how  the  shortness  of  the 
duration  in  office  can  affect  the  independence  of  tlie 
Executive  on  the  legislature,  unless  the  one  were  pos- 
sessed of  the  power  of  appointing  or  displacing  the 
other.  One  answer  to  this  inquiry  may  be  drawn  from 
the  principle  already  remarked — that  ix,  from  the  slender 
interest  a  man  is  apt  to  take  in  a  short-lived  ;idvantage, 
and  the  little  inducement  it  affords  him  to  expose  him- 
self, on  account  of  it,  to  any  cunstderjiilr  inconvenience 
or  hazard.  Another  answer,  perhaps  more  obvious, 
though  not  mure  conclusive,  will  result  from  the  con- 
sideration of  the  influence  of  the  legislative  b<»dy  over 
the  people;  which  might  be  employed  to  prevent  the 
re-election  of  a  man  who,  by  an  upright  resistance  to  any 
sinister  project  of  that  tmdy,  should  have  made  himself 
obnoxious  to  its  resentment. 

It  may  be  asked  also  whether  a  ditratinn  of  four  jc»n 
would  answer  the  end  projKtscd;  and  if  it  would  not, 
whether  a  less  period,  which  would  at  least  be  rcconiq 
mended  by  greater  security  ;igain«t  ambitious  dcsigns^i 


HtBllwn)        EFFECT  OF  FOUR  YEARS^    TERM.  479 

would  not  for  that  reason  be  preferable  to  a  iongrr 
period,  which  was,  at  the  same  lime,  too  short  fur  the 
purpfrsc  t>r  inspiring  the  desired  fiimaess  and  indepcn- 
derxre  of  the  niaj^istratc. 

It  cannot  be  affirmed  that  ,1  <Iurutit>ii  of  four  years,  or 
any  other  limited  duration,  would  completely  answer  the 
end  proposed;  Imt  it  irutild  contribute  towards  it  in  a 
degree  which  would  have  a  material  iiilluence  upon  the 
spirit  and  character  of  the  government.  Between  the 
cummenoemcnt  and  termination  of  such  a  period  there 
would  always  be  a  eoniiderable  interval  in  which  the 
prospect  of  annihilation  would  be  sufficiently  remote  not 
tu  love  an  trnjiropirr  elTcct  upon  the  conduct  of  a  man 
indued  with  a  tolerable  portion  of  fortitude;  and  in 
which  he  mi);ht  reasonably  promise  himself  that  there 
would  be  time  enougli  before  it  arrived  to  make  the 
commimity  sensible  of  the  propriety  of  the  measures  he 
mitfht  incline  to  pursue.  Though  it  be  probable  that,  as 
he  approached  the  moment  when  the  public  were  by  a 
new  election  to  signify  their  sense  of  his  conduct,  bis 
confidence,  and  with  it  his  firmness,  would  decline;  yet 
both  the  one  and  the  olhrr  would  derive  support  from 
the  opportunities  which  his  previous  continuance  in  the 
station  had  aRorded  him  of  establishing  himself  in  the 
esteem  and  good  will  of  bis  constituents.  He  might 
then  haxard  with  safety,  in  proportion  to  the  proofs  he 
had  given  of  his  wisdom  and  integrity  and  to  the  title  he 
had  ac<|uired  to  the  respect  and  attachment  of  his  fellow* 
citizens.  As,  on  the  one  hand,  a  duration  of  four  years 
will  contribute  to  the  firmness  of  the  Executive  in  a 
^sufficient  dtigree  to  render  it  a  very  valuable  ingredient  in 
ithe  composition,  so,  on  the  other,  it  is  not  enough  to 
justify  any  alarm  for  the  public  liberty.'     If  a  British 

<  Tbi*  ((aetliiMi  of  Xtbitity  has  «Ii«*dr  faccn  ilbcuued  In  •  note  to  No. 
)7.  Ite|t^iic  btMiWft  the  AiiXfioii  Kuvciioncnl,  mil  ettiuUlly  lh« 
(iipii.inny,  li«i-Biita  "  llioto  U  ii"  fl«»lic  eUmeiii;  octylLmn  ii  I'C"'. 
ipnilie'l,  ■liltJ."  and  h*'  i*itn  at  iii  n<lTatitii|;ir  <*(  ilir  KiigjIUli  lyilBin  llui 
powci  by  whkh  >  new  gorernmcTil  lan  tic  prcnnpllr  tuhitilDlnl.  inilincini; 
the  tiuninc  out  of  llie  Attciikcn  iiiliinel  JioiiiK  (he  C'lUncan  iJiAcullici. 
when,  "kt  WB  uidai  Uie  iluc,  'vrc  lutn  out  the  i^udter  and  pal  in  Ihe 


43o     fOti'S/i  Of  costMoys  of/m  cjfoiyy.    ai<t.n, nt 

House  of  Commons  from  the  most  feeble  bes'naiDss, 
/rum*  /Ae  mtre  ^<nMr  of  atseitiiHg  or  ditagruing  to  the  impoa-^ 
tian  a/  a  mw  tax,  have  by  rapid  strides  reduced  tti 
prerogatives  of  (he  crovn  and  the  privileges  of  the  no- 
biliiy  wiUiiii  the  limits  they  conceired  tu  be  com|iatil>Ic 
with  the  principles  of  a  free  government,  while  ihcy 
raised  themselves  to  the  runk  and  consequence  of  a 
coequal  branch  of  the  legislature:  if  they  have  been  able, 
in  one  instance,  to  abolish  both  the  royalty  and  the 
aristocracy  and  to  overturn  all  the  ancient  establish- 
ments, 4S  well  in  the  Church  as  Stale;  if  they  have  been 
able,  00  a  recent  occasion,  to  make  the  monarch  tremble 
at  the  prospect  o(  an  innovation*  attempted  by  them, 
what  would  be  to  be  feared  from  an  elective  inai!istrat£ 
of  four  years'  duration,  with  the  confined  authorities  of  i 
President  of  the  United  States?  What  hut  that  he  might 
be  unequal  to  the  task  which  the  Constitution  assigns 
bim?  I  sitall  only  add  that,  if  his  duration  be  such  as  to 
leave  a  doubt  of  his  firmness,  that  doubt  is  inconsistent 
with  a  Jealousy  of  his  encroachments. — PuBLiua 


Mrilbl."*  Il  iBiy  be  gnnted  thai  ilw  En|:>i>li  Metbod  a  nate  i 
in  il>-il  ll  prmlii  Oic  irxufcMrm  o(  power  lo  ■  ut  of  iiicn  belter  Httc 
til  i<i-a1  mill  •  I'Ci'ulikr  conililioa  :  mil  il  iroiM  linv  been  >ii  aJvinlsn 
to  the  Uiiilnl  Stairt  lull*  aliJe  lo '■iilntiinie  fivnacli  Pmiilnilt  at  M*£> 
iMi  ani)  BucliKiian  n>en  btlter  6llnl  for  eiixri^Tiicic*.  A  lairljr  dow 
■pproiiiMUion  toiucli  >  fttxible  mtthod  \%.  houco,  obulKd  t^  mahiaff 
■he  SnTCUry  of  War  the  Mliullr  ics|<onuUe  oacial,  •lid  tben  by  (ulitli- 
luting  anotbrr  lot  Klin  if  be  fUli,  ai  wat  done  Iwkr  (»  llie  Wat  <•(  i^ll 
and  once  iuthe  Ciril  War.  Thr  ml  illAniltjr,  M-rtain  t(it>eei|<*i>enc«Aj 
1^  Mch  coMtilulional  governmenli  n  tin«i  Uritain  and  Ibe  Uniti 
Slaiea,  latoKnda  maabrcd  in  political  life,  who  poucBtsal  the lamelia 
thr  pffL'uliaily  mipulitical  faculiiei  vhKbarc  nceiletl  hi  coMLaciine  a  war. 
Shonld  tilhor  r«iinlr)?  lie  called  upna  al  [iTetcnl  to  irtoM  an  uAcial  la 
cany  on  a  an»\  war.  the  apiioinlMcnt  of  a»  abk  Miaii  wottld  be  itrt 
uuch  d(  n  biiicty.— Ediior. 

*TbU  «*i  tbe  case  with  rtapcct  lo  Mr.  Fni't  Imlu  bill,  which  < 
eanled  In  the  Ilouie  of  ComtooM  and  rejected  in  the  I  Ionic  ol 
U>  Ike  mtlre  aaiitfactlon,  m  ll  it  taid,  of  ibe  people.— PUBUi/a. 


HuUuB] 


HE-ELIGIBIUTY  OF  P/IES/DENT. 


48. 


Kl^i 


No.  72  [71].      umJifimdimt/Mnuii.UtKitti^iiu.'t      Hamilton. 
RE-ELIGIBILITY  OF  THE  PRESIDENT. 

ralitH  in  s^t  affrtli  ilatiHly  «/  aJminSitraliou — HtaJ$  e/  dtfiarl- 
mrnfi  iifttidtnt  en  Hxnatitfe  and  mi//  <^iirtgi  vith  Mm — /CtiHgiUHl}! 
af  Etnulipt —  '/'it  fffeiiliHi  In  it  leHiiJtffi — A  /iaiif  of  ii  liiglt  Irrm 
wfnSJ  dimimtk  iHJitiimfHli  It  gintJ  iiiatvvr,  iittrtrtit  ttnf/aliimi  O 
■ii'jfiUfi/av/.  pretftl  tif^riftt/f  tu  tkt  >^^^/.  lifprivt  lAf  cauttrjr  itt  rater' 
gtiuiti  tf  ttu  UTtritti  ••/  Ikt  ifil  mm,  anJ  at!  ji  h  e^nili/Mlifiia/  tarrier 
/A  ifiiMiir  if  aJniniitraiita — Tit  iHfifiPUJ  aJninlagfs  of  a  $i»g/t  Itrm 
(enwUrei —  Tkt  ftffit  tkiidJ  Htl  tt  frrvemrJ  /ram  fk^nitg  ittn  ff 
ufirirtur. 

Te  Iht  Pett^e  oj  the  Slatt  of  New  Yi>rk: 

The  adminUtraiion  of  Kovcrnmenl,  in  its  iarscst  sense, 
comprelieiKis  all  the  operations  of  the  body  politic, 
whether  legislative,  executive,  or  judici^iry;  hut  in  its 
most  usu.ll  and  perhaps  in  its  most  precise  si^niricaiion, 
it  is  limited  to  executive  details,  and  fulls  peculiarly 
within  the  province  of  the  execative  department  The 
tuat  conduct  of  foreign  negottaiions,  the  preparatory 
ans  uf  finance,  the  application  and  disbursement  of  the 
public  moneys  in  confunnity  to  the  general  appro- 
priations of  the  legislature,  the  arranscment  of  the  army 
and  navy,  the  direction  of  the  operations  of  war — these, 
and  other  matters  uf  a  like  nature,  constitute  what  seems 
to  be  must  properly  understood  by  the  administration 
of  government.  The  persons,  therefore,  to  whose  im- 
mediate management  these  different  matters  arc  com. 
mittcd,  ought  to  be  considered  as  the  assistants  or 
deputies  of  the  Chief  M;igirtrate,  and  on  this  account 
they  ought  to  derive  their  offices  from  his  appointment, 
at  least  from  his  nomination,  and  oiiglil  to  be  subject  to 
his  superintendence.  This  view  of  the  subject  will  at 
once  suggest  to  us  the  intimate  connection  between  the 
duration  of  the  executive  minjistrate  in  office  and  the 
stability  of  the  system  of  administration.  To  reverse  and 
undo  what  has  been  done  by  a  predecessor  is  very  often 
considered  by  a  successor  as  the  best  proof  he  can  give 


4i» 


DVRATtOM  OF  TtR.V. 


ni«.  TS  m» 


of  liiii  own  capacity  and  Jescrt;  and  ia  nddilton  to  ltii« 
prupcnsiiy,  where  tlie  iiltentiun  has  been  the  result  of 
public  chuicc,  chc  person  substituted  is  warraiiicd  tn 
supposing  ilut  the  dismission  of  his  predt-ccssor  tus 
pi'uceedcd  fmin  a  <]i«h)ce  tu  his  measures;  and  ihat  the 
less  be  resembles  him,  the  mure  he  will  rccooirocnd  him- 
self to  the  favor  of  his  constituents.  These  considen- 
liiKis,  and  the  iiiflucme  uf  perxunul  confidences  and 
attachments,  would  be  likely  to  induce  every  new  Presi- 
dent to  promote  a  change  of  men  to  fill  the  subordinate 
stations;  and  these  causex  together  could  nut  fail  to 
occasion  a  disgraceful  and  ruinous  mutability  in  tlic 
administration  of  the  government. 

With  a  ponttivc  duration  of  considerable  extent,  I 
connect  the  circumstance  of  rc-cligibility.'  The  first  is 
necessary  to  give  to  the  oflicer  himself  the  inclination 
and  the  resolution  to  act  his  part  well,  and  to  the  com- 
munity time  and  leisure  to  observe  the  tendency  of  his 


■  Thit  rp'etisibility  wh  *  thtorf  of  the  tnmm.  bated  om  the  Mm  Am 
lo  loac  4>  It  iku  i^mibk  flit  ■  niiui  Ui  tic  ic-clcvlol  lo  Ihc  prolideBtf,  krt 
vriiiilcl  tliirr  tiy  ^0"1  t^jiidut'I  III  uiu  U,  ^Uilc.  il  li«  viu  ciiatlltiitiuDAlly 
tlnrm).  b«  wonlj  I>t>4ia1>l)r  '>ireiliito  lljf  toinlitulin'i  liy  finer:  lliw  Ultn 
'nsuh  hu  rcpcutnlly  cKcutr«l  in  (he  ^inulli  AiDrritan  n]iuiiiici.  In  \ht 
conslitulioB  of  iIk  Coalcilciate  States  ihc  icriu  wu  iiwd  al  «■  Jtaa 
aiiil  a  ucoiid  (criu  vnf.  (uiblitJcu,  tliou^h  nu  leaton  wu  |[ivcii  for  llie 

lit  piaclic*  xhittr  bM  come  to  lie  an  unwcillpii  uiKlcnliwIiiii;  dial  ao 
Pre>uJGiii  tliJll  be  itvetocted  inoie  tliaii  aatt ;  and  lliit  ku  been  Ulaincd. 
n<il  liy  (he  p<'(>iiUr  ajll,  liut  enliirly  by  Ihc  vnlmitary  action  al  iht  Pini- 
dciitii  lli«nH:Itr>.  Wa>>liiii|-tnn  nili«l  *(  llie  cihI  «f  liiu  tcrnui ;  bal 
lb<i>p  liy  ul>u«i  lie  wai  iii-nl  •iriye>l  am  urginu  bin.  jihl  beluie  be  iHaA, 
Fun-*r  ta-tre  it  uHet  liiintclf  l<ir  Ibit  |>OBiilia«  ;  anil  lliiiKgb  lir  il«TliDT4.  W 
'  •cLnowlcdgeil  ihal  tlw  atotire  al  "  gfc*t  fmbltc  cikhI  "  B-oiiid  meiro— 
his rcliu^.  JeScn-oa  initialed  hiua.  )V(>|i*n|i  "thai  a  few  mivc  Yrrvi- 
ifeiili  will  iip|iOB«  Ibe  ulojacle  of  liabll  [nwl  .  .  .]  hcu<l  a  .iicmi^nn 
li>  r^lahlnh  il  Ixy  At\  ainiTn<tn>eiil  of  tlic  ciMtlllutKiii  "  1^ 
Vii'-  SWi-      He  iliulnctty  •intliiifd  a  poiiiliililr.  Iiimeocr.  '■■■i  1 

tiiilDw  hiiu  to  a«epl  a  lliiiil  tctm,  linl  liou  litile  lh«  pruiili'  . .;        ....  :jt 
^he  nutter  U  iKown  by  the  fui  ihat  inwe  than  ■  majonty  il  >l  r   <i  n-- 
jpdaMm  raltil   itvi>    '  I  Juj;  liini  Iti  ■o^-  '     ' 

iMliviaaiHl   M'lirix  okr  a  iliml  ii<. 

r^prinrt|il»  l<«<:am«  vj  t ''"  '^-\t  I'l^   .  -    .. 

igimlHinalily  trillisr:  lo  ilood  lu'  i.  ihr  tipfKiiit.iin  vilti 

own  ;«tly.  asd  llic  i»«n|:Ui  at  Ih  :v»n  ptoloti,  ircic  nil 

to  (itcvcnl  Itlk  ui;iiiiii|t  evuit  tlic  noiii  ift*»  wii- — Etil  roa. 


BibIRm) 


ILL  EFFBCT  OF  EXCLUSION. 


483 


measures,  an<!  Ihcncc  to  form  an  experimental  estimate 
of  their  merits.  The  bst  is  ni-ccBS.irjr  ly  enable  llic 
people,  when  tliey  sec  reusuii  to  3|ipruve  of  his  conduct, 
tu  continue  him  in  his  siatiun,  in  order  to  prolong  the 
utility  of  his  talents  nnd  virtues,  and  to  secure  to  the 
government  the  ailv.iiitiige  of  permanency  in  a  wise 
system  of  administration. 

Nothing  appears  more  plausible  at  5rst  sight,  nor  more 
ill'founded  upon  close  iciKpectinn,  than  a  M^lieme  which  in 
relation  to  the  present  point  has  had  some  respectable 
advocates — [  mean  that  of  continuing  the  chief  magis- 
trate in  olSge  for  a  ccrtiiin  time,  and  then  excluding  him 
from  it,  either  for  a  limited  period  or  forever  after. 
This  exclusion,  whether  temporary  or  perpetual,  would 
have  nearly  the  »anit;  effeitts,  and  these  effects  would  be 
for  the  most  part  rather  pernicious  than  salutary. 

One  ill  effect  of  the  exclusion  would  be  a  diminution  of 
the  inducements  to  good  behavior.  There  arc  few  men 
wKii  would  nut  feel  much  le^s  Keal  in  tlit  discharge  of  a 
duly  when  ihcy  were  conscious  that  the  advantages  of 
the  station  with  which  it  was  connected  must  be  re- 
linc^utshed  at  a  determinate  period,  than  when  tliey 
were  permitted  to  entertain  a  hope  of  n^tnininx  by  "ifif- 
ing  a  continnance  of  them.  This  position  will  nut  be 
disputed  so  lung  as  it  is  admitted  that  tlie  desire  of 
rcmrard  is  one  of  the  strongest  incentives  of  human  con- 
duct;  or  that  the  best  security  for  the  fulelily  of  man- 
kind  is  (o  make  their  Interest  coincide  with  their  duty. 
Even  the  love  of  fiime,  the  ruling  passion  of  the  noblest 
minds,  which  would  prompt  a  man  to  plan  and  undertake 
extensive  and  arduous  enterprises  for  the  public  benefit, 
requiring  considerable  time  to  mature  and  perfect  them, 
if  he  could  llaltcr  himsrlf  with  the  prospect  of  being 
allowed  to  finish  what  he  had  begun,  would,  on  the 
contrary,  deter  him  from  the  undertaking,  when  he  fore- 
saw that  he  must  i|uit  the  scene  before  he  conid  accom- 
plish the  work,  and  must  commit  that,  together  with  his 
own  reputation,  to  hands  which  might  be  unequal  or 
unfriendly  to  the  task.     The  most  to  be  expected  from 


■*B4 


TEMPTATION   TO  AVAKiCE. 


IHo.TgaU 


the  generality  of  men,  in  such  a  situation,  i&  the  negative 
merit  of  not  doi»x  lurm,  instead  of  the  positive  merit  of 
doing  good. 

Another  ill  effect  of  the  enclasion  would  be  the  temp- 
tation to  sordid  views,  to  peculation,  and,  ia  some  in- 
stances, to  usurpation.  An  avaricious  man,  who  might 
happen  to  fill  the  office,  looking  forward  to  a  time  when 
he  must  at  all  events  yield  up  the  emoluments  he 
enjoyed,  would  feel  a  propensity,  nut  easy  to  be  resisted 
by  such  a  man,  to  make  the  best  use  of  the  opportunity 
he  enjoyed  while  it  lasted,  and  might  not  scruple  to  have 
rwroursc  to  the  most  corrupt  expedients  to  make  the 
harvest  as  abundant  as  it  was  transitory;  though  the 
same  man,  probably,  with  a  different  prospect  before 
him,  might  content  himself  with  the  regular  perquisites 
of  his  situation,  and  might  even  he  unwilling  to  risk  the 
consequences  of  an  abuse  of  his  opportunities.  His 
avarice  might  be  a  guard  upon  his  avarice.  Add  to  this 
that  the  same  man  might  be  vciin  or  ambitious,  as  well 
as  avaricious.  And  if  he  could  expect  to  prolong  his 
honors  by  his  good  conduct,  he  might  hesitate  to  sacrifice 
his  appetite  for  them  to  hix  appetite  for  gain.  But  with 
the  prospect  before  him  of  approaching  an  inevitable 
annihilation,  his  avarice  would  be  likely  to  get  the 
victory  over  his  cauti<m.  his  vanity,  or  his  ambition. 

An  ambitious  man,  too,  when  he  found  himself  seated 
nn  the  summit  of  his  country's  honors,  when  he  looked 
forward  to  the  time  at  which  he  must  descend  from  the 
exalted  eminence  forever,  and  reflected  that  no  exer- 
tion of  merit  on  his  part  could  save  him  from  the  unwel- 
come reverse;  such  a  man,  in  such  a  situation,  would  be 
much  more  violently  tempted  to  embrace  a  favorable  con- 
juoctnre  for  attempting  the  prolongation  of  his  power,  st 
every  personal  hazard,  than  if  he  had  the  probability  of 
answering  the  same  end  by  doing  his  duty. 

Would  it  promote  the  peace  of  the  community,  or  the 
stability  of  the  government,  to  have  half  a  doien  men  who 
bad  had  credit  enough  to  be  raised  to  the  seat  of  the 
supreme   magistracy  wandering  among  the  people  like 


i^ 


BuftllMJ 


ADVANTAGE  OF  £XP£R/E.VC£. 


485 


K 


discontented  ghosts,  and  sighinf;;  for  a  place  wbich  (hey 
were  destined  never  more  to  possess? ' 

A  third  ill  eSect  of  the  exclusion  would  he  the  deprir- 
nj  the  community  of  the  advantage  of  the  experience 
gained  by  the  chief  miigistrate  in  the  exercise  of  his 
office.  That  experience  is  the  parent  of  wisdom  tx  an 
adage  the  truth  of  which  is  recognized  by  the  wisest  as 
well  the  simplest  of  mankind.  What  more  de&irable  or 
Rinre  essential  than  this  quality  in  the  governors  of 
nations?  Where  more  desirable  or  more  essential  than 
in  the  first  magistrate  of  a  nation?  Can  it  be  wise  to 
put  this  desirable  and  essential  quality  under  the  ban  of 
the  Constitution,  and  to  declare  that  the  moment  it  is 
aciiulred  its  possessor  shall  be  compelled  to  abandon  the 
station  in  which  it  was  acquired,  and  to  which  it  is 
adapted?  This,  nevertheless,  is  the  precise  import  of  all 
those  regulations  which  exclude  men  from  serving  their 
country  by  [be  choice  of  their  fellow-cilizenit,  after  they 
have  by  a  course  of  service  fitted  themselves  for  doing  it 
with  a  greater  degree  of  utility. 

A  fourth  ill  effect  ol  tlie  exclusion  would  be  the  banish- 
ing men  from  stations  in  which,  in  certain  emergencies 
of  the  state,  their  presence  might  l>e  of  the  greatest  mo- 
ment to  the  public  interest  or  safely.  There  is  no 
nation  which  has  not,  at  one  period  or  another,  experi- 
enced an  absolute  necessity  of  the  services  of  particular 
men  in  particular  situations;  perhaps  it  would  not  be  too 
strong  lo  say,  to  the  preservation  of  its  political  exist- 
ence.' Flow  unwi$e,  therefore,  must  be  every  such  self- 
denying  ordinance  as  serves  to  prohibit  a  nation  from 
making  use  of  its  own  citisens  in  the  manner  best  suited 
to  its  exigencies  and  cin;umstances!  Without  supposing 
the  personal  essentiality  of  the  man,  it  is  evident  that  a 
change  of  the  chief  magistrate  at  the  breaking  out  of  a 


*  liDprotMblc  at  ihit  now  socmi.  one  hu  but  to  (tudr  the  iMriipin  cl 
Aamii  Bmr,  after  bii  rElinment  (nun  ihc  vice  pmiuency,  lo  ice  how 
niurli  loiix  ihU  leiHuiii'i);  llira  cartiril.  —  KoiTOn. 

*  Had  th«  pnitUltnilial  lerni  been  liaiited  to  four  x<nn,  >  very  ibngctoos 
«iint  vroulil  hare  oconrred  b  1S64.— ICiirrax. 


4» 


MUTAfitLlTY  OF  UE4SUXES. 


OrfcTSiTl) 


trar,  or  at  any  siinil.-ir  crUiti,  for  another,  eren  of  equal 
merit,  would  ut  all  times  be  detrimental  to  the  com* 
munitjf,  inQsmucli  as  il  would  substitute  inexperience  to 
experience,  and  would  tend  to  iinlitnge  untl  set  afloat  tbe 
ul ready  Keitled  train  of  the  adniintsiratJon. 

A  fiftb  ill  effect  of  the  delusion  would  be  that  it 
would  operate  as  <1  consiituttunal  interiliction  of  stability 
in  the  administration.  Ky  me^ftsifa/itig  a  change  of  mat 
in  the  first  ofRce  of  liic  nation,  it  would  necessitate  a 
mutability  of  measures.  It  is  nut  generally  to  be  ex- 
pei  ted  lli;it  men  will  v.iry  and  measures  remain  uniform. 
The  contrary  is  the  usual  course  of  thinj^s.  And  we 
need  not  be  apprehensive  that  there  will  be  too  touch 
stability  while  there  is  even  the  option  of  chan^jing;  nor 
need  we  desire  to  prohibit  the  people  from  continuing 
their  confidence  where  they  think  it  may  be  safely  placed, 
and  where,  by  constancy  on  their  part,  they  may  ubmie 
the  fatal  inconveniences  of  fluctuating  councils  and  a 
variable  policy. 

These  are  some  of  the  disadvantages  which  woold 
flow  from  the  principle  of  exclusion.  Tliey  apply  mo»i 
forcibly  to  the  scheme  of  a  perpetual  exclusion;  but 
when  we  consider  tliat  even  a  partial  exclusion  would 
always  render  the  readmission  of  the  person  a  remnie 
and  precarious  object,  the  observations  which  have  been 
made  vil)  apply  nearly  as  fully  to  one  case  as  to  the 
other. 

What  are  the  advantaj^s  promised  to  countcrbataoce 
these  disadvantages?  They  are  represented  to  be:  isl, 
greater  independence  in  the  magistrate;  »l,  greater 
security  to  the  people.  Unless  the  exclusion  be  per- 
petual, there  will  be  no  pretense  to  infer  the  first  advan* 
tage.  Hut  even  in  that  case,  nwiy  he  tiave  no  object 
beyond  hiii  present  station  to  which  he  may  sacrifice  his 
todependcncG?  May  he  have  no  connections,  no  friends 
tor  whom  he  may  sacriBce  it?  May  lie  not  be  lew  wtlllD|[, 
by  a  firm  oomluci,  to  make  persmial  enemies  when  he 
acts  under  the  impression  ihat  a  time  is  fnsi  approaching 
00  the  arrival  of  which  he  not  only  UAV,  but  MUhT,  be 


HMilUcni      DAA-GBXS  FXOM  AUBITIQUS  MEN. 


487 


expoHcd  to  their  resentments,  upon  an  equal,  perhaps 
upon  an  infcriur,  fooling?  It  is  not  nn  easy  point  to 
determine  whether  his  independence  would  be  must  pro- 
muted  or  impaired  by  such  an  arrangement. 

As  to  the  second  supposed  udviintage,  there  is  still 
greater  reason  to  entertain  doubts  concerning  it.  If  the 
exclasion  were  to  be  pcrpcHial,  a  man  of  irregular  am- 
bition, of  whom  alone  there  could  be  reason  in  any  case 
to  entertain  apprehension,  would  with  infinite  reluct;ince 
yield  to  the  necessity  of  taking  his  leave  forever  of  a 
post  in  which  his  passion  (or  power  and  pre-eminence 
bad  acquired  the  forr*  of  habit.  And  if  he  tud  been 
foftanatc  or  adroit  enough  to  conciliate  the  good  will  of 
the  people,  he  might  induce  them  to  consider  as  a  very 
udinus  and  unjustifiable  restraint  upon  themselves  a 
provision  which  was  catculaled  to  debar  them  of  the 
right  of  giving  a  fresh  proof  of  tlieir  attachment  to  a 
favorite.  There  may  be  conceived  circumstances  in 
which  this  disgust  of  the  people,  seconding  the  thwarted 
iinibition  of  such  a  favorite,  might  occasion  greater 
danger  to  liberty  than  could  ever  reasonably  be  dreaded 
from  the  possibility  of  a  perpetuation  in  office  by  the 
voluntary  suffrages  of  the  community,  exercising  a  con- 
stitutional privilege. 

There  i»  an  excess  of  refinement  in  the  idea  of  dis- 
ubliQg  the  people  to  continue  in  ofhce  men  who  had 
entitled  themselves  in  their  opinion  to  approbation  and 
confidence,  the  advantages  of  which  are  at  best  specu- 
lative and  equivocal  and  arc  overbalanced  by  disadvan- 
tages far  more  certain  and  decisive.  Publius. 


48ft 


PKESIDE.Vr/AL   SAlAltY. 


Vo.TS<7f}) 


No.  73  [72].     iVf»  y*'»fiMt*H.  Mwh  .^  1^)  Hunltton. 

THE   PRESIDENTUL  SALARY  AND  VETO. 

tfilHtiiut  tHiMiti  /rvM'nwt  It*  Exetttlilt  wilt  ii  ^1  Ikr  mrrty  t/tkt 
Itfiitilurf,  ai$J  Ihf  in-ltfindnut  pf  lit  Sx/fuliK  lAeuU  ■»/  it  im/wrfi 
—  TktttUfvtirr — Rriutati  ftr khJ  agaimtl,  muaiiniltJ  amJ  ifiiiidtrtJ — 
TMt  vftcfnatr  m*£  aii^ult^/l  airtiidy  tiiiU  iit  A'mi  VWi  ami  ifntm- 
<kmitlli. 

To  the  People  0/  Ifie  Slate  ef  New  iWJt: 

The  thiril  ingredient  towards  constituting  the  viffor  of 
tlie  execulive  authority  is  an  adequate  provision  for  its 
5,,  support,     it  is  evident  thai,  without  proper 

K0.7B.  attention  to  this  article,  the  separation  of  the 

executive  from  the  IcgistatJTe  de]urtmcnt  would  be 
merely  nominal  and  nugatory.  The  legislature,  with  a 
discretionary  power  over  the  salary  and  emoluments  of 
the  Chief  Magistrate,  could  render  him  as  obsequious 
to  their  will  as  they  might  think  proper  to  make  him. 
They  might  in  most  cases  either  reduce  him  by  famine, 
or  terapt  him  by  largesses,  to  surrender  at  discretion  his 
judgment  to  their  ini'linationv  These  expressions, 
t:iken  in  all  the  latitude  of  the  terms,  would  no  doubt 
convey  more  than  Is  intended.  There  are  men  who 
could  neither  tie  distressed  nor  won  into  u  sacrifice  of 
their  duty;  but  this  stern  virtue  is  the  growth  of  few 
souls;  and  in  the  main  it  will  be  found  that  a  power  over 
a  man's  support  is  a  power  over  his  vrilL  If  it  were 
necessary  to  confirm  so  plain  a  truth  by  facts,  example) 
would  not  be  wanting,  even  in  this  country,  of  the 
intimidation  or  seduction  of  the  Kxerulive  by  the 
terrors  or  allurements  of  the  pecuniary  arrangements  of 
the  Icgtslalivc  body.' 

'  Among  lonMiicnlilc  iiMaiirM.  ihe  conduce  ot  Gn*en»or  Dvitnj  «( 
PDitantranl*  la  •  B-.«wt  mmnl''  ii'  ►>•.!!  }rf^Ti  lirtnn,!  li.  hi.  •mtnic-' 
li'xn  from  tht  y.  ■  ■  n  iMr 

UniU.      Wh«n    li        '  '  .<     '  iiiml  M 

vote  him  kii  ulftiy.  uiil  biuAlf  conpcHiid  liiia  li>  uceiic  lawiih  k|^U*- 
ikin  »  Uwj  duwc—Conoa. 


StMllMil 


FIXITY  OF  COMPENSATION. 


4&9 


It  is  nnt  casj-,  therefore,  to  commend  too  IiikIiI)'  the 
judicious  attention  which  has  been  paid  to  this  subject  iD 
the  j»riij>i)»cd  Cimstitution,  It  is  there  provided  that 
"The  President  of  the  United  States  shall,  at  stated 
imes,  receive  for  his  service  a  compensation  whub  shail 
•itAer  it  iiureateJ  nor  diminished  during  Ihi  ptrtod  fcr  fckitk 

ihall  have  iten  tU<ted;  and  he  thall  nol  reedve  icilhin  that 
ptriod any  0thtr  tmoiitmtat  from  the  United  States,  or  any 
of  them."  It  \%  impossible  to  imagine  any  provision 
which  would  have  been  more  eligible  than  this.  The 
Ivgisliitiire,  on  the  appointment  of  a  President,  is  once 
for  all  to  declare  what  stiall  be  the  compeniSAlion  for 
his  services  darin);  the  time  for  which  he  shall  have 
been  elected.  This  done,  they  will  have  no  power  to 
alter  it,  either  by  increase  fir  diminiiliftn,  till  a  new 
leriod  of  service  by  a  new  elccliwn  commence*.     They 

n  neither  weiikcn  his  fortitude  by  operating  on  his 
necessities,  nor  corrupt  his  integrity  by  appealing  to  his 
avarice.  Neither  the  Union  n«r  any  of  its  members 
win  be  at  liberty  to  give,  n»r  will  he  be  at  liberty  to 
receive,  any  other  emolument  than  that  which  may  have 
been  determined  by  the  first  act.  He  can,  of  course, 
have  no  pecuniary  inducement  to  renounce  or  desert  the 
independence  intended  for  him  by  the  Constitution. 

The  last  of  the  requisites  tn  energy  which  have  been 
enumerated  arc  competent  p«wers.  Let  us  proceed  to 
consider  those  which  arc  proposed  to  be  vested  in  the 
President  of  the  United  States. 

The  first  tiling  that  oRcrs  itself  to  our  observation  is 
the  qualified  negative  of  the  President  upon  the  acts  or 
olutioni  of  the  two  houses  of  the  legislature;  or,  in 
other  words,  his  power  of  returning  all  bills  with  objec- 
tions to  have  the  effect  of  preventing  their  becoming 
laws,  unless  they  should  afterwards  be  ratified  by  two- 
thirds  of  each  nf  the  component  members  of  the  legis- 
lative body. 

The  propensity  of  the  legislative  department  lo  intrude 
upon  the  rights  and  to  absorb  the  powers  of  the  other 
departments  has  been  already  suggested  and  repeated; 


^b 


490  PXOPKJETY  OF  A  NHGATIVB.  Wo. 73 1 

the  insufficiency  of  a  mere  parchment  delineation  o( 
the  boundaries  o(  caeli  h^s  ;ilsu  been  remarket]  ii|h>ii: 
Sm  i">d    the   necessity  of  futni^liing    uiuh    with 

Vo.aB.  constitutional   arras  for  its  own  defense   has 

been  inferred  and  provc<l.'  From  these  clear  u ml  imlo' 
bilablc  principles  results  the  propric-iy  of  a  negative, 
either  absolute  or  qualified,  in  the  Executive  upun  the 
acts  of  the  lej;i»lative  br^inclies.  Without  the  une  "r  ibe 
other,  the  former  would  be  absolutely  unable  to  defend 
himself  at;-3Jiist  the  depredations  of  the  I-aller  He 
might  gr^idu.illy  (>e  stripped  of  his  aulhurilie»  by  sac- 
cessivc  resolutions,  or  annihilated  by  a  single  vote.  Anil 
in  the  one  mode  or  the  other  the  legislative  and  execu- 
tive powers  might  speedily  come  to  be  blended  in  the 
same  hands.  If  even  no  propensity  had  ever  discovered 
itself  in  the  legislative  body  to  inv.idc  the  rights  of  the 
Executive,  the  rules  of  just  reitsoning  and  theoretic 
propriety  would  of  themselves  teach  us  that  the  one 
ought  not  to  be  left  to  the  mercy  of  the  other,  but  ought 
to  possess  a  constitutional  and  effectual  power  of  self- 
defense. 

But  the  power  in  question  has  a  further  use.  It  not 
only  serves  as  a  shield  to  ihc  Executive,  but  it  furnishes 
an  additional  security  against  the  enaction  of  improper 

'  Twice  the  veto  power  has  served  IIib  purpnie  la  •  Kmiinl  tanmsr. 
in  Ihc  <oiite>u  ol  Coiit>reu  wllh  TrnKleMt  johBwn  over  f  i, 

and  u-iih  Ptvti-lriil  Itaynotci  \v\tn  fxe  iioir.  p. 3J0},  <»- 

lilit  cauie  if  «ht  t"*^''!*"*'''  nTS*!!*!!  lux  lir*ii  (be  congtri-i.  .•!  [-i(v4l- 
leclion  for  intcfDil  improieniciiti.  which  waichtvfljr  fniximibk  for  iht 
veloM  by  Mailtxn.  Jwlttuu.  Piervc.  awl  the  UitT  oullnirii  tA  ipn-iaJ 

KiMin  Irfiislm  iim  ulikh  Inl  in  (icqociit  vcioci  lijrCraiil  ami  Clevelaml, 
I  intctnlini;  In  nuln  Ihil  lu  a  >ii)e  Ihc  >«»  power  liH  ii-il  tir«n  ■»•■>) 
mod    when  (he   t*teii<Ion1  awl  (.'imi-tTW  Ixkini^)  !<>  diltrrrnt    polrlkal 

Crlin.  but  ill  th<ac  few  catn  in  which  (li«  rmi'lnii  »ni)  bit  onii  ymnj 
ve  dlaiKreeil.  Thiu  tbc  chief  iiiei  (A  itte  vtv>  have  Imn  by  I'mideiiH 
Mon>iB«1I)>in«ccar<l  wiih  the  nu)oriiraf  CdocK".  cipcciiilly  (>y  lackma. 
Tjrler,  Jolinmn.  %oA  CleveUnl.  Coiit""—  — !'l»  "Hii-Eaeu  lo  Ifc* 
Praident  have  not  watityl  tlieir  tinw  in  fi  -  rlain  to  he  vdovl 

(eic«bt  dutlnc  Jnhnion'i  pmHieacy.  when  'mil  Ihe  ni-i-norir 

Iwo-thiiilt  pally  voce  lo  menide  a  ne^aliier.  wii  >u- 

|[nn(  in  ln»e  mcr«ril  have  wotkt-l   \«^»t\yrt  mi,  tn 

neeilkv  ;  aivl  (hit  li»  h:'<    <  li>.klfi  lu  <!»• 

credit  the  cmereuional  ii< '  \  e\fi  Muutw 

of  tbe  ricuJoitj  of  the  Lkh-.i  .ti^ic-..      <  :>.  "— KlinUL 


HaalltMl 


l-£rO  /S  DEFENSIVE. 


«< 


Uwft.  It  establishes  a  salutary  check  upon  the  legisla- 
tive body,  calculated  to  guard  tlic  cummunity  against 
the  effects  of  faction,  precipitancy,  or  of  any  impulse 
unfriendly  to  the  public  good  which  may  li;ippcn  to  in- 
llucncc  a  majority  of  that  body. 

The  propriety  of  a  negative  has,  upon  some  occasions, 
been  combated  by  an  observation  that  it  was  not  to  be 
presumed  a  single  man  would  poxses«  more  virlue  and 
wiMliiin  tlian  a  number  of  men;  and  that,  unless  this  pre- 
sumption should  be  entertained,  it  would  be  improper  lo 
give  the  executive  magistrate  any  species  of  control 
over  the  legislative  body. 

But  this  observation,  irhcn  examined,  will  appear 
rather  specious  titan  sutiil.  The  propriety  of  the  thing 
does  not  turn  ui>on  the  supposition  of  superior  wisdom 
or  virtue  in  the  Executive,  but  upon  the  supposition 
that  the  legislature  wilt  not  be  infallible;  that  the  love 
of  power  niay  sometimes  betray  it  into  a  disposition 
to  encroach  upon  the  rights  of  other  members  of  the 
government;  that  a  spirit  of  faction  may  sometimes  per- 
vert its  deliberations;  that  impressions  of  the  moment 
may  sometimes  hurry  it  into  measures  which  itself,  on 
maturer  rellection,  would  condemn.  The  primary  in- 
ducement to  conferring  the  power  in  question  upon  the 
Executive  is  to  enable  him  to  defend  himself;  the 
secondary  une  is  to  increase  the  chances  in  favor  of 
the  community  against  the  passing  of  bad  laws  through 
bastCf  inadvertence,  or  design.  The  oftcner  the  measure 
is  brought  under  examination,  the  greater  the  diversity  in 
the  situations  of  those  who  arc  to  examine  it,  the  less 
must  be  the  danger  of  those  errors  which  flow  from 
want  of  due  deliberation,  or  of  those  missteps  which 
proceed  from  the  contagion  of  some  common  passion  or 
interest.  It  is  far  less  probable  that  culpable  views  of 
any  kind  should  infect  all  the  parts  of  the  government  at 
the  same  moment,  and  in  relation  to  the  same  object, 
than  that  they  should  by  turns  govern  and  mislead  every 
one  of  them. 

It  may  perhaps  be  said  that  the  power  of  preventing 


49* 


^lll  BE  CSF.D  CAUTIOUSLY. 


CVo.  Tl  >11' 


Irad  laws  includes  that  of  preventing  good  ones,  and  Doaf 
be  used  to  the  one  purpose  as  veil  aa  to  the  other.  Bui 
this  objection  will  have  little  weight  with  those  who  can 
properly  csiimAte  the  miscliiefs  of  (hnt  inconsliincy  and 
Riuiabiliiy  ia  the  laws  which  form  the  ^reaient  blemish 
in  the  character  and  genius  of  our  governments.  TUcy 
will  consider  every  institution  calculated  to  reslraio  the 
excels  of  lawnuikin;;,  and  to  keep  things  in  the  tame 
state  in  which  they  Happen  to  be  at  any  given  period,  as 
much  more  likely  to  do  good  than  h»nn;  lie<:anse  it  is 
favorable  to  greater  stability  in  the  system  of  legislation. 
The  injury  which  may  possibly  be  done  by  defeating  a 
few  good  I;iwK  will  Ik  amply  com|>ensated  by  the  advan- 
tage of  preventing  a  number  of  bad  ones. 

Nor  is  this  all.  The  superior  weight  and  influence  of 
the  legislative  body  in  a  free  government,  and  the  hazard 
Id  the  Executive  in  atrial  of  strength  with  that  body, 
afford  a  satisfactory  security  that  the  negative  would 
generally  he  employed  with  great  caution,  and  there 
would  oftener  be  room  for  a  charge  of  timidity  than  of 
rashness  in  the  exercise  of  it.  A  king  of  Great  Britws, 
with  all  his  train  of  sovereign  atiriliulcs,  and  with  all  the 
g,f  influence  lie  draws  from  a  thousand  sources, 

■o.W.  would  at  this  day  hesitate  to  put  a  negative 

upon  the  joint  resolutions  of  the  two  houses  of  Parlia- 
ment. He  would  not  fail  to  eiert  the  utmost  resources 
of  that  influence  to  strangle  a  measure  disagreeable  to 
htm  in  its  progress  to  the  throne,  to  avoid  being 
reduced  to  the  dilemma  of  permitting  it  to  take  effect 
or  of  risking  the  displeasure  of  the  nation  by  an  opposi- 
tion to  the  sense  of  the  legislative  h<wly.  Nor  is  tt 
probable  that  he  would  uliimaiely  venture  to  exert  lus 
prerogatives,  but  in  a  case  of  manifest  propriety  or 
vKtreme  necessity.  All  well-informed  men  in  that  king, 
dom  will  accede  to  the  justness  of  this  remark.  A  very 
considerable  period  has  elapsed  since  the  negative  of  the 
crown  has  been  exercised. 

If  a  tnagistrate  so  powerful  am]  so  well  fortified  as  a 
British  monarch  would  liavc  scruples  about  the  exercise 


Hmmilwa)      EXECUTiVa    WILL   DARE    TO   USE  IT.       495 

of  the  power  under  consideration,  hoir  much  greater 
caution  may  be  reasonably  expected  in  a  President  of  the 
United  States,  clothed  for  the  short  period  of  four  years 
with  the  executive  authority  of  a  government  wholly  and 
purely  republican? 

It  is  erident  that  there  would  be  greater  dangler  of  his 
not  using  his  power  when  necessary  than  of  his  using  it 
too  often,  or  too  much.  An  argument,  indeed,  against 
its  expediency  has  been  drawn  from  this  very  source. 
It  has  been  represented,  on  this  account,  as  a  power 
odious  in  appearance,  useletts  in  practice.'  But  it  will 
not  follow  that,  because  it  might  be  rarely  exercised,  it 
would  never  be  exercised.  In  the  case  for  which  it  is 
chiefly  designed,  that  of  an  immediate  attack  upon  the 
constitutional  rights  of  the  Executive,  or  in  a  case  in 
which  the  public  good  was  evidrnlly  and  palpably  sacri- 
ficed, a  man  of  tolerable  firmneit*  would  avail  himself  nf 
his  constitutional  meant  of  defense,  and  would  listen  to 
the  admonitions  of  duty  and  responsibility.  In  the 
former  supposition,  his  fortitude  would  be  stimulated  by 
his  immediate  interest  in  the  power  of  his  ofBce;  in  the 
latter,  by  the  probability  of  the  sanction  of  his  constitu- 
ents, who,  though  they  would  naturally  incline  to  the 
ief;islative  body  in  a  doubtful  case,  would  hardly  suffer 
their  partiality  to  delude  them  in  a  very  plain  case.  I 
spealt  now  with  an  eye  to  a  magistrate  possessing  only  a 
common  share  of  firmness.  There  are  men  who,  under 
any  circumstances,  will  have  the  courage  to  do  their  duty 
at  every  hazard. 

But  the  convention  have  pursued  a  mean  in  this  busi- 
ness which  will  both  facilitate  the  exercise  of  the  power 


*  Aj  •  fact  tbe  ue  <■[  the  r«Io  [xmcr  hn  hsr!  ■  (irnif  r  jiopuUr  tui<port 
Ihoji  •njr  oilier  pmidentul  prer(ig«li»e,  an"!  the  iwo  rtnidcnti  who  li«ife 
iit*d«  tMmMh'n  mom  popnltr  (wilhoiii  (iKiit)ogi  cirrunuuncvs)  alirr 
taklai;  oftcc  {]v:VM>n  and  t'leittsml)  h*vc  itonc  o  Uigcly  ihioiigh 
lli«ir  UM  of  (hit  [lowrr.  It  n  iiitftsMiiii;  to  nntc  llni  Jcdeixin  reiatdi 
in  rtnnl  to  llw  fini  vvio  of  WuhinKlon  Ihil  "■  frir  of  thr  Imltcit 
Irieiiifi  of  Ibe  bill  «nmH<d  pauioii.  hut  (lu  majority  were  Miiifiol,  and 
both  in  and  <mi  o(  doon  tl  (avf  plcMUre  («  bave  M  len|;th  ftn  intiaDie 
of  Ibe  net:aijv«  b«ii^  txcrnteil." — EMTOk. 


494 


FOftCE  OP  QUAUFIKD  KECATIVE.     WfclSiTB 


VGttled  in  this  respect  in  the  executive  magistnte,  and 
make  iu  efficacy  to  depend  on  the  s<:»iie  of  a  considerable 
part  of  the  IcgisluUvc  body,  lasteat)  of  nn  absolute  uejca- 
tive,  it  IK  proposed  to  give  the  Executive  the  (|(uliiicd 
nes-ilive  already  dcstjribed.  This  is  a  power  whicb 
would  be  much  more  readily  exercised  than  ibc  other. 
A  man  who  might  be  afraid  to  defeat  a  law  by  his  single 
vp.To  mij^ht  not  scruple  to  return  it  for  recoiisideralioa: 
subject  to  being  finally  rejected  only  in  the  event  of 
more  than  one-third  uf  each  house  concurring  in  the  suf. 
ficienoy  of  his  ohjet-tions.  lie  would  lie  encour^igcd  by 
the  reflection  that,  if  his  opposition  should  prevail,  it 
would  embark  in  it  a  very  respectable  proportion  of  the 
Icsislattve  body,  whoite  tnltuence  would  be  united  with 
his  in  supporting  the  propriety  of  his  conduct  in  the 
public  opinion.  A  direct  and  categorical  negative  has 
something  in  the  appearance  of  it  mure  harsh,  nnd  mnre 
apt  to  irritate,  than  the  mere  sugjjestion  of  argumentA- 
live  objections  to  be  approved  or  disapproved  by  those 
to  whom  they  are  nddrcKscd.  In  proportion  as  it  wooltl 
be  less  apt  to  offend,  it  would  be  more  apt  lo  be  ex> 
erciscd;  and  for  this  very  reason,  it  may  in  practice  be 
found  more  etTe<;tiial.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  it  will  not 
often  happen  tliat  improper  views  will  govern  so  large  a 
proportion  as  two-thirds  of  both  branches  of  the  legisla- 
ture at  the  same  time;  and  this,  too,  in  spile  of  the 
(-ounterpni»ing  weight  of  the  Executive.  It  is  at  any  rate 
far  less  probable  that  this  should  be  the  case  than  llul 
such  views  should  taint  the  resolutions  and  canduct  ufa 
lure  majority.  A  power  of  this  nature  in  the  Rxccalive 
will  often  have  a  silent  and  unperccived,  though  forcible; 
openition.  When  men  engaged  in  unjustifiable  pursuits 
are  aware  that  obstructions  may  come  from  a  ([uarter 
which  they  cannot  control,  they  will  often  be  resinuned 
by  the  liare  apprehension  of  oppoMlion  from  doing  wtut 
ihcy  would  with  eagerness  rush  into  if  no  such  eateraal 
impediments  were  to  be  feared. 

This  (lualified   negative,   as  has  been    elsewhere  rv- 
narked,  is  in  this  State  vested  in  a  couocil,  cuosutiiig  d 


HuditoBi         D/sr/A'Crjvi;ss  of  judiciary.  495 

tlie  governnr,  with  the  chancellor  and  judges  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  or  any  two  of  them. '  It  has  been  freely 
8m  Hm.  89,  employed  upon  a  variety  of  occasions,  and 
TO,  »nil  16.  frequently  with  success.  And  its  utility  has 
become  so  apparent  that  persons  who,  in  compiling  the 
Constitution,  were  violent  opposers  of  it,  have  from  expe- 
rience become  its  declared  admirers.* 

I  have  in  another  place  remarked  that  the  convention, 
in  the  formation  of  this  part  of  their  plan,  had  departed 
from  the  model  of  the  constitution  of  this  State  in  favor 
of  that  of  Massachusetts.  Two  strong  reasons  may  be 
imagined  for  this  preference.  One  is  that  the  judges, 
who  are  to  be  the  interpreters  of  the  taw,  might  receive 
an  improper  bias  from  having  given  a  previous  opinion 
in  their  revisionary  capacities;  the  other  is  that,  by  being 
often  associated  with  the  Executive,  they  might  be  in- 
duced to  embark  too  far  in  the  political  views  of  that 
magistrate,  and  thus  a  dangerous  combination  might  by 
degrees  be  cemented  between  the  executive  and  judiciary 
departments.  It  is  impossible  to  keep  the  judges  too 
distinct  from  every  other  avocation  than  that  of  expound- 
ing the  laws.  It  is  peculiarly  dangerous  to  place  them  in 
a  situation  to  be  either  corrupted  or  influenced  by  the 
Executive. 

PUBLIOS. 

*  Mr.  Abraham  Vates,  a  warm  opponent  a(  the  plan  of  the  conventioD, 
is  of  this  number. — Pitbulfs. 

'  It  is  now  vested  solely  in  the  governor. — Editok. 


496 


COMMAlfDER-lSCHlEF. 


[l«iT4(n> 


No.  74,  (73J.       tv™  y,rk  r»cJM.  UmA  ,^.  .,«*.)        HamtltoB. 

THE  PRESIDENTIAL  COMMAND  OF  NATIONAL 
FORCES  AND  POWER  OF  PARDON. 

CgmmaitJ  mr  armyatdtutryaKd  miStia^P^ntrta  ttitnUl  rjrn-Mlir 
tfidah — !^rtJ  */  iJkt  pardmiHg  fvwrr — Sp€<i*l  tmiidtratUn  tf  tlit  (mt- 
liming  ftnufT  as  rfgardt  tn*t«M — AdvaKtagt  ef  frvmfl  utr  e/  far  dm— 
laiidtui  .<f  Maiuuhntfitt — L»ti  t/ Hmt  i/ fto-Jtmng fv>KtT  wert  fisUd 
in  tfg>itititt't. 

To  Ike  Peopi*  0/  the  Slate  of  New  York;  _ 

1'Ik!  Prrstttent  uf  the  United  Sutcs  is  to  be  "coni- 
niandiT-iii-chicf  of  the  urmy  and  navy  uf  the  United 
Stiitcs,  atM)  of  the  militia  of  the  several  States  vhtn  eaiM 
into  the  oitual  ttrvue  of  the  United  States."  The  pro- 
priety of  this  pritvinion  is  so  evident  in  itself,  and  it  is 
at  the  »mc  time  so  conHonant  to  (he  prtfcedents  of  the 
State  constitutions  in  general,  that  little  need  be  uid  to 
explain  or  enforce  it.  Even  those  of  them  which  have, 
in  other  respects,  coupled  the  chief  masiittrtte  with  a 
council  have  for  the  most  part  concentrated  the  iniliury 
authority  in  him  alone.  Of  all  the  cjires  or  concerns  of 
Soveromenl,  the  direction  of  war  most  peculiarly  de- 
mands those  qualities  which  distinguish  the  exercise  of 
power  by  a  single  hand,  The  dtre<:tion  of  war  implies 
the  direction  of  the  common  strength;  ami  Die  power  of 
directing  and  employing  the  common  strength  form  a 
usual  and  essential  part  in  the  de6nition  of  the  executive 
authority.' 

"  The  President  may  require  the  opinion,  in  writing,  iif 
the  principal  officer  in  each  of  the  executive  departments, 
upon  any  subject  relating  to  the  dudes  of  their  respective 

'In  lhi>  brief  prr^gmfh  h  "liwnmH  Ihr  ^titt*!  pnAlwo  nrfiMi  nw 
ECfinnnipnt  h  I  ...  >lid 

Mr.  IU|^li.il  II.  ^ 

186)  BB  Vonlil  .i:^j  .T1JZ  ^1/1  riTKunit  «ijm;  U-^.ILIT        riflllK      : 

[or.M  Ml.  %r-  \'<vrn.A  (h*  PraH^rat"  ■■  au  laat, u^ 

ancdaUy  Im  <i .  -  '-  wiih  "pantnlaattpnvL"     lnil—1.  La- 

vam  wtart  n  lu  m  10  ■mwi  tbaU  "  m  mauasmlo  in-cMd  of  tk>  aiwf 


HMBiHon) 


PABt>ONING  fOlVES, 


offices."  This  1  consider  as  a  mrre  redundancy  in  the 
plan,  a«  the  right  (or  whicli  it  provides  would  result  uf 
itself  from  the  office. 

He  is  also  to  be  authoriicd  to  grant  "  reprieves  and 
pardons  for  offenses  ag:iinst  the  United  Sutcs,  txe^/ft  ii* 
eatet  of  im^ii<hmeNl."  Humanity  and  good  policy  conspire 
to  dictate  tluit  the  benign  prerogative  of  pardoning 
should  be  as  little  as  possible  fettered  or  embarrassed. 
The  criminal  code  of  every  country  partakes  so  much  of 
necessary  severity  that,  without  an  e;tsy  access  to  excep- 
tionsi  in  favor  of  unfortunate  guilt,  justice  would  wear  a 
countenance  too  sangiiin:iry  and  cruel.  As  (he  Sense  of 
responsibility  is  always  strongest  in  proportion  as  it  is 
undivided,  it  may  be  inferred  that  a  single  man  would  be? 
most  ready  to  attend  to  the  force  of  those  motives  which 
might  plead  for  a  mitigation  of  the  rigor  of  the  law,  and 
least  apt  to  yield  to  considerations  which  wereealculated 
to  shelter  a  6t  object  of  its  vengeance.  The  reflection 
that  the  fate  of  a  fellow-creature  depended  on  \\MtoJt fiat 
would  naturally  inspire  scrnpidousncss  and  caution;  the 
ilread  of  being  accused  of  weakneut  or  connivance  would 
beget  equal  circumspection,  though  of  a  different  kind. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  men  generally  derive  confidence 
from  their  numbers,  they  might  ufleii  cnuourage  each 
other  in  an  act  of  obduracy,  and  might  be  less  sensible  to 
the  apprehension  of  suspicion  or  censure  lor  an  injudi- 
cious or  affected  clemency.  On  these  accounts,  one 
man  appears  to  be  a  more  eligible  dispenser  of  the  mercy 
of  giivernnient  than  a  body  of  men. 

The  expediency  of  vesting  the  power  of  pardoning  in 
the  President  has,  if  I  mistake  not,  been  only  contested 
in  relation  to  the  crime  of  treason.  This,  it  has  been 
urged,  ought  to  have  depended  upon  the  assent  of  one, 
or  both,  of  the  branches  of  the  legislative  body,     I  shall 

■ad  na'T.  in  liioe  oi  w*c.  1  luppofc  I  haita  Hchl  l»  take  any  me*tiiT(« 
whirli  may  bnl  Mhiliie  ilic  enemy."  Ci'iirrming  iliit  uw  «(  war  pnotr 
daring  Ih*  (tivil  W»r  «»»  ''iirtw  »  "  Kifniliyo  I'i>««t."  i56i:  Lowt*j'» 
"  Tlie  Cnmniamt*[-iB-Oii«)."  I*/*  ;  Diinnin);'*  ■■The  ConMhnllnn  of 
ihc  Untlcil  Hiam  m  Ciril  War  "  {PelilUil  Sti/irr  QHarlt'lt,  vol.  L 
iStti).  Kill  U'liiiiiie'*  "  VVai  Pawert  of  llie  PicuiImi.^'  16(14.— Em To>. 


;id 


498 


P  Alt  DOS  BXTBHOS  TO   TSBASOX.     Ul«i7inij 


not  deny  that  there  are  struns  reasons  to  be  asHtjfuecl  for 
requiring  in  this  particular  the  concurrence  uf  ifiat  buOjr, 
or  of  a  part  of  it.  As  treas<)n  ix  a  crime  li^vt^lrd  jl  the 
immediate  hein^  of  the  society,  when  the  I^iws  liaveunce 
ascertained  the  guilt  of  theoRenOer,  tlicrcseemsa  fitness 
in  referring  the  cxpciliencjr  of  an  act  uf  mercy  inwards 
him  to  the  jiitlKinent  of  the  legislature.  And  this  ought 
the  rather  lo  be  the  case,  as  the  supposition  of  the  con- 
nivance of  the  Chief  Magistrate  ought  not  to  he  cDlircly 
excluded.  But  there  are  also  strong  objections  to  locti 
a  plan.  It  i-t  not  to  be  douhlcd  that  a  single  man  at 
prudence  and  good  sense  is  better  filled,  in  delicate  coo- 
junclurcs,  to  babnce  the  motives  which  may  plead  for 
and  against  the  remission  of  the  punishment  than  any 
numcruus  body  whatever.  It  deserves  particular  atten- 
tion lliat  trr^i^im  will  often  be  connected  with  seditions 
which  eml>r:ice  a  large  proportion  of  llie  community,  us 
lately  happened  in  Massachusetts.  In  every  such  case 
WG  might  expect  to  see  the  representation  of  the  people 
tainted  with  the  same  spirit  which  tud  given  birth  to  the 
offense.  And  when  parties  were  pretty  C()iially  matched 
the  secret  sympathy  of  the  friends  and  favorers  of  the 
condemned  person,  availing  itself  of  the  good-nature  and 
weakness  of  others,  might  frequently  bestow  impuoiiy 
where  the  terror  of  an  (example  was  neccssiiry.  On  the 
other  hand,  when  the  sedition  had  proceeded  from  causes 
which  had  inflamed  the  resentments  of  the  major  pisrty, 
they  might  often  be  found  obstinate  and  inexorable  when 
policy  demanded  a  cnnduct  of  forbearance  and  clemency. 
But  the  principal  argument  for  reposing  the  power  of 
pardoning  in  this  tA*x  to  the  Chief  Magistrate  is  this:  ia 
seasons  of  insurrection  or  rebellion  there  arc  often  criti- 
cal moments  when  a  wclt-timcd  offer  uf  pardon  to  the 
insurgents  or  rebels  may  reittore  the  trani]uil]ily  of  the 
commonwealth;  and  which,  if  suffered  to  pass  unimprovctl, 
it  may  never  be  possible  afterwards  to  recall.  The  ttila- 
tory  process  of  conveoing  the  legitlalure,  or  one  of  its 
branches,  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  its  sanrlmn  la  the 
measure,  would  frequently  be  the  occasion  uf  letting  &Up 


EkDlltn] 


TSEATYMAKtyC  POWER. 


499 


the  golden  opportunity.  The  loss  of  a  wccic,  a  day,  an 
hour,  may  sometimes  be  fatal.  If  it  shi^iild  be  observed 
ihiit  a  dis4;rciionary  power,  with  a  view  to  such  contin- 
gencies, might  b«  occasionally  conferred  upon  the  Presi- 
dent, it  may  be  answered,  in  the  first  place,  that  it  is 
questionable  whether,  in  a  limited  Con»itution,  that 
power  could  be  delegated  by  law;  and  in  the  second 
place,  that  it  would  generally  be  imjjoliiic  beforehand  to 
take  any  step  which  might  hold  out  the  prospect  of  impu- 
nity. A  proceeding  of  this  kind,  out  of  the  usual  course, 
would  be  likely  to  be  construed  into  an  argument  o( 
timidity  or  of  weakness,  and  would  have  a  tendency  to 
embolden  guilt.  FunLitiif. 


No.  75  |74].         VmJif^m^ntJtMrmtl,  Mircb  lA,  >^>  MatDJItOn. 

THE  PRESIDENTIAL  POWER  IN  TREATIES. 

Ottt  9/ thi  tttt fniltira  »ftkt  tfmtilmlifn—Wfftttptt  Ikatil  ifmHart 
ikt  ixnittixM  a»4  Ifgiitalni  Jff«rimntli  <fmtidir/J — //  it  a  fr»fer  ttm- 
hittalian — Htotom  far  Ihit — Hmtie/  RtprtitmUtlitti eaHtuI fropttly  kt 
oUm'ttfd — Ot}4tti*H  ^rt^uitifg  ^nfy  tutii-lhiidt  t/ analtri  frtunt. 

Ta  the  Ptople  of  (he  State  <•/  New  York: 

The  President  is  to  have  power,  "  by  and  with  the  ad- 
vice and  consent  of  the  Senate,  to  make  treaties,  provided 
two-thirds  of  the  senators  present  concur." 

Though  this  provision  has  txen  assailed  on  different 
grounds  with  no  small  degree  of  vehemence,  I  scruple 
j„  not  to  declare  my  firm  pcrsu.ision  that  it  is 

Va.  M.  one  of  the  best  digested  and  most  unexcep- 

tionable parts  of  the  plan.  One  ground  of  objection  is 
the  trite  topic  of  the  intermixture  of  powers:  some  con- 
tending that  the  President  unght  alone  to  possess  the 
power  of  making  treaties;  others,  that  it  ought  to  have 
been  exclusively  deposited  in  the  Senate,  Another 
source  of  objection  is  derived  from  the  small  number  of 
persons  by  whom  a  treaty  may  be  made.  Of  those  who 
espouse  this  objection,  a  part  are  of  opinion  that  the 


S«>  /.vrs/rAr/xrc.-£s  of  Fowsits,       vt'>.if>'r,\' 

House  oT  Rcprcficntativrs  ought  to  have  hc-cn  as3ocialcil 
in,  the  business,  while  anather  part  seem  in  think  that 
nothing  mure  was  neccitiary  tlian  lo  have  subtilituied  two- 
thirds  of  all  the  members  of  the  Senate  to  two-thirds  o( 
the  members  fretful.  As  I  flatter  myxclf  the  observations 
muJe  in  a  preceding  number  upon  this  part  of  the  plan 
must  have  sufficed  to  place  it,  to  a  discerning  eye,  in  a 
very  favurable  light,  I  shall  here  content  myself  with 
offering  only  some  supplementary  remarks  principally 
with  a  view  to  the  objections  which  have  been  just  staled. 
With  regard  to  the  intermixture  of  powers,  I  shall  rely 
upon  the  explanations  already  given  in  other  places.  o( 
the  true  sense  of  the  rule  upon  which  that  objection  is 
founded;  and  shall  take  it  for  granted,  as  an  inference 
from  them,  that  the  union  of  the  Executive  with  the 
Senate,  in  the  article  of  treaties,  is  no  infringement  of 
that  rule.  I  venture  to  add  that  the  particular  nature  of 
the  power  of  making  treaties  indicates  a  peculiar  pro- 
priety in  that  union.  Though  several  writers  on  the 
subject  of  Governmenl  place  that  power  in  the  class  of 
executive  authorities,  yet  this  is  evidently  an  arbitrary 
disposition;  for,  if  wc  attend  carefully  to  its  operation, 
it  will  be  found  to  partake  more  of  the  legislative  than  of 
the  executive  character,  though  it  does  not  seem  strictly 
to  fall  within  the  de6nition  of  cither  of  them.  The  essence 
of  the  legislative  authority  is  to  enact  laws,  or,  in  other 
words,  to  prescribe  rules  for  the  regulation  of  the  society; 
while  the  execution  of  the  laws  and  the  employment  of 
the  common  strength,  either  for  this  purpose  or  for  the 
common  defense,  seem  to  comprise  all  the  functions  of 
the  executive  magistrate.  The  power  of  making  treaties 
is  plainly  neither  the  one  nor  the  other.  It  relates 
neither  to  the  execution  of  the  subsisting  laws  nor  to 
the  enaction  of  new  ones,  and  still  less  to  an  exertion  of 
the  common  strength.  Its  objects  are  coktkacts  with 
foreign  nations,  which  have  the  force  of  law,  but  derive 
it  from  the  obligationsof  good  faith.  They  are  not  rules 
prescribed  by  the  sovereign  to  the  subject,  but  agree- 
ments between  sovereign  and  sovereign.     The  power  ia 


aunlltool      DAJVGEXS  POSSIBLE  IJV  EXECUTIVE. 


question  seems,  therefore,  to  form  a  distinct  department, 
and  to  belong,  properly,  neither  to  the  legislative  nor  to 
the  executive,  the  quuHiicti  elsewhere  detaitetl  as  indis- 
pensable in  the  management  of  forci);n  neKotiationa 
(Kiini  out  the  Rxeciitive  as  the  most  fit  agent  in  those 
transaetions ;  while  the  v:ist  iniportanee  of  the  trust,  and 
the  operation  of  treaties  as  laws,  plead  strongly  for  the 
participation  of  the  whole  or  a  portion  of  the  legislative 
body  in  the  office  of  making  them. 

However  proper  or  safe  it  may  be,  in  governments 
where  the  cxecntive  magistrate  is  an  hereditary  monarch, 
to  commit  to  him  the  entire  puwer  uf  making  Ireitties,  it 
would  be  utterly  unsafe  and  improper  to  intrust  that 
power  to  an  elective  magistrate  of  four  years'  duration. 
It  hat  been  remarked  upon  another  occattion,  and  the 
remark  is  unquestionably  jtist,  that  an  hereditary  mon- 
arch, though  often  the  oppressor  nf  his  people,  has  per- 
sonally too  much  stake  in  the  government  to  he  in  any 
material  danger  of  being  corrupted  by  foreign  powers. 
But  a  man  raised  from  the  stalion  of  a  private  citizen  to 
the  rank  of  chief  magistrate,  possessed  of  a  moderate  or 
slender  fortune,  and  looking  forward  to  a  period  not  very 
remote  when  he  may  probably  be  obliged  to  return  to 
the  station  from  which  he  was  taken,  might  sometimes 
be  under  temptations  to  sacrifice  his  duty  to  his  interest 
which  it  would  require  superlative  virtue  to  withstand. 
An  avaricious  man  might  be  tempted  to  betray  the  in- 
tcresls  of  the  slate  to  the  acquisition  of  wealth.  Ad 
ambitious  man  might  make  his  own  aggrandiiemeni,  by 
the  aid  of  a  foreii;r>  power,  the  price  of  his  treachery  to 
hU  constituents.  The  history  of  human  conduct  does 
not  warrant  that  exalted  opinion  of  hnman  virtue  which 
would  make  it  wise  in  a  nation  to  commit  interests  of  so 
delicate  and  momentous  a  kind,  as  those  which  concern 
its  intercourse  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  to  the  sole  dis- 
posal of  a  magistrate  created  and  circumstaoced  as  would 
be  a  President  of  the  United  States. 

To  h^vc  intrusted  the  puwer  of  making  treaties  to  Ihe 
Senate  alone  would  have  been  to  relinquiih  the  benefits 


500 


mTEKUlXTl/SE  OF  J'OIFSSS. 


IN«.7A>n> 


Housp  of  RcprcMntativcB  onght  to  have  been  associaic.l 
in,thc  business,  vhilc  another  |Kirt  scent  to  think  ttiat 
nothing  more  was  netreiiiiry  than  to  have  sub«titiiictl  two- 
thirds  of  aJ/  the  members  of  the  Senate  to  two-thirds  of 
the  members /rf/zir/.  As  t  flatter  myself  the  obserratioDS 
made  in  a  [Kci^cdini;  number  upon  this  part  of  the  plan 
must  have  sufficed  to  place  it,  to  a  discerning  eye,  in  a 
very  favorable  light,  I  shall  here  content  myself  with 
offering  only  some  supplementary  remarks,  principally 
with  a  view  to  the  objections  vhich  have  been  just  stated. 
With  regard  to  the  intermixture  of  powers.  I  shall  rely 
upon  the  explanations  .-ilreudy  given  in  other  pbces.  o( 
the  true  scDse  of  the  rule  upon  which  that  objecticm  it 
founded;  and  shall  take  it  for  granted,  as  an  infercnrc 
from  them,  that  the  union  of  the  Executive  with  the 
Senate,  in  the  article  of  treaties,  is  no  infringement  of 
titat  nde.  I  veninre  to  add  that  the  particiiUr  nature  of 
the  power  of  making  treaties  indicates  a  peculiar  pro- 
priety in  that  nnion.  Though  several  writers  on  the 
subject  of  Government  place  that  power  in  the  class  of 
executive  authorities,  yet  this  is  evidently  an  arbitrary 
disfMsitian;  for,  if  we  attend  carefully  to  its  operation, 
it  will  be  found  to  partake  more  of  the  legislative  than  of 
the  executive  character,  though  it  does  nut  seem  strictly 
to  fall  within  IhcdcCinitionof  cither  of  them.  The  essence 
of  the  legislative  authority  is  to  enact  laws,  or,  in  other 
wonl«,  to  prescribe  rules  for  the  regulation  of  the  society: 
while  the  execution  of  the  laws  and  the  employment  of 
the  comraon  strength,  either  for  this  purjwse  or  for  the 
common  defense,  seem  to  comprise  all  the  functions  nf 
the  execntive  magistrate.  The  power  of  making  treaties 
i«  plainly  neither  the  one  nor  the  other.  It  relates 
neither  to  the  execution  of  the  subsisting  laws  nor  to 
the  enaction  of  new  ones,  and  still  less  (o  an  exertion  of 
the  common  strength,  lt»  objectx  are  contracts  with 
foreign  nations,  which  have  tbe  force  of  law,  but  derive 
it  frpm  the  obligations  of  good  faith,  They  are  not  rules 
prescribed  by  the  sovereign  to  the  subject,  but  agree- 
ments between  sovereign  and  sovcrciso.     The  power  ia 


■uUUB)     DANGERS  POSSIBLE  tN  EXECUTIVE.        50» 


t< 

■5 


question  seems,  therefore,  to  form  a  distinct  cteparlmcnl, 

nd  to  belong,  properly,  neither  to  the  legittlativc  nor  to 

he  execuiire.     The  qualities  elsewhere  detailed  as  india- 

ensnble  in  the  management  of  foreign  ncgotiatioos 
f-point  out  the  Executive  as  the  most  lit  agent  in  those 
transactions;  while  the  vast  importance  of  the  trimt,  and 
the  operation  of  treaties  as  laws,  plead  strongly  for  the 
iparticipaiion  of  tlie  whole  or  a  porrion  of  the  legislative 
dy  in  the  office  of  making  thcro. 

However  proper  or  safe  it  may  be,  in  governments 
where  the  executive  magistrate  is  an  hereditary  monarch, 
to  commit  to  him  the  entire  power  of  making  trealiei^  it 
would  be  utterly  unsafe  and  improper  to  intrust  that 

ower  to  an  elective  magistrate  of  four  years' duration. 

t  has  been  remarked  upon  another  occasion,  and  the 
remark  is  imquestionably  just,  that  an  hereditary  mon- 

rch,  though  often  the  uppri-ssor  of  his  people,  has  per- 
nally  too  much  stake  in  the  government  to  be  in  any 
material  danger  of  being  corrupted  by  foreign  powers. 

ut  a  man  raised  from  the  station  of  a  private  citizen  to 
the  rank  of  chief  magistrate,  possessed  of  a  moderate  or 
slender  fortune,  and  looking  forward  to  a  period  not  very 

emote  when  he  may  pmhalily  be  obliged  to  return  to 
the  station  from  which  he  was  taken,  might  sometimes 
be  under  temptations  to  sacrifice  his  duty  to  his  interest 
which  It  would  require  superlative  virtue  to  withstand. 
An  avaricious  man  might  be  tempted  to  betray  the  in- 
terests of  the  state  to  the  acquisition  of  wealth.     An 

mbitious  man  might  make  his  own  aggrandizement,  by 
the  aid  of  a  foreign  power,  the  price  of  his  treachery  to 
hiK  ronstituenis.     The  history  of  human  condnet  does 

ot  warrant  that  exalted  opinion  of  human  virtue  which 
would  make  it  wise  in  a  nation  to  commit  interests  of  so 
delicate  and  momentous  a  kind,  as  those  which  concern 
its  intercourse  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  to  the  sole  dis- 
posal of  a  magistrate  created  and  circumstanced  as  would 
be  a  President  of  the  United  States. 

To  have  intrmted  the  power  of  making  treaties  to  the 
Senate  alone  would  have  been  to  relinquish  the  benefits 


S61 


aKOPBSATION  OF  SBNATB.         llfcTftiT* 


of  ihc  coiiiitiluliunal  agency  of  the  President  in  the  con- 
duct of  foreign  ncgutialiuns.  It  is  true  thiit  the  Senate 
wutild,  in  that  <:a$e,  have  ihe  option  of  employing  him  ia 
this  Capacity,  but  they  would  also  have  the  option  of 
letting  it  alone,  and  pique  ur  catui  might  induce  (he 
latter  rather  than  the  former.  Besides  this,  the  minis- 
terial servant  of  the  Senate  could  not  be  expected  Ui 
enjoy  the  confidence  and  respect  of  foreign  powers  in  the 
same  degree  with  the  constitutional  rei>resentatires  of 
Ihc  nation,  and,  of  course,  would  not  be  able  to  act  with 
an  equal  degree  of  weight  or  efficacy.  While  the  fnion 
would,  from  this  cause,  lose  a  considerable  advanUge  in 
the  management  of  its  external  concerns,  Ibe  people 
would  lose  the  additional  security  which  would  result 
from  the  co-operation  of  the  Executive.  Though  it  wouhl 
be  imprudent  to  confide  in  him  solely  so  important  a  trust, 
yet  it  cannot  be  doubted  tliat  his  participation  would 
materially  add  to  the  safely  of  the  society.  It  must 
indeed  be  clear  to  a  demonstration  that  the  joini  possev 
sion  of  the  |>over  in  question,  by  the  President  and 
Senate,  would  afford  a  greater  prospect  of  sevurity  than 
the  separate  possession  of  it  by  cither  of  them.  And 
whoever  has  maturely  weighed  the  circumsiunccs  which 
must  concur  in  the  appointment  of  a  President,  wdl  be 
satisfied  that  the  office  will  always  bid  fair  to  be  filled  by 
men  of  such  characters  as  to  render  their  concurrcQce  in 
the  formation  of  treaties  peculiarly  desirable,  us  well  on 
the  score  of  wisdom,  as  on  that  of  integrity. 

The  remarks  nude  in  a  former  number,  which  have 
been  alluded  to  in  another  part  of  this  paper,  will  apply 
with  conclusive  force  against  the  admission  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  toa  share  in  the  formation  of  treaties. 
The  lluctuating  and,  taking  its  future  increase  into  il»e 
account,  the  multitudinous  composition  of  that  body, 
forbid  us  to  expect  in  it  those  qualities  which  are  csmd- 
tial  to  the  proper  execution  of  such  a  trust.  Accurate 
and  coniprchrnsive  knowledge  of  forrign  politics;  a 
steady  and  system;tlic  adherence  to  the  same  views;  a  nice 
and  uniform  semtbility  to  national  diaractcr;  deciuoa, 


REQUISITE  MAJORITY. 

tttrtcy,  and  dispatch,  are  incomiutible  witi)  the  genius  of 
l>otiy»o  variable  and  so  numerous.  The  very  complica- 
tion of  the  business,  by  introducing  a  necessity  of  the 
concurrence  of  so  many  diScrent  bodies,  would  of  itfceU 
afford  a  solid  objection.  The  Krcalcr  frequency  of  the 
calls  upon  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  the  greater 
length  of  time  which  It  would  often  be  necessary  to  keep 
them  together  when  convened,  to  obtain  their  sanction 
in  the  progressive  stages  of  a  treaty,  would  be  a  source 
of  so  great  inconvenience  and  expense  as  alone  ought  to 
condemn  itie  project. 

The  only  objection  which  remains  to  be  canvassed  is 
that  which  would  substitute  the  proportion  of  two*tliirds 
of  all  the  members  composing  the  venutorial  body  to 
that  of  two-thirds  of  the  members  fresent.  It  has  been 
shown,  nndcr  the  second  head  of  our  inquiries,  that  all 
provltiont  which  require  mure  than  the  majority  of  any 
body  tu  its  resolutions  have  a  direct  tendency  to  embar- 
rass the  operations  of  the  government,  and  an  indirect 
one  to  subject  the  sense  of  the  majority  to  that  of  the 
minority.  This  consideration  iteems  sufhcienl  to  deter- 
mine our  opinion,  that  the  convention  have  gone  as  far 
in  the  endeavor  to  secure  the  advantage  of  numbers  in 
the  formation  of  treaties  as  could  have  been  reconciled 
either  with  the  activity  of  the  public  councils  or  with  a 
reasonable  regard  to  the  major  sense  of  the  community. 
If  two-thirds  of  the  whole  number  of  members  had  been 
required,  it  would,  in  many  cases,  from  the  non-attend- 
ance of  a  part,  amount  in  practice  to  a  ne4:«ssity  nf  unan- 
imity. .And  the  history  of  every  political  establishment 
in  which  this  principle  has  prevailed  is  a  history  of  im- 
potence, perplexity,  and  disorder.  Proofs  of  this  posi- 
tion might  be  adduced  from  the  examples  of  the  Roman 
Tribuncship.  the  Polish  Diet,  and  the  States  General  of 
the  Netherlands,  did  not  an  example  at  bonte  render 
foreign  precedents  uonecessiiry. 

To  require  a  6xed  proportion  of  the  whole  body  would 
not,  in  all  probiibility,  contribute  to  the  advantages  of  a 

Lrous  agency,  better  than  merely  to  require  a  pro- 
^Ml        III  -    -   - 


504  VOTIXC  CAPAUTY  OF  SBSATB.     nr«.7»(Tll 

()orti»n  of  (lie  ;itt^n(lirig  mcmt»ers.  Tlie  former,  by 
making  a  determinate  number  at  all  times  requisite  to  a 
rcsoUittun,'  diminishes  ttie  motives  to  punctual  attend- 
ance. The  latter,  h)-  niiiking  the  aipacity  ot  the  txxty  to 
depend  on  a  proportion  wlitch  may  be  varied  by  tbc 
absence  or  prrscncc  of  a  single  member,  has  the  contrary 
effect  And  as,  by  promoting  punctnaliiy,  it  tends  to 
keep  the  body  complete,  there  is  great  likelihood  that  its 
resolutions  would  generally  be  dictated  by  as  great  a 
number  in  this  cnite  as  in  the  otlier;  while  there  would 
be  much  fewer  occasions  of  delay.  It  ought  not  lo  be 
forgotten  that,  under  the  existing  Con  fed  era  tio  a,  two 
members  nvirt-,  and  usually  Jo,  represent  u  State;  whence 
it  happens  that  Congress,  who  now  arc  solely  invested 
with  ■*//  Iht  ptnttrs  of  the  Union,  rarely  consist  of  a 
greater  number  of  persons  than  would  compose  the 
intended  Senate.  If  wc  add  to  this  that  as  tbc  members 
vote  by  States,  and  that  where  there  is  only  a  single 
member  present  from  a  St;ite,  bis  vote  is  b'St,  it  will 
justify  a  supposition  that  the  active  voices  in  tlie  Senate, 
where  the  members  are  to  vole  individually,  would  rarely 
fall  short  in  number  of  the  active  voices  in  the  existing 
Congress.  When,  in  addition  to  these  consideraliuns, 
we  take  into  view  the  co-o[>cratinn  of  the  I'residcnt,  «e 
shall  not  hesitate  to  infer  that  tlie  people  of  America 
would  have  greater  security  against  an  improper  use  o( 
the  power  of  making  treaties,  under  the  new  Comtliluli'in. 
tlian  they  now  enjoy  under  the  Confcderatioru  And 
when  we  proceed  still  one  step  further,  and  look  forward 
to  the  probable  augmentation  of  the  fienaie,  by  the 
erection  of  new  States,  we  shall  not  only  perceive  ample 
ground  of  confidence  in  the  snfficicnry  of  ihc  members  to 
whose  agency  that  power  will  be  intrusted,  but  we  sltaH 
proltably  be  led  to  conclude  tttat  a  body  mure  nnmcroiis 
than  the  Senate  would  be  likely  to  become,  would  be  very 
little  lit  for  the  proper  discharge  of  the  trust. 


■InlKvlciIoT  iRM:    "Th«  fiUiM*.  Iiy  Im-miin^   ii,;  itiTitmrja' 
r«u>lBliiw(  <lhai;»™'>'*  '" ''»  niliK^ijr." — Erlioa. 


SmdUIob] 


/•OWES  Of  APFOINTMEKT. 


S«5 


No.  76  |7S].  (-Vf*  YtTk  fittJM,  A|kII  I.  tits.)         Hamilton. 

PRESIDENTIAL   POWER   OF   APPOINTMENT. 

Alt  txtttlnl  ftalurt — ■^Tku potatr  taititBl  it  txrrtiatJ  tj  Ihr  firf/Jfmt 
turgt — //  ««//  taHif  a  Svtlitr  unit  ••/  liuty — Qbjtelitn  It  tit  Ating 
tnl'UiteJ  la  lit  rrnidint  aleai — Ih  «tay  tt  avrrrulrd  ty  Seaalt^Ctnt- 
currfnti  »/  Sennit  n  tkttk  «w  favfrilhm — Ohjttlifn  iKat  Iht  priudtnl 
tnay  Ihmt  cealrtt  Sttalf  eeuiiJirtJ — Iflkeit  isJy  0/  SnMt  tamtrt  ii 
mrrufttJ — Frtttrtitn  »f  ttnililulisn. 

To  Ike  People  of  Ike  Stale  of  New  York: 

The  President  is  "  to  nominatt,  and,  by  and  with  the 

advice  aiuJ  conscni  of  the  Seiute,  to  a]>{>oiiit  ainbassa. 

durs,  other  public  ministers  and  consuls,  judges  of  the 

Supreme  Court,  and  all  olhcr  officers  of  the  Uniled  States 

whose  appointments  are  not  olhervrisc  provideil  for  in 

the  Constitution.     But  the  Congress  msy  by  law  vest  the 

'  appointment  of  such  inferior  officers  as  they  thinlt  proper 

in  the  President  alone,  or  in  the  courts  of  law,  or  in  the 

}ica<ls  of  deparlmcnts.     The  President  shall  have  power 

to  fill  up  alt  fa(ancies  which  may  happen  Juring  iht  reeets 

\t/  the  Senate,  by  granting  commissions  which  siiall  ex/n're 

'  at  the  end  uf  their  next  session." 

It  has  been  observed  in  a  former  paper  that  "  the  true 
test  of  a  good  government  is  its  aplitmie  and  tendency 
to  produce  a  good  administration."     If  the  justness  of 
Ethis  observation  be  admitted,  the  mode  of  appointing 
the  officers  of  the  United  States  contained  in  the  fore- 
going clauses  must,  when  examined,  be  allowed  to  be 
entitled  to  particular  commendation.     It  is  not  easy  to 
conceive  a  plan  better  calculatc<]  than  this  to  promote 
a  Judicious  choice  of  men  for  fitting  the  ofKccs  of  the 
I  Union;  and  it  will  not  need  proof  that  on   this  point 
'inust  essentially   depend   the  character  of  its  adminis- 
tration. 

It  urill  be  agree<t  on  all  hands  that  the  power  of  ap- 
puintment,  in  ordinary  cases,  ought  to  he  mwlified  in 
ODC  of  three  nays.     It  ought  either   to   be   vested  in 


So6 


VXDfVlDeD  RESPONSIBILITY.         t»o.  W  .7». 


a  tingle  nuin,  or  in  a  telett  »«eiiibl)-  of  a  moderate  nam- 
ber;  or  ia  a  single  man,  with  the  concurretice  of  vax.\t 
an  assembly.  The  cxer(.isc  of  it  by  tbc  pe<]plc  at 
large  ntll  be  readily  admitted  to  be  impracticable; 
as,  waiving  every  other  consideration,  it  would  leare 
tlicrn  little  time  to  do  anything  else.  When,  therefore, 
mention  Is  made  in  the  subttequent  reasonings  of  an 
assembly  or  body  of  men,  what  is  said  tDUst  be  under> 
stood  to  relate  to  a  select  budy  or  assembly  of  tbc 
descrij>tion  already  given.  The  people  collectively,  from 
their  number  and  from  their  dispersed  situation,  cannot 
be  regulated  in  their  movements  by  that  systematic  spirit 
of  cat>al  and  tntri(;ue  wliii^h  will  be  urged  as  the  chief 
objections  to  reposing  the  power  in  question  tn  a  body 
of  men. 

Those  who  have  themselves  reflected  upon  the  subject, 
or  who  have  attended  to  the  obiiervations  made  in  other 
parts  of  these  papers,  in  relation  to  the  appointment  of 
the  President,  will,  I  presume,  agree  to  tlic  position  that 
there  would  always  be  great  probability  of  hariog  the 
place  supplied  by  a  man  of  abilities,  at  least,  respectable. 
Prcmisitig  this,  1  proceed  to  lay  it  down  as  a  rule  that 
one  man  of  discernment  is  better  fitted  to  analyze  and 
estimate  the  peculiar  qualities  adapted  to  particular 
offices  than  a  body  of  men  of  equal  or  perhaps  even  of 
superior  discernment. 

The  sole  and  undivided  responsibility  of  one  man  wiQ 
naturally  beget  a  livelier  sense  of  duty  and  a  more  csoct 
regard  to  reput.ilion.  He  will,  on  this  account,  feel 
himself  under  stronger  obligations,  and  more  interested 
til  investigate  with  care  Uie  (jualilies  ri'<]uisite  to  the 
stations  to  be  filled,  ami  to  prefer  with  imparttulily  the 
persons  who  may  have  the  fairest  pretensions  tn  ihcoL 
lie  will  havc/n*v»-  personal  attachments  lo  gratify  than 
a  body  of  men  who  may  each  be  supposed  to  have  an 
equal  number;  ami  will  be  so  much  the  less  liable  to  be 
misled  by  the  sentiments  of  friendship  and  of  atfeetHiiL 
A  single  well-directed  man,  by  a  single  understanding 
cannot  be  distracted  and  warped  bj  that  iliversily  of 


OwUtMl      CHOICE  BY  AN  ASSEifBLY  UNSAFE.        50? 

\-icws,  reelings,  and  intereMs  which  frequenti)'  distract 
and  warp  the  resolutions  of  a  collective  body.  There  is 
nothing  so  apt  to  agitate  the  passions  of  mankind  a» 
personal  considerations,  whether  they  relate  tu  ourscivcs 
or  to  others  who  are  to  be  the  object!)  of  our  choice  or 
preference,  Mcncc,  in  every  exercise  of  the  power  of 
appriiniing  to  offices  by  an  assembly  of  men,  we  must 
expect  to  &ec  a  full  display  of  all  the  private  and  party 
likings  and  dislikes,  partialities  and  antipathies,  attach- 
ments and  animosities,  which  are  felt  by  those  who  com- 
pose the  assembly.  The  choice  which  may  at  any  time 
happen  to  be  made  under  such  circumstances  will  of 
coarse  be  the  result  either  of  a  victory  gained  by  one 
party  over  the  other,  or  of  a  compromise  between  piir- 
lics.  In  cither  case,  the  intrinsic  merit  of  the  candidate 
will  l»c  lou  often  out  of  Mght.  In  the  first,  the  tiualilica- 
g^  tions  best  adapted  to  uniting  the  suffrages  of 

Ra.  6$.  the  party  will  be  more  considered  than  tho»c 

which  lit  the  person  for  the  station.  In  the  last,  the 
coalition  will  commonly  turn  upon  some  interested 
equivalent:  "Give  us  the  man  wc  wish  for  this  office, 
and  you  shall  have  the  one  yoti  wish  fur  that." '  This 
will  be  the  ufual  condition  of  the  bargain.  And  it  will 
rarely  happen  thai  the  advancement  of  the  public  service 
will  be  the  primary  object  either  of  jwrty  victories  or  of 
party  negotiations. 

The  truth  of  the  principles  here  advanced  seems  to 
have  been  felt  by  the  most  intelligent  of  those  who  hare 
found  fault  with  the  provision  made,  in  this  retipeci,  by 
the  convention.  They  contend  that  the  President  ought 
solely  to  have  been  authorized  to  make  the  appointments 
under  the  federal  government.  But  it  is  easy  to  show 
tfiat  every  advanuge  to  be  expected  from  such  an 
arrangement  wonid,  in  substance,  be  derived  from  the 


'  Ir  hu  frciiu«nlly  kapfteiwd  lh*l  Ui«  Eiccmive  h«t  Innuenceil  leeit- 
ItUos  b;  t;'*'"!' '"  ''"  n<enili«n  oi  (:»ni:r«»t  offins  ailh  vhich  lo  rcnH 
Ibcir  idlmcntK,  Bui  an  wri'  i:l<>>>rT  apptuiinialion  («  Itits  niggnlcd 
dmi^  hu  bern  cioattd  in  lh«  lO-tallcil  *'  Mimlnrijl  cnnrtriy."  hy  vhich 
Ike  Seiure  rcfcdi  ■  nominee  limply  bcraiiw  li«  n  oppoud  by  the  tenntor 
of  Ibr  psilii-uhu  u>le  Itoin  iihi>;h  wdi  nominee  maj  hall. — EotTuk. 


5o8 


ACCSP7-AXCE  OF  JiOMIXATIOXS.        [■•.  7«  (78i 


power  of  iMmiaalian.  which  is  proposed  to  be  conTcrrcd 
upon  him;  while  several  disadvantages  which  might 
attend  the  absolute  power  of  appHintmeiit  in  the  hands 
of  that  officer  would  be  avoided,  lo  the  act  of  nomiaa> 
tion,  his  judgment  atone  would  be  «xcrcised;  and  as  it 
would  be  his  sole  duty  to  point  out  the  man  who,  witk 
the  ap|irolNttii>n  of  the  Senate,  shnuld  fdl  an  office,  hb 
responsibility  would  be  as  complete  as  if  he  were  to 
make  the  final  appointment.  There  can,  in  this  view,  be 
no  dilTerence  between  nominating  and  appointing.  The 
same  motives  which  would  influence  a  proper  discharge 
of  his  duty  in  one  case  would  exist  in  the  other.  And 
as  no  man  could  be  appointed  but  on  his  previous  nomi- 
nation, every  man  who  might  be  appointed  would  be,  in 
fact,  his  choice. 

Hut  might  not  his  nomination  be  ovemtled?  I  grant 
it  might;  yet  this  could  only  be  to  make  place  fur 
another  nomination  by  himself.  The  person  ultimately 
appointed  must  be  the  object  of  his  preference,  though 
perhaps  not  in  the  first  degree.  It  is  also  nut  very 
probable  that  liis  nomination  would  often  be  overruled. 
The  Senate  could  not  be  tempted,  by  the  preference  they 
1,^  might  feel  to  another,  to  reject  the  one  pro- 

Ra. M.  posed;   because  they  could  not  assure  them, 

selves  tltat  the  person  they  might  wish  would  be  brought 
forward  by  a  second  or  by  any  subsequent  nomination. 
They  could  not  even  be  certain  that  a  future  nomination 
would  present  a  candidate  in  any  degree  more  acceptable 
to  them;  and  as  their  diKsent  might  cast  a  kind  o(  sttgma 
upon  the  individual  rejected  and  might  have  the  appe«r> 
ance  of  a  rejection  upon  the  judgment  of  the  Chief 
Magistrate,  it  is  not  likdy  that  their  sanction  would  often 
Ik  refused  where  there  were  not  special  and  strong 
reasons  for  the  refusal. 

To  what  purpose,  then,  require  the  co-operation  of  the 
Senate/  I  answer  that  the  nec»sity  of  their  concur- 
rence would  have  a  powerful  Ihnugh,  in  genrral,  a  silent 
operation.  U  would  be  an  excellent  <:hei-k  upon  a  sptril 
of  favoritism  in  the  IVcsidcnt,  and  would  tend  greatly  to 


HuuilUMil         CAUTION  IK  APPOiXTMENTS.  509 

gprcvcnt  llic  appointment  of  unfit  characters  from  State 

}rcjudicc,  from  fjimiljr  <;oiincclioii,  from  personal  attach. 

lent,  or  from  u  vieuf  to  popularity.'     In  atlttition  to  tln», 

|jl  would   t>c  an   cfficacioiis  source   of  sla[)i!ity   in   the 

idninistration. 

It  will  rcadify  t>e  compreliemted  that  a  man  who  had 
hinisiilf  the  sole  disposition  of  offices  would  be  governed 
much  more  by  liis  private  inclinaliuns  and  interests  than 
when  he  was  bound  tn  submit  the  pro|>riety  of  his  choice 
to  the  di«cii<ision  and  determination  of  a  different  and 
j  independent  body,  and  that  body  an  entire  branch  of  the 
'legislature.  'Ilie  possibility  of  rejection  woidd  be  » 
Ntron^  motive  to  care  in  proposing.  The  danger  to  his 
own  reputation  and.  in  the  case  of  an  elective  magistrate, 
to  his  political  existence,  from  betraying  a  spirit  of 
favoritism,  or  an  unbecoming  pursuit  of  popularity,  to 
the  observation  of  a  body  whose  opinion  would  have 
great  weight  in  forming  that  of  the  public,  could  not  fail 
to  operate  as  a  iKirrrer  to  the  one  and  to  the  other,  lie 
would  be  both  ashamed  and  afraid  to  bring  forward  for 
the  most  distinguished  or  lucrative  stations  candidates 
who  had  no  other  merit  than  that  of  coming  from  the 
same  State  to  which  he  particularly  belonRed,  or  of  being 
in  some  way  or  other  personally  allied  to  him,  or  ul 
possessing  the  necessary  insignific^ince  and  pliancy  to 
render  them  the  obsequious  instruments  of  his  pleasure. 
To  this  reasoning  it  has  been  objected  that  the 
Tresident,  by  the  influence  of  the  power  of  nomination, 
may  secure  the  complaisance  of  the  Senate  to  his  views. 
This  supposition  of  universal  venality  in  bnman  nature 
is  little  less  an  error  in  political  reasoning  than  the  sup* 
iposition  of  universal  rectitude.  The  institution  of  delc- 
f'aatcd  power  implies  that  there  is  a  portion  of  virtue 
and  honor  among  mankind  which  may  be  a  reasonable 
foundation  of  confidence;  and  e.xperiencc  justifies  the 
theory.     It  has  been  found  to  exist  in  the  most  corrupt 

■  Thi»  WW  prond  (■>  the  conlmty  in  the    Mminiilniiorn  ot  Joha 
[^AtUn*.  when  »  caM|4M«(it  Senate  {onfirmeil  Mi-ci*t  fniiiiljt  Bppoiiit. 
nu.— Euliua, 


5"0        INTEGRITV  OF  SESATB  PftOBABLE.     !■«.«(«» 

periods  of  the  most  corrupt  governments.  Tlie  vcnalit; 
of  th«  british  House  of  Comnmns  has  been  long  a  topic 
of  accttsation  against  that  body,  in  the  country  to  which 
they  belon);  !x*  well  »»  in  this;  anil  it  cunnot  be  doubted 
that  ibe  cUarKe  is,  to  a  considerable  extent,  well  founded, 
liut  it  is  as  little  to  be  doubted  that  there  is  always  a 
targe  proportion  of  the  body  which  consists  of  inde- 
pendent and  public-spirited  men,  who  have  an  influential 
weight  in  the  councils  of  the  nation.  Hence  it  is  (the 
present  reign  not  excepted)  that  the  &cn$e  of  that  body 
is  often  seen  to  control  the  inclinations  of  the  monarch, 
both  with  regard  to  men  and  to  measures.  Though  it 
might  therefore  be  allowable  to  suppose  that  the  l^xccu- 
ttve  might  occasionally  influence  some  individuals  in  (he 
Senate,  yet  the  supposition  that  he  could  in  general 
purchase  the  integrity  of  the  whole  body  would  be  forced 
and  improbable.  A  nuin  di.tpufted  to  view  human  nature 
as  it  is,  without  either  flattering  its  virtues  or  exagger- 
ating its  vices,  will  sec  sufficient  ground  of  confidence  iti 
the  probity  of  the  Senate  to  rest  sattslicd,  not  only  that 
it  will  be  impracticable  to  the  Executive  to  corrupt  or 
seduce  a  majority  of  its  members,  but  that  the  necessity 
of  its  co-operation,  in  the  business  of  appointments,  will 
bea  considerable  and  salutary  restraint  upon  the  condoct 
of  that  magistrate.  Nor  is  the  integrity  of  the  Senate 
the  only  reliance.  The  Constitution  has  provided  some 
important  guards  against  the  danger  nf  executive  influence 
upon  the  legislative  body:  it  declares  that  "  No  senator 
or  representative  shall,  during  the  Wm^  for  toAi^M  he  vat 
elteuJ,  he  appointed  to  any  civil  office  under  the  United 
Slates,  which  shall  have  been  created,  or  the  emoluments 
whereof  shall  have  been  increased,  during  such  time;  and 
no  person,  holding  any  oflice  under  the  United  Stales, 
shall  be  a  member  of  either  house  during  his  continuance 
in  office."  FuBUi;s. 


HauilMoI 


CO.yCVKtl£.VCE  OP  SEA'ATS. 


5'» 


No.  77  [76].       iimj.ftmitwij*mmtt,hfAt.  ifM-i        Hamilton. 

APPOINTMENT    TO   OFFICE    AND    REMAINING 
POWERS  OK  PRESIDENT. 

The  tnuurrtiHt  */  lit  Smiili  tuitiiary  la  diiplaii  as  xr*U  at  la 
af'/vinf — OtJKliimt  ai  lo  hhJiu  latlrti  aj  lAt  .'timilf  iy  llu  PreiiJtHi 
tr  Ihi  rtvtrlr  taaiuttfiJ — OnHpartd  viilk  tyitcm  ■>/  affnHliMtitl 
(H  Atno  ytrk—Aff^nling  ftni-tr  shi/ulJ  te  dtttgaltd  Is  j  lemucil 
tr  ihartJ  in  *y  ikt  Httiit — t'fUKr  It  tf—mHmtatf  inffrmation  U 
Ctngrrti — T»  tttfmpttnJ  m/atutti  t»  Cengrnt — Te  tenvtiK  «tif  er  hoik 
bTmtKkti  tf  Ctngrtit — 7*  adfaum  Ctigmi — T»  rtititt  ambatiadfrt 
aadalktr  fiMie  minultri—  7i>  txttult  Ihr  Mtiii  •■/  lit  Umtt — T«  teiH- 
HtiituK  ttti  tfittn  »/  lltt  United  Stalei^C«9iludin£  ttiiiarki  at  Ikt 
Exatilivt, 

Tc  the  Pe^e  of  the  State  of  New  York: 

It  has  been  mentioned  as  one  of  the  advantagci  to  be 
expectcti  from  ilie  <:o'0(icraiion  of  tlie  Senate,  in  the 
sm  buKtnesit  of  appointments,  that  it  would  con- 

He  A5.  tribute  to  tile  stability  of  the  administration. 
The  consent  of  thai  body  would  be  iicceBsary  to  displace 
ati  well  a«  to  ai})>oinl.  A  change  of  the  Chief  M;i{(isiralr, 
therefore,  would  not  occasion  so  violent  or  so  general  a 
revolution  in  the  officers  of  the  government  as  might  be 
experte:!  if  he  were  the  sole  disposer  of  ofBoes.  Where 
a  man  in  any  station  had  given  satisfactory  evidence  of 
hts  fitness  for  it,  a  new  Pmtideni  would  be  restrained 
from  attempting  a  change  in  favor  of  a  person  more 
agreeable  to  him  by  the  apprehension  that  a  discounte- 
nance of  the  Senate  mi(;ht  fruKtrate  the  attempt  and  bring 
sumc  degree  of  discredit  upon  himself. '     Those  who  i:an 

*  tn  No.  55  HsmlliAn  ircued  llul  r4tfancie«  wouIJ  onit  rai-nll  ham 

"  iKiliniiy  ia»iHli11ct,"  IhUH  appumtlf  nut  i'OBC«ivli>|;,  u  \\e  duct  IwM, 
the  pOH-iUilily  u(  ii«ac|>iii|;  [«iiiunli  wiili  nth  iBtniiiiiiin;  I'tcuilcul.  Tki« 
practifr  I11&  siac«  l>t<i>tne  nlmuit  lh(  gtcntnl  (ttuiiiii)-  tlii^cc  of  ouc 
aslioeal  vH>lili-^.  9aA.  a>  nnlcxl  ctwulictc.  iti«  mmt  debinchint;  influrnce 
I  An  pabllc  nwioU,  iknl  to  pcntioiu.  lot  whicfa  out  ^[eiicral  eovcmiaml  is 
I  rc^pMuibJ*.  El  tu^  bccfi  ukujil  tu  B«LrJt>c  ihe  oit^u)  of  ihitpcillcy  l<i  Jcf. 
I  Itnon.  aiKl  fraiu  l)cn-.-o  to  ugu*  >  i>rtii1>aity  JciwktbIJc  nierii  in  the 
I  tfMm.  Hot  in  Ihit  (v«  live  irur  pvil,  I)«)>ub  Ifcfore  llie  cicction  ol  Ihe 
I      gicM  UeiiMM:tat,  ru  Uib  clcinikiii  lo.  or  cxdiuioa  from,  office  <A  Tiwa 


5l»  VS'DUe  COffTftOr.  OVER  SENATE.      WftTT* 

best  estimatt  the  value  or  a  steady  ailminiKlr.ttioii  will 
be  most  dUpuscO  to  prize  a  provision  which  conntcis  ibe 
official  existence  of  pnblic  men  with  the  approbation  or 
disapprobation  of  tJiat  body  which,  Trom  the  ceaier 
permanency  of  its  own  composition,  will  in  ^11  probability 
l>c  Irss  subject  to  inconstancy  than  any  other  member  of 
the  government 

To  this  union  of  the  Senate  with  the  President,  in  tb« 
4rtic1c  nf  appninlmc-nts,  it  has  in  some  cases  been  suk* 
gested  that  it  would  serve  lo  give  the  President  un  undue 
influence  over  the  Senate,  and  in  others  (hat  it  would 
have  an  opposite  tendency — a  strong  proof  that  neither 
suggestion  is  true. 

To  slate  the  first  in  its  proper  form  is  to  refute  it.  It 
amounts  to  this:  The  rresidenl  would  have  an  improper 


nol  liFiauK  (hey  were  fit  (a  niifil  (or  lli«  fmblk  tevnn,  biil  Wauue  tiKf 
clicxic  ti>  hold  iH-'ftDiiiil  vknk  on  (lolinct.  Thu«  ibe  »yiiciu  it  roll*  ■« 
tiiduviir  lo  lorn  men  ui  rc>i>iii  politkal  n|>iiii(>ii«.  u><l  h  lliRrlora  la  il* 
vccT  nwiKa  iinilemtimtic. 

The  «>)t  hitloty  lA  rimovaU  pesiestn  malctul  inihir.  Ib  Wuhiae* 
l(iii\  Bilininuliition  nppointiiicnli  wnc  mkde  lokljr  (or  filneu.  wUh 
•cin'i-'ly  any  i:iimid<Yal](iii  >A  ike  patlr  •icm  »(  Ihe  noiulocn.  aaci  lUl 
leil  Adiiiu  lu  cmnpiuiu  Ikal  "  Wsihiiijilnii  ■)i|i>,tiiiol  ■  Riallilailc  vk 
•Icmucfkli  ■nd  jacotiini,"  Fuithrrni'iri*.  friiiu  Ibv  S«crrlary  u(  Slatt; 
Jcffcnon,  lo  the  tnin%laliiij;  cipric  in  ihnt  <le))attmi:n(.  rrenraa.  oflkc- 
liolilcn  were  »ltu«iY>l  ihcu  oun  ii^iDiorK.  difler  u  the>'  mit^hl  linn  tht 
I'tcsi'lriit.  Ib  ihe  uholc  ci^hl  ftitfi.  Diil  one  wai  rrinnrcil  iir  iuilc<l  M 
rriisti  hiviuw  uf  \\n  (loliik^;  ami  Imiirr  wit.  vrciir*  tn  ton);  ai  rachoAciil 
•]|-t  hi<  <Tr>ik  hinFiltjr  sikI  lapahly.  When  Ailant  tocccMln).  be  (m  ihi 
tin4  lime  inlmluceil  ihe  ijrsKB  od  apipoiiitiDK  nr  tcntovinu  puhik  uAculi 
<iii  Hico^iit  >i(  iheii  Oi|'lnion,  and  Ihoi.  when  JclIcRoa  wu  dnicil  In  Ibc 
pmulriii'v.  Ill-  lo'iDil  a  i-lvU  urrvli-c  whlrh  Kwl  hten  picknl,  mil  lot  cA* 
cnnl  mliniiiiiliilitMt.  Wl  fiirgarliuit  piirfiuu^,  initwbich  rcmuilnl  lur  Ibt 
miHl  pan  o(  men  notMiuu^lr  ofipOHHl  In  him  and  to  hit  ailniiniuiatirr 
policy.  Vei  he  only  removed  >  Terj"  *'"  '*  •'■e  eiliembu.  ■nd  (ot  ihb 
■ic<«u>tly  he  ua^  hanlly  r<«|io«itil>lc.  Unfonuiiilely,  thcnc  eatly  pree- 
tilrnU  tA  Ailuiia  lUi'l  Jcllcnun.  and  fkfwitatly  the  »i|ii>tiM-il  ilrmiK- 
racy  i>(  the  Illte('^  aclion.  no'lc  il  ixKiitile  Foi  JuinHi.  who  ratne  Iwlli 
office  o-ilh  a  (Inltke  lor  ihe  riiabliihcd  <>i-il  vrvice,  to  InimlBre  a 
■lioleule  »ireep.  not  merely  to  remore  oAkul'.  hut  to  rewarJ  Ui 
adh-Tfeiilt  wilh  (Acainks  ihuk  cie^led.  Floni  IhM  il«niir)tliali>ia  ti 
••llii-r>h-'i<lr[  awl  liflire  ii-i'kfr  alike  itc  have  laffrfr-l  *»«i  irnti .  hnl 
fortmoMelr  ibe  e»trn\i"o  111  llie  civil  "■.>,:>■  i.u  ..,..,(.,  ii,,  „.,  r—i- 
dcnti   ptomitei  l»  end  evenluilly  tli'  -3 

coi'vniinenl.     U  U  njemoralile  ihll  v,  ■     .  i         .  I'n 

(lie  Seiiatt  Hid  lu  Imi  to  |irevcnt  ihe  wioft^  jiul  «k  it  wat  kmie  HiQ(«[nl 
ihjJ  Ihai  Iwty  wvuM—Cniinn. 


fftniltani     RESTRAINT  BY  SSKATB  SALUTARY.       513 


ia/liifiief  mrfr  \hc  Scnair,  because  tlic  Senate  would  tiavc 
llie  power  of  mlrainiitg  him.  This  is  an  ahsunlity  in 
termft.  It  cannot  admit  of  a  doubt  that  the  entire  [>on'er 
of  appoinimcnt  would  enable  him  much  mure  efTccttialty 
to  establish  a  dangerous  empire  over  tti.-ii  body  than  a 
mere  power  of  nomination  subject  to  thetr  control. 

I.ct  us  take  a  view  of  the  converse  of  the  proposition: 
"the  Senate  would  influence  the  Excculix-e."  As  1  have 
had  occasion  to  remark  in  several  other  instances,  the 
indistinctness  of  (he  objeclion  forbids  a  precise  answer. 
In  what  manner  in  this  influence  to  be  exerted?  In 
relation  to  what  objects?  The  power  of  inHucncing  a 
person,  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  here  used,  must  imply 
■1  power  of  conferring  a  benefit  upon  him.  Flow  could 
the  Senate  confer  a  benefit  upon  the  President  by  the 
manner  of  employing  their  right  of  pcf^ative  upon  his 
nominations?  If  it  be  said  they  might  sometimes  gratify 
him  by  an  acquteitcence  in  a  favorite  choice,  when  public 
motives  mijiht  dictate  a  different  conduct,  I  answer  that 
the  instances  in  which  the  President  could  be  personally 
interested  in  the  result  would  be  too  few  to  admit  of  his 
beini;  materially  affected  by  the  compliances  of  the 
Senate.  The  power  which  can  originait  the  dispo.sition 
of  honors  and  emoluments  is  mure  likely  to  attract  than 
to  be  attracted  by  the  power  which  can  merely  obstruct 
their  course.  If  by  influencing  the  President  be  meant 
rrslrai'ii^g  him.  this  is  precisely  what  must  have  been 
intended.  .And  it  has  been  shown  that  the  restraint 
would  be  salutary,  at  the  same  time  that  it  would  not  be 
such  as  to  destroy  a  single  advantage  to  be  looked  for 
from  the  uncontrolled  agency  of  that  magistrate.  The 
right  of  nnraination  would  produce  all  the  good  of  that  of 
appointment,  and  would  in  a  great  measure  avoid  its  evils. 

Upon  3  comjiariMfi  of  the  ptin  for  the  appointment  o(  ihe  ofli' 
cers  a\  ll»r  prnfioteal  j;oiTmmcnl  Willi  thai  wtiich  I*  eilalijalied  by 
BMirai.0S  '''e  cun«ti(utiun  of  ihU  St^tc.  a  decided  preference 
10,  unI74.  must  hr.  f^wrn  to  the  lonxtft.  In  that  pUn  the  power 
of  nomination  is  uncquit'ix^ally  v«Mr<l  in  the  Executive.  Anitas 
there  would  be  a  neceMily  for  submitting  each  nominatioa  to  the 


U 


■M 


514  NEW  YORK  i^triiOD  OF  APPOINTMENT.    «•.  Trrr» 

juil^mcriL  ot  an  eiitici;  branch  of  Ihc  kgiililuic.  Ihc  drcumtUncn 
aitcniliiig  AH  Aj>jioinlni«nl,  from  (he  mode  tA  conduct iii^,'  it,  would 
nalurully  btcuini^  matters  o(  noloriely  ;  and  \\x  puMic  would  be  it 
no  loss  lo  ilctcrininc  what  pin  hud  bcci)  performt^  by  the  diflemii 
aclori.  The  blame  of  a  bad  nonilRaiion  urould  fall  ujioit  the 
l'rcsi<lent  singly  and  absolutely.  The  censure  ol  rejecting  a  good 
one  would  lie  entirely  at  the  door  of  the  Senate  -,  axxiavated  by 
the  coiiMdcraiioii  of  their  having  counteracted  the  good  inicntkwi 
of  Ihc  Exccuiirc.  If  an  ill  uppuintuient  should  be  nude,  the  Exec- 
utive for  nominating,  and  the  Senate  for  approving,  would  pantci- 
pate,  though  in  different  <legre«,  in  the  opprobrium  and  ditj^rare. 
The  reverse  of  all  this  cluractcriies  the  ntanner  of  appointment 
in  this  Stale.  The  council  of  appointment  Gon»tsU  tA  from  titree 
10  five  persons,  of  whom  the  governor  is  always  one.  This  small 
bcidy,  ihut  up  in  a  private  apartmenl.  impenetrable  to  the  public 
eye.  proceed  to  the  execution  of  tlie  trust  committed  lo  them.  Ii 
in  known  that  the  govern oi  cbims  tlic  right  of  nomination,  npM 
Ihc  sircngtU  of  some  .iiubiguous  cipiessions  in  the  conaiJinlMn: 
but  it  i>  not  known  10  what  extent.  (»  in  what  mannef  he  nerctses 
it ;  nor  upon  what  occasions  he  is  conlradicted  or  opposed.  Tbc 
censure  of  a  bad  appointment,  on  account  cA  the  uncertainty  of  its 
author,  ami  lur  want  of  a  determinate  obfcct.  has  ncillier  poignancy 
nor  duration.  Am)  while  an  unbounded  field  lor  cabal  and  in- 
trigue lies  open,  all  idea  of  rcspunsibiliiy  is  last.  Tlie  rouM  llut 
the  iHibtic  can  know  is  thai  the  governor  claims  the  right  of  nomi- 
iiatbon  :  thai  /kw  out  of  the  inconsiderable  number  tAJear  men  cia 
too  often  be  ntanagcd  wiihoui  much  difficulty ;  that  if  tame  of  the 
members  of  a  paiiKulat  council  should  happen  lu  be  uf  an  urcmb- 
jftying  character,  it  is  frcquettlly  not  impossible  to  gel  tid  nf  ihetr 
opposition  by  regulating  the  ttmesoi  meeting  in  sucli  a  maniter  as 
10  render  their  attendance  inconvenient ;  and  that,  from  whaiercr 
cause  it  may  proceed,  a  grcai  number  «(  very  improper  appoUil- 
ments  are  from  litne  la  linte  made.  Whether  a  governor  of  this 
State  avails  liims«ll  of  ihe  ascendant  he  must  necessarily  have,  in 
this  delicate  and  impun.int  part  ol  the  admin tsiiat  ion,  to  prefer  ta 
oAkes  men  who  are  best  qualified  lor  iliem.  on  whether  he  proKi- 
lutes  that  advantage  to  the  advancement  of  persons  whose  chief 
merit  is  their  implicit  devotion  lo  his  will,  and  to  tlie  support  ul  a 
despicable  and  tlanKcfous  system  <>(  personal  influcttce.  arc  qucv 
lions  which,  unfortunately  for  the  communiiy,  can  only  be  the  sul^ 
)ect9  ol  speculation  and  connect uic. 

Every   mere   council  of    appointment,    huvrcvrr  cni»- 
ktituted,  trill  Im:  a  conclare   in  which  cabal  and  intrigue 


HMUttBl      Et'iLS  OF  AX  AFPOINTIXG  COVXCIL.      SIS 

will  have  tlicir  (ull  scope.  Their  number,  without  an 
unwarranUblc  increase  of  expense,  cannot  be  large 
eiiciugh  tu  |>rcctii<Jc  a  facility  uf  eumbi nation.  And  s.% 
each  member  will  have  hi»  friends  and  connections  to 
provide  for,  the  desire  of  mutual  gratHication  will  beget 
a  sc:ii)daloiis  bartering  uf  votes  and  luirgaining  for 
places.  The  private  attachnionis  of  one  man  mixhc 
easily  be  satisfied;  but  to  satisfy  the  private  attachments 
of  a  tlojcn,  or  of  twenty  men,  would  occasion  a  monopoly 
of  all  the  principal  em  ploy  men  tti  of  the  government  in  a 
few  families,  and  would  lead  more  directly  to  an  aris- 
tocracy or  an  oligarchy  than  any  measure  that  could  be 
contrived.  If,  to  avoid  an  accumulation  of  offices,  there 
was  to  be  a  frequent  change  in  the  persons  who  were  to 
compose  the  council,  this  would  involve  the  mischiefs  uf  a 
mutable  administration  in  their  full  extent.  Suchacoun< 
cil  would  also  be  more  Uiibic  to  executive  influence  than 
the  Senate,  because  they  would  be  fewer  in  number,  and 
would  act  less  immediately  under  the  |)ubiic  inspection, 
Such  a  council,  in  fiTR-,  as  a  substitute  for  the  plan  of  the 
convention,  would  be  productive  of  an  increase  of  ex- 
pense, a  multiplication  of  the  evils  which  spring  from 
favoritism  and  intrigue  in  the  distribution  of  public 
honors,  a  decrease  of  stability  in  the  administration  of 
the  government,  and  a  diminution  of  the  security  against 
an  undue  inltuencc  of  the  Executive.  And  yet  such  a 
council  has  been  warmly  contended  for  as  an  essential 
amendment  in  the  proposed  Constitution. 

I  could  nut  with  propriety  conclude  my  observations 
on  the  subject  of  appointments  without  taking  notice  of 
a  scheme  for  which  there  have  appeared  some,  though  but 
few  advocates;  I  mean  that  of  uniting  llic  House  of 
Representatives  in  the  power  of  making  ihem.  I  shall, 
however,  do  little  more  than  mention  it,  as  1  cannot 
imagine  that  it  \%  likely  to  gain  the  countenance  of  any 
considerable  part  of  the  community,  A  body  so  fluctuat- 
ing and  at  the  s.imc  time  so  numerous,  can  never  be 
deemed  proper  for  the  exerciite  of  that  power.     Its  unfit- 

tvill  appear  manifest  to  all,  when  it  is  recollected 
"-  -  —  -  -^^ 


5l6        KEMA/XrXC  POtfK/tS  OP  EXF.CUTIVR.       nh," 

liiat  in  half  a  centurjr  it  muy  consist  of  three  or  four 
hundrcil  [tcrsons.  All  the  advaDtagcn  of  tiie  stability, 
tmth  of  the  Executive  and  of  the  Senate,  woald  be  de- 
feated \v$  this  union,  and  infinite  delays  and  embarrass- 
ments would  be  occasioned.  The  example  of  most  of 
the  Slates  in  their  local  constitutions  encourages  us  to 
reprobate  the  idea. 

The  only  remaining  powers  of  the  Executive  are  com* 
prehended  in  givinu  information  to  Congress  of  the  slate 
uf  tkc  Union;  in  recommending  to  their  consideration 
such  measures  as  he  shall  judge  expedient;  in  convening 
them,  or  cither  branch,  upon  extraordinary  occasions;  in 
adjourning  them  when  they  cannot  themselves  agree 
upon  the  time  uf  adjournment;  in  receiving  ambas&ailurs 
and  other  public  ministera;  in  faithfully  executing  the 
laws;  and  In  commissioning  all  the  officers  of  the  United 
Stales. 

Except  some  cavils  about  the  power  of  convening  tilhtr 
house  of  the  legislature,  and  that  of  receiving  amba.«sa> 
dors,  no  objection  has  been  made  to  this  class  of  authuri- 
ties;  nor  could  they  possibly  admit  of  any.  It  required, 
indeed,  an  insatiable  avidity  for  censure  to  invent  excep- 
tions to  the  parts  which  have  been  excepted  lo.  In 
regard  (o  the  power  of  convening  either  honse  of  the  leg- 
islature, 1  shall  barely  remark  that,  in  respect  to  the 
Senate  at  least,  we  can  readily  discover  a  good  reason 
for  it.  As  this  body  has  a  concurrent  power  with  the 
Executive  in  the  article  of  tre.ttics,  it  might  often  be 
necessary  to  call  it  together  with  a  view  to  thta  object, 
when  it  would  l>e  unnecessary  and  improper  to  convene 
the  House  of  Representatives.  As  to  the  deception  of 
ambassadors,  what  I  liave  said  in  a  former  paper  will  fur- 
nish  a  sufficient  answer. 

We  have  now  completed  a  survey  of  the  structure  and 
powers  of  thcexecutive  department  which,  I  have  endeav- 
ored to  show,  combines,  as  far  as  republican  principles 
will  admit,  all  the  requisites  to  energy.  The  remain- 
ing  inquiry  is;  Hoes  it  also  combine  the  rer;uisltes  In 
safety,  in  a  republican  sense — a  due  dependence  oo  Itie 


A 


H»^tao)      EXECUTIVE  DULY  RESPONSIBLE. 


5'7 


people,  3  due  responsibility?  The  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion has  b«cn  antiripated  in  llic  invfMigjlii>n  ii(  its  other 

^characteristics,  and  is  aatitfaclorily  dcitucible  (rom  these 
circumstances:  from  the  election  of  the  I'residcnt  once 
in  four  years  tiy  persons  inimcilintcly  chosen  by  the  peo- 
ple for  that  piirpD^te;  and  from  his  being  at  all  times 
liable   to  impeachment,  trial,  dismission  from  office,   in- 

t^capacily  to  serve  in  any  other,  and  to  furfeilure  of  life 
and  estate  by  subsequent  prosecution  in  the  common 

icoursc  of  bw.  But  these  precautions,  great  as  they  arc, 
are  not  Ihc  only  ones  which  the  plan  of  the  convention 
has  provided  in  favor  of  the  public  SKCurity.      In  the  only 

I  instances  in  which  the  abuse  of  the  executive  authority 
materially  to  he  feared,  the  Chief  Magistrate  of  the 
\\rA  Stiitcs  would,  by  that  plan,  be  subjected  to  the 
control  of  a  branch  of  the  legislative  body.  What  more 
could  be  desired  by  an  enlightened  and  reasonable  people? 

I'UftLIUS.. 


No.  78.         tFiiu  aiiKud  t^iiDi..  n™  vaA.  %m\         Hamilton. 

TENURE    OF    OFFICE    OF  THli   JUDICIAL    DE- 
PARTMENT. 


Mfiit  *f  ttffvintmtnt —  7'nmn — NttJ  n/  ifinftttt  inJcftudtmct — 
Anlh^ity  In  (•rfnfUiKt  »m  Iht  fniHlHlimutity  b/  Ihr  Miri —  TAr  Ifgiita- 
turt  ihfaU  tf  lif  /!•</('  "/  ill  •"■'■'  fr'Ufn — Inltt^trtaltm  0/  Ikt  liitat 
Ikr  pfSHliir  frt»inKt  a/  tht  }u.t)(iary—Nttii9f  imlrftitJfiut  .'H  thit  at- 
*BKnl~!itdtf^adtn{t  rt^nirtd  for  jmiidary  ti  guarHaHi  rf  Ihi  CsHith 
lulifn  tt»4  *f  fritnit  righli  at  wiil—tVii4Mi  »f  rtqmiriag g^^  teka^r 
ar  iaiii  e/  Unmrt, 

To  the  People  0/  t/ie  S/ate  of  Nno  York: 

We  proceed  now  to  an  examination  of  the  judiciary  (le> 
partment  of  the  proposed  government. 

In  unfoldini;  the  defects  of  the  existing  Confederation, 
llic  utility  and  necessity  of  a  federal  judicature  have  been 
clearly  pointed  ont.  It  is  the  less  necessary  to  recapitu- 
late the  considerations  there  urged,  as  the  propriety  of 


Si8 


CONSTITUTION  OF  JUDlCtAKV. 


iifo.  :■ 


the  institution  in  the  abstract  is  not  (lis|)ut<:d;  the  on\j 
qucstiQiis  which  have  been  raised  being  relative  lu  the 
manner  of  constitulinK  it,  and  to  its  extent.  To  these 
points,  therefore,  our  ubsrfrations  sliall  be  confined. 

The  milliner  of  conxituttng;  ii  Keeins  to  embrace  these 
several  objects:  ist.  The  mode  of  appointing  the  jtulges, 
ad.  The  tenure  by  which  they  are  to  hold  their  places. 
^A.  The  partition  of  the  judiciary  authority  between  dif- 
ferent courts,  and  their  relation!)  to  each  oiher. 

Firit.  As  to  the  mode  of  appointing  the  judges;  this  is 
the  same  with  that  uf  app^jintin^  the  ufficcrtt  of  ilie  Union 
in  general,  and  has  been  so  fully  discussed  in  the  two  last 
numbers,  that  nothing  can  be  said  here  which  would  not 
be  useless  repetition. 

Stfoit/.  As  to  tbe  tenure  by  which  the  indues  arc  to 
hold  their  places:  this  chiefly  concerns  their  duration  in 
office;  the  pruviKions  for  their  support;  the  precaution* 
for  their  respon»ibility. 

According  to  the  plan  of  the  convention,  all  judges 
who  may  be  appointed  by  the  United  States  are  to  hold 
their  oRiceit  rfort'wy  jf iW  bthafior;  which  \%  conformable  to 
the  most  approved  oi  Uie  Mate  constitutions,  and  among 
the  rest,  to  that  of  this  Suie.  Its  propriety  having 
been  drawn  into  qtiestion  by  the  adversaries  of  that  plan, 
is  no  light  symptom  of  the  rage  for  objection  which  dis- 
orders their  imaginations  and  judgments.  The  standard 
uf  good  behavior  (or  the  continuance  in  office  of  the 
judicial  magistracy  is  certainly  one  of  the  roost  valuable 
of  the  mo<lcrn  improvements  in  the  practice  of  govern- 
ment. Ill  a  monarchy  it  is  an  excellent  t>arrier  to  the 
despotism  of  the  prince;  in  a  republic  it  is  a  no  less  ex- 
cellent  barrier  to  the  encroachments  and  oppressions  ol 
the  representative  body.  And  it  is  tlie  best  expedient 
which  can  be  deviled  in  any  government  to  secure  a 
stoady,  upright,  and  impartial  administration  of  ibe  Inwv 
,  Whoever  attentively  considers  the  different  depart- 
tnenis  of  power  must  perceive  that,  in  a  government  in 
which  they  arc  separated  from  each  other,  the  judiciary, 
frora  the  nature  of  its  functions,  will  always  be  the  lea) 


KmbUUbI    relative    weakness  of  JVDICiAttY.     S19 


dangerous  to^hc  polilical rights  of  the  Constitution ;  be- 
cause U  witi  b^  least  in  a.  capacity  to  annoy  or  injure 
them.     The   Executive  not  only  dispen^cK  the  honors, 
but  hokls  the  sword  of  the  community.     The  IcKi&laiure 
Hot  only  commiinds  the  purse,  but  prescribes  the  rules  by 
rhich  the  duties  and  rights  of  every  cittien  are  to  be 
plated.     The  judiciary,  on  the  contrary,  has  no  inBu- 
o*er  either  the  swonj  or  the  purse;  no  direction 
either  of  the  strength  or  of  the  wealth  of  the  »odcty; 
and  can   take   no  active   resolution   whatever.     It  raayl 
truly  be  said  to  have  neither  roKce  nor  witL,  but  merely  | 
judifmenl;  and  must  ultimately  depend  upon  the  aid  of/ 
the  executive  arm  even  for  the  cffii:acy  of  its  judijment^ 

This  simple  view  of  the  matter  suggests  several  im- 
portant consequences.  It  proves  inconte^tahly  that  the 
judiciary  is  beyond  comparison  the  weakest  of  the  three 
departments  of  power*;  that  it  can  never  attack  with 
success  cither  of  the  other  two;  and  that  all  possible 
care  is  reciuisite  to  enable  it  to  defend  itself  against  their 
attaclcs.  It  equally  proves  that  though  individual  op. 
pression  may  now  and  then  proceed  from  the  courts  of 
justice,  the  genera)  liberty  of  the  people  can  never  be 
endangered  from  that  quarter;  I  mean  so  long  as  the 
judiciary  remains  truly  distinct  from  both  the  legislature 
;inil  the  Execnltvc.  For  I  agree  that  "there  is  no 
liberty,  if  the  power  of  judging  be  not  separated  from  the  , 
legislative  and  ciccutivc  powers."  f  And  it  proves,  in 
the  last  place,  that  as  liberty  can  have  nothing  to  fear 
from  the  judiciary  alone,  but  would  have  everything  to 
fear  from  its  union  with  either  of  the  other  departments; 
that  as  all  the  effects  of  such  a  union  must  ensue  from  a 
dependence  of  the  former  on  the  latter,  notwithstanding 
a  nominal  and  apparent  separation;  that  as,  from  the 
natural  feebleness  of  the  judiciary,  it  is  in  continual 
jeopardy  of  being  overpowered,  awed,  or  inHucnccd  by 


•The  oekliraiecl  Monltuiiikii,  t^tcakin^  (.f  them,  wy»;  "0(lli«  thr«t 
pnwCT»  «l"i*p  n>tntio(ir<l.  Itie  judkiuy  u  nexl  to  nothinc.' — "Spirit  ol 

L«"%."  Mil     i.  pL   1»6.— Pl'SI.IUJ, 

I  IJtM,  p.  iSi. — Punuu*. 


5*0      JUDICIAL  IlfDHPEXDESCE  KECESSARi'.     iWo.  71 


^ts  co-ordinate  branches;  and  that,  as  nothing  can  con- 
tfibntc  »o  much  to  its  riniiness  and  itidcpcndence  iu 
permanency  in  office,  this  quality  may  therefore  be  justly 
regarded  as  an  indispensable  ingredient  in  its  constitu- 
tion, and.  in  a  great  incisure,  as  tlie  eiudcl  »i  the  public 
tjuslice  and  the  public  security, 

The  complete  iodcpentlencc  of  the  courts  o(  justice 
■s  peculiarly  essential  in  a  limited  Constitution,  p^y  a 
|m)ited  Constitution  1  umtcrstJiid  one  which  contains 
I  certain  spcciflcd  exceptions  to  the  legislative  uutbortty; 
such,  for  instance,  as  that  it  sliall  jkiss  no^bills  of  attain- 
der, no  ex  pvsl  faeto  law&,  and  the  like. /Limitations  of 
this  kind  can  be  preserved  in  practice  no  other  nay  than 
through  the  medium  uf  courts  of  justice,  whose  duty  it 
it^gfH  In-  to  ilprl:|rc  all  acts  contrary  to  the  manifest  tenor 
of  th.-  t:oiistitutjon  void,] 


Without  tins,  all  the  rcscrra. 
lions  of  particular  rights  or  privileges  would  amount  to 
Dotliing. 

Some  perplexity  respecting  the  rights  of  the  courts  to 
pronounce  Iccislalivc  act«  void,  because  contrary  to  the 
Constitution,  lias  arisen  from  an  imagination  that  the 
doctrine  would  imply  a  superiority  of  the  judiciary  to 
the  legislative  power.  Iiisuri^ed  that  the  authority  wtiich 
can  declare  the  acts  of  artothcr  void  must  necessarily  be 
superior  to  the  one  whose  ads  may  be  declared  void. 
As  ttiis  doctrine  is  of  K^eat  importance  in  all  the  Ameri- 
can constitutions,  a  brief  discussion  of  thi  ground  on 
which  it  rests  cannot  be  unacceptable.' 

'  During  Iks  carijr  yrun  of  our  i<n>emnKn(  <hU  priadplr,  (hxt  ll  ou 
tot-  iht  fciTenl  (outU  la  <)M«le  irliellier  »IM,  were  OMtiiltiii  t. 

w.ii  w>  little  ■cccple't  ihU(h«  I'mldciiU  ciw>i-Uinl  Uieiiuir) ,  .i> 

well.      WruhlB|;(iiii  xioeii  ibc  ii|>|utli'>nni«iil  liill  nf  I7r)i  nr  I 

ihaindtd  noteucfom  lolli*  conMilutianal  nijuirnnrntt.     Jc>l>  r..  n   » n' 

mate  olrcsic  action,  liolJin|[  the  alien  uhI  irililiiia  iic(< '"  ' 

tiuvil.  uluall)'  refiucil  to  concidicr  llieiu  at  Ui>».  tbixj  > 

puMd  bjr  Conicrat  xnd  approvctd  by  ilin  I'tniilcni, 

JackMn.    Tflei.    Potk.    txiA   ("fcrvc   Vdofd    iiilcrcLl    imiirii'  l> 

bcuulclli«Tb«lleve<llhrnl  lohaiiiiointiitiiipniiiil.  aitt  Jirfcvi 

HflM;  iliai  Ite  intemterl  lo  luiiport  (h«  cooiiiiiitinn  ■>  hr 

Slowlj,  bowevvr.  upinioM  luu  boconw  noctil  llul  iK:  ■'. 

,  can»niuiiniulH)>  i><kn  mi  rcMiMtely  wlih  tbo  Supicu..  . .....  ..  ^ 

tm»af  Iran   (ihm   the   pnuilcatlal   ><«>  lia>  Icvu   IntfrpOMd  on   IU> 
rraoiul.— KuiioiL. 


Jft 


lUalnuI      UMIT  OF  DELEGATED  AUTHORITY.       l%\ 


Tlicrc  U  no  posiUoii  which  depends  on  clearer  priociJ 
pies  than  \Wa\.  every  act  of  a  delegated  authority,  com 
.  trary  to  the  tenor  of  the  commiasioD  under  which  it  i« 
Im  exerciiicd,  is  void,     ^o  legislative  act,  there*' 

Ha.  11.  fore,    conlTarx__tp_  th5_  CoiWlilution,    can  Ec 

valid.  To  deny  this  would  be  to  afiirro  that  the  deputy 
is  greater  than  his  principaU  that  the  servant  is  above 
ht>  master;  that  the  representatives  of  the  people  arc 
superior  to  the  people  themselves;  that  men  acting  by 
virtue  of  powers  may  do  not  only  what  their  powers  do 
not  authoriie,  but  what  they  forbid.' 

If  it  be  said  that  the  legislative  body  are  themselves  the 
constitutional  judges  of  theif  own  powers,  and  that  the 
construction  they  put  upon  them  is  conclnsivc  upon 
the  other  departments,  it  may  be  answered  tlut  this 
cannot  be  the  natural  presumption,  where  it  is  not  to  be 
collected  from  any  particular  provisions  in  the  Consti* 
tutiun.  It  is  not  otherwise  to  be  supposed  that  the 
Constitution  could  intend  to  enable  the  representatives 
of  the  people  to  substitute  their  tc///  to  that  of  their 
constituents.  Kit  is  far  more  rational  to  suppose  that 
the  courts  vrere  designed  to  be  an  intcfmediute  body 

bftgrrn  ^hp  pfppli*    anri   thf    (fgiclamr^^    in   order, JUUOng 

Other  things,  to^kce(tthcJatter  within  thi;  limits  assigned 
tQ.Uicicjat h ori ly^  'Th^  interpretation  of  the  laws  is  the 
properaad  peculiar  province  of  the  courts.  A  constitu- ' 
tion  is,  in  fact,  and  must  be  regarded  by  the  judges,  as  a 
fundamental  law.  It  therefore  belongs  to  them  to  ascer- 
tain  its  meaning,  as  well  as  the  meaning  of  any  particu- 
lar act  proceeding  from  the  legislative  body/(  If  there 
|t should  happen  to  be  an  irreconcilable  variance  between 
the  two,  that  which  has  the  superior  obligation  and 
validity  ought,  of  course,  to  be  preferred;  or,  in  other 
wonlft,  the  r<in<ti^ii^|nn  9Uf;ht  to  be  preferred  to  ^he 
statute;  the  intention  of  the  people  to  the  intention  of 
■"lhclr"Sgcnt|r 

Nor  does  tliis  conclusion   by  any   means  suppose  a 


'See   M>re1ull'»  optnian   in   Mubtuy  v,  Maditon,  io   Appendix. — 
Bmiur. 


^ 


'illH '1 J    *"""'■ 

only  iujiposcs  ilut  llic  puwer  of  [lit 


CijtTiT 


aiio  tii.it  where  the  will 


IV*.  Tl 

■iniTi"'"-'  r"'irT'    It 

e  j^  iup'.-i'ior  to 


/ 


tilt  (i.i-.i'-l.itnrc.  iK-'furol 
i^Mtinri  In  il'-.i;  yl  iln-  ucuple. 


Ill  '''•  ^^il^"'''^    ■■i.imK  in  i>|  ____^_. 

(leclarcd  in  the  i.iin51l!llll(iii,  iTic  jii<I;;c&  ought  to  tw 
govcrnctl  by  the  latter  mthcr  than  the  former.  Thejr 
ought  to  rcgn)»l«  their  decisions  hy  the  fumhimental 
law*,  rather  than  by  those  which  are  not  luDdamcntalJ 

This  exercise  of  judicial   discretion,  in   determining 
between    tvo   contniOiciory   bws,    ijt    exemplified  in   a 
familiar    instance.     It    not    uncommonly   happens  that 
there  arc  two  statutes  existing  at  one  time,  clashing  in 
whole  or  in  |iart  with  each  other,  and  neither  o(  them 
containing  any  repealing  clause  or  expression.     In  such 
a  cjse,  it  is  the  province  of  the  courts  to  liquidate  and 
fix  their  meaning  and  iiperalionTl  So  f.ir  as  ihey  can  by 
any  fair  construction  be  reconciffa  to  cjch  other,  reason 
and  law  conspire  to  dictate  that  thia  should  be  dotte; 
where   this   is    impractic.iblc,   it  becomes  a  matter  of 
.    necessity  to  give  effect  to  one,  in  exclunion  of  (he  othcf. 
V The  rule  whith  has  obtained  in  the  courts  for  delermio- 
^**fng  their  reUlivc  validity  is  that  the  last  in  order  of  time 
^  shall  be  preferred  to  the  firsL     But  this  !s  a  mere  rule 
^  of  construction,  not  derived  from  any  positiTe  law,  bnt 
^XcS  from  the  nature  and  reason  of  the  thing.     It  is  a  rule  not 
X  3  '^"i"'"^*'  u|>on  the  courts  by  legislative  proriiuon,  but 
"^        adopted  by  themselves,  as  consonant  to  trulh  and  pro- 
priety, for  thejlirection  of  their  conduct  as  interpreters 
of  the  law.  fThey  thought  it  reasonable  that,  l>elween 
the  interfering  acts  of  an  ffitat  authority,  that  which  was 
the  last  indication  of  its  will  should  have  the  preferenctT} 
But  in  regjrrd  to  the  interfering  acts  of  a  superior  oo^ 
subordinate    authority,    of   an  original    and    derivative 
|iower,  the  nature  and  reason  of  the  thing  indicate  the 
converse  ol   thai  rule  as  proper  to  be  (ullowcd.     They 
teach  us  that  the  prior  act  of  a  superior  ought  to  be 
preferred  to  the  subsequent  act  i>f  an  inferior  and  ^uln 
dinale  authority;  and  that  accord inKt)'>  whenever  a  , 
I  ticular  stitute  contravenes  the  Constitution,  it  will  be  the 

^ c 


HAmllUDi    COVJtTS  COffST/rOTiOSAL  BULH'AKKS.     S'J 


duty  of  the  judicial  tribunals  to  adhere  to  the  latter  and 
disregard  the  former. 

It  can  be  of  no  weight  to  say  that  the  courts,  on  the 
pretense o(  a  repugnancy,  may  substitute  their  own  pleas* 
ure  to  the  constitutional  intenliont  of  the  legislature. 
This  might  as  wcJl  happen  in  the  case  of  two  contradicKiry 
statutes;  nr  it  might  as  well  happen  in  every  adjudication 
upon  any  single  statute.  Tii*-j*mrt^  nnl  declare  ilir  . 
sense  "f  the  l.nv:  ami  if  thcv  should  be  dj^pfiKpH  '■-■  .-v.-f 

y\^r    villi      ]]i'il-,Mil     rii      ir  IliTviKN  r,    [hf    rnii^jjjjIIIIIIM      \\      lllll 

equally  be  the  substitution  ol  lliiir  nleaiiure  \v  tim  of 
~ilii  li  jii  I  iliiii  I-™']'  Tin  iilmil  iliiiii,  il  ii  \\\  HI  any- 
thing, would  prove  that  there  ought  to  be  no  judges 
distinct  from  that  Intdy. 

If,  then,  the  courts  of  justice  arc  to  be  considered  as 
the  bulwarks  of  a  limited  Constitution  against  legislative 
encroachments,  this  consideration  will  afford  a  strong 
argument  for  the  permanent  tenure  of  judicial  offices, 
since  noihinj;  will  contribute  so  much  as  this  to  that 
independent  spirit  in  the  judges  which  must  be  essential 
to  the  faithful  performance  of  so  arduous  a  duty. 

This  independence  of  the  judges  is  equally  requisite  to 
guard  the  Constitution  and  the  rights  of  individuals  from 
the  effects  of  those  ill  humors  which  the  arts  of  design- 
ing men  or  the  inltuence  of  particular  conjunctures  some-, 
times  disseminate  among  the  people  themselves,  and! 
which,  though  they  speedily  give  place  to  better  informa- 
tion and  more  deliberate  reflection,  have  a  tendency,  in 
the  mciintime,  to  occasion  dangerous  innovations  in  the 
government  and  serious  oppressions  of  the  minor  party 
in  tbc  community.  Though  1  trust  the  friends  of  the 
proposed  Constitution  will  never  concur  with  its 
enemies*  in  questioning  that  fundamental  principle  of 
republican  government  which  admits  the  right  of  the 
people  to  alter  or  abolish  the  established  Constitution 
vrhencTcr  they  find  it  inconsistent  with  their  happiness, 
yet  it  is  not  to  be  inferred  from  this  principle  that  tbc 

•  fide  ••  Proicw  at  the  ttlinoriijp  ot  tb«  CooTcntion  of  penntrK*'^.' 
Matiia't  Speech,  cic— rvfLIUS. 


f» 


S»4    coysrirurioN BixDs tiEPRsssii/TArjyes.\M*.n 

representatives  of  the  people,  whenever  a  momeniarf 
incliiution  liappens  to  lay  hold  of  u  majurit)r  of  their 
constituents,  incompatible  with  the  provtsioas  in  the 
existing  Constitution,  would,  on  that  account,  be  justi- 
Aable  in  a.  violation  of  those  provisions;  or  that  tlic 
courts  would  be  under  a  greater  oblif^ation  to  connive  ai 
infractions  in  this  shape  than  when  they  had  proceeded 
wholl/  from  the  Gal>als  of  the  repretientaitvc  Irady. 
Until  the  people  have  by  some  soleran  and  authoritative 
act  annulled  or  changed  Ihc  established  form,  it  is  biad- 
in;;  upon  themMlves  collectively  as  welt  as  in<tividiiatly; 
and  no  presumption,  or  even  knowledge,  of  their  senti* 
ments  can  warrant  their  representatives  in  a  departure 
from  it,  prior  tu  such  an  act.  But  it  is  easy  to  see  that 
it  would  require  an  uncommon  portion  of  fortitude  in 
the  judges  to  do  their  duty  as  faithful  guardians  of  the 
Constitution,  where  legislative  invasions  of  it  had  been 
instigated  by  the  major  voice  of  the  community. 

But  it  is  not  with  a  view  to  infractions  of  the  Constitu- 
tion only  that  the  independence  of  the  judges  may  be 
an  essential  safeguard  against  the  effects  of  O4;casional 
ill  humors  in  the  society.  These  sometimes  eiiend  no 
farther  than  to  the  injury  of  the  private  rights  of  par- 
ticular classes  of  citizens,  by  unjust  and  i>artial  laws. 
Here  also  the  lirmness  of  the  judicial  magistracy  is  of 
vast  importance  in  mitigatim|  the  severity  and  conhning 
I  the  operation  of  such  laws.  .  1 1  not  only  serves  to  isuder- 
ate  the  immediate  mischiefs  of  those  which  may  have 
Iwcn  passed,  hut  it  operates  as  a  check  ujian  the  legisla- 
tive body  ill  passing  them;  who,  perceiving  that  obstacles 
to  the  success  of  iniquitous  intention  are  to  be  cipeeutd 
from  the  scruples  of  the  courts,  are  in  a  manner  com- 
pellcd,  by  the  very  motives  of  the  injustice  they  medrtate, 
to  qualify  their  attempts.  This  is  a  circumstance  cal- 
culated to  bare  more  influence  upon  the  character  of  our 
governments  than  but  few  may  be  aware  of.  The  bene- 
lits  of  the  integrity  and  moderation  of  the  judiriary  have 
already  been  felt  in  mure  States  tJian  one;  and  tliouifh 
they  may  have  displeased  those  whose  sintsier   eipcc- 


BftMUtOBl  IXDBPBNDENCE  A  JUDICIAL  NECESSITY.  S*S 


uiions  they  may  have  disappointed,  they  must  have  cotn- 
manilcd  the  esttvtn  and  Jt>|tl;iiise  )■(  ;il]  the  virtuuus  and 
ditiintcrcslcd.  Cui»>derjtc  meu  uf  every  de&iiriptiun 
uujjht  to  prize  whatever  wUI  tend  to  beget  vr  (urtify  that 
temper  in  the  courts;  as  no  man  can  be  sure  that  he 
may  not  be  tD-morrow  the  victim  of  a  spirit  u(  injustice 
by  which  he  may  be  a  gainer  to-day.  And  every  man 
must  DOW  feel  that  the  ineviiable  tendency  of  su«;h  a 
spirit  is  to  sap  the  foundations  of  public  and  private 
confidence  and  to  introduce  in  its  stead  universal  dis- 
iruM  and  distress. 

Thut  inllexilile  and  uniform  adherence  to  the  rights  of 
the  Constitution  and  of  individuals,  which  we  perceive 
to  be  indispensable  in  the  courts  of  justice,  can  certiiinly 
not  Ijc  expected  from  jud{;e»  who  hold  their  offices  by  a 
temporary  commission.  Periodical  appointment*,  how- 
ever regulated,  or  by  whomsoever  made,  would,  in  some 
way  or  other,  be  fatal  to  their  necessary  independence. 
If  the  power  of  making  thcin  was  committed  either  to 
the  Kxccutivc  or  lc;;:islaturc,  there  would  be  danger  of 
an  improper  complaisance  to  the  branch  which  possessed 
it;  if  tu  both,  there  would  be  an  unwillingness  to  haxanJ 
tlic  displeasure  of  cither;  if  to  the  people,  or  to  persons 
chosen  by  them  for  the  special  purpose,  there  would  be 
toil  great  a  diKiH>sition  to  consult  popularity  to  justify  a 
reliance  that  nothing  would  be  consulted  but  the  Consti- 
tution and  the  laws. 

There  i«  yet  a  further  and  a  weightier  reason  for  the 
permanency  of  the  judicial  offices,  which  is  deducible 
from  the  nature  of  the  qualifications  they  rc(|uirc.  It 
has  been  fre()ucnlly  remarked  with  great  propriety  tliat 
a  voluminous  code  of  laws  is  one  of  the  inconveniences 
necessarily  conncctc<l  with  the  ndvuniages  of  a  free 
gnverument.  To  avoid  an  arbitrary  disqr.etioi}  '\f,  the 
courts  it  is  indispensable  that  they  should  be  bound 
down  by  strict  rules  and  precedents,  which  serve  to  define 
and  point  out  their  duty  in  every  particular  case  that 
comes  before  them;  and  il  will  readily  be  conceived  from 

Liricty  of  controversies  which  grow  out  of  the  folly 


) 


I 


\l 


5^6 


yALUE  OF  JUDICIAL  EXFERIBffCB.  ai«.n 


and  wiclc^-'lnycc  rtf  manHntl    that  the  records  ot  those 

precedents  must  tinavoidalily  swell  to  a  very  cnnsidcraUe 

bulk,  and    must   demand   long   and   laborious  study  to 

.  ;ic<iuiri:  a  competent  knowledge  of  them.     Hence  it  is 

^jgptliat  there  can  be  but  few  men  in  the^jociety  who  will 

have  sutticicnt  skill  In  the  laws  to  qualify  them  for  the 

i^-      ,  stations  of  judges.      And  making  the  i>nnmr  deductioBs 

1''^  '  for  tlie  iirtliiuiry  denrav'ly  "f  hum-in  "iatiife.  the  number 

)^  I  niUSt  be  Slill  snlalhj    of    ihot^  ^tl  /^nln.  thi-   n-gi.Uit^  in. 

tegritjji-ith  the  recnii^Jte  knowledge-     These  considera- 


tions apprise  us  thai  the  Kovemment  can  have  no  great 
option  between  fit  characters;  and  that  a  temporary  dura- 
tion in  office,  which  would  naturally  discourage  such 
characters  from  quitting  a  lucrative  line  of  practice  to 
accept  a  scat  on  the  bench,  would  have  a  tendency  to 
throw  the  administrntiun  of  justice  into  hands  less  able 
and  less  well  qualiried  to  conduct  it  with  utiliiy  and 
dignity.  In  the  prenent  circumstance*  of  this  country, 
and  in  those  in  which  it  is  likely  to  be  for  a  Ions  (■<»<  to 
come,  the  disadvantages  on  this  score  would  be  greater 
than  they  may  at  first  sight  ap[>ear;  J>ut  it  must  be  con. 
fesKCd  that  they  are  far  inferior  to  those  which  present 
themselves  under  the  other  aspects  of  the  subject. 

Upon  the  whtile,  there  c:tn  he  no  room  to  douhi  thai 
the  convention  acted  wisely  in  copying  from  the  models 
of  those  constitutions  which  have  established  g^ini  hthaviar 
as  the  tenure  of  their  judicial  offices,  in  point  of  duration; 
and  that,  so  far  from  being  blamablc  on  this  account, 
their  plan  would  have  been  inexcusably  defective  if  it 
bad  wanted  this  important  feature  of  good  governmenL 
The  experience  of  GcesL-ficitaUi  aUords  an  illusinoos 
commetit  on  the  excelleacc  of  the  institation, 

PtJBUiri 

ckru^  'k  d<  if* 


I 


PECUhUARY  INDEPHNDBNCE. 


No.  79.  criniMMnitanliUM.  NnrVMh,t7Sl.)  HatoiltoR. 


SUPPORT  AND    RKSPONSlIlILlTy  OF  THE 
JUDICIARY. 


1  '^' 
I  til 

wt 


f  A  fixtJ  ptpt'liit'i  ffr  Ik4  tufftrl  tf  Iht  JuJitiary  nettnary  la  Ihfir 

'       {fdrf*iiJtiKt—lttif<-niiiitity  »f  lit  jmiieiary—JiKigei  liabU  fii  imfrath- 
uuni — Caaniti  if    madt    rtmMKiiii    /w    inaiilily — KMmU  /w  IMit — 

To  Iht  PtofU  of  Iht  Stale  0/  iVew  York: 

Next  to  permanency  in  office,  nothing  can  contribute 
more  to  the  imicpvndcncr  of  the  judges  than  a  fixed 
g^  provi«toi)    (or     their    su]>port.       The    rt-nurk 

Ha.  73.  made  in   rciaiion  to  the  President  is  equally 

applicable  here.  In  the  general  course  of  human  nature, 
rt  pmcfr  i«v/-  a  man's  ju^sitUnet  amountt  to  a  ptrtcrr  ever  his 
will.  And  we  can  never  hope  to  tiee  re.ilixec1  in  practice 
the  complete  separation  of  the  judicial  from  the  legitln- 
live  power,  in  any  system  which  leaves  the  former 
kpendent    for  pecuntary    resources  on    the    occasional 

ants  of  Ihe  latter.  The  enlightened  friends  to  good 
government  in  every  State  have  seen  cause  to  lament 
the  want  of  precise  and  explicit  precautions  in  the  State 
constitutions  on  this  head.  Some  of  these  indeed  have 
declared  that  pfrmanrnt*  salaries  should  be  established 
for  the  judges;  but  the  experiment  basin  some  instances 
shown  that  such  expressions  are  not  sufficiently  definite 
to  preclude  legislative  evasions.  Something  still  more 
positive  and  unequivocal  has  been  evinced  to  be  re<)uisitc. 
The  pl.in  of  Ihc  convention  accordingly  has  proved  that 
the  judges  of  the  United  States  "shall  at  staled  times 
receive  for  their  services  a  compensation  which  shall  not 
be  ^iW««A^i/ during  their  continuance  in  office." 

This,  all  circumstances  considered,  is  the  most  eligible 
provision  that  could  have  been  <Ievi)icd.  It  will  readily 
be  understood  that  the  fluctuations  in  the  value  of  money 

li         *  t'iJt  "  ConsUuilM  of  MMMcbaietU,"  ch*pi«r  1,  wdioa  1.  anida 
I      IS— HfHJUt. 


5»8 


HEGULATIOff  OF  SALARY. 


[■•lTS 


anil  in  the  state  of  society  rendered  a  fixed  rate  of  com- 
pensalion  in  the  Constitution  inndmis^ililc.  What  might 
be  extravagant  tu-(l:iy  might  hitialfa  century  became 
penurious  and  inadcc|uatc.  U  was  therefore  necessary 
to  leave  it  to  the  discretion  of  the  legUlalure  to  vary  its 
provisions  in  confDrtnity  to  the  variations  in  clrcuin- 
stances,  yet  under  such  restrictions  as  to  put  it  out  of 
the  power  of  that  body  to  change  the  condition  of  the 
individual  for  the  worse.  A  man  may  then  be  sure  of  the 
ground  upon  which  he  stands,  and  can  never  be  deterred 
(rum  hi«  duty  by  the  appreiicnsiun  of  being  placed  in  « 
leu  eligible  situalicm.  The  clause  which  has  been  quoted 
combines  both  advantages.  The  salaries  of  judicial 
ofRcers  may  from  time  to  time  be  altered,  as  occAsion 
shall  require,  yet  so  as  never  to  lessen  the  allowance 
with  wliich  any  particular  judge  comes  into  office,  in 
respect  to  htm.  It  will  be  observed  that  a  dillerence  hai 
been  made  by  the  convention  between  the  compensation 
of  the  President  and  of  the  judges.  That  of  the  former 
can  neither  be  increased  nor  diminished;  that  of  the 
latter  can  only  not  be  diminished.  This  probably  aroie 
from  the  difference  in  the  duration  of  the  respective 
ofBces.  As  the  President  is  to  be  elected  for  no  more 
than  four  years,  it  can  rarely  happen  that  an  adequate 
salary,  fixed  at  the  commencement  of  that  period,  will 
not  continue  to  b«  such  to  its  end.  Hut  with  regard  to 
the  judges,  who,  if  Ihey  twhave  pro[H!rly,  will  be  secured 
in  their  places  for  life,  it  may  well  happen,  cspeciafly  in 
the  early  stages  of  the  government,  that  a  stipend  which 
would  l>c  very  sufTicient  at  their  first  appointment  would 
become  too  small  in  the  progress  of  their  service. 

This  provision  for  the  support  of  the  judges  bears 
every  mark  of  prudence  and  efficacy;  and  it  may  be  ufely 
affirmed  that,  together  with  the  permanent  tenure  of  tbctr 
ofltres,  it  affords  a  better  prospect  of  their  independence 
than  is  discoverable  In  the  constitutions  of  any  of  the 
Slates  in  regard  to  their  own  judges. 

The  pret^autions  for  their  resjwnitdiitity  are  coniprtwd 
tn  the  ariicle  respecting  impeachments.     They  ore  Gaiile 


il  REMOVAL  OF  JVDGES. 

to  he  impcaolicd  for  malcondtict  by  the  House  of  Reprf- 
senlativcs  and  tried  by  the  Senate;  and,  \i  convicted, 
may  he  dismissed  from  office  and  dJHqualtfied  for  holding 
any  other.  This  is  the  only  provision  on  the  point  wliirh 
is  consistent  with  the  necessary  independence  of  the 
jaiiicial  character,  and  is  the  only  one  which  we  find  in 
our  awn  Constitution  in  respect  to  our  own  judges^' 

The  want  of  a  provision  for  removing  the  judges  on 
account  of  inability  has  been  a  subject  of  complaint. 
Bui  all  consiiicrate  men  will  be  sensible  that  such  a  pr.*- 
vision  would  either  not  be  practiced  upon  nr  would  be 
more  liable  to  abuse  than  calculated  to  answer  any  good 
purpose.  The  mcnsuratinn  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind 
has,  I  believe,  no  place  in  the  cntalogue  of  known  arts. 
An  attempt  to  fix  the  boundary  between  the  regions  of 
ability  and  inability  would  much  oftener  give  scope  to 
personal  and  party  attachments  and  enmities  than  ad- 
vance the  interests  of  justice  or  the  public  good.  The 
result,  except  in  the  case  of  in.ianiiy,  must  for  the  most 
part  be  arbitrary;  and  insanity,  without  any  formal  or 
express  provision,  may  be  safely  [irunuuitccd  to  be  a 
virtual  disqualification. 

The  constitution  of  New  York,  to  avoid  investigations 
that  must  forever  he  vague  and  dangerous,  lias  taken 
a  particular  age  as  the  criterion  of  inability.  No  man 
can  be  a  judge  beyond  sixty.  1  believe  there  arc  few  at 
present  who  do  not  (liMipprove  of  this  provision.  There 
is  no  station  in  relation  to  which  it  is  less  proper  than 
to  that  of  a  judge.  The  deliberating  and  comparing 
faculties  generally  preserve  their  strength  much  beyond 
that  period  in  men  who  survive  it;  and  when,  iu  addition 
to  this  circumstance,  we  consider  how  few  there  are  who 


I  AMiiMMh  tlie  oaMtitulion  mode  (he  (cnnte  of  office  ol  juiign  dependent 
<M  iftoA  MhtTioT.  Il  pcovidcd  nu  mrani  of  retnovwl,  uvr  by  im- 
ucachtneml.  'I'liit  miiltvi^ii  [r>.iilt«>t  in  t)ir  curlnii*  cate  «i  Ji><));r  I'li:kct- 
inj;.  who  ■■»  .illJ'iiftl  l"  hivo  bccunio  iimiie.  »>i'l  »Ii<j  wtm  imi-fKhfil  in 
l8oj.  (Spf  Ailims's  ■■  Hi->lonofthe  UniltH  Sinlri."  ii.  155.)  Iri  GirW 
Britain  jadgn  an  rcraoTable  by  (he  crnwn  00  nn  addrcii  lij>  hoih  houtFi, 

Kl  is  MavwctiuKitt  they  aic  leiaovahle  by  Ihe  gfntittoi  and  council,  oa 
lUos  of  llie  U^ltUlurv.— EiiITOft. 
L 


5io 


AG/-:  LiMir  DiSADVAXTAGEOUS 


l>o.Tfl 


outlive  ihe  season  of  intellectuAl  vigor,  and  how  im- 
probable it  is  that  any  consiiJerabte  portion  of  the  bench, 
whether  more  or  less  numerous,  should  be  lo  such  u 
situation  at  the  same  time,  we  shall  be  ready  to  conclude 
that  limitations  of  this  sort  have  little  to  rccomnicnd 
them.  Jn  a  republic,  where  fortunes  are  not  afRuent 
and  pensions  not  expedient,  the  dismission  of  men  from 
stations  in  which  they  have  served  their  country  long 
and  usefully,  on  which  they  depend  for  subsistence,  and 
from  which  it  will  be  too  late  to  resort  to  any  other  occo- 
patiun  for  a  livelihoud,  ought  to  have  some  b<:l(erapolog}' 
to  humanity  than  is  to  l>e  found  in  the  iin;i);inary  danger 
of  a  superannuated  beach.  Pi}BLit.-& 


No.  80. 


(nm  tollKlvd  •dliian.  Kc*  Ittk,  ■;«>.) 


Hamilton. 


EXTENT  OF  THE    POWERS  OF  THE  JUDICIAL 
DEPARTMENT. 

T*  wkal  caiei  lA/  jhJumI  >tiitAmiy  tuglit  t»  exiimd-^  TV  »tl  tatri 
mhifA  ariir  /rem  Jult  rniuttii  /awi  tf  lie  C/iu'tn  ;  a-titA  mirern  fA/ 
fxtcUttM  i/ lAt  prrtiiitmi  «/  ikttftlilulim;  in  leiick  lit  Ij'ait/J  SlaUt 
it  a  forly:  vfkiiA  Jmwi'cv  Ikt  fMet  tf  Ikt  Uttr*  im  /mi fa  rflitn*ai. 
or  mAm  /bv  il^lfi  w  a  lUU  niJ  lAt  titiuiu  a/  attMktr  itsu,  rr  tki 
tititem  »/  difftn-l  lUht.  art  psriiti;  vhi<k  artpitalt  rm  AigA  UM  *•■ 
ttree/adiHirttUrjii'isAidttn;  iit  nfkiih  ilalt  tritmuti  (tnnol  be  lupfitii 
1»  W  imfJu.iffJ  fTa  art*f  tmttt  anAtTitf  •/  fajiriary  mil  r^tmd  itmdtr 
frtfMni  ftuihltitifm — Slaumml  e/  mutilmtifnal  ftMSiMtr^TAtU 
preritifHi  tea/^m  la  teKM  thi  fsjetri  »/  lAt  jmdift^ry  oigki  la  tt— 
fr^itlf  »/  Jtifgaliag  rqvily  jmrisJictUm. 

Tf  the  Peoflt  o/  Ihe  State  ef  New  York: 

To  judge  with  accuracy  of  the  proper  extent  of  the 
federal  jmlicature,  it  will  be  necessary  to  consider,  in 
the  first  place,  what  arc  its  proper  objects. 

It  seems  scarcely  to  admit  of  controversy  that  Ihe 
judiciary  authority  of  the  Union  ought  to  extend  to  tbeie 
several  descriptions  of  cases:  ist,  in  all  those  which 
arise  out  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  |uis«mI  in 
pursuance  of  ihelr  just  and  conslilutiunal   puwen  of 


lAft 


KM«ntmil  FIDBRAL  COffTROL  OVER  STATE  LAWS.     SJI 


legislation;  n),  l«  all  tliosc  which  conctrn  the  execution 
of  the  prorixions  expressly  cunt:iined  in  the  artli^lei  of 
Union;  jd,  (o  ail  those  in  which  tlie  United  States  are  a 
parly*,  4th,  to  all  those  which  involve  the  peace  of  the 
CoNFEiir.RACv.  whether  they  relate  tn  the  intercourse 
between  the  United  States  and  foreigD  nations,  or  to 
that  between  the  Slates  themselves;  5th,  to  all  those 
which  ori)pnatc  on  the  high  «eas,  and  are  of  admiralty  or 
maritime  jurisdiction;  and  lastly,  to  all  those  in  which 
the  State  tribunals  cannot  be  supposed  to  be  iinparlJal 
and  unbiased. 

The  first  point  depends  upon  this  obvious  consider- 
ation, titat  there  ought  always  to  be  a  constitutional 
method  of  givinj;  efficacy  to  constitutional  provisions. 
Wh.it,  for  instance,  would  avail  restrictions  on  the 
authority  of  the  State  lej^ixlaiurcH,  without  some  consti- 
tutional mode  of  enforcing  the  ohticrrance  of  them* 
The  Slates,  by  the  plan  of  the  convention,  arc  prohibited 
from  doing  a  varirty  of  things,  some  of  which  are  incom- 
patible  with  the  interests  of  the  Union,  and  others  with 
the  principles  of  good  government.  The  imposition  of 
duties  on  imported  articles,  and  the  emission  of  paper 
money,  arc  specimens  of  each  kind.  No  man  of  sense  will 
believe  that  such  prohibitions  would  be  scrupulously 
regarded,  without  some  effectual  power  in  the  govern- 
ment to  restrain  or  correct  the  infractions  of  them. 
This  power  must  either  be  a  direct  negative  on  the  Stale 
laws,  oran  authority  in  the  federal  courts  to  override  such 
as  might  be  in  manifest  contravention  of  tbe  articles  of 
Union.  There  is  no  third  course  that  I  can  imagine. 
The  latter  appears  to  have  been  thought  by  the  conven- 
tion preferable  to  the  former,  and,  I  presume,  will  be 
roo<)t  agreeable  to  the  Slates. 

As  to  the  second  point,  it  is  impossible  by  any  argu- 
ment or  comment  to  make  it  clearer  than  it  is  in  itself. 
If  there  are  such  things  as  political  axioms,  the  propriety 
of  the  judicial  power  of  a  government  being  coextensive 
with  its  legislative  may  be  ranked  among  the  number. 
The  mere  necessity  of  uniformity  in  the  inierpretatioa 


53* 


Ar£C£S5MRY  UKiFORMlTV. 


Od-H 


of  the  Dalional  laws  clecMes  the  qncstinn.  Thirteen 
inttcpenOcnt  courts  or  fiii:il  jurisdiclion  aver  the  umc 
cau!t«s,  arising  upon  the  same  laws,  15  a  hydra  in  gorom- 
mcnt,  from  which  nothing  but  contradiction  ami  con> 
fusion  can  proceed.' 

Still  less  need  be  said  in  regard  to  the  third  point. 
Controversies  between  the  nation  and  its  members  or 
citizens  can  only  be  properly  referred  to  the  national 
tribunals.  Any  other  plan  would  be  contrary  to  reason, 
to  precedent,  and  to  decorum. 

The  fourth  point  rests  on  this  plain  proposition,  that 
the  peace  of  the  whole  ought  not  to  be  left  at  the  dis- 
posal o(  a  PART.  The  Union  will  undoubtedly  be  answer^ 
able  to  foreign  powers  for  the  conduct  of  its  members.* 
And  the  responsibility  for  an  injury  ought  ever  to  be 
accomiianied  with  the  faculty  of  preventing  it.  As  the 
denial  or  perversion  of  justice  by  the  sentences  of  courts, 
as  well  as  in  any  other  manner,  is  with  reason  classed 
among  the  just  causes  of.  war,  it  will  follow  that  the 

'  On  A|>ril  J.  1788,  llunllloii  wrMe  lo  MadUoo ; 

"  1  kivc  liceii  very  dcliii>]iitBl,  mf  dou  tir,  in  nol  tluiiklnc  you  for 
your  Iclto  Irom  I'hitxidphii.  The  irmirLi  joa  nuile  «n  >  cerlalii 
subject  ftri  jmpotiani.  ».i\A  will  be  iuiriid«l  to. 

"  There  Is  \jv\j  niiKh  eiBl<«Tr>uaieiii  in  ihe  <at«. 

"  I  ihiiik.  hotrervr.  Ihe  |»liKi{>l«  we  b-iri!  lolkeil  iit  arc  luil  <iii)y  \iM, 
liul  wiH  ig'i'ly  to  the  uttiot  ilv|>aitinci>i*i.  Nm  will  itir  mnicipiman 
appear  10  disij'tnatile  at  Ihcy  xavf  wcsi  *l  linl  ii|;ht,  vhrn  we  uiDOiiJ 
lo  tjie  true  import  of  ihe  lule  nlaliliilwl.  Tlic  Sliite^  rtliiin  all  ihe 
Aiilllaritiei  tliey  were  before  jionetteJ  of.  not  alieaUnl  in  llie  ifatnr 
iii.Klr>  jii>iiitc<l  »ul  ;  but  lliit  itoc*  noc  ioelaile  caiet  whldi  *re  llie  m»- 
lurniil  I  hi:  iieir  (-iiiiklilulicn.  Kur  imUiice.  (he(>ini<  «f  irri.<..:  •'-tivil 
the  Uniteil  SIMet  immtdiaUfy  n  *  urioiv  kixmn  only  li>  <>i  ii> 

tuttuii.     Thtra  of  omraa  mar  no  poixr  in  the  Stale  i  <>.  ..  la 

pinion  ihu  oinve.  There  will  thetefore  be  none  un'lrr  liiE  l-c».  <(c. 
Tliit  11  louielhine  likely,  il  wcnn  to  me.  lo  afiunl  Ihe  Ltu  ti>liijji«  it( 
ihe  iMAcaltT.  t  «cnil  you  iha  FiJrraliil  from  Ihe  l>e]fintiiD|;  ti>  the  aim- 
elatloa  at  aie  comwenUiT  oa  the  KtecBlive  Brknch.  II  uar  UBpkkini 
of  ih«  auibur  Ix  tichl.  he  miut  be  loo  nMfh  en);*c«l  10  Make  ■  niiU 
pruervM  in  wbal  irnaini.  Tlie  Court  td  Chancery  and  ■  Ctnmtt  Cuitrt 
are  nmr  ulling,"— EtitruR. 

'The  rrrene  wu  uwitctl  in  the  taae  ol  the  Malia  iiait  al  New 
OileaiB.  our  cmeritoKni  utj^ic];  ilui  ii  bail  no  power  t»  iiirtrnt  w 
puillih.  becaute  the  H<'H  wn<  tnlrly  allain  of  local  t>"<«lli>ion:  Ihm  II 
ackttowleilgnl  teuMRilbiiily  fi>r  Ihe  nrgtccl  al  duly  I7  lh>  manidial 
•iMlKitfl^.  tiv  nakint  inJeinniiiet  fat  the  OBlraco.  The  Mm*  |ile*wa» 
mmU  in  (be  Wyorainu  AntiHTiiiiac  tiun.— EulRM. 


J 


KMiUtMl  FOREJGX  AND  WTBH-STATM  DISPUTES.     533 

ft;dcnil  judicbry  ought  to  have  cogniiancc  of  all  causes 
in  which  the  citizens  of  other  countries  arc  concerned. 
i'liis  is  not  less  essential  to  the  [)rexvrv;itiun  of  the  public 
faith  than  to  the  security  of  the  public  tranquillity.  A 
distinction  may  perhaps  be  imagined  between  cases  aris> 
ing  upon  treatiesand  the  laws  of  natioiisand  thf>Ke  which 
.may  stand  merely  on  the  footini;  of  the  municipal  law. 
The  former  kind  may  be  supposed  proper  fur  the  federal 
juri«diciiun,  the  latter  for  that  of  the  St:ites.  But  it  is 
at  least  problematical  whether  an  unjust  sentence  against 
a  (oreigtwr,  where  the  subject  of  controversy  was  wholly 
rcUtive  to  the  Ux  loti,  would  not,  if  unredressed,  be  an 
aggression  upon  his  sovereign,  as  well  as  one  whieh 
vtnlated  the  stipulations  of  a  treaty  or  the  general  law 
of  nations.  And  a  still  greater  objection  to  the  dis- 
tini'tion  would  result  from  the  immense  difficulty,  if  not 
impossibility,  of  a  practical  discrimmalion  between  the 
cues  of  one  complexion  and  those  of  the  other.  So 
great  a  proportion  of  the  cases  in  which  foreigners  are 
parties  involve  national  questions  that  it  is  by  far 
most  safe  and  most  expedient  to  refer  nil  those  in  which  ^ 
they  are  concerned  to  the  national  tribunals. 

The  power  of  determining  causes  between  two  Slates, 
between  one  State  and  the  citizens  of  another,  and 
between  the  citizens  of  different  States,  is  perhaps  not 
less  essential  to  the  pe^cc  of  the  Union  than  thjit  which 
has  been  ju*it  examined.  History  gives  us  a  horrid 
picture  of  the  dissensions  and  private  wars  which  dis- 
trai-tcd  and  desolated  (icrmiiny  prior  to  the  institution 
of  the  Imperial  Chamber  of  M.iximilian,  towards  the  close 
of  the  fifteenth  century;  and  informs  us,  at  the  same 
time,  of  the  vast  influence  of  that  institution  in  appeasing 
the  disorders  and  establishing  the  tramiuillity  of  the 
empire.  This  was  a  court  invested  with  authority  to 
decide  finally  all  differences  among  the  members  of  the 
Germanic  body. 
A  method  of  terminating  territorial  disputes  between 
.  the  States,  under  the  iiulhority  of  the  federal  he;id,  was 
I     not  unattended  to,  even  in  the  imperfect  system  by  which 


534 


F.QU.U  CIVIL  SIGHTS. 


□b.H 


thejr  hire  been  hitherto  bdd  to£ether.'  But  (here  are 
many  otiicr  sources,  besides  interfering  cUims  ol 
bounclary.  from  whieti  bickerings  and  aniinusitiex  may 
spring  up  anion;:  (he  members  of  the  Union.  To  some 
of  these  we  have  been  witnesses  in  the  course  of  utir  past 
experience.  It  will  readily  be  conjectured  (hat  1  allude 
to  the  fraudulent  lavs  ivhich  have  been  passed  in  too 
many  of  ihe  States.  And  though  the  proposcii  Cunstltii' 
lion  establishes  particular  guards  agjiDst  the  repetilton 
of  thuse  instances  which  have  beretofurc  m»dc  thrir 
appearance,  yet  it  is  warrantable  tu  apprehend  ihat  the 
spirit  which  produced  them  will  assume  new  shapes  that 
could  not  be  foreseen  nor  specifically  provided  against. 
Whatever  practice  may  have  a  tendenry  to  disturb  the 
harmony  between  the  States  arc  proper  objects  of  federal 
superintendence  and  control. 

It  may  be  esteemed  (he  ba»)s  of  the  Union  (lui(  "  the 
citizens  of  each  State  sha"  be  entitled  to  all  Ihe  privi- 
leges and  ininiunitics  of  citizens  of  the  several  Slates," 
And  if  it  be  a  just  principle  that  every  government  migkl 
A»  p^iieit  (hi  mtani  of  txffutins  Hf  osfn  frwitiavt  iy  Ut  «vnt 
ttHth^riiy,  it  will  follow  that,  in  order  to  the  inviolable 
maiiitenjnce  uf  that  eijualtty  of  privilrj^es  and  im- 
munities to  which  the  citiiens  of  the  Uniuu  wUI  be  en- 
titlctt,  the  national  judiciary  ought  to  preside  in  alt  cases 
in  which  one  Slate  or  itx  citizens  are  opposed  to  another 
State  or  its  citiicns.  To  secure  the  full  effect  of  so  fun- 
damental a  provision  against  all  evasion  and  subterfuge, 
it  is  necessary  ttiat  its  construction  should  be  com- 
mitted to  that  tribunal  which,  having  tw  local  attach- 
Rtentc,  will  be  likely  to  be  iropnniat  l>etwec'n  the  different 
States  and  their  citiiens,  and  which,  onini;  its  official 
existence  to  the  Union,  will  never  be  likely  to  (eel 
any  bias  inauspicious  to  (he  principles  un  which  it  it 
founded.* 

The  fifth  point  will  demand  little  animadversion.     Thi 

I  Sec  the  "  IVffrtfrrvK'i  •\*  lln-  Su(»nn»  t  Jiuit."'  In  limrHnt't  "  Einf) 
in  the  Conkiilnliiiiul  llittuiy  >il  iIm'  Uailed  !>Uln,'  ISS9  — EDItUI. 
*8mi)m:XIi|i  AmeiufancBi.— BciintK. 


Hkmlttoil      MARITIME  AND  BOUNDARY  CASES. 


535 


inost  bi£otc(l  idolizcrs  of  Slate  iiutlioritjr  liave  not  thus 
far  shown  a  disposition  to  deny  the  notiimal  judiciary  the 
cogniMnces  of  mAritimc  causes.  These  %o  generally  de- 
pend on  the  laws  of  nutiuntt,  and  so  commonly  affect  the 
rights  of  foreigners,  that  they  fall  within  the  considera- 
tions which  are  relative  to  the  public  peace.  The  most 
important  part  of  them  are  hy  the  present  Confedera* 
tion  submitted  to  federal  jurisdiction. 

The  reasunablcnc&B  of  the  agency  of  the  national 
courts  in  cases  in  which  the  State  tribunals  cannot  be 
supposed  to  be  impartial  speaks  for  itself.  No  man 
ought  certainly  to  b«  a  judge  in  his  own  cause,  or  in 
any  cause  in  respect  to  which  he  has  the  least  interest 
or  bias.  This  principle  has  no  inconsiderable  weight 
in  designating  the  fedei.1l  courts  as  the  proper  tribunals 
for  the  detcrminattoo  of  contruversics  between  different 
States  and  their  citizens.  Atid  it  ought  to  have  the  same 
operation  in  regard  to  some  cases  between  citizens  of 
the  same  State.  Claims  to  land  under  grunts  of  different 
States,  founded  upon  adt'er.se  pretensions  of  boundary, 
are  of  this  description.  The  courts  of  neither  of  the 
Sranting  States  conld  be  expected  to  be  unbiased.  The 
laws  tnay  have  even  prejudged  the  question,  and  tied 
the  courts  down  to  decisions  in  favor  of  the  grants  of 
the  State  to  which  they  belonged,  .Ami  even  where  this 
had  not  been  done,  it  would  be  n.itural  th;it  the  judges, 
as  men,  should  feel  a  strong  predilection  to  the  claims  of 
their  own  government. 

Having  thus  laid  down  and  discussed  the  principles 
which  ought  to  regulate  the  constitution  of  the  federal 
judiciary,  we  will  proceed  to  test,  by  these  principles,  the 
particular  powers  of  which,  according  to  the  plan  of  the 
convention,  it  is  to  be  composed.  It  is  to  comprehend 
"all  cases  in  taw  and  equity  arising  under  the  Constitu- 
tion, the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  treaties  made,  or 
which  shall  be  made,  under  their  authority;  to  all  cases 
affecting  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers,  and  con* 
suls;  to  all  cases  of  admiralty  and  maritime  jurisdiction; 
to  contruversics  to  which  the  United  States  shall  lie  a 


536 


FEDERAL  EQUITY  POWER. 


tlls.W 


party;  to  controversies  between  two  or  more  States; 
between  a  Slate  and  citizens  of  another  Statci  between 
citixen»  of  tliHcrcnt  States;  between  citizens  o(  the  winie 
State  claiming;  lunds  and  grants  o(  dificrcnt  Stales;  and 
between  u  State  or  the  citizens  thereof  and  foreign  slates, 
citizens,  and  subjects."  This  constitutes  the  entire  mass 
of  the  judicial  authority  of  the  Union.  Let  us  now  re- 
view it  in  detail.      It  b,  then,  to  extend: 

First.  To  all  cases  in  law  and  equity  arititis  under  tht 
Canstitutian  and  lAe  iatos  of  llu  Vnittd  StaUs.  This  cor- 
responds with  the  two  first  classes  of  causes  which  have 
been  enumerated  as  proper  for  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States.  It  has  been  asked,  what  is  meant  by 
"cases  arising  utukr  the  Constitution,"  in  contradistinc- 
tion from  those  "arisin^t  under  the  laws  of  the  United 
States"?  The  dillerencc  has  been  already  explained. 
All  the  reMrictton*  upon  the  authority  of  the  Slate 
legislatures  furnish  examples  of  it.  They  are  not,  for  in- 
stance, to  emit  (uper  money;  but  the  interdiction  results 
from  the  Constitution,  and  will  have  no  connection  with 
any  law  of  the  United  Stales.  Should  paper  money,  not- 
withstanding, be  emitted,  the  controversies  conceraini 
it  woald  be  cases  arising  under  the  Constitution  and  oat 
tli«  laws  of  the  United  States,  in  the  ordinary  signi5ca- 
tioii  of  the  terms.  This  may  serve  as  a  sample  of  tiKt 
whole. 

It  has  also  been  asked,  what  need  of  the  word  "eqitity"} 
What  equitable  causes  can  Ktov  out  of  tlie  Constitu- 
g^  tiun  and  laws  of  the  United  States?     I'bcfc 

M».  BS.  is  hardly  a  subject  of  litixatton  between  in- 

dividuals which  may  not  involve  those  ingredients  of 
/rand,  aeddtnt,  trust,  or  iarJikip,  which  would  render  the 
matter  an  object  of  e<iiiiliihlc  rather  than   nl  -»- 

diction,  as  the  disttnciion  is  known  and  r&i  '  in 

several  of  the  States.  It  is  the  peculiar  province,  Inr  in- 
stance, of  a  court  of  equity  to  relieve  again.it  witat  arc 
called  bard  bargains:  these  are  contracts  in  which, 
thniif^h  there  may  have  twen  no  direct  fraud  or  deceit, 
sufBcicnl  to  invalidate  tbem  iu  a  ciiurt  of  law,  yei  thr/c 


-BwUtoal 


REMAINING  JUDlCtAL  FOWBK&. 


537 


may  have  bven  sume  un^lue  and  uncohicioiiable  advun- 
tuge  Liken  of  the  necessities  or  misfortunes  of  oac  of  the 
parties,  which  a  court  of  equity  would  not  tolerate.  In 
such  cases,  where  foreigners  were  concerned  on  cither 
side,  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  federal  judicatories 
to  do  justice  without  an  equitable  as  well  as  a  legal  juris- 
diction. Agreements  to  convey  lands  claimed  under  the 
grants  of  different  States  may  afford  another  example  of 
the  necessity  of  ^n  equitable  jurisdiction  in  (he  federal 
courts.  This  reasoning  may  not  be  so  pulpable  in  ihosc 
States  where  the  formal  and  technical  distinction  between 
LAW  and  EQUITY  is  not  maintained,  as  in  this  State, 
where  it  is  exemplified  by  every  day's  practice. 

The  judiciary  authority  of  the  Union  is  to  extend: 

Stcoiui.  To  treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be  made, 
under  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  and  to  all  cases 
affecting  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers,  and  con. 
suls.  These  belong  to  the  fourth  class  of  the  enumcr> 
atcd  cases,  as  tbcy  have  an  evident  connection  with  the 
preservation  of  the  nntioniil  peace. 

Third.  To  cases  of  admiralty  and  maritime  jurisdic- 
tion, These  form,  aliogcther,  the  fifth  of  the  enumer- 
ated classes  of  causes  proper  for  the  cognizance  of  the 
national  courts. 

Fcurth.  To  controversies  to  which  the  United  States 
shall  be  a  party.  These  constitute  the  third  of  those 
classes. 

Fi/th.  To  controversies  between  two  or  more  States; 
between  a  State  and  citizens  of  another  State;  between 
citizens  of  different  States.  These  belong  to  the  fourth 
of  those  classes  and  partake,  in  some  measure,  of  the 
n.aturc  of  the  last. 

SixtA,  To  cases  between  the  citizens  of  the  same  State 
eiaimiitg  ianJi  umier  graatt  of  dtffcrtttt  SlaUt.  These  fall 
within  the  last  class,  and  art  the  only  inUamts  in  VfMUM  tkt 
frufouJ  Contliluthn  dirtetly  <Qnieaifi,ittt  the  eognitanee  of 
dispuUi  Mweea  the  citiuns  ef  the  tame  State, 
II  Sfpenlh.  To  cases  between  a  State   and   the   citizens 

L      thereof,  and  foreign  States,  citizens,  or  subjects.     These 


53*      FEDERAL  POWERS  PROPERLY  BXTBS  DUD.  l»fli» 

have  been  already  explained  to  belonjt  to  tlie  (nurtli  of  tlie 
enumerated  classes,  and  have  been  shown  to  be,  in  a  pccut- 
iar  manner,  the  proper  subjects  of  the  national  judiiatDre. 
From  this  review  o(  the  particular  powers  of  the  federal 
judiciary  as  marked  out  in  the  Constitution,  it  appears 
that  the/  are  .-ill  conformable  to  ihe  prineiples  which 
ought  to  have  governed  the  structure  uf  that  deparlmeni, 
and  which  were  necessary  to  the  perfection  of  the  system. 
If  some  partial  inconveniences  should  apprsr  to  be  con- 
nected with  the  incorporation  of  any  of  them  into  ihe 
plan,  it  ought  to  be  recollected  that  the  national  legisla- 
ture will  have  ample  authority  to  make  such  rx(tft/«ns 
and  to  prescribe  such  re;;uI.itions  as  will  be  calculated  to 
obviate  or  remove  these  inconveniences.  The  possibility 
of  particular  mischiefs  can  never  be  viewed  by  a  wcll- 
informed  mind  as  a  solid  objection  to  a  ;;eneral  prinriplc 
which  is  calculated  to  avoid  general  mischiefs  and  to 
obtain  general  advantages.  PUDUt;sL 


No.  8l.         ('*™  mWtati  «iiiii»,  K«o  v«it,  iioj         Hamilton. 

DISTRIBUTION    OF   THE   AUTHORITY  OF  THE 
JUniCIARV. 

Prvfirittf  ef  ttt^iikint  «iu  tirmTl  «f  Jiii»t  <a4  mfrmt jurii^iticm— 
Prfftitty  »/  Jfltg,\Uifg  jttdisMt  aiilkfrity  t*  a  tliitimi  ilrfy\rtmtit-~ 
O^/iilifli  U  till  tmitJtrt4 — TAii  4tlfxiili»it  tf  aulhfity  stiiris  mrrt 
<«mfltt/ty  Iht  itfar.-iti.tH  «/  lie  jmJUi-iry  /ram  Ikt  lefiilAlmrt,  ritsgiuttt 
mart  futly  lit  frimtfti  »/  fKaJ  irijifiBr  m  a  ttuurt,  itturei  jfrtJiltr 
Irgat  aiilily,  aitd  rtatevti  tkt  jitJidary  /ritm  farly  ilri/t—  The  natafit 
«/iirUiH»/lhi  ilattt~-Tkal  »a  ligiiUlHTf  taa  ttitify  juJitUI  miUatrt 
fxt^  at  le  futia-t  aitita.  titd  Ikt  Jaagrr  tf  tmteaik'nrnti  tt  itf 
jHJititry  on  lit  Itgist-tlMr/,  ffanJtrfJ —  Prtfritly  ff  tanitilHliag  inftritr 
ttmrli — Riluf  U  tufrtmt  ttmrt — Slitlt  trmtli  mtl  fit  JfT  titit — AJuam-^ 
t»^  tf  divijiag  VtiiCrJ  Statu  iitlt  JtUniiU  Jiilriili—M^mmtr  im  ■(•4wA 
auiAjfifw  ikfiU  Af  Juirihuud—OrigiMitl  juiudi€UPm  «/  tmftwm 
tvtirl— Original  /iiriiifUlttn  */  im/trirr  t^urtM—MfftllaU  jmritdittiem 
9/  tmfrimt  tenrl. 

To  the  Ptofit  of  the  State  af  S'ew  Yfrk: 

Let  us  now  return  to  Ihe  p.iriiiioo  of  the  judiciary 
authority  between  difTcrciit  courts,  ami  their  rclnlinnt  to 
each  oelier. 


fljaafltM]     SUPREME  JURISDICTION  yECESSARV.      5J9 


"  The  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  is  "  (hy  the 
pbii  of  the  convention)  "  to  lie  vested  in  one  Supreme 
Court,  and  in  such  inferior  courts  as  the  Congress  may, 
from  time  lo  time,  ordain  and  establish."* 

Th;it  thcre_ought  to  l>e  ong.  eoiirt  of  supreme  and^linal 
jurisdiction  is  a  pfoposition  which  is  not  likely  to  be 
conlc5l<.'d.  The  reasons  for  it  have  been  assigned  in 
another  pbce,  and  nrc  ton  obviouit  to  need  repetition. 
The  only  question  that  seems  to  have  been  raised  con- 
cerning it  is,  whether  it  ought__tpJjta_distincl.bo3yj>r 
a~1>ranch  of_tJie  Tc,Risl;it«re.  The  «aine  contnidiction  is 
observable  in  regard  to  this  matter  which  has  been 
remarked  in  several  other  cases.  The  very  men  who 
object  to  the  Senate  as  a  court  of  impeachments,  on  tlie 
ground  of  an  improper  intermixture  of  powers,  advocate, 
by  impHcalton  at  least,  the  propriety  of  vesting  the 
ultimate  decision  of  nil  causes  in  the  whole  or  in  a  part 
of  the  1e|;islative  body. 

The  arguments,  or  rather  suggestions,  upon  which  this 
charge  is  foundetl  arc  to  this  effect:  "The  authority  of 
the  proposed  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  which 
is  to  be  a  separate  and  independent  body,  will  be  superior 
to  that  of  the  legislature.  The  power  of  construing  the 
laws  according  to  the  spirit  of  (he  (.'onstitution,  will  enable 
that  court  to  mold  them  into  whatever  shape  it  may 
think  proper;  especially  as  its  decisions  will  not  be  in 
any  manner  subject  to  the  revision  or  correction  of  the 
legislative  body.  This  is  as  unprecedented  as  it  is  dan- 
gerous. In  Britain  the  judicial  power,  in  the  last  resort, 
resides  in  the  Hou«e  of  Lortb,  which  ts  a  branch  of  the 
legislature;  ai>d  this  part  of  the  British  government  has 
been  imitated  in  the  State  constitutions  in  general.  The 
Parliament  of  Great  Drilatn  and  the  legislatures  of  the 
several  States  can  at  any  time  rectify  by  law  the  ex- 
ceptionable decisions  of  their  respective  courts.  But 
the  errors  and  usurpations  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  will  be   uncontrollable  and   remediless." 


4^ 


'Article}, sec  I.— FusUtiS. 


SAp     r/lOPS/l  SEFAKA  TION  OP  SUPREME  COUR  T.  Wfcil 


np 


•This,  upon  cxamiitatiun,  vriU  be  found  to  be  m;tUc 
altogether  of  (;iIm:  reasoiiing  upon  misconceived  f;ict. 
/^In  the  Urst  place,  iJiere  is  nut  Jt  »yltable  in  the  plan 
under  consideration  which  dirtttly  empovers  the  nattiinal 
\^     I  j>M  courts  to  construe  the  luws  according  to  the 

Ko.TS.  spirit  of  the  Con»tilution,  or  which  gives  them 

any  greater  latitude  in  this  rcs|M:ct  than  may  lie  cbimed 
by  the  courts  of  every  State.  I  admit,  however,  that  the 
Constitution  ought  to  Ik  the  suindurd  of  construction 
for  the  hiws,  an<l  ihnt  wherever  there  i»an  evident  oppo- 
sition the  laws  ought  to  give  place  to  the  CoDStitution. 
But  this  doctrine  is  not  dcdncible  from  any  circumstance 
petTiiliar  to  the  plan  of  the  convention,  but  frnni  the 
general  theory  of  a  limited  Constitution;  and,  as  far  as 
it  is  true,  is  equally  applicable  to  most,  if  not  to  all  the 

l_Siate  governmeiitit.  There  cin  be  no  objection,  there- 
fore, on  this  account,  to  the  federal  judicature  which 
will  not  lie  against  the  local  judicatures  in  general,  and 
which  will  not  serve  to  condemn  cvj^^^,juuutautioa  that 
attempts  tu  set  ImundK  to  tegistuttve  discretion. 

f""BUl  perhaps  me  lorcc  oi  itic  objection  may  be  thought 
to  consist  in  the  particular  organization  of  the  Supreme 

'Court!  in  ii»  being  composed  of  a  distinct  body  of 
magistrates,  instead  of  being  one  of  the  brancbea  of  the 
legislature,  as  in  the  government  of  Orcat  Britain  and 
that  of  this  State.  To  insist  upon  this  point,  the  anihurs 
of  the  objection  must  renounce  the  meaning  they  tinve 
labored  to  annex  to  the  celebrated  maxim  requiring  a 
separation  of  the  departments  of  power.  It  shall,  ncvcf 
thcles-s  be  conceded  to  them,  agreeably  to  the  interpre- 
tation given  to  that  maxim  in  the  course  of  these  papers, 
tlial  it  is  not  violated  by  vesting  the  ultimate  power  oi 
judging  in  a  patt  of  the  legislative  body.  But  though 
this  be  not  an  almolnte  violation  of  that  excellent  rule, 
yet  it  verges  so  nearly  upon  It,  as  on  this  account  alone 
to  be  less  eligible  than  the  mode  preferred  by  the  con- 
vention. From  a  body  which  had  even  a  partial  agency 
in  passing  bad  laws,  we  could  rarely  expert  a  dispusitino 
to  temper  and  moderate  them  in  the  application.     The 


RumtMl    LECISIA  riVE  BRANCH  NO.\'.JUDtClAL.        S4l 


same  spirit  whJch^ hatl^jmatctl  Jn  making  llictn. would 
l>e  [Qoaptjnjnterttreting  thciti;  still  less  cuuld  it  be  ex. 
pcctcd  that  men  wlio  haO  inTringed  the  Cunsiitution  in  the 
character  of  legislators  would  be  disposed  to  repair  tlie 
breiieli  in  the  i^haratter  of  judges.  Nor  is  this  all.  Every 
reason  which  rccommcDds  the  tenure  of  good  behavior 
for  judicial  oflices  militates  against  placing  the  judiciary 
puwer,  in  lh«  List  resort,  in  a  body  composed  of  men 
chosen  for  a  limited  period.  There  is  an  absurdity  in 
referring  the  determination  of  causes,  in  the  first  instance, 
to  judges  of  permanent  standing;  in  the  l<i«t.  to  those  of 
a  temporary  and  mutable  constitution.  |^nd  there  is  ii 
still  greater  absurdity  in  subjecting  the  decisions  of  men 
selected  for  their  knowledge  of  the  laws,  acquired  by  long 
and  laborious  study,  to  the  revision  and  control  of  mc(l 
who,  for  want  of  the  same  advantage,  cannot  but  be 
deficient  '\\\  that  knowledge.  The  members  of  the  Icgis-' 
lature  will  rarely  be  chosen  with  a  view  to  those  ([ualirica- 
tions  wliich  lit  men  for  the  sutions  of  judges;  and  as,  on 
this  account,  there  will  be  great  reason  to  apprehend  all 
'tfae  ill  consequences  of  defective  information,  so,  on 
account  of  the  natural  propensity  of  such  bodies  lo  party 
divisions,  there  will  be  no  less  reason  to  fear  that  the 
pestilential  breath  of  faction  may  poison  the  fountains  o(^ 
justice.  The  habit  of  being  continually  marshaled  onJ 
o}ipositc  sides  will  be  too  ajU  to  slillc  the  voice  both  u(| 
law  and  of  equity.' 

These  considerations  teach  us  to  anplaud  the  wisdom 
of  thote  States  who  have  committed  the  judicial  power, 
in  diflast  resort,  not  to  a  part  of  the  legislature,  but  to 
distinct  and  independent  bodies  of  men.  Contrary  to  the 
supposition  of  those  who  liave  represented  the  plan  of 
the  convention  in  this  respect  as  novel  and  nnpret- 
edenteil.  it  i&,bm  a  copy  of  the  constitutions  of  New 
IJAimiSJure,  Massachusetts,  i'ennsylvania,  Delaware, 
Maryland,  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  South  Car.>lina,  and 
Georgia;  and  the  preference  which  has  been  given  to 
tliose  m'MJeU  is  highly  lo  be  commended. 

'  The  kuluc):  ul  im peach iBC III  liiith  liu  provnl  lbU.-~EuiroB. 


< 


54* 
^^     It 


JUDICIAL  BNCROACIIMRNTS. 


tV«.  %\ 


It  is  not  true,  In  tlie  Mcond  place,  that  the  Parliament 
of  Great  Britain  or  the  legislatures  of  the  particular 
States  can  rectify  the  eiccptionat>le  decisions  of  their 
respective  courts,  in  any  other  sense  than  niig;bl  be  done 
by  a  future  lesislature  of  the  United  States.  The  theory, 
Dcithcr  of  the  British,  nor  the  Stale  constitutions, 
•iHthorizcs  the  rcvisal  of  a  judieial  sentence  by  a  legitU- 
live  aeL  Nor  is  there  anythinn  in  the  pro|>osed  Con- 
stitution, more  than  in  cither  of  Ihcm,  by  which  it  is 
forbidden.  In  the  former,  as  irell  as  in  the  latter,  the 
impropriety  of  the  thing,  on  the  general  principles  of  law 
and  reason,  is  the  sole  obstacle,      A  IrgislaTUfi  «itt">"f 

CJiCCcding;   its    prnyinf*-,  ^finnm    r..v.-r.ci-   .1    ■Iflffmin.niim 

once  made  in  a  particolar  cage:  though  jt  may  fire»cr|jie 
a  new  rulc_lu£-lmurc  cases.  This  is  the  principle,  and  it 
applies  in  all  its  conset|iienccs,  exactly  in  the  same  man- 
ner and  extent  to  the  State  governments  as  to  the 
national  government  now  under  consideration.  Not 
the  least  difference  can  be  pointed  out  in  any  view  of 
the  subject. 

It  mj^  in  the  last  place  be  nb<nTir^j  \\\\\\  ih^  ^.ippojjt^ 
gcr   of  judiciary   encroach m tills  f^   ""•   ''•fl'^l'-tiw 


aiithoruy.  which  has  been  upon  many  iH-t-a^inni;  rritfrjUrcl, 
*1K  in  rrainya  pnan^om.      Particular  miicunstructionitand 

GOolraventions  of  the  will  of  the  legislature  may  now  and 
^^  then  happen;  but  they  can  never  be  so  enlcnsive  as  tn 
^H  amount  to  an  inconrenience,  or  in  any  sensible  degree  ta 
^H  affect  the  order  of  the  political  system.  This  may^be 
^1         infrrrpil  with  tfriainty  from  the  general  nature  of  the 


jtij1ici:il  power,  from  the  objects  to  which  it  relates,  from 
the  manner  in  whTcIi  it  is  exercised,  from  its  comparative 

weakness,  and    from     im -tJ>t:i|^  inrapjfity    tn  mippnTt     Its 

usurpations  by  fnrceT^  .\nd  the  inference  is  greatly 
fortified  by  the  consKTcration  of  the  important  consiitu- 
tional  check  which  the  power  of  insiilnting  itpf^ttnluumn 
in  one  part  of  the  legislative  body,  and  of  deicrniiaiog 


'  In  thv  Cherakce  cue  PretulFM  f>cl[«ni  lairf  of  ihe  CMef  Julk*. 
''  Jiihn  Msniull  hM  prooDUnnd  lia  jodsmenl ;  Id  liiiu  taU\nx  U  tl  Iw 
CM.  "■— fDlTOt. 


n 


I 


a«BiUan| 


THE  CHECK  OF  IMPEACHMENT. 


S« 


*: 


upon  them  in  the  other,  would  give  to  that  body  upon 
the  nieniberti  of  ilie  judicial  <1e]>artmGiit.  Tlti%  is  alone  a 
complete  security.  There  never  can  be  danger  that  the 
judges,  by  a  series  of  deliberate  usurputions  on  the 
uthority  of  the   legislature,   would  hazard  die   united 

sentmcnt  of  the  body  intrusted  with  it,  while  this  body 

as  posseKsed  of  the  means  of  punishing  (lieir  presump- 
tion  by  dc£r.idin|{  them   from    their   stations.      Wliite 
this  ought  to  remove  all  apprehensions  on  the  subject,  it    < 
alTurdK  at  the  same  lime  a  cngent  argument  for  consti- 
tuting tbe  Senate  a  court  for  the  trial  of  impeachmeniii. 

Having  now  ciamincd,  and,  1  trust,  removed  the 
objectioHii  to  the  diKliiict  and  independent  organisation 
of  the  Supreme  Court,  I  proceed  to  consider  ihe  pro- 
priety  of  the  power  of  constituting  inferior  courts,*  aid 

ih»  »wli»iut.»^  ilthlAh  will  JtyrreKt  iifiim-rn  tfifyr  <  l*-- 

fornicr. 

1  he  power  of  constituting  inferior  courts  is  evidently 
jCakulatcd  to  obviate  the  necessity  of  having  recourse  to 
he  Supreme  Court  in  every  case  of  federal  cogni/.ance. 
It  is  intended  to  enable  the  national  }{overnment  to 
institute  or  authoriu,  in  each  State  or  district  of  the 
United  States,  a  tribunal  competent  to  the  dcterminalion 
of  matters  of  naiion:il  jurisdiction  within  its  limits. 

But  why,  it  is  asked,  might  not  the  same  purpose  have 
been  accomoliahed  bV  the  timLrumBrmlity  of  the  Sta t e 
coiixi??  This  admits  of  different  answers.  Though  the 
filncss  and  competency  ni  those  courts  should  be  allowed 
in  the  utmost  latitude,  yei  the  substance  of  the  power  in  ^ 
question  may  still  be  regarded  as  a  necessary  part  of  the 
plan,  i(  it  were  only  to  empower  the  national  legislature  - 
to  commit  to  them  the  cognizance  of  causes  arising  out 
of  the  national   Constitution.     To  confer  the  power  of 


*  T1ii«  pnwtr  hu  been  abninllf  rroreMnlcd  **  iiitruil«<l  lo  kkolUh  «ll 
ih<  county  conitt  in  the  leveral  Siiici.  which  air  cuinmonty  caltrct 
inferiof  coutii.  Hal  Ihe  ciprcnJoni  of  lh«  Conttitulioa  aie.  to  con. 
uilule  "  lilliuKtU  iNniitdi.  to  tiik  *^t.-t-«n«K  Coumt  ":  and  ihE  cridMit 
<lrti|^i  >i(  ihc  lutiviaiiw  U  In  cimble  the  tndilnllun  n(  local  conila.  lubor- 
■j  rfinatc  lo  IheSnprtme.  either  in  Sislmir  larKV  diMriclk.  ll  it  riJiculou* 
I        Ut  taa^ine  Ihal  cwial)-  coum  «««  in  cofitein(il«lian.— PVN-iUS. 


S44 


tXFERtOR  COUKTS. 


X»:%\ 


»• 


deUrmining  snch  causes  upon  the  existing  courts  of  itie 
several  States  would  perhaps  be  as  much  "  to  consiiiate 
trtt>uiiitli"  aj(,tu  create  new  courts  with  the  like  power. 
But  ought  not  a  more  direct  and  explicit  provision  to 
have  pf8n  maiic  in  favor  of  thff'RI.iLi^  miuim^ — There  jre. 
In  my  opinion,  substantial  reasons  against  such  a  pro- 
.vision;  the  most  discerning  cannot  foresee  liow  far  the 
( ffreTitlency  of  a  local  spirit  may  l>c  found  to  disqualify 
I  the  local  tribunals  for  the  jurisdiciiiin  of  natioival  causes: 
whilst  every  maa  may  discover  that  courts  constituted 
like  those  of  some  of  the  States  would  be  improper  chan- 
nels of  the  judicial  authority  of  the  Union.  State  judges, 
holding  their  offices  during  pleasure  or  from  year  to 
year,  will  be  loo  tittle  independent  to  be  relied  upon  for 
an  inflexible  execution  of  the  national  laws,  ^nd  if  there 
was  a  necessity  for  confidins  the  original  cognizance  of 
causes  arising  under  those  laws  to  Ihcm.  there  would  be 
a  corrc«iK>ndent  necessity  for  leaving  titc  door  of  appeal 
as  wide  as  possible.  In  proportion  to  the  grounds  of 
confidence  in,  or  distrust  of,  the  subordinate  tribunals, 
ought  to  he  the  facility  or  ditli'ulty  of  appeals.  And 
well  satisfied  as  1  am  of  the  propriety  of  the  appellate 
jurisdiction,  in  the  several  classes  of  causes  to  which  it 
is  extended  hy  the  plan  of  the  convention,  I  should  CJin- 
sidcr  everything  calculated  to  give,  in  practice,  an 
unrffifiintJ  iiftirs*  to  appeals,  as  a  source  of  public  and 
private  inconvenience, 

lam  not  sure  but  that  it  will  be  found  highly  expedient 
and  useful  to  divide  the  United  States  into  four  or  five 
or  half  a  doxen  districts;  and  to  institute  a  fi:dcral  court 
in  each  district,  in  lieu  of  une  in  every  Stale.  The  judges 
of  these  courts,  with  the  aid  of  the  State  judges,  may 
hold  circuits  for  the  trial  of  causes  in  the  several  paru 
of  the  respective  dt?itricts-  Jusiice  through  them  mvf 
he  .idministcred  with  ease  and  dispatch,  and  appoils 
may  be  safely  circumscribed  within  a  narrow  compass. 
This  plan  appears  to  me  at  present  the  most  eligible  of 
any  that  could  be  adnpied;  and  in  order  to  it,  it  b 
necessary  that  the  power  nf  constitiUing  inferior  courts 


'HMHtMl    mSTRIBUTIOfl  OF  JUDICIAL  POWKR.        S4S 

'should  exist  in  the  full  extent  in  which  it  is  to  be  found 
pn  the  pro|>o»-d  Constitutiffn, 

TheM  rea&ons  seem  suRicteiU  to  satisfy  a  candid  mind 

liat  the  want  of  such  a  power  would  have  been  a  great 

ct  in  the  plan.     Let  us  now  ejtiimine  in  what  manner 

Fthe  judicial  aiiihorif^^^TTP'^*  Hi.t..i.iiK-.|    ^,f^mnl|■l^■^^|l» 

r^iiprcmc  anil  rlir  infrfirr  ^'"""f  "* ''"•  ''nil'" 

I  he  ^iiipreme  Court  in  to  be   invested  with  original 

Jurisdiction,  only  '•  in  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  other 

>ublic  ministers,  and  cnnsuts,  and  those  in  which  a  State 

llull  be  a  party."     Public  ministers  of  every  class  are 

immediate  representatives  of  their  sovereigns.     All 

Questions  in  which  they  arc  concerned  are  so  directly 

>nnected  with  the  public  peace  that,  as  well  for  the 

[(reservation  of  this  as  out  of  respect  to  the  sovereignties 

they  represent,  it  is  both  expedient  and  proper  that  such 

qucuions  should  be  submitted  in  the  first  instance  to 

the  highest  judicatory  of  the   nation.     Though  consuls 

have  not  in  strictness  a  diplomatic  character,  yet  as  they 

_^arc  the  public  agents  of  the  n;ition»;  to  which  they  belong, 

the  same  ot»ervatinn  is  in  a  greul^ measure  applicable  to 

''them.     In  cases  in  which  a  State  might   happen  to  be  a 

party,  it  would  ill  suit  its  dignity  to  be  turned  over  to  an 

inferior  tribunal. 

Though  it  may  rather  be  a  digression  from  the  immediate 

subject  of  this  paper,  I  shall  take  occasion  to  mention  here 

a  supposition  which  has  excited  some  alarm  upon  very 

mistaken  grounds.     It  has  been  suggestc<1  that  an  assign-^ 

meni  of  the  public  securities  of  one  State  to  the  citizens 

of  another  would  enable  ihcni  to  prosecute  that  State  in 

the  federal  courts  fur  the  amount  of  those  securities;  a 

su^lKcstion  which  the  following  considerations  prove  X.O, 

be  wilhout  foundation. 

I  It  is  inherent  in  the  niiture  of  sovereignty  not  to  be 

"      amcnat^e  to  the  suit  of  an  individual  wiikeut  Hi  eoaitnt^]^ 

This   is   the  general  sense  and  the  general  practice  ofi 

mankind;  and  the  exemption,  as  one  of  the  attributes  of 

sovereignty,  is  now  enjoyed  by  the  government  of  everyi 

I      State  in  the  Union.     Unless,  therefore,  there  is  a  sur- 

^^^^^^^  "      ■        -         -  


S46     FEDERAL  POWER  OVER  STATE  DEBTS.      «•.« 

render  of  thisimmunily  in  the  plaD  of  the  cotivcniion,  il 
will  rein»in  with  the  States,  and  the  danger  inlimiilcd 
must  be  merely  ideal.  The  circumstances  which  arc 
necessary  to  produce  an  alienation  of  State  sovereignty 
were  discussed  in  considering  the  article  of  taxation 
and  need  nut  be  repeated  here.  A  recurrence  to  the 
principles  there  established  will  satisfy  us  that  there  is 
no  color  ti>  jirrtcfid  that  the  State  govrrnmrnis  would  by 
the  adoption  of  that  plan  be  diveiiied  of  the  privilege  at 
paying  their  oun  debts  in  their  own  way,  free  from  every 
conttr^int  but  that  which  Hows  from  the  obligations  u( 
good  faith.  The  contracts  between  a  nation  and  indi- 
viduals are  only  binding  on  the  conscience  of  the  sovereign, 
and  hare  no  j>ret*^n!tions  to  a  compulsive  force.  They 
confer  no  right  of  action  independent  of  tlie  sovereign 
wilt.  To  what  purpose  would  it  be  to  authorize  suits 
against  Statrs  fur  the  debts  ihey  owe?  How  cotdd 
recoveries  be  enfon^ed?  It  is  evident  it  could  not  be 
done  without  waging  war  against  the  contracting  State; 
and  to  ascribe  to  the  (eilcral  courts  by  mere  implicatluR, 
and  in  destruction  of  u  pre-exisiing  right  of  the  Slate 
governments,  a  power  which  would  involve  such  3  coa> 
sequence  would  t>e  altogether  forced  and  unwarrantable. 

Let  us  resume  the  train  of  our  observations.  We  have 
seen  that  the  original  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court 
would  be  conline<l  to  two  classes  of  causeit,  and  those  of 
a  nature  r.ircly  to  occur.  In  all  other  cases  of  fetlcral 
4y>gnizance,  the  original  jurisdiction  would  appertain  to 
the  inferior  Inbunats;  and  the  Supreme  Conrt  would 
have  nothing  more  ttian  an  appellate  juriMticlioii,  "  with 
such  txetfrtiont  and  under  such  reguiatii'us  as  the  Congress 
shall  make." 

The  propriety  of  this  appellate  jurisdiction  has  been 
scarcely  aitlcil  in  <)uestion  in  reg.irti  to  m.ttters  ol  law; 
bul  the  clamors  have  been  loud  against  it  as  appliid  to 
matters  of  fact.  Some  well  intenlioned  men  in  llii* 
Stale,  deriving  their  notions  from  the  langiinge  and 
forms  which  obtain  in  our  courts,  have  been  induced  in 
consider  it  as  an  implied  superscdnre  of  the  trial  by  jury. 


Haalltoa 


in  favor  of  the  civil-bw  moilc  of  tml  which  prrrails  in 
our  courts  of  admirally,  |>rob3te,  ami  chanc<!ry.  A  tech. 
nical  sense  has  been  affixed  to  the  term  "appellate," 
which,  in  uiir  law  p>.ir)ancc,  is  commonly  tised  in  refer- 
ence to  appeals  in  (he  course  of  the  civil  l.tw.  Rut  if  I 
am  not  misinformed,  the  same  meaning  would  not  be 
given  to  it  in  any  part  of  New  I^ngland,  There  an  ap- 
peal from  one  jury  to  another  is  famili^ir  both  in  language 
and  practice,  and  is  even  a  matter  of  course,  until  there 
have  been  two  verdicts  on  one  side.  The  word  "  appel- 
late," therefore,  will  not  he  understood  in  the  same  $ens« 
in  New  England  as  in  New  Vork,  which  shows  the  im- 
propriety of  a  technical  interpretation  derived  from  the 
jurisprudence  of  any  particular  State.  The  expretesion, 
lakcn  in  the  abstract,  denotes  nothins;  more  (ban  the 
power  of  one  tribunal  to  review  the  proceedings  of 
another,  either  as  to  the  law  or  fact,  or  both.  The  mode 
of  doing  it  may  depend  on  ancient  custom  or  legislative 
provision  (in  a  new  sovcrnracnt  it  must  depend  on  the 
latter),  and  may  be  with  or  without  the  aid  of  a  jury,  as 
may  be  judged  advisable.  If,  therefore,  the  re-ex;imtna' 
lion  of  a  fact  once  determined  )>y  a  jury  should  in  any 
case  t>c  admitted  utider  the  proposed  Constitution,  it 
may  be  »«  regulated  as  to  be  done  by  a  second  jury, 
cither  by  remanding  the  cause  lo  the  court  below  for  a 
second  trial  of  the  fact,  or  by  directing  an  issue  Immcdi; 
ately  out  of  the  Supreme  Court. 

But  it  docs  not  follow  that  the  rc-examinalion  of  a  fact  t 
once  ascertained   by  a   jury   will   be   permitted  in  the  i 
Supreme  Cuurt.     Why  may  not  it  be  said,  with  the  strict. ' 
est  propriety,  when  a  writ  of  error  is  brought  from  an  in- 
ferior to  a  superior  court  of  law  in  this  State,  that  the 
latter  baa  juritdiction  of  the  fact  as  well  as  the  lay?     It 
is  true  it  cannot  institute  a  new  inquiry  concerning  the 
htct,  but  it  takes  cognizance  of  it  as  it  appears  upon  the 
record,  and  pronounces  the  law  arising  upon  it.*     This 
is  jurisdiction  of  bo'th  fact  and   Law;  nor  is  it  even  pos. 

*  Thu  w^rri  U  eosipiuni  of  )v*  nixl  iticnn.Jurii  iSetim,  or  a  spciMaf 
util  (iriononiKing  ul  llio  l*w.— Pi'ci.iLi. 


548        JUKISDICTIOH  AS  TO  LAW  AND  FACT.     VA*\ 

sibic  M  separate  thcni.  Though  the  common  law  courts 
of  this  Stale  ascertain  disputed  facts  by  a  jury,  jrct  ihcy 
onquealionaUy  have  jurisdiction  of  both  fact  and  taw; 
and  accordingly,  when  the  former  is  agreed  in  (he  plead* 
ings,  they  have  no  recourse  to  a  jury,  but  proceed  at 
oivce  to  juilgRicnt.  1  ^opl<'inl.  tlifn-torc,  hh  \\\\t  gfomyl. 
r  tljpr  tlir  f>i[pi--»ti"nff|  "njfrllirr  i'"'''ii!iii;i'""|  ^■*'*'  as  to 
bw  .mil  f.ict."  do  not  necessarily  inn>lv  a  re -examination 
in  n\e  Supreme  C.'imrt  of  facts  decided  by  iurie»  in  the 

The  following  train  of  ideas  may  well  be  imagined  to 
have  inllucnccd  the  convention,  in  relation  to  this  par- 
ticular provision.  The  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the 
Supreme  Court  (it  may  have  been  argued)  will  citend  to 
causes  determinable  in  different  modes,  some  in  the  course 
of  the  COMMON  LAW,  Others  in  the  course  of  Uie  civn. 
LAW.  In  the  former,  (be  revision  of  the  lav  only  will  bt, 
generally  speaking,  the  proper  province  of  the  Siiprrme 
Court;  in  the  latter,  the  reexamination  of  the  fact  is 
agreeable  to  usage,  and  in  some  cases,  of  which  prue 
causes  arc  an  example,  might  be  essential  (o  the  presem- 
tiun  of  the  public  jK-ate.  It  is,  therefore,  necessary  that 
the  appellate  jurisdiction  should,  in  certain  cases,  extend 
in  the  broadest  sense  to  matters  of  fact.  It  will  not 
answer  to  make  an  express  exception  of  cases  which  »hatl 
have  been  origiiully  tried  by  a  jury,  because  in  the  courts 
of  some  of  the  States n// f(iif»«  are  tried  in  this  mode'; 
and  such  an  exception  wonld  preclude  the  revision  of 
ntatters  of  fact,  as  well  where  it  might  be  proper  M 
where  it  might  be  improper.  To  avoid  all  incoovcn- 
teneev,  it  will  be  safest  to  declare  generally  that  the 
/  Supreme  Court  shall  possess  appellate  jurtsdicliun  both 
I  as  to^aw  and/ir*-/,  and  tliat  this  jurisdiction  shall  be  sub- 
I  ject  to  such  fxcfpH^mt  and  regulations  u  the  national 
I  legislature  may  prescribe.     This  will  enable  the  govern- 


■  I  tiolil  Ihat  (lie  HMIn  will  har«  ronrUirmt  jnritdklinii  wttk  ike 
«ul>ui>limlt  IHcrRl  ju^katunet.  in  mvai  cuo  ul  l«d«ial  nc^< 
will  be  (iplainril  in  nir  am  t'lpef.  — I'UVui'k. 


lUmlllMl      TKIAL  BY  JURY  NOT  ABOUSIIED. 


S49 


.  niciit  to  modify  it  in  such  Zk  manner  as  will  best  answer 
tlie  ends  of  public  justice  and  security. 

This  view  of  the  matter,  at  any  rate,  puts  it  out  of  .i1l 
dntibt  iliiit  the  suppttsed  aMilionsd-iXM  truil  by  jury  by 
the  opcralian  oLthis  provision  is  fallacious  and  untrue. 
The  legislature  iif  the  United  Stiites  would  certainly  have 
|full  power  to  provide  that  in  appeals  to  the  Supreme 
[Coun  there  should  be  no  re-examination  of  facts  where 
L,they  had  been  tried  in  the  original  causes  by  juries. 
This  wiiuld  certainly  be  an  autborixvd  exception;  but   if, 
for  the  reason  already  intimated,  it  should  be  thought 
too  extensive,  it  might  be  qualified    with  a   limitation  to 
such  causes  only  as  are  determinable  at  common  law  in 
thai  tnodc  of  trial. 
The  amount  of  the  observations  hitherto  made  on  the 
[authority  of  the  judicial  deixirtment  \\  this:  that  it  lias 
been  carefully  restricted  to  those  causes  which  are  mani- 
festly proper  for  the  cognizance  of  the  national  judica- 
ture; that  in  the  partition  of  this  authority  a  very  small 
portion  of  original  jurisdiction  has  been  j)rescrvcd  to  the 
I  Supreme  Court,  and  the  rest  consigned  to  the  subordi* 
Rate  tribunals:  that  the  Supreme  Court  will  possess  an 
appellate  jurisdiction,  both  as  to  law  and  (act,  in  all  the 
cases  referred  to  Ihcm,  both  subject  to  any  txeefliam anA 
regulaliom   which   may   be  thought  advisable:  that  this 
appellate  jurisdiction  does,  in  nn  c.ise,  aMish  the  trial  by 
jury;   and   that   an   ordinary   degree   of   prudence    and 
integrity  in  the  national  councils  will  insure  us  solid  ad- 
vantages from  the  establishmenl  of  the  proposed  judi- 
ciary, without  exposing  us  to  any  of  the  inconveniences 
which  have  been  predicted  from  tlwt  source. 

PUBLIUS. 


S5«     RELATIOlt  OF  STATE  COURTS  TO  FBDEKAl.    !»•.! 


No.  82. 


(FiM  mllMtfd  Milllok,  Km  Vw%,  ift«.t 


Hamilion. 


SOME   MISCELLANEOUS   QUESTIONS   REGARD- 
ING THE   JUDICIARY. 

Tk*  jmruStH»H  9/  tkt  ttaif  t»urti  «m  ftJirtl  ftntHamt—  TJU  sUlt 
fftaU  niU  Tilain  all  Ihal  ti  n>'l  exilmittl^  JtUgaltJ — DraiUn  »fMMtn 
iriitBg  /r,-m  a  farluular  rtgitlalira  m.iy  ht  J/ligaltJ  hy  Cfgrtll  ftttK- 
livtty  U  lUfrtau  tttiii —RilaliBH  Mtetf»  tUU  aati /tdirat  <mrti  avknt 
Ihry  iatv  timurrrll  iuriiJutifn^AHtfptal  mil  Of /rgm  lUU  ^mrli 
la  Ihr  tMprtmt  t*url—  Tkt  affttUtli  Junidittitm  9/  tki  im/erUr  JiJtral 
tptirti. 

TV  /**■  Pa^pte  pj  tke  State  of  Nem  Y^rk: 

The  erection  o(  u  new  government,  whatever  care  or 
wisdom  may  distinguish  the  work,  cannot  fail  to  on'gioAtc 
<Itiestiuns  of  intricacj  anO  nicety;  nnd  thette  may,  in  a 
pitrticular  manner,  be  eKpected  to  flow  from  the  establish- 
ment of  a  constitution  founded  upon  the  total  or  partial 
incorporation  of  3  number  of  distinct  sovereignties. 
'Tis  time  only  that  can  mature  and  perfect  so  compound 
a  system,  can  liquidate  the  meanins;  of  all  the  parts,  and 
can  adjust  them  to  each  other  in  a  harmonious  and  coU' 
sistent  wholb. 

Such  questions,  accordingly,  have  artnen  upon  the  plan 
proposed  by  the  convention,  and  particularly  cooceming 
■  he  judiciary  department.  The  princi{>.d  of  these  respect 
the  itituntion  of  the  State  courts  in  regard  to  those  causes 
which  arc  to  be  submitted  to  federal  jurisdiction.  Is  this 
to  be  exclusive,  or  are  those  courts  to  possess  a  concur- 
rent jurisdiction?  !f  the  latter,  in  what  relation  will  they 
stand  to  the  national  tribunals?  These  are  inquiries 
which  we  meet  with  in  the  mouths  of  men  of  sense,  and 
which  are  certuitdy  entitled  to  attention. 

The  principles  established  in  a  former  paper  "  teach  ti5 
that  the  Stales  will  retain  all //■^■cjMV/f'(f  authnritics  which 
may  not  be  i^xcluKiveJy  delegated  to  ihe  federal  head ;  and 
that  this  exclusive  delegation  can  only  exist  in  ooe  of 


HuUltOQl  COXCVRRKNT  JUniSDICTlOU. 


55> 


three  cases:  where  ao  exclusive  authority  is  in  express 
terms  granted  to  the  Union;  or  where  a  particular 
autliunty  is  granteil  to  the  Union,  and  the  exercise  of  u 
like  authority  is  prohibited  to  the  States;  or  where  an 
authority  is  granted  to  the  Union,  with  which  a  similar 
authority  in  the  States  would  be  utterly  incompatible. 
Though  these  principles  may  not  apply  with  the  same 
force  to  the  judiciary  as  to  the  legislative  power,  yet  1 
am  inclined  to  think  that  they  are,  in  the  main,  just  wiih 
respect  to  the  former,  as  well  a«  the  latter.  And,  under 
this  impression,  1  shall  lay  it  down  as  a  rule  that  the 
State  courts  will  rtlain  the  jurisdiction  they  now  have, 
unless  it  appears  to  be  taken  away  in  one  of  the  enumer- 
ated modes. 

The  only  thing  in  the  proposed  Constitution  which 
wears  the  appearance  of  conrmiitg  the  causes  of  federal 
cognizance  to  the  federal  courts  is  contained  in  this  pas> 
sage:  "The  jtiuiciAL  power  of  the' United  States  lAd// 
Af  V€tttJ  in  one  Supreme  Court,  and  in  tuck  inferior 
courts  as  the  Congress  shall  from  time  to  time  ordain  and 
establish."  This  might  cither  be  construed  to  signify 
that  the  supreme  and  Nubordinate  courts  of  the  Union 
should  alone  have  the  power  of  deciding  those  causes  to 
which  their  authority  is  to  extend;  or  simply  to  denote 
that  the  orjrans  of  the  national  judiciary  should  be  one 
Supreme  Court,  and  as  many  subordinate  courts  as 
Congress  should  think  proper  to  appoint;  or,  in  other 
words,  that  the  United  States  should  exercise  ttie  judiciid 
power  with  which  they  are  to  be  invested,  through  one 
supreme  tribunal,  and  a  certain  number  of  inferior  ones, 
to  br  instituted  )>y  them.  The  first  excludes,  the  last 
admits,  the  concurrent  jurisdiction  of  the  State  tri- 
bunals: and  as  the  first  would  amount  to  an  alienation  of 
State  power  by  implication,  the  last  appears  to  me  the 
most  natural  and  the  most  defensible  construction. 

But  this  doctrine  of  concurrent  jurisdiction  is  only 
clearly  applicable  to  those  descriptions  of  causes  o( 
which  the  Slate  courts  have  previous  cognixance.  It  is 
not  equally  evident  in  relation  to  cases  which  may  ^oni 


55»     STArs  couxrs  not  merely  local,      (■•.m 


out  of,  and  be  pttuliar  to,  the  Constitution  to  be  es- 
tablished; for  not  to  Jillnw  the  State  courts  a  right  of 
jumdiction  in  such  cihcs  can  hardly  be  considered  as 
tlic  abridgment  of  a  pre-existing  authority.  1  mean  nut 
therefore  to  contend  that  the  United  States,  in  the 
course  of  legislation  upon  the  olijects  intrusted  to  their 
direction,  may  not  commit  the  decision  of  causes  arising 
upon  a  particular  regulation  to  the  federal  courts  solely, 
if  such  a  measure  should  be  deemed  expedient;  but  1 
hold  that  the  Slate  courts  will  be  divested  of  no  part  of 
their  primitive  jurisdiction,  further  than  may  relate  to 
jui  appeal;  and  1  am  even  of  opinion  that  in  every  case 
in  which  they  were  not  expressly  excluded  by  the  future 
acts  of  (he  national  legislature,  they  will,  of  coarse,  take 
cngnixance  of  the  causes  to  which  those  acts  may  give 
birth.  This  I  infer  from  the  nature  of  judiciary  power, 
and  from  the  general  genius  of  the  system.  The  judi- 
ciary power  of  every  government  looks  beyond  its 
own  local  or  municipal  lairs,  and  in  civil  cases  lays 
hold  of  all  subjects  of  litigation  between  parties 
within  its  jurisdiction,  though  the  causes  of  dispute 
are  relative  to  the  laws  of  the  most  distant  part  of 
the  globe.  Those  of  Japan,  not  less  tlian  of  New  Vurk, 
may  furnish  the  objects  of  legal  discussion  to  our  courts. 
When,  in  addition  lo  this,  we  consider  the  .Slate  govern- 
ments and  the  national  governments,  as  they  truly  are, 
in  the  light  of  kindred  systems,  and  as  parts  of  onk 
WHOLE,  tlie  inference  seems  to  be  conclusive  that  the 
State  courts  would  have  a  concurrent  jurisdiction  in  all 
cases  arising  under  the  laws  of  the  Union,  where  it  was 
not  expressly  prohibited. 

Here  another  question  occurs:  What  relation  would 
subsist  between  the  national  and  Slate  courts  in  thcK 
instances  of  concurrent  jurisdiction?  I  answer  that  an 
appeal  would  certainly  lie  from  the  latter  to  the  Supreme 
C'Jtirt  of  the  United  .States.  The  Constitution  In  direct 
terms  gives  an  appellate  jurisdiction  to  the  Supreme 
Court  in  all  the  enumerated  cases  of  federal  •  -e 

\Q  which  it  is  not  to  have  ati  original  one,  :  a 


■Mnntw!       APPELIA  TE  JURISDICTIOS. 

single  expression  to  conTinc  its  operation  to  the  inferior 
federal  courts.  The  objects  of  appeal,  not  the  trihun;ils 
from  which  it  is  to  be  made,  are  alone  contemplated. 
From  this  circumstance,  and  from  the  reason  of  the 
thing,  it  ought  to  be  construed  to  extend  to  the  Slate 
tribunals.  Either  this  must  be  the  case,  or  the  local 
courts  must  be  excluded  from  a  concurrent  jurisdiction 
in  matters  o(  national  concern;  else  the  judiciary  au- 
thority  of  the  Union  may  be  eluded  at  the  pleasure  of 
every  plaintiff  or  prosecutor.  Neither  of  these  conse- 
(|uences  ought  without  evident  necestity  to  be  involved; 
the  latter  would  be  entirely  inadmissible,  as  it  would 
defeat  some  of  the  must  important  and  avowed  purposes 
of  the  proposed  governmeni,  and  would  essentially  em- 
barrass its  measures.  Nor  do  1  perceive  any  foundation 
for  such  a  supposition.  Agreeably  to  the  remark  already 
made,  Ihe  national  and  State  systems  are  to  be  regarded 
At.  ONE  WHOLE.  The  courts  of  the  latter  will  of  course  be 
natural  auxiliaries  to  Ihe  execution  of  the  laws  of  the 
Union,  and  an  ap[xa1  from  them  will  as  naturally  lie  to 
that  tribunal  which  is  destined  to  unite  and  assimilate 
the  principles  of  national  justice  and  the  rules  of  national 
decisions.  The  evident  aim  of  the  plan  of  the  conven- 
tton  is  that  all  the  causes  of  the  specified  classes  shall, 
for  weighty  public  reasons,  receive  their  original  or 
final  determin.^lion  in  the  courts  of  (he  Union.  To 
fimfine,  therefore,  the  general  expressions  giving  ap- 
pcllate  jurisdiction  to  the  Supreme  Coon  to  appeals 
from  the  subordinate  federal  courts,  instead  of  allow- 
inj);  their  extension  to  the  State  courts,  would  be  to 
abridge  the  latitude  of  the  terms,  in  subversion  of  the 
intent,  contrary  to  every  sound  rule  of  interpretation. 

But  could  an  appeal  be  made  to  lie  from  the  State 
courts  to  the  subordinate  federal  judicatories?  This  is 
another  of  ihe  questions  vhich  have  been  raised,  and  of 
greater  difficulty  than  the  former.  The  following  con- 
siderations countenance  the  affirmative.  The  plan  of 
the  convention,  in  the  first  place,  authorixes  the  national 
lejfislature  "  to  constitute  tribunals  inferior  to   the  Su- 


^ 


MB 


554  APPEALS  TO  IHFERIOR  COURTS.  (■«.» 

premc  Court."  •  It  declares,  in  the  next  place,  that  •'  the 
jvDiciAi.  rowtiR  of  (he  United  States  tkallht  vftted  in  one 
Supreme  Court,  and  in  %\x<z\\  inferior  cnurts  as  Congress 
shall  ordain  and  establish";  and  it  then  proceeds  to 
enumerate  the  cases  to  which  this  judicial  power  shall 
extend.  It  afterwards  divides  the  jurisdiction  nf  ihc 
Supreme  Court  into  original  and  appellate,  but  gives  no 
dcliniiiun  of  that  of  (he  subordinate  courts.  The  only 
outlines  described  far  them  are  that  they  slialt  )>c  "iii> 
fcrior  to  the  Supreme  Court,"  and  that  they  shall  not 
exceed  the  specified  limits  of  the  federal  judiciary. 
Whether  their  authority  shall  be  ortgiiuil  or  appellate,  nr 
both,  IS  not  declared.  All  this  seems  to  be  left  to  the 
discretion  of  the  legislature.  And  this  being  the  case. 
I  perceive  at  present  no  impediment  to  the  establishment 
of  an  appeal  from  the  State  courts  to  the  subordinate 
national  tribumds;  and  many  advantages  attending  the 
power  of  doing  it  may  be  imagined.  It  would  diminish 
the  motives  to  the  nmUipIic-aitnn  of  federal  courts,  and 
would  admit  of  arrangements  calculated  to  contract  the 
appellate  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court.  'I'he  Sute 
tribunals  may  then  be  left  with  a  more  entire  charge  of 
federal  causes;  and  appeals,  in  most  cases  in  which  they 
may  be  deemed  proper,  instead  of  being  carried  to  the 
Supreme  Court  may  be  made  to  lie  from  the  SUte  courts 
to  district  courts  of  the  Union. 

Pt' BLIPS, 

*Sec.  8th,  ul.  111.— rtiBi.lvs. 


y. 


HwUltooI        SitE.VCE  AS  TO  J  UK  Y  TRIAL. 


55S 


,      No.  83. 


fFinlcatlKici«dil>oD,Kniyaik.  i)W.) 


Hamilton. 


TRIAL  BY    JURY    IN    RELATION    TO  THE 
NATIONAL  JUDICIARY. 


Oijrttim  thai  tkrrt  ii  Ha  prirviiipu  in  tit  fropanJ  CeitlilHlifn  far 
trial  iyjury  in  livi/taia,  tvitii^ai—  Triu  mfaniag  of  maxiiiu  tn  whttk 
(tit  «tjritif»  rtsti—lmft^tautt  «/ right  ef  trial  hy  jury,  leniUerti 
— Criminal  and  livil  latfi—fury  lyilm  in  diffirtnt  Sloitt — DiffieuUy 
»f  ritabhtkinti  1  gftivt  rutr — fmfrrftifly  ef  imh  a  gmmil  riitr  in 
irrtaintAtti — Tlu profvittitm  tf  Maitmkuiflti—Tht  fraviiitni  t/ Ikt 
Ntw  York  ifniiituti&H—  Tit  pm/vtilivH  that  the  jury  lyiltm  ihtmU  te 
tsUtlisheJ  in  ail  taiti  rehativtr — CemSuMng  rtmarkt. 

To  the  Pti^e  of  the  Stale  oj  New  York: 

Tti«  objreiiim  to  the  plan  o(  ihefonvrniion  which  has  mrt  wilh 
most  aucce**  in  ihw  SMie,  ami  prih^iM  rn  several  o(  (he  olher 
Slnlcs.  is  tki*t  relati^ft  lo  the  ■waul  a/  it  eoiulilulienal  profiiion 
(or  the  Irul  by  jury  in  civil  n^<^.'  Th«  ili.singt^nuous  (orm  in 
which  this  olijcction  is  usunlly  st,4iccl  )us  been  icpcaicdly  ndverled 
10  .-inil  exposed,  hut  vonliiitm  lu  be  puisued  in  nil  the  conreixa- 
lioiisaoil  wiiliiiEsnf  the  opponents  of  ihe  plan.  The  mere  silence 
<it  the  Qinsiilutioii  in  lej^.ud  to  (ivUcautes  ii  rF|>reseniril  at  an 
nholjlion  of  the  iriaJ  by  jiity.  and  the  dccUmationt  tn  which  it  has 
allonled  a  pretext  are  aitfully  cilculitlcd  to  Induce  a  iteniauiim 
thai  thi«  pretended  al>o)itiun  is  complete  nnti  univerul.  mending 
not  only  to  every  tpecies  ol  cirtt.  but  even  10  crim/nal  cauui. 
To  argue  with  icaipecl  to  the  lulter  wuulil,  however,  be  as  vain  and 
(ruilless  as  lo  atlenipl  the  serious  proof  of  the  exiilfHtt  vA  nmller, 
or  ta  demonstrate  any  ol  lltose  propuailions  which.  t>y  their  own 
Internal  evHknce,  foice  conviction,  when  ex]>icsscil  in  liinguaKG 
nihpted  to  convey  their  nicxniiit;. 

Wlih  rq^rd  to  civil  caiiK».  subtleties  almost  too  coniem|ttifa1e 
for  refulatvon  have  been  employed  to  counieitaiicc  the  Mirmite 
that  a  thing  wliieh  is  only  not  prmiidid  f»r  a  entirely  aMitktd. 
Every  man  of  diaceinraeni  must  at  once  perceive  tlie  wiile  differ- 
ence between  silenee  and  aMitien.  But  ns  the  inrcntors  of  thif 
laJtacy  have  atiemplcd  lo  Mpport  it  by  cert.iin  legal  maxims  oi 
ifllcrpreiatian.  which  lliey  have  perverted  from  tbeir  true  meaning, 
it  may  not  be  wholly  useless  to  explore  the  ground  iliey  liai-e 
taken. 


ss« 


NO  LIMiT  O.V   miAt.  liY  JURY. 


The  maxima  on  wliicli  ilicy  rely  ar«  o(  iliis  nxiurc :  "  A  »peciftca- 
Uon  of  p.irlicu1.)n(  U  ;in  cxcliiMftn  of  f^tticntU";  or,  "The  expre»- 
»ion  'A  oiicllung  ii  t)ic«xclu»iono(an<)tli(r."  Itcncr. say  (hcf.  u 
the  Contlitiilion  h.i*  c^UblUheii  ihe  trial  b)-  jury  in  cHmiiiiil  caso, 
anil  IS  silent  in  respect  to  ciril,  tins  silence  t»  an  implied  prolitbitian 
of  trial  by  jury  in  regard  to  Ihe  Litter. 

The  rules  of  jes'l  Interpretations  are  rules  of  eommei*  umte. 
nilojiied  by  (he  couns  in  Ihe  conitraciion  of  the  laws.  Tl>e  iibc 
icsi.  iheiefore,  of  a  ju^i  xpplicatioti  of  ibem  ts  Its  conformity  lu  the 
toui'cc  from  which  ihcy  arc  <ieiire<l.  Tliis  being  the  c3k.  kl  tue 
a»k  if  it  15  conkiitent  with  contmon  sense  to  suppose  that  a  pit>- 
miun  nt)l>giii;;lhe  le^khlire  power  to  coinniil  the  ttUl  ol  cnminal 
cnuses  lo  juries,  is  a  pnv;ition  of  its  tight  lo  aulhotijc  or  pentKI 
ibat  iiioilc  of  itial  in  other  casea  ?  Is  it  nutural  to  W{i)<ose  that  a 
cointiund  10  do  one  thrng  Is  a  prohibition  to  the  doing  of  anoilicr, 
whkh  there  was  a  pretiou*  power  (o  do.  and  which  is  not  incoin- 
paiible  with  the  thing  commanded  to  be  done?  II  suchacuppos^ 
tioii  would  be  unnatural  and  uiireasoiiabtc.  it  cannoi  be  rttkxuil  lo 
maintain  thjit  an  injunction  of  Ibc  trial  by  jury  in  certain  cases  b 
an  inlerdiction  ol  it  in  others. 

A  power  to  consliitiie  coons  is  a  power  to  picserihr  the  mode  ol 
trial :  and  conscqiienily,  if  nothing  was  said  in  tile  Consliiutiun  on 
Ihe  Mihject  of  juries  the  legislature  would  be  at  liberty  either  to 
adopt  ihat  institution  or  to  let  il  alone.  This  discretion,  in  rej^ard 
to  citminal  canve«.  is  atxidgcil  by  the  nprcM  injunctkm  of  inal  by 
jury  in  alt  such  cases ;  but  It  ts,  of  course,  left  at  laige  In  rebiion  lo 
ciril  cauMo.ihere  being  a  total  silence  on  (his  head.  The  specifica- 
tion of  an  ohligatton  lo  try  all  criminal  causes  ni  a  particular  mude 
excludes  indeed  (he  i>(>llgalloi)  or  necessity  ol  employing  ihr  sanie 
mode  in  civil  causes,  btii  does  not  .ibridgc  the  p^nttt  of  the  lejis- 
latute  to  exercl«e  that  mode  if  it  should  be  (bought  pm|ier.  The 
pretense,  ihetcforr.  that  the  nallnn^l  Icgktatiinr  would  not  be  at 
full  liberty  to  subinil  all  (he  civil  causes  of  federal  cognlt.ince  to 
Ihe  ikierrai nation  of  jutie*  is  a  pretense  deuilnte  of  all  just 
foundation. 

From  these  otmervalions  (his conclusion  remit*:  (hai  the  trial 
by  jury  in  civil  cases  would  not  be  abolished ;  and  thai  the  nse 
allcmpied  to  b«  made  of  (lie  maxims  which  hare  lieen  i|Ua<ed  ti 
contrary  (o  reason  and  common  senve.anil  therefore  not  adnitMUric. 
Even  if  these  maxims  had  a  precise  technical  seiue,  corresfvinditf 
with  ihe  idea  of  those  who  employ  ihcm  iipno  the  pi.  i- 

aion.  whith.  however,  is  not  the  case,  they  wouM  still - 
•bk  toaconstblUllon  of  governiHEnt.     In  relation  let  auth  a  subject. 


LlAtrrS  OF  FEDERAL  JURISDICTION.        557 

the  natural  anil  obvious  sense  of  lis  proviirons,  xpart  from  any 
Icttinical  luki,  \%  ihc  true  criterion  of  construction. 

Havini:  now  seen  that  llie  nuxiins  relied  upon  will  no(  1>cbi  the 
Utemaile  of  them,  let  us  endeavor  lo  ascertain  their  proper  UMand 
Irue  meaning.  Tl>is  will  be  bcsi  done  by  examples.  The  pUn 
of  the  coarention  declares  th^t  the  power  of  Congress,  or.  in 
ottier  wotdti.  o(  ilic  national  UgiiUtltire.  shall  extend  (o  certain 
enumerated  cases.  This  spcciltcalion  of  particulars  evidcnlly 
exclude!)  jII  |»c(cn»ion  lo  x  );cneial  Ic^istAtlve  auilioiiiy,  because 
an  alfi til  1.1  live  grant  of  special  powers  would  be  abmrd,  as  well 
as  useless,  if  a  gencml  authority  was  tnicnded. 

In  Ijkc  manner  the  judicial  aiilhority  of  the  federal  judicatures 
is  ticclare*!  b)-  ihc  Constitution  to  comptehend  certaiti  c^ses  piiv- 
titularly  specified.  The  expression  of  (ho»c  cases  marks  ihe 
precise  limits  bcjxind  which  the  federal  couits  cannot  eitcnd  their 
juriwliciK)n,  because,  ihe  objects  of  llieir  cogiii«ance  liciri); 
enumerated,  the  speci6caiion  would  be  nugatory  if  ii  did  not 
cxi^'tudc  all  idcai  of  mure  extensive  aulhority. 

These  examples  arc  sudicirni  lo  elucidate  the  maxims  which 
have  been  inenlioned.  anil  lo  doiKtiale  the  manner  in  which  ihey 
should  he  used,'  f  But  ih.-xl  there  m.iy  be  no  misapprehension  upon 
this  subject.  I  sh:ill  »dd  one  tase  more,  to  demonstrate  the  proper 
use  of  ihcte  maxims,  and  the  abuse  which  has  been  made  of 
them. 

Lei  us  suj^sc  that  by  the  law^  of  this  Slaie  a  ntarried  woman 
W4S  incapable  o4  conreying  her  esiaic.  and  thai  the  legiilaiure,  con- 
sidering  ihis  a.s  an  evil,  should  cnaci  that  she  might  dispose  of  bcr 
piupeily  by  deed  executed  in  the  piescnccof  a  rnagiMrale.  In  such 
a  case  there  can  be  no  doubt  hul  the  specification  would  ;imount  to 
an  exclusion  of  any  oilier  mode  of  conreyaiicc.  becau&e  the  woman 
having  no  previous  poiver  to  .itienate  her  properly,  the  specification 
dctermints  ilx  particular  nMxIe  which  she  is.  for  that  puipose.  to 
avail  hcrtelf  of.  But  let  us  further  suppose  thai  in  a  subsequent 
part  of  the  same  act  il  should  be  declared  that  no  woman  should 
dispone  of  any  estate  of  a  deieiminatc  value  without  the  coiiseiii  of 
three  of  her  neircst  relations,  signified  by  their  signing  the  deed ; 
could  it  be  inferred  from  this  regulation  thai  a  inanicd  woman 
might  noi  procure  the  approbation  of  her  relations  lo  a  <lecd  for 
conveying  piopcrt)  of  inferior  value  ?  The  position  ia  too  absurd 
to  merii  a  refutation,  and  yet  this  is  prrcisely  the  pnailion  which 
llMM  must  mablish  who  conlend  thai  the  trial  b)r  ^rics  In  ciril 

'  The  teDlencet  which  follow  in  brackets  are  omitted  in  the  text  of  Ibi 
ediiiuni  of  iSo*and  i$iti.— Esiioa. 


U 


ones  ii  aboluhed,  beoiue  it  b  expreuir  pravMted  (4>r  in  <:» 
criminal  nature.) 

From  (h»e  obMrvalJani  it  muit  iif^war  umiiieilion.itrl)-  tnK 
ihm  Irfii)  by  jury  is  in  no  cmc  aboiithrd  by  the  propmit<i  Cotisutu- 
(ion,  and  il  is  rqually  liue  Ihiil.  in  ihtne  coiiltvversiio  bt^lv 
iniltvidusls  in  whKh  lfi«  grr^t  bndy  of  the  people  nrc  likely  i 
interested,  that  instituiion  wdl  retiiitiii  pipcively  in  tlie  name  liiua- 
lion  in  which  il  b  placed  by  the  Stale  coniiiiuiions  land  viill  Iw 
in  no  de{[ice  alteretl  or  in8uenced  by  the  adoixion  ol  ll>e  |>lan  uniler 
con»idcra(i<in|.'  The  (ountlatton  of  this  auertion  b.  thai  the 
natioii.-il  judiciaiy  will  have  no  cognisance  of  ilicm,  anil  of  count 
they  will  temain  deicrminnble  as  hercloftirc  by  the  State  qoorli 
only,  and  in  the  manner  which  the  Stale  conMiiuiions  and  lam 
ptescrihe.  All  laml  cau«e:i,  exce|>t  where  clainu  uniler  the  cranti 
of  different  States  come  into  question,  and  all  other  ronlro- 
vctsiea  between  the  ciiiiens  of  tlw  Nune  Slate,  uiitesn  wlietc  Ihey 
depend  <ipnn  positive  violations  of  the  articles  of  iininn.  by  acts  ol 
the  Slate  legialaiure^  will  bctoiiK  ezL-luuvcly  lu  (he  JiiiiMlictMN 
of  the  Slate  iribunaU.  Add  to  thia  that  admiralty  cautea,  and 
almost  all  IIumc  which  are  ol  equity  jurivliclion,  aie  <leletin(naMe 
under  our  own  government  wilhoiil  (he  inierreniion  of  ■  Jtity,  aad 
the  inference  from  the  whole  will  be  that  (hii  iiuliiution.  as  it 
ciitls  with  us  al  present,  caiinni  possihly  be  alffrled  to  any  grtatl 
exicnl  by  the  proposed  alteration  m  our  system  of  t^oremmenl. 

The  friends  and  adversaries  of  Ihe  pUti  n(  the  conven- 
tion, if  they  agree  in  nothing  else,  i»>ncur  at  least  in  the 
value  they  set  upon  the  trial  by  jtiry;  or  if  there  is  any 
diFference  between  thcin  it  consists  in  this:  the  former 
regard  il  as  a  valuable  safeguard  to  liberty:  the  latter 
represent  it  as  the  very  palladium  of  free  govcrnmenL 
For  my  own  part,  the  more  the  operation  of  the  Jiistitu* 
lion  has  fallen  under  my  observation,  the  mure  reason  I 
have  discovered  for  holding  it  in  high  estimation;  and 
it  would  be  altogether  superfluous  to  examine  to  what 
extent  it  deserves  to  be  esteemed  useful  or  essential  in  a 
representative  republic,  or  how  much  more  merit  it  may 
be  entitled  to  as  a  defense  .igainst  the  oppressions  of  an 
hereditary  mDnarch  than  as  a  barrier  to  the  tyranny  of 
popular  magiMrates  in  a  popular  goTcrnmeau  Discus- 
Bioos  of  this  kind  would  be  more  curious  than  beneficial. 


■  Thii  dauM  ia  tmckcta  li  onritiej  la  ibt  mwcd  teat.— Eotroa. 


J 


E>>Ut«al     TRIAL  BY  JURY  AND  TAXATION. 


559 


as  ull  are  iuti«riecl  of  the  utility  of  the  institution  and  of 
its  friendly  aspect  to  liberty.  But  1  muitt  ackiiovrlcge 
that  I  cannot  readily  discern  the  inseparable  connection 
between  the  esislcnce  of  liberty  iind  the  trial  by  jury  in 
civil  cases.  Arbitrary  impeachments,  arbitrary  methods 
of  prosecuting  pretended  offenses,  and  arbitrary  punish- 
ments upon  arbitrary  convictions,  have  ever  appeared  to 
me  to  be  the  great  engines  of  judicial  despotism;  and 
(M  thcs«  have  alt  relation  to  criminal  proceedings. 

■•■•*.  The  trial  by  jury  in  criminal   naees,  aided  by 

the  habtat  eorput  act,  seems  therefore  to  be  atone  con- 
cerned in  the  question.  And  both  of  these  are  provided 
for,  in  the  most  ample  manner,  in  the  plan  of  the  con- 
vention. 

It  has  been  observed  that  trial  by  jury  is  a  safeguard 
against  an  oppressive  exercise  of  the  power  of  taxation. 
This  observation  deserves  lo  be  canvassed. 

It  \%  evident  that  it  can  have  no  influence  upon  the 
legislature  in  regard  to  the  amount  of  taxes  to  be  laid,  to 
the  olijectt  upon  which  they  arc  10  be  imposed,  or  to  the 
nr/r  by  which  they  are  to  be  apportioned.  If  it  can  have 
any  influence,  therefore,  it  must  be  upon  the  mode  of 
collection  and  the  conduct  of  the  oflicers  intrusted  with 
the  execution  of  the  revenue  laws. 

As  to  the  mode  of  collection  in  this  State,  under  our 
own  Constitution,  the  trial  by  jury  is  in  most  cases  out 
of  use.  The  taxes  arc  usually  levied  by  the  more  summary 
proceeding  of  distress  and  sale,  as  in  cases  of  rent.  And 
it  is  acknowledged  on  all  hands  Uiat  this  is  essential  to 
the  efficacy  of  the  revenue  laws.  The  dilatory  course  of 
a  trial  at  law  lo  recover  the  taxes  imposed  on  individuals 
would  neither  suit  the  exigencies  of  the  public  nor  pro- 
mote the  convenience  of  the  citizens.  It  would  often 
occasion  an  accumulation  of  costs  more  burdensome  than 
the  original  sum  of  the  t:ix  to  be  levied. 

And  as  to  the  conduct  of  the  officers  of  the  revenue, 
the  provision  in  favor  of  trial  by  jury  in  criminal  cases 
will  alTonl  the  security  aimed  at.  Willful  abuses  of  a 
public  authority  lo  the  (ippression  of  the  subject,  and 


^ 


560 


JUKY  TRIAL  IN  CIVIL  CASES. 


ObLkl 


every  species  of  official  extortion,  are  offenses  against 
th«  govcrnmcnl,  fur  which  the  persons  who  commit  them 
may  be  indicted  an<I  punished  according  ^o  ">^  circum- 
stancGS  of  the  case. 

The  excellence  of  the  tri;tl  by  jury  in  clril  cases  appears 
to  depend  on  circumstances  foreign  to  the  preserratioo 
of  liberty.  The  strongest  argument  in  its  favor  is  thai 
it  is  a  security  against  corruption.  As  there  is  always 
more  time  and  better  opportunity  to  tamper  with  a 
standing  body  of  magistrates  than  with  a  jury  summoned 
for  the  occasion,  there  is  room  to  suppose  thai  a  corrupt 
influence  would  mure  easily  find  it»  way  to  the  former 
than  to  the  latter.  The  force  of  this  consideration  Is, 
however,  diminished  by  others.  The  sheriff,  who  is  the 
aummoner  of  ordinary  juries,  and  the  clerks  of  courts, 
who  have  the  nomination  of  special  juries,  are  themselves 
Standing  oflicers,  and,  acting  individually,  may  (m:  sup- 
posed more  accessible  to  the  toach  of  corrnpUoa  than 
the  judges,  who  are  a  collective  body.  It  is  not  difficult 
to  see  that  it  would  be  in  the  power  of  those  officers  to 
select  jurors  who  would  serve  the  purpose  of  the  parly 
as  well  as  a  corrupted  bench.  In  the  next  place,  it  may 
fairly  be  supposed  that  there  would  be  less  difficulty  in 
gaining  some  of  the  jurors  promiscuously  taken  from  the 
public  mass,  than  in  gaining  men  who  had  been  chosen 
by  the  government  for  their  probity  and  good  character. 
But  making  every  deduction  for  these  considerations,  ilic 
trial  by  jury  must  Still  be  a  valuable  check  upon  cornip- 
tion.  It  greatly  multiplies  the  impediments  to  its  success. 
As  matters  now  stand,  it  would  be  necessary  to  corrupt 
both  court  and  jury;  for  where  the  jury  have  gone  evi- 
dently wrong,  the  court  will  generally  grant  a  new  trial, 
and  It  would  be  in  most  cases  of  little  use  to  pracbce 
upon  the  jury,  unless  the  court  coutd  be  likewise  gained. 
Here  then  is  a  dituble  security,  and  it  will  readily  be 
perceived  that  tliis  complicated  agency  tends  to  preserve 
the  purity  of  botli  institutions.  By  iocrcasing  ilir 
olMtacles  to  success,  it  discourages  attempts  to  sciluce 
the  integrity  of  either.     Tbc  temptations  10  prottitutioa 


mvEKSirv  OF  sYsm.vs. 


whk'h  tl)«  judges  might  have  to  stirmuutit  must  cer- 
tainly be  much  fewer,  while  the  cooperaiion  o(  a  jury  is 
necessary,  than  they  might  be  if  they  had  themselves 
the  exclusive  detGrininiition  of  all  causes.' 

Notwithstanding,  therefore,  the  doubts  I  have  ex- 
pressed as  to  the  es«enliality  of  trial  by  jury  in  civil 
cases  to  liberty,  I  admit  that  it  is  in  most  cases,  uniler 
proper  regulations,  an  excellent  method  of  determining 
(liiestions  of  properly;  and  that  on  this  account  alone 
it  would  be  entitled  to  a  constitutional  proriMon  in  its 
favor  if  it  were  possible  to  fix  the  limits  within  which 
It  ought  to  be  comprehcn«led.  There  is,  however,  in  all 
cases,  great  difficulty  in  this;  and  men  not  blinded  by 
enthusiasm  must  be  sensible  that  in  a  ftdcral  govcrn- 
mrnt,  which  is  a  composition  of  societies  whose  ideas 
and  institutions  in  relation  to  the  matter  materially  vary 
from  each  other,  that  difficulty  must  be  not  a  litilc  aug- 
mented. Kor  my  own  part,  at  every  new  view  I  lake  of 
the  subject,  1  become  more  convinced  of  the  reality  of 
the  obstacles  which,  we  are  authoritatively  informed, 
prevented  the  insertion  of  a  provision  on  this  head  in 
the  plan  of  the  convention. 

I'he  gieai  tliflcivnee  between  the  limits  of  lite  jury  trial  in 
iliffcrriii  Sialc«  ii  not  grnrnlly  undcnlood;  am)  a.i  il  rauM  have 
<:o"isiilc(.tbl«  influence  on  Ihe  sentence  wc  ought  to  pass  upi»i  ilic 
omUtiiMi  cuinpUinctI  of  in  rcgDrt!  la  this  ixiiiii.  an  cxpUnation  ol 
It  IS  necessary,  (n  this  Slaie  our  judici.il  csiahiishnicms  resemble, 
more  nearly  llian  in  any  other,  thutc  ul  Greut  Briiatn.  Wc  have 
courts  of  common  law.  courts  nf  prohairs  (.malngous  iti  cntaui 
maitets  to  ihc  spiritual  courts  in  EngUnd).  a  cuun  ol  admiralty, 
and  a  court  of  cluncety.  In  the  coiiriK  of  common  law  only  the 
trial  by  Jury  prevails,  and  this  with  some  exceptions.  In  all  the 
others  a  single  jiulge  prciiiles.  anil  prncecds  in  general  cither 
according  to  (he  course  of  the  canon  or  civil  Uw.  Hithnut  tlir  aid 
of  a  jury.*     In  New  Jeney  thete  is  a  cotut  of  chancery  which 


*  It  hu  li«en  cnoneoody  lailnuatcil.  with  rcsud  to  the  court  o\ 
dinvny,  that  ibU  cuiid  c""''*"]'  <r>^  ilitputnl  tiict*  l>y  ■  Jiirr.  The 
Irutb  i>  ihit  rrfnnicn  lo  a  jury  in  that  (miit  rurly  h.-ipprii.  and  ate 
IB  no  cue  iicc«nMybut  where  the  validity  uf  adctiHut  land  cornea  into 
l|IM«lii>II.— Pu«i.lvs. 

■  Whin  Ihc  Uiiilol  Si*tei  nuuxliab,  lowxtil  llie  end  ol  tlie  t^'cderaliat 


^ 


Iflta 


56a 


JURY  TRIAL  IN  THE  STATES. 


tSa.D 


procfptli  likt  ours.  Iiiil  neither  courts  of  ai!niirall)r  nor  o\  probate^ 
in  thi;  sctiM  in  which  tlicvc  lait  arc  cstjblivlird  wiih  uv  In  llut 
Sutc  ihe  couKa  o(  Eominon  law  have  the  cojcniiancc  ol  ihoce 
causes  which  with  us  are  (Ictciininable  in  ihc  couiii  oJ  adinir«li]p 
uni]  of  |>rol>utet.  and  of  caume  ihe  jury  trial  \%  more  esiensireia 
New  Jersey  than  in  New  VorV.  In  PcnnsyU-aniit.  this  it  pcrlups 
siill  more  thr  cam,  for  (here  U  no  court  of  cltancery  in  thai  State 
and  its  coinnion'Uw  court*  have  equity  jurisiiiciion.  It  hai  a 
court  of  ndmiraltr.  but  none  of  probatet,  at  least  on  ibt  pUa  ct 
ours.  Delaware  has  in  these  respects  imtinled  I'enniTlvann. 
Maryland  approacliet  more  nearly  to  Neiv  York,  ai  itncK  alM 
Virginia,  except  that  the  Utter  ha«  a  plurMity  of  c'uncellorv 
North  Carolina  bean  m<Ht  nflinity  to  l^nntylvania ;  South  Caro- 
lina to  Vifglntii.  I  believe,  hnwo'cr.  that  in  sonic  of  thuMr  Stales 
which  liave  ditlinci  courts  of  admirally.  the  cautci  depending  in 
them  are  triable  by  juries.  In  Georgia  (l>ere  arc  none  but  coiniaoii' 
bw  courts,  and  an  appeal  of  Countc  lies  Itom  the  verdict  of  one 
jury  to  another,  which  it  called  a  special  jury,  and  for  which  a 
particular  mode  of  appointDicnt  is  inaibcd  out.  In  Connecticut 
they  have  iio  distinct  courts  either  of  chanrery  or  of  admiralty. 
an<l  their  courts  of  iM-ultAiei  lore  no  juriidiclion  of  causes.  Their 
coinn>on-Uw  couns  hnve  ndmintliy  and.  to  a  certain  eitenl.  equtty 
jurudiction.  In  cases  of  impotlance  their  Ecneral  a»semMy  is  the 
only  courl  of  chancery.  In  ConnectKUt.  thcrrforc.  the  trial  liy 
jury  cileiids  in  ^rrff/rir/-  luitlicr  than  in  any  oilier  Slate  )-ei  men- 
tioned. Rhode  Island  Li,  I  liclieve,  in  this  |>anicuUr,  pretty  much 
in  the  situation  of  Connecticut.  Massachusetts  and  New  Hamp- 
sliirc,  in  regard  to  ilie  I>leadin|[  of  law,  equity,  and  admiralty  juru- 
dictions.  arc  m  a  simiUr  prcdican>eni.  In  tiK  four  Eastern  State* 
the  trial  hy  jury  not  only  stands  upon  a  bra^idrr  foundation  ifaan 
in  (he  olher  Suies.  but  it  is  altended  with  a  peculiatiiy  unknown, 
in  its  full  extent,  to  any  of  them.  There  is  an  appeal  ef  romrit 
front  one  jury  to  analhct.  till  there  have  been  two  verdicts  out  of 
lliree  on  one  side. 

From  this  sketch  it  appears  that  there  is  a  material  divcrMiy,  ss 
well  in  tlie  niiMlU'icaiion  as  in  live  extent  of  the  iiulilutton  irf  Itisi 
by  jury  in  civil  cases,  in  the  sneral  .States;  and  [ram  this  fva 
these  obvious  reRections  flow:  first,  that  ivo  general  rule  could 
have  been  fixed  upon  hy  the  convention  which  would  have  cone- 
Sponded  with  ttic  circiimstaitccs  of  all  the  Slates ;  and  secoadly, 


,  pocked  ))•»  jnric*  t«  txrun  pajliun  vcfdicti. 
ibe  cleftton  ol  jiiron  Ity  Bio|iii1>r  vote. 
(Fonl's  eiBlionV  »ii-  rts  — EiiltolL 


r'ipi 

■  scbcmii  tot  ibe 

ol  Jcllciwin  " 


trnriMadnttad 


1 


H»«auoI  PtiOPOStTIONS  B  Y  ANTI-FEDERALISTS,     563 

thai  iriore  or  at  least  us  much  mlglii  hare  h*tn  liatanlc^l  by  taking 
the  system  of  jny  one  Si.ilc  fur  a  kUndanl.  as  by  omUiing  a 
provision  altogether  and  leaving  llie  msiter,  as  ha>  bcKa  done,  10 
legislative  regulation. 

The  propositions  which  hnvc  been  made  for  supplying  the  omis- 
sion hare  rather  served  to  illustrate  than  tu  obviate  the  dilficulty 
of  the  thing.  The  minority  of  Pennsylvania  have  proposed  this 
■  nolle  of  cxpicssion  lor  the  [mrpo*e  — "  Tiial  by  jury  iliall  lie  a« 
hprcloforc" — ami  thifc  I  maintain  would  br  senseless  anil  nugatory. 
'I'lie  United  Stales,  in  their  united  01  culltiln'c  i::<p;ii-ily.  are  the 
iiHJKCT  10  which  all  grnr-ral  prpi-isiojis  in  llic  Constitution  initst 
necessarily  be  conilrueil  lu  tefcT.  Now  it  i&  evident  ihat  though 
trial  by  fury,  with  various  limitations,  is  known  in  each  Sl.ile  in- 
dividually, yet  in  the  United  Suiet.  at  tuch,\\  is  at  this  lime 
altogHher  unknown,  because  the  present  federal  gmcniment  has 
110  judiciary  power  whatever;  and  conse<|uenily  there  is  no  proper 
antecedent  or  previous  establitbuicni  to  which  the  term  hertle/m't 
couUI  relate.  It  would  therefore  be  dcitituic  of  a  precipe  meuning. 
anil  inoperative  from  lis  uncrriaint)-. 

As.  on  the  one  hand,  the  form  of  the  provision  would  not  fulfill 
the  intent  of  its  proposers,  so,  on  the  other,  if  I  apprehend  thai 
intent  rightly,  il  would  be  in  itself  inexpedient.  I  presume  i1  to  be. 
ihal  causes  in  the  fctler.tl  courts  should  br  tried  by  jut)',  il,  in  the 
Slate  where  the  courts  sal.  thai  mode  of  trial  would  obtain  in  a 
similar  case  in  the  Stale  courts:  that  is  to  s.iy.  ailmii^lty  c.iuscs 
shoold  be  Irieil  in  Connectictii  by  a  jury,  in  New  York  wiiliout 
one.  The  capricious  operation  of  so  dissiinitar  a  method  of  trial 
in  the  same  ca&M.  under  the  Mine  government,  is  of  itself  sufficient 
to  indispose  every  well-regulated  judgment  toward  it.  Whetlier 
the  c.tuseshouk)  be  tried  with  01  without  a  jury,  would  'Icpeiid. 
in  a  Kieji  number  of  cases,  on  the  accidental  situation  ol  the 
couii  ami  parties, 

lliit  this  is  not,  in  my  estimation,  the  greatest  objec- 
tion. I  fuel  :i  deep  and  deliberaK;  conviction  that  there 
arc  many  ciscs  in  which  the  trial  by  jury  is  an  ineligible 
one.  1  think  it  so  partictilarly  in  cases  which  concern 
the  public  peace  with  foreign  nations— that  is,  in  most 
cases  where  the  question  turns  wholly  on  the  laws  of 
nationa.  Of  this  nature,  among  others,  are  all  prixe 
causes.  Juries  cutinot  be  supposed  oompetcnl  to  inves- 
tigations that  rcciuirc  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  laws 
Lisages  of   nations;    and    they   will   Sometimes   be 


564 


JUStBS  AND  FOREIGXERS. 


(a«uM 


under  the  influence  of  impressions  which  will  not  suSci 
them  to  pay  sufficient  rcgurti  to  ihtoii:  con»i iterations 
of  public  policy  which  oukIh  to  (;uiiie  their  inquiries. 
There  would  of  course  be  always  danger  that  the  rigfiU 
uT  other  nations  might  be  infringed  by  their  deciMons, 
HO  as  to  atford  occasions  of  reprikul  and  war.  'Ilioush 
the  proper  province  of  juries  be  to  determine  matters 
of  fact,  yet  in  must  cases  legal  consequences  arc  com- 
plicated with  fact  in  such  a  manner  us  to  render  a 
separation  impracticable. 

It  will  add  gre;it  weight  to  tliU  remark,  in  relation  to 
price  cause.*,  to  mention  that  the  method  of  dcterroiiiiu{ 
them  has  been  thought  worthy  of  particular  regulation 
in  v.-irious  treaties  between  different  powers  of  Kuropc, 
and  that,  piirsitaiit  to  such  treaties,  tliey  are  determin* 
able  ia  Great  Britain,  in  the  last  resort,  before  the  king 
himself  in  his  privy  council,  where  the  fact,  as  well  as 
the  bw,  undergoes  a  rr-exa  mi  nation.  This  alone  dcBWD- 
strates  the  impolicy  of  inserting  a  fund:imeiital  pruvisino 
in  the  Constitution  which  would  m:ike  the  St^tc  systems 
a  sundard  for  the  national  government  In  the  article 
under  consideration,  and  the  danger  of  eneumbcring  the 
government  with  any  constitutional  provisions  the  pro- 
pricty  of  which  is  not  indispuuble. 

My  convictions  are  equally  strong  that  great  advan- 
tages result  from  the  separation  of  the  equity  from  the 
g^  law  jurisdiction,  and  that  the  causes  which 

Ko.  M.  belong  to  the  former   would    be  improperly 

committed  to  juries.  The  great  and  primary  use  of  a 
court  of  equity'  is  to  give  relief  in  txtraarJinaty  taut, 
which  arc  txetpiioHs*  to  general  rules.  To  unite  the 
jurisdiction  of  such  cases  with  the  ordinary  jurisdiction 
must  have  a  tendency  to  unsettle  the  general  rules,  and  In 
subject  every  case  that  arises  to  a  sfttiat  determination; 

*  II  U  vmt  itul  llie  pri>ici|il<n  Iry  wlkkli  Ibit  relMf  U  fyrtrjfA  ut 
nnw  mlacvil  lo  >  rwulu  tjnttttn  ;  but  it  id  mil  Ibc  lc»  true  ll»l  Ihcr  ara 
In  III*  luiii  ■[■I'lkiMc  lu  Hi-itciAJ.  cittvnitUnvc*,  abicb  lum  eurpliuni 
loi^nal  rain.— i'L'nui'V. 

■See  "  WnliBcioI  JcSciwm"  (Fwd't edttJM),  \*.  tog.  for  wiaEciMnl 
o(  Uie  oiigia  of  eijuitj  couiti. — tunOK. 


HkOlhini! 


EQUiTV  JVRISDICTIOff. 


S«5 


while  a  scpar;ition  of  the  oiA  from  the  other  lias  the  con- 
trary effect  uf  rendering  one  a  sentinel  over  the  other, 
and  of  keeping  each  within  the  expedient  limits.  Be- 
sides this,  the  circumstances  tiiat  constitute  cases  proper 
for  courts  of  equity  are  in  in;iny  in.ti;inces  so  nice  and 
iiuricute  that  they  arc  incompatible  with  the  genius  of 
trials  by  jury.  They  require  often  such  long,  deliberate, 
and  critical  investigation  as  would  be  impracticable  to 
men  called  from  their  occupations  and  obliged  to  decide 
before  they  were  permitted  to  return  to  them.  The  sim- 
plicity and  expedition  which  form  the  distinguishing 
characters  uf  this  mode  of  trial  require  that  the  matter  tu 
be  decided  should  be  reduced  to  some  single  and  obvious 
point;  while  the  litigations  usual  in  chancery  frequently 
compiehend  a  long  train  of  minute  and  independent  par- 
ticulars. 

It  is  true  that  the  scpar^itiun  of  the  equity  from  the 
legal  jiirttidiciiiin  is  peculiar  to  the  English  system  of 
jurisprudence,  which  is  the  model  that  has  been  followed 
in  several  of  the  Stales.  Uui  it  is  equally  true  that  the 
trial  by  jury  has  been  unknown  in  every  case  in  which 
tlif^y  have  been  united.  .\nd  the  separation  is  essential 
to  die  preservation  of  that  institution  in  its  pristine 
purity.  The  nature  of  a  court  of  equity  will  readily 
permit  the  exteuiuon  of  its  jurisdiction  to  matters  of 
law;  but  it  is  not  a  little  to  be  suspected  that  the  at- 
tempt to  extend  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  law  to 
matters  uf  eiiuiiy  will  not  only  be  unproductive  of  the 
advantages  which  may  be  derived  from  courts  of  chancery 
on  the  plan  upon  whirh  they  arc  established  in  this  State, 
but  will  tend  gradually  to  change  the  nature  of  the  courts 
of  law,  and  to  undermine  the  trial  by  jury,  by  introduc- 
ing questions  too  cumplicaled  (or  a  decition  in  that  mode. 

TiKrte  appeared  lo  b«  conclusive  tcatnns  againti  incMporaitng 
llw  systems  t>f  all  the  folates,  hi  llie  foimation  of  (he  naiiuiial  jutti- 
ciary,  nccording  lo  wlui  may  be  conjcciiircd  lo  have  been  d>e 
attempt  of  the  ['iriins)tvHtiii  ininoiily.  Let  us  now  esaniiTir  Itow 
far  ihc  proiMniiion  of  M.i-i^chuteiis  is  cakulaiec'  lo  remedy  the 
supposed  defect. 


5^6  PflOPOSAL  OF  MASSACJtUSBTTS.  fUn.!* 

Il  is  in  thh  foim :  "  In  ciril  ticliflnn  1)«Iwc«r  ciliient  o(  iliBcrcnl 
States,  every  iuue  of  fact,  aiising  m  infivnt  a/  cemmon  lav,  may 
be  liicd  l>y  u  jury  il  (he  parlies,  orcilltcr  of  them,  mjuest  it."' 

Thi:;,  ai  brvt,  is  n  proposition  coiiliiicd  lo  oric  dcsciiptton  of 
causes;  and  l)ie  inference  is  fiiir.  eillter  ih.it  the  MauichuKctti 
convention  con«[lerr<l  thai  as  the  only  class  of  frdrral  c;iuNe&  <□ 
which  the  trial  by  jur^-  woulil  be  proper;  or  th,-it,  t(  desirous  of  a 
nwie  eatenxirc  provttion,  the)-  fouiul  It  iinpracttciiblc  lo  devise  one 
which  would  propeily  answer  (he  end.  I(  titc  lirsl.  llw  omiuion 
of  a  regulation  rexpcciing  so  paniat  an  lAjeci  can  netxr  be  co«i- 
nidered  at  a  material  imperfection  in  the  sydem.  U  the  last,  tt 
aFTorils  a  strong  corroboration  of  the  exireme  ililTiculty  ol  ilie  itiinR. 

Rill  this  is  not  all ;  if  we  advert  to  the  obsvn'.iliuni  alrexdy  made 
respecting  the  courts  tlkat  miImiM  in  ihc  several  Staler  of  the 
Union  and  ilie  different  powers  exercised  by  ilicin,  it  witl  appeal 
that  there  ai«  no  exprcvtont  more  vague  and  indclerminaii*  titan 
those  which  have  been  cinployed  to  characierite  ikal  species  o< 
cames  which  it  is  intended  shall  l>e  entitletl  to  a  trial  by  jury.  In 
(his  State  the  boundaiics  between  actions  at  coiiitiion  law  aniJ 
a^rlions  of  equitable  jurisdiclion  arc  ascertained  in  conformily  10 
the  nilcs  wliich  prev.iil  in  England  upon  tli'Hl  suhjecl.  In  manyol 
(he  other  States  the  bouiitiaiics  arc  less  ptrci.u.  In  some  of  them 
ever)-  cause  is  to  be  tried  in  a  court  of  coinrtvon  law,  and  upun  (liat 
(ound.ition  every  action  may  be  considcreil  as  an  nclian  at  rom- 
mon  bw,  to  be  determined  by  a  jury,  if  the  patties,  or  enher  of 
them,  choose  i(.  Hence,  the  same  irreKUlarily  and  confusion 
would  be  inirmluced  by  n  compliance  with  this  proposition  (kal 
I  have  already  noticed  as  resulttn);  front  tItc  regulation  propuaeil 
by  the  Pennsylvania  miuoriiy.  In  one  Slate  a  cause  would  trcetve 
its  determination  from  a  jUiy,  if  the  {Kirlics,  or  cither  ol  \\f^m,  rr- 
i)uesred  ii;  Init  in  anoihirt  Slate,  a  cause  exactly  similar  to  the 
otitcr  must  l>e  decided  without  the  intcn'cnlinn  of  a  jury,  b«cauM 
the  State  judicatories  varied  as  to  common-law  jutisdiciinii. 

Il  is  obvious,  theicfnir,  that  the  M.iss.icliiiscit*  pToi««iii(in  upon 
this  subject  cannot  opemle  ns  agcnirr.tl  re}>u1atiun.  uiiiil  some  uivl* 
form  plan  with  respect  (o  the  limits  n(  common  law  ,-iiMJ  equitable 
jurisdictions  shall  be  adopted  by  iIk  diffcretii  States.  To  drrisc 
a  plan  of  that  kind  is  a  task  arduoas  in  itself,  and  which  ti  would 
r<>(iuire  much  tin>e  and  reflection  to  mature.  Il  would  bi  ex* 
iremely  diUkull,  If  not  impossible,  to  surest  any  Kenerol  regnla- 
(ion  thai  woul<l  l>e  accefktahlr  In  all  the  States  in  the  I'liim,  or 
thai  would  perfectly  quaiiiaie  with  the  se^nal  Si.itc  insutulhiM. 


'  Sec  Appeixlu  p.  <i]l— E«roa. 


Jk 


1 


HamJUoal 


NEW   YORK  SYSTEM. 


5«7 


It  m.iy  be  ^iikcd,  Why  could  not  a  reference  have  been  ntadc  lo 
ttie  ConKlilulbon  o(  (hit  SUiie.  I.ikiiig  tlui.  which  i»  allawcd  by  nit 
Id  be  ngood  one,  MA  slan<Ut<i  for  ihc  United  Suics?  I  answer 
Iliat  il  t>  not  very  jiTDbabte  the  other  Slates  would  enlerlain  the 
same  opiniim  of  our  insiiiuiionsas  wcdnoiitMlirs.  It  is  natural  lo 
suppose  that  tliey  are  hitherto  more  attached  to  their  awn,  and  that 
each  would  xliiiKt;le  lor  the  preference.  If  the  plan  nf  inking  one 
Sute  an  model  fur  the  whole  had  tireii  ihoui^ht  of  in  Itieeoiiten- 
IMfi.  it  U  to  be  ptcKumed  Ihiit  the  udoption  of  it  in  ttiM  body  w-ould 
have  been  tendeied  dilficuli  by  the  piedileciion  of  each  lepiescnt^ 
■ion  in  Cnvor  ol  its  own  govcrniiicnt ;  and  it  must  lie  uncertain 
which  ol  the  Stales  uoitld  Ihnvc  been  taken  as  llic  model.  It  has 
been  shown  thai  many  of  lliem  would  be  improper  ones.  And  1 
Ie«TC  il  to  conjccitirr  whether,  under  alt  circumstances,  il  is  mosi 
likely  that  New  York,  or  some  oihcr  Si.iie.  would  have  been  pre- 
ferred. But  a<li»il  that  a  joiliciniis  srieelion  could  have  been 
effected  in  (he  conreiilion:  Mill  ihcie  ivuiikl  have  tieen  |;ieat  <lartf{ec 
of  )e<)lmisy  and  disj^iist  in  iheolhrr  Slair^s  a[  the  parliahty  which 
had  been  thown  (u  ihe  inilitutionx  of  uiie.  The  cnrtnicn  of  the 
plan  would  luve  been  funii^heil  with  .1  fine  preicxi  for  laising  a 
jiuxi  □[  local  prejudice*  aKaiiiit  it,  wlitcli  peiha|i»  miKlu  ha^-c  hai- 
ardcd.  m  no  inconsitlerablc  tlegree.  its  final  establish  men  I. 

To  avoid  the  embarrassments  of  a  dcfinitiun  of  the  cases 
wliicti  the  trial  by  jury  ouKht  to  embrace,  it  iw  sometimes 
suRgcstcd  by  men  of  enthusiastic  tempers  that  a  pro- 
vision might  have  been  inserted  for  csinblishing  it  in  all 
cases  wtialsoever.  For  thU,  I  believe,  no  precedent  is  tu 
be  found  in  any  member  of  the  Union ;  and  the  consider- 
ations which  have  been  xtated  in  discussing  the  {iroposi- 
tiou  of  the  minority  of  Pennsylvania  must  satisfy  every 
sober  tnind  that  the  establishment  of  the  trial  by  jury  in 
<i// cases  would  have  been  an  unpardonable  error  in  the 
plnn. 

In  short,  the  more  it  is  considered  the  more  arduous 
will  appear  the  task  of  fashioning  a  provision  in  such  2 
form  as  not  to  express  too  little  to  answer  the  purpose, 
or  loo  much  to  be  advisable;  or  which  might  not  have 
opened  other  sources  of  opposition  to  the  great  and  essen- 
tial object  of  introducing  a  firm  national  govcrnmenl. 
.  I  cannot  but  persuade  myself,  on  the  other  hand,  that 
I     the  different  lights  in  which  the  subject  has  been  placed 


5*8  iUPORTAtiCE  tN  CKIMINAL  CASES.         Ws-W 


in  the  course  or  these  observations,  will  go  far  toward 
removing  in  candid  minds  the  apprehensions  they  mnj 
have  entertained  on  the  point.  <lhey  have  tended  to 
show  that  the  security  o(  hherly  i»  miitcriiitly  conrtfnied 
only  in  the  trinl  t>y  jury  in  criminal  c^scs,  which  \% 
provided  for  in  the  most  ample  manner  in  the  plan  of  tbe 
convenlion;  that  even  in  far  the  greatest  proporiitm  of 
civil  cases,  and  those  in  which  the  K^eat  hody  of  the 
community  is  intcrcstetl,  that  mode  of  trial  will  remain 
in  its  full  (orcc,  as  established  in  the  State  constitutions, 
untouched  and  unaffected  by  the  plan  of  the  coovcalion; 
that  it  is  in  no  case  abolished  *  by  that  plan;  and  that 
there  are  great  if  not  insurmountable  difhcullies  in  ihe 
way  of  making  any  pre4;i5c  and  proper  provision  for  it  in 
a  Constitution  for  the  United  Stales. 

The  best  judgert  of  the  mutter  will  be  the  least  anxious 
for  a  constitutional  establishment  of  the  trial  by  jury  in 
civil  cases,  and  will  be  the  most  ready  to  admit  that  the 
changes  which  are  continually  happening  in  the  alTairt 
of  society  may  render  a  different  mode  of  dctenuinins 
questions  of  prujicrty  preferable  in  many  cases  in  whiLh 
lliiit  mode  of  trial  now  prevails.  For  my  part,  I  acknuwl- 
cdgc  myself  to  be  convinced  that  even  in  this  Stale  it 
might  be  advantageously  extended  to  some  cases  to  which 
it  does  noi  at  present  apply,  and  mit:ht  as  advantageously 
be  abridged  in  others.  It  is  conceded  hy  all  fcasoitablc 
men  tliat  it  ought  not  to  obtain  in  all  cases.  The  examples 
of  innovations  which  contract  its  ancient  limits,  as  well 
in  these  States  as  in  Great  Britain,  afford  a  strong  ptc- 
sumpcion  that  its  former  vxtenl  has  liecn  found  inconven- 
ient, and  give  room  to  suppose  that  future  eiprrit-nce  may 
discover  the  propriety  and  utility  of  other  cxcrpdnnG. 
I  suspect  it  to  lie  imposKit>Ic  in  the  nature  of  the  thing  10 
tix  Ihe  salutary  point  at  which  the  operation  of  the  institu- 
tion ought  to  stop,  and  this  is  with  mc  a  strong  argument 
(or  leaving  the  matter  to  the  discretion  of  llic  lr"'i.^l.i(iirc 

*  PiA  No.  l.XX\I..  Ill  uIikIi  \\\'-  ui-puliloQ  nl  lu  ht  ._  xfri 

by  Ik*  apn-IUlo    r  i4   Cui   Iwiiig   itsica  ■■  Ihs 

SyfnmeCoirtt.  itc  -ruki.iut. 


BuelltaB)  PARTICULAR PROVlStOKS iNADEQVATE.     5^ 

This  is  DOW  clearly  understood  to  be  ihc  case  in  (irciit 
Britain,  and  it  is  <:<iually  su  in  the  State  uf  Connecticut; 
jiDtl  yet  it  may  be  safely  affirmed  that  more  minncrous 
encroachments  have  been  made  upon  ibc  trial  by  jury  in 
this  Stale  since  the  Revolution,  though  i>rovided  for  by  a 
IKi«itive  article  of  our  constitution,  than  has  happened  in 
the  same  time  cither  in  Connecticut  or  Great  Britain, 
It  may  he  added  that  these  encroachments  have  generally 
ofiKinated  with  the  men  who  endeavor  to  persuade  Ihc 
people  Iheyarc  the  warmest  defenders  of  popular  liberty, 
but  who  have  rarely  suflcred  cnnstituttonal  obstacles  to 
arrest  tlvem  in  a  favorite  career.  The  truth  is  that  the 
general  gemus  of  a  government  is  all  that  can  be  sub. 
Sianttally  relied  upon  for  permanent  effects.  Particular 
prorisions,  though  not  altogether  useless,  have  far  less 
virtue  and  efficacy  than  arc  commonly  ascribed  to  them; 
and  the  want  of  them  wilt  never  be,  with  men  of  sound 
discernment,  a  decisive  objection  to  any  pl;in  which 
exhibits  the  leading  characters  of  a  good  government. 

It  certainly  sounds  nut  a  little  harsh  and  extraordinary 
to  afErni  that  there  is  no  security  for  liberty  in  a  Const!* 
tution  which  expressly  establishes  the  trial  by  jury  in 
criminal  cases  t>e<'ause  it  docs  not  do  it  tn  civil  also; 
while  it  is  a  notorious  fact  that  Connecticut,  which  has 
been  always  regarded  as  the  most  popular  State  in  the 
Union,  ain  boast  of  no  cun.stitutiunal  provision  fur 
either.  Puslius. 


No,  84.         (rbM(nii«Mdf4iiim.Hor York. <)•«->         Hamilton. 

LACK  or  A  BILL  OF  RIGHTS. 

BiUcfrightt — lUfiif  ef  lit  frt$i — Sral af  gmitrHmttit  Ite  Kmslt^ 
Affrt  fttriiitn  fcr  JtUt  dut  If  tkt  UnifrJ  Slalti — AdJilitiMt  tirfetttn 
*/  Httt  ijiUn — CfnitttdtHg  ritntrii. 

To  Ike  People  0/  Ike  Stale  ef  New  York: 

In  the  course  of  the  foregoing  review  of  the  Constitu- 
tion I  have  taken  notice  of,  and  endeavored  to  answer 
most  of  the  objections  which  have  appeared  against  it 


^amtm 


5?0  PRIFILEGBS  IN  CONSTITUTION.  \W*A 

'rh(-r«,  however,  remain  a  fcir  which  cither  did  noc  fall 
naiurully  under  any  [>iirtictihir  head  or  were  forgutteo  in 
their  projKr  places.  These  shall  now  be  discu&sed;  but 
asthu  subject  has  been  drawn  into  great  length,  I  shall 
so  UxT  eiiiistilt  lirvvily  as  to  cumprisc  all  my  iib»ervatiuns 
on  these  miscellaneous  points  in  a  single  paper. 

The  most  considerable  of  the  remaining  objections  is 
tliat  tttc  plan  of  the  convention  coniains  no  bill  of  rights. 
Amon2  other  answers  given  to  this,  it  has  been  u[Min 
dilTcrcnt  occasions  rcmarbcd  that  the  constitutions  uf 
iteveral  of  the  States  arc  in  a  similar  predicament.  1  add 
that  New  York  is  of  the  number.  And  yet  (he  opposers 
of  the  new  system  in  this  State,  who  profess  an  unlimited 
adntiratiun  (or  its  constitution,  are  among  the  must  in. 
temperate  partisans  of  a  bill  of  rights.  To  justify  their 
zeal  in  this  matter  they  allege  two  things:  one  is  that, 
though  the  cun»tilutioi)  of  New  York  has  no  bill  of  rights 
prefixed  to  il,  yet  it  contaiits  in  the  l>ody  of  it  various 
provisions  in  favor  of  particular  privileges  and  rights, 
which  in  substance  amount  to  the  same  thing;  the  other 
is  that  the  Constitution  adopts  in  their  full  extent  tbe 
common  and  statute  law  of  Crcat  [trilain,  by  which  manf 
other  righi!^,  noi  expressed  in  it,  are  c()iia1ly  secun-d. 

To  the  first  1  answer  that  the  Con.stitution  proposed 
by  the  convention  contains,  as  well  as  the  constitution  of 
this  State,  a  number  of  ?(uch  provisions. 

Imlrpcndrnl  ol  tlinsc  nliichrrlalcin  ihc«lnlciurr  «(  (hrgmnn- 
meiil.  we  find  die  (ulldwini-  :  Ailicle  l,»«lion  j.cl.iuie  7 — ~  Judg- 
inenl  in  cikcs  of  inipFnrlimriit  sh.itl  nnl  rxirnd  (urihn  Ihitn  It 
leinui'iil  (toni  office,  ami  ditqu^lifKalKni  lu  bold  ami  enjoy  aay 
office  of  honor.  Iniu.  or  pnifii  iindcr  the  I'nilrd  St.ilcii:  h<it  the 
parly  convict*^  sluU,  neieittieleM.  be  linlile  and  sattjtct  to  indirl- 
menl,  Irial.  fu<lgment.  and  punnJirocnt  »ccDnlinc  to  bw."  Secikia 
9  nf  the  same  a r dele,  clause  a— "  Tlvc  pritik-gc  of  the  writ  of 
htttras  (orfius  shall  tvM  be  su-ipende<l.  unless  when  in  casc»  of  i»> 
bcllion  or  iiivnsinn  tlie  puhlic  safely  may  requite  it."  Oinse  J— 
"  Noliillof  xuajniifi  at  ex  fii>it /atto\jiir  i\\!i\\  he  |>as>«<l."  Cbiiw 
7—."  No  litlc  of  nobility  sh  nil  he  granlf^  by  the  Un  ■  -ij 

and  iw  person  liotdrng  any  ofBve  ol  praAl  ot  Inisi     <  ">. 

sball.  wilhuul  the  content  trf  tlie  CongreH.  accept  of  any  pnsenl. 


Htniltgiil 


HABEAS  CORPVS. 


cfiioliiiiitiil.i>ffii.e,  or  lilk  of  any  kind  wh.ilrvcr.  from  ni-y  Wllg, 
priiici;,  or  liictij;ii  stale."  Auick  J.  scclioti  2.  cUu»e  3— "The 
trUl  of  ;ill  Ctimes.  rxccpl  in  cnj«  «t  impcK-hmcnl,  shall  Iw  liy 
jury:  ami  such  irial  shall  be  h«ld  in  ilic  Sijiie  tvlinc  the  said 
crimes  shall  have  been  cominitled  ;  hut  whcni  not  cotnmillcrl 
wittim  any  Stale,  ihc  trial  shall  l>e  al  such  plucc  or  |flac»  aa  ihe 
Congms  nuy  by  bw  have  directed."  .Section  3,  of  ihe  santc 
article — "  Treason  against  the  United  Stales  shdilt  consist  only  in 
levying  war  aKainsI  Ihem.  or  In  adherlnE  lu  their  cnernies.  giving 
(heiii  aid  and  c«n>fori.  No  person  shall  be  convicted  o(  tieasoi>, 
unku  (in  the  tetllmony  of  two  wilneisci  to  the  ume  overt  aci,  or 
on  confession  in  open  court."  At>il  clause  3  of  the  same  section 
— ■•  The  Conjress  sbiill  hare  power  to  declaie  the  punithmcnt  of 
treason ;  hut  n<i  attainder  of  treason  shall  worfc  cotrtiption  of 
blond,  or  forfeiture,  eiccepi  durin);  the  life  of  ilie  pcnon  attainted." 
It  may  well  be  a  qiicBtion  whether  these  arc  not,  upoti 
the  whole,  o(  equal  importance  with  any  whtch  arc  to  be 
found  in  the  constitution  of  this  Stale.  The  establish' 
ment  of  the  writ  of  iia^as  (frput,  tlie  prohibition  of  tx 
/>t»i/aeto  laws,  and  of  titi.fs  OF  Koim.iTV.  la  wkish  vt 
hmt  n«  (orretpondiitg  frffriiion  in  tfur  ccntliluHen,  are  per- 
haps  greater  KectiHtics  tn  liberty  and  republicanism  than 
any  it  contains.  The  creation  of  crimes  after  Ihc  com- 
mission of  the  fact,  or,  10  other  words,  the  stihjccling  of 
men  to  ptmishmcnt  for  things  which,  when  they  were 
done,  were  breaches  «f  no  law.  ami  the  practice  of  arbi- 
trary impriKontnentK,  have  been  in  all  ages  the  favorite 
and  most  formidable  instrumcnls  of  tyranny.  The  ob- 
servations of  the  judicious  Bbck«tone,»  in  reference  to 
the  liitter,  are  well  worthy  of  recital:  "To  bereave  a 
man  of  life  [says  he],  or  by  violence  to  confiscate  his 
estate,  without  accusation  or  trial,  would  be  so  gross  and 
notorious  an  act  of  despotism  as  must  at  once  convey 
the  alarm  of  tyranny  throughout  the  whole:  natioit;  but 
confinement  of  the  periton,  by  secretly  huirying  him  to 
fc,  jail,  where  his  sufferings  are  unknown  or  for- 

■11.M.  gotten,  is  a  less  public,  a  les»  striking,  and 

therefore  a  more  Janj^erffui  engine  of  arbitrary   govern, 
ment."     And  as  a  remedy  for  this  fatal  evil  he  is  evcry- 

*  Fi4e  HUckMoNc'i  "  CotnnKiitkrio,"  toL  i.  p.  136.— Fi.'BUllI;. 


L  •  FUe  &U< 


Al 


ISm 


TITLES  OF  NOBtLlTY. 


m*iy 


where  peculiarly  cmphatical  in  his  encomiucis  on  lh« 
habtas  eorpui  act,'  which  in  one  place  he  calis  "  the  buu 
WAKK  of  the  Bfiti&h  CoDiitUiition,"* 

Nothing  need  be  said  to  illustrate  the  inportaDce  of 
the  prohibition  ul  titles  uf  nubility.  This  may  (nily  be 
<Jenomin;itet1  liie  corner  stone  of  republican  governmcDt; 
for,  »o  lunj:  as  tlicy  arc  excluded,  there  can  never  be 
serious  danger  that  the  government  will  be  any  other 
than  that  of  the  people. 

To  the  .ttcouc! — ihal  \%,  to  the  pretended  establishment 
of  the  common  and  statute  law  by  the  Constitution— I 
answer  tli;it  they  are  expressly  m;idc  subject  "tosnch 
alierationx  and  provisions  -.vt  the  legisUture  shall  (rum 
time  to  time  make  concernini;  the  same."  They  are, 
therefore,  at  any  moment  liable  to  repeal  by  the  ordinary 
legislative  power,  vaA  uf  course  have  no  constiluuonal 
sanction.  The  only  use  of  the  declaration  was  to  recog- 
nize the  ancient  law,  and  to  remove  doubts  which  might 
have  been  occasioned  by  the  Revolution.  This  coose- 
4juently  can  he  considered  as  no  part  of  a  declaration  uf 
rights,  which  under  our  constitutions  rautil  be  intended 
as  limitations  of  the  power  of  the  government  itself. 

It  has  been  several  limes  truly  rcm<irkcd  Ihat  bills  of 
rightit  are,  in  their  oriifin,  stipulations  between  kings  and 
their  subjects,  abridgntcnts  of  prerogative  in  favor  of 


•  yidt  m»cl!«onp'i  '•  Comm<nt>ri«,"  toI.  'v.  p.  43S.— rtmue*. 
I|n  connpclion  willi  lll«  Buil  plot  Jeffcnon  ciMcaiviiol  t«  liatii  Ihit 
tlftlit  a(  H«licx>  C«il>n»  u»|i«mleil,  but.  10  avniil  llie  rr>|H>iitllnl<K  (at 
wImI  miulil  |>nnc  nniiopilllc.  he  MMiglil  lu  hi>c  il  <Ioih  )i]r  acl  of  Cn*. 
F:rF».  'I'hc  Sr».-ila  pwBcd  >  bill  lor  (h«  pntpMC.  bui  ihe  oinrc  pnpaUr 
lloiisp  rrfi»p<l.  hy  an  ovFrwhclmini;  najotily,  lo  connir.  la  lUi 
I  jiKoln  fiKEil  (Ikc  diniciilly.  irilhoitt  any  >lleni|ic  U  Iniliinliw.  I>j  u»> 
l>cii<lii>f:  llicHubl  i>(  lUtictHCor^Rit  liy  pfixlamatioo.  Tlitt  ic<<  lu  ■nnB 
diwuviiiici  o(  Itn  (wwor  of  ih*  Kxccali»e  in  Ibit  matttT.  thr  tl*-!!  «»it»" 
RMtnubdng  Binncy'i "  rriiilvctscrfihc  Wriiof  llalw  I  '4 

Cwislilutjon."  liiiUdclphM.  1S61;  Nicholat'i  "  llitx-  ^ 

vill«,  rSM:  Slonljjomcfy't  "Writ  of  II«t>ek^ '"  ■  '  "riui.riimii,  irroi; 
fatkrcV-'Halw^CoTinisaiul  Martial  Ijif  Ma.it>6*;  "•"nw 

&atpf(i>linc  t'ower  and  The  Wiit  tA  llaboai  1  >  -  '  ^■t'J'Iplua.  iMti 
and  VrhitiBg'i  "Miliiary  Atieiti  in  Time  of  via'  WKhineian,  ltfi> 
Liacdln'i  o«ni  vi«w  Ji  jyita  in  fab  rrjily  lu  ■  CoamllWa  nf  AtLaay  De*- 
(KTitlt.  Jane  la.  1H63,  linl  pf  Intnl  in  "  Ik  ll>e  frol-Icnl  ill  (he  XlniMj 
frtatca  ^oliUiig  th«  Coiiiitiloti.hn  in  making  Ait*Uv?"— EvTTOM. 


BunittMl 


ENGLISff  mCUTS. 


573 


privilege,  r*scrvalions  of  rights  not  surrendered  lo  tiic 
prince.  Such  w:is  Magna  Charta,  ot)t;iined  by  the 
barons,  sword  in  hand,  from  King  John.  Such  were 
the  subsequent  confirmations  of  th.Tt  charter  by  succeed- 
ing princes,  Siit^li  was  llie  Pelifien  c/  Itig/it  ;iss(;ntcil  lo 
hy  Charles  I.,  in  the  beginning  of  his  reign.  Such,  alto, 
was  the  Declaration  of  Right  presented  by  the  Lords  and 
Commons  to  the  Prince  of  Orange  in  i6i!S,  nnd  uflerwurd 
thrown  into  tlic  form  of  an  act  of  parliament  called  the 
Bill  of  Rights.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that,  according 
lo  their  primitive  signification,  they  have  na  application 
to  constituliona  professedly  founded  upon  the  power  of 
the  pc<jplc,  and  cx<iutcd  by  their  immediate  reprcsenta- 
tiveft  and  Hervanis.  Here,  in  stricinexK,  tlie  people  sur- 
render nothing;  and,  as  they  retain  everything,  they  have 
no  need  of  parlicnbr  reservations.  "  We,  int.  ceoplk 
of  the  United  St;ites,  to  secure  the  blessings  of  liberty 
to  ourselves  and  our  posterity,  do  ordain  and  tslablUh  thix 
Constitution  for  the  United  States  of  America."  Here 
is  a  better  recognition  of  popular  rights  than  volumes  of 
those  aphnrismit  which  make  the  priiicipjl  figure  in  several 
of  our  State  bills  of  rights,  and  vhich  would  sound  much 
belter  in  a  treatise  of  ethics  than  in  a  constitution  of 
government 

But  a  minute  detail  of  particular  rigbts  is  certainly  far 
less  applicable  to  a  Constitution  like  that  under  consid- 
eration, which  is  merely  intended  to  regulate  the  general 
pcditical  interests  of  the  nation,  than  to  a  Constitution 
which  Itas  the  regulation  of  every  species  of  |>vrM>iial  and 
private  concerns.  If,  therefore,  the  loud  clamors  against 
the  plan  of  the  convention,  on  this  score,  are  well 
foun<lcd,  no  epithets  of  reprobation  will  be  too  strong 
for  the  constitution  of  this  State.  But  the  truth  is  that 
both  of  them  contain  all  which,  in  relation  to  tlwir 
objects,  is  reasonably  to  t>e  desired, 

I  go  further,  and  afliim  that  bills  of  rigiits,  in  the  sense  > 
and  to  the  extent  in  which  they  are  contended  for,  are  I 
not  only  unneceMUkry  in  the  proposed  Constitution,  buu 
would  even  be  dangerous.    ,They  would  contain  various 


^tM 


su 


iNFESENCE  FftOM  SP£CIF/C  CLAIMS.       Wo.  N 


exceptions  lo  powers  not  granted;  and.  on  this  rcry 
account,  would  alTord  a  coloiaMe  pretext  to  cUtm  more 
llian  were  granted.  For  why  declare  that  things  stult 
not  Ije  done  which  there  ix  no  power  to  do?  Why,  firr 
instance,  should  it  he  said  that  the  liberty  of  the  press 
sltall  not  be  restrained,  when  no  power  is  (jivcn  by  which 
restrictions  may  be  im|>r>sed?'  I  will  not  conti-nd  that 
such  a  provtshin  would  confer  a  regubtinf;  power;  bat 
it  is  evident  that  it  would  furnish,  to  men  disposed  (u 
usurp,  a  plnusihle  pretense  for  cUiming  thai  power. 
They  might  urge  wilti  a  semblance  of  reason  Ihal  the 
Constitution  ought  not  to  he  charged  with  the  absurdity 
of  providing  against  the  abuse  of  an  authority  which  was 
nol  given,  and  that  the  provision  against  restraining  the 
liberty  of  the  press  afforded  a  clear  implication  that  a 
power  to  prescribe  proper  regulations  concerning  it  wu 
intended  to  be  vested  in  the  uatiuital  government.  This 
may  serve  aiv  a  specimen  of  the  numerous  handles  which 
would  be  given  to  the  doctrine  of  constructive  powers, 
by  the  indulgence  of  an  injudidous  zeal  for  bills  of 
rights. 

On  the  subject  of  the  liberty  of  the  press,  as  moch  as 
has  been  said,  I  cannot  forbear  adding  a  remark  or  two: 
in  the  first  pbce,  Lj>hserve  that  there  ts  not  a  syll.iMe 
conceroinj;  it  tn  the  constitution  of  this  State  i  in  the 
next,  1  contend  that  whatever  has  been  said  about  it 
in  that  of  any  other  State  amounts  to  nothing.  What 
signifiesa  declaration  that  "the  liberty  of  the  press  sliall 
be  inviolably  preserved"?  What  is  the  liberty  of  the 
press?  Who  can  give  it  any  definition  which  would  ni«l 
leave  the  utmost  latitude  for  evasion.*  I  hold  it  to  be 
impracticable;   and  from   this  I  infer  that   its  secority. 


'  Ahhuucb  Uie  linl  un«n4a>cnl  xliinl  a  (tli>itnct  cnatanity  lo  ilii»<aa- 
lentkin  tlim  no  pswtr  ti  inltifrre  •illi  "-  '  >— y  o(  \he  ptnu  •«* 
mnlninril  in  th«  national  coiiitiliition.  thr  >  w  |>Ucf4  apoa 

■lie   tIatBle     book     wiiliin    Icn   Tou*.       V.  IiUft    tf>     tlarUa 

("  Woiki,"  i».  387)  ihom  thai  lie  taiiiiilercil  Ikii  Uw  lurth  "  trniiiitu- 
UoimI  awl  polllic."  Tlie  niillluy  *u)>|<icv«|a«  of  (cnain  ]<*prn  '■■nn( 
llicCIill  War  (nillcile*  nl  how  llnli' account  tonMllBllinul  jpumntica  SI* 
In  mommu  of  ntccuiij'.—EiKTo*. 


JH^HikJ 


HMBltUBl  rilE  COSSTirVTtOff  A  BfU.  OF  RIGHTS.     575 

whatever  fine  declarations  may  be  inserted  in  any  con- 
stitutiun  respecting  it,  must  altogether  depend  on  public 
opinion,  und  on  the  gener;il  Kpirit  of  the  people  and  of 
the  government.*  And  here,  after  all,  as  is  intimated 
upon  another  occasion,  must  we  seek  for  the  only  solid 
basis  of  all  onr  rights. 

There  remains  but  one  other  view  of  this  matter  to 
conclude  the  point.  The  troth  is.  after  all  the  deciitma- 
lions  we  have  heanl.  lh:it  tin:  t'onstitutJon  ia  itself  in 
■gverv  rational  sense,  and  to  every  use fsL purpose,  a  bill 
<H;jimilirs.  The  several  bills  of  rights  in  Great  Itrilain 
form  its  constiluiion,  and  conversely  the  constitution  of 
each  State  is  its  bill  of  rights.  And  the  proposed  Consti- 
tution, if  adopted,  will  be  the  bill  of  rights  of  the  Union. 
Is  it  one  object  of  a  bill  of  rights  to  declare  and 
specify  the  political  privileges  of  the  citizens  in  the 
structure  and  administration  of  the  government?  This 
is  done  in  the  most  ample  :iiid  prcttse  manner  in  the  plan 
of  the  convention;  comprehending  various  precautions 
for  the  public  security  which  arc  not  to  be  found  in  any 
of  the  Stale  constitutions.  Is  another  object  of  a  bill  of 
rights  to  define  certain  immunities  and  modes  of  proceed- 
ing, which  arc  relative  to  personal  and  private  concerns? 

*To  ikow  ititt  lliere  it  a  power  !n  Itie  Contlllitftoa  Iqr  «4iick  Ibe 
lihrrly  til  ibr  |i(r«  may  b'  (llfrtdl,  ifumrw  iLik  >i«Vn  ^tA  M  the  pOWM 
ul  iixalioii.  11  Uaid  that  dutin  iiiny  be  laid  u|mii ihe paMkaclwitto 
lligh  »  to  kmouni  to  ■  ptoliiltiiiiMi.  I  know  nol  bj-  whal  lugic  it  coulil 
be  mBiniiiiicil  iliii  ihe  ilt<la>*liiint  iii  the  Stale  conilitiiiinni  in  fxor 
of  ihe  Itecilom  tA  ihr  |ircu  woiihl  lir  >  cot»llliitloiial  inipixlinicfil  to  the 
lni|KMiliii<i  111  iliilin  ii|i<iii  pnbl  list  ions  by  th«-  Slalc  l«i"»Uluf«.  iKniv- 
D»t  rerininljr  be  prrlFiidnl  iIibI  any  degree  '>(  iliiliri.  b^urin  low.ironid 
lie  Ul  ihriclf^cfil  of  the  lilierly  of  tlic  pceu.  We  knuu  ttial  newtpapen 
ore  IMed  in  (Iresl  Btiuin.  ami  yet  il  W  imlotmiis  ihal  ihe  prem  nowhere 
en  joy  t  e  real  CI  til>etty  tlun  in  Ihni  cimnlry.  Ami  II  itiitie^  ul  any  klluJ 
may  l»  loxl  biiIichI  a  liolniion  of  tb*l  lilicTly.  il  nuiilenl  thai  the  ex- 
lent  tnitsl  •Iqwnd  on  l«);iilitivc  dixreiion  re^ hIbIoI  hy  {luhlic  opinion; 
to  tint,  after  aJl.  cencicU  >lecl«nlians  letpeclint;  <hc  llbrrty  of  Ihc  pros 
will  ciTe  il  no  gicaltr  tc<urlly  lluii  it  «111  have  without  ihem.  Tlie 
Htniic  iiiTuiiwtt  <il  It  ii<ay  tie  cflvrtnl  iiiidrr  ihc  Stxir  (;r<ni^tilutiont  which 
Ciintain  llio<«  ilc<'liliatii>ni  ihraugh  lh«  incani  nf  tiii>lii>ii,  a\  under  the 
fimpoMd  CuBititulion.  uhi<)i  bos  nothing  of  (lie  kind.  It  wi>ulil  lie 
quite  M  ngnificinl  to  ileclue  that  (OTernnieni  cughi  to  he  frrr.  that 
Uiem  ought  not  ta  he  ciiciwive.  etc.,  u  ibal  the  litietty  tA  ibe  piev 
Mi£lit  nM  to  lie  mminrJ.— riivi  im. 


576 


DtSTASCB  Of  COFBK/fMBtfr. 


(■■lM 


This  we  hxve  «ecn  has  also  been  attended  to,  in  a  variet)' 
of  cases,  ID  the  same  plan.  Advcrtiug,  tlicrcfore,  to  the 
substantial  meaning  of  a  bill  of  ristits,  it  is  absurd  tu 
allege  that  it  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  wurk  of  Ibe  con- 
vention. It  may  be  said  ibat  it  does  not  go  far  cnoagi), 
though  it  will  not  be  easy  to  make  this  appear;  but  it 
can  with  a«  proprietj'  be  contended  that  tlie«  is  no  soch 
thing.  It  certainly  must  be  immalcfial  what  mode  is 
observed  as  to  the  onler  of  declaring  the  rights  uf  the 
citizens.  If  thejr  are  to  be  (uutid  in  any  part  of  the  instnc 
mcnt  which  establishes  Uic  goviTDuicoL  And  beiMre  it 
muKt  be  app.ircnt  that  muuh  of  wiiat  has  been  said  on 
this  subject  rests  merely  on  verbal  and  ntimitial  distinc- 
tions, entirely  foreign  from  the  subsuncc  of  the  thing. 

Anoiher  objeciion  which  has  been  inatle.  and  wliicb.  fiuni  the 
frequency  of  lis  repcikion.  it  is  lo  be  prrsumcd  b  rclird  on.  b  iif  ihit 
nature :  "  It  is  tmprapcr  (say  the  ^>jcci<usj  (o  ronlcr  u*clt  lorce 
IMnven  a.i  aic  prapotctl  ujion  the  national  gDvernmcnl.  bccaosc 
ibr  M-ai  of  ihJit  govtrnmtht  niuu  of  owi-ssily  be  Ion  rrmote  frMn 
many  ol  ihc  Siatri  to  a4lniii  of  a  proper  knowlfilse  on  the  pait  ul 
lli«  ron-tliiuenl  of  ihr  conduct  ol  the  rcprrK-iiUtive  btHiy.***  Thn 
ar^unicni,  il  it  pram  anything.  iHuves  lh.it  there  ought  lo  be  ■>(> 
gcnciAl  govciiiincnt  uhaicver.  For  lite  powen  whicJt,  il  seems  In 
be  aKieed  on  alJ  baiuls.  utigtit  to  be  vested  in  the  Union  canaul 
safely  l>e  inliUKlcii  to  a  body  which  ia  luil  under  evciy  reqwilitr 
ninirol.  Bui  there  ut  saliKfactoty  rcasam  to  show  that  the  olv 
jection  is  in  reality  not  well  founifeil,  Thctr  U  in  most  of  the 
arsurivenis  whkh  relate  to  ilist.mce  a  palfuble  Ulution  of  the 
imngiiutioa.  Whul  are  the  sources  of  inforinatimi  tiy  which 
ihe  peoftle  in  MotilKumery  county  mUM  R^uUie  thtii  t<*dKinea> 
of  ihc  tviuluct  of  thc'T  repieu-ntalives  in  the  Siolt  leyi&lalureF 
Of  prrsonal  abscrvaltuii  lltcy  can  have  no  bmHit.  Tliis  is 
i:onhi>eil  to  lite  ctliirns  on  the  <pM.  Tliey  niunt  IlKrclun 
depend  on  llie  infonn^tioii  of  iiiirlltgcnt  men,  in  wltoni  ihcy  ciw- 
fide ;  aitd  how  must  ihoe  nien  ohiaui  their  iidamutntn  ?  En- 
ilenlly  fruni  tfie  coiDpleiion  of  public  meuure^,  (runi  the  pnUte 
prtnis.  from  correspondences  with  their  rrprrsentnlivcs,  and  Wfib 
odier  prisons  whii  rrudc  at  tlie  place  of  tlx'it  dclilicratiuiu.  This 
does  rm:  apply  >o  Mnmgomery  county  only,  hul  lo  all  thv  cuunUcs 
at  any  conuJerable  ilisUnce  tiooi  the  srat  hi 

Il  u  cquAlJy  evMlenI  thai  die  unie  loufcc  i,  wouli) 

be  open  to  the  people  in  rebuiun  tu  iheuniUuciul  Uwu  twft*' 


BtmUtan] 


DEBTS  Of  THE   UNJQH. 


$77 


sentiilii'cs  iit  <hi^  general  govcrnmoit,  unrl  the  inip«ilinicnl&  lo  a 
prampi  rftmiiiniiicjiioii  which  ilistiiricc  nuy  lie  sujiiioieil  ii>ci«.iie 
will  be  ovci-UiUiiccil  by  tiic  cHrels  of  the  vigibncc  <if  ihc  Slate 
gavcrnmctiit.  The  cxetmii-e  ami  lenislaiive  bod)i'S  of  cacli  Slate 
will  be  io  tiiany  sriiimcls  over  llit  petsons  cn)|>loyeil  in  cveiy 
lle|]aninctil  of  tlie  ii;iliu[i:il  adinim^lrulion ;  nnd  sa  11  will  tie  in 
llicir  poucT  lo  Atlojn  ^iiil  piirsui:  a  regular  and  cRcclu.il  xyxtcni  <>[ 
intclltgriKi;,  they  can  netvr  be  at  a  loss  to  know  ilic  bi-liavior  ■>( 
those  who  rcpTcsrnt  llieii  caDsiitiicnls  in  the  national  coutiL-ilt.  anil 
can  reailily  coinniuiiic^itc  the  same  knowk-dj-c  to  tlie  pcuplc.  Tlicir 
ili»|w$llion  loippii^c  the  cumiiiunity  uf  whatever  may  prejudice  lis 
inteicsls  liom  aiiodiri  quarter  may  Iht  relied  tipoii.  if  i(  U'eir  only 
from  ihc  tirakliip  o(  power.  And  uc  may  concliiilc  wilh  the 
(ulk-§i  :iwurnnce  that  the  peo|ilc.  ihrnugli  ihni  clunncl.  will  hr 
hcitcr  infuiinol  of  tlic  uundiici  ul  ihcir  national  lepreicnlativeK 
ilun  (hey  can  be  by  any  mejiis  they  now  possess  pf  that  of  their 
Slate  tepresen  la  lives. 

Ii  oughi  aUuio  be  tcmembeicd  thai  the  ciliicns  who  inhnbii  ihe 
couiilry  at  and  rtear  the  seal  of  Kuvetniiicnl  will,  in  all  c|ticil)mis 
that  aflcct  the  generAl  libeity  ami  prttspeirt).  have  the  sjnic  inter- 
exi  with  t)io«e  who  arc  at  n  diMance.  and  lh;it  itiey  will  xiand  icaity 
to  ^nimil  the  alarm  when  nrcf&s.ir)'.  am!  lo  point  out  the  actots  in 
any  pernicious  projecl.  The  public  pnper«  will  be  expediliou* 
tneiiiengers  of  intelligence  to  ihc  most  remote  inhabitants  of  the 
Union. 

Aniong  thft  mftny  curious  objections  which  have  appeared 
a};aiiiit  the  pruputnl  Cuiistilution,  ihc  rmist  exiraordinaty  and  the 
lea:Ll  cotnrablc  W  dcrii'cd  from  ibc  want  of  some  provision  icspeci- 
inj;  the  debts  due  /#  the  Unilcd  Stuiea.  This  ha»  been  leprcsented 
a<  a  lacit  relin(|uishn>cnt  of  ihote  ilcbis  and  as  a  wickeil  con- 
trivance to  screen  public  defjuliers.  The  news|Mpers have  teemed 
wilh  ihe  mo«l  inllanimatoty  railini;s  on  this  head:  yet  thpre  in 
nothing  clearer  than  thai  ihe  Miggcsiion  is  eniirely  void  uf  (oun-ita- 
ttun.  the  oRiprirtK  of  extreme  ignorance  or  exiretne  dishoncKly.  In 
addiiion  lo  ihc  remuiks  I  have  made  upon  the  subject  in  another 
pUec.  1  ^latl  only  observe  that  as  it  is  a  plain  <lictale  ul  common 
sense,  so  ii  is  also  an  csiablishcd  doctrine  of  political  law,  ihat 
*■  Stalet  ntiihtr  hu  any  of  Ifirir  rigtiH.  nor  art  diuAarged from 
amy  ef  Ihtir  ebligations,  by  a  ekaitgt  in  tkt  form  cf  l6tir  tMl 
govtrnmtntr  • 


*  Vidt  Ruiberfonk'i  "  lauiiuiet." ntl-  ■>■  l>ock  II.  ilia^^  a.  soci.  li*. 
L  tnd  IT.  Vidt  alM  Ctotiw,  book  11.  chap.  ix.  sect.  viii.  aad  U.-> 
I      Ptnuvt. 


S78 


£XP£JVS£  OF  KSW  GOVHUNMENT. 


tl«M 


Tlie  lail  ob^Klion  oXstcf  consrqiicncr  wlikli  t  ar  present  recol- 
Icci  (urns  u|>oii  ihe  article  of  ex|ien»<.  t(  ii  wrre  even  uuc 
fM  ">>>  ■'>■'  adaption  of  ihr  proposed  govcmmcni  would 

W«.  It.  occasion    u    cotiSMkr^ble    increaM    ot    expense:,   H 

would  be  an  ohjixiion  that  ought  to  Iutc  ik>  weight  agnitisi  Ibc 
plan. 

Tlie  great  Inilk  of  the  ciiixen^  nf  America  are  with  rciuon  coo 
vinccil  that  Union  b  (lie  bjisi^of  (heir  pohiical  liappiiieh>.  Mca  o( 
sense  of  all  pariiet  new.  with  few  exceptions,  agree  (Itat  it  can- 
not be  prrscrvrd  under  the  pre«ent  system,  nor  wiihMit  ndics) 
altcntions :  thai  new  and  extensive  powers  ought  to  be  granted  to 
the  iinliuiul  head, anil  that  ihcsc  requii-eadifieiciit  Oi:g::itiir:ttii>no( 
the  feitcml  goveminent^a  singte  body  being  an  Uiisale  dcpiiiilarr 
of  such  3in|ile  aiithoriiiet.  In  conceding  all  ihis.  the  i|uesiion  of 
expense  must  be  given  up:  (or  il  ii  iiiipo^Mble.  Mrtli  an>  ilrgteeof 
safely,  to  narrow  the  (oundaiion  upon  which  the  system  Is  lo 
stand.  The  two  branches  of  the  legislature  lire,  in  (be  fitxt 
Inslunce.  to  consist  of  only  sixty-fiTc  petson*.  which  is  the  nine 
tiuinber  of  which  Congicss,  un<l<r  the  esisting  Coiifcileration,  tiuy 
be  composeil.  It  is  inie  that  (hit  numtkrr  is  inlendrd  iv  be 
Increased,  but  this  is  to  keep  pace  with  the  progies*  of  the  popu- 
lation and  resources  of  the  country.  It  is  evi<Icni  that  n  less 
niiinbcT  would,  txnn  in  the  first  iriMance.  have  been  unsafe,  anil 
that  a  eomintrance  ol  the  present  number  would,  in  a  more 
advancnl  "agr  of  population,  be  a  *ery  lnBde«(uatc  rtpresenlatkin 
ol  the  people. 

Whence  is  iIk  dreaded  augmentation  of  expense  lo  spriiiK? 
One  source  indicated  is  llie  niutti  plication  of  olBces  under  the  aew 
government.     Let  us  euniinc  this  a  tittle. 

It  is  eviilenl  that  (he  principal  departments  of  the  admin islratioa 
under  the  present  goi-emmeni  are  the  umc  which  will  be  reqtiireil 
under  tlic  i»ew.  There  arc  now  a  Secretary  of  War,  a  Secrr- 
lary  of  Foreign  Affain.  a  Secretan'  [or  Domestic  ARairs,  a  Board 
of  Treasur)'.  consistiiig  of  three  prrvms.  a  Tteasoiei.  assistanti. 
cferks,  etc.  Thei«  offH-crs  are  iti(Iif.|)rn sable  imdet  any  syslctn. 
and  will  suffice  unikr  the  new  as  well  as  the  old.  As  lo  ninliaHa 
dors  and  other  ntinlstets  and  .igents  in  foreign  counirtes.  ibe  pni- 
posed  Constitution  can  make  iw  other  difference  llian  |a  rcndn 
their  eharscten,  where  they  re»i<le.  more  mpeclalile.  and  iher 
services  roorv  usefaL.  As  lu  persons  lo  be  ereploye^l  In  llie  eolltC- 
lion  of  the  reienoes.  tl  in  unqurstionably  iiur  thai  ihew  «ill  fntxi 
a  very  considerable  aildition  to  the  nuniher  of  federal  officers; 
but  II  will  not  (oltow  that  this  will  occasion  an  increase  of  puhbc 


HMnfltonl    SAVhVG  IN  STATE  ESTABUSHMEKTS.     5;9 


ci[icnM.  It  will  tie  in  most  cn^vs  nfitMng  more  tlun  .in  exctiAiige 
of  Slate  for  national  officers.  In  ilie  collection  of  all  dutirs,  (i>r 
fnMance.  Ifi<  pemon*  cinpluyrH  will  be  wholly  of  the  lallcr  drscrip- 
Hon.  TIte  Stairs  individually  will  sianil  in  no  n«(I  of  any  (or  lhi» 
purpose.  Wli»I  difleTence  cnn  it  make,  in  point  of  ciipen\e.  to  pay 
officers  fA  the  customs  appointed  by  t)ie  Stale  or  by  ihe  United 
*ilnles?  [There  is  no  good  reason  to  suppose  thjit  clihrr  tlir  num- 
ber or  Ihe  saUries  of  the  lallcr  will  be  greater  llian  lliosc  of  llie 
former.  1' 

\Vbrr«.  then,  arc  we  to  seek  for  lliose  additional  anicles  of 
eipense  wliicli  arc  lo  swell  ihe  account  lo  ilic  rnomious  siie  lliat 
hat  been  reprrscweil  lo  us  ?  The  chid  ilcm  whirh  occui*  lo  me 
respecis  the  support  of  the  judj^es  of  the  l.'niied  Slates.  1  do  not 
ndii  the  Presiden I.  because  there  Is  now  a  president  of  ConKfcss, 
M'hbse  expenses  may  not  be  far,  if  anyitirn£.  short  of  those  which 
will  he  incurred  on  accouni  of  the  President  of  ihe  United  Stales. 
The  support  of  tite  judges  will  cle:irly  be  an  extri  expense,  but  (O 
what  extent  wilt  depend  on  ihr  p^nkular  plan  which  may  be 
adopted  in  regard  lo  this  m^iller.  But  upon  no  reasonable  pUn 
can  it  amniini  lo  a  sum  which  wilt  be  an  object  of  material 
consequence. 

Let  us  now  sre  what  there  Is  lo  counter  balance  any  extra  ci- 
per)se  thai  rnny  attend  the  est abliili men!  oF  the  proposed  i;overn- 
menl.  The  first  thing  which  presents  tiself  is  thai  n  greai  pjiri  of 
ihe  busrfiess  which  now  keeps  Congress  sitting  ihiough  the  year 
will  be  transacted  by  ihr  President.  F-vcn  the  mnnagemrnl  of 
foieigit  negotiations  will  natuially  devolve  upon  him.  accoiTling  lo 
(■eneral  principles  concerted  with  the  Senate,  and  Milijecl  lo  llieir 
final  concurrence.  Hence  il  is  evident  th.st  a  potlion  o(  the  year 
will  sufliirc  for  the  scwon  of  holh  the  Senate  ;ind  tbeltouseuf 
R  e  preset!  la  I  i  res ;  we  m.sy  suppose  aboui  a  fourth  for  the  latter 
and  a  thinl.  or  perhaps  HatI,  for  (he  former.  The  exrra  business 
r>f  treaties  and  appointments  may  give  (his  eilra  occupation  to  the 
Senate.  From  Ihis  circumstance  we  may  infer  that,  unlil  Ihe 
House  of  Represenlalives  shall  be  increased  greatly  beyond  its 
present  number,  there  will  be  a  considerable  saving  of  esjiense 
from  the  diflrrrnce  between  the  cnnst.int  session  of  Ibc  present 
and  ihe  lcmjit>rary  session  o(  ihe  luluie  Congress, 

But  there  it  anoibrr  circumslance  of  gre.il  im|)4irlance  in  IIm 
view  of  economy.  The  Imsiness  ol  ibe  United  States  has  hiiheno 
occupied  Ihc  Slate  legittaliires,  as  well  as  Congress.  The  latter 
has  ifwde  leqntsitfons  which  the  fomwr  have  had  10  provide  for. 

'  TUs  Mniciiiu  if)  hrwleU  ii  oMilted  iu  ih'  ravUcd  lext. — EjilTOK. 


58o       NATIONAL  AFFAIRS  IN  lEGISLATVKES.     Olfci* 


Hcac«  ii  hoi  happened  tliat  the  icMiona  of  Ihc  Slate  kgisUli 
have  Iwrn  |»oiracir<l  crraily  beyond  wKai  nai  nece)>£.-iry  for  ihe 
eieculioii  ul  ihe  mere  ImiiI  business  of  ihe  Slates.  More  thui  half 
{heir  lime  hns  Utrn  frcijucnily  nnplojred  Jn  ninllen  whkh  rclaled 
to  the  Uiiiied  Suites,  Now  ilic  iiicmbeis  who  cotiipo&e  ilic  lc|-i»la- 
tiitcs  Af  the  scvcnti  States  ninount  to  two  ihuuMinO  uiitl  upiU'onK 
u'hicli  iiuinlKr  tus  hiilierto  performed  uhai  under  the  r)cw  sysicm 
will  be  done  in  tlie  litM  jntlancc  by  iiUly>five  penwnt,  and  prolMlily 
at  no  (uttiic  i>eiiod  by  above  a  fouiih  or  a  fifth  of  lliat  nuntbcr. 
The  Congrest  tinder  il>e  proposed  govern meni  will  do  all  the  buu- 
nesaol  the  United  Stales  themselves,  wiiboui  ilic  intciirenlion  of  tlic 
SlJite  legisUtures.  who  Ihenceforlh  will  have  otity  to  altenil  to  iIk 
affairs  of  their  pjtiicuUr  Slates,  and  will  not  haTe  to  sit  In  any 
proportion  as  long  as  they  hiivc  heretofore  dune.  I'his  diffcrmce 
III  the  lime  of  t)tc  scssiions  of  tltc  State  legHliiiircs  will  be  ctoir 
gain,  and  will  alone  form  an  atlicle  of  saving  which  may  be 
regarded  as  ati  equivalent  for  any  additional  o)ijeicu  ol  ra)>eiue 
dial  may  be  occasioned  by  the  adoption  of  i)ie  new  syMcm. 

The  reftull  from  these  ob»crraitoni  ii^  that  the  sources  of  )iikl»- 
lional  expense  from  the  ulablishinenl of  the  prapn«Ml  Con»iitulion 
are  much  fewer  ih.in  may  have  been  imagined:  (hat  ihcy  are 
counlerlMtaoced  liy  contider.ihle  objects  of  taring;  and  that  while 
■t  Is  qumionahle  on  which  side  the  scale  will  (HeponileTaie.  it  is 
certain  thai  a  governmenl  leu  cxpcnsire  would  be  tncompcient  to 
ihe  purposes  of  the  Union.  PUKUUS. 


H»mil»o|  RESEMBLANCE  TON.  K  CONSTirVTION.     S^' 

No.  8$.         <r^ii  c«iikm4  niirtDn,  N**  Yoifc.  <ia.)  Hamilton. 

CONCLUSION. 

Mamtfrin  whuk  iHhjtti  has  btin  JinuiuJ — Anafptattt  Iktrtadtr  U 
frigh  the  mallt'  artfaUy  amiiKl  cnu^rntirmily — LrnfiJtitu  »f  FtAUiu 
rn  **!■  argumriftt  v-huk  kt  kat  aJiiiiutJ— 'J  Ai  tuHiuitii  imptr/eelintt 
nt  rraiiH  /rr  delay — kxltHI  tj  Iktm  ixag^tfaUd —  7'kc  ttnititHtian  ntt 
Todiiolly  Ji/rtlitt — />'i£hli  and  inltrtili  »/  Ikt  ftgflr  ta/r  ufJrr  ikf 
{•NUlilnlim — X^  ptrftit,  kul  a  gi>pii plan —  Thi  lUtlt  0/  lAi  if  unity  for . 
Ml  Jf^r  in  twin/r  UtUng  a  ferjnt  flan — D'^rnlly  •>/  katiitg  otiMkfr 
leiitvntimi — hitsitT  la  tmrt  dtfttU  by  omtnJmtmi  aftir  sht  aJt/fliaH — 
N>  pUnian  ht  tatit/actrry  to  atl  tht  ilaltt—  Suffaitd abslaitn  in  Ihtxroy 
a/  iHahing  JbAfyv/if/  ttmfnJmrutt^iaaiiJft/tf-^J'hf  ratt  ipilk  jvAifh  a 
ftdrral  lantunlian  «uif  tt  talltJ  $6  mair  iimrnJmmh — Cem/iiliam. 

To  tht  Peefte  0/  tht  State  pf  New  York: 

Accnrding  (o  Ihc  formal  division  of  ihe  subject  oF  thue  papeni. 
iinnouDCPd  ill  m)'  fiiM  numbirr.  ihcre  woutd  appear  still  to  remain 
(or  ■liM'tissini)  two  points:  "  llic  ^nnlci^y  uf  the  proposed  gov  cm - 
niciil  lo  your  own  Slatt  tomlilulioii."  jnd  "  tlic  uddilional  Mxuriljf 
which  its  adoption  will  iifTonl  \a  icjiiiMican  gm rrnmcnT.  to  libctly, 
and  lo  projwnjr."  Bin  ilic-iC  licsd*  h«y«  bttn  so  fullji  anticipaird 
ami  nitatislcd  ui  tii«  progrru  of  the  work  tliat  it  woiiUi  now 
warcdx  be  powble  to  do  aii)iliin^  morcibdn  itpcikt.  in  a  itiore 
dilated  lorn),  what  liat  berti  licretolorc  s.-iid.  uhich  ihc  ailvanccd 
9l;ise  ol  the  qucMion  and  the  time  alicody  spent  upon  it  conspire 
to  (otbid. 

It  is  mnarkable  thai  tlie  rrtemblAnce  of  the  plan  o(  ihe  con- 
Tcnlion  10  tliF  act  whicli  oiganitca  ihe  t|ovemmcni  ol  this  Slate 
holds  not  less  wnh  frgard  lo  nijii)'  of  llic  suppOMtl  defects  ihait 
la  ihe  leal  i^ncrltcnces  <i(  the  luiiner.  AnionK  the  pretcniled 
deleels  Are  the  re-el igitiiliiy  of  ihe  F.xeciiiive,  ihc  wjint  of  *  touncil, 
ihc  uniiasKin  i>l  ii  lunnal  bdl  of  iiglilt.  the  oniisMon  of  ;i  proriniuR 
res|icclirig  itic  liben)-  of  the  pte».  These  and  several  ollicrs 
nhich  have  l>cen  noted  in  the  course  oi  our  inquiiies  ate  as  much 
chargrahlr  on  tile  enisling  constitution  oi  this  Slate  .is  on  the  one 
prapused  for  the  Union ;  and  a  man  must  liavc  slender  pielensioiia 
10  consistency  who  can  rail  at  the  Liller  fo(  imperfrcltons  which 
he  bnili  no  difTKuiiy  in  excusing;  in  the  (oimcr.  Nor  indeed  can 
ihrie  be  a  better  proof  ol  the  msincvritf  and  aRcclation  of  some  of 
lllr  (ealou^  advirisaiics  o(  the  plan  of  the  convention  among  us. 
wfaa  prolcss  lo  be  the  derated  admiias  of  tlic  government  under 


S8a 


ADDITIONAL  SBCVSITV. 


nr«.u 


which  iltF]r  )ii«,  than  (he  (ury  with  w)ikb  llicy  have  lULKkMl  chat 
plan  for  nuitcnt  in  rrg;irt)  to  whkb  our  ixwn  conitiluliun  is 
equally  ur  pctlixps  mure  vuinciabk. 

The  acUlilional  securitic«  lo  republican  governmenl.  lo  Ubertjr, 
nnd  10  proiMiiy,  lo  be  dcrircii  (rum  ilic  ado|>licin  ol  llic  plan 
under  cansideraikxi,  canti«t  chiefly  in  the  resUainli  which  the 
prescri'ation  o(  the  Union  will  impose  on  local  laclioni  and  insut- 
reciiona,  :iiid  on  ilie  amtiilion  of  |K>werlul  indiriiluatii  in  tingle 
SlJics,  who  miy  acquire  crcilii  and  influence  enough,  from  leaders 
iind  lavorilet.  (a  become  the  deipoU  ^A  the  petijtic ;  in  the 
■liminuiion  of  tlie  opporUintiies  lo  foreign  iiiirigur.  which  Ihr 
diMolulion  u[  the  Conleilenicy  would  invite  and  Lie  dilate ;  in 
the  prei-rnlioii  of  e-Htcnsh-e  niilit.iry  cslabliKlimentu,  which  could 
nut  fail  to  crow  uui  o(  wars  between  the  Stales  in  a  tliauniled 
situation ;  in  tlie  cxprrM  giuraniy  of  a  rcpHliliean  fonn  ol  )>ovcnv> 
nwntlocach;  in  the  absolute  and  univeisal  exclusion  of  titles  of 
nobility;  anil  in  the  precauiionx  against  the  repetition  of  ibose 
practices  on  iIk  part  of  lite  Suie  governments  which  hate  untkr- 
mined  the  foundations  of  pmperty  and  cmlil,  hare  |ilunled  iiiutuat 
■liiiruU  in  iliebreastsof  all  cbmeiuf  eiiiiens.and  have  occa&iuned 
an  almost  uiiireital  prostration  uf  riioraU. 

Thus  have  I,  fellow-citizens,  executed  the  ta^k  I  had 
assignctJ  myself;  with  wliat  success,  yuur  coniltict  must 
determine  I  trust  nt  least  you  will  admit  dial  I  have 
not  failed  in  the  assurance  I  gave  you  respcctinc  the 
spirit  with  which  my  endeavors  should  lie  condofted,  I 
have  adc]re<tRed  myself  purely  to  your  judgments,  and 
have  studiously  avoided  those  asperities  which  are  loo 
apt  to  disgrace  political  disputants  of  all  parlies,  and 
which  Itave  been  nut  a  litile  provuked  by  the  language 
and  conduct  of  the  opponents  of  the  Constitution.  The 
charge  of  a  con^iracy  against  the  liberties  of  the  people, 
which  has  l>«en  iiidtKcriininali-ly  brought  agatnsi  the 
advocates  of  the  plan,  has  something  in  ii  too  waninn 
and  too  malignant  not  to  excite  the  indignation  of  every 
man  who  feels  in  hit  own  bosom  a  refutation  of  the 
calumny.  Tlic  perpetual  changes  which  have  been  rung 
up4>n  the  wealthy,  the  well-born,  and  the  great,  liave 
been  such  as  to  inspire  the  disgust  u(  all  sensible  men. 
And  the  unwarrantable  concealments  and  misrepre»rnia' 
lions  which  have  been  in  various  ways  practiced  to  keep 


HabUim) 


DVTV  Of  CiTlZES. 


583 


I     the  truth  from  the  public  eye  have  been  of  a  nature  to 
demand  the  reprobation  ol  all  honest  men.     It  is  not 
impo»t>ibte  th^t  theie  circuinstunces  may  )>av«  occasion- 
iilty  betrayed  me  into  iniemperances  of  expreision  which 
I  did  not  intend;  it  is  certain  that  I  have  frequently  felt 
a  struggle  twtween  »eii$ibilii}-  and  muderalion;  and  if 
the  former  ha&  in  some  instances  prevailed,  it  must  be 
^^y  excuse  that  it  has  been  neither  often  nor  much. 
^^B  Let  us  now  pause  and  ask  ourselves  whether,  in  the 
^course  of  these  papers,  the  proposed  C<>risiiiiiti<iii  lia«  not 
been  satisfactorily  vindicated  from  the  aspersions  thrown 
upon  it;  and  whether  it  has  not  been  shown  to  be  worthy 
of  the  public  approbation  and   neccs^a^y  to  the  public 
safety  and  prosperity.     Every  man  is  bound  to  .inswer 
these  questions  to  himself,  according  to  the  best  of  his 
^^Oiiscience  and  understanding,  and   10  act  agreeably  to 
^^pe  genuine  and  sober  dictates  of  Iits  judgment.     This  is 
^a  duty  from  which  nothing  can  give  him  a  dispensation. 
'Tis  one   that  he  is  called  upon,  nay,  ctmslratned  by  all 
the  obligations  thai  form  the  bands  of  society,  10  dis- 
charge sincerely  and  honestly.     No  partial  motive,  no 
I     particular  interest,  no  pride  of  opinion,  no  temporary 
passion  or  prejudice,  will  justify  lo  himself,  to  his  coun- 
try, or  to  his  posterity,  an  improper  election  of  the  pari 
he  is  to  act.     Let  him  beware  of  an  obstinate  adherence 
to  parly;  )el  him  reflect  that  ihe  object  upon  which  he  Is 
to  decide  is  not  a  particular  interest  of  the  community, 
but  the  very  existence  of  the  nation;  and  let  him  remem- 
ber that  a  majority  of  America   has  already  given  i>s 
sanction  to  the  pbn  which  he  is  to  approve  or  reject. 

I  shall  not  dissemble  that  I  feel  an  entire  cunrKlemc  in 
the  arguments  which  recommend  the  proj>osed  system  10 
your  adoption,  and  that  I  am  unable  to  discern  any  real 
^^prcc  in  those  by  which  it  has  been  opposed.  ]  am  per- 
^^■aded  that  thU  is  the  best  which  our  fvolitir^t  situation, 
^^Bibils,  and  opinions  wUl  admit,  and  superior  to  any  the 
^^kvolution  has  produced. 

^^1  Concessions  on  the  part  of  the  friends  of  the  plan,  that 
Fffiltas  not  a  claim  to  absolute  perfection,  ha.Nc  a!iVQt<i«A. 


5*4  DEFECTS  IN  CONSTITUTION.  (»«.  H 

matter  of  no  stoall  triumph  lo  its  CDcmtcs-  "  Why,"  say 
(hey,  "nhdutil  wc  adopt  an  imperfect  thing?  Uhy  nut 
amend  it  and  make  it  perfect  before  it  \%  irrcv<jcab)j 
established  r'  This  may  be  plausible  enough,  bat  it  U 
only  plausible.  In  llic  first  place,  I  remark  that  the  ex- 
tent of  these  coiiecXMOns  has  been  ^really  cxu;{};er.-tted. 
They  have  been  stated  as  amounting  to  an  adinissiun  llat 
the  plan  is  radically  defective,  and  lliat  without  nialerial 
alterations  the  rights  and  the  intereMs  of  the  community 
cannot  be  safely  confided  to  it.  This,  as  far  as  I  have 
uiKlerstood  the  meaning  of  those  who  make  the  cuocet* 
sions,  is  an  entire  (lerTrrsion  of  their  sense.  No  advo- 
cate of  the  measure  can  be  found  who  will  not  declare  as 
his  sentiment  that  the  system,  though  it  may  not  be 
perfect  in  every  |inri,  \%,  \x\n^n  the  whole,  a  good  oue;  is 
the  best  that  the  present  views  and  circumstances  of  the 
country  will  permit;  and  is  such  an  one  as  promises 
every  species  of  security  which  a  reasonable  people  can 
desire. 

I  answer,  in  the  next  place,  that  I  should  esteem  it  the 
extreme  of  imprudence  to  prolong  I  lie  precarious  stale  of 
our  national  afl'airs,  and  to  expose  the  Union  to  the  jeop- 
ardy of  successive  experiments,  in  the  chimerical  pur- 
suit of  a  perfect  plan.  1  never  expect  lo  see  a  perfect 
work  from  imperfect  man.  The  result  of  the  dclit»efa- 
tions  of  all  collective  bodies  must  necessarily  be  a  com- 
pound, as  well  of  the  errors  and  prejudices,  as  of  tlie 
Kood  sense  and  wisdom  of  the  individuals  of  whom  they 
are  composed.  The  compacts  which  are  to  embrace 
thirteen  distinct  Slates  in  a  common  bond  of  amity  and 
union  must  as  necessarily  be  a  compromise  of  ns  many 
dissimilar  interests  and  inclinations.  How  can  perfection 
spring  from  such  materials? 

The  reiisons  assigned  in  an  excellent  little  ))ampMet 
lately  published  in  this  city,**  are  unanswerable  to  show 

*  Entillcil  "  An  Addnu  to  die  Pecqile  tA  Uic  SUte  <A  N*w  Votk."— 
Ptmn^s. 

>  \Vtill«a  liT  tofan  Iny  and  repnnlcil  in  Focd'*  "  r*<n{ditet»  on  Ui* 
CoailititliMi.'  — KirtToi.. 


HunUlonl 


A  SECO/fD  CONVENTION. 


585 


the  utter  improbability  of  awembling  a  new  convenlion 
under  circiimsl^inces  in  any  degree  so  favorable  to  a 
tiajipy  issue  us  ilioiie  in  which  the  bte  coiiventiun  met, 
deliberated,  and  concluded,  I  will  not  repeat  the  argu- 
ments there  used,  as  1  presume  the  production  itself  lias 
had  an  extensive  circulation.  It  is  certainty  well  worthy 
the  perusal  of  every  friend  to  his  country.  There  is, 
however,  one  point  of  light  in  which  the  subject  of 
amendments  still  remains  to  be  considered,  and  in  which 
it  has  not  yet  been  exhibited  to  public  view.  I  cannot 
resolve  to  conclude  without  first  taking  a  survey  of  it  in 
this  aspect. 

It  appears  to  me  susceptible  of  absolute  demonstration 
that  it  will  be  far  more  easy  to  obtain  subsetiuent  than 
previous  amendments  to  the  Constitution.  The  momcnl 
an  alteration  is  made  in  the  present  plan,  it  becomes,  to 
the  purpose  of  adoption,  a  new  one,  and  must  undergo  a 
new  decision  of  each  State,  To  its  complete  establish. 
inent  throughout  the  Unioa,  it  will  therefore  require  the 
concurrence  of  thirteen  States.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the 
Con.«tiiution  pn^posed  shutild  once  be  ratified  by  all 
the  Slates  as  it  stands,  alterations  in  it  may  at  any  time 
be  effected  by  nine  States.  Here,  then,  the  chances  arc 
as  thirteen  to  nine  *  in  favor  of  subsequent  amendment, 
rather  than  of  the  original  adoption  of  an  entire  system. 

This  is  not  all.  Every  Constitution  for  the  United 
States  must  inevitably  consist  of  a  great  variety  of  par- 
ticulars, in  which  thirteen  independent  States  are  to  be 
accommodated  in  their  interests  or  opinions  of  interest. 
We  may  of  course  expect  to  see,  in  any  body  of  men 
charged  with  its  original  formation,  very  different  com- 
binations of  the  parts  upon  different  points.  Many  of 
those  who  form  a  majority  on  one  question  may  become 
the  minority  on  a  second,  and  an  association  dissimilar 
to  either  may  constitute  the  majority  on  a  third.  Hence 
the  necessity  of  motdingand  arranging  all  the  paniculars 
which  are  to  compose  the  whole  in  such  s  manner  as  to 

*  li  may  riiher  be  Mid  TEN,  (or  lh«uRti  iwo-lhinli  nui7  set ««)  fooC  the 
meuuit,  ituM-lostths  biiM  ntily.— FtWUVS. 


'         '"- 


5»6 


AMEaVOMEAT  AFTER  ADOFTIOX. 


{][a.H 


satisff  all  the  parties  to  the  compact;  anO  hence,  also, 
immense  multiptication  <;f  (tifficulties  and  casualittes 
olttuitiiug  the  t;olle'Jtive  a&<>cnl  lo  a  final  acL     The  degree 
of  that  multiplication  must  evidently  be  in  \\  ratio  to  the 
number  of  particulurs  an<l  the  number  of  parties. 

Rut  every  amendment  tu  the  Constitution,  if  once  es. 
tablisiicd,  would  be  a  single  proposition,  and  oiiEht  be 
brought  forward  singly.  I'hcre  would  then  be  no  neces- 
sity for  management  or  compromi&c,  in  relation  to  any 
other  point — no  givin);  nor  taking.  The  will  of  ttn: 
requisite  number  would  at  onee  bring  the  matter  to  a 
decisive  issue.  And  consequently,  whenever  nine,  or 
rather  ten  States,  were  united  in  the  desire  of  a  partico- 
lar  amendment,  that  amendment  must  infallibly  take 
place.  There  can,  therefore,  be  no  comparison  between 
the  facility  of  elfccting  an  amendment,  and  that  of  estab- 
lishinK  hi  the  first  instance  a  complete  Coiixiitution. 

In  opposition  to  the  probability  of  sulisetiuent  amend- 
ments, it  has  been  urged  that  the  persons  delegated  to 
the  administration  of  the  national  government  will  always 
be  disinrlmed  to  yield  up  any  portion  of  tile  authority  of 
which  they  were  once  possessed.     For  my  own  part,  I 
acknowledge  a   thorough  conviction   that   any    amend- 
ments which  may,  ufxin  mature  consideration,  be  thought 
useful,  will  be  applicable  to  tlie  organizalioo  of  the  gov- 
ernment,   not  tu   Ihc  mass  of  its   powers;  and    on    this 
account  alone,  1  think  there  is  no  weight  in  the  observa- 
tion just  stated.     I  also  tliink  there  is  little  weight  in  it 
on  another  account.     The  intrinsic  difficulty  of  govern- 
ing thirteen  Stales  at  any  rate,  independent  of  calcula- 
tions upon  an   ordinary   degree    of    public    spirit    oail 
integrity,  will,  in  xa,y  opinion,  constantly  impose  on  the 
national  rulers  the  necessity  of  a  spirit  of  accomraodo- 
Uon  to  the  reasonable  expectations  of  their  consti'i    i 
itut  there  is  yet  a  furilier  consideration,  whicli  j 
beyond  Ihc  possibility  of  a  doubt  Uiat  the  obscrvaUoo  ts 
futile.     It  is  this,  that  the  national  rulers,  wbencrer  nine 
States  concur,  will  lave  no  option  upon  the  subject     By 
the  fifth  article  of  the  plan,  the  Congrcst  will  ht  obngcd 


ttnlllMl 


METHOD  OF  AMEXDMENT. 


5»T 


"(in  Uie  application  of  the  legislatures  of  two-thirds  of 
the  States  (which  at  present  amount  to  nine),  to  call  a 
convention  for  proposing  amendments,  which  shall  be 
valid,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  as  part  of  the  Consti- 
tution, when  ratified  by  the  legislatures  of  three-fourths 
of  the  States,  or  by  conventions  in  three-fourths  thereof." 
The  words  of  this  article  are  percmptor)'.  The  Coiigreis 
"shall  call  a  convention."  Nothing  in  this  particular  is 
left  to  the  discretion  of  that  body.  And  of  conscijucnce 
all  the  declamation  about  the  disinclination  to  a  change 
vanishes  in  air.  Nor,  however  difficult  it  may  be  sup- 
posed to  unite  two-thirds  or  three-fourths  of  the  State 
legislatures,  in  amendments  which  may  affect  local  inter- 
ests, can  there  be  any  room  to  apprehend  any  such  diffi- 
culty in  a  union  on  points  which  are  merely  relative  to 
the  general  liberty  or  security  of  the  people.  We  may 
safely  rely  on  the  disposition  of  the  State  legislatures  to 
erect  barriers  against  the  encroachments  of  the  national 
authority. 

If  the  foregoing  argument  is  a  fallacy,  certain  it  is  that 
1  am  myself  deceived  by  it,  for  it  is,  in  my  conception, 
one  of  those  rare  instances  in  which  a  political  truth  ain 
be  brought  to  the  test  of  a  mathematical  demonstration. 
Those  who  see  the  matter  in  the  same  light  with  me, 
however  zealous  they  may  be  for  amendments,  must 
agree  in  the  propriety  of  a  previous  adoption  as  the  most 
direct  road  to  their  own  object. 

The  «al  for  attempts  tu  amend,  prior  to  the  establish' 
ment  of  (he  Constitution,  must  at»ate  in  every  man  who 
is  ready  to  accede  to  the  truth  of  the  following  obser- 
vations of  a  writer  equally  solid  and  ingenious:  "To 
balance  a  targe  state  or  society  (says  he),  whether  mo- 

Inarchicai  or  republican,  on  general  taws,  is  a  work  of  so 
great  difficulty  that  no  human  genius,  however  compre- 
liensive,  is  able,  by  the  mere  dint  of  reason  and  reflec- 
tion, to  effect  it.  The  judgments  of  many  must  unite  in 
the  work;  experience  must  guide  their  tabor;  time  must 
I  bring  it  to  perfection,  and  the  feeling  of  inconveniences 
I     must  correct  (be  mistakes  whicb  they  innitably  fall  into 


5M 


DANCEK  OF  DEIA  Y. 


in  tlieir  first  trials  ami  cspcrimcnt*^"*  These  judiciuus 
rcllcctions  contain  a  lesson  ol  moderation  to  all  the  sn- 
cere  lovers  of  the  Union,  and  ought  to  put  them  npon 
tlieif  guard  against  hazarding  anar<:hy,  civil  war,  a  per- 
petual alienation  of  the  States  from  each  other,  and  per- 
haps the  military  despotism  of  a  virtorious  demagogue,  ta 
the  pursuit  of  what  they  are  not  likeljr  to  obtain  but  (run 
time  and  experience.  It  may  be  in  mc  a  derect  of  poltii- 
eal  fortitude,  but  1  acknowledge  that  1  cannot  entcrtatK 
an  equal  tranquillity  with  tliote  who  afiect  to  treat  Ibe 
dangers  of  a  longer  continuance  in  our  present  situation 
as  imaginary.  A  nation  without  a  national  government 
\%  in  my  view  an  awful  tpeclacle.  The  estiiblishaieot 
of  a  Constitution,  in  time  of  profound  peace,  by  the  roF- 
nntary  consent  of  a  whole  people,  is  a  prodigy,  la  tAc 
completion  of  which  I  took  forward  with  tremblinj;  au* 
iety.  I  can  reconcile  it  to  no  rules  of  prudence  to  let  (g 
the  bold  we  now  have,  in  so  arduous  an  enterprise, 
seven  out  of  the  thrrtcrn  Slates,  and,  after  haviitf 
orer  so  considenihlc  a  part  of  itte  jpvund,  to 
the  coorsc.  I  dread  the  note  tbe  coose<qDcocn  of 
attempts  because  I  know  that  poweriol  radrridsal^  b 
this  and  tn  other  States,  are  enemies  to  a  scoeral  — *i««— < 
covemment  in  every  pos»He  shape.  Pc-aojos. 


APPENDIX. 


m 


y<l^NDrx. 


i^ 


ARTICLES  OF  CONFEDERATION.    178? 

ARTICLKSof  Confwier.ilion  anil  prrpclual  Union  brlWMii  the 
SlalRSof  Nrw  H<iinpil>irr.  Maivichtiscltx  Bay.  Kitoilc  lUand  anii 
I'rovidence  rinnl.ilioiiit.  Coiinccliciil,  New  York,  New  Jersfy. 
t'ciiniylviiriia.  IJpUware.  Marjlaiid,  Vitgmiu,  Noilli  Orutiiia, 
South  Carolitia.  uiid  Georpa. 

ARTICLE  I. 

The  UvleollJiis  Confcdcmcy  ihall  be  "Tlie  Uuiied  States  of 
America.  * 

ARTICLE  H. 

Each  Stale  retain*  its  sovrTcignty.  freedom,  and  indrpMidence, 
;ind  every  pnwei.  jurisdiction,  and  (ighl.  uihkh  n  not  hy  ihix  Con- 
federaiioa  cxptculy  dcleKatcit  to  (he  United  Stales  in  Congrcu 
awembled. 

ARTICLE    HI. 

The  wid  Slates  herttiy  severaily  enler  into  a  firm  t«ague 
.«(  (liciiit&Mp  with  each  other,  (or  tficir  common  deleiisc.  tlic 
urlly  u(  their  hbeitiet.  und  Ihcir  mutual  and  gcncial  welfare, 
Iitriillng  ihemsclvea  to  jtSMst  cacli  otiiei  Jtgani^t  all  force  oflcred  lo, 
or  4(tJckK  m.iilR  upon  iheiii.orany  of  ihcm.on  account  ol  religion, 
soverciftiily,  inulc,  or  any  other  pretend  whaleircT. 


ARTICLE  IV. 

Thc-bctler  to  secure  and  perpetuate  mulual  friendship  and 
intercourse  among  the  people  of  ihc  differeni  Stales  in  thw  I'mon, 
the  free  inlvaNiants  of  each  of  theiie  Stairs,  paupers,  vagabonds, 
ami  (iigilivcv  fmm  jitilice  excepted,  xluill  be  entitled  <o  all  the 
(>iivitc|[cs  and  immuniiirs  of  free  cili»n«  in  Ihc  several  States,  .ind 
the  people  of  each  Sliiic  shall  ha»e  fiee  iiiRreu  und  regress  lo  ami 
from  any  other  Stale,  and  i.hall  enjoy  therein  .-ill  the  privile^jei  ui 
^Irade  and  eonimcrcc.  suhjecl  to  the  same  duties,  impositions,  ami 
sirictions  af  ihe  mlutiitjiiiiB  thereof  reside iii'rty,  prnvide<l  thai 
ch  restrictions  shall  ni>l  cilnid  mi  far  a*  lo  pievent  the  rrtnoi'al 
property  imfioneil  into  any  Slate,  lo  any  other  Slate  of  which 
owner  is  an  inh.ihitani :  provided  atsu.  that  no  imposition. 
tluiic%.  01  teilricliun  shall  Ik  hitd  by  any  Slate,  on  ihe  property  ol 
the  Uniietl  Slates,  or  either  of  t)i«m. 


59» 


ARTICLES  OF  COKFEDEXA  TIO?!. 


ntn 


If  .my  person  guiliy  o(  or  ch.irgcil  with  rrc-.i^on,  Telony.  ar  nihn 
high  inisdrincaiior  in  any  Si;ilr.  shnll  Iki-  (rum  juMk'c.  and  lie 
found  ill  any  of  rhc  Unilcil  Sliilo.  hr  ^uU,  u|>oii  di-iiiuiiil  nl  the 
Uovemor  or  cxccultvc  power  o(  Ihc  State  trotii  ulikti  he  lleil.  be 
(Ic'liveieU  upaud  [cniorcii  to  the  Stale  having  )urisdlciM>n  ol  hb 
uffcnM. 

Full  faith  ATiA  credit  shnll  be  given  In  each  q\  iIimc  Sutr«  tii  llx 
recnrd«,  acts,  and  jutlicial  proceedings  o(  the  courts  nnd  nia^U- 
Iraics  of  every  other  State, 

ARTICLE  V. 

For  the  more  convenient  munag^meni  of  the  general  tnictrfi 
ol  ihc  United  Slates  dckifAles  thall  be  nnnuall)'  an|>nintr4  la 
such  niiiniirr  as  the  IceiM.iiiirc  ol  <-arli  Siair  shall  diiecl.  lu 
inrel  In  Congress  on  iIm-  hrxl  MmiilHy  in  N'nvFnd>rr.  iii  every  yoi, 
with  ;i  power  icscreeil  to  each  Stiilc  lo  retail  its  dvhrtjaiev  ut  aay 
of  tlieiti.  at  any  lime  wiiUm  the  year,  and  lo  «civd  uiheis  in  iheir 
Klead.  (of  llir  irtnaiiider  ol  the  yrar. 

No  Slair  sl>;ill  be  Te|ir<-M-nle<i  in  Congress  by  less  than  two.  nur 
by  more  than  srt'cn  nieinbevs:  and  ivo  prison  ^all  br  raiMble  of 
hciiigailRirgaic  (or  more  lUnn  ihice  years  in  any  irim  o(  mx  y«an, 
nor  *hall  ;iny  pcrnon.  bein);  a  drlrgalr.  be  cafiable  of  holding  any 
ulfice  under  the  United  Stales  for  which  he  or  another  foriM 
betielil  lereivu  any  ^art*.  fees,  or  rmolumenl  of  any  kind. 

Each  Slate  shall  m.iintain  its  ovrn  dele|{aln  in  a  mertini;  of  the 
Slates,  and  wliile  lliey  act  as  ntenibets  ol  the  coniiniiiee  ol  the 
Slates. 

In  rlriermining  questions  in  the  United  States,  in  Con^itM 
tttsc-inhlnl,  rurli  Slate  shall  liave  oiie  role. 

Frredom  of  speech  and  drbnte  in  Congrru  shall  not  tir  in- 
peacheil  orqueMloned  many  court  o«  pt.icc  out  of  ConKre^s.  jumI  ihe 
nKrnheis  of  ConKre«<  shall  be  prolecinl  in  iht^ir  |>rrvin>  Ironi 
arrests  and  inipfisonnu'nis.  during  the  time  ol  ilieii  going  lo  and 
Iron),  anil  attendance  on.  Congress,  except  (or  lieason,  felon)-,  or 
breach  of  the  peace. 

ARTICLE   VI. 


No  Stale,  vriiboui  the  consent  of  the  United  Staler  in 

Kcss  assembled,  shall  scihI  any  embassy  10.  or  receive  any  em- 
ssy  fion>,  or  cniei  into  any  conferciKC.  acTrenient,  alliance,  or 
ticaly  wilh.  any  king,  pnnce.  or  slate  ;  nor  *Uall  any  p»-rv. 
ing  any  oAke  of  profit  or  ttuM  under  ihc  Unitcil  Hl.iti-s.  i 
them,  acrrnt  of  any  prcS'-nl.  emolument,  olhce.  or  title  ol  ... 
whalLvei  from  any  king,  prince,  or  foieitin  stale;  nur  shall  the 
Uniteil  Stales  in  Congress  assembled,  or  any  of  them,  gram  aov 
title  I.-A  niibilily, 

No  vvio  or  more  Stales  shall  enter  Into  any  iteaty.conrMleraiKin. 
or  alliance  whatri-rr  beiiven  Ihrm,  witliooi  itir  consrnl  nt  iKe 
United  Stales  In  Congrcsa  asscnihinl.  sjircifymg  nntii.iiely  lh« 
IHirposes  for  which  the  Kinte  ia  U>  be  entered  into,  and  bow  lonf  tt 
sliail  continue. 


mil 


ARTICLES  OF  COX  FEDERATION. 


593 


No  S(»te  ihalt  lay  any  impoiU  or  duii^s.  wliich  may  ifitrrf«e 
with  any  stiput^iion!i  in  ticalics  cnirrrri  iiuo  by  tlir  UniiFd  Sutcs 
in  Cu'>l;r<^s«  avscmhlrd.  wilh  Any  kini;,  piincf.  or  f\A\t,  in  piiixu- 
ancG  01  any  trc;itie»  jlica<ly  proposed  liy  CongTcu,  to  (he  courlsof 
France  ami  Spain, 

No  vcsmU  a\  war  nhatl  he  kept  up  in  lime  ol  peace  Iiy  any  Slate, 
except  such  nunihcr  only  as  shall  l)c  ileemeJ  necessary  by  the 
United  Siaiei  ii>  Conijre**  asietnblett,  (or  ilie  def  ..lae  o(  such 
Stale  or  its  Hade  ;  nor  shall  any  body  i>f  forces  he  kcpl  iin  by  any 
State,  ill  lime  of  peace.  exc«pt  such  number  only  as  in  ine  judg- 
rncni  of  i)i«  Uniicd  Stales  in  Congress  assembled  sb.ill  he  dremrd 
rcquisiie  lo  garrison  the  foits  necessary  for  the  defense-  of  such 
Stale ;  liul  every  State  thall  always  keep  up  a  well  rc);ulalrd  and 
disciplined  milili.i.  suf!iciently  armed  and  acc»iitei«:<l.  and  shall 
proi'iile  and  fonstanlly  hAe  ready  for  u»c.  in  pulilic  stores,  a  due 
number  of  t'leld  pieces  and  lents.  and  a  proper  quaniiiy  ol  arms. 
aiiinmriiinxi.  .iiid  camp  etjuipaj'c. 

No  Stale  shall  mi;.i);e  in  any  war  without  ihe  consent  of  ihe 
UniiiNl  .Siairs  in  Congress  assembled,  unless  sucb  Slaie  be  aciii- 
ally  inv.KlFil  by  eiieiiiies.  or  ihall  have  received  cerlain  adticcof 
a  resolvitH>n  bring  turiited  by  some  nalloii  of  Indians  to  invade  such 
Stale,  and  the  danger  is  so  imminent  as  not  to  admit  of  a  delay 
lill  the  United  Sl.<les  in  Congrns  assembled  can  he  consulted; 
nor  shall  any  Stale  grant  commissions  lo  any  ships  or  vessels  of 
war,  nor  Iclters  of  marijuc  or  reprisal,  except  it  be  alter  a  dcclara- 
lion  of  war  by  the  Uii<(c<l  Stales  in  Congjress  .assembled,  and  then 
only  .tgainsl  the  kingdom  or  stale,  and  the  subjects  thereof, again s( 
winch  war  has  been  so  declareil.  and  under  i<uch  tcguUtions  at 
shall  be  established  by  the  Unitcil  Slates  in  Congress  assembled, 
unless  such  Slate  be  infested  by  pir^iles.  in  which  case  vessels  of 
war  may  be  fitted  oui  for  thai  oct;ision,  and  ke|>l  so  long  as  ilie 
danger  »h4l)  continue,  or  until  the  United  Stales  in  CutlgrcM 
>  asMinblcil  shall  dciciuiine  otlieiwiite. 


ARTICLE  VII. 

When  land  fi>rces  arc  ratted  by  any  Stair  for  the  common 
defense,  all  oHiccnt  of  or  under  the  rank  of  colonel  shall  be 
appointed  liy  the  kKislalure  ol  each  State  respectively,  by  whom 
such  (orces  shall  be  raised,  or  in  stich  manner  as  such  Slate  shall 
direct ;  and  all  v.ieancies  sImII  be  filled  up  by  the  State  which  first 
made  I  Ik  appoininxni. 

ARTICLE  VIII. 

All  charges  ol  war  and  all  other  expenses  that  shall  be  tncuried 
for  ihe  common  defense  or  general  welfare,  and  allowed  by  the 
United  Stales  in  Congress  avtemlilcd.  shall  be  defrayed  out  of  a 
common  treasury,  which  shall  tie  supplied  by  the  several  Slates,  in 
|>Toportion  to  the  value  of  all  land  within  e.-ich  Slate,  granted  to  or 
t  Mrveyed  for  any  person,  and  such  land  and  the  buddings  ;ind  iiii- 
provetncnts  thereon  shall  be  estimated  accoiding  lo  such  mode  as 


594 


ARTICLES  OF  CONFEDEKATlO/f. 


|1(C  Untied  SisTM  in  Congress  assembled  shall  (ran  time  to  i 
<kircet  and  aprmint. 

TIk  lasct  lor  paying  thai  proportion  shall  be  Uk]  and  levied  br  I 
the  ■wtbariiy  aiuI  (Urccikm  ol  ibe  Icgislaiuics  of  the  aoeral  SuusJ 
withi*  the  lime  agreed  upon  by  the  United  Sum  in  CocvtaaJ 
assembled. 

ARTICLE  IX. 

The  Untied  Slates  in  Congress  aisembled  shall  have  ihe  tde 
and  eichisive  right  an<l  power  of  determining  on  peace  and  wvt. 
except  in  the  castas  mentioned  \n  the  siiili  ariklf— ol  u^ndmi;  and 
rcceiriug  ambassadors— citicring  mio  iie^tiics  and  alium 
vtdrd  thai  no  irrjily  of  comntctce  sliall  be  made 
legislalii-e  power  ol  the  respective  Slates  ih^ill  lie  ir^ 
im|MMint;  tiKrh  impoitt  and  (luti»  on  foteignmi  ai  Ihnr  imn  \ 

ate  subjected  lo.or  from  pri>)ii tilling  the  ei|HiruiK>n  or  ini[Hui      

ol  any  •kp«:ic^ol  gooils  oi  cumrtMMtrlicTi  u' hat  soever— ot  ctiAbIitIihi|f 
rules  lor  deciilinK.  m  all  osi-s.  what  captures  on  bnd  or  waici 
shall  he  IrKal.  and  in  what  manner  priies  taken  b>'  lind  or  nasal 
fo*e«  in  ihc  service  of  the  Uniird  Stales  shall  be  divhicd  or  appro- 
priatc<r  ol  )^tanlinK  Ictterii  ol  maique  and  reprisal  in  Itme  ol 
|>eace-  ;ippuiiilin>;  cMirts  (or  Ihc  liUI  ol  pjntcies  and  fctooin 
committed  on  Ihe  higli  leas.  and  eslahli.thing  rmiiia  for  recen'iH|[ 
and  determining  hnally  appcaU  in  all  cases  (if  ca|iliirr&.  iirorldnl 
thai  no  ntember  i>l  Cotigress  shot!  be  appointed  judge  of  anjf  ol 
lite  said  courts. 

TIte  United  Stales  in  Congress  assemblnl  slull  a1«o  be  the  tasl 
resort  nn  appeal  in  all  disjHiies  and  difTeiencrs  now  suttsiMingor 
thai  herrafler  may  aiise  lirlwrcn  two  or  ntote  Slairs  coocerainic 
boundary,  iuriwliclion,  or  any  other  cause  wluii^iei  ;  wlucE 
authority  shall  nlw.iy^  l>e  excrrise^l  tn  ihc  manner  fidlowing  :— 
Whenever  the  legislaiircur  e>icculive  aiilhoiily  or  lawlul  M(^t  ol 
any  Slate  in  conlroveny  wilti  anollvt-r  shall  present  a  prininn  In 
Congress  il.iliTi);  (tie  mailer  in  <|unl)iMi  aiul  praying  lor  a  heanni;. 
notice  ihereot  sli.tll  be  given  liy  order  of  CongreM  lu  Ihe  Ifj^isIaiiic 
or  executive  aulhortly  of  ihe  other  Slale  in  continversy,  and  a  day 
assigned  (or  the  appearance  ol  the  parlies  hy  thetr  laivful  »^^ty. 
who  shall  then  be  dircctn)  lo  apfioml.  I>y  joint  cniisenl,  eummis- 
sionets  or  judges  lo  constilule  a  court  lor  hearing  an<l  detmntniw 
Ihe  mailer  in  ipieMion  ;  Init  t(  ihey  canitnl  agree.  Oingrevi  slull 
name  three  jiersons  oul  ol  each  o(  ilie  United  Statea,  and  from  ihr 
list  of  such  |ierson»  eadi  party  shall  aliernately  strike  out  one,  llir 
(Wlilionei's  iH-ginning,  unlillhenundwr  shall  be  minced  lolhiiteen; 
and  Irom  Ihai  niimbrr  not  less  lli.in  seven  nor  more  I'rjn  nine 
names,  as  Congrns  shall  direct. shnll,  in  ihr  prrjirnci-  tt, 

lie  drawn  out  by  tut,  and  (he  prisons  whose  nam<  -  -  m 

drawn,  or  any  fire  ol  lliem,  shall  be  commissioners  oi  jiMl|;r^  10 
Ivar  Mnd  finsllv  drietmlne  ihe  conirnvemy,  wi  ^l*3rv  a*  ■  mnye* 
jMn  ol  ilic  jiufges  who  »hall  dear  the  c-. 
rtelcrminalion;   and  if  cilhrr  njiiij  slull  n 
day  appointed.  wl(hou(   showing  reasons.  ivnKli  <.u>ik-icM  i-iuJi 


nil) 


ARTICLES  OF  CO.VFEDEKA  TtOM. 


S9S 


judge  siifliiictiT,  or,  iKing  prMtiil,  shall  re-tu&c  to  strike,  flip  Con- 
gress shall  proceed  ro  ixMiiin.'klr'  ihr**  persons  out  of  each  Sialc, 
anil  the  Sccrciaiy  of  Consri-ss  i^hall  sirikc  in  behalf  of  lucli  pariy 
abitctil  or  rcfuung  :  ;inil  iIm:  juilgiiicnt  anil  scnicncc  of  die  court 
tu  l)c  atkpuiriied,  in  ihc  manner  Iwforc  iinrscribed.  shall  be  final 
arid  cuncluvivi?  ;  and  if  any  of  llie  jhirlies  shall  ii:(u*«  lo  suhmil  to 
liic  Hulhonly  of  Mich  courl.  or  lo  a|>|>cai  or  defend  ihcir  cUim  or 
c.iiisc.  (lie  court  ^lijlt  nrvcniielcss  piucccit  to  pionouncc  teniencc 
or  iiidi^mcnt,  mIiIcIi  shall  in  like  manner  be  final  anil  dwisive,  rhc 
jiu(i;rn(-nl  or  sentence  and  oihcr  procccilings  bring  in  rilhei' case 
lr;in«niilled  lo  Congrru,  and  IoiIkcc)  among  the  actK  of  Congress 
fitr  the  security  of  the  pjilics  concerned  :  provided  lliat  every 
CDiiiniiviHJner.  Iidorc  lie  lils  in  judfjuicni.  shall  liike  .in  uutb.lo  IK" 
ail'ninislercd  by  one  of  the  jud^riol  the  Supreme  or  Superior  Court 
of  tlieSlJle  wlieie  the  ciusc  ifijU  be  Xi\ti\."  wtU  itad trufy t<'  Aear 
ami  iitltrmiat  Ikf  in.itUr  inyufifion  atioriiing  lo  Iht  htil  of  bi$ 


JHiigmtnl,  wilktal  f,iv^,  affititioit,  or  kept  0/  rrwiJ."  provided 
aUo  liial  no  Slate  JiM  be  ifcprivcd  of  territn 
llie  Unilcil  State*. 


territoi^  for  tlie  beneSt  of 


Ail  conlioveriies  concerning  the  prii'ale  riahl  o(  soil,  claiineil 
undci  dilfcieiit  tji.itiu  of  two  or  more  Sl.it».  whose  Juiisdictions 
a»  tliey  may  rnpcct  such  lanil.i  ami  the  Sutes  which  nasseit  such 
grants  are  ^idfuiteil,  the  sxid  j-ranis  or  either  of  them  [leiiig  at  the 
line  time  claiineil  to  hjivc  Dii^jiiiMtcd  antecedent  to  such  scltlr- 
iCDt  of  jiii lidiction,  »hjll.  on  ihc  priii]on  of  either  party  lo  the 
CongrcM  of  the  United  Slates,  he  finally  detrrminrd  at  near  .-i« 
may  be  in  the  «an»c  manner  as  is  bpfi>rc  ptetcrihrd  for  dccitling 
diipule*  respecting  ttrriiorial  jutiwliction  between  difle urn! Slates. 
'i'liir  Unileil  States  in  CoiigieiS  assenibk-il  shall  also  liawr  the 
sole  aild  exclusive  lij^ht  anil  jHJwer  of  regut.ttitig  the  allny  snd 
vjlue  of  coin  stiuck  by  their  own  autlToriiy,  or  hy  thai  of  the 
respective  St.iti-s— tiling  the  standard  of  weights  -ind  measures 
throughout  ihc  United  States— regulating  the  trailc  and  managing 
nil  affairs  with  the  Indians,  not   incmhrrs  of  any  of  the  Stales, 

i>rovided  that  the  Icgi^latire  right  of  any  Stale  within  it*  own 
iiiijts  Imt  nut  infringed  or  riulated — eslabliihmgor  regutalinK  post 
olficcs  froni  one  State  lo  Jiiuthcr,  throughout  all  the  tJmted  Stdles, 
and  cx.Lciitig  such  poMagc  on  the  p.ipers  jiassiiig  thtotigh  the 
ii.imc  ;is  mny  be  rri)Nisili'  ii>  ilcfr.iy  the  expanses  of  the  5aid  nffiee — 
.-ippoimiiig  all  officers  of  the  land  forces  in  ihr  service  of  the  United 
Slalct.  excepting  reginiFntal  ufTiceis — appointing  alt  the  olBccri  of 
the  n.tval  ftnces,  ;ind  coiiiiiiiMicwiing  all  oflicera  whatever  in  the 
Vtrviec  of  the  United  Stales— iiiakin};  rules  fur  the  Kovernnienl  and 
regul.tlion  of  the  Mid  Uiiil  and  iiai'a)  totccs,  antrdiiccltiig  their 
upri'.tiinng. 

The  United  Sl.ilcs  in  Coftgreis  assemhlcd  shall  have  authority 
lo  appoint  a  conimiltcc,  lo  sit  in  the  recess  of  Cangre».  to  be  de- 
nominated "  A  Committee  of  the  Slates,"  ar>d  lo  consist  of  one  ilele- 
(fale  from  each  Slate;  and  lo  appoint  such  other  tomniilleeiaml 
civil  officers  us  may  lit  necessary  for  inaiuiging  the  general  uHairs 
uf  llie  Unilcil  States  uiidct  ihcir  direction ;  to  appoint  one  (4  tiKM 


5«« 


ASTfCLES  or  COlfFEDERATIOlf. 


um 


numlxt  to  pre«iilc,  prorided  that  no  prtnin  he  allon-nl  In  vrvr 
in  ihe  office  of  pmiiknt  inoir  ihnn  one  yr:ir  in  ;iiiy  Irrni  of  tlurw 
years — lo  iiscnliiin  tlie  ni-cnsaij-  suni%o(  inDitrjr  lo  Iw  miscU  (ot 
the  seivice  o{  lliu  UiiilcO  Sl.-iln.  iii\il  lu  approptislc  ami  apply  the 
same  (or  lidfnying  ihc  public  rji|>di9cs— lo  boiTow  money,  or  emit 
liilUon  llic  cicilit  of  llic  Uiiilcil  Suics.uansniiilini;  rvciy  hiil(')tar 
lo  the  rcipcclivr  Slater  an  ncfnimi  of  tlir  Mmm  ol  money  10 
Uurtowed  or  emitted— to  build  mid  njuip  n  nniT— to  aetee  upon 
\\w  number  of  land  forces,  and  to  ninhe  (rquiiiiiions  from  each 
State  for  'as  quota,  in  propoiliun  lo  liit-  numlier  oI  wliile  inliabitanu 
in  tucti  State ;  wliici)  requisilion  slijill  be  Innding.  and  iliercupoo 
the  legi^Ulutc  ol  each  Sititc  shall  Anpoinl  the  (e^imental  ofBcvn. 
r.iisc  y\\e  men.  am]  c1»i lie.  arm.  anil  ruiiip  lliem  in  a  Knldirr-likc 
tn^inner,  at  the  expetitc  of  the  Unileit  ST;iteK.  nnd  the  ol)irer«  and 
men  M>  clothed,  armed,  nnd  equii>ped  shall  nurrh  to  the  jitace 
appointed,  and  within  the  time  a^n'ed  on  by  the  United  Statet 
in  ConKreu  assembled;  but  if  the  Uniled  States  in  Congre» 
aasemblcd  »hall.  on  consideration  of  circumttatKi's.  jtiilf-e  prontr 
that  any  Si«lc  should  not  raise  n>en.  or  simiild  iais<-  »  <iir>aller 
number  than  itt  (|uota.  and  llut  any  other  State  shiiiihl  rai^e  a 
gre^trr  ntimber  of  men  than  the  quot.i  thereof,  uirh  rxli  j  nuiiihrt 
sh;ill  l)c  raisetl,  olTiccred,  clu1he<i.  ntiiinl.  ;ind  mjurppFd  in  ihe 
ume  minner  as  thi^  quota  of  sui^h  State.  unlrM  the  leKi^laturr  tA 
such  State  shall  ju<Isc  that  such  extra  numlwr  c.iniiut  be  safdy 
spared  out  of  llic  same,  in  which  c.isc  they  shall  raise.  ofBcer, 
Gluthe.  aim.  and  equip  us  ntJiny  of  such  extra  mmdier  As  they  ykAffi 
can  l>e  safely  spared  :  and  the  i>flici-rs  and  nien.wi  cUirhed,  armnl. 
and  cqui|>|w<l  shall  mari-h  lo  ih*  place  apixiinleil.  and  with>n  the 
lin»e  agreed  on,  by  the  t'niled  St.ites  in  Conyirss  as^enihled. 

Tlie  United  States  in  Co"Kcess  assembled  vh.ill  nrvrr  eneape  in 
a  war,  nor  Kinni  leltvrs  of  maique  ^nd  leprtul  in  time  of  peace, 
nur  enter  into  any  treaties  or  alliances,  nor  coin  nioiMry.  itur  rtjo- 
Jate  the  v.tlue  thereof,  nor  ascertain  the  siimt  and  eVjieiiu-s  necn- 
sary  for  the  defense  aitd  welfare  tA  the  irnimi  Stale*,  tn  any  ti( 
them,  nvr  emit  hills,  nor  Ixyrrow  monry  on  the  crrilii  of  ihr 
(.'niiol  Stairs,  nor  apfiropri.-ite  money.  i><>r  a^rre  upon  the  number 
of  vcswh  of  war  tn  he  built  or  parcnased.  or  the  ntmdirr  of  land 
or  *ea  forces  lo  l>c  raised,  nor  appoint  a  commander- in  chief  of  the 
ariny  or  navy,  unless  nine  States  assent  lo  the  s:>nie;  not  shall  « 
question  on  any  other  |M><nl.  except  for  adjoninin).'  fiom  itay  tu  dly. 
tic  drtctmiiied.  unless  by  ihr  voira  of  a  majority  of  ilrr  Unri«l 
Stairs  in  0>ngiess  asscmhlei). 

The  Congress  of  the  IJnitnl  States  shall  lure  power  lo  sdjouni 
lo  any  (iine  within  the  year,  and  lo  any  place  wiihiii  the  (.'nilnl 
States,  so  ihal  no  period  of  udiuuinnieiil  be  for  ■  limi^er  ihnatwM 
than  the  space  of  six  months,  and  s)mII  publish  ihr  )>tuinal  «l  ikrtf 
proceedings  monthly,  except  such  jutts  thereof  rrLiln^  lo  imlit*, 
alhaoc^.  or  milif.try  o|a-r.itl(ins.  as  in   tlirir  .it 

secrFcy.  and  the  yeas  ami  nays  of  the  delegate-  in 

«ny  question  shall  be  enlrred  on  ihe  juuinii).  whr»  <>  ii  •ii\.<rTi  \if 
any  delegate ;  and  tlie  dEle^ates  uf  a  Slate,  or  any  of  ihem,  at  Ui 


I7tl) 


A/tTIClES  Of  CONFEDERATION. 


597 


or  iheir  rtquesl,  shnll  be  furnished  wilh  a  transcript  of  the  *»«! 
iuurnjl.  except  vich  pnri«  a^  are  above  cxccpicd,  to  Uy  belore  the 
legJslulUTCX  oi  Ibc  several  Sinles. 

ARTICLE    X. 

The  Conimillee  o(  ihe  Stales,  or  any  nine  of  ihem.  shall  he 
nuihoriie'f    to  execuie.  in  the    recess  of    Congicss,  »u<h  of  the 

1  lowers  <>\  Conj^css  as  the  Unilc<l  Suirs  In  Congrr-v*  aiiicmWeii, 
>y  the  consent  of  nine  Suies.  vh.iti  from  tirne  to  iinic  ihiulc 
expedient  to  vot  them  with :  provided  ihal  no  power  be  delc^aicil 
(o  the  mill  Coinmillee.  for  the  exercise  ol  which,  bv  th«  AniciVs  of 
Confederation,  the  voice  of  nine  Stales  in  Ihc  Congress  ■>(  the 
United  Slates  assembled  n  leqoislte. 

ARTICLE   XI. 

Canada,  acceilinu  to  tliis  Confederation,  and  joining  in  the 
measures  lA  the  United  Slates,  shall  be  adiiiilled  nito  and 
entitled  to  all  the  advanliigrt  of  this  Union ;  but  no  other  colonjr 
shall  be  aitnnlicd  into  the  same,  unless  such  admission  be  aj^iced 
10  by  nine  Slates. 

ARTICLE    XIL 

All  bills  of  credit  emitted,  moneys  borrowed,  and  debts 
coniracied  by  or  under  the  nulhcirily  of  Congress,  before  the 
assemblin"  <>(  ihr  United  Slain  in  ptirsunn<e  of  Ihe  present 
ConFe[|irr;ition.  shnll  be  drcme<l  and  ron%idereil  a*  n  chart;r  ag^tinsl 
the  Uniii^il  Si-iiea.  for  jMymem  and  laii^faciiun  whereof  the  »aid 
United  States  and  ll>e  public  (aiih  arc  hereby  solemnly  pledged. 

ARTICLE    XiU. 

Ever^  Stale  stiall  abide  by  the  deierminaiions  of  ihe  United 
.Stalei  in  Congress  as^mbled.  on  all  questions  which  by  this 
Confederation  ate  subniitled  lo  then).  And  the  Articles  of  this 
Con  fed  era  I  ion  shall  tie  inviul.ibly  ohvn'ed  by  every  Sl.tle.  and 
the  Uoioii  shall  Iw  perprluni ;  nor  kIi.-iII  any  ;illerati«n  .il  any  time 
heTF^-ilti-r  Ite  made  in  any  ol  Ihem.  iinlcu  such  alteralion  he  aRreeil 
to  in  a  ConKtess  ol  the  Unileil  Stales,  and  be  afterwards  confimied 
by  the  lci;i»lalme»  ol  every  Slaie. 

Ano  whereas  il  haih  pleased  the  Great  CM'enior  of  the  world 
in  inciiitc  the  hearts  of  thr  legtslaluies  we  respectively  represent  in 
CotiKres*  to  apptovc  of  and  to  anihorii^  us  to  i.nify  the  said 
Arlictes  of  Con(e<leralion  ami  prtpelual  Union,  KNOW  VK,  That 
we.  IheundertiRiieJl  delegates,  by  virtue  ol  Ihepovfet  and  authohly 
to  us  giTen  for  thai  puqK'se,  do  hy  these  presents,  in  Ihe  name  and 
in  liehall  ol  out  respective  eonstituenti.  (oily  and  enlirely  ratify 
and  conlirin  each  and  creiy  oi  the  said  Articles  of  Confederation 
and  perpetual  Union,  and  all  and  singular  the  mailers  and  ihin^fs 
ttieiein  contained :  aiw)  w«  do  fiirlhrr  solemnly  plight  .ind  engage 
■I  the  (ailh  of  otir  respective  constituents  that  Ihcy  shall  abide  hy  ihe 
I     deter niination*  of  the  United  Slates  in  Congress  assembled,  on  all 


598 


ARTICLES  OF  COKFBDERATW/f. 


[IWI 


qtiestiflns  whirli  bj'  the  ^aid  Conrfdrrntion  .irr  siilimlfinl  \o  them. 
And  ih.il  the  AtticlM  thorco/  thai!  hr  invioLiliW  olnrrvrtJ  liy  iW 
States  we  respectively  rcprueni.anii  the  UnioD  shall  be  perpeiuL. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF 
AMERICA.* 

WF.  the  pkOPI.B  i>f  ihe  Uiiite<l  Statct.  in  Orilcr  lo  form  a  more 
perfrct  Umoii.  c3i;il>tnti  Jiwtice,  inwire  <!oniniic  Tntntuiitiiy.  pni. 
riile  (or  the  c(iinni«n  ilcfcnce,  promole  ilie  Krnnal  Wftf.irr.  juid 
ML-ate  tliF  Bti.-<i<iir>>;s  of  Lilicrty  lo  otirvrln-i  and  our  IViMrrily.  ■!« 
uitl.tin  »n<l  nublisli  iliis  CunsiitL'TIun  (or  the  United  Sioio  of 
Anicrii'.i. 

Chishnim  f.  OearKin.  I  TXil).  419:  MrCtillocli  t'.  Stale  of 
M.-irylinil  et  h1.,  4  \Vh.  316;  Dtown  ct  ah.  v.  Mar)lund.  11 
\Vh.  419:  It.-itrnn  v.  The  Mayar  nnd  City  Council  n(  Italti- 
more,  7  Pet.  243;  Lane  County  v.  Oregon.  7  Wall,  71; 
Teus  V.  While  et  al..  7  Wall.  700, 

*In  May.  lySs.  ■  tommiitcc  of  Con^nst  made  ■  ivpiMi  reoonnni^ 
inc  ui  attcnllioii  in    ihr  iirlii'k<i  »(  vi>ci(r>lmli'<n.  tnil   no  Mtion    wtx 
tixrn  on  it,  and  il  wai  t«(t  In  ihe  tiair  Ics-iilniuiet  lo  proceed  tn  iW 
mailer.     In  JsiMiiry.  1786,  ihe  teKidiiiite  of  VirvinM  pauni  a  rr>ala- 
iIdii  (inivliling  fo(  tbc  a|ipuiBlnKiil  of  fiit  tomoiiMionerii.  wliii,  va  tmj 
itirve  of  u-Iioin.  (Iimild  nicel  (iich  cunmlMiiincrs  lu.  iiilphl  t>r  ipiioinlnl  i* 
Ihe  niher  tiain  nl  lb«  I'Diun.  iil  a  lime  awl  jilair  lu  Ix  ai-creil  u)»n.  In 
tahe  into  <Diiii<lrnili"n  ihr  trail*:  ol  llio  Unilnl  Slain  :  ti>  (outidei  h»a 
fir  «ulijfainii}>>Ici''iiilhcircoinRietdal  KentatioiKBiielit  br  nacvurylii 
il>el>  fiinimon  iIlIcI•^T  and  iheir  ixnnanMit  hannony  ;  an-l  i-i  rr]*,ifl  tn 
the  >wiTral  Ktatct  Mieh   on   wt,   rcUlive   lu   (Ut   cnol   ■•bin.l   >t.   vhea 
ratilirJ  t<y  lliein.  Would  nnal'l*  ihc  United  ."^aln  in  Coiietrn  Hleilually 
lo  prmide  for  Ihe  v\mt.     Tlic  Vircinia  <vimi"i*ii'>«'i*n.  alitt  ciine  corrr- 
i.pos<leiK«.  fixed  the  fil^l  Momby  in  Scp^einlwr  *i  the  Irnie,  and  iIm  city 
(•I  Aiiiiu|H>1ik  M  (he  plkce  for  (he  nieciinc.  but  unly  fmii  octin    <iiii*i 
nttr  icjJTe«nleil,   vli.:   Delaware.   New   Voik.  New  Jenwy,    mid   I'mn- 
irl'a'i'a :  i'>e  ti^nittituiiiniMn  ap|>aluicil  by  MowcichBu-iii.,  Nru-  Itanfi. 
tiirc.  Norlh  Can^lina.  bmI  Rlinlr  IJiiiil  (ailed  to  *lti-»>l,      Uulet  tW 
cin:iiinilin<n  oi  10  partial  a    r«pcr-iTiitali«n.  Ihe  ciann-.imiimrn  ftmeni 
BfTccd  iipim  a  report  (drawn  by  Mr.  Ilnmilton.  ol  Nfw  Voik),  ei|w>«> 
Inc  their  iinanlmovi  convklion  (hil  il  mif^lil  nteiilially  lend   lo  aihmta 
llie  ielen^v  i^   llie   I'ninei  if   lli«   tUlH  by  ulikh  (key  werr  mpectivdy 
dclrj^rpil  liciid'l  rftiH-TT,  and  u*^  thrrr  ei>clEaTijr^  Ut  |4iK&rv  Ihe  Qaacnr* 
lenue  o(  the  ntlier  utatci,  in  Ibe   ai'(><iiiilinrDl  nl  cioit" '•■">"-  —  10  MM 
1*  Philadelphia  on  (lie  second  Mun-lay  of  May  fol)i<  '  Xt  iaU* 

eosuUeralton  ihe  uloaliooof  the  Uiiiini  Sulci:  t>:<  ru^Wr 

lirorltiont  at  Oiculd  B[>pcat  lo  ihem  nr«ciuiry  I'    '  11 

of  the  Peitcral  <^veriiniri<i  ^kqualc  !■>  iIm  c^  ; 

ami  to  repaii  lui-h  ««  kI  for  that  |iii|>-Ar  ii>  inr  ,r, 

Cowiew  auenldril  «,  when  acmil  I"  I'y  ihem  anil  m '  -il 

by  tS«leipiUiiir»^oJ  eireiT  Mate,  would  effcciBallynr...    .,  i...  i.,i  — 1* 

Cca|[KB,  00  the  ildM  Pebnoary,  1787,  ada|itM  *re*olutl4n  la  (««ar 


K>7  II 


CONSTITUTION. 


599 


ARTICLE  I. 

Section  I.  Atl  t(^{;ifil.1liv«  Powm  herein  granted  shntl  be  vested 
in  a  Congrrvi  of  tlir  Unilt^cl  St.ilci.  which  .sh.-itl  consLtt  of  a  Senile 
3n(l  Home  of  KfptcwnUtivM. 

H.iyliutn'i  CaM.'  (notes),  i  D:il1.  409. 

Sec.  11.  'The  HouKol  Rc|>icMnt.iiivn  iJikU  be  composed  ul 
Memben  chosen  ef^rystcotid  Y«ir  tiy  1li«  Pcopti- (■(  i)ir  scicrjl 
Stoics,  and  ili«  Electors  in  c«ch  Stale  shall  hav^  Ihc  Qu.ihlic.itioiit 
rrqiMMie  (or  EJcctore  of  the  mou  numciQUi  Dnnch  o{  the  Slate 
Lcgi&littiiic. 

In  re  Green.  IJ4  U.  S.  377. 

'  No  Petion  Hhiill  he  i\  KcpresenlMirc  who  »hall  not  haw  atlntnal 
10  the  Age  ol  tnenty-ltve  Years,  and  been  &cvcii  Years  a  Ciiiien 
o(  the  Liiited  Stales,  and  uho  shall  not.  ivlien  elected,  be  an 
InhabitHtii  o(  that  Stale  in  which  he  shall  be  chosen. 

'  •  [Reprcsenlalivrs  anil  dttecl  Tales  shall  he  apporlioned 
nmnn);  the  >eVF»l  Slaici  which  niay  he  included  within  ibis  Uninn. 
accnnlii^  lo  their  iciiieclivc  Numbeii.  whifti  sluill  Itc  rktcriniiiccl 
by  adding  lo  lite  ivbolc  Number  w(  ([<.-«  I'erftons,  includini;  thuM 


of  ■  conirenlkin.  ini)  the  te^iiJalurn  of  iboie  Sut»  (with  the  cucep- 
lionol  Kb(HlcI>Lin(l)wliii:hhl(lnaliJrea<ly*ppoiittti)(lclc|:ali:t.  proRiplly 
aliil  ill.  »)n  the  ajth  o(  May.  «vcn  Giuct  hjiiiiij;  t-Mivi'mxl,  l.k"<iri;e 
W«Hlim|^i)<n,  ni  Vlrg^iaiai.  wa^  unjintiiiouMy  clcLirU  I'tr^iHriit  nf  the  cixi- 
venljon.  «ii<^  Iho  itiiiMJvnIivn  »f  llie  p^'■|>o^T>I  (cinitiluliun  oaii  bcgvii. 
On  ihv  17th  «<  Sr|'leiii'<flr,  17$}.  the  cunitilution  u  cni^cucd  mil  auicctl 
u|H>D  wan  liranl  l>y  all  the  mcmlieli  priicnt,  eicrpt  Mf.  ticrry.  uf  Uasw- 
cliutcll*.  and  Mcuri.  Maion  mil  Kan<lt)l|>h,  of  Vii|;iiitA.  'I'lic  I'iokIcbI 
wX  the  i;"HvcTLlioii  tijinuiiillcd  ii  luf 'nii|;rcv«.  hlIN  h  rwluii«"i  ttali^if^  liow 
thf  proi""?'!  tV'lml  (j^ivcdimrnl  ■.liiiiiM  lie  put  ill  r-|ict«tiiiii,  ■ml  an 
eijilannlory  letter.  Con|;i«si,  on  llie  l8tli  uf  Srpteiiibcr.  17B7.  clitccted 
the  coiiuilnliun  to  (ramcil,  with  the  n;it>tiiliun>  aud  Utter  conccrniiii; 
Ifae  umc,  lo  "  lie  IranimiltuI  t»  the  wicrsl  LcgitlRlillet  in  order  la  tie 
•iitfitiitlMln  It  i-<iiii«nii(HH>f  ileleeile*  thr*™  hi  endi  Slate  hj  llic  peiiplc 
Ihi-iciif,  ill  tiiiilc'iiiiily  [ij  l!w  tr>.>i>r»  "(  llio  cuiiveiitiim.'' 

(In  tbe  4th  of  Miieh.  i^Sq,  the  day  which  h.iJ  been  liaed  for 
ktiiting  Ihc  lyittrni  of  GoVErnmriil.  Ihc  new  con^ililuiion  had  been 
ralitietl  hy  the  omvciitianx  chotcii  in  each  ilmc  to  consider  It.  at 
{alhiwi  ;  l>ela<ikatc.  I>ccciiibcr  7.  ■7S7 1  11-11111;  I vniiia.  Dcninliet  13. 
1787;  N«w  Jer«y,  DeiYiiibcr  18.  17S7  ;  (irxitijia.  jami.iry  9.  17S!; 
Connectkai.  jannary  i).  1)83 :  Mi«*si*hiiv.-il><.  KiTmiHty  6.  \'i^  \  Mary- 
land, April  IS,  I7$S ;  Smith  Catoiiiia.  May  33.  i;SB  ;  Nvur  Hampihire. 
June  ti.  17S3  :  Vireinia.  June  36,  \i%%\  (iHi  Neir  Vork.  July  36,  17HS. 
Tbc  I'le'iilent  infaiiiieii  Coonrcu,  on  the  iSih  of  Jsnuar)'.  1790,  thai 
Norlb  ITaruiiiia  biil  ratl&nl  the  eonitltuiiim  No>'ctiibcr  at,  179^;  and 
he  infurmcil  Cotigrevi  uii  Ihc  IM  <■(  June.  ITQO,  that  Khmlc  Ulaiid  hail 
talJIM  the  ooniiiiuttDn  May  Vt,  1799.  Vcrmunl.  in  convention,  ratificrl 
tbe  cotHtiiiition  January  to.  IT^ji.  and  wsa,  by  an  act  of  ConErew 
afi|>ni*cit  t'cbruaij  18,  1791,  ''received  ind  ndmilted  into  thii  Union  at 

11       >  iww  aixl  esiirc  iiicinbrr  •>(  ihe  L'oltcil  Siatci." 

I  ■  The  cbste  ini.h-l«l  io  Imckelt  h  anwmted  by  ilie  XlVtIi  amend- 

1      IMBI,  acooitd  atction,  \ 


6o<t 


coysr/rvrioAT. 


ami 


Ikiuim)  In  Seme?  for  a  Tvtm  »(  Yean.  »t«i  cictuiIiriK  IndiAtu 
taxed,  ihrFc-fifllu  of  .ill  oihcr  IVnon».)  The  acluul  KiiunicraticMt 
shiill  be  iiiitile  within  three  Yeats  after  ilielitst  Meeting  of  ihr  Con- 
Kieuof  the  L'iiiIfiJ  Stflti-<i.  aiiil  wiiliin  ereiy  Mibwnjuenl  I'erm  oJ  im 
VtMtk.  in  iueh  Mannrr  as  tli^y  shall  b)'  Law  (hied.  TIte  Number 
of  Re|>iescntaiives  s^4ll  itot  exited  out  for  cicry  ihitiy  Tlinucand. 
hut  e.ith  Slate  ih*\l  h.ive  HI  Lfjst  oiw  Rr|>Trsrnt.iiivr  ;  and  tmlit 
siKh  ciiiiinrT.-itiOfi  »)mII  l>e  made,  the  Si«tc  of  New  Haitipiliitr- 
nh.ill  l>c  rniilkd  to  cl>usc  three.  M.-isuchiisclix  cighl.  KhixiclslanU 
ami  l'rovi4lriicc  I'Uni.ilions  one.  Coniii^tiitul  live.  New  York  *i». 
New  Jet5cy  four,  fennsvlvaciia  eintil.  DtUwjire  one.  MatyUnd  u*. 
Vii|{iiikt  (en,  Nvnii  C'aioliiia  tive.  Suuili  Carolina  five,  xhiI 
Gcoi^ki  ihice. 

Vc3/«c  Bank  f.  Fenno.  8  Wall.  533;  Scholef  v.   R«r.  53 
Wall.  331 ;  PollQck  f.  FaniKis' Lojin  and  Tnxt  Co..  1 57  U.S. 

429- 

'Wlicii  vacancies  happen  in  the  Rcpmentaiion  fnifn  any  Siau, 
ilie  Execuiive  Auihoiitjr  ihtrcoT  shall  Imuc  Writs  of  EleciiiM  to 
1)11  Midi  Viicantics, 

'The  Hou&euf  Rciirr»tnt.i lives  sImII  chwsr  thWr  Speaker  and 
Other  Olficefs:  anil  vlull  Iwht  the  sole  Pouer  ol  Inip<-a4.lin)enL 

Sec.  III.  ■  Th<;  Si:n.ile  of  the  United  Stairs  sli^ll  tie  (-on» 
posed  oi  two  SrnaloT^  (inin  c*rh  Stale.  rbi«cn  hy  the  Li^bUruir 
thereof,  for  MX  Yrais ;  and  each  Senator  shall  h.ive  one  X'ote. 

'Imiitediately  after  ihey  ihall  lie  asiembkd  in  Cont-eijuence  i4 
the  liiTit  Election,  they  slull  be  liivided  as  euually  a»  ituy  lir  tnio 
three  CUsses.  The^ntiof  the  Senators  of  the  first  Class  iiuD 
be  vHcaled  al  live  bx|>tiation  of  the  seconi)  Year.  o(  the  tccond 
Ctast  al  llic  EijHi.tti'tn  of  l)ie  Inunh  Year,  and  of  Ihe  lliird  Clan 
al  Ihe  E<pii.-ilion  of  iIh-  Si»lh  Ye.ir.  »o  ihni  Dnc-lhhd  may  be 
ctiosen  cverj'  m^oI'I  Year;  and  if  V.icaitciea  happen  by  Kr&ij;tia' 
lion,  or  otherwise,  do rinjt  the  Rece_«  of  Ihe  Legislature  nf  ^nx 
Slate,  the  Executive  thereof  nwy  itiaWt  tenipoiarv  Appi':i 
until  iIk:  next  Mectinj;  of  the  U-^iklaluie.  which  »liall  ilien  r 
VacaiM.ie4, 

*No  IVrson  thall  be  n  Seiutnr  who  shall  not  haic  MlaJnnI  to 
ihc  Akc  of  thirty  Years,  jnd  lieen  nine  Years  a  Citiren  vt  ihr 
United  Si.ttrs,  ami  who  shall  not.  when  elected,  be  an  I n hstiititiii 
oi  that  St.jtc  for  which  he  shall  be  choien. 

*Thc  Vice  I'leiiiteiit  ol  Ihe  Unileil  Sl-iles  shall  l>e  Ptesulent  »l 
llle  Senate.  ImiI  s1i.'«II  hnte  no  Vole,  unless  they  be  eipially  divided. 

*  llie  SciLitc  slull  chuseiheiroihci  Officers,  and  also  a  I'rcsidvnl 
pro  Irnipoie,  in  the  Absrnte  ot  the  Yicc  Presidrm,  m  when  li« 
shall  cxemse  the  Office  of  President  of  the  United  Slatci. 

♦The  .Senate  shall  have  the  sole  I'Owrr  to  try  all  Itnpearhmmlv 
Wltcn  


lion. 


siding  foi  llini  I'uipasr.  they  slull  be  Oh  Uath  or 
When  tlir  riesitlmt  ol  llic  t  nilrd  Slate*  <s  tiwd,  tl 


Justice  sImII  piirside:  And  no  I'et^on  shall  lie  conrirleil  \kklh»ui 
(he  Coivfuneurr  n(  two-thirds  of  the  Members  present. 
'  Judfpneni  in  Cases  d|  Iiiipe;ichniei>l  slull  nul   1 1 . 
than  to  removal  tnini  Ulbce,  anil  ili:iiiii3lificaUon  to  hi 


1717  Bl  CONSTiTVTtON.  6oi 

any  Office  of  honor,  Trusl  or  Profii  wn<ler  tfie  Uniicil  Si.it»  ;  but 
ihc  Parly  convicletl  shall  rKverlSflcss  be  li.ihlt  :irnl  MibJFCt  to  In* 
ilktmcnt.  Trinl.  luOgnKnl  nml  l*uhisliiTii.'iit.  nccoriliii);  to  Lnw. 

Sec.  IV.  'Till:  Times.  Places  ami  M.inrK^r  of  liotilin)!  El«c< 
titiiis  for  SniAior^  anil  Rrprescnlaiivcs,  shall  he  ptMCfibed  In 
each  Slate  by  tlir  l.rK'^laliirr  ihcrrof;  hut  lh<!  Congress  m.iy  Ot 
any  lime  l>y  Law  make  or  allct  auch  Regulations,  excepi  as  to  the 
Places  of  chuiinK  SctMlors. 

Ex  parte  SieboliJ.  100  U.  S.  371 :  £x  parte  Yaitioroueh, 
■  10  U.  S.  651. 

'The  ConRK**  shall  assemble  at  least  once  in  ei-ery  Y*Jir.  wid 
such  Menirig  shall  be  011  the  first  Monday  in  December,  unlets 
ihcy  th.tit  by  Law  appoint  a  iliffrrcnl  Day. 

Skc.  V.  '  E.ich  Hiitise  sbal!  lie  the  Judge  of  the  Ekctions. 
Return*  ami  Qiialificaiions  i>(  ill  own  Members,  an<l  a  Majority  o( 
each  aJiall  conilrlule  »  Quorum  to  do  Ktusiiind;  but  a  smaller 
Number  iiiay  adjourn  fiom  day  10  d^y.  ami  may  Ik  authoiizeil  tu 
compel  the  Aitnidance  ofabvnt  Members,  in  such  Manner,  and 
under  surh  Prnaliics  a«  ra«h  Douse  may  prnvi<k. 
In  re  l.oncy,  134  U.  S.  371. 

'  Each  Hiniw  may  ileietmitie  the  Rules  of  its  rmceedings,  puninh 
it»  Metiiliets  (or  diiordetly  Itehaviuur,  and,  willi  the  Concurrence 
of  Iwxvthird*.  cupel  .1  Member, 

Anderson  v.    Dunn.  6  Wh,  J04:  Kilboum  w.  Thompson, 
toj  U.  S.  168  :  U.  S.  V.  Bollin.  144  U.  S.  t. 

■  Each  Hout«  \li.ill  keep  a  Journal  of  lis  Piocccdings.  and  from 
time  to  time  publish  ihrsamr,  exrepling  su<-b  Parl»  as  may  in  their 
JudKnirnt  lequjte  Secrecy  ;  and  the  Was  and  Nays  of  the  Mem- 
bers of  either  llouiconany  question  shall,  at  the  Desire  of  one- 
fifth  of  those  Present,  be  enteri^d  on  the  JouriuL 

*  Neitlitr  Hmise.  during;  lh«  Session  of  Conjfiess.  shall,  without 
the  Consent  of  the  other,  R<ljouin  for  more  than  tlitee  d.iys,  nor  to 
any  other  Place  than  that  in  whirh  thetwo  Houies  shall  be  sitting. 

Skc.  V(.  'The  Scnalot-t  and  Rcpfrspniaiircs  »hall  receive 
a  Compensation  for  tltcir  Services,  to  lie  ascertained  by  I-iw.  am} 
paid  out  of  the  Treasury  of  ihc  Ui>ited  Slates.  They  stiall  in  all 
CJSes.  except  Treason.  Felony,  an<l  Breach  of  llie  Peace,  be  privi* 
leged  from  Arrest  duiii>)'  ihcir  Attendance  at  the  Session  ol  iherr 
reapertivc  Hwiscs,  and  in  eiiinc  to  and  returning  from  the  snme  j 
and  for  any  Speech  or  Debate  in  either  House,  they  shall  not  be 
questioned  in  any  other  Place. 

Coxc  V.  .M'CleniJchan.  3  [>aL  478. 

*No  Senator  or  Kciireienlaiit'e  shall,  diirinf;  the  Time  tor  which 
he  was  elected,  he  ap{H>ii>tnl  10  any  civil  Offitc  under  the  Authority 
nf  the  United  St-nes.  which  shall  have  been  created,  or  the  £inolu> 
menis  whereof  shall  hiive  been  inctrawil  <hiring  such  time,  and 
no  Person  holdinR  any  Office  un<ler  the  United  .State*.  t.hall  be  a 
Member  of  eilh^rr  House  duiinj;  his  Cwnlinu.ince  in  Office. 

Sec.  VII,  'All  Hills  for  raising  Rercnuc  shall  oiiginale  in 
the  Mouse  of  KepreMrntativcs ;  but  the  Senate  ntay  pTO[ioM  or 
concur  with  Amcndnvcuts  as  ixi  other  bills. 


•Every  Bill  which  shall  have  jMtsird  iIm  IIoum  oI  RcprewnU- 
lives  nnd  the  Senulc.  shnll.  bc-fnte  it  l)ecome«  .1  Ijiw.  he  pr<r«mic<l 
(o  llie  rr«i<l«iil  1)1  tlie  Unileil  Stairs:  H  he  approi-rhe  shall  iign 
it.  bill  il  nol  he  ••tuill  rcluni  il.  with  hii  OSjccliuiis  (o  ih.il  Hi>iitc  tfi 
M'hicli  il  shjill  lijve  oriKiii.ited.  ulio  hImII  enter  the  Uhjrctiontai 
Ixr^f  on  ihrir  JournjI,  ;:itiii  prccrtil  li>  lecoiiMctcr  il.  II  xtiei  xucii 
KcL-anMilcT.-ition  iwo-ihirilh  of  iluil  llriiiw  sh^ll  ;>gire  to  luu  the 
Itill,  It  Kh.ill  he  Kent,  tngpllirr  with  the  Ot>ieciii>n».  to  iFic  o4hn 
HonM,  Ity  wliich  it  ihail  likcuitr  he  recuniiiilcml.  ami  if  iipiiroied 
by  two-lhinii  of  lliiit  HmiHe.  ii  »I>3|I  hecome  a  I..iw.  But  In  M 
such  Cam  ihe  \'oln  of  liotli  Ilouir*  khuti  ()c  dfleriniticil  by  jrntt 
And  Nays,  anil  ihc  N»iiie<>  of  ihc  Pei^uii^  vulm|{  (or  ^nd  asaiiisl 
ihc  Bill  shiill  bo  cnirrrd  on  the  Jouriinl  i4  each  ijuu^e  resjicciiidy. 
If  any  Bill  shall  nol  In-  returnnl  hy  ihi-  I'rcsidfrit  wilhin  ten  I)an 
(Snn(^;iTs  rxcppletl)  after  it  xh.-ill  have  l)r4-n  pip^rnlrd  lo  him.  Ihe 
Same  shall  he  a  Law,  in  lite  Manner  an  if  he  h.id  ufptci)  it,  itnlru 
the  Cutif^iess  by  thdr  Adjournincnl  prcrcoi  iiv  Rcium,  in  Mliicb 
CxM'  it  nh^ill  not  lie  il  Law. 

'  Kvei)-  Orilcr,  RrwiliiliOfi.  o(  Vote  10  which  the  Concunrtice  ol 
the  Senate  .tnd  Hmise  of  Ri'im-v-iii.iiive*  may  be  iHieviiity  (m- 
rcpt  on  a  que<.Tti>n  ol  AiljouinnK'nl)  slull  (w  piescnlnl  lu  Ihe 
Prexidenl  of  the  I'niird  .Si.-ilr«;  and  IWoic  the  kin>e  shall  lake 
Kffrel,  shnll  be  apprarrd  liv  him.  or  hcinjt  divtppioved  by  him. 
thall  be  rrpastrd  by  iwn-lliints  of  tfieScn.ilc.-md  Moiue  »f  Rcprr* 
seniativcs.  .-icrofdinj;  la  the  Rules  and  LimiUIHxis  prcKribed  m 
Ihe  Cnie  of  n  Bill. 

Sec.  VIII.  'The  Congress  shfll!  have  ["ower  To  Uy  anri 
railed  Taxrv  Duties.  Impose  .ind  Excises,  to  pny  il>c  Debts  and 

froviOe   (or   the   common    DcfeiKC   nnd    k*'""'-''  Welf.iie  of  the 
'nilcl  Sinlrt:  but  nil  [>uiir«.  impohik.  .-ind  Excises  shall  be  uni- 
form ihrouuhoiil  titr  I'niird  Slates; 

Hvlt<m  r.  I'Tiiiol  SiMcs.  3  IJall.  I7«  ;  McCutloch  t',  Sl-nle  of 
M.-iiyUiid,  4  Wh.  316;  L<)uf;h1iuii>U};h  1:  ItUke.  5  Wh.  317; 
OJiorti  1'.  Bank  ol  the  United  St.itrs.  9  Wh.  71R.  Weston  *t 
al.  f.  Cily  Council  i-f  Cliarle*ton,  3  Vrt.  449;  Dobbins  v.  nie 
Commissiont-is  "i  Erie  Coootv.  id  Pel. 435:  License  Cam-s.) 
How.  J04 ;  Conte)  c,  Biiard  of  Waideni  ol  t'ort  of  I'hilaitcl- 
|>)iia  et  .il..  11  llow.  3if9:  McGiiite  I'.  Tlve  Common  wealth,  3 
W'all.  3S7  ;  \''an  Allen  i-.  Tlie  Aiscason,  jWall.  J73;  BraiHey 
V.    The    People.  4  Wall.    4(9. 

Lkenxe  'I'as  C.ises.  j  Wall  461 :  Pervcar  f.  The  Commoif 
wealth,  s  W«ll,  475:  Woodruff  v.  Parham.  8  Wall.  113; 
Hinfton  V.  I»tt.  ft  Wall  148;  Vcaiie  Bank  v.  Fcnnn.  8 
WbU.  533:  The  Co11et-l»«  v.  U.iy.  II  Wall.  113:  Uminl 
States    V.  Singer.  15  Wall.  Ill  ;  Stale    Tax  on    I'l  :  '      I 

BoihK  is  Wall.  300;  United  States  c.  K^iilrna' 
17  W:ilL  313;  R;(itroa(l  Conipniiy  i-,  IVniMon,  1^  ii.in.  ;. 
Scholeyf.  Rew,  13  W.ill.  331  ;  Sprmccr  t/.  United  Slniet.  lol 
U.S.  s86;  I-pgal  Tender  Cn»*-.  ito  U.  S,  411  ;  California 
V.  Central  P.icilic  RiMliiwid  Co..  137  U.S.  I  ;  K.itleinijn  ir. 
Wotem  Union  Tdesnipb  Co..  137  U.S.  4(1 ;  Uloupt-.  I'an 


i 


ITSTS) 


CONSTITUTION. 


603 


i>r    Mobtk.    117  \3.  S.  &to;  Fii-iJ  v.  Cliulc.    uj  U.  S.  £49; 
Pollock  c.  Fiirmcis  Loan  &  Tmsl  Co,.  IS7  U.  S.  439. 
•To  hanrfH  Money  on  thecrrilir  rA  ihc  Unit«l  Slalvs: 

MeCullocli  V.  Ttic  Slale  o(  M^uybiKl.  4  Wii.  316  ;  Wcslon 
r(  al.  t'.  Tin;  Lit)-  Cuuiicil  i>(  Clutknon,  I  i'el.  449 ;  Itiiiik  of 
Comnierce  v.  Nrw  York  City,  2  Itl.ti'k  62U;  lliiiik  T^ix  C.-im;s, 
3  WaII.  100;  TItc  B.iiiki  t'.  rlic  Muyoi.  7  \V;ill.  16:  B.iiik  f. 
S<ipeiviso«,  7  WhII.  i5:  H('|>t>uri>  v.  Gii&wulil.  8  Wall.  003: 
Ni*lioi).-ii  n.itik  t'.  C«ninii>nHc-nlili,  9  W.ill.  153;  l>.iil.cr  v, 
D.ivit.  12  Willi.  4^7  ;  Lci;rfl  Tcnikr  Casr,  1 10  U.  S.  421. 
'To  recuUif  Cointnetr*  wiih  forpiRn  Naiionx,  anil  ainon)[  llie 
'Severot  Sintes,  uml  Mith  ilic  ImtMit  Tiibt^i; 

Gibbons  V.  U^dcn.  9  Wli.  1  ;  Biown  et  al.  v.  Slaic  ot 
M'trrUiw).  13  WTi.  41Q;  Wilson  n  ul.  f.  Bluck  Bixl  Ci>(«k 
Xlnish  Ccimp.iny,  2  Pet.  24S :  \Von-esicr  v.  The  Stale  ol 
C^ciMgi.i.A  Pel.  jij:  City  ol  Nrw  Vork  C.  Miln,  11  Prl.  102: 
l.'nilcit  Si.ilct  :'.  Coixnlis.  1 1  Pel.  73 ;  I  lolnics  v.  Jciiniw»ri  el 
«l.  14  IVi,  540;  Licrnie  C»»e5,  5  How.  504;  1'jss(^iis<-'r 
IMS,  7  Hovf,  283;  .\iiili;m  J*.  I.'juisiaim.  8  How.  73:  M^iger 
v.  GiiiiNi  el  mI..  S  Huu'.  490:  Ufiiied  S[.nt»  i'.  Mjii^uUI,  9 
Hon.  560:  Cowley  t'.  BoAid  u(  WiiiilctiA  of  Pull  ol  PliiUiJvU 
phtn,  12  How.  299;  The  Propcllei  Ccncsre  Cliirf  cl  Ji),  V. 
Fiuhiieli  ei  .1I,,  13  ilow.  443;  .Slate  of  PfpnsylvaoiaT'.  The 
Whecliiix'  IlhiJKC  Co..  13  How,  ;i8  ;  Vcuic  et  al.  t'.  Monie, 
14  How.  56S;  Smith  V.  St.ile  uF  NUryUml.  iS  How.  71  ;  Slate 
of  IViinsyltiini'  v.  Tlie  Wheeling  .I'ui  Belmonl  RikIrc  Co.. 
elAl..  iB  How,  411  :  Siiiiiilt  V.  D-mmpon.  II  How.  227; 
Foslrr  K\  al.  V.  UH<reii|Hiii  cl  iil..  12  How.  344:  Conway 
ri  «l.r.  T»vloi*a  En.,  i  Kliu-k  603:  Umicd  Siuie&t'.  Hut- 
liiUy.  3  Wall.  407;  Cilmnn  c  Pliit.xklptiin,  J  Wall.  713;  I'lc 
P;iMiiic  BridKcs,  3  Wall.  782  :  Slrmnsliip  Co'»|<>my  v.  Poll 
Wairfens.  6  Wall.  31  :  CianiUll  v.  Slalc  of  Nrvaila.6  Wall. 
35;  Wliite'i  Bank  v.  Siiiitli,  7  Wall.  646;  Waiinj;  t'.  The 
Major.  8  Wall.  1  lo  ;  Paul  v.  Vircinia.  8  Wall.  16S ;  lliodiioo 
V.  hicifiL-  Katlioar).  g  WjII.  579;  Uowiihaii)  el  al.  v.  Alcs- 
anririn  Co>iii«il.  10  W*ll.  173 ;  Tlie  Clinion  Biidge.  lO  Wall. 

M:  The   U.inKl   Hall,   lo   Wall.   j;7;    LifrrtKiol   lusurjiicc 

'otn]Kiiiy  V.  M--i!>&icliuv1ls.  10   W.iU.  566;  The   Monli-tlo.  11 

iVall.  411  ;  E»  pnrie  McNiel.  13  W.ill.  236:  SUie  Frcii;ht 
Ta«.  15  WiUi.  232;  Slate  Tai  on  K.allway  (Iioh  Rtcerpls.  15 
Widt.  384:  0»tKii(i  f.  .Xlobite.  16   Wall.  479;  Kailio-id  Cmw 

any  v.  Fulki.  17  W.<ll.  $601  Barienicycr  v.  lorn.  18  W.tll. 

39;  Tlvc   Deiawaie   R.iilr«:»d  Tan.  t8   Walt.   306:  Peclr   T'. 

iore.in.  19  Wall.  ;8i  :  Ral1n>ad  Company  :'.  Richmond.  19 
I'^'.-dl.  584 :  B.  &  O.  R.tdroad  Comgiany  v.  Maryland.  21  Wall\ 

56;  Tlie  Loitan-anaa.  21  Wall.  558:  ilendciion  el  al.  :'.  The 
Mayor  ot  lla-  Cily  of  Ntw  Votk,  92  It.  S,  259 ;  Cliy  Luriy  v. 
f  reem.in  «  .il„<)2  U.  S,  27s  ;  Simlli  Carolina  t'.  (rt-urgi.i  ei  al, 

13 U.  S.  4:  Slieilixkcl  »!.'■.  Allinc  adm.. 93  U.S. 99;  Uniled 

i.ilcbt-.  F«ny-tliice  fallout  of  Wliisliey.  etc..  93  U.  S.  188; 

osier  V,  MaMcr  and  Wankix  ol  tli«  Port  tA  New  Qdc^ins, 


6o4 


CONSTITUTION. 


ItTtll 


94  U.  S.  346:  Railroad  ComiMny  v.  Flustn,  9$  U.  S.  46$; 
l-fHuicola  Tel.  Co.  I'.  W.  IJ.  Tel.  Co..  </b  C.  S.  t  ;  Beer  Co-R 
MaMuchuK-lls.  97  U,  S.  25 ;  Cook  v.  Pcntiiydraiiia.  97  tl.  5. 
S66i  l'd<:kv(  Co,  i>.  Si.  Louis,  loo  U.  S.  4)3;  Wihan  r. 
SlcN.iim4^<.-.  101  U.  S.  S73 ;  Moi.ni  v.  New  Orleans,  1  \i  U.  S. 
69;  Hm<I  Monry  C;i«rs.  11:  U.  S.  s&>;  Ci>o|>cf  M(g.  Co-t. 
Ferguson,  113  U.  S.  717  :  riloiict^Ier  Ferry  Co.  tf.  Pcnnsyl- 
vanid,  114  I.'.  5.  ti)6;  Brown  ;'.  Housloii.  114  V>  S.  611 ; 
Watting  :>.  Michi];7iii.  116  U.  S.  446;  I'icknrcl  v.  Pullnun 
Soirllipm  Car  Co..  11?  U.  5,  ^iTenii^ssre  i*.  Piillnua 
Soulliein  Ca'  Co.,  1 17  U.  S.  Ji :  Sprtij^iir  :■.  Thompson.  <  it 
U.S,  90;  Mi>rK»"  "■  LoinMnna.  118  U.  S.  4(S:  Wuliuh,  SL 
Louis,  and  P.*cific  Ry.  i-.  llhniHS,  118  U.  S.  ^^  \  lltue  v. 
Glover,  ti9  U.  S,  543;  Kohltin*  r',  Sl«-ll>)-  Co.  Taxinij  Dt»L, 
110  U.  S.  489;  Conon  v.  M.ir>l.-in<l.  im>  U.  S.  502  :  ILirTtMiv. 
Bumsiite.  izi  U.  S,  186:  Fargo ?-.  Michigan,  121  U.S,  330, 
OuHcliiU  I'acket  Cu.  i'.  Aiken,  12I  U.  S.  444;  PbiU.  ami 
Sooihcrn  S.  S.  Co,  f.  Fn.i.a  .  iij  U.  S.  316;  W.  U.  TeL  Col 
V.  Pfiidkion.  us  U.  S.  347;  Sjnrls  t>.  ManlMe^  Kim  loifi 
Co..  113  U.  S.  iSt!;  SoMih  ^.  Alalunu,  134  U.  S.  4)^^  :  U'.l- 
Inmctlc  Iron  llrirtgc  Co.  v.  tialcli,  iJj  U,  S.  t  ;  t 
Mine  Co.  t'.  Prnna,,  ij;  U.S.  181;  Itowman  r.  ■ 
NonhwcBl«n  RW7,  Co..  laj  II,  S,  4ft;;  WKilrni  Union  1t1, 
Co.  v.  Ma»..  ii;  0.  S.  $30;  California  r.  Ccniml  l^ciKr 
R.  R.  C.>-.  1:7  U.  S.  I  ;  Leloup  c.  l-orl  of  Mobile.  1  =7  U.  S. 
640;  KiiW  V.  I'eartMMi,  118  (.'.  S.  1;  Ashcr  f.  Tc«a»,  138  V. 
S,  129:  .Sloulenlwr^  v.  Hciiiitck,  139  U.  S.  141  ;  Wfstrm 
Union  Td.  Co,  t'.Al.itMrivs.  132  U.  S.  47J  ;  FnUs  i-,  raln-rr. 
133  U.  S.  181;  Louisvilk,  N.  O..  etc.  Railway  t'.  Mi»--"!  '■■ 
133  U.  S.  587;  I.<«sy  t'-  H.mlin,  135  U.  S.  100;  1 
Micliignn,  13s  U.  S.  161  ;  Cheiokr*  Nation  v.  Kan  ■ 
way  Co..  135  U.  S.  641  ;  .MeCall  r.  Caliloniia.  136  U.  S.  io|; 
Norfolk  and  \Vc«fin  R.  Kil.  i'.  I'eniisylvfama.  136  I'.  S,  lUi 
Minnnoiai'.  [UiImi.  136  U.S.  31];  rrx4s&  I'jcilii!  K>.  Co. 
I'.  StHirtictn  PsciiSc  Co,,  137  U,  S.  4S  ;  Brimmer  v.  RctniMii. 
138  U.  S.  78:  Manrh^lrr  v.  W»v.,.  139  V,  S.  340:  In  it 
Rahicr,  140  U.  S,  545  :  rullm.in  P-iUce  Car  Co.  i'.  fVniu. 
141  ti.  5.  iS :  rullman  FjIjicc  C.ir  Co.  v.  Iljywanl.  141  U.  S. 
36;  MaM.  f.  W«l*m  Union  Td,  Co..  141  L'.  S.  40;  CnUchtf 
f.  Keniocky.  14  ■  U-  S-  4?  1  Henderson  Itridgp  Co.f,  IIoiiIm- 
son.  141  L'.  S,679;  in  re  GHrntii,  t4(  U,  S.  1 ;  MjiIm  v. 
Grand  Trunk  Ry,  Co..  141 1',  S.  217 :  iili:i>>iinura  Ekin  »,  U. 
S.,  (43  y^-  S.  651  :  P.>cifK  Kk,  Co.  V  .Srihcrt.  142  I'.  S.vp?: 
Horn  SiU-er  Mininj"  Co.  ».  New  York.  143  U.  S  i.i:  Oiic 
&  Hmmi  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wellnun,  143  U.  '^  Jd 

v.  N.  v.,  143  U.  S.  S17:  Ficklcn  1'.  Slidiiy  Co,    i  ,.'*-. 

145  U,  S,  I  ;  Lehigh  V;illfy  R.  Rd.  v.  Peonylvaniji.  14}  U. 
S.  193  ;  Tnierstatc  Cnnimerr^  Commn  f.  H.  K  O.  R ,  Kit.  14J 
U,  S,  264;  BicnnAo  v.  Tmi"il|p.  lij  U.  S.  189;  Urnw  », 
Sincvr,  tS3  L'-S.  391  ;  A*Iilcy  i'.  Ryan.  153  IJ,  5,  43ft;  l^»- 
ton  f.  N.  River  Bridge  Co..  153  U.  S.  519:  Erie  R.  Rd  c 


i7n-« 


CONSTITUTION. 


605 


Peniu..  153  U.  S.  628;  Posiiil  Tcl.  CiiMe  Co,  v.  Cliarlenon. 

•S3  U-  S  691 :  C(ivin);ti>ii  &  Cmi'ii  llridge  Co.  f.  Ky..  iS4 

U,  S.    lOJ:  Pluniky  t'.    M.iw..   155   U,   S.   461  ;   IVxis  rixI 

Pacific  Kw)-.  Ci>.  V.  [iiirrsialc  Transfer  Co.,  is|  U,  S.  ^y. 

Itoojicr  V.   Calif-.   155  U.  S.  648;  Post.il  Tcl.   CaWc  Co..  t'. 

Ailams.  155  U.  S.688:  U,  S.  v.  E.  C.  Knicht  &  Co..  is6U. 

S.  I  ;  Erne*!  v.  Mi»M«iri.  156  IJ.  S.  J96;  N,   V.,  L,  K-  & 

W«C'ii  V.  Peii[i;i.,  ij8  U.  S.  431  ;  Piti4l>uisli  &  So.  Coal  Co. 

V.  Batn.  f  s6  U.  S.  S77 :  l'>ii->l>iirgh  &  So.  Co*l  Co.  f.  La,. 

156  U.  S.  590;  0>.lf.  Colo.  &  S.  F.  Rw}-.  Co.  f.  Hclley.  158 

U.  S.  98  :  Iti  ye  DH«.  ijS  U.  S.  5^4. 

'Tocsublis^h  .11)  uiiifomi  Rule  of  NnliinliMlion.  >anil  uiiifoim 

Law*  oa  ihc  subjrct  of   lUiikruplcics  llitou};h(>ui  l)ie  United 

Slate* :  • 

*Slui«M  V.  Crow(iTnsliicI(l.4  Wh.  tl2:  'McMillan  v.  Mc- 
Neil, 4  Wh.  109 ;  'Fanner*  .-iiul  Mtthanics"  BanV,  Pwiinyl- 
VAnia,  V.  Smillt.  6  Wh.  13):  *OK!lrn  v.  Saiiml<-rs.  13  W'li. 
113;  '  Hnylc  1',  itieli-irio.tnd  Turner,  6  PrI.  348:  '  n.i»i«s  v. 
B.illon.  6  Pet.  761  :  '  Ileers  cC  al,  v.  Il.iiighton.  9  Pet.  319; 
'  Suyitatn  et  A,  v.  Hro^iToax.  14  Pet.  67  ;  '  Cook  »'.  Moffal  ct 
•I..  5  Hon*.  IiJS;  '  Ured  SciHl  i'.  Sanfoid.  19  How.  J9J. 
'To  coin  Money,  crjiiilalr  live  Value  thereof,  and  o( foreign  Coin, 
and  til  the  Slamlinl  of  Wcit{hl.i  and  Mc.i&uies  : 

Briscoe  7i.  The  Rank  of  ilie  Corn  >i  ion  wealth  of  Kcniucliy, 
II  Pet.  157;  Fox  I'.  TiieSlJiie  of  Ohio.  5  How.  410;  United 
Slates  V.  MsrieoU,  9  How,  jfitx 
'To  proviilc  lor  the  PiiDishment  of  counteffeilinj;  the  Securilie* 
and  current  Coin  of  the  United  Stales ; 

Foi  V.  Ttie  Slate  of  Ohio.  5  How,  410 ;  United  Staits  v. 
Marigold,  9  How.  ;6a 
'  To  esubllsh  Post  Office*  anrt  post  Road* ; 

Slate  of  Pcnn<iy1vani.-i  ?.-.  The  Wheetine  and  RelmonI 
Drid|;ft  Compiiny.  iS  How.  4:1  ;  Horner  ;'.  u.  S..  143  U.  S. 
207;  In  re   K.iiiier.    143  U.S.  no;  In  re  Uetr».  158   U.  S. 

•To  promote  the  Ptogrw»  ol  Science  an<l  asefal  Art*,  bjr  secur- 
ing (or  limited  Times  to  Authors  and  Inventore  the  cxclusirc 
Right  to  thrir  tesi>ecti»'e  Wriiines  and  OiBfoveiie*  ; 

(•ram   ei   al,  %:  Raymond.  6   Pel.   218;  Whenlon  el  al.  v. 
Peters  el  al..  8  Pel.  591. 
'To  consiiiuic  Trihunals  inferior  to  (he  supreme  Court; 
"  To  define  and  puiu%h  IHnties  anil   Felonies  conimitted  00  the 

Ehij;h  Sea*,  anil  ORenses  auainst  the  L.tvr  of  Nation* ; 
United  Stales  r.  Palmer.  3  Wh.  610:    Uniicd  St.iles  v. 
WllibtrKer.   5  Wh.  7*  ;  Unilcrf  States  »..  Smith.  5  Wh.  1 53 ; 
United  -Stales  f.  Pirates.  %  Wh.  184 ;  United  Stales  v.  An- 
ixm^.  120U.  S.  479- 
"  To  declare  War,  Rrnnl  !-elleraol   Mar^itie  ,ind   Reprisal,  anti 
make  Rules  concerning  C.iplures  on  Land  and  Water  ; 
Itruwn  tr.  United  Stales,  8  Cr.  iio;  Antettcan    Insurance 
Company  c(  al.  v.  Cantei   (356  Iwiles  cotton),  1  Pet.  jit; 


6o6 


CONSTITUTION. 


DTRI 


Mrs.  Alexan4l«r*>  CoitoD.  s   Wall.  404:    Millrr  v.  United 
Sltil«.    II     Wall.  a68:    Tyltr  i-.   Detre«,    11    \V>ri.    jji; 
Stew^n  V.  Kaliii,    11    Wall.  493;    Hamilton  v.  Dillin,    ai 
Wall.  73 :  Lantar.  ex.,  v.  Browne  ci  al..  9:  U.  S.  187. 
"To  nuKC  and  SUppott  Armies,  bul  nn  Afiprnprinlimt  of  Money 
to  ihat  Wifi-  ^i,ill  be  \<t\  a  longrr  Terin  ihan  two  Years  ; 
CrnnfUII  v.  Slate  of  Neiatia,  6  Wall.  31. 
"To  ptoviik  and  inainlaiti  a  Na»T  ; 

Oiiiicil  Sialcii  V.  Iteiaii»,  3  W'li.  3j6i  Dynea  v.  Hootct.  so 
How.  6j. 
"To  m.tkc  Rul«  for  (he  Covernmciit  and  Regumion  n|  the 
land  anil  nav;il  Forces ; 

"  To  prnviilc  Cor  callin;;  fottli  tlic  Militia  to  exrcule  ibc  Laws  ol 
the  Union,  MipprcK^  In^urtrciinns  and  re|tcl  ln*a«ioni ; 

llouMon  x:  Mortrc.  5  Wli.  I  ;  Matlin  v.  Molt.  11    Wh.  19; 

Lulhcr  I'.  Iturikii,  1  How.    1  ;  Cniixlall  f.  ^lule  oj  Nnada, 

6  Wall.  JS;    Teiaif.  WliUc.  7  Wall.  700. 

'*To  pioviiln  foT  <>T|>an'(iiig,  arming. and  <liMriplinin|;.  iW  Mililia, 

anil  for  gniTrnine  siicli  I'ati  ol  ihrni  as  m.iy  l>c  cniployeil  in  tlie 

Scn'ice  of  ihe  Ufitlcd  Slain.  tcservinK  to  ihr  Stales  rrsp^litcljr, 

the  Appoint  men  I  <A  ilic  Ollkirrs.  and  the  Aiillrafiiy  of  Irainiitg  the 

Mililia  accfirctmj;  lu  llie  diicipIiiK.-  |>tesciil)«^l  liy  Connre**  ; 

Hntiilun  T'.  Moorp.  5  Wh.  1  ;  Matlin  v.  Moll,  13  Wfa.  ig; 
Luther:'.  Hotilen,  ^  Huw.  1. 
"  To  exerciix;  excluMi'u  L<.-|;iBUtt<in  in  all  Caw9  wlialsoerr*-, 
over  Mich  Ui!ilttct  |mi>i  cxcci-diii];  Ini  Miles  »qua<e)  -is  niny.  fiy 
Cession  of  |MrtkMl.ir  Slair*.  ami  ilw  Areeinaore  ol  Congici*.  hr- 
rnmc  X\\f  Srat  of  ilie  CovrrniiiFni  of  the  Um'nt  St.tles,  .tnil  la  ex- 
ercise like  Aulhoiily  nvn  all  I'lacrs  jHitchaKil  by  ihr  Consent  ul 
ihc  l.e^iil-iliire  ul  the  St.iie  in  which  the  Same  ikhall  be,  for  Ihr 
Errciion  of  Kotis,  MaKaiinett,  Anwiials,  dock-Yarib,  am]  Mh«r 
needful  Hiiildinp  ;^And 

Hepl)u>i>  el  aL  v.  Ellfejr.  3  Cr.  444:  LoughbotouRh  V. 

biakr,  S  Wh.    317;  Cohens  v.  ViiKinia,  6  Wh.  264;    Ameri- 

C-.tn  hiMir.-inre  (!oni|uny  v.  Cantet  IjjA  Ihiles  cndon).  1    )VI. 

51 1  :  Kendall,  Po^lni.i»tet  (General,  ».  The  United  .State*.  11 

Pel.    $14:    United  SUlei  r.    Dewill.  9  Wall.  41  ;  Diinphy  n 

Klein.imilh   et   al.,   11    Wall.  610;    Willaiil  v.    I'icsbury,   14 

Wall.   676:    fhillipfl  r.    I>.iyne.  92   U.  S.  130:  Uiidnl  Stale* 

I'.  Fux.  94  U.  S.  31 J  :  Nallfiiial   Itank  i'.  Y'anklon  Coiiiiljr.  im 

U,  S.  119 ;  Ft,  LeaveiHvonh  R.  Rd.  Co.  v.  Howe.  1 14    (-'.  S, 

515:  Benson  V.  U.  S,  146  U.  S,  315=  Shoeuuilicr  v.  U.  S.. 

147  U    S.  181. 

"To  make  all   Law-i  whicli  >lull  be  neeewary  ami  proper  lor 

carrying   into   Kxetrulion   the   foregoing;   i'owers,    anil    all    niliei 

I\iwer>  ire«e*l  by   thii  ConMiloiion  in  the  Corcfnmeni  of  the 

United  Stiller,  ot  in  any  [>e|>atinienl  or  Officer  thereof, 

McCulloch  f .  The  Slate  of  MaryUnd,  4  Wh.  316;  Way- 
man  V.  Southard.  10  Wh.  t  :  Hank  of  Unilrd  Stalci  v.  Hal' 
U«9id,  ID  Wh.  51:  Heptwrn  v.  Griiwold,  8  Wall  fiuj; 
NatHNial  Uank  v.  Commoiiwcallh,  9  Wall.  Jjji  ThunuciaK 


ITIT-tl 


CONSTITUTION. 


«07 


Pacilic   Rallnmcl,  9  Wall.   $70:    Partcer  v.  Davi).  rj   Wall. 

4S7  :  Riilronil  Comi)3iiy  !•.  lonnsoTi.  ij   Walt.  195:  K^ilnMd 

CouijNiny  I'.  Pciiisioit,  iS  WaJl,    5  ;  Lru^l  Triider  Case,  rto 

U.  S.  421  :  III  re  Coy.  127  U,  S.  731  ;  .Sioitlcfiburgh    v.  Hen- 

nick.  119   U.  S.  141  ;  Chiimc  Ex.  Case,  130  U.  S.  581  :  In   te 

Nei);<c.  IJJ  U.  S.   1  ;  Si.  P;iiil.  Minncapolii  &  Maniiubj  Ky. 

Co.  I'.  Phdps.   137    U.  S.  «8;   lloitiCT  t'.  U.  S„    143    U.  S. 

S70;  Log^ii)  t'.  U.  S.,  144  t.  S,  363  ;  Fong-Yue  Tiiii;  v.  U.  S., 

149   U,   S.  698;  Lcn  V.  U.  S..   150  U.  S.  476;  Luiton  v. 

Norih   Rivet   Btidgc   Co.,    153   U.  S.  519:  Knc  R.  Rfi.  v. 

{*Knn.i..t53  U.S.    6z8;  Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co..  f.  Chartcilon, 

I  S3  U.S.  692;  Clinic  V.  U.  S..  159  U.S.  59a. 

Sec  IX.  'The    MiUFiitioii    or   liiiporUiiQii    o(    such   Peraons 

as   niiy  of  the  Siuics   now  cxiiiii>K  ^I'iitl  ihink  pioper  ri>  sdmil, 

sliflll  nut  be  iiroliibiinl  l)y   (he  Coii^'ivm  prior  10   the  Ycat   one 

ihousaiitl  eigni  humlrei!  aiid  eight,  but  a  Inx  or  thity  in.iy  be  iiii- 

poKcil   on  such   linporl.iiiiMi.  not  exceeding  ten  dolUrs  tor  each 

Person, 

Drcd  Scon  V.  Sniifonl.  19  How.  393. 
■The   I'livile^e   ol   (lie   Writ  of  Habeas  Corpus  shall  noi  be 
sus|Kn<led.  tiTik-ss  wheti   hi   Cases  of   Kebellioii  or  Inraslon  the 
puhhc  S;i(ity  may  te(|tiiie  i(. 

United  Siniet  i'.  H;iiiiiii')i>.  3  UjII.  17;  Hepburn  et  al. ». 
Etlicv,  3  Cr.  44;:  Ex  |i.utc  Bolliii.in  and  Swaitwout.  4  Cr. 
75i  kx  parte  Ki'iiiiK-y.7  Wh.  38;  Lx  pane  Tubus  Watkins, 

3  Pel.  191:  E<  pane  Milliiiin.  9  P«.  704;  Hi/lme*  w.  Jcn- 
niMHi  Ft  .-il,.  14  I'ct.  540;  Ex  pane  Uorr.  3  Itaw.  103: 
Lullier«'.  tlonleii.  7  How.  1  ;  Alilenun  v.  Bnurh  ar>d  United 
S[4(eTt  I*.  Iluolh.  21  lluw.  S06:  Ex  pane  Vullaiii!i){hain.  t 
Wall.  24;:  Ex  pane  Miiili^jn.  4  Wall.  3;  Ex  paile  Mc- 
Canllr.  7  W..I1.  506  ;  Et  jiailc  Veiyri.  8  W.ill.  8}  :  TaibU-"B 
Case.  >3  VV.ill,  397  :  Ex  |»ilc  I.aiigr.  (8  Wall.  16;  Ei  parte 
Pniks.  93-t;.  S.  iS;  F.x  pane  KarMenillck,  93  U.  S.  3961  Ex 
pane  V'ii):iiiia.  lOo  U.  S,  339:  In  te  Ne;igle.  13$  U.  S.  I  ;  III 
re  llunc.iii,  139  U.  S.  449. 

*  No  bill  u(  Allntiiikr  or  ex  post  (acto  Law  sImII  Ih:  paMed. 

Ek-lciiCT  V.  I'tx:k.6  Cr.  87;  0<lgeii  f.  Saumlcri.  ii  Wh. 
JI3;  Waison  el  al.  P.  Mriccr.  8  Pr(.  S8  ;  C.irpeiKei  et  al.  f. 
CciinmoiiweJilh  of  lViin«'lvania.  17  How.  456 ;  I.ocke  «'.  New 
Orleans   4  Wall,    171 ;  Cummmgrt  v.  The  State  of   Mmmiri, 

4  -Wall.  277  i  Ex  paile  Garland.  4  Wall.  333 ;  llrehinan  f. 
Sti'lf.  8  Wall.  J9S:  Klingcr  v.  Stale  ul  .Miiiourl.  t3  Wall. 
257;  Pierce  v.  Carsliadoii.  \b  Wall.  1]4;  Hoidcn  i'.  Miii> 
nciKHa.  137   U.  S.  483  ;  C.»ok  v.  U.  S..  138  U.  S.  ((7. 

*  No  t^piUIiot),  or  olhrt  direct.  Tax  shall  l>c  laid,  iiiiless  In  Pro- 
IMrlwM  10  ihe  CcnMia  01  Eiiumerniion  h«reinl>efoic  directed  lo  be 
Uken. 

License  Tax  Caws.  5  Walt.  461;  Springer  v.  United  States. 
loi  U.   S.  586;  IVillock  V.  Farnien  LuanA  Tnni  Co..  157 
U.  S.  419- 
'  No  Tax  or  Utiiydull  be  laidooAiiicles  exported  from  any  Slate; 


&o8 


cOiVsriTunoA'. 


wm 


Coolcy  V    Boaiil  of  Watikns  ol  Port  of  I1iUuiic)|iliiii.  u 

How.  399  •   ^^&f  V.  BurgMa,  cullKior.  93   U.    S.  37a  :  I'lo- 

pin  f.  Burgess.  117   U.  S.  $04;  PiitttMiigl)  &  Souiltcrn  CmI 

Co,  *•.  Uales,  ij6  U.  S.  577. 

*  No  I'tefcrcncc  sh.-ill  be  Given  hy  any  Reijuliitian  of  Coniinem 

or  Revenue  lo  tlie  i'orltulonc  Stale  ui-cr  thuM  of  anoihcr:  nor 

s\\M  Vutdcltk  bound  lu,  or  from,  one  Siale,  be  obliged  10  enin, 

clcnr,  or  pay  Duiit-s  in  anuibcr, 

Ci>»ley  T'.  Buuttl  o(   Waidcns  ol  Pori  ol  Phihclepliia  cl  al,. 

II  How.  399:  ST«ie  of  Pennsvlvania  v.  Wlirrliri);  and  Bel* 

mom  Ilrklge  Company  cl  al..  iS  How.  4-1 ;  Munn  f.  Illmoa. 

at   tJ-    S.     113;  Packet    Co.    v.    Si.    Uiuix.    loo    U.  S.  41] ; 

Packet  Co.  V.  Ciiletiabui^.  105  U.  S.  SS9:  Moigan  S.  S.  Ot. 

V,  La.  Uourdul  He^lDi.  1 18  V.  S.  45^ 

'  No  Money  shnll  he  drawn  (n>in  Uir  Treasury.  I>ui  in   Cofitr- 

qaonce  ol  A|i|iiopnaiio«s  made  tiy  Law  ;  uiid  a  legular  Siuimimi 

■iix)  Accouni  of  iti«'  ft  re  ri  pi «  ami  Expcndiiuicsolal)  public  Moiicy 

xh.ill  he  ptililishcil  from  nine  in  iinic. 

■NuTiib  ol  N»t»lily  \hM  be  gianled  hy  the  United  Slalel : 
And  nu  Pcduii  hiililinK  '•>"}'  Office  ol  Pruiil  or  Trust  under  ihem, 
§kill.  wiilioui  <Iie  Cunseni  ul  ilic  Cungrc»».  accF|M  ol  »ny  prMcni. 
Emolumtni.  Office,  or  Tillc.  of  any  kuid  whaievc*.  (rom  any  Kiii(. 
Pnnte,  or  loreign  Stale. 

SK'.  X.  'No  Slalc  sIihII  rnler  into  any  Treaty.  Alliuncr.  ui 
CoiilrdeiAliot) :  giAni  Letlcts  of  ^larquc  and  Reprisal;  cuui 
Money  :  unit  tlills  of  Credit  :  '  make  any  thing  biil  gold  and  siKei 
Coin  11  Tender  in  Paymenl  ol  Debts;  pau  any  Bill  of  Altainttrf. 
Fi  pu%t  Uctu  L.1W,  *o(  Law  impaiiing  the  Obligslion  ol  Con- 
IIACIS,  '01  grant  any  Tillc  ol  Nobility. 

'Calderand  Wilef.  Bull  and  Wife,  3  Dal  I.  386;  •  Fletcher 
V.  Peck,  6  Cl.  «7;  'Stale  ol  New  Iciiej  V.  WiImhi,  ;  Ci. 
164  ;  'Stiirgis  v.  Crownin^tiicld.  4  Wh.  is::  '  McMillan  v. 
McNeil.  4  Wh,  309;  'Dartmoulli College  f.  Woailu.tid.  4  Wh. 
J18;  "Owing*  r.  S|)c<:(l.  J  Wli.  410;  'Famiet*'  and  Mrclianlc*' 
Bank  V.  SmiiJi.  6  Wh.  131:'  Green  el  al.  t..  Biddle.  8  Wh.  I ; 
'Ogilen  V.  Saunders.  I3  Wli.  313;  'MaMin  t:  Hade.  13  Wh 
370  :  '  SMtteilec  r.  Malttiew^un.  1  Pet.  3S0 ;  •  Hail  v.  Lam- 
phire.  3  Pet.  180;  'Craig  rl  iil,  f.  Sl.iie  of  Mluoun.  4  f^L 
410;  *  Providence  B^nk  v.  Billings  ami  Pilnian.  4  Pel.  $14, 
'  Byrne  t:  Slate  ol  Mi«<onri.  8  Pet.  40 :  <  Walton  v.  Meircr, 
8  Pel.  S8:  'Mumma  i'.  Potomac  Coni|>any.  8  Pel.  3Si  7 
•  Been  t» .  Haughlon.  9  i'el.  339 ;  '  Bri*tu«  ei  at.  r.  Tlte  Bank  nJ 
the  CumM>i>nweallli  ol  Kentucky.  II  I*cl.  3J7  ;  *Tt>e  IVuftne- 
toni  ol  Cliaile*  ki*ei  Biidge  v.  Tlw  Proprieioii  ol  W«nm 
Brwige.  II  IVi.  430:  *  Airastrong  ».  Tbc  TieaMirerof  Allmt* 
Conip.my.  16  Pel.  3B1  ;  '  Bromion  V.  Kiniic  et  al,.  1  flow. 
311;  *  .\ttCr;ickefl  V.  Haynard.  3  H««.  608.  '•  '  i-. 
Ap|>eal   Tax    CouK.  3    How.  133:    "Stale   o(     '  V. 

Baltiinore   and  Ohio  K.   K.  Co..  t  How.   $34;  :.;..ifc 

&    Co.    V.    Slate    o(   Ohio.    3   liiiw,  730;    'Cook   v.   Mol' 
lail,  s  How.  39s ;  '  ri.iiii'is'  Bank  v.  Sharp  el  al .  6    Ho* 


17tT-81 


coNsrirvrioiii. 


«09 


301  :  'West  River  BrUlt;*  Compuny  v.  DIx  cr  al..  6  Hour. 
Y^;  'Crawford  rt  al..  r:  (Ir^tnrli  Hank  of  Mobile.  7  Maw, 
179:  >  WooiltiilT  t'.  Tn|>H4ll,  10  How.  190:  'Caup  ct  n].  v, 
Dtew,  to  How.  118;  ■"*  lUltiiiKiic  iuiil  Sus(jiJ<:h.-inna  R.  K. 
Co.  V.  Nc*l>iu  ei  al..  10  Huw.  395  ;  '  Uuiler  ax  iil.  v.  Fcnnsyl- 
vania.  10  Huw.  40] :  '  U.i<iiTi);(uii  et  al.  v.  Tlic  Bank  o( 
Akbania.  M  How.  u:  'Kicliiiiaiid.  cic.  R.  K.  Co..  t-.  The 
LouiM  R.  R.  Co..  13  How,  71:  'TrusicM  (or  Vinccnnrs 
Univenily  v.  .Slaic  of  Indiana,  14  How.  16S;  'Ciitr;in  v. 
Stair  of  Ark.invis  ct  .1I.,  1;  How.  304  :  'Suie  Bunk  of  Ohio 
V.  Knoo]>.  16  How.  369;  'Cir|)eni«  et  al.  f. Commonweallli 
of  l*cniii)i*Jinia.  (7  How.  456;  '  Uodijc  v.  Woolsny.  18  How. 
3][ :  '  tt«n  V.  Suti^  i>[  ArLui^s.  10  How.  $17  \  '  Aftpinuall 
el  al.  i».  Comniiviioncr*  of  Couniy  of  n.ivirs*.  IJ  How.  3^4  ; 
'Kcvlor  of  ChnM  Churrb,  Philn(lirl|)hiH,  v,  Coiinly  of  Phila- 
delphiia,  34  How.  300;  '  Howard  v.  Itiiglicv.  24  How.  461  ; 
'Jpffrtion  U(.incli  llaiik  J'.  Skcllcy.  1  Black  436;  'Franklin 
BMndi  Bank  !■.  Suic  of  Oliio.  1  Bl-nk  474  ;  '  Tiiiii«s  of  ihe 
Waliasli  aiul  Krie  Canal  Company  ;'.  Dcci'k.  %  BUck  448 ; 
'Gilmanr.  City  of  Slicttuy^an.  1  Itl.ick  jio:  'Bridge  Pro- 
priclOfb  V.  Hol>okcit  Company.  1  W.,tll.  116;*  H^iwiluirnc  v, 
Catrf,  3  Wall.  10;  'The  HinKh^tmtim  Bridge.  3  Wall.  St; 
•Ttie  Tumpflk';  Comji.iny  V.  The  -Slate.  3  Wall.  210;  '  I.ocke 
V.  Cil^  of  New  <)ilrjn«.  4  Wall.  172  :  '  Rallinxd  Coin|>;inv  v. 
Rock,  4  Wall.  177  ;  '  Ciininimi;^  v.  Stale  ai  Missouri,  4  W^ll. 
277 ;  ■  '■»  P^f'e  Garland.  4  W.dl.  335 ;  *  Von  Hoffman  V.  Cily 
of  yuincy.  4  Wall.  535 ;  '  Mulligan  }'.  Corbins.  7  Wall.  487  ; 
*Kurii>an  v,  Nidiol,  8  Wall.  44  ;  '  Hi>mc  of  llir  Fi icncllci»  f. 
Kousv.  8  WjII.  430;  *Tlic  WAthirigton  IJiiiveisiiy  v.  Rouse, 
S  Wall,  439 ;  '  BiiK  v.  Ciry  of  Mutiaiinc.  8  Wall,  57s  ;  '  Dre- 
mcn  (',  Siillc.  8  Wall.  595;  ■  Hepbiiin  v.  tJrUwold.  8  Wnll. 
603  ;  '  (Jul  V.  Tlic  St.ile,  9  Wall.  35  ;  '  K^iliuad  Comp.iny  v. 
McCluic.  10  Wall.  S"  ;  '  I'Jf***'  "  Uai'».  11  Wall.  4S7  '• 
'Cuilb  V.  Wliitin^.  13  Wall.  68;  '  I'cnnijtvnnia  Colletje 
OlSM.  13  Wall.  190;  '  Wilii)iiij{tori  R.  R.  1:  Reiri.  sheriff.  13 
Wall.  164:  'Salt  Coniiianv  1:  East  Sugiuiw.  13  Wall,  373: 
•While  V.  Han,  13  Wall.640:  *Osl)orn  ;'.  Nicholson  ei  aX. 
13  Wall,  6(4  ;  '  Railioad  Company  v,  Johnton,  t;  Wall.  195; 
•Cjsp  of  ilic  Stale  Tjx  oi>  Foteignheld  Bond*.  15  Wall.  300; 
*  Tom  Union  :■.  Jessiip.  i{  Wall.  4(4;  'TomllnNun  v.  Branch, 
I S  Wall.  460 ;  '  Millei  v.  Tlit  Sl.ile.  i  J  WjiII.  478 ;  '  Hohokc 
Coiopany  v.  I.yinan.  1$  Wnll.  JOO;  'Gtinn  v.  B.un',  IS  Wall. 
6to:  '  Honnttxey  ".  IVgnrt.  t6  Wall.  244;  'Walker  v, 
Whilchra<l,  16  Wall.  314  ;  'Solin  v.  Walenon.  t?  Wall.  Syfi; 
'Uatin^x  v.  Dattnev,  ly  Wall.  I  ;  'Head  t'.  The  Univrnity, 
19  Wall.  5:6;  'I'aolic  R.  K.  Co.  v.  Maijuire,  K>  Wall.  36; 
•Garriwii  i-.  The  Cit);  of  New  Yoik.  II  Wall.  196;  'Othd- 
irw  f.  Tlie  Railroad  <.oni|wiiiy,  Jl  Wall.  149;  '  WilminRlw. 
&c..  Railio.vl  V,  KiiiK,  ex..  91  If.  S.  3 ;  'County  of  Moultrie  v. 
Rockingluri)  Ten  Ccin  Savings  Bank.  92  U.  S.  631  ;  'Home 
liuiitBiicc  Company  v.  Cily  CiMincil  tA  Augusta.  93  U.  S.  116; 


i^ta 


cox sTi  runoff. 


itTtr-a 


'West   Wisconiin   R.  R.  Co.  v.  SuprrrisoM.  93   U.  S.  595; 
Murray  t».  Chartnlon.  i)6  U.  S.  43I ;  Kdw.irtls  v.  Kearny,  96 
U.  S.  59S:  Keiili  t*.  Claik.  97  U.  S.  4114;  UailroiuJ  Co,  v. 
Ccofgin,  98  L'.  S.  3;i>;  Railroad  Co.  v.  'iciincssec.  101   Xl.S. 
337  ;  Wrighi  v.  N.ifile,  rof   U.  S.  79»  :  Swoc  f.  Miuisippi, 
101    U.  S.   814:    R.-iilroiic1    Co.  J-.  Alnlunu.  101    V.  S.  S31. 
Louiniaiia  V.  New  OilcAni,  101  U.  S.  103 ;  Hall  f.  WbMwfiB, 
103  It.  S.  5 ;  I'd) uy man's  Caw,  toj  U.  S.  714 ;  Guafanl^  C<k 
V.    Itiurd   ol    Lrnuiiliitiuii.    (OJ     U.    S.   6jS;    Cimtwood  r. 
Fr*i([ht  Co..  105  U.  S.  1 3  ;  Krii>(!  v.  Missouri.  I07  U.  S.  «l ; 
■.oiiisiaDA  7.  Nrw  Orleans.  109  U.  S.  18;  :  CtllilUn  v.  Uiuon 
Canal  Co.,  ioi>  U.  S.  401 ;  Nelson  v.  Si.  Minin*  I'ar»h,  Ml 
U.    S.  716:  Cliic,    I.i(e    Inv  Co.   V.    Nrrdlts,  113  U,  S.    574; 
Virginia  Coupon  Case*.  1 14  II.  S.  270;  Amy  v,  Shrlliy  Co.. 
1 14  U.  S.  J87 ;  Effin!(<^r  i'.  Keiiiity.  1 IJ  U.  S.  566 ;  N.  OriraH 
C»»  Co.  v.  La.  L(};lil  Co..  11 J  U.  S.  650:  N.  Urlr^n*  Waia 
Works  V.   Rii'crs,   iij    U.   S.   674;   Louisvillf  G.is   Co,   r. 
CitiicfiiC'   Gas   Co..  lis    U.   S.  6Sj;  Kisk  i'.  JrlTrison  Polk* 
Jury.  irA  U.  S.  tjt  ;  S«o«ir  «■.  Farnti-i*'  Lo.)n  bimJ  Tru«  Co., 
1 16  U.  S.  J07  ;   Slo«e  j'.  III.  Ceniral  R.  R.  Co,   116  IT.  S. 
347  ;  Koyall  V.  VIrxini.i.  1 16  U.  S.  571 ;  Si.  Tammany  Wato 
Work's  V.  N.  Oil*iir>«  Wiili-r  Works.  120  U.  S.  64;  Chanh  i>. 
KHscy.  tit  U.  S.  2«a  :  Lrliij-h  Wmci  Co.  v.  EhMoii.  in  U.  S. 
3«8;  ScilwM   t'.    Liwis,  IJI   U.   S.  1S4 :   N.  Orleans  Wato 
WoiUf.  Ln.  SuK^ir  Hi-f.  Co..  115  U.  S.  iS:  Mavnartl  f.  Udl, 
I3S    U.  S.  140:  Jarhne  i-    N.  V..  ijS    U.  S.  189  ;  UttMf  r. 
ISMinelt.  118    U.  S.  489:  Chinese    Ex.  Owe.  130    U.    S.  <Ui 
Willi.miHin  i'.  N.  J..  130  U.  S.  189;  Html  t'.  Hum.  131  V.  S. 
d»v;  KrecLiml   j-.    Williams,    131    U.    S.    405;  C;inipbc(l  ». 
Wade.  134  U.S.  34;   IVnita.  K.  Kd.  Co.  t'.  MilUr.  134  U.S. 
1%;    Hitn*  f,    [>KiHMna.  134   U.   S.    ■:    North  Caroliiu  v, 
TiTupk.  134  U.  .S.    aa;    Crrnslww  «-.  O.  S,.  134  U.  S.  99: 
I^Miisinnn  rx   rrt.  I'hi;  N.  Y.  Ciuranty  and  ln<Icninitr  Co.  V. 
Slcrle.  151  U.  S.  zSo;  Minneapolis   Eaiton  Kwy.  Co,  v,  Mil>- 
nmiln.  134  U.  S.4l^:  Hill  »-.  Mcrrlianii' In*.  Co..  114  U.S. 
51$;  Meillcy,  ptrliiKHicr.  134    U.  S.  i(>o;  Ctierokrv   NaHonr. 
K^ins.-ts  Ky.  Co..  641  ;  Vir|{<iii.i  Coupon  Cafrrs,  13 J  U.  S.  £63; 
Mormon  Cliurch  f.  U.  S.,  I)i6  U.  S.  I  ;  Wbrrlct  »>.  Jsckson. 
1.17   t'.  S.   24S  :  Holdrti  I'.  MinnrKoja.  137  U.  S.  483 ;  Siout 
City  Slr^rt   Rnilw.iy  Co.  i'.  Sioux  Cilv,  138  U.  S.  98;  Cook  p 
U.    S..  ij«   U.   S.    157:  Relmont   liriittr   Co.   V.    Wlmline 
Vtt\A%e   Co..  138  (J.   S.   187;    Couk   County  r.  Cnlumrl    anil 
Cliit-a-:o   CjimI   Co.,  138    U.    Si    635;  Crnnojcr   f     MtCoi»- 
n.i(ii;liy.  i]9  V-  S.  t :  Scoilnnd  Couiiiy  Cmm  f.  Hilt,  1J9  U. 
S.  4r  :  Scoll  I-.   Nn-ly.  139    V.    S,    106:  Eswx    I'l  '  '        "n! 
Ttontd    t'.    Shiiiktr,  140    (.'.  S.  334  ;    Siein  v.  lli<'T  '  't 

Supply  Co.,  141  U.  S-  67  ;  Hprnlerson    Uriilt:?  Cn.  .       nr- 

wm,  141    U.  S.  679 ;  N*W  Oilcans  p.  N.  O.  W.ilrf    W'ks,  141 
U.S.  79:  hicil'ic    Kx.   Co.    t'    S.nl.^ri    m;    r    S      >!...  N   ?), 
Ciiv&  Lak'R,  Bd,Co,r.  N< 
ona  & -Si.  P«tcr  R.  K«l.  Co.  r,  -  ]     ■  >- 


viVt  WMti  Co.  t'.  Clitfc,  143  II.  S.  r:  S.  V.  7:  Squirt.  14;  U.  S. 
175;  Broun  i',  Siiiati,  14;  U.   S.  454:  B.ikcT*  Exts.  v.  Kil- 

5;orp,  14$  U,  S.  487  ;  MtKley  v.  Lake  Shore  A:  Mich.  Soulhrrn 
{y.  Cu..    146    U.  S.    161  ;  Haiiiilion,  G4.    LM,  Cuke  Co.   ir, 
H.imili.>it.  146  U.  S.  IS*  ;  WirmJngion  &  WVIdon   R.  R<l.  Co. 
V.  Ahbrook.  146  U.  S.  279:  tlutlrrf.  Gorlcy.  146  U.  S.  30J: 
lll».CFni.  K.  K.v.(Ils,.i46t<..S.387:  MoHcyt'.  L^ikcShotcA: 
Mich.  So.  Kwv.  Co..  146  U.  S.  IM  :  Huiiiiltuii  Gas  L't  Co.  v. 
Hamilton   Ciiy.  146   U.   S.  2iSi   Wil.  &    Wi-I.  R.  K.  Co.  w. 
Ahbniok.  146  U.  S.  179:  lit.  Cent.  R-   Ktl.   Co.  v.    lltinoi». 
146  U.  S.  3S7 :  Birr  f.  McOclicc.  14II  U.  S.  137 ;  Schurr  v. 
Ciuib.  r48  U,  S.  31)7:  Eu&iis  i*.  Bollcs.  ijo  U.  .S.  361 ;  Duncun 
v.  MiEsmii-i,  iji    L".  S.  377  ;  Urarl  :-.  Arllnir.  153    U.  S.  355  ; 
New  Orlr.ifl*  v.  tieny.in>'in,  153  U.  S.  411  :  l'l.)j{lc  I "5-  Co.  i'. 
0*ik).  153  V.  S.  44&;  Kne  R.  Kd.  i',  Ptniw..  IJ3  U.  S.  6i« ; 
.Motxk  &  Uliio  K.  KJ.  V.  T«iiti.  I  $3  U.  S.  4»6 ;  I'iU^uikI>  & 
So.  CujI  Cu.  V,   Lj.,  156    U.  S.  590:  U.   S.  ex    rrl.  Sirijcl  f. 
Thomaii.  156  U.  S.  353;  City  and  Ukr  R.Rcl,  w,  N.  O..  157 
V.  S.   119;  Crniral    l-iiul   Coi.    »'.    I.aiillcy.  159  U.  S.   103: 
Winona  &  .Si.  PciRf  I.aiiil  Co.  f.  Minn..  159  U.S.  JlS. 
'  No  Slate  shall,  without   tile  Convriil  of  ihi;  Cungruu,  lay  any 
Itnpoitt  or  Uotifi  on   liii]i«ris  at  ExpoiU.  i-xce|)l  what    may  be 
abxolutcty  necF»ary  (or  cxcculinn   iti   ins|)<-ciioii    Law*;  ami  ili« 
net  frotluceol  all  Uuli«taml  Imposts,  laiil  by  any  Sl.iteon  tiiipiirls 
or  Ex|ioiU.  sliall  be  (ur  llie   Use    o(  tlie  Tic»suiy  o(  llie  UiiilcU 
KiAIca :  ami  alt  sucli  Livii  tball  be  subjec;!  to  ibc  Revision  aii^t 
Contrniil  o(  tlw  Congress. 

MtCuUiKli  ('.  Suic  of  Maryland,  4  Wh.  3tA:  CiMions  v. 

OK'Ino.  9  Wh.  t  :  Bro»-n   v.  Tlic  Slate  of  Maryland,  12  Wh. 

419;  Mailer  V.  Crima  et  :il..  8  Mow.  490;  Cooley  v.  Uoatd  o( 

Warden*  of  I'oit  ol  t>)iil.utcrl|>liia  ci  al..  II  How.  199;  Almy  f. 

Sute  ol  Califuiiii.i.  24  Hi)w.  i(hj;  License  Tax  Ca»e».  J  Wall. 

46);  CraiidatI  i'.  Stale  ul  Ncvji1j,6  Wall   35;  Waiin^  f.  Tlic 

M^iyor.   8    \V..II.    iro;  \Vo."lii.ff   j:    Pc.lum.   8    Wall,    ijj; 

Hliisnn   t'.  Loll,  S  W.ilt,  148  ;  State   Tonnafie   Tan  Canct.  11 

Wall.  :a| :  St.iie  Tax  on    Railway  Giou  Kcccipis,  15  WalL 

184:  Iiiinaii    Stcanii)ii|>    Company    f.  Tinker.   04    U.  S.  138; 

Ci>ol(   I'.  IVninybania.  97    U.  S.  ^06  ;  Packet   Co.  {'.  Keokuk, 

9$  U.  S.  80;  1'euple  V.  Conipngiiie  Cintfiittc  TiaiiMtlantiquc. 

107    V.    S.    S9  :   Uiuwn  v.  Hnuslon.  114   U.   S,    613;    Ptlls^ 

hurgli  3:  So.  Coal  Co.  v.  i)ai»,  156  U.  S.  S77  :  PttifrUlIgb  & 

So.  Co.ll  Co.  V.  La,,  I S6  U-  S.  590. 

^NoSLxieslinll.wiiliout  the  Consent  of  Con j> test,  lay  any  Duly  o[ 

Tonnace.  keep  TioogM.  or  Ships  o(  War  in  time  ot  Peace,  enter 

tntu   any  A^jrcemcni  or  Cum|>ac(  with   another  Stale.  01  wtih  a 

luriiKn  Power,  or  engage  in  War,  unless  dctujilly  inv;tdcil.  or  in 

Mch  imtninriit  O.tugrr  a«  will  not  jiiiiiii  of  delay. 

r.rwn  t-.  nidiUe.  S  Wh.  1  ;  Poole  el  al.  f.  The  Lessee  of 
Flecker  cl  al..  11  tVI.  iSj:  Cat>\ey  v.  Board  of  W.-ir<lcn»  of 
pbtt  ot  I'liitadelpliia  et  aL,  13  How.  399 :  I'ecte  v.  Moicaii.  19 
Wall.  581 :  C«nni>n  v.  New  Orleans,  30  WalL  $77 ;  Inman 


«l« 


CONSTITVTWN. 


[lTfT4 


MrjimUMp  Ciiinpaii)'  v.  Tmker.  94  U.  S.  139;  hM-kH  Co  ». 
M.  l^uU.  too  U.  S.  41J;  l-aclicl  Co.  f.  Kmkiili.  95  U.  S.  So; 
ViikkliMfK  I.-.  t'liJNn.  100  U.  S.  4)u:  PJivkct  Co.  i*.  Cvilnik- 
lilirK.  lu}  U,  S,  SW>  Mor^xt  Slc-Aii>»htp  Com|Mn)  f .  Ltitiisiaiu 
DiMitl  ol  llnltTi.  118  U.  S.  45SMI«'ChiU  IWkcl  Co.  r. 
Alkrii.  til  U,  S.  444;  llu-ie  !',  Clurcr.  iiy  U.S.  543;  Hjt> 
lltvit  f,  UlikJiuif,  147  U.  S.  396:  Va.  V.  Tenn..  14S  U.  S.  503; 
WItuiiuit  V.  XVtM:,  1(3  U.  li,  IS5. 

AKTICI.E  II. 

Kmi'iMN  I.  '  The  (>lccurivl^  Power  %li.ill  be  vwipil  in  a  Prr^drai 
»( (hi*  Uiillcil  SlaUa  ul  An)«ric4.  \\r  slivill  Imlct  hit  Oilice  during 
lit*  Trrin  lit  li>m  Vfiiih.  iiiid.  (oKvihcr  niih  ihc  V'tcc  PtcsidMn. 
I  tiiiM'ii  Ikir  llw  viiiir  Tciiii.  bi-  clicinl  as  (uIIuwh 

'I'Uili  SI4I1'  Kliiilt  ujiooint.  in  such  Maniiri  as  llir  Li-j^uXilim 
llmlfiiil  iiij)r  ilim-l.  a  Niiinlwr  ii(  Fkilnit.  raua)  in  lti«  ntM4r 
Nuiiitwi  III  Sriijliim  tmA  Kri>iF5mMiit'rt  10  wfiKli  Ihr  Sl^ie  nta| 
Iv  rixlilr-l  in  itu-  liwi(;n^% :  liul  mi  Sriiaior  or  Rcpt»-*«^iaii>i,  0* 
IVi-     '  ".  .«ii  dttic^' »l  Titutur  Pio^  under Ihe  Uniinl Sunk 

«tl>il<  I'llnl  ,>»   i:tM-|<H. 

I  iii\i.i'iiii,  r\,.  V.  (.icurifta,  :  lUll.  419:  I  rilinwtnili  1  e<  jL 

!■    Wvwi.  Ill  ll,i«.  17ft  i  Ft  paitr  Sk-UiM.  ioo   I/.  &  ap ; 

Ml  ("hi-tso"  r   RLwkfr.  ijft  I'  S,  i. 

I*  llw  P)n.-U>rt  ihiill  mrd  in  thrtr  ir^^prnnc'  Statrv  aarf  *■»  lif 

11.11,1.1    I.,,,    tun.    IVnuinx,  tA  m-bawu  hoc  al   Ibbu  «IuII    mmi  W  la 

I   v\  tt-r  utnr  !i(alr  wiUi  ihwaaghrv     A^d  Ar«  ^iMt 

I  :.;  .'I  ..:i  iKr   IVi^uM  «n«<rd  lur. Md  af  Ite  NmA^^ 

:^  4ull  «!••  mA  orra^i.  aarf 

iK«  L'«t<tlK«m,  awl  iW  V«n  «fal  ito*  tv  onaMA     TW 


1TS7I] 


coffsr/TurioAf. 


«is 


'ThrCongrnig  maydccerminc  ihc  Timeof  chusingthc  Elccloti, 
nnd  ihe  Day  on  which  ihcy  ^all  civcr  ihdr  Volet:  which  Day 
■.h.ill  \k  the  umr  throiiKhoiii  the  Unitcil  Sliilo. 

*Nupi:iu)ii  except  a  iiatut;>l  burn  Citucii,  or  a  CJlii^i  of  the 
Uiiiied  Suic*.  at  the  time  o(  itie  Ailopiion  o(  this  Cuiisiitutioit. 
shall  be  clitjilfk-  to  itie  UtUci;  of  Cte&idciit ;  iidlhcr  shall  any 
Person  be  eligible  to  that  OiBcc  who  shnti  not  have  all^iinril  lo  the 
Age  o(  ihirty-ftve  Vcais,  Ai)d  been  fourteen  Years  a  Resident 
within  Ihe  Uniteil  Slates. 

English  V.  The  Trutieu  of  th«  Sutlora'  Snug  Harbor.  3  Pel. 

'  111  Caw  ol  llic  KeitKival  of  llie  IVEsideiil  from  Office,  or  of  his 
Dc^ilh.  Kesi^na(H>ii.  vr  Inability  lo  diiicliarKe  the  Powers  and 
Dulles  of  the  s.iiil  Officr,  the  same  sh*ll  (Teiolve  on  thr  Vice 
Prefideni,  And  ihe  Congirst  may  by  L^w  provide  (or  Ihe  Case  ol 
Rcmora),  Death.  Rr-i>ij;nation  or  Inability.  IkiiIi  of  thr  Prrsidcnl 
and  Vice  PreMdeiil.  decUriiig  nhut  Olliccr  &hall  then  act  a»  t're*i- 
ilcnc.  and  nuch  Ollicrr  >hatl  act  4ccurdiiit;ly,  until  the  Uisabdity  be 
removed,  or  a  Ciesiilerit  shall  he  elected. 

•The  President  *h^ll,  at  stated  Times.  recei»'e  for  liis  Servtees, 
a  Cnnipeiisaiion.  which  shall  neither  lie  cncrcased  nor  diminished 
during  the  Pniod  for  vrhirh  he  shall  have  been  elected,  and  he 
shall  not  receive  within  that  Period  any  other  Emolument  from  the 
United  States,  or  any  of  ihrni. 

Pollock  V.  Fanners'  Ijian  &  Trust  Co.  157  U.  S.  429. 
'  before  he  enter  uri  tile  Hxecution  of  his  OIBce.he  shall  (ak«lhe 
(ollowins  Oath  or  Alfirmation  :  — 

"  1  do  solemnly  swear  <<ir  affirm)  that  I  will  faithfully  eiecule  the 
OUicc  ol  President  ol  (he  United  Stales,  and  wdt  lo  the  best  of  my 
Ability,  preserve,  pioicci  and  defend  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
Stales." 

Src.  It.  'The  President  shall  be  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
Army  and  Nary  of  the  United  .States,  ami  of  the  Militia  of  the 
several  Slates,  when  called  inlo  the  actual  Strvice  of  the  Umled 
Stntes  :  he  m.iy  mjiiiie  the  Opinmn.  in  writing,  of  the  principal 
officer  in  each  of  the  erecotive  Depattmenls.  upon  any  subject 
relating  to  the  f>utirs  o(  their  respective  Oflices.  and  he  shall  have 
Power  to  grant  Reprieves  an<l  Pardons  for  Offences  against  the 
United  States,  except  in  Cases  ol  linpe-nchment. 

United  State*  V.   Wilson.  7   Pet.  150;  Ex  parte  William 

Wells.   18  How.  307:  Ex    juirte   Garland.  4  Wall.  ]l)  ;  Ami- 

strong's  Foundry,  6  Wall,  jtib ;  TIte  Grape  Shot.  9  W.tIL  1  tf : 

Unitnl  StHtes  I'.   Padelfotd,  9  Wall.  541 ;    United   States  v. 

Klein.    13  Wall.   tj8;    Armstrong   v.  The  United   Stales,  13 

Wall.    IS6;    Pargoud    v.   The    United    States.  13  Wall.  156; 

Hamilton    v.    Dilhti.  Il    W.ill,    73;  Mecb.inies  ,iml    Traders' 

U.iiik  I'.  Union  Bank,  Ii  Wall.  176 :  l.amar,  ex.,  v.  Urowne  el 

h)..  01  U.S.  187:  WallMh  ct  at.  f .  Van  Kiswick.tjJ  U.  S.  toi. 

'  He  shall  have  I^>wer,  by  and  with  llie  Advice  and  Consent  o( 

the  Senate,  to  make  Ticalies.  proiiiktl  two-thirds  of  the  Senators 

proeni  concur:  and  he  shall  nominate,  and  by  and  with  the  Advice 


6,4 


COftSTlTUTiOH. 


t»IT4 


andCociunt  of  ihe  Senate.  iha1t3|>p(»ni  Ambaasadon.  other  public 
HmtMcra  and  Consuls.  J udgrs  of  (Kc  supirme  Court,  and  alt  Mhrr 
OAcers  of  ihc  United  ^am.  whose  Apnoinimemn  ane  no,  hcrfla 
olfatruriM  provided  for.  and  which  shiill  be  csi^lithcd  b]r  Law: 
but  the  Congress  in.-iy  by  Law  vest  ibe  Appuintnicnl  of  soch 
inferior  OfBcer*.  nx  ther  think  proncr.  in  (li«  I'retideni  alone,  in  the 
Conrls  of  Law.  or  in  the  Heudi  ol  Depatimenis. 

Ware  v.  Hytion  el  al..  ]  DaJl.  199;  Miiibuiy  v.  Mftdison,  I 

Cr.  137  :  United  Slates  v.  Kickpdtnch.  9  W'h.  720;  Anwricwi 

In&urnnc*  Cooipany  t-.  Canter  (3s6  bales  cotton).  1  Pri.  jii : 

Foster  amt  F.lam  v.  Neilsoo.  3  Pel.  153  ;  Cherokee  Nation  v. 

State  of  Georgia,  5   Pel.  ,  ;  Pailenon  v.  CwJnn  et   at..  5  Prt, 

333  :  Woreentct  v.  State  of  Georsia.  6  Pet.  JtS  ;  City  of  New 

Drteani  v.  De  Anna*  rt  al..  9  Tvi.  114 ;  Holden  v.  Joy.  I? 

Wall.  Ill  :  Geofroy  I'.  KtKKVIJJ  U.  S   3(«;  Ho*i»er  f .  U.S., 

143  U.  S.  570:  Stioenwiker  f.  U.  S..  147  t'.  S.  aSl, 

*T)ic  Piesident  shall  \%xtt  Power  to  fill  up  all  Vacancies  lliai 

may  happen  tlurint;  the  Recrss  of  (he  Senate,  by  j^ntlng  Com- 

miHions  which  shiill  expire  at  the  Ktid  of  their  i»e»l  Session. 

The  United  Slate*  v.  KIrkpalrick  et  al.,  9  Wli.  710. 

Sec.  lit.  He  shall  (roni  linie  to  lirne  ^irc  10  the  Cungreu  Infoi- 

ntaliun  of  the  Slaie  of  the  Union,  and  lecommend  to  thrir  Coa- 

siderallon  sueh  Measure*  as  he  slull  judge  necessary  amt  eipetlimt ; 

he  may,  on  extraoidin:iiy  Occt^ions,  convene  both  Houses,  or  eilher 

of  Ihcin.  and  in  Caj*  of  I>rsa|^ei.-n>(.-nl  between  (hem.  with  Rei,pe(I 

to  the  Time  o(  Ailjou'nnicni.  he  may  adjourn  them  10  such  Time 

as  he  sh.ill  think  proper  ;  he  shall  receive  Ainb.>SMi)ors  ami  oilier 

public  Ministers;  l>e  sliall  take  Care  thai  the   Laws  be  (aiililully 

crcGuted,  and  tfiall  Commiuion  all  the  Officer*  ol  the  UnilM 

SliUCK. 

Marhtiry    t'.     Madison.    1    Cr.    137 :     KencbTl,    I'cKtlmulfr 

Genetal.f.The  United  Stales.  I3  Pet.  SM;   Lulhcr  v.  Borrfm, 

7   How.  I  ;  The  Slate  of    Mississippi  v.  Johnson.  I'residenl. 

4  W»ll.  475  :  Stewait  v.  Kahn.  1 1  wall.  493  :  In  re  Neatgle. 

IJS  U.  S.  t. 

Sue.  IV.  The  Prrtideni,  Vic^  Pmrideni.  and  nil  eiri)  Olficera  of 

the  United  Stai».  shall  he  rrmm-eil  fiom  Office  un  Imi'rartimnii 

for,  and  Conviction  of,  Trca-ion,  Biil>er)-.  or  other  liigh  Crimes  and 

MiMlemeanots, 

ARTICLE  IIL 

SrCTION  I.  The  jiHticul  Power  ot  (he  Unit«l  Slatex.  shall  be 
vewed  in  one  Miprcnie  Court,  and  in  such  inferior  Courts  »•  ihe 
ConKTCis  rnay  from  time lo time  ordjiin  and  estaMi<i)i.  The  JmlKn. 
liolh  ol  ihe  supreme  and  infrrior  Courts,  shall  hold  their  Ofltre* 
■luring  guiiiT  llehavinitf , anil  &ha1I.  al  stjitrd  Toiirt.  receive  fur  iheii 
Services,  a  Comjicniailon,  whkh  ah.ill  not  be  diminished  duri»][ 
llieir  Coniino.inee  in  Office. 

CluHbnlm.  ex..f'.  GeocKia.  3  Dall.419;  StuaH  v.  Laird.  1 
Cr.  ii»  :  Uiiileil  .Slates  r.  IVters.  5  Cr.  1 1 5  ;  Co1>en<  (^ 
Virginia.  6  \Vh.  264  :  Martin  f .  llunier's  Leuee,  1  Wh.  ym 


rmn 


CQNSriTUTlOft. 


6.S 


Oiboni  f.  UiiimI  S(.ttc&  Hank.  qWIi.  73S:  Ben  net  «  al.  v. 

Porter.  9  How.  jjj;  Tlic  UmicflSlalM  v.  Kitchlc.  17  How. 

jas  :  Murray*  Lessee  «  al.  p.  Hobokcn  Land  and  Imprnvc- 

mciit   Company,   18  How.    372;  Kx     p.irlr    Vallaiiilii;lum.  1 

Wall.  i\y.  .\mcs  v.  Kaii:us.  111  U.  S.  449;  in  if  Kus«.  140 

U.  S.  4S3;   .McAlliMer  i-.  U.S..   14I   U.  S.  174;  I'ollock  i-. 

Farmers'  L»an&  Trust  Co..  157  U,  S.  429- 

Sec.  11,   T lie  judicial   Power  stiall  ealeriit  10  all  Cases,  in   Law 

and   Cquity.  ari&tuE  under  tlii&    Consiiluiion,  ihe  Laws  o(  llie 

Unitetl  Sinirs,  and  Treailes  made,  or  which  Khali  br  made,  under 

(heir  Authority  :— to  all  Caaes  afFectii>]f  Anibattadors.  other  public 

Minittcia  am)  Consuls; —10  all  Cases  of  admiralty  and  muritiiiic 

Jurisdictiod  ;— to  dxilrDvci'^ic!!  ii>  wliich  (he  Uiiiied  Slutus  shall  be 

a  farly ;— 10  Coiilroveisies  between  two  01  more  Slates ; — between 

a  Stale  and  Citizens  of  another  Stale; — between  Cliitensof  different 

Stales, — between  Ciiuoit  o(  the  same  Siaie  claiminK  Land*  under 

Grants  of  different  Suici,  and   beiwccn  a  Sialc.  or  the  Ciliiens 

thereof,  and  for«sn  Slalen,  Ciii;;en«.  ur  Subjects. 

llavburn'sCase(iiute).  iDall,  410;  Chrsholm.ex-.T'.GtwtKia, 
I  Dall.4<9:  Uliiu  cl  al.  v.  Sloop  Uelic>.  3  Uall.6:  Uniled 
Stales  V.  La  Vcn);eancc.  j  Uall.  icfi ;  llulliugsworlh  el  al.  v, 
VifKinia.  ]  DjI!.  178  :  Mw»man,  ca..  v.  W<^^i\M-Qw.  4  Dall.  13  ; 
Marbury  t>,  Madaon.  i  Cr.  137  ;  Hepburn  ci  al.  i>.  Ellicy,  2 
Cr.  44s :  United  Slates  t>.  Muure.  3  Cr.  1  $9 ;  Siniwbri<lge  et 
bLv.  Cuilissci  al.,3  Cr.  267 ;  Ex  pane  tloltman  and  Swanwom, 
4  Cr.  7;  ;  Rose  v.  MimHy.  4  Cr.  141  :  Cliappcdclalnc  cl  al.  v. 
Declienaux.  4  Cr.  505;  Hope  Insurance  Company  v.  Board- 
man  et  al.  5  Cr.  57  :  B;uik  o(  Uniicd  Slates  i'.  Uevaux  et  'l.  5 
Cr.  61;  Hodgson  el  al.  v.  BoHcibatik  et  al.,  J  Cr,  joi; 
Owln^s  1'.  Norwood's  Lessee,  %  Cr.  344 ;  Durousseau  v.  The 
Untied  Stales,  6  Cr.  307  ;  Uniied  Slates  v.  Hudson  and  Good- 
wiD.  7  Cr.  31 ;  Marlin  %>,  Hunter,  1  Wh.  304  :  Colson  ci  al,  v, 
Lewis.  1  Wh.  377:  United  States  f,  Bciaiis,  3  Wh.  336; 
Coheoi  V.  Vii|{in>a.6  Wh.  164;  Ex  parle  Kearney,  7  Wh.  3S; 
Mallhcwsf.  Zaiu:,  7  Wh.  164;  Oibarnf.  United  SUtcs  Bank. 

JWh,  738;  Uniled  Slates  i'.  Ortcf;a.  11  Wh.  467:  Amciican 
nsurancc  Company  v.  Canlcr  <35b  bales  coiton),  1  Pet,  ji  1 ; 
Jackson  v.  Twcmynuin.  3  l\t,  136;  Cherokrc  Nation  v. 
Slate  of  Ceorgi,!,  5  Pel,  1  ;  State  of  Npw  Jersey  v.  Slaic  of 
New  York.  5  Pel.  183;  Davis  f.  Packard  et  al.,  6  Pel.  41  ; 
United  Stales  v.  Arretfondoet  aL  6  Pet. 691 :  Uavn f.  Paekaid 
etaL,7  I'd,  176;  Ureedlovceial.  tr.  Nickoletei  al.,  7  Pel.  413; 
Sfownv.  Kcene.  8  Pel.  M3;  Davis  i-,  PiickaTd  el  al.,  8  Pel. 
313;  Cily  of  New  Orlransw.  Oc  Armas  et  al.,  9  Prt.  234; 
The  Slate  of  Rhoilc  Island  v.  The  Commonwealth  of  M,iua< 
ehusetls,  13  Pel.  657  ;  The  Bank  of  Au^U-ita  v.  Earic,  I]  Pel. 
519;  Tlpe  Commercial  and  Kadriud  Bank  of  Vicksliur;;  V. 
Slocomb  et  al..  14  Pel.  bo  \  Suul.-ini  el  iil.  v.  Broadnaa,  14  Pet, 
^ ;  Pi'SK  '',  The  Common we.d  1)1  of  Pennsylvania,  16  Pel.  530J 
LoiMsviile,  Cincinnau  and  Charleston  Railway  Company  v. 
Lct*on,  3  How,  497:  Cary  a,  aL  v.  Curtis,  3  How.  236; 


6i6 


CONSTITUTION. 


txm^ 


Warring  v.  Clark.  5  How,  441 ;  Luther  v.  Borden,  7  How.  1 . 
Slirltlon  ct  n1.  v.  Silt.  8  How.  441  ;  The  PrnprDer  Onnrt 
Chid  f .  Fiuhii;;li«i  al..  11  ttuw.  ^3  :  l-'rctiet  aI.  S'.  Ballnal. 
12  How.  47<>:  Ni;v»  cl  al.  v.  Scoll  el  ul..  13  How.  168; 
Stale  u(  IVriiiNylvdnU  i'.  Tlie  WIkcIi'ii;,  vKc.  I)[idj[c  Computf 
el  al..  IJ  Huw.  ;iS:  .Mji>1>j1I  %'.  't'l>e  Baltimoie  and  Om 
B.  R.  Co,.  16  How.  314  ;  The  United  Stairs  v.  Guitme.  17 
How.  184  :  Sinilli  v.  State  ul  Mar>'iaii<l.  16  How.  71  ;  joim 
CI  al.  f.  Ixaguc.  iS  How.  76;  MuirajTs  l.c»»e<-  et  al.  V. 
Itobnkcn  Land  jiid  ItnpTovrinenl  Cflnipi;in}'.  18  How.  371. 
Hyde  el  al.  p.  Sluiie.  jo  How.  170;  Irvine  v.  Marshal]  ct  aL 
30  How.  $$tl  1  t'ciiii  V.  Hi>in)e»,  31  How.  481  :  MoutcwotMl  ct 
al. f.  Ei«|iiisi.  13  How.  491  :  Cufiiiiiun wealth  uf  Kentucky  », 
Dennlvin,  coverivoi.  }4  How.  66;  Ohio  iiiid  Mis»i<iM{>pi  Rai^ 
road  Company  i'.  Wheeler.  1  niack  i8fi :  The  Steiimrr  St, 
LawTCDCc.  t  Bbck  511;  The  Ptoocllel  Comnirrce.  t  Black 
574;  Ex|»atle  V;ilIaiiiliK)iain.  1  Wall.  343;  £x  |MMc  Mtlligan. 
4  Wall.  I  ;  TIm!  Mosc*  Iiijloi-.  4  WalL  41 1  ;  Slate  of  Mi«i»- 
ainpi  V.  Johnson.  I'icaKlenl.  4  WiiH.  475  '•  Tl"  Hine  v.  Trevoi, 
4  Wall.  s;s:  City  cA  Philadelphia  f .  Tlic  Collcclor.  ;  Wall 
730;  Stale  of  Georgia  v.  Slamon.6  Wall,  so;  Pa^ne  v.  Huui. 
7  W^ill.  413;  The  Alicia,  7  Wall.  571;  E«  pane  YcfKei,  t 
Wall.  8j :  Insurance  Companv  v.  Dunham.  11  Wall.  X; 
VirBTt>ia  :'.  WcU  Virginia.  11  Wall.  39;  Coal  Conin.in]r  ». 
Blalchford.  1 1  Wall.  172:  Railway  Company  v.  Whliion'i 
Adm.,  13  Wall.  370;  TarWca  Case.  13  Wall.  397  ;  BIjcw  el 
al.  V.  The  United  SUIes.  13  Wall.  581  :  U.iris  i-.  Cray.  16 
Wall.  10} ;  Caiie  of  llie  Setting  .M^K-hine  Companie*.  \% 
Vi'all.353:  InsuiaiKC  Company  f.  Moise.  30  Wall.  44$;  Va>- 
nevar  v.  Itrjant.  3t  Wall.  41  :  T)ie  Lotlawanna,  31  WalL 
S)8;  Gaincx  v.  Fucntes  rl  »I..9I  U.  S.  to;  Millrr  v.  Dom. 
94  U.S.  444:  Doyle  I'.  Coittlnental  Institiitice  Company.  94 
U.  S.  5]{ :  Tennessee  f.  Davix,  100  U.  .S.  357;  Baldwin  v. 
Krank}>  IIO  U.S.  678:  Barron  i-.  Buins^ide.  131  U.  fi.  186; 
St.  Louis,  Ito«i  Mountain  and  SoullHrn  Railw;iy  v.  Vickcn. 
133  U.  S.  360;  Cliinese  Ex.  Case.  130  U.  S  ;8i  :  Biookic 
MiSKMiri,  124  U.  S.  394;  New  Orleans  ^\aict  Works  K 
Luumana  Sugar  Refining  Co..  12;  U.  S.  t8;  S 1  fencer  n 
Merdtanl.  135  U.  S,  345;  Dale  Tile  RlfR,  Co.  t-  I1v»II.  I3t 
U.  S.  46:  Kelii  1'.  StbatnwebcT.  IJJ  U.S.  54;  H.-innihal  aiij 
St.  Joseph  K.  R.  t',  Missouii  Kivei  Parkei  Co..  115  U.  S.  360; 
Kreixcre'.  Shelby  R.  K.  Co..  13;  U.  S.  39;  Cratj;  i-.  Lxkem- 
doflcr.  137  U.  S.  764;  Jones  t'  Craig.  127  V.  S.  313;  WiacoA- 
sini*.  I'dican  Int. Co.,  tl7  U.  S.  265  ;  U.  S.r.  Itcchc,  1 37 U.S. 
338;  Chinese  Ex.  Caw.  1 30  U.S.  $8t ;  Ltnculn  Ciruntr  v.  L<m- 
ln»;.T33  U.  S,  539;  Christian  f.  Atlantic  &  N.  C.R.Rd,  Co.,  1313 
U.S.  233:  Hans  v.  Louisiana,  134  U.  S.  I  i  Louisiana  ex  rI 
The   N.  V.  Cuaianty  a    Indemnity  Co.  p.   Sieft  '■     S. 

380;  Jones  I',  U.  S,,  137  U.S.  202;  Manchestet  ijg 

U.  S.  340i  It)  le  Rou,  140  U.  .S.  453,-  In   ic  i...M.f'M.  141 
U.  S.  I  i  U.  S.  ».  Texas,  143  U.  S.  631  ,  Cooke  v.  Avery,  147 


wtin 


CONSTITUTION. 


617 


U.  S.  375  ;  S.  Pic.  Co.  V.  DeiiHio,  146  U.  S.  lOJ;  Lawton  v. 
Sicetc,  151  U.  S.  135;  Inierst.tie  Com,  ConiMi.  f.  Biinson, 
IM  U.S.  447. 

*  In  all  Cnsrs  HfTcctiiig  AmtMssitdors,  oilier  pii)>1ic  Ministers  and 
Cnn«iils.  »nil  l!:<nr  in  whkh  3  Sl.iic  shall  Ix^  Parly,  the  KUprrmc 
Conn  sh.ill  have  DrlginAl  Jiiti-wliction.     In  .ill  ihc  oilier  Cii«*  lie- 

,  /ore  menlioneil.  ihc  Miprenic  Courl  shall  have  iippellale  juriwlic- 
Ition.  bi>lh  ii>  lo  L^iw  ami  Fuel,  wiih  lucli  Kxcepliuii^.  and  under 
^ftuch  KeuuLiUoo!!  :ii  (lie  Cont-ie^s  sh.tll  make. 

Ctiisholm.  ex..  v.  GroijjiM,  I  D.ill.  419;  Whc.irt  et  a!,  v. 
DflUchy.  J  Dall.  .111:  Maihwry  v,  Mailison,  1  Cr.  137  ;  Dvitoos- 
Mau  CI  al.  V.  United  .Slates.  6  Cr.  307:  MailJn  i'.  Htinier's 
Lcuee,  t  Wh.  304 ;  Cohens  v.  Virj(iiii;i.  5  Wli.  !&*  ;  Ex  iiarle 
Kearney,  7  Wh.  38;  WViymsti  v.  S<nnh.-ird.  10  Wh.  1;  Uank 
o(  the  United  Slatei  I'.  HalMead.  10  Wh.  Jl:  United  Slate* t'. 
Onega.  II  Wh.  467:  The  Cherokee  N.i i ion  ».  Tile  Siaie  of 
Georgia.  5  Pet.  1 ;  Ex  parte  Cr.inc  el  als..  ;  Pel,  i8g ;  The 
Stale  ot  New  Jert^y  v.  The  State  ot  New  Vork.  5  Pel.  163  : 
Ex  parte  Sibhald  t'.  United  St.iie*.  \z  IVl.  488;  The  Sl.nie  o( 
Rhode  Itland  v.  The  Siaie  o[  Ma.%»achu!ie(l!i.  12  Pel.  b%T. 
Stale  (A  t'eiiniylv.iiiLt  I'.  The  Wheel  in);' <'<■'-  Uridge  Company, 
13  Huiv.  J18  i  In  i>e  K.iiiie,  14  How.  103;  Ahlenian  t>.  Itooih 
snd  United  Slates  w,  Itooth.  11  How.  506:  Kreeliornt'.  Smith, 
1  Wall.  160:  Ex  pane  McCaidle.  6  Wall.  jiS:  Ex  pane  Mc- 
Cardle,  7  Wall.  506 :  Ex  pane  Verger.  8  Wall.  85  :  The  Lucy. 
B  Wall,  307  ;  The  JusiiccK  v.  .Murray.  9  Wall.  174 ;  Pennsyl- 
vania V.  Qtiipkiikcr  Cotnpany,  10  Wall.  SSJI  Murdock  v. 
City  o(  Meini>hit,  so  Wall.  590 ;  B<its  f.  Prwloti.  Ill  U.  5. 
Jta;  Ame^  I'.  Kaiis.ii,  ill  U.  S.  449:  Clouffh  v.  Curlis.  134 
U.  S.  361  :  III  re  NciKle,  13s  U.  S.  1 ;  Mobile  &  Ohio  R.  Rd. 
V.  Tenn.,  isj  U.  S  486- 

*  The  Trial  ofall  Crimea,  except  in  Cxxesof  Impeaehment.  ithnll 
he  by  Jury ;  and  such  Ttial  Khali  be  held  in  the  Stale  where  the 

\*i\\>\  Crimes  shall  have  been  committed  ;  bui  when  noi  ei>mniiii«l 
wtlhin  any  Stale,  iKe  rri,il  shall  be  at  *uch  Place  or  Places  as  the 
Congress  tnay  by  Law  have  ilirecied. 

Ex  pane  Milligaii.  4  Wall,   i;  Ellcnbccker  v.  Plynioiilh 

Couniy.  134  U.  S,  31 :  Cook  V.  U.  S.,  13S  U.  S.  157 :  In  re 

Rims,  140  U.  S  433. 

Src.  IIL  'Treason   against  the  United  Sinie*.    sh.ill  coDsist 

only  ill  Ictyinn  War  against  them,  or  in  adherinu  10 ihcir  Enemies, 

kcivin);  Ihem  Aid  and  Comfort,     No  E'erson  shall  be  cofivtcted  o4 

I  Treason  unless  on  lh«  Testimony  of  iwo  Witnesses  10  the  same 

|0*vn  Aci,  or  on  Confession  In  open  Court, 

United  Slates  w.    The  (nsurKcnis,   a   Oall.  355;  United 

Stales  r.  Mitchell,  i  Dall.  y\% ;   Ex  parte  Ilollman  and  Swart' 

wout.  4  Cr.  75  :  United  Stales  v.  Aaron  Hirrr.  4  Cr.  469. 

•The  Con^tess  shall   hare   Power  to  dechic  llie  Punishment 

ol  Treason,  but  no  Aiiatiidcr  of  Tre;(Son  shall  work  Conupiion 

of   B^ood,  or  Foifciturc  exccpi  during  ilie  Life  of  the  PcrMii 

t(i  Willed. 


i«ft 


Bigctow  V.  FotMi,  9  Wall,  yyt;  Ouy  v.  Micou,  d?  WaB 
ijti;  Ex  paiii^  I.u<ig«.  iS  Wnll.  163;  WulUcli  ct  «J.  v.  Vm 


Riswick,  9]  U.  S.  303 


ARTICLE  IV. 


SkCtion  1.  Full  Fjilti  aiiil  Criilii  attM  br  giwn  in  c.-ich  State 
to  tUc  piililic  Acis.  KccoiiU.  aiitl  juilicin)  PruccnlinK^  of  nraj 
other  Sinic  And  llic  Omgri-ss  I»-iy  hy  Rrnct.il  Laws  \tm^rjbr 
Ihc  Mannrr  in  which  wicli  Ad*,  Kccpnh  and  Proceed  Digs  vImU 
be  pruvf^il.  ami  ihi;  EiTccI  ibcicol. 

Mills  f.  UuQ-ec,  7  Cr.  481  ;  Ilniiiplon  c  McConncI,  3  Wh. 
au;  Miiylicw  V.  Tliatch«,  6  \Vh,  IJ9;  Unrhy'i  L«ure  f. 
Mayer.  loWh.  465;  The  United  Slates  v.  AniiMly.  it  Wh. 
391;  OldureU  CI  ->).  T'.  Cjtriiiicton's  Hein.  q  rct.'86;  M'EI- 
inoyli;  ».  Cohrii,  13  Pet.  31J  ;  The  Bank  o(  Auciima  v.  Eaiie. 
13  m.  J 19;  n.-ink  of  the  St.ilc  M  AlnlMoiJi  i-.  O.iltnn.QHow. 
521;  D'Arcj-T'.  Krichum.  II  How.  16;;  Chiuliiios  c,  Rnt- 
sell,  $  Wall.  3«>;  deeit  r>.  Van  llu»kirk.  7  Wall.  139:  Fault-. 
Virgii^ia.  8  Wall.  Ib&i  Bwiid  i>(  Public  Wuits  c.  Culumfaia 
College.  17  WjiII.  511  :  TlwnipMn  f.  Wliirman.  18  Wall 
457  1  Ili>n.ipBrtc  v.  Tax  Coon.  104  V.  S.  $92 ;  Hanley  tr. 
Donoghue,  ti6  U.  S.  t  ;  Rrnaud  f.  Ahlioll,  lift  U.  S,  377; 
Chic,  and  Alton  R.  R.  f.  Wiggins  Feiry  Co..  119  U.  S.  615; 
Cole  I'.  Cunningh.iin.  113  tJ.  S.  107;  Ttlouiit  f.  W;>UeT,  134 
U.  S.  607  ;  Tesin  &  i'nciRc  Ry.  Co.  v.  Soulltrtn  Pacific  Ok 
137  U.  S.  48:  Sintinunn  v.  Saul,  138  U.  S.  4391  Keynnldsv. 
Stockton,  140  U.  S.  154:  Ciin>c"><''  ''■  ^Irjuge.  141  U.  S. 
87:  Gleno  V.  Gaitli.  147  O.S.  3!^:  Humiiit:tun  f.  AlUi),  14^ 
U.  S.  6S7. 
Sec.  II.  f^The  CiliiriH  of  encit  Stale  »h«ll  he  raiitled  i»  all 
Ptivilegcs  and  Immuiiilicti  of  CiltirDK  in  the  tcTrral  States. 

tt.mk  of  Uniicil  .Slater  v.  Deveicux.  5  Cf.  61  :  GaKSir*  K 
Ballou.  6  Pet.  761  ;  The  Slate  cf  Rhmlc  Island  i*.  The  Coc»- 
monweallh  of  Mau.u:huM;lt.i.  12  Pel.  657  ;  The  B-itik  of  Ai>- 
gusta  I'.  Earle.  13  Pel.  $19;  Mixife  v.  Tl>e  t'etitileul  tite  Slate 
of  lllii»H«.  14  Hon.  It:  Conner  el  al.  t:  Ellx'in  ;tl..  i8ilaw, 
S9t  ;  Died  Scml  u.  Santonl.  19  How.  393;  CriiniUlI f.  Stiile 
of  NcTarI,i,6  W.iil.  3s:  WrxKlruff  v.  Parluni.  S  Wall  IJ3; 
Paul  V.  Viiglnia,  8  W.iII.  168 :  Downhani  v.  Alei;indtia  Ciiin»- 
cil,  10  Wall.  173:  l.ivi-rpool  Iniurance  Cotnpaii)'  t'.  M*mi 
chusclts,  10  Wall.  566:  W,inl  V.  M.'ir>Unil.  12  Will.  41*; 
Slaughter  house  Cases,  16  Wall,  j6:  Bfadwellt'.  '  it 

Wall.  130;  Cheniuii(jBHnl(t'.  LuweTy.93U.  S.  7;  .If 

r.  Vitginia.  94  U.  S.  391  :  Brown  T-. 'Houston.  114  L- -S.  UiSi 
PemlHna  Mining  Co.  t'.  Prnna.,  tij  U.  R,  iSi ;  Kiniini&h  at 
Ball,  i»)  U.  S.  217;  Cole  ;'  CunninEtiam.  133  1.',  S.  lOTi 
LeiiyS'.  Hardin.  135  U.S.  100;  Minnesota r.  Bathw,  ij6  V. 
S.313;  McK^nc  V.  Uiirsion.  153  U.  S.^i  Pillsbaniti ft Sn 
Coai  Co.  V.  Baiei,  1 56  U,  S.  j??. 


J 


HIT  »\ 


CONSTITUTION. 


619 


*  A  Person  cliarcnl  in  any  Sinic  with  Tte.-uon.  Feloiiy,  or  other 
Crime,  who  »lull  nee  from  juiticc,  ;iii<!  be  found  in  anuilier  Slate. 
shall  on  denund  ol   the   esetulive   Authority  ol  (he  Sliilc  (rtiiu 

|Which  he  tJeO.  be  ilctivtrcd  up.  10  b«  removed  to  ili*  State  hjviiig 
luii^K'lioii  of  tlic  Cniiie. 

Holmes  i-.  Jeiinison  el  al..  14  Pei,  540 :  Commi>nwciilih  ot 

Kentucky  f.    DeiinMnn.    governor,    ^    How.    66 ;  Tnylor   f. 

TiiinicT.  16  Wall.  366;  t^KrcIlcs  :'.  t^corgi.i.  14S  U.  S.  337 ; 

Peiircc  t'.  Teijs.  155  U.  S.  311. 

"  No  Pervin  held  ii>  Sri  vice  or  Labour  in  one  State,  under  the 

Laws  thereof.  esc;iiiiii>;  into  another,  shall.  In  Consequence  of  any 

,  L-itv  or  Ke-;tiNiIiun  tliL'rcin.   be  di^charKed  frrxii  such  Service  or 

JL-ihuiji.  Uit  shall  he  lidivereit  up  on  cTaiin  of  (he  Fariy  to  whom 

Much  Seivice  or  L.ilHJiir  mjy  Ije  tlue. 

Pi^rg  V.  The  Cornmonwcjilih  of  Pcnnsylv.inia.  16  Pel.  539; 
Joitex  t>.  Vail  Z.indt.  5  How.  11;  :  .Sliaclei  el  -tl.  v.  Graham, 
10  How.  8;:  Moore  v.  The  I'euiiie  of  the  Siale  of  llliiiui*.  I4 
How.  13;  Died  StiJII  I*.  S,inloril.  19  How.  393:  Ablcman  v. 
Booth  and  Uiiilcd  Slato  v.  B^iolli.  II  How.  jo6;  Callan  v. 
WitMn.  ti7  U.  S.  $401  Nashville.  ChiatUnoog-i,  etc.  Kuy. 
V.  AIhImiiix.  138  U.  S.  96. 
SkC.  111.  '  New  States  m;>y  be  3ii)ti)iiicd  liy  the  CnnfircM 
tntn  this  Uniiin;  Init  no  new  States  shall  Ik  loniied  or  erect eti 
within  the  Juri^dlCllOI1  of  ^ny  other  Slate ;  nor  any  Sl.ilc  be  fonneil 
by  the  Juncliuii  ol  two  or  inoFc  States,  or  VmW  of  Slates,  wiihuul 
the  Con!>enl  uf  the  Le);i>Uture3  of  the  Slates  cunceined  3a  well  as 
of  the  Cortjjrevi, 

American  Insurance  Company  d  al.  v.  Canter  ()$>>  bale» 
cotton),  t  Pel.  Sit:  Pollard's  Lessee  f.  Hagan.  3  How,  313; 
Cross  ci  -il.  V.  Harrison.  16  How.  164. 

*  The  CiHigrrss  sliall  have  Power  to  ctLipose  of  and  make  all 
tieeitful  Kotei  nnd  KecuUlioiii  mjtpciinij  the  Teriiloty  or  olher 
Fro|>erty  Ijeioiigini"  to  Ihe  United  Sutes;  nnd  iiulhing  in  this  Con- 
stitution sJi.ill  he  Ml  construed  as  to  Picjudtoe  any  CUims  «f  the 
United  Si.iie*.  or  rA  any  patticular  Slate. 

MtCullocli  V.  Slate  of  Matylatx).  4  Wh.  316 ;  American  In- 
*itr«ncc  Company  v.  Canter,  I  Pri,  jit;  Unileil  Kl.)lrs  v. 
(iiatiutel  al..  14  Pet.  $26 :  Uiiileil  Stales  v.  Rogcn.  4  How. 
;&7;  Crm-t  et  al.  v.  Harriion.  16  How.  164;  Miickry  el  al. 
V.  Coxe.  18  How.  100;  Gi1>M>ii  t'.  Chouteau.  13  Wall.  92; 
Clinton  V.  En^lrbcrl.  ij  Wall.  434;  Iteall  v.  New  Mexico. 
,6  W.jII.  535;  D^vts  p,  Btvison.  133  U.  S.  3J1;  Wiscon- 
Cenlnl  K.  Ril.  Co.  V.  Pfice  Cnunty.  133  U.  S-  496; 
Tope  1'.  Cope,  137  U.  S.  683;  .Mommn  Chunh  f,  U-  S., 
136  U.S.  I. 
Sec.  IV.  The  United  States  shall  Guarantee  to  every  Stale 
In  this  Union  \  Repul>hL-3ii  form  of  Government,  and  shall  protect 
(uich  ol  them  a^.tinst  Invasion  :  and  on  Application  of  the  Le^'S- 
laiiire.  or  of  the  Furcullve  Iwhen  Ihe  LegislalUTC  cannol  be  COft- 
vened)  ogainii  domctlic  Violence 

Lutbcr  V.  Borden,  7  How.  1  ;  Texas  v.  White.  7  Wall.  70a 


620 


CO2fSTtTUTi0N. 


ARTICLE  V. 


UTTt 


The  CongrcM.  wfamrver  iwoiliittls  ol  buili  Iluuses  xhall  dmn 
it  ncccvMt}', didll  propoic  Aiti«nOiti«iU  la  thuCoimliiuiton,  or,  mi 
the  Ap|>1icalJon  ol  lli<  LfH'*'"'"'"  ■>'  two-lhirxli  of  ihc  tcmml 
Sliiteii. shnll  cull  u  Cunvcntiuii  for  piupostng  Aii>cr«tiii*!iils,  uhich. 
in  viitier  Cik:.  sluill  be  vaIIiJ  lo  j||  Imciiis  i^inil  I\iipti<ica,  »>  pan 
of  tliiB  ConMitiilion.  when  nlidcd  hy  like  LegiKtjiuir<>  ol  ihitc- 
(ourths  of  the  scvcrjl  Stiim,  or  i>y  Conventions  in  ihirc-luuilla 
thereof,  a&  ihc  one  or  the  other  Muilc  of  K.ilificalian  ni<iv  t>r  pro- 
piMeil  by  ilie  ConjfTcut;  i'rovKlcd  lh»l  no  Amctitlmeni  wiiicli  tiuy 
be  in;iile  prior  lu  ilic  Yciii  Une  iIkiukiikI  cigtil  fiundred  and  eigLi 
shall  rn  any  Manner  afleel  the  first  uml  f<Mirth  Clatisn  in  Ibe  Ninth 
Seciioiiof  thclitst  Article;  nnd  thiil  n«  ST^te.  writhoul  Us  Con»eiu. 
shall  be  deputed  of  il's  eciuul  SuRrAgc  ui  the  Senate, 
Hi>l{tngswx>rih  el  al.  v.  Vii^iiiia.  3  D,ill.  378. 

ARTICLE  VL 

'AH  Debts  contracted  ant!  Kngagcnwnis  entertd  into,  hetoe 
the  Adoption  of  llii«  Co[i»lilul>uii.  xhall  be  as  vjlid  Jif(.-iinst  the 
Ui^iled  Slates  undct  this  Coi)Siiiuitt>ii.jis  tinder  the  Con  li^  (I  era  lion. 
'This  ConKtiiiilinn.  and  ihe  Law.*  tA  tl>e  Unilrd  St.xtcs  nhkli 
sliall  he  made  in  Ptimiiance  thereof;  and  all  Treaties  made,  or 
which  shall  he  made,  iiiwli-r  the  Aiilhorily  of  the  Uniteit  Slates, 
»liali  be  the  supreme  t^w  of  the  Land  ;  anil  ihe  judges  III  crrry 
Slate  shall  be  Imuml  rhercby,  any  Tiling  in  the  CoiuiiiutioD  or 
Laws  of  any  Stale  to  the  Contrary  nolnitjistandinj;. 

H*ylnirn's  Case,  I  Dall.  409 :  Waie  r.  Hilion.  3  Dall,    199; 

Calder  and   Wife  v.   Bull  and  Wife.  3  Dall.  J*6;  MaiUiiy  v. 

Madison.  1   Cr.  137;  Ctniac  v,  Chiiac.  3  Wli.  3S9:  McCut- 

loch  I',  Tlic  Stale  of  Maryland,  4  Wh,  316;  Socirly  r.  New 

tt.ivrn,  8  Wh.  ,(64 ;  Gibbons  v.  t^drn.  9  Wh.  1  ;  Frislet  and 

El,im  V.  Neilson,  ;  Pet.  253;  UuckncrT'.  Fintey.  i  Pet.  586; 

Worcester  v.  State  of  (ieot)pa.  6  Pet.  51  J;  Kenneli  el  af.  r. 

Clininbers.  14  How.  38:  Lodge  »■.  Wootsty.  18  Hnw.  531; 

Slate  of  New  York  v.   Dibble,   ai    How.    jM>;  Ablminn   v. 

Booih  and  (.'niinl  States  v.  Uoolb.  21  How.  $06;  Stnnoi  ■. 

DHicnport.  Ji    How.  227:  Foster  v.  Davenport,   ii   Hole. 

244:  llaver  v.  Y;tker,  9  Wall,  32;  Whitney  v.  Roltenson,  1 14 

U.  S.   190;  In  re  NeaRle.  135  U.   S.    I  ;   Oietofcec    Nation 

V.  K3n«;u  Ry.  Co..  135  U.  S.  641  :  Cook  Co.  r.  Calumet  & 

Chkago  Canal  Co .  138  U.  S,  6JS :  CoH.  Coloradu  *  SanU 

F*  Rwy.  Co.  V.  Hefley,  is«  D.  S.  98;  In  re  Qu«rie*».  Butler, 

158  U.S   sji- 

The  Senators  and  RepicsentatJvrs  Iwtnre  meiilii>n*-d.  «ml  the 

Membcn  of  the  se\-eral  Slate  l.cgisln  lines,  and  all  exeinjlive  and 

jodicial  OBicers,  both  of  the  Unitwl  Stales  and  of  the  H-i*rra] 

Stales,  shall  be  houm)  by  Oath   or  Aflinnalton,  to  Mq-^rrt  ihts 

Constitution :  but  tio  relig>otis  Test  sImII  tin  he  '  -  * 

Qtialiltnuinn  lo  any  OtTiee  of  publ>C  Triisl  Under  the  I.  -» 

Ex  jMifie GarliUifL4  W«ll. 333;  Davb  v.  Ek4Mn,  1 3^  L . Is. 3 j> 


ITtTS] 


CONSTITUTION. 


631 


I 


ARTICLE  VII. 

The  Ratilication  of  ihc  ConreniJons  of  nine  Stales,  shall  be  »uf- 
firirni  for  the  Esuhlishjncnl  of  ihi(  Constitution  between  the 
.StAicn  xo  rniifying  the  S.ime. 

Duke  in  Convetuion  by  ihe  Un.inimou-i  Conscni  of  the  States 
preseiil  (he  Sefcnlcenth  D.1)'  of  Svulcriihcr  in  the  Year  of  our 
Lord  one  thousan<i  seven  hundreil  am'  Eightv-seicn  anrf  of 
the  Independence  of  ihf  United  Sinies  of  America  Ihe 
Twelflh  In  witnkss  whereof  We  have  hereiinin  tul»cribed 
our  Name*.  C*  WASHINGTON. 

Preu'd/  and  dfPmly  Jrom   Virginia. 


NEW  Hampshire. 
John  LnneHon, 
Nicholas  Gil  man. 


MAf^ACHUSETTB. 

Nathaniel  Gorham, 
Kufut  King. 

CONNECTICUT, 
Wm  Sam  I  JohnBon, 
Roger  Sherman. 

NEW  YORK. 

Alexander  Hamilton. 

NEW  JKRSKV. 

Wil:  Livinj^ton, 
Ujvid  Brearley, 
Win  i'atenon. 
jona :  I>a)'lo«i. 


PENJJSVl.VANIA. 

B  Franklin, 
Thurnai  Mitllin, 
Robt  Morris, 
Ceo.  CIvmer, 
Thos  Firj^imons. 
Jareii  1ii},>rT%al1, 
James  Wilton. 
Gouv  Mo  rip. 

[ieLah'aKK. 
Oo:  Read,, 
Cimning  Bedford 

iuii. 
John  Dickinson, 
Richaid  Hiuaetl, 
Jaco :  Broixn. 

UARVI.AND. 

James  McMenry. 
Dan  ul  Si  Thus 

Jenifer. 
DanI  Carroll. 


VIKtilNIA. 

John  Blair, 
ames  Madison  Jr, 


NI>ltTH  CAKOLINA. 

Wm  BlounI, 

Richd  Uobbs  Spaight. 

Hu  Wit<iafti»on. 


SOUTH    CAROLINA. 

J.  Ruitcilge, 
Charles  CMMWOrth 

E'lnctncy. 
Chatics  Pine kney. 
Pierce  Builei. 


GEOKGIA. 

William  Few, 
Abr  Baldwin. 


AUe*t  WILLIAM  JACKSON  Stcrttary. 


AMENDMENTS  TO  CONSTITUTfON. 

Articles  in  addition  (o  and  Amcndmeni  01  ihc  Const  it  ul  ion 
of  the  Unilcd  Slates  of  America,  firoposcil  hy  Congress,  and  ra'i- 
Red  by  the  I.rKi«)atUTrs  of  tlie  scleral  Slate».  pursuant  lo  tb« 
Fifth  Artick  u(  the  original  Consiiiutkin, 

Elleiibecker  v.  Plyniouih  Oiuniy,  134  U.  S,  3. 

ARTICLE  !.• 

CoBgrew  sh.ill  make  no  law  tespecling  an  eitabllshmeni  of 
religion,  or  pmhih^ling  ihe  free  exercise  thereof :  or  ahriilging  the 

■The6rtt  im  aowiidinain  In  the  Cooiiitaiion  ol  ih<  I'mir*!  %um 
were  prufiMcil  t»  Ibe  l«sbluwn  tA  lb«  MmaJ  States  by  the  Fir^  Con:. 


^- 


6n 


co,vsr/rt/7voy. 


am 


(rcrffom  of  »pMcli.  or  of  the  press;  of  llic  right  ot  (he  people 
p«accably  lo  assemble,  anij  lo  petition  lite  Govern mcni  for  m  inlicH 
o(  gripvnnccs. 

Tcrrct   Ct  «1.  p.  Taylor  cl  nl,.  9  Cr.  4J ;  VKtal  ct    al.  v.  C«- 
r>Kl  el  al.,  2   How.    1:7;  Ex  |iat(e  GaiUnil,  4  Wall,  3)3: 
United  States  i'.  Cniiluh^nk  cl  al.,  91  U.  S.   542  ;  Rrjnalirj 
V.  United  St.itct.  9S  U.  S.  14$ :  Davis  t:  Bnison.    133  U.  S. 
33:  In    le  Kapler,    143  U.  S.    no;  Hoiu«  v.   V.  S.,  14]. 

;.  s.  193. 

ARTICLE  11. 

A  well  regulateil  Mililin.  I>eiiig  nMicsMiry  lo  the  security  t>l  a  litr 
State,  the  rlgtii  o(  the  people  lo  keep  and  bear  Arms.  »liall  nol  be 
inlrlngnl. 

I'lcsteri'.  Illinois,  116  U.  S.153. 


^? 


ARTICLE  111. 


I 


No  Soldier  stial).  in  titii«  of  peace  (>c  quartered  in  arijr  hi 
witliout  ilie  consent  of  the  owner,  nor  in  time  of  war.  but  lu  » 
ner  to  be  prescribed  by  Uw. 

ARTICLE  IV, 

The  riuht  ol  ihc  peO|>l(;  to  be  v«;ute  In  their  pcrvins,  bouM% 
papers,  and  effecli,  a^.iirut  Unrtiiioitaltlc  seJtclits  and  »rixarr». 
shall  not  be  vioUled,  and  no  VVaiT;inls  shall  issue,  hul  upon  prob- 
able  cause,  suppoited  by  Oath  or  atiirmatioi),  and  paiiM-tilaily  rie- 
acribing  the  place  lo  be  searched,  and  the  pci»on&  or  things  to  be 
»etui}. 

Smith  f.  Slate  ol  Maryland,  18  How.  71 ;  Murray's  L««ce 
el  al.  V.  ni>tiiikcn  Lund  and  lnii>rwentenl  Coniiiany.  18  lltnt. 
272;  Ex  piirlc  Miltigan.  4  Wall,  I;  Boyd  r.  Uiiileil  States, 
116  U.S.  616;  Pons  Yuen  Ting  v.  U.  S.,  149  U.  S.  698. 

ARTICLE  V. 

No  penon  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  capital,  or  oilivrwise 
tnfamoiu  ciiriic.  unless  on  n  prcsentmeiit  or  inilicimcni  of  a  Ciand 
Jur)-.  except  In  cases  aiising  in  the  Und  or  nairal  forces,  or  in  the 
Mdiiia.  when  in  acttial  w-niee  in  lime  ol  War  or  public  dan|;ri ; 
i>OT  shall  any  person  )>e  subjccl  (or  the  same  vRence  to  tie  twice 
pin  in  jeopardy  of  life  or  linib ;  nor  shall  be  compelled  tn  mmf 

Ijresa,  oo  Ihe  ijlh  nl  ftepleoilwi.  17S9.  They  were  nii£rd  hf  the  fol- 
Iqwiaf  Sliici,  Mill  the  iMitifii^ion  ot  mtiUcttion  by  ibc  gottnan 
tlicnut  were  ineccnlrriy  eomniuniratf  I  by  (Im  I'letiileiit  la  Conprti : 
New  Jency.  Noreasber  Jo.  l?!^;  Marvlxnd,  IVvemlut  19.  I7$q. 
North  Orolina,  I><ceiBU«T33.  1789:  Sovth  Ckrchna.  Jin^i^ri  n.  17*10; 
New    Itiinpthitc.    January   SJ.  1790 :  Dclivt'c.    Jiiiu.i  >■; 

Poiiiayliania,    Manii  to,  1790;  New  Voik.   Maii'li  >?.  I'lr 

lUinil.  Jnnt  IJ,  171^1;  Vcmoal.  N  mem  tier  j.  1791  l>e 

cenidcr  JS.  1791.     Then  I1  no  eii^rnre  m  ihu  t>mt<  iiU 

the  kci^atim*  of  Coanecticiit.  Georgu,  unl  Huiacliuuiu  mn.rii  larm, 


M 


ITU] 


AMEXDM£,VrS  TO  COXSTiTVTION. 


«»3 


criniinnl  cue  to  be  a  wiinnts  ii2;iintt  htinsrif,  nor  \ic  ilcprivrd  ol 

Ii(e,  litwttjr.  or  properly,  withoiil  due  proc"S  ol   t.iw  ;    trnt  sh.il! 

private  pioperiy  be  lukcii  foi  public  ukc.  without  just  comiiensa- 

tion. 

Uniled  States  w,  Perci.  9  Wh.  579:  Uatron  w.  The  Ciiy 
o(  tUllimorc.  7  P«.  143;  For  v.  Oliio.  $  How.  410:  West 
Rivrr  Biiilge  Company  v.  [)ix  rx  *\..  6  How.  507 ;  Mitchell  v. 
Hdcmony.  ij  How.  115;  Mnorc.  ex..  tr.  The  People  of  ihc 
State o(  Illinois.  14  How.  13:  .Murray's  l.ci^eceliil..f.  Hobokeii 
Land  xsvi  Irnproveinent  Cmiipiny,  18  How.  271;  Dynts  v. 
Hoover,  10  How.  6$ ;  Wuhi-ts  v.  Buckley  el  a1..  iO  How,  84 : 
Gllinau  V.  Tlic  City  o(  Sliebuygan,  1  Bbck  {to;  Ex  purlc 
Millig,)!!.  4  Wjill.  ];  Twitciicll  V.  Tlic  ComiiionWFalih,  7 
Wall,  3;i  ;  Hepbuin  »',  Griswold.  &  W.iH.  603;  Miller  v. 
United  .S(]ir«.  ti  W,)ll,  169:  Ijrgal  Tender  Cnae;^  ti  Wdl. 
457:  Puinpclly  f.  Green  liayComiwny.  13  Wall,  166:  Unburn 
f,  Nkhoison,  13  Wull.  654:  Ex  parte  Lange.  18  Wall,  163; 
Kohl  «.  al,  V.  Uiiiied  States.  91  U.  S.  367  ;  Cole  i'.  La  GrHii^e. 
113  U.  S.  I;  Ex  pdrTc  Wilson,  114  0.  S.  417:  Brown  v. 
Gram,  It6  U.  S.  107;  Boyd  v.  Unitnl  States.  116  M.  .S.  616; 
M;ikin  V.  United  Slates.  II7  U.  S,  34S;  Kx  untie  ttain.  121 
U.  S.  I  ;  i'arkinvnn  v.  United  Staled.  121  U.  .S.  281  :  Spies  ■s. 
Illlrtois.  123  U.  S.  lit  :  Saiidf  v.  Maiiiitiee  River  linprovenit^nt 
Company.  123  U.  .S.  j8S:  Mugler  v.  Kiiniut,  123  U.  S.  623: 
Grcial  FalU  M.-inufacluring  Comp.iny  v.  The  Atloiney  General, 
\ZX  U.  S.  (Si  ;  United  Stales  v.  Dc  Walt.  I18  U,  S.  393; 
Hutini;  I'.  Kaw  Valley  Railway  and  Imiiiovciiieiil  ConipHiiy. 
130  U.  S,  JJ9;  Freeland  v.  Wdtiaiiii,  131  U,  S.  405  :  Cross 
V.  Noiih  Caiulina,  ijJ  U,  S,  131 ;  Manning  V,  French.  133 
U.  S.  186;  StjiIc  v.  Sihool  Dist.  No.  2.  133  U.  S.  553; 
Paimci  V.  Mi:M;tlion.  133  U.  S.  660 ;  Elimbecker  v.  Plymouth 
County,  134  U.  S.  31 :  Chic.  Md.  &.  St.  P,iul  Kwy,  Co.  f. 
Mtnii!^)0(a,  134  U.  S.  418;  Wheeler  t'.  Jackson.  137  U.  S>. 
xtS  ;  Hi>UIcn  1'.  Minnesota.  137  U.  S.  245  ;  Caldwell  v.  Texas. 
1 37  U.  S,  691 :  Clienikce  Nation  v.  Kanxai  Ky.  Co.  1 JJ  U.  S. 
<S4t:  Kauk,iuna  W;4tcr  Power  Co.  v,  Miu.  Canal  Co..  143 
U.S.  lu:  New  Oflransi'.  N.  O.  W.tier  W'k&.  143  U.S.  79: 
Couiuclman  V.  Hiichcock.  14:  U.  S.  547 ;  Simnionds  V.  U.  S., 
142  U.  .S.  148  ;  Horn  Silver  Mining  Co.  f.  N.  Y..  143  U.  S. 
WJ;  Hallinitei  i-.  Daris.  146  U.  S.  314;  Shoenuki-r  v. 
U.  S„  147  U.  S,  282  ;  Tlioiinglim  v.  MoniKoniery.  147  U.  S. 
490:  Yesltr  t'.  Waih'n  H.irbor  Line  Corni'rs.  146  U.  S.  646; 
Mononj^jlteh  Nar.  Co.  v.  U.  S.  14S  U,  S.  31I:  Kong  Yuen 
Ting  V.  U,  S..  149  U.  S.  698;  In  re  Lcnnon.  150  U,  S.  393: 
Pitls-CCOt  Si.  I,.  Rwy.  Co,  V,  U.ickii».  1^  U.S.421:  Intet- 
it^eCnm.  Conim.!'.  Bnm«)fi,  I J4  U.  S.447;  Penrccc.  TexaK, 
15s  U.S  in  :  IJnford  7;  F.llivon.  ij;  U.S.  503;  Andrews  v. 
Stvaitf.  1(6  U,  S,  271;  ISitOiiirxii  &  Sonihetn  Co-il  Co.  v. 
La.,  15IU.S.  yv>:  .St.L.&S,  F.  Rwy.  Co.  t..  Gill.  IJ6U.S. 
649;  Ji>biiwi«!'.  Sivic.  1(8  U.  S.  109;  Sweet  v.  Recltcl,  159 
U.  S.  380. 


6i4 


MS/£yeJU£JV7'S  TO  COSSTITUTWN. 


ARTICLE  VI. 

In  all  critninnl  prosequi  ions  the  accuHcl  shall  enjoy  ihe  n\_ 
X  speedy  .iiid  iiuUic  liial,  l>y  ;iii  iiiijuiiul  juiy  ol  llic  S<^e 
ilislrkt  whervin  (lie  tiiriic  slull  linvi;  been  coiiiitiiltetl.  Mhich 
irict  sliull  have  liecii  previously  ascciiaiiipil  tiy  law.  and  in  be 
inlomicil  of  llie  iiiilurc  iittU  cjiu&i!  of  ihc  jciusalion  ;  to  be  coa- 
rruiilL-iJ  wi[li  (he  wilcicsscs  ji^.udsi  Imn  :  \i>  liAk('COiii|JulM>ry  ptoc- 
cu  (or  olji.iiiiing  wiiiicwrs  >n  lii»  fiiitor.  aiul  lo  hjivc  ibc  AMUIiuict 
of  Counsel  for  hi^  ilcfriicr. 

United  .Slala  v.  Coolcdj^.  I  \Vh.  415:  Kt  parlr  Kesnt^r. 
7  Wh.  3^;  UiiilLii  ^(ates  v.  MilU  7  IVI.  142:  Hit  1  ion  V.  Ciiy 
of  Batiiruuic.  7  Ht:!.  Mj;  foi  I'.  Ohio,  5  How.  410;  WillMrrs 
*'.  Buckley  ct  *!,.  Jo  How.  84  ;  Ex  pane  MilliKan.  4  Wall.  Ji 
TwiiehHI  v.  The  CoiiiinoiiMTalih.  7  Wall.  311:  Miller  V 
The  tJnilcd  S(«(e«,  11  Wall.  WiS;  Unttrd  Sl.*tn  f.  Cook,  t7 
Walt.  168;  Unileil  Sui»  v.  CtuiL«h;ink  ct  al..  93  0.  S.  ^1; 
Spi<rsK.  Illinois.  i3]  U.  S.  131  :  Ellcniicckcr  v.  Plyntouth  Co., 


IJ4  U.  S.  31  :  Jones  v.  U.  S..  IW  U.  S.  JOI;  Cook  v.  U.  S, 
138  U.S.  157:  III  re  KoM.  140  U.S.  4(3;  Hatlinger  v.  Uant. 
■46  U.  S.  314 ;  &Iai(»x  I'.  U.  S..  I  s6  u.  S.  137 ;  UctgeniMin 
V.  Becker,  157  U.  S.  6sS. 


ARTICLE  VII. 

In  suits  at  common  Uw,  where  the  value  in  <rofitroveny  ilktil.] 
exceed  tuenly  doll.irs.  (lie  riehl  of  liial  by  juiy  stiall  be  ptncrved.] 
ami  no  f^icl  tried  by  a  jiiiy  shall  be  otherwitc  te-cuiniinrd  In  any 
Court  ol  tiK  Uni(cd  S(atcs,  than  accoidin^;  lo  ilie  rules  of  Uk 
coinaion  law. 

Uiiiiet)  Similes  v.    La   Vei>)[eance.   3  Dall.  197  :   B.ink  ol 
Columbia  v.  Oakley.  4  Wh.   23$ ;  ParMns  t'.  Uedloid  ct  aL 

?I'<1-43J;  Lessee  of  Liringslon  v.  Moore  »t  at.,  7  f^t-  46y- 
Vcbbicr  t'.  Kcid.  II  Iluw.  437:  St»ic  »l  Peniit)U.iiiia  T'.  The 
Whccline  &c.  Bridge  Company  ct  al..  13  How,  jiS  ;  The  Ju»- 
liccs  V.  Murray.  9  Wall.  374:  EdnnriJ*  v.  Elliott  ri  bL,  11 
W.i!l.  5Jl;  IVsrvon  v.  Yewdall,  9s  U.  S.  I'>4;  McEbath  V. 
Uniicil  bt^ties.  102  U.  S.  426:  Calkin  v.  Wibun.  117  U.  S. ' 
540;  Aik.  Valley  I_>i«i  and  Cattk  Co.  v.  Mann.  130  II.  5. 
69;  Whitehead  v.  Shatiuck.  13$  U.S.  146;  Scoti  v.  N«l;. 
140  U.  S.  106:  Cates'i'.  AUen.  149  U.  &  45>- 


ARTICLE  VIIL 

Exotwre  hai)  shall  not  be  rctjiiiicd.  nor  cxccstire  iuMtS  bni 
nor  cruel  and  unusual  punishments  inflklcd. 

I'crvenr  w.  Commonwealth.  5  Wall.  475  ;  Manning f.  Fivnclt. 
133  U.S.  (86;  Ellmbecker  v.  [lymouili  County.  134  U.  & 

tl  i  In  re  Keinndcr.  i  tfi  U.  S.  456  ;  McElvaine  r.  Broth,  141 
'.  S.  155;  O'Neill f.Vcinioni.  144  U.  S.  313. 


WW  Ml      AAfESDAfEXrS  TO  COSSTtTUTlOX.  6*5 

ARTICLE  IX. 

The  rnunKT.nion  in  tlie  Cnnslituiioii,  of  crit.iin  riglilv,  s.hM  not 
be  conslrucil  to  dcnj'  or  (1i(|Mr;i^<'  o<bcrs  reUinrd  by  (he  people. 
Lrucc  o[  Litingxion  v.  Moore  ei  al.,  7  Pet.  469^ 

ARTICLE   X. 

The  powers  not  (lelc};;ti(;il  lu  the  Uiiiicd  Stales  bj-  ihc  Con&lltu- 
tum,  nor  nfohiblietl  hy  it  10  the  Stales,  are  rcservett  lo  ihc  Sinid 
rei|>r<;ti»'Hy,  or  to  llie  propl*. 

ChUholtn.  ex..  V.  Si.ite  of  Ceor^a.  z  D-ili.  419;  Holliri]^ 
wiitlh  el  ul.  V.  Tlic  Slate  of  VirRi'iia.  3  V>M.  378  ;  Mariiri  v. 
Hunter's  Leaice.  1  Wh.  3U4;  MeCiilliich  t".  Slate  of  M;it)- 
tjhiJ,  4  Wh.  316 ;  Amktvm  c,  Uuiiii.  6  Wh.  104  ;  Cohen*  c. 
Vii){i[)M.  6  \M<.  l&l:  CHboin  v.  Uiiiteil  Sliite>  Uiink.  9  Wh. 
738;  Bkithler  v.  Fiiiley.  J  Pel.  586;  Ablenian  t'.  Bfjoih.  21 
llrtw.  506:  The  Collecior  v.  Oiiv.  11  W..11.  113;  CInthn  f. 
Houtetiun.  aui^nce.  93  U.  S.  130;  Intii.iri  Sicaiiuhip  Coin- 
ly  V.  Tiiikrr,  1)4  U.  S.  138 ;  Church  v.  KcUev.  ill  U,  S, 
;  OiiMhiU  Packet  Co.  v.  Aiken,  ill  U.  S.  '444;  W.  U. 
'eL  Ci>.  r.  Ptinlkiuii,  ill  U.  S.  347;  Bowman  v.  ChU-dfto, 
And  Nnrthwe>tcfii  Ky.  Co..  liS  U.  S.  465  :  M.ihon  v.  JuMiCe. 
IJ7  U.  S.  700:  Lcisy  p.  Hardin.  135  U.  S.  lou;  Manchester 
V.  Mass.,  IJ9  U.  S,  J40;  Pwllock  »,  Fanucrs'  Loan  &Trusi 
Co.  157  (J.  S.  419. 

ARTICLE  XI.* 

Tlie  Judici.-il  power  of  ihc  United  States  shall  not  be  construed 
to  cvlend  to  any  suit  in  Uw  or  euuity,  cuiiiiiienccil  or  prosecuted 
ajjainti  one  of  ibe  United  Stales liy  Ciliiciiti  of  aiiollier  State,  or 
subjccli  of  Rny  Foreign  Stale. 

St.tle  o/Ceorgui  i'.  RraiUford  rl  al,.  1  Dall.  401 ;  Chi»ho!ni. 
ex.  V.  Sute  of  GearK>-i.  2  Dull,  419;  HolhnKKWorth  ct  a!.,  v. 
Vif uiniii.  3  DjII.  578 ;  Cohans :'.  Virginia.  6  Wh.  264 ;  Osborn 
V.  united  State*  Kjnk,  9  Wh,  738;  United  Stale*  v.  The 
Planters'  Hank.  9  Wh,  904;  The  Go^-ernor  tA  Georgia  f. 
Ju.in  Mailr;iia,  1  Pet.  1 10;  Cherokee  Nation  V.  Stale  of 
Geoi]{U,  5  Pel,  I  ;  ftrUcoe  v.  The  Dank  of  the  Common U'cnhh 
of  Kentucky.  11  Pel.  357  ;  Curran  f.  SlAie  of  Arkanus  et  al,. 
15  How.  ^104;  New  llampUiire  v.  Louisiana.  108  U.  S.  76; 
VlrginU  Coupon  Cases,  II4  U.  S.  170;  HaKoud  r-,  Soulliern. 
1 17  U.  S.  %i  ;  \n  ic  Ayres,  i  jj  U.  S,  443  ;  Lincoln  County  v. 
l.unlng.  133  U,  S.  SI9:  Coupon  Cases,  13J  U.  S.  661 ;  Pen- 
nover  v.  ^IcConl^aughy,  140  U.  S.  i ;  In  re  Taylor,  149  U  S. 
164;  Reag.in  v.  F.irmers'  I,onn  and  Tni«  Co..  1^4  U.  S.  361 ; 
Reajjiin  :'.  Mer^-antik  Tru«  Co.,  1^4  V-  S.  413. 

*  The  eleventh  uncnJmcnl  to  the  coctiitutioii  of  the  Uoitpd  Sola 
wu  ptnjiotcd  to  iIh  kelkltiiitei  o(  the  se»ei»l  (lil«  by  ihe  TbinJ  Con- 
i;nu,  nil  (lie  51I1  -A  Msich,  171^  :  ■■■•1  '"»>■  AeiXaieA  ID  a  tnratif^  from 
the  Prr«i<ltiii  lo  OmK'*™-  lialrd  Ihc  Sih  iif  Jaiiuaiy,  1794.  lu  faxrc  been 
nlifietl  by  Ui«  ktfiiUlatet  oJ  three-foDithi  ul  llie  iUM»- 


6a6         AA/F.yDU£.vrs  TO  co.vsr/rar/OM.     in«« 

ARTICLE  Xll.» 

The  Electors  shall  mvct  iii  lltvii  ri'S|K-cikc  states,  sinil  vott  hf 
ballnl  for  I'rciiilenl  arxl  \'iti;  Presidrnt,  one  of  •/■  lioii).  a%  ir*u, 
shull  1)01  be  an  inh^bil.tiil  of  tlie  s.iiuc  Sulc  willt  t)>emsctves ;  ihe^r 
»liall  name  m  their  tinllots  the  [iFison  voirii  for  a»  t'rajdenl.  anit 
in  ilixliiicl  I);ilkii4  thr  persan  vntcil  for  as  Vice  I'mitlcnt  :  and  tlicy 
sivill  m:ike  ili^liiict  lislK  of  all  pcnont  vulcd  for  as  ['rrudcnt,  and 
of  ill!  uersoii*  voicd  for  as  Vice  Prelidirol.  ami  of  llic  nunilwr  uf 
tola  fur  CJicli,  wliich  lislv  llicy  »}ull  mk"  "'"I  ccttift .  nnd  iranMoa 
Milled  to  llie  sell  uf  the  cuiciiiiuent  of  l)ic  Uniteil  !i4:iles,  dttrclol 
to  llie  Picsi-lciit  of  llie  Senate ; — The  Presidriit  of  the  Srnair  shill, 
in  tKe  piTsence  of  the  Senate  aiiii  House  of  Rc|if»eniaii(-c«.  opm 
all  tlM-ccnificAlcs  anil  iliRvole'^iilMll  thei)  be  counted  ; — Tile  nenoa 
haviiii;  the  greatest  nunilx-r  of  Voirs  fur  I'fe»idenl,  sliall  be  the 
lYrxident,  if  such  number  Itc  a  majtu'ity  of  tlie  uliotv  nuniber  ri 
Ekctont  appointed;  nnd  if  no  periKHi  luivc  sudi  iri-tjoriiy.  then 
from  the  perMiiis  havitic  the  hiiihesl  nunii)eis  iml  txctr.lini;  tdtfr 
on  the  list  of  tliuie  vulul  fur  .i»  I'll-sidcnl,  llir  |-|oil<^  of  Jtejitr^rnl- 
alires  ^liall  choiisp  iriiinrdiatcl)-.  by  ti^tlol,  the  FirsHlriil,  Itui  in 
choosing  the  I'ltsiJciit.  the  voles  shall  be  taken  h>-  italrv  ibe 
representation  (loni  e>ich  state  having  one  vote  ;  a  ijuorum  fuf-  ihii 
purpose  shall  consist  of  a  mriiil)cr  or  members  fiuin  luu-ilurd*  of 
the  stales,  and  a  majofiiy  of  all  the  states  ihall  br  necevurjr  lu  ■ 
choicr.  And  if  the  House  of  Kci>icsentalive%  shall  nut  choeoe  a 
PrMident  whenever  thr  riKbt  of  rhoice  shall  devolve  D|Hin  them, 
before  the  fourlh  day  of  March  i;«xl  fotluwuig.  ibeii  ihr  Vicv 
i'resiileiil  shall  act  a«  Presiiicnt,  at  in  the  case  of  the  dcftlli  or 
other  coniTiIution.il  ilisnhllily  uf  the  I*(esldenl.  The  prnon  haviii|[ 
the  ifreateM  number  of  voles  as  Vice  Prewknt,  shall  be  the  Vim 
President,  if  such  number  \>t  a  majoniy  of  the  nhole  numltcr  oC 
Electors  appodiird.  jml  if  no  |>erson  have  n  majority.  iJicn  frum  tt« 
two  highest  numlwri  on  thr  liM,  Ihc  Senate  sliall  chouse  the  Vkt 
President  :  a  quorum  for  the  purpose  shall  cunsisi  of  Iwo-lhltils  of 
the  whole  nuintier  of  Senators,  anil  a  inajonty  of  llie  wh<i' •  - '—  - 
her  shall  be  necesvirj-  I"  a  choice.  Biii  no  person  conttii  i 
ineligible  to  the  office  of  PicsmIcoI,  shall  be  eligible  to  thai  —  t^^ 
Pretidcm  of  the  United  States.  '^^ 


ARTICLE  Xlll.f 

Settios  I.     Neither  slavery  nor  tnvolunlarv  setrlmde.  r»e 
as  a  punishment  for  crime  wberefyi  the  parly  shall  have  liceti  dui) 

*Tli«  IwelllK  tnieiulncnt  to  the  cimililulion  of  llir  b'n  <•>• 

profMHcil  Id  the  Icipilalum  of  Ilie  several  Ultes  liy  ll>«  ti,  >-m. 

on  the  iith  dI  I>ei'cn>her.  1803.  in  Itcu  of  Ibe  oriciasl  ihini  ,.<'i-i<  <■ 

Ubc  lirtl  w^litib  fit  Ihe  «rit>ii4  nfiic^ ;  MttA  was  dedsred  if.  1  .'■.-    ims- 

tkin  I J  1)'  r,  ul  ^Bie,  a^iri!  1'.  .  '  '  -'.  .  1  t,  ii>  haw 
tieeii  rsi  '                   It^itatam  iii  n 

^Thci:.                  ■■"■■"■tm«il  tu  1  .i-JM** 

inapi«|mr<l  1                       iiiit»  of  I'  <  'itli 

Conpcsi,  on  I               .  t  (.-bmuy.  1-  loit- 


i«m 


AJUEKDXtf.XrS  TO  COXSTlTUTlO/f. 


6,1 


cnnvictMl.  shall  txht  within  ihc  Uniiril  SlatM.orany  place  subject 
■o  ihdr  juriMlictioTi. 

Sec.  11.  ConKreu  xhitil  have  power  to  en  Torce  this  article  bjr 
apptupriate  k^iilaiioii. 

Dred  Scoii  v.  Sanforil.  I?  How.  393;  While  v.  H«r1,  IJ 
Wiitl.  646;  Oibom  t',  Nicholson.  13  Wall.  654;  Slaughter- 
house O&cs.  16  Wall.  16;  Ex  parte  Virginia,  100  U.  S.  339: 
Crvil  Righu  C&sc.  109  U.  S.  3. 

ARTICLE   ,\IV.» 

Sectiom  I.  AH  persons  bom  or  naturalised  in  the  United  Stales, 
and  subject  to  t)ie  junidiction  thereof,  are  ciiiirns  of  the  United 
Slates  and  of  the  Slate  wherein  ihcy  reside.  No  Stale  shall  make 
or  enforce  any  law  winch  shall  abridge  the  privileges  or  immuni- 

lion  i>(  llir  SreR(ai7  ol  KUIe.  ililcJ  ll>e  l8(h  at  l)ccrin1>cr.  1S65.  to  liave 
bewi  ralifitd  br  tl>e  tt^itlnliirei  of  Iwcnlr'Mvr^n  al  ihc  Tliirlr-tU  tt&lo, 
vii. :  Ulinoii,  Jtliodc  lilaiid.  Mirliigan.  MiTyliiiil.  Mtir  Voik.  West  Vir- 
Ifiuii,   Maine,    Kaiiut.   Muuii:lm>ell>,    IVniiiylv^nia,   Vir^iiik.  Ohio, 

•  Miuoun,  Nctiila.  Indiana.  I.>jui\>ana.  Minnesota.  WiKontin.  Vermont. 

IT(iin*MM.  Ackanww,  l;<iiiiicrii<ul.    New   Hanijiklitic,  South  Carolina, 

F  Alatiaiua.  Koflli  Carolina,  and  Gtvrgia. 

*  The  (ouitecnlli  amenilmeiil  10  ihc  CnnMitulMln  of  the  Unilpd  Stales 
nail  propD«<ii  lu  tliR  IcgijikUlurei  nf  llie  Mverat  Stales  liy  itie  I'hirly.nlnlli 
Coaiimt,  on  llie  iClli  uf  fvuc.  iBbt>.  On  llie  aitl  of  Julf,  ittiS.  Cuii- 
gr«H  adofiled  and  transmillcil  to  (he  Depart mvnt  of  Slalea  cunoirreiit 
reMlulion  <le<Uriiii:  ihal  "  (he  Irgiilaturn  of  the  Slates  of  Comiettitut, 
TciiBtwee.  Nrw  Jeruejf,  l")rc);on,  Vennonr,  New  Voik.  Ohio.    Illinoii. 

.  Wed    Vii|;<it>a.    K.viiu.    Maine.    Nevaila.    Miu^url.    bifliaiia,    Miime- 
ol«.  New  Hani|i)h>re,  MawJ-r'iiiwllt.  Nrbiiika.  luwa,  ArkaiiHn^  Klorida. 

FMorth  Carolina.  Aliliania.  Siulh  Carolina,  nnil  Louisiana,  beinc  thrt«> 
tonnhs  and  more  of  tlie  several  Stiles  of  the  Union.  ha>e  raiirieil  ihe 
(oarlceiilh  aillelc»l  aincmtmeiit  lo  llie  Cousiiiiition  of  (he  UnilctI  Sutea, 
doly piapMed  by  (wiiiliiiiU o(  each  Houxe of  the  I'hiity -ninth C^ngreu : 
Therfdm  Jtrttm^.  That  said  lonrlornlh  ailiilo  it  htrehjp  ijniared  lo  b« 
a  pan  of  the  Coiuiiuiioii  o(  the  Uniitd  Stnirs,  and  it  slialt  be  duly 
proMulgatod  as  nich  by  the  Secrclaiy  of  Slaie."  Tlie  SecreUry  of  Siaic 
acoonlinglf  iuued  a  proclamation,  daled  Ihe  aSth  of  July.  t^dS,  d<>;Uiiiif; 
(hit  ihr  propiMcJ  filioUienlh  amemlini-iil  had  Iierii  rHlil'ieil.  iii  Ihe  maii> 
tier  hereafter  meiilicneil.  by  (h<  Iceiilsttirei  of  Ihirlr  of  Ihc  ihiilyux 
Suies.vii.:  Connecticut.  June  ]u.  1S66:  New  Itanipshin-.  July  7.  lB()6  ; 
Tennesice,  Inly  tg,  iSftft;  Neu-  Jeney.  Sepiemhct  11.  i8<)(i  (and  Ihe 
UiCiklalurc  of  the  aune  Stale  patuil  n  teuilution  in  April,  lt6S.  10  »ilh- 
dcaar  ita  connal  li>  it):  Otecon.  Srplrmtirr  tt),  1SO6  ;  Vernuml, 
November  9,  1S66 ;  Georgia  rejecied  it  November  1  j,  1666,  and  ratitieil 
it  Jaly  11,  tUS  :  North  Carolina  rejected  it  Pev-ember  4.  1S66,  and  mii- 
6m  it  Ittly  4.  iSbS  :  .Sodih  Camliiin  rejecled  it  December  ao,  1S66.  and 
tatifieil  it  Jnly  •>,  ISM  ;  New  Voik  ratified  It  January  10,  1867  ;  Oht» 
ratified  il  Janiiaiy  11.  iSb7  (and  ibe  Ingialatuie  of  Ihe  same  Sute  paMrd 
I  molution  in  Janoary.  iSI^^.  to  withdraw  iti  cMitenI  lull)  ;  llhimia  rati- 
U  January  IJ.  '^^7  :  Weit  Virt;inia,  January  16,  1(67  ;  Kansst, 
amaary  18,  1H7 ;  Maine,  January  to.  itdj :  Neiada.  lanuair  31, 
6C7  ;  Miaaonti,  Jaauary  36,  1H7 ;  Indiana,  Januaiy  10,  1867 ;  Muuae- 


6«8  AMF.XD.VE/fTS  TO  COXSTlTUT/OAr. 

tiPS  ol  ciliidis  of  th*  I'nittd  Sl:ilr* ;  nor  *Kall  any  Siaif  tipnritr 
jiiiy  person  <i(  lile.  lilicrtj,  or  pioperly,  willxmi  itoc  |>tDccMul  u«  .- 
nor  ilcti)'  10  any  pcrinMi  wiilitii  ila  juriuliciioik  Ihc  m]uk1  praiKtioa 
i>{  the  Uivs. 

Siraudcr  v,  West  Viiginb.  ico  U.  S.  303:  X'irpiniii  v.  Rivws. 
100  U.  S.  313;  Kx  p.irip  Viisinin.  too  U.  S.  339;  MImouti 
w.  Lewi«.  101  U.  S.  23:  Civil  Kijfhtx  Coh-s.  109  V,  S.  i; 
LiiuUunn  )'.  New  Ortcin!!,  109  L'.  S.  1S5;  ilurt.-iilu  f.  C^- 
(urnu.  110  U.  S-  sr6;  Hagar  t'.  KitLimaii^m  DiM..  111  U.S. 
701  ;  Elk  V.  VVilkiTi^  1 1 3  U.  S.  94 :  Hcnil  t'.  Anio^lccaE  ^"K- 
Cc.  iij  U.  S,  9;  U.iitHcr  1'.  CcnrmMv,  irj  U.  S.  27;  I*roTi- 
tlcni  Inxiimrioa  t'.  Jrrvy  City.  ri3  0.  S.  906:  Snmi  Hiiif;  r. 
Crou-l<7.  113  U,  S.  703;  Wurtij*.  HiugUml.  1*4  V.S^.tOb. 
Ky.  R.  Ril.  Tax  Ows.  ii;  i;.  S.  3:1  ;  Camplwd  v.  Hoti. 
11$  U.  S.  610;  PiFSNi-t  f-  niii>»u.  tib  U.  S.  3;i  .  Siune  it. 
F.irmrrs'  Ijmii  an<l  'I'luHt  C"..  1 16  U.  S,  J07 ;  AnuwiniHb  •. 
Rmiioniiig,  118  U.  S.  194;  Viok  Wo  i'  llopkinv  tl8  U.S. 
3(6;  Santa  Cl-nra  Co.  v  S,  Paiifir  R.  Ril..  118,  U.  S.  394. 
Iliila.  I'ire  Amhi.  t'.  N.  V.,  119  l-'.  S.  no;  Schnijtil  »■.  CuMt. 
119  U.  S.  J86:  aiklwin  i-.  Frank.  119  U.  S.  678;  tlotes  w. 
Miuouri.  tJO  U.  S.  68;  Cliuich  v.  Kclwy,  I?i  U,  S.  aSl; 
Pembina  Minini;  Co.  f.  Pnina..  I3C  U.S.  iSi :  SprncttT'.  Mrt- 
«hnnl.  115  U-  S.  34;:  Oiiiv  «.  Bri<lrlnu>n,  135  U.  S.  fiSo;  Banl 
<A  Rdlciiiplion  »'.  Iltisioi*.  i;sU.S  60:  Ro  Ilaid^r.  Lamh,  117 
t'.  S.  58;  Mo.  I'.ir.  Wwy.  Co.  f.  H:icki-y,  137  U,  S,  »(; 
7ktini<cajioli«  and  Si.  I^>ii»  Rny.  f.  Hctrtck.  137  If.  S.  310^ 
I'owtll  V.  IViina.,  137  U.  S.  678  ;  Kidd  !'.  Pcanoi),  12K  U.  S. 
I  ;  Naslivilk-,  CiMllaiio(>)<a.  Sm..  Kwy.  f.  AlalMtnn,  13JJ  U.S. 
06;  Walslun  I'.  N'jvii).  128  U.  S.  J78  ;  Minnrdtiuln  anil  Sl 
Loub  Rwy.  )•.  Hcctwiili.  139  U.  S,  16;  Drni  i.  \Vpsi  Va..  1:9 
U.  S.  114:  Hutiog  f.  Kaw  Vnllr-y  Kuy.  ami  liiit<tavEinnrt 
C»..  130  U.  S.  559;  Frcdand  v.  Williamc.  rji  U.  S.  40$: 
Cross w.  North  Carolina.  t31  V.  S,  131  ;  IVniiirT'.  Kri».  IJ3 
U.  S.  464;  Siijrs  t'.  Thomlon,  133  V.  S.  (34:  Uavi«  »•,  IlmKm. 
133  U.S.  333:  Kllcnticcktt  V.  Plymouth  Co..  134  U.  S.  31; 
Hell  Cap  K.  R.J.  Co.  v.  Penna.,  134  U.  S,  933;  Chicspi. 
Milwaukee,  ami  St.  Pjtil  Rwy.  »*.  Mmnrsola.  134  U.  S.  4(8; 
Hnmr  liis.  Co.  t'.  N.  V.,  134  U.  S.  S94:  l-ouitvillc  &  Niub- 
rillc  R.  R<l.  Co.  V.  Wnoihoa.  134  U.  S.  614;  Ilonw  Im. 


vA;  Fobn«7  I.  itt;:  Rhn>c  Island.  Frimury  7,  iM>7  ;  Wrtcnmao, 
Kebioary  ij.  iftd?;  rcnnsyhania,  Ffl>ni»ry  1),  IBftJ :  Mickina. 
Fclifnary  ■$•  1^7;  MaauMiui-rti^.  Mnnli  >u.  iHi?  ;  Nel'iMka.  ruu* 
1$.  iBfr?  ;  linra.  KytW  3.  if«S  :  Atkaatat.  Ajxil  b,  iSbS  ;  Klomla.  Jaai 
9,  IIU>3  ;  tjiiiUlaca.juki).  >^^;  ami  AUloiiu.  Julf  t.t.  iHtiS.  (^voifU 
M*in  nliricil  llir  inifixlnirill  Fctnti.iry  s.  iNto,  iraM  n-ivcwd  n 
Nnrfsihn  1.  (Mfi.  «i>i'.  ralilicit  jl  I'fl.iiintT  l>.  lK7ix  Virginia  >«inm( 
it  Janavy  it),  i^'ij.  anl  taiil>«fl  it  tjiii.lirr  8,  itt«).  Th*  aiwrnJMiat 
W9t  tf  jpciM  hy  Krniiicky  Jaiinarr  tu.  180;  ;  Xrf  l>»Uii»t^,  Frimurrlk 
1U17  :  )iy  MarybiiJ,  Maidi  13.  iKi7,  aud  •«>  uot  ftlluwanl  tailinllif 
oillici  Stale. 


I 


AMKA'DUKXTX    TO  COXSTITUT/OX. 


629 


Co.  V.  N.  v..  134  U.  S,.  S94:  Lrtty  v.  Hnniin.  135  U.  S. 
100;  In  Tc  KcminlfT,  ijfi  0.  S.  436;  York  v.  Tfxas,  137 
U,  S,  IJ  ;  Onwlry  I'.  Cfinslenscn.  137  U.  S.  89;  Whcclcr  v. 
Jackton,  137  U.  S.  345;  Holdrn  v.  Minnoala,  137  U.  S, 
4$3;  In  re  Convecsc.  137  U.  S.  6J4;  Cnldivtrll  v.  Te»jis.  IJ7 
U.  S.691:  K.-iuflmiui  f.  Woiiiicrs.  i]8  U.  S.  385;  Lesperv, 
Tcxjis.  139  L'.  S.  461  ;  1ti  ir  M->iinin);.  139  U.  S.  $04  ;  Mabal 
V.  LouibiariJi.  139  U.  S.  611 :  In  re  Duncan.  139  U.  S.  449: 
In  re  Shibura  Jugiro,  139  II.  S.  391  ;  I.rnt  v,  Tilluin.  14a 
^_  U.  S.  316 :  New  Orlrnns  v.  N.  O.  Waier  Wks.  141  V.  S.  79; 
^H  McKlvainc)-.  ilnii)).  141  U.S.  [;;:  Kaukaunn  W.iler  t'ow«r 
^»  to.  I'.  Mils.  Canal  Co..  141  U.  S.  154 ;  Chailotte.  Augiiila  & 
f  Col.  K.  Kd-  Co.  V.  Clibbes.  143  U.  S.  j86  ;  I'acifit  ti.  Co.  f. 

I  Siebcri.  141  U.  S.  339:  Honi  Hilvtr  Mining  Co.  v.  N.  V..  143 

I  U.  S.  30s ;  Budd  I'.  N.  Y.,  143  U.  S.  517 ;  Schwab  v.  Bcre- 

\  grcn.  r43  U.  S.  443  ;  Firlden  v.  Illinois,  143  U.  S.  4«  :  N.  Y, 

^^^  K  Squire.  t44  U.  S.  175  :  ttiAwn  v.  Smntl.  144  IJ.  S.  4S4: 
^^P  Mcl'ncnon  p.  Itlni^krr,  146  U.  S.  1 :  Mmley  v.  I.^ke  Shorr  & 
^^  Mich.  Souiliern  Ky.  Co..  i4(>  U.  S.  161 :  HallinKer  !'.  Davii. 
146  U.  S.  314;  Verier  v.  Wiisliin|[li>n  Harlior  Line  Comsts.. 
146  U.  S.  64<>:  liuller  ?'.  CorW.  146  U.  S.  303;  SnnlliFni 
Pacilic  Co.  J'.  Dciilon.  14ft  L'.  S,  lol  :  Thoringlon  J'.  Mont- 
Komcry,  147  U,  S-  490 ;  Gloiia  v.  Ticman.  148  U.  S.  657: 
Paulsen  v.  Ponland.  149  U.  S.  30:  Minn.  &  St.  L.  Rwy,  Co. 

IV.  Emmons.  149  U.  S.  3^4;  Coliimhiis  So.  Railway  Co.  w. 
Wright.  151  U.  S-  470:  In  re  Firderict.  149  U.  S.  70: 
HcN«1iy  V.  Oilif..  149  U.  .S.  645  ;  l-f«s  v.  U.  S.  150  U.  S. 
476:  Lawlon  V.  Stcelr.  151  U.  S.  133;  Montana  Co.  v.  St. 
I.ouin  Minlii);  Co.,  153  U.  S.  160;  IJuncan  i'.  Miviouii,  151 
U.S.  377;  McKane  v.  Uii»loii.  153  U.  S,  684;  MarclianI  i'. 
Peiina.  R.  R.  Co..  153  U.  S.  380;  Brass f.  Storser.  153  U,  S, 
39t  :  ScotI  f.  McNi-al.  154  U.  S,  34:  RcA^an  v.  Far.  Loan 
&.  TrwM  Co  .  154  U.  S.  361 ;  P.,  C,  C.  &  Si.  L.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  li.ickii*,  134  U.S.  411  :  Imrtstale  Com.  Comtn.t'. Drim^ion, 
154  U.  S,  447;  Kcnfiaii  i'.  Mrtcantilc  Tru«  Co..  154  U.  S. 
447  ;  PtaiL'ci".  Teiiis.  156  U.  S.  ill ;  I'idsburj;!!  &  So.  CobI 
Co.  V.  La..  is<>  U.  S.  590;  Andrews  I'.  Si*  ant,  156  U.  S, 
371:  SI.  u  &  s.  F.  Rwy.  Co.  t'.  cm.  tsfi  U.  S.  649: 
Sievrnt.  ndm.,  i*.  Nichols.  157  U.  S.  370;  ncrgrmann  v. 
Becker.  I57U.S.6JS:  QiurlMW.  Btiller.  tsSU.  S.  S3i ;  Cray 
r.  Conikecticul.  1  ;i>  U.  S.  74 ;  Central  LantI  Co.  v.  Uiutley, 
159  U.  S.  103;  Muotc  V.  Miuoiiri.  159  U.  S.  673:  Winona 
&  St-  IVter  Land  Co.  r.  Minn,,  1 59  U.  S.  J^S. 
Skc.  II.  Rcprf«nt.«llves*h.\IM)cappi>nl(jncil  among  (he  sevwal 
(jites  according  to  ihrir  rfspcciivr  niimbetB.  counting  the  whole 
timber  ol  prrM>nt  in  c.-u-h  Slate.  excliiHinj;  Imli.vi!!  not  taxed. 
But  when  the  right  to  vote  ill  any  election  dir  the  choice  ol  clecloia 
(or  President  ami  Vice  I'rcsident  ol  the  United  .Slate*.  Rcprrieiit- 
3liTe\  in  ConKress.  Ih«  Rxrcutivc  .in<l  Judicial  officcnol  a  Slate,  or 
Ihc  mem)>eta  ol  the  Le>;isl;iture  thereof,  is  denied  lo  any  ol  the 
male  inhabitant  of  siKh  Stale,  be<i%  twenty-one  )-cars  of  age,  and 


6i« 


AMEh'DMEXrS  TO  CONSTlTUTiOK.        IlMMi 


Cilbois  of  lti«  Cniieit  Slales,  or  in  anjr  way  al>ri<lgMl.  rxcrpi  for  par- 
llCrpMtOn  ill  iFticlltun.  or  oiher  crirne,  live  tmis  o(  rcpresmi'iion 
ihcrtin&liAll  be  reduced  in  ilie  propoiiimi  uliich  the  number  o< 
soch  male  ciiitci«  shall  boai  lo  ihe  whole  numtict  o(  tnalc  ciIuch 
iwcniy-one  years  o(  age  in  such  Stale. 

Sec.  III.  No  person  shnll  be  a  S«n:«tor  or  RepivKniMirc  in 
Conj^rest.  or  elector  of  Pretiilcnt  or  \'ice  President,  or  Ivold  any 
oRice.ciril  or  military,  under  t lie  United  Si.-tlcs,  or  under  nnySutc 
who,  haviitc;  previou^ly  taken  an  oaili.  as  a  member  of  Congrew, 
or  as  «n  olncer  o(  the  Uniled  Stale*,  or  as  a  member  of  any  Stale 
legislature,  or  as  an  executive  or  judicial  officer  ul  any  Slate,  lo 
KUppori  tbe  Constitution  of  the  United  Stales,  shall  have  engaged 
in  insurrection  or  lehellion  against  the  same,  or  K'**n  aid  or  com- 
fort to  the  enemies  ihereof.  Kill  ConEress  may  oy  a  i-Ole  ol  iwo- 
(hiriUof  each  l-lou^e.  remove  iiuch  disability. 

Sec.  IV.  The  validity  of  Ihe  public  debt  of  the  United  Slates, 
aulhoriieit  by  laiv,  including  debts  incurred  for  payment  of  pensioM 
and  bounlies  (or  serrices  in  suppressing  insurrecitun  or  rrl)clluin. 
shall  noi  be  ({uestioned.  Bui  neither  the  United  Staie?i  nor  any 
State  shall  assume  or  pay  any  debt  or  obligation  incurred  in  aiil  ••( 
Insurrection  or  rebellion  against  the  United  Stales,  or  any  claim 
for  ihe  los^  or  emancipation  of  any  slave;  but  all  uch  debts, 
obligations  and  claimt  \ha1l  be  held  illegal  and  void. 

Sec.  V.  I'he  Congress  shall  have  power  (o  enforce  bjr  appnv 
priatc  legislation,  ihr  provisions  of  thi^  article. 

Cramlall  v.  The  Stale  of  Ner.tda.  6  Wall.  %y,  Paul  v.  W- 

ginia,    8    Wall.    168;    WanI    i:   .Maryland,    ii    Wall.   418; 

SlauR  liter  house  Cases.  16  Wall.  j6:  lltadwell  f.  The  S«aie. 

■6  Wall,  ijo:  Rtrieme^er  i'.  loua,  18  Wall,  iiq;  Minor  p. 

Happcrselt.  11   Wall.  161 :  Walker  v.  Saiivincl.  91  U.  S.  90: 

Kennard  i'.  l.outviana.  ea  rel.  Morgait,  91  U.  S.  480;  U.  S. 

V.  Cruikshank.  92  U.  S.  S4> :  Munn  v.  IIMikms.  94  U.  S.  i  I}. 

ARTICLE  XV* 

Section  1.  The  riKbt  of  cilircn*  of  the  United  Slain  in  wile 
Aliall  not  be  denied  or  abrftlged  by  the  United  Si.-Ucs  or  by  any 
Slate  on  account  of  rai;e.  color,  or  prerioiii  condition  of  aemiuite. 


■The  fifteenth  unendiaenl  U>  Iha  oonMitulion  o(  Ibe  Uaiied  Slain 

.was  proposed  to  the  lopilalures  o(  lh«  Mrtral  tlatct  by  the  Fortieth 

I  Conipaa  on  ihe  97ih  of  Fclimary,  1S69.  and  *aa  declared,  in  ■  pKicla- 

I  malKin  of  ihe  iiecTelary  of  Suie,  d*lcd  Mktch  JO.  1870.  tu  have  hem 

mlibenl  b]^ihr  Ir^iiiUiuits of  twenty-aiB* of  Iho  ibitly-iieven  tUira.     The 

dntrt  (if  llicv:  ralitii'alioni  (anansed  in  Ibe  order  of  Ihnir  rece|Mt(iD  al 

Ihe  IVturimeTii  «(  Stnie)  were :  From  North  Catirlinn.  March  ),  lU^i 

Wnl    VirEinia.    March    3.    1S64  ;    ManacbuMUl,    March   i>-ta,   IS69; 

WricanMii.  Mmih  9.  1^  ;  MaliK,  March  13.  1S61);  LoultUoa.  Maioi 

5,  tS6q :    Mi<:liti:an,    Miirh  !.  |S6i)  ;  S<^ul^  ('inJimi.  Mvih   |fr,  |iti(i 

i'aankylnnii.  March  >6.  l56i)  ;  Arkaniai.  Matih  30,  \tlbvt :  ConnnilcM. 

Marig.  i860;  Florida.  June  It.  )36q;  lllinaii.  Mirth  f.  lS6g  ;  ln<il«ia. 

,  May  13-14.  1^69  ;  New  Yo<k.  March  17-  Ajiril  14.  1M9  (tiul  ihc  le^i*- 


ISTO] 


AMENDMENTS   TO   CONSTITUTION. 


631 


Sec.  II.  The  Congress  shall  have  power  to  enforce  this  article 
by  appropriate  legislation. 

United  States  v.  Reese  et  a1.,  91  U.  S.  314 ;  United  Stales 
V.  Cruikshank  et  al.,  91  U.  S.  543;  Ex  parte  Yarborough, 
110  U.  S.  6ji :  McPherson  I/,  Blacker,  146  U.S.  1. 


Iitnre  or  the  same  slate  pused  a  reiolution  Januarr  S.  1B70,  to  with- 
draw its  conwnt  to  it) ;  New  Hampshire,  July  7,  186^  ;  Nevada,  March 
I.  1869;  Vermont.  Ociober  ai,  i86q  ;  VirBinia,  October  8,  1869; 
Missouri,  January  10,  1S70  ;  Mississippi,  January  I{-I7.  1870;  Ohio, 
January  37.  1S70 ;  Iowa,  February  3,  1870  ;  Kansas.  January  18-19, 
1B70;  Minnesota.  February  19,  1870;  Rhode  Island,  January  iB,  1B70  ; 
Nebraska.  February  17.  1870  ;  Texas.  February  18.  1870.  The  sUtc 
ol  Georgia  also  ratified  Che  amendment  February  3,  lS7a> 


AUENDUF.NTS  PKO 

Firit.  Tlial  il  bccii[>ln-itly  ilc 
dclegaiecl  by  the  afi>ics.iiil  •luva 
Stales  lobr  by  rlicin  rn'rciF^nl. 

SteonJly.  Tli-it  ihrrc  \)i.ill  bi 
ihous.ind  pciHiiis  accunlin^;  to 
luiion.  uniil  ihc  wIiuIf  muiiber 
liufxited. 

Thiftify.  1"hnt  Coni-iioa  do  t 
tlicm  by  ibc  (»urlh  iiCL'Iioti  of  ih 
suie  shiiH  ntxl'-'t't  <■■'  (cfu>ic  to  n 
lioiicd.  or  sb;i1l  m.tkr  ir(;ulalia( 
propic  lo  .1  Tree  and  rqual  rcpre 
he  const  Kilt  inn. 

Fourthly.  Thill  Congtess  rfo  i 
motley*  aming  fioin  il'c  impoti 
piibhc  nigiindn.  nur  then  until 
rct|iiisilion  upon  ihr  tiliiTci  \a  iiu 
propitrtioii  ol  %vu.\\  Ti'cjui  sit  ions,  ( 
%*.M  consliuition.  in  huch  way  a 
Ihc  sl.itrs  fh^ll  lliiiik  bni.  nn 
neglcci  or  rcftisc  to  pay  itt  prop 
ihcnCongresK  inny;i!(»oi  and  le 
with  interest  tlicicon  .-it  ilic  nile 
the  time  o(  |>.-iytnent,  prcsciilied 

Fijikly.  Thill  Congress  erec 
vjntjgcs  of  commerce. 

SixtMiy.  ThAI  no  person  shaU 


XlklY.    ■ 


L 


I7M1      AME.VDM£AfrS  OP  MASS..  S.  C.  AND  N.  //. 


the  [calif  or  pcnonaUy.  is  not  of  ihe  value  of  fidccii  hundred 
dnlUn  .11  ihc  tcui. 

Eighthfy.  In  civil  actions  belween  citi/ctis  o(  iliffiTciil  «UIcs. 
every  iuue  a(  (iicl  arising  iii  aclioiis  ;it  common  l»w,  xli;ill  Lie  tried 
by  4  jury,  ii  tiie  p^rucs  ut  ciilicr  o(  iliein  rcqucW  ii. 

Ninthly.  Coi>k<css  sImII  at  iiu  iiinc  co'isciii  tliai  ;iny  |ierboii 
lioklitig  an  ofHce  of  irtut  or  t>''olil  under  the  Unilt'd  States  sh;ilt 
accept  of  a  title  of  nobility,  or  any  other  title  or  olfice,  from  any 
king,  prince,  or  foreign  state. 

AMKNUMEMTS   PHQPOSEU   BY  THK  COKVKNTION  OF 
SOUTH    CAROI.IKA.   I788. 

And  whereas  it  ii  esscnlial  to  the  preservation  of  llic  riKhls 
reserved  to  i)ic  M-'vcidl  si.iics  imd  tlicfrecilum  u(  the  |)eu[ile.  under 
iheopersiiuii^  of  a  ){ciie(.il  govcnimeiiT.  ilui  Ilic  light  uF  picKilb* 
inK  tlic  nunner,  lime,  and  pl.)Ces  of  holding  ilit-  elrttioiis  to  the 
fecleriit  leg isl.1l lire,  should  be  forever  insepniubly  ;inneird  to  the 
sovereignty  of  ihc  several  states;  This  convention  dolh  drcl.-irc, 
thai  the  s.imc  ought  lo  rcrnutn  lu  all  pusleritj-.  a  perpetual  and 
fundamental  right  In  the  local,  exclusive  of  the  interference  of  the 
general  goveniment.  except  in  case*  where  the  legiUiilures  o(  the 
states  shall  refuseorncglcct  to  peiform  and  (ullill  the  suine,  accord- 
ing  10  the  tenor  of  the  s.iid  coiiMitutioii. 

rtiis  convention  doth  also  <leclare.  That  no  section  or  paraf;f.ipli 
of  the  said  conMitution.  vrarrants  a  construction  thai  the  states  do 
not  retain  every  power  not  expressly  rrlinquislied  by  them,  and 
vested  in  the  general  i^overnmcnl  o(  the  union. 

Rtsulvtii,  That  the  general  government  of  Ihc  United  Stales 
oiichi  never  to  impose  (tliect  tanes,  liul  wlieie  the  mnncvs  arising 
(rum  the  duties,  imposts  and  excise,  are  insuflicient  for  the  public 
csigencies.  tior  then  untd  Congress  shall  luv-c  made  a  requisition 
upon  the  slates  to  assess,  levy,  and  pay  (heir  resiicciive  proportions 
ol  such  reijuisilions  ;  and  in  case  any  stale  shall  ne}jtect  or  refuite 
to  pay  its  proportion,  puisuant  to  such  requisition,  then  Congress 
may  assess  ami  levy  such  state's  proportion,  together  with  intci-est 
thereon,  ai  the  rate  of  six  per  centum  per  annum,  from  the  lime  of 
p.iymeni  prescribed  by  iuch  requisition. 

Ftifhtd.  That  the  third  section  of  tile  lixlh  article  ought  to  Iw 
amended,  by  inscning  the  wotd  "other."  between  the  words  "  no" 
suid  "  leligious," 

Rfi^h'td,  That  it  be  n  standing  instruction  to  all  such  delegates 
as  may  hereafter  be  elected  to  rrpieseni  this  state  in  the  general 
government,  to  exert  their  utmost  .ibilities  and  influence,  lo  effect 
an  alteration  of  the  constitution,  conformably  to  the  aforegoing 
resolutions. 

AMKNDMKTTTS  PltOIK>SI!n   DV  THK  CDNVUITION  OP 
sew  IIAMfSlllKK,  178$. 

The  convention  do  therefore  recommentl.  tliat  the  (oHowing  al- 
tcraliona  and  provisions  be  introduced  into  the  said  coiuiilutioo. 


PROPOSED  AMENDMHNTS  TO  THE 
CONSTITUTION. 


AMF.KOMENTS  PROPOSP.D  BV  THE  COKVEHTION    OF 

MA5SACHL-sr.rrs.  1788. 

Finl.  ThM  il  liccxplitillyOcil.itcd  lh;il  nil  |>owct§  mil  cxprruly 
drlcgiiicil  by  the  nforc-'iiil  cuiutitutioci  arc  tc9ctvc*l  10  ihc  several 
*i.ii»  tt)  be  l»y  ihem  excrciicil. 

Stet'HiiJy.  Tlvsi  Uicii-  shall  be  wiie  rr|HestntaiiTc  10  ev«T)r  ihldy 
thous:iiul  pi'iiiuns  aixuiiliii^  to  (liv  tciiius  ntcniiuncil  in  tlitr  coiikik 
tulioii.  uiilil  tlic  wliulc  number  of  fC|>ii:^ciiMliirs  aitiuunia  lo  iwo 
hun<tml. 

ThirMy.  TJiiil  Congrw*  do  not  eicrciw  Ihc  ponfrr^  vested  m 
ihein  hy  ihe  townh  •^ciion  of  Ihc  firet  atlicV.  Iiiii  in  cases  wlierr  a 
sX*yv  sIihII  nptflcrt  or  rcluHc  lo  tiMke  Ihc  rr};ul.ilit>n>i  tlinrin  men- 
tioiicil,  or  kK^iII  in.ilir  TfKubiion.i  siibiYrsiic  of  lite  righu  <>(  ilie 
people  lo  a  free  and  L-qu.il  tcpretcnialtun  m  Cungicns,  a);ici->iltt>'  to 
the  coiulilution. 

FaurlMy.  Tbal  Consics"  *lo  ""'  lay  dtiect  lines  Iwil  wlirn  lUc 
moneys  afisiiij;  fioix  (be  tmposi  and  rxciiie  arc  insiifl'tcirni  fur  Ihc 
|>u>>hc  exigencies,  i)i>r  ilirn  until  Conctcss  sli.1l]  kite  hr»t  made  4 
requisition  upon  the  st.itr*  to  .imms.  levy  .md  pay  itieit  M-stieeliir 
piopoilion  of  »iich  tcquiMlion.i.  a];rccalily  to  the  renMis  liir<'  in  tlic 
sAulrnnxtitiltion.  in  nucli  wny  luid  matiner  :x\  Ihe  li^Lhl.i lutes  of 
the  sl.-iles  ilull  ihiiik  l>e»l.  and  in  soch  case  il  .iny  stale  shall 
neglect  or  rcfuie  lu  pity  il»  pfo)Kiition  pursuant  lusiicliinpiisitKiti, 
then  Congress  miiy  assess  «nit  levy  sikIi  state's  piupuitniii.  t<r(-riber 
with  iiitcieal  thvieon  .11  the  rate  of  six  per  cent.  |K-t  aiinuni.  flum 
the  time  of  jMyinent.  prr«crihc<l  in  sucn  rojiiisiiioOB. 

Fi/lkly.  Th.-it  Coiisrciu  erect  no  comp-iny  with  exclusire  ad- 
van  iai;e«  of  comntcrcc. 

Sixthly.  Tltai  no  |>crson  sluill  I>e  tried  (or  any  crinic  tnr  wlndi 
lie  may  incur  an  nifamoui  punisbintnt.  or  loss  of  life,  until  lie  te 
tiisl  indkled  by  a  grjinil  juiy.  eicept  in  such  crises  av  rnAy  jiiik  Id 
til*  govrmmrni  ami  re^Uiion  of  ihe  Und  .ind  im>  -■'  ' - 

Seventhly.   The  Supreme  Judicial  Feitri.il  Com  .c  nu 

jurisdiction  ol  cauies  between  cili/ens  of  difleieni  ■■!  1   pii  die 

niattcr  in  ilitptiie.  nlicther  il  concern*  lire  really  ur  petsunaliv,  \t* 
ol  the  value  of  three  tltuusand  dollars  at  the  leau— nor  v)iilf  •'tp 
fcileral  jmlkiJil  powers   extend  lo  any  aitton  lietu-eni 
different  M^ics,  where  Ihc  matter  in  dispute,  whether  ii 


ITMJ      AMKXOMEKrS  OF  MASS.,  S  C.  AND  .V.  //.       63J 

the  realty  oi  personalty,  is  nol  of  ihc  value  ol  fiflcciL  Imndtcd 
dolUrs  al  the  lcn»I. 

KigAtAfy.  In  civil  aclJoRfi  between  dliirnt  of  different  MaIcs, 
,  evecy  issue  of  fact  ansini;  in  ttctionx  -it  cumniun  Inw,  nholl  be  iricil 
phy  A  jury,  if  the  pirticx  ut  either  of  llicin  ieiiue»t  it. 

NintAfy.  Co(i};ie»  iliall  ut  no  time  cojiseiit  that  any  iicfsoii 
hulding  an  otlko  uf  Iruit  or  (irofit  under  llic  United  Slater  b^jII 
accept  of  a  title  uf  nubility,  or  any  other  title  01  ol&cc.  fiuui  atiy 
kinu,  prince,  or  foreign  stale. 

AUKKUUEMTS   PKUIK>SKI>   KV    IIIK  <^ONVENriOM  Of 
SUirrU   CAROLINA.   17S8. 

And  wheien*  H  is  ewentjal  to  the  preservalion  of  the  ri);hlx 
reserved  to  the  several  stales,  and  the  fieeiluin  o(  the  peO|)k',  umU-r 
the  04ie  rations  o(  a  general  govern  men  I.  that  the  right  uf  picstiit>- 
'n&  the  tiunncr.  lime,  aiut  pUres  of  holding  the  elections  to  the 
[ederal  IcgisUiuie,  shoulii  l>c  forefer  inseparably  anneneil  lo  ihc 
soverrigmy  wf  ihc  several  Mates;  This  convenlion  dolh  declare, 
itiai  ibr  »ame  might  in  remain  to  .ill  {xisLerity,  a  jieipelual  ,-iniI 
fund.-tmcnlal  right  in  ihe  local,  exclusive  of  the  inteiltrcnce  of  the 
jteticml  jTovernmenl,  except  in  caiei  where  Ihc  Ir^islalures  of  llie 
sinles  shall  refuse  or  neglect  toperluim  and  lullill  llicsame,»ixoid* 
ing  to  (he  icnoc  of  the  s^iid  const  it  ut  ion. 

This  convention  doth  also  declare.  That  no  seciion  or  parugrapli 
of  Ihc  i^aid  consiitulion.  warrants  a  conslrticliun  that  the  sutes  do 
not  retain  every  power  not  expresslv  relinquished  byihcm,  iind 
vested  in  the  Kencial  government  of  Ine  union. 

^«i^)v./.  That  the  general  government  of  the  United  Stales 
Alight  never  to  impose  direct  iaxc:i.  but  where  the  moneys  arising 
(mm  the  duties,  imiiosi-i  and  excise,  are  insufficient  for  ifie  puhlic 
^^vexigencies.  nor  then  until  Congress  shall  have  made  a  re(|uisiti<m 
^^nipon  the  states  lo  asscM.  levy,  and  pay  iheir  rcaiieciivc  pioporlions 
^^Bol  such  rettuisitions :  and  in  ctM  any  slate  sh^ll  neglect  or  icluse 
^Hio  pay  its  proporiion.  pur»iiani  to  such  requisition,  then  Congress 
^"inay  asK*-*  and  levy  surh  slate's  proportion,  together  with  Inieresl 
r  thereon,  at  the  tale  of  six  per  ceniuiu  per  .innuiR,  from  the  time  of 
I         payment  preacribeil  hy  such  requisition. 

fiesirhvii.  That  the  third  section  of  the  sixth  article  ought  lo  be 
tiinended,  by  Inserting  the  word  "  other."  beivteen  the  words  "  no  " 
and  ■■religious," 

RfxaijyJ,  Thai  it  be  n  standing  instruction  to  all  such  delegates 

as  may  hereafter  he  electee!  to  represent  ihis  stale  in  the  gcrieial 

government,  to  eieri  their  iitmoisi  abiliiics  and  influence,  to  cflricl 

n  alteration  of  the  constitution,  conformably  to  the  tjoregoing 

>1n  lions. 

AMSNDMKKTS  FROPOSEt)  IIV  T)IE  COS  VCNTIOM  OP 
KEW  IIAMfSllIKK,   1788. 

The  convention  <lo  therefore  recommend,  thai  the  following  at* 
lerations  and  provisions  be  iniroditced  mio  the  said  constitution, 


6S4 


AX/EXDMEXrS  OF  A'.  H. 


xxm 


Ffrtl.  Thnt  it  be  explicit)/  declaivd  Hut  all  powers  aol  exi>renlf 
and  paiti(.'uljirt)-<IHegntC(lby  theatoic8.i>d  conMituiion,  are  tcsmred 
lo  the  several  slates  to  be  l>y  them  excrcisert. 

Ste^iHy.  Tiial  there  shall  l>e  one  icprefrenlalife  to  every  thirijr 
thouvinil  pcrtons  aecoidin^  lo  the  ccnms  mrntuined  In  the  coiuih 
Itiiion.  until  the  witole  niiinber  of  rcprcicnta lives  amount  lo  twa 
111)  nd  ted. 

TAirdfy.  Thai  Congress  do  not  exercise  ihe  powrrt  reued  In 
tlicm  fa)'  the  fourth  section  o(  the  first  aiiicle.  faut  in  cuse«  whoi  a 
state  shall  negleet  or  refuse  to  nvake  the  regtiU lions  ilieiein  tncn- 
lioned.ot  shnll  make  ipcufaiion^  siihvenive  n(  the  rights  of  l^e 
people  to  n  free  and  equ.il  reprcsenl.it ion  in  Cotigrciu — Nor  shall 
Congriiu  in  any  case  make  rcgulaiiofla  contrary  to  a  free  and  equal 
repteienliiiton. 

Fourthly.  That  Congress  do  not  lay  direct  taxes  tiui  when  ihc 
moitev  arising;  from  impost,  excise,  and  ttieir  other  re^>uTrrs.  are 
iRSuflicieni  for  the  pubhc  exigeiKies.  nor  then,  until  Corifrreu 
shall  have  first  (nude  a  reqi(isiii"n  upon  the  slatet.  to  assess,  lei^ 
and  pay  Ihcir  respeciive  proporiioni.  of  «ueh  rcquiiiiioo,  agreeatdj' 
lo  the  ccnMii  fi\rd  in  the  snitl  const  it  tit  ion.  in  »uch  way  and  man- 
ner AS  Ihc  IcBvsliitun:  ol  the  stale  iball  think  best,  and  in  MKhcase 
if  any  sl.ile  ah.dl  neglect,  then  Con);re»s  ni;iy  assess  ami  levy  Mith 
Stale's  propuilion.  loj^cilier  with  the  inieiesi  thereon  at  the  m|c  ol 
six  per  cent,  per  annum,  from  the  lime  of  payment,  prescribed  m 
sudi  requisitiuit. 

Fi/tXlj,  That  Congress  sh.il)  erect  no  company  of  mcrchajit* 
with  exclusive  advantages  of  commerce. 

SixrAfy.  Thai  no  peruin  shall  \k  Irird  for  any  crime  by  Mlrich 
he  may  incur  .in  infamous  puniihmeni.  or  loss  oJ  life,  until  he  tu\t 
be  indiclctl  by  a  i^iiind  jury,  escepl  in  such  cases  as  m.-iy  ame  m 
Ihe  Kovcnitnenl  and  rcKulalion  of  the  land  and  naval  forces. 

i^MtlfAly.  All  common  taw  cases  between  ciliiens  of  dttferen! 
Males,  shall  be  commenced  in  the  common  law  courts  o(  ibc  ir< 
spectivc  stales,  and  no  appeal  shall  be  allowed  lo  the  ledervl  court, 
in  such  cases,  unless  the  sum  oi  value  o(  the  thing  in  conlinvciV 
amount  to  three  ihouiand  dollars. 

Eigifify.  In  civil  aclions  tielween  citizens  of  different  slates. 
ei-ery  iviue  of  (act  aiising  in  actions  at  comnion  law,  sitall  be  tiM 
by  itiry.  if  the  parties  or  either  of  them  leqiiesi  it. 

h'inthlf.  Crtngress  sliall  ai  no  time  consent  that  any  pcno" 
holding  an  office  of  trust  oi  profit  under  (he  Unileil  .Slalrs.  shall 
accept  any  lille  of  notxlily.  or  any  Olbcr  title  or  ufhcc,  from  any 
kinx.  or  furriKn  state. 

Tenth.  1  liai  no  slnndins  army  shatt  be  keM  up  In  time  nl 
peace,  unlets  with  the  consent  ol  three- (our  I  lis  oJ  (he  memben  t\ 
each  branch  of  Congress,  uor  shall  soldiers  in  lime  tA  pe»ce  be 
quanered  upon  privaic  houses,  withooi  iJie  consent  o(  the  ow'nns. 

FJnfilk.  Coogrrss  shall  make  iw  laws  ttracbing  religion,  or  lo 
inlrinKe  the  rit^is  of  conM'ience. 

Twil/th.  Connivs  shall  never  disann  aity  cUiim.  unless  Mich 
as  ar«  or  have  been  in  uctua)  rebcUiuu. 


AitKsnitKSTS  rKoro»p.i>  nv  thr  convention  or 

VIRGINIA.    J78& 

Subsequent  smcndmenlt  agreed  to  in  convention,  u  necessary 
10  the  ptoposed  consiliuiion  ot  ^vcmmciit  {or  the  Unilcil  Slaict, 
recommended  lo  itic  con.vtlcnili»n  of  ihc  Congrct^  which  ibM 
lir«l  asxcniblc  under  the  suid  conxliiulion,  (o  be  aetr<\  upon  iic- 
cnrding  to  (he  mode  prcscribt^  in  the  lillh  uclide  ilieieof— - 
xudtlittt  : 

Thjt  iliPTc  be  a  declaration  or  bril  o(  rights,  assorting  and  Mcur- 
int;  fruni  encroachment,  the  csMntiJil  Jtnd  unalienable  lights  of  tbc 
people,  tn  some  such  manner  as  the  followmg  : 

J-irtt,  Tliai  there  me  certain  n;>tural  ri^hli,  of  which  men,  when 
tbry  foini  »  soci-il  corop.ict,  cannot  deprive  or  divest  thrit  poiteniy, 
arnonx  which  are  the  enjoyment  of  lite  and  hbctly,  with  the  nieuiii 
o(  acquiring.  poiseBsinii.  an(lpioteclingpro|i(.Tly.anil  puisuinf;  and 
obi.iiiiing  happuicss  and  lalely-  Sfconii.  That  all  puwci  i:i  iiJlu< 
rally  inreiiM  tn.  and  coiiK4)uenil)'  derived  from  ibc  people  ; 
th't  miisisiralcs,  Ihcreforc,  »tr  iheir  trustees  and  sgenis,  at  all 
times  amenahle  to  ihrm.  Third.  That  (government  ought  10  be 
inxitulcd  for  Ihc  common  bnictit.  protection  .ind  ^iccuritj-  of  the 
people;  and  that  the  doctrine  of  n«n' resistance  .igainit  atbilrary 
powerandopprcttion.  is  Absurd.  sUvish,  anil  destrucliveof  thcROod 
and  happincu  of  mankind,  I'aurik.  rhal  no  man  or  .let  of  mvn 
areenlitled  t03epanilcorexclu%ive  public  emulumenlsor  piiviieyes 
Irom  (hecommunily.  but  in  conMiItrration  of  public  seivices.  vthich 
not  being  descendible,  neither  ought  the  offices  of  magistrate,  \vv- 
bUtor,  or  judge. Of  any  other  public  office  lobe  hcreiliiaiy.  Fi/lh. 
That  the  l«gislalitY.  circtilive  and  judicial  powers  of  govcinm<-nl 
should  be  separate  and  distinct,  and  that  the  mcmlieni  of  the  two 
tir»t  may  be  rcili,iinc<l  from  oppie^xion  by  feehng  and  participat- 
ing the  public  burdens,  they  should,  at  fixed  petiOfls.  he  reduced 
to  a  pri»ate  nation,  return  into  Ihc  mass  of  Ihe  people,  and  the 
vacancies  be  supniied  by  certain  and  regular  elections  ;  in  which 
all  or  any  pan  of  the  foimer  mcmbci-s  to  be  ebgible  or  ineligible, 
as  ihc  ruin  of  the  consliluiton  of  government,  and  the  laws  sh.ill 
direct.  Sixth.  That  the  elections  of  rcprcsenl.ilive.i  in  the  Irgii- 
lature  ought  to  be  free  and  fieijuent,  .ind  all  men  having  ludkipnt 
evidence  of  wrmaneni  common  mteresi.  with  an  attachment  to 
the  community,  ought  to  lure  Ihe  ritjht  of  suffrage :  and  no  aid. 
charge,  tax  or  (ee  can  be  set.  lated  or  levied  upon  the  people  with- 
out iheir  own  consent,  or  that  of  their  repiescma lives  so  clecled, 
nor  can  they  be  tMiund  by  any  law  to  which  they  have  not  in  like 
manner  assented  fat  the  public  good.  Sj\'tHlh,  That  all  power  of 
suspending  laws,  or  the  execution  of  laws,  l>y  any  authority,  with- 
out ll»e  consent  ol  the  representatives  of  the  people  in  ihe  legtsla- 
lure.  ia  iniunous  to  then  tights,  and  ought  nut  to  be  exeiciMi). 
Eif:klh.  That  in  all  capital  anil  criminal  prosecutions,  a  ninn  haih 
a  right  to  demand  the  cause  and  nature  of  his  accus.iiion,  10  be 
confrontMi  with  the  aocuscl«  and  witnesses,  to  call  for  cviilenrc. 
and  be  allowed  counsel  in  his  favof.  aiul  10  a  fair  and  speedy  triaJ 


U 


HMHk 


636 


AMEXDitSyrS  OF  ViSGiXtA. 


I  ITU 


by  an  impatiul  jury  ciC  his  vicitiiigc,  wiihoul  whose  utuiiijiiiijnt 
coiMcnl  he  onnoi  hi:  found  K>"''T-  (c^ct^pl  >■>  ihr  Kovrmmeni  nl 
ihc  Uiiil  1111(1  naval  (urccs ;)  not  can  he  be  ei)tn]KlI«l  1o  i;ivc  en- 
AvtKc  aK'iTist  liimiii;!!.  A'inlA.  'I'biil  no  (recinait  uu}[lit  lu  bp  taken, 
imprisoned,  Ot  iWsttciifA  o(  his  li(.-<;hul(l,  libeitits,  )>rivilc);t:3i.  or 
(MKchiMS,  or  OulUwcJ.  or  exiled,  or  in  uny  mmiiikt  ilcMruyctl  or 
i)eprivc«l  of  his  life,  libciir  or  piopciiy.  t>ui  liy  the  law  of  ibr 
l;inil.  Ttnlk.  Thnt  every  trcrmjin  r««ninf<l  of  his  liberty,  is  «»- 
lilleil  to  .-t  ieiii«<ly.  to  iiM|lji[c  inlo  ihc  l.ttvlulncu  ihcreol^  aihI  (» 
lanovc  the  Kirnc.  if  UTil.-iwful.  nml  thnt  %\\th  remedy  ou[;hi  iwt  iii 
be  denied  nor  ilelaye<l.  Hln-enib.  Tli.nt  in  toiiirovcraici  R:sprri> 
ing  properly,  und  in  kuiIs  htriweeti  niiui  and  iiiuii,  the  anrienl  irul 
by  Jury  is  one  of  the  );ie41eM  securiltvs  lu  Itie  rights  ol  Ili«  ixroplc. 
srio  oilghl  lo  rciiwiiii  s.Ktcil  .<iid  riiviol^ble.  'ItttlJIh.  Thai  erct; 
trcem:in  ought  (o  find  »  eetmin  rcnie<ly  l>y  ircouric  lo  Ihe  laws  tor 
all  injuries  .-knd  wnonfr«  he  nmy  revive  in  his  pfrson.  pi(>|Mitir  or 
dmracter.  He  i>tit(ht  to  obi^tin  tighl  and  juslice  ficel>  wiiltiMt 
sdle.  cumplelcly  .iiid  niihout  denial,  pioniplly  und  wiiIiihii  delay. 
Mnd  lbnl>i!i  OtiiblisMmeiiTsut  rF|;uUtHim  eimtrafcnrnj;  l(ic»e  njihtl. 
xtc  oppmtive  and  uiiju&l.  I hirleenlh.  Th.it  excessive  tmil  ii>if[lil 
not  t<i  be  requirnl.  nor  excessive  tines  im|Hisrd.  nor  ciurl  and  un> 
ii»uiil  puni.ihmeniK  inflidcd.  l-'fiurtttttlk.  That  nviy  (rrvRMn  hit> 
•A  ri^hl  to  be  sei'tirc  from  all  unrentnnablc  searches  and  *cifur«i 
of  hii  prtxon.  Iiis  p^ipcrs  and  property  ;  all  warr^antt.  llicfefiirr. 
to  search  Hispccted  places,  or  scuc  any  freeman,  hi*  paper*  m 
))fOI>ei(y.  without  inCoimalion  on  oath  (or  afliinulion  of  a  p«T~ 
son  ieli(;iously  scriiputuus  ol  takiiif;  an  uath)  of  le|;id  and  sufbcicnl 
c-tusc,  die  grievous  and  oppressive;  and  all  general  uairanl*  U) 
senrcli  suspected  jilaces.  or  lo  nppirhrn<l  nnt  tutiiecied  |>eTMm. 
without  s|iecially  naming  or  dcseribing  the  pl.ire  or  prrMin.  nrr 
dangcroui  jiim]  OUkIiI  ih>1  lo  he  {[Taiiied.  l-iJUenlh,  I'hat  (tic 
|icop)e  hatvarijEht  pc-iceihly  to  aiseniMe  lo^^iher  to  consult  for 
the  common  k"oiJ><"'  to  imttuct  lltcir  tepmrnlutitcs;  nnU  tli*l 
eveiy  freeman  lus  n  tight  lo  petition  01  H|<|ily  to  ihe  legislature  tot 
iedrc»  of  Kiievanccs.  Si.tfefHlh.  Thai  llvepropkh.ive  a  nghl  l*t 
freedom  of  sprecb,  aiwl  oi  whiiitg  and  puhlivhing  ihr-ir^rnliiKniK: 
th.il  the  frrrdom  of  lite  prr»  is  one  ol  the  gteaieM  bulwark*  of 
liberty,  and  otighl  not  to  lie  viulaied.  SrtKHtreHlk.  Tbal  iIk  peo- 
ple hare  a  riRht  lo  keep  .-ind  licat  aims ;  Ihal  a  vie4l  ref;ul.ited  niiW- 
tu.  c«ni|>used  ui  ihc  IkkIv  u(  llie  people.  If ained  lo  Ainiv  is  llie 
proper,  natural  and  safe  (U'fense  of  a  free  Mate.  I'hai  »iJ>ndinK 
armies  in  itine  oi  ueace  ate  iLingerou*  lo  liberty,  and  (htreJon 
(nl);ht  lo  \tr  j^voiilril.  as  far  as  ihc  ciiirvmstances  iind  ir    '  <  nf 

Ihe  conimuniiy  will  admit :  and  ih.il  in  all  casri  Ihe  nn;  .lil 

beunder  sIHcl  subonlinaiion  lo  and  jjoremed   by  the  '  'f. 

HighUtnlh.  That  no  soldier  in  time  o(  peace  oujthi  to  ird 

in  any  house  without  thecon^rnl  nf  Ihe  nwner.  and  in  \..:~  .,  -ar 
in  such  manner  only  as  llic  l.iw  iliiccls.  yintttmlh.  That  any  pn* 
son  retigiousjy  scrupulous  o(  bearini;  arms.  ou(;hI  to  lir  riniLTi^nt, 
U|>on  paynieni  of  an  (-<(uiv.ileiit  tu  eiii|iloy  another  to  I '  tti 

his  stcoJ.      'Jv*MtiH/t.  That  religion,  ui   tl>c  duly  wJi<i   <  ne 


itasj 


AMEXDUEA'TS  OF  VIRGINIA. 


Hi 


la  our  Cieatof,  -ind  tlie  in.iiiii«r  of  (lischargiiig  it.  cnn  be  iliicclcd 
unty  tnr  rr-iion  lUii!  conticliixi.  not  by  fi>ii:c  iir  violt-ncr,  .iinl  ihcTc- 
(orc  all  men  have  An  «-t(iMl,  iinitir»1.  anil  uii;ilK'nahle  riRhl  lo  ihe 
free  cxcccisc  o[  ii-ligian.  ACcoidine  to  the  die  lain  of  cunsciciice, 
atnl  Ihni  no  iiarlitul.ii  Kli^iiMi.-i  :>cci  or  society  uugiit  to  be  fatutcd 
or  cMablixhcd  by  l:iw  tn  preference  lt>  others. 


AUKNUHKNTS  TO  THK   BODY  OP  THR  CONSTITUTIOK. 

Fi'rif.  Tti.it  each  slate  in  the  union  shall  rcipeclivdjr  roinin 
every  power,  jutisrliciioD.  Jnd  tiKhl.  wliicli  is  nol  by  (his  consli- 
lution  <  Icing  .lint  (ii  the  Conj^rc^s  of  ihc  Unileil  States,  or  to  Ihe 
(lr|urliiir-nt«  of  the  fcilcr.i!  govcmrijent.  SretmJ.  'I'tirit  there 
«hall  lie  oDc  representative  for  ciery  thiriv  Ihuuund  iittouljnj;  to 
l)i«  enuineraiTcMi  or  cpniiii  nienlionecl  in  the  cunsliiutimi.  utiiil  (hi; 
whole  nuinbci  ol  re|>iir!i(;nlalivini  .-iniuunli  (o  iwo  liumlicil  ;  after 
which  lliAt  nuiiihci  <ilialt  be  cunlinui^tl  or  incicj^cd  ■.\\  Cvof^xrsi 
^atl  (lirecl.  tipoit  tile  piiiiciplcs  liacd  in  the  roitslilulinn  by 
apportioning  Ihe  rcprrwn  la  lives  of  each  slate  to  «inie  RrcalcT 
niindier  of  people  from  time  in  thnc  as  population  iiicre-ut^. 
Third.  \Vhen  llic  Congros  .%hnll  lay  diicct  laio  or  excises,  they 
shall  imnmlialcly  inform  the  cuetutive  poivcr  of  eacli  stale,  of 
Ihe  quota  ol  such  state. -icconlmj;  to  the  census  herein  directed, 
whkh  is  propiwed  to  be  tliereliy  niisol;  and  it  the  lef;i!kl:ilure  of 
any  stale  shall  pas.^  a  law  wliieli  sh.ill  be  effectual  for  laising  sucli 
4{uula  ;»t  the  lime  r(X|Uit«l  )>>  tJonxicss.  the  taxes  and  excises  laid 
by  Congress  slwll  not  hecollecinl  instioh  state  I'autlk.  That  ibc 
members  of  the  Senate  and  FTiMitc  nf  Representatives  shall  fir  in- 
eligible to.  and  inca|»hlei:fholilint;  any  civil  oHiccuiidcT the  aiilhor- 
ily  of  the  United  Slates,  during  the  time  for  which  Ihty  slull  reijiec- 
lively  l>e  etccled.  Fifth.  That  the  journals  of  Ihe  |iruceedin^s  of 
the  Sctiilr'arid  Huuieof  K epicscn tat i«es shall  bvinihlisheHl  nl  Irxsl 
uoee  ill  eveiy  yc^r.  except  such  pirls  thcieol  retalinu  to  treaties. 
alli-Mices,  or  iiiilit.i<ry  opei.tiioiis.  as  in  their  jud^nvnt  require 
secrecy.  Sixth.  That  a  regular  statement  and  ncroiint  of  the 
receipts  and  cxprniliium  ol  jmhlic  money  shall  he  pubtishctl  At 
least  once  a  ye;ir.  Sri'fHth.  That  no  cnminerciAl  treaty  shall 
be  ratified  willwxii  the  concurrence  o(  Iwo-thinlsot  the  whole 
number  of  the  nieinbers  uf  Ihe  Senate;  and  nu  ticaty.  ceding, 
contracting,  resliaining  or  stispending  the  tcitiloii.d  ri);hls  or 
claims  of  the  United  States,  or  any  ol  litem,  or  then,  or  nn^of  ibeir 
rights  or  claims  to  fi-shing  in  the  Adicrican  seas,  or  nnvigaimg  ibc 
Arnerican  rii-crs.  shall  be  mailc,  hut  in  cases  of  ihe  mnsi  urgent  nnd 
extreme  necesMly,  nor  ^h.sll  any  such  treaty  be  ratilied  without  ibe 
concurrence  0<  three-fourths  of  the  whole  number  of  (he  members 
ol  boili  IwMses  respectirely.  Eii;hth.  Thai  no  navigation  law,  or 
law  rcgulaiing  comnicicc.  shall  be  passed  wtiboui  ibe  cotiseni  ol 
Iwo-thlrds  of  ih<  members  picseni  m  both  houses.  Ninth.  That 
no  standing  army  or  regular  troops  shall  be  raised  or  kei>t  up  in 
lime  of  peaice.  wiiliaui  the  consent  of  two-thirds  o(  the  members 
present  in  bolh  liouscs.     Ttnlh,  Thai  no  soldier  shall  be  cnlislcd 


63« 


^M£.\DM&KTS  OF  VIKGIXIA. 


II 


for  any  longet  Icim  itian  (our  years,  eicqH  In  liiitr  of  war, . 
llicn    tor   no    longer   irrm    Ihnn  ttir  coiiiintiaticc    of    ilie 
KlrVfitk.   That  rncli  stale  rcspcc lively.  \li.4l1  luive  the  piraTi 
piQi'itle  for  orK^inizinf;.  nmiing.  ami  dUciplinine   it«   own  milic 
wIi«nioeTer  Coiigresi  ihalloniit  or  nfj{'cct  to  pmvitlr  for  ih*i 
Tli^l  the  initiiid  uliuil  not  be  sitbjecl  to  inarlml  Uw.  cxcrm  uhmi 
HctUJil  brrviee  in  time  ul  w:ir,  invaiion.  or  rrl>rllian  ;  anri  when  i 
In  tlic  actual  m:i  I'icc  of  the  United  State*.  »ltall  In-  sulijcct  i 
]>ikIi   fines.   pi.-ii,i1tic«,  and   puniiiliiiittiis  as   sh:<ll    be    ilirrc 
infllclcd    by   ihc   Uws   of    its  o%vn    state.      T^tul/tM.    Tha 
cxcluxivc  |iovn:r  o(  Ir^UUtinn  given  lo  ConRrrss  over  ihc  {r. 
town, and  its»d)jicent  disinct.  and  mlier  iilaccs  purctia&evi  i 
purdUMd  by  ConKress  ul  any  dI  the  italcs.  ntuil   cxtrrtd 
buchreguIalionaa»  lespecl  the  jKilitcaiid  j-wid  f;overnincnt  <l 
TkirltfHlh.  Thai  no  iicrsofi  thill  be  capable  o(   beinR 
of  the  United   States  lor  ntorc  ihan  eiEnl  vejirs   in  any  temi  < 
MXIrcn  years.     Fi-urUtntb.   That  the  judicial  power  ol  itic  UnH 
Stale*  siiall  be  vesleii  in  one  Stiprrmc  Court,  and  in  Kiii'h  couiUt 
adniiialtv  at  Congress  may  from  time  to  lime  ord.-iin  anil  eyiat' 
in  any  of  iIk  diflcreril  states.     Tlw  judicial  |)ower  shall  rxteadi 
all  cases  in   Uw  and  equity  aiiim)-  under  treaties  mnde.  or  whir 
shall   be   made,   under   the   aulhvnty   nl   the   L'ntletJ    Stales;  \\ 
all    ca&e&    aRecling    aniba^Mtdois.  other  lorei^ii    nuniuer, 
consuls;  10  all  cases  of  admiralty  and   mantirne   juritdit 
to  controversies  lo  which  the  United  Stales  shall  be  a  par 
controversies  between  iwo  or  more  slates;  and  bctH-een  pan* 
clainiinK  land.t  under  Ihe  frants  of  different  slates.     In  allcaH 
aHeciing  amiusuidnrs.  other  furei^   ininiiten  and   cnnsul*.! 
ihosc  in  which  a  slate  shall  \te  a   |"ariy.  ll>c  S«i)Heme  Coiitl 
have  original  JoriMliclion  ;  in  all  other  cavt  befme  rnenlkined.  tk 
SuptenM  Couit  shall  have  appellate  jurisdiction  a«  lo  rnaliera  oJba 
only;  except  in  cases  of  ei^uily.  nnd  of  admiralty   aiiA   matilin 
jurisdiction,   in   which   the  Supreme  Court   shall    harrr   a| 
jarUdiclMMi.  bolH  as  to  law  and  fact,  with   socti  cxcrplti 
untlef  »l>eh   regulationi  as   the   Congresi  shall   make, 
juitictal  power  of  ilie  United  States  shall  eitetid  to  no  na 
llie  cause  ol  action  shall  have  originated  before  Ihe  raliff 
thn  ronstilulion  ;  earcpt  in  disputes  between  states   about 
lefrilnry.   disputes   1>elwccn    persons   claimint;    lands   Mnitrt   It 
Srant*  ol  diflerent  states,  and  suii»  Im  dcbii  due  tn  the  Un 
Slates.     FifUtnlM.  Thai  in  criminal  proseirultona  no   nun 
be  r>Mtmii>ed  in  Ihe  exercise  of  the  usual  and  accuMomed 
chalienginj;  or  eicepting;  to  the  jury.     Sixtetntk,  Thai  C« 
Khali  noi  alter,  modify,  or  interfere  in  the  times,  ptacn,  ne  ii 
tA  holding  eirrlions  for  senators  and  rcpresenlai'ves.  or  eilheri 
Iheni.  except  when  the  leKislalure  o(  any  Slate  sh.i'l  nrclrrl.  rH'-'i^.l 
or  be  dbabled   t>y   invasion  or  relicllion.  to   [i- 
StvtHtfeatk.  Th.it  those  clauses  whtch  derl.-ir*  i 
not  eiercise certnin  power*  l>e  n^  ■  'cd  n\  .in;, 

«oe»er  to  extend  the  powers  n(  llui  th.i 

cOfutnKd  either  «■  nkaiing  exccjiiivii^  lo  Um  sftrciiinl 


W«l       AMEiVDME.VTS  Of-'  VIRGINIA  AXD  K.  V.         <>39 

where  this  slull  be  tlie  ca&e.  or  aihcnvise  as  tnwned  merely  for 
greater  caution.  EigkiitfHih.  TtiJt  the  Iaa-<)  aMcrlaining  llie 
corn  |i«n  141  ion  to  nctiJtors  and  icpresrniatives  (or  their  service*,  be 
potiponed  in  their  tiperalioii.  uniil  ;ilier  ihe  election  of  rcpreSMiI- 
nliTri  immediately  xucccedinE  the  pauln^  thereof :  th.it  excepted, 
which  slull  first  be  ]Mue<l  en  ihc  subject.  NinrUeiith.  iTiat 
scene  tribunal  Olhci  than  the  Seriate  be  providcil  for  IryiiiK  inipe.ieh- 
menu  of  senalocs.  TtvtHlielh.  Tliat  the  siiiary  of  a  juduc  shall  not 
be  Increased  or  diminished  during  liis  continuance  In  omce,  other* 
wise  tlian  by  general  regulations  of  s.ilary  which  may  take  place  on 
a  revision  of  the  subject  at  slalcil  periods  of  not  less  than  seven 
jreaJs,  to  coinmencc  from  the  lime  such  salaries  shall  be  fiisl 
asceriained  bv  Cun^-iess.  And  the  convention  do,  in  the  nunic 
anil  behati  of  the  people  of  Ihis  Codiinonweatth.  enjoin  it  upon 
their  rcpresentatii'es  in  Congress,  (o  exert  alt  tbeir  niflucnce.  and 
use  all  reasoiiiihle  and  legal  methods  to  obi.iin  n  ratification  of  the 
(oiegoinj;  altciaiuins  and  provisions,  in  ihi'  in.inner  provided  by  the 
Afth  article  of  the  said  constitution  ;  nnil  in  all  congrcHiunal  liiw.s 
to  be  passed  in  (he  meantime,  to  conform  lo  the  spirit  of  those 
ainendmenis  as  far  as  iIk  said  constitution  will  admit. 

AHEKDMEKTS  PROPIKED  BY  THE    COKVENTION  OF  NEW 
YORK,    1788. 

We.  tlie  flelegaies  of  lite  people  of  the  State  of  New  York,  duly 
elected  and  met  in  convention,  having  maturely  eonsjdcinl  llie 
consiiititton  for  the  United  States  of  America,  agreed  to  on  ihe 
sevenicenlh  day  of  Srpirmbcr.  in  the  year  one  thousand  seven 
hiinilrcil  and  eiglity-sevi-n.  by  the  convention  itien  assembled  at 
riiiladelphia.  In  the  commomvc.iltli  of  Pennsylv.inia,  (a  cojiy 
whereof  precedes  these  presents)  and  haling  also  serlouslv  and 
itdiberatctgr  consideieil  Ihe  picscBt  situation  of  the  United  States, 
Do  declare  aixt  m.ike  known, 

That  all  power  is  oiiginally  vested  in  and  consequently  derived 
from  the  people,  ami  thai  government  is  instituted  by  Ihcm  (or 
their  common  Interest,  protection  and  security. 

That  the  enjoyment  of  life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness, 
are  euentiil  riffhls  which  every  ({OvernmenI  ought  lo  respect  and 
preserve. 

That  tlie  powers  of  gm-emment  may  he  reassumed  bj'  llie 
people,  whensoever  it  shall  become  necessary  (o  their  hapumcss ; 
that  every  power,  jurisil  let  ion  ami  right,  which  is  not  by  the  said 
constitulion  clearly  delegated  lo  the  Congress  of  the  Unltnl 
Stales,  or  the  BejariTnetiis  uf  the  gm*etnmenl  thereof,  remains  lo 
Ihe  people  of  the  several  stales,  or  to  their  respective  slate  govern- 
ments, to  whiMi)  they  may  have  grante<l  the  same;  and  that  iltose 
clauses  In  the  s.iid  constitution,  which  declare,  tlviii  Congress  shall 
no!  have  or  rxeieise  certain  powers,  do  not  imply  that  Congress 
is  enlilkd  to  any  powers  not  given  by  the  s.-iid  constitution  ;  Ixii 
sucli  clauses  are  to  be  construed  either  .is  exceptions  to  certain 
speclDed  powers,  or  as  inieited  merely  (or  greater  caulion. 


6^0 


AMEA'D.VE!<rTS  OF  KSXV    VOJ^fC. 


Thai  ih«  people  hnvc  ai>  equal,  nalu ml  nn<l  uniilirnsb!?  rifH 
freely  nn<l  peaceably  to  exercise  llvclr  religion,  jiccuidinc  to  Ui 
dicuirs  of  conscience ;  nnil  ilini  no  rclt^out  hect  or  MtCKiy  ou|[li 
to  be  f.ivoTcd  or  c5ial>1iK)irii  hy  l.iw  in  preference  o(  others. 

Th.-il  the  people  h.ive  a  right  to  keep  and   bear  nrrns;   Ihll 
well  regulaleil  iiiililLa.  iiK'ludlnK  the  bod^r  of  (he  people  ^aiaUr  , 
during  arm),  ik  the  proper,  iiatuijil,  and  sale  detente  ut  a  Im 
stale. 

Tlifll  llie  miliila  should  not  be  subjcci  lo  inani.il  law.  excepi  i 
lime  of  vi';ir.  rebdlinii  or  inKuirccliini. 

That  M.imlii>K  .Kiniri^  in  lime  of  pcice  nie  dangerous  U>  IBmtI' 
an^l  <>t)K)u  not  lu  he  kept  up.  cice|>I  iit  ciise!>  of  nrrrsuiy.  and  (hi* 
ai  all  tiine^  (he  niiliUiy  >hoii1d  be  uiulei  strict  mi bordt nation  lo  tin 
civil  pi>Wixr. 

That  ill  linte  of  peace  no  soldier  ought  to  be  qunnetvd  m 
house  without  the  consent  of  ihc  owiKr;  and  in  (ittie  ul  war.  o«l] 
liy  ihc  civil  maifisiiiatc,  in  such  nuinncr  as  ihc  laws  may  dtrctx 

That  no  prnon  niishi  to  be  t;iken.  inipiiHtneil  or  diitseued  <4 
his  (reehirfd,  or  tic  exilcil  or  depiivrd  nf  tiis  pririlcgrs.  franchuei) 
life,  liberty  or  piupviiy.  but  by  doe  proccM  of  Uw. 

That  no  perioii  ou^Ul  lo  be  pat  twice  in  fcoiMrily  of  life  or  ll»il 
for  one  and  the  same  offense,  nor.  unless  in  case  ul  iinpcaclunent 
be  piml'slietl  more  ih.in  once  lor  tlie  same  o(Tcii*e, 

Thai   every  person   ipstr^inn)  of   his  lilictty   is  entitled  la 
inquiry  into  the  lawfulitrss  fA  Mich  restraint,  and  (u  a  rrmon 
thereof  if  unlawful,  and  that  such  inqtiiiy  and  removid  oujrhl 
to  be  (knie<l  or  delayed.  etce|tt  wheii.on  account  of  publii-  dani^n, 
the  Cuii|>(csx  shall  sus|>eiMl  the  ptivikge  of  the  writ  of   Habu' 
Coipus. 

That  eicessive  hsti  ought  not  to  be  required ;  nor  exceulw  ftnc 
imposed  ;  iMir  cruel  or  unusual  punisbmeiiis  infficied. 

TImi  (except  in  ihe  );;n\'rrntneiil  of  the  land  .ind  naval  farces.aaa 
of  the  iiiililia  when  in  acliiat  srniee.^inil  in  raiicsof  inijir.i   '  i 
a  presenliiicnl  or  indicimcnt  by  a  Krand  jury  ought  lo  \tr  , 
n«  a  necc»ary  prchminaty  to  the  (rial  of  all  crimen  copinr.iiiii 
Ihe  judiciary  of  the  Uniicd  Slate* ;  and  sm^h  trial  shoulillie  s 
public,  and  by  an  impatlial  )ur>'  of  the  i-uuniy  where  ihe 
was  cunimiiied  -  and  ihai  no  person  can  be  found  Ko^'y  wii 
■  he  unanimous  consent  nfsiich  jury,     flul  in  rases  of  ninti 
comnulleti  within  any  coiinly  of  any  of  Ihe   l.'nileil   .Stal 
in  cases  of  crimes  coininilted  within  any  county  la  which  a  i. 
insurrection  may  prcTail,  or  which  may  be  in  ihc  pi««-ss'on  irf fi" 
foreign  i-iieiny.  (be  inquiry  and  liial  m.iy  be  in  such  counly  as  ihe 
Cont;<eM  shall  bv  law  direcl  ;   which  county  in  the  Iwo  casn  tan 
meniioited,  Nlioiild  l>e  as  near  as  convenienily  may  be  lo 
C0un(y  in  which  ihr  crime  may  hare  tiern  coinmided.     And 
in  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accu:ied  nuKhl   Id  be  intoi 
the  caiKe  and  nutuie  ol  his  acciitaiion.  to  tic  i      '..  'h 

necuieis  ami  (tic  wiliieuo  iiKaniM  hini.  lu  )iav> 
ilucini;  the  ivitnesscs,  and  Die  assis(ancc  of  cou»i  ■<  ,,:  u^.  ,..\ 
and  should  not  l>e  compelled  lo  sire  evxlcflce  againit  Iiinitelf. 


17S8I 


AAtF.XDMEXTS  OF  XEW   YOXK^. 


641 


TI1.1i  Uic  ItLil  by  jury  in  ihe  extrni  lliat  it  ohuins  by  itie  00m- 
ninn  law  of  Knfjlanil.  L«  one  at  tliir  |{re.ii<:M  lecuriiics  \o  the  rights 
of  ;i  free  people,  and  oiij[lil  U>  teniaiti  inviulult.-. 

Tliat  ever)*  fteein^n  liasi  a  riglii  10  be  stcufC  from  all  uoreAson- 
able  searches  itnd  wittun  «(  bis  person,  tii'i  papers  or  his  properly ; 
anil  ilierefoce.  thai  .til  warrants  to  scAich  suspected  place%.  or  sciic 
any  (tceman,  hU  papers  or  propcny.  without  intoimaiion  upon 
o;ilh  or  affinnation  of  sufficient  naiisc.  Are  {{ticvoui  ami  ii|>{ireMive  ; 
and  lliat  all  general  warranU.  (oriuch  in  which  llie  place  or  person 
su«pecietlaie  nal  particularly  designate il)  are  dantferuus  aiKToutjht 
not  to  be  (granted. 

That  lite  people  have  a  tif-ht  peaceably  to  assemble  together  lo 
consult  for  thnr  common  gfMiiJ,  or  to  instruct  llieir  rcprescnialivcs. 
and  ilial  ever)'  person  has  a  right  10  pclition  or  apply  10  the  irgi»- 
talure  for  mlrrvt  of  grievances. 

That  tlbc  lieciloin  of  the  press  ought  not  lo  be  violated  or 
TCMraineil. 

That  there  should  be  once  in  four  ycart.  an  election  of  llic 
pfi-sideiit  and  vice  piesident.  so  tkit  no  oflicer  ivho  may  be  ap- 
|)i>iiitetl  by  the  Congress  load  as  Ptcsideni.ln  case  of  the  removal, 
dc.*ih.  rcsignalion  Of  inability  o(  the  president  an<l  vice  president, 
can  ill  any  ea.ie  continue  to  act  l>eyond  the  lermination  of  the 
period  for  which  the  last  preiidcnt  and  vice  presiiienl  wci-e  elected. 

That  nothing  coiil.-iined  in  the  taid  conslitution.  is  lo  be  con- 
strued to  prevent  the  IcK'^'-'Iute  of  ,iny  state  from  puiing  lau-s  in 
Its  discretion,  from  time  to  time,  to  divide  aiich  state  into  conven* 
ieni  districi*.  and  to  appoiiioti  its  rc|)ruent>lives  to,  and  amonssl 
&ucb  districts. 

Thai  the  prohibition  conlalned  in  the  said  constitution,  against 
ex  post  facto  Uws.  emend*  only  to  laws  concerning  crimes. 

Thai  all  appeaU  in  causes,  dclrrminable  according  to  ilie  course 
of  the  common  law,  ought  to  be  by  writ  of  error,  and  not  other- 
wise. 

Th,il  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States,  in  cases  in  which 
a  state  may  be  a  party,  does  not  extend  to  criniiTial  prosecutioiM. 
or  to  aiitlioriite  any  suit  by  any  person  against  a  state. 

Thai  the  judicial  piiwerof  the  Uniled  Siales.as  to  eonimversies 
t)etivccn  ciliicns  of  ihc  sante  slate,  claiming  laniU  under  grants  of 
different  stales,  is  not  to  be  contlrucd  lo  extend  to  any  other  con- 
troversies between  them,  except  those  which  tclale  to  s»ich  lands, 
so  claimed,  under  grants  of  different  stales. 

That  the  juiisdictioii  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  Siatei. 
or  of  any  other  court  to  be  instiTuted  by  the  Congi^eM,  U  not  in 
«nv  ciEC  to  lie  increased,  enlarged,  or  extended,  by  any  fiction, 
collusion  or  mere  suggestion ;  and  that  no  treaty  is  lo  be  contirued, 
so  to  opemle,  as  lo  alter  the  constitution  of  any  Klate. 

Ut>der  these  impressions,  and  decJaring  that  the  rights  aforesaid 
cannot  Ik  abridgeil  or  violated,  and  that  Ibe  explanations  afore- 
said, are  Mnsisicnl  with  the  said  conslitulion.  and  i»  contidence 
that  the  ar»endments  which  shall  hat-e  been  proposed  to  the  said 

nsiitution,  will  receive  an  eaily  and  mature  considernuon  :    Wq 


641 


amexdmeaVts  of  new  roRjir. 


IITM 


the  whI  drWatn.  in  llie  name  and  in  llie  behaU  of  thr  p<-(ifife 
of  (lie  St.itt  of  New  Vof  It,  Do,  Uy  tliese  pTei«nl»,  asieni  lo  and  R»l- 
i\y  ihc  &«i(l  coiiDiilution.  In  full  con6ilence.  neveiihelcsa.  thai  until 
a  conveniion  shall  be  called  and  convened  lor  proposini;  Ainend' 
mcntt  10  the  said  conttiiulion.  ihe  miliiii  of  this  M.itc  uill  not  br 
continued  in  service  out  of  this  tt^tc  (or  a  longer  trim  than  sii 
ureehk,  without  (he  consent  of  the  Icgislnture  ihcrcof:  that  the 
Congress  will  not  make  or  alter  any  regulation  in  ihU  aXaXc. 
resfeciing  (he  limes,  placvi.  and  manner  o(  holding  elections  tor 
servaiore  or  representatives,  unless  the  Icct^lature  ol  ttiis  »taie  &tiall 
neglect  or  refuse  to  make  laws  or  regulations  for  the  purpose,  or 
from  any  ci  re  u  instance  be  incapable  of  mafcine  the  same:  *»d  tliai 
in  (hose  ca«ei  such  power  urill  only  br  cictcttcd  until  the  legisla- 
ture of  this  tilate  shall  make  provision  in  the  premises  :  that  no 
eiLcisc  will  lie  imposed  on  any  article  of  the  growth,  production  or 
manufaciute  of  Die  United  Slates,  or  any  of  them,  within  ilia 
slate,  ardent  spirits  excepted  ;  and  thai  ihc  Congress  will  not  lay 
direct  taxes  withm  iliia  stale,  but  when  the  ntone^'samlng  fiomitc 
impost  and  excise  shall  he  ■nsufficirnl  for  ihe  public  eilgencirs. 
nor  then,  until  Congress  shall  first  have  made  a  rrijutsitirin  upon 
lhi«  stair  to  as%rH.  levy  and  pay  the  amount  of  such  rrquiMtion, 
made  agreeably  to  the  census  fixed  in  tl>e  sawl  con  il  it  u  I  ton,  in  sucb 
way  anil  manner  as  the  legislature  ol  this  Stale  shall  judK«  best ; 
bul  that  m  lucli  case,  if  ihe  state  shall  neglect  or  refuur  to  pay  ils 
propOTiion  pursuant  lo  such  ret|uisilion,  then  tite  Con£rcss  may 
assess  and  let'y  ihis  state's  proportion,  together  with  interest  al 
lite  rate  of  six  per  centum  per  annum,  from  ihc  lime  ai  whkh  Ihe 
same  was  required  to  be  paid, 

.  .  .  And  tKr  convention  do,  in  Ihc  name  and  tichalf  of  the  peo|)tr 
of  IIk  State  of  New  York,  enjoin  it  upon  their  reprcscninlivrs  in  ilie 
Congress,  to  exert  all  their  influence  and  use  all  reaiunalilr  tnrans 
lo  obtain  a  ratification  of  Ihe  following  amendments  lo  the  saMi 
conitilulion  in  the  manner  pmcril>ed  therein  ;  and  in  all  taws  lO 
be  passed  by  Ihe  CongreM  m  the  mean  lime,  to  conform  lo  the 
spirit  of  the  said  amenomrnts  as  far  as  the  consliluiion  will  adm'l. 

That  there  shall  he  one  rrpmenlalivc  for  every  thirty  thousand 
inhabitants,  accordini;  lo  the  enuii>cnilian  or  cco^iui  mrnlioned  in 
llvecunstiiulion,  until  the  whole  numlierof  rejiresrnialivcs  amounts 
to  two  hundrni :  alter  which  that  number  shall  t>e  i-nriijriiinl  ur 
iitcmsed.  bul  not  diminished,  as  Congress  shall  direci  \A- 

ing  lo  such  ratio  as  the  Congress  uial)  fix.  in  conf<  r  _  'nc 
rule  presrribed  lor  the  apportionmenl  ol  reprrtrnta lives  awl 
direct  (axe^. 

Thai  Ihe  Congreis  do  not  impose  any  rxciie  aa  any  article 
(ardent  spirits  excepted)  of  the  growth,  production  or  manutaciutc 
of  Ihc  Uniic^l  Sinlri.  or  any  ol  them. 

That  the  Congress  do  not  lay  diteri  taxes,  hat  when  Ibe  tnnncra 
arising  from  the  impost  and  excise,  sliall  l>e  in     ""  '      'lie 

puhlic  exigencies,  nor  then,  until  Congress  shall  Ir 

a  requisition  upon  the  stairs,  to  assess,  levy  and  juj  (•■€  u  ir-.|.i-r- 
tivc  proportioo  ol  stidi  requisition,  agreeabty  to  ihe  cvrbu*  ^*it 


17Hi 


AMEAfDMBffTS  OF  S'EW    YORK. 


643 


in  ihc  sakI  conMtlution.  in  such  way  and  manner,  as  the  legbbtutc 
d(  the  r««p<«tlt'e  simes  ^ihall  judge  best  :^an(l  in  iiucli  case,  if  anv 
stair  sh.iil  ncglcGi  or  (cfus«  10  |}ay  iis  piojionion,  pur&uani  losucn 
requisilmn.  Ihun  CoiigTCH  nuy  assess  itnd  levy  sucji  stale's  pro- 
porlion.  tu^FiIier  with  interest  at  the  late  of  six  per  centum  per 
.iiiiium.  ([uiti  ihe  lime  of  payment,  prescribed  in  such  requJKiliOii. 
Thai  \\\<t  CuaxieM  shall  not  make  ar  ditcr  any  (CKulaiKin,  in  any 
state.  res|icctin);  (lie  time^.  places  and  manner  of  holding  elections 
lor  senal'>is  or  represcntalivcs.  unk'»«  the  legisUlure  of  such  slate 
shall  neglect  or  refuse  to  ni^ke  laws  or  rc^utatii>ns  (or  thepuipose, 
or  from  any  citctmit^iance  he  incap.ihlc  of  marine  the  same,  and 
then  only,  until  the  legi:ilatuie  of  such  sljitetlioU  make  provision 
in  the  premises :  providcil  that  Congieu  nuy  preacrilie  the  lime 
(or  llie  election  ol  [epreseiilalit'cx. 

That  no  peisurii.  except  natural  born  ciliiens.  or  such  as  were 
citifeiis  on  or  before  (he  41!)  d.ty  of  July.  1776.  or  such  as  helil 
commissions  undct  (he  United  Sutcs  uuriii];  the  war.  and  have  at 
any  time,  vitce  (he4lh  day  of  July,  1776,  become  citizens  of  one  or 
other  of  the  Uniled  .St.iles.  .-inil  who  ^hall  be  freclioklers.  shall  be 
dizlbic  to  the  prices  of  pre^idrnt.  vice  i)resi<!cnt.  or  nictnbers  o( 
eilher  house  ol  the  Congress  of  the  United  Slates. 

That  the  Congress  do  not  ctani  monopolies,  or  erecl  any  com- 
p.iny.  with  eiclusive  advanuges  ol  commerce. 

That  no  slanding  aimy  or  regular  troops  slia  11  be  raised,  or  kept 
up  m  lime  of  peace,  uiilioui  the  consent  of  iwo-ihirds  of  the  sena- 
tors and  repri^eni.iiivrs  pres'ui  in  e-ach  house. 

That  no  money  be  borrowed  nn  the  credit  of  the  United  State* 
williuut  the  assent  of  luro^thinls  of  the  senators  and  repmcntativcs 
present  in  eacli  house. 

That  (he  Congie**  shall  not  declare  war  wi(houi  the  conctir- 
reiice  of  invo-thitds  of  the  senators  and  icpreseniaiivcs  picscni  in 
cacti  house. 

Thai  ihe  privileKC  of  ihe  Habeas  Corpus  shall  not  by  any  law  be 
suspended  for  a  longer  trim  ihan  six  months,  or  until  twenty  days 
after  the  mccllnjc  of  the  Conxrcss  next  following  the  passing  (be 
act  for  such  sus|iensioiu 

That  (be  rij;lii  ul  the  Congress  to  exercise  exclusive  Icgistaiion 
over  such  district,  not  excccilmg  ten  miles  square,  as  may  by  ces- 
sion of  a  particular  stare,  and  the  acce^^iancc  ol  Congress,  become 
the  seat  of  Ihe  government  of  Ihe  United  Slates,  sliall  not  be  so 
exercised  as  lo  cxempl  ihe  mb.ibiianis  ol  such  dislrict  from  paving 
ibc  like  taxes.  im|M)sis.  duties  and  excises,  as  sh;dl  be  iitipuscii  on 
the  other  inhabitants  of  the  stale  in  which  such  ilisirivl  may  be; 
and  titai  no  {lenuo  shall  be  privileged  within  ilic  said  disiiici  ftoiti 
arrcsi  for  crimes  coiDiniticd.  or  debts  conliacied  out  o(  the  said 
disiricl. 

That  the  right  of  eiclusire  iegislalion  with  respect  10  such 
places  ax  may  be  puichaseil  for  ihe  erection  of  forts,  magazines, 
arsenals,  dock-yards,  and  other  nccilfui  buildings,  stiall  not  author- 
i»  the  CongreM  to  make  any  'a>v  lo  |>rcveot  the  laws  of  tlie  stales 
respectively  in  wliich  they  may  be,  (lom  extending  to  such  pbccs 


644 


AMENPAfS/t^TS  OF  KBIV   VOIUC. 


Ksm 


In  all  rivil  and  criintnal  maiten.  cxoepi  as  to  uich  persona  u  shall 
bt  in  ihcr  Kivicc  uf  \\\t  United  SUUa;  nor  to  ihemwith  rvspectW 
ciini»coTiimittc(I  wiiliout  &uGb  plwccs. 

Tim  ihc  coti)pcits:(tion  (or  th«  ^cnntors  and  reprrMniaiives  be 
asccrtniiKd  by  tt-mding  laws;  ami  thai  no  ntlri;ilK>n  of  ihr  nitl- 
'\n%  rale  of  compcns.iiioii  «h»II  o|>etalc  fut  the  I>ciirtii  of  the  repn- 
scnlativea.  unlit  after  a  siilncqucnt  election  khall  hutc  been  Had. 

That  the  journal  ul  tbc  Co«igie«s  shnll  be  inibli^bcd  at  teau 
once  a  year,  with  the  rxcipiion  oT&uch  |karls  reUtini;  tg  tieaiie«ai 
iiittitary  opeiaiions.  M9  In  ihe  judgnicnl  o(  either  hoiiiir  shall  n- 
<|uirc  srcd-cy;  and  th.fl  both  houM-t «(  Congrrw  shall  alwny&kcep 
their  lioorK  oprii  during  iheir  nevMons.  unless  tlic  buiinra*  fnay  \t\ 
their  opinion  require  nrctecy.  ThnI  the  )Yni  and  nay*  shall  bt 
enlerrd  on  the  jouriinli  whenever  two  n)cnibct«  in  either  houic 
may  tcquitc  iL 

I'hal  no  capitation  tax  shall  erer  be  laid  by  the  Congres*, 

1'hai  no  person  slmll  be  eligible  as  a  senator  (or  more  than  tli 
yenrt  \\\  xny  leini  of  twelve  ycais ;  and  that  the  legisUlurrs  o(  llic 
respective  stales  may  rfeall  Iheir  Benalom  or  either  of  Ibriti,  •nil 
elect  other*  in  their  stciul.  to  serve  the  rrmaindcr  of  the  lime  lor 
which  the  senators  to  recalled  were  ap|>ointe(l. 

That  no  senator  or  rcprcientative  shall,  durfntf  ihe  time  for 
which  he  was  ekcted.be  appointed  to  anyolTioeuitdeTlhcaulharily 
of  the  Uni!e<l  Slates. 

Tliai  ihc  antlioi'ity  gircn  to  the  eiecuiives  of  lite  stales  to  fill  th> 
vacancies  of  senators  be  abolished,  and  that  suchvACitnefesbeflUel 
by  the  respective  Icgislaluies. 

Thai  the  power  of  Confess  to  pats  nniform  law*  concerwne 
bnnkmpicy,  shall  only  exieiiil  to  merchants  ami  other  traders :  and 
that  Ihe  slates  lespeclively  may  pass  laws  Xon  the  relief  of  oilrtt 
insultent  debtors. 

That  no  |>er»on  slull  he  ctigibte  to  tlK  office  oj  president  ol  tlW 
United  Slates,  a  ihiid  tin>e. 

niat  the  executive  slutll  not  giant  psrdons  |nr  irrason,  unirs* 
inlh  the  consent  of  llie  Congress:  but  may,  al  his  discreiitin.gniK 
rcgirirves  to  peisnns  convicted  of  treasoa,  until  their  coses  can  be 
litid  before  I  lie  Con]i>iess. 

That  the  pccaidenl.  or  pervin  eaerciHing  his  powers  for  (he  tifii' 
beinc.  shall  not  comniAnd  an  army  in  the  ficM  in  pernon,  tvillioul 
the  pivviout  desiic  of  the  Congress, 

Thai  .ill  li-iiers  iMlrnl.  commUsiotis,  p.irdons. writs  and  proorors 
of  the  t'niled  Stales,  shall  run  in  the  name  of  Mc;*--*'-r-' f4/ 
Vni/fii  Staltt.  and  lie  tested  in  the  name  of  the  prt  ■  ■  i>.r 

United  Slaio.  or  the  jierson  eieicisin^'  his  poikcrs  k.  ....  iime 
lM>ing.  or  ttie  liist  Jwlse  of  the  court  out  of  which  the  san>e  shall 
iswie.  as  the  case  may  lie. 

That  the  Conc'ess  shall  not  conslilnte,  orilain.  or  '  ngr 

triUlnals  or  inferior  eonrts.  with  .iny  olhrr  than  appeil  l>c- 

tion.  except  such  as  may  be  neceisary  for  the  triid  ul  KaM^e»  ot 
adnliraliy,  «nil  luaritinie  Jufisdictiun.  anil  (or  the  trial  i>t  piracwi 
anil  tdonkt  cotnmiticd  on  the  high  seas;  and  in  all  other  ca>e*,to 


17W 


AMENDMENTS  OP  NEW  YORK. 


fi« 


which  the  judicial  power  of  Ihe  Unitnt  Slates  extends,  anti  in 
which  itie  xupicroe  coun  of  the  t.'nitcd  Stale*  ku  not  on^inol 
juriiidicliun,  the  nuiet  shall  be  heard,  tried,  and  determined,  in 
some  one  of  the  lUite  courU.  will)  the  riglu  of  appeal  to  the  supteme 
court  of  itie  Uniied  States,  or  other  proper  tiibuaal.  to  be  estab- 
lished lor  that  purpo^.  by  the  Congreu.  with  such  exceptions,  and 
under  such  regutaiion^  as  the  Congress  «halt  make. 

That  the  court  for  the  trial  of  intpeachmmts  sliall  consist  of  the 
senate,  the  jutlgct  of  the  supreme  conn  of  the  United  States,  and 
llie  first  or  senior  jud^'e.  for  rhe  lime  beine.  of  Ihe  hishest  court o( 
jfeneral  and  ordinary  cuinniun  law  jurisdiction  in  eacn  Mate :  that 
UM  Congress  shall,  by  siandlu^-  laws,  designate  the  courts  in  ihc 
respective  suites  answering  this  descripiion,  and  in  states  having 
no  courts  cxacilv  answering  this  description,  shall  designate  some 
other  court,  preferring  such,  if  nny  there  be,  whose  jtidee  or  judgcj 
may  hold  their  places  during cood  behavior:  provided  thai  no  more 
thjn  one  judge,  olher  than  judges  of  Ihr  supreme  court  of  the 
United  Slatct.  shall  come  from  one  state. 

That  the  Congress  be  aulhoriKed  to  p:iss  laws  (or  compensatinj; 
the  judg»  for  such  services,  iind  for  compelling  their  attendance ; 
and  that  a  majority  at  least  of  the  said  judges  Miall  be  requisite  to 
constitute  the  said  court.  That  no  person  impeached  shall  sii  as 
a  member  thereof —that  each  nicmbcr  sliall,  previous  lo  the  enter- 
ing upon  any  irial.  lake  an  oaih  or  affirmation,  honestly  and  im- 
parli.tlly  to  hear  am)  determine  ihe  cause  ;  and  (hat  a  majority  of 
the  mcml>crs  prevnt  shall  be  nece^vtry  lo  a  conviction. 

That  perKms  .iKgrieved  by  any  judgment,  sentence  or  decree  o( 
the  supreme  court  ul  Ihe  United  Stales  in  any  cause  in  which  that 
court  nas  original  jurisdiction,  with  such  exceptions  and  under 
such  regtilations  as  llie  Congress  shall  make  concerning  llie  same, 
diall  upon  application,  have  a  commission,  to  be  isstied  by  the 
nresideot  of  the  United  Stales,  to  such  men  learned  in  ihc  law  as 
Itc  sh.-dl  nominate,  and  by  and  ivith  the  advice  and  con^rnl  ol  the 
senate  appoint  not  Icxs  than  seven,  authoriiini;  such  commissioners, 
or  any  seven  or  more  of  ihcm.  to  correct  the  errors  in  such  judg* 
incnt,  or  to  review  such  sentence,  and  decree  as  (lie  case  may  be, 
and  lo  do  justice  to  the  parties  in  the  premises. 

That  no  judge  of  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  »haU 
hold  any  other  office  under  the  United  Stales,  or  any  of  them. 

Th.it  the  iiidici.-il  power  ol  ilic  Uniied  States  shall  cxterMl  to  no 
cnnirorcrr.ies  rcjqiccling  land,  unless  it  relate  to  claims  of  territory 
or  jurisdiciion  between  ii.iies.  or  lo  claims  of  bnd  between  indi- 
vifluals.  or  between  slates  and  individuals  under  (he  sraiits  of 
(tide tent  states. 

That  the  mdiiia  of  any  state  sliall  not  be  compdled  10  serve  with- 
out the  limits  of  the  stale  for  a  longer  term  than  tli  weeks,  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  legislaliiie  thereof, 

1'hat  the  wonis  n-it/iout  ihr  tatt-wnl  of  tht  Coi^rtfS.  in  the 
seventh  clause  of  the  ninth  section  of  tiM  first  ankle  ol  the  con- 
Milulion  tie  exjMinged. 

That  (he  senators  and  representatives,  and  all  executive  and 


646 


AAfEiVD!U£NTS  OF  /f.   Y.  AND  A'.  C. 


UTM 


jutticial  ofRcen  of  the  L'nited  States,  shall  be  hound  li)r  oath  «r 
nffirmHiion  not  10  iitfrinKC  or  riulaie  the  coiuiiiuiiona  or  righu  nl 
the  rcspeciive  Mates. 

That  tlic  Ir^islauirc  of  ilie  re^peciii'c  Elates  may  make  provuioa 
by  law.  thiit  the  clt^tors  of  ihr  rlnrtton  ilisiricis.  lo  l>e  by  Oina 
ap|ioinlrr<l,  sh;ill  chaosc  .1  cItUrii  nf  the  United  Slater  wlu>  shall 
have  hctn  ;in  inhiiUiianl  of  such  ilisttici  for  tlw  term  of  one  yeta 
imnicdialely  pmiiliug  the  litiic  of  hit  clecliiMi.  fur  one  of  the  nrp- 
resciualives  of  such  stale. 

AMKMIMEX'ili  PRUPOHFD    RV  TRK  CONVEN'TIOH  OF  NORTH 
CAKULIN'A.   I7S8. 

Rtt^vtd,  Thai  n  tlecUratiun  of  rights,  jusrrtinc  and  sccniinf 
from e^c road) ti>rnl  iliegrcMt  piiiiciplcsof  citil  Ji>il  ich);<ou«)ilvtl|r. 
and  ihr  unatitTi.iblc  njjiils  of  tlw  people,  toji'^lter  nilh  jmrno* 
incnis  lo  the  idcmI  ;iinhiKuous  and  nrrplionsblF  jurtK  of  the  said 
cunslilulion  ol  jfovemmcnl.  ou|;ht  to  he  bill  Iwfcire  Congrenn.  anil 
the  coiivenlion  of  llie  »l3le%  tliat  shall  or  riiay  he  c^tkd  lurltie 
purpose  of  anifiidiii;;  the  s:iid  cwiililulion.  for  ihetr  cunv deration, 
previous  10  the  niiticaiion  of  the  consiiluiion  ^foresanl.  on  tbr 
pan  of  the  date  of  Noith  Carolina. 

Deftaralien  ef  Rights. 

isi.  That  there  ate  eeil.iin  natural  rig  lit  s  of  whtcb  men.  when 
llwy  (unn  a  social  cuinpa<:l.  cannot  deiirivc  or  liifest  I  heir  iiosierity. 
amoni;  which  are  Ihe  cnjuynteol  ol  lil<r  and  hl>criy,  with  llie  mexns 
ol  acquiring,  posimin^-,  and  |>ri>trcling  piu|>erty.  and  punulitg  ami 
obtaining  liJippinets  and  safety. 

3(1.  Thai  rII  power  is  nalurnlly  vesleil  in.  and  consequently  de- 
rivr<l  from  (he  people  ;  that  magistrates  therefuie  are  their  iruucd 
and  agents,  ami  at  all  limes  amenahle  lo  llxin. 

3d.  That  government  ouflhi  (o  be  instituted  (or  thp  romfiMM 
Iwnefit.  protection,  anit  security  of  the  people;  and  that  (he  doe- 
dine  of  non<iesistancF  agamM  arbitrary  powei  and  uppicssKin  it 
Mb9uid.  sbvish,  aitd  destructive  10  the  Kuod  and  happiucM  of 
mankind. 

4(h.  That  no  nvan  or  set  o(  men.  are  eniiiM  to  cxclusivr  i>r 
separate  poMic  etiM>lunienls.  or  privdeges  from  (he  cnnimuniiy. 
but  n>  cormdeiation  of  the  poWic  srmccs ;  which  not  |jciii|[  tie- 
scemlit>lp,  neither  oujjhi  the  oiSces  ol  niaKi^iraie,  legnUtor,  or 
jiMlge.  or  any  other  puhltc  nflice.  lo  he  hertdiuri'. 

5Ih.  That  the  lefliU'iiivr,  eieculite  .iitd  jixl.riary  pnwers  nf 
goTemnienI  iJiuutd  l>c  sepanie  ami  drslincl.  ami  ihnl  the  n-.r-mhrrs 
of  the  two  liist  may  lie  restrained  from  oppteMion.  I>y  '  'I 

paitkip.ittnK  Ihe  [lublic  buidens.  ihey  shMild  at  lixe.J  I* 

reduced  to  n  priv.Me  station,  return  into  the  mua  of  <  -  ; 

and  (he  vacancirt  Xir  supplied  by  certain  and  rrffuUr   <  m 

which  all  or  any  part  of  iJie  fiirriiei   memlirrs  In  he  ehj;.l>li:   ui   .0- 
eli^ible,  as  the   rules  ol  the  consiilulion  of  gotrrnmrin.  iind  Ihc 
.laws  stuU  direcL 


AMSXDME^rrS  Of  NORTH  CAROLINA. 


647 


6th.  I'hat  cI«ciioiis  of  represent Jiii'i^i  in  the  lejjislature  ought 
lo  be  ((*c  and  tirqucni.  and  all  men  having  sumeiein  rviiience 
o(  pcnnanent  coiiimon  inlcrr»l  wilh,  and  .Mt.ichnicnl  10  the  com* 
Rianiiy.  ought  10  have  the  inght  n\  xtiffmKc;  and  no  aid.charKC, 
t.u  or  fee.  ciii  l>e  scl.  rated  or  levied  upon  the  people  without 
their  oMTti  cunsenl.  or  that  i>(  iheir  re|ites«ntalire«  &u  elected,  nor 
can  Ihey  he  iMiuiid  hy  any  Uw,  to  which  they  have  not  in  like 
iiuinncT  as^nieil  (or  the  pulilic  good. 

7ih.  That  ,tll  power  of  suspending  Uws.  or  the  execution  of 
Uw4.  by  any  .lulhtirtly.  tvilhmil  ihc  coriacnl  o(  the  represenl;* lives 
of  the  people  In  the  legi^Uture,  ix  injuriou.t  lo  their  nghls.  and 
ought  ifoi  to  lie  exercised. 

8ih.  That  in  nil  capital  and  criminal  prosecutions  a  man  liaih 
n  right  to  ikmani!  llie  cauie  and  niiture  of  h>«  Acmsallon,  to  be 
cotiTioiited  with  the  accusers  ami  witnesses,  lo  call  for  evidence, 
and  be  allowed  counsel  in  hi*  favor,  and  a  fair  and  speedy  trial 
by  an  impartial  jury  of  Ills  vicin.-i^e,  without  whose  unanimous 
consent  he  cannot  Ik:  found  fiuiliy,  texerpt  in  the  ({overnnieni  of 
the  land  and  naval  forced  -.)  nor  can  lie  be  compelled  lo  give  ei*l- 
dence  asainsi  himself. 

9th.  Thai  no  freeman  ought  lo  be  taken,  inipiisoned.  or  dts- 
ftciiedof  hisfrtchuld.  ItlKrtics,  privileges  01  IrancliiK^.or  outlawed 
or  exiled,  or  in  any  manner  desimved  or  dvpiivcd  of  his  life, 
liberty,  or  propcuy.  but  by  the  law  of  the  land. 

lotn.  That  every  (rccman  tc*iraincd  of  his  lihcily,  is  entitlwl  10 
tt  rcmc^ly  10  inijtiite  into  Ihc  lawfulness  thereof,  anil  to  remove 
■  he  same,  if  unlawful,  and  thai  Mich  remedy  ought  not  to  be  denied 
nor  dcbyeil. 

inh,  Tlwt  in  cotiiroversies  fcspeciing  property,  and  in  suits 
l)e|s^e«n  nvan  and  man.  the  .ancient  liul  l>y  jury  is  one  of  the 
f-reaiesi  secutiiirs  to  the  rights  of  the  people,  and  ought  to  remain 
sacred  and  inviolable. 

Iith.  That  ci-cry  frcenun  ouKht  lo  find  a  certain  rcmeily  hy 
recourrie  (o  the  lawn  for  all  injuries  and  wtuiic»  he  may  reccire  In 
person,  pri^ietly  or  eliarjclci.  He  onglit  to  oblaiii  tiRht  and 
}U!iiH'e  ficcly  without  sale.  cumplciHy  ami  without  denial,  proinplly 

<d  without  delay,  and  th.tl  all  rsiabllshmenis.  01  re};ut.ilions  con- 

ivcningthe-Mr  nghn,  are  opprrwi-e  and  iinjusi, 

Ijlh.  That  excessive  bail  nii^ht  nol  lo  be  rr<)iiired.  nor  CJices- 
sivc  lino  imposed,  nor  cruel  .ind  unusual  punishments  intlicled: 

I4lh.  Thai  every  freeman  has  a  riKhi  10  he  seciiie  from  all  un» 
Tcuonable  swarGhea  and  sciiures  of  hiii  penon.  his  papers,  and 
{Koperty:  all  warrants  ihciefore  to  search  suspected  places,  or 
W  apprehend  any  suspected  person  without  specially  naming  or 
detcnbing  the  place  or  person,  arc  dangerous  and  ought  nol  lo  be 

mied. 

ijlh.  That  the  people  have  a  Hf^lil  peaoeabty  lo  aitemtile 
■ther  to  consult  for  the  common  good,  or  to  Jnslrucl  iheir 
represent  a  lives  :  and  that  eveiv  freeman  has  a  nght  lo  petition  or 
apply  to  lite  tcgisUturo  for  redress  of  grievances. 

iMh.  That  the  people  have  a  rigtii  to  freedom  of  speech,  Aotf 


«48  AM£.VD.V£NrS  OF  NORTH  CAROUXA,         HTM 

of  writing  aniJ  Hubiinhiiig  their  wnlimciil» :  llni  frrcctoni  of  tlic 
press  t»  oii<r  o(  the  grvaic»t  bu]w«il;s  of  Ubcrly,  aiid  uu{;lit  not  ui 

I7(h.  That  llic  people  hare  a  righl  to  keep  ^nd  bear  nrnis;  ttui 
a  ivdI-tcKiiliilcd  milili.-i.  coiiipovril  of  ihc  IkxI)-  of  itic  pctiplc. 
irniiicci  to  xrm.1,.  \%  ihe  |>io|trr.  n.ilural.  and  vifc  ilcfcntc  of  h  ^rt 
Stale.  Tliul  sumling  uimii-s  in  time  uf  jwiicc  are  dangc-rous  \a 
liberty,  and  dierefure  oufilit  I"  •>e  avoided,  js  far  iia  Itip  eirtum- 
Miitices  ^nd  |)tolcvliuii  of  Ilic  cuiiiniuiiily  nil!  adinil ;  and  t)ul  in 
all  caics  Ihe  iniliiaiy  lihoidd  be  uniicr  &lncl  suburdmaliun  Id,  and 
governed  hy  ihrciril  power. 

i8th.  Thai  no  luldier  in  lime  of  peace  ooiiht  to  be  quattctcd  m 
any  liouse  wiihuui  ilie  consent  uf  Ihe  oivncr,  and  in  liiite  ol  war  in 
sueh  niJinncr  oidy  as  ihe  laiv  direcd. 

I9ih.  Tliil  any  petion  letif-iouAly  scrupulous  of  bearing  ontu 
0UK''t  I"  '>e  exciiipied  upon  pHyniciii  uf  an  cquivalcril  lo  anjiluy 
another  (o  bear  aiint  in  hih  sirad. 

lolh.  Thai  telit;ion  or  ihr  duly  nhieh  we  nwr  lo  our  Crcoinr. 
and  the  ninnner  of  discharKiiig  ii.  can  he  directed  oiily  by  r«a«aii 
and  convietion.  not  by  force  or  viulcncc.  and  therefurc  all  meli 
liavean  ciju.ll.  iintuial  «nd  unalienalite  ri};lil.  lo  ihe  free  excniK 
of  religion  .tcconling  to  ibe  dklales  irf  conscience,  and  lital  no 
pariicular  reli^miis  MCt  or  sociciy  oujjhi  lo  he  lavoicd  or  eU^^ 
lishcd  hf  law  in  preference  lo.otltcre.  ^^^1 

Atnefiilmeitli  lo  ike  ConUiluttitn. 

I.  Thai  each  Mate  in  ihr  union  »lut)l,  rrspee lively,  retain  eirery 
power,  jtirivliclion  and  n>.dil,  vdikh  is  not  hy  this  ro»«iiiutian 
dcleKnied  to  ihe  Comkh^i  of  the  Untied  Stales,  ur  to  the  depon- 
atcnU  of  111*  federal  Korcmriieiil. 

II.  Thai  there  slijiii  ttc  otic  trpte«eni.iiii'c  for  every  ihiny  tboa> 
S*nd.  jcconling  lo  ttie  eiiiinicr-ilton  (m  census,  tncniioord  in  Ihc 
coiutilution,  until  the  whole  nnmbcT  of  rejHrvnl.-ilivr!^  hmiouiii* 
10  l\kxi  hundred,  after  which,  thai  nunilirr  itiall  bf  coniinurd  or 
inCTrase>l,  .is  ConKrens  Mull  dircci,  njHin  ihc  pnitcipin  lixed  \n  iW 
cniitlilulion.  by  apportkHimjc  Ihe  represeittalive»  nl  e;«t;b  slate  *m 
Mxne  ({TeaicT  nuinlier  of  Ihe  people  fioin  limeloiintc,  a&  population 
incieaies. 

III.  When  Congress  shall  lay  direct  lax«  or  excise*,  they  Vull 
imine<li.>icly  inform  ibe  executive  ixi-ucr  u(  each  Mate,  uf  lt>e  C|(iula 
of  such  «lalc.  accoidini;  to  Ihe  eenuii  htreii"  itirceicd,  which  Is 
pioponed  lo  be  thereby  tiuiteil :  And  d  like  le^nxUturr  nf  arty  Male 
shall  psss  any  taw.  which  sh.ill  tic  elTeclual  for  niuiri);  «ucli  ifuMd 
M  Ihc  liine  requireil  hy  Congc>-M.  the  t.»ie«  and  excises  laid  by 
Ohi{P'cs»  xhall  not  Ik*  rolleclcd  in  :iuch  state. 

iV.  Tlui  the  nKnibcnt  ol  the  Senate  ai>d  Hounc  ol  fe|imeDL»> 
lives  iliali  he  ineti^hle  tu  ind  incapable  o(  holdinjc  any  cail  office 
under  ihe  auU>oritv  «l  ihr  L'niietl  States,  during  llie  lime  [cr  which 
ihev  sh.ill  ■        i     ■      -'-rtriL 

V.  Tti  ]'roceeilinj[io(  iheSenaleand  H>Awe 

of  Rcprr^,, :-■-:.■..  'i  .  -    I'ubbslied  al  leaii  once  la  tvuy  )ew. 


ITiW         AUESDAtHXTS  OP  NOSTH  CAROUttA.  H'i 

-  except  such  paiis  ihcrrnf  rclaling  lo  ir»tin.  Alliances,  or  miliiaiy 
Dpcralions,  a«  in  ihcir  iuil^iiirnl  rcigtiirc  secrecy. 

VI.  Tiiiit  a  ttTKular  si.iicmcrtt  and  iiccnimt  of  the  rtceipls  am) 
cxpcndiiuics  of  itie  public  iDoi»ey:i  ahull  be  publislietl  at  Icail  once 
in  every  year. 

VII.  Thai  na  coiiiiiii'tcia)  (rcalv  fA\tA\  lie  ratifK-d  witliout  the 
cuiicurrcnce  o(  iwo*iliinli  of  (he  wfiole  number  o(  ilie  mcnilrcis  of 
the  Seiuie:  Ani)  no  tiriity,  r.cilin};,  cnniracliiig.  or  (cslrainiiij;  or 
EUS|>en<l>rig  the  Icrriloflal  li^lils  oi  cLilms  of  (lie  United  Sulrs,  or 
juiy  of  (hem,  or  their,  or  any  of  (hdr.  ri};hls  or  cUimx  uf  fl^llir1s  in 
(he  American  seas,  or  navif;atinfi  llie  Ameiican  rivtrs.  shall  he 
made,  but  in  casca  of  the  tni»t  urgenl  ajid  cxlicinc  nccessit)  ;  nor 
bIihII  any  itich  ireAty  be  rAlil'icd  wiihoul  the  concutrence  of  ihree- 
fouiihs  of  the  whole  number  of  the  members  of  both  houses 
respect  it'clv. 

VIII.  Tlut  no  nair(|:atbn  law.  or  law  rcKulalInK  commerce, 
■ball  lie  paued  without  the  consent  of  two>[liinla  of  tbe  inenibeis 
present  in  both  houses. 

IX.  That  (i<i  sundiri^'  arniv  or  regular  troops  shall  be  raised  or 
Iccpt  up  in  titne  of  peace,  without  the  consent  of  two-thirds  of  the 
members  prcMni  in  both  lioiiscx. 

X.  Thai  ix>  soldier  sh,-ill  be  cnli^teil  for  any  longer  term  ttun 
fnur  yenrs.excepl  tn  (iiiic  oi  war.anti  then  for  no  longer  term  than 
the  coniiniunce  of  the  w.ir. 

XI.  Thai  ciich  *L.nlc  respectivelv,  shall  have  the  power  to  provide 
for  orijanitinz.  arminK.  and  discipfimnu  lis  own  niililia.  whciiioever 
Conitreis  shall  oniit  or  neglect  lo  provide  for  the  same.  That  the 
militia  khall  not  be  subject  to  martial  law.  except  when  in  actual 
service  in  time  of  war,  nw.tsion  or  rebellion  :  And  when  not  in  the 
actual  service  of  iIk  Untied  Stales.  »hall  be  subject  only  to  such 
fines,  penalties  nn«l  punishments,  as  sh.-dl  be  directed  or  inflicted 
by  the  laws  of  its  own  state. 

XII.  That  Congress  sliall  not  declare  any  stale  to  be  in  Tebelliun 
wrihout  the  coiiM-nt  of  at  lenst  two'tbttas  of  all  lite  locmbcn 
[ircsenl  m  both  houses. 

XIII.  That  ihe  exclusive  power  of  legtshtion  given  to  Congress 
over  the  federal  town  and  lU  .idjacent  district,  and  other  places, 
purchased  or  lo  be  purchased  by  Congress,  of  any  of  the  stales, 
shall  cileni)  only  to  such  retaliations  a.t  respect  the  police  and 
Rood  (roveminent  thereof. 

XIV.  That  no  person  shall  be  capable  of  beinfc  President  of  the 
United  Sutcs  for  more  than  cikIii  years  in  any  teim  of  siitcen 
years, 

XV.  Thai  ihejitdicial  power  of  the  United  Stales  shsll  be  wsled 
in  one  Supreme  Court,  ,-ind  in  uicl)  count  of  admir.dlv.  asCongicM 
may  from  lime  to  time  ord.iin  and  establish  in  any  of  the  different 
states.  The  judicial  power  shall  extend  (o  all  c.oses  in  Uw  and 
equity,  arising  uivilcr  treaties  made,  or  which  sliall  be  made  undirr 
the  autbotity  of  the  United  Stales ;  to  all  cases  alTectinK  ainb.-ks- 
■adors.  other  foreign  ministers  and  consuls:  to  all  cases  of 
admiralty  and  raaritimc  jurisdiction  ;  to  controirenie«  to  which  the 


5 


fiSO 


A.ll£XDMEMTS  Of  A'ORTH  CAROUIf^. 


tHH 


United  Sum  »hall  be  a  party:  >o  coniTDvcTsio  between  tmn 
more  statRK,  .-ind  bctwem  panic*  cI.iirainK  lan<I«  tinitcr  the  granuof 
riiftcrent  sUi«:t.  in  all  cniev  aScciin];  .-inib»u.-i((i>ni.  oihcr  lorti);* 
niinisteni  and  cannul!!,  and  Ihust  in  wliich  a  &i>ie  shall  be  a  party. 
lheSuiJri.itie  CoutI  &liall  have  ohgiiiul  junsdiclion.  In  all  uihn 
caM-s  before  meniioivMi,  tlie  Supreme  Conn  shall  have  appi 
iuriKlicii[>n  is  It>  ntnUrrs  of  Inw  only,  except  in  rasr«  of  njuhy, 
ofiidmir.-illyanil  marilimcitiiiMliclion.  in  which  the  Su|>irtnr  C 
nimll  have  apjicllate  jurittliction,  Iwih  at  to  law  -inil  fact,  wiih  such 
exception!!,  and  under  »<>ch  [eKulaljuns  a«  ihc  CoiiKirss  shall 
make.  But  the  judicial  power  oi  the  Unite*!  Slates  ^}1all  eilmd 
in  no  case  where  i)ie  cause  ol  aciioti  thall  have  o<ri{-iiia<cd  tiefotr 
the  mlitic.ilion  of  this  consliiulion,  exc«p1  in  dispute*  bctwccB 
Mate*  nhoul  their  lerriloiy,  diii|nitn  bclwern  peraoiii  cLaiaiHiK 
lands  under  ihr  grants  of  different  itatcK,  and  suits  for  debts  dne 
to  ihe  Uimeil  Slale*. 

XV'].  That  ill  cnnitiial  piowcutions,  no  man  shall  be  resuain^d 
ill  tlie  cxcrciM:  ol  the  usual  and  accustomed  ri^ht  of  ehallengtng  ff 
exerpiing  to  the  Jury. 

XVII.  That  Congress  shall  not  ahrr,  madifjr,  oi  interiere  in  the 
time:),  pl.ices,  or  manner  of  holding  elections  for  u-n.iiiin  uid 
represcnIalivFS.  or  other  iif  them,  except  when  tbe  t  U 

any  Slate  ^lall  nefilect,  refu.ic  or  be  disabled  by  iuvasi !«!• 

lion,  to  prescribe  the  same. 

XVIII.  Thai  those  clause*  which  declare  thai  Coitgrew  slnU 
not  eaerciM  certain  powers,  be  nol  interpreted  in  any  nianMt 
whatsoever  to  extend  the  powers  of  Cotigiess;  but  that  iht^  be 
ConMruml  rtiher  as  making  cxGepiM>ni  to  the  specified  powrrt 
where  this  shall  be  the  case,  or  otiierwise.  as  inserted  meiclf  far 
greater  c.iutiun. 

XIX.  That  tfie  laws  ascerlaining  the  compensation  of  wiuteQ 
and  representatives  [«t  their  services,  be  posiponcd  in  their  opeta- 
tion.  until  after  llie  election  of  lepiewniaiivrs  iinmetlinirljr  suc- 
ceeding the  passing  ilicml.  that  excepted  which  sh^U  lirrt  be 
passed  on  the  subject. 

XX.  That  some  iiihunal,  other  than  the  senate,  be  provided  tec 
trying  impeachments  of  senators. 

.\XI.  That  the  ulary  of  a  judge  shall  ttot  be  tnctmsed  n» 
diminisheil  ilurtng  his  continuance  in  office,  olhctwise  than  hj 
general  regulations  of  sat.iry  which  may  lake  place,  on  «  revMim 
of  thc8ub)ecl.3t  staleil  peiiodsoi  nut  Ie3.s  than  »even  re.in.iocniii- 
mencc  from  the  time  such  salaries  shall  be  litsi  asccrtaiiwd  by 
Congress. 

X.\II.  That  CangnrsK  erect  im>  cofnpsnjr  of  merchants  walk 
exclusire  advantages  ol  commerce. 

XXIII.  That  no  treaties  which  shall  be  directly  opposed  tn  the 
exiting  hw*  of  ihc  Unitrd  Slates  in  Congress  a''-"!.!...  .[„||  ^ 
valid  until  such  Liivri  shall  be  irpealnl,  t>r  ntui  :  iblr  to 
such  treaty  ;  nor  shall  any  treaty  be  vahd  wliich  i:.  .-■<.:.. ..-..cwrfva 
the  coiiMitution  of  the  United  .Si.-tles. 

XXIV.  Thai  ihc  latter  pan  of  the  6fth  paragraph  nf  tbe  ainih 


' 


HMl      AAtEMDAtEXTS  OF  NORTH  CAROUXA.  65I 

section  n(  the  first  article  be  altered  to  read  thus — "  Nor  shall  ves- 
:tcls  bound  10  a  lurtkular  sinle  be  oblijjed  to  enter  or  pay  iluiies  in 
any  other ;  nut  when  bound  from  any  one  of  the  states  be  obliged 
to  clean n  another." 

XXV.  Thai  CooKTcs*  ilwll  not  dirtcilv  or  indirectly,  either  by 
themselves  01  through  the  judici^itry,  Inietlerc  with  oiiy  or>e  o(  ilie 
Slates  in  ihe  rcilempikm  of  paper  money  already  ciniiied  and  now 
in  circuUlion.  or  m  Ii(|ui<Ul>ni;  and  discharging  ihc  public  sccuri- 
tiFt  of  any  one  of  ihc  litalct :  Ihil  c.ich  an<i  every  stale  shall  have 
the  cxchiMve  right  of  making  %uch  Uvrs  and  r^^lalions  for  the 
ahove  purpose,  as  ibcy  shall  think  proper. 

XXVI.  Tluil  ConRicss  shall  not  introtluce  fotcif;n  Hoops  into 
the  United  State*  uiihuul  the  coik&cnt  of  two-thiitia  u(  ihc  incin- 
bcra  present  of  both  houses. 

JEFPERSON'S    OPINIOK     OS    THP.    CONSTITUTIOKALITV     OP     A 
KATIOKAL   BANK.    I79I. 

The  bill  (or  establishing  a  National  Bank  unilerlakes  among 
other  thinf^ : 

I.  To  (onn  the  subserihcrs  into  3  corporation. 

%.  To  cnat>le  iliern  in  their  corporate  capxcilics  to  receive  grants 
of  land  :  and  so  far  is  against  ihu  laws  of  Afartmitin.^ 

3.  To  nuike  alien  &ub'<ciibeis  capable  of  huldinj;  lands;  and  so 
far  is  against  ihc  laws  of  Aluaagt. 

4.  To  transmit  these  tnn<ts.  on  the  dcAth  of  a  proprietor,  to  R 
ccK.^in  line  of  luoccsson ;  and  so  far  changes  the  course  of 
Descentt. 

5.  Tu  put  the  lands  out  of  ihe  reach  of  forfeiture  or  escheat ;  and 
so  far  is  against  the  laws  of  Fcr/eilart  and  litcheal. 

6.  To  iran^niii  |>er!iOiial  chaiieU  to  sucucssocs  in  a  certain  line  ; 
and  so  (ar  is  aRainsi  the  laws  of  Dislrihulien. 

7.  To  give  ihem  the  sole  and  exclusive  right  of  banking  under 
the  national  aiilhoriiy;  and  so  far  is  against  the  laws  of  Monopoly. 

8.  To  commuiii<'alc  to  them  a.  power  to  make  laws  paramount 
to  the  laws  of  the  Stales  :  for  so  they  must  be  constnicd.  to  pro- 
tect the  institution  from  the  control  o(  the  Stale  legislatures ;  a/id 
so.  probably,  il»cy  will  be  cormrued. 

f  consider  ilie  founilaiioii  of  Ihe  Constituiioo  as  bid  on  this 
ground  :  That  "  all  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  Stales,  by 
Ihc  Constitution,  nor  ptoliihited  by  it  to  Ihe  Stales,  arc  reserveit  to 
ihc  Slates  or  to  the  proplc."  [Xlllh  amendTncni.)  To  lake  a  single 
siFp  beyond  the  bouiul.-iries  thus  specially  drawn  around  ihc  powers 
of  Congress,  is  to  take  possession  of  a  boundlcM  field  of  power,  no 
longer  susceptible  of  any  deAnition. 

'rile  uKuijiotaiion  of  a  bank,  aiid  llie  powers  assumed  by  ibis 

*TliQU|>b  Ihe  Coniiitulion  conitoli  (he  lawi  of  MottMsin  so  far  U  to 
))emil  Coii|;ieu  itwif  to  bold  land  (or  certain  piitpnset,  yei  moI  m  fu  a* 
la  pemil  ibon  to  coniMunlcaie  a  ainiilu  rirhi  to  other  cotporaW 
bodm.— T.  J. 


6S> 


JEFFEKSOf/  ON  A  NATIONAL  BANK. 


ftm 


bU).  have  nol.  in  mjr  upuiion,  been  debs>(^  lo  t^  Unitcil  Suu\ 
by  ibe  Conxiituiion. 

I.  They  are  iiot  among  lh«  powrra  specialty  FnuinErstn)  -  \t*. 
ihoc  aic  :  \%\.  A  powei  to  by  lues  (oi  the  yatymK  ot  frayinE  the 
dcbis  ol  Ibe  Uniioi  Sum ;  but  no  debt  is  |mmI  by  ihu  IrilL  tut 
any  ui  laid.     Were  ir  a  lull  lo  raite  motiry.  its  aiiginuion  M  lli 
Seiuic  would  comtcmn  ii  by  the  Constitution. 

I.  "To  borrow  motKy."     Bui  thi*  bill  nciibcr  bmrow* 
nor  cninrct  the  borrowing  it.    Tlic  proprteiors  ol  Ihc  Lank  vtU 
just  as  free  a>  any  other  money  hoMcts,  to  lend  or  nni  lo 
their  money  to  the  |nil>lic.     The  operation  pniptMed  in   t^-e 
tint,  to  lend  litem  two  iiiiltion^,  and  then  to  borruw  ihcai 
*gain.  caniMM  cbanj,'e  ilie  nature  of  the  Uiicr  aci.  wbicli  will  i 
tiir  a  payincni.  <ind  nol  a  loan,  call  it  by  wiuti  luinvr  ^iw  gileaie. 

3-  To  "  rvguUlc  commerce  *ith  foreign  nations,  and  dlnoBg ' 
States,  and    with    the    Indian    Int'rt."     To  ctcct  a  bank,  and 
reguUle  commerce,  arc  fci)-  diRcicnt  acts,     tie  who  erccis  « 
crealcs  a  Mtbjecl  of  caiiimercc  in  its  UtU  \  so  docs  he  who 
a  bushd  of  wheul.or  lli^a  dolloi  out  of  ihe  mines;  yel  oejt 
these    peraons    regulates  commerce    ttierrby.     To  Bokc  a 
wtiich  may  be  bought  and  sold,  is  itot  to  prescribe  rcgulaitotu 
buying  and  selling.     Besides,  \i  this  vras  tin  nercise  ol  ibr 
of  rrc"l-'>l  ing  commerrr.  it  would  be  void,  as  ntcndtnK 
ibc  iniMn.il  commerte  of  cwn'  S'<iir.  as  lo  iis  MtcrtHil.     Fi 
(Mwcr  giTcn  lo  Congress  by  the  Coiislitution  ilocs  nui  cxtcBil 
ibe  internal  rct:ubtinn  of  ibr  commerce  of  a  Slate,  (thai  is  to  0^ 
of  the  cotnmnce  beiwern  citircn  and  citizen,)  nhidi  retmm  cjicIb- 
savely  with  il»  own  lej;>ilature  ;  but  to  its  exteinal  cornmerce 
llial  is  10  My.  il*  commerce  with  another  Stale,  or  with  (1 

nations,  ot  with  the  Indun  tribes.     Accordingly  the  tnll  di 

pwpoae  (he  nKasuie  as  a  regulation  of  trade,  bu>  as  "  prrMJactlfe 
of  crnisittcrable  adi'.-tniages  In  trxk."  Still  leu  ate  these  pOMcn 
covered  by  any  other  of  the  special  cnnmctaiions. 

II.  Nor  are  ibeywiltiin  either  of  the  general  ptuiuec,  whiidi  MC 
tlie  two  following : 

t.  To  lay  taxes  to  provide  for  Ihe  general  wellaic  of  llie  Uoibrf 
Slatev  lltal  ia  lo  say.  "  10  lay  la»es  fur  Ihf  frurfime  of  prniniba 
for  ihe  general  wt'lfaic."     Vot  the  lading  of  taxes  is  the/><mr.aM 
ll»c  general  wcKarc  the  fiurfii'if  for  which  tbe  powi-i 
dsed.      'Chcy  are  not  to  lay  uxcs  ad htiltiit  for  am 

pleat*  ;  but  an\y  to  fiay  lAr  d^tli  er  prafidt /or  lie  ;. 

Union.      In  like  manner,  ihci,'  arr  rtot  l<s  <la  amylhiKf-  ikiy  _ 
pravide  tor  ihe  general  welf.nre.  tnit  only  lo  lay  /..■  -.-  ^  f  t  t 


IMWe.     To  consider  the  talter  pliraie.  not  as  il 
pose  of  llie  lirsl,  but  as  giving  a  distmci  and  in'i' , 
doanv  aci  ihey  please,  whkh  might  br  lor  live  gu«i 
would  render  all  ihe  prrredJng  and  subsequent  er.  . 
powtT  complrtrty  uselrss. 

It  wiiuld  reduce  Ihe  whole  instrument  to  a  aingle  ph 
inslittiltng  a  Concrcss  wilh    pirwer  lo  do  wh-'i 
tbc  good  of  Ihe  United  SIjiIc^  ;  anil,  u  tliey 


that  I 

Ihe'. 


i7»x!       j£fi-tif:s<iiv  oy  a  national  bank. 


653 


judges  of  ihe  good  or  evil,  it  would  be  aIso  a  power  lo  do  whatever 
evil  ihcy  plc.t^. 

It  ii  311  cst.il>li«hetl  rule  aI  construction  where  4  phrase  will  hear 
either  o(  two  mciningt.  to  give  it  thnt^  which  nill  allow  Kome 
lueaniDK  to  llie  other  |>ari»  of  the  irutriinieiit.  utxl  nut  tlial  which 
would  tcrukr  all  the  othtri  useless.  Certainly  r>o  stith  universal 
|KiwGT  was  ii)eaiil  to  be  ^tven  ilieni.  It  w.i»  inleiiileil  to  tiice  them 
upUr'tilt)  uiitliifi  the  r[iiiii)i:rriic^  ponei'^.  iinil  \\\<mx  viilhuiil  winch, 
«s  (Dcans.  these  |>owcts  could  not  be  c.irrii:d  into  cfteci.  It  ih 
known  that  ihe  vcrv  powrt  now  nropn»cd  a%  a  Mc-rui  was  lejecled 
as  an  /hJ  )iy  the  Convmliim  which  foimed  the  Conntitiitioii.  A 
)>ropcn>tion  was  made  in  thcin  to  nuthoriie  Congress  to  open 
tdtijU.  and  iin  amen<ljtury  diic  to  empower  thcin  lo  incoi^i urate. 
But  the  whole  w.is  rejrcteil.  and  one  o(  the  reasons  (or  rtjectiori 
urged  in  delijte  was.  iluit  then  tlicy  would  have  a  power  lo  erect  a 
liarik,  which  would  lender  the  ^rcut  cities,  where  there  weie  preju- 
ihcei  aivd  jealousies  on  the  subject,  adverse  lo  the  rcceptiiMi  o(  iXit 
ConMituliim. 

3,  Tile  Kecond  Rcneral  phraie  ii.  "  lo  male  all  laws  tifeesiary 
and  proper  lot  carryidj;  into  cxeculioii  the  enunicraleil  powcrn." 
But  they  cjn  all  lie  carried  iiilu  eaeculiun  without  a  think.  A 
bank  Iheii-fure  is  not  ueettsary.iin^  CuiitK-'quenl!)'  not  uuthoneed 
by  this  phrase. 

J(  lias  been  ur^ed  that  a  h.tnlc  will  give  ^rcat  facility  or  conven* 
tencc  in  the  coHection  of  (axes.  Suppose  this  were  true  :  yd  ihc 
Constitution  .illnws  only  the  me^ns  ivhich  .ire  "  n^tssary,"  not 
iho^r  whirh  are  merely  "convenient  "for  rllecling  the  cnuraemled 
powers,  If  Mich  a  latitude  of  construction  he  nllowcd  to  this 
phrase  as  to  give  any  iton -enumerated  3>owcr,  it  will  ga  to  every- 
one, (or  Ilterc  is  not  one  which  ingenuity  in.iy  not  torture  into  a 
tottvfHitntt  in  some  instance  »t  elher.  lo  some  t'Ht  of  so  long  a  list 
of  enuiivcr.atcd  powers.  It  would  swallow  up  all  the  delegated 
powers,  and  icituce  the  whole  lo  one  power,  as  before  observed. 
Therefore  it  was  th.il  the  Constitution  restrained  them  lo  the  Htt- 
ittary  mc.tns,  that  is  to  uiy.  to  those  means  wllhniil  which  the 
grant  of  jKiwer  would  he  nugalory. 

But  let  us  exjiiiiiu;  this  convenience  an<l  xee  what  it  is.  I'he 
re)Kirl  on  tins  subject.  p:ige  J.  st.iles  the  only  ji^^n^rd/ convenience 
to  be.  the  pmcniing  the  lianspoilation  and  ie-traiispoitntion  of 
money  between  the  Stales  and  the  Ireasuiy.  (for  I  pass  over  the 
incrcaRcof  circulating  nietii urn, ascribed  to  il  as  a  want,  and  which, 
according  lo  my  idms  of  paper  money,  is  clearly  a  ilcniehl.) 
Every  Stale  will  havr  to  pay  a  sum  of  tax  money  into  the  ttcasuTV : 
and  the  treasury  will  iuiipe  to  pay,  in  wery  Slate,  a  part  of  the 
interest  on  the  public  debt,  and  salaries  to  llic  ofliters  of  Roveiri- 
inent  resident  in  that  Slate.  Iii  most  of  Ihe  Slates  there  will  sttll 
be  a  surplus  ol  lax  money  lo  cotoc  up  to  the  Mat  of  govcinmeni 
foe  ilie  officers  residing  there.  The  paymenis  o(  interesi  and 
mUry  in  each  Sl-ilc  m.iy  he  mnde  by  treasury  orders  on  the  .Slate 
collector.  This  will  take  up  ihr  grratcr  pari  nl  the  money  he  has 
collected  in  bis  Slate,  and  coiucqucnily  picrcnt  the  great  moss  of 


6S4 


JEFfiERSOy  ON  A  NATIONAL  BANK. 


itm 


it  (ram  being  drawn  oul  of  the  Sinle.     I(  lliete  be  a  hnlance  «! 
commeice  in  f;ivi>t  a\  iliiit  HiiiK  ;i(;ii>[iM  the  one   in   uhlch  ihc 

eovcinincnl  residcK.  (he  iutittm  of  l;ites  will  Ix:  remiltcd  \n  the 
■tls  of  exchange  <li'dwn  for  tliat  com  mere  iai  balance.  Anaio 
tnuM  be  if  tline  was  a  bank.  Itut  If  ihetc  be  no  tMlantr  ol 
merer,  either  dirrci  or  cireuiioiis.  all  the  hanks  in  the  world  coul 
noi  bring  iip  ihc  ttitplu^  of  i.ixes.  Ihii  in  the  fnrm  of  mom 
Treasury  Milcrs  ibcn.  ami  f>ill«  ol  cxrhanKe  may  prevent  ihe  i!i; 
pUceincnl  of  Ihe  m.iiii  mass  of  Ihe  money  ci> Muted,  nitboiit  IN 
ail)  o(  iiny  Iwnk  ;  and  where  ll)e»c  (;iil,  it  Cdnnol  be  [nevcntcil  ct' 
wiih  that  ai<l. 

Perhaps.  indiYi).  bank  Mils  may  bt  a  more  rem'tMimt  v(4»di 
than  tirasiiry  orOcrt.  Itui  a  ItHle  difftrtnft  in  l(i«  desree  * 
eOHvenieitcf  c.innoi  ronititutc  the  nrccssitr  which  the  ConslttaliDi 
makes  the  e"*""*'  '"''  *."ii"i'"K  ""y  non-eminiernicri  pou  ri-. 

lieiiilc*  ;  the  eiisiing  hanks  will,  without  a  ifouhi,  niirr 
arrangementit  (or  kmlirifj  their  agericv,  ami  ibe  nmre  favorable,  ._,_ 
there  will  be  a  tomiieliiion  amoii};  iWm  (oi  it ;  wbeieas  the  bll 
delivers  us  up  houniS  Id  the  naticnial  bank,  who  aie  (ree  to  refin< 
nil  arrnnjfemeni.  but  on  their  own  lerm^,  and  ibe  puhlic  not  It 
on  tuch  refusal,  lo  employ  any  other  l>Bnk.  Tbal  of  Pbiladelpbial 
I  believe,  now  docs  ibis  business,  by  their  posi-notps.  wlikh.  by 
arraoKerncnt  with  the  lir.^vuri-.  n»r  paid  by  any  State  cnlWior  14 
whom  they  are  prMcniPil.  This  e»[ieilirnt  alone  Milfires  to  prei'rnt 
the  exigence  of  thai  nttmily  which  may  jnitiFy  the  a^^tuiiiptton  iA 
n  non-c numerated  power  a«  a  meant  (or  carrying  into  effei.'i  an 
enunieraied  one.  The  ihing  may  be  done,  and  has  been  done,  mJ 
well  done,  without  ihit  a»uuipiion  :  iherelt'ie.  it  does  nM  (land 
on  tbat  deciee  of  netftiily  which  can  honesilv  fusiify  it. 

It  may  l>c  said  that  a  bank  whose  bill*  woufd  hate  a  currency  (Jl 
over  ihc  Si  .lies,  would  l>e  more  romrnirnl  than  ont-  wbi>Mr  cuftn*y 
i»  limiletl  to  a  single  Slale.  Sta  il  would  be  Mill  more  con<'cnie"l 
ihal  lher«  should  >)c  a  b.ink,  whose  t>ilU  sliould  h.ivr  a  runnicy  all 
over  the  world.  But  il  does  not  follow  (lom  Ihii  superior  cflom- 
iencv,  Ihal  iheie  exists  anywbeie  a  power  torslaMish  such  a  tkuth: 
Of  tfiat  ihe  world  may  ivot  (jo  on  very  well  without  it. 

Can  it  be  thought  th.it  die  Constilulion  Inti-ndcd  lb.it  \'i-. 
or  two  of  eonVfnitntf,  more  or  less,  Congrcvi  should  be  jm  i 
to  bre.]k  down  rbc  most  ancient  and  fundamental  taws  of  tiv 
serend    Stales;    such    as   Ibose   a^ainsl    Muitm.iin,    ihe    law*  et 
Alienage,  ihe  rules  of  desceni,  tlie  acts  of  distritxilion.  ihe  law«  af 
escheat  and  (oifeiluie.    llte    laws  <A  monopolv  ^     Noiliinj;  but  ■ 
nccessiiv  invincible  by  any  oihci  means,  can  justify  ■ 
tnlton  of  laws,  whirh  conslliule  (be  pillars  of  our  w  I 
jurisptudfnre.     Will   Congress   Ite  too   str^il-laced 
Constitiiiion  into   honest  effect,  nnlesi^    Ihey  may   [ 
foiiiid,4iiun-l.-iws  of  the  Stale  goTemmenl  (w  the  sti^in 
ieiw:eof  Iheiis? 

The    nrgniive   ■•'    ''"•    President  is  ''>,-  s1.;,.t.(  ,..„■-„ 
Coniiitulion  to  I  mist  ihe   i 

I.  Tile   right  of  i       i        uiiie.     ».  i  i  ■  ^. 


iiif 
<h( 


n»ll        /EFFKKSON  Off  A  NATIONAL  BANK. 


6SS 


Kuics  ami  Stale  les:i>1.ituiex.  The  preienl  is  ihe  ca9«  of  a  riglit 
rem.-iiningexcluiivdy  wilh  the  Staler,  ami  coiisc(]iiciiii)roii«  of  IliuM 
icttcnded  by  tlie  CumiiiuiKin  tu  be  plitced  untlei'  lis  praieclivii. 

It  muM  be  addnl.  liOMcriT.  thai  unlrs^  the  l'iL-&i(lc[it'&  mind  on 
a  view  o(  evciytliKi);  which  is  urged  for  and  agninsi  ihi&  bill,  is 
tolerably  clear  thai  il  \\  unauthoiiMd  h)'lhc  Consiiliilton:  if  ihc 
prn  ami  (be  con  lung  so  even  as  li>  bnl.uicc  hi«  iuilgmenl.  a  just 
rcspecl  for  ihc  wiulom  of  the  legislature  would  natur;i][y  dcelile 
the  balartce  in  favor  of  iheir  uplnioii.  It  Is  chiclly  (or  cases  where 
they  are  cteaily  milled  by  errur,  amhitiun.  or  inlete^I.  thai  ibe 
Constitution  has  placeil  a  check  in  the  nes;alivc  ol  the  {'resident. 


BAMILTOM'S  opinion  as  to  THK  COKfiriTlITIONALITV  OP 
THE  BA\k  OF  THE  UMTEl)  iH'ATCS,   ■;9I. 

The  SecrMsrj'  of  ihc  Treasury-  baring  perused  wilh  aitenlion  ihe 
pa^is  coni.iiiMng  the  opinioiis  ol  the  .Secretary  of  Stale  and  Ai> 
lornny  Cenei.il,  roncrrning  the  C«nstilulionahly  of  the  bill  for  cs- 
lablishinga  N.)linii.il  ILiiik.  procce^ls,  acconling  lo  ihc  order  of  ihe 
Preudcni.  to  submit  the  rcMont  which  have  iiulticcd  him  loenicr- 
lain  a  different  opinion. 

It  will  naiurally  have  been  anticipated,  that  in  performing  ihls 
Luk.  he  would  feel  uncommon  solicitude.  Perv)n;il  cnnsidcrjlions 
ntone,  arising  fruni  the  rclleciion  that  the  iiie.uute  uriKiiiateil  urilh 
'jim,  would  be  sullkient  to  piuduce  il.  The  sense  which  he  has 
iiLiinifestcd  of  the  ^irai  linpuitdnce  ol  such  an  instiiuiiun  la  ibe 
successful  ndminisir.iiion  of  Ibe  (icpattment  under  hi«  pjiriicuUr 
eare.  and  ."i"  ri|i«laiion  of  serimi*  III  consequences  to  result  from 
A  failure  of  the  meiuiirc,  do  not  permit  him  lo  be  without  nnilrty 
on  pubhc  uccuunls.  Bui  (he  chid  loliciiudc  arises  from  a  lirm  per- 
suasion, that  principles  of  coiiMiucliun  like  ilio^e  espoused  hy  the 
SeEretaiy  of  Siaic  and  Aiiinnejr  Ueneral.  would  be  Ulal  lo  (he  just 
anil  indispensiiblr  auiiioriiy  ol  the  United  Sutcs. 

In  rnierini;  upon  ilie  arjjunn-nt,  it  ougbi  to  be  premised  ibni  ibe 
objections  of  (he  Secretarv  of  Stale  and  Attorney  Cencrijl  a<c 
founded  on  a  eenenl  denial  of  the  ntithority  of  ibe  United  .St.)1cs 
lo  erect  cor ponit  ions.  The  laller.  indeed,  expressly  admits,  ihat  if 
there  be  ariyihing  in  (he  bill  which  Is  not  wananicd  by  the  Con- 
stitution, it  IS  the  clause  ol  incutpuralion. 

Now  it  ap|>rnrs  to  the  Sccteury  of  ilie  Treasury  ihat  this  frett- 
eralptimtplt  is  inhtrtnl  in  ihe  ve(>'(/c/w*//cir  ofi;oveinTiient.  and 
tsittUial  Id  every  slep  of  progress  lo  be  made  by  liial  of  ihc  United 
States,  namely  :  That  every  power  vcslei)  in  a  govemmcnl  is  In 
it«  nature  f^'treign.  and  inciiiilei.  by  force  of  (he  term,  a  right  lo 
employ  all  llie  meant  requisite  and  (airly  applicable  to  thcaliain- 
menl  of  ihefWi  u(  such  pi/wer.  and  wfuch  are  not  precludeil  by 
restrictions  and  exccptiofis  specitieil  in  Ihe  Cotistilulion,  or  not  ini- 
looral.  or  not  con(i.)r>'  to  lite  eiuHti.tt  eudi  ol  political  society. 

This  ptinei|iir.  in  ils  applkaiion  lo  government  in  genertil.  would 
be  admitted  as  an  aiiom ;  and  il  will  be  JDaiJubCDl.  Upon  ihott 


6$6 


HAMILTON  ON  A  NATIONAL  BAKK. 


who  may  iiiclint  lo  ilcny  it.  lo  proi*  ailislinclion,  id  -  iht 

a  rule  whitli.  in  ihc  grcieral  sj-xtctn  o(  itiings,   i»  i-  '  lk« 

prcecnstion  o(  ihc  »ociaI  onkr.  b  iiuppliiMbie   lo    tuc  UiMcl 
Stai«s, 

The  circumitanre  that  the  powers  o(  suvrfcrgnty  are  \»  llni 
country  divided  Iictween  Uie  Nuttoiul  anJ  Suie  ^ovcninicnli.  tlwi 
not  aflonJ  th«  disiinclioii  (cqu'>c(t.  1<  dors  not  folluw  tram  tlm, 
that  each  vf  llie  ponton  ol  fiMvri  dclrgnled  lo  ihr  unc  ur  \a  ilic 
Other,  i*  not  sovereign  with  rtgard  to  iH  prtififr  oijf.-ii.  Ii  »>l| 
only  foiiirw  froni  il,  that  each  has  sovrrriEn  puwcr  .is  (o  trrttia 
M/Ufi, anil  not  as  lo  ^tirr  Ihiugs.  Tu  deny  that  ihr  KOVrmmn>[ 
of  the  United  States  hus  Kuvcieijiti  powicr.  as  lu  iis  declared  fwr- 
pojtes  and  IrtiMs,  because  iti  uuuei  don  nui  cxlmd  la  .iH  eai 
would  be  equally  lo  deny  lli.it  ihe  Stale  govern tiieiiti  lta»-c  scwrr- 
eign  power  in  aity  case,  brc.iusr  ihcit  power  dix-H  nol  niend  In 
every  coie.  Tti«  tenlli  K«lii>n  o(  the  firM  arlirlr  of  Ihc  CcmMjiu- 
llon  exhibits  a  long  list  of  Tei)-  miponant  things  which  they  ini| 
not  ilo.  And  ihnu  the  United  .Slatn  uoub)  futniiih  ihr  MtigtiLir 
spcciAcIc  of  n  polilical  t^ttly  without  sm-trftgnijr,  or  of  .1  fjv^ 
gen'trned,  ynx^vwA  gwernmemt. 

If  il  would  be  nccesuiy  10  biinK  |>rool  10  a  proposition  so  cImt, 
asihut  wliich  affirms  that  ihe  powcis  of  the  federal  KoternnMnt. 
to //<  tf^fv/f,  were  sovereign.  Ihr  re  Li  a  e  Ijum  of  lis  ConaiiiiMi 
which  would  be  d<'ciiivc.  It  h  Ilui  which  iltfl.kies  that  the  Con- 
Slitutlon,  and  the  laws  of  the  Unitnl  Slater  made  in  pursuance  A 
it.  and  >ill  ticalir*  ni.4de,  or  which  shall  be  made,  tindtr  lhr» 
authority,  shall  betlic  tupt rme law  of  Ibt  land.  The  power  wIikIi 
can  etvatc  \\ie.  lupriHie  l-rtf  of  Ikt  fanii  \n  any  (.tit,  i»  douJilic» 
$efpertign  as  lo  siich  r.Tie. 

This  general  and  indiv|>uiabte  principle  puts  at  onee  an  end  M 
the  •«^«/'*iii'/ question,  wliel tie*  tlw  United  Slater  hate  power  U 
erect  a  lorparatioH :  thai  it  to  say,  to  (jive  a  Ifgal  at  artiftti^ 
rapaiily  to  one  or  nioie  tiersons.  disliiicl  linm  Ihe  natural.  Fie 
ii  14  u  mill  est  ion  ably  inciilcnt  10  iinnrffijiii  pever  lo  rietl  corpar>> 
lions,  and  coflsi-qiientlj  lo  iMal  of  tlw  United  Slates,  In  rel,Ur»n  to 
ihe  cbjtfli  ininisicd  lo  the  nianat;rnienl  of  ihe  guvenitiient.  The 
rfifferenre  It  this ;  where  Ihc  aulhotily  o(  Ihe  ({•"'•^nmrnl  la  p»- 
cral,  it  can  create  coquratiom  in  atl cafes;  where  il  is  ciinfinriJ  tu 
ceitaiii  hranchet  tA  iFgiilalion.  it  can  create  i:or|M>(;alinn»  d«^  h 
tboK  cases. 

Here  (hen,  as  far  as  cimcems  the  reasonlngi  of  ihe  Secretary  «( 
Sl.ilr  and  itie  Atlmnrv  CencTji!.  llie  affirnistlve  of  lite  cuaaliln- 
tionality  «(  ihe  bill  niij;n<  bcpermillert  loresl.  Il  will  in-ruriulhe 
I'Tesideni.  thai  the  principle  hoe  advancciJ  has  bef:n  unloucbmt  If 
either  of  them. 

For  a  more  complete  elofHlation  of  the  point,  iieiretihrte»i,  tJie 
«rgtimen(«  which  ibcy  bad  used  asarnsl  the  power  <il  the  eDi>m>- 
ment  10  erecl  cor|iota(lonii.  however  foiei[;ii  ihey  arr  111  'i 
and  Iiindamental  rule  whKh  ha«  l>een  slalcd.  sivall  lie  p.i  1 
examinetl.     Anil  Blirr  showiri);  that  they  do  nni  tend  to  itnii't'i  "^ 
force,  it  shall  also  6e  ihown  liiat  ihc  power  of  iiK^rponUlon,  lAd* 


IT911 


llAUILTOtf  0/f  A  NATIOHAL  BANK. 


Ht 


Avn\  to  <^e  gwernment  In  ccrtnin  cascn.  docs  fairly  extend  to  the 
p.irtieiil.ir  cjim;  which  is  llic  object  ot  ilic  bill. 

The  first  ol  these  nrgumcnis  is.  ih;U  ihe  (i>iiTi(UtJon  of  ihc  Con- 
Sliliiiion  it  Uid  on  ihi«  grDiin<l :  "  That  .ill  pancrsi  noi  dclcKaletl 
to  (he  United  Suiei  by  ihe  Coifstitulion.  nor  prohlliiied  lo  it  by  the 
StAie«,  are  reierved  (or  the  States,  or  lo  the  people."  Whence  it  is 
meant  to  be  infeired.  lh.it  Congress  cuii  in  no  case  exetcise  any 
|>ower  not  Included  in  tlioic  not  ciitiii)cr.iicd  in  the  ConMiiutiOTi. 
And  it  is  afTirmcd.  ili.ti  the  power  o{  creeling  a  corpnriiiioti  is  not 
iiiclixletl  in  any  of  ihr  cnumer.iicrt  powers. 

Thr  main  prnpoxition  here  laid  down,  in  \\%  true  signilicAtion  is 
not  to  l>e  qucMicmcd.  It  i«  nothing  more  ih.in  a  consequence  of 
this  rcpubhcan  maxim,  ilial  all  Euvemmcnt  it  a  delegation  of 
power.  But  liow  much  i*  ilelenaied  in  each  C4»e.  is  aiiUCMion 
0(  fact,  to  be  made  out  by  fair  rea^^onin^'  and  construction,  upon 
the  (Mirticubir  provisions  of  Ihe  Con^iiituiiuii,  taking  as  guides  Ihe 
general  princi|il''s  .ind  general  ends  of  govern  men  is. 

It  is  not  deninl  that  there  tiXc implird TiswrW us txprfti psniiert, 
.md  thai  the  farmer  arc  a«  cffcctLiatly  drlrjj.ilnl  as  ihe  littler. 
And  lor  the  sake  of  accuracy  it  shall  l>c  mcniionrd,  that  llicre  is 
another  class  of  powers,  which  may  lie  properly  denominated 
resallini^  pa^-rra.  It  will  not  be  doubled,  that  i(  Ihe  United  States 
shotild  mnke  a  conquest  o(  any  of  the  territories  of  its  neighliors. 
they  would  possess  sovereign  jufisiliciion  over  the  conqoercd  ter- 
ritory- This  would  be  taiher  a  result,  from  the  whole  ma^s  of 
the  power*  of  the  government,  and  from  the  nature  of  politic.il 
society,  than  a  consequence  of  either  of  the  powers  tpeci.illy 
enumerated. 

llul  be  this  as  it  m.iy,  it  fumithes  a  striking  iltuMtntion  of  the 
jICTieral  doctrine  contended  for;  it  shows  an  cxicniive  case,  in 
which  a  power  o(  erecting  corporations  is  either  implied  in,  or 
would  tesult  (torn,  some  or  all  ot  the  powers  vested  in  the  national 
govcnrnicnt.  The  jiins'litiion  acquired  over  such  conqucrcil  coun- 
tiy  would  certainly  be  compeient  to  any  species  «( Ic-jislsiion. 

To  return; — It  is  conceded  ihat  impluii p^iivtri  nic  li>  l>e  con- 
lidercid  as  delet;.iled  equally  with  txprfsi  itHts.  Then  it  follows, 
that  as  a  power  of  erecting  a  corporation  may  as  well  be  implied 
as  any  other  thiiij;.  it  may  .i»  well  be  eitiployed  .is  an  intlrumentoi 
mtitH  of  carrying  into  execution  any  of  the  spccilied  powers,  asany 
other  inilruMfnl  or  mtixn  whatever.  The  only  question  must  be, 
ill  this,  as  in  every  oihcr  case,  whether  the  mean  to  be  cniploved, 
or  in  this  inst.tnce,  the  corporation  lo  be  creeled,  has  a  naiiiral  re- 
lation lo  any  ot  the  acknowledged  objects  or  lawful  ends  of  Ihe 
goremmeni.  Thus  a  corporeiion  may  not  he  erected  by  Congress 
fur  superintending  the  police  of  the  clly  of  Philailclphia,  because 
t  bey  are  not  authorized  \arrgnlaU  l\\r  police  of  thai  city.  But  one 
may  be  erected  in  relation  tu  the  collection  of  taxes,  or  lo  the  trade 
witn  foreign  countries,  or  to  the  trade  between  the  Slates,  or  with 
lite  Indian  tribes :  hecautc  it  >s  ihc  province  of  the  federal  govern' 
men!  lo  rtgnlali  those  objects.  an<i  because  it  is  tn<i<l<nl  lo  a  gen- 
eral iotftreign  or  legislalivi  power  to  rtguttiie  a  thing,  to  employ 


lo  form  ihc  requisite  c.iptlal. 
an  iiicoiiHiialion  wctr  ikMciI 
quality  to  Ihiil  asMicialion.  II 
ii  would  he  enabled  lo  proseci 
cuiiv'cnirntc. 

Tluit  the  iinpofiancc  ol  itu 
aggeralnl.  Ir.iding  to  rtioiM 
from  Ir.tcing  ii  lo  ils  nri£ic). 
acrardine  lu  which  n  tWuiAl 
timf, or  fMnny  purpow.  wat. 
wh«'ncc  our  nolioiit  of  ii  are  i 
ol  ihr  cxKUlive  aiilhoritr.  a 
4tlrgaltJ  by  tlut  auili<irity, 
llic  iiipposilittii  tli.ll  It  lies  M 
porUiil  poil»ont  of  sovrrci^ 
live,  which  belongs  to  ihe  ffi 

To  this  mode  of  reAsomn 
all  ihe  ricxhk  tequJttie  lo  tt 
of  ihe  f^vetnnienl.  it  it  obj 
proper  ine4i»  arc  lo  be  etn 
nuiiilami.  that  no  mcAitt  | 
thoK  wiilKMii  which  ihe  cni 
Najt.  VI  f*t  does  he  go  in  till 
M  even  lo  make  ihe  Ciue  tA  « 
Uilulional  eiercitc  of  (he  po* 
rmry  c<rcum«Uncc« :  an  iiiea 
The*r/*'^*>«.T-  of  eserciwiii 
iVme.  muu.  iiMteeJ.  ilcpcMl  i 
iKmal  ni;lii  ol  ciricising  \\  \ 
Mine  lOHlay  as  lo-motioir. 

All  lite  ar];uinenlt,  Ihnrloi 


JtJMflLTO/f  Of/  A  HATlOffAL  BAKK. 


657 


dent  lo  lh«  ]|rav«rnment  in  cert»n  case*,  doex  falriy  extend  (o  (he 
particular  cam;  which  i»  lite  object  rA  (lie  bill. 

The  first  of  these  urKUtiienI&  is,  Ihul  the  foundation  o(  the  Con- 
ttiiution  is  laid  on  thU  ground :  "  Tint  lUl  poM-en  not  delegated 
to  itie  United  Slates  bjr  ihc  Coi»ii1u[ion.  nor  [Kohibitod  to  it  by  the 
Si-Ke*,  ate  reserved  (or  lh«  Stales,  or  to  the  people."  Whence  it  is 
riiMnt  to  he  infcrrcrt.  that  Congress  can  in  no  case  exercise  any 
jiowrr  not  IndiKtci)  in  those  not  enumerated  in  the  Constitution. 
And  it  is  afTinneil,  that  the  power  ol  etecting  a  corpanitkxi  is  no< 
included  in  any  ol  ttie  enumerateil  power*. 

The  nuin  pioposition  lierc  hid  down,  in  its  true  stgnitiMlion  >9 
not  to  be  quest  11  >n<-d.  I1  is  nolhin);  more  ihaii  a  consequence  of 
litis  repiibl>c-in  maxim,  thai  all  government  is  a  delegjiion  of 
pnwer.  Dm  how  nnwh  is  <lc1<^ated  in  each  ctw,  is  atiiiestion 
oi  fact,  to  tic  made  out  by  fair  rcavining  and  consiruciion,  upon 
the  particular  iiruviiiona  ol  tl>e  Constitution,  taking  as  guides  llw 
general  ]>rinciple»  and  gentTal  emU  ol  governmetils. 

It  in  not  denied  that  ihcre  ArciMfiliedasvvfWaiexprrit pMftrs, 
and  th.lt  \yi*:  /ifrmrr  are  as  cITeclually  delegated  as  the  latter. 
And  for  the  sake  ol  accuracy  it  sh.ill  be  mentioned,  that  ilierc  is 
another  cl.iss  of  powers,  which  mav  Iw  properly  dcnonilnaled 
r/iulfiMg  fitwtrt.  It  will  not  t>r  dniiblrd.  that  if  live  Uniteil  .Stales 
should  make  a  conquest  of  any  of  the  territories  of  its  neighbors, 
ihry  would  pouess  iiiTcreign  jurisiIiciiiHi  over  the  conquered  ter- 
ritory. This  would  be  tnther  a  result,  from  the  wliole  m.iss  o( 
the  powers  of  the  goremmunl.  and  from  the  nature  ol  |>o1itical 
society,  than  a  con^iequence  of  either  of  lite  powers  ipeciatly 
enumerated. 

Kill  be  this  M  it  may,  it  furnishes  s  striking  illustration  of  the 
general  doctrini-  contendeii  for;  it  shows  an  extensive  case,  in 
which  a  power  of  erecting  rorporations  is  either  implied  in.  or 
would  result  from,  some  or  all  nf  ihr  powers  vntei)  in  the  national 
gDvemmenl,  The  jiiiiidii:tiun  acquired  over  such  ronijuere^l  coun- 
try would  certainty  he  i*<im|>elenl  tu  any  .tpecies  of  le^t^itaiion. 

To  return ; — It  is  conceded  th:it  imptud ^ifwfrt  aie  to  be  con- 
sidered as  dHeg.<tcd  equally  •k'\\\\  e.tpren  oiui.  Then  it  follows, 
that  as  a  power  of  erecting  \  corporation  maj-  as  well  he  implUd 
AS  any  other  thing,  it  may  as  well  he  emploj'eo  .is  an  imlrumeiit  ax 
Muan  of  carrying  inlocieculi'in  any  of  the  specified  poweti,  asany 
other  iHitramml  or  mean  wha[e»-er.  The  only  que^tioti  must  l>e. 
in  this,  aa  in  ecery  other  tjie,  whether  the  mean  to  lie  eniploved, 
or  in  this  insiancc.  the  curporalion  to  he  erected,  has  a  natural  re- 
Ialior>  to  any  of  the  ackno^^1<.■•l);ed  ohjetiK  or  lawful  en<ls  ol  the 
govcrnmeni.  Thus  s  coipoiaiion  may  not  be  erccieil  by  Congress 
fitr  superintending  the  police  of  the  city  of  Ptiilaitelphia,  because 
ihey  are  not  ^nitlxMi/ed  tu  regulstU  the  poliee  of  thai  city.  Bui  om; 
may  be  erected  in  relation  lo  the  collection  ol  taxes,  or  10  the  trade 
with  (oreign  countries,  or  to  the  trade  between  the  Slaiei.  or  with 
the  Indian  tribes :  bec.iuve  it  is  the  province  u(  the  ledcrd  govern- 
ment lo  rfguLitf  thiit*  o!>j«rts.  and  betausc  it  is  incident  to  a  gen- 

ral  S9vertiga  or  iegisLilix'e  power  to  regulate  a  thing,  lo  employ 


658 


HAMILTON  ON  A  JfAT/ONAL  BAKJC. 


a)|[|ir  menns  which  relate  (o  its  RguUlion  to  the  bnt  and  great 
advnniAge. 

A  strjingc  (ntljtcy  sccms  to  haw  crepi  into  the  manner  a(  lUnk 
m%  aiul  rcAsnnlng  upon  the  subject.  Imu^iniition  appcAr*  to~ 
been  unuKually  buty  conceminK  it.  An  incorporation  ■« 
hnve  been  regnTikd  as  some  great  indfptndtnl  mbUantivr 
its  a  iiuliliciil  end  ot  peculiar  niKgnuudc  and  moment;  witi 
is  tcut)'  lu  be  considered  »s  a  ^ualil/,  (aftifily,  or  mean  lo  on  en 
Tliui  <i  niercjiiiilc  company  is  foimeti,  wiib  n  crri«in  capital,  i 
the  purpose  of  carryinfi  on  a  pnitieular  branch  of  busmr&t.  He 
ihc  [>u5inci^  to  br  proKcnutal  i«  the  end.  The  asKxrinricin.  inunli 
to  (arm  the  rcquisilc  capitoJ.  is  Ihc  priniat^-  mean.  Suppose  (tul 
an  incorpuralion  were  added  to  thU.  it  would  only  tie  to  add  a  ni 
fuality  to  that  itssocialion.  la  ^n-c  It  an  nitificlal  capacity.  t>y  wli 
It  would  be  enabled  to  prosecuie  the  buriineM  wiiK  more  safety 
UHivetiicnce, 

Thai  the  importance  of  the  power  of  incorporation  h:is  been 
.IgRrralert.  leading  lo  erroneous  conclusions,  will  (unlivr  a^ , 
from  ir.^iring  il  10  its  ori;;in.  The  Kom.-in  law  is  the  source  ■>( 
according  (n  which  a  volunUtry  asMKialion  of  indivi<lual».  al 
//m^,  ot  lor  any  purpose,  was  cjpableot  producing  it.  In  Eitg' 
whence  our  notions  of  it  ate  itnniedlalely  borrowed,  ii  fnnns 
of  the  eicculive  aulhurily.  and  the  exerciic  of  il  ha.i  been 
iM^at/d  hy  that  auihottiy.  Whence,  therefore,  the  croi 
■he  suppOiMlion  that  it  lies  beyond  the  reach  of  all  tliinc  very  ii»> 
potiani  portions  of  sovcrrign  power.  IcK'slntive  as  writ  as  ctem- 
live,  which  belongs  to  llie  govenimenl  o(  the  Unite*!  Stales. 

To  this  mode  of  reasoning  respecting  the  righl  of  rmployii^ 
all  the  means  rc4]nisilc  to  the  execution  of  ibe  s|HTifi>:d  {nwtn 
of  Ihc  government,  it  is  objn^lecl.  thai  nune  Inil  necess>iiy  aiul 
proper  nveans  are  lo  be  employed :  and  tite  Secietary  ol  SliM 
mainlainii,  lliat  iw  meau  are  to  be  con&iilrtrd  as  nrctnarf  bat 
ihow;  without  which  the  grant  of  the  power  woohl  be  nt^oJtrf. 
Nay.  so  (.11  docs  l>e  go  in  his  rcslrtctive  inlrrprelation  o(  IheakinA 
at  e»en  10  male  the  case  of  ntiftiilr  which  shall  warr.-)nt  the  ewt- 
sliltltional  exerciu' of  the  power  to  depend  on  i-iiivd/  anil  lemft- 
rttry  circumsianccs:  an  i<lea  which  akine  refutes  the  construction. 
"Xht  txf^difHiy  o(  exercising  a  |>arIioulai  power,  at  a  pankular 
time,  must,  indeed,  defiend  on  cncumslances;  bul  the  consiilu- 
lionil  right  of  exercising  It  must  be  unilorm  and  invariable,  tte 
tame  lo~day  as  to-morrow. 

All  ihe  aigumenis.  thrirfotc.  against  the  conslitnlionality  ol  llie 
bill  derivcil  from  the  accident.tl  existence  rA  certain  Slalr  bants.— 
insiiiulions  which  happen  lo  exist  to-dav.  and,  for  aii;  t-m- 

cenis  the  jtwcrnmeni  of  the  United  Siiiie*.  may  1.  to- 

morrow.— must  not  only  be  tcjectetl  ai  fallwous,  bul  inithl  be 
viewed  as  demon &ira live  thai  there  is  a  radUal  source  tA  error  ■> 
ll»e  reasoning. 

It  is  cucntinl  lo  llw  hciiiA  o(  the  nalioiial  government,  ihai  a 
erroneous  a  conception  of  the  meaning  of  the  word  tt*ttsatrl 
should  be  exploded. 


UAUn.TOtt  Oft  A   NATIONAL  BANK.  fi59 

ll  is  ccfiain  tlial  iwiihrr  the  Erammalical  nnr  popular  «enM  of 
llie  wrm  tR|uirrt  tli.il  eoiwiruclion.  Accutiliiig  lo  liotli.  Htet$stiry 
aden  mvant  no  more  ihnn  nttJffl.  lei/uiiilt.  imiilenlal,  ttse/i/. 
or  tinti/ufrtv  la.  Ii  U  a  common  inoile  of  PxprcKsion  lo  My,  lliat 
il  Ii  tiftttiiiry  (or  a  government  or  a  person  to  ilo  ihU  or  thai 
lliidg,  when  nothing  niorr  i«  intcndcil  or  unilcrMood,  than  Oi.tl  Ihc 

tinlrrcils  of  the  giivcinmeiil  or  jtcison  require,  or  will  lie  promoted 
liy.  ilie  (loicig  ol  tliis  or  ilui  thing.  The  ini»>;inaiion  oiit  be  nl  no 
Ius«  lor  excinpli5raiionit  of  (he  iise  ol  the  word  in  this  len&r.  An<l 
It  II  the  (rue  one  in  which  it  i*  to  lie  umlcrsluod  as  used  in  the 
Con&iituiion.  The  whole  turn  of  the  clause  containing  it  iiidic»ie». 
Hi:n  il  w*s  the  inietH  o(  the  Convention.  Iiy  that  cUu&e.  to  give  a 
lilKral  l^tituile  to  the  drerciae  ol  (he  »pecificd  powers.  The  cx- 
preuMMis  h«T«  peculiar  cntnpicheiislvencss-  Tlie^  are. "  lo  make 
all  laws  necn«ary  and  proper  for  tarrying  iato  txemlion  the 
/^rrgoine  pawtrs.  and  ali  other  fiotveri  vcKted  tjy  ilie  Cuiisittii- 
li'Hi  in  ihc.foiv-wOT/ir/of  the  United  Sulcs,  or  in  any  deparlmtnl 
or  affittr  ihercot," 

To  undersiund  the  word  a«  the  Secretary  of  State  does,  would 
l>c  to  depart  from  (Is  obvious  ai^d  popular  sense,  and  lo  give 
it  a  restrictive  oprraiion.  an  ide*  nei'cr  liefoic  enicriaiiied,  Il 
woulil  be  (o  give  it  the  s.-ime  lorce  as  it  llic  word  nhd/u/r/*' or 
in.tuftfntaNy  had  tiecn  prciixed  lo  it. 

Such  a   conitinclion  wutitd   be^el  endleu  uncertainly  and  ein- 
harr.-ixumrnl.     The  ciw's  inosit  he  iiriljublc  and  extreme,  in  wbich 
it  could  be  pronounced,  wilh  ceil;iiiily.  that  a  mrasorc  was  ab»0- 
lulcly    necemn-,  or  one,  wilhuut  which,  the  exercise  ol  a  given 
jKiwcr    would    lie    iiiigalor>-.      There    are    few    ineaniies    of    any 
{overnnieiit  which  would  si.ind  so  severe  a  lesi.    To  \n<n\   upon 
t,  ivotjiil  be  to  nijike  the  criterion  ol  the  exercise  of  any  implit*! 
>ower,  a  easref  fxtrfmeiueettity;  which  isralhcra  rule  to  juslity 
lir  overleaping  ul  the  hounds  of  const  i  tut  ion  a  1  authority,  than   to 
govern  the  onhnnry  exercitc  of  il. 

f  I  itiAy  be  irulv  said  of  every  government,  as  well  as  of  that  of  tlie 
jnitc«l  State*.  tliM  it  has  only  a  right  to  puss  such  l.iws  as  are 
e<?e!u«ury  and  proper  to  nccomplish  the  ohjrcis  intrusted  lo  It. 
'or  no  norernmenl  hiis  a  right  to  do  mtrely  whiit  il  filrttsf. 
Ie:nc«.  by  a  pioce»  of  rciioning  similar  lo  Ihai  of  the  Secrr-lnry 
f  Stale.  It  might  he  pioved  that  neither  ol  the  Simile  governmrrdts 
ns  I*  riRhi  to  incorporate  a  bnnh.  It  might  l)e  shown  thai  all  the 
liblic  biisinest  of  the  «ure  could  he  pcrlormed  without  a  bnnk. 
1(1  inferring  thence  lh«  it  was  unnecessary,  il  might  be  arati«'<t 
lal  il  coiilonot  be  done,  because  it  is  against  the  rule  which  lm« 
-cr»  jiist  trientioneil.  A  like  mode  of  reasoiuni;  would  prove  I  h:»l 
ere  was  no  power  to  incorporate  the  inh.ihilantsof  a  town,  willi  i* 
p\v  to  a  mure  pcrlecl  police.  For  it  is  crrlain  ih.it  an  incoipurJt  — 
■>n  may  be  dispensed  with,  though  it  is  better  to  have  one.  1 1  i» 
He  rcmf  mlicred  that  there  is  no  txprtu  |K>wet  in  any  Siaiecor*- 
jltilion  If)  erecl  corporations.  j 

Xltc  itegrM  m  which  a  measure  is  necessary,  can  never  be  a  r^x^\ 
the  legal  right  to  adopt  it ;  thai  must  be  a  mailer  of  opinion. 


6(>a 


HAMILTON  ON  A   NAriONAL   BANK. 


nn<l  cAn  onlp  l>e  a  Uft  of  «|)e«tirnc)r.     I'he  rrlaifon  brtircm  I 
measure  and  ihe  eHii;  between  llic  rntturr  o(  llie  meam  riiiplii;r4| 
toward  Ibe  execution  ul  d  iiduxt.  ainl  ll>c  object  ut   itui  ptnit; 
must  be  ibc  vmetion  ol  consxiluiianality,  not  ibc  uoie  or  la«i' 
nettiUty  or  ulilily. 

The  praciicc  of  tlic  government  i»  against  th»^  rule  of  coiuir 
tion    advoc.-lt(^<I  by  the    Secretary  tA    Stale.     Oi   ilits,   tlw 
concerning  liijhtliuuMrs.  beacons,  buoys,  and  public  picr«,  b  i 
wvc  example.     This,  doubtlesi,  must  be  rcfciird  lo  ihe  po* 
re^Mlaliiij;    irjxle.  hihI  i«  laiily   relative   to  il.      Hut    it    cam 
afliimcil   ihai   Ilie  cxeicisc  nf  ihvti   power  in   ihis  insianc 
6lricily  tiefeiitfy,  or  tli;tl  tlic  ymwcr  ilsdf  wquUI  be  nu^alv 
out  lliat  o(  rcKiiblint^nrtslilislimcnli  ol  lliis  nature. 

This  reWiiciive  itiier|>rcution  of  ihe  woul  ntfetutry  is  a|«o  i 
irary  to  tliis  sound  niiuim   of    cui»tiui:ttc>n  ;    nnnii^ly.  tJtai 
poneia  coiiiamcd  in  a  constitution  of  i^ovciiiiiMTiti,  e.-i|>rcially 
which  concern  the(;cnci^tl  a<tmiii&iratioit  of  thcallaits  of  a  ta 
its  finance*,  trade.  ricfcn*e,   etc.,  ought    (o  l>e  conMnled   lit 
ill  adcanceropni  of  the  public  giXKl.     This  rule  tloc«    not 
on  the  p.iiticiil.v  (onn  of  a  giitemntcnl,  or  on  the  partv 
innrcaliDn  of  the  buunilaries  of  ilt  jiowet^  Irul  on  the  iiatui 
object  of  goveniinent  ilielf.     The  meant  l>y  which   njiiiin 
gcndes  are  to  be  pcovideil   (or,  national  inconvcnicncr^  ot 
national  pio*i|>ciity  |)iuiiiu(cd.  aic  of  Uich  luliiiile    variety, 
ami  complexity,  tU.il  theie  inim  u(  nvcrssiiy  be  Ric.ii   Uma 
dltCTMion  in  the  selection  .-indnppliraii'w  of  thnse  n«-iins. 
COOKquently,  the  nece^Mly  an<l  propiiety  of  exen-iung  Ihe; 
ttc«  intiuiiled  toa  government  on  princi|>le!(of  hlH^r.tl  cottMr 

The  Alloincy  (Itnci.il  admits  llie   rule.  Iioi  I;ikes  n   dis 
between   a  Slate  and  the   Ke<leial  ConMiluluni.     The    Ulli 
thinks,  ought  to  be  construed  with  gre.tlcr  sliictncss,  liecituscj 
ts  more  d.inger  o(  error  in  dciiiiiiig  p,trli,tl  than  gtH^taf  i 
Itiil  the  rr-nxnn  of  the  rule  foihiils  such  a  distindioti.      This  i 
».  the  rjiriely  ■'■nd  extent  o(  pulihc    cxigrncii-s.  a  (ai   gn-nier  ^ 
portion  «(  which,  and  of  a  lar  more  critical  kind,  nie  ohjetts  ' 
Aiiliimal  than  ol  Slate  administralioti.     "f '  -  t  hII 

CTTor.as  far  aft  il  is  supposablc.  may  be  a  | 
lion  In  pi^dtctice.  but  it  cjiimut  be  n  (uleot  , !,..  ,ra 

In  regarii  to  the  cl.iuse  of  the  Conililution  inihi  indftJ 

considernlion.  it  tn  ailn)iiie<t    by  the  Allornri     ■">  ,i  mI 

reUridrfe   eflc«t    can    be  aMirilied  lo  it.     \\<  oivril 

ttKesiary  \\\\i%-.  "To  I>c  net-etiary  is  lo  be  m     ,  .  ..   c   n»«)rj 

be  denmninaieil  the  natural  means  of  executing  a  puwrr."  I 

Ikit  while  on  the  one  hartd  ihe  consiniciion  of  the  Secirtsrr  =Vl 
State  it  deemed  inadinivsible,  it  will  i»o«  be  contended,  ari 
that  Ihe  claioe  in  cjuesti'in  giiTS  any  next'  at  intfrfftitf.' 
Hut  tt  gives  ;in  exjklicit  sanction  to  tlie  iloetiinr  .  < 
StitI  is  ci)ui(alciil    to  an  ailiiiisi.iun    uf    the   |i  i| 

gOvernmEni,  as  to  ils  ifvu'/i/J /• 
MM'creign  authwiiy.  in  f.nni<:  <  i 
Otltcts,  co-ofdiiute  wilh  il.      Fm    m'lh    h  n'rii^im   inTi"-')  d 


IT9U 


HAMILTON  Off  A  NATIONAL  BANK. 


66 1 


tkclarailon.  (hat  It  may  pius  all  laws  necessary  aad  proper  to 
cirrj-  imo  execution  those  powers. 

li  is  no  valid  objection  to  the  doctrine  to  Mv,  that  it  is  calcu- 
lated to  extend  the  ^wer  o(  the  jtovcrnmcni  ihrauehoui  ihc  entire 
sphere  oi  SUtte  lesislulion.  The  mine  thiiijc  has  been  suid,  untl 
may  be  &aid.  Mith  regard  lo  every  eicrciie  ol  power  by  imputation 
or  €«Hstruili«H. 

The  moment  the  literal  meaning  is  departed  from,  there  is  a 
chance  o(  error  anil  nhuse.  And  yet  an  sdhcrcncc  to  the  letter  of 
its  powers  would  at  once  arrest  the  motions  of  governmrni.  It  is 
not  only  ugreed.  on  all  hands,  thai  the  exercise  of  constructive 
])awers  is  indispensable,  but  evcnr  act  which  hai  been  passed,  is 
more  or  less  an  exemplification  of  it.  One  has  been  already  inen- 
lionrd-~thal  rrhiing  to  lighthouses,  etc. — (bat  which  declarer  Ihc 
piiwcr  of  the  h^rsulcni  lo  remove  officers  at  pleasure,  acknowl- 
edges ihe  xanie  inilh  in  nnolhcr  ;ind  a  signnl  instance. 

The  irulh  is.  that  diffictillics  on  ihis  point  are  inherent  in  the 
nature  of  (lie  Fedeml  Con*tjtmion;  ihcy  result  inevitably  from  a 
division  of  the  leE'slaiivc  power.  The  consequence  ol  this  division 
Is.  that  there  will  be  caM^s  clearly  within  the  puwer  of  the  national 
government;  otheis.  clcnrly  without  its  powers;  and  a  third  cinss. 
which  will  leave  room  for  controversy  and  diilercncc  of  opinion, 
and  concerning  which  a  reasonable  latitude  of  judgmeut  must  be 
allowed. 

But  the  iloctrinc  which  is  contended  for  is  not  chargeable  with 
the caosci|uenres  imputed  toil.  It  does  nolalhrm  ihat  the  national 
goremmeni  b  sovereign  in  all  respects,  but  that  it  is  soi-ereign  lo 
a  certain  citeoi ;  tlut '».  lu  the  extent  of  the  objects  <A  iu  spccirtcd 
powers. 

It  leaves.  Iherefore.a  criterion  of  what  is  const  it  utional.  and  of 
whai  is  not  so.  This  criterion  is  the  m^.  to  which  the  nieasure 
relates  as  a  mraa.  If  (he  ftii  be  clearly  comprehended  within 
any  of  the  s|tecifieil  jKiweni,  and  if  Ihc  measure  have  an  obvious 
relalion  to  that  end,  and  is  not  forbidden  by  any  particular  pro- 
vision of  the  Constitution,  it  may  s.ifely  be  deemed  lo  come  within 
the  comptH  ol  the  national  auihoiity.  There  is  also  this  further 
criirrion.  which  may  muteiialty  Assist  the  decision ;  Does  ihe  pro- 
posed measure  abridge  a  pie-exiMing  right  of  any  .'iute  or  of  any 
milividual  ?  II  it  diics  not,  Iheic  is  a  sirong  prrsiimplion  in  f.ivor 
of  its  consliluliunaliiy,  and  sliKhter  letalioni  to  any  declared  object 
ol  Ihe  Constituiion  may  be  nermiiicd  to  torn  the  scale. 

The  general  objections,  which  arc  lobe  inferred  from  the  reason- 
ings of  the  Secrfiary  of  St.itc  and  Auorney  General,  to  (he  dociritie 
which  has  hern  advancc<l,  have  been  slatnl,  anil  it  is  hopcil  salis- 
faclorily  answered.  Those  of  a  more  particular  n.itutc  shall  now 
be  examined. 

The  Secretary  of  Slale  inlroducei  his  opinion  with  an  otMcrva- 
lion,  ih.tt  the  proposed  inc«f|>')ration  undeitakes  lo  create  ceititin 
capacities,  prispcniev  or  aiiiilioies.  which  are  against  Iho  laM« 
of  alifitngf,  iltuetiJt.  tukf-il  awl  far/tilurt.  diUribulion  and 
menap^fy,  and  to  confer  a  power  to  make  laws  paramount  lo  those 


663 


HAMILTON  Oy  A  NATIOS'AL  BAXK. 


IITH 


otlhe  StntcK.  Andnnthinj;,  aaysiie.in  anctlhCT  place.  Iiul  itetfuilj, 
iHfiHciblt  by  olhrr  mtans,  can  juitilv  such  a  prottralion  nf  b«s. 
which  cuMililulv  tlic  piltais  of  our  whole  sjMctii  of  juiijiprudcncc, 
artdaiF  the  foundaiion  Uwfi  of  ihc  SiMc  goicitimrnis.  I(  ihcM 
are  liuly  ibe  foundailon  laws  of  the  srvrtal  Stam.  iltm  have  mort 
of  rhcm  subvcttPil  their  own  foiind.-ittnnt.  Fot  \\\«tr  is  scaictlf 
one  of  ihrrn  which  has  not.tinccthc  rslnl>tiilimcnt  of  ilx  pnnlcnlar 
Gonaiiiuiion,  made  malerial  allcfstians  in  iiome  o(  ihov  limiidiE* 
of  its  joriipmdence,  especially  ihe  law  of  dcMCnu.  tlul  it  is  Dot 
coricc'it'cil  how  anyihint;  can  be  called  the  fundamental  Ian  at  * 
Slate  govcinnicni  which  is  not  cstnblished  in  its  conMitulNm, 
unailrrnhle  by  the  ordinary  legislature.  Atid,  with  rcgnrd  to  tli* 
(|iicil>i>n  of  necessity,  il  has  been  shown  thai  this  C-On  only  congi- 
lulc  a  c|ucsIion  of  expediency,  not  of  rij;hl. 

To  erect  a  cor|>oi;ili(>n.  is  to  substitute  a  Ifgal  or  or/i/i,ial  lor 
a  nalural  |>eisi>ii.  and  whcie  a  nunibct  are  conccmei).  tn  %m 
thcin  iHiiividuality.  To  thai  l^^l  or  atii/Uial  person,  mice^ 
created,  the  common  l»w  of  every  Siatc,  o(  iisrif.  annexes  all  ihoie 
incidents  ami  atinhtitrs  which  nrr  represented  Jts  a  proBlrvlion  ol 
Ihr  m-tin  pillat^  of  ihejt  jurisprudence. 

ll  is  cerUirily  not  accur.iie  to  say,  that  the  erection  of  a  cnrpora- 
lion  is  agaiiil  those  different  keatft  of  the  Slate  laws  ;  because  it 
t<  rather  to  create  a  kind  of  penon  or  entity,  lo  winch  iliejf  ate 
ina|>|>licab1e,  an<l  to  which  the  scnerat  rule  of  those  Uws  assign  a 
diflerenl  regimen.  The  laws  of  alienage  cannot  apply  lo  an  attt- 
licial  person,  beCAute  it  can  have  no  COUiilr^':  those  of  desceni 
cannot  apply  to  it.  because  ii  can  hare  no  heim ;  (ho»e  of  esclvji 
are  forei^  from  it,  (or  the  same  reason  :  iho.%e  n(  furfeiittre, 
because  it  cannot  commil  a  crime :  those  of  distribulion.  beCaBv. 
thuiif^h  il  may  lie  dissolved,  il  cannot  die. 

As  iryly  micht  il  be  said,  that  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  pre- 
scribing the  rule  by  Mhich  foreigners  sltal I  beiialuraliicd,  is  apinit 
the  bw  of  alienage,  white  it  is.  in  fact,  only  (o jr>ui  iheiii  in  a  wiu*- 
lion  to  cease  to  l»e  the  subject  i>(  that  Uw.  To  du  a  ihinj^  whick 
is  ajpitist  a  law,  is  to  do  somcthmg  which  i(  forfMds,  or  which  U  a 
vMntion  of  it. 

But  if  it  were  even  to  be  admitted  ihat  thecrectkin  of  a  coriiarUin 
Isa  direct  alteration  of  the  slate  taws,  in  the  enumetatcd  panicnbll. 
il  would  do  nnthing  toward  proving  that  the  measure  was  uncoB- 
stittiiionat.     If  the  goremmenl  of  ihe  L'niiert  S«air»  can  do 
which  amounts  to  an  alteration  of  n  Slate  bw.  all  its  [w 
nuKalory ;  (or  almost  every  new  taw  is  an  alteration,  in  aamr 
or  other,  of  an  ^J  iaw.tixher  (vrnmon  ox  ilatntt. 

There  are  laws  r.i-imninf;  bankruptcy  In  vmir  Sinii-i  ^ntnr 
Stales  have  laws  i  ihe  values  of  (■ 

are  empowered  !■  i  i   unifoim  l,»»^ 

throoshout  the  Uniird  Si-tirs, and  to  rcgtilaieihr  laluct  ul  lunign 
COtRS.  The  exercise  of  either  of  these  powers  by  CiingtrM.  nccO' 
■arily  involves  an  allcration  ol  the  laws  of  those  Stales. 

Aj;ain.  Every  person.  Iiy  the  common  law  ol  each  Sntti*.  noT 
export  hit  property  to  foreign  countries,  al  pleasure     But  Coi^roc 


mil 


HAMILTON  ON  A  NATIONAL  BANK. 


663 


in  pursuance  of  ihe  power  of  iCKubliiic  tTudc  may  prohibit  ihe 
(xporiiiion  of  coin ri>o<li tics;  in  doing  wnich.  they  would  alter  the 
common  Uw  of  each  State,  in  abridgiocm  of  individii-il  right. 

It  c»x\  therefore  never  be  edoH  reasoning  to  s.iy  this  or  that  «« 
ix  urtcoDXtilutioiial.  Iiccauxe  it  .liters  this  or  thAI  law  of  a  Slate. 
It  inu«t  l)<?  shown  tlial  the  act  which  makci  the  alterallon  i^unron- 
iliUitional  on  other  accounts ;  not  hecausi  it  iti.-ikei  ihe  allcmllon. 

There  are  iwo  points  in  tht  sugsejiiom  of  ilic  Settcury  of 
Slate,  which  hiive  beco  noteil.  that  ;iie  peculiarlv  iniorrect.  One 
i».  that  the  proposril  ineorporition  is  n^g.^mst  ihe  fawsof  monopoly, 
hecaui«  it  ilipulatci  an  rxciiuivc  right  of  thinking  under  (he 
national  authority ;  the  other,  ihat  ii  gives  power  to  the  in»iittition 
to  make  lawn  paiamouiii  to  lliosc  of  the  Staten. 

Itui.  with  rcjjaril  10  the  lirat :  The  bill  rtuither  prohibits  any 
Stale  from  eiecliit);  as  many  banks  an  they  ptea^ic.  nor  any  number 
of  individiMls  from  associaiing  to  carry  on  the  business. and  con&e- 
qtirnily,  i»  free  from  ilic  charge  of  establishing  a  monopoly;  foi' 
iiionojioly  implirii  a  legal  imfieiUmeHt  to  the  cnrtying  on  of  the 
Iraffc  by  others  than  those  to  whom  It  b  gt.tncetl. 

And  with  repaid  to  the  secoud  puini.  there  is  still  less  (ouniIn> 
lion.  TIk  by-laws  of  such  an  institution  as  a  bank  can  operate 
ooly  on  its  own  members— can  only  concern  the  Oispu>ilion  of  tl» 
own  propcny,  and  iiiuM  essentially  resemble  (he  rules  of  a  piivaie 
rneifanlile  partnership.  They  are  exprevtly  not  10  be  contrary  to 
I.1W  :  AtiA  Uw  must  here  mean  the  law  of  a  Stale,  as  well  as  of  the 
Unitcil  Siatr».  There  never  can  be  a  doubt,  thai  n,  law  o(  a  cor- 
jinmllon,  if  conlrar}'  lo  a  Uw  ol  a  Stale,  niusl  Ih-  ovcriuird  im  voitl, 
unless  the  law  o(  the  Stale  is  contrary  to  ihal  of  ihc  United  Staler, 
;ind  then  the  <|ue3imn  will  not  be  lietwecn  the  law  of  the  Stale  ami 
that  of  ibe  eorputaiion,  but  between  the  law  of  the  Slate  and  (bat 
u(  [he  Unilcil  Stales. 

Anoil>cr  argtimeni  made  use  of  by  the  Secretary  of  Stale  is.  ihc 
rejection  of  a  proposition  by  ihc  Convention  lo  empower  Congress 
to  make  corporations,  either  generally,  or  for  some  s|>ri:ial  piirpDi>c. 

What  was  the  precise  nature  or  extent  of  this  proposition,  or 
what  the  reasons  (or  refusing  it.  is  nut  ascertained  by  any  ^ulbcnlic 
documcril.  or  even  by  accurate  teculleclion.  As  (ar  iis  any  such 
document  eiisis.  it  specifies  only  canals.  If  this  was  the  amount 
of  It,  II  would,  at  mow,  only  protc  that  it  was  thought  itiexpedicnt 
in  give  a  power  lo  incorporate  for  ihc  purpose  of  opening  canals, 
(or  which  purpose  a  special  power  wouki  ha»-c  been  necessary, 
except  with  regard  lo  the  western  lerrilory.  there  being  noihinj;  in 
any  pari  o(  Ihe  Constitution  respecting  Ibe  regulation  ol  canals.  It 
must  be  confessed.  Iiowcver.  ibat  very  diffcicnt  accounts  are  gircn 
of  tlie  invpon  o(  the  pro  position,  ami  of  ibc  motives  for  rejecting  it. 
Some  afiirm,  that  it  was  cnntined  to  the  opening  of  CJinals  ani) 
obstructions  in  rivers  1  olliers,  ibal  it  embraced  banks  :  an<l  oihers, 
that  it  extended  10  the  power  ol  incorporalin);  (;enerally.  Some, 
again,  allege,  thai  it  was  disagreed  to  because  it  was  (hougbl 
iiniwoper  to  vest  in  Congress  a  power  of  erecting  corporalions, 
Oilten,  because  it  was  thought  unnecessary  10  tpt(i/y  ilic  power, 


(J64 


HAMILTON  ON  A  NATIONAL  BANK. 


tntt 


and  incxpedicnl  lo  furnisK  an  addiiioiuil  lofik  of  objcclkio  to  iM 
Consiitulion.  In  thU  stale  ol  the  milder,  no  infetcnct;  tvhalms 
can  be  ilr.iwn  from  il. 

Bui  wliaic»-cr  may  have  been  ihe  naiure  o(  the  pruposiiiun. 
ihe  rcjL&on^  tor  rejecting  it.  iioitiiii);  i^  Inctudeit  by  it.  iliai  d, 
(he  proposiiion,  in  rrspecl  to  the  ical  iiirril*  of  liic  qutriliuii.     71i« 
Secretary  of  Si.ilc  will  not  deny,  lh.it,  whatever  m.iy  ti.ive  liecn  llic 
inlentian  of  the  fr.viien  uf  a  contliliitiun,  or  «(  a  law,  ihal  mini- 
lioii  »  to  be  nought  lor  in  the  instranicni  itself,  iiccordin]^  lo  t)i 
uuial  and  est.tbhsticd  lules  of  cuiutiuctiuii.     Nutbing   t»  more 
common  llian  for  l.iwo  to  rxprett  und  fffed  niorc  or  less  ilinn 
intended.    If,  then,  a  power  lo  creel  a  coqwratiuo  in  any  case 
■leducible,  by  fair  inference,  froni  the  whole  or  any  i>aii  oi  ilia 
numerous  provisions  of  the   Contiilullon   of   the   I'niird    Stol' 
ar(n»ncnt>  dr^iwn  (rum  exirinuc  circumsiaiicct  n:];arding  ibc 
lention  of  the  Cotiveniion  iiiusl  be  rejecleil. 

Must  <)(  llie  ui)>uineiili  ol  Ihe  Seerctary  of  Sime.  which  have 
been  coiisideicd  ill  the  (orecvin);  leniaikt,  Art-  o(  a  luture  mlliicr  10 
apply   to  the  expediency  ihan  lo  Ihe  conMiliilionnliiy  of   ihe  biB. 
TItey  will,  however,  be  nolicc<]  In  ihc  dit^uuioD.s  which   will 
necessary  in  rcfcicncc  to  the  parliciilar  he.-uU  of  Ilic  poueia  of  Ihe 
government  which  uie  iiu-nlve»l  in  the  C|uesltvn. 

Those  of  the  Alloiney  General  tvill  now  jiroperly  come  oBihr 
view. 

Ilis  Tirsi  ohjeclion  is.  tluil  ihe  powrr  oT  incofixmlion  it  net 
txprrnly  given  lo  Congreu.     This  shall   be  conecileil.  but  in  tkii 
WHie  only,  that  it  Is  not  <leclare<l  in  txpttii  Itrms  ib.ii  Cunsrtis 
may  erect  a  coipnralion.     Dot  ihis  cannot  mean,  thai  thi-te  are  DM 
ceitain  exprrts  patetrt  which  nneitarily  incliide  it.     For  iii&laKt, 
Coiigros  lure  cxprcu  power  to  cxercbc  exclusive  tcj^iKliiliaii,  in 
nil  cases  whutsocvcr.  over  »uch  diilrid  (nol  exceeding  ten  nutct 
squ.ire)  us  may,  by  ces»ion  <>1  pjittculai  Stales  anil  the  accKntaim 
of  CoTigiess,  bccuinc   the  !ie:il  of  the  governiiienl   ol   the   Uniled 
States  ;  and  locxcrvis*  likt  •iulk<n  ily  attx  >i\\  places  purcb. 
consent  of  the  IrgiU.iiure  of  the  Stale  in  whicn  the  saliic  si 
(or  the  erection  of  forls,  arsenals,  doclr-yardi.  and   ^the^ 
buildin;>E.      Here.   then,  is   express  jiowcr   to   exercise   tithuic* 
legiilatiiMi,  m  all  caut  wiSii/Kvrvf,  over  certain  places ;  tlt.il  i\. 

10  do,  in  respect  to  ihose  pl.ictv  all  that  aiiv  (Toveinintni 
ever  niay  do.    For  laiigujige  dues  not  nfloid  .1  more  1       1 
de^'gnatton  ol  sovereign  power  than  In  ihosiT  coinprrhriisive  (« tii>. 

11  is.  in  olhn  words,  n  power  to  pavt  all  law«  wliatsonet.  ami. 
Ci>nM-(iiienlly,  lo  pass  1aw-»  for  electing  corpomlions.  &»  well  as  lor 
any  oilier  purpose  which  is  Ihc  proper  object  of  law  in  a  (m 
gorernment. 

Surely  it  can  never  be  beUeved  thai  Congress,  wilh  xxrAuAv 
poterrs  fif  Ireiilaliett  in  all  taiei  whatsoever,  cannot  errd  a  t»- 
poratkm  within  the  district  which  shall  becotiK  ibe  k»[  ol  gami>- 
menl,  for  ihr  better  legulnlion  ol  its  polke.  And  yel  then;  Is  w 
umju-ilified  denial  of  Ihe  power  to  cirel  corfiorations  in  every  cait. 
on  Ihc  part  both  of  the  Sccictar]  ol  Sute  and  of  the  Altunicjf 


e   UBuea 
ti»e^| 


ITSII 


HAMILTON  ON  A  NATIONAL  BANK. 


665 


General:  the  former. indeed, speaks  o(  tliat  power  in  lliue  einphiU- 
ical  lenris  :  Tliat  it  is  a  rf^ht  remaiHirtg  exclmixtly  with  the 
Slattt. 

As  (ar,  then,  as  there-  rs  an  txpreit  p»Hvr  to  do  any  pariicular 
mt  a/i/^-ii/aii.'»,  ibcre  i^  an  fxprtu  one  lo  erecl  3,  cor])or:ition  in 
(tir  case  above  d«rribed.  Jlut.accur.ilcly  spcaliiiiK.  n<tp»rluular 
fUMpfr  is  more  than  Ikat  imptieJ  in  ,1  gmiral  a»f.  Thus  Ihe 
power  io  Xxf  a  duly  oti  ugaHun  a/  rum  is  only  a  pailicular  implUii 
in  the  ([cnenl  |iutver  to  collect  tJixe^.  ilulieit,  iin|)u^l*i.  and  excised 
Tliis  seTTC4  To  i-:i|>lain  in  uiiai  sciise  il  titny  he  saitt  itiat  Coil£iiCSS 
liave  not  an  express  pn«'cc  10  make  eorporaiions. 

This  may  not  be  an  improper  pbrc  lo  lake  notice  of  an  arj>u- 
incnl  wliicfi  wjs  used  in  debate  rn  ilic  House  of  Repi-etcnutive«. 
It  WAS  IJKre  9ii):ucil,  lliat  if  (lie  Const iliilion  iiileiideil  lo  confer  so 
imporianl  a  power  ;ii  thai  of  ereclins  corporations,  it  would  have 
lv:en  cxpievily  meniioned.  Bui  ihe  i:^^^  whieh  has  been  iiulieed 
is  clciuiy  one  in  which  such  fi  power  exists.  And  yet  without  any 
spec'tie.)ti<inof  expiess  giani  of  it.fiiilhcr  than  as  every  friiftiiuliir 
implifii  in  a  gcoerisl  power  can  be  said  to  lie  so  Kninieil. 

Hut  tl>c  ar};un)col  i1se<f  n  foundeil  upon  \n  cia}^^era1e<l  .ind 
erroneous  conccptiim  u(  the  nature  of  the  power.  It  has  been 
«>iuwn  thai  it  ts  mil  o(  so  Irjn  seen  (ten  i  U  kind  as  llie  leasoninf; 
suppose!,  ami  that,  viewed  in  A  just  N};hl,  il  is  a  mean,  whicb  ouj^ht 
to  have  been  led  lo  I'mpJiitifioH,  ratlicr  thaw  an  end,  which  ought 
lu  have  l>ren  expressly  granted. 

Havin;;  observed  thjt  the  power  of  eiccliiig  corporations  is  not 
expressly  ^{lanicd  to  Congress,  ibc  Ailorncy  Cciieral  procccdi 
thus:— 

"  If  )t  can  be  cxercitctl  by  (hem,  it  must  be — 

"  I,  Recause  the  naturi^  of  the  federal  jroremment  implies  it. 

*'  3.  Uecanse  it  is  invulved  in  some  of  the  specilied  powers  of 
Iei;islalian. 

■■  3,  Urcause  it  is  itecessary  ani!  proper  10  carry  into  execution 
aoinc  of  the  specified  powers." 

To  be  iiiiph"!  in  the  nature  of  ibc  ftiUral  gmvrnmmt.  say* 
he,  woulil  bcgel  a  doctrine  so  in<lelinitc  as"  10  grasp  every 
1  lower. 

Tbli  propasiiioti.  it  ouxhl  lo  be  remarked,  is  not  precisely,  or 
even  subslaniially.  thai  which  has  been  relied  upon.  The  proposi- 
tion relied  ii|>un  is.  that  \^k  ifrei ifitd  pototrs  ef  Cont;resi  are  in 
ihcir  nature  »iw«rrt^«.  Thai  11  is  incidrnl  10  sovereign  power  to 
eiecl  corporations,  and  thai  therefore  Congress  have  a  righi,  w  ithin 
\\\v  tpktre  and  '\n  r^hlioH  lo  ihe  okjfclt  ef  Ihtir  purvtr ,  \s>*r(fl 
fiirfiorsitiens.  Il  xh.ill.  however,  be  supposed  thai  the  Ailorncy 
General  would  consider  the  two  propositions  in  ihe  same  liKht, 
and  that  the  objection  niaile  lo  the  one  wouki  be  nude  lo  the 
other. 

To  tWs  objeciion  an  answer  has  Iwen  already  given.  It  is  ihla. 
ihai  ibciliviiine  is  stated  with  i\\ii  r.rprftt  guali/SdtfhH.  that  ihc 
right  10  erecl  cor|>oratloos  does  imi/v  rxteii<l  totai^t  and  irijutt 
wllhili  Uie  tpktrt  of  the  spettJUtt  /iosfrrs  of  \h^  gaveriiiiunt,     A 


666 


HAMILTON  OAf  A  IfATJOXAL  BMA'A'. 


f'«M^ii/ logi»1attv«  auttiotity  implin  a  power  \o  irteti  co  , 
in  ail ttiut.     h  parluulitr   legislalivr  povvcT  iinpltrs  .-lu^itnii} 
erect  corporalions  in  rcl-ilion  lo  c.isp^  Arining  iiiKlrt   that  fk'w- 
itnfy.     Ilciicc  ihc  alliiniing  lli.ii,  ns  incii/tnt  lo  stvcfeij;i)  pcix 
Con£reMi  m.i)*   creel  a  cc>i}K>ralion   in   rcUlioii    lo  ihc    ii>, 
of  tlicir   laxfn,  is  no   more    lo  aflimi  that  lliey  ni.iy  do  w 
else   ihe)'    please.— lh»Ti    ihe  ^^yixjl   ll'iit  Itie}*  luive   «    pu' 
regulate  irmlc.  would  be  to  aAiitn   ilui  iticV  have  a    po 
rvgiiUtc  icli^ion  ;  or  ihjii  (tie  ma  in  I  nixing  thai  ilicy  hare  soi 
power  Uln  iJiiallon.tvniild  belomaiRiatn  that  ihey  Iiare  sovert^ 
poWTr  a«  li>  cvrrylhiiig  else. 

The  AUomcy  (rt^ivcral  iinilcrlakcv  in  Ihc  next  nl.-ice  to  sbai*.  tlud 
the  power  of  electing  tui purjiliuns  i-i  not  involicd  in  any  uj  llic 
npccilied  poweis  »I  lci;itl:iiiun  contiileii  to  llie  iiulion.-il  t,'ovnnti>enl. 
In  unler  loThis.  he  hitalteinpieit  jn  cTiuntci'Jilion  o(  ihc  pjitKuUiS 
which  he  suppnses  lo  lie  comprehended  under  (he  »ereral  hrtib  nf 
\ht  tovrfri  Id  U)r  and  collrcl  l.-ixen.  &c. ;  lo  bonow  inoncy  uu  (lie 
crcdil  ol  the  United  .Si.iIck;  I«  rcKul.ile  commerce  uitti  MX'errign 
nniion* ;  Iwiween  llie  Suien,  and  niih  ll>e  Indian  Uibes ;  to  ilo- 
po*e  of  and  inuke  all  nee<i(iil  rules  ;i(id  re^ulnlinns  tc»t>ectiiit;  Ihe 
teirilonr  o(  oiIht  pioptily  bt-lonKin;;  to  the  Uniled  St.ilo.  The 
ilcsif-n  of  which  eiiutiii'r;ilii)n  n.  lu  show,  what  is  included  umkt 
(hose  tliffeieni  he^ids  of  power,  jiiid  ivcgniively,  ibut  llic  power  ol 
creeling  corporjiiom  n  nol  inchidetl. 

The  truib  of  this  ii)fereiicc  of  conclusion  niuvi  drncnil  on  ll<c 
accurftcyof  iherniiniei^ilioii.  Ifil  canbctbnwn  ihai  the  enumcn- 
lion  is  ae/tciisrt,  the  inference  is  ilv»tTioycd.  To  do  ilils  will  be 
attended  with  no  diflkully. 

The  bendi  of  ihe  (lowei  lo  lay  and  cotlcct  taxes  are  SUJed  lallC^ 

I.  Ti>  iilipuldic  the  sum  lo  be  lenl. 

3.  An  tiiiere&i  or  no  iniereftt  to  Ix  |uid. 

].  Tii«  lime  aivd  nianner  of  re|>B)ing,  unt«^  the  loan  be  plind 
on  an  irredeemable  fund. 

Thi^  eiiumer^itinri  i«  liable  lo  a  vnriMy  of  otijccitoni.  Ii  omiu 
in  the  fitsi  place,  llie  ptedging  vt  '>*<»'fg''gi'>g  oi  n  Fund  for  Ihe 
«ecufiiy  of  the  money  tent,  an  usuaJ.and  in  most  case*  ^iti  euenlul 
incredienl. 

The  idea  <^  a  slipulslkin  o(  an  iHlerrtt  oi  no  mterett  is  loo  <«*' 
fined.  It  should  ralher  liarc  been  61ik1.  in  &(ipul.<ic  lb'-  ■  .'v.u//r*- 
tion  of   the   10k*n.      liullviduals   nlien   borrow   on    i  tiu 

olftcr  ihnn  tlte  payment  «f  inlcreil.  ui  may  g;oTcinii<  '  '  <i  «» 
ihey  often  find  it  necesMry  lu  do.  Everyone  recollects  ihc  Inilrry 
tickets  and  ulber  douecun  uflen  £iven  in  Creai  Britain  as  rolbl> 
eill  inducement*  to  the  lending  of  money  lo  the  corrtninrnl. 
There  are  also  fieqocnily  colUteiHl  cnndiiiotig.  which  the  cnumet*- 
lion  doct  not  contrnipUle.  Every  contract  which  hiu  been  madt 
for  money*  borrowed  in  Holland,  mduce*  slipulaiton^  ihat  the  m» 
due  xhaU  be  frtr  from  tai^i,  and  (ram  xcqucsl ration  in  time  W 
war.  and  niortsagn  all  ihe  land  and  pioprrty  uf  ihc  I  Silted  Suin 
(iw  the  reinilwr  semen  L 

It  is  alio  known  tlul  a  lottery  b  a  common  npetllnt)  f»r  fn* 


mil 


UAMILION  ON  A  NATIONAL  BANK. 


«67 


rowing  nxMicj',  whkli  cciUiiily  tloa  not  (all  under  eilher  ol  tlie 
cnurnMalc<l  lieids. 

The  licadi  of  \)v:  power  lo  rcguUlc  conimetcc  with  (oicisfl 
natioLift.  arc  staicil  lo  be  : 

I.  To  prohibit  t>icn>  or  ihrii  coimnoditiftt  from  our  ports. 

a,  Tq  impose  ilul'e*  on  ihem.  ivhcrc  none  cAihiL-d  before,  or  lo 
incrMKc  exii/iHg  duiics  on  lliem. 

3.  To  subject  liem  to  uiiy  spvcies  o(  cuiilotn-Iiauiie  re{[ulutioi». 

4.  To  graiil  fheiH  any  CKemplioiis  or  privilei;e9  wliicb  pulicy  aaf 

iTiis  enum«t;iiioii  is  far  fi)oi'«  exceptionable  than  cillicr  of  the 
former.  It  omits^'tryfliing  that  tcl.ites  lo  \hc  u/ii^Ht'  ivuf/i,Ot 
(ommtfdiiift  of  ibc  United  St.iics. 

The  falloning  palp.ilile  oiiiivMonx  occur  nt  once : 

t.  Of  the  power  (o  poihitiil  llic  cxporlatinn  of  comtiidditiefl, 
which  not  only  exiuli  ai  all  liint^s.  but  tvhicli  in  time  of  w.u  It 
^  wontil  Ikt  necMsiry  lo  exeiciite.  partKulaily  with  iclaltun  to  niivd 
ml  wailike  stor**, 

3.  Of  the  power  lo  prescribe  rules  concerning  the  (httrgicUr- 
isliis  and  pru  ilegc*  of  an  Arnri  irati  hotlom  ;  how  she  shall  be 
navigated,  or  whether  by  ciiiieiis  or  loreigners,  or  by  a  proportion 
of  each. 

3.  Uf  the  power  of  rerulatin;;  the  manner  of  conlmclinj;  with 
l.Seatnen :  the  police  of  »tiip»  on  Iheir  voy.\i;».  &c, .  of  which  the 
LAct  for  the  jfovernmnil  and  ri'jful.-ition  uf  seamen,  in  the  iner- 

chanla'  service.  \%  a  specimen. 

That  ihc  three  preceding  a(tic1»  arc  omissions,  will  not  be 
doubtftti— there  is  A  long  list  of  items  in  addition,  which  admit  ot 
lillle.  if  any  (pieMion,  of  which  a  (ew  samples  shall  l>e  given. 

1.  The  granting  of  bounties  lo  certain  kinds  of  vessels,  and 
certain  ipecies  of  mcrchandiic :  of  this  nature,  is  the  allowance  on 
dried  and  pickled  lish  and  s.ilied  ptuvinoii^ 

J.  The  prcsciihinii  of  rules  tonccrninjj  the  insfnilion  of  com- 
modities to  be  CKporlcd.  Thuu^h  the  States  iiidividuallv  arc 
cooipelciit  lo  this  rcguUiion,  yet  theie  is  no  re;)son.  in  point  ut 
aiilhotily  at  least,  why  a  general  system  might  not  be  adopted  by 
(he  Unilcd  Stales. 

].  The  regulation  of  policies  of  insarance ;  o(  lalvage  uptin 
goods  found  at  sea.  and  liie  dis|K>siIion  of  sucli  goods. 

4.  Tlie  resulaiion  of  nilols. 

{.  The  regulation  of  bills  of  exchange  drawn  by  a  iiicrchuni  of 
en*  Stair  upaii  a  merchant  of  aHi'lAer  Slate.  This  la.st  Tutli<:r  be- 
longs  10  ihc  reguUlion  of  trails  l>ct>ivrcn  the  States,  but  is  equally 
omitted  in  the  specifications  under  ifi.it  head. 

The  last  enumeration  rcUtcs  to  the  power  to  dispose  of.  aiul 
m«ke  idl  Httd/ul  rulet  and  rfgMlaiiont  respeciing  the  territory  01 
olAtr  firafierty  belonsing  lo  the  United  Stales. 

The  heads  o(  this  power  aie  said  to  he : 

I,  To  exwl  an  owncrshin  over  the  lerritotv  o(  ihe  Unilcd  Slates 
which  m.iy  l>C  proppily  calfeil  the  propriiy  ol  tlie  United  Slat«.  as 
in  the  western  lerrilut}',  aii<l  to  imtilult  a^aV4>HmiHt  thtittit.  0( 


668 


HAMtLlVy  O/f  A  KATIOffAL  BANK. 


3.  To  exert  an  owner»liip  over  the  Mlid  properly  of  tli«  Uiiilcri 
Slates. 
The  idea  o(  exerting  jid  (»vn«*hip  ov<t  lli«  icrriiory  or  othtr 

rTwtny  of  the  L'niic<l  Suirs.  is  p.tnKul.iHy  indofiniir  utid  v»ik. 
I  (foes  not  at  all  sailsfy  \\w  concrpiion  of  kIi^i  \\\k\s\  h^rc  Ztxm 
inlcndcd  by  a  power  \o  make  all  netd/ui  ruhi  ami  r<y  w/it/jiiirt, 
nor  would  there  hare  been  unf  u»c  far  a  »))Fci.i]  cUum:,  utiicli 
aiilhoriietl  nothinj;  muie.  For  the  ri^ht  of  eierlin]:;  »ii  ownrmtii)) 
t>  iini>lie(l  in  the  very  (Ivtiiiitioii  o(  jiroiicTir-  It  v^  'dniilted,  ibitt 
in  regard  to  Ihe  westuiii  (ririioiy.  suiiictmn|;  niotc  iii  tnlcnilml; 
even  the  in^Uiution  of  a  f-ovcnimcnt.  ilut  is.  ihe  crcattun  ol  a 
body  politic,  or  corpoiAiion  ot  the  liighcsi  nMurc  ;  oite  which,  in 
tis  maiuiity.  will  be  able  ilsrlfto  create  other  cnr|ioniltons.  Why, 
■hen,  docs  not  the  x.imc  claiixe  aulborite  ihe  erection  of  .t  corpon* 
lion.  In  respect  to  the  rrt^ut.-iilon  or  ditpoaal  oi  any  other  of  ilw 
propeny  o(  Ihe  Unlieil  Suiies, 

T  htsi  idea  will  be  eiibc^eil  upon  in  anolhei  place. 

Hence  ii  »)>|M:ai»,  iluit  the  enumer.tiMiis  which  havtf  been  ai- 
Icmpied  li)'  the  Attorney  General,  .iir  so  impeifrcl.  M  lu  nutharitc 
no  conclusion  whjlevei;  they,  therefore,  h.ivc  no  (cnilemy  in 
ilisprove  tlul  ea<-h  .ind  every  o(  the  powrrs.  to  Mhirh  lliry  lelatc. 
jiicluiics  lh;it  of  errtliiiK  corpoi.Tiioiu,  whith  they  criliinily  ilo.  « 
the  sulHequrtii  illustrations  will  tuore  and  more  evince. 

It  i»  presumed  lo  have  been  utistuclunlf  »l)uwii  in  ilie  courfc  ol 
ihe  prcccditiB  obnervaliiMii : 

1,  That  the  power  of  the  ([OTernnKnl,  ni  lo  the  obiccis  in- 
liusted  10  iu  maii.if-cmcnl.  ib.  in  its  itJilute.  soveiei^n. 

1.  TliJI  l>ic  right  of  eiecling  c«r|>o(ations  is  ont-  inherent  is,  md 
insepar.ihlr  from,  the  iilw  o(  sovereign  power. 

3.  Thai  the  po&illon.  th.it  the  governinenl  of  ibe  Uniled  Slattt 
Ciiti  exercise  no  power.  Itiii  xuch  a»  is  delej^lcd  to  it  by  lis  C*iB> 
siiiution,  docs  not  militate  aic-"'^"'  '^■'^  principle. 

4.  Tlut  the  wi>rd  ntienary.  in  the  grneral  clause,  can  lia»c  iw 
rettriiliVf  o|>erjilion  deiugaling  from  (Itc  foice  of  ihu  princltile; 
indeed,  thai  the  degree  in  which  a  mcauire  is  or  is  not  Htfruaty, 
cannot  be  a  Ittt  of  fHHstilH/ional  rii;il.  Init  of  fxpfditiuy  iialy. 

J.  Tlwt  tile  power  to  erect  corponlioni  is  (wit  to  lie  rnnsideml 
as  an  inJef'/HdeKt  or  mMan/nv  power,  but  as  an  itictdtntml 
awl  au-tiluiry  one.  and  was  iherefoiv  iiioie  properly  left  tu  im- 
piicaiion.  ih.in  expreisly  gtnnted. 

6,  That  llie  pitnciplc  in  oueslion  does  R0I  extend  the  powrr  nf 
the  governinenl  bcyonti  the  prescribed  liniiU.  bccniise  it  only 
affrrnis  a  power  to  iafarft^rate  for  purposes  vt'lhtn  tkt  ifiArrt 
of  ihe  sfifcifiid p^terrs. 

And  LisHy.  Ihai  Ihe  rij[hi  10  exercbe  aoch  t  powr  tn  edsfii 
CAKS  is  unc4|  III  vocally  framed  (n  the  most  fhui/Hr     '  ~- 

j/rv  terms.     To  nil  winch  it  only  rrniains  lo  lie  O'  1 

power  has  actually  Ih-w  exercited  in    two  very  er-i 
namely.  In  the  ctectiim  of  two  governments ;  one  1  ■ ;  c 

River  Oh>o.  anil  ihe  oilie*  *otiih»csi— the   laM    i-    ■  t 

wiy  antccedeni  cotnpaci.     And  ihcitc  ruull  Inafull^i:  c 


mm 


ri 


ITBll 


IIAMILTOH  ON  A  NATIONAL  BANK. 


669 


clemonMmtion.  Ihal  the  SecreUrv  of  Stale  and  the  Attorney 
Genaal  are  mixaken  when  the}"  ifeny  geneulljr  Ihc  power  of  ihe 
national  covcnkment  to  erMt  corpoTstions. 

It  stuUrnow  be  endr-tvortd  10  )>e  shown  ihjit  iheic  i&  a  power 
lo  erect  one  or  the  kind  propospi]  by  ihe  hill.  This  will  be  done 
by  tncing  .1  natural  and  oh vioiix  tcIai ion  bci ween  ibc  in»Iilulion 
01  a  bank  and  the  uiijccii  o(  teventi  of  tlie  enumi:Tatc<l  povrcnt 
o(  il»e  Korcmment :  anil  by  iliuwing  lhal,/i</r//fA/^  speaKing,  h 
ii  neeesciary  10  the  edectu;!!  execution  o(  one  or  more  of  ihoM 
pon'cri. 

In  the  course  of  this  investigation,  various  instances  will  he 
staled,  by  way  of  illusiraiion  ol  a  right  to  erect  corpornltons  under 
itiosc  powrrt. 

Scime  pivliminary  aJMenrationi  inay  be  proper. 

The  pruputcd  bunk  is  to  consist  iA  *n  aviociatioii  of  penona, 
for  llie  piir|KHie  of  cteating  a  joint  capital,  lo  be  finployed  thiefly 
and  csiiCDIi.itly  in  loam.  So  far  the  object  is  nol  only  liiwful.  but 
it  Is  ihc  menr  exercise  of  *  tight  which  the  Uw  nllows  10  every  In- 
clivldiial.  The  D.irik  of  New  York,  which  Is  r)ol  incorporated,  is 
an  example  of  «ucli  an  auoci.-ition.  The  bill  proposed  In  Addition 
ihal  ihe  Koveriimciit  shall  become  .1  joint  proprietor  in  this  undcr- 
takinH.  and  Ihal  It  shall  pennil  the  bills  u(  the  company,  payable 
on  iktiiand.  to  be  receirabte  in  lis  ro'cnuts ;  and  Mipulales  ihal 
It  shall  not  grant  phvdeges.  Mniil;ir  10  ihoic  which  are  to  l>e  al* 
lowed  10  this  conipany.  to  any  others.  All  this  ii  inoontruvertlbly 
within  ihc  compass  of  the  discretion  of  the  government.  T)ic 
only  question  is,  whether  il  has  a  right  10  incorporate  this  com- 
pany, in  order  to  cn.ihic  it  the  more  effectually  to  accomplL-tli  ends 
which  are  in  ihemiclres  lawful. 

To  esUbliib  Kuch  a  right,  it  remains  lo»liaw  the  relation  of  such 
an  instltuttofi  to  une  or  more  uf  [hc&pcctAeil  powers  of  tbe  govern* 
incni.  Accoiihngly  it  Is  atfiiim-d  that  it  has  a  relation,  more  or 
less  direct,  to  Ihc  power  ol  collecting  nxes.  lo  that  of  borrowing 
money,  to  ih.ti  ol  regotaling  tt.ide  between  the  Slates,  and  to 
those  of  raising  and  tnainlalnuiK  llects  and  anniev  To  the  two 
fonuer  tbe  relation  may  be  said  to  be  initnediatc :  and  in  the  last 
place  it  wilt  be  argued,  that  it  Is  clearly  within  the  provision  which 
aulhotucs  the  making  of  all  Heedful  rules  and  regulatieni  con- 
cerning the  praterly  of  Ihe  Llnitcd  Stales,  as  the  same  ha»  been 
praclKTeri  upon  by  the  govcinnient. 

A  bank  rclala  to  the  collection  of  laxfrt  in  two  wayt— in- 
dlredly.  by  increasing  the  qunnllty  of  circulatinj;  medium  and 
qurckeiiing  citcul.ilkHi.  which  fnciliiales  llie  means  of  paying 
liirectly.  by  creating  a  t«m'enienl  sfiectet  of  mc<lium  in  which  they 
arc  to  ne  paid. 

To  dcKienate  or  appoint  the  m^iey  or  Iking  in  which  taxes  are 
to  he  pai(T.  it  nol  only  a  proper,  bat  a  nt^esiary  txtrcise  <A  the 
power  of  colleciin};  them.  Accordinfily  Congress,  In  the  law  con- 
cerning tbe  collection  ol  llie  ilullcs  on  im|<osls  and  tonnage,  h.ive 
provided  Ihal  they  shall  t)c  |Mid  in  gold  and  silver.  But  while  it 
wuaiiindispciiiablcpailolihc  work  to  say  in  what  they  »haultl  be 


KATIQNAL  8AXK. 


p;ti(1,  the cliokc  of  th«  tpccilk  thing  w;LsiiM:r«  niailcr  of  difiCKttOD. 
'flic  pajfmeni  might  h.ivc  been  rc<|uircd  in  the  c<imiiioiI(lirs  tlmti- 
selvev  Tnxcs  in  kind,  hou-ever  ilUju'lgri).  ate  not  w-illmut  pr»- 
cmleiils,  even  in  the  Unitetl  Sinici :  of  ii  iiiighl  have  iKen  In  llie 

Ki|>er  iiionc}- «(  the  >eteiiil  Slates,  or  in  the  bitli  o\  ilic  Bank  uf 
unh  Atuerica.  New  Vork  an!  M.nswicliuiiett!!,  all  or  citlier  oj 
iheni  \  or  it  might  hate  Le«n  in  tiills  iwucd  under  the  auibnniy 
of  the  Unliexl  Sijiiev 

No  pari  ol  ihl&  cnn.  ii  is  picsumed.  bcdit-puted.  The  Jppiiini- 
menl.  then,  of  the  menty  or  tlii-g  in  ivhich  the  (mrs  are  to  be 
paid,  IK  nn  incident  ti)  ihc  potvet  of  colWtion.  And  amonjj  tlie 
expedienit  which  may  be  ai>»|i[ed,  ia  thai  of  Intls  issued  umtcr  (be 
aulhoiily  i)f  the  Uniltil  .States. 

Now,  the  iiiannet  of  isMiing  lliese  bilU  ia  again  matter  ol  diM^e- 
l>on.  Tl>c  government  (night  doubtlcst  proceed  m  tlie  fulhiwmg 
manner : 

It  tnishi  provide  Ihai  ihcy  &hotili)  be  iuued  under  the  ilirertion 
nf  certain  ofTicerx,  payable  on  demand  :  aii<l.  in  order  to  «uppcMt 
their  creitit,  ami  give  them  a  te^uly  circulatiort,  it  rnighl,  bH»des 
^ving  llicin  a  ctirieney  tn  ilt  tax(.'<i.  set  ajMil.  out  uf  any  irHineiii  m 
s  tfe^surv.  a  giien  sum.  and  appioptijtc  it,  umlcr  (l>e  diiectinn 
f  thoM  ofBccrs,  HIS  a  fund  for  imsifcimg  the  bills, as  picKnieU  for 
ayment. 

The  cumitiluiionality  of  all  this  nmiM  not  admit  of  a  qutttian, 
and  yet  i(  wotild  ;iniount  to  ijte  instilutiiMi  of  n  bank,  with  a  Ticw 
111  t)ie  more  convenient  culletiion  of  taxes.  Vvi  the  siinplevi  and 
mini  piecise  idea  of  a  IhiiW  n,  a  depotil  of  coin,  or  utiier  piop- 
eily.  a«  a  fun<l  for  (iriulaUmg  ertdil  upon  It,  ivhich  ii  tu  aniiwei 
ihe  purpose  of  money.  That  such  an  arrangement  M<iuld  be 
equivalent  to  Ihc  establish  mm  t  of  a  hank,  would  liccmue  nbvKtut, 
■if  the  place  where  the  fund  In  be  set  ap.irt  was  kept  should  be 
^.vle  a  receptacle  of  the  inoneys  <if  all  oiImt  [lersun^  wlxi  sbuuld 
incline  lo  d«|M)sil  them  ihcie  fin  safe-keeping  ;  aiid  would  become 
still  more  so.  if  the  otTicri-s  chaignl  Willi  ll>c  dirrclKMi  of  I  In- fund 
were  HUlhnnfetl  lo  make  diMrou'iIs  at  tlic  usual  rale  of  miriesl, 
ayttn  good  security.  To  deny  the  power  of  ihe  ([m'ctnineni  to 
»<til  lltrsc  tngrcdienti  to  llie  plan,  vifHiM  be  lo  teiine  away  all 
government. 

A  furtlter  process  will  slill   more   ciraily  illuslmir  llie  noint. 
Suppose.  wl>en  llie  sprcic^  of  bank  which  has  l>een  ilcscriliru   wa* 
hImiuI  lo  be  iiiitilutnl,  il  was  to  lie  utK'^d  that,  in  onlcr  in   u-mfr 
to  it  a  due  dcc'rc  of  confidtnt-e.  lite  fund  ouglil   nut    ■ 
fiet  apart  ami   appro|wialed  generally,  b^it  0*igfit  to  be  'j  > 

vested  in  (he  uRicers  who  were  to  have  the  direction  of  it.  anil  >n 
their    itutrturt  In  oflirc.  to  the  end   th.it  it   niij-ht    neqinrr  llie 
character  oj  privMt prfptrty,  incapable  of  bei»g  tp%ti 
o<li  B  violation  of  the  siinctions  by  which  (he  ri;;Ktt  k\  jh 
pmteried.  and  occasioning  more  setinus  and  ' 
apfitelieniiiun  of  which  miglil  opeT.ile  ns  a  civ. 
meiit.     Such    a    prnpnsition    micht    be    oppnvi:    iii 
tigainsi  (be  eipnlicnce  of  ti.  im  the  MjidHy  of  the  ica» 


r^ 


lTftl3 


HAMILTON  ON  A  NATIONAL  BANK. 


6jt 


■ 


far  it.  but  it  11  not  ranreirable  wli.il  could  be  nrgcil  n^insi  its 
coiiitiluiionntily  :  ami  yci  such  n  (lii|>(ixitii>n  of  llic  ihiiig  vroiilil 
;iiiK)unl  lu  itie  ereciion  ■>(  u  curputulioii ;  lur  lli«  (rue  dchiiilioii  o( 
a  curpuiiiliuii  Kcirrm  tu  be  llib  :  It  is  a  Ifg'*^  [letsun.  or  ii  peison 
crtrMtcil  by  act  of  Uw.  contisliiig  of  one  or  nimc  nulurul  pcnona 
auihuciieil  to  hold  pinpertv.  or  B  ffianchiM-  in  succession,  in  a 
legal.  'K  conimJiMiiixuiMheii  from  naigml,  c-apacity. 

Lcl  the  ilkulrAlioii  priKced  a  »tcp  further.  Suiipose  a  bnnlc  of 
■  lie  nilurc  which  h;i>  been  Ucsenbcd.  Willi  or  wilhout  incorjicira* 
imn,  lud  been  insiilui<^d.  und  ilut  tx]i«rience  had  evinced.  n.t  it 
probably  would.  1I13I.  being  wliully  under  a  public  diieclioii,  it 
puMcMed  not  ihc  cuiilidciiL'c  rcquisiti;  to  lli«  crcdil  of  llic  bills. 
SuppLiw.  !x\%a,  ili.-ii.  by  some  of  (hose  adverse  coujunclures  which 
occ.isinii.illy  nlleni)  nvitiont,  Iheic  had  been  a  ver>'  g1e.1t  drain  of 
the  specie  of  (he  couniiy,  %a  a«  not  only  10  cause  geiieial  disireu 
for  wont  of  an  ndcquiitc  medium  of  circulatiun.  bui  to  produce,  in 
conse(|uence  of  Ihai  drcumilaoce.  con»idcrible  defalcations  in  the 
public  revenues,  Suppuse,  also,  thai  (here  was  no  bank  Insliluled 
III  anv  Slate;  111  sucb  a  poMure  of  thJnti'S,  would  it  not  be  most 
iii.'miint,  iImi  ibe  incorpor^iiiun  of  a  bank  like  ili«t  propoM-d  hy 
the  hiil  would  be  a  measure  immediately  rcl.-ttivc  (o  tl>e  ffftclual 
eolltttiaa  at  ilic  laics.  and  cnmplelcly  within  the  province  of  the 
sovereign  power  of  providing,  by  all  laws  nec«^stv  ami  proper. 
fi>r  that  collection?  II  il  heiaid,  that  such  a  stale  of  things  would 
render  that  ncccsMry.  ami  therefore  coiistilutioiuil,  which  in  not  so 
now.  the  answer  to  ihii,  and  a  solid  one  it  doubtless  is,  must  still 
be  thil  which  hai  Iwren  already  Stated — circumstances  may  aHeel 
the  expedieitcy  of  (he  mtMiurc,  but  they  can  neither  add  to  mw 
diminish  i(s  conMitutiooality. 

A  bank  h.is  a  direct  relniioo  to  the  power  of  bortnwiog  rnooey, 
because  it  is  an  usual,  and  in  sudden  emergencies  an  essenti.-d,  ift- 
Strumeiit  in  the  obtain ing  of  loans  to  government. 

A  nation  is  threatened  with  a  war  ;  large  sums  are  wanted  on  a 
sudden  10  make  iltc  rc<|L]isiic  preparations.  Taxes  aie  liiid  for  tlie 
puipose.  but  it  requires  lime  10  obtain  the  benebt  of  them.  An- 
tiop.Kinn  IS  ind<spcn»ahle.  IF  there  be  a  tunk  (he  supply  can  at 
once  be  h.id.  If  tlicre  be  none,  lo.ins  from  indiviihials  must  be 
sought.  The  progress  of  these  is  often  ton  slow  for  the  exigency  ; 
in  some  situitlions  they  are  not  practicable  at  all.  Frcqueflily, 
when  they  are.  It  is  o(  great  consequenee  !o  be  able  to  anticipate 
the  product  of  them  by  advance  Ituiii  a  bank. 

The  esscnii.iliiy  of  such  an  institution  as  an  insirument  of  loans 
is  exemplified  at  this  vrry  moment.  An  Indi.in  cxpcilitioii  is  to  be 
prosecuted.  The  only  tunil.  out  of  which  the  money  ran  arise, 
consistently  with  tlie  public  engagements,  it  a  tax.  which  only 
begins  to  be  collected  in  July  next.  The  preparations.  Iwwerer. 
are  instantly  to  be  made.  The  money  must,  therefore,  be  bor- 
rowed—and of  whom  could  it  be  borrowed  if  tlicie  were  no  public 
banks  f 

It  happens  that  there  are  inMilutMins  of  this  kind,  but  if  there 
were  none,  it  would  be  iitdispensable  to  create  one. 


671 


HAMtLTOK  OK  A  NATIOSAL  BA.VK. 


cim 


Lei  it  then  Ik  supposed  that  ihe  Rcccully  cxisird.  (as  but  Inr  • 
casiuUy  would  be  [he  case.)  thai  propMjJs  w^rc  ni«dc  for  obtain- 
iiig  a  loan  :  tlui  \  number  of  inilivHlii:)ls  c.ime  forward  mhI  laM. 
wc  arc  wilting  \o  aceonimoiUic  the  govern  men  I  wlih  the  moKT ; 
with  what  we  h.-tvc  in  hand,  and  (he  credit  wc  c.in  ta'xne  upon  )l 
we  doul>l  not  of  bcinf;  able  to  liirnish  the  Stlrii  ci^quirrd  ,  Kui  in 
order  to  llii»,  it  Is  inilmpeniablc  lliat  ue  should  be  incutporaicd  u 
u  ItHnk.  This  i>i  rssL-niial  toward  pulling  it  in  our  power  la  do 
wlui  1%  desired,  and  wc  are  ohligril  on  ihai  account  to  make  il 
the  (otuiiitralii'u  or  eoaditiiit  of  the  loan. 

Can  it  l>c  bclicvtd  tliat  a  cotnplLincc  wilh  IhU  proposition  would 
be  uivconnlitutionni  ?  Docti  tiut  lliis  alone  evince  tile  conlrwy? 
It  is  a  iii.-i.'essui]r  |>arl  of  a  power  to  buiruw.  lo  be  able  lo  stipuUle 
the  considrialion  or  cuiidiliuna  o(  .1  loan.  It  a  evident,  ai  hja 
been  reinaiked  elicwhcrc.  tlial  this  is  not  i-onliited  to  live  mere 
Slipulatioii  (it  .x/ramhitf^  If  il  riMjr,  and  il  is  i>i>l  |>«r((civril  why 
il  iiiny  n»l.  then  llic  grant  of  a  corportle  rapacity  niav  tic  slinu- 
l;ilr(l  aK  a  coiisiiletation  of  ihr  lonii.  There  iirrni'^  to  Itr  iiiillnnf 
unfit  or  foreign  from  the  ii.iiiire  of  (he  lliin|;  in  K'ving  mdiiidii.ilily, 
or  a  coipuiaie  cajwcily  to  a  number  oj  perwnn.  whu  are  willuw  lo 
lend  a  sum  ol  money  to  ihf  uovernmein.  ihc  beller  lo  enable  inmi 
to  do  il.  and  make  Ihem  an  ordinary  iriUiunicnt  o(  loans  in  future 
emergencies  of  ll>e  5l4ilc.  liul  trie  nioie  k'ix'T*!  ^lew  of  Ihc 
siihJFCl  is  Mill  more  sal ihfac lory.  The  legislative  power  ol  bo*- 
rowing  nioiv-y,  and  of  ni.iking  all  laws  necessary  and  proper  for 
eattyine  into  circulion  that  power,  seems  obviotitly  ctMnpetetil  lo 
the  nppoininirnt  of  the  organ,  ihroueh  which  Ihe  nhi1ii>r»  and 
wills  of  individu.-ili  may  be  most  emcociouily  cieitcd  tor  llie 
accomniudation  of  llic  governnieiil  by  loan*. 

The  Atiorncy  (leneral  oi>j>i.i«cs  to  this  reasoning  llie  fcllowtnf 
obscrv.itton  : — "  U»rrowing  moncv  presupposes  ihe  aceuinulation 
of  a  (nnd  10  be  |i-ni.  and  b  seconiUiY  to  the  crcaiion  of  an  abiliiy 
to  lemt."  This  is  plaiiMble  in  llvcotj-.  but  is  noi  Ime  in  fuel.  In 
A  great  numhirr  of  catei,  a  previous  nceumuUlion  of  a  fund 
equal  10  Ihc  whole  sum  requiied  does  nol  exiM.  And  nulhuig 
more  can  Ite  actually  itrcsuppoaed.  than  ihai  ibeie  ejii*t  re- 
noutcei,  which,  put  inlo  .icliviiy  10  the  giraicsl  advantage  by  ihe 
naiuie  of  llie  operation  uiih  Ihe  government,  will  be  equal  to  Ihe 
effect  desired  10  be  produceal.  All  the  pronuoiis  and  operaiions 
of  (^vernmeni  must  Iw  presumed  lo  coniemplnic  tbirg^  lu  ihry 
rftiify  ate. 

The  instiiution  of  a  l*ank  h.i«  also  a  n.ilund  rel.-iiion  lo  the  reifn- 
bllon  of  Irailc  tMilween  Ihe  Slates,  in  so  far  as  il  is  conducive  10 
Ihe  nralioii  of  a  convenient  ineiliuin  of  r.ii^irit^^  lirtwren  them, 
and  10  the  Leeping  up  a  full  ciicul.ition.  by  preveiiliiiK  the  tte- 
qiteiit  di^plnreinent  of  ibi:  metal*  in  icciiwocal  reinillancek 
Money  is  ih?  very  hinge  on  which  coniincrce  turns.  Aiul  ihl> 
ilors  not  merely  mean  gold  anil  silver  ;  many  oilier  things  hove 
seneil  lli«  purpusc.  wiih  dilTcieiit  degrees  of  ulihly.  t'apcr  has 
been  exienslrrlf  em|it(>)'ed. 

|l  caonol.  ihervfon;,  be  admiilcd,  with  the  AllOtni^  Gcncrd 


HAMILTON  OK  A  ilATWXAL  BAKK, 


thai  the  rtvulatioii  of  trade  betwc«n  ihc  Slates,  as  it  conccrtis  lUc 
medium  oicirculation  mid  cxchaTigc.  ou;;hi  to  be  considered  as 
conlincd  to  coin,  ll  ts  even  suppoMble  (h.it  the  wholc'.  or  the 
greaicst  pan,  of  the  coin  of  ihc  country  might  be  carried  out 
of  it. 

The  Secrelniy  of  Slnle  oi}]^!!];  to  the  irl.ition  h^re  insivleil  upon, 
\vf  the  falluwiitK  mode  of  reasoning  : — To  etecl  a  bank,  lays  he. 
and  to  ref^late  cotntneice.  arc  rtry  diflcrenl  acts.  He  who 
creates  a  b.tnk.  created  a  subject  of  cuitirnercc ;  sa  does  he  who 
inakrs  a  bushel  of  wheal,  m  illj^sa  dollar  out  of  (he  mines:  yet 
nriiher  of  ihrse  prriinns  re);iil.iir«  cnmrncrce  thereby.  To  rnakc  a 
thiii]{  which  ni.-i)-  he  houcht  and  u>l<l,  \%  not  to  prciicribc  regula- 
tion* for  buying  and  ulling. 

Thi*  m^ikit)^'  (he  [r;{iitaiit>ri  of  commerce  lo  consist  in  presctib- 
iii);  rvlt'S  fur  buyin/;  and  ttilin^ — this,  indecil,  is  a  species  of 
rc(;ulj1ioi>  'if  ir.i'lr.  tuit  in  one  wnich  falU  more  aptly  wilhin  ttie 
province  of  ihc  local  jiiriMticlii'ns  ih.in  within  \\%i.\  of  ihc  );encra| 
Koveiiimcnl.  whiwe  rare  ihcy  must  lie  pr<r»iimcd  lo  lisve  hren  in- 
icnileil  Id  tic  ilirrcleil  lo  ihntc  general  political  arranerments  iron* 
cerning  itailp  on  which  its  nKKrccalcd  inleresi*  depend,  rather 
than  lo  Ihc  itel^iiii  of  buying  and  leiUnjC.  Accorilinjjly.  such  only 
are  the  ref[iilali'>n>  lu  be  f^iuiid  in  the  lans  of  the  Unilei]  Stairs, 
whose  objects  arc  to  give  encuiifii);i-inenl  lu  tlic  enteiiitise  of  our 
own  iileiehanls.  and  lu  advance  our  naviffaiiun  and  nianuluctnies. 
And  ll  ts  In  reference  to  these  ffeneial  icliitiooa  of  commerce,  that 
an  cM.ibl'Oimeni  which  (iitiiisne*  (acililiei  to  circulation,  and  a 
rnncpnicnl  n>ediiin)  of  r\rh.iny;e  and  alicnalton.  is  to  be  regarded 
U  a  reKulitlion  of  trade. 

The  Secretary  of  State  furllier  arj^es,  that  if  this  wax  a  re|^la> 
tion  ot  commerce,  il  would  be  void,  as  txttmling  as  much  lo  tht 
t'tilfrnitl  cifnimeref  f/ ft'efy  Stale  at  to  its  t.Ttirnat.  Bill  what 
rei>ulaiioii  of  commerce  dues  noi  extend  to  the  internal  commerce 
of  every  Stale  ?  Wh.ii  .ire  all  ihc  ilulie^  upon  ini potted  articles, 
amnunlini;  to  pmhihilionii,  hut  mi  many  liminlirs  upon  domettic 
manuficliim.  -iffptiing  the  Intaests  of  dilTetcnl  classes  of  citizens, 
in  diffrteni  ways?  What  are  all  the  prorlsionx  in  ihi?  Coaslini; 
Ads  which  relate  lo  ihe  trade  between  ilistilcl  anil  district  of  the 
san>e  Stale?  In  short,  what  reKulalion  of  trade  between  Ihe 
Stales  but  must  affwl  the  intern.il  trade  of  each  State?  What 
cati  operate  upon  ihc  whole,  hut  must  emend  lo  es'ery  part  ? 

The  telaiion  of  a  b,-ink  In  Ihc  execution  of  the  powers  that  con- 
cern the  cointnon  delenKc  has  been  anticipated.  It  has  liem 
noleil,  llul.  at  ihis  »ct>-  moment,  the  .lid  of  such  an  Inslilution  is 
essential  to  the  measures  to  lie  pursueil  for  the  protection  of  our 
frontiers. 

It  now  remains  lo  sliow.  lliat  the  incorporation  of  a  liank  is 
wilMn  ihc  operation  of  the  provision  which  amhorires  Congress  lo 
ntskc  all  ncriifnl  rules  and  regul.iiions  conrcminc  the  propetry  of 
Ihe  United  Slnl'-s,  But  It  is  ptei'i»u*ly  neccsuiry  lo  advert  lo  a 
distinrtinn  which  has  been  i:iken  by  ihe  Attorney  General. 

He  adrnils  tliat  the  word  property  may  sijinily  personal  jwop" 


HAMlLTQlif  OK  A  NATIONAL  BAA'X, 


iim 


ttly.  liftweiTr  nc<|uireil,  anil  yet  asierts  llut  i(  cannot  stfrnilf 
money  aininz  'ro'"  ihc  souitcs  of  menup  pointnt  owt  in  \he  Can-- 
Mituliun.  "because."  s,-i)s  lie.  -  llic  iJIspuMl  and  regulalion  €A 
money  is  the  lin-il  c.tiiscr  (or  r.iisiii|;  i(  by  la»es." 

Ilul  ii  wniiUI  lie  more  arciir.ilc  to  s.iy  lliat  llic  eijeft  lo  which 
tnnnry  i«  intended  In  he  applied  vi  the  jSHa/  cayte  for  rsi&ing  it, 
tli.-tn  ilint  itie  disposdl  ntid  tej^ulaiKHi  of  it  'muik. 

The  »ii|i|mrl    o(    goveriiiiieiU— the   swppoit   o(   lroop%    for  ih« 

!^COlT)^lOn  ile(ense~-(he  payment  ol  ihe  public  debt,  are  ihc  (me 
fimtl  (liHtti  forniising  ninnry.  The  dispnsirinn  and  rrnjulalion  ol 
ii.  when  rniKctl,  jiie  ihr  sirps  hy  which  ii  U  applied  to  Ihc  endt  lor 
which  it  w.ii  r.iiMd.  nol  the  tnJi  ihcniMlvc:*.  llcniTr,  ihcfv- 
fure,  the  money  l«  be  i^icd  by  taxe%  a»  ucll  us  nny  otlirr 
prnonut  pioperly,  inu*l  be  suppoicti  to  ciwiie  wiitiin  themr.mine. 
ii!i  iliet'ceitairily  do  williin  lite  kller,  of  aulliohly  lo  ni.ike  nil  neni* 
f<tl  lulci  and  ie^iiUiioni  cont-crniiii;  the  piopeiiy  ol  ibe  United 
Stales. 

A  CiWe  will  mnlce  this  pl.iiner.  S»lppo<e  ihc  public  debt  ihs- 
ch.ir^ed,  anil  the  (iinils  now  pli-ilj^ed  fur  ii  liliernte^l.  In  some  in- 
iLintn  it  »<iul<l  lie  louiiil  cxpciTient  lo  rc|ml  ihe  l.iirs  ;  in  uthri s. 
Ilie  ii'peal  might  injure  our  own  iniluslr)-.  uor  osriculiure  aod 
nianufjicturrs.  In  these  caxcs  ihey  would,  u(  eotir^e.  tie  retjiiml. 
Here.  ihen.  wuuhl  be  moneys  arisiii);  fniin  the  aulhociied  Kouice« 
lA  rm-cnur.  which  would  not  fall  wiilnn  tl*e  rule  by  tvhieh  the 
Allorney  Grnerjil  rnijeavotii  to  except  ihein  Troni  other  pmonsl 
property,  nnd  from  (he  npriAtii>n  of  i)ie  rUkise  in  qtK-slion.  The 
inoneyTt  beint;  in  the  coffers  of  gDVeinnienl.  whni  U  to  hinder  such 
;i  (liipuiilioii  (u  \k  tnuile  of  ihrni  ai  i»  contemplated  in  tlie  bd) ;  iif 

.what  an  incurpoiaiion  ol  iIk  (urlieft  cuocetncd,  under  Ibc  claiAC 

Iwliicli  has  been  riled  ? 

It  IS  aiiiiiillcd  thai  with  regard  to  the  wesleni  territorv  Ihey  %\\* 
a  |M>wrr  lo  erect  .1  corporation — that  i».  lo  niililule  a  i-uvFmnienl ; 
and  hy  wlmt  ruk  of  cnnurvclion  can  it  l>e  maint.kined.  that  ihe 
Mine  wmrls  in  a  coi«lilulion  of  (;o»Trnnient  will  not  have  Ihi* 
same  pffe<it  witen  np)ihcil  lo  one  <]ieeie«  of  property  a*  In  nnolhrf. 
.-i!i  far  n-1  the  subject  it  capable  uJ  it  ?— Or  that  a  IcS'nlalivc  poser 
In  make  all  neeilldl  rules  arid  regulations,  or  10  pass  all  lawi 
necessary  and  iiroper,  concerning  ibe  public  pioiurriy.  wliich  u 
xrtmittefl  10  authonte  an  incurporaiion  In  one  caxe.  will  mil  ati- 
Ihoriie  it  In  annihei  ? — will  justify  the  inMiliilion  of  a  gnveninmil 
over  the  weiuern  lerrilory,  and  will  not  jtiMify  the  incoriHiralntn  iil 
a  hank  for  the  more  useful  inanaKemcnl  of  ihe  money*  ul  llie 
United  Slates'  II  i(  will  do  Ihe  lail.  as  well  .is  llw  Tml.  then, 
under  ihiH  piovisiun  *lone.  ihe  bill  rseoMStitulionn),  hrraiise  II  ciwi- 
letnnUles  lh;ii  iltc  United  Slates  stiall  be  joint  proprirtoif  of  llir 
aiock  of  the  lunk. 

There  is  an  nliMrraiMn  of  ihe  Secretary  of  Stale  to  ihi*  effect, 
which  may  r<-<(tiiie  niitiec  in   (his  pl.icr  :— Cr-  ■- ■ —   — -   '-   ■ 
nol  lo  lay  xxus  .ui  /iMtn'i./AV  aav  pur^it  :  v  | 

I  o  pay  the  ilebtv  nr  pioride  lot   the  welfare  ':      .   ^ -i  ...     i.-i- 
Uinty  no  tnlerence  can  be  drawn  from  ihit  agniitit  Ihc  puwer  of 


17*11 


llAiiiLTOlif  ON  A  ffATlONAL  SANK. 


675 


applying  their  money  (or  <he  insilliiljon  a\  a  hank.  Il  is  true  that 
tliry  cnnnot  n-irhout  brrarh  nf  trtiit  l.iy  taxes  for  any  other  pur- 
paKc  than  the  gcnrral  wcir^rc :  Iiui  lo  ndtlicr  can  any  oilier 
government.  Tlie  welfare  of  the  community  is  llie  only  lejtitimaie 
cnil  (or  wliicli  mwney  tan  he  raised  on  llie  coininunil)-.  Cun{;reM 
can  be  considercO  as  under  onlv  one  re&triction  whicli  does  not 
apply  to  other  governmenis-'iney  cannot  riehlfullv  apply  ihe 
nioiiey  ihei'  raise  to  any  purpose  merely  or  purely  local. 

Itni.  u'iifi  (his  excvplion,  incy  have  a«  lari;r  a  (lixcretion  in  rcia* 
lion  10  tlir  applictiion  of  money  ns  any  legiilaiuve  vvh.ilever.  The 
conitiiuironal  trstoi  a  rT([lit  .njiplicuiion  must  alwa)-*  be.  whether 
it  be  for  a  puipuie  ol j-tntral ui  local  ni\»Tt,  If  (lie  former,  there 
cnn  be  no  want  of  cunatitutional  power.  The  quality  of  Ihe 
object,  as  liow  far  it  will  really  promote  or  not  the  welfare  of  the 
Union,  musr  lie  m.iiicr  of  conscientious  liiscri'hon.  and  the  ar^i- 
mirnts  foe  or  ajjainst  a  measure  in  this  li};ht  must  he  arguments 
concerniiii;  expnllency  ur  inenpeillcncy.  not  constitulional  Ti](bt. 
Wh.nttfvcr  relates  to  the  it^'icrsl  orikr  of  the  finances,  to  the 
general  intciesis  o(  Irade,  etc..  being  gmcral  objects,  arc  coltsli- 
tuiioiiitl  ones  for  the  afifih'eatioH  of  monfy. 

A  bnnk.  then.  v>h<>s<;  bills  Arc  to  circulate  In  all  the  rerenues  of 
the  cnunliy.  i»  n'idiHtly  a  gfntral  o(>j''Ct.  and.  for  that  very 
reaion,  a  consliiiilional  one.  as  far  as  regards  the  appropriation  of 
money  to  ii.  Wlieiher  il  will  realty  be  a  benelirial  one  or  not,  is 
ivnrihy  of  careful  ciamin.ition.  hiil  is  no  more  A  constiiiiiionni 
piiini,  in  the  p^irticiilar  rrfcricd  to,  than  the  question,  whether  llic 
western  lands  shall  be  sold  (or  twenty  or  thirty  cents  per  acre. 

A  hupe  is  i-nlcitaiiied  that  il  has.  by  this  lime,  been  made  to  ap> 
pear,  tu  tlie  s.ttlsfactiun  of  the  f resident,  that  a  bank  has  a  natural 
iclaiion  lo  the  power  of  collecting  i.ixes— to  that  of  regulniing 
lrsde~to  that  of  providing  (or  rhc  rommon  defense — and  ihat.  as 
ihr  hdl  mwlrr  consideration  contemplates  the  eovernment  in  (he 
liaht  of  a  joint  propfieior  of  tbe  slock  of  iheliank,  it  hiioji^  the 
case  within  Ihe  jKovision  of  the  clause  of  the  Constitution  which 
immeiliardy  respects  the  property  of  the  Uniteil  Stale*. 

Under  :i  convict'Oii  that  such  3k  relation  subsists  the  Secretaiy 
o/  (he  Treasury,  with  all  deference,  conceives,  lluit  it  will  result  a% 
a  necess.-iry  ronsrt|iiencc  (ran)  the  pntition.  that  all  the  special 
powers  of  froTrmmenl  are  soveieipi,  as  to  the  proper  objects  ; 
lliat  Ihe  iML-urporalion  of  a  bank  is  a  constitutional  measure :  anil 
thai  the  objecliuiis  lakcn  tu  llie  bill,  in  lliis  respect,  are  ill- 
founded. 

But.  from  an  earnest  desire  to  give  the  utrnost  possible  satisfac- 
tion to  the  mimi  of  the  President,  on  so  delicate  and  rmporiant  a 
tidiic4:t,  the  Secrviary  of  ihi;  Trc-isury  will  ask  his  indulgence, 
while  he  gives  tome  additional  illusiMtions  of  cases  in  wnich  a 
power  of  ercclinK  corpornlions  may  he  exercised,  under  some  of 
those  beads  of  the  spceilied  powers  of  the  suveinment.  which  are 
alleged  tu  include  the  rtght  of  incorporating  a  bunk. 

I.  It  does  not  appear  susreptible  of  a  doubt,  llut  ifCongresi 
had  Uxnjght  proper  lo  provide,  itt  Ihe  «ollection  laws,  that  ili* 


(,^(, 


UAMtl.TOht  OK  A  NATiONAt.  BANIC. 


IW 


lion<ls  to  l>c  given  for  the  ilutitt  should  be  t;ivnt  lo  ilie  cnlli^ciote 
the  diMricl.  A  or  B.  as  llie  l';h«  Diighl  rci]uiir.  lo  fmirr  tu  hini  an 
his  successors  ict  office,  in  (rust  for  the  United  Sl;iln,  iluu 
would  have  been  conmlenl  n  ilh  the  Coiiuilution  lo  iii^ke  sudi  i 
arTangemciit ;  and  yet  this,  it  a  coticeiveil.  would  amouiii  ivi 
bicoipotutiuii. 

3.  Ii  t!i  nut  an  unnsuul  expedient  o(  uuiion  lo  lann  fur 
br^tnches  of   lei-enuc — tlut  is.  lo  iiioM];nt,'e  vr  &etl  Itie   piodudi 
■  hem  (i>r  criuin  defi^iilc  »uins,  le.tvirij;  itie  col  lee  I  ion  lo  the  , 
lo  whom  ilicy  aie  iixji igngcd  or  sold.     There  are  even  eia 
o(  (his  ill  ihc  Uiiilcd  SliIcs.     Suppose  llvnl  llieic  was  any  • 
lof  l>i;indi  of  revenue  tvhicli  it  w^s  ni.iiiileitly  cx|K-diriit  in  |iJ 
this  fouliii;;.  iind  there  were  a  numherof  pmonx  iviUinK  lo  en{^ 
with  ihe  govcininenl,  upon  condition  thji   lliev  nhDUkT  lie  iru*- 
pof.ited.  and  the  sum&  ini-cslcd  in  Iheni.  as  well   Im  their  ([realer] 
safely,  as  (or   llie  fnorc  coiiveiiiinl  tecoveiy  and  ni.inaf;eineM  Ul 
ihc  taxes.     Is  it  suppusabtc  th^ii  there  eould  be  Hny  con>iiiiiiionjll 
obstacle  to   ihc  me.istiie  ?     Il  is   pre^imeil  ih.ii   there   cauld 
none.     It  '»  certainly  »  mode  oJ  collcctHin  whirli   it   wuuld  be  h| 
the  disctclivti  of  ihc  gavcmnkent  lo  adopt.  lhoii);h  ilic  cntiim- 
stances  must  be  veiy  exlnu>iilinai]r  Ibal  would  induce  Itic 
tary  lo  ihiiik  il  f»p«licni, 

3-  Supuosc  a  iRW  mid  unexplored  brjiich  ol  Irade  si..    ' 
Benl  ilsetl.  wiih  lunie  luniifn  cunniry.     SupiKise   it    wa> 
ihiil    lo   iinderiake  il    uiih  :iilvuiiit.i},'e    leqiiiied  an   uiiimi 
e.ipilnls  of  a  nuinher  ol  indiviiluals,  »nd   llial   Ihosc   indivi^ 
would  not  liedibpiisrd  tocml>ark  niihout  an  iDco<|Hii.viK>n.  at] 
to  obiiaic  th.il  <:iini.e4|ii<^ncc  o(  n  pnviilr  lurtiietihip  wlnLh  n 
cveiy  initiviilu^d  liable  in  his  whole  cstalc  (or  Ihc  drliiv  nt  tl.n 
\aivf,  ii>  their  utmost  cxieni,  ai  (or  ihe  more  convt  i  ,ij 

mciii  o(  ibc  business^ what  iciioa  can  tlieic  be  lo  ^  \\ 

national  govemnicnt  would  hnve  a  const ituiional    iii^la  lu  onKi>' 
lute  and  incorpocaic  siich  a  c«tn|Mn]r.'    None.     They  (MisseM  *| 
grner.il  authority  I»  (rf^utatc  trade  with  (oieijfn  cnuiiiiies.     Tl><>] 
u  a  ine.^n  which  has  been   practiced   lo  that  end.  by  alt  lh(  pnn- 
cipal  coinmeccial  nations,  who  liavc  tiailins  cwni|Kiiiics  lo  ibl*/^ 
wnicli  have  sulisislej  (ot   cenlune&.     Why  nijiy    rio4    Ihc  \3% 
Slates,  ttmtlitul'ifii'illy.  employ  the  mfant  usu.d    in  oihcr 
irirs,  for  attamiiig  llieVwr/j  inlmsird  lo  Ibeni.* 

A  power  to  make  all  needful  rules  iiitd  tcijulalitM"^  <■ 

icnitorj'.  h.ts  tifcn  tymslrued   lo  mean  a  |)owet  lo  ei  ■ 

mrni.     A  |M>weT  lo  rei;ubte  trade,  ii>  a  poiver  lo  ni.,>  . 

nilc«  anil  regulations  conecriiiii);  trade.  Why  niay  it  not,  I 
include  tliat  o(  erecting  a  ii.tding  company,  as  well  as,  in< 
CUet.  lo  etPCt  .1  Rovemiiirnt  ? 

Il  is  reiTiarkable  that  the  State  convefilKHis,  who  liail  pTOf""' 
amendments  in  retntion  to  this  point.  I  '   il  noi  all  ul  ihcm. 

cxptesscd    ihrinsclves    neaily    lhi»:  vlmtl    not    frnM 

monopolies,  ntii  fr/i'/ iTji/  fomp>t»x  wii'i 
cotnnieree  !     Thus,  ai  ibe  sanie  tmie,  cxpi< 
the  power  to  cicci  iradinj;  companies  or cotjHii.4iii.ii!>  was  .m«:j=-i 


ITOll 


flA.Uir.TOy  Off  A  KATIOS'AL  BANK. 


677 


in  Congm't.  awA  ohJKling  to  it  no  further  than  as  to  the  giAnt  ol 
txcliifivt  privileges. 

The  SecTci.irj'  cnterinjns  nil  the  doubts  which  prevail  concern- 
ing ihc  utility  of  Mich  compaitiet.  but  he  c.iniiol  f.iihign  to  his  own 
mind  a  icvion.  to  induce  n  doubt,  ihai  there  is  .1  contiiiuiion.-tl  au- 
thority in  the  Uiiiitil  !>I:iI<:i  lu  rslubliih  ihem.  If  xtich  3  reanon 
were  ilenunileit.  none  could  be  given,  tiiilus  it  tvere  iliis :  That 
Congiess  cannot  creel  a  coiporjtion.  Which  would  be  no  lietlef 
th.m  tn  My,  ihcy  cannot  do  it,  because  they  cannot  do  ii^firat 
presuming  An  iii;ihility.  without  rmsnn.  and  then  assigning  that 
iiialiility  xi  the  cause  of  ilncK.  llliisl rations  (A  this  kind  might 
be  multipUcd  without  end.  They  shall,  however,  be  pursued  no 
fun  her. 

There  ii  a  sort  of  evidence  on  this  point,  aiiiing  from  an  aR- 
g^egate  view  u(  the  Constitution,  which  is  of  no  in  considerable 
weight:  the  very  general  power  of  laying:  s»<l  collecting  taxes, 
and  appropriating  iheir  proceeds-' I  ha  I  oJ  borrowing  money  ilulefi- 
nilcly — thit  »f  coining  money.  an<i  legiiUting  foreign  coins^lhal 
of  making  all  needful  rule^.tnd  rcgubtions  rc^pecling  the  properly 
of  the  Unitol  Staler.  These  powers  combined,  as  well  as  the 
reason  and  nature  of  the  thing,  speak  sltoMRly  this  l;mi;ua|;e  :  lh.1t 
it  ii  the  manifest  design  .imt  iC(i|H;  of  the  ConslituTiun  lo  vest  in 
Congress  all  the  posvers  reuuisire  lu  the  effectual  ndminsiraliun  of 
the  tin.uicci  of  llie  United  States.  As  f.nr  as  concerns  this  object, 
there  iippcaTS  to  be  no  parsimony  of  power. 

To  t.iippose,  ihen.  ihal  the  governnicnl  is  precluded  from  the 
employment  of  «i  uximI  ami  so  imporianl  an  instiuinenl  for  the 
aii nil nUl ration  of  ils  fin.inces  .\s  that  of  a  bank,  is  to  suppose  what 
docs  not  coincide  wlih  the  {general  tenor  and  conipleAion  of  the 
consiiiution,  aad  what  is  not  agree.-ible  to  impressions  lliat  any 
new  spectator  would  entertain  concemin»  it. 

Little  be&s  tlun  a  pioliibitory  cUuse  can  de&iroy  the  strong  pre- 
•itimpiions  which  result  from  the  general  aspect  of  the  Eoveii>- 
inent.  Nothing  but  dcmonslrilion  should  exclude  the  idcJ  ihat 
the  power  enists. 

In  all  questions  of  this  nature,  the  practice  of  mankind  i>tighl  to 
have  great  weight  against  the  theories  of  tndividnats. 

The  fad.  fur  tnslance.  that  all  the  piincipal  commercial  nations 
have  RMde  use  of  trading  corpor.ttions  or  companies,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  exttrnal  comnifffr,  is  a  s-niif.ictory  proof  that  the 
entiiblidimcnt  of  ihcm  i$  an  incident  to  the  rcgublion  of  the 
commerce. 

This  other  (act.  thai  funks  are  an  usual  engine  in  theailmtnislm- 
lion  of  naliunal  finances,  and  an  ordinary  and  llie  most  effectual 
inslfumenl  of  loan,  and  oikt  which,  tn  this  counlty.  has  been  found 
essential,  pleads  strongly  against  the  supposition  that  a  govern- 
meni,  clothed  with  most  of  the  most  imnoitani  pierogatires  of 
soTcreigniy  in  relaiinn  to  its  revrmies.  ils  debis.  its  cicdils.  its  ilc- 
(enfiC.  its  trade,  its  inlercourse  with  foreign  nations,  is  forbidden 
tn  make  use  of  tb.it  insinimcot  as  an  appendage  to  its  owv 
authority. 


6jS  UAMILTON  OK  A  S'ATIONAL  BAXK.  IKtl 

II  111*  been  itatril  a*  an  Auxiliary  IWI  o/  conatiliilinnal  authotiljt 
lo  Iry  wlicllier  il  aliciOgn  any  prr>Fxi!>(lii['  rij;)il  uf  :iny  Sule.  oi 
an>'  lodiiidual.  Tlic  |>roiioi«l  tnvctilignlion  will  st;in(l  tlte  moU 
sercTc  exam iiviti ion  on  litis  poini.  Each  Stale  ntay  Mill  end  ai 
m.iny  bnnks  ns  it  plrnsn.  Ever)-  tnHiniliuil  may  siiil  carry  on  tbf 
iMnkinjr  buitiTi«w  in  any  rxiciil  he  pIcn.'tM. 

Another  criterion  mny  be  this.  Whether  the  in.iliiution  or  ihinK 
lua  a  more  ditecl  relntiori,  la  to  its  uses.  10  llie  olijrcts  tA  ttr 
reserved  powers  of  the  Stale  t-ovemmenls  than  lo  ihoM  of  ifce 
powers  delegated  by  the  United  Stales.  This,  nile,  indent,  is  le*i 
precise  than  the  former;  hut  it  may  siitl  serve  as  MJtne  goKk. 
Sutrly  a  luink  h-is  more  referrnce  to  the  olijrcM  inlrusteil  lo  ilu- 
n:«tional  ^vrrnmt-nl  than  lo  lliote  left  lo  the  care  oi  ilie  SUtr 
^ovrinnicnls.  Hie  common  defense  it  decitiTc  in  this  con- 
(lariion. 

Il  il  presumed  thai  nolhiog  of  consequence  in  the  ub^ervatiom 
of  ibc  Secrelar^-  oj  Stale,  and  Alturiiey  General,  has  been  leli  m- 
noiic«d. 

There  XK,  Indemt.  a  nirieiy  of  otKervations  of  the  Secretary  nt 
Stale  designetl  lo  show  that  ihe  utilities  ascribed  to  a  tiank.  in  re- 
)atinn  la  ihe  collertion  of  taxes,  and  lo  Imde,  could  be  obiaiiiril 
withuui  il ;  to  analyre  which,  would  jwoiong  the  discassinn  bryrwri 
all  bounds.  1 1  shall  lie  forborne  (or  two  reasons.  Firsl.  bccMae 
Ihe  report  concerning  tbebank.miy  speak  for  iiscKin  this  topecl; 
and  secondly,  because  all  those  obsetv^iKms  ate  Krotmilcd  on  Ihr 
erroneous  idea  ihai  the  euautum  ot  necessity  or  uitliiy  ts  tbe  U^ 
of  a  constitutional  exercise  of  power. 

One  or  two  remarks  only  shall  be  made.  One  is.  llial  be  liss 
t.ikni  no  notice  of  a  very  cssentinl  adrantaj;e  lo  trade  in  genenl, 
which  is  mrnlioncd  in  tite  report,  as  peculiar  to  Ihe  existence  nl  a 
bank  circulation,  eipial  in  Ibe  public  estimation  lo  |[old  and  silver. 
It  is  this  ihal  renders  il  univeeessary  lo  lock  up  the  money  utthe 
country,  to  accumulate  for  ntoiilhs  sucressiTelv.  In  order  lo  the 
periodical  payn<eTi1  o(  interest.  TIte  other  is  ittis  :  that  his  argis- 
ments  lo  show  thai  Ireasiiryorilert  ni»d  bills  ol exchange,  (roin  ilw 
course  of  Iraite.  will  picveni  any  consiilrrahlc  displacement  of  the 
nieials,  are  (nunded  on  a  particular  view  of  the  suhjeel.  A  cxtc 
will  prove  this.  The  sums  roJIeded  in  a  Slate  may  be  snsall  is 
comparison  wilh  the  debt  due  to  it :  the  balance  uf  its  tnule. 
direct  and  circuitous  with  the  seat  of  government,  may  t>e  even,  ni 
iteofly  so:  here,  then,  without  bank  hilk.  which  in  that  Slate 
answvr  the  pur^se  o*  coin,  there  n«iM  l>e  a  displanrment  ol  tbe 
coin,  in  proport»on  to  the  difference  between  the  sum  rollreied  in 
tbe  Stale,  and  thai  to  be  paiil  in  it.  With  lunk  hills,  rro  socb  dis- 
placement would  lake  place,  or  as  far  as  il  did.  il  <*  oulil  lie  ^radiul 
and  insensible.  In  many  other  w.ivs.  also,  would  there  be  al  tcMl 
a  temporary  and  iitconvenfcni  dispUcetneni  of  Ihe  cam,  rrrn 
where  the  course  o(  trade  would  cvtnluolly  rclum  it  to  il*  pfvptr 
channel. 

The  difference  of  the  two  siiiutioni  in  point  of  tr-  -  in 

the  treasury,  can  only  be  appreciated  by  one.  who  t\\  :U 


HAMILTON  ON  A  NATIONAL  BANK. 

embarraasmcnu  of  making  provision  (or  the  pavinent  of  the  in> 
ttrcsi  on  A  uock.  coniiiiiulTy  changing  piflcc  in  tmiteeii  tliffcrent 
|>lacFs. 

One  thing  which  hu  been  omilicil,  just  occurs,  although  ii  is 
rtol  very  tn-alcrial  lo  Ihc  main  arj;iimcnl.  The  Secrcr»ry  of  SiaIc 
aftimis  that  (he  bill  only  conicmpljtei  a  repayment,  not  a  loan,  to 
(he  £ui-erninent.  Bui  here  he  in  certainly  iniMaken.  It  is  tiuc 
the  Koi'erninent  invests  in  tlie  siockof  the  l>ank  a  sum  equal  lu  that 
winch  It  receives  oil  loan.  But  lei  it  be  rcnieinbercii.  UmI  ii  does 
not.  Ihcrefore.  ceAsc  to  bo  &  proprietor  of  the  stock,  which  would 
he  the  caje,  1(  the  money  received  back  were  in  the  naiure  of  a 
p.iynicni.  It  remains  a  p[o;)rieiar  Mill,  anti  will  xh.ire  in  the  profit 
or  loas  of  the  iniililulion.  accordinj;;  lU  the  dividcnil  is  more  or  Icit 
than  the  inieresl  it  is  to  pay  on  ihe  sum  buirowcd.  Hence  that 
sunt  is  manifmly.  and  in  the  strictest  sense,  a  loan. 

KENTUCKY  KKSOLUTIONS  Or   1798,' 

The  House,  according  lo  ihc  slanding  order  of  the  <lay,  resolved 
Itself  iiiio  a  commiiiee  of  the  whole  on  the  Male  of  the  common- 
wealth. Mr.  Caldwell  in  ihe  chair,  and  after  some  linic  speiil 
therein,  the  Spc;ikcr  resumed  the  chair,  and  Mr.  Caldwell  reported 
th.it  the  conimillec  hatl.  aec^orillng  to  order,  h.-ir)  under  consldera- 
ttoD  the  (lovcmor's  aildrcu,  and  h,-i<l  come  to  the  (ollowin|r 
resolutions  thereupon,  which  he  ddiveied  in  at  the  clerk's  table, 
where  they  were  iwite  read  and  ajjrccd  to  by  the  Mouse. 

I.  Rtiifhvi/.  Tiiat  the  several  states  composing  ilie  United 
Slates  of  AmeiicJi.  arc  not  united  on  the  principle  of  utilimiml 
subiniMton  to  their  general  government;  but  thai  by  comp-tci. 
under  ihe  style  and  title  of  a  Conslilullon  for  the  United  Slates, 
and  of  ameiidincnts  iberelo,  they  constiluted  a  gener.d  uovern- 
tnent  for  special  purposes,  delegated  lo  ih.ii  nuvtniinent  cerialn 
dolinile  powers.  lesrrving.  each  stale  to  ilsell.  llie  residuary  mass 
of  right  to  tlieir  own  seif-f-overnment ;  and  that  whensoever  ihe 
general  governmeni  assumes  un<le1egatcd  powers.  Its  a<is  arc 
iinaulhoni  alive,  void,  and  of  no  force :  Thai  lo  this  compact  each 
state  acceded  as  a  stale,  and  U  an  inlegral  party,  lis  co-«faIr3 
formint;as  lo  itself,  the  oilier  party:  Th.it  the  Eovemmenl  created 
by  this  comp^ict  was  not  made  the  extlusli-e  or  final  jii/c'  "f  the 
exlenl  o(  the  jwwprs  delegated  to  itself;  since  thai  would  have 
made  its  discretion,  and  not  the  Constitution,  the  measure  of  ils 

t lowers  ;  but  that,  as  in  all  other  cases  of  compact  aniung  panics 
laving  no  common  JudEe,  each  party  has  an  raual  light  to  judge 
for  liKclf,  as  well  01  inmicilons,  as  of  the  moile  and  mcuure  of 
redress. 

a.  Rttoivid.  That  ihe  Constitution  of  the  United  Slates  having 
tlelCKated  to  Congress  a  power  to  punish  treason,  couiili'tEeiliug 
the  securities  and  current  coin  of  t'le  United  States,  jiiracies  and 
felonies  ciMnmldcd  on  the  high  teats,  and  offenses  Hgainsi  the  biKs 

■  Drafted  by  Tboous  Jeffeisoa. 


69o 


KENTUCIiY  R&SOLV210NS. 


ttm 


of  naiions.  and  no  olh«  vrimcs  wluuei'«r,  and  it  being  tiur  *^» 
eencnl  priMciiilcand  one  of  t)i«  anirndmcnift  lo  ihe  Coruiiiuiioa 
Knving  also  dcckrnl.  "  ih^l  the  powers  nol  ddtr^aied  tu  the 
Uiiilcd  Sutcs  tty  the  Consiiiuiion,  nor  piohibiic-d  by  U  la  iht 
Mates,  are  reserved  lo  ihc  stale*  rcsprctivdy,  or  lo  ll.c  pnipte;' 
tl>crF[ore.  .ilto.  ihc  umc  act  o(  Congren,  p.iueil  on  Ilic  141(1  ilair 
of  July.  1798.  und  eolilki),  "  aii  ai:i  in  addition  la  the  ad  mintM. 
an  act  lor  Iht  punishment  of  ccrlain  cniim  a|t;unxl  Ilic  L'aunI 
States";  ;ualio  ilic  act  passed  by  litem  on  the  37ih  day  n(  Jspc; 
179$.  cniiilcd.  "an  act  to  punis-h  frauds  committed  on  (he  lu^ 
of  Ibc  United  Stalet,"  (and  ail  other  llteir  acls  which  suuroeu 
create,  define,  ami  punish  crimes  other  than  IbDCCcnunieratolH 
■he  Coniiitution.)  .ire  alt»Kethet  viihI.  and  of  na  force,  and  that 
tbr  puwci  la  create,  define,  and  puniih  Mich  Other  crimes  is  re- 
seived.  and  ul  lighl  appct-l.-iini.  ttolely  and  cxcliisircly,  lo  the 
icspeciii'c  siaiM.  each  witlnn  it&  own  leiritory, 

3.  Kfi^wii.  That  it  is  ituc  as  .t  general  principle,  and  H  alw 
exprcwly  declared  by  one  of  the  anii-ndinenl*  lo  the  CunslilitiHW, 
that  "  the  pawert  nol  deleRatnl  lo  the  United  Slates  by  Ihr  Com- 
slilulion,  nor  pruhiblled  liy  il  lo  Ihc  States,  arc  rcM-ivetl  In  Ihe 
titaics  reipixiivfly,  01  to  ihc  people'*;  and  that  no  jKiurr  over  ilic 
freedom  of  leligiun,  fienloni  <>(  speech,  or  freedom  of  Ihe  (xesk 
heini;  delegated  lo  ihe  Unilo)  Slaleii  by  ihe  Conslilutiun.  nnr  pm> 
hibiied  by  il  to  ihe  stales,  all  lawful  poweis  res|>eeiins  the  sane 
did  of  richi  rem  a  in.  and  uere  reserved  to  ibe  slaiem.  or  lo  ibe 
people ;  innl  thus  was  maniftsied  then  del ermiiu lion  lu  retain  lo 
ihcmselres  the  li^hi  of  jiidKing  hnw  far  the  iKenliuuuiex  cA 
speech  anil  of  t!ie  preu  may  l>c  abfidjfed  without  lessening  ibcu 
luelul  freedom,  and  buw  far  Ihoie  abuses  which  cannot  be 
»c|)aralcd  from  their  uie,  should  be  toteialeil  ralher  tliaa  ll>c  uk 
be  deslioved  ;  and  thus  also  ihey  i;uatde<t  ni:atnsl  all  ahriil^niRit 
by  Ihe  United  Stales  of  ilie  freedom  of  religious  opminnt  ai«l 
exercises,  and  retained  lo  ihcmvtvc*  the  nghi  of  pmlccimi;  tho 
same,  as  thit  Mate  by  a  law  [Mued  on  tlie  general  ilcniand  of  lU 
citiientL,  had  ,-ilready  piotcctcd  them  liom  all  human  irsirairtt  or 
inlc.fcrence;  and  thai  in  addition  lo  this  ^enei^l  prnnijiic  ami 
expreM  declaration.  luiother  and  fnote  special  piuiiiion  has  been 
made  by  uite  of  ihe  amifidrncnls  to  ihr  Consttlulbon.  whkii  ex- 
pressly declares,  thai  "  Congrrij  shall  make  no  law  rcsfiecIitiK  f 
esiahhthmeni  of  rrl<EH>n,  or  pmhilittinK  ihe  free  nercoie  iherrnf. 
or  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech,  or  o(  ibe  preu,"  Ihnriiy 
Ku.itdini!  in  tbe  same  sentence,  and  under  the  same  wards,  ibe 
Fteedoin  of  reliKion.  of  >|>eech.  aiKj  of  ihe  picM.  insomuch.  Uial 
w  ha  I  e^er  violates  either,  throws  down  the  sanctuary  wliicb  nirm 
the  others,  and  Ihal  libels,  falteliood^.  and  detania lions,  equttflr 
with  heresy  and  false  iclipon.  are  wiihh^tO    liom  Ilic  nie 

of  federal  tribunals:  thai  therefore  ilie  act  of  the  Cor  'le 

Ignited  Slates,  passed  on  the  I4lh  day  of  July.  t-gS.  ■  m 

iict  111  addition  to  the  act   for   the  puni^hmeni  of  rr:  !\ 

agaiiHl  Ihc  United  State*."  which  Aon  al>ii<lEe  Ihe  lu  1.,.,.  ,  i  iLe 
press,  is  nol  law,  tral  is  allogelhcr  void  and  M  no  cOeGi, 


i 


ma 


A'EXTUCA-Y  RKSOLUTlOifS. 


fiSi 


4.  RftahvJ,  Tlut  ;ilicri-[rien(js  nre  Hn<lcr  ll>c  jurl^jiclioit  ^nd 
prolccljoit  n(  the  laws  i>f  the  »t;ilc  whcicin  they  ace :  thai  no 
power  over  tlicm  tia^  been  l)ell^i;nlF(l  to  fitc  Uniieil  St.it<^,  nor 
]iri)htl>ilc(l  lu  (he  iiidividiMl  !tt;Ues  dislinct  (mm  their  power  over 
ciliiens;  .ind  H  bdiiif  (rue  as  a  ^tmcral  principle,  and  one  uf  the 
ainL-nilriiciii§  to  the  Constltuiiuii  h^ivtii);  aJso  ilvclaivd,  thai  "  the 
fKtweis  not  dclrsAicil  to  the  I'liilcd  Slates  l>y  the  Consiituttoii, 
nor  prohibitnl  by  it  lo  the  stAics,  arc  rctct>'ed  to  the  stales 
Tr*pec lively,  or  to  the  people,"  the  acl  of  the  Congtrss  of  the 
United  Statu,  panited  on  the  ziA  d.iy  of  Juric,  1798,  eniillnl  "  311 
iict  ccnccminK  alii-n*."  which  ;iMiime!i  power  over  alien-friends 
iiiH  dde^jli-d  by  tlie  Cunstitutiun,  iii  nul  taw.  bul  ia  altogether 
void  and  i>f  no  force. 

5.  RfS'^ivii.  'I'h.il  in  Addilion  lo  the  general  prtDciptc  at  well  as 
the  express  ilecUr.iiion.  thai  powers  not  dclcg.iied  iirc  I'eseivcJ, 
.another  and  innre  special  pmvi^inn  inserted  in  the  ConMiiution. 
from  .-ibuiidant  cniilion.  h;is  decbretl.  "  that  the  migr.itiirn  or 
impurlHiiuii  of  such  pcrscms  ;ii  any  of  the  st.iies  miw  existing  shall 
Ibiiik  priiper  to  a<lniil.  >h;ill  nut  lie  piolubiied  by  the  Connrcs* 
pi>i)[  to  ilic  year  iSoS":  that  this  cum nion wealth  dues  admit  the 
itii};r.ilion  of  alien-friends  desciibed  as  (he  subject  uf  (he  &aitt 
HCt  conceiving  .iticn«:  thai  n  prousion  agntnst  ptohibiiing  their 
tnisralion,  U  ;)  provision  ngAinsi  ;ill  arl«  cqulvnlent  thereto,  or  it 
would  be  nug-itory ;  tlial  to  remove  (hem  when  nirgiaic).  is 
e(ji]iv;ilmt  to  A  prohibition  of  ihcit  rnigr^itlinn.  and  is  iheicforQ 
contrary  lo  the  i^iid  provision  nf  the  Consllluiian.  and  void, 

6.  AVk>/[W.  That  the  Imprisonrticnt  of  a  person  under  the 
prolec(iuii  o(  the  Lift's  o(  this  com inoti wealth,  on  bis  (iilure  to 
obey  the  simple  trjfrol  ihc  President,  lo  dqiart  oul  «f  the  United 
Slates,  as  is  iindiTlaken  by  (be  said  ac(,  eniiilcd  "  an  act  concern- 
ing aliens."  is  ronlr^iry  lo  ihe  Consiilution.  one  aniendnieni  lo 
^ich  h.Ts  prorided.  that  "  no  peison  ihall  lie  deprived  of  lihcrly 
without  Ihc  <lue  process  of  l.iw."  and  th^it  anolher  having  pro- 
vided, "  tlut  in  all  criminal  proieculions.  the  accused  shall  enjoy 
Ihc  risht  to  a  public  trial  by  an  iinparlial  jury,  lo  be  informed  of 
the  nature  .ind  Cduw?  of  Ihe  nccusAtion.  lo  ne  eonfionted  Willi  ihe 
witnesses  ai^ainst  hiio.  lo  have  compulsory  process  for  «b(.li^illg 
witnessr*  in  his  lavor,  and  lo  have  Ihe  assistance  of  counsel  for 
hi«  defense."  the  same  .trl  undcrlaking  to  aulboriie  the  President 
10  remove  a  person  out  of  the  United  Slater  who  is  under  Ihe 
proteclion  o(  ihc  law,  on  his  own  suspicion,  withoul  accusalion, 
without  jury,  without  public  liial.  without  confiunl.ition  o(  (he 
witnesses  .«g:iinst  hiin.  vrilhout  liaviiig  witnesses  in  his  f.ivor.  \vilh- 
oul  ticfense.  withnul  counsel,  is  contrary  to  ibesc  provisions,  also, 
of  Ihe  Consiilution,  is  llvere{ore  not  law.  but  Uticrly  roi*!  and  0* 
no  force. 

Thai  transferring  the  power  of  iiid};inK  any  person  who  is  untler 
ihe  proleclion  of  ihc  laws,  from  ific  court*  lo  ibe  Preiidcnl  of  (he 
United  Slates,  as  is  underiaken  by  the  same  act.  conceining  altcits, 
b  sg.iinsl  the  article  of  the  Consf'luiinn  which  provides,  thai  "'  ihe 
^•cial  power  of  iltc  United  Slates  shall  be  rested  in  courts,  (be 


KF.xrUCKY  KESOLVTfOXS. 


;it<tK»  of  nhich  !ih;i11  hold  rheir  oHicet  iliiring  good  bcluiTMa.' 
and  (hut  Ilie  said  ^ct  \i  void  (or  that  ruson  al«>;  nnd  i(  tt  fiinliti 
to  be  noted,  tlut  this  transfer  of  judiciar}-  power  is  to  (hjl  nugi*- 
irate  o(  itie  General  Government,  who  alrejdy  poBiesics  M  ibe 
executive,  and  a  qualilieil  negalive  in  all  the  kx>^'-<'ive  power*. 

7.  Hfishtd,  That  (lie  c>tiM[uction  applieil  hy  the  Gcn«nl 
Covcrnmenl,  (at  is  evinced  by  BUnrir)'  of  rheii  pro<-eedlnfr>.l  l» 
lho«e  paru  of  ihc  ConMilUtion  of  the  Uniird  Statrt  which  deV- 
i;iit»  to  Congrcu  a  power  to  tajr  and  collect  t.-ixes,  ituiies.  impinu. 
and  excises;  Id  pay  ihe  debt*,  and  (wmiile  for  ihc  cimiiKni 
defense  and  general  welfaie  o(  the  United  Slates,  and  lo  ntakc 
all  laws  which  s^hall  be  iiece^Mrv  and  proper  fot  carryiof^  inin 
execution  the  powers  vested  by  the  Constitution  tn  tlic  Guran- 
menl  of  the  Umlcd  St.ilrs.  or  any  dejvknmcnt  thereof,  gnes  i«  the 
dcMniClion  of  all  ihr  limilK  pre:fcril>etl  tn  their  power  by  the  Con- 
Mituilon:  that  wonit  meant  by  that  tnMiumeni  to  \ik  kuhsi^lury 
only  to  the  execution  of  (he  limited  iwiveni.  otishi  nnt  lo  be  w 
cotittiued  as  themselves  to  give  unlimited  powers,  nor  a  pan  wo  to 
be  taken,  as  to  destroy  the  whole  resirtiK  of  the  insttutncnt  thai 
the  proceedings  of  the  General  Govcrnnieni  under  cotcr  of  iliese 
articles,  w;lt  be  a  tit  and  necesury  sobjcci  (or  revisai  and  coi- 
rcction  at  a  time  «(  greater  iranquillity.  while  those  speetti^  In  (he 
prrceiling  rcMiliilions  call  (or  immediate  redreM. 

8.  Rrtohted.  That  the  prrceding  rcwilulions  be  IranKmtlled  to 
the  senators  ami  reptevniatives  in  Congress  frutn  this  coinmon- 
wcalih.  who  arc  hereby  enjoined  10  present  the  same  to  their 
respective  houses,  and  lo  use  iheir  besi  etideavors  to  piixruir,  A 
the  next  session  of  Congress,  a  repeal  o(  the  aforesaiil  uocan- 
stituiional  and  obnoxious  acis. 

9.  iits«iviJ.h\itlx.'Vha\  thcGovenw*  wdhUcommonwealih  be, 
and  is  hereby  niithorixedand  requetled  tocommunicaie  ihe  preced- 
ing resolutions  to  the  legiilntuiea  of  the  sei'eral  stairs,  to  attnre 
them  tlial  this  cominonwcdllh  consideis  union  fur  speciSed  lu- 
tional  purposes.  3nd  paiticulaily  for  thow  specilicd  in  their  late 
federal  compact.  10  be  friendlv  10  the  peace.  tiappinrM  and  pros- 
perity of  all  the  stales:  that,  laithful  to  ihnt  compact,  actoiding 
to  the  plain  intent  and  meaning  in  which  it  was  undrii.iood  aMil 
acceded  to  by  the  sevend  parties,  i(  is  sincerely  aiixiou*  for  ii> 
preservation  :  that  it  docs  alio  believe,  th-it  in  taiie  fioin  Ihe  alato 
alt  the  fiovreis  of  self-goi-einmem,  and  trnnifer  thrin  lu  n  general 
and  c<inso!idiite<l  government,  without  regard  to  ihe  Kt>eciat  i>bli(a' 
lions  and  rrservntions  solemnly  agrrcil  to  in  ihat  cunipact,  is  iwi 
for  the  |>eacc,  hapiMitess  or  prosperity  of  these  siJici:  iinl  thai 
therefore,  this  commonwealth  it  ileiermineil.  a*  it  it  is 
co>siaies  arc,  tamely  to  submit  to  undelegated  and  1  iil^ 
unlimited  powers  in  no  man  or  bo<ly  of  men  on  caiiti;  tlijj  if 
the  acts  before  specified  should  stand,  these  cuiclucmnt  wntlU 
flow  from  them ;  that  the  general  govenimctit  '  'I'l 
they  ihink  proper  on  the  list  of  crimes,  anil  put-i  -». 
whether  cniimeTate«l  or  not  enumerated  by  ihc  1  iii.-tii,iii,iii^  ns 
co^lubte  by  them:  (hat  they  may  lnui>l«r  lt«  cognijiUKc  to  th* 


mn 


/CE/fTi/cttv  jtesoLurjojvs. 


683 


President  or  any  olhcr  petmn.  who  may  himKlt  be  the  accuser, 
couniicl.  judiic  and  jurj-.  wlio?ie  tuspicioHt  may  be  ihc  evificnce, 
hi«  (itder  lh«  sentence.  Iiis  ofBccr  ilie  executioner,  and  his  breast 
the  luie  record  o(  the  Itaiisaclion ;  that  a  very  iiuineti>u&  and 
valu.ible  description  of  the  inli^ibii^inis  of  these  Maic»  bi-iiig.  by 
this  precedent,  reduced  as  ouiUws  to  ihc  absoWtc  dominion  of 
one  man,  and  the  barrier  of  the  Consiitulion  ihus  swept  away 
from  lis  all,  no  ranipart  now  rciiiains  against  the  passions  and 
the  power  of  a  (n.-ijority  of  Congrcvt.  to  protect  from  a  like  «• 
porlaliim  or  other  more  grievous  punUlimeiit  the  miiioriiy  of  the 
»itrae  body,  the  Icf^iftlaiurcs.  judges,  ^uvcrnorv  and  counselors  of 
the  flutes,  nor  iheir  oilier  pejice^blc  irilijibitdiilt  who  niAy  venture 
to  recUini  lite  coiislitutiondl  ri);ht»  and  lilicrlicsot  the  sl^itesand 
people,  or  who,  (or  other  caiiici.,  good  or  Iwd,  may  be  obnoxious 
10  itic  views,  or  marked  b)-  the  suspicions  of  the  Prrsirtenl.  or  be 
ihouK^'  danji^tDUS  to  his  or  their  elections,  or  other  interests 
public  or  pertonal :  tliat  the  frieiulless  alien  \\An  indeed  been 
selected  u  the  safest  subject  of  a  first  eiperimenl;  but  the  ciliten 
W1II  soon  foUow,  or  rather  his  already  followeil ;  for,  alre^idy  hjis 
a  sedition -act  marked  him  as  its  prey:  that  these  and  successive 
ftCtS  of  the  same  charjcier,  unless  arrested  on  the  threshold,  may 
lend  to  drive  these  states  inlo  revolution  and  blood,  and  will  fur- 
nish new  calumnies  ag'iiiist  republican  govrmments,  and  new 
pretexts  for  those  who  wi.th  it  to  be  believed,  that  man  cannot  1>e 
governed  hut  by  a  rod  uf  iron :  that  it  would  be  a  danseruus 
delusion,  n-cte  a  coiiliikncc  in  tlie  men  of  our  choice,  to  silence 
our  feats  for  tlte  safety  of  our  nghts :  thai  conridcnee  tsercrywbcie 
the  parent  of  despolism  ;  free  Kovernment  is  founded  in  jealousy, 
and  not  in  confidence;  it  is  je-ilousy  and  not  coiitiilencc  which 
prescribes  litnil(^<l  constitutions  to  hind  doivii  those  whom  wne  are 
obliged  to  mist  with  power:  that  our  Constilulion  has  »ccordiiijcly 
fixed  the  limits  to  which  and  no  further  our  conli<lcnce  may  go; 
and  let  Ilie  boiiest  advocate  of  cuiitidence  tend  the  ahcn  and 
sedition  acis.  and  say  if  the  Cunstilution  has  nut  been  wise  ui 
l)xii>K  limiis  to  thegovernmeni  it  created,  and  whcibcr  we  should 
be  Wise  in  destroying  those  limits?  I.ei  him  say  what  the  govern- 
ment is  if  it  be  not  a  tyranny,  which  the  men  of  our  choice  Ivave 
conferred  on  the  Presiacnt.  and  the  President  of  our  choice  has 
assented  lo  and  accepted,  over  lli«  friendly  stmnKcis.  to  whom 
the  mild  s|nht  uf  our  country  and  lis  laws  bad  plet1j;ed  honpilaltly 
and  iitoieclion:  that  the  timt  o(  our  choice  have  muie  tesiwctrd 
the  bare  suspicions  of  the  President,  th.^n  tlie  solid  iiKbts  of  inno< 
ccitce.  the  claims  oJ  jusiihc^iion.  Ihc  sacred  force  ol  iriiih,  and 
the  forms  am)  suhitancc  of  law  and  justice.  In  <)uesIions  of 
power,  then,  let  no  mare  be  heard  of  confidence  in  man,  but  bind 
him  down  from  mischief,  by  the  chains  uf  the  Constitution,  That 
this  comtnmiwealih  doev  iliGieforc,  call  on  its  co-stales  fur  an 
expression  of  ibeir  sentimenis  on  the  acts  concerning  aliens,  and 
for  the  punishment  of  certain  crimes  hcieinbelore  s}ici.jlicd,  plainly 
declaring  whether  these  acts  are  or  arc  not  aultioriied  by  Ihc 
Federal  compact.    And  it  doubts  not  tliat  their  sense  will  )>e  m 


6S4 


KENTUCKY  RESOLUTIONS. 


announced,  »  to  pr<n-e  Ihcir  attaclinitni  unaltered  lo  limjtn] 
government,  whether  ^-crtcnil  or  paiticubi,  anil  ili.il  ibt^  ri):hu 
and  lilieilies  of  (heir  co-sliiles,  will  be  exposed  to  no  (1;ii<)jcts  bf 
remaining  cnibarhn)  on  a  common  boliom  ivilli  itieir  own  :  That 
ihey  will  concur  with  ihii  rommonwealih  in  consiilcriiig  the  Mid 
ads  as  no  ii.-it|i.ilii)-3;;iiinit  the  Connilulion,  as  to  aniotiiil  to  la 
unilisguiscd  ileclarMiutu  (h-^I  Ihe  compact  i»  not  ineani  to  be  tlir 
mejsuie  of  the  powins  of  itie  itenerai  goveniment.  but  tliAl  a  «■!■ 
pioceed  111  the  cxeicise  uvci  these  sliiles  of  at!  poweis  w)uil&ocret' 
rlul  ihcy  will  virw  tliis  ;is  M-izinj;  tlw  tightA  of  ihc  states,  anil 
cimsnhd tiling  ihein  in  ihe  hand»  of  Ihe  general  Roveinnicnl  wiih 
a  power  anonieil  to  biii'l  the  xlates,  (not  mervly  in  casts  niaik 
federal.)  but  in  all  cases  wlutioever.  by  laws  tn.-ide.  not  wllh  ihcti 
consent,  but  l>y  others  against  their  consent :  That  this  woutd  be 
to  surrender  the  form  of  Koveniment  we  have  chosen,  anil  to  Kvr 
uikIct  one  dctlving  its  iiowen  frotn  iii  own  irilj,  am)  oot  froai 
our  authority ;  ;ind  tlut  the  co-states,  fecuiiiiig  to  their  nalin:iJ 
right  in  rxBrs  not  made  federal,  ivill  conrur  In  decl.-ttiiic  ihric 
acts  void  and  of  no  force,  and  will  cich  unite  with  Ihrs  coininuD- 
wealth.  in  roqummg  Ihcir  repeal  at  the  next  session  o(  Conptu. 

VIRGINIA   RESOLtnriONS  OP   I798.< 

I.  Rttfih'ed.  that  ihe  General  AsseniVly  of  Vii);inLi  doth  une> 
quivocally  express  a  limi  resolution  to  maini.itn  r\Ti<\  rt-fcnd  the 
Constitution    of  ihc  Uniied  Slates,  and  the  C  -  .    of  this 

Slate,  against  every  aggression,  cither  foreign  or  <  .  .  ^nil  llial 
it  will  snppori  the  gDvernnienl  uf  tlie  United  States  ;n  4II  iiteaMira 
wnrranicil  by  Ihe  fotn>er. 

S.  That  Ihii  Aiicinbly  moat  sotemnty  declares  a  wann  qimHi- 
menl  to  the  union  ol  the  Slate*,  lo  in.ii»lain  nhich,  it  pledge*  »\i 
its  powers ;  ami  thai  fur  tins  end  It  is  its  duty  lo  watcli  oi-er  b4iiI 
oppiue  eveiv  infraction  of  lho««  piinciplen.  which  consliiuie  the 
only  basis  0/  thai  union,  hcrausr  a  faithful  otiscrvancc  of  Itiem  can 
alone  secure  il»  eiisience.  anil  ihe  puhlK:  hapjunrsK. 

3.  Thai  ihif  Aiscndily  iloih  cxpliciily  and  |termiptori1y  (leclaie 
that  it  views  the  powers  of  llie  teileral  Oovi'rnnient  as  ii'«utliM( 
from  the  compact,  10  which  the  Slater  are  parlies,  as  limilrd  by 
llie  pl.-un  sense  ami  inlcntiofi  of  tltr  tnyfunieni  t-iiisliluting  thai 
compact;  as  tiofurllier  valid  than  litryaie  auilK'tited  In  itir  j;ranu 
enumerated  in  iliat  compact;  and  that  in  c^se  of  ,ia. 
palpaMe,  and  dangerous  exercise  of  olhcr  pawns  n<<  liy 
the  said  eompacl.  the  States,  who  .ire  ihe  pariia  thcfdu,  It^vc  llM 
right,  and  ate  in  duty  Imunil.  to  interpose  forain-iliin-  ilir  jiii^ca 
of  Ihe  evil,  and  for  ina-i  |>c  lindts,  |he 
aalhoritieit,  lights,  and  i 

4.  Thai  ihe  General  /\"-'tii.pij  iiniii  .\iv<  rMin^>  iis  dM!p  raftct 
Ihni  a  ipiril  has  in  sundry  instances  been  inanifeslnl  h)-  the  FnJmJ 

■  WriiiBu  kj  JniM  llaiUfam. 


17M] 


VIRGINIA  RESOLUTIONS. 


685 


Cot'cnimenl.  (o  enl.ir){C  its  powers  by  lorcecJ  codkI ructions  of  the 
cotiitituiional  charter  whjcli  ilebncH  iheni ;  and  that  indicaitons 
have  apjwareil  of  K  desi^  to  expound  cciuin  genenil  phraaes 
(wliicli.  LiTing  been  coitied  from  the  vtvy  limilcd  grant  of  powers 
ill  itic  foinirr  aiikloot  confederation,  were  the  less  liable  lo  be 
misconsiruccl).  so  as  to  de^lroj-  tlic  meaning  and  effect  of  the 
parilciilai  enum<'nlion,  which  nrccssatily  rxpUinit  and  limits  the 
geiier;)]  plitiuev  ,-ind  so  as  lo  consolidate  the  States  by  dcKtcrs  Into 
one  lovcrcignty.  the  obvious  tendency  and  inevitable  re:iult  of 
which  wuuld  \x  lo  ttiiiiifonn  the  ptcieiil  re]iul)licaii  sysleni  o(  the 
United  Stales  inlu  an  absolute,  or  at  beM,  a  mixed  inonarcliy. 

;.  TliJit  the  Gcncrjl  Assemlily  doth  particularly  protest  against 
the  palpable  and  alarming  infractions  of  the  Consiiluiion,  in  the 
two  late  casrs  o(  the  "  alien  and  sedition  ]tcts,"  passed  al  the  last 
session  of  Congrc-H.  ihe  fiisl  of  which  exetciset  a  povrer  nowhere 
delegated  to  ihc  Federal  (jovernment ;  and  which  by  uiiiiing  Icglt- 
lalirc  and  judicial  nowers  to  those  of  executive,  subverls  the 
general  piiriciples  of  free  );i>i*eniniefit.  as  well  a«  (he  particular 
organtcitiun  Jnd  positive  piovisioiis  of  the  Federal  Conslilulion; 
and  the  other  of  which  acts  exercises  in  like  manner  .1  power  not 
delegated  by  ihc  Conslitution,  but  on  the  contrary  expressly  and 
positively  forbidden  by  one  of  the  aniendtnenls  ihercto;  a  powrr 
which  more  than  any  other  ouj;ht  to  prtiducc  univerul  alarm. 
because  It  is  leveled  against  the  right  of  freely  enamlning  puli'lc 
characters  ami  measure*,  and  of  free  cominuiiicaiion  among  the 
people  thereon,  which  has  ever  been  justly  deemed  the  oidy 
cffcclua!  goanlian  of  every  other  right, 

6.  That  this  Slate  having  by  its  convention  which  ratified  the 
federal  Consiiiuiion.  expressly  declared,  "  that  srrtong  other 
essential  rights,  the  libetty  of  conscience  and  of  the  press  cannot 
be  canceled,  nhridgcd.  Tcslrained.  or  modified  by  any  aulhnrity  of 
the  United  Stales, '  .ind  from  its  extreme  anxiety  lo  giiard  these 
rights  from  every  posiible  attack  of  sophistry  or  ambition,  having 
with  oiber  States  recomniendeil  an  anietwltnenl  for  Ihat  purjKise, 
which  ainenditicnt  was  in  due  Iiine  annexed  to  the  Consiiiuiion.  it 
would  ntark  a  tcproaclifut  inconsistency  and  crimiii4it  dcgeneiacy. 
Han  indifference  were  now  shown  to  tlie  mosi  palp.ible  violation 
of  one  of  the  tights  thus  declared  and  secured,  and  lo  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  preccilcnt  which  may  be  f.ital  to  Ihc  other. 

7.  Thai  Ihc  good  people  of  this  commonwealth  having  e»CT  (ell, 
and  continuing  lu  feel  Ihe  most  sincere  affection  to  their  brethren  o( 
the  other  St.ttes,  the  truest  anxiety  (or  establishing  and  peipcluating 
the  union  o(  alt.  and  the  most  scrupulous  iidehty  lo  thai  Constitu- 
lion  which  is  the  pledge  of  mutual  friendship,  and  the  instrument 
of  mutual  happiness,  the  General  Assembly  dolh  solemnly  appeal 
lo  the  like  dispoulions  of  the  other  .Slalrs,  in  confidence  lliai  ihfy 
will  concur  with  this  coramonvrealih  in  decl.iring,  as  ii  does  hcrrliy 
declare,  that  the  acts  aforesaid  arc  unconsiiiulioiinl.  and  that  Ihe 
nec«SMry  and  proper  measure  will  Iw  taken  by  each,  for  co-ojieral- 
ing  with  this  Stale  in  mainUining  unimpaired  llic  authorities,  rights, 
MkI  libtrtKt  reserved  10  the  States  mpcctlvcljr.ot  to  lh«  people. 


686 


JEFF£RSO.VS  LOVlSIAffA  AMENDMMNT.      (tl 


8.  Thai  tli«  GovcrnoT  l>c  dcsiird  to  Irsnsmii  a  copy  of  iIib  Iw*- 
KoinR  Tc$o1iiti»n&  to  the  executive  aulltarity  of  pncn  of  (he  oiIk( 
Stiilet.  with  n  Tcc)ucs(  that  ihc  Nime  may  be  coiiimtinicatcd  Id  the 
tcKiilniurc  thereof.  And  that  a  copy  be  luniihlicd  to  uch  of  il« 
iiCTiaiuiK  .-in<l  rep  re«en  tali  vet  rqncsciiting  th»  S<«Ic  m  tbc  Cooertn- 
ol  Ihc  Untied  Sutes. 

JKFFBKSOH'S  UKAFT  ON   AN  AMKNI>MENT  TO   TBE  COW- 

sriTUTiOM.  1803. 

The  province  of  Louisiana  is  incoqioraied  with  the  U.&aad 
(nadc  pari  thereof.  The  rii;ht»  of  occupancy  in  llic  soil,  amt  U 
self -govern  men  I,  arc  confiinied  10  the  Indian  inhahil^nb.  its  iWy 
now  exist.  rre-ein|iIioii  only  of  the  piMliansriKhifiilly  ocrupied  bj 
them,  and  a  succession  to  Ihc  occupancy  of  such  nt  ihey  nuji 
iibundori,  with  ihc  lull  rights  of  puwcuion  as  well  as  of  |>it>j)rTt|r 
iipid  sovereignty  in  whaiei^r  is  not  or  sIihII  cea»c  to  tw  so  nghifullf 
occupied  by  ihem  shall  belong  to  the  U.  S. 

The  tcgiUaturc  of  ihc  Union  shall  have  aulhoiitv  lo  eachanre 
ihc  right  of  occupancy  in  portions  where  the  U.  S.  nai't  full  ii](ht 
lot  lands  possessed  by  Indians  vrithin  the  U.  S.  on  the  East  mIc 
of  the  Missisipt ;  lo  exchange  lands  on  ilie  East  side  of  the  liicr 
(or  ibOM  on  the  West  liilc  Ihercuf  and  above  the  latitude  ol  ]l 
destees:  to  maintain  inanyp;itt  of  ihc  proviiicc  »uch  tnililarypuus 
ns  may  be  retiuisiic  lor  peace  or  safclv ;  lo  exercise  nolice  uier  all 
persons  therein,  not  being  Indian  iiihutiilants;  to  noiL  uill  spiingi, 
or  mines  ol  coal,  meiaU  and  oilier  minerals  within  ihe  post.£ssMin 
of  the  U.  S.  or  in  anv  others  with  the  consent  of  the  posscssoni 
to  regiilalc  Irailc  and  inlercouise  between  the  Indian  inhabitants 
niul  all  other  persons ;  to  explore  and  aiccitain  Ihc  geo]-Ta|diy  o( 
Ihc  province,  ils  tiruductions  and  other  iiitercslin£  circumst.-inret ; 
li>  open  roiads  and  navitjation  theidn  where  iK-cessaty  lor  t>cneficiat 
coinmunicalion ;  and  to  establish  agencies  and  facloiirs  thnrtn 
for  the  cultivation  of  coiniiieicc.  peace  and  good  undeistandiiif 
will)  ibc  Indians  residing  there. 

The  legislature  shall  have  no  aulhorilv  to  dispose  of  llw  tnndl  nl 
th«  province  otherwise  than  is  herelnlicfore  petmiiied.  uiilll  a  new 
Amendment  of  the  consiilulioa  shall  |[ive  llial  anlhoritj'.  Except 
as  to  that  portion  thereof  which  lies  south  of  the  latitude  of  }1 
degrees;  wliich  whenever  they  deem  expedient,  they  niay  acd 
into  a  territorial  Coveniitieni.  either  separate  or  as  making  part 
with  one  on  the  eastern  side  ol  the  rivet,  vesting  ihc  mhabilanU 
thereof  with  all  ihe  rights  possessed  by  [>tli>ct  lerriloiul  cIlucM 
of  tbe  U.  S. 

ABSTRACT  or  DECISION   IN  THK  CASE  Or  MARIIUItr  VS. 
MADrSQN,    1803.' 

The  question  vrhetber  an  ad  repufiiianl  to  the  constitution  cMi 
become  a  Law  of  Ihe  land,  K  a  question  deeply  iiiierrslinf  (m  tl* 

•  In  lull  In  I  Crancb  ijy. 


IMS)        Ofi/.VIOff  AV  MA  KB  UK  Y  VS.  MAD/SOX. 


^7 


Uii'iol  Stales  :  bul  h;i|)|>il>-  not  of  an  iiiEticaL:y  pruporlionKil  to  its 
inietrat.  l!  weiii*  only  ncct-war)'  !o  reL'ogniie  cerluio  prjrtcrples 
supjioicd  lo  havt  been  lung  ;iMd  well  csi.ibliiilicil.  lo  decide  ii.  .  ,  . 
Th;ii  lite  people  lutvc  an  ocigiiifil  nghi  to  establish  (or  (heir  fuiiire 
government  such  principles  js  in  their  opinion  shall  most  conduc*: 
lo  lh«ir  own  hnppmcst,  15  the  iMxis  on  which  ihc  whole  Amefic.iti 
tAhtic  hAt  been  erected.  The  orieinnl  supreme  will  orgnnucs  the 
xovernmcnt  and  as>i){n*  to  the  dinerent  iJejiaiimcnis  ;beii  reipcc- 
tive  powers.  .  .  ,  The  powers  o(  ihc  le|[i»laiure  are  defined  and 
limited:  and  thai  those  hmils  niiy  not  be  mistaken  or  (orcottcn. 
the  consiiiuiioii  is  wiiiien.  To  wiiat  purpose  are  powers  hmitcd 
and  to  wlut  purpose  is  that  limitation  committed  lo  writing,  i( 
(hose  limiis  may  at  any  lime  be  pas5<il  by  those  intended  to  he 
TcVraineil?  ....  Th^CI>n^1>lulion  ttrilher  ii  superior, paramount 
law.  uiKh.-uigcable  by  ordinary  mcan\  or  it  It  on  a  level  with 
uriiiiiary  le][i«lalJre  acts,  and  like  any  other  act  b  alterable  when 
the  legislature  shall  please  to  alici  it.  I(  ihe  (otmer  juit  o(  the 
aliernalive  be  true,  then  a  legislative  act  contrary  to  the  constitu- 
tion is  not  Inw.  [( the  lattei  part  be  true,  then  written  consiilu- 
tionsare  absurd  alt  cm  pis  on  the  pan  of  the  pcopletto  limii  a  puwcr 
in  its  own  nature  illimilahlc.  ...  If  an  ad  of  ihc  lr|;isUlurc 
rcpui^n.-ini  li>  the  contiituiion  1^  void,  tiom  it,  notwithxtandinu  its 
validity,  bind  ihc  courts  and  oblige  them  to  f[i»e  it  effect  ?  Or,  in 
other  words,  though  it  he  not  law.  does  it  constitute  a  rule  at 
operative  at  lliouEh  It  was  a  law  ?  This  wimkl  be  to  overthrow  in 
fact  what  was  eslahtisheil  in  theory ;  and  would  seem  at  lirsl  view 
an  .tinitnlily  too  gfmi  lo  he  insistetl  U|ion.  It  shall,  however. 
receive  a  more  atteiiiive  consideiailon.     It  is  emphatically  the 

Erovincc  and  dMiv  of  the  judiciiil  deparinieni  lo  say  what  the 
iw  is.  Thnw  who  apply  ihr  rule  to  paniciiUr  caM's  miKt  of 
nrrrssity  rinoiiml  .ind  inlerprrt  that  rule.  If  two  laws  conllict 
with  eachoiiicr.the  courts  must  decide  upon  the u|ier^iti()n  iifeach. 
So  if  a  l.iw  he  Jn  opposition  lo  the  Consfilulion ;  if  both  the  law 
and  the  Conslilulioo  apply  lo  a  uarlic<i!ar  case,  so  that  the  court 
iniKl  either  dectde  tliM  case  conlonnalily  lo  the  law.  (tisrcgarding 
the  Coiislitution.  or  conformably  lo  the  Constitution,  disregarding 
tfie  Uw — the  court  must  detemiinc  which  of  ihescconHioiing  nilcs 

f'Ot'rriis  Ihe  cave.  This  is  of  (he  very  nsencr  of  judicial  duty. 
(.  then,  the  courts  are  lo  rcgani  Ihe  Constitution,  and  the  Con- 
stT(uiion  is  Superior  (o  any  onlinary  ac(  of  the  legisUiure,  the 
Coil  si  it  II I  ion  and  not  surti  ordinary  ac(.  must  govern  the  case  to 
whk'h  they  iMMh  apply.  Those,  then,  who  controvert  the  principle 
that  the  Oinsliluti'>n  is  to  be  consideie<l  in  couit  as  a  paramount 
law.  arc  reduceiJ  lo  the  necessilj'  of  maintaining  that  courts  must 
close  (heir  eyes  on  the  CoflStt(u(ian  aitd  sec  only  the  Uw. 


AUCNUMCNTS    TO    TUB     COKeTITITTION     PROPOSliD     BY     TIIK 
IIARTrORD  COKVKNTtOrt.    1814. 

Thfrrfert  rtsah'ttt. — That  it  be  and  hereby  is  recommended  to 
the  l,cgislatures  of  the  several  States  rcpiesenied  in  this  Convcn- 


AyiSDMEHTSOF HARTFORD  CONVEfTTiOlf.  BIM^ 

lion,  to  iulofit  all  auch  meA-ttiTcs  ai  may  be  nccessarr  Hlrciuilii 
lo  prated  tii«  cituciu  of  *m\  States  ftum  the  operation  unil  t  ~ 
of  all  iwlv  wliich  have  beeii  or  injy  tie  [luised  by  llie  Cungi 
the  United  St3te».  which  aliiUI  contain  piovt&ions.  bubjc^iii^f' 
tnilitU  or  othcrcitiiciislo  forcible  drafts,  coiiKriptions,  or  impmt- 
mcnts,  not  authoriicd  by  the  Coitslitulion  ot  the  Uniird  St.-ktci. 

Mttehtd. — Ttiat  il  be  and  hereby  is  [ccomMicnded  lo  the  *m1 
Le^iixlalutcs.  to  aulhofiic  m\  imincilutc  and  e;im««t  Dpplic.itioB  W 
be  mnde  to  the  (juvenimcnt  of  the  United  Sl;iln,  rM|uciling  llieir 
cunsirnt  to  Kiine  arranufH'tit,  whcrehy  the  Siiid  Sl.ilea  uuf. 
HCpariiicly  ur  in  vunccrl.  becniiioVfcicd  Iojsmikc  u|>on  lhciiuiri*r« 
tile  dcfenic  of  ihcii  Iciiiloiy  ii){Hiitsi  tlx-  eiiciny  ;  and  a  rcisonoliir 
portion  of  the  tJixc^,  «)ltrcted  within  uid  Stales,  may  he  paid  oita 
tlie  icspcciive  ireaHirirs  thereof,  and  apjHoprialeil  to  the  payttkenl 
of  tile  balance  due  »aid  Slatci.  and  to  tlie  future  delcoic  of  the 
same.  Tiic  ainaunt  so  ])aid  into  the  i-iid  ticaMiiies  to  be  credited, 
and  the  iliihuraeiitcnts  riiude  u  aforesaid  ta  be  char);cd  ta  the 
United  Stales. 

/ifh'h'tii. — Th.ii  it  be.  and  it  licreby  is.  iccommcnded  lo  llic  Lcj- 
islaiures  of  the  afoicsatd  Slatt^  lo  pass  Uw»  (uherr  ii  has  nol 
already  been  done)  aiithoiiiiiig  the  Govcriiors  (it  Co[nfi)andrt»><ii 
Chief  of  ihcir  niililia  lo  make  detachments  fiom  the  lame.  or  10 
form  roluntary  cor]M.  ai  ihall  lie  most  cunvenioil  and  cunfomiaUr 
to  their  Coniiiiuttons,  and  to  cnuse  the  same  tu  be  \iell  armed. 
equij>pcd  and  disciplined,  and  held  in  reaihiic»  for  winrice ;  altd 
upon  the  request  ut  the  Governor  of  either  o(  llic  other  Stales,  to 
employ  the  whole  of  such  <leiachnteni  of  corps,  as  well  ju  the 
regular  foic(.-tof  the  Slate,  or  »uch  pari  thereof  at  may  lie  leqtitrvd 
and  can  be  ^p.^red  consistently  with  the  s.ilriy  'A  il>e  State,  itt 
atilUing  the  Stale,  making  such  request  to  repel  any  inTonon 
thereof  which  sIxaH  be  made  ot  altrmpml  by  ihe  public  enemy. 

/f/ii?hyJ. — Thai  Ihe  fallowing  amendmenli  of  the  ConMilulim 
of  the  United  .States,  l>e  recommended  lo  Ihe  St>ite*i  ai  ulnieuitL 
10  he  pco|ioscd  by  them  for  adouiion  b)-  lltc  Stan-  Lc|{i^laiure!>.  .ind. 
in  such  cawi  a«  may  tiedeemedeipcdimt.by  «  Con  rent  mn  chonm 
by  the  |ieople  ui  each  Slate. 

And  It  il  funlier  recomnwndcd,  that  ihe  saiil  St.ite*  shall  pcrw- 
vcrc  in  iheii  cfToris  to  obtain  such  aincitilment!).  untd  the  lame 
&hall  he  effectcil. 

/-Vfi/,- Represent  at  i«s  and  direct  taxes  ilull  b*  spforiiwnnl 
anxMig  the  »«*eral  Stales  which  in.iy  be  ii»clu<led  «ilh  i  ■    >  i  .lO, 

accuidins  to  iheii  respective  numbers  o4  fice  prtsu  ifij 

thoie  bouiMl  to  icTve  for  a  lemt  oi  years,  and  cicliHiing   irimans 
nol  laird,  ami  all  oil>er  iiersoiii. 

.Siiviirf,— No  new  State  sliJill  b*  admitted  into  the  union  lif 
Congress  in  rirtue  of  Ihe  jxiwcr  grantcil  by  the  Cuiistituliun.  viA- 
out  the  concurrence  of  itvo.thinU  of  both  lIouMs. 

/"(i/V*/. —Congress  .ihall  n«t  hare  powei  to  lay  ai>'  •» 

ibe   ship*  or   ir-vsrl..  ii(  ihe  ciiiieiii  of  the  UniinI   :-  ilc 

pons  or  hat'i  f.  fi>i  more  tli.tn  si\ly  days. 

/■■«>((»/*.—'  ihall  tKH  have  power,  without  tlic  airnaW 


iili]  AA/eXDArEXTSOF /lA/tTFOKD  COXVEXTlOff.     6*9 

nnce  of  hini  ihiiiK  a\  bolh  Houses,  to  inlcniict  llie  commncMl 
inicrcuurse  bc:lwecn  (lie  United  StUM  aiuJ  any  foreign  nnlion  or 
the  ile{ienileTicii:%  ilicreof. 

J-'iJth. — Cuii^ivM  shall  n*il  make  or  declare  wax,  or  aulbuiize 
acls  o(  lioililiiy  u£;tiiiil  ;in)*  loicJjjii  n^Uun,  willioul  tile  toiicui- 
rcnce  of  two-lliiiilit  of  both  Mou^rs,  rtei-pt  »udi  acl«  of  hostility 
lie  in  (IcfniK  of  llic  iciriiorics  of  the  UiiiiL-d  Stoics  when  aciu:illy 
iiivndnl. 

SijtA.—Ko  pmon  who  shall  hcrrafier  be  naturalizrcl,  shnll  be 
rli|;iblF  lis  u  member  u(  the  Senate  or  KoUKt:  of  Kcpivtrnta liven  of 
the  Uoiinl  Siiiici.  imr  (.'ujHble  of  htikliiij;  any  civil  oHitc  jiniler  the 
juth'ititj  ol  tlic  Lniicd  Stiile». 

.Svrj'.H/A.— The  wiiie  iicrsun  sliiill  nol  be  elccleil  ]*teii<leiil  ol  llie 
Uiiilt-'l  Slates  a  s<-i:i>iiil  Iiiiiv  ;  nur  shdl  the  t'lcMili-nl  bv  clecicil 
Uont  llip  same  Slalo  lv»o  Itilits  in  »u«ci6io". 

Riiokiid. — Thai  i(  the  applied  ion  of  ihcse  Stairs  10  tli*  ROffcrn- 
mciil  ol  Ihe  Unilei)  Slale.%,  iccoimnrndol  in  a  forrf^oioK  ke«>lti- 
lioo,  should  be  unnucceviful,  ami  pmce  thouhl  nol  be  cohcIikIciI. 
«in<l  the  defense  of  these  iiiale>  slmiild  be  ne>;lecl«l,  n»  il  has  tieeii 
siocr  the  conKoeoL-rinent  of  the  war,  il  will  in  the  apii>iuiiu(  this 
Coni'cittion  lie  eiiioilieiit  for  the  Ltgiilature*  of  the  stvcrJii  Stale* 
to  appoint  DrlcE-iies  to  nnolher  Coiiveiitioii.  to  meet  at  ttoslon.  in 
the  Stair  of  Massachusetts,  on  the  third  I'hurKlay  of  June  next. 
Miih  Kuch  powers  anil  insiructioiis  as  the  exi|;cnc)'  of  a  crisis  so 
inumenious  may  require. 

THE  MISSOURI   COMPKUMISE.    iSlO. 

kn  act  to  aiilhoi-ite  the  people  of  the  Miuouri  territory  Id  form  a 
conilituiionaiid  stale  Koveinmetil..ind  for  the  admission  of  such 
state  into  the  Union  on  an  equal  foutin;;  with  the  orlgiual  Slates, 
and  Id  pioiiibil  sUvtrj'  in  ceilain  teriiloiies. 
Seltiun'  I.  Ue  it  cn^ctnl  by  the  Senate  am!  House  of  Keprc- 
tlentatiifrsof  the  Unilrd  Slates  «f  Aniciio  in  Conc''e»s  asscmbletl, 
'I  hal  llie  mhabilaiilf  of  \\\M  portion  of  Ih<:  Mis,tnuii  territory 
included  within  the  liaim<laiies  hrreimifter  desi^n.-iled.  be.  am) 
they -ire  hereby  authoruol  to  form  fur  ihrmietvts  ;t  constitution 
ami  stale  EovernmenI :  and  to  iissuioe  such  name  as  ihev  shall 
deetn  pioriei ;  ami  Hie  said  slate  when  formed,  shall  be  admitted 
into  the  Union  upon  an  c<|u;d  footing  with  ihc  original  states,  in 
all  icsprcis  u'hiilsiicvrr.    ,   .   , 

SBf.  8.  And  Ik  il  further  enJicled.  That  in  all  that  Irrriton' 
<:eded  by  Fmnee  li>  the  Unilrd  Stalr$.  under  the  n.ime  of  Louisi- 
ana, whi<:h  Ites  north  ol  <hirty-!tix  ilrcrtes  and  ihiily  minutes  north 
laiilnde,  nol  included  within  Ihc  limits  of  the  stale  coriteniplaled 
by  this  a<:l, slavi:r)'  and  involuniarv  servitude,  otherwise  than  m  ihe 
pom^hment  of  irirnes  whrirof  iKe  p.iitirs  slmll  have  been  dulv 
(••nvictw),  *h.il!  be.  and  is  herebv  forever  prohibited  ;  PrnTjiled 
always.  Thai  any  pcrvin  escaping  into  the  same,  fmm  wlwin  labor 
or  sorvim  b  Ian  fully  claimed,  in  any  siMe  or  lerritory  of  ilic  United 


690 


iilSSOURt  COMrxOMISE. 


obHP 


Stales,  such  fugitive  inny  be  lawfully  fFctaimctt  ani]  conveyed  ta 
ihc  person  chimin)'  lits  0*  her  Ulnw  ik  scniw  as  afor«M>d. 
Approved  6iti  Miuch,  tSaa 

SOtn-H  CAKOLINA  ORDINAKCK  Of  NULLiriCATION,    tSjl. 

An  ordinanee  (o  naWHj  certain  acts  of  the  Congress  of  the  VwxtA 

Stales,  purporting  to  be  tavrs  laying  duties  aitd  irnposu  cm  Ifec 

imponation  of  foreign  commodities. 

whereas  the  Congres*  of  the  United  Slates  by  variniu  ictt. 
puriMrlin^  to  be  a«ls  laying  dulics  and  im|XMtton  fomgn  tltipArti. 
IjuI  in  mlii^  intendcil  for  iTic  protection  of  domeMic  maiiufarlum. 
and  (he  Kiiriiig  of  l>uunliu  10  classes  and  individuals  engaged  m 
pariicular  employmenls,  al  llie  eijienie  and  to  Ihc  injury  and 
oppression  of  other  clashes  and  individuals,  and  by  whull)  atOBpi 
ing  from  laxaiion  ccriain  foreign  comroodilit^.  such  as  aie  " 
produced  or  m.inuf.icluretl  111  itic  Uniicl  Stales,  to  ;ifford  a 
fivr  imposing  higher  and  eicetsirc  duties  on  artirles  sirn 
Ihoic  inli'ndi-d  \a  tie  ptoleclcd,  hath  c(Cc«ded  <l«  just 
under  Ihe  curiiiiiulion,  which  confers  on  it  no  aulhorily  lo 
such  praieclK'n.  anil  hath  violated  llic  Irae  meaning  and  intent  of 
the  const  It  ulion.  which  provides  for  equality  in  imimung  the 
burdens  of  tainiion  upon  the  several  Stales  and  poitian»ot  rtn 
confederacy:  And  whefca*  the  said  Congress,  eicrcdint;  its  jiol 
power  to  impote  i.-ixcs  and  collect  revenue  (or  the  purpote  «f 
effecting  nnd  .iccoinplishing  the  specific  «>bjecls  and  purposes 
which  the  coiiiiiintion  of  the  United  Slates  aiiihoriies  it  to  cllecl 
and  accuinplixh,  hath  raised  and  collected  unncccssaiy  revcniK 
(or  objects  unaulhoii/ed  by  Ihe  conslilulion. 

We,  therefore,  the  people  of  the  Stale  of  South  Carolina,  jn  C0» 
vention  assenihle<l.  do  declare  .ind  ordain  and  It  is  herehv  decUiH 
and  oid.iiiied.  thai  (he  s<-t'crid  acis  and  pairs  of  acts  id  the  Cos- 
gicss  of  Ihe  Uoiicl  St;iir5,  pwrponmg  lo  lie  laws  fur  the  iinpmli^ 
of  duties  and  im|>nsts  on  ihc  im|H)n.-it>4in  of  foreign  eotnmodltws. 
aMi  now  having  actual  operalinn  and  eSecl  within  the  Urtilrfl  Siutrv 
and,  ni'iire  es|>eci.dl>'.  an  acl  enlillei)  "  An  act  in  alleralion  of  tbe 
several  acts  iiiiposing  duliea  un  iinpoits."  approved  un  the  nine- 
(eenlh  day  of  ,May.  one  thousand  eighl  hundred  and  Iweniy-eiglic 
an<l  also  an  acl  enlilled  "  An  acl  li>  alter  and  amend  Ihe  several 
acl«  imposing  duties  on  im|>nrt4,"  approved  on  Ihe  fourteenth  day 
ol  July,  unr  thousand  eighi  hundrnl  aitd  thirty>lwo.  arr  uiuulhar> 
iied  by  the  constitution  of  Ihe  United  Stales,  and  vioiale  ilie  (nir 
meaning  and  intent  ihereof  and  are  mill.  void,  and  nn  law,  tiw 
binding  upon  lliis  Slate,  its  officers  or  citiiens ;  and  all  prODIiMlt 
conttncis,  :inil  oblig.itioits.  made  or  entered  into,  or  to  be  in«ilt  iW 
eniered  into,  with  purpose  In  secure  the  duties  imposed  hysMJ 
acts,  and  all  judicial  proceedings  which  sliall  he  hrreallet  had  IP 
al¥inn-ince  thereof,  are  and  shall  he  held  utterly  null  ny^i  >"  '' 

And  tl  is  fuilher  ordained,  iN.-il  il  sliall  not  be  lawlu  "I 

the  coBslituied  auihorities.  whether  of  ihi*  Siaie  or  11  ..  rd 

Slates,  to  enforce  ihe  paynteni  0I  ilutie*  imposed  by  the  «MI  acts 


IMS] 


S.  C.  NULLIFICATION   ORDINANCE. 


691 


within  ihe  limlu  o(  ihis  Slate :  bat  it  shall  be  llie  dutjr  o(  liw  leg- 
lilature  to  adopt  such  nicnsutrs  snd  pass  such  Acts  as  may  be  n«T- 
etsary  to  give  full  effect  to  this  oKtinnnce,  anil  to  pTrrenl  the 
enforcement  aiwl  arrest  ihc  oncraiinn  of  ihc  taitl  acts  and  pans  o( 
acts  o(  the  Congiru  of  ihe  United  Stales  wrilhin  the  limits  of  this 
Stale,  from  anil  afier  ihe  tir»i  il;iy  of  Frbriiarj-  next,  and  thediitie* 
o(  all  orhei  conMiluted  author iiies.  and  of  all  pci-icn*  reiiflitig  or 
beiDg  within  the  timils  of  thii  Stale,  and  they  aie  hereby  lequireij 
and  enjoined  10  i>be%'  jnd  give  cHect  10  this  ordiTiance.  ^ni)  such 
sets  and  rneastircs  o/ihe  legislature  as  may  Ik  passed  01  adopted 
in  obedience  thereto. 

And  it  is  further  ordained,  that  in  nocASc  of  law  or  e<)tnly,  de- 
cided in  the  count  of  ihift  Suite,  wherein  shall  be  dr^iwn  in  ques> 
lion  the  authority  of  this  onlinancc,  or  the  validity  of  such  act  ot 
acts  of  the  teljisLiIure  as  may  be  pai-ied  (or  Ihc  purpoK  of  Ktvin|[ 
effect  tiKielu.  ot  the  validity  of  the  aforesaid  ads  of  Congress, 
Imposing  duties,  shall  nny  appeal  be  taken  or  allowed  to  ih« 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  Slates,  nor  shall  any  copy  of  the 
record  l>e  |>crniiticd  or  allowed  for  that  purpose:  and  if  any  such 
apjieal  nh-iil  lie  allFmplcd  to  he  taken,  the  cnutls  of  this  Stale 
shall  piiK'ecd  to  execute  and  enforce  their  judj^ments  accunting  lo 
the  laws  and  usages  of  the  Slate,  wiihout  tcftrcncc  to  such  at- 
tempted appeal,  and  the  penon  or  petsoiis  aitcmiitiiig  ID  take  sucb 
appeal  may  be  dealt  with  as  for  a  oonlemjit  of  the  court. 

And  it  IS  furibcT  ordained,  that  all  persons  now  holding  any 
office  of  honor,  profit,  or  trust,  civil  or  miliiarv',  under  this  State 
(members  o(  the  legislamre  excepted),  shall,  wiihin  such  time,  and 
in  such  manner  a*  the  legislature  shall  prescribe,  takeanoaih  well 
and  truly  to  obey,  execute,  and  cnforer  this  ordinance,  and  such  act 
or  acis  of  Ihe  legislature  ,is  may  t>e  passed  in  pursuance  thereof, 
aecording  lo  the  true  intent  and  meaning  o(  the  same ;  and  on  the 
Deflect  or  oniisnion  of  any  such  person  or  persons  so  to  do.  his  or 
their  office  or  offices  shall  be  foitliwilh  vacated,  and  shall  be  filled 
up  At  if  Kueh  pr-rson  or  persons  Mere  dead  or  had  reiiigned ;  and 
no  person  brrrafirr  elected  to  any  oflirc  of  honor.  pmHt,  ot  inivt, 
civil  i>r  military  (members  of  ihc  le);i«lattire  nccpied),  shall,  until 
the  legislature  shall  olberwbc  |>rovi<lc  and  direct,  enter  on  the  exe- 
cution of  his  oflicc,  or  be  in  any  respect  coni|)elent  to  dist-harj-e 
■he  duties  Ibcreol  until  he  sh^Il.  in  like  manner,  have  taken  a  sim- 
ilar oath;  and  no  juror  shall  be  impaneled  in  iiny  of  the  courts 
of  Ibis  State,  in  any  cause  in  which  shall  be  in  (tiiestion  this  ordi- 
nance, or  anv  act  of  the  legislature  paMcd  in  pursuance  thereof,  un- 
less he  shnU  fir^i,  in  addition  lo  ihr  usual  oath,  have  taken  an  oatb 
that  he  vtill  well  and  truly  oliey,  execute,  and  enforce  this  ordi- 
(uncc.and  such  act  or  acts  o(  the  legislature  as  may  be  |>3ssed  lo 
carry  the  same  into  operation  and  effeci,  accoiding  to  tlic  true  iif 
lent  and  meaning  thereof. 

And  we.  the  people  of  .South  Carolina,  to  the  end  that  !t  may  be 
(uily  unilcrilood  by  tlie  government  of  the  United  Sl.ites.  and  the 
people  »{  the  co-Slalcs,  that  we  arc  determined  lu  maintain  ihis 
OUT  ordinance  and  tieclaralion.  ol  every  hazard,  do  further  declare 


6^7 


S.  C.  NULLlFICATiOlf  ORDINAffCE, 


that  we  will  not  submit  to  the  a|>p4icalion  <*\  torcc  an  the  part  d 
tfie(e<lcral  g^v«nm«nt,  to  reduce  iliisSuic  tool>c<!icncc;  tnilttiM 
we  will  coniider  (he  patMgr,  by  Congrrss,  at  any  net  nulhui ' 
the  eniploymcnl  of  a  niilit.-iry  or  naval  force  against  ibe  Si 
Souili  Carulinu.  her  conKliiaiional  authorities  or  citizciu;  or^ 
act  abolishing  or  closiitff  the  pot1»  ol  this  Slnle,  or  any  of  ihi 
otherwUe  olisiruciins  the  (ree  in|{re«i  anil  cgics)  ol  vessels  io  and 
from  the  said  ports,  or  any  other  act  on  the  |iait  o(  the  fcitcfal  £■*- 
ernmrnl.iocoetce  the  Stale,  shut  up  her  |>otls.  destroy  or  haratha 
commerce  or  Io  enlnrcc  the  acts  hcrelty  declared  to  be  null  aoJ 
Toid.  otherwise  than  ihroiij;h  the  civil  iriliunaU  of  the  counliy.  at 
tnconitttenl  with  the  longer  continuance  of  South  Carolina  in  the 
Union;  anil  that  the  people  of  Ihii  Stale  will  henceforth  )mU 
themselves  absolved  ironi  all  further  obligation  to  rtiainiatn  v 
prcsfrre  their  polrlical  connection  wilh  the  peflplf  ol  the  ocbrf 
Stale*;  and  will  forthwith  piocifd  to  ofKaniie  a  separate  govef>- 
n)ent.  and  do  all  ntlier  acts  and  things  which  sot-ereign  juul  mtt- 
pendent  Slates  may  of  richi  tlo. 

Done  in  convention  at  Columbia,  the  twCTty-founh  day  ol 
v«inhei.  in  t)ic  year  ol  our  Voti  one  tliousaiid  eiKhi   hundred  . 
thirty-two,  awl  in  (he  fifty-so'ciith  year  of  the  Dcclaratton  of 
Independence  of  the  United  Slates  of  Amertca. 

rRKSlDEKT  JACKSON'S  PltOCLAMATtOH.   183a:.* 

Whereas  a  eonivntion.  asseinbled  in  th«  State  of  Souib  Cv» 
hna.  haiv  passed  an  ordinance,  by  which  they  declarr  "  ihai  tlir 
sevcTsI  actf  .ind  fUTtt  of  acts  of  the  Concrm  of  the  United  Slaick 
purportinj;  to  be  laws  for  the  impoun^  irf  dotifs  and  imposta  Pi> 
the  im|>»tlalian  of  foreitn>  ConuBoditicv  aiul  ixrw  having  acmal 
operation  and  effect  within  the  United  States,  and  OMn  ene- 
cially  *  two  acts  for  the  same  purposes,  passed  on  lh«  >9d)  ■!  mtf. 
1838.  and  on  the  tjih  of  July,  1831,'  are  ima&thoriicd  by  tto 
Constitution  of  the  I'niicd  States,  and  violate  ifae  inie  mamim 
and  inient  thereof,  acd  are  nult  and  viml.  aiwl  so  law,"  nor  biBB- 
mjF  on  the  cilirrni  of  ihal  Slate  or  its  of&cers :  amibf  ite««d 
ordinance  it  >S  further  declared  to  be  anUwful  fco-aBy  <■  tlw  ol^ 
siiiiitc<l  authorities  of  the  Stale,  oral  the  Uniied  Stuea,  to  eribm 
the  payment  of  tlie  duties  imposerl  by  (he  sml  acts  wilfciii  (he 
uine  Slate,  ami  that  it  is  the  iluty  of  llie  lecisUUK  la  pns  Mck 
Lam  .-u  ntay  be  necessary  10  give  foil  effect  IS  ibr  nU  WiJImjtmi- 

And  wttcie.^s.  by  the  said  ofiliBance  it  is  fnnbrt  mi  itiiiii  il  ihM. 
in  no  btv  >^f  l.tw  or  ti^aby,  decided  id  the  courts  of  ^d  Stale. 
wherein  shall  be  ibaw«  in  qaestian  the  vsb&CT  «f  tbc  «ad  ai^ 
nance,  or  of  the  acts  ol  the  lepslalu/e  ihal  b^  bK  paamtrt  1b  gat  € 
■Sect,  or  oflhe  aaiil  laws  ol  the  United  &Mea.  oo  ap^ml  Aafl  fee 
■fcmntl  to  the  Sapnnc  Coon  at  the  Daftnl  Statok.  m 


lull 


JACKSON'S  PROCLAMATION. 


tiSj 


rnpy  of  tlie  recoil!  Ixr  pcrmiited  or  allowed  for  that  porpoKc;  and 
lh»1  any  penun  utlempling  lo  lake  tuch  nppeal,  shall  be  punjahed 
Hs  fot;a  contempt  of  cuun : 

I  Ana.  fitiJillv.  the  said  oulinance  declurw  tliat  the  people  of  Souili 
|Car9lina  will  rn^inuin  ilic  sjiid  ordinance  at  eicrv  hnzatd;  and 
thai  they  will  ron^iilcr  the  pAs^a^c  ol  any  act  l>y  Congress  abol- 
lihiiig  or  closing  ihc  pnru  of  llie  said  SUile.  or  oilicrwiscohsltuci- 
injf  the  free  ingm.i  or  cgrrss  of  ve^srls  to  and  (roni  the  said  pons, 
or  anf  oilier  act  of  the  FrdetaJ  Oovcmment  to  coerce  the  Stale, 
shut  up  hiT  iwrij,  (leMroy  or  hamu  brr  commerce,  ot  to  cnfoice 
ih?  said  acts  olherwise  than  tiiruux'i  >lie  civil  tiil)unul!i  of  the 
country,  as  incniisi^lcnt  witli  the  lun^jcr  cojilinuance  of  iiuulh  Car- 
oliiM  in  ihc  Union;  and  thai  the  iiroplc  of  tlie  sni(l  Stale  wilt 
thenceforth  hold  ihcinielves  ahvolvcd  from  all  fuithcr  ohliealion  lo 
nuiinuin  or  [Kesen-c  (heir  poiilical  connrnlion  with  the  people  of 
the  uihec  Stales,  iitid  will  turihwith  proceed  to  orgnnire  a  leparale 

f;ovcinincnt.  and  do  all  other  acts  and  lliinf^  which  sovereign  and 
ndtpendcnt  States  may  of  li^lit  do : 

And  whereas  the  said  ordinance  prescribes  In  the  people  of 
Smith  Cirolina  acaui~se  <>(  conduct  in  direct  violal ion  of  their  duly 
at  ciliuDs  of  ihc  United  Stales,  contrary  in  ihe  Uws  of  theirmnn- 
Iry,  Mibvenivc  of  ill  Coiistittiiion.  and  having  for  Its  object  Ihe 
iJeJilriictionof  the  Union— that  Union,  which,  coeval  with  oiirpulill- 
cal  exigence,  led  our  father*,  without  any  other  lies  tu  unite 
then)  tlian  those  of  jiuliiocism  and  common  cause,  through  the 
Mni<uiiiary  stiugglc  to  a  glorioun  independence— that  sacred 
Union,  hitlieno  iiiviolAte.  which,  peifected  ^y  our  happy  Constiiu- 
tlon,  has  brought  us,  by  the  fatur  of  Heaven,  to  a  stale  of  ptos- 
pci'ily  at  home,  and  high  consideration  abroad,  rarely,  if  rver, 
equaled  in  the  history  of  nations:  lo  preserve  this  bond  of  our 
political  eiiMeiifc  from  deiiliuction,  to  maintain  Inviolate  thiistale 
of  naiiiMial  honor  and  proipcriiy,  and  to  justify  the  confidence  my 
(ellow>citixi-n!i  have  reported  In  me,  I.  Aniitcw  J.ickiou,  l*iesideht 
of  the  United  States,  have  thought  proper  to  issue  this  my  Pitoc- 
LAUATION,  slating  my  views  of  ihe  (.onstiiution  and  laws  appli- 
cable to  Ihc  measures  adopted  by  the  Convention  of  South 
Cnroiina,  and  to  the  r<-2si>iis  they  have  put  forth  to  sustain  them, 
iI«clarinK  Ihe  coupic  which  duly  will  rcijuircmeloputiue.and,  ap- 
ptraling  lo  the  underitandine  .ind  palriuiisin  of  tlie  people,  warn 
tlicm  of  the  consn|ittrnces  iImI  miiit  invvilahly  lesult  from  an  ob- 
senancf  of  the  dictates  of  the  Contention. 

Sliict  duly  would  rrquirc  of  me  nothmg  more  than  the  cicrcise 
of  ihnoc  powers  with  winch  I  am  now.  or  may  hereafter  be.  in- 
vested, forpreiervinK  the  Union,  and  for  the  execution  o(  the  lawv 
But  the  iinpoiing  nipect  which  opposition  ha.i  assumed  in  this 
ca&e.  byclulhinc  itself  with  Stale  authuiily.  and  ihe  de«p  interest 
which  the  people  of  the  United  Slates  niusl  »il  feci  in  preventing  a 
icsori  lo  stronger  measuies,  while  there  is  a  ho|)c  that  anything 
will  fie  yiehW  to  reasoning  and  remonstrances,  perhaps  demand, 
and  will  certainly  justify,  a  full  rxpnsitvon  lo  Souih  Cirolina  and 
the  nation  of  the  views  I  entertain  of  this  important  question,  ai 


«94 


jACKSOJf-S  PKOCLAMATIOft, 


ivFtl  31  adrtlinct  enunciaiioii  of  ihc coane  wdkh  mrantsrof  dMj 
will  in|tiirc  me  lo  putsuc. 

The  ordiiLaiKe  i*  loandcd,  IWI  on  the  indefeaiililr  tight  a( 
ing  acts  which  are  pbtnly  anconstituiioiuJ,  and  loo  oppteM 
he  endured,  bm  on  il>e  strange  posilian  that  anjrunc  Siaie  my 
only  declare  la  act  of  COnsreM  void,  but  prahibii  U»  esiccati^t— 
(fui  thejr  nur  do  Ihi^  consistently  with  (he  Coastttmlaa — IkM  iIk 
■rue  cofuiructkKi  of  ihjii  mttnimeni  pcrraits  •  Sale  le  tnain  lli 
pUce  in  the  Union,  And  yet  be  bound  bjr  no  oilier  of  its  law* 
thow  It  nuy  choose  lo  connder  as  conttitaiioiiaL  It  rt  ffve 
add.  thai  to  justify  this  abroipitkn  <A  a  taw.  it  must  be 
contniv  to  the  Constittitiun ;  but  ii  is  endcnt,  liui  to  p*e 
fight  of  resisting  laws  of  that  d«K:n|>lii>a.  coupleil  with  iheoii 
tiollRl  right  to  decide  wliat  laws  dr:>cTVc  llial  character,  is  to  _ 
Ihc  pawn  of  rcsiiting  all  laws.  For.  as  by  the  Ihcorr.  ihcn:  n  tm 
appeal,  the  rcaaoitt  alkged  hj'  the  -State,  f;ood  or  bad.  bmim  (Mr- 
vail.  If  tt  xhould  be  saiti  that  public  opinion  is  a  suWiciem  ckrit 
against  the  abuse  of  this  power.  It  may  be  asked  why  ii  ts  nM 
deemed  a  sufficient  g^iard  against  the  passage  ol  an 
tional  act  by  Congress.  There  is.  hottevtr,  a  tesualni  ia  ikte 
case,  which  makes  Ihc  asstuncd  power  of  a  State  mora 
hie,  and  which  doTfi  not  eiisl  in  the  o(hcr.  There  arr  iwoaMnft 
from  on  unconxtitulional  act  paR«nt  by  Congress —noe  to  the  )■£• 
clary,  ihc  other  to  the  people  and  the  Stairs.  Thrrr  is  no  appeal 
from  the  State  deciston  in  theory :  and  the  practicat  illntaratM 
shows  that  the  courts  are  closed  again-U  an  apphcatkin  lo  renew 
■I.  both  twigcs  and  jurors  being  sworn  todecKJe  in  its  favoc.  Btf 
reaMning  on  this  subjrci  is  superfluous,  whm  out  social  cowpaO 
in  cipre^s  trmn  decUrcs,  that  the  bw^of  the  United  Station 
Constitution .  and  trtaiict  made  under  it,  are  the  xuprcirw  law  «( 
the  land  :  .ind  for  j^aier  caution  adds.  "  (hat  the  judges  in  envy 
Stalin  ihnll  l>e  bound  iliereh)'.  anything  in  Ihc  ConstiluiMn  or  Ina 
of  any  Slate  to  the  conlmry  nolwhIttUftding."  And  W  BHtybeM- 
sened.  without  fr^r  of  rcfiilaiion.  thai  no  feder«ti*r  ^■»»auwtrt 
coutd  exist  wllhoul  a  limiiar  provisiao.  Look,  fnc  a  wwnnw.  Bi 
the  conwquence.  If  .South  Carolina  coitsirfef^  the  mmoe  laws 
■RConu it u tional.  awl  has  a  right  10  preveni  i  '\i 

poet  of  ChadcMon.  tliere  would  be  a  clear  cr  « 

io  (heir  colleciion  m  every  other  port,  and  no  ifivduccmiU  W^- 
lecied  any vrbere :  for  all  •mpost&  mitd  be  eqnaL  It  is  no  an— «r 
to  rcMai  thai  an  unconslitutjonal  law  is  no  law,  so  hMg  aa  tlv 
tfUcMMMi  of  its  tegatilv  b  to  be  decided  by  the  Suie  teeU;  tm 
evety  taw  operaliog  hi  juriously  upon  any  lool  inteteat  wfB  be  per- 
haps (bought,  and  ceruMy  reprnnUed.  as  nnconiliRnfanaL  aad. 
as  has  been  shown,  there  is  no  appeaL 

If  ihi*  doctrine  had  been  cst-tblotied  al  an  earlirr  day,  the  Ui 
would  hare  hern  diucrfved  m  its  Infancy.  The  racise  law  in 
syleania.  the  Fnibar^i>  and  noa-inioca«ne  taw  in  the 
Slates,  the  carriage  \ajl  In  Vlrvmia.  weie  all  tkemed  vmamPtOH^ 
lional.  and  were  more  unrtpial  in  their  operation  than  any  of  the 
I  kw*  Duw  compUiaed  of.-  but,  loitunately,  none  of  thone  StaMa 


1S33I 


JACKSOKIS  FROCLAUATIOtr. 


«95 


discovered  that  ihcy  hai!  Ihe  risht  now  claimed  by  South  Carolina, 
The  wjr  into  which  we  were  locccd,  lo  sujijioit  the  ilicnilj'  of  the 
nation  aiKl  the  rights  o(  our  citizms,  intghi  hacc  ciKicd  in  defeat 
and  disgrace,  instcid  of  victory  und  hori'jr.  if  the  Suti'S.  who  in\>- 
poud  ll  A  ruinous  jind  uriLOnsiilulional  mcasutc.  hnd  Ihouehl  llicv 
poMrsK^  the  right  of  nullifying  the  act  by  which  it  wa(  tlrcUretl. 
and  denying  supplies  for  its  proscrulion.  lUrdlyand  uiirqiuliy 
AS  those  measures  bare  utioh  several  ractubeck  of  the  Union,  lo 
llic  Icgulaluies  of  nunc  did  this  cfhcicnl  and  pcacuabk  reiricdy,  at 
it  is  called,  suggest  itself.  The  discoveiy  of  this  iiiiporljol  feature 
in  out  Constitution  was  reserveil  to  the  present  ddiy.  To  the  states- 
men of  South  Carolina  belongs  the  invention,  and  upon  the  citi- 
icns  of  that  Slate  will,  unfoiiun^tcly,  tail  ihc  evils  of  reducing  it  to 
practice. 

If  the  doctrine  of  a  State  veto  upon  the  taws  of  the  Union  car- 
ries with  it  internal  evidence  ul  it%  inipraciicable  .nlMurility.  our 
constitutional  hi^loiy  will  ^ilio  ullutd  abundant  pioot  lliit  it  would 
have  been  lepudialed  with  imlignaiioii  had  it  been  propostd  to 
form  a  feature  in  our  Goveinnient, 

In  our  colonial  state,  although  dependent  on  another  power,  we 
very  caily  ronvdeird  oiiisrivcs  as  coniiMicil  by  common  interest 
witli  each  niher.  Leagues  were  formed  for  coinniun  defense,  and 
before  the  Declaration  of  Indcprndence.  we  wrrr-  known  in  our 
a);err^atc  rharacirr  as  xYic  Unhrd  Colonies  of  Arnerica.  That  de- 
cisive and  important  step  was  taken  jointly.  \Vc  declared  our- 
selves a  nation  by  a  joint,  not  liy  several  acts ;  and  when  tlic  icmis 
of  our  confedeiation  were  reduced  to  form,  it  was  in  thai  of  a 
solmnti  league  of  scvcfal  Slates,  by  whicti  they  agreed  that  they 
would,  cottcctirely.  fomi  one  nation,  for  the  puiposieof  conducting 
some  certain  domestic  concerns,  and  nil  foreign  irlaiions.  In  tlie 
instrument  forming  that  Union,  is  found  an  article  whirh  declares 
that  "  every  Slate  shall  abide  by  ihc  dctcrininationsof  CongrcM  art 
.-ill  questions  which  by  that  Confederation  should  be  submitted  to 
them." 

Under  the  Confederation,  then,  no  Slate  could  legally  annul  a 
decision  of  the  Congress,  or  rcfuw  to  submit  to  its  execution  ;  but 
no  provitiofl  was  made  lo  enforce  these  decisions.  Congiess  niadc 
Tcqiiisiiions.  but  they  were  i>ot  complied  with.  The  Government 
could  not  ojierale  mi  iiKliriduals.  Ttiey  hail  iiojudiciaty,  no  meaitt 
of  collecting  rei'enue. 

But  I  he  defects  of  ihcConfedcraiion  need  nol  be  detailed.  Uik 
der  its  operation  wc  could  scarcely  be  called  a  nation.  We  had 
neither  piospenty  at  home  nor  consideration  ahroad.  This  state 
0^  things  could  not  l>e  endured,  and  our  prrscm  happy  Constitu- 
tion was  formed,  but  formed  in  vain,  if  liiis  fatal  doctrine  prevails. 
It  was  formed  for  imjiorianl  objects  thai  are  annoimcnl  in  the  pie- 
amble  made  in  the  name  and  by  the  auihurily  of  the  people  of  tli« 
Unite*!  States,  whose  delegates  framed,  and  whose  conTentions 
approve  I  ll. 

The  cno«i  important  among  ihcse  objects,  that  which  is  placed 
first  in  tank,  on  whkh  all  the  others  rest,  ts  "t«/«rmtt  mtrt 


696 


JACKSOyS  PKOCLAMATtOff. 


[im 


per/ttt  l/nio»."  Now,  Is  j(  possibk  thai,  rr«n  if  there  wen  h 
txprMS  provision  giving  Mipidnncv  to  the  CotislJimion  and  b«« 
of  thr  Unilnl  Stnlcs  nver  tlionc  of  inc  Sintcs.  it  cni)  b«  conni>vd 
ihnt  >n  intlniment  mailc  for  the  putpo>«  of  "/firming  «  anwr 
ftrrfe€t  Union"  iliati  thiil  of  llie  coofudcratiun,  tould  l>c  so  co»- 
(Iniclnl  tijr  (lie  iivteiiiiilml  wisdom  0/  our  country  :■•■  to  suhititHlc 
for  thai  coiifetkiaiiDii  «  form  of  goi'emitwnt.  ilcpritikni  for  'at,  a- 
islenoFOM  tlic  lociil  intc-iirsl.  lite  parly  spiiit  of  »  Suir.  or  of  a  |ni> 
vailing  faction  lit  a  Stale?  Every  in.ii),  of  plain.  unsopliUituiH 
underM^ndiiig,  who  hr.ini  the  (|ue«tii>n.  uill  givr  such  an  ansoo 
ns  will  pirservc  ihc  Union.  Mclaphfucn)  subilely.  m  [lurhittt  nf 
an  impnictie.iltle  theoi)-,  could  alone  have  devised  one  iluii  is  cal- 
culated to  destroy  ii. 

I  consider,  then.  ilie  power  to  nunul  a  law  of  the  United  Staler 
assumed  by  one  Siatr,  inromfitt/ii/r  With  fkt  rxistrittt  of  ikt 
Unian,  <eHlra^i(ltti txf'tiUy  *r  Iht  lellrr  of  tkt  dymriHitMf. 
HHaulkorix/J  fy  its  tfiitil,  iitc^ttsitteil  vrilh  tvery  priKcipU  m 
tuA/fA  it  \ei»sj6uniitd,  and  Jrslrtt^livf  of  lAe  grfat  vifjtit Jtr 
which  it  'OKtt  /orimd. 

Alier  tliit  general  view  of  llic  leailing  prtnciple,  w«  mufil  rMXit- 
Inc  llie  paiiiculai:  application  of  it  whkli  is  niade  in  ihe  ordinance. 

The  |>rc-tiiit>lc  tests  lis  jusdlicatton  on  llvrse  (;iaund%  :  It  uy 
sitmes  AS  a  fjict.  that  tlie  obnoxious  Uws,  nlihougli  ihey  pitipon 
10  be  l.iws  for  r-iisiogt  lei'cnuir.  uieie  in  le.tlily  intended  (ot  the  [xo- 
tection  of  manufaciuics.  tvhicb  piiipov  it  Asscns  10  be  uncomtUB- 
lional;  ihat  ihc  oprr;iiion  of  these  U**  is  unrquiil  ;  tital  Ihr 
amount  rnitrd  by  llicm  is  %icxiei  than  i«  requirrd  by  ibe  w.-intl  uf 
ihe  Cnvetnmeni :  and,  finally,  thai  the  proceeds  arc  lo  he  itpplir^ 
in  objecti  unaulhoriieil  by  the  Conititulion. .  Tbene  are  thr  onlgr 
cautes  alleged  to  juilify  an  0|>cn  oppusilion  to  ilie  laws  of  tbt 
country,  and  a  threat  of  seceding  from  ihe  Union,  if  any  attempl 
»)iould  be  ni^iie  to  enforce  tlvem.  The  fir^l  virtually  Hcknowledgei 
iltat  the  law  in  question  wac  piasscrt  under  «  power  expressly  givm 
by  iheConstilution,  tolny  and  collect  impovts  ;  bul  its  conalllv- 
lionaliiy  is  drawn  in  question  from  the  motives  of  those  wliopManI 
il.  However  npp.ticnt  tliis  purjwse  may  be  in  the  presrni  c«r. 
nothing  can  be  more  dangrniu^  tli.in  to  admil  ihe  po«itioo  ihat  an 
unconMilulional  |Mir|>u«c.  enlcrliiined  by  (lie  mernbcrt  who  assort 
to  a  law  enjicteil  under  a  coosliluliuna)  power,  sb.ill  make  ihai  law 
void  ;  for  how  is  Ihal  purpose  to  be  a-wrrtalnc*l  ?  \Vli.>  ■•  i..  ."il(* 
the  scrniliny  ?     How  ofirn  may  biwl  purjio^M  l>c  f,il\r  .•} 

In  how  many  cams  ar«  they  coneraleil  by  f»Ne  prof-  In 

bow  many  is  no  declaration  o(  motive  m.ide  .*   Admit  \ !  nr, 

and   you   give  to  the  States  an  unconliollcd  right  t.  rid 

every  law  may  be  annulled  under  (bis  fireli'jtl.      If,  1  l>a 

•bsurd  and  dangerous  dnciNne  should  be  admitted.  jie 

mnv  annul  an  tinconMlttitional  law.  oi  OM  thai  It  decnu  lucU,  il 
will  no)  apply  to  Ihe  present  ca»e. 

The  next  objection  H,  tlini   ihc  U«s  in  qiKsilon  1  ni* 

equally.     This  objection  may  Iw  m.i>le  wilh  inilh  to  <■  it 

lias  been  or  can  be  paaaed.     The  wisdom  of  man  never  jc<  con* 


/ACk'SOJfS  PRGCLAMATIOtr. 


irivcd  a  system  of  tamiMjn  ihal  would  operate  with  perfect  cqunl- 
tty.  If  Ihe  unrqu;)!  oprmtion  of  a  \xoi  mnkc«  it  unconstituliniul, 
and  if  all  laws  oi  thai  drscriplian  may  be  abTO};-'><ed  by  any  Stale 
for  Uial  cause,  then,  indeed,  is  ihc  (edeial  Consliluliun  unworlhy 
(if  ihe  slightest  clfuri  for  it^  prncrv.^tion.  We  have  hitlierlo  relieil 
uii  It  as  l)ie  jieipctu^l  bond  of  our  l.'nion.  Wc  luive  received  it  as 
Ihe  work  of  the  asiemhW  wisdom  of  tlie nation.  Wcliatcirusied 
to  it  as  to  ihc  sheet-anchor  of  our  safety,  in  the  sioimy  times  o( 
ConHict  with  a  torciKn  or  domestic  foe.  Wc  have  looked  toil  uilh 
sacred  awe  as  ihc  paltadium  of  our  liberties.  And  Mith  all  the 
Htlemnilics  of  religion  bare  pleilf;ed  to  each  other  our  !i>T5  ;ind 
foilunes  lieie,  and  our  bopcs  of  hajijtiiiess  bcieafier.  in  its  drfense 
and  supgiott.  Wcic  we  niisiAkcn,  iny  countiynicii.  in  aiiachui^ 
this  importance  to  the  Constilution  o(  our  country  ?  Wss  our  de- 
votion paid  lo  the  WTctched,  inefficient.  rlumsyconlrivanc<-,  wUich 
thi«  new  doctrine  woirld  make  it  ?  Did  wc  pled);r  ourselves  to  the 
support  of  an  airv  nothing— a  bubble  ihai  must  tie  blown  away  by 
the  first  breath  or  disafleclion  ?  Was  thissclf-tlestroyin|[.Tisianacy 
theory  the  work  of  Ihe  profound  stalesnien,  the  exallcil  patriots, lo 
wlioni  the  task  of  const iiuiiorial  refoim  waa  intrusted  ?  Did  the 
name  of  Wftsbington  sanction,  did  the  Slates  deliberately  ratify, 
such  an  anomaly  in  the  historv  of  fundnniental  legislation?  No. 
Wc  were  not  mistaken.  The  Ictlci  of  this  great  inslrumeni  is  lie« 
(lom  lliis  r.(dicitl  (auli ;  its  l.inguBEc  directly  roKlrjiJicts  the  mipti- 
lation:  iis  spirit,  ils evident  intern,  contradicts  it.  No,  nc  did  not  eir. 
Our  CoRSlitutioD  doea  not  contain  the  ab^u^dily  of  Ki>'iiisP°^'"  '<* 
make  law»,  and  another  power  lo  resist  tliem.  l*he  sages.  wbDse 
memory  will  always  be  rtverenced,  have  Biccn  us  a  practical,  and, 
as  they  hoped,  a  pertniinent  constitutioiinl  coiiipucl.  The  father 
of  his  Country  did  oot  aflix  his  revered  name  lo  so  pNljublc  an  ab- 
flurrlily.  Nor  did  the  Slates,  when  they  severally  raiined  It,  do  so 
under  Ihf  impression  ihni  a  veto  on  the  laws  of  the  L'nilcd  Stales 
was  retervrd  to  them,  or  that  ihey  could  exercise  it  by  application. 
Search  Ihc  debates  in  all  iheir  conventions'  eiainine  the  speeches 
of  the  most  xeatous  oppoaers  of  federal  aulburiiy-look  at  the 
amendments  that  were  proposed.  They  are  all  silent— not  a  syl- 
lable uttered,  not  a  vote  given,  not  a  motion  made,  to  collect  the 
explicit  supremacy  given  to  the  laws  of  ihc  Union  over  those  ol 
the  .Sl.ites,  or  to  show  that  implication,  as  is  ivow  contended, could 
<irfeal  it.  No, we  h.ivr  not  erred!  The  Conitilulion  is  «lill  the 
object  o(  our  reverence,  the  bond  o(  our  Union,  ourdetensc in 
danger,  the  source  of  our  prosperity  in  peace.  It  iihatl  descend,  as 
we  h  JVC  received  it,  uneorrupled  by  sopliislical  conslruction.  to  our 
posterity  :  and  ihc  sacilfices  ol  local  interest,  of  State  prejudices, 
of  personal  animosities,  that  were  ni.ide  lo  bring  it  into  rxisleiico, 
will  again  be  |>airio  lie  Ally  offered  tor  its  support. 

The  two  remnlning  objectiorls  made  by  the  ordinance  to  these 
laws  are.  thai  the  sums  intended  to  be  rai.i'rd  by  them  arc  greater 
than  are  re4|uire<I.  and  thai  the  proceeds  will  be  unconstitutionally 
cmjployed.  The  Constitution  baii  ^iven  eaptessly  lo  CongieKS  the 
riifbl  of  raisiiij  lerenue,  and  of  dciciminirtg  the  sum  tbe  public  eai- 


a 


698 


J4CKS0NS  PitOaMMATlOIf. 


um 


sencies  will  require.  The  Stales  luve  no  control  over  ihe  exerdie 
cA  thit  tiKhl  other  than  thnt  which  reuilli  f  rDOi  the  power  of  cku(- 
■\n%  the  represcniaiires  who  abuKC  il.  and  lliu«  proeure  redmt. 
Connreis  rn^y  uniioulxedly  abuse  lhi»  ili»creliuii:ii7  |>owcr,  bolllic 
Uiiie  may  be  said  ol  othcn  with  it  liicb  thc>'  .iri-  vested.  Vel  llir 
d»cictioi)  muu  «x»si  somewliere.  The  Constiiuiioo  h*»  given  li  la 
ihereprcKntJiiii'csof  all  the  praplc.  cheeked  by  the  r^reseriiainci 
of  the  SulN,  iind  by  ih«  cxccutii'e  power.  The  South  Carolw 
conxtruction  Rives  it  la  the  Icgi^alurc.  or  the  convention  a(  a  •»- 
;;le  Stale.  wHctc  neither  the  people  «[  Ihe  diffetent  Stales,  n^ 
fhe  Slates  in  Iheir  scpurale  capacity,  nor  the  cliicf  mas>3^^^| 
elected  by  the  people,  tijve  any  representation .  Which  is  thcO^^H 
discreet  ditposiilon  of  the  powci  ?  I  do  not  ask  you,  fellow-citl- 
xfn%.  which  \s  the  con  si  it  u<  tonal  disposiiioa— iKat  insiruirwM 
xpealcs  a  Ungu.!^  not  to  he  misunderslood.  But  if  you  were  s*- 
xcmblei)  in  general  convention,  which  would  you  think  Ihe  saicM 
depository  of  this  discretionary  power  in  the  last  leautt  ?  Would 
you  add  a  clause  giving  it  to  each  o(  the  Slatei.  or  would  you  aanc- 
iion  the  wim  provisions  already  ntftde  by  youi  ConMituliun  ?  It 
this  should  be  the  result  o(  your  dcliberaiiotis  wlicn  prnvidinc  for 
the  future,  arc  yoii— can  you— be  ready  la  riik  all  thai  »c  hold 
ilear,  to  ettablisli.  for  a  temporary  and  a  local  purpose,  thai  whicb 
you  rnu^t  acknowlcdKC  to  i>c  destriKtire.  anil  even  absurd,  as  a 
general  provision?  Carry  out  the  coniequencea  of  this  ni^i 
vested  in  the  different  State*,  and  you  must  perceive  thai  Ihecrati 
TOur  coiiitucl  presents  at  this  dav  would  recur  whenever  any  U* 
of  the  United  States  drs|>lease<i  any  of  Ihe  Stales,  and  thai  we 
should  soon  cease  to  be  a  lution. 

The  ordinance,  with  the  same  kiMxwleclEc  of  the  fuinn  thai 
characlcriics  a  former  objection,  tells  you  tlmt  ll>e  pmcectts  nf  the 
tax  will  be  unconitiluiionally  applied.    If  ihi»  coulil  be  ascertained 
with  certainly,  the  objection  would,  wiili  mote  proprtciy,  be  re 
for  ttie  law  so  apulyiti);  the  proceeds,  but  surely  caiinoi  be 
againM  ilic  laws  lev^'in^  the  duly. 

These  are  the  allegahnn*  coniaincd  in  the  ordinance.     ExamtM 
them  (eiiously.  my  frlloW'Citixens — jiidRe  (or  yourselves.    I  a| 
to  you  lo  delrtininc  whether  they  are  so  clear,  so  convincms. 
leave  no  doubt  uf  tfieir  cortcclneM :  and  rvm  if  )t>u  •.)<', n', 1  , 
to  this  conclusion,   how  far   ibcy  justify  the  rccklc*-  le 

coune  which  you  arcdiieclrd  topursue.    Review  ihcM  11*. 

and  the  coocluaonx  drawn  from  then)  once  more.  Whni  arr  ibey? 
Every  law,  then,  for  raisiiig  revenue,  according  to  the  South  Coio- 
lina  ordinimce.  niay  be  rightfully  annulled,  unless  il  be  so  franwl 
as  no  law  ever  will  or  can  be  framed.  CtMiKreu  have  a  riglK  U 
pass  taws  fur  raismg  revenue,  and  each  State  has  a  rinht  to  pppiiK 
their  execution— two  rtghtt  directly  opposed  to  each  other;  and 
yet  Is  this  atnunlity  supposed  to  be  contaiived  in  an  inatrumenl 
drawn  for  the  express  pur|>i>se  of  avoiding  collisions  beiweea  the 
Slates  and  the  general  government,  by  an  assembly  of  Ibc  moB 
cnliiihtened  slaiesincn  and  purest  palliuts  erer  emboifitd  lor  a 
similar  purpose. 


USf) 


JACKSOlfS  PROCLAMATION. 


«99 


In  vain  have  these  sages  dcclaied  (hat  Coiietcm  shall  have  power 
to  Uy  and  collect  taxes,  dulirs.  imposts,  and  -xciscs— in  vain  have 
they  provided  thai  ihey  shall  have  power  (o  pass  law«  which  sliall 
be  neccsur]'  tod  proper  to  carry  those  powers  inta  execution,  that 
those  laws  »nd  thai  Conxiiiulion  »liall  he  ihc  "  supreme  law  of  the 
land ;  aod  thai  ihe  jiKlRes  in  every  Slate  ^all  he  bountt  thereby. 
anylhinR  in  Ihc  contiituiioii  or  law-s  of  any  Siaic  to  the  contrary 
noiwiihsiancliti};."  In  viiin  have  ilie  people  uf  Ihe  several  Stales 
>u<eninly  ^anciiuned  these  iiruvisjoott,  nude  tlieio  their  paramount 
law,  and  imliviilually  swum  to  suppoti  theni  whenever  they  were 
called  un  to  execute  any  olTice. 

Vain  provisions  !  Incifcctu^l  [cstnciiont!  Vile  profanation  of 
oaths!  Miserable  mockeiy  of  IrgisUiion  !  If  a  bare  majority  of 
the  voters  iit  any  one  Stale  mav.  on  a  real  or  Mip{>o«ed  knonlnlj^e 
of  ihc  intent  with  which  a  kin-  hax  licen  paueil.  declare  ihemsetves 
free  from  il.i  opciniion  — say  here  it  gives  too  little.  Iheie  loo  much, 
awl  operate*  unequally— here  il  iuifcTB  article*  lo  be  free  that 
ought  10  be  taaeil.  there  it  laaes  thot«  th^t  ou|{ht  lo  be  dee — m 
this  case  Ihc  proceeds  arc  inieiided  lo  be  applied  to  puiposcs  which 
we  ilo  not  approve,  in  iliai  iheamount  raife<l  is  more  than  is  wanted. 
Congress,  il  \%  true,  are  inv<-*le<]  by  the  Consliiulion  with  the  right 
of  decidinji  ihene  (juestions  according  to  their  souiul  di«crelion. 
ConercM  in  composed  of  the  Trpre^mlaiives  of  all  ihc  Stales,  and 
of  aVl  'Im!  people  nf  all  ihe  slatci;  but  WK.  part  of  the  people  of 
one  Stale,  to  whom  ihe  Coiuiitutiun  ha.i  given  no  power  on  the 
subject,  from  whoniil  basexpreMly  taken  11  away— ttv,  who  have 
solenioly  agreed  thai  ibis  Coi»li<utioii  shall  be  our  law— trv,  inoM 
of  wliom  have  sworn  lo  support  it—nv  now  abrogate  this  law.  and 
swear,  and  force  others  lo  swear,  ihal  ii  shall  not  be  obeyed— and 
we  do  this,  no<  liccause  Confirm  have  no  right  lo  pi.iss  such  laws  : 
ihiK  we  do  not  allege :  hut  became  they  have  paiwd  ihcm  with 
improjrer  view*.  They  are  uncoiuiituiional  (mm  the  moiires  of 
lho>e  who  paued  Ihein.  which  we  can  nevei  with  certainly  hnow, 
from  their  une((ual  upetalion;  although  it  is  impossible  from  tlie 
lUilure  of  things  thai  ihey  should  be  equal — and  (lom  the  dis|>osi- 
lion  which  we  prestinie  may  he  made  of  their  proceeds,  aliliouf-h 
thai  dispowiion  has  not  l>rrn  declared.  This  is  the  plain  meaning  of 
ihe  ordinance  in  rclalion  lo  taus  which  il  abrogales  forallcgcd  un- 
constilutionaiiiy.  Out  it  doe;>  not  Mop  here.  It  repcalii.  in  cxprexs 
terms,  an  iniporlani  part  o(  the  Coiulitulion  ilKell.  and  of  laws 
passed  to  give  it  effect,  which  ha»-e  never  been  alleged  lo  be  uncon- 
stituiional.  The  Consiltuiioii  deciarn  that  the  judicial  powers  o( 
lite  United  Stairs  extend  lo  cases  arising  under  ihe  laws  of  the 
United  States,  and  that  such  laws,  the  Coasiiiuiion  and  ire«tks, 
shall  be  piarainoani  to  the  Si.itc  constitutions  and  bws.  The  judi- 
ciary act  prescribes  the  mode  by  which  the  case  may  Ik  brought 
before  a  court  ol  the  United  Stales,  by  appeal,  when  a  Stale  iri- 
bunal  shall  d«ide  aK"'"^  'his  provision  of  tlie  Consiiiution.  The 
ordinance  declares  there  slwill  be  no  appeal ;  makes  the  State  law 
mramouni  to  the  Consiiiution  and  mws  of  the  United  Stales ; 
forces  judges  and  juiors  to  sw«ar  that  they  will  disregard  their 


70© 


JACKSON'S  PROCIAMATIOKI. 


01 


provtstons :  and  t^vn  maVc4  il  p«nal  ia  a  auiimr  to  altemM  nikl 
hjr  appeal,  li  funlirr  dcL-t^rcft  thai  it  sitall  not  be  lAwtuf  lur  tlic 
authorilicB  o(  the  UiiKcd  Sutrs.  or  of  ihal  Sijiir.  to  e»rnrce  tht 
payment  of  dulirs  ininnsnl  hy  ihc  revenue  Uwi  within  it*  limits. 

llrie  is  .1  l.ivr  (if  Ihc  United  S(<itrs,  nnl  even  pirlrnileit  to  lie 
uncoiittllulionil.  tcpc^kil  by  tlie  auibiKiiy  of  a  snialt  xrx»yvn\-j  oi 
(he  vmeisnf  a  Mn){l«Hljte.  {^iCTcbaprurliiionof  th«  Conslitulita 
wbich  is  sulemiily  abro};nt«d  by  the  same  uutliurity. 

On  ^ucli  <.'X])i)Mii<)iis  ;kiiil  leaNOnings.  (he  ordin.iitcc  crounH*  MM 
oi>l^-  an  as&eiiioi)  of  the  light  in  annul  the  laun  o(  wnicti  it  com* 
pUins,  but  to  rnforec  i(  by  a  ihivat  of  seceding  from  the  Union  i( 
any  atlempt  is  mailr  to  cKcctKc  lliem. 

This  ri^ht  (o  !iec«ile  is  (Urduced  from  live  nature  of  thr  Cos- 
xtitulioii,  which  ihey  say  is  a  coin[iac(  l>e(ween  stu-cfcipi  Staio, 
who  \\ji\K  preMtvnl  ibeir  whole  sovereignly,  and  Iherelore  ate  sub- 
ject lo  no  superior ;  (hat  because  tliey  Mi;ule  llie  eunipact.  (hey  ca* 
break  it  whrn  in  ihciropiiiioiiit  hat  been  depailed  liuoi  by  ibe  titbet 
Slates.     TalLiciouK  ;is  this  course  of  reaM>nii>g  !«,  it  enlists  SUtc 

Elide,  aitd  fin<U  advocAtcK  in  the  honest  pirjudici'S  o(  Ihusr  wha 
Ave  not  studied  ibe  n.itiirc  of  our  government  sufbrirnlly  lo  mc 
the  radical  etror  on  which  il  rests. 

The  |>e>oi)le  of  the  Uniteil  Stales  formed  the  Constitution.  aetiM 
thiough  ibclSlate  legist.ttures,  in  making  tli«  compncl.  lo  mrrl  aM 
■liscuss  its  provisions,  and  acting  in  separ^ite  citnveniions  when 
ilicy  laiiiied  those  provisinns;  but  the  terms  used  m  lis  cotistnx' 
lioi>  show  it  to  be  n  govrinntcot  in  which  tli<  people  ol  all  the 
States  collectively  ate  rcpii«ented.  We  arc  Onk  riXJPLK  tii  tiM 
cboice  of  (he  l*(esident  and  Vice  President.  Here  tlie  Slates  h4i» 
no  (liber  agency  (h.in  to  direct  the  mode  in  whkh  the  vote  shall  be 
girei).  The  candidates  lianiiK  Ihe  mafirtity  ol  all  the  votes  arc 
chosen.  The  electors  of  a  majority  of  States  may  have  giren  tfactt 
voles  for  one  candidaie.  and  yei  another  may  he  chosen.  Tht 
people,  then,  and  not  the  St.itcs,  are  represented  in  the  ezecutnr 
branch. 

In  ihc  House  of  Represenlatives  (here  is  this  diRcrerice.  that  ih( 

[leoplc  of  one  .Stale  do  not.  as  in  llie  case  of  ["residenl  and  V« 
'n:sidenl.  atl  vote  for  all  the  members,  each  Slate  elpL-IinK  only  tU 
own  rcpresentaiives.  But  this  creates  no  material  disiincini*< 
When  choM-n,  Xttry  are  all  lepiescntativcs  of  Ihc  I'nileil  StatM.  not 
rcpresentaiives  of  the  particular  State  from  which  lliey  cume. 
They  ate  paid  by  the  United  Stales,  no*  by  (he  Slate ;  nor  are  (iMtf 
accounl.iIHc  lo  i(  for  any  act  ilone  in  performance  ol  thrir  Ifxnta- 
lire  funnions:  and  Itowcvcr  tlicy  may  in  practice,  as  ii  ly 

to  do.  conauU  and  prefer  (he  interests  n(  llu-ir  p^rtlci::  'ii- 

cnts  when  tlicy  come  in  conflict  with  any  other  p^rtul  or  lucal 
interest,  yet  it  is  tbetr  first  and  highest  duty,  as  repicsctitalives  ol 
ll>e  United  Stales,  to  proniole  the  general  goo<l. 

The  Conititullon  of   the   UniietF  States,  then,  fornu  mgatlrr»- 

meni,  not  a  league,  and  whether  II  be  formed  by." ■  >  -.    -rt, 

lite  Slates,  or  in  any  other  manner,  ils  chafactet  i  '  '.* 

a  governtucni  Hi  which  all   the  people  ate  11^....^..:....   ..,..cli 


isai 


jACtesoys  proclamation. 


701 


opcr.ites  (lirectlv  on  the  people  indindtiiitly.  not  upon  the  Sinlu ; 
ihry  reiaintrd  all  the  powei  tlicy  ilid  noi  t;r;inl.  Ilul  e^ch  Sdile 
hivinf;  ei<|)ir<isly  p.iiloil  willi  &o  iiiiiiiy  puwciA  a^  10  cunstilulc 
joinity  Willi  (he  <i<hct  Suieft  a  single  nation,  caiiiiol  Iroiii  lliAt 
period  pnsws^  any  right  I0  secede,  twcaiise  sucli  »cCcMion  does 
nol  hrfflk  a  IraRiif.  but  dcMmys  Ibe  iinily  of  a  nation,  and  any 
injur]-  In  thai  uniiy  is  not  only  a  brr^cli  which  would  tcMilt  fioin 
the  contmTciilion  of  a  compact,  but  it  is  an  uRcme  ni-Hlnxl  ihc 
whotr  trniun.  To  wf  thai  ;iiiy  Stale  nwy  at  pkii.'mte  »ecede  tioin 
the  Union,  b  to  My  ihiil  the  United  Stiil«  ate  not  ii  n:ilioti; 
twcatiM  it  would  ok  a  sokci&iii  10  cotiteiid  that  jiiiy  [lait  of  a 
tiatton  might  dissolve  its  coiinri:tion  uiih  itic  other  parts,  lo  ihrrr 
injory  0*  ruin,  wiihoui  corn  mil  ting  any  ©fTeiisr.  Secession,  like 
any  other  m-nlulionary  act.  may  t>c  moially  jiiiliBrd  by  the 
extremity  of  oppression ;  but  to  call  It  a  coiisiiiutioniil  ri^hl.  U 
coiifoundiTij;  the  meiitiinK  of  lenns.  and  c:in  only  be  done  (hiouiih 
)[ioss  error,  or  lu  tleceive  those  who  aie  wiDiii};  lo  aMeit  u  tigiii. 
but  would  p;iu<te  before  they  made  a  tevolulion,  or  incur  tliC 
peiiallie>  corisequeiit  up^ii  a  fi'ilure. 

Because  the  Union  was  (oinicij  by  compact,  it  is  ssiil  the  parlies 
to  tluit  compact  may.  when  ihry  (rel  ihcmsrlvrs  aggrieved,  depart 
from  it:  hut  it  is  precisely  bec.iiisc  it  is  a  comp.icl  that  they  can- 
not. A  comp.icl  It  an  agrcrm^'nl  or  binding  oMigalioii.  It  may 
hy  its  terms  have  a  s^nci'on  or  pennliy  for  its  breach,  or  it  m.iy  nol. 
If  it  coniaini  no  sanction,  it  may  be  broken  with  no  other  conse- 
qiielKC  than  moral  guill;  if  it  have  a  sanction,  then  the  breach 
■nciiTS  tl>e  designated  or  implied  penalty,  A  lca|;uc  between 
tndrptitdrnt  nations,  generally,  has  no  sanction  oihrr  than  a  iitoial 
one:  or  i(  it  should  contain  a  penalty,  as  there  \s  no  cnmrron 
superior,  it  cannot  be  enforced.  A  Kovcmmrni,  on  the  contrary, 
always  h.u  a  sanction,  exprcts  or  implied :  and,  in  our  case,  it  is 
bolb  necestarilv  rmplie*!  and  expre^ily  given.  An  attempt  by 
force  i>l  armi  lo  destroy  a  govcnimeni  is  an  offense,  by  whaieviT 
means  the  constitutional  compact  may  have  been  foniKd;  and 
SMch  government  has  the  tis'*'.  I>y  'he  law  of  self-defense,  to  pass 
acts  lor  punishing  the  offender,  unless  thai  light  is  modifie<l, 
restrained,  or  Tej^iimcd  by  the  coiistiluIiDiial  act.  tn  our  system, 
althougli  it  it  modified  in  the  case  of  Irea.son,  ycl  ntilhofily  is 
eaprcMily  given  to  |>ass  all  laws  neccHnary  to  carry  its  powers  into 
effect,  anil  under  ihia  grant  provision  has  been  made  lor  puni&liing 
acts  which  obstruct  the  due  ad  mi  nisi  ration  of  the  laws. 

it  would  seem  superfluous  to  add  anything  to  show  the  nature  of 
that  union  which  connects  iis :  hut  as  erroneous  opinions  on  this 
suhject  are  the  foundation  of  doctrines  the  most  desiiuctive  to  our 
peace.  I  must  give  some  further  <!ci-eUipnicnt  to  my  views  on  this 
subject.  No  one,  fellow-citiiens,  has  a  higher  reverence  lor  the 
reiwTved  rights  of  the  States  than  the  magistrate  who  now 
axidreifses  you.  No  one  would  make  gi^eaier  personal  s-icrifices, 
or  ofliciji  exertions,  to  defend  them  from  violation ;  but  equal  care 
I,      must  be  taken  to  prevent,  on  their  part,  an  improper  interference 


703  JACKSON'S  PJiOCLAA/Ar/Off. 


The  line  hjis  not  bc«ii  so  dlslincllr  dr^wn  .is  lo  anjJd  dooto 
some  cAscs  of  Ihc  ciercisc  •>(  power.    Men  of  the  ticM  ini 
and  lounilRsI  views  may  differ  in  Ihcir  conxlruction  of  some 
of  tbc  Conjtilulion ;  but  there  are  uthent  on  which  ditpaMJ 
rcAection  can  leave  no  doubt.    Of  iliu  nature  appears  lo  be  il 
suined  riahl  of  scvession.     It  rcsl»,  in  «ve  have  wren,  on  (he 
undivideu  sorereigniy  of  ihr  Slaies,  ami  on  their  tinvifijc 
in  this  sovcTci^  C3|Mcity  »  compact  which  it  called  tlie  C 
tioii,  from  which,  bcc^Utc  they  made   It,  they   have   the  hgM 
scenic.     Both  of  these  pMitlons  are  erroneou*,  and  some  ol  tbc 
argiiment*  to  prove  them  so  luve  bttn  aniicipaleil. 

The  Stales  severally  have  not  retained  their  entire  sovercigarj. 
[|  has  been  shown  thit  >»  bccouinig  parit  of  a  nation,  mm 
membera  of  a  league,  they  fturicndctcd  many  of  ihcir  easoiUil 

Krta  o(  sovereignty.  Tlie  right  lo  make  lrcalie«,  devlarc  wu. 
■y  taxes,  exercise  eiclinivc  judicial  and  IcjjisUiivc  powri ^.  wtie 
all  functions  ol  sovcreiKn  power.  The  Slates,  then.  Inr  .tU  ihcK 
important  purposes,  were  no  tonfter  loveretKn.  The  al1ci;iancE  d 
Iheir  ciliicns  was  Iransfctrcd  iii  the  lirat  instance  to  ihc  jiotw*- 
ntenl  of  the  United  Stales;  iliey  became  AmeiKaji  iinicn*.  aad 
owed  obcihcDce  to  the  ConititutMti  of  Ibe  United  States,  .inil  )■ 
laws  made  in  confnrmity  with  tbc  poweis  vcstetl  ii>  Coii|;reis. 
This  last  position  has  not  been,  ai>d  cannot  be.  dmied.  Koa. 
iben.  can  thai  Stale  be  said  to  Iw  sovereign  and  iiMkpcndm 
whose  citizen*  owe  obedience  to  laws  not  made  by  it.  and  whov 
ma^slratei  are  sworn  to  ilisregard  those  laws,  when  ihey  come  in 
conflKl  with  those  puml  by  another  ?  What  shows  cooclusirrlf 
lltat  the  States  cannot  be  said  lo  have  reserved  an  uniliiidal 
sovervigniy.  is  that  they  expressly  ceded  the  rigtii  to  punbh 
treason — not  trea^in  against  their  sepniaie  power,  but  iiumhi 
against  the  United  States.  Trrasnn  i«  an  offense  against  MM*^ 
*i(gtt/y,  and  sorcreignty  imist  reside  with  the  power  to  punMli  it 
But  llK  resei^-cd  rights  of  the  Slates  are  nut  less  sacred  becauM 
Ihey  have  (or  ihcir  common  interest  made  the  KcientI  goferniM* 
tlie  depositoiy  of  these  powers.  The  unity  of  our  pnU 
charjcier  (as  has  been  ihown  fo»  another  purpose)  coniini 
with  its  rery  existence.  Under  the  royal  f;ovcrnn>ent  wt  hail  M 
separate  character;  our  opposition  to  its  oppreuion   bwaa  m 

UNITliD  COLUNtBS.  We  Were  llie  UNITED  StATKS  Under  Uic 
Confederal iofl,  and  the  name  was  iierpetuated  and  the  Unioa 
rendered  more  perfect  by  the  federal  Constiruiion.  In  none  fl( 
these  stages  did  we  consider  ourselves  in  any  olhei  light  Ihaiiai 
forming  one  nation.  Treaties  «r>d  alliances  were  made  in  |he 
name  o(  ail.  I'roops  were  tailed  for  the  )oinl  defciiK.  Huw, 
then,  wilh  all  these  proofs,  th.it  under  all  changes  ol  nur  positam 
we  had,  (or  destgnaied  purposes  nml  wilh  ddined  powers,  cicaied 
naimn.-d  govemmenis — how  is  it  that  the  most  perfTi:!  <<  iliex 
sereral  modes  of  union  should  now  bcconsidetcd  as  <  o* 

that  may  tie  distnlrcl  at  pleasure?     Il  is  from  an  ah.  -  jiil 

Compact  is  used  as  st-nonynHHii  with  league,  allhoui^h  it-.c  l/ue 
terai  is  not  employed,  oecausc  it  would  at  oiKe  show  the  fallacy  ul 


^^^1^ 


JACKSON'S  PROCLAMATIOH. 


the  reasoning;.  It  would  ooi  (to  to  lay  that  our  Contlitulion  wai 
only  a  logur.  bui  il  is  i:ilM>red  lo  prove  it  a  compact  (which,  in  one 
Knsc.  it  it),  and  ihm  to  urg^ur  ihai  t.%  a.  learue  ts  a  compact,  every 
compact  biciwccn  n^iiuns  imum.  of  coutsc,  Dc  a  l«ague,  and  that 
from  ttich  an  cng.igcfntiii  ever)-  aovercijrn  powcT  has  a  nght  to 
recede.  But  it  has  been  shown  that  in  this  sense  the  Stairs  arc 
not  sovcicign.  and  that  even  it  they  were,  and  the  naiionnl  Con< 
siitution  hiA  been  formed  l>y  compact,  there  would  be  no  ri^ht  in 
any  one  State  to  eKoiieiule  il.icK  fruin  the  obhgalion. 

So  otnious  arc  the  reaMiis  which  forbid  this  secession,  that  ft 
fs  necessary  onlv  to  allude  to  them.  'I'he  Union  was  formed  for 
the  bcnehi  of  all.  It  was  prockiced  by  mutual  sacritice  of  inierrst 
and  o]>inioiu.  Can  those  s-irrihrcs  be  rccilted  ?  C.in  the  States, 
who  maj[nanimoii\ty  surrenrirrFil  thrir  titir  lo  the  terrilories  of  the 
West,  recall  the  itranl  ?  Will  the  itihaliitaniK  of  (tic  inland  Stales 
agree  to  pay  the  ituliea  thai  may  be  iinpoied  wiihoul  ilieir  anient 
hy  lltosc  on  the  Atlatilic  or  the  Gulf,  tor  llieir  own  benetil  ?  Shall 
there  be  a  free  port  in  one  Stale,  and  ciioimoiis  duties  in  another  ? 
No  oive  hrlievrs  thai  any  right  exists  in  a  single  .Stale  to  involve  all 
the  others  In  these  and  roiintless  other  evils,  conlrarj'  lo  engage* 
menls  solemnly  m.iiie.  F.verj'one  must  see  that  the  other  Stales, 
in  sclf-flcfcnse.  must  oppose  it  at  all  hntards. 

These  are  the  alternatives  that  are  presente<l  by  llie  conven« 
lion :  A  repeal  of  all  the  acts  (or  raising  revenue,  leaving  the  gov- 
eniinent  wilhuut  the  means  of  soppoil ;  or  an  acquiescence  in  the 
ilissohilton  of  our  Union  by  llie  secession  of  one  of  its  members. 
When  the  hrsl  was  propose),  it  was  known  that  it  could  nol  be 
IrUctied  to  (or  a  monienl.  It  was  known  if  force  was  applied  to 
oppose  ihA  execution  of  the  laws,  thai  il  must  l>e  teprlled  by 
force — that  Congress  could  not.  vriihout  involving  itself  In  diseracc 
and  the  country  in  ruin,  acceile  to  the  proposition  ;  and  yei  il  this 
iinot  tlune  in  a  Kiven  day,  or  if  any  attempt  is  made  to  execute  the 
laws,  the  Stale  n,  by  the  or<linatice,  declared  to  be  out  of  the 
Union.  The  majority  of  a  convention  assembled  for  the  purpose 
have  dift.tled  ihciiC  terms,  or  raihT  this  rejection  of  all  trrnis.  in  the 
name  of  the  people  of  South  Carolina,  It  is  inielh.-it  the  governor 
a(  tlie  Stale  speaks  of  the  sobmtssiun  ol  their  grievances  lo  a  con- 
renlion  of  .ill  the  Slates;  which,  he  says,  they  '■sincerely  and 
anxiously  see*  and  desire."  Yet  this  obvious  and  corisiiiulional 
motle  of  obtaining  lite  sense  of  the  other  Slates  on  the  construc- 
tion of  the  federal  compact,  and  amending  it.  if  necessary,  h;is 
never  l>een  aiiempled  by  those  who  have  urged  the  State  on  to 
this  destructive  mrnsure.  The  Stale  might  have  propoird  a  call 
tor  a  general  convention  lo  the  oiher  Slates,  and  Congress,  if  a 
sufhcienl  number  of  them  concurred,  mml  have  called  il.  But  the 
first  magtSlrale  of  South  Carolina,  when  he  expressed  a  hope  ihat. 
"on  a  review  bv  Congress  and  the  functionaries  of  the  general 
govemnieni  of  the  n»ciiis  of  the  controversy."  such  a  convention 
will  be  .-recorded  to  them,  must  havr  hnon'n  that  neither  Congress, 
nor  any  functionary  in  the  general  govcmrnrni.  has  authority  to 
call  simIi  a  cnnvenllon,  unless  it  lie  demanded  by  two-thirds  of  the 


704 


/MOrSOAr-S  PHOCLAMATiOtr. 


im 


Suies.  This  suggcsiioit,  ihn.  is  anoihrr  intiance  of  ihe  iccklm 
iiuiiimliun  to  th«  prontiantof  ihc  ConGiitution  with  wMcb 
crisis  has  been  madly  hurticl  on ;  or  of  the  aitenipl  to  [wnirtl 
the  people  ihal  a  comtitulUinal  remedy  has  been  soughl  mA 
refuted.  If  the  tcKisUtureut  South  C^rotiiui  ">iixioii>lf  iltun' 
a  KeHCnil  cut)VFniion  to  consiilcr  their  complainis.  why  have  ihrt 
noi  iii^iIl-  ;ip]ilicaiioit  foi  it  in  ilic  way  iIm  Coasiituitoa  poiiiiiiiui' 
The  nucdion  thai  ihcy  ""  eamcsily  tedt"  is  axuplrtely  necUhnl 
by  the  nliiiMion. 

This,  thcTi,  Is  the  pmilion  in  which  we  stand.  A  snull  nujofllT 
ol  the  ciliwiisof  one  Stale  in  the  Union  hnvc  dccird  dd^gatoto 
a  State  cunvrnlion  ;  lliut  cuiivenlton  hus  ordained  l)ist  >l)  lie 
revenue  laws  oi  the  L'niled  Sialics  mun  I*  rcjieakd.nr  ihjt  ihr^' 
no  longer  a  mcml>cr  of  the  Union.  TIk' governor  o(  thai  Slate  ha 
rrcommcriiled  to  ihe  kgisUiure  ihc  thImo);  of  an  niiny  tu  oiry  the 
ficcrMion  into  cffri'i,  aiu)  that  he  may  be  empowered  to  cite  cleat' 
nnces  to  Teuels  in  ihe  name  a(  the  Slate.  Nti  act  ol  violnfl 
omioftilion  to  Ihe  hviA  has  yel  been  comnillled.  tml  «uch  a  siatr 
of  Ihrngs  is  hiniily  H|ipiehenilFd.  and  il  is  ihe  intml  uf  Ihn  iiuUTv 
nicni  lo  Pk(X.'Laim.  not  only  th.ii  tlic  duly  imi>uwd  on  me  Iqr  itic 
Con«lilulion,  -to  lake  cjire  that  the  la«^  be  iailhfully  cxecutnt.' 
Khali  be  performed  lo  the  cilcni  o(  the  powrrs  already  vcslnl  m 
nie  by  law,  or  uf  such  clhets  as  the  wisdom  nf  Conjoins  *tull 
(leviM!  and  inliuU  tu  nie  foi  thai  puqwse ;  but  lo  wain  the  cilitran 
of  Sutilh  Caiolina.  whu  li;ive  been  iteludcd  into  an  opposition  Ifl 
the  laws,  of  Ihe  daii};<'r  lliey  will  incur  by  obedience  In  ihc  tlkpl 
And  disni^aiiiimv  ordinance  of  ihe  coni'eniiun — lo  e>han  ibnte 
who  hai-c  rrfuvvTlo  suppolt  il  lo  ])eiM-vcre  in  iheit  deienninatiMt 
lo  uphold  ihr  Conuiiuiion  and  laws  of  ihrii  country,  .ind  in  poini 
nm  to  all  llii-  perilous  *ilunlion  inln  which  ihc  good  pei>ple  uf  Ihal 
8tale  have  been  l«l,  and  ihal  ihe  coiinc  ihcy  are  ur^ed  to  punut 
is  OIK  of  min  and  disgrace  lo  the  very  Stiitc  wImmc  rights  thry 
affect  lo  supjiuti. 

Kctlow-ciiizens  of  my  native  Stale  I  let  me  not  only  adnwnitib 
you.  as  tile  first  nia4;isliaie  uf  o«ii  common  counlry.  not  to  ina< 
the  penally  of  its  laws,  bui  use  lite  influcnc*-  ihai  a  f.iiher  wmiU 
over  his  rhildrcii  whom  he  saw  ruvhing  lo  a  ccrlain  rum.  In  Ihal 
pntemal  latigii.igc,  wilh  that  palcmal  freling,  let  nie  tell  vtiu,  bit 
couniiynien.  that  vou  are  deluded  by  mm  wIm  are  riihcr  decrnreil 
ihrinseltefi  ui  wish  to  di-ceive  you.  Maik  vnilet  what  picinise* 
you  liarr  l>een  led  on  lu  the  brink  of  i iii>u tree t Kin  and  ircaMn  nn 
which  you  stand!  First  a  dtoiinuiior  of  Ihc  value  of  out  ilafilr 
comiiHMliiy.  lawftcd  by  ovirr-pioiluction  in  other  quartere  and  iJk 
cntisequeni  ditninuljon  in  ihe  raloe  of  your  lanili,  wrre  ihe 
cHrcl  ol  the  lariH  law-i.  The  rifrci  o(  ifioke  lau>  was  con 
injiirKitis,  but  lite  evil  was  }{rcaiiy  eia^geralcd  by  Ihe  unfi 
llvrory  you  were  lauKhl  lo  Ixlieve.  thai  its  birnkns  Kiete  in 
jrariion  lo  youi  eiporis,  not  to  your  c  on  tu  in  pi  inn  nl  i(^.^ 
arlictes.      Your  piide  wa*  aTOtised  by  llie  aiAerTM>Ti 

mmion  to  these  laws  was  a  stale  of  vaualaKC.anJ  t:  

lo  iliem  was  equal,  in  patriotic  ment.  lo  Uic  opposiuon  out  Utten 


MA 


/ACKTSOVS  PROCLAMATION. 


m 


tMv*A  lo  ihe  oppresMvc  la«f«  of  Great  Brilain.  Yoo  were  told 
ihat  (his  opposiiiuii  inl^lii  be  puicealily— rriiyhi  be  cDii&iitutionally 
mad* — Uui  yrni  might  enjoy  all  l)ic  advanugrs  of  the  Union  anil 
hear  none  of  its  hunlcns.  kloquent  appeals  to  your  paasions,  to 
nxir  State  pride,  lo  your  Ti:ilivR  couraee,  to  your  xrnsc  of  it^al 
injury,  wcte  used  in  prrpaie  you  (or  Ihe  period  when  the  m.ink 
which  concealed  ttic  hideoui  fe:ilum  of  DiSUXlOX  should  he 
taken  oR.  It  fell,  and  you  were  made  to  look  with  conipUcency 
on  object!  which  not  ton^  since  you  would  have  regnriled  wtili 
horror.  Lonk  hack  to  the  aru  which  have  brouglii  you  to  thin 
state — look  forwanl  to  the  consequences  to  which  it  must  inevi- 
talily  lead  !  I^ok  luck  to  what  wa«  first  toldyou  as  an  induce- 
ment to  enter  inlo  this  dnngcrout  course.  The  great  politicil 
truth  was  repealed  to  you  that  you  h,id  the  revolutionary  right  of 
resiiting  all  lans  that  were  palpably  uncoiixlitutional  and  intoler- 
ably oppressive— it  was  ad<l«l  that  the  rigiii  lo  nullify  a  law  rested 
oi)  the  same  principle,  but  that  it  vv.is  a  peaceable  remedy !  This 
ch  a  racier  which  was  givrn  lo  it,  m.ide  you  receive  with  too  much 
COiiAdcnce  the  assrrtinn^  th;it  were  made  of  ihc  unconililulioiiaiity 
of  Ihe  l.iw  -ind  its  opprp';sive  effects.  Mark,  my  fellow  cili/cns, 
th.it  by  the  -idminsiori  of  your  Itailcrs  ihc  unconsiilulioii.'iliLy  must 
he  pitl^bU,  or  it  will  not  justify  cither  re'iManee  or  nuililication  ! 
Wliat  is  the  nieaniKf;  of  the  word  palpiiiU  in  Ihe  sense  in  which 
ii  is  here  used  ?  lhat  which  is  app.iient  lo  cvciyonc,  lliat  which  no 
man  of  onhn.iry  iniellect  nill  (ail  1u  perceive.  Is  itie  unconslitu- 
tioii.iliiy  of  these  laivs  of  th.il  deseripiion  ?  Let  those  among  j-our 
leaders  wlwi  owe  approved  and  advor.iled  the  princiitles  o(  protect- 
ive rlutict.  answer  the  question  :  and  let  theni  choosr  whether  they 
will  he  conniilercd  as  incapable,  then,  o(  perceiving  lhat  wliicfi 
mutl  have  lieen  apparent  lo  every  man  of  common  understanding, 
or  as  imposing  upon  your  confidence  and  endeavoring  to  mislead 
you  now.  In  either  case,  they  are  unsafe  guides  in  the  jierilotis  path 
they  urge  you  to  tread.  Ponder  well  on  this  circumstance,  and 
you  will  know  how  lo  nppreciaie  the  cxagseraied  language  ihey 
address  lo  you.  They  arc  noi  champions  of  Uberty  cmulaiing  the 
(ame  of  our  Kevolulionary  (aihrrs.  nor  are  you  an  oppressed 
people,  contending,  as  they  repeat  to  you.  against  worse  than 
colonial  vassahice.  You  are  free  members  of  a  tloorishing  and 
happy  Union.  I'heie  is  no  settled  design  to  oppress  you.  You 
have,  iivlecd,  felt  the  unequal  operation  o(  laws  which  may  have 
been  unwisel},  not  unconslituiion-illy  passed;  bul  that  inequality 
inusi  necessarily  be  removed.  At  the  very  moment  when  you 
were  madly  urged  on  lo  the  unfonimate  course  you  liave  begun,  a 
change  in  public  opinion  has  commenced.  The  nearly  approach* 
ing  payinenl  o(  ihe  public  debt,  and  the  conse<|uent  necessity  ul 
a  (iiniinution  of  duties,  liad  already  caused  a  considerable  reduc- 
tion, and  thai.  too.  on  some  aiticles  of  general  consumption  in 
your  State.     The  imporlance  of  this  change  was  underrated,  and 

f'ou  were  authoiila lively  lold  ihat  no  funiier  alleviation  of  your 
lunlens  was  to  be  eipecied.  at  the  very  time  when  ihc  condition 
of  the  country  imperiously  demanded  such  a  modiRcatton  of  ibe 


MT 


706  JjICtfSOy'S  PROClAUATIOff.  til 

iliilies  ns  ihoiild  rr<tiic<^  ihem  to  a  juKt  an<t  nnuilatile  Kcalt.  Bui. 
M  apprehensive  of  the  effect  of  (hit  change  in  ultayrng  ynai  dit- 
conlenls.  yuu  were  predpjiated  inio  the  fearful  state  m  vrhidi  |«b 
now  fioU  yourtclTCi. 

I  have  urged  you  to  look  back  to  tlie  mearis  ihal  were  uwd  W 
hurry  you  on  to  itie  pnsition  ym  hiive  now  SMumed,  and  lorwMri 
10  the  conscqiLcncr*  tliey  will  proriucc.  Somrthing  more  is  id 
Mrv.  Crnitempliilr  the  eontlition  of  thai  ctHintrj-  of  wfitch 
Mill  form  an  inipoti;iTit  pan  ;  coniiilrr  Its  government  uniiEi^ 
une  honil  of  common  inleiest  antt  general  proteciiun  so  nuftv 
difleienl  Slates — sivin);  10  all  ihdr  inhabitanis  tlw  proud  lilkol 
AUKKIL'AN  CiTKEl'—protettrnt;  iheir  coiTiniclce— secuiini;  lh«ii 
lilenliii'r  and  Arts—facihi.ii^ni;  their  inicicommunicalion—acAau^ 
in([  their  fronlier? — and  ninKing  ihcir  name  resprctcd  in  the 
remnicsi  parts  of  ilie  earth ',  Consider  the  extent  of  iis  irfniixT, 
its  increa-iing  and  happy  popiil.-iiion,  its  advance  in  art>.  wbidi 
render  life  a);reeal>le.  and  ihe  irienccs  which  elevate  the  moid! 
Sec  education  spreading  the  lights  of  ielit;if.ii.  morality,  aaA 
cenerjl  iiifoini-ntiofi  into  ei-cry  cottage  in  tins  wide  extent  of  cor 
Tririiorirs  and  Slates!  Behold  ri  *A  the  asylum  vifieiv  the 
wrrtrhrd  and  ihr  oppresKrd  find  a  refuge  and  support !  Look  M 
lhispi<:liire  of  happiiir«  ami  honor,  and  say,  WK  too.  ark  Cm- 
ZEN-I  or  Am  F.RICA— Carolina  i*  one  of  these  proud  Stales  he* 
arms  have  defendet)— her  best  blood  has  cemented  Ihis  ha-pfiy 
Union  1  And  ihen  add,  if  you  can,  without  horror  and  rrmorse, 
this  ha|>|iy  Union  we  will  dksolve— this  picture  of  peace  and 
prosperity  we  will  deface — this  free  tnieicourse  we  wdl  Intemipt— 
these  fcnile  lieldi  wr  will  deluge  with  blood — (he  proiecitoncl 
tliM  glorious fluK  we  renounce — Itie  veiy  name  of  Amnuaniwc 
discard.  And  Kir  what.  miMaken  men !  For  what  rtn  yon  throw 
away  these  in rslimahlF  blessings— for  what  would  you  nchancr 
your  share  in  the  advantages  and  honor  of  the  Union  ?  Fnt  the 
dream  o(  a  separate  indqienilence— a  dream  interrupted  by  bloody 
eonfticis  with  )otir  oeighlMirs.  and  a  vile  deptodrnce  on  a  Iniripi 
power.  If  your  leaderscoutd  succeed  In  esiahlishing a  sefMmlf 
ivhai  would  be  j-oor  siluailon  ?  Are  yod  tiniied  at  hnmr — aie 
free  from  the  ^pretiensinn  of  civil  discord,  with  all  ili  fearful  1 
sequenres  ?  Do  o*ir  ncighljoriog  republics,  every  dsy  suflerinf 
some  new  revolution  or  eonl ending  wilh  some  new  insurreelicm — 
do  ibey  excite  your  envy  >  But  the  dictates  of  a  high  duty  obBfe 
n>e  solemnly  to  announce  that  you  cannoi  succreri.  Tlir  hitvi  pf 
the  United   Stales  ni««   be   ruecuted.      I  have  no  1  ity 

power  on  the  subject— my  duly  is  rmphMiratly  pmn'  iVie 

Constitution.  Those  woo  told  you  ihal  yo«  tnigtii  [Jirrihly 
prevent  iheir  execution,  deceived  you— ihey  could  nol  hate  been 
rleceived  themselves.    They  know  ih.it  a  d-ri  .m  ci«U 

alone  ^te^■enI  the  enecution  of  the  laws,  sm  i  ni  inch 

op[M«ilion  must  be  repclkd.  Their  object  t^  h^.li'i  m  .<iit  brnot 
deceived  bj-  names ;  disunion,  by  armed  force,  is  Trf.amik,  Are 
yoa  mtly  ready  id  incur  ils  cuilt  t  If  yon  are,  on  the  hra<l  i>f  Kic 
lOitigaiors  of  ihe  act  Iw  the  dreadful  coiiseqnettco— on  iheii  heaib 


inai 


JACKSON-S  PROCLAMATlOtf. 


707 


be  the  ilishonw,  but  on  jroan  niajr  fall  the  puniKhnienl— on  yoxtt 
unhappy  Stale  will  ineritabt<r  (all  all  the  evili  □(  the  conflict  you 
(orce  upon  the  government  o(  yoor  comiiry.  It  cannot  accede  to 
ihc  mid  projccl  of  disunion,  of  which  you  would  be  the  tint 
vicihm— iit  first  m.igiiitaie  cannot.  i(  he  would,  avoid  the  perform- 
aiKe  of  his  duty— the  conwijiicnce  must  lie  fearful  for  yoti.  di.i- 
IreMing  (o  your  fellow-ciliiens  here,  ;)nd  to  the  liietidf.  of  good 
government  throiiglioui  the  world,  lis  cncmici  have  beheld  our 
prosperity  ivjtli  a  vExation  they  couUl  not  conceal— it  was  a  siaiid- 
ing  reliilJiliun  of  tdeir  slavish  (tocIrin».  and  Ihey  will  point  to  our 
discord  with  the  triumph  of  miti^inHni  joy.  It  i^  yet  in  your  power 
to  disappoint  them.  1  hero  11  yet  tune  to  show  thai  the  descendants 
of  ihc  Pincltneys.  the  Somptets.  ihc  Rullcdget,  and  of  the  Ihotis.ind 
other  nnnx^s  which  .-idorn  the  pages  of  your  Revolutionary  history. 
will  not  alundon  1h.1t  Union  10  support  which  so  m:iny  o(  ihcm 
luu;;!!!  anil  bled  and  died.  I  adjure  you,  as  you  honor  their 
memory— as  you  love  the  cause  of  (leedom,  to  which  I  hey  dedi- 
cated incii  lives — Rs  you  priie  the  peace  of  your  country,  the  lives 
of  its  best  ciii'cns.  und  your  own  (air  itmt.  Xo  reiocc  your  steps. 
Snatch  from  the  archives  of  your  State  the  disorganiiing  edict  of 
its  convention — bid  it*  membei-s  in  re-assemble  nnd  ptomulK:iIe 
the  decided  expressions  of  your  will  to  rem.-iin  in  the  jiaih  vrliich 
alone  can  coiMiuct  I'Ou  la  safety,  i>tnsperity,  and  honor — lell  ihein 
ihiit  cumpatcd  to  duunian.  all  other  evils  are  liKhi,  because  that 
btings  wilh  it  an  accumuUtion  of  all^^lecUre  that  you  will  never 
take  the  l>eld  unless  the  star>span{;led  tMiniier  of  your  country  shall 
final  over  you— that  you  will  not  be  sligniatiied  when  (lca<l.  and 
dishoncvea  and  sci>ri>ed  white  you  live,  as  the  nuihots  of  the  first 
BiiBck  on  the  Constitution  of  your  country  I— ils  desimyen  you 
cannot  be.  Vuu  may  disturb  its  peace^you  may  interrupt  ihe 
course  olilsprDs|ierity— you  may  cloud  its  repul.ition  (or  stability — 
but  its  tTani)uilliiy  will  be  restored,  its  prosperity  will  relurii,  and 
the  stain  utioi\  its  national  char.icter  will  be  transferred  and  lemain 
an  eternal  blot  on  tite  memory  of  those  who  caused  the  disorder. 

Fetlow-citi/cns  i>t  tlie  Unii«l  Stales!  ibe  ihteal  of  unhallowed 
disunion — the  names  of  those,  once  respecied,  by  whom  it  is 
uttered — Ihe  array  of  military  force  to  support  it— denote  th« 
approach  of  a  crisis  in  our  aAairs  on  which  the  cvniiniMnce  of  our 
unexamplct  pnw|>erily.  our  poliiital  exisience,  and  perhapA  that  o( 
all  free  governments,  may  depend.  The  conjuncture  dernanded  a 
free,  a  full,  and  explicit  enunciation,  not  only  of  my  utlcniions,  but 
of  my  principles  of  aciron;  nnd  as  the  claim  was  asserted  of  a 
right  by  a  State  to  annul  ihe  laws  of  ihe  Union,  and  even  to  secede 
from  it  at  pleasure,  n  frank  csposition  of  my  opinions  in  relation  lo 
the  ori^n  and  (otm  o(  our  government,  and  the  consiructkin  I 
give  10  Ihe  insiruiiM-'ni  by  which  it  was  created,  seemed  to  be 
proper.  Having  the  fullest  confidence  in  the  iuslncss  o(  the  le^l 
and  const  it  uiional  opinion  of  my  duties  which  has  been  expressed. 
1  rely  with  equal  conlidcnce  on  your  untllrided  sunnori  in  mv 
drtcrminatioit  to  execute  ibe  laws—to  prctcn-c  ibe  Union  by  .ill 
ConstiluUunil  iiKans-  -to  arrest,  if  possible,  by  moderate  but  firm 


DftED  SCOTT  DEaStOff. 


measures,  the  necnstty  of  a  trcouree  to  force;  and,  l(  it  bclbt 
will  of  Heaven  ih»l  ibe  rerURCnce  of  its  (iriinEVal  cuisr  on  man 
for  ihc  »hc(l<liii£  of  a  Ixoihcr's  blood  should  f^ill  upon  oui  land, 
thai  it  be  not  cnllcd  down  by  any  oReii»ve  acl  on  Ihc  pjiti  tif  tt> 
United  Slates. 

Fetlow-ciliieiis !  tlie  rnoinenKKis  case  b  before  ]roii.  On  in 
undivided  support  of  )-our  government  depends  the  tIecUion  of  the 
grejt  question  It  Involves,  whether  your  sacred  Union  will  !k 
pri;scivc<l,  and  the  blessing  it  srcurrt  to  us  as  onr  people  sliatl  be 
per]>cttitilect.  No  one  can  doubt  that  the  unanfmiiy  uiih  which 
that  decision  will  be  espreMctI,  vrill  lie  such  .is  to  inspire  new  «■> 
hdence  in  republlc.in  inilituiions,  aiul  that  the  prudenrc,  Uie 
wi^duiii.  and  llie  courage  which  it  will  brinj;  ici  their  defense,  wiU 
transmit  them  unimpaired  nnd  invigorjited  to  our  cliddreti. 

May  the  Great  Ruler  of  nations  gi-ini  that  the  siunal  titessi^ 
with  whicli  he  has  Uvorcd  ours  may  not,  by  tlw  nM<rnca>k  tA  party, 
or  pergonal  ambition,  be  liitrrgaidcd  and  lost,  and   may  His  wiic 

tirovidence  briiij;  those  who  hare  produced  this  crisis  lo  see  tlir 
ully. before  iheyfcel  Ihc  miseiy.uf  civd  strife,  anil  inspire  ji  teioni- 
mg  veneration  fur  thai  Union  which,  i(  we  may  flare  to  pennrate 
his  designs,  he  has  choicn,  as  llic  onlv  means  ol  alioinmg  iht 
high  destinies  to  which  wc  may  reasonauly  aspire. 

In  icstintotiy  nherenl,  I  have  caused  thr  wa]  of  the  Unite' 
States  lo  be  hereunto  affixed,  having  signed  the  same  «rtlh  nj 
band. 

f>one  ai  the  City  of  W.ishington.  ihls  to«li  «lay  of  December,  ■ 
the  ycarof  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  Ihiity-lwft 
and  of  the  independence  of  the  United  Slates  the  hfiy-sevroth. 

ANDREW  JACKSON. 
By  the  President. 

Etiw.  LiviNCSTOK,  SecrtUry  of  Suie. 


ABSTRACT  OP  THE  DRED  SCOTT  DBCISIOK,  1857.* 

.  .  .  Bui,  In  making  this  objection,  wc  thinic  the  peculiar  and 
limited  iurisdiciion  olcfiuris  of  ihc  Uniml  St.iirs  has  no4  bm 
adrerteil  lo.  This  peculiar  and  timitcil  jurisdiclion  has  made  A 
necrsiiary,  in  these  courts,  to  adopt  different  rulei  and  prmripiet 
of  plcnding.  so  far  a*  juiisdktion  is  concerned,  from  those  wnNrh 
re^iil.iie  cuuris  of  common  law  in  England,  and  m  ihc  difie*c«i 
siBirsof  iheUnion  which haveadoplcdtliccommun-Uw roles.  .  .  . 

This  difference  arises,  lis  wc  have  said,  from  the  peculiar  chai- 
acter  of  ihr  government  of  Die  United  Stales.  For  alihougli  M  H 
Kivcrcign  and  siipieme  in  its  appfoprinle  sphere  of  acliiin.  yrl  il 
does  not  pustest  all  the  powers  whu'h  usually  belong  lo  the 
SOVGicigiiiy  ut  a  nation.  Certain  specitied  powers,  enumeralrd  ia 
Ihc  Const  iiutton.  have  been  conferred  tipoa  U;   and  neither  the 


DRED  SCOTT  DECISrOy. 


legitlat!re.  exemlive,  nor  juHici.-il  dcparlmi^ts  of  the  goremfiMnt 
can  lawfully  eicrcUe  any  niiihoriiy  beyond  the  limits  marked  out 
by  Ihe  CunstilulioR.  Ami  in  rei;ul.iiiTig  the  juriiciol  depnitmcnl, 
tlie  cases  iti  which  the  courts  o(  the  Unlicd  Stales  shall  hat-e 
jurisdiction  are  pariicularly  ;>n<l  sp«d6cally  enuineraicd  and 
tlclineil ;  and  ihry  arc  uoi  auihurizca  to  lake  cogniiaiicc  ol  any 
case  which  doM  not  come  wiihin  the  description  therein  specified^ 
Hence,  when  a  nlainiiff  »iics  in  a  court  o(  the  United  SihIc»,  it  is 
neceaurjr  that  he  shaul<l  Khow,  in  his  pleading,  ihat  the  suit  he 
hriiiK^ii  within  the  jtiiiuliction  of  tile  court,  anil  that  he  is  entitled 
to  sue  there.  ...  In  this  c:uie.  the  citi«cnship  is  averted,  but  il  is 
denied  by  the  defendant  in  the  manner  requited  by  the  rule*  of 
uleadini^.  and  the  fad  upon  which  tile  denial  is  ba&ed  is  admitted 
bv  the  ileinuirer.  And.  il  the  plea  and  demurrer,  and  judgment 
of  the  court  below  upon  il,  are  before  us  upon  this  record,  the 
<|uectian  to  be  decided  is,  wliRlhrr  the  fiicls  staled  in  the  plea  are 
DifGcienl  la  show  that  the  pUintiff  is  not  entitled  to  sue  as  a 
citizen  in  a  court  of  the  United  States.  .  .  . 

This  is  ceiiaiiily  a  very  serious  (|uestion.  and  one  thai  now  (or 
llie  tirsi  time  has  been  Ixouffht  for  decision  before  this  court.  But 
It  is  brought  here  by  those  who  hat'c  a  tii;hl  to  bring  it,  and  it  is 
our  duly  lo  meet  il  and  decide  it. 

The  <|uestion  is  simply  ihis :  Can  n  negro,  whose  anccston  were 
imimrted  into  this  conniry,.inil  sold  as  ^avcs,  become  a  member 
cii  the  pnliilcal  commnniry  formed  and  brnuKht  into  existence  by 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  Slalei.  and  as  such  become  entitled 
to  all  the  rtKhls,  and  |>rivilrt;es,  and  immufiities.  guaranteed  by 
that  insltumunl  lolhe  ciliieti?  One  ul  which  righls  is  the  privilege 
of  suing  in  a  cuun  of  the  United  Slates  in  ihe  cases  specilied  in 
the  Const iiution. 

Il  will  be  observe),  ihal  ihe  pica  applies  lo  that  class  of  persons 
only  whose  anccslnrs  were  negroes  of  the  African  race,  and  im> 
ported  into  IhLs  country,  and  sold  and  held  ns  sUtcs.  The  only 
inaltcr  in  issue  before  the  court,  therefore,  is.  whcihcr  the  descend- 
an(!t  of  such  slaves,  when  llicy  shall  be  tmancipalcd,  or  whoate 
burn  ol  pjtenis  wlio  had  become  free  before  their  birth,  are  citizens 
of  a  slate,  in  the  serise  in  which  the  word  crti/en  is  used  in  the 
Constiturion  o(  the  Unilcd  Suites,  And  this  being  ihe  only  mai- 
ler in  dispute  on  the  pleiailings,  the  court  musi  be  understood  as 
speaking  in  this  opinion  of  that  class  only.  That  is.  of  those 
persons  who  are  the  descendants  of  Africans  who  were  imported 
into  this  country,  ami  sold  as  slaves.  .  .  . 

The  wurdi  "  people  o(  the  United  States  "  and  "  cittzeas  "  are 
synonymous  teimv  and  mean  the  same  thmf-.  They  both  desciibe 
ine  poliiicjil  body  who.  according  to  oui  republican  inslitutions, 
form  the  sovereignly,  and  who  hold  llie  power  and  conduct  the 
eoremment  ihrougn  their  representatives.  They  are  what  we 
familiarly  c.ill  the  "  sovereign  people."  and  every  ciliten  is  one  of 
this  people,  and  a  constituent  member  of  this  sovereignly.    The 

ration  before  us  is,  wlveiber  the  class  of  persons  described  in 
plea  in  abaiemenl  compose  a  poriioit  of  this  people,  and  are 


r 


710 


DRED  SCOTT  DECIStOHT. 


tun 


coniiilueni  memtwn  of  ihU  soreniKniy  ?  We  ihink  they  are  bm, 
and  ihjit  ihcjr  are  not  incluilcJ.  anil  wrre  not  iiitrniVnJ  in  be  »• 
daded,  under  the  word  "ciiiieiu"  iii  the  Conaiituiiun,  and  nn 
therefore  rUim  none  o(  the  ng!\i>>  and  privileges  w  l)icli  iliui  initni- 
menl  prm-idcx  for  and  sccuirs  lo  eiiiicns  i>l  (he  Umied  St»ia, 
On  the  conirnry,  thejf  weri;  M  that  limr  cnnvdcrrd  .is  a  subiirA* 
nate  and  inlcrior  clau  of  beingK.  who  h^d  been  Milijiigjird  liy  tW 
■Jominant  race,  and  wheilicr  cniancipated  or  nol,  )'ei  rrmaifird 
subiect  to  ll>eir  aiilhorliy.  and  had  no  rights  or  privileges  but  toA 
as  those  wlio  held  the  power  and  the  goretnmeDl  might  choose  u 
grant  ibeni. 

Il  is  nol  ihc  province  of  the  court  10  decide  upon  the  juitke  m 
injutlice,  the  (ml icy  or  impolicy,  «(  these  laws.  The  d^-ctMon  d 
that  quHllon  hrlnngrd  to  the  political  or  law  makin);  powitr;  to 
(lioic  who  formed  ihr  ^iiverciKniy  and  (ranied  the  Ccintiituiioc- 
The  duty  of  (he  i^miit  iv,  tti  intetprel  the  iniiiument  liiry  hate 
(rained,  nitli  the  best  tij^hli  we  can  ol>4ain  on  the  subject,  and  ta 
admtniater  ii  ns  we  lind  it,  according  to  its  liuc  intent  antt  mran- 
ing  when  it  was  adopted. 

In  discussing  this  question  we  must  not  confound  the  riutitt  of 
citiienship  whkh  a  smtc  mjy  confer  within  its  own  limttL  and  Uw 
rif!htit  of  ciiii*ii*hip  aK  a  member  of  the  Union,  l(  does  nol  br 
any  means  follow.  tKcaimc  hr  hnit  nil  the  tighli  and  pritilrgrsuf  a 
cHiren  of  a  Mate,  that  he  must  be  a  ciiiten  of  the  llniird  Staua. 
He  may  have  all  the  rights  and  priTilc]ics  of  the  ciiLirn  of  a  ualt. 
and  yet  nol  beenltlled  to  the  rrghit  and  pHvilexex  of  a  ctliienia 
any  other  Stale.  For,  previous  to  the  a<I<>plio«i  of  ilit  Consiitutioa 
of  the  United  States,  every  Stale  bad  tlw  undoubted  right  tu  confrr 
on  whomsoever  it  pleased  the  character  ol  cituen.  and  to  cndov 
him  with  all  lis  righis.  Itui  this  character  of  caiii%c  waa  confoiMl 
lo  the  boiindarirs  of  tl>e  sUie.  and  gave  him  no  rij^hts  or  pririk)|et 
in  04her  slates  brynnd  thow^  secured  to  him  by  Ihe  laws  of  naliBOt 
and  Ihe  comity  of  st.-iiet.  Nor  h;ive  ibe  several  slates  surrrndered 
thcpawvrof  conferring  these  rights  and  privileges  by  adopt  in  g  lW 
Constitution  of  ilic  United  States,  Each  stale  ntay  still  cnMler 
them  upon  an  al>en,  or  anyone  it  thinhs  nroprr,  or  upon  any  clau 
or  description  of  persons :  yei  he  would  not  be  a  citirrn  Hi  lli> 
sense  in  which  that  word  to  usrd  in  the  Constitution  of  the  Untied 
.Stales,  iM>T  entitled  lo  sue  as  such  in  one  ol  its  courts,  nor  la  llie 
privileges  and  immunities  of  a  crtiien  in  the  other  Siatei.  The 
rights  which  he  would  acquire  would  be  restricted  lo  the  Stale 
wnich  gave  them.  Tlie  Constitution  has  conferred  on  Co«i«t» 
Ihe  right  to  establish  an  uniform  ruli"  of  naiuraliiation,  ami  this 
right  is  evidrnlty  etchisivcnnd  Ims  ,nln-nyi  been  he)d  by  l!ii«  court 
lo  be  so.  ConM^uenlly,  no  state.Eince  lli*  adoption  of  the  Cnn* 
stliulioii.  can  by  naiiiraliilng  .an  alien  invest  him  with  the  nctiH 
and  privileges  secuieit   to  a  citizen  of  a  state  undei    the  tedeial 

l^vemment.  allhnugh.  so  far  as  the  Stale  alone  was  rni  . '   he 

would    UMloulMoliy    l>e   rntitlcd    to    the  rights  «t    a  id 

doihed  with  all  ihe  rights  and  mimiinities  which  ihr  ^, ;.:ua 

and  Uw«  of  the  slate  attocheil  tu  that  charaatr. 


1 


liW)  S.  C.  ORDINANCE  OF  SECESSION.  711 

It  is  v«r>  clor.  ibereton,  Ituit  no  Mak  can,  by  any  act  or  law  of 
its  own.  pauMi  since  the  adoption  of  Ihe  ConMiiution.  introduce  a 
new  rn ember  iniothe  political  community  created  by  the  ConMi- 
lUlion  o(  Ihc  United  Slates,  It  cniinm  make  llira  it  member  of  this 
community  hy  mAkin^  him  a  member  of  its  own.  And  fur  t lie 
tatnc  rca-soti  it  cantiot  introduce  any  petsun.  or  dcKriplion  of 
persons,  who  were  not  iiiiendeil  to  be  einbmccd  in  this  new 
political  family,  wliii:h  the  Curisiitutioti  brought  into  existence,  but 
wcfe  intended  to  be  eicluded  (torn  it. 

The  ((ucstion  then  ariscft,  whether  the  provisions  of  the  Cnnsii- 
lulion.  in  relation  to  the  penonaJ  rights  .nnd  pnvilr);n  to  which 
the  citizen  of  a  state  should  be  entiiicd,  embraced  the  t\v%to  African 
race,  »t  that  time  in  this  country,  or  who  mi^bt  alieiward  be 
imported,  who  had  thtn  or  should  afterwaid  be  made  free  in  any 
suie  ;  and  (o  put  it  111  the  power  of  a  single  state  10  make  him  a 
citlren  of  the  United  States,  and  endtie  liim  with  the  ftill  iiEhls  of 
citizenship  in  every  oilier  state  wilhoiil  their  cnni^cnt  ?  Dnct  the 
Constitution  of  the  Unitrd  States  act  upon  him  whenever  lie  shall 
be  made  free  under  the  laws  of  the  state,  and  railed  there  to  the 
r^ink  of  a  cillien.atid  immediately  clothe  him  with  all  the  privileges 
t>l  a  citizen  in  evefy  other  slate,  and  in  its  own  cuuits? 

The  court  think  the  Atfimutive  of  these  propositions  citnnot  btt 
maintained.  And  if  il  cannot,  the  p]ait\liff  in  error  could  not  be  x 
citi/en  o(  the  StAie  of  Ntissouti.  within  the  meaning  of  the  Consti- 
lution  of  the  Unitcil  Stales,  and,  consci]ucolly,  was  not  cnlilkd  to 
sue  in  its  cotttis. 

SOUTH  CAROLINA  ORmNANCE  Of  SECESSION,   tS6o. 

An  (inllnance  to  dissolve  Ihe  Union  between  the  State  of  South 
Carolina  and  Other  States  united  with  her  under  the  coinjuct 
entitled  "  The  Constlttttion  of  the  United  States  of  Anieiica.~ 

We.  the  People  o(  the  St.ite  of  South  Carolina,  in  Convention 
assembled,  do  declare  and  ordain,  and  it  is  hereby  declared  and 
ordained,  that  the  Ordinance  adopted  l)y  us  in  Convention,  on  the 
Twenty-third  o(  May.  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  »even 
liiinilred  and  eit;hty*ei);hl.  whereby  the  Cunstitutlon  o(  the  United 
States  was  r^tilied.and  also  all  other  Acts  and  patis  of  Acts  ol  liie 
General  Assembly  u(  the  State  tatifyini;  amendments  of  the  s^id 
Constitution,  HTc  hereby  repevileil.  .inil  the  union  now  subsisting 
lietwern  South  Carolina  and  other  Slates,  under  t)ic  itnmc  of  (he 
Uniictl  St.ttes  of  Aineiica,  is  hereby  dissolved. 

SOtTTH  CAROLIKA  DCCLARATION  OP  ISDEPRKDCNCF.,  1S60. 

The  Stale  of  South  Carolina,  having  determined  to  resume  Iwr 
separate  and  pigiial  place  among  nations,  deems  il  due  to  herself, 
to  the  remaining  United  St.-itn  of  America,  and  lo  the  nations  of 
the  world  that  stie  should  declare  (tie  causes  which  have  led  Iq 
this  act. 


Jt2        S.  C.  DECLAKATION  OF  INDEPEXDENCB. 

In  the  year  1765,  tl«t  portion  of  ihe  Biiiish  empire  cniUi  _ 
Great  Britain,  untlenook  10  miikc  Uwi  (ur  thi?  govpniincnt  nf  ibit 

fiortioti  toinpoicJ  ol  tJie  ihirtecn  Amtiican  coiunii--v  A  sirujgih 
or  l)i«  riclil  of  Hclf'^uvrrfitiicnl  riisunl.  which  iinulKfd,  tin  tlie  4ih 
of  julv,  177(1.  in  a  (leclnr.ilion  l>y  the  colonirt.  ■'  ih.il  Itiry  arr,  ainl 
of  rigiil  ought  to  be.  free  and  independent  stales.  Anil  lliat.  at  Im 
ami  indcileniicnt  siHie».  th<^j-  have  full  jxiwer  lo  levy  war.  tocon- 
cludc  peace,  contract  nUiiiTices.  »lal>liih  cvinmcrcc.  niid  do  aO 
other  acts  and  ihinR!!  which  inde|>ciMlcni  slain  inuy  tA  riffhi  da" 

They  further  wkmnly  declare,  thai  whenever  ai>y  ■' form  d 
goveinRMrnl  i>ccoiiies  dcsliuclive  of  ihc  ends  for  which  it  aas 
e&ubli&hed,  ii  is  ihc  ri);hi  of  thai  people  to  alter  or  al>uiiih  it.  tmk 
lo  insliluic  a  new  govrrnincnl.  Deeming  ihc  govertiinenl  ft 
Great  Biilain  in  have  become  duirucliK  ol  thrsc  ends,  ibey 
declared  that  the  colonic*  "  are  absolved  from  all  ailrgijiicc  (o  ibr 
British  crown,  and  that  all  potiiical  connecliun  Irrtiveen  ihein  and 
(he  Slates  ol  Great  Biiuin  is  atxl  oughl  10  be  loUlly  dissolve^!." 

In  pursuance  of  this  decUralion  nf  indrpcodericc.  each  nf  lie 
thirteen  slates  Moceetled  lo  cxcfci!«  lis  srpgir.itc  Mn-eiiri|^tT; 
adopted  for  itself  a  cmiMitUlkin,  am)  apnolnlril  ofTieets  fnr  IM 
admlnislralion  of  govcinmetil  In  all  its  dep.irlnients— legisUUit. 
executive,  and  juOicinl.  For  piir|Kise  ol  dcfenw.  they  united  ihrs 
anus  and  (heir  counsels;  and,  in  I77li,ihey  united  in  a  league 
knovtn  u  ll>c  arlicles  of  cotikdnaiivit.  nlirirby  itiey  agreed  M 
intrust  the  administration  of  their  estcriMl  relations  in  a  conunm 
agent,  known  as  the  Congreu  of  the  United  Slates,  enpiesal; 
declaring  in  the  firsr  article,"  that  each  slate  reiains  IIk  sovrrdgnif. 
freedom,  and  independence,  anil  every  power,  jurisdtctiun.  sM 
right  which  IS  not. by  (his  confederation,  expresftly  ddcgalctl  iu  IW 
United  .Stales  in  Conf^ess  aviembled." 

Under  this  confedcr;it>on  (be  war  oj  (be  Rerolution  was  carried 
an.  and  on  the  jd  of  ScptendM.T,  178^,  (he  contest  ended,  and  a 
definite  (rcaty  was  signed  b)'  Great  Btitain,  in  nhich  st>e  acknowt* 
edged  (be  independence  of  the  colonies  in  the  (oHowtng  i-rmi  ■ 

"  Article  I.  Hi*  Britannic  Majcsly  aclinowkdcf*  ll'  Til 

Slalcx,  vit. :  New  llampshirr.  Maixachuieiis   Hay,  1:'  i^ul 

and  Provi<lecice  Plani.iiion.  Cimneciicm.  Nfw  Vork, 
Pennsylvania.  I>eU\varc.  Murylaml.  Virginia,  North  (' 
CaioIiiu.  nni\   Geoi^ia.  to   tie    free,   uiverei^in.  and    iFmrj-rni 
litatr*  ;  that  he  treats  thcin  :ts  such  ;  and  for  himself,  his  hdra.. 
MtccessoTs,  rrlin(|uishet  all  claim  to  Ibe  goveinincnt.  hiofiri! 
and  leiritorial  rights  of  (he  same,  and  every  pail  (hereol." 

Thus  wa»  eiUblishetl  Ihe  two  gii-al  principles  asM>rlrd  !>y  tkr 
coionies.  namely,  the  tifihl  of  a  stale  to  go\-em  ilw!f,  nnd  (he  right 
of*  people  10  abolish  a  governnieni  when  il  becomes  ilrstnictm 
of  the  enil\  for  which  it  was  insliiuK^d.  And  coiiciirrrnt  with  ibr 
establishment  of  (hew  principles  was  ibe  (aci.  that  each  cntonj 
became  and  was  recognite<l  by  the  mother  country  as  a  bnt 
sovereign,  and  imtcpendcni  state. 

In  1787,  deputies  were  appointed  by  the  tlair^  10  r^ie  ll« 
articles  of   Coufeilciatioii,  and    on  September   17th,    17S7,    tkc 


1«0I      i  a  DECLARATION  OF  INDEPENDENCE.       7'3 


■lei)uti?t  m:i>inmcii(!«<l  for  tht  ndoptiun  <>[  the  siiiies  lUe  ailiclea 
of  union  kiiowii  a»  the  conslituiion  o(  the  Uiiiitd  Slates. 

Tlic  p.titic^  10  wliom  the  conMrtuiion  wjs  &ul>iniiied  wcr«  the 
several  sovcingn  &i«ics;  ihcy  were  to  iigrec  or  disagree,  and  when 
nine  o(  ihem  ag^reed,  ih«  conipaci  was  io  lake  effect  among  iliosc 
concurring;;  and  ihe  i;ri)cral  government,  U  the  corninon  ageni, 
wax  then  la  l>c  vestcil  wiih  their  authority. 

If  only  nine  of  (he  iliirieen  lUtea  had  cor>ccHTed.  the  other  four 
woukt  have  reiiiaineil  as  ihey  then  were — separate,  sorereign  slates. 
Imkpendritt  of  .111V  o(  the  provisions  of  the  constitution.  In  faci, 
two  of  the  (tales  did  not  accede  to  the  consllTuiinn  until  long  after 
it  had  gone  tnio  oprralion  among  the  other  eleven  ;  ami  during 
that  interrat.lhey  exerciirdlhr  functions  of  an  inrlrjwndcnl  nation. 

By  this  contiiiulion,  cert.iin  duties  were  ch.irgrd  im  the  several 
slates,  am!  the  exertiie  of  cerl.iin  of  their  power*  not  dele£aled  to 
the  UnJled  Slates  by  the  constitution,  nor  prohibited  by  it  10  the 
States,  arc  reserved  to  the  sMies  rcspcc lively,  or  to  the  people. 
On  the  33d  of  M.iy,  1788.  South  Carolina,  hy  a  eonvenimn  of  her 
people,  pAued  an  ordinance  assenting  to  (his  consiilution.  aiitl 
afterwards  altering  her  own  consiilution  to  conform  herself  to  the 
obligation  she  had  undertaken, 

Thus  was  esublished,  by  coinp.ncl  between  the  stales,  a  govern-* 
ment  with  dcrmed  objects  and  powers,  limited  to  the  express 
vrords  of  the  gram,  and  10  so  much  mote  only  as  w.is  necessary  Io 
execute  the  power  granted.  The  hmitjtions  lell  the  whole  re- 
maining m%M  of  pnwrr  subject  10  the  clause  reserving  it  (o  the 
Slate  or  (o  the  people,  and  rendered  unnecessary  any  specification 
of  reserved  pciwcrt. 

We  hold  th.it  the  gnvernmcni  thus  exiabtisheil  is  subject  to  the 
two  great  principles  asserted  in  the  declaraiion  of  independence, 
and  we  hfltil  further  il»at  the  mode  of  its  lurmaiion  subjects  it  to  a 
third  fundamental  principle,  namely — the  law  of  compact.  We 
maintain  that  in  every  compact  between  iwo  or  more  parlies,  ihe 
obli^iion  is  mutual— that  the  failure  of  one  of  the  contracting 

Carties  to  perform  a  maicrial  p.in  of  the  agreement  entirely  rc- 
raMs  the  obligation  of  the  other,  and  that,  where  no  arbiter 
is  appointed,  each  party  is  remitted  Io  his  own  judgment  to  deter> 
mine  the  fact  of  failure  with  .ill  its  consectuences. 

In  the  present  case  thai  fact  is  esialilished  with  certainty.  We 
assert  thai  fifteen  of  ihe  stales  have  delihcraicly  refused  for  years 
past  to  fuliill  their  constituiiona!  obligation,  and  wc  refer  to  ibcir 
own  statutes  for  the  proof. 

The  constitution  of  Ihe  United  Slates,  in  its  fourth  articte,  pro- 
vides as  follows: 

"  No  person  held  to  terrice  or  labor  in  one  state,  under  the  laws 
thereof,  escaping  into  another,  shall,  in  consequence  ol  anv  law  or 
regulation  tbrrein,  be  discharged  fiom  any  service  or  laoor,  but 
shall  be  delivered  up,  on  claim  of  the  pany  to  whom  such  service 
or  tabor  may  be  due." 

This  stipulation  vras  so  tnatenal  Io  the  compact  that  without  it 
that  compact  would  not  hare  been  made.     The  greater  number 


;i4       S.  C  DECi^XATlQN  OF  tNDEP£yi>EyC£.     HW 

oF  (he  conliaclingpattirs  Md  slaves,  and  lh«  auie  o(  Virgini 
had  previously  dr<^Urc<l  her  rslimale  of  its  value  by  making  it  tht 
condition  of  ccMJon  of  the  tcrniory  which  now  composes  Uictttia 
iiorili  of  ihe  Ohio  river. 

The  same  article  of  the  Cotixlllulinn  xtjpulialct  ilso  Iw  <im 
rendition  by  the  several  stales  of  fugitives  frnm  justice  tma  A* 
other  iiairs. 

The  general  Kovemmenl.  as  the  comriMKi  agent,  patccd  bwsM 
carry  into  effect  tlvese  siipuhittons  ol  the  states,  tor  many  jc«n 
IhcM  Uws  were  execuied.  But  »n  increasing  hostility  on  itr 
pait  of  the  noiihem  slates  to  the  insliiuiion  of  slavery  has  led  In 
a  disre]{3rd  of  their  obligations,  and  the  laws  of  the  nasi' 
government  have  ceated  to  eRecl  the  ol>)ects  ol  (he  conatititlML 
The  stales  of  Maine.  New  Hampshire.  Vermont.  Mascachuttfli. 
Connecticut.  Rhode  Isbad.  New  York,  i'cnnxylrania.  lllinaiv 
Indiana,  Ohio,  Michigan,  Wisconsin,  and  Iowa  have  enacted  bm 
which  cither  nullify  ihe  acts  of  Congress,  or  render  useless  tay 
attempt  to  execute  them.  In  many  of  these  stales  the  fugitrrt  it 
dischaiii^d  from  the  serrice  of  lalmi  clainvct).  and  in  none  of  llim 
has  the  alale  xo^'ernmenl  complied  with  the  .itipulatMm  mailt  ■ 
the  consliluliuii.  The  stateuf  New  Jersey,  at  an  early  day.  luuscil 
a  law  for  the  rei>dilioii  of  tu|;ilive  slaves  in  confoTniiiy  wMb  hrr 
cnnsliliilional  undertaking:  bol  (he  current  of  anti-slavery  fetiing 
h.ii  led  her  more  rrcrnlly  to  rtucl  laws  which  rcndtr  inopeeiUrf 
(he  reinctlies  provided  by  her  own  law,  and  by  (he  laws  ol  Con- 
Kren.  In  the  state  of  New  Voiit  even  the  right  of  transit  fers 
slave  has  been  dcnicil  by  Iter  tribiinils.  ami  the  stAlcs  of  Ohio  and 
Iowa  have  refused  to  surrender  to  jmiice  fugitives  charged  witfc 
murder  and  inciting  servile  insurieclion  in  tlie  state  <4  Vlipin- 
Thus  the  constitutional  compsct  Ids  been  dchberately  broken  Mt 
disregarded  by  (he  non-slaveholdlng  stales,  and  (he  consequean 
loUovrs  thai  South  Camlina  ii  relrasrii  frnm  it«  ohl ignition. 

The  ends  for  which  this  conslitution  uai  framed  .iir  itr^Iiird 
by  itself  to  be"(o  form  a  tnore  peifecl  union,  csl  .  i*e, 

insure  domestic  tianquillity.  provide  for  the  common  ii  |iii>- 

ted  (Ik  general  welfare,  and  secure  the  bfeasin^s  of  libcriy  la 
ourselves  and  posterity." 

These  ends  il  endcavoeeil  to  accomplish  by  a  federal  goT«r>- 
ment.  iri  which  each  sinir  was  tvcosniml  as  an  e<]ual,  and  had 
separate  control  over  its  own  institutions.  Tlie  right  of  property 
iit  slaves  was  reeogniied  by  giving  (O  free  persons  distinct  polit- 
tral  rights:  by  givrnf-  them  the  light  to  reltrescnt.  and  burdcnMC 
them  with  direct  taxes  for  ihrcc-tilth*  of  their  slnves  ;  by  authm* 
iting  the  importation  of  <1avr<i  fnr  twenty  years,  and  by  s(ipulatla( 
lor  Ihe  rendition  of  fugitives  from  laltor. 

We  affirm  that  these  ends  for  which  this  govenmirnt  aas  insti- 
tuled  have  been  defeated,  and  the  government  >!*■  -n  nvade 

deslrticlivr  of  them   by  the  action  of  the  non--'l  '  r  g  sut*. 

These  slates  have  aiuumed  the  light  of  deciding  upim  the  pr<>prl«tT 
of  oor  domestic  institutions,  ami  h*ve  denieil  llic  nglits  til  piiiprny 
esiablUheil  in  fifteen  of  the  slates  and  re»)gtuied  by  ihc  cm- 


riL 


lint    j:  c.  declaration  of  independence.     t'S 


alilutiun;  lliey  hui-e  ileomidced  ux  sinful  ihe  initilution  of  iJavery: 
lliey  have  penniltei)  tile  open  tstaliliithmenl  amon^  ihem  of 
tocieiies  whose  Jivoncd  oi>jcvt  is  to  iliiturb  the  peace  and  claim 
ilic  propcny  of  iticcm^eii&of  oihrrstuivs.  They  have  encouraf-ed 
and  at»i»icii  ihou&ands  of  out  slaves  to  leave  tlicit  honiei.  and 
those  wlio  remain  h^vc  bt«n  incited  by  emissaiies.  books,  and 
pictures  lo  servife  insuitcciion. 

For  MTienty-five  year*  this  agitation  has  been  st»dily  incTeasIng, 
until  it  has  now  secured  toits;ud  Ihepowet  of  thecotnmongovcrn- 
aient.  Observing  Ihe  forms  of  the  conMitution,  a  Mclioiiai  party 
hu  found  within  tliat  article  establishing  the  executive  depart- 
ment the  mejns  of  subvening  the  co^istiiuiion  ilself.  A  geo- 
graphical line  b.is  l>ecn  drawn  across  the  Union,  aiid  all  ihe  sinlcs 
north  of  ihal  line  hare  united  in  [h«  election  of  a  man  (o  the  high 
office  of  President  tA  Ihe  United  Slates  whose  opinions  and  pur- 
poKCS  arc  hostile  lo  slavery.  He  is  to  he  iniriisted  with  the  ad- 
miniftlraiion  of  the  common  government,  because  he  has  declared 
that  that  "goveinnieni  cannot  endure  permanently  half  sluve, 
half  free."  and  that  Ihe  public  mind  must  rc»t  in  the  belief  tlui 
sUvery  is  in  the  course  of  ultimate  exiinclion. 

This  sectional  combination  lor  the  subversion  of  ihe  conslituilon 
has  been  aided  in  some  of  the  slates  by  HevatinR  lo  citiicnshlp 
persons  who.  by  the  supreme  law  of  Ihe  land,  arc  incapable  nf  be- 
coming ciliien*.  and  ilieirvi>iet  have  been  utK>d  to  Inaugurate  a  new 
policy  noslile  to  the  loulh,  and  deslruclivc  of  its  peace  and  safety. 

On  the  4ih  of  March  next.  Ihls  narly  will  lake  nastej^ttion  of  Ihe 
governmenl.  It  has  annouiKcd  that  the  south  sball  he  excluded 
from  the  common  terniory;  that  the  judicial  tribunals  shall  be 
made  sectional,  and  thai  a  war  n^ust  be  waged  against  slavery 
until  it  shall  cease  ihnitighoul  ibc  United  Slates. 

The  gu.iraniecs  of  Ihe  co«i.ititullon  will  then  no  longer  exist ; 
the  equal  nghis  of  the  slates  will  be  lost.  The  siavehoMing  stales 
will  no  hmffef  have  the  power  of  setl'^oremment  or  sclf-proiecilon, 
and  ll»e  federal  government  will  have  become  their  enemies. 

Sectional  tntciest  and  animosity  will  deenen  the  irriiation.  and 
all  hO|)e  of  remedy  is  rendered  vain  by  the  laci  that  public  opinion 
at  ihc  Roiih  has  invested  a  great  political  error  with  the  sanctions 
ol  a  more  rtionrous  religious  hrhef. 

We,  iheielore.  the  people  of  South  Carolina,  by  our  detegales 
in  convention  .Tucmbied.  appealing  lo  ihr  Supreme  Judge  of  ihe 
world  for  llie  reclllude  ol  our  iiitciilions,  have  solemnly  <leclare4i 
that  the  union  heretofore  existing  between  ihis  stale  and  ihe 
other  stales  of  North  America  Is  dissolved,  and  that  the  stale  of 
South  Carolina  has  resumed  her  position  among  the  nations  of 
the  world  as  a  free,  sovereign,  and  independent  Stale,  with  full 
powen  to  levy  war,  conclude  peace,  conirsct  alliances,  establish 
comroerce,  and  to  do  all  other  acts  and  things  which  Independent 
Slates  may,  of  rii;hl.  do. 

And.  lor  (lie  supjKirt  vA  this  dccUration.  with  a  firm  reliance  on 
(h«  pTDiection  of  Uivine  I'luvidence.  we  mutually  pledge  to  each 
Other,  our  lives,  our  loiiuncs,  and  our  ucred  bonar. 


716 


CRlTTElfDEfr  AWENDStENTS. 


ain 


AMEKDMemS  ritOPOttEO  IM  CONGRESS  BY  CHITTRKOSK,  iKl. 


Whrms.  i^rious  and  alatming  dliiM^sIons  have  arisen  hex 
ihe  Nonhcrn  «nii  Souilicin  StiSics,  cnnccrning  t\\e  rish<>  "nl 
securily  of  ihc  rights  of  llic  slavelwlding  Sinlrs.  8I11J  trspeoiK 
iheit  righl«  in  the  common  tctritoty  o(  the  Unitc<t  Slates;  jm 
whcTcai  il  in  eminenll)-H<!sir.-i)>lc.-iiMl  piti|>cr  (hat  these  ilisscnwon^ 
which  now  (hrcAicn  ihc  very  exixience  uf  thiii  l^ntnn,  should  (ic 
prrnuncritly  quieleil  anil  w^tled  hy  coii&liluiionut  provisions  wliwh 
thai]  do  e(|ual  ju!ittcc  to  all  seclionk  and  Ilicretiy  mtore  xa  ilit 
|>eopl«  ihM  peace  and  good  will  which  ooeht  10  prenil  l>eiir«cii 
all  Ihe  citiKii»  of  Ihc  Uni<c<l  Slates :  Therefore, 

Rewlvrd  liy  the  Scn.iic  and  Mouk  of  Rcprr«cnlailre*  ol  the 
Unitetl  Siatc«  of  America  in  Congress  asv'mhipd  ((wt»-ih>rt!t  of 
bolh  iloiitrs  conciirrint;),  Thai  the  followiri];  ariictes  he.  and  Ut 
liercb)'.  proposed  and  submltied  »,%  amend  men tn  (o  ihr  Coitsiwii' 
I1011  of  the  United  Stales,  which  shall  he  valid  lo  all  tnlcnis  ond 
puipoMS,  a»  [>ar(  of  saki  Conuiiulion.  whcD  ratirMd  by  convmtian) 
ol  tnm>(our(hs  of  ih«  Mvcra)  Stales: 

ARTICLE   I. 

In  alt  the  tcrrilory  of  the  Unitcl  Slates  now  held,  or  herp- 
after  aci)ui red.  silualcd  nonh  of  laiuudc  36°  30.  ftLxvcry  or  int«i- 
untaiy  servilude,  eicepi  A,ta  punishnvent  for  crime,  n  prolubiHd 
while  such  teffilory  shall  remam  imdei  lertllortal  govcinment.  In 
all  Ihe  lerriloty  south  of  said  line  of  latitude,  slavery  of  the  Alticu 
race  is  liereliy  teco^^niied  as  eni.itinf;.  and  sliall  not  be  itktcfftnd 
will)  by  Cont;te<i%.  Cut  ahatl  be  protected  a.i  pioperty  by  all  (he 
dcfMrtnxiits  of  ibc  tcriilorial  governnieiil  during  tis  continuance. 
And  when  any  Trriiior)'.  iiortTi  01  south  ol  said  line,  wtlhin  soci 
boumUnes  as  Congressman  prescribe. shall  coniaiit  ihe  populatiea 
requisite  for  a  member  ot  Congress  according;  lo  the  ihcn  Federal 
ratto  of  representation  of  the  people  of  the  Unilnl  Slalrs.  il  sha3. 
II  its  form  of  governmenl  he  republican,  be  .Tdmitlctl  into  ihe 
Union,  on  an  equal  fooling  with  Ihe  original  Sutcs,  with  or  «nih* 
out  slaKif,  u  the  oooHlilulion  of  Mich  new  Stale  may  piuride. 

ARTICLE  II. 

Conf^ess  shall  have  no  power  to  abolish  tiavcrv  in  plitet 
under  its  exclusive  jiirisdiclion.  and  liiuate  wtlhin  m«  Umlti  iA 
Stales  that  peimit  the  holding  of  slaves. 

ARTICLE  III. 

Con|rre«  shall  Iiave  no  power  to  abolkh  tlaven 
IKslricI  of  Cnlumhis.  $0  long  as  il  exists  in  ihe  adj  .  n 

of  Virgi'iia  anri  Matyl.tnd.  or  either,  nor  willmui  ii.r  ..ih.-ivoat 
of  ihe  >iifviihii:inlx.  nor  without  just  compensation  first  mai)e  lo 
such  owners  of  slaves  as  da  not  con.iient  to  such  atiolithmefit 
Nor  shall  Congrettjd  any  time  |irohibit  uflWcn  o(  tlic  Federal 


1M11 


CRiTTENDEN  AMENDMENTS. 


7*7 


Cftvcmmenl.  or  mcnibcn  o(  Cungrcsa.  whose  duiies  rcquiie  litem 
lo  br  in  taid  DlMnci.  from  tiiinK>'<^'  Willi  tli«m  tlicir  sliin-s.  and 
holding  ihcm  bs  such,  during  llic  lime  their  diilits  injy  require 
them  to  remain  tlieic.  and  aficrwaid  [iikitig  ihciii  (loiii  tlic  Ui^tnci. 

ARTICLE    IV. 

Congress  sliall  have  no  powCT  to  prohibit  or  hinder  the  Irans- 
pottalion  a(  sUvca  (ivin  uiie  Slate  lo  another,  or  to  a  Terri- 
tory in  Mliich  ^UvcA  Hic  b]r  law  pcniiilled  to  be  held,  nhetbcr  lliat 
irftosporiBtion  be  by  land,  navigable  nvcrs.  or  by  the  sca. 

ARTICLE   V. 

That  in  addition  to  the  iiruviaions  of  the  third  piiragnph  of 
the  beeond  section  of  [lie  luurth  article  o(  the  Cunstilulion  ol 
the  Uiiitcil  States,  Congietis  shall  have  power  lo  prtiviilc  by  law. 
^nd  It  shall  he  it»  duty  vo  to  pmvide.  thfit  the  United  Siiiies  !ihall 

finy  to  ihc  owner  who  tlull  apply  for  il.  the  full  v.iliie  of  hit 
iiKiiivr  slave  in  all  c.u»  when  the  marKli.il  or  oihrr  tiRiccr  whosA 
duly  it  wai  to  ajrcit  wid  fuKiiive  was  prevenled  from  «>  doinj;  hy 
violence  or  inliniidaliun.  or  when,  after  arrest,  niiid  (u](iiive  w.is 
rescued  by  force,  (he  owner  ihercby  prevented  and  ubiliuvted  in 
the  puisuit  oi  hi«  icnicdy  lor  the  recovery  of  his  fugitive  slare 
uttder  (lie  said  clause  of  the  Constiluiion  and  the  laws  rtiade  in 
pursuance  thereof.  And  in  all  such  cases,  ivlien  tile  United  States 
»hall  pay  (or  such  (UKilive.  they  shall  have  the  right,  in  ilidr  own 
IVAine,  to  Kile  (he  county  in  which  said  violence,  intimidatiori.  or 
resctK  WAS  coitimittcd.  and  to  recover  fruin  it.  nilh  inlercal  and 
ilam^et.  the  atnounl  paid  by  them  fur  said  futiilive  slave.  And 
the  iaid  county.aller  it  has  paid  said  aniount  to  the  United  Stales, 
may.  for  its  idcinnily.  sue  and  recover  tioni  llie  urungdi^is  or 
rescoei*  by  whom  ihc  owner  was  prevented  from  ihe  recovery  of 
his  fugitive  slave,  in  like  manner  as  the  owner  himself  might  luve 
sued  and  recovered. 

ARTICLE  VI. 

No  future  amendment  of  the  Constiliition  shall  affect  the 
five  preceding  aiticles;  nor  ihc  third  paragraph  o(  the  second 
section  ot  the  first  article  of  the  Con^liiiiiinn  :  nor  ihr  third  para- 
graph of  the  MTComl  xeclion  of  Ihc  fourth  article  of  said  Con.ililu- 
tion.  and  no  amendment  shall  be  made  lo  the  Cun^iiiuliun  which 
shall  nulhotiie  or  give  to  Congress  any  power  to  abulish  ur  inter- 
fere with  slavery  in  any  of  lite  Statu  by  whose  laws  it  is,  or  may 
be  allowed  or  permitted. 

And  whitens,  also,  besides  these  causes  of  dissension  embraced 
In  The  forrRcMng  amendments  prflpowd  to  the  Con^tiiuiioti  of  the 
United  Stales,  there  are  others  which  come  nithin  the  juriwlktion 
of  Con;;ress,  as  tar  as  its  power  will  extend,  lo  remove  all  jnst 
cause  lor  the  popular  discontent  and  af^tation  which  now  diUuib 
the  peace  of  (he  country,  and  threaten  the  stability  of  its  UiUtlu- 
lious;  Therefore, 


718 


CRITTENDEN  AMENDMENTS. 


Qttl 


t.  Resolred  by  (lie  Senate  and  llou.ie  of  Rcpmcnlatives  tA  tta 
United  Suics  of  America  in  Concips*  aMembleil.  That  the  bwi 
now  In  force  (or  the  recovery  o(  (ugiin-e  slaves  ate  in  strict  puna- 
anceof  lhc)ilaiii  anil  miuitlalury  p ru vision s  ol  the  Coiitiltlution. ikI 
hare  been  ^anciioiieil  as  valid  and  constiiaiional  bv  itic  judcnmR 
of  the  Supmite  Cojit  of  the  Unilrd  Suirs  ;  that  the  hlavelioli' 
.Stales  arc  enitilcil  to  ihe-  f^iililiil  obscnante  and  execution  of  i 
IuwIl.  and  tliat  liicy  ought  not  to  I>e  rc|>calcd,  or  m>  iiuhIiAc 
changed  ax  in  im|i;iir  tlicir  efficiency ;  anil  that  IdMS  ought  io1 
made  (oi  the  punishmenl  <A  those  who  allempt  by  mcuc  u(  llu 
slavo.  or  other  illegal  means,  to  hinder  or  defeat  the  due  exemtioa 
of  said  Uws. 

3.  That  all  State  laws  which  conflict  with  the  fugitire  slare  i 
o*  Congrw5,  or  anj'  other  con^tttutional  acls  o*  Congtrss.  or 
in  their  operation,  imppHe,  hinder,  or  delajr  'l^  F''^^  course  and  \ 
execution  of  any  of  xaid  artu,  arc  null  and  xotA  bjr  th«  pUin  pra- 
visioflji  of  the  CiHistiluiion  of  the  United  Slate* ;  yet  ihoM'  SiMt 
laws,  void  a*  they  .ire,  have  given  color  to  ptaclice.  and  led  to  co*- 
s«lu«"ices  which  have  obvlrucled  the  due  vdnuni  strati  on  and 
execution  of  acts  of  Congress,  and  especially  the  «cts  for  Uie 
delivery  of  fugitive  slaves,  and  h.ive  thereby  conirilnited  much  to 
the  discord  and  commotion  now  prevailing.  CongrcM,  ihetefon, 
in  the  present  perilous  juncture,  does  not  deem  it  improper, 
respectfully  ami  earnestly  to  recommend  the  repeal  of  those  Uwi 
to  the  several  Stales  which  have  cnacic<l  them,  or  such  leetsLalire 
corrections  or  ci  plana  I  ion  n  of  them  as  may  prevent  their  bang  uied 
or  perverted  to  iiicli  iniicliievnus  pur|>osc3. 

y  That  the  act  of  the  l8ih  of  Sepiember,  iScOv  commonly  called 
ihc  fupiive  slave  law,  ought  lo  be  so  ainendedu  to  mske  U»e  he 
of  the  coinmissioi>cr.  meniiuncO  in  (he  eighth  section  of  the  w1, 
equal  in  amount,  in  the  cases  decided  by  claimant.  And  to  avaU 
misconstruction,  (he  lau  clause  nf  the  fifth  section  n(  said  aei. 
which  auttiorircs  the  person  holding  a  warrant  for  the  anrsl  or 
detention  ■>(  a  fuj:iiive  slarc.  to  summon  to  his  aid  ihc  ^mw 
ti/milalus.  and  which  declares  tt  to  be  (he  duty  of  all  good  cituens 
to  HS$is(  him  in  its  execution,  ought  to  be  so  amended  a*  la 
e^iptessly  limit  the  authority  and  duty  to  case«  In  which  (lierv  ilial 
be  rewstance  or  daneer  of  resistance  or  rescue. 

4.  That  the  laws  Tnj  the  supprrsuon  of  (he  African  sUre-lraife, 
and  especially  those  ptoliihiimj;  Ihe  importation  of  ^lavrs  in  tin 
United  Slates,  ought  to  be  made  cITcclual,  and  otighl  in  be  thor- 
oughly executed;  and  all  further  enac(n»enls  necessary  to  llriBe 
ends  ought  to  be  promptly  made. 


AMENDMENTS   rROPOSEU    HV    THK    PKACK   CONrSSEMCE,   lter> 

ARTICLE  Xni. 

Section  1.  In  all   (he  present  lenrilory  of  the  Unite.*  ^mti*. 
nonh   of    the    parallel   of    56"    yi  of    nonh   Intiin  irt- 

lary  scrtitude,  except  in  puntsbtnent  of  ciinie,  ts  pr<'  In 


J'EACS  COXFEKEXCE  AMEXDMEXTS. 


»W  the  present  Trrtiloty  aouih  of  that  line,  (he  tialax  of  penons 
Iteltl  to  mrcluntary  service  or  l«bor.  a%  it  now  uinls.  sh»ll  not  be 
chnnged;  nor  »lull  uny  kw  be  passed  Xry  Congress  or  the  l*erii* 
torUl  Les>>''>''>"i  tu  hinikr  or  pretent  lh«  lakinx  <A  lucli  pcnons 
from  iuiy  o(  ihe  States  o(  thi<i  Unroii  to  said  Tcrntury.  nor  lo 
impair  the  rights  arising  fiom  said  relation ;  but  the  same  shall  be 
subjecl  to  )<i<ticial  cogniianoe  in  the  Federal  couns.  accorriing  to 
the  <™jr»c  of  live  cotninon  law.  When  any  Territory  nortli  or 
Miiitti  of  uhI  line,  within  such  boundary  as  Congress  ntay  pre- 
scribe, shall  contain  a  population  equal  lo  that  required  for  a  inrnw 
l>cr  of  Con^ttss.  it  shall,  if  its  lotm  of  Koveinmenl  be  rc|nit)tic4n. 
be  ^Mliiiiiti'tl  into  the  Union  vo  an  equal  fouling  wllh  the  original 
Slates,  with  or  willtoul  tnvolunuujserrilude.as  the  const  iiuiion  of 
such  Stjtc  nijiy  iiruvide. 

Skc.  3.  No  Territory  shall  be  ncauired  by  the  Uniie<l  Stales, 
except  by  discovery  and  for  naval  ano  commercial  stations,  tlrpois. 
and  transit  mutes,  without  the  concurrrncc  of  a  niajorily  of  all  the 
Senalors  Ironi  States  which  allow  involuni.iry  scnltude.  and  a 
majorily  of  all  llie  Senaiors  from  Slates  winch  prohiliil  that  tela- 
tkHl;  nor  shall  Terriloty  be  atquitetl  by  licalv,  titiless  Ihe  \-otes  of 
a  inajof ity  of  ilie  Senators  tiuni  cacli  class  oi  StjIcs  hereinbefore 
mentioned  be  cast  as  a  pan  of  ihe  two-thirds  niajoitly  necessary 
lo  the  raiification  of  such  treaty. 

Stc.  y.  Neither  ihc  Constitution  nor  any  amendment  ihereof 
shall  be  consliuei)  lo  give  Congress  power  to  legulite,  abolish,  or 
control,  within  any  Kliitc  the  relation  rslablishcd  or  le^'ogitiieil  by 
the  lavre  thereof  touching  persons  held  to  labor  or  involuntary 
service  Iherein.  nor  lo  inieriere  with  or  abolish  invutunlaiv  service 
in  (he  Districl  of  Columbia  without  Ihe  consent  of  Maiyland  and 
without  the  consent  of  the  owners,  or  making  (he  owners  who  do 
nol  ronsrnt  jusi  compensation  :  nor  the  power  to  intetfrie  with  or 
prohibit  Reprrsrninturs  and  others  from  luinging  with  ihem  10 
(III;  District  ol  Cohinibin.  retaining,  and  taking  away,  prrsnns  so 
lickl  to  l.ilior  or  seiricr ;  nor  the  power  lo  inlerlerc  with  or  abolish 
inroluntary  service  in  places  under  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  ihe 
United  Stales  wiihin  Ihoie  Stales  and  Teiriioriei  where  the  same 
is  esiablislicd  oi  ifeof;ni(cil ;  nut  ilie  power  (o  piuhibil  the  rernoval 
or  iransponaiion  ol  )ieisoiis  held  to  latMH  or  invotuntaiy  scivice  in 
any  Stale  or  Territory  of  tl«  United  Stales  to  any  other  Stale  Of 
Teltilory  ibcreol  wivere  it  is  eslablisheil  or  recogni/rd  by  law  ot 
usage,  antl  the  right  <liiring  Iransportalion.  l>y  sen  or  iii*cT.  of 
touching  at  potts,  shores  and  landings,  am!  of  landing  in  case 
of  disliess,  shall  exist  -.  but  not  tlic  ris;ht  of  transit  in  or  ihiough 
any  State  or  Terrilory.  or  of  sale  or  Iraflic.  against  llie  laws 
lltereof.  Noi  shall  Congress  have  povm  to  auttiurizc  any  higher 
rate  of  laxaiion  on  persons  licid  to  labor  or  service  ihan  on  land. 
The  bringing  into  Ihe  Distrirl  of  Columbia  o(  pcraons  held  10 
IrImm  or  service,  fur  sale,  or  placing  ihem  in  depots  to  be  aflcrwarris 
Iransfctred  In  nthcr  places  lor  sale  ai  nierchandise,  is  prohibited. 

Sec.  4-  The  third  junagraph  of  Ihe  second  section  of  the  fouiili 
■it  of  tbe  Consiitulion  sluU  not  be  coostnied  to  prevent  any  of 


7IO 


PEACE  CONFEREfifCE  AMEh'DUEKTS. 


rxm 


\\\t  Stales,  by  ap^rojirinlr  lrfp'«liitton.  and  ihroufh  ihe  acticn  rf 
llicir  juilkial  anil  minUteh^I  oBictrs,  from  cntomng  the  (IdinsT 
of  (ugitivcs  (roiu  labor  lo  (he  persuii  to  whoitt  such  service  or  bfaor 
bdue. 

Src.  5-  The  foreign  slive-irjiilc  is  hereby  forever  |>rohil>itrtl ;  uti 
il  shall  he  ihu  duty  of  Congiess  lo  pass  lawt  to  pm'eni  itic  impM- 
Intion  of  sUvcs,  coolies,  or  persons  Held  lo  service  or  l«lwit.  wm 
the  United  Slates  and  (he  Terriiorks  from  place*  be)<ond  '' 
limits  I  hereof. 

Sec.  6.  The  lirst.  third  and  fifth  lectionx.  lOKCiHrr  with  ika 
Mction  of  tticte  ameiidments.  ami  tite  thini  ihiragmph  d(  tbe 
second  section  of  the  fir&l  irlicle  of  ihe  Constitution,  and  the  t))M 
paragraph  of  the  sccomt  seciioti  ul  ilic  fourth  ntticle  thereof,  diii 
nm  be  ameniM  or  nholishett  wrjihmii  llie  con^^nl  of  all  the  Sum 

■Sfx.  7.  ConKre»  sh.-ill  provide  by  Uw  that  the  United  Slatn 
tliall  pa>-  to  the  owner  the  full  value  of  his  fugitive  from  Ubor,  la  iH 
zasK-i  where  Ihe  tniirihal  or  oilier  oflker.  wliose  duly  it  was  u 
arrest  such  (u;;iiive,  was  prevented  front  ut  doinc  by  i-iolcnicc  sad 
in  I  i  initiation  from  iiiubs  01  tiulous  asM.'mblat>et.  or  when  alltr 
aiicst  such  fugitive  Uii)  mcurd  by  hke  violciKc  or  intiruidatiMi 
and  llie  owner  iheicby  depriiciJ  of  ihc  XAme;  and  the  » 
anccof  such  itAyincnl  shall  preclude  the  owner  from  further 
to  xuch  fiiKilivc.  Conemt  shall  piuvidc  by  law  for  »ecun 
Ihc  cilixens  uf  each  Stale  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  a\ 
In  the  several  Stales. 


COKSnTUTION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES  OF 
AMERICA.   1861. 

We.  (he  people  tA  Ihe  Confederate  Slates,  each  State  aciinf  ■ 
its  sm'ereign  and  inilcpen<t<:til  character,  in  uider  10  fnrin  a  pma^ 
nent  feiletai  govern meii I,  establish  iosiicc.  insure  ilonieMic 
()iiitlity.  and  sccnie  the  blessings  of  libeity  10  ourselves  a 
pusieriiy — invoking  the  favor  and  guidance  o(  Almighty 
ordaiii  and  establish  this  ConstJlutton  of  Ihe  Confederate  Staiarf 
America. 

ARTICLE  I. 

Section  t.  '  All  keislative  powers  herein  ddegaied  diail  IM 
vested  tn  a  Congress  ofthe  Confrderate  Stales,  whlcn  slull  coaM 
of  a  Senate  and  House  of  Reprcsenlativcc. 

SBC.  1.  '  The  House  of  Rcpmetilalii-es  shall  be  Mm|KMMl  d 
nwinbeis  chosen  every  »econ<!  year  by  il»e  pe«]>le  of  ihe  »c»e™' 
States;  anif  Ihe  electors  in  each  Slate  shall  be  citiieiis  of  llic  Con- 
federate .Stntes.  and  have  the  qualilidi  -  .  n'liie  liir  elednnii 
Ihe  mont  niiMteroos  branch  of  the  St;i  '  ire  :  but  tiu  persM 

o(  (ort-ifrn  twnti.  nol  a  Ciilirn  ol  the  ihall  6r 

allowed  In  vntr  (or  any  officer,  civil  i>i  >i|cr«L 

'  No  person  shall  tiea  Rc)>nrscntalivc  ■.  ..^  .  ;.,..£  allMifri 

llie  age  of  twenty-five  years,  and  be  a  cillien  ol  Ibc  ConfedenM 


IMl] 


COKFEDEKATE  COXSTITUTIOH, 


7ai 


Stale*!.  aiKl  w)io  shall  not.  when  e!ec1e<l,  be  an  inhabilant  ol  ihal 
Sdle  in  whicli  he  hliall  be  chosen. 

*  Keprrsetit-ttit'cs  uiid  OirccI  (axes  shall  be  a|)iioilioiie<i  among 
ihe  teveral  Slates  which  may  be  inclutfed  viitnin  this  Confed- 
eracy, according  lo  their  respeciii'e  n uni bet 8~~ which  shall  he 
deteimtncd  by  arirtine  lo  the  whole  nuinhet  ot  tiee  pcisonj, 
includini;  those  bouniTto  senice  (ot  .1  Icrm  of  yearn,  and  exclud- 
ini;  Indians  not  taxed.  Ihtce-liflhs  of  .ill  slaves.  The  actual  enu- 
nicrailon  slull  be  nude  within  three  years  after  the  lit«l  mreiing 
of  ihe  Congrwa  of  ihe  C«nfe<lerjie  Stales,  and  wiihin  every  sub- 
sequcnl  term  of  ten  yeais.  in  such  itiaitricr  as  ihey  shall,  by  law, 
diircl,  The  number  of  Kcpiesrnlalives  shall  not  cice<^l  one  (or 
evt-ry  fifty  thousand,  but  eacli  State  shall  have,  at  lejisi,  one  Rrp- 
reienialive;  and  until  Mich  cntimrraiion  shall  be  tnadr.  the  Stale 
i)(  South  Carolina  shall  be  enlillrd  to  choose  sk.  the  Stale  of 
Georgia  ten.  ihc  Stale  ol  Alabama  nine,  the  Slate  of  Florida  two, 
tlic  State  o(  Mississippi  seven.  Ihe  Slate  o(  Louisiana  six.  and  the 
Stale  of  Tesas  six. 

*  When  vacancies  happen  In  the  rcpiesenlKlion  from  any  Slate. 
Ihc  Exrcuiit-c  auihorily  thereof  shall  issue  writs  oldeciion  to  fill 
such  vacancies. 

'  The  House  of  Reptescniaiivn  shall  chooM  their  Speaker  and 
other  oftkeu.  and  sh^ll  h.ivc  the  sole  povrer  of  iiniwachniettl; 
except  that  any  judicial  or  other  fcdend  o(nc«r,  resident  and  acting 
solely  wiihin  ihe  limits  o(  any  Stale,  may  be  impeached  by  a  vole 
ot  two-thirds  of  l>olh  branches  of  the  LejiUtaTute  thereof. 

Src.  t.  '  The  Senate  of  the  Coii(rilemtF  Stales  shall  be  cont- 
po«rd  of  two  Sennlors  from  each  State,  chosen  for  s\%  years  by  the 
Legislature  1  hereof  at  ihr  rrgular  session  rirxi  iminnlialrly  preccd- 
in;;  ihe  commeoccmcnt  of  ihc  term  of  service;  and  each  Senator 
shrill  have  one  role. 

'  Immediately  after  they  shall  be  assembled,  in  consequence  ot 
the  first  election,  ihey  shall  be  divided  as  eoually  as  may  be  into 
three  classes.  The  seats  of  ilie  Senaiots  ol  iKe  fi(st  class  shall  be 
vacated  at  Ihe  expiration  of  the  second  year;  of  the  srcond  clavs. 
at  Ihr  cxpiraiion  of  ihe  (ouith  year:  and  ol  the  third  clats.  at  the 
expiration  of  ihe  sixth  year;  so  thai  one-third  may  be  chosen 
every  second  year:  and  if  vacancies  happen  by  resisnalion,  or 
otherwise,  duiint:  ihe  recess  of  the  Legislature  ol  any  Stale,  the 
Executive  thereof  may  mate  lemporary  appointments  until  the  next 
fneciing  o(  ihc  Lcyiilalure.  which  shall  then  All  such  vacancies. 

*  No  person  shall  be  a  Seiiaior  who  has  not  atwinwl  ihc»Eeo( 
thirty  years,  anil  be  a  ciltien  of  the  Confederate  Stales;  and  who 
shall  noi.  when  elected,  be  an  mhabilnnt  of  ihc  Stale  foe  which  he 
shall  be  chosen. 

'  Ihe  Vice  ('resident  o(  the  Confederate  Slates  shall  be  Prcsi- 
'Imt  o(  lite  Senate ;  but  shall  have  no  vote,  unless  they  be  equally 
divided. 

*  The  ScnAie  shall  choose  their  other  oiKcers :  and  aUo  a  Presi- 
dent pro  irmfttitt  in  ihe  absence  of  the  Vice  Ptesidenl.  or  w  hen  he 
(hall  exercise  (he  oSice  of  Piestdenl  o(  the  Confederate  Stales- 


COIfFSOEItATF.  CQNSTtTUTiOif. 

*  Tbc  Senate  thaJl  hare  the  lok  power  lo  try  all  mv 
When  sitiinc  for  ihai  purpo«c,  ibcy  ahall  be  on  mlb  or 
lion.    When  the  I*reudetii  of  the  Confedetaie  Slaic»  is  ii 
Chid  Jasiice  slull  preude ;  and  no  penoa  ihail  be  roiiTiiHed 
out  th«  concurrence  o(  iwo-ihinis  of  ihe  meinbets  pnaent. 

'  Jodgmcnc  tn  caws  of  ^peachmrni  shall  no<  uriead  (oflktr 
iban  in  rrmoval  from  office,  and  diM|UAlificai>on  to  hold  and  cnj^ 
any  oAkc  <if  honor.  Initt  or  profit  undri  the  Coofrdciule  SUUSl 
but  the  party  convicted  shall,  nererlbctcii.  br  lialiir  and  wli)(CI 
lo  inrliciment.  trial,  jadxaicnt.  and  puni^Lhmt^nt  accordioE  to  law. 

SCC-  4.  '  The  linies,  jriaces  and  manner  of  lioMing  etectkau  ba 
Senaion  and  Kcurescntalives  «liall  be  pretcnbed  in  e^th  Siaie  bf 
Ike  LegisUiure  increof.  Mibjeci  to  ihe  provisions  o(  tl>i>  CtnutJiit- 
iton:  but  the  Congress  may,  ai  any  trme.  by  law,  make  or  alin 
such  leguUtiont,  except  as  to  the  limes  anil  placea  tA  cbouwc 
Senaion. 

'  The Con|[resii  thall  asMtnbte  al  least  once  in  erery  yesr;  aid 
such  nteetini;  ilull  lie  on  tKe  first  Monday  in  December,  luil^ 
Uinr  shatt.  bt-  laur,  appoint  a  diflerenl  day. 

Sec.  {.  '  Each  House  iihall  be  the  judge  of  the  ele^iiuni,  msraa 
and  quJiliticAiiom  ol  \\\  own  memben.  and  a  nvM)or>ty  nl  eack 
shall  rontiilutr  a  qiiorum  10  do  basinett;  but  a  smjllrr  a«li 
may  adjourn  from  day  to  day.  and  may  be  authortict  lo 
the  altenitince  of  alnml  members,  in  such  manncf,  and 
MCh  penalties,  as  each  House  mav  pronile. 

'  Each  House  may  determine  tn«  rules  of  its  nroceedin^  (Mm- 
ish  its  members  (of  disorderiy  behaviot.  and.  wiih  the  concurrcKS 
ol  two-thirds  of  the  whole  number,  expel  a  ineml>er. 

'  tach  House  shall  keep  a  Journal  ol  its  proceeding,  and  \xtm 
lime  10  time  publish  the  same,  excepiiiig  such  |>arts  as  niay  tt 
their  jorfcnKnt  require  secrecy;  and  the  vca?  .and  nays  of  the  ■ 
bet*  ok  eilhrr  Hniitc.  o«i  any  question.  SAatl.  at  the  ilalre  of 
filth  of  those  present,  b?  entered  on  the  journal. 

'  Neither  House,  during  the  session  o(  CunKress.  shall.  wrllMral 
the  consent  of  the  other,  adfoum  {or  mote  Uun  three  dan.  nor 
to  any  oilier  place  than  that  in  which  ihc  two  Houses  shall  bc 
sittini;. 

Sbc,  6.  '  The  Senatonand  Repre*enlaii»e*  shall  rrceire  ■  otuft- 

pentaiion  for  iheir  servicrt.  to  be  ascenainrd  by  law, <  nt.\\  nut 

tA  ihe  treasury  of  the  Cnnfc.leratc  Slates.     They  shnl :  '*», 

except  treason,  felony  and  breach  of  the  peace,  be  pr  ,,  in-w 
arrest  during  iheir  attendance  at  Ihe  session  ol  llmr  resmeciiTe 
Houses,  and  in  godng  to  and  reluming  from  the  wine  :  and  nwasiy 
speech  or  tkbaic  ia  either  House.  Ilwy  shall  nM  bc  qupsiioacil  !■ 
any  other  place. 

'  No  Senator  or  Represent  al  ire  sb.iM 
he  was  rlecled.  be  appohued  la  any  r. 

of  the  C'lnjinleiili  .'■     '■\  ilull  ri.ivr  '■•  'lie 

einoluincnis wbei<  ren  increased  ^le; 

and  no  peisoo  Imiuini;  .I'lj  hlmk!  under  the  L'/ntrr-icr-jnr  TKaHS 
shall  be  a  member  of  either  Hnusc  during  hu  coniinnaacx  Ii 


1W11 


COSFEDEKATB  COSSTITVTJON. 


Ti 


ofUce.  Bui  Congress  may.  by  law,  grant  to  the  principal  officer  in 
c'cb  of  lh«  Executive  Dcpjirimmis  a  sent  iipnii  the  floor  of  tdiher 
Mouse,  with  the  privilege  of  discussing  any  mcnturc  appertaining 
to  Ills  ilcparimcnt. 

Sec.  7.  '  All  bills  for  raising  revenue  shall  urij-inate  in  llie 
MouMol  Kcpmeri  la  lives ;  but  the  Senate  may  propose  or  concur 
Willi  amciximenis.  aa  on  other  bills. 

■  Every  bill,  whicli  shall  have  passed  both  Homes,  shall,  before 
il  l>c<:ome«  a  Uw,  he  pre^emwl  to  the  Picsi<leiit  of  tiie  Confcdeiale 
Stntes :  if  he  approve,  he  siiall  sign  il  ;  but  if  not.  he  shnll  return 
it,  with  bis  objections,  to  ihal  House  in  which  it  sh.-ill  h.nve 
orisinatod,  who  shall  «iilcr  Ihc  objections  ul  laixe  on  iheir  juurnal 
and  proceed  to  reconsiiler  it.  H,  after  such  reconsideration,  two- 
thirds  of  that  Hou^  shall  agree  to  pnss  the  bill,  it  shall  be  senl. 
together  wiih  tli«  obieciions.  to  lite  ulher  House,  by  which  it  shall 
likewise  be  rcconsioered.  aiul  il  approved  by  two-lhlrils  of  IhAl 
ftuusc.  it  shall  become  a  law.  But.  in  all  such  cases,  ihc  votes  of 
both  Houtes  shall  be  rieterminei)  hy  yea<  am)  nays,  nnd  the  names 
of  the  persons  voting  for  and  against  ihe  bill  sh.ill  be  entered  on 
llie  fournal  of  each  House  res jiee lively.  H  any  bill  shall  not  be 
relumed  bv  tlic  I'tesidctil  within  ten  days  (Sundays  eiccpted) 
sfler  il  ihxU  have  been  prrsented  to  him.  llie  i^tmc  shall  be  a  law, 
in  like  manner  as  if  he  had  signed  il.  unless  the  Congress,  by  their 
Mljournmcnt.  prevent  its  return :  in  which  case  it  shall  not  be  a 
Uw.  The  Pirsidcm  may  approve  any  appropriaiion  and  disap- 
prove any  other  appiopriaiion  in  (he  same  bill.  In  such  cafe  he 
shall,  in  signinK  the  bill,  designate  the  appropriations  dis-ipproved ; 
anO  shall  return  a  copy  of  such  appropriations,  with  his  objections, 
tu  the  House  in  which  the  bill  shall  have  <ir>ijiii:ited  ;  and  Ihc  same 
pioccc<liiigs  shall  then  be  had  as  in  c^se  of  other  bills  disappioved 
by  the  Pr<^idcnt. 

»  Every  onier.  resolution  or  vole,  to  which  the  concurrence  of 
both  Houses  may  be  necessary  (except  on  a  C|Ue*lion  of  adjourn- 
ment), shall  be  presented  In  the  President  of  (he  Confederate 
StAtes ;  and  beloi  c  the  same  shall  take  rfleel.  shall  be  approved  by 
him  :  or  being  disapproved  by  him.  shall  be  repassed  by  iwo-lhitdt 
ol  both  Houses,  accoidliig  to  the  rules  and  limiuiions  prescribed 
In  case  of  a  bill. 

Sac.  S.  The  Congress  shall  have  power— 

'  To  lay  and  collect  taxes.  <lulies.  imposts  am)  excises  for  rev- 
enue necessary  to  pay  the  debts,  pnivide  for  the  common  defense, 
and  10  carry  on  Ihc  HDvernmcnt  of  (he  Confederale  Stales ;  but  no 
bounties  shall  be  granted  liom  the  treasury ;  nor  shall  any  itulies 
oi  taxes  on  inipor Ulions  from  foreign  nations  be  laid  to  promolc 
Of  fo*ier  any  branch  of  industry ;  and  all  iluties.  imposts  and 
esciscii  thall  be  unilom>  throughout  the  Confederate  Stale*  : 

»  To  borrow  money  on  the  credit  of  the  ConfeiJerate  St.Mci: 

'  To  regulate  eommrrce  with  foreign  nations,  and  among  the 
several  Sl.ilev  and  with  the  Indian  tribes;  but  neilher  this,  nor 
any  OllKr  clause  cofil.iined  in  llw  Constitution,  shall  cvet  be  con- 
ucd  (o  dcle£:aie  ihc  power  to  Congress  to  appropriate  money  (or 


7*4 


COJVFKDE/tATE  CO.yST/TVTlOJf. 


tlNt 


any  inlern.il  improvrriK'nl  intrmlml  to  hcililalc  rommrTcr  ;  rmpl 
(or  Ihc  purpose  of  furnishing  I>t;hls.  beacons,  and  buuyt.  and  other 
■■>M\i  to  nuvi)fuiion  upon  ihc  cuuis.  und  Ihc  improvcntcnt  irf  hw* 
bon  aii<l  llie  rcniovin);  ol  obtlruciiutii  iti  rirer  nuvij*;!!!!)!),  in  al 
which  cases,  such  duties  shxll  t>c  Intd  on  ilic  navi(>Ation  (aciliOMd 
ihcicby,  as  may  be  iicce&sary  to  pay  the  costs  aiid  eiqMBia 
ihcreoi : 

*  To  establUh  uniform  Uvr«  of  naluraJitarion.  and  unifonn  lam 
on  (he  Kubject  of  bankruptcic!!.  Ihroi^houi  the  Coafedcrate  Sunt, 
but  no  Uvr  of  CoogrFSs  ilull  dUchaqje  any  debt  Eoniiacled  betott 
the  pasinxe  ol  tlie  Mtiie : 

'  To  coin  money,  rn:ul.iie  the  value  thereof  anij  of  foreign  coin, 
and  lix  the  standard  ofwei^iltu  and  mcastim: 

*  To  provide  for  the  punishmenl  of  counterrcillDg  (be  KcuMiei 
and  cuncnl  coin  of  the  Confederate  States : 

'  To  esiabliih  poii  ofHces  and  (tost  routes  -.  but  tbc  cupcnv*  ^ 
(lie  Pom  Office  Dtp.-uinietil,  uficr  the  fir>i  day  of  Miirch.  in  ibr 
year  of  our  LuiU  eiKhicen  hundred  and  uziytfaiee.  shall  be  p«<rf 
out  of  its  own  revenues  : 

*  To  p(on>ote  the  progress  of  science  and  useful  arts,  by  smut* 
ing  for  liinileil  itmcs  to  auihort  and  inventors  lite  csclustve  right 
ID  their  rcspcclirc  urrilingt  and  discovciics  : 

*  To  coDsiiiute  tribunals  inferior  to  (he  Supreme  Cowt : 

"  To  di^liiie  and  punish  piracies  and  (domes  conttnilted  im  Itie 
high  teas,  and  oflentct  against  the  bw  of  nations  : 

"  To  ■Jpclarc  war,  grant  letter*  of  fnatc)u«'  ami  reprisal,  and  Ittake 
rules  concerning'  caplum  on  Und  and  ivalcr  : 

"  To  raise  and  support  armks ;  Imii  no  appropriallon  of  nancf 
10  thai  use  shall  be  for  a  longer  (Mm  ihan  (wo  y«an : 

"  To  provide  and  maintain  a  navy : 

**  To  make  niles  for  the  government  aivil  regulation  of  ihr  tand 
and  naval  fonres : 

"  To  provide  foi  calling  forth  the  miliiia  to  execute  the  laws  o( 
the  Confcileiate  Si  .lies,  suppress  insnrrcf  lions,  and  fepel  iiivauaalT 

■•  To  provide  for  orgBnirmg,  anning  and  diteiplinuig  tlic  miBtuk 
nnd  (or  gavenimg  iiuch  p.iri  of  tlkcm  as  may  be  cmiilnyrd  in  llw 
service  of  tbc  Confedcraie  Stales ;  re»er»*in(;  to  llie  Stale*.  rr*^m- 
ively,  the  apjiolntmrni  of  Ihe  olBeen,  and  the  authority  of  inunmc 
the  militia  accurding  to  the  diiciphiie  prescrit>rd  by  Congrt^ss  . 

"  To  exereiie  exclusive  legislation,  in  all  cases  KhatS"r«'FT.  oiw 

rach  districl  (not  ncM^fing  ten  miles  Hjuare)  as  mnv    ' 'nw 

uf  one  or  two  St.iles  and  the  acceptance  of  Congrevi  ihe 

Wat  of  llHf  (kivemnient  ul  Ihe  Coiiledcrrile  States  ;  ani  l  .  .:i> 

tike  authoiily  over  all  placed  puichascd  by  ihc  cun>«tii  ul  the  Leg- 
islature of  iIk  State  in  which  the  s-ime  shall  t>e.  for  the  crcclioa  ol 
forts,  magaitiKs.  arsenals,  dockyards,  and  othst  nevdiul  buddiqpt 
and 

■•  To  make  all  law*  which  shall  be  necttsarj'  anil  prtiprr  ft>r 
carrying  into  execution  the  (orrgutng  (towfis.  anil  .ill  oilier  powm 
T«slcd  by  this  Constirulton  in  llie  government  of  (lie  Conledeiali 
Slates,  or  in  any  dcpanmenl  ur  oflkcr  tlicreoi. 


IMl) 


COXFilDEKATE  CONSTITVTIOK. 


735 


[     SBC.  ^  '  TfM  importaijon  ot  negroes  (A  the  African  race,  from 
!  any  forei^  country,  otbcr  ihan  the  slavehnMing  Siatct  or  Tcni- 

loiie^  of  the  Unileil  Sl.iici  of  Amcij«,  in  hctehy  forhidden  ;  and 

CDi>|[rck%  »  icijuiceil  to  pus  such  Uws  u  sliali  elicctuuliy  prci'cnt 
'  the  same. 
I      '  Congrtis  shall  alio  have  pow-er  10  prohibit  ilir  imroclueiion  «( 

slaves  from  uny  State  uM  a  lueniber  of.  or  Tcrntoi)'  not  bclorig- 

ine  to,  thU  Co«f«ier*c¥. 

*  The  (Mivilrgir  of  ihc  Aa/irai  corpus  shall  not  Ijl-  suspendrd, 
iinlcos  when  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion  (he  jiiibtic  safety  may 

'  require  it. 

*  No  bill  of  aitaiiider.  ex  post  Jada  law,  or  law  denyini;  or 
I  impairing  live  hi;lil  of  property  in  negco  slaves,  shall  be  pAsW. 

'  *  No  capitalioii  or  ulbei  direct  tax  shall  be  laid  utilcM  in  pro- 
portion lo  the  census  or  enumeration  hereinbefore  directed  10  be 
taken. 

*  No  lax  or  duly  &hall  be  laid  on  articles  exported  front  any 
I  Stale,  except  by  a  vote  of  inv-lhirLls  o(  both  Housu. 

'  •  No  piefereiiL-c  shall  be  given  by  any  regulation  of  commeice  or 
revenue  to  tlie  poils  of  one  Slate  over  those  of  aiiollitr. 

*  No  money  shjil  be  ilrawn  from  the  treasury,  but  In  conse- 
<|iKnce  of  a|)propmiions  mitile  by  law ;  an<l  a  rccular  st.ilenient 
Mid  accoiini  o(  ihe  iccripis  and  expenditures  of  all  public  money 
sliall  Ik  puhliKhril  (loni  lime  to  lime. 

*  Congress  shall  appropriate  no  money  from  ibe  treasury  except 
by  a  vole  of  two  thirds  of  both  IIousfs,  taken  b}*  yeas  and  nays, 
unless  it  >ic  asked  and  estimated  lor  by  some  one  of  the  hc.idi  of 
ilepartmenl.  and  submiUti!  to  Congress  b)'  the  ["resident  ;  or  for 
Ihc  purpose  of  |>a)ing  its  own  expenses  and  conlin-^cncies;  or 
for  the  pajrineril  of  claims  against  ine  Confederate  StMtes.  ihc  jus- 
lice  of  whi-:h  shall  have  been  juilicially  ilfclareri  by  a  Iribunaifor 
Ihe  investigation  of  claims  against  the  Covrrnnicni.  which  it  is 
hereby  m.vle  the  duly  of  Congress  10  cilablish. 

**  All  btlU  nppmpriating  money  shall  specify,  in  federal  cur- 
rency, the  exact  amount  of  e.ich  appropriation,  and  ilie  purposes 
tor  which  t(  is  made  ;  and  Coii}{re»  siiall  grant  no  extra  compen- 
sation to  anv  publie  contractor.  olTicer.  agent.  01  sctv.ini  after  siich 
contract  ahal)  havr  l»eeo  maile.  or  such  service  irrtderer!. 

'■  No  title  of  nohilily  shall  l>r  granied  hy  the  Cor. frile rate  Rt.ilet: 
ai>d  rto  person  holding  any  oRire  of  prolil  or  tninl  under  them 
shall,  wilhcnil  the  contcnl  of  Congress,  accept  of  any  present, 
emolument.  oflVce  or  lilte.  o(  any  kind  wlialcvvr.  from  any  king, 
prince,  or  foreign  Stale. 

"  Coivgress  sliall  make  no  taw  respectii>g  an  esiahlishmml  of 
religfon.  of  prohittiting  the  free  exercise  theieof :  or  ahndging  ihc 
frcedooi  of  speech,  ot  of  llie  press;  ot  llic  right  of  ihc  people 
peaceably  to  assemble  and  petition  Ihc  Goveinmcnt  for  a  tediess 
of  grievances. 

■■  A  Weil  TPgulaled  militia  being  necessary  to  the  security  <A  > 
free  Stale,  the  righl  of  Ihe  people  (o  keep  and  bear  arms  shall  not 
fringed. 


;»i5  CO/t^FF.DF.KA  TE  CONSTITUTION.  lUH 

"  No  soldier  (ha]],  in  lime  of  peace,  be  quaTicred  in  anjr  booK 
wjthoat  the  cotiMtit  xi\  the  oumet ;  not  in  time  ol  u-ar.  but  ta  i 
manner  lo  be  prMcribed  by  Uw. 

"  rh«  right  o(  the  people  lo  b«  secure  in  iheir  p«tMin»,  bogMi. 
papers.  an<I  eSecis  against  unreasonable  scArchca  and  seiium. 
tiliall  not  be  violated  ;  and  no  wamiiis  shall  itsve  but  upoo  pob' 
Adie  cause,  supported  1)^  oath  or  affirmaiion.  and  p«niculw)f 
ilcscrtbing  the  p[«ce  to  lie  searched,  and  the  perions  or  Uring*  u 
be  seitcd. 

'•  No  person  shall  be  held  to  aniwer  for  a  c3[Hia1  or  othenrsr 
infamous  crime,  unleu  on  a  presentment  or  inditiinvnl  ol  a  gnwl 
jury,  except  in  canes  arishi);  in  the  laTid  or  oaval  lorce^.  w  In  Ihr 
imtiria,  when  in  actual  service,  in  lime  of  war  or  publk  dugvr; 
nor  shall  any  person  be  subject,  tor  the  wmc  oflenw,  to  l»c  tw«e 
piK  in  jeopanly  of  life  or  limb ;  nor  tie  compelled  in  any  crimi- 
nal rate,  to  be  a  witneu  againM  himtelf;  nor  be  dcpnred  d 
life,  lilierly  or  properly  without  due  process  of  bw :  nor  shall  piv 
Viiie  pro|)etty  he  taken  (or  public  use  without  just  cotiipensatiOB. 

"  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accusol  thati  cnioy  the  riftii 
to  a  spccily  and  public  trial,  by  an  impiriial  jury  of  the  Stale  and 
dtslrict  wheiein  ine crime  shall  have  iwcn  conimiitrd.  whtcb  di> 
trici  Khali  have  licen  pm-iously  aMett.iincct  by  taw,  and  Ul  be 
informed  of  the  nature  and  cause  of  the  accuiaiion ;  la  \x  tt»- 
fnmicd  with  the  wili>esses  aKuinul  him;  to  liave  conpabwr 
procci-1  (or  ohtainln^  witnesses  tn  his  favor;  and  to  bate  tlir 
asii^Cincc  of  counsel  (or  his  defense. 

"  In  suits  at  common  taw.  where  the  value  in  controversy  shall 
exceed  twenty  dollars,  the  rij^hi  o(  trial  by  jury  shall  be  |irei<Tr«nl. 
and  no  fact  so  tried  bv  a  jury  shall  be  otherwise  re-cicaniioeil  »> 
any  court  of  the  Confcdcnicy,  thait  According  to  the  rules  tA  He 
common  law. 

**  F.icrsKive  bail  shall  not  be  reqaired,  nor  excenive  ftnct  in^ 
poMtl.  nor  cruel  and  unusual  punishnieni»  inflkled. 

"Every  law  or  resolution  having  the  (oice of  taw.  shall  relaleU 
bui  one  subject,  and  thai  shall  l>e  exprrssed  in  the  title. 

Sec.  to.  ■  No  State  shall  enter  into  any  treaty,  alliance,  or  ca» 
(edcraiion  :  gram  Icltcr*  o(  marque  and  rrprisal;  coin  numry; 
make  anyihinj;  l>ul  Kold  and  lilrer  coin  a  lender  in  paynicnt  al 
debts;  pn.ts  .iny  bill  o(  aitainiler.  or /■.r^// _/■»!-/*  I.ior,  or  tawim- 
pairini;  the  obligation  of  cuntiacis ;  or  grant  any  title  of  nohiUty. 

'No  Slate  shall,  without  the  consent  of  the  Conj^ress.  lay  aftf 
impoats  or  duties  on  miporls  or  eiport*.  nrrpi  Mh.ii  ntat  lie 
absolutely  necessary  for  execulinf;  its  inspection  lawt;  aM  thf 
net  ptixluce  of  all  dutic*  and  imports,  laid  by  any  State  on  itnporu 
or  expoits,  !i)iall  be  (or  the  use  ol  the  treasury  o(  the  ConfedenUi 
State* ;  and  all  such  taws  shall  be  subject  to  tbo  nirlsM>n  and  con- 
trol oX  Congress. 

'  No  State  Oiall,  without  the  rnntent  of  Canj;re««.  lay  any  dtfT 
oit  tonnage,  except  on  se.i'eDinj;  Teueli.  lor  the  Impravetncnl  •! 
lt«  nvers  anil  harbikrs  nnvigatnl  by  the  said  iresseb  ;  bul  HK*i 
duties  shall  not  cotiilict  wiih  any  treaties  ot  the  Coolciterate  SUiei 


I 


ilil) 


COffFEDEKA  TE  COHSTITUTlOy. 


T7 


witb  fotvkin  n«(jons.  ami  aaj  surplus  revenue,  thas  derived,  shall, 
aTier  making  aucH  improwmcni.  be  paid  imo  tlie  common 
Ireaiut)' ;  nor  &)ial1  any  Stale  keep  troops  or  ships  of  war  iii  time 
o(  peace,  enter  into  .iity  agreemi-m  or  compact  wlih  anotlict  S(alr. 
or  with  a  forcii;ii  power,  or  engage  in  war,  unless  actu^ll)'  invadi^d, 
or  in  tucli  Imminent  danger  ax  will  nnl  ailmil  of  delay,  Bui  uhi-ii 
Miy  river  divides  or  flows  through  two  or  mare  Siaics.  they  may 
enter  into  compacts  with  each  i>thcr  to  improve  the  navigation 
1  hereof. 

ARTICLE   II. 

Section  t.  'The  cscculive  power  shall  be  vested  in  a  Picsidtnl 
of  the  Confcdeinte  Slates  of  America.  He  and  the  Vice  President 
shall  hold  their  nfliccs  for  the  Icmi  of  six  ycare;  but  the.  Presi- 
dent shall  nut  be  re-cllicible.  The  President  and  Vice  President 
shall  be  ciecicd  as  follows : 

'Each  Stale  shall  appoint.  In  sttch  manner  as  ibe  Legislature 
thereof  may  direct,  a  number  o(  electois  e<|ual  to  the  whole 
number  of  Senators  and  Kcfirc&eniativcs  to  which  tlic  Stale  may 
be  entitled  In  the  Congress  :  but  no  Senator  or  Keprcsciii  alive,  oi 

Srson  holding  an  ofTicc  of  trnsi  or  protil  under  the  Conlcdctalc 
ales,  shall  he  appuinied  an  ricctcir. 

*  The  electors  shall  m«et  in  their  respective  Stales  and  vole  by 
ballot  fiir  Prc^itl<rnl  and  Vice  President,  one  of  whom,  at  least, 
sludt  nw  he  an  mliahiunl  at  the  same  Slalc  wltli  themselves  ;  they 
9.ImI1  nanvc  In  their  tulluls  ihc  pi-rson  voled  for  as  Pietidcni.  and 
in  distinct  ballots  the  peison  vuled  for  as  Vice  President,  and  they 
«liall  make  distmct  lists  of  alt  persons  voted  for  as  Picsidcnt.  and 
of  alt  persons  voteil  fov  as  Vice  Piesidciit,  and  of  the  numhei  of 
voles  lor  each,  which  list  they  sh^ll  sign  and  rritify.  .ind  Iiansmil. 
Sealnl.  to  the  scat  of  the  goveinment  of  the  Confeder.nic  Slates, 
directed  to  the  Pie^idcnt  ol  the  Senate  ;  ihe  President  of  the 
Semite  shall,  in  the  presence  ol  ihe  Senile  atui  Hou&e  of  Kepie- 
sentativc).  o)icn  alt  the  ceilillcales.  .ind  ihe  vole»  shall  then  be 
counted  ;  the  prison  having  ihegreaicst  number  of  voles  for  Presi- 
dent shall  be  ihe  Piesidcnl,  if  such  nuin1>er  tie  a  majoiiiy  of  the 
whole  mtmlicr  of  elecinrs  appointed  ;  and  if  no  person  have  such 
iii.iJDitly,  then,  from  ihe  pcl^rlns  having  the  highest  numbers,  not 
csceedinx  three,  on  llic  Iml  o(  ihoie  voted  lor  as  Picsident,  the 
House  oi  Ke|>resenUtives  shall  cl'Oo^e  inimcdialrty.  by  ballot,  Ihe 
Prcsidenl.  Hul  in  choosing  ihe  Piesidcnl.  the  voles  shall  be  tat^cn 
by  Slates,  the  icpreM-niaiion  from  each  Slate  having  one  wie  :  a 

Siuorum  for  this  purpose  shall  consist  of  a  memtier  or  memtjeis 
lom  two-thirds  ol  ttic  Stales,  and  a  tnajoriiy  of  all  the  SLntes  shall 
be  ivecessary  to  a  choice.  And  if  the  House  of  Representatives 
shall  not  choose  a  President,  whenei'er  the  right  of  ctiolce  shall 
devolve  ulwn  iheni,  before  the  fotiith  day  of  March  next  following, 
then  the  Vice  President  shall  act  as  Piesidcni.  as  in  case  of  the 
deaih.  or  oilier  conMiuiiional  disahilily  of  ibc  Presidrnl. 

•The  person  havi  g  thegralri.l  mimtier  of  vole*  a«  Vice  Presi- 
dent shall  Ik  ihe  Vice  rtcsiileni.  If  such  number  be  a  majority  of 


7«8 


COXFEDESA  TE  COKSTITUTION. 


the  wliok  nunit>cr  of  electors  appoinieri  ;  and,  if  no  ntr^on  h>K 
majority,  \\\vn.  (torn  llie  two  higlieM  miinbcn  on  ihc  list,  the  - 
»hall  chooic  the  \"\<v  President ;  s  quorum  (or  lh«  puipos^ 
COntiM   o(  Iwo'ihirils  ol  the  wliolc  number   o(   Senalora,  % 
majoriiy  ot  Ihc  whole  number  shall  l>e  necessary  to  n  choice.' 

'  Dot  no  perxon  comtilutton.illy  ineligible  lo  the  ofTiee  lA 
(lenl  shall  be  eligible  to  thai  oC  Vice  IVetidcnt  of  the  IJond 
States. 

*Tbe  Congress  mny  determine  the  time  ol  choosing  the 
ami  the  cl.iy  on  which  ihey  shall  Hve  llteit  votes  ;  which  dxjr 
be  the  K^mc  ihrougbout  ttie  ConMeraie  Slates. 

'No  penon,  except  a  n.ituial  bom  citttcn  of  th«  Canfedaav 
State*.  Of  a  ciliten  tbcrcol,  .-it  the  lime  ol  the  atloMion  of  this 
stilulion.  or  a  ciiiun  thereof  born  in  the  Unitcil  .Si:iie^  oiiitrto  ita 
lOth  of  December.  i86o.  shall  he  eligifate  to  the  oHirc  of  Prrwter; 
neither  shull  any  (lersoii  be  eligible  lo  that  otrice  w  Im  «h«II  ■« 
luve  altatned  Ihc  >)-e  of  tbirly*livc  yejirs.  ami  been  ruunrrn  yon 
X  re-iident  wiilirn  ihr  limits  of  the  Confeder>lc  Stato  iu  ihry  anj 
cxi«  at  the  lime  of  his  cleetlon. 

*  In  Ciuc  of  the  removal  of  the  President  from  office,  or  iif  1* 
death.  fesJEnatinn.  or  inability  to  ilincharge  Ibe  powm  and  (hdU 
of  that  saiij ofltce.  Ilie  same  shall  devolve  on  the  Vice  IVi 
and  lite  ConK^ess  may.  by  l.iw,  provide  for  the  caw  of 
death,  retignalion.  or  inability  lioth  of  the  I'reiident  and 
President,  declaiing  what  olTic-er  sImII  ihcn  act  as  I'mKlciit.  »d 
such  officer  ihjl)  aci  accordingly  until  Ihe  disability  be  removed* 
a  Pre^idcni  shall  \ir.  elected. 

*  The  I*rc»iileni  sh^ll.  at  statwl  limes,  receive  for  his  >er*kcs  ■ 
compensation,  which  shall  neither  be  incrcaMxI  nor  dimiiushrd 
during  lhepeno<l  for  whkh  he  shall  have  ticcn  elected;  anil  Ik 
shall  not  receive  within  that  iieriod  any  other  emolument  (ran  tie 
Confederate  Slates,  or  any  of  thetn. 

"Before  he  enters  on  the  execution  of  his  ofBce.  be  shall  tib 
the  following  oath  or  aflirnvatton  : 

"  1  ilo  tolemnljr  swe^r  (or  affirm)  thai  1  will  faithfully  esenik 
the  office  of  Prestdenl  of  Ihe  Coofedrraie  .States.  an<l  Mill,  to  ikr 
best  of  my  ability,  preserve,  praicct.  and  defentl  the  CunstliutM 
thcTeol." 

S»x'.  I.  '  The  President  shall  be  commander -in  •chief  of  Ifir 
army  and  navy  ot  the  Cunfeileiate  Srales.  and  of  Ihe  tnilitb  of  tht 
SAi-cfal  .Sl.ite-i,  when  called  into  ihe  .ictiial  seiviec  of  the  Cunlelr- 
rale  Stales ;  he  may  re()iiire  the  opinion,  in  wriiin);.  of  the  pTiB<i|i>l 
officer  in  each  of  the  Exerulivc  Departments,  and  upm  »»T 
suhiecl  rel.ilinn  to  Ibe  duties  of  their  rcspctiirr  f^'     -  i  Ir 

shall    have  power  to  ([rant    reprirves    and    pardar-.  .Vi 

againti  ihe  Confederate  Stale*,  except  in  cases  of  in  ■  ii. 

*  He  shall  have  power,  by  and  willi  the  a<ivji:e  ni  ■  d 
the  Senate,  to  make  treaties,  pm-  '-  "  ■■■i-ihinls  ol  '.ttn 
present    concur ;  and    lie  sh.ill                        and    by  ite 

attvico  *tu\   consent   ot  the  Sc^..;..   -  ..^'.'.   .ipruiini    ,-.-.-.\a^ 

Olhcrpubllc  ministers  and  constils,  Judges  of  the  Suprrmc  CiioA 


Itlll  CONFEDERATE  CONSTiTUTION.  7*9 

and  «ll  «ther  officers  of  the  Confedt^rate  States,  whose  appoint- 
nienifl  ate  ii«i  heieiti  oihrrwise  ptovi<tcii  for.  and  which  sliflll  be 
CMabhshcd  hy  law  ;  h«i  the  Congrrss  may.  hy  law,  vr*t  (he  an- 

Kinlmcnl  of  sucli  inferior  ofiiccrt.  ;is  ihcy  ifiink  proper,  in  ifie 
rsideni  alone,  in  the  couitx  of  law.  or  in  tlic  licadK  of  Dcp.-iil- 
tnentt. 

'  The  principal  officer  in  each  of  ihe  Executive  Depart  m en l». 
Mml  ail  peiiBOna  connected  uith  the  (liploriiiilic  service,  may  he  ic 
nioved  fcom  oHic«  at  (he  I'le.'isiitc  of  ihe  Picsidciil.  All  othci  civil 
officers  of  ihe  Exccuiivr  l)ep.>rimrnl  ni«y  he  reniove<lal  any  Cinic 
by  the  President,  of  other  appointing  power,  when  their  *«rvice« 
nie  iinnrcrststy.  or  for  dishonesty,  incap.-icity.  incfTicitncy,  ntis* 
conduct,  or  neglect  of  duty ;  and  «het)  so  remored.  Ihe  rfmoval 
shnll  he  repotted  lo  (lie  Sen.ile.  IO(;cther  with  ihe  msoiis  llierefor. 

•The  I'rriident  shiill  have  powei  lo  lill  nil  vaciincies  thfti  niJiy 
h.ippen  dijiini;  ihe  tecrw  of  the  Senate,  hy  gr.iniing  <-i>iiiniissif>iis 
which  shrill  expire  at  th^  <-nd  of  their  nexi  session  :  Inn  no  pcison 
rejected  hy  ihe  Senate  shnll  be  reappointed  to  the  sntne  cflice  dur- 
ing their  cnuiin);  tyreiiv 

Sec  3.  '  The  PreiiilenI  shsll.  fioni  tiii>e  to  ihiie.  (jive  lo  (he 
Con|{re»  information  of  the  Stale  of  the  Confederacy,  and  lecom- 
inend  lo  their  con  si  1 1  era  lion  Mich  mf.isuies  as  he  sh.itl  Jixlge 
necessary  and  expedient:  he  may.  on  extraordrnaiy  ocrasinns, 
convene  wi  1^1  Hijuses.  01  either  of  iheni ;  anil  in  case  of  dis.igite- 
meni  between  tlietn.  with  resprci  10  the  time  of  adjoutitnu-nt.  he 
may  adjourn  ihern  to  such  n  time  as  he  Hhall  think  proper ;  he 
shall  rccrivr  amhauadors  and  other  public  minivien :  he  shall 
lake  care  that  the  laws  he  faithfully  rxeeulrd.  and  «hidl  cnmmis- 
sion  all  the  oRiceni  of  the  Conteiterale  Slatev 

Sec.  4.  '  The  I'tesident.  Vice  rreiitleni,  and  all  civil  officers  ol 
the  Confederate  Slates,  shall  be  removed  fiom  office  on  Itnpcach' 
menc  for,  attd  cotiticlion  of,  treason,  bnbery  or  other  high  crimes 
and  tnisdcnieanors. 

ABTIC[.K    \\\. 

Section  i.  '  The  judicial  poiver  of  the  Confederate  States  thall 
be  veMed  in  one  Supreme  Court,  and  in  such  Inferior  Courts  at  (he 
Coogrcss  m.iy  (torn  lime  to  time  ordain  and  estaWiih.  The 
judge*,  both  of  the  Supreme  and  Inferior  Courts,  shall  hold  their 
offices  during  Rood  Iwliavior.  and  itiall.  al  slated  times,  receive  (or 
their  seivices  a  compensation,  which  shall  not  be  diminished  (lur- 
injf  their  continuance  In  ofiiet. 

Src.  I,  'The  judicial  power  shnll  ejlend  to  all  caw*  ariGtne 
under  this  Conitihilion.  the  laws  of  (he  Confrdeinle  SLi(e^  and 
trealiin  made  or  which  sh.ill  he  in.ide  under  their  authority  ;  to  all 
cases  affecting  ambasiarfors.  other  puhlic  ministers  and  consuls; 
to  all  cases  of  adniindlr  and  manlirne  jurisdiction  ;  to  con- 
Ifoversies  to  whkh  the  Confederate  St.Aies  sh.ill  he  a  party:  10 
conlroveisies  liclweeti  two  or  more  Stuirs  ;  hctwceti  a  State  and 
cUiietiS  of  another  Slate  where  the  Slate  is  pbintiR;  bciwccn 


730  CONFEDERATE   CQNSTtTUTIOff.  Um 

citizens  clniinlng  Unds  under  grants  of  diScreni  Stales.  And  be- 
beiween  a  Slate  or  th«  ciiiten*  ihcreof,  &nd  foreign  Stnics.  citiK^t 
or  »ul>)ect!i ;  but  no  Stale  shall  be  saeid  bjr  a  ciliicn  or  lubject  ol 
anv  loreigD  Stale. 

*  In  ail  caMS  aHecting  ainbasndnn,  olher  pubtK  minislen,  and 
consuls,  and  llio^e  in  wTiicti  a  Stale  slull  be  a  party,  llie  Supinpi 
CcKiri  sIiaII  hare  (wiKirial  Juiisilkiion.  In  all  iiic  oihrr  cajn 
before  meniioned.  ihe  Supreme  Court  shall  hnve  n|>pelUtc  junKlic- 
lion.  both  as  lo  l.iw  and  fact,  wiih  ^uch  exceptions,  and  undci 
such  regulaticins.  ai  the  ConKirvi  xhall  make. 

'  The  trial  of  nil  crime*,  excrpt  in  ca-ies  of  im  peach  men  r,  nhall  ht 
by  jury,  and  such  trial  sliall  lie  beUI  in  llie  Stale  where  the  said 
crimes  sliall  have  been  coniitiitled :  but  when  not  coinmillol 
within  any  Slalc.  the  trial  tiliall  be  at  such  place  or  places  a»  ihc 
Congress  may  by  low  have  dtiected. 

Skc.  3-  '  Ttcawn  agAiusi  the  Confcderaie  State*  shall  contiu 
only  in  levying  vraragaiiitl  ihcnt.  or  in  adhering  la  their  encmiex 
giving  them  ai<l  and  comfort.  No  j>ei»on  shall  be  convicted  ti 
treason  unless  on  the  lesiiinony  of  two  wiloeues  to  the  same 
oveit  aei.  or  on  confession  in  upen  court. 

'  Tile  Coiif-ievt  fthall  have  power  to  declare  (be  puntshmeni  of 
treason,  bui  no  ailamdcr  of  treason  s)i.«ll  woilc  comipiion  of  Mood, 
or  forfdlure,  except  during  the  life  of  the  pctsofl  altAinlcd. 

ARTICLE  IV. 

Section  t.  ■  Full  faith  and  credit  shall  be  given  in  each  S)aK 
(O  the  public  nclc,  recwdt  and  judicial  ptocee«ling»  of  evrr^  a(hn 
Slate.  And  Ibe  Congress  may.  by  general  bivs,  prc«*n(ie  the 
tnanner  in  which  sucli  acts,  rccinds  and  ptoceedings  shall  be 
pnired.  and  the  cfftfl  ihcreol. 

Sec.  ).  '  The  cititcns  of  each  Slate  ah.ill  he  enlitlcil  (o  all  the 

Crivileees  and  inimuniii<^  of  ciiiirnt  in  ihr  several  Slates,  and  slull 
avc  inc  right  of  linnsit  and  sojourn  in  any  Slate  of  ihis  Cm- 
fcdcrac)-.  with  their  slaves  and  other  pfu{>eity :  anil  ftic  nght  cJ 
property  in  said  slaves  shall  nol  be  thereby  impaired. 

'  A  person  charged  in  any  Stale  wild  trcoMMi.  felony,  ar  Ollla 
crime  againu  lite  l.iwsof  iuch  Slate,  who  sludl  dec  fioni  fustier 
and  br  found  In  anothrr  Stale,  shall,  on  demand  of  the  Lxecnlivr 
authority  o(  ibc  State  fmm  which  he  fled.  I>e  delivcfcO  up  to  be 
rnnovM  (o  the  Stale  h-nring  jurisdiction  of  the  ciiine. 

•  No  slave  or  other  person  held  lo  scriite  or  labor  in  anv  Stale 
or  territory  of  the  Confederate  States,  undo  ibe  laws  iherrci. 
escaping  or  lawfully  carried  into  another,  shall,  in  cmiM-quence  ol 
any  law  or  regiiliilinn  ibrrcin,  be  discharged  from  such  service  or 
labor  ;  but  shall  be  delivered  up  on  claim  of  the  p.iny  to  whom 
uch  »iave  belongs,  or  to  whom  such  seriice  or  laliur  i-  i-. 

SSC.  3.  'Olher  Stales  may  be  aiJmiiled  Inia  lli<*   <  ,,-y 

l*y  a  Toteof  tnn-lbintsul  the  whole  Houscof  Rr|  1  nil 

lwo-tbi>ds  uf  the  Senalc,  ihc  .Senate  vnimg  by  Si  -w 

State  shall  be  lonncd  or  cfcctod  wiihin  tiw  jn>t>(i'<.iiijn   ui  any 


IMl)  COtfFF.DF./IA  TE  COh'STlTUTiON.  73» 

other  St»1« ;  i»oc  any  Slate  be  forniefl  bj  Hie  juncliDii  i>(  two  or 
moK  SiMn.  or  parts  <>(  Sum.  wiihoul  ihc  coomtiii  of  ilic  I-e£i»- 
laitiic.t  of  the  Sialcv  conccnml,  va  well  as  of  Ihe  Conjftt^u. 

'  The  Coiigrcw  itiall  have  jiowter  lo  Jisposc  i>(  anil  make  all 
needful  rules  ami  ii-|;ulaliun!>  <:un<.cining  itic  piupcil)  of  llie  Con* 
fcdrrfllc  Sl.kles.  iiicliKling  ihe  Unds  iheieof. 

'  The  Confederate  Stales  may  acquire  new  leniiory ;  and 
Conciesft  sfiall  have  power  to  lej^Klaic  and  provide  governments 
for  iTie  inhablianiK  c(  all  tetriloty  belonging  lo  ihe  ConfedeinlC 
Slates,  lyini;  WTlhmit  the  limits  of  the  several  Stales;  and  may 
permit  Ihcm,  at  such  limes,  and  in  such  manner  as  it  may  by  law 
provide,  lu  furm  Stales  lo  be  admilled  into  the  Conledciacy.  In 
all  such  Icrriloiy,  the  iiistilulion  of  negtu  slavery  as  it  nun  exists 
in  the  Confedctaie  Slater,  shall  be  rccognlied  and  niuiectcd  by 
Congre«.  hv  the  Icnilnn.i!  fjovemnn-iit  ;  ami  ibr  InVabilants  o( 
the  several  Confederate  Slale*  and  Trrritories.  shall  have  the  right 
to  take  to  such  teirilory  nnv  slat-es.  lawfully  held  by  tlicni  in  any 
of  Ihe  Stales  or  Icrrilorics  of  ilic  Confederate  Slates. 

'The  Confcderalc  Slates  shall  );uarantee  to  every  State  that  now 
is  or  heieafter  may  ))e<.uii>c  a  niriiiber  uf  this  Ctinfedciacy.  a  le- 
publkan  foim  (A  govern  men  t.  and  sball  proieci  c-^icli  of  ihtm 
against  invasion  ;  and  on  appUraiion  of  Ihc  Legislaluic  <»r  of  Ihe 
Executive,  when  the  Legislature  is  not  In  session)  agninsl  donit'»- 
lic  violence. 

ARTICLE  V. 

'Upon  the  demand  of  any  three  Slates,  le^lly  assembled  in 
their  several  Convrnlions,  Ihe  CongJCSS  shall  siimnton  a  coiiven- 
linn  of  all  Ihr  Stales,  lo  take  into  considemlion  sucli  amcitdiiienls 
tn  the  Cnnililulion  as  the  said  States  shall  concur  in  su^gesnng  at 
the  time  when  ihe  said  demand  is  made ;  and  should  any  of  ibe 
proposed  amendtuenls  to  the  CoTiUitulton  be  agieed  on  hy  the 
said  Cunvenlion — voting  by  Stales— and  the  s.ime  be  ratilicd  by 
the  Legislatures  of  iwo-ihirds  of  i)ie  several  States,  or  by  Convcn- 
liotitin  two-lbir<U  lliereof— as  Ihe  one  or  the  oiher  mode  of  rali- 
ticalion  n:ay  he  proposed  by  the  ^'''''tnl  Cinvriilion — lliey  shall 
thenceforward  form  a  part  ol  this  CtmMiliilion.  llul  no  Stale 
shall,  iviihout  its  consent,  be  deprired  ol  its  equal  reptcsctilation 
In  the  Senate. 

ARTICLE  VI. 

'The  Covemmcnt  established  by  this  Constttulion  is  lite  sue* 
cessnr  of  (he  Provisional  Cove rnnienl  ol  the  Coiifrileiaie  Slates  ol 
America,  and  all  the  laws  passed  by  the  taller  shall  ronlinur  In 
force  until  ihe  same  sliiill  be  repealed  or  niodilicil :  and  alt  the 
oRicen  appointetl  by  the  same  sliall  remain  in  office  until  their 
successors  .ire  ap)>Mnled  and  qtialifird.  oi  the  nfltces  alMliahed. 

*  All  debts  conlr.icicd  and  cngacemenis  entered  inio  before  the 
adoption  of  this  Constitution  snail  he  as  valid  .igaintt  the  Con- 
federate Stales  under  this  Constitution  as  under  the  rtDvisionoJ 
Corcmmeai. 


7ja  CO.VFEPF.JtArH  COXSTirUT/OAf.  lUO 

■This  ConMiiation.  and  ihe  Uwit  of  th«  Contcdenic  Sam 
miule  in  punu.iiice  ihcT«)(.  nnd  all  trentiFs  mndc.  ar  which  dai 
hr  mide.  unritt  ttip  aultianly  ol  llie  Confrdtnitc?  States,  tluU  it 
the  supreme  bw  i>f  ih«  l.iiul :  unO  (li«  judges  in  eveiy  Stale  dol 
be  bounU  ttierHi}',  anyiliing  in  i)ie  Coii&iitution  ot  lavrs  of  «t) 
Siaie  lo  the  eonlMi)-  notwiihsuixling, 

*  The  Senators  nnil  Rr|)tr5cnMlit'<-«  )>«fore  m<mlKinr<l.  and  tl( 
mcmbeni  of  ihe  scvrrni  Slaic  Ln;iiil.)!iirFS.  and  all  rKc^'utn^at 
iudkial  (tfriirers.  both  of  (he  CnnfFilmitc  St-itrs  anil  of  tlir  »et«rjl 
SiaiM.  shiill  lie  bound  Iqr  ualh  or  ii(limi;iiM>n.  to  snpixut  iliis  O^ 
slllution  ;  but  no  Tcligious  test  shall  eircr  be  required  a>  a  ^afr 
ficaiion  to  any  oflicc  or  p<iblic  trust  under  ilie  CoDfcdoMt 
Suica. 

*Thc  enumcfatinn,  in  th«  Constitution,  of  ccruin  rights,  ibl 
not  be  conslriK^l  to  deny  or  disparage  others  Kiaincd  \if  Ac 
people  o4  the  several  Slntct. 

•The  jMwert  nut  deleealetl  it>  ihe  Cootederale  Siatec  bf  lit 
Conslilulion.  nur  pruhibiled  by  it  lo  the  States,  are  rcscnred  to  tie 
States,  res|>cciii-ely,  or  to  the  people  lliocol. 

ARTICI-E  VII. 

'  The  talilkallon  of  lite  conventions  of  five  Stales  shall  be  nl- 
fieient  for  the  esiablishmcnt  of  this  Constitulion  between  the 
Siaie»  so  ratifying  the  same. 

'  Whrn  fivr  SUtcs  *h-«II  have  r.ilificd  ihis  Conititulimi.  in  the 
manner  nbovr  specified,  the  CoiiRtrss  under  tl»c  Provisionnl  Cwt- 
stilutioD  shall  prcscrihc  (he  time  for  holding  ihe  cleciioii  (il  Pmt- 
(lent  and  Vice  I'reuileni ;  and,  for  the  tncclint;  of  the  Elecinol 
College  :  and,  for  cuunlinf;  the  voles,  and  inauKumtint*  the  Pres- 
(lenl,  Thejr  shall,  alio,  prescirbe  the  lime  (or  holding  (he  fini 
eleciton  o(  membets  o(  Congress  under  this  Coniiiiution.  anil  the 
lime  for  assembling  the  same.  Unitl  ihe  as^cinblin];  ol  such 
ConfTTCss.  the  Congrcw  under  the  Pim'isional  Cnnslilution  shall 
continue  to  rsenriv:  ihi?  legislative  pow-ers  gi^nlrd  liirm  :  nol  rs- 
teiMling  beyond  the  lime  limited  by  the  Constitution  o(  the  " 
visional  Government. 

ACT  CRKATINC  AN   St.KCTORAL  COSIMISSIOK.   1S77. 

AN  ACT  lo  provide  for  aivd  regulate  ihe  couniinK  of  votes  lot 
President  and  Vice  Presldenl.  and  the  dec>sin«i  of  quesiims aris- 
ing thereon,  for  (he  lerm  commencing  Maircli  fourth,  asno 
Domini  eighteen  hundred  and  sdcnij. seven. 

Be  it  tnatted  In  Ih*  Stnate  and  ffousr  ef  Rfprtimtativa  vflk*  1 
United Stattt  0/ AmrrUa  in  Cungrnt  afuntbUd.  Tlvat  the  Sen-! 
ate  and  House  o(  Represent.itivrs  ihjil  meet  in  the  hull  of  the 
House  of  Representatives,  at  the  hour  (>l  one  o"'-!'-'^'--  "'■■-•   ".-rid-  ' 
ian.  on  ihe  first  Thuisd.iy  in  Kebtuar}-.  anno  Drr  /.lO. 

drtd  and  seven ty- seven ;  and  the  I'rcsident  of  Uil  ^,.:^ _i:  bt 


i«rn 


ELECroJtAL  COMMISSION  ACT. 


7J3 


ihcir  presidinf;  officer.  Two  tellers  shall  be  previously  afijioiiitetl 
on  the  part  o(  the  Senate,  and  Vmo  on  the  p.iil  ol  the  House  of 
Kepresenliitivet,  lo  whoiTi  fthall  be  hanilerl.  as  tbey  are  ojiened  by 
the  I'leiitlcnl  of  the  ^ciMite,  nil  llie  cert  iticjitcs.  and  papers  purport - 
iiig  lo  be  ceitificjiies,  of  the  electoral  votrs.  which  ceriilkates  Jind 
p^per* shall  hcopenpd,  prpscntcH,  nnd  actetl  upon  in  the  alphabeti- 
cal order  of  the  Stales,  beginning  with  Ihc  ietier  A  ;  and  said  Icll- 
ers  having  ihen  fead  ihe  s.ime  in  ihe  prcsrnee  and  hearing  of  the 
two  liout>es,  shall  miike  a  li*I  of  the  votes  as  lliey  shall  npptiur 
from  the  sJid  ceiiiriciitcs :  and  the  votes  hiivinj'  been  ascertainol 
and  coiinled  as  in  this  act  provided,  the  result  o4  the  same  shall  be 
delivered  10  the  President  of  the  Senate,  who  shall  thereupon 
announce  the  siBie  of  the  vote,  and  the  names  of  ihc  perMin\,  if 
any,  elected,  which  annoiinccmeni  shall  be  tleemrrf  a  stifRcicnt 
dcclar.-iiion  of  the  persons  circled  Cresidenl  and  Vice  President  of 
the  United  Stales,  and,  together  with  .1  list  of  the  voles,  be  entered 
on  the  journals  of  Ihe  two  houses,  t'pon  such  readtn);  of  any 
such  certificate  or  paper  when  there  sb;<II  lie  only  one  return  ftom 
a  State,  the  President  of  the  Senate  shall  call  for  objpclions,  ifiinjr. 
Every  objection  shall  be  made  in  writing,  and  shall  stale  clearly 
and  conriscly.  and  wilboiit  argiimrnl.  the  g|-ound  thereof,  and 
shall  be  signed  by  at  lea-ii  one  Senator  and  one  Member  of  the 
Hou^eof  Reptcscntalirn  brfoTc  the f^mr  shall  be  received.  When 
all  objections  so  made  to  any  vote  or  p.iper  from  a  Slate  shall 
have  been  received  and  read,  the  Senate  sh.iU  thereupon  wiihilrawr, 
and  such  objections  shall  l>e  submitted  to  tbe  Sen;^lF  lor  its  deci- 
siun  :  and  the  Speaker  of  tbe  House  of  Representativesshall.  inllke 
manner,  submit  such  objections  to  the  House  of  Representatives 
for  its  decision;  and  no  eleclnra)  vote  or  voles  from  any  State 
from  which  h«t  one  relnm  ha%  Iwrn  rrrrived  shall  be  tcjectnl  ex- 
cept by  the  affirmative  vole  of  the  two  homes.  When  the  Iwo 
houses  have  voted,  they  shall  inime«liaiely  again  meet,  and  the 
presiding  officer  slull  then  announce  ihc  decision  of  the  question 
submit  ttd, 

SEiTtON  2.  That  If  more  than  one  return,  or  paper  purporting  to 
be  a  return  from  a  Slate,  shall  have  hepnieceivei!  by  the  President  of 
the  Senate,  purporttnglobc  tbrcertifiralrs  of  elrrloral  votes  given 
at  the  1,-ist  ptrceding  election  f<)r  President  and  Vict  President  in 
such  State  (unless  they  shall  he  duplicates  of  the  s.ime  return.)  »JI 
such  returns  and  piipers  shall  be  opened  b}'  him  in  the  presence  of 
the  two  bouses  when  met  as  aforesaid,  and  read  Iw  tbetellers.and 
all  such  returns  and  papers  shall  iheretipon  he  siihmitted  10  the 
Judgment  and  decision  as  to  which  is  tbe  true  and  lawful  electoral 
vole  of  «irh  State, ofa  commission  cnnstilittcd  as  follows,  namely: 
Dufingtbe  session  of  each  house  on  the  Tuesday  next  preceding  Ihe 
Brst  Thursday  in  February,  erghlcen  hundred  and  sei-enty- seven, 
each  house  shall,  by  viva  voce  vote,  appoint  five  of  its  members, 
who  with  the  live  associate  justices  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States.  10  be  ascertained  as  beiciiiafter  provided,  sh.tll  con- 
stitute a  commission  for  Ihe  decision  of  all  aucsiions  upon  or  in 
respect  of  stKh  double  returns  named  in  this  uttlon.    On  the 


7S4 


ELECTORAL  COMMISSION  ACT. 


Ilfn 


Tuesday  next  preceding  Ibe  fust  Thuntday  in  February,  xnnu 
Domini  etghleeii  hundrdU  and  ievcnty- seven,  w  ai  soon  Uiereaber 
.■«  mav  be,  the  liMCMie  juMiccs  M  lite  Supreme  Court  ol  lfc» 
Uniloi  Slate.'i  now  .tssii^iici]  (o  the  (ixa.  third,  eighth.  anA  ntntli 
circtiilK  ihall  wifcl.  in  such  msnncr  n*  a  mijotiljr  o(  tliein  sl'iil 
deem  lit.  anothci  o(  iIk  aMOci.ife  iusliccs  of  said  court,  wliich 
FJire  perwms  xhnil  be  memlwrs  of  uitl  oominisiian  ;  and  th«  perMm 
lungeM  in  comiiiiHton  o(  Mid  tii-c  justices  ilull  be  tbe  prevideMot 
smiTcominisiion.    The  nieinliem  ol  wid  comniiMion  stiall  respeei- 

ivciy  take  and  subscribe  the  (ollowing  oaili:    "I, .do 

solemnly  swear  (or  affirm,  us  the  cusc  n^y  be)  that  I  will  iiDpar- 
(ialljr  cxaniiiic  and  con»»ler  ali  qiiesiions  submilicd  loihecotnuiw- 
xiun  o(  which  I  iiTii  ;i  member,  and  a  tiue  judgn>cnl  i;ivc  iheienn, 
iif^reenbly  to  the  Conitiiiiiion  nnd  (he  laws:  mi  hrlp  mr  Cml;" 
which  OMtU  shall  l>e  lik<l  willi  Ihc  .Secteiary  of  the  Senaie.  Wlien 
■  he  commtMion  slvdl  huve  been  thus  <irf;jriiied.  it  shall  not  be  in 
the  power  of  either  Itouie  to  diMoIre  ilic  Mnie.  or  to  withdraw  any 
of  its  cneinhers;  but  If  anf  such  Senator  or  member  shall  die  oi 
.  become  physically  unable  to  perform  (he  duties  rrnuiml  by  this 
Inct.  the  fact  of  turh  dr^ih  oi  pliysicjil  inability  sh.ill  he  by  taid 
'commission,  before  it  shall  pmceeil  fuilhrr,  cvniniuiiicAlcit  to  (be 
Kenale  or  Houh-  of  Representalircs.  as  itie  case  may  be.  whkli 
body  shall  iinitieiliatety  and  without  delMile  proceed  by  vi>a 
voce  TOte  10  fill  the  place  so  vacated,  and  Ihe  |>crion  so  apfmiolnl 
shall  (akc  and  subsciibe  (he  oalh  hcreinbvfoir  presciibed.  «iid  be- 
come a  member  of  s)i<l  cuiiimit^iofi  ;  and.  in  bkc  m«niier.  if  ;4nyof 
Mid  justice*  of  Ihe  Supreme  Coiiri  shall  die  or  liecomc  phys'iallj 
incapable  of  prrfnmiing  the  duties  Trquirrd  by  (his  net.  the  oiber 
o(  siiid  justices.  ii)ciiil>rrs  of  the  sakl  commisuun.  shall  iminediately 
appoint  another  juMicc  of  saul  cmiit  a  memlier  uf  said  commiiiunn, 
umA,  in  sucli  appoint  men  is.  le^janl  sliall  l>e  liad  to  (he  imp.trtinbty 
and  frredoni  from  bias  soui;hI  by  the  onvmal  appointments  tu  said 
commission,  uho  shall  ttieieupon  immediately  lake  and  bubvnlie 
llif  oalh  l»cteinlwfoir  prescrit>cd.  and  become  a  miMiif--  '  I 
cflmmiMwn  to  lill  lite  vacancy  M>  occasioned.  Alt  the 
,jtnd  pajicrs  tnirpoMinf;  li>  he  cerliticaies  of  the  electoi...  .-...-  -  „1 
ach  Slate  shall  lie  opened,  in  the  alphabetical  older  ol  ihe  Stales, 
proviilfd  in  st^Ction  one  of  this  act;  and  wlicn  (hrir  \li.i:t  \<v 
more  llian  one  such  cerlificale  or  paper,  as  ttie  err 
papers  from  such  Slate  shall  so  be  opened,  (excepting  (In  ii 

Ihe  a-imc  return.)  iheV  shall  be  read  by  the  telleis.  and  ihcmqami 
Ihe  Cresident  of  the  Senate  shall  call  for  ubirctiutis,  il  any.  Every 
objection  slull  be  made  in  writine,  and  shall  slate  clearly  anil  con> 
cisely.  and  without  arEuinen(.  (Vie  grouitd  thereof,  and  shall  be 
■iKoed  by  at  legist  one  benator  and  one  memliet  of  il>e  House  of 
KepreMnt;i(iv»  before  the  same  shall  be  recdvetl.  When  «ll  <iiih 
objections  so  maile  to  any  certiltcaie,  vole,  or  paper  li, . 
shall  have  been  leccived  and  read,  all  lucli  Ctrttticatev  > 

papers  so  objected   to.  and  all   p.i: —    ■ 

toKct her  with  surh  objeccons,  shall 

comnusston.wliicli shall proccird to ci ;..-, ..,;..,:,.  ,. ..: 


1«T71 


ELECrOXAl  COAtM/SSlOX  ACT. 


73S 


pow«n,  if  any.  now  poMMiicil  foi  Ihal  ptiipoie  by  the  two  hDuMS 
actinj;  xepaintely  or  toKclhcf.  .iml.  by  n  niiiidiily  of  t-ulct.  decide 
wivelhtt  any  -itid  what  voles  from  sucli  Suie  aiv  tlie  voles  pio- 
vided  fur  by  llie  CoiiMliutiua  ol  ihe  Uiiiicd  Stat».  And  )iow  muiy 
and  whAl  (lersoiis  were  duly  appumied  electois  in  siich  State,  and 
may  tliciein  take  into  view  sucri  peiiiiont.  drposilions,  and  other 

Kpen,  if  any.  at  shall,  by  the  Ct>i)»uiution  and  now  rxisimg  law, 
coni|ictcnl  ami  pcilinent  in  tucli  consideralian  ;  which  decision 
shall  be  made  in  willing.  Mating  briefly  the  gfound  thereof,  and 
signed  by  I^e  members  of  said  CDminiKMOn  aRreeing  therein; 
wheieupun  ilie  tivo  liuuies  shall  ugatii  meet,  and  sucli  decision 
shall  be  read  and  cnlcicd  in  (lie  journal  of  cacli  house,  and  (lie 
counting  of  tlic  vnics  shall  firocvcd  in  conlormiiy  thcrewiili.  unlrs«, 
upon  nbj^clion  made  thereto  in  writing  t>y  nl  least  five  Scn.ilom 
and  five  members  of  the  Houkc  of  Kenrmenlaiives,  the  two  houses 
shall  separalcty  concur  in  orderini;  otherwJM;.  in  which  case  such 
concurrent  iwiler  shall  govern.  No  votes  or  papers  from  any  oiher 
Stale  shall  be  acted  upon  until  the  obieciiDMs  previously  made  to 
the  vote»  or  papers  from  any  State  snail  have  been  finally  dis- 
posed of. 

Sfc.  J.  That  while  the  iwo  houses  ^hall  be  in  meding.  ai 
provided  in  ihii  .ici.  no  debate  shnll  be  allowed  and  no  question 
shall  be  pul  by  Ihe  presiding  nITicer,  except  to  cither  house  on  a 
motion  lo  withdraw  :  an<l  he  shall  have  power  to  preserve  order. 

Sf.C,  4.  That  M'hen  <he  Iwu  houses  separate  10  decide  upon  an 
objection  thill  may  have  been  made  to  the  counting  of  any  electoral 
vote  or  voles  froiii  any  Stale,  or  npon  objection  lu  a  report  of  said 
continisvon.  01  oihcr  question  aiising  under  this  act.  each  Senator 
and  Repnrsenialive  may  speak  to  such  obieclion  or  ijiieslion  Irn 
minutes.. ind  not  oftener  than  cncc;  but  aflcr  such  tfebnte  shall 
have  histed  two  hours,  it  :ihall  be  Ihe  duly  of  each  house  lo  put  Ihe 
m^iin  question  without  further  debate. 

Site.  J.  Thai  at  such  joint  roeetinf  of  the  two  houses,  seals 
shall  l)c  prm'ided  as  follows:  For  tne  President  of  the  Senate, 
the  S|>ral;rt's  chair ;  (or  the  Speaker,  immediately  upon  his  left; 
the  Senators  in  the  body  of  irtc  hall  upon  the  right  o(  the  presid- 
ing officer;  (or  iJic  Reprcsentalivt^  in  the  holly  of  ihe  hail  not 
provided  for  the  Senators ;  for  Ihe  tellers.  .Srcrelaty  of  the  Senate, 
nnil  Clerk  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  at  the  Clerk's  desk  : 
for  Ihe  other  uAkcrs  of  the  iwo  houses,  in  front  of  ihe  Clerk's 
ilrsk  and  upon  each  sitle  of  the  Speaker's  plaifmm.  Such  joint 
meeting  shall  not  be  diMoIved  until  the  roimi  of  electoral  voles 
shall  be  completed  and  ihr  result  decl.-ired  :  and  no  recess  shall  he 
taken  unless  a  questioti  shall  have  arisen  In  regard  lo  counting  any 
Mich  votes,  or  otherwise  under  this  act,  in  which  case  il  shall  be 
compelent  for  either  house,  acting  separately,  in  the  manner  here- 
Infwfoie  provideil.  lo  direcl  a  recess  of  such  house  nol  be)y>nd  the 
Dcit  day,  Sunday  excepted,  al  live  h<mr  o(  ten  o'clock  in  the  (ore- 
noon.  And  while  any  quolion  is  I>cin;:  considered!  by  ui<l  com- 
mission,  either  bouse  may  proceed  with  its  legtsloiivc  ot  other 
business. 


L 


756 


ELECTORAL  COMMISSION  ACT. 


nnr 


Sec.  6.  ThM  noihiBK  tn  this  act  shall  be  hrM  to  Imptir  «r 
flffrci  Any  iighr  now  exisiine  uixlcr  the  Consliiurioti  and  Mira  w 
quciiion.  by  pioccf^liog  In  inc  judicul  count  of  ihc  Unilcd  SlMei, 
the  right  or  ink  of  ihe  person  who  shall  tic  ilcclaicd  elcclnl.  er 
who  »liall  clniin  lo  be  President  or  VJc«  Ptcudeni  of  the  Untied 
Stales.  i(  any  such  ri][ht  exists. 

Sec.  7.  That  snid  commission  shall  make  il«  own  ruin, 
n  record  of  its  proccedtrif^.  and  shall  tiJive  power  to  employ  i 
persons  AS  may  DC  nccMsaiy  lor  the  iransactioD  of  lis  bcisinmi 
the  cieculion  of  its  powcifl. 

Approved,  Januaiy  19;  1S77. 


ABSTkACr  or  the  DECISIOM  in  third  l.tiCAL 
TENDER  CASE,   1884.* 

.  The  single  question.  Iherrlorc,  to  be  considered.  >im1 
the  answer  lo  which  the  jiidKment  to  Iw  rendered  lieiuccn  ili 
parlies  depends,  is  wheihi-r  nuies  q(  Ihe  Unitcil  Suics,  iuuc 
lime  of  wjr.  undi-r  ai-I^  of  Conj-resi  declaring  them  to  be  a  Itjal 
tender  in  paymcnl  of  private  tkbts.  and  Jiftcrwaiil  in  litneul  peace 
recleemed  anil  p^aid  in  ^old  coin  at  ih«  treasury,  and  then  reiiturd 
uniler  the  act  of  1878.  can,  under  Ihe  Conslilulion  o(  the  Uailcd 
Stales,  be  a  IcgstI  tender  in  p.iynicnl  of  Mich  debts. 

,  .  .  No  question  of  llic  scope  anii  exieni  of  the  implied  powen 
of  Congress  under  the  Constitution  can  tw  s^iiiifanoiily  disciiHtrd 
without  repeatiiiE  much  ol  tlie  reasuninii  ol  Chief  Justice  Marshall 
in  (lie  t!'eat  jud);nient  in  McCullovh  V>.  MaryUnd.  (4  Wheat.  316), 
by  which  ihe  power  of  Congreu  10  incoiporaie  a  bonk  w.is  Aem- 
onsiraied  and  .illirmed,  not wiih&i adding  the  Constitution  Joes  BM 
cnuiTiei.ile,  among  the  powers  grajiled.  that  of  establishing  a  banli 
oi  creating  a  corporal  iun. 

Tlir  people  of  the  Unilcd  -Slates  by  llie  Con«litution  estAblltbed 
a  National  Govenimenl.  wiih  sovereign  powers,  tegUlaiivc,  eiecu- 
live  and  judicial.  "  TIk  Gm-eminent  ol  ibe  Union."  uul  Chid 
Ju&iicc  Marshall.  "  though  limited  in  its  powen.  i*  supreme  wilhtft 
Its  sphertr  of  nciion ;  "  "  and  its  laws,  when  made  <n  iMirsuance  of 
the  Con  Eli  I  (I  I  ion,  form  the  supreme  law  of  ihe  land."  "  Amon| 
the  enumeialetl  power*  ol  Govrrninrni  wc  find  the  great  powers 
lu  Uy  and  culled  taxes ;  to  bortuw  money;  luTrKulalccommctcc; 
lodecbre  and  conduct  a  war:  and  lo  raise  and  supiKirl  aimirsiMl 
naric:*.  The  sword  and  tlie  purse,  all  the  eiiernal  iclaiiuns,  and 
no  iitconsiilerahlc  portion  of  ihe  indu-iliy  of  the  nation  Ate  >■■ 
trusted  10  its  gavernmenl  "  (4  Wheal.  40$.  406,  407). 

A  constiTulion  eslnblishing  a  frame  of  gm-ertimnil.  declallas 
fundamrniat  ptincioles.  and  creating  n  national  sovereignty.  sdiI 

inlende<l  to  rndutc  lor  agev  and  lo  be  adapted  lotlie  1  '- -te» 

of  human  aR.iirs,  is  not  to  \yf  interpreted  wiih  Ihe  i.\-  \  a 

private  contract.    The  CoflAtUuiion  oi  the  United  ^u;...  „,  .>p( 


*In(atltnlloU.  S.  «». 


ISMl 


l£GAL    TUNDER  DSCISJON. 


737 


woTils  i>f  ddisnation  or  general  cirtcription,  marks  ihc  oullirm  ol 
ihc  powers  gianied  lo  llic  National  Lrgiil-iliire.  but  il  does  not  on- 
(Icitakc  wilh  tli«  iimiMuii  and  deuil  o[  a  code  o\  taws  to  enumer- 
ate the  subdiusiooii  of  tliusr  poweis  or  to  specifv  a\\  [lie  incan»  by 
which  iliey  may  be  carried  into  execution.  Olm-f  Justice  Mar- 
»hall.  aficT  ilwcljinj;  ui>nn  ihi»  view,  ns  required  hjr  i|i«  vcrv  naiure 
of  (he  Constiluiion.  by  the  language  in  which  it  is  framctl.  by  the 
hiTiitatlotis  upon  the  tT'^neral  powers  of  Conereu  introduced  in 
the  iiliuh  lection  ol  the  first  article,  and  by  the  onii»ion  to  use 
any  reMiictii-c  tern)  whicli  miKhi  prevent  its  receiving;  a  fMr  and 
jusi  inieiprelRiton,  added  tlietc  einphatie  word) :  "  III  considering 
this  qurttion,  (hen,  we  must  never  forget  that  it  is  a  consliiuiion 
we  arc  expounding"  (4  \VIt*-.iI.  407.     See,  also,  p.  4IJ). 

...  In  McCuiloch  vs.  Maryland  he  more  fully  developed  the 
same  view,  concluding  thus  :  "  We  admit,  at  all  itiunt  admit,  that 
the  powers  of  llie  Government  are  limited,  And  lliat  iU  limits  are 
not  to  be  li.uiiecndcd,  Uul  we  think  the  sound  con&litiction  of 
the  Constitution  must  allow  to  the  N^itiunal  Legislature  (hat  dis- 
cretion wilh  respect  to  the  means  by  which  the  powers  it  confers 
are  to  be  carried  into  execution,  which  will  cnaiilr  ihai  body  10 
perfunn  the  hit,'h  duties  asKignctt  id  ii  In  ihc  manner  moit  benefi- 
cial to  ihc  people.  Let  the  end  lie  lct;iliinate.  lei  il  be  within  the 
sciipe  o(  the  Couiiimtion,  and  all  means  which  are  appropriate, 
which  Aie  plainly  adapted  to  (liat  end.  which  are  nol  prohibited. 
hui  consist  with  the  k'ller  and  spirit  ol  the  Consiilulion,  arc  con- 
siituiional  '*  (4  Wheat.  431). 

The  rule  olinierpretaiion  thus  laid  down  has  been  constantly 
adhered  to  and  acted  on  by  this  court,  and  was  aceeptcd  as 
cxpresiing  the  true  test  by  all  ihc  Judge*  who  took  pari  in  (he 
former  iliscusiions  of  ihe  power  ol  Congress  to  make  the  treasury 
notes  of  Ihc  United  Slaiei  a  legal  tcntlcr  in  paymenl  of  private 
debts.  .  , 

li  appe.ir^  10  us  (o  follow,  as  a  logical  and  necessary  conse- 
qufnce,  ihai  Congress  has  the  power  to  issue  the  obligalionsnfihe 
United  States  in  such  form,  and  to  impress  upon  them  such  quali- 
ties as  currency  for  the  ptirch.ise  of  merrhandiv  and  ihe  payment 
of  debts,  as  accord  wilh  ihc  uuge  of  sovereign  notcmnienis.  The 

fiower,  as  incident  to  the  power  of  btirrowing  money  and  issuing 
fills  or  notes  of  ilie  Govcrnmeni  for  money  bonowc'l.  of  impress- 
ing upon  lliose  hills  or  notes  ihe  quality  of  being  a  legal  lender  for 
the  paymenl  of  private  drbls.  was  a  power  universally  undcrstooil 
to  belong  to  sovereignty,  in  Europe  and  Anierir.a.  at  the  time  of 
the  framing  and  adoption  of  the  Constimtion  of  ihe  Uniied  State*. 
The  governments  of  Europe,  aclin)?  through  the  monarch  or  the 
legisUiure,  according  lo  ihe  disiiibuiion  of  powers  under  their 
respociivc  coikStiiulions.  had  and  have  as  sovereign  a  power  of 
tSMiingpapermoney  asol  stamping  coin.  This  power  has  been 
dblincily  rccognited  in  an  important  modem  case,  ably  argued 
and  fully  considered,  in  which  the  Emperor  fA  Austria,  as  King  of 
Hungary,  obtained  from  the  English  Court  of  Chancery  an  injunc- 
tion against  the  i»uc  in  England,  without  his  license,  of  oolcs 


738 


LBGAt   TENDER  DECtSIOK. 


nw 


purporting  to  be  public  paper  money  of  Hungarr  (Austria  m; 
Day,  a  Giff.  638,  and  3  D.  F.  &  J.  217).  The  power  oi  tswinf 
billa  of  credit,  and  making  them,  at  the  diicretion  of  the  legisla- 
ture, a  tender  in  pavmenl  of  private  debts,  had  long  been  exeraied 
in  this  country  by  tlie  several  Colonies  and  States ;  and  during  the 
Revotulionary  War  the  States,  upon  the  recommendation  of  the 
Congress  of  the  Confederation,  had  made  the  bills  issued  by  Con- 
gress a  legnl  tender  (see  Craig  vs.  Missouri.  4  Pet.  4^5.  4SJ; 
Briscoe  fT.  Bank  of  Keniucky,  1 1  Pet.  a;;,  313,  334-336;  Le^ 
Tender  Cases.  13  Wall.  557,  558,  611 :  Phillips  on  American  Paptr 
Currency,  patsim).  The  exercise  of  this  power  not  being  pi^ 
hibiled  to  Congress  by  the  Constitution,  it  is  included  in  the  power 
expressly  granted  to  borrow  money  on  the  credit  of  the  United 
States.  .  .  . 


INDFX 


All  6sur«i  in  the  (ollowing  tndci  in  h«avy-fac«  IjTpc  r«[«r  to 

'I  kr  ftdtralitt  propci. 

All  rcfcfcncc*  aficr  Mbkh  an  t  \*  placed  rafcr  la  1|)«  Editor'* 
notes  to  Tir  Fr^rraliit. 

Alt  rel«rcntci  KJicr  which  a  «  fa  placed  refer  to  the  CotiMltu- 
tion  ol  Ihc  Unilcd  Siatcs. 

All  tefereiKci  in  Roronn  nuineiBit  arc  a  kef  lo  the  Iniroductton 
and  tu  the  prelitnioury  material. 

All  other  leterences  are  to  the  matter  coniained  in  the  App«n- 
<liK,  the  Coiuilluilan  of  the  United  Suics  excepted. 


Aobi 

L;: 


Aocaoftta  of  public  money  vhall 
tie  |iul>ti9bcil,  tiait, 

AobMn  l4a«*.se.  111-114.337; 
One  of  tne  best  of  uricieni 
league*.  M;  RcnemljUnce  ul. 
to  itovernment  crcaicd  by 
~!onalitulioii,  SOS:  Abiin- 
doned  the  cxperinicnl  of 
I>liitit1  prKiuK,  4es. 

AeU:  Consreis  shall  presctibr 
the  maaner  of  proving. 
6lS<;  PdII  faith  and  <reilll 
■  liuit  be  given  lo,  MSr.  TJO. 

Adam,  John.  sum. 

Adataa,  J.  Q..  3i9>(. 

Adam,  Saoiiirl.  3h. 

A^POnauM,  6oir,6i44-i  Exrcu- 
livc  poircr  nvcr  legUlative, 
4fll. 

Admiralty  (i/r  ali»  ttarilimr 
JuriiJiitifK):  Cautti  deter- 
mlaed  wlihaui  jury.tSS;  Fed- 
eral pover  over,  &is>-. 

Afrlnltan  iu/  «/«•  LaaJtJ  In- 
uwisli);  InlctciK  of,  iniet- 
iravet)  with  those  of  com- 
merce,  TJ:  Only  a  concern  of 
local  legisUtioD.  IM;  Sunte 
Staiei  Iliilc  more  than  sotie- 
ttea  u(  haiibandrocn,  37i;  Pte- 
domlnancc  of,  in  ibc  U.  S., 
SM. 


Aluha.  i»<.i>. 

Albur.  3*S- 

AU«n  {lie  all* Foreign  /m/lmtntf; 
A'aiutaiiuUi^:  Feeling 
uituiii«c.  In  America,  ijqr; 
AnlaKDoiMii  to.  usually  the 
clojikuf  religioaB  intolerance, 
■  .I'}™-  Nallonat  aud  Slate 
fowct*  MS  to,  973;  PuMlblo 
influence  of,  in  pruducinK  do- 
mviiic  InmrreeiioD,  MB:  Cs- 

Sc<ial    danger    from     stave, 
W;      Naiiooal     va.     Sut« 
Doners  over,  fA\. 
Allan  Lav:  UnconMitutionaUiy 

■■I.  liBl.(jS$. 

AU«na(«,  6si,  C54,  661. 

Alloglaiiaa  {uf  alia  OulA) :  Stale 
VI.  nalionul,  703. 

AlllaDM:  No  Slate  aball  enter 
into  any.  tiaSt. 

Ambauadtn  1  The  Pre«!denl 
mny  aiipcii]!,  I>ni ,  Ji]dicljll 
power  of  ibc  United  Slulei 
shiiil  Fiiend  to,6t<(.  bljt. 

Aneodment :  ESeciof  Fleventt). 
xiv:  CUuM  In  Coottltmion 
concerning.  191:  Limilaiiona 
upon,  291;  Syaiem  of  obtain- 
ing, 636;  Greaici  cisc  ul  ob- 
(amlng  single,  S84:  Nui  de- 
pendent  on    Congress,   HT  ; 

7» 


-40 


INDEX. 


A  Di*ndnMn  t—  O'lifiinifJ. 

AllcmiiCti  to  ubtain.  prkir  (o 
•dopiionof  Coniiiiulion,  Sti: 
Congrei*  a>»y  [ito|iocc, 
6XV  :  On  application  ol  the 
ICDislalurci,  ConRrcvs  shall 
call  a  conveniion  to  (>topoM, 
630i :  Viild  ■fhcn  (aiiflcd  by 
the  kgialaturc*  of,  or  by 
coaveniiant  in,  ihr«e-(ou(th> 
ol  the  Slates,  6!ot ;  To  the 
C'ontfdvrNic  Cuiiitiiullon, 
hoB'  tirade,  731. 

Amiadnieau.  F(«p«Md ;  Mbha- 
ciiiitKWtjiji;  Souih  Carolina, 
63s;  N*w  flampiibire,  63J; 
Viigiaim,  6js ;  New  York. 
6}q :  North  Carolina,  b^b; 
By  CoiivcnilunB,  0J6;  jcWflr- 
■on'K  Louisiana,  686,  llan- 
(ord  ConvcDiion.  687  ;  Crit- 
tenden'*. 7tt;  Peace  Coo- 
frrcncc.  ;i8. 

Not  eicRipird  from  common 
tatamiiio,  877;  The  United 
Stales  aiccndani  in.  70;  Ex- 
tlutlonul  Guru(can  infloencc 

Aiu«rl«tw  GIUmd  :  Prouil  title  o( ; 
706. 

AnMrlcanOovaniniaiili'  Improve* 
ii^cnl 'iver  aiicicni,  64;  l>elecl 
of,  68. 

Amwleaa  PMpIa  (itralio  Cititni; 
Majority;  Pfsptf ;  Stavti)'. 
Fear  at,  xii  ;  i.itnitcd  Infln- 
cnrr  of.  in  U.  S.  Oovcrnineni, 
jiii;  Iniim  upon  Mlectinif 
l'r«^i^lenl.  xrii  ;  VJndkaiioa 
ol,  to  chooilng  Pretidem, 
xvli;  Self-control  of,  six; 
Great  body  of,  m  farur  of 
union, XKV, 6,*,It,  U;  Ca|M- 
city  of,  for  nelf-sovernnveni. 
1  ;  Pro«p»-riiy  «t.  depcndi 
Da  unian,  I ;  Inlelligeni  and 
we )Mn formed,  19  ;  Kioihip 
i>t,  M  ;  Peel  no  blind  venera- 
llon  for  anliquily  or  cuittain, 
t0;  Numerous  innovaliofiiof. 
in  favor  of  |<tiv.iic  ..  ' 
happinetH.  tT  ;  > 
•CI  wilhoui  pfcccJi-...,  »:  . 
Qoilc  u  liWIy  10  tJde  wrtlh 


Amerieaa  PMpI*-  tontinmti. 
Naliooal  as  h  irli  Stale  Om- 
cinmcRla.  102.  lOS,  IM  .  wm 
entirely  control  NattoMi 
Government.  104  ;  Ma^orttr 
of.  ronitolkd  l>y  niincifiit 
undvc  Confederation,  til. 
Gave  no  sanrtioa  Iv  Artklit 
of  ConfcderalioD,  143.  M, 
The  only  hourcc  v\  Iraiil- 
mate  aulliority,  143,  Ul. 
Wilt  be  more  apt  In  aide  wilk 
(heir  local  coverntneau,  Ul, 
Too  diacetoing  in  be  arioad 
iBIoaaarcby.  163  ;  Ptvjoil)!! 
of.  againal  aiuniling  araiiei. 
derived  from  Gredt  Uiluit, 
IM;  Theory  that  ihey  irill 
oppoae  Kedcia)  auihinitr. 
IM:  Hold  the  balance  W- 
iween  State  and  NatlooiJ 
governmenis.  177.  tVT;  Tbt 
final  jiidjce*  ul  natvoiial  U«. 
lat.  Sit;  In  rattlyins  Cw 
KlilUIMin  lilll  ari  in  lfc«it 
corporal*  cap«cil  y.  94>.  M 
Noianatioii.Mt  ;  A  nailoaal 
body  ns  rcKaiila  Hun**  tf 
Rrprrticnlalivet.  fU,  TraiB- 
cendent  right  oi.  lu  aboIUt 
or  alter  sovetuutcniB,  IN. 
Pa»»  ordlauncei  ol  nullitn- 
lloBBiid  acc<«iik>n,  x>]>>.  Tht 
lost  Tciori  (or  uncnBatila- 
llonti  Federal  act*.  aOO;  Rtl- 
alive  Krealvr  importance  d< 
Stale  BOTcrPineni*  lu,  M, 
911:  Ullimate  aulbutiiy  a- 
ktdea  In,  Sll  ;  Unly  |>i>ii:1ilt 
method  ol  Nalional  tioniti- 
menl  accurtnK  preleiencadd, 
319;  Advanlaite  ul,  bi  la 
arini.  SIT  ;  Nccetaary  protti- 
lion  of  minority  ol.  Irom  dta- 
jorliy.SiO;  I'osjlble .;  ,  - 
ineiit  ol,  with  Sialr 
fficnis  in  relation  ti-  ..._  . 
tional  CtovernmeDi.  Sm.  M , 
A  tnajority  ol,  reqi;fr»-)  '■ - 
national  icEi^laiiiin.  ■■ ' 
Senate  a  defence  a,; 

■    ■  '■  '  « 


Arertiua    ol,   to   BtooaRbtn 


INDEX. 


741 


447  :  Supcdor  Co  Ibelt  own 
rcpi«Mni*tivei.  6>t ;  Right 
of.  lo  bIict  or  abolish  Bov«rn- 
BMAI,  US;  Ke<ognliliMi  of, 
Id  Preamble  of  Cuiisliliition, 
•TS:  Will  b«  naichCul  ol 
Nailo4ial  Govemmcat.  B77  ; 
Equal  piirilcKi^*  under  Coti- 
fcdetstioD,  jqt ;  Rieht  oi.  to 
B>«emble  and  p«iiiion  for 
f elites*  of  itrEevances  «hall 
not  be  abridcetl  bjr  ConKieu. 
6*3c:  Rtghl  of.  ta  keep  and 
bear  aim*  shall  noi  be  in- 
frin|tod.6»r  :  Rif;h(  ot.lobe 
secure  ia  persuns.  houses, 
paper*,  and  eSccr*  againii 
unr«ai«(iabl«  »earrheii  and 
»ei*ure!i  ihall  not  be  violalcd, 
(mj  ;  The  rlgfaii  in  the  Con- 
Btllullun  thdll  not  be  held  lo 
deo)^  or  diDparait'  other*  re- 
tained by,  mit;  Ponen  not 
drlcunlod  to  the  United 
States,  nor  prohibited  lu  the 
Stale*,  ate  leiFrved  to  Ibe 
States  or  (o  Ihr.  (•ij^:  Ri|[ht* 
of:  Propotedanirr.dinciit  con- 
cerning, 6j5,  639.  6^6  ;  Free- 
dom of  aiseinbly  o(:  Proposed 
kDMndmrnt  ronccrninjt,  6jQ. 
641,  647;  Right  of.  to  renft- 
■amecoTeiameni:  Proposed 
amcndfnrnt  toiucrning.  639  ; 
Governmental  aemloitin  In 
name  of  :  Proposed  amend- 
ment eoncernlnc.  644  ;  Right 
of,  to  Bstabltth  (undnnienlal 
law*,  6g7  ;  Formed  ibe  Cun- 
•lIlUtlon.TOO;  Nklional  Gov. 
eminent  acts  directly  upon, 
701  :  SyootiymoDS  with  cill- 
teoi.TO)  :  SoTcreianty  at,7oq, 

Aiii«Tlun  tynea  :  Idea  of  one. 
70- 7S. 

AB;ki«tya>lc  OmtMtracy':  Ae- 
couoi  of.  lOe,  Kl :  Analogy 
uf,  tu  Ameikan  Coofedcta- 
tio*.  IM. 

AsaipoU*  CenvsailM :  Recom- 
mvndalioni  of.  9S1.  MT. 

Aane.  Q«mb,  9B. 

Annnlmest :   itt  Sufrf m4  Cftirt ; 


lat(-F*d*r*1I«t«  (tff  altr  SiHH 
Cunitrmii.'nisii):  In  New 
York.  ix.  xxl;  Triumph  of,  In 
New  York  ele<iloo,  a»v  ;  A 
land-holdinK  parly,  xx*I ; 
Dtircn  from  polls  in  New 
York  City,  xxvl  ;  Forced  to 
ratify  Consiltuilon  In  Now 
York,  xsvl  ;  One  motive  of. 
jSn  :  Error  in  the  nature  of 
attacks  ot.  U>  :  The  prlnd- 
ples  of.  drslruclivo  o(  all 
governtneot,  16S  :  Objection 
of,  to  Federal  taxation.  IM ; 
Want  ol  f:iline«»  in  Jiubllc*- 
tiont  of.  tM.  447.  SM  :  Uck 
of  accord  in  objcc  lions  of. 
to  Const  It  lit  Ion,  UO,  241  ;  Re- 
tray  ihemlclves  in  objections 
to  standing  army.  US;  Do 
not  consider  people  In  rela- 
tion to  Conltitiiliiin.  910. 

AppMtls  to  the  PeopU:  Dangers 
and  inconvenicflcct  aiiend- 
Inii.  3S6-83T;  ObjcclJons  to 
periodical.  S3ft-M3. 

Appellate  Jnrladlctltn  :  Meaaing 
ol.  U7  \  No  Impediment  to 
appeal  from  Slate  courts  to 
inferior  Naiiooal  court*. U4  ; 
lit  what  cases  the  Supreme 
Court  Shalt  have,  6l7r. 

AppolDtnest  {m  aba  Ciptl 
Sirvifr ;  Offi€i-hai<teri):  Con- 
gressional assumption  at, 
svl,  J99>i :  Prrsidonlial 
powerof.4«3,»0»:  New  York 
systemof.iM.  47S.  >19;  Fre- 
quent PiesliteiiiUI  (hiiniteB 
will  produce  mutability  in. 
4U  ;  ConsiitntioDal  cUus«  re- 
garding, commended,  t/A\ 
Possible  syitcsis  of,  MB;  Im- 
portance of  rcspoDsibiliiy  in. 
606  :  Possible  favoritism  In, 
506.  9Oa-0;  Danger  ot  bat- 
galas  over.  BOT;  President 
•hoold  be  solely  concerned 
in.  607:  As  a  meaas  of  secur- 
ing legisUtlon.  MI7.  MS  ;  No 
advsiilaitr  f'lr  Scnal<>  lu  neg- 
ative, toi;  C'lrKtessmen  ex- 
cluded from.  AlO ;  Rnilynun- 
parlisan  system  of.  s> tn : 
Crowih    «l    panisan,    siaai 


iSSk 


742 


INDEX, 


Appot  Btmnt —  Critinutd. 

Share  at  Smaie  in.  pr«VEDtt 
pAtliun  icn>ovsl,  Bli;  Pieil- 
dcnli*!  power  of.  iil  an  in- 
flacoce  on  Senate.  <1S ;  A 
council  of.  an  inlflguini  cob- 
cUve.  M<  ;  Friiputillon  lo 
unile  lliiuie  of  Kepraseala- 
■irci  wiih  Senate  in,  Ht; 
at  olDceri,  and  aulhorily  lu 
Itnio  ihn  Riilliia  rnervccl  lo 
ibt  Suiu  tcsp«ciivcly.  6o6i- ; 
Con|{lCK*  may  vcxt.  in  Prcii- 
dcni,  bi.|' ;  B)r  cuotls  of  U«r 
and  beads  of  dcpaiimeDl*. 
(fi4< ;  lo  be  made  by  tbc 
FfrsideiH.  738. 

App«rttini»«iit  Utf  alit  ftffrt$tn- 
Utivti,  HtHif  .•/) :  Of  rcpre. 
•enlatlon  and  ditccl  taxation 
amonK  Ihe  m^tcihI  Slate*. 
109^;  Of  Representatives 
amonK  ihe  leveral  Stale*, 
t^tfc  ;  Of  rcpre*eatal<vcii,  711. 

J>|)pr«fiTiaUeD« '.  Of  money  for 
army  limited,  txbt:  No  money 
ibHll  be  dfa«a  Iroen  (be 
Treasury  but  in  eonHqucnce 
»f,  6uSi  \  Bills  may  be  ap- 
proved ia  pan  and  dixap- 
proved  ill  pail.  7aj:  For 
Army  nol  to  cKcced  (ten 
Tears.  734:  By  law,  71s. 

Ari«to«rMy  (ih  aha  Wrii-trm\: 
DeAnilioa  of,  xliii.  xlir. 

AnnlM.IMBdinf:Oaeadvant*t(e 
ai.  in  Kiifope,  41;  Adran- 
(■Kfi  »'.  41.  ^'aUl  cDectavl, 
on  liberty.  41-44:  Modern  4c- 
Telapmeniof,  4iw;  Motive  for 
eatablisklng.  41a,  4]ii;  Superi- 
ority MKttrril  by.  43;  ur  U.S., 
Mexico,  and  Brniil,  4311;  Not 
provided  against  in  CoaMltu- 
lion.  43;  Will  roult  ItondU- 
•<>lul<<in  uf  Confederacy,  4S, 
4(1;  Why  (hey  did  not  tpring 
up  in  the  Grecian  republic*, 
M  ;  Neccnaiutod  by  modem 
coiniuercialisni,  44;  Allempl 
to  coerce  State*  witfl. 
amounts  tu  w«T  Ix-lvteen 
Stnles.BT.  Hrioiircn  o(Uti<un 
nui  eijuiil  to  Rreali  H;  No 
prottttion  aKUliul,  in  Coa*ll> 


AmlM.  Uaadlag— Cneftmurf. 
talloo  and  In  maa(  Stale  (■*' 
einnenia.  IM  ;  D«cLBtau>M 
GiMceminic.  IM.  Kl;  Fully 
controlled  by  Conntea*.  Ul . 
Raiting  o(,  doei  not  real  vilk 
Executive.  141  ;  Arpropti^ 
tions  (or,  limited  to  two  yean, 
161:  Fen  Interdict  loo*  el, 
in  Sute  cAnitiiiuiioaa.  Ul; 
Under  Arlicic*  of  Conledets- 
lion.  159.  IM;  NcceMtty  •(. 
[or  weilein  Kirrlaoni.  IM, 
lni|>ru]>HFly  of  any  cosiua' 
lional  interdiction  of.  ]M; 
Wby  tl  i>  belter  for  an  arar 
10  be  In  the  handa  of  tbe 
eritl  Kovernnieni  ifaan  In 

of    the    Stale    govomfl 

t««-lM;  Uanecra  of.  If  tm- 
trolled  by  States.  IftT;  Indefr- 
nileness  of  objection*  to.  IH. 
Nccrisiiated  by  Indians,  Ui; 
ERe<t  of  a  lioiiialion  oa,  la 
lime  of  peace,  IM  ;  Origin  tf 
prejudice  against,  IW;  Ilia- 
lory  of,  in  Ureal  tlrilaia.  tM; 
P(uvi*ion  coDceiiilng.  in  tie 
Eni-lisb  Bill  of  Kigbts  Iramrd 
al  the  Revniuili.n  in  ifi^g.  Ii4. 
State  limilalioDS  on.  wiilt' 
aont  of  Ibe  tegiiUiutc, 
Ne*r  Vork  coiisiitnilim 
regarding.  Itt ;  Limiied  ^ 
Caastiluilon  loiwo  years. IM; 
Undue  agKtneniatlon  n(.  u) 
own  vaming  •>!  danKei.  Ut. 
Far  Icssneeeiuiry  ina  uiui«< 
(ban  in  a  dlnuollcd  atalt. 
IM  ;  Necessity  of,  lor  etaiT 
government,  ITS:  Idle  trar 
of,  in  representative  goTCt*- 
■neni,  1TB  :  A  large  an«  AM 
probable  in  America.  ITV;  Xtr- 
(roductliia  ul,  in  Europe. Mt. 
Guarded  sKainsi  by  Coostln- 
tittn.M3.HI:  Nocbeekuiwa. 
In  Great  Urltaln,  S64;  iiicb- 
est  pioporiion  r.f  a  staodlif 
army  <o  the  poDulallon  af  t 
counicy.  SIT;  VonsiUr  air* 
«(.  in  U.  S.,  SIT;  PtopiMl 
■iDcndrncRi  concerning,  *M. 
6)6.  hyi.  C>4u,  64}. 

Lmm\   Kigbt  ul  the   |mb^*  la 


INRRX. 


t«l     Crtitin  ltd. 

kccpHiid  1101,633^.735:  Rigbt 
■o  UI17 :  Piop')«c<1  AiBcnd- 
BicDt  (oncerninK,  bJ4,  636, 
fijn.  (14B.  r>.|9. 
Arnj  :  Puncr  (o  ralie.  ander 
Coaled  era  (ion.  IS)  :  Uiitimil- 
cd  |>a>cT«  o(  Conlineolal 
Con|trT»«  10  ralcc,  HS :  Siaicn 
rcsdictrd  from  kcri'lnit.  UT: 
RegDlatioti  of.  by  Cunfedrra* 
liuii.  S9]:  Conteiletale  Con- 
grcH   lo  ralic  aocl   luppoti, 

Avvjr,  Uslttd  SUIM  Uir  Rig- 
ulitrt.  C.  .V-l-  HclatiTcIytmaU 
growtk  of.  ^^l^  ;  Ucf«i»  of  a 
tKiuniv  **ii«in  foi  cnliiiinR, 
IM :  Untimiicd  conirol  of. 
bjr  nati'in,  \<b  ;  PieiideniUI 
command  ovrr.  480 :  Cun- 
tre»  ihall  makr  rules  foi  (he 
govrrniBetit  and  reKuUiloa 
of  (tae  land  and  naval  force*. 
tobt :  Liinii  on  approptiaiioo 
for.  60&1 :  Preildeni  iMt  10 
eommand.  644. 

Anar.  TolvftUar  :  More  Ukelj'  10 
plunder,  48. 

AraMala :  Exclui>)v«  auihoriir 
oTtt  M.bofn. 

Anhnr.  OhaaUr  A.,  syM. 

jLrti*lM     «f    OraMtratloi  1    ut 

C^nftdtratien,  Arlittri  tf. 

Arta  sad  SdaocM,  6o}r,  734. 

Aipkria.  91. 

AaaamUa:  People  may,  73J. 
ia«»>Ula  {.trt  <tli»  Kifr/xnta' 
livti.llfiif  vf):  Objcf lions  ro 
nnmcrotis,  Ml,  SM.  SBS-ni; 
Atler  a  number  of  Kepieien- 
Ulivci  suflicieiil  for  lli«  pur> 
p€>se>  of  Mfeiv,  of  local  In- 
(onitaiion,  and  of  dIHudve 
■ympath)'  with  ihe  whole 
•ocielj  it  Mcaicd.  any  addi* 
lion  toibcrois  injnrionB.  8M- 

»ei. 

Ath«M.  30,  11.  ion:  Ruin  of.  b^ 
perianal  influence,  18:  In- 
doence  ol.  In  Grccee.  114:  Ri- 
valry of,  with  Spartit,  IIO  ; 
Lack  of  a  MlcgDard  aKain^l 
pa*»lon*in,  4lt:  Gorernment 
of.  Ul. 


ItlaQtleCftaM:  VutnetaMlity  of, 
MO. 

Atuindar:  Ol  ireaton  ihalt  no< 
w4'rk  i^"riui>li(in  ol  blood  or 
forfeiture.  6(7.-,  73i>. 

Attainder.  BUI  of:  R«iUi<ll«n 
iijion  Statcl  regarding.  8H, 
!»e,  »T0  :  Sliall  >iol  be  paMcd, 
6071,  to^j;  Prohibited  10  Con- 
grc»,  73s;  prohibited  to  the 
Hiatei.  J«>, 

AMtrla.  SI. 

BagalMt :  Cited,  4(i3a.  ITS.  4</hi; 
On  Eni:UBh  C»ii*tiiiil><in. 
17IH  :  As  10  fixed  Icrm  ol  of. 
Ace,  *y>H;  Go  separation    of 

S>vernm«iilHl  t>i>u<cfa,  ytan. 
,  EsMMiT*  :  Shall  noi  be  re- 
quired, 63+1^,  716;    Propotcd 
aniendnicol  cooceroing;,  63(1, 
('to.  647. 

>aUat  {lit  o/r*  SUftiom):  For 
PrctidenI  and  Vkc  -  Ptt«< 
ident.  636*. 

Bank.  Mallanal:  tefle rion's opin- 
ion on, bji;  Hamilton's  opin- 
ion un,  bii  ;  Nature  ol,  Wq  ; 
Necetilty  of,  to  govemnenl, 
ti69-<i7t;  Nc«d  of,  In  naihtnal 
Anan<e«,  *l7-8  ;  Utxonaiiiu- 
lionallly  of  law  coiKorning, 
680.  6^s. 

Baokrupler :  Hatlonal  power  10 
tcKoIate.  8T9,  661:  Congren 
■hall  haT<r  power  10  pass  uai> 
iorm  law*  00  the  iifbject  ol, 
6os<  ;  Propoicd  amcadmvnt 
conccrninK.  644;  Laws  pf,  to 
be  itnilotni.  7*4- 

BatOMt :  SiruBBle  ol,  with  Man- 
archy.  tOT. 

BavarU :  Forced  to  jcdn  Gerinaii 
Empire,  99H. 

Btlgk  CanMeraor  -  Outline  ol, 
lis.  Drfrct  of.  ISI. 

"Ba«  Man":  More  likely  to 
tvtTK  national  than  local  guv 
ernmeno,  13.  M. 

BUI  of  Atlalnda- :  it/  AttaimJtr, 
mil  of. 

Bill  of  BJgbU  (iti  aho  Privitt 
Hi f  All) .  VIolalbMi  nf.  ))■•;  In* 
•Scary  nf.  in  ^>iilb  AtnerJcan 
govcrnnieat*,  SS".  Lack  of,  iu 


744 


IXDEX. 


Greu  Brilain.  SB":  Slanding 
•rmr  clau*e  la  (hoie  of  Penn- 
sylraitiu  and  North  Cuiotfn*, 
I6t.  104.  185^  CUuse  in  Brii- 
l(h.  164.  IM:  Objetiion  thai 
Ibr  CAntiiliu:](>ii  <]»»  not  coit- 
lain.  STOi  Scverul  uf  the  Slate 
Coniiicmion*  lack.  STO;  Ne<r 
York  doci  not  poitei),  BTO. 
OTS;  Fcdccnl  CooHlilulioncm' 
bodies,  kTO,  173^  OitEiiKlljr 
■lipulationi  beiateen  kinei 
and  aubjecls,  ATS:  Nature  of, 
tit,  ITS;  Not  «»«ntial  in 
limited con»iiiiilion.  671;  Poi- 
sibly  dangcrout  In  f-'eileisi 
Conttitatioti.  678;  Ini«rtiori 
of,  to  Federal  Consittution 
wontd  imply  juriiiiiiciioa  over 
BDitranted  power*,  ST4;  The 
Federal  Constiiulion  in  iiscll 
•,  t7(  :  Proposed,  63},  bjj. 
6ji>.  (4(1. 

Kii*(irn'li»  Ctnxrrii.  XaiUnai): 
For  raiiinRrcTcnucshallorif- 
Inalc  In  the  H»ut«  ol  Repie- 
MiiiBti*e>,  6011'.  733;  If  no< 
rciQfncd  In  ten  days  thatl  be- 
cone  taw*,  bou,  71;  ;  B«(oio 
bccoRiinK  l!kn^.)hall  bepaHMd 
hy  boih  housFi.  boti,  713. 

BlUl  «f  Cr«dtt  (cr  alia  Oritn- 
fttii;  Poftr  Mmry)  :  RcMrk' 
lion  upon  Statci  concerpiDg. 
9M.  M»:  Ho  Stale  atiall 
emit,  AoAc. 

Blrawnk.  qan. 

BlMkitea*:  Cited.  67*. 

B»R«viiiK  P*v«r  |irr  aht  PiH. 
O-  S.^,  (03.,  Toy.  i'owet*  of 
taxation  aeccisarj  to  secure. 
IM ;  Propoked  amcmlsient 
concernins.  &13. 

B««BtiM  ;  European,  on  lith,  )•; 
Competition     among     Stales 

ftodures  cxcesiive  nillltary. 
M.  Produce  proeiaati nation 
In  cnlltlment.  and  oilicrevill, 
IM  ;  Feasible  ncceulty  for 
coismcrelal.  IM  ;  Shall  not 
be  queitioiicd.  b^;  Protec- 
tive diiiiTi  nothing  bni,  6qo  ; 
Cannot  be  nraated  from  ibe 
treasury.  733. 


Boiav*.  E.    O.  :  Article  oa  ■»- 

(hotship  of  Fnttraliil.  IXI. 
Ira^ :  Siandlnx  armjr  of.u*- 
Britlab  :  iff  (irral  /triliHi. 
Brvlu*:  ife    Valet.  K'tAtri. 
try%».     Jame* :      Cited.    mU 

Aiin.  4<^n;  Cited  aato 

n'cn."  1411. 
BachaEBn.  J.>ities.  sSja. 
Bslldlng*:  I)if5cu1l)r  of  valtiMi 

for  purpoaeaof  i«ikaiioa.Ui 

OaUMt :  OriKin  of  PreaidealMl 
47JI';    Shall     ndviae 
dcnl.  4M. 

OalifPtmia :    Non-circulallM 
SiernbHcki  in.  loiiii. 

Cambray.  L.ea0ue  nf.  tl. 

Ca«paiBa  rnada  .  CoUcctk>a  eli 
364". 

Cuada  {ittahf  Crtat  BrU*i»\i 
Nrgotiatioiu     nf.    iiriib    Vt 
Bloot.M;  An  unfailing  sourrt 
Of  (rfclion  with  1  irral  BpU  i, 
TD;ClaDSein  Arlic:es  ti  C - 
fedctalltin  admit  ting, Ml.  tj) 

Canal* :     More   cHstly   uI>iiidc< 
bT  a  united  counirr,  H 
1 1 o  n  a  I   encourage 
iSOii ;    Amendment 
in(!.  voted  iluwa.  *j6j. 

Capiul.  .Vaiioiial  -  Uisiaste  •!, 
fiv'in  rrimtier  Si4les.  M.  ■, 
IIT6  i  Power  ot  rxclunlTr 
illation  over,  SSI,  60O..  M4, 
734  ;  ivxperience  of  Caati- 
nonial  Congrcaa  (e^a 
iiit.  tlrstiKy  III.  sg 
(inimliUemcnl  m\  cltia: 
sSju  ;  Propi.-MiJ  ami 
concerning.  63B,  (t^j, 
Slavery  in.  7ifj.  7nj. 

Oaidtaticn   Tax       EviU   of, 
mittril.  92«.  Vn      5ptrtf»  frf. 
SM  :  Unhkelit. 
be  laid.  n«;   I 
goicrnmeiils.  S:<u  .    >ti.;i 
laid    in    propvniun     to    I 

(rnt.v.t       latj,   ;       pTOpO*tl 

il  <onccTtiiiii,  AU  ' 
II  upon,  735. 
Oariiag*   Ta«:     LlfKoaatUw 

a)itv  of.  ri^. 
OartfcM«.>0.)l:  Scp.u  ul,4U 
US. 


Mil 


tXOEX. 


745 


» 


VkU  :  ttt  Ciinl^n,  Cttrgt. 

C«iliu  :  Rcprcscnialion  and  di- 
rccl<l>x  clause  fitimanloc* 
fairncM  of.  SH ;  Puciisan 
Dndertaiing  of.  36JW  ;  To  be 
Blade  wilbin  three  yenn  tmd 
everir  len  jrcaiii  tlicrcaltet. 
fioM,  73t  ;  N«  capitaiion  or 
other  d)re<i  lai  (hnll  be  Ufd 
«xc«p(  in  pr«|ii>r(it>n  lc>.  6oT(, 

CkuianafH:  Empire  of.  114. 

OhailM  IL:  InMilUtct  IlaQding 
urm/.  164. 

Cbarlai  V. :  I'ro)CCl  ol  uotvcnal 
iDonaicby  of,  99. 

Cb«r«kM  Cut :  HclplctRnen*  o( 
Supreme  Couti  in,  ixttt. 

CbtaUrMd,  Eail  of  r  Coirupts 
Nclherland  dcputict.  ISO. 

Clilu  Traill:  Our  rivaltr  "ill' 
Europe  in,  19. 

CItiMM  {itr  Faitiami  ll-mau 
Xaturt :  JifaH ;  ,Va/uraliat- 
lien;  PiefU;  Stavft;  iBriety): 
HeceifHj  that  (lie  GcnerMi 
Goveriiinrm  »hail!  acl  direi-lly 
■tpon.  103.  104;  Slight  Ivia- 
lion  ol  the  Nidioiial  Govern- 
mcni  to,  IDB ;  A  aHliimal 
Covernnirni  acta  directly 
upon.  SAO;  A  federal  gor- 
crntocni  acti  upon,  In  ihcir 
corpniatc  rupacitjr,  S80:  Per- 
plplinK  tlause  in  Ariicles 
of  Confedeialion  concerning. 
87t :  Inicr-Stntr  privilccea 
of.  ITS :  New  Consiitulion 
provide*  for  unifoim  rule  of 
lUturiiliiatloii,  S79  :  Ulilian- 
Chiacmenl  o(.  in  DiMtict  of 
Colurobia.  3831 :  Rclatire 
(rcatcr  Importame  o(  ttical 
govcifinienii  to,  yoCm  ;  Of 
eacb  State  entitled  to  the 
ptlTilegei  and  iinniuniliei  of 
cidien*  ol  the  levcrul  Klate*. 
6t&;  A)i  p^rtons  born  or  nat* 
aialit«<I  in  the  U.  S.  arc,  biT'^ 
States  (hall  mnhc  no  lax 
which  shuU  aliTtdKi  the  piiv- 
ileg«c  or  immuniiici  of,  617. ; 
Of  each  Slate  to  be  entitled 
to  the  privilege*  o'  ciliienK 
in  the  several  States,  730;  Of 
one   Slate   not  10   sue   those 


Of  tlnsi— diHin  ueJ. 
of  another  in  Confederate 
cuuitii,  7]0 ;  Kifiht  of,  to 
eairyarmt;  Ptoposcdamend- 
mcnt  eoQCcrning,  63.1.  636, 
(14S,  tuq.  F.IUIhility  of.  for 
feileral  offices :  Prnpo«cd 
amendmcDt  conccrnino,  (143; 
Definition  ol.  709;  [)  r  e  d 
Scoit  c.-kM  and  the  qucf<lioTi 
ol.  Toq  :  Of  a  Stite.  not 
iieceuMiily  citiiens  of  U.  S., 
7i'>. 

nrui;  Offict  •  Aeldtri;  Tax 
Ofiifrt\ :  Rconomf  In, 
through  anion.  79;  Taxation 
fur  support  ol.  1S1  :  Relative 
tiitiAllnesft  of  Federal  over 
State.  SOT  ;  ConKrcMinen  In* 
eligible  to.  971 ;  Senate  a 
chei:k  on  undue  removals 
from.  911;  Kctiiuv.iI  from,  on 
impcachmenl,  614^, 

Clauiblp  in  Scotland.  lOT. 

Cltv*i»Dd.  Gruvar,  7111. 

Clinton.  George  (Cato).  31*,  61*. 
4411  ;  t.ettcr  ol  New  Vork 
dclcgiile*  to,  sx  :  Wrilfls  let- 
ters 'if  Cuto,  xxi  :  Falsehood 
ol,  41S  ;  An  opponeni  of  the 
Conilltut'on.  tiled,  449. 

OlMnta :  Parli.imentary  Intro* 
duction  of,  14311. 

Cuilitl«D:  The  iiotd  used  In  a 
fiood  Mtnsc,  949.  394.  99S. 

0«lnac« :  Power  of  Kaiioital 
Government  over,  ttl ;  Im- 
portance of  securing  uniform, 
ST1:  States  tetlrtciert  Iron). 
S9i :  Congress  to  regolatc. 
U>%..  T»4. 

ColrnUl  FarUd  :  Governmental 
systetn  of.  ix. 

Colonlea,  European  ^  Danger  to, 
ItiJin  Aiiietica,  M. 

CotorMI    Ba«a    {ttt   «U»  ff/grt; 

(Mnmbla.  District  of :  it*  Citpi- 
Camnaader  -  la  •  thM :  ite  Prti- 

iJriU. 
Camnurw*    (tir    o/iv    Embargo ; 
i\'<vix^ii*H) :     Extension     of 
American,      displeasing      to 


/NDEX. 


^ 


COBUMrM—  CeHliH  laid. 

Euiope,  19.  61  ;  EKitfniniiiian 
of  the  opiniiiii  (hat  irnilcncj 
«I,  is  pacific.  S&,  30,  )3n:  The 
chief  uiusc  of  nor  between 
Prance  and  Ofcai  Britain, 
M:  Ct>  m  pc  t  i  I  i  on  H  of.  a 
■otirce  of  conlcniion  fieiirceo 
Ihe  tepatale  Sluteo,  M,  ST; 
American  vpirii  of  cnierpr<«« 
in,  ST;  InHueoce  of,  in  hcui- 
ing  adoption  of  ConKiliniloo. 
j!iia  :  InijivrlHncg  of  niilioiuil 
control  aver,  U,  ITS:  Impor- 
tance of  American  ntarkeli  to 
European,  et  :  Potaihilllir  at 
lodirect.  with  Gicai  Britain. 
H :  Policy  of  probibiloty 
rcBalalioas  In  rcRaiil  to.  no 
Ihe  pan  of  (lie  United  Slaloa. 
W.  66:  Division  will  make 
American.llic  preyof  Europe. 
67;  The  m<>»l  pri><1iicijvc 
■Durceof  naiioaal  wenlih.TS: 

The  he*l  frirnd  iif  a|;fkiil- 
lure.  7>,  441  ;  l'r<>duce» 
abundani  luppliei  of  piecious 
iBctaU.  TS  ;  M^he*  payment 
of  taxes  easier.  TS  ;  Chief 
govemnMntal  r«»enue  is  de- 
rived from.  T>:  American,  at 
Ihe  lowe*l  |H>int  t>i  dccten- 
■JCKii  W ;  Want  of  power  to 
regDialc.  in  Confederation, 
lit;  ConlllctinK  State  rcgula- 
lions  of.  ISS;  Iiriporlanca  of 
navy  to.  H5  ;  Sew  Jersey 
proposition  thit  ibe  naiioo 
•hall  contiol.  B39;  AK'criiient 
that  the  Federal  ton  xhotilil 
regulate.  SM :  Example  of 
Swilicilanil.  9Tfi.  {^sample  of 
Germany.  ST8  ;  Enuinplo  of 
Nelhctland),  978;  ReRulalion 
of.  with  Indian*,  876  ;  Local 
kiiowtedke  not  necessary  for 
TeKutalion  of.  8TS ;  Iicpor- 
tance  of  koowteds'  <>'>  I" 
national  repieleaiativcs,  S7S; 
Impoiianio  of,  In  ccMain 
States,  400;  A  blow  ai.  an 
Injury  to  the  laacl*boldiD|t 
clasM*.  401 :  fower  lo  ree- 
ulaie.  with  foreiEn  aalions. 
tejr,  79) ;    Proposed  aincMd* 


OwBawrw     Oh  tiwiMti. 

mcai  concerninic.  6B9:  ttei- 
ulations  of.  should  be  aa> 
form,  715, 

Onsowree,  Intemaict  A  Matu- 
o<  conlenlion.  SB,  ^So,  Itl. 
)mponaiu:e  of  rri[ulatiu(. 
ITS.  400  ;  I'ropoacd  aineiu] 
meiit  CKiceininc.  651;  Rtlj- 
tion  of  banks  lo.  673. 

ONmiartUI nUa*  :  P«recdioler- 
lify  lfae<Bselvcs,  t^'?*. 

CaiUKtreial  CUhm  |/rr  ah»  thr- 
LiHiilt  I'Uiies]:  Want  of  la- 
Auence  of.  In  Revolnllon,  li. 
Uaiile  of.  with   laitded  intet- 

esl.  4<MM. 

Oanjnerdal  Companlaa  :  Poarorcd 

CViKiri*  |,i  incurporalr.  6j6. 
Caoiniarcltl  lloa«p«ly  :  Prajioietf 

Bii:endment  cuiiccr>iln|,  Ojl. 

ftji.  ''43.  (^fl,  *>Vf- 
Commeielal  TrMtlai :    PropoaH 

ainendmetit   concernlec,  637. 

f>J9- 
CoBUBwdal    Unity       tmpusdMe 

wiihuiit  poliiical  unliy,  TOt 
Conuniaaiana  to  lie^'anicd  by  fk( 

Hreildcnl,  6TJ.,  735, 
OCMmttue  or  ftalaa  :  Fallerc  «f, 

jfi^  ;    Clause   In  Confedcn- 

tlon  periiib|[(n);.  ;<tS.  s<IT- 

OaBtaan  Dafanea :  u*  Ctmrtl 
CUiifi. 

OODiBMi  law  {itr  air*  £«««). 
txLV,  ivt;  PreteiKled  estalK 
li*hmrnl  of,  679. 

OaniMans.  Mouse  of  :  Tena  of 
■ncmberi  nf,  SM;  The  insini 
ment  of  Ihe  kiriR  rntber  than 
of  the  people.  ST(;  Sv>ien  1I 
representation  in.  SSI.  SU: 
Growth  of  tnflneDcc  of,  as 
compared  with  Ilnnse  of 
Lords.  StT,  4U,  «M;  Vvnatlly 
of.  610. 

0«arM(:  Obviout    '  '  BL. 

I4S  ;  Delicate    '  t*. 

cernint.  by  adii  ,ia- 

■illiilion,    SM;  OB 

which  ii  may  be  JVI; 

Belweeo  two  or  muie  Staia*. 
Rtlr.Tjy;  Nature  of  naifoaal. 
Ot-j.  too,  toi.  713;  Wrooxdaf' 
tuition  of,  7i». 


IXD£X. 


747 


■ffMatloa:  0(  Scnatort  xniJ 
KeprcKnlaliTci  lo  be  astci- 
Ulnotl  by  Uw,  tx>\s:  Ol  Itie 
I'ruBitlcrit  not  l<>  bcchiiiiEri) 
during  icrni  of  offlic,  6lv;  0( 
tb«  tudgel  ol  (he  Fcdcr*! 
c<ian«  not  («  be  dlininl>lici) 
during  continuance  in  ultcr, 
At4<;  Private  (ilopcny  not  lo 
be  taken  tor  pat>li«  u>e  xilh- 
<Mt.  bjyi :  Extra,  to  cvn- 
trnctoix  or  officer*  not  to  be 

KJii.IIr,].  7»S- 
CoBMvrftetM  {ire  alia  Aehgan 
LtagHf  :  lJt/4<tmoH  :  Lytian 
Lvn/tdrraty):  Diflcrence  be- 
tween leagfuct  uml.  0I-»: 
Obedience  lu.  I  com  a  sense  ol 
(otnmon  imctcsti.  03;  Nat- 
ural cenlrlluKai  icndcneiei 
lii.M;  Experience  ai  to  coer- 
cive power*  of  ancient.  M: 
Altcmpti  to  tile  military 
coercion  in.  the  sisnal  lur 
war.  100;  Tendency  of,  teth- 
er lo  anarchy  Mniont  the 
memlwia  than  to  lyianny  in 
the  heud.  IM-W;  Structure 
and  faitloiy  of  tiieck,  10ft- 
114;  Peeuliar  nclvjinUKC  ol, 
•«  to  insunectioD.  tSO;  Ten- 
dcncy  to  deipoil  geoeral  gov 
ctnmciit  in  Hnclrnl  und  mod- 
ern. SOB;  N'f  Slate  ali^ill  enter 
into  .iny  treatJT.   alliance,   or, 

'iTkH,. 

C*nl*d«r*elM.  Separate  Amerl- 
ean  ;  State  officiHla  favor.  S; 
Whispers  of  project)  for,  C; 
Deliel  In,  h^  npposera  of 
ConMllulhKi.Ait.  <:  Scelionul 
conirovernyin  relation  (a,  bn; 
'i'bc  iniereit  of  the  people  u 
•fleeted  by.  B;  Treaty  dtmcul- 
ticK  nrisinic  from.  It;  Keinltt 
of.  91  ;  Inevitable  foteisn 
alliaiKe*  of,  SS.  M:  Inex- 
pediency of  dividing  the 
Union  into  tbree  or  four,  IS- 
St  :  Mutual  diiiru*!  an  in- 
evitable conkcquenee  ol.  M  ; 
ImpOStlbililyul  ilirir  reniain- 
inff  equal,  S4 ;  Formidable 
only  lO  each  otlier.  Ift;  Will 
bedlMlactnaiioaa.SU;  NvtKb- 


Co  nbdaraelM —  Crttdm  at  J. 

brirhMoJ  of.  irill  coflstjtnie 
anugunitm.  18.  I'onimriciiil 
jraloiiiiy  betwrrn.SO;  titratet 
cxpeiiM  of.  T»;  Geographical 
division*  of,  TD.  M;  tiettt^ 
sily  u(  each  foi  a  Kovernmenl 
as  enernetic  a«  the  pioposed 
Coniiituiion.  79.  W;  Proba- 
ble nnrobci  of,  !o  the  rveiil  of 
diBunion,  T9-*l  ;  ^lCllllI,rily 
of.  to  feudal -.yitein.  100;  Ar- 
Kumcoi  for.  implied  by  Ami- 
FederHlicl    cnntcntiun.     141  ; 

;av.  a,%  cxpuMd  as  Sinto  [o 
niurtection.  ITS;  Will  make 
the  United  litalc*  but  a  copy 
of  Europe.  MS;  Will  facili- 
tate oppressive  combination* 
of  nujotltlei.  S4T ;  Project 
lor.  a  never  fiiilinK  bail  Id 
Sme  official.  8M. 

Contrderaey,  Northern :  New 
Lniiljnd  project  lor,  tit, 

CoDfedoraay,  Southern  Uf  «lf 
Xeifiinn) :  Slave  Ncale*  pfr>j- 
ect  for,  tm;  Seek  foreign  al- 
linncei.  lAx;  Constitution  of, 
an  regnrdi  a  torifl.  jSit,  73]; 
Inherently  weaker  than 
Northern.  W  ;  Consiilntion 
of.  7JO. 

C»Df«daTaU  BepnbUo :  i/r  Ktfu^ 
U.<. 

Ooofalaration  ef  U,  I.  1781:  Itn- 

Cotency  ol.  x  :  Modelled  on 
lalavian  and  Helcelic  Con- 
atiluiions.  x  :  Only  a  legis- 
lative dependeot,  i;  Alleged 
cbaracterlitic  dlillncllon  be- 
tween conBolldatton  aitil.  BS ; 
Dissolution  of.  jeopardiies 
inportJint  righti;.  U  ;  Iniul- 
Acicncy  ol.  BB.  141:  fJeKt^id- 
ing  experienee  under.  80.  9A: 
Imbecility  of.  89:  Great  and 
radical  vice  of,  legislation  lor 
commtinilK*  instead  of  per- 
Boni,  90,  91  ;  In  eRect  a  rtiere 
league  or  alliaiKc  Itelween 
nailons,91;  Soverei|tn  powers 
of,  made  tnelleciive  by  not 
extending  to  iodividiLal  till* 
icns,  91:  SoceielEO  powers 
of,   in   practice  mere  reborn- 


748 


INDEX. 


Caafodarction—  Cfnlittaii. 

cay  of,  9S.  9B  ;  Kci|ui»itioni> 
ondct.  can  only  be  cofortcd 
liy  gfcal  arnijr,  99  ;  Coroparl- 
(on  of.  iriili  Ihn  Iruiliil  li»r<)- 
nje»,  107;  CompuriBon  ol, 
with  Swiss  League.  118;  No 
Mdctlon  to  tuwii  of.  IM:  Hm« 
DO  power  l'>  exact  ubr<l>flDi:e, 
194;  Tfae  synlcm  ol  quotas  a 
(undamenul  error  of,  196; 
HI»lOTy»[  ijuala  K)r»lcin  an- 
•l«r.  labMi  RFveiiucsof.  lljn: 
Powerless  to  legulnie  com- 
merce. 131;  t-inilteil  military 
powers  u(.  IM;  laequaliljr  of 
iuffragc  ondet.  189:  MJiiuiiiy 
conlfol  In.  189;  Kate  of  fnr- 
eijEn  inflneiiec  under,  1S7 ; 
Eiiil*  <lui^  lo  (h«  niinoriiy 
under.  187;  W<ni  of  ■  ju- 
dlcUry  pDwer.  a  ctownInK 
defect  uf.  140;  Perilous  (en> 

dei>cy  of  a  iinjtic  IcgUlalive 
houtc.  141:  A  system  radi- 
cally *iciou«,  141;  Want  of 
populat  consent  to.  another 
delect  in,  lU ;  Assertion 
Uiat  raliftcatiuni  of.  can  be 
repealed.  14S.  MS:  Acknowl. 
cdcet  the  necessity  of 
sircnElli  in  llii^  federal  pow- 
er. I4S;  Rrcounijcs  netcMiiy 
ol  national  control  of  na- 
lioiul  forces.  146;  Experi- 
ence of  divided  aulfaorlly 
onder.  147 ;  Dual  govern- 
menlii  under,  aiulually  check 
each  olbei.  177;  Full  powers 
of  lniaiir>ii  iniended  by  fram- 
ers  ol,  184;  Founded  on  fal- 
laclDu*  priiKipte*.  SS9;  lin- 
praclicable  cha racier  of  cer- 
tain provisions  under.  M3- 
U9;  Necc^uiry  usui|ial(i>i>» 
of  Coagtret*  andcr.  24S-I4B  ; 
Nature  of.  948  ;  All  debt*  ol. 
valid  against  ibc  U.  S,,  980, 
6**;  l-<GlsUilvr  inMsbilliy 
under,  >B7:  System  of  Toting 
under.  KM ;  Judiciary  lys- 
leoi  under.  888.  ftSi;  Civil 
ervirc  undet.  B7Bi  Viyr  ol 
las  iSiais*  Dtceasarf  for  «x- 


C«oJed<TatlaD—  Cmi  lin  tn4. 

etcise  ul  miKil  powers  ol.  %tfi; 
KclHIion  of  Stales  tu,  bt^\  A 
mere  league  beiweco  sorer- 
elcn  Sl.-ilcs,  713. 

Coiif*<)sTatlaD.  AilUIrt  of  {leit 
in  full).  (Qi-fu^;  Imperfect 
because  made  in  limes  of 
sireu.  9;  Imiltuied  to  pre- 
S«rvc  union,  9;  Ftinilamraul 
e  rrof  s  in,  preTcm  weic 
amend nent,  80:  (General  >»' 
Kent  us  to  material  delects  of. 
90:  Want  of  eneiK;  la.  W: 
No  guaranty  to  Slate  gov- 
ernmeni*.  iM:  Kc<ei»eit  an 
sanctioo  from  people.  148; 
Delicate  quesiion  tit  super- 
Kcdlng.  148.  999;  Ankles  as 
to  millury  cxlsblihhmeBU, 
IBt;  Clause  relating  to  na- 
tional foicei,  189;  Suggested 
nbjrcliona  and  amendraeBli 
lu,  (80;  Refusal  ol  Maryland 
to  agree  to.  989;  Far  more 
defcclivc  Ibnn  pioposcd  Coo- 
slilulion.  942;  Was  ibe  Con- 
TCDlkm  limited  to  an  amcnrf- 
menl  of,  984;  Syslcm  ol 
popular  appointment  uoJcr, 
891;  ConstiiBtion  merely  an 
cipaniloo  of  ptiuclplci  Ib. 
S94;  Comparison  ul  Consti- 
lution  with  poweis  of.  91V. 
971;  Attempt*  of,  to  recondl* 
pjulial  saveirlcniy  In  union 
with  comptete  State  SOTrcr- 
eigitty.  977;  Defeciive  cUnte 
in.conccinlng  ciTiirnnhipaDd 
natural  iiai  I  "u,  978.  Lack  «l 
provision  in,  i;oni:«tnin«  new 
Slates.  989;  hias  only  Irgla- 
lalivc  SBiictinn,  989;  Inftac- 
licins  of.  fnrtiish  ;jr"tird"  lor 
dissolution.  IBS    '  -d 

twYauxuf  StJie  .1  I. 

810;M«ih<xl<>la...  .•■ 

CtafsdsrattM.  CmtK  - 

irt  i.'tmgrtst  f/  tA-   ,._.'J. 

CsagTMt.  Conf«dcr«t«  i  OntanK 
latton  and  PawersoI.Taik-Til. 

OMgr«w,  Cnatloentnl;  Powcf 
SeeureJ  try,  Ibioucli  paper 
noncy.  811. 


/A-JJ£X. 


BwfTBH  o(  1T74.  334n:  Oppo> 
«L[u^ii  I"  rTkCHMjrc-R  (■!,  ID, 
[CoagrHiar  tbfConlMtrKUoD  in- 
jUslicF  to.  xi;  In  rrlallon  (■> 
jiiibHc  Und*.  Si;  C*n  scaice- 
]jr  kc«[>  up  Ihe  fornm  »f  ail- 
minUtiaiiun.SS:  Impoicnl  po- 
sition of,  due  lo  tysicm  of 
Rilfltigc,  ISA;  flfKatiiuticin 
of,  ilrfocliKC,  141;  tnlrinsic 
feeblcncst  of.  14S  ;  i'ropoii- 
llon  In  iiict«aie  puwctk  of. 
14S;  Dcfocis  of,  iluc  lu  il*  l>c- 
intc  a  single  UiiiiUlivc  bod^, 
lu;  UnlimilcddiKrelli'nol.iii 
conlrol  ul  (iHiiiiniil  (iiccTH,  lt6; 
Nugaiorr  pofrcrs  of.3M;  De- 
pendence of.  on  SlBtei,  MS. 
Kcxoluijiiii  of,  riii«-fiitn); 
Federal  Cunventi'sn.  S83:  Un- 
conaiiiDtional  adiuns  of.  9T1; 
A«iiur»|Mii>n  of.  n*  regards 
n<w  Stale*,  tti  :  Waning  of 
eniha»ii(sm  for.  SIS:  Siaie 
patllsiinihlp  ln,S14;Cnn*Unt 
rrfleclion  of  niemticrx  of.  S59: 
Clauses  in  Confederation  es- 
(ablishioic,  59Z;  Members  of, 
excluded  from  otber  piiliUf 
office,  sqi;  Powers  of,  under 
Cunfederalion,  594. 
CcagriM,  K.ti>oniil  (irr  alto  Df 
farlmtnt!  r/  P-'wtr  I  GntrH' 
mritl.V.  S.;  Loxfi;  Lts^iiUllV* 

IDifsirimmi ;  Kifrritnlatirn  ; 
Jftpr/ttnt^ttiz'ti,  ffaitJi  tf  I 
Stnalt)'.  Constitution  of.  xii; 
Linitaiion*  upon,  xiii;  Eifeci 
of  dual  body  In,  xv  :  Kn- 
cro*cbm<<(ils  of,  on  piiwer  of 
appoinimeoi,  xt;  Chansc  in 
(he  nature  of  members  orijiv; 
liDpofflbillty  that  every  man 
In.  will  be  a  traitor,  ItT ; 
Power  of.  under  the  Federal 
Conmitmion.ovcrcapital.Ml: 
.  Poticr   of,  cooKernina   lorri- 

[  loTf  beloeginjt  to  the  United 

^H  Slaict,  MS;  Possible  miscon- 
^^1  (iructloo  of  the  Conslllullon 
^V  by,  SOO:  Persistent  attempts 
'  «(,  Id  eacroiich  yi%a\  At  re- 

!  gards  election  of   President. 

jaBi ;    As    regards  appoint 

L meots-     319111 ;     As   regards 

^H     Pfcsidcnlial  veto,   Jtgn  i   At 


CooKTMS—  CenltHuii. 

regards  iieaty  power.  Jjon; 
Ulijeciion  to  small ness  of 
rcDrese  Dial  ion  in,  MS;  In- 
evitable gronih  of.  SW;  Lib- 
erties of  Ameiica  ahtotulcljt 
safe  in,  S69:  Members  of.  io- 
cligibte  10  cirll  olftces.  STl : 
A  leprcteatatlvc  of  buth  citi- 
zens and  Slates,  SB4  ;  Presi- 
deniial  power  of  adjourning, 
481;  New  governmenl  will 
impty  shorter  sessions  of. 
STft;  Publication  of  Journal 
of.  rcfguitcd,  596,  (137,(144.648; 
Coostilulional  piovitioa  con- 
leining,  599^)3iir;  Number  of 
Representatives  in:  Proposed 
a  me  (III  men  I  ^oorerninK,  63:, 
(>)(.  637.  64a.  64S;  Umiiation 
on  :  Proposed  ameodment 
coocernins.  63J.  6J4. 1139, ^44, 
648:  Compensation  of:  Pio> 
posed  amend  roc nt  cooccfo* 
'r>|i  C'3<>>  ^44,  6jo:  Executive 
Depnrlmcnts  admitted  in 
Confedernle  Constitution. 

713;  Implied  ConslilBlioiMl 
P'lners  of,  736. 

CooiiMtieat,  ii6h,  irjm,  MS, 
30tJii.  Dispute  of, over  Wyo- 
mint;  38,  SB.  tOO.  170;  Com- 
mercial tribute  of.  to  New 
Vork.ST;  Reason  for  Federal- 
ism of,  3lifl;  Ketallation  of, 
■owarda  Rhode  Island.  40; 
Maintain*  loyal  charier  as 
conslilullon.  3Z4H:  Provision 
id  Constitution  of, concerning 
elections,  SH;  One  branch  of 
legislature  of.  so  constituteil 
that  each  member  of  itiscl«<i- 
cd  by  (he  whole  State,  SH; 
Jury  trial  in.  IM,  S69  ;  Mo«t 
democratic  State  In  Union, 
»eB. 

C«B«eriptiaa  :  Proposed  amend- 
mem  coacerniag,  tA%. 

C«BS«lUaUoD  (</<  ah*  Crmfttt ; 
C'^nfiJrraiiil  ;  CrHililMtifH  ; 
GreiTnatrtil.  U.  S. ;  Lragtttt  ; 
Slatt  Stvtrtigntyy.  The  plas 
o(  the  Union  aims  only  at 
partial.  B9.  191.  MB  ;  Desire 
of  the  States  lo  guard  aitaiiisl 
improper,  ill. 


i 


CODiUtiiUoa:  Kaiare  ol  •  wrii< 
icn,  r'\i:  IiTi|)r<)v«i»eiii  In 
American,  over  iin<>«nl,  H; 
Neceiiiiy  ntwayt  tcadi  tudis- 
rcRanl  ol.IQl.  lU;  Hitherto, 
uiukily  thv  *t>rk  of  our  nmn, 
93T;  Ongin  □(  aiKient,  tST; 
Only  a  republican,  cuitcd 
lo  AmoriCii,  B4t:  Catinui  be 
(tamed  (orexi>tin|;exigf  neiei 
merely.  SM.  Sll  :  Rcvisioii 
of  ■■>  c*IiitiUtlied.  a  Cfllical 
matter.  386;  UcAniiiorf  ft  u 
limited.  6M :  Can  only  be 
mnintiiineil  hy  Jtidicul  de- 
parliDenl,  All;  A  )iin<Iiinirn- 
tjit  lin.  Ml.  bSy:  Must  be  the 
*lanil>fd  of  legal  contituc- 
liof),  S40  ;  Theory  of  a  lim- 
ited. SW:  UistiiKrliunbetireea 
aiaiuie  l.-iw  bdiI.  687;  Not 
■llerable  by  leglilalure,  b37; 
Nature  vt  limited.  ('87;  Cnn- 
not  be  rnieiprct«d  wjib  tbe 
klrtctnfu  ol  a  private  con- 
liact,  T]6;  Rule*  of  inlerpre' 
lalion  of,  J3J. 

CDoitltiitlom,  CoDfedetate,  38a. 
7»o. 

Ooiiitllvtl««  M  CoaMtrallea  :  1^ 

i'*ftfiiieralifn.  Artitht  pf, 
G«Ii(tltntloii,  Feiletal  (i»  AnrnJ- 
mtnlt;  AMli-Ftdtratiilti  Bill 
tf  fligili:  Cem^fl;  Cenitrut- 
tiffti;  Dtfart<Ktnli  f/  Prwtr; 
Gntfral  Cttmri;  Grttrnmrnt, 
U.  S.  :  Xsti/Uatitw ;  Start 
Stftrtiznty:  I'mitH):  Text  In 
lull,  with  amendment*,  ;<)H- 
631;  Worship  of.  vii,  iTt". 
6i)7;  Protoiype*  of.  rii  :  Dis- 
TegaTd  of,  tU:  DcTelnpmeai 
ol,  vil ;  Peculiar  diii|in<Mion 
of.  vili:  Guaranty  to  minority 
in,  viii.  xiv :  NcceMkrily 
bated  on  people  and  Siatea, 
kil:  A  cheuk  on  popular  con- 
trol, xll:  Rail&calionof.  xlii: 
Development  of  goveroaient 
onder.  itiii;  ConieM  over  ral> 
lAottlnn  ol.  XK  ;  Oppoiiiion 
lo.lt)  JJeir  York,  tx:  Writing* 
■niaii.xxh  Aitliude  cilp«o- 
plf  t'lWHtii*.  x%v -.  Form*  » 
fcprcBouiative       dcinocnacjr. 


Cod>tltnti*n — CimltHmtd. 

xliv;  Personal  snd  loe«l  «fi> 
potillon  10.  I:  OpptiiTtiaa  ol 
State  official*  to,  1;  Pubiiui 
not  ttnlrleadly  lo,  •;  Adu)- 
tloR  of.  Ihf  alternative  of  dii- 
memberment  ol  Union.  T, 
Onljr  iccommeodcil  by  C<w- 
vcnilon.  19.  US,  SCT;  InSe- 
cDce  of  <onimrice  in  fecmlBg 
adoption  of.  3BH:  Hoei  not 
Imply  abolition  of  SlHte  |[ot- 
rrnmenll,  M;  Rcslraint  on 
States  imposed  by.  ksh  :  Guar> 
anty  ol.  to  the  Slate*  nl  a 
rcpubllcHii  form  n(  K^'cia* 
ment.  IH.  ISS.  SM-MO;  Kc 
eeiitty  of  one  as  enersctic  tu 
(■ccorc  union,  IM;  Ncmsily 
(oT  creal  caution  concerning, 
Mt:  No  power*  too  greal 
when  lodged  !n  properly  coa- 
tlructrd.  lU:  The  iaiersal 
•iructurc  of.  tbe  onty  pi^ot 
for  Hue  criticism.  IM;  Wis- 
dom of  the  provision  in.  con- 
cerning the  milltaFV  forte, 
ISO-IBS,  16«-16l.  SM,  Re*' 
■on  ohy  the  cxecniion  of. 
will  probably  be  popular.  179- 
171:  Extends  national  Bulhiir- 
Ity  to  cilliens,  1T3;  La«* 
under,  at  10  tbe  eoumcr> 
■led  and  Icfiltiinaie  ob>rcii 
ol  Its  Jurisdiction,  will  be 
the  supremo  taw  o(  tbe  lar.d. 
IT> ;  Absurdity  of  objec- 
tion* to  clause*  concnnliiii 
militia.  IMt:  Inc'ihcTcnie  iil 
objections  to.  Itl;  No  pro- 
vision in.  concecaini  feut 
tfml/alwi,  IBl;  ttlilntled 
psblicaiionsaRalnsl.  1B4.IM. 
SM;  ForoiBonly  a  paTlUlcan- 
solldalion  or  union,  IM;  Ho* 
far  sovcrriKn.  IM:  Cannui 
bo  framed  merelr  for  cxiM- 
ing  eiigencie*.  MM.  til:  Hll- 
Acullj  o(  comtiiniriK  onrrnf 
and  liberty  In, 1X9:  Defeci -.il. 
the  result  of  want  of  sMnr- 
■lenl  ripcrtence,  tSS:  tXVTi 
*ily  ol  objections  to.  940,  Ml. 
Far  less  defective  than  AnJ- 
cle>   ol    Confederation.   MS; 


ISDEX. 


75« 


D»ti  tuttoa — Ctnlin  II f 4. 
Conformity  ol.  lo  ttpublican 
pritKijilci.  MS-SU:  Analogy 
betaeea  llic  mode  of  iji- 
poinlmcnK  undcT,  and  undci 
tbe  Siitc  goveiamenis,  %W. 
m-.  Wholly  [C|iul>llcHn  in 
ctiarsclcr.  I4T:  A  rutiricatliin 
ol.  by  ihe  people  aciinc  ■" 
corporale  capacily,  1MB; 
Nclitier  a  nmloaal  nor  »  led- 
er>l,  but  ■  combiiMlioD  of 
both,  Mft-US:  Adoplioo  of. 
not  a  eBtlonal,  but  a  lederal 
MCI.  HO;  The  (irupoBcd,  na- 
lioaal  in  iis  nciion  on  iodi- 
viduaU,  2M;  Fcdeial  as  nn 
Bfbltct  bcKrcen  the  Suicti. 
MO;  Naliunal  in  operation, 
but  federal  in  eiteni.  S51  : 
Right  of  Convention  lo  lianie 
turh,  US.IM:  Merely  iin  ri- 
pantion  of  printiplcs  con- 
lainetl  in  Confedcialion.  IH; 
I II  111)  v>  I  tun  of.  in  it*  reference 
to  Ihe  people  laiher  than  lo 
the  States.  >U;  General  view 
of  the  iKmerd  veitcd  by,  in 
the  Uniun.  SSO-303:  I'onrr 
of,  lodKlafewar.Wl:  Gu-icdi 
againil  «t.)nding  aroiy,  SS). 
984;  {''Iter  tif,  to  piuvi<lp  n 
navy,  St5;  Ko  part  of,  can  be 
contttQcd  (TJibouliliiconlexl, 
Sn :  Computoon  uf  poweis 
ol.  nilh  ihoMt  uf  Article*  of 
Confederation,  STO.  STl.  ST9; 
STT;  Power  of,  ro  make  ir^iit- 
Ir*,  *n-,,  Vl\:  ft'wer  "f.  i" 
deGn«  and  punish  oflcntes 
on  Ibe  high  ica*.  >T1 ;  Pro- 
hibllloa  by.  ol  the  imporia- 
tiun  ot  slave*  after  iSoS,  tTS: 
Power  of.  to  regulate  com- 
merce.nS;  Power* of,  locoln 
niotiey.  to  pilnivh  counter- 
(eilers.  and  to  iCKUlale 
weights  and  mcBfurc*,  STT; 
Pi>wer  uf.  to  ctlablUh  a  nni- 
lurm  aioda  ot  natoiiiliialion. 
S77-S7t ;  Power  of.  to  eitab- 
liih  uniform  lawa  of  bank- 
ruptcy. tT9;  Power  o(.  lo 
eatiibliah  poat-ioada.  9T9 ; 
Power  uf,  concctolng  publk 


Cb  ntUtntl«B  ~-C<iHiiH  utd. 

aclt.  records,  elc,  210:  Power 
of.  lo  grant  copyrlghii.  SBO. 
SBl;  Power  ot.  to  cxcrcl«e  ex- 
clusive Irgittalion  over  ■  di*' 
irict  not  exceeding  ten  milei 

auare,  if  ceded  to  the  U.  S., 
1  :  Power  uf,  ron(e(nln( 
Ireasoii.  1S3;  Power  of.  to  ad- 
mit new  Siatti.  181;  Power 
ol,  conrerning  icirllory,  etc.. 
balunKini:  to  tha  U.  5..  tM  ; 
CUu«e  of.  admitting  new 
Stale*  carefully  guarded,  MC; 
OblTgllion  roncrrning  public 
debts  incurred  prior  lo  the 
adoption  of.  390.  bloc'.  Pro- 
rltiina  v(,  concernlni:  amend-  { 
meota.  S91 ;  Clause  of,  coa> 
ceming  ratificaiion  of.  9M; 
Queilloa  concerning  super- 
seding iif  Articles  of  Cunfcd- 
e ration  by.  MS;  Disabilities 
of  the  Slate*  created  by.  SM- 
BSI;  Power  given  by  lo  Con- 
gress, to  make  all  taws  nec- 
essary and  proper  for  excCDl> 
ing  il*  ennmeraird  powera, 
Mt-SOl;  Necessarily  a  docu- 
ment ot  coiiBiruciion  or  im- 
pitfaliim.  199  ;  Impoiiiiibllity 
ol  a  pi>silive  enumeration  uf 
powers  of.  9H:  Possible  mis- 
cooitroclion  of,  by  Coogrc**, 
SOO;  Proriticin  ot.  IhHI  the 
Constitution .  laws,  and  trrat- 
iei  of  the  United  States  shall 
be  Ihe  supreme  law  of  ihc 
land.  391  ;  Oaih  of  officers  to 
BUppoti.  SOS,  (>3(u  :  Why  Stale 
oAclal*  should  take  oath  lo 
support,  sot;  Does  nut  add 
new  powers  so  much  a*  in- 
vigorates old  ones.  IM:  Ex- 
aniin'lion  uf  ilic  particular 
structure  of.  319;  Imperlid 
*«paiailon  of  departments  Id. 
nil  tiMire  proaouoced  than  in 
Slata  coDSti  tat  ions,  SMi  Pe- 
culiar division  under,  ol  the 
power  surrendered  by  the 
people,  84a-M(:  Mi^deof  pro- 
tecting Ihe  minofity  from 
ttsurpaiioos  by  the  majorily 
Hsdci,  347;  Number  ol  mem- 


4 


rsa 


INDEX. 


Conitltatlaa —  Cmiitt  an/. 

tiers  nf  Housr  of  Rcprcicnla- 
t)v«i  unclrr.  a  (ruiiiul  theme 
of  dcclanijiliuii,  MS;  Peeull- 
mfitjr  •!  rrK)ii<1t>  iriirrscnla- 
lioQ  under.  $M  ;  Conlenlioa 
ihal  (be  Ekciion  I^w  ihould 
be  part  o(,  lOS;  \jfm*  iiitdrd 
conlmty  lo.  are  void.  Bll, 
A86:  A  check  on  opinciiire 

law*  of  Sltilc*.  BS4;  .SltenCe 
■>f.  concern iKK  trial  by  jurjr. 
6)6  ;  Itavi  not  abolish  trial 
by  fury.  K>.  SM;  Answer  lt> 
Ihc  ObjXIi'in  lli:>l  tiu  Kill  ol 
RiKhis  ii  contaiord  io.  669- 
6T8;  PrctcDilFd  CBlabliihmcnt 
<il  the  C»niin(i(i  iinil  Nlaiiilc 
Law  b)-.  6TI;  The  Preamble 
ol,  •  tecDgnition  ol  popuUi 
rlthit.  6T) :  Rcciignliiim  of 
people  111  Preamble  ol.  6TS  ; 
Embodies  Uill  of  Rigbi«.6T», 
676;  Omisiion  from,  of  a  (ifo- 
rltlon  evTicernirii;  the  liberty 
ol  the  preis  defended.  674: 
Anlwei  to  an  obir^llon  lo. 
founded  on  the  remolcneaa  uf 
the  seal  ol  governnneni  from 
many  o\  the  Staiei.  676.  677; 
An*wcr  to  the  objcciron  ibni 
A  proTiiivn  coneeininK  deblH 
due  to  the  United  Stale*  i» 
waniinK  In.  677;  Antwer  to 
■he  olifeelion  as  to  enpenM.' 
attending  ■dopilon  of,  676; 
The  t'tdnahit  hilt  vindicated. 
669 ;  AclinowlrdRed  impci- 
feelions  of,  661  ;  Propcised 
anMadment  of,  664  ;  A  com- 
promise  ol  Rmnj  dlulmllar 
interests  and  inclination*. 
664,  666;  Can  be  amended 
sabseqnenl  lo  adoption.  666  ; 
Method  o(  amciidiiit,  667, 
6aafi  The  eaialitishmenl  wf, 
by  Tuluninry  consent,  an 
absolaie  phenomenon,  666  ; 
Reiectlan  ol.  ItHisidH  anarchy 
and  civil  war.  668:  Katifica- 
lioa  of,  by  the  Slates,  {99  ; 
I'fenldet)!  shall  tokeanoalb 
lo  piVM'rvc.  li\y.  Tba  indi- 
cial  power  extends  lo  all 
caaes arising  atideT,6is<;  tic 


Coaatll  atim  --  Cm  limtii, 

supreme  law  ol  the  land.  6nr, 
The  )uil)(es  in  every  Slati 
chnll  be  honnd  by.  bsoi- :  Thai 
roliAcAtion  «t  nine  States] 
sball  establish.  blK-;  AratDd- 
mem*  10.  63t-£3tc:  Raiii 
iii>n  of,  &ti,  A3J-437,  6)0:1 
Power*  not  dcle|t>tcd  lo  ibc 
U.  S,  by,  are  reseri-ed,  6>y[; 
Rniimeraicd  powers  under, 
6s»;  Powers  «n<I«r,  the  In- 
hetcnl  difficulty.  M'l  ;  Kaluie 
ul,  bTQ.  6g4  ;  Consi ruction  oL 
makes  -in  iinlimlled  Kovcr»- 
metit.  (183;  Protective  datte* 
not  peimitied  by.  690;  Dot- 
Itinv  »l  nulhftcatiirii  rcdDcct 
it  to  airy  bubble,  (19J:  A  sot- 
einmctii,  not  a  league.  7<xi; 
Formed  by  tbe  people,  not 
the  Slates,  700;  A  roinpact 
between  the  people,  not  i 
Sistesol  the  Union,  700;  N 
a  terminable  compact,  Toa: 
Meaning  of  word  "ciltiea" 
in.  709  ;  A  mere  cunipact,  71J: 
Violatiiin  of,  by  Noiihcin 
Stales,  713.  JI4;  Election  ol 
Lincoln  destroy*  guaranties 
of,  71s:  Criltenden'*  |)|iipu*ed 
amendmenlsto.  716 ;  Aticmpi 
10  make  certain  proposed 
pntt*  ■■(,  iinaliriabte,  717. 7to. 

Caa*tlIDtl»nalUy  :  OisiecHrd  ul, 
vit.  ("17;  Slatet  ttitiFt  nol 
decide,  of  Sulionjl  laws, 
xii.  100-102.  140.  ITS,  lU. 
Ovs.  '"M,  7^  :  Nature  ol,  ITl. 
174.  Ul.  9tl.  64Q.  661.651, 
f^i.  (.S7,  (.94.  7J6.  737  ;  A  Ian 
without,  is  a  utnipaliun,  W6: 
Judicial  (Xi'iver  lo  decide  on 
a  Ish's.  621  :  The  pleasure  ol 
the  Judicisiy  will  not  decide, 
6SS ;  As  regards  a  Daliimal 
bank,  frst^ji) ;  A*  regsril* 
alien  and  sedition  taw>,  '■-.  j 
f>S6  ;  Decihiofi  n*  10,  bSii.  I  -', 
As  regards  protective  duties, 
690-708. 

CoksmetUn  (>/(  ii/»   VI., .r  >  .■■. 
itruitiirniitiS;  Twi  F, 

264;  Rules  of  leg.  1. 

666;    Possible  illsUi><.)tuit  U 


/ADSX. 


^ 


CmtlnMtira — C'ltin  neit. 
tee>l.bctwcenSiDic  and  F«d- 
rral  Kovcrnmt^niii,  (^o. 

Costi'MU  1  LuKB  in  violslion  nf. 
an  ngRtcsiion  on  <i(iiens.  3$; 
CcrlRin  to  be  more  inequllA- 
bl«  if  Suics  arc  hitdicT  ili- 
vlded.  44;  In  ibeir  nature  re- 
ciprocal. 291  :  Reiliictioni 
upon  I'lwM  iiii|ijiirtnK  lb?  obli- 
gation »l.  IM,  SM.  6i)S<-.  ■Jib. 

CoATtntJaa.  Comlituiiona)  (i» 
j4iHiif,'tii  ;  l-edtral ;  AmWi/J- 
talitn  i  S<tniia'i  i  atij  ta.h 
Slalr) :  Jcfletson's  propusiltun 
tor  procuring  a  rciriiifig,  1S4  : 
Most  likely  t"  br  drnianilcd 
by  execuiite  or  juditiary  de - 
piriRients,  S37;  rrobi»hie  pre- 
dominance of  Iet;(ii1ntive  dr- 
patlment  in.  33T.  Ml:  Project 
(or  periodical.  189:  Demand 
for  a  MTotid.  3]qn.  Ui  ;  Pl*n 
«(  une  in  li'ii.  33<)»;  AtRxiHt 
sure  lo  be  jnfc<led  by  party 
•pirfl,  940;  An  InadrquHle 
ciKck  on  1e]{ittalive  cicciicf, 
MS:  Initanee  ol,  in  Pcnn- 
■ylvanU  Council  ol  Centum, 
MO;  Pnipntilion  to  ncluile 
leKi*lB(i*c  department  from. 
MS ;  Twoihird*  of  Slate*  m^v 
call,  Moj;  Ol  nine  Siulc*  shnll 
CMablish  CoDHlilulton.  dll'': 
Consiiiuliunaloieihodof  mm- 
noniiig  national.  704;  For 
profioiinK  am  end  men  In  i« 
ConfeiIetateConiititDtii>n,7}i. 

CanTtallou.  Ilariford,  3391. 

CMiTrQtlon.  Nomlaatlng:  laflo- 
CDCV  of,  1411. 

OMiT«aU«B.  Pcaec.  339H. 

C>a*«atl*ii,  Siiuth  Carolina,    of 

tB3>.  JW".  70)- 

Oop7ri|ht:  PoKets  of  Coanmt 
oret.  2aO.  Ml:  In  Great  Brit- 
ain.MI  :  CatiHreu  ihdil  liaic 
power  to  provide.  Ii>  authors 
(or  limited  time.  6os(. 

Corpomtloa  -.  Power  of  Congreu 
to  form,  6i»,  b5b.664-6t)6,(i(>S, 
674.  6;*.  frJ7,  73* ;  Nature  o(. 

niscuMinn  of   proierl 
s)<leiiiial.4Tl-4T4:  Sys- 


C  0  nn  cl  1 — Cfuiitutif. 

ictn  of  execuiire,  in  Stale*, 

4T1:  UiinecetsaljcxpenM;  ol, 

4TB. 
ConiUrfeitins :   Nalicttal   pow«r 

to  puniih.  S7T,  605^,  744. 
Court*:      It/    JiJittAryi    Jtiry; 

Stlfrttnl  CfUrl. 

Ct«dll:  Public  and  private.  bi 
Hn  end.SS;  NccCMily  ol  Uo- 
rEstiicled,  191. 

Ci«dlt.    Kill*   ol:      i<v  Bilh    cf 

CTMlltai  ClUl  TV.  D*bHT,  I.  SI. 

CreU:  Coimj  ul.  493. 

CriniM:  How  10  be  trkd,  6i7r, 

(■23c,  730;  P(.wetsoI  National 

Government   over,  6J9,  680; 

Pei^oni  accused  ol,  may   be 

deinatidrd.  730. 
CrSmtnal    Csd*:     Neccitary    si*- 

vciiiy  of.  497. 
Criminal  Preiraatloiit^  Clauiie  in 

Ciitilc'letiilion       conccrnidi;, 

Sgi :    Proceeding!     In.    ta^c. 

7»ij ;     P(opi)»ed    anirndmenl 

concerning.  034-636,633,  64O, 

bA7.  650. 
OrlttvodJn:     Proponed     aniend- 

inenla  lii  Cun*titulion.  716. 
Cniab«Tiagd  Boad.  i^un. 
CnrtU.  G.  T.:  Clied.  xtili. 

I)aiif*r:      Constitutions      must 

£fovide   for  (uiure   poMible, 
M.  Sll. 
DawMs.  Kenrr   B.:  Edfia  Tit 

F/drrAlilf,  xl. 

D«bt.  U.  S. .  Dilliculty  of  appor- 
lioning.  In  rate  «f  disnnton, 
39:  Itiminiitat  vrewi  anxing 
lfa«  Stales  concerning,  39; 
Inierett  of  foreign  powets 
In,  M;  frobablr  inri|u>tiu- 
tion  o(.  99:  Non-paynveni 
of.  ■•;  Of  Con  federal  Ion. 
910 :  Conxioiiirinal  clause 
concernini:.  990;  Abanidily 
Ibat  Constitution  repndlalcl. 
Ml:  No  provltioB  in  Cooslt- 
luiion  concerning.  BIT:  Cun< 
federation  Icgaljtc*  prcvtnut 
public,  %<jn. 

Otwa,  Public :  Necessary  pro- 
vitioH  (or.  197,  19»:  Chiefly 


Otbu—  Cfnii''uiJ. 

due  to  •at.  B09  :  Of  Gr«nl 
Kiiltiln.  StO  ;  Modern,  large- 
ly ll>c  rcdull  ■><  public  iin- 
pruv«menU,  huh;  Of  ici<)i> 
vidual  Siaics.  SIO;  Siaic 
dcbtk  not  allcctril  by  FederAl 
Government.  H6 ;  Nt>  Stale 
Khali  inakt  Boything  but  gold 
■nil  tilvcr  coin  a  lender  in 
payment  ul,  60$^:  AgaiiiHi 
provisional  Confederate  Go t- 
criimenl.  731. 

Drbtor  CUu  ri.  CrcdlUt,  s,  W. 

Balawftra.  i3&h;  Illending  uf 
Kovciemenial  powers  in. 
SU;  Number  of  icpieienla- 
livea  in  llie  nintr  iiuiiirr»u» 
btanth  in  IcfiiBliiiuie  uf,  tVl. 
Jury  trial  in,  668. 

IMMa(Tac<r  \itt  alu  KtfuhHtiY 
Dc6niiion  o(,  xliii.  xliv:  A 
pure  one  dehned.  69;  A  pure 
one  unable  to  preveoi  lac- 
lion.  09;  DiMiiKtivu  from 
fcpublic,  to.  t%;  llitheiio 
inroinpatil'lc  wJiti  pcivale 
richt-.  60;  Niilural  limit  of, 
■3;  UiiTiKer  of  legislative  lyr- 
anaf  in.  lU. 

DtuocraeT,  American:  Appar- 
ent grave  «f,  x;  Vindication 
«f,  xvii. 

Daiiiif,  (invcrnor,  ^RSn. 

D*p*(tDtnU  vf  Ftt»«r  (ite  alu 

l^.xtLHllVtl    JufiltiatJl     i,tgti- 

talitt\:  Vbant  of  balaiKO 
anions, in  Kevolnliunaijf  ov- 
ctnments.  ix;  llow  far  did 
ibe  ConstiiaiJon  create  indc- 
jienilrnt,  xv;  Hiiw  (»r  Coo- 
■lituiitin  separate*,  xlv;  De- 
velopment uf  dilltibulion  of 
powei  niuunic.  U;  Piuper 
orc^tniialion  <il,  SIO;  Act  ac- 
cumulation q1,  in  Ibe  same 
hand*,  a  tyranny.  31B:  Prin- 
ciples of  Ibc  IJiitith  Condi- 
lullon  roncctDing-  SlO-Stt  ; 
PruviMons  of  the  State  con- 
•liiutions  ciwicrraing,  3S8- 
SM;  lcnp<>a«ibilti)rolab*olulc 
■rpaialiofi  of,  3ST  ;  Adv^ti- 
lai[c*  of  a  narildt  btendinx. 
SST ',    EspcrUace  as  regards 


D*p4rtnMta  of  f  »w«r — Cttfd. 
mrie  paper  barricta,  SU.SS. 
SSI;  KelatiiE  liniiiati('n  «< 
(Kiu'cis  in,  S30,  Sll  ,  Jellti- 
ton'*  proieci  lor  pravcoiiaf 
maiusl  cncroacbmcni*.  IM- 
1S<  :  Tbe  people  the  onJ; 
judie  bclatcen.  iSi;  The  pat- 
liiion  amoni  them  to  be 
Biainlalned,  not  by  extehM 
proviiiiin*.  tiul  by  tbr  iniariu 
Btrnciure  of  the  goveriMnnil. 
StS ;  Nccessiiy  ibai  ibcy 
kball  fhrck  each  oifacr,  SU- 
SU;  HuKt  be  distinct  a*  la 
appointments.  MS;  MuiI  be 
niuiually  iiidcpcndciil  aa  la 
craolDnicnl.  S4i  ;  Ul  ibe  ad- 
vftBlnge  ol  making  thEni  «^ 

Kaile  and  rival  iuieieiu, 
(.  MB;  DivcKiiy  in  choice 
in,  prevent*  tnulual  predi- 
leciions,  S9S:  Objcctio*  M 
Impeachment  l>ccaa>«  It 
blend*.  440;  Necesiiiy  ol 
moliial  iadepeodencc.  4n : 
Proper  bteiiding  of.  in  mat- 
ing tr«aiic>.  BOO;  SugceMtd 
blending  of.  as  regard*  Sa> 
praoM  C»url,  BSO,  640  ;  Pru- 
poaed  amendment  concern- 
Ing.  63s.  t|C, 

PmaittI,  \jkti  ol,  (ist,  ti54,  661. 

DMpMiiBi:  Utually  beptia  wlik 
ilrm.igogues.  4- 

Dl«latM;  Kcscn  to,  to  ilmM  nJ 
dmiKcr.  4*9. 

nplanall*  Bar  via*:  Netceitr 
lot.  tTS;  Results  from  cita' 
log  ireallcs.  979. 

Dtnct  Tana  (itt  atte  T»M*ti4m\ 
Unpopular  in  Ibe  Uaited 
Stales,  74;  Ooty  partlalll 
tucccosful  in  deal  Driuun, 
T4;  ProbabU  kinds  of.  UBj 
Mutt  be  proportioned  to 
pupulaliun.  991;  Apportioa- 
mcnl  of  Repreientaiiic* 
with.  S40:  In  irlailun  to 
federal  numt-cr.  991  ;  Aal 
Rcprsienlnticet.  lion  apuur- 
lioned.  S'w .  t*"!- .  7>i  ;  Pro- 
posed amendmeni  cnncers- 
{».g,  <yy»^U.  637.  *<».  64I, 
MS. 


INDEX. 


;ss 


k 
% 


^ 


Mctrlot  af  CotaaUk:    ut  Cafi- 

lal,  AValimal. 

Drkft,  I'topoicd  amendment 
coaccining.  bSH. 

Dtai  BMtt  DadilM:  ]o  lelaliun 
to  Riinorily  Tights,  xiii;  Et- 
cllemcnl  orcr.  xvili:  Ab- 
»(r»ei  of.  708. 

DsdM  Mft  Pntt/tioM;  Tariff: 
Jaxatitn):  Rcfuli  i>f  Stale. 
ST;  Amcikan  pte(c(en«* 
(or,  M;  Avcraitr  ia  States, 
77;  In  France,  T7;  In  Gieai 
Briuin.  T7:  Posiiblc  lacfcaic 
in  Ifnilcd  Sfa(e«.  77;  A  M-H- 
lovicd  i»x.  1S9;  If  high, 
lessen  tol lection  and  con- 
sompilon,  IM;  Pro]io»cd  lim- 
itation of  Federal  Govern* 
ment  to.  lU.  191  ;  Dangcri 
of  reilrirting  the  ^'cder.1l 
power  to  l.irinit  dutici  on 
impotli.  018  :  l>ivi<lecl  be- 
tween teller  and  buyer,  tt4  : 
An  addilioDHl  tax  upon  itii- 
poiiing  SiBlei  pTuducci  nn- 
equal  laxalion  among  Statu. 
>li:  l^^urbilani.icftillomake 
community  tribuiary  to  man- 
nfaciuring  claise*.  914  ;  Fa- 
TOrablc  ID  mnniipolir.  214  ; 
The  most  concenienl  branch 
of  Naiional  revenue.  MS ; 
Rcamn  (of  not  IJtniling  Na- 
tional Go»«rnm<nt  (■■,  887  ; 
Eventual  tesseninc  of.  S67. 
70s  ;  State*  reiimied  from 
Icvyjnc    on    ln9|H>it*   or   ek- 

Krli.  WT  ;  Cannot  be  levied 
the  States.  6ii<^.  73^;  S.  C. 
KnlliAcaitonof.  690;  May  not 
bo  laid  on  iaipotm  to  loaier 
BOf  branch  ol  inilutiry.  7a}; 
To  be  IcTied  by  Conicteia, 
andiobeunilortn,  733;  Notto 
be  levied  on  expvftaliunt  ex- 
cept by  lwo-ihrrd»  vote.  ^%%  ; 
On  expoils  and  impuiliihalt 
Inure  to  Ircatury  u(  GenernI 
Govern  men  I.  jrt, 

BaitiTB    StatM:    itt   Nm  lC»g- 

ElMtloM :  Frequent,  eiiential 
10   Itbtftr,   >M>;  Maxim   that 


El6ttlaii(—  CenlitituJ. 

annual,  arc  ne« tsar jr  to  pre- 
vent tyranny.  SBS;  Dicertiij^ 
concertilne.  In  State  eonailin- 
tion(,  884  :  DiwuMion  ot 
biennial.  SM;  Trial  ot  dii- 
puied.  889;  Keiiraiol  of  Ire- 
(fiicni.  ST9;  Naiicinal  reitulii- 
ttiin  of,  Ml;  Contention  that 
the  clause  controlling  ihould 
Ij«  made  part  of  the  (.ondiiu- 
tion.  899;  Ncceiiiiy  of  a 
NalioQal  control  of,  8Bt ; 
Bxclualve  State  power  of 
rrj{ul»lln|t.  make*  Union  loo 
dependent. 393;  Unliketihood 
that  NalionLil  regulnlion  trill 
tx  abuRcd ,  SS3 ;  Nxl'onal  con- 
trol of.  will  not  elect  any 
class.  W7;  An  unjust  use  of 
National  power  will  produce 
revolt  in  people.  VVt  \  Ab- 
■urdity  that  National  control 
ol,  will  elevate  the  wentihy 
and  well-born,  899;  Proposed 
liDiitaiiotis  on  National  con- 
trol of.  4IH ;  I.Biltude  «w- 
cernine.iiiSl»teconstitiiliaa«, 
404-4;  Sirstcm  in  New  York 
State.  406;  AdramaKc  of  uni- 
foini  dale  of,  40C;  Frequent, 
do  not  always  produce  rv- 
sponsiblliijr,  4lS;Of  Senators 
and  Repfcscniittivcs  shall  be 
pre»cribrd  by  States,  (jot^. 
711  ;  Qualifications  and  re- 
turns of  members  of  Congress 
to  be  determined  by  each 
Hooae.  6011-,  lit ;  Kalionul : 
Proposed  amendment  con- 
ccrninii.  032  6^.638.642.6*3. 
6jo ;  Fitqiienl ;  Propoaed 
antcndment  concerning,  63$. 
6.17:  Kali  anal  -  Act  creating 
FJcctorHl  Commission.  731. 

Xltotortl  Collaga  (>»  ahf  E*nu- 
rivt.U.  S.;  /'rriittrtH:  Failure 
of.  to  act  independently,  xvi. 
■tltf.  Itseless.  and  a  dlBltei. 
xvij  ;  System  of  choosing, 
30711:  Congressional  assump- 
tion over,  3iSa ;  Merit  ol 
aysicm  ot,  4At ;  Los*  of  in- 
dependence of.  4S»«'  ;  Pre- 
vents  tumult    aiid    disorder 


J 


756 


I/fDEX. 


Eleetonl  Call«g«— Oh/iuka/. 
liuritiB  elcriion.  US  ;  Free 
Itotti  cjibal  intrtjcur  and  cot' 
fupiioii.4U;  FoiiiKn  power* 
cannot  inSucnce.  493,  OlHce- 
holder*  li»ric<l  lion'.  4M  : 
Metttodolchooiin8.4M:VVili 
only  chooM  man  ol  merii.  456; 
Hub  choKKfi,  artd  their  dn- 
lic«,  61)1^,  737  :  Ko  Senator 
fhall  serve  at  elector.  71J. 

EUetnal  Cammlwlon :  Actcieai' 
ihk.  7]3. 

SI«ctora :  OI  CDncrex,  based 
uR  Suie  law5.  848;  Character 
ul.  3TI  ,  )JuaIIA<aiIon«  of,  la 
Great  HriiatD,  3BS. 

Bmbarni  Rc*isiaoce  to,  in  Ncw 
EngTand.  lotn ;  Propoicit 
jimfmlmeni  cftiic^iiiinc,  f)S8 ; 
Li  nconllitulioOillily  of.  694. 

Eaglnnd:  ire  Urtat  Hriltiiti. 

■qolly:  Why  E'Viletal  juitlcUry 
sliuuld  poBBci*  pvonrii  of. 
B3S  ;  neteimineil  Kilhont 
jury,  AtS;  Juticanol  valuaMc 
in.  564  ;  Dialinctioii  of.  (lom 
l«gal  juriidictton  peculiarly 
Rn|>li«h,  5<S  :  StAte  tyiicmi 
coineii'iiiK.  M8. 

Xquitf  CenrU:  UTfinilionol,  5M; 
In  Siutes,  665. 

Europe:  Rlvaliy  In  navigation, 
It :  Tfaile  advniiluxcl  of  U. 
S.  nith  European  colooics, 
19;  JcbTouij  of  AmerUn  by, 
19:  W»r»  »r.  31,  49;  W»* 
of.  unlike  prothiblr  Aioctican 
van.  4t  :  Modern  dcTclop- 
nicni  ot  armies  <>(,  4111 ;  Com- 
mercial     ^alousr       luirardB 

United  Slates.  M ;  United 
Suie*  the  arbiter  ol,  in 
Aoierlci,  68;  Kxtlualoa  of, 
from  Anierka,  70H ;  Amcrino 
culunien  of,  a  cause  of  dll- 
Bcnsion  *rith  United  State*. 
TM.  71*.  151.  195:  Uoduccx- 
tenslon  of  Inlluence  of,  Tl  ; 
Plume*  herself  as  n]i»lr«(s 
of  the  world.  71  :  Aucrilon 
«f  pby*kal  *upeti<>t>ly  c>f  man 
In,  T)  ;  More  liable  lo  wais. 
7t":  Enlitn  absente  of  pupa- 
tar  novetuntents  tu,SS;  Rage 


Bnr  Dp»—  Cmiinmai. 

for  leagues  In  elgbicce 
cenlorf,  91  :  Fear  i"  ailm 
people  arms  in.  91T  ;  A  aa- 
llonalcoTetninenl  far  United 
State*  aa  object  of  jcalouay 
to,  S9«. 

EMiia*  {ftt  mtu  TaxsHtm): 
Unpopularity  of,  74;  Re*aon 
for  unpopularity  of,  TV.  75s, 
DUlincilytinpupalarinAaicr- 
ka.  78  ;  Kulliocalion  ot.  ia 
Southern  Stale*,  loin  :  Ki- 
(istance  to,  in  1791.  tois;  A 
sell-levied  tax.  119;  Tower  lo 
lay.  (lOlr;  Sball  be  uniform. 
bati;  Propoacd  amrndnMOl 
concerning. (137,  bn.b^i,  U»' 
conflllulionality  uf .  A94. 

EsMDtlTa  {•//  Dtfurtmnli  tf 
p9\tet)\  Power  of.  increaacd 
brwar.  43;  Power*  of  Duick, 
itO;  fowcr*  of  BtiiUh.  ttl; 
American  dread  iil.  M: 
Sliest  reljtlirc  popiilarilf  ol. 
337,349;  AdviiniaKe  •>(  a  ua 
gle.  4S6.  437  :  Enerey  an  ■*■ 
scnitil  (eaiuie,  U9;  Unttr 
conducive  to  encfiiv  In.  401; 
EvIlK  of  plur:>l.  439.  471.  In 
State  goternmenlB.  499;  Ea- 
peiience  ol  plural,  under  Coa- 
fcdctallatt.  4^n:  Evil  ol  dl«- 
■oniion  in  this  depBrlmmt. 
479;  Result  o(  council  in  New 
Vork,  479;  System  1.1  secar* 
lnt£  rcii^t'ntiliihly  i>f,  tn  Ljieat 
Britain.  473;  Additional  ex- 
pense ol  plural.  475;  InSa- 
ence  of  term  of  ulDcc  on, 
<T6,  4T6:  Shuirnr**  ol  irta 

Jrevenls  iDdepeDdcncc  nl. 
78. 
Eswali**,  U.  S,  {ut  uh*  J*rtii- 
d/ntj .  Aiiack  on  Jadictary. 
xv;  Attacked  by  Conyren. 
xt;  I>eilved  (lutn  a  werj 
cimipoutid  source,  H9;  Po*- 
Bcssen  U>ih  Federal  and  K*> 
tional  feaiDies,  959.  JeSer> 
sun's  lot:(casr  »l  iTilluencrof, 
}M";  Conwilulii.'F'i  ""-  ■'(. 
at  valid  as  taw,  Ai'  < 

on  senatorial  coi  <  t>- 

ceralQK  ircaiivB,  44ii  licuitaJ 


tNDXX. 


757 


-CfntiHuiJ. 
■  survey  of,  MT-BIT;  Coniiiiu- 
lion  ol,  <<T:   Dilliculty  ul  ut- 
ranK'nK-  ^f  -  ^tifcprcicn  lo- 
tion of  Anli-Feilcialim  <on- 

^K  ho  i*  •   monntch.   MT  ;    Kc 

^■'el'gibilitjr  of.  4S'.  4lt  ;    Proj- 

^H  eci    of    k    (ouncit    for,   471  i 

^H   I'liir^Iltjr  of.    jiiixIuccE    iriC' 

^^^  spDfisibiliiy,  471  :    A  C"utii'il 

will  dcsiioy  mpontibilliy  of. 

473;  Peculiar  duiic*  of.  481; 

Mtntiiiiunc  i>(    [iii-iHbiliiy  In. 

u 4H;  Velo  po»«r  a  ihiclil  lo, 

^K  4M:  Will  ticiitace  lo  u»«  veto 

^^1  jiowet.    401:     Populif![y    ol 

^^V  v«lopoircrin.  41)3111;  Kclultiin 

^1    of,      10     irvalics.     MO.     BOl; 

^V    Tiealy'tnalimg  pcmcr  should 

not    be  tru4tcd   *olely  to   an 

tleclire,   BOl;    Power  vented 

in  B  Piciident.  bi'U,  737. 

Skp«rU  |i//  .t/'c   7iij<(/iVn):   No 

^H    lux    uti.   (i07r.   bi\i:   May  be 

^^^  laxed  hi  two-ihUdi  vulc.  7IS. 

^^■x  Foit   F>MO  Law*  :      Kmini.- 

^V^iiuna    up'»i,    SM.    296.   670; 

^B    Not   to  be  pnticd,  6o7,.7^5; 

^H    E>rohib<ic(l    to    Slates,     Uie<. 

^^K   ;i6  ;     Ptopu«cil    amendmeiil 

^^T  coacetning,  bji. 

^Th»ellO»:  DiiiiKrr  of,  in  n!]  |jf>p- 
tilar   governmcnls.  Sf;   Dcfi- 

Iniiioa    of.  58;    Cures   of.  SB; 
Lklenl    causes    ol,    IT;    The 
various   and    unequal  dixKi- 
buiion  of  propetiv  the  most 
common  and  durable   source 
ot,    n  ;     Uneheckcl  in  jiuic 
democracy.    M;     Cauiics   uf. 
cannot    be  remoTed,  M;    As 
4    Hiiitorily,     unable     10   use 
1^^    conililutional  fotnt*.  M;  iM- 
^H    ca!   nature   of,   M;    Unlikely 
^^    to  extend  heyond  individual 
^^    S(a(C>,    63^    0|>jnci*Kii.ii     by, 
prodaccs  iinatcby.  347;  \'<ia- 
albiliiy  ol.  in  Amcrk^i.  490, 
Puatta  {irr  alto   J^rimtiurt; 
Landtd iHirrmi)-  IlilDoully  in 
paying;  taxes.  74.  74:  A  laud 
tax  an  opprea<>i<ii)  on,  78. 
Ftdaral  C«4iT«Bttoa:  AueniblidK 


r*d*rat  C«nv«iitloB — C^ntintud. 
of.  xi;  Menial  attitude  of,  ll: 
Anli-dL-niocrncy  in.  xl:  Piu- 
fnul^aics  Cunsdiuiion,  xix; 
Alleeed  to  have  exceeded  it* 
powers,  xx;  Origin  ot,  t; 
HiKh  I'hsraclcruf  mcmbcii. 
10;  Confidence  of  people  in, 
10 :  The  diflicullles  expe- 
rienced by,  in  ttic  furniadun 
'if  X  proper  plan.  Xt7-S45  ; 
Survey  of  the  Work  o(,  Stt; 
DllhcLlties  surmounlrd  by 
2SB ;  Excmpliun  of,  tiuni 
patiy  animosiite*,  tSi;  Un- 
usual unanimity  in.  SSS;  W.is 
It  aulhuiited  t»  frame  the 
ptopoHfd  Coriitituliun  ?.  189. 
863  ;  Merely  rectinimends 
Conslltultoii.  IBS,  SB?  ,  For- 
luaale  sacrifice  ul  form* 
to  substaace  by.  SB<;  The 
appointment  of.  a  usurpation 
of  puwcr  by  the  Slalca.  IM; 
Firii  urged  by  Nev  Yuik.SSS; 
Whether  ur  not  authorised, 
cunHltlulel  no  rca»un  lor  re- 
iectiug  Constitution,  9tB; 
Kejisons  against  a  second, 
B8B;  HiRlory  of,  598. 

F«d«ra|    DUtriM :     $u     Cafiul. 

F«d«nl  FamtM:  An  opponcat  o( 

the  C"iiHli1utiuii,  481. 
Fadtral  Oovtrnmtnt:  m  G»vrrn- 

Fadenlin,  The:  Great  lasfc  in- 
volved in,  xxiii:  Publicaiiufi 
of  first  number  of.  xxiii; 
Marked  excellence  of,  xxiv; 
Ncit  c).pcci>lly  potent  in  elec- 
tion* til  t;B8,  xxiv;  Uefecu 
in.  due  to  cttcumdauces  of 
produetlon,  xxvii:  Jeffeison't 
opinion  concciriinK,  ixvii. 
xxixM;  Hamilton'*  apology 
for.  xxviii;  Contcmpoiary 
and  recent  nplnivn  of,  xxvii- 
xxix;  Conirover»y  coneetn. 
ing  authorship  ol,  xxix- 
xxxix;  Flrii  edition  of.  xxx: 
Outline  of.  zxxiitit.  xliii  : 
Hamilton  the  roaster  mind 
ID.  xxxlx;  BiblioKraphy  ol 
rdiliona,   xixtx;    Hamiliou'* 


J 


ijvDex. 


Ftdani  i  tt —  CfnltnurJ. 
tylUbu*  of.  tljii:  llamiltof)'* 
Titlite  ill  Conlenti  n(,  txiill- 
llamilion'tl'rcfvec  to.  Iixvli: 
MidUoa'*  atcouni  o{,  xtix: 
Outline  «r.  5;  Noiic«  coti- 
coreinx  publication  of.  40: 
AV«>  Yart  Jeu'nat  notice 
coiKerning  pubHcaiion  of. 
I44u;    Delajr  In   progre««  of. 

rtdml  IlDinbcr  (i«  u/i*  ftifre- 

IratalieH.    ^tatll)-.    ArgUIDCOI 

for. Mil  AbtoKHli<'ni>(.]C3«. 

ttvAal  XaroniM:  Compuirson  oi. 
wlih  Iht  Confederacy.  107. 

V«ndal  87(taiii:  Outline  ii(,  106: 
Cumpuieil  wiih  cuii(r'lci»leO 
govetnincnu.  104;  In  rela- 
tion lo  soTcrclgnl)'.  90t. 

FIbm  :    cxtcMi*e.    prablblted, 

riibariN:  Rivalry  Jn.  IS:  Dis- 
•oiailon  (it  Confcdcrkc^ 
jecpardUcs.  97,  W. 

n«k*,  John.  Sjh:  Ci(«d  on  rep* 
rrhcnlatliin,  ^ili. 

Fortlyn  A&ln  {irt  ,iliv  Eurrf^y. 
loipoktiblc  lo  coodacl.  if 
cunt  Tolled  by  liulividUBl 
SUics.  141:  Knowl«d(;c  rc- 
(luired  lo  rcgulalc,  3M. 

Fsrelfn  iBBBanM:  French,  ijn; 
Diviiiur  Mill  ibcviiably  In- 
volve United  Suttrl  in,  40; 
Will  encourage  ditisensioQ 
among  Stale*.  M:  Positbic 
iflfluence  of.  nndcr  Cud- 
tedcrallon.  187 ;  Op«nne«ii 
lo.  u  wcaknexn  of  Republic!. 
)tS:  Dread  of.  In  Amcricji. 
ijSw;  Sudden  diKappearaiK'e 
of,  In  America,  tjgn;  Dll- 
Acuity  o(.  I"  new  govern- 
ment.nO:  Will  hr  cxottiwd 
to  produce  Kalional  dUMn* 
■Ion.  SM.  Will  not  affect 
etection  ol  Prexidcnt.  4*1. 

fKalia  nallnnt:  Inevitable 
i;rc«ler  reipeci  iLccoldcd  to 
4  united  criiintiy  by.  t\. 

F«r«ifn  TrMjM :  CtopoMd 
•m«D<lmeni  concerning.  6si. 

FonlAuttMU:  liifluence  on  war 
of,  41. 


FmU,  Xational:  Keccsiity  fix 
Fedciat  jutladkiion  orei.ln, 
913:  Attempted  irtiure  ni. 
by  a  State  an  act  of  var,  IN: 
Exclusive  National  antiMrlly 
over.  tMbt. 

Fax.  Chirle*  Janrn:  MU  InJU 
ti^ll.  4». 

Fraata:  Rivalry  of  U.  S.  at  te- 
garilt  n»)>rrica.  IB;  War  wuli 
Austria.  31;  W>r  with  £njc- 
laod.  31;  Tetnpotatj'  Amen- 
eao  illalike  of.  Tow;  InDueac* 
in  American  pulitiCa,  IsBa. 

"FrankHn*  :  l&i"- 

FlaaUin.  Itenjainin:  70*. 

FnglUv*  [iir  atit  SUvt  l»v. 
Fufitivt):  From  jotice.  to  br 
delivered  up.  61a.',  7;i>;  Flora 
lervlce.  to  t>e  delivrtcd  up, 
'>i<K,  jy>'.  National  Govetn- 
meni  to  pay  for  utttetursei]. 
717.  7»o. 

fl*B«tal   ClABMi  1%  C«uUliUloa 

iir/ atif  CmililKUm;  GrtvrM. 
mini.     C     S.  :     Stall    Sort'- 

nx>"yV>  S'tS«.  <">»'.  fri>-  6J). 

66j  ;  Exaeseraied  eScci  of. 
HI;  The  i:of)>.|iiulici(i  »ui 
altered  If  ([■'"cal  elaoau 
were  omiiie-l.  SOS:  AniUvlu 
of.  MS:  Why  liiitodiKed.Ma; 
Object  kin  to.  a*  r«sard» 
taxation.  HB;  Sin|;uUrly  ex- 

Sreised,  if  onlimiTed.  MB. 
SS:  The  baitlc-Rtnund  «f 
National  politics.  i<i3h;  IJen- 
tical  with  Ariiele*  of  Con- 
trderailon.  STO;  A  ruontltu- 
lion  a  ilrail  tcitrr  wiifaool. 
MB;  The  Constitutioa  rad> 
ically  defective  without,  Ml; 
Proposed  ameDdm«at  cm> 
ccrniDg. 6S9- 

0«B««:  Obliged  to  knitibte  !!• 
*e1f,  IT. 

QvanMtj-  Wby  \tt  prlndples 
are  received  without  dIB> 
cnliv,  103. 

OMtfl'a.  ittm;  Rcilitance  to  de- 
cree* of  the  Siipr^ni-  C.itn 
In  Creek  ar.' 

pote,  ln|i>:  1'  r- 

ainmcnul     pov<:ii     ui.  IZB; 


JNDSX. 


7S9 


e*or|[i« —  CtHlin  tu4. 

SuBiber  ol  rciiiocnotivrii 
in  Ihr  tnoio  numcfuit 
lirdncb  of  bet  kRiiUiuic, 
HT:   lur;  irUI  ia.  (G9. 

Oarmuls  Lmk*>*  -  Oullii>«  his- 
xotf  of.  114-119. 

Q«m*ar.  4S«;  T»xabt«  poVcdy 
i>l.  71;  (rucrcioa  nf  Sjixooji 
and  Eta*aria  by.  i)i>a:  HiMorf 
of  c  on  fed  c  (Bled  cxpciJeiKc, 
114;  Federal  lyitem  ol.  lit; 
Govemmonlal      dafm*      in 

IUiRue.  lie.  IIT:  Only  bcM 
li>tc(her  by  external  dangcl, 
IIT  :  CoininrrciKl  iraniinel* 
in.  lU:  Monieiquicu  quotrd 
Bi  lo.  !I>I;  liticinat  dUtcn- 
iDunt  111,  US. 
rrj.  Elbriiljce.  M. 
OUmd.  Jacob:  laaue*  «diiioni 
(it  /■'rJiraliil.  xl. 

OoM  and  HlTar:  Sia(e»  ar« 
inblbiled  from  m'tiing  any- 
chioK  ■■''0  «  (Ciiiirr  in  (uy- 
mcnl  of  debis,  m-2S8.  <>o9<. 

OoTwnaent  {m  alit  CoHiiiin- 
tien ;    (irtml    ffrifaiM):     How 

ilar  controlled  by  a  Contlitu- 
ilon.  TJi;  Smbility  ol.  vHi; 
DiMlncilon  tielwecn  limited 
anil  anlimitsd.  xii;  Vigor  of. 
eM«niiaI  lo  liberty.  4:  En- 
ersy  In.  xtlgmaliied  a>  h«9- 
lite  to  llbciiy.  <;  Necemiiljr 
of.  T;  Influence  <il  t^ivunal 
can«tdeiaiioni  In,  S9;  IdAu- 
cncc  (il  Individual*  In  papu- 
lar. M;  I'opuUr.  lubjcci  in 
human  pusioas,  89:  Ten- 
dem-y  ol  pi>|tuljr.  to  (action. 
M;  Cliitlly  ■  judiEc  bciwcen 
opposins  iniemts.  01;  In- 
I  hereat   dtfflcalty   ol  taiallon 

in  popular.  T4:  Ancient,  vcre 
I  democraik.    not    lepulilican, 

tl;    Popular,  wholly   abienl 
!  in  Europe.  14;  laiprnveaicnl 

I  tn.  M:  Types   ol   repreaanla- 

'  live,   S}*;    Impossible   i*ith- 

oul  power  to  enforce  its 
law*.  9S:  Why  Instiiulcd. 
n,  Ciin  iinly  ael  opon  indi- 
Tidual*.  in,  0««t  ROYern- 
m«ni>  an  imponibilUy.  ISX: 


GcvtraEiieiit— Cen  liimrJ. 

Jf  (rctilc.  noi  tc«per(Dd  by 
cnnMiluciiiti,  161,  Difficulty 
of  securing  energy  in, 
uith  lEcuiiiy  of  pfivair 
lights.  16flj  The  danjter  of 
felteting  it  with  reitriciions 
which  canooi  be  abieivcd, 
16S.  lO;  KclicI  in  America 
that  il  must  b«  cnorc  encf- 
gclk.  IM;  Obedience  to,  in 
proportion  to  Its  goudncs* 
ur  badness.  168:  Money  ihe 
viul  Drinciple  of,  IIT;  Pow- 
ers of,  must  be  proporlloned 
lo  objects  ol.  IH.  194: 
Importance  of  siabiiiiy  in, 
S30:  Energy  In.  teouircs  du- 
ration ol  power,  »li  DiiTi- 
cully  in  dclinralinE  objocia 
and  limits  ol.  SSS.  US;  Re. 
■lArkable  fealuro  »f  cceiy 
government  reported  hy  an. 
tient  history  which  w.t(  es- 
tabritlicd  hy  iU'lilivr.aiii>n  and 
conicnt,  I3T;  llilhcrlo  uou. 
ally  ibe  work  of  one  man. 
SST;  IJiilincitonii  hdwrrit 
Kedecal  anil  N^lional,  UO; 
Subitance  should  never  be 
sacrlliccd  to  forms.  tU; 
Tranwciidcitl  iighl  of  |>ooplc 
I'lHlioliih  or  nlicr.SBI.  Pow- 
ers of.  involve  possible 
abuset.  260.  161.  ImporlAiice 
ol  vcneriiiion  fur,  338;  Ought 
lo  control  the  paasioni.  and 
to  be  controlled  by  the  reatim 
of  Ihc  |>iibli<,  318;  The  great- 
est of  all  reltei-tiiinson  human 
nature.  S44:  jiislice  Ihe  end 
of,  311;  Greut  Ilrilain  an 
unliniited.  3tB;  Mntlconlain 
the  means  of  iia  own  preser- 
vation, 19);  Definition  of  a 
KOi>d,  413;  Lack  of  knowl- 
edge th«  chief  defect  of 
Sovernntenii  io  America.  413; 
Uschicvous  clfcct*  ol  tnuiH- 
ble,  414-416;  The  true  itsi  of. 
is  aptitude  and  tendency  to 
produce  a  good  idtnlniMra- 
t>i>u.4SS.M9:  Definition  of  a 
lilDiteil.  tlO.  717:  The  general 
genius   of,   all   tha.v   ^^^v   Vi« 


76o 


INDEX. 


00Tanim**t —  CtalintuJ, 

relieil  upon.  SW:  Ptiipoa«  of, 
6]S.  6}q,  64b:   Right  10  tcaS' 
•ume.  7ti,  7i>. 
0*TwuB*nt.   United  Siatr«  (in 
aht      CfiitilMfii'H,      ffJtrai ; 
U.  S.\.    Power  of.  over  State 
l[ovrrnii>rni».  xii;  PiHlrcliijii 
of    minority    thtoogb.    xjii; 
Nol  ihln  to  other  navereign 
KOvcrnmrnl*.   xiv;   Iiitcoilr<l 
to  be  equal  in  operation,  xix^ 
Remarkable  stability  of,  xix: 
Mote    likelv   to  olxain    tcr- 
I'kel  of  "  lietl  men."  IS.  tO: 
Wiser    and    more    judKioui 
tbita  Stiitc  gnvernmenls.  14; 
Unallcctrd   by  li>cal  ciroini- 
•laac«>.  IB:  tteiier   fiitnl   lo 
•ccomtnodaic    disputei.     16; 
A  Dlronjt  oiiebeltei  pl*ced  (a 
maintain   peace.  IT;  Specific 
advaataKCs  of.  SO:  More  llke- 
t*  t(>  I'uriuc  A  uniform  policy. 
SO:    More    ea»ily    sopportect 
by  all  llic  Slalei.ai:  Limlteit 
)utifttll<iiiin    "I.   M;    Impos- 
(ible  to  baae  il  on  Slaleii.  in 
their  corporate  capacity.  M; 
A    power    to   coerce    Staten 
neroBsary  in.  VT:  Muil  rxlend 
iti  operation*  to  indiviiluaU 
or   maintain   rait   army,  M; 
Mont  cnity  It  >  .iKL-iicy  to  elll- 
ICOB,  100:  >[uM  ilanif  in  need 
a\     no    iniFrmcdlaie     poner. 
too,   Mutt   liave  the  puwerk 
ul  ordinat)'  ma)citiracy,  100: 
Mull  poHcss  all  the  mean* 
□(  executing:  It*  own  powers. 
100.    Must    .let    iliiecily    on 
ciiiieni.    lOS.   IM:    Will  not 
ab*orb    Stale    goccrntnentB. 
IM:  Likely  to  be  cncioached 
npon    by    Stale    authorilirt, 
104;   Inherent  weaknes*  of. 
lot;   Slight    relation*   of,   to 
cititeni.    108;     Saluril    iiral 
of  State,  tot;  Muxt  oriKinale 
In  cunicnt  of  the  people.  149, 
Most  hate  a  greater  san>:tr<.>ii 
than   delegated   power.    143; 
An  indlnKolnbtc  contract  Ik* 
iw«n  [laiiiei.  tM;  Object* 
to  be  finivMt4  l<»  \i%,  \M', 


uie      I 


0«Ttraaust — CtmtimmfJ. 

Quantity  of  power  dec*' 
144;  Upon  whom  tit  powM 
Kfauuld  n^xratc.  144;  Sc< 
sary  aoliniiied  powera 
14A;  Mcani  of,  muM  be 
poilSunrd  to  the  enit, 
MUM  bare  full  contiol  < 
national  force*.  14S;  M 
be  comr><>Uiu1,  IM .  UnM 
have  full  fontrvit  <j|  anvy, 
naiy.  re  venue. andcomoMiKc. 
14T;  Moit  likely  to  know  Ib- 
tercfltf  of  whole  country.  14T; 
Structure,  and  not  ealcDl  aL, 

tnwet*.  the    only    qucsU 
4S.  140;  MiMt   hare  powi 
equal  lo  its  Ituiti,  IW;   t.  __ 
ou»  watchfutiieiT  of.  by  ^|e 
legi*laturea,  IM;  ii|4ir<   nt^il 
even  »m  people  aKain  ■ 
Theory   that    the    A<- 
people  Kt!l«piiu>e,  169 
ably  better  admin iilcr' 
Slate,    ITO:    Cloi«    rei 
with     people     oecett.-, :  . 
command  luyaliy.  111.  i 
action     on     people     [if. 
necc**ity  of  force.  ITS.    j 
lalation     upon     State*     irnly 
nccsiitiitc*     oeieiim.     ITI. 
Bagchot's      »iew      of,      1  -;- 
Uuit     Hmetiinei     e  tn  ;  .-  i 
tarte.  IT4;  Chc<  kni  by  .Si^tri 
177.    ITI;     I'rutCBti    til    Scaic 
legi*UlureB     a);aliisl.      174. 
Mu9>l  potsett  power  ovei 
lis.  ITS:   Mu*l  otRaiTiie 
diKciptincmiliiia.lM;  Limi: 
powen  of  taiatioo  of,  rc» 
In  luletBice  l<>  State   i;"i'"^ 
mcnl*.  IBB:  Ni-ce-ctilie*  ai  to 
taxation  not  '  ■!■  "■  ■  > 
KequiiltioD*  :. 
Iff    excite     hi  < 
190:     MuBl     poBBcc*    geucia 
power     of    taXBiiFMi.      IH 
t^nsUile  encroacIiRirnt  itl. 
State  iiurcrnninnih,  IM,  C 
jeclure*   aboui   Ibe    uiar 
lion*     of.  ao     dnfathijip* 
■l>y««,  IM:  DinculTv  1.1    ' 
chmiaatinij  puwii 
National     in     tt>     ' 
»rHt  federal  in  lu  cxieav,  ill: 


INDEX. 


761 


N 


iBunt —  Caalitt  luif, 
A  tiuly  nx;!i>nal.  involve!  hu- 
picmiicy.  SSI  :  Arc  Ino  great 
powers  eranicd  to?.  ISO;  Arc 
pnw«r*  o!.  <Uii|;erous  tn  St.ilc 
juriidiclton  ?,  160  ;  Poosible 
danger  of  war  pDvrcrsof.Mt. 
MS;  En<  roach  It)  en  I*  and  at- 
•unip(i[>n<t  r>f,  limited  lo  no 
partjr,  i6$ii,  j6^;  Atlempi  to 
reconcile  Stale  lovetelgnly 
with,  BTT;  [.■>i:k  Iialilo  nver 
public  imtiroveitiFnl  poii*n 
of.  iSou;  Necessily  o(  power 
over  ranilal,  atxciialR,  etc., 
Stl.  S(S :  JaiiMlklion  over 
(orii,  mdKafinei.  and  arsc- 
DaU.  StS;  In  ihc  cittr  al  F<irt 
Somtcr.  jSjB  ;  ilHc»iiiinB 
concerning  public  tetrilorv, 
SM  IM:  Ciiaranly  of  repub- 
llcHn  gtotcfnoieiil  to  States. 
M7;  Ptolection  of  Slates  bv, 
MT.  3tt .  Importance  of 
ixiwcr  III  interfere  iriih 
dotnetiie  inturreciion.  Sfi9  ; 
Balnnre  of,  wiib  Siaici  wcU 
maintained.  30SM  ;  In  no 
viMi  essential  10  Ihe  opeia- 
tion  or  ortcAnitailon  of  ihe 
Stale  x^ivc  ">"■*'■>(■>  tOJ',  MiiRi 
inpoTlMfil  io  liracB  of  war. 
SW:  Powers  of,  few  and  de- 
fined, aoe.  OlticehoMeiii  of. 
will  have  liical  prrpOMe»- 
«ions.  StSi  Difficulty  of  iiien- 
totcini;  nn  unpopular  tnw  in  a 
Stale, )It.  Kncroarhnirnl*  by. 
on  Slalc  (["vernmcnlta  lijcnal 
for  serieral  alarm,  311:  Vis- 
ionary inppotiilion  tlial  it  will 
CMabliHb  a  tyranny.  S18;  Iiil 
possibility  thai  it  can  accu- 
mulate a  t(rc4i  militarir  force. 
116.  SIT;  Pri'ivtrly  rfcpemlciil 
on  people,  Sll  ;  Restrained 
by  boib  people  and  State 
Itovcfnnienli.  U>;  llnfoitu- 
naio  lesullsof  ilsiiilerfcieiice 
in  local  problems.  36311 :  Noi 
dependent  upon  Siniei,  SU; 
Resemblance  ol  repretCRI*' 
tive  system  of,  to  Slate  ^ov- 
ernmcniK.   ISO,  Stl;   Possible 

aympoiby    of    people    wiih, 


Qe  vtnimaDt — CBHiiHutit. 
3SS  ;  A  cotniiounil  republic, 
410;  An  incoiporaiion  of  di*- 
linct  sovereignties,  ttO;  ht- 
icnc  of  powers  of,  $91;  Ob* 
jection  10  extent  of  power* 
of.  674:  Dbjeeiion  to  expense 
of,  SIS;  CoiDpuTC'l  with  ex- 
pense ol  Confcdcrslion.  STS; 
Amendments  not  lifcely  10 
be  opposed  by.  SSt;  Anicad- 
menis  n"t  dependeni  upon. 
SST,  In  its  delegated  puwets 
absolulety  sovereign,  6;6, 
66t.  t>6;,  6C18  ;  Not  the  Una] 
find  exclusive  judfce  of  ill 
own  powers.  679,  6*4;  En- 
deavor of,  to  enlarge  iia 
pnwer*.  CSJ:  Acts  direcliy  on 
people,  Toi  ;  Peculiar  char- 
*c(er  of.   700,  Dcfiniiion   of. 

Oraitt.  U.  B..  33011. 

Oraat  Britain.  IS.  88.  SI.  846; 
(-hrcli  nn  (t"vetninenl  In.  i  li; 
DIsctiminatiTiK  taxation  in, 
viii  ;  Hamilton's  numerous 
tcferenres  to,  xxivii;  Kx- 
pcrieiice  of  Britisli  treaty, 
tiled.  W;  Rivalry  of  L'.  S. 
as  regard*  hihcrics,  IS:  The 
ciHvy  of,  a  result  ol  union, 
SO:  Queen  Anne's  leller  un 
union  of.  S2 ;  Union  of, 
SS.  SS  ;  Kiprtienre  when 
divided,  M :  Frc'iueney  I'f 
narsof.Sl,  Wars  wilh  Spain, 
ym;  lllinii  trade  wiih  Spanish 
Main.jlw;  Fortunate po*lli<>n 
as  lo  exlemal  dnniter.  40: 
I.ackof  Rill  of  Rights  in.  S!"; 
Poisllile  Indirect  coraoieice 
with  ihe  United  Statek,  8*; 
Suggested  commercial  dts- 
crlmlnallon  against.  06  ; 
American  colonies  of,  pro- 
duce nsttonai  >ntai;unisni, 
tow;  Preference  lot  indirect 
uxet  in.  74:  Hill  for  regulai- 
init;  <«mmcr<:ia1  relations  with 
f .  S..  1S8  ;  Trade  reTations 
with,  13IU;  Anti'Itrlilsh  party 
in  Atnrrira,  IJin;  Intltgoes 
ol,  in  America.  n*«,  Infrac' 
tions  ol  Treaty  ol   17S3  by, 


J 


j62 


tNDBX. 


Grait  BriUIa— Cvrfiawfif. 

£4111 ;  Mrniicc  of  Amcrkan 
colonies  ol,  to  U.  S.,  1S3,  IBS, 
tH  ;  HUlury  ul  kUiidiHK 
aimiei  in.  163-lM;  Accotd- 
ln{  la  liagchot.  governmcni 
«f,  pMirMc*  ft  (lli;iiilic<l  end 
cfficknl  powcc,  I7ln  ;  Ex* 
pcricncc  of.  during  Common- 
wrftllh,  i;3ii;  Hit  1 1  111  men  II  r<r 
teim  of.  ajvu.  ajin;  Iiidcicf' 
inin4tcliniil*ofcouiiiof.S3l: 
GuverniDcnt  of.  S4S;  Never 
cheated  icilu  rMcnhive  peace 
ciiabliihmeni.  S83;  Nucbcck 
tipoa  Handing  army  in,  964; 
Muntct<|iiic>i')>  vicn  uf  can- 
■Itlutiun  of,  320.  831^  Blend- 
ing ol  dcparimcnii  in,  891, 
StZ;  Tb<r  Hiiiiie  of  Commoiu, 
3W.  SSI.  8Tt.  881;  No  c»n- 
•liiuiiunal  limiiaiion*  oa 
pRtliamem  in,  365  :  Con- 
■tUulioBil  ini«<u(iir  In.  US; 
Syilcn  of  tcpTcKntaiiciD  In. 
SIS:  Sacrifice  of  Ibe  landed 
climet  in,  *jl«;  Tlir  Hou"* 
i>(  Lotds,  4SA:  Inipcaclimeni 
Kfilon  in,  US  :  President 
rompared  (oklngol,  44T,  44B, 
H7-4SS:  Why  Ibe  kini;'* 
paver  of  an  absolute  negative 
on  Liitla  lia*  )>ccii  long  dl«' 
uxd.  4SS  :  Puu'cr  of  aorci- 
eixn  in.  4(>3ii.  MS;  Executive 
eabinci  ol,  4T3  :  Ixcsfioniibi- 
lit)'  of  kinE  <>'■  ^T3^  <>]iticmn( 
nmuvrng  judges  in.  S^*.  J"- 
dicial  system  of.93>.SM;  Trial 
ol  priir  CHscii  in.  H4;  Sytiem 
of  jury  trial  in.  MS,  860;  Hills 
ofKii{titsiii.4TS.  STS;  Liberty 
ol  llic  press  in.  S7S:  Taxation 
of  nrwipapcis  in,  SIS. 
Or«al  LakM:  S'iivic'liun  ul.  0T. 
Or«K«:  Example  of  slates  ol.  in 
loceign  wart.  SI;  Ex|>ciii:nc« 
ul,  ill  waft  lor  (leiKonul  endk, 
St;  Di«ir3ciioa«Df.  i4.  47. 43. 
B3;  Reliance  ol,  on  single 
men.  2ST,  83B  .  Montesquieu 
i|U»trd  ■*  tu.  SI7. 
(liMDbwki:  Non-ci(cnl«|{aD  of, 
In  CalUotala  dDrlog  Civil 
War,  tot". 


OntiW:  Cited.  i7T. 

Golf  BCTMin;  .\Ricticaa  coaitoil 

of.  JIU. 

HabuaCwpw:  A  theck  on  Ihi 
judiciary.  SSB;  LiniitDti^<P  ua 
(uapcnaion  'if.  S70:  Scispea- 
•ioD  of,  in  L'.  S..  573it  ;  Can 
only  be  suspended  In  case* 
o(  tetiellion,  try}i.  TJj;  Im- 
posed umendmeni  concet*. 
ina,  &40,  643. 

KmbJIiod.  Alexander.  tyvt. 
aSdn.  53J",  S74*  ;  Viein  on 
govcinmcni,  vil  ;  Exceed) 
powers  by  sitnlng  fToitalii*- 
(ion.  m  Wriie*  tinder  nan* 
of  CK«ar.  xii;  Want  of  pA- 
lilical  lact  thown  by,  SXi; 
Plant  Tkt  Frdiraliit,  xxa'. 
Accused  ol  lepeaiing  Puliliin 
In  New  York  Co»rentl<m. 
xxv;  -«i1ia(e  of.  In  Tkt  FtJ*r, 
aliit.  xxin-ixiti;  The  iiu*t(t 
writer  of  7*itr  FiJtra&a. 
xxiix;  Pielace  tu  rililioa  ol 
i;^S.  lixvii;  Syllabus  ol  Tkt 
fiJeraiiit.  xlili;  Table  uf  Cu»- 
tcnitut  Tk'  /-ititT-tli  J  I,  Xxtiiii 
Opiniuci  on  National  Dank. 
(■5S- 

EamlltMi.  John  C. ;  Edit*  71* 
FfJerjtitt,  XXX,  xl. 

Havetok.  John :  Bargain  Im 
Govcfnoiship  of  Ua*aackn- 
m;ii».  1«. 

HuaiWl.  SI. 

H»rt((r4  CoaTmtiMi.  jijn.  yttm; 

Amendments     {/rfjposcd     by. 

68;. 
Hayn.  Rulhedord  H..  JJom. 
Reary.  Pntrlrk.  y.  bit. 
Bareillty:    l>ccUralioa  concrm- 

i"«.  ''3J.  (Mh. 
High   Smi  (f»  dffK  jidmir^iti; 

.VariliiMf    JtiittdiiH"-^\    TW 

power  Dudcrlhe  <  "1 

of  definlnc  and  p'  i- 

fenccl  DR.  STS.  273. 
HalUkd:    Wsts   ol,    11;   Xot  a 

irpublic.  M9. 
B*aM    of    B«^aMit«Ur«  1    »i» 

K'frtltHljlini.    UrKJt  tf. 

Bsnit-i  Ratmn:  It*  latr  tWa, 
371,  8I»-S>0. 


wn£X. 


7*3 


I      Hon*.  D*vld:  ClUiioD  ffOHi  U( 
c  BIO  ft.  MT,  BM, 


L  ftJtra!;  Stnali);   Di^uttf  of 

I  coDMitDlini;  court  ol.  4S8 : 
I  Share  of  Senate  ID.  413.  4U: 
^^L  Neartf  ainAyx  p«lill«t.  AM, 
^^K  Hitioty  of.  ill  tl.  S.,  434>>:  A 
^^  Oktiooal  JDcjiieiit  iniij  conduct 
ai  ofllce-h»i<]<(,  4U;  Sytieni 
ot,  in  Gicii  U(U*io.  49t;  in 
Stmte  ooastiiiiitoDs.  4M.  441; 
Sniireme  Court  not  filled  to 
try.  4U;  Pr»|>ii«<livn  to  unite 
the  Sup(en;e  Court  with  Scd- 
Mc  in.  4>T  :  Pr«po*iiiaa  xa 
create  a  dUllaci  body  (or 
(riali  of.  4SB :  Vclicmcsci- 
againBl  canitiiiiiiinnBlafslelD. 
Ml  :  Atcumuliile*  undue 
power  in  Senate.  Ml:  Sena- 
tarial  favoritixn  for  office 
hnlder.  413 ;  Sbould  not  be 
given  to  Scn^iic.  lieeauso  ju- 
dicial. 444:  Mikei  Kcnatota 
ihelr  own  Jitil^'cs  in  ireiaty 
ca«c*,  44*.  PiciiJenl  liablr 
lo.  461:  King  of  Oreal  Britain 
nc-t  liable  to.  4B>:  Pariiuin- 
Aklp  In,    Hit  :    Taken  Irocn 

['udicial  aad  Riven  to  IcRia- 
Btive  authority.  ft49  :  One 
advanlnge  of  lodging  in  Sen- 
alt;,  MS  :  To  be  bcuuichl  by 
House  of  K<prc»cntati<rc>. 
bfKV.  7il;  Tried  by  Ihc  Sen- 
k(«,  boCK,  ^it ;  Proposed 
■mcDdmont  concerning,  byt- 
64?,  650. 
InpoiU:     itt     Dutin;     Taftg; 

ImprcMisast:  Ptopuwd  atncod- 
mtLai  concerniog,  beS. 

Inoom*  Tax  of  1^94:  Annulled. 
fiii;  Intended  evationi  uf, 
ttv- 

laMcpwKtIo*:  Power  i>f  Con- 
ItreM  of.  65>;  Nature  of.  bjf. 

todla  Trad*:  Rivalry  iriih  Eu- 
rope in.  IS. 

ladlaa    XUlaoa :     Mecemiity    of 

Ci'icbrck,  U4:  Meo- 
t8;     Nrce»:(al«     a 
iitny.  lU;  Hon  tat 
- 1^—^ 


Indlaa  Rtttou—dHfiHiui/. 

mrinliei*  of  a  Stale,  hiii]  lioir 
fat  a  loleiitn  DaliuTi.  171. 
InAita  Tiada:  Importance  ol 
wrttcin  p<i*l*  (o.  IH;  Im- 
pociaDce  <il  ro|:uIating.  STT: 
Coiigres«   (ball   bsve   poner 

tr>  [riflllitIC,  6o][. 

Indian  Van:  Uiually  du«  to 
conduci  of  individual  Slutei. 

le. 

Indlnet  TajM  {irt  .ilia  Dultii; 
£xiini:  Taxaiien):  The  most 
expedient  xturce  of  leveniie 
in  ihc  United  Suiet.  14,  V»^ 
ISO:  Compared  (o  a  fluid 
wliiih  findi  its  own  level. 
119:  Pietcrilje  then  own 
limit.  130;  Will  U  the  chief 
mean*  of  national  revenue. 
lU:  Limited  to  dullet  and 
exciari  UD  conkuinpiion,  SSI. 

InaorrMtJOtt  (/«  alia  KtMlien; 
St-tiiiiin  ;  Siityi'  KiMlitn  ; 
H'ii'ity  /niurrtitiBH):  Moans 
to  lupprcs*.  114.  1T4 ;  Kb> 
[i'<ri;>l  iKJwer  to  quell  State, 
as*.  2SS  ;  Unlikelihood  thai 
it    will     extend     ibroughout 

SiMtc!.,  eso. 

lutvnal  AAln:  Contenlii>ii  Ikat 
the  Natitmal  GoverBancnl 
thou  Id  havenoconcetn  la,M. 

lutdrnal  ImprovaMeuM  (itt  a/ir 
C-^n^li;  FbI-IU  KfiUi;  ftnil- 
rradiy.  Grrjwth  of  Kational 
power*  through.  fSoft  ;  Hit- 
toif  uf,  sSq«:  UUcuMion  »I. 
in  Convention.  Us;  Limita- 
tion upon,  in  Confederate 
CoDRiiiution,  71].  ;zi. 

laUraal  Kertau  Lava:  Nullifi- 
cniion  of.  in  Svuthcru  Stales. 

tOIH. 

liitamalTaJiM:  Divided  between 
dir«:l  iind  indir«rl.  9St:  Will 
be  lesotied  to  only  for  sup- 
plemenlaty  revenue,  SOt; 
Poatibiliiy  ihiil  they  will  bo 
raited  by  quotas,  SM. 

iBUmaitiMal  !*«:    )ft  L*it  »J 

A'atimi. 
Irataod      Law^  mainuined  with 
ilifhculiy  in,   ma  ;    EleciiMit 
id.  SSL 


764 


INDKX. 


ItallkaBUtM:  Veelcekieitoiio, 
31;  Dlltracllonaol,4T.4S.U. 

Jft^ton,  Andreir:  iSti*,  31911. 
Jlls,  530".  i*3i:  Nullrfii-a- 
lion  pruclnmntioD  of.  691. 

Jtmsi  n.:     Incrcaici  mandliii; 

J»T.  John;  Ai'li  in  Tir  FiJfral. 
ill,  xxiii;  Slight  ab»c  in  7'ii 
frdtraliil,  xxxlx;  Pimphlcl 
of.  citeil.SH. 
JoArtoii, Thoma*.  611,  ton.  lytn. 
ijSw,  IM".  s''?".  3*o",  M4"> 
5itw,  5»on,  563K,  s;i«;  I'lo- 
Ictl  hj.  iin;  Citcil  SR  to 
legUUiiv«  tTnnnjr  in  Vir- 
ginU,  SSI:  t)»lt  ol  a  con- 
sliluttun  tor  Virictnia  bjr, 
384;  Schema  of  plural  execu- 
tive. 4A0'):  Opinion  on  Nb- 
tioaal  Ranb.  IVii:  Draft* 
Kcniiackjp  RcKotDtioni,  679: 
LouiiiftOB  amcndintm  to  Ibe 
ConsiUniioii.  fcSd. 

JMldM«B.  Charlct:  [ncroduce* 
commercial  bill.  1)S. 

JndgM:  Shiill  hold  their  olitc** 
dufinx  r<khI  botisvior.  Al^r, 
nt:       Tbeir    com  pen  sat  ion, 

Jiull«lM7:  InlTodnciion  of  per- 
manent. 46;  PoM<*«es  no 
uitimaie  power  10  enforce 
laws.  9S:  Grealett  del«<t  in 
Coa  federal  ion  •  lack  of,  140; 
AbM>llile  n«'en*il7  fur  Due 
Bupreme,  for  National  cxiM- 
encc.  140 ;  SI>kI>i  relaiire 
pn|iuUr)lr  of.  SS7  :  Defect  In 
thi*  depnrlmrnt  under  C<in- 
fcdcrailon,  tl7;  S^ilcm  of 
appo4nline.  SIS;  Tenure  of 
olic«.  aia.  >S9:  SboiiM  serve 
dnrinic  rocxI  behnviur.  StI: 
Tenure  of  office  under  Slile 
coniiiiuiions.  til:  A  t^i-rier 
li>  despotlim  in  a  monarchT. 
Bit;  A  barrier  fo  lefUUllTe 
oppTOvifoo,  Sit ;  The  loan 
dABRerou*  department  of 
][ove>nrncni .  Sll.  SIS:  Po*- 
cet*e(  jTi'lument.but  nn  force 
o«  wil).  B19:  Weaknr*>>  ■■(.  in 
Rlation     to     cxceniiee     end 


J  odlolary — Ctniit  trJ. 

IcKihlaiire.     SIS;     Neeemn 

independenee     of.    SIB.    tft, 

The  weakcit  of  ihc  ihi«e4i- 

paitmenli  of  power.  SIB:  Rt- 

qumie  independence  of,  111 

Tbe    bulwaitii    iif    a    l^DltcJ 

cooMitution.  6S3  ;   The  inil<- 

pendence   of    the   juilges  <«■ 

•ential.    and    mhf.    BU^MI. 

DiOicaltrnf  rcaiitln^  majm- 

\lf,    BS4 ;     A*     a     mtaigatini 

power  on   severe    law*.  Ml; 

Evil*    of    |ier>i>dl»l   appolal' 

mvnlvl.  SZS:   Necessarj- per 

mancDceof.SSft;   VolureiuMi 

law*  re<iuUc    permanence  In. 

SIS;   Kxpericocv  and   kaowt- 

rdceesBeniialiti.SM;  Neco- 

<iHy    of    pertnaoeni    salann 

for,  UT;  Sydcin  of  rrraneiaf 

in  Gre;il   Britain  nnd  Man*' 

chusclis.  <»)'•:  niHTunion  «< 

«ge  tiniilatioo   ol,  SS>;    Nc* 

York   Bfarem    of,  MS:   Mml 

hare  coextf  niive  pnwef«wd> 

tcKltJature.  S)t,    Piirtllinn  of 

power  of,  S3B:  Absurd  (cat 
of  il*  eni:r'>jichinK  on  tegii- 
laiive  authority.  frU:  C^^ 
paralive  wedknen*  of.  BM. 
I.i"il:*  ticyonil  naii<Htal  taa. 
8S9;  Mcnn*  of  dopoiiam  by, 
BBS:  It*  province  and  diUf  to 
expound  the  law.  ^87. 
Jsdlaiary.  Federal  {icc  o/i*  S— 
fTimi  Cftirl):  Cnanlvd  liw 
popular  inDoence,  xii;  tyaal 
resUtance  to.  liv  :  Aiiarkcd 
bj  leglttallte  and  cxc<culif« 
branche*,  >v ;  The  dintia- 
gviihini;  feature  of  tbe  Na- 
tiona]  Govemreent.  itUI;  Ua- 
popularity  ol.  ■xvill:  R«a|iMI 
acrocdcd  to,  iviii;  Peculiar 
power  of.  Kviii ;  Clamor 
again*!,  4]6<i.  4SB :  ncnaral 
survey  of.  SIT-U4  :  lla  itBlx 
to  deelare  uneiinKtilntiBOal 
■cisvoJd.  t>0:  VJodicaUna  >J 
ill  power  to  prooaonce  lefi*- 
ladve  act*  void,  becanae  nx^ 
Irary  to  the  Ccnxltutiun.SM- 
Bn  iVruliar  advanlaK*:*  af 
tbe  pr«eitiuB  in  tbe  CottRIIK- 


IND£X, 


tnUAMt—CftitiiufJ. 
lioQ  (or  *appor(  ol.  UT,  tSt; 
Precaution*  iot  r«E(>on(it>itlly 
«(,  SSI:  ConllilutiunslcUata 
conceiainK  taUrict,  BIT:  Li- 
Able  lo  Impcacbmcni.  BM: 
Want  o(  ■  (vrorUion  for  re- 
■Bovini:.  H9  :  Omission  of  a 
proviilon  (orrptnaviog.oniic- 
e«tiini  III  kiiul>illir,  defcncted. 
•99.  SSO;  Eitrnt  ol  power* 
of,  UO.  SSI.  MS:  Muii  have 
ragniisorc  over  catca  con- 
«crnln|t  lofciK"  coiinlriei  or 
citiitns.  MI.  633:  IntFtreti- 
lion  bclHccn  Suicx.  U3.  S34. 
•97:  Will  not  be  «D^ie<l  lo 
local  atlachniinis,  SM;  Mum 
kavc  CDsnitance  of  mariiimc 
CkU*e<,  BIB.  B3Ti  Syitem 
uixlcr  Con  l«l  era  linn.  US. 
EU;  Musi  deciile  buunility 
dliputcs.  M6.  aST:  Need  of 
equity  power*  by, 138;  P«wer 
over  ireatiet.  and  alJ  c.i»i 
alleciing  amba*«ad«tt.  S3T: 
Power  over  t«»e»  in  nhifli 
the  Unitrd  Sla(«i  shall  be  a 
parly.  H?:  Power  orer  dU- 
puled  Male  graoli.UT;  Pow- 
er  over  ca*r«  in  which  fot- 
cinncfa  are  contcrned,  5JT; 
Proper  conilllulion  of,  BSl; 
Na  ob>ertion  to.  thai  doe* 
not  lie  ac^inM  State  jii(]it.i- 
ariei,  HO.  Ml;  Modelled  on 
mi>^t  StMIe  nyatcnit.  Ml,  MS: 
Nccewily  of  inferior  eourl* 
In,  Mi;  I'ropoiiijon  thai  ihe 
Slate  count  ihall  be  the  la- 
fcrtof  coiirti  of.  8i3:  SyMvin 
of  inferior  court*  of.  Ml: 
Clamor  asainil,  ai  regards 
appellate  jurlidktlun  OTcr 
fiKta.  MS:  A|>t>i^1Uie  power* 
of,  M7, 640:  SuGgesied  lupei- 
•edure  of  trial  by  Jury  Is, 
0M,  MT:  Case*  of  c oik ur rent 

Juricliction  with  Sinic^.  BU, 
SO-MS:  Limiled  locnuiesof 
federal  cotnliiince,  B5t;  Na- 
tmnal  and  Stale  »yHici»t  one 
whole,  H8:  Wbeihrr  an  ap- 
pent  would  11c  fr»Ri  the  Stale 
courts  lotulioidinnle  Federal 


JvHUuj—Ontin  utit. 

tudicaloriei.MS:  Potiible  re- 
lation of  Stale  court*  to.  BM; 
PreciHc  limit*  of.  UT.  MB. 
The  chief  added  item  of  cx- 

Eenie  in  ibc  new  Ri-vernmcnl, 
:l;  Tribuiiai*  Inferior  lo  the 
Supreme  Court  may  be  erect- 
ed. 6i>sc,  714:  Powers  of  the, 
6i4-6i7r,  7sg,  730:  Ve«ieil  in 
a  Supreme  Court  and  inferior 
court*,  6)4i',  779:  Reitrictiofts 
a«  lo  suits  agnlnsi  a  State, 
^^i'l  JV*  '•  Proposed  amend- 
mcnt  (oncerninB.  bji,  638; 
Proposed  amcndmcDi  con- 
cerniiic;  limitation*  on,  6ja, 
6j4,  641,  644.  644:  Proposed 
amcDdmcni  concerning  sala- 
ries of.  631).  650:  Proposed 
amendment  couccrnint:  limit 
of.  in  land  controversies.  &41, 
64s;  Limitation  on,  In  Ofdi- 
nance  of  Nullification,  691, 
Aq9 ;  Peculiar  and  limited 
JurlMlkilon  of,  70ft;  DidiiiK- 
lioD  betwcea  jurisdiction  of 
Enalish  courts  and.  70^. 
JtidMarlM,  Slate:  Imimriance 
ol  local  rourl*,  108:  jurisdic- 
lioo  extends  only  to  such 
case*  as  they  have  had  cog- 
nisance of  before  orcAni/a- 
tinnnf  National  Gorernin'^nl, 
fJ]',Ul:  Copied  in  nrsanl- 
laiioo  of  (edcfHl  couriH,  MS: 
Recotnltton  n(,  by  Feileral 
Government,  B(4 :  Reasons 
(or  not  civing  juiisdirtion  In 
NBllonar  causes.  Ml  :  Will 
b»ve  concurrent  juriMliction 
with  Buhordin-iie  Ffderal  ju- 
dicatories, M8.  S50  3M:  Kc- 
malnint;  jut'^tlkli.'n  Irll  lo, 
BM ;   Not   deprived   of  their 

frimitive  jurisiliction.  BBS ; 
osslhic  relation  of.loNalton- 
al  jodiciaiy.  BM  :  JuiHsdiction 
remaining  to.  MS  ;  lliversiiy 
of  sTSiems  of,  B8I,  HI,  SST. 
Juitdletloa  :  Necrtntiy  of  one 
su|irTiiie.  140:  Derivation  of 
word.  M7 ;  Nature  of  con- 
cuirenl.betwfni  N'.iTFonalsod 
State  court*,  MS.  MO-SM. 


J 


766 


IKDSX. 


taij:  Trial  bj,  noi  tupcrMdcd 
ID  Fsdcml  courtt,  M.  M9; 
Not  abotished  by  Cunslilu- 
■U>ti.H9, UB. M8;  Inielatlon 
to  adiioiiitl  judicial}'.  AM; 
Want  of  Cuniitituti'fn«1  p>u 
vUion  coiKcrniiiE.  5M-  ReU- 
■ire  Titlue  ol.  StS;  A  check 
on  judicial  (IcBp-vlilin.  U9; 
Not  a  >afegiiaril  lEainl  op- 
pfeiiiic  uxution.  tbS  ;  Ai  ii 
cbcck  on  cot  I  u  pnoii,  HO : 
Nal  leM  liable  than  juilKci 
■o  cofrupiion.  600;  Why  * 
dauac  eoacernioK.  naa  out 
inaotlcd  ill  Consul  111  ion.  HI; 
Jcfletnon't  propottition  to 
eJecl,  S'^l"  ■  Sjilein  ot.  in 
Stnlcx.  Ml.  Sff.  Mli  Ibi|ioii- 
■ilMlity  uf  adnpiiQic  5i-'>ic  sr' 
lcin«  in  aaiional  court*.  S43. 
HT:  CaMi  ill  u'hicb  li  ii  in- 
ali(ibl«.M3.Mt:  Propoailion 
concertiiog  it  mide  bj  the 
miitofitj  of  Peasaylvanla. 
MS ;  Pr'>i>a«jt!<id  of  Ma*»a- 
cbuicili  Cunventioo  concern- 
tng.  »S$.  6M;  OificnliF  of 
fr«BiLa)[  cluute  cooccittlBi, 
ICT;  Oo\j  impuilani  In  ciim- 
mal  cuei.  IM :  Sf  Mem  in 
New  Vurk,  Connecticut,  and 
Great  Britain,  tM.  149  ;  In 
criminal  caKi.  fll;  Trial  ic 
cured  In  suits  at  common 
lao.  Cl^t^.  736;  I'lDpotrd 
atnendcnent  concern  lug.  6}J, 
634. 636, 640.  (41.  647.  6sci. 

Jury,  Grand:  Proposed  amend- 
menl  confer  nine  .631,  6^.640. 

Xm(.  Janxs.   cited,  Kxix,  xxxi, 

■  XX*. 

BMlBOk^:  iSja;  join  ;  Reaoln- 
tiwni  o(  17^.  ^>i•l,  *ji>. 

Kan-  KmUbi  Fanj  ;  Riac  ot. 
IJ9-. 


oa.  son;  Power  l»  Ami- 
phictyonk  Leaifur.  110;  Rule 
concerning  admial  nf.  KL 
Laatf :  K;se  m.  due  la  coMUOeiTe. 
13  ;  [Inrrsacd  value  of.  W; 
Diffinilif  cf  t-aloiBe.  fur  (uit- 
poses  of  (asaitofi,  IM. 


Lud«d  laUnri     '^■-''lical  cm 
IroldMrlni:  a.ii,f. 

Eventua]   il :    Ubi  t»- 

pccullrlaTonnK.x;  ir.Man 
faclarinn.  M.  ReiieiciiuilMi 
in  New  York  Slatr  of,  Itt.  « 
unit  on  qucstioos  of  taulim. 
SIT:  Pfcdoniioance  of,  in  I' 
S..  899:  Will  pr<rd<irn<rult  t= 
nalionsl  goveiumr"'  ** 
Potuble  kacnflee  ui 
caiiiilc  cUk>.  400  :  1 
with  mcrcnnlile  inirrrw.^dM, 
Rtllie  wilb  comiDercial  b- 
icreait  in  tut>ipe,  ^ooa.  tV 
aatiooAl  |{i-vernin«al  win  aof 
■Mdalj  faiur.UI;  Tbe  ia|«r> 
ol  coflUBcrcean  iuilirecl  bU« 
al.WI. 

L4a4  Tas:  UnpopnUriir  "I  b>- 
iional.    79;    Oppre^-iirf.    T* 
Propoaiiii  1 
BU:  Bean. 

poor  l«ndh[.'Kic[,  itii .  .-■Tiit'' 
«(.  KS:  WIllanswEi  ^intpiM 
of  the  Stale*.  tM. 

ball.  Public  (iff  aim  rerriMni 
i'ml-ii.  :    Wttit'H    Tfritmy 
CfantA  uf .  \it  r  .4 
History  ol  Slai' 
natio*.  3S4k:  At^uistiir.in  ci. 
aS5a;  Possibtc  altriiattuB  nl, 

LaislBf.  John.  Ji.r    Wlibdrawi 

(roin  ihc  Conreolioo,  is. 
Law  «l  lu^oa     ImpoTiaaoE  of 

(itncriluii.  13;  Mont  likal;  i* 

be  uIiaetTed  bv  one  niilTg*' 

goTemoienl.  tl. 
Lnri;    Comroj    nvcr.  vS;    Aa- 

nuli&rnt    of.   Ttti;     OiM^riv* 

uilnx.  *iii.  ■;    \l»n-    m-.i- 

neodatiDBi  if  nt 

br    power    10 

bead  kucn  wi  .iii. 

IW;  In  Ikeii  «  -  ■»• 

preinn,   Wf  :    Wr-., 

ifaafiklns  bm  >api' 


S73,  2>£.  L>|t«4i 
9T9,  ticciure 
a  delect  n(  Anr 

mmtt,   €11,     i 


INDtX. 


767 


L**I —  Cendinuti. 
4iiR.4I>;  KvUof  volumlnou* 
oT  bad,  41S  ;  loslabitity  in, 
tbe  appotlunilr  o(  (beculatut 
«ni1  Dwindlcr,  <lt;  uniluble. 
dUturb  snd  tbcck  l>u*inc«9. 
416;  The  ini*rprriation  of, 
the  lunciion  a(  ihc  judkliry, 
Ml:  C»snnf tiiiilr»4i('tlnilbc- 
tw«en  (undamnntal  and  Bist- 
uie.  S91:  ConliailkiJon  bc- 
iwccTi  iwa  or  in  Are.  StS; 
Vuluminou*.  rcqiiirr  perma- 
nent judiciary.  US;  A  body 
which  (Uiiiiei,  sbould  nol  be 
ih>r  iuilEc  u(,  640:  Hrricndvil 
csiab1ishin«cit  of  comrnun  and 
«lalul«.  by  Coniliiuiion.  OTl; 
OnTy  til  be  8u«pcnde>l  by  rrp- 
rcseniativvK.  (>3S.  647  ;  Dis- 
linciioD  beiwcen  consiitu- 
tU>niil  aod  legUUilve,  687; 
Deiriiioii  od  conflkiine.  6St; 
Ineriiablc  Inequaliiy  of.  696- 

t^l  :  Reviilulionufy  riKlit  "' 
reiiatiilff.  70s;  Nuliificaiion  ■ 
peAccaMe  means  ol  ruining. 
7"5- 
I*w*.  U.  S. :  Superiur  10  State, 
%\\\  DiMiacliofl  between  n4)n> 
compliaiwe  of  a  Stale  with. 
und  U1U*)  rrnitUncr  l'>.  100- 
109:  Oppotiliun  Id.  sbouM 
be  quelled  by  (un>c  mclhods 
G>i)|>luyed  by  RlHlea.  102;  Ini- 

fxislible,  if  (ondavritTd  by 
aws  o(  Stalei.  HO;  So  mote 
unpopular  than  Slate,  ITO ; 
Win  \tr  llie  (iipicmi:.  t,\  (he 
land.  ITS;  Who  it  10  judt(e 
propriety  of.  t08  ;  Uncoaaii- 
luiioiuilliy  lit.  6&0,  6S5;  Ai- 
templrd  nullifiotion  of,  690; 
Abiurditf  of  Sule  abrogation 
of,  l>94:  Conxilulional  oielh- 
Ml  i>r  rL'|icjiltii|[.  694;  Kciiti- 
•  nee  to.  is  ireuKon.  7o(i. 

lucn**:  Ruropean  rage  for.tl. 

Lm  nttloa,  yt. 

Laf&l  tnt«rf«*t>ilM  {irt  ^!if 
CcHitrH/iisuy.  Rule*  of.  U6, 

t»%*X  Itnin  U"  •>!'»  Bith  tf 

Crtdtt;     Paftr    Hfenrf):      Uo- 

jnM  uBo  01.  x:    Naiiirtf   ol, 
xtv;    Tlie    right   to    create. 


bfd  Tntt—CeiUiauiii. 
n  poRcr  at  sovereignty, 
liv;  liijuitlce  of.  xlv;  R«- 
siiiance  to  icrecnback*  in 
C^ttKornU.  loin:  In  pnyment 
•if  dcbli.  no  Suic  *bal1  mahe 
aoylbinfc  bui  Kold  and  silver 
coin  a,  6o3f.  ;:b;  Ab«ira<l  ol 
decUlon  In  Third  I^kkI  Ten- 
der Case.  736. 

L«Ki<IiUaa  0"  '•/«'  Lao:)):  Sln- 
glc'bodied  IcgiElaiurei  pro- 
duce variable.  I4i>i:  Check 
to  excessive,  by  dual  bodied 
legiiUturei.  14111;  Excc»lve 
und  uniitHMe,  a  defect  ol 
Anierican  guvernmeDts.  411; 
Checks  up<>n,4tiH;  Evil*  of 
miiiHblc.  414^16. 

LagltlallT*  D*!)artn*nt  {s/r  -lit 
Lengrtii):  Attack  of,  on  judl* 
cikry.xv;  Aitickof.inicxecii- 
iSve,  xv;  Lri'cniiiK  of  in- 
fluence ol,  through  cxecuiive 
a»sumpllL>n  ol  war  piiivi.'is. 
\i;  fower  of.  lessened  by 
trnr.  4S;  Development  of  bnl- 
uncei  and  check*  on.  46; 
A  >in|[le  tiody  an  improper 
system.  141;  Defects  of,  ilia*, 
trated  in  Coniincatal  Con- 
giess  and  Assembly  ol  Penn- 
tylvaniu,  14IH;  Tendency  to 
check  leRislalion  in  dual 
body.  14311;  A  voriex  ut  guv- 
ernmcntal  ponrr.  321;  En- 
croachmenit  ol,  in  U,  S.  gov- 
crnrncni,  31811;  As  liable  (o 
tyranny  us  execulitc,  3St; 
niRiculiy  ol  selling  precise 
limits  lo  powers  ol,  S90;  Kn- 
CTOAchments  »l,  in  Virginia, 
161;  KBcroachments  of,  in 
Pennsylvania,  SSS.  640;  Re- 
publican K'lveinnienlS  ag- 
giandlie,  SST.  M>;  Kelaiivclv 
greater  popularity  ol,  wild 
peopie,  687;  The  greater  itie 
■izE  ol,  the  greater  ifac  influ- 
ence «(  individuals,  686;  A 
mean  in  siie  ol,  680;  Advan- 
tage ol  dual-bodlcd.  416; 
Slngle-bodlcd.  liable  to  sud- 
den and  violent  passions,  4U; 
Opinion*  favor  a  numerous. 


/iVD£X. 


LvgitUti**  Itaputntat— C>M/'.A 
MT ;  I'lciiideiit  muti  noi  be 
<oinplaU»(iI  |n,4T7;TriiiltoCf 
la  ab«oib  all  puwcrt.  4TS.  4C9; 
In  Kpublic*,  ihe  lepretcnu- 
llve»  Uncy  ihcy  arc  the 
people.  478;  ItniiiiiicniT  luv- 
■td*  oih«r  depart  me  nl*.  4TB; 
Not  kiiilcd  lo  exRicltc  par- 
■loninic  power,  4n;  Prob- 
able birgains  orer  offices, 
MT;  Power  ol  couric  to  de- 
cluic  aC(«  ol,  nncofiMllu- 
lional.  S20:  Ptiwcr*  uf,  lrm> 
ited  by  Cun*iiiuii'>n.  Ul; 
Not  ihc  judge*  of  their  own 
ConstiEulicinal  power*,  Ul; 
Lirnitetl  delegated  power  of. 
B21:The  juditiarya  bultrarh 
■iC^lniil  encrojcbmcnl*  of, 
SS3;  Judicial  power  ntuDI  b« 
coexteniire  wilh.  Ml;  Argu- 
merit  Ihat  branch  of.  ihouhl 
b«  court  ot  la«i  reooii.  839, 
MO:  Vilnl  objeclioni  tu  ludu. 
ine  jadlrlat  (lowerii  In.  MO. 
MI;  Cannot  revive  judicial 
deciiioni.  Mf;  An  act  ton- 
Irary  to  the  Conitllulion 
pasM'')  by.  not  law,  637. 

LeKUIatuit*:    m  SiMt  Ltgith- 

L*(t*r*  of  Karfiw:  Keairlcilona 
upon,  19t,  >ta,  6051-.  boSr. 

Liberty:  Relaiioa  ol,  to  faction, 
S8:  In  <>rrc<:ca>pc<:l(ruii  name 
(ot  iiidep<-iiilt-<mr  of  federal 
incrahers.  113;  DilficDity  of 
maintalnltij;.  In  energelk 
Kovcrnment,  S30,  Eadan- 
gercd  by  abuiet  of  liberty  ai 
welt  at  by  abuves  of  poirer, 
423. 

UMitalltot :  A  check  on  tuiil 
IctiiiUtion.  •■  well  aa  on 
Kuod,  131. 

Uatolti.  Abnabum.  aja.  STW; 
Quoted,  xviii;  Hokiility  of. 
to  (laxery.  7tS  ;  The  Pre»i- 
drn)  of  a  ii«ci!on,  not  uf  the 
Uiii'in,  71  J. 

LlTiBptoa.  Edward:  Writea 
lackion'*  MulllficailoA  Pioc* 
lamation,  h-tt, 

Lwal    OAVtrsnrat :     Kelallnly 


LmkI  OarrrBBast — CfHfimmiJ. 
Kreaicr     iinporlHoce     of.   Il 
model  II  life,  }06i». 

Lo(*l  Pr«p«BMri*ii*:  Great 
ptopcirtion  of  sovernAcriUl 
erioii  due  to,  113. 

Ui$*.  II,  C:  Edit*  cdltlOB  of 
7i/  Ffjtra/ist.  xl. 

L«td«.  Hoaxeoft  Reference  to.ia 
7,1/  Ft4<ralUl,  XKXVili:  Cai»« 
pared  wiib  Senate.  4S>;  lUa 
not  b«en  able  todelrnd  ItMtt 
atpilnil  C'lrniniint,  4U;  Tt* 
court  of  lu«t  leaort.  6M,  HI 

Loab  XIT.,  31;  Fotcei  Uumltu- 

iii>ii  III  (icniia.  IT. 
.Iaul»lana:  I'urchasB  ol,  6it.l9]a; 
ConiiituiioDol       atDcsdmcM 
coitcefning,  bSb;  Slavrr;  ia, 

Loyalty:  Merely  nn  eiprcsi'ia 
of  real  natlooalily,  17*1; 
(>r»i>ih  of.  ill  t^.  S. .  i;m. 

Lydan  GoafHlMaer.  tOS:  Orfi- 
iuiiion  ol.  S3:  Mohir 
fcdmlrutlun    fur.    hi  , 
the  be*t  of  aiKieiil    ii^mt^- 
eraciei.  M. 

Lywngoa,  SS7,  ISt. 

■»bly.  Abbt  de:  On  «  niiJal- 
elate  repobllc.  33;  tin  Arhna 
l.eif  DC.  IIS;  C'llrd  on  [)ej(k 
Confrdcrary.  ItX. 

MaMdto:  Rvlatiooi  of.  m  A»- 
nhiciyonlc  l.ea|t"G.  It*.  Ill 
KeUlinnt  ot.  to  Acbvaa 
LeaicDe.  lit.  lUI. 

lUatwn:  Aid!  Id  rtfFrJm&J. 
xula  :  Share  o(.  in  rik,  fid- 
frjHii,  xxix-xxxix;  Acoaal 
ol    Tit   FeJf'alul    by.   xlir. 

jjuoted    aa    to   1 ■• 

erninrrit.  ^Kn,    '■■■ 
iS-jo  of  TAt  /..,  .  li 

Hi*  note*  of  ancicoi  uJ' 
iiHHlern  ciinledBractes,  toqa. 
Writes  Virginia  Keaolatlu**, 
££4;  .^bitiuct  ol  deiialuH  )• 
r.iHr  III  .Matbuty  n..  (iW. 

■ainf,  1^41*. 

Haintaovn.  M.i  <i,n,e  .ir  «« 

Majority:  Gr  \tii 

ol  *eif  roiii  irW' 

liua  tatwten  pupulai  4.uAtn( 


Hn4.  xil:  Sacrifice  of  povn 
b^.  in  Knliunal  0>nxillilli'>n, 
xiii;  Overb«aHng  tulc  vt.  (S; 
Daagerof  tnctioui,  in  popa- 
Ur  cotcrnment.  M;  No  (ov- 
erniDcnl  br.  unil«i  Cunfctl- 
craiion.  IS).  13*:  To  dcmind 
I  mine  Ihsn,  ii  lo  place  contiul 
I  io  hanilB  ot  miiK'iily.  116; 
Abiurttiiy  of  (ubjtriini;.  lu 
p«rveMUy  of  inconsiilcrablc 
■niiKitilr,  IM;  Muit  noi  t>c 
unliinil«il  in  puwrcH.StS.  989: 
Propn  protetiion  of  minority 
tront,  >U:  Oppicssion  by. 
wiil  prwlure  anxicliy,  H7: 
Opprcition  1>y.  w<irk*i  il«  onn 
I  cute,  M:  VioUiioii  oj  frce- 
fliitn  by.  39T;  Of  li->lh  people 
and  Slalr*  ri'qt]iml  (i>r  iri;i»- 
lation.  411;  Unsiubl^  fcEisla- 
(iiin  pcrmiic  tobticry  of.  tit- 
Cannot  ratify  iremici,  50J. 
More  iliao,  required  by  Con- 
re^irrutlon.  H«;  The  judi- 
ciary a  cIki'Ic  upun  oppre*- 
lion  by.  «S3.  AM. 

MftS  (i/f  o/iJ  Amrtiitm  PttfU: 
FnfiUy.  <:apa<lly  of,  lor  Mif- 
government.  1,  t&y,  Inipui- 
«ible  IQ  ptnducc  uniform- 
ity In,  BS;  TendcBcr  to  fall 
into  miiliial  aninxisilicd.  ST; 
Gorerncneiit  orif^lnAti^i  in  \\\v 
|xt«(ioni  of.  83;  Colli-ciivrlj- 
aclt  with  leu*  rectitude  th.tn 
indivtduatif .  M;  All^clinienl 
of,  a  matter  uf  propinquity. 
IM;  The  telf-made,  an  excep- 
tion. 919;  liilliienci- of  piitilK 
opinion  upon.  3t8;  Republi- 
can gavernment  prvsuppotei 
m"re  K"*"!  than  bad  in,  XX\. 

ManotaMaNt:    Incrcaoc   of,    in- 
I       e«ilabl«      with     growih      of 
ciiuntry.  MT;  S.  C.  nullifica- 
lion  of  pnMection  to.  690L 

]|»n>(M(srUc  OIm*:  Want  of 
influence  of.  in  Revolution, 
ii;  pj,  I,anilei!  C'inu.  U. 

Martttry  vi.   Midtua     Abtiraci 
(if  deciiiiDn  in  case  of.  6.S6, 
I  %ttix.vm/t^t\mim:  National  power 
ret,  n«<cssstr,  STt. 


aaritima  Juriidietlon  (i^  alto 
^./mii-iiiii ):  The  jadklal 
ptiirnt  i,h.ill  extend  10  »1l 
cnscs  of  admiralty  and.Al^i'- 

Marlborqaich.  John.  Dut;e  of.  SI. 

Hatlberongb.  ^arah.  [luchciaot, 
29. 

Karqna  and  rapriial.  letter*  of, 
Cofi.  7J4. 

Hanttoll.  John,  Stan;  Abilraa 
»f  decision  of.  in  caie  of 
Maibury  r>.  Madixon,  bS6: 
In  Cjse  of  McCulloch  fj,  Ma- 
lyl^iiij,  J)6. 

Kaiylaod.  ii6n;  Senate  of, 
xxxviil;  Refusal  of,  to  a)[tc« 
to  thr  Arlictcs  uf  Canfcdera- 
iion.I38;  Petuliarly  vuinet> 
able  cou.ii  of.  966;  Illendine  of 
SOvetmnciiTuI  piiwos  in, 986; 
Peculiar  eitelleiice  of  senate 
of,  4S4  ;  Jury  trial  In.  ttt. 

Itaioa.  Gcdrge.  5Jb. 

Ma»B«hDi*tt*.  labii.  7S411.  jain, 
383.  4S9;  Revolt  nf  Sbnyt  in, 
X.  89,  S3.)SS;  IhincuclE'iibar- 
Kain  lui  GovcrnorBhip  of,  3i>; 
Compelled  to  raiie  troopa, 
IM ;  Ulendlnt!  of  Kovern- 
mental  powers  in.  SSI;  Nui»> 
bcr  of  representatives  in  the 
■noie  numerdii*  branch  of  I«i;- 
Ulaiarc  of.  KJ;  Siie  of  aena* 
toflal  d<»Iricts  of,  compared 
with  thai  of  the  district* 
proposed  b^  the  corivenlion, 
3S3;  ProviHiun  of.coiicrtning 
■inpenc1iments,441;  National 
veto  modelled  »n  constilD> 
■loaal  ■7«trm  uf.  49S:  System 
of  r«nii7ving  )u<1kps  in,  539*; 
Jury  trial  In.  S6S  ;  Propoaed 
jury  amendment  of,  SS6. 

Hateastlla  OlaatM  (itf  alit  Com- 
mrt.uil  Ciasiii):  Special  In- 
ftiiencc  of,  SIfl. 

Meiloo:  Standini-  armjr  q(,  431*. 

■lUtary  Coarsl^n  ;  In  confcd- 
et*iies.  cjn  only  be  applied  lo 
weaker  membcrH.  99. 

■iUtar;  Eatablltknania  in  V.  S. 
{i/i  all*  Armifs,  SlaHi/ing ; 
Army,  U.  S.;  Jttiulan.  V.  S.V 
Uitder  Confederation,  IM. 
193;  NeccMJtj  of  futnre.lAl- 


MlUtATf  Saubliihniaiit*— CVm/V. 
M:  Scate  jciitouiirof  Stale, 
1»T. 

MIUUtTFo«*r:  Uiifununatein- 
flnencc  of.  46  :  In  Umc<  of 
iltnZ".  tund*  to  definde  ihc 
condilioo  of  th?  tiiiivn.  4C; 
Moul  be  rCf[utaied  by  the  re- 
M>iircei  a)   (be  coiimty.  11%. 

■lUUa:  Nr«'<n<tr«(  Nu(i»ii>l 
ConrToluf.M.  1T9:  Exiio>pl«o( 
Briiith,  90;  Not  iccviceubl« 
!«(  rci(utikf  wurh.  IH:  Anll- 
FederaliM  cuuiention  thai  k 
h  a  natural  bulivatk,  180; 
Dr|icn>lcote  on,  atiDO<>l  lull 
AtneHCHD  inde  pan  douce,  100: 
Enormous  «x|>cnsc  of,  IW; 
Grutrr  local  blllerncua 
loiratdH.   I7IUL   Adi-(]Mjiir  to 

fucll  imall  iniurrFctirina.  17S; 
oadeqoncy  of.  for  seiioui 
dilHciiltici.  ITft,  ITS;  Hectn- 
(lljr  (oi  >o«n«  ntvic  rritulir 
force  In  cTcry  government. 
1T9:  Should  have  uiillorniliy 
In  ors'niintinn  and  dilci- 
pllnc.  IM;  Njluial  defence  ol 
a  lte«  couniry.  IM  ;  Stale* 
relaia  at>painiin*ni  of  nllicer* 
of,  IM.  IH;  Inprotiabiliiy  of 
■buie  of.  by  nailonnl  govern- 
monl.  Ill;  Uanicrrt  from  *e- 
le<l  corps  of,  lU,  1>3:  Impoi' 
albiltty  of  di^i^iplining  all, 
IM ;  Jeffcnnn's  projioiltlan 
for  a  claMllitd,  iSax;  Vnpop- 
DUritf  of  tcrvicc  in.  due  lu 
War  of  l9ti.  iHim:  Creation 
of  titw  National  Guard.  iSln; 
Loi^al  •eotimeni  in.  I9tii. 
iSsfl;  Lctten*  the  cati  upon 
regular  army,  lU  ;  Abiurd 
IdeMiifdanRerlolilxily  truin, 
IM;  Fiirniih  sucf  or  lu  nciiih 
boring  Sintc*.  lU;  Kaiionil 
abnle  of.  In  cinployinrni  at 
diitanc*.  IBS  :  P»taible  lalc 
of.  to  lorrlKfi  govcromeaii, 
IM ;  Mote  likely  to  turn 
agalntl  th*n  aid  g"Drpcr,  lU; 
Experience  of.  in  Whiskey 
Iniurreclion.  iSsn  ;  Refuul 
of,  to  ln?jdc  Canada  In  iBta. 
iBjH  i    M««  ERglatid,  In  Wiir 


■lUtl»— Giw/»«i«'/.  

of  l8t3.  tSsx;  In  Cirll  Wli. 
ISS":  In  ia>lr»ail  iirike  «J 
iSi)4.  iS5ir;  An  absolute cbMl 
on  a  standing  amy  In  V.  $.. 
317:  C(im)>cteBcy olCongiCM 
li>  IcKisIate  fuT.  874  ;  Hfati 
dcnlinl  power  over,  4Sfl;  Pr^ 
piucd  antendmeoi  concen- 
iog.  6jS.  fMO,  (>4»,b45  b»).6»l- 

■laarlly:  Grants  bv.  vtti;  Help- 
lesiDcsi  of,  TJii;  Giurant) 
to.  vlli.  zir;  Ptotecilon  ot.bl 
National  Covcrnnient.  liii, 
Rir;  Lack  of  protection  ia,ia 
»ep>iratc  Slaira,  sin  ;  Tca^ 
laiiun  to  apportion  taxM  tm. 
it  ;  Sacrilice  of,  in  port 
democracy.  M:  Umloe  ia- 
HuriKc  of.  ondrr  CiHllcden- 
tion.  138 ;  I'os^ible  undat 
power  of,  sat.  tM;  Prctectios 
of.  Itoni  inaji>tiiy.  SM;  LTaati- 
bfe  lei[i«Uiion  the  upputto- 
nliyof  a  shrewd. 414;  Speciti 
power  of,  over  trrAile*.  M. 
Power  of,  undrl  Cunfadcta- 
lioo,  604;  The  juiljcnrj  ikr 
pn.icctor  o(,  8n. 

HlBM.  937. 

HiniMlppI  BlvfT;  Naviga|h68 
ol.  6w.  19.  M;  ImportBoceol. 
In  CItII  War.  t()a.  EsetariM 
o(  U.  S,   fiom,  n. 

■iM*Brl  C««pr««ilM,  6Bq. 

MaMTOhy;  Deliniiion  of.  xliii. 
alir;  Tcndencir*  in.  lo  pcr- 
lunal  warn.  1>;  Nu  araR 
addicted  to  a-ats  than  riytib- 
\ict.  M;  Unlikelihood  ifcat 
king!  wilt  KNiilflce  thtti 
counlliea.  I3t;  T>i*ttn*t  ill, 
164:    Aversion    >'  '    'raa 

people  to.  447,  .   M 

Fcder.l1  gxkCfnii i-.ti-fd, 

bi-,. 

Xonaj:  The  grcateo  canac  M 
dLffetencei  among  Bicn.  ff, 
Exiiiting  wartitv  nf,  ir.  V  S., 
74:  The  vital  pr  ikr 

body    politic.  ''.t. 

aniler  I^c  ("•  i-i  -  ■  ■  r  n,  */ 
t-'iri-riK.  2r7     L'M     1U 

MoBtjr  Bllli.  hri  Mi'iui  iiuwn 
aecsreil  tbtongta.  )M.  Mt. 


INDEX. 


771 


lOMpely:  UniuM  acueunccro- 
ing  nnii-.  x.  6si.  6i4:  Pro- 
poicil    Mdiendmenl    concein- 

I'lK,  '.J!.  <i.m.  ii^j. 
lovM  DooUiD*.  Germ  of,  70H. 
loatMqii.i«a:  Ciied,  rll;  Inap- 
pllcnbiliiy  of  Iheuty  of,  etin- 
trrninc  (mnll  rrpablici  to 
Amcikan  Suiet,  U-SI:  Jef- 
fcrsoR'R  refutitluii  <>l,  Jon; 
Theory  i;(.  re^Iljr  favurnblr 
lu  Union.  S3i  Admimllon  of, 
for  the  LytUn  CuDfcdcrHcy, 
h\\  Cilcil  a*  li>  *e|i«i.i(ic)(i  •)[ 
fCurcrniiiFntAl  pow«ts.  S34  ; 
ReinBrk*  of.  concefning  ihc 
iudlclary.  S19. 

XarrU,  Outivrtncur.  344". 

KortaiKln,  bsi.  ^S4>  'i^i. 

VUl«akl  6iiud  {.III  eUe  Mililia). 

I>fi:icasc  of   local  Mnliment 

in.  t8iM,  tSjH. 
KkUaul  PolltUtr   Inllutnc*  of, 

on  Suir  |Kiiiifcs,  JH. 
]rMleB4Utr:  [nhereat  111  Amer- 
ican people.  XXV.  ft;  tmpoc- 
lancr  of.  i7aH, 
i  ITaiiirallutloa  {iit  ah*  Glittn; 
Piafit;  S/ui/)i  Impofiaaccijf 
unKoiniiiy  in  rul«»  of.  177  ; 
Confution  i-orvcerninK.  in  At- 
Iklps  of  Coofedeintlon.  978; 
ProTliloR  for  uiiifoidi  lule 
uf.  in  Cunntitaiiun.  179;  Uiii- 
foim  rules  of.  bast.  714;  Lnw 
gorerrtlag.  bda  ;  Propoacd 
amendntcnl  <:uii<-crninK,  ASq; 
UnifoTm  i ales  of ,  ;io. 
1IaTisatl«n:  Rivnlry  oiili  Eu- 
rope m,  18;  CiruKili  of  Amei- 
ioii.  19;  Of  llie  lakrii,  ST. 
IlkTjgatlen  Lawi;  Tropustd 
tmrndmeni  conterniiig,  637, 
(149. 
a**7;  Prtciicabiliiy  of  croalioK 
«  federal,  69;  General  gov- 
ernment H'llt  lecurc  a  na- 
lloti.il,  08;  Will  Hfcuia  lu 
Amfiica  a  IuUhCfoJ  p««ei. 
96;  CommeirUI  pilvilcgei 
obraiiiril  by.  H:  Advaniiii:rB 
of,  07.  89;  A  icreal  national 
object,  68:  The  S«uihern 
Slaiea  the  riuriery  ol  vfoi>d, 


and  thr  Norlhrrn  of  meo.  for 
shipi,  68.  69;  Unlimiied  con- 
liol  of,  by  nation,  145;  Un- 
limited pooer*  of  Continental 
CongrcM  to  tiise,  146:  Im- 
porlance  of  chinbtUhiiia;,  aa 
earlr  a*  po^sibln.  Itft;  A  ne- 
ceuiiy.  If  wc  are  to  be  a  (om- 
■narcial  people,  ItS;  Possible 
conlinfifni'irii  for.  tialtle  polit- 
ical uriiliinctic.909:  Nrcesaiiy 
foi.Sflft.  Power  inlbcFedcrjJ 
Consiiiuiiun  to  Create  a,  969, 
M6,6o6f.7J4:  SlulTH  rostritltd 
Iriini  keeping.  Wt ;  Preii- 
(trnli^l  n)i)in>,and  over,  409. 

ItMeutrTi  DiscuM^ioii  <>(  nican- 
iitj^  of.  in  Geoetal  CIau*«s. 
(.(S-M>o,  668. 

Naoiur.  J.  76. 

NsgatlTt  on  BIIK:  iti  Crt^l 
llrilain;   PrtiiJrnt:    frfp, 

R«(TO|i//i:/fa,S*/<if/iJ:CanIi«be- 
ccmcu  cilifen?,  JOi).  711.  71  J, 

HcgTO  Tata:  Supprcision  of.  In 
Scmlli,  Jlijn- 

Vatbnlandt  :  Guvctnment  of. 
119-113. 3)8:  Foreign  foirup- 
lliin  of  drjiudci  of.  139;  At- 
tempt to  tefutR)  vices  of  con- 
ttiiuiion  of.  969;  An  «vil 
attending  the  conitltuiion  ol 
the  SlJt<*-Grnei..1.  &03. 

Raatrality:  Piici*  of  American. 
66;  Only  secured  by  poner. 
61;  tlxpefknteot  (he  Unitcil 
State*  as  tu,  fruui  1794  lo 
lilO.  671*. 

IfMt  Enilaiid.  3ifH;  Projeci  of, 
fo(  ftcpamic  (onlcdeiue^.  6Hi 
Siatoi  of.  naturally  linked 
together,  80  ;  RcsUiance  of, 
to  enibat|[0  laws,  tolit. 

Raw  Hampthin:  iibii;  BIcniItng 
i.f  Kovcriimc Dial  powers  in, 
333  :  The  tiie  of  senatorial 
district*  of,  9fl  ;  Provision 
conierninc  impenchment  in. 
441;  Jury  uial  in.  i83. 

K«w  J«TMy.  0711  .  CimimrretBl 
tribute  of.  to  New  Y"rk,  97; 
Reason  for  Fedeolitni  of, 
39«:  Too  feeble  to  remain  in- 
dependent    of    the    Easierti 


772 


INDEX. 


ConfTilccucy.  SO:  PropoxillMi 
ol.  thai  natron  tbal)  caeuol 
coRimercc.  S39;  Blrndin;  of 
gqTKrnmenlul  powefiin.  SM: 
Conc^riiifilC  im(»Grichm«fitt  in. 
Ml;  Execnlitc  and  cnuncil 
in.  Mt;  Juijr  (Hal  in,  HI. 

K«wport :  Take*  iribute  from 
Cunncclkul.  jSn. 

It«v(pap«r«  {ut  ah*  Prtii, 
Lititflj  e/Y  Ttxaiion  o(,  in 
Grr:il  HitlHiii.  ftTt. 

■w    Tork    8t>U :     IJ7H,     3S4H. 

3t>4i>.  489 ;  Discriminatini: 
Uiaiion  in,  viil  :  Ami-Fcil- 
cralist  jKirt)'  in.  i.x\  LimUa- 
liont  on  ii«  ilclet;>ies  In  the 
Federal  CoQVcniion.  xx;  Ma- 
jority of  ill  <telcKnle«  with- 
draw trurn  Federal  Conren* 
■ion.  xn:  Elecijon  for  mctn- 
bcf*  l«  liic  Slate  ConvcniJofi 
of,  xxv^  The  inajotilr  in.Anli- 
Fedcrnliii.  xxi-i;  Thr««l  lo 
divide.  XX vi:  Rtchlinpoctaof. 
xsvi  ;  Why  Anli-r<deral<tt, 
xxvi;  Forced  to  ratify  Con- 
ttltuiIoD.  xxvil;  The  Cllaion 
l>arir  in,  jn;  Hcrc<in'ro»ef«v 
wilb  (he  disirirt  o/  Veimotil. 
H  ;  Commercial  adTanlafcci 
of.  make  Hthcr  Sinres  triho- 
tary.  ST:  Reason  for  raiif  y tng 
Conitllnlion.  jSn :  Reason 
for  Anll-Pcdeialiim  of.  jSm; 
Would  jirohaUljr  join  KaiteiB 
Coofederacy.  M;  Difference 
ofoiinlle*  In  taiabte  value, 
IH;  t^^tpntol  p'>ill{onol.  IH: 
Silence  of  coDiiidiiion  of, 
con<:ernlnc  ttanding  armjeii, 
184;  AllcKed  exeellente  of 
her  <oaMiIuiion.  W(  ;  Jiir<»- 
diciion  over  Vermont,  178; 
A  peculiar  liiifferer  ffom  rc- 
•irainri  on  )m|>o*ti.  818: 
RepreienlattoD  of  laad- 
holdeiK  io,  UT:  Firn  urges 

appaiaitn'OI  of  Conrcmlon, 
tn  :  fecultar  TUtnerahilllT 
of,  2H;  Ex|>crienrro(.  a*  to 
Kational  fort ilic.it ioai,  36611: 
Rlcndlng  of  governmenlal 
puweia   in,  ttf  :  Numbnt  of 


t 


Rnr  Twk  %WM—CrHlinmfd. 
repreccntBtlvci  In  (be  nor« 
numeroui  branch  of  Itpf* 
laiure  of.  8ST:  Siie  of  Maa> 
lorial  diitricti  of.  coin[Hlitrf 
with  that  of  the  diitricu 
proposed  by  (he  Coovetiiioa. 
SU:  ConititDtioa  ol.  make* 
ndtprovliltxi  cunicrntaic  Ibt 
locality  of  cleciioni.  4M. 
Election  system  in.  WiJIKt: 
tmpcachmcnt  ayciciA  in.  MI: 
Powers  of  frrtidrnl  com- 
pared with  poKeri  of  Gov- 
ernor of.  MS.  U7  469  ;  Pro- 
vliion  cooccralai;  (he  ooity 
of  exoculivr  of.  46L.   Evil  uil 

executive  counctrin.  411; 
Unity  of  cxccuiive,  a  dliti*- 
Kuiifainic  frature  of  conllltu- 
tian  of.  478:  Veto  «y«teB  Svl 
4M:  SyiiFm  of  aopotntncan 
In,  813:  Age  limit  on  Joitki- 
aiy,  8M:  Technical  meaninf 
!ven  to  appellate  In,  Ht; 
iltber    court!    of.    poiavw 

I'uriadkiion  of  both  tact  aad 
aw,  MT;  Syclcmol  rnllectinf 
laxctln,  UB;  Jodkial  lyile* 
of.  rcscmbiet  Great  Britain, 
681:  Proposed  tranafcrenrcol 
jury  lyiieni  of,  to  NklkHtal 
Governnieni.  867;  Poitibillty 
of  amendinu  jurv  sTiteni  at. 
SOS:  No  Mill  of  Rights  In  con- 
ttllution  of,  870,  BTl:  l.D-efly 
of  the  pieKi  fixl  prnietted  by, 
874;  Coociiiuiiunut.eiDtHidie* 
most  of  the  alleged  defecit  at 
new  eosfililalion,  881. 

Hwm  Totk  City:  iSjn.  ;'>6«.  tSf; 
Sitoagly  Federal,  xxvl;  Aoti- 
Federalists  driirn  Irmn  polli 
in,  xxvi:  Threat  id  sepanlv 
from  ten  of  Sinlc.  xxvl.  j!«; 
Rich  Impodaol.  xivi. 

VvvTork  OravMitioa:  Anti-Fad* 
eraiist  siajoHly  in,  xxvi 
.VlnntFUvrinv  in.  ixri. 

KtUUty  .  Prohlhlil»n  "I  liile) 
.11.  eiS.  »*.  WT,  870  '•■St. 
JU;    Not    lu  be    1  ■  » 

the  State*.  6oS<-.  t  ;- 

boldcri  ahall  not  arteiii.  njj 
liJ4- 


^^■«Mliutia(    BjtUnt  -.    Develop- 
'  coent  ol.  I4i>;  Originaiiun  of . 

■wUi  Okr«llftft:  ii/xt,  384'';  Ke- 
vollolauartol.SSi  Rcatrainl 
aa  IcaUlativc  auihoritr  >o. 
leS.  1$4.  lU;  DcUyn  in  H.Iupt. 
ingCanstiiotion.iiMu;  Bltnij- 
log  ol  govcromental  powers 
I  In.  IM:  joiv  itUl  in.  iSS. 

RortWn  ConfMtTUj:  New  E^iik- 
laiui  project  fvr.  671;  StalvTf 
ptolNitiljr  conijiosing,  10. 

>«rtbMrn  nal**^   Man  (urmida- 

Pbla  in  HlrctiKlh.  SB;  Frienclli- 
it«s*  of  Russia  10.  (luring 
Civil  Vim.  itw  ;  Si-itmcn 
chkHf  ilrawn  from,  OS;  Nul- 
li6cation  of  Fugilive  Slave 
'  Law    by.    lotM  :    Object     10 

U>uii>ai»  (»iii'h:ii«,  sHsH. 
■«VttwMl  Ordiune*  ;  it/   OrJi- 

mtntt  ir/i7S7, 

VnUlAMtlon;  Of   National  Uwa 

and  mcatuTct,   tuiM ;    South 

I  Carojinian.  tsgw;  Of  IncaniP- 

isK    l>y    £a»i.    isgx :    S.   C. 

Ordifiance  of.  690;  JacliBon's 

.  fttoclamat  ion  <:oii<«rninit.  691: 

AllcKcd   conatitulloii.iliiy  uf. 

6ga.  b^  :    Logical   retuii  of. 

6^;  In  effect,  *  Stale  veto  on 

I  National   Uir,   £95-^1)7:     |n- 

coMlV-itiMe  with   Llnioa,  6qb; 

L  Impossibility  of  nalion   tub- 

^H      milling   to.  703:    Inirodnce* 

^B      riitr  tit  minoilljr,  704. 

Okth  (ue  attf  AllrgiaHaY.  Why 
Stale  olDciala  should  tnkc.  to 
supiwK  CufiMitntion,  303  ; 
Probable  disietfard  by  State 
(ifllciala  iif  Naiiiiiial.  814.  0( 
Ibe  pTcsideot.  6i3(,  738;  Of 
the  public  ol&c«r*,  6301'.  733; 
Profioftcd  ameiiiliiMiit  con- 
cvrninti,  b4S;  Prugwitcd  5.  C. 
to  oppoic  National  act*. 
691. 

OBM:  SccktnK  ol,  by  "beat 
men,"  J4«  ;  Fixed  lerm  of, 
3U0.  tyan,  i}iii;  InlluCDce 
o(  term  of.  ITS;  Produce* 
■PB*elatlk  elcmonl,  tTV' 


IKDEX. 


773 


OS««*li*Idart  [tti  Civil  Servite]: 
Tcndeiiry  of,  10  bM-ome  proxy 
rather  ibnn  iruiice,  ij»;  Pe- 
culiar deference  of.  tonaid 
iniitituteil  aulhi>tity.  141-  Rel- 
ative sDiallneBs  of  cumber 
of  Federal,  over  State.  SOT; 
Natuial  «ndcavar  to  Increaae 
their  oH-n  pterogaiivci.  344*1; 
Supposed  senatorial  predilec- 
lion  fur,  448;  Excluilcd  from 
Eleciural  ColleK<^.  4U;  Will 
not  licnble  to  influence  thoire 
ut  Premilcni,  4M  ;  IJicadcd 
muliipli('»ii<in  ol,  under  nenr 
government,  671;  Proposed 
amendment  concerning  liml- 
lalRin  on  foioijcn  title*  and 
office*  of.  633,634;  PropoiMd 
amendtneni  concerning  mem- 
beti  of  Con|tr«*»  becoming, 

nient  onipclling,  to  be  <ill> 

lens.  (143,  b99. 
Olmauad  Cw«:  Slate  lestMatKe 

in,  loin. 
OpporliiDiiin:       tmporIaiK«     of 

uliliiing.  4S9. 
Ordinftaca  of  I'l?:  Guaranty  of 

republican    i>ovcrnni<;nt    by. 

■  IS";  Conj^rcss  exceeded  it* 

poner*   in   patiing.  £44;   An 

act   of   liicotpniatiuii  by  (he 

government.  fi63. 

Vaper  Xooay  (irr  aire  BUtt  •>/ 
C'f-iil;  Orirnlmitt;  Lfff 
J'tnJir):  Misuse  of  poster  to 
create,  ix;  Great  loaa  to 
America  Ihrcnitlh,  tBft;  t)i»> 
honesty  of,  SM;  Coniinenial 
power  oecored  by.  in  Revo- 
lution. Sll;  Maryland's  refu- 
sal 10  issue.  494;  Proposed 
amemlmcnl  concerning.  651; 
Can  It  be  made  a  legal  lea- 
der? 736. 

Pardon:  Preiidenlial  power  of, 
4»B.  4tT.  In  Great  Britain. 
US;  ImpoTiaiicc  ol.ln  check- 
ing insurrection  and  rebel- 
lion, Vtl:  If  lodged  in  tegis. 
latlite.  will  always  lie  dila- 
loty,  491;  Best  lodged  in 
bands  of  single  official,  4t>; 


774 


IXDEX. 


PMdeB— C»mlta  Ufd. 
Advantage  of  prompt  aclion 
In.  MS;  Priiidcnl  mtiy  gtiiAt. 
(il)i',  7ja  ;  PropuMcl  aiucml- 
mum  conccrninK,  644. 

?uUHHnt:  Corruption  of,  Mft; 
Rofal  p(>wcr  »vrr.  Wl.  409. 

rudMUUp:  InlroduclioD  of, 
in  civil  tclrkc.  $t3H. 

Purtr  FMUng:  Miilortune  ol, 
tM. 

7m*dU-  Ponret  o(  C<Kiftr«M  to 
piDlcct.  SM.2II1:  '!'•>  Iicicrntii- 
cd  In  Irii'diiom.  <M>j<,  ;a4. 

FMM:  I'Bladox  of  perpclual, 
M;  True  inicrcx  at  all  n*- 
liiiiix,  M. 

F*at«  CoaAran**:  Acnendmcni* 
Id  Contiliuilan  piii|iusnd  by, 
7i&-7Ja 

Fuibit1t*b1«.  117".  US:  The 
ultra  •dcinofr^adr  party  iri. 
Vl;  Olaliiiliiinrts  in.  (ti-ft 
WrORiiiiK.SS.VS:  A  probable 
■iciBber  at  Noiihrrii  Cotiffd- 
eracy.  SO;  Koiisiaoca  of ,  to 
oiciM  Imw».  ioih;  Aclion  of 
Govcrtioi  of.  In  OloMiciid 
cnic.  luiit;  ('1llu^«  in  Bill  of 
Riiihla  dc.-iltnK  wlih  Bfoile*. 
ISO:  RcitralDt  on  le^Ulaiiv* 
auiborliy  in,  ICt,  104.  IftS; 
Blci>ding  of  forcininenlaJ 
powers  in,  9U:  F.ncirjKcti- 
menl  »f  legitlHllvc  p»wcT 
m.  ns.  S40;  N«mb«r  of  rep* 
tescnuiive*  in  the  more 
naincious  btaiirh  in  lesii- 
lalure  uf.  MT:  I'roriiion  con- 
cernidK  impeach  mrnli  in, 441: 
Piiip<j«ition  fium  the  mi' 
nority  of  Convention  of.  SIS. 
BM.  UT;  jury  trial  in.  H9 

ViMiiaD*:  Iiifxpediency  o/,  In 
teuulilici.  (SO. 

iMfM  {itt  ai//j  Atieriian  Pri^ 
fl*):  Guvniimcnl  eTcnillally 
conforms  to,  vit;  Ri|{bi*  at. 
■  ipeciBu*  pica  u(  deoia- 
II0«ne(,  4;  SafHr  of,  the 
chief  CBuae  of  JniiliuiinK 
CUTernment,  IS;  Seldom  per- 
firveie  In  crrofirnu*  opin> 
iom.  IS;  Vrl  trmole  (torn 
Iitileci    vinaa,   M;    MnJcrn 


reprcaealatioa  of.  Vt;  Con- 
icolliog  induence  of.  in  rcpab- 
llct,  IM;  linpiowa  d«culM 
ifaal  they  ir«ra  nu4*  Im 
kings.  S04:  Tbe  good  ol.tbt 
•uprcniE  objctt  of  goTsm- 
men),  S04;  An  ingtabtt  gov- 
ernment loses  Biiacbment  ol. 
41S;  KcprcKQtalion  of,  tn 
ancionl  irpubllc*.  4Bt;  Co«- 
tnonly  intend  the  pvWir 
Kuod.  4T8;  l.labiltty  locrtM. 
4T«,  4TT^  Pieciillvc  tboaM 
be  complaisant  to.  4TT; 
tjeRltlalivc  power  fancy  tbcy 
are  ilic.  4TB:  Rigbl  vl.  10 
ftbolUli  and  fo«ni  ga*af» 
meats.  7)1. 
PtrUlM:  l)ik  pfvraonal  molivv* 
injurinun  10  his  (ounlrr.  Wt- 

PM«m«l  Ubatty  Law*.  Re<o«- 
■ncndailon 111  NoitheiaSiam 
to  rcpul.  71S- 

PtMma)  frtparty  Tas  {irr  aht 
Tatjliirin,  Too  inritibl*,  Tl; 
DilTiriilty  «l  collectinx,  Tt : 
Onlv  politic  in  cilic*.  TV. 

PMIUm:   Risbt  of.  bHr,  7a%. 

PUdla*.  n. 

PhiUdalpUa.  »8. 

Phoolan*;    Unruly    cwidnct   ol. 

Itl. 
Plaktrlag.  J 11  dice.  \v)m. 
Piiaey:    Congress   to   pre«ctfbc 

punishmcRi  (or,  (10^.  714. 
Pitt.  William:  Mu  bill  to  fcg»- 

Ule  irailf  trlntion*.  tji*. 
Palaodr  Her  govetnmeni.    lit. 

9M;  An  elaniplci>i  a  giivcra 

■neni  orer   lixat  aoTprvlgiia. 

llS;    An  avil  of   the    Poltah 

Uiel.  MS. 
Ptlitiis:  Absurd  lu  mafc*  prau- 

lytes  lif  faii;e,4:   Science  o!, 

icrcBitr  improved  In  nudeTn 

limes,  is. 
?OUTax:  Itt  Cifitaiirn   Ttt. 
Foapadaor.  MaJrnne  da.  10. 
PopttUr  AMMsbUaa    UiAculiy  nt 

■«<  urine     bAimoay     tn,    M; 

Diitrnii  At  people  of.  IM. 
?op«lalUn  lin-4/'^  PiV/rf  Tajrw; 

Sttvr    fi'r/rfiimUh4m\       Ao    • 

baaia  lor  uxatliia,  ItJ. 


ISOBX. 


m 


rart«t«],  IS. 

PtM«  COBlUtiu:  Ho  ptovition 
in  Conitiiuiloa  coacEtmnic, 
181. 

PMt  OficM  and  po»l  roadt,  e*- 

PmI  S««dt  {irralir  /"uHii  R^ad); 
Ji»a4i}\  ll>rmlcs»  nniuinal 
power  over,  *TB.  aif. 

nwm  (iM  d/ji>  iiifartmtnu  tf 
Prntr)'.  Difficulljr  ul  >ppor- 
llonmcni  bemcea  piiTiicRc 
■nd,  IflSi  Al<i»)'>>  lite  liial 
of  power.  117;  Dcliiiiiion  of. 
MS;  Alvayi  iiivulveii  poui- 
ble  sbuM*.  MO.  261:  A 
maxim  Ihiii  the  grflaiviihc. 
tba  (botler  ihc  durst  ion.  3S3; 
Proposed  amend  men)  (im- 
ccdiiiii;  raMtrtttd.  633.  (ijj, 
<•«.  637.  638,  6J9.  &50,  6si. 
6S7.  tjij.  OJo,  70;.  713;  Gov. 
ciABiviilnl,  imjiliril  a*  well  n* 
«xprc>*cd.  657;  A  ihird  iatm 
of.  I»  ictultlnu,  A57. 

TnMDla  fiotn  fiirciEii  p'>wct» 
to  public  oAcc»  ptohibitcd, 
Mil'.  715. 

VtMMtU  (wr  o/jc  Afffintmtnt; 
£xt<tilivt,  U.  S,  :  /*•!  rri'i'i*  ; 
Trtalits;  yttA-  Sysiero  ol 
cleclliis,  xii;  W*r  puwoaof. 
Jiv;  D«<««(iv«  aytlcni  o) 
chooting,  kvi;  EnooKhmcnt 
upon  appolBlin«ii(  ol.  by 
Consrcsa.  xvi;  Eli:<.'l«d  by 
people,  xvii.  too;  Dinpropor- 
lioncd  populariij  ol,  xvij  : 
Safely  n(  popular  cholte  of. 
xvii;  Mai  not  eiidnvoicd  !•• 
perpcluaic  hiiDtell  in  office, 
svii  1  A*>uniplii>n  ol  dcw 
powara,  xtil  ;  ConKrTKsioniil 
i*tertcicn<«  in  election  of. 
j*3i«  ;  Cults  reEEion,!]  >oier- 
icrcoce  in  power  <'l  Appoint- 
ment. if)H  :  ConBir^xiiiiiil 
endeuvor  to  oeuirAlite  veto 
pooei  of,  }l9n:  Dnlikcllhoud 
Uiat  he  Rill  corrii|>i  Houie 
of  Rcprcteniiiiivei.STO:  (.iCb- 
cral  aurvey  <>(,  MI-SIT;  l^< 
adoration  nf  ihf  Biilhorlly 
VCBIcd  in  liiiK,  447,  Aii|)i-riii- 
IllS  power  of.   44ft.  49*.  KM; 


frMldnt— Onf (II  utd. 

Cannot  appoint  senators,  4W; 
Sy>ien>  ol  appoinilnR.  Ul  : 
Noo'crilkiain  o(  iniKle  ol  ap- 
poiniing,  441;  Defect  ol  ayi- 
teni  ol  appoifiliDcnl,  451a, 
4)3>i;  A  Mirciivc  choice  ol. 
ratablished,  453;  Election  o(, 
Ruarded  from  intrigue  and 
roriupOon.  4M;  Ofliee.hold- 
art  cannot  p.-iriicipaie  iii  elec- 
tion of.  U4  ;  Necessity  (bat 
he  bIiiiM  lir  ini)r|reTi<lc<iI  of  ,, 
■II  bit  people.  4M;  Systam  of 
appuintnicnl  secures  man  ol 
merit.  448;  Kleiilon  of,  by 
House  of  Re  prctentu  tired 
when  Electoral  CoIIckc  docs 
not  uive  cl<^iir  ni'4ji>Fity.  4U; 
Stmccd  of  sinK'^r,  4ST;  Term 
ol  oftcc.  497.  47».  47S;  Cow-  - 
pafcd  will)  king  of  En)|land. 
487-465;  C\>nii«rril  wllh  (ov- 
croor  of  New  Vork.  467-488  ; 
Kr-«liKihil>lyol.4»T,UL:  141* 

JUfllifird  nesnlive  on  billt, 
88.  480;  Linble  to  impcDCh< 
ment,  488;  Comniander  ol 
naliixiul  Ioiccb.  488;  Power 
of  pardon,  4M.  487  :  Rcrom- 
mcDdalloas  to  Congreiis,  468; 
Power  to  convene  and  ad- 
journ Congress.  469;  Coin- 
tnand  oil  militia.  4S8;  Treaiy 
puwrr  of,  441  ;  To  receive 
ambassadorB.488.616.  McKnn 
ol  giving  eneigr  to.  487; 
(Ibjcclloiis  to  a  plural  Exec- 
utive. 468-478;  The  term 
of  four  years  deleitdod.  4T8-  >^ 
480;  Should  be  responsivo  lo 
people,  but  not  10 legislator*. 
ff7  :  Hi*  re-vliKibillly  dc 
fended.  4*1-487;  Danger  of  -' 
insiablllty  in  the  syiiiem  of 
•dminiaiTslion,  481,  48C;  Pre- 
tguent  chanicFa  in.  will  pnid- 
ute  changes  of  oAce-holdcm, 
48S;  Term  ol,  in  Confederate 
Slatea.  aSm;  Growtk  of  ant>- 
third  term  idea.  iSiH  ;  Ke- 
cligibillty  as  »  Iiiibe  10  good 
condiirl,  488:  Daiifer  from 
•■a-IVrsidrnlFv.  4*4.  4BR;  Seri- 
vus  danger  involved  in  |U)1- 


-       .--    -  -     ^^ 


776 


moEx. 


pTMld«Bt —  CaHtin  utd, 

Ullaa  oo   the   re-eteelion  of, 
4U  ;    Evil  uf  iirtcssiliiltnii  a 
change  in.  48S:    Excluaiun  of 
populai  Piesideat  a  li[«l  ilc|> 
to  force. MT;  !>*laTr  of.  muit 
not  b«  ai  diacKtioii  ol  Icgi*- 
lalurc.     Ul;     Conslilulkmal 
clauRC  relalinc  lasHUti'.4U: 
An  adililionalsccuTitir  «{(>'">( 
■he     enaciing     of     improper 
Uwii,  4B0.  491  :  War    puircm 
of.  vfii;  Cuininan(I  over  Na- 
tional forces,  4M:  Hii  power 
o(  lequlring  (he  opinion*   In 
wrilin|[  ul  Ihc  headt  of  the 
exccuiive    depariment*.  499; 
Objection  to  (hare  lii  trealy- 
makjnc  powrr  <>f,499;  Trea- 
lie*    ahoald    not    l>c    (ruHlFil 
•oleljr  (o.  50)  ;    Will    alvay* 
be  a    rctpeciable    man,   MM; 
ArEURieiil     Ibal    ho    itboulil 
have    sole    power  of    filling 
oflkco.  607;  Secure*  IckUU- 
lion  bjr  gift*  of  oScoB,  SOT. 
MM:    Unlikelihood    that    hta 
aonlBaiioaK    will     be    orcr- 
iNted.  109;  POMible  fiivrnii- 
itm     in    appoinlmenl*.    M(. 
■09;  The  Senate  a  check  on 
removal*    by.    All;    Appirinl- 
metii  power  si""  him  undue 
InflueDce   over    Senate,    113; 
Remaining    poweri    of,  SIC; 
Power  (o  Rirc  iufocmalion  to 
Congreu,(16;  rowcfiocon- 
Tena  Conffrem.  ftl9:   ConxU 
inlioD*!  clauw*  relalioK    lo, 
6oor,   txfu,    6isf.   fi\y.   6i4<. 
ftMir  ;    Propnaeil    ameodmcet 
coacerniBK  limilnl    icrm   of. 
63B,    (144,   <>4i; ;    PropoHeil 
■mendn)enl  (oncernlni;  com- 
mand   of  national  (oreci  by. 
644  :     Ttie    veio     btk    *hi«ld 
asalBti  Congress,  654:    Pro- 
po««4  anMisilmeoi  coDcerning 
re>«li|iibi1itj'  of,    69^;    State 
allcroatioD     ol ;       Ptnpoacd 
amendment  cnorerninK,  E'Sq; 
System     of     electinR,    700: 
Term  of  lix  yeinfor  Coo  fed- 
erate.   717;    Sul    ie-rliK>b)e, 
737;  01  Utc  CoittcdeiMe  Con- 


PTM)d««t—  Ctmlin  ueJ. 

stituilon,  717-724;  Muat  have 
been  fourteen  ye«ra  a  eltliea, 
718. 
Ptm*,  Liberty  of :  Hot  guantf- 
teed  in  ConHitnlion  of  Ne« 
Vork.  914;  Impossibility  of 
dellnltlon  of,  (74 ;  Ameitd- 
mcnt  concerninB,  S74i>.  Tbe 
aedition  law  in  relattcn  to, 
574n;  In  the  Civil  War.  «T«ei 
In  Great  Britain,  S7S"  ;  Se- 
cured. 6iif,  7S»  :  Propoted 
arnenilmenl  conceraing.  djft. 
<>|i.  648. 
PreTloaiQuMtl«n:  C«nKrc»laail 

adoplioo  of,  I4in. 
Frlmarr :  tnlluencc  of  nominal* 

inK.  tft. 
rrieat*    Blfhta     {iff    i/w    Cn- 
iratd ;     Pfvf/t) :     Abuie   o(. 
cauMS   of  our    besvlest  ni*- 
(ortanes.  M .  Not   protected 
In  pure  democracy.  M:  Anti^ 
ican  innovation*  coneerDinf. 
17  :    CoTiiiiluiional    bulwark 
i.>.  999.  »T0. 
PrIviUg*;    nilUciiliy    of    appiM- 
lionrtient  between  power aoil, 
ISA  ;  PtirileKCE'  and  immunl- 
tie*  of  members  of  Congre**, 
toll-,  7S«. 
tiifj  Omaell:  Control  of,  o*>i 

colonial  caarts.  i«. 
FttM  Caa«*  (if  milt  Admiralty): 
Turirs  inetiEiblc  in.  661: 
Method  of  iryinK,  in  Great 
iitiiLiin.  5C4. 
Frepwty  -  Kicak*  »ocSeiir  iMo 
parties.  IT;  Rutis  of.  fortat- 
aiton.  13T:  ReprctentnlioBof. 
961;  Rr|<reieiii.iii»n  of  ike 
slave.  861,361:  lin|>"rian(e  nt 
represenlniion  ol  weal  lb.  991; 
Co*i|[re»«  to  provide  for  tare 
of  public, 6191'.  711;  Shall  dot 
be  taken  for  public  use  with* 
out  just  rnmprnsatinn,  lity. 
716;  Confederate  Coagtvai 
ahull  put  no  law  Impalriaf 
tfaerrKhlo(,ln»laim.7a«,7)a. 
rrvpnty.  Real  :  Dit&cnil*  Ol 
Tatuinn.  for  purposea  uf  re^* 
eniie.  IM;  Syaiem  of  tssatloo 
of.Ut. 


INDEX, 


777 


Tt*lMU«a     {itt     atif     Diiifi  ; 

Tt%riff;    7'i.'afi*H):    Natu>nji1 

Uxarion    pcrmitl.   S14;  S,  C. 

nnllirK^iinn  ol,  69a. 
Pi-BMla.  13, 
Public  Cr*dlt:  Uote»I(itted  pow- 

Frx  of  Ijixallon  aecessarf  (or, 

101. 
TvVUa  D«bt(:  ir/  DtHi,  PtiHit. 
PbWIo  InpranaMau:  tt<  jKUr. 

PnbUe  Lutd*  {iir  ah*  TtrHtfry. 
PuHU:  W/iftrn  Ttrritery): 
A  troilfiil  toalce  o(  contrii- 
rfrsjr.  M-88;  Itifliicncr  ot,  on 
tialional  potilics,  34:  Di»piilF 
among  (he  Stales  over.  M; 
Dil5(ull]r  OToi.  in  <aH  of 
leiHiaiion  of  UniiMi,  M;  C«»- 
*loits  of.  10  Union  by  Slal«s, 
U;  [in|H>T(«n[C  <it  li'iilnii  fo( 
the  cfeation  of  nfir  State* 
ffotn.  U:  Treaty  violaiion* 
(Oiie^rnine.  W. 

rnbUt  PTOp*rtj:   irt  Cofilal.  A'.i- 

lit  Undi. 
mblle  BmAi  {,114  aha  F*it  UmiIi: 

I  Rient  ol,  iSoN. 

PaUln*-  SiKnalUTv  of,  to   FrJ- 
f-'liil.  xiii, 
^^Anltknaati :  Cruel  and  unusual. 
^^B  pfokiblted.  b*tr.  716- 

I  Q««rau:  If  more  than  a  majot- 
itv  required,  iiiiduly  Sacfcaiei 
influeiite  uf  m'(i«ril;f.  3»0  ; 
ExpvrtccCF  in  Pcnniylvania. 
}90m;  F.ip«rlen«e  in  I1ou*c  of 
Ke|>ietrnl»tivrt>  in  couatlati 
of.  yv'"'.  Tcndi  to  incioatc 
•eccssioni.  S91  ;  What  atiatt 
tM  a,  ba\t.  711:  Of  States. 
in  ckOMini  a  I'tcsidcnt  Iiy 
llonM  of  RcprettentxtiTes. 
6aft(.  757. 
QaOCM  (i«  ttttt  Ftvtnut;  Taia- 
fien}:  Ouiline  of,  under  Con- 
(ederaiioo.  ii6in  :  Ineqnality 
of.  119  ;  Imlieclllly  produced 
by  ivttem  of.  134.  Uninn  only 
poiilbic  if  abandoned.  I4(  ; 
Sy*lem  of.  umlet  Cunfedera- 
lion,    m,  m  ;  A*  a  syaiem 


QoOtM —  CfilintifJ. 

to  mak?  up  national  dtficien- 
cie»,  190:  Syjicra  of, enfeeble* 
Uainii.  190;  Sydcm  of  ap- 
portiotii")!.  under  Confrdera- 
lion,  W8,  M4  ;  Proposed 
amendment  <oi>cernin{[,  (i]l- 
6>l.  f'J7.  &<»■ 

E*Ul«*id*:  Influence  of  Naltonal 
(iuvcinmenl  on,  6r;  Diatinc- 
lioo  between  regulars  and 
militia  in  strikes  on,  171H; 
Nallonal  cncourHgemeni  ol, 
381H:    Keileral   control    over, 

BatlflMUon:  Clauxe  cnncernlnK 
conslilulional.  S9S.  taor.bait. 

Batelllea  \i/r  SecmifH ;  SHayi' 
tVltitttyV.  Proposed  amend- 
ment conerrnlni;.  rny. 

Sc**lpl«  and  EipindllarM  ;  Ac- 
i!ounls  of,  to  be  published. 
txAt.  735. 

Btootd*:   How  ID  be  auihenii- 

cated,  6iSr.  731V 
Bogratlnf  Law*:  Unjust  uaa  of. 

X. 

Ba^lari.  V.  B.  {itr  all*  Armj. 
(.'. -S.l:  I^»»  liable  to  excite 
loral  TrBi»lKn<e  than  militia. 
I7in, 

Baligion  :  A  cause  ol  parlitan- 
shlp.  tT;  Alliicks  on  alitrns 
uaually  a  cloak  of  intolerance 
in,  lytn  :  Nolan  10  be  made 
pcohlbltliiK  free  exercise  f>f, 
ftsir,  7>5:  No  test  as  to.  re- 
quired. 610*,  731;  Propoted 
amendment  Ccxieerniin;,  (133, 
''34.  ''J''-  ^l".  '"4''.  ("^S, 

Bansral  {i/i  alia  Civil  .Vi-rviVr) : 
Changes  of  President  will 
produce  frequent,  4SS  :  The 
Senate  a  check  on  Ptesi- 
deniial.  511;  Alleged  democ- 
racy of.  Jitn :  JclIrrKin'*, 
{im;  Early  history  of.  fisn  : 
Inauguration  of  partisan, 
Jtan;  Jackson's,  Sian;  Mclh- 
od  as  recard*  judiciary.  BM; 
Rieht  of,  (161. 

Bapr«aeDtatloii ;  European  dU> 
covery  of,  93  ;  Influence  of 
didcrcnl    iitte tests    In,    S19, 


778 


B*prM*nUt  i«D — CdMf  lit  itJ. 
ill;  An  absolute.  ili»£CIh«r 
vitiotiary.  tl8,  810:  finpcr- 
ftciiy  knuirn  tu  aiKieni 
govern mcnis.  SSOi  Ai  devel- 
oped In  Gicjil  llfitniii,  3M; 
Experience  in  Iteiund,  $S1: 
In  Suie  governmcBti.  359; 
Apportion  me  111  In  idmion  i<> 
direct  iBxct,  380;  In  relation 
to  Federal  asmbet.  Ml:  In 
relalloo  to  property.  3S1  : 
In  relation  to  itlavit.  S81 ; 
Parti  Ban  inaccutucy  io. 
36511)  ;  Increaic  o(.  doen 
not  n«c«*sarity  Inctckae  se- 
curity, iWi  System  of,  in 
Stale  Bovcrnn)cn(9.3tS;  Will 
chiclly  lie  between  the  lundcd 
inlcreilit  and  the  mercaatJIe. 
SM:  ConxiiulCB  the  diiitinc. 
tlon  between  Amerk^in  Kiid 
•ncicnl  republic*. UI ;  Syntoni 
of,  in  ancient  re[>ut>lici.  491. 
US;  Failureof  ancient  repub- 
llr«  throiiKh  wnnl  ol,  4»n: 
No  St.-itc  ihall  be  deprived  of 
equal,  in  Senate,  tiKv;  Direct 
laiallun  and:  How  agipof 
llDned  amon^  the  several 
Slates,  sqof.  tnjoe,  ba^,  68(1; 
AntoDK  the  •evcml  StHles 
■hall  be  accotdlnR  to  tbeir 
rvBpectire  aombers,  6>9i'; 
Proposed  amendment  con- 
ceriiinic,  b}.7,  b^.  637,  64a, 
64S. 

a«praMaUU*w :  Ol  p  e  o  p  I  e  , 
changed  characici  of.  ijti ; 
Advantaso*  and  diiadvan- 
laue*  «{  gotereoieitt  by,  M; 
Proportion  of,  81;  A  large 
elccioratc  securcH  beitur.  CI; 
In  rrpubliiB.  fancy  ibty  ate 
Ibe  people.  <T*.  4*8. 

BtprMMUtlTM,  House  of:  Al- 
leged ainatlDcsa  of.  in  rela- 
tion to  taKuiiuD.  818:  Rep- 
ictcnlation  ol  people  In,  M8; 

auslilications  of  the  ele«l«r», 
iB;  Onatllkaiiona  of  mcoi> 
ber«,M8.  3T8:  TerniofoMce, 
880;  Impoiiance  ot  aspeii- 
rorc  10  Ricmber*  of,  SM ; 
Greater  isf«)tmali«<t  req aired 


Baprwaatali  n* —  CtmimmeJ. 
ot.  in  National  Covefooieat, 
8>T;  Advaniaxe  u(  eipciuoec 
in  member*  III,  8M;  Saptttwt 
influence  ol  ceriuin  oieK' 
of,  888:  InvcmiKailos 
electiiint  ol.  388;  Ktcct 
diipules  in.  ISO.  Appoit 
tnent  of,  nitb  direct  tax**. 
880:  SUvc  t«prcii«ntatlDe 
to  election  ol,  8B1:  Proper 
Bomber  of.  846:  Ineritalile 
Htowih  of.  881.  SM:  f>oMlhle 
COrtBplion  ol,  810;  Compatcd 
with  CoBlinenttU  Congreaa, 
8T0;  Exclusion  ol  mcni^ert 
of,  front  civU  aemice,  til: 
Too  small  to  be  properly 
lepreseotallve,  878;  lUlaal 
of  inforniHtlon  needed  by. 
878:  Local  knoirlcdie  pa*- 
sesscd  by  roerabets  at ,  n, 
171;  A  sals  aad  cainpelvBl 
Ituardian,  378;  Chatsc  IhM 
it  will  be  un  otigaxhy.  STTi 
Probable  hiicli  character  ok 
membertol.  878;  Restrained 
by  frequent  electiuas,  878; 
Will  pob»e«s  Slime  intF(t*l) 
as  ill  constituents.  ITS,  388. 
Not  limited  to  present  site, 
STB;  Will  groar  wlili  pto|[(es> 
«l  pupalalioo,  888;  browth 
ol  re  pre  sen  tat  ion  a*  aiU 
guarded  as  in  State  ranstll*- 
lions, 888;  'Die  (oprc««alaUiB 
ol  the  people.  3M:  FuuiStaUs 
•rill  control  a  nia)uh(f  of, 
381;  KetatlscI)  fire.itcr  pawn 
•if.  Hi  c»iRpaie<l  with  SmMe, 
3U;  Cbeck  posscnaed  by.  en 
Senate.  388  ;  DlsagtesBiat* 
with  Senate.  jHTin;    ficosoMT 

of  small.  StB;  Qacsiioti  m  w 
qnorttm,  880;  Lees  libdy 
tban  local  legislature*  to  be 
iianiat  10  iHtnieulsr  inisr- 
CMS,  IW.W1;  AilranUge  •! 
unllofmity  in  tbc  (Id*  nf 
■lection*.  «0B,  4«T;  On* 
c««*e  of  Irtcspunnibility  \m. 
41SM,  Anovermatcb  lui  Saa- 
aie.  441:  Nccetnliy  (itt  thr 
iiUhiinH  ol.  440:  Sboiild  bim  b 
a>*o<Ut«d    in    ircaikts,    8M 


WDEX. 


779 


RtJMMS  t*tJT  W—  CilJI/l  H  tui. 

sot  -.   Propoiltion  to  thaic  ap> 

Soiniing  pninci  wUh  S«a«t«, 
U;  Con«lilutioiial  cla>»c) 
coivccrntng,  ifr^u.  6iif, 
630c,  6391.  6301';  Chosen  by 
prople.  700:  Ifl  Coiifcdcialo 
Constitution.  7*0-733. 

B«prl«TM:  Gtanied  by  tbc 
Prc»i<lont.  fi»v,  jjS. 

B*pnbUMO  fl«T*raiM«nt:  Decried 
bevauM  of  ancient  cxaniplci. 
4S.  SS;  Great  modeio  iin- 
[irovemciitk  >if.  49;  Advan- 
tage u(  cntar((<:Di«nl  u\  ihc 
orUt  •(.  49:  Anxwci  10 
Monlciqulcn'*  ihcuiy  Ihiit  it 
tnnst  have  a  cuniracKil  lct> 
ritorr.  48:  Guaraniy  of.  Iiy 
nalion.  1S8,  ISft-SaO.  WouM 
not  prcvciii  SiaiTs  atter- 
in£  their  conatitution*.  US: 
A  ncceiclijr  of  Amcrkii,  14S; 
GuHianly  o).  S4>,  916 :  Pie- 
•upposei  more  tnoA  iban  bad 
In  mHii.  STt;  Elective  object 
of,  STT;  Security  to.  ilciirc<l 
from  new  cunsiitutiuo.  B83. 

BlnMUt:  Definition  of.xtiii.SO. 
00.  M6:  Usually  oveduiiieil 
by  tyrants.  %:  No  lct(  Ad- 
dicted to  wars  than  mon- 
mrchies,  SO:  Ex4in|ile«  ol  an- 
cknl,  ■*  10  war.  SO;  Gcniut 
of,  not  pacific,  30.  3);  Their 
•dvantngei,  49-4S  ;  Diilinc- 
lion  from  democracy,  SO.  98: 
Are  «in«il  oi  Uiec  the  more 
advantageous?  91.  SS  ,  Itii- 
asilury  limit  of  teititc'rlal 
sphere,  99:  Kniural  limit  of. 
IS ;  Ainericao  dEvclopmeni 
of,  19:  Tendency  of  the  Fed- 
eral principle  10  nioderatton 
in  Kovcrnmcnl.  119;  Pecul- 
iarly open  lo  foreign  cotrup- 
■ion,  I3H>>:  Danger  that  am- 
cUli  of.  witl  betiay  Ihcir 
ITasi«,  119:  Examples  of  for* 
eign  eorrapiion  in,  130:  Can- 
not be  governed  aolely  by 
force  of  l>ie.  1T4:  Revolution 
the  scourge  of  petty,  ITS: 
Strength  alwayi  on  (he  tl<le 
g(  the  people  In.   IM:  What 


Btpablici —  ContiHUiil. 
conititutet.  S4t :  Hollanit  «f' 
roneoukly  «*iertcd  to  b«  a. 
949:  Veiuce  ini»terined  a, 
Ht:  Poland  potsetsed  no 
reiembtancc  to.  MB;  Ct«al 
Biilaiii  »  slight  ajipruxima- 
tion  to.  944;  Government* 
which  derive  their  power* 
directly  or  indirectly  (loni  ihe 
people.  9*0;  In  Unilcd  Slates, 
MS:  Rcpiesentation  the  fun- 
damriital  principle  of,  990: 
Delinilion  of  compoDnd.  410: 
Olliccis  of,  not  necessarily 
faithful  trustee*.  419:  Ruled 
by  th<  deliberate  Mnso  of 
the  coDimunity.  4T6:  Check* 
upon  iriansienc  impulses  in. 
4T8.  477;  li.riipe(iirncy  of 
pcniic<ns  in.  S30,  Prohibition 
ol  lilies  of  nobility  the  tor- 
ncr-kloiie  of.  SJS. 

B*pablie*.  Ancient:  t)i«tractIoii 
In.  44.  47.  49.  89:  Vibrated 
between  tyranny  And  aiial- 
chy,  4T.  4S;  CXillinc  of.  IM- 
114;  Influence  of  single  men 
in,  399:  All  long-lived,  pos- 
sessed ncnute,  420,  Krprcien- 
iitioii  in.  421. 

Baqultttions  nadir  CenftderaUon; 

BhoIdUodi,  Viiginia  and  Ken- 
tucky. JlS".  *'7').  t*4' 

Btvens*:  Ko  nation  can  eiUt 
without,  78:  Paymeiili  of 
Fcdeial,  under  Confedera- 
tion. ii6ii:  Desire  for.  will 
prevent  excessive  taxation , 
ISO:  Natloa  must  possess 
full  powers  of  raising.  144, 
14T;  Tlills  to  oriitinnte  in  the 
H'>u**  ol  Kcpresenlallvet, 
bou.  -m :  ¥\u*\  causes  for 
raising.  974. 

Kevolntioa:  Thcscourge  of  petty 
republics,  179:  RIk«  •>(.  ITS, 

m. 

l«T«lmUoii.  American:  Govero- 
ineni*  diirinc.  ix:  Excetsive 
influence  of  land  -  holding 
classes  in.  Ik;  Undue  power 
of  lett'^lotlvc  branch  duilnj;, 
U;  French  influence  in.ljSa; 


78o 


INDEX. 


Foriun.-itf  exctcisa  of  rifihl 
of  scK-sovcrnincnl  in.  Btl; 
ImpoftttncG  of  Continenul 
Gorcrnmcnt  hi.  311;  Nature 
of  the.  »1«L 

Bh«d«  UUnd.  19611.  >U:  ReaMD 
lot  Alill-t'cderallxR]  of,  3811; 
IniquiiDui  Iccislationof,  40ii. 
tl7:  Connecticut's  tela  I  iafioD 
on.U:  Perver»en»»of.  I56if ; 
DBlay  In  acJoiMlni  Conuliu- 
i\oa.  tf^x":  pTDpoMlion  10  din' 
memlxr.  394m:  MainEainito;'- 
■I  ch»ilcf  atconMilulion.  3H : 
Factious  spirit  in,  will  wnrk 
111  awn  cote.  347;  Proviilonin 
Iwr  CO<i*lltull»D  concerning 
«1«tiOD«.SH:  Nainlicr of  tcp- 
leieniatlvei  in  the  more  nu- 
nirriu*  brktich  of  her  legisla- 
ture. 39T;  Rc»ult  of  tbori  term 
in,  417. 

Bigbtl:  itt  Privale  Kiiin. 

BifkUotHaa:  iie  M^im;  PtvfU. 

XItv  and  H»Tb;T  BtU:  HUiory 
of  National,  3B1H. 

BMidt  (/«  all*  Ptit  Kaadti  Pui' 
tit  KraJiy.  Improve ntcatl  in. 
if  couniiy  i«  united.  SS. 

Biun«,  90,  11,  UO :  ConqucM* 
made  ti^.  in  llic  character  o( 
allie».96;  Coieof  divided  lov- 
ereignly  in.  iM7;  Military  sue- 
ce*»  ul.  SB9;  .Scnkite  ol.  «Mi 
Thelribunc»of,48I.4St:  Re- 
tort  lo    diciatorihip  in.  4M: 

I  Ptutnl  executive  ol.iM;  RviU 
■risinic  frunlherhdrini;  j^Uirnl 
cuoiuli  and  IribuneK,  463; 
Danger  from  decemviri,  474. 

SaiBSlH.  S37. 

KhmU.  iI\h, 

BaUBrfottb'i  IiutlMUs,  677. 

tU  L»wr«BM-,  Amerh-an  exclti- 

*ion  fioio,  19. 
■uduc  Capture  of  the  tXVj  of. 

■uMf:  Forced  to  join  Gemun 

Empire,  g^. 
■dpio.  >1- 

BMtUsl:  Clanship  In.  lOT. 
4MrabM   and  Miuh:   Sccorlty 

kgmloit,  6s3.,  7M1. 


■•MMlaB :  Of  lauibrrn  Kc 
Vork,  siri;  tka  ;  Jclleni^oi 
vieMS  on.  6m;  Logical  rettli 
of,  6m  :  Threal*  of,  6m  ;  Ua- 
cotn'i  Ticw  of,  ajv;  RisM  <( 
■  p•rI)^  to  revoke  a  conipui. 
tl.  143-  Popular  atiitutt 
toward*  ConfedErate.  17111', 
Ctealicni  of  Well  VtiK>nU  «i 
a  result  of.  aBju;  Of  Stawt 
from  ConfedctBiioa,  MI.M. 
0(  South  Carolloa.  aQJi;  Ol 
Soutbcrn  States.  a93>>;  S>C. 
threat  of.  fxtt;  Not  a  coiuti- 
lutl<>nal  right.  700:  A  brcKk 
of  c<>nt[a<t.  701;  A  right  al 
revolution.  701 ;  RcadjaN 
meni  iatp«*siblc  if  cartiet 
out. 703;  S.  C.  ordinanc*  d, 
7ti. 

•mUm)*]  Co»tra*«nr:  Project 
of  separate  confedcracic*  la 
connection  with,  ttn;  Local 
Ipirit  if),  313a. 

fcett—l  iBUrMto:  Ditttnctloo* 
in  Union  no  gtraler  thaa  i> 
each  state.  6a  ;  InDnemc  tA. 
6h;  Ai  10  public  debt,  M; 
Atlituda  towards  tariff,  ji*: 
Inlctfercitce  of,  in  cIcciIom. 
M4;  Uncoln  the  cipreaiiM 
of.  ;is. 

•*dlU«a:  National  GoTernawnt 
better  able  10  cope  wllh,  tTl. 

CsdltiDn  Law:  Uacoasiliuiional- 
ity  of.  (.8",  6iij. 

Mast*:  Influence  a\  new  Stal» 
in.  xvi;  Effect  of  iRditrcl 
drle|[ati»n  (it,  xvl;  Tendrnit 
to  (itravasance  in,  x*i,  I^- 
culiar  merit  of.  I7O;  I.>m  art 
to  be  tainted  bf  faction,  11*, 
Divclotimcnt  of  ba«ls  of  rrp- 
rescntation  In.  134s;  Rep- 
rcHDiition  of  Stair*  la, 
349,  E:qua1iir  d(  suBiac* 
shall  nut  bv  amended  In.  HI, 
A  piilladlnin  o(  Ihe  trstiluaty 
Stale  hivsicIkim-  !»|  Cn- 
likelihood  that  <  ,ipi 

lipase    of    Re. I  -  .a, 

370;  Fear  ri(  nrtveisc  <oilit|o« 
In.  to  will  ul  i^oplr.  U».  Tbt 
weaker  ol  Ihr  twoliranchn, 
laS;  L'nllkclibmMl  ihat  b  wIU 


INDSX. 


SMMt* —  CfaliuHti/. 

oppose  incrvnid  rcpriicnla- 

lion.  MA:  Clieck  |io«ic*scd 
by  HoBHc  o(  KrprcMaiitilvc* 
on.  US;  Diuigic<:i»i<til»  otlb 
lloua«  ol  RFpresenuiires, 
}B6ii:  Qaotnllun  Ironi  Brycc 
lonretniHK,  )S7m;  KfiksibiHiy 
of  Sinles  ilrrlininc  the  *ji- 
poinimcnt  of.  ni;  Term  of 
ottcc  makci  luchen  liy  ike 
5t»tr»  uoimportanl  hikI  inet- 
(ettire,  SW;  Cenniti  to  check 
undue  inicrferencc  in  el«iO> 
lh>ai,  3M)39S:  (.>uHlitkaiiori» 
(or.  40$:  Sj'stpm  of  appoint- 
ment. 4W;  Equality  of  rcpre- 
senlalion  in.  409;  A  conl- 
pTamikc  bclwmi  liitBe  and 
■mall  Siaici.MO:  A  ptcy  lo 
vetted  jnierciiis.  409>i:  A  <on- 
Slitiillonal  rrcuunlti""  of  W- 
siduarr  Sliilo  BoverelRiity. 
410-  Rctulls  of  equal  tcprc- 
■cnulinn  in.  JIOh;  A  i:Iieck 
on  basty  lri!islaiton.411*.  Th« 
check  of.  will  lonictimci  be 
in)urlAu».  411;  N mnhcr  u( 
membcti  of,  41S;  Advantage 
by  futniabinfi  a  dual  body. 
413;  Sujicriur  kni:ii'li^<jj{e  due 
(o  Icnjcih  <>(  t^Tvirc.  41Si  Ad- 
vanuge  poitcMrd  by  kngih 
at  term,  413.  414;  Will  fxMi. 
B«u  flMfC  *cn»c  uf  u  iMliona' 
chatattet.  4U,  417;  Will  be 
atteatiTC  to^udglui^nt  of  other 
■kalioni,  41T  ;  A  ilcfrnM  lo 
tbe  pcupli:  :i|!ain81  Iherr  uirn 
crrotB  and  illnaions.  410;  Eii- 
dutins  republk*  posiieiied. 
420;  N<.>l  lifevly  Ici  boconiv  a 
lytaonica)  atialocracy,  4SS; 
Ifflpossibiliiy  ibai  ii  <an  cor- 
rupt all  olhcr  branebet  ol 
goTeiamenl.  42S;  Compared 
with  Senate  of  Marylai>d, 
424;  Wc>ilcni.-i«  of,  aa  a  dele- 
Kaird  body. 420;  Trraly-inak* 
ing  power  of,  4S6;  ProvUion 
(or  tbe  bieoninl  lucccttloa  of 
one  Ihrrd  of  nvir  •nnalon. 
4M;  Viewed  ai  a  (onrt  of  Jcn- 

peactiinenl.  4S9~44S:  Ini- 
jxacbiiieiit  p<jwrrof.433,43ft; 


BniUa— Cdw/i  a  it  J. 

Propoiiiioo  to  uniie  Supreme 
Court  with,  in  impcnrlitnc^nt*. 
4*7  :  No  objection  tliai  im- 
|ieach>[ieiil  power  i»  judicial. 
440;  Too  grtu  poners  of. 
441:  OTetmalched  by  Haute 
ol  Kciireocciaiivrt,  442;  Pre- 
fudicCH  in  favor  of  ofllce- 
bolders  unlits  it  (oi  impeueh- 
menl.  44S;  Sliare  of.  in  ap- 
pol<ilnicnT4.444;  "Couriesjr" 
in.444'>;  Impoasible  that  two 
ihitils  will  be  corrupt.  44S; 
Ita  own  jiidKC  in  impeach- 
oicnl  caMn  arising  from 
tieatica,  444 ;  Power  of  flilinii 
vacanciet  In.  44ft;  Should  nul 
bai'c  w>lr  power  to  form 
trcalira.  SOI  ;  Objection  to 
(vro  thirds  of.  railfyinff  (rea- 
i!e».  MM;  Kvil  of  reTnirinR 
majority  of  total  nurnbrr.SH; 
Objection  that  it  sbould  nol 
be  ccii>i-rtiii-<l  in  appoinl- 
Qieata,  SOT.  SOB;  UnlikcUhood 
that  it  will  rejeti  PreBld«niiaI 
nominal  ion*,  SOS:  Why  join- 
ed with  I'reiident  In  appolm- 
tncni*.  SOS;  A  proper  cheek 
oo  PreiidentUI  (iviiiidom  in 
appoinlmi'ula.  008.  609;  Po>. 
tibilily  Ibit  the  I'iciideni 
can  corrupt,  hy  ofllcc*.  SOS; 
Exchidrd  (rum  oRic**,  610 ; 
A  clieek  on  P(csidciili»l  re* 
movati.  511  ;  Appoinlonenl 
power  Rives  Hirxid^-tit  undue 
inlluence  over.  SIS;  A  special 
reason  for  lodRioK  impcjch- 
meiii  with.  A4S  ;  Coniiiiiu- 
llonal  c1HlI^e8  concerninK, 
yt^-boie,  biy.  614/,  frwx. 
tjytt ;  Shall  not  xty  impeach- 
mcn(«:  Propi>»eil  amend m*ni 
concernina.  l^jiQ.  (i«4;  In  Coo- 
federjte  Consiiimion,  711- 
7*3.  7S7- 

Bhayr  BabtlUoB.  s,  xi.  ».  »; 
Caoses  of.  29:  Failure  of 
Confederation  to  quell,  1S6; 
Coiiduet  of  Mjannrliusptl* 
regardiiiK,  IM.  ITS;  Nerd  of 
Natinnal    aid     in     quelling 


mD£X. 


■Up-bnlMtoc:  Th«  •mmeA  of  ihe 
Souiheto  Suic*  pNlermble 
(oi.M. 

Nftn  Lav.  Ku|[iii*«  ;  NulTifioil 
in  Notihcrn  Slates.  lom.  714; 
Under  Misiourl  Cotnpioiitiiie, 
fiS9:  Oct  Ik  ra  I  ion  In  ffiviir  uf 
such  laws  .-I*.  71S. 

!!»*•  tUUa:  Projeci  (of  Souik- 
em  ('cmteiltrjicy,  (>■*. 

SU*«  T»d*'  Limit  uf  ptohibi- 
(iun  of.  trS;  CUdsc  in  Con- 
■liiviion  (ciuti  of  c(iin|ir<i' 
■nUc,  >7jh:  A  <teal  b«iwrei-n 
Um  NavigatiDS  ancl  Souihcrn 
SuiMCOiKcrakflK.  27.1".  37<|i«; 
A  batbarnuB  Iralbc.  2T4 ; 
Aoierica  tcadi  the  way  in  the 
•boJilJoQ  ol.lT4;  Unfjifcon- 
•([uctinii*  itivcn  lo  eonwitu- 
lionit  clauM  concerning.  214; 
Lair*  lot  supprcsiion  of. 
flicinlil  be  mad  r  entclual.jtS, 
?90;  FoTbidilcn  In  Cutifodcr- 
ale  Conitituiion,  ?>;. 

■lavnj:  I'ralli  of,  to  brMdlax 
Slates. I74>t;  Selfish  action  of 
Stale*  conceiniox.  274a;  UH' 
der  MliMiaii  ConiprocnlM, 
6S9;  G«ORTa|>hlcal  iitnitalton 
to  «xt«n*ion  of,  6&g,  716 ; 
Recoaiijiion  of.  south  of  }6' 
3o.6i!i).7i6.  7iH:  Stiiillniii  br 
inleitticd  with  b)r  Congrex. 
716,  719;  Each  new  Sute  10 
declile  upon.  71(1,  719;  Id  T)!*- 
Iticl  of  C'llamtiia,  716;  Pro- 
Boacd  BBi«ndn>enls  coaccrU' 
m%  not  to  be  alterable.  717. 

■     790. 

daTM  (t//  d/(i<  Ft-itral  Aan^r): 
la  relation  to  minority  ligblt. 
xlil;  ttcpmcntation,  ixxrH. 
381.  fr>$;  The  ImporMlloa  of 
ihem  afier  the  year  iSoS  pro- 
hit>iie-.I.  273;  t-Uiieclal  danger 
o(,  l<i  tlunicalic  price  from. 
SM:  Defence  ol  (he  ptovitloa 
of  the  CmMiiution  combining 
ibcm  nlih  free  clilicnit  nt.  « 
ratio  ul  taxation,  S60-SM: 
Consirlcrol  as  pniperif.  981; 
i'osicia  ihc  mixfil  cbaracicf 
ol  peiM)ii>  and  p«>|ictly,  SSI; 
RoptCBcnlaiiua  of,  a  ci>inpr»> 


MaTW     CttUinuid. 

mise.  MS;  Admiailna  la  cltl- 
teiiahlp.  MS;  Valu*  of,  a*  « 
rcproM'ntallon  ol  prapirl^. 
IM;  Can  they  bccaitic  ciU- 
ieni?7o9.  71;;  RlKkt  of  praf^ 
(iiy  in,  reciiKnIicd  bj  CobM|> 
tntiuD.  714;  Tiaiuportaiiaa 
of,  not  to  be  hindered,  711, 
711);  N»  law  to  impair  lis 
right  ol  property  in,  ja), 

ItHtn^'K'  f't  orb  hast  daitn 
|iriKluc«,  S14. 

Sodaly  {utatn  Cititrmi;  Fatlim; 
J/mnaa  Nature ;  iUmfritj: 
Min;  Mitt^rily;  iVjIaratUt- 
lifn :  fiir/li)  :  ln>«parabt> 
maladies  of.  1T4;  NeceMitr 
of  guardins  minoitty  Iro* 
n).i;orilv.  3U. 

Boerata*.  SM. 

aolM.  4tl. 

•mtk  AnorlMS  BapabtUa:  ln«>- 
cacf  of  Hill  ol  Right*  la. 
SS". 

Sooth  OwoUaa.  isAm-  Aiicnplaf 
nullification  of  Naiicma)  la> 
in.  toin  ;  Troop*  embodlel 
by.  lam;  AroiyeatborfMbr. 
Ill  1831.  isSni  AbaotMv  iitrl*- 
diction  of  National  Gorei*- 
meat  aver  Ion*  in.  tt-yi. 
Nolifciallua  \ti,  ilmi  in  attack 
un  Fort  Sumter  i>  an  act  ■>( 
war,  aSjn ;  Cooventtoa  if 
■  K]i,  3is>i:  Conieiiilon  of 
iSbl,  3l'>n;  Bleo'lini;  «f  IM- 
crnmental  powers  in,  SM . 
ProTiston  coacemlng  e(»tf 
lion*  In.  9S4 ;  Nuffiber  irf 
reprrttenlstlTea  la  the  ■■■>«* 
oameroa*  htanrb  of  leal*- 
lalDte  ol.  S87  ;  I'lovinina  trm- 
carninK  Irnpeacbmrnt*.  4*1; 
Juir  trial  in.  68C  ;  Onliaano 
of  NaIiilicali^)n,(>r;o;  AnalnM 
ol  Ucliiiance  at  SutlKutW 
6i)6 ;  DccUtaiit-n  of  tnlla- 
peodence.  71 1  ;  Ordioaiic*  el 
Sree*»ioo,   711, 

Baatberaatttaa:   Danrrrto.trm 
"  Ntiilh>rfn  Hiv- 
■tore*  in,  M.   S< 
revenue  law*  In    1.1-.       \  r. - 
0(,  tm   alavc   reprracntattoa. 


/XDEX. 


783 


Ssathvrm  MUM— Cmn'iNHf^. 
Ml  :    Su[>pre(*loa    ol   ocfio 
v<Ar  in.  jftjn. 

•oT«r«lf«  :  tlow  fat  Unil«4 
States  GoTciiimeni  I*.  toS, 
-*■ 

Sonivtgstr:  In  reUiion  to  leg;al 
ttniler,  xiv:  lmp«i»ible  duikt. 
80:  L'nder  (cuiIhI  ■yateiii,  106, 
lOT;  Over  •Dvcrnijins  an  im- 
pofitibilitr.  IM;  Reserved 
righis  ut.  IM ;  Concurrcni 
JBrliulhtion  inv<>lv«t  ilivition 
of.  MM):  Ca^«  of  dividM).  la 
Roman  republk.  WJ -.  1111- 
ftcully  of  itiHrkiiii;  Iritr  Ix' 
lBc«nSlai«  and  General.  S33; 
An  inheicnt  qualilj  of.  MA: 
Kature  of,  <i5$:  DivUioii  ol. 
In  U.  %..  b)6,  Ml :  Poirvri  ol, 
lot:  The  ptinUhmpnc  of  trca- 

fK  >on   mldei   In,    Toi  :   Siaici 
l'fc«ve   parted    with    mTiiIial 
Bpani  of.  703:  The  tight   10 
K  enak«   money.   ■    power    ol, 
Spalat     It,     3*if:     Expcrl«occ 
when  dividcit,  IB:  American 
(eelinK  aguinst.  701;  PlottiriK* 
ol,  in  Well.  1381:  UriiBce  ol 
Amcrtcitn  «i1i>nlei  ol.   (o  U. 
S..  lU.  let.  I»8. 
Sjianlife  Hftlor  Illicit  trade  with. 

Sparta,  30.31,420:  Rivalrrwiih 

Atliin^.  110;  Tbe  Epliuri  ol, 

4S1.4K. 

8p»«iilat«T  .    l.'nuuMe   Uni  the 

opfHirtuiiiiy  <:f.  411. 

n       SpMCk,  Ktevdom  of.  6ilf.  715  ; 

I  I'niiposed     amendtneai    eon- 

'  ceinlni.  6yi,  b|7. 

Bpirlta  iift  ah*  £m'ifi) :   Poa- 

»ilj|«  rerenue  ftom,  TI. 
•t«dtli*ld«r:    pDHcr  of   Dutch, 
190. 

*i«f    At«y  :     tee    Armiti, 
SfanJinjc. 

'■M  OnnMltatlatit  ■  llnw  [Hr  le- 

{■  lubllcun.  S«,  »*7;  Rrsull  of 
Eavini;  th-iti  supreme.  801; 
Inevitable  disagicenwrni  with 
HattonnI  ontlilulHHi  ani) 
tnw4,  801:  Great  diRpren^eK 
areong.SOl,  MS;   Blending  »l 


MftU  CpntUivtioat—CniriiiiitJ. 
jioweri  In.  SftS  128:  Rear  Iba 
niark*  ol  hade  and  inexpe- 
rience, 398;  Growth  of  fcprc- 
xcniiiiion  under.  8H1  Court* 
<■!  I.iil  temn  under.  kS9. 

Stftt*  ElMElona:  Syatcm  of.  4IH' 
406. 

Mate  eoveromaaU  :  0|i|]rrsiii<in 
liy,  riii.  xi:  Check  on,  by  Nj- 
lionalGovernnieni.  viii  :  Ini- 
porlanl  and  mvcreltcn  piiir. 
ors  left  to,  B8;  I>etcct  in,  iS": 
Natural  rirnls  of  Genciat 
Govecnnicni.  108;  l.ikeUhoi>d 
Ihal  the  Nuliuiial  Gi>vFrn> 
ment  nitl  be  bcller  admin- 
iilered.  170  ;  Protection  of. 
by  rmtlftn,  176;  Clinked  ^ 
N.nlioti.il  GoYcrnmcnt,  177; 
Advaoi.ifje  of.  as  A  check  on 
Nkilfinal  uiurpallont.  177; 
Bxllvriei  a|[aln»t  Nalional 
GoTcroment.     ijSk  ;     Orig- 

inslly  iTiwemri]  with  Com- 
plete ■overcigoly,  IW;  Dii- 
ponition  to  encroach  on 
National  Go»emni«nt.  IM  ; 
Dan  Re  r  that  they  will  sap 
Union,  903;  Improbabililjr  of 
daajtei  to,  from  NallonaMiov- 
ernment,  SOS;  Advaniaiccs 
o(.  ai  compared  itiih  Nnlional 
Government,  S08,  S18  ;  An 
cMcnlial  part  ol  the  National 
goveminenl.  SOT.  812;  Pow- 
er* of .  numeroui  and  indelU 
nilr.  SOS;  MoK  Imponnni  In 
titnes  of  pearr.  S0>:  Predi- 
lection of  people  for.  810. 
Sll:  Evil  of  local  ipiril  In, 
SIS ;  Le:Ei»l.illve  enoiincb- 
ment*  by.  381;  Kntlonnl  Gov- 
crameot  00  more  ignoram 
ihan.  ATO:  In  tbeli  proper 
(uiKlion  •overcif  n.  650. 

0t«U  Law  :  AheraiioD  of,  by 
Uw*  ol  tiniofi.  tAit. 

■UU  LfCtalatniM  ;  Contempt 
of,  x:  Seek  outside  pro- 
tection, xi ;  Why  .Senators 
rhoKO  by,  sil :  Curtailment 
of  poworn  of.  xit  ;  Di^lrusi 
of.  IM:  Jealoii*  walchfulner;^ 
on  National  Governoient,  IH, 


■diiM 


7H 


tffDEX. 


Btat*  L4giilatitr«a— OnrtHH/y. 
I'ccullnrly  litlol  «>  dttcovrr 
Nulioiial  aitur|iaii«nB.  178; 
Will  unite  lo  protect  their 
comiDoo  libcny,  ITS;  I'ro- 
ta^ls  >i;aiiiKt  N:ili<Miul  Cov- 
cinmcni.  17S11;  Adopted  Ar> 
(Icki  of  CoiifcderAilon.  SMi 
Kill  CHjxklilo  i>r  (IccUiinii 
Mccsiion.  lujn:  Will  round 
the  aUini  to  (he  people  of 
Krdciul  nt-uf|iMtLijii,MO:  [)*<>■ 
gcr  uf  leavinK  exclusive  r«i;> 
uUtioii  uf  Sational  cleciiont 
10,  tS2.  391;  Fotcral  «>urtt 
moM  cviitt-jt,  S31;  Orcup»- 
lk>n  o(,  niih  National  con- 
ceriti.  tU>:  Possci*  power  of 
■mcnilioK  Nxlii>niil  Conntilii- 
lioD.  S9T:  Will  be  liarricra 
agiinit  cn<roachmcnt  of  Na- 
li'rn:i!  ^tulhorily.  BB7. 

BtUt  OfflcAoUUr*  PfilMiblcilit- 
rei{jr<l  u(  Kutiunal  oalb  b]r, 
314. 

Bt>U  r«liti«t:  lnflaen<«  of  Na- 
tional on.  3J1. 

BIkU  Klghl*^  Dlnlciillr  of  dl*- 
cfimiiiAiiDic  Itutn  Naliooal, 
93S. 

■tat*  8oT«(«lpit7  (t//  aha  Stv- 
rriignSyi:  lin[io»it>lc  in  N»- 
(ional  union.  80:  Dcstrorrd 
hf  a  National  to<u|»ct.  91. 
IH:  Cn>c*  o(  allGiiullon  of. 
IM:  Alli'in|il  I'l  rrcixiHIr  Nii- 
lionat  viih.  S77;  The  Setijte 
II  pHlInclluiii  of  reiiduTT. 
S91:  I>i>|>riivcil  hy  thrir  own 
action,  vna:  Tlic  kixhI  of 
ibe  people  lullicicni  reaiiun 
(of  MCtiIke  of.  9M;  No 
([onuine  allcmpi  to  iiiinUin. 
3l6j»;  The  Scnald  a  tccoeni- 
lion  ol  tniAattr.  410:  One 
quallljr  111.  MS:  I'lisxlble  col- 
lection of  iIcIjIh  ihruuKb  U.S. 
couoi.  Sii.  UO;  Uoder  Coii' 
federation,  jt|i;  Proposed 
■meoilDienl  cvncetntii|{,  (>J»- 
bW.  *'.ir.  t>w.  643.  6(0:  Oefi- 
nili'in  ol,  (itfj;  Asieitiun  of. 
679:  ^•'upMi.iitcd  by  Kcderal 
■iCtii.  bSj-fiii;  HroiHiMd  lll- 
cr«aM  of.  by  ilanfonl  Cod- 


But*  B»*«r*lg:it]r — Cnuimutd, 

ventiiin,  (iS3:  National  (or^ 
cioD  and.  (cfli  SarreadoA 
to  lecure  union,  <«J5;  UbIib- 
Ilcd.  an  uierlioil  llial  vivt 
ni>l  a  naiion.  7'xi;  AllepJ 
limited.  701 ;  Stmei  da  M 
poMcas  the  eL»enii«l  pun 
of,  701;  Hxnr<is«  of,  }li; 
Recosnixed  bjr  BrItUb  xratf 
ol  1783.  7H- 

autM.  Cilitcna  of:  Not  axn- 
Mriiy  riiiicni  of  U.  S..  7iix 

SUtw,  Doubtful:  Use  of  ua> 
|*Aijfn  fLiiiila  In,  3f>4n. 

BUIM.  Fr'iniier:  More  likct^K 
tie  inrolved  tn  iliiputci.  Ifc 
Inipodance  of  uniun  to,  Bl 

BlAtM.  Individual:  Pimtik 
taken  from,  xii:  RcaUunn 
to  Katlooal  judrciarr.  ur; 
CotMllun  ut  »niall.  Kti; 
nuance  ol  small,  ia  Scimt. 
xvi;  The  Ihiiieen,  imi 
lot  una  Kovp.rnnreai,  B: 
Treaty  dilEcullies  atiaaf 
from  thiiteca  ■urcirigo.  U: 
SelBtb  Inierni*  of.  in  ■<»• 
tion  to  foreign  trcabo.  Uc 
GoTetnnirota  of.  utialitt  t> 
enloice  legaid  ••(  trs^ilica.lk 
Rr»iill  of  tliiclcen  aoTerrii:. 
SI;  Nentr.iliiirig  of  ani 
forei|{n  puKera,  SI; 
liei  involved  in  a,aj 
cunlllct.  SI:  D.-iiiK«n 
leniioni  among.  9T.  ' 
lurdity  of  peace  Iniliiii' 
SB;  VVinil)  KinBtiium  itirti' 
natural  enemies.  IS;  livlui 
mentt  10  nuke  war  on 
olbef.S3;Te((llr>r<nl  di'ra^'* 
siOu«S.  M;  Co  I 
0«1T  nmong.  S>.' 
New  Vurlt  of  >i,i.i.i  a. ,  . 
fcreni  view*  umons.  ' 
ceitting  (lubltc  i!r;  i  11-  >»>■ 
iect  10  tome  v 
a\\  nflIJin»,41. 

'Iratic-ka,b||, 
.irniiEa    will 
tf-Lli      unuolllri  ;j.' 

r>'viinlon     )if.  1 

Eiirnpeati  de. ,■...>-.„,  M 
RcatraJnl*     on,    (npuMd 


INDEX. 


78s 


SUtM —  C'nHnittd. 

Federal  Concliluiion.  %%n: 
Tendeocy  to  fucilan  in.  63: 
Impuftance  uf  unn strained 
intertouMe  between,  TO;  Un- 
likelihood of  IniimAle  intrr- 
course  bt-lirccn.  wilhuul  Nu- 
li<inal  uniiy,  TO:  Viin  lax 
UwK  ol.  71;  E»sc  of  imug:- 
Kllnc  amunn,  TS:  Grr»lcr  cx- 
pcnsr  ul,  7S;  Not  too  vast  n 
tciritorr  for  a  general  gov- 
ctaaicni,  U;  Nui  uliolithrd 
bf  pTOpMcd  Cunhtiluliun.  M; 
A  n*ee«ii!r  in  ihc  General 
Governmctil.  M,  IS;  Impoii- 
tlblc  to  (mill  N.i[tunal  Gor- 
crDmeni  fot.  in  ihi^ir  corpo- 
rate eapaciiy.  80;  Dlallnctlon 
iMIweeii  Ihctr  corpiiralc  and 
individual  capacity.  M:  Ob- 
»«r*c  or  disregard  reijoisi- 
■  loDil  o(  Congrett  m  Ihcir 
Itlcssiiro.  91;  A  Himple  alli- 
ance between,  more  hnncit 
lllMn  a  pteleaded  eoiilrdeta- 
lioo,  89;  Inevitable  opposi- 
tion of,  to  National  GoTcrn- 
nicnt.H;  NHtiira!  ccnltifLii;^] 
tcnileticle*  in,  94;  Will  un- 
dertake to  judtje  Federal 
meaiurei.  H;  Experience  of 
•UTCrritcu.  nmlci  Confcdprii- 
tion,  M;  Xoii-cvniplianee  of. 
with  teqniiitioni.  &(;  A 
power  to  eoerce.  neccsKiity 
lot  National  C>tivrri>me(it.9T: 
In  etrff  diiputc  with  Ni- 
llonal  Gov'cinmenl  will  prub- 
■Lly  ftcck  luiciicn  alliance*. 
M;  AntiE'iniini  beiirccn.  un- 
der Coil  Icde  tat  ion.  W;  Dif- 
Acuk  tu  cucrce  Ihc  Iar|;e(, 
W:  Po»»lbk  obsiructioo  by. 
of  National  law.  100;  Distinc- 
tion between  non-compllani^c 
and  acllvir  tetinlanre.  100- 
109;  Kfsistanco  uf  decree)  of 
SnpteiDc  Court,  torn;  Fail- 
ure! i>(  attempt*  tu  nullify 
HalioDBl  law*,  loin;  Dilficuily 
of  iolerfeleiiee  nith  National 
law.  108;  N'.illonal  (iuvcrn- 
meiil  will  nut  ab»uib  iwirerd 
of,  tOl;  Likely  to  cneroach  on 


ttttw— r«i  tinmd. 
National    Govcrnnent.  104 ; 
Unimportance  of  powcf*  of. 
104;  Will  potiesi  gioaieidp. 

free  of  influcntc  over  people, 
OS.  157;  lluntictouc  rivHl«  lo 
the  power  o(  lite  Union.  106; 
Reserve  powers  of,  IM  ;  No 
gaaranly  10  Dovernmeiil*  o(. 
by  Article* ulConfederatioo, 
IM;  Inordinate  pride  of.  pre • 
vents  appeal  to  nation.  lU; 
Not  protected  Huaiimt  domes- 
lie  intiur  reel  ion  by  Confed- 
eration. 12s  ;  Conduct  of.  as 
leiHrdt  i)UolM«.  tttin;  l>!ITer- 
cnce  in  itbility  of.  ui  to  taxa- 
tion.LS6;  Competition  acnong, 
(orioldlcri.  131;  Aitcnipitof, 
ttidiocriminatc  HSainot  Ilrilish 
trade,  133:  ClasJiinH  commer- 
cial regulations  of.  131:  Dari- 
crriii]*  anjniogliir*  anioiiK. 
138;  Unequal  endeavors  of, 
to  raise  troops  and  money, 
134;  Kijiiiil  nuffrHKo  among,  a 
defect  o(  the  Confederation. 
IM:  Equality  of  suffrage  de- 
stroys fiindiimcnlHl  principle 
u(  republican  Kovcrnment. 
18S  :  Majoiity  of.  eooiain  a 
minoiiiy  uf  the  peopte.  UB; 
Iiieriiable  diflercncei  of  su- 
preme tribunals  of,  140:  Peace 
of  Union  at  the  mettj  of 
each.  141  ;  ttiiund  (u  obey 
Continental  Congrcs*  in  req- 
uisitions ft»  men  and  money. 
143;  Krtlrjiini  n{Kin,  us  to 
military  cstabiiBhincotN.  IH; 
Should  not  be  chariied  wiih 
comnton  defence,  ISO ;  Ex- 
posed position  of  ceit.-iiu.  IS6; 
Jealousy  of  military  eit>bli»h- 
menis.  197;  I'rone  to  liraJ- 
ship.  187;  tJelMnrtl  by  Coo- 
federation  from  h.ivins  narj 
or  army,  IH :  Raising  of 
iroopB  by.  contrary  to  Arll- 
clr*  of  Confoderalion.  ISO: 
More  liable  tfano  Union  to 
faction.  171;  Goveininentsof, 
l>'>iiiid  to  enfoTce  Nattonat 
law.  173;  Sophistry  that  the 
National   will    destroy    local 


IMDBX. 


Sum— Cn/i  n  »/•/. 

Kuvcrnmcnts.  178;  Dlffi<ull]r 
of  chcckiog  uiurpaiioa  In. 
ITT:  Failure  loaidcach  uttivr 
aKaifislNalionatGovcrnment. 
179*  :  Should  poncM  |M>w«r 
orcr  inicTDAl  luxe*.  IIB,  %M: 
Umilrd  piiwris  of  (axaiiiiTi 
Toutt  in  iuivIbkc  •>(  National 
Govcrnmcni  lo.  1(9;  SyMeoin 
of  icqulitikm*  upon,  190; 
Rcqutsilivni  apon.  sure  to 
CKCiit  hoitllhr  aK>i">t  ^*' 
lional  Govetfimcat.  190  ;  Nk- 
ceisilf  fur  revenue  uf.  lOS; 
Mail  posMis  tnclrpFRilcnt 
mean*  ol  rercnue,  lOT;  Only 
ptohtbitad  fiom  laiiiiK  iin- 
poru  •nd  rxpotti.  18T;  Co- 
equal aulhorily  vilh  nnlinn 
over  uxa(i»n.  199.  9M,  tit; 
DebiB  of,  for  Nattonal  pur- 
pot««,  aim;  Small  need  of 
rorcnuc  for.  til.  SM  ;  Itic|;< 
■Ur  and  maljbk  IcRiiIaiion 
of,  nO;  HUiory  of  repre- 
•cDlaliun  of,  in  NHtUmnl  Gov- 
ernmeni,  33411;  Uitajcrpenx-ni 
bclvecn  large  and  tmall.  IM; 
Sectional  anil  cla**  <iit{tif 
ences  In,  989  ;  l)ani[orou« 
power*  poKtessed  bf.  Ml. 
M;  ConH>tidai)OB  of  the. 
M9;  Each  8  KDveiciRn  body 
in  ralifring  (-~o<i>tttulion.9t9: 
Coniiliuilonal  loiificaiion  bjr 
the  peoptc  ai'linu  In  (heir  cor- 
porate capacity.  M9;  Kcpre- 
icntatioo  of,  In  Senate.  9M; 
Ate NnliiiTiat  jkiwct* danner- 
ous  to  juritdtrlion  of?  MO; 
Constttuiiaoal  poirertoteK' 
ulate  lotercooTsc  among.  9li: 
National  powers  !■•  ic^uUie 
cummerce  tmtmg.  2TB;  Clti- 
icnihip  amoDg.  STB;  Guar* 
•nif  of  i:<:c)d  failh  between. 
9T9;  Tteaiinent  of  |ri)iiliiii» 
by,  979;  Power  of  Congreii 
10  admit  new  SiuIfi  Into  the 
L'nion.  SH  ;  Cluunnty  trutn 
dlvUlonof.  984  ;  Uispnieover 
di«i«iuii<if.  under  Confedcra- 
t<«ti.  t$tH  :  CrcailOB  of  West 
Vir)[inla.  »4>i;  l>OHlblc<)i*ci- 


JMf*     C.-iiimi*J. 

tion  cooceminjt  latidl  of. 
under  treaty  power,  llja. 
De(lru«tion  of  balalM«  wf, 
3S;r  ;  Hamilton'*  propMrd 
diviiioo  of,  iHm;  Conv^a- 
ijonni  BUaninljr  of  ropubDoB 
fiirrrnnicnl  to,  9S6;  ProWx- 
lion  from  Invaaiim  or  4c- 
meitic  violence,  1*7;  t*B» 
■Ible  S'.tiM>iiiil  InieffereMt 
with.  9«T,  389:  IX.mratic  to- 
tnrrecliofl  In,  may  aBecl  »•- 
ilonal  Government,  S9S:  Piw 
rtkion  of    thr   r  •Am. 

concerninf;  in  i  -  It 

nine  Slalei,  983  . tt- 

Ulic>n»  lirlnccn  i.itil  ytiiK  aalt 
non-talif;inf;.  9M  ;  Ri-.trii- 
tive  poweri  upon.  SM;  Tbr 
Fciletul  Government  panit 
dependcnl  upon.  909:  tlat- 
ance  with  nation  wri)  nula- 
lained,  30511,  Advaniaec 
National  GcTcrntnenl  in 
berof  oAciali.  SOT.  9«9; 
iiuqueneyot.neretiilateaar* 
Const  it  uiioti.  SIO  ;  NaikiRil 
ofBceholdera  will  feel  pri- 
poaveaalooa  (or,  tlS,  Appeili 
of.  to  other  Sulci.  3t5j»;  Ha 
real  atiempi  to  ireate  actBil 
KOTereignij',  316"  .  Adna- 
lase  of  Koteinmrntft  of,  a 
reiiMing  N.ili"nal  muToacli' 
ments  SIT.  S4fl.  991;  Cna- 
gresiional  eleclors  not  at  thr 
meiey   of.  »*9,   :  lliir 

ol     leeurini;  ol 

cleclois  in.  3i&  .  i.hi<<im- 
nieni  of  coniiituiiona  a(.  ar 
to  election*.  SH  i  Want  ni 
IbSuciicv  over  lo-titalei.  991- 
National  Govertimeat  bib 
dependent  upini,  SM ;  I'ro 
vi»ions  'if .  '■■loirtnmc  ek*- 
tlont.  SM-nS;  Vkiriance  asn- 
KSrd*  ratio  ol  irpieMriilatHia. 
SfT;  Diveoily  '■(  law*  of,  911. 
ITS;  PtoTltiona  of.  loama- 
log  tb«  (iie  ol  eleciorkl  4i«- 
irio*.  993;  Pjnallile  dlufm- 
tnenl  tietwrrn  larxi  an* 
■mail.  «•  to  tti)fe»rnlaH*" 
SM,     A>     liUt     1u    {nvMBx 


WDEX. 


787 


■tttia— OatintuJ. 

abuKBD  of  power  hy  ihe  Stale 
goTcrnmcDU  •«  by  th«  Fed* 
ctbI  Goverameni,  IM ;  Un- 
likelihood that  Ihey  iiill 
combine  in  noD-appuiotment 
of  senators.  385:  Exclusive 
control  ol  National  elcc* 
lion*  a  poBtibIa  danger.  9$S: 
PiMtible  tliaaffrcem«ni  of  peo- 
ple iiilh,  39t,  396;  Sh^ic  of, 
in  N'aliuiixl  Sriiaic,  MS;  Un- 
[onanaie  inllueiKe  ol,  in 
alcciloii  of  seoatoTi,  409n ; 
Portion  o(  tovcrciKnljr  re* 
HMiniDK  io  the,  rei:oKniM<l 
b)r  the  Conitituiion.  410 ;  A 
majority  of,  re<|uirGcJ  for 
Naliooal  IcjtiHtalion,  411  ; 
Treaty-making  power  «ill  not 
Injarc,  482:  Froviiionnof  the 
coDltitutiun*  uf.  concerning 
Impcachnient  1.441;  NewYork 
and  New  Jcticy  ibc  only 
Slates  whicK  have  catruntcd 
the  cicculiTC  autborlty 
wholly  10  sinsle  men,  46t : 
Excculiire  Coancil  in,  4TS : 
loiegriiy  of  judiciar;  in,  BM; 
In  contfDvef«iei  ol,  with  oa- 
tion.  f'nimi  count  must  be 
arbiters.  B31:  Reserve  powers 
of.  SJli;  Intervention  of  N;i- 
lioaal  cuBiK  brtncen.  S33. 
tVTi  Let-al  liaudt  passed  by. 
BM ;  D«nger  of  enforcing 
public  debt*  of.  by  Supreme 
Court,  Mft;  DlHercncc  be- 
tween the  Umiis  of  ibc  jury 
trial  In  the  different.  Ml  fiCS; 
Siivinjc  111.  by  lifw  Kovrrn- 
mvni,  MO;  I'owcrful  individ- 
asti  in,  enemies  to  a  Salionat 
government. UC;  Kelaiionof, 
IO  ConlcilerHiion,  591  ;  Full 
faith  between,  ui  ;  Eoaal 
vote  of,  nndecCoofederatlon. 
J91:  Rc«trlction»  on,  in  Cun- 
federation.  S'>*.  M3  1  ConMl- 
lutional  provisioa*  C04ic«rn- 
Ing.  boor.  txiy.  OoSr,  6ttc, 
6iSr.  619c.  biVii.  6911-.  616^: 
Equal  judge*  wilb  Federal 
GoTcrameot  of  National 
fowere.    679>    634;     Canooi 


■UtM—  CiiHin  ufJ. 
abrogate    National    law   and 
remain  in  Union.  694;  Small 
agency  of.  in  National  Oov- 
ernnxnt.     yto;      Potteis     no 

foner  Io  punish  treason.  709; 
n  Confederate  Constitution. 
T116.  jaj.  7)0.  7)». 

■tatM.  New:  Cungreasional 
usurpation  in  creation  of.  244; 
ContiiiiiiionNi  clatiM  admit- 
ting. 984;  Lack  of  proviaion 
to  Articles  of  Confederation 
(oncernlni!,  Sfit;  Ubvlou*  iii> 
lereai  of,  as  regard*  lepre- 
■entalion.  380;  Proposed 
atncedcnent  concerning,  683; 
Clauac  for  admivtion  of,  into 
Confederacy.  T30. 

Strict    Constraationicu  (i/r   alia 

Anti-fiJentltilt ;  Stolt  S^vtr- 
tignijY.  Altitude  u(,  toward* 
internal  improvements.  sSom. 

SnAagc  The  funilantcntal  arti- 
cle of  republican  govcinmenl, 
MO. 

aDprein*  Court  (ttr  atie Judinitry, 
tttirraiy.  Process  of.  resined 
in  Olmslead  Case,  iota  ;  In 
Creek  and  Cheiokee  trouble*, 
lom;  Rei-iciiiibk  action  of, 
a*  regards  Electoral  Com- 
mlsnion,  Jljii;  Propoalllon  to 
give  impeachDMal  trials  to. 
438;  Danger  «( trusting  party 

Sucsilon*  Io.  43bit;  Propocf- 
rni  10  unite  Senate  with.  In 
impeacfam«nt*,4ST:  Neceisitr 
of.  8W:  Should  it  be  a  branch 
of  the  legisUlurc>  188;  Will 
l>e  sii)iefioi  10  (he  leKillalure, 
639;  tjsuipatiuns  by.  vill  be 
remediless.  t3S;  Original 
iurltdiciion  of,  841.  HO.  Wl; 
Kxact  nature  ol  appellaia 
jurisdicUon  of.  848;  will  not 
oecesaarily  revise  decision* 
of  juricaas  regard*  facts, 848; 
In  exact  of  concurrent  Na- 
tional Am!  Slate  jtirisdictioo. 
848.M<l-a«a:  Doei  not  abolish 
trial  by  jury,  840.  880.  868; 
t/llimaie  decision  will  rest 
with,  S8t;  Jurisdiction  of. 
divided  into  original  and  ap- 


;88 


INDEX. 


peliale.tM;  Proposed  ■mend- 
m«at  crFaiinn;  luperior  of, 
6i15;  Absuaci  of  dFcUlan  of: 
In  Mitihuiy  PI.  M jcliivn,  IVS6; 
In  Drc<l  Scuit  Chsc.  jai;  Na- 
ture of  dmie»o(,  710;  Share 
of.  In  Klccloral  CixniDluloa, 
73J.  734:  I"  Third  L«ii«i- 
icniler  C«¥«.  73b. 

Swodsn:  CoiruptJon  (n.lltceaute 
111  the  Kii'liirn  <Ir*ixrti««i  of 
Gatlavui  111,,  140;  For«ien 
corni|>i)on  of  partiei  In,  IM. 

SwiM  CoDMorwy:  UcfcCl*  of, 
lU:  H<-!i]  ii>ccthcr  br  nno- 
Kraphkal  poaiiion.  Ill;  Mn- 
iDal  prolectlon  in.  MB. 

T«iMiir:  Quoted.  440. 

TwUt  National  U"  -'•'  Duliti; 
Ktforti  :  /"reffi/int  ;  Tlini- 
fimi)  :  InDuenca  of.  in  Mcnr* 
Ing  tnillkaiion  of  Coaxlia* 
tion.  Jin;  As  »  rauM  al  •«(- 
liunal  ill-fneling.  ]Sn :  Al- 
lempi  of  South  Carolina  10 
BBlllfy,  jSb;  lilscoBtenl  ol 
Soultarrn  Stales  with,  ■j^h  ; 
Proieelivp,  not  p«miitcd  by 
ConiiltuiUMi,  690, 

TuUlOB  (ire  alio  CafiltitUm 
T,ix:  Carritagi  Tax;  Dine* 
Tasfi ;  Ditlitt;  EMtiiei;  Im- 
«^m/  Ttixl  iusiirtit  Taxttl  iM- 
rrm-tl  Taxn-  LanJ  Tax;  Pir. 
Ioim/  P'f^rty  Tax;  Ptll  Tax; 
QHttat^ :  Dlacrtmlnatins  a*c 
«t,  vili;  $utf«8«U>n,  viii;  In- 
heritance, viii;  Incotne,  riil; 
DMimctlon  ol  abiliif  to  ptj-. 
x:  TempiailKn  in  a|iportt<ia, 
oiinilni'rliy.tS;  Abllitftopajr, 
pro  pott  loiKd  10  circulaitttg 
mcdiuHi.  TS;  Commerce  coa- 
IrlhutcB t» «a>c "I  payinnniof. 
TB;  I'opulsr  and  unpopular. 
74:  Importaocc  of  Union  to. 
Tt;  On  cfiRiumplriin  larfnelf 
Inipfrccptiblr.  T6;  Suf-ReHtion 
of,  on  arJeni  spiriii.  TT;  PrO' 
potcd  tisii  i>f,  1ST.  Ko  KFn- 
« rat  rule  fot.  ISB;  ln«|tialii/ 
nf.  will  prfMliicv  eveatnal 
dc*ttnclioit  al    Union,    IJW : 


TuKtJaa — CtH  tin  utJ. 

Unfair  or  ir^ilDoat,  will  dt| 
wajri  produrir  di*obcdte<M« 
or  cTBiloii.  ISB.  IM:  EipnI. 
Mice  >«  rei-arda  tbe  larif  al 
iSlO-lSji.  tl!la.()fiTno»H-1 
tlon  a  lelflcvtrd  iki.  IkI 
E»pe»*rfire  of,  as  rcfaidi  n- 
finni«-(axof  l^.tl^K;  !iy>lrt3 
of.  in  Turkish  Enpirr.  IM. 
Uwlnilliiie  of  Confedcradca 
diir  to  want  of  po 
IBS;  ConfederaliuB  rnti 
ao  onlldtited  |i4>n«r  over.' 
Diltlnctiiin  between  Inlmvl 
and  enema).  IM.  SU;  ft*. 
eral,  ihould  nni  Imi  liniierfia 
ImpoMa,  m,  SIS;  lnadei}utT 
(>f  rri|i)t»ii<«nii  on  tkc  S<M«>. 
lOO-lM:  Reiuarce*»f.B*w4lf 
et^ual  to  iiHciifiiifs  ol,  IH; 
Coinpl*!*  pi>«er  of.alluwiBi- 
ttoti  (o  borroiT,  IBS;  Naltaail 
GoTcraDMni  muii  pocmt 
i;ca*r«l  power  ot.  tW:  liai>- 
tatioD*  on  State  power  •', 
107;  Danger  ul  bo  Testiof 
ibc  power  denied,  1ST,  Wkk 
e>cap«ioM.  a  cuncHrieal 
power  of  U.  S.  and 
IBS;  DujI,  unir  a  huk* 
expedicnc)'.  SOO:  Llml 
oa.  rcSMll  lo  dafe^lr*  BX 
lyatemt.  til.  SIS;  Res»h  ol 
limilinK  National  <':;)TTrB- 
meal  to  duties.  SIS,  Et- 
tremex  of.  pctnhiooa,  tH. 
Knre»tive.  force*  l«^D«rr 
Ironi  natural  chaaaeta,  tH; 
fniereit  of  revenue  a  ehMI 
apon  ence'Rire.  SIB;  Atlif*4 
■Riallnn*  t<f  Ibe  HuMc  >f 
Repreteniativei  in  rvUlba 
to.  SU;  Need  i>l  rvicniivr  1b- 
(ormaihMi  to  I^Knlaie  u^ua, 
SIS ;  CoBtenltc-a  ih»t  |W 
nation  caxBoi  «•«  iMnaal 
with  adraniBKB.  SM:  UM^ 
o>lf  iif  drvistng  r^mrm  it, 
S90;  Uiitlni-lln»  b'twre*  ^ 
rcri    and     intlir.  If 

liiciiBtenirnt.    '■  ■ -«■ 

ernmrnt  n-   ■■ 
aiiioM  in  1  r^ 

National     ,1  uk 


rfH 


tUDBX. 


m 


lyilcm  lit.  St3;  Musi  be  tinl- 
li'tni  ihruDBlioal  Uiilxn.  9B3: 
Sp«<lTc9  of  doub]«.  2M : 
Not  oeteMniily  incicascd  hy 
•ilopilon  o(  Cunntilaltno.lw; 
Will  ihen  be  double?.  tU: 
The  sinew*  of  nalioool  de- 
tcnce.  967;  ProvU!»n  of  the 
Coiislliiitwin  ii>nr»rninK.  M7. 
Mt:  Ho*  far  inicmal. 
tequite*  knowlclffc  ot  lociil 
el(ctin>(>iit>K'rk.  sri:  A  Rcn- 
CT>I  Inw  of.  (umpilublr  (lom 
State  taws.  S73:  TrUI  by 
Juiy  oof  M  (heck  upon  op- 
ptvHsinr.  M9;  UMmllr  cul- 
letted  by  summary  ptiM:F«i. 
UB:  Al  a  mcJDK  of  aiding 
dtMivcmir  iiviluKiry.  6741  Cor- 
tecl  lifnilat>«n  of.  674.  675; 
Need  of  •  bank  (or  putpo«e« 
^1  t>j%;  Farming  of,  676; 
Proposed  amendmcnl  cod- 
(croinK.  tiSS;  Pioitciive,  not 
permitted  liy  <'<mMitnlion. 
6qo;  I'ticonslilutional  em- 
ploymem   ol   power  of,  690, 

Tkt  Law*:  Inrflrcliv*  oinltipli- 
caiion  of.  in  U.  S.,  7i. 

Tos  OMMt*  ((/(  aiir  Cint  Srr- 
vi'ciV.  SfM-iJitB  ol  double  Dels 
ol.  SM.  Employ meot  of  Slate, 
bv  nation,  819. 

Taytor.  Jc.iin.  Clud,  kkiv. 

Tatafnfk:  InlluFnce  of,  on  Na- 
tional GoveiDmenl.  6ir. 

T««Bpl«.  Sir  William:  Ciled  nn 
BriKif  C<>nrrdera<^y.  Itl,  IS9. 

TmUIw  Lb*i:  11/  /.fgjl  T/vdir. 

Tn  ff  0«e*:  RiiKlliih  f. 
American.  ajiM;  Influence  of, 
WT;  ShurliKss  of,  dmttojrs 
resfionsibiliir.  41S. 

Tarrltonal  I>Upat«a:  Ctau*«  in 
ConlcdciHil<in  comrotiini;. 
S4S:  Proposed  atnendreient 
cnncerfling.  (141. 

TtrriMry:  U.  S.,  loo  vaU  (or 
one  gwetnutcat.  6m:  A>  a 
caitM  ot  dlapole  amonii 
Slaia*  and  nativni.  M  ; 
Smallncts  of,  aids  uiurper. 
ITT;    GoTernucfii    relaiively 


Tarrttory  ~  Ceo  /I  wuft/. 

weaker  in  lailte.  ITT:  Grtaf 
exirni  r>l.  11  |>cc«ilar  advan- 
t>KC  against  forcli^n  eocmie* 
and  ambitious  rulciii,  171: 
Advaniaite  of  eiieiitive,  4tl. 

TtrritatT,  public  <if/  alit  J.aHji, 
Pmtlit:  tyrslirn  TrrritcryY, 
[^oorntoirt  value  of.  MS,  H4: 
Uncon«iiluti(>nat  action  of 
Congtcsi  over.  M4;  Cranti 
of,  to  nation,  IM":  ^ue*- 
tliiiit'  coiiecrniiiK,  sB**.  985^: 
Acquisition  of,  IS;,  sSjh; 
Pederal  ad)udicatiaa  of  dis- 
putes o»ci,  M*.  587;  Power 
to  iDCorporato,  674;  Rigliis 
of  Ihe  Soutberti  Slalec  Id, 
71(1:  l.imllalloB  on  eciilon  of 
Nali»iiH);  Propnted  amend- 
mcDL  concerning.  637.  649; 
New,  not  10  be  acqaircd  by 
U.  S.  without  content  of  a 
majority  of  both  dave  and 
free  Stale*,  719., 

T»aa,  a8;u. 

Thabaas:  Relailoris  of,  to  Am- 
phlcivonic  Ijcague,  110,  111. 

ThMaat'.  tlT. 

TUdao.  Samuel  I..  367<t. 

Titba  D(  RaMlltr  fir/  Arti- 
latraiy:  X,'t,Ulr;  Wfll-tfrn): 
The  probibiiion  of,  the  corner- 
stone of  republican  govern. 
iDcnt,  671. 

TMda;  itf  atn  Crmmtrti;  Jflrfi- 

m«Mn:  Power  of  K»iionHl 
GiiTernmrnt  over.  SM.  W!. 
»TI:  ConstitDtional  deiinilion 
of.  H3:  Power  o)  pardoning. 
UB  Ml:  Prrxident  rxclildri) 
from  pardoninit.  4t9.  W1; 
Power  of  patdonini;.  in  Great 
Britain.  UD:  A  crime  against 
society.  4M:  A  power  of  par- 
d'lninK.lieit  lodged  In  hands 
of  single  olHcinl.  49>:  Prn- 
pnaed  anieridiiieMl  ■■mceni- 
ing,  fm;  The  punishtnent  of, 
the  power  of  sovereignly 
only.  70a:  SlHtnB  poiseu  no 
power  to  punish,  7o9. 

Traasary  Dtpartnaat :  Neceitlty 
kjl  bank  to,  ^SS- 


790 


IHDRX. 


TmtlM:  Violation*  o(.  a  fre- 
qucnl  cause  of  war.  IS;  Ini- 
piiMiblK  to  ndjutliotc,  In  Ihir 
teen  Stales  or  ta  Mparaic 
confedcrade*,  14;  Violation 
ol,  ii*iiatl)r  local,  18;  Stiifhl 
dependence  lo  Ix  plated 
upon,  M;  Ijtck  ol  conimclckal 
pawi  ■  bnr  In.  131;  Necc*' 
•ily  uf  suptcmt  tribunal  lor 
coniiiuinc,  IM;  U.  S.:  Li- 
able in  iBffHCIlonti  ol  Ihifterii 
Slates,  141;  National  power 
concerniDx,  97t;  No  Umger 
can  be  (rutlraled  by  individ- 
nal  Slate*.  tTI;  Stale*  re- 
Mri<te(l  ftom  enlerins  toio. 
904;  Power  under  the  Con- 
•lilulioii  runcerniiiit,  U4  ; 
Enctoacbmeni  of  House  of 
ReprcscDlittives  in.  33011  ; 
Clau*e  in  Cunilllulloa  COH- 
cerninK.  4M;  Importance  of, 
4U:  Tn  be  made  bf  ipeciall^ 
able  Ririi.  4SI;  lni|H>iiiiiH:e  <>l 
M:c(ec)r  ia.  4ilB ;  Shoald  be 
disCDSsci)  like  laws.  429a  ; 
Opponuiililet  (or  lavotablc. 
490;  tniiwiiianec  of  dispalcb 
in.  430;  Contention  that  ibcr 
are  acli  of  leijltlallon.  4W: 
(Jbjer^liun  to  their  beioK  the 
supreme  law  of  ihe  land,  411; 
Coiiienlliin  Ibal  Ihejr  shoold 
be  repcaUble  a(  ptrature, 
4S1 ;  I'ottible  corroption  w, 
4S9  ;  SeaaloTl  ibeif  own 
}uit|{Ft  in  impeach  men  I  catMi 
oiiK'nalini;  in.44t;  Prrsidcn- 
lial  power  oTcr.  4dl;  English 
syilem  of .  4SI ;  Objecltonto 
Picliilenlial  Kbare  in.  4M . 
Both  an  executive  and  a  l«jt- 
islative  act,  500;  Conuaci* 
with  (oreixn  puweo.,  UO . 
Senate  should  nut  have  tolr 
power  to  form.  Ml;  Wbjr  ibe 
lloase  of  Reprcsenlatlircs 
aaghl  >»  bave  nn  power  in 
torsiinK.  50t ;  Rec|uisiies  for 
forming.  (03;  Ubjeciloa  to 
iwoikiril*  i>f  Senile  latlfy- 
Ins,  Ml  1  Proposed  amenil^ 
meni   coi>c«r«ing.   A37,    649, 


?«?**•. 


Ttvntt  VI.   Wa«dM  -    Ca*e  tA, 

Trial  bj  Jiii7'  lit  Jury, 
TnialMaUp  of  OBb*:  Sieady  lo 
leninu  o(,  I'ir. 

mtlu  HmIiUm.  sst. 

Twklah  Empjra:  System  of  ut 

ation  in.  IM. 
TrruBj:  Conijiiions  whick  Is 

*ur    eMablisfaiaeni    of.    ITT. 

Definition    of.    SIS  ;    Auwnl 

clcciions     iieceitaair  to 

vent.  SH, 

Ualaa  {in  altit  CenftJtratitm 
U.  S.  i;Si  ,-  {.>ajrirarn>. 
Ftthrall  GtfernmtHi,  U,  i; 
L'hiHJ  SUfr.i  1  Inharral  ^ 
llel  of  Auierican  pieople  h. 
XKV.  • :  Altitude  of  panr 
leaders  toward,  ksv  -,  Inpn- 
lance  of.  I.  T, «;  UtiUir  «4.  <: 
InirrcHi  of  Ametton 
in.T;  AdopiioD  ot  naw 
tiliuiion  or  diaiBembei 
of.  I;  CoDtinenta!  Cohl 
inlarorof,  II;  Ui»>oIb: 
an  end  lo  nallttoal  ffTCtti 
11.  H;  TcikI*  to 
nattoaal  peac«.  IS; 
lection  from  foiei|;n 
IS;  Capa<ilr  of.  to  oU  DMa 
serrice  Ihe  beat  talE: 
■he  country.  18,  14.  , 
watk  acaiflsl  futcign 
and  influence.  18-ST;  A 
of  pievcDtiDg  dliM 
aniline  Ihe  Slate*.  ST.  A 
Itaaid  Njiainst  dmnestic  ia- 
sutieeiions  and  wars.  tl-H. 
4T-SS ;  A  aafc|[uaid  »fala« 
UAnAiae  amiias  a*  evbW- 
queoi  on  domenie  laiumc 
tloQ*  and  wars.  4I-4T;  A 
barrier  aiainti  fa<-|ina  td 
insuorciiuD.  47,  M,  84,  8M, 
Siie  of,  has  a  l<n<leBt|  li> 
dcprrst  faction.  4>.  iuw.  O*- 
fcetion   lu  lattil'irial   si»  fit. 

4t,  H ;  MoAieMiuieu'ii  ibtsoi 

really  laenralrtr  1  '     U     Ito- 

llnction     I  :  '.r> 

acy    anil    >  S 

Peculiar  la 

glealaesa  .  tt 


Batk5r< 


moBx. 


791 


6$ ;  A  repnblkao  remeilj 
lor  rcpublicHn  tliscssra,  »; 
Ioipur(anc«  of,  in  a  cotnmci- 
ciai  liBhl.  M:  Will  make  the 
Uniied  Suiei-  (hr  ;iiliit«r  of 
EuTviic  in  America,  W:  In 
flu«ncc  of,  as  10  revenue.  TS; 
Tbe  oalj  p(i**lble  (heck  oa 
Eutopeati  !("<■■"*-'■>■  T2:  Ease 
in  prvvi-nting  smuggling  by. 
76;  Great  itdvanugc  ai  10 
econontir.  79;  ]m)HirUiii:e  of, 
lu  facilitate  inlercourae.  9S: 
ImporiaDce  of.  in  relalion  10 
new  Sutct,  B3:  liiiiiiDtiMr 
iidh  Slaic  iiiilt[>rnden<:c.  M: 
Impinsible  10  enforce,  if  ail- 
ing only  upon  Siurc*.  BS ; 
Uiuolution  uf,  IIiTuaf[h  war 
bctvecn  Stales  and  Nallon. 
f S  :  Plintipal  puipoics  III  br 
securetl  liy.  IM;  Mu«l  aban- 
don le|:i*1alini:  upon  States, 
to  secure,  IUl  Mud  have 
power  III  cxiend  national 
lair  to  diiicns.  148.  Ml: 
Hasi  tonirol  means  of  com. 
moo  defence,  IBB:  ADci-iiun 
of  ciliivnK  lowurdn.  nill  be 
•irenglheticd  bv  eilenslon 
of  poweli  of,  ITS;  Poijilc  of. 
will  oppose  Slate  inturtec 
lions,  1TB;  ImporlalKe  of. 
lor  p  rot  eel  ion  o)  Slates,  1TB; 
Lessen*  need  of  standing 
arm}'.  IS>  ;  Reaulis  of  lack 
of ,  SM:  AiiempI  10  reconcile 
Stale  sovereignty  wlili.ST). 
3H.  Action  of  Slates  in  vlih- 
(Irawinf;  from,  1931;  The 
Coastitutjon       coniaios      im 

<wer  unneeessarf  (or,  808; 
'mtcilying  sense  of  oalion- 

ity  in,  sitn ;  lncreas!n)( 
interest  in  aflairs  ul,  StB, 
Diversity  In.  a  k"*'  advan- 
tage, SOT:  Ciiiteni  of  Amer- 
ica believe  it  the  basis  ol 
their  political  bapplncii.  BT9; 
Only  •ccored  by  a  com- 
prooiisc  of  many  Entercsis 
and  iiKlinations,  BBI  ;  De- 
ctarcit  by  Conlcdrralion  lo 
be  pcrjiciuat,  sg;;  Haiuteol, 


Q»Im—  Centinutd. 

679;  Attachment  to.  6S4,  6S5: 
Null!Acati»ii  alms  at  dEStruc- 
lion  of.  693;  Outline  hiaioryof 
formation  of,  69!;  Object  in 
Itic  U>^m.\\\\in  (li.btfii.iif);  All 
uniind  action    based    ofi,  70s, 

Dnttad   Nt(li«iUiid«,  ut   A'ttifr. 

Pnltad  Statas  (ttr  attf  AmtrUan 
Pteflti  QfnMtmi^m;  Cb»- 
itilnhtn,  FtJf'at;  Cmtm- 
mrnl.  I'.S.;  Vfieti):  Coverit- 
menial  aysteni  of.  prior  10 
independence  of,  ix;  Govero- 
ineni  diiri»|[  the  Kevolulion, 
it;  Di'vclupment  of,  xviii; 
Too  great  eiieni  of.  for  any 
one  Eovernment.  8.  141;  Iti- 
babilril  by  one  united  prople. 
8;  Geographical  Condi  lions  of, 
8;  Nilionnl  elements  In.  8.  D; 
N;ilnt«l  union  of  people  of, 
8,  B;  Existing  ircaiies  of,  in 
178S.  18;  Ciiinmerce  "I,  with 
foreign  countricii.  18;  Result 
of  disunion  in.  S3:  Divisions  tn, 
favored  by  Krnieb,  ^S"'.  \i\i- 
lercncc  tif  wiir>  in,  41;  Happy 
insuUriiy  of,  48:  Diitance  of 
Eu  rope  f  rom,46. 868  ;l^ufopean 
colonies  In  America  100  weak 
lo  be  dangerou*  10,  48;  Ex- 
tensive mililnry  cslabllsh- 
mciiis  not  nccc»Mry  In.  46; 
Commercial  chaiaclcr  of,  84; 
Largeil  territory  in  tbe  world 
with  unrcstrlvtcd  trade,  Oqn; 
l)ominancoof,in  Amerii'a,7Uic: 
A  nest  for  peopling  all  Amer- 
ica. 70«;  Great  economy  In 
p)e(eiill<>n  of  smiicgtiag,  TT; 
Hjiipy  position  of.  a>  resard* 
conicaband  trade.  77:  Tcrtl- 
lorial  dimension  of.  84;  Co«n- 
parison  ol  cxtriil  of,  with 
European  count ries,S4;  Inibe 
last  singe  of  national  humili- 
ation, 8B:  Sovercisn  pnvrtfr* 
of,  made  incflectivc  by  out  ex- 
lending  to  iftdividoal  ciiixens, 
81;  Hill  10  regulate  Itriiisb 
reUlions  wilh,  189;  Neces- 
sity of  military  extablisb* 
nenis   in,   188;    Dangers  to. 


UnlUd  IUte»— cVn/iHKn/. 
Irooi  Eutopean  cotuiiivs,  lU; 
Noi  an  upuUni  couniry.  191, 
IH;  Eflcct  qI  fixed  term 
of  ottcc  In,  xy3n,  131;  .Scr- 
lional  iliffcrenc«s  in.  W; 
Haladki  of,  140:  Sciiure  ol 
properly  ol.  by  u  Sine,  tn  act 
of  irar,  SIS;  CongrcHH  lo  ninkc 
rolri  tonccrninjt  ptoperiy  ol, 
SU:  Fulurc  tclallon  ul  rali(y> 
inn  ■"'!  n»Ti-inlifyin|!  SiMtri 
ol.  SH:  AciMnpaund  icpublk. 
t46;  Too  gtcdi  and  Tadcd  to 
nulie  laelioiii  Kuvrrnnacnl 
pruliable.  MB  ^  Without  (o- 
■pcct  in  Europe.  414:  Ulsilac* 
lioa  belveen  puwcri  of.  and 
$lal«  flowers,  Hiif  Njilioiul 
priile  in,  To6. 

TMOiiuilaa  CooUoTcnj;  Unfor- 
[irnoitc  posuion  (oBard.  71s. 

TSDJM.  31:  .Sot  J.  republic,  ttt. 

Ternmat,  aA^ir ;  C»niT»vcr*y 
wiih  N«w  York.8S:Suppciri<rd 
by  other  Slatei.  H:  Rap- 
prrjchcfncot  vf.  wilb  CunndJ. 
M;  JurisdiciroD  of  N«"  Vork 
orcr.  17$. 

TiU:  In  coloaial  period.  Ik  ; 
Power  of  separate,  jiji:  Ai- 
Icnipl  to  neuuatiiv  value  of 
Presidential,  jsqw;  Proposed 
cxicnsloa  of,  sJon  ;  Pjctl- 
dential.  4$9.  4M;  In  Gre.il 
Britain.  UB.  493:  In  Ne- 
York  Stutc,  iM;  la  Mn>>u- 
cbiiscils.  WQ;  A%  .*  thrrk  on 
improper  laws.  4B0:  A  *hie1d 
10  tbc  Executive,  490;  Use  of. 
In  U,  S.  490«;  IJjie  of.  10 
limil  power  of  ConKroits,<<>on: 
Chief  uie  of.  io  U.  S.,  4<«on: 
Not  datiteiuui  In  >lni;1e  man. 
4B1  ;  llediuncy  <>t  Kuicli^li 
hiii]{  to  aBe.4M:  Dani-et  th.1l 
the  President  will  not  often 
enou^b  uic,  481;  Preildmllal 
popuUriiy  tbiuUKb  use  ul, 
Vli";  UiBs  eAfl  be  puicd 
oicr.  4S4:  Syxieia  i>t.  In  New 
York  State,  4f4;  ConMJtu- 
llonal  (iauKc  re^rdiufi. 
modi  lied   on    MauacbuxGiu 


C'>nslitali<in,  4tM;  Um  oI^  M 
preTCDiuaconstiluiionalUn. 
SMm:  The  Pioidcni'*  ifchM 
.liCMinKt  the  LcK'*lalure.  614; 
Nullilicaiioii  of  Nalional  Ua 
amounii  to  a  power  of  Stall. 

TlM'PTMldtal:  FuilDTc  of.  m, 
Syslcni  i-<lc1rctin|[.  4M;  Att<- 
iDrnU  ^iiiainit  »trd  of.  <Ml 

Tlrglala.  I37u:  Vlnlationa  «f 
Bill  ot  RiKbli  <■(.  SS";  Alien 
and  Scitltion  rcioluliiiftk  al. 
lOlw.  H^n,  tAf,  Pfupfiaitbin 
of.  to  amrnil  the  Cuateden' 
(ion,  HI:  Peculiarly  vnlnr:- 
able  coiatt  ot,  SSB;  Convva- 
liou  of  iSOl.  aE^n;  BleBdiaf 
of  govemincBiBl  powers  it. 
39S;  Lcgiilatlvc  lyraoor  ta. 
S31;  Jrffcrson't  ilrafl  ul  * 
convlilulivn  tor.  SM.  Trr* 
of  office  in.  in  relnlion  to  tt- 
flJMam.'c  I')  Great  Britain, 
8S9:  Wat  ibe  firM  Ki  mi 


by  a  pu!>l>i:  an  the  rrtulotlpa 
ul  lndc)icnilcn{o.  SSS;  Bhw- 
lions  unilet  lormur  fo<«ia- 
nteni  of.  SBS:  tniy  irUl  l>. 
f€l. 

WW:  Causeaol.  U.H;  Natioa 
will  go  10,  lot  pfibi,  IB:  prt' 
tenilerJ  as  well  a*  tosi  taoin 
(or,  IB:  Someiinies  whollr 
personal.  IB:  F.xpcii<»t'  ul 
ancient  repulilks  as  to,  BB 
Love  o(  wcatih  as  gnu  • 
came  of.  as  love  of  power  sr 
glory,  SO:  Violation  ol  "W- 
irart*  ,1  musr  for.  49;  lofln- 
•nee  of  lunibiaiiuni  oa.  fl. 
Inrreasci  the  (niwrt  "I  em> 
nlivG,  41;  l)ci:ira«cii  tr||l«>» 
live  authority.  41;  UalmtB- 
nalc  indueiKie  ot.  oa  nmcalt. 
4t:  Refusal  to  aUoW  Ekr^ 
l<can.  IO  extend  In  Aaicrtta. 
7IW;  Beiirrn  tialfim  and 
States  will  probably  tcfwl- 
(latc  Union,  BB;  ScicoLr  irf, 
ISO;  Intfneiite  a  I.  npixi  aa> 
llaaaJ  tercnue,  Ut:  C^aMW 
be  a  utaitcr  ol   nattooAl  «lr 


moEx. 


m 


W*r — CfittiHued. 

lion.  909;  PaHiotit  fof.  reign 
in  (he  honun  breutt.  tM: 
Difficulijr  of  cociiiiiuiional 
govcromenii  conduciing. 

43on:  t:Kpen*«t  of.  iinil«r 
CoDlcderBtion.  $1)3;  Power  tn 
declare:  Proposed  amcnd- 
mcnl  roncernlne.  ^43.  ^Sg. 

War  Tovtra;  Pratidetilial  a«- 
tumpijon  (especiing,  xv ; 
Prctldeniiat,  tq/bn. 

Wan,  ladian:  Usually  dua  In 
conduct  of  individual  Statm, 
16. 

Waahingisa,  Clly  a(:  itr  Cafilal, 
iVMiirnii/. 

Wubia^oa.  GcDrg«,  {isn,  Sson; 
Clicd.  \\\. 

Waaltb.  Nutional:    Dcpctidn   on 

iiifiiiilr  vnticiy  of  cause*.  191; 

Not     Iil[i:ly     10     be     unduly 

I  repreieiiir'i  in  National  Gov- 

f  riRnirnt.   999.    Well  diRutcd 

ihrou^Z]  (Gunlrv,  40S- 

Weight!  aod  Mvanrta:  National 
[lOnrr  111  rri;iiUte,  B7T. 

Wall-bora:  Abnurdii)'  that  the 
National  Government  will 
favni.      190:       Well     .liflutcd 

Ihivugb  ibe  couDlty,  W9.     _ 


Waataratakaa  Navtgaiionof.ar. 
WMtarafD*!*:  (irral  icnparranc* 

ol  '  rriiiin.  Ibt. 
VMUra   8tatM:    Grierancc    ot, 

concerning  Ml*Miit-i|>|ii.  bi*. 
WMtarn  TirrllotT  (irr  alie  Ttrri' 

Itry,     Putli, );     Neccs*it)r     ot 

fCarrisoni  lor.  IM. 
WMt  India  Trad*:  Enjoyment  of 

privilcctx  ol.  60. 
WM  India*:   European  holding 

of.  a  (outce  of  poMlble  dan- 
cer. IftS. 
W*(l  Virginia,  1S4H. 
Whiikty  iQiametlon,  7511.  lom. 
Wolny,  (.'iidinal'    Influrncv   of 

■  inMiirin  cif,  SS. 
Woman:   influence  of.  In  public 

jRairs.  29. 
Woed,  Kernnndo.  184^1. 
World-      Naiuial      geographical 

diviiilons  of,  TO- 
Wjomlng.   Conteoi  over.  SS.  U; 

I)i«|iiita  forces  Pennsvlvania 

to  laiae  troogix,  160.  ITS. 

TatM,  Abraham  :  Quoted.  4SS. 

Tata*.  Robcn:  Withdraws  Irotn 
Conveiiiion,  •$,%-,  Writes  Icl- 
leri  of  Htutua,  axl,  xiili.  xx%. 

StltBOU,  9ST. 


AMERICAN     POLITICAL     HISTORY 

A  POLITICAL   HISTORY  OF  THE 
STATE  OF   NEW  YORK 

By  tbe  Hon.  DiALVA  STANWOOD  ALEXANDER 
1  (ulft.,  about  575  pp.  rach.  Svo.  Prubable  pritx  (3  oo  net 
or  M-Jo  net  per  volume 
A  hlilocy  oi  Ihc  niovf nicnit  of  t«>tilic^^  pnrtirs  fn  thq 
Empire  Slala  frvin  1777  lo  llUt.  and  inccH  the  causn  o( 
(acliuii^il  divbiuns  inU>  "Ducktaik"  and  "CUnlonun*." 
"  lluitkcn  "  and  '■  Barntmrixm."  ctr.  If  upon  niiy  special 
ff»lurr,  i-mphantt  lu)  brm  placisl  on  Iht^  aMQM  mrlhoila 
and  suutunof  power  by  which  Ihe  brilliant  kadcri.  Geor^tt 
CllKion.  H^iinlltoo.  Itiiir,  D«  Will  ClitiKm,  Vnii  Ijuii^n,  Scy- 
ni'iiip  iiiiil  Thiirlijw  Wi^,  each  »ticC(<sttiT«ly  idntrutkd  Ihe 
p.litical  dc»tiiiy  of  Ihe  State. 

A  POLITICAL   HISTORY  OF   THE 
UNITED    STATES 

By  J.    P.  OORUV 
4  voli.     lamo-     fi.TS  net,  per  vol.     (By  mail,  ti.Sg.) 
VOLUME  1..   1787-1S09 

A  wdl-rounded  biitory  o(  the  Federal  period. 
"  liny  Ih' nsd  bj  alaiMl  knybodr.  wim  pinNt.    WrlUfn  In  •  clear 
and   ■Imptt   fCylb  eallralT  iHuk-ptiUuiit  an4  rnak*«  (he  C9utp«  ft 
earljr  fArly  MniKKle*  uiuch  cltanr   lluu    nuny  a   more   ebbonM 

rVOLL'MB   IL,    1809-18JS 

Mucfa  attention  u  piid  to  Ihe  financial   aspect   of  the 

War  of  iSil,  and  lo  liie  ciuioualy  MmiUr  attitude  of  ttto 

North  and  uia  Suulli  luward  Iho  iivi.to  tn  tho««  early  ycuri. 

"Succinct and  itrfklnif  Uwtm^loil  elievchca  are  sow  and  Ih4n 
encovnivcd  .  .  .  Tbli  «i!iiilr»bTe  worii."— A'«w  Yf»  Sft, 

VOLUMES   IlL  ANI>   IV.  (In  ftrfparatien) 

HISTORY   OF    AMERICAN 
POLITICS 

By  ALEXANDER  JOHNSTON  itimo.  So  c«iiti 

"Tha  imailatHulbaoihallli*  lar  Uaciiinftad  for  fiupfU  !•  |<thn* 
•IdB'a  ■AnwMaa  MMOo'— /Ms  futt-a  'Cnu  tirrrrm^tmi  ti  1*4 
VnUtd  S4mtn." 


Henry     Holt 

39  W.  3311  Stuxt 


and     Company 

(V.  '06^  Nkw  Vcwx 


TWO  BOOKS  BY  THE  LATE 

FRANCIS  A.  WALKER 


JISCOSSIOHS  IK  ECONOMICS  AWD  STATISTICS 


Kdtii'.l  bv  Pttifivst  Davu  K,  LlKwur. 

H'llA  fvrlrttl.     tu  f  4I1  p^     1  Toll.     «VI».     KjwlH/. 

tnipiKKaiit  IxtiFni  an  Finance.  Taialton,  tla*«}'.  Bfaaulllan.  Be*- 
noinK  Theory.  Stadxlte*.  NalioRSl  Qmwtb.  Satial  Beaoonitc4.  ttc  Tl» 
author  ha4  bgjiMl  to  h<niv:j  brinv  itirw  pAp«r*  tngvltwr. 

^Jtr  Di4ii  ''Vrotetaot  L'twer  hm  ptrrormed  ■  nal  wrrln  to  i>c 


public  >■  weK  ■>  to  tb«  mcniAr y  tA  bii  lalo  cAief. 


!■  Uir  pn«9C 


coIlMUon  Iha  adltor  hiu  not  liKJlDilcd  •verrtbiaR  OsiiBral  Walkar  mr 
wroMi  but  hu  uiD*d.  M  (■(  u  pouibl*.  ti>  avnU  npalltlcnu  of 
thougtit  ....  iTicre  are  waa  dItcDMion*  of  Vbt  (wlloa*!  Ihwacc*  >■ 
tbc  perlDd  toTlDwini  tite  CI*a  Whr,  wlUck  have  a  Umdy  u  iMI  ■■  iU*- 
lofical  intaraM  at  tlw  praacM  Um*  .  .  .  T»  Improve  lit*  ca»iii»  *■* 
CanfTil  Wa1k*r'ii  irntk  tut  many  y*aT>.  and  blhaiparlaMa  CBKBot  tail 
t«be  of  lii1*r*«lot>ir  nrvMOt  v^rH-CBilon.  .  .  .  BrovoiiBni  In  tbr  hand* 
«ttlii»  maatei  wai  nojiliinal  aclrnw.  heoani*  af  M*  broad  (rnnattilaK 
bi*  lisaltky,  cnnattvative  opclsntUB.  Iiii  belief  in  Ibe  MSoacT  Of  eCort : 
anil.  In  a  (nor*  lUparflcial  •vnaau  bacauae  el  liia  aarine  iMiaa  o(  bnanr 
and  Iili  happy  way  of  pntllac  lUnaa  ....  ha  ma  tba  rnrlmata  paa- 
acaur  al  a  vsrj  pleaatng  literary  Myla  .  -  ■  .  <t<*r  and  iBianalinK  ta 
tha  iniBral  fsadsr.  as  well  aa  ioMmclivc  lothaoaieful  uu<leni.  Tfin* 
enalo  bava  btaa  nn  mora  Aufny  monamaM  10  bla  ateowiry  llian  Ume 
|ia«ir<4«iBta.tocMlnr  wlt&tte  otbar  volaBaat 'UiKuaaloaa  ta  Bdaca- 
Itoi.*" 

AVw  Verk  Oimmrreiai  A^vtrtlifT  .■  "aear,  dlrcd  and  (afve<tf.f«n« 
familiar  fllDMraUr.n  and  appaal  to  fact,  and  alwayi  tDtcnMisK.  C*(- 
(nJulj  BO  othot  man  hat  had  iiikI)  a  trlila  InflotBo  on  (ha  ccoDosnlc 
Ihotisht  uf  Amciica.  or  ha*  done  (omvtkMvlevalr  it.  -  ■  ntaaUOa- 
mBol.  hawerei,  can  cIt*  no  adcqaale  BMMi  at  Iha  waaUk  at  Batatlal 
or  wida  Bcnpa  of  toblBcta  earcTM  by  U>e*a  ilKirMt  altliMa  ....  ana 
can  atmoil  hear  tb»  apnkBo  word  tn  ausia  of  lha  •icwaaa  .  .  .  .  bm 
aiwllcni  fnd*i." 

DISOISSIOHS   rW   EDUCATIQH 

BdllMl  by  Jtwr^l'xiMXKV  Uukkok     m>  pp.    Iro.    VtaBnw^. 

Tbe  aathOT  had  hoped  blmicif  to  coiKcI  thcaa  paf>eta  In  a  *ahisiL> 

nr/Wa/,- "A  AltlnecMtanrUlMitaaatboa.  .  .  .  Thebnadthotl 
aiparlanca.  aa  well  aa  t(H  natoral  rasita  o(  hto  Bind,  arr  bar*  r«#a 
Tm  Bnb>«ct>  d*«ll  with  arv  ail  llt«  and  prartKal.  ...   He  aaver  < 
with  thain  iaa  narrow  or  lOi-callcJ  '  pra^ikal*  way." 

IJIttalmrt !  "YM  <U*tiait«iBblnK  itaiu  »[  (licae  papsra  ara  opait- 
■ntmleilnpM,  brvaritti.  and  untly.  .  .  .  N'n  tapabt*  (taiian*  of  advi*- 
Uon  wfll  OTertook  (irneral  WWlkrt'>i  bc-^kj  no  tarloBn  ««VmMmi  of 
booka  on  mtuMllon  will  be  witboui  K.  Tb«  dlaWiC^^a*  >«tkof^ 
koneaty.  aaRiacfly.  and  i-uuiaitc  alihMon  e>*ry  |iacn." 

n*  Atf/pa  rnrnttrift:  "  Two  of  hia  cMmtteaoaaiaaritaohwaawriaa 
tiMM  papBra.  the  paevDar  pnwrr  h«  inaaMaed  of  cnllMku  •«<  raUiUlaf 
the  atlenlioa  for  lahAT  are  commonly  anppot«1  to  b«  ilry  and  dlPf  ■If 
■QbJoMa.  Bad  tba  onpadty  ba  Itad  for  c«nliui-eray.  tkarp  and  iBcuiea, 
tat  no  candid  and  gBBer»B>Ikat  ll  left  nn  toMrinti  wumil~ 

aa  Weat  sat  Si  .  New  f>rM 
Wt%  WMMWb  AVK,  QUI—— 


HENRY  HOLT  &  CO. 


TWO    BOOKS    ON    VITAL    QUESTIONS 
FOR    THOUGHTFUL    AMERICANS 

THE  NEGRO  AND    THE   NATION 

By  GEORGE  S.  MEKRIAM 

Prolubly  Ihc  fir3(  complete  biilory  of  Uic  ncjffo  in  Mb 
rrbiiuii  X"  our  jj^Jiife*.  j^i priniing  436  pp.  $1.75  net 
By  muil  ft. 93. 

T>ie  Rci.  Ej)*a>i>  W.tftnwn  H^ui  In  "LpihI  •  Huiid":  "Sen*l- 
bi»  pfc-piJr  who  «T»»li  In  know,  who  wtih  to  iatm  -rj^tiA  muun'l  '.i>inX'tn», 
•Ik')  ^'iT'CkDU' Ihofr  vfhrt  WI4I1  I0  lak^r  lh«*lr  honvl  ^r1  hi  Ih'  f^*^^ 
duUH'il  \Uv  Ttour.  w»l  f fud  the  X^Ai.  wtti  i(u-]j  II.  ahJ  ^lll  rm-t  i.^Hih^ 

"AdmiroMe.  nnfllv  thfltarlfif  lH-h-pk(ir<''(]*d.  ,-,  Kn^lghlnneiliind 
^.  uaitir  di*rii«t|on  0I  lh«  n^Eiv  pmb^^m  In  lit  pTrin^nl  phnum  «nd 
ft>|j?t?(*,     Ntit  d  dry  hl*lury.     l1uniAA,di  jnulk.  Ii>1rrv4rfri^»  4l>4orb- 


pvnuaitir  di*rii«t|on  0I  lh«  n^Eiv  pmb^^m  In  lit  pTrin^nl  phnum  «nd 
ft>|j?t?(*,  Ntit  d  dry  hl*lury.  l1uniAA,di  jnulk.  li> 
tiif£,  Ihvrc  k>  |ihllHjvi3|)hjr  *i{  niKlinfuL  ■iPit  p-rTiili.tl 
phll(»ophy  which  tinf  cmlv  fiimiiiht-d  jTiiBri^f-fbiMon  cfl  |*i«l  c%«(il*, 
bill  oHrrA  |;uliLincp  inr  thr'liil<ir«  .  ,  .  Im^'uirll^l  ;int1  hiioriitlng;-  -  -  . 
~I  ht»«  li  niv«:li  tli4l  tf-iiipt*  4uoTAtton^  .  ,  M(  M--rTl;iiii  h^n  ^Ivni 
iih  nil  cKixlJefrU  M){h-iiiliidrd,  ][luuaiuti11n|{  Uouk  iift  the  problem  <4 
the  Amtttcan  Decrv^"— CIkh^  iUctrtt^/f^rtid- 

"A  dtviplj  Intowling  wtarf.   ■  -  ^  An    nirpMllnRlv  r*3c1iiblr  vol' 
vtne.  eipecutlr  vaiublefn  ii*  onalyie*  ol  <:ondlni''n-   '-i<"--,  -iU'i 
UnBB  uiidmukln,  md  aninvl   hlpi    nAt»   cudcIu^Ii-ji     h  '  <p 

tnn  tontend,*'— fl**/flii  lra»H-'i/t. 

STUDIES   IN 
AMERICAN   TRADE-UNIONISM 

J.    II.    HOLLANDER    ami  G.   E.    BARNETT    {Editoni) 

Twrlvr  papm  by  i;nid«.»lc  oludcol*  aiiJ  oflicwr*  ol 
John*  IIopkinB  Univrniitjr.  the  r«9ulti  of  orii^nNl  invnti|^- 
iltini  nl  rvpicientalivr  Trade  Uniom.  There  are  alio 
chnpl«r«  on  KinpUtywrif  Anucblioiis,  Ihc  Knlnhb  of 
Labor,  and  the  American  FedarvtUin  ot  IjiWr.  Ijto  p|>,, 
Hvo.  fi.75  Oft,    By  mail,  t^qg.) 

"A  uruHr  at  tni<4i--iinlu(ift  In  ihr  mncrti'      tmpciiual  and  Ihor* 

"Thi^lfh  nMnditmt  i<t  particular  f<wiiur«  ni  foMculmt  lr*d« 
unloTiH,  Ib4  ddlu  clrjfJt  wltli  an  i-i?iiipr<h«iiilve  and  iTplcal ;  ad  Ihal 
thti  rf>*u](  Ik  a   ■uhtinEilkal  rntitrihuiiitn   Id  our  linowrM|>«  of  mdD> 

union  aTruftumandEviifitDtfiL  .  .  ,  Kir«Lri?iil  »<udlm.^ 

"  U  !■  duubirul  ir  Hdj^iiiic  aftprvAchInK  ^^  ^  brcailA  and  cv^ttnH' 
nattbji  ban  vfllluiirid  Ira  wvt  intn  crldl.  -  .  ,  Arcnr  uacfol  b(fi>k-^ 

-'San  A-aaoK*  Ctrvmfrft. 

Henry     Hole     and     Company 


62 


130SU 
a/OI  3]  150-22 


m^ 


lltl 

3  bias  DHi  ^Ib  -"oc