Federal motor vehicle safety standards and regulations, with amendments and interpretations

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EfFacHvt: Morch 18, 1976

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection
(Docket No. 75-33; Notice 2)

This notice amends Standard No. 208, Occu-
pant Crash Protection, to permit certain U.S.
Postal Service vehicles to meet the requirements
of the standard that were in effect until January
1, 1976, instead of the new requirements that
became effective on that date.

The NHTSA proposed this modification of
Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208) in a notice
published December 31, 1975 (40 FR 60075).
The occupant protection requirements in the
standard imtil January 1, 1976, specified either a
Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly at the
driver's position of the light delivery vehicles
used by the Postal Service on delivery routes.
The Postal Service's safety research organization
developed a seat belt design that met the re-
quirements and resulted in improved usage by
vehicle operators.

The newer requirements now in effect for the
light delivery vehicles in question require the
same seat belt assembly installations as in most
passenger cars, including a Type 2 seat belt as-
sembly with non-detachable shoulder belt at each
front outboard designated seating position. The
Service judges that installation of Type 2 seat
belts at the driver's position with non-detachable
shoulder portion will decrease the percentage of
seat belt use by their mail delivery personnel.

The Postal Service indicated its support for
the proposal. Ford Motor Company objected to
the basis of the vehcile category as a "single user
exemption." The agency, while in agreement
that categorization based on the status of a single
user is not generally utilized, recognizes the dis-

tinctive scope and nature of U.S. Postal Service
operations. The Service is a part of the Federal
government, its delivery activities are unique in
scope and variety, and the organization has an
active safety research effort that addresses the
particular environment of mail delivery by motor
vehcile. No other comments were received. The
agency concludes that the new requirements for
Type 2 seat belt assemblies at the driver's posi-
tion in this limited category of vehicle are not
justified, because their interference with the
many entries and exits from the vehcile may
discourage usage.

In consideration of the foregoing, S.4.2.2 of
Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208) is amended
by the addition of the phrase "vehicles designed
to be exclusively sold to the U.S. Postal Service,"
following the phrase "motor homes."

E-ffective date: March 18, 1976. Because this
amendment creates no additional requirements
for any person, and in view of the Postal Serv-
ice's need to contract for vehicles with appro-
priate seat belt assemblies at the earliest
opportunity, an immediate effective date is found
to be in the public interest.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407); delegation of authority
at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on March 10, 1976.

James P. Gregory
Administrator

41 F.R. 11312
March 18, 1976

PART 571; S 208— PRE 65-66

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection
(Docket No. 74-14; Notice 6)

This notice amends Standard No. 208, Occu-
pant Crash Protection, to continue until Au<rust
31, 1977, the present three options available for
occupant crash protection in passenjrer cars.

This extension of the present occupant crash
protection options of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR
571.208) was proposed July 19, 1976 (41 FR
29715), alonp^ with several other subjects that
will be the subject of a future notice. Vehicle
manufacturers supported the proposal but re-
quested that the options be extended indefinitely
instead of being limited to a 1-year extension.
Mr. Benjamin Redmond advocated the use of an
interlock system to increase usage of active belt
systems. Ms. Lucie Kii-jlak expressed a prefer-
ence for active occupant crash protection systems.
The National Motor Vehicle Safety Advisory
Council did not take a position on the proposal.

The Secretary of Transportation has initiated
a process for the establishment of future occu-
pant crash protection requirements under Stand-
ard No. 208 (41 FR 24070, June 14, 1976). The
Secretary's proposal addresses the long temi is-
sues involved, and this 1-year extension of re-
quirements is intended to pi-ovide the time
necessarj' to reach that decision. Because a 1-
year extension is consistent with the process that
has been established and because a longer exten-
sion was not proposed for comment, the NHTSA
declines to extend the existing requirements as
recommended by the manufacturers.

Other matters proposed in the notice that
underlies this action will be treated at a later

date, following the receipt of comments that are
due on October 20, 1976.

The NHTSA notes that no effective date was
proposed for the other matters addressed by the
proposal. Those matters involve modification of
the existing passive protection options so that
they conform to the proposal of the Department
of Transportation, and to reduc* somewhat the
femur force requirement. Also, further specifi-
cation of dummy positioning in the vehicle was
addressed. The agency proposes an immediate
effective date for these changes, because they rep-
resent relaxation of the requirements. However,
the views of interested persons, particularly
Volkswagen (which is certifying compliance
under one passive option), are solicited by
October 20, 1976.

In consideration of the foregoing, the heading
and text of S4.1.2 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR
571.208) are amended by changing the date
"August 31, 1976" to "August 31, 1977" wherever
it appears.

Effective date : August 26, 1976.
(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; delegation of authority
at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on August 26, 1976.

John W. Snow
Administrator

41 F.R. 36494
August 30, 1976

PART 571; S 208— PRE 67-68

Effective: January 19, 1977

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection
(Docket No. OST 44; Notice 77-3)

This notice amends Standard No. 208, Occu-
pant Crash Protection, to extend indefinitely the
current occupant crash protection requirements
for passenger cars.

In a notice published June 14. 1!)76 (41 FR
24070), I i)roposed five alternative courses of
action for future occupant crash protection re-
quirements under vStandard No. 208 (49 CFR
571.208). Based on an analysis of connnents
received, a decision was reached to call upon the
automobile manufacturers to join the Federal
government in conducting a large-scale demon-
stration program to exhibit the eilectiveness of
pa.ssive restraint systems. The reasoning that
underlines that decision is contained in a Decem-
ber 6, 1976, document ("The Secretary's Decision
Concerning Motor Veiiicle Occupant Crasli Pro-
tection") that is hereby incorporated by refer-
ence in this notice. The effect of that decision
on Standard No. 208 is to require the contimui-
tion of the current requirements for passenger
cars, as proposed in the first of tlie five alterna-
tive courses of action.

The first alternative was written as a three-
year extension (to August 31, 1979), although
the preamble discussion made clear that the
length of the extension was open to discussion.
It is now apparent that a continuation of the
existing requirements is best effectuated by a de-
letion of any tennination date. This action ac-
cords with the intent of the first alternative to
maintain current occupant crash protection re-
quirements for the indefinite future. Because
this action represents a cont intuition of existing
manufacturing practices, it is the Department's
finding that no new significant economic or en-
vironmental impacts result from this amendment.

I have directed tiie National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) to propose
comparable changes in the requirements for
multipurpose passenger vehicles and light trucks.
The NHTSA has also been directed to take final
action on the substantive changes to Standard
\o. 20S that were proposed in its notice of July
19, 1976 (41 FR 2971.5).

The Department hereby closes OST Docket
No. 44, which is transferred to the NHTSA's
docket on occupant crash protection. I want to
make it clear, however, that by closing OST
Docket No. 44 and amending Standard No. 208
to extend indefinitely the current occupant crash
protection requirements for passenger cars, I have
not in any way foreclosed a future Secretary or
Administrator of NHTSA from instituting at
any time a rulemaking to amend Standard No.
208 either to place a tenninate date on Standard
No. 208 or to mandate passive restraints on some
or all passenger cars.

In consideration of the foregoing, the heading
and text of S4.1.2 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR
571.208) are amended in part to read as follows:

S4.1.2 Passenger cars manufactured on or
after September /, 1973. Passenger cars manu-
factured on or after September 1, 1973, shall
meet the requirements of S4.1.2.1, S4.1.2.2. or
S4.1.2.3. * * *.

Effective date; Januaiy 19, 1977.

(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407.)

Issued on January 19, 1977.

William T. Coleman, Jr.
Secretary of Ti-ansportation
42 F.R. 5071
January 27, 1977

PART 571; S 208— PRE 69-70

Effetflve: June 2, 1977

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection
(Docket No. 74-14; Notice 9)

This notice amends Standard No. 208, Occu-
pant Crash Protectio-n, to extend indefinitely the
current occupant crasli protection requirements
for light trucks and multipurpose passenger ve-
hicles. The question of future requirements for
occupant crash protection is presently being con-
sidered by the Secretary of Transportation, and
thus the current requirements for light trucks
and multipurpose passenger vehicles should be
continued for the indefinite future.

Effective date: June 2, 1977.

Addresses: Requests for reconsideration should
refer to the docket number and be submitted to:
Docket Section, Room 5108, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh
Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

For further information contact :

Guy Hunter

Motor Vehicle Programs

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration
Washington, D.C. 20590
(202-426-2265)

The requirements of Standard No. 208 (49
CFR 571.208) have been implemented in three
stages. The current stage for trucks and multi-
purpose passenger vehicles (MPV's) with a gross
vehicle weight rating (G\^VR) of 10,000 pounds
or less specifies a choice of three means to pro-
vide occupant protections (S4.2.2) and is sched-
uled to end August 14, 1977. After that date
many of these vehicles would be required by
S4.2.3 of Standard No. 208 to provide occupant
crash protection by means that require no action
by vehicle occupants (commonly known as pas-
sive protection). In the original promulgation
of Standard No. 208 in its present form (36 FR

4600; March 10, 1971) it was established that
thic modification of occupant protection should
follow a similar modification of protection in
passenger cars by two years, to provide manu-
facturers with time to assimilate and benefit
from passenger car experience.

The issue of future occupant protection in
passenger cars is being decided at this time, in
a notice of proposed i-ulemaking issued by the
Secretary of Transportation (42 FR 15935;
March 24, 1977). Thus, light truck and MPV
naanufacturers have not had the benefit of ex-
perience with new systems in passenger cars as
originally anticipated. In view of this fact and
the fact that they are not prepared to meet re-
quirements other than the existing performance
options after August 14, 1977, the agency has
decided to continue the existing requirements in-
definitely.

This action does not preclude future rulemak-
ing to modif)' occupant crash protection for the
affected vehicles, but notice and opportunity for
comment will be provided prior to further action.

Because this action represents a continuation
of existing manufacturing practices, it is the
agency's finding that no new significant economic
or environment impacts result from this amend-
ment.

The lawyer principally responsible for the pre-
paration of this document is Tad Herlihy of the
NHTSA Office of Chief Counsel.

The economic and inflationai-y impacts of this
rulemaking have been carefully evaluat«d in ac-
cordance with 0MB Circular A-107, and an
Inflation Impact Statement is not required.

In view of the fact that future occupant pro-
tection requirements are not established and
manufacturers are prepared only to meet exist-

PART 571; S 208— PRE 71

Effective: June 2, 1977

ing occupant protection requirements after (Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718

August 1977, the agency finds that notice and (15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407); delegation of authority

public procedure on this amendment to continue at 49 CFK 1.50.)

existing requirements is unnecessary and contrary

to the public interest in knowning next model Issued on May 27, 1977.

year's i-equirements as soon as possible. The

agency also finds that this amendment may be- Joan Claybrook

come effective immediately, because the amend- Administrator

ment relieves a restriction.

In consideration of the foregoing, Standard 42 F.R. 28135

No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208) is amended. . . . June 2, 1977

PART 571; S 208— PRE 72

Effective: July 5, 1978

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection
(Docket No. 74-14; Notice 11; Docket No. 73-8; Notice 7)

This notice amends occupant crash protection
Standard Xo. 208 and its acconipanyinu: test
dummy specification to further specify test pro-
cedures and injury criteria. The chanjjes are
minor in most respects and reflect comments by-
manufacturers of test dummies and vehicles and
the XHTSA's own test experience witli the stand-
ard and the test duimny.

Date : Effective date July 5, 1978.

Addresses: Petitions for reconsideration should
refer to the docket number and be submitted to :
Docket Section, Room 5108, Xassif Building, 400
Seventh Street. S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

For further information contact:
Mr. Guy Hunter
Motor Veliicle Programs
X^ational Highway Traffic Safety

Administration
Washington, D.C. 20590
(202) 426-2265

Supplemental information: Standard X'^o. 208,
Occupant Crash Protection (4!) CFR 571.208).
is a Department of Transportation safety stand-
ard that requires manufacturers to provide a
means of restraint in new motor vehicles to keep
occupants from impacting the vehicle interior in
the event a crash occurs. The standard has,
since January 1968, required the provision of
seat belt assemblies at each seating position in
pas.senger cars. In January 1972 the require-
ments for seat belts were upgraded and options
were added to permit the provision of restraint
that is "active" (requiring some action be taken
by the vehicle occupant, as in the case of seat
belts) or "passive" (providing protection with-
out action being taken by the occupant).

In a separate notice issued today (42 FR
34289; FR Reg. 77-19137), the Secretarj' of

Transportation has reached a decision regarding
the future occupant crash protection that must
be installed in passenger cars. The implementa-
tion of that decision will involve the testing of
pa.ssive restraint systems in accordance with the
test procedures of Standard Xo. 208, and this
notice is intended to make final several modifica-
tions of that procedure which have been proposed
for change by the XHTSA. This notice also
responds to two petitions for reconsideration of
rulemaking involving the test diunmy that is
used to evaluate the compliance of passive re-
straint systems.

DOCKET 74-14; XOTICE 05
Xotice 5 was issued July 15, 1976 (41 FR
29715; July 19, 1976) and proposed that Stand-
ard X'^o. 208's existing specification for passive
protection in frontal, lateral, and rollover modes
(S4.1.2.1) be modified to specify passive protec-
tion in the frontal mode only, with an option to
provide passive protection or Ijelt protection in
the lateral and rollover crash modes. Volkswagen
had raised the question of the feasibility of small
cars meeting the standard's lateral impact re-
quirements: A 20-mpii impact by a 4,000-pound,
60-inch-high flat surface. The agency noted the
particular vulnerability of small cars to side im-
pact and the need to provide protection for them
based on the weight of other vehicles on the
liighway, but agreed that it would be difficult to
provide passive lateral protection in the near
future. Design problems also underlay the pro-
posal to provide a belt option in place of the
existing passive rollover requirement.

Ford Motor Company argued that a lateral
option would be inappropriate in Standard No.
208 as long as the present dummy is used for
measurement of passive system performance.

PART 571; S 208— PRE 73

Effective: July 5, 1978

This question of dummy use as a measuring de-
vice is treated later in this notice. General
Motors Corporation (GM) supported the option
without qualification, noting that the installation
of a lap belt with a passive system "would pro-
vide comparable protection to lap/shoulder belts
in side and rollover impacts." Chrysler did not
object to the option, but noted that the lap belt
option made the title of S4.1.2.1 ("complete
passive protection") misleading. Volkswagen
noted that its testing of belt systems without the
lap belt portion showed little loss in efficacy in
rollover crashes. No other comments on this
proposal were received. The existing option
S4.1.2.1 is therefore adopted as proposed so that
manufacturers will be able to immediately under-
take experimental work on passive restraints on
an optional basis in conformity with the Secre-
taiy's decision.

There were no objections to the agency's pro-
posal to permit either a Type 1 or Type 2 seat
belt assembly to meet the requirements, and thus
it is made final as proposed.

The NHTSA proposed two changes in the in-
jui-y criteria of S6 that are used as measures of
a restraint system's qualification to Standard No.
208. One change proposed an increase in per-
missible femur force limits from 1,700 poimds to
2,250 pounds. As clarification that tension loads
are not included in measurement of these forces,
the agency also proposed that the word "com-
pressive" be added to the text of S6.4. Most
commenters were cautionary about the changes,
pointing out that susceptibility to fracture is
time dependent, that acetabular injury could be
exacerbated by increased forces, and that angular
applications of force were as likely in the real
world as axial forces and would more likely
fracture the femur.

The agency is aware of and took into account
these considerations in proposing the somewhat
higher femur force limit. The agency started
with the actual field experience of occupants of
GM and Volkswagen vehicles that have been
shown to produce femur force readings of about
1,700 pounds. Occupants of these vehicles in-
volved in crashes have not shown a significant
incidence of femur fracture. The implication
from this experience that the 1,700-pound figure
can safely be raised somewhat is supported in

work by Patrick on compressive femur forces of
relatively long duration. The Patrick data
(taken with aged embalmed cadavers) indicate
that the average fracture load of the patella-
femur-pelvis complex is 1,910 pounds. This
average is considered conservative, in that ca-
daver bone structure is generally weaker than
living human tissue. While these data did not
address angular force applications, the experience
of the GM and Volkswagen vehicle occupants
does suggest that angular force application can
go higher than 1,700 pounds.

The agency does not agree that the establish-
ment of the somewhat higher outer limit for
permissible femur force, loads of 2,250 pounds is
arbitrary. Wliat is often ignored by the medical
community and others in commenting on the in-
jury criteria found in motor vehicle safety stand-
ards is that manufacturers must design their
restraint systems to provide greater protection
than the criteria spe^'ified, to be certain that each
of their products will pass compliance tests con-
ducted by the NHTSA. It is a fact of industrial
production that the actual performance of some
units will fall below nominal design standards
(for quality control and other reasons). Volks-
wagen made precisely this point in its comments.
Because the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act states that each vehicle must comply
(15 U.S.C. § 1392(a)(1) (a)), manufacturers
routinely design in a "compliance margin" of
superior performance. Thus, it is extremely un-
likely that a restraint system designed to meet
the femur force load criterion of 2,250 pounds
will in fact be designed to provide only that
level of performance. With these considerations
in mind, the agency makes final the changes as
proposed.

While not proposed for change, vehicle manu-
facturers commented on a second injury criterion
of the standard : A limitation of the acceleration
experienced by the dunnny thorax during the
barrier crasli to 60g, except for intervals whose
cumulative duration is not more than 3 milli-
seconds (ms). Until August 31, 1977, the agency
has specified the Society of Automotive Engi-
neers' (SEA) "severity index" as a substitute for
the 60g-3ms limit, because of greater familiarity
of the industry with that criterion.

PAKT 571; S 208— PKE 74

Effcclive: July 5, 1978

General Motors recommended that the severity
index l>e continued as tlie chest injury criterion
until a basis for using chest deflection is devel-
oped in place of chest acceleration. GM cited
data whicli indicate that chest injury from cer-
tain types of hlunt frontal impact is a statistically
significant function of chest deflection in humans,
while not a fimction of impact force or spinal
acceleration. GM suggested that a shift from
the temporary severity index measure to the
60g-3ms measurement would be wasteful, because
there is no "strong indication" that the 60g-3ms
measurement is more meaningful than the sever-
ity index, anil some restraint systems might have
to be redesigned to comply with the new require-
ment.

Unlike GM. Chrysler argued against the use of
acceleration criteria of either type for the chest,
and rather advocated that the standard be de-
layed until a dummy chest with better deflection
characteri.stics is developed.

The Severity Index Criterion allows higher
loadings and therefore increases the possibility
of adverse effects on the chest. It only indirectly
limits the accelerations and hence the forces
which can be applied to the thorax. Acceleration
in a specific impact environment is considered to
be a better predictor of injury than the Severity
Index.

NHTSA onlj' allowed belt systems to meet the
Severity Index Criterion of 1,000 instead of the
60g-3ms criterion out of consideration for lead-
time problems, not because the Severity Index
Criterion was considered superior. It is recog-
nized that restraint systems stich as lap-shoulder
belts apply more concentrated forces to the
thorax than air cushion restraint, and that injury
can result at lower forces and acceleration levels.
It is noted that the Agency is considering rule-
making to restrict forces that may be applied to
the thorax by the shoulder belt of any seat belt
assembly (4l" FR .")4961; December 16^ 1976).

With regard to the test procedures and condi-
tions that imderlie the recjuircments of the stand-
ard, the agency proposed a temperature range
for testing that would be compatible with the
temperature sensitivity of the test dummy. The
test dunmiy specification (Part 572, Anthropo-
morphic Test Dummy, 49 CFR Part 072) con-

tains calibration tests that are conducted at any
temperature between 66" and 78° F. This is
because properties of lubricants and nonmetallic
parts used in the dummy will change with large
temi)erature changes and will affect the dummy's
objectivity as a test instrument. It was proposed
that the Standard No. 208 crash tests be con-
ducted within this tempeiature range to eliminate
the potential for variability.

The only manufacturers that objected to the
temperature specification were Porsche. Bayer-
ische Motoren "Werke (B\nV), and American
Motors Corporation (AMC). In each case, the
manufacturers noted that dynamic testing is con-
ducted outside and that it is unreasonable to
limit testing to the few days in the year when
the ambient temperature would fall within the
specified 12-degree range.

The commenters may misunderstand their cer-
tification responsibilities under the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Section
108 (b)(2) limits a manufacturer's responsibility
to the exercise of "due care" to assure compliance.
The NHTSA has long interpreted this statutory
"due care" to mean that the manufacturer is free
to test its products in any fashion it chooses, as
long as the testing demonstrates that due care
was taken to assure that, if tested by NHTSA
as set forth in the standard, the product would
comply with the standard's requirements. Thus,
a manufacturer could conduct testing on a day
with temperatures other than those specified, as
long as it could demonstrate through engineering
calculations or otherwise, that the difference in
test temperatures did not invalidate the test re-
sults. Alternatively a manufacturer might
choose to perform its preparation of the vehicle
in a temporarily erected structure (such as a
tent) that maintains a tetnperature within the
specified range, so that only a short esposure
during acceleration to the barrier would occur
in a higher or lower temperature. To assist any
such arrangements, the test temperature condi-
tion has been limited to require a stabilized tem-
perature of the test dunuuy only, just prior to
the vehicle's travel toward the barrier.

In response to an earlier suggestion from GM,
the agency proposed further specificity in the
clothing worn by the dummy during tlie crash
test. The onlv couunent was filed by GM, which

PART 571; S 208— PRE 75

EfFeclive: July 5, 1978

argued that any shoe specification other than
weight would be unrelated to dummy perform-
ance and therefore should not be included in the
specification. The agency disagrees, and notes
that the size and shape of the heel on the shoe
can affect the placement of the dummy limb
within the vehicle. For this reason, the clothing
specifications are made final as proposed, except
that Ihe requirement for a conforming "config-
uration" has been deleted.

Renault and Peugeot asked for confirmation
that pyrotechnic pretensioners for belt retractors
are not prohibited by the standard. The stand-
ard's requirements do not specify the design by
which to provide the specified protection, and
the agency is not aware of any aspect of the
standard that would prohibit the use of preten-
sioning devices, as long as the three performance
elements are met.

With regard to the test dummy used in the
standard, the agency proposed two modifications
of Standard No. 208 : a more detailed positioning
procedure for placement of the dummy in the
vehicle prior to the test, and a new requirement
that the dummy remain in calibration without
adjustment following the barrier crash. Com-
ments were received on both aspects of the pro-
posal.

The dummy positioning was proposed to elim-
inate variation in the conduct of repeatable tests,
particularly among vehicles of different sizes.
The most important proposed modification was
the use of only two dummies in any test of front
seat restraints, whether or not the system is de-
signed for three designated seating positions.
The proposal was intended to eliminate the prob-
lem associated with placement of three 50th-
percentile male dummies side-by-side in a smaller
vehicle. In bench seating with three positions,
the system would have to comply with a dummy
at the driver's position and at either of the other
two designated seating positions.

GM supported this change, but noted that
twice as many tests of 3-position bench-seat ve-
hicles would be required as before. The company
suggested using a simulated vehicle crash as a
means to test the passive restraint at the center
seat position. The agency considers this ap-
proach unrepresentative of the actual crash pulse

and vehicle kinematic response (e.g., pitching,
yawing) that occur during an impact. To the
degree that GM can adopt such an approach in
the exercise of "due care" to demonstrate that
the center seating position actually complies, the
statute does not prohibit such a certification
approach.

Ford objected that the dummy at the center
seat position would be placed about 4 inches to
the right of the center of the designated seating
position in order to avoid interference with the
dummy at the driver's position. While the
XHTSA agrees that a small amount of displace-
ment is inevitable in smaller vehicles, it may well
occur in the real world also. Further, the physi-
cal dimensions of the dummy preclude any other
positioning. With a dummy at the driver's posi-
tion, a dummy at the center position cannot
physically be placed in the middle of the seat in
all cases. In view of these realities, the agency
makes final this aspect of the dummy positioning
as proposed.

GM suggested the modification of other stand-
ards to adopt "2-dummy" positioning. The com-
patibility among dynamic tests is regularly
reviewed by the NHT8A and will be again fol-
lowing this rulemaking action. For the moment,
however, only those actions which were proposed
will be acted on.

As a general matter with regard to dummy
positioning. General Motors found the new speci-
fications acceptable with a few changes. GM
cautioned that the procedure might not be suf-
ficiently reproducible between laboratories, and
Chrysler found greater variation in positioning
with the new procedures than with Chrysler's
own procedures. The agency's use of the proce-
dure in 15 different vehicle models has shown
consistently repeatable results, as long as a reason-
able amount of care is taken to avoid the effect
of random inputs (see "Repeatability of Set Up
and Stability of Anthropometric Landmarks and
Their Influence on Impact Response of Automo-
tive Crash Test Dummies." Society of Automo-
tive Engineers, Technical Paper No. 770260,
1977). The agency concludes that, with the
minor improvements cited below, the positioning
procedure should be made final as proposed.

PART 571; S 208— PRE 76

Effective July 5, 1978

The dummy is placed at a seating: position so
that its midsagittal plane is vertical and longi-
tudinal. Volkswajren argued against use of the
midsagittal plane as a reference for dummy
placement, considering it difficult to define as a
practical matter during placement. The agency
has used plane markers and plane lines to define
the midsagittal plane and has experienced no
significant difficulty in placement of the dummy
with these techniques. For this reason, and be-
cause Volkswagen suggested no simpler orienta-
tion technique, the agency adopts use of the
midsagittal plane as proposed.

Correct spacing of the dummy's legs at the
driver position created the largest source of ob-
jection by commenters. Ford expressed concern
that an inward-pointing left knee could result in
unrealistically high femur loads because of
femur-to-steering column impacts. GM asked
that an additional 0.6 inch of space be specified
between the dummy legs to allow for installation
of a device to measure steering column displace-
ment. Volkswagen considered specification of
the left knee bolt location to be redundant in
light of the positioning specification for the right
knee and the overall distance specification be-
tween the knees of 14.5 inches.

The commenters may not have understood that
the 14.5- and 5.9-inch dimensions are only initial
positions, as specified in S8.1.11.1.1. The later
specification to raise the femur and tibia center-
lines "as close as possible to vertical" without
contacting the vehicle shifts the knees from their
initial spacing to a point just to the left and
right of the steering column.

As for GM's concern about instrumentation,
the agency does not intend to modify this posi-
tioning procedure to accommodate instrumenta-
tion preferences not required for the standard's
purposes. GM may, of course, make test modi-
fications so long as it assures, in the exercise of
due care, that its vehicles will comply when
tested in accordance with the specification by the
agency.

In the case of a vehicle which is equipped with
a front bench seat, the driver dummy is placed
on the bench so that its midsagittal plane inter-
sects the center point of the plane described by
the steering wheel rim. BMW pointed out that

the center plane of the driver's seating position
may not coincide with the steering wheel center
and that dunmiy placement would therefore be
unrealistic. Ford believed that the specification
of the steering wheel reference point could be
more precisely specified.

The agency believes that BifW may be de-
scribing offset of the driver's seat from the steer-
ing wheel in bucket-seat vehicles. In the case of
bench-seat vehicles, there appears to be no reason
not to place the dummy directly behind the steer-
ing wheel. As for the Ford suggestion, the
agency concludes that Ford is describing the
same point as the proposal did, assuming, as the
agency does, that the axis of the steering column
passes through the center point described. The
Ford description does have the effect of moving
the point a slight distance laterally, because the
steering wheel rim upper surface is .somewhat
higher than the plane of the rim itself. This
small distance is not relevant to the positioning
being specified and therefore is not adopted.

In the case of center-position dummy place-
ment in a vehicle with a drive line tunnel. Ford
requested further specification of left and right
foot placement. The agency has added further
specification to make explicit what was implicit
in the specifications proposed.

Volkswagen suggested that the NHTSA had
failed to specify knee spacing for the passenger
side dummy placement. In actuality, the speci-
fication in S8.1. 11.1.2 that the femur and tibia
centerlines fall in a vertical longitudinal plane
has the effect of dictating the distance between
the passenger dummy knees.

The second major source of comments con-
cerned the dummy settling procedure that assures
uniformity of placement on the seat cushion and
against the seat back. Manufacturers pointed
out that lifting the dummy within the vehicle,
particularly in small vehicles and those with no
rear seat space, cannot be accomplished easily.
While the NHTSA recognizes that the procedure
is not simple, it is desirable to improve the uni-
formity of dummy response and it has been ac-
complished by the NHTSA in several small cars
(e.g., Volkswagen Rabbit, Honda Civic, Fiat
Spider, DOT HS-801-754). Therefore, the re-
quests of GM and Volkswagen to retain the

PART 571; S 208— PRE 77

EfFective: July 5, 1978

method that, does not involve lifting has been
denied. In response to Renault's question, the
dummy can be lifted manually by a strap routed
beneath the buttocks. Also, Volkswagen's re-
quest for more variability in the application of
rearward force is denied because, while difficult
to achieve, it is desirable to maintain uniformity
in dummy placement. In response to the requests
of several manufacturers, the location of the
9-square-inch push plate has been raised 1.5
inches, to facilitate its application to all vehicles.

Volkswagen asked with regard to SIO.2.2 for
a clarification of what constitutes the "lumbar
spine'" for purposes of dummy flexing. This
refers to the point on the dummy rear surface
at the level of the top of the dummy's rubber
spine element.

BMW asked the agency to reconsider the place-
ment of the driver dummy's thumbs over the
steering wheel rim because of the possibility of
damage to them. The company asked for an
option in placing the hands. The purpose of the
specification in dummy positioning, however, is
to remove discretion from the test personnel, so
that all tests are run in the same fashion. An
option under these circumstances is therefore not
appropriate.

Ultrasystems, Inc., pointed out two minor er-
rors in SI 0.3 that are hereby corrected. The
upper arm and lower arm centerlines are oriented
as nearly as possible in a vertical plane (rather
than straight up in the vertical), and the little
finger of the passenger is placed "barely in con-
tact" with the seat rather than "tangent" to it.

Two corrections are made to the dummy posi-
tioning procedure to correct obvious and unin-
tended conflicts between placement of the dummy
thighs on the seat cushion and placement of the
right leg and foot on the acceleration pedal.

In addition to the positioning proposed. Gen-
eral Motors suggested that positioning of the
dummy's head in the fore-and-aft axis, would be
beneficial. The agency agrees and has added
such a specification at the end of the dummy
settling procedure.

In a matter separate from the positioning pro-
cedure, General Motors, Ford, and Renault re-
quested deletion of the proposed requirement that
the dummy maintain proper calibration follow-

ing a crash test without adjustment. Such a
procedure is routine in test protocols and the
agency considered it to be a beneficial addition
to the standard to further demonstrate the cred-
ibility of the dummy test results. GM, however,
has pointed out that the limb joint adjustments
for the crash test and for the calibration of the
lumbar bending test are different, and that it
would be unfair to expect continued calibration
without adjustment of these joints. The NHTSA
accepts this objection and, until a means for sur-
mounting this difficulty is perfected, the proposed
change to S8.1.8 is witlidrawn.

In another matter unrelated to dummy posi-
tioning, Volkswagen argued that active belt sys-
tems should be subject to the same requirements
as passive belt systems, to reduce the cost differ-
ential between the compliance tests of the two
systems. As earlier noted the NHTSA has issued
an advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (41
FR 54961, December 16, 1976) on this subject
and will consider Volkswagen's suggestion in the
context of that rulemaking.

Finally, the agency proposed the same belt
warning requirements for belts provided with
passive restraints as are presently required for
active belts. No objections to the requirement
were received and the requirement is made final
as proposed. The agency also takes the oppor-
tunity to delete from the standard the out-of-date
belt warning requirements contained in S7.3 of
the standard.

RECONSIDERATION OF DOCKET
73-8; NOTICE 04

The NHTSA has received two petitions for
reconsideration of recent amendments in its test
dummy calibration test procedures and design
specifications (Part 572, Anthropomorphic Test
Dummy, 49 CFR Part 572) . Part 572 establishes,
by means of approximately 250 drawings and
five calibration tests, the exact specifications of
the test device referred to earlier in this notice
that simulates the occupant of a motor vehicle
for crash testing purposes.

Apart from requests for a technical change of
the lumbar flexion force specifications, the peti-
tions from General Motors and Ford contained a
repetition of objections made earlier in the rule-
making about the adequacy of the dummy as an

PART 571; S 208— PRE 78

Effective: July 5, 1978

objective nieasurinp device. Tliree issues were
raised : lateral response characteristics of the
dummy, failure of the dummy to meet the five
subassembly calibration limits, and the need for
a "whole systems" calibration of tiu' assemliled
dummy. Following receipt of these comments,
the ajrency published notification in the Federal
Register that it would entertain any other com-
ments on the issue of objectivity (42 FR 28200;
June 2. 1977). General conunents were received
from Chrysler Corporation and American Motoi-s.
repeating their positions fioni earlier comments
that the dununy does not (jualify as objective.

The objectivity of the dinnmy is at issue be-
cause it is the measuring device that rejristers the
acceleration and force readings specified by
Standard No. 208 during a 30-mph impact of the
tested vehicle into a fixed barrier. The resulting
readings for each vehicle tested must remain be-
low a certain level to constitute compliance.
Certification of compliance by the vehicle manu-
facturer is accomplished by crash testing repre-
sentative vehicles with the dunmiy installed.
Verification of compliance by the \HTSA is
accomplished by crash testing one or more of the
same model vehicle, also with a test dummy in-
stalled. It is important that readings taken by
different dummies, or by the same dummy re-
peatedly, accurately reflect the forces and ac-
celerations that are being experienced by the
vehicle during the barrier crash. This does not
imply that the readings pro<luced in tests of two
vehicles of the same design must be identical.
In the real world, in fact, literally identical ve-
hicles, crash circumstances, and test dummies are
not physically attainable.

It is apparent from this discussion that an
accurate reflection of the forces and accelerations
experienced in nominally identical vehicles does
not depend on the specification of the test dunuuy
alone. For example, identically specified and
responsive dummies would not provide identical
readings unless reasonable care is exercised in
the preparation and placement of the dummy.
Such care is analogous to that exercised in posi-
tioning a ruler to assure that it is at the exact
point where a measurement is to commence. No
one would blame a ruler for a bad measurement
if it were carelessly placed in the wrong position.

It is equally apparent that the forces and ac-
celerations experienced in nominally identical
vehicles will only be identical by the greatest of
coincidence. The small diffeTences in body struc-
ture, even of mass-produced vehicles, will affect
the crash pulse. The particular deployment
speed and shape of the cushion |)ortion of an
inflatal)le restraint system will also affect results.

All of these factors would affect the accelera-
tions and forces experienced by a hinnan occupant
of a vehicle certified to comply with the occupant
restraint .standard. Thus, achievement of identi-
cal conditions is not only impossible (due to the
inherent differences between tested vehicles and
underlying conditions) but would be unwise.
Literally identical tests would encourage the de-
sign of safety devices that would not adequately
serve the variety of circum.stances encountered in
actual crash explosure.

At the same time, the safety standards must
be "stated in objective terms" so that the manu-
facturer knows how its product will be tested and
under what circumstances it will have to comply.
A complete lack of dummy positioning proce-
dures would allow placement of the dunmiy in
any posture and would make certification of com-
pliance virtually impossible. A balancing is
provided in the test procedures between the need
for realism and the need for objectivity.

The test dummy also represents a balancing
between realism (biofidelity) and objectivity
(repeatability). One-piece cast metal dummies
could be placed in the seating positions and in-
strumented to register crash forces. One could
argue that these dummies did not act at all like
a human and did not measure what would hap-
pen to a human, but a lack of repeatability could
not be a.scribed to them. At the other end of the
spectrum, an extremely complex and realistic
surrogate could be substituted for the existing
Part 572 dununy, which would act realistically
but differently each time, as one might expect
different humans to do.

The existing Part 572 dummy represents 5
years of effort to provide a measuring instrument
that is sufficiently realistic and repeatable to serve
the purposes of the crash standard. Like any
measuring instrument, it has to be used with care.
As in the case of any complex instrumentation.

PART 571; S 208— PRE 79

Effective: July 5, 1978'

particular care must be exercised in its proper
use, and there is little expectation of literally
identical readings.

The dummy is articulated, and built of ma-
terials that permit it to react dynamically, simi-
larly to a human. It is the dynamic reactions of
the dummy that introduce the complexity that
makes a check on repeatability desirable and
necessary. The agency therefore devised five
calibration procedures as standards for the eval-
uation of the important dynamic dummy response
characteristics.

Since the specifications and calibration proce-
dures were established in August 1973, a substan-
tial amount of manufacturing and test experience
has been gained in the Part 572 dummy. The
quality of the dummy as manufactured by the
three available domestic commercial sources has
improved to the point where it is the agency's
judgment that the device is as repeatable and
reproducible as instramentation of such complex-
ity can be. As noted, GM and Ford disagree and
raised three issues with regard to dummy objec-
tivity in their petitions for reconsideration.

Lateral response characteristics. Recent sled
tests of the Part 572 dummy in lateral impacts
show a high level of repeatability from test to
test and reproducibility from one dummy to
another ("Evaluation of Part 572 Dummies in
Side Impacts"— DOT HS 020 858). Further
modification of the lateral and rollover passive
restraint requirements into an option that can be
met by installation of a lap belt makes the lateral
response characteristics of the dummy largely
academic. As noted in Notice 4 of Docket 73-8
(42 FR 7148; February 7, 1977), "Any manu-
facturer that is concerned with the objectivity of
the dummy in such [lateral] impacts would pro-
vide lap belts at the front seating positions in
lieu of conducting the lateral or rollover tests."

While the frontal crash test can be conducted
at any angle up to 30 degrees from perpendicular
to the barrier face, it is the agency's finding that
the lateral forces acting on the test instrument
are secondary to forces in the midsagittal plane
and do not operate as a constraint on vehicle aild
restraint design. Compliance tests conducted by
NHTSA to date in the 30-degree oblique impact
condition have consistently generated similar

dummy readings. In addition, they are consid-
erably lower than in perpendicular barrier im-
pact tests, which renders them less critical for
compliance certification purposes.

Repea.tahility of dummy calibration. Ford
questioned the dummy's repeatability, based on
its analysis of "round-robin" testing conducted
in 1973 for Ford at three different test labora-
tories (Ford Report No. ESRO S-76-3 (1976))
and on analysis of NHTSA calibration testing
of seven test dummies in 1974 (DOT-HS-801-
861).

In its petition for reconsideration. Ford
equated dummy objectivity with repeatability of
the calibration test results and concluded "it is
impracticable to attempt to meet the Part 572
component calibration requirements with test
dummies constructed according to the Part 572
drawing specification."

The Ford analysis of NHTSA's seven dummies
showed only 56 of 100 instances in which all of
the dummy calibrations satisfied the criteria.
The NHTSA's attempts to reproduce the Ford
calculations to reach this conclusion were unsuc-
cessful, even after including the H03 dummy
with its obviously defective neck. This neck
failed badly 11 times in a row, and yet Ford
apparently used these tests in its estimate of 56
percent compliance. This is the equivalent of
concluding that the specification for a stop watch
is inadequate because of repeated failure in a
stop watch with an obviously defective part. In
this case, the calibration procedure was doing
precisely its job in identifying the defective part
by demonstrating that it did not in fact meet the
specification.

The significance of the "learning curve" for
quality control in dummy manufacture is best
understood by comparison of three sets of dummy
calibration results in chronological order. Ford
in earlier comments relied on its own "round-
robin" crash testing, involving nine test dummies.
Ford stated that none of the nine dummies could
pass all of the component calibration require-
ments. What the NHTSA learned through
follow-up questions to Ford was that three of the
nine dummies were not built originally as Part
572 dummies, and that the other six were not
fully certified by their manufacturers as qualify-

PART 571; S 208— PRE 80

Effective; July 5, 1978

in<r as Part o72 dummies. In addition. Ford
instructed its contractors to use the dummies as
provided whether or not tliev met the Part r>72
specifications.

In contrast, recent NHTSA testing conducted
l.y Calspan (DOT-HS-6-01.514, May and June
1077 progress reports) and the results of tests
conducted by GM (USG 1502, Docitot 73-8. GR
64) demonstrate good repeatability and reproduc-
ibility of dummies. In the Calspan testing a
total of 152 calibration tests were completed on
four dummies from two manufacturers. The re-
sults for all five calibration tests were observed
to be within tlie specified performance criteria
of Part 572. The agency concludes that the
learning curve in the manufacturing process has
reached the point where repeatability and repro-
ducibility of the dummy has been fully demon-
strated.

Interestingly. Ford's own analysis of its round-
robin testing concludes that variations among the
nine dummies were not significant to the test
results. At the same time, the overall accelera-
tion and force readings did vary substantially.
Ford argued that this showed unacceptable
variability of the test as a whole, because they
had used "identical" vehicles for crash testing.
Ford attributed the variations in results to
"chance factors," listing as factors placement of
the dummy, postural changes during the ride to
the barrier, speed variations, uncertainty as to
just what part of the instrument panel or other
structure would be impact loaded, instrumenta-
tion, and any variations in the dynamics of air
bag deployment from one vehicle to another.

The agency does not consider these to be un-
controlled factors since they can be greatly re-
duced by carefully controlling test procedures.
In addition, they are not considered to be un-
acceptable "chance factors" that should be elimi-
nated from the test. The most important
advantage of the barrier impact test is that it
simulates with some realism what can be experi-
enced by a human occupant, while at the same
time limiting variation to achieve repeatability.
As discus.sed, nominally identical veliicles are not
in fact identical, the dynamics of deployment will
vary from vehicle to vehicle, and humans will
adopt a large number of different seated positions

in the real world. The .30-mph barrier impact
requires the manufacturer to take these variables
into accoimt by providing adequate protection
for more than an overly structured test situation.
At the same time, dummy positioning is specified
in adequate detail so that tlie manufacturer
knows how the NHT8A will set up a vehicle
prior to conducting compliance test checks.

^^ Whole systems''' calibrafi.on: Ford and GM
both suggested a "whole systems" calibration of
tlio dummy as a necessary additional check on
dunuuy repeatability. The agency has denied
these requests previously, because the demon-
strated repeatability and reproducibility of Part
572 dumiiiies based on current specification is
adequate. The use of whole systems calibration
tests as suggested would be extremely expensive
and would unnecessarily co!nplicate compliance
testing.

It is instructive that neither General Motors
nor Ford has been specific about the calibration
tests they have in mind. Because of the variables
inherent in a high energy barrier crash test at
80 mph, the agency judges that any calibration
readings taken on the dummy would be over-
whelmed by the other inputs acting on the dummy
in this test environment. The Ford conclusion
from its round-robin testing agrees that dummy
variability is a relatively insignificant factor in
the total variability experienced in this type of
test.

GM was most specific about its concern for
I'epeatability testing of the whole dununy in its
comments in response to Docket 74—14; Notice
01:

Dunuuy whole body response requirements
are considered necessary to assure that a
dummy, assembled from certified components,
has acceptable response as a completed struc-
ture. Interactions between coupled components
and subsystems must not be assumed acceptable
simply because the components themselves have
been certified. Variations in coupling may
lead to significant variation in dummy response.

There is a far simpler, more controlled means
to assure oneself of correct coupling of compo-
nents tiian by means of a "whole systems" cali-
bration. If, for example, a laboratory wishes to
assure itself that the coupling of the dummy

PART 571; S 208— PRE 81

Effective: July S, 1978

neck structure is properly accomplished, a simple
statically applied input may be made to the neck
prior to coupling to obtain a sample reading,
and then the same simple statically applied in-
put may be repeated after the coupling has been
completed. This is a commonly accepted means
to assure that "bolting together" the pieces is
properly accomplished.

Lumbar spine ftexion. The flexibility of the
dummy spine is specified by means of a calibra-
tion procedure that involves bending the spine
through a forward arc, with specified resistance
to the bending being registered at specified angles
of the bending arc. The dummy's ability to flex-
is partially controlletl by the characteristics of
the abdominal insert. In Notice 04, the agency-
increased the level of resistance that must be
registered, in conjunction with a decision not to
specify a sealed abdominal sac as had been pro-
posed. Either of these dummy characteristics
could affect the lumbar spine flexion perfonii-
ance.

Because of the agency's incomplete explanation
for its actions. Ford and General Motors peti-
tioned for reconsideration of the decision to take
one action without the other. Both companies
suggested that the specification of resistance levels
be returned to that which had existed previously.
The agency was not clear that it intended to go
forward with the stiffer spine flexion perfomi-
ance, quite apart from the decision to not specify
an abdomen sealing specification. The purpose
for the "stiffer" spine is to attain more consistent
torso return angle and to assure better dummy
stability during vehicle acceleration to impact
speed.

To assure itself of the wisdom of this course of
action, the agency has performed dummy cali-
bration tests demonstrating that the amended
spine flexion and abdominal force deflection
characteristics can be consistently achieved with
both vented and unvented abdominal inserts
(DOT HS-020875 (1977)).

Based on the considered analysis and review
set forth above, the NHTSA denies the petitions
of General Motors and Ford Motor Company for
further modification of the test dummy specifi-

cation and calibration procedures for reasons of
test dunnny objectivity.

In consideration of the foregoing. Standard
No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208) is amended as pro-
posed with changes set forth below, and Part
572 (49 CFR Part 572) is amended by the addi-
tion of a new sentence at the end of § 572.5,
Geiheral Desc-nptlon, that states : "A specimen of
the dummy is available for surface measurements,
and access can be arranged through : Office of
Crashworthiness, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590."

In accordance with Department of Transpor-
tation policy encouraging adequate analysis of
the consequences of regulatory action (41 FR
16200; April 16, 1976), the Department has eval-
uated the economic and other consetjuences of this
amendment on the public and private sectors.
The modifications of an existing option, the
simplification and clarification of test procedures,
and the increase in femur force loads are all
judged to be actions that simplify testing and
make it less expensive. It is anticipated that the
"two dummy" positioning procedure may occa-
sion additional testing expense in some larger
vehicles, but not the level of expense that would
have general economic effects.

The effective date foi' the changes has been
established as one year from the date of publica-
tion to permit Volkswagen, the only manufac-
turer presently certifying compliance of vehicles
using these test procedures, sufficient time to
evaluate the effect of the changes on the com-
pliance of its products.

The program official and lawyer principally
responsible for the development of this amend-
ment are Guy Hunter and Tad Herlihy, respec-
tively.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407); delegation of authority
at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on June 30, 1977.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

42 F.R. 34299
July 5, 1977

PART 571; S 208— PRE 82

Effective: September I, 1981

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection

(Docket No. 74-14; Notice 10)

The existing motor vehicle safety standard for
occupant cra.sh protection in new passenjxer cars
is amended to require tlie provision of ''passive''
restraint protection in passenger cars with wheel -
hases greater than 114 inches manufactured on
and after September 1. 1981, in passenger cars
with wheelbases greater than 100 inches on and
after September 1. 1982. and in all passenger cai-s
manufactured on or after September 1, 1983.
The low usage rate of active seat belt systems
negates much of their potential safety benefit.
However, lap belts will continue to be required
at most front and all rear .seating positions in
new cars, and the Department will continue to
recommend their use to motorists. It is found
that upgraded occupant crash protection is a
reasonable and necessary exercise of the mandate
of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act to provide protection through improved
automotive design, consti-uction, and performance.

Dates: Effective date September 1, 1981.

Addresses: Petitions for reconsideration should
refer to the docket number and be submitted to:
Docket Station, Room 5108— Nassif Building, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, B.C. 20590.

For further information contact :
Tad Herlihy
Office of Chief Counsel
National Higliway Traffic Safety

Administration
Washington, D.C. 20590
(202) 426-9511

Supplementary Information :
Considerations Underlying the Standard

Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act, as amendefl (the Act) (15 U.S.C.
1381 et seq.), the Department of Transportation

is responsible for issuing motor vehicle safety
standards tliat, among other things, protect the
public against unreasonable risk of death or in-
jury to persons in the event accidents occur.
The Act directs the Department to consider
whetlier a standard would contribute to carrying
out the purposes of the Act and would be reason-
able, practicable, and appropriate for a particular
type of motor vehicle (15 U.S.C. 1392(f)(3)).
The standard must, as formulated, be practicable,
meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and be
stated in objective terms (15 U.S.C. 1392(a)).
The Senate Committee drafting the statute stated
that safety would be the overriding consideration
in the issuance of standards. S. Rep. No. 1301,
89th Cong., 2d Sess (1966) at 6.

The total number of fatalities annually in
motor vehicle accidents is approximately 46,000
(estimate for 1976), of which approximately
25,000 are estimated to be automobile front seat
occui)ants. Two major hazards to which front
seat occupants are exposed are ejection from the
vehicle, which increases the probability of fatal-
ity greatly, and impact with the vehicle interior
during the crash. Restraint of occupants to pro-
tect against these hazards has long been recog-
nized as a means to substantially reduce the
fatalities and serious injuries experienced at the
front seating positions.

One of the Department's first actions in imi)le-
mcnting the Act was promulgation in 1967 of
Standard No. 208, Occupant Cm.<ih Protection
(49 CFR 571.208), to make it possible for vehicle
occupants to help protect themselves against the
hazards of a crash by engaging seat belts. The
standard requires the installation of lap and
shoulder seat belt assemblies (Type 2) at front
outl)oard designated seating positions (except in
convertibles) and lap belt assemblies (Type 1)

PART 571 ; S 208— PRE 83

Effective: September 1, 1981

at all other designated seating positions. The
standard became effective January 1, 1968.

Wliile it is generally agreed that when they
are worn, seat belt assemblies are highly effective
in preventing occupant impact with the vehicle
interior or ejection from the vehicle, only a
minority of motorists in the United States use
seat belts. For all types of belt systems,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(XHTSA) studies show that about 20 percent of
belt systems are used (DOT HS 6 01340 (in
process)). The agency's calculations show that
only about 2,600 deaths (and corresponding
numbers of injuries) of front seat occupants were
averted during 1976 by the restraints required by
Standard No. 208 as it is presently written.

Two basic approaches have been developed to
increase the savings of life and mitigation of
injury afforded by occupant restraint systems.
More than 20 nations and two provinces of
Canada have enacted mandatory seat belt use
laws to increase usage and thereby the effective
lifesaving potential of existing seat belt systems.
The other approach is to install automatic passive
restraints in passenger cars in place of, or in
conjunction with, active belt systems. These
systems are passive in the sense that no action by
the occupant is required to benefit from the re-
straint. Passive restraint systems automatically
provide a high level of occupant crash protection
to virtually 100 percent of front seat occupants.

The two foniis of passive restraint that have
been commercially pi'oduced are inflatable occu-
pant restraints (commonly known as air bags)
and passive belts. Air bags are fabric cushions
that are rapidly filled with gas to cushion the
occupant against colliding with the vehicle in-
terior when a crash occurs that is strong enough
to register on a sensor device in the vehicle. The
deployment is accomplished by the rapid genera-
tion or release of a gas to inflate the bag. Passive
belt systems are comparable to active belt systems
in many respects, but are distinguished by auto-
matic deployment around the occupant as the
occupant enters the vehicle and closes the door.

HISTORY OF STANDARD NO. 208
Because of the low usage rates of active belt
systems and because alternative technologies were

becoming available, the initial seat belt require-
ments of Standard No. 208 were upgraded in
1970 to require passive restraints by 1974 (35 FR
16927; November 3, 1970). Most passenger car
manufacturers petitioned for judicial review of
this amendment (Chrysler v. DOT, 472 F.2d 659
(6th Cir. 1972)). The Sixth Circuit's review
upheld the mandate in most respects but re-
manded the standard to the agency for further
specification of a test dummy that was held to be
insufficiently objective for use as a measuring
device in compliance tests. The court stated with
regard to two of the statutory criteria for issu-
ance of motor vehicle safety standards:

We conclude that the issue of the relative
effectiveness of active as opposed to passive
restraints is one which has been duly delegated
to the Agency, with its expertise, to make; we
find that the Agency's decision to require
passive restraints is supported by substantial
evidence, and we cannot say on the basis of the
record before us that this decision does not
meet the need for motor vehicle safety. 472
F.2d at 675.

... we conclude that Standard 208 is prac-
ticable as that term is used in this legislation.
472 F.2d at 674.

As for objective specification of the test dummy
device, a detailed set of specifications (49 CFR
Part 572) was issued in August 1973 (38 FR
20449; August 1, 1973) and updated with minor
changes in February 1977 (42 FR 7148; Feb-
ruary 7, 1977). A full discussion of the test
dummy specifications is set forth in a rulemaking
issued today by the NHTSA concerning technical
aspects of Standard No. 208 (42 FR 34299; FR
Doc. 77-19138).

In March 1974, the Department made the
finding that the test dummy is sufficiently objec-
tive to satisfy the Chryshr court remand (39
FR 10271; March 19, 1974). In the same notice,
mandatory passive restraints were again pro-
posed. Based on the comments received in re-
sponse to that notice, the passive restraint
mandate was once again proposed in a modified
form in June 1976 (41 FR 24070; June 14, 1976).
In the interim. General Motors Corporation
manufactured, certified, and sold approximately
10,000 air-bag-equipped full-size Buicks, Olds-

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mobiles, and Cadillacs. Volkswagen has manu-
factured and sold approximately 65,000 passive-
belt-i>quipped Rabbit model passenger cars.
Volvo Corpoi-ation has also introduced a rela-
tively small number of air-bag-equipped vehicles
into service. Ford Motor Company had earlier
manufactured 831 air-bag-ecjuipped Mercurys.
These vehicles were manufactured under one of
two options placed in the standard in 1071 to
permit optional production of vehicles with
passive restraint systems in place of seat belt
assemblies otherwise recjuired. In 1972, the
standard was also amended to require an "igni-
tion interlock" system on front seat belts to force
their use before the vehicle could be started.
This requirement, effective in September 1973,
was revoked in October 1974 in response to a
Congressional prohibition on its specification
(Pub. L. 93-492, § 109 (October 27, 1974)).

The Department's final action on its June 1976
proposal ("The Secretary's Decision Concerning
Motor Vehicle Occupant Crash Protection," here-
inafter "the December 1976 decision") continued
the existing requirements of the standard (42
FR o07l : January 27, 1977) and created a dem-
onstration program to fanuliarize the public
with passive restraints. The Department nego-
tiated contracts with four automobile manufac-
turers for the production of up to 2.50,000 passive-
equipped vehicles per year for introduction into
the passenger car fleet in model years 1980-1.
Mercedes-Benz agreed to manufacture 2,250 such
passenger cars, and Volkswagen agreed to manu-
facture 125,000 of its passive-belt-equipped
Rabbit models. Ford agreed to participate by
"establishing the capability of manufacturing"
140,000 compact model passenger cars, and Gen-
eral Motors agreed to "establish production ca-
pacity" to manufacture 300,000 intermediate size
passenger cars. The December 1976 decision was
based on the finding that, although passive re-
straints are technologically feasible at reasonable
cost and would prevent 9,000 fatalities annually
when fully integrated into the fleet, possible ad-
verse reaction by an uninformed public after the
standard took eff'ect could inspire their prohibi-
tion b\- Congress with substantial attendant
economic waste and incalculable harm to the
cause of highway safety. This finding was based
in large part on the Department's experience

with the ignition interlock on 1974- and 1975-
model passenger cars, wliicli was prohibited by
Congress in response to industn' and public
opposition.

Early in 1977, the Department reconsidered
the December 1976 decision because public ac-
ceptance or rejection of passive restraints is not
one of the statutory criteria which the Depart-
ment is charged by law to apply in establishing
.standards. In addition, the demonstration pro-
gram introduced a minimum 3-year delay in
implementation of mandatory passive restraints.
The Department questioned the premise that
passive restraint systems would fo.ster consumer
resistance as had the ignition interlock system.
AVhile the ignition interlock system forced action
by the motorist as a condition for operating an
automobile, passive restraints eliminate the need
for any action by the occupant to obtain their
crash protection benefits.

A third reason for reassessment of tlie De-
cember 1976 decision was the certainty that an
increasing proportion of the passenger car fleet
will be small cars, in response to the energy
situation and the automotive fuel economy pro-
gram established by the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act. The introduction of these
new, smaller vehicles on the highway holds the
prospect of an increase in the fatality and injury
rate unless countenneasures are undertaken.

Based on this reconsideration, the Department
proposed (42 FR 15935; March 24, 1977) that
the future crash protection requirements of
Standard No. 208 take one of three forms: (1)
continuation of the present requirements, (2)
mandatory passive restraints at one or more seat-
ing positions of passenger cars manufactured on
or after September 1, 1980, or (3) c(mtinuation
of the existing requirements in conjunction with
proposed legislation to establish Federal or State
mandatory seat belt use laws.

The proposal foi' an occupant restraint system
other than seat belts invoked a provision of the
Act (15 U.S.C. § 1400(b)) that requires notifica-
tion to Congress of the action. The Act also
recjuires that a public hearing be held at which
any member of Congress or any other interested
person could present oral testimony. The pro-
posal was transmitted to the Congress on March

PART 571; S 208— PRE 85

Effective: September 1, 1981

21, 1977, with an invitation to appear at a public
hearing chaired by the Secretary on April 27 and
28, 1977, in Washington, D.C. A transcript of
this meeting, along with written comments on the
March 1977 proposal, are available in the public
docket.

DISCUSSION OF ISSUES

The March 1977 proposal of three possible
courses of action for future occupant crash pro-
tection is grounded in a large, complex adminis-
trative record that has been developed in the 8
years since passive restraints were first contem-
plated by the Department. Interested persons
are invited to review the NHTSA public docket
that has been compiled under designations 69-7,
73-8, and 74—14. Consideration of the issues and
questions that have arisen during the years of
rulemaking can be found in the preambles to the
Department's numerous rulemaking notices on
passive restraints. Although many of the com-
ments on the March 1977 proposal raised issues
that have been discussed in previous notices, the
significant issues will be addressed here again, in
light of the most recent information available to
the Department.

The need far rulemaking action. An important
reason to consider anew the occupant crash pro-
tection issue is the basic and positive changes
that the automobile will undergo in the years
ahead. Until recently, the basic characteristics
of automobiles sold to the American public have
evolved for the most part in response to the
forces of the market place. High premium was
placed upon styling, roominess, and acceleration
performance. In a cheap-energy society, rela-
tively little attention was paid to efficiency of
operation. Nor, until relatively recently, was
serious consideration given to minimizing the
adverse impact of the automobile upon air
quality.

Recent circumstances, however, have drastically
altered the situation, and have made it abun-
dantly clear that the automobile's characteristics
must reflect broadly defined societal goals as well
as those advanced by the individual car owner.
The President has announced a new national
energy policy that recognizes a compelling need
for changes in the American lifestyle. Congress
has implemented statutory programs to improve

the fuel economy of automobiles, as one result of
which this Department has just issued demand-
ing fuel economy standards for 1981 through
1984 passenger cars. Right now, the Congress is
deliberating over amendments to the Clean Air
Act which will impose relatively stringent emis-
sions requirements effective over the same time
frame.

The trend toward smaller cars to improve
economy and emissions performance contains a
potential for increased hazard to the vehicles'
occupants. But technology provides the means
to protect against this hazard, and this Depart-
ment's statutory mandate provides authority to
assure its application. The Report of the Fed-
eral Interagency Task Force on Motor Vehicle
Goals for 1980 and Beyond indicated that simul-
taneous achievement of ambitious societal goals
for the automobile in the areas of fuel economy,
emissions, and safety is technologically feasible.
Integrated test vehicles developed by this De-
partment confirm that finding and, further, dem-
onstrate that the resulting vehicles need not
unduly sacrifice the other functional and esthetic
attributes traditionally sought by the American
car buyer.

Moreover, the socially responsive automobile of
the 1980's need not bring a penalty in economy
of ownership. The just-issued passenger car fuel
economy standards are calculated to reduce the
overall costs of operating an automobile by $1,000
over the vehicle's lifetime. In the case of im-
proved safety performance, the occupant restraint
improvements specified in this notice can be ex-
pected to pay for themselves in reduced first-
person liability insurance premiums during the
life of the vehicle.

The issue of occupant crash protection has been
outstanding too long, and a decision would have
been further delayed while the demonstration
programs was conducted. A rigorous review of
the findings made by the Department in Decem-
ber 1976 demonstrates that they are in all sub-
stantial respects correct as to the technological
feasibility, practicability, reasonable cost, and
lifesaving potential of passive restraints. The
decision set forth in this notice is the logical
result of those findings.

PART 571; S 208— PRE 86

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In reassessinp the December 1076 decision, the
Dei)artinent has considered each available means
to increase crash protection in arriviiifr at the
most rational approach. As proposed, the possi-
bility of "driver-side only" passive protection
was considered, but was rejected because of the
unsatisfactory result of havin<r one front-seat
pas,senper offered protection superior to that
offered other front-seat passengers in the same
vehicle. On balance, there was found to be little
cost or lead-time advantage to this approach.
The possibility of reinstitutinsr a type of safety
belt interlock was rejected because the agency's
authority was definitively removed by the Con-
gress less than three years ago and there is no
reason to believe that Congress has changed its
position on the issue since that time.

Mahdalory belt use laws. One of the means
proposed in the March notice to achieve a large
reduction in highway deaths and injuries is Fed-
eral legislation to induce State enactment of
mandatory seat belt use laws, either by issuance
of a highway safety program standard or by
making State passage of such laws a condition
for the receipt of Federal highway construction
money.

The prospects for passage of mandatory seat
l)elt use laws by more than a few States appear
to be poor. None of the commenters suggested
that passage of such laws was likely. A public
opinion survey sponsored by the Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association and conducted by
Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Inc. indicated
that a 2-to-l majority nationwide opposes belt
use laws. Many such bills have been presented;
no State has enacted one up to now. Also, Con-
gress denied funding for a program to encourage
State belt use laws in 1974, suggesting that it
does not look favorably upon Federal assistance
in the enactment of these laws.

More recently. Congress removed the Depart-
ment's authority to withdraw Federal safety
funding in the case of States that do not mandate
the use of motorcycle helmets on their highways
(Pub. L. 94-280, Sec. 208(a), May 5, 1976). The
close parallel between requiring helmet use and
requiring seat belt use argues against the likeli-
hood of enactment of belt use laws.

These strong indications that Congress would
not enact a belt use program in the foreseeable

future demonstrate, in large measure, why the
-success of other nations in enacting laws is not
parallel to the situation in the Ignited States. In
the belt use jurisdictions most often <-ompared to
the United States (Australia and the Provinces
of Canada), the laws were enacted at the State
or Province level in the first instance, and not at
the Federal level. In the Department's judgment,
the most reasonable course of action to obtain
effective belt use laws in the United States will
be to actively encourage their enactment in one
or more States. An attempt to impose belt use
laws on citizens by the Federal government
would create difficulties in Federal-State rela-
tions, and could damage rather than further the
interests of highway safety.

EffectivenesH of passive restraints. The De-
cember 1976 decision concluded that the best esti-
mates of effectiveness in preventing deaths and
injuries of the various types of restraint .systems
under consideration were as set forth in Table I.
Using the effectiveness estimates from Table I,
the projection of benefits attributable to various
restraint systems is summarized in Table II.
Several comments concerning the effectiveness of
passive restraint S3'stems were submitted in re-
sponse to the March 1977 proposal.

Insurance company commenters generally sup-
ported the Department's estimates. General
Motors, however, disputed the validity of the
estimates in the December 1976 decision, arguing
that the results experienced by the approximately
10,000 GM vehicles sold the public indicated a
much lower level of effectiveness. It made com-
parisons between accidents involving those cars
and other accidents with conventional cars, se-
lected to be as similar as possible in type and
.severity. On the basis of this study, GM stated
that the data indicate that the "current air
cushion-lap belt system, if available in all cars,
would save le.ss than the nearly 3,000 lives that
can be saved by (mly 20 percent active lap/
shoulder belt use."

The Department finds the methods used in the
General Motoi-s study to be of doubtful value in
arriving at an objective assessment of the experi-
ence of the air-bag-equipped vehicles. General
Motors is a va.stly interested party in these pro-
ceedings, and the positions that it adopts are
necessarily those of an advocate for a particular

PART 571; S 208— PRE 87

Effective: September 1, 1981

result. This is in no sense a disparagement;
advocacy of desired outcomes by interested
parties is an essential part of the administrative
process. But if a study advanced by an inter-
ested advocate is to be seriously considered from
a "scientific" viewpoint, it must be carefully de-
sigjied to avoid dilution of its objectivity by the
bias of the sponsoring party. The GM study
fails that test. Its foundation is a long series of
qualitative judgments, which are made by em-
ployees of the party itself. An equally serious
fault is that the basic body of accident data from
which the comparison accidents are selected is
not available to the public, so that countering
analyses cannot be made by opposing parties, nor
can the judgments in the original study be
checked. General Motors had previously sub-
mitted to an earlier Standard No. 208 docket a
study of restraint system effectiveness based on
similarly qualitative judgments by its own em-
ployees (69-07-GR-256-01). The shoulder belt
effectiveness figui-es arrived at in that study were
about one-half of what are now generally recog-
nized to be the actual values. While this later
study utilizes a somewhat different methodology,
it suffers from the same flaws in its failure to
preclude dilution of its objectivity by the bias of
its sponsor.

Economics and Science Planning, Inc., sub-
mitted three studies that made estimates of air
bag effectiveness. In one, the estimate of air bag
effectiveness was at least as high as the theoreti-
cal projections made in Table II. In another, a
very low estimate of air bag effectiveness was
made — from 15 to 25 percent.

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
submitted another estimate of fl,ir bag effective-
ness based on the experience with the GM cars
in highway use. A selection was made of acci-
dents in which the air bag was designed to oper-
ate, based on frontal damage, direction of impact,
and age of occupant. In these accidents, air bags
were determined to have reduced fatalities by 66
percent, as compared to 55 percent for three-
point belts. However, the narrow selection of
accidents limits the application of the figures
derived in the IIHS study.

The Department considers that the most re-
liable method of evaluating the experience of the
air-bag-equipped cars at this time is to compare

the number of injuries, at various levels, sustained
by their occupants with the number that is ex-
perienced in the general population of vehicles
of this type. The vehicles in question are not a
sampling of the general vehicle population : they
are relatively new, and mostly in the largest
"luxury" size class. Some adjustment must be
made for these factors.

The adjustment for the size of the vehicles has
been made by multiplying the overall injury
figures by a factor of 0.643, which has been found
in one study (Joksch, "Analysis of Future Ef-
fects of Fuel Storage and Increased Small Car
Usage Upon Traffic Deaths and Injuries," Gen-
eral Accounting Office, 1975) as the ratio of
fatalities per year for this size of vehicles to the
figure for the general population. The newness
of the vehicles has a double-edged aspect: newer
vehicles are evidently driven more miles per year
than older ones, but they also appear to experi-
ence fewer accidents per mile traveled (Dutt and
Reinfurt, "Accident Involvement and Crash In-
jury Rates by Make, Model, and Year of Car,"
Highway Safety Research Center, 1977). These
two factors can be accounted for if it is assumed
that they cancel each other, by using vehicle
years, rather than vehicle miles, as the basis of
comparison. With these adjustments, the ex-
pected number of all injuries of AIS-2 (an index
of injury severity) and above in severity for
conventional vehicles equivalent to the air-bag-
equipped fleet during the period considered was
91. The actual number experienced was 38, indi-
cating an effectiveness factor for these injury
classes of 0.58.

A possibility of bias in these estimates exists
in that injuries that have occurred in the air bag
fleet may not have been reported, despite the
three-level reporting system (owners, police, and
dealers) that has been established. This bias is
less likely to be present in frontal accidents,
where the air bag is expected to (and generally
does) deploy. For frontal accidents only, the
number of injuries expected is 60, or 66 percent
of the total ("Statistical Analysis of Seat Belt
Effectiveness in 1973-1975 Model Cars Involved
in Towaway Crashes," Highway Safety Research
Center, 1976) ; only 29 have been experienced,
indicating an effectiveness factor of 0.52.

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Effectiva: September I, 1981

These figures ronfirni (and in fact exceed) the
effectiveness estimates of the December 1376 de-
cision. For injuries of lii»rher severity levels, the
numbers experienced are mucii too small to be
statistically significant.

The various assumptions and adjustments that
must be made to arrive at u valid "expected"
figure, and the possibility that some injuries were
unreported, leaves substantial room for uncer-
tainty and argument as to the true observed
effectiveness of the restraint systems. Neverthe-
less, the results of the field experience are en-
couraging. Even if the observed-effectiveness
figures arrived at by these calcidations were high
1)V a factor of 2, they would still substantially
confirm the estimates of the December 1976 deci-
sion. Considering all the argimients on both
sides of the issues, the Department concludes that
the observed experience of the vehicles on the
road equipped with air bags does not cast doubt
on the effectiveness estimates in the December
1976 decision.

It has been argued that the Department should
not issue a passive restraint standard in the ab-
sence of statistically significant real world data
which confirm its estimates of effectiveness.
Statistical '"proof" is certainly desirable in deci-
sionmaking, but it is often not available to resolve
public policy decisions. It is also clear from the
legislative hi.story of the Act that the Department
was not supposed to wait for the widespread
introduction of a technology- before it could be
mandated. The Senate report for example re-
fers to the "failure of safety to sell" in automo-
biles, and describes how the Department was
intended to piish the manufacturers into adopt-
ing new safety technologA' tiiat would not be
introduced voluntarily (S. Rep. 1301, 89th Cong.
•2nd Scss. 4 (1966)). The Chi^slcr case foimd
that "The explicit purpose of the Act is to enable
ti»e Federal Goveninient to impel automobile
manufacturers to develop and apply new tech-
nology to the task of improving the .safety design
of automobiles as readily as possible." (47'2
F.2d at 671.)

Cost of /la-snirc rt-HtraintK. Passive belts have
l)een estimated in the past by the Department to
add $25 to the price of an automobile, relative to
the price of cars with present active belt systems.

The increaseil operating cost over the life of a
vehicle with passive belts is estimated to be $5.
These figures are assumed valid for purposes of
this review, and were not contsted in the com-
ments received.

This I)ei)artment, General Motors, Ford, De-
Lorean. and Alinicars all have produced estimates
of the passenger car price increase due to the in-
clusion of air bags. These are sufficiently detailed
and current to be comi)ared. and are set forth in
Table III. The Department estimate has been
raised somewhat above its previous ones because
of the $14 increase in the price of the compo-
nents of an air bag .system quoted by a supplier.

The General Motors estimates have been re-
vised from previous estimates in several respects.
Research and development, engineering, and tool-
ing expenses are no longer amoi-tized entirely in
the first yeai', but are spread over 8 years (other
estimates spread these costs over 5 years). The
allowance for removal of active belt hardware
has been reduced to conform more closely to the
Depai'tment's estimates. The newer figuies re-
flect a somewhat more complex system, including
new sensors. Of the $81 spread between the
Department and the GM estimates, all but $11
can be attributed to differences in the following
areas: GM*s estimate of dealer profit which is
based on sticker prices (rather than actual sale
l)rice). GM's shorter amortization period, added
complexity of the 1977 system over the 1976 sys-
tem, and the cost of major modifications of the
vehicle which the agency (juestions. The remain-
ing $11 difference must be con.sidered as disagree-
ment concerning the elements of cost shown in
the table.

The Ford estimate is the same as previously
submitted. Forty-two dollars of the difference
from the Department estimate is a higher profit
figure arising from Ford's use of sticker prices
rather than actual i)rice of sale, which gives the
dealer less mark-up. A substantial amount of
difference is for a complex electronic diagnostic
module, extra sensors that the Department does
not view as neces.sary, and the use of a knee
bolster instead of a cheaper knee air bag. Thirty-
nine dollars represents unreconcileil differences.

Operating costs consist mainly of the cost of
replacing a deployed bag, fuel cost, and mainte-

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Effective: September 1, 1981

nance. Ford also includes an amount for periodic
inspection. The Department estimate for re-
placement cost differs from the GM and Ford
estimates almost entirely as a result of the lower
estimate for the first cost of the system. The
fuel costs differ primarily as a result of different
weijDfht figures for the passive systems, which may
be design choices of the manufacturers. The
Department's evaluation of manufacturers' cost
objections is being placed in the public docket as
required by § 113 of the Act.

If, as projected, passive restraints are effective
in saving lives and reducing injuries, as compared
to existing belt systems at present use I'ate, the
insurance savings that will result will offset a
major portion, and possibly all, of the cost to the
consumer of the systems. There may be some
doubt on this point that arises from skepticism
concerning the behavior of insurers.

The vast majority of auto occupant injuries
beyond the minor level result in automobile,
health, or life insurance claims. In some States,
insurers may lack a degree of flexibility in the
adjustment of premiums because of pressures
from insurance commissions. However, the evi-
dence indicates that premiums are fundamentally
based on claims experience.

In its comments to the docket. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Companies estimated that sav-
ings in insurance premiums should average $32.50
per insured car per year, if all cars were equipped
with air bags. Of this amount, 75 percent is the
result of an assumed savings of 24.6 percent in
the bodily injury portion of automobile insurance
premiums, 21 percent from a 1.5 percent reduc-
tion in health insurance premiums (30 percent
of the 5 percent of the premiums that pay for
auto-related injuries), and the remainder from
savings in life insurance premiums. The Ameri-
can Mutual Insurance Alliance and Allstate re-
ferred to existing 30 percent discounts in first-
party coverage and concluded that comparable
reductions would be expected to follow a mandate
of passive restraints.

It has been argued that these savings would be
largely offset by the increased cost of collision
and property damage insurance due to the in-
creased cost of repairing a car with a deployed
air bag. This claim appears to be largely un-

founded. Using figures based on field tests, it is
estimated that each year 300,000 automobiles will
be in accidents of sufficient severity to deploy the
air bag. (Cooke, "Usage of Occupant Crash
Protection Systems," NHTSA, July 1976, #74-
14-GR-30, App. A.) Accepting vehicle manu-
facturer estimates, it is further assumed that the
cost of replacing an air bag will be 2.5 times the
original equipment cost. If a car more than 6
years old is involved in an air-bag-deploying
accident, it is assumed scrapped rather than being
repaired. Combining these assumptions with the
estimated $112 cost of installing a full front air
cushion in a new vehicle gives a total annual cost
of replacement of $50.4 million, or a per car cost
of less than 51 cents per year. Increases in col-
lision premiums should, therefore, not exceed $1
per car- per yeai'. It is noted that deployment in
non-crash cases would be covered by "comprehen-
sive" insurance policies.

The $32.50 annual insurance savings estimated
by Nationwide would be sufficient to pay for the
added operating cost (around $4 per year) of an
air-bag-equipped car with enough left over to
more than pay for the initial cost of the system.
Discounting at the average interest rate on new
car loans measured in real terms (6 percent), the
air bag would almost recover the initial cost in
4 years, with a savings over operating cost of
$107.

Economic and Science Planning, Inc. (ESP)
has submitted a differing estimate, that insurance
savings with full implementation of passive re-
straints would be only $3.60, rather than $32.50
per year. About one-half of the difference arises
from ESP's assumption that seat belt usage
would voluntarily rise to the 44 percent level by
1984. This seems highly improbable, based on
experience to date.

Moreover, that assumption does not support
the deletion of projected insurance savings re-
sulting from passive restraints, but suggests that
other courses of action (such as whatever might
be done to increase belt usage to 44 percent)
might also produce savings. The remaining dif-
ferences aie based on such factors as the portion
of injury costs that is paid for by insurance. If
the assumptions of ESP are allowed to remain,

PART 571; S 208— PRE 90

Effscllve: September 1, 1981

the savinjrs per year would he ahout $lfi. and tlie
present value of auto-lifetime saviiitrs would be
$120.

Side effects of ah' bag iixstallafion. Some con-
cerns were expressed in the comments about air
baps that mipht be frroupetl as possible undesir-
able side effects. One of these was injuries that
might be caused by design deployment. There
is no question that any restraint system that
must decelerate a human body from 30 mph or
more to rest within approximately 2 feet can
cause injury. Belt systems often cause bruises
and abrasions in protecting occupants from more
serious injuries. The main question is whether
any injuries caused by air bags are generally
within acceptable limits, and are significantly less
severe than those that would have been suffered
had the occupants in (juestion not been restrained
by the air bags. The evidence from the vehicles
on the road indicates that this is indeed the case.
The injuries cited by GM as possibly caused or
aggravated by air bag deployment are in the
minor to moderate (AIS-1 and -2) categoiy.
From this it can be concluded that injuries
caused by design deployment, though worthy of
careful monitoring with a view to design im-
provements by manufacturers, <lo not provide a
serious argument against a passive restraint re-
quirement.

A closely related (juestion that has caused con-
cern in the past is whether air bags pose an
unreasonable danger to occupants who are not in
a normal seating position, such as children stand-
ing in front of a dashboard or persons who have
l)een moved forward by panic braking. Much
development work has been devoted to this prob-
lem in the past, to design systems that minimize
the danger to pei-sons who are close to the infla-
tion source. The most important change in this
area has piobably been the general shift away
from inflation systems that depend on stored
high-pressure gas. in favor of pyrotechnic gas
generators. \\'\i\\ these systems the flow of gas
can be adjusted to make the rate slower at the
l)eginning of inflation, so that an out -of -posit ion
occupant is pushed more gently out of the way
before the maximum inflation rate occurs.

With one exception, there have been no cases
where out-of-position occupants have been found

to be seriously injured in crashes in which air
bags have deployed. Five of the crashes involv-
ing GM vehicles liave involved children in front
seating positions (although not necessarily out
of [)osition). and others have involved children
unbelt('(l in the rear seat.

The only exception has been tlie death of an
infant that was lying laterally on the front seat
unrestrained. Apparently during panic braking
that proceeded the crash, the infant was thrown
from the seat. While this constitutes an out-of-
position situation technically, it is not the type
of circumstance in which the air bag contributes
to injury of the out-of-position occupant.

Inadvertent actuation of an air bag may be a
particular concern to the public, as noted by both
General Motors and Ford. The sudden deploy-
ment of an air bag in a non-crash situation would
generally be a disconcerting experience. The
experience with vehicles on the road, and tests
tliat have been performed on 40 subjects who
were not aware that there were air bags in their
vehicles, indicate the loss of control in such sit-
uations should be rare: none has occurred in the
incidents up to now. There is little (juestion,
however, that inadvertent actuation could cause
loss of control by .some segments (aged, inexperi-
enced, distracted) of the driving population, and
it must be viewed as a small but real cost of air
bag protection.

The frequency of inadvertent actuation is
therefore of special concern. The Ford fleet of
air-lmg-equipped cars (about 800 vehicles that
have been on the road since late 1972, with around
.")00 now taken out of service) has experienced
no inadveitent actuations at all. The General
Motors fleet, about 10,000 sold mostly to private
buyers during 1974 and 1975, has experienced
three inadvertent actuations on the road. Six
others have occurred in the hands of mechanics
and body shop personnel, two in externally
caused fires or explosions, and one from tamper-
ing in a driveway. The Volvo fleet of 7.") vehicles
has experienced none. It is believed that the
causes of the GM inadvertent deployments arc
understood, and that the means of eliminating or
considerably reducing the likelihood of all the
known causes of inadvertent deployments have
been found. These include shielding of the
squibs (the device to ignite the propellant ma-

PART 571; S 208— PRE 91

Effective: September 1, 1981

terial in the bag inflators) against electromag-
netic radiation, automatically disarming the
system through the ignition system when the car
is not in operation, and routing wiring so that it
is less accessible to tampering or degradation.

If the figures for the combined fleets are
projected onto the U.S. vehicle population, they
would amount to around 7,000 on-the-road in-
advertent actuations annually, or one for every
15,000 vehicles. The chances of an individual
experiencing one as a vehicle occupant during
his or her lifetime would be on the order of 1 in
200. This estimate probably overstates the like-
lihood of occurrence since the inadvertent actua-
tions in the GM cars to date are believed to be
due to design deficiencies that are correctable.
Thus, although it will probably continue to be a
public concern, the infrequency with which in-
advertent actuation occurs leads to the conclusion
that it does not constitute a weighty argument
against a passive restraint requirement.

Some private individuals expressed, in their
comments, concern over possible eai- damage, or
injuries that might be cau.sed to persons with
smoking materials in their mouths, or wearing
eyeglasses. Although some early tests with over-
sized cushions of prototype design produced
some temporary hearing losses, later designs have
reduced the sound pressures to the point where
ear damage is no longer a significant possibility.
AVith respect to eyeglasses and smoking materials,
the results from the vehicles on the road have
been favorable. Of the occupants that had been
involved in air cushion deployments as of a re-
cent date, 71 had been smoking pipes or wearing
eyeglasses or other facial accessories. None of
these received injuries beyond the minor (AIS-1)
level. From this it can be concluded that these
circumstances do not create particular hazards to
occupants of air-bag-equipped vehicles.

Toyo Kogyo and some private individuals
questioned whether air bags might experience
reliability problems in high-mileage and older
vehicles. The fact that air bags have only one
moving part, and most of the critical components
rest in sealed containers during their non-deploy-
ment life, indicates that they should perform
well in this regard. The systems in the vehicles
in the field, some of which have been in use for
almost 5 years, have demonstrated extremely good

durability, with no apparent flaws. Manufac-
turers use sophisticated techniques such as ac-
celerated test cycles to assure a high level of
reliability.

Reliability of restraint systems is, of course,
absolutely necessary. Unlike the failure of acci-
dent prevention systems such as lights and brakes
where failure does not necessarily result in harm
to occupants, the failure of a restraint system
when needed in a serious crash almost certainly
means injury will result. Vehicle and component
manufacturers are fully aware of this and take
the special precautions to ensure reliability which
might not be taken for less critical systems. The
Department is equally aware of it and has moni-
tored manufacturer efforts to date to ensure fail-
safe performance of crash-deployed systems. As
an example, copies of reliability information re-
quest letters from the Department to manufac-
turers preparing for the demonstration program
or otherwise involved in air bag systems have
been made public in the docket.

The projections of reliability to date are, of
necessity, based on pilot production volumes, and
cannot demonstrate fully that reliability prob-
lems associated with mass production will never
occur. So that manufacturers can avoid these
types of reliability problems, the Department has
settled on a phase-in of the I'equirements which
is described later in greater detail.

General Motors and the National Automobile
Dealers Association commented that product lia-
bility arising from air bag performance would
be a major expense. The insurance company
coumienters, on the other hand, suggested that
the presence of air bags in vehicles could reduce
auto companies' product liability.

The new risk of liability, attached to a require-
ment for passive lestraints, does not differ from
the risk attached to the advent of any device or
product whether mandated by the Federal gov-
ernment or installed by a manufacturer by its
own choice. Just as liability might arise because
of the malfunctioning of a seat belt system or
braking system, liability may also arise because
of the malfimctioning of a passive restraint sys-
tem. The mandating of a requirement by the
Federal government has, in fact, often served to
limit liability, since most jurisdictions accord

PART 571; S 208— PRE 92

EfFective: September 1, 1981

preat weight to evidence showinjr tliat a device
has met Federal standards.

There is little evidence that the mandating of
passive restraints will lead to increases in product
liahility insurance premiums. Although the ad-
vent of new technology has often been accom-
panied by an increase in products liability
insurance, it is unclear liow much of the increase
is attributable to increased risk and how much
to inflation. Officials of the Department of Com-
merce and at least two major insurance companies
doubt that Fedei'al passive resti-aint requirements
will lead to increased risk and insurance pre-
miums. They point out that Federal require-
ments are imposed to make products safer, and
safe products are less likely to cause injur\-.

It is noteworthy that the Allstate Insurance
Company agreed to sell product liability insur-
ance for the GM cars which were to be equipped
with passive restraint systems pursuant to the
demonstration program, at a rate no greater than
the product liability insurance rate for cars not
equipped with passive restraint systems.

Small cars. An important consideration in the
decision concerning passive restraints is their
suitability and availability for small cars, which
because of the energy shortage will comprise an
increasing segment of the vehicle populatitm in
future years. Passive belts have been sold as
standard equipment in over 6.5,000 Volkswagen
cars, and must be viewed as a proven means of
meeting a passive restraint requirement. Some
vehicle body designs may require some modifica-
tion for their installation, but passive belts could
Ih" used as restraints for most bucket -seat ar-
rangements at moderate cost with present tech-
nology.

Some manufacturers have expressed doubt that
a large proportion of their customers would find
passive belts acceptable, because of their rela-
tively obtrusive nature and the i-esistance shown
by the U.S. public to wearing seat belt systems.
i.e., Ijelts that occupants must buckle and un-
buckle. These manufacturers submitted no sup-
porting market surveys. Further, there is reason
to believe that the experience with active belt
systems is not an accurate indicator of the ex-
perience to be expected with passive belts. The
Department anticipates that some manufacturers

will install passive belts in the front seats of
small cars having only two front seats. Passive
belts would not confront the occupants of those
seats with the current inconvenience of having
to buckle a belt system to gain its protection or
of having to unbuckle that system to get out of
their cars. ITnlike the interlock active belt sys-
tems of several years ago. the passive belt systems
will have no effect on the ability of drivers to
start their cars.

Nevertheless, the question of the acceptability
of passive belts may make the suitability of air
bags for small cars an important one. Although
the shorter crush distance of small cars may im-
pose more stringent limits on air bag deployment
time, the evidence from studies conducted by the
Department with air bags in small cars is that
there are no insujjerable difficulties in meeting
the 30-mph crash re(|uireinents of Standard 208
in cars as small as 2000 pounds gross vehicle
weight rating with existing air bag designs (see,
for example, "Small Car Driver Inflatable Re-
straint System Evaluation Program." Contract
DOT-HS-6-01412. Status Report April 15.
1977).

The "packaging" problems of installing air bag
systems are greater for small cars than for larger
ones. They occupy space in the instrument panel
area that might othenvise be utilized by other
items such as air conditioning duct,s, glove com-
partment, or controls and displays. Toyo Kogyo
(Mazda) and Honda indicated that their instru-
ment panels might have to be displaced 4 inches
rearward, that some engine compartment and
wheelbase changes might be needed, and that
some dash-mounted accessories might have to be
deleted or mounted elsewhere. This type of prob-
lem is expected to be important to the existing
choice between aii' bag and passive belt systems.

It is not the role of the government to resolve
these problems since, in the Department's judg-
ment, they reflect design choices of the manufac-
turei-s. Xo manufacturer lias claimed, much less
demonstrated, that it would be impracticable to
install air bags in small cais without increasing
vehicle size. Occupation of instrument panel
space is certainly <me of the uiupiantified costs
of air bags, however, and the cost is more onerous
in a small car than in a large one. At the same
time, small car makers mav choose to use the less

PART 571; S 208— PRE 93

Effective: September 1, 1981

costly passive belt system. The evidence pre-
sented to date indicates tliat small-car manufac-
turers would be able to meet a passive restraint
requirement by making reasonable design com-
promises without increasing vehicle size.

Lead time and production readiness. There
was considerable discussion in the comments to
the docket about the ability of the automobile
industry to develop the production readiness to
provide passive restraint systems for all passen-
ger cars. The installation of passive restraint
systems requires the addition of new hardware
and modification of vehicle structures in such a
way that the system provides performance ade-
quate to meet the standard and a high level of
safety and reliability on the road. A new in-
dustrial capacity will have to be generated to
supply components for air bag systems. Major
capital expenditures will have to be made by the
vehicle industry to incorporate air bag systems
into production models. The Department esti-
mates that the total capital required for tooling
and equipment for the production of passive re-
straint systems in new cars is approximately $500
million.

Establishment of an industry to produce com-
ponents for air bag systems centers on the pro-
duction of the inflator component. Five major
companies have indicated an interest in produc-
ing inflators for air bags. The propellant pres-
ently being considered for use is sodium azide.
The primary source of sodium azide, Canadian
Industries Ltd., has a capacity of around 1 mil-
lion pounds per year, sufficient for only about
S00,000 full front seat air bag systems. Thus,
additional capacity of 10 million pounds or more
of sodium azide will have to be generated, or
alternative propellants would have to be used.
The Department's analysis of the capital require-
ments and lead time to develop sufficient capacity
indicates that adequate propellant can be avail-
able for annual production levels of several mil-
lion units in less than three years. The production
of inflators (from several sources) can reach sev-
eral million units within two to three years of
the receipt of firm orders, including design speci-
fications, from the automobile manufacturers. A
new capacity has already been generated to sup-
ply the demonstration program which is being
pursued at this time.

The vehicle manufacturers face substantial
work to incorporate air bags in their production.
In the case of domestic manufacturers alone, the
instrument panels of approximately half of the
new cars that will be manufactured in the early
1980's will have to be completely redesigned to
provide space for the passenger bag and structure
to accept the loading on the passenger bag. In
some cases, relocation of the instrument cluster
is needed to facilitate visibility over the bag
module in the steering hub.

The burden placed on the vehicle manufactur-
ers to redesign the instrument panel and related
components to accept air bags can be reduced
considerably by phasing in the passive restraint
requirements over several years. With phased
introduction, the redesigning of instrument panels
and other components can be done at roughly the
same pace that these components would ordinarily
be redesigned, although perhaps not within the
manufacturer's preferred schedule.

The rulemaking docket contained a number of
references to additional reasons for phased intro-
duction of new systems like passive restraints :
to establish quality systems in production, to ob-
tain experience with these systems in the hands
of a more limited segment of the public, and to
obtain feedback on the performance and reliabil-
ity of the systems. If production levels are rela-
tively small at the beginning of a mandated
requirement, any unforeseen issues that arise are
made more manageable by the limited number of
vehicles affected. A major automotive supplier,
Eaton Corporation, stressed this aspect of pro-
duction feasibility over all others.

Based on its evaluation, the Department has
determined that a lead time of four full years
should precede the requirement for the produc-
tion of the first passive-equipped passenger cars.
This lead time accords with General Motors' re-
quested lead time to accomplish the change for
all model lines. Equally important, the 4-year
lead time represents a continuation to its logical
conclusion of the early voluntary production of
passive restraints represented by the Decembei'
1976 decision. The continued opportunity for
early, gradual, and voluntary introduction of
passive restraints to the public in relatively small
niunbers offers a great deal of benefit in assuring
the orderly implementation of a mandatory

PART 571; S 208— PRE 94

Effective: September 1, 1981

passive restraint reqniroinent. Experience vvitli
the limited quantities of early passive-restraint-
oqiiipped vehicles can confinii in the jjublic's
Miind tile value of these systems prior to manda-
tory production. Because of the value of such a
voluntary phase-in approach to both the manu-
facturer and the public, the Department antici-
pates that the manufacturers which were parties
to the earlier demonstration pro<rram ajrreements
will continue their current preparations for vol-
untary production of passive restraints. The
Department also expects that othei- manufactur-
ers will undertake to [)roduce litnited quantities
prior to the efl'ectivity of the mandate. The
Department intends to vigorously support tlie
efforts of manufacturers to foster sales on a vol-
untary basis, both throujrh major public infor-
mation proprrams and throu<rh efforts to encourage
their i)urchase by Federal, other government
agencies, and private-fleet users.

The Department also intends to initiate an
intensive monitoring program to oversee the im-
plementation plans of both vehicle manufacturei-s
and their suppliers. The purpose of the moni-
toring program will be not only to confirm that
adequate levels of reliability and quality are
being achieved in implementing designs to com-
ply with the standard, but also to provide assur-
ance to the public that the issues that have been
raised on passive restraint reliability are being
resolved under the auspices of the Secretary of
Transportation.

In addition to a long lead time, the Depart-
ment considers that the mandate should lie ac-
complished in three stages, with new standard-
and luxury-size cars (a wheelbase of more than
114 inches) meeting the requirement on and after
September 1, 1981, new intermediate- and com-
pact-size cars (a wheelbase of more than 100
inches) also meeting the requirements on and
after September 1, 1982. and all new passenger
cars meeting the requirement on and after Sep-
tember 1, 1983.

"WTieelbase was chosen as a measure to delineate
the phasing requirements because it is a well-
defined cjuantity that does not vary significantly
within a given car line. With the downsizing of
most automobiles made in the United States,
wheelbases are being reduced by four to six
inches on most standard-intermediate- and com-

pact-size cars. As a result, in the period of
phased implementation (the 1982 through 1984
model years) standard-size cars will generally
liave wheelbases in a range of 115" to 120",
intermediate-size cars will have wheelbasesS in a
range of 107" to 113", and compact-cai"s will
generally have wheelbases in a range of 102" to
108". Subcompact-size cars will continue to have
wheelbases below 100".

The determination of which car sizes to in-
clude in each year of the phased implementation
was made in consideration of the effect on each
manufacturer and the difficulty involved in engi-
neering passive restraints into each size class of
automobile. Because of the extensive experience
with passive restraints in full-size cars, and the
space available in the instrument panels of these
cars to receive air bag systems, this size car was
deemed to be most susceptible to early imple-
mentation.

The gradual phase-in schedule is intended to
permit manufacturers to absorb the impact of
introducing passive restraint systems without un-
due technological or economic risk at the same
time they undertake efforts to meet the challeng-
ing requirements imposed by emissions and fuel
economy standards for automobiles in the early
1980's;

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Section 104(b) of the Act directs that the
Secretary consult with the National Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Advisory Council on motor vehicle
safety standards. The Council has announced in
an April 26, 1977, letter to the Department that
"The Council feels that the time has come to
move ahead with a fully passive restraint stand-
ard.'" The Council stated that it was recom-
mending passive protection in the lateral and
rollover modes as well as the frontal mode pro-
posed by the Department. The Department
thei-efore will take under consideration the Coun-
cil recommendation, with a view to expanding
the passive restraint requirement as new tech-
nology is advanced. The Council also recom-
mended that mandatory seat belt u.se laws should
al.so be promoted until the entire vehicle fleet is
equipped with passive restraints. As noted, the
Department intends to encourage States to enact
such laws in their jurisdictions.

PART 571; S 208— PRE 95

EfFeclive: September 1, 1981

It is noted that the National Transportation
Safety Board supported the mandate of passive
restraints, with a cautionary note to preserve the
present performance specification that permits
meeting the requirement by means of passive
belts as well as inflatable passive restraints.

The United Auto Workers Union, which rep-
resents the vast majority of the workers whose
industry is affected by the mandate, has also
advocated mandatory passive restraints to the
Department.

The Council on Wage and Price Stability (the
Council) supported the mandate of passive re-
sti'aints, based on the assumptions that no serious
technical problems exist with either the air bag
or the passive belt system concept and that the
Department's cost estimates are substantially cor-
rect. The Council based its support on the com-
parative costs of achieving benefits under the
three approaches, finding passive restraints to be
the most cost effective.

The Council urged that passive belt systems
continue to be permitted as meeting the perform-
ance requirements of the standard, because they
represent the least costly passive restraint system
currently commercially available. Standard No.
208 has always been and continues to be a per-
formance standard, and any device that provides
the performance specified may be used to comply
with the standards. With regard to passive belt
systems, it is important that they remain avail-
able, particularly in the case of smaller-volume
manufacturers who may not care to provide air
bag type protection because of its engineering
and tooling costs relative to production volume.

In accordance with S 102(2) (C) of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42
U.S.C. 4332(2) (C)), as implemented by Execu-
tive Order 11514 (3 CFR, 196&-1970 Comp., p.
902) and the Council on Environmental Quality's
Guidelines of April 23, 1971 (36 FR -7724), the
Department has carefully considered all environ-
mental aspects of its three proposed approaches.
A Draft Environmental Impact Statement
(DEIS) was published March 25, 1977, and com-
ments have been received and analyzed. The
Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)
is released today. Petitions for reconsideration

based on issues and information raised in the
FEIS may be filed for the next 30 days (49 CFR
Part 553.35).

There was substantial agreement by comment-
ers with the agency's conclusions about impacts
on the consumption of additional natural re-
sources, the generation of pollutants in the manu-
facturing process and in transporting the system
throughout the vehicle's life, and on solid waste
disposal problems. In response to the comments
of General Motors and others on the DEIS, sev-
eral estimates were revised. In the Department's
view, the two most significant consequences of
a passive restraint mandate are the use of large
amounts of sodium azide as the generator of gas
for air bags, and the increased consumption of
petroleum fuel by automobiles because of the
added weight of air bags.

Sodium azide is a substance that is toxic and
that can burn extremely rapidly. The agency is
satisfied that the material can be used safety both
in an industrial setting and in motor vehicles
during its lifetime, due to inaccessibility and
strength of the sealed canisters in which it is
packed. The problem is to assure a proper means
of disposal. Junked vehicles that are .shredded
have batteries and gas tanks removed routinely,
and the air bag could be easily deployed by an
electric charge at the same time. A hazard re-
mains, however, for those vehicles that are simply
abandoned. However, the agency judges that the
chemical's relative inaccessibility will discourage
attempts to tamper with it. The proportion of
abandoned cars is less than 15 percent of those
manufactured. The Department will work with
the Environmental Protection Agency to develop
appropriate controls for the disposal of air bag
systems employing sodium azide.

The additional weight of inflatable passive re-
straints was judged to increase the annual con-
sumption of fuel by automobiles by 0.71 percent
(about 521 million gallons annually). While this
increase is not insignificant, the Department be-
lieves that it is fully justified by the prospective
societal benefits of passive restraints. The De-
partment took full account of the impact of a
passive restraint standard in its recent proceed-
ing to set fuel economy standards for 1981-1984
passenger automobiles.

PART 571; S 208— PRE 96

Effective: September 1, 1981

In accordance with Department policy encour-
aging adequate analysis of the consetpiences of
refrulatory action (41 FR Ifi'iOO, April 1(5. 1976),
the Department has evaluated the economic and
other consequences of this amendment on the
public and private sectors. The basic evaluatio?i
is contained in a document ("Supplemental In-
flation Impact Evaluation'') that was developed
in conjunction with the Department's June 1976
proposal of mandatory pa.ssive restraints. That
evaluation has been reviewed and a supplement
to it represents the Department's position on the
effect of tiiis rulemaking on the nation's economy.

The standard, as set forth below, allows manu-
facttirers two options for compliance. First, a
manufacturer may provide passive occupant
crash protection in frontal modes only. If this
option is chosen, the manufacturer must also pro-
vide lap belts at all seating positions in the auto-
mobile. The lap belts are provided to give crash
protection in side and rollover crashes, and have
a demonstrated effectiv^eness in these crash modes.

A second option for manufacturers is to pro-
vide full passive protection for front seat occu-
pants in three crash modes: frontal, side and
rollover. If a manufacturer can achieve this
performance, it would not have to provide seat
belts in the front seat. Under this option, lap
belts would continue to be required for all rear
seating positions.

The Department has found that use of any
seat belt installed in accordance with the stand-
ard is necessary to enhance the safety of vehicle
occupants. Thus, the Department continues to
advocate the use of all seat belts installed at all
seating positions in motor vehicles, regardless of
whether the vehicle is also equipped with passive
restraints.

In consideration of the foregoing. Standard
No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208) is amended

Effective date fnding: Under § 125 of the Act,
an amendment of Standard No. 208 that specifies
occupant restraint other than belt systems shall
not become effective under any circumstances
imtil the expiration of the 60-day review period
provided for by Congress under that section
"unless the standard s{M>cifies a later date." Sec-
tion 125 also provides that the standard does not
become effective at all if a concurrent resolution
of disapproval is passed by Congress during the
review period. The Department's view of this
section is that a "later date" can be established
at the time of promulgation of the rule, subject
to the possibility of reversal by the concurrent
resolution.

The amendment is therefore issued, to become
effective beginning September 1, 1981, for those
passenger cars first subject to the new require-
ments. The reasons underlying the effective
dates set forth in the standard have been dis-
cussed above. The establishment of the effective
dates is accomplished at this time to provide the
maximum time available for preparations to meet
the requirements. The Congressional review
period will be completed prior to the commitment
of significant new resources by manufacturers to
meet the upcoming requirements of the standard.

The program official and lawyer principally
responsible for the development of this rulemak-
ing document are Carl Nash and Tad Herlihy,
respectively.

(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15U.S.C. 1392, 1407))

Issued on June 30, 1977.

Brock Adams

Secretary of Transportation

42 F.R. 34299
July 5, 1977

PART 571; S 208— PRE 97-98

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO
MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Restraint Systems
{DoektM No. 74-14; NoUm 19

With the exception of minor perfecting amend-
ments, tliis notice denies petitions for reconsid-
eration of tiie Department's decision to require
the provision of automatic occupant crash pro-
tection in future passenger care, commencing in
some models on September 1, 1981, and in all
models by September 1, 1983. Six petitions for
re>consideration and one application for stay of
the standard's etfective dat« pending judicial re-
view were filed by parties that disagreed with
aspects of the DOT decision to upgrade occupant
crash protection as a reasonable and ne«essaiy
exercise of the mandate of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Act) to pro-
vide protection through improved automobile
design, construction, and performance. This
notice denies the petitions and establishes the
automatic crash protection requirements and ef-
fective dates of S4.1.2 and S4.1.3 as final for
purposes of judicial review under § 105(a) (1) of
the Act as to any person who will be adversely
affected by them. One petition for reconsidera-
tion of a related rulemaking action ("Notice 11")
is granted in this notice.

Effective date : December 5, 1977.

For further information contact :

Mr. Ralph Hitchcock, Motor Vehicle Pro-
grams, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Washington, D.C. 20590
(202-426-2212).

Supplementary information: On June 30, 1977
(42 FR 34289; July 5, 1977) the DOT upgraded
the existing occupant restraint requirements of
Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection,
to require the provision of automatic crash
protection in passenger cars with wheelbases

greater than 114 inches manufactured on or
after September 1, 1981, in passenger cars with
wheelbases greater than 100 inches manufac-
tured on or after September 1, 1982, and in all
passenger cars manufactured on or after Sep-
tember 1, 1983. In place of the lap/shoulder seat
belt combinations provided in the front seats of
most of today's passenger cars, the standard man-
dates a performance standard for crash protec-
tion that must be met by means that require no
action by the vehicle occupant. The automatic
protection must be provided in the frontal mode —
specifically, when the vehicle impacts a fixed col-
lision barrier at any speed up to and including
30 mpli and at any angle not more than 30 de-
grees to the left or right of perpendicular, the
t«st dummies installed at the front seating {x>si-
tions must remain in the vehicle and be protected
against specified head, chest, and femur injuries
by passive means (means that require no action
by the vehicle occupants). A manufacturer may
meet lateral and rollover crash requirements by
the provision of active or passive belt systems.

This amendment to the existing standard in-
voked a provision of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1400(b) )
that provides for a 60-day Congressional review
of the action. A resolution of disapproval from
both Houses of Congress was specified as neces-
sary to disapprove the action. Hearings were
held by both the Senate and the House in Sep-
tember 1977, and votes were conducted in October
1977. The House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce adopted its Subcommittee's
adverse report on the disapproval resolution and
voted to table it. The Senate also voteil to table
the disapproval resolution by a vote of 65 to 31.
The 60-day review period ended October 14, 1977.

PART 671; S aOS-PRE 9»

Six petitions for reconsideration of the decision
were filed by interested parties, along with an
application for stay of the effective date of the
decision pending disposition of a i^etition for
judicial review of the standard filed by the Pacific
Legal Foundation on September 1, 1977. One
petition requested an effective date change in a
related rulemaking action.

Disposition of Petitions

Effectiveness. A central factor in the Depart-
ment's decision to upgrade occupant crash pro-
tection requirements was a determination that
passive restraint teclmology could substantially
reduce fatalities and injuries in crashes.

Comprehensive analyses of the effectiveness of
passive restraints in preventing fatalities and
reducing injuries appear in the preamble to the
decision, the "Explanation of Rule Making Ac-
tion" that accompanied the decision, and in
underlying research and analyses that were con-
ducted by and for the Department's National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) and placed in the public rule making
docket throughout the Standard's eight-year rule
making history.

The estimates of restraint system effectiveness
are based on extensive field data with active
safety belt restraint systems, evaluate-d in con-
junction with thousands of crash and sled tests
comparing the performance of various active and
passive restraint technologies in occupant protec-
tion with each other and with the performance
of unrestrained occupants. The analyses show
that air bags and passive belt systems are ap-
proximately equivalent in overall protective
ability to combined lap and shoulder belts when
worn. However, usage of passive restraints will
be substantially higher than the 20-percent usage
rate of active safety belts observed at present.

General Motors (GM) petitioned for suspen-
sion of the decision while an oi'ganization not
involved in the passive restraint issue"audits" the
DOT and GM effectiveness estimates. A mod-
erate amount of field experience with the GM
1974-1976 air bag fleet of 10,000 vehicles is now
available, and GM sought to obtain an effective-
ness estimate from the field data by comparing
injuries in the air bag accidents that have oc-

curred with injuries in accidents of comparable
severity found in GM insurance company files.
Based on this methodology, GM concluded that
air bags are little more effective than no restraint
at all.

Analysis of GM's "matching case" methodology
indicates a failure to correct their statistical con-
clusions for known differences between the air
bag and insurance file fleets. For example, be-
cause air bags were only offered in GM's full
size and luxury cars, the occupants of the air bag
cars were older than the general population of
motorists represented in the matcliing insurance
files by an average of about 12 years. Older
persons are more susceptible to injury in crashes
than the generally younger population of Ameri-
can inotorists. This age bias alone could result
in an underestimation of air bag effectiveness of
about 30 percent.

A further source of error in the GM meth-
odology results from matching the air bag crashes
with a range of similar crashes in the insurance
files. For example, consider an air bag car crash
into a pole resulting in 17 inches of crush to the
front of the car. This case was matched against
"similar" crashes into poles or trees of non-air
bag cars with between 14 and 20 inches of crush.
Since the insurance files contain many more lower
speed crashes than higher speed crashes, the com-
parison group of "similar" crashes will always
contain a range of severity that is biased toward
less severe crashes. When air bag crashes are
matched in this way, a downward bias is intro-
duced that could reduce estimates of air bag
effectiveness by 50 to 100 percent.

DOT finds that proper analytical corrections
for age distribution and downward severity of
the case matching technique yields an air bag
effectiveness value of about 40 percent for AIS-3
or greater injuries. Tlie Department's decision
in June 1977 (Table I) estimated air bag effec-
tiveness for AIS-3 injuries at 30 percent and for
AIS-4 to 6 at 40 percent.

A more direct and definitive comparison can
be made of passive and active restraint effective-
ness using field data on the accident experience
of 80,000 VW Rabbits with passive belt systems
that have been sold in the U.S. These data show
that the rate of fatalities in Rabbits equipped

PART 571; S 208-PRE 100

with passive belts is less than onc-tliinl of the
rate for Rabbits of the same years of manufac-
ture equipped witli active lap/shoulder beh
systems.

p]conomics and Science Pianninfr. Inc. (ESP).
asked that the passive re.straint decision be modi-
fietl to require pa.ssive belts in all 2-fr(mt-seatin<r-
position passenper cars on and after September 1.
1981, witli passive requirements for other care to
follow only after further evaluation of air bajj;
effectiveness. The seatin<f-position distinction
reco^izes that passive belts may not be j)ractical
yet for 3-passeng:er bencli-seat contiffuiations.
ESP's basis for advocatinjr passive belts is the
preliminaiy data on experience with passive-belt -
efjuipped \'ollcswa^en Kabbits.

Standard No. 208 is a performance standard
that can be met by several (lesijrns. im-ludinfr the
air bag and passive belt that have already been
shown to be commercially feasible. The same
performance wouhl be required of any system
chosen by the manufacturer.

ESP's preference for passive belts is grounded
in its air bag analysis which, in the Department's
opinion, seriously underestimates air bag effec-
tiveness. ESP compared the experience of
accident-involved 1973, 1974, and 1975 model cars
equipped with seat belts (DOT-HS-.5-01255-1)
(RSEP study) with accident-involved air bag
cars from tlie 10,000-car GM fleet now in high-
way service.

In attempting the comparison ESP maile two
major errors. Because the towaway mileage
figures for the air-bag fleet are not known, ESP
simply speculated what this critical fac-tor would
be, with no credible grounds for the validity of
its estimates. The other error was to compare
the two data sets, ignoring relevant differences
in the ratio of urban to rural exposure, the pro-
portions of vehicles of various sizes in the sets,
the crash modes and severity of the crashes, and
the age and sex of the vehicle occupants involved.
When ESP corrected its analysis, in a later sub-
mission to the Department to eliminate these
errors, it obtained results that tend to support
the DOT estimates.

The ESP petition for deferral of air-bag-type
passive restraints is also grounded in the un-
founded assertion that seat belt usage is or can

Ije expected in the future to rise to 44 percent.
ESP relies on a finding from the RSEP study
tliat Ih'U use was as high as 44 percent in 1974
and 1975 model cars observed during 1974 and
the first part of 1975. But this isolated finding
cannot be used out of context as a general pre-
ilictor of belt usage rates. Most of these vehicles
were originally ecjuipped with ignition interl(K'ks
and sequential warning systems, many of which
had not yet been disabled and tluis induced oc-
cupants to buckle up. Subsequent observations
confirm that belt usage in those motlel year care
has now dropped to less than 30 percent. In the
most recent model year cars (1976 and 1977
mwlels) with only a brief reminder system, usage
is only about 20 percent (DOT-HS-6-01340).

ESP suggested that future belt u.sage could be
higher than DOT observations, based on its be-
lief tiiat usage is higher (1) in rural areas where
DOT observations were not concentrated, (2) in
high-risk situations because drivers j)erceive a
risk and take appropriate action, and (3) in small
cars that will become a higher proportion of the
fleet in the future. This speculation has no basis
in fact. The RSEP stutly shows belt usage to be
higher in urban areas where DOT observations
were concent I'ated, tending if anytliing to bias
the observation in favor of high usage rates.
The same study provides evidence that belt usage
is no more likely in higher i-isk situatitms. Usage
was lower for vehicles that sustained higher levels
of damage. The higher belt usage in smaller cars
is more likely attributable to the general attitudes
of existing small car buyers than simply to occu-
pancy of a smaller vehicle.

Chiysler, Ford, and AMC alluded to air bag
effectiveness but raised no i)oints that have not
already been addres.se<l as a part of the passive
restraint decision at the time of its issuance. No
basis in these petitions exists upon whicli to re-
con.sider the decision.

Implementation schedule. The Center for .\uto
Safety (the Center) and Ralph Nader petitioned
for modification of the effective tlate and phase-in
to make the recjuircments Injcome effective for all
cars on September 1, 1980. The Center argued
that installation in that time peritxl is technically
feasible, that compliance of large care first, and
less crashworthy small care last, contradicts the

PART 571; S 208-PRE 101

Act's mandate to reduce death and injury, that
phase-in of requirements by wheelbase length is
not authorized by the Act, and that insufficient
notice of the implementation schedule was pro-
vided by the Department.

The introduction of passive restraint systems
in all new cai-s will require the design, testing,
and manufacture of components for a variety of
passive restraint systems, in many variations to
accommodate all sizes and models of passenger
automobiles sold in the domestic market. Parties
to the rulemaking generally agreed wliat tasks
are necessary to redesign new automobiles to ac-
commodate passive belts and air bags. However,
some disputed the length of time needed to ac-
complish these tasks effectively and in an orderly
manner for all cars sold in the United States
during the time frame from now into the early
1980's.

A comprehensive discussion of the considera-
tions underlying the establislunent of the stand-
ard's implementation schedule appears in the
Production Readiness and Introduction /Schedule
section of the "Explanation of Rule Making
Action" underlying the decision.

The Department estimates that the new re-
quirements will apply to approximately 2.8
million five- and six-passenger full size care in
September 1981, an additional 4.9 million inter-
mediate and compact cars in September 1982,
and an additional 3.2 million sub-compact and
mini-compact cars in September 1983.

Depending on the amount of research and de-
velopment conducted to date, the product lines,
and the resources of the various manufacturers,
lead time required by each will vary significantly.
Some manufacturers have done preparatory de-
velopment work toward the installation of passive
systems, and some have done very little. Thus,
the varying capabilities and state of the develop-
ment programs of most manufacturers must be
considered in establishing technically feasible
lead times, and not simply the capability of the
most or least advanced.

Facilities for manufacturing air bag inflator
components in large numbers do not exist and
must be developed. The development of this new
industrial capacity cannot be expected to coincide
fully with the development and planning activi-

ties of the vehicle manufacturers alone, because
component supplier investments will probably not
be made without the suppliers having firm orders.
This is particularly so where the passive restraint
requirements have been issued and remanded
several times over the last seven years. Vehicle
manufacturere generally do not order components
from the suppliers until they have developed,
tested, and settled on the configurations necessary
to meet the standard in their products. The
serial nature of development, design, testing, and
tooling processes for mass production strongly
affects lead time requirements.

The NHTSA estimates that the lead time for
the major and secondary design changes (such
as to the instrument panel, stefering colunan, door
structure, and "B" pillar) that would be required
to place air bags or passive belts in new automo-
biles can vary from less than 26 months to more
than 38 months for a typical large manufacturer.

Another factor affecting lead time is the period
of time needed to develop a large scale production
capacity for pyrotechnic propellant materials.
Based on existing inflator technology and produc-
tion capacity, the Department estimates that
approximately 3 years will be necessary to pro-
duce sufficient inflators for the entire annual
production of passenger cars without an extra-
ordinary commitment from this industry. The
development of large scale inflator manufacturing
capacity is likely to occur only after the design
and initial testing of air bag systems by the auto
manufacturers.

A final and extremely important factor that
must be considered in establishing lead time re-
quirements is the necessity to assui'e that systems
furnished to comply with the standard will pro-
vide trouble-free, durable, and marketable char-
acteristics in service. Reduction in lead time, or
inefficient use of lead time, may increase the
probability of defects occurring in sei'V'ice.

From these considerations, it is apparent that
installation of either air bags or passive belts
would not be practical for all new automobiles
within less than 3 years as requested by the
Center. To provide reasonable opportunity for
development, design, testing, and tooling of
passive restraint systems with adequate durabil-
ity, quality, reliability, and overall perfonnance,

PART 571; S 208-PRE 102

48 months of lead time is justified. This is par
ticularly true for smaller-volume manufarturei"s
who have done little passive restraint develop-
ment work and are only now studying specific
designs for their 1982 and 1983 model year
products.

It should be noted that the lead time author-
ized is required by the facts and circumstances
presented in this particular and complex rule-
making and in no way is to lie considered as a
precedent for the calculation of lead time in any
other standard which may later l)e promulgated
by the agency.

The Center also advocated that the changes
necessary to install passive restraints should oc-
cur at the same time instead of being phased-in
over thre« years. The Center suggested that ac-
commodation of the manufacturers" preferences,
specifically their plans to meet future emissions
and fuel economy requirements, had dictated the
3-phase implementation. This is not the case.
The major vehicle redesign and retooling for
materials conservation, fuel economy, and emis-
sions that has been and will occur through the
early 1980's must be considered in reaching any
determination about the technical and economic
feasibility of automotive regulatory actions of
DOT. A thorough evaluation of the consequences
of this passive restraint decision requires no less.

However, the requirements for improved occu-
pant restraints were not subordinated to the
attainment of fuel economy or emissions require-
ments. The preamble to DOT's fuel economy
rulemaking makes clear that downward adjust-
ment in the fuel economy levels was made to
accommodate the weight of passive restraints.
As earlier explained, a 4-year lead time was
judged to be reasonable and appropriate to assure
that a satisfactory product could he developed
by most manufacturers in the United States
market for most of their products.

The decision to require only a portion of pro-
duction to comply in the first year further rec-
ognizes the limit on the available tooling industry
capacity to accomplish major changes, and the
demands this industry will face within the next
several years because of an unprecedented com-
bination of regulatory requirements and commer-
cial pressures. A manufacturer with several

vehicle offerings ordinarily undertakes major
product changes in only a portion of its produc-
tion at one time. Assuming a 4-year cycle within
the industry for substantial changes, for example,
it is evident that only about one-fourth of the
engineering and tooling capacity reso\irce^s neces-
sary to change the entii-e production are in place
and available for use in any one year. The lead
times provided are based on reasonable utilization
of available tooling and the objective that reliable
and effective passive restraint sy.stems be devel-
oped.

The longer lead time allowed for smaller cars
is also intended to provide the alternatives to
small-car mantifacturers for the installation of
air bag systems in lieu of the simpler pa.ssive belt
systems. The development of either type of oc-
cupant crash protection for smaller oars presents
a greater engineering challenge than for large
cars, and some makers of smaller cars have sig-
nificantly smaller engineering resources than do
the makers of the majority of larger cars. The
Department intended to provide .sufficient lead
time so that the most effective designs can be
fully considered and tested before production
decisions must be reached. The agency considers
that its analysis, reported in the "P^xplanation
of Rule Making Action."" provides ample justifi-
cation for a phase-in as the practicable approach
to meeting the need for motor vehicle safety in
upgrading automobile occupant crash protection.

The Center argued that a phase-in of recpiire-
ments in stages that distinguish among vehicles
on the basis of a design characteristic (wheelbase
length) is not authorized by the Act. The Cen-
ter argue^l that "type" distinction does not in-
clude wheelbase distinctions. The Center also
asserts that the DOT believes it has only "across-
the-board" authority to implement standards, and
that Congress acquiesed in this view by not pro-
viding DOT additional phase-in authority in the
1974 amendments to the Act.

The Department has repeatedly utilized "type"
distinctions based on design in cariying out the
Act. The basic vehicle type distinctions used to
distingxnsh the phasing of requirements among
passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles,
and light trucks are not expressly authorized by
the Act. DOT established the distinction to ra-

PART 571; S 208-PRE 103

tionally implement the Act. The wheelbase dis-
tinction has been used in the bumper safety
standard Xo. 215, Exterior Protection.^ to imple-
ment upgraded requirements as expetlitiously as
possible. This regular practice contradicts the
assertion that DOT itself believes it has "across-
the-board" 'authority only. The DOT 1974 re-
quest for "percentage of production" phase-in
authority in no way applies to the question of
phase-in authority based on design distinctions
such as wheelbase length, weight, or chassis type,
that the Department already had.

Congress has in fact implicitly approved
phase-in based on design distinction by its 1974
ratification of Standard Xo. 301-75, Fuel System,
Integrity, in a form that contains a gross vehicle
weight rating (GVWR) phase-in criterion. Such
design distinctions have been relied on by DOT
and acquiesed in by Congress, the industry, and
the public since the Act's inception.

Finally, the agency does not agree that the
legislative history cited by the Center supports
the proposition that phase-ins are illegal. The
quoted statement by Senator Magnuson states
that standards will apply to every vehicle, but
does not address the question of when they would.
The refusal by Congress to authorize phase-in
by "customary model change" criteria in no way
excludes the authority to phase-in by design dis-
tinction. The Senate Report language addresses
particular vehicle changes that take more than a
year to implement, and simply notes tliat the
DOT is authorized to set later dates for those
changes. This passage does not address the ques-
tion of later dates for a particular category of
vehicle.

The Center asserted that inadequate notice of
the implementation schedule had been provided
by the Department, because the September 1981
date was adopted in place of the proposed 1980
date, and because the wheelbase phase-in was
adopted in place of the proposed phase-in by
occupant position. While conceding that "every
precise change ultimately adopted need not be
published", the Center believed that inadequate
opportunity was made available to the public to
address the implementation schedule.

The Department has fully considered the Cen-
ter's objection in the light of its public notices.

hearings, and the rulemaking record on Standard
208. The question is whether the public has had
sufficient notice of the issue (the timing of man-
datoiy passive restraint installation). As a gen-
eral matter, some changes from the proposal are
inherent in the notice and comment process so
that the nilemaker can benefit from comments
and modify the rulemaking without having to
repropose every time new information is learned.
In this case, the notice proposed a timing
schedule, and the notice indicated that the im-
plementation was tentative, even suggesting a
phase-in at occupant positions as an alternative
timing approach. The Draft Environmental
Impact Statement described phase-in alternatives,
and many parties in their written and oral com-
ments raised the issue of the timing for the
mandate. The Center itself commented on tim-
ing which demonstrates that they were sufficiently
aware of the issue to comment on it.

Implementation of the Standard

An important element in implementing the
passive restraint requirements is to ensure that
they are introduced in significant numbers prior
to the time they are required by mandate. While
passive belt systems are already in use in sub-
stantial numbers on the Volkswagen Rabbit
(about 80,000 cars), relatively few air bag sys-
tems are in highway service. The two major
reasons to have passive restraints voluntarily
produced prior to the mandate are to familiarize
the public with passive restraint technology and
to work out early problems in production systems
that could interfere with orderly implementation
of the mandate and jeopardize success of the
program.

The Department is taking steps to provide for
voluntary early introduction. In addition to
Volkswagen, GM and Ford have indicated plans
to introduce passive belts as an option as early
as the 1979 and 1980 model yeare, respectively.
Ford and GM have also announced the intention
of making an air bag option available in one or
more models in the 1981 model year, one year
before the mandate. The Department conunends
this initiative and is encouraging these companies
to expand this commitment to introduce air bags
voluntarily in the 1980 model year and in other

PART 571; S 208-PRE 104

than full-size cars. The Department will con-
tinue to monitor the perfonuanoe of voluntarily
introduced systems, botli air baj^ and passive
belts, as it has to date.

In support of manufacturers' efforts to market
air baps earlier than the mandate, th© Depart-
ment has contacted the General Services Admin-
istration, State and local {joverrunent ojierators
of fleet vehicles, the insurance companies, rental
fleet owners, taxi operators, and other institutional
users of passenger cars to encourage the purchase
of air bag cars. This is the most direct induce-
ment to the manufacturers to make air bags
available earlier than the initial September 1981
effective date. Complementary activities to assist
the early introduction of the systems are: (1) a
DOT public education campaign that is already
underway throughout tJie country. (2) monitor-
ing component and vehicle manufacturers' im-
plementation programs to assure proper attention
is given to cost, reliability, and effectiveness, and
(3) continued research, development, and evalua-
tion of passive restraint systems to insure that
the best overall passive restraint technology is
available to manufacturers and the public, both
now and in the future.

Other Issues

The Pacific Legal Foundation filed a petition
for review of the rule in the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. It then asked the
Department to stay the effective date of the rule
for a period of time equal to the length of ju-
dicial review.

The Foundation, in its application for a stay,
listed in general terms a number of items it said
the Department failed to consider or evaluate
appropriately. The Department did, however,
review and assess all of those items before an-
nouncing the rule. It discussed many of them
extensively in the preamble to the rule and the
accompanying "Explanation of Rule Making
Action". Upon receiving the application for a
stay the Department reconsidered all of those
items and it finds that the Pacific Legal Founda-
tion's list of objections has no merit.

The Foundation argued that the Department
should stay the rule pending judicial review
because manufacturers will make capital ex-
penditures preparing to comply with the rule

in model year 1982 and if the Court then over-
turns the rule, manufacturers may abandon the
passive re.straint program and pass on these
preparation expenses to new car buyers. The
Foundation thus asks the Department to balance
a possible loss of a relatively small amount of
money against a certain loss of lives and increase
in injuries. The Department does not know-
how nmch time the Court will need to review
the rule, but each year's continuance of the rule
will add only a few dollars to the price of a new-
car while each years delay of the rule w-ill
idtimately cost the public thousands of prevent-
able fatalities and many more thousands of pre-
ventable serious injuries. The potential harm
the Pacific Legal Foundation seeks to avoid
through a stay is trival compared to the cost of
a stay in lives that cannot be restored, injury
that cannot be repaired, and suffering that can-
not be erased. This rule has already remained
unresolved for too long. The Department denies
Pacific Legal Foundation's application for a stay.

Some manufacturei-s repeated many of their
earlier objections, all of which were extensively
addressed in the preamble that accompanied the
decision and the supplementary "Explanation
of Rule Making Action". Not only were these
issues fully ventilated in the rulemaking action,
but they were also extensively treated in the
hearings and subsequent reports of the Senate
and House Conunerce Committees as a part of
their review of the standard. The Department
does not consider repetitious i^etitions as a part
of the reconsideration process (49 CFR §553.21)
and accordingly denies them.

One new issue raised was Ford's complaint
that the NHTSA response on test dummy ob-
jectivity had misinterpreted Ford data on testing
conducted in 1973. While the Ford dummy test
program performed in 1973 may have been an
ambitious attempt to investigate all of the var-
iables involved in a vehicle crash test, subse-
quent development and test programs to reduce
sources of test variability have made the Ford
test series obsolete. As noted in the preamble
to Notice 11, dummy manufacturers have gained
experience in the manufacture of dununies, the
Part 572 specifications and test procedures have
been further defined, and the dummy positioning
procedures in Standard No. 208 have been modi-

PABT 671; S 206-PRB 106

fied for bench-seat cars to eliminate the problem
noted in the Ford tests of fitting 3 dummies side-
by-side in tlie test.

Ford did not contest the more recent findings
(DOT-HS-6-01514) of hard-seat sled tests of
pairs of dummies with l>elts, air bags, and unre-
strained, showing coefScients of variation on the
pooled data basis for head accelerations from
1.2 percent to 10.7 percent, for chest acceleration
from 1.6 percent to 8.5 percent, and for femur
compressive force from 3.51 percent to 24.2 per-
cent. Similar results were obtained in sled test
oblique impacts (DOT-HS-802-570). In the
face of this unrebutted conclusive evidence of the
repeatability of current commercial dummy pro-
duction, the agency finds the test instrument and
associated procedure to be objective.

It has been brought to the attention of the
Department that the NHTSA's decision to con-
tinue indefinitely the existing requirements for
multipurpose passenger vehicles and light trucks
was imperfeetly stated. A corrective amendment
of S4.2.2 is accomplished by this notice.

Volkswagen petitioned to have a longer transi-
tion period between the existing requirements
for dummy positioning and the upcoming ones
published "in Notice 11 (42 FR 34299, July 5.
1977), because the company will not be able to
evaluate the new requirements by July 5, 1978,
yet must continue to certify its passive-belt-
equipi>ed Rabbit model. The Automobile Im-
porters Association and General Motors sug-
gested that compliance with either the old or new
requirements, at the manufacturer's option, be
permitted immediately. The NHTSA considers
optional procedures more desirable than specify-
ing the old procedures longer than one year as
suggested by Volkswagen. Undei' optional pro-
cedures, Volkswagen can continue its certification
of the Rabbit model, effecting a transition at any
time, wliile the manufacturers undertaking new
development efforts can immediately utilize the
new procedures. To accomplish this, the effec-
tive dates of the requirements of Notices 10 and
11 are changed to become effective immediately.

with modifications of the language as necessary
to preserve the old procedures as an option until
September 1, 1981. These minor adjustments
are accomplished in this notice.

Ford noted that the dummy head adjustment
procedure of SlO.4 was not consistent with
dummy construction, which positions the head
automatically. The XHTSA had intended that
the dummy head and neck system be shimmed
to compensate for different seat back angles in
vehicles being tested. Because of the relative
difficulty in accomplishing this in relation to
the amount of specificity gained thereby, the
NHTSA hereby deletes S10.4 as requested by
Ford.

For the reasons stated above and after full
consideration of the petitions by all parties sub-
mitted, the Department of Transportation denies
petitions for reconsideration of its June 30, 1977,
decision to require the installation of automatic
crash protection in future passenger cars. The
requirements set forth at 42 FR 34289 and 42 FR
34299 (July 5, 1977) are final for purposes of
review in accordance with § 105(a) of the Act.

In consideration of the foregoing. Standard
No. 28 (49 CFR 571.208) is amended. . . .

Effective date fnd.mg: Because tlie amend-
ments provide an option and do not create addi-
tional requirements for any person, it is found
that an immetliate effective date is in the public
interest so that manufacturei'S may take advan-
tage of the new option as rapidly as possible.

The program official and lawyer principally
responsible for the development of this nale-
making document are Ralph Hitchcock and Tad
Herlihy, respectively.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407)

Issued on December 5, 1977.

Brock Adams

Secretary of Transpoitation

42 F.R. 61466

December 5, 1977

PART 571; S 208-PRE 106

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection in Passenger Cars, Multipurpose Passenger

Vehicles, Trucks and Buses

(Docket No. 74-14; Notice 14)

Action: Final rule.

Summai'y : The purpose of this notice is to
amend Safety Standard Xo. 208. Occupant Crash
Protection, to provide for the optional use by
motor vehicle manufacturers of alternatives to
latches for releasing occupants from passive seat-
belt systems in emergencies and to allow means
other than pushbuttons to operate the emergency
release mechanisms of passive belt systems. The
amendment is based on a proposal issued in re-
sponse to a petition from General Motors Corp.
to allow manufacturers greater latitude in de-
signing emergency release mechanisms for passive
belt systems. The amendment will allow manu-
facturers to experiment with various emergency
release mechanisms aimed at encouraging passive
belt use by motorists, prior to the effective date
of passive restraint requirements specified in this
standard.

Ejfective date : November 13, 1978.

Address: Petitions for reconsideration should
refer to the docket number and notice number
and be submitted to : Docket Section, Room 5108,
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street SW., Wash-
ington, D.C. 20590.

For further information contact :

Guy Hunter, Office of Vehicle Safety Stand-
ards, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Washington, D.C. 20590,
202-426-2265.

SupplemerUary information: Safety Standard
No. 208, 49 CFR 571.208, currently specifies that
a seatbelt assembly installed in a passenger
car shall have a latch mechanism that re-

leases at a single point by pushbutton action.
General Motors petitioned for relief from tliis
recjuirement for passive l)elts, following the issu-
ance of the final rule requiring passenger cars to
be equipped with passive restraints (air bags,
passive belts, or other means of passive, i.e..
automatic, protection) (42 FR 34289, July 5,
1977). The petition described a "spool release"
design General Motors would like to use on one
of its passive belt systems. The system would
include a shoulder belt that would not detach at
either end. Rather, tlie design would allow the
belt to "l)lay out" or unwind from the retractor
in an emergency, allowing sufficient slack for the
door to be opened and the occupant to exit from
the vehicle. The purpose of such a "spool re-
lease" design is to minimize the disconnection of
the passive belt system by motorists. Under the
current latch mechanism and pushbutton require-
ments for belts, a passive belt system could be
easily disconnected by a buckle release identical
to buckles on current active belt systems (i.e..
belts that motorists must manually put into
place). As long as the belt remains disconnected,
the "passivity" of the system would be destroyed
for future use.

In response to the GM petition, the NHTSA
issued a proposal to amend standard 208 to allow
alternative release mechanisms for passive belts
(43 FR 21912, May 22, 1978). As noted in that
proposal, the NHTSA is very concerned about
the usage rate of passive belts by motorists since
it ap{)ears that there may be many new cars in
the 1980"s equippeil with these systems. If mo-
torists who would prefer air bags in a particular

PART 571; S 208-PRE 107

car line can only obtain passive belts from the
manufacturer the defeat I'ate of the belts could
be high. The agency is, therefore, interested in
fostering any passive belt design that is effective
and that minimizes the rate of disconnection.
The notice pointed out, however, that there are
other factors to be considered in the proposed
change.

The original purpose of the latch mechanism
and pushbutton requirements of standard 208 was
to insure uniformity of buckle design for the
purpose of facilitating routine fastening and un-
fastening of active belts, encouraging belt use by
making the belts as convenient as possible and
facilitating the exiting of vehicle occupants in
emergency situations. Since the proposed amend-
ment would allow various types of release mech-
anisms, the agency was concerned that the
resulting nonuniformity might liave adverse con-
sequences in emergency egress situations from
passive belts. In order to examine the implica-
tions of the General Motors petition thoroughly,
the proposal sought public comments on four
specific questions concerning the efficacy and ad-
visability of allowing alternative release mech-
anisms to latches for passive belt systems. The
four questions were as follows :

1. "How should the NHTSA or the vehicle
manufacturers monitor the efficacy of and public
reaction to various systems for discouraging dis-
connection of passive belts (such as the latch
mechanism with a 4-8 second audible/visible
warning system that operates if the belt is not
connected when the ignition is turned on, a latch
mechanism with additional warning or interlock
systems voluntarily installed by a vehicle manu-
facturer, or a lever operated spool release as
requested by General Motors) ?"

2. "Are there safety or other considerations
that would make it inadvisable to allow the spool
release at this time as an option to vehicle manu-
facturers which install passive belts?"

3. "Compared with a passive belt system
equipped with the currently required latch mech-
anism, would a passive belt system equipped with
a spool release whose actuation lever is located
between the seats have substantial disadvantages
for emergency exit or extraction from a vehicle

that would offset any possible increase in usage
in the passive belts?"

4. "If the \HTSA decides to permit the use of
alternative occupant release mechanisms, should
such use be permitted indefinitely oi' only for a
finite period, e.g., several yeai-s, to allow field
testing of the various systems ? If a finite period
were to be established, when should it begin and
end?"

All 15 comments to the May 22, 1978, notice
supported the intent of the proposed change to
allow alternative release mechanisms for passive
belts. Most conunentei-s agreed that a nonsep-
arable passive belt should discourage disconnec-
tion by motorists and that this should be given
higher priority consideration than possible ad-
vei-se effects .such a belt might have on emergency
occupant egress. Volkswagen did express some
concern that the benefits achieved by increased
belt usage might Ido somewhat offset if problems
with emergency exiting arise, but agreed that
more flexibility in passive belt design should be
allowed to encourage belt use.

Volkswagen urged the use of the passive belt
system utilized on its Deluxe Rabbit — a pushbut-
ton release latch mechanism guarded by an igni-
tion interlock. The company stated that this
type system is simple and works well in emer-
gency situations regardless of the condition of
the retractor or the positioning of the webbing
(potential problems of a "spool release" type
design). Volkswagen pointed out that a system
that is too complex will require close monitoring
to insure effectiveness.

While the Volkswagen system has shown high
use rates in the field, there is a possibility that
widespread use of this type system could lead to
adverse public reaction because of the interlock
feature. As pointed out by the Alliance of
American Insurers in its support of the proposed
amendment, there could be a second public. "back-
lash" from a return to the use of starter inter-
locks, even if placed on the vehicle voluntarily
by the manufacturer. Alliance stated tliat the
"spool release" system proposed by General
Motors should be preferable to the interlock from
a public acceptance standpoint.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 108

The Center for Auto Safety and the Prudential
Property & CasuaUy Insurance Co. both com-
mented that ''spool release" type mechanisms
should be self-restorin<j to insure that in sub-
sequent uses of tlie vehicle the passive belt is
ready to provide the automatic protection for
which it was desired. The self-restoring fea-
ture would automatically retract the belt after
the manual release has been activated to allow
the belt to "play-out." The NHTSA believes
that both self-restoring "spool release" designs
and manual restoration designs have distinct ad-
vantages. The automatic restoration does not
require the vehicle user to have any knowledge
of the system to reactivate the passive belt. How-
ever, a manual restoration design would be less
complex and would probably be more reliable.
The manual design could be coupled with audible
and visible warnings to indicate when the lock-
up portion of the retractor is inoperative. The
amendment set forth in this notice allows both
types of restoration systems for "spool release"
passive belt designs.

The majority of commenters argued that the
proposed amendment should be elfective in-
definitely, and not merely during the interim
period until the passive restraint requirements
become effective. The comments statetl that man-
ufacturers should be given the greatest possible
design latitude to encourage the early introduc-
tion of innovative passive belt systems that are
designed to minimize disconnection by motorists.
The industry noted that manufacturers will be
hesitant to initiate such new programs and pas-
sive belt designs if alternative release designs
are allowed only for an interim period. Further,
the commenters stated that an interim rule would
not allow time for an adequate examination of
the effectiveness of the various new designs that
might be developed. The agency has concluded
that these argimients have merit. Accordingly,
this amendment is effective indefinitely.

Several comments stated that the new passive
belt designs should be standardized, so that the
public will understand their use and problems of
emergency occupant egress will lx> minimized.
While the agency agrees that unifonnity in re-
lease design is advantageous, it is not practical
to standardize .systems that are only in the de-
velopment stage. Further, if manufacturers are

not given latitude in their passive belt designs,
the purpose of this amendment would be defeated.
It is unclear at this time which passive belt sys-
tems will be the most effective in encouraging
belt use and at the same time be accepted by the
public. The agency will, of course, monitor all
new passive belt systems as closely as possible,
and efforts to standardize systems could be made
in the future.

Ford Motor Co. commented that the revision
of standard No. 208 as requested in the General
Motors petition would provide greater latitude
than presently exists, but that the requested
wording is restrictive in that it would inhibit the
development of methods .of release other than
those specifically related to the retractor. Ford
requested that the proposed revision include lan-
guage permitting manufacturers the greatest pos-
sible design latitude. The agency emphasized in
the previous notice that the proposal was tenta-
tive as to the language and substance of an
amendment that might be adopted in response
to the General Motors petition. Accordingly,
this amendment is broader than that proposed
in the General Motors i^etition and does not limit
the types of passive belt designs that may be
developed.

In order to insure that vehicle occupants are
aware if their passive belts are inoperable be-
cause a release mechanism has been activated,
this amendment specifies that the warning light,
"Fasten Belts," remain illuminated until the l)elt
latch mechanism has been fastened or the release
mechanism has been deactivated. This warning
light of indefinite duration is in addition to the
4- to 8-second audible warning signal currently
required by the standard. The agency believes a
continuous warning light is essential since this
amendment will allow various types of unfa-
miliar release systems for passive l)elts.

In summary, the agency has concluded that
manufacturers should be given considerable lati-
tude in designing emergency release mechanisms
for passive l)elt systems. This will permit the
development of innovative systems aimed at lim-
iting passive belt disconnection by motorists.
Otherwise, the use rate of passive belt systems
could be as low as the current use rate for active
belt systems. This amendment will allow manu-

PART 671; S 208-PRE 109

facturers to experiment with various passive belt
designs before the effective date of the passive
restraint requirements and determine which de-
signs are the most effective and at the same time
acceptable to the public.

The agency does not believe that the use of
alternative release mechanisms will cause serious
occupant egress problems if manufacturers take
precautions to instruct vehicle owners how the
systems work through the owner's manual and
through their dealers. While uniformity in re-
lease mechanisms is certainly important for pur-
poses of emergency occupant egress, the agency
has concluded that this consideration is at least
temporarily outweighed by the importance of
insuring passive belts are not disconnected. The
agency will, however, monitor all new passive
belt designs to assure that the release mechanisms
are simple to understand and operate. If the

methods of operation of the various release mech-
anisms are self-evident, the problem of lack of
uniformity in design will be less important in
terms of emergency occupant egress.

The agency has concluded that this amendmwit
will have no adverse economic or environmental
impacts.

The engineer and lawyer primarily responsible
for the development of this rule are Guy Hunter
and Hugh Gates, respectively.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (15
U.S.C. 1392, 1407), delegation of authority at 49
CFR 1.50.)

Issued on November 1, 1978.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator
43 F.R. 52493
November 13, 1978

PART 571; S 208-PRE 110

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD

NO. 208

Occupant Protection

(Docket No. 78-16; Notice 3)

SUMMARY: This notice responds to petitions for
reconsideration of the November 29, 1979, notice
(44 F.R. 68470) amending Standard No. 208, Occu-
pant Crash Protection. In response to petitions
from the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
and Chrysler Corporation, the agency is deleting
the requirement for emergency-locking or auto-
matic-locking seat belt retractors at the outboard
seating positions of the second seat in forward con-
trol vehicles. The effect of this deletion is to permit
manufacturers to continue to use manual adjusting
devices for the seat belts at those seating positions.

EFFECTIVE DATE: March 27, 1980.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

William E. Smith, Office of Vehicle Safety
Systems, National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington,
D.C. 20590. (202-426-2242)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On Novem-
ber 29, 1979, NHTSA published a notice amending
Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (44
F.R. 68470). The amendment deleted the exemp-
tion for forward control vehicles from several of
the occupant restraint system requirements of the
standard. (A forward control vehicle is one with a
short front end. More than half of the engine is
located to the rear of the forward point of the
windshield base and the steering wheel hub is in
the forward quarter of the vehicle.)

Chrysler Corporation and the Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association (MVMA) filed petitions
for reconsideration concerning the amendment.
They argued that the November 1978 notice of pro-
posed rulemaking for the amendment only proposed
a change in the requirements for the safety belt
systems in the front seat of forward control

vehicles and did not give adequate notice about a
change in the requirements for belts in the second
seat of forward control vehicles (43 F.R. 52264).
They said that the amendment adopted in the final
rule requires forward control vehicles to have lap
and shoulder belts in the front outboard designated
seating positions and have automatic-locking or
emergency-locking retractors at the outboard des-
ignated seating positions of the second seat of the
vehicle.

The petitioners have correctly described the
requirements added by the amendment. The
amendment applies the requirements of § 4.2.2 of
Standard No. 208 to all forward control vehicles
manufactured after September 1, 1981. Section
4.2.2 requires a manufacturer to meet one of the
following three occupant crash protection
requirements: $ 4.1.2.1, complete automatic pro-
tection, $ 4.1.2.2, head-on automatic protection or
$ 4.1.2.3, lap and shoulder belt protection system.
Manufacturers choosing to comply with $ 4.1.2.3
must install seat belt assemblies meeting the
adjustment requirements of $ 7.1 of the standard.
The provisions of $ 7.1 require that the seat belt
assemblies installed at the outboard seating posi-
tions of the front and second seats adjust by means
of an emergency-locking or automatic-locking
retractor. Seat belt assemblies installed at all other
seating positions can adjust either by an
emergency-locking or automatic-locking retractor
or by a manual adjusting device. Prior to the
November 1979 amendment of Standard No. 208,
forward control vehicles did not have to meet the
requirements of $ 4.2.1.3 but instead could meet
$ 4.2.1.2, which did not require the use of
emergency-locking or automatic-locking retractors
in the outboard seating positions of those vehicles.

The agency's November 1978 notice of proposed
rulemaking was addressed to the specific portion

PART 571; S 208-PRE-lll

of Standard No. 208 exempting forward control
vehicles from the shoulder belt requirements. The
final rule eliminating the exemption inadvertently
changed the requirements for the second seats of
light trucks and vans as well. Therefore, the
agency is amending the standard to retain the cur-
rent seat belt requirement for the second seat in
light trucks and vans. The agency notes that one
manufacturer (GM) of forward control vehicles
voluntarily equips its vehicles with automatic-
locking retractors and urges Chrysler to do the
same. The agency will consider eliminating the

remaining forward control exemptions from
Standard No. 208 in future rulemaking.

The principal authors of this notice are Mr.
William E. Smith, Office of Vehicle Safety
Systems, and Mr. Stephen L. Oesch, Office of
Chief Counsel.

Issued on March 18, 1980.

Joan Claybrook,
Administrator,

45 F.R. 20103
March 27, 1980

PART 571; S 208-PRE-112

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD

NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection

(Docket No8. 1-18 and 74-14; Notices 16 and 18)

ACTION: Final rule (correction).

SUMMARY: The purpose of this notice is to cor-
rect an amendment to Safety Standard No. 208,
Occupant Crash Protection, that was issued
September 27, 1979 (44 F.R. 55579). That notice
amended the seat belt warning system require-
ments of the standard to specify the use of the seat
belt telltale symbol that is specified in Safety
Standard No. 101-80, Controls and Displays. In
that amendment, certain warning system require-
ments, which had previously been deleted from
Standard No. 208, were incorrectly reinserted in
the standard. This notice corrects those errors.
Further, this amendment makes clear that the
telltale symbol of Standard No. 101-80 will
supersede certain existing requirements in Stand-
ard No. 208 after Standard No. 101-80 becomes
effective September 1, 1980.

DATES: These amendments are effective on July
14, 1980.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

Hugh Gates, Office of Chief Counsel, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.
(202-426-2992)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The seat
belt warning system requirements of Safety Stand-
ard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR
571.208), currently specify that under certain con-
ditions, when seat belts are not fastened, the
words "Fasten Belts" or "Fasten Seat Belts" shall
be displayed on the vehicle dashboard. On June 26,
1978, the NHTSA published Safety Standard No.
101-80 (49 CFR 571.101-80) to establish new
uniform requirements for the location, identifica-
tion, and illumination of controls and displays in

motor vehicles. That standard specifies a telltale
symbol that is to be illuminated when a vehicle's
front seat belts have not been fastened. The stand-
ard is to become effective September 1, 1980.

On September 27, 1979, the agency amended
Safety Standard No. 208 to permit the optional use
of the seat belt telltale symbol specified in Safety
Standard No. 101-80 prior to the effective date of
that standard (44 F.R. 55579). However, that
amendment failed to clarify that, after the effec-
tive date of Standard No. 101-80 (September 1,
1980), the telltale symbol will be required to be
used in a vehicle's belt warning system. This notice
clarifies that point.

When the seat belt telltale symbol was added to
Safety Standard No. 208, the amendment inac-
curately stated the pertinent sections of the stand-
ard that were to be modified. Further, paragraph
S4.5.3.3(b) (1) inadvertently omitted language con-
cerning the audible warning. This notice adds the
omitted language for that paragraph and, addi-
tionaUy, deletes the parenthetical "(1)" in the
paragraph heading. Since there is no longer a sub-
paragraph "(2)," the heading should be specified as
"S4.5.3.3(b)."

The 1979 amendment also incorrectly added two
sections to the warning system requirements that
had previously been deleted from the standard,
S7.3.1 and S7.3a. This mistake occurred because
the warning system requirements are incorrectly
codified in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions. On July 5, 1977 (42 F.R. 34299), Safety
Standard No. 208 was amended to delete section
S7.3 and to redesignate section S7.3a as S7.3 (as
the sections were numbered at that time). When
this amendment was codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations, however, only paragraph
S7.3 was deleted, not the entire section (S7.3
through S7.3.5.4). Instead, S7.3a was transposed

PART 571; S 208-PRE-113

as S7.3 and S7.3.1 through S7.3.5.4 remained. Un- Issued on July 7, 1980.

fortunately, these deleted sections were used as a Michael M. Finkelstein,

reference when the seat belt telltale symbol Associate Administrator for Rulemaking.

amendment was added to Standard No. 208. This

notice also corrects that error. *^ ^•"- 47151

July 14, 1980

PART 571; S 208-PRE-114

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD

NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection

(Docket No. 74-14; Notice 19)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends Safety Standard
No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, to specify
additional performance requirements for both
manual and automatic safety belt assemblies
installed in motor vehicles with a Gross Vehicle
Weight Rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less.
These performance requirements are specified in
order to prevent the installation of particularly
inconvenient and uncomfortable belt assemblies
and to ensure that people are not discouraged from
using belts because of their design or performance.
This amendment does not include several provi-
sions that were contained in the notice or proposed
rulemaking preceding this rule. Based on com-
ments received in response to the proposal, the
agency has determined that only certain of the
specifications should become mandatory at the
present time. Consideration involving cost, lead-
time and the encouragement of innovative seat
belt designs have led the agency to conclude that
the other provisions should be issued only as
performance guidelines that manufacturers should
follow where possible, or find alternative means to
accomplish the same ends. The performance
guidelines will be published in a separate Federal
Register notice.

DATE: Effective date: September 1, 1982.

ADDRESS: Any petitions for reconsideration
should refer to the docket number and notice
number and be submitted to: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

Robert Nelson, Office of Vehicle Safety Standards,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
Washington, D.C. 20590. (202-426-2264)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Safety
Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49
CFR 571.208), currently requires most motor
vehicles to be equipped with safety belts at each
designated seating position. Beginning in
September 1981, and phasing in over the following
two years, new passenger cars will have to provide
automatic occupant crash protection (i.e., occupant
restraint that requires no action by occupants,
such as fastening seat belts, to be effective). Many
new automobiles will be equipped with automatic
belts to comply with the automatic restraint re-
quirements (automatic belts move into place
around a vehicle occupant automatically when he
or she enters the car and closes the door). The
requirements specified in this amendment are
designed to remove some of the most egregious
disincentives to use of current belt designs to en-
sure that both the automatic belts and the manual
belts installed in future vehicles will be comfortable
and convenient to use.

The requirements specified in this notice are
applicable to seat belt assemblies installed in all
vehicles with a GVWTl of 10,000 pounds or less,
except for Type 2 manual belts Gap and shoulder
combination belts) installed in front seating posi-
tions in passenger cars through the 1983 model
year. As noted in the proposal preceding this
amendment (44 F.R. 77210), Type 2 manual belts
will be phased out in passenger cars when the
automatic restraint requirements of Standard No.
208 become effective. Accordingly, the agency
believes that manufacturers should be allowed to
focus their efforts and resources regarding com-
fort and convenience on manual belts in vehicles
other than passenger cars and on developing the
Type 1 manual belts (lap belts) which will be in-
stalled in rear seats in passenger cars and in some
front seats in conjunction with air bags and single
diagonal automatic belts.

PART 571; S 208-PRE-115

As stated in the notice of proposed rulemaking
the discomfort and inconvenience of current seat
belt designs are among the most prominent factors
resulting in the current low rate of safety belt use
(approximately 11 percent). The proposal cited
various studies which conclude that comfort and
convenience play a determinative role in whether
people continue to use the safety belts installed in
their vehicles after they first try them (DOT
HS-801-594; DOT HS-803-370). Some of the
problems identified in these studies include: many
belts are difficult to reach; many belts do not fit
properly (e.g., they cross the occupant's neck); the
pressure of many shoulder belts is felt to be
excessive, particularly by women; many belts are
difficult to buckle; and many belts become too tight
after they have been worn for several minutes and
their users have moved around.

In order to alleviate the most serious of these
problems, the notice of proposed rulemaking
sought to establish a variety of relatively simple,
objective performance requirements that would
improve the comfort and convenience of seat belt
systems. Specifications involving the following
performance areas were therefore proposed: torso
belt occupant fit; belt retraction; adjustable
buckles for certain belts; belt/ seat cushion
clearance; torso belt body contact pressure;
automatic locking retractors (ALR's) were to be
restricted; "comfort clips" were to be precluded;
latchplate accessibility; webbing guides; conven-
ience hooks for belt webbing clearance between
webbing and the occupant's head; and specifica-
tions for motorized belt systems.

There were 38 comments in response to the pro-
posal from vehicle manufacturers, seat belt
assembly manufacturers, public interest groups
and consumers. All comments were considered and
the most significant are discussed in this notice. In
response to those comments, and for reasons set
forth more fully below, the agency has concluded
that this amendment will only include specifica-
tions relating to: latchplate accessibility; seat belt
guides; adjustable buckles for certain belts;
shoulder belt pressure; convenience hooks; belt
retraction; and comfort devices. The other provi-
sions of the proposal will be issued to the public
only as performance guidelines which manufac-
turers may voluntarily follow if they choose. Those
guidelines will be issued in a separate Federal
Register notice.

Proposed Provisions Not Included in This
Amendment

(The following section sets forth the major com-
ments to the proposed provisions that are not
being included in this amendment. A general
discussion of the agency's response to these com-
ments follows after the summary.)

There were nine comments to the proposed
amendment from concerned citizens. Five of these
consumers supported the proposed rulemaking and
stated that they have experienced extreme com-
fort and convenience problems with their seat belt
systems. Three citizens opposed the proposal on
the basis that the rulemaking represents unwar-
ranted government interference. Finally, one com-
menter objected to the technical nature of the pro-
posal, stating that the specifications were difficult
to understand.

Almost all vehicle manufacturers supported the
concept of the proposal that seat belt assemblies
should be convenient to use and comfortable to
wear. However, most manufacturers disagreed
with the agency's contention that there is a
demonstrable relationship between seat belt com-
fort and convenience and belt usage rates and that
improving comfort and convenience will improve
those rates. Additionally, most manufacturers did
not agree that the specifications proposed by the
agency would lead to belt designs that are ap-
preciably more comfortable and convenient. For
example, Ford Motor Company stated that
although it does not deny that there may be some
correlation between comfort and convenience and
wearing rates at the extremes (i.e., for very com-
fortable belts or belts that are particularly uncom-
fortable), there is no objective evidence that a
measurable relationship exists between comfort
and convenience and wearing rates. Ford also
stated that certain of the proposed requirements
would not accommodate a large number of vehicle
occupants (e.g.. Ford stated that the fit zone
specified in the proposal would only ensure that
belts properly fit 60 percent of the population. The
proposal stated the agency's belief that the fit zone
would ensure over 90 percent of the population had
comfortable belts). The Motor Vehicle Manufac-
turers Association stated that experience has
shown that the incorporation of features in belt
systems to improve their comfort and convenience
has not resulted in increased seat belt use, and that
comfort and convenience are highly subjective con-

PART 571; S 208-PRE-116

cepts that are not readily quantifiable. Chrysler
Corporation stated that comfort and convenience
improvements alone will not result in a substantial
increase in belt use. Chrysler stated that the only
way to improve seat belt use is to enact mandatory
seat belt use laws. Volkswagen of America stated
that the proposed modifications would actually
eliminate several of the most promising existing
automatic seat belt designs because of design
restrictions. General Motors Corporation cited a
study conducted for it by MOR, Inc., which in-
dicated that removal of all perception of discom-
fort and inconvenience in belt systems would result
in only a 1.7 percent increase in seat belt usage.
The NHTSA proposal indicated that usage could be
increased about 8 percent, and took exception to
the MOR study. General Motors argued that the
NHTSA has not adequately demonstrated,
however, why the conclusions in the MOR study
are invalid. American Motors Corporation stated
that manufacturers already incorporate adequate
comfort and convenience features in their belt
systems and that regulatory action is, therefore,
not warranted in this case.

The American Seat Belt Council, Hamill
Manufacturing Company and other commenters
supported the rationale of the proposal totally.
Hamill stated that comfort and convenience is of
paramount importance to 75-80 percent of the
non-user segment of the driver population, who
already perceive that seat belts are effective in
mitigating the risk of death and injury in vehicle
crashes but are dissuaded from using the belts
because of perceived inconvenience and discom-
fort. Volvo of America Corporation acknowledged
that comfort and convenience is one factor that in-
fluences usage, but stated that the major reason
for the low rates of seat belt use is lack of motiva-
tion on the part of the motoring public.

In addition to the general negative comments
concerning the relationship between seat belt com-
fort and convenience and wearing rates, many
commenters (vehicle manufacturers) argued that
certain of the proposed specifications would
adversely affect belt effectiveness in vehicle
crashes. For example, several manufacturers
argued that the comfort zone for belt webbing
specified in the proposal would require belt an-
chorages in some vehicle models to be in locations
that are not the optimum location for belt perform-
ance in restraining victims in a crash situation.

Torso Belt Occupant Fit (Manual and
Automatic Belts)

To alleviate problems of torso belt fit such as rub-
bing of the occupant's neck, the proposal specified a
zone in which the torso belt would have to lie on a
test dummy placed in a vehicle. The zone was
established to ensure that belts are installed so that
the torso belt crosses the occupant's shoulder and
chest approximately midway between the neck and
shoulder tip, and crosses the sternum approxi-
mately midway between the breasts. The proposed
requirements specified geometric criteria to
describe the required chest-crossing envelope.

The motor vehicle manufacturers were unani-
mous in their opposition to the proposed torso belt
fit requirement. Their objections were primarily
rela.ted to: the location of the specified compliance
zone on the Part 572 test dummy; the location of
the test dummy in the vehicle; the width of the
compliance zone on the Part 572 test dummy; and
the test procedure to determine compliance.

Manufacturers argued that the test procedure is
not objective and repeatable because of the com-
plexities and variability associated with locating
the dummy in a specific position in the vehicle.
They also argued that the procedure for placing
the belt around the test dummy (the "rocking"
procedure) is not objectively stated. Most manufac-
turers argued that the 3-inch width of the fit zone
specified in the proposal is too design restrictive.
Additionally, Ford argued that its tests show that
the 3-inch zone would only assure proper fit on ap-
proximately 60 percent of the driving population
(the agency stated in the proposal that 90 percent
of the population would have the proper fit with
the proposed specifications). Ford did not substan-
tiate how it arrived at this conclusion, however.
Manufacturers argued that the fit zone should be
at least 3.6 inches wide and possibly as much as
five inches wide in order to ensure repeatability of
the compliance procedure. Manufacturers stated
that the location of the compliance zone on the test
dummy would not necessarily place the belt in the
optimum position for effectiveness in crashes in
certain vehicle models. They based this assumption
on the fact that in certain current vehicle models
both the belt anchorages would have to be moved
to place the belt in the specified zone. The
manufacturers argued that these new anchorage
locations would degrade belt performance in some
instances.

PART 571; S 208-PRE-117

Clearance Between Webbing and Seat Cushion
(Automatic Belts)

As noted in the notice of proposed rulemaking,
the shift from manual to automatic belts may in-
itially lead to confusion on the part of some per-
sons. The lower end of many automatic shoulder
belt designs is attached between the two front
seating positions. The upper end is attached to the
rear upper comer of the front door. If the lap belt
or torso belt of an automatic belt system is de-
signed so that it lies on the seat cushion or against
the seatback cushion(s) when the belt system is
reeled-out in its open-door position, some people
are likely to be confused about how to get into the
vehicle. Additionally, if the belt is lying on or hang-
ing slightly above the seat cushion, it is likely to
pull against clothing in an irritating fashion as the
occupant tries to sit down. These factors led the
agency to propose minimum specifications for web-
bing/seat clearance (three inches) so that people
would not be encouraged to disconnect automatic
belts because of the inconvenience.

Most manufacturers opposed the minimmn
specification for webbing /seat clearance. The com-
ments stated that there is no safety rationale for
the requirement because any misconception con-
cerning the proper way to enter the vehicle would
be removed after the occupant became familiar
with the vehicle. Peugeot stated that experience
has shown that the occupant can easily push the
strap aside for a moment in order to enter the vehi-
cle. The company argued that the proposed re-
quirement is tantamount to requiring the installa-
tion of an automatic mechanism to move the belt
system's top anchor's position. (Note: In response
to this specific comment, the agency would not
consider a belt system that had to be manually
moved out of the way by the occupant to be an
"automatic" system that would satisfy the re-
quirements of the standard; see 39 F.R. 14594,
April 25, 1974). Several manufacturers stated the
minimum specification could degrade belt effec-
tiveness in a crash. These manufacturers argued
that the specification would preclude a belt, par-
ticularly a lap belt, from fitting securely around the
occupant. This could result in the occupant "sub-
marining" under the belt during a crash.

Motorized Track Systems— Webbing/Head
Clearance

Some automatic belt designs rely on overhead,
motorized track-puller systems instead of the open-

ing of the door to move the webbing automatically
out of the occupant's way when getting in and out
of the vehicle. These systems pull the webbing
toward the dashboard when the vehicle door is
opened and then pull it toward the rear of the vehi-
cle to deploy around the occupant after the door is
closed. If such a system is used, the vehicle design
should be such that the belt webbing does not pass
too close to the occupant's head during its move-
ment. Webbing that passes too close to or brushes
the occupant's face or head could be annoying or
disconcerting (perceived as hazardous by the in-
tended user) and cause the occupant to defeat the
automatic belt system (by unbuckling or cutting
the belt, for example). The proposal specified a
webbing /head clearance envelope that was in-
tended to ensure that a moving torso belt would
not come within a certain specified distance of an
occupant's head and face.

Industry objected to this proposed requirement
on the basis that many small vehicle models could
not comply with the requirement without substan-
tial changes to the vehicle structure (i.e., because
of limited head room in these small cars). Toyota
Motor Company stated that an automatic belt
design it has already introduced in the market
would have to be withdrawn if this proposed
requirement were finalized because there is not
sufficient room in its vehicle model to obtain the
specified clearance. Volkswagen stated that any
specification for webbing/ head clearance should
only specify that the webbing cannot touch the
occupant's face while it is articulating, and that a
minimum distance specification is too design
restrictive. General Motors stated that the
spherical zone specified in the proposal falls out-
side the vehicle on some GM body styles, and would
thus preclude motorized belt systems in these
vehicles.

Rate of Movement of Motorized Belts

The agency stated its belief in the proposal that
motorized belt systems will be unacceptable to the
public if the rate of belt movement is too slow,
since the occupant would be delayed in exiting the
vehicle. Systems that move too rapidly might also
be unacceptable since they could be viewed by vehi-
cle occupants as a possible hazard. Each of these
problems could lead vehicle occupants to defeat the
automatic belt system. Therefore, the proposal
specified minimum and maximum times allowed

PART 571; S 208-PRE-118

for belts to move forward and backward on
motorized track systems (between 1.5 and 1.9
seconds from start to stop).

Manufacturers stated that this proposed specifi-
cation should be deleted because of the variation in
performance of motorized systems due to
environmental conditions. The comments pointed
out that ambient temperature greatly affects
motor speeds and battery conditions and that the
movement time, therefore, could not be held
stable. Several commenters argued that a single
movement time is impractical because of the wide
variety of vehicle sizes and the varying distances a
belt system would have to move. The commenters
stated that if such a requirement is retained it
should be stated as a rate rather than total times
allowed. In this way, the movement of all systems
would be uniform even though it would take longer
for the belt webbing to move down the track in a
large vehicle than in a small vehicle.

Agency Response to Comments on
Unadopted Proposals

The agency does not agree with the general
negative response of most vehicle manufacturers
regarding the relationship between seat belt com-
fort and convenience and belt use. Likewise, the
agency believes that the specification in the notice
of proposed rulemaking would greatly improve the
comfort and convenience of seat belt systems, par-
ticularly the new automatic belt systems that will
be introduced in the future. Although the agency
agrees that many factors influence belt use, it con-
tinues to believe that belts which are inconvenient
to use and uncomfortable to wear will be used less
regardless of these other factors. The research
studies cited in the notice of proposed rulemaking
clearly establish that there is a definite problem
with many current seat belt designs, and that seat
belt systems can be improved with relatively minor
changes. Removing the most egregious problems
with seat belt designs will, at a minimum, remove
an impediment that currently thwarts other pro-
grams designed to increase seat belt use. For
example, seat belt education campaigns will have
little effect if people attempt to wear the belts but
find them inconvenient and uncomfortable.

The agency also does not agree with many of the
comments regarding specific provisions included in
the proposal. Proper torso belt fit is an extremely
important aspect of ensuring that belts are com-

fortable to wear and do not cross the neck or face.
The problems cited by the industry with the pro-
posed specification and test procedure are prob-
lems the agency believes can be solved. While it is
true that some vehicle models may require signifi-
cant modifications to comply with the fit zone, the
agency believes that this is due primarily to the
fact that in the past vehicles have been designed
with little attention given to how the belt system
will fit when installed in the vehicle. Belt systems
are typically added as an afterthought long after
the vehicle's structural design has been completed,
with no systematic effort to coordinate a particular
belt design to a particular structural design.

The industry's comments that webbing/seat
clearance for automatic belts will not be a problem
after occupants learn how to get into the vehicle
only address part of the problem. In the months
since issuance of the proposal, the agency has
observed many prototype and production auto-
matic belt designs. These observations have dem-
onstrated that webbing /seat clearance is extremely
important to ensure that the belt webbing does not
scrub across the occupant's clothing when entering
the vehicle. Some of the designs that were observed
had such minimal clearance that buttons and shirt
pocket contents were snagged by the belt system
as an occupant entered the vehicle. This is obviously
a problem that would encourage disconnection of
the belt system. In addition, if the webbing/ seat
clearance is so minimal that the person has to
manually move the belt out of the way to enter the
automobile, the system is not really "automatic"
and would not satisfy the automatic restraint
requirements of the standard. The agency has con-
cluded that these problems outweigh the percep-
tion problem discussed in the proposal. Conse-
quently, the agency believes that the 3-inch
specification in the proposal is inadequate and a
greater clearance is desirable. While it is true that
greater clearance may require innovative designs,
the agency believes these are problems that can
and should be solved.

Although these basic disagreements do exist be-
tween the NHTSA and vehicle manufacturers, the
agency does believe that many of the specific
comments to the proposal have merit. Also, the
agency is aware that many of the problems cited by
the industry are legitimate concerns. The agency is
cognizant of the fact that there are a multitude of
vehicle configurations that would have to be dealt

PART 571; S 208-PRE-119

with in complying with all of the provisions included
in the notice of proposed rulemaking. In certain
situations it may be true that strict compliance
with the provisions as originally specified might
compromise belt effectiveness in crashes to a
limited degree, if applied to existing, unchanged
structural configurations. Most manufacturers
stated that the injury criteria of the standard could
be met under the specifications of the proposal, but
that in some instances the margin of safety would
not be as great. Obviously, the agency does not
want belt system performance to be degraded in
the attempt to make belts comfortable and con-
venient enough that they will be used. However,
the agency does not believe that such a com-
promise is necessary if belt system design and vehi-
cle structural design are coordinated at the outset.

The agency has also considered the numerous
comments concerning the leadtime that would be
necessary to implement the proposed requirements
in certain vehicle models, as well as the costs
associated with making the changes after design
plans have already been completed.

These considerations and the factors mentioned
below have led the agency to conclude that re-
quirements for torso belt fit, webbing/ seat
clearance, webbing /head clearance, and motorized
belt track speed should not be included in this final
rule. The agency believes that manufacturers
should be encouraged to rapidly develop innovative
automatic belt designs that will coordinate belt
comfort and convenience and belt effectiveness to
the greatest extent possible. In some vehicle con-
figurations, particularly in smaller cars, strict com-
pliance with the proposed specifications mentioned
earlier may hamper these efforts. While the agency
believes that it is possible and desirable to design
comfortable and convenient safety belts meeting
all of the proposed specifications, it does not wish
to retard the introduction of automatic restraints
because of minor technical problems in particular
vehicle configurations. If all of the proposed re-
quirements were issued in this final rule, additional
leadtime would have to be given because of the
special problems in a few vehicle models. The agency
believes it is preferable to encourage voluntary
compliance with some of the proposed provisions
so that a majority of vehicles can be introduced at
an earlier date with the comfort and convenience
features incorporated.

The agency also intends to continue development
of the proposed specifications in order to refine
comfort zones and test procedures. Although the
provisions as proposed would represent an impor-
tant improvement in seat belt comfort and conven-
ience if incorporated in current vehicle designs,
comments from the industry have led the agency to
conclude that some modifications and adjustments
in the specifications may be desirable. Instead of
delaying the introduction of improvements in seat
belt design while the agency continues this
development work, it has been determined that it
is wiser to urge voluntary compliance with the
major provisions included in the proposals so that
they may be introduced as soon as possible. As
automatic belts are introduced in the market,
valuable data will be received concerning con-
sumer perception of comfort and convenience.
These data will be helpful to both the agency and
the industry in further improving the belt systems.

Another factor influencing the decision not to
include the proposed specifications in this final rule
is the fact that there are automatic belt designs
currently in production that do not comply with all
the provisions proposed. The agency does not wish
to preclude the continual production of these
designs because, for example, they are V4 inch out-
side the torso belt fit zone. This is particularly true
since the automatic belts currently on the road
were introduced voluntarily by the manufacturers
prior to the effective date of the standard.

As stated earlier, the agency does urge manufac-
turers to voluntarily incorporate the performance
specifications that were proposed but that are not
included in this final rule. The agency believes all
of the provisions deal with seat belt design features
that substantially affect the comfort and conven-
ience of seat belt systems, and therefore help
determine whether a particular belt system will be
worn. The agency also believes that the provisions
adequately specify performance criteria and that
manufacturers can design systems that are in con-
formity with the specifications and that also
optimize belt effectiveness in crash situations.
Although some variations may be required for
specialized vehicle configurations, the great
majority of the specifications should prove to be
extremely helpful to manufacturers attempting to
develop seat belt designs that are comfortable to
wear and convenient to use.

PART 571; S 208-PRE-120

In order to aid both seat belt manufacturers and
vehicle manufacturers, the NHTSA will publish in
a later Federal Register notice suggested perform-
ance guidelines for torso belt fit, belt /head
clearance, belt/ seat cushion clearance, and speed
of motorized belt track systems. The agency will
also include in that notice tabulation of all research
reports, studies and other data concerning the
improvement of seat belt comfort and convenience
that are available at the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration. The agency urges all
manufacturers to use the information that is
available and to incorporate these performance
guidelines so that vehicle occupants will not be
discouraged from using seat belts because of their
discomfort or inconvenience.

Provisions Included In This Amendment

In addition to the provisions discussed already,
the notice of proposed rulemaking included
specifications dealing with seat belt guides, torso
belt pressure, latch plate accessibility, adjustable
buckles for certain belts having emergency-locking
retractors, convenience hooks for automatic belts,
emergency-locking retractors in lap belts, belt
retraction and belt comfort devices. The proposed
provisions relating to these topics were intended to
alleviate some of the most serious problems with
current seat belt designs. Most manufacturers
agreed that there are problems in these areas,
although there was not total agreement on all of
the remedies specified in the proposal. After con-
sidering the comments, the agency has concluded
that improvements in these areas can and should
be made. The changes required by this amendment
are not burdensome and can be accomplished
rapidly. The major objections of the industry to the
proposal related primarily to the proposed provi-
sions that are not being included in this amend-
ment (discussed earlier in this notice).

Seat Belt Guides

Seat belt webbing and buckles in motor vehicles
often fall or are pushed down behind the seat. Con-
sequently, occupants are discouraged or actually
precluded from using the belts. Therefore, the pro-
posal specified that belt webbing at any designated
seating position shall pass through flexible stiff-
eners or other guides in the seat cushion to ensure
that the belts are easily accessible to occupants.
The provision also specified that belt buckles and

latchplates are to remain above the rear cushions
at all times, even in folding or tumbling seats, and
that all buckles are to be "free-standing" to allow
one-hand buckling. These provisions were included
in response to a petition for rulemaking submitted
some time ago by the Center for Auto Safety.

The American Seat Belt Council supported the
proposed requirements for both seat belt guides
and "free-standing" buckles. Vehicle manufac-
turers requested that several changes be made in
the specification or that it be deleted altogether.
Volkswagen stated that it would be difficult to
comply with the requirement for seats that both
fold and tumble and for seats designed to convert
into beds. The agency believes that suitable
designs can be developed to ensure that belts re-
main above seats that both fold and tumble. Two
vehicles were furnished by Volkswagen which
showed two different rear seat configurations. The
agency determined that belts could be developed
for either that would comply with the provision.
However, one design configuration would require
seat-mounted belts, with a considerable increase in
cost for the belts and increased weight for the vehi-
cle. Based on its consideration of available designs
and their costs, NHTSA has concluded that the
cost of requiring seats that both fold and tumble
seats to comply with the requirement may not be
justified. Therefore, this type of seat is not subject
to this amendment.

Several manufacturers stated that the proposed
requirement should not apply to fixed seats since
the purpose of the requirement can be accomplished
without guides or conduits for fixed seats. The
agency disagrees. The problem addressed in this
proposed requirement has been most prevalent
with fixed seats. Latchplates and buckles that get
lost behind fixed seat cushions are more difficult to
retrieve than buckles behind movable seats. While
it is true that fixed seats can be designed so that
there is little clearance between seat backs and
seat cushions, buckles and latchplates can still be
forced down behind the seat when a person sits on
the seat.

The proposal specified that the belt latchplate
and buckle must remain in fixed positions in rela-
tion to the seat cushion and vehicle interior.
Several manufacturers pointed out that the belt
hardware could not remain in a "fixed" position
with adjustable seats. The agency agrees that this
aspect of the provision was inaccurately stated.

PART 571; S 208-PRE-121

The intent of the provision was only to require that
the belt hardware pass through guides or conduits
to maintain the location of the buckle and latch-
plate on top of the seat cushion. The provision is
modified accordingly in this amendment.

Several manufacturers also objected to the
specification for the "freestanding" buckles and
"one-hand" buckling on the basis that the criteria
is design restrictive and not stated in objective
terms. The agency continues to believe that these
provisions would increase the convenience of
buckling a seat belt. Nevertheless, after consider-
ing the comments, the agency has decided that the
specification would be difficult to enforce and may
be too design restrictive in some instances. Addi-
tionally, a majority of vehicle manufacturers have
already begun using stiffeners and other devices to
make buckling of belts more simple. If this trend
continues, a provision regarding this aspect of belt
performance will not be necessary. Therefore, the
agency is not including a requirement for "free-
standing" buckles in the amendment at this time.
The agency does urge, however, manufacturers to
voluntarily design their belt system so that buckles
are "freestanding" or of some other design that
facilitates easy buckling by consumers.

Torso Belt Body Contact Pressure
(Manual and Automatic Belts)

NHTSA research indicates that occupants are
likely to complain about belt pressure if the torso
belt net contact force is greater than .7 pound.
Therefore, the proposal specified that the torso
portion of any belt system shall not create a con-
tact pressure exceeding that of a belt with a total
net contact force of .7 pound.

Most manufacturers objected to the belt contact
force limitation. Many commenters stated that the
agency has not adequately demonstrated that .7
pound of belt webbing force is the optimum upper
limit in all seating configurations. In lieu of the
proposed limitation, various manufacturers sug-
gested force limitations ranging from 1 pound to
11 pounds. Manufacturers also argued that the
.7-pound pressure does not allow for engineering
tolerances. Ford stated that its tests using the pro-
posed procedure indicate that test variability
amounts to ±.3 pound. Other manufacturers
stated that the proposed force level is so low that it
would be difficult to also meet the proposed re-
quirement that belts retract completely when un-

buckled by the vehicle occupant, i.e., the retractor
forces would have to be too low to meet the "self
stow" provisions. Chrysler Corporation and
General Motors stated that a more precise test pro-
cedure for measuring belt contact force is needed.
This comment was echoed by several foreign
manufacturers.

The agency does not agree with most of these
objections. In a detailed study conducted by Man
Factors, Inc., webbing retractor forces were
varied in an experimental belt system mounted in a
production vehicle. A series of male and female
test subjects experienced each force level during
on-the-road driving tests and reported whether the
pressure felt was satisfactory or too great. That
study showed that belt pressure greater than 0.7
pound was unacceptable to more than 60 percent
of the test subjects. Therefore, manufacturers'
comments that belt pressure should be as high as 1
to 11 pounds have little, if any, credence. Regard-
ing other comments, the study that was conducted
to determine maximum tolerable belt pressure was
not conducted for a myriad of seating configura-
tions since a given belt pressure will likely be either
acceptable or unacceptable to an occupant
regardless of the seating configuration. In
automobiles that presently meet this pressure re-
quirement, retraction has not been found to be a
problem. Their belts retract in compliance with the
proposed retraction requirements. The agency
believes that comments stating that a test pro-
cedure should be included in the standard to
measure the belt pressure have merit. Therefore,
this amendment specifies a .7-pound maximum
pressure limitation and includes a procedure for
measuring belt pressure.

Latch Plate Accessibility

As noted in the proposal, one of the most
inconvenient aspects of using many current seat
belt designs is the difficulty that seated occupants
have in reaching back to grasp the belt latchplate
when the belt is unbuckled and in its retracted posi-
tion. The greater the difficulty in reaching the
latchplate to buckle the belt, the more likely that
belt usage will cease or never begin. Poor ac-
cessibUity of latchplates results from two main fac-
tors: Location of the latchplate beyond the conven-
ient reach of some seated vehicle occupants, and
inadequate clearance between the seats and side of
the vehicle to allow easy grasping of the latchplate.

PART 571; S 208-PRE-122

The proposal specified requirements to define
limits on reach distance for latchplates and to
prescribe minimum clearances for arm and hand
access.

There were several comments from the vehicle
manufacturers recommending changes in the pro-
posed specifications. The proposed test procedures
for this provision specified that the vehicle seat is
to be placed in its forwardmost position when
testing for compliance with the reach envelope (the
position in which there would presumably be the
most problems). Ford Motor Company stated that
the requirement should be modified to specify that
the seat be located in the mid-track position since a
50th percentile adult would not normally have the
seat in the forwardmost position (the proposal
specified that a 50th percentile dummy be used to
test for compliance with the reach envelope). The
NHTSA agrees that some difficulty may be en-
countered in placing the 50th percentOe test
dummy in the forwardmost seat adjustment posi-
tion. If this occurs, there is nothing that would
preclude manufacturers from removing the test
dummy's legs, since legs are irrelevant to the arm
reach envelope. However, the agency believes that
the requirement should specify that the seat be in
its forwardmost adjustment position since many
current latchplates are blocked with the seat in this
position although they are not when the seat is in
its mid-position. Since a significant number of vehi-
cle occupants will have the seat in the forwardmost
position (particularly women), the agency beheves
that the latchplate should be within easy reach for
these occupants or they will be discouraged from
wearing the belt system.

One manufacturer stated that it is not clear from
the proposal whether the latchplate access
specifications would apply to all seats or to just the
front outboard seating positions. The requirement
applies only to the front outboard seats, and the
specification is modified in this amendment to
clarify this point. Several commenters stated that
the size of the test block used to measure latchplate
access should be modified and that the block should
be designed to articulate to represent the forearm
and wrist of a human being. The agency does not
agree with this recommendation. This size of the
test block was designed to account for the limita-
tion of the human arm and hand as they would
articulate through various openings (in this case,
between the seat and vehicle structure). The

dimension was based on a detailed study conducted
by Man Factors (See IX)T-HS-7-01617, December
1978). The agency also believes that the test ap-
paratus would be unnecessarily complicated if
specifications were included for articulation. For
these reasons, the test block specification and test
procedure is unchanged in this notice, except for
minor technical changes in the string dimensions
and the deletion of one illustration (Figure 3) that
was included in the proposal. These minor
technical changes are in response to comments and
are included for clarification purposes.

Convenience Hooks for Automatic Belts

Some automatic belt designs might include a
manual "convenience hook" located, for example,
on the dashboard near the A-pillar, which would
enable occupants to manually move the belt web-
bing totally out of the way as they are about to exit
the vehicle. These devices would only be permitted
as additional equipment since automatic belts must
operate automatically, i.e., manual hooks could not
be used as the sole means of moving the belt web-
bing out of the occupant's way. The proposal
specified that if manufacturers install such "con-
venience hooks," the hook must automatically
release the belt webbing so that it will deploy
around the occupant prior to the vehicle being
driven. The proposal specified that the hook would
have to automatically release the webbing when

(a) The vehicle ignition switch is moved to the
"on" or "start"position.

(b) The vehicle's drive train is engaged.

Manufacturers did not object to the proposed re-
quirements for "convenience hooks," although
there were several comments that the provision
needs clarification. Jaguar Rover Triimiph, Inc.
stated that it is not clear from the proposal
whether conditions (a) and (b) mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs are sequential or alter-
natives. This notice modifies the language of the
requirement to clarify that the "hook" must
release the belt webbing when the ignition switch
is in the "on" or "start" position and the vehicle's
drive train is engaged at the same time (i.e., when
both condition (a) and (b) exist at the same time).
An optional condition "(c)" is added in response to
a comment by American Honda Motor Co. to allow
vehicles with manual transmissions to have the
"hook" release the webbing when the ignition is on
and the vehicle's parking brake is released at the
same time.

PART 571; S 208-PRE-123

Belt Retraction

Many persons find seat belts inconvenient
because the belt webbing will not retract completely
to its stowed position when the system is unbuckled,
so that the webbing is an obstacle when the occu-
pant is trying to exit the vehicle. Therefore, the
proposal included a specification to ensure that
belts do retract completely and automatically when
they are unbuckled. While there were no serious
objections to the proposed requirement, several
manufacturers requested changes in the test pro-
cedures. For example, it was requested that
manufacturers be allowed to remove the arms on
the test dummy during the compliance test since
the belt webbing can get hung-up on the dummy's
arms while retracting. The agency believes that
this suggestion has merit since a human occupant
can move his arm out of the way when a seat belt is
retracting and that flexibility cannot be incor-
porated in the test dummies currently available.
Manufacturers also requested that the test be con-
ducted with the vehicle door open, since some
systems are designed to automatically retract
when the door latch is released (i.e., the retraction
force is stronger in this mode). The agency agrees
with this suggestion also, and it is incorporated in
this notice.

Automatic Locking Retractors

Seat belts incorporating automatic locking
retractors (ALR's) in the lap belt portion of the
system have been identified as a major item of
complaint by vehicle occupants because of the
feature's discomfort and inconvenience. Many
vehicle occupants report that belts incorporating
the ALR's tighten excessively under normal driv-
ing conditions, making it necessary to unbuckle
and refasten the lap belt to relieve pressure on the
pelvis and abdomen. This discomfort causes many
persons to stop using their belts.

Belt systems having ALR's have also been found
very inconvenient to use, particularly if the ALR is
incorporated as part of the latchplate assembly.
During the process of putting the belt on, the occu-
pant must extend the belt in a single continuous
movement to a length sufficient to allow buckling.
Otherwise, the retractor locks before sufficient
webbing has been withdrawn to accomplish buck-
ling, and the belt has to be fully retracted before
the occupant can repeat the donning process.
Many persons have found this characteristic of

ALR's extremely irritating and consequently have
avoided use of the belt. In addition, ALR's inhibit
the driver's normal movement to pay tolls, reach
the glove compartment, etc. With emergency lock-
ing retractors (ELR's) instead of automatic lock-
ing retractors, these problems would be alleviated.

Safety Standard No. 208 currently requires lap
belts at outboard seating positions to be equipped
with either automatic locking retractors or
emergency locking retractors, in order to assure
that belts are sufficiently tightened to be effective
during a crash. However, this effectiveness feature
can be achieved by ELR's without the concomitant
discomfort and inconvenience associated with
ALR's. Therefore, the proposal sought to
eliminate ALR's as an alternative in the standard
for front outboard designated seating positions.

The proposal also specified that emergency lock-
ing retractors for the lap belt portion of the belt
system at the front outboard passenger's position
shall be equipped with a manual locking device so
that child restraint systems can be properly
secured. Since emergency locking retractors allow
some movement when the belt is fastened, the
agency and some child safety experts were con-
cerned that the child restraint system could slide
out of position prior to a crash if the retractor can-
not be manually locked.

Few manufacturers objected to the requirement
that lap belts at front outboard designated seating
positions be equipped with emergency locking
retractors. However, nearly all manufacturers ob-
jected to the requirement that these emergency
locking retractors be equipped with a manual lock-
ing device for securing child restraint systems.
Ford Motor Company stated that the manual lock
requirement is design restrictive and will preclude
the installation of continuous loop manual belts
and certain three-point automatic belts. Also, Ford
stated that the proposed requirement is inconsis-
tent with another proposal precluding any device
that allows the introduction of slack in a belt
system (e.g., comfort devices). Ford argued that
the manual lock could be used to introduce ex-
cessive slack in the belt when worn by an adult.
Toyota Motor Company stated that an emergency
locking retractor is definitely superior to an
automatic locking retractor from the standpoint of
comfort and convenience. Toyota argued,
however, that its tests with the GM child seat
(braking, fast cornering, driving on rough roads)

PART 571; S 208-PRE-124

have demonstrated that the performance of
emergency locking retractors in restraining this
child seat is satisfactory without a manual locking
device.

The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
pointed out that the Economic Commission of
Europe (which sets international motor vehicle
safety standards) does not even permit manual lock-
ing devices on emergency locking retractors.
Volkswagen of America stated that the proposed re-
quirement would impair the operation of these belts
by allowing too much slack in the system, and
argued that parents should be encouraged to place
their child restraints in rear seating positions that
have automatic locking retractors. General Motors
argued that the agency's data is totally inconclusive
in demonstrating that emergency locking retractors
without locking devices cannot adequately secure
child restraint systems. General Motors cited its
own tests which it states demonstrated child
restraints are adequately secured with emergency
locking retractors. Finally, several manufacturers
stated that the manual locking devices could pose a
hazard in emergency situations if the emergency
locking retractor is located on the vehicle door.
These commenters pointed out that the vehicle door
would be impossible to open from the outside if the
retractor is locked.

After considering these comments, the agency
has decided that while emergency locking retrac-
tors should be required for lap belts at front out-
board designated seating positions, these retrac-
tors should not be required to have manual locking
devices. The agency believes that the points raised
in the comments represent legitimate concerns.
Further, agency tests conducted after the issuance
of the proposal indicate that there may not be a
substantial problem with Type 2 belts incor-
porating emergency locking retractors restraining
child seats. However, the agency is planning to
conduct further research regarding the use of Type
1 belts with ELR's to secure child restraints. Addi-
tionally, the agency recently issued a proposal to
amend Safety Standard No. 210, Seat Belt An-
chorages, to require that lap belt anchorages be
present at front outboard seating passenger posi-
tions that are not equipped with lap belts (e.g.,
vehicles equipped with a two-point, single diagonal
automatic belt). Therefore, if that proposal is
adopted, parents wishing to place child seats in
front seating p)ositions in the affected vehicles can

purchase a lap belt having an automatic locking
retractor or a manual webbing adjusting device. In
light of these considerations, and the cost of in-
stalling manual locking devices on emergency lock-
ing retractors, the manual locking device of the
proposal is not adopted.

The proposal also included a provision to allow
manual adjustment devices on seat belt assemblies
in rear seating positions that have emergency lock-
ing retractors. Although automatic locking retrac-
tors are allowed in rear seating positions, some
manufacturers are currently installing emergency
locking retractors. These manufacturers have re-
quested that manual webbing adjustment devices
be allowed on these belt systems, specifically for
facilitating the securement of child restraint
systems. Nearly all commenters agreed with this
provision and it is included in this amendment.

In summary, although manual locking devices
are not being required on emergency locking
retractors in front seating positions, these devices
or manual webbing adjustment devices are being
allowed in rear seating positions. The manual web-
bing adjustment device would not be permitted in
front seating positions, but manufacturers would
be permitted to voluntarily install manual locking
devices on belts in front seating positions.

Devices That Introduce Slack in Belt Webbing

Some current seat belt designs include devices
that are intended to relieve shoulder belt pressure.
These "comfort clips," "window-shade" devices, or
other tension-relieving devices can reduce the effec-
tiveness of belts in crash situations if the occupant
uses the device to put excessive slack in the belt
webbing, i.e., so that the belt is not snugly against
the occupant. Therefore, the proposal included a
provision to prohibit any device, either manual or
automatic, that would permit the introduction of
slack in the upper torso restraint. The proposal
stated that such devices would not be necessary to
relieve the discomfort caused by excessive belt
pressure since the proposal also included a limita-
tion on belt pressure.

Several manufacturers objected to an outright
ban on tension-relieving devices. The American
Seat Belt Council stated that an appropriate
performance requirement should be developed that
will allow a small, controlled amount of slack in belt
systems. General Motors stated that its tension-

PART 571; S 208-PRE-125

relieving devices allow some slack but that this slack
could not be introduced inadvertently. General
Motors argued that such devices should be allowed
provided the slack is cancelled when the vehicle
door is opened, i.e., so that there is no slack at all
when an occupant uses the belt on a subsequent oc-
casion. The commenters argued that some persons
do not like any belt pressure at all, not even the .7
pounds that would be the maximum allowed under
the proposed belt pressure provisions.

The agency believes there is some merit to these
arguments particularly in regard to automatic belt
systems that are required to comply vnth the injury
criteria of Safety Standard No. 208. Therefore,
tension-relieving devices are not prohibited in this
amendment in automatic belt systems provided the
belt system can comply with the injury criteria of
the standard with the belt placed in any position to
which it can be adjusted. This means that if six
inches of slack can be introduced in the automatic
belt system by means of the tension-relieving
device, the belt must be able to comply with the in-
jury criteria with the belt webbing in that position.
Since manual seat belt systems are not required to
comply with the injury criteria of the standard
generally, they would also not be required to com-
ply just because they include tension-relieving
devices. The agency does urge manufacturers to
voluntarily limit the amount of slack that can be in-
troduced in their manual belt systems, however.

Seat Belt Warning System

The proposal included a provision for a new
sequential seat belt warning system in all motor
vehicles which are not passenger cars and which
have a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000
pounds or less.

Safety Standard No. 208 currently requires a
visual and audible warning system to remind vehi-
cle occupants to fasten their manual safety belts.
The present standard requires a warning system
which activates, for a period of 4 to 8 seconds, a
reminder light each time the vehicle ignition is
operated, and an audible warning if the driver's lap
belt is not in use. Studies of manual seat belt usage
in passenger vehicles have shown that a sequential
logic system which incorporates a visible reminder
light of continuous duration and a 4- to 8-second
audible warning could produce usage rates signifi-
cantly greater than those obtained with the warn-

ing systems currently required. The sequential
logic warning system activates unless buckling of a
person's belt occurred after the person sat down in
his seat. Under the current 208 requirement, the
warning system can be permanently defeated if the
belt is buckled and pushed behind the seat cushion
and left there during subsequent occasions on
which the vehicle is used.

Only the American Seat Belt Council supported
the requirement for a sequential warning system.
The vehicle manufacturers uniformly objected to
the requirement, stating that such a system would
cost $25 to $35 per vehicle (this is much higher
than the agency's estimated cost figure). Also,
manufacturers disputed the agency's data and
argued that there is no documentation demonstrat-
ing that a sequential warning system will substan-
tially increase belt use in vehicles other than
passenger cars.

The agency agrees that the data relied upon in
the proposal dealt primarily with sequential warn-
ing systems in passenger cars (The Phoenix Study,
DOT-HS-801-953). There is no conclusive
evidence that such a system would also improve
seat belt use in light trucks and vans to a com-
parable degree. Although the agency is convinced
that an effective warning system similar to or like
that proposed would result in some increased seat
belt use in these other vehicles, the agency has con-
cluded that manufacturers should be allowed to
voluntarily install such systems under an im-
plementation schedule suited to particular vehicle
models in order to minimize costs. Therefore, the
proposed requirement is not included in this
amendment. Specifications for a sequential warn-
ing system will, however, be included in the volim-
tary performance guidelines that will be issued in
the near future, however, for the benefit of
manufacturers that are interested in such a
system.

The proposal also included a specification for
warning systems for automatic seat belts, to en-
sure that motorized systems are locked into place
before the vehicle begins moving. If for some
reason the motorized belt has not returned and
locked into its protective mode, the occupant
would be alerted by the continuous light and by a
4-to 8-second audible warning. Although several
manufacturers objected to this requirement, again
primarily because of cost, the agency believes such
a requirement is essential for motorized automatic

PART 571; S 208-PRE-126

belt systems. It is therefore included in this amend-
ment.

The proposal also included an illustration chart
specifying the weights and dimensions of various
human body sizes (e.g., 5th percentile female). The
comments to the proposal indicated that some per-
sons were confused about inclusion of the chart.
Some commenters interpreted the figures in the
chart to represent a change in the Part 572 dummy
dimension. The chart was included in the proposal
to be republished in the standard since it had been
inadvertently deleted by the Code of Federal
Regulations some time ago. The chart, however,
was not intended to make any changes in the Part
572 test dummy.

In order to give manufacturers sufficient lead
time to implement the changes required by this

notice, and to minimize the cost of such changes,
the effective date of this amendment is September
1, 1982.

Note — The agency has determined that this amendment does
not qualify as a significant regulation under Executive Order
12221, "Improving Government Regulations," and the Depart-
mental guidelines implementing that order. Therefore, a
regulatory analysis is not required. A regulatory evaluation con-
cerning the amendment has been prepared and placed in the
public docket under the docket number and notice number of
this Federal Register notice.

Issued on December 31, 1980.

Joan Claybrook,

Administrator.

46 F.R. 2064
January 8, 1981

PART 571; S 208-PRE-127-128

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO

FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection
(Docket No. 208; Notice 21)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The purpose of this notice is to amend
Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protec-
tion, to delay for one year the effective date of the
first phase of the automatic restraint require-
ments of the standard. Prior to this notice, the
automatic restraint requirements were scheduled
to become effective for large cars on September
1, 1981 (model year 1982), for mid-size cars on
September 1. 1982 (model year 1983), and for
small cars on September 1, 1983 (model year
1984). As amended by this notice, the require-
ment for equipping large cars with automatic
restraints will not take effect until September 1,
1982, or model year 1983.

This one-year delay in the automatic restraint
requirements is being specified in light of
dramatic changes in production plans for the
model-year 1982 fleet (fewer large cars and more
small cars) and because the economic and other
justifications for the existing phase-in schedule
have changed drastically since the standard was
adopted in 1977.

The one-year delay will also allow the Depart-
ment sufficient time to re-evaluate the entire
automatic restraint standard as required by the
Presidential Executive Order 12291 (February
17, 1981). The Department is simultaneously issu-
ing a notice of proposed rulemaking in today's
issue of the Federal Register discussing further
possible changes in the automatic restraint
standard.

DATES: The new effective date of the automatic
restraint requirements for large cars is Septem-
ber 1, 1982.

ADDRESSES: Any petitions for reconsideration
should refer to the docket number and notice
number of this notice and be submitted to: Docket

Section, Room 5109, Nassif Building, 400 Seventh
Street. S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Michael Finkelstein,Officeof Rulemaking,
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Washington, D.C.
20590 (202-426-1810)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On February
12, 1981, the Department of Transportation
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to delay
for one year the first phase of the automatic
restraint requirements of Safety Standard No.
208, Occupant Crash Protection, (46 FR 12033).
Automatic restraints are systems that require no
action by vehicle occupants, such as buckling a
seat belt, to be effective. Two existing systems
that qualify as automatic restraints are air
cushion restraints (air bags) and automatic seat
belts (belts which automatically envelop an occu-
pant when entering the vehicle and closing the
door).

The automatic restraint requirements were
added to Standard No. 208 on July 5, 1977 (42 FR
34289), and require installation in accordance
with the following schedule:

• For full-size cars (wheelbase greater than 114
inches) beginning September 1, 1981 (1982 model
year);

• For mid-size cars (wheelbase not more than 114
inches but greater than 100 inches) beginning
September 1, 1982 (1983 model year);

• For small cars (wheelbase less than 100 inches)
beginning September 1, 1983 (1984 model year).

The February notice issued by the Department
proposed to alter this phase-in schedule by

PART 571; S208-PRE 129

deferring the first phase (large cars) for one year,
from model 1982 to model year 1983. The proposal
noted that such a change may be appropriate
because of the effects of implementation in model
year 1982 on large car manufacturers, because of
the added significance which those effects assume
due to the change in economic circumstances
since the schedule was adopted in 1977, and
because of the undermining by subsequent events
of the rationale underlying the original phase-in
schedule. (See the notice of proposed rulemaking
for a full discussion of the facts which led to the
proposed alteration of the phase-in schedule.)

Comments Upon Proposal

The responses to the proposal were equally
divided between those commenters adamantly
opposed to any delay in the automatic restraint
requirement and those commenters in favor of
both the delay and a total revocation of the re-
quirements. The comments and data supporting
these factions were as diametrically opposed as
the competing economic interests involved, in
this instance the automobile and the insurance in-
dustries. Following is a summary of the major
comments submitted in response to the proposal.
A more detailed summary of representative com-
ments is included as an appendix at the end of this
notice.

The automobile insurance industry was
unanimously against the proposed delay in the
first phase of the automatic restraint re-
quirements, unless the standard is also amended
to require an earlier implementation of automatic
restraints for small cars (i.e., a delay and reversal
of the current schedule). The commenting in-
surance companies stated that the automatic
restraint requirements will save thousands of
lives and prevent hundreds of thousands of
serious injuries. They argued that the proposed
delay of the 1982 requirements would, therefore,
result in a significant number of fatalities and in-
juries that would not otherwise occur. These com-
panies also argued that the monetary savings
that would result from the proposed delay are so
small that they would not significantly help the
ailing automobile industry. The commenters
pointed specifically to the fact that most of the
capital expenditures have already been made for
installing automatic restraints on 1982-model
large cars.

In urging a reversal of the implementation
schedule, the insurance companies noted the
dramatically increasing number of small cars, and
pointed to insurance research which shows small
cars are inherently more dangerous for occupants
than large cars. (NHTSA statistics show that a
person is eight times more likely to be killed in a
small car than in a full-size car in a crash between
the two.) Since small cars will represent a major-
ity of the 1983-model passenger car fleet, the com-
panies argued that more lives could ultimately be
saved if automatic restraints are required on
small cars in that model year, than under the ex-
isting implementation schedule.

Many of these same sentiments were also
voiced by consumer g^roups and health organiza-
tions, the majority of which were also opposed to
the proposed delay of the MY 1982 requirements.
Like the insurance companies, most of these
groups asserted that usage rates for automatic
belts will be relatively high and that the auto-
matic restraint standard as a whole wiU save
thousands of lives.

Several consumer groups and air bag compo-
nent suppliers stated that they could support the
proposed delay provided there is also a require-
ment that vehicle manufacturers at least offer air
bags as options on some of their model lines.
These groups are concerned that further delay of
the automatic restraint standard will drive the
remaining air bag component suppliers out of the
market and that, as a result, the life-saving poten-
tial of air bags will be lost.

The insurance industry and a majority of the
consumer groups argued that the benefits of the
1982-model year requirements outweigh the
costs. A detailed analysis by Professor William
Nordhaus of Yale University was submitted on
behalf of several insurance companies. This
analysis concludes that the economic costs of the
proposed delay would be approximately five
times greater than the benefits, for a net cost of
$200 million. These figures are based on computa-
tions regarding the societal costs of deaths and in-
juries that would result without the MY 1982
automatic restraint requirement.

Several of the commenting insurance com-
panies and consumer groups also argued that as a
matter of law and statutory authority the Depart-
ment cannot rely on the general economic health
of the automobile industry to justify a delay in

PART 571; S208-PRE 130

the automatic restraint standard. The National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Vehicle
Safety Act) (15 U.S.C §1381, et seq.) provides that
motor vehicle safety standards shall be "reason-
able" and "practicable." These commenters noted
that the legislative history of the Vehicle Safety
Act indicates that in promulgating standards,
safety shall be the overriding consideration. The
commenters contend that the current poor
economic condition of the automobile industry
does not make the 1982 model-year requirements
impracticable.

In addition to comments from the above groups
and organizations, the Department also received
comments from numerous private citizens, who
were equally divided in their support or opposi-
tion to the proposed delay.

The proposed delay in the 1982 model-year re-
quirements was unanimously supported by the
automobile industry, both foreign and domestic.
In addition, most manufacturers urged the
Department to reconsider the entire standard, to
provide additional leadtime for all phases of the
implementation schedule, or to revoke the
automatic restraint requirements altogether.
Regarding a possible reversal of the current im-
plementation schedule, nearly all of the foreign
automobile manufacturers joined Chrysler Cor-
poration and American Motors in stating that it
would be impossible to install automatic
restraints on 1983-model small passenger cars
because of insufficient leadtime.

In support of a complete rescission of the
automatic restraint requirements, the vehicle
manufacturers made several arguments. The
manufacturers believe that automatic seat belts
will be so unacceptable to the public that they will
create a consumer "backlash" greater than that
caused by ignition interlock devices required by
NHTSA to be installed on 1974-75 models. These
devices made it impossible to start the vehicle
unless front seat belts were fastened, and were
specifically precluded by the Congress by amend-
ment to the Vehicle Safety Act in 1974.

The manufacturers contend that automatic
seat belts will produce such a reaction because of
their coercive nature and obtrusiveness. They
also contend that automatic belts must be de-
signed so that they are easily detachable (and
presumably thereby more acceptable to the
public). In such case, they argue that the usage

rate for automatic belts would be no greater than
for current manual belts, and that the increased
cost of automatic belts would not be justified.

Auto manufacturers also argued that the ex-
tremely high price of air bags makes them
impractical, and allege that few will be installed
on future passenger cars. Consequently, they con-
tend, the only benefits attributable to the
automatic restraint standard will be those de-
rived from automatic belts, which for the above
reasons will not be effective.

Only two vehicle manufacturers. Ford Motor
Company and General Motors, produce any
significant number of large cars. Therefore, the
existing automatic restraint requirements for
1982 models would only directly affect these two
companies.

Ford Motor Company supported the proposed
delay and stated that it considers its original
1982-model, three-point automatic belt designs to
be "out of date" because of their release concepts
(i.e., they include a feature to frustrate release
and thus defeat of the system). Ford believes this
could lead to significant public dissatisfaction
with MY 1982 automatic belts. In response to this
concern. Ford had decided to add a conventional
release buckle to this three-point belt, so that it
can be detached by those motorists who refuse to
wear a belt. Ford's submission stated that the
company projects that as many as 100,000 pur-
chasers would switch to mid-size cars in the 1982
model year rather than buying large cars with an
automatic belt. Ford plans to redesign its
automatic belts, but states that such a program
has major leadtime implications which would
make it impractical to install improved automatic
belts in small cars before September 1, 1983.

General Motors Corporation stated that its
planned 1982-model automatic belt designs are
easily detachable (i.e., there will be a buckle
release mechanism without an interlock or other
mechanism to discourage defeat of the system).
With this type belt, according to GM, the impact
on safety will depend upon voluntary use of the
automatic belt, so use would not likely be any
greater than with current manual belt systems.
Therefore, General Motors argues that the pro-
posed delay should have only a minimal adverse
safety impact.

General Motors stated that the proposed delay
would result in a net increased sales revenue to

PART 571; S208-PRE 131

the company of $760 million, and that the com-
pany could realize a savings of approximately $13
million in capital investment for the 1982 model-
year program. General Motors explained the $760
million figure with the following rationale:

Automatic belts will be regarded by many as
an unnecessary inconvenience, and they will
deprive purchasers of six passenger seating
capacity. Thus, 1982 full-size cars equipped
with such a restraint will be at a competitive
disadvantage in that consumers can avoid the
penalties of increased cost and reduced accom-
modation either by purchasing vehicles not
subject to passive restraint requirements in
that year, or by deferring their purchases. The
proposed delay will allow the consumer to pur-
chase a full size car in 1982, without a cost
penalty, which fully meets his needs and expec-
tations.

General Motors' concern in this regard derives
from the fact that large cars with automatic seat
belts will be able to have only two front seating
positions, since no company has developed an
automatic belt system for the center seat posi-
tion. With the automatic restraint requirements
delayed. General Motors would be able to install
bench front seats with three seating positions in
its large cars. General Motors estimates that the
reduced seating capacity thus caused by auto-
matic belts will result in 120,000 fewer large car
sales: 50,000 purchasers will shift from large
cars to GM mid-size cars, and 70,000 potential
purchasers will defer buying a new large car in
the 1982 model year if they cannot obtain a
six-passenger large car. General Motors
contends that these factors will result in a
revenue loss to the company of $760 million if the
automatic restraint requirements are not
delayed.

Rationale For Agency Decision

The agency has given thorough consideration
to all comments submitted in response to the pro-
posed delay of the first phase of the automatic
restraint requirements, and carefully analyzed all
such information and data in the Record of this
proceeding. The wide diversity among factual,
analytical and policy-related positions urged by
those supporting and those opposing the pro-
posed delay illustrates the degree to which this

proceeding involves questions for which there are
currently no concrete answers.

For example, the usage rate of automatic belts
will be extremely dependent on the exact design
of a particular belt system. Consumer expecta-
tions (for example, that six-seat cars will be
available), consumer acceptance (for example, the
purchase of cars with automatic belt systems
which cost more than current belt systems) and
actual rates of usage are values crucial to the
Department's decision-making process. These fac-
tors, which are dependent on the desires and
reaction of the American public, cannot be quan-
tified or predicted with certainty.

On the basis of the record herein, the Depart-
ment has concluded that the applicability of
FMVSS 208 in MY 1982 to large cars would be im-
practicable and unreasonable. Requiring such
compliance would reduce sales and profits, and in-
crease unemployment, for the manufacturers of
such vehicles. The Department believes that it is
in the public interest to avoid these unnecessary
costs and impacts by providing an additional year
of leadtime.

The February 12, 1981 notice detailed many of
the specific reasons which led to the proposed
delay. As specified in that notice, many of the fac-
tual assumptions and premises which led to adop-
tion of the phase-in schedule have been proven
wrong by subsequent events. The economic situa-
tion of the industry and of consumers and the
economy as a whole have drastically changed
since the standard was adopted in 1977.

The current phase-in schedule for automatic
restraints was intended to permit manufacturers
to introduce automatic restraints without undue
technological or economic risk. Such risks would
otherwise have had to have been assumed con-
temporaneously with the risks involved in having
to meet the requirements imposed by emission
and fuel economy standards applicable to
automobiles in the early 1980's.

Large cars were chosen for the first phase of
the schedule because at that time there was more
experience with air bags in such full-size cars. A
phased schedule to cover progressively smaller
cars, in stages, was adopted to provide manufac-
turers with a chance to gain similar levels of ex-
perience in smaller cars. To ensure that manufac-
turers would in fact have the maximum flexibility
to choose between equipping smaller cars with air

PART 571; S208-PRE 132

bags or automatic belts, those cars were to be
phased in last. This justification for a phased im-
plementation schedule is no longer valid. Gasoline
shortages, price increases (especially those occur-
ring since the Iranian oil cut-off in 1979), and
continuing uncertainty about levels of future
petroleum supplies have led to dramatic in-
creases in production plans for small cars. The
small car share of new production is growing at a
much faster pace than was anticipated by the
Department when the automatic restraint re-
quirements were issued.

In 1977, the Department projected that new car
production in the model year 1982-1985 period
would be approximately 24 percent large cars, 53
percent mid-size cars, and 23 percent small cars.
However, NHTSA now estimates that actual pro-
duction of large cars will be about 11 percent in
model year 1982 while mid-size and small cars are
expected to increase commensurately in that
model year.

Thus, under the state of facts now facing the
Department, about 11 percent of the 1982 model-
year cars would be required to have automatic
restraints under the 208 standard.

This major shift in the absolute and relative
numbers of cars which would be subject to the
first year of the standard will have important
adverse impacts upon the benefits to be achieved
by the first year of application of the standard.
Consumer acceptance of the automatic restraints
now anticipated to be used in the 1982 model-year
cars is likely to be substantially less than was
assumed in 1977. There will be more than a
million fewer vehicles with automatic restraints
than was previously expected. With fewer cars
equipped with automatic restraints, the vehicles
which are so equipped will be far more vulnerable
to negative consumer reaction.

The Department has long recognized that any
costly, arguably coercive restraint system will
cause a certain percentage of the population to
react negatively. The factors leading to such
negative reaction will be magnified as the per-
centage of new 1982-model cars equipped with
automatic restraints decreases. Adverse con-
sumer preferences leading to deferral of the pur-
chase of large cars, or to shifts to the purchase of
mid-size cars, will predictably occur.

Concern about providing additional leadtime to
adapt air bags to small cars is also less important

now as a result of changes in facts occurring since
1977. When the standard was issued, the Depart-
ment assumed that manufacturers would equip a
great majority of their vehicles (75%) with air
bags in preference to belt systems. However,
most manufacturers now indicate that they in-
tend to offer air bags on very few of their large
cars, and on almost none of their smaller cars.
Almost all 1982 model-year cars are planned to
use automatic belts.

The absence of any opportunity to select be-
tween automatic restraint systems will materi-
ally affect public acceptance of the automatic
restraint standard. General Motors has pointed
out that two automatic belt designs recently of-
fered as options on its Chevette line produced
very low purchaser interest, even though the cost
was minimal and the car line was in high demand.
GM states that fewer than 13,000 of 415,000
1980-model Chevettes sold were equipped with
the automatic belt option, despite the fact that
the option was offered at no cost to most pur-
chasers, GM salesmen were to be given an addi-
tional commission of $25 for each sale, and over $1
million was spent on advertising and marketing.

Similar low interest has been shown in an
automatic belt system offered as an option on
General Motor's 1981 Cadillac.

The poor consumer acceptance of these auto-
matic belt options substantiates the Department's
assumption that automatic belts installed on only a
limited percentage of a particular model-year fleet
will have difficult public acceptance problems.

The public acceptance of 1982-model automatic
restraints is a valid concern of the Department
and is of primary importance in determining the
reasonableness and practicability of the standard,
and whether there is good cause for the delay. As
stated by the Court of Appeals in Pacific Legal
Foundation \. Department of Transportation, 593
F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir.). cert, denied, 444 U.S. 830
(1979):

We believe that the agency cannot fulfill its
statutory responsibility unless it considers
popular reaction. Without public cooperation
there can be no assurance that a safety system
can "meet the need for motor vehicle safety."
And it would be difficult to term 'practicable' a
system, like the ignition interlock, that so an-
noyed motorists that they deactivate it.

PART 571: S208-PRE 133

The Department is unable to conclude from its
current data, taking into account the large
number of private citizens who took the time and
effort to file comments reflecting their opposition
to automatic restraints, that the 1982 automatic
belt designs planned by the manufacturers will
receive "public cooperation."

The proposal stated that the changed economic
circumstances may make the current implemen-
tation schedule for automatic restraints imprac-
ticable. Several commenters argued that the
general economic situation of the automobile in-
dustry is not a legitimate criterion for determin-
ing whether a safety standard is practicable
under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act. The legislative history of the Vehicle
Safety Act clarifies that economic considerations
may be considered in determining the "prac-
ticability" of a particular safety standard:

This would require consideration of all relevant
factors, including technological ability to
achieve the goal of a particular standard as
well as consideration of economic factors. (H.R.
Rep. No. 776. 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) at 16.)

One commenter stated that the term "prac-
ticable" must be viewed as relating solely to the
economic and technological capability of the in-
dustry to meet the timetables established by the
particular safety standard in question, and not to
the general economic health of the industry. The
Department disagrees with this reading of the
Vehicle Safety Act and its legislative history.

The reasonableness and practicability of the
current phase-in schedule cannot be determined
in a vacuum. What is reasonable and practicable
for a healthy firm or industry may not be for an
ailing one. The proposal noted the current finan-
cial difficulties of the automobile industry. Vehi-
cle sales remain at depressed levels and
unemployment in the domestic industry is ex-
tremely high. Approximately 200,000 workers
have been indefinitely laid off, and more have
been temporarily laid off. These losses come at a
time when the domestic manufacturers are
spending unprecedented sums to meet the contin-
uing demand for more fuel efficient cars.

The Department concludes further that
economic hardship to the affected industry and
individual companies must be balanced with
all other considerations in determining the

"reasonableness" and "practicability" of a par-
ticular safety standard. None of the individual
factors involved in the deliberations may prop-
erly be applied without regard to the other fac-
tors. This proposition holds both in promulgating
a standard and in retaining a standard when rele-
vant factors have materially changed since the
standard was first adopted.

The same commenter also argued that the
Department had not shown "good cause" for pro-
posing to delay the effective date of the automatic
restraint requirements, in light of the require-
ments of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act that the
leadtime for the effective date of safety stand-
ards shall be no longer than one year, unless the
Secretary finds, for good cause shown, that an
earlier or later effective date is in the public in-
terest (15 U.S.C. 1392).

The leadtimes associated with the existing im-
plementation schedule were much longer than
one year. These were upheld by the Court in the
Pacific Legal Foundation case, supra. In that case,
the court relied heavily on the inability of the
manufacturers to comply with the requirement in
one year's time, and on the need for considering
the likelihood that the public will accept the
change:

When dealing with a "technology-forcing" rule
like Standard 208, the agency must consider
the abilities of producers to comply with the
new requirement and of the public to grasp the
need for the change.

As was stated earlier, the Department is now
concerned that 1982-model large cars might be
seriously unacceptable to a large portion of the
public.

The Department concludes that "good cause"
exists for the proposed delay. The public interest
in the economic viability of the industry and, with
respect to the proposed delay, the particular cir-
cumstances of the manufacturers of the vehicles
involved, requires that inequitable burdens and
unnecessary costs be avoided where possible in
implementing FMVSS 208. Large cars are not ex-
pected to be produced beyond MY 1985. Applica-
tion of the standard to large cars in advance of
smaller cars would thus involve such burdens and
could involve such costs.

In addition to these considerations, the Depart-
ment believes that the proposed delay must be

PART 571; S208-PRE 134

viewed as a separate regulatory action insofar as
leadtime is concerned. The leadtime specifica-
tions for the existing implementation schedule
were upheld by the court in Pacific Legal Founda-
tion. The proposed delay represents a new con-
sideration of the factors which will determine
whether automatic restraints are reasonable and
practicable for large cars in the 1982 model year,
with primary attention being given to acceptabil-
ity of these systems by the public.

Opponents of the proposed delay have pointed
to the adverse safety impacts that might result,
stating specifically that the safety benefits of the
1982 model-year requirements outweigh the
costs. The Department's proposal stated that a
delay of the first phase requirement could over
the ten-year life of the vehicles involved result in
a loss of 600 lives, and the accrual of 4,300 more
injuries than would have occurred without the
delay. After reviewing the information submitted
in response to the proposal and analyzing more
current data, however, the Department now con-
cludes that its earlier estimate of adverse effects
is invalid.

First, the assertion that 600 lives would be lost
was based upon earlier estimates of benefits that
would arise from 100 percent usage of automatic
restraint systems. This calculation in turn had
been based primarily on 1977 assumptions that
air bags would be the technology of choice. As
stated earlier, however, the Department now
knows that very few air bags are planned for the
1982 model-year.

Unlike air bags, estimates of benefits arising
from compliance with the automatic restraint
standard by means of automatic belts must be
based upon projected usage rates. The most op-
timistic expectations of automatic belt use for the
1982 model-year now appear to be a usage rate of
60 percent. Moreover, given the planned design of
the 1982-model automatic belts, NHTSA now
believes that a much lower usage rate will in fact
occur. Both General Motors and Ford plan
automatic belt designs which have a release
buckle identical to the buckle on current manual
belt systems. Motorists would therefore be able
to disconnect the proposed belts with the same
ease with which current active belt systems can
be released. NHTSA believes it is likely that a
large percentage of motorists would adopt this
usage pattern, and detach the automatic belts.

Usage could thus in fact turn out to be low, and
approach levels similar to that of current manual
belt systems (7%).

The final regulatory analysis thus now includes
a range of possible usage rates for 1982-model
automatic belts, in analyzing possible benefits to
be foregone by deferring the MY 82 standard for
one year. If usage rates for the automatic belts
otherwise required for that model-year were to
be 15 percent, more than double the rate of use of
current manual belts, retention of the 1982 re-
quirements might save a total of 75 lives over the
projected ten-year life of the large cars involved.
If usage rates were to occur at the level of 60 per-
cent, this number could possibly increase to as
many as 490 lives over the same ten-year period.

NHTSA now believes that the potential usage
of 1982-model automatic belt designs would more
likely be near the bottom end of this scale.
NHTSA data on observed usage rates for the belt
systems employed in some models of the Volks-
wagen Rabbit, for example, are relevant. All such
belts are optional, and were chosen by the pur-
chaser either as a separate option or as a part of
the "Deluxe" package. Moreover, the VW system
employs an interlock mechanism, so that the
engine may not be started if the system is not in
place. Despite these factors, usage rates have
been observed to be only 81%. That is, of the pur-
chasers who specifically selected this optional
system, nearly 20% thereafter in practice enter
their vehicles, start their engines, and then
deliberately disconnect the belt system when
driving.

Moreover, actual accident data relating to such
vehicles show even lower usage rates, of 55-57%.
(See Regulatory Analysis, at V-11, 13 for discus-
sion.)

After analyzing the data submitted in response
to the proposal, the Department has determined
that the one-year delay will result in a cost sav-
ings to consumers of approximately $105 million.
Capital investment savings for the industry will
be about $30 million. Net income available for
reinvestment would be increased to $292 million
by the delay. Over 13,000 jobs will be saved in the
automobile manufacturer and supplier industry, a
savings of $159 million. The basis for these
figures is explained in detail in the final
regulatory analysis. Given the current economic
situation of the American public and the domestic

PART 571; S208-PRE 135

automobile industry, these savings are signifi-
cant, particularly when viewed in conjunction
with the Department's belief that the safety im-
pact of the delay can be minimized.

While some measure of safety benefits will be
foregone by this delay, the Department has con-
cluded that such benefits are relatively minor.
Moreover, the Department believes that any such
loss of safety benefits can be offset with a coor-
dinated effort by all parties involved. The Depart-
ment believes that an intense seat belt use educa-
tion campaign, joined by the Department, in-
dustry and consumer groups and targeted di-
rectly at the 1982 model-year cars, has the poten-
tial of affording even greater safety benefits than
would otherwise accrue.

Finally, such a targeted campaign to increase
the use of existing manual seat belts will provide
further data on the viability of such strategies in
increasing active seat belt use. Such information
would be especially valuable for future rulemak-
ing purposes, since it would in any event be at
least ten years before all cars in the passenger
fleet would be expected to be equipped with new
safety equipment. Such information would enable
the Department, State and local governments,
and other interested parties to determine how to
make the best use of their scarce resources to in-
crease actual usage of the millions of manual seat
belts that will remain on the nation's highways
for years to come.

Summary of Agency Conclusion

The Department has determined that the ex-
isting schedule for the first year of implementa-
tion of FMVSS 208 is no longer reasonable or
practicable. The assumptions leading to the 1977
rule are no longer valid. There will be few, if any,
air bags installed in passenger cars because
manufacturers have chosen automatic belts as
the preferred means of compliance with the
standard. The number of small cars on the road is
increasing drastically and these cars are more un-
safe than large cars. Yet, under the current imple-
mentation schedule, small cars are to be equipped
with automatic restraints last.

The delay of the first phase of the automatic
restraint requirements will enable the Depart-
ment to adequately reassess the most viable
alternatives for the occupant crash protec-
tion standard. The Department is publishing

simultaneously with this final rule a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking addressing alternatives to
this standard, and attention is specifically
directed to that proposal.

The Department is taking these actions
because courts have found that the Department
has a statutory responsibility to reexamine its
safety standards in light of changing circum-
stances and new data. In those circumstances, the
Department is required to make necessary revi-
sions and schedule changes to ensure that the
standards are practicable, reasonable and ap-
propriate. As noted above, key assumptions
underlying the issuance of the automatic
restraint requirements in 1977 have been
substantially undermined by subsequent events.

The delay and reevaluation of FMVSS 208 is
also consistent with Executive Order 12291,
which directs all executive branch agencies to
delay final rules to the extent necessary to re-
evaluate those rules under criteria specified in
the Order.

This amendment has been evaluated as a major
rule under the guidelines of new Executive Order
12291 and a final regulatory analysis is being
placed in the public docket simultaneously with
the publication of this notice. The major findings
of that analysis have been discussed in the body
of this notice.

The effect of the one-year delay has been
evaluated in accordance with the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969. It has been deter-
mined that this action is not a major Federal ac-
tion significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment. An evaluation of the en-
vironmental consequences of the amendment is
included in the regulatory analysis. Further infor-
mation regarding environmental issues concern-
ing automatic restraints, especially air bags, can
be found in the environmental impact statements
published in conjunction with the 1977 automatic
restraint standard.

The regulatory analysis also includes a discus-
sion of the Department's consideration of the
possible impact of this amendment on small en-
tities. The analysis shows that the one-year delay
will have a minimal effect on the automatic seat
belt-related firms, since it is likely that most of
the 1982-model large cars will continue to be
equipped with conventional manual type seat
belts. Generally, however, the same firms

PART 571; S208-PRE 136

produce both automatic and manual belts, and
none of these direct suppliers qualify as "small
businesses" under the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

The effect of the delay on air bag suppliers is
less certain. Neither Ford or General Motors
would have installed air bags in 1982 vehicles
regardless of the delay. The analysis determined
that some suppliers of the air bag components
will be adversely affected by the delay to some
extent and that a few of these qualify as small
businesses. However, it is doubtful that a
substantial number of small businesses will be
adversely affected by the delay to a significant
degree.

The analysis also considered the effect of the
delay on the small governmental units and other
small fleet purchasers of cars. Since large cars
are not generally sought for fleet purposes, the
amendment is likely to have only a minimal effect
on all types of small fleet purchasers.

In consideration of the foregoing. Safety Stand-
ard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR
571.208) is amended as follows:

Section S4.1.2 is amended to read:

"S4.1.2 Passenger cars manufactured from
September 1, 197S, to August 31, 1983. Each

passenger car manufactured from September
1, 1973, to August 31, 1982, inclusive, shall
meet the requirements of S4. 1.2.1, S4. 1.2.2, or
S4. 1.2.3. Each passenger car manufactured
from September 1, 1982, to August 31, 1983, in-
clusive, shall meet the requirements of S4. 1.2.1,
S4.1.2.2, or S4. 1.2.3, except that a passenger
car with a wheelbase of more than 100 inches
shall meet the requirements specified in S4.1.3.
A protection system that meets requirements
of S4. 1.2.1 or S4. 1.2.2 may be installed at one or
more designated seating positions of a vehicle
that otherwise meets the requirements of
S4.1.2.3."

(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (15
U.S.C. 1392, 1407).)

Issued on April 6, 1981.

Andrew L. Lewis, Jr.
Secretary of Transportation

46 FR 21172
April 9, 1981

PART 571; S208-PRE 137

APPENDIX
DETAILED DISCUSSION OF COMMENTS

A. Comments Opposing the Delay

The insurance industry argued that the
automatic restraint requirements will save
thousands of lives and prevent hundreds of
thousands of serious injuries. The League xln-
surance Companies stated that the proposed one-
year delay would be "tragic and costly," adding
that "there is a legitimate place for regulation
when the need is great, the cost-benefit is
demonstrably high, and the structure of the
market place requires uniformity to be imposed
on all manufacturers."

Allstate Insurance Companies argued that the
growing proportion of small cars will increase
deaths and injuries by 35 percent during the next
four years, and that the only way to reverse this
trend is by implementation of the automatic
restraint standard. Allstate also argued that the
proposal's analysis of the economic consequences
of the scheduled implementation is based only on
conjecture. The company stated that there is no
substantial evidence of record that the proposed
delay would provide any significant financial
assistance to car makers. According to Allstate,
however, the proposed delay would result in
needless deaths and injuries at huge costs to
society at large and to insurances-buying
customers. Allstate concluded that it could only
support a one-year delay in the automatic
restraint requirements if the delay is coupled
with a requirement that small cars comply with
the standard in model year 1983 (i.e., one year
earlier than the existing schedule). This senti-
ment was also expressed by the Alliance of Ameri-
can Insurers and the League Insurance Com-
panies. Alliance stated that a move to install auto-
matic restraints on small cars first is consistent
with insurance research which shows small cars to
be inherently more dangerous to occupants than
large cars, and that such a change could also afford
domestic manufacturers some economic relief.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company attacked the proposed delay of the
automatic restraint requirements on several
grounds. First, State Farm argued that the
record in this rulemaking proceeding demon-
strates that full implementation of the automatic
restraint standard will save thousands of lives
and avoid tens of thousands of crippling and
maiming injuries. The company pointed to the
Department's analysis which found that the pro-
posed delay would cost the nation 600 deaths and
approximately 4,300 injuries over the lifetime of
the 1982-model large cars, and stated that a delay
is not justified under any cost/benefit calcula-
tions. State Farm also argued that the proposed
delay is inconsistent with the overriding mandate
of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act (15 U.S.C. 1381, et seq.) and that "the controll-
ing statutes do not permit the Secretary to defer
otherwise supportable life-saving regulations
solely on the basis of current economic conditions
in the auto industry."

State Farm concludes that the current eco-
nomic situation of the auto industry does not
make the implementation of the current auto-
matic restraint schedule impractical. First,
nearly all of the necessary capital commitments
for automatic restraint implementation for large
cars have already been made. Second, the
variable costs associated with installing auto-
matic restraints on 1982-model large cars are in-
significant to the industry. State Farm also
argued that the balance of costs against benefits
does not support the proposed delay; rather, it
supports an acceleration of the existing schedule
if anything. The company cited a recent study by
Professor William Nordhaus (discussed below)
which contends that the annual economic costs of
the proposed deferral of the model year 1982 re-
quirements relative to the current schedule are
five times greater than the economic benefits to
the auto industry.

PART 571; S208-PRE 138

It is State Farm's position that as a matter of
law and statutory power, the Department cannot
rely on the general economic health of the
automobile industry to justify a delay in the im-
plementation of the life-saving automatic
restraint standard. The comment cites the Senate
report concerning the Vehicle Safety Act which
stated that safety is "the overriding considera-
tion" in carrying out the purposes of the Act (S.
Rep. No. 1301. 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966)). State
Farm argues that econoniic considerations in
rulemaking by the Department and NHTSA
under the Vehicle Safety Act must relate to the
costs and benefits of the standard itself and not to
the general health of the auto industry: ". . . if the
Secretary were to implement the proposed delay
in this rulemaking on the basis of the general
employment, production, and economic status of
the auto industry, he would be acting arbitrarily
and capriciously and outside the scope of his
statutory authority." The legal memorandum
submitted in support of State Farm's contentions
included the following argument:

If the general economic condition of the auto in-
dustry could justify suspending implementation
of the automatic restraint standard in the face of
such cost and benefit data, the industry's
economic condition could also be used to justify
suspension or elimination of other safety stand-
ards. The industry's current problems could
thus be used to effectively nullify the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

Professor William Nordhaus of Yale University
submitted comments concerning the economic
ramifications of the proposed delay in the first
phase of the automatic restraint requirements.
(The submission was sponsored by Allstate,
Kemper, Nationwide, and State Farm Insurance
Companies.) (For a full discussion of the
methodology and bases for these calculations, one
should refer to the Nordhaus submission filed at
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion under Docket 74-14, Notice 20. NHTSA's
response to this analysis is set forth in detail in
the Appendix to the Regulatory Impact
Analysis.) The basic conclusions contained in the
Nordhaus comment are as follows (verbatim):

1. The current passive restraint requirement
(FMVSS 208) has very substantial net benefits

compared to current lap and shoulder belt
usage. According to the economic analysis
presented here, the current rule has net
benefits of approximately $10 billion for model
years 1982-85. The substantial economic gain
from passive restraints should not be ignored
in debates on fine-tuning the phase-in.

2. Using standard analysis, the ranking of op-
tions in terms of net benefits is as follows (with
the first having the highest net benefits and
the last the lowest net benefits):

(1) Simultaneous 1983 implementation (all
cars equipped with passive restraints in 1983).

(2) Delay and reversal (small cars in 1983,
intermediate cars in 1984, large cars in 1985).

(3) The current rule (large cars in 1982, in-
termediate cars in 1983, and small cars in 1984).

(4) The proposed delay (large and inter-
mediate cars in 1983, small cars in 1984).

(5) General rollback (large cars in 1983, in-
termediate cars in 1984, large cars in 1985).

3. A sensitivity analysis shows the ranking of
alternatives is unchanged under a wide range
of alternative assumptions.

4. Any deferral of requirements to install
passive restraints on any size automobile has
net costs unless it is "traded in" on an accelera-
tion of requirements on a larger number, or a
smaller sized, set of automobiles.

5. In terms of the costs and benefits of dif-
ferent options, there is no justification for
either the proposed delay or for a general
rollback. In particular, the economic costs of
the proposed delay are approximately 5 times
greater than the benefits, for a net cost of over
$200 million. The net costs of the general
rollback are significantly greater, in the order
of $4.5 billion.

6. There appears to be strong economic
justification for the simultaneous 1983 option if
it is technically feasible.

7. The analysis indicates that the delay and
reversal option has the highest net benefits of
any of the four considered in the proposal and
regulatory analysis. The superior net benefit of
delay and reversal arises because the reversal
of the requirement to small cars first affects a
larger number of automobiles more quickly and
because the net economic benefits per vehicle
are greater for small cars than for large and in-
termediate cars.

PART 571; S208-PRE 139

8. The estimated impact of the proposed
delay on the automobile industry is minuscule.
There will be little or no improvement in the
"health" of the domestic automobile industry
from the proposed delay. For this reason,
nonregulatory considerations discussed in the
notice (the effect on imports, the conditions of
the automobile industry, or freedom-of-choice
arguments) should not, from an economic point
of view, enter in this rulemaking.

The proposed delay of the automatic restraint
requirements was also opposed by various con-
sumer groups and health-related organizations,
including: the Consumer Federation of America,
the National Spinal Cord Injury Foundation, the
Epilepsy Foundation of America, the Consumers
Union, the Automotive Occupant Protection
Association, the National Safety Council, the
Houston Independent School District, the
American College of Surgeons, the Georgia
Department of Human Resources, the New York
Department of Transportation, and the Center
for Auto Safety. The National Safety Council con-
ceded that the economic situation of the auto in-
dustry is serious, but stated that any adjustment
of the implementation schedule for automatic
restraints should also include consideration of an
earlier implementation for small cars, since the
need for protection is much greater in these
vehicles.

The Automotive Occupant Protection Associa-
tion stated that it could support the proposed
delay of the automatic restraint requirements for
one year, as well as a reversal of the implementa-
tion schedule, provided there is a requirement for
the major automobile manufacturer to offer op-
tional air bag systems on at least one model line.
The association is concerned that further delay of
the automatic restraint standard could drive the
remaining air bag supplier manufacturers out of
the business, and the life-saving potential of air
bags could be lost. The Epilepsy Foundation of
America echoed this sentiment and stated that
"consumers deserve a guarantee that would
assure the air bag option will be available in any
model they wish to purchase."

The Consumers Union argued that the auto in-
dustry's financial condition should not be used to
justify "less safe automobiles." Moreover, accord-
ing to the Union, the proposed delay is unlikely to

significantly alleviate the financial problems fac-
ing domestic automobile manufacturers.

The Center for Auto Safety argued that the
proposed delay of the first-phase automatic
restraint requirements will not help the auto in-
dustry solve its current economic problems. In
addition, the Center stated that the projected
savings of 600 lives and 4,300 injuries associated
with the first-phase requirements represents an
economic gain of approximately $170 million, and
this far outweighs any savings to the industry. In
regard to a possible reversal of the existing im-
plementation schedule for automatic restraints,
the Center stated that automatic belts can be in-
stalled on all small cars with a leadtime as short
as one year because automatic belts are so well
developed.

Comments were also received from two manu-
facturers which supply air bag system com-
ponents, Thiokol and Rocket Research Company.
Rocket Research stated that it could support the
proposed delay and reversal of the implementa-
tion schedule provided any such change also con-
tains a requirement that the major manufac-
turers "tool for and offer for sale" air bag systems
on at least one car line. The company stated that
without such a guarantee there is little incentive
for air bag suppliers to remain in the business.
Rocket Research stated that an indefinite delay
of the automatic restraint requirements over the
next five years would amount to a business loss of
23 percent. The company also stated that cost
savings accruing to General Motors and Ford
because of the one year delay (estimated in the
proposal to be approximately 37 million dollars)
would be reduced if air bag programs are delayed
or eventually canceled since both Rocket
Research and Hamill Manufacturing Company
have substantial claims against the two com-
panies for capital expenditures to build and equip
production plants to make air bag modules.
(Rocket Research stated that these claims are
based on letters of agreement and contingent
liability statements.)

Thiokol stated that the model year 1982
automatic restraint requirements for large cars
resulted in the first major production program
for Thiokol, and that substantial funds have been
expended for manpower, tooling and facilities
to meet this requirement. According to Thiokol,
a one-year delay in the program would add

PART 571; S208-PRE 140

substantial additional expenses and result in a
reduction of manpower, facility use and vendor
capability. In response to questions contained in
the notice of proposed rulemaking, Thiokol stated
that another year of delay would discourage
rather than encourage further design im-
provements and research efforts in automatic
restraint systems.

B. Comments Favoring the Delay

The Pacific Legal Foundation supported the
proposed one-year delay, and stated four primary
reasons why such a delay is warranted.

1. The proposed delay would create additional
time for the Department of Transportation
to implement an adequate evaluation pro-
gram for air bags.

2. The proposed delay would give the Ameri-
can public an additional year of freedom to
choose their means of occupant protection.

3. The proposed delay would allow additional
time for the public to familiarize itself with
passive restraints [which have been or will
be voluntarily installed prior to a mandatory
effective date].

4. The proposed delay would reduce the like-
lihood of costly Congressional action on the
passive restraint standard after its im-
plementation.

The proposed delay of the first phase of the
automatic restraint requirements was unani-
mously supported by all commenting automobile
manufacturers, both domestic and foreign. Addi-
tionally, most manufacturers urged the Depart-
ment to reconsider the entire standard and to
provide additional leadtime for all phases of the
implementation schedule or to revoke the
automatic restraint requirements altogether.
Regarding a possible reversal of the current im-
plementation schedule, nearly all of the foreign
automobile manufacturers stated that it would be
impossible to install automatic restraints on 1983
model small passenger cars because of insuffi-
cient leadtime.

Chrysler Corporation also urged that the
automatic restraint requirements be withdrawn
entirely. The company argued that automatic
belts will be disconnected by many motorists and
that purchasers will turn to models that are not
equipped with automatic belts. Chrysler predicts

that automatic belts would create a consumer
"backlash" greater than that resulting from igni-
tion interlocks (devices installed on 1974-75
models which made it impossible to start the vehi-
cle unless the seatbelt was fastened).

In lieu of automatic restraints, Chrysler urged
the Department to mount a national educational
effort to increase the use of current manual seat
belt systems: "Increased usage of these systems
is the most cost effective and immediate method
of reducing injuries and fatalities in motor vehicle
accidents." Regarding a possible reversal of the
current implementation schedule, Chrysler
stated that it would be impossible at this time to
advance automatic belt installation for small cars
prior to the 1984 model year.

American Motors Corporation recommended
that a delay in effective date of the automatic
restraint requirements be adopted for all cars to
permit a re-evaluation of all issues. The company
particularly does not support a reversal of the im-
plementation schedule so that small cars would
be phased in first, since the company will rely on
technology developed for or by other automobile
manufacturers after it is proven in actual volume
production. American Motors also recommended
that if a new phase-in schedule is adopted, at least
a one-year delay for low-volume manufacturers
(e.g., less than 200,000 sales) be included in the
change.

Foreign vehicle manufacturers produce few, if
any, large passenger cars (i.e., cars with
wheelbases over 114 inches), but all the foreign
manufacturers supported the proposed delay of
the first phase of the automatic restraint re-
quirements. However, these manufacturers were
unanimously against any reversal of the existing
implementation schedule that would require
small passenger cars to be equipped with
automatic restraints a year earlier than currently
required.

Fiat Motors of North America recommended
that the entire automatic restraint schedule be
delayed for one year (i.e., each phase delayed one
year). The company stated that if its small cars
were not required to comply until model year
1985, it would give the company more time to
develop appropriate automatic belt designs for
its convertibles. Fiat stated that it is currently
having difficulty with its convertibles in terms of
finding adequate automatic belt attachments and

PART 571; S208-PRE 141

fittings for existing vehicle structures. Fiat
stated that it would prefer to see the automatic
restraint standard revoked and mandatory seat
belt use laws implemented.

Nissan Motor Company stated that it would
not be possible to equip its small cars with
automatic restraints by September 1, 1982.
Nissan's objection does not relate to capital ex-
penditure or retail price increase, but rather, to
"the lack of proper leadtime needed to develop
acceptable, reliable and high quality vehicles for
the consumer." Nissan argued that automatic
belts already face a tough challenge in winning
consumer acceptance without forcing the imposi-
tion of hastily developed designs.

Toyota Motor Company also stated that it
could not comply with a change in the effective
date for small cars from September 1, 1983, to
September 1, 1982. Toyota stated that if such a
change is adopted, it would have to drop from
production certain of its volume passenger car
lines for the 1983 model year, thereby limiting
the freedom of choice of the customers who wish
to purchase Toyota cars.

Volvo of America Corporation requested that
the implementation schedule for automatic
restraints be amended to reflect the fact that the
current market situation has forced the industry
to be flexible with respect to model year in-
troductions. Volvo refers specifically to the
desire of some manufacturers to continue model
lines past the September 1 effective dates for the
three phases of the current implementation
schedule, and to discontinue these lines at the
beginning of the new calendar year. Volvo argues
that tooling for installation of automatic
restraints on model lines that will be discon-
tinued six months after the effective date of the
standard is cost prohibitive. Consequently,
without a change in the implementation sched-
ule, manufacturers would be required to cease
production of certain models sooner than they
would like.

Volvo recommends that the implementation
schedule be amended to provide that the effec-

tive dates for the three phases is "September 1
or the date of production start of the new model
year if this date falls between September 1 and
December 31."

Rolls-Royce Motors produces three models
that would have to be equipped with automatic
restraints by September 1, 1981, under the ex-
isting schedule. Rolls-Royce originally planned to
offer air bags in these models but changed plans
after General Motors announced in 1979 that it
would delay the introduction of air bags. Conse-
quently, Rolls-Royce states that it got a late start
with automatic belts and the automatic belt
system it has planned for the 1982 models is not
developed to a degree of refinement normally
associated with Rolls-Royce cars. In support of
the proposed one-year delay in the automatic
restraint requirements, Rolls-Royce made the
following comment:

Refinement, weight and cost will all be subject
to continuous development anyway but one
year extra leadtime would permit full develop-
ment of the system before the customer is
charged a cost premium for the restraint
system.

(NOTE: Allstate Insurance Company requested
that a public hearing be held on the one-year
delay in the large car requirement. However, due
to the limited time available before the previous
effective date of this requirement, the agency
must deny this request. The issues on which this
decision is based are primarily technical and
economic, lending themselves well to written
presentations. Interested parties have taken full
advantage of the opportunity to provide their
views in writing in this proceeding. Further, an
additional opportunity for comment on issues
relating to the automatic restraint standard is
provided in the notice of proposed rulemaking
issued today.)

PART 571; S208-PRE 142

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD

NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection

(Docket No. 74-14; Notice 25)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The purpose of this notice is to amend
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208,
Occupant Crash Protection, to rescind the re-
quirements for installation of automatic restraints
in the front seating positions of passenger cars.
Those requirements were scheduled to become ef-
fective for large and mid-size cars on September 1,
1982, and for small cars on September 1, 1983.

The automatic restraint requirements are being
rescinded because of uncertainty about the public
acceptability and probable usage rate of the type of
automatic restraint which the car manufacturers
planned to make available to most new car buyers.
This uncertainty and the relatively substantial cost
of automatic restraints preclude the agency from
determining that the standard is at this time
reasonable and practicable. The reasonableness of
the automatic restraint requirements is further
caUed into question by the fact that all new car
buyers would be required to pay for automatic belt
systems that may induce only a few additional peo-
ple to take advantage of the benefits of occupant
restraints.

The agency is also seriously concerned about the
possibility that adverse public reaction to the cost
and presence of automatic restraints could have a
significant adverse effect on present and future
public acceptance of highway safety efforts.

Under the amended standard, car manufacturers
will continue to have the current option of pro-
viding either automatic or manual occupant
restraints.

DATES: The rescission of the automatic restraint
requirements of Standard No. 208 is effective
December 8, 1981. Any petitions for reconsidera-
tion must be received by the agency not later than
December 3, 1981.

ADDRESS: Any petitions for reconsideration
should refer to the docket number and notice
number of this notice and be submitted to:
Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

Michael Finkelstein, Associate Administrator for
Rulemaking, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590. (202-426-1810)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On April 9,
1981, the Department of Transportation published
a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) setting
forth alternative amendments to the automatic
restraint requirements of Standard No. 208 (46
F.R. 21205). The purpose of proposing the alter-
natives was to ensure that Standard No. 208
reflects the changes in circumstances since the
automatic restraint requirements were issued (42
F.R. 34289; July 5, 1977) and to ensure that the
standard meets the requirements of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and
Executive Order 12291, "Federal Regulations"
(February 17, 1981).

Background and NPRM

The automatic restraint requirements were
adopted in 1977 in response to the high number of
passenger car occupants killed annually in crashes
and to the persistent low usage rate of manual
belts. The manual belt is the type of belt which is
found in most cars today and which the occupant
must place around himself or herself and buckle in
order to gain its protection. Then, as now, there
were two types of automatic restraints, i.e.,
restraints that require no action by vehicle oc-
cupants, such as buckling a belt, in order to be ef-

PART 571; S 208-PRE-143

fective. One type is the air cushion restraint (air
bag) and the other is the automatic belt (a belt
which automatically envelopes an occupant when
the occupant enters a vehicle and closes the door).

In view of the greater experience with air bags in
large cars and to spread out capital investments,
the Department established a large-to-small car
compliance schedule. Under that schedule, large
cars were required to begin compliance on
September 1, 1981, mid-size cars on September 1,
1982, and small cars on September 1, 1983.

On April 6, 1981, after providing notice and op-
portunity for comment, the Department delayed
the compliance date for large cars from September
1, 1981, to September 1, 1982. As explained in the
April 6, final rule, that delay was adopted

. . . because of the effects of implementation in model year
1982 on large car manufacturers, because of the added
significance which those effects assume due to the change in
economic circumstances since the schedule was adopted in 1977,
and because of the undermining by subsequent events of the ra-
tionale underlying the original phase-in schedule.

Simultaneous with publishing the one-year delay
in the effective date for large cars, the Department
also issued a proposal for making further changes
in the automatic restraint requirements. This ac-
tion was taken in response to a variety of factors
that raised questions whether the automatic
restraint requirements represented the most
reasonable and effective approach to the problem
of the low usage of safety belts. Among these fac-
tors were the uncertainty about public acceptabil-
ity of automatic restraints in view of the absence of
any significant choice between automatic belts and
air bags and the nature of the automatic belt
designs planned by the car manufacturers, the con-
sequent uncertainties about the rate of usage of
automatic restraints, and the substantial costs of
air bags even if produced in large volumes.

The three principal proposals were reversal of
phase-in sequence, simultaneous compliance, and
rescission. The reversal proposal would have
changed the large-to-small car order of compliance
to a requirement that small cars commence com-
pliance on September 1, 1982, mid-size cars on
September 1, 1983, and large cars on September 1,
1984. The proposal for simultaneous compHance
would have required all size classes to begin com-
pliance on the same date, March 1, 1983. The
rescission proposal would have retained the
manufacturers' current option of equipping their
cars with either manual or automatic restraints.

In addition, the Department proposed that,
under both the first and second alternatives, the
automatic restraint requirements be amended so
that such restraints would not be required in the
front center seating position.

Following the close of the period for written
comments on the April NPRM, NHTSA decided, at
its discretion, to hold a public meeting on the alter-
natives. The purpose of the meeting was to permit
interested parties to present their views and
arguments orally before the Administrator and en-
sure that all available data were submitted to the
agency. The notice announcing the meeting in-
dicated that participants at the hearing would be
permitted to supplement their previous comments.
The notice also urged participants to consider the
issues raised in former Secretary Coleman's Jime
14, 1976 proposal regarding occupant restraints
and in former Secretary Adams' March 24, 1977
proposal regarding automatic restraints.

Rationale for Agency Decision

The decision to rescind the automatic restraint
requirements was difficult for the agency to make.
NHTSA has long pursued the goal of achieving
substantial increases in the usage of safety belts
and other types of occupant restraints. Former
Secretary Adams clearly believed that he had en-
sured the achievement of that goal in July 1977
when he promulgated the automatic restraint re-
quirements. Now that goal appears as elusive as
ever. Instead of being equipped with automatic
restraints that will protect substantially greater
numbers of persons than current manual belts,
most new cars would have had a type of automatic
belt that might not have been any more acceptable
to the public than manual belts. The usage of those
automatic belts might, therefore, have been only
slightly higher than that of manual belts. While
most of the anticipated benefits have virtually
disappeared, the costs have not. Vehicle price in-
creases would have amounted to approximately $1
billion per year.

This turn of events may in part reflect the failure
of the Department in the years following 1977 to
conduct a long term effort to educate the public
about the various types of restraints and the need
to use them. The need for such an undertaking was
seen by former Secretary Coleman in announcing
his decision in 1976 to conduct an automatic
restraint demonstration project prior to deciding

PART 571; S 208-PRE-144

whether to mandate automatic restraints. His in-
struction that NHTSA undertake significant new
steps to promote safety belt usage was never effec-
tively carried out. The result of such an effort could
have been that a substantial portion of the public
would have been receptive to a variety of
automatic restraint designs. As a result of concern
over public acceptance, manufacturers have
designed their automatic restraints to avoid
creating a significant adverse reaction. Unfor-
tunately, the elements of design intended to
minimize adverse reaction would also minimize the
previously anticipated increases in belt usage and
safety benefits of requiring new cars to have
automatic restraints instead of manual belts.

The uncertainty regarding the usage of the
predominant type of planned automatic restraint
has profound implications for the determinations
which NHTSA must make regarding a standard
under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act. NHTSA has a duty under the Vehicle
Safety Act and E.O. 12291 to review the automatic
restraint requirements in light of changing events
and to ensure that the requirements continue to
meet the criteria which each Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard must satisfy. If the criteria cannot
be satisfied, the agency must make whatever
changes in the standard are warranted. The agency
must also have the flexibility to modify its standards
and programs in its efforts to find effective methods
for accomplishing its safety mission.

The agency believes that the post-1977 events
have rendered it incapable of finding now, as it was
able to do in 1977, that the automatic restraint re-
quirements would meet all of the applicable criteria
in the Vehicle Safety Act. Section 103(a) of the
Vehicle Safety Act requires that each Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard meet the need for
safety and be practicable and objective. Each
standard must also be reasonable, practicable and
appropriate for each type of vehicle or equipment
to which it applies (Section 103(f) (3)). To meet the
need for safety, a standard must be reasonably
likely to reduce deaths and injuries. To be found
practicable, the agency must conclude that the
public will in fact avail themselves of the safety
devices installed pursuant to the standard. {Pacific
Legal Foundation v. Department of Transporta-
tion, 593 F. 2d 1338, at 1345-6 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
To be reasonable and practicable, a standard must
be economically and technologically feasible, and

the costs of implementation must be reasonable.
(S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966).)

In reaching the decision announced by this
notice, NHTSA has reviewed the enormous record
compiled by this agency over the past decade on
automatic restraints. Particular attention was paid
to the information and issues relating to the
notices which the Agency or Department has
issued regarding automatic restraints since 1976.
All comments submitted in response to the April
1981 proposal by proponents and opponents of the
automatic restraint requirements have been
thoroughly considered. A summary of the major
comments is included as an appendix to this notice.
The agency's analysis of those comments may be
found in this notice and the final regulatory impact
analysis. A copy of the analysis has been placed in
the public docket.

Usage of automatic restraints and safety benefits.
As in the case of the comments submitted concern-
ing the one-year delay in automatic restraint re-
quirements for large cars, the commenters on the
April 1981 proposal expressed sharply divergent
views and arguments and reached widely differing
conclusions concerning the likely usage rates and
benefits of the automatic restraints planned for
installation in response to the automatic restraint
requirements. The wide distance between the posi-
tions of the proponents and opponents of these re-
quirements stems primarily from the lack of any
directly relevant data on the most important issue,
i.e., the public reaction to and usage rate of
detachable automatic belts. These disagreements
once again demonstrate the difficulty in reaching
reliable conclusions due to the uncertainty created
by the lack of adequate data.

In issuing the automatic restraint requirements
in 1977, NHTSA assumed that the implementation
of those requirements would produce substantial
benefits. According to the analysis which NHTSA
performed in that year, automatic restraints were
expected to prevent 9,000 deaths and 65,000
serious injuries once all cars on the road were
equipped with those devices. That prediction was
premised on several critical assumptions. Most im-
portant among the assumptions were those con-
cerning the safety benefits of automatic
restraints— reductions in death and injury— which
in turn are a function of the types of automatic
restraints to be placed in each year's production of
new cars.

PART 571; S 208-PRE-145

The agency assumed that the combination of air
bags and lap belts would be approximately 66 per-
cent effective in preventing fatalities and that
automatic belts would have a 50 percent level of
effectiveness. The agency assumed also that air
bags would be placed in more than 60 percent of
new cars and that automatic belts would be placed
in the remaining approximately 40 percent. The
agency's analysis predicted that air bags would
provide protection in virtually all crashes of suffi-
cient severity to cause deployment of the air bags.
It was further assumed that the automatic belts
would be used by 60 to 70 percent of the occupants
of those cars.

As to public reaction, the agency anticipated that
the public would, as a whole, accept automatic
restraints because it could choose between the two
types of those restraints. Those not wanting
automatic belts would select an air bag. Partly as a
function of the expected large volume of air bag
installation, the agency projected that the cost of
air bags would be only slightly more than $100 (in
1977 dollars) more than manual belts.

As part of its efforts to monitor and facilitate
implementation of the automatic restraint re-
quirements, the agency continued its gathering of
data about the use and effectiveness of air bags and
of automatic belts with use-inducing features, the
only type of automatic belt available to the public.
With respect to automatic belts, this effort was car-
ried out through a contract with Opinion Research
Corporation. Under that contract, observations
were made of seat belt usage during the two year
period beginning November 1977. These observa-
tions provided data on usage of manual and
automatic belts in model year 1975-79 VW Rabbits
and of manual belts in model year 1978-79 GM
Chevettes. As a result of voluntary decisions by VW
and GM, a number of the Rabbits and Chevettes
were equipped with automatic belts. The observa-
tion data showed usage rates of about 36 percent for
manual belts and about 81 percent for automatic
belts in the Rabbits. The observed rate of manual
belt usage in Chevettes was 11 percent. There were
insufficient numbers of model year 1978-79 Che-
vettes equipped with automatic belts to develop
reliable usage figures.

Several telephone surveys were also made under
contract with Opinion Research. The first survey in-
volved owners of model year 1979 VW Rabbits and
GM Chevettes equipped with automatic belts and

was conducted during 1979. This survey showed
that 89 percent of Rabbit owners and 72 percent of
Chevette owners said that they used their automatic
belts. A second survey was conducted in late 1979
and early 1980. It covered owners of model year
1980 Rabbits and Chevettes. The usage rates found
by the second survey were almost identical to those
in the first survey.

Now, however, the validity of the benefit predic-
tions in 1977 and the relevancy of the extensive
data gathered by NHTSA on air bags and on
automatic belts with use-inducing features have
been substantially if not wholly undermined by
drastic changes in the types of automatic
restraints that would have been installed under the
automatic restraint requirements. Instead of in-
stalling air bags in approximately 60 percent of
new cars, the manufacturers apparently planned
to install them in less than 1 percent of new cars.
Thus, automatic belts would have been the
predominant means of compliance, and installed in
approximately 99 percent of new cars. Thus, the
assumed life-saving potential of air bags would not
have been realized.

Manufacturers have stated that they chose belt
systems for compliance because of the competitive
disadvantage of offering the relatively expensive,
inadequately understood air bag when other
manufacturers would have been providing
automatic belts. These explanations seem credible.

The other drastic change concerns the type of
automatic belt to be installed. Although some
aspects of the car manufacturers' automatic belt
plans are still tentative, it now appears reasonably
certain that if the automatic restraint re-
quirements were implemented, the overwhelming
majority of new cars would be equipped with
automatic belts that are detachable, unlike the
automatic belts in Rabbits and Chevettes. Most
planned automatic belts would be like today's
manual lap and shoulder belts in that they can be
easily detached and left that way permanently.

Again, this design choice would appear to have
arisen out of concern that without such features
emergency exit could be inhibited, and, in part as a
result of a perception of this fact, public refusal to
accept new designs would be widespread. The
agency shares this concern, and has since 1977
required that all such belts provide for emergency
exit. Agency concerns on this point have been

PART 571; S 208-PRE-146

validated by recent related attitudinal research,
discussed below.

In its final rule delaying the initial effective date
of the automatic restraint requirements, the April
1981 proposal and the associated documents analyz-
ing the impacts of those actions, NHTSA expressly
confronted the lack of usage data directly relevant
to the type of automatic belts now planned to be in-
stalled in most new cars. The agency stated that
there were several reasons why the available data
was of limited utility in attempting to make any
reliable predictions about the usage of easily
detachable automatic belts. The most important
reason, which has already been noted, is that the
predominant type of planned automatic belt would
not have had features to ensure that these belts are
not detached.

Second, all of the available data relate to only
two subcompacts, the Rabbit and the Chevette.
Due to a combination of owner demographics and a
correlation between driver perception of risk and
the size of the car being driven, belt usage rates
are typically higher in small cars than in larger
ones. Therefore, the usage rates for the two sub-
compacts cannot simply be adopted as the usage
rates for automatic belts in all car size classes.

Third, most of the Rabbit and Chevette owners
knew that their new car would come with an
automatic belt and had it demonstrated for them,
even if many state that they did not consciously
choose that type of belt. Having voluntarily in-
vested in automatic restraints, they are more likely
to use those restraints than someone who is com-
pelled to buy them.

The significance of the fundamental difference
between the nondetachable and detachable auto-
matic belt bears further discussion. The Rabbit
automatic belts are, as a practical matter, not per-
manently detachable since they are equipped with
an ignition interlock. If the belt is disconnected,
the interlock prevents the starting of the car. Each
successive use would therefore require re-
connection before engine start. The Chevette auto-
matic belts also were initially equipped with an
ignition interlock. Beginning in model year 1980,
the Chevette belts were made both practically and
literally nondetachable. They consist of a con-
tinuous, nondetachable shoulder belt. Additional
webbing can be played out to produce slack in the
belt; however, the belt remains attached at both
ends.

By contrast, the automatic belts now planned for
most cars do not have any effect on the starting of
the cars and are easily detachable. Some belt
designs may be detached and permanently stowed
as readily as the current manual lap and shoulder
belts. Once a detachable automatic belt is detached,
it becomes identical to a manual belt. Contrary to
assertions of some supporters of the standard, its
use thereafter requires the same type of affirmative
action that is the stumbling block to obtaining high
usage levels of manual belts. If the car owners
perceive the belts as simply a different configura-
tion of the current manual belts, this stumbling
block is likely to remain. They may treat the belt as
a manual one and thus never develop the habit of
simply leaving the belt attached so that it can act as
an automatic belt.

The agency recognizes the possibility that the ex-
posure of some new car purchasers to attached
automatic belts may convert some previously occa-
sional users of manual belts to full time belt users.
Present attitudinal survey data clearly establish
the existence of a population of such occupants
who could be influenced by some external factor to
convert to relatively constant users. However, the
agency believes that many purchasers of new cars
having detachable automatic belts would not ex-
perience the potential use-inducing character of at-
tached automatic belts unless they had taken the
initiative themselves to attach the belts.

Thus, the change in car manufacturers' plans has
left the agency without any factual basis for
reliably predicting the likely usage increases due to
detachable automatic belts, or for even predicting
the likelihood of any increase at all. The only ten-
tative conclusion that can be drawn from available
data is that the installation of nondetachable
automatic belts in other subcompacts could result
in usage rates near those found in Rabbits and
Chevettes. Even that use of the Rabbit and
Chevette data may be questionable, however,
given the element of voluntarism in the purchase
of automatic belts by many of the Rabbit and
Chevette owners. Thus, the data on automatic belt
use in Rabbits and Chevettes may do little more
than confirm the lesson of the model year 1974-75
cars equipped with manual belts and ignition in-
terlocks, i.e., that the addition to a belt system of a
feature that makes the belt nondetachable or
necessitates its attachment before a car can be
started can substantially increase the rate of belt
usage.

PART 571; S 208-PRE-147

In estimating automatic belt usage rates for the
purposes of the April final rule and proposal, the
agency recognized the substantial uncertainty
regarding the effects of easily detachable auto-
matic belts on belt usage. NHTSA attempted to
compensate for the lack of directly relevant data
by using two different techniques to predict a
potential range of usage.

One technique was to assume a consistent multi-
plier effect, whereby belt usage in cars of all size
classes would be assumed to be more than slightly
double as it had in Rabbits. A doubling of the cur-
rent 10-11 percent manual belt usage rate pro-
jected over the general car fleet would mean a 22
percent rate could be achieved with the installation
of automatic belts. The other technique was to
assume that there would be a consistent additive
effect, whereby the same absolute percentage
point increase in belt usage would occur as there
had been in the case with Rabbits. Use of this
method would result in a predicted 50 percentage
point increase in belt usage, over the entire fleet,
from the current 10-11 percent to approximately
60 percent.

The agency used the results of these two tech-
niques in an attempt to construct a range of possi-
ble increases in belt usage. Thus, a range of 15 to
60 percent was used in both the final regulatory
impact analysis for the April rulemaking to defer
the effective date for one year and the preliminary
analysis for the current action. The figure of 15
percent was derived by doubling the observed 7
percent usage levels in the large type cars affected
by the deferral. A figure of 22 percent would have
been more appropriate as the low end of the range
for the current action, since it would represent a
doubling of the current usage rate of the car fleet
as a whole. This latter figure has been used in ad-
dressing this question in the current final
regulatory analysis.

Although the agency had no definitive way of
resolving the uncertainty about the usage of
detachable automatic belts, the agency estimated
that belt usage with automatic belts would most
likely fall near the lower end of either range. This
estimate was based on a variety of factors. Most
relate to the previously discussed limitations in the
relevancy of the observations and surveys of Rab-
bit and Chevette owners. In addition, those data
were on their face inconsistent with data regard-
ing automatic belt usage in crashes involving Rab-

bits. Those crash data indicated a usage rate of
55-57 percent instead of the better than 80 percent
rate indicated by the observation study and
telephone surveys.

Thus, the agency made the preliminary judg-
ment in its impact analyses that the switch from
manual belts to detachable automatic belts could
approximately double belt usage. However, the
April 1981 final rule noted that the actual belt
usage might be lower, even substantially so. With
respect to cars with current low usage rates, that
notice stated that the usage rate of detachable
automatic belts might only approach levels similar
to those currently achieved with manual belts.

The commenters on the April 1981 NPRM did
not present any new factual data that could have
reduced the substantial uncertainty confronting
the agency. Instead, the commenters relied on the
same data examined by the agency in its impact
analyses.

The commenters were sharply divided on the
question of usage rates. Proponents of the auto-
matic restraint requirements did not in their
analyses address the significance of the use-
inducing nature of the nondetachable automatic
belts in the Rabbits and Chevettes or the demo-
graphic factors relating to those car purchasers.
Instead, they asserted that the usage rates achieved
in Rabbits and Chevettes would, with slight ad-
justments, also be achieved in other car size
classes. In reaching this conclusion, they asserted
that the usage rate increases of automatic belts
shown by Rabbit and Chevette owners were the
same regardless of whether the automatic belts
were purchased knowingly or unknowingly. There
was an exception to this pattern of comment
among the proponents. One public spokesperson
for an interest group acknowledged that automatic
belts could be designed in a way that they so closely
resembled manual belts that their usage rates
would be the same.

Opponents of the automatic restraint require-
ments, relying on the similarity of detachable auto-
matic belts to manual belts, predicted that the
automatic belts would not have any substantial ef-
fect on belt usage. The opponents of the require-
ments also dismissed the experience of the Rabbit
and Chevette owners on the grounds that the auto-
matic belts in those cars had been voluntarily pur-
chased and were nondetachable.

PART 571; S 208-PRE-148

While the public comments did not provide the
agency with any different or more certain basis for
estimating belt usage than it already had, they did
induce the agency to reexamine its assumption
about the possible automatic belt usage rates.
Although it is nearly impossible to sort out with
precision the individual contributions made by
nondetachability, interlocks, car size, demograph-
ics and other factors, NHTSA believes that the
usage of automatic belts in Rabbits and Chevettes
would have been substantially lower if the auto-
matic belts in those cars were not equipped with a
use-inducing device inhibiting detachment.

In the agency's judgment, there is a reasonable
basis for believing that most of the increase in
automatic belt Rabbits and Chevettes is due to the
nondetachability feature, whether an interlock or
other design feature, of their belt systems.
Necessitating the attachment of belts by the addi-
tion of interlocks to 1974-75 cars resulted in an in-
crease in manual belt usage by as much as 40 per-
cent in cars subject to that requirement. A similar
effect in the case of the Rabbit would account for
four-fifths of the increase observed in the auto-
matic belt vehicles. A significant portion of the re-
maining increase could in fact be attributable to
the fact many owners of automatic belt Rabbits
and Chevettes knowingly and voluntarily bought
the automatic belts. By the principle of self-
selection, these people would be more inclined to
use their belts than the purchasers of 1974-75 Rab-
bits who did not have any choice regarding the pur-
chase of a manual belt equipped with an interlock.
This factor would not, of course, be present in the
fleet subject to the standard.

The most appropriate way of accounting for the
detachability problem and other limitations on the
validity of that Rabbit and Chevette data would be
to recognize that the levels of usage resulting from
both the point estimates are based on uncertain con-
clusion and adjust each appropriately. The agency's
estimate in the final regulatory impact analysis for
the April 1981 final rule that usage would likely fall
near the lower end of the range had the effect of
substantially adjusting downward the usage rate (60
percent) produced by the technique relying on the
absolute percentage point increase (50 percentage
points) in belt usage in automatic belt Rabbits and
Chevettes. A similar adjustment could also be made
in the usage rate (15 percent) indicated by the
multiplier technique.

Throughout these sequential analyses, the agency
has examined the extremely sparse factual data, ap-
plied those factors which are known to externally
affect usage rates, and defined for analytical pur-
poses the magnitude of potential safety effects.
Aside from the initial data points, all such analyses
in all cases necessarily involve exercises of discre-
tion and informed judgment. Resultant conclusions
are indications of probable usage which always have
been and always must be relied upon by the agency
in the absence of additional objective data.

The agency believes that the results produced by
both techniques must be adjusted to account for
the effects of detachability and the other factors af-
fecting usage rates. Therefore, as the April 1981
final rule recognized, the incremental usage at-
tributable to the automatic aspect of the subject
belts may be substantially less than 1 1 percent.

The agency's analysis of the public comments
and other available information leads it to conclude
that it cannot reliably predict even a 5 percentage
point increase as the minimum level of expected
usage increase. The adoption of a few percentage
points increase as the minimum would, in the agen-
cy's judgment, be more consistent with the
substantial uncertainty about the usage rate of
detachable automatic belts. Based on the data
available to it, NHTSA is unable to assess the prob-
ability that the actual incremental usage would fall
nearer a 0 percentage point increase or nearer
some higher value like a 5 or 10 percentage point
increase.

Thus, the agency concludes that the data on
automatic belt usage in Rabbits and Chevettes
does not provide a sufficient basis for reliably ex-
trapolating the likely range of usage of detachable
automatic belts by the general motoring public in
all car size classes. Those data are not even suffi-
cient for demonstrating the likelihood that those
belts would be used in perceptibly greater numbers
than the current manual belts. If the percentage
increase is zero or extremely small due to the
substantial similarity of the design and methods of
using detachable automatic belts and manual belts,
then the data regarding manual belt usage would
be as reliable a guide to the effects of detachable
automatic belts on belt usage as data regarding
usage of nondetachable automatic belts. Indeed,
the manual belt data may even be a more reliable
guide since the data are based on usage by the

PART 571; S 208-PRE-149

general motoring public in cars from all size and
demographic classes.

In view of the uncertainty about the incremental
safety benefits of detachable automatic belts, it is
difficult for the agency to determine that the auto-
matic restraint requirements in their present form
meet the need for safety.

In concluding that for this reason detachable
automatic belts may contribute little to achieving
higher belt usage rates, the question then arises
whether the agency should amend the standard to
require that automatic belts have a use-inducing
feature like that of the Rabbit and Chevette auto-
matic belts. NHTSA believes that such features
would increase belt usage. The agency does not,
however, believe that such devices should be man-
dated, for the reasons discussed in detail below.

Costs of automatic restraints. In view of the
possibly minimal safety benefits and substantial
costs of implementing the automatic restraint re-
quirements, the agency is unable to conclude that
the incremental costs of the requirements are
reasonable. The requirements are, in that respect,
impracticable. While the car manufacturers have
already made some of the capital expenditures
necessary to comply with the automatic restraint
requirements, they still face substantial, recurring
variable costs. The average price increase per car
is estimated to be $89. The costs of air bags and
some designs of automatic belts would be substan-
tially higher. With a total annual production of
more than 10 million cars for sale in this country,
there would be a price effect of approximately $1
billion.

While the car manufacturers might be able to
pass along some or all of their costs to consumers,
the necessary price increases would reduce sales.
There might not be any net revenue loss since the
extra revenue from the higher prices could offset
the revenue loss from the lower volume of sales.
However, those sale losses would cause net
employment losses. Additional sales losses might
occur due to consumer uncertainty about or an-
tipathy toward the detachable automatic belts
which do not stow so unobtrusively as current
manual lap and shoulder belts.

Consumers would probably not be able to recoup
their loss of disposable income due to the higher car
prices. There does not appear to be any certainty
that owners of cars with detachable automatic belts

would receive offsetting discounts in insurance
costs. Testimony and written comments submitted
to the agency indicate premium reductions gener-
ally are available only to owners of cars equipped
with air bags, not automatic belts. Some large in-
surance companies do not now offer discounts to
any automatic restraint-equipped cars, even those
with air bags. If insurance cost discounts were to be
given owners of cars having detachable automatic
belts, such discounts would be given only after the
automatic belts had produced significant increases
in belt usage, and in turn significant decreases in
deaths and serious injuries. The apparent improb-
ability of any economic effect approaching the
magnitude of the consumer cost means that the dis-
counts would not likely materialize on a general
basis.

Insurance company statements at the August
1981 public meeting reaffirmed this belief as they
state that they could not now assure reductions in
insurance premiums but would have to first collect
a considerable amount of claim data.

Finally, the weight added to cars by the installa-
tion of automatic belts would cause either increased
fuel costs for consumers or further new car price in-
creases to cover the incorporation of offsetting fuel
economy improvements.

The agency does not believe that it would be
reasonable to require car manufacturers or con-
sumers to bear such substantial costs without more
adequate assurance that they will produce benefits.
Given the plans of the car manufacturers to rely
primarily on detachable automatic belts and the
absence of relevant data to resolve the usage ques-
tion, implementation of the automatic restraint re-
quirements amounts to an expensive federal
regulatory risk. The result if the detachable
automatic belts fail to achieve significant increases
in belt usage could be a substantial waste of
resources.

The agency believes that the costs are particularly
unreasonable in view of the likelihood that other
alternatives available to the agency, the states and
the private sector could accomplish the goal of the
automatic restraint requirements at greatly re-
duced cost. Like those requirements, the agency's
planned educational campaign is addressed primar-
ily to the substantial portion of the motoring public
who are currently occasional users of manual belts.

Effect on public attitude toward safety. Although
the issue of public acceptance of automatic

PART 571; S 208-PRE-150

restraints has already been discussed as it relates
to the usage rate of detachable automatic
restraints, there remains the question of the effect
of automatic restraints on the public attitude
toward safety regulation in general. Whether or
not there would be more than minimal safety
benefits, implementation of the automatic
restraint requirements might cause significant
long run harm to the safety program.

No regulatory policy is of lasting value if it
ultimately proves unacceptable to the public. Public
acceptability is at issue in any vehicle safety
rulemaking proceeding in which the required safety
equipment would be obtrusive, relatively expensive
and beneficial only to the extent that significant
portions of the motoring public will cooperate and
use it. Automatic belt requirements exhibit all of
those characteristics. The agency has given the
need for pubhc acceptability of automatic restraints
substantial weight since it will clearly determine not
only the level of safety benefits but also the general
public attitude toward related safety initiatives by
the government or the private sector.

As noted above, detachable automatic belts may
not be any more acceptable to the public than
manual belts at any given point in time. If the
detachable automatic belts do not produce more
than negligible safety benefits, then regardless of
the benefits attributable to the small number of
other types of automatic restraints planned to be
installed, the public may resent being required to
pay substantially more for the automatic systems.
Many if not most consumers could well conclude
that the automatic belts would in fact provide them
with no different freedom of choice about usage or
levels of protection than manual belts currently of-
fer. As a result, it is not unreasonable to conclude
that the public may regard the automatic restraint
requirements as an expensive example of ineffec-
tive regulation.

Thus, whether or not the detachable automatic
belts might have been successful in achieving
higher belt usage rates, mandates requiring such
belts could well adversely affect public attitude
toward the automatic restraint requirements in
particular and safety measures in general. As
noted in more detail in the 1976 Decision of
Secretary Coleman:

Rejection by the public would lead to administrative or Con-
gressional reversal of a passive restraint requirement that
could result in hundreds of millions of dollars of wasted

resources, severe damage to the nation's economy, and,
equally important, a poisoning of popular sentiment toward
efforts to improve occupant restraint systems in the future.

It can only be concluded that the public attitude
described by the Secretary at that time is at least
as prevalent today. The public might ultimately
have sought the legislative rescission of the
requirements. Action-forcing safety measures
have twice before been overturned by Congress. In
the mid-1970's. Congress rescinded the ignition
interlock provision and provided that agency could
not require the States to adopt and enforce motor-
cycle helmet use laws. Some people might also
have cut the automatic belts out of their cars, thus
depriving subsequent owners of the cars of the pro-
tection of any occupant restraint system. These
are serious concerns for an agency charged by
statute with taking steps appropriate for address-
ing safety problems that arise not only in the short
term but also the long term. The agency must be
able to react effectively to the expected increases
in vehicle deaths and injuries during the 1980's.

Equity. Another relevant factor affecting the
reasonableness of the automatic restraint
requirements and of their costs is the equity of the
distribution of such costs among the affected con-
sumers. Responsible regulatory policy should
generally strive to ensure that the beneficiaries of
regulation bear the principal costs of that regula-
tion. The higher the costs of a given regulation, the
more serious the potential equity problem. The
automatic restraint requirements of the standard
would have required the current regular user of
manual belts not only to pay himself for a system
that affords him no additional safety protection,
but in part to subsidize the current nonuser of belts
who may or may not be induced by the automatic
restraints to commence regular restraint usage.

Option of Adopting Use-Compelling Features. As
noted above, some commenters have suggested
that the only safety belts which are truly "passive"
are those with use-compelling features. Such com-
menters have recommended that the agency
amend the standard so as to require such features.
For example, an ignition interlock which prohibits
the car from starting unless the belt is secured is a
use-compelling feature. Another example is a
passive belt design which is simply not detachable,
because no buckle and latch release mechanism is
provided. While NHTSA agrees that such use-
compelling features could significantly increase

PART 571; S 208-PRE-151

usage of passive belts, NHTSA cannot agree that
use-compelling features could be required consist-
ent with the interests of safety. In the case of the
ignition interlock, NHTSA clearly has no authority
to require such a use-compelling feature. The
history of the Congressional action which removed
this authority from NHTSA suggests that Con-
gress would look with some disfavor upon any
similar attempt to impose a use-compelling feature
on a belt system.

But, even if NHTSA were to require that passive
belts contain use-compelling features, the agency
believes that the requirement could be counter-
productive. Recent attitudinal research conducted
by NHTSA confirms a widespread, latent and irra-
tional fear in many members of the public that they
could be trapped by the seat belt after a crash.
Such apprehension may well be contributing fac-
tors in decisions by many people not to wear a seat
belt at all. This apprehension is clearly a question
which can be addressed through education, but
pending its substantial reduction, it would be
highly inappropriate to impose a technology which
by its very nature could heighten or trigger that
concern.

In addition, the agency believes there are com-
pelling safety reasons why it should not mandate
use-compelling features on passive belts. In the
event of accident, occupants wearing belts suffer
significantly reduced risk of loss of consciousness,
and are commonly able to extricate themselves
with relative ease. However, the agency would be
unable to find the cause of safety served by impos-
ing any requirement which would further com-
plicate the extrication of any occupant from his or
her car, as some use-compelling features would.
NHTSA's regulations properly recognize the need
for all safety belts to have some kind of release
mechanism, either a buckle and latch mechanism
or a spool-out release which feeds a length of belt
long enough to extricate a car occupant.

Alternative methods of increasing restraint
usage. Finally, the agency believes that it is possi-
ble to induce increased belt usage, and enhance
public understanding and awareness of belt
mechanisms in general, by means that are at least
as effective but much less costly than the installa-
tion of millions of detachable automatic belts.

In the decision noted above. Secretary Coleman
noted the obligation of the Department of
Transportation to undertake efforts to encourage

the public to use occupant restraints, active or
passive. Toward this point, Secretary Coleman
directed the Administrator of NHTSA to under-
take significant new steps to promote seat belt
usage during the demonstration program. This in-
struction of the Secretary was not effectively car-
ried out and, unfortunately, we do not enjoy today
the benefits of a prolonged Departmental cam-
paign to encourage seat belt usage. Had such a pro-
gram been successfully carried out, increased seat
belt usage could have saved many lives each year,
beginning in 1977.

Rather than allowing the Coleman demonstra-
tion program and its accompanying education ef-
fort to come to fruition, the Department recon-
sidered Secretary Coleman's 1976 decision during
1977. At the conclusion of the reconsideration
period, the Department reversed that decision, and
amended the standard to require the provision of
automatic restraints in new passenger cars, in ac-
cordance with a phased-in schedule.

The benefits of any such belt use enhancement
efforts could have already substantially exceeded
those projected for the automatic restraint require-
ments of this standard. Over the next ten years,
the requirements of the standard would have ad-
dressed primarily those occasional belt users
amenable to change who buy new cars during the
mid and late 1980's.

Prior to the initiation of rulemaking in February
of this year, the Department had resolved to
undertake a major educational effort to enhance
voluntary belt usage levels. Such efforts will be
closely coordinated with new and preexisting ma-
jor initiatives at the State level and in the private
sector, many of which were discussed at the public
meeting on the present rulemaking. These efforts
will address not only those users /purchasers
amenable to change, but also those currently driv-
ing and riding in cars, multipurpose passenger
vehicles and trucks on the road today. The poten-
tial for immediate impact is thus many times
greater. Further, with the much greater number of
persons directly impacted, educational efforts
would need to raise safety belt usage in the
vehicles on the road during the 1980's by only a
few percentage points to achieve far greater safety
benefits than the automatic restraint requirements
could have achieved during the same time period.

This is in no sense to argue or suggest that
nonregulatory alternatives are or should be con-

PART 571; S 208-PRE-152

sidered in all cases appropriate to limit Federal
regulation. However, the existence of such efforts,
and their relevance to calculations of benefits in
the present case, must be and has been considered
to the extent discussed herein.

Summary of Agency Conclusion

As originally conceived, the automatic restraint
requirement was a far reaching technology forcing
regulation that could have resulted in a substantial
reduction in injuries and loss of life on our
highways.

As it would be implemented in the mid-1980's,
however, the requirement has turned into a billion
dollar Federal effort whose main technological ad-
vance would be to require seat belts that are an-
chored to the vehicle door rather than the vehicle
body, permitting these belts to be used either as
conventional active belts or as automatic belts.

To gain this advantage, under the standard as
drafted, consumers would see the end of the six
passenger car and an average vehicle price in-
crease on the order of $89 per car. The almost cer-
tain benefits that had been anticipated as a result
of the use of air bag technology have been replaced
by the gravely uncertain benefit estimates
associated with belt systems that differ little from
existing manual belts.

In fact, with the change in manufacturers' plans
that in essence replaced air bags vnth automatic
belts, the central issue in this proceeding has
become whether automatic belts would induce
higher belt usage rates than are occurring with
manual belts.

Many of the comments in the course of this
rulemaking were directed specifically at the ques-
tion of belt use. Most addressed themselves to the
information in the docket on the usage witnessed
in the VW Rabbit and Chevette equipped with
automatic belts.

The Agency's own analysis of the available infor-
mation concludes that it is virtually impossible to
develop an accurate and supportable estimate of
future belt use increases based upon the Rabbit
and Chevette automatic belt observations. The
Agency further believes that it is impossible to
disaggregate the roles that demographics, use in-
ducing devices, and automatic aspects of the belt
played in the observed increases.

Faced with this level of uncertainty, and the wide
margins of possible error, the agency is simply

unable to comply with its statutory mandate to con-
sider and conclude that the automatic restraint
requirements are at this time practicable or
reasonable within the meaning of the Vehicle Safety
Act. On the other hand, the agency is not able to
agree with assertions that there will be absolutely
no increase in belt use as a result of automatic belts.
Certainly, while a large portion of the population ap-
pears to find safety belts uncomfortable or refuses
to wear them for other reasons, there is a sizeable
segment of the population that finds belts accept-
able but still does not use them. It is plausible to
assume that some people in this group who would
not otherwise use manual belts would not discon-
nect automatic belts.

It is this same population that will generate all of
the benefits that result directly and solely from this
regulation. This is a population that can also be
reached in other ways. The Agency, State govern-
ments and the private sector are in the process of
expanding and initiating major national belt use
educational programs of unprecedented scale.
While undertaken entirely apart from the pending
proceeding, the fact remains that this effort will
predominantly affect the same population that the
automatic belts would be aimed at.

On the one hand, it could be argued that, the
success of any belt use program would only be
enhanced by the installation of automatic belts. In-
dividuals who can be convinced of the utility of
safety belts would presumably have an easier time
accepting an automatic belt. On the other hand,
there is little evidence that the standard itself will
materially increase usage levels above those other-
wise achievable.

However, the agency is not merely faced with
uncertainty as to the actual benefits that would
result from detachable automatic safety belts.
When the uncertain nature of the benefits is con-
sidered together with the risk of adverse safety
consequences that might result from the
maintenance of this regulation, the agency must
conclude that such retention would not be
reasonable, and would not meet the need for motor
vehicle safety.

It is useful to summarize precisely what the
agency believes these risks might be. The principal
risk is that adverse pubhc reaction could under-
mine the effectiveness of both the standard itself
and future or related efforts.

PART 571; S 208-PRE-153

The agency also concludes, however, that reten-
tion would present serious risk of jeopardizing
other separate efforts to increase manual belt
usage by the Federal government, States and the
private sector. A public that believes it is the victim
of too much government regulation by virtue of the
standard might well resist such parallel efforts to
enhance voluntary belt usage. Further, to the ex-
tent that States begin to consider belt use laws as
an option, a Federal regulation addressing the
same issue could undermine those attempts as
well.

While one cannot be certain of the adverse ef-
fects on net belt usage increases, it would be ir-
responsible to fail to consider them. A decision to
retain the regulation under any of the schedules
now being considered would not get automatic
belts on the road until 1983 and would not apply to
the entire fleet of new cars until 1984. By the end
of the 1984 model year, under most options, there
would have been fewer than 20 million vehicles
equipped with automatic belts on the road.

By the same time, however, there will be upward
of 150 million vehicles equipped with only manual
belts, drivers and occupants of which will have
been exposed to interim belt usage encouragement
efforts.

Agency analysis indicates that external efforts
of whatever kind that increase usage by only 5 per-
cent, will save more than 1,300 lives per year
beginning in 1983. Installation of automatic belts
could save an equal number of lives in 1983 only
with 95 percent belt usage.

Further, even if one is convinced that automatic
belts can double belt usage and alternative efforts
would only increase usage by 5 percent, it would
not be until 1989 that total life savings attributable
to automatic belts installed under the automatic
restraint requirements would reach the total life
savings achieved through such other efforts.

NHTSA fully recognizes that neither outcome is
a certainty. Much closer to the truth is that both
outcomes are uncertain. However, neither is
significantly more likely than the other. That being
the case, to impose the $1 billion cost on the public
does not appear to be reasonable.

It is particularly unreasonable in light of the fact
that the rescission does not foreclose the option to
again reopen rulemaking if enhanced usage levels
of both manual and automatic belts do not

materialize. Long before there would have been
any substantial number of vehicles on the road
mandatorily equipped with automatic belts as a
result of this standard, NHTSA will conclusively
know whether other efforts to increase belt use
have succeeded either in achieving acceptable
usage levels or in increased public understanding
and acceptance of the need for further use-
inducing or automatic protection alternatives. If so
obviously no further action would be needed. If
such is not the case, rulemaking would again be a
possibility. Any such rulemaking, following even
partially successful efforts to increase belt use,
would be much less likely to face public rejection.

It has been said that the Vehicle Safety Act is a
"technology-forcing" statute. The agency concurs
completely.

However, the issue of automatic restraints now
before the agency is not a "technology-forcing"
issue. The manual seat belt available in every car
sold today offers the same, or more, protection
than either the automatic seat belt or the air bag.
Instead, the agency today faces a decision to force
people to accept protection that they do not choose
for themselves. It is difficult to conclude that the
Vehicle Safety Act is, or in light of past experience
could become, a "people-forcing" statute.

NHTSA cannot find that the automatic restraint
requirements meet the need for motor vehicle
safety by offering any greater protection than is
already available.

After 12 years of rulemaking, NHTSA has not
yet succeeded in its original intent, the widespread
offering of automatic crash protection that will
produce substantial benefits. The agency is still
committed to this goal and intends immediately to
initiate efforts with automobile manufacturers to
ensure that the public will have such types of
technology available. If this does not succeed, the
agency will consider regulatory action to assure
that the last decade's enormous advances in crash
protection technology will not be lost.

Impact Analyses

NHTSA has considered the impacts of this final
rule and determined that it is a major rulemaking
within the meaning of E.0. 12291 and a significant
rule within the meaning of the Department of
Transportation regulatory policies and procedures.
A final regulatory impact analysis is being placed

PART 571; S 208-PRE-154

in the public docket simultaneously with the
publication of this notice. A copy of the analysis
may be obtained by writing to: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, Docket Section,
Room 5109, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washing-
ton, D.C. 20590.

The agency's determination that the rule is ma-
jor and significant is based primarily upon the
substantial savings in variable manufacturing
costs and in consumer costs that result from the
rescission of the automatic restraint requirements.
These costs would have amounted to approxi-
mately $1 billion once all new cars became subject
to the requirements. The costs would have re-
curred annually as long as the requirements re-
mained in effect. There is also a recurring savings
in fuel costs of approximately $150 million an-
nually. Implementation of the automatic restraint
requirements would have increased the weight of
cars and reduced their fuel economy. In addition,
the car manufacturers will be able to reallocate
$400 million in capital investment that they would
have had to allocate for the purpose of completing
their efforts to comply with the automatic
restraint requirements.

The agency finds it difficult to provide a reliable
estimate of any adverse safety effects of rescind-
ing the automatic restraint requirements. There
might have been significant safety loss if the in-
stallation of detachable automatic belts resulted in
a doubling of belt usage and if the question were
simply one of the implementation or rescission of
the automatic restraint requirements. The April
1981 NPRM provided estimates of the additional
deaths that might occur as a result of rescission.
However, those estimates included carefully
drafted caveats. The notice expressly stated that
the impacts of rescission would depend upon the
usage rate of automatic belts and of the effec-
tiveness of the agency's educational campaign. The
agency has now determined that there is no cer-
tainty that the detachable automatic belts would
produce more than a several percentage point in-
crease in usage. The small number of cars that
would have been equipped with automatic belts
having use-inducing features or with air bags
would not have added more than several more
percentage points to that amount. Further, any
potential safety losses associated with the rescis-
sion must be balanced against the expected results
of the agency's planned educational program about

safety belts. That campaign will be addressed to
the type of person who might be induced by the
detachable automatic belts to begin regular safety
belt usage, i.e., the occasional user of manual belts.
Since that campaign will affect occasional users in
all vehicles on the road today instead of only those
in new cars, the campaign can yield substantially
greater benefits than the detachable automatic
belts even with a much lower effectiveness level.

The agency has also considered the impact of this
action on automatic restraint suppliers, new car
dealers and small organizations and governmental
units. Since the agency certifies that the rescission
would not have a significant effect on a substantial
number of small entities, a final regulatory flex-
ibility analysis has not been prepared. However,
the impacts of the rescission on the suppliers,
dealers and other entities are discussed in the final
Regulatory Impact Analysis.

The impact on air bag manufacturers is likely to
be minimal. Earlier this year, General Motors,
Ford and most other manufacturers cancelled their
air bag programs for economic reasons. These
manufacturers planned instead to rely almost
wholly on detachable automatic belts. Therefore, it
is not accurate to say, as some commenters did,
that rescission of the automatic restraint require-
ments will "kill" the air bag. Rescission will not af-
fect the air bag manufacturers to any significant
degree. Further, the agency plans to undertake
new steps to promote the continued development
and production of air bags.

The suppliers of automatic belts are generally
the same firms that supply manual belts. Thus, the
volume of sales of these firms is not expected to be
affected by the rescission. However, there will be
some loss of economic activity that would have
been associated with developing and producing the
more sophisticated automatic belts.

The effects of the rescission on new car dealers
would be positive. Due to reduced new car pur-
chase prices and more favorable reaction to
manual belts than to automatic belts, sales in-
creases of 395,000 cars were estimated by GM and
235,000 cars by Ford. While these figures appear
to be overstated, the agency agrees that rescission
will increase new car sales.

SmaU organizations and governmental units
would be benefited by the reduced cost of purchas-
ing and operating new cars. Given the indeter-

PART 571; S 208-PRE-155

minacy of the usage rate that detachable automatic
belts would have achieved, it is not possible to
estimate the effects, if any, of the rescission on the
safety of persons employed by these groups.

In accordance with the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, NHTSA has considered the en-
vironmental impacts of the rescission and the
alternatives proposed in the April 1981 NPRM.
The option selected is disclosed by the analysis to
result in the largest reductions in the consumption
of plastics, steel, glass and fuel/energy. A Final
Environmental Impact Statement is being placed
in the public docket simultaneously with the
publication of this notice.

This amendment is being made effective in less
than 180 days because the date on which the car
manufacturers would have to make expenditure
commitments to meet the automatic restraint re-
quirements for model year 1983 falls within that
180-day period.

In consideration of the foregoing, Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash
Protection (49 CFR 571.208), is amended as set
forth below.

§571.208 [Amended]

1. 84. 1.2 is amended by revising it to read:

84 . 1 . 2 Passenger cars manufactured on or after
September 1, 1973. Each passenger car manufac-
tured on or after September 1 , 1973, shall meet the
requirements of 84.1.2.1, 84.1.2.2 or 84.1.2.3. A
protection system that meets the requirements of
S4.1.2.1 or S4.1.2.2 may be installed at one or
more designated seating positions of a vehicle that
otherwise meets the requirements of 84.1.2.3.

2. The heading of 84.1.2.1 is amended by revis-
ing it to read:

84.1.2.1 First option— frontal! angular auto-
matic protection system.

• ••*•••**

3. 84.1.3 is removed.

54.1.3 [Removed]

(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (15 Stat. 1392,
1407); delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50)

Issued on October 23, 1981.

Raymond A. Peck, Jr.,

Administrator.

46 F.R. 53419
October 29, 1981

PART 571; 8 208-PRE-156

Appendix

Editorial

Not*— This appendix will not appear in the Code of Federal
Regulations.

Following is a summary of the major comments
submitted in response to the April 9, 1981 notice of
proposed rulemaking. A more detailed summary of
comments has been placed in NHTSA Docket No.
74-14; Notice 22. This summary is organized in
broad terms according to the interest groups from
which the comments were received.

Insurance Companies

All commenting insurance companies strongly
favored retention of the automatic restraint re-
quirements. Many favored maintaining the present
implementation schedule (i.e., September 1, 1982,
for large and medium-sized cars and September 1,
1983, for small cars), although several companies
stated they would support a change to require that
small cars are phased in first or a simultaneous
implementation date. Several insurance companies
stated that air bags offer the best technology for
saving lives and reducing injuries. These com-
panies pointed out that repeated surveys have in-
dicated that consumers appear to favor air bags,
even if higher costs are likely. Several insurers
argued that a retreat from the standard represents
a breach of the Secretary's statutory obligation to
reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries
which result from them. One company argued that
a delay in the standard (i.e., the delay and reversal
alternative) would produce no measurable eco-
nomic benefit to car makers and might possibly
result in an economic loss to them. Nearly all the
companies argued that the standard is cost-
beneficial and represents the optimum approach to
resolving this country's most pressing public
health problem. Many companies stated that
reduced insurance premiums resulting from the
lives saved and injuries prevented by automatic
restraints would help offset the cost of those
systems to consumers.

A majority of the insurance companies argued
that seat belt use campaigns will not be effective in
raising the current use rate of manual belts
significantly. The companies pointed to the failures
of all past campaigns to have any substantial im-
pact on use rates. On the other hand, these com-
panies believe that the use rate of automatic belts
will be significant. The companies point to the cur-

rent use data for automatic belts on VW Rabbits
and Chevettes as evidence that automatic belt use
will be significant. The companies believe that seat
belt use campaigns should only be complementary
to automatic restraints, not a substitute.

Several insurance companies pointed to the huge
economic losses resulting from traffic accidents.
One company stated that these losses mount to
over $1 billion dollars per year and result in recur-
ring costs because of continuing medical problems
such as epilepsy and quadriplegia. One company
cited Professor William Nordhaus's analysis of the
consequences of rescinding the standard as being
equivalent to society's loss if the tuberculosis vac-
cine had not been developed, or if Congress repealed
the Clean Air Act. In his submission on behalf of the
insurance companies. Professor Nordhaus stated
that fatalities will increase by 6,400 each year and
injuries by 120,000 if the standard is rescinded. One
company argued that the standard is cost-beneficial
if automatic belt use rates increase usage only 5 per-
cent. However, this company stated that use rates
as high as 70 percent could be expected, and that
the costs of rescinding the standard could reach as
much as $2 billion dollars per year. This company
also argued that the economic condition of the
vehicle industry is no excuse for any delay in the
standard and is not a statutorily justified reason
for rescinding the standard.

Consumer Groups and Health Organizations

There were many consumer groups and health-
related organizations which strongly urged that
the automatic restraint requirements be main-
tained and that there be no further delays in the
implementation schedule. Most of these groups
argued that the cost of both air bags and automatic
belts are greatly exaggerated by vehicle manufac-
turers. One group stated that the three alternative
proposals are "naive and exhibit a callous disregard
for human lives that flouts the agency's mandated
safety mission." This group argued that a worse
alternative is to rescind the standard and rely on
education programs to increase the use of manual
belts, since seat belt campaigns have failed
repeatedly in this country. The group stated that
the simultaneous implementation alternative in
March 1983 ignores the industry's background of
introducing safety changes only at the beginning
of a new model year. Regarding a reversed phase-

PART 571; S 208-PRE-157

in schedule, the group stated that the requirement
that small cars have automatic restraints by
September 1, 1982, would not likely provide suffi-
cient lead time for small car manufacturers. Addi-
tionally, with approximately 2 to 1 difference in
seat belt use in small cars versus larger cars, it is
not at all clear that the proposed reversal would
make up for the delay in implementation in the
larger cars in terms of lives saved. The group
argued that the best alternative is to maintain the
existing implementation schedule.

Several consumer groups argued that the center
seating position should not be eliminated from the
requirements for several reasons. First, they
argued, this position is likely to be occupied by
children. Second, the center seat requirement is
one factor that will lead to the installation of air
bags in some vehicles since current automatic belt
designs cannot be applied to the center seat.
Nearly all consumer groups argued that benefits of
the automatic restraint standard far outweigh the
costs.

One association stated that the air bag supplier
industry could be forced out of business if substan-
tial modifications and further delays are made to
the standard. This would mean, the association
argued, that the life-saving air bag technology
could be lost forever. The association would sup-
port some modifications to the standard if there
were some clear commitment by the Department
that some car models would be required to offer
the consumer the choice of air bags. The group
noted that air bag suppliers have indicated that a
sufficient production volume would result in air
bag systems priced in the $200 to $300 dollar
range.

Various health groups and medical experts
argued that the pain and suffering resulting from
epilepsy and paraplegia, as well as mental suffer-
ing and physical disfigurement, could be greatly
reduced by the automatic restraint standard.
These persons argued that the standard should be
implemented as soon as possible.

One consumer oriented group did not support
the automatic restraint standard. That foundation
argued that the standard is not justified, par-
ticularly if it is complied with by means of air bags.
The group stated that air bag effectiveness is
overestimated since the agency does not include
non-frontal crashes in its statistics. The organiza-

tion argued that in many situations air bags are
actually unsafe. This group also argued that the
public acceptability of automatic seat belts is
uncertain, and that a well-founded finding of addi-
tional safety benefits by the Department is re-
quired in order to justify retention of the standard.

Vehicle Manufacturers

The vehicle manufacturers, both foreign and
domestic, were unanimously opposed to retention
of the automatic restraint standard. Most
manufacturers stated the predominate means of
complying with the standard would be with auto-
matic belts, and that such belts are not likely to
increase usage substantially. This is because most
automatic belts will be designed to be easily
detachable because of emergency egress con-
siderations and to avoid a potential backlash by
consumers that would be counterproductive to the
cause of motor vehicle safety. The domestic
manufacturers argued that the public would not ac-
cept coercive automatic belts (i.e., automatic belts
with interlocks or some other use-inducing
feature). Eliminating any coercive element pro-
duces, in effect, a manual belt, which will be used
no more than existing manual systems.

The domestic manufacturers also argued that air
bags would not be economically practicable and
would, therefore, be unacceptable to the public.
One manufacturer noted that current belt users
will object strenuously to paying additional money
for automatic belts that will not offer any more
protection than their existing belts.

One manufacturer argued that the injury criteria
specified in the standard is not representative of
real injuries and should be replaced with only static
test requirements for belt systems. The company
argued that there are many problems with test
repeatability under the 208 requirements.

All manufacturers of small cars stated that it
would be impossible for them to comply with the
standard by September 1, 1982, i.e., under the
reversal proposal. These manufacturers stated
that there is insufficient lead time to install
automatic restraints in small cars by that date, and
several foreign manufacturers stated they would
not be able to sell their vehicles in that model year
if the schedule is reversed. Most of the manufac-
turers, both domestic and foreign, stated that it is
also too late to install automatic restraints in their

PART 571; S 208-PRE-158

small cars even six months earlier than the existing
schedule, i.e., under the March 1983 simultaneous
implementation proposal. Many manufacturers
supported a simultaneous implementation if the
standard is not rescinded, but requested that the
effective date be September 1, 1983, or later. The
manufacturers argued that an effective date for
small cars prior to September 1, 1983, would not
allow enough time to develop acceptable, reliable
and high quality automatic belts.

Nearly all vehicle manufacturers believe that an
intensive seat belt education campaign can be just
as effective as automatic restraints and without
the attendant high costs of automatic restraints.
Additionally, most foreign manufacturers recom-
mended that mandatory seat belt use laws be
enacted in lieu of automatic restraints.

One foreign manufacturer requested that any
effective date for automatic restraints be
"September 1 or the date of production start of the
new model year if this date falls between
September 1 and December 31." The company
stated that this would allow manufacturers to con-
tinue production for several months of models that
would then be phased out of production. However,
a domestic vehicle manufacturer argued that this
would give foreign manufacturers an unfair com-
petitive advantage, and that current practice of
September 1 effective dates should be retained.

Most manufacturers supported the proposal to
exclude the center seating position from the auto-
matic restraint requirements, in order to give
manufacturers more design flexibility. However,
the two domestic manufacturers which would be
most affected by such an exception stated that it is
too late for them to make use of such an exception
for 1983 models. The two companies stated that
such an exception would have benefits in the long
run, however, and would allow them to continue
production of six-seat passenger cars in the
mid-1980's.

Suppliers and Trade Groups

Suppliers of air bag system components sup-
ported continuation of the automatic restraint re-
quirements. One commenter stated that having to
buckle-up is an act which requires a series of
psychological and physical reactions which are
responsible for the low rate of manual seat belts.
Also, this company stated that educational cam-
paigns to increase belt use will not work.

One motor vehicle trade group stated that a
study by the Canadian government has established
the superiority of manual seat belt systems. This
group argued that the automatic restraint require-
ments cannot be justified because any expected
benefits are speculative.

One trade group voiced its concern about sodium
azide (an air bag propellant) as it pertains to possi-
ble hazards posed to the scrap processing industry.

A group representing seat belt manufacturers
stated that the most effective way of guaranteeing
belt use is through mandatory belt use laws. That
group believes that belt usage can be increased
through public education, and that simple, easy to
use automatic belts such as are currently on the
VW Rabbit wall also increase belt usage. This
group did not support a simultaneous implementa-
tion date for automatic restraints, stating that this
could put a severe strain on the supplier industry.
The group did support elimination of the automatic
restraint requirements for center seating positions.

An automobile association recommended equip-
ping small cars with automatic restraints first. The
association stated that a reversed phase-in
schedule would protect a significantly large seg-
ment of the public at an earlier date, would reduce
a foreign competitive advantage (under the ex-
isting schedule), and would give needed economic
relief to large car manufacturers. This organiza-
tion also recommended that, as an alternative,
automatic restraints be required only at the
driver's position. This would achieve three-
quarters of the reductions in deaths and serious in-
juries now projected for full-front seat systems, yet
cost only half as much.

Congressional Comments

Mr. Timothy E. Wirth, Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection and Finance, made the following com-
ments:

—The automatic restraint requirements would
produce benefits to society far in excess of costs.

—The Committee findings strongly point to the
necessity of requiring the installation of automatic
crash protection systems, at a minimum, on a
substantial portion of the new car fleet at the
earliest possible date. Mr. Wirth suggested that
the effective date for small cars be September 1,
1982, and for intermediate and large cars
September 1, 1983.

PART 571; S 208-PRE-159

—The economic conditions of the automobile in-
dustry should not be relevant to the NHTSA's deci-
sion on matters of safety. NHTSA's decision must
be guided solely by safety-related concerns.

—The agency should not discount its own find-
ings indicating high use of automatic belts (refer-
ring to the existing VW and Chevette automatic
belt use data).

In a joint letter to the Secretary, eighteen Con-
gressmen urged that the automatic restraint re-
quirements be maintained. This letter noted that
over 50,000 people are killed each year on the
highways and stated: "While the tragedy of their
deaths cannot be measured in economic terms, the
tragedy of their serious injuries cost all of us
billions of dollars each year in higher insurance
costs, increased welfare pajonents, unemployment
and social security payments and rehabilitation
costs paid to support the injured and the families of
those who have been killed." The letter stressed
the Congressmen's belief that the automatic crash
protection standard would produce benefits to
society far in excess of its cost.

In a letter addressed to Administrator Peck,
fifty-nine Congressmen urged that the automatic
restraint standard be rescinded. That letter stated:
"The 208 standard persists as one of the more con-
troversial federal regulations to be forced on the
automobile industry. . . . The industry continues to
spend hundreds of thousands of dollars every day
in order to meet this standard, despite con-
siderable evidence that any safety benefits realized
by enforcing the standard would be minimal."

Private Citizens

In addition to comments from the above groups
and organizations, the agency also received
general comments from numerous private citizens.
These comments were almost equally divided in
their support or opposition to the automatic
restraint standard.

Raymond A. Peck, Jr.
Administrator

46 F.R. 53419
October 29, 1981

PART 571; S 208-PRE-160

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection
(Docket No. 74-14; Notice 24)

ACTION: Final rule; partial response to petitions
for reconsideration.

SUMMARY: The purpose of this notice is to delay
for one year the effective date of the comfort and
convenience requirements for seat belts in Safety
Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection.
Standard No. 208 was amended January 8, 1981,
to promote the installation of more comfortable
and convenient belts by specifying additional
performance requirements for both manual and
automatic seat belts installed in motor vehicles
with a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of
10,000 pounds or less. Petitions for reconsideration
of these new performance requirements were
received from seven vehicle manufacturers.

The agency has determined that the recent
rescission of the automatic restraint requirements
of Standard 208 has made it necessary to review
the comfort and convenience requirements in
their entirety. The changed circumstances have
made it difficult to respond to the substantive
issues raised in the petitions for reconsideration
at this time. Since the requirements are currently
scheduled to become effective September 1, 1982.
the agency has concluded that it is necessary to
extend the effective date until September 1, 1983,
to give the agency sufficient time to re-evaluate
these requirements.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The new effective date for
the existing comfort and convenience requirements
is September 1, 1983.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On January
8. 1981, Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash
Protection (49 CFR 571.208), was amended to
specify performance requirements to promote the
comfort and convenience of both manual and

automatic safety belts installed in vehicles with a
GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less (46 F.R. 2064). Type
2 manual belts (lap and shoulder combination belts)
installed in front seating positions in passenger
cars were excepted from these additional
performance requirements since it was assumed
such belts would be phased out in passenger cars
as the automatic restraint requirements of
Standard No. 208 became effective.

Seven petitions for reconsideration of the
January 8, 1981 amendment were received from
vehicle manufacturers. These petitions requested
that the requirements be revoked entirely, or
that at least various modifications be made and
that the effective date be delayed.

Since the receipt of these petitions for
reconsideration, the agency has revoked the
automatic restraint requirements of the standard
(46 F.R. 53419, October 29, 1981). This recission
alters the circumstances which must be considered
in determining appropriate requirements for seat
belt comfort and convenience. Therefore, it is
difficult for the agency to respond to the
substantive issues raised in the petitions for
reconsideration at the current time. Many of the
issues that were raised are no longer pertinent
and many of the rationales discussed by the
agency when the requirements were first
established must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the
agency has determined that the comfort and
convenience requirements should be reviewed in
their entirety.

In light of these conclusions, the agency has
decided that it is necessary to delay the effective
date of the current comfort and convenience
requirements for at least a year (from September
1, 1982, to September 1, 1983). This will give the
agency sufficient time to re-evaluate the
requirements and the petitions for reconsideration

PART 571; S208-PRE 161

in light of the changed circumstances. Further,
manufacturers should not be required to comply
with the requirements by September 1, 1982,
since they may be altered substantially.

The agency intends to respond to the substantive
issues raised in the petitions for reconsideration
at a later date. Moreover, the agency is considering
additional changes to the comfort and convenience
requirements which would encourage and ensure
maximum possible technical improvements and
enhancements are included in future seat belt
designs.

The NHTSA has considered the economic and
other impacts of this one-year delay in effective
date and determined that the rule is neither a
major rule within the meaning of Executive
Order 12291 nor a significant rule within the
meaning of the Department of Transportation's
regulatory procedures. A regulatory evaluation
concerning the one-year delay has been placed in
the public docket. This evaluation supplements
the regulatory evaluation which was prepared
when the regulation was issued in January 1981.

The agency has also analyzed the delay for
purposes of the National Environmental Policy

Act and has determined that it will not have a
significant impact on the quality of the human
environment.

No regulatory flexibility analysis has been
prepared on this final rule since the proposal
underlying this final rule and the January 8, 1981
final rule was issued before the effective date of
the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

In consideration of the foregoing, the effective
date of the comfort and convience requirements
of 49 CFR 571.208 that were issued January 8,
1981 (46 F.R. 2064) is hereby delayed from
September 1, 1982 to September 1, 1983.

Issued on February 11, 1982.

Raymond A. Peck, Jr.
Administrator

47 F.R. 7254
February 18, 1982

PART 571; S208-PRE 162

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Occupant Crash Protection

[Docket No. 74-14; Notice 28]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The purpose of this notice is to
amend the fuel loading test conditions of Safety
Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection.
The amendment is in response to a petition for
rulemaking submitted by Mercedes-Benz of
North America. Standard No. 208 currently
specifies that vehicles are to be crash tested with
their maximum capacity of fuel. Several other
NHTSA safety standards only require fuel tanks
to be filled from 90 to 95 percent of capacity. This
amendment makes the fuel loading conditions of
Standard No. 208 consistent with these other
standards. This change will enable manufacturers
to simultaneously determine compliance with
several standards during the same crash tests,
thereby reducing compliance test costs. In
connection with this change, this notice also adds
a definition for "fuel tank capacity" to the
agency's general definition list in 49 CFR Part
571.3.

EFFECTIVE DATE: October 28, 1982.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The fuel
tank loading condition in Safety Standard No.
208, Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208)
differs from that used in several other NHTSA
safety standards. Paragraph SS.l.Ka) of Standard
No. 208 currently specifies that a passenger car is
to be loaded "to its unloaded vehicle weight plus
its rated cargo and luggage capacity weight"
prior to conducting a barrier crash test. The term
"unloaded vehicle weight" is defined in 49 CFR
571.3 as "the weight of a vehicle with maximum

capacity of all fluids necessary for operation of
the vehicle..." Therefore, under the current
test conditions of the standard, fuel tanks are to
be filled to 100 percent capacity. The fuel loading
conditions of Safety Standards Nos. 301, Fuel
System Integrity; 212, Windshield Mounting; and
219, Windshield Zone Intrusion, specify that fuel
tanks are only loaded from 90 to 95 percent of
capacity.

On January 28, 1982, the agency proposed to
amend the loading conditions of Standard No. 208
to make them consistent with those of Standards
Nos. 301, 212 and 219 (47 F.R. 4098). The proposed
amendment was issued in response to a petition
for rulemaking submitted by Mercedes-Benz of
North America, which asked that the fuel loading
conditions of Standard No. 208 be amended to be
consistent with Safety Standard No. 301.
Mercedes pointed out that such an amendment
would serve to harmonize the two standards and
would eliminate the current need for running
separate barrier crash tests for the two
standards. The company stated that tests being
conducted to evaluate occupant crash protection
systems yield data which cannot be used to
evaluate the integrity of fuel systems because of
the variation in fuel tank loading conditions.

Seven parties commented on the proposed
change. All of them were vehicle manufacturers
which supported lowering the fuel loading
conditions of Standard No. 208. All the
manufacturers noted that the proposed change
would standardize test conditions for the
standards employing dynamic crash testing, and
would thereby reduce costs. After reviewing
these comments, the agency has determined that

PART 571; S208-PRE 163

the standard should be amended as proposed.

As noted in the proposal, the agency believes
that filling fuel tanks from 90 to 95 percent
capacity for Standard 208 testing will be
sufficiently representative of the maximum fuel
loading that will occur on the highway. Vehicles
are seldom driven with their fuel tanks filled to
100 percent capacity. Moreover, the difference in
overall vehicle weight because of the 5 to 10
percent less fuel with this amendment should
have no significant effect on the test results of
Standard No. 208. Therefore, the change does not
significantly reduce the stringency of the
standard and realistically maintains the intended
purpose of the loading conditions.

The agency also believes it is important to
facilitate simultaneous testing for various safety
standards, where possible, in order to minimize
testing costs. Since Standard Nos. 301, 212, and
219 only require fuel tanks to be loaded from 90 to
95 percent capacity, the agency has determined
that Standard No. 208 should be amended to be
consistent. In this case, testing costs can be
reduced without jeopardizing safety whatsoever.

In its comment. General Motors Corporation
suggested that the amendment also include a
definition of "fuel tank capacity," so that there
will be no questions concerning the proper
procedure for filling fuel tanks prior to testing.
General Motors' suggestion was prompted by a
discussion in the preamble of the proposal
concerning what constitutes the "capacity" of a

fuel tank. That discussion was included because
the agency had previously received several
questions asking whether the vapor volume of a
fuel tank is included in determining capacity. The
discussion clarified the agency's position that
"capacity" does not include vapor volume.

The agency believes that General Motors'
suggestion has merit. Therefore, a definition for
"fuel tank capacity" is added by this amendment
to 49 CFR 571.3, the agency's general definition
section. The term is defined as the volume of fuel
that can be pumped into a previously unfilled
tank through the filler pipe with the vehicle on a
level surface, but excluding the vapor volume of
the tank and the volume of the tank filler pipe.
The definition is being added to 49 CFR 571.3,
rather than to Standard No. 208, so that it is clear
the same term is applicable to all safety
standards which specify fuel loading in terms of
tank capacity (i.e.. Standards Nos. 301, 212, and
219 as well as Standard No. 208).

The agency has determined that this definition
can be added to 49 CFR 571.3 without notice and
opportunity to comment since it is merely an
interpretive amendment and is therefore within
the exceptions to rulemaking procedures
specified in the Administrative Procedure Act (5
U.S.C. 553 (b) (3) (A)). In fact, the addition of this
definition is merely a codification of previous
NHTSA interpretations.

Issued on October 5, 1982.

Raymond A Peck, Jr.
Administrator
47 F.R. 47839
October 28, 1982

PART 571; S208-PRE 164

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection
[Docket No. 74-14; Notice 30]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The purpose of this notice is to delay
for two years the effective date of the comfort and
convenience requirements for seat belts in Safety
Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection.
These requirements were issued January 8, 1981,
to promote the installation of more comfortable and
convenient belts by specifying additional perfor-
mance requirements for both manual and
automatic belts installed in motor vehicles with a
Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of 10,000
pounds or less. The requirements were originally
scheduled to become effective September 1, 1982,
but in partial response to petitions for reconsidera-
tion, and in light of the agency's rescission of the
automatic restraint requirements of Standeird No.
208, were delayed for one year to September 1,
1983.

The agency has now concluded that a further
delay is necessary because of concerns that have
arisen within the agency regarding the efficacy and
level of stringency of certain of the requirements,
and because of the unsettled state of future plans
for seat belt designs. The two-year delay set forth
in this notice will give the agency sufficient time
to complete its review of performance
characteristics of restraint design that would lead
to enhanced comfort and convenience for users, and
to resolve the many questions that have developed
regarding particular provisions.

ADDRESS: Any petitions for reconsideration
should refer to the docket number and notice
number of this notice and be submitted to: Docket
Section, Room 5109, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590. Docket hours are from 8
a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday through Friday.

DATES: Any petitions for reconsideration of this
rule must be received within 30 days after the date
of publication of this notice. The new effective date
for the seat belt comfort and convenience re-
quirements is September 1, 1985.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On January 8,
1981, Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash
Protection (49 CFR 571.208), was amended to
specify additional performance requirements to
enhance the comfort and convenience of both
manual and automatic safety belts installed in
vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less (46
FR 2064). Type 2 manual belts (combination lap
and shoulder belts) installed in front outboard
seating positions in passenger cars were excepted
from these additional requirements because it was
then assumed that these belts would be phased out
of production in passenger cars as the automatic
restraint requirements of Standard No. 208 became
effective. However, the agency rescinded the
automatic restraint requirements on October 29,
1981 (46 FR 53419). This rescission altered basic
assumptions that had been made when the com-
fort and convenience requirements were first
issued. Likewise, it altered the belt designs which
manufacturers would be installing in future cars.
In partial response to petitions for reconsidera-
tion that were received concerning the comfort and
convenience requirements, the agency delayed the
effective date of the requirements for one year
because of the changed circumstances surrounding
the rescission of the automatic restraint re-
quirements (47 FR 7254). The agency noted that
it was difficult to respond to the substantive issues
raised in the petitions for reconsideration, at that
time, because many of the issues are no longer per-
tinent and because many of the rationales dis-
cussed by the agency when the requirements were

PART 571; S208-PRE 165

first established must be re-evaluated.

During the agency's review of the comfort and
convenience requirements following the one-year
delay, questions arose concerning the efficacy and
appropriate level of stringency of certain of the re-
quirements. It became evident that the agency
needed additional time to re-evaluate the comfort
and convenience requirements in their entirety.
Thus, on November 15, 1982, the agency proposed
an additional two-year delay, to September 1, 1985
(47 FR 51432).

As noted in the proposal, agency experts have
identified concerns about various countervailing
safety consequences that could develop depending
on the final form of the requirements. For exam-
ple, tension-relieving devices on belt systems can
reduce belt pressure and increase comfort, but
there is a concern that the increased belt slack due
to misuse could reduce belt effectiveness. The pro-
posal pointed out that the agency must have time
to complete its evaluation and resolution of these
and other similar conflicting considerations.

Eleven comments were received in response to
the proposed two-year delay, and only one of these
objected to the proposal. The State of Idaho
Transportation Department strongly recommended
against a further delay on the basis that this would
hinder current national and State level education
efforts to encovirage the voluntary use of seat belts.
All of the vehicle manufacturers which commented
vigorously supported the proposed delay, as did the
American Seat Belt Council. Three manufacturers,
however, urged the agency to delay the re-
quirements indefinitely, rather than to September
1, 1985. These manufacturers agreed that the
agency needs additional time to re-evaluate the
comfort and convenience requirements in their en-
tirety, but they are concerned that the two-year
period proposed would then leave no lead time for
manufacturers prior to the effective date. One
manufacturer stated, "A new effective date should
not be specified before the final requirements are
established."

The agency understands the manufacturers' con-
cerns regarding lead time. There were many issues
raised in the petitions for reconsideration to which
the agency has not yet responded (e.g., objectivity
of the requirements, test repeat ability, conflicts
with the requirements of other safety standards).
However, the agency believes that a specific effec-
tive date, September 1, 1985, is preferable to an
indefinite delay since it gives all parties, including

the agency, a time frame within which to work.
The agency will, of course, evaluate whether there
is adequate lead time for manufacturers after all
the issues have been resolved in this rulemaking,
and modify the effective date accordingly if that
is necessary.

In spite of the concerns raised by the Idaho
Department of Transportation, the agency has con-
cluded that a two-year delay in the effective date
of the comfort and convenience requirements is
necessary. As noted in the proposal, the issues in-
volved in this proceeding have been clouded in
uncertainty since the regulation was first adopted.

Safety belt designs are currently in a state of
flux. Therefore, it is not certain exactly what type
of restraints will be on the road in the foreseeable
future. For this reason, the agency has determined
that it would be wise to delay the comfort and con-
venience requirements, to give the agency suffi-
cient time to re-evaluate the requirements in light
of evolving belt systems and avoid imposing
possibly unnecessary costs. For example, one com-
menter to the proposal stated that it had been ex-
perimenting with a particular seat belt design for
neEirly two years and is still uncertain whether the
design will consistently meet the somewhat con-
flicting requirements (in Standard No. 208) for full
belt retraction, 0.7 pound chest force limitation and
the retractive force requirements of Safety Stan-
dard No. 209 (49 CFR 571.209). The agency needs
additional time to evaluate these and other similar
problems.

Finally, as noted in the proposal, the agency
believes that it is impossible at the current time
to determine how to achieve or induce effective im-
provements in the comfort and convenience of belt
systems until the occupant crash protection stan-
dard can be reviewed in its entirety. The two-year
delay will allow the agency time to complete its
evaluation of all the current provisions in terms
of expected applicabilty, effectiveness, overall
safety consequences and appropriate level of detail.

The agency does not believe that this delay will
retard the introduction of new improved belt
systems, in terms of comfort and convenience. One
vehicle manufacturer which commented on the pro-
posal specifically stated that it "plans to proceed
voluntarily with a variety of improvements in seat
belt comfort and convenience for 1984 and future
models regardless of the proposed delay in effec-
tive date." The agency encourages other manufac-
turers to also voluntarily introduce improved com-

PART 571; S208-PRE 166

fort and convenience features in their belt designs
during this interim period in which the agency is
resolving the issues associated with the Standard
No. 208 requirements.

The agency has examined the impacts of this
amendment and determined that it is not major
within the meaning of Executive Order 12291 or
significant according to the Department of
Transportation regulatory policies and procedures.
The agency has prepared a final regulatory evalua-
tion concerning the amendment, which has been
placed in the Docket. (A free copy may be obtained
by contacting the Docket Section.) That evaluation
shows that the safety impact of the proposed delay
will not be significant. The precise magnitude of
the impact cannot be quantified because the agency
has not been able to successfully address in quan-
tified terms the larger question of the effects of the
comfort and convenience requirements. That
adverse impact will be minimized as a result of the
improved seat belt designs that are currently be-
ing introduced by manufacturers on a voluntary
basis, partly in response to the dialogue generated
by the proposal and adoption of the comfort and
convenience requirements. The agency believes
that manufacturers will experiment further dur-
ing the two-year delay with innovative designs

aimed at increasing the comfort and convenience
of belt systems. This effort will at least partially
offset any negative impacts that the delay might
otherwise cause. The proposed delay will provide
slight cost savings for both manufacturers and
consumers.

NHTSA has also considered the impacts of this
amendment under the Regulatory Flexibilty Act.
I hereby certify that amending Standard No. 208
to delay the effective date of the comfort and con-
venience requirements will not have significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities for the reasons just discussed. The only
small entities that would be affected would be
small manufacturers or small organizations or
governmental units that purchase vehicles. The ef-
fect would not be significant since the cost savings
made possible by the delay would be slight.

Issued on May 27, 1983

Diane K. Steed,
Acting Administrator.

48 F.R. 24717

June 2, 1983

PART 571; S208-PRE 167-168

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection;
Automatic Occupant Restraint Requirement

[Docket No. 74-14; Notice 31]

ACTION: Suspension of rule.

SUMMARY: This notice suspends the automatic oc-
cupant restraint requirements of Safety Standard
No. 208. Occupant Crash Protection. This action
permits the agency time for the further review con-
templated by the recent Supreme Court decision
that found NHTSA's rescission of the requirement
to be arbitrary and capricious. This suspension is
issued without a prior opportunity for notice and
comment; the rule might otherwise be deemed ef-
fective on September 1, 1983. However, public com-
ment on the suspension is requested and the
suspension will be revised or revoked, if ap-
propriate, in response to the comments received.

DATES: Suspension— The mandatory automatic
restraint requirement of Standard No. 208 is
suspended until September 1, 1984. This suspen-
sion is effective on September 1, 1983.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On October
29, 1981 (49 FR 53419), the Department of
Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) published a notice re-
scinding the automatic restraint requirements of
Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protec-
tion. (The language of Standard 208 as it was
codified prior to the rescission is contained in Ap-
pendix A to this notice.) On June 1, 1982, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found the
agency's action to be arbitrary and capricious and
overturned the agency's action. (State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Department
of Transportation, 680 F.2d 206.) On August 4,
1982, the Court of Appeals issued an order stay-

ing the effective date of the requirement until
September 1, 1983.

In June 1983, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the scope of review used by the lower court,
but also found the rescission to be arbitrary and
capricious. The Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the
case to that Court with directions to remand it to
NHTSA for further consideration consistent with
the Supreme Court's opinion. (Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. (No. 82-354; June 24,
1983)).

Because the Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, it could be argued
that the rescission of the automatic restraint re-
quirement technically continues in effect pending
the further agency review contemplated by the
Supreme Court. However, if that were not the case,
compliance with the rule could be considered to be
required by September 1, 1983. In order to clarify
this situation, the Department has determined that
it is appropriate to issue this notice suspending the
effect date of the requirement.

The Suprement Court stated that the agency has
sufficient justification to suspend Standard 208
pending any further consideration in accordance
with the Court's decision. The Department believes
that further consideration is necessary and, as part
of our review efforts, it is our intention to issue a
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) by October
15, 1983. We intended to expedite this rulemaking
and reach a final decision as quickly as possible
and well before the end of the one-year suspension.
At that time, we will establish an appropriate ef-
fective date either for the rule that was rescinded.

PART 571; S208-PRE 169

if we decide to retain it, or for any other action that
we take, including re-rescission of the rule.

We believe that it would be inappropriate to re-
quire compliance with the rule during this short
review period. Neither consumers nor manufac-
turers should be required to incur additional ex-
penses to comply with a requirement that is being
actively reviewed.

Moreover, there is substantial evidence showing
that a September 1, 1983, effective date is not prac-
ticable. After the D.C. Circuit entered its of August
4, 1982, reinstating the automatic restraint re-
quirement on September 1, 1983, NHTSA obtain-
ed current information from vehicle and automatic
restraint equipment manufacturers concerning
their ability to comply with a September 1, 1983,
effective date. After reviewing and analyzing the
letters and affidavits submitted by the manufac-
turers, NHTSA concluded, in an October 1, 1982,
submission to the D.C. Circuit Court, that a
September 1, 1983, effective date was not
achievable at that time and that a significantly
longer time period would be needed before prac-
ticable compliance with the automatic restraint re-
quirements could be achieved. Based on that data,
the Department has concluded that it would not
be practicable for vehicle manufacturers to comply
with the September 1, 1983, requirement because
there is not sufficient leadtime for them to make
all the necessary design, development, testing, and
production preparations by that date.

Because it is not practicable for the manufac-
turers to comply by September 1, 1983, the Depart-
ment also has determined that notice and public
procedure on this notice of suspension are imprac-
ticable, unnecessary, and contrary to the public in-
terest. The recency of the Supreme Court decision
and the imminence of the deadline for compliance
with the rule justify this determination. We wish
to stress, however, that we are providing an oppor-
tunity for public comment on this suspension im-
mediately subsequent to its issuance. After review-
ing the public comment that is recieved, the
Department will determine whether this suspen-
sion should be revised or revoked and we will issue
a document stating our final decision.

This suspension may be made effective im-
mediately upon publication in the Federal
Register because it relieves a restriction.

This suspension is a major action within the
meaning of Executive Order 12291 and a signifi-
cant action under the Department's Regulatory
Policies and Procedures. The benefits and costs of

the automatic restraint requirements have been
CEU-efully reviewed in the prior final regulatory im-
pact analysis dated October 1981, which has been
placed in the docket for the automatic restraint
rulemaking. That analysis also provides an assess-
ment of the impact of this suspension. The prior
regulatory impact analysis also discusses the im-
pact of the rescission of the automatic restraint re-
quirements on small businesses and governmental
entities. Based on that prior analysis, I hereby cer-
tify that this suspension will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The Department has also evaluated this
suspension in accordance with the National En-
vironmental Policy Act and has determined that
this action is not a major Federal action signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.
Issued in Washington, D.C. on August 30, 1983.

James H. Burnley, IV,

Acting Secretary of Transportation

Appendix A

The text of S4.1.3 of Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Pro-
tection, (49 CFR Part 571.208) that was rescinded on October
29, 1981 (46 FR 53419) reads as follows:

S4.1.3 Passenger cars manufactured on or after September 1,
1983. Each passenger car manufactured on or after September
1, 1983 shall-

(a) At each front designated seating position meet the frontal
crash protection requirements of S5.1 by means that require
no action by vehicle occupants;

(b) At each rear designated seating position have a Type 1
or Type 2 seat belt assembly that conforms to Standard No. 209
and S7.1 and S7.2; and

(c) Either-

(1) Meet the lateral crash protection requirement of S5.2 and
the roll-over crash protection requirements of S5.3 by means
that require no action by vehicle occupants; or

(2) At each front designated seating position have a Type 1
or Type 2 seat belt assembly that conforms to Standard No. 209
and S7 through 7.3, and meet the requirements of S5.1 with
front test dummies as required by S5.1, restrained by the Type

1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly (or the pelvic portion of any Type

2 seat belt assembly which has a detachable upper torso belt)
in addition to the means that require no action by the vehicle
occupant.

48 F.R. 39908
September 1, 1983

PART 571; S208-PRE 170

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO

FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection

(Docket No. 74-14; Notice No. 36]

ACTION: Final Rule

SUMMARY: This rule requires the installation of
automatic restraints in all new cars beginning with
model year 1990 (September 1, 1989) unless, prior
to that time, State mandatory belt usage laws are
enacted that cover at least two-thirds of the U.S.
population. The requirement would be phased in
by an increasing percentage of production over a
3-year period beginning with model year 1987 (Sep-
tember 1, 1986). To further encourage the instal-
lation of advanced technology, the rule would treat
cars equipped with such technology other than
automatic belts as equivalent to 1.5 vehicles dur-
ing the phase-in.

DATES: The amendments made by this rule to the
text of the Code of Federal Regulations are effec-
tive August 16, 1984.

The principal compliance dates for the rule,
unless two-thirds of the population are cov-
ered by mandatory use laws, are:

September 1, 1986 — for phase-in requirement.

September 1, 1989 — for full implementation

requu-ement.

In addition:

February 1, 1985 — for center seating position
exemption from automatic
restraint provisions.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 171-172

SUMMARY OF THE FINAL RULE

After a thorough review of the issue of auto-
mobile occupant protection, including the long
regulatory history of the matter; the comments on
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and
the Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(SNPRM); the extensive studies, analyses, and
data on the subject; and the court decisions that
have resulted from law suits over the different
rulemaking actions, the Department of Transpor-
tation has reached a final decision that it believes
will offer the best method of fulfilling the objec-
tives and purpose of the governing statute, the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. As
part of this decision, the E>epartment has reached
three basic conclusions:

• Effectively enforced State mandatory seatbelt
use laws (MULs) will provide the greatest safety
benefits most quickly of any of the alternatives,
with almost no additional cost.

• Automatic occupant restraints provide demon-
strable safety benefits, and, unless a sufficient
number of MULs are enacted, they must be re-
quired for the most frequently used seats in pas-
senger automobiles.

• Automatic occupant protection systems that do
not totally rely upon belts, such as airbags or
passive interiors, offer significant additional
potential for preventing fatalities and injuries,
at least in part because the American public is
likely to find them less intrusive; their devel-
opment and availability should be encouraged
through appropriate incentives.

As a result of these conclusions, the Department
has decided to require automatic occupant protec-
tion in all-passenger automobiles based on a
phased-in schedule beginning on September 1,

1986, with full implementation being required by
September 1, 1989, unless, before April 1, 1989,
two-thirds of the population of the United States
are covered by MULs meeting specified condi-
tions. More specificaUy, the rule would require the
following:

• Passenger cars manufactured for sale in the
United States after September 1, 1986, will have
to have automatic occupant restraints based on
the foUowing phase-in schedule:

• Ten percent of all automobiles manufactured
after September 1, 1986.

• Twenty-five percent of all automobiles manu-
factured after September 1, 1987.

• Forty percent of all automobiles manufac-
tured after September 1, 1988.

• One hundred percent of all automobiles manu-
factured after September 1, 1989.

• The requirement for automatic occupant
restraints will be rescinded if MULs meeting
specified conditions are passed by a sufficient
number of States before April 1, 1989 to cover
two-thirds of the population of the United States.

• During the phase-in period, each passenger auto-
mobile that is manufactured with a system that
provides automatic protection to the driver
without automatic belts will be given an extra
credit equal to one-half of an automobile toward
meeting the percentage requirement.

• The front center seat of passenger cars will be
exempt from the requirement for automatic
occupant protection.

• Rear seats are not covered by the requirements
for automatic protection.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 173-174

BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court Decision

On October 23. 1981, the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued an
order pursuant to section 103 of the National Traf-
fic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 15 U.S.C. 1392,
amending Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (4fr CFR
571.208; "FMVSS 208"), by rescinding the provi-
sions that would have required the front seating
positions in all new cars to be equipped with auto-
matic restraints (46 FR 53419; October 29, 1981).

On June 24, 1983, the Supreme Court held that
NHTS A's rescission of the new automatic restraint
requirements was arbitrary and capricious. Motor
Vehicle Manufacturer's Association v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 103 S.Ct. 2856.
The agency had rescinded because it was unable to
find that more than minimal safety benefits would
result from the manufacturers' plans to comply
with the requirement through the installation of
automatic belts. In particular, the Court found the
agency had failed to present an adequate basis and
explanation for rescinding the requirement. The
Court also stated that the agency must either con-
sider the matter further or adhere to or amend the
standard along the lines that its "reasoned anal-
ysis" and explanation supports.

By a five to four vote, the Court held that the i
agency had been too quick in dismissing the bene-
fits of detachable automatic belts. The Court
stated that the agency's explanation of its rescis-
sion was not sufficient to enable the Court to con-
clude that the agency's action was the product of
reasoned decision making. The Court found that
the agency had not taken account of the critical dif-

ference between detachable automatic belts and
current manual belts. "A detached passive belt
does require an affirmative act to reconnect it,
but — unlike a manual seatbelt, the passive belt,
once reattached, will continue to function auto-
matically unless again disconnected."

The Court unanimously found that, even if the
agency was correct that detachable automatic
belts would yield few benefits, that fact alone
would not justify rescission. Instead, it would
justify only a modification of the requirement to
prohibit compliance by means of that type of auto-
matic restraint. The Court also unanimously held
that having concluded that detachable automatic
belts would not result in signficantly increased
usage, NHTSA should have considered requiring
that automatic belts be continuous (i.e., nondetach-
able) instead of detachable, or that FMVSS 208 be
modified to require the installation of airbags.

The 1983 Suspension

On September 1, 1983, the Department sus-
pended the automatic restraint requirement for
1 year to ensure that sufficient time was available
for considering the issues raised by the Supreme
Court's decision (48 FR 39908).

The NPRM

On October 14, 1983, the Department issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) (48 FR
48622) asking for comment on a range of alterna-
tives, including the following:

• Retain the automatic occupant protection re-
quirements of FMVSS 208. Under this alter-
native, the substantive automatic occupant pro-
tection requirement of FMVSS 208 would be

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 175

retained, but a new compliance date would have
to be established. Compliance could be any type of
automatic restraint, including detachable belts.

• Amend the automatic occupant protection re-
quirements of FMVSS 208. Numerous alterna-
tives were proposed. For example, an amendment
could require compliance by airbags only or by
airbags or nondetachable automatic belts only.
Subalternatives included automatic protection
for the full front seat, the outboard seating posi-
tions, or the driver only. An additional alterna-
tive would have required that cars be manufac-
tured with an airbag retrofit capability.

• Rescind the automatic occupant protection
requirements of FMVSS 208. The Department
could again rescind the requirements if its anal-
ysis led it to that conclusion. The Supreme Court
decision does not bar rescission after the Depart-
ment "consider[s] the matter further."

The NPRM also proposed other actions that could
be taken in conjunction with, or as a supplement
to, the above alternatives. They were as follows:

• Conduct a demonstration program. Such a pro-
gram could be along the voluntary lines sug-
gested by Secretary Coleman in 1976 and would
be accompanied by a temporary suspension of
FMVSS 208's automatic occupant protection
requirements. It would be designed to acquaint
the public with the automatic restraint technolo-
gies so as to reduce the possibility of adverse
public reaction and to obtain additional data to
refine effectiveness estimates.

• Seek mandatory State safety belt usage laws.
The Department could seek Federal legislation
that would either establish a seatbelt use re-
quirement or provide incentives for the States
to adopt and enforce such laws. If large numbers
of persons wore existing manual belts, there
would be less need for automatic restraints.

• Seek legislation mandating consumer option.
Under this alternative, the Department would
seek Federal legislation requiring manufac-
turers to provide consumers the option of pur-
chasing any kind of restraint system: airbag,
automatic belt, or manual belt.

Following the issuance of the NPRM, the Depart-
ment held public meetings in Los Angeles, Kansas
City, and Washington, D.C. One hundred fifty-two

people testified at these hearings. The public com-
ment period on the NPRM closed on December 9,
1983. The Department received over 6,000 com-
ments on that NPRM by the close of the comment
period. Since then, the Department has received
an additional 1,800 comments. Some of these com-
ments raised issues or led to the identification of
other alternatives on which the Department
wanted to receive further public comment.

The SNPRM

As a result of the desire for additional public
comment, the Department issued a supplemental
notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) on May 10,
1984 (49 FR 20460).

The SNPRM asked for comment on issues involv-
ing the following areas: the public acceptance of
automatic restraints, the usage rates and the effec-
tiveness of the various restraint systems, the ben-
efits that would be derived from the various alter-
native means of protecting automobile front seat
occupants, including potential insurance premium
savings, and the testing procedures that would be
required for automatic restraints. The SNPRM
also sought comment on four additional proposed
alternatives for occupant crash protection:

• Autom,atic restraints with waiver for manda-
tory use law States. Under this proposal, auto-
matic restraints would be required in all cars
manufactured after a set date, but this require-
ment would be waived for vehicles sold to resi-
dents of a State which had passed a mandatory
safety belt use law (MUD.

• Automatic restraints unless three-fourths of
States pass mandatory use laws. Under this pro-
posal, automatic restraints would be required in
all cars manufactured after a set date, unless
three-fourths of the States had passed manda-
tory use laws before that date.

• Mandatory demonstration program. This alter-
native involves a mandatory demonstration pro-
gram, which was suggested by the Ford Motor
Company. Each automobile manufacturer would
be required to equip an average of 5 percent of
its cars with automatic restraints over a 4-year
period.

• Driver's-side airbags in small cars. Under this
alternative, airbags would be required only for
small cars and only for the driver's position in
those cars.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 176

The comment period on the SNPRM closed on
June 13, 1984. The Department received over 130
comments.

The Statute

Pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended, the De-
partment of Transportation is directed to "reduce
traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons
resulting from traffic accidents." The Act autho-
rizes the Secretary of Transportation to issue
motor vehicle safety standards that "shall be prac-
ticable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle
safety, and shall be stated in objective terms." In
issuing these standards, the secretary is directed
to consider "relevant available motor vehicle
safety data," whether the proposed standard "is
reasonable, practicable and appropriate for the
particular type of motor vehicle ... for which it is
prescribed," and the "extent to which such stan-
dards will contribute to carrying out the purposes"
of the Act.

The Safety Problem
Occupants of front seats in passenger cars ac-
count for almost half of the deaths that occur annu-

ally in motor vehicle accidents (including pedes-
trian fatalities). In recent years (1981-83), an
average of approximately 22,000 persons have
been killed annually in the front seats of passenger
cars; another 300,000 suffered moderate to severe
injuries and more than 2 million had minor injuries.
Approximately 55 percent of these fatalities and
injuries occur in frontal impacts and another 25
percent occur in side impacts. Table 1 shows the
number of fatalities, by seating position, for
1975-1982, while Table 2 shows data for injuries,
by severity and seating position, for 1982, the lat-
est year for which such a breakdown is available.
Table 3 provides estimates of similar data for 1990
to illustrate the impact of any rulemaking. For the
1990 data, it was assumed (for purposes of this
rulemaking analysis only) that manual belt usage
rates would remain the same as current rates.

To fully understand the benefits of various occu-
pant restraint systems, it is helpful to recognize
the frequency with which various front seating
positions are used in cars involved in injury-
producing accidents. As Tables 1 and 2 Ulustrate,
three-fourths of all front seat occupant fatalities
and serious injuries are experienced by drivers
and almost all of the remainder are passengers in

TABLE 1
FRONT SEAT PASSENGER CAR FATALITIES WITH KNOWN SEATING POSITION

Driver

Front Middle

Front Right

Other Front

Total

1975
Percent

16,270
72.2

644
2.9

5,601
24.8

21
0.1

22.536
100

1976
Percent

16.375
72.1

602
2.7

5.714
25.1

24

0.1

22,715
100

1977
Percent

16.967
72.0

677
2.5

5.992
25.4

14
0.1

23,550
100

1978
Percent

18.224
72.7

627
2.5

6,180
24.7

16

0.1

25,047
100

1979
Percent

18.267
73.8

513

2.1

5,968
24.1

6

24.754
100

1980
Percent

17.966
73.3

626
2.2

6,012
24.5

9

24.513
100

1981
Percent

17.722
73.8

460
1.9

5.844
24.3

6

24.032
100

1982
Percent

15.225
73.1

878

1.8

5.202
25.0

16
0.1

20,816
100

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 177

TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF FRONT SEAT PASSENGER CAR OCCUPANT INJURIES BY SEVERITY LEVEL

Injury Severity

Driver

Front Middle

Front Right

Other Front

Total

Minor

1,388,519

29,914

515,786

2,526

1,936,745

Moderate

187,660

6,467

47,417

1,604

243,148

Serious

45,627

289

16,100

0

62,016

Severe

5,592

0

2,411

0

8.003

Critical

3,233

0

728

0

3,961

Percent of

Minor

Injuries

71.7

1.5

26.6

0.2

100.0

Percent of

Moderate

to Critical

Injuries

76.3

2.1

21.0

0.6

100.0

the right outboard seat. Thus, automatic protec-
tion is likely to have three times the level of bene-
fits for drivers as for front seat passengers. Addi-
tionally, not only are occupants of the center seat
rarely involved in fatal or injury-producing
crashes, but their involvement is declining as
shown in the tables. This decline is thought to be
occurring, at least in part, because of the decline in
the number of automobiles manufactured with
bench-style front seats.

TABLE 3

PROJECTIONS OF FATALITIES AND INJURIES

FOR 1990

Front

Front

Driver

Middle

Right

Total

Fatalities

18,050

370

6,140

24,560

Percent

73.5

1.5

25.0

100.0

Moderate to

Critical Injuries

290.000

5.000

75.000

370,000

Percent

78.5

1.5

20.0

100.0

Minor Injuries

2.110,000

40,000

800,000

2,950.000

Percent

71.5

1.5

27.0

100.0

Current Occupant Restraint Technology

Manual belts

Manual belts are safety belts that will provide
protection in a crash in the occupant places the

belt around himself or herself and attaches it.
Manual belts can come in two types: lap belts that
fit around the pelvic region and combined lap and
shoulder belts, which are found in the majority of
all new cars sold today. Manual shoulder belts are
equipped with inertial reels that allow the belt
webbing to play out so that the occupant can reach
forward freely in the occupant compartment under
normal conditions, but lock the belt in place if a
crash occurs. To remind occupants to use their
belts, FMVSS 208 requires the installation of a
brief (4-8 seconds) audible and visible reminder.

Automatic belts

The automatic belt is similar in many respects to
a manual belt but differs in that it is attached at
one end between the seats in a two front seat car
and at the other end to the interior of the door or,
in the case of a belt with a motorized anchorage, to
the door frame. The belt moves out of the way
when the door is opened and automatically moves
into place around the occupant when the door is
closed. Thus, the occupant need take no action to
gain the protective benefits of the automatic belt.

Automatic belts differ significantly in their
design. Some designs consist of a single diagonal
shoulder belt (2-point belt) with a knee bolster
located under the dashboard to prevent the occu-
pant from sliding forward under the belt. Other
designs include both a lap and a shoulder belt
(3-point belt).

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 178

The designs differ also in the features and
devices included to encourage belt use by motor-
ists and at the same time allow for emergency
egress if the car door cannot be opened following a
crash. Several designs are described below.

One design takes advantage of the opportunity
for the manufacturer to include, on a strictly vol-
untary basis, an ignition interlock. The belt in that
design detaches from the door, but must be reat-
tached before the car can be started the next time.
This type of automatic belt (2-point belt with knee
bolster) has been installed in more than 390,000
Volkswagen (VW) Rabbits over an 8-year period
beginning in 1975. It was also installed on a small
number 1978-79 General Motors (GM) Chevettes.
It is still available as an option on Rabbits.

Another design is similar in that the belt de-
taches, but there is no ignition interlock. The belt
may be detached and left that way without affecting
the starting of the car. This was the type of auto-
matic belt that most manufacturers had planned to
use in complying with the automatic restraint
requirement before the agency issued its rescis-
sion order. It was briefly offered by General
Motors as a consumer option on a Cadillac model.

A third type of automatic belt is a continuous
belt that does not detach at either end. Some con-
tinuous belts use a spool release, which plays out
additional webbing length. Sufficient slack is
created by an emergency release lever so that the
motorist can lift the belt out of his or her way and
exit in an emergency. Another type of continuous
belt with a spool release mechanism is the motor-
ized belt. The belt's outer anchorage is not fixed to
the door but runs along a track in the interior side
of the door's window frame. When the door is
opened, the anchorage moves forward along the
track, pulling the belt out of the occupant's way.
When the door is closed, the process is reversed so
that the belt is placed around the seated occupant.
This type of continuous belt, which is a two-point
system with a knee bolster and which contains a
manual lap belt, has been installed in all Toyota
Cressidas for the last several model years and
enhances occupant ingress and egress.

Another type of continuous belt was installed on
a small number of 1980 Chevettes. The belt con-
sisted of a single length of webbing that passed
through a ring near the occupant's inboard hip and
served both as a lap and shoulder belt. The end of
the lap belt that was connected to the lower rear
corner of the door could be detached from door.

However, the end could not be pulled through the
ring. Thus, the effect of detaching the lap belt was
to create an elongated shoulder belt. The extra
slack in the belt system enabled occupants to get
out of their belt in the event of an emergency.

Air bags

Airbags are fabric cushions that are very rap-
idly inflated with gas to cushion the occupant and
prevent him or her from colliding with the vehicle
interior when a crash occurs that is strong enough
to trigger a sensor in the vehicle. (Generally, the
bag will inflate at a barrier equivalent impact
speed of about 12 miles per hour.) After the crash,
the bag quickly deflates to permit steering control
or emergency egress.

In 1973-76, General Motors produced approxi-
mately 11,000 full-sized Chevrolets, Buicks, Olds-
mobiles, and Cadillacs equipped with airbags. Dur-
ing the same period. Ford installed airbags in 831
Mercurys. A small number were installed in
Volvos also. Today, only a single manufacturer,
Mercedes Benz, is offering airbags in the United
States. That company began offering airbag-
equipped cars in the country beginning with the
1984 model year; it has been selling airbag cars
outside the United States since late 1980. Since
then, it has sold approximately 22,000 of those cars
worldwide, with most sales occurring within the
last year or so. GSA has contracted with Ford
Motor Company to build 5,000 cars equipped with
driver's side airbags. Delivery on these cars is
expected to begin in Model Year 1985.

Other Automatic Occupant Protection
Technologies

The automatic occupant protection provisions of
FMVSS 208 do not specify that particular tech-
nologies, such as automatic belts or airbags, be
used to comply with the standard. Rather, the
standard requires a level of safety performance
that can be met by any technology chosen by the
manufacturer. Although safety belts and airbags
are the most widely discussed technologies, the
use of "passive interiors" as a means of compliance
is also generating interest.

Under this approach, improvements are made to
the vehicle structure, steering column, and inte-
rior padding so as to minimize potential occupant
injuries. Thus, a "restraint" system, of any kind, is
unnecessary for occupant protection in frontal
crashes. GM has been actively pursuing "passive
interiors."

PART 571; S 208-PRE 179-180

SUMMARY OF THE PUBLIC COMMENTS

INTRODUCTION

In this section of the preamble we have summa-
rized the public comments on the Department's
October 19, 1983, NPRM and the May 14, 1984,
SNPRM. We have presented the summaries under
headings that generally relate to the headings us-
ed in the subsequent portions of the preamble.
Some of the comments are very generally stated
and may relate to more than one issue. Because of
the large number of public comments, we have pro-
vided a representative sample of the comments
made and the commenters who made them. Subse-
quent portions of the preamble discuss the issues
and alternatives and present the Department's
position and response to the public comments. The
comments are analyzed and responded to in more
detail in the Department's Final Regulatory Im-
pact Analysis (FRIA).

OCCUPANT PROTECTION SYSTEMS

Usage

Vehicle manufacturers generally agreed that
mandating automatic belts would increase usage
initially. However, based on their expectation of
installing detachable automatic belts if required to
install some type of automatic protection, some car
manufacturers generally predicted that use would
fall close to the current levels for manual belts
once the belts were disconnected for the first time.
GM believes this to be true for detachable auto-
matic belts, and for nondetachable automatic belts
as well. Honda also believes that, while there
would be an initial increase in restraint usage if
automatic belts were mandated, long-term usage
of automatic belts might not be higher than cur-
rent usage of manual belts. The key determinants

would be the comfort and convenience of auto-
matic belts. The other manufacturers believed
that automatic belts would probably produce some
small usage increase. Chrysler stated that usage
for automatic belts would be less than 10 per-
centage points higher than current usage for
manual belts. Ford commented that the use of non-
detachable automatic belts would initially be
higher than the usage level for detachable auto-
matic belts, but that over the long term it would
fall to the same level. Ford said further that occa-
sional belt users would use automatic belts more
often than they currently use their manual belts,
but the overall level of usage would not signifi-
cantly rise.

The car manufacturers generally believe that
nondetachable automatic belts would not be prac-
ticable since consumers would object strongly to
them and, therefore, would defeat and possible dis-
able them. The manufacturers concluded that
there would be little or no increase in usage over
manual belt rates.

The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) said that
mechanically compelled use by unwilling occu-
pants would be no more likely to succeed than
legally compelled use by such persons.

On the other hand, the American Seat Belt
Council (ASBC) believes that usage of automatic
belts would be 50 percent, which is roughly half-
way between the current driver usage of 14 per-
cent for manual belts and 80 percent for automatic
belts with ignition interlocks. Professor William
Nordhaus of Yale University believes that use of
automatic belts would increase by 33 percentage
points. John Graham of Harvard University found
that expert opinion varies on the extent to which
automatic belts would increase usage. His survey

PART 571; 8 208 -PRE 181

of seven experts found that detachable automatic
belts would increase usage by 10 percentage
points with an 80 percent confidence interval of 5
to 40 percentage points.

The issue of use inducing features or reminder
mechanisms was raised by several commenters.
ASBC believes that a continuous buzzer could dou-
ble usage, and that buzzers, chimes and lights
would all increase usage over levels that could be
observed in vehicles without such features. VW
stated that a continuous buzzer might be as effec-
tive as an interlock. On the other hand, Ford
stated that while a continuous buzzer would induce
some nonusers to wear their safety belts, driver
irritation and actions to permanently defeat the
system could also be anticipated.

Effectiveness

Manual Belts

The vehicle manufacturers generally stated that
current manual lap and shoulder belts are more
effective (when used) than either automatic belts
or airbags. However, the combination of an airbag
and manual lap and shoulder belts was acknowl-
edged to be the most effective system of all.

The Automobile Importers of America (AIA)
estimated manual belt effectiveness at 50 percent.
Honda expressed the view that, based upon results
of its 35 mile per hour crash testing, manual belts
may be more effective than airbags in terms of
chest acceleration and femur load injury criteria.

Most commenters on the SNPRM believed that
the agency's range of effectiveness estimates for
manual belts is too low. ASBC concluded that the
estimate is too low because the agency estimate of
lives saved from manual belt usage is approx-
imately half the value previously cited by the
agency. Renault argued that manual belt effective-
ness data should not be adjusted to account for the
presumably more cautious driving behavior of belt
users, since belt use may lead some individuals to
drive faster in the belief that they are better pro-
tected. VW provided a procedure for calculating
manual belt effectiveness from NHTSA's Fatal
Accident Reporting System (FARS) data, which
led to a very high effectiveness estimate. Ford con-
cluded that the agency's analysis would support a
higher range of manual belt effectiveness (50-60
percent). Ford also challenged agency conclusions
that manual belts are more effective in preventing
moderate to serious injuries than fatalities and

that manual belts are not likely to be effective in
accidents involving a velocity change of over 35
miles per hour.

Automatic Belts

The manufacturers stated that automatic belts
may be less effective than manual belts. Similarly,
the National Automobile Dealers Association
(NADA) argued that automatic belts may be less
effective than current manual belts if the auto-
matic belt is attached to the door. VW and State
Farm disagreed, saying that automatic belts are as
effective as manual belts.

Volvo argued that nondetachable automatic
belts may be less effective than detachable auto-
matic belts due to a "film spool effect." This effect
may occur in 1-door models, if the amount of web-
bing must be increased to allow entrance of pas-
sengers into the rear seat area.

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
(IIHS) criticized the agency's effectiveness esti-
mates for automatic belts, saying there was no
support for the agency's conclusion that such belts,
compared with manual belts, may increase the
probabUity of occupant ejection. IIHS also sug-
gested that the agency consider data that show
that automatic belts may reduce the probability of
the occurrence of head injuries. VW also chal-
lenged the conclusion that automatic belts could
permit higher rates of occupant ejection. Ford
argued that the agency should use a range instead
of a point estimate for the fatality reduction of
automatic belts. Ford also questioned the agency's
conclusion that 3-point automatic belts should be
as effective as manual belts, due to the lack of data
supporting such a conclusion and the fact that
manual belts can be more securely adjusted than
automatic belts.

Professor William Nordhaus criticized the agen-
cy's adjustment of automatic belt effectiveness
data to account for the lower accident experience
of drivers who had elected to use belts as com-
pared to nonusers of safety belts. The agency had
concluded that as increasing numbers of current
nonusers of manual belts were brought into the
population of automatic belt wearers, the overall
effectiveness of automatic belts would be decreased.
Professor Nordhaus argued that the agency over-
estimated the magnitude of this effect. Professor
Nordhaus also argued that automatic belts need
not be less effective than current manual belts. In
making this argument, he relied on agency crash

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 182

test data and somewhat different data than those
found by the agency to be most probative.

Airbags

Many consumer groups and health organizations
indicated their belief that the reliability and effec-
tiveness of airbags has been researched and tested
to a far greater extent than any other item of vehi-
cle safety equipment, and that the effectiveness of
these devices is "unquestionable."

Allstate stated that airbags are more effective
than belts in protecting against head and facial
injuries. That company stated that while some of
the dummies wearing belts "survive" 35 mph
crashes under the injury test criteria, they sus-
tained head and facial injuries far in excess of
those produced with airbags at comparable
speeds. Allstate noted, also, that belts were not
dynamically tested as automatic restraints would
be. Citing its field experience, Allstate said that
airbags are effective not only in reducing deaths
and injuries in frontal crashes but also in reducing
injuries in side impact crashes. Allstate challenged
the accurancy of the agency's NPRM estimate of
airbag effectiveness, pointing out that that anal-
ysis was based on the use of restraint technology
that is more than 10 years old. Allstate noted that
GM itself had admitted that that technology was
"obsolete." IIHS stated that, based on its analysis,
airbags should be at least 34 percent effective in
reducing fatalities.

Ford argued that the number of airbag cars that
have been produced to date is too small to ade-
quately answer questions about effectiveness.

PLF expressed the view that the agency really
had no evidence that airbags are effective. That
group argued that the agency erred in saying that
the effectiveness of airbags is probably under-
stated in the field data. According to PLF, DOT
cannot know about all of the fatalities that have oc-
curred in accidents involving airbag equipped cars.
The group stated that the Department's estimate
of airbag effectiveness is overstated to the extent
that there are such undetected fatalities. Further,
the group believes that the claim of the agency in
the Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis
(PRIA) that the large size of the cars equipped
with airbags leads to an understating and obscur-
ing of the potential effectiveness of airbags in
smaller size cars is no more reasonable a conclu-
sion than one that the large size of these cars
masks the deficiencies of airbags by offering

greater protection to out-of-position occupants and
allowing longer deployment times for airbags. This
group also asked DOT to provide an updated anal-
ysis of injury data for the fleet of airbag cars.

The National Head Injury Foundation stated
that the airbag offers unique protection against
head injury which even the automatic belt does not.

PLF and V W suggested that the presence of air-
bags might induce drivers to take greater risks
while driving in reliance on the perceived increased
protection. PLF argued that these increased risks
could easily offset any gains in protection available
as a result of the airbags. Professor Orr of Indiana
University raised the same point, arguing that the
"risk compensation" theory is sound but that the
magnitude of its effect was unknown. IIHS submit-
ted a study showing that the implementation of a
safety belt use law in a Canadian province did not
result in any increased risk taking by drivers. The
study looked at the frequency with which certain
risky maneuvers were made before and after the law
was implemented and found no significant differ-
ence. John Graham stated that, based on several
studies he has undertaken, any risk-compensation
effect is significantly lower than the magnitude of
benefits derived from the safety improvements.

Several vehicle manufacturers expressed their
view that an airbag is relatively ineffective by
itself, and should be viewed as a supplement to a
belt system. The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association (MVMA) emphasized its view that air-
bags are effective in frontal crashes only.

In their SNPRM comments, several commenters
addressed the agency's estimated range of effec-
tiveness for airbags. IIHS concluded that the
range is conservative but not unreasonable at the
middle and high ends. They cautioned, however,
that it would be inappropriate to compare the
effectiveness of airbags in relation to safety belts
by using the low end of the airbag effectiveness
range and the middle or high end of the safety belt
range. Mercedes Benz commented that its new
"supplemental restraint system," which employs
an airbag, has worked according to design in all
accident situations in which vehicles equipped
with the system have been involved.

PLF and VW also said that the Department's
effectiveness studies were subjective. PLF argued
that DOT was using precisely the same type of anal-
ysis that GM had offered and NHTSA had rejected
in the 1977 rulemaking on automatic restraints.
That group stated that DOT failed to explain this

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 183

change of view. The PLF also criticized the agency's
studies on airbag effectiveness for failing to take
into account data for all vehicles using airbags, i.e.,
the non-GM Air Cushion Restraint System (ACRS)
cars. Renault expressed the view that airbag effec-
tiveness could not exceed 20 percent, due to the
inability of airbags to provide protection in non-
frontal and ejection accident situations.

Ford argued that notwithstanding the limited
amount of actual field data on airbag cars, those
data cannot be totally dismissed in arriving at an
estimate of airbag effectiveness. Ford also sug-
gests updating field data to include Fatal Accident
Reporting System data through 1983, instead of
only through 1981 as was done in the PRIA. Ford
found two of NHTSA's studies based on the Na-
tional Crash Severity Study (NCSS) data to pro-
vide reasonable estimates of airbag effectiveness
but found the third study to be flawed. Ford
argued that the latter study was restricted to data
from crashes in which airbags would be most likely
to be effective. Ford also challenged a fourth
agency study, on injury reducing effectiveness,
based on field data, since it tended to show airbags
to be most effective in accident situations in which
the airbag is unlikely to deploy. Ford also stated
that there appeared to be no basis for the agency's
effectiveness range for airbags used in conjunction
with safety belts.

Benefits

Several major insurance companies commis-
sioned Professor William Nordhaus of Yale
University to provide an updated economic anal-
ysis of alternative approaches to automatic crash
protection. In response to the NPRM, Professor
Nordhaus concluded that automatic crash protec-
tion would have net economic benefits to the nation
of between $2.7 and $4.1 billion per year, while
rescission would cost the nation $33 billion. Pro-
fessor Nordhaus stated that every year of delay
increases fatalities by approximately 5,000 and
increases moderate to critical injuries by at least
70,000. His analysis also concluded that the impact
of retaining the rule on profits or jobs in the auto-
mobile industry, as well as on the national economy,
would be miniscule. He stated that automatic crash
protection would be cost beneficial even if auto-
matic belts increased restraint usage by only eight
percentage points and even if airbags cost $825.

Many consumer and health organizations ex-
pressed concern that the agency had understated

the benefits that would be associated with auto-
matic restraints through their prevention of
deaths and injuries. HHS noted that the agency
was relying on police reports to calculate the num-
ber of injuries from vehicle accidents. The group
submitted evidence that only 70 percent of injuries
resulting from vehicle accidents and treated in
hospital emergency units were reported to the
police. The evidence was taken from a study com-
paring car accident treatments in northeastern
Ohio emergency rooms with police reports of acci-
dents. To compensate for this underreporting of
vehicle accident related injuries, this group sug-
gested that the agency multiply its projected num-
ber of injuries by 1.4 to give a more accurate indi-
cation of the number of vehicular nonfatal injuries
that could be expected. Such a step would, of
course, increase the benefits associated with auto-
matic restraints. Another group was also con-
cerned that the agency had underestimated the
minimum level of effectiveness of airbags and sub-
mitted an analysis showing that airbags would
have a minimum effectiveness of 35 percent, in-
stead of the 20 percent minimum used by the agency
in the PRIA.

Several of the health organizations commenting
on the proposal emphasized that the agency ought
to reconsider the human costs of the head and
spinal injuries suffered by persons in car acci-
dents. One group submitted data projecting 66,000
head injuries annually as a result of vehicle acci-
dents, with nine percent of those injured persons
either dying in the hospital or discharged to
chronic institutional care. Another 8 percent
would be discharged but subject to follow-up medi-
cal attention. Many of these victims are young peo-
ple who have to readjust to life with these injuries,
which prevent them from performing even simple
tasks they once did for themselves. These impacts
are not readily quantifiable in dollars, according to
these groups, but are just as significant as eco-
nomic impacts for the people with family members
who have suffered serious head and spinal injuries.

VW asked for an explanation of the methodol-
ogy used in calculating Table 3 of the SNPRM,
since the baseline of fatalities if no restrains were
used seems to change with each listed effective-
ness rate. This comment also noted that if manda-
tory usage laws are in effect by 1988, and 70 per-
cent buckle up, the airbags' benefits would not
equal the benefits of the mandatory use laws until
the 21st century.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 184

Professor Nordhaus states that using NHTSA's
effectiveness rates for the various types of
restraint systems shows both automatic belts and
airbags to be highly cost beneficial, and that fur-
ther delays cost the country at least $24 billion
annually. He also stated that the benefits of
mandatory belt use laws are so speculative as to
necessarily remove those options from any serious
consideration.

IIHS stated that DOT's projected airbag usage
rate of 98 percent a fortiori means that airbags are
the most beneficial alternative, because DOT has
consistenly recognized that the benefits of any of
the restraint systems depend almost completely
on the usage rates. IIHS repeated its contention
that belt nonusers constitute such a dispropor-
tionate number of crash-involved occupants that
actual reductions in deaths and injuries will be
noticeably lower than would be projected for that
level of belt use until the usage rate approaches
100 percent.

The insurance companies stated that several
companies now have in effect 30 percent premium
reductions for first and third party bodily injury
liability for cars with automatic restraints. They
contended, however, that the benefits associated
with this rulemaking are not lower insurance pre-
miums. In their view, the benefits are the preven-
tion or reduction in seriousness of thousands of
fatalities and serious injuries annually.

Public Acceptance

State Farm stated that it considered public
acceptability of restraint systems to be a very
important issue. It argued that a regulatory alter-
native could not be rejected on the grounds of
insufficient public acceptability if the benefits of
the alternative would exceed the costs of that
alternative. It argued further that the legislative
history of the Vehicle Safety Act made it clear that
safety was the overriding consideration in imple-
menting the Act. Thus, more weight should be
given to the safety benefits of a contemplated safety
requirement than to the public acceptability of the
devices used to comply with that requirement.

State Farm also said that public reaction has
regulatory significance as a legal and practical
matter only if it is translated into behavior; that is,
if people disable automatic restraints. If not, public
acceptability meets the statutory criteria. Public
opinion surveys over the last decade, including the
1983 GM and IIHS surveys, show public support

for mandatory automatic restraints, "All studies of
usage rates of automatic belts show levels of incre-
mental usage far above break-even levels."

Contradictory evidence was provided on the
attitude of the public toward automatic restraints.
Consumer Alert provided a public opinion poll
showing that fewer than 15 percent of the respond-
ents wanted mandatory automatic restraints. Pub-
lic Citizen submitted a public opinion poll which it
viewed as showing a clear preference for auto-
matic restraints, especially airbags. IIHS cited a
recent public opinion poll indicating that 56 per-
cent of the respondents favored requiring auto-
matic restraints on new cars as standard equip-
ment and 37 percent favored requiring that the
type of restraint be offered as an option. AAA
stated that while consumers may not rush to pur-
chase automatic restraints as options if manual
belts were original equipment, they would accept
automatic restraints as original equipment, par-
ticularly if they could choose between the various
types of automatic restraints. Other groups
argued that the increased protection against facial,
spinal, and head injuries afforded by airbags would
result in consumers choosing airbags as the pre-
ferred automatic restraint, if they are allowed to
make that choice. Most of these groups indicated
that airbags are less intrusive than automatic
belts, and would therefore be more readily accepted
by the public.

The manufacturers said that nondetachable
belts would raise consumer acceptance problems
since they are more coercive than current belts.
This expectation is based in part on the interlock
experience of 1974. NADA said that the expe-
rience with VW Rabbits, Toyota Cressidas, and GM
Chevettes indicates a lack of consumer acceptance
of automatic belt systems and that the GM experi-
ence with airbag cars shows a similar lack of con-
sumer acceptance.

Mercedes, on the other hand, said that its sys-
tem had met with "favorable market acceptance"
in Europe and projected it would be accepted in
the U.S. VW said, contrary to dealer statements,
that it did not believe its automatic belts had been
defeated in the sense of being destroyed but only
that the interlock had been defeated, perhaps by
dealers themselves.

MVMA submitted a memorandum of law with
which GM and VW agreed. Ford and AMC also
agreed, adding comments. MVMA restated the
State Farm argument saying that State Farm

PART 571; 8 208 -PRE 185

believes the Act forbids NHTSA from considering
adverse public reaction to a mandatory automatic
requirement except to the extent that the public
will disable the equipment. MVMA believes the
State Farm position is not consistent with the leg-
islative history of the Act, judicial precent, or prior
positions of DOT. MVMA says that public accepta-
bility is part of the "all relevant factors" considera-
tion under the Act. Two 1974 congressional actions
shed light on what is acceptable: the ignition inter-
lock ban and congressional review of a mandatory
automatic restraint rule (MVMA cites the Senate
debate on the 1974 Federal highway aid bill on the
congressional review issue). MVMA claims Secre-
tary Coleman's decision was made with these fac-
tors in mind. Matters of future probability, as
raised in the Coleman decision, are relevant to an
agency decision even though they cannot be pre-
cisely measured.

GM agreed, adding that public acceptability is
not a narrow issue.

VW also agreed, stating that public acceptabil-
ity is a two-faceted problem: State Farm's concern
over consumers defeating or destroying the re-
straint systems and public popularity are equally
important. Consumer backlash could result from
an expensive or coercive system, such as an igni-
tion interlock. VW claims that airbags have been
oversold; fatalities would continue and DOT's
credibility would be questioned.

Ford agreed, stating that public acceptance in-
volves far broader issues than disabling unwelcome
equipment. Ford asks what percentage of front
seat occupants would defeat automatic restraints
and whether there would be enough benefits to
justify the systems. Ford's best projection is that
manual and automatic usage will be equivalent
over the long run; that is, positive and negative
belt use inducement factors for automatic belts
will balance out to produce usage rates equivalent
to those for active belts. Ford said also that com-
fort, entry and egress, and the defeatability of
automatic belt systems are still unknowns; there-
fore, a field test is needed.

Chrysler said the State Farm position is too nar-
row. There must be widespread public perception
that benefits are worth the price. It predicted that
the automatic restraint requirement would suffer
the same fate as the ignition interlock.

Toyota said the State Farm position is inappro-
priate. The public may press for legislative rescis-
sion of an automatic restraint requirement, even

though the public does not or cannot disable the
system, citing the ignition interlock experience.

BL Technology Ltd. said that public accepta-
bility and usage should be considered together. It
said that the NHTSA definition of public accep-
tance is correct, i.e., "tolerance and use of restraint
system," whether manual or automatic. BL sug-
gests that the U.S. try mandatory seat belt use
laws coupled with effective enforcement.

Renault accepts the State Farm interpretation
but pointed out that a belt is needed with an air-
bag. Renault said that public acceptance and use of
automatic belts will remain limited.

PLF and Consumer Alert said there is no man-
date for an automatic restraint requirement. The
issue of public acceptance is not limited to the sole
question of deactivating mandatory automatic
restraints; it encompasses all factors which may af-
fect dot's implementation of the Vehicle Safety
Act. They said an automatic restraint requirement
could cause the public to forestall buying new cars,
which would delay the introduction of automatic
protection and reduce safety by increasing the age
of the total vehicle population. They also said DOT
should consider risk compensation by those forced
to wear belts or buy bags, citing John Adams' 1982
SAE paper, which PLF claims DOT has ignored.
Experience in other countries is also cited to show
that restrained occupants are less likely to be
involved in fatalities.

IIHS said that earlier evidence submitted by
them and others shows that automatic restraints,
especially airbags, are acceptable.

Allstate supports State Farm on the acceptance
issue. Allstate argues that if public acceptability is
a controlling factor, then we cannot continue with
the present manual seat belt requirements, due to
low usage levels. They said there is no doubt that
airbags have the most public acceptance; auto-
matic belts have greater acceptance than manual
belts. Therefore, DOT should reinstate the pre-
vious automatic restraint standard.

The American Insurance Association supports
the State Farm interpretation. It said DOT should
require automatic restraints because they only re-
quire toleration by the public to be effective. The
standard for public acceptance should be public
acquiescence, not public preference.

The National Association of Independent Insur-
ors (NAII) said the DOT record shows that manda-
tory airbags are acceptable.

NADA said State Farm is correct in suggesting

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 186

that public acceptance should be given a "narrow,
legal interpretation." They argued that there are
four indicia for determining public acceptance,
each with substantial evidence: (l)The public has
expressed opposition to coercive occupant restraint
devices, e.g., the ignition interlock. The record
shows people will disable automatic belts. (2) The
cost indicates that airbags will not be replaced;
therefore, they will be disabled after one use. (3) A
significant number of consumers are unwilling or
unable to purchase new vehicles equipped with
automatic restraint devices. (4) Consumers will
buy vehicles without automatic restraints, such as
vans or pickup trucks, or used cars.

Cost and Leadtime

A number of manufacturers provided cost esti-
mates for automatic restraints. The incremental
consumer costs of adding a full airbag system were
estimated at $838 by GM, $807 by Ford and $800
by Chrysler. Jaguar provided an estimate of $1800.

Breed Corporation submitted an estimate of
$140 for its all-mechanical airbag design, assuming
a volume of one million units. According to Breed,
this estimate has been independently verified by
technical experts familiar with auto industry prac-
tices, procedures and pricing mechanisms. The
estimate does not include necessary vehicle modifi-
cations, such as adding knee bolsters. Romeo
Kojyo provided an estimate of $150 for a driver
airbag retrofit kit, exclusive of installtion and
assuming an annual volume of one million units.
Ralph Rockow, president of Dynamic Science,
stated that airbags could be produced at an incre-
mental consumer price of $185. The Automotive
Occupant Protection Association incorporated the
Rockow estimate in its comment and provided a
detailed breakdown of costs for a $185 full front
passenger system at a production volume of two
million units annually.

The incremental consumer costs of adding auto-
matic belts were estimated at $45 by General
Motors and Richard Lohr, a cost estimating consul-
tant, $115 by Chrysler, $150 by Jaguar and Honda,
and $200 or more by Nissan and Renault. Peugeot
provided an estimate of $350 for a motorized auto-
matic belt system.

Numerous manufacturers provided comments
on required leadtime. In commenting on an auto-
matic belt requirement, GM stated that while
1V« years is adequate for models already designed.

three years are necessary for new designs or non-
detachable automatic belts. Chrysler, Mazda and
Peugeot also stated that 3 years are needed for
automatic belts. Renault said that 24 months were
needed for belts, while AMC said 30 to 36 months.
Nissan provided an estimate of 30 to 42 months
and Ford provided a figure of 4 years. VW said it
could comply immediately for some models but
would need 4 years for all models.

GM's estimate for a airbag requirement was

3 years for large cars and longer for small cars.
Chrysler stated that 4 to 5 years would be needed
to implement a requirement for full front airbags.
AMC stated that 3 to 3V2 years would be neces-
sary for such a requirement, while Ford said

4 years. Renault said 3 years were needed while
Saab claimed 58 months were necessary.

The National Safety Council said the automatic
restraint requirement should be made effective
September 1985, or 1 year thereafter at the latest.
Mr. Lohr, a cost estimator, provided an estimate
for automatic belts of 18 months, while the
Automatic Occupant Protection Association
(AOPA) stated that 18-30 months leadtime would
be sufficient.

Two studies were submitted to the docket that
analyzed the overall economic effects of an auto-
matic restraint requirement. One study was by
Dr. Barbara Richardson, of the University of Mich-
igan, and was sponsored by MVMA. The other
study was by Professor William Nordhaus and was
sponsored by several major insurance companies.

Dr. Richardson concluded that a requirement for
airbags costing between $300 and $800 per car
would have severe detrimental effects on the auto-
motive industry and the economy as a whole.
Dr. Richardson stated that a short-run reduction in
vehicle sales of 2.7 percent to 9.7 percent would
occur, as well as an increase in unemployment of
between 62,000 and 197,000 persons. She also con-
cluded that gross national product (GNP), wages,
disposable income, and personal consumption
would decrease.

Professor Nordhaus concluded that an auto-
matic restraint requirement would have a minimal
effect on the automobile industry and the national
economy as a whole. According to his analysis, an
automatic restraint rule would result in an in-
crease instead of a decrease in jobs in the auto-
mobile and supply industries.

NADA said the dealership operating costs and
costs of automatic repair and service would increase.

PART 571 ; S 208 - PRE 187

Insurance Premium Changes

Numerous insurance industry commenters
stated that implementation of an automatic crash
protection requirement would provide significant
economic benefits in the form of insurance pre-
mium reductions. Some commenters provided spe-
cific estimates of savings. Others argued more gen-
erally that an automatic restraint requirement
would result in cost savings and that those savings
would be reflected in insurance premium reduc-
tions. According to insurance commenters, a num-
ber of insurance companies have for some time
been offering premium discounts for medical pay-
ment coverage for cars equipped with automatic
restraints. Those commenters indicated that some
discounts apply to all types of automatic restraints,
while others are restricted to airbags.

Nationwide stated that installation of airbags in
all automobiles would reduce private first- and
third-party liability premiums by 24.6 percent of
$31 annually per insured car. Using the Nation-
wide data. Professor William Nordhaus, in his
NPRM comments, estimated that owners of cars
equipped with automatic belts would experience
consumer insurance cost savings of $24 per year.
Professor Nordhaus estimated that, for vehicles
equipped with automatic belts, taking into account
consumer cost of the automatic belt, fuel cost and
insurance cost, the total direct financial impact
over the life of the vehicle would be to lower the
cost of operating an automobile by about $60.
According to Professor Nordhaus, this underesti-
mates true total consumer savings as it omits non-
insurance costs, lost wages, medical costs borne by
the consumer and pain and suffering. New York
State Insurance Superintendent Corcoran stated
that, for average New York premiums, an all air-
bag requirement would result in insurance savings
of $66 per year.

State Farm stated that while it does not now
offer a discount to policy holders with automatic
restraint equipped vehicles, the substantial finan-
cial benefits resulting from an automatic restraint
requirement would be reflected in its rates,
although it could not give an quantified estimate of
that reduction. According to State Farm, its con-
sistent policy in making insurance pricing deci-
sions is to base them upon actual observed on-the-
road insurance experience. State Farm also stated
that, while that practice remains its policy, in
other cases it has responded to competitive pres-
sures where discounts have been made available.

and it expects that the same thing would occur in
this instance. Several other companies also empha-
sized that premium reductions would result as
fatalities and injuries are reduced by automatic
restraints. Emphasizing the relationship between
premiums and loss experience. Nationwide noted
that since August 1981, it has lowered auto insur-
ance rates in 19 jurisdictions, despite continuing
inflation. Insurance Superintendent Corcoran stated
that he would mandate reductions in New York to
assure that savings to insurers are reflected in
premium rate changes to the public and assumes
that all other regulators would do the same. Since
his comments were submitted. New York has en-
acted legislation authorizing the superintendent
to require such premium reductions.

Not all commenters were certain that insurance
costs would be reduced. Dr. Barbara Richardson, of
the University of Michigan, stated that estimates of
insurance premium changes resulting from airbags
range from a large decrease over the lifetime of a
vehicle to a net increase in insurance cost. In addi-
tion, one insurance company, the Automobile Club
of Michigan, expressed concern that the PRIA's
estimates of additional insurance costs for airbags,
based on replacement frequencies and costs, were
substantially understated. The Automobile Club
and the General Motors Acceptance Corporation
(GMAC) argued that the agency forgot to include
increases in insurance premiums to reflect the
greater value of cars equipped with airbags.

The commenting insurance companies, including
State Farm, also indicated that insurance premium
reductions would occur in States that enacted
safety belt usage laws, to the extent that real
world experience justified such reductions. The
American Automobile Association (AAA) of Michi-
gan said it would lower personal injury premiums
by 20 percent upon enactment of a seatbelt use
law. Commenters indicated that some companies
now offer an incentive of increased benefits at no
additional cost if manual belts are worn. Com-
menters pointed out difficulties in implementing a
discount program for seatbelt usage, since verifi-
cation of such usage, both generally and in the case
of specific accidents, is not easy to obtain.

In response to the SNPRM, State Farm referred
to the discounts offered for 5 mph bumpers as an
example of the industry's quick reaction to reduce
rates when new safety features are introduced.
Citing the D.C. Circuit's decision in State Farm
V. DOT, State Farm argued that insurance com-

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 188

panies' practices have no significance for the deci-
sion that DOT has to make. It argued that if this
concern were relevant, insurers have already
given premium discounts for automatic restraint
cars. It further argued that the issue of premium
reductions is irrelevant to the conclusion that an
automatic restraint rule will be cost beneficial. It
said this is so "because a proper cost-benefit anal-
ysis weighs the costs and benefits of a standard to
society as a whole. That balance cannot be deter-
mined from an analysis of the insurance effects of a
rule, since there are enormous societal losses that
go uncompensated under any insurance coverage."
Finally, State Farm argued that DOT has a statu-
tory obligation to require implementation of new
technology where necessary to further the Safety
Act and that consideration is different from the ac-
tuarial considerations that determine whether an
insurance company will offer a premium discount.

The American Insurance Association (AIA) said
that the industry has previously addressed the
issue of insurance reductions. AIA pointed out
that many of its members currently offer a 30 per-
cent discount for medical payment and/or no-fault
coverage for automatic restraint equipped vehi-
cles. It referred to Nationwide's estimate of a
potential annual premium savings per insured car
that would equal $31 if all cars had airbags. AIA
also noted that Nationwide and United Services
Automobile Association (USAA) currently provide
incentives for wearing manual belts.

Nationwide criticized the agency for allegedly
ignoring Nationwide's previous testimony on
insurance premium reductions. Nationwide said
that, for the past 10 years, it has provided a 30 per-
cent discount for first-party injury coverages for
cars equipped with airbags. It further noted that,
in its DOT testimony in 1976, it submitted its esti-
mate of premium savings and its methodology for
deriving that estimate. Nationwide updated that
estimate to 1982, and said the potential insurance
saving per policy holder is $31 annually. That esti-
mate is for a full front-seat airbag system; Nation-
wide said that it is currently studying what dis-
count it would give to a driver-side only system. It
expects to offer a 25 percent discount on first-
party medical coverage.

Nationwide also pointed out that, since 1963, it
has offered extra medical insurance coverage, at
no cost, to policyholders wearing their safety
belts; last year it began providing a $10,000 death
benefit and doubled medical payments coverage at

no extra cost to policyholders wearing belts.

Allstate said that since 1974 it has had a 30 per-
cent discount on first-party injury coverages for
airbag-equipped cars. It said that if airbags were
installed in the entire fleet, there would be a 30 per-
cent reduction in all insurance premiums, including
medical payments, no-fault personal injury protec-
tion, death benefits, uninsured motorist coverage
and bodily injury liability protection. Allstate said
it could not provide an estimate of the insurance
cost savings for automatic belts.

NAII pointed to prior testimony by USAA and
Allstate providing details of insurance savings and
observed that Nationwide specifically responded
to the Secretary's questions at the public hearing
concerning savings. NAII provided an attachment
summarizing the prior industry testimony on the
insurance savings issue.

NAII criticized the SNPRM's suggestion that
insurers are not providing incentives for belt use.
It cited Nationwide's policy and Leon Robertson's
study that found that insurance incentives have
not increased belt use. It also cited a 1980 National
Academy of Sciences report done for DOT which
questioned whether insurance incentives would be
effective.

The Kemper Group said it currently offers a dis-
count of up to 30 percent on first-party medical pay-
ment and no-fault auto insurance rates for cars with
automatic belts or airbags. Kemper said that the
cost of replacing an airbag could raise the physical
damage insurance cost, but the increase would be
minimal compared to the costs of the deaths and
injuries that could be avoided with airbags.

Aetna estimated that the reduction in first-
party no-fault, medical payments and uninsured
motorist coverage premiums would be 25 to 30
percent for airbag equipped cars. As the percent-
age of automatic restraint equipped cars increases
in the fleet, Aetna said there could be a similar
reduction in third-party bodUy injury premiums.

Conversely, Mercedes said "no company to our
knowledge has reduced its rates on Mercedes-Benz
Supplementary Restraint System (SRS) equipped
vehicles" and Volkswagen stated that, to their
knowledge, "no major insurance company offers a
discount to owners of automatic restraint equipped
vehicles," despite the fact that VW has been ap-
proached by insurers ostensibly for that purpose.
VW said it has provided information to insurance
companies because it desires to see its customers

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 189

who have purchased automatic belt equipped Rab-
bits rewarded through lower insurance premiums.

Other Issues

Product Liability

The Automotive Service Council of Michigan
raised the issue of the potential liability of inde-
pendent repair shops that would service automatic
restraint equipped vehicles. In addition, individual
new car dealers and NADA raised the issue of
whether the use of automatic restraints will in-
crease a dealer's product liability costs. William C.
TurnbuU, President of NADA, testified that:

The reliability of passive restraint systems,
particularly airbags, has been a matter of
grave concern to dealers and consumers alike.
No mass-produced product can ever be "fail-
safe." Components deteriorate due to passage
of time, usage and climate. There are reports
of inadvertent airbag deployments in the past.
We fear that, with any widespread usage of air-
bags, incidences of inadvertent deployments
and system failure will occur, with perhaps
tragic consequences to vehicle occupants. In
such cases, dealers may be the innocent vic-
tims of product liability lawsuits.

However, Willi Reidelbach of Mercedes-Benz,
which is currently marketing an airbag-equipped
car in Europe and the U.S., testified that he was not
aware of any product liability concerns expressed
by Mercedes dealers about the airbag system.

Several insurers provided comments on the po-
tential of automatic restraints to reduce product
liability claims and the availability and cost of
manufacturer product liability insurance. Mr. Don-
ald Schaffer, Senior Vice President, Secretary, and
General Counsel of Allstate, testified that:

Our product liability people believe that the
airbag equipped cars, if you insure the total
vehicle, will produce better experience than
the non-airbag cars because the airbag relia-
bility factors are much higher than anything
on the car. They are much higher than the
brake failure rates or anything else.

Mr. Schaffer also testified that at the time of
Secretary Coleman's proposed demonstration pro-
gram, Allstate was Ford's product liability insurer
and had informed Ford that there would be no in-
crease in its product liability insurance costs if

Ford built an airbag fleet. He also testified that
Allstate entered into a written agreement with
General Motors that "we would write all of their
product liability insurance for cars in the Coleman
demonstration fleet at the same price they were
getting from their regular product liability insurer
per unit for non-airbag cars of the same make and
model year."

NAII also addressed the product liabUity con-
cerns raised by manufacturers and dealers. NAII
said that:

The potential for product liability suits is
always present for any manufacturer or seller
of consumer goods. That threat is present at
the current time for anyone in the distribu-
tion chain. We in the insurance industry ex-
pect that savings (not increased costs) would
accrue to manufacturers and dealers, as a
result of automatic crash protection systems
being installed in all cars, as lives are saved
and injuries are reduced, thus reducing poten-
tial litigation over safety deficiencies.

Another potential source of manufacturer liabil-
ity was raised by Stephen Teret, representing the
National Association for Public Health Policy.
Teret argued that:

If a reasonable means of protection is being
denied to the motoring public, that denial
should lead to liability, even if the liability can
be imposed on each and every car manufac-
turer. People whose crash injury would have
been averted had the car been equipped with
an airbag can sue the manufacturer to recover
the dollar value of that injury.

Sodium Azide

The Institute of Scrap Iron and Steel (ISIS) and
the Automotive Dismantlers and Recyclers Asso-
ciation (ADRA) said that they were concerned
about potential health hazards posed to their
employees by sodium azide contained in airbag
systems. Both ISIS and ADRA noted that sodium
azide is toxic and a mutagent and that there is a
general correlation between mutagenicity and car-
cinogenicity. In addition, they raised the issue of
possible air canister explosions during the recycl-
ing and scrapping process.

To reduce potential hazards they recommended
a number of actions:

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 190

1) Place a warning on the vehicles with airbags
so their employees can easily identify them.

2) Design airbag systems so that they can be
deployed by remote control or so that they
can be easily removed from a vehicle.

3) Provide financial incentives, such as a
bounty or fee, for removing the airbag canister.

Breed System

The Breed Corporation estimates the cost to the
consumer of a Breed airbag system for the driver
and one passenger to be $140 installed, based on an
initial production rate of 1 million units annu-
ally. Breed states that its cost estimates have been
independently verified by technical experts famil-
iar with auto industry practices, procedures and
pricing mechanisms. Breed says that the system
still requires a "good" year of research before it
can be put into production.

Ford and GM expressed doubts about the readi-
ness and performance of the Breed System.

Breed urged DOT to require car makers to design
airbag cavities in steering wheels and dashboards
to facilitate the retrofitting of cars with airbags.

Automatic Belt Detachability

Virtually all commenters who addressed the
issue of detachability expressed concerns that non-
detachable belts should not be required. The vehi-
cle manufacturers generally agreed that the pub-
lic, especially the hard core belt nonusers, would
react adversely to nondetachable automatic belts.
They also doubted that the difference in the long
run usage rates for detachable belts and for non-
detachable belts would be significant.

GM suggested that its experience with the 1980
Chevette shows that the public will not accept non-
detachable belts. According to GM, general annoy-
ance and fear of entrapment will lead many hard
core nonusers to defeat that type of belt. As to
detachable automatic belts, GM says that the iner-
tia effect cited in the State Farm decision can be
expected to operate only until the belts are first
detached. While there would be an initial increase
in usage, in the long run neither detachable nor non-
detachable automatic belts would yield any increase
in usage. Ford agreed that fear of entrapment
would produce some adverse reaction to nondetach-
able automatic belts. Ford stated that detachable
automatic belts would produce some undefinable
amount of usage increase. While nondetachable

belts would produce higher increases in the short
run, in the long run the usage rate for nondetach-
able belts would fall to the level of the usage of
detachable belts. Honda commented that nonde-
tachable belts would not be accepted by the public
because of entry and exit problems, entrapment
fears and poor appearance. Nissan anticipated no
difference in the long-run usage rates of detachable
and nondetachable belts. VW said that the high
usage rate of their automatic belt is due largely to
the interlock. Without the interlock, VW said, the
usage rate would be between that for manual belts
and the current VW Rabbit automatic belt system.
VW suggested also that it was important in design-
ing an automatic belt to locate the release mech-
anism near the window so that persons assisting
an injured occupant could release the belt. ASBC
predicted that 10 to 20 percent of car occupants are
hard-core nonusers who will cut out nondetachable
belts. The Council said that, in the long run, usage
of detachable belts would fall between current
manual belt usage rates and the rates for auto-
matic belts in cars on the road today, i.e., usage
would be about 50 percent. IIHS submitted a sur-
vey indicating that 68 percent would never detach
a detachable belt, 21 percent would occasionally
and 8 percent would do so permanently. John
Graham stated that his survey of experts indi-
cated that detachable automatic belts would in-
crease usage by 10 percentage points and that
55 percent of motorists would dismantle non-
detachable belts.

Alternatives

Retain

Most of the manufacturers indicated that they
would comply by installing detachable automatic
belts, since those belts would facilitate emergency
escape from a vehicle after a crash and would face
the least consumer resistance due to their lower
price (compared to airbags) and the fact that they
can be detached by occupants who do not choose to
use safety belts for whatever reason.

Several insurance companies argued that the
agency is required by law, based on the record, to
implement some form of an automatic restraint
requirement. According to State Farm, the effect
of the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm is
to require the Department to go forward with an
automatic restraint requirement unless it has a ra-
tional basis for concluding that effective automatic

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 191

restraint technology is not within reach of the car
manufacturers. That company argued that the
record amply demonstrates the existence of such
technology.

Allstate argued that the record demonstrates
that cost beneficial technology exists which, when
included in all new cars, could save up to 10,000
lives each year and prevent more than 100,000
serious injuries annually. Allstate also argued
that under the decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme
Court in the State Farm case, the Department
lacks authority to look beyond that fact. That com-
pany stated that in its view, all proposed options
that do not include the implementation of some
form of automatic restraint requirement must,
under the law, be rejected.

Similarly, NAII urged that the case for automatic
protection has been fully documented. According
to NAII, further delays for studies, demonstra-
tions and so on are totally unwarranted and would
only result in many more needless deaths and in-
juries. Such delays would also be inconsistent with
the mandate of the Supreme Court.

Almost all commenting insurance companies
favored implementation of the automatic restraint
requirement as soon as possible. These com-
menters generally argued that the requirement is
cost beneficial and would save many thousands of
lives and prevent tens of thousands of injuries
annually. Several insurance companies stated that
airbags offer the greatest possible safety benefits.
However, the insurance companies generally urged
that such issues as requiring compliance by means
of airbags only or barring compliance with detach-
able automatic belts should be considered only
after a general automatic restraint requirement
has been implemented. Allstate stated that the
airbag-only requirement is preferable, but said
that simple retention of the automatic restraint
requirement is acceptable.

IIHS supported retention, noting, as did various
commenters associated with medical and health
organizations, that public health measures depend-
ing for their success upon repeated cooperation of
the intended individual beneficiaries, as would
mandatory belt-use laws, have historically had lim-
ited effectiveness.

Insurance Superintendent Corcoran of New
York State maintained that it has been clearly
established that, for whatever reasons, people do
not generally use their manual belts, and efforts to

modify this behavior have been unsuccessful for
the past 15 years. He believed that it is incum-
bent on DOT to mandate automatic restraints as
the only means for increasing usage.

The manufacturers said that if automatic belts
are less effective than manual belts, then persons
who regularly use manual belts would end up pay-
ing more in the future for an inferior restraint sys-
tem, raising fairness questions. Most of the com-
panies indicated that, if the automatic restraint
requirement were retained, they would use de-
tachable automatic belts to comply, since those
systems facilitate emergency escape from a vehi-
cle after a crash and would face the least consumer
resistance due to their lower price (compared to
airbags) and the fact that they can be detached by
occupants who do not choose to use safety belts for
whatever reason. However, if such belts were left
detached by most occupants, little safety benefit
would be gained through their installation.

PLF and Consumer Alert and vehicle manufac-
turers argued that DOT should concentrate on
educating the public about the value of manual
belts in providing protection in the event of a
crash. Once the public is convinced of the need to
buckle up, fatalities and injuries will decline with-
out having to mandate expensive new equipment
in cars.

GM argued that implementation of the auto-
matic restraint requirement would divert engi-
neering resources away from the development of
more publicly acceptable alternatives, such as the
"built-in" safety of energy absorbing interiors.
Increasing safety through the redesign of vehicle
interiors instead of the installation of add-on
devices like occupant restraints would benefit
unbelted as well as belted occupants at a cost far
below that of airbags.

Amend

Airbag Only

Several health organizations argued that the
agency should mandate airbags because that type
of automatic restraint is the least intrusive for the
occupant and because young drivers were the least
likely to buckle manual belts and the most likely to
try to defeat automatic belts. The Center for Auto
Safety (CFAS) argued that small car occupants
need the protection of airbags. The organization
suggested that belts properly fit less than 50 per-
cent of the population.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 192

Many consumer groups and health organizations
supported agency action that would mandate the
installation of airbags in at least some new cars. To
avoid the Congressional intervention that they
thought might follow adoption of a requirement for
nondetachable automatic belts, some consumer
groups and health organizations urged adoption of
either a requirement for airbags only or a require-
ment for airbags or nondetachable automatic belts.

The manufacturers objected to an airbag-only
requirement for several reasons. First, it was
stated that an airbag is effective only in single
impact, frontal crashes, and does not protect
against occupant ejection from vehicles. The
manufacturers view airbags as supplemental pro-
tection devices, to be used in conjunction with
safety belts. The manufacturers also expressed
concern as to the real world reliability of airbags,
the difficulties in applying airbag technology to
small cars, the effects of airbag inflation on out-of-
position occupants (particularly small children),
the potential adverse environmental impacts of
using sodium azide as a propellant to inflate the
airbag, and product liability impacts. The eco-
nomic effects of an airbag only requirement were a
major concern of the manufacturers. The addi-
tional cost of that restraint system was projected
to raise vehicle prices significantly, adversely
affecting industry sales and thereby employment
and profitability.

Some commenters, including MVMA, argued
that adopting an automatic restraint requirement
that specified the installation of a specific type of
restraint, i.e., airbags, would violate the require-
ment of the Safety Act that safety standards be
stated in terms of performance instead of design.

Congressman Dingell questioned the legal author-
ity for an airbag-only requirement in light of
Ckadha, which declared the legislative veto to be
unconstitutional. The Congressman suggested that
if the legislative veto provision were invalid, then
because of the absence of any severability provision
and because of the importance attached by Con-
gress to the veto provision, the exception to the
prohibition in the Vehicle Safety Act against non-
belt standards must fall with the veto provision.

One public interest group (PLF) and one econ-
omist. Professor LLoyd Orr, argued that airbags
would encourage motorists to drive less safely
since they would be given more safety than they
desire and would compensate accordingly. Their
argument is based on the "risk compensation hypo-

thesis," which states, for example, that given bet-
ter brakes, a driver is likely to follow more closely,
negating some of the benefits associated with the
safer braking system. The IIHS and John Graham,
another economist, presented data which contra-
dicted the above hypothesis. Those data concern
the behavior of drivers in Newfoundland which
indicate that safety belt users were not any more
likely than nonusers to make risky driving maneu-
vers. John Graham referred to papers he had
authored, criticizing the concept of "risk compen-
sation hypothesis."

Airbags and Nondetachable Automatic
Seatbelts

Some consumer groups and health organizations
argued that permitting readily detachable auto-
matic belts would only encourage those consumers
not already in the habit of wearing belts to detach
the belts and would result in a minimal increase in
protection for car occupants. These groups urged
therefore that the agency mandate that automatic
belts not be easily detachable.

Some consumer groups and health organizations
argued that automatic belts should be detachable
to allow ready escape in emergency situations and
to permit those confirmed nonusers of seatbelts
(estimated by these groups at 10 to 20 percent of
the population) to deactivate the belts for them-
selves by something other than permanent means,
such as cutting the belts. These groups argued
that nondetachable automatic belts would lead to
Congressional action overturning the entire auto-
matic restraint standard just as Congress had
overturned the ignition interlock requirement in
1974. The car manufacturers opposed this option
because it would limit their flexibility by requiring
the installation of the most expensive and/or con-
troversial types of automatic restraints. Manufac-
turers also argued that, given a choice, they would
not produce nondetachable automatic belts because
of anticipated adverse consumer reaction and diffi-
culty in emergency egress with such systems.

Passive Interiors

GM stated that, since the original issuance of
FMVSS 208, there have been significant ad-
vances in the state of the art of occupant protec-
tion. These advances have been made available in
large part because of the increased use of advanced
computer technology in the design and develop-
ment of new vehicles. GM has implemented a Vehi-

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 193

cle Safety Improvement Program which is aimed
at increasing the "built-in" safety of its vehicles for
restrained and unrestrained occupants.

GM said that the purpose of the "built-in" safety
strategy is to maximize the reduction in total harm
resulting from vehicle crashes. It argued that "no
promising technology should be excluded simply
because it either cannot meet arbitrary laboratory
requirement or can only meet them on selected
types of vehicles. Nor should new and promising
technologies be discouraged because they are not
envisioned in a regulatory scheme." GM urged
that implementation of FMVSS 208 would "impede,
or at lesat greatly dilute the effects that are needed
to increase the state-of-the-art of other promising
occupant protection technology."

In its comments on the SNPRM, GM suggested
that DOT consider a more flexible approach to
reducing deaths and injuries. They propose a
three-step approach consisting of:

1) Retain the current requirements of FMVSS
208, but give manufacturers the option of
meeting it with manual belts;

2) If a manufacturer chooses to comply with
Standard 208 using manual belts, test the vehi-
cle as follows:

(a) fastened manual belts must satisfy the
same dynamic criteria as airbags or auto-
matic belts, and

(b) the vehicle would be subjected to a 25
mph barrier crash with unfastened manual
belts. The same injury criteria would be
used to evaluate acceptable performance in
this test as is used in the 30 mph test
above; and

3) Approve various changes in the Standard
208 test procedures, most notably using the
Hybrid III dummy, instead of the Hybrid II.

GM stated that this option would offer protec-
tion to all unbelted front seat occupants, not just
the 5 percent of current non-users who would use
automatic belts. GM estimated that this step
would yield a 12 percent reduction in fatalities and
serious injuries, which is equivalent to attaining 36
percent manual belt usage.

Small Cars

Several car manufacturers expressed concern
about the difficulty of applying airbag technology

to small cars. The shorter "crush space" between
the fronts of small cars and the passenger com-
partments of those cars means that small cars
decelerate faster in a frontal crash, leaving less
time for an airbag system to sense the crash and
inflate the airbag. The limited time means that the
airbags must inflate more rapidly than in a large
car, raising concerns as to airbag induced injuries,
particularly to out-of-position occupants. GM
expressed the view that the faster airbag inflation
rate needed for small cars, in conjunction with the
thicker airbag needed to decelerate the faster
moving occupant of a small car, could cause fatal
lesions in out-of-position occupants.

Honda expressed the view that airbags provide
inferior protection as compared to manual belts in
small cars at crash speeds above 30 miles per hour.
Attempts to improve airbag performance in small
cars through the use of a knee bolster were not
particularly successful, since the resulting limited
available space in such cars made entry inconve-
nient and the weight of the knee bar adversely
affected fuel economy.

IIHS noted that two studies compared the effec-
tiveness of airbags and manual lap/shoulder belts
in small cars. One study, using Ford Pintos, showed
that airbags performed slightly better than belts.
The other study, using Renault R-12's, showed that
the two types of restraints performed approxi-
mately the same, according to IIHS.

GM agreed that small cars needed the highest
priority, but argued that the rapid inflation rate
required to meet a 30 mph test poses an unaccept-
able risk to out-of-position occupants.

State Farm said that the analysis by Professor
William Nordhaus of Yale University showed that
it is significantly more cost beneficial to require
installation of automatic restraints in both out-
board seating positions and to require automatic
protection for all size cars.

NADA restated its general opposition to any
mandated automatic restraint and said that it was
specifically opposed to a driver airbag-only option
for small cars. NADA said that such a standard
would be a design standard in violation of the Vehi-
cle Safety Act and current airbag technology is not
adequate for small cars.

Ford estimated that the cost of a driver-side air-
bag system would be about $600, which represents
a large cost increase for vehicles at the lower end
of the price range. Ford also questions the effec-
tiveness of airbags in any size vehicle, the public

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 194

acceptability of airbags, and the authority of the
agency to issue an airbag-only standard.

VW also opposed driver-side airbags for small
cars, saying that the technology is not proven for
those vehicles and the Department should set per-
formance and not design standards.

AMC supported the concept of requiring driver-
side-only automatic restraints. AMC, however,
said that airbags should not only be required on
small cars since it "was not aware of any technical
information that suggests that restraint require-
ments are fundamentally variable as a function of
car size."

Nissan argued that requiring airbags for small
cars is unfair to purchasers of those cars "because
people buy small cars for economic reasons and the
small car buyer should not be singled out to pay for
expensive devices." Nissan also argued that if
drivers assume that the airbag provides sufficient
protection, then they might stop wearing their
manual belts which are needed for protection in
rollover and other accidents.

Toyota restated its general opposition to man-
dated automatic restraints and its specific opposi-
tion to a design (airbag) standard rather than a per-
formance standard. It further argued that airbag
technology has not been developed for small cars.

Allstate said that automatic protection should
not be limited to small cars, but should be available
on all cars.

The American Safety Belt Council (ASBC) said
that a lap belt should also be required for a driver-
only airbag. It recommended that for the right
front passenger position, an automatic belt should
be required.

Honda said that more development time is needed
and that the added cost of airbags will substantially
increase the cost of small cars.

Renault said airbag technology for small cars has
not advanced far enough. It recommended waiting
for the results of the Breed research program.

Jack Martens recommended that all cars with a
wheelbase of less than 101 inches be equipped with
airbags and with either manual or automatic belts
for all front seat positions. Cars greater than 101
inches would be equipped with either nondetach-
able automatic lap and shoulder belts or airbags.

Public Citizen argued that if drivers of small
cars can readily be protected then it is even more
unreasonable not to protect the passenger in small
cars and drivers and passengers in all cars.

IIHS supported mandating driver-side airbags
in all cars, if it would lead to full front airbags.

Center Seating Position

Ford suggested that six-seat cars would prob-
ably no longer be produced if the center front seat-
ing position were required to be equipped with an
automatic restraint. There is no known practical
design for an automatic belt system that could be
used for a three-position front seat. Hence, the
only known automatic restraint system that could
be used for the center position would be an airbag.
Citing its concern about the hazards it believes
would be posed by airbags to an out-of-position
occupant, Ford indicated that it would probably
choose to eliminate the front center seating posi-
tion. The American Automobile Association (AAA),
Chrysler, AMC and Consumers Union agreed that
the center position should be excluded, noting that
the agency's 1982 data show that 98.1 percent of
front seat fatalities occur to persons sitting either
in the driver's seat or in the passenger's seat next
to the right door.

One commenter strongly urged that the front
center seating position not be excluded from the
automatic protection requirements since young chil-
dren are the most frequent occupants of this posi-
tion and thus would be the ones who would suffer
the most from the absence of automatic protection.

Rescind

Those commenters who favored rescission op-
posed adoption of the other alternatives and vice-
versa. Since this section of the preamble discusses
each alternative separately, the views of com-
menters who favored one alternative are not nec-
essarily included as negative comments to the
other alternatives.

Generally, rescission was favored by all auto-
mobile manufacturers and by all new car dealers.
Insurance companies and health associations all
favored some form of retention and thus opposed
the rescission alternative.

Most of the individual commenters opposed
automatic restraints, especially airbags, on the
basis of excessive government interference, high
cost, and fear about the failure of airbags to oper-
ate properly. A very substantial number of these
commenters were GM stockholders or employees.

Automobile manufacturers favored the stan-
dard's rescission on several grounds; that it was not
as effective or cost-effective as mandatory belt use

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 195

laws, that it unnecessarily would add to vehicle
costs without commensurate benefits and that the
technologies available for compliance would be re-
jected by the public as being too costly or intrusive.

For instance, Ford said that it could not support
mandatory passive restraints by either amending
or reinstating FMVSS 208 because of serious ques-
tions on restraint effectiveness and consumer
acceptance.

GM said that detachable automatic belts are un-
likely to increase belt usage and nondetachable
belts would be rejected by the public. Because of
technical concerns regarding airbags, particularly
for out-of-position occupants in small cars, and
because reinstatement would divert engineering
resources from the development of passive inte-
riors, GM believes the automatic occupant protec-
tion requirements should be rescinded.

The AutomobUe Importers of America (AIA)
favored the adoption of mandatory use laws and
said that questions of consumer acceptance, par-
ticularly regarding airbag technology and con-
sumers' fear of entrapment, still need to addressed.

BMW said that the passive restraint issue
should be "decided in the free market" and not by
regulation.

One airbag supplier. Breed, recommended that
the agency retain the current manufacturer option
of installing either manual or automatic restraints.
The commenter believed that this approach would
impose minimal costs on the car manufacturers.
After this supplier's airbag has been proven in
more field tests, it believed that many car manu-
facturers would elect to provide airbags as readily
available options.

The automobile dealers urged rescission because
they thought that car purchasers are unlikely to
accept automatic restraints. NADA cited the VW
and Toyota experience with automatic belts and
GM's experience with automatic belts and airbags
as support for this contention. NADA also said
automatic restraints would have an adverse im-
pact on sales.

Most insurance companies and most consumer,
medical and safety organizations opposed rescis-
sion or suspension, whether taken as a single action
or in conjunction with a demonstration program or
seeking legislation to mandate a consumer option,
but organizations such as the Pacific Legal Foun-
dation favored rescission. The PLF argued that
the data did not support the Department's analysis
of the effectiveness of automatic restraints.

State Farm said that a decision to rescind would
be arbitrary and capricious. They referenced Pro-
fessor Nordhaus' study as showing that rescission
would impose enormous net costs on society. Nord-
haus said that, for every year during which no
automatic protection is required, it will cost soci-
ety $2 to 2.5 billion. The American Association for
Automotive Medicine said that "from a public
health perspective, maximum protection requiring
no action by the occupant is obviously preferable
and desirable."

Congressman John Dingell argued that as long as
the Department applied a reasoned analysis, rescis-
sion is possible and the best course to follow. Con-
gressman Timothy Wirth contended that the stat-
ute requires that DOT move forward as promptly
and expeditiously as possible to the implementa-
tion of meaningful automatic crash protection.

Joan Claybrook, of Public Citizen, said that
there is more information on the benefits of auto-
matic restraints than on any standard ever issued
by NHTSA. Consumers Union "strongly" urged
DOT "to promulgate promptly" FMVSS 208.

Demonstration Program

Ford argued that the effectiveness of automatic
restraints could be determined only after a large-
scale demonstration program is conducted. It pro-
posed a program for the installtion of automatic
restraints in 5 percent of the new car fleet over a
4-year period. The comments of several other
manufacturers suggested that they would not op-
pose a demonstration program.

Ford said that the SNPRM misstated its pro-
posed demonstration program requirement as at
least 5 percent of each manufacturer's annual pro-
duction for four years. Ford corrects this to mean
an average of 5 percent of annual production
manufactured for sale in the U.S. over a period of
4 years. Ford continues to believe that its proposal
is the most effective means to resolve the stale-
mate on how best to improve occupant protection.

In response to the SNPRM, AMC said that a
demonstration/test program similar to Ford's pro-
posal is absolutely necessary prior to any effective
date for requirement of automatic restraints. In
the interim, the automatic restraint requirements
should be suspended and a rule drafted so that
rescission would occur if the findings of the test
program were negative. AMC supports a demon-
stration program, but it does not feel that a manda-
tory program should necessarily be imposed on all

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 196

low-volume car manufacturers. In some cases, the
minimum added information to be gained would be
more than overshadowed by excessive resultant
cost. A five percent program for a 2- to 4-year
test period would be acceptable, utilizing various
automatic restraint systems for the driver only.
AMC could launch such a program between early
1987 and fall 1987.

VW endorses a demonstration program and pro-
poses an alternative plan, which would give credit
to manufacturers that have already produced
large numbers of automatic restraint cars. VW
also said that any demonstration program should
permit automatic belts to continue to be per-
mitted. VW said that DOT should take into account
the fact that costs will be higher for smaller manu-
facturers and that DOT has proposed no mechan-
ism to "guarantee" that the public will buy auto-
matic restraints.

Chrysler prefers mandatory seat belt use laws.
If there is a demonstration program, companies
would need adequate time to evaluate test results
regarding airbag performance and public accepta-
bility. Chrysler will cooperate in such a program,
with up to 5 percent of its production for FY 1987
and 1988, provided that it applies to all domestic
and foreign manufacturers. Chrysler believes there
should be an automatic restraint for the driver
only and that the program should only require a
manufacturer's "best effort" to sell 5 percent of
its total production, all on one car line, with appro-
priate pricing to validate public acceptance.

Volvo said the idea has some merit, but any air-
bag system should be for the driver only. The five
percent figure should apply to total vehicle sales,
not to a percentage of each car line.

Renault said that the program would produce
concrete evidence in an uncertain area and that it
should apply to foreign manufacturers selling
more than one million vehicles per year in the U.S.

Honda said the program should be voluntary
and include ways to encourage use of manual belts.
Honda believes there are R&D problems that must
be solved prior to an automatic restraint mandate.
Honda opposes the requirement of two kinds of tool-
ing on production lines and views the 5 percent
requirement as unreasonable, regardless of demand.

Lotus said that since it imports only 300 cars into
the U.S., at 5 percent, there would be 15 Lotus
autos involved. It suggests an exemption for manu-
facturers selling less than 10,000 cars per year in
the U.S. It points out this this is the small manufac-

turer definition used by EPA, and that DOT has
overlooked the impact of this proposal on small
entities, including manufacturers and dealers.

BMW would not be adverse to the program, if
the manufacturer has a choice of driver-only sys-
tems, a choice of restraint type and vehicle models,
and the initiation of the program was not earlier
than September 1986.

Mazda suggested that DOT limit the program to
high-volume production vehicles and to models
produced in volumes exceeding 200,000 units per
year. This will permit recovery of investment and
development costs.

Peugot said that the demonstration program is
the best approach. Peugeot believes that conclu-
sions can be drawn 4 years after implementa-
tion and that the program must take into account
both manual and automatic restraints. The only
disadvantages of the demonstration program are
economic, but this can be alleviated by letting the
manufacturer choose 5 percent of each model, or 5
percent of one model.

The American Seat Belt Council said that the
program should be used only for airbags to deter-
mine market suitability. Any automatic belt sys-
tem should be permitted to be detachable.

The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) said that if
DOT is to proceed with the automatic occupant
protection issue, it should use the demonstration
program to acquire a data base.

General Motors (GM) said that a mandatory
automatic restraint demonstration program does
not answer the basic question of whether the pub-
lic will accept or use automatic belts or accept the
higher cost of airbags.

AMC said in response to the NPRM that it was
inappropriate to require a small company like
AMC to participate in a demonstration program.

Toyota was generally opposed to a demonstra-
tion program. However, if one were undertaken,
the DOT program should: (1) contain performance,
not design, requirements; (2) permit the manufac-
turer to select the car lines to be affected; and
(3) have the same requirements for all manufac-
turers, small and large.

Nissan said that the problem with the program
is that sales projections of any percentage are
impossible to forecast. Only customer preference
can dictate the numbers sold. But if the program is
mandated, then: (1) Nissan would need 30 months
leadtime; (2) it should permit either automatic or
3-point belts; (3) let the manufacturers decide the

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 197

type of restraint on any mode; and (4) it agrees
with Ford on amending the test injury criteria.

NADA said that automatic restraints have not
been proven to be more effective than manual belts
and that a demonstration program was a counter-
productive idea due to delays in implementation
(21 to 42 months) and assessments (6 to 8 years),
which would divert manufacturer resources. It
would also have an adverse effect on franchised
dealers, who would have to attempt to sell the
automatic restraint equipped cars.

IIHS opposed the program because it does not
meet the statutory responsibility of DOT. There
would be no economies of scale; therefore, higher
costs could result. However, if it were done very
quickly, the program could be a useful supplement
to this rulemaking. IIHS reiterated its belief that a
mandatory automatic restraint standard was
needed as soon as possible.

Allstate said that a demonstration program
could delay the safety needs of the public for
7 years, 4 for the demonstration, and 3 for lead-
time to equip the rest of the fleet.

State Farm said such an alternative was unlaw-
ful, irrational, arbitrary, and capricious. Adoption
of the Ford proposal would impose a costly, harm-
ful and unjustified delay.

The National Association of Independent Insur-
ers (NAII) opposed the program as a form of delay.

The Center for Auto Safety (CFAS) said the dem-
onstration is outside the limit of DOT's statutory
authority, as illustrated by former Secretaries
Volpe's and Brinegar's requests to the Congress
for explicit authority for a standard's phase-in based
on percentage of production. The CFAS said that
NHTSA has recognized that percentage phase-in
is of questionable legality, citing the DOT brief in
PLF V. Adams, 593 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

Public Citizen said that a demonstration was not
authorized by the Act.

The Breed Corporation said that a mandatory
demonstration program, since it would result in a
safety standard which did not apply to all motor
vehicles of a particular type, would be unlawful.

Mandatory Belt Use Laws

General

Almost all car manufacturers supported belt use
laws in lieu of some form of automatic restraint re-
quirement. They stated that these laws would be
the most effective and least costly approach. The

automobile dealers also supported these laws.
Most individuals who opposed automatic restraints
and supported an alternative named belt used laws
as that alternative.

The American Seat Belt Council said that belt
use laws would be the most effective approach, but
expressed the belief that some sort of financial
incentive would be necessary to get individual
States to consider passage of such laws. Congress-
man Dingell supported belt use laws and noted his
bill to encourage state enactment of them.

Many vehicle manufacturers and other com-
menters noted that belt usage laws would begin
producing benefits over the entire fleet of cars on
the road as soon as the laws became effective. By
contrast, they noted, the benefits associated with
automatic protection would accrue only as new
vehicles equipped with automatic protection were
added to the fleet of vehicles in use. It would take
at least 10 years for car equipped with that type
of protection to fully replace nonautomatic cars.
Because of this factor, many commenters suggested
that the agency mandate automatic restraints, to
provide that protection to occupants of new cars,
and seek belt usage laws, to provide increased pro-
tection to occupants of older cars.

The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
(MVMA) and several individual manufacturers
stated that the minimum criteria specified in the
SNPRM for belt usage laws deny State legislatures
the flexibility to design belt use laws consistent
with the demographics, motor vehicle statutes,
and law enforcement practices of the individual
States. These commenters suggested that rather
than DOT specifying the means which must be
used to achieve the goal of increased belt usage, it
should simply specify the desired end (in terms of
the percentage of front seat occupants wearing
their belts) and allow the State legislatures to
select the most effective means to that end for
their particular State.

Several insurance companies opposed safety
belt use laws as a substitute for the automatic
restraint requirement because all front seat occu-
pants of a car equipped with automatic restraints
would be protected while a belt use law would pro-
tect only those front seat occupants who complied
with it. The insurance companies. Congressman
Wirth, and Public Citizen argued also that safety
belt use laws were not an alternative that would
satisfy the Safety Act or the State Farm decision.
However, the insurance industry generally fav-

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 198

ored these laws as a supplement to an automatic
restraint requirement.

Although virtually all medical and health organi-
zations opposed substituting safety belt use laws
for the automatic restraint requirement, they
noted that recent experience in Canada and Great
Britain has shown that introduction of these laws
produced sizable reductions in injuries and deaths.

Both the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
(IIHS) and the Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) sub-
mitted studies indicating that while belt use laws
do increase usage, the resulting reductions in
deaths and injuries are proportionately smaller
than increases in usage. These studies led both
groups to conclude tentatively that the population
with the greatest likelihood of being in vehicle
accidents is also the least likely to comply with
belt use laws. A similar point was made by New
York Insurance Superintendent Corcoran. Hence,
both groups urged DOT not to overstate the bene-
fits that would result from belt use laws. Ralph
Nader opposed safety belt use laws as an alterna-
tive because of his belief that such laws would not
be adopted by the States and would not be com-
plied with by those who most need to buckle up.

As to the question of the likelihood of enact-
ment of state safety belt use laws, IIHS said the
closest analogy was not the child restraint use
laws or the recent wave of more stringent drunk
driving laws, but the motorcycle helmet use laws
that have been repealed or weakened in a signfi-
cant number of States.

Several commenters including the National
Association of Governors' Highway Safety Repre-
sentatives (NAGHSR) stated that the DOT ap-
proach was fundamentally wrong in that it sets
automatic restraints and belt usage laws as an
either/or proposition. These commenters argued
that both of these requirements are needed to en-
sure maximum use of restraints by front seat pas-
sengers. Further, these commenters asked why
the Federal government was intruding on the
States' prerogative to shape the usage laws by
specifying minimum criteria.

The Governor of Wyoming stated that there
was little or no chance of ever passing a belt usage
law in that State, and recited a list of enforcement
problems which would be posed for that State if it
were to pass a belt usage law.

The insurance companies generally argued that
dot's options of pursuing belt usage laws were
illegal as an abdication of DOT's statutory respon-

sibilities. The proposals in the SNPRM, it was
argued, would result in a lack of uniformity nation-
wide. As a practical matter, these commenters
believed that either of the options which would
eliminate the requirement for automatic restraints
if States passed belt usage laws would encourage
manufacturers to develop the cheapest automatic
restraints which would satisfy the standard, since
it was possible that the manufacturers would
never be required to put these restraints in their
vehicles and they would thus wish to minimize any
investment losses. It was also stated that these
systems would be the least effective automatic
restraints. The insurance companies noted the
serious enforcement problems which belt usage
laws would impose on the States. IIHS stated that
there is no evidence anywhere in this record to
support the claims that belt usage laws would be
obeyed without vigorous enforcement, and such
enforcement would be a headache for the States.
Their researchers found that in New York, where
an administrative regulation requires holders of
learner's permits to wear their belts while driving,
39 percent, 32 percent, and C percent of drivers
with learner's permits actually wore their belts at
three different locations. Further, IIHS noted that,
as of the time of their docket submission, no State
had yet passed a belt usage law and such laws
were being considered in only 11 States.

Volvo responded to the claim that belt usage laws
would not protect those who are most likely to be
in accidents, and that therefore belt use laws will
not achieve the reductions in deaths and injuries
which would accompany a particular level of belt
use. Volvo argued that these drivers would also be
the most likely to defeat any automatic belts, and
so would not be protected by those restraints, and
the most likely to be in rollover crashes, in which
they would not be protected by airbags.

SNPRM Alternative: No Automatic Restraints
Required in a State That Passes a MUL

The manufacturers generally opposed this alter-
native on the grounds that it would create major
distribution problems, it would create serious
enforcement problems for the States (for instance,
will residents of a State be permitted to cross the
border to purchase a car equipped with the re-
straint system they want?), and it would force the
manufacturers to produce two different types of
otherwise identical vehicles.

The State of Washington asked why DOT would

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 199

waive an automatic restraint requirement, and
stated that it believed the existence of automatic
restraints would be as much of an incentive to pass
a mandatory belt use law as would a waiver. Simi-
larly, NAGHSR stated that the waiver would be
an administrative nightmare for the States, and
that this waiver would make it difficult for a con-
sumer to purchase a car with automatic restraints
if the State has a mandatory use law.

NADA stated that this alternative would create
uncertainty and a patchwork pattern of automatic
restraint requirements, which would cripple prod-
uct planning, pricing, advertising, and distribution.

A Michigan legislator and the Michigan secre-
tary of state supported this proposal, saying the
most effective protection available to front seat
occupants is the manual belt already in the vehicle.

SNPRM Alternative: Automatic Restraints
Required Unless 75 Percent of States Pass
Mandatory Belt Use Laws by a Certain Date

The manufacturers strongly objected to this
alternative, since they would be forced to imme-
diately begin investing time and money on a device
which might never be needed. They said that this
alternative would raise car prices even if the auto-
matic restraints were never required. The manu-
facturers also stated that the progress reports
were an unnecessary burden since a manufacturer
that was not prepared to install automatic
restraints when those were required would be com-
pletely forced out of the market until such time as
it could install automatic restraints. That is incen-
tive enough to ensure that the manufacturers will
be ready to install those restraints.

Ford would change this alternative to suspend
FMVSS 208 while a good faith effort is made to
pass mandatory use laws, and, if this is unsuccess-
ful, specify an effective date for FMVSS 208.
Volkswagen (VW) suggests setting an effective
date on a sliding scale after seeing if enough States
pass mandatory use laws. For instance, if 10 per-
cent of the States have not passed mandatory use
laws in two years. Standard 208 would become
effective three years after that date, if 25 percent
had not passed mandatory use laws in 4 years,
Standard 208 would become effective 3 years after
that date, and so forth. American Motors Corpora-
tion (AMC) would amend the alternative to specify
no automatic restraints when 75 percent of the
driving public is subject to mandatory use laws or
when 75 percent are using the manual belts in

their vehicles.

The National AutomobUe Dealers Association
(NADA) stated that there is no basis for imposing
automatic restraints, whether or not 75 percent of
the States pass a mandatory belt use law.

The insurance companies wondered how DOT
had decided that residents of 25 percent of the
States could be left without enhanced occupant
protection in their cars when the record was so
clear on the need for enhanced protection. The Na-
tional Association of Governor's Highway Safety
Representatives (NAGHSR) stated that Federal
intrusion was not needed to get States to pass
mandatory use laws.

Two Michigan officials stated that the 75 per-
cent figure should be lowered, since it was doubt-
ful that it could be achieved, and argued that
greater flexibility should be allowed to the States.

Test Procedures

Repeatability

Most automobile manufacturers raised several
issues concerning the automatic occupant protec-
tion provisions of FMVSS 208. Statements were
made that the test procedures, in general, faU to
meet the "objective" criterion of the statute. Sug-
gestions were also offered to change the proce-
dures, the anthropomorphic test dummy, and the
standard's injury prevention criteria.

Manufacturers stated that the test procedures
do not produce repeatable results. Relying on data
from the agency's New Car Assessment Program
(NCAP) repeatability tests, the manufacturers
argued that there is substantial, uncontrollable
variability in the test results. As a result, they
argue that the standard is not practicable.

NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program, which
is an experimental program designed to develop
consumer ratings of vehicle crashworthiness, is
similar in test procedure to FMVSS 208 in that is
uses instrumented Part 572 test dummies to ascer-
tain potential injuries to human occupants in a
frontal barrier crash. The program differs from
FMVSS 208 in that its purpose is to rate cars.
Therefore, there is no minimum level of perfor-
mance specified as in FMVSS 208, and the tests
are conducted at 35 mph instead of the safety stan-
dard's specification of 30 mph.

In 1983, NHTSA conducted tests to determine
the repeatability of test results from the NCAP.
Twelve Chevrolet Citations were tested in three

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 200

different laboratories (four in each laboratory) to
help determine the magnitude of variability sur-
rounding a single test result. GM supplemented
the agency's program by crashing an additional
four Citations at their own facilities.

In commenting on the October 1983 NPRM,
AMC referenced the NCAP repeatability tests and
stated that based on the high degree of variability
in injury criteria test results, the FMVSS 208 test
procedures were "unacceptable" and lacked the
necessary objectivity required by a safety stan-
dard. To compensate for this large variability,
AMC suggested the agency use a "design-to-
conform" approach as a means of compliance.

Chrysler also stated its concern over test re-
peatability and variability, as evidenced in the
NCAP program, and argued that testing airbags
under the current test procedure could lead to
even greater variability. Chrysler suggested test-
ing airbags with a belt, exempting the front center
seat from any passive requirements, eliminating
the 30-degree oblique test and waiving all injury
criteria.

Volkswagen referenced the NCAP repeatability
program and concluded from its results that the
current test procedures were "not appropriate,"
particularly for safety belts. VW argued that the
test procedures, and the dummy, were developed
for testing compliance with airbags. It suggests
that the procedures be revised to only use dynamic
testing if a vehicle is equipped with airbags.

GM also spoke of excessive variability and
stated that the test procedures must be improved.
GM urged NHTSA to approve its petition to use
the Hybrid III dummy as an alternative test
device and to develop different compliance tests
for different technological safety improvements.

Ford claimed that the test procedures are neither
objective nor practicable and, based on the NCAP
tests, manufacturers would have to "overdesign"
their vehicles to ensure that all vehicles were in
compliance. Ford stated that the procedures do
not comply with the Court's ruling in the Chrysler
case that test procedures must be capable of pro-
ducing identical results when test conditions are
exactly duplicated. Ford argued that repeatable
results are impossible to achieve with the current
FMVSS 208 test procedures. The company sup-
plied results of early 1970's sled tests to show that
variability was inherent in the test procedures and
test dummy and was not solely related to vehicle-
to-vehicle differences. Ford suggested that test

variability could be compensated for by using a
design to conform approach, eliminating the
30-degree oblique test, not dynamically testing
automatic belts, changing the FMVSS 210 anchor-
age location requirements, and testing airbags
with a belt.

MVMA emphasized their concern that the
NPRM failed to address the issue of test repeat-
ability. Its concern was based on the NCAP test
results. MVMA urged the agency to publish a sup-
plemental notice to address the issue.

Several commenters to the NPRM suggested
that there was no reason to be concerned over test
procedures or repeatability. Byron Bloch, an auto-
motive safety consultant, pointed out that cars are
designed using crash tests and sophisticated dum-
mies and he supplied the text of a GM advertise-
ment to that effect.

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
reviewed the results of the NCAP repeatability
test program and concluded that these tests "pro-
duced repeatable results when the correct pro-
cedures were adhered to ... "

Allstate Insurance Company claimed that the
current test procedures assure individual pur-
chasers of automatic restraints of protection and
that the agency should also test manual belts
dynamically.

Because of the above, the issue of repeatability,
as well as other test procedure concerns, was rais-
ed in the SNPRM. In the SNPRM, the Department
stated that it believed that the Part 572 test
dummy was not a major source of the variability
found in the NCAP repeatability tests, that the
proposed adoption of two of the NCAP procedures
into FMVSS 208 would further reduce variability,
and that additional changes in the test procedures
to reduce variability were not necessary. Any
remaining variability was assumed to be due
llargely to vehicle-to-vehicle differences, which are
outside the control of the Department.

In commenting on the SNPRM, auto manufactur-
ers took exception to the Department's conclusions.

Ford reiterated its prior arguments about re-
peatability and criticized the agency for not clearly
setting out what are the proposed NCAP changes
to the 208 standard. It characterized what it under-
stood to be the revisions to the NCAP test proce-
dures as minor, subjective, and unverified. Ford
said that the agency was still conducting its repeat-
ability research study and questioned how the
agency could conclude that the test dummy is not a

PART 571; S 208 - PRE 201

major source of variability.

Ford further argued that the agency had not
shown that the "test device and test procedure are
separable in their influence on test results from
the performance of the vehicle, so that any vari-
ability in test results 'must be' attributable to
vehicle-to-vehicle differences in manufacture or
performance."

Ford also argued that overdesign should be used
only to compensate for manufacturing variances,
which can be estimated and controlled for by the
manufacturer and that overdesign should not be
required of manufacturers because of deficiencies
in test procedures.

Ford concluded that the test procedures were
"flawed," that variability was inherent in barrier
crashes and was likely "irreducible," and that the
current procedures, with their large associated
test result variability, placed a manufacturer in
"unacceptable jeopardy" in terms of assuring com-
pliance with the standard.

The company also claimed that "comparable
variability," to that observed in the NCAP Cita-
tion tests would be expected for other models. It
based its conclusion on the coefficient of variation
(GOV) of 33 Mercury airbag sled tests, scaled to
35 mph, and seven Volvo barrier crash tests.

GM said that the driver HIC results of the
NCAP repeatability tests, which incorporated the
test procedure changes proposed in the SNPRM,
already demonstrate that the range of variability
is too large. GM argued that the amount of vari-
ability is not due to vehicle differences. It referred
to a series of controlled sled tests it conducted, in
which the coefficient of variation of the HIC data
was as high as 11 percent for the driver and 8 per-
cent for the passenger. For the NCAP series, the
COV was 21 percent for the driver and 11 percent
for the passenger. GM said that a comparison of
the two data sets shows that the major portion of
the variability is test-related, not vehicle-related.

GM argued that because of the variability, the
amount of overdesign needed to provide a reason-
able certainty of compliance would be imprac-
ticable. It said that the design level of HIC protec-
tion could not be justified in terms of a "minimum"
safety requirement. GM said that it does "not
believe that a practicable dynamic test require-
ment can be devised to provide manufacturers
with the assurance of 'certainty' specified by the
Paccar court. The only solution may be the one
suggested by that court: "... it must propose some

alternative method for those manufacturers
which, if followed, it will recognize as fulfilling the
due care requirement.'"

Mazda commented that the NCAP repeatability
study dealt with a compact size vehicle, which has
more available crush space than a subcompact. It
recommended that a similar repeatability study is
necessary for subcompact vehicles. Mazda agreed
with NHTSA that adoption of the NCAP test pro-
cedures would eliminate some of the existing vari-
ability, although further refinements are possible.

American Motors said that adopting the NCAP
modified test procedures cannot be expected to
reduce test variability since the modifications are
minor. AMC said that there are other test vari-
ables, such as safety belt tension and actual dummy
position just prior to impact, that have a similar
effect on dummy positioning, but those variables
are not controlled for in the test procedure.

AMC also claimed that because of the lack of
repeatability in the FMVSS 208 test procedures,
the standard does not meet the requested statu-
tory criteria. AMC believes the above because the
unreliability of test results demonstrated in the
NCAP program are "indicative" that a similar
level of variability will exist in FMVSS 208.

Peugot stated that it "can but reluctantly accept
as valid a test procedure" with a COV of 21 per-
cent. It suggested that the level of performance
(e.g., HIC criterion of 1000) be raised by the
amount of variation.

Chrysler, based on the NCAP data, concluded
that the test procedures are not capable of produc-
ing identical results when a given vehicle is repeat-
edly tested. They believe the current procedures
only measure a manufacturer's ability to conduct
the test and do not measure the adequacy of the
restraint system. Chrysler said that because dif-
ferences in dummy foot placement and ambient
temperature make a difference in test results, the
test is not practicable. Chrysler also argued that
the agency must develop a test which takes into
account the inherent crash variability of the vehi-
cle itself.

Volvo said that the modified NCAP procedures
only address a portion of the variability and that it
has not been demonstrated that the new position-
ing requirements will in fact result in a repeatable
positioning of the test dummy. It noted that the
procedures do not ensure that the same webbing
location is used in each test. Volvo also said that
because of the effect of temperature on dummy

PART 571: S 208 -PRE 202

performance, either the permitted range for crash
testing must be narrowed or new materials be
used in dummy construction. Volvo also said the
NCAP repeatability program shows that there is a
certain amount of unreliability in the signals
obtained from the accelerometers and that differ-
ent laboratories have used different methods to
process crash data.

Volvo also supplied the results of 10 sled tests in
which there was a stable crash pulse and no con-
tact between the dummy's head and vehicle inte-
rior, thus eliminating most vehicle-to-vehicle
parameters. The mean HIC was 466.5 with a GOV
of 12.5 percent.

Nissan said that under the current test proce-
dures, it is difficult to maintain the same relative
positioning of the test dummy for several tests. It
recommended that the agency maintain the same
initial relative measurements between the dummy
and steering wheel and instrument panel for each
test of a particular model. It also said that the posi-
tioning of the seatbelt should correlate to design
measurements submitted to the agency by manu-
facturers. It urged changing the seat position
requirement (it is currently set at the mid-position)
since passengers in small cars tend to move the
seat rearward. Nissan recommended that the
meassurement between the hip point and ankle
should be constant for the positioning of the seat.

Toyota said there are still unresolved problems
concerning the variability in electronic crash data
collection systems. It also recommended that the
test procedure specify the "timing of dummy instal-
lation prior to crash. . . . Such timing will affect
test results depending upon the extent of the
breaking-in (sic) between the dummy's hip and the
seat materials."

Mercedes said that the Part 572 dummy is not suf-
ficiently repeatable for compliance test purposes,
that the Hybrid III dummy provides no improve-
ment in this regard and that adoption of the NCAP
test procedures is a step in the right direction.

Volkswagen also contended that the variances
resulting from the NCAP repeatability tests were
too large for compliance test purposes of a safety
standard. VW argued that overdesign to comply
with FMVSS 208 has nothing to do with improved
safety but only costs the company time, effort, and
money in overcoming the inherent variability in
the test itself.

Renault said that the current COV of 21 percent
(which permits a variation of 63 percent) is too

large; it said the COV should not exceed 10 per-
cent. It said that as long as the COV remains at
21 percent, the HIC limit should be raised by
63 percent.

MVMA again reiterated its concern over test
variance and said that FMVSS 208 is not objective.

IIHS said that overdesign is standard industry
practice and current test data show that compli-
ance is "easily achieveable."

Allstate again contrasted the lack of any dynamic
testing of seatbelts with the detailed test proce-
dures for testing of automatic restraints. It cited
the Public Citizen v. Steed decision on tire tread-
wear grading (UTQGS) for the proposition that "no
test procedures . . . are going to approach perfec-
tion." Allstate said that it seemed "strange" for
the Department to be concerned over "minute de-
tails" of test procedures and to refuse to imple-
ment FMVSS 208 because of minor test details
would be absurd. Allstate said that the test proce-
dures were developed over many years and have
proven highly acceptable.

State Farm concurred with the SNPRM analysis
of crash test variability and cited the UTQGS deci-
sion as undercutting the manufacturers' arguments.

State Farm concluded that FMVSS 208 is both
practicable and objective, that the test procedures
have been subject to court challenge and have
been improved, and that the results of the NCAP
repeatability program were conducted at 35 mph,
not 30 mph as in FMVSS 208, where the vehicle
must absorb 36 percent more energy. They said
testing at 30 mph should result in less variance as
well as lower readings.

British Leyland suggested "that at tWs point in the
rulemaking process, the subject of test procedures
is not supremely important for discussion ..."

Design to Conform

Because manufacturers believe that the variabil-
ity in test results, particularly HIC, is so large that
extensive overdesign would be required to ensure
that all vehicles would comply with the standard,
the concept of "design to conform" was suggested
as a more appropriate measure of compliance.

Both Ford and American Motors suggested this
concept in response to the NPRM. Ford said that
to overcome the unacceptable jeopardy of being in
noncompliance, as a result of the test procedure's
lack of objectivity, compliance should be based on
the design-to-conform concept, similar to that used
in FMVSS 108. AMC favored the design-to-conform

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 203

approach for the same reason as Ford, and also
said that excessive variability was the same rea-
son design-to-conform was adopted in standard 108.

In the SNPRM, the Department sought public
comment on whether an approach which required
a manufacturer to show that a vehicle was "de-
signed to conform" to FMVSS 208, instead of
requiring actual conformity with the standard's re-
quirements, could be reconciled with the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decision in Chrysler Corp.
v. DOT, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972), wherein the
Court stated that compliance should be "obtained
from measuring instruments as opposed to the
subjective opinions of human beings," 472 F.2d at
676, and that "compliance be made by specified
measuring instruments; there is no room for an
agency investigation in this procedure." 472 F.2d
at 678. Since the design-to-conform approach
would require the manufacturer to justify to
NHTSA that it had taken reasonable steps in the
vehicle's design and testing to certify that it had
been designed to conform to the standard's require-
ments, it appeared that adoption of this proposal
would introduce unacceptable levels of subjectiv-
ity, contrary to the Chrysler court's direction, into
what was heretofore an objective compliance pro-
cedure. Comments were also sought on the poten-
tial effects on vehicle design and construction
under a design to conform approach.

Responses to the SNPRM by manufacturers
showed agreement with the concept of design to
conform as applied to FMVSS 208. Ford argued
that if Standard 121, regarding air-braked heavy
trucks (subsequently overturned by the courts)
had had a design to conform provision, "it might
well have been judged to be practicable, for manu-
facturers would have had the assurance that bona
fide results of their own compliance tests would
have to be taken into account in determining
whether their products were in fact noncompliant."
It said that dictum in Wagner Electric supports
the lawfulness of a design to conform alternative
to a strict compliance scheme.

Ford said that adopting a design to conform ap-
proach would not "materially" affect a vehicle's
design and that its main effect would be to permit
a manufacturer to not be judged in noncompliance
based on failure to meet the specified injury cri-
teria in a single test, if the manufacturer had bona
fide test results to verify that the designed level of
performance had been achieved.

GM also supported the design to conform con-

cept. GM argued that such a concept does not con-
travene the Paccar decision. It said design to con-
form is "compatible with the court's finding that
all relevant factors must be considered in estab-
lishing a standard and would not require manufac-
turers to overcompensate for test variability to
assure compliance."

GM added that a design to conform requirement
would not materially change a manufacturer's ap-
proach to assuring conformity with FMVSS 208.
GM believes that a manufacturer would still be
required to demonstrate that the performance of
its design would meet the requirement. GM also
said that the philosophy of adopting design to con-
form in FMVSS 108 was based on the recognition
of test variabilities and thus applies equally well to
this standard.

VW said that it was uncertain about the effect of
adopting design to conform language in the stan-
dard. VW contrasted what it called the accurate
and precise test of Standard 108 with the variable
test procedure of Standard 208. VW also believes
that the Department essentially operates under
such a concept.

Mercedes, Renault, and MVMA supported adop-
tion of a design-to-conform standard.

Peugeot termed the concept "interesting" and
said that NHTSA's concern was understandable.
Peugeot suggested that an in-depth study of the
"reasonable steps" a manufacturer should take
might be necessary.

Jack Martens, an automotive safety consultant,
opposed a switch to the design-to-conform stan-
dard arguing that there will no longer be any
means to ensure that the vehicle as purchased
meets the performance requirement.

Thirty Degree (30°) Oblique Test

In commenting on the NPRM, both Chrysler and
Ford suggested deleting the oblique test require-
ment in the standard. Ford argued that the test is
redundant, since dummy readings are lower than
in perpendicular barrier crashes, that it not only
adds to development costs and time but also in-
creases test result variability, and that it is a hin-
drance to airbag development. Chrysler's recom-
mendation for deletion also was in the context of
airbag development.

Although not directly addressing the test require-
ment, Renault said that air bags are not as effective
as manual belts in oblique crashes and that their
effectiveness limit corresponds to the 30° barrier

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 204

impact conditions. Beyond 30°, Renault believes,
airbag effectiveness is slight or nonexistent.

Puegeot claimed that airbags are less effective
than manual belts at oblique crashes of 25 to
30 degrees, while Allstate said that the field expe-
rience with airbags indicates that they will be ef-
fective in crashes at frontal angles of 30° or greater.

The Department, in the May 10, 1984, SNPRM,
voiced its own concerns over the necessity of the
30° oblique test to assure proper passive restraint
performance. NHTSA test data indicate that the
instrumented dummy readings in such tests are
consistently lower than in direct frontal barrier
crashes due to a less severe crash pulse. Although
the original rationale for the requirement appeared
to be ensure that car occupants were protected in
oblique crashes, the data available to NHTSA indi-
cated that the 30° test was unnecessary to achieve
that goal. That is, the protection was provided re-
gardless of whether or not the test was conducted.
The elimination of the oblique test was proposed in
the SNPRM and specific data were sought to sup-
port commenters' positions on the issue.

Most of the auto manufacturers and several
other commenters offered remarks on the pro-
posal. However, the manufacturers' opinions were
split into three categories — in favor, against, or re-
tain the oblique test but eliminate the direct frontal
barrier crash requirement.

Ford restated its belief that the oblique test is
redundant and merely adds to the cost of testing,
adversely affects leadtime and adds more unpre-
dictability to the testing.

Ford referenced material it had submitted to
NHTSA previously which contained data on 30°
angular vs. frontal tests. These data related to Ford's
33-car barrier crash tests of 1972 Mercury airbag
vehicles. Ford's February 1976 report on the sub-
ject, "Airbag Crash Test Repeatability" (ESRO
Report No: S-76-3), stated that the results of the
angular crashes were lower in magnitude and had
less variability than the frontal crashes. In 12
frontal tests, average driver and passenger HIC
values were 479 and 462, respectively. In angular
tests, the respective means for HIC were 185 and
330, well below the values in the frontal crashes.

Favoring the deletion of the oblique test, due to
its stated redundancy and its adding to costs, lead-
time, and variability, were BMW, Volvo, Nissan,
Mercedes, Honda, and Mazda. Mazda supplied data
which showed a driver HIC of 779 and a passenger
value of 758 in a frontal crash test using an experi-

mental two-point passive belt while the corre-
sponding values in the angular test were 488 and
302. Mercedes also stated that the oblique test is
an obstacle to producing airbags.

Peugeot and Renault supported retention of
the oblique test, arguing that it is more represen-
tative of the majority of actual crashes, and dele-
tion of the perpendicular test. They stated this
would be harmonized with a European regulation
(WP 29/R237/REV 1).

Two manufacturers opposed the elimination of the
test outright, while a third expressed concern over
deleting the oblique test for airbag-equipped cars.

GM opposed deletion of the oblique test. It said
that while "most angular tests would result in
lower injury numbers than obtained from a per-
pendicular barrier test, angular tests are more
representative of the variety of frontal crashes
that actually occur in the field."

GM further stated that it was their experience
that the oblique test is "important in the evalua-
tion of airbag performance."

Saab also opposed its deletion, terming the pro-
posal "a way to cover up for a weakness in the air-
bag system." Saab stated that a test requirement
must cover a large part of real world accidents.

VW supported, with reservation, the proposal to
delete the 30 degree oblique test. VW recom-
mended dropping the perpendicular test since the
forthcoming Economic Commission for Europe
(ECE) regulation on crash protection will only have
an oblique test. VW said that an oblique test
should be retained for vehicles which do not include
upper torso belts, that is, airbag equipped cars.

The CFAS opposed deletion of the oblique test
since it could compromise occupant protection.

IIHS supported the deletion of the oblique test if
its elimination will promote the use of airbags.

The Breed Corporation favored the deletion of
the oblique test, citing confidential data it had seen
from manufacturers.

Adequacy of the Part 572 Dummy

In its December 1983 response to the NPRM,
GM said that better diagnostic tools are needed to
assure improved occupant safety, including better
dummies. GM argued these tools should lead to im-
proved test result repeatability. According to GM,
the Part 572 dummy "is deficient as a tool on which
to base assessments of the potential of all occupant
protection technologies." GM believes their devel-
opment of the Hybrid III dummy provides for such

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 205

assessments and, as part of their response, peti-
tioned NHTSA to permit the use of the Hybrid III
dummy as an alternative test device (i.e., as a sub-
stitute for the Part 572 dummy) in measuring com-
pliance with FMVSS 208.

Although not responding directly to the relative
adequacy of the GM Hybrid HI dummy, the Depart-
ment concluded, in the SNPRM, "that the test
dummy [i.e., the Part 572 dummy] is a repeatable
test device and is not a major source of the variabil-
ity found in NHTSA's 35 mph repeatabUity test
series." It was further stated that NHTSA would
address the merits of GM's petition to permit the
use of the Hybrid III as an alternative test device
in a separate rulemaking action at a later date.

Several manufacturers took exception to the De-
partment's conclusion that the Part 572 dummy
was a repeatable test instrument and met the
appropriate statutory criteria. Peugeot said that
the current dummy is one cause of test result vari-
ability and thus it does not meet the statutory cri-
teria. But, since manufacturers need some refer-
ence test instrument, Peugeot said that even though
its use is questionable, "it must be maintained."

American Motors described the dummy as "a
state-of-the-art compromise — it lacks in reasonable
measurement fidelity."

Volvo said that "the present Part 572 test
dummy has serious limitations with respect to its
use for determining compliance with FMVSS 208."
Volvo believes design and material improvements
are necessary to make the dummy more durable,
repeatable, and trouble-free.

Toyota said that there was "uncertainty of the
Influence of [the] Part 572 dummy tolerances on
crash test results" while Ford said that although
the calibration of the dummy is repeatable, its per-
formance in barrier crashes may not be. Ford ques-
tioned the Department's conclusion that the dummy
is not a major source of variability.

GM again reiterated the potential benefits of
the Hybrid III dummy and called for quick action
on its petition, saying that a delay could hamper
installation of new technology in its vehicles.

This view was supported by Nissan which said it
believes the Hybrid III demonstrates greater
repeatability than does the Part 572 dummy. Nis-
san believes the Hybrid III has a more controlled
twisting motion and offers a greater degree of con-
trol and stability.

Mercedes disagreed with the conclusion that the
Part 572 dummy satisfies all legal criteria because

it is "not sufficiently repeatable for compliance test
purposes." Mercedes also stated that "the Hybrid
III provides no improvement in this regard."

Conversely, Renault said that it agreed with
NHTSA that "the present Part 572 dummy is not
the major cause of the dispersion of results."

Adoption of N CAP Test Procedures

As a result of its repeatability test program,
NHTSA amended the test procedures (IP 212-02)
for the New Car Assessment Program to reduce
any variability associated with the test procedures
themselves. Since the NCAP procedures are more
specific than the current FMVSS 208 require-
ments (in terms of dummy foot placement, place-
ment in the seat, etc.) and since the test procedure
is an integral part of complying with the standard,
it was proposed in the SNPRM that the NCAP test
procedures, aside from those aspects solely related
to the consumer rating program such as the need
for high-speed cameras, testing at 35 mph, etc., be
adopted in FMVSS 208. It was argued that the
increased specificity of these procedures would
further reduce any variability associated with the
test procedures themselves.

Most manufacturers favored, or at least took no
exception to, the adoption of the NCAP proce-
dures, although many felt it would do little to
reduce variability. AMC said that the changes
associated with adopting the NCAP procedures
were "very minor" and could not be expected to
significantly reduce variability. AMC contended
that other sources of test procedure variability,
such as safety belt tension and actual dummy posi-
tion just prior to impact, are still not accounted for
in the NCAP procedures.

Volvo said that the procedures were "a step in
the right direction" but doubted whether variabil-
ity would be reduced significantly by their adop-
tion. Volvo said that other sources of variability,
such as belt geometry and identical dummy posi-
tioning, still exist.

Nissan did not comment on the adoption of the
procedures themselves, but also stated that
dummy positioning may not be properly specified.
To aid in this regard, Nissan recommended that
dummy placement be further specified by dimen-
sions of dummy-to-car part distances.

Toyota deemed the adoption incomplete and
said that the timing of dummy installation prior to
impact and the extent of the breaking-in between

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 206

the dummy's hip and the seat materials was also
important.

Mercedes, as did Volvo, said that the NCAP pro-
cedures were "moving in the right direction."

Conversely, VW said it "has no confidence that
the changes proposed will cause a significant
reduction in variability" and that the Depart-
ment has not provided any data to show that vari-
ability will be reduced. The lack of data to support
the contention of reduced variability was also cited
by MVMA and Ford.

While Honda said that the NCAP test proce-
dures were "inadequate" to reduce variability,
Renault stated it had "no objection" to their incor-
poration in FMVSS 208. Mazda agreed that there
would be some reduction in variability with their
adoption. Renault also asked whether all these
types of problems are solved by their adoption.

MVMA, Ford, and GM also claim that the latest
revisions to the NCAP test procedures, dummy
foot placement and seat placement, were already
incorporated when the repeatability tests were
conducted by NHTSA; thus, no reduction in vari-
ability from the values shown in those tests could
be expected from their adoption. Ford also con-
tended that adequate public notice was not pro-
vided on this issue since the precise NCAP proce-
dures to be incorporated in FMVSS 208 were
never specified.

Head Injury Criteria IHIQ Measurements

The SNPRM sought public comment on whether
HIC should be measured in the absence of the
dummy's head contacting the vehicle interior. It
was pointed out in the notice that the historic deri-
vation of HIC was based on the head striking
something. It was also noted in the SNPRM that
NHTSA had permitted, for belt systems, the com-
pliance with the HIC criterion only when head con-
tact was made and only for the duration of head
contact. The Department pointed out that because
of some conflicting data and because it believed
that a noncontact HIC criterion could act as a
surrogate for neck injury, it was not proposing to
change the standard.

Peugeot, AMC, Volvo, Mercedes, VW, Renault,
MVMA, Ford, GM, and Mazda favored eliminating
measurement of HIC in the absence of head con-
tact. Only Allstate opposed this, claiming that it
prevents cervical and spinal injuries. BMW, VW,
and Mercedes also favored raising the HIC cri-
terion, even if there is dummy head contact, to a

level of 1500, as proposed in a petition to NHTSA
by the Committee on Common Market Automobile
Constructors (CCMC).

Peugeot said that they believe HIC is not a good
criterion to protect against neck injury and that
further research needs to be done on the subject.
This view was supported by Volvo, Renault, and
Ford. Peugeot, Honda, and GM also said that there
is no basis to use a different — for example, 1500 —
value for HIC in the absence of head contact. They
believe HIC should not be measured at all in such
circumstances.

Volvo said that the origin of HIC was based on
forehead impacts and only for accelerations in the
anterior-posterior components. Volvo said it was
little wonder, as HIC is now used in FMVSS 208
for noncontact accelerations, including those in
lateral directions, that HIC readings have little
real-world relevance. AMC and Chrysler also
claimed little relevance between HIC and the
potential for real-world injury. Conversely, IIHS
submitted data, based on calculation of HIC and
associated real-world injuries to baseball players
who were struck in the head, that there is a real-
world relevance of HIC and that serious injuries,
even death, occur at HIC values of 1,000. The
CFAS also said that higher HICs would compro-
mise occupant protection.

Ford, although agreeing that noncontact head
accelerations can produce injury, claimed that
there was no correlation between the likelihood of
such brain injuries and HIC values, nor was there
any relation between neck injuries and HIC.

In commenting on HIC in general, Peugeot and
Renault asked that HIC values based on dummy
head-to-knee contacts also be eliminated from mea-
surement because the dummy's knee is much harder
than the human knee, leading to higher values of
HIC than would be expected in actual crashes.

Testing of Safety Belts

Commenting on the NPRM, Chrysler, VW, and
Ford said that there was no need to dynamically
test automatic safety belts, and that the static test
requirements of FMVSS 209 and FMVSS 210, as
currently related to manual belts, be applied
instead. It was argued that current manual belts,
which are not tested dynamically, have been proven
effective as evidenced by worldwide data. Thus,
the companies argue, there is no reason to test
automatic belts any differently than manual belts.
Dynamic testing of belts only adds to development

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 207

time and costs without resulting in a higher level
of safety. Recognizing the problem of assuring pre-
vention of submarining for two-point automatic
belts, VW suggested that a compliance test be
added for knee bolsters. Ford also suggested that
the anchorage location requirements of FMVSS 210
be waived for automatic belts.

Allstate said that the fact that manual belts are
not dynamically tested results in the consumer
having no assurance that the restraint system in a
particular vehicle will perform as it is supposed to
and, thus, is the "safety scandal of the century."

No new comments were offered on this subject
in responding to the SNPRM except from Jack
Martens, who said that replacing the dynamic test
requirement of FMVSS 208 for automatic belts
with the static tests of standards 209 and 210 could
result in lower quality levels for restraints. In-
stead, he agreed with Allstate that manual belts
be dynamically tested for compliance.

Impact Test Speed

In responding to the SNPRM, GM proposed an
additional set of test criteria for NHTSA to con-
sider. GM said that if some form of passive require-
ments should be retained, then in addition to the
current test procedures in FMVSS 208 for auto-
matic restraints, an additional alternative of com-
plying with manual belts, at two test speeds,
should be provided. GM's proposal would permit
compliance with manual belts if all FMVSS 208 cri-
teria were met at 30 mph, with the manual belts
buckled around the test dummies, and all criteria
were also met at 25 mph, with the dummies unre-
strained (i.e., belts unbuckled). GM believes this
proposal would allow both consumers and manu-

facturers to choose between active and passive
restraints while improving overall motor vehicle
safety. GM also asked that the Hybrid III, or equiv-
alent dummy in terms of biofidelity, be permitted
as the test instrument.

GM claims safety benefits for their proposal
equivalent to 36 percent belt usage. Their estimate
is based on the reduction of total harm (which is a
surrogate for the weighting of various severities
of injuries by their dollar consequences) of 12 per-
cent, which is derived by calculating the percent
reduction of harm which occurs at 25 mph assum-
ing that all current injuries were reduced in sever-
ity by one AIS level. Since GM believes that no
more than a 5 percent increase in belt usage would
occur with passive belts, and since the 85 percent
of individuals who currently do not use their
safety belts would benefit by their proposal, total
safety benefits oculd be nearly 17 times higher.
GM further states that although they only calcu-
lated benefits for reductions in harm due to frontal
crashes, benefits could also be extended to other
crash modes.

GM envisions that its proposal would result in
greater manufacturer flexibility in offering
improved occupant safety than does the current
FMVSS 208 criteria and would subsequently
result in the development of a variety of occupant
safety technologies, such as "safer" steering col-
umns, interior padding, door latches to prevent
ejection, windshield glazing, etc. GM stated in its
NPRM response that reimposition of FMVSS 208
without changes so as to permit such "buUt-in"
safety to be developed could result in the reduc-
tion of the firm's efforts in this area due to diver-
sion of engineering resources.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 208

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

USAGE OF OCCUPANT PROTECTION SYSTEMS

General

Restraint systems will only have safety value if
they are used by occupants or are in a state of
readiness such that they provide protection from
harm when required to do so. The following para-
graphs describe these characteristics of the vari-
ous restraint systems.

Manual Belts

Various changes have been required over the
last 15 years to seatbelt designs to improve man-
ual belt usage (replacing separate lap and shoulder
belts and buckles with an integrated lap and shoul-
der belt having a single buckle and adding an iner-
tial reel to give occupants freedom of movement)
and to remind occupants to use their belts (adding
brief audible and visible reminders). Nevertheless,
the rate of manual belt usage has not changed sub-
sUntially over the 15-year history of FMVSS 208
(except during the brief period around 1973 when
interlocks and continuous buzzers were used).

Based on recent NHTSA data, the overall safety
belt usage rate for front seat occupants is 12.5 per-
cent. This information also showed that usage
varies significantly by seating position — 14 per-
cent for drivers, 8.4 percent for passengers in the
right front seat, and 5 percent for passengers in
the center seat.

Departmental studies have noted other inter-
esting statistics about usage of manual belts:

• People involved in more severe accidents use
their restraint systems less often than the gen-
eral driving public. (One theory is that belt
wearers are more cautious and less prone to
severe accidents.)

• Import car occupants have substantially higher
seatbelt usage than domestic car occupants. (For
example: usage in domestic subcompacts was
12.3 percent, while in import subcompacts usage
was 22.1 percent in 1981-82.)

• Seatbelt usage increases as car size decreases.
(In 1981-82, usage was 16.8 percent in subcom-
pacts, 10.5 percent in compacts, 7.4 percent in
intermediates and 5.4 percent in full-size cars.)

• Usage is higher in newer cars than in older cars.
(In 1981-82. the usage in MY 81-82 cars was
16.0 percent; the usage in MY 79-80 cars was
13.6 percent.)

Automatic Belts

Usage rates for automatic belts vary substan-
tially depending on the particular type of belt
design and on the method of measuring usage.
(Around 500,000 American fleet automobiles have
been equipped with automatic belts; they include
some 1975-1984 VW Rabbits and 1978-1980 GM
Chevettes, and the 1981-1984 Toyota Cressidas.)
Studies of usage rates of existing automatic re-
straints are not necessarily applicable to systems
that would be used to comply with an automatic re-
straint requirement. For example, nearly 80 per-
cent of the existing systems (in VW Rabbits) are
voluntarily equipped with starter interlocks
(which DOT is prohibited by law from requiring),
some owners purchased the systems voluntarily,
disconnection and storage of the belts on some sys-
tems was very easy, some were installed only on
rental vehicles (drivers may be atypical and, also,
may not try to take long-term action to defeat the
system), and some involved the more expensive
motorized (with easier ingress and egress) sys-
tems. Based on the record of this and previous

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 209

rulemakings, manufacturers are unlikely to equip
automatic restraint vehicles with either interlocks
or motorized systems. The most likely system,
given that manufacturers have freedom of choice,
may be the detachable automatic belt. Since this is
the system for which little field experience exists,
application of the current usage data to a future
fleet of all automatic belt equipped vehicles may
not be appropriate.

Current usage estimates for the VW Rabbit
range from about 50 percent based on accident
data to 80 percent based on traffic observations to
90 percent from telephone surveys. Chevette
usage, based on an extremely small number of
observations, is about 70 percent (a similar value is
derived from telephone surveys), while Cressida
belt usage appears to exceed 90 percent (observa-
tions and telephone surveys.)

The Department's estimate of future usage is
based on an analysis of existing systems and sur-
veys of usage and attitudes. Essentially, the
Department tried to determine whether certain
features of automatic belts might overcome some
of the reasons people do not use manual belts,
while recognizing the wide range of belt systems
likely to be produced under a mandate. Our cur-
rent estimate for automatic belt use covers a
broad range: 20 to 70 percent. We expect usage
rates for automatic belts to be higher than current
manual belt usage because of the automatic nature
of the belt, which would overcome some of the
stated reasons for not buckling up: laziness, forget-
fulness, and not wanting to be bothered. Although
precise estimates are impossible, it seems reason-
able that some increment of increased usage
should be imputed to nondetachable belts, since
some effort would be required to deactivate them.

There is no way to know precisely where within
the range the automatic seatbelt usage rate would
actually fall. The actual rate will depend on many
considerations, such as comfort and convenience
(including ease of entry and exit) and appearance.
Education programs and proven on-the-road effec-
tiveness could also affect usage.

Airbags

Impact protection benefits for airbags do not
depend on usage since the occupant does not have
to do anything. (However, as discussed elsewhere
in this preamble, for greater protection, a lap belt
should also be used.) As to whether airbags will
deploy when they should, the Department believes

that airbag technology is reliable and that airbags
would function properly (they will not activate
inadvertently and they will activate when they
should) in virtually all instances. The automobile
manufacturers agree. Two manufacturers stated
their goal for reliability of airbags to be at least
99.99 percent.

Although usage is not a factor with airbags,
"readiness" is. In the Department's Final Regula-
tory Impact Analysis (FRIA), based on an analysis
of the number of automobiles involved in acci-
dents, the Department determined that, if all auto-
mobiles were equipped with airbags and none of
the airbags were repaired after an accident, 1.2
percent of the fleet would be without airbags at all
times. This figure would be slightly higher if there
were inadvertent deployments and they were not
repaired. The Department has no reliable metho-
dology for determining what percent of these air-
bags would, if fact, not be repaired. Because it
would be very difficult to dismantle or remove an
airbag— much more difficult than a belt system —
and because it is not obtrusive, the Department
estimates that only a small percent of car owners—
perhaps 1 percent — would defeat the airbag. If, as
a result of these two problems, 2 percent of all
automobiles were without airbags at any one time,
airbags would still be ready to deploy in 98 percent
of the fleet. Thus, for analysis purposes, the
Department estimates that airbag readiness
would be 98 percent.

As explained in the next section, a lap belt or a
lap/shoulder belt should be worn with an airbag to
obtain maximum protection in side and roll-over
accidents, as well as in frontal crashes. Becuase of
this, questions arise over the usage rate of the belt
system supplied with an airbag. (The Department
does not know whether manufacturers would sup-
ply lap/shoulder belts or just lap belts.) One argu-
ment is that belt use would decline because people
would believe that airbags give ample protection.
On the other side, it is contended that usage will
increase if just lap belts are provided because the
shoulder belt portion makes the belt uncomfort-
able to some people and lap belt usage in the past
was near 20 percent. Education may help over-
come the "decrease" argument, but habit (people
are unlikely to change their habits) may also over-
come the "increase" argument. As a result, in its
benefit calculations, the Deparment has assumed
that current belt usage will continue with respect
to the belts accompanying airbags (12.5 percent).

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 210

Other Automatic Occupant Protection
Technologies

As with airbags, passive interiors do not have a
"usage" rate applicable to them. However, unlike
airbags, there are no deployment, replacement, or
inactivation problems associated with them. Thus,
the readiness factor of other known technologies is
assumed to be 100 percent. As with airbags, lap
belts or lap/shoulder belts might be required for
protection in other crash modes (i.e., side, rear,
rollover).

General

The safety benefits to be derived from any occu-
pant restraint system are a function of both the
usage (or readiness) of the system and its effective-
ness, when used, to reduce injuries or deaths.
Effectiveness of an occupant restraint system is
expressed as a percentage reduction in injuries or
deaths when compared to the situation when an
occupant is unrestrained. If, in 100 crashes, a sys-
tem would prevent the death of 60 percent of the
occupants who would have been killed if they were
unrestrained, then it would be rated as 60 percent
of the occupants who would have been killed if
they were unrestrained, then it would be rated as
60 percent effective in reducing fatalities. It is
important to note two points in this regard:

(1) some crashes are so severe that no occupant
protection system could prevent death or injury;

(2) when a device prevents a fatality or serious
injury that otherwise would have occurred, the
individual may suffer a less serious injury instead.
(As a result, a device that is more effective at
reducing serious injuries, may appear less effec-
tive, statistically, at reducing minor injuries.)

The Department's estimates for the effective-
ness of the various occupant restraint systems are
presented in Table 4.

Finally, it should be noted that, in general, the
Department has less confidence in the effective-
ness estimates for minor injuries than for more
severe injuries due to reporting problems; many
people do not report minor injuries or do not know
they are injured until the next day and thus the
injuries may not appear on police reports (the main
source of injury data). While the relative effective-
ness of the various systems should be unaffected,
there is some doubt about whether the overall
level of effectiveness for minor injuries is accurate.

TABLE 4

SUMMARY OF EFFECTIVENESS ESTIMATES

(All Accident Directions)

Air-
Manual bags Airbags
Manual Lap and Auto- Air- and and Lap/
Lap Shoulder matic bags Lap Shoulder
Injury BelU Belts Belts Alone Belts Belts

Fatal

30-40 40-50 35-50 20-40 40-50 45-55

Moderate

to critical 25-35 45-55 40-55 25-45 45-55 50-60

Effectiveness of Occupant Protection Systems Minor

10

10

10

10

10

10

Manual Belts

The effectiveness of manual belts is based on a
comprehensive analysis of accident data, involving
thousands of accidents. The estimates take into
account various factors, such as the fact that occu-
pants who wear their belts are generally involved
in less severe accidents then unrestrained occu-
pants. If factors such as this were not "controlled,"
the raw data would over estimate effectiveness.
Although "controlling" the data helps, it cannot
pinpoint an exact effectiveness estimate. For that
reason, ranges were used. Nevertheless, the
Department has the greatest confidence in the
estimates of manual belt effectiveness.

Automatic Belts

To determine the effectiveness of automatic
belts, the Department reviewed a number of dif-
ferent data sources: analyses of accidents involv-
ing existing automatic belt systems, crash tests,
and a study by the Canadian Government, referred
to below. Since most of the available accident data
involve a 2-point automatic belt with a knee bol-
ster, the Department's conclusions on the effec-
tiveness of all types of automatic belts lack a
statistically reliable base. In addition, in our anal-
ysis of accident data involving VW Rabbits with
automatic belts, the Department was unable to
determine with certainty the usage rates of the
automatic belts. Because of the lack of firm usage
data, effectiveness could not be estimated with as
much confidence as was done for manual belts.

Furthermore, recent research by the Canadian
Government has indicated that the absence of a
lap belt may result in the 2-point automatic belt
being less effective in preventing ejection. In addi-
tion, the door mounted, 2-point belt may have little

PART 571; S 208 - PRE 21 1

capability of preventing ejection of an occupant in
the event of an accidental door opening during a
collision. However, even a 3-point automatic belt
will not prevent all fatalities involving ejection,
since some fatalities occur as a result of impacting
interior components before ejection, while others
occur as a result of occupant contact with objects
outside the vehicle after partial ejection. More-
over, the door mounted belt in the 2-point system
may actually prevent door openings in many
instances, since the "loading" of the belt (which is
attached to the door) can tend to keep the door
closed during a crash.

Three-point automatic belts should be as effec-
tive as manual belts, and the Department's esti-
mates for effectiveness of automatic belts reflect
this. Automatic belt effectiveness estimates
have been adjusted downward by 5 percent at the
lower end of the range because there is some evi-
dence that 2-point belts may be less effecitve than
3-point belts.

Airbags

Because of limited field experience with airbags,
estimating the effectiveness of these devices is
very difficult. There are so few cars equipped with
airbags and so few cases or serious or fatal injuries
that the field experience has no statistical mean-
ing. Based on field experience through Decem-
ber 31, 1983, (excluding prototype and test fleet
vehicles) and a front seat fatality count of 10, the
computed airbag and manual belt effectiveness (as
used in the equivalent cars) for fatalities is now the
same. This means that airbags would not save any
more lives than the belt systems as used in those
cars. But because the data base is so small, we can-
not place any confidence in this effectiveness fig-
ure. Based on a normal "confidence interval"
(statistical certainty) of 90 percent, all that can be
stated based on the field data is that airbags could
range from being 46 percent more effective than
the manual belts as used in the same cars to 70 per-
cent less effective. Small changes in the number of
fatalities would have drastic changes in these
effectiveness estimates. Also, the comparisons are
to manual belt usage in equivalent 1972-1976 cars.
Belt usage is these cars was high compared to
usage in later models, because they had, first, con-
tinuous light and buzzer reminders and, then,
interlock systems. The airbag and equivalent man-
ual belt cars also were very large and had low
fatality rates. Finally, the accidents — small in

number— were frequently atypical and involved a
greater than normal number of circumstances
where a restraint system could not provide protec-
tion (such as a drowning). All of these factors indi-
cate that the "true" effectiveness could be signifi-
cantly higher than in this small fleet.

Current estimates of airbag effectiveness are
based principally upon four new analyses which
have recently been conducted by NHTSA. The
three studies concerned with fatality effectiveness
all use the National Crash Severity Study (NCSS),
a major accident data collection program designed
to result in a nationally representative sample.
Effectiveness was estimated by partitioning the
NCSS accidents into various subgroups by distin-
guishing characteristics and then making judg-
ments about whether an airbag could prevent the
fatalities that occurred in that subgroup. A fourth
study estimated moderate to critical injury effec-
tiveness by comparing injury rates sustained in
the airbag fleet cars to a comparable non airbag
group in the NCSS file.

We have relied on these new studies primarily
because they are based on a relatively large, repre-
sentative set of unrestrained fatal accident cases.
These data, as well as the now available 8-year
census of fatal accidents, were unavailable to
NHTSA when the automatic occupant protection
requirements were first promulgated in 1977. Thus,
effectiveness estimates which are not derived
from field experience now have a large file of acci-
dent data upon which to be based. Further, NHTSA
assembled a task force comprised of experts in the
field of restraint design, crash testing and accident
data analyses to ensure that the resulting esti-
mates represented a consensus of varying judg-
ments and expertise.

However, it must be noted that even these new
analyses have a significant degree of uncertainty
associated with them. For the most part, they rely
on judgments about airbag performance based on
limited field experience and controlled crash test-
ing. This technique has obvious limitations, because
death and injury in highway accidents are very
unpredictable.

There is little disagreement that airbags will
function very well in noncatastrophic, frontal or
near frontal collisions up to speeds approaching
45 mph and will offer little or no protection in rear
end collisions. The real issue concerns airbag effec-
tiveness in side or angle impacts, rollover, and
catastrophic frontal crashes. Because the Depart-

PART 571; S 208-PRE 212

ment is undecided on airbag effectiveness in the
latter three situations, a wide range of estimated
effectiveness for airbags has been provided. The
lower portion of the range (20 to 25 percent) is gen-
erally consistent with the assumption that airbags
will have fairly low effectiveness in side and roll-
over crashes. With progressively more optimistic
assumptions regarding their performance in these
types of crashes, the overall effectiveness estimate
approaches the higher end of the range (40 per-
cent). The 20 to 40 percent range fully encompasses
the above dichotomy of assumptions. The zero per-
cent field experience figure is discounted because
of its statistical unreliability, crash test data show-
ing superior performance of airbags at higher
speeds than for manual belts, and statements to
the docket.

Other Occupant Protection Technologies

Effectiveness estimates for other technologies
are currently unavailable.

Conclusions

Some conclusions can be drawn from the general
effectiveness data that have been developed. First,

the most effective system is an airbag plus a lap
and shoulder belt. To obtain maximum protection
in not only frontal, but also side and roll over acci-
dents, occupants of cars with airbags and lap belts
must use a lap belt to supplement the airbag. An
airbag plus a lap belt provides an equivalent level
of effectiveness to a manual lap and shoulder belt
system. Finally, an airbag alone is less effective
than a manual lap and shoulder belt or automatic
belt, when those systems are used.

Benefits of Occupant Restraint Systems

Safety Benefits

With its estimates for usage and effectiveness,
the Department can determine benefits by multi-
plying the product of those two estimates by the
fatality or injury figure. The final result is the
number of fatalities or injuries prevented. Table 5
shows the incremental benefits; i.e., the benefits
over and above those accruing from current levels
of restraint usage. The numbers provided in
Table 5 are annual benefits assuming full imple-
mentation. They are based on all cars on the road
having the restraint system noted (which would

TABLE 5
ANNUAL INCREMENTAL REDUCTION IN FATALITIES AND INJURIES

Fatalities

Moderate -Critical Injuries

Low

Mid-
Point

High

Low

Mid-
Point

High

Airbags only

3,780

6,190

8.630

73.660

110.360

147,560

Airbags with
Lap Belts
(12.5% usage)

4.410

6,670

8.960

83,480

117,780

152,550

Airbag with

Lap/Shoulder Belts
(12.5% usage)

4,570

6,830

9.110

85.930

120.250

115,030

Automatic Belts

Usage
20%
70%

520

5,030

750

6.270

980
7.510

8.740
86,860

12.180
105,590

15,650
124,570

Mandatory Belt Use Laws (Manual Belts)

Usage
40%
70%

2,830
5,920

3,220
6,720

3.590
7.510

47,740
110.430

53,440
112.410

59,220
124,570

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 213

not be the case until at least 10 years after full
implementation). Mixes of restraint systems, for
example, half of the cars with airbags and half with
automatic belts, would lead to results between the
values shown for those systems. The numbers also
reflect the mid points, as well as the extremes, of
the effectiveness ranges provided in Table 4. For
these calculations, belt usage with airbags was
assumed to be at current levels of restraint usage.
The Department has also provided data on the
benefits of airbags even if belts were not used. A
range of benefits is provided for automatic belts
and mandatory belt use laws, because of uncer-
tainty over usage rates.

Another aspect of the analysis of benefits is the
difference in short-term benefits of the different
alternatives. Roughly one-tenth of the American
fleet of automobiles is replaced every year. Al-
though some automobiles are kept beyond 10
years, the Department generally assumes that, ten
years after a rule requiring a safety device on new
automobiles has been implemented, the device
would be in place in virtually the entire American
fleet. In this regard, mandatory seatbelt use laws
that are enforced can have a distinct advantage in
that they can be applied to all automobiles in the
existing fleet immediately rather than only new
cars. Since the precise date at which different
States would pass and implement a mandatory belt
use law can not be judged, it is difficult to predict
with certainty when benefits would accrue and
what the level of those benefits would be.

However, comparisons can be made based upon
reasonable assumptions. For example, if all states
pass a mandatory belt use law and usage through-
out the nation increased to 70 percent or more
within three years, the short-term benefits (over
the next 10 years) would be 2.5 times higher for
such laws than those associated with airbags or
with automatic belts at the 70 percent usage level.
As the amount of time necessary to pass the laws
increases, or the number of States passing such
legislation decreases, or if usage does not increase
to 70 percent, the shortrun (and longrun) benefits
of mandatory belt usage would decrease compared
to the benefits of airbags (and possible automatic
belts if they are used at high levels). Nevertheless,
the benefits of mandatory belt use compared to the
introduction of automatic restraints are substantial.

Table 6 compares benefits for the first 10 and 15
years after the introduction of automatic
restraints into the fleet with those associated with

mandatory belt use laws. Three use-law scenarios
are examined. If all States quickly pass a manda-
tory belt use law and usage increased to 70 per-
cent or more, short term benefits (over the next 10
years) would be about 2.5 times higher than bene-
fits with airbags or automatic belts with 70 per-
cent usage. Thus, unless all cars had airbags, or
automatic belt usage approached 70 percent, the
longrun (15 years) benefits of automatic restraints
would be unlikely to approach those associated
with rapid passage of State belt use laws. The
short-run safety benefits of such laws are always
likely to be higher.

Conversely, if a large number of States do not
pass a law, or it takes a long time to get the State
laws passed, or usage does not increase to 70 per-
cent, then the shortrun and longrun benefits of
mandatory belt usage and automatic restraints
may be equal.

Insurance Savings

The potential reduction in fatalities and injuries
that would result from mandating automatic re-
straints could produce a corresponding decrease in
funeral, medical, and rehabilitation expenses. A
reduction in these expenses could, in turn, result in
reductions in premiums for any insurance that
covers them. (Automobile insurance premiums could
also increase to cover added expenses due to acci-
dents or thefts involving airbag equipped auto-
mobUes. This is discussed later in the preamble.)
The Department cannot be certain that consumers
would receive any premium reductions or, if they
would, what their magnitude might be. Most insur-
ance industry representatives are reluctant to pro-
vide quantitative estimates of potential savings to
consumers. However, at least one company pro-
vided an independent estimate and one State offi-
cial assured the Department that he will mandate
such reductions in his State.

The Department, based on the potential safety
benefits discussed previously and an estimate of
the portion of premiums associated with front seat
occupant fatalities, estimates that the discounted
value of automobUe insurance savings (assuming a
10 percent discount rate and a 10-year vehicle life)
could be, based on the midpoints of the effective-
ness ranges, $95 for cars equipped with airbags.
Spread over the entire vehicle fleet (including un-
insured vehicles), the discounted value is $89. For
belt systems the savings would depend upon usage
rates but could be as high as $85 per insured car

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 214

TABLE 6
TIME PHASE ANALYSIS OF FATALITY BENEFITS

Air Bag With Automatic Belt:

Mandatory Belt Use Law: 40-70% Usage

12.5% Usage

20-70%

Year

of Lap Belt

Usage

Scenario 1'

Scenario 2^

Scenario 3'

1

400

50-380

3,220-6.720

2.160-4,500

680-1,650

2

1,000

110-940

3,220-6.720

2.160-4,500

730-2,100

8

1.590

180-1,500

3,220-6.720

2.160-4.500

790-2,540

4

2.180

250-2,050

3,220-6.720

2.160-4.500

840-2,980

6

2.730

310-2.570

3,220-6.720

2,160-4,500

890-3,400

6

3.230

360-3,030

3.220-6.720

2.160-4,500

930-3,770

7

3.690

410-3,470

3.220-6.720

2,160-4,500

970-4.120

8

4.130

460-3.880

3,220-6,720

2.160-4.500

1,010-4,450

9

4.560

510-4.280

3,220-6.720

2.160-4.500

1,250-4,770

10

4.960

560-4.660

3,220-6,720

2,160-4,500

1,090-5.070

TOTAL

(1-10)

28.470

3,200-26.760

32,330-67,200

21,600-45,000

8.980-34,850

11

5.340

600-5.010

3,220-6,720

2,160-4,500

1,120-5,350

12

5.660

640-5.320

3,220-6,720

2,160-4,500

1,160-5,600

13

5.900

660-5.550

3,220-6,720

2,160-4,500

1,170-5,780

14

6.090

680-5.720

3,220-6,720

2,160-4,500

1,190-5.920

15

6.240

700-5.860

3,220-6,720

2,160-4,500

1.200-6,030

TOTAL

(1-15)

57.700

6.480-54.220

48,300-100.800

32,400-67.500

14,820-63,530

'Scenario 1 — It is assumed that all States have mandatory belt use laws which are in effect at the time that an automatic occupant pro-
tection standard becomes effective for new cars.

^Scenario 2 — It is assumed that 57 percent of the population is subject to mandatory belt use laws which are in effect at the time that
an automatic occupant protection standard becomes effective for new cars.

'Scenario 3 — It is assumed that 20 percent of the population is subject to mandatory belt use laws which are in effect at the time that
an automatic occupant protection standard becomes effective for new cars. The remaining 80 percent of the population would have
cars equipped with automatic belts, with usage in the 20-70 percent range.

and $79 when spread over all cars, if usage rose to
70 percent; at 2 percent usage, the figures would
be $10 and $9. respectively.

The Department's analysis also showed that
between $49 million and $1,100 million could be
saved annually in health, life, and worker's com-
pensation insurance and governmental payments
for social services such as Medicare, Medicaid, dis-
ability insurance, etc. The discounted value of
these insurance and governmental payment sav-
ings expressed on a per vehicle basis would be in
the range of $2 to $61.

Table 7 summarizes the insurance savings that
couls result from a requirement for automatic
occupant restraints. These potential insurance

savings do not account for some offsetting insur-
ance premium increases for airbag equipped cars,
which are discussed later.

Public Acceptance
of Occupant Protection Systems

The public acceptance of safety devices likely to
be installed in compliance with Federal motor
vehicle safety standards is one of the factors which
must be considered by the Department in estab-
lishing those standards. In Pacific Legal Founda-
tion V. DOT, the court found that in order for a
safety standard to be practicable and meet the
need for safety, the safety devices to be installed
pursuant to the standard must be acceptable to the

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 215

TABLE 7

SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL SAVINGS

ON INSURANCE PREMIUMS FROM AUTOMATIC RESTRAINT REQUIREMENTS

Savings ($)

Per Vehicle

Annual
Savings ($)

Per Vehicle

Lifetime

Savings ($)

Total Annual
Savings (M)
1990 Fleet

Air Bags

Automobile Insurance
Health Insurance
Life Insurance

9-17

4-8
0-1

62-115

29-54

3-7

1108-2046

521-962

62-136

Total

13-26

94-176

1691-3144

Automatic Belts

(For 20 Percent Assumed Usage)

Automobile Insurance
Health Insurance
Life Insurance

Total

1-2

0-1
0

1-3

5-14

2-7

0-1

7-22

89-243

42-114

7-14

138-371

Automatic Belts

(For 70 Percent Assumed Usage)

Automobile Insurance
Health Insurance
Life Insurance

Total

10-14
5-7
1

16-22

65-94

31-44

4-6

100-144

1146-1676

539-788

71-105

1756-2570

public. The Department has attempted to deter-
mine the likely public attitudes toward manual and
automatic restraints and mandatory safety belt
usage laws based on public opinion surveys. In
analyzing these surveys, the Department recog-
nizes that the usefulness of the surveys as pre-
dictors of future public attitudes is limited by sev-
eral factors. One is the public's lack of experience
with automatic restraints on which to base its
opinions. In view of the increase in favorable atti-
tudes toward automatic belts by owners of auto-
matic belt cars between the time of initial owner-
ship and a later time, the Department believes
that gradual exposure of the public to automatic
restraints will increase the acceptability of those
restraint systems above the levels indicated in the
surveys. Equally important, most of the surveys
are more than several years old. Since public opin-
ion appears subject to change in relatively short
periods of time in this area, as is evidenced by the

fairly rapid enactment of child restraint usage
laws in most States, there is additional reason to
believe that these surveys may not accurately
reflect future public attitudes and perhaps not
even current public opinion.

Awareness/Knowledge of Automatic Restraints

The extent of the survey respondent's knowl-
edge about automatic restraints is important in
assessing the validity of the surveys as predictors
of public reaction to automatic restraints. The less
knowledgeable the respondents are, the less
weight can be given to the survey results. Several
surveys made in the late 1970's and early 1980's
show that considerably higher percentages of the
people surveyed were aware of airbags than auto-
matic belts. The figures for airbags were 62 to
93 percent of the respondents, while those for
automatic belts were much smaller.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 216

Government's Role in Making Automatic
Restraints Available

There were a variety of deficiencies in the sur-
veys which included questions about public atti-
tudes toward a government requirement for air-
bags or automatic restraints. For example, most
surveys did not attempt to ascertain the degree of
the respondents' knowledge of airbags and did not
inform respondents about the cost of automatic
restraints. Eight of the 12 surveys which attempted
to ascertain public attitudes found that respon-
dents favored a Federal requirement. Based on its
analysis of those surveys, the Department con-
cluded that while many people do not favor such a
requirement on all new cars, there is also a sub-
stantial number who state their willingness to pur-
chase cars with automatic restraints. Thus, initial
public reaction will be divided. Public education
and the performance of automatic restraints will
be the key factors in determining the long run pub-
lic acceptance of automatic restraints.

How Muck Would the Public Pay for Airbags?

The surveys on the willingness of the public to
purchase airbags indicate that only a small per-
centage appears willing to pay more than $400 or
would expect to pay less than $100 for any airbag
system. The majority of respondents cluster
around the $200 to $300 levels, covering a range of
approximately $150 to $350. Toward the upper end
of this cost range, the driving public is roughly
evenly divided in its willingness to buy airbags.
This suggests that a substantial potential market
for airbags exists and that a significant portion of
the public would opt for them if they were priced
within the $150 to $350 range and available in suffi-
cient quantities.

Attitudes Toward Manual Belts, Automatic
Belts, and Airbags

The surveys generally indicate that the public
views automatic belts as superior to manual belts in
comfort and convenience and that these character-
istics would apparently override some of the rea-
sons respondents give for not using manual belts.
Those reasons include not wanting to be bothered
with belt usage and being lazy and forgetful. At
the same time, some of the reasons for not using
manual belts appear equally applicable to automatic
belts, e.g., fear of entrapment, doubting the value
of safety belts, and not wanting to be restrained.

Airbags were rated highest on comfort, conve-

nience and appearance and were perceived to be
safer than other restraint systems by infrequent
belt users. Primary concerns expressed about air-
bags relate to reliability, whether they will work
when needed or deploy accidentally, and cost.

Public AttitiLdes Toward a Mandatory Safety
Belt Usage Law

Surveys made in the 1970's indicate that the
public is divided on the issue of mandatory belt
usage laws when the concept of sanctions is not
mentioned; two 1983 surveys found the public to
favor mandatory use laws. When the possibility of
sanctions was mentioned as part of several sur-
veys taken in the 1970's, there was increased oppo-
sition to mandatory use laws. Since the newest of
these surveys involving sanctions is 6 years old,
the Department does not have a current reading of
nationwide public opinion.

Public Opinion Surveys— Docket Submissions

Two public opinion surveys on occupant restraint
issues were submitted to the docket, one by GM
and the other by IIHS. Since both surveys included
questions whose wording appears to have affected
the answers, the Department does not believe that
the answers to those questions can be regarded as
accurately reflecting current public attitudes. For
example, some questions failed to mention either
the benefits or the costs of automatic restraints. In
addition, there are reasons for questioning the rep-
resentatives of the sample of respondents.

As to whether there should be airbags in new
cars, the GM survey found that 51 percent of the
respondents favored installtion if the price were
$100. That number dropped to 35 percent if the
price were $320 and to 19 percent if the price were
$500. The GM survey also asked whether the re-
spondents would favor installation of automatic
belts at an additional cost of $100. Thirty-eight per-
cent answered affirmatively.

IIHS' survey asked whether airbags and auto-
matic belts should be standard or optional equip-
ment. Fifty-six percent favored installation as
standard equipment and 40 percent as optional
equipment. When the 44 percent who did not be-
lieve that automatic restraints should be standard
equipment were asked if manufacturers should be
required to offer those restraints as options,
84 percent answered affirmatively.

Of the two surveys, only the IIHS survey directly
queried the respondents about their preference for

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 217

automatic restraints at various price levels. At a
cost of $100 over the cost of manual belts, 30 per-
cent favored automatic belts over manual belts
and at a cost of $150, 25 percent did so. Similarly,
at a cost of $100 for airbags 55 percent favored air-
bags over manual belts. The percentage fell to
47 percent at $200 and 42 percent at $350.

Both surveys asked about preferences for air-
bag requirements versus a safety belt usage law.
The GM survey found that 28 percent would most
like to see a combination of a belt usage law and a
65 mph speed limit on the Interstate System,
24 percent preferred airbags in all cars, and
16 percent favored a belt usage law by itself. To
measure dislikes, the GM survey asked which
requirement the respondents would least like to
see enforced. Airbags were picked by 44 percent, a
belt usage law by 14 percent, and the combination
of a belt usage law and a 65 mph speed limit by
11 percent. The IIHS survey showed a preference
of 2 to 1 in favor of an airbag requirement over a
belt usage law. The results of both surveys in
these areas were at least in part due to the particu-
lar information provided the respondents and to
the wording of the questions.

The Department does not believe that it is nec-
essary to resolve the dispute between the com-
menters over the precise role of public accept-
ability in establishing safety requirements. The
nature and significance of public acceptability
issues varies greatly depending on the particular
factual circumstances of individual rulemakings.
Since Pacific Legal Foundation v. DOT, it has been
beyond dispute that public acceptability must be
considered in rulemaking under the Act. The De-
partment agrees that public acceptability involves
more than considering consumer preferences. As
Allstate noted, if preferences alone were a con-
trolling factor, then that would call into question
the current provisions under which manual belts
are installed in new cars. However, the Depart-
ment also agrees that behavior other than dis-
abling occupant restraint systems may be relevant
in considering public acceptability. The Depart-
ment believes that its consideration of public
acceptability would satisfy whatever definition
might be applied in assessing its actions.

Based on the likelihood that the car manufac-
turers will install detachable automatic belts or
airbags instead of nondetachable automatic belts,
the Department does not believe that there will be
a significant reduction in benefits due to persons

disabling automatic restraints. Neither the detach-
able automatic belt nor the airbag have the intru-
sive or coercive qualities that the combination of
manual belts and ignition interlocks had in 1974.
However, the Department recognizes the need for
the public to become accustomed to the technology
and the need for protection, and believes that an
across-the-board mandate too quickly could engen-
der adverse public reaction. The Department's
decision to gradually phase in the requirements of
this rule will help build public acceptance of this
rule. Additionally, although the added costs of
automatic restraints will theoretically have some
effect on new car sales, those effects, as discussed
in the FRIA, would not be substantial.

Costs and Lead Time
for Occupant Protection Systems

Equipment

General

Table 8 provides the Department's estimates for
the incremental increase in equipment and fuel
costs and required lead time for automatic belts
and airbags. The increment is the cost over that of
the current manual lap/shoulder belts. The Depart-
ment estimates that installation of airbags in com-
pact and larger cars would require 3 to 4 years
lead time and automatic belts in all cars would
require 2 to 3 years; installtion could begin sooner
for a small fraction of annual production, and is
likely to take even longer for airbags in small cars.
Greater detail on the estimates is provided in the
Department's Final Regulatory Impact Analysis.

The costs of manual and automatic belts and air-
bags are based on tear-down studies and com-
ments to the docket. The cost for belts are believed
to be typical of high volume production costs; the
estimates for airbags are based on production of
1 million units, which is believed to be representa-
tive fo full production system costs if airbags were
widely used.

Table 9 presents industry estimates on costs
and lead time. It shows investment costs separately
because of its effect on cash flow. Investment costs
are not, however, additive to equipment; they are
already included in equipment costs.

Manual Lap and Shoulder Belts
Based on Departmental analyses, the increase in
a new car's price attributable to the addition of a

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 218

Manual Belt System

Automatic Belt System
(2 pt or 3 pt non-

TABLE 8
PER VEHICLE COST IMPACTS

Incremental
Cost

Lifetime

Energy
Costs

Base

•For compact-sized and larger cars

Total

Cost
Increase

Required
Leadtime

power high volume)

$40

$11

$51

24-36 Mo.

Air Bag — Driver Only
(High volume)

$220

$12

$232

36 Mo.*

Air Bag-FuU Front
(High volume)

$320

$44

$364

36-48 Mo.*

manual lap and shoulder belt to the front outboard
seating positions and a manual lap belt to the front
center position is approximately $64, based on a
production volume of one million units per year.
The added weight for the manual belt would increase
fuel usage at a cost of $22 over the life of the car.
Industry estimates for the cost of existing man-
ual seatbelts ranged from $50 (Honda and Peugeot
for two seating positions) to $90 (Nissan for two
positions). GM and Chrysler said seatbelts for
three positions cost $65 (GM said $59 for two posi-
tions).

Automatic Belts

For the various designs of automatic belts hav-
ing a fixed anchorage on the door, the increase in a
new car purchase price over that for a car with
manual seatbelts has been estimated at $40. Added
fuel costs over the life of the car would be $11.
Some manufacturers may offer motorized belt sys-
tems, such as Toyota currently offers in its Cres-
sida. Incremental cost increases for such systems
are estimated by manufacturers to be as high as
$300 to $400, but the NHTSA teardown study of
the Cressida system shows incremental consumer
cost increases of only $115 for such systems. Al-
though motorized systems may lead to higher
usage levels because of their convenience, they
were not required under FMVSS 208 prior to its
rescission in 1981, and are not required by this
amendment to the rule.

Of the major automakers, only GM provided a
detailed cost estimate in its comments to the rule-
making docket. GM's estimate was for a high vol-
ume, four-door sedan with two front seats and
3-point detachable automatic belts with single
door-mounted retractors. No provision was neces-
sary for knee bolsters. Their estimate, as well as
that of an experienced cost estimator (Lohr) was
$45, similar to our estimate of $40. The NHTSA
tear-down studies of the Rabbit and Chevette sys-
tems, including modifications to fit other cars,
yielded costs of $11 to $34. Other manufacturers'
estimates are higher than NHTSA's because of
"extras" (i.e., equipment not required under
FMVSS 208; providing manual lap belts with
2-point automatic belts, knee bolsters with 3-point
belts or extra retractors to "hide" detached auto-
matic belts) and different assumptions about mark-
ups (profit and overhead) over actual variable costs.

The NHTSA teardown studies were adjusted to
account for a mix of 2- and 3-point belts as well as
for provision of items not required by the stan-
dard, but which could increase usage or safety.
Two items that fit in the latter categories are
motorized systems and the provision of manual lap
belts with 2-point automatic belts. These additions
increase the tear-down study estimates to $40.

The NHTSA estimate of incremental weight
associated with automatic belts is 5 pounds. This
compares with GM's estimate of no increase in
weight with such systems, VW's estimate of

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 219

TABLE 9
INDUSTRY STATEMENTS* INCREMENTAL ON COSTS OF OCCUPANT RESTRAINT SYSTEMS

AND LEAD TIME
($ 1983)

Investment

Equipment Cost of

Cost'

**

Fuel

Lead

Consumer per Vehicle ($)

($ MUlions)

Cost (lbs)

Time (mos.)

Auto- _

Airbags

Auto

Auto-

Auto-

matic

Full

matic

Air-

matic

Air-

matic

Air-

Belts

Driver

Front

Belts

bags

Belts

bags

Belts

bags

GM

$45

5102

8382

125

5738

0

56

36

36

Ford

—

—

8073

—

—

25

40

36-48

48

Chrysler

115

5001

8001

37

89«

—

—

36

36-60

AMC

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

30-36

36-42

Mercedes

—

8806

-

—

—

—

—

—

—

Renault

200

—

1,000'

1.5

—

—

—

24

36

Jaguar

150

900

1.800'

—

31

—

35

—

—

VW

—

—

—

—

—

7

—

48

—

Saab

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

30

58

Nissan

130-150

—

—

—

—

—

—

30-42

—

Honda

150-170

—

—

5

—

—

—

36-48

—

Mazda

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

36

36

Peugeot

380

—

—

—

—

—

—

36

36

American Seat

Belt Council

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

24

—

AOPA

—

—

185^

—

—

—

—

18-30

18-30

Breed

—

45^

141^

—

—

—

—

18

—

Lohr

45

—

—

little

—

—

—

—

—

Romeo Kojyo

—

150«

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

• A " — " indicates no data was submitted or the commenter claimed it was confidential.
•• Already included in equipment costs. Also shown separately because of effect on cash flow.

1 At 1 million units

2 At 3 million units
^At 200,000 units
^At 2 million units

^Includes pretensioned passenger belt plus driver lap/shoulder belt

^Retrofit; does not include installation

'Estimate

^FoT driver only airbags, GM said that investment costs would be $428 million and Chrysler said $12 million.

7 pounds and Ford's 25 pound estimate. Assuming
an equal increment of secondary weight, NHTSA
estimates that the total 10 pound weight increase
would result in $11 extra in fuel consumption over
the vehicle's lifetime.

Airbags

The Department estimates that the vehicle
price increase resulting from the installtion of air-
bags in all three front seating positions of cars

would be $320 over the cost of a car with manual
lap and shoulder seatbelts, based on a production
volume of one million units. The replacement cost
for a deployed airbag is estimated to be $800.
There would also be a fuel penalty of $44 over the
life of the car, above that for a car with manual lap
and shoulder belts. The cost for a driver-only air-
bag and lap belt is estimated to be $220, plus a $12
fuel penalty.

The price of airbags is sensitive to volume

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 220

changes. At annual volumes of less than 300,000
units, full front airbags may cost anywhere from
$400 to $1,500 per car. For volumes of 10,000 units
per year or less, the latter figure is most represen-
tative. A successful, all mechanical airbag system
(such as the Breed system) may reduce the unit
price of a full front airbag system to about $250 at
an annual volume of one million units.

NHTSA's airbag tear-down study involved a
1979 Ford and a 1981 Mercedes Benz driver and
passenger airbag system. The systems were disas-
sembled into their component parts and, using
automotive engineering cost estimating tech-
niques, a NHTSA contractor estimated a variable
or "piece" cost of each component exclusive of any
fixed overhead expenses incurred in the produc-
tion of airbag systems. These estimates are similar
to those supplied by the actual airbag manufac-
turers through their association. The estimates
that were developed include our best estimate of
the cost of required vehicle modifications. The esti-
mates also include certain component modifications
suggested by the contractors for high volume pro-
duction. Estimates were developed for annual pro-
duction volumes of 300,000, 1,000,000 and 2V2 mil-
lion for both systems. In arriving at a unit retail
price, unit variable costs were marked up by a fac-
tor of 1.33 to arrive at "wholesale" or "dealer" cost
and a dealer discount of 12 percent was assumed.

The difference between the Department's esti-
mates and industry's estimates is basically due to
differences in design and pricing assumptions. For
example, one major cost difference involves the
price of the diagnostic module and associated elec-
tronics. In its comments to the docket. Ford indi-
cated that it believes that military specification
grade electronics are necessary in view of product
liability considerations; we have assumed that
automotive grade electronics will suffice, although
we recognize that, initially, manufacturers may
resort to military specification grade electronics
until the reliability of automotive g^ade elec-
tronics is proven sufficiently. Significant differ-
ences also exist in the number of required crash
sensors, module costs (NHTSA used supplier
quoted costs) and vehicle markups. The Depart-
ment also found the estimates provided by the
major U.S. manufacturers for driver-only airbag
costs difficult to justify at their stated volumes.
For example, even recognizing that there are vast
differences in basic design between Mercedes and
GM vehicles, Mercedes appears to be charging its

customers a price 25 percent higher than GM's
estimate for a driver-only system even though the
Mercedes system is optional and sold at an annual
volume which is 42 times lower than that esti-
mated by GM.

Other Occupant Protection Technologies

Costs for other technologies are currently un-
available.

Investment

Investment costs, which are defined as outlays
for property, plant, machinery, equipment, and
special tools to be used in the production of auto-
matic occupant restraint systems, are estimated to
be $1.3 billion if airbags were required in all new
cars and $500 million if automatic belts were re-
quired. These estimates are for the multiyear
period prior to full implementation of an automatic
restraint requirement. Industry's estimate for
these expenses are contained in Table 9.

The implementation of automatic occupant re-
straint requirements should not substantially alter
the magnitude of planned capital spending over the
next several years, since domestic manufacturers
alone are investing nearly $10 billion annually.

Insurance

If airbags were required in all automobiles, colli-
sion and property damage liability insurance poli-
cies would have to absorb additional costs for re-
placing deployed airbags, for the value airbags add
to vehicles that are "totaled", and for the added
cost that would result when some damaged vehi-
cles are considered "totaled" instead of repairable
because of the added cost of replacing the airbag.
The Department estimates that the maximum ex-
pected loss, because of a requirement for airbags
in the entire automobile fleet, that would be borne
by collision insurance policies would be approxi-
mately $177 million per year. For property damage
liability policies, the cost would be $118.2 million.

Comprehensive insurance policies will also have
to absorb additional costs for the value that air-
bags add to vehicles that are stolen or damaged by
such things as fire and flood. The cost to insurance
companies for these vehicles would be increased
by the average depreciated value of airbags in the
vehicles. The Department estimates that the maxi-
mum loss that would be covered by this insurance
would be approximately $55 million per year.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 221

These additional losses from airbags may cause
annual premium increases, per insured vehicle, of
about $2.60 per vehicle per year or $16.60 over a
vehicle's lifetime. Table 10 shows these costs.

TABLE 10

SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL AUTOMOBILE

PHYSICAL DAMAGE PREMIUM COSTS

RESULTING FROM AIRBAGS

($ 1982)

Per Per

Insured Insured Per Per Total

Vehicle Vehicle Vehicle Vehicle Annual

Annual Lifetime Annual Lifetime Costs,

Cost Cost Cost Cost MUlions

Collision

1.90

13.45

1.31

8.85

177.2

Property
Damage
Liability

.94

6.35

.88

5.95

118.1

Comprehensive

.54

3.65

.41

2.77

55.4

TOTAL'

2.60

17.57

350.7

' No total is provided for per insurance vehicle figures because
each type of insurance covers a different number of vehicles.
The addition of these numbers would therefore be meaningless.

Economic Impact

In response to the comments about the potential
economic impact of any rulemaking, the Depart-
ment's analysis indicates that, with a labor force of
over 115 million projected for the mid-1980's, it
would be difficult to conclude that a restraint sys-

tem costing the consumer no more than $500 would
result in any measurable impact on national employ-
ment. Any perceptible effect on GNP is unlikely.
Finally, as to the consumer price index, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics generally considers higher con-
sumer costs due to safety equipment as quality
improvements, not inflationary increases, having
no effect on the consumer price index. The projec-
tion of effects on the GNP and the price index have
one thing in common: the relative changes are
small. Long-term effects on auto sales are expected
to be minor and auto industry revenue and employ-
ment would be expected to increase. In any event,
any significant changes would result only from an
all airbag requirement, not from the installation of
automatic belts.

There are also positive economic benefits asso-
ciated with automatic occupant protection. Based
on the previously mentioned estimates of lives
saved and injuries avoided (see Table 5), and the
economic losses associated with those casualties as
contained in a recent NHTSA study, "The Economic
Cost to Society of Motor Vehicle Accidents" (Jan-
uary 1983), as much as $2.4 billion in protection.
Although we do not wish to— and cannot— place a
value on human life or injury, there are some costs
associated with those deaths and injuries that can
be measured, and only these are included in the
study. Because they do not include such things as
pain and suffering or loss of consortium, they will
obviously understate total benefits of the life sav-
ings and injury reducing potential of occupancy
restraint systems.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 222

ANALYSIS OF THE ALTERNATIVES

General

Introduction

Numerous alternatives have been considered as
part of the response to the Supreme Court deci-
sion on automatic occupant restraints. Before anal-
yzing each of the specific alternatives, this portion
of the paper first looks at some of the general pros
and cons of each automatic protection system. It
also discusses the pros and cons of other general
features of many of the alternatives: a demonstra-
tion program, mandatory State seatbelt use laws,
legislation to require that the consumer be given
the option of buying an automatic restraint sys-
tem, airbag retrofit capability, passive interiors,
and the center seat issue.

Airbags

Airbags offer a distinct advantage over other
occupant restraints in that they ensure a usage
rate of nearly 100 percent for both drivers and pas-
sengers. Used alone, they do offer protection, but,
to equal the effectiveness of a manual lap and
shoulder belt, airbags must be used with lap belts.
Lap belts in airbag equipped cars would probably
be used only at a level near the current level of
seatbelt use, 12.5 percent. Because manual belt use
is so low, however, airbags would provide much
greater safety benefits.

Airbags with lap belts also provide protection at
higher speeds than safety belts do, and they will
provide better protection against several kinds of
extremely debilitating injuries (e.g., brain and
facial injuries) than safety belts. They also gener-
ally spread the inpact of a crash better than seat-
belts, which are more likely to cause internal in-
juries or broken bones in the areas of the body

where they restrain occupants in severe crashes.
However, the airbag does not provide protection
at less than 10 to 12 miles per hour, nor does it
provide protection in rollover or read-end crashes.
Its level of effectiveness in side crashes is uncer-
tain, hence the large range of effectiveness esti-
mates for airbags. To attain protection in these
nonfrontal crashes, a lap belt, or lap/should belt
must be worn.

Full front airbags also can provide protection
for the center seating position. No other automatic
restraint system can do this, because, as with man-
ual seatbelt systems, a shoulder belt cannot prac-
ticably be offered for the center seat.

The use of airbags would overcome possible
public objections to the obtrusiveness of continu-
ous automatic belts, lessen concerns about entrap-
ment and avoid problems of shoulder belt comfort
and convenience. Although there are significant
public concerns about the alleged hazards associ-
ated with airbags, the Department believes that
many of these (e.g., inadvertent activation, sodium
azide, and lack of assurance that they work when
needed) are unfounded.

The public might also be very concerned about
the cost associated with airbags — especially cur-
rent belt users who may argue that they would be
getting very little additional protection at much
greater cost. The cost of airbags is one of their big-
gest disadvantages.

One problem with respect to costs is the wide
disparity between the Department's cost esti-
mates and industry's. Although the Department
can explain its estimate and the reasons for the dif-
ferences, it cannot control the price at which the
system is offered to the consumer. Thus, although
the Department believes full front airbags need

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 223

cost ho more than $320, they could, especially in
the near term, cost much more, since airbag costs
are very sensitive to production volume. Any
alternative that does not result in the use of a
large number (for example, 300,000) of airbags may
result in their per unit costs being very high.

Repair shop owners have raised concerns about
their potential liability if an automobile's airbag
fails to work after repair work was done on the
car. The Department believes this concern is over
stated; the introduction of an airbag into an auto-
mobile is no different from the introduction of
other safety features that may not work after
repair work is done on an automobile. Moreover,
the insurance companies have indicated in their
testimony and docket comments that there would
be very little if any increase in premiums to pro-
vide insurance protection against such risks.
Indeed, some insurance companies testified that
product liability claims should decrease with auto-
matic restraints. The expected reduction in deaths
and injuries should result in fewer claims, for
example, alleging that the brakes or steering were
defective. Although some consumers might view
airbags as a panacea and bring suit if subsequently
injured, such "nuisance" suits are unlikely to be
successful and, thus, should be short-lived.

Concerns were also raised about the dangers of
sodium azide, the gas generant in most airbag sys-
tems. The sodium azide pellets are hermetically
sealed and the potential of exposing motorists to a
harmful dose is remote. Additional concerns in-
volved the dangers posed by persons tampering
with unfired sodium azide canisters and by the
scrapping of cars with unfired canisters. While the
Department believes that disposal problems can
be resolved, further action on this issue is required,
and the Department will work with automobile
manufacturers and scrappers to ensure the safe
retirement of airbag equipped vehicles. Although
it is possible that individuals may tamper with or
try to steal an unfired sodium azide canister, the
Department believes that this is highly unlikely.
The amount of sodium azide contained in the canis-
ter is small and it is more readily available through
other sources. Other items in the automobile — anti-
freeze, gasoline, battery acid, or flares — are either
more poisonous or explosive.

Dealers are also concerned that car sales will
decline with an all airbag fleet. They fear that
potential buyers may stay out of the market, hop-
ing to buy in later model years when an all airbag

decision would have been overturned by subsequent
agency or congressional action. However, as dis-
cussed in the FRIA, the price increases associated
with an all airbag new car fleet, would, at most,
result in one to three postponed sales per dealer-
ship. In the long term, lost sales would not, on
average, be expected to exceed one per dealer.
Since airbags are not being required by this amend-
ment to FMVSS 208, a consumer need not purchase
an airbag-equipped vehicle unless he or she so
desires. Thus, there should not be any reduction in
sales resulting from the fact that airbags are one
of several systems made available to consumers.

Another concern involves the technical problem
of out-of-position occupants in small cars. The out-
of-position occupant problem primarily affects
children less than 3 years old. (The size of the
child and the speed with which the bag must open
in small cars are the primary reasons for the prob-
lem.) Overall, the safety benefits are greater for an
out-of-position occupant with an airbag than with-
out one. Moreover, technical modifications (e.g.,
sensors that could detect an out-of-position occu-
pant and adjust the opening of the airbag to account
for the occupant's position) and child restraint laws
should lessen the problem. Nevertheless, the
Department can not state for certain that airbags
will never cause injury or death to a child. This
situation is similar to current safety belts where
the benefits are well-known, but they do on occa-
sion cause injuries that otherwise would not have
occurred. Again, the Department is not mandating
the use of airbags.

In addition, manufacturers have commented
that space limitations in small cars would inhibit
the installation of current airbag systems and
adversely affect their effectiveness. While this
problem can be resolved, more time would be
needed. At least 4 years lead time would be
needed if airbags were required in small cars.

Still another issue is raised by some manufac-
turers who contend that tests required under the
rule are not sufficiently repeatable to enable
manufacturers to assure themselves of compli-
ance. They argue that they get too wide a varia-
tion in results when they test the same automobile
under the test procedure. To protect against some
cars not passing the test, they say they will have
to design the restraint systems to a more stringent
standard then should be necessary. Although diffi-
culties in the testing procedures are still of con-
cern to the manufacturers, we believe that the

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 224

testing device and testing procedure have matured
greatly in the last decade. Furthermore, based on
the result of NHTSA's NCAP tests, most cars
(albeit with manual belts) already meet the injury
prevention criteria of FMVSS 208, at 35mph — a
36 percent more severe crash than required by the
standard (with is a 30 mph test). Compliance by air-
bags is even less of a problem since the injury
levels of the test dummy tend to be well below the
maxima of the standard (much lower than for belt
systems), providing a large margin of safety. In
summary, we do not think that test repeatability is
such a severe problem as to preclude an airbag or
other occupant restraint standard, although the
Department will subsequently address possible
improvements in this area.

Some people are concerned that the failure to
issue a rule that will result in at least some airbags
being placed in automobiles might mean the end of
the development of airbag technology. In this
regard, it must be remembered that some improve-
ments—such as those made by the Breed Corpora-
tion—have come about without regulation. More-
over, four manufacturers are currently planning to
offer driver-only airbags in their automobiles, even
though not required. It is, therefore, possible that
others may follow suit to meet the competition.
Most important, the Department believes that this
rule will result in the use of airbags in a far larger
number of automobiles than is the case today.

It should be noted that improvements are pos-
sible in the airbag system that might overcome
some of the remaining problems. For example, the
airbag system being developed by Breed might
make airbags available at less cost than current
airbag systems.

Some may argue that consumer fears and dislike
of airbags may come close to generating a level of
public disapproval equivalent to the seatbelt inter-
lock system. On the other hand, the unobtrusive-
ness of the system may result in the airbag gener-
ating the least disapproval.

Nondetachable Automatic Seatbelts

The usage rate for nondetachable automatic
belts should be higher than that for manual belts,
but some people will certainly find them uncom-
fortable, combersome, and obtrusive. Others will
fear entrapment. Although they are much less
costly than airbags and not much more expensive
than manual seatbelts, these concerns with non-
detachable belts might hamper automobile sales.

Finally, it is possible that, in an emergency, peo-
ple may find nondetachable belts harder to get out
of than detachable belts. Although data do not
exist on this issue, the Department has long
expressed concern about the possibility that an
unfamiliar egress mechanism could impede emer-
gency exit. In the early 1970's, DOT issued a rule
requiring all automatic belts to be detachable to
permit emergency exit. Even in a later amend-
ment in 1978 allowing the "spool-release" feature
on continuous belts, NHTSA continued to express
some concerns about ease of exit in case of emer-
gency. The Department believes, however, that
current designs of continuous belts will not create
a safety problem.

Perhaps the most serious concern with respect
to nondetachable belts is that the public's dislike of
them may lead to defeat of the system (e.g., by cut-
ting the belt). A number of surveys have found
that 10 to 20 percent of the public might do so. This
would result in not only the original owner but
subsequent owners and passengers being deprived
of any occupant restraint system. Since the aver-
age car has two to three owners during the useful
life, belt availability could decrease to nearly
50 percent for a 10-year-old car.

Nondetachable belts are probably the most coer-
cive type of automatic restraint. Combining this
with the fears of entrapment and the concerns
over obtrusiveness could cause enough public
clamor to result in the same type of problem that
arose out of the interlock requirement in the mid
1970's when Congress forbade the Department from
requiring that device. (In the NHTSA authorization
bill of 1980, which barely failed enactment, there
was a provision to ban nondetachable seatbelts.)

Nondetachable belts would also force manufac-
turers to eliminate the center front seat (by the
use of bucket seats and consoles). There is no com-
mercially developed technology to provide an auto-
matic belt for the center seat; even if it were
exempted from the requirement for an automatic
restraint, occupants would have a difficult time
getting by the nondetachable belts to reach the
center seat.

Another problem with nondetachable belts is
that they make it difficult to install a child re-
straint seat properly.

Detachable Automatic Seatbelts

Detachable belts should alleviate some con-
sumer concern about automatic belts and govern-

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 225

ment involvement in the consumer's decision
about belt usage. Although it is easy not to use the
automatic feature (by detaching the belt and leav-
ing it stowed), the availability of the automatic fea-
ture would make it easier to overcome some of the
problems of manual seatbelt usage.

Detachable belts would also be only slightly
more expensive than manual belts, but the addi-
tional expenditure would be made for what are
likely to be relatively small safety benefits, if
usage does not increase substantially over than for
manual belts. In this regard, however, it must be
remembered that NHTSA rescinded the automatic
restraint requirement in 1981 because it found
that detachable automatic belts would be installed
in most cars and thought that those belts might
not increase belt usage enough to justify them.
The Supreme Court, in reviewing this action, then
found that the evidence in the record indicated a
possible doubling of usage with automatic belts.
The Court also said that the inertia factor pro-
vided grounds for believing that seatbelt use by
the 20 to 50 percent who wear their belts occasion-
ally would increase substantially. The manufac-
turers also now agree that detachable belts will
increase usage, at least initially.

Demonstration Program

Although we may gain more data on usage and
effectiveness, the main purpose of a demonstration
program would be to obtain detailed data on the
issue of public acceptabUity of automatic occupant
restraints. To the extent consumer purchases
under a demonstration program would be volun-
tary, data that were gathered on usage or effec-
tiveness would be too small to determine the reac-
tion of the general population under an automatic
occupant restraint mandate. To obtain statistically
reliable data within a reasonably short period of
time, a large number of automobUes would have to
be included in the program. If such a program
were to be conducted, the Department believes
that it should include provision for producing at
least 500,000 cars per year over a 4 year period
with airbags, detachable and nondetachable auto-
matic belts. The three types of automatic restraints
would be divided evenly among the cars produced.
This should provide statistically reliable results in
4 to 5 years from the date the first car is sold.
(If the program is limited to airbags, 250,000 cars
should be manufactured per year over a four year
period. This would provide results in about 4 to 5

years.) The program could be conducted in essen-
tially the same fashion as envisioned by Secretary
Coleman when he announced his plans in 1976 to
conduct a demonstration program. At that time,
the Department negotiated contracts with four car
manufacturers for the production of up to 250,000
automatic restraint equipped cars per year for
model years 1980 and 1981.

During our recent public hearings. Ford indi-
cated support for a mandatory demonstration pro-
gram. Other manufacturers are receptive to a
voluntary program, but only as an alternative to
an automatic restraint requirement, and only
under several conditions regarding the manufac-
turer's freedom to choose the type of restraint and
model, test procedure changes, etc. Several manu-
facturers would not voluntarily participate in any
demonstration program.

Three methods could be considered for conduct-
ing a demonstration program: (1) a voluntary con-
tract program such as that suggested by Secretary
Coleman; (2) use existing National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act authority to mandate
such a program; and (3) seek Federal legislation. A
mandated demonstration program would be diffi-
cult to justify under the Safety Act. Ford now
believes that such authority exists, but the
Department thinks that new legislation would be
necessary. It is unclear whether Congress would
provide the necessary legislation or any funding
that might be required. Moreover, the time neces-
sary to obtain any legislation would have to be ad-
ded to the time necessary to conduct an effective
program. There also may be serious objection to a
demonstration program after so many years of at-
tempted rulemaking, and especially so many years
after Secretary Coleman's efforts.

Mandatory State Safety Belt Usage Laws

A number of analyses of seatbelt use in coun-
tries that have mandatory use laws show that such
laws do increase usage. Survey results, based on
responses from officials in foreign countries, show
that when seatbelt usage was required and the re-
quirement was properly enforced, usage increased
dramatically and remained high. Tables 11 and 12
clearly illustrate these dramatic increases. Table 11
provides data available to the Department on 17
nations that have passed MULs; the table shows
the difference in usage rates before and after the
enactment of MULs. In addition, a number of
Canadian provinces have enacted MULs. Those

PART 571; S 208 - PRE 226

TABLE 11
CHANGES IN SEAT BELT USAGE RATES UNDER MANDATORY USE LAWS

Effective
Date of Law

Belt Usage

Country

Before

After

Australia

1-72

30%

73-87%

New Zealand

6-72

40%

89%

France

7-73

20-25%

95% highways
75% country roads
50% night in cities
35% day and night in built
up areas

Puerto Rico

1-74

5%

14%

Sweden

1-75

22%

75%

Belgium

6-75

17%

87%

Netherlands

6-75

11% urban

58% urban

24% rural

75% rural

Finland

7-75

30% highways on weekdays

68% highways on weekdays

9% urban traffic

53% urban traffic

Israel

7-75

6%

70%

Norway

9-75

13% urban

77% urban

35% rural

88% highway

Denmark

1-76

25%

70%

Switzerland

1-76

(repealed 10-77)

19% city streets

75% city streets

Reenacted ll-«0

35% highways

81% highways

42% expressways

88% expressways

West Germany

1-76

55% autobahns

77% autobahns

32% country roads

64% country roads

20% city streets

47% city streets

33% weighted average

58% weighted average

Austria

7-76

10% urban

20% urban

25% rural

30% rural

South Africa

12-77

10%

62%

Ireland

2-79

20%

45%

Great Britain

1-83

40%

95%

provinces and the data on their experience are con-
tained in Table 12. (More detail on the information
in these tables can be found in the FRIA.)

The data in these two tables clearly illustrate
the significant effect MULs have on seatbelt
usage. As Table 11 shows, usage rates ranged
from 5 to 40 percent before MULs went into effect,
and from 14 to 95 percent after enactment. Usage
typically at least doubled and in some cases in-
creased three times or more. The average usage
for the 17 countries in the table was 23 percent
before mandatory belt usage and 66 percent after,
an increase of 43 percentage points.

The Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company (PMM)
study from which most of the data included in
Table 11 were obtained concluded that the main
factors that influence the frequency with which
individuals wear their seatbelts under MULs are:

(1) the level of enforcement applied by the police;

(2) the natural propensity of indivuduals to be law
abiding; and/or (3) the individual's personal per-
spective regarding their own safety.

Given the geographical proximity of Canada to
the U.S. and the many similarities between our soci-
eties, the Canadian experience with MULs is espe-
cially valuable. MULs are in effect in seven prov-

PART 571; S 208 - PRE 227

TABLE 12
CHANGES IN DRIVER SEAT BELT USAGE IN CANADA UNDER MANDATORY USE LAWS

Province

Effective
Date of Law

Use Before

Use in 1983

23%
18%
32%
37%
9%
4%
12%

Averages weighted by Traffic Counts at Data Collection Sites:

Provinces with Mandatory Use Laws
Provinces with No Mandatory Use Laws
Unweighted Average Usage Before
Laws Passed (Excl. Manitoba) 21%

Ontario

1-76

Quebec

8-76

Saskatchewan

1-77

British Columbia

10-77

Newfoundland

7-82

New Brunswick

6-83

Manitoba

1-84

60%
61%
54%
67%
76%
68%
12%

61%
15%

inces in Canada, but, since Manitoba's did not go
into effect until January 1984, data are not yet avail-
able from the province. Usage rates before MULs
went into effect for the six other provinces averaged
21 percent. Usage rates for those six averaged
61 percent in 1983. This is an increase of 40 per-
cent under MULs. The PMM and other studies of
MULs, which are more fully discussed in the
FRIA, have concluded that success is dependent
on how well the public is prepared for these laws,
the severity of sanctions, and on the diligence of
enforcement. For this reason, the Department has
established critieria in the amended rule to ensure
an appropriate level of educational, sanction, and
enforcement efforts.

The 1982 background paper on "Mandatory Pas-
sive Restraint Systems in Automobiles," prepared
by the Congressional Office of Technology Assess-
ment, stated that "Mandatory belt use laws are
potentially the most effective approach to ensur-
ing passenger restraint. Experience in other
industrialized countries suggests that a manda-
tory law might result in usage rates exceeding
those achievable with passive belts because so
many passive belts would be detached. Neverthe-
less, in today's political climate in the United
States, mandatory seatbelt-use laws seem unreal-
istic." The Department agrees with the potential
for belt use laws, but feels that the political climate
and public attitudes have changed significantly

since then, making the possibility of enactment of
such laws considerably higher.

Currently, one State legislature, New York's,
has passed a mandatory use law which provides
for a $50 fine, allows waivers for medical reasons
only, and requires the Governor to conduct a pub-
lic education program in conjunction with the law.
Eleven other States are reported as actively con-
sidering seatbelt usage laws.

A number of statewide and nationwide surveys
have been taken in the United States to determine
the public acceptability of mandatory State belt
use laws. Surveys taken in 1979 or earlier gener-
ally indicate that the public is strongly divided on
mandatory seatbelt use laws. However, public atti-
tudes about automobile safety have changed mark-
edly over the past few years, in part because of the
grass roots uprising in opposition to drunk driving.
The public now strongly supports laws and innova-
tive enforcement action to reduce the needless
deaths and injuries caused by drinking and driv-
ing. This movement has spilled over into other
highway safety areas such as safety belt and child
safety seat usage. Evidence of this attitudinal
change can be seen in the fact that 46 States and
the District of Columbia have enacted child safety
seat laws since the beginning of 1981 (bringing the
total to 48), the New York State Legislature's re-
cent enactment of the adult MUL law, and the sig-
nificant progress made toward the enactment of

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 228

MULs in other States — notably Illinois, Minnesota,
and Michigan. Recent surveys taken by several
States found 66 percent in favor of mandatory belt
usage laws in Michigan, 69 percent in Delaware,
52 percent in New York, and 56 percent in Ohio.
Many of the commenters who support such leg-
islation stress the need to have public education
programs before the actual enactment of the laws
and Federal incentive grants as an effective impe-
tus to stimulate the States. Indeed, the success of
the mandatory law in Great Britain can be attrib-
uted to an intensive public information and educa-
tion program conducted during the 2 preceding
years before enactment of the law.

Legislation to Require Consumer Option

The option would ensure that consumers were
given the widest possible choice of both whether
to purchase an automatic occupant restraint and,
depending on the requirement, what type of auto-
matic restraint. Unlike the current market situa-
tion, those who wish to purchase an automatic
occupant restraint system could do so. This would
probably not be as effective in generating safety
benefits as a requirement for automatic restraints
in all cars. Those drivers who are involved in more
serious accidents are probably the ones least likely
to purchase such systems. Depending on how "con-
trolling" the legislation that was adopted was,
numerous other problems could develop. For exam-
ple, dealers might not stock vehicles with auto-
matic restraints, requiring consumers to wait a
long time so as to "force" many people to purchase
manual safety belts. In addition, the small number
of automatic restraints produced under this alter-
native would likely mean high prices per unit due
to a lack of economy of scale. There also would be
significant costs imposed on manufacturers because
of extra design and tooling costs, if it were neces-
sary to provide more than one type of automatic
restraint for each model. As a result, the overall
costs for manufacturers and consumers might far
outweigh the benefits, and if an insufficient vol-
ume of different types of restraints were produced,
there might not even be enough data to permit fur-
ther evaluation of the different types of systems.

Airbag Retrofit Capability

Requiring an airbag retrofit capability would
make it easier for owners of automobiles to have
airbags installed in their cars in the "aftermarket."
It would also allow purchase of an airbag by a sec-

ond or third owner, if the original owner failed to
purchase one. This would be especially valuable if
systems like Breed's airbag eventually proved suc-
cessful. However, it could be argued that only the
more safety conscious consumers are likely to pur-
chase such airbags; the high risk drivers might not
take advantage of the option. In addition, all auto-
mobiles would become more expensive, even if the
airbags were installed in relatively few cars, and
the cost of airbags could be very high if they are
purchased in low volumes that do not permit econ-
omies of scale. Moreover, this alternative would
not ensure that airbags would be available to con-
sumers who wish to have them installed.

Passive Interiors

GM has been doing research to develop "passive
interiors" — to build in safety by improving such
things as the steering columns and padding. It
believes this would be better than automatic occu-
pant restraints and contends that it cannot afford
to do both. Although an attractive alternative, this
approach is still being developed, and even GM is
not willing to say that it will meet FMVSS 208 in
the immediate future. Moreover, FMVSS 208 does
not require airbags or automatic belts; GM's pas-
sive interior concept is an acceptable compliance
method, which should be encouraged. It holds the
promise of being a low cost, nonobtrusive method
of complying with the standard.

GM also asked that the Department consider
dropping the barrier standard from 30 mph to
25 mph for passive interiors. The Department has
virtually no data on what dimunution in safety
would occur if the lower standard were to be used.
Thus, it has no basis for making such a change.

Nevertheless, the Department encourages fur-
ther research in this area. From the limited test
data available, it is generally evident that it is
within the state-of-the-art to pass FMVSS 208 cri-
teria at 25 mph (using unrestrained Hybrid III
dummies). General Motors, in their docket submis-
sion, indicated that the Oldsmobile Omega and the
Pontiac Fiero have passed the injury prevention
criteria of FMVSS 208 at 30 mph. Nissan engi-
neers indicated in 1974 that the 260Z would come
close to meeting the FMVSS 208 criteria at
25 mph. In a NHTSA test of a Ford Crown Vic-
toria, the driver dummy's performance met the
FMVSS 208 injury criteria in a 30 mph barrier
test. However, even though these vehicles met the
FMVSS 208 criteria, none of the manufacturers

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 229

have expressed confidence in their ability to so
certify to the government. Nonetheless, the
Department remains optimistic about further
development of this technology.

Center Seating Position

Intertwined with most of the alternatives is the
issue of what to do about the center seating position.
Automatic seatbelts (and even 3-point manual belts)
cannot be used for the center seat. As a result, the
only automatic protection available for front center
seat occupants is an airbag or passive interiors. If
automatic seatbelts were used to comply with a
requirement for automatic occupant restraints,
the center seat would have to be eliminated as an
occupant position, unless it were exempted from
coverage. Moreover, even if it were exempted
from coverage, if nondetachable belts were re-
quired, occupants would have a difficult time get-
ting to the center seat. Finally, even if airbags
were used to meet a requirement for automatic
restraints, at least one commenter (Ford) indicated
that the center seat position might be eliminated
due to the problem of out-of-position occupants.

If the center seat were exempted from coverage
and detachable belts (or airbags) were used to pro-
vide automatic protection for the outboard seats,
the center seat could still be used because the auto-
matic belts are detachable. If they are detached to
let a passenger sit on the center seat, the question
then arises as to how often they would be reat-
tached. In this regard, a recent study by Market
Opinion Research is noteworthy. It indicated that
the interaction between the driver and the passen-
gers was a significant factor affecting belt usage;
i.e., if the driver wore a belt, this made it more
likely that a passenger would. Since passengers
normally enter the front seat from the passenger
side of the automobile, the driver's automatic belt
would not have to be disconnected for them to
enter. Therefore, if the driver does not disconnect
his belt, the fact that the passenger side automatic
belt is disconnected to permit entrance to the cen-
ter seat may not have a serious adverse effect;
since the driver is wearing his belt, it may encour-
age reconnection of the right front belt and/or the
use of the center seat lap belt. Conceivably, center
seat lap belt usage could increase compared to the
expected usage in cars with only manual belts.

If the center seat were not exempted, the loss of
the center seat would affect both manufacturers
and consumers. In arguing for exempting the cen-

ter seat. Consumer's Union and the AAA pointed
out that consumers would lose vehicle utility due
to a reduction in the maximum seating capacity.
Manufacturers could be affected if customers opt
to purchase smaller cars if they lose the center
seat in larger cars. This could cause a loss of prof-
its, since larger cars yield more profit per unit
than smaller ones.

The indirect safety effects are quite complex.
Moving a child, for example, from the center seat
to a back seat has the advantage of significantly
improving the child's safety, but the disadvantage
of possibly leading to a driver who may frequently
turn around to check a child in the back seat.
There are also fuel economy and safety implica-
tions, if two cars are necessary when one would
have otherwise been sufficient for a particular
trip. The issue is made even more complex by the
fact that some center seat passengers may move to
the right seat and others may move to the back
seat, if the right seat is already occupied. The front
right seat is statistically the least safe position in
the automobile, but sitting in the back is slightly
safer for adults than sitting in the front.

On the other side, only one-third of the cars sold
in 1982 were six seat cars, and that number has
been declining as cars are being downsized. (Re-
cent trends, however, indicate some increasing con-
sumer preference for larger cars). An estimated
1.5 percent of front seat fatalities and injuries in-
volve the front center seat occupant. Automatic re-
straints for the front center seating position would
not yield as many benefits as when FMVSS 208
was originally imposed in 1977 and would not pro-
vide the same benefits per dollar spent as provid-
ing protection for the two outboard seats.

Although the center seat is rarely used, about
one-third of its present occupants are children. For
that reason, many are concerned about the equity
of not providing automatic protection to this posi-
tion. However, with child restraint laws becoming
effective in 48 States and the District of Columbia,
this argument loses a great deal of its merit.

Rationale for Adoption of the Rule

The Requirement for Automatic Occupant
Restraints

The final rule requires, in accordance with the
phase-in schedule, that automatic occupant protec-
tion be provided in passenger cars. The require-
ment can be complied with through any of the

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 230

occupant protection technologies discussed earlier
in the preamble, if those systems meet the testing
requirements of the rule; i.e., manufacturers may
comply with the rule by using automatic detach-
able or nondetachable belts, airbags, passive inte-
riors, or other systems that will provide the neces-
sary level of protection.

The requirement also only applies to the out-
board seating positions of passenger cars. The cen-
ter seat in those cars that have one is exempt from
the requirement for automatic occupant protec-
tion. In addition, the requirement does not apply to
other than passenger cars; for example, trucks,
tractors, or multipurpose vehicles such as jeeps
are not covered by the rule.

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966, as amended, directs the Department of
Transportation to reduce fatalities and injuries re-
sulting from traffic accidents. In its decision in the
State Farm case, the Supreme Court held that, in
carrying out its responsibilities under the Safety
Act, the Department "must either consider the
matter further or adhere to or amend Standard 208
along the lines which its analysis supports" 103 S. Ct.
at 2862. In a number of instances throughout its opin-
ion, the Court indicated where it found NHTSA's
1981 rescission to be inadequately supported or ex-
plained. The Department has now completed its
further review of this matter, giving special con-
sideration to the Supreme Court's decision.

Based on this review, the Department has deter-
mined that the data presented in this preamble
and more fully analyzed in the Department's Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis support the following
conclusions:

• After assessing the data now available to it, the
Department has revised its 1981 analysis con-
cerning the likelihood of increased usage if auto-
matic detachable belts are installed to meet
FMVSS 208; it cannot project either widespread
usage, or a widespread refusal to use such sys-
tems by automobile occupants.

• While it is clear that airbags will perform as
expected in virtually all cases, it is also clear
that the effectiveness of the airbag system is
substantially diminished if the occupant does
not use a belt. Consumer acceptability is diffi-
cult to predict, with the major variables being
cost, fear, and the unobtrusiveness of airbags.

• Nondetachable automatic belts may result in

sharply increased usage, but there may also be
substantial consumer resistance to them.

• The installation of automatic occupant protec-
tion in passenger cars may significantly reduce
both fatalities and injuries.

• The costs of the existing automatic restraint
systems are reasonable, and the potential bene-
fits in lives saved, injuries reduced in severity
and costs avoided are substantial.

• Technologically, the systems are feasible and
practicable.

Even if we assume the lower level of the range
for the effectiveness of automatic belts (35 per-
cent) and very little increase in usage (an increase
on only TVz percent over the current 12V2 percent
usage rate for manual belts places us at the 20 per-
cent level used in Table 5), there still would be sig-
nificant incremental annual reductions in deaths
and injuries as a result of an automatic occupant
restraint rule complied with entirely by the instal-
lation of belts; 520 fatalities and 8,740 moderate to
critical injuries would be prevented. Using the
higher effectiveness figure (50 percent) and still
only 20 percent usage, we would come close to dou-
bling the benefits; 980 fatalities and 15,650 moder-
ate to critical injuries would be prevented annu-
ally. If usage increases to 70 percent, 5,030 to 7,510
deaths and 86,860 to 124,570 injuries would be pre-
vented annually.

With respect to airbags, even assuming low effec-
tiveness and no use of lap belts, the record sup-
ports the conclusion they would provide signifi-
cant incremental reductions in deaths and injuries.
Airbags without a lap belt could save 3,780 to 8,630
lives and prevent 73,660 to 147,560 injuries each
year. With lap belts used at the current manual
belt usage rate (12.5 percent), the evidence in the
record indicates that airbags could save 4,410 to
8,960 lives and prevent 83,480 to 152,550 injuries.

The potential reduction in fatalities and injuries
that would result from automatic restraints could
produce a corresponding decrease in funeral, medi-
cal, and rehabilitation expenses. A reduction in
these expenses could, in turn, result in reductions
in premiums for any insurance that covers them
and a reduction in the burden on taxpayers of vari-
ous medical, rehabilitation, and welfare costs.

As discussed earlier, collision and property dam-
age liability and comprehensive insurance policies

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 231

will have to absorb some additional costs to the
extent that airbags are used.

In attempting to provide any relationship be-
tween costs and benefits of occupant protection
systems, three important points must be kept in
mind: (l)The statute directs us to "reduce...
deaths and injuries," and, in doing so, to consider
whether the standard we issue "is reasonable,
practicable and appropriate." The Supreme Court
noted in the State Farm case that it is "correct to
look at the costs as well as the benefits of Stan-
dard 208," 103 S. Ct. at 2873, but we should also
"bear in mind that Congress intended safety to be
the preeminent factor under the Motor Vehicle
Safety Act." Id. (The Senate Report said safety
was "the paramount purpose." The House Report
called it "the overriding consideration.") (2) The
net result of any calculations will only provide
information on measurable benefits. They would
not represent the full benefits of reducing fatal-
ities and injuries because the Department cannot
measure the intangible value of a human life or a
reduced injury. It cannot adequately measure, for
example, the value of pain and suffering or loss of
consortium. (3) The data developed on usage and
effectiveness are not always precise and in many
instances involve broad ranges. As a result, they
can have an effect on figures derived from them
and the various relationships that ensue.

With this in mind and recognizing that insur-
ance premium reductions alone only identify a por-
tion of the economic benefits resulting from an
automatic occupant protection rule, it is inter-
esting to note some breakeven points for the cost
related to automatic belts using low and high effec-
tiveness estimates. The breakeven point occurs
when lifetime cost (retail price increases and addi-
tional fuel cost) equals lifetime insurance premium
reductions. At the high effectiveness level, the
breakeven point occurs at the 32 percent usage
level. At the low effectiveness level, the break-
even point occurs at the 44 percent usage level.
Thus, by increasing current usage by approxi-
mately 20 to 30 percent, automatic belts will pay
for themselves simply based on estimated insur-
ance premium reductions. Inclusion of noninsurance
benefits would lower these breakeven points, per-
haps significantly.

Although airbag systems do not attain similar
breakeven points based just on insurance premium
reductions, it is interesting to note that a signifi-
cant portion of airbag costs would be paid for just

by insurance premium reductions. The estimated
lifetime cost of a full front airbag system is $364,
including increased fuel cost; the lifetime insur-
ance premium reductions are estimated to range
from $76 to $158 assuming 12.5 percent usage of
the lap belt.

By issuing a performance standard rather than
mandating the specific use of one device such as
airbags or prohibiting the use of specific devices
such as nondetachable belts, the Department be-
lieves that it will provide sufficient latitude for
industry to develop the most effective systems.
The ability to offer alternative devices should
enable the manufacturers to overcome any con-
cerns about public acceptability by permitting
some public choice. If there is concern, for exam-
ple, about the comfort or convenience of automatic
belts, the manufacturers have the option of provid-
ing airbags or passive interiors. For those who re-
main concerned about the cost of airbags, auto-
matic belts provide an alternative. This approach
also has the advantage of not discouraging the
development of other technologies. For example,
the development of passive interiors can be con-
tinued and offered as an alternative to those who
have objections to automatic belts or airbags.

Because one manufacturer has already begun to
offer airbags and three others have indicated plans
to do so, the Department expects that airbags will
be offered on some cars in response to this require-
ment. Moreover, the continued development of
lower cost airbag systems, such as the system
being developed by Breed, may result in their use
in even larger numbers of automobiles. By encour-
aging the use of such alternatives to automatic
belts through this rulemaking, the Department
expects that more effective and less expensive
technologies will be developed. In fact, the Depart-
ment believes it is in the public interest to encour-
age the development of technologies other than
automatic belts to reduce the chance that the pur-
chaser of an automobile will have no other option.
See 103 S. Ct. at 2864. Thus, the rule is designed to
encourage nonbelt technologies during the phase-
in period. The Department's expectation is that
manufacturers who take advantage of this
"weighting" will continue to offer such nonbelt
systems should the standard be fully reinstated. It
also expects that improvements in automatic belt
systems will be developed as more manufacturers
gain actual experience with them.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 232

Center Seat

The Department has also decided to exempt the
center seat of cars from the requirement for auto-
matic occupant protection. This has been done for a
number of reasons described in more detail earlier
in this preamble. First, limitations in current auto-
matic belt technology would probably result in the
elimination of the center seat for most cars if it
were required to be protected. Balancing the loss
of vehicle utility, and the numerous effects that
this could have, with the limited number of occu-
pants of the center seat and, thus, the limited ben-
efits to be gained from protecting it, warrant
exempting its coverage. It should be noted that dif-
ferent protection by seating position already
exists as rear seat requirements differ from front
seat requirements; the center front seat itself is
already exempt from the requirement to provide
shoulder belts. Thus, there is ample precedent for
this action.

Mandatory Use Law Alternative

The rule requires the rescission of the automatic
occupant protection requirement if two-thirds of
the population of the United States are residents
of States that have passed MULs meeting the
requirements set forth in the regulation. The re-
quirement would be rescinded as soon as a deter-
mination could be made that two-thirds of the pop-
ulation are covered by such statutes. However, if
two-thirds of the population are not covered by
MULs that take effect by September 1, 1989, the
manufacturers will be required to install auto-
matic protection systems in all automobiles manu-
factured after September 1, 1989. As discussed in
an earlier section, use of the three-point seatbelt
(which our analysis indicates is exceeded in its
effectiveness range only by an airbag with a three-
point belt) is the quickest, least expensive way by
far to significantly reduce fatalities and injuries.
"We start with the accepted ground that if used,
seatbelts unquestionably would save many thou-
sands of lives and would prevent tens of thousands
of crippling injuries." 103 S. Ct. at 2871. As set out
in detail earlier in the preamble, coverage of a
large percentage of the American people by seat-
belt laws that are enforced would largely negate
the incremental increase in safety to be expected
from an automatic protection requirement.

The rule also contains minimum criteria for each
State's MUL to be included in the determination
by the secretary that imposition of an automatic

protection standard is no longer required. Those
minimum criteria are as follows:

• A requirement that each outboard front seat
occupant of a passenger car, which was required
by Federal regulation, when manufactured, to
be equipped with front seat occupant restraints,
have those devices properly fastened about
their bodies at all times while the vehicle is in
forward motion.

• A prohibition of waivers from the mandatory
use of seatbelts, except for medical reasons;

• An enforcement program that complies with the
following minimum requirements:

• An enforcement program that complies with the
following minimum requirements:

• Penalties. A penalty of $25 (which may include
court costs) or more for each violation of the
MUL, with a separate penalty being imposed
for each person violating the law.

• Civil litigation penalties. The violation of the
MUL by any person when involved in an acci-
dent may be used in mitigating any damages
sought by that person in any subsequent liti-
gation to recover damages for injuries result-
ing from the accident. This requirement is
satisfied if there is a rule of law in the State
permitting such mitigation.

• The establishment of prevention and educa-
tion programs to encourage compliance with
the MUL.

• The establishment of a MUL evaluation pro-
gram by the State. Each State that enacts a
MUL will be required to include information
on its experiences with those laws in the an-
nual evaluation report on its Highway Safety
Plan (HSP) that it submits to NHTSA and
FHWA under 23 U.S.C. 402.

• An effective date of not later than September 1,
1989.

The data in Table 5 indicate the important safety
benefits that can be derived from an effective
MUL. The relative benefits of a MUL compared
to an automatic occupant restraint rule are
dependent on two unknowns: the percentage of
cars equipped with each restraint and the usage or
readiness rates for them. For example, if most cars
were equipped with automatic belts and seatbelt

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 233

usage increased 15 to 20 percent, some people
would consider the automatic occupant restraint
rule quite successful. A MUL would more than
match the safety benefits of this rule, however,
even if it was only half as successful as the data
indicate foreign MULs have been. Unlike an auto-
matic occupant restraint, MULs achieve these
safety benefits without adding any cost to the car.

Moreover, a MUL can save more lives immedi-
ately. It covers all cars as soon as it is passed and
put into effect. An automatic occupant restraint rule
requires lead time before the manufacturers can
begin installing the devices, and then it would take
10 years before most of the American fleet was
replaced with cars with the automatic restraints.

At the same time, the Department recognizes
that MULs must be enacted before they can have
any effect. Although a number of States are consid-
ering MULs, only one State legislature has passed
one that is applicable to the general population.
Many commenters have argued that the possibility
that MULs may be passed is an insufficient basis
for the Department of Transportation to decide
not to issue an automatic occupant restraint rule;
such inaction would violate the Department's obli-
gations under the National Traffic and Motor Vehi-
cle Safety Act.

This rule allows the Department to meet the
concerns over the obstacles to enactment of MULs
and still be able to take advantage of their benefits
if they are enacted. To the extent that automatic
protection systems encounter substantial con-
sumer resistance, it encourages State legislatures
to seriously consider what some may view as a
more attractive alternative. Regardless of the ulti-
mate course the country takes, the end result will
be a significant improvement in automobile safety,
which is the Department's goal.

This approach avoids many of the problems
associated with the other MUL proposal set forth
in the SNPRM. That alternative would have re-
sulted in waivers being granted on an individual,
State-by-State basis, for those States that passed
MULs. The chosen approach eliminates the need
to "regulate" the sale of manual belt automobiles
to prevent them from being purchased by people
in States without MULs. In addition, under the
rule, consumers should not have to delay pur-
chases of cars if they want to avoid automatic pro-
tection systems. Before September 1, 1989, they
will have a choice, since not all cars will be manu-
factured with automatic protection systems. After

that, either MULs will be in effect or automatic
protection will be required in all cars. Under the
other SNPRM MUL alternative, some consumers
might have delayed the decision to buy a car while
waiting for their State to pass an MUL.

Under this aspect of the regulation, the Depart-
ment will review each State MUL as it is passed to
determine whether it meets the minimum criteria
established by the regulation. If, at any time
before April 1, 1989, the Secretary determines
that the total population covered by MULs that
meet the minimum criteria of the regulation
reaches or exceeds two-thirds of the population of
the United States, the Secretary will declare the
rule rescinded. If, on April 1, 1989, the Depart-
ment's information indicates that two-thirds of the
population are not covered by MULs, the Depart-
ment will publish a notice asking for public com-
ment on these data. If no new data are presented
to the Department establishing that, prior to
April 1, 1989, two-thirds of the population were
covered by MULs, the automatic occupant protec-
tion requirement will remain in effect.

Some have argued that as soon as the rule is
rescinded, one or more States may rescind their
MULs. The Department must presume the good
faith of State legislators. It also believes that the
advantages of MULs will be so clear that it would
be extremely difficult and unlikely that any State
would rescind its statute. The Department's posi-
tion on this matter is fortified by the success of
MULs in foreign jurisdictions and the fact that
only one of those jurisdictions has ever withdrawn
a MUL, and that nation subsequently reinstated
the law. Furthermore, it would be completely im-
practical to tie reinstatement/rescission in short
cycles to the action of one or two State legisla-
tures. The Department will, of course, continue to
monitor the general issue of the protection of auto-
mobile occupants and, in accordance with its statu-
tory responsibilities, take whatever action is
deemed necessary in the future to ensure that the
objective of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act are met.

If the automatic occupant protection require-
ments are rescinded because of the passage of
MULs, up to one-third of the population may have
no automatic occupant protection systems in their
automobiles and their States may not pass MULs.
However, as discussed at length above, there are
disadvantages to each of the automatic restraint
systems. No approach will completely eliminate

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 234

deaths and injuries. The National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act's very purpose is
"reduc(ing] traffic accidents and deaths and in-
juries to persons resulting from traffic accidents."
15 U.S.C. §1381. Coverage of two-thirds or more of
the American people by MULs will be a major
achievement and is clearly consistent with the Act,
and it will result in a more substantial reduction in
deaths and injuries more quickly and at a lower
cost than any other practical alternative. In the
interim, this rule will have required the automo-
bile manufacturers to make automatic protection
systems available on an unprecedented scale.

A number of points must be kept in mind while
considering the relative merits of an automatic
restraint as compared to MULs: (1) MULs immedi-
ately cover the entire fleet of automobiles within
the State. We do not have to wait 10 or more years
for a system to become installed in the entire fleet.

(2) The Department expects that, under a simple
automatic occupant restraint requirement, the
primary method of compliance would have been
through the use of automatic belts. Although
automatic seatbelts would likely result in some in-
creased usage, MULs, based on foreign experi-
ence, should result in higher usage rates.

(3) Although automatic belts are relatively inex-
pensive in terms of the significant safety benefits
they achieve, MULs have no cost increment over
the existing system. (4) If only two-thirds of the
population are covered by MULs and the MULs
result in what the Department estimates to be the
lowest possible usage rate based on our analysis of
foreign experience — 40 percent of the occupants—
they will still result in a reduction in fatalities of
from 1,900 to 2,400 and a reduction in moderate to
critical injuries of 32,000 to 40,000 on an annual
basis. This compares to automatic restraints,
which, if installed in all automobiles, would result
in a reduction in fatalities of between 520 and 980
and a reduction in moderate to critical injuries of
between 8,740 and 15,650 at 20 percent usage,
after they are installed in all automobiles. More-
over, during the first 10 years, MULs would save a
total of from 19,000 to 24,000 lives and prevent
from 320,000 to 400,000 moderate to critical injur-
ies. During those same 10 years, while they were
being installed in the American fleet, automatic
belts at 20 percent usage, for example, would save
a total of between 2,900 and 5,400 lives and pre-
vent between 48,000 and 86,000 moderate to criti-
cal injuries. Thus, the overall safety benefits of the

rule should exceed the benefits of a simple auto-
matic protection requirement, even if one-third of
the population are not covered. (5) We also expect
that residents of MUL States will develop the
habit of wearing seatbelts and will wear them even
in non-MUL States. Residents of non-MUL States
will be required to wear them while traveling in
MUL States. This should increase the protection
level somewhat.

In addition to the tremendous safety benefits of
MULs, we also have the advantage of providing
some local option in the decision-making. If enough
States prefer MULs to automatic occupant protec-
tion, they can pass such laws and the requirement
will be rescinded. We believe that offering this
"option" should lessen any public resistance to an
automatic occupant protection requirement. Hav-
ing some ability to choose one alternative over the
other should make both alternatives more accept-
able. As noted earlier, public acceptance is an
appropriate and important concern of the Depart-
ment in its rulemaking under the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Some commenters
argued that automatic restraints should be used in
conjunction with and not as an alternative to
MULs. This argument ignores both the public
acceptability concerns set forth above and the
incentive for passage of such laws — to the extent
there is significant consumer resistance to auto-
matic protection devices — created by the Depart-
ment's approach.

A number of commenters disagreed with the
SNPRM proposal to establish criteria for the
MULs. They argued that the criteria should be left
to State governments and that establishment of
criteria by the Department of Transportation
might discourage a number of States from enact-
ing MULs. Although the Department understands
this concern, it believes that, under the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, in order for
it to accept MULs as an alternative to requiring
automatic crash protection, MULs must provide a
level of safety equivalent to that which would be
expected to be provided under existing technology
by the automatic systems. The Department, there-
fore, believes it is imperative that it establish
minimum criteria that will ensure that the MULs
will achieve a usage level high enough to provide
at least an equivalent level of safety. Otherwise,
for example, a State could pass an MUL that per-
mitted so many waivers or exceptions as to be
meaningless.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 235

The Department would like to note that, rather
than requiring a State to amend an existing MUL,
the Department will consider granting a waiver
from the minimum requirements for an MUL for
any State that, before August 1, 1984, has passed
an MUL that substantially complies with these
requirements.

In the SNPRM, the Department asked whether
a rule such as the one the Department has adopted
should be based on the number of States pass-
ing MULs or the population that is covered by
the MULs.

The Department has decided to base the final
rule on the percentage of the population rather
than the number of States for the following rea-
sons. If three-quarters of the States passed MULs,
it might result in as little as 41 to 42 percent of the
population being covered. The Department believes
that the percentage of the people who are covered
is the important aspect of any MUL alternative.
As the Department has already clearly explained,
the valuable safety benefits of MULs warrant
encouraging their enactment.

It is the position of the Department that it has
both the legal authority and the justification to
require automatic occupant protection in all pas-
senger automobiles. It is also the Department's
position that it has the legal authority and the
justification for rescinding the automatic occupant
restraint requirement if two-thirds of the popula-
tion are covered by MULs before September 1,
1989. It believes that either alternative would pro-
vide tremendous safety benefits; both meet all the
standards of the Act and both carry out the objec-
tive and purpose of the statute.

The Phase-In

The rule requires the manufacturers to follow a
phase-in schedule for compliance with the auto-
matic occupant protection requirements. A mini-
mum of 10 percent of all cars manufactured after
September 1, 1986, must have automatic occupant
crash protection. After September 1, 1987, the per-
centage is raised to 25 percent; after September 1,
1988, it is raised to 40 percent; and after Septem-
ber 1, 1989, all new cars must have automatic occu-
pant crash protection.

To enable the manufacturers to determine at
the beginning of the model year how many auto-
mobiles must be manufactured with automatic
crash protection, the percentage of automobiles to
be covered will be based upon each manufacturer's

average number of automobiles produced in the
United States during the prior three model years.
If, for example, the manufacturer sold 3 million
cars in model year 1984, 3.2 million in model year
1985, and 3.7 million in model year 1986, its 3-year
average would be 3.3 million automobiles; for
model year 1987 (beginning September 1, 1986) it
would have to equip 10 percent of 3.3 million —
330,000 automobiles — with automatic occupant
crash protection systems.

The Department decided to phase in the require-
ment for automatic occupant crash protection for a
number of reasons.

First, by phasing-in, some automatic protection
systems will be available earlier than if implemen-
tation were delayed until the systems could be in-
stalled in all automobiles. The earliest the Depart-
ment could have required automatic protection in
100 percent of the fleet would have been Septem-
ber 1, 1987. Manufacturers' comments to the
docket on lead time for automatic belts ranged
from immediately, for some cars such as the VW
Rabbit, on which automatic belts are now offered
as an option, to 3 to 4 years for all cars. Estimates
for airbags ranged from 2 years for driver side air-
bags on some models on which these devices were
already planned to be offered as options (some
Mercedes, BMW, and Volvo car lines) to 5 years for
airbags for some companies (e.g., Chrysler and
Saab). Differences in lead times among manufac-
turers are due to such factors as the number of
model lines a company has, previous research and
development efforts and supplier considerations.
The 36 months lead time needed for automatic
belts, inter alia, is required to develop spool-out
features and other components on some nonde-
tachable belts in order to maximize consumer
acceptability in terms of entry/egress. Detachable
belts could require vehicle modifications to
strengthen belt attachment points on the door or
integrate door and roof strength to accommodate
the belt anchorage. While some driver airbags
could be introduced with 24 months lead time,
available evidence suggests that many vehicle
models will require major modifications to the
steering wheel and column and extensive instru-
ment panel modifications or redesign, including
glove box relocation, for passenger airbags. Test-
ing of occupant kinematics on the passenger side is
also required. Because of the number of models
involved, differing car sizes and available industry
resources, it is the Department's judgment that at

PART 571; S 208-PRE 236

least a 48-month leadtime would have been re-
quired for full front airbags.

If the Department had required full compliance
by September 1, 1987, it is very likely all of the
manufacturers would have had to comply through
the use of automatic belts. Thus, by phasing-in the
requirement, the Department makes it easier for
manufacturers to use other, perhaps better, sys-
tems such as airbags and passive interiors.

Phasing-in also permits consumers and the De-
partment to develop more information about the
benefits of these systems, thus enhancing the
opportunity to overcome any public resistance to
automatic protection. Over the first 3 years, con-
sumers will have a choice as to whether they pur-
chase an automobile with automatic protection.
Since they will not be forced to accept them, the
Department expects that they will be more likely
to be openminded about their benefits.

Another advantage of phasing-in the requirement
for automatic protection is that is possible that by
the time two-thirds of the population are covered
by MULs, the manufacturers will have made pro-
gress in designing and producing these systems at a
lower cost and a significant number of consumers
will continue to demand them from the manufac-
turers as either standard or optional equipment.

The specific percentages used for the phase-in
were chosen because they balance technological
feasibility with the need to encourage technologi-
cal innovation. These percentages should also pro-
vide the gradual phase-in that the Department
believes will help build up public acceptance.

To ensure compliance with the phase-in require-
ment, it will be necessary for each manufacturer to
submit a report to the Department of Transporta-
tion within 60 days of the end of each model year
certifying that it has met the applicable percent-
age requirement. The report would have to sepa-
rately identify, by Vehicle Identification Number
(VIN) number, those cars that the manufacturer
has equipped with automatic seatbelts and those
cars that it has equipped with automatic airbags or
some form of occupant protection technology. The
Department will issue an NPRM on this matter in
the very near future. In the event that a manufac-
turer fails to comply with the percentage require-
ment under the phase-in schedule, the Department
has appropriate enforcement authority, e.g., civil
penalties.

Thus, the use of a phase-in appropriately takes
into account the abilities of the different manufac-

turers to comply with the requirement, encour-
ages the use of different, and perhaps better,
means of compliance, and provides the public with
an opportunity to better understand the value of
automatic protection. The phase-in will permit the
manufacturers to ensure that whatever system
they use is effective, trouble-free, and reliable. By
starting off with a relatively small percentage and
building up to full compliance, the phase-in will
provide the manufacturers with a better opportu-
nity to manage unforeseen development and pro-
duction problems and, as a result, also make it less
likely that consumers will develop adverse impres-
sions based upon earlier experience.

Some commenters suggested that the manufac-
turers would use the cheapest system to comply
with an automatic restraint requirement under
our SNPRM MUL alternatives. They said the
short time allowed for passage of MULs would
force the manufacturers to choose the least expen-
sive alternative so that they would lose little in
investments if sufficient numbers of MULs passed.
The Department does not agree with this conten-
tion. It believes that competition, potential liabil-
ity for any deficient systems and pride in one's
product would prevent this. The phase-in schedule
should provide adequate time to design and pro-
duce high quality systems.

The Credit for Nonbelt Restraints

The rule also permits manufacturers to receive
extra credit during the phase-in period if they use
something other than an automatic belt to provide
the automatic protection to the driver. For each
car in which they do so, they will receive credit for
an extra one-half automobile towards their per-
centage requirement. It will be the manufacturer's
option whether to use the same nonbelt technol-
ogy to provide the automatic protection to the pas-
senger; however, such protection must be auto-
matic—the manufacturer may not use a manual
belt for the right front seat. As a result of this
option, manufacturers will be able to get extra
credit for the use of airbags, passive interiors, or
other systems that meet the test requirements of
the rule.

There are a number of reasons for the Depart-
ment's decision to permit this option. First, it
believes that the primary system that would be
used under this "extra credit" alternative would
be the airbag. As the data in Table 5 clearly illus-
trate, airbags should provide very significant safety

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 237

benefits. Even though fewer cars would be equipped
with automatic protection if extra credit is given
for airbag automobiles, airbags — when used with
belts — are very effective. In addition, the Depart-
ment believes that there is a definite advantage in
the initial stages of compliance with this rule to en-
courage the use of various automatic protection
technologies. This should promote the development
of what may be better alternatives to automatic
belts than would otherwise be developed. If enough
alternative devices are installed in automobiles
during the phase-in period, it will also enable the
Department to develop a sufficient data base to
compare the various alternatives to determine
whether any future modifications to the rule to
make it more effective are necessary or appropriate.
Both the Act and the Supreme Court's decision
last year provide the Department with the neces-
sary flexibility to establish safety standards that
are tailored to engineering realities. Recognizing
some of the technological problems, for example,
that have been discussed earlier with respect to
airbags and small cars and coupling this with a
desire to comply with the statutory safety objec-
tives with the best possible systems, the Depart-
ment believes it appropriate to establish a regula-
tory scheme that provides enough flexibility for
the best possible systems to be developed.

Rationale for Not Adopting Other Alternatives

Retain

We have determined, for reasons more fully
explained in the prior section — "Rationale for
Adoption of the Rule," not to simply retain the
existing requirements for automatic occupant
crash protection. Simply retaining the existing
rule would result in the use of detachable auto-
matic seatbelts in nearly all (i.e., 98 or 99 percent)
cars. The amended rule the Department has
adopted will encourage more effective solutions to
the nation's safety problems, and it should result
in the prevention of even more deaths and injuries.

Amend

Airbags Only

Despite the potentially large safety benefits
that would result from the use of airbags, there
are a number of reasons why the Department has
determined that airbags should not be required in
all cars.

Costs. As we have discussed in more detail else-
where in this preamble, the Department has esti-
mated that airbags will cost $320 more per car
than manual belts. They will also increase fuel
costs by $39 over the life of the car. In addition, the
replacement cost for a deployed airbag is esti-
mated to be $800. Because of the high cost of air-
bags, physical damage and comprehensive insur-
ance premiums will also increase, adding over $18
to the lifetime cost of the vehicle. On the other
hand, automatic belts would only add $40 for the
equipment, $11 in increased fuel costs, and would
not adversely affect physical damage and compre-
hensive insurance premiums. Thus, although air-
bags may provide greater safety benefits, when
used with belts, and potentially larger injury pre-
mium reductions than automatic belts, they are
unlikely to be as cost effective.

Moreover, there is still a great discrepancy
between the Department's airbag cost estimates
and those of industry, while the Department's esti-
mates for the cost of automatic belts are much
closer to those of industry. If, despite the Depart-
ment's ability to fully justify our cost estimates,
airbags are priced much higher than it has esti-
mated, it will further compound this problem.

Finally, the high cost of replacing an airbag may
lead to its not being replaced after deployment.
The result would be no protection for the front
seat occupants of such an automobile.

Technical Problems. Several technical problems
concerning airbags have been mentioned by manu-
facturers, consumers, and the vehicle scrapping
industry. One technical concern involves the al-
leged dangers of sodium azide. Some commenters
claim that sodium azide, the solid propellant which
is ignited and converts to nitrogen gas to inflate
the air cushion, is hazardous. It is claimed that it is
an explosive, is mutagenic, toxic, and an environ-
mental hazard. As explained in the FRIA, sodium
azide is not an explosive. Rather it ignites, under
controlled conditions, to form harmless nitrogen
gas. Furthermore, studies have continually shown
that it is not mutagenic or carcinogenic in mam-
mals, due to its inactivation by the liver. Sodium
azide can be toxic, but its transport in hermetically
sealed containers does not pose a hazard to manu-
facturers, dealers, repairmen, or consumers. The
scrapping of vehicles with undeployed airbag can-
isters does have to be done under controlled condi-
tions so as to avoid adverse environmental effects
and, although the risk is small, the Department

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 238

will continue to work with manufacturers and the
vehicle scrapping industry in this area.

Another concern involves the technical problem
of out-of-position occupants in small cars. Manufac-
turers claim that little development work has been
done with airbags for small (e.g., subcompact or
smaller) cars and that a particular problem in
these vehicles is how to protect small children,
who are not properly restrained, from the more
rapidly deploying air cushion in such vehicles. The
Department believes that this problem can be miti-
gated and that technical solutions are available, as
described in the FRIA. However, the lack of expe-
rience in this area, as well as the lack of experience
for some companies in any form of airbag develop-
ment, make the Department reluctant to mandate
across-the-board airbags.

Some people have argued that the failure to issue
a rule that will require at least some airbags might
mean the end of the development of airbag tech-
nology. In this regard, it must be remembered that
some improvements — such as those made by Breed
Corporation — have come about without regula-
tion. Moreover, three manufacturers — Mercedes,
Volvo, and BMW — are currently planning to offer
driver only airbags in their automobiles even
though not required, and Ford will produce driver
airbags for 5,000 U.S. General Services Adminis-
tration cars next year. It is, therefore, possible and
likely that others may follow suit to meet the com-
petition. Furthermore, the extra credit provided
during the phase-in should encourage manufacturers
to equip at least some of their cars with airbags.

Public Acceptability. Airbags engendered the
largest quantity of, andmost vociferously worded,
comments to the docket. Some people have serious
fears or concerns about airbags. If airbags were re-
quired in all cars, these fears, albeit unfounded,
could lead to a backlash affecting the acceptability
of airbags. This could lead to their being disarmed,
or, perhaps, to a repeat of the interlock reaction.
Some people are, for example, fearful of the
dangers of the sodium azide used to deploy the air-
bag. People are also concerned that the airbag will
inadvertently deploy and cause an accident or that
it will not work at the time of an accident. Some
people are also concerned because they feel less
secure in an automobile unless they have a 3-point
belt wrapped around them (and if the Department
requires a 2-point belt with an airbag, the costs
will be even higher) and are thus urtsure that they
will be protected at the time of an accident.

Although the Department believes that these
concerns can be adequately addressed, these con-
sumer perceptions must be recognized as real con-
cerns. It may be easier to overcome these concerns
if airbags are not the only way of complying with
an automatic occupant protection requirement.
Under the rule being issued, if people have con-
cerns about airbags, they can purchase automo-
biles that use automatic belts. The real world
experience that will come with the production of
airbag equipped cars during the phase-in period
should help to mitigate these fears.

Effectiveness. Airbags are not designed to pro-
vide protection at barrier equivalent impact
speeds less than approximately 12 mph. In addi-
tion, in order to provide protection comparable to
that of a 3-point belt, they must be used in conjunc-
tion with at least a lap belt. Despite this, the over-
all benefits provided by an airbag, because of its
extremely high "usage" rate, may be much better
than those provided by automatic belts. Wide-
spread use of both systems is the only way to
develop definitive data.

Performance Standards. Several commenters
questioned the Department's authority to issue an
airbag only standard, claiming it would be a
"design" standard. Even if the Department could
legally issue a performance standard that could
only be met by an airbag under present tech-
nology, it believes that by taking away the manu-
facturers' discretion to comply with an automatic
occupant restraint requirement through the use of
a variety of technologies, it creates a number of
problems. First, by restricting the manufacturers,
the Department runs the risk of killing or seri-
ously retarding development of more effective,
efficient occupant protection systems. With real
world experience, the Department may find, for
example, that automatic belts would be used by
much higher percentages of occupants than cur-
rently anticipated. The manufacturers also would
not be able to develop better automatic belt sys-
tems that may be more acceptable and, therefore,
used by larger numbers of people. This may result
in automatic belts that save as many lives but at a
much lower cost than airbags. Similarly, the devel-
opment of passive interiors, being pursued by GM,
would be stymied under such an option. The De-
partment believes an airbag only decision would
unnecessarily stifle innovation in occupant protec-
tion systems.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 239

In addition, if airbags were not mandated in
every car, people may be more willing to give them
a chance to prove themselves than they would be if
they were forced to buy them. If consumers are
concerned about automatic belts, it may cause
manufacturers to make greater efforts to lower
the costs of airbags to make them more acceptable
as an alternative.

Airbags and/or Nondetachable Seatbelts
The rationale provided in the preceding sections
for adopting the new rule and for not retaining the
old rule or amending it to require airbags in all
cars essentially provides the basis for the Depart-
ment's decision not to amend the old rule to re-
quire either airbags or nondetachable belts or just
nondetachable belts; (i.e., would not permit the use
of detachable belts to comply with the automatic
protection requirements). It is also concerned that
nondetachable belts may be too inconvenient and
restrictive, resulting in serious adverse public
reaction if required in all cars. (See the discussion
on nondetachable belts in the first part of the
"Analysis of the Alternatives.")

Limited Seating Positions

Several of the alternatives would have required
all or some particular type of automatic protection
for specified seating positions. For example, air-
bags would have been required for only the driver
position under one alternative. As explained under
the section on "Rationale for Adoption of the
Rule," the Department has determined that the
data on center seats warrants exempting that posi-
tion from automatic protection requirements. It
also has decided that, during the phase-in period, it
is appropriate to give "extra credit" for providing
automatic protection to the driver through non-
belt technology, such as airbags and passive inte-
riors, to provide an incentive for developing and
producing these other, possibly better, systems.
The Department has determined that existing
data, discussed earlier in the preamble and in the
FRIA, does not warrant exempting the front right
seat or providing any other special protection to
the driver.

Small Cars

The SNPRM raised for comments the alterna-
tive of providing airbag protection for the drivers
of small cars and questioned the safety justifica-
tion for this. We have not received data that indi-

cate that small cars are always less safe than large
cars. For that reason, we have no justification for
requiring any special protection for small cars.

Rescind

After a full review of the rulemaking docket and
performing the Analysis contained in our FRIA,
we have concluded that the Supreme Court deci-
sion in the State Farm case precludes us from
rescinding the automatic occupant protection re-
quirements at this time based on the present rec-
ord in this rulemaking.

The Supreme Court noted that "an agency chang-
ing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to
supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond
that which may be required when an agency does
not act in the first instance." 103 S. Ct. at 2866
(emphasis supplied).

To avoid having its actions labeled "arbitrary
and capricious," the Supreme Court said that "the
agency must examine the relevant data and articu-
late a satisfactory explanation for its action includ-
ing a 'rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.'" 103 S. Cr. at 2866-67.

The Supreme Court also held that, if automatic
belts are not justifiable, the agency should have
considered requiring airbags in all automobUes.

The Court found that:

Given the effectiveness ascribed to airbag
technology by the agency, the mandate of the
Safety Act to achieve traffic safety would sug-
gest that the logical response to the faults of
detachable seatbelts would be to require the
installation of airbags. 103 S. Ct. at 2869.

It added that:

Given the judgment made in 1977 that airbags
are an effective and cost-beneficial life-saving
technology, the mandatory passive restraint
rule may not be abandoned without any consid-
eration whatsoever of an airbags-only-
requirement. 103 S. Ct. at 2871.

The primary issue concerning automatic belts is
the anticipated usage of the detachable belts.
Although the Department cannot establish with
certainty the level of usage it can expect with auto-
matic belts, the information gathered during the
comment periods on the current rulemaking
NPRM and SNPRM does assist DOT in answering
the Supreme Court's finding that:

PART 571; S 208-PRE 240

[T]here is no direct evidence in support of the
agency's finding that detachable automatic
belts cannot be predicted to yield a substan-
tial increase in usage. The empirical evidence
on the record, consisting of surveys of drivers
of automobiles equipped with passive belts,
reveals more than a doubling of the usage
rate experienced with manual belts. 103 S. Ct.
at 2872.

Although some would argue that the belts will
merely be detached after most drivers or passen-
gers first enter the car and never used more than
current manual belts are used, no evidence has
been found to support this. In responding to
NHTSA's 1981 rescission argument that "it cannot
reliably predict even a 5 percentage point increase
as the minimum level of increased usage," the
Supreme Court said:

But this and other statements that passive
belts will not yield substantial increases in
seatbelt usage apparently take no account of
the critical difference between detachable
automatic belts and current manual belts. A
detached passive belt does require an affirma-
tive act to reconnect it, but — unlike a manual
seatbelt — the passive belt, once attached, will
continue to function automatically unless
again disconnected. Thus, inertia — a factor
which the agency's own studies have found
significant in explaining the current low
usage rates for seatbelts — works in favor of,
not against, use of the protective device.
Since 20 to 50% of motorists currently wear
seatbelts on some occasions, there would
seem to be grounds to believe that seatbelts
used by occasional users will be substantially
increased by detachable passive belts. Whether
this is in fact the case is a matter for the agency
to decide, but it must bring its expertise to
bear on the question. 103 S. Ct. at 2872.
Although the Department believes that the
existing automatic belt usage data is not generally
applicable to the entire vehicle population, there is
an absence of data that indicate that there will be
no increase in usage associated with detachable
automatic belts. The record of this rulemaking
only has assertions that this will be so, but it lacks
support for those assertions.

The Supreme Court has made it clear that it
believes the better arguments support increased
usage. Not only does the Department have no new

evidence to counter this, but, for the first time, the
manufacturers have acknowledged that, at least
initially, automatic detachable belts will result in
an increase in usage. The Department also now
believes that some level of increase will occur
based on the reasons people give for not using
manual belts (e.g., "forget" or are "lazy"). Thus, it
has no evidence that the belts will not be used, but
merely questions about how large an increase will
occur. The Supreme Court said:

[An agency may not] merely recite the terms
"substantial uncertainty" as justification for
its actions. The agency must explain the evi-
dence which is available, and must offer a "ra-
tional connection between the facts found and
the choice made." . . . Generally, one aspect of
that explanation would be a justification for
rescinding the regulation before engaging in a
search for further evidence. 103 S. Ct. 2871.

It could also be argued that the public will not
accept automatic belts because of such problems as
their obtrusiveness and inconvenience. Although
an argument about public acceptabUity can be
made, strong data on which to base it do not exist.
As is discussed in more detail elsewhere in this
preamble, the public opinion surveys that have
been taken are flawed to the extent that they will
not withstand close scrutiny and support a rescis-
sion decision that has already been struck down
once by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court also found that, if detach-
able belts were unacceptable to the agency, than it
"failed to articulate the basis for not requiring non-
detachable belts under Standard 208." 103 S. Ct. at
2873. The Court added that, "while the agency is
entitled to change its view on the acceptability of
continuous passive belts, it is obligated to explain
its reasons for doing so." 103 S. Ct. at 2873. Finally,
the Court said that:

The agency also failed to offer any explana-
tion why a continuous passive belt would
engender the same adverse public reaction as
the ignition interlock, and, as the Court of Ap-
peals concluded "every indication on the
record points the other way." . . . We see no
basis for equating the two devices: the contin-
uous belt, unlike the ignition interlock, does
not interfere with the operation of the vehicle.
103 S. Ct. at 2873-74.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 241

Again, "substantial uncertainty," 103 S. Ct. at
2871, will not suffice and there is no substantive
evidence in the rulemaking record to refute the
point made by the Court.

The Department has no new evidence that non-
detachable belts are not an acceptable means for
reducing deaths and injuries. Although there are
some comments in the current docket that some
people will dislike tham and may even cut them or
otherwise destroy them, it is primarily specula-
tion; there is no clear data. Moreover, even if 20 or
30 or even 40 or 50 percent of the people find some
method for defeating the belt, the evidence in the
record indicates that it will still result in a signifi-
cant reduction in deaths and injuries for the
remainder who do not.

Some people expressed concern about emer-
gency egress from nondetachable belts. The
Supreme Court had the following to say on this:

. . . NHTSA did not suggest that the emer-
gency release mechanisms used in nondetach-
able belts are any less effective for emer-
gency egress than the buckle release system
used in detachable belts. In 1978, when Gen-
eral Motors obtained the agency's approval to
install a continuous passive belt, it assured
the agency that nondetachable belts with
spool releases were as safe as detachable
belts with buckle releases. 103 S. Ct at 2873.

Manufacturers commented that it would likely
be more difficult to extricate oneself from a non-
detachable as compared to detachable automatic
belt. However, they did not claim that it repre-
sented an "unsafe" condition, and again, there is no
new evidence to buttress their concerns.

Finally, there are a number of attractive argu-
ments that are based in part on the following
theme: the presence of the government in the mid-
dle of the debate over passive restraints has dis-
torted the activities of both automobile manufac-
turers and insurance companies; if the marketplace
had been allowed to work, insurance incentives
would have led to the voluntary adoption of one or
more systems by the manufacturers. Whether
these arguments are correct or not, they cannot be
considered in a vacuum. In fact, the context pro-
vided by the Supreme Court is quite harsh:

For nearly a decade, the automobile industry
waged the regulatory equivalent of war against
the airbag and lost— the inflatable restraint

was proven sufficiently effective. Now the
automobile industry has decided to employ a
seatbelt system which will not meet the safety
objectives of Standard 208. This hardly con-
stitutes cause to revoke the standard itself.
Indeed the Motor Vehicle Safety Act was nec-
essary because the industry was not suffi-
ciently responsive to safety concerns. The Act
intended that safety standards not depend on
current technology and could be "technology-
forcing" in the sense of inducing the develop-
ment of superior safety design. 103 S. Ct. at
2870. (Footnotes omitted).

The history of this rulemaking, the State Farm
decision, and the rulemaking record have put us in
a position where rescission of the automatic occu-
pant restraint requirements — unless there is a
very substantial increase in use of seatbelts in the
future — cannot be justified. On the other hand, as
discussed in detail elsewhere in the preamble, such
a substantial increase as a result of the widespread
enactment of MULs would provide increased safety
benefits much more quickly and at a much lower
cost, thus making rescission clearly justifiable. As
the Supreme Court said, "We start with the ac-
cepted ground that if used, seatbelts unquestion-
ably would save thousands of lives and would pre-
vent tens of thousands of crippling injuries."
103 S. Ct. at 2871. It also noted that the Depart-
ment originally began the passive restraint rule-
making exercise because "[i]t soon became appar-
ent that the level of seatbelt usage was too low to
reduce traffic injuries to an acceptable level"
103 S. Ct. at 2862. The data set out elsewhere in
this preamble and in the Final Regulatory Impact
Analysis demonstrate the dramatic reductions in
deaths and injuries that widespread usage of the
manual belt systems would achieve. Thus, the De-
partment has concluded that if two-thirds or more
of the American people are covered by such laws,
the need for an automatic occupant restraint re-
quirement would be obviated.

Demonstration Program

Because of the length of time a demonstration
program would take, the Department believes that
it would be necessary to justify rescission of the
old rule under this alternative. It also believes that
the phase-in portion of the amended rule will
achieve the public education/acceptance aspects of
any demonstration program.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 242

Other Mandatory Use Law Alternatives

The Department's rationale for not adopting the
other MUL alternatives is explained more fully in
the preceding sections. These other alternatives
are generally deficient in one of two respects: they
either make it necessary for the Department to
justify rescission under current circumstances
or the requirements they impose are much too
burdensome.

Under the alternative raised in the NPRM, the
Department would have sought the enactment of
MULs. The Department could not be certain that a
sufficient number of MULs would pass or that, if
passed, they would contain the necessary provi-
sions concerning penalties, enforcement, sanc-
tions, education, and waivers. As a result, the
Department could not determine whether the nec-
essary level of benefits would be achieved.

Under the other SNPRM alternative, the De-
partment would have waived the requirement for
automatic restraints in individual States that
enacted MULs. This alternative would have re-

quired the "regulation" of the sale of the manual
belt cars to ensure that they were not covered by
people not covered by MULs. It also would have
had adverse market impacts if consumers delayed
their purchases of cars, in anticipation of their
States passing MULs, in order to avoid purchasing
automatic restraints.

Legislation to Require Consumer Option

As with some of the previous alternatives, this
approach would require the Department to justify
rescission of the old rule. In addition, it would
place a tremendous economic burden on the manu-
facturers to have to be able to provide a variety of
systems on each model. It would, in turn, raise the
cost of all automobiles for the consumer.

Airbag Retrofit Capability

This, too, would require justification for rescis-
sion. It would also result in increasing the cost of
all cars even if no one ever retrofitted a car.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 243-244

TESTING PROCEDURES

Repeatability

The single most significant repeatability issue
related to test procedures, as reflected in com-
ments to the docket, was that of the repeatability
of the barrier crash test results. Nearly all manu-
facturers claim that because test result differences
are encountered in repeated tests of the same car,
and since these differences are large, they can not
be certain that all their vehicles will be in com-
pliance even when their development and compli-
ance tests show that the vehicles are. These large
differences, or test variability, place a manufac-
turer in jeopardy, it is claimed, because NHTSA,
while checking for compliance, may find a single
vehicle with test results exceeding the maximum
values in the standard, even though the manufac-
turer's results are to the contrary. Thus, they
stated, they might have to recall vehicles and
make vehicle modifications (which they claim they
would not know how to make) even though the
vehicles actually comply with the standard. The
auto companies say that the test result variances
are essentially due to deficiencies in the test proce-
dures themselves as well as the prescribed
Part 572 test dummy.

Because of these alleged deficiences, the argu-
ment goes, the standard is neither "objective" nor
"practicable" as required by statute. Manufac-
turers cite court decisions in Chrysler Corp.
V. DOT 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972) and Paccar, Inc.
V. NHTSA. 573 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1978), to argue
their point. In Chrysler, the court said that for a
standard to be "objective"

tests to determine compliance must be capable
of producing identical results where test con-
ditions are exactly duplicated, that they be

decisively demonstrable by performing a ra-
tional test procedure, and that compliance is
based upon the readings obtained from meas-
uring instruments as opposed to the subjec-
tive opinion of human beings. 472 F.2d at 676.

Because manufacturers claim that the only way
they can assure compliance is to "overdesign"
their vehicles (e.g., because of alleged variances in
results, to comply with a HIC requirement of 1000
manufacturers would design their vehicles to only
have an HIC of 500), resulting in excessive costs
without safety benefit, the Paccar case has rele-
vance. In overturning a truck braking standard,
the Court said that although the standard's test
procedures were "objective," they were not "prac-
ticable" because variations in test surface skid
numbers required manufacturers

not simply to comply with the stated standard,
but to over-compensate by testing their vehi-
cles on road surfaces substantially slicker than
official regulations require. 573 F.2d at 644.

The Department continues to believe, however,
that FMVSS 208 is both objective and practicable.
Manufacturers have not supplied for the record
data to support their claims of excessive test vari-
ability nor have they demonstrated that the bulk
of any variability is due to test procedures and
instruments as compared to vehicle-to-vehicle
differences.

The primary, and for most manufacturers the
sole, basis for claims of variability was the Repeat-
ability Test Program conducted by NHTSA under
its New Car Assessment Program. NHTSA tested
12 Chevrolet Citations in an attempt to ascertain
the reliability of publishing barrier crash test

PART 571: S 208 -PRE 245

results based on a single test. The results of the
testing program for HIC (only HIC was mentioned
by manufacturers as a variabUity "problem") were:

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Coefficient
of Variation

Driver
Passenger

655
694

137

77

21%
11%

The manufacturers focused on the GOV of the
driver HIC values — 21 percent — and claimed that
this is too large. They claim that with this large a
COV, they would have to design their vehicles to
achieve an HIC no higher than 560 to assure than
95 percent of their cars, when tested, would have
HIC values below 1000.

This argument is faulty for several reasons. First,
the NCAP results were based on the testing of a
single car — the Citation — at a higher test speed
(35mph) than required in FMVSS 208 (30 mph).
Passing the FMVSS 208 criteria at 35 mph requires
a vehicle to absorb 36 percent more energy — since
the energy dissipated in a crash is proportional to
the square of the speed — then in the required
30 mph crash. The Department would expect that
test result differences would be lower at 30 mph
since at 35 mph the design limit of certain struc-
tural members has been exceeded. Assuming that
the COV at 35 mph would be identical or lower
than that at 30 mph is without foundation and is
counterintuitive to sound engineering theory.

Second, the NCAP data can only be used to de-
rive a COV, at 35 mph, for the Citation. Extending
the Citation results to other vehicles is again with-
out basis. For example, Volvo tested four MY 1983
760 CLE vehicles according to the NCAP proce-
dures (although an additional 3 760 GLEs were
tested by a laboratory, MIRA, for Volvo, the
NCAP procedures may not have been fully followed
by that organization and thus can not be combined
with Volvo's own data). The results of the four
Volvo tests are:

Mean

Standard
Deviation

COV

Driver
Passenger

898
731

71
27

8%
4%

Here, we see coefficients of variation about
60 percent lower than that shown for the Citation.

Although not as many tests were run as for the
Citation, the Volvo 760 OLE results cast doubt as
to whether the Citation results can be applied to
all vehicles. The Department also points out that
even the Citation results for the passenger, which
tended to be ignored in the docket comments (man-
ufacturers instead tended to focus on the higher
COV for the driver) exhibit half the COV cited by
the auto companies.

Ford commented that the Volvo data, "though
nominally somewhat lower, was not significantly
different than that found in the Citation ..." Ford,
however, used all seven Volvo tests. Since these
tests were not all conducted similarly, they are
from two different statistical "universes" and can-
not be combined for statistical purposes. Nor does
Ford disagree that the Volvo results are lower
than for the Citation. And, Ford only compared the
standard deviation of the Citation and 760 GLE
results. Since the mean was higher for the
760 GLE than the Citation, and since the COV is
equal to the standard deviation divided by the
mean, had Ford compared COVs it might have
found that these differences were statistically sig-
nificant. Thus, Ford's use of the Volvo is inac-
curate in that it: (1) combines two unlike data
sets -the MIRA and Volvo 760 GLE tests; (2) fails
to examine coefficients of variation, a better des-
criptor of variance than the standard deviation;
and (3) only examines the larger differences asso-
ciated with driver HIC, and ignores the lower, pas-
senger variances.

Ford also supplied, in response to the SNPRM,
data which the company claims shows that their 33
Mercury tests, with airbags, conducted in 1974
also exhibited the same variances. Ford took the
results of these tests on MY 1972 Mercurys, which
were conducted at 30 mph, and "scaled" them to
35 mph. They claim that after "scaling," the Mer-
curys exhibited the same standard deviation as
the Citation.

The Department has examined the actual
30 mph test results of these Mercurys, contained
in Ford's February 1976 report, "Airbag Crash
Test Repeatability," ESRO Report No. S-76-3, and
finds that the results are not just for frontal bar-
rier tests but also 30 degree angle tests. At least
nine of the 24 frontal tests were at the oblique
angle. Although FMVSS 208 requires angle tests,
the comparison of angle plus frontal results to only
frontal results is somewhat inappropriate.

PART 571; S 208 - PRE 246

Furthermore, Ford again compares only the
standard deviations of driver HICs. After
"scaling," Ford shows the driver HIC standard
deviation to be 137. However, the standard devia-
tion based on Tables 4-1 of the Ford report show
driver HIC standard deviations, without "scaling,"
in frontal crashes to be only 80, and the GOV in
frontal crashes, given the mean of 479, is 16.7 per-
cent. As Ford somehow converted these values, or
some other value representing both frontal and
oblique crashes, from 30 mph to 35 mph. Ford is
implicitly agreeing with NHTSA that one can not
compare statistical results from crash tests con-
ducted at different speeds.

These Departmental positions — that the Cita-
tion tests may not be applicable to all cars and that
35 mph test results may not be applicable to results
at 30 mph — were raised in the SNPRM wherein
the Department stated "We are also interested in
comments on the relevance of the Citation variabil-
ity tests (conducted at 35 mph) to the FMVSS 208
compliance tests (specified to be conducted at
30 mph) and the applicability of the new Citation
results to other vehicles." Other than the above
cited Ford data, responses were submitted by only
GM, which provided data based on 30 mph sled
tests which showed COVs of 11 and 8 percent for
the driver and passenger, respectively, and Volvo,
which also provided sled test data showing a mean
of 467 and a COV of 12.5 percent. Further, only
Ford claimed that "comparable variability" to that
resulting from the Citation tests "would be ex-
pected for other vehicle models." Other manufac-
turers failed to address the issue.

Based on the above, the Department concludes
that the Citation test results cannot, without the
analysis of data for other vehicles, be applied to
other cars models at lower speeds.

The second reason the Department does not ac-
cept manufacturer claims of excessive variability
is also related to test speeds. Variability by itself
is not a crucial factor for a manufacturer to be con-
cerned about. Rather, it is the combination of vari-
ability and the mean (or average) value which can
be cause for concern. For example, assume that a
manufacturer is 95 percent confident that all its
HIC test results will be within ± 150 points of the
mean. If the mean value is 900, then the manufac-
turer may not be certain that all its vehicles will
comply with a criterion whose maximum value is
1000. However, if the mean is 500, then the ±150
variation is of little consequence in ascertaining

assurance of compliance.

It is clearly intuitive, due to the 36 percent less
energy involved in a 30 mph crash compared to a
35 mph crash, that average test results will be
lower at the 30 mph barrier crash speed than at
the 35 mph speed used in the NCAP program. No
commenter to the docket argued to the contrary.
Therefore, the issue of variability can not be ex-
amined in isolation but must be analyzed in the
context of the mean value.

Reexamining the Ford Mercury data, conducted
with airbags at 30 mph, the mean HIC value, taken
from page 4-20 of the Ford report, is 319.9. With
such a low mean, the derived variance is irrelevant
for compliance purposes. The Department wishes
to point out that: (1) based on its NCAP testing,
even with manual belt systems and when tested at
35 mph, 80 percent of the dummy drivers and
about 60 percent of the passenger dummies meet
the FMVSS 208 injury prevention criteria with
mean HICs of 899 and 845, respectively. These per-
centages would of course increase and the means
decrease at 30 mph. And (2) all airbag tests shown
mean HICs in the 400 to 500 range, a range
wherein variability again becomes meaningless for
assuring compliance. For instance, tests with air-
bags for MY 1972 Pintos showed maximum HICs
in the 500 to 600 range with the median value less
than 400; the maximum and mean for MY 1972
Mercurys were less than 700 and less than 400,
respectively; and for MY 1974-76 GM airbag cars
the values were under 600 and about 450, respec-
tively.

Thus, mean HICs for automatic belt systems in
30 mph barrier crashes would be lower than the
899 and 845 values observed from the 35 mph
NCAP program and for airbag equipped cars would
likely be in the 400 to 500 range, making variabil-
ity a moot issue.

A third reason that the Department believes
that variability is not so significant as issue as to
preclude the standard's reinstatement is that
manufacturers have not demonstrated that the
test procedures and test dummy are the major
causes of variability. GM and Volvo provided sled
test data which showed COVs of about 10 percent.
Since a sled test provides a steady crash pulse, it
was argued that most of, if not all, the variability
seen was due to dummy and test procedure vari-
ances. Without arguing the point, the Department
notes that these manufacturers failed to address
the question of whether this 10 percent level of

PART 571; S 208 - PRE 247

variability, when combined with an expected
mean, is unacceptable. For instance, if it is assumed
that the mean 30 mph passive belt HIC is 800 —
which is not unreasonable given current means of
between 845 and 899 at 35 mph -a COV of 10 per-
cent translates into a standard deviation of 80. Since
95.45 percent of all test results fall within the mean
± 2 standard deviations, a manufacturer can be sure
than more than 95 percent of its cars will have
HICs below 960 (800 + 2[80]) and the manufacturer
could be about 98 percent certain that all tested
cars will have values below 1,000. A lower mean
would increase the above-mentioned percentages.

In the SNPRM, the Department requested com-
ments on what level of variability was deemed
"reasonable," given that some variability will
always exist. Only Renault provided a quantitative
answer, saying the "the variation coefficient must
not exceed a maximum of 10 percent." Although
Renault provided no further justification for its
recommendation, the Department notes it is nearly
identical to the variation contributed by the test
procedures and dummy, according to Volvo and GM.

Manufacturers generally asserted that the ob-
served variability was not caused by vehicle-to-
vehicle differences but by the test procedures and
use of Part 572 dummy. In the SNPRM, the Depart-
ment said that it did not believe that the dummy
contributed significantly to test variabUity. The
Department, after reviewing the docket, stUl re-
tains this conclusion. The 1976 Ford repeatability
test report concluded that "that portion of the
variabUity in the test results which can be attrib-
uted to differences between the nine part 572 dum-
mies ... is small for the HIC measurements and
virtually nil for the chest g and femur load mea-
surements." Ford engineers also said in an SAE
paper (SAE paper 750935) the "differences in test
readings from one test dummy to another were
rather small, especially when compared to other
factors ... In fact, the variance in test readings
associated with differences among dummies was
essentially zero for chest g and for femur loads."
Renault, in response to the SNPRM, said that "the
present Part 572 dummy is not the major cause of
the dispersion of results."

In its NCAP repeatability program, NHTSA
found that differences in dummy calibration
results have "no correlation ... to dummy response
results in the vehicle crash event." (SAE paper
840201, February 1984). NHTSA further noted
that the Citation's "structural response . . . dis-

played significant variability" from vehicle-to-
vehicle. These differences included variations in
engine cradle buckling, floor pan and toe board
buckling, and irregular motion of the steering col-
umn. NHTSA concluded that "previous safety
research has demonstrated that these structural
behavior characteristics do have influence on
dummy HIC values, possible of major proportions."
Because of the large variations among vehicles and
the lack of correlation of dummy calibration to HIC
results, NHTSA believes that a large part of the
test variability is due to vehicle variability.

In summary, the Department finds that FMVSS
208 meets all statutory criteria for objectivity and
practicability, that manufacturers have not
demonstrated that there would be either exces-
sive variabUity in total or due to the test proce-
dures alone, and that compliance with FMVSS 208,
particularly with airbags, does not represent an
insurmountable burden to manufacturers.

Compliance Procedure

Having concluded that any test variabUity is not
sufficient to delay the standard's reinstatement,
the Department is stUl concerned that manufac-
turers believe themselves to be in unacceptable
compliance jeopardy. To reduce this jeopardy,
manufacturers suggested that a "design to con-
form" policy be adopted. They claimed this was
neither inconsistent with court decisions regard-
ing the required objectivity of standards nor
would it materially affect vehicle design, since
they would still have to demonstrate, through
crash tests, that their design could achieve the re-
quired levels of compliance. Furthermore, it was
argued by VW that NHTSA presently operates
under this concept.

We agree with VW that, in the event of a non-
conforming test result, NHTSA wUl seek to obtain
manufacturer compliance, test data and/or conduct
a second compliance test itself, prior to asserting
that a particular model is in noncompliance. The
Department is unaware of any instance in which
NHTSA has sought remedy under the statute for
noncompliance with a safety standard based on
only a single test result. Thus, for example, if
NHTSA found a car with an HIC value of 1050 and,
after reviewing manufacturer test data and/or con-
ducting another test, both of which demonstrated
compliance, it would likely determine that the
manufacturer had exercised "due care" and would
not seek remedy under the statute.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 248

However, the Chrysler Court disapproved of
any agency offering to investigate whether differ-
ences in test results (between manufacturer tests
and agency compliance tests) were sufficient to
determine a noncompliance. The court stated that
manufacturers needed objective assurances and
there was no room for agency investigations. Thus,
the Department recognizes that automobile com-
panies need some guarantee that should one car
out of a million, for example, be found to fail the
compliance test, that all one million will not have
to be recalled.

The guarantee sought by the industry, "design
to conform," though, is not acceptable. As pointed
out in the SNPRM, the Department believes such
an approach introduces unacceptable subjectivity
into the determination of compliance with the stan-
dard, in contravention to the decisions of the
courts to minimize nonobjective determinations of
noncompliance. Instead, since NHTSA already
exercises discretion in compliance cases, we will
seek, through a subsequent Notice to be issued
shortly, to provide such assurances without com-
promising either safety or the necessary statutory
objectivity. Essentially, we will propose to amend
FMVSS 208 by recognizing that a vehicle shall not
be deemed in noncompliance if a manufacturer has
exercised "due care" in designing and producing
such vehicle. Rather than increase the subjectivity
of the compliance process by introducing a "design
to conform" concept, NHTSA will explicitly rec-
ognize in FMVSS 208 the statutory direction ex-
pressed in section 107(bK2) of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 USC 1397), that
the penalties associated with producing a noncom-
plying vehicle "shall not apply to any person who
establishes that he did not have reason to know in
the exercise of due care that such vehicle ... is not
in conformity with applicable Federal motor vehi-
cle safety standards ..." (emphasis added).

Test Dummies

As stated earlier, the Department continues to
believe that the Part 572 test dummy fully meets all
statutory criteria and is not a major source of test
result variability. Most manufacturers, however,
disagreed. Volvo contended that the dummy has
"serious limitations" and must be more durable,
repeatable, and trouble-free. Toyota said it could
not be sure of the influence of the dummy on test
results. Mercedes also said that the Part 572 dummy

is not sufficiently repeatable while Ford said that
the dummy's calibration is repeatable but its crash
test performance may not be. American Motors
said that the Part 572 dummy is a state-of-the-art
compromise and lacks in measurement fidelity.

While not claiming that that Part 572 dummy is
not repeatable or fails to meet statutory criteria,
GM urged NHTSA to approve the use of the Hybrid
HI dummy as an alternative test device. GM said
that the Hybrid HI "offers significant improve-
ments over the part 572 dummy relative to bio-
fidelity of frontal head, chest and knee responses,
fore-aft neck bending, ankle and knee articulation
and automotive seated posture." Nissan agreed
that the Hybrid HI is a superior dummy which
demonstrates greater repeatability. Conversely,
Mercedes said that the Hybrid HI is not any more
repeatable than the Part 572 dummy.

As part of its petition to use the Hybrid HI, GM
submitted a paper by Mertz ("Anthropomorphic
Models," GM USG 2284, Part HI, Attachment I,
Enclosure 3) which stated that the Part 572
dummy (actually, the Hybrid H dummy, also devel-
oped by GM) has "good repeatability, durability,
and serviceability." "The Part 572 dummy repre-
sents the state-of-the-art of dummy technology in
the early 1970's."

Based on the conclusions of the Ford Mercury
testing and the agency's NCAP testing, NHTSA
has concluded that the dummy does not contribute
significantly to test variability. Renault agreed
with this conclusion. Industry characterizations of
the dummy, as shown above, vary considerably,
from the Part 572 being a major cause of variabil-
ity to it not being a major cause, to the Hybrid III
being an improvement, to it not being an improve-
ment. Only a few manufacturers provided data to
support their contentions but these data, supplied
by Ford, GM, and Volvo, based on sled tests, could
neither separate the contribution of variability
associated with the dummy alone nor demonstrate
why any dummy-induced test result variances
were so high as to be unacceptable. Since the
Department recognized, in the SNPRM, that some
variability will always be present in specifically
sought comment on the levels of variance which
were deemed "unacceptable." Only Renault replied
to this direct question and it did not supply a ratio-
nale for its conclusion. In the absence of data to the
contrary, the Department continues to believe
that the current Part 572 test dummy is adequate
to use as a compliance test device in standard 208.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 249

Nevertheless, it is recognized that the Part 572
dummy is more than 10 years old and, we agree
with AMC and GM in this regard, is a state-of-the-
art compromise. Recognizing that dummy develop-
ment, especially improved biofidelity — that is, the
dummy's replication of actual human motion and
potential for injury — is crucial for continued
improvements in vehicle safety, NHTSA has been
utilizing the Hybrid III dummy in its research and
development work, as have GM and other manu-
facturers. NHTSA recognizes that the Hybrid HI
dummy does have additional measurement capa-
bility over the Hybrid H (Part 572) and, assuming
injury criteria can be agreed upon and its repeat-
ability, durability, etc. verified, it could be viewed
as an improvement over the Hybrid H. Because of
these views, and the data presented in the GM
position, NHTSA will address these issues in a
separate rulemaking. Because we have concluded
that the current Part 572 dummy is fully adequate
to use in testing to the injury criteria specified in
FMVSS 208, action on the Hybrid HI dummy is
irrelevant for the purposes of this rulemaking.
Should NHTSA decide to permit the use of the
Hybrid HI as an alternative test device, as GM has
petitioned, it would not pose any additional burden
on manufacturers since they could still use the cur-
rent Part 572 dummy for compliance purposes. If
NHTSA decides to substitute the Hybrid III for
the Hybrid II as the compliance test device speci-
fied in Part 572, a gradual phase-in period would
be provided so as not to interfere with manufac-
turer leadtime and the timely implementation of
the automatic occupant protection provisions of
FMVSS 208.

Injury Criteria

Several manufacturers recommended that the
injury criteria associated with potential head in-
jury be adjusted in two ways: (1) to eliminate the
measurement of HIC in the absence of head con-
tact, and (2) to increase the HIC in case of a head
strike to 1500 from its current level of 1000.

It is recognized by NHTSA that the Head Injury
Criterion (HIC) was primarily developed from tests
of forehead impacts, resulting in acceleration of
the brain in the anterior-posterior (i.e., forward
and backward) directions. This was pointed out in
the SNPRM, wherein the Department also briefly
discussed accident and test data, including informa-
tion from NHTSA itself, which suggested a very
low probability of brain injury in the absence of

head contact. However, it was suggested that mea-
suring HIC in noncontact situations could serve as
a surrogate for potential neck or other injuries.

Volvo supplemented the above arguments by
stating that the use of HIC for other than what
was the basis of its development — forehead im-
pacts in the anterior-posterior directions — results
in less dummy biofidelity. Volvo suggested that
this expanded use of HIC, beyond what it was in-
tended to measure, is inappropriate. They stated
that if neck injuries are of concern, then other cri-
teria, related solely to the neck, be used. This posi-
tion on neck injuries was supported by Peugeot,
Renault, Ford, and GM. Mercedes and MVMA also
opposed measuring HIC in noncontacts but did
not mention its use as a surrogate in potentially
preventing neck injuries. Allstate opposed its elimi-
nation in such crash situations, claiming it protects
occupants from cervical and spinal injuries.

The primary derivation of HIC from head impact
tests is not in question. HIC was developed from
the Wayne State Tolerance Curve (WSTC) which
was itself based on the hypothesis that the domi-
nant head injury mechanism was linear acceleration.

The Department agrees with the commenters,
based on its own review of the origins of HIC, that
its predictive capabUity of neck injuries is weak.
The Department further agrees that the preven-
tion of neck injuries, through assuring that exces-
sive head motion is prevented, is important for
automobile safety since neck injuries account for
78.2 percent of all crash-related noncontact-harm
in passenger cars (see SAE Paper 820242, "A
Search for Priorities in Crash Protection," Mil-
liaris, et al, February 1982). The Department also
notes that the Hybrid III dummy is capable of neck
injury measurements, by monitoring the dummy's
neck's axial loading, shear load, and bending move-
ment (see GM's petition, USG 2284 Part III, At-
tachment I, Enclosure 2). Although the Hybrid
Ill's neck biofidelity may be deficient in that its
lateral bending response may not be humanlike
and its neck too stiff in axial compression, its
measurement of fore/aft bending provides supe-
rior biofidelity to the Part 572 dummy, which is
incapable of direct injury measurements (see ibid.
Enclosure 3).

The Department thus believes that prevention
of neck injury would be better served by direct
dummy measurement, measurement which can be
made with the Hybrid III. This position was also
expressed by the U.S. delegation to ISO/TC 22/SC

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 250

12/WG 6 which stated that "the head injury cri-
terion should not be applied in the event of no head
impact other injury criteria, perhaps based on
neck loads ..." should be used instead. As part of
the subsequent rulemaking mentioned previously,
the adoption of neck injury criteria will be pro-
posed. In addition, the issue of noncontact HICs
will be further addressed in the context of the cur-
rent Part 572 dummy. Data relating to the biofi-
delity of the dummy, in this regard, will be specif-
ically sought.

This issue is not viewed as one which affects the
decision regarding FMVSS 208 contained in this
notice. Any action by NHTSA in this area should
only result in reducing the required test burden,
thus additional leadtime should not be required.
Action regarding the dummy is viewed by the De-
partment as seeking to continually improve the
biofidelity of its anthropomorphic test devices, and
is thus separate from, although related to, the
208 decision.

Although several manufacturers requested that
the HIC criterion, even when there is a head
strike, be raised to 1500, the Department will not
take any action on that issue at this time. The 1500
HIC level is the subject of a petition for rule-
making by the CCMC. NHTSA will respond directly
to this petition at the same time that it prepares
the aforementioned rulemaking action.

Oblique Test Requirement

The SNPRM contained a proposal to eliminate
the requirement to test compliance at angles up to
30° from the longitudinal direction. The basis for
this proposal was data from Ford's Airbag Crash
Test Repeatability report, which consistently
showed lower dummy injury readings in angular
crashes, especially for HIC and chest g's, and
NHTSA test data which agreed with that from
Ford. Chrysler, BMW, Volvo, Nissan, Mercedes,
Honda, and Mazda agreed with the proposal, claim-
ing that no insight in restraint performance was
provided by the test, it was not essential for veri-
fying compliance since test results were lower
than in the direct frontal tests, and thus it only
contributed to lead time and testing costs. Mazada
was the only company to provide data to support
its conclusion. Mazda provided the results of a
single test which showed lower readings in the
angular than the frontal crash.

GM and Saab opposed the deletion of the oblique
test. GM, in further discussions with NHTSA,

based its objection on the belief that the oblique
test is more representative of real world crashes
than the frontal test. GM also said that regardless
of the agency's decision it would continue to con-
duct oblique tests; thus, although it believed such
tests to be more representative it has no objection
to their being deleted from the standard. Saab, in
subsequent discussion with NHTSA, did not elab-
orate on their assertion that deletion of the test
would be a "cover-up" for airbag deficiencies nor
did VW, when contacted by NHTSA, explain why
they believed the test necessary for airbags but
not automatic belts.

The Department continues to believe, as ex-
pressed in the SNPRM, that the oblique test require-
ment may not meet the need for motor vehicle
safety and thus may unnecessarily add to compli-
ance costs. However, prior to taking final action the
Department wishes to have additional test data
and/or supporting and dissenting arguments. This
information will be sought as part of the notice
described earlier, as will comments from the public
on the issue of international harmonization of test
requirements, as sought by Peugeot and Renault.

Other Test Procedure Issues

The Department still believes that adoption of
the NCAP test procedures will reduce test result
variability. The added specificity of these proce-
dures, as compared to the current FMVSS 208 com-
pliance criteria, can have no other effect than to
reduce variabUity compared to inconsistent dummy
placement, albeit by some unknown amount.

However, we also agree with manufacturer com-
ments concerning the inadequacy of notice as to
the specific parts of the NCAP procedure to be
adopted. In addition, several commenters sug-
gested other test procedure changes to even fur-
ther reduce variability. The soon to be issued
NPRM will thus repropose the specific NCAP pro-
cedures to be adopted, plus propose additional
changes as suggested in comments to Notice 35 of
Docket 74-14.

Ford, Chrysler, and VW suggested that if auto-
matic belts are the means of compliance, then the
static test requirements of FMVSS 209 and 210,
instead of the dynamic test requirements of
FMVSS 208, be used to check compliance. The De-
partment disagrees. The concept behind FMVSS
208 is that it is an overall vehicle standard, not just
a restraint standard. To simply test the restraint
system, statically, would not assure the occupant

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 251

that injury protection, equivalent to that of other
types of restraints which would continue to have
to be dynamically tested, was being provided. In
this regard, the Department agrees with Allstate
that dynamic testing (as is also done for child
restraint systems as required by FMVSS 213) is
superior to static testing and the requests cited
above are responded to in the negative.

The Department also rejects GM's proposal to
amend FMVSS 208 by permitting compliance with
manual belts if the vehicle complies with the
injury criteria at 30 mph with the dummies belted
and at 25 mph with the dummies unbelted. The
Department does not believe, based on data in its
possession on crash tests at 25 mph with unre-
strained dummies, that equivalent safety benefits
are possible with this proposal. GM's estimate of
benefits is not complete in that it is based on vehi-
cles in NHTSA's NCSS file, vehicles which, on
average, are of early 1970's vintage. A more com-
plete analysis would be based on the ability of
current production vehicles to supply such protec-
tion. Data available to NHTSA indicate that some
current vehicles are capable of supplying auto-
matic occupant protection at speeds up to 25 mph.
Without data to the contrary, there is no assur-
ance of the magnitude of safety improvement asso-
ciated with the GM proposal. Since it has not been

demonstrated as an equal alternative, it will not be
further considered in this rulemaking, although
the Department applauds GM for its work in the
area of passive interiors and encourages both it
and other companies to continue to provide protec-
tion for otherwise unprotected occupants. The
Department also notes that nothing in FMVSS 208
precludes compliance through the use of "passive
interiors" as being developed by GM. But such
compliance must be demonstrated at 30 mph, not
25 mph as GM has suggested.

Finally, Ford requested that convertibles by ex-
empted from the automatic occupant protection re-
quirements. Ford argues that automatic belts are
not feasible in convertibles and that the only
means of compliance would be airbags, thus result-
ing in a "design" standard for these vehicles. Since
the statute requires that safety standards be
"appropriate for the class of vehicles to which they
apply," and since convertibles are already exempt
from the requirement that all front outboard seat-
ing positions have lap and shoulder belts. Ford
argues that exemption for convertibles is appro-
priate. Although we disagree with Ford that pro-
viding automatic belts in convertibles is not fea-
sible, it may be not acceptable or appropriate to do
so. NHTSA will seek additional guidance from the
public on this issue in subsequent rulemaking.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 252

REGULATORY IMPACTS

The Department has considered the impacts of
this final rule and determined that it is a major
rulemaking within the meaning of E.0. 12291 and a
significant rule within the meaning of the Depart-
ment of Transportation Regulatory Policies and
Procedures. A Final Regulatory Impact Analysis
is being placed in the public docket simultaneously
with the publication of this notice. A copy of the
Analysis may be obtained by writing to: National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Docket
Section, Room 5109, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590.

The Department's determination that the rule is
major and significant is based on the substantial
benefits and costs resulting from the requirement
for the installation of automatic protection sys-
tems. The Department's determinations regarding
these matters are discussed elsewhere in this pre-
amble. As noted above, the number of lives saved
and injuries prevented will depend on the type of
automatic restraints installed in new cars and on
the usage and effectiveness of those restraints.
Estimates range from 520 to 9,110 lives saved,
8,740 to 155,030 moderate to critical 2 to 5 injuries
prevented and 22,760 to 255,770 minor injuries pre-
vented. The total incremental cost increase for a
new car would be $51 for automatic belt cars (incre-
mental cost of $40 and lifetime energy costs of $11),
$232 for a high volume of cars with driver position
airbags (incremental cost of $220 and energy costs
of $12), and $364 for a high volume of cars with air-
bags for all front seat occupants (incremental cost
of $320 and energy costs of $44). Assuming 10 mil-
lion cars sold annually, total economic costs, exclu-
sive of insurance or other savings, would be be-
tween $510 million and $3,640 million.

The Department has also assessed the impacts

of this final rule on car manufacturers, automatic
restraint suppliers, new car dealers, and small
organizations and governmental units. Based on
that assessment, I certify that this action will not
have a significant economic effect on a substantial
number of small entities. Accordingly, the Depart-
ment has not prepared a final regulatory flexibility
analysis. However, the impacts of the final rule on
suppliers, dealers and other entities are discussed
in the FRIA.

The impact on airbag manufacturers is not likely
to be significant, but will be positive. The final rule
does not require any car manufacturer to install
airbags in any new cars. To the extent that car
manufacturers respond to the incentive provided
by this final rule to install airbags, airbags sales
will increase. The Department is not able to assess
precisely the extent to which car manufacturers
will so respond.

Similarly, the suppliers of automatic belts are
not likely to be significantly affected. These are
generally the same firms that currently supply
manual belts. Therefore, their volume of sales is
not expected to increase significantly as a result of
this final rule. There may be some economic bene-
fits associated with developing and producing the
more sophisticated types of automatic belts.

Since the Department anticipates that most car
manufacturers will comply with the final rule by
installing detachable automatic belts, the cost im-
pacts on new cars will not be large enough to have
a significant effect on new car sales. Similarly, the
Department does not expect that the design or oper-
ation of the automatic restraints will affect new
car sales. The Department expects that the detach-
able automatic belts will be sufficiently acceptable
to the public so that their presence in new cars will

PART 571; S 208 - PRE 253

not be a factor in the purchasing of new cars.

For the reasons discussed in the preceding para-
graph, the Department does not expect that small
organizations or governmental units would be sig-
nificantly affected. The price increases associated
with the installation of detachable automatic belts
should not affect the purchasing of new cars by
these entities. A somewhat greater effect would
occur to the extent that any of these entities
decide to purchase airbag cars.

In accordance with the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, the Department has considered
the environmental impacts of this final rule. A
Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) is
being placed in the public docket simultaneously
with the publication of this notice. The FEIS
focuses on the environmental impacts associated
with the alternative having the largest potential
impacts. The alternative incorporated in this final
rule will have substantially smaller impacts. The
Department has concluded that there is no signifi-
cant effect on the environment. Since most auto-
matic restraints will be automatic belts, the
amount of safety belt webbing manufactured should
not change significantly.

The Department finds good cause for making
this final rule effective more than 1 year from

the date of issuance, since the possibility exists
that a substantial number of cars would comply
with other than belt systems. As discussed earlier
in this preamble and in the FRIA, the provision of
automatic restraints requires significant vehicle
modification. Airbag installation requires steering
column changes and instrument panel redesign.
The lead time to accomplish these alternatives,
based on the time necessary to design and test the
structural changes and to order tooling, especially
for small cars, is several years. Similarly, a multi-
year leadtime is necessary to provide automatic
belts due to structural changes in seat and door
strength and floor pan reinforcements. Passive
interiors can require even longer leadtimes if
structural modifications to a vehicle's front end, to
better absorb the energy of a 30 mph crash, are
necessary. The leadtime provided will provide car
manufacturers with an effective choice about the
type of automatic restraint they install in their
cars. Providing less leadtime would limit their
choices and tend to necessitate their selecting
detachable automatic belts, the means of compli-
ance with the least certainty as to level of benefits,
in place of more advanced technology such as air-
bags or passive interiors.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 254

THE RULE

PART 571 — FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE
SAFETY STANDARDS

In consideration of the foregoing, Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash
Protection, (49 CFR 571.208), is amended as set
forth below.

§571.208 (AmendecU

1. S4.1.2 through S4.1.2.2 of Standard No. 208
are revised to read as follows:

S4.1.2 Passenger cars manufactured on or
after September 1, 1973, and before September 1,
1986. Each passenger car manufactured on or after
September 1, 1973, and before September 1, 1986,
shall meet the requirements of S4. 1.2.1, S4. 1.2.2, or
S4.1.2.3. A protection system that meets the re-
quirements of S4. 1.2.1 or S4.1.2.2 may be installed
at one or more designated seating positions of a
vehicle that otherwise meets the requirements of
84.1.2.3.

S4. 1.2.1 First option— frontal/angular auto-
matic protection system. The vehicle shall:

(a) At each front outboard designated seating
position meet the frontal crash protection require-
ments of S5.1 by means that require no action by
vehicle occupants;

(b) At the front center designated seating posi-
tion and at each rear designated seating position
have a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly that con-
forms to Standard No. 209 and to S7.1 and S7.2; and

(c) Either: (l)Meet the lateral crash protection
requirements of S5.2 and the rollover crash protec-
tion requirements of S5.3 by means that require no
action by vehicle occupants; or

(2) At each front outboard designated seating
position have a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assem-
bly that conforms to Standard No. 209 and to S7.1
through S7.3, and that meets the requirements of
S5.1 with front test dummies as required by S5.1,
restrained by the Type 1 or Type 2 seabelt
assembly (or the pelvic portion of any Type 2 seat
belt assembly which has a detachable upper torso
belt) in addition to the means that require no ac-
tion by the vehicle occupant.

S4. 1.2.2 Second option— head-on automatic
protection system. The vehicle shall:

(a) At each designated seating position have a
Type 1 seatbelt assembly or Type 2 seatbelt
assembly with a detachable upper torso portion
that conforms to S7.1 and S7.2 of this standard.

(b) At each front outboard designated seating
position, meet the frontal crash protection require-
ments of S5.1, in a perpendicular impact, by means
that require no action by vehicle occupants;

(c) At each front outboard designated seating
position, meet the frontal crash protection require-
ments of S5.1, in a perpendicular impact, with a
test device restrained by a Type 1 seatbelt assem-
bly; and

(d) At each front outboard designated seating
position, have a seatbelt warning system that con-
forms to S7.3.

2. S4.1.3 of Standard No. 208 is revised to read
as follows:

S4.1.3 Passenger cars manufactured on or after
September 1, 1986, and before September 1, 1989.

S4. 1.3.1 Passenger cars manufactured on
or after September 1, 1986, and before Septem-
ber 1, 1987

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 255

54.1.3.1.1 Subject to S4.1.3.1.2 and S4.1.3.4,
each passenger car manufactured on or after Sep-
tember 1, 1986, and before September 1, 1987,
shall comply with the requirements of S4.1.2.1,
S4.1.2.2 or S4.1.2.3.

54.1.3.1.2 Subject to S4.1.5, an amount of the
cars specified in S4.1.3.1.1 equal to not less than
10 percent of the average annual production of
passenger cars manufactured on or after Septem-
ber 1, 1983, and before September 1, 1986, by each
manufacturer, shall comply with the requirements
of S4.1.2.1.

54. 1.3.2 Passenger cars manufactured on
or after September 1, 1987, and before Septem-
ber 1, 1988.

54.1.3.2.1 Subject to S4.1.3.2.2 and S4.1.3.4,
each passenger car manufactured on or after Sep-
tember 1, 1987, and before September 1, 1988,
shall comply with the requirements of S4.1.2.1,
S4.1.2.2 or S4.1.2.3.

54.1.3.2.2 Subject to S4.1.5, an amount of the
cars specified in S4.1.3.2.1 equal to not less than
25 percent of the average annual production of
passenger cars manufactured on or after Septem-
ber 1, 1984, and before September 1, 1987, by each
manufacturer, shall comply with the requirements
of S4.1.2.1.

54.1.3.3 Passenger cars manufactured on
or after September 1, 1988, and before Septem-
ber 1, 1989.

54.1.3.3.1 Subject to S4.1.3.3.2 and S4.1.3.4,
each passenger car manufactured on or after Sep-
tember 1, 1988, and before September 1, 1989,
shall comply with the requirements of S4.1.2.1,
S4.1.2.2 or S4.1.2.3.

54.1.3.3.2 Subject to S4.1.5, an amount of the
cars specified in S4.1.3.3.1 equal to not less than
40 percent of the average annual production of
passenger cars manufactured on or after Septem-
ber 1, 1985, and before September 1, 1988, by each
manufacturer, shall comply with the requirements
of S4.1.2.1.

54.1.3.4 For the purposes of calculating the
number of cars manufactured under S4.1.3.1.2,
S4.1.3.2.2, or S4.1.3.3.2 to comply with 84.1.2.1,
each car whose driver's seating position will com-
ply with these requirements by means other than
any type of seatbelt is counted as 1.5 vehicles.

3. Standard No. 208 is amended by adding the
following new sections:

54.1.4 Passenger cars manufactured on or
after September 1, 1989. Except as provided in
S4.1.5, each passenger car manufactured on or
after September 1, 1989, shall comply with the re-
quirements of S4.1.2.1.

54.1.5 Mandatory seatbelt use laws.

54. 1.5.1 If the Secretary of Transportation de-
termines, by not later than April 1, 1989, that
State mandatory safety belt usage laws have been
enacted that meet the criteria specified in S4.1.5.2
and that are applicable to not less than two-thirds
of the total population of the 50 States and the Dis-
trict of Columbia (based on the most recent Esti-
mates of the Resident Population of States, by
Age, Current Population Reports, Series P-25,
Bureau of the Census), each passenger car manu-
factured under S4.1.3 or S4.1.4 on or after the date
of that determination shall comply with the re-
quirements of S4.1.2.1, S4.1.2.2 or S4.1.2.3.

54.1.5.2 The minimum criteria for State man-
datory safety belt usage laws are:

(a) Require that each front seat occupant of a
passenger car equipped with safety belts under
Standard No. 208 has a safety belt properly fas-
tened about his or her body at all times when the
vehicle is in forward motion.

(b) If waivers from the safety belt usage re-
quirement are to be provided, permit them for
medical reasons only.

(c) Provide for the following enforcement
measures:

(1) A penalty of not less than $25 (which may
include court costs) for each occupant of a car who
violates the belt usage requirement.

(2) A provision specifying that the violation
of the belt usage requirement may be used to miti-
gate damages with respect to any person who is in-
volved in a passenger car accident while violating
the belt usage requirement and who seeks in any
subsequent litigation to recover damages for injur-
ies resulting from the accident. This requirement
is satisfied if there is a rule of law in the State per-
mitting such mitigation.

(3) A program to encourage compliance with
the belt usage requirement.

(d) An effective date of not later than Septem-
ber 1, 1989.

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 256

Sec.103. 119, Pul. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (15 U.S.C.
1392. 1407)

Issued on July 11, 1984

Elizabeth H. Dole
Secretary of Transportation
49 F.R. 28962
July 17, 1984

PART 571; S 208 -PRE 257-58

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection; Improvement of Seat Belt Assemblies
[Docket No. 74-14; Notice 40]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice adopts a one-year delay,
from September 1, 1985, to September 1, 1986, in
the effective date for the safety belt comfort and
convenience requirements issued by NHTSA in
January 1981. The agency proposed a one-year de-
lay in a notice issued in April of this year. The
April notice also proposed several minor modifica-
tions to the comfort and convenience require-
ments, which will be addressed in a subsequent
notice.

This notice also denies the petitions submitted
by American Motors Corporation and the Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association for an indef-
inite delay in the proposed effective date of these
amendments. The denial is based on the agency's
belief that the substantive issues in the proposal
will be quickly resolved in a separate final rule
and that delaying the effective date for one year
will give the motor vehicle industry sufficient time
to meet the modified comfort and convenience
requirements.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On January
8, 1981, NHTSA amended Standard No. 208, Occu-
pant Crash Protection, to specify additional perfor-
mance requirements to promote the comfort and
convenience of both manual and automatic safety
belt systems installed in motor vehicles with a
GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less (46 FR 2064). The
requirements have not yet become effective. In
partial response to seven petitions for reconsidera-
tion, the agency extended the effective date of the
comfort and convenience requirements for one
year, from September 1, 1982, to September 1,
1983 (47 FR 7254). Subsequently, the agency
adopted (48 FR 24717) a further extension of the ef-
fective date for the requirements to September 1,
1985.

On April 12, 1985, the agency proposed to
change the effective date of the comfort and conve-
nience requirements to September 1, 1986, to coin-
cide with the effective date of the Department's
July 11, 1984, rule requiring the installation of
automatic restraints. This notice also proposed
modifications to certain aspects of the comfort and
convenience performance requirements in order to
clarify the agency's intent and to address the con-
cerns raised in the petitions for reconsideration (50
FR 14580).

After the April 12, 1985, notice of proposed rule-
making was issued, American Motors Corporation
and the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
petitioned NHTSA to postpone the effective date
immediately and indefinitely, until all issues con-
cerning the comfort and convenience requirements
are resolved. They stated their belief that a final
rule on the former effective date is unlikely to be
issued before production of 1986 model year ve-
hicles begins in July 1985; that manufacturers will
be uncertain of the standard's applicable require-
ments; and that it is unreasonable to have this
critical timing issue tied to the rulemaking pro-
cess. Chrysler Corporation, General Motors Cor-
poration and Volkswagen of America, Inc., sup-
ported this request in submission to the docket.
General Motors stated that deferral is essential to
provide time to resolve the many interrelated is-
sues of Notices 37, 38, and 39, as well as to provide
time to meet the final requirements flowing from
these rulemaking actions. The agency disagrees.
Although each of these proposals concerns Stan-
dard No. 208, the agency maintains that the issues
are separable, as are the notices proposing them.

The agency realizes that September 1, 1985, is
an inappropriate effective date for the comfort and
convenience requirements because there is insuffi-
cient lead time before the beginning of the new

PART 571; S208-PRE 259

model year to comply with the requirements either
in the currently adopted version or in the version
proposed in April 1985. The agency believes that
an effective date of September 1, 1986, provides
sufficient time for industry to meet either version
of the comfort and convenience requirements. This
conclusion is based on NHTSA's own analysis and
on the absence of indication in the comments of the
other domestic and foreign motor vehicle manufac-
turers, seat belt manufacturers, and a technical re-
presentative that a September 1, 1986, effective
date would pose any problems in complying with
the proposed requirements. Since its range of
choices regarding the substantive differences in
the two versions is not large, the agency does not
foresee that there will be any changes to the com-
fort and convenience requirements which would
necessitate additional lead time beyond September
1, 1986. Therefore, the agency is adopting that
date as the new effective date for all requirements
except the one discussed immediately below. How-
ever, if the final rule on the substantive issues does
include changes for which the industry might need
additional lead time, the agency will consider
these circumstances and, if necessary, take
appropriate steps to adjust the effective date.

In a separate final rule to be issued in the very
near future, the agency will respond to the sub-
stantive issues raised in the notice of proposed
rulemaking and the comments thereon.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
571.208 is amended as follows:

1. The authority citation for Part 571 continues
to read as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1391, 1401, 1403, 1407;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

2. S7.1.1.3 is revised to read as follows:

A lap belt installed at any front outboard desig-
nated seating position in a vehicle manufactured
on or after September 1, 1986, shall meet the re-
quirements of this section by means of an emer-
gency-locking retractor that conforms to Standard
No. 209 (571.209) of this chapter.

3. S7.4 is revised to read as follows:
S7.4 Seat belt comfort and convenience.

(a) Automatic seat belts installed in any vehicle
with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less manufac-
tured on or after September 1, 1986, shall meet
the requirements of S7.4.1, S7.4.2, and S7.4.3.

(b) Manual seat belts, other than manual Type 2
belts in front seating positions in passengers cars,
installed in any vehicle with a GVWR of 10,000
pounds or less manufactured on or after September
1, 1986, shall meet the requirements of S7.4.3,
S7.4.4, S7.4.5, and S7.4.6.

Issued on August 19, 1985

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

50 F.R. 34152
August 23, 1985

PART 571; S208-PRE 260

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection
[Docket No. 74-14; Notice 41]

ACTION: Response to Petitions for Reconsidera-
tion.

SUMMARY: On July 11, 1984, the Secretary of
Transportation issued a final rule requiring auto-
matic occupant protection in all passenger cars
based on a phased-in schedule beginning on
September 1, 1986, with full implementation
being required by September 1, 1989, unless,
before April 1, 1989, states covering two-thirds of
the population of the United States have enacted
mandatory safety belt use laws meeting specified
criteria, with such laws becoming effective by
September 1, 1989. Subsequently, sixteen in-
terested parties filed petitions for reconsideration
of the final rule. This notice responds to the issues
raised in those petitions.

EFFECTIVE DATE: October 14, 1985

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background
On July 1 1 , 1984 (49 FR 28962), the Secretary of
Transportation issued a final rule requiring auto-
matic occupant protection in all passenger cars
based on a phased-in schedule beginning on Sep-
tember 1, 1986, with full implementation being
required by September 1, 1989, unless, before
April 1, 1989, states covering two-thirds of the
population of the United States have enacted
mandatory safety belt use laws (MULs) meeting
specified criteria, with such laws becoming effec-
tive by September 1, 1989.
More specifically, the rule requires:
• Front outboard seating positions in passenger
cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1986,
for sale in the United States, will have to be equip-

ped with automatic restraints based on the follow-
ing schedule:

• Ten percent of all cars manufactured on or
after September 1, 1986.

• Twenty-five percent of all cars manufactured
on or after September 1, 1987.

• Forty percent of all cars manufactured on or
after September 1, 1988.

• One hundred percent of all cars manufactured
on or after September 1, 1989.

• During the phase-in period, each car that is
manufactured with a system that provides auto-
matic protection to the driver without automatic
belts will be given an extra credit equal to one-
half car toward meeting the percentage require-
ment.

• The requirement for automatic restraints will
be rescinded if MULs meeting specified conditions
are passed by a sufficient number of states before
April 1, 1989, to cover two-thirds of the population
of the United States.

Sixteen interested parties subsequently peti-
tioned for reconsideration of the standard. The
issues raised by the petitioners and the agency's
response are discussed below.

Rescind the Standard

One petitioner asked the agency to reconsider
the decision not to rescind the automatic restraint
requirements of Standard No. 208. He argued
that the Secretary's decision was apparently bas-
ed on a belief that rescission was not a possible
result under the Supreme Court decision in Motor
Vehicle Manufacturer's Association v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (State Farm).
The petitioner further argued that the record in
the Standard No. 208 proceeding in fact supports
rescission. In particular, the petitioner argued that
the rulemaking record shows that air bag techno-

PART 57 1 ; S208-PRE 26 1

logy is not an effective automatic restraint alterna-
tive. Quoting from portions of the July 1984 final
decision, the petitioner specifically Eirgued that air
bag systems require the use of a lap belt and do not
provide protection at less than 10-12 mph, the dis-
posal problem related to the gas generation agent
in air bag systems needs more action, air bag sys-
tems may cause injury to out-of-position occupants,
the cost of air bag systems is a major disadvantage,
and the use of air bag systems in small cars re-
quires more lead time. The petitioner concluded
that few manufacturers will use air bag systems,
thus leaving automatic belts as the only automatic
restraint alternative. As to automatic belts, the
petitioner argued that the record does not show
that detachable automatic belts would increase
usage. The petitioner specifically argued that
there has been no showing that the combination of
motorist inertia and automatic belts will increase
belt usage.

NHTSA's position is that the State Farm deci-
sion allows the agency to make a reasoned choice
between rescinding or retaining the standard.
However, the agency stated in the July 1984 final
rule, and still believes, that the rulemaking record
does not justify rescission— unless there is a very
substantial increase in the use of manual safety
belts in the future. The data set forth in the July
1984 final rule demonstrate the dramatic reduc-
tions in deaths and injuries that widespread usage
of the safety belt systems would achieve. Thus, if
twothirds or more of the American people are co-
vered by mandatory use laws, that would increase
useage of safety belts, the need for an automatic oc-
cupant restraint requirement would be obviated
and the rule would be rescinded.

The agency believes that the rulemaking record,
taken as a whole, shows that air bag systems are
an effective automatic restraint technology. The
discussion in the final rule concerning the need to
use a safety belt with an air bag system and the
ability of such systems to provide protection at low
speeds concerned the relative advantages and dis-
advantages of different restraint technologies. As
noted in that discussion, air bag systems have an
advantage over other occupant restraints in that
they ensure a usage rate of nearly 100 percent for
both drivers and passengers. Even without use of a
lap belt, an air bag system will offer protec-
tion; however, to equal the effectiveness of a
manual lap-shoulder belt, air bag systems must be
used with a lap belt.

Likewise, while air bag systems do not inflate in
low speed crashes, other standards, such as those
on energy-absorbing steering columns and instru-
ment panel padding, ensure that occupants will
still be provided with protection in low speed colli-
sions. In addition, research data indicate that air
bag systems will provide protection at higher
speeds than safety belts.

As to potential problems with the disposal of the
gas generator, the July 1984 final rule pointed out
that as long as appropriate procedures are followed
by vehicle recyclers and scrappers, disposal should
not pose a problem. Subsequent to issuance of the
rule, the agency has had discussions with recyclers
and scrappers concerning the joint NHTSA-
General Services Administration air bag fleet
demonstration program to discuss safe and reason-
able disposal procedures. We believe that this ef-
fort will lead to further improvements in the safe
disposal of the chemical agents in air bag systems.

The July final rule acknowledged concerns about
the effects of air bag systems on out-of-position oc-
cupants; however, it also explained that technical
solutions are available to address the out-of-posi-
tion occupant problem. The final rule also acknow-
ledged the higher costs of air bag systems in com-
parison to automatic belts; the high cost of replac-
ing an air bag system, which could lead to its not
being replaced after deployment; public uncertain-
ty and concern associated wiht air bag systems;
and the longer lead time needed for air bag sys-
tems, particularly in small cars. It was a balancing
of those factors, plus the factors discussed above,
that led to the decision that air bag systems should
not be mandated for all cars. However, as dis-
cussed in the final rule, the agency believes that
air bag systems are an effective restraint techno-
logy which, along with other types of automatic re-
straint technology, will provide demonstrable safe-
ty benefits. The provision in the final rule pro-
viding manufacturers that use non-belt automatic
restraints with extra credit in complying with the
phase-in requirements was intended to encourage
alternative technologies, including enhanced
availability of air bag systems.

As to detachable automatic belts, as discussed in
the July 1984 final rule, the agency cannot project
either widespread usage for detachable automatic
belts or a widespread refusal to use such systems.
As discussed by the Supreme Court in the State
Farm decision, it is reasonable to expect that iner-
tia will work to increase usage, since once an auto-

PART 571; S208-PRE 262

matic belt is connected, it continues to function au-
tomatically until it is disconnected. However,
using even the lowest level of the range for the ef-
fectiveness of automatic belts and a very little
increase in usage (only a 7 1/2 percentage point in-
crease), automatic belts will result in a significant
incremental annual reduction in deaths and
injuries.

For the above reasons, the agency concluded in
July 1984 that automatic restraint systems are
reasonable in cost, feasible, and practicable, and
the potential benefits in lives saved and injuries
reduced in severity are substantial. At that time,
the agency stated that rescission, in the absence of
a substantial increase in manual belt usage, has
not been justified. Since the petitioner has not pro-
vided any new data to support rescission, the peti-
tion is denied.

Require Automatic Restraints

Several petitioners urged the agency to recon-
sider the decision to rescind the automatic re-
straint requirements if two-thirds of the popula-
tion of the United States is covered by State
MULs. They urged the agency to retain the auto-
matic restraint requirement, regardless of what
action the States take in adopting MULs.

The petitioners have offered no new evidence to
justify modifying the July 11 final rule. As ex-
plained in that rule, the Secretary determined that
if enough people are covered by State mandatory
belt use laws, usage rates will be sufficiently high
so that the additional requirement for automatic
restraints should not be required. The evidence
from Canada and other countries with MULs sup-
ports the conclusion that State belt use laws will
bring higher usage rates and immediate and inex-
pensive benefits. The petitioners' requests to man-
date automatic restraints even if two-thirds of the
population is covered by MULs is therefore denied.
Phase-In Requirements

A number of petitioners asked for several modifi-
cations of the phase-in requirements of the stand-
ard. Each of the modifications sought by the peti-
tioners is addressed in the following discussions.
Change September 1st Effective Date

One modification was to change the September 1
effective date used for each part of the phase-in.
The petitioners argued that they would be pre-
cluded from applying any portion of their vehicles
produced prior to that date to meet the required
percentage of automatic restraint equipped cars.
The agency has already, in effect, proposed to
grant a portion of the petitioners' request in an-

other notice (Docket 74-14; Notice 38; 50 FR
14602) issued on Standard No. 208. The agency
proposal would not change the September 1 effec-
tive date, but it does propose that manufacturers
be allowed to count any automatic restraint vehi-
cle produced during the one year preceding the
first year of the phase-in. In addition, the agency
proposes, in Notice 38, to permit manufacturers
which exceed the minimum percentage phase-in
requirements in the first or second years to count
those extra vehicles toward meeting the require-
ment in the second or third year.

Several petitioners sought a change in the provi-
sion of the final rule specifying that the computa-
tion of the minimum vehicle production to be
equipped with automatic restraints must be based
on the average of the production for the three pre-
ceding model years. The petitioners argued that if
car sales were to drop drastically during the phase-
in period, then the number of vehicles that they
would have to equip with automatic restraints bas-
ed on their prior three year sales volume would be
a significantly greater percentage of their actual
production than intended by the final rule. The
agency has already responded to this request in
Notice 38 by proposing to adopt an alternative that
would permit a manufacturer to equip the re-
quired percentage of its vehicles with automatic
restraints based on its actual production of
passenger cars during each affected year.

Manufactured for Sale in the U.S.

Several petitioners asked the agency to amend
the rule to clarify that the rule applies only to cars
manufactured for sale in the United States. As dis-
cussed in the preamble to the final rule, the deter-
mination of the base years' production figures and
the calculation of the number of vehicles that must
comply with the percentage phase-in requirements
of the standard is to be based on vehicles manufac-
tured for sale in the United States. Since all of the
agency's safety standards apply only to vehicles
manufactured for sale in the United States, the
agency does not believe that an amendment to the
rule is necessary. Nevertheless, today's preamble
should serve as the clarification requested; that
the rule applies only to vehicles manufactured for
sale in the United States.

Carry-Forward/Carry-Back

A number of petitioners urged the agency to pro-
vide manufacturers more flexibility in meeting the
phase-in requirements. They proposed that

PART 571 ; S208-PRE 263

manufacturers be able to carry -forward credits for
the number of automatic-restraint equipped ve-
hicles they produce in excess of the required per-
centage. One petitioner also asked that manufac-
turers be permitted to carry -back credits earned in
the second and third year to the first year.

The agency agrees that it would be appropriate
to permit manufacturers that exceed the minimum
percentage phase-in requirements in earlier years
to count those extra vehicles toward meeting the
minimum percentage requirements of later years
and has proposed such a carry-forward credit in
Notice 38. Such a credit would encourage early in-
troduction of larger numbers of automatic re-
straints and provide increased safety to the public
and flexibility for manufacturers. The agency has
decided to deny requests for any carry -back credits
because their use would delay the safety benefits of
the rule and undermine the purpose of the phase-
in, which is to introduce automatic restraints on a
prompt and orderly basis.
Definition of Manufacturer

Several petitioners asked the agency to further
define the term "manufacturer." The agency has
responded to this request in Notice 38 by proposing
to permit manufacturers to determine, by contract,
which of them will count passenger cars as its own
for the purposes of meeting the percentage goals
set forth in the phase-in. Notice 38 proposes two
rules of attribution in the absence of such a con-
tract. First, a passenger car which is imported for
purposes of resale would be attributed to the im-
porter. Second, a passenger car manufactured in
the United States by more than one manufacturer,
one of which also markets the vehicle, would be at-
tributed to the manufacturer which markets the
vehicle. Readers are referred to Notice 38 for a
more detailed discussion of the proposed attribu-
tion rules.
Credits for Non-Belt Technology

The July 11 final rule provided that manufac-
turers that used non-belt technology, such as air
bags or passive interiors, to meet the automatic re-
straint requirement for the driver's seating posi-
tion and any type of automatic restraint at the pas-
senger's seating position during the phase-in per-
iod, would receive additional credit. For each car in
which they use a non-belt system, they will receive
credit for an extra one-half car toward meeting
their percentage requirement. One petitioner said
that the text of the rule does not achieve the agen-
cy's intention, as stated in the July 1984 final rule,
to encourage the use of automatic restraints other

than automatic belts, since the rule precludes giv-
ing the additional credit for a system that requires
the use of a safety belt, whether automatic or man-
ual, to enable the non-belt technology to provide
full protection. That petitioner pointed out that all
current air bag systems must also use safety belts
for full protection; belts are permitted by the stan-
dard to be used as an alternative to the use of auto-
matic restraints to meet the lateral and rollover
tests. It was not the agency's intention to deny the
extra credits to air bag or other systems that also
use such safety belt systems to ensure protection in
other than frontal crashes. Therefore, the agency
is amending the rule to ensure that those systems
are eligible for the additional credit.

The agency was also petitioned for another modi-
fication to the credit provision. It was asked that
manufacturers be allowed, during the phase-in, to
receive a one vehicle credit for vehicles which are
equipped with non-belt technology at the driver's
position and manual safety belts at the front out-
board position. The petitioner argued that this
would encourage manufacturers to produce driver-
side air bag systems or other non-belt system tech-
nology sooner than if they had to complete develop-
ment of passenger-side automatic restraint sys-
tems as well, significantly advancing the Secre-
tary's goal in this regard.

The agency has decided to modify the credit pro-
vision as requested by the petitioners. The purpose
of the phase-in period is to provide a rapid intro-
duction of the lifesaving benefits of automatic
restraints and to facilitate the earliest possible in-
troduction of such restraints to permit the public to
become familiar with their operation and benefits.
The purpose of the credit provision is to encourage
the production of a wide variety of such restraints
especially in the early years. The agency believes
that permitting manufacturers to receive a 1.0 car
credit for driver-only non-belt systems with man-
ual belts on the passenger side will encourage the
introduction of non-belt technologies into passen-
ger cars, earlier than would otherwise occiu*.

The agency is aware that one company is cur-
rently offering driver-side air bags to the public.
Other manufacturers have indicated that they
may offer driver-side air bags to the public within
the next few years. The agency is aware neither of
any manufacturers that currently plan to offer a
passenger-side air bag system nor of any firm
plans for other types of non-belt automatic protec-
tion on the passenger side of vehicles. The longer
lead time estimated in the Final Rule to be re-

PART 571; S208-PRE 264

quired for non-belt automatic protection on the
passenger side, coupled with the advanced stage of
design of vehicles that will be available at the ear-
ly stage of the phase-in period, mitigates against
such full-front non-belt protection being available.
Increasing public awareness of the benefits of a
variety of automatic protection techniques is one of
the primary objectives of the phase-in and credit
provisions. Achieving this objective will depend,
therefore, on the availability of an adequate num-
ber of cars equipped with non-belt protection of the
driver's side. We now believe that there are a
number of factors that might discourage manufac-
turers from making such equipment available in
significant numbers.

Under the current rule, cars equipped with non-
belt driver's-side automatic protection would qual-
ify for credit only if passive protection were made
available on the passenger side. As noted above,
such protection is most likely to be provided by au-
tomatic belts. Some models in which driver's-side
air bags are being considered by manufacturers,
however, are at an advanced stage of design. It is
unlikely the redesign required to equip these cars
with automatic belts will be undertaken. Even if
these cars could be modified to incorporate auto-
matic belts, manufacturers would be faced with a
complex, and expensive, marketing task. Not only
would they have to convince customers of the safe-
ty and utility of automatic belts, but they must
also perform this task for the more expensive air
bag. Unwillingness on the part of manufacturers
to assume this added task may create a serious
disincentive to the prompt offering of air bag
technology.

Alternatively, these manufacturers considering
driver-side air bags might also elect to meet phase-
in requirements by producing a sufficient number
of automatic belt equipped cars. Under these cir-
cumstances, it is likely that the marketing efforts
of the manufacturers during the phase-in will con-
centrate on marketing the automatic belts, pos-
sibly to the detriment of the public's acceptance of
the driver-side air bags. As the agency learned in
recent research studying the marketing efforts
used by General Motors to sell its air bag equipped
cars in the mid-1970's effective, affirmative
marketing of an air bag system is essential to over-
come consumer concerns about such things as the
fear of inadvertent deployment, price and post-
crash replacement cost. ("A Retrospective An-
alysis of the General Motors Air Cushion Restraint
System Marketing Effort, 1974 to 1976") If cars

equipped with driver-only air bags do not count to-
ward compliance with the phase-in, the manufac-
turers will have less incentive to market the air
bags aggressively, and these circumstances may
even lead to decisions to drop the early offering of
air bags. The agency's goal of encouraging signifi-
cant public exposure to alternative protection tech-
nologies may not be realized. Therefore, the agen-
cy has determined that permitting manufacturers
to receive a 1.0 car credit during the phase-in by
installing driver-only non-belt automatic protec-
tion systems m their vehicles will encourage
earlier introduction of alternative automatic pro-
tection technologies, wider public availability of
such technologies, and more effective marketing of
such technologies than would be achieved by the
original decision. The final rule is amended to per-
mit such vehicles to be counted toward the phase-
in requirements.

The agency has fully considered the safety im-
plication of this amendment. An important safety
consideration is the number of occupants at the
risk of injury at each seating position, not just the
number of seating positions that are covered by the
automatic restraint requirement. Accident data,
presented in the agency's Final Regulatory Impact
Analysis, show that there are approximately 2 1/2
to 3 times as many driver injuries and fatalities as
there are to front right seat passengers. Therefore,
the agency believes that it is reasonable to encour-
age manufacturers to provide automatic restraint
protection as soon as possible to the driver— the
person who is most at risk.

Convertibles

Several petitioners asked that convertibles be ex-
empted from the automatic restraint require-
ments. They argued, for example, that the installa-
tion of automatic lap and shoulder belts is not fea-
sible in convertibles, thus air bag systems must be
used in those cars. The result, according to the pe-
titioners, is a design standard for convertibles.
They also stated that an exemption would be ap-
propriate since convertibles are already exempt
from the requirement in Standard No. 208 that all
front outboard seating positions have lap and
shoulder belts. The agency has already responded
to these petitions in Notice 38 by proposing that
manufacturers have the option of installing man-
ual lap belts instead of automatic restraints in con-
vertibles. Readers are referred to Notice 38 for a
more detailed discussion of the petitions and the
reasons for the agency's proposed alternative re-
quirements for convertibles.

PART 571; S208-PRE 265

Oblique Crash Test

A number of petitioners requested the agency to
delete the oblique barrier crash test of Standard
No. 208. They argued, among other things, that
the test is unnecessary since it generates a lower
crash pulse than the frontal crash test. As dis-
cussed in detail in Notice 38, the agency is also
concerned that the oblique test may not be neces-
sary and has therefore requested commenters to
provide additional data on the safety and cost ef-
fects of deleting the tests. Readers are referred to
Notice 38 for a more detailed discussion of the
issues involved in the proposed deletion of the
oblique test.

Lead Time

One petitioner requested a change in the two
year lead time for the automatic restraint stan-
dard. Citing the table on lead time requirements
included with the July 11 final rule, the petitioner
argued that only one manufacturer, Renault, has
said that it can comply in 24 months. The table
showed that most companies have said they need-
ed at least 30 to 48 months. The petitioner asked
for the lead time to be extended.

The table cited by the petitioner reflects the lead
time required by a manufacturer to equip its entire
fleet with automatic restraints. The agency agrees
that a longer lead time would be necessary if the
automatic restraint requirement were simultane-
ously applied to the entire vehicle fleet. The final
rule, however, phases-in the automatic restraint
requirement so that only a portion of a manufac-
turer's fleet must be equipped initially. Based on a
study of current automatic restraint equipped ve-
hicles and manufacturers' comments, the agency
has determined that automatic belt systems can be
added on to existing vehicle designs with approxi-
mately 24 months of lead time. The manufacturers
generally agree with that estimate. For example,
GM said that lead time for models for which de-
tachable belts had previously been designed would
be 21 months and Ford said that a driver-side air
bag system could be in production for some of its
cars within the allotted lead time. The Agency
therefore does not believe that additional lead time
is necessary for the percentage requirements dur-
ing the phase-in period and the petition is denied.

ALA raised a separate lead time issue. It said
that the July 1984 final rule identified a number of
issues, primarily related to test procedures, that
would be the subject of further rulemaking. AIA

argued that the implementation schedule for auto-
matic restraints should not begin until those is-
sues are resolved. Any changes due to the unre-
solved issues are not expected to increase lead time
and, indeed, should relieve some burdens associ-
ated with preparing for compliance. At this time,
the agency believes that the resolution of the re-
maining issues, which does not involve the imposi-
tion of more stringent performance requirements,
should be accomplished shortly and therefore is
denying AIA's petition.

Repeatability

One petitioner raised arguments about the re-
peatability of the test procedures used in Standard
No. 208 compliance testing. The petitioner's funda-
mental argument is that the agency's Repeatabili-
ty Test Program found what the petitioner says is
an unacceptable level of variability in the test re-
sults and thus, the petitioner argues, the agency
has failed to demonstrate that the test procedures
can be reproduced, car-to-car and test site-to-test
site. The petitioner noted that for a manufacturer
to certify its vehicles, it must meet maximum
limits for each of eight separate requirements: HIC
for driver and passenger dummy heads, "g" loads
for driver and passenger chests; and femur loads
for each dummy's right and left leg. Because of the
test variability, the petitioner said that it cannot
confidently predict that its vehicles will comply
with the standard. It urged the agency to develop
an alternative method of determining compliance
with the standard.

The petitioner did not, however, provide any new
data which demonstrate that the crash test proce-
dures and the test dummy pose significant repeat-
ability problems. More importantly, the petition
er did not provide new data indicating that the test
procedure and the dummy are incapable of
measuring compliance with Standard No. 208.

The agency believes that the test procedure, test
dummy, and test instrumentation are repeatable
within the statutory requirements of objectivity
and practicability. The agency does recognize that
because of the complexity of the requirements of
Standard No. 208, manufacturers are concerned
about certifying compliance with each of the re-
quirements of the standard. To address this con-
cern, the agency has proposed in Notice 38 that the
rule be amended to state that a vehicle shall not be
deemed in noncompliance if its manufacturer es-
tablishes that it did not have reason to know in the

PART 571; S208-PRE 266

exercise of due care that the vehicle is not incon-
formity with the standard.

by a MUL. The text of the final rule, requiring a
MUL to cover all the front seating positions, is the
correct version.

Comfort and Convenience
Several petitioners asked the agency to answer
promptly the pending petitions for reconsideration
of the comfort and convenience requirements of
Standard No. 208. The agency has already issued a
separate notice (Docket 74-14, Notice 37; 50 FR
14580) proposing changes to the comfort and con-
venience requirements in response to the petitions
for reconsideration. Readers are referred to that
notice for a detailed discussion of the proposed
revisions.

Judicial Review
One petitioner asked the agency to clarify the ex-
tent to which a challenge to the legality of the final
rule must be made now, rather than when the Se-
cretary makes a determination that two-thirds of
the U.S. population is covered by a mandatory belt
use law. The reviewability of the final rule and any
subsequent agency action is a matter for the
courts, not the agency, to decide.

Mandatory Seat Belt Use Law Criteria
A number of petitioners sought reconsideration of
the minimum criteria for mandatory safety belt
use laws. The agency is still considering the issues
raised in those petitions and will respond to them
at a later date.

Corrections

MVMA pointed out two minor errors in the text
of the final rule. First, in section 4.1.2 of the rule,
the word "before" should be used instead of the
word "after." Likewise in section 4.1.2.2(b), the
word "outboard" is misspelled. Both of those errors
are corrected by this notice.

In addition, the agency wants to clarify a conflict
between the preamble to the MUL provisions of
the final rule and the text of the final rule's
provisions on MULs. The preamble to the rule
stated that one of the minimum criteria for a MUL
was that each front outboard occupant of a passen-
ger car be required to wear a safety belt. The text
of the final rule provides that each front seat occu-
pant, which would include the outboard and the
center seating positions, would have to be covered

Cost and Benefits
NHTSA has examined the impact of this rule-
making action and determined that it is not major
within the meaning of Executive Order 12291 or
significant within the meaning of the Department
of Transportation's regulatory policies and pro-
cedures. A Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation has
been prepared on the changes proposed in Notice
38 and discussed in this notice. A copy of that eval-
uation is available for public inspection and copy-
ing in the agency's docket section. The agency has
determined that the economic and other effects of
the rulemaking action in this notice are so mini-
mal that a full regulatory evaluation is not re-
quired. The changes adopted in this action concern
minor adjustments to the phase-in requirements,
which will give manufacturers more flexibility
without imposing any economic costs.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

NHTSA has also considered the effects of this
rulemaking action under the Regulatory Flexibili-
ty Act. I hereby certify that it will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Accordingly, the agency
has not prepared a regulatory flexibility analysis.

Few if any motor vehicle manufacturers would
qualify as small entities. The suppliers of webbing
and other manual or automatic restraint compon-
ents will not likely be significantly affected, since
this notice is not making a change in the perfor-
mance requirements of the standard. Small organ-
izations and governmental units will not be signifi-
cantly affected since there are no price increases
associated with this action.

In consideration of the foregoing, Part 571.208,
Occupant Crash Protection, of Title 49 of the Code
of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

1. Section 4.1.3.4 is revised to read as follows:

S4. 1.3.4 For the purposes of calculating the
numbers of cars manufactured under S4. 1.3. 1.2,
S4.1.3.2.2, or S4. 1.3.3.2 to comply with S4. 1.2.1:

(a) Each car whose driver's seating position will
comply with the requirements of S4. 1.2. 1(a) by
means not including any type of seat belt and
whose front right seating position will comply with
the requirements of S4. 1.2. 1(a) is counted as 1.5
vehicles.

PART 571; S208-PRE 267

fb) Each car whose driver's seating position will 3. Section 4.1.2.2(b) is revised to change the word
comply with the requirements of S4. 1.2. 1(a) by "outbord" to the word "outboard."
means not including any type of seat belt and

whose front right seating position is equipped with Issued on August 27, 1985

a Type 2 seat belt is counted as a vehicle conform-
ing to S4. 1.2.1.

2. The first sentence of section 4.1.2 is revised to Diane K. Steed

read as follows: Administrator

Each passenger car manufactured on or after

September 1, 1973, and before September 1, 1986, 50 FR 35233

shall meet the requirements of S4. 1.2.1, S4.1.2.2 or August 30, 1985
S4.1.2.3.

PART 571; S208-PRE 268

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Improvement of Seat Belt Assemblies
[Docket No. 74-14; Notice 42]

ACTION: Final rule

SUMMARY: On April 12, 1985, NHTSA issued
a notice proposing modifications to certain aspects
of the comfort and convenience performance re-
quirements in Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash
Protection. The agency's purpose was to clarify the
intent of the requirements and to address the con-
cerns raised in petitions for reconsideration re-
ceived from seven vehicle manufacturers regard-
ing the final rule on comfort and convenience
issued on January 8, 1981. This notice sets com-
fort and convenience performance requirements for
both manual and automatic safety belt assemblies
installed in motor vehicles with a Gross Vehicle
Weight Rating of 10,000 pounds or less. The April
12, 1985, notice also proposed to change the effec-
tive date of the comfort and convenience re-
quirements. A final rule setting the effective date
as September 1, 1986, was issued on August 23,
1985.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 1, 1986.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On Jan

uary 8, 1981 (46 FR 2064), NHTSA amended Safety
Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49
CFR 571.208), to specify additional performance re-
quirements to promote the comfort and conven-
ience of both manual and automatic safety belt
systems installed in motor vehicles with a GVWR
of 10,000 pounds or less. The final rule included
specifications relating to the following aspects of
safety belt performance and design: latchplate ac-
cessibility; safety belt guides; adjustable buckles
for certain belts; shoulder belt pressure; conven-
ience hooks; belt retraction; and comfort devices.
Type 2 manual belts (lap and shoulder combina-

tion belts) installed in front seating positions in
passenger cars were excepted from these additional
performance requirements, since it was assumed
such belts would be phased out in passenger cars
as the automatic restraint requirements of Stan-
dard No. 208 became effective.

Seven petitions for reconsideration of the
January 8, 1981, amendment were received from
vehicle manufacturers. On February 18, 1982 (47
FR 7254), the agency issued a partial response to
the petitions for reconsideration by extending the
effective date of the comfort and convenience re-
quirements for one year, from September 1, 1982,
to September 1, 1983. Subsequently, the agency
proposed (47 FR 51432) and then adopted (48 FR
24717) a further extension of the effective date for
the requirements until September 1, 1985.

The April 12, 1985 (50 FR 14580), notice proposed
to delay the effective date until September 1, 1986,
in order to give the industry sufficient leadtime to
meet the proposed changes in the rule. A final rule
delaying the effective date to September 1, 1986,
was issued on August 23, 1985 (50 FR 34152).

As discussed in the April 12, 1985, notice, the
agency continues to believe that certain of the per-
formance requirements included in the final rule
will tend to enhance safety belt use by providing
occupants with safety belts which are more com-
fortable to wear and more convenient to use. The
requirements in this final rule are important to
support the agency's program to increase safety
belt use in the United States.

This rule makes minor changes to the modifica-
tions proposed in April 1985 in response to con-
cerns raised by the commenters. A discussion of
these changes is set forth below. (For a complete
understanding of the performance requirements
discussed in this notice, including the relationship

PART 571; S208-PRE 269

of the requirements to safety belt comfort and con-
venience, interested persons should refer to both
the December 31, 1979 (44 FR 77210), notice of pro-
posed rulemaking and the January 8, 1981 (46 FR
2064), final rule).

Application to Manual Lap/Shoulder Belts in Pas-
senger Cars

The January 1981 final rule exempted manual
Type 2 safety belts installed in the front seats of
passenger cars from the comfort and convenience
requirements. This was done to allow manufac-
turers to devote their resources to automatic
restraints in these vehicles since Type 2 manual
belts in the front seats would have been phased out
when the automatic restraint requirements
became effective. However, the subsequent July
1984 (49 FR 28962) final rule mandating automatic
restraints specifies that if States representing two-
thirds or more of the nation's population enact
qualifying mandatory safety belt usage laws before
April 1, 1989, the requirement for automatic pro-
tection will no longer apply. The April 1985 notice
proposed that, in the event that this occurs, the
comfort and convenience requirements would be
extended to Type 2 manual belts installed in the
front seats of passenger cars, effective September
1, 1989.

Two domestic manufacturers objected to the ex-
tension of the comfort and convenience re-
quirements to manual Type 2 safety belts in front
outboard seating positions of passenger cars until
a decision has been made in 1989 regarding the
future of automatic restraints. They stated that
there is no justification for setting such a require-
ment now, which could cause manufacturers to in-
cur design and tooling costs, because manual belts
could be phased out in 1989 if an insufficient
number of States pass qualifying mandatory safety
belt use laws.

The September 1, 1989, effective date provides
a leadtime of four years to comply with the com-
fort and convenience requirements for Tj^e 2 front
seat manual belts in passenger cars. The agency
is therefore adopting the proposed September 1,
1989, effective date for Type 2 front seat manual
belts in passenger cars if the automatic restraint
requirement is rescinded.

The agency recognizes that the possibility exists
that the industry will have to discontinue manual
belts after 1989 if the automatic restraint require-
ment for all cars becomes effective. However, the

agency believes that comfort and convenience
technology developed for automatic belts and for
Type 2 manual belts in light trucks and multipur-
pose passenger vehicles (MPV's) should be
transferable to passenger cars with a minimum of
design and tooling cost with a four -year leadtime.
The agency notes that a large number of passenger
cars will have been manufactured with manual
belts between 1986 and 1989, and the agency
believes it is desirable, from a safety standpoint,
to have the front outboard seating positions of
these cars incorporate comfort and convenience
features which will contribute to increased belt
usage. The agency therefore encourages manufac-
turers to begin voluntarily incorporating comfort
and convenience features in their Type 2 front seat
manual belts. Since the technology is available, the
cost to incorporate these features should be
minimal, especially if they are made part of the
design process for newly introduced vehicles.

Emergency Locking Retractors (ELR) and Child
Restraints

Paragraph 37. 1.1.3 of Standard No. 208 was
amended in the January 1981 final rule to specify
that certain lap belts installed at front outboard
seating positions are required to have an
emergency-locking retractor rather than an
automatic-locking retractor (which was previously
allowed as an option). Some manufacturers also in-
corporate emergency-locking retractors in rear
seats as well. Automatic-locking retractors are in-
convenient to use since they must be extended in
a single continuous movement to a length suffi-
cient to allow buckling or they will lock. They also
tend to tighten excessively under normal driving
conditions, sometimes making it necessary to un-
buckle and refasten the lap belt to relieve pressure
on the pelvis and abdomen. Neither of these prob-
lems exists with the emergency-locking retractor,
which allows occupant movement without tighten-
ing and which locks only upon rapid occupant
movement, vehicle deceleration or impact.

The April 12, 1985, notice proposed a revised ver-
sion of this requirement. The proposed revision
reflected the agency's tentative judgment that use
of child restraints in the front outboard passenger
position with a lap belt equipped with an
emergency-locking retractor could result in the
child restraint moving forward during normal, low-
speed driving and braking, or pre-crash vehicle
maneuvering or braking. (At higher speeds or upon

PART 571; S208-PRE 270

impact, the locking mechanism in existing belt
designs would work to restrain the child seat ap-
propriately.) Therefore, the agency proposed that
Type 1 safety belts or the lap belt portion of Type
2 belts with emergency-locking retractors, used in
any designated seating position other than the
driver's position, be equipped with a locking means
to prevent forward motion of child restraint
devices.

A majority of vehicle manufacturers objected to
this proposal. The main arguments they raised
were: ( 1 ) the locking means could degrade the per-
formance of the belt system for adult passengers;
(2) the proposed language would exclude alter-
native designs, such as owner-installed "locking
clips," which could serve the same purpose; (3) the
requirement would not be cost effective, because
not all vehicle .owners need a locking means to
secure a child restraint system in the front seat;
and (4) the proposed effective date for the require-
ment, September 1, 1986, does not provide suffi-
cient design and development time for compliance.
They also argued that, if this requirement is main-
tained, it should be delayed until the agency
decides whether it will require dynamic testing of
manual safety belts.

Two manufacturers of child restraint devices and
a child passenger safety association supported the
proposed amendment. They stated that the ap-
proach cited in the proposal would solve potential
problems relating to child seats and ELR's, and
would eliminate the need to devise what they
termed makeshift solutions.

Child restraint manufacturers stated that some
restraint devices, when positioned by safety belt
systems which are adjusted by ELR's, become
unstable when occupied by very active children.
Agency testing of child restraint devices under con-
ditions of low-speed braking and vehicle maneu-
vers indicates that, although improvements in belt
systems could improve the stability of these
devices, there are no data to show that low-speed
movement of child safety seats is affecting the
safety performance of child restraint devices in
motor vehicle accidents (Docket 80-18-GR-004).

Because the agency's research did not show that
low-speed movement of the seats is actually reduc-
ing the effectiveness of child restraints in acci
dents, and because after-market locking devices
are available which achieve the same goal, it has
decided not to adopt a manual locking requirement
for ELR's at this time. The agency will continue
to monitor the potential problems associated with

the restraint of child restraint devices by ELR
safety belt systems and consider whether to ad-
dress these problems in future rulemaking actions.

Additional ELR Issues

Regarding S7.1.1.3, one manufacturer asked
NHTSA to clarify whether an ELR located at the
point of shoulder belt retraction on a Type 2 belt
system, which combines the lap and torso belt in
a continuous running loop, complies with the re-
quirement. NHTSA confirms that a Type 2 con-
tinuous belt system, which incorporates an ELR to
control slack in the lap and torso belt portions,
would comply with the requirement.

Another manufacturer asked for clarification on
the use of lap belts in passenger cars equipped with
air bags versus those equipped with single
automatic diagonal belts. The requirement of
S7.1.L3 only applies to lap belts installed in a vehi-
cle to comply with Standard No. 208. Thus, a lap
belt installed in conjunction with an air bag, in
order to meet the lateral and rollover requirements
of S4.L1.2(cX2), would be required to have an
emergency locking retractor. However, a Type 1
lap belt voluntarily installed by a manufacturer in
conjunction with a single diagonal automatic belt
would not have to comply with the provisions of
S7.L1.3, since the single diagonal automatic belt
would fully meet the belt requirements of the stan-
dard by itself.

Open-Body Vehicles, MPV's, and ELR's

One manufacturer stated that open-body vehicles
should be exempted from the ELR requirement of
S7.1.L3, because these vehicles are designed to per-
form numerous off-road, heavy-duty tasks, and
both the lap and upper torso portions of the belt
system are subjected to design criteria far different
from typical passenger car belt systems. In par-
ticular, occupants may want the belts tightly
fastened around them when the vehicle is used on
rough terrain. The agency agrees that open-body
vehicles do perform numerous off-road, heavy-duty
tasks, but they are also commonly used in normal
highway driving to perform the same functions as
passenger cars, where tight belts may discourage
belt use. Furthermore, belt systems are available
for open-body vehicles as well as passenger cars,
which can function as ELR's for the lap belt or lap
belt portion of a combined lap and shoulder belt,
and still be capable of being manually or

PART 571; S208-PRE 271

automatically locked by occupants when they want
the belt to be tightly fastened around them. These
systems can also provide tension relieving and ELR
functions for the torso portion of a Type 2 belt
system.

Incorporating a single retractor, which can func-
tion as either an ALR or an ELR, into a lap belt
or the lap belt portion of a Type 2 belt for off-road
use, would accommodate the desire of occupants to
be tightly restrained when needed and would also
provide a more comfortable belt when this is suffi-
cient for normal operation of the vehicle. Such an
ALR/ELR feature may be desirable in some
vehicles and is currently available in some im-
ported and sports cars. The agency estimates the
cost to range from $1.00 to $5.00 per seating posi-
tion. Alternatively, a locking D-ring in the lap belt,
which enables users to snugly fasten the lap belt,
could be provided for virtually no increase in cost
to the consumer. For these reasons, the agency is
not exempting open-body vehicles from the require-
ment of S7. 1.1.3.

Another manufacturer requested an exemption
from the requirements of S7. 1.1. 3 for all multipur-
pose passenger vehicles, stating with no supporting
rationale that the ELR requirement is design
restrictive. The agency does not believe that the
ELR requirement is design restrictive for the
reasons discussed above. In addition, multipurpose
passenger vehicles provide the same functions as
passenger cars. While some types may also be
designed for heavy-duty, off-road use, the same
rationale set out in the discussion of open-body
vehicles applies to other multipurpose passenger
vehicles. The agency concludes that multipurpose
passenger vehicles should continue to be subject to
the requirement of S7.1.1.3.

Corrections

Two technical corrections are made in this final
rule relating to paragraph S7. 1.1.3. As proposed in
the April 12, 1985, notice paragraph S7. 1.1.3(b) ex-
empts manual Type 2 safety belts installed in the
front outboard seating position of passenger cars.
That exemption was inadvertently omitted from
paragraph S7.4(b), which specifies requirements for
passenger cars after September 1, 1986. Clarifying
language is added to paragraph S7.4(b) in this final
rule.

The second technical change clarifies the
agency's intent to require passenger cars, manufac-
tured on or after September 1, 1989, to have ELR's

for the lap belts or the lap portion of lap/shoulder
belts used in the front outboard seating positions,
if the automatic restraint requirement is rescinded.
Paragraph S7. 1.1. 3(b) is revised to include the
September 1, 1989, effective date for manual Type
2 belts in the front outboard seats of passenger
cars.

Convenience Hooks for Automatic Belts

Some automatic belt design plans include a
manual "convenience hook" which enables oc-
cupants manually to stow the belt webbing totally
out of the way as they are about to exit the vehicle.
Paragraph 87.4.1 was included in the January
1981 final rule to ensure that such convenience
hooks would not affect compliance with the
automatic restraint requirements. Automatic belts
installed for compliance with the injury criteria of
FMVSS 208 must operate without requiring any
manual procedures by the vehicle occupant. Thus,
manual hooks could not be a necessary component
to move or hold the belt webbing out of the occu-
pant's way since this would defeat the automatic
aspect of performance. Paragraph S7.4.1 currently
provides that any such hook must automatically
release the belt webbing prior to the car being
driven.

In response to comments in one petition for recon-
sideration of the 1981 final rule, the April 1985 pro-
posal contained revised language to make it clear
that convenience hooks are intended to release the
webbing only when the automatic belt is otherwise
operational. One commenter objected to the revi-
sion, stating that it would not promote the use of
detachable automatic belts which have been
disconnected. These objections appear to be based
on a misunderstanding of the function of the con-
venience hook. The convenience hook concept was
developed to allow it to be used in conjunction with
automatic belt systems which would be in the
automatic operational mode. In this way, the con-
venience hook could promote the use of detachable
or nondetachable automatic belts, because the hook
would facilitate entering or exiting the vehicle by
the front seat occupants, who would then be less
prone to detach or mutilate the belt system.

The commenter apparently believed that the
"stowage hook," which is used to stow the latch-
plate of a disconnected, detachable belt, should also
be covered by the requirement of S7.4.1. The
stowage hook is not a convenience hook; nor is it
subject to the provisions of S7.4.1. The commenter 's

PART 571; S208-PRE 272

suggestion that the "stowage hook" also release a
disconnected detachable belt automatically could,
in theory, increase usage, but it might also en-
courage owners to damage the belt physically or
remove it, thus making it unavailable to subse-
quent owners and vehicle users. In the case of a
disconnected automatic belt, the warning system
would indicate to the vehicle occupants that the
belt is disconnected and remind them to reconnect
the belt. For these reasons, the agency denies the
suggestion for automatic release of stowage hooks.

Webbing Tension-Relieving Devices

Some safety belt designs include devices intended
to relieve shoulder belt pressure. These "window-
shade" mechanisms or other tension-relieving
devices increase the comfort of the belt, but may
reduce the effectiveness of belts in a crash situa-
tion if they are misused so as to introduce excessive
slack in the belt webbing. The January 1981 final
rule specified that any such tension-relieving
devices may be used on automatic belt systems only
if the system would comply with the injury criteria
of the standard with the device adjusted to any
possible position. (The notice of proposed rulemak-
ing preceding that final rule would have banned
tension-relieving devices outright.) The 1981 final
rule was adopted in recognition of the fact that
tension-relieving devices can improve belt fit and
increase belt comfort in certain circumstances, and
was intended to allow manufacturers somewhat
wider latitude in designing automatic belts, but,
as discussed below, would probably have had the
effect of banning these devices.

Several manufacturers objected to the wording
of the January 1981 final rule on the basis that the
belt system would have to meet the injury criteria
even when the device had been misused to produce
excessive slack in order, essentially, to defeat the
system, even if such a usage was not intended by
the manufacturer.

In the April 1985 proposal, the agency proposed
rewording this provision to require manufacturers
to include instructions in their vehicle owner's
manual concerning the proper use of any tension-
relieving devices incorporated in their automatic
belt systems. These instructions must state the
maximum amount of slack that can safely be
introduced and include a warning to vehicle oc-
cupants that if excessive slack is introduced into
the system, the protection offered by the belt
system would be substantially reduced or even

eliminated. The agency will test for compliance
with the injury criteria by adjusting the belt within
the slack levels recommended by the manufac-
turer. With one exception, those manufacturers
who commented on this proposal supported the
revision to allow tension-relieving devices.

However, one domestic manufacturer and a con-
sumer group objected to the provision related to
dynamic testing with the tension-relieving device
adjusted to the manufacturer's recommended slack
position. The manufacturer objected to a dynamic
test that would require any slack at all to be in-
troduced into the belt system, on the grounds that
uncontrolled variability would be introduced into
the dynamic test procedure, which would then lack
objectivity. The manufacturer asserted that it
might have to eliminate all tension-relieving
devices for its safety belts.

The agency's proposed test procedure was
intended to accommodate the view that tension-
relieving devices increase the comfort of belts
while, at the same time, limiting the potential
reduction in effectiveness for safety belt systems
in which excessive slack is introduced. The agency
does not agree that this test procedure would
eliminate tension-relieving devices from the
marketplace. As mentioned earlier, other manufac-
turers supported the proposal and did not indicate
they would have to remove tension-relieving
devices from their belt systems. This commenter
did not show that injury levels cannot be controlled
within the specified injury criteria by testing at the
recommended slack adjustment, as determined by
the manufacturer. The recommended slack could
be between zero and any level selected by the
manufacturer as appropriate to relieve belt
pressure without being unsafe. As a practical mat-
ter, most tension relievers automatically introduce
some slack into the belt for all occupants. Testing
without such slack would be unrealistic.

The same commenter objected to the requirement
that belt slack be cancelled each time the vehicle
door is opened and the buckle is released, because
this requirement would encourage occupants to
disconnect automatic belts. In addition, this com-
menter stated that the requirement is inconsistent
with non-detachable, automatic belts and re-
quested that the belt slack be required to be
cancelled each time the door is opened whether or
not the buckle is released. The agency believes this
request has merit and has revised the requirement
to reflect this change.

PART 571; S208-PRE 273

The consumer group objected to the proposal for
automatic belt systems using tension-relieving
devices to meet the injury criteria with only the
specified amount of slack recommended in the
owner's manual. They stated that most owners
would not read the instructions in the owner's
manual regarding the proper use of the tension-
relieving device. It said an occupant could have a
false sense of adequate restraint when wearing an
automatic belt system adjusted beyond the recom-
mended limit.

The agency's views on allowing the use of ten-
sion relievers in automatic safety belts were
detailed in the April 1985 notice. The agency
specifically noted the effectiveness of a safety belt
system could be compromised if excessive slack
were introduced into the belt. However, the agency
recognizes that a belt system must be used to be
effective at all. Allowing manufacturers to install
tension-relieving devices makes it possible for an
occupant to introduce a small amount of slack to
relieve shoulder belt pressure or to get the belt
away from the neck. As a result, safety belt use is
promoted. This factor could outweigh any loss in
effectiveness due to the introduction of a recom-
mended amount of slack in normal use. This is par-
ticularly likely in light of the requirement that the
belt system, so adjusted, must meet the injury
criteria of Standard No. 208 under 30 mph test con-
ditions. Further, the inadvertent introduction of
slack into a belt system, which is beyond that for
normal use, is unlikely in most current systems.
In addition, even if too much slack is introduced,
the occupant should notice that excessive slack is
present and a correction is needed, regardless of
whether he or she has read the vehicle owner's
manual.

Torso Belt Body Contact Force

NHTSA research indicates that a substantial
number, approximately 60 percent, of occupants
are likely to complain about belt pressure if the
torso belt net contact force on an occupant is
gi-eater than 0.7 pound (DOT HS-805 597).
Therefore, the January 8, 1981, final rule specified
that the torso portion of any manual or automatic
belt system shall not create a contact pressure ex-
ceeding that of a belt with a total net contact force
of 0.7 pound. Most of the petitions for reconsidera-
tion objected to this requirement, but gave no new
reasons which would cause the agency to reverse
its prior decision on this issue.

The April 1985 proposal contained a revised
S7.4.2 which retained the 0.7-pound contact force
requirement and proposed applying the require-
ment to tension relievers. Several commenters ob-
jected to the requirement that automatic belt
systems with tension-relieving devices must meet
the 0.7-pound contact force limit when the tension
reliever is deactivated. Both domestic and foreign
manufacturers questioned whether imposing this
contact force requirement on belt systems with ten-
sion relievers would advance safety, because the
belt contact force requirement could result in in-
sufficient force to retract webbing reliably in some
systems.

The agency has decided to exempt safety belt
systems incorporating tension-relieving devices,
such as window-shade devices, which can com-
pletely relieve belt tension, from the 0.7-pound tor-
so belt contact force requirement. The agency is
still concerned that some occupants may introduce
belt slack, who otherwise would not, in a belt
system incorporating a tension-reliever, if the belt
force exceeds 0.7 pound. However, the agency does
not want compliance with the body contact force
requirement to limit manufacturers' design
flexibility in meeting the retraction and other
requirements in the rule.

The 0.7-pound contact force limit is retained for
belt systems without tension-relieving devices,
which have either a constant or variable force. The
tension in these belt systems cannot be completely
removed, as it can in a belt system incorporating
a window-shade or other type of tension reliever.
Therefore, the agency believes it is important to
limit belt contact force in those systems to promote
belt usage.

One manufacturer requested that the 0.7-pound
contact force level be increased to ensure belt
retraction. Another manufacturer stated that oc-
cupants of open-body vehicles may prefer to have
the secure feeling of the upper torso belt webbing
tight against their chests, i.e., a force greater than
0.7 pound. The company asked that open-body
vehicles be excluded from the 0.7-pound limit. As
previously noted, manufacturers may use an
ALR/ELR belt system or other means to allow oc-
cupants to have belts with a tight fit. In addition,
the agency believes that such an exclusion, or an
increase in the 0.7-pound contact force level, is un-
necessary with the modification of S7.4.3 to allow
tension-relieving devices in lieu of meeting the
0.7-pound force requirement. Both manufacturers
will have the option of meeting this requirement

PART 571; S208-PRE 274

by installing a tension-relieving device in a belt
system with a contact force of more than 0.7 pound.
One commenter stated that the standard should
be revised to specify requirements for manual belts
with tension-relieving devices. The agency did pro-
pose requirements for these manual belts in Notice
38, in conjunction with the dynamic tests for
manual belts. If the agency does adopt a dynamic
test requirement for manual belts, the provision
on tension-relievers for manual belts would be ex-
pected to be identical to those for automatic belts.

Belt Contact Test Procedures

The April 1985 NPRM proposed that the test
dummy be unclothed during the belt contact force
test to avoid drag produced by clothing. The agency
was concerned that such drag could cause un-
wanted deviations in the measurement of belt con-
tact force, as specified in S10.6. Three commenters
supported the change to remove the dummy
clothing for the test. However, two other com-
menters stated that test variability would be
greater with the test dummy's clothes removed
based on the variability of skin friction due to
changes in test temperature and humidity. They
also said that a clothed dummy would more close-
ly represent real world conditions. After considera-
tion of the comments, NHTSA agrees that the
clothed test dummy would more closely represent
real world conditions. The agency has therefore
revised the rule to require testing on a clothed test
dummy, using the clothing specified in Part 572.

Two commenters asked that the test for belt con-
tact force set maximum limits for belt release
speed. The agency believes that adding a belt
release speed requirement would add an un-
necessary complication to the test without pro-
viding any significant improvement in controlling
repeatability.

Several commenters correctly pointed out that
the proposed text for S7.4.3 should reference the
test procedure of S10.6 instead of S10.8. This notice
adopts that correction.

Latchplate Accessibility

One of the most inconvenient aspects of using
many current manual saifety belt designs is the dif-
ficulty that a seated occupant has in reaching back
to grasp the belt latchplate when the belt is un-
buckled and in its retracted position. The greater
the difficulty in reaching the latchplate to buckle

the belt, the more likely the occupant will be
discouraged from using the belt.

Paragraph S7.4.4 of the January 1981 final rule
specified requirements to define limits on the
distances an occupant has to reach for latchplates
and to prescribe minimum clearances for arm and
hand access. The latter requirement was specified
in terms of a test block which must be able to move
to the latchplate unhindered. The April 12, 1985,
proposal contained a revision in the dimensions of
the test block, reducing it from 3x4x 12 inches to
2'/ix4x8 inches.

Two manufacturers requested a test procedure
revision which would provide for seat cushion
deflection in determining access to a latchplate
with the test block shown in Figure 4. One sug-
gested that force applied to the test block, not to
exceed a certain limit, should be used to allow for
seat cushion deflection. The other stated that the
requirement should be deleted until such time as
a test device that simulates the human hand can
be developed to address seat cushion deflection.

The agency believes that reducing the size of the
test block is simpler than developing an objective
method for measuring and limiting seat cushion
deflection. The agency also believes that the test
block with its new dimensions, which are based on
hand length and thickness dimensions referenced
by the Society of Automotive Engineers, is suffi-
ciently representative of the human hand.
Therefore, the agency is adopting the new test
block in the test procedure.

One manufacturer stated that Figure 3 in Stan-
dard No. 208, which gives the location of the reach
strings for the latchplate accessibility test, does not
state whether the view of the dummy is intended
to depict the dummy being tested on the left or
right side of the vehicle. Therefore, the implication
is that the outboard reach string is always located
on the right side of the dummy, according to the
manufacturer. The view in Figure 3 is meant to
depict the dummy being tested on the right side
of the vehicle. The agency would use the string
placements in Figure 3 to perform an accessibility
test for the right front outboard passenger seating
position, because the outboard reach string is
located on the right side of the test dummy. This
string would be reversed for the driver position,
because the outboard side would be located on the
left side of the dummy with the dummy facing for-
ward. The string in Figure 3 is labeled "outboard"
and the agency believes this explanation is suffi-
cient without changing Figure 3.

PART 571; S208-PRE 275

Several manufacturers stated that a latchplate
accessibility test using the test block representing
a human hand to check the clearance between the
arm rest and seat cushion should not be necessary,
if the belt system is designed so that the latchplate
is retained in an accessible area. For example, one
manufacturer said that it uses a sliding plastic bar
on its belt webbing which positions the latchplate
in an accessible area near the upper torso an-
chorage point. The manufacturer said that the
plastic bar prevents the latchplate from sliding
down the webbing to a position under the arm rest
or between the seat and side of the vehicle. The
manufacturer said that it could also use a fixed
plastic button to retain the latchplate near the up-
per torso anchorage. The agency agrees that if a
latchplate is permanently retained in an accessi-
ble area, reachable by the test block, there is no
need to conduct a clearance test between the arm
rest and seat cushion.

The purpose of the latchplate accessibility re-
quirement is to address designs in which the latch-
plate can freely move on the belt webbing. In those
cases, the latchplate may initially be located in an
accessible area, but the design of the belt may per-
mit the latchplate to slide along the webbing into
the area between the seat cushion and the door in-
terior, or below the door arm rest when the belt is
retracted. If this situation is likely to occur in nor-
mal use with any regularity, such a belt system
would be required to comply with the test for
accessibility at the point where the latchplate nor-
mally slides along the webbing into the area be-
tween the seat cushion and the door interior, or
below the door arm rest. The agency believes that
the addition of language stating that access to the
latchplate should be tested with the latchplate in
its "normally stowed position" to the requirement
should clarify this requirement. If the belt system
incorporates a design which ensiu-es that the latch-
plate cannot move near an arm rest or move down
between the seat and the vehicle's side structure,
the system will have no problem passing the hand
access test.

Several commenters apparently believed that
S7.4.4 requires the latchplate to be mounted on the
outboard side of a vehicle seat. They said that the
requirement was design-restrictive for a Type 1
safety belt assembly because such an assembly
could otherwise be designed so that the latchplate
is located at either the inboard or outboard posi-
tion. The requirement was developed to test for ac-
cess of the latchplate or buckle on belt assemblies

which are located outboard of the designated
seating position for which the latchplate is
installed. This is because access to a latchplate
located in that position can be hindered by the vehi-
cle's side structure. The requirement was not in-
tended to specify that the latchplate or buckle be
located outboard of a designated seating position.
The language of the rule is therefore revised to in-
dicate that the test applies only to latchplates or
buckles located outboard of the designated seating
position.

One manufacturer recommended that the com-
pliance test for accessibility be made similar to the
requirement for safety belt anchorages in Standard
No. 210, Seat Belt Anchorages. Compliance arcs
would be generated from a point on the SAE two-
dimensional manikin, whose H-point is positioned
at the full-forward position of the design H-point,
or on a full-scale design drawing. This commenter
stated that such a procedure would eliminate test
variability, reduce the compliance test burden, and
allow manufacturers to determine compliance
while the vehicle is in the advance design stage.

Manufacturers are free to determine compliance
with a requirement by any method they choose,
while exercising due care. There is no reason to
believe that the procedure suggested by the com-
menter is not compatible with the procedure defin-
ed in Standard No. 208. Therefore, it is un-
necessary to revise the current test procedure for
latchplate accessibility.

Another manufacturer requested that the
language of S7.4.4 be amended to specify that the
access requirement be met with the seat within the
adjustment range of a person whose dimensions
range from those of a 50th percentile six-year-old
child to those of a 95th percentile adult male. The
rationale for the request is that, when securing a
child restraint in some of their vehicles, the latch-
plate is located at a very low height near the floor,
after locking. In this situation, the ability of small
cars to comply with the latchplate access require-
ment is severely compromised. To achieve com-
pliance, the seat back would have to be deeply cut
away at the outboard side.

The latchplate access requirement is meant to ad-
dress access problems when the latchplate is in its
normally stowed position. It was not meant to ad-
dress potential access problems with child
restraints that might occur in specific vehicles.
Therefore, the agency does not believe an amend-
ment is necessary.

PART 571: S208-PRE 276

Belt Retraction

The April 12, 1985, notice proposed to revise
S7.4.5 to allow for the stowage of arm rests on vehi-
cle seats, such as captain's chairs, which must have
the outboard arm rests stowed before the occupant
can exit the vehicle. One commenter asked the
agency to permit all arm rests, which protrude into
the door opening in a manner which encumbers
egress, to be placed in their stowed position for the
retraction test. The agency believes this comment
has merit and has revised S7.4.5 to permit the
stowage of outboard arm rests if they protrude in-
to the door opening in a manner which encumbers
egress. The agency notes that folding arm rests are
usually designed that way for the purpose of
facilitating egress or ingress by moving them out
of the way to a stowed position.

The April notice also proposed to allow tension-
relieving devices on the safety belts of open-body
vehicles without doors to be manually deactivated
for the retraction test. One commenter objected to
allowing these tension-relieving devices to be
manually, rather than automatically, cancelled.
The commenter said that there are belt systems
currently available which will automatically
cancel a tension-relieving device when the latch-
plate is released from the buckle.

At the time the agency proposed the requirement
for open-body vehicles, it was not aware that there
were belt systems which would automatically deac-
tivate tension-relieving devices solely through the
action of unbuckling the belt. Therefore, the
agency only proposed that belt systems in open-
body vehicles be tested with their tension-relieving
devices manually deactivated. The agency will con-
sider the commenter's suggestion as one for future
rulemaking. The agency notes that manufacturers
can voluntarily adopt the use of other automatic
means for deactivating the tension-relieving device
in open-body vehicles.

The April notice also proposed that the latchplate
must retract to its "completely stowed position."
Two commenters objected to this proposal saying
that determining whether the belt is "completely"
stowed is difficult. They believe that, if the stowed
position prevents the safety belt from extending
out of the vehicle's adjacent open door, the require-
ment for belt retraction should be satisfied. The
agency believes that this comment is reasonable
and consistent with the intent of this section to pre-
vent belts from getting dirty as a result of being
caught in the door and from hindering ingress or

egress of occupants. The language in the rule is
revised accordingly.

Seat Belt Guides

The April notice proposed clarifications in the
language of S7.4.6.1(a) to increase the accessibility
of belt buckles and latchplates and belt webbing
to the vehicle occupant, while giving manufac-
turers flexibility to use stifTeners, guide openings,
cables, or conduits of any type. The notice also pro-
posed modifying S7.4.6.1(b) to exempt seats which
are movable to serve a dual function.

Two commenters stated that the language in
S7.4.6. 1(h) did not adequately address seats which
are removable or seats which are movable to serve
a secondary function. NHTSA believes these com-
ments are valid, because a seat belt latchplate, a
buckle, or a portion of the webbing cannot be main-
tained on top of a seat which has been removed or
moved to serve a secondary function. Therefore, the
requirement does not apply to seats which are
removable or movable so that the space formerly
occupied by the seat can be used for a secondary
function, such as cargo space. However, the term,
secondary function, does not include the movement
of a seat to provide a comfortable driving and
riding position for different size occupants.

Two manufacturers requested that the words
"seat cushion" in S7.4.6.1(1d) be amended by adding
the words "and/or seat backs." The agency
specifically excluded "seat backs" from the exemp-
tion because there is no evidence that seats with
folding seat backs cannot comply with the re-
quirements. Adding movable seat backs to the
language in S7. 4. 6. 1(b) could exempt front seats in
passenger cars and the second seat in some
vehicles, such as station wagons. The agency
believes that there is no reason for exempting these
seats.

One manufacturer stated that the center safety
belt in the rear seat of a motor vehicle should be
exempted from the requirement in S7.4.6.1(a) con-
cerning seat guides. This commenter stated that
there is little chance of this belt ever becoming
"lost" behind the seat due to the abundance of web-
bing material available for the center rear safety
belt; therefore, a webbing guide seems un-
necessary. The agency disagrees. The agency
believes that the requirements are necessary since
they address specific problems associated with belts
which are not adjusted by retractors, such as the

PART 571; S208-PRE 277

rear center seat belts. (Center seats are not re-
quired to have safety belt retractors, which auto-
matically stow the webbing after the belt is taken
off. Instead, they usually have more of the webbing
lying on the seat cushion and have a manually ad-
justable buckle which slides along the webbing so
that an occupant can tighten the belt around
himself or herself) Having more of the belt lying
on the seat can make the belt more accessible; it
can also cause the user to stuff the belt behind the
seat cushion to get the webbing out of the way
when the center seating position is not being used.
In addition, one company, such as the commenter,
may provide ample webbing which will lie on the
seat cushion, while another company may not. The
agency is therefore not exempting center seats.

One manufacturer stated that a 3-point belt
assembly, with the lap webbing portion designed
to pass between the seat cushion and seat back, will
not necessarily have the latchplate positioned on
the top of the seat, when the webbing is retracted.
It urged that the requirement be revised to read,
"maintain the accessibility of the safety belt latch-
plate or buckle," and to strike the words "or a por-
tion of the safety belt webbing on top of the seat
cushion." The agency agrees that the latchplate
and buckle do not necessarily have to be located
on the seat cushion to be accessible. NHTSA does
believe that as long as the webbing is accessible
on top of or above the seat, an occupant should be
able to retrieve the latchplate and buckle.
Therefore, the rule is revised to require that only
one of the three belt parts (the seat belt latchplate,
the buckle, or seat belt webbing) be maintained on
top of or above the seat cushion under normal con-
ditions. Although the other two parts will not be
required to be on the seat cushion, the agency has
revised the rule to require that they remain ac-
cessible under normal conditions.

Another manufacturer stated that the provision
that a buckle be accessible in S7.4.6.2 with an ad-
justable arm rest in any position of adjustment
lacked objectivity and should be deleted. The
agency does not agree and continues to believe that
a simple visual inspection should be sufficient to
determine whether or not the buckle is accessible
when the arm rest is in the down position.

Warning System Requirements

The purpose of the proposed revision to these re-
quirements in the April notice was to allow for a
warning light which activates for at least 60

seconds if condition (A)— the vehicle's ignition
switch is moved to the "on" or "start" position,
exists simultaneously with condition (B)— the
driver's automatic belt is not in use or, if the belt
is non-detachable, the emergency release
mechanism is in the released position. Specifying
a minimum activation time was intended to allow
the manufacturer the option of providing for addi-
tional warning time. The proposal would also re-
quire that condition (O— the belt webbing of a
motorized automatic belt is not in its locked, pro-
tective mode at the anchorage point— be indicated
only by a continuous or flashing warning light in
lieu of a buzzer each time the ignition switch is
turned to the "on" position. The light would re-
main lit as long as condition (C) existed.

Two manufacturers raised concerns about deter-
mining when condition (B) exists— the driver belt
is not in use or the emergency release mechanism
is released— in a motorized belt system. They, in
effect, made the point that with certain motorized
designs, the April proposal would have required
the audible warning required for condition (B) to
sound while the belt webbing is moving along its
track to its fully locked position. For example, one
manufacturer stated that in some motorized belt
systems the emergency release belt latch
mechanism sensing is done by a proximity switch
in the (B) pillar which senses the presence of a
magnet in the part attached to the webbing. In this
case, the system will sense that the latch is un-
fastened until the motorized belt is in its fully
locked position and, thus, under the proposal,
would activate the audible warning during the
period that the belt is in motion. This commenter
requested that to prevent an audible warning from
being given when the mechanism is being operated
normally, the manufactuer should be given the op-
tion of starting the audible warning period from
the time that the belt reaches the fully locked
position.

The agency believes that it is important that an
audible warning sound when the driver's belt is not
in use or the belt's emergency release mechanism
is actuated. However, to prevent the sounding of
the audible warning when a motorized belt is mov-
ing into place, the agency is revising the warning
system requirement. The revision provides that, in
the case of a motorized belt, the existence of condi-
tion (B) is determined once the belt is in its fully
locked position. Once a motorized belt has reached
its fully locked position, an audible warning must
sound if condition (B) exists. The agency wishes to

PART 571; S208-PRE 278

emphasize that all motorized belts, regardless of
their design, should have an audible warning that
sounds if the driver's belt is not in use or the belt's
emergency release mechanism is actuated.

One of the same commenters also said it is plan-
ning to use detachable automatic belts in some of
its new belt system designs. Its concern is that con-
dition (B), which is determined by the belt latch
mechanism not being fastened, would require them
to locate the electrical sensor in the emergency
release buckle. In a motorized system, the wire
harness for the electric sensor would have to be
moved along a track, because the "emergency
release buckle" slides along the track with the
buckle end. The location of the electrical sensor in
the buckle makes the wire harness less reliable,
because of the constant movement, according to the
commenter. After the close of the comment period
on the April notice, NHTSA received a petition for
rulemaking to amend the requirements of
paragraph S4. 5. 3. 3(b) of Standard No. 208 from
Chrysler Corporation which raised the same issues.
Chrysler petitioned for an alternative means to
determine when the belt latch mechanism is not
fastened. It asked that the warning requirement
be modified to permit actuation of the warning
when less than 20 inches of webbing has been
withdrawn from the driver's seat belt retractor.

The agency believes the problems identified by
the commenter and the Chrysler petition are valid.
NHTSA did not intend to imply in the April 1985
notice that the method for determining that the
belt latch is not fastened must be by a sensor
located in the belt buckle. The agency believes that
manufacturers should have maximum design flex-
ibility to develop systems to determine if the latch
is not fastened. The condition could be determined
by any means, such as a predetermined amount of
belt webbing spool-out, or the location of a sensor
in the overhead, motorized track area or in the
working mechanism of the buckle/latchplate,
which would show that the automatic belt is not
fastened. The agency does note that if a manufac-
turer decides to use belt webbing spool-out that it
determine the least amount of webbing necessary
to go around a person in the driver's position with
the seat in its rearmost position. If less than this
minimum amount of webbing spools out of the
retractor in an attempt to defeat the system, the
warning should be activated.

Two manufacturers requested that NHTSA con-
firm that the same light signal may be activated
under both conditions (B) and (C), since the re-

quired audible signal suffices to differentiate be-
tween the two conditions. The agency agi'ees that
this comment has merit and confirms that the
same light signal may be activated under both con-
ditions (B) and (C).

Use of Additional Warnings

One manufacturer sought permission to use ad-
ditional warnings to supplement those required by
the standai'd. This manufacturer stated that its
warning system provided for an audible warning
system in addition to the warning light to indicate
that condition (A) + (C) exists. Further, the
passenger seating position is also equipped with a
warning system, which is not required by the stan-
dard. The agency notes, again, that a manufacturer
is free to provide features in addition to those re-
quired by the standard, as long as the standard's
requirements are met. No change in the standard
is necessary to permit the commenter to install ad-
ditional features in its warning systems.

Another company stated that, for non-detachable
automatic belts, the proposed 60-second visual
warning and the 4- to 8-second audible warning
may not be sufficient to indicate that the
emergency spool release is in the released position.
This company believes that the visual warning
should remain on for as long as the emergency
release mechanism remains in the release or
"emergency" position. The agency notes that the
requirement specifies a minimum 60-second visual
warning and does not limit it to 60 seconds for con-
dition (B). The agency specified a minimum period
of time, which is believed sufficient to warn oc-
cupants of this condition. Manufacturers have the
choice of extending the time for a warning light
to more than 60 seconds to indicate that the
emergency release mechanism is in the release or
emergency condition. Therefore, no change in the
language of the standard is required.

Walk-in Van Vehicles

The agency tentatively proposed to exclude walk-
in step vans from the safety belt comfort and con-
venience requirements in the April 12, 1985,
notice. By the term, "walk-in vans," NHTSA is
referring to city delivery type vehicles used, for ex-
ample, to deliver parcels or dry cleaning where the
drivers can walk directly into the vans without
stooping. A consumer group objected to the pro-
posed exemption for walk-in step vans on the basis

PART .S7I; S208-PRE 279

that NHTSA should promote belt use in these
vehicles by making them easier to use. The agency
is not persuaded that the increase in belt usage
which might result from the redesign of walk-in
vans to meet the comfort and convenience re-
quirements would justify the cost of such a
modification. Moreover, these vehicles do not nor-
mally have a secondary use, for example, as a
family vehicle, as do other utility vehicles which
are required to meet the comfort and convenience
requirements for safety belts. Due to the problems
with cost and vehicle redesign, the agency does not
believe that it is appropriate to apply the comfort
and convenience requirements to these vehicles.

Weights and Dimensions

In the April 12, 1985, notice, the agency proposed
a chart of weights and dimensions which included
small dimension changes and tolerances for the
50th percentile adult male. One manufacturer com-
mented that the agency has supplied no rationale
for these changes and that such dimensional revi-
sions to the Part 572 dummy should be the subject
of a separate rulemaking under Part 572. This com-
menter also objected to inclusion of a seated hip
circumference in the chart. The agency notes that
the chart of weights and dimensions of vehicle oc-
cupants was included in Standard No. 208 as a
guide for manufactuers. The seated hip cir-
cumference was included in this chart because it
is referred to in Standard No. 208. There is no re-
quirement in Part 572 for a seated hip cir-
cumference; therefore, this dimension is not a re-
quirement for the Part 572 test dummy. The
agency proposed the minor changes to the chart to
ensure that the dimensions set forth in the chart
agreed with the dimensions specified on drawing
SA 150 M002 of the test dummy, which is incor-
porated by reference in Part 572.5. The agency is
therefore adopting the proposed changes.

Another company said that the dimensions of a
six-year-old child are contained in the table defin-
ing the vehicle occupants. Although it highly
recommends safety belt use for a child of this age,
this commenter stressed that optimum protection
for a person of these dimensions can only be
obtained by using an additional special booster
cushion equipped with a safety belt guide system.
These types of cushions are readily available in the
United States. The commenter therefore requested
that the standard be amended to permit the com-
menter to recommend the use of such a cushion in

order to ensure correct positioning of the belt
around a six-year-old child. The agency agrees that,
in some instances, booster seats do facilitate the
use of adult restraints by this size occupant.
However, the agency also believes that the average
six-year-old child should be suitably accommodated
by the adult belt system in such a way that the
child is adequately protected from injury and
fatality. Therefore, the agency declines to make
this change to the standard.

Automatic Safety Belt Interpretation

In 1974 (39 FR 14594), the agency issued an in-
terpretation that it would not consider a belt
system which had to be manually moved out of the
way by the occupant to be an "automatic" system
that would satisfy the requirements of Standard
No. 208. In the April 12, 1985, notice, the agency
stated its belief that such an interpretation may
be overly stringent and requested public comment.

Four commenters argued that the past inter-
pretation was overly stringent, because it would
have allowed no manual movement of the belt to
accommodate ingress into the vehicle. As a
minimum, these commenters stated, such an inter-
pretation should acknowledge that a safety belt
design should be considered "passive" or
"automatic" if an occupant would normally push
the webbing aside upon entering the vehicle. In
addition, an automatic belt requiring a slight ad-
justment for comfort should be considered an
automatic restraint system. The commenters urged
that any belt design, which would perform its pro-
tective restraining function after a normal process
of ingress, without separate deliberate action by
the vehicle occupant to deploy the restraint system,
should be allowed. Finally, the commenters said
that to provide an automatic lap and shoulder belt
design which would comply with the original in-
terpretation could increase the tendency for the oc-
cupant to submarine under the belt. The reason is
that the lap belt portion, which would enable an
occupant to enter or exit the vehicle without
manually moving the belt, could be raised too high.
To solve this problem, a very expensive motorized
system would be required to move the belts out of
the occupant's ingress/egress area.

The agency believes these comments have merit
and has revised its interpretation. The concept of
an occupant protection system which requires "no
action by vehicle occupants," as that term is used
in Standard No. 208, is intended to designate a

PART 571: S208-PRE 280

system which will perform its protective restrain-
ing function after a normal process of ingress or
egress without separate deliberate actions by the
vehicle occupant to deploy the restraint system.
Thus, the agency considers an occupant protection
system to be automatic if an occupant has to take
no action to deploy the system but would normally
slightly push the safety belt webbing aside when
entering or exiting the vehicle or would normally
make a slight adjustment in the webbing for com-
fort. The agency believes that the marketplace will
help curb use of automatic belt systems which are
complicated, or require excessive adjustments
before ingress or egress, since prospective pur-
chasers would reject vehicles with such systems.
The agency believes that adoption of the comfort
and convenience requirements will help ensure
that manufacturers provide automatic belt systems
which will promote belt usage.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR 571.208
is amended as follows:

1 . The authority citation for Part 57 1 continues to
read as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1403, 1407;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

2. S7. 1.1.3 is revised to read:

S7. 1.1.3(a) Except as provided in S7. 1.1.3(b), a
Type 1 lap belt or the lap belt portion of any Type
2 belt installed at any front outboard designated
seating position for compliance with this standard
in a vehicle (other than walk-in van-type vehicles)
manufactured on or after September 1, 1986, shall
meet the requirements of S7.1 by means of an
emergency-locking retractor that conforms to Stan-
dard No. 209 (§ 571.209).

(h) The requirements of S7. 1.1. 3(a) do not apply
to the lap belt portion of any Type 2 belt installed
in a passenger car manufactured before September
1, 1989, or to walk-in van-type vehicles.

3. S7.4 is revised to read:

87. 4 Seat belt comfort and convenience, (a)
Automatic seat belts installed in any vehicle, other
than walk-in van-type vehicles, with a GVWR of
10,000 pounds or less, manufactured on or after
September 1, 1986, shall meet the requirements of
S7.4.1, 87.4.2, and 87.4.3.

(b) Except as provided in S7.4(c), manual seat
belts, other than manual Type 2 belt systems in-
stalled in the front outboard seating position in
passenger cars, installed for compliance with this

standard in any vehicle which has a GVWR of
10,000 pounds or less, and is manufactured on or
after September 1, 1986, shall meet the re-
quirements of 87.4.3, S7.4.4, 87.4.5, and 87.4.6.
Manual Type 2 seat belts in the front outboard
seating positions of passenger cars manufactured
on or after September 1, 1989, shall meet the re-
quirements of 87. 1.1.3(a), S7.4.3, S7.4.4, S7.4.5, and
87.4.6, if the automatic restraint requirements are
rescinded pursuant to 84.1.5.

(c) The requirements of S7. 4(b) do not apply to
manual belts installed in walk-in van-type
vehicles.

4. 87.4.1 is revised to read:

87.4.1 Convenience hooks. Any manual conven-
ience hook or other device that is provided to stow
seat belt webbing to facilitate entering or exiting
the vehicle shall automatically release the webbing
when the automatic belt system is otherwise opera-
tional and shall remain in the released mode for
as long as (a) exists simultaneously with (b), or, at
the maufacturer's option, for as long as (a) exists
simultaneously with (c)—

(a) The vehicle ignition switch is moved to the
"on" or "start" position;

fb) The vehicle's drive train is engaged;

(c) The vehicle's parking brake is in the released
mode (nonengaged).

5. 87.4.2 is revised to read:

57.4.2 Webbing tension-relieving device. Each
automatic seat belt assembly that includes either
manual or automatic devices that permit the in-
troduction of slack in the webbing of the shoulder
belt (e.g., "comfort clips" or "window-shade"
devices) shall comply with the occupant crash pro-
tection requirements of 85 of this standard with
the belt webbing adjusted to introduce the max-
imum amount of slack that is recommended by the
vehicle manufacturer in the vehicle owner's
manual to be introduced into the shoulder belt
under normal use conditions. The vehicle owner's
manual shall explain how the device works and
shall specify the maximum amount of slack (in
inches) which is recommended by the vehicle
manufacturer in the owner's manual to be in-
troduced into the shoulder belt under normal use
conditions. These instructions shall also warn that
introducing slack beyond the specified amount
could significantly reduce the effectiveness of the
belt in a crash. Any belt slack that can be
introduced into the belt system by means of any

PART 571; .S208-PRE 281

tension-relieving device or design shall be can-
celled each time the safety belt is unbuckled or the
adjacent vehicle door is opened except for belt
systems in open-body vehicles with no doors.

6. S7.4.3 is revised to read as follows:

57.4.3 Belt contact force. Except for seat belt
assemblies which incorporate a webbing tension-
relieving device that complies with S7.4.2, the up-
per torso webbing of any seat belt assembly, when
tested in accordance with S10.6, shall not exert
more than 0.7 pound of contact force when
measured normal to and one inch from the chest
of an anthropomorphic test dummy, positioned in
accordance with SIO in the seating position for
which that assembly is provided, at the point where
the centerline of the torso belt crosses the midsagit-
tal line on the dummy's chest.

7. The first sentence of S7.4.4 is revised to read
as follows:

57.4.4 Latchplate access. Any seat belt assembly
latchplate which is located outboard of a front out-
board seating position in accordance with S4.1.2,
shall also be located within the outboard reach
envelope of either the outboard arm or the inboard
arm described in SlO.5 and Figure 3 of this stan-
dard, when the latchplate is in its normal stowed
position. There shall be sufficient clearance be-
tween the vehicle seat and the side of the vehicle
interior to allow the test block defined in Figure
4 unhindered transit to the latchplate or buckle.

8. S7.4.5 is revised to read as follows:

57.4.5 Retraction. When tested under the condi-
tions of S8.1.2 and SB. 1.3, with the anthropomor-
phic test dummies whose arms have been removed
and which are positioned in accordance with SlO
and restrained by the belt systems for those posi-
tions, the torso and lap belt webbing of any of those
seat belt systems shall automatically retract when
the adjacent vehicle door is in the open position,
or when the seat belt latchplate is released, to a
stowed position. That position shall prevent any
part of the webbing or hardware from being
pinched when the adjacent vehicle door is closed.
A belt system with a tension-relieving device in an
open-bodied vehicle with no doors shall fully retract
when the tension-relief device is manually deac-
tivated. For the purpose of the retraction require-
ment, outboard armrests may be placed in their
stowed positions if they are on vehicle seats which

must have the armrests in the stowed position to
allow an occupant to exit the vehicle.

9. S7.4.6.1 is revised to read as follows:

S7.4.6.1(a) Any manual seat belt assembly whose
webbing is designed to pass through the seat
cushion or between the seat cushion and seat back
shall be designed to maintain one of the following
three seat belt parts (the seat belt latchplate, the
buckle, or the seat belt webbing) on top of or above
the seat cushion under normal conditions (i.e., con-
ditions other than when belt hardware is inten-
tionally pushed behind the seat by a vehicle occu-
pant). In addition, the remaining two seat belt
parts must be acessible under normal conditions,
(b) The requirements of S7.4.6.1(a) do not apply
to: (1) seats whose seat cushions are movable so
that the seat back serves a function other than
seating, (2) seats which are removable, or (3) seats
which are movable so that the space formerly oc-
cupied by the seat can be used for a secondary
function.

10. S4. 5. 3. 3(b) is revised to read as follows:
S4.5.3.3(b) In place of a warning system that con-
forms to S7.3 of this standard, be equipped with
the following warning system: At the left front
designated seating position (driver's position), a
warning system that activates a continuous or in-
termittent audible signal for a period of not less
than 4 seconds and not more than 8 seconds and
that activates a continuous or flashing warning
light visible to the driver for not less than 60
seconds (beginning when the vehicle ignition
switch is moved to the "on" or the "start" position)
when condition (A) exists simultaneously with con-
dition (B), and that activates a continuous or
flashing warning light, visible to the driver,
displaying the identifying symbol for the seat belt
telltale shown in Table 2 of Standard No. 101 (49
CFR 571.101), or, at the option of the manufacturer
if permitted by Standard No. 101, displaying the
words "Fasten Seat Belts" or "Fasten Belts," for
as long as condition (A) exists simultaneously with
condition (C).

(A) The vehicle's ignition switch is moved to the
"on" position or to the "start" position.

(B) The driver's automatic belt is not in use, as
determined by the belt latch mechanism not being
fastened or, if the automatic belt is non-detachable,
by the emergency release mechanism being in the
released position. In the case of motorized

PART 571; S208-PRE 282

automatic belts, the determination of use shall be
made once the belt webbing is in its locked protec-
tive mode at the anchorage point.

(C) The belt webbing of a motorized automatic
belt system is not in its locked, protective mode at
the anchorage point.

11. The first sentence of SlO.5 is amended to delete
"S7.4.7" and to insert in its place "S7.4.4."

12. S10.6 is amended to read as follows:

S10.6 To determine compliance with ST. 4. 3 of

this standard, position the anthropomorphic test
dummy in the vehicle in accordance with S8. 1 . 11 ,
and under the conditions of S8.1.2, S8.1.3, and
SB. 1.9. Close the vehicle's adjacent door, pull 12
inches of belt webbing from the retractor and then
release it, allowing the belt webbing to return to
the dummy's chest. Pull the belt webbing three
inches from the dummy's chest and release until
the webbing is within one inch of the dummy's
chest and measure belt pressure.

13. Figure 4 of this standard is modified as follows:

Clearance Test Block

(Note corners are rounded off
to reduce snagging.)

Typical arm rest

Figure 4-USE OF CLEARANCE TEST BLOCK TO DETERMINE HAND/ARM ACCESS

PART 571: S208-PRE 283

14. The weights and dimensions of the vehicle oc-
cupants referred to in this standard and specified
in S7.1.13 are modified to read as follows:

an occupant has to take no action to deploy the
system but would normally slightly push the seat
belt webbing aside when entering or exiting the

50th-percentile
6-year-old child

5th-perCentile
adult female

50th-percentile
adult male

95th-percentile
adult male

Weight

Erect sitting height

Hip breadth (sitting)

Hip circumference (sitting)

Waist circumference (sitting).
Chest depth

47.3

pounds

25.4

inrhe.s

8.4

inches

23.9

inches

20.8

inches

Chest circumference:

(nipple)

(upper)

(lower)

102

pounds

_ 164

pounds

30.9

inches

_ 35.7

inches

12.8

inches

_ 14.7

inches

36.4

inches

_ 42

inches

23.6

inches

_ 32

inches

7.5

inches

_ 9.3

inches

30.5

inches

29.8

inches

_ 37.4

inches

26.6

inches

± 3

±10

+ 7

+ 60
±20

±6

215 pounds
38 inches
16.5 inches
42.5 inches
42.5 inches
10.5 inches

44.5 inches

15. The Note following paragraph Si 1.8 is revised
to read as follows:

Note: The concept of an occupant protection
system which requires "no action by vehicle oc-
cupants," as that term is used in Standard No. 208,
is intended to designate a system which will per-
form its protective restraining function after a nor-
mal process of ingress or egress without separate
deliberate actions by the vehicle occupant to deploy
the restraint system. Thus, the agency considers
an occupant protection system to be automatic if

vehicle or would normally make a slight adjust-
ment in the webbing for comfort.

Issued on November 1, 1985

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

50 FR 46056
November 5, 1985

PART 571; S208-PRE 284

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO

FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

OCCUPANT CRASH PROTECTION

[Docket No. 74-14; Notice 43]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: On April 12, 1985, NHTSA issued a
notice proposing a number of amendments to Stand-
ard No. 208. Occupant Crash Protection. Based on its
analysis of the comments received in response to that
notice, the agency has decided to take the following
actions: retain the oblique crash test for automatic
restraint equipped cars, adopt some New Car Assess-
ment Program test procedures for use in the stand-
ard's crash tests, provide in the standard for a due
care defense with respect to the automatic restraint
requirement, and require the dynamic testing of
manual lap/shoulder belts in passenger cars. This
notice also creates a new Part 585 that sets reporting
requirements regarding compliance with the
automatic restraint phase-in requirements of the
standard.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendments made by this
notice will take effect on May 5, 1986, except the re-
quirement for dynamic testing of manual safety belts
in passenger cars will go into effect on September 1,
1989, if the automatic restraint requirement is
rescinded.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On July 11, 1984 (49 FR 28962), the Secretary of
Transportation issued a final rule requiring automatic
occupant protection in all passenger cars. The rule is
based on a phased-in schedule beginning on
September 1, 1986, with full implementation being re-
quired by September 1, 1989. However, if before

April 1, 1989, two-thirds of the population of the
United States are covered by effective state man-
datory safety belt use laws (MULs) meeting specified
criteria, the automatic restraint requirement will be
rescinded.
More specifically, the rule requires:

• Front outboard seating positions in passenger
cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1986, for
sale in the United States, will have to be equipped
with automatic restraints based on the following
schedule;

• Ten percent of all cars manufactured on or
after September 1, 1986.

• Twenty-five percent of all cars manufactured
on or after September 1, 1987.

• Forty percent of all cars manufactured on or
after September 1, 1988.

• One hundred percent of all cars manufactured
on or after September 1, 1989.

• During the phase-in period, each car that is
manufactured with a system that provides automatic
protection to the driver without the use of safety belts
and automatic protection of any sort to the passenger
will be given an extra credit equal to one-half car
toward meeting the percentage requirement. In addi-
tion, each car which provides non-belt automatic pro-
tection solely to the driver will be given a one vehicle
credit.

• The requirement for automatic restraints will be
rescinded if MULs meeting specified conditions are
passed by a sufficent number of states before April 1,
1989, to cover two-thirds of the population of the
United States. The MULs must go into effect no later
than September 1, 1989.

In the July 1984 notice, the Secretary identified
various issues requiring additional rulemaking. On
April 12, 1985, the agency issued two notices setting

PART 571; S208-PRE 285

forth proposals on all of those issues. One notice (50
FR 14589), which is the basis for the final rule being
issued today, proposed: reporting requirements for
the phase-in, deletion of the oblique test, alternative
calculations of the head injury criterion (HIC), allow-
ing the installation of manual belts in convertibles,
use of the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP)
test procedures, and adoption of a due care defense.
The notice also proposed the dynamic testing of
manual lap/shoulder belts for passenger cars, light
trucks and light vans. The second notice (50 FR
14602) set forth the agency's proposals on the use of
the Hybrid III test dummy and additional injury
criteria. NHTSA has not yet completed its analysis of
the comments and issues raised by the Hybrid HI pro-
posal or the proposal regarding convertibles and
dynamic testing of safety belts in light trucks and
light vans. The agency will publish a separate Federal
Register notice announcing its decision with regard to
these issues when it has completed its analysis.

Oblique Crash Tests

Standard No. 208 currently requires cars with
automatic restraints to pass the injury protection
criteria in 30 mph head-on and oblique impacts into a
barrier. The April 1985 notice contained an extensive
discussion of the value of the oblique test and re-
quested commenters to provide additional data re-
garding the safety and other effects of deleting the
requirements.

The responses to the April notice reflected the
same difference of opinion found in the prior
responses on this issue. Those favoring elimination
of the test argue that the test is unnecessary since
oblique crash tests generally show lower injury levels.
They also said the additional test adds to the cost of
complying with the standard - although manufac-
turers differed as to the extent of costs. Four manufac-
turers suggested that any cost reduction resulting
from elimination of the test would be minimal, in part
because they will continue to use the oblique tests in
their restraint system developmental programs,
regardless of what action the agency takes. Another
manufacturer, however, said that while it would con-
tinue to use oblique testing during its vehicle develop-
ment programs, the elimination of the oblique test in
Standard No. 208 would result in cost and manpower
savings. These savings would result because the parts
used in vehicles for certification testing must be more
representative of actual production parts than the
parts used in vehicles crashed during development
tests.

Those favoring retention of the test again em-
phasized that the test is more representative of real-
world crashes. In addition, they said that occupants in
systems without upper torso belts, such as some air
bag or passive interior systems, could experience con-
tact with the A-pillar and other vehicle structures in
the oblique test that they would not experience in a
head-on test. Although, again, there were conflicting
opinions on this issue -one manufacturer said that
oblique tests would not affect air bag design, while
other manufacturers argued that the oblique test is
necessary to ensure the proper design of air bag
systems. The same manufacturer that said air bag
design would not be affected by the oblique test, em-
phasized that vehicles with 2-point automatic belts or
passive interiors, "may show performance charac-
teristics in oblique tests that do not show up on
perpendicular tests." Similarly, one manufacturer
said that oblique tests will not result in test dummy
contact with the A-pillar or front door - while another
manufacturer argued that in the oblique test contact
could occur with the A-pillar in vehicles using non-
belt technologies.

After examining the issues raised by the com-
menters, the agency has decided to retain the oblique
tests. There are a number of factors underlying the
agency's decision. First, although oblique tests
generally produce lower injury levels, they do not
consistently produce those results. For example, the
agency has conducted both oblique and frontal crash
tests on 14 different cars as part of its research ac-
tivities and NCAP testing. The driver and passenger
HIC's and chest acceleration results for those tests
show that the results in the oblique tests are lower in
31 of the 38 cases for which data were available.
However, looking at the results in terms of vehicles, 6
of the 14 cars had higher results, exclusive of femur
results, in either passenger or driver HIC's or chest
accelerations in the oblique tests. The femur results
in approximately one-third of the measurements were
also higher in the oblique tests. Accident data also in-
dicate that oblique impacts pose a problem. The 1982
FARS and NASS accident records show that 14 per-
cent of the fatalities and 22 percent of the AIS 2-5 in-
juries occur in 30 degree impacts.

The agency is also concerned that elimination of the
oblique test could lead to potential design problems in
some automatic restraint systems. For example, air
bags that meet only a perpendicular impact test could
be made much smaller. In such a case, in an oblique
car crash, the occupant would roll off the smaller bag
and strike the A-pillar or instrument panel. Similarly,
the upper torso belt of an automatic belt system

PART 571; S208-PRE 286

could slip off an occupant's shoulder in an oblique
crash. In belt system with a tension-relieving device,
the system will be tested with the maximum amount
of slack recommended by the vehicle manufacturer,
potentially increasing the possibility of the upper
torso belt slipping off the occupant's shoulder. In the
case of passive interiors, an occupant may be able to
contact hard vehicle structures, such as the A-pillar.
in oblique crashes that would not be contacted in a
perpendicular test. If the A-pillar and other hard
structures are not designed to provide protection in
oblique crashes then there would be no assurance, as
there presently is, that occupants would be adequate-
ly protected. Thus, the oblique test is needed to pro-
tect unrestrained occupants in passive interiors, and
to ensure that air bags and automatic or manual safe-
ty belts are designed to accommodate some degree of
oblique impact.

The agency recognizes that retention of the oblique
test will result in additional testing costs for manufac-
turers. The agency believes, however, that there are a
number of factors which should minimize those costs.
First, even manufacturers opposing retention of the
oblique test indicated that they will continue to per-
form oblique crash tests to meet their own internal re-
quirements as well as to meet the oblique test re-
quirements of the Standard No. 301, Fuel System In-
tegrity. Since the oblique tests of Standard No. 208
and Standard No. 301 can be run simultaneously, the
costs resulting from retention of the oblique crash
test requirements of Standard No. 208 should not be
significant.

Dynamic Testing of Manual Belts

The April notice proposed that manual lap/shoulder
belts installed at the outboard seating positions of the
front seat of four different vehicle types comply with
the dynamic testing requirements of Standard No.
208. Those requirements provide for using test dum-
mies in vehicle crashes for measuring the level of pro-
tection offered by the restraint system. The four vehi-
cle types subject to this proposal are passenger cars,
light trucks, small van-like buses, and light multipur-
pose passenger vehicles (MPV's). (The agency con-
siders light trucks, small van-like buses, and light
MPV's to be vehicles with a Gross Vehicle Weight
Rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less and an
unloaded vehicle weight of 5,500 pounds or less. The
5,500 pound unloaded vehicle weight limit is also used
in Standard No. 212, Windshield Retention, and
Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion. The
limit was adopted in those standards on April 3, 1980

(45 FR 22044) to reduce compliance problems for
final-stage manufacturers. Readers are referred to
the April 1980 notice for a complete discussion of the
5,500 pound limit.)

Currently, manual belts are not subject to dynamic
test requirements. Instead they must be tested in ac-
cordance with Standard No. 209, Seat Belt
Assemblies, for strength and other qualities in
laboratory bench tests. Once a safety belt is certified
as complying with the requirements of Standard No.
209, it currently may be installed in a vehicle without
any further testing or certification as to its perform-
ance in that vehicle. The safety belt anchorages in the
vehicle are tested for strength in accordance with
Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages.

The April 1985 notice also addressed the issue of
tension-relieving devices on manual belts. Tension-
relieving devices are used to introduce slack in the
shoulder portion of a lap-shoulder belt to reduce the
pressure of the belt on an occupant or to effect a more
comfortable "fit" of the belt to an occupant. The
notice proposed that manufacturers be required to
specify in their vehicle owner's manuals the maximum
amount of slack they recommend introducing into the
belt under normal use condition. Further, the owner's
manual would be required to warn that introducing
slack beyond the maximum amount specified by the
manufacturer could significantly reduce the effec-
tiveness of the belt in a crash. During the agency's
dynamic testing of manual belts, the tension-relieving
devices would be adjusted so as to introduce the max-
imum amount of slack specified in the owner's
manual.

The agency proposed that the djTiamic test require-
ment for passenger cars take effect on September 1,
1989, and only if the Secretary determines that two-
thirds of the population is covered by effective safety
belt use laws, thereby rescinding the automatic
restraint requirement. Should such a determination
be made, it is important that users of manual belts be
assured that their vehicles offer the same level of oc-
cupant protection as if automatic restraints were in
their vehicles. Absent a rescission of the automatic
restraint requirement, application of the dynamic
testing requirements to manual safety belts in
passenger cars would be unnecessary since those
belts would not be required in the outboard seating
positions of the front seat. In the case of light trucks,
light MPV's and small van-like buses, the agency pro-
posed that the dynamic test requirement take effect
on September 1, 1989. The proposed effective date
for light trucks, light MPV's and van-like buses was

PART 571; S208-PRE 287

not conditional, because those vehicles are not
covered by the automatic restraint requirement and
will likely continue to have manual safety belts.

Adoption of the requirement

As discussed in detail below, the agency has decided
to adopt a dynamic test requirement for safety belts
used in passenger cars. The agency is still analyzing
the issues raised in the comments about dynamic
testing for safety belt systems in other vehicles and
will announce its decision about safety belt systems in
light trucks, MPV's and buses at a later date.

Most of the commenters favored adopting a
dynamic test requirement for manual belts at least
with respect to passenger cars, although many of
those commenters raised questions about the lead-
time needed to comply with the requirement. Those
opposing the requirement argued that the field ex-
perience has shown that current manual belts provide
substantial protection and thus a dynamic test re-
quirement is not necessary. In addition, they argued
that dynamic testing would substantially increase a
manufacturer's testing costs, and its testing
workload. One commenter said that because of the
unique nature of the testing, it could not necessarily
be combined with other compliance testing done by a
manufacturer. The same commenter argued that
vehicle downsizing, cited by the agency as one reason
for dynamically testing belts, does not create safety
problems since the interior space of passenger cars
has remained essentially the same as it was prior to
downsizing. The commenter also argued there is no
field evidence that the use of tension-relieving devices
in safety belts, the other reason cited by the agency in
support of the need to test dynamically manual safety
belts, is compromising the performance of safety
belts.

The agency strongly believes that current manual
belts provide very substantial protection in a crash.
The Secretary's 1984 automatic protection decision
concluded that current manual safety belts are at
least as effective, and in some cases, more effective
than current automatic belt designs. That conclusion
was based on current manual safety belts, which are
not certified to dynamic tests. However, as discussed
in the April 1985 notice, the agency is concerned that
as an increasing number of vehicles are reduced in
size for fuel economy purposes and as more tension-
relieving devices are used on manual belts, the poten-
tial for occupant injury increases. The agency agrees
that downsizing efforts by manufacturers have at-
tempted to preserve the interior space of passenger

cars, while reducing their exterior dimensions.
Preserving the interior dimensions of the passenger
compartment means that occupants will not be placed
closer to instrument panels and other vehicle struc-
tures which they could strike in a crash. However, the
reduction in exterior dimensions can result in a
lessening of the protective crush distance available in
a car. Thus the agency believes it is important to en-
sure that safety belts in downsized vehicles will per-
form adequately. In the case of tension-relieving
devices, agency tests of lap/shoulder belt restrained
test dummies have shown that as more slack is in-
troduced into a shoulder belt, the injuries measured
on the test dummies increased. Thus, as discussed in
detail later in this notice, the agency believes it is im-
portant to ensure that safety belts with tension-
relievers provide adequate protection when they are
used in the manner recommended by vehicle manu-
facturers. This is of particular concern to the agency
since the vast majority of new cars (nearly all
domestically-produced cars) now are equipped with
such devices. For those reasons, the agency is adopt-
ing the dynamic test requirement.

The adoption of this requirement will ensure that
each and every passenger car, as compared to the
vehicle population in general, offers a consistent,
minumum level of protection to front seat occupants.
By requiring dynamic testing, the standard will
assure that the vehicle's structure, safety belts, steer-
ing column, etc., perform as a unit to protect oc-
cupants, as it is only in such a test that the synergistic
and combination effects of these vehicle component
can be measured. As discussed in detail in the Final
Regulatory Evaluation (FRE), vehicle safety im-
provements will result from dynamic testing; and, as
discussed later in this notice, such improvements can
often be made quickly and at low cost.

The agency recognizes that manufacturers may
have to conduct more testing than they currently do.
However, the dynamic testing of manual belts in
passenger cars, as with testing of automatic
restraints, can be combined with other compliance
tests to reduce the overall number of tests. The agen-
cy notes that in its NCAP tests, it has been able to
combine the dynamic testing of belts with measuring
the vehicle's compliance with other standards. The
agency has followed the same practice in its com-
pliance tests. For example, the agency has done com-
pliance testing for Standard Nos. 208, 212, 219, and
301 in one test. The agency would, of course,
recognize a manufacturer's use of combined tests as a
valid testing procedure to certify compliance with
these standards.

PART 571; S208-PRE 288

Effective Date

Two commenters argued that the requirement
should become effective as soon as practical. As
discussed in the April 1985 notice, the agency pro-
posed an effective date of September 1, 1989, because
it did not want to divert industry resources away
from designing automatic restraints for passenger
cars. The agency continues to believe it would be in-
appropriate to divert those resources for the purposes
of requiring improvements on manual belt systems
that might not be permitted in passenger cars.

Other commenters asked for a delay in the effective
date-one asked for a delay until September 1, 1991,
while another asked that the effective date be set 2-3
years after the determination of whether a sufficient
number of States have passed effective mandatory
safety belt use laws. NHTSA does not agree there is a
need to delay the effective date beyond September 1,
1989 for passenger cars. Commenters argued that
the time span between any decision on rescission of
the automatic restraint requirements (as late as April
1, 1989) and the effective date of the dynamic testing
of manual belts (September 1, 1985) is too short to
certify manual belts.

The agency believes there is sufficient leadtime for
passenger cars. Most of the vehicle components in
passenger cars necessary for injury reduction
management are the same for automatic restraint
vehicles and dynamically tested manual belt vehicles.
Additionally, as indicated and discussed in the April
notice, approximately 40 percent of the passenger
cars tested in the agency's 35 mph (NCAP) program
meet the injurj- criteria specified in Standard No. 208,
even though a 35 mph crash involves 36 percent more
energy than the 30 mph crash test required by Stand-
ard No. 208. In addition, the FRE shows that with
relatively minor vehicle and/or restraint system
changes some safety belt systems can be dramatically
improved. This is further evidence that development
of dynamically tested manual belts for passenger cars
in 30 mph tests should not be a major engineering
program. Thus, a delay in the effective date for
passenger cars is not needed.

Webbing tension-relieving devices

With one exception, those manufacturers who com-
mented on the proposal concerning tension-relieving
devices supported testing safety belts adjusted so
that they have the amount of slack recommended by
the manufacturer in the vehicle owner's manual.
However, one manufacturer and two other com-
menters objected to the provision related to dynamic

testing with the tension-relieving device adjusted to
the manufacturer's maximum recommended slack
position. The manufacturer objected to a dynamic
test that would require any slack at all to be intro-
duced into the belt system, on the grounds that un-
controlled variability would be introduced into the
dynamic test procedure, which would then lack objec-
tivity. The manufacturer asserted that it might have
to eliminate all tension-relieving devices for its safety
belts.

The agency's proposed test procedure was intended
to accommodate tension-relieving devices since they
can increase the comfort of belts. At the same time,
the proposal would limit the potential reduction in ef-
fectiveness for safety belt systems with excessive
slack. The agency does not agree that this test pro-
cedure need result in the elimination of tension-
relieving devices from the marketplace. As men-
tioned earlier, other manufacturers supported the
proposal and did not indicate they would have to
remove tension-relieving devices from their belt
systems. The commenter opposing the requirement
did not show that injury levels cannot be controlled
within the specified injury criteria by testing with the
recommended amount of slack, as determined by the
manufacturer. The recommended slack could be very
small or at any level selected by the manufacturer as
appropriate to relieve belt pressure and still ensure
that the injury reduction criteria of Standard No. 208
would be met. As a practical matter, most tension-
relievers automatically introduce some slack into the
belt for all occupants. Testing without such slack
would be unrealistic.

The two other commenters objected to the proposal
that manual belt systems using tension-relieving
devices meet the injury criteria with only the
specified amount of slack recommended in the
owner's manual. They stated that most owners would
not read the instructions in the owner's manual re-
garding the proper use of the tension-relieving
device. They said an occupant could have a false sense
of adequate restraint when wearing a belt system ad-
justed beyond the recommended limit.

The agency's views on allowing the use of tension
relievers in safety belts were detailed in the April
1985 notice. The agency specifically noted the effec-
tiveness of a safety belt system could be compromised
if excessive slack were introduced into the belt.
However, the agency recognizes that a belt system
must be used to be effective at all. Allowing manufac-
turers to install tension-relieving devices makes it
possible for an occupant to introduce a small amount
of slack to relieve shoulder belt pressure or to divert

PART 571; 8208 -PRE 289

the belt away from the neck. As a result, safety belt
use is promoted. This factor should outweigh any loss
in effectiveness due to the introduction of a recom-
mended amount of slack in normal use. This is par-
ticularly likely in light of the requirement that the
belt system, so adjusted, must meet the injury criteria
of Standard No. 208 under 30 mph test conditions.
Further, the inadvertent introduction of slack into a
belt system, which is beyond that for normal use, is
unlikely in most current systems. In addition, even if
too much slack is introduced, the occupant should
notice that excessive slack is present and a correction
is needed, regardless of whether he or she has read
the vehicle's owner's manual.

Exemption from Standard Nos. 203 and 204

One commenter suggested that vehicles equipped
with dynamically tested manual belts be exempt from
Standard Nos. 203, Impact Protection for the Driver
from the Steering Control Systems, and 204, Steering
Column Rearward Displacement. The agency does
not believe such an exemption would be appropriate
because both those standards have been shown to pro-
vide substantial protection to belted drivers.

Latching procedure in Standard No. 208

One commenter asked that Standard No. 208 be
modified to include a test procedure for latching and
adjusting a manual safety belt prior to the belt being
dynamically tested. NHTSA agrees that Standard
No. 208 should include such a procedure. The final
rule incorporates the instructions contained in the
NCAP test procedures for adjusting manual belts, as
modified to reflect the introduction of the amount of
slack recommended by the vehicle manufacturer.

Revisions to Standard No. 209

The notice proposed to exempt dynamically tested
belts from the static laboratory strength tests for
safety belt assemblies set forth in S4.4 of Standard
No. 209. One commenter asked that such belts be ex-
empted from the remaining requirements of Stand-
ard No. 209 as well.

NHTSA agrees that an additional exemption from
some performance requirements of Standard No. 209
is appropriate. Currently, the webbing of automatic
belts is exempt from the elongation and other belt
webbing and attachment hardware requirements of
Standard No. 209, since those belts have to meet the
injury protection criteria of Standard No. 208 during
a crash. For dynamically-tested manual belts,

NHTSA believes that an exemption from the webbing
width, strength and elongation requirements (sec-
tions 4.2(a)-(c)) is also appropriate, since these belts
will also have to meet the injury protection re-
quirements of Standard No. 208. The agency has
made the necessary changes in the rule to adopt that
exemption.

The agency does not believe that manual belts
should be exempt from the other requirements in
Standard No. 209. For example, the requirements on
buckle release force should continue to apply, since
manual safety belts, unlike automatic belts, must be
buckled every time they are used. As with retractors
in automatic belts, retractors in dynamically tested
manual belts will still have to meet Standard No.
209's performance requirements.

Revisions to Standard No. 210

The notice proposed that dynamically tested
manual belts would not have to meet the location re-
quirements set forth in Standard No. 210, Seat Belt
Assembly Anchorages. One commenter suggested
that dynamically tested belts be completely exempt
from Standard No. 210; it also recommended that
Standard No. 210 be harmonized with Economic
Commission for Europe (ECE) Regulation No. 14.
Two other commenters suggested using the "out-of-
vehicle" dynamic test procedure for manual belts con-
tained in ECE Regulation No. 16, instead of the pro-
posed barrier crash test in Standard No. 208.

The agency does not believe that the
"out-of- vehicle" laboratory bench test of ECE Regula-
tion No. 16 should be allowed as a substitute for a
dynamic vehicle crash test. The protection provided
by safety belts depends on the performance of the
safety belts themselves, in conjunction with the struc-
tural characteristics and interior design of the vehi-
cle. The best way to measure the performance of the
safety belt/vehicle combination is through a vehicle
crash test.

The agency has already announced its intention to
propose revisions to Standard No. 210 to harmonize it
with ECE Regulation No. 14; therefore the com-
menters' suggestions concerning harmonization and
exclusion of dynamically tested safety belts from the
other requirements of Standard No. 210 will be con-
sidered during that rulemaking. At the present time,
the agency is adopting only the proposed exclusion of
anchorages for dynamically tested safety belts from
the location requirements, which was not opposed by
any commenter.

PART 571; S208-PRE 290

Belt Labelling

One commenter objected to the proposal that
djTiamically tested belts have a label indicating that
they may be installed only at the front outboard
seating positions of certain vehicles. The commenter
said that it is unlikely that anyone would attempt to
install a Tj^pe 2 lap shoulder belt in any vehicle other
than the model for which it was designed. The agency
does not agree. NHTSA believes that care must be
taken to distinguish dynamically tested belt systems
from other systems, since misapplication of a belt in a
vehicle designed for use with a specific dynamically
tested belt could pose a risk of injury. If there is a
label on the belt itself, a person making the installa-
tion will be aware that the belt should be installed
only in certain vehicles.

Use of the Head Injury Criterion

The April 1985 notice set forth two proposed alter-
native methods of using the head injury criterion
(HIC) in situations when there is no contact between
the test dummy's head and the vehicle's interior dur-
ing a crash. The first proposed alternative was to re-
tain the current HIC calculation for contact situa-
tions. However, in non-contact situations, the agency
proposed that a HIC would not be calculated, but in-
stead new neck injury criteria would be calculated.
The agency explained that a crucial element
necessary for deciding whether to use the HIC
calculation or the neck criteria was an objective
technique for determining the occurrence and dura-
tion of head contact in the crash test. As discussed in
detail in the April 1985 notice, there are several
methods available for establishing the duration of
head contact, but there are questions about their
levels of consistency and accuracy.

The second alternative proposed by the agency
would have calculated a HIC in both contact and non-
contact situations, but it would limit the calculation to
a time interval of 36 milliseconds. Along with the re-
quirement that a HIC not exceed 1000, this would
limit average head acceleration to 60g's or less.

Almost all of the commenters opposed the use of
the first proposed alternative. The commenters
uniformly noted that there is no current technique
that can accurately identify whether head contact has
or has not occurred during a crash test in all situa-
tions. However, one commenter urged the agency to
adopt the proposed neck criteria, regardless of
whether the HIC calculation is modified. There was a
sharp division among the commenters on the second
proposed alternative. Manufacturers commenting on

the issue uniformly supported the use of the second
alternative: although many manufacturers argued
that the HIC calculation should be limited to a time in-
terval of approximately 15 to 17 milliseconds (ms),
which would limit average head accelerations to 80-85
g's. Another manufacturer, who supported the sec-
ond alternative, urged the agency to measure HIC
only during the time interval that the acceleration
level in the head exceeds 60 g's. It said that this
method would more effectively differentiate results
received in contacts with hard surfaces and results
obtained from systems, such as airbags, which pro-
vide good distribution of the loads experienced during
a crash. Other commenters argued that the current
HIC calculation should be retained; they said that the
proposed alternatives would lower HIC calculations
without ensuring that motorists were still receiving
adequate head protection.

NHTSA is in the process of reexamining the poten-
tial effects of the two alternatives proposed by the
agency and of the two additional alternatives sug-
gested by the commenters. Once that review has been
completed, the agency will issue a separate notice an-
nouncing its decision.

NCAP Test Procedures

The April 1985 notice proposed adopting the test
procedures on test dummy positioning and vehicle
loading used in the agency's NCAP testing. The com-
menters generally supported the adoption of the test
procedures, although several commenters suggested
changes in some of the proposals. In addition, several
commenters argued that the new procedures may im-
prove test consistency, but the changes do not affect
what they claim is variability in crash test results. As
discussed in the April 1985 notice, the agency
believes that the test used in Standard No. 208 does
produce repeatable results. The proposed changes in
the test procedures were meant to correct isolated
problems that occurred in some NCAP tests. The
following discussion addresses the issues raised by
the commenters about the specific test procedure
changes.

Vehicle test attitude

The NPRM proposed that when a vehicle is tested,
its attitude should be between its "as delivered" condi-
tion and its "loaded" condition. (The "as delivered"
condition is based on the vehicle attitude measured
when it is received at the test site, with 100 percent of
all its fluid capacities and with all its tires inflated to
the manufacturer's specifications. For passenger

PART 571; S208-PRE 291

cars, the "loaded" condition is based on the vehicle's
attitude with a test dummy in each front outboard
designated seating position, plus carrying the cargo
load specified by the manufacturer).

One commenter said that the weight distribution,
and therefore the attitude, of the vehicle is governed
more by the Gross Axle Weight Rating (defined in 49
CFR Part 571.3) than the loading conditions iden-
tified by the agency. The commenter recommended
that the proposal not be adopted. Another commenter
said that the agency should adopt more specific pro-
cedures for the positioning of the dummy and the
cargo weight. For example, that commenter recom-
mended that the "cargo weight shall be placed in such
manner that its center of gravity will be coincident
with the longitudinal center of the trunk, measured
on the vehicle's longitudinal centerline." The com-
menter said that unless a more specific procedure is
adopted, a vehicle's attitude in the fully loaded condi-
tion would not be constant.

The agency believes that a vehicle attitude
specification should be adopted. The purpose of the
requirement is to ensure that a vehicle's attitude dur-
ing a crash test is not significantly different than the
fully loaded attitude of the vehicle as designed by the
manufacturer. Random placement of any necessary
ballast could have an effect on the test attitude of the
vehicle. If these variables are not controlled, then the
vehicle's test attitude could be affected and potential
test variability increased.

NHTSA does not agree that the use of the Gross
Axle Weight Rating (GAWR) is sufficient to deter-
mine the attitude of a vehicle. The use of GAWR only
defines the maximum load-carrying capacity of each
axle rather than in effect specifying a minimum and
maximum loading as proposed by the agency. In addi-
tion, use of the GAWR may, under certain conditions,
make it necessary to place additional cargo in the
passenger compartment in order to achieve the
GAWR loading. This condition is not desirable for
crash testing, since the passenger compartment
should be used for dummy placement and instrumen-
tation and not ballast cargo. Thus the commenter's
recommendation is not accepted.

The other commenter's recommendations regard-
ing more specific test dummy placement procedures
for the outboard seating positions were already ac-
commodated in the NPRM by the proposed new
SIO.1.1, Driver position placement, and SIO.1.2,
Passenger position placement. Since those proposals
adequately describe dummy placement in these posi-
tions, they are adopted.

NHTSA has evaluated the commenter's other sug-

gestion for placing cargo weight with its center of
gravity coincident with the longitudinal center of the
trunk. The agency does not believe that it is
necessary to determine the center of gravity of the
cargo mass, which would add unnecessary complexity
to the test procedure, but does agree that the cargo
load should be placed so that it is over the longitudinal
center of the trunk. The test procedures have been
amended accordingly.

Open window

One commenter raised a question about the require-
ment in S8.1.5 of Standard No. 208 that the vehicle's
windows are to be closed during the crash test. It said
adjustment of the dummy arm and the automatic
safety belt can be performed only after an automatic
belt is fully in place, which occurs only after the door
is closed. Therefore, the window needs to be open to
allow proper arm and belt placement after the door is
closed.

NHTSA agrees that the need to adjust the slack in
automatic and dynamically-tested manual belts prior
to the crash test may require that the vnndow remain
open. The agency has modified the test procedure to
allow manufacturers the option of having the window
open during the crash test.

Seat back position

One commenter recommended that proposed
S8.1.3, Adjustable seat back plaxieTYient, be modified.
The notice proposed that adjustable seat backs should
be set in their design riding position as measured by
such things as specific latch or seat track detent posi-
tions. The commenter suggested two options. The
first option would be to allow vehicle manufacturers
to specify any means they want to determine the seat
back angle and the resulting dummy torso angle. As
its second option, the commenter recommended that
if the agency decides to adopt the proposal, it should
determine the "torso angle with a H-point machine ac-
cording to SAE J826." The commenter said that
depending on how the torso angle is established, dif-
ferent dummy torso angles could result in substantial
adjustment deviations that can affect seat back place-
ment.

The purpose of the requirement is to position the
seat at the design riding position used by the
manufacturer. The agency agrees with the com-
menter that manufacturers should have the flexibility
to use any method they want to specify the seat back
angle. Thus, the agency has made the necessary
changes to the test procedure.

PART 571; S208-PRE 292

Dummy placement

One commenter made several general comments
about dummy placement. It agreed that positioning is
very important and can have an influence on the out-
come of crash tests. It argued that both the old and
the proposed procedures are complicated and imprac-
tical to use. The commenter claims this sitution will
become more complicated if the Hybrid III is permit-
ted, since the positioning must be carried out within a
narrow temperature range (3°F) for the test dummy
to remain in calibration.

The commenter also believes that the positioning of
the dummy should relate to vehicle type. It said that
the posture and seating position of a vehicle occupant
will not be the same in a van as in a sports car. For ex-
ample, it said it has tried the proposed positioning
procedures and found that they can result in an "un-
natural" position for the dummy in a sports vehicle.
The commenter argued that this "unnatural" position
would then lead to a knee bolster design which would
perform well in a crash test, but would likely not pro-
vide the same protection to a real occupant because of
difference in positioning. The commenter recom-
mended that the old positioning procedure be re-
tained and the new procedure be provided as an op-
tion for those manufacturers whose vehicles cannot
be adequately tested otherwise.

Because consistency in positioning the dummy is re-
quired prior to test, NHTSA believes that a single set
of procedures should apply. As discussed in the April
1985 notice, the agency proposed the new procedures
because of positioning problems identified in the
NCAP testing. Allowing the use of the old positioning
procedures could lead to sources of variability, thus
negating a major objective of the procedures. The
commenter's suggestion is therefore not adopted.
The agency also notes that during its NCAP testing,
which has involved tests of a wide variety of cars (in-
cluding sports cars), trucks and MPV's, NHTSA has
not experienced the "unnatural" seating position
problem cited by the commenter.

Knee pivot bolt head clearance

Two commenters said that the proposal did not
specify the correct distance between the dummy's
knees, as measured by the clearance between the
knee pivot bolt heads. The commenters are correct
that the distance should be 11% inches rather than
the proposed value of 14V2 inches. The agency has
corrected the number in the final rule.

Foot rest

One commenter believes that a driver of cars
equipped with foot rests typically will place his or her
left foot on the foot rest during most driving and
therefore this position should be used to simulate nor-
mal usage. The commenter said that using the foot
rest will minimize variations in the positioning of the
left leg, thus improving the repeatability of the test.
In a discussion with the commenter, the agency has
learned that the type of foot rest the commenter is
referring to is a pedal-like structure where the driver
can place his or her foot.

For vehicles without foot rests, the commenter
recommended the agency use the same provisions for
positioning the left leg of the driver as are used for
the right leg of the passenger. It noted that position-
ing the driver's left leg, as with the passenger's right
leg, can be hampered by wheelwell housing that pro-
jects into the passenger compartment and thus similar
procedures for each of those legs should be used.

NHTSA agrees that in vehicles with foot rests, the
test dummy's left food should be positioned on the
foot rest as long as placing the foot there will not
elevate the test dummy's left leg. As discussed below,
the agency is concerned that foot rests, such as pads
on the wheelwell, that elevate the test dummy's leg
can contribute to test variability. The agency also
agrees that the positioning procedures for the
driver's left leg and the passenger's right leg should
be similar in situations where the wheelwell housing
projects into the passenger compartment and has
made the necessary changes to the test procedure.

Wheelwell

One commenter believes that the wheelwell should
be used to rest the dummy's foot. It said that position-
ing the test dummy's foot there is particularly ap-
propriate if the wheelwell has a design feature, such
as a rubber pad, installed by the manufacturer for this
purpose.

NHTSA disagrees that the dummy's foot should be
rested on the wheelwell housing. The agency is con-
cerned that elevating the test dummy's leg could lead
to test variability by, among other things, making the
test dummy unstable during a crash test. Although
the wheelwell problem is similar to the foot rest prob-
lem, placement of the test dummy's foot on a
separate, pedal-like foot rest can be accomplished
while retaining the heel of the test dummy in a stable
position on the floor. That is not the case with pads
located on the wheelwell.

PART 571; S208-PRE 293

Another commenter also said that the proposed
procedure for positioning the test dummy's legs in
vehicles where the wheelwell projected into the
passenger compartment was unclear as to how the
centerlines of the upper and lower legs should be ad-
justed so that both remain in a vertical longitudinal
plane. In particular, it was concerned that in a vehicle
with a large wheelhousing, it may not be possible to
keep the left foot of the driver test dummy in the ver-
tical longitudinal plane after the right foot has been
positioned. It believes that the procedure should
specify which foot position should be given priority; it
recommended that the position of the right leg be re-
quired to remain in the plane, while bringing the left
leg as close to the vertical longitudinal plane as possi-
ble. The agency agrees that maintaining the inboard
leg of the test dummy in the vertical plane is more
easily accomplished since it will not be blocked by the
wheelwell. The agency has modified the test pro-
cedure to specify that when it is not possible to main-
tain both legs in the vertical longitidinal plane, that
the inboard leg must be kept as close as possible to
the vertical longitudinal plane and the outboard leg
should be placed as close as possible to the vertical
plane.

Lower leg angle

One commenter argued that proposed sections on
lower leg positioning (SIO.1.2.1 (b) and SIO. 1.2.2 (b))
will not result in a constant positioning of the test
dummy's heels on the floor pan, thus causing dif-
ferences in the lower leg angles. It stated that the
lower leg angles will affect the femur load generated
at the moment the foot hits the toe board during a col-
lision. The commenter therefore proposed that the
test procedure be revised to include placing a 20
pound load on the test dummy's knee during the foot
positioning procedure. The commenter did not,
however, explain the basis for choosing a force of 20
pounds.

NHTSA believes that use of the additional weight
loading and settling procedure proposed by the com-
menter will add an unnecessary level of complexity to
the test procedure vnthout adding any corresponding
benefit. The positioning of the test dummy's heel has
not been a problem in the agency's NCAP tests. Ac-
cordingly, the agency is not adopting the
commenter's recommendation.

Shoulder adjustment

One commenter asked the agency to specify that
the shoulders of the test dummy be placed at their

lowest adjustment position. While the shoulders are
slightly adjustable, the agency believes that specifying
an adjustment position is unnecessary. The agency's
test experience has shown that the up and down move-
ment of the shoulders is physically limited by the test
dummy's rubber "skin" around the openings where the
arms are connected to the test dummy's upper torso.

Dummy lifting procedure

One commenter was concerned about the dummy
lifting proposed in (Section SlO.4.1, Dummy Vertical
Upward Displacement). It said that if the dummy lift-
ing method is not standardized, test results could be
affected by allowing variability in the position of the
dummy's H point (the H point essentially represents
the hip joint) through use of different lifting methods.
It recommended use of a different chest lifting
method to avoid variability in the subsequent posi-
tioning of the test dummy H-point.

The agency is not aware of any test data indicating
that the use of different lifting methods is a signifi-
cant source of variability. As long as a manufacturer
follows the procedures set forth in SlO.4.1 in position-
ing the test dummy, it can use any lifting procedure it
wants.

Dummy settling load

One commenter was concerned about the proposed
requirements for dummy settling (SlO.4.2, Lower tor-
so force application, and SIO. 4. 5, Upper torso force
application). The commenter believes that the pro-
posals are inadequate because they do not prescribe
the area over which to apply the load used to settle
the test dummy in the seat. The commenter said that
if the proposed 50 pound settling force is applied to an
extremely small contact area, then the dummy may
be deformed. It recommended that the load be applied
to a specified area of 9 square inches on the dummy.
In addition, it recommended that the agency specify
the duration of the 50 lb. force application during the
adjustment of the upper torso; it suggested a period
of load application ranging from 5 to 10 seconds.

NHTSA and others have successfully used the pro-
posed settling test procedures in their own tests
without having any variability problems. Unless ab-
normally small contact areas are employed, or ex-
tremely short durations are used, standard
laboratory practices should not result in any such
problems. The agency believes that further specifying
the area and timing of the force application is not
necessary.

PART 571; S208-PRE 294

Dummy head adjustment

One commenter pointed out that it is impossible to
adjust the head according to SlO.6. Head Adjust-
ment, because the Part 572 test dummy does not have
a head adjustment mechanism. The agency agrees
and has deleted the provision.

Additional dummy settling and shoulder belt posi-
tioning procedures

One commenter suggested a substantial revised
dummy settling procedure and new procedures for
positioning of the shoulder belt. NHTSA believes that
its proposed procedures sufficiently address the set-
tling and belt position issues. In addition, the com-
menter did not provide any data to show that
variability would be further reduced by its suggested
procedures. A substantial amount of testing would be
needed to verify if the commenter's suggested test
procedures do, in fact, provide any further decrease
in variability than that obtained by the agency's test
procedures. For those reasons, the agency is not
adopting the commenter's suggestions for new pro-
cedures.

D%ie Care

In the April 1985 notice, the agency proposed
amending the standard to state that the due care pro-
vision of section 108(bX2) of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(bX2)) ap-
plies to compliance with the standard. Thus, a vehicle
would not be deemed in noncompliance if its manufac-
turer establishes that it did not have reason to know
in the exercise of due care that such vehicle is not in
conformity with the standard.

Commenters raised a number of questions about
the proposal, with some saying that the agency
needed to clarify what constitutes "due care," others
recommending that the agency reconsider the use of
"design to conform" language instead of due care and
another opposing the use of any due care provision.

A number of commenters, while supporting the use
of a due care provision, said that the proposal pro-
vides no assurance that a manufacturer's good faith
effort will be considered due care. They said that the
agency should identify the level of testing and
analysis necessary to constitute due care. Another
commenter emphasized that in defining due care, the
agency must ensure that a manufacturer uses
recognized statistical procedures in determining that
its products comply with the requirements of the
standard.

Another group of commenters requested the agen-
cy to reconsider its decision not to use "design to con-
form" language in the standard; they said that the
agency's concerns about the subjectivity of a "design
to conform" language are not greater and could well
be less than that resulting from use of due care
language.

One commenter opposed the use of any due care
language in the standard. It argued that the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act requires the
agency to set objective performance requirements in
its standards. When a manufacturer determines that
it has not met those performance requirements, then
the manufacturer is under an obligation to notify
owners and remedy the noncom.plying vehicles. It
argued that the proposed due care provision, in ef-
fect, provides manufacturers with an exemption from
the Vehicle Safety Act recall provisions.

As discussed in the July 1984 final rule and the
April 1985 notice, the agency believes that the test
procedure of Standard No. 208 produces repeatable
results in vehicle crash tests. The agency does,
however, recognize that the Standard No. 208 test is
more complicated than NHTSA's other crash test
standards since a number of different injury
measurements must be made on the two test dum-
mies used in the testing. Because of this complexity,
the agency believes that manufacturers need
assurance from the agency that, if they have made a
good faith effort in designing their vehicles and have
instituted adequate quality control measures, they
will not face the recall of their vehicles because of an
isolated apparent failure to meet one of the injury
criteria. The adoption of a due care provision provides
that assurance. For the reasons discussed in the July
1984 final rules, the agency still believes use of a due
care provision is a better approach to this issue than
use of a design to conform provision.

As the agency has emphasized in its prior inter-
pretation letters, a determination of what constitutes
due care can only be made on a case-by-case basis.
Whether a manufacturer's action will constitute due
care will depend, in part, upon the availability of test
equipment, the limitations of available technology,
and above all, the diligence evidenced by the
manufacturer.

Adoption of a due care defense is in line with the
agency's long-standing and well-known enforcement
policy on test differences. Under this long standing
practice if the agency's testing shows noncompliance
and a manufacturer's tests, valid on their face, show
complying results, the agency will conduct an inquiry
into the reason for the differing results. If the agency

PART 571; S208- PRE 295

concludes that the difference in results can be ex-
plained to the agency's satisfaction, that the agency's
results do not indicate an unreasonable risk to safety,
and that the manufacturer's tests were reasonably
conducted and were in conformity with standard,
then the agency does not use its own tests as a basis
for a finding of noncompliance. Although this inter-
pretation has long been a matter of public record,
Congress, in subsequent amendments of the Vehicle
Safety Act, has not acted to alter that interpretation.
The Supreme Court has said that under those cir-
cumstances, it can be presumed that the agency's in-
terpretation has correctly followed the intent of the
statute. (See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S.
544, 544 n. 10 (1979))

Phase-In

Attribution rules

With respect to cars manufacturered by two or
more companies, and cars manufactured by one com-
pany and imported by another, the April 1985 notice
proposed to clarify who would be considered the
manufacturer for purposes of calculating the average
annual production of passenger cars for each
manufacturer and the amount of passenger cars
manufacturered by each manufacturer that must
comply with the automatic restraint phase-in re-
quirements. In order to provide maximum flexibility
to manufacturers, while assuring that the percentage
phase-in goals are met, the notice proposed to permit
manufacturers to determine, by contract, which of
them will count, as its own, passenger cars manufac-
tured by two or more companies or cars manufac-
tured by one company and imported by another.

The notice also proposed two rules of attribution in
the absence of such a contract. First, a passenger car
which is imported for purposes of resale would be at-
tributed to the importer. The agency intended that
this proposed attribution rule would apply to both
direct importers as well as importers authorized by
the vehicle's original manufacturer. (In this context,
direct importation refers to the importation of cars
which are originally manufactured for sale outside
the U.S. and which are then imported without the
manufacturer's authorization into the U.S. by an im-
porter for purposes of resale. The Vehicle Safety Act
requires that such vehicles be brought into conformi-
ty with Federal motor vehicle safety standards.)
Under the second proposed attribution rule, a
passenger car manufactured in the United States by
more than one manufacturer, one of which also

markets the vehicle, would be attributed to the
manufacturer which markets the vehicle.

These two proposed rules would generally attribute
a vehicle to the manufacturer which is most responsi-
ble for the existence of the vehicle in the United
States, i.e., by importing the vehicle or by manufac-
turing the vehicle for its own account as part of a joint
venture, and marketing the vehicle. (Importers
generally market the vehicles they import.) All com-
menters on these proposals supported giving
manufacturers the flexibility to determine contrac-
tually which manufacturer would count the passenger
car as its own. The commenters also supported the
proposed attribution rules. Therefore, the agency is
adopting the provisions as proposed.

Credit for early phase-In

The April 1985 notice proposed that manufacturers
that exceeded the minimum percentage phase-in re-
quirements in the first or second years could count
those extra vehicles toward meeting the re-
quirements in the second or third years. In addition,
manufacturers could also count any automatic
restraint vehicles produced during the one year
preceding the first year of the phase-in. Since all the
commenters addressing these proposals supported
them, the agency is adopting them as proposed. The
agency believes that providing credit for early in-
troduction will encourage introduction of larger
numbers of automatic restraints and provide in-
creased flexibility for manufacturers. In addition, it
will assure an orderly build-up of production capabili-
ty for automatic restraint equipped cars as con-
templated by the July 1984 final rule.

One commenter asked the agency to establish a
new credit for vehicles equipped with non-belt
automatic restraints at the driver's position and a
dynamically-tested manual belt at the passenger posi-
tion. The commenter requested that such a vehicle
receive a 1.0 credit. The commenter also asked the
agency to allow vehicles equipped with driver-only
automatic restraint systems to be manufactured after
September 1, 1989, the effective date for automatic
restraints for the driver and front right passenger
seating positions in all passenger cars. In its August
30, 1985 notice (50 FR 35233) responding to petitions
for reconsideration of the July 1984 final rule on
Standard No. 208, the agency has already adopted a
part of the commenter's suggestion by establishing a
1.0 vehicle credit for vehicles equipped with a non-
belt automatic restraint at the driver's position and a
manual lap/shoulder belt at the passenger's position.
For reasons detailed in the July 1984 final rule, the

PART 571; S208-PRE 296

agency believes that the automatic restraint require-
ment should apply to both front outboard seating
positions beginning on September 1, 1989, and is
therefore not adopting the commenter's second sug-
gestion.

Phase-In Reporting Requirements

The April 1985 notice proposed to establish a new
Part 585, Automatic Restraint Phase-in Reporting
Requirements. The agency proposed requiring
manufacturers to submit three reports to NHTSA,
one for each of the three automatic restraint phase-in
periods. Each report, covering production during a
12-month period beginning September 1 and ending
August 31, would be required to be submitted within
60 days after the end of such period. Information re-
quired by each report would include a statement
regarding the extent to which the manufacturer had
complied with the applicable percentage phase-in re-
quirement of Standard No. 208 for the period covered
by the report; the number of passenger cars manufac-
tured for sale in the United States for each of the
three previous 12-month production periods; the ac-
tual number of passenger cars manufactured during
the reporting production (or during a previous pro-
duction period and counted toward compliance in the
reporting production period) period with automatic
safety belts, air bags and other specified forms of
automatic restraint technology, respectively; and
brief information about any express written contracts
which concern passenger cars produced by more than
one manufacturer and affect the report.

One commenter questioned the need for a reporting
requirement, saying that the requirement was un-
necessary since manufacturers must self-certify that
their vehicles meet Standard No. 208. The agency
believes that a reporting requirement is needed for
the limited period of the phase-in of automatic
restraints so that the agency can carry out its
statutory duty to monitor compliance with the
Federal motor vehicle safety standards. During the
phase-in, only a certain percentage of vehicles are re-
quired to have automatic restraints. It would be vir-
tually impossible for the agency to determine if the
applicable percentage of passenger cars has been
equipped with automatic restraints unless manufac-
turers provide certain production information to the
agency. NHTSA is therefore adopting the reporting
requirement.

The same commenter said that requiring the report
to be due 60 days after the end of the production year
can be a problem for importers. The commenter said

that production records may accompany the vehicle,
which may not actually reach the United States until
30 or 45 days after the production year ends. The
commenter asked the agency to provide an appeal
process to seek an extension of the period to file the
report. The agency believes that the example
presented by the commenter represents a worst case
situation and complying with the 60 day requirement
should not be a problem for manufacturers, including
importers. However, to eliminate any problems in
worst case situations, the agency is amending the
regulation to provide that manufacturers seeking an
extension of the deadline to file a report must file a
request for an extension at least 15 days before the
report is due.

Calculation of average annual production

The agency also proposed an alternative to the re-
quirement that the number of cars that must be
equipped with automatic restraints must be based on
a percentage of each manufacturer's average annual
production for the past three model years. The pro-
posed alternative would permit manufacturers to
equip the required percentage of its actual production
of passenger cars with automatic restraints during
each affected year. Since all commenters addressing
this proposal supported it, the agency is adopting it as
an alternative means of compliance, at the manufac-
turer's option. In the case of a new manufacturer, the
manufacturer would have to calculate the amount of
passenger cars required to have automatic restraints
based on its production of passenger cars during each
of the affected years. Since the agency has decided to
adopt the alternative basis for determining the pro-
duction quota, it has made the necessary conforming
changes in the reporting requirements adopted in this
notice.

One commenter also requested the agency to clarify
whether a manufacturer does have to include its pro-
duction volume of convertibles when it is calculating
the percentage of vehicles that must meet the phase-
in requirement. The automatic restraint requirement
applies to all passenger cars. Thus, a manufacturer's
production figures for passenger car convertibles
must be counted when the manufacturer is
calculating its phase-in requirements.

Retention of VINs

In order to keep administrative burdens to a
minimum, the agency proposed that the required
report need not use the VIN to identify the particular
type of automatic restraint installed in each

PART 571; S208-PRE 297

passenger car produced during the phase-in period.
Since that information could be necessary for pur-
poses of enforcement, however, the agency proposed
to require that manufacturers maintain records until
December 31, 1991, of the VIN and type of automatic
restraint for each passenger car which is produced
during the phase-in period and is reported as having
automatic restraints. Although direct import cars are
not required to have a US-format VIN number, those
cars would still have a European-format VIN number
and thus direct importers would be required to retain
that VIN information. (The agency is considering a
petition from Volkswagen requesting that direct im-
port cars be required to have US-format VINs.)

The reason for retaining the information until 1991
is to ensure that such information would then be
available until the completion of any agency enforce-
ment action begun after the final phase-in report is
filed in 1990. The agency believes this requirement
meets the needs of the agency, with minimal impacts
on manufacturers, and therefore is adopting it as pro-
posed. One commenter asked whether a manufac-
turer is required to keep the VIN information as a
separate file or whether keeping the information as a
part of its general business records is sufficient. As
long as the VIN information is retrievable, it may be
stored in any manner that is convenient for a
manufacturer.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR Part
571.208 is amended as follows:

The authority citation for Part 571 would continue
to read as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1403, 1407;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

1. Section S4. 1.3. 1.2 is revised to read as follows:

S4.1.3.1.2 Subject to S4.1.3.4 and S4.1.5, the
amount of passenger cars, specified in S4. 1.3. 1.1
complying with the requirements of S4. 1.2.1 shall be
not less than 10 percent of:

(a) the average annual production of passenger
cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1983,
and before September 1, 1986, by each manufacturer,
or

(b) the manufacturer's annual production of pas-
senger cars during the period specified in S4. 1.3. 1.1.

2'. Section 4.1.3.2.2 is revised to read as follows:
S4. 1.3.2.2 Subject to S4.1.3.4 and S4.1.5, the
amount of passenger cars specified in S4. 1.3.2.1 com-
plying with the requirements of S4. 1.2.1 shall be not
less than 25 percent of:

(a) the average annual production of passenger
cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1984,

and before September 1, 1987, by each manufacturer,
or

(b) the manufacturer's annual production of pas-
senger cars during the period specified in S4. 1.3.2.1.

3. Section 4.1.3.3.2 is revised to read as follows:
S4. 1.3.3. 2 Subject to S4. 1.3.4 and S4.1.5, the

amount of passenger cars specified in S4. 1.3.3.1 com-
plying with the requirements of S4. 1.2.1 shall not be
less than 40 percent of:

(a) the average annual production of passenger
cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985,
and before September 1, 1988, by each manufacturer
or

(b) the manufacturer's annual production of pas-
senger cars during the period specified in S4. 1.3.3.1.

4. Section S4. 1.3.4 is revised to read as follows:
S4. 1.3.4 Calculation of complying passenger cars.

(a) For the purposes of calculating the numbers of
cars manufactured under S4. 1.3. 1.2, S4. 1.3.2.2, or
S4. 1.3.3.2 to comply with S4. 1.2.1:

(1) each car whose driver's seating position com-
plies with the requirements of S4. 1.2. 1(a) by means
not including any type of seat belt and whose front
right seating position will comply with the re-
quirements of S4. 1.2. 1(a) by any means is counted as
1.5 vehicles, and

(2) each car whose driver's seating position com-
plies with the requirements of S4. 1.2. 1(a) by means
not including any type of seat belt and whose right
front seat seating position is equipped with a manual
Type 2 seat belt is counted as one vehicle.

(b) For the purposes of complying with S4. 1.3. 1.2,
a passenger car may be counted if it:

(1) is manufactured on or after September 1, 1985,
but before September 1, 1986, and

(2) complies with S4. 1.2.1.

(c) For the purposes of complying with S4. 1.3. 2.2,
a passenger car may be counted if it:

(1) is manufactured on or after September 1, 1985,
but before September 1, 1987,

(2) compHes with S4. 1.2.1, and

(3) is not counted toward compliance with
S4.1.3.1.2

(d) For the purposes of complying with S4. 1.3.3.2,
a passenger car may be counted if it:

(1) is manufactured on or after September 1, 1985,
but before September 1, 1988,

(2) complies with S4. 1.2.1, and

(3) is not counted toward compliance with
S4.1.3.1.2 or S4.1.3.2.2.

PART 571; S208-PRE 298

5. A new section S4.1.3.5 is added to read as follows:
S4. 1.3.5 Passenger cars produced by more than one

manufacturer.

54. 1.3. 5.1 For the purposes of calculating average
annual production of passenger cars for each
manufacturer and the amount of passenger cars
manufactured by each manufacturer under
S4. 1.3. 1.2, S4.1.3.2.2 or S4. 1.3.3.2, a passenger car
produced by more than one manufacturer shall be at-
tributed to a single manufacturer as follows, subject
to S4. 1.3.5.2:

(a) A passenger car which is imported shall be at-
tributed to the importer.

(b) A passenger car manufactured in the United
States by more than one manufacturer, one of which
also markets the vehicle, shall be attributed to the
manufacturer which markets the vehicle.

54. 1.3.5.2 A passenger car produced by more than
one manufacturer shall be attributed to any one of the
vehicle's manufacturers specified by an express writ-
ten contract, reported to the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration under 49 CFR Part 585,
between the manufacturer so specified and the
manufacturer to which the vehicle would otherwise be
attributed under S4. 1.3. 5.1.

6. A new section S4.6 is added to read as follows:
S4.6 Dynamic testing of manual belt systems.

54.6.1 If the automatic restraint requirement of
S4.1.4 is rescinded pursuant to S4.1.5, then each
passenger car that is manufactured after September
1, 1989, and is equipped with a Type 2 manual seat
belt assembly at each front outboard designated
seating position pursuant to S4.1.2.3 shall meet the
frontal crash protection requirements of S5.1 at those
designated seating positions with a test dummy
restrained by a Type 2 seat belt assembly that has
been adjusted in accordance with S7.4.2.

54.6.2 A Type 2 seat belt assembly subject to the re-
quirements of S4.6.1 of this standard does not have to
meet the requirements of S4.2(a)-(c) and S4.4 of
Standard No. 209 (49 CFR 571.209) of this Part.

7. 87.4.2 is revised to read as follows:

S7.4.2 Webbing tension relieving device. Each vehi-
cle with an automatic seat belt assembly or with a
Type 2 manual seat belt assembly that must meet
S4.6 installed in a front outboard designated seating
position that has either manual or automatic devices
permitting the introduction of slack in the webbing of
the shoulder belt (e.g., "comfort clips" or "window-
shade" devices) shall:

(a) comply with the requirements of S5.1 with the
shoulder belt webbing adjusted to introduce the max-
imum amount of slack recommended by the manufac-
turer pursuant to S7.4.2.(b);

(b) have a section in the vehicle owner's manual that
explains how the tension-relieving device works and
specifies the maximum amount of slack (in inches)
recommended by the vehicle manufacturer to be in-
troduced into the shoulder belt under normal use con-
ditions. The explanation shall also warn that in-
troducing slack beyond the amount specified by the
manufacturer can significantly reduce the effec-
tiveness of the shoulder belt in a crash; and

(c) have an automatic means to cancel any shoulder
belt slack introduced into the belt system by a
tension-relieving device each time the safety belt is
unbuckled or the adjacent vehicle door is opened, ex-
cept that open-body vehicles with no doors can have a
manual means to cancel any shoulder belt slack in-
troduced into the belt system by a tension-relieving
device.

8. Section 8.1.1(c) is revised to read as follows:
S8. 1 . 1(c) Fuel system capacity. With the test vehicle

on a level surface, pump the fuel from the vehicle's
fuel tank and then operate the engine until it stops.
Then, add Stoddard solvent to the test vehicle's fuel
tank in an amount which is equal to not less than 92
and not more than 94 percent of the fuel tank's usable
capacity stated by the vehicle's manufacturer. In ad-
dition, add the amount of Stoddard solvent needed to
fill the entire fuel system from the fuel tank through
the engine's induction system.

9. A new section 8.1.1(d) is added to read as follows:
S8. 1.1(d) Vehicle test attitude. Determine the

distance between a level surface and a standard
reference point on the test vehicle's body, directly
above each wheel opening, when the vehicle is in its
"as delivered" condition. The "as delivered" condition
is the vehicle as received at the test site, with 100 per-
cent of all fluid capacities and all tires inflated to the
manufacturer's specifications as listed on the vehicle's
tire placard. Determine the distance between the
same level surface and the same standard reference
points in the vehicle's "fully loaded condition". The
"fully loaded condition" is the test vehicle loaded in ac-
cordance with S8. 1.1(a) or (b), as applicable. The load
placed in the cargo area shall be centered over the
longitudinal centerline of the vehicle. The pretest
vehicle attitude shall be equal to either the as
delivered or fully loaded attitude or between the as
delivered attitude and the fully loaded attitude.

10. S7.4.3 is revised by removing the reference to
"S10.6" and replacing it with a reference to "S10.7."

11. S7.4.4 is revised by removing the reference to
"S10.5" and replacing it with a reference to "S10.6."

12. S7.4.5 is revised by removing the reference to
"SB. 1.11" and replacing it with a reference to "SIO."

PART 571; S208-PRE 299

13. Section 8.1.3 is revised to read as follows:
S8.1.3 Adjustable seat back placement. Place ad-
justable seat backs in the manufacturer's nominal
design riding position in the manner specified by the
manufacturer. Place each adjustable head restraint in
its highest adjustment position.

14. Sections 8.1.11 through 8.1.11.2.3 are removed.

15. Sections 8.1.12 and 8.1.13 are redesignated
8.1.11 and 8.1.12, respectively.

16. Section 10 is revised to read as follows:

SIO Test dummy positioning procedures. Position a
test dummy, conforming to Subpart B of Part 572 (49
CFR Part 572), in each front outboard seating posi-
tion of a vehicle as specified in SlO.l through SIO. 9.
Each test dummy is:

(a) not restrained during an impact by any means
that require occupant action if the vehicle is equipped
with automatic restraints.

(b) restrained by manual Type 2 safety belts, ad-
justed in accordance with SIO. 9, if the vehicle is
equipped with manual safety belts in the front out-
board seating positions.

SlO.l Vehicle equipped with front bucket seats.
Place the test dummy's torso against the seat back
and its upper legs against the seat cushion to the ex-
tent permitted by placement of the test dummy's feet
in accordance with the appropriate paragraph of SIO.
Center the test dummy on the seat cushion of the
bucket seat and set its midsagittal plane so that it is
vertical and parallel to the centerline of the vehicle.

SIO. 1.1 Driver position placem,ent.

(a) Initially set the knees of the test dummy IPA
inches apart, measured between the outer surfaces of
the knee pivot bolt heads, with the left outer surface
5.9 inches from the midsagittal plane of the test dum-
my.

(b) Rest the right foot of the test dummy on the
undepressed accelerator pedal with the rearmost
point of the heel on the floor pan in the plane of the
pedal. If the foot cannot be placed on the accelerator
pedal, set it perpendicular to the lower leg and place
it as far forward as possible in the direction of the
geometric center of the pedal with the rearmost point
of the heel resting on the floor pan. Except as
prevented by contact with a vehicle surface, place the
right leg so that the upper and lower leg centerlines
fall, as close as possible, in a vertical longitudinal
plane without inducing torso movement.

(c) Place the left foot on the toeboard with the rear-
most point of the heel resting on the floor pan as close
as possible to the point of intersection of the planes
described by the toeboard and the floor pan. If the
foot cannot be positioned on the toeboard, set it

perpendicular to the lower leg and place it as far for-
ward as possible with the heel resting on the floor
pan. Except as prevented by contact with a vehicle
surface, place the left leg so that the upper and lower
leg centerlines fall, as close as possible, in a vertical
plane. For vehicles with a foot rest that does not
elevate the left foot above the level of the right foot,
place the left foot on the foot rest so that the upper
and lower leg centerlines fall in a vertical plane.

SlO.1.2 Passenger position placement.

SIO. 1.2.1 Vehicles with a flat floor pan/toeboard.

(a) Initially set the knees IPA inches apart,
measured between the outer surfaces of the knee
pivot bolt heads.

(b) Place the right and left feet on the vehicle's
toeboard with the heels resting on the floor pan as
close as possible to the intersection point with the
toeboard. If the feet cannot be placed flat on the
toeboard, set them perpendicular to the lower leg
centerlines and place them as far forward as possible
with the heels resting on the floor pan.

(c) Place the right and left legs so that the upper
and lower leg centerlines fall in vertical longitudinal
planes.

Si 0.1. 2. 2 Vehicles with wheelhou^e projections in
passenger compartment.

(a) Initially set the knees 11% inches apart,
measured between outer surfaces of the knee pivot
bolt heads.

(b) Place the right and left feet in the well of the
floor pan/toeboard and not on the wheelhouse projec-
tion. If the feet cannot be placed flat on the toeboard,
set them perpendicular to the lower leg centerlines
and as far forward as possible with the heels resting
on the floor pan.

(c) If it is not possible to maintain vertical and
longitudinal planes through the upper and lower leg
centerlines for each leg, then place the left leg so that
its upper and lower centerlines fall, as closely as
possible, in a vertical longitudinal plane and place the
right leg so that its upper and lower leg centerlines
fall, as closely as possible, in a vertical plane.

SIO. 2 Vehicle equipped with bench seating. Place a
test dummy with its torso against the seat back and
its upper legs against the seat cushion, to the extent
permitted by placement of the test dummy's feet in
accordance with the appropriate paragraph of SlO.l.

SIO. 2.1 Driver position placement. Place the test
dummy at the left front outboard designated seating
position so that its midsagittal plane is vertical and
parallel to the centerline of the vehicle and so that the
midsagittal plane of the test dummy passes through
the center of the steering wheel rim. Place the legs,

PART 571; S208-PRE 300

knees, and feet of the test dummy as specified in
SIO.1.1.

SlO.2.2 Passenger position placement. Place the
test dummy at the right front outboard designated
seating position as specified in S 10. 1.2, except that
the midsagittal plane of the test dummy shall be ver-
tical and longitudinal, and the same distance from the
vehicle's longitudinal centerline as the midsagittal
plane of the test dummy at the driver's position.

510.3 Initial test dummy placement. With the test
dummy at its designated seating position as specified
by the appropriate requirements of SlO.l or S10.2,
place the upper arms against the seat back and
tangent to the side of the upper torso. Place the lower
arms and palms against the outside of the upper legs.

510.4 Test dummy settling.

SlO.4.1 Test dummy vertical upward displacement.
Slowly lift the test dummy parallel to the seat back
plane until the test dummy's buttocks no longer con-
tact the seat cushion or until there is test dummy
head contact with the vehicle's headlining.

Si 0.4. 2 Lower torso force application. Using a test
dummy positioning fixture, apply a rearward force of
50 pounds through the center of the rigid surface
against the test dummy's lower torso in a horizontal
direction. The line of force application shall be 6V2 in-
ches above the bottom surface of the test dummy's but-
tocks. The 50 pound force shall be maintained with the
rigid fixture applying reaction forces to either the floor
pan/toeboard, the 'A' post, or the vehicle's seat frame.

S 10.4.3 Test dummy vertical downward displace-
ment. While maintaining the contact of the horizontal
rearward force positioning fixture with the test dum-
my's lower torso, remove as much of the 50 pound
force as necessary to allow the test dummy to return
downward to the seat cushion by its own weight.

510.4.4 Test dummy upper torso rocking. Without
totally removing the horizontal rearward force being
applied to the test dummy's lower torso, apply a
horizontal forward force to the test dummy's
shoulders sufficient to flex the upper torso forward
until its back no longer contacts the seat back. Rock
the test dummy from side to side 3 or 4 times so that
the test dummy's spine is at any angle from the ver-
tical in the 14 to 16 degree range at the extremes of
each rocking movement.

510.4.5 Upper torso force application. With the test
dummy's midsagittal plane vertical, push the upper
torso against the seat back with a force of 50 pounds
applied in a horizontal rearward direction along a line
that is coincident with the test dummy's midsagittal
plane and 18 inches above the bottom surface of the
test dummy's buttocks.

510.5 Placement of test dummy arms and hands.
With the test dummy positioned as specified by S10.3
and without inducing torso movement, place the
arms, elbows, and hands of the test dummy, as ap-
propriate for each designated seating position in ac-
cordance with S 10.3.1 or S 10.3.2. Following place-
ment of the arms, elbows and hands, remove the force
applied against the lower half of the torso.

510.5.1 Driver's position. Move the upper and the
lower arms of the test dummy at the driver's position
to their fully outstretched position in the lowest possi-
ble orientation. Push each arm rearward, permitting
bending at the elbow, until the palm of each hand con-
tacts the outer part of the rim of the steering wheel at
its horizontal centerline. Place the test dummy's
thumbs over the steering wheel rim and position the
upper and lower arm centerlines as close as possible
in a vertical plane without inducing torso movement.

510.5.2 Passenger position. Move the upper and the
lower arms of the test dummy at the passenger posi-
tion to fully outstretched position in the lowest possi-
ble orientation. Push each arm rearward, permitting
bending at the elbow, until the upper arm contacts
the seat back and is tangent to the upper part of the
side of the torso, the palm contacts the outside of the
thigh, and the little finger is barely in contact with the
seat cushion.

510.6 Test dummy positioning for latchplate access.
The reach envelopes specified in S7.4.4 are obtained
by positioning a test dummy in the driver's seat or
passenger's seat in its forwardmost adjustment posi-
tion. Attach the lines for the inboard and outboard
arms to the test dummy as described in Figure 3 of
this standard. Extend each line backward and out-
board to generate the compliance arcs of the outboard
reach envelope of the test dummy's arms.

510.7 Test dummy positioning for belt contact force.
To determine compliance with S7.4.3 of this stand-
ard, position the test dummy in the vehicle in accord-
ance with the appropriate requirements specified in
SlO.l or S10.2 and under the conditions of S8.1.2 and
SB. 1.3. Pull the belt webbing three inches from the
test dummy's chest and release until the webbing is
within 1 inch of the test dummy's chest and measure
the belt contact force.

SlO.9 Manual belt adjustment for dynamic testing.
With the test dummy at its designated seating posi-
tion as specified by the appropriate requirements of
S8.1.2, S8.1.3 and SlO.l through S10.5, place the
Type 2 manual belt around the test dummy and fasten
the latch. Remove all slack from the lap belt. Pull the
upper torso webbing out of the retractor and allow it
to retract; repeat this operation four times. Apply a 2

PART 571; S208-PRE 301

to 4 pound tension load to the lap belt. If the belt
system is equipped with a tension-relieving device in-
troduce the maximum amount of slack into the upper
torso belt that is recommended by the manufacturer
for normal use in the owner's manual for the vehicle. If
the belt system is not equipped with a tension relieving
device, allow the excess webbing in the shoulder belt to
be retracted by the retractive force of the retractor.

17. Sll is removed.

18. S4.1.3.1.1, S4.1.3.2.1, S4.1.3.3.1, S4.1.4 and
S4.6.1 are revised by adding a new second sentence to
S4. 1.3.1.1, S4.1.3.2.1, S4. 1.3.3.1 and S4.1.4 and a
new second sentence to S4.6.1 to read as follows:

A vehicle shall not be deemed to be in non-
compliance with this standard if its manufacturer
establishes that it did not have reason to know in the
exercise of due care that such vehicle is not in con-
formity with the requirement of this standard.

19. S8.1.5 is amended to read as follows:
Movable vehicle windows and vents are, at the

manufacturer's option, placed in the fully closed posi-
tion.

20. S7.4 is amended to read as follows:
S7.4. Seat belt comfort and convenience.

(a) Automatic seat belts. Automatic seat belts in-
stalled in any vehicle, other than walk-in van-type
vehicles, which has a gross vehicle weight rating of
10,000 pounds or less, and which is manufactured on
or after September 1, 1986, shall meet the re-
quirements of S7.4.1, S7.4.2, and S7.4.3.

(b) Manual seat belts.

(1) Vehicles manufactured after September 1.
1986. Manual seat belts installed in any vehicle, other
than manual Type 2 belt systems installed in the front
outboard seating positions in passenger cars or
manual belts in walk-in van-type vehicles, which have
a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less,
shall meet the requirements of S7.4.3, S7.4.4, S7.4.5,
and S7.4.6.

(2) Vehicles manufactured after September 1. 1989.

(i) If the automatic restraint requirement of S4.1.4
is rescinded pursuant to S4.1.5, then manual seat
belts installed in a passenger car shall meet the re-
quirements of S7. 1.1.3(a), S7.4.2, S7.4.3, S7.4.4,
S7.4.5, and S7.4.6.

(ii) Manual seat belts installed in a bus, multipur-
pose passenger vehicle and truck with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less, except for
walk-in van-type vehicles, shall meet the re-
quirements of S7.4.3, S7.4.4, S7.4.5, and S7.4.6.

571.209 Standard ko. 209, Seat belt assemblies.

1. A new S4.6 is added, to read as follows:

S4.6 Manual belts subject to crash protection re-
quirements of Standard No. 208.

(a) A seat belt assembly subject to the requirements
of S4.6.1 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR Part 571.208)
does not have to meet the requirements of S4.2 (a)-(c)
and S4.4 of this standard.

(b) A seat belt assembly that does not comply with
the requirements of S4.4 of this standard shall be per-
manently and legibly marked or labeled with the
following language:

This seat belt assembly may only be installed at a
front outboard designated seating position of a vehi-
cle with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000
pounds or less.

571.210 Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly An-
chorages.

1. The second sentence of S4.3 is revised to read as
follows:

Anchorages for automatic and for dynamically
tested seat belt assemblies that meet the frontal crash
protection requirement of S5.1 of Standard No. 208
(49 CFR Part 571.208) are exempt from the location
requirements of this section.

PART 585 -AUTOMATIC RESTRAINT PHASE-
IN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

1. Chapter V, Title 49, Transportation, the Code of
Federal Regulations, is amended to add the following
new Part:

PART 585 -AUTOMATIC RESTRAINT PHASE-
IN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Sees.

585.1 Scope.

585.2 Purpose.

585.3 Applicability.

585.4 Definitions.

585.5 Reporting requirements.

585.6 Records.

585.7 Petition to extend period to file report.

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407; delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

585.1 Scope.

This section establishes requirements for passenger
car manufacturers to submit a report, and maintain
records related to the report, concerning the number
of passenger cars equipped with automatic restraints
in compliance with the requirements of S4.1.3 of
Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49
CFR Part 571.208).

585.2 Purpose.

The purpose of the reporting requirements is to aid
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
in determining whether a passenger car manufac-

PART 571; S208-PRE 302

turer has complied with the requirements of Standard
No. 208 of this Chapter (49 CFR 571.208) for the in-
stallation of automatic restraints in a percentage of
each manufacturer's annual passenger car produc-
tion.

585.3 Applicability.

This part applies to manufacturers of passenger
cars.

585.4 Definitions.

All terms defined in section 102 of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C.
1391) are used in their statutory meaning.

"Passenger car" is used as defined in 49 CFR Part
571.3.

"Production year" means the 12-month period be-
tween September 1 of one year and August 31 of the
following year, inclusive.

585.5 Reporting requirements.

(a) General reporting requirements.

Within 60 days after the end of each of the produc-
tion years ending August 31, 1987, August 31, 1988,
and August 31, 1989, each manufacturer shall submit
a report to the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration concerning its compliance with the re-
quirements of Standard No. 208 for installation of
automatic restraints in its passenger cars produced in
that year. Each report shall -

(1) Identify the manufacturer;

(2) State the full name, title and address of the of-
ficial responsible for preparing the report;

(3) Identify the production year being reported on;

(4) Contain a statement regarding the extent to
which the manufacturer has complied with the re-
quirements of S4.1.3 of Standard No. 208;

(5) Provide the information specified in 585.5(b);

(6) Be written in the English language; and

(7) Be submitted to: Administrator, National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh
Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

(b) Report content.

(1) Basis for phase-in production goals.

Each manufacturer shall provide the number of
passenger cars manufactured for sale in the United
States for each of the three previous production
years, or, at the manufacturer's option, for the cur-
rent production year. A new manufacturer that is, for
the first time, manufacturing passenger cars for sale
in the United States must report the number of
passenger cars manufactured during the current pro-
duction year.

(2) Production.

Each manufacturer shall report for the production
year being reported on, and each preceding produc-
tion year, to the extent that cars produced during the
preceding years are treated under Standard No. 208
as having been produced during the production year
being reported on, the following information:

(i) the number of passenger cars equipped with
automatic seat belts and the seating positions at
which they are installed,

(ii) the number of passenger cars equipped with air
bags and the seating positions at which they are in-
stalled, and

(iii) the number of passenger cars equipped with
other forms of automatic restraint technology', which
shall be described, and the seating positions at which
they are installed.

(3) Passenger cars produced by more than one
manufacturer.

Each manufacturer whose reporting of information
is affected by one or more of the express written con-
tracts permitted by section S4. 1.3.5.2 of Standard
No. 208 shall:

(i) Report the existence of each contract, including
the names of all parties to the contract, and explain
how the contract affects the report being submitted,

(ii) Report the actual number of passenger cars
covered by each contract.

585.6 Records.

Each manufacturer shall maintain records of the
Vehicle Identification Number and type of automatic
restraint for each passenger car for which informa-
tion is reported under 585.5(b)(2), until December 31,
1991.

585.7 Petition to extend period to file report.

A petition for extension of the time to submit a
report must be received not later than 15 days before
expiration of the time stated in 585.5(a). The petition
must be submitted to: Administrator, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh
Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590. The filing of a
petition does not automatically extend the time for fil-
ing a report. A petition will be granted only if the
petitioner shows good cause for the extension and if
the extension is consistent with the public interest.

Issued on March 18, 1986

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

51 F.R. 9801
March 21, 1986

PART 571; S208-PRE 303-304

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO

FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Protection-Improvement of Seat Belt Assemblies

(Docket 74-14; Notice 44)

ACTION: Final rule; response to petitions for
reconsideration.

SUMMARY: In November 1985, NHTSA pub-
lished a final rule setting comfort and convenience
performance requirements for both manual and
automatic safety belt assemblies installed in motor
vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000
pounds or less. This notice responds to two petitions
for reconsideration and corrects certain technical
and typographical errors in that final rule.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendments made by
this notice to the text of Standard No. 208 will take
effect on June 17, 1986. Manufacturers do not have
to comply with the comfort and convenience re-
quirements of S7.4 until September 1, 1986.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The agency
published a final rule on November 6, 1985 (50 FR
46056), which modified the comfort and convenience
performance requirements in Standard No. 208,
Occupant Crash Protection. Petitions for reconsider-
ation of that final rule were received from Ford
Motor Company (Ford) and General Motors Corpor-
ation (GM).

Webbing Tension-Relieving Devices
Both Ford and GM requested modification of the
requirement in ST. 4. 2 of the final rule that any belt
slack that can be introduced into an automatic safety
belt system by means of any tension-relieving device
or design "shall be cancelled each time the safety
belt is unbuckled or the adjacent vehicle door is
opened except for belt systems in open-body vehicles
with no doors." Both petitioners said that the
language in the rule could be interpreted as requir-
ing belt slack to be cancelled each time a safety belt
is unbuckled, whether or not the adjacent door is
open. The petitioners also stated that the language
in the amendment did not reflect the agency's in-
tent as expressed in the preamble to the final rule.
They urged the agency to amend the requirement
so that belt slack in an automatic belt system must

be cancelled only when the adjacent vehicle door is
opened.

The agency's intent, as expressed in the pream-
ble (50 FR at 46059), was that belt slack in automatic
belt systems must be cancelled each time that the
adjacent vehicle door is opened, whether or not the
belt is buckled. Anticipating the adoption of a
dynamic test requirement for manual belts, the
language of the final rule was also intended to give
manufacturers increased design flexibility by pro-
viding them the option of linking cancellation of
tension-relievers in dynamically-tested manual belt
systems to, at their choice, either opening of the door
or releasing of the belt. Therefore NHTSA is amend-
ing the requirement to clarify that for automatic
belts, cancellation of the tension-reliever is linked
to opening the adjacent vehicle door and for
dynamically-tested manual safety belts, a manufac-
turer has the option of using either opening the door
or releasing the belt as the event leading to cancella-
tion of the tension-reliever.

Torso Belt Body Contact Force
In the final rule, the agency exempted certain
automatic and manual safety belt systems incor-
porating tension-relieving devices, such as window-
shade devices, from the 0.7-pound torso belt contact
force requirement. The reason for this exemption
was the agency's concern that compliance with the
body contact force requirement could limit manufac-
turers' design flexibility in meeting the retraction
and other requirements in the rule. In their com-
ments on the notice of proposed rulemaking, both
foreign and domestic manufacturers had questioned
whether imposing a contact force requirement on
belt systems with tension-relievers would advance
safety. They said that the necessity for complying
with the belt contact force requirement could result
in the production of some belt systems in which there
was insufficient force to retract webbing reliably.
Ford and GM objected to the language in the final
rule, because the exemption was limited to safety
belt systems "which incorporate a webbing tension-

PART 208-PRE 305

relieving device that complies with S7.4.2." Section
7.4.2 requires automatic belt systems with webbing
tension-relieving devices to meet the injury criteria
of the standard when the belt is adjusted to have the
maximum amount of slack recommended by the
vehicle manufacturer. The petitioners stated that
they do not believe the reference to S7.4.2 was in-
tended to discourage the use of tension-relief devices
on manual seat belt systems or to imply that manual
seat belt systems incorporating tension-relief devices
should not be eligible for the exemption now ac-
corded automatic seat belt systems.

In the preamble to the final rule (50 FR at 46060),
the agency noted that the tension-relieving re-
quirements for manual safety belts were proposed
in Notice 38 of this docket, in conjunction with the
dynamic tests for manual safety belts. The agency
also said that if a dynamic test requirement for
manual belts was adopted, the provisions on tension-
relievers for manual belts would be expected to be
identical to those for automatic belts. On March 21,
1986 (51 FR 9800), the agency published a final rule
setting dynamic test requirements for manual safety
belts in passenger cars. The March 1986 rule adopted
the same requirements for tension-relieving devices
in dynamically-tested manual safety belts that were
adopted in the November 1985 final rule for auto-
matic belts. (In the March 1986 rule, the agency
deferred action on whether to adopt the proposed
dynamic testing for manual safety belts in light trucks
and vans. If such a requirement is adopted, NHTSA
will apply the same requirement on tension-relievers
to those manual belts that are applied to other
dynamically-tested manual safety belts.)

In the November 1985 final rule, the agency did
not intend to preclude the use of tension-relieving
devices on non-dynamically-tested manual safety
belts or to imply that manual belt systems incor-
porating tension-relieving devices should not be
eligible for the exemption from the belt contact force
requirement now accorded automatic safety belt
systems and dynamically-tested manual safety belts.
The agency has revised the language of S7.4.3 to ex-
empt all belts, whether manual or automatic, incor-
porating tension-relievers from the belt contact
force requirement. The agency encourages manufac-
turers to provide information in their owner's
manual on properly adjusting non-dynamically-
tested manual safety belts with tension-relievers.

Belt Retraction
In the final rule, the retraction requirement for
manual safety belts stated that torso and lap belt
webbing must automatically retract to a stowed posi-

tion, when the adjacent vehicle door is in the open
position, or when the seat belt latchplate is released.
Both Ford and GM interpreted this requirement to
mean that retraction must occur when the latchplate
is released whether or not the adjacent door is
opened. They requested that the wording be revised
to require retraction only when both conditions
exist, i.e., release of the latchplate and opening of
the adjacent door. They stated that the belt cannot
retract until it is unbuckled and that they see no
safety need to require retraction before the adjacent
door is opened.

As stated in the April 1985 notice of proposed
rulemaking, many persons find seat belts incon-
venient because the belt webbing will not retract
completely to its stowed position when the system
is unbuckled, thus creating an obstacle when the oc-
cupant is trying to exit the vehicle or soiling the belt
if it is caught in the door. The intent of the retrac-
tion requirement in the final rule was to provide
manufacturers increased flexibility by giving them
the option of triggering tension-relief cancellation
and belt retraction by either release of the latchplate
or opening of the adjacent vehicle door. As noted
by the American Safety Belt Council in its comments
on the April 1985 NPRM, new safety belt designs
are available which will cancel a tension-relieving
device and retract the belt when the latchplate is
released from the buckle, regardless of whether the
door is open or not. The agency did not intend that
each condition trigger the retraction mechanism, but
instead intended to allow manufacturers the option
of using either condition to initiate belt retraction.
For these reasons, the agency is amending the re-
quirement to make it clear that manufacturers have
the option of determining whether door opening or
latchplate release is the mechanism that triggers
retraction of a manual safety belt.

The rule will continue to provide that in an open-
body vehicle with no doors, a manufacturer has the
option to provide either automatic or manual deac-
tivation of a tension-relieving device. Thus, in the
retraction test in those vehicles, the agency will
deactivate the tension-relieving devices in the man-
ner provided by the manufacturer.

Armrests
The petitioners also requested a further clarifica-
tion of the language of the final rule on belt retrac-
tion. That requirement permits an outboard armrest
of a seat to be placed in its stowed position for the
purpose of the retraction test, if the armrest must
be stowed to allow the seat occupant to exit the

PART 208-PRE 306

vehicle. The agency stated in the preamble to the
final rule that it intended to allow the stowage of
folding armrests during the retraction test if "they
protrude into the door opening in a manner which
encumbers egress." (50 FR at 46061).

Ford noted that the common dictionary meaning
of "encumber" is "impede," or "hinder," so that
egress would be made difficult although not
necessarily impossible. Ford said that the language
of the final rule limited the stowage of armrests to
situations in which armrests, unless stowed, make
egress impossible.

To eliminate the possibility of having to make sub-
jective judgments as to whether an armrest
"hinders" occupant egress, the agency is modifying
the retraction requirement to provide that any
folding armrest must be stowed prior to initiation
of the retraction test.

Technical Corrections

Ford pointed out a typographical error in amend-
ment 14 of the final rule, which referred to S7.1.13,
instead of referring to S7.1.3. The agency has made
the necessary correction. Ford also stated that
decimal points should be added, where appropriate,
to the specified dimensional tolerances in the table
of weights and dimensions of vehicle occupants.
These corrections would conform the dimensions set
forth in the chart, which is in amendment 14 in the
final rule, to the corresponding dimensions specified
on drawing SA 150 M002 or the test dummy. The
agency agrees and has made the necessary
corrections.

The comfort and convenience requirements in S7.4
of Standard No. 208 apply to automatic and manual
safety belt assemblies installed in any vehicle with
a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less. The title of S7
in this standard. Seat belt assembly requirements—
passenger cars, is no lonqer accurate, because the
paragraphs of S7., by their terms, apply to pas-
senger cars and several other types of vehicles.
Therefore, the title is corrected in this notice to read
S7. Seat belt assembly requirements. The agency is
also amending the retraction requirements of S7.4.5
to make clear that, as proposed in the April 1985
NPRM, the retraction test only applies to the front
outboard designated seating positions.

The remaining amendments are made to remove
an extra "and" in paragraph S7. 4. 6. 1(a), and to cor-
rect a typographical error in S4. 5.3.3(b) (change
"set" to "seat").

Effective Date
This notice makes minor clarifications and
typographical and technical corrections to the text
of Standard No. 208. NHTSA has determined that
it is in the public interest to have these amendments
to the language of the standard go into effect on
publication of this notice in the Federal Register,
since these amendments will provide manufacturers
with more flexibility in developing designs to
comply with the safety belt comfort and convenience
requirements, which will go into effect on
September 1, 1986.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR 571.208
is amended as follows:

1. The title of S7. is revised to read:
S7 Seat belt assembly requirements.

2. S7.4.2 is revised to read:

S7.4.2 Webbing tension-relieving device. Each
vehicle with an automatic seat belt assembly, or with
a Tj^pe 2 manual seat belt assembly that must meet
S4.6, installed in a front outboard designated seating
position that has either manual or automatic tension-
relieving devices permitting the introduction of slack
in the webbing of the shoulder belt (e.g., "comfort
clips" or "window-shade" devices) shall:

(a) Comply with the requirements of S5.1 with the
shoulder belt webbing adjusted to introduce the
maximum amount of slack recommended by the
vehicle manufacturer pursuant to S7.4.2(b).

(b) Have a section in the vehicle owner's manual
that explains how the tension-relieving device works
and specifies the maximum amount of slack (in in-
ches) recommended by the vehicle manufacturer to
be introduced into the shoulder belt under normal
use conditions. The explanation shall also warn that
introducing slack beyond the amount specified by the
manufacturer could significantly reduce the effec-
tiveness of the shoulder belt in a crash; and

(c) Have, except for open-body vehicles with no
doors, an automatic means to cancel any shoulder
belt slack introduced into the belt system by a
tension-relieving device. In the case of an automatic
safety belt system, cancellation of the tension-
relieving device shall occur each time the adjacent
vehicle door is opened. In the case of a manual seat
belt required to meet 84. 6, cancellation of the
tension-relieving device shall occur, at the manufac-
turer's option, either each time the adjacent door
is opened or each time the latchplate is released from
the buckle. In the case of open-body vehicles with
no doors, cancellation of the tension-relieving device
may be done by a manual means.

PART 208-PRE 307

3. S7.4.3 is revised to read as follows:

S7.4.3 Belt contact force. Except for manual or
automatic seat belt assemblies which incorporate a
webbing tension-relieving device, the upper torso
webbing of anv seat belt assembly, when tested in
accordance with S10.6, shall not exert more than 0.7
pounds of contact force when measured normal to
and one inch from the chest of an anthropomorphic
test dummy positioned in accordance with SlO in the
seating position for which that assembly is provided,
at the point where the centerline of the torso belt
crosses the midsagittal line on the dummy's chest.

4. S7.4.5 is revised to read as follows:

S7.4.5 Retraction. When tested under the condi-
tions of S8.1.2 and S8.1.3, with anthropomorphic
test dummies whose arms have been removed and
which are positioned in accordance with SlO in the
front outboard designated seating positions and
restrained ^y ^*i» belt systems for those positions,
the torso and lap belt webbing of any of those seat
belt systems shall automatically retract to a stowed
position either when the adjacent vehicle door is in
the open position and the seat belt latchplate is

released, or, at the option of the manufacturer, when
the latchplate is released. That stowed position shall
prevent any part of the webbing or hardware from
being pinched when the adjacent vehicle door is
closed. A belt system with a tension-relieving device
in an open-bodied vehicle with no doors shall fully
retract when the tension-relieving device is deac-
tivated. For the purpose of the retraction require-
ment, outboard armrests, which are capable of being
stowed, on vehicle seats shall be placed in their
stowed positions.

5. S7. 4. 6. 1(a) is amended by removing the second
occurrence of the word "and" in the first sentence.

6. S4. 5. 3. 3(b) is amended by correcting the word
"set" to read "seat" and the word "show" to read
"shown."

7. Condition (B) of S4. 5.3.3(b) is amended by
removing the second occurrence of the word "the"
and by correcting the word "relases" to read
"release."

8. The weights and dimensions of the vehicle oc-
cupants referred to in this standard and specified
in S7.1.3 are revised to read as follows:

50th-percentile 5th-percentile 50th-percentile 95th-percentile

6-year-old child adult female adult male adult male

Weight

Erect sitting height

Hip breadth (sitting)

Hip circumference (sitting) . . ,
Waist circumference (sitting) ,

Chest depth

Chest circumference:

(nipple)

(upper)

(lower)

47.3 pounds .... 102 pounds 164 pounds .±.3.

25.4 inches 30.9 inches 35.7 inches .±.1.

8.4 inches 12.8 inches 14.7 inches .±.-7.

23.9 inches 36.4 inches 42 inches

20.8 inches 23.6 inches 32 inches . .±.-.6

7.5 inches 9.3 inches .±.-?.

30.5 inches

29.8 inches 37.4 inches ±.-f'.

26.6 inches

215 pounds
38 inches
16.5 inches
47.2 inches
42.5 inches
10.5 inches

44.5 inches

Issued on: June 11, 1986.

Diane K. Steed
Administrator
51 F. R. 21912
June 17, 1986

PART 208-PRE 308

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Anthropomorphic Test Dummies
(Docket No. 74-14; Notice 45 )

ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY: This notice adopts the Hybrid III test
dummy as an alternative to the Part 572 test dummy
in testing done in accordance with Standard No. 208,
Occupant Crash Protection. The notice sets forth the
specifications, instrumentation, calibration test pro-
cedures, and calibration performance criteria for the
Hybrid HI test dummy. The notice also amends
Standard No. 208 so that effective October 23, 1986,
manufacturers have the option of using either the
existing Part 572 test dummy or the Hybrid III test
dummy until August 31, 1991. As of September 1,
1991, the Hybrid HI will replace the Part 572 test
dummy and be used as the exclusive means of deter-
mining a vehicle's conformance with the perfor-
mance requirements of Standard No. 208.

The notice also establishes a new performance
criterion for the chest of the Hybrid HI test dum-
my which will limit chest deflection. The new chest
deflection limit applies only to the Hybrid HI since
only that test dummy has the capability to measure
chest deflection.

These amendments enhance vehicle safety by per-
mitting the use of a more advanced test dummy
which is more human-like in response than the cur-
rent test dummy. In addition, the Hybrid III test
dummy is capable of making many additional
sophisticated measurements of the potential for
human injury in a frontal crash.

DATES: The notice adds a new Subpart E to Part
572 effective on October 23, 1986.

This notice also amends Standard No. 208 so that
effective October 23, 1986, manufacturers have the
option of using either the existing Part 572 test
dummy or the Hybrid III test dummy until August
31, 1991. As of September 1, 1991, the Hybrid III
will replace the Part 572 test dummy and be used
as the exclusive means of determining a vehicle's
conformance with the performance requirements of
Standard No. 208. The incorporation by reference

of certain publications listed in the regulation is ap-
proved by the Director of the Federal Register as
of October 23, 1986.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In December
1983, General Motors (GM) petitioned the agency to
amend Part 572, Anthropomorphic Test Dummies,
to adopt specifications for the Hybrid HI test dum-
my. GM also petitioned for an amendment of Stand-
ard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, to allow the
use of the Hybrid HI as an alternative test device
for compliance testing. The agency granted GM's
petition on July 20, 1984. The agency subsequently
received a petition from the Center for Auto Safety
to propose making Standard No. 208's existing in-
jury criteria more stringent for the Hybrid HI and
to establish new injury criteria so as to take advan-
tage of the Hybrid Ill's superior measurement
capability. The agency granted the Center's petition
on September 17, 1984. On April 12, 1985 (50 FR
14602), NHTSA proposed amendments to Part 572
and Standard No. 208 that were responsive to the
petitioners and which, in the agency's judgment,
would enhance motor vehicle safety. Twenty-eight
individuals and companies submitted comments on
the proposed requirements. This notice presents the
agency's analysis of the issues raised by the com-
menters. The agency has decided to adopt the use
of the Hybrid III test dummy and some of the pro-
posed injury criteria. The agency has also decided
to issue another notice on the remaining injury
criteria to gain additional information about the
potential effects of adopting those criteria.

This notice first discusses the technical specifica-
tions for the Hybrid III, its calibration requirements,
its equivalence with the existing Part 572 test
dummy, and the applicable injury criteria. Finally,
it discusses the test procedure used to position the
dummy for Standard No. 208 compliance testing and
the economic and other effects of this rule.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 309

Test Dummy Drawings and Specifications

Test dummies are used as human surrogates for
evaluation of the severity of injuries in vehicle
crashes. To serve as an adequate surrogate, a test
dummy must be capable of simulating human impact
responses. To serve as an objective test device, the
test dummy must be adequately defined through
technical drawings and performance specifications
to ensure uniformity in construction, impact
response, and measurement of injury in identical
crash conditions.

Virtually all of the commenters, with the excep-
tion of GM, said that they have not had sufficient
experience with the Hybrid III to offer comments
on the validity of the technical specifications for the
test dummy. Since the issuance of the notice, GM
has provided additional technical drawings and a
Society of Automotive Engineers-developed user's
manual to further define the Hybrid HI. These new
drawings do not alter the basic nature of the test
dummy, but instead provide additional information
which will enable users to make sure that they have
a correctly designed and correctly assembled test
dummy. The user's manual provides information on
the inspection, assembly, disassembly, and use of the
test dummy. Having the user's manual available wdll
assist builders and users of the Hybrid HI in pro-
ducing and using the test dummy. GM also provided
information to correct the misnumbering of several
technical drawings referenced in the notice.

In addition, the agency has reviewed the proposed
drawings and specifications. While NHTSA believes
the proposed drawings are adequate for producing
the test dummy, the agency has identified and
obtained additional information which should make
production and use of the test dummy even more ac-
curate. For example, the agency has obtained infor-
mation on the range of motions for each moving
body part of the test dummy. Finally, to promote
the ease of assembly, NHTSA has made arrange-
ments with GM to ensure that the molds and pat-
terns for the test dummy are available to all in-
terested parties. Access to the molds vdll assist other
potential builders and users of the Hybrid III since
it is difficult to specify all of the details of the various
body contours solely by technical drawings.

The agency has adopted the new drawings and
user manual in this rule and has made the necessary
corrections to the old drawings. The agency believes
that the available drawings and technical specifica-
tions are more than sufficient for producing,
assembling, and using the Hybrid III test dummy.

Commercial Availability of the Hybrid III
A number of commenters raised questions about
the commercial availability of the Hybrid HI test
dummy, noting problems they have experienced in
obtaining calibrated test dummies and the in-
strumentation for the neck and lower leg of the
Hybrid III. For example, Chrysler said that it had
acquired two Hybrid III test dummies, but has been
unable to obtain the lower leg and neck instrumen-
tation for five months. Likewise, Ford said that it
has been unable to obtain the knee displacement and
chest deflection measurement devices for the Hybrid
III. It also said that of the test dummies it had
received, none had sufficient spine stiffness to meet
the Hybrid III specifications. Ford claimed to have
problems in retaining a stable dummy posture which
would make it difficult to carry out some of the
specified calibration tests. Subsequent investigation
showed that the instability was caused by out-of-
specification rubber hardness of the lumbar spine,
and was eliminated when spines of correct hardness
were used. In addition. Ford said that the necks and
ribs of the test dummy would not pass the proposed
calibration procedures. Finally, Ford said that the
equipment needed for calibrating the dummy is not
commercially available.

Although the commenters indicated they had ex-
perienced difficulty in obtaining the instnmientation
for the Hybrid Hi's neck and lower legs, they did
not indicate that there is any problem in obtaining
the instrumentation needed to measure the three in-
jury criteria presently required by Standard No. 208,
the head injury criterion, chest acceleration, and
femur loading and which are being adopted by this
rule for the Hybrid HI. For example, Volkswagen
said it had obtained Hybrid III test dummies with
sufficient instrumentation to measure the same in-
jury criteria as with the Part 572. VW did say it had
ordered the additional test devices and instrumen-
tation for the Hybrid III but was told the instrumen-
tation would not be available for six months.

The agency notes that there are now two commer-
cial suppliers of the Hybrid HI test dummy. Alder-
son Research Labs (ARL) and Humanoid Systems.
Humanoid has built nearly 100 test dummies and
ALR has produced five prototype test dummies as
of the end of December 1985. Both manufacturers
have indicated that they are now capable of produc-
ing sufficient Hybrid Ills to meet the demand for
those dummies. For example, Humanoid Systems
said that while the rate of production is dependent
on the number of orders, generally three test dum-
mies per week are produced. Thus, in the case of the
basic test dummy, there appears to be sufficient
commercial capacity to provide sufficient test dum-
mies for all vehicle manufacturers.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 310

As to test dummy instrumentation, the agency is
aware that there have been delays in obtaining the
new neck, thorax, and lower leg instrumentation for
th-i Hybrid III. However, as Humanoid commented,
while there have been delays, the supplies of the
needed parts are expected to increase. Even if the
supply of the lower leg instrumentation is slow to
develop, this will not pose a problem, since the
agency is not adopting, at this time, the proposed
lower leg injury criteria. In the case of the neck in-
strumentation, the supply problem should be
minimized because each test facility will only need
one neck transducer to calibrate all of its test dum-
mies. The neck instrumentation will not be needed
for a manufacturer's crash testing since at this time,
the agency is not adopting any neck injury criteria.
In the case of the instrumentation for measuring
thoracic deflection, the supplier has indicated that
it can deliver the necessary devices within 3 months
of the time an order is placed. As to Ford's comment
about calibration test equipment, the agency notes
that current equipment used for calibrating the ex-
isting Part 572 test dummy can be used, wdth minor
modification, to calibrate the Hybrid III test dummy.

Calibration Requirements
In addition to having complete technical drawings
and specifications, a test dummy must have ade-
quate calibration test procedures. The calibration
tests involve a series of static and dynamic tests of
the test dummy components to determine whether
the responses of the test dummy fall vidthin specified
performance requirements for each test. The testing
involves instrumenting the head, thorax and femurs
to measure the test dummy's responses. In addition,
there are tests of the neck, whose structural prop-
erties may have considerable influence on the
kinematics and impact responses of the instru-
mented head. Those procedures help ensure that the
test dummy has been properly assembled and that,
as assembled, it will provide repeatable and
reproducible results in crash testing. (Repeatability
refers to the ability of the same test dummy to pro-
duce the same results when subjected to several
identical tests. Reproducibility refers to the ability
of one test dummy to provide the same results as
another test dummy built to the same specifications.)

Lumbar Spine Calibration Test

The technical specifications for the Hybrid III set
out performance requirements for the hardness of
the rubber used in the lumbar spine to ensure that
the spine will have appropriate rigidity. NHTSA's
test data show that there is a direct relationship be-
tween rubber hardness and stiffness of the spine and

that the technical specification on hardness is suffi-
cent to ensure appropriate spine stiffness. Accord-
ingly, the agency believes that a separate calibra-
tion test for the lumbar spine is not necessary.
Humanoid supported the validity of relying on the
spine hardness specification to assure adequate
stability of the dummy's posture, even though it
found little effect on the dummy's impact response.
Humanoid's support for this approach was based on
tests of Hybrid III dummies which were equipped
with a variety of lumbar spines having different
rubber hardnesses.

Subsequent to issuance of the notice, the agency
has continued its testing of the Hybrid III test
dummy. Through that testing, the agency found that
commercially available necks either cannot meet or
cannot consistently meet all of the calibration tests
originally proposed for the neck. To further evaluate
this problem, NHTSA and GM conducted a series
of round robin tests in which a set of test dummies
were put through the calibration tests at both GM's
and NHTSA's test laboratories.

The test results, which were placed in the docket
after the tests were completed, showed that none
of the necks could pass all of the originally specified
calibration tests.

In examining the test data, the agency determined
that while some of the responses of the necks fell
slightly outside of the performance corridors
proposed in the calibration tests, the responses of
the necks showed a relatively good match to existing
biomechanical data on human neck responses. Thus,
while the necks did not meet all of the calibration
tests, they did respond as human necks are expected
to respond.

In discussions with GM, the agency learned that
the calibration performance requirements were
originally established in 1977 based on the responses
of three prototype Hybrid III necks. GM first
examined the existing biomechanical data and
established several performance criteria that
reflected human neck responses. GM then built
necks which would meet the biomechanically based
performance criteria. GM established the calibration
tests that it believed were necessary to ensure that
the necks of the prototype test dummies would pro-
duce the required biomechanical responses.
Although extensive performance specifications may
have been needed for the development of specially
built prototype necks, not all of the specifications
appear to be essential once the final design was
established for the mass-produced commercial
version. Based on the ability of the commercially
available test dummies to meet the biomechanical
response criteria, NHTSA believes that the GM-

PART 571; S 208-PRE 311

derived calibration requirements should be adjusted
to reflect the response characteristics of commer-
cially available test dummies and simplified as much
as possible to reduce the complexity of the testing.

Based on the results of the NHTSA-GM calibra-
tion test series, the agency is making the following
changes to the neck calibration tests. In the flexion
(forward bending) calibration test, the agency is:

1. increasing the time allowed for the neck to
return to its preimpact position after the pendulum
impact test from a range of 109-119 milliseconds
to a range of 113-128 milliseconds.

2. changing the limits for maximum head rotation
from a range of 67°-79° to a range of 64°-78°.

3. expanding the time limits during which max-
imum moment must occur from a range of 46-56
milliseconds to 47-58 milliseconds.

4. modifying the limits for maximum moment
from a range of 72-90 ft-lbs to a range of 65-80
ft-lbs.

5. increasing the time for the maximum moment
to decay from a range of 95-105 milliseconds to a
range of 97-107 milliseconds.

In the extension (backward bending) calibration
test, the agency is:

1. expanding the time allowed for the neck to
return to its preimpact position after the pendulum
impact test from a range of 157-167 milliseconds
to a range of 147-174 milliseconds.

2. changing the limits for maximimi head rotation
from a range of 94°-106° to a range of 81 °-106°.

3. expanding the time limit during which the
minimum moment must occur from a range of 69-77
milliseconds to 65-79 milliseconds.

4. modifying the limits for minimum moment
from a range of -52 to -63 ft-lbs to a range of -39
to -59 ft-lbs.

5. increasing the time for the minimum moment
to decay from the range of 120-144 milliseconds,
contained in GM's technical specifications for the
Hybrid III, to a range of 120-148 milliseconds.

In reviewing the NHTSA-GM test data, the
agency also identified several ways of simplifying
the neck's performance requirements. In each case,
the following calibration specifications appear to be
redundant and their deletion should not affect the
performance of the neck. The agency has thus
deleted the requirement for minimum moment in
flexion and the time requirement for that moment.
For extension, the agency has eliminated the limit
on the maximum moment permitted and the time
requirement for that moment. The agency has

deleted those requirements since the specification on
maximum rotation of the neck in flexion and minimum
rotation of the neck in extension appear to adequately
measure the same properties of the neck. Similarly,
the agency has simplified the test by eliminating the
pendulum braking requirement for the neck test, since
GM's testing shows that the requirement is not
necessary to ensure test consistency. Finally, the
agency is clarifying the test procedure by deleting the
specification in the GM technical drawings for the
Hybrid III calling for two pre-calibration impact tests
of the neck. GM has informed the agency that the two
pre-calibration tests are not necessary.

Based on the NHTSA-GM calibration test data,
the agency is making two additional changes to the
neck calibration test procedure. Both NHTSA and
GM routinely control the calibration pendulum im-
pact speed to within plus or minus one percent.
Currently available dummy necks are able to meet
the calibration response requirements consistently
when the pendulum impact speed is controlled to
that level Thus, NHTSA believes that the proposed
range of allowable velocities ( ± 8.5 percent) for the
pendulum impact is excessive. Reducing the allow-
able range is clearly feasible and vdll help maintain
a high level of consistency in dummy neck responses.
The agency has therefore narrowed the range of per-
missible impact velocities to the neck to ± 2 per-
cent. This range is readily obtainable with commer-
cially available test equipment. In reviewing the
neck calibration test data, GM and NHTSA noted
a slight sensitivity in the neck response to
temperature variation. In its docket submission of
January 27, 1986, GM recommended controlling the
temperature during the neck calibration test to 71 °
±1°. NHTSA agrees that controlling the tem-
perature for the neck calibration test wall reduce
variability, but the agency believes that a slightly
wider temperature range of 69 ° to 72 °, which is the
same range used in the chest calibration test, is
sufficient.

Neck Durability

Nissan commented that, in sled tests of the two
test dummies, the neck bracket of one of the Hybrid
III test dummies experienced damage after 10 tests,
while the Part 572 test dummy had no damage. The
agency believes that Nissan's experience may be the
result of an early neck design which has been subse-
quently modified by GM. (See GM letter of Septem-
ber 16, 1985, Docket 74-14, Notice 39, Entry 28.)
The agency has conducted numerous 30 mile per
hour vehicle impact tests using the Hybrid III test
dummy and has not had any neck bracket failures.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 312

Thorax Calibration Test

As a part of the NHTSA-GM calibration test
series, both organizations also performed the pro-
posed calibration test for the thorax on the same test
dummies. That testing showed relatively small dif-
ferences in the test results measured between the
two test facilities The test results from both test
facilities show that the chest responses of the Hybrid
III test dummies were generally within the
established biomechanical performance corridors for
the chest. In addition, the data showed that the
Hybrid III chest responses fit those corridors
substantially better than the chest responses of the
existing Part 572 test dummy. The data also showed
that the chest responses in the high speed (22 ft/sec)
pendulum impact test more closely fit the corridors
than did the chest responses in the low speed (14
ft/sec) test. In addition, the data showed that if a
test dummy performed satisfactorily in the low
speed pendulum impact test, it also performed
satisfactorily in the more severe high speed test.

Based on those results, GM recommended in a
letter of January 27, 1986, (Docket No. 74-14, Notice
39, Entry 41) that only the low speed pendulum im-
pact be used in calibration testing of the Hybrid III
chest. GM noted that deleting the more severe pen-
dulum impact test "can lead to increasing the useful
life of the chest structure."

Based on the test data, the agency agrees with the
GM recommendation that only one pendulum impact
test is necessary. NHTSA recognizes that using only
the low speed pendulum impact will increase the
useful life of the chest. However, the agency has
decided to retain the high speed rather than the low
speed test. While NHTSA recognizes that the high
speed test is more severe, the agency believes the
high speed test is more appropriate for a number
of reasons. First, the data showed that the high
speed chest impact responses compared more closely
with the biomechanical corridors than the low speed
responses. Thus, use of the high speed test will make
it easier to identify chests that do not have the cor-
rect biofidelity. In addition, since the higher speed
test is more severe it will subject the ribcage to
higher stresses, which will help identify chest struc-
tural degradation. Finally, the high speed impact
test is more representative of the range of impacts
a test dummy can receive in a vehicle crash test.

Although the NHTSA-GM test data showed that
the production version of the Hybrid III chest had
sufficient biofidelity, the data indicated that
proposed calibration performance requirements

should be lightly changed to account for the wider
range in calibration test responses measured in com-
mercially available test dummies. Accordingly, the
agency is adjusting the chest deflection requirement
to increase the allowable range of deflections from
2.51-2.75 inches to 2.5-2.85 inches. In addition, the
agency is adjusting the resistive force requirement
from a range of 1186-1298 pounds to a range of
1080-1245 pounds. Also, the hysteresis requirement
is being adjusted from a 75-80 percent range to a
69-85 percent range. Finally, the agency is clarify-
ing the chest calibration test procedure by deleting
the specification in GM's technical drawing for the
Hybrid III that calls for two pre-calibration impact
tests of the chest. GM has informed the agency that
these tests are not necessary. These slight changes
will not affect the performance of the Hybrid III
chest, since the NHTSA-GM test data showed that
commercially available test dummies meeting these
calibration specifications had good biofidelity.

Chest Durability

Testing done by the agency's Vehicle Research
and Test Center has indicated that the durability of
the Hybrid Ill's ribs in calibration testing is less than
that of the Part 572 test dummy. ("State-of-the-Art
Dummy Selection, Volume I" DOT Publication No.
HS 806 722) The durability of the Hybrid III was
also raised by several commenters. For example,
Toyota raised questions about the durability of the
Hybrid Hi's ribs and suggested the agency act to
improve their durability.

The chest of the Hybrid III is designed to be more
flexible, and thus more human-like, than the chest
of the Part 572 test dummy. One of the calibration
tests used for the chest involves a 15 mph impact
into the chest by a 51.5 pound pendulum; an impact
condition which is substantially more severe than a
safety belt or airbag restrained occupant would ex-
perience in most crashes. The chest of the Hybrid
III apparently degrades after such multiple impacts
at a faster rate than the chest of the Part 572 test
dummy. As the chest gradually deteriorates, the
amount of acceleration and deflection measured in
the chest are also affected. Eventually the chest will
fall out of specification and will require either repair
or replacement.

In its supplemental comments to the April 1985
notice, GM provided additional information about
the durability of the Hybrid HI ribs. GM said that
it uses the Hybrid III in unbelted testing, which is
the most severe test for the dummy. GM said that
the Hybrid III can be used for about 17 crash tests
before the ribs must be replaced. GM explained

PART 571; S 208-PRE 313

that it does not have comparable data for the Part
572 test dummy since it does not use that test
dummy in unbelted tests. GM said, however, that
it believes that the durability of the Part 572 test
dummy ribs in vehicle crash testing would be com-
parable to that of the Hybrid III.

Having reviewed all the available information, the
agency concludes that both the Hybrid HI and ex-
isting Part 572 test dummy ribs will degrade under
severe impact conditions. Although the Hybrid Hi's
more flexible ribs may need replacement more fre-
quently, particularly after being used in unre-
strained testing, the Hybrid Ill's ribs appear to have
reasonable durability. According to GM's data,
which is in line with NHTSA's crash test experience,
the Hybrid Ill's ribs can withstand approximately
17 severe impacts, such as found in unrestrained
testing, before they must be replaced. Ford, in a
presentation at the MVMA Hybrid III workshop
held on February 5, 1986, noted that one of its belt-
restrained Hybrid HI test dummies was subjected
to 35 vehicle and sled crashes without any failures.
The potential lower durability of the ribs in
unrestrained testing should be of little consequence
if the Hybrid HI test dummy is used in air bag or
belt testing.

Chest Temperature Sensitivity

The April 1985 notice said NHTSA tests have in-
dicated that the measurements of chest deflection
and chest acceleration by the Hybrid HI are
temperature sensitive. For this reason, GM's
specifications for the Hybrid III recognize this prob-
lem and call for using the test dummy in a narrower
temperature range (69° to 72° F) to ensure the con-
sistency of the measurements. GM has also sug-
gested the use of an adjustment factor for
calculating chest deflection when the Hybrid HI is
used in a test environment that is outside of the
temperature range specified for the chest. While this
approach may be reasonable to account for the ad-
justment of the deflection measurement, there is no
known method to adjust the acceleration measure-
ment for variations in temperature. For this reason,
the agency is not adopting GM's proposed adjust-
ment factor, but is instead retaining the proposed
69° to 72° F temperature range.

A number of commenters addressed the feasibility
and practicability of maintaining that temperature
range. BMW said that although it has an enclosed
crash test facility, it had reservations about its
ability to control the test temperature within the
proposed range. Daihatsu said that it was not sure
it could assure the test dummy's temperature will

remain within the proposed range. Honda said that
while it had no data on the temperature sensitivity
of the Hybrid HI, it questioned whether the
proposed temperature range was practical.
Mercedes-Benz said it is not practicable to maintain
the proposed temperature range because the flood
lights necessary for high speed filming of crash tests
can cause the test dummy to heat up. Nissan said
it was not easy to maintain the current 12 degree
range specified for the existing Part 572 test dummy
and thus it would be hard to maintain the three
degree range proposed for the Hybrid HI. Ford also
said that maintaining the three degree range could
be impracticable in its current test facilities.

Other manufacturers tentatively indicated that the
proposed temperature range may not be a problem.
VW said the temperature range should not be an in-
surmountable problem, but more experience with
the Hybrid III is necessary before any definite con-
clusions can be reached. Volvo said it could main-
tain the temperature range in its indoor test
facilities, but it questioned whether outdoor test
facilities could meet the proposed specification.
Humanoid indicated in its comments, that it has
developed an air conditioning system individualized
for each test dummy which will maintain a stable
temperature in the test dummy up to the time of the
crash test.

The agency believes that there are a number of
effective ways to address the temperature
sensitivity of the Hybrid HI chest. The test pro-
cedure calls for placing the test dummy in an area,
such as a closed room, whose temperature is main-
tained within the required range for at least four
hours before either the calibration tests or the use
of the test dummy in a crash test. The purpose of
the requirement is to ensure that the primary com-
ponents of the test dummy have reached the correct
temperature before the test dummy is used in a test.
As discussed below, analytical techniques can be
used to determine the temperature within the test
dummy, to calculate how quickly the test dummy
must be used in a crash test before its temperature
will fall outside the required temperature range.

Testing done by the agency with the current Part
572 test dummy, whose construction and materials
are similar to the Hybrid HI, has determined how
long it takes for various test dummy components to
reach the required temperature range once the test
dummy is placed in a room within that range.
("Thermal Responses of the Part 572 Dummy to
Step Changes in Ambient Temperature" DOT
Publication No. HS-801 960, June 1976) The testing
was done by placing thermocouples, devices to

PART 571; S 208-PRE 314

measure temperature, at seven locations within the
dummy and conducting a series of heating and cool-
ing experiments. The tests showed that the thermal
time constants (the thermal time constant is the time
necessary for the temperature differential between
initial and final temperatures to decrease from its
original value to 37% of the original differential)
varied from 1.2 hours for the forehead to 6.2 hours
for the lumbar spine. Using this information it is
possible to estimate the time it takes a test dummy
originally within the required temperature range to
fall out of the allowable range once it has been ex-
posed to another temperature. The rib's thermal
time constant is 2.9 hours. This means, for exam-
ple, that if a test dummy's temperature has been
stabilized at 70.5 ° F and then transferred to a test
environment at 65 ° F, it would take approximately
0.8 hours for the rib temperature to drop to 69 ° F,
the bottom end of the temperature range specified
in Part 572.

Thus, the NHTSA test results cited above show
that the chest can be kept within the range proposed
by the agency if the test dummy is placed in a
temperature-controlled environment for a sufficient
time to stabilize the chest temperature. Once the
chest of the test dummy is at the desired
temperature, the test data indicate that it can
tolerate some temperature variation at either an in-
door or outdoor crash test site and still be within the
required temperature range as long as the crash test
is performed within a reasonable amount of time and
the temperature at the crash site, or wdthin the vehi-
cle, or within the test dummy is controlled close to
the 69 to 72 degrees F range. Obviously, testing con-
ducted at extremely high or low temperatures can
move the test dummy's temperature out of the re-
quired range relatively quickly, if no means are used
to maintain the temperature of the test dummy
within the required range. However, auxiliary
temperature control devices can be used in the vehi-
cle or the test environment to maintain a stabilized
temperature prior to the crash test. Therefore, the
agency has decided to retain the proposed 69 to 72
degrees F temperature range.

Chest Response to Changes in Velocity

The April notice raised the issue of the sensitivity
of the Hybrid Hi's chest to changes in impact
velocities. The notice pointed out that one GM study
on energy-absorbing steering columns ("Factors In-
fluencing Laboratory Evaluation of Energy-
Absorbing Steering Systems," Docket No. 74-14,
Notice 32, Entry 1666B) indicated that the Hybrid
ni's chest may be insensitive to changes in impact

velocities and asked commenters to provide further
information on this issue.

Both GM and Ford provided comments on the
Hybrid Hi's chest response. GM said that since the
Hybrid III chest is designed to have a more human-
like thoracic deflection than the Part 572 test dum-
my, the Hybrid Ill's response could be different. GM
referenced a study ("System Versus Laboratory Im-
pact Tests for Estimating Injury Hazard" SAE
paper 680053) which involved cadaver impacts into
energy-absorbing steering columns. The study con-
cluded that the force on the test subject by the steer-
ing assembly was relatively constant despite
changes in test speeds. GM said that this study in-
dicated that "rather than the Hybrid III chest be-
ing insensitive to changes in velocity in steering
system tests, it is the Part 572 which is too sensitive
to changes in impact velocity to provide meaningful
information for evaluating steering systems."

GM also presented new data on chest impact tests
conducted on the Hybrid III and Part 572 test dum-
mies. The tests involved chest impacts by three pen-
dulum impact devices with different masses and
three impact speeds. GM said that the test results
show that "the Hybrid HI chest deflection is sen-
sitive to both changes in impact velocity and impac-
tor mass." Ford also noted that the Hybrid III ap-
pears sensitive in the range of speed and deflections
that are relevant to Standard No. 208 testing with
belt-restrained dummies.

Ford noted that the GM testing referenced in the
April notice was conducted at higher impact speeds
than used in the calibration testing of the Hybrid
III. Ford said it agreed with GM that the indicated
insensitivity of chest acceleration to speed and load
is a reflection of the constant-force nature of the
steering column's energy absorption features. After
reviewing the information provided by Ford and
GM, NHTSA agrees that in an impact with a typical
steering column, once the energy-absorbing
mechanism begins to function, the test dummy's
chest will receive primarily constant force. The
lower stiffness of the Hybrid III chests would make
it respond in a more human-like manner to these
forces than the existing Part 572 test dummy.

Chest Accelerometer Placement

Volvo pointed out that the chest accelerometer of
the Hybrid III is located approximately at the center
of gravity of the chest, while the accelerometer is
higher and closer to the back in the Part 572 test
dummy. Volvo said that since the biomechanical
tolerance limits for the chest were established us-
ing a location similar to that in the Part 572, it

PART 571; S 208-PRE 315

questioned whether the acceleration limits should
apply to the Hybrid III. Volvo recommended chang-
ing the location of the accelerometer in the Hybrid
HI or using different chest acceleration criteria for
the Hybrid HI.

The agency recognizes that Hybrid HI ac-
celerometer placement should more correctly reflect
the overall response of the chest because it is placed
at the center of gravity of the chest. However, the
dimensional differences between the accelerometer
placements in the two test dummies are so small that
in restrained crash tests the differences in accelera-
tion response, if any, should be minimal.

Repeatability and Reproducibility

As discussed previously, test dummy repeatabil-
ity refers to the ability of one test dummy to
measure consistently the same responses when sub-
jected to the same test. Reproducibility refers to the
ability of two or more test dummies built to the same
specifications to measure consistently the same
responses when they are subjected to the same test.

Ford said that it is particularly concerned about
the repeatabOity of the chest acceleration and deflec-
tion measurements of the Hybrid III and about the
reproducibility of the Hybrid HI in testing by dif-
ferent laboratories. Ford said that once a test dum-
my positioning procedure has been established, the
agency .should conduct a series of 16 car crash tests
to verify the repeatability and reproducibility of the
Hybrid HI.

In its comments, GM provided data showing that
the repeatability of the Hybrid III is the same as the
existing Part 572 test dummy. Volvo, the only other
commenter that addressed repeatability, also said
that its preliminary tests show that the Hybrid III
has a repeatability comparable to the Part 572. The
agency's Vehicle Research and Test Center has also
evaluated the repeatability of the Hybrid III and the
Part 572 in a series of sled tests. The data from those
tests show that the repeatabOity of the two test dum-
mies is comparable. ("State-of-the-Art Dummy
Selection, Volume I" DOT Publication No. HS 806
722.)

GM also provided data showing that the
reproducibility of the Hybrid III is significantly bet-
ter than the Part 572. In its supplemental comments
filed on September 16, 1985, GM also said that
Ford's proposed 16 car test program was not
needed. GM said that "in such test the effects of
vehicle build variability and test procedure variabil-
ity would totally mask any effect of Hybrid HI
repeatability and reproducibility."

The agency agrees with GM that additional testing
is unnecessary. The information Provided by GM
and Volvo shows that the repeatability of the Hybrid
HI is at least as good as the repeatability of the ex-
isting Part 572 test dummy. Likewise, the GM data
show that the reproducibOity of the Hybrid III is bet-
ter than that of the existing Part 572 test dummy.
Likewise, the recent NHTSA-GM calibration test
series provides further confirmation that tests by
different laboratories show the repeatability and
reproducibility of the Hybrid III.

Equivalence of Hybrid III and Part 572

As noted in the April 1985 notice, the Hybrid III
and the Part 572 test dummies do not generate iden-
tical impact responses. Based on the available data,
the agency concluded that when both test dummies
are tested in lap/shoulder belts or with air cushions,
the differences between the two test dummies are
minimal. The agency also said that it knew of no
method for directly relating the response of the
Hybrid III to the Part 572 test dummy.

The purpose of comparing the response of the two
test dummies is to ensure that the Hybrid HI will
meet the need for safety by adequately identifying
vehicle designs which could cause or increase occu-
pant injury. The agency wants to ensure that per-
mitting a choice of test dummy will not lead to a
degradation in safety performance.

As mentioned previously, one major improvement
in the Hybrid HI is that it is more human-like in its
responses than the current Part 572 test dummy.
The primary changes to the Hybrid HI that make
it more human-like are to the neck, chest and knee.
Comparisons of the responses of the Part 572 and
Hybrid III test dummies show that responses of the
Hybrid III are closer than the Part 572 to the best
available data on human responses. (See Chapter II
of the Final Regulatory Evaluation on the Hybrid
HI.)

In addition to being more human-like, the Hybrid
HI has increased measurement capabilities for the
neck (tension, compression, and shear forces and
bending moments), chest (deflection), knee (knee
shear), and lower leg (knee and tibia forces and
moments). The availability of the extra injury
measuring capability of the Hybrid III gives vehicle
manufacturers the potential for gathering far more
information about the performance of their vehicle
designs than they can obtain with the Part 572.

To evaluate differences in the injury mea-
surements made by the Hybrid III and the existing
Part 572 test dummy, the agency has reviewed all
of the available data comparing the two test
dummies. The data come from a variety of sled

PART 571; S 208-PRE 316

barrier crash tests conducted by GM, Mercedes-
Benz, NHTSA, Nissan, and Volvo. The data include
tests where the dummies were unrestrained and
tests where the dummies were restrained by manual
lap/shoulder belts, automatic belts, and air bags. For
example, subsequent to issuance of the April 1985
notice, NHTSA did additional vehicle testing to com-
pare the Part 572 and Hybrid HI test dummies. The
agency conducted a series of crash tests using five
different types of vehicles to measure differences
in the responses of the test dummies. Some of the
tests were frontal 30 mile per hour barrier impacts,
such as are used in Standard No. 208 compliance
testing, while others were car-to-car tests. All of the
tests were done with unrestrained test dummies to
measure their impact responses under severe con-
ditions. The agency's analysis of the data for all of
the testing done by NHTSA and others is fully
described in the Final Regulatory Evaluation for this
rulemaking. This notice wall briefly review that
analysis.

One of the reasons for conducting the analysis was
to address the concern raised by the Center for Auto
Safety (CAS) in its original petition and the In-
surance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) in its
comments that the Hybrid HI produces lower HIC
responses than the existing Part 572 test dummy.
As discussed in detail below, the test data do not
show a trend for one type of test dummy to con-
sistently measure higher or lower HIC's or femur
readings than the other. Based on these test data,
the agency concludes that the concern expressed by
CAS and IIHS that the use of the Hybrid III test
dummy will give a manufacturer an advantage in
meeting the HIC performance requirement of
Standard No. 208 is not valid.

In the case of chest acceleration measurements,
the data again do not show consistently higher or
lower measurements for either test dummy, except
in the case of unrestrained tests. In unrestrained
tests, the data show that the Hybrid HI generally
measures lower chest g's than the existing Part 572
test dummy. This difference in chest g's measure-
ment is one reason why the agency is adopting the
additional chest deflection measurement for the
Hybrid III, as discussed further below.

HIC Measurements

The April 1985 notice specifically invited com-
ments on the equivalence of the Head Injury
Criterion (HIC) measurements of the two test dum-
mies. Limited laboratory testing done in a Univer-
sity of California at San Diego study conducted by
Dr. Dennis Schneider and others had indicated that

the Hybrid III test dummy generates lower accelera-
tion responses than either the Part 572 test dummy
or cadaver heads in impacts with padded surfaces.
The notice explained that the reasons for those dif-
ferences had not yet been resolved.

In its comments, GM explained that it had con-
ducted a series of studies to address the Schneider
results. GM said that those studies showed that the
Schneider test results are "complicated by the
changing characteristics of the padding material
used on his impact surface. As a result, his tests do
not substantiate impactor response difference be-
tween the Hybrid HI head, the Part 572 head and
cadaver heads. After examining our reports, Dr.
Schneider agreed writh the finding that padding
degradation resulting from multiple impact ex-
posures rendered an input-response comparison in-
valid between the cadaver and the dummies." (The
GM and Schneider letters are filed in Docket 74-14,
General Reference, Entry 556.)

The agency's Vehicle Research and Test Center has
also conducted head drop tests of the current Part
572 and Hybrid III heads. The tests were conducted
by dropping the heads onto a two inch thick steel
plate, a surface which is considerably more rigid than
any surface that the test dummy's head would hit in
a vehicle crash test. One purpose of the tests was to
assess the performance of the heads in an impact
which can produce skull fractures in cadavers. The
tests found that the response of the Hybrid III head
was more human-like at the fracture and subfracture
acceleration levels than the Part 572 head. The
testing did show that in these severe impacts into
thick steel plates, the HIC scores for the Hybrid III
were lower than for the Part 572. However, as
discussed below, when the Hybrid III is tested in vehi-
cle crash and sled tests, which are representative of
occupant impacts into actual vehicle structiires, the
HIC scores for the Hybrid III are not consistently
lower than those of the Part 572 test dummy.

The agency examined crash and sled tests, done
by GM, Mercedes-Benz, NHTSA and Volvo, in which
both a Hybrid III and the existing Part 572 test dum-
my were restrained by manual lap/shoulder belts.
(The complete results from those and all the other
tests reviewed by the agency are discussed in
Chapter III of the Final Regulatory Evaluation on
the Hybrid III.) The HIC responses in those tests
show that the Hybrid HI generally had higher HIC
responses than the Part 572 test dummy. Although
the data show that the Hybrid Ill's HIC responses
are generally higher, in some cases 50 percent
higher than the Part 572, there are some tests in
which the Hybrid Ill's responses were 50 percent
lower than the responses of the Part 572.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 317

For two-point automatic belts, the agency has
limited barrier crash test data and the direct com-
parability of the data is questionable. The tests using
the existing Part 572 test dummy were done in 1976
on 1976 VW Rabbits for compliance purposes. The
Hybrid III tests were done in 1985 by the agency's
Vehicle Research and Test Center as part of the
SRL-98 test series on a 1982 and a 1984 VW Rabbit.
Differences in the seats, safety belts, and a number
of other vehicle parameters between these model
years and between the test set-ups could affect the
results. In the two-point automatic belt tests, the
data show that the Hybrid III measured somewhat
higher head accelerations than the existing Part 572
test dummy. In two-point automatic belts, the dif-
ferences appear to be minimal for the driver and
substantially larger for the passenger. In air bag sled
tests, the Hybrid Ill's HIC responses were generally
lower; in almost all the air bag tests, the HIC
responses of both the Hybrid III and the Part 572
test dummies were substantially below the HIC limit
of 1,000 set in Standard No. 208. Because of the
severe nature of the unrestrained sled and barrier
tests, in which the uncontrolled movement of the
test dummy can result in impacts with different
vehicle structures, there was no consistent trend for
either test dummy to measure higher or lower HIC
responses than the other.

Chest Measurements

For manual lap/shoulder belts, NHTSA compared
the results from GM, Mercedes-Benz, NHTSA, and
Volvo sled tests, and GM frontal barrier tests. The
NHTSA sled test results at 30 and the Volvo sled
test results at 31 mph are very consistent, with the
mean Hybrid III chest acceleration response being
only 2-3 g's higher than the response of the existing
Part 572 test dummy. In the 35 mph Volvo sled
tests, the Hybrid III chest acceleration response was
up to 44 percent higher than the existing Part 572
response. The GM 30 mph sled and barrier test data
were fairly evenly divided. In general, the Hybrid
III chest acceleration response is slightly higher than
that of the existing Part 572 test dummy. The
agency concludes from these data that at Standard
No. 208's compliance test speed (30 mph) with
manual lap/shoulder belts there are no large dif-
ferences in chest acceleration responses between the
two dummies. In some vehicles, the Hybrid III may
produce slightly higher responses and in other
vehicles it may produce slightly lower responses.

As discussed earlier, the agency has limited test
data on automatic belt tests and their comparability
is questionable. The Hybrid III chest acceleration

responses are up to 1.5 times higher than those for
the existing Part 572 test dummy. Only very limited
sled test data are available on air bags alone, air bag
plus lap belt, and air bag plus lap/shoulder belt. In
all cases, the Hybrid III chest acceleration responses
were lower than those for the existing Part 572 test
dummy.

For unrestrained occupants, the Hybrid III pro-
duces predominantly lower chest acceleration
responses than the existing Part 572 test dummy
in sled and barrier tests, and in some cases the dif-
ference is significant. In some tests, the Hybrid III
chest acceleration response can be 40 to 45 percent
lower than the Part 572 response, although in other
tests the acceleration measured by the Hybrid III
can exceed that measured by the Part 572 test
dummy by 10 to 15 percent.

In summary, the test data indicate the chest ac-
celeration responses between the Hybrid III and the
existing Part 572 test dummy are about the same
for restrained occupants, but differ for some cases
of unrestrained occupants. This is to be expected
since a restraint system would tend to make the two
dummies react similarly even though they have dif-
ferent seating postures. The different seating
postures, however, would allow unrestrained
dummies to impact different vehicle surfaces which
would in most instances produce different responses.
Since the Hybrid III dummy is more human-like, it
should experience loading conditions that are more
human-like than would the existing Part 572 test
dummy. One reason that the agency is adding a
chest deflection criterion for the Hybrid III is that
the unrestrained dummy's chest may experience
more severe impacts with vehicle structures than
would be experienced in an automatic belt or air bag
collision. Chest deflection provides an additional
measurement of potential injury that may not be
detected by the chest acceleration measurement.

Femur Measurements

The test data on the femur responses of the two
types of test dummies also do not show a trend for
one test dummy to measure consistently higher or
lower responses than the other. In lap/shoulder belt
tests, GM's sled and barrier tests from 1977 show
a trend toward lower measurements for the Hybrid
III, but GM's more recent tests in 1982-83 show the
reverse situation. These tests, however, are of little
significance unless there is femur loading due to knee
contact. These seldom occur to lap/shoulder belt
restrained test dummies. Also, in none of the tests
described above do the measurements approach
Standard No. 208's limit of 2250 pounds for femur

PART 571; S 208-PRE 318

loads. The air bag test data are limited; however,
they show little difference between the femur
responses of the two test dummies. As would be ex-
pected, the unrestrained tests showed no systematic
differences, because of the variability in the impact
locations of an unrestrained test dummy.

Injury Criteria

Many manufacturers raised objections to the ad-
ditional injury criteria proposed in the April 1985
notice. AMC, Ford, and MVMA argued that adopt-
ing the numerous injury criteria proposed in the
April 1985 notice would compound a manufacturer's
compliance test problems. For example. Ford said
it "would be impracticable to require vehicles to
meet such a multitude of criteria in a test with such
a high level of demonstrated variability. Notice 39
appears to propose 21 added pass-fail measurements
per dummy, for a total of 25 pass-fail measurements
per dummy, or 50 pass-fail measurements per test.
Assimiing these measurements were all independent
of one another, and a car design had a 95% chance
of obtaining a passing score on each measurement,
the chance of obtaining a passing score on all
measurements in any single test for a single dummy
would be less than 28% and for both dummies would
be less than 8%." Ford, Nissan, VW and Volvo also
said that with the need for additional measurements,
there will be an increase in the number of tests with
incomplete data. BMW, while supporting the use of
the Hybrid III as a potential improvement to safety,
said that the number of measurements needed for
the additional injury criteria is beyond the capability
of its present data processing equipment.

VW said there is a need to do additional vehicle
testing before adopting any new criteria. It said that
if current production vehicles already meet the
additional criteria then the criteria only increase
testing variability without increasing safety. If cur-
rent vehicles cannot comply, then additional infor-
mation is needed about the countermeasures needed
to meet the criteria. Honda said there are insuffi-
cient data to determine the relationship between ac-
tual injury levels and the proposed injury criterion.

As discussed in detail below, the agency has
decided to adopt only one additional injury criterion,
chest deflection, at this time. The agency plans to
issue another notice on the remaining criteria pro-
posed in the April 1985 notice to gather additional
information on the issues raised by the commenters.

Alternative HIC Calculations

The April 1985 notice set forth two proposed alter-
native methods of using the head injury criterion

(HIC) in situations when there is no contact between
the test dummy's head and the vehicle's interior
during a crash. The first proposed alternative was
to retain the current HIC formula, but limit its
calculation to periods of head contact only. However,
in non-contact situations, the agency proposed that
an HIC would not be calculated, but instead new
neck injury criteria would be calculated. The agency
explained that a crucial element necessary for
deciding whether to use the HIC calculation or the
neck criteria was an objective technique for deter-
mining the occurrence and duration of head contact
in the crash test. As discussed in detail in the April
1985 notice, there are several methods available for
establishing the duration of head contact, but there
are questions about their levels of consistency and
accuracy.

The second alternative proposed by the agency
would have calculated an HIC in both contact and
non-contact situations, but it would limit the calcula-
tion to a time interval of 36 milliseconds. Along with
the requirement that an HIC not exceed 1,000, this
would limit average head acceleration to 60 g's or
less for any durations exceeding 36 milliseconds.

Almost all of the commenters opposed the use of
the first proposed alternative. The commenters
uniformly noted that there is no current technique
that can accurately identify whether head contact
has or has not occured during a crash test in all situa-
tions. However, the Center for Auto Safety urged
the agency to adopt the proposed neck criteria,
regardless of whether the HIC calculation is
modified.

There was a sharp division among the commenters
regarding the use of the second alternative; although
many manufacturers argued that the HIC calculation
should be limited to a time interval of approximately
15 to 17 milliseconds (ms), which would limit average
long duration (i.e., greater than 15-17 milliseconds)
head accelerations to 80-85 g's. Mercedes-Benz,
which supported the second alternative, urged the
agency to measure HIC only during the time inter-
val that the acceleration level in the head exceeds 60
g's. It said that this method would more effectively
differentiate results received in contacts with hard
surfaces and results obtained from systems, such as
airbags, which provide good distribution of the loads
experienced during a crash. The Center for Auto
Safety, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
and State Farm argued that the current HIC calcula-
tion should be retained; they said that the proposed
alternative would lower HIC calculations without en-
suring that motorists were still receiving adequate
head protection.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 319

NHTSA is in the process of reexamining the
potential effects of the two alternatives proposed by
the agency and of the two additional alternatives
suggested by the commenters. Once that review has
been completed, the agency will issue a separate
notice announcing its decision.

Thorax

At present, Standard No. 208 uses an acceleration-
based criterion to measure potential injuries to the
chest. The agency believes that the use of a chest
deflection criterion is an important supplement to
the existing chest injury criterion. Excessive chest
deflection can produce rib fractures, which can
impair breathing and inflict damage to the internal
organs in the chest. The proposed deflection limit
would only apply to the Hybrid III test dummy, since
unlike the existing Part 572 test dummy, it has a
chest which is designed to deflect like a human chest
and has the capability to measure deflection of the
sternum relative to the spine, as well as accelera-
tion, during an impact.

The agency proposed a three-inch chest deflection
limit for systems, such as air bags, which sym-
metrically load the chest during a crash and a two-
inch limit for all other systems. The reason for the
different proposed limits is that a restraint system
that symmetrically and uniformly applies loads to
the chest increases the ability to withstand chest
deflection as measured by the deflection sensor,
which is centrally located in the dummy.

The commenters generally supported adoption of
a chest deflection injury criterion. For example.
Ford said it supported the use of a chest deflection
criterion since it may provide a better means of
assessing the risk of rib fractures. Likewise, the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety said the
chest deflection criteria, "will aid in evaluating injury
potential especially in situations where there is chest
contact with the steering wheel or other interior
components." IIHS also supported adoption of a
three-inch deflection limit for inflatable systems and
a two-inch limit for all other systems. However, most
of the other commenters addressing the proposed
chest deflection criteria questioned the use of dif-
ferent criteria for different restraint systems.

GM supported limiting chest deflections to three-
inches in all systems. GM said that it uses a two-inch
limit as a guideline for its safety belt system testing,
but it had no data to indicate that the two-inch limit
is appropriate as a compliance limit.

Renault/Peugeot also questioned the three-inch
deflection limit for systems that load the dummy
symmetrically and two inches for systems that do

not. It said that the difference between those
systems should be addressed by relocation of the
deflection sensors. It also asked the agency to define
what constitutes a symmetrical system. VW also
questioned the appropriateness of setting separate
limits for chest compression for different types of
restraint systems. It recommended adoption of a
three-inch limit for all types of restraint systems.

Volvo also raised questions about the ap-
propriateness of the proposed deflection criteria.
Volvo said that the GM-developed criteria proposed
in the April 1985 notice were based on a comparison
of accident data gathered by Volvo and evaluated
by GM in sled test simulations using the Hybrid III
test dummy. Volvo said that the report did not
analyze "whether the chest injuries were related to
the chest acceleration or the chest deflection, or a
combination of both."

The agency recognizes that there are several dif-
ferent types of potential chest injury mechanisms
and that it may not be possible to precisely isolate
and measure what is the relevant contribution of
each type of mechanism to the final resulting injury.
However, there is a substantial amount of data in-
dicating that chest deflection is an important con-
tributing factor to chest injury. In addition, the data
clearly demonstrate that deflection of greater than
three inches can lead to serious injury. For example,
research done by Neathery and others has examined
the effects of frontal impacts to cadaver chests with
an impactor that represents the approximate dimen-
sions of a steering wheel hub. Neathery correlated
the measured injuries with the amount of chest
deflection and recommended that for a 50th percen-
tile male, chest deflection not exceed three inches.
(Neathery, R. F., "Analysis of Chest Impact
Response Data and Scaled Performance Recommen-
dations," SAE Paper No. 741188)

Work by Walfisch and others looked at crash tests
of lap/shoulder belt restrained cadavers. They found
that substantial injury began to occur when the
sternum deflection exceeded 30 percent of the
available chest depth ("Tolerance Limits and
Mechanical Characteristic of the Human Thorax in
Frontal and Side Impact and Transposition of these
Characteristics into Protective Criteria," 1982
IRCOBI Conference Proceedings). With the chest
of the average man being approximately 9.3 inches
deep, the 30 percent limit would translate into a
deflection limit of approximately 2.8 inches. Since
the chest of the Hybrid III test dummy deflects
somewhat less than a human chest under similar
loading conditions, the chest deflection limit for
systems which do not symmetrically and uniformly

PART 571; S 208-PRE 320

load the chest, such as lap/shoulder belts, must be
set at a level below 2.8 inches to assure an adequate
level of protection.

To determine the appropriate level for non-
symmetrical systems, the agency first reviewed a
number of test series in which cadaver injury levels
were measured under different impact conditions.
(All of the test results are fully discussed in Chapter
III of the Final Regulatory Evaluation on the Hybrid
III.) The impact conditions included 30 mph sled
tests done for the agency by Wayne State Univer-
sity in which a pre-inflated, non-vented air bag
system symmetrically and uniformly spread the im-
pact load on the chest of the test subject. NHTSA
also reviewed 30 mph sled tests done for the agency
by the University of Heidelberg which used a
lap/shoulder belt system, which does not sym-
metrically and uniformly spread chest loads. In
addition, the agency reviewed 10 and 15 mph pen-
dulum impact tests done for GM to evaluate the
effects of concentrated loadings, such as might oc-
cur in passive interior impacts. The agency then
compared the chest deflection results for Hybrid III
test dummies subjected to the same impact condi-
tions. By comparing the cadaver and Hybrid III
responses under identical impact conditions, the
agency was able to relate the deflection
measurements made by the Hybrid III to a level of
injury received by a cadaver.

The test results show that when using a relatively
stiff air bag, which was pre-inflated and non-vented,
the average injury level measured on the cadavers
corresponded to an Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS)
of 1.5. (The AIS scale is used by researchers to
classify injuries an AIS of one is a minor injury, while
an AIS of three represents a serious injury.) In tests
with the Hybrid III under the same impact condi-
tions, the measured deflection was 2.7 inches. These
results demonstrate that a system that symmetri-
cally and uniformly distributes impact loads over the
chest can produce approximately threeinches of
deflection and still adequately protect an occupant
from serious injury.

The testing in which the impact loads were not
uniformly or symmetrically spread on the chest or
were highly concentrated over a relatively small area
indicated that chest deflection measured on the
Hybrid III must be limited to 2-inches to assure
those systems provide a level of protection compar-
able to that provided by systems that symmetrically
spread the load. In the lap/shoulder belt tests, the
average AIS was 2.6. The measured deflection for
the Hybrid III chest in the same type of impact test
was 1.6 inches. Likewise, the results from the

pendulum impact tests showed that as the chest
deflection measured on the Hybrid III increased, the
severity of the injuries increased. In the 10 mph pen-
dulum impacts, the average AIS was 1.3 and the
average deflection was 1.3 inches. In the 15 mph
pendulum impacts the average AIS rose to 2.8.
Under the same impact conditions, the chest deflec-
tion measured on the Hybrid III was 2.63 inches.

Based on these test results NHTSA has decided
to retain the two-inch limit on chest deflection for
systems that do not symmetrically and uniformly
distribute impact loads over a wide area of the chest.
Such systems include automatic safety belts, passive
interiors and air bag systems which use a lap and
shoulder belt. For systems, such as air bag only
systems or air bag combined with a lap belt, which
symmetrically and uniformly distribute chest forces
over a large area of the chest, the agency is adopt-
ing the proposed three-inch deflection limit. This
should assure that both symmetrical and non-
symmetrical systems provide the same level of pro-
tection in an equivalent frontal crash.

In addition to the biomechanical basis for the chest
deflection limits adopted in this notice, there is
another reason for adopting a two-inch deflection
limit for systems that can provide concentrated
loadings over a limited area of the test dummy. The
Hybrid III measures chest deflection by a deflection
sensor located near the third rib of the test dummy.
Tests conducted on the Hybrid III by NHTSA's
Vehicle Research and Test Center have shown that
the deflection sensor underestimates chest displace-
ment when a load is applied to a small area away
from the deflection sensor. (The test report is filed
in Docket No. 74-14, General Reference, Entry 606.)

In a crash, when an occupant is not restrained by
a system which provides centralized, uniform
loading to a large area, such as an air bag system,
the thorax deflection sensor can underestimate the
actual chest compression. Thus, in a belt-restrained
test dummy, the deflection sensor may read two-
inches of deflection, but the actual deflection caused
by the off-center loading of a belt near the bottom
of the ribcage may be greater than two inches of
deflection. Likewise, test dummies in passive in-
terior cars may receive substantial off-center and
concentrated loadings. For example, the agency has
conducted sled tests simulating 30 mile per hour
frontal barrier impacts in which unrestrained test
dummies struck the steering column, as they would
do in a passive interior equipped car. Measurements
of the pre- and post-impact dimensions of the steer-
ing wheel rim showed that there was substantial
non-symmetrical steering wheel deformation, even
though these were frontal impacts. (See, e.g.,

PART 571; S 208-PRE 321

"Frontal Occupant Sled Simulation Correlation,
1983 Chevrolet Celebrity Sled Buck," Publication
No. DOT HS 806 728, February 1985.) The expected
off-center chest loadings in belt and passive interior
systems provide a further basis for applying a two-
inch deflection limit for those systems to assure they
provide protection comparable to that provided by
symmetrical systems.

Use of Acceleration Limits for Air Bag Systems

Two commenters raised questions about the use
of an acceleration-based criterion for vehicles which
use a combined air bag and lap/shoulder belt system.
Mercedes-Benz said that acceleration-based criteria
are not appropriate for systems that reduce the
deflection of the ribs but increase chest acceleration
values. Ford also questioned the use of acceleration-
based criteria. Ford said that its tests and testing
done by Mercedes-Benz have shown that using an
air bag in combination with a lap/shoulder belt can
result in increased chest acceleration readings. Ford
said it knew of no data to indicate that combined air
bag-lap/shoulder belt system loads are more in-
jurious than shoulder belt loads alone. Ford recom-
mended that manufacturers have the option of using
either the chest acceleration or chest deflection
criterion until use of the Hybrid III is mandatory.

As discussed previously, acceleration and deflec-
tion represent two separate types of injury
mechanisms. Therefore, the agency believes that it
is important to test for both criteria. Although the
tests by Mercedes-Benz and Ford show higher chest
accelerations, the tests also show that it is possible
to develop air bag and lap/shoulder belt systems and
meet both criteria. Therefore, the agency is retain-
ing the use of the acceleration-based criterion.

Use of Additional Sensors

Mercedes-Benz said the deflection measuring in-
strumentation of the Hybrid HI cannot adequately
measure the interaction between the chest and a
variety of vehicle components. Mercedes-Benz said
that it is necessary to use either additional deflec-
tion sensors or strain gauges. Renault/Peugeot
recommended that the agency account for the dif-
ference between symmetrical systems and asym-
metrical systems by relocating the deflection sensor.

The agency recognizes that the use of additional
sensors could be beneficial in the Hybrid HI to
measure chest deflection. However, such technology
would require considerable further development
before it could be used for compliance purposes.
NHTSA believes that, given the current level of
technology, use of a single sensor is sufficient for

the assessment of deflection-caused injuries in
frontal impacts.

Fem,urs

The April 1985 notice proposed to apply the femur
injury reduction criterion used with the Part 572 test
dummy to the Hybrid HI. That criterion limits the
femur loads to 2250 pounds to reduce the possibil-
ity of femur fractures. No commenter objected to
the proposed femur limit and it is accordingly
adopted.

Ford and Toyota questioned the need to conduct
three pendulum impacts for the knee. They said that
using one pendulum impact with the largest mass
impactor (11 pounds) was sufficient. GM has
informed the agency that the lower mass pendulum
impactors were used primarily for the development
of an appropriate knee design. Now that the knee
design is settled and controlled by the technical
drawings, the tests with the low mass impactors are
not needed. Accordingly, the agency is adopting the
suggestion from Ford and Toyota to reduce the
number of knee calibration tests and will require
only the use of the 11-pound pendulum impactor.

Hybrid III Positioning Procedure

The April notice proposed new positioning pro-
cedures for the Hybrid HI, primarily because the
curved lumbar spine of that test dummy requires a
different positioning technique than those for the
Part 572. Based on its testing experience, NHTSA
proposed adopting a slightly different version of the
positioning procedure used by GM. The difference
was the proposed use of the Hybrid HI, rather than
the SAE J826 H-point machine, with slightly
modified leg segments, to determine the H-point of
the seat.

GM urged the agency to adopt its dummy position-
ing procedure. GM said that users can more con-
sistently position the test dimimy's H-point using the
SAE H-point machine rather than using the Hybrid
HI. Ford, while explaining that it had insufficient
experience with the Hybrid HI to develop data on
positioning procedures, also urged the agency to
adopt GM's positioning procedure. Ford said that
since GM has developed its repeatability data on the
Hybrid HI using its positioning procedure, the
agency should use it as well. Ford also said that the
use of GM's method to position the test dummy
relative to the H-point should reduce variability.

Based on a new series of dummy positioning tests
done by the agency's Vehicle Research and Test
Center (VRTC), NHTSA agrees that use of the SAE
H-point machine is the most consistent method to
position the dummy's H-point on the vehicle seat.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 322

Accordingly, the agency is adopting the use of the
H-point machine.

In the new test series, VRTC also evaluated a
revised method for positioning the Hybrid III test
dummy. The testing was done after the results of
a joint NHTSA-SAE test series conducted in
November 1985 showed that the positioning pro-
cedure used for the current Part 572 test dummy
and the one proposed in the April 1985 notice for
the Hybrid III does not satisfactorily work in all cars.
(See Docket 74-14, Notice 39, Entry 39.) The posi-
tioning problems are principally due to the curved
lumbar spine of the Hybrid III test dummy. In its
tests, VRTC positioned the Hybrid III by using the
SAE H-point machine and a specification detailing
the final position of the Hybrid III body segments
prior to the crash test. The test results showed that
the H-point of the test dummy could be consistently
positioned but that the vertical location of the
Hybrid III H-point is V4 inch below the SAE H-point
machine on average. Based on these results, the
agency is adopting the new positioning specification
for the Hybrid III which requires the H-point of the
dimimy to be within a specified zone centered V4 inch
below the H-point location of the SAE H-point
machine.

GM also urged the agency to make another slight
change in the test procedures. GM said that when
it settles the test dummy in the seat it uses a thin
sheet of plastic behind the dummy to reduce the fric-
tion between the fabric of the seat back and the
dummy. The plastic is removed after the dummy has
been positioned. GM said this technique allows the
dummy to be more repeatably positioned. The
agency agrees that use of the plastic sheet can
reduce friction between the test dummy and the
seat. However, the use of the plastic can also create
problems, such as dislocating the test dummy during
removal of the plastic. Since the agency has suc-
cessfully conducted its positioning tests without
using a sheet of plastic, the agency does not believe
there is a need to require its use.

Ford noted that the test procedure calls for testing
vertically adjustable seats in their lowest position.
It said such a requirement was reasonable for ver-
tically adjustable seats that could not be adjusted
higher than seats that are not vertically adjustable.
However, Ford said that new power seats can be
adjusted to positions above and below the manually
adjustable seat position. It said that testing power
seats at a different position would increase testing
variability. Ford recommended adjusting vertically
adjustable seats so that the dummy's hip point is as
close as possible to the manufacturer's design

H-point with the seat at the design mid-point of its
travel.

The agency recognizes that the seat adjustment
issue raised by Ford may lead to test variability.
However, the agency does not have any data on the
effect of Ford's suggested solution on the design of
other manufacturer's power seats. The agency will
solicit comments on Ford's proposal in the NPRM
addressing additional Hybrid III injury criteria.

Volvo said that the lumbar supports of its seats
influence the positioning of the Hybrid III. It
requested that the test procedure specify that
adjustable lumbar supports should be positioned in
their rearmost position. Ford made a similar re-
quest. GM, however, indicated that it has not had
any problems positioning the Hybrid III in seats with
lumbar supports. To reduce positioning problems
resulting from the lumbar supports in some vehicles,
the agency is adopting Ford's and Volvo's sug-
gestion.

Test Data Analysis

The Chairman of the Society of Automotive
Engineers Safety Test Instrumentation Committee
noted that the agency proposed to reference an
earlier version of the SAE Recommended Practice
on Instrumentation (SAE J211a, 1971). He sug-
gested that the agency reference the most recent
version (SAE J211, 1980), saying that better data
correlation between different testing organizations
would result. The agency agrees with SAE and is
adopting the SAE J211, 1980 version of the in-
strumentation Recommended Practice.

Ford and GM recommended that the figures 25
and 26, which proposed a standardized coordinate
system for major body segments of the test dummy,
be revised to reflect the latest industry practice on
coordinate signs. Since those revisions will help
ensure uniformity in data analysis by different test
facilities, the agency is making the changes for the
test measurements adopted in this rulemaking.

Both GM and Ford also recommended changes in
the filter used to process electronically measured
crash data. GM suggested that a class 180 filter be
used for the neck force transducer rather than the
proposed class 60 filter. Ford recommended the use
of a class 1,000 filter, which is the filter used for the
head accelerometer.

NHTSA has conducted all of the testing used to
develop the calibration test requirement for the neck
using a class 60 filter. The agency does not have any
data showing the effects of using either the class 180
filter proposed by GM or the class 1,000 filter
proposed by Ford. Therefore the agency has adopted

PART 571; S 208-PRE 323

the use of a class 60 filter for the neck transducer
during the calibration test. The agency also used a
class 60 filter for the accelerometer mounted on the
neck pendulum and is therefore adopting the use of
that filter to ensure uniformity in measuring pen-
dulum acceleration.

Optional and Mandatory Use of Hybrid III

AMC, Chrysler, Ford, Jaguar and Subaru all
urged the agency to defer a decision on permitting
the optional use of the Hybrid III test dummy until
manufacturers have had more experience with using
that test dummy. AMC said it has essentially no
experience with the Hybrid HI and urged the agency
to postpone a decision on allowing the optional use
of that test dummy. AMC said this would give small
manufacturers time to gain experience with the
Hybrid HI.

Chrysler also said that it has no experience with
the Hybrid HI test dummy and would need to con-
duct two years of testing to be able to develop suffi-
cient information to address the issues raised in the
notice. Chrysler said that it was currently develop-
ing its 1991 and 1992 models and has no data from
Hybrid HI test dummies on which to base its design
decisions. It said that allowing the optional use of
the Hybrid HI before that time would give a com-
petitive advantage to manufacturers with more
experience with the test device and suggested in-
definitely postponing the mandatory effective date.

Ford said that the effective date proposed for
optional use of the Hybrid HI should be deferred to
allow time to resolve the problems Ford raised in
its comments and to allow manufacturers time to
acquire Hybrid III test dummies. It suggested defer-
ring the proposed optional use until at least
September 1, 1989. Ford also recommended that the
mandatory use be deferred. Jaguar also said it has
not had experience with the Hybrid HI and asked
that manufacturers have until September 1, 1987,
to accumulate information on the performance of the
test dummy. Subaru said that it has exclusively used
the Part 572 test dummy and does not have any ex-
perience with the Hybrid HI. It asked the agency
to provide time for all manufacturers to gain ex-
perience with the Hybrid III, which in its case would
be two years, before allowing the Hybrid III as an
alternative.

A number of manufacturers, such as GM, Honda,
Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen, and Volvo, that sup-
ported optional use of the Hybrid HI, urged the
agency not to mandate its use at this time. GM asked
the agency to permit the immediate optional use of
the Hybrid HI, but urged NHTSA to provide more

time for all interested parties to become familiar
with the test dummy before mandating its use.
Honda said that while it supported optional use, it
was just beginning to assess the performance of the
Hybrid III and needed more time before the use of
the Hybrid III is mandated. Mercedes-Benz also sup-
ported the use of the Hybrid HI as an alternative
test device because of its capacity to measure more
types of injuries and because of its improved
biofidelity for the neck and thorax. However,
Mercedes recommended against mandatory use until
issues concerning the Hybrid Ill's use in side impact,
the biofidelity of its leg, durability and chest deflec-
tion measurements are resolved. Nissan opposed the
mandatory us of the Hybrid HI saying there is a
need to further investigate the differences between
the Hybrid HI and the Part 572. Toyota said that
it was premature to set a mandatory effective date
until the test procedure and injury criteria questions
are resolved. Volkswagen supported the adoption of
the Hybrid HI as an alternative test device, but it
opposed mandating its use. Volvo supported the op-
tional use of the Hybrid HI. It noted that since
NHTSA is developing an advanced test dummy,
there might not be a need to require the use of the
Hybrid HI in the interim.

The agency recognizes that manufacturers are
concerned about obtaining the Hybrid III test
dummy and gaining experience with its use prior to
the proposed September 1, 1991, date for mandatory
use of that test dummy. However, information pro-
vided by the manufacturers of the Hybrid HI shows
that it will take no longer than approximately one
year to supply all manufacturers with sufficient
quantities of Hybrid Ill's. This means that manufac-
turers will have, at a minimum, more than four years
to gain experience in using the Hybrid HI. In addi-
tion, to assist manufacturers in becoming familiar
with the Hybrid HI, NHTSA has been placing in the
rulemaking docket complete information on the
agency's research programs using the Hybrid HI
test dummy in crash and calibration tests. Since
manufacturers will have sufficient time to obtain and
gain experience with the Hybrid HI by September
1, 1991, the agency has decided to mandate use of
the Hybrid HI as of that date.

As discussed earlier in this notice, the evidence
shows that the Hybrid HI is more human-like in its
responses to impacts than the existing Part 572 test
dummy. In addition, the Hybrid III has the capability
to measure far more potential injuries than the cur-
rent test dummy. The agency is taking advantage
of that capability by adopting a limitation on chest
deflection which will enable NHTSA to measure a

PART 571; S 208-PRE 324

significant source of injury that cannot be measured
on the current test dummy. The combination of the
better biofidelity and increased injury-measuring
capability available with the Hybrid III will enhance
vehicle safety.

Adoption of the Hybrid HI will not give a com-
petitive advantage to GM, as claimed by some of the
commenters, such as Chrysler and Ford. As the
developer of the Hybrid HI, GM obviously has had
more experience with that test dummy than other
manufacturers. However, as discussed above, the
agency has provided sufficient leadtime to allow all
manufacturers to develop sufficient experience with
the Hybrid HI test dummy. In addition, as discussed
in the equivalency section of this notice, there are
no data to suggest that it will be easier for GM or
other manufacturers to meet the performance re-
quirements of Standard No. 208 with the Hybrid III.
Thus GM and other manufacturers using Hybrid III
during the phase-in period will not have a com-
petitive advantage over manufacturers using the
existing Part 572 test dummy.

Finally, in its comments GM suggested that the
agency consider providing manufacturers vdth an
incentive to use the Hybrid III test dummy. GM said
that the agency should consider providing manufac-
turers with extra vehicle credits during the
automatic restraint phase-in period for using the
Hybrid III. The agency does not believe it is
necessary to provide any additional incentive to use
the Hybrid III. The mandatory effective date for use
of the Hybrid III provides sufficient incentive, since
manufacturers will want to begin using the Hybrid
III as soon as possible to gain experience with the
test dummy before that date.

Optional use of the Hybrid HI may begin October
23, 1986. The agency is setting an effective date of
less than 180 days to facilitate the efforts of those
manufacturers wishing to use the Hybrid III in cer-
tifying compliance with the automatic restraint
requirements.

Use of Non-instrumented Test Dummies

Ford raised a question about whether the Hybrid
III may or must be used for the non-crash perfor-
mance requirements of Standard No. 208, such as
the comfort and convenience requirements of S7.4.3,
7.4.4, and 7.4.5 of the standard. Ford said that
manufacturers should be given the option of using
either the Part 572 or Hybrid III test dummy to
meet the comfort and convenience requirements.
The agency agrees that until September 1, 1991,
manufacturers should have the option of using either
the Part 572 or Hybrid III test dummy. However,
since it is important the crash performance
requirements and comfort and convenience

requirements be linked together through the use of
a single test dummy to measure a vehicle's ability
to meet both sets of requirements. Therefore, begin-
ning on September 1, 1991, use of the Hybrid III
will be mandatory in determining a vehicle's com-
pliance with any of the requirements of Standard
No. 208.

In addition. Ford asked the agency to clarify
whether manufacturers can continue to use Part 572
test dummies in the crash tests for Standard Nos.
212, 219, and 301, which only use non-instrumented
test dummies to simulate the weight of an occupant.
Ford said that the small weight difference and the
small difference in seated posture between the two
test dummies should have no effect on the results
of the testing for Standard Nos. 212, 219, and 301.
The agency agrees that use of either test dummy
should not affect the test results for those standards.
Thus, even after the September 1, 1991, effective
date for use of the Hybrid III in the crash and non-
crash testing required by Standard No. 208,
manufacturers can continue to use, at their option,
either the Part 572 or the Hybrid III test dummy
in tests conducted in accordance with Standard Nos.
212, 219, and 301.

Economic and Other Impacts

NHTSA has examined the impact of this rulemak-
ing action and determined that it is not major within
the meaning of Executive Order 12291 or significant
within the meaning of the Department of Transpor-
tation's regulatory policies and procedures. The
agency has also determined that the economic and
other impacts of this rulemaking action are not
significant. A final regulatory evaluation describing
those effects has been placed in the docket.

In preparing the regulatory evaluation, the agency
has considered the comments from several manufac-
turers that the agency had underestimated the costs
associated with using the Hybrid III. Ford said that
the cost estimates contained in the April 1 985 notice
did not take into account the need to conduct sled
tests during development work. Ford said that for
1985, it estimated it will conduct 500 sled tests re-
quiring 1000 test dummy applications. Ford also said
that NHTSA's estimate of the test dummy inven-
tory needed by a manufacturer is low. It said that
it currently has an inventory of 31 Part 572 test
dummies and would expect to need a similar inven-
tory of Hybrid Ill's. In addition. Ford said that
NHTSA's incremental cost estimate of $3,000 per
test dummy was low. It said that the cost for
monitoring the extra data generated by the Hybrid
III is $2,700. Ford said that it also would have to
incur costs due to upgrading its data acquisition and
data processing equipment.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 325

GM said that NHTSA's estimate of a 30-test useful
life for the test dummy substantially underestimates
its actual useful life, assuming the test dummy is
repaired periodically. It said that some of its
dummies have been used in more than 150 tests. GM
also said that the agency's assumption that a large
manufacturer conducts testing requiring ap-
proximately 600 dummy applications each year
underestimates the actual number of tests
conducted. In 1984, GM said it conducted sled and
barrier tests requiring 1179 dummy applications.
GM said that the two underestimates, in effect,
cancel each other out, since the dummies are usable
for at least five times as many tests, but they are
used four times as often.

Mitsubishi said that its incremental cost per
vehicle is $7 rather than 40 cent as estimated by the
agency. Mitsubishi explained the reason for this dif-
ference is that the price of an imported Hybrid III
is approximately two times the agency estimate and
its annual production is about one-tenth of the
amount used in the agency estimate. Volvo also said
the agency had underestimated the incremental cost
per vehicle. Volvo said it conducts approximately
500-600 test dummy applications per year in sled
and crash testing, making the incremental cost in
the range of $15-18 per vehicle based on its export
volume to the United States.

NHTSA has re-examined the costs associated with
the Hybrid III test dummy. The basic Hybrid III
dummy with the instrumentation required by this
final rule costs $35,000 or approximately $16,000
more than the existing 572 test dummy. Assuming
a useful life for the test dummy of 150 tests, the total
estimated incremental capital cost is approximately
$107 per dummy test.

To determine the incremental capital cost per test,
the agency had to estimate the useful life of the
Hybrid III. Based on NHTSA's test experience, the
durability of the existing Part 572 test dummy and
the Hybrid III test dummy is essentially identical
with the exception of the Hybrid III ribs. Because
the Hybrid III dummy chest was developed to
simulate human chest deflection, the ribs had to be
designed with much more precision to reflect human
impact response. This redesign uses less metal and
consequently they are more susceptible to damage
during testing than the Part 572 dummy.

As discussed previously, GM estimates that the
Hybrid III ribs can be used in severe unrestrained
testing approximately 17 times before the ribs or the

damping material needs replacement. In addition,
GM's experience shows that the Hybrid III can
withstand as many as 150 test applications as long
as occasional repairs are made. Ford reported at the
previously cited MVMA meeting that one of its belt-
restrained Hybrid III test dummies underwent 35
crash tests without any degradation. Clearly, the
estimated useful life of the test dummy is highly
dependent on the type of testing, restrained or
unrestrained, it is used for. Based on its own test
experience and the experience of Ford and GM cited
above, the agency has decided to use 30 applications
as a conservative estimate of the useful life of the
ribs. Assuming a life of 30 tests before a set of ribs
must be replaced at a cost of approximately $2,000,
the incremental per test cost is approximately
$70.

The calibration tests for the Hybrid III test
dummy have been simplified from the original
specification proposed in the April 1985 notice. The
Transportation Research Center of Ohio, which does
calibration testing of the Hybrid III for the agency,
vehicle manufacturers and others estimates the cost
of the revised calibration tests is $1528. This is $167
less than the calibration cost for the existing Part
572 test dummy.

Numerous unknown variables will contribute to
the manufacturers' operating expense, such as the
cost of new or modified test facilities or equipment
to maintain the more stringent temperature range
of 69 ° F to 72 ° F for test dummies, and capital
expenditures for lab calibration equipment, signal
conditioning equipment, data processing techniques
and capabilities, and additional personnel. Obviously,
any incremental cost for a particular manufacturer
to certify compliance with the automatic restraint
requirements of Standard No. 208 will also depend
on the extent and nature of its current test facilities
and the size of its developmental and new vehicle
test programs.

In addition to the costs discussed above, Peugeot
raised the issue of a manufacturer's costs increas-
ing because the proposed number of injury
measurements made on the Hybrid HI will increase
the number of tests that must be repeated because
of lost data. Since the agency is only adding one
additional measurement, chest deflection, for the
Hybrid III the number of tests that will have to
be repeated due to lost data should not be substan-
tially greater for the Hybrid III than for the Part
572.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 326

Effective Date

NHTSA has determined that it is in the pubMc in-
terest to make the optional use of the Hybrid III test
dummy effective in 90 days. This will allow manufac-
turers time to order the new test dummy to use in
their new vehicle development work. Mandatory use
of the Hybrid IH does not begin until September 1,
1991.

In consideration of the foregoing, Part 572,
Anthropomorphic Test Dummies, and Part 571.208,
Occupant Crash Protection, of Title 49 of the Code
of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

Part 572-[AMENDED]

1 . The authority citation for Part 572 is amended
to read as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1403, and 1407;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

2. A new Subpart E is added to Part 572 to read
as follows:

Subpart E-Hybrid III Test Dummy

§ 572.30 Incorporated materials

§ 572.31 General description

§572.32 Head

§572.33 Neck

§ 572.34 Thorax

§ 572.35 Limbs

§ 572.36 Test conditions and instrumentation

§ 572.30 Incorporated Materials

(a) The drawings and specifications referred to in
this regulation that are not set forth in full are hereby
incorporated in this part by reference. The Director
of the Federal Register has approved the materials
incorporated by reference. For materials subject to
change, only the specific version approved by the
Director of the Federal Register and specified in the
regulation are incorporated. A notice of any change
will be published in the Federal Register. As a con-
venience to the reader, the materials incorporated by
reference are listed in the Finding Aid Table found
at the end of this volume of the Code of Federal
Regulations.

(b) The materials incorporated by reference are
available for examination in the general reference
section of Docket 74-14, Docket Section, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Room 5109,
400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20590.
Copies may be obtained from Rowley-Scher
Reprographics, Inc., 1216 K Street, N.W.,
Washington, DC 20005 ((202) 628-6667). The draw-
ings and specifications are also on file in the
reference library of the Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Ad-
ministration, Washington, D.C.

§ 572.31 General description

(a) The Hybrid III 50th percentile size dummy
consists of components and assemblies specified in
the Anthropomorphic Test Dummy drawing and
specifications package which consists of the follow-
ing six items:

(1) The Anthropomorphic Test Dummy Parts
List, dated July 15, 1986, and containing 13 pages,
and a Parts List Index, dated April 26, 1986, con-
taining 6 pages,

(2) A listing of Optional Hybrid III Dummy
Transducers, dated April 22, 1986, containing 4
pages,

(3) A General Motors Drawang Package identified
by GM drawing No. 78051-218, revision P and subor-
dinate drawings,

(4) Disassembly, Inspection, Assembly and Limbs
Adjustment Procedures for the Hybrid III dummy,
dated July 15, 1986,

(5) Sign Convention for the signal outputs of
Hybrid II dummy transducers, dated July 15, 1986,

(6) Exterior Dimensions of the Hybrid III dummy,
dated July 15, 1986.

(b) The dummy is made up of the following com-
ponent assemblies:

Dravring Number Revision.

78051-61 Head Assembly-Complete- (T)

78051-90 Neck Assembly-Complete- (A)

78051-89 Upper Torso Assembly-Complete- (I)
78051-70 Lower Torso Assembly— Without

Pelvic Instrumentation Assembly,

Drawing No. 78051-59 (C)

86-5001-001 Leg Assembly-Complete (LH)-
86-5001-002 Leg Assembly-Complete (RH)-
78051-123 Arm Assembly-Complete (LH)- (D)

78051-124 Arm Assembly-Complete (RH)- (D)

(c) Any specifications and requirements set forth
in this part supercede those contained in General
Motors Drawing No. 78051-218, revision P.

(d) Adjacent segments are joined in a manner such
that throughout the range of motion and also under
crash-impact conditions, there is no contact between
metallic elements except for contacts that exist
under static conditions.

(e) The weights, inertial properties and centers of
gravity location of component assemblies shall con-
form to those listed in drawing 78051-338, revision S.

(f) The structural properties of the dummy are
such that the dummy conforms to this part in every
respect both before and after being used in vehicle
test specified in Standard No. 208 of this Chapter
(§ 571.208).

PART 571; S 208-PRE 327

§572.32 Head

(a) The head consists of the assembly shown in the
drawing 78051-61, revision T, and shall conform to
each of the drawings subtended therein.

(b) When the head (drawing 78051-61, revision T)
with neck transducer structural replacement (draw-
ing 78051-383, revision F) is dropped from a height
of 14.8 inches in accordance with paragraph (c) of
this section, the peak resultant accelerations at the
location of the accelerometers mounted in the head
in accordance with 572.36(c) shall not be less than
225g, and not more than 275g. The acceleration/
time curve for the test shall be unimodal to the ex-
tent that oscillations occurring after the main ac-
celeration pulse are less than ten percent (zero to
peak) of the main pulse. The lateral acceleration vec-
tor shall not exceed 15g (zero to peak).

(c) Test Procedure. (1) Soak the head assembly
in a test environment at any temperature between
66° F to 78° F and at a relative humidity from 10%
to 70% for a period of at least four hours prior to
its application in a test.

(2) Clean the head's skin surface and the surface
of the impact plate with 1,1,1 Trichlorethane or
equivalent.

(3) Suspend the head, as shown in Figure 19, so
that the lowest point on the forehead is 0.5 inches
below the lowest point on the dummy's nose when
the midsagittal plane is vertical.

(4) Drop the head from the specified height by
means that ensure instant release onto a rigidly sup-
ported flat horizontal steel plate, which is 2 inches
thick and 2 feet square. The plate shall have a clean,
dry surface and any microfinish of not less than 8
microinches (rms) and not more than 80 microinches
(rms).

(5) Allow at least 2 hours between successive tests
on the same head.

§572.33 Neck

(a) The neck consists of the assembly shown in
drawing 78051-90, revision A and conforms to each
of the drawings subtended therein.

(b) When the neck and head assembly (consisting
of the parts 78051-61, revision T; -84; -90, revision
A; -96; -98; -303, revision E; -305; -306; -307, revi-
sion X, which has a neck transducer (drawing
83-5001-008) installed in conformance with
572.36(d), is tested in accordance with paragraph (c)
of this section, it shall have the following
characteristics:

(1) Fhxion (i) Plane D, referenced in Figure 20,
shall rotate, between 64 degrees and 78 degrees,
which shall occur between 57 milliseconds (ms) and

64 ms from time zero. In first rebound, the rotation
of plane D shall cross 0 degree between 113 ms and
128 ms.

(ii) The moment measured by the neck transducer
(drawing 83-5001-008) about the occipital condyles,
referenced in Figure 20, shall be calculated by the
following formula: Moment (Ibs-ft) = My -i- 0.02875
X Fx where My is the moment measured in Ibs-ft by
the moment sensor of the neck transducer and Fjj
is the force measure measured in lbs by the x axis
force sensor of the neck transducer. The moment
shall have a maximum value between 65 Ibs-ft and
80 Ibs-ft occurring between 47 ms and 58 ms, and
the positive moment shall decay for the first time
to 0 Ib-ft between 97 ms and 107 ms.

(2) Extension (i) Plane D, referenced in Figure
21, shall rotate between 81 degrees and 106 degrees,
which shall occur between 72 and 82 ms from time
zero. In first rebound, the rotation of plane D shall
cross 0 degree between 147 and 174 ms.

(ii) The moment measured by the neck transducer
(drawing 83-5001-008) about the occipital condyles,
referenced in Figure 21, shall be calculated by the
following formula: Moment flbs-ft) = My -i- 0.02875
X Fx where My is the moment measured in Ibs-ft by
the moment sensor of the neck transducer and Fx
is the force measure measured in lbs by the x axis
force sensor of the neck transducer. The moment
shall have a minimum value between - 39 Ibs-ft and
- 59 Ibs-ft, which shall occur between 65 ms and 79
ms., and the negative moment shall decay for the
first time to 0 Ib-ft between 120 ms and 148 ms.

(3) Time zero is defined as the time of contact be-
tween the pendulum striker plate and the aluminum
honeycomb material.

(c) Test Procedure. (1) Soak the test material in
a test environment at any temperature between 69
degrees F to 72 degrees F and at a relative humidity
from 10% to 70% for a period of at least four hours
prior to its application in a test.

(2) Torque the jamnut (78051-64) on the neck
cable (78051-301, revision E) to 1.0 Ibs-ft ± .2 Ibs-ft.

(3) Mount the head-neck assembly, defined in
paragraph (b) of this section, on a rigid pendulum
as shown in Figure 22 so that the head's midsagit-
tal plane is vertical and coincides with the plane of
motion of the pendulum's longitudinal axis.

(4) Release the pendulum and aUow it to fall freely
from a height such that the tangential velocity at
the pendulum accelerometer centerline at the in-
stance of contact with the honeycomb is 23.0 ft/sec
± 0.4 ft/sec. for flexion testing and 19.9 ft/sec ±
0.4 ft/sec. for extension testing. The pendulum
deceleration vs. time pulse for flexion testing shall

PART 571; S 208-PRE 328

conform to the characteristics shown in Table A and
the decaying deceleration-time curve shall first cross
5g between 34 ms and 42 ms. The pendulum
deceleration vs. time pulse for extension testing shall
conform to the characteristics shown in Table B and
the decaying deceleration-time curve shall cross 5g
between 38 ms and 46 ms.

Table A
Flexion Pendulum Deceleration vs. Time Pulse

Time (ms)

Flexion

deceleraiion

level (g)

10 22.50-27.50

20 17.60-22.60

30 12.50-18.50

Any other time above 30 ms 29 maximum

Table B
Extension Pendulum Deceleration vs. Time Pulse

Time (ms)

Extension

deceleration

level (g)

10 17.20-21.20

20 14.00-19.00

30 11.00-16.00

Any other time above 30 ms 22 maximum

(5) Allow the neck to flex without impact of the
head or neck with any object during the test.

§572.34 Thorax

(a) The thorax consists of the upper torso
assembly in drawing 78051-89, revision I and shall
conform to each of the drawings subtended therein.

(b) When impacted by a test probe conforming to
S572.36(a) at 22 fps ± .40 fps in accordance with
paragraph (c) of this section, the thorax of a com-
plete dummy assembly (78051-218, revision P) with
left and right shoes (78051-294 and -295) removed,
shall resist with the force measured by the test probe
from time zero of 1 162.5 pounds ± 82.5 pounds and
shall have a sternum displacement measured relative
to spine of 2.68 inches ± .18 inches. The internal
hysteresis in each impact shall be more than 69%
but less than 85%. The force measured is the pro-
duct of pendulum mass and deceleration. Time zero
is defined as the time of first contact between the
upper thorax and pendulum face.

(c) Test procedure. (1) Soak the test dummy in
an environment with a relative humidity from 10%
to 70% until the temperature of the ribs of the test
dummy have stabilized at a temperature between
69° F and 72° F.

(2) Seat the dummy without back and arm sup-
ports on a surface as shown in Figure 23.

(3) Place the longitudinal centerline of the test
probe so that it is .5 ± .04 in. below the horizontal
centerline of the No. 3 Rib (reference drawing
number 79051-64, revision A-M) as shown in Figure
23.

(4) Align the test probe specified in S572. 36(a) so
that at impact its longitudinal centerline coincides
within .5 degree of a horizontal line in the dummy's
midsagittal plane.

(5) Impact the thorax with the test probe so that
the longitudinal centerline of the test probe falls
within 2 degrees of a horizontal line in the dummy
midsagittal plane at the moment of impact.

(6) Guide the probe during impact so that it moves
with no significant lateral, vertical, or rotational
movement.

(7) Measure the horizontal deflection of the ster-
num relative to the thoracic spine along the line
established by the longitudinal centerline of the
probe at the moment of impact, using a poten-
tiometer (ref. drawing 78051-317, revision A)
mounted inside the sternum as shown in drawing
78051-89, revision I.

(8) Measure hysteresis by determining the ratio
of the area between the loading and unloading por-
tions of the force deflection curve to the area under
the loading portion of the curve.

§572.35 Limhs

(a) The limbs consist of the following assemblies:
leg assemblies 86-5001-001 and -002 and arm
assemblies 78051-123, revision D, and -124, revision
D, and shall conform to the drawings subtended
therein.

(b) When each knee of the leg assemblies is im-
pacted by the pendulum defined in S572. 36(b) in ac-
cordance with paragraph (c) of this section at 6.9
ft/sec ± .10 ft/sec, the peak knee impact force,
which is a product of pendulum mass and accelera-
tion, shall have a minimum value of not less than 996
pounds and a maximum value of not greater than
1566 pounds.

(c) Test Procedure. (1) The test material consists
of leg assemblies (86-5001-001) left and (-002) right
with upper leg assemblies (78051-46) left and

PART 571; S 208-PRE 329

(78051-47) right removed. The load cell simulator
(78051-319, revision A) is used to secure the knee
cap assemblies (79051-16, revision B) as shown in
Figure 24.

(2) Soak the test material in a test environment
at any temperature between 66° F to 78° F and at
a relative humidity from 10% to 70% for a period
of at least four hours prior to its application in a test.

(3) Mount the test material wath the leg assembly
secured through the load cell simulator to a rigid sur-
face as shown in Figure 24. No contact is permitted
between the foot and any other exterior surfaces.

(4) Place the longitudinal centerline of the test
probe so that at contact with the knee it is colinear
within 2 degrees with the longitudinal centerline of
the femur load cell simulator.

(5) Guide the pendulum so that there is no signifi-
cant lateral, vertical or rotational movement at time
zero.

(6) Impact the knee with the test probe so that the
longitudinal centerline of the test probe at the
instant of impact falls within .5 degrees of a horizon-
tal line parallel to the femur load cell simulator at
time zero.

(7) Time zero is defined as the time of contact
between the test probe and the knee.

§ 572.36 Test conditions and instrumentation

(a) The test probe used for thoracic impact tests
is a 6 inch diameter cylinder that weighs 51.5 pounds
including instrumentation. Its impacting end has a
flat right angle face that is rigid and has an edge
radius of 0.5 inches. The test probe has an
accelerometer mounted on the end opposite from
impact with its sensitive axis colinear to the
longitudinal centerline of the cylinder.

(b) The test probe used for the knee impact tests
is a 3 inch diameter cylinder that weighs 11 pounds
including instrumentation. Its impacting end has a
flat right angle face that is rigid and has an edge
radius of 0.2 inches. The test probe has an ac-
celerometer mounted on the end opposite from im-
pact with its sensitive axis colinear to the
longitudinal centerline of the cylinder.

(c) Head accelerometers shall have dimensions,
response characteristics and sensitive mass locations
specified in drawing 78051-136, revision A or its
equivalent and be mounted in the head as shown in
drawing 78051-61, revision T, and in the assembly
shown in drawing 78051-218, revision D.

(d) The neck transducer shall have the dimen-
sions, response characteristics, and sensitive axis

locations specified in drawing 83-5001-008 or its
equivalent and be mounted for testing as shown in
drawing 79051-63, revision W, and in the assembly
shown in drawing 78051-218, revision P.

(e) The chest accelerometers shall have the dimen-
sions, response characteristics, and sensitive mass
locations specified in drawing 78051-136, revision
A or its equivalent and be mounted as shown with
adaptor assembly 78051-116, revision D, for
assembly into 78051-218, revision L.

(f) The chest deflection transducer shall have the
dimensions and response characteristics specified in
drawing 78051-342, revision A or equivalent, and be
moimted in the chest deflection transducer assembly
87051-317, revision A, for assembly into 78051-218,
revision L.

(g) The thorax and knee impactor accelerometers
shall have the dimensions and characteristics of
Endevco Model 7231c or equivalent. Each ac-
celerometer shall be mounted with its sensitive axis
colinear with the pendulum's longitudinal centerline.

(h) The femur load cell shall have the dimensions,
response characteristics, and sensitive axis locations
specified in drawing 78051-265 or its equivalent and
be mounted in assemblies 78051-46 and -47 for
assembly into 78051-218, revision L.

(i) The outputs of acceleration and force-sensing
devices installed in the dummy and in the test
apparatus specified by this part are recorded in
individual data channels that conform to the
requirements of SAE Recommended Practice J211,
JUNE 1980, "Instrumentation for Impact Tests,"
with channel classes as follows:

(1) Head acceleration— Class 1000

(2) Neck force-Class 60

(3) Neck pendulum acceleration— Class 60

(4) Thorax and thorax pendulum

acceleration— Class 180

(5) Thorax deflection-Class 180

(6) Knee pendulum acceleration— Class 600

(7) Femur force-Class 600

(j) Coordinate signs for instrumentation polarity
conform to the sign convention shown in the docu-
ment incorporated by § 572.31(a)(5).

(k) The mountings for sensing devices shall have
no resonance frequency within range of 3 times the
frequency range of the applicable channel class.

(1) Limb joints are set at Ig, barely restraining the
weight of the limb when it is extended horizontally.
The force required to move a limb segment shall not
exceed 2g throughout the range of limb motion.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 330

(m) Performance tests of the same component,
segment, assembly, or fully assembled dummy are
separated in time by a period of not less than 30
minutes unless otherwise noted.

(n) Surfaces of dummy components are not
painted except as specified in this part or in draw-
ings subtended by this part. PART 571 [Amended]

2. The authority citation for Part 571 continues
to read as follows:

AuthoHty: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1403, 1407;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

3. Section S5 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR
571.208) is amended by revising S5.1 to read as
follows:

§571.208 [Amended]

S5. Occupant crash protection requirements.

S5.1 Vehicles subject to S5.1 and manufactured
before September 1, 1991, shall comply with either,
at the manufacturer's option, 5.1(a) or (b). Vehicles
subject to S5.1 and manufactured on or after
September 1, 1991, shall comply with 5.1(b).

(a) Impact a vehicle traveling longitudinally for-
ward at any speed, up to and including 30 mph, into
a fixed collision barrier that is perpendicular to the
line of travel of the vehicle, or at any angle up to
30 degrees in either direction from the perpendicular
to the line of travel of the vehicle under the ap-
plicable conditions of 88. The test dummy specified
in S8. 1.8.1 placed at each front outboard designated
seating position shall meet the injury criteria of
S6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.3, and 6.1.4.

(b) Impact a vehicle traveling longitudinally for-
ward at any speed, up to and including 30 mph, into
a fixed collision barrier that is perpendicular to the
line of travel of the vehicle, or at any angle up to
30 degrees in either direction from the perpendicular
to the line of travel of the vehicle, under the ap-
plicable conditions of S8. The test dummy specified
in S8.1.8.2 placed at each front outboard designated
seating position shall meet the injury criteria of
S6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, and 6.2.5.

3. Section S5.2 of Standard No. 208 is revised to
read as follows:

85.2 Lateral moving barrier crash.

S5.2.1 Vehicles subject to S5.2 and manufactured
before September 1, 1991, shall comply with either,
at the manufacturer's option, 5.2.1(a) or (b). Vehicles
subject to S5.2 and manufactured on or after
September 1, 1991, shall comply with 5.2.1(b).

(a) Impact a vehicle laterally on either side by a
barrier moving at 20 mph under the applicable

conditions of S8. The test dummy specified in
S8. 1.8.1 placed at the front outboard designated
seating position adjacent to the impacted side shall
meet the injury criteria of S6.1.2 and S6.1.3.

(b) When the vehicle is impacted laterally under
the applicable conditions of S8, on either side by a
barrier moving at 20 mph, with a test device
specified in S8. 1.8.2, which is seated at the front out-
board designated seating position adjacent to the im-
pacted side, it shall meet the injury criteria of S6.2.2,
and S6.2.3.

4. Section S5.3 of Standard No. 208 is revised to
read as follows:

S5.3 Rollover Subject a vehicle to a rollover test
under the applicable condition of 88 in either lateral
direction at 30 mph with either, at the manufac-
turer's option, a test dummy specified in S8. 1.8.1
or 88.1.8.2, placed in the front outboard designated
seating position on the vehicle's lower side as
moimted on the test platform. The test dummy shall
meet the injury criteria of either SB. 1.1 or 86.2.1.

5. Section 86 of Standard No. 208 is revised to
read as follows:

86. Injury Criteria

86. 1 Injury criteria for the Part 572, Subpart B,
50th percentile Male Dummy.

86. 1 . 1 All portions of the test dummy shall be con-
tained within the outer surfaces of the vehicle
passenger compartment throughout the test.

86.1.2 The resultant acceleration at the center of
gravity of the head shall be such that the expression:

i-^r - ]

2.5

U-U

shall not exceed 1,000, where a is the resultant
acceleration expressed as a multiple of g (the ac-
celeration of gravity), and ti and t2 are any two
points during the crash.

56.1.3 The resultant acceleration at the center of
gravity of the upper thorax shall not exceed 60 g's,
except for intervals whose cumulative duration is not
more than 3 milliseconds.

86.1.4 The compressive force transmitted axially
through each upper leg shall not exceed 2250
pounds.

S6.2 Injury criteria for the Part 572, Subpart E,
Hybrid III Dummy

86.2. 1 All portions of the test dummy shall be con-
tained within the outer surfaces of the vehicle
passenger compartment throughout the test.

PART 571; 8 208-PRE 331

S6.2.2 The resultant acceleration at the center of
gravity of the head shall be such that the expression:

i-^r ' ]

2.5

t,-t,

shall not exceed 1,000, where a is the resultant
acceleration expressed as a multiple of g (the
acceleration of gravity), and ti and t2 are any two
point during the crash.

56.2.3 The resultant acceleration calculated from
the thoracic instrumentation shown in drawing
78051-218, revision L, incorporated by reference in
Part 572, Subpart E of this Chapter, shall not exceed
60g's, except for intervals whose cumulative dura-
tion is not more than 3 milliseconds.

56.2.4 Compression deflection of the sternum
relative to spine, as determined by instrumentation
shown in drawing 78051-317, revision A, incor-
porated by reference in Part 572, Subpart E of this
Chapter, shall not exceed 2 inches for loadings
applied through any impact surfaces except for those
systems which are gas inflated and provide
distributed loading to the torso during a crash. For
gas-inflated systems which provide distributive
loading to the torso, the thoracic deflection shall not
exceed 3 inches.

56.2.5 The force transmitted axially through each
upper leg shall not exceed 2250 pounds.

6. Section SB. 1.8 of Standard No. 208 is revised
to read as follows:

S8.1.8 Anthropomorphic test dummies

S8.1 8.1 The anthropomorphic test dummies used
for evaluation of occupant protection systems
manufactured pursuant to applicable portions of
paragraphs S4.1.2, 4.1.3, and S4.1.4 shall conform
to the requirements of Subpart B of Part 572 of this
Chapter.

S8.1.8.2 Anthropomorphic test devices used for
the evaluation of occupant protection systems
manufactured pursuant to applicable portions of
paragraphs S4.1.2, S4.1.3, and S4.1.4 shall conform
to the requirements of Subpart E of Part 572 of this
Chapter.

7. Section S8.1.9 of Standard No. 208 is revised
to read as follows:

S8.1.9.1 Each Part 572, Subpart B, test dummy
specified in S8. 1.8.1 is clothed in formfitting cotton
stretch garments with short sleeves and midcalf
length pants. Each foot of the test dummy is equip-
ped with a size llEE shoe which meets the config-

uration size, sole, and heel thickness specifications
of MIL-S-131192 and weighs 1.25 ± 0.2 pounds.

S8. 1.9.2 Each Part 572, Subpart E, test dummy
specified in S8. 1.8.2 is clothed in formfitting cotton
stretch garments with short sleeves and midcalf
length pants specified in drawings 78051-292 and
-293 incorporated by reference in Part 572, Subpart
E, of this Chapter, respectively or their equivalents.
A size llEE shoe specified in drawings 78051-294
Oeft) and 78051-295 (right) or their equivalents is
placed on each foot of the test dummy.

8. Section S8.1.13 of Standard No. 208 is revised
to read as follows:

S8.1.13 Temperature of the test dummy

58. 1.13.1 The stabilized temperature of the test
dummy specified by S8. 1.8.1 is at any level between
66 degrees F and 78 degrees F.

58.1.13.2 The stabilized temperature of the test
dummy specified by S8.1.8.2 is at any level between
69 degrees F and 72 degrees F.

9. A new fourth sentence is added to section
S8.1.3 to read as follows:

Adjustable lumbar supports are positioned so that
the lumbar support is in its lowest adjustment
position.

10. A new section Sll is added to read as follows:

Sll. Positioning Procedure for the Part 572
Subpart E Test Dummy

Position a test dummy, conforming to Subpart E
of Part 572 of this Chapter, in each front outboard
seating position of a vehicle as specified in Si 1.1
through SI 1.6. Each test dummy is restrained in
accordance with the applicable requirements of
S4.1.2.1, 4.1.2.2 or S4.6.

SI 1.1 Head. The transverse instrumentation
platform of the head shall be horizontal within V2
degree.

S11.2 Arms

511.2.1 The driver's upper arms shall be adjacent
to the torso with the centerlines as close to a ver-
tical plane as possible.

511.2.2 The passenger's upper arms shall be in
contact with the seat back and the sides of torso.

SI 1.3 Hands

S 1 1 . 3 . 1 The palms of the driver test dummy shall
be in contact with the outer part of the steering
wheel rim at the rim's horizontal centerline. The
thumbs shall be over the steering wheel rim and
attached with adhesive tape to provide a breakaway
force of between 2 to 5 pounds.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 332

SI 1.3.2 The palms of the passenger test dummy
shall be in contact with outside of thigh. The little
finger shall be in contact with the seat cushion.

S11.4 Torso

SI 1.4.1 In vehicles equipped with bench seats, the
upper torso of the driver and passenger test
dummies shall rest against the seat back. The mid-
sagittal plane of the driver dummy shall be vertical
and parallel to the vehicle's longitudinal centerline,
and pass through the center of the steering wheel
rim. The midsagittal plane of the passenger dummy
shall be vertical and parallel to the vehicle's
longitudinal centerline and the same distance from
the vehicle's longitudinal centerline as the midsagit-
tal plane of the driver dummy.

Sll.4.2 In vehicles equipped with bucket seats,
the upper torso of the driver and passenger test
dummies shall rest against the seat back. The mid-
sagittal plane of the driver and the passenger
dummy shall be vertical and shall coincide with the
longitudinal centerline of the bucket seat.

Si 1.4.3 Lower torso

SI 1 .4.3. 1 H-point. The H-point of the driver and
passenger test dummies shall coincide within V2 inch
in the vertical dimension and V2 inch in the horizon-
tal dimension of a point 'A inch below the position
of the H-point determined by using the equipment
and procedures specified in SAE J826 (Apr 80)
except that the length of the lower leg and thigh
segments of the H-point machine shall be adjusted
to 16.3 and 15.8 inches, respectively, instead of the
50th percentile values specified in Table 1 of SAE
J826.

Sll.4.3.2 Pelvic angle. As determined using the
pelvic angle gage (GM drawing 78051-532 incor-
porated by reference in Part 572, Subpart E, of this
chapter) which is inserted into the H-point gaging
hole of the dummy, the angle measured from the
horizontal on the 3 inch flat surface of the gage shall
be 22V2 degrees plus or minus 2V2 degrees.

SI 1.5 Legs. The upper legs of the driver and
passenger test dummies shall rest against the seat
cushion to the extent permitted by placement of the
feet. The initial distance between the outboard knee
clevis flange surfaces shall be 10.6 inches. To the
extent practicable, the left leg of the driver dummy
and both legs of the passenger dummy shall be in
vertical longitudinal planes. Final adjustment to
accommodate placement of feet in accordance with
Si 1.6 for various passenger compartment configura-
tions is permitted.

SI 1.6 Feet

SI 1.6.1 The right foot of the driver test dummy
shall rest on the undepressed accelerator with the
rearmost point of the heel on the floor surface in the
plane of the pedal. If the foot cannot be placed on
the accelerator pedal, it shall be positioned
perpendicular to the tibia and placed as far forward
as possible in the direction of the centerline of the
pedal with the rearmost point of the heel resting on
the floor surface. The heel of the left foot shall be
placed as far forward as possible and shall rest on
the floor surface. The left foot shall be positioned
as flat as possible on the floor surface. The longi-
tudinal centerline of the left foot shall be placed as
parallel as possible to the longitudinal centerline of
the vehicle.

Sll.6.2 The heels of both feet of the passenger
test dummy shall be placed as far forward as possi-
ble and shall rest on the floor surface. Both feet shall
be positioned as flat as possible on the floor surface.
The longitudinal centerline of the feet shall be placed
as parallel as possible to the longitudinal centerline
of the vehicle.

Si 1.7 Test dummy positioning for latchplate ac-
cess. The reach envelopes specified in S7.4.4 are ob-
tained by positioning a test dummy in the driver's
seat or passenger's seat in its forwardmost adjust-
ment position. Attach the lines for the inboard and
outboard arms to the test dummy as described in
Figure 3 of this standard. Extend each line
backward and outboard to generate the compliance
arcs of the outboard reach envelope of the test dum-
my's arms.

SI 1.8 Test dum,my positioning for belt contact
force. To determine compliance with S7.4.3 of this
standard, position the test dummy in the vehicle in
accordance with the requirements specified in SI 1.1
through Si 1.6 and under the conditions of S8.1.2
and S8.1.3. Pull the belt webbing three inches from
the test dummy's chest and release until the webb-
ing is within 1 inch of the test dummy's chest and
measure the belt contact force.

Si 1.9 Manual belt adjustment for dynamic
testing. With the test dummy at its designated
seating position as specified by the appropriate re-
quirements of S8.1.2, S8.1.3 and SI 1.1 through
Si 1.6, place the Type 2 manual belt around the test
dummy and fasten the latch. Remove all slack from
the lap belt. Pull the upper torso webbing out of the
retractor and allow it to retract; repeat this opera-
tion four times. Apply a 2 to 4 pound tension load

PART 571; S 208-PRE 333

to the lap belt. If the belt system is equipped with Issued on July 21,1986

a tension-relieving device introduce the maximum

amount of slack into the upper torso belt that is

recommended by the manufacturer for normal use

in the owner's manual for the vehicle. If the belt v ^i a

system is not equipped with a tension-relieving Diane K. bteed

device, allow the excess webbing in the shoulder belt Admmistrator

to be retracted by the retractive force of the 51 F.R. 26688

retractor. July 25,1986

PART 571; S 208-PRE 334

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE
SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection and Seat Belt Assemblies
(Docket No. 74-14; Notice 46)

ACTION: Final Rule; Response to petitions for
reconsideration.

SUMMARY: This notice responds to eight peti-
tions for reconsideration of several of the amend-
ments to Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Pro-
tection, that appeared in the Federal Register of Fri-
day, March 21, 1986. In response to the petitions,
the agency is modifying the test dummy position-
ing procedures. However, so as not to affect com-
pliance testing done using the old procedures, the
agency is permitting manufacturers to use either
the old or new procedures for a one-year period.
Beginning September 1, 1987, the new procedures
would be mandatory. This notice denies a request
to extend the September 1, 1989, effective date for
dynamic testing of manual lap/shoulder belts in the
front seat of passenger cars. (The dynamic test
requirement would go into effect on that date only
if the automatic restraint requirement is re-
scinded.) A response to four petitions asking the
agency to reinstate certain of the test requirements
of Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies, for
dynamically -tested manual lap/shoulder belts, and
to revise the current exemption for automatic belts,
will be addressed separately at a later date.

DATES: The amendments made by this notice
are effective on September 5, 1986.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On March
21, 1986 (51 FR 9800), NHTSA published a final
rule amending Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash
Protection, Subsequent to publication of the amend-
ments, eight interested parties timely filed peti-
tions asking the agency to reconsider some of the
amendments adopted in that final rule. This notice
responds to those petitions.

Test Procedures

The March notice adopted several changes to the
test dummy positioning procedures of the standard.
Ford Motor Company (Ford) said that the revised

test procedures were not objective because of what
it termed ambiguities, inconsistencies, and subjec-
tive elements in the test procedure provisions.
Each of Ford's specific objections are discussed
below, in the order that Ford raised them.

Positioning of Manual Belts for Dynamic
Testing

Ford noted that the standard provides that in the
dynamic test for manual belts, the lap/shoulder
belt is to be placed around the test dummy after
the dummy's arms and hands have been posi-
tioned. Ford said it is impracticable to position
properly a lap/shoulder belt on a driver test dummy
whose hands are on the steering wheel or on a
passenger test dummy whose palms are in contact
with its thighs. Ford noted that the agency's New
Car Assessment Program (NCAP) test procedures
provide for positioning the arms and hands after
the safety belt has been positioned.

Ford is correct that the NCAP test procedure pro-
vides that the safety belts are to be placed on the
test dummy before the arms and hands are placed
in their final positions. To eliminate possible safety
belt positioning problems, NHTSA is amending the
Standard No. 208 positioning requirements to
adopt the NCAP requirement.

Positioning of Automatic Belt for Dynamic
Testing

Ford also noted that the safety belt positioning
procedure applies only to manual belts and asked
the agency to specify at what stage during the posi-
tioning of the test dummy automatic belts are to
be deployed. Ford also asked what adjustment pro-
cedures the agency would use with automatic belts.

In NCAP testing, NHTSA has finally positioned
both automatic and manual safety belts after the
test dummy has been settled in its specified posi-
tion and before the hands are placed in their final
position. The agency has used this procedure
because it is simpler than having to position the
hands first and then move them in order to place

PART 571; S208-PRE 335

the safety belt on the test dummy. NHTSA is
therefore modifying the title of the safety belt posi-
tioning procedure to indicate that it applies to the
positioning of both manual and automatic safety
belts.

In the agency's NCAP testing, the only adjust-
ment NHTSA has made to an automatic belt once
it has been deployed on the test dummy is to en-
sure that the belt is lying flat on the test dummy's
shoulder when the belt is in its final position. The
agency is adopting the same procedure for the Stan-
dard No. 208 compliance test. In addition, as
discussed immediately below, the agency will also
adjust an automatic belt with a tension-relieving
device that can be used to introduce slack in the
belt system in accordance with the manufacturer's
instructions provided in the vehicle owner's
manual. For automatic belts that do not have
devices that can be used to introduce slack in the
belt system, it should not be necessary to make any
further adjustments, other than ensuring the belt
is flat on the test dummy's shoulder.

Adjusting Belt Slack

Ford noted that S7.4.2 of the standard requires
automatic belts and dynamically-tested manual
lap/shoulder belts to be tested with the maximum
amount of slack recommended by the manufac-
turer. It said that the standard does not, however,
prescribe a procedure for adjusting the slack of
automatic belts with tension-relieving devices.

The purpose of S7.4.2 of the standard is to ensure
that automatic and dynamically-tested manual
belt systems will perform adequately when they
are adjusted to the maximum amount of belt slack
recommended by the vehicle manufacturer.
S7.4.2(b) of the standard specifically requires
manufacturers that use tension-relieving devices
to provide information in their owner's manual
describing how the tension-reliever works. In ad-
dition, the owner's manual must inform vehicle
owners of the maximum amount of safety belt slack
recommended by the vehicle manufacturer. In con-
ducting its crash tests, the agency will adjust any
safety belt tension-relieving devices in accordance
with the instructions provided by the vehicle
manufacturer in the owner's manual.

Belt Tension Loading

Ford noted that the safety belt positioning pro-
cedure specifies applying a 2-to-4 pound tension
load to the lap belt of a lap/shoulder belt, but does
not specify how the load is to be applied or how the

tension is to be measured. Ford asked the agency
to clarify the procedure, particularly with regard
to whether the load is to be applied to the lap por-
tion of the belt or whether an increasing load is to
be placed on the shoulder portion of the belt until
the required amount of tension has been reached
in the lap portion of the belt.

NHTSA does not believe that the area of applica-
tion of the belt tension load should have a signifi-
cant effect on the subsequent performance of the
belt in a dynamic test. However, to promote unifor-
mity in application of the load, the agency is
amending the standard to provide that the load will
be applied to the shoulder portion of the belt adja-
cent to the latchplate of the belt. If the safety belt
system is equipped with two retractors (one for the
lap belt and one for the upper torso belt), then the
tension load will be applied at the point the lap belt
enters the retractor, since the separate lap belt
retractor effectively controls the tension in the lap
portion of a lap/shoulder belt. The amount of ten-
sion will also be measured at the location where
the load is applied. Finally, the agency is amending
the standard to provide that after the tension load
has been applied, the shoulder belt will be posi-
tioned flat on the test dummy's shoulder. This will
ensure that if the belt is twisted during the applica-
tion of the tension load, it will be correctly posi-
tioned prior to the crash test.

Test Dummy Settling and Leg Positioning

Ford said that it was particularly concerned
about the repeatability of the leg placement ob-
tained using the new test procedures. Ford said
that the positioning procedures provide for the
placement of the test dummy's legs before the test
dummy is settled. Ford said that the settling pro-
cedure usually results in movement of the test
dummy's legs, but the new procedure does not call
for readjustment of the leg positions after the test
dummy has been settled. Ford requested that the
procedure be changed by providing that after test
dummy settling and placement of the arms and
hands, the test dummy's feet and knees should be
repositioned, if necessary. As an alternative ap-
proach, Ford suggested that the procedure provide
that the test dummy settling be performed prior
to adjustment of the legs.

NHTSA agrees that the procedures should be
changed to minimize the possibility of inadvertent
leg movement during the settling procedure. The
agency is therefore adopting Ford's suggestion that
the test dummy's feet and legs should be reposi-
tioned, if necessary, after the test dummy has been

PART 571; S208-PRE 336

settled and its hands and arms have been
positioned.

Initial Knee Spacing for the Driver

Ford and Nissan Motor Company, Ltd., (Nissan)
expressed concern that NHTSA had misinterpreted
comments made by General Motors Corporation
(GM) and Honda Motor Company, Ltd., (Honda)
concerning one of the proposed changes to the test
dummy positioning procedures in the April 1985
NPRM. In that notice, NHTSA proposed a test
dummy initial knee spacing of 14.5 inches for both
the driver and passenger test dummies. In their
comments on the April 1985 notice, GM and Honda
requested that the proposed initial spacing of the
passenger test dummy knees be changed from 14.5
inches to 11.75 inches, which would mean that the
passenger test dummy legs would be parallel. In
the March 1986 final rule, NHTSA adopted the
11.75 inch initial knee spacing change for both the
driver and the passenger test dummy.

In their petitions for reconsideration. Ford and
Nissan said that they support the change sought
by GM and Honda for the initial placement of the
passenger's knees. Thus, they requested the agency
to apply the 11.75 inch requirement only to the
spacing of the passenger's knees and retain the
former 14.5 inch requirement for the driver's
knees. Ford noted that an 11.75 inch initial knee
spacing for the driver is not compatible with the
requirement to position the driver's right foot on
the accelerator pedal and keep the leg in a vertical
plane.

NHTSA misinterpreted GM and Honda's sug-
gested change and therefore believed that the com-
menters were seeking a change to the initial knee
spacing requirement for both the driver and the
passenger. NHTSA agrees that a change should
not have been made to the initial knee spacing for
the driver's knees, since the smaller initial knee
spacing requirement is not compatible with the
positioning requirement for the driver's right foot.
The agency is therefore reinstating the 14.5 inch
initial spacing requirement for the driver.

NHTSA emphasizes that, as it stated in the
notice adopting the test dummy positioning pro-
cedures on July 5, 1977 (42 FR 34301), the knee
spacing requirements apply only to the initial
placement of the knees. The final spacing of the
knees depends on the specific configuration of the
vehicle's occupant compartment and may vary due
to the positioning of the test dummy's feet to ac-
commodate such differing design featuies as pro-

truding wheelwells, foot rests, and ventilating
system ducts. Thus, the agency recognizes that the
initial spacing may have to be modified to ensure
that the legs and feet are correctly positioned.

Driver Right Leg Positioning

Ford objected to the requirement in SlO. 1.1(b)
that the driver's right leg be placed so that the up-
per and lower leg centerlines fall, as close as possi-
ble, in a vertical longitudinal plane. Ford said the
requirement that the legs be in a vertical
longitudinal plane is not compatible with the re-
quirement that the driver's foot be placed on the
accelerator pedal. Ford said that "in many
passenger cars the accelerator pedal is further in-
board than the pivot point of the driver's right
femur and therefore not in the same longitudinal
plane as the dummy's upper leg." Ford further said
that requiring the leg to remain in a vertical plane
is incompatible with the knee spacing requirement.
Ford suggested that a leg position specification is
unnecessary since specifying the positions of the
foot and knee would adequately define the position
of the right leg.

NHTSA recognizes that the initial knee spacing
requirement and the requirements on foot place-
ment help to maintain the right leg in a consistent
position. However, because of the numerous varia-
tions in passenger car interior designs, it may not
be possible to maintain the initial knee position
and thus a further control is needed to maintain
proper placement of the right leg. NHTSA recog-
nizes it may be particularly difficult to place the
right leg so that it is in a longitudinal plane, since
as Ford pointed out, the right leg may have to be
moved to place the foot on the accelerator. On
reconsideration, the agency believes that simply
requiring the leg to remain in a vertical plane after
the right foot has been positioned (instead of a ver-
tical longitudinal plane) should be sufficient to en-
sure consistent placement of the right leg.

Foot Placement on the Accelerator Pedal

Ford noted that SlO. 1.1(b) provides that if the
driver's right foot can not be placed on the ac-
celerator pedal, it is to be placed as far forward as
possible in the direction of the "geometric center"
of the pedal. Ford said that a formula is needed to
guide technicians in determining the geometric
center of an asymmetrically shaped accelerator
pedal.

The agency agi'ees with Ford's underlying point
that it is unnecessary to place the foot in the

PART 571; S208-PRE 337

"geometric center" of the accelerator pedal to en-
sure proper foot placement. The intent of the re-
quirement, which is to provide for consistent place-
ment by different testing organizations, can be
achieved by simplifying the requirement by pro-
viding that the centerline of the foot is to be placed,
as close as possible, in the same plane as the
centerline of the pedal.

Driver Left Foot Placement

Ford said it was concerned about the re-
quirements of SIO.1.1 for the placement of the
driver's left foot in vehicles which have wheelwells
that project into the passenger compartment. Ford
agi'eed that in the case of the passenger test
dummy, it "may be desirable to avoid placing the
passenger dummy's right foot on the wheelwell
because such placement can result in head contact
with the dummy's knee, but head-to-knee contact
is virtually impossible on the driver's side of the
vehicle because the steering wheel would block any
potential contact. In addition, placement of the
driver's left foot is complicated by the presence of
brake and clutch pedals, and therefore placement
of the driver's left leg to avoid the brake and clutch
pedals may have to take precedence over avoiding
the wheelhouse projections."

Ford also said that it is not clear from the text
of the standard whether the driver's left foot is to
be placed inboard of a wheelwell projection. In ad-
dition, Ford said that SIO. 1.1(c) does not clearly
specify where the driver's left leg should be posi-
tioned in such cases. Ford said "it is unclear
whether the foot should be placed perpendicular to
the tibia with the heel resting on the floor pan and
the sole resting on one end of the brake pedal, or
whether the foot may be pivoted around the axis
of the tibia to eliminate contact with a brake pedal.
It is also unclear whether the entire foot (and leg)
may be moved laterally to miss the brake and
clutch pedals."

NHTSA agrees with Ford that avoiding the posi-
tioning of the passenger's right foot on the
wheelwell is more of a concern, since if there is
floor buckling, the passenger's right knee can be
pushed upward and strike the head. Although the
agency has not seen as much floor buckling on the
driver's side of the car in its NCAP tests, such
buckling can happen. Although the positioning pro-
cedures for the driver's left foot and leg and the
passenger's right foot and leg are the same as far
as the final positioning of those parts is concerned.
Ford is correct that the standard does not specifi-
cally state that the driver's left foot should not be

placed on the wheelwell. To correct this, the agen-
cy has amended the standard to specifically pro-
vide that the driver's left foot is not to be placed
on the wheelwell.

NHTSA has not experienced in its NCAP testing
the difficulty mentioned by Ford in placing the
driver test dummy's left foot in the vicinity of the
clutch or brake pedals. However, to provide for a
consistent positioning if there is pedal interference,
the agency is making a minor amendment to the
foot positioning procedure. The amendment pro-
vides that if there is pedal interference, the driver's
left foot should be rotated about the tibia to avoid
contact with the pedal. This simple action should
avoid most problems. If that is not sufficient, the
procedure provides that the left leg should be
rotated about the hip in the outboard direction.

Driver Left Leg Placement

Ford noted that the agency did not adopt the re-
quirement proposed in the April 1985 notice that
the driver test dummy's left leg be placed in a ver-
tical and longitudinal plane. Instead, in the March
1986 final rule, the agency provided that the
driver's left leg need only be placed in a vertical
plane. Ford said that if the leg is placed in a ver-
tical plane with the knee 5.9 inches from the mid-
sagittal plane, as called for in the initial knee spac-
ing requirement for the driver, the leg will still be
in a vertical longitudinal plane. Ford said it was
unclear whether the agency intended the leg to re-
main in a vertical longitudinal plane or whether
the 5.9 inch dimension is no longer appropriate.

The requirements are not inconsistent. As em-
phasized earlier in this notice, the requirement for
the knee spacing is an initial setting. The agency
recognizes that this initial placement will result
in the driver's left leg being in a vertical longi-
tudinal plane. However, to accommodate differ-
ences in vehicle designs, that spacing can be
modified to achieve the other leg and foot place-
ment requirements. The agency is retaining the re-
quirement adopted in the March 1986 final rule
that when the driver's left leg is in its final posi-
tion it must be in a vertical plane.

Foot Rests

Ford said that its new Taurus/Sable models have
a driver's foot rest, which is a flat area located low
on the wheelwell projection. Ford said that plac-
ing the driver test dummy's left foot on the foot rest
would mean that the dummy's left heel would be
no higher than its right heel. Thus, Ford said that
its foot rest is apparently different from the Honda

PART 571: S208-PRE 338

foot rest discussed by NHTSA in the March 1986
notice. Ford asked the agency to clarify whether
SlO.1.1 of the standard would result in the driver
test dummy's foot being placed on the Ford-type
foot rest or whether the knee spacing and leg posi-
tioning requirements specified elsewhere in
SlO.1.1 would be controlling.

The foot rest positioning requirement adopted in
the March 1986 final rule states that if the foot rest
"does not elevate the left foot above the level of the
right foot," then the left foot should be placed on
the foot rest. If as it appears, the Ford foot rest does
not elevate the left foot above the right foot, then
the left foot should be placed on the foot rest.

Restraint Use During Testing

Ford said that the provisions of SIO regarding the
restraint of the test dummy are inconsistent with
the provisions of S4. 1.2.1 for the testing of vehicles
equipped both with automatic restraints and with
manual Type 2 safety belts. The agency has
modified SlO to make it consistent with S4. 1.2.1.
In brief, the new language provides that if a
seating position in a vehicle is equipped with an
automatic restraint to meet the frontal crash re-
quirement and a manual safety belt to meet the
lateral and rollover protection requirements, then
the vehicle is subjected to two tests. First, the vehi-
cle must pass a test in which the test dummy is
restrained solely by the automatic restraint. In ad-
dition, the vehicle must pass a second test in which
the test dummy is restrained by the automatic
restraint and the manual safety belt as well. To
reduce unnecessary testing costs for vehicles
equipped with driver-only, non-belt automatic
restraint systems, the agency is providing
manufacturers with the option of using a passenger
test dummy during the Standard No. 208 com-
pliance test.

Placement of the Test Dummy on the Seat

Ford said that the wording of SlO.l is unclear
regarding the placement of a test dummy in a seat
whose centerline is not positioned in the vertical
longitudinal plane of the vehicle. Ford said that in
its Econoline van-type vehicles, the centerline of
the front passenger's seat is "oriented a few
degrees outboard to comfortably accommodate oc-
cupants by avoiding the intrusion of the engine
cover on foot placement space. It is unclear
whether, in compliance testing, the dummy would
be placed in the vertical longitudinal plane pass-
ing through the center of the seat cushion, as im-
plied by the wording of SlO.l This would place the

dummy's torso out of alignment with the seat back,
and such a position may be unstable. Alternatively,
it is unclear whether the dummy would be placed
in the vertical longitudinal plane passing through
the seating reference point. Or would the dummy's
torso be centered in the seat and only the legs
placed in vertical longitudinal planes."

The positioning procedures have two purposes;
to ensure consistency in dummy placement and to
have the test dummy reasonably simulate the
posture of a human in the seat. As Ford noted, the
seats in its Econoline vehicles are oriented only a
few degrees outboard of the vehicle's centerline.
Thus, regardless of how the test dummy is posi-
tioned, the few degrees difference in orientation
should not make a significant difference. It appears
unlikely that many persons would even notice a
few degrees difference in the seat orientation and
it thus would be natural for a person to sit so they
are centered in the seat. The agency is modifying
the positioning requirements to provide that the
test dummy is centered with the centerline of the
seat cushion.

Subjective Phrases

Ford said that many of the test dummy position-
ing requirements contained subjective phrases,
such as "to the extent permitted," and "except as
prevented." Ford said that these phrases make the
procedures ambiguous and can lead to varying in-
terpretations by different testers.

As discussed previously, manufacturers use a
wide variety of interior design configurations and
the agency has established a positioning procedure
that attempts to accommodate those differing con-
figurations. The purpose of such phrases as "to the
extent permitted" is to permit reasonable, minor
adjustments in the positioning requirements so
that a test dummy can be positioned in a vehicle
with design features which may make it impossi-
ble to position the test dummy in absolute confor-
mance to the test procedure. By allowing for minor,
necessary adjustments, the test procedure can be
used in all vehicles, regardless of their differing
design features.

Test Dummy Upper Torso Rocking

Ford said that the provisions of S10.44 are
unclear as to how much force is to be applied to the
test dummy's lower torso while the test dummy is
being positioned in a seat. Ford asked whether the
initial force application of 50 pounds is to be re-
duced only long enough to allow the test dummy
to slide down the seat back into contact with the

PART 571; S208-PRE 339

seat cushion and whether that force is to be main-
tained until the test dummy's arms and hands are
positioned. Ford recommended that the agency
specify one specific force and provide that this force
should be maintained during the upper torso force
application.

The purpose of permitting testers to reduce the
horizontal force on the test dummy during the set-
tling procedure is to accommodate seats with dif-
fering frictional properties. In a vehicle with
"slick" material, the test dummy may easily slide
down the seat back without reducing the horizon-
tal force much, if at all. If the seat has high fric-
tion material, the horizontal force must be reduced
considerably to allow the test dummy to slide down
the seat back. NHTSA, however, agrees with Ford
that providing for use of a specific force should
eliminate another possible source of test variabil-
ity. NHTSA is thus modifying the settling pro-
cedure to provide that a force of 10 to 15 pounds
of horizontal rearward force will be applied to the
test dummy during the final upper torso position-
ing procedures (SIO.4.4 and SIO.4.5).

Test Dummy Position Fixture

Ford also asked the agency to specify the test
dummy positioning fixture that will be used in
accordance with the requirements of SlO.4.2 to
position the test dummy. Although the NCAP test
procedures specify the use of a specific test posi-
tioning fixture, the agency does not believe it is
necessary to specify such a device here. NHTSA
believes that manufacturers should be permitted
the option of devising their own positioning fix-
tures. This results in a more performance-oriented
standard. Thus, the agency is not adopting Ford's
recommendation for a specific test procedure but
is making a minor change to SlO.4.2 to delete any
reference to a "dummy positioning fixture."

Arm and Hand Placement

Ford noted that S10.5 calls for placement of the
test dummy's arms and hands prior to settling and
asked that the requirements be changed to provide
for arm and hand placement after settling. Ford
also noted that the reference in SlO.5 to the arm
and hand placement requirements is incorrect.

NHTSA agrees with Ford that the procedure
should be changed to provide for arm and hand
placement after the test dummy has been settled.
The agency has made the necessary change and
has also corrected the references in the position-
ing procedure.

Vehicle Test Attitude

Ford said that the requirements of S8. 1.1(d) re-
quire the cargo load to be centered over the
longitudinal centerline of the vehicle. Ford said
that the "longitudinal centerline of the vehicle
marks the lateral center of the vehicle, and center-
ing of the cargo on the longitudinal centerline of
the vehicle only determines its lateral (side-to-side)
position, but not its fore-and-aft position." Ford
asked the agency to specify that the cargo be
centered over the longitudinal centerline of the
vehicle and at the longitudinal center of the cargo
area.

Ford also asked the agency to clarify how to
determine the longitudinal center of the cargo ai'ea
in a station wagon or hatchback with a second seat
that can be folded down to form a cargo area or in
a multipurpose passenger vehicle with readily
removable rear seats.

NHTSA agrees with Ford that cargo should be
centered on the vertical longitudinal centerline of
the vehicle and in the center of the cargo area. In
the case of vehicles with a folddown seat or with
a readily removable seat, the agency will consider
the cargo Eu-ea as the area that is available with
a folddown seat in its upright position and a readily
removable seat anchored at its position. The agen-
cy will then determine the center of that position
and place the cargo there.

Effective Date for New Test Procedures

Ford and the Automobile Importers of America
(AIA), asked the agency to reconsider its decision
to implement the test dummy positioning pro-
cedure changes prior to September 1, 1986. AIA
said that while some manufacturers wanted the
new procedures to go into effect as soon as possi-
ble, the 45-day effective date placed an unreason-
able burden on other manufacturers that are cur-
rently producing automatic restraints. AIA said
that the short effective date did not provide enough
time for a manufacturer to determine whether the
test procedure changes affect the compliance of its
current vehicles. AIA asked the agency to allow the
optional use of the test procedures now and set a
later mandatory effective date.

By adopting a 45-day effective date, the agency
did not intend to jeopardize the compliance testing
that has already been done by manufacturers.
NHTSA is adopting AIA's suggestion to allow the
use, at the manufactiu-er's option, of either the old
or new test procedure during the first year of the
phase-in. Beginning September 1, 1987, the use of
the new test procedure will become mandatory.

PART 571; S208-PRE 340

Revisions to Standard No. 210

Ford asked the agency to clarify the revision
made to the safety belt anchorage location re-
quirements of S4.3 of Standard No. 210, Seat Belt
Assembly Anchorages. The March 1986 notice ex-
empted anchorages for automatic belts and
dynamically-tested manual belts from the an-
chorage location requirements of Standard No. 210.
Ford asked whether a manufacturer must provide
two sets of anchorages in vehicles with dynami-
cally-tested manual lap/shoulder belts that have
the anchorages located outside the zone specified
in S4.3— one set of anchorages for Type 2 manual
belt systems located within the anchorage zone set
out in S4.3 of the standard, and the other set of an-
chorages for the dynamically -tested Type 2 manual
belt systems.

NHTSA has recently responded to a petition from
GM raising the same issue. In a letter of April 14,
1986, the agency explained that anchorages for
Type 2 manual belt systems must be included for
vehicles that have automatic or dynamically -tested
manual belts located outside of the zone. (The agen-
cy's letter is available in the Standard No. 210 in-
terpretation file in the NHTSA docket section.) The
agency did, however, grant GM's petition to amend
the requirement, saying that GM had raised a
number of reasons why the requirements of Stand-
ard No. 210 should be changed. NHTSA will
shortly issue a notice of proposed rulemaking on
this subject.

Labeling of Dynamically-Tested Safety Belts

Ford objected to the adoption, in Standard No.
209, Seat Beit Assemblies, of a requirement that
dynamically-tested belts have a label identifying
the vehicles in which they can be used. Ford said
that the required label does not specifically iden-
tify the safety belt as a dynamically-tested belt and
the label does not suggest that the belt may be
safely used only in specific vehicles at specific
seats. Ford asked the agency to rescind the label-
ing requirement.

Ford suggested that the intent of S4.6(b) could
be accomplished by requiring the safety belt in-
stallation instruction required by S4.1(k) of the
standard to specify both the vehicles for which the
belt system is to be used and the specific type of
seating position for which it is intended.

NHTSA still believes that it is important that a
dynamically-tested safety belt be labeled to ensure
that it is installed only in the type of vehicle for
which it is intended. NHTSA agrees with Ford that

providing the information in the installation in-
structions would address most of the problem of
possible misuse. However, there still may be in-
stances where the instruction would be lost. In ad-
dition, the installation instruction requirements
apply only to aftermarket belts. There can be situa-
tions where a safety belt may be taken from one
vehicle and transferred to another. Given these
considerations and the importance of alerting
motorists that a safety belt may have been de-
signed for use in one particular make and model
vehicle, the agency has decided to retain the label-
ing requirement.

In response to Ford's comment, NHTSA believes
that the statement appearing on the label should
be changed to require a manufacturer to specify the
specific vehicles for which the safety belt is in-
tended and the specific seating position (e.g., "right
front") in which it can be used.

Exemption of Dynamically-Tested Safety Belts

The March 1986 rule adopted a requirement that
the manual lap/shoulder belts in the front seats of
passenger cars must meet a dynamic crash test.
The requirement would go into effect for those
manual belts on September 1, 1989, if the
automatic restraint requirements of the standard
are rescinded. Three petitioners, the American
Seat Belt Council (ASBC), the Narrow Fabrics In-
stitute (NFI), and Phoenix Trimming Company,
asked the agency to reconsider its decision to ex-
empt dynamically -tested manual safety belts from
the webbing width and breaking strength re-
quirements of Standard No. 209, Seat Belt
Assemblies. On August 4, 1986, ASBC petitioned
the agency to rescind the current Standard No. 209
exemption for automatic safety belts. The three
petitions for reconsideration on dynamically -tested
manual safety belts and the new petition for
rulemaking on automatic safety belts raise similar
issues, which the agency is currently reviewing.
The agency will respond to those petitions at a later
date.

Effective Date for Dynamic Testing of Manual
Lap/Shoulder Belts

Nissan asked the agency for a two-year postpone-
ment, from September 1, 1989, to September 1,
1991, of the effective date of the dynamic test re-
quirement for front seat manual lap/shoulder belts
in passenger cars. The dynamic test requirement
for passenger car manual belts will go into effect

PART 571; S208-PRE 341

only if the automatic restraint requirement for
passenger cars is rescinded. Nissan said that if a
decision to rescind the automatic restraint re-
quirements is not made until the end of March
1989, it will have only six months in which to
develop a manual belt which can meet the dynamic
test requirement. Nissan also said that having to
develop a dynamically-tested manual safety belt
prior to March 1989 places an unreasonable burden
on manufacturers since they would have to be
simultaneously developing both automatic
restraints and dynamically-tested manual belts.
The agency has previously denied, in the March
21, 1986, final rule, a similar request from
American Motors Corporation (AMC) for such an
extension. In denying AMC's request, the agency
noted that most of the vehicle components in
passenger cars necessary for injury reduction are
the same for automatic restraint vehicles and
dynamically-tested manual belt vehicles. In addi-
tion, the agency noted that the New Car Assess-
ment Program results show that approximately 40
percent of current model passenger cars can meet
the injury criteria of Standard No. 208 in 35-mph
crash tests, which involve 36 percent more crash
energy than the 30-mph crash test used in Stand-
ard No. 208. Nissan has not provided any new data
that would justify changing the agency's prior deci-
sion and therefore, Nissan's request for an exten-
sion of the effective date is denied.

Due Care Defense

The Center for Auto Safety (CFAS) and Ford peti-
tioned the agency to reconsider its decision to adopt
a due care defense in Standard No. 208. CFAS said
that adoption of the defense contravenes the non-
compliance notification and remedy requirements
of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act. In addition, CFAS said that the due care
defense is not a standard for motor vehicle perfor-
mance as required by the Vehicle Safety Act and
is too broad to accomplish its intended purpose.
Ford said that adoption of the due care defense does
not sufficiently address its concerns about the ob-
jectivity and practicability of the standard's re-
quirements. It urged the agency to adopt a design
to conform to the requirement in the standard.

The agency is still reviewing the issues raised by
CFAS and Ford about the due care defense.
Because the automatic restraint phase-in require-
ment is imminent, NHTSA has decided to retain
the due care provision for the first year of the
phase-in, pending the agency's final decision on

this issue. The agency will expedite its review of
these issues.

To clarify its interpretation of the due care
defense, the agency does want to address one issue
raised by the CFAS. In its comments, CFAS offered
an example of what it believed was a problem with
the due care defense. The CFAS said:

Consider, for example, a scenario in which the
agency's compliance test reveals a very high HIC
score. The manufacturer's tests show complying
results. It turns out that the manufacturer
received from a supplier a shipment of poor
quality restraint system components that
resulted in the poor figure in the agency's test
and would cause similarly poor results for most
vehicles containing the components from that
shipment. The poor quality components were not
caught in the manufacturer's quality control pro-
gram. Perhaps this failure to catch the poor
quality component is because their problems
only show up in dynamic crash testing. (The due
care defense surely will not require manufac-
turers to crash test a vehicle containing com-
ponents from each shipment.) Or perhaps the
manufacturer's quality control by chance
checked only some of the few units in the ship-
ment that were of good quality. Under the due
care exemption these vehicles could not be re-
called for noncompliance despite clear evidence
of a specific problem that will cause high HIC
levels.

As stated in the preamble to the March 21, 1986,
final rule, the due care defense is meant to address
an instance where there is an isolated apparent
failure and the manufacturer can demonstrate that
it made a good faith effort in designing its vehicles
and instituted adequate quality control measures.
NHTSA considers the example used by CFAS as
an instance in which the agency would not accept
a due care defense and the vehicles would be sub-
ject to the noncompliance notification and remedy
provisions of the Vehicle Safety Act. Clearly, the
CFAS's example shows there is a significant flaw
in the manufacturer's quality control process
which affects a widespread number of vehicles.
Manufacturers are capable of instituting quality
control measures that will adequately test the per-
formance of individual components without hav-
ing to subject a vehicle containing that component
to a crash test. Likewise, quality control measures
are available so that manufacturers can statisti-
cally check a sufficient number of components to
ensure that nearly all of the components of a par-
ticular shipment are of the required quality. For

PART 571; S208-PRE 342

these reasons, the agency would not accept a due
care defense in the example posed by CFAS.

Belt Contact Force Test Procedure

The March 21, 1986, notice renumbered the test
dummy positioning procedure for the belt contact
force test of the safety belt comfort and convenience
requirements. In making that amendment, the
following sentence was inadvertently left out:
"Close the vehicle's adjacent door, pull 12 inches
of belt webbing from the retractor and then release
it, allowing the belt webbing to return to the dum-
my's chest."

Nissan has recently written the agency contain-
ing the deletion of the sentence. Nissan said that
if the deletion was inadvertent and the require-
ment was reinstated, then the agency should
slightly modify the requirement. Nissan said that
in systems where it is not possible to pull out 12
inches of belt webbing, the requirement should pro-
vide for pulling out the maximum available length
of the belt webbing.

Nissan pointed out that, as stated by the agency
in the April 12, 1985, notice proposing amend-
ments to the comfort and convenience requirement,
one purpose of pulling out the webbing is to reduce
belt drag in the the belt guide components prior
to measuring the belt contact force. It further said
that maintaining the 12-inch requirement would
necessitate a complete redesign of some of the belt
systems for its vehicles.

NHTSA agrees that the purpose of the belt web-
bing pull requirement can be adequately met by
pulling out the maximum allowable amount of the
belt, when the belt has less than 12 inches of
available additional webbing. Pulling the belt in
this way will ensure that the belt retractor is work-
ing and webbing drag is reduced. Thus, the agency
is changing the requirement to provide that prior
to measuring the belt contact force the agency will
pull out 12 inches of webbing or the maximum
amount of webbing available when the maximum
amount is less than 12 inches.

The agency recognizes that manufacturers may
have relied, in good faith, on the version of the belt
contact force test procedure and based their cer-
tification of compliance on tests conducted accord-
ing to that procedure. So as not to invalidate those
compliance tests, the agency is amending the
standard to allow the manufacturers to conduct the
belt contact force test either with or without first
pulling the webbing. Beginning September 1, 1987,
the old test procedure will become mandatory.

Typographical Errors

The amendments made on March 21, 1986, con-
tained a typographical error which is being cor-
rected in this notice. In S4. 1.3.2.2(b), the word "car"
is corrected to read "cars."

Costs and Benefits

NHTSA has examined the impact of this
rulemaking action and determined that it is not
major within the meaning of Executive Order
12291 or significant within the meaning of the
Department of Transportation's regulatory policies
and procedures. The agency has also determined
that the economic and other impacts of this
rulemaking action are so minimal that a full
regulatory evaluation is not required.

The amendments adopted by this notice make
some minor clarifying changes to the test dummy
positioning procedures. In addition, the agency is
providing increased flexibility to manufacturers by
allowing them to use one of two sets of test pro-
cedures for a one-year period. Use of either set of
test procedures should have only minimal impact
on a manufacturer's testing costs.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

NHTSA has also considered the impacts of this
rulemaking action under the Regulatory Flexibil-
ity Act. I hereby certify that it would not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Accordingly, the agency
has not prepared a full regulatory flexibility
analysis.

Few, if any, passenger car manufacturers would
qualify as small entities and the test procedure
changes made by this notice are minimal. Small
organizations and governmental units should not
be significantly affected since the costs, if any,
associated with the test procedure changes should
be minimal.

Environmental Effects

NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking action for
the purposes of the National Environmental Policy
Act. The agency has determined that implemen-
tation of this action will not have any significant
impact on the quality of the human environment.

Paperwork Reduction

The information collection requirements of this
notice are being submitted to the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget pursuant to the requirements of

PART 571; S208-PRE 343

the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et
seq.).

Effective Date

NHTSA has determined that it is in the public
interest to amend, upon publication of this final
rule, the requirement of Standard No. 208 since the
test dummy positioning options adopted by this
notice affect manufacturer's plans for the 1987
model year.

In consideration of the foregoing. Part 571.208
of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations is
amended as follows:

1. In S4.1.3.2.2(b), the word "car" is amended to
read "cars."

2. SIO through S10.9 is revised to read as
follows:

SlO Test dummy positioning procedures. For
vehicles manufactured before September 1, 1987,
position a test dummy, conforming to Subpart B
of Part 572 (49 CFR Part 572), in each front out-
board seating position of a vehicle as specified in
SlO through SIO. 9 or, at the manufacturer's option,
as specified in S12 through S12.2.3.2. For vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1, 1987, posi-
tion a test dummy, conforming to Subpart B of Part
572 (49 CFR Part 572), in each front outboard
seating position of a vehicle as set forth below in
SlO through SIO. 9. Regardless of which position-
ing procedure is used, each test dummy is re-
strained during the crash tests of S5 as follows:

(a) In a vehicle equipped with automatic
restraints at each front outboard designated
seating position that is certified by its manufac-
turer as meeting the requirements of S4. 1.2. 1(a)
and (c)(1), each test dummy is not restrained dur-
ing the frontal test of S5.1, the lateral test of S5.2
and the rollover test of S5.3 by any means that re-
quire occupant action.

(bXi) In a vehicle equipped with an automatic
restraint at each front outboard seating position
that is certified by its manufactiu"er as meeting the
requirements of S4. 1.2. 1(a) and (c)(2), each test
dummy is not restrained during one frontal test of
S5.1 by any means that require occupant action.
If the vehicle has a manual seat belt provided by
the manufacturer to comply with the requirements
of S4. 1.2. 1(c), then a second frontal test is conducted
in accordance with S5.1 and each test dummy is
restrained both by the automatic restraint system
and the manual seat belt, adjusted in accordance
with S10.9.

(ii) In a vehicle equipped with an automatic
restraint only at the driver's designated seating
position, pursuant to S4.1.3.4(aX2), that is certified
by its manufacturer as meeting the requirements
of S4. 1.2. 1(a) and (cX2), the driver test dummy is
not restrained during one frontal test of S5.1 by
any means that require occupant action. If the
vehicle also has a manual seat belt provided by the
manufacturer to comply with the requirements of
S4. 1.2. 1(c), then a second frontal test is conducted
in accordance with S5.1 and the driver test dummy
is restrained both by the automatic restraint
system and the manual seat belt, adjusted in ac-
cordance with SIO. 9. At the option of the manufac-
turer, a passenger test dummy can be placed in the
right front outboard designated seating position
during the testing required by this section. If a
passenger test dummy is present, it shall be
restrained by a manual seat belt, adjusted in ac-
cordance with S10.9.

(c) In a vehicle equipped with a manual safety
belt at the front outboard designated seating posi-
tion that is certified by its manufacturer to meet
the requirements of S4.6, each test dummy is
restrained by the manual safety belts, adjusted in
accordance with SIO. 9, installed at each front out-
board seating position.

SlO.l Vehicle equipped with front bucket seats.
Place the test dummy's torso against the seat back
and its upper legs against the seat cushion to the
extent permitted by placement of the test dummy's
feet in accordance with the appropriate paragraph
of SIO. Center the test dummy on the seat cushion
of the bucket seat and set its midsagittal plane so
that it is vertical and parallel to the centerline of
the seat cushion.

SlO. 1.1 Driver position placement

(a) Initially set the knees of the test dummy 14.5
inches apart, measured between the outer surfaces
of the knee pivot bolt heads, with the left outer sur-
face 5.9 inches from the midsagittal plane of the
test dummy.

(b) Rest the right foot of the test dummy on the
undepressed accelerator pedal with the rearmost
point of the heel on the floor pan in the plane of
the pedal. If the foot cannot be placed on the ac-
celerator pedal, set it initially perpendicular to the
lower leg and place it as far forward as possible in
the direction of the pedal centerline with the rear-
most point of the heel resting on the floor pan. Ex-
cept as prevented by contact with a vehicle surface,
place the right leg so that the upper and lower leg
centerlines fall, as closely as possible, in a vertical
plane without inducing torso movement.

PART 571; S208-PRE 344

(c) Place the left foot on the toeboaid with the
rearmost point of the heel resting on the floor pan
as close as possible to the point of intersection of
the planes described by the toeboard and the floor
pan and not on the wheel well projection. If the foot
cannot be positioned on the toeboard, set it initially
perpendicular to the lower leg and place it as far
forward as possible with the heel resting on the
floor pan. If necessary to avoid contact with the
vehicle's brake or clutch pedal, rotate the test
dummy's left foot about the lower leg. If there is
still pedal interference, rotate the left leg outboard
about the hip the minimum distance necessary to
avoid the pedal interference. Except as prevented
by contact with a vehicle surface, place the left leg
so that the upper and lower leg centerlines fall, as
closely as possible, in a vertical plane. For vehicles
with a foot rest that does not elevate the left foot
above the level of the right foot, place the left foot
on the foot rest so that the upper and lower leg
centerlines fall in a vertical plane.

SlO.1.2 Passenger position placement.

SIO. 1.2.1 Vehicles with a flat floor panJ toeboard.

(a) Initially set the knees 11.75 inches apart,
measured between the outer surfaces of the knee
pivot bolt heads.

(b) Place the right and left feet on the vehicle's
toeboard with the heels resting on the floor pan as
close as possible to the intersection point of the
toeboard. If the feet cannot be placed flat on the
toeboard, set them perpendicular to the lower leg
centerlines and place them as far forward as possi-
ble with the heels resting on the floor pan.

(c) Place the right and left legs so that the up-
per and lower leg centerlines fall in vertical
longitudinal planes.

SlO. 1 .2.2 Vehicles with wheelhouse projections in
passenger compartment.

(a) Initially set the knees 11.75 inches apart,
measured between the outer surfaces of the knee
pivot bolt heads.

Oj) Place the right and left feet in the well of the
floor pan/toeboard and not on the wheelhouse pro-
jection. If the feet cannot be placed flat on the
toeboard, initially set them perpendicular to the
lower leg centerlines and then place them as far
forward as possible with the heels resting on the
floor pan.

(c) If it is not possible to maintain vertical and
longitudinal planes through the upper and lower
leg centerlines for each leg, then place the left leg
so that its upper and lower centerlines fall, as
closely as possible, in a vertical longitudinal plane
and place the right leg so that its upper and lower

leg centerlines fall, as closely as possible, in a ver-
tical plane.

510. 2 Vehicle equipped with bench seating. Place
the test dummy's torso against the seat back and
its upper legs against the seat cushion, to the ex-
tent permitted by placement of the test dummy's
feet in accordance with the appropriate paragraph
of SlO.l.

510.2.1 Driver position placement Place the test
dummy at the left front outboard designated
seating position so that its midsagittal plane is ver-
tical and parallel to the centerline of the vehicle
and so that the midsagittal plane of the test
dummy passes through the center of the steering
wheel rim. Place the legs, knees, and feet of the
test dummy as specified in Si 0.1.1.

510. 2. 2 Passenger position placement. Place the
test dummy at the right front outboard designated
seating position so that the midsagittal plane of the
test dummy is vertical and longitudinal, and the
same distance from the vehicle's longitudinal
centerline as the midsagittal plane of the test
dummy at the driver's position. Place the legs,
knees, and feet of the test dummy as specified in
SIO.1.2.

510. 3 Initial test dummy hand and arm place-
ment. With the test dummy at its designated
seating position as specified by the appropriate re-
quirements of SlO.l or SlO.2, place the upper arms
against the seat back and tangent to the side of the
upper torso. Place the lower arms and palms
against the outside of the upper leg.

510. 4 Test dummy settling.

510. 4.1 Test dummy vertical upward displace-
ment. Slowly lift the test dummy parallel to the
seat back plane until the test dummy's buttocks
no longer contact the seat cushion or until there
is test dummy head contact with the vehicle's
headlining.

510. 4. 2 Lower torso force application. Apply a
rearward force of 50 pounds against the center of
the test dummy's lower torso in a horizontal direc-
tion. The line of force application shall be 6.5 inches
above the bottom surface of the test dummy's
buttocks.

510. 4. 3 Test dummy vertical downward displace-
ment. Remove as much of the 50-pound force as
necessary to allow the test dummy to return
downward to the seat cushion by its own weight.

510. 4. 4 Test dummy upper torso rocking. Apply
a 10-to- 15-pound horizontal rearward force to the
test dummy's lower torso. Then apply a horizon-
tal forward force to the test dummy's shoulders suf-
ficient to flex the upper torso forward until its back

PART 571; S208-PRE 345

no longer contacts the seat back. Rock the test
dummy from side to side 3 or 4 times so that the
test dummy's spine is at any angle from the ver-
tical in the 14-to-16-degree range at the extremes
of each rocking movement.

SIO.4.5 Test dummy upper torso force applica-
tion. While maintaining the lO-to-15-pound
horizontal rearward force applied in SlO.4.4 and
with the test dummy's midsagittal plane vertical,
push the upper torso back against the seat back
with a force of 50 pounds applied in a horizontal
rearward direction along a line that is coincident
with the test dummy's midsagittal plane and 18
inches above the bottom surface of the test
dummy's buttocks.

510.5 Belt adjustment for dynamic testing. With
the test dummy at its designated seating position
as specified by the appropriate requirements of
S8.1.2, S8.1.3, and SlO.l through SlO.4, place and
adjust the safety belt as specified below.

510.5.1 Manual safety belts. Place the Type 1 or
Type 2 manual belt around the test dummy and
fasten the latch. Pull the Type 1 belt webbing out
of the retractor and allow it to retract; repeat this
operation four times. Remove all slack from the lap
belt portion of a Type 2 belt. Pull the upper torso
webbing out of the retractor and allow it to retract;
repeat this operation four times so that the excess
webbing in the shoulder belt is removed by the
retractive force of the retractor. Apply a
2-to-4-pound tension load to the lap belt of a single
retractor system by pulling the upper torso belt ad-
jacent to the latchplate. In the case of a dual retrac-
tor system, apply a 2-to-4-pound tension load by
pulling the lap belt adjacent to its retractor.
Measure the tension load as close as possible to the
same location where the force was applied. After
the tension load has been applied, ensure that the
upper torso belt lies flat on the test dummy's
shoulder.

510.5.2 Automatic safety belts. Ensure that the
upper torso belt lies flat on the test dummy's
shoulder after the automatic belt has been placed
on the test dummy.

510.5.3 Belts with tension-relieving devices. If the
automatic or dynamically-tested manual safety
belt system is equipped with a tension-relieving
device, introduce the maximum amount of slack
into the upper torso belt that is recommended by
the manufacturer for normal use in the owner's
manual for the vehicle.

510.6 Placement of test dummy arms and hands.
With the test dummy positioned as specified by
S10.4 and without inducing torso movement, place
the arms, elbows, and hands of the test dummy,

as appropriate for each designated seating position
in accordance with SIO.6.1 or SIO.6.2. Following
placement of the arms, elbows, and hands, remove
the force applied against the lower half of the torso.

510.6.1 Driver's position. Move the upper and
the lower arms of the test dummy at the driver's
position to their fully outstretched position in the
lowest possible orientation. Push each arm rear-
ward permitting bending at the elbow, until the
palm of each hand contacts the outer part of the
rim of the steering wheel at its horizontal
centerline. Place the test dummy's thumbs over the
steering wheel rim and position the upper and
lower arm centerlines as closely as possible in a
vertical plane without inducing torso movement.

510.6.2 Passenger position. Move the upper and
the lower arms of the test dummy at the passenger
position to the fully outstretched position in the
lowest possible orientation. Push each arm rear-
ward, permitting bending at the elbow, until the
upper arm contacts the seat back and is tangent
to the upper part of the side of the torso, the palm
contacts the outside of the thigh, and the little
finger is barely in contact with the seat cushion.

510.7 Repositioning of feet and legs. After the
test dummy has been settled in accordance with
SlO.4, the safety belt system has been positioned,
if necessary, in accordance with S10.5, and the
arms and hands of the test dummy have been posi-
tioned in accordance with S10.6, reposition the feet
and legs of the test dummy, if necessary, so that
the feet and legs meet the applicable requirements
of SlO.l or S10.2.

510.8 Test dummy positioning for latchplate ac-
cess. The reach envelopes specified in S7.4.4 are ob-
tained by positioning a test dummy in the driver's
seat or passenger's seat in its forwardmost adjust-
ment position. Attach the lines for the inboard and
outboard arms to the test dummy as described in
Figure 3 of this standard. Extend each line
backward and outboard to generate the compliance
arcs of the outboard reach envelope of the test dum-
my's arms.

510.9 Test dummy positioning for belt contact
force.

SIO.9.1 Vehicles manufactured before Septem-
ber 1, 1987. To determine compliance with S7.4.3
of this standard, a manufacturer may use, at its
option, either the test procedure of SIO.9.1 or the
test procedure of SIO.9.2. Position the test dummy
in the vehicle in accordance with the appropriate
requirements specified in SlO.l or S10.2 and under
the conditions of S8.1.2 and S8.1.3. Fasten the latch
and pull the belt webbing three inches from the test
dummy's chest and release until the webbing is

PART 571; S208-PRE 346

within one inch of the test dummy's chest and
measure the belt contact force.

SlO.9.2 Vehicles manufactured on or after Sep-
tember 1, 1987. To determine compliance with
S7.4.3 of this standard, position the test dummy
in the vehicle in accordance with the appropriate
requirements specified in SlO.l or S10.2 and under
the conditions of S8. 1.2 and S8. 1.3. Close the vehi-
cle's adjacent door, pull either 12 inches of belt
webbing or the maximum available amount of belt
webbing, whichever is less, from the retractor and
then release it, allowing the belt webbing to return
to the dummy's chest. Fasten the latch and pull
the belt webbing three inches from the test dum-
my's chest and release until the webbing is within
one inch of the test dummy's chest and measure
the belt contact force.

3. A new section S12 is added to read as follows:

S12. Optional position procedures for the Part
572, Subpart B test dummy. The following test
dummy positioning procedures for the Part 572,
Subpart B test dummy may be used, at the option
of a manufacturer, until September 1, 1987.

S12.1 Dummy placement in vehicle. Anthro-
pomorphic test dummies are placed in the vehicle
in accordance with 812.1.1 and S12.1.2.

S12.1.1 Vehicle equipped with front bucket seats.
In the case of a vehicle equipped with front bucket
seats, dummies are placed at the front outboard
designated seating positions with the test device
torso against the seat back, and the thighs against
the seat cushion to the extent permitted by place-
ment of the dummy's feet in accordance with the
appropriate paragraph of S12.1. The dummy is
centered on the seat cushion of the bucket seat and
its midsagittal plane is vertical and longitudinal.

S12. 1.1.1 Driver position placement. At the
driver's position, the knees of the dummy are in-
itially set 14.5 inches apart, measured between the
outer surfaces of the knee pivot bolt heads, with
the left outer surface 5.9 inches from the midsagit-
tal plane of the dummy. The right foot of the
dummy rests on the undepressed accelerator pedal
with the rearmost point of the heel on the floor pan
in the plane of the pedal. If the foot cannot be
placed on the accelerator pedal, it is set perpen-
dicular to the tibia and placed as far forward as
possible in the direction of the geometric center of
the pedal with the rearmost point of the heel
resting on the floor pan. The plane defined by the
femur and tibia centerlines of the right leg is as
close as possible to vertical without inducing torso
movement and except as prevented by contact with
a vehicle surface. The left foot is placed on the

toeboard with the rearmost point of the heel resting
on the floor pan as close as possible to the point
of intersection of the planes described by the
toeboard and the floor pan. If the foot cannot be
positioned on the toeboard, it is set perpendicular
to the tibia and placed as far forward as possible
with the heel resting on the floor pan. The femur
and tibia centerlines of the left leg are positioned
in a vertical plane except as prevented by contact
with a vehicle surface.

S12.1.1.2 Passenger position placement. At the
right front designated seating position, the femur,
tibia, and foot centerlines of each of the dummy's
legs are positioned in a vertical longitudinal plane.
The feet of the dummy are placed on the toeboard
with the rearmost point of the heel resting on the
floor pan as close as possible to the point of intersec-
tion of the planes described by the toeboard and
the floorpan. If the feet cannot be positioned flat
on the toeboard, they are set perpendicular to the
tibia and are placed as far forward as possible with
the heels resting on the floor pan.

S12.1.2 Vehicle equipped with bench seating. In
the case of a vehicle which is equipped with a front
bench seat, a dummy is placed at each of the front
outboard designated seating positions with the
dummy torso against the seat back and the thighs
against the seat cushion to the extent permitted
by placement of the dummy's feet in accordance
with the appropriate paragraph of S12.1.1.

512. 1.2.1 Driver position placement The dummy
is placed at the left front outboard designated
seating position so that its midsagittal plane is ver-
tical and longitudinal, and passes through the
center point of the plane described by the steering
wheel rim. The legs, knees, and feet of the dummy
are placed as specified in S12. 1.1.1.

512.1.2.2 Passenger position placement. The
dummy is placed at the right front outboard
designated seating position as specified in
S. 12. 1.1. 2, except that the midsagittal plane of the
dummy is vertical, longitudinal, and the same
distance from the longitudinal centerline as the
midsagittal plane of the dummy at the driver's
position.

S12.2 Dummy positioning procedures. The
dummy is positioned on a seat as specified in
S12.2.1 through S12.2.3.2 to achieve the conditions
of S12.1.

S12.2.1 Initial dummy placement. With the
dummy at its designated seating position as
described in S12.1 place the upper arms against the
seat back and tangent to the side of the upper torso

PART 571; S208-PRE 347

and the lower arms and palms against the outside
of the thighs.

512.2.2 Dummy settling. With the dummy posi-
tioned as specified in SlO.l, slowly lift the dummy
in the direction parallel to the plane of the seat
back until its buttocks no longer contact the seat
cushion or until its head contacts the vehicle roof.
Using a flat, square, rigid surface with an area of
9 square inches and oriented so that its edges fall
in longitudinal or horizontal planes, apply a force
of 50 pounds through the center of the rigid sur-
face against the dummy's torso in the horizontal
rearward direction along a line that is coincident
with the midsagittal plane of the dummy and 5.5
inches above the bottom surface of its buttocks.
Slowly remove the lifting force.

512.2.2.1 While maintaining the contact of the
force application plate with the torso, remove as
much force as is necessary from the dummy's torso
to allow the dummy to return to the seat cushion
by its own weight.

512.2.2.2 Without removing the force applied to
the lower torso, apply additional force in the
horizontal, forward direction, longitudinally
against the upper shoulders of the dummy suffi-
cient to flex the torso forward until the dummy's
back above the lumbar spine no longer contacts the
seatback. Rock the dummy from side to side three
or four times, so that the dummy's spine is at an
angle from the vertical of not less than 14 degrees
and not more than 16 degrees at the extreme of
each movement. With the midsagittal plane ver-
tical, push the upper half of the torso back against
the seat back with a force of 50 pounds applied in
the horizontal rearward direction along a line that
is coincident with the midsagittal plane of the
dummy and 18 inches above the bottom surface of
its buttocks. Slowly remove the horizontal force.

512.2.3 Placement of dummy arms and hands.
With the dummy positioned as specified in S12.2.2
and without inducing torso movement, place the
arms, elbows, and hands of the dummy, as ap-
propriate for each designated seating position in
accordance with S12.2.3.1 or S12.2.3.2. Following

placement of the limbs, remove the force applied
against the lower half of the torso.

512.2.3.1 Driver's position. Move the upper and
the lower arms of the dummy at the driver's posi-
tion to the fully outstretched position in the lowest
possible orientation. Push each arm rearward, per-
mitting bending at the elbow, until the palm of
each hand contacts the outer part of the rim of the
steering wheel at its horizontal centerline. Place
the dummy's thumbs over the steering wheel rim,
positioning the upper and lower arm centerlines
as close as possible in a vertical plane without in-
cluding torso movement.

512.2.3.2 Passenger position. Move the upper
and the lower arms of the dummy at the passenger
position to the fully outstretched position in the
lowest possible orientation. Push each arm rear-
ward, permitting bending at the elbow, until the
upper arm contacts the seat back and is tangent
to the upper part of the side of the torso, the palm
contacts the outside of the thigh, and the little
finger is barely in contact with the seat cushion.
§571.209 Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies.

1. S4.6(b) of §571.209 is revised to read as
follows:

(b) A seat belt assembly that meets the require-
ments of 4.6.1 of Standard No. 208 of this part
(§571.208) shall be permanently and legibly
marked or labeled with the following statement:

"This dynamically -tested seat belt assembly is
for use only in (insert specific seating position(s),
e.g., 'front right') in (insert specific vehicle make(s),
and model(s))."

Issued on August 29, 1986

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

51 F.R. 29552
August 19, 1986

PART 571; S208-PRE 348

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE

SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection and Automatic Restraint Phase-in Reporting

(Docl^et No. 74-14; Notice 47)

ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY: On April 12, 1985, NHTSA published a
notice proposing amendments to Standard No. 208, Oc-
cupant Crash Protection. On March 21, 1986, NHTSA
published a final rule that addressed a number of the
proposed requirements. This notice announces the
agency's decisions on several of the remaining pro-
posals. NHTSA has decided to adopt an exemption
from the automatic restraint requirement for conver-
tibles. The exemption would only apply during the
phase-in period. In a subsequent rulemaking the agency
will determine whether to apply the automatic restraint
requirement to convertibles manufactured after
September 1, 1989, or whether to apply a dynamic test
requirement to the manual safety belts used in those
vehicles. The agency is modifying the head injury
criterion used in Standard No. 208 compliance testing
by adopting a maximum time interval of 36 milliseconds
for calculating the HIC values.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendments made by this
notice will be effective on November 17, 1986.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

On April 12, 1985 (50 FR 14589), NHTSA published
a notice, which is the basis for the final rule being issued
today, proposing the following amendments to Stand-
ard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection: reporting re-
quirements for the phase-in of automatic restraints,
deletion of the oblique crash test, use of the New Car
Assessment Program (NCAP) test procedures, adop-
tion of a due care defense, alternative calculations of
the head injury criterion (HIC), and alternative occu-
pant crash protection requirements for convertibles.
The notice also proposed the dynamic testing of manual
lap/shoulder belts for passenger cars, light trucks and
light van-type vehicles.

On March 21, 1986 (51 FR 9800), NHTSA published
a final rule amending Standard No. 208 that retained
the oblique crash test for automatic restraint equipped
cars, adopted some NCAP test procedures for use in
the standard's crash tests, provided for a due care
defense with respect to the automatic restraint require-

ment, and required the dynamic testing of manual
lap/shoulder belts in passenger cars if the automatic
restraint requirement is rescinded. The March 1986
notice also created a new Part 585 setting reporting
requirements regarding compliance with the automatic
restraint phase-in requirements of the standard. This
notice announces the agency's decision on several of
the other actions proposed in the April 1985 notice.
NHTSA will soon publish a separate notice announc-
ing its decision on dynamic testing of safety belts in
light trucks, buses, and multipurpose passenger
vehicles.

Convertibles

The April 1985 notice proposed alternative occupant
crash protection requirements for convertibles, begin-
ning with model year 1990. The agency proposed that
manufacturers have the option of installing manual lap
belts, subject to the belt strength requirements of
Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies, and the an-
chorage strength requirements of Standard No. 210,
Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, instead of installing
automatic restraints subject to the occupant crash pro-
tection criteria of Standard No. 208.

As a part of the notice, NHTSA requested data on
several specific questions to assist the agency in mak-
ing a decision. Those questions covered such issues as
current and future production figures for convertibles
and the cost and practicability of installing various
types of automatic restraints. The answers provided
by the commenters show that:

• Through 1989, convertibles will average slightly
over one percent of annual passenger car
production.

• Manufacturers uniformly said that automatic
safety belts are not a practical alternative for con-
vertibles. For example, General Motors estimated
an automatic lap/shoulder belt would cost $600 for
convertibles, with much of that cost needed for
structural modifications to the car. It also said that
while automatic lap belts may be technically possi-
ble, their actual performance could be below that
of manual belts because of additional belt "slack"
that would be inherent in such designs.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 349

• Manufacturers' estimates of the costs of air bag
systems, exclusively for use in convertibles, ranged
from $1,200 to $3,500.

• Most manufacturers supported exemption of con-
vertibles from the automatic restraint require-
ment, saying that the increased costs of automatic
restraints would diminish convertible sales. Ford,
Toyota, and Volkswagen said that if convertibles
had to meet the automatic restraint requirement,
they would probably have to discontinue their con-
vertible lines.

• All manufacturers that provided information on
the type of safety belt they are installing in their
convertibles stated that they use lap/shoulder
safety belts, even though the standard currently
gives them the option of using only a lap belt.
Volkswagen suggested requiring all convertibles
to have lap/shoulder belts.

• The Center for Auto Safety (CFAS), Insurance In-
stitute for Highway Safety (IIHS), and State
Farm, all of which supported the use of automatic
restraints in convertibles, argued that convertibles
are "luxury" cars and thus any cost increase
associated with automatic restraints would not af-
fect the sales of convertibles. In support of its
argument or requiring automatic restraints in con-
vertibles, CFAS also noted that the agency's
NCAP data show that, with two exceptions, crash
test results in the convertible version of a vehicle
were considerably worse than in the "parent"
vehicle.

• The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
argued that the current provision in the standard
allowing manufacturers the option of installing
only lap belts in convertibles is inadequate and may
not provide sufficient protection in a crash.

After reviewing the comments, NHTSA continues to
believe that applying the automatic restraint require-
ment to convertibles is not reasonable, practicable or
appropriate for that vehicle type, at least during the
phase-in. The information provided by the commenters
shows that use of automatic belts is not reasonable for
some models because they would have to make substan-
tial structural redesigns to incorporate a "pylon" or
other structure for attaching the upper torso portion
of the automatic belt. If manufacturers use air bag
systems, then the cost of the system could be substan-
tial enough to severely curtail sales of those models.
However, as new types of air bag and other automatic
restraint systems are developed, the cost could be
reduced. The agency has therefore decided to limit the
exemption for convertibles to the phase-in period.
NHTSA will re-examine, at a later date, the issue of
whether to apply an automatic restraint requirement

to convertibles manufactured after September 1, 1989,
or to require dynamic testing of the manual safety belts
installed in those vehicles.

NHTSA believes that its decision is consistent with
its duty, under section 103(f)(3) of the National Traf-
fic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1392(fX3)),
to "consider whether any such proposed standard is
reasonable, practicable and appropriate for the par-
ticular type of motor vehicle . . . for which it is pre-
scribed." The legislative history of the Vehicle Safety
Act makes clear that Congress recognized that it might
not be appropriate to set the same standards for some
vehicle types, such as convertibles, as other vehicle
types. In discussing the purpose of section 103(fX3), the
Senate Report stated that:

[T]he committee intends that the Secretary will
consider the desirability of affording consumers con-
tinued wide range of choices in the selection of motor
vehicles. Thus it is not intended that standards will
be set which will eliminate or necessarily be the same
for small cars or such widely accepted models as con-
vertibles and sports cars, so long as all motor vehicles
meet basic minimum standards. [Emphasis added.]

NHTSA's decision vdth regard to convertibles is also
consistent with the guidance provided by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in its decision
in Chrysler v. Department of Transportation, 472 F.2d
659 (1972). In that decision, the court reviewed the
legislative history of section 103(fX3), discussed above,
and concluded that the agency did not give sufficient
attention to the issue of whether convertibles should
be subject to the same occupant crash protection re-
quirements as hard top vehicles. While the court's deci-
sion to send the rule back to the agency for further
consideration was based primarily on the perceived in-
adequacy of the test dummy used in compliance tests,
the decision v/as also based on the need for the agency
to consider adequately the potential effects of the oc-
cupant crash protection rule on convertibles.

The substantial cost impact of requiring convertibles
to have automatic restraints, would be true even if con-
vertibles were considered "luxury" cars, since the cost
would have to be spread over a very low production
volume. For example, although the agency believes that
the cost for low volume installation of air bag
systems— 10,000 to 100,000 cars or less annually—
would be smaller than the estimates submitted by some
manufacturers, the cost, which ranges from $600 to
$1,500 per vehicle, would still be substantial. Although
convertible models are priced higher than their sedan
counterparts, they are not all "high priced" or "lux-
ury" cars. For example, convertible versions of the
Renault Alliance, Chevrolet Cavalier, Chrysler
LeBaron, Dodge 600, Ford Mustang LX, and Pontiac
Sunbird all sell from $11,000-$13,000.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 350

It is possible that development of new technology
may lead to new air bag systems with lower costs. The
Eigency is currently conducting research with the Breed
Corporation on an air bag system with an all-mechan-
ical sensor, which has the potential of being produced
at a lower cost than current systems with electronic
sensors. The preliminary data from the sled and crash
tests of the Breed system are promising. However, the
system still must be field-tested before the agency will
be able to evaluate its effectiveness. Thus, it is still too
early to predict whether this research system or other
systems can be successfully developed into an effective
and low-cost air bag system that can be used in con-
vertibles and other passenger cars.

In the case of "built-in" safety (i.e., use of padding
and structural changes to provide protection to
unrestrained occupants), the agency notes that only
General Motors has done some preliminary work, and
GM has not yet indicated that it could certify conver-
tibles or any vehicles to the injury protection criteria
of Standard No. 208. Thus, the practicability of this
approach across the fleet of convertibles (i.e., for all
manufacturers for each of their convertibles) is uncer-
tain at this time. The agency will continue to monitor
the development of new automatic belt, air bag and
built-in safety systems and review the practicabOity and
appropriateness of those systems for convertibles.

Definition of convertible

Toyota asked the agency to clarify what vehicles are
considered to be convertibles; in particular, it asked
whether a passenger car with a T-bar roof or a Targa
top would be considered a convertible. In several let-
ters of interpretation, the agency has said that a con-
vertible is a vehicle whose A-pillar or windshield
peripheral support is not joined at the top with the
B-pillar or other rear roof support rearward of the B-
pillar by a fixed rigid structural member. Thus, a vehi-
cle with a Targa top would be considered a converti-
ble since it does not have any fixed structural member
connecting the tops of the A and B-pillars. However,
a vehicle with a T-bar roof would not be considered a
convertible since there is a fixed structural member in
the vehicle's roof which connects the A and B-pillars.

Changes in reporting requirements

Part 585, Automatic Restraint Phase-in Reporting
Requirements, requires manufacturers to provide
NHTSA with a yearly report on their compliance with
the automatic restraint phase-in requirements of
Standard No. 208. Part 585 currently requires
manufacturers to provide data on their entire produc-
tion of passenger cars, including convertibles. Since
NHTSA has decided to exempt convertibles from the
requirement for mandatory installation of automatic

restraints during the phase-in period, the agency is
making a change to Part 585. The agency is amending
the reporting requirement so that a manufacturer does
not have to count convertibles as a part of its passenger
car production volume when it is calculating its phase-
in requirement. However, since a manufacturer may
decide to install voluntarily automatic restraints in its
convertibles, the changes made to the phase-in re-
quirements of Standard No. 208 and the reporting re-
quirem.ents of Part 585 will allow a manufacturer the
option to include automatic-restraint equipped conver-
tibles in its passenger car production volume when it
is determining its compliance with the automatic
restraint phase-in requirement.

Modification of the head injury criterion

In response to a petition from the Committee on
Common Market Automobile Constructors and com-
ments from other vehicle manufacturers, the April
1985 notice set forth two proposed alternative methods
of using the head injury criterion (HIC) in situations
when there is no contact between the test dummy's
head and the vehicle's interior during a crash. The
agency said that, after considering the comments, it
would decide whether to retain the current HIC re-
quirement or to adopt one of the proposed alternatives.
As discussed in detail below, the agency has decided
to adopt the proposed alternative which will calculate
a HIC in both contact and non-contact situations, but
limit the calculation to a maximum time interval of 36
milliseconds.

I. First Proposed HIC Alternative.

A. Use HIC only when there is head contact

The first proposed alternative was to retain the cur-
rent HIC calculation for contact situations, but limited
to the actual times that contact occurs. However, in
non-contact situations, the agency proposed that a HIC
would not be calculated, but instead new neck injury
criteria would be calculated. The agency proposed that
neck criteria would be calculated differently depending
upon whether the existing Part 572 test dummy or the
Hybrid III test dummy was used in the crash test. The
reason for the proposed difference was that the Hybrid
III test dummy has instrumentation in its neck to
measure directly shear and tension forces in the neck
and the existing Part 572 test dummy does not. The
agency proposed to use the Hybrid Ill's neck instru-
mentation and set limits on the shear and tension forces
in the neck. Since neck forces cannot be measured
directly by the existing Part 572 test dummy, the
agency proposed to use a surrogate measure for neck
forces through the use of head acceleration-based
criteria, a calculation that is valid only when the head
does not contact any object during a crash test.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 351

The agency explained that a crucial element
necessary for deciding whether to use the HIC calcula-
tion or the neck criteria was an objective technique for
determining the occurrence and duration of head con-
tact in the crash test. As discussed in detaO in the April
1985 notice, there are several methods available for
establishing the occurrence and/or duration of head
contact, but there are questions about their levels of
consistency and accuracy.

Almost all of the commenters opposed the use of the
first proposed alternative. The commenters uniformly
noted that there is no current technique that can ac-
curately and reliably identify whether and exactly when
head contact has or has not occurred during a crash
test in all situations. The agency agrees that, in the
absence of such a method to determine the occurrence
and duration of head contact, the first alternative is
not appropriate.

B. Apply neck criteria if there is no head contact

As discussed above, the agency proposed a new neck
criteria to be used in non-contact situations, however,
because of the problems involved in trying to identify
when head contact occurs, the agency is not adopting
the non-contact proposal. CFAS urged the agency to
apply the neck injury criteria in both contact and non-
contact situations. It also argued that because the neck
has more soft tissue than the head, a lower accelera-
tion threshold should be used. As noted above, with the
Part 572 test dimimy, the proposed neck injury criteria
(based on head acceleration measurements) are valid
only when the head does not contact another object,
so they should not be used in situations when there is
an impact to the head. Similarly, the impossibility of
determining, in all situations, when head contact begins
and ends precludes the agency from adopting the pro-
posed non-contact neck injury criteria for the Part 572
test dummy. The agency has already indicated that it
will consider the issue of neck injury criteria for the
Hybrid III test dummy in the separate rulemaking on
that test dummy.

II. Second HIC Alternative.

At present, a HIC is calculated for the entire crash
duration. The second alternative proposed by the
agency would calculate a HIC in both contact and non-
contact situations, but it would limit the time duration
during which a HIC is calculated. NHTSA proposed a
limit on the maximum time duration of the HIC calcula-
tion because the current calculation can produce high
HIC values for a crash which has a relatively low ac-
celeration level, but a long time duration, and which
in all likelihood will not result in brain injuries.

The agency proposed to limit the HIC calculation to
a maximum of 36 milliseconds because it determined

that the 36 millisecond limit together with a HIC of
1,000 limit will assure that the acceleration level of the
head will not exceed 60 g's for any period greater than
36 milliseconds. The 60 g's acceleration limit was set
as a reasonable head injury threshold by the originators
of the Wayne State Tolerance Curve, which was used
in the development of the HIC calculation. (Readers
are referred to the April 12, 1985 notice of proposed
rulemaking for information on the development of
HIC.)

There was a marked division among the commenters
on the second alternative. Manufacturers and their
trade associations commenting on the issue imiformly
supported the use of the second alternative, although
nine of those commenters (AMC, Chrysler, Ford, GM,
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA),
Peugeot, Renault, Volvo, and Volkswagen) argued that
the HIC calculation should be limited to a time inter-
val of approximately 15 to 17 milliseconds, which would
limit average long time duration head accelerations to
80-85 g's. Other commenters (CFAS, IIHS, and State
Farm) argued that the current HIC calculations should
be retained, they said that the proposed alternative
would lower HIC levels without ensuring that motorists
were still receiving adequate head protection.

Those favoring the second alternative raised a
number of arguments in support of its use. They said
that using a time limit for the HIC calculation is ap-
propriate because head contacts with hard surfaces
generally have high accelerations, but a short time
duration (10 to 15 milliseconds). In the case of head con-
tacts with softer surfaces, such as an airbag system,
they said that the time duration of the contact is longer,
but the acceleration is much lower, and thus the poten-
tial for injury is reduced. Ford pointed to airbag system
testing in which human volunteers "experienced
average accelerations between 59 to 63 g's for HIC
calculation durations of 24 to 30 ms, without any head
or neck injury."

Those favoring use of a shorter time duration than
36 ms offered additional arguments. They said that the
proposed 36 ms requirement is too stringent because
it would not allow the average head acceleration levels
during a crash to exceed 60 g's. For example, GM said
that the the Wayne State cadaver test data show that
the head can withstand acceleration levels of up to 80
g's without injury. GM also said that Wayne State and
other test data show that brain injuries and skull frac-
tures in cadavers occur at HIC durations of 15 ms or
less and thus there is no basis for considering any time
interval longer than 15 ms. Likewise, Volvo said that
it does not believe that 60 g is a critical acceleration
level. Volvo noted that Standard No. 201, Occupant
Protection in Interior Impact, permits an acceleration

PART 571; S 208-PRE 352

level of up to 80 g's in 15 mile per hour impacts of the
instrument panel with a headform.

Mercedes-Benz, which supported the second alter-
native, urged the agency to measure HIC only during
the time interval when the acceleration level in the head
exceeds 60 g's. It said that this method would more
effectively differentiate results received in contacts
with hard surfaces and results obtained from systems,
such as airbags, which provide good distribution of the
loads experienced during a crash.

Those opposing the proposed second alternative
argued that a 36 millisecond time limit is too short and
could result in lower HIC scores being calculated than
are calculated by the current HIC formula. For exam-
ple, IIHS noted that a 60 g impact with a time dura-
tion of 50 milliseconds would produce a HIC of greater
than 1,000 using the calculation methods currently
found in the standard. IIHS also said that since some
brain injuries can occur at a HIC level of less than
1,000, the agency should not take any action that
would, in effect, allow HIC levels of above 1,000. It also
urged the agency not to adopt the 36 millisecond limit
since there is evidence showing that even mild brain
injuries can produce long-term disability and it is not
known whether such injuries can be caused without
head contact.

A. Rejection of 17 millisecond HIC limit

To evaluate the effect of the 17 millisecond limit sug-
gested by many of the commenters, NHTSA re-
examined the biomechanical studies cited by the com-
menters and looked at the effect of how the recom-
mended time limits would affect the HIC values
measured in a 30 mile per hour barrier crash test, which
is the compliance test used in Standard No. 208 for dif-
ferent types of restraint systems and also with respect
to the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP). After
completing this review, NHTSA has concluded, as
discussed below, that the use of a 17 millisecond limit
is not appropriate in vehicle crash tests.

The agency reviewed the Wayne State laboratory
test results cited by several of the commenters in sup-
port of adopting a 17 millisecond limit for the HIC
calculation. In those tests, cadaver heads were drop-
ped on various hard and padded surfaces. The results
from those tests show that those impacts generally pro-
duce a single peak acceleration, which ranges from 4
to 13 ms in duration. While NHTSA agrees that a 17
millisecond limit would be appropriate for short dura-
tion, single impacts into a hard surface, head accelera-
tion responses in crash tests are considerably different
from laboratory drop tests. In a vehicle crash, the dura-
tion of head impacts is often considerably longer, the
head impact can involve considerably higher forces, and

the head can experience multiple impacts. Given these
differences, NHTSA does not believe that a 17 millise-
cond limit, based on single, short duration laboratory
tests, should be adopted.

NHTSA agrees with Ford that the test results from
the human volunteer airbag test are important and
demonstrate that the probability of injury in longer
duration impacts (greater than 15 milliseconds) with
moderate accelerations is low. However, NHTSA
believes that the air bag tests are limited in their ap-
plication. Those well-controlled tests using young,
healthy males do not necessarily represent the results
that would be found using other segments of the
population. Likewise, the recommendation by the
Wayne State researchers regarding a head accelera-
tion limit of 60 to 80 g's is deduced mostly from tests
with healthy 19 to 48 year old male volunteers. As to
Volvo's comments about the use of an 80 g criteria in
Standard No. 201, the agency notes that the standard
places a specific limit on the 80 g criteria by prohibiting
the accelerations from exceeding 80 g's for more than
3 continuous milliseconds.

NHTSA believes that it should take a cautious ap-
proach in modifying the head injury tolerance level set
by the HIC requirement. Any modifications should en-
sure that a wide range of the population is provided
protection. Therefore, the agency believes that it
should use a HIC calculation which will not exceed 60
g's during relatively long duration impacts, which is
the lower end of the recommended range proposed by
the Wayne State researchers for use with HIC.

A review of the effect of a 17 millisecond limit on
291 test results from the 35 mph NCAP test program
and the test results from 30 mph barrier impact tests
also support the agency's decision not to adopt that
suggestion. This analysis yielded the following results:

1. Using the current HIC calculation, this agency
noted that the average HIC for the 291 NCAP tests
was 1,107 and the percentage of HIC's that exceeded
1,000 was 46 percent. Using a 17 millisecond limit, the
average HIC in the 291 NCAP tests dropped to 931
and the percentage of HIC's that exceeded 1,000 fell
to 35 percent.

2. The current HIC failure rate of approximately 16
percent for 30 mph belted occupants could be cut to
approximately 8 percent,

3. For unrestrained occupants, the average HIC
value would drop by 21 percent and their Standard No.
208 compliance failure rate would be reduced by 42
percent,

4. Airbag average HIC values would be reduced by
28 percent, however, thfs would not affect the Stand-
ard No. 208 failure rates, since air bags that function
properly produce HIC values well below the 1 ,000 level.

PART 571; S 208-PRE 353

B. Rejection of Mercedes-Benz HIC limitation

To evaluate the effect of the Mercedes-Benz sugges-
tion to hmit the calculation of HIC to instances when
the acceleration exceeded 60 g's, the agency
recalculated the HIC values for 30 mph 3-point belts
(driver and passenger sides), 30 mph unrestrained
(driver and passenger), air bag (only), and 35 mph
NCAP barrier and barrier equivalent crash tests us-
ing the Mercedes-Benz method.

Compared to the 36 ms proposed by NHTSA and
15-17 ms. approach advocated by some commenters,
the Mercedes-Benz method would bring about the most
significant numerical reduction in HIC scores. At 30
mph, all lap/shoulder belt passenger HIC scores would
be reduced to zero (a 100 percent reduction). Using the
current HIC calculation, the average HIC for the 291
NCAP tests was 1107 and the percentage of HIC's that
exceeded 1,000 was 46 percent. Using a 60 g limit, the
average HIC would drop to 808 and the percentage of
HIC's that exceeded 1,000 would fall to 32 percent. 30
mph air bag HIC values would be cut by 47.9 percent
and unrestrained occupants would experience a 31 to
36 percent reduction of the average HIC score. The
data also indicates that failure rates on airbags would
not be affected, while approximately 14 percent of the
unrestrained passengers would be shifted from failing
to passing the HIC 1,000 limit.

The use of a minimum head acceleration threshold
or cut-off to define the maximum HIC time duration,
as proposed by Mercedes-Benz, provides a means of dif-
ferentiating between critical and non-critical accelera-
tion peaks, if and when they exceed 60 g's. However,
there are a number of problems which led the NHTSA
to reject the proposed Mercedes-Benz method. The
Mercedes-Benz method only takes into account head
accelerations that are greater than 60 g's. Thus, the
average head acceleration permitted by the Mercedes-
Benz method must be, at a minimum, 60 g's and most
likely the average head acceleration permitted by the
Mercedes-Benz method would substantially exceed that
limit. In contrast, the 36 millisecond alternative
adopted by the agency will ensure that the average
head acceleration does not exceed the 60 g accelera-
tion limit. In addition, it is unclear from Mercedes-
Benz's comments how their method would accommo-
date multiple non-continuous acceleration peaks in
excess of 60 g's. Discriminating between injurious and
non-injurious peaks is critical to picking the time dura-
tion. If all peaks are to be included, it is unclear from
Mercedes' proposal how the time interval would be
measured. Given all of these concerns, NHTSA believes
that the Mercedes-Benz proposal should not be
adopted.

C. Adoption of 36 millisecond HIC limit

As discussed earlier in this notice, the agency pro-
posed a time limit for the HIC calculation because the
current method can produce an artificially high HIC
for a crash which has a relatively low acceleration level,
but a long time duration. To evaluate the effects of the
proposal, NHTSA took the NCAP results and recalcu-
lated the HIC using the proposed 36 millisecond limit.
That analysis shows that the 36 millisecond limit would
have only a minor effect on HIC scores recorded in the
NCAP tests. As discussed above, using the current HIC
calculation, the average HIC for the 291 tests was 1107
and the percentage of HIC's that exceeded 1,000 was
46 percent. Using a 36 millisecond limit, the average
HIC dropped slightly to 1061, and the percentage of
HIC values that exceeded 1,000 dropped to 41 percent.
Thus, the results show that in the NCAP tests, which
are conducted at 35 mph, the average HIC value would
be only four percent lower when calculated with the
36 millisecond limit. In addition, the results showed
tiiat of the 291 NCAP tests, only 38 tests had both a
HIC value which exceeded 1,000 and a HIC duration
exceeding 36 milliseconds. Of this group of 38 tests,
there are only 15 instances in which the 36 millisecond
limit results in a new HIC value less than 1,000. Since
the NCAP tests at 35 mph involve 36 percent greater
energy than the 30 mph tests used in Standard No. 208
compliance testing, the number of HIC values possibly
changing from above 1,000 to below 1,000 because of
the 36 millisecond limit should be even less in the
Standard No. 208 compliance tests.

The agency further examined these 15 instances of
HIC's greater than 1,000 being recalculated to be less
than 1,000. In 12 of these 15 cases, the original HIC
(i.e., without a time limitation) was between 1,000 and
1,074. Again at 30 mph, with 36 percent, less energy
involved, it is doubtful if any of these vehicles would
have had occupant HIC's greater than 1,000. Thus, in
only three cases (one percent of the total involved)
would a "fail" have potentially become a "pass," using
the 208 criteria. If this same value is associated with
30 mph barrier tests, the risks to safety associated wdth
having a HIC calculation which is foimded on a sounder
basis than the current calculation are not significant.

To further evaluate the effects of a 36 millisecond
limit, the agency specifically examined the potential im-
pact of the new HIC calculation on whether a vehicle
will pass or fail the HIC of 1,000 limit set in Standard
No. 208. NHTSA recalculated the HICs recorded in a
wide variety of 30 mph crash tests, which is the com-
pliance test speed used in Standard No. 208. The tests
included vehicles using the following different types of
restraint systems: manual lap/shoulder belts, automatic
belts, air bags only, and air bag with lap and lap/

PART 571; S 208-PRE 354

shoulder belts. In addition, the agency recalculated the
HIC values recorded in 30 mph tests with unrestrained
occupants, which would simulate the types of HIC
values that could be recorded in vehicles with built-in
safety features. (The results of those tests are discussed
in Chapter III of the Final Regulatory Evaluation on
HIC). The agency's analysis shows that in all the 30
mph tests, the 36 millisecond limit does not change a
"failing" HIC into a "passing" HIC. Thus, a vehicle
which currently does not comply with the HIC require-
ment of Standard No. 208 using the prior HIC calcula-
tion method also will not comply using the 36 millise-
cond limit.

Cost and Benefits

NHTSA has examined the impact of this rulemak-
ing action and determined that it is not major within
the meaning of Executive Order 12291 or significant
within the meaning of the Department of Transporta-
tion's regulatory policies and procedures. The agency
has prepared a regulatory evaluation that examines the
economic and other impacts of this rulemaking action.

The changes in the HIC calculation should not have
a significant impact. As discussed in detail above, the
agency's analysis of crash test data shows that the 36
millisecond limit does not have any significant effect
on changing the HIC values currently recorded in 30
mile per hour compliance crash tests. The extent of the
effect of this change on mild brain injuries is unknown.
As IIHS noted, there is insufficient data on how such
injuries are caused. Thus, the agency cannot assess the
role of the current or changed HIC calculation in
preventing or reducing such injuries. However, since
the agency's crash test analysis shows that a vehicle
that currently exceeds a HIC of 1000 in Standard No.
208's 30 mile per hour compliance test will still exceed
1000 using the new 36 millisecond limit, the agency
believes that the effect of the 36 millisecond limit on
mild brain injuries should be no different than the ef-
fect of the current calculation. In addition, NHTSA
does not believe that manufacturers will change their
vehicle designs because of the slight change in the HIC
calculation. Thus, the 36 millisecond limit should not
adversely affect safety or a manufactiirer's compliance
costs.

Likewise, the decision to exempt convertibles dur-
ing the phase-in period should not have a significant
effect. Because convertibles represent a small portion
of most manufacturers' production, they do not need
to install automatic restraints in their convertibles in
order to meet the production requirements during the
phase-in. The problems associated with installing auto-
matic restraints in convertibles also make it unlikely
that manufacturers would equip their convertibles with
such restraints during the phase-in. Thus, the exemp-

tion adopted in this notice should have little effect on
the type of restraint system that will be used in con-
vertibles during the phase-in.

Effective Date

NHTSA has determined that it is in the public in-
terest to make the amendments, adopted in today's
notice, effective immediately. The change in the HIC
calculation can affect manufacturer's plans for the
model year beginning September 1, 1986.

Jt9 CFR PART 585— Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

In consideration of the foregoing. Part 571.208 of Ti-
tle 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended
as follows:

1. The authority citation for Part 571 continues to
read as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1403, 1407., delega-
tion of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

2. A new S4.1.3.1.3 is added to Part 571.208 to read
as follows:

S4. 1.3. 1.3 A manufacturer may exclude convertibles
which do not comply with the requirements of S4. 1.2.1,
when it is calculating its average annual production
under S4. 1.3. 1.2(a) or its annual production under
S4.1.3.1.2(b).

3. A new S4.1.3.2.3 is added to Part 571.208 to read
as follows:

S4. 1.3.2. 3 A manufacturer may exclude convertibles
which do not comply with the requirements of S4. 1.2.1,
when it is calculating its average annual production
under S4. 1.3. 2. 2(a) or its annual production under
S4.1.3.2.2(b).

4. A new 84.1.3.3.3 is added to Part 571.208 to read
as follows:

S4. 1.3. 3.3 A manufacturer may exclude convertibles
which do not comply with the requirements of S4. 1.2.1,
when it is calculating its average annual production
under S4. 1.3. 3. 2(a) or its annual production under
S4. 1.3.3.2(b).

6. S6.2 of Part 571.208 is revised to read as follows:
S6.2 The resultant acceleration at the center of grav-
ity of the head shall be such that the expression:

1

t; - ti

/

n2.5

oat

W-t,

shall not exceed 1,000 where a is the resultant accelera-
tion expressed as a multiple of g (the acceleration of

PART 571; S 208-PRE 355

gravity), and ti and t2 are any two points in time dur-
ing the crash of the vehicle which are separated by not
more than a 36 milHsecond time interval.

Part 585, Automatic Restraint Phase-In Reporting

1. Part 585.4 is revised to read as follows:
§ 585.4 Definitions.

(a) All terms defined in section 102 of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391)
are used in their statutory meaning.

(b) "Passenger car" means a motor vehicle with
motive power, except a multipurpose passenger vehi-
cle, motorcycle, or trailer, designed for carrying 10 per-
sons or less.

(c) "Production year" means the 12-month period
between September 1 of one year and August 31 of the
following year, inclusive.

2. Part 585(bXl) is revised to read a follows:

(b) Report content— (1) Basis for phase-in prodv^ction
goals. Each manufacturer shall provide the number of

passenger cars manufactured for sale in the United
States for each of the 3 previous production years, or,
at the manufacturer's option, for the current produc-
tion year. A new manufacturer that is, for the first
time, manufacturing passenger cars for sale in the
United States must report the number of passenger
cars manufactured during the current production year.
For the purpose of the reporting requirements of this
Part, a manufacturer may exclude its production of
convertibles, which do not comply with the requirments
of S4. 1.2.1 of Part 571.208 of this Chapter, from the
report of its production volume of passenger cars
manufactured for sale in the United States.

Issued on October 10, 1986.

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

51 F.R. 37028
October 10, 1986

PART 571; S 208-PRE 356

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 208

Occupant Crash Protection in Passenger Cars, IVIultipurpose Passenger

Vehicles, Trucks and Buses

(Docket No. 69-7; Notice No. 9)

51. Scope. This standard specifies perform-
ance requirements for the protection of vehicle oc-
cupants in crashes.

52. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is
to reduce the- number of deaths of vehicle oc-
cupants and the severity of injuries, by specifying
vehicle crashworthiness requirements in terms of
forces and accelerations measured on an-
thropomorphic dummies in test crashes, and by
specifying equipment requirements for active and
passive restraint systems.

53. Application. This standard applies to
passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses. In addition, S9, Pressure
vessels and explosive devices, applies to vessels
designed to contain a pressurized fluid or gas, and
to explosive devices, for use in the above types of
motor vehicles as part of a system designed to pro-
vide protection to occupants in the event of a crash.

54. General requirements.

S4.1 Passenger cars.

S4.1.1 Passenger cars manufactured from
January 1, 1972, to August 31, 1973. Each
passenger car manufactured from January 1, 1972,
to August 31, 1973, inclusive, shall meet the re-
quirements of S4. 1.1.1, S4. 1.1.2, or S4. 1.1.3. A
protection system that meets the requirements of
S4. 1.1.1 or S4.1.1.2 may be installed at one or
more designated seating positions of a vehicle that
otherwise meets the requirements of S4. 1.1.3.

S4.1.1.1 First option— complete passive protec-
tion system. The vehicle shall meet the crash pro-
tection requirements of S5 by means that require
no action by vehicle occupants.

54.1.1.2 Second option— lap belt protection
system witfi belt warning. The vehicle shall—

(a) At each designated seating position have a
Type 1 seat belt assembly or a Type 2 seat belt
assembly with a detachable upper torso portion
that conforms to S7.1 and S7.2 of this standard.

(b) At each front outboard designated seating
position have a seat belt warning system that con-
forms to S7.3; and

(c) Meet the frontal crash protection re-
quirements of S5.1, in a perpendicular impact, with
respect to anthropomorphic test devices in each
front outboard designated seating position
restrained only by Type 1 seat belt assemblies.

54.1.1.3 Third option— lap and shoulder belt pro-
tection system with belt warning.

S4.1. 1.3.1 Except for convertibles and open-
body vehicles, the vehicle shall—

(a) At each front outboard designated seating
position have a Type 2 seat belt assembly that con-
forms to Standard No. 209 and S7.1 and S7.2 of
this standard, with either an integral or detachable
upper torso portion, and a seat belt warning
system that conforms to S7.3;

(b) At each designated seating position other
than the front outboard positions, have a Type 1 or
Type 2 seat belt assembly that conforms to Stand-
ard No. 209 and to S7.1 and S7.2 of this standard;
and

(c) When it perpendicularly impacts a fixed colli-
sion barrier, while moving longitudinally forward
at any speed up to and including 30 m.p.h., under
the test conditions of S8.1 with anthropomorphic
test devices at each front outboard position
restrained by Type 2 seat belt assemblies, ex-
perience no complete separation of any load-bearing
element of a seat belt assembly or anchorage.

PART 571; S 208-1

S4.1. 1.3.2 Convertibles and open-body type
vehicles shall at each designated seating position
have a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly that
conforms to Standard No. 209 and to S7.1 and S7.2
of this standard, and at each front outboard desig-
nated seating position have a seat belt warning
system that conforms to S7.3.

S4.1.2 Passenger cars manufactured on or after
September 1, 1973, and before September 1, 1986.

Each passenger car manufactured on or after
September 1, 1973, and before September 1, 1986,
shall meet the requirements of S4. 1.2.1, 84. 1.2. 2,
or S4.1.2.3.

54.1.2.1 First option— frontal/angular automatic
protection system. The vehicle shall—

(a) At each front outboard designated seating
position meet the frontal crash protection re-
quirements of S5.1 by means that require no action
by vehicle occupants;

(b) At each front center designated seating posi-
tion have a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly
that conforms to Standard No. 209 and to S7.1 and
S7.2; and

(c) Either-

(1) Meet the lateral crash protection re-
quirements of S5.2 and the rollover crash protec-
tion requirements of S5.3 by means that require no
action by vehicle occupants; or

(2) At each front outboard designated seating
position have a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly
that conforms to Standard No. 209 and to S7.1
through S7.3, and that meets the requirements of
S5.1 with front test dummies as required by S5.1,
restrained by the Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt
assembly (or the pelvic portion of any Type 2 seat
belt assembly which has a detachable upper torso
belt) in addition to the means that require no action
by the vehicle occupant.

54.1.2.2 Second option— head-on automatic pro-
tection system. The vehicle shall—

(a) At each designated seating position have a
Type 1 seat belt assembly or a Type 2 seat belt
assembly with a detachable upper torso portion
that conforms to S7.1 and S7.2 of this standard.

(b) At each front outboard designated seating
position, meet the frontal crash protection re-
quirements of S5.1, in a perpendicular impact, by
means that require no action by vehicle occupants;

(c) At each front outboard designated seating
position, meet the frontal crash protection re-

quirements of S5.1 , in a perpendicular impact, with
a test device restrained by a Type 1 seat belt
assembly; and

(d) At each front outboard designated seating
position, have a seat belt warning system that con-
forms to S7.3.

S4.1.2.3 Third option— lap and shoulder belt
protection system with belt warning.

54.1 .2.3.1 Except for convertibles and open-
body vehicles, the vehicle shall—

(a) At each front outboard designated seating
position have a seat belt assembly that conforms to
S7.1 and S7.2 of this standard, and a seat belt
warning system that conforms to S7.3. The belt
assembly shall be either a Type 2 seat belt
assembly with a nondetachable shoulder belt that
conforms to Standard No. 209 (S571.209), or a
Type 1 seat belt assembly such that with a test
device restrained by the assembly the vehicle
meets the frontal crash protection requirements of
85. 1 in a perpendicular impact.

(b) At any center front designated seating posi-
tion, have a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly
that conforms to Standard No. 209 (S571.209) and
to S7.1 and 87.2 of this standard, and a seat belt
warning system that conforms to 87.3; and

(c) At each other designated seating position,
have a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly that
conforms to Standard No. 209 (8571.209) and 87.1
and 87.2 of this standard.

54.1 .2.3.2 Convertibles and open-body type
vehicles shall at each designated seating position
have a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly that
conforms to Standard No. 209 (8571.209) and to
87.1 and 87. 2 of this standard, and at each front
designated seating position have a seat belt warn-
ing system that conforms to 87. 3.

S4.1.3 Passenger cars manufactured on or after
September 1, 1986, and before September 1, 1989.

S4.1.3.1 Passenger cars manufactured on or after
September 1, 1986, and before September 1, 1987.

S4.1.3.1.1 Subject to 84.1.3.1.2 and S4. 1.3.4,
each passenger car manufactured on or after
September 1, 1986, and before September 1, 1987,
shall comply with the requirements of 84.1.2.1,
84.1.2.2 or 84.1.2.3.

[A vehicle shall not be deemed to be in com-
pliance with this standard if its manufacturer
establishes that it did not have a reason to know in
the exercise of due care that such vehicle is not in
conformity with the requirement of this standard.
(51 F.R. 9801— March 21, 1986. Effective: May 5,
1986)]

(Rev. 3/21/86)

PART 571; 8 208-2

S4.1.3.1.2 Subject to S4. 1.3.4 and S4.1.5, the
amount of passenger cars, specified in S4. 1.3. 1.1
complying with the requirements of S4. 1.2.1, shall
not be less than 10 percent of:

(a) the average annual production of passenger
cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1983,
and before September 1, 1986, by each manufac-
turer, or

(b) the manufacturer's annual production of
passenger cars during the specified in S4. 1.3. 1.1.

|S4.1 .3.1 .3 A manufacturer may exclude conver-
tibles which do not comply with the requirements of
S4. 1.2.1, when it is calculating its average annual
production under S4. 1.3. 1.2(a) or its annual produc-
tion under S4. 1.3. 1.2(b). (51 F.R. 37028— October 17,
1986. Effective: November 17, 1986.)]

54.1.3.2 Passenger cars manufactured on or after
September 1, 1987, and before September 1, 1988.

54.1.3.2.1 Subject to S4.1. 3.2.2 and S4. 1.3.4,
each passenger car manufactured on or after
September 1, 1987, and before September 1, 1988,
shall comply with the requirements of S4. 1.2.1,
S4.1.2.2 or S4. 1.2.3.

A vehicle shall not be deemed to be in compliance
with this standard if its manufacturer establishes
that it did not have a reason to know in the exercise
of due care that such vehicle is not in conformity
with the requirement of this standard.

54.1. 3.2.2 Subject to S4.1.5, the amount of
passenger care specified in S4. 1.3.2.1 complying
with the requirements of S4. 1.2.1 shall be not less
than 25 percent of:

(a) the average annual production of passenger
cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1984,
and before September 1, 1987, by each manufac-
turer, or

(b) the manufacturer's annual production of pas-
senger cars during the period specified in
S4.1.3.2.1.

(S4.1 .3.2.3 A manufacturer may exclude conver-
tibles which do not comply with the requirements of
S4. 1.2.1, when it is calculating its average annual
production under S4. 1.3. 1.2.2(a) or its annual pro-
duction under S4. 1.3. 1.2.2(b). (51 F.R. 37028— Oc-
tober 17, 1986. Effective: November 17. 1986.)!

54.1 .3.3 Passenger cars manufactured on or after
September 1, 1988, and before September 1, 1989.

S4.1.3.3.1 Subject to S4.1.3.3.2 and S4.1.3.4,
each passenger car manufactured on or after
September 1, 1988, and before September 1, 1989,
shall comply with the requirements of S4. 1.2.1,
S4.1.2.2orS4.1.2.3.

A vehicle shall not be deemed to be in compliance
with this standard if its manufacturer establishes

that it did not have a reason to know in the exer-
cise of due care that such vehicle is not in conform-
ity with the requirement of this standard.

S4.1.3.3.2 Subject to S4. 1.3.4 and S4.1.5, the
amount of passenger cars specified in S4. 1.3.3.1
complying with the requirement of S4. 1.2.1 shall
be not less than 40 percent of:

(a) the average annual production of passenger
cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985,
and before September 1, 1988, by each manufac-
turer or

(b) the manufacturer's annual production of
passenger cars during the period specified in
S4.1.3.3.1.

IS4.1. 3.3.3 A manufacturer may exclude conver-
tibles which do not comply wdth the requirements of
S4. 1.2.1, when it is calculating its average annual
production under S4. 1.3.3. 2(a) or its annual produc-
tion under S4.1.3.3.2(b). (51 F.R. 37028— October 17,
1986. Effective: November 17, 1986.)!

S4.1.3.4 Calculation of complying passenger cars.

For the purposes of calculating the numbers of
cars manufactured under S4. 1.3. 1.2, 84. 1.3.2.2, or
S4.1.3.3.2 to comply with S4. 1.2.1:

(1) each car whose driver's seating position
complies with the requirements of S4. 1.2. 1(a) by
means not including any type of seat belt and
whose front right seating position will comply with
the requirements of S4. 1.2.1(a) by any means is
counted as 1.5 vehicles, and

(2) each car whose driver's seating position
complies with the requirements of S4. 1.2. 1(a) by
means not including any type of seat belt and whose
right front seat seating position is equipped with a
manual Type 2 seat belt is counted as one vehicle.

(b) For the purposes of complying with
S4. 1.3. 1.2, a passenger car may be counted if it:

(1) is manufactured on or after September 1,
1985, but before September 1, 1986, and

(2) complies with S4. 1.2.1

(c) For the purposes of complying with
S4. 1.3.2.2, a passenger car may be counted if it:

(1) is manufactured on or after September 1,
1985, but before September 1, 1987,

(2) complies with S4. 1.2.1, and

(3) is not counted toward compliance with
S4.1.3.1.2

(d) For the purposes of complying with
S4. 1.3.3.2, a passenger car may be counted if it:

(1) is manufactured on or after September 1,
1985, but before September 1, 1988,

(2) complies with S4. 1.2.1, and

(3) is not counted toward compliance with
S4.1.3.1.2 or S4. 1.3.2.2.

(Rev. 10/17(86)

PART 571; S 208-3

IS4.1.3.5 Passenger cars produced by more than
one manufacturer.

54.1 .3.5.1 For the purposes of calculating
average annual production of passenger cars for
each manufacturer and the amount of passenger
cars manufactured by each manufacturer under
S4.1.3.1.2, S4. 1.3.2.2 or S4.1.3.3.2, a passenger
car produced by more than one manufacuter shall
be attributed to a single manufacturer as follows,
subject to S4.1.3.5.2:

(a) A passenger car which is imported shall be
attributed to the importer.

(b) A passenger car manufactured in the United
States by more than one manufacturer, one of
which also markets the vehicle, shall be attributed
to the manufacturer which markets the vehicle.

54.1 .3.5.2 A passenger car produced by more
than one manufacturer shall be attributed to any
one of the vehicle's manufacturers specified by an
express written contract, reported to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration under 49
CFR Part 585, between the manufacturer so
specified and the manufacturer to which the vehi-
cle would otherwise be attributed under S4. 1.3. 5.1.
(51 F.R. 9801— March 21, 1986. Effective: May 5,
1986)1

54.1.4 Passenger cars manufactured on or after
September 1, 1989. Except as provided in 84. 1.5,
each passenger car manufactured on or after
September 1, 1989, shall comply with the re-
quirements of S4. 1.2.1.

[A vehicle shall not be deemed to be in compliance
with this standard if its manufacturer establishes
that it did not have a reason to know in the exercise
of due care that such vehicle is not in conformity
with the requirement of this standard. (51 F.R.
9801— March 21, 1986. Effective: May 5, 1986)1

54.1.5 Mandatory seatbelt use laws.

S4.1.5.1 If the Secretary of Transportation
determines, by not later than April 1, 1989, that
state mandatory safety belt usage laws have been
enacted that meet the criteria specified in S4.1.5.2
and that are applicable to not less than two-thirds
of the total population of the 50 states and the
District of Columbia (based on the most recent
Estimates of the Resident Population of States, by

Age, Current Population Reports, Series P-25,
Bureau of the Census), each passenger car
manufactured under S4.1.3 or S4.1.4 on or after
the date of that determination shall comply with
the requirements of S4.1.2.1, S4.1.2.2, or S4.1.2.3.

S4.1.5.2 The minimum criteria for state man-
datory safety belt usage laws are:

(a) Require that each front seat occupant of a
passenger car equipped with safety belts under
Standard No. 208 has a safety belt properly fast-
ened about his or her body at all times when the
vehicle is in forward motion.

(b) If waivers from the safety belt usage require-
ment are to be provided, permit them for medical
reasons only.

(c) Provide for the following enforcement
measures:

(1) A penalty of not less than $25.00 (which
may include court costs) for each occupant of a car
who violates the belt usage requirement.

(2) A provision specifying that the violation of
the belt usage requirement may be used to mitigate
damages with respect to any person who is in-
volved in a passenger car accident while violating
the belt usage requirement and who seeks in any
subsequent litigation to recover damages for in-
juries resulting from the accident. This require-
ment is satisfied if there is a rule of law in the State
permitting such mitigation.

(3) A program to encourage compliance with
the belt usage requirement.

(d) An effective date of not later than
September 1, 1989.

S4.2 Trucks and multipurpose passenger
vehicles with GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less.

S4.2.1 Trucks and multipurpose passenger
vehicles, with GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less,
manufactured from January 1, 1972, to December 31,
1975. Each truck and multipurpose passenger
vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000
pounds or less, manufactured from January 1,
1972, to December 31, 1975, inclusive, shall meet
the requirements of S4.2.1.1 or S4.2.1.2, or at the
option of the manufacturer, the requirements of
S4.2.2. A protection system that meets the
requirement of S4.2.1.1 may be installed at one or
more designated seating positions of a vehicle that
otherwise meets the requirements of S4.2.1.2.

(Rev. 3/21/86)

PART 571; S 208-4

54.2.1.1 First option— complete passive protec-
tion system. The vehicle shall meet the crash
protection requirements of S5 by means that
require no action by vehicle occupants.

54.2.1.2 Second option— belt system. The

vehicle shall have seat belt assemblies that con-
form to Standard 209 installed as follows:

(a) A Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly shall
be installed for each designated seating position in
convertibles, open-body type vehicles, and walk-in
van-type trucks.

(b) In all vehicles except those for which
requirements are specified in S4. 2. 1.2(a), a Type 2
seat belt assembly shall be installed for each
outboard designated seating position that includes
the windshield header within the head impact area,
and a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly shall be
installed for each other designated seating position.

54.2.2 Trucks and multipurpose passenger
vehicles, with GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less,
manufactured on orafter January 1, 1976. Each truck
and multipurpose passenger vehicle, with a gross
vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less,
manufactured on or after January 1, 1976, shall meet
the requirements of S4. 1.2.1, or at the option of the
manufacturer, S4. 1.2.2 or S4. 1.2.3 (as specified for
passenger cars), except that forward control vehicles
manufactured prior to September 1, 1981, conver-
tibles, open-body type vehicles, walk-in van-type
trucks, motor homes, vehicles designed to be ex-
clusively sold to the U.S. Postal Service, and vehicles
carrying chassis-mount campers may instead meet
the requirements of S4.2.1.2.

54.2.3 (Reserved)

S4.3 Trucks and multipurpose passenger
vehicles, with GVWR of more than 10,000 pounds.
Each truck and multipurpose passenger vehicle,
with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than
10,000 pounds, manufactured on or after January
1, 1972, shall meet the requirements of S4.3.1 or
S4.3.2. A protection system that meets the re-
quirements of S4.3.1 may be installed at one or
more designated seating positions of a vehicle that
otherwise meets the requirements of S4.3.2.

S4.3.1 First option — complete passive protection
system. The vehicle shall meet the crash protec-
tion requirements of S5 by means that require no
action by vehicle occupants.

S4.3.2 Second option— belt system. The vehi-
cle shall, at each designated seating position, have
either a Type 1 or a Type 2 seat belt assembly that
conforms to Standard No. 209.

54.4 Buses. Each bus manufactured on or
after January 1, 1972, shall meet the requirements
of S4.4.1 or S4.4.2.

54.4.1 First option— complete passive protection
system— driver only. The vehicle shall meet the
crash protection requirements of S5, with respect
to an anthropomorphic test device in the driver's
designated seating position, by means that require
no action by vehicle occupants.

54.4.2 Second option— belt system— driver only.

The vehicle shall, at the driver's designated
seating position, have either a Type 1 or a Type 2
seat belt assembly that conforms to Standard No.
209.

54.5 Other general requirements.

54.5.1 Labeling and driver's manual information.

Each vehicle shall have a label setting forth the
manufacturer's recommended schedule for the
maintenance or replacement, necessary to retain
the performance required by this standard, of any
crash-deployed occupant protection system. The
schedule shall be specified by month and year, or in
terms of vehicle mileage, or by intervals measured
from the date appearing on the vehicle certifica-
tion label provided pursuant to 49 CFR Part 567.
The label shall be permanently affixed to the vehi-
cle within the passenger compartment and lettered
in English in block capitals and numerals not less
than three thirty-seconds of an inch high. Instruc-
tions concerning maintenance or replacement of a
system and a description of the functional opera-
tion of the system shall be provided with each vehi-
cle, with an appropriate reference on the label. If a
vehicle owner's manual is provided, this informa-
tion shall be included in the manual.

84.5.2 Readiness indicator. An occupant pro-
tection system that deploys in the event of a crash
shall have a monitoring system with a readiness
indicator. The indicator shall monitor its own
readiness and shall be clearly visible from the
driver's designated seating position. A list of the
elements of the system being monitored by the
indicator shall be included with the information
furnished in accordance with S4.5.1 but need not
be included on the label.

PART 571; S 208-5

S4.5.3 Automatic belts. Except as provided in
S4.5.3.1, a seat belt assembly that requires no
action by vehicle occupants (hereinafter referred
to as a "passive belt") may be used to meet the
crash protection requirements of any option under
S4 and in place of any seat belt assembly otherwise
required by that option.

54.5.3.1 An automatic belt that provides only
pelvic restraint may not be used pursuant to S4.5.3
to meet the requirements of an option that requires
a Type 2 seat belt assembly.

54.5.3.2 An automatic belt, furnished pursuant
to S4.5.3, that provides both pelvic and upper torso
restraint may have either a detachable or nonde-
tachable upper torso portion, notwithstanding pro-
visions of the option under which it is furnished.

54.5.3.3 A passive belt furnished pursuant to
S4.5.3 shall-

(a) Conform to S7.1 and have a single emer-
gency release mechanism whose components are
readily accessible to a seated occupant.

(b) In place of a warning system that conforms
to S7.3 of this standard, be equipped with the
following warning system: At the left front
designated seating position (driver's position), a
warning system that activates a continuous or in-
termittent audible signal for a period of not less
than 4 seconds and not more than 8 seconds and
that activates a continuous or flashing warning
light visible to the driver for not less than 60
seconds (beginning when the vehicle ignition
switch is moved to the "on" or the "start" posi-
tion) when condition (A) exists simultaneously with
condition (B), and that activates a continuous or
flashing warning light, visible to the driver,
displaying the identifying symbol for the seat belt
telltale shown in Table 2 of Standard No. 101 (49
CFR 571.101), or, at the option of the manufac-
turer if permitted by Standard No. 101, displaying
the words "Fasten Seat Belts" or "Fasten Belts"
for as long as condition (A) exists simultaneously
with condition (C).

(A) The vehicle's ignition switch is moved to the
"on" position or to the "start" position.

(B) The driver's automatic belt is not in use, as
determined by the belt latch mechanism not being
fastened or, if the automatic belt is non-detachable,
by the emergency release mechanism being in the
released position. In the case of motorized auto-
matic belts, the determination of use shall be made
once the belt webbing is in its locked protective
mode at the anchorage point.

(C) The belt webbing of a motorized automatic belt
system is not in its locked, protective mode at the
anchorage point.

S4.5.3.4 An automatic belt furnished pursuant
to S4.5.3 that is not required to meet the perpen-
dicular frontal crash protection requirements of
S5.1 shall conform to the webbing, attachment
hardware, and assembly performance require-
ments of Standard No. 209.

[S4.6 Dynamic testing of manual belt systems.

54.6.1 If the automatic restraint requirement of
S4.1.4 is rescinded pursuant to S4.1.5, then each
passenger car that is manufactured after
September 1, 1989, and is equipped with a Type 2
manual seat belt assembly at each front outboard
designated seating position pursuant to S4. 1.2.3
shall meet the frontal crash protection re-
quirements of S5.1 at those designated seating
positions with a test dummy restrained by a Type 2
seat belt assembly that has been adjusted in accor-
dance with S7.4.2.

A vehicle shall not be deemed to be in compliance
with this standard if its manufacturer establishes
that it did not have a reason to know in the exercise
of due care that such vehicle is not in conformity
with the requirement of this standard.

54.6.2 A Type 2 seat belt assembly subject to
the requirements of S4.6.1 of this standard does
not have to meet the requirements of S4.2(a)— (c)
and S4.4 of Standard No. 209 (49 CFR 571.209) of
this Part.

S5. Occupant crash protection requirements.

S5.1 Frontal barrier crash. [Vehicle subject to
S5.1 and manufactured before September 1, 1991,
shall comply with either, at the manufacturer's
option, 5.1(a) or (b). Vehicles subject to S5.1 and
manufactured on or after September 1, shall
comply with 5.1(b).

(a) Impact a vehicle traveling longitudinally
forward at any speed, up to and including 30 mph,
into a fixed collision barrier that is perpendicular
to the line of travel of the vehicle, or at any angle
up to 30 degrees in either direction from the
perpendicular to the line of travel of the vehicle
under the applicable conditions of S8. The test
dummy specified in S8. 1.8.1 placed at each front
outboard designated seating position shall meet
the injury criteria of S6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.3, and 6.1.4.

(b) Impact a vehicle traveling longitudinally for-
ward at any speed, up to and including 30 mph, in-
to a fixed collision barrier that is perpendicular to

(Rev. 7/25/86)

PART 571; S 208-6

the line of travel of the vehicle, or at any angle up
to 30 degrees in either direction from the perpen-
dicular to the line of travel of the vehicle, under the
applicable conditions of S8. The test dummy
specified in S8. 1.8.2 placed at each front outboard
designated seating position shall meet the injury
criteria of S6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, and 6.2.5. (51
F.R. 26688— July 25, 1986. Effective: October 23,
1986)1

55.2 Lateral moving barrier crash.

S5.2.1 Vehicles subject to S5.2 and manufac-
tured before September 1, 1991, shall comply with
either, at the manufacturer's option, 5.2.1(a) or (b).
Vehicles subject to S5.2 and manufactured on or
after September 1, 1991, shall comply with
5.2.1(b).

(a) Impact a vehicle laterally on either side by a
barrier moving at 20 mph under the applicable con-
ditions of S8. The test dummy specified in S8. 1.8.1
placed at the front outboard designated seating
position adjacent to the impacted side shall meet
the injury criteria of S6.1.2 and S6.1.3.

(b) When the vehicle is impacted laterally under
the applicable conditions of S8, on either side by a
barrier moving at 20 mph, with a test device
specified in S8. 1.8.2, which is seated at the front
outboard designated seating position adjacent to
the impacted side, it shall meet the injury criteria
of S6.2.2, and S6.2.3.

55.3 Rollover. Subject a vehicle to a rollover
test under the applicable condition of S8 in either
lateral direction at 30 mph with either, at the
manufacture's option, a test dummy specified in
S8.1.8.1 or S8.1.8.2, placed in the front outboard
designated seating position on the vehicle's lower
side mounted on the test platform The test dummy
shall meet the injury criteria of either S6.1.1 or
S6.2.1.

S6 Injury criteria.

S6.1 Injury criteria for the Part 572, Subpart B,
50th percentile Male Dummy.

56.1.1 All portions of the test dummy shall be
contained within the outer surfaces of the vehicle
passenger compartment throughout the test.

56.1.2 [Thfe resultant acceleration at the center
of gravity of the head shall be such that the expres-
sion:

,t, -12.5

adt t2 - t,

1

ti

-/ '^^ ]

shall not exceed 1,000 where a is the resultant
acceleration expressed as a multiple of pi (the accel-
eration of gravity), and t, and t, are any two points
in time during the crash of the vehicle which are
separated by not more than a 36 millisecond time
interval. (51 F.R. 37028— October 17. 1986. Effective:
November 17, 1986.)!

56.1.3 The resultant acceleration at the center
of gravity of the upper thorax shall not exceed 60
g's, except for intervals whose cumulative duration
is not more than 3 milliseconds.

56.1.4 The compressive force transmitted
axially through each upper leg shall not exceed
2250 pounds.

S6.2 Injury Criteria for the Part 572, Subpart E,
hybrid III Dummy.

S6.2.1 All portions of the test dummy shall be
contained within the outer surfaces of the vehcile
passenger compartment throughout the test.

6.2.2 The resultant acceleration at the center of
gravity of the head shall be such that the expres-
sion:

/ adt U-U

I ^-^' if J

shall not exceed 1,000, where a is the resultant
acceleration expressed as a multiple of g (the
acceleration of gravity), and t, and t^ are any two
point during the crash of the vehicle which are
separated by not more than a 36 millisecond time
interval. (51 F.R. 37028— October 17, 1986. Effective:
November 17, 1986.)!

6.2.3 The resultant acceleration calculated from
the thoracic instrumentation shown in drawing
78051-218, revision L incorporated by reference in
Part 572, Subpart E of this Chapter shall not
exceed 60g's, except for intervals whose com-
ulative duration is not more than 3 milliseconds.

56.2.4 Compression deflection of the sternum
relative to spine, as determined by instrumenta-
tion shown in drawing 78051-317, revision A in-
corporated by reference in Part 572, Subpart E of
this Chapter, shall not exceed 2 inches for loadings
applied through any impact surfaces except for
those systems which are gas inflated and provide
distributed loading to the torso during a crash. For
gas inflated systems which provide distributed
loading to the torso, the thoracic deflection shall
not exceed 3 inches.

56.2.5 The force transmitted axially through
each upper leg shall not exceed 2250 pounds.

S6.3 The resultant acceleration at the center of
gravity of the upper thorax shall not exceed 60g,
except for intervals whose cumulative duration is
not more than 3 milliseconds. However, in the case

(Rav. 10/17/86)

PART 571; S 208-7

30'

Attach the Inboard Reach String
(IGVe" long) at the base of
the head on centerline.

Rear view
50th %-ile
dummy,
seated in
foremost
seat adjust-
ment position

\

Attach the Outboard Reach String
(28" long) at this point on the
torso sheath.

A— Using flexible tape measure 8"
from back centerline 10- V4" from
front centerline to find anchor point
below arm pit on torso sheath.

_:i^

Seat Plane is 90° to the Torso Line

Figure 3. Location of Anchoring Points for Latchplate Reach Limiting
Chains or Strings to Test for Latchplate Accessibility

PART 571; S 208-8

Clearance Test Block

1/2" R
TYP

(Note: corners are rounded off
to reduce snagging.)

Typical arm rest

Figure 4. Use of Clearance Test Block to Determine Hand/Arm Access

' (50 F.R. 46056-November 6, 1985. Effective: September 1, 1986)

PART 571; S 208-9

of a passenger car manufactured before August
31, 1976, or a truck or multipurpose passenger
vehicle with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less
manufactured before August 15, 1977, the resul-
tant acceleration at the center of gravity of the
upper thorax shall be such that the severity index
calculated by the method described in SAE Infor-
mation Report J885a, October 1966, shall not
exceed 1,000.

S6.4 The compressive force transmitted axially
through each upper leg shall not exceed 2,250
pounds.

S7. Seat belt assembly requirements.

S7.1 Adjustment.

S7.1.1 Except as specified in S7. 1.1.1 and
S7. 1.1.2, the lap belt of any seat belt assembly fur-
nished in accordance with S4.1.1 and S4.1.2 shall
adjust by means of an emergency-locking or
automatic locking retractor that conforms to Stan-
dard No. 209 to fit persons whose dimensions
range from those of a 50th-percentile 6-year-old
child to those of a 95th-percentile adult male and
the upper torso restraint shall adjust by means of
an emergency-locking retractor or a manual
adjusting device that conforms to Standard No.
209 to fit persons whose dimensions range from
those of a 5th-percentile adult female to those of a
95th-percentile adult male, with the seat in any
position and the seat back in the manufacturer's
nominal design riding position. However, an upper
torso restraint furnished in accordance with
S4. 1.2. 3. 1(a) shall adjust by means of an
emergency-locking retractor that conforms to
Standard No. 209.

S7.1.1.1 A seat belt assembly installed at the
driver's seating position shall adjust to fit persons
whose dimensions range from those of a 5th-
percentile adult female to those of a 95th-per-
centile adult male.

S7.1.1.2. (a) A seat belt assembly installed in a
motor vehicle other than a forward control vehicle
at any designated seating position other than the
outboard positions of the front and second seats
shall adjust either by a retractor as specified in

S7.1.1 or by a manual adjusting device that con-
forms to S571.209.

(b) A seat belt assembly installed in a forward
control vehicle at any designated seating position
other than the front outboard seating positions
shall adjust either by a retractor as specified in
S7.1.1 or by a manual adjusting device that con-
forms to S571.209.

57.1.1.3 (a) Except as provided in S7. 1.1. 3(b), a
Type 1 lap belt or the lap belt portion of any Type 2
belt installed at any front outboard designated
seating position for compliance with this standard
in a vehicle (other than walk -in van-type vehicles)
manufactured on or after September 1, 1986, shall
meet the requirements of S7.1 by means of an
emergency-locking retractor that conforms to
Standard No. 209. (S571.209)

(b) The requirements of S7. 1.1. 3(a) do not apply
to the lap belt portion of any Type 2 belt installed
in a passenger car manufactured before September
1, 1989, or to walk-in van-type vehicles.

57.1.1.4 Notwithstanding the other provisions
of S7.1-S7.1.1.3, emergency-locking retractors on
belt assemblies located in positions other than
front outboard designated seating positions may
be equipped with a manual webbing adjustment
device capable of causing the retractor that adjusts
the lap belt to lock when the belt is buckled.

57.1.2 The intersection of the upper torso belt
with the lap belt in any Type 2 seat belt assembly
furnished in accordance with S4.1.1 or S4.1.2, with
the upper torso manual adjusting device, if pro-
vided, adjusted in accordance with the manufac-
turer's instructions, shall be at least 6 inches from
the front vertical centerline of a 50th-percentile
adult male occupant, measured along the centerline
of the lap belt, with the seat in its rearmost and
lowest adjustable position and with the seat back in
the manufacturer's nominal design riding position.

57.1.3 The weights and dimensions of the
vehicle occupants specified in this standard are as
follows:

50th-percentile
6-year-old child

5th-percentile
adult female

102 pounds

30.9 inches

12.8 inches

36.4 inches

23.6 inches

7.5 inches

30.5 inches

29.8 inches

26.6 inches

50th-percentile 95th-percentile
adult male adult male

164 pounds _±_3 _ 215 pounds

35.7 inches t-f _ 38 inches

14.7 inches ±.-.T__ 16.5 inches

42 inches 47.2 inches

32 inches ±.-o_. 42.5 inches

9.3 inches t.?... 10.5 inches

37.4 inches t.3... 44.5 inches)

IWeight 47.3 pounds _

Erect sitting height 25.4 inches^.

Hip breadth (sitting) 8.4 inches __

Hip circumference (sitting) 23.9 inches__

Waist circumference (sitting) 20.8 inches..

Chest depth

Chest circumference:

(nipple)

(upper)

Oower)

(51 F.R. 21912— June 17, 1986. Effective: June 17, 1986)

(Rev. 6/17/86)

PART 571; S 208-10

57.2 Latch mechanism. A seat belt assembly
installed in a passenger car, except an automatic
belt assembly, shall have a latch mechanism:

(a) Whose components are accessible to a seated
occupant in both the stowed and operational
positions;

(b) That releases both the upper torso restraint
and the lap belt simultaneously, if the assembly has
a lap belt and an upper torso restraint that require
unlatching for release of the occupant; and

(c) That releases at a single point by a push-
button action.

57.3 A seat belt assembly provided at the
driver's seating position shall be equipped with a
warning system that activates, for a period of not
less than 4 seconds and not more than 8 seconds
(beginning when the vehicle ignition switch is
moved to the "on" or the "start" position), a
continuous or flashing warning light, visible to the
driver, displaying the identifying symbol for the
seat belt telltale shown in Table 2 of Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 101-80 or, at the
option of the manufacturer for vehicles manufac-
tured before September 1, 1980, displaying the
words "Fasten Seat Belts" or "Fasten Belts"
when condition (a) exists, and a continuous or in-
termittent audible signal when condition (a) exists
simultaneously with condition (b).

(a) The vehicle's ignition switch is moved to the
"on" position or to the "start" position.

(b) The driver's lap belt is not in use, as deter-
mined at the option of the manufacturers, either by
the belt latch mechanism not being fastened, or by
the belt not being extended at least 4 inches from
its stowed position.

S7.3.1

Deleted

S7.3.2

Deleted

S7.3.3

Deleted

S7.3.4

Deleted

S7.3.5

Deleted

S7.3.5.1

Deleted

S7.3.5.2

Deleted

S7.3.5.3

Deleted

S7.3.5.4

Deleted

S7.3a

Deleted

(Rev. 6/17/S6)

S7.4 Seat belt comfort and convenience.

(a) Automatic seat belts. Automatic seat belts
installed in any vehicle, other than walk-in van-
type vehicles, which has a gross vehicle weight
rating of 10,000 pounds or less, and which is
manufactured on or after September 1, 1986, shall
meet the requirements of S7.4.1, S7.4.2, and
S7.4.3.

(b) Manual seat belts.

(1) Vehicles manufactured after September 1,
1986. Manual seat belts installed in any vehicle,
other than manual Type 2 belt systems installed in
the front outboard seating positions in passenger
cars or manual belts in walk-in van-type vehicles,
which have a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000
pounds or less, shall meet the requirements of
S7.4.3, S7.4.4, S7.4.5, and S7.4.6.

(2) Vehicles manufactured after September 1,
1989.

(i) If the automatic restraint requirement of
S4.1.4 is rescinded pursuant to S4.1.5, than
manual seat belts installed in a passenger car shall
meet the requirements of S7.4.2, S7.4.3, S7.4.4,
S7.4.5, and S7.4.6.

(ii) Manual seat belts installed in a bus,
multipurpose passenger vehicle and truck with a
gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or
less, except for walk-in van-type vehicles, shall
meet the requirements of S7.4.3, S7.4.4, S7.4.5,
and S7.4.6.

57.4.1 Convenience hooks. Any manual
convenience hook or other device that is provided
to stow seat belt webbing to facilitate entering or
exiting the vehicle shall automatically release the
webbing when the automatic belt system is other-
wise operational and shall remain in the released
mode for as long as (a) exists simultaneously with
(b), or, at the manufacturer's option, for as long as
(a) exists simultaneously with (c)—

(a) The vehicle ignition switch is moved to the
"on" or "start" position;

(b) The vehicle's drive train is engaged;

(c) The vehicle's parking brake is in the released
mode (nonengaged).

57.4.2 Webbing tension-relieving device. [Each
vehicle with an automatic seat belt assembly, or
with a Type 2 manual seat belt assembly that must

PART 571; S 208-11

meet S4.6, installed in a front outboard designated
seating position that has either manual or
automatic devices permitting the introduction of
slack in the webbing of the shoulder belt (e.g.,
"comfort clips" or "window-shade" devices) shall:

(a) comply with the requirements of S5.1 with
the shoulder belt webbing adjusted to introduce the
maximum amount of slack recommended by the
manufacturer pursuant to S7.4.2(b);

(b) have a section in the vehicle owner's manual
that explains how the tension-relieving device
works and specifies the maximum amount of slack
(in inches) recommended by the vehicle manufac-
turer to be introduced into the shoulder belt under
normal use conditions. The explanation shall also
warn that introducing slack beyond the amount
specified by the manufacturer could significantly
reduce the effectiveness of the shoulder belt in a
crash; and

(c) have, except for open-body vehicles with no
doors, an automatic means to cancel any shoulder
belt slack introduced into the belt system by a
tension-relieving device. In the case of an
automatic safety belt system, cancellation of the
tension relieving device shall occur each time the
adjacent vehicle door is opened. In the case of a
manual seat belt required to meet S4.6,
cancellation of the tension-relieving device shall
occur, at the manufacturer's option, either each
time the latchplate is released from the buckle. In
the case of open-body vehicles with no doors,
cancellation of the tension-relieving device may be
done by a manual means. (51 F.R. 21912— June 17,
1986. Effective: June 17. 1986)1

57.4.3 Belt contact force. [Except for manual
or automatic seat belt assemblies which incor-
porate a webbing tension-relieving device, the
upper torso webbing of any seat belt assembly,
when tested in accordance with S10.6, shall not
exert more than 0.7 pounds of contact force when
measured normal to and one inch from the chest of
an anthropomorphic test dummy, positioned in
accordance with SIO in the seating position for
which that assembly is provided, at the point where
the centerline of the torso belt crosses the
midsagittal line on the dummy's chest. (51 F.R.
21912— June 17, 1986. Effective: June 17, 1986)J

57.4.4 Latchplate access. Any seat belt
assembly latchplate which is located outboard of a
front outboard seating position in accordance with
S4.1.2, shall also be located within the outboard
reach envelope of either the outboard arm or the

inboard arm described in 1810.6] and Figure 3 of
this standard, when the latchplate is in its normal
stowed position. There shall be sufficient clearance
between the vehicle seat and the side of the vehicle
interior to allow the test block defined in Figure 4
unhindered transit to the latchplate or buckle.

57.4.5 Retraction. (When tested under the con-
ditions of S8.1.2 and S8.1.3, with anthropomorphic
test dummies whose arms have been removed and
which are positioned in accordance with SIO in the
front outboard designated seating positions and
restrained by the belt systems for those positions,
the torso and lap belt webbing of any of those seat
belt systems shall automatically retract to a
stowed position either when the adjacent vehicle
door is in the open position and the seat belt lat-
chplate is released, or, at the option of the
manufacturer, when the latchplate is released.
That stowed position shall prevent any part of the
webbing or hardware from being pinched when the
adjacent vehicle door is closed. A belt system with
a tension-relieving device in an open-bodied vehicle
with no doors shall fully retract when the tension-
relief device is deactivated. For the purpose of the
retraction requirement, outboard armrests, which
are capable of being stowed, on vehicle seats shall
be placed in their stowed positions. (51 F.R.
21912— June 17, 1986. Effective: June 17, 1986.)!

57.4.6 Seat belt guides and hardware.

57.4.6.1 (a) Any manual seat belt assembly whose
webbing is designed to pass through the seat cushion
or between the seat cushion and seat back shall be
designed to maintain one of the following three seat
belt parts (the seat belt latchplate, the buckle, or the
seat belt webbing) on top of or above the seat cushion
under normal conditions (i.e., conditions other than
when belt hardware is intentially pushed behind the
seat by a vehicle occupant). In addition, the remain-
ing two seat belt parts must be accessible under
normal conditions.

(b) The requirements of S7.4.6.1(a) do not apply
to: (1) seats whose seat cushions are movable so
that the seat back serves a function other than
seating, (2) seats which are removable, or (3) seats
which are movable so that the space formerly
occupied by the seat can be used for a secondary
function.

57 .4.6.2 The buckle and latchplate of a manual
seat belt assembly subject to S7.4.6.1 shall not pass
through the guides or conduits provided for in
S7.4.6.1 and fall behind the seat when the events
listed below occur in the order specified: (a) the belt
is completely retracted or, if the belt is nonretrac-
table, the belt is unlatched; (b) the seat is moved to

(Rev. 6/17/86)

PART 571; S 208-12

any position to which it is designed to be adjusted;
and (c) the seat back, if foldable, is folded forward
as far as possible and then moved backward into
position. The inboard receptacle end of a seat belt
assembly installed at a front outboard designated
seating position shall be accessible with the center
arm rest in any position to which it can be adjusted
(without having to move the armrest).

S8. Test conditions.

S8.1 General conditions. The following condi-
tions apply to the frontal, lateral, and rollover tests.

S8.1.1 "Except as provided in paragraph (c) of
this section, the vehicle, including test devices and
instrumentation, is loaded as follows:"

(a) Passenger cars. A passenger car is loaded to
its unloaded vehicle weight plus its rated cargo and
luggage capacity weight, secured in the luggage
area, plus the weight of the necessary anthropo-
morphic test devices.

(b) Multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and
buses. A multipurpose passenger vehicle, truck, or
bus is loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight plus
300 pounds or its rated cargo and luggage capacity
weight, whichever is less, secured in the load car-
rying area and distributed as nearly as possible in
proportion to its gross axle weight ratings, plus the
weight of the necessary anthropomorphic test
devices.

S8.1.1(c) Fuel system capacity. With the test
vehicle on a level surface, pump the fuel from the
vehicle's fuel tank and then operate the engine
until it stops. Then, add Stoddard solvent to the
test vehicle's fuel tank in an amount which is equal
to not less than 92 and not more than 94 percent of
the fuel tank's usable capacity stated by the vehi-
cle's manufacturer. In addition, add the amount of
Stoddard solvent needed to fill the entire fuel
system from the fuel tank through the engine's
induction system.

(S8.1.1(d) Vehicle test attitude. Determine the
distance between a level surface and a standard
reference point on the test vehicle's body, directly
above each wheel opening, when the vehicle is in
its "as delivered" condition. The "as delivered"
condition is the vehicle as received at the test site,
with 100 percent of all fluid capacities and all tires
inflated to the manufacturer's specifications as
listed on the vehicle's tire placard. Determine the
distance between the same level surface and the
same standard reference points in the vehicle's
"fully loaded condition." The "fully loaded condi-

tion" is the test vehicle loaded in accordance with
S8.1.1.(a) or (b), as applicable. The load placed in
the cargo area shall be centered over the
longitudinal centerline of the vehicle. The pretest
vehicle attitude shall be equal to either the "as
delivered" or "fully loaded" attitude or between
the "as delivered" attitude and the "fully loaded"
attitude.

58.1.2 Adjustable seats are in the adjustment
position midway between the forwardmost and
rearmost positions, and if separately adjustable in
a vertical direction, are at the lowest position. If an
adjustment position does not exist midway
between the forwardmost and rearmost positions,
the closest adjustment position to the rear of the
midpoint is used.

58.1 .3 Adjustable seat backs replacement. Place ad-
justable seat backs in the manufacturer's nominal
design riding position in the manner specified by
the manufacturer. Place each adjustable head
restraint in its highest adjustment position.

58.1.4 Adjustable steering controls are adjusted
so that the steering wheel hub is at the geometric
center of the locus it describes when it is moved
through its full range of driving positions.

58.1.5 Movable vehicle windows and vents are
at the manufacturer's option, placed in the fully
closed position.

58.1.6 Convertibles and open-body type
vehicles have the top, if any, in place in the closed
passenger compartment configuration.

58.1.7 Doors are fully closed and latched but
not locked.

[S8.1.8 Anthropomorphic test dummies

58.1.8.1 The anthropomorphic test dummies
used for evaluation of occupant protection systems
manufactured pursuant to applicable portions of
paragraphs S4.1.2, 4.1.3, and S4.1.4 shall conform
to the requirements of Subpart B of Part 572 of
this Chapter.

58.1.8.2 Anthropomorphic test devices used for
the evaluation of occupant protection systems
manufactured pursuant to applicable protions of
paragraphs S4.1.2, S4.1.3, and S4.1.4 shall con-
form to the requirements of Subpart E of Part 572
of this Chapter. (51 F.R. 26688— July 25, 1986.
Effective: October 23. 1986)1

S8.1 .9.1 [Each Part 572, Subpart B test dummy
specified in S8. 1.8.1 is clothed in formfitting cotton

(7/25/86)

PART 571; S 208-13

stretch garments with short sleeves and midcalf
length pants. Each foot of the test dummy is
equipped with a size llEE shoe which meets the
configuration size, sole, and heel thickness
specifications of MIL-S-131192 and weighs 1.25 ±
0.2 pounds.

S8.1.9.2 Each Part 572, Subpart E test dummy
specified in S8. 1.8.2 is clothed in formfitting cotton
stretch garments with short sleeves and midcalf
length pants specified in drawings 78051-292 and
-293 incorporated by reference in Part 572, Sub-
part E of this Chapter, respectively or their
equivalents. A size llEE shoe specified in draw-
ings 78051-294 (left) and 78051-295 (right) or their
equivalents is placed on each foot of the test
dummy. (51 F.R. 26688— July 25, 1986. Effective:
October 23, 1986)1

58.1.10 Limb joints are set at Ig, barely
restraining the weight of the limb when extended
horizontally. Leg joints are adjusted with the torso
in the supine position.

58.1.11 Instrumentation does not affect the
motion of dummies during impact or rollover.

58.1.12 The stabilized temperature of the test
instrument specified by S8.1.8 is at any level
between 66°F. and 78°F.

58.1.13 Temperature of the test dummy

58.1.13.1 [The stabilized temperature of the
test dummy specified by S8. 1.8.1 is at level bet-
ween 66 degrees F and 75 degrees F.

58.1 .1 3.2 The stabilized temperature of the test
dummy specified by S8.1.8.2 is at any level bet-
ween 69 degrees F and 72 degrees F. (51 F.R.
26688— July 25. 1986. Effective: October 23,19861

S8.2 Lateral moving barrier crash test conditions.

The following conditions apply to the lateral
moving barrier crash test:

58.2.1 The moving barrier, including the impact
surface, supporting structure, and carriage,
weighs 4,000 pounds.

58.2.2 The impact surface of the barrier is a
vertical, rigid, flat rectangle, 78 inches wide and 60
inches high, perpendicular to its direction of move-
ment, with its lower edge horizontal and 5 inches
above the ground surface.

58.2.3 During the entire impact sequence the
barrier undergoes no significant amount of
dynamic or static deformation, and absorbs no
significant portion of the energy resulting from the
impact, except for energy that results in transla-
tional rebound movement of the barrier.

58.2.4 During the entire impact sequence the
barrier is guided so that it travels in a straight line,
with no significant lateral, vertical or rotational
movement.

58.2.5 The concrete surface upon which the
vehicle is tested is level, rigid and of uniform con-
struction, with a skid number of 75 when measured
in accordance with American Society for Testing
and Materials Method E-274-65T at 40 mph, omit-
ting water delivery as specified in paragraph 7.1 of
that method.

58.2.6 The tested vehicle's brakes are disen-
gaged and the transmission is in neutral.

58.2.7 The barrier and the test vehicle are posi-
tioned so that at impact—

(a) The vehicle is at rest in its normal attitude;

(b) The barrier is traveling in a direction perpen-
dicular to the longitudinal axis of the vehicle at 20
mph; and

(c) A vertical plane through the geometric
center of the barrier impact surface and perpen-
dicular to the surface passes through the driver's
seating reference point in the tested vehicle.

S8.3 Rollover test condition. The following
conditions apply to the rollover test:

58.3.1 The tested vehicle's brakes are disen-
gaged and the transmission is in neutral.

58.3.2 The concrete surface on which the test is
conducted is level, rigid, of uniform construction,
and of a sufficient size that the vehicle remains on
it throughout the entire rollover cycle. It has a skid
number of 75 when measured in accordance with
American Society of Testing and Materials Method
E-274-65T at 40 mph omitting water delivery as
specified in paragraph 7.1 of that method.

58.3.3 The vehicle is placed on a device, similar
to that illustrated in Figure 1, having a platform in
the form of a flat, rigid plane at an angle of 23°
from the horizontal. At the lower edge of the plat-
form is an unyielding flange, perpendicular to the
platform with a height of 4 inches and a length suf-
ficient to hold in place the tires that rest against it.
The intersection of the inner face of the flange
with the upper face of the platform is 9 inches
above the rollover surface. No other restraints are
used to hold the vehicle in position during the
deceleration of the platform and the departure of
the vehicle.

(7/25/86)

PART 571; S 208-14

SB.3.4 With the vehicle on the test platform, the
test devices remain as nearly as possible in the
posture specified in S8. 1 .

58.3.5 Before the deceleration pulse, the plat-
form is moving horizontally, and perpendicularly
to the longitudinal axis of the vehicle, at a constant
speed of 30 mph for a sufficient period of time for
the vehicle to become motionless relative to the
platform.

58.3.6 The platform is decelerated from 30 to 0
mph in a distance of not more than 3 feet, without
change of direction and without transverse or rota-
tional movement during the deceleration of the
platform and the departure of the vehicle. The
deceleration rate is at least 20g for a minimum of
0.04 seconds.

S9. Pressure vessels and explosive devices.

59.1 Pressure vessels. A pressure vessel that
is continuously pressurized shall conform to the
requirements of 49 CFR S178.65-2, -6(b), -7, -9(a)
and (b), and -10. It shall not leak or evidence
visible distortion when tested in accordance with
Si 78. 65- 11(a) and shall not fail in any of the ways
enumerated in S178.65-ll(b) when hydrostatically
tested to destruction. It shall not crack when flat-
tened in accordance with S178.65-12(a) to the limit
specified in SI 78.65- 12(a) (4).

59.2 Explosive devices. An explosive device
shall not exhibit any of the characteristics pro-
hibited by 49 CFR S173.51. All explosive material
shall be enclosed in a structure that is capable of
containing the explosive energy without sudden
release of pressure except through overpressure
relief devices or parts designed to release the
pressure during actuation.

S10. Test dummy positioning procedures. [For
vehicles manufactured before September 1, 1987,
position a test dummy, conforming to Subpart B of
Part 572 (49 CFR Part 572), in each. front outboard
seating position of a vehicle as specified in 810
through S10.9 or, at the manufacturer's option, as
specified in S12 through S12.3.3.2. For vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1, 1987, posi-
tion a test dummy, conforming to Subpart B of Part
572 (49 CFR Part 572), in each front outboard
seating position of a vehicle as set forth below in SIO
through S10.9. Regardless of which positioning pro-
cedure in used, each test dummy is restrained during
the crash tests of S5 as follows:

(a) In a vehicle equipped with automatic restraints
at each front outboard designated seating position
that is certified by its manufactiirer as meeting the
requirements of S4. 1.2. 1(a) and (c) (1), each test
dummy is not restrained during the frontal test of
S5.1, the lateral test of S5.2 and the rollover test of
S5.3 by any means that requires occupant action.

(b) In a vehicle equipped with an automatic restraint
at each front outboard seating position that is
certified by its manufacturer as meeting the
requirements of S4. 1.2. 1(a) and (cX2), each test
dummy is not restrained during one frontal test of
S5.1 by any means that require occupant action. If
the vehicle has a manual seat belt provided by the
manufacturer to comply with the requirements of
S4. 1.2. 1(c), then a second frontal test is conducted in
accordance with S5.1 and each test dummy is
restrained both by the authomatic restraint system
and the manual seat belt, adjusted in accordance with
S10.9.

(ii) In a vehicle equipped with an automatic
restraint only at the driver's designated seating posi-
tion, pursuant to S4.1.3.4(aX2), that is certified by its
manufacturer as meeting the requirements of
S4. 1.2. 1(a) and (cX2), the driver test dummy is not
restrained during one frontal test of S5.1 by any
means that require occupant action. Lf the vehicle
also has a manual seat belt provided by the manufac-
turer to comply with the requirements of S4. 1.2.1(c),
then a second frontal test is conducted in accordance
with S5.1 and the driver test dummy is restrained
both by the automatic restraint system and the
manual seat belt, adjusted in accordance with S10.9.
At the option of the manufacturer, a passenger test
dummy can be placed in the right front outboard
designated seating postion during the testing re-
quired by this section. If a passenger test dummy is
present, it shall be restrained by a manual seat belt,
adjusted in accordance with S10.9

(c) In a vehicle equipped with a manual safety belt
at the front outboard designated seating positions
that is certified by its manufacturer to meet the
requirements of S4.6, each test dummy is restrained
by the manual safety belts, adjusted in accordance
with S10.9, installed at each front outboard seating
positions. (51 F.R. 31795— September 5, 1986. Effective:
September 5, 1986)1

S10.1 Vehicle equipped with front bucket seats.

Place the test dummy's torso against the seat back
and its upper legs against the seat cushion to the ex-
tent permitted by placement of the test dummy's feet

(Rev. 9/5/86)

PART 571; S 208-15

in accordance with the appropriate paragraph of
SIO. Center the test dummy on the seat cushion of
the bucket seat and set its midsagittal plane so that
it is vertical and parallel to the centerline of the
vehicle.

S10.1.1 Driver position placement.

(a) Initially set the knees of the test dummy 11%
inches apart, measured between the outer surfaces
of the knee pivot bolt heads, with the left outer
surface 5.9 inches from the midsagittal plane of the
test dummy.

(b) Rest the right foot of the test dummy on the
undepressed accelerator pedal with the rearmost
point of the heel on the floor pan in the plane of the
pedal. If the foot cannot be placed on the
accelerator pedal, set it perpendicular to the lower
leg and place it as far forward as possible in the
direction of the geometric center of the pedal with
the rearmost point of the heel resting on the floor
pan. Except as prevented by contact with a vehicle
surface, place the right leg so that the upper and
lower leg centerlines fall, as close as possible, in a
vertical longitudinal plane without inducing torso
movement.

(c) (Place the left foot on the toeboard with the
rearmost point of the heel resting on the floor pan
as close as possible to the point of intersection of
the planes described by the toeboard and the floor
pan and not on the wheelwell projection. If the foot
cannot be positioned on the toeboard, set it initially
perpendicular to the lower leg and place it as far
forward as possible with the heel resting on the
floor pan. If necessary to avoid contact with the
vehicle's brake or clutch pedal, rotate the test
dummy's left foot about the lower leg. If there is
still pedal interference, rotate the left leg outboard
about the hip the minimum distance necessary to
avoid the pedal interference. Except as prevented
by contact with a vehicle surface, place the left leg
so that the upper and lower leg centerlines fall, as
close as possible, in a vertical plane. For vehicles
with a foot rest that does not elevate the left foot
above the level of the right foot, place the left foot
on the foot rest so that the upper and lower leg
centerlines fall in a vertical plane. (51 F.R.
31765— September 5, 1986. Effective: September 5,
1986)]

S10.1.2 Passenger position placement.

S10.1.2.1 Vehicle with a flat floor pan/toeboard.

(a) Initially set the knees 11% inches apart,
measured between the outer surfaces of the knee
pivot bolt heads.

(b) Place the right and left feet on the vehicle's
toeboard with the heels resting on the floor pan as
close as possible to the intersection point with the
toeboard. If the feet cannot be placed flat on the
toeboard, set them perpendicular to the lower leg
centerlines and place them as far forward as possible
with the heels resting on the floor pan.

(c) Place the right and left legs so that the upper
and lower leg centerlines fall in vertical
longitudinal planes.

S1 0.1 .2.2 Vehicles with wheelhouse projections
in passenger compartment.

(a) Initially set the knees 11% inches apart,
measured between outer surfaces of the knee pivot
bolt heads.

(b) Place the right and left feet in the well of the
floor pan/toeboard and not on the wheelhouse pro-
jection. If the feet cannot be placed flat on the
toeboard, set them perpendicular to the lower leg
centerlines and as far forward as possible with the
heels resting on the floor pan.

(c) If it is not possible to maintain vertical and
longitudinal planes through the upper and lower
leg centerlines for each leg, then place the left leg
so that its upper and lower centerlines fall, as
closely as possible, in a vertical longitudinal plane
and place the right leg so that its upper and lower
leg centerlines fall, as closely as possible, in a
vertical plane.

S10.2 Vehicle equipped with bench seating. Place

a test dummy with its torso against the seat back
and its upper legs against the seat cushion, to the
extent permitted by placement of the test dummy's
feet in accordance with the appropriate paragraph
of SlO.l.

510.2.1 Driver position placement. Place the
test dummy at the left front outboard designated
seating position so that its midsagittal plane is
vertical and parallel to the centerline of the vehicle
and so that the midsagittal plane of the test
dummy passes through the center of the steering
wheel rim. Place the legs, knees, and feet of the
test dummy as specified in SIO. 1.1.

51 0.2.2 Passenger position placement. IPlace
the test dummy at the right front outboard
designated seating position so that the midsagittal
plane of the test dummy shall is vertical and
longitudinal, and the same distance from the
vehicle's longitudinal centerline as the midsagittal
plane of the test dummy at the driver's position.
Place the legs, knees, and feet of the test dummy as
specified in SIO.1.2. (51 F.R. 31765CSeptember 5, 1986.
Effective: September 5, 1986)1

(Rev. 9;5/86)

PART 571; S 208-16

510.3 Initial test dummy placement. With the
test dummy at its designated seating position as
specified by the appropriate requirements of SlO.l
or S10.2, place the upper arms against the seat
back and tangent to the side of the upper torso.
Place the lower arms and palms against the outside
of the upper legs.

510.4 Test dummy settling.

S10.4.1 Test dummy vertical upward displace-
ment. Slowly lift the test dummy parallel to the
seat back plane until the test dummy's buttocks no
longer contact the seat cushion or until there is
test dummy head contact with the vehicle's
headlining.

510.4.2 Lower torso force application. [Apply a
rearward force of 50 pounds against the center of the
test dummy's lower torso in a horizontal direction.
The line of force application shall be 6V2 inches above
the bottom surface of the test dummy's buttocks.

510.4.3 Test dummy vertical downward displace-
ment. Remove as much of the 50 pound force as
necessary to allow the test dummy to return
downward to the seat cushion by its own weight.

51 0.4.4 Test dummy torso rocking. Apply a 10 to
15 pound horizontal rearward force to the test
dummy's lower torso. Then apply a horizontal for-
ward force to the test dummy's shoulders sufficient
to flex the upper torso forward until its back no
longer contacts the seat back. Rock the test dummy
from side to side 3 or 4 times so that the test
dummy's spine is at any angle from the vertical in the
14 to 16 degree range at the extremes of each rock-
ing movement.

51 0.4.5 Test dummy upper torso force application.

While maintaining the 10 to 15 pound horizontal
rearward force applied in SIO.4.4 and with the test
dummy's midsagittal plane vertical, push the upper
torso back against the seat back with a force of 50
pounds applied in a horizontal rearward direction
along a line that is coincident with the test dummy's
midsagittal plane and 18 inches above the bottom
surface of the test dimuny's buttocks.

S10.5 Beit adjustment for dynamic testing. With
the test dummy at its designated seating position
as specified by the appropriate requirements of
S8.1.2, S8.1.3 and SlO.l through SlO.4, place and
adjust the safety belt as specified below.

S1 0.5.1 Manual safety belts. Place the Type 1
or Type 2 manual belt around the test dummy and
fasten the latch. Pull the Type 1 belt webbing out
of the retractor and allow it to retract; repeat this
operation four times. Remove all slack from the lap
belt portion of a Type 2 belt. Pull the upper torso
webbing out of the retractor and allow it to retract;
repeat this operation four times so that the excess
webbing in the shoulder belt is removed by the
retractive force of the retractor. Apply a 2 to 4
pound tension load to the lap belt of a single retrac-
tor system by pulling the upper torso belt adjacent
to the latchplate. In the case of a dual retractor
system, apply a 2 to 4 pound tension load by pulling
the lap belt adjacent to its retractor. Measure the
tension load as clase as possible to the same loca-
tion where the force was applied. After the tension
load has been applied, ensure that the upper torso
belt lies flat on the test dummy's shoulder.

S10.6 Placement of test dummy arms and hands.

With the test dummy positioned as specified by
S10.4 and without inducing torso movement, place
the arms, elbows, and hands of the test dummy, as
appropriate for each designated seating position in
accordance with SIO.6.1 or SIO.6.2. Following
placement of the arms, elbows and hands, remove
the force applied against the lower half of the
torso.

S1 0.6.1 Driver's position. Move the upper and
the lower arms of the test dummy at the driver's
position to their fully outstretched position in the
lowest possible orientation. Push each arm rear-
ward permitting bending a the elbow, until the
palm of each hand contacts the outer part of the
rim of the steering wheel at its horizontal
centerline. Place the test dummy's thumbs over
the steering wheel rim and position the upper and
lower arm centerlines as close as possible in a ver-
tical plane without inducing torso movement.

SIO.6.2 Passenger position. Move the upper and
lower arms of the test dummy at the passenger
position to the fully outstretched position in the
lowest possible orientation. Push each arm rear-
ward, permitting bending at the elbow, until the
upper arm contacts the seat back and is tangent to
the upper part of the side of the torso, the palm
contacts the outside of the thigh, and the little
finger is barely in contact witht the seat cushion.

(R«v. 9/5«86)

PART 571; S 208-17

510.7 Repositioning of feet and legs. After the
test dummy has been settled in accordance with
S10.4, the safety belt system has been positioned,
if necessary, in accordance with S10.5, and the
arms and hands of the test dummy have been posi-
tioned in accordance with S10.6, reposition the
feet and legs of the test dummy, if necessary, so
that the feet and legs meet the applicable re-
quirements of SlO.l or S10.2

510.8 Test dummy positioning for latchplate ac-
cess. The reach envelopes specified in S7.4.4. are
obtained by positioning a test dummy in the
driver's seat or passenger's seat in its forward-
most adjustment position. Attach the lines for the
inboard and outboard arms to the test dummy as
described in Figure 3 of this standard. Extend each
line backward and outboard to generate the com-
pliance arcs of the outboard reach envelope of the
test dummy's arms.

Test dummy positioning for belt contact force.

S1 0.9.1 Vehicle manufactured before September
1, 1987. To determine compliance with S7.4.3 of
this standard, a manufacturer may use, at its
option, either the test procedure of SIO.9.1 or the
test procedure of SIO.9.2. Position the test dummy
in the vehicle in accordance with the appropriate
requirements specified in SlO.l or S10.2 and under
the conditions of S8.1.2 and S8.1.3. Fasten the
latch and pull the belt webbing three inches from
the test dummy's chest and release until the
webbing is within one inch of the test dummy's
chest and measure the belt contact force.

S10.9.2Vehicle manufactured on or after
September 1, 1987. To determine compliance with
S7.4.3. of this standard, position the test dummy in
the vehicle in accordance with the appropriate
requirements specified in SlO.l or S10.2 and under
the conditions of S8.1.2 and S8.1.3. Close the vehi-
cle's adjacent door, pull either 12 inches of belt
webbing or the maximum available amount of belt
webbing, whichever is less, from the retractor and
then release it, allowing the belt webbing to return
to the dummy's chest. Fasten the latch and pull the
belt webbing three inches from the test dummy's
chest and release until the webbing is within one
inch of the test dummy's chest and measure the
belt contact force. (51 F.R. 31765— September 5,
1986. Effective: September 5, 1986.)!

S11 Positioning procedure for the Part 572
Subpart E Test Dummy.

Position a test dummy, conforming to Subpart E
of Part 572 of this Chapter, in each front outboard
seating position of a vehicle as specified in SI 1.1
through S11.6. Each test dummy is restrained in
accordance with the applicable requirements of
S4.1.2.1, 4.1.2.2 or S4.6.

51 1.1 Head. The transverse instrumentation
platform of the head shall be horizontal within V2
degree.

51 1.2 Arms.

S1 1.2.1 The driver's upper arms shall be ad-
jacent to the torso with the centerlines as close to a
vertical plane as possible.

S1 1.2.2 The passenger's upper arms shall be in
contact with the seat back and the sides of torso.

51 1.3 Hands.

51 1.3.1 The palms of the driver test dummy
shall be in contact wdth the outer part of the steer-
ing wheel rim at the rim's horizontal centerline.
The thumbs shall be over the steering wheel rim
and attached with adhesive tape to provide a
breakaway force of between 2 to 5 pounds.

51 1 .3.2 The palms of the passenger test dummy
shall be in contact with outside of thigh. The little
finger shall be in contact with the seat cushion.

51 1.4 Torso.

51 1.4.1 In vehicles equipped with bench seats,
the upper torso of the driver and passenger test
dummies shall rest against the seat back. The mid-
sagittal plane of the driver dummy shall be vertical
and parallel to the vehicle's longitudinal centerline,
and pass through the center of the steering wheel
rim. The midsagittal plane of the passenger
dummy shall be vertical and parallel to the
vehicle's longitudinal centerline and the same
distance from the vehicle's longitudinal centerline
as the midsagittal plane of the driver dummy.

51 1.4.2 In vehicles equipped with bucket seats,
the upper torso of the driver and passenger test
dummies shall rest against the seat back. The mid-
sagittal plane of the drivers and the passenger
dummy shall be vertical and shall concide with the
longitudinal centerline of the bucket seat.

51 1.4.3 Lower Torso.

(Rev. 9/5/86)

PART 571; S 208-18

51 1 .4.3.1 H-polnt. The H-point of the driver and
passenger test dummies shall coincide within V2
inch in the vertical dimension and V2 inch in the
horizontal dimension of a point 'A inch below the
position of the H-point determined by using the
equipment and procedures specified in SAE J826
(Apr 80) except that the length of the lower leg and
thigh segments of the H-point machine shall be
adjusted to 16.3 and 15.8 inches, respectively, in-
stead of the 50th percentile values specified in
Table 1 of SAE J826.

51 1 .4.3.2 Pelvic angle. As determined using the
pelvic angle gage (GM drawing 78051-532 incor-
porated by reference in Part 572, Subpart E of this
chapter) which is inserted into the H-point gaging
hole of the dummy, the angle measured from the
horizontal on the 3 inch flat surface of the gage
shall be 22V2 degrees plus or minus 2V2 degrees.

511.5 Legs. The upper legs of the driver and
passenger test dummies shall rest against the seat
cushion to the extent pemitted by placement of the
feet. The initial distance between the outboard
knee clevis flange surfaces shall be 10.6 inches. To
the extent particable, the left leg of the driver
dummy and both legs of the passenger dummy
shall be in vertical longitudinal planes. Final
adjustment to accommodate placement of feet in
accordance with SI 1.6 for various passenger com-
partment configurations is permitted.

511.6 Feet.

51 1 .6.1 The right foot of the driver test dummy
shall rest on the undepressed accelerator with the
rearmost point of the heel on the floor surface in
the plane of the pedal. If the foot cannot be placed
on the accelerator pedal. If the foot cannot be
placed on the accelerator pedal, it shall be
positioned perpendicular to the tibia and placed as
far forward as possible in the direction of the
centerline of the pedal with the rearmost point of
the heel resting on the floor surface. The heel of
the left foot shall be placed as far forward as possi-
ble and shall rest on the floor surface. The left foot
shall be positioned as flat as possible on the floor
surface. The longitudinal centerline of the left foot
shall be placed as parallel as possible to the
longitudinal centerline of the vehicle.

51 1.6.2 The heels of both feet of the passenger
test dummy shall be placed as far forward as pos-
sible and shall rest on the floor surface. Both feet
shall be positioned as flat as possible on the floor

surface. The longitudinal centerline of the feet
shall be placed as parallel as possible to the
longitudinal centerline of the vehicle.

511.7 Test dummy positioning for latchplate
access. The reach envelopes specified in S7.4.4
are obtained by positioning a test dummy in the
driver's seat for passenger's seat in its forward-
most adjustment position. Attach the lines for the
inboard and outboard arms to the test dummy as
described in Figure 3 of this standard. Extend each
line backward and outboard to generate the com-
pliance arcs of the outboard reach envelope of the
test dummy's arms.

511.8 Test dummy positioning for belt contact
force. To determine compliance with S7.4.3 of
this standard, position the test dummy in the vehi-
cle in accordance with the requirements specified
in SI 1.1 through SI 1.6 and under the conditions of
S8.1.2 and S8.1.3. Pull the belt webbing three
inches from the test dummy's chest and release
until the webbing is within 1 inch of the test
dummy's chest and measure the belt contact force.

511.9 Manual belt adjustment for dynamic
testing. With the test dummy at its designated
seating position as specified by the appropriate
requirements of S8.1.2, S8.1.3 and Sll.l through
S11.6, place the Type 2 manual belt around the test
dummy and fasten the latch. Remove all slack from
the lap belt. Pull the upper torso webbing out of the
retractor and allow it to retract; repeat this opera-
tion four times. Apply a 2 to 4 pound tension load
to the lap belt. If the belt system is equipped with a
tension-relieving device introduce the maximum
amount of slack into the upper torso belt that is
recommended by the manufacturer for normal use
in the owner's manual for the vehicle. If the belt
system is not equipped with a tension-relieving
device, allow the excess webbing in the shoulder
belt to be retracted by the retractive force of the
retractor.

[S12 Optional position procedures for the Part
572, Subpart B test dummy. The following test
dummy positioning procedures for the Part 572,
Subpart B test dummy may be used, at the option
of the manufacturer, until September 1, 1987.

S12.1 Dummy placement In vehicle. An-
thropomorphic test dummies are placed in the
vehicle in accordance with S12.1.1 and S12.1.2.

SI 2.1 .1 Vehicle equipped with front bucket seats.

In the case of a vehicle equipped with front bucket

(Rev. 9/S/86)

PART 571; S 208-19

seats, dummies are placed at the front outboard
designated seating positions with the test device
torso against the seat back, and the thighs against
the seat cushion to the extent permitted by place-
ment of the dummy's feet in accordance with the
appropriate paragraph of SI 2.1. The dummy is
centered on the seat cushion of the bucket seat and
its midsagittal plane is vertical and longitudinal.

51 2.1. 1.1 Driver position placement. At the

driver's position, the knees of the dummy are
initially set 14.5 inches apart, measured between
the outer surfaces of the knee pivot bolt heads,
with the left outer surface 5.9 inches from the mid-
sagittal plane of the dummy. The right foot of the
dummy rests on the underpressed accelerator
pedal with the rearmost point of the heel on the
floorpan in the plane of the pedal. If the foot can-
not be placed on the accelerator pedal, it is set
perpendicular to the tibia and placed as far for-
ward as possible in the direction of the geometric
center of the pedal with the rearmost point of the
heel resting on the floorpan. The plane defined by
the femur and tibia cneterlines of the right leg is as
close as possible to vertical without inducing torso
movement and except as prevented by contact
with a vehicle surface. The left foot is placed on the
floorpan as close as possible to the point of in-
tersection fo the planes described by the toeboard
and the floorpan. If the foot cannot be positioned
on the toeboard, it is set perpendicular to the tibia
and placed as far forward as possible with the heel
resting on the floorpan. The femur and tibia
centerlines of the left leg are positioned in a ver-
tical plane except as prevented by contact with a
vehicle surface.

51 2.1. 1.2 Passenger position placement. At the

right front designated seating position, the femur,
tibia, and foot centerlines of each of the dummy's
legs are positioned in a vertical longitudinal plane.
The feet of the dummy are placed on the toeboard
with the rearmost point of the heel resting on the
floorpan as close as possible to the point of in-
tersection of the planes described by the toeboard
and the floorpan. If the feet cannot be positioned
flat on the toeboard they are set perpendicular to
the tibia and are placed as far forward as possible
with the heels resting on the floorpan.

S12.1.2 Vehicle equipped with bench seating. In

the case of a vehicle which is equipped with a front
bench seat, a dummy is placed at each of the front
outboard designated seating positions with the
dummy torso against the seat back and the thighs

against the seat cushion to the extent permitted by
placement of the dummy's feet in accordance with
the appropriate paragraph of SI 2. 1.1.

SI 2.1 .2.1 Driver position placement. The dummy
is placed at the left front outboard designated
seating position so that its midsagittal plane is ver-
tical and longitudinal, and passes through the
center point of the plane described by the steering
wheel rim. The legs, knees, and feet of the dummy
are placed as specified in S12. 1.1.1.

SI 2.1 .2.2 Passenger position placement. The

dummy is placed at the right front outboard
designated seating position as specified in
S8.12. 1.1.2, except that the midasgittal plane of
the dummy is vertical, longitudinal, and the same
distance from the longitudinal centerline as the
midsagittal plane of the dummy at the driver's
position.

S12.2 Dummy positioning procedures. The

dummy is positioned on a seat as specified in
S12.2.1. throught S12.2.3.2. to achieve the condi-
tions of S12.1.

512.2.1 Initial dummy placement. With the
dummy at its designated seating position as
described in S12.1 place the upper arms against
the seat back and tangent to the side of the upper
torso and the lower arms and palms against the
outside of the thighs.

51 2.2.2 Dummy settling. With the dummy posi-
tioned as specified in SI 0.1, slowly lift the dummy
in the direction parallel to the plane of the seat
back until its buttocks no longer contact the seat
cushion or until its head contacts the vehicle roof.
Using a flat, square, rigid surface with an area of 9
square inches and oriented so that its edges fall in
longitudinal or horizontal planes, apply a force of
50 pounds through the center of the rigid surface
against the dummy's torso in the horizontal rear-
ward direction along a line that is coincident with
the midsagittal plane of the dummy and 5.5 inches
above the bottom surface of its buttocks. Slowly
remove the lifting force.

SI 2.2.2.1 While maintaining the contact of the
force application plate with the torso, remove as
much force as is necessary from the dummy's torso
to allow the dummy to return to the seat cushion
by its own weight.

(Rev. 9/5/86)

PART 571; S 208-20

S1 2.2.2.2 Without removing the force applied to
the lower torso, apply additional force in the
horizontal, forward direction, longitudinally
against the upper shoulders of the dummy suffi-
cient to flex the torso forward until the dummy's
back above the lumbar spine no longer contacts the
seatback. Rock the dummy from side to side three
or four times, so that the dummy's spine is at an
angle from the vertical of not less than 14 degrees
and not more than 16 degrees at the extreme of
each movement. With the midsagittal plane ver-
tical, push the upper half of the torso back against
the seat back with a force of 50 pounds applied in
the horizontal rearward direction along a line that
is coincident with the midsagittal plane of the
dummy and 18 inches above the bottom surface of
its buttocks. Slowly remove the horizontal force.

S12.2.3 Placement of dummy arms and hands.

With the dummy positioned as specified in S12.2.2
and without inducing torso movement, place the
arms, elbows, and hands of the dummy, as ap-
propriate for each designated seating position in
accordance with S12.2.3.1 or S12. 2.3.2. Following
placement of the limbs, remove the force applied
against the lower half of the torso.

S1 2.2.3.1 Driver's position. Move the upper and
the lower arms of the dummy at the driver's posi-
tion to the fully outstretched position in the lowest
possible orientation. Push each arm rearward, per-
mitting bending at the elbow, until the palm of
each hand contacts the outer part of the rim of the
steering wheel at its horizontal centerline. Place
the dummy's thumbs over the steering wheel rim,

positioning the upper and lower arm centerlines as
close as possible in a vertical plane without in-
cluding torso movement.

SI 2.2.3.2 Passenger position. Move the upper
and the lower arms of the dummy at the passenger
position to the fully outstretched position in the
lowest possible orientation. Push each arm rear-
ward, permitting bending at the elbow, until the
upper arm contacts the seat back and is tangent to
the upper part of the side of the torso, the palm
contacts the outside of the thigh, and the little
finger is barely in contact with the seat cushion. (51
F.R. 31765— September 5. 1986. Effective: September
5, 1986)1

Interpretation

The concept of an occupant protection system
which requires "no action by vehicle occupants," as
that term is used in Standard No. 208, is intended to
designate a system which will perform its protective
restraining function after a normal process of ingress
or egress without separate deliberate actions by the
vehicle occupant to deploy the restraint system.
Thus, the agency considers an occupant protection
system to be automatic if an occupant has to take no
action to deploy the system but would normally
slightly push the seat belt webbing aside when enter-
ing or exiting the vehicle or would normally make a
slight adjustment in the webbing for comfort.

36 F.R. 4600
March 10, 1971

(Rev. 9/5/B6)

PART 571; S 208-21-22

EIImIIv*: Janwory 4, 1969

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 209

Seat Be'' Assemblies — Passenger Cars, Multipurpose Passenger Vehicles, Trucks,

and Buses

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 209 (32
F.R. 2415, as amended 32 F.R. 3310), specifies
requirements for seat belt assemblies for use in
passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks and buses, incorporating by reference the
requirements of Department of Commerce, Na-
tional Bureau of Standards, Standards for Seat
Belts for Use in Motor Vehicles (15 C.F.R. Part
9; 31 F.R. 11528).

The Administrator of the Federal Highway
Administration has determined in the interests
of clarity and ease of reference that the require-
ments specified by 15 C.F.R. Part 9 should be
incorporated into Standard No. 209 where it is
presently incorporated only by reference. There-
fore Standard No. 209 is hereby amended by
deleting present paragraph S3 and adding new
paragraphs S3, S4, and S5, so as to incorporate
the requirements of 15 C.F.R. Part 9. Accord-
ingly 15 C.F.R. Part 9 is hereby deleted.

Since this amendment imposes no additional
burden on any person and involves no substantive
change in the requirements of Standard No. 209,
notice and public procedure hereon are unneces-
sary and good cause is shown that an effective

date earlier than 180 days after issuance is in
the public interest and the amendment may be
made effective less than 30 days after publication
in the Federal Register. The requirement of
former Paragraph S3 of Standard No. 209 that
seat belt assemblies shall use the attachment
hardware specified in 15 C.F.R. § 9.3(f) "or
approved equivalent hardware" has been incor-
porated into new Paragraph S4.1(f) of Standard
No. 209.

This amendment is made under the authority
of sections 103, 117(c) and 119 of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
(15 U.S.C. sees. 1392, 1405(c), and 1407) and
the delegation of authority contained in the
Regulations of the Office of the Secretary (49
C.l^.R. § 1(c)), and is effective upon publication
in the Federal Register.

Issued in Washington, D.C., on December 24,
1968.

Lowell K. Bridwell,

Federal Highway Administrator

34 F.R. 115
January 4, 1969

PART 571; S 209— PRE 1-2

Effvrtiv*: S«pt«mb«r 1, 1971

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 209

Seat Belt Assemblies in Passenger Cars, Multipurpose Passenger Vehicles, Trucks and Buses

(Docket No. 69-23; Notice No. 2)

This notice amends Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard No. 209 in § 571.21 of Title 49
of the Code of Federal Regulations, to upgrade
the requirements for seatbelt assemblies for use
in passenger cars, multipurpose passenger ve-
hicles, trucks, and buses. As amended, the
standard is both an equipment and a vehicle
standard. The equipment aspect applies to a
seatbelt assembly manufactured on or after the
effective date. The vehicle aspect applies to an
assembly installed in a vehicle manufactured on
or after the effective date, regardless of when
the assembly was manufactured.

During the period since the original issuance
of Standard No. 209, laboratory tests and ex-
perience with actual seatbelt usage have disclosed
areas where improvements in performance re-
quirements are necessary. Consequently, a notice
of proposed amendments to the standard was
published on March 17, 1970 (35 F.R. 4641) to
upgrade the performance requirements for seat-
belt assemblies. Interested persons were given
an opportunity to comment on the contents of
the proposed rule. These comments, and other
available data, have been carefully considered
in the development of these amendments.

Paragraph S4.1(f) of the standard is amended
to make it clear that a manufacturer may use
bolts other than the specified bolts if the substi-
tuted bolts are equivalent.

The standard formerly required a Type 1 or
Type 2 seatbelt assembly to be adjustable to fit
an occupant with the weight and dimensions of
a 95th -percentile adult male. To insure that belt
assemblies can be adjusted to fit the range of
occupants who may use them, paragraph S4.1(g)
is amended to require each Type 1 or Type 2

seatbelt assembly to be adjustable to fit occupants
whose weight and dimensions range from those
of a 5th-percentile adult female to those of a
95th-percentile adult male. A belt assembly
installed for an adjustable seat must conform
to the requirements regardless of seat position.
Several comments noted that no dimensions were
specified in the notice for the various occupants
which a belt assembly must fit. To remedy the
problem, the standard provides a table of weights
and dimensions for 5th-percentile adult females
and 95th-percentile adult males.

In the notice, it was proposed to reduce the
force required to release seat belt buckles from
30 to 22.5 pounds and to require that the release
forcp for pushbutton-type buckles be applied
no closer than 0.125 inch from the edge of the
pushbutton access opening. In light of comments
received, and other available information, the
value of 30 pounds has been retained. The pro-
cedure for testing the buckle release force of a
pushbutton-type buckle has been amended as pro-
posed, however, to insure that the release force
will not be applied so close to the edge of the
access opening that the button might tilt in a
manner unrepresentative of actual use conditions
and thereby exaggerate the release force.

The buckle crush release requirements are
amended to extend the standard's crush release
requirements to all Type 1 and Type 2 seatbelt
buckles, and to require application of the test
load to areas of a buckle other than directly over
the center of the release mechanism. Experience
has indicated that non-pushbutton buckle release
mechanisms are also subject to impairment when
compressed, and occupants using such buckles
are therefore provided equivalent protection by
the extension of the buckle crush release require-

PART 671; S 209— PRE 3

Efftctiv*: September 1, 1971

ments. In laboratory tests on pushbutton-type
buckles, buckle release or malfunction occurred
when a compressive force as low as 275 pounds
was applied to a surface area other than the
area directly over the pushbutton. The amended
test will tend to eliminate buckle designs that
are prone to accidental damage, or that release
during the initial phase of the accident.

The notice proposed a new buckle latch test
procedure in which a specified tensile load was
to be applied at 30° to the buckle. In the light
of comments received and other information that
has become available indicating that the require-
ment was not justified, the procedure has not
been adopted.

In response to comments that the acceleration
levels proposed in the notice were too high, the
acceleration level above which an emergency-
locking retractor must lock has been reduced
from 2g, as proposed, to 0.7g, and the accelera-
tion level below which the retractor must not
lock has been reduced from Ig to 0.3g. For
reasons of occupant convenience, the notice pro-
posed that the required upper limit on accelera-
tion had to be met only when the webbing was
extended to the length necessary to fit a 5th-
percentile adult female. Upon review it has been
determined that the proposed free travel distance
could make a belt unsafe for use by a child, and,

further, that an adequate measure of convenience
is provided by the requirement that a belt not
lock at accelerations of less than 0.3g. Accord-
ingly, the standard does not limit the belt with-
drawal range within which the acceleration levels
must be met. For similar reasons, the retraction
force requirements are required to be met regard-
less of the amount of belt withdrawal.

As stated in the notice, the hex-bar abrasion
test does not adequately simulate the type of
webbing abrasion caused by some buckles. The
standard as amended retains the hex-bar test,
but supplements it with an additional abrasion
requirement, under which webbing is required to
retain at least 75 percent of its breaking strength
after being repeatedly passed through the as-
sembly buckle or manual adjustment device.

Effective date: September 1, 1971.

In consideration of the foregoing. Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Standard No. 209 in §571.21 of
Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, is
amended. . . .

Issued on March 3, 1971.

Douglas W. Toms,
Acting Administrator.

36 F.R. 4607
March 10, 1971

PART 571 ; S 209— PRE 4

Effective: April 1, 1971

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 209
Seat Belt Assemblies for Passenger Cars, Multipurpose Passenger Vehicles, Trucks and Buses

The purpose of this notice is to amend Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 209, in § 571.21 of
Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, to clarify
the method in which the buckle release force of
a Type 3 seat belt assembly is measured.

The standard provides (S4.3(d)(l), S5.2(d)
(1)) that the force required to release a Type 3
assembly buckle is measured following the as-
sembly test of S5.3, with a force of 45 ±5
pounds applied to a torso block restrained by the
Type 3 assembly. The test procedure was in-
tended to represent the situation in which the
vehicle is inverted and the child is held by the
harness. The force applied along the line of the
belt is of primary significance, but it appears
that the release force of some buckles is signifi-
cantly increased by the pressure of the torso
block on the back of the buckle. This pressure
is not regarded as representative of actual condi-
tions, in that the hard surface of the torso block
offers much more resistance than would a child's
body. To eliminate the effects of such pressure
by the torso block, section S5.3(c)(l) of the
standard is amended to read as set forth below.

Since this amendment is interpretative and
clarifying in intent and imposes no additional

burden on any person, notice and public pro-
cedure thereon are unnecessary.

Effective date: April 1, 1971.

The major usage of Type 3 seat belt assembly
buckles will be on child seating systems that
comply with Standard No. 213, effective April 1,
1971. So that the amendment to Standard No.
209 will have maximum effect, good cause is
found for establishing an effective date sooner
than 180 days after issuance. Since the amend-
ment is interpretative in nature and relieves a re-
striction, there is also good cause for establish-
ing an effective date sooner than 30 days after
issuance.

In consideration of the foregoing. Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Standard No. 209, in §571.21 of
Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, is
amended. . . .

Issued on March 23, 1971.

Douglas W. Toms,
Acting Administrator.

36 F.R. 5973
.V.srch 27, 1971

PART 571; S 209— PRE 5-6

EfftcHv*: January 1, 1972
(Except ai noted in ttie Rule)

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 209
Seat Belt Assemblies in Passenger Cars, Multipurpose Passenger Vehicles, Trucks and Buses

(Docket No. 69-23; Notice No. 3)

Reconsideration and Amendment

The purpose of this notice is to respond to
petitions filed pursuant to § 553.35 of Title 49,
Code of Federal Regulations, requesting recon-
sideration of various amendments to Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 209, Seat Belt
Assemblies, that were published March 10, 1971
(36 F.R. 4607). The petitions are granted in
part and denied in part. Requests not expressly
discussed in this notice should be considered
denied.

1. One of the results of the March 10 amend-
ments was that as of September 1, 1971, the
standard would have become a vehicle standard
as well as an equipment standard, i.e., vehicles
manufactured after the effective date would have
had to have equipment conforming to the new-
requirements. The amendments relating to emer-
gency-locking retractore are such, however, that
with normal production tolerances it would be
difficult to manufacture retractors that conform
to the currently applicable requirements so that
they would also conform to the post-September 1
requirements, and vice-versa. This creates an
awkward situation, in which retractors supplied
to vehicle manufacturers for use on September 1
would have to be made on September 1 and not
before.

The vehicle aspect of the standard is therefore
being deleted, and the date on which the
amended requirements become mandatory is post-
poned to January 1, 1972, to coincide with the
effective date of the new Standard No. 208. To
allow for efficient changeover, manufacturers are
permitted to manufacture belts to either the cur-
rent or the amended requirements between
September 1, 1971, and January 1, 1972.

2. With respect to the technical amendments
to the attachment 'hardware requirements in

S4.1(f), American Safety Equipment Corpora-
tion requested that the reference to Standard
No. 210 be omitted, so that anchorage nuts, plates,
and washers would not have to be supplied if
the vehicle has an anchorage that does not re-
quire them. The request has been found reason-
able, and the standard is amended accordingly.

3. The National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration has also evaluated requests by the
American Safety Equipment Corporation con-
cerning the range of occupants that a belt must
adjust to fit, the test buckle release force test
procedure, and the buckle crush resistance test
procedure. The amended adjustment require-
ments (S4.1(g)(l) and (2)) specify more ex-
actly the range of occupants that was intended
by the original standard. The importance of
liaving installed belts of proper length for the
normal range of occupants outweighs, in the
agency's judgment, the effort involved in ascer-
taining vehicle dimensions. The adjustment re-
quirements are therefore not changed. With
respect to the buckle test procedures, the peti-
tioner's requests relating to the clarity of the
buckle release procedure and to the need for an
explanatory diagram to accompany the crush test
are also denied. Although the buckle release
test no longer refers to a method for testing lever
action buckles, the method was little more than
a suggestion and may in some cases have con-
flicted with the intent of the procedure that the
force shall be applied so as to produce maximum
releasing eflfect. The diagram requested to show
the buckle crush procedure is not regarded as
essential to understanding the procedure and has
not been adopted.

4. Although no petition was received directly
relating to the subject, the Swedish Trade Com-
mission, on behalf of the Swedish manufactur-

PART 571; S 209— PRE 7

Effectlva: January 1, 1972
(Exupl OS noted In the RuU)

ers, has expressed uncertainty as to how the
crush test is to be applied to seat belt assemblies
that have a buckle mounted on a rigid or semi-
rigid bracket between the front seats. As de-
scribed by the Commission, one design would
tend to bend downwards under the pressure of
the test device long before the required force of
400 pounds could be reached. In this case, the
buckle will have to be supjwrted from beneath,
just as the conventional lap belt has to have some
rigid backing in order to reach the 400-pound
level. It is anticipated that if additional ques-
tions are raised concerning the method of force
application to specific buckles, such questions can
be answered through administrative interpreta-
tion.

5. Several petitions questioned the need to
test a vehicle-sensitive emergency-locking re-
tractor by accelerating it "in three directions
normal to each other with its central axis
oriented horizontally". The pendulum device
used in most vehicle-sensitive retractors can sense
lateral accelerations and sense the tilt of the
vehicle, but it cannot readily sense upward or
downward accelerations of the type required by
the three-direction test when the retractor is
oriented horizontally. It was suggested by
Volvo that a retractor that locks when tilted to
35° in any direction should be exempt from the
acceleration requirement. Volkswagen recom-
mended accelerating the retractor in the hori-
zontal plane in two directions normal to each
other. On reconsideration, the National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration has concluded
that it is appropriate to relieve such a retractor
from the vertical acceleration requirement when
it is oriented horizontally and to establish an
alternative to the requirement that it lock when
accelerated in directions out of the horizontal
plane, but that accelerations within the hori-
zontal plane should continue to be required.

Accordingly, S5.2(j) is amended to require a
vehicle-sensitive retractor to be accelerated in the
horizontal plane in two directions normal to
each otlier. During these accelerations, the re-
tractor will be oriented at the angle in which it
is installed in the vehicle. In addition, the re-
tractor must either lock when accelerated in
orientations out of the horizontal as prescribed
in the March 10 rule or lock by gravity when

tilted in any direction to any angle greater than
45°.

6. One petitioner questioned the correctness of
requiring webbing-sensitive retractors to be ac-
celerated in the direction of webbing retraction,
rather than in the direction of webbing with-
drawal. The usage is necessary because under
the test procedures of S5.2(j) it is the retToctor,
and not the webbing, that is accelerated. The
acceleration must be in the direction that will
reel the webbing out of the retractor — i.e., the
direction in which the webbing moves when re-
tracting.

7. An additional question on retractor ac-
celeration levels concerns the distance which a
belt must be withdrawn in determining compli-
ance with the requirement that the retractor shall
not lock at 0.3g or less (S4.3(j) (ii)). The
Hamill Manufacturing Company has requested
an amendment to S4.3(j)(ii) to provide that the
retractor shall not lock before the webbing ex-
tends a short distance at an acceleration of 0.3g.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration recognizes that many retractors may be
velocity-sensitive to some degree as well as
acceleration-sensitive. Although a retractor that
locks at too low a velocity would be an incon-
venience, the NHTSA recognizes that an occu-
pant does not ordinarily accelerate the belt after
an initial pull and that the usual velocity in-
volved in withdrawing the belt is low. On re-
consideration, the NHTSA has therefore decided
to amend S4.3(j)(ii) to provide that the re-
tractor shall not lock before the webbing extends
2 inches at 0.3g.

8. Several petitioners pointed out that the re-
quirements for retractor force specified in
S4.3(j)(iii) and (iv) were not appropriate for
systems in which a single length of webbing is
used to provide both lap and shoulder restraint.
In a typical installation of this sort, the webbing
passes from a floor-mounted retractor up to a
fitting on the B-pillar, then down across the
shoulder to a slip joint on the buckle connector,
and from there back across the lap to an out-
board floor attachment. Although such a system
may provide satisfactory restraint, it cannot
simultaneously exceed a retractive force of 1.5
pounds on the lap belt and have a retractive

PART 671 ; S 209— PRE 8

force on the shoulder belt of between 0.45 and
1.1 pounds, and it would therefore fail to con-
form to the standard as published March 10.

T'pon reconsideration, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration has decided to
amend S4.3(j) by establishing retraction forces
for 3-point systems that employ a single length
of webbing. A new subsection (v) is added that
requires such a system to have a retraction force
falling within the range 0.45 pounds-1.50 pounds,
and (iii) and (iv) are amended so that they do
not apply to retractors in such systems. This
range was suggested by Volkswagen, Volvo, and
Klippan, and is considered to be a reasonable
compromise between the need to i)rovide com-
plete retraction of the belt when not in use and

Efhctiv*: January I, 1973
(Exc*pt at noltd In th« RuU)

the need to limit the force so that it will not be
uncomfortable to occupants.

Effective date: January 1, 1972, except that
seat belt assemblies manufactured on or after
September 1, 1971 and before January 1, 1972,
may conform either to the current requirements
of Standard No. 209 in 49 CFR 571.21 or to the
requirements of Standard No. 209 as amended
by this notice and the notice of March 10, 1971
(36 F.R. 4607).

Issued on August 26, 1971.

Charles H. Hartman
Acting Administrator

36 F.R. 17430
August 31, 1971

PART 571 ; S 209— PRE 9-10

Effeclivs: August 28, 1973

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 209

Seat Belt Assemblies

(Docket No. 73-16; Notice 2)

The purpose of this notice is to amend certain
requirements of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
No. 209 (49 CFR 571.209), Seat heU assemblies,
relating to the width of belt webbing and to the
performance of seat belt retractors. The amend-
ments were proposed in a notice published June
20, 1973 (38 FR 16084).

In the June 20 notice, the agency proposed to
allow the width of those portions of a combina-
tion lap and shoulder belt that do not touch the
occupant to be less than the 1.8 inches formerly
required by the standard. The Chrysler Cor-
poration, in its comment, suggested that nar-
rower webbing should also be permitted for the
type of lap belt that is used by itself. The
agency agrees that a lap belt in combination with
a shoulder belt (known as Type 2 assembly) is
indistinguishable from an independent lap belt
(Type 1 assembly), as far as the width of its
webbing is concerned, and is therefore amending
the standard to permit narrower webbing for
non-contact portions of Type 1 belts as well as
Type 2 belts.

Chrysler also requested narrower webbing for
non-contact portions of children's harnesses
(Type 3 assemblies). In view of the close-fit-
ting design of Type 3 assemblies, the agency has
not found a benefit to be gained from the use
of narrower webbing in tlie few areas of non-
contact. The Type 3 requirements are not being
amended at this time. The American Safety
Equii)ment Corporation requested that the con-
tactability of the webbing with occupants be
determined with a range of occupants. The
agency remains persuaded that the use of a 9.5th
percentile adult male occupant will be sufficient
to insure that the narrower webbing will not
touch any occupant who uses the seat. The

agency therefore declines to adopt American
Safety's suggestion.

The proposed amendment of the emergency-
locking retractor requirements of 84.3 drew sev-
eral comments, not all of them relating to the
parts of S4.3 that were proposed to be changed.
Mercedes Benz requested revision of the require-
ment of S4.3(j)(2) that the retractor must not
lock before tlie webbing extends 2 inches under
an acceleration of 0.3g or les.s. The 0.3g require-
ment had been carried over without change from
the previous version of S4.3 and was thought to
be a reasonable means of preventing retractors
from Ijeing inconveniently sensitive. The
NHTSA does not find sufficient cause at this
time to alter its conclusion concerning the most
approjiriate minimum level and is therefore re-
taining the minimum level of 0.3g.

A second issue raised by Mercedes Benz con-
cerns the treatment under section S4.3(j) of a
retractor having both vehicle sensitive and
webbing sensitive features. It has been the
NHTSA's position that with respect to the maxi-
mum permissible locking level, a dual-action re-
tractor would conform if it met either of the
applicable requirements. Thus, a dual-action
retractor whose webbing-sensitive mechanism
locks within 1 inch at an acceleration of 0.7g
will conform, even though its vehicle-sensitive
mechanism is not capable of locking at its re-
quired level. With respect to the minimum
locking level, however, different considerations
apply. The agency's intent in providing a mini-
mum level below which the i-etractor must not
lock is to enhance the convenience of the .system.
The webbing-sensitive nieclianism that locks be-
low 0.3g would be no less inconvenient if coupled
with a vehicle sensitive mechanism than it would

PART 571; S 209— PRE 11

Eftactiv*: August 28, 1973

be if used by itself. The agency has there-
fore concluded that a dual-action retractor may
conform to the maximum locking acceleration
level of 0.7g (S4.3(j)(l)) with either mech-
anism, but that it must conform to both mini-
mum locking level requirements (S4.3(]')(2)
and (3)).

The tilt angle of 17° proposed as the minimum
locking level for vehicle sensitive retractors was
stated by several comments to be too high. Al-
though there was general agreement as to the
advisability of using a tilt test rather than an
acceleration test, lower tilt angles were suggested,
ranging downward to 11°. After considering
the comments, the NHTSA has concluded that
a moderate downward revision to 15° will pre-
vent retractor lockup in normal road operation
and has adopted that angle in S4.3(i)(3). The
suggestion by Ford and American Motors that
the "retractor drum's central axis" may be diffi-
cult to determine in complicated mechanisms
has been found to have merit and the require-
ment as adopted refers to the orientation at
which the retractor is installed in the vehicle.

The proposed revisions to the minimum re-
traction force requirements for retractors at-
tached to upper torso restraints encountered
several objections, the principal one being that
no one was certain about the meaning of the
proposed requirement that the retractor should
"retract the webbing fully." The quoted lan-
guage had been proposed in response to a peti-
tion by General Motors requesting amendment of
the requirement that the retractor exert a re-
tractive force of not less than 0.45 pound. The
GM petition had requested a force of 0.2 pound,
but the agency's initial intent, as reflected in the
notice, was to grant a potentially greater relief
by deleting reference to a specific minimum
force. It appears from the confusion in the com-
ments that a contrary result might be produced
in some cases, and the agency has fherefore con-
cluded that a simple reduction in the force level
to the level requested by GM is the least com-
plicated and most readily enforceable means of
lowering thfe minimum force level. The sugges-
tion by Ford, that the ability to retract is im-
plicit in the definition of retractor and that no

minimum force level is required, has some merit,
but the agency prefers to retain a measurable
minimum level.

There were several questions of interpretation
concerning the point at which the retraction
force is to be measured. The test procedures
of S5.2 provide that the webbing is to be fully
extended, passing over any hardware or other
material specified for use with the webbing, and
that it is then to be retracted and the retraction
force measured as the lowest force within plus
or minus 2 inches of 75 percent extension. The
procedure is intended to measure the ability of
the retractor to retract the webbing as installed
in the vehicle, and the point of measurement
most consistent with this intent is the most dis-
tant point of the webbing from the retractor.
The NHTSA intends to conduct its measure-
ments in this fashion.

The proposed amendment to S5.2 that would
amend the test procedures to reflect the limita-
tion of the 0.3g acceleration level to webbing-
sensitive retractors was not objected to and is
adopted as proposed.

In consideration of the foregoing, S4.2(a),
S4.3(j), and S5.2(j) of Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard No. 209, 49 CFR §571.209, are
amended. . . .

Effective date: August 28, 1973. The NHTSA
finds it desirable to allow manufacturers to pro-
duce seat belt assemblies under the requirements
as hereby amended (which generally are relaxed
relative to previous requirements) prior to the
effective date of the next phase of Standard No.
208 (49 CFR 571.208). It is therefore found for
good cause shown that an immediate effective
date is in the public interest.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718, 15
U.S.C. 1392, 1407; delegation of authority at 49
CFR 1.51.)

Issued on August 23, 1973.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

38 F.R. 22958
August 28, 1973

PART 571 ; S 209— PRE 12

Effective: Januory 34, 1974

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 209

Seat Belt Assemblies
(Docket No. 73-16; NoHce 4)

This notice amends Standard No. 209, Seat
belt assemblies, 49 CFR 571.209, to reduce the
minimum retraction force i-equired of emergency-
locking retractors attached to lap belts from 1.5
pounds to 0.6 pounds. This amendment to S4.3
(j) (4) responds to a rulemaking petition submit-
ted by Toyo Kogyo.

A notice of proposed rulemaking published
October 2, 1973 (38 F.R. 27303), proposed the
modification because the 1.5-pound force could
prove excessive for occupant comfort, and ex-
perience with the 0.6-pound level in automatic-
locking retractors has been satisfactory. Their
performance at 0.6 pounds does not support an
assertion in one comment to the docket that
degradation of the retractor elements over time
would result in almost total loss of retractive
force. All other comments to the docket were
favorable.

In consideration of the foregoing, S4.3(j)(4)
of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 209. Seat
belt assemblies, 49 CFR 571.209, is amended. . . .

Effective date: January 24, 1974. Because the
amendment relaxes a requirement and creates no
additional burden, it is found for good cause
shown that an effective date earlier than one
hundred eighty days after issuance is in the
public interest.

(Sees. 10.3, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718,
15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on January 18, 1974.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

39 F.R. 2771
January 24, 1974

PART 571; S 209— PRE 13-14

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY

STANDARD NO. 209

Seat Belt Assemblies
(Docket No. 74-9; Notice 7)

ACTION: Final rule; response to petitions for
reconsideration.

SUMMARY: This notice responds to five petitions
for reconsideration and petitions for rulemaking
concerning Standard No. 213, Child Restraint
Systems. In response to the petitions, the agency is
changing the labeling requirements to permit the
use of alternative language, modifying the
minimum radius of curvature requirement for
restraint system surfaces and extending the effec-
tive date of the standard from June 1, 1980, to
January 1, 1981. In addition, several typographical
errors are corrected in Standard No. 209, Seat Belt
Assemblies.

DATES: The amendments are effective on May 1,
1980. The effective date of the standard is changed
from June 1, 1980, to January 1, 1981.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

Vladislav Radovich, Office of Vehicle Standards,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.
20590 (202-426-2264).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December
13, 1979 (44 F.R. 72131) NHTSA published in the
Federal Register a final rule establishing Standard
No. 213, Child Restraint Systems, and making cer-
tain amendments to Standard No. 209, Seat Belt
Assemblies and Anchorages. Subsequently, peti-
tions for reconsideration were timely filed with the
agency by Cosco, General Motors, Juvenile Prod-
ucts Manufacturers Association (JPMA), and
Strolee. Subsequent to the time for filing petitions
for reconsideration, Strolee also filed a petition for
rulemaking to amend the standard. After evaluat-

ing the petitions, the agency has decided to modify,
as fully explained below, some of the requirements
of Standard No. 213. All other requests for
modifications are denied. The agency is also cor-
recting several minor typographical errors in the
text of Standard No. 209.

Labeling

Standard No. 213 requires manufacturers to
place a permanently mounted label on the restraint
to encourage its proper use. General Motors (GM)
petitioned for reconsideration of three of the label-
ing requirements.

Section S5. 5.2(f) of the standard requires each
child restraint to be labeled with the size and
weight ranges of children capable of using the
restraint. In its petition, GM said that the require-
ment could "unnecessarily preclude some children
from using the restraint or suggest use by children
too large for the restraint." GM also commented
that some infant restraints are intended to be used
from birth and thus the lower size and weight
limitation serves no purpose.

In addition, GM said that stating the upper size
limit for infant restraints in terms of seated height
rather than in standing height is a more appro-
priate way to set size limitations for infants. For
example, GM said that an infant with a short torso
and long legs might be precluded from using the
restraint if the limitation is stated in terms of
standing height, while an infant with short legs
and a torso too long for the restraint would be in-
appropriately included among ones who could sup-
posedly use the restraint. GM requested that infant
restraints be allowed to be labeled with an optional
statement limiting use by upper weight and seated
height.

PART 571; S 209-PRE 15

NHTSA agrees that specifying a lower weight
and size limit is unnecessary for an infant carrier
designed to be used from birth and has amended
the standard accordingly. The agency has decided
not to adopt GM's proposal to state the upper size
limit in seating rather than standing height. The
purpose of the label is to provide important in-
structions and warnings in as simple and
understandable terms as possible. Standing height,
rather than seating height, is a measurement
parents are familiar with and which is commonly
measured during pediatric examinations. As GM
pointed out, it is possible to establish a limit based
on standing height which would exclude any infant
whose seating height is too high to properly use the
restraint. Therefore, the agency will continue to
require the upper size limit to be stated in terms of
standing height.

GM also requested that manufacturers be al-
lowed to establish a lower usage limit for restraints
used for older children based on the child's ability
to sit upright rather than on his or her size and
weight. GM said the lower limit "is not as depend-
ent upon the child's size as it is on the child's ability
to hold its head up (sit upright) by itself. This im-
portant capability is achieved at a wide range of
child sizes." NH'TSA agrees that the type of label
GM proposes can clearly inform parents on which
children can safely use a restraint and therefore
will permit use of such a label.

Section S5. 5.2(g) of the standard requires the
use of the word "Warning" preceding the state-
ment that failure to follow the manufacturer's
instructions can lead to injury to a child. GM
requested that the word "Caution" be permitted as
an alternative to "Warning." GM said that since
1975 it has used caution in its labels and owners'
and service manuals as a lead or signal word where
the message conveys instructions to prevent possi-
ble personal injury. GM said that the words caution
and warning are generally accepted as synonymous.

The agency believes that the word "Warning,"
when used in its ordinary dictionary sense, is a
stronger term that conveys a greater sense of
danger than the word "Caution" and thus will em-
phasize the importance of following the specified
instructions. Therefore, the agency will continue
to require the use of the word "Warning."

Section S5.5.2(k) of the standard requires
restraints to be labeled that they are to be used in a

rear-facing position when used with an infant. GM
said that while the requirement is appropriate for
so-called convertible child restraints (restraints
that can be used by infants in a rear-facing position
and by children in a forward-facing position), it is
potentially misleading when used with a restraint
designed exclusively for infants. GM said the cur-
rent label might imply that the restraints can be
used in forward-facing positions with children. GM
recommended that restraints designed only for in-
fants be permitted to have the statement, "Place
this infant restraint in a rear-facing position when
using it in the vehicle." The agency's purpose for
establishing the labeling requirement was to
preclude the apparent widespread misuse of
restraints designed for infants in a forward-facing
rather than rear-facing position. Since GM's
recommended label will accomplish that goal, the
agency is amending the standard to permit its use.

Radius of Curvature

Section S5.2.2.1(c) of the standard requires sur-
faces designed to restrain the forward movement of
a child's torso to be flat or convex with a radius of
curvature of the underlying structure of not less
than 3 inches. Ford Motor Co. objected to the 3-inch
limitation on radius of curvature arguing that
measuring the radius of curvature of the underlying
structure would eliminate designs that have not pro-
duced serious injuries in actual crashes. Ford said
the shield of its 'Tot-Guard has a radius of curvature
from 2.2 to 2.3 inches and it had no evidence of
serious injury being caused by the shield when the
restraint has been properly used.

The purpose of the radius of curvature require-
ment was to prohibit the use of surfaces that might
concentrate impact forces on vulnerable portions
of a child's body. It was not the agency's intent to
prohibit existing designs, such as the Tot-Guard,
which have not produced injuries in actual crashes.
Since a 2-inch radius of curvature should therefore
not produce injury the agency has decided to
change the radius of curvatiu-e requirement from 3
to 2 inches.

Although the standard sets a minimum radius of
curvature for surfaces designed to restrain the for-
ward movement of a chUd, it does not set a
minimum surface area for that surface. Prototypes
of new restraints shown to the agency by some
manufacturers indicate that they are volimtarily
incorporating sufficient surface areas in their

PART 571; S 209-PRE 16

designs. The agency encourages all manufacturers
to use surface areas at least equivalent to those of
the designs used by today's better restraints.

Occupant Excursion

Section S5. 1.3.1 of the standard sets a limit on
the amount of knee excursion experienced by the
test dummy during the simulated crash tests. It
specifies that "at the time of maximum knee
forward excursion the forward rotation of the
dummy's torso from the dummy's initial seating
configuration shall be at least 15° measured in the
saggital plane along the line connecting the
shoulder and hip pivot points."

Ford Motor Co. objected to the requirements
that the dummy's torso rotate at least 15 degrees.
Ford said that it is impossible to measure the 15
degree angle on restraints such as the Tot-Guard
since the test dummy "folds around the shield in
such a manner that there is no 'line' from the
shoulder to the hip point." In addition, restraints,
such as the Tot-Guard, that enclose the lower torso
of the child can conceal the test dummy hip pivot
point.

The agency established Ted the knee excursion
and torso rotation requirements to prevent
manufacturers from controlling the amount of test
dummy head excursion by allowing the test dummy
to submarine excessively during a crash (i.e.,
allowing the test dummy to slide too far downward
underneath the lap belt and forward, legs first). A
review of the agency's testing of child restraints
shows that current designs that comply with the
knee excursion limit do not allow submarining.
Since the knee excursion limit apparently will pro-
vide sufficient protection to prevent submarining,
the agency has decided to drop the torso rotation
requirement. If future testing discloses any prob-
lems with submarining, the agency will act to
establish a new torso rotation requirement as an
additional safeguard.

Head Impact Protection

Section S5.2.3 requires that each child restraint
designed for use by children under 20 pounds have
energy-absorbing material covering "each system
surface which is contactable by the dummy hea.d."
Strolee petitioned the agency to amend this re-
quirement because it would prohibit the use of
unpadded grommets in the child restraint. Strolee
explained that some "manufacturers use grom-

mets to support the fabric portions of a car seat
where the shoulder belt and lap belt penetrate the
upholstery. These grommets retain the fabric in
place and give needed support where the strap
comes through to the front of the unit." Because of
the use of the grommets in positioning the energy-
absorbing padding and belts, the agency does not
want to prohibit their use. However, to ensure that
use of the grommets will not compromise the head
impact protection for the child, the agency will
only allow grommets or other structures that com-
ply with the protrusion limitations specified in sec-
tion S5.2.4. That section prohibits protrusions that
are more than % of an inch high and have a radius
of less than V4 inch. Because this amendment
makes a minor change in the standard to relieve a
restriction, prior notice and a comment period are
deemed unnecessary.

Beit Requirements

Strolee petitioned the agency to amend the re-
quirement that all of the belts used in the child
restraint system must be IV2 inches in width.
Strolee said that straps used in some restraints to
position the upper torso restraints have " 'snaps'
so that the parent may release this positioning belt
conveniently." Strolee argued that such straps
should be exempt from the belt width requirement
since "the snap would release far before any loads
could be experienced."

The agency still believes that any belt that comes
into contact with the child should be of a minimimi
width so as not to concentrate forces on a limited
area of the child. This requirement would reduce
the possibility of injury in instances where the snap
on a positioning strap failed to open. Strolee's peti-
tion is therefore denied.

Strolee has also raised a question about the inter-
pretation of section S5.4.3.3 on belt systems.
Strolee asked whether the section requires a
manufacturer to provide both upper torso belts, a
lap belt and a crotch strap or whether a manufac-
turer can use a "hybrid" system which uses upper
torso belts, a shield, in place of a lap belt, and a
crotch strap. The agency's intent was to allow the
use of hybrid systems. "The agency established the
minimum radius of curvature requirements of sec-
tion S5. 2.2. 1(c) to ensure that any shield used in
place of a lap or other belt would not concentrate
forces on a limited area of the child's body.
NHTSA has amended section S5.4.3.3 to clarify

PART 571; S 209-PRE 17

the agency's intent. Because this is an inter-
pretative amendment, which imposes no new
restrictions, prior notice and a comment period are
deemed unnecessary.

Height Requirements

Strolee asked the agency to reconsider the re-
quirements for seat back surface heights set in sec-
tion S5.2.1.1. Strolee argued that the higher seat
back required by the standard would restrict the
driver's rear vision when the child restraint is
placed in the rear seat.

The final rule established a new seat back height
requirement for restraints recommended for use
by children that weigh more than 40 pounds. To
provide sufficient protection for those children's
heads, the agency required the seat back height to
be 22 inches. The agency explained that the 22-inch
requirement was based on anthropometric data
showing that the seating height of children
weighing 40 or more pounds can exceed 23 inches.
The agency still believes that 22-inch requirement
is necessary for the protection of the largest child
for which the restraint is recommended. NHTSA
notes that child restraints can be designed to ac-
commodate the higher seat backs without allowing
the overall height of the child restraint to unduly
hinder the driver's vision.

Padding

In its petition, JPMA claimed that the standard
"calls for the application of outdated specifica-
tions" for determining the performance of child
restraint padding in a 25-percent compression-
deflection test. A review of the most recent edition
of the American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM) handbook shows that the compression-
deflection test in two of the three ASTM standards
referenced by the agency has not changed. The
third standard (ASTM D1565) referenced by the
agency has been replaced. However, the replace-
ment standard does not contain a 25 percent
compression-deflection test. Therefore, the agency
will continue to use the three ASTM standards
referenced in the December 1979 final rule.

Effective Date

Cosco, Strolee, and the JuvenDe Products
Manufacturers Association (JPMA) petitioned the

agency for an extension of the June 1, 1980, effec-
tive date. They requested that the effective date be
changed to at least January 1, 1981, and Strolee
requested a delay until March 1, 1981. They argued
that the June 1, 1980, effective date does not allow
manufacturers sufficient time to develop, test and
tool new child restraints.

Testing done for the agency has shown that
many of the better child restraint systems cur-
rently on the market can meet the injury criteria
and occupant excursion limitation set by the stand-
ard. Some of those seats would need changes in
their labeling, removal of arm rests and new belt
buckles and padding to meet the standard. Such
relatively minor changes can be made in the time
available before the June 1, 1980, effective date.

Several manufacturers have informed the agency
that they are designing new restraints to meet the
standard. Based on prototypes of those restraints
shown to the agency, NHTSA believes that these
new restraints may be more convenient to use, less
susceptible to misuse and provide a higher overall
level of protection than current restraints. Based
on leadtime information provided by individual
manufacturers and the JPMA, the agency con-
cludes that extending the standard from June 1,
1980, to January 1, 1981, will provide sufficient
leadtime. Providing a year's leadtime is in agree-
ment with the leadtime estimates provided by the
manufacturers as to the time necessary for design
and testing, tooling and buckle redesign.

Compatibility Witli Vehicle Belts

On December 12, 1979, NHTSA held a public
meeting on child transportation safety. At that
meeting, several participants commented about
the difficulty, and in some cases the impossibility,
of securing some child restraint systems with a
vehicle lap belt because the belt will not go aroimd
the restraint. Testing done by the agency during
the development of the recently proposed comfort
and convenience rulemaking also confirms that
problem. The agency reminds child restraint
manufacturers that Standard No. 213, Child
Restraint Systems, requires all chUd restraints to
be capable of being restrained by a vehicle lap belt.

Corrections

In the final rule published on Standard No. 209,
Seat Belt Assemblies, there were a number of

PART 571; S 209-PRE 18

typographical errors, such as listing the lower menters. The standards have therefore been

chest circumference of the 5 percentile female as amended to include that requirement.

36.6 inches rather than the correct figure of 26.6 The principal authors of this notice are Vladislav

inches. Those errors have been corrected. Radovich, Office of Vehicle Safety Standards, and

In addition, the final rules for Standards No. 209 Stephen Oesch, Office of Chief Counsel,

and No. 213 inadvertently did not include a re- Issued on April 23, 1980.

quirement on belt resistance to buckle abrasion. Joan Claybrook

The notice of proposed rulemaking for both stand- Administrator

ards included the belt buckle abrasion require- 45 F.R. 29045

ments, which were not opposed by any of the com- May 1, 1980

PART 571; S 209-PRE 19-20

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY

STANDARD NO. 209

Seat Belt Assemblies
(Docket No. 80-12; Notice 2)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends Safety Standard
No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies, to exempt seat belts
installed in conjunction with automatic restraint
systems from the belt elongation requirements of
the standard. This amendment is based on a peti-
tion for rulemaking submitted by Mercedes-Benz
of North America and follows the publication of a
proposal. The amendment permits manufacturers
to install belt systems incorporating load-limiting
devices which are intended to make further reduc-
tions in head and upper torso injuries during an ac-
cident. Some load-limiting belt systems utilize web-
bing that elongates more than is ciurently allowed
by Standard No. 209. This amendment would per-
mit this and other type systems to exceed the max-
imum elongation allowed by the standard.

DATES:

1981.

This amendment is effective January 12,

ADDRESSES: Any petition for reconsideration
should refer to the docket number and notice
number and be submitted to: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

William Smith, Office of Vehicle Safety Standards,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-2264).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Safety Stand-
ard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies (49 CFR
571.209), specifies performance requirements for
seat belts to be used in motor vehicles. One of these
performance requirements specifies the maximum

amount that the webbing of a belt assembly is per-
mitted to extend or elongate when subjected to
certain specified forces (paragraph S4.2(c)).
Mercedes-Benz of North America petitioned
NHTSA to exempt seat belt assemblies installed in
passenger cars in conjunction with air cushion
restraint systems from the webbing elongation
requirements of the standard. The agency granted
that petition and issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking to amend the standard on August 4,
1980 (45 F.R. 51626).

Mercedes is considering the use of a belt system
that incorporates a load-limiting device. A load-
limiter is a seat belt assembly component or
feature that controls tension on the seat belt and
modulates or limits the force loads that are im-
parted to a restrained vehicle occupant by the belt
assembly during a crash. Load-limiting devices are
intended to reduce head and upper torso injuries
through increased energy management. A load-
limiter can be a separate component of the seat
belt system, such as a torsion bar that allows the
retractor to reel out additional webbing when a
certain designed force level is reached. The load-
limiter can also be a feature of the webbing itself,
such as webbing that will elongate to certain
designed lengths when subjected to particular
force levels. Mercedes is interested in using the lat-
ter type load-limiting system. However, the web-
bing in the Mercedes belt system would elongate
beyond the limits that are currently specified in
Standard No. 209. Mercedes' petition stated that
this type belt system should be allowed in vehicles
equipped with air cushion restraints since the two
systems used in conjunction with one another can
be designed to achieve the maximum reduction in
head injuries and upper-torso injuries.

PART 571; S 209-PRE 21

Although safety belts protect occupants from
life-threatening impacts with the vehicle interior,
the forces necessarily generated by the belts upon
occupants during a crash can result in upper torso
injury. As noted in the notice of proposed rulemak-
ing, data available to the agency indicate that load-
limiting belts can reduce these injuries, as well as
working in combination with an automatic
restraint system to provide protection for impacts
with the vehicle interior. The proposal specified
that both Type 1 (lap belts) and Type 2 (combina-
tion lap and shoulder belts) manual belts having
load-limiting devices and used in conjunction with
automatic restraints would be exempted from the
elongation requirements. Additionally, the pro-
posal specified that such belts would have to be
labeled to clarify that they are intended for use
only in vehicles equipped with automatic restraint
systems.

The proposal limited the use of load-limiting
belts to vehicles equipped with automatic
restraints since there are currently no dynamic
performance requirements or injury criteria for
manual belt systems used alone. There are no re-
quirements to ensure that a load-limiting belt
system would protect vehicle occupants from im-
pacting the steering wheel, instrument panel and
windshield, which would be very likely if the belts
elongated beyond the limits specified in Standard
No. 209. Therefore, the elongation requirements
are necessary to ensure that manual belts used as
the sole restraint system will adequately restrain
vehicle occupants.

Nine comments were submitted in response to
the August 4 proposal, all supporting the exemp-
tion for load-limiting belts. Vehicle manufacturers
stated that the proposed exemption from the
elongation requirements would allow design flex-
ibility and lead to improved occupant restraint
systems.

American Motors Corporation (AMC) stated that
the exemption for load-limiting belts should only
apply to Type 2 manual belts. The company argued
that the only available data relates to the ability of
Type 2 load-limiting belts to reduce certain head
and upper-torso injuries. AMC stated that torso in-
jury is not a function of lap belt loads and that no
similar correlation has been made between lap belt
loads and pelvic fractures. Therefore, the company
believes that the exemption from the elongation re-

quirements for Type 1 belts should be postponed
until specific injury patterns can be correlated with
lap belt loads.

The agency proposed allowing the exemption for
both Type 1 and Type 2 belts in order to give
manufacturers broader design latitude to use load-
limiting features on all belt systems used in con-
junction with automatic restraints. AMC is correct
in its statement that more data are available
regarding the correlation between Type 2 belts and
upper-torso injury than is available regarding load-
limiting features on Type 1 belts. However, com-
ments received from Rolls-Royce Motors stated
that the company has tested manual Type 1 belts
incorporating load-limiting features and found that
better results are obtained under the injury criteria
of Safety Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208) than
with Type 1 belts which must comply with the
elongation requirements. In light of this informa-
tion, and the fact that load-limiting Type 1 belts
would only be allowed in conjunction with auto-
matic restraint systems complying with the injury
criteria of Standard No. 208, the agency has de-
cided to include Type 1 belts in the exemption. This
will allow manufacturers to develop innovative
designs to maximize the protection provided by its
automatic restraint systems. If future data in-
dicate a problem with Type 1 belts that incorporate
load-limiting features, the exemption from the
elongation requirements can be reconsidered by
the agency.

The August 4, 1980, notice proposed to add a
new definition to Standard No. 209 to define "load-
limiter," and limited the exemption from the
elongation requirements to belts incorporating
load-limiters and installed in conjunction with
automatic restraints. Volvo of America Corpora-
tion commented that the definition of "load-
limiter" is very broad and could be interpreted to
include all existing belt webbing. Volvo stated that
the exemption should, therefore, apply to any Type
1 or 2 belt installed in conjunction with an
automatic restraint, and not be limited to load-
limiting belts.

While the agency understands Volvo's point that
the proposed language may be extremely detailed,
we beheve the language is necessary to clarify the
exemption and to avoid confusion for belt manufac-
turers. Safety Standard No. 209 is an equipment
standard rather than a vehicle standard, and each

PART 571; S 209-PRE 22

seat belt assembly must be certified by the belt
manufacturer. The proposed language was intended
to create a clear distinction between belts comply-
ing with elongation requirements of Safety Stand-
ard No. 209 and those that incorporate load-
limiting features that preclude compliance with the
elongation requirements. The proposed language
explained which belt systems must be labeled as
being for use only in vehicles equipped with
automatic restraints. The agency believes this
language, including the definition of "load-
limiter," is necessary at the current time to clarify
the requirements for those persons or manufac-
turers who may not be totally familiar with the
requirements of Safety Standard No. 209. Other-
wise, it would not be clear from the standard why
certain belts are exempted from the elongation re-
quirements of the standard.

In another comment related to this same subject.
General Motors Corporation pointed out that the
proposed labeling requirement for load-limiting
belts could apply to all Type 1 and 2 belts incor-
porating load-limiting features even if all current
209 requirements are met. General Motors stated
that load-limiting belt systems that can, never-
theless, comply with the elongation requirements
of the standard should not be limited in their ap-
plication to vehicles equipped with automatic
restraint systems. The agency agrees with this
argument, and the language is changed in this
amendment accordingly.

General Motors also questioned the need to re-
quire any label at all on load-limiting belts. The
proposal specified that such belts would have to be
permanently marked or labeled to indicate the
assembly may only be installed in vehicles in con-
jimction with an automatic restraint system.
General Motors argued that a label is not
necessary to control the installation of load-
limiting belts in the proper vehicles. Seat belt
manufacturers must currently provide appropriate
installation instructions for its equipment. General
Motors contends that this requirement, coupled
with the fact that replacement belts are generally
ordered and installed by a repair facility, will en-
sure that load-limiting belts are only installed in
vehicles equipped with automatic restraints. The
agency does not agree with this position. As stated
earlier, the agency believes that care must be
taken to distinguish load-limiting belt systems
from other systems. If there is a label on the belt

itself, a person making the installation will be
aware that the belt should only be installed in con-
junction with automatic restraints. This should be
made obvious to the person making the installation
without reference to the installation instructions.
Further, none of the other commenters objected to
the proposed labeling requirement. American
Motors Corporation specifically stated that a label
is necessary.

General Motors is correct in its statement that
this warning will also be provided in the installa-
tion instructions provided by the belt manufac-
turer. Paragraphs S4.1(l) of Safety Standard No.
209 provides, in part, that the installation instruc-
tion sheet provided by the belt manufacturer shall
state whether the assembly is for universal in-
stallation or for installation only in specifically
stated motor vehicles. Therefore, belt manufac-
turers will be required to specify in the installation
instructions that load-limiting belts are only to be
installed in combination with automatic restraint
systems. The agency believes that at the current
time these duplicative warnings, in the instruction
sheet and on a belt label, are a necessary precau-
tion to ensure that load-limiting belts are only in-
stalled in the proper vehicles. After a majority of
vehicles on the road are equipped with automatic
restraints, such labeling may no longer be
necessary.

Volvo of America Corporation commented that
some upper limit on belt elongation may be re-
quired for Type 1 manual belts incorporating load-
limiting featiu-es, although no such limit was
specified in the proposal. Volvo pointed out that
Type 1 belts installed in conjunction with air
cushion restraints will also provide roll-over pro-
tection for vehicle occupants. The company is con-
cerned that if no upper limit on elongation is
specified, such belts may not provide the intended
protection in roll-over accidents.

While the agency agrees that this is a legitimate
concern, it does not believe it is necessary to
specify such an upper limit at the current time. It is
not likely that manufacturers will design load-
limiting belt systems that will elongate appreciably
beyond the limits specified in Standard No. 209.
Presumably, load-limiting belts will be desig^ied to
provide actual restraint in conjunction with the
automatic restraint system, if the vehicle is to com-
ply with the injury criteria of Safety Standard No.

PART 571; S 209-PRE 23

208. If a load-limiting belt design elongates to the
extent that it would provide no protection in roll-
over accidents, it would also not provide any pro-
tection in frontal crashes. Therefore, it is not likely
that manufacturers would permit such extensive
elongation in their systems. Moreover, the forces
generated in frontal crashes are more severe than
those that occur in roll-over accidents, so the
elongation that would occur even with load-
limiting systems would not be as great in roll-over
accidents as in frontal accidents. The agency
believes that manufacturers should be given broad
latitude in the development of load-limiting belt
systems to be used in vehicles equipped with
automatic restraints. In light of these considera-
tions, no upper limit on belt elongation is specified
in this amendment. Manufacturers should be
cognizant of the point made by Volvo, however,
during the development of their systems.

The comments of Renault USA included general
questions regarding automatic seat belts and the
relationship between Safety Standard No. 208 and
Safety Standard No. 209. Some confusion ap-
parently exists regarding paragraph S4.5.3.4 of
Safety Standard No. 208 and agency interpreta-
tions regarding that paragraph. The agency has
stated in the past that only automatic belts that are
installed to meet the frontal crash protection
requirements of S5.1 of Standard No. 208 are ex-
empted from the requirements of Standard No.

209. Yet, the agency has also stated that those por-
tions of Standard No. 209 relating to retractors
are applicable to all automatic belts. Renault finds
these statements inconsistent.

Paragraph S4.5.3.4 of Standard No. 208 is a
general provision which exempts certain automatic
belts, those meeting the injury criteria of the
standard, from the requirements of Standard No.
209. However, paragraph S4. 5.3. 3(a) of Standard
No. 208 specifically provides that automatic belts
shall conform to S7.1 of Standard No. 208, and
that paragraph relates to the performance require-
ments for belt retractors specified in Standard No.
209. It is for this reason that the agency has stated
that all automatic belts must comply with the
retractor requirements, notwithstanding the
general exemption specified in S4.5.3.4.

Renault contends that paragraph S4.5.3.4 is also
inconsistent by its own terms since, Renault
states, an automatic belt system must always com-
ply with the injury criteria of S5.1 of Standard No.
208. This incorrect Paragraph S4.5.3 of Safety
Standard No. 208 specifies that an automatic belt

may be used to meet the crash protection require-
ments of any option under S4 and in place of any
seat belt assembly otherwise required by that op-
tion. Therefore, prior to the effective date of the
automatic restraint requirements of the standard,
automatic belts could be used to satisfy the third
option of section S4— the seat belt option.
Automatic belts installed under the third option
would not be required to comply with the injury
criteria of S5.1, since the injury criteria is only
specified as a requirement under option 1 and op-
tion 2. Manufacturers are permitted, however, to
install automatic belts in satisfaction of either op-
tion 1 or option 2 and to certify to the injury
criteria, if they desire. In summary, automatic
belts installed in passenger cars in compliance with
the injury criteria of Safety Standard No. 208 are
only required to comply with the provisions of
Safety Standard No. 209 relating to retractors.
They are not required to comply with any other
provision in Standard No. 209. Automatic belts in-
stalled in passenger cars that are not certified as
being in compliance with the injury criteria of
Standard No. 208, i.e., those installed under the
third option of the standard, are required to com-
ply with all provisions of Standard No. 209. Manual
seat belts having load-limiters, installed in vehicles
in conjunction with automatic restraints meeting
the injury criteria of Standard No. 208, are re-
quired to comply with all provisions of Standard
No. 209 except the elongation requirements (by
this amendment).

The agency has determined that this amendment
is not a significant regulation under Executive
Order 12221, "Improving Government Regula-
tions," and the Departmental guidelines im-
plementing that Order. Therefore, a regulatory
analysis is not required. The exemption specified in
this amendment provides manufacturers with
broader design alternatives and should have little
if any economic or environmental impact. Conse-
quently, the agency has also determined that a
regulatory evaluation is not required.

The engineer and lawyer primarily responsible
for the development of this rule are William Smith
and Hugh Oates, respectively.

Issued on January 5, 1981.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator
46 F.R. 2618
January 12, 1981

PART 571; S 209-PRE 24

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 209

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Seat Belt Assemblies

[Docket No. 82-15; Notice 2]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The purpose of this notice is to amend
Safety Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies,
which incorporates by reference a number of recom-
mended practices and test procedures developed by
voluntary standards organizations. This amend-
ment updates those references by incorporating the
most recent version of the recommended practices
and procedures. This amendment is intended to
keep the standard in pace with the technological
changes and improvements in the industry.

DATE: This amendment is effective July 30, 1983.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 209, Seat Belt
Assemblies (49 CFR 571.209), specifies perfor-
mance requirements for seat belts used in
passenger cars, trucks, buses and multipurpose
passenger vehicles (both as original and after-
market equipment). Several of the performance re-
quirements of the standard incorporate recom-
mended practices developed by voluntary stan-
dards organizations and associations. In addition,
the standard specifies that certain, long-
established industry test procedures be used in
determining whether the seat belts meet those per-
formance requirements. Because of the lengthy and
technical nature of the recommended practices and
test procedures, the standard incorporates those
specifications by reference rather than setting out
full texts in Standard No. 209.

Since Standard No. 209 was first issued, along
with the incorporated material, some of the
referenced practices and procedures have been

modified in some respects by the standards
organizations, because of technological changes
and advancements. In light of these modifications,
the agency conducted a review of all the materials
incorporated by reference within Standard No. 209
to determine which materials needed to be changed
so that their most recent version is incorporated
in the standard. That review led to the issuance
of a proposal to amend the standard to update all
materials incorporated by reference (47 FR 31712,
July 22, 1982). Interested persons should consult
that notice of proposed rulemaking which sets out
in detail the specific sections of the standard that
include incorporated material, along with the pro-
posed updated version of that material. As noted
in the proposal, the incorporated material was
developed by such voluntary standards associa-
tions as the American Association of Textile
Chemists and Colorists (AATCC), the American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) and the
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE).

Nine comments were submitted to the agency in
response to the notice of proposed rulemaking, all
of which supported the proposed update of
materials incorporated by reference in the stan-
dard. There were only a few recommended changes
in the proposed revisions.

In addition to incorporating the new ASTM cor-
rosion resistance test procedure (paragraph S5.2(a)
of the standard), the agency proposed a minor
change in the procedure. The ASTM procedure
specifies that the seat belt hardware is to be
"suitably cleaned" prior to testing. To clarify the
extent of cleaning necessary, the agency proposed
to specify that any temporary coating placed on the
seat belt hardware shall be removed prior to

PART 571; S209-PRE 25

testing. The pui-pose of the proposed change was
to prevent the use of a coating material on the
hardware during the corrosion resistance test that
would aid the hardware in meeting the require-
ment, but which would not be found on the hard-
ware when it is in actual vehicle use. Coatings
which are applied permanently to the hardware
would not have to be removed. The language pro-
posed was as follows;
"Any surface coating or material not intended for
permanent retention on the metal parts during
service life shall be removed prior to preparation
of the test specimen for testing."
Both Ford Motor Company and the Motor Vehi-
cle Manufacturers Association requested changes
in this language. Ford argued that the phrases "in-
tended for permanent retention" and "during ser-
vice life" are unduly restrictive because some anti-
corrosion coatings are applied to component parts
to inhibit their corrosion during shipment to
assembly plants and are intended to remain on
those parts after assembly of the vehicle and its
delivery to the first retail purchaser. Ford noted
that such oil coatings may, however, disappear
(e.g., dry up) during the service life of the vehicle.
(MVMA's concern appeared to be identical to
Ford's.)

The agency proposed to clarify the cleaning in-
structions in the corrosion test procedure because
a testing laboratory brought a potential problem
to the agency's attention. The laboratory reported
that certain seat belt components had been
delivered to it for corrosion testing which had been
coated with wax. Obviously, such a coating would
preclude a true testing of the components' corro-
sion resistance and the coating would not likely be
present throughout the service life of the vehicle
(and might in fact be removed during vehicle
assembly). While the agency understands the point
raised by Ford and MVMA (that oil coatings are
intended to remain on the components upon
delivery), as Ford pointed out, these coatings will
likely dry up during the service life of the vehicle.
Therefore, it is the agency's opinion that wax, oil
or other coatings that are not permanent should
be removed prior to testing since they can skew the
test results and misrepresent the corrosion
resistance of component parts during actual vehi-
cle use. Consequently, the proposed language is be-
ing maintained in this amendment. It should be
noted, however, that this test requirement is in no
way intended to preclude manufacturers from plac-

ing any coatings, either temporary or permanent,
on their seat belt assembly components.

Section S5.1(e) of Standard No. 209 specifies the
test procedures for measuring the resistance to
light of seat belt assemblies. In May 1980, the
agency proposed to alter the test apparatus used
for these requirements in light of new dacron
materials being used in belt assemblies (45 FR
29102). As a part of that action, the agency pro-
posed to update the one ASTM recommended prac-
tice (E42-64) already incorporated in the standard
and to add a reference to another ASTM practice
(G24-66). The proposal preceding this amendment
noted that the agency is awaiting the completion
of additional testing before taking final action on
the May 1980 proposal and that, if an amendment
were adopted, the agency would incorporate the
most recent version of both the ASTM recom-
mended practices.

Volkswagen of America pointed out that ASTM
G24-66 is not the most recent version of that stan-
dard and cited instead G24-73. The Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association stated that its member
companies had not yet had a chance to evaluate
the new ASTM procedures and indicated that they
could involve significant changes. Both com-
menters requested that a new proposal be issued
before a final amendment involving the resistance
to light requirements is issued. The agency realizes
that the new ASTM procedures may involve
substantial changes in the test procedures and does
intend to issue an additional proposal prior to up-
dating that aspect of the Standard No. 209 test pro-
cedures (pending completion of additional testing,
as noted in the notice of proposed rulemaking).

Two commenters, American Motors Corporation
and Ms. Patricia Hill, pointed out a discrepancy
between the Occupant Weight and Dimension
Charts referenced in S4.1(gX3) of Standai-d No. 209
and in S7.1.3 of Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash
Protection (49 CFR 571.208). The hip breadth (sit-
ting) for the 95th percentile adult male is listed as

16.4 inches in the former and as 16.5 inches in the
latter. To remove this discrepancy, this notice
amends the chart in Standard No. 209 to agree
with the chart in Standard No. 208 (i.e., to read

16.5 inches). (Originally, the chart in Standard No.
208 also listed the hip breadth as 16.4 inches. This
was amended January 8, 1981, to be consistent
with the dimensions of the Part 572 test dummy
(46 FR 2064)).

The American Seat Belt Council noted that a

PART 571; S209-PRE 26

more recent version of AATCC Test Method 30
(30-81), Resistance to Microorganisms, has been
issued than was noted in the proposal (which
referenced 30-79). The agency has reviewed this
latest version and determined that the only dif-
ference between 30-79 and 30-81 is the optional ad-
dition of glucose to the test culture used in Test III.
The agency agrees with this option and therefore
is incorporating AATCC Method 30-81 in this
amendment.

The notice of proposed rulemaking preceding this
amendment also solicited comments, information
and data from the public concerning any current
requirements of Standard No. 209 which possibly
impose a regulatory burden and have a negligible
or inconsequential impact on safety. The agency
solicited this information as part of its regulatory
review of all existing regulations. All comments to
the proposal included suggested changes or revi-
sions to reduce burdens, clarify requirements or to
harmonize Standard No. 209 with European stan-
dards. These comments are currently being re-
viewed by the agency under its Regulatory Reform
program and may lead to additional rulemaking
to reduce or eliminate regulatory burdens imposed
by Standard No. 209. (Persons interested in the
recommended changes should consult comments to
the proposal: Docket 82-15; Notice 1.)

In addition to the amendments discussed earlier,
this notice also amends 49 CFR Part 571.5, Mat-
ter Incorporated by Reference, to list the address
of the American Association of Textile Chemists
and Colorists (AATCC). This amendment will
assist interested parties in obtaining copies of the
AATCC test procedures which are incorporated by
reference in Standard No. 209.

The amendments included in this notice are to
become effective 30 days after the date of this
publication. The Administrator has determined
that there is good cause for an effective date sooner
than 180 days because this amendment only up-
dates material incorporated by reference and
makes no real substantive changes in the standard.
Consequently, the burdens on manufacturers will
in no way be increased.
Executive Order 12291

The agency has evaluated the economic and other
impacts of this final rule and determined that they
are neither major as defined by Executive Order
12291 nor significant as defined by the Department
of Transportation's regulatory policies and pro-
cedures. The final rule only updates references to

recommended practices and test methods already
incorporated by reference in Standard No. 209.
Because the economic and other effects of this pro-
posal are so minimal, a full regulatory evaluation
has not been prepared.
Regulatory Flexibility Act

In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility
Act, the agency has evaluated the effects of this
action on small entities. Based on that evaluation,
I certify that the final rule will not have a signifi-
cant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities. Accordingly, no regulatory flexibili-
ty analysis has been prepared.

Only a few of the vehicle and parts manufac-
turers required to comply with Standard No. 209
are small businesses as defined by the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. Small organizations and govern-
mental jurisdictions which purchase fleets of motor
vehicles would not be significantly affected by the
amendments. The final rule merely updates
references to test methods and recommended prac-
tices incorporated by reference in Standard No.
209. These updates should not impose any costs or
other burdens.

PART 571— FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
STANDARDS

In consideration of the foregoing, the following
amendments are made to Title 49, Chapter V, §
571.209, Seat Belt Assemblies, and § 571.5, Mat-
ter incorporated by reference:
§ 571.209 [Amended]

1. The first sentence of S4.1(f) is revised to read

as follows:

*****

g4 J * * *

(f) Attachment hardware. A seat belt assembly
shall include all hardware necessary for installa-
tion in a motor vehicle in accordance with Society
of Automotive Engineers Recommended Practice
J800c, "Motor Vehicle Seat Belt Installation,"

November 1973. * * *

*****

2. The chart included in S4.1(gX3) is amended so
that the dimension for hip breadth (sitting) for the
95th percentile adult male reads as follows:

S4.1(g) * * *

(3) * * *

Hip breadth (sitting). . . . 12.8 in 16.5 in.

3. The last sentence of S4.1(k) is revised to read

as follows:

*****

S4.1 * * *

PART 571; S209-PRE 27

(k) Installation instructions. * * * The installa-
tion instructions shall state whether the assembly
is for universal installation or for installation on-
ly in specifically stated motor vehicles, and shall
include at least those items specified in SAE
Recommended Practice J800c, "Motor Vehicle Seat

Belt Installations," November 1973.

*****

4. The second sentence of S4.3(aXl) is revised to

read as follows:

*****

S4.3 * * *

(a) Corrosion resistance, (l) * * *
Alternatively, such hardware at or near the floor
shall be protected against corrosion by at least an
electrodeposited coating of nickel, or copper and
nickel with at least a service condition number of
SC2, and other attachment hardware shall be pro-
tected by an electrodeposited coating of nickel, or
copper and nickel with a service condition number
of SCI, in accordance with American Society for
Testing and Materials B456-79, "Standard
Specification for Electrodeposited Coatings of Cop-
per Plus Nickel Plus Chromium and Nickel Plus
Chromium," but such hardware shall not be racked
for electroplating in locations subjected to max-
imum stress.

*****

5. The first sentence of S5.1(b) is revised to read

as follows:

*****

S5.1 * * *

(b) Breaking strength. Webbing from three seat
belt assemblies shall be conditioned in accordance
with paragraph (a) of this section and tested for
breaking strength in a testing machine of capaci-
ty verified to have an error of not more than one
percent in the range of the breaking strength of
the webbing in accordance with American Society
for Testing and Materials E4-79, "Standard
Methods of Load Verification of Testing

Machines."

*****

6. The first sentence of S5.1(f) is revised to read

as follows:

*****

S5.1 * * *

(f) Resistance to microorganisms. Webbing at
least 20 inches or 50 centimeters in length from
three seat belt assemblies shall first be precondi-
tioned in accordance with Appendix A(l) and (2) of
American Association of Textile Chemists and Col-

orists Test Method 30-81, "Fungicides Evaluation
on Textiles; Mildew and Rot Resistance of Tex-
tiles," and then subjected to Test I, "Soil Burial
Test" of that test method.

7. Paragraph (g) of S5.1 is revised to read as
follows:

S5.1 * * *

(g) Colorfastness to crocking. Webbing from three
seat belt assemblies shall be tested by the pro-
cedure specified in American Association of Tex-
tile Chemists and Colorists Standard Test Method
8-181, "Colorfastness to Crocking: AATCC
Crockmeter Method."

8. Paragraph (h) of S5.1 is revised to read as
follows:

55.1 * * *

fh) Colorfastness to staining. Webbing from three
seat belt assemblies shall be tested by the pro-
cedure specified in American Association of Tex-
tile Chemists and Colorists (AATCC) Standard
Test Method 107-1981, "Colorfastness to Water,"
except that the testing shall use (1) distilled water,
(2) the AATCC perspiration tester, (3) a drying time
of four hours, specified in section 7.4 of the AATCC
procedure, and (4) section 9 of the AATCC test pro-
cedures to determine the colorfastness to staining
on the AATCC Chromatic Transference Scale.

9. The first sentence of S5.2(a) is revised and a
new sentence is added after the first sentence so
that the two sentences read as follows:

55.2 Hardware.—

(a) Corrosion Resistance. Three seat belt
assemblies shall be tested in accordance with
American Society for Testing and Materials
B117-73, "Standard Method of Salt Spray (Fog)
Testing." Any surface coating or material not in-
tended for permanent retention on the metal parts
during service life shall be removed prior to
preparation of the test specimens for
testing. * * *

10. The first sentence of S5.2(b) is revised to read
as follows:

S5.2 Hardware.

(b) Temperature resistance. Three seat belt
assemblies having plastic or nonmetallic hardware

PART 571; S209-PRE 28

or having retractors shall be subjected to the con-
ditions prescribed in Procedure D of American
Society for Testing and Materials D756-78, "Stan-
dard Practice for Determination of Weight and
Shape Changes of Plastics under Accelerated Ser-
vice Conditions." * * *

11. The eighth sentence of S5.2(k) is revised to
read as follows:

85.2 * * *

(k) * * * Then, the retractor and webbing shall
be subjected to dust in a chamber similar to one
illustrated in Figure 8 containing about 2 pounds
or 0.9 kilogram of coarse grade dust conforming to
the specification given in Society of Automotive
Engineering Recommended Practice J726, "Air
Cleaner Test Code" Sept. 1979. * * *

In § 571.5, paragraph (bXS) is redesignated (bX6)
and a new paragraph (bX5) is added to read as
follows:

§ 571.5 Matter incorporated by reference.

*****

(b) * * *

(5) Test methods of the American Association of
Textile Chemists and Colorists. They are published
by the American Association of Textile Chemists
and Colorists. Information and copies can be ob-
tained by writing to: American Association of Tex-
tile Chemists and Colorists, Post Office Box 886,
Durham, NC.

(6) * * *

Issued on June 22, 1983

Diane K. Steed,
Acting Administrator.

48 F.R. 30138
June 30, 1983

PART 571; S209-PRE 29-30

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 209

Seat Belt Assemblies
[Docket No. 80-06; Notice 3]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends Safety Standard
No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies, to alter the test
procedure specified under the "resistance to light"
requirements of the standard. This amendment is
intended to establish an equivalent strength test
for both nylon and polyester webbing materials
used in seat belt assemblies. This amendment
changes the test apparatus for polyester fibers by
replacing the currently specified "Corex D" filter
with a chemically strengthened or tempered soda-
lime glass filter. The "Corex D" filter would still be
utilized in testing nylon webbing, since it offers
the best correlation with actual outdoor results
when dealing with nylon webbing material.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 18, 1985.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Under Safe
ty Standard No. 209. Seat Belt Assemblies (49
CFR 571.209), seat belts must pass a "resistance to
light" test (paragraph S4.2(e)). This test measures
the strengfth and durability of the seat belt web-
bing material after exposure to sunlight. The
"resistance to light" test represents an ac-
celerated determination of outdoor exposure or
aging. A rapid form of testing is needed so that
webbing may be certified in accordance with Stan-
dard No. 209 and automotive companies' specifica-
tions prior to shipment.

On May 1, 1980, a Notice of Proposed Rule-
making (45 PR 29102) was issued, proposing an
amendment to the procedure to be used in "resis-
tance to light" tests. The original standard called
for a "Corex D" filter in testing webbing material.
The "Corex D" filter was an adequate test appa-

ratus prior to the introduction of polyester web-
bing material for seat belts. Research had shown
that although the specified test apparatus of a car-
bon arc light source combined with a "Corex D"
filter, in general, was an effective method of simu-
lating the effects of sunlight, it did result in the
emission of certain radiations that were unrepre-
sentative of the actual effects of natural sunlight.
These peculiar radiations, which destroyed polyes-
ter but not nylon fibers, made the "Corex D" test
procedure inappropriate for measuring the "resis-
tance to light" requirements of seat belts contain-
ing polyester webbing material.

The proposed procedure replaced the required
"Corex D" filter with a plain soda-lime glass filter
in an attempt to create a similar, adequate testing
for both nylon and polyester webbing material
used in seat belt assemblies. Responses to that
notice indicated that the proposed plain soda-lime
glass filters were cracking either during the test
cycle, due to the intense heat emitted during the
100 hours of test time, or after the test period,
during the cool down of the equipment.

The Narrow Fabrics Institute, Inc. requested a
delay in the rulemaking process in order to locate
a less heat sensitive substitute. On September 16,
1980, the agency informed the Narrow Fabrics In-
stitute, Inc. that the rulemaking process would be
delayed until the development of a filter more
resistant to thermal shock.

Upon completion of a 2-year search and a 1-year
period of evaluation, the Narrow Fabrics Insti-
tue submitted a revised test apparatus. The im-
proved filter was a chemically strengthened or
tempered soda-lime glass. Testing done by the
agency under Contract No. DTNH-22-83-P-02016
confirmed that the new filter maintained the same

PART571;S209-PRE31

light transmittance characteristics of the un-
treated soda-lime glass filter originally proposed,
but was free of the previous thermal shock prob-
lems. The treated soda-lime glass filter produces
an excellent correlation with actual outdoor
results, for the proper accelerated degradation of
polyester webbing, without the prior breakage dif-
ficulties.

A careful evaluation of data compiled over the
past few years demonstrates that as to nylon web-
bing material, the "Corex D" filter still affords the
best correlation with actual outdoor results. In
light of these various findings, the agency pro-
posed on November 28, 1983 (48 FR 53583) to
amend the test procedure to reflect these results.

Four of the five commenters to the docket sup-
ported the proposed amendment to Standard No.
209. The other commenter, Renault, made two ob-
jections. First, it argued that the carbon arc light
used in Standard No. 209 is unrepresentative of
real use conditions. It urges the use of an xenon
lamp. As stated previously, the use of the carbon
arc light with the appropriate filters produces ex-
cellent correlation with actual outdoors test of the
resistance to light capability of seat belts. The
agency, therefore, does not believe it is necessary
to propose an amendment to allow the use of an
xenon lamp.

Renault also said that Standard No. 209 should
not use different test procedures for different
materials. It recommended that the agency not re-
quire the use of different filters, but instead
specify the transmission band and spectral distri-
bution of the radiation used in the test. Finally,
Renault said that if the agency decides to require a
filter, it should provide a more specific definition
of the filter to be used in the testing. In particular,
Renault asked that the agency specify the wave
length of the light being used.

The agency disagrees with Renault concerning
the use of different filters in the resistance to light
test. The carbon arc test equipment used in the re-
sistance to light test is a well-established test pro-
cedure that has been long used by the motor vehi-
cle and seat belt industries. Tests conducted by
the Narrow Fabrics Institute show that the carbon
arc test equipment, when used with the appropri-
ate filters, produces results comparable to actual
outdoor resistance to light tests. Although the
agency has decided to retain the use of the filters,
it agrees with Renault that the specific charac-
teristics of the new soda-lime filter need to be

more precisely defined. The agency has obtained
information on the transmittance of chemically
strengthened soda-lime glass from the principal
manufacturer of that device. Based on that infor-
mation, the agency is amending the standard to
specify the transmittance of the soda-lime glass to
be used in the resistance to light test of polyester
belts.

Update References

In the November 1983 notice, the agency pro-
posed to update one of the American Society for
Testing and Materials recommended practices in-
corporated by reference in the standard. The pro-
posal to incorporate ASTM G23-81 was not op-
posed by the commenters and is therefore
adopted.

PART 571 -[AMENDED]

In consideration of the foregoing, paragraph
S5.1(e) of Safety Standard No. 209, Seat Belt
Assemblies (49 CFR 571.209), is amended by re-
vising paragraph (e) to read as follows:
§571.209 Standard No. 209; seat belt assemblies.

S5.1 * * •

(e) Resistance to Light Webbing at least 20
inches or 50 centimeters in length from three seat
belt assemblies shall be suspended vertically on
the inside of the specimen rack in a Type E carbon-
arc light-exposure apparatus described in Stan-
dard Practice for Operating Light-Exposure Appa-
ratus (Carbon-Arc Type) With and Without Water
for Exposure of Nonmetallic Materials, ASTM
Designation: G23-81, published by the American
Society for Testing and Materials, except that the
filter used for 100 percent polyester yarns shall be
chemically strengthened soda-lime glass with a
transmittance of less than 5 percent for wave
lengths equal to or less than 305 nanometers and
90 percent or greater transmittance for wave
lengths of 375 to 800 nanameters. The apparatus
shall be operated without water spray at an air
temperature of 60 ± 2 degrees Celsius or 140 ±
3.6 degrees Fahrenheit measured at a point 1.0 ±
0.2 inch or 25 ± 5 millimeters outside the speci-
men rack and midway in height. The temperature
sensing element shall be shielded from radiation.
The specimens shall be exposed to light from the
carbon-arc for 100 hours and then conditioned as
prescribed in paragraph (a) of this section. The
colorfastness of the exposed and conditioned speci-
mens shall be determined on the Geometric Gray

PART 571; S209-PRE 32

Scale issued by the American Association of Tex- Issued on August 31, 1984.

tile Chemists and Colorists. The breaking strength
of the specimens shall be determined by the pro-
cedure prescribed in paragraph (b) of this section. Diane K. Steed
The median values for the breaking strengths de- Administrator
termined on exposed and unexposed specimens

shall be used to calculate the percentage of break- 49 FR 36507

ing strength retained. September 18, 1984

PART 571; S 209-PRE 33-34

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 209

Seat Belt Assemblies

(Docket No. 69-23)

S1. Purpose and Scope.

This standard specifies requirements for seat
belt assemblies.

52. Application.

This standard applies to seat belt assemblies for
use in passenger cars, multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks, and buses.

53. Definitions.

"Seat belt assembly" means any strap, webbing,
or similar device designed to secure a person in a
motor vehicle in order to mitigate the results of
any accident, including all necessary buckles and
other fasteners, and all hardware designed for in-
stalling such seat belt assembly in a motor vehicle.

"Pelvic restraint" means a seat belt assembly or
portion thereof intended to restrain movement of
the pelvis.

"Upper torso restraint" means a portion of a
seat belt assembly intended to restrain movement
of the chest and shoulder regions.

"Hardware" means any metal or rigid plastic
part of a seat belt assembly.

"Buckle" means a quick release connector which
fastens a person in a seat belt assembly.

"Attachment hardware" means any or all hard-
ware designed for securing the webbing of a seat
belt assembly to a motor vehicle.

"Adjustment hardware" means any or all hard-
ware designed for adjusting the size of a seat belt
assembly to fit the user, including such hardware
that may be integral with a buckle, attachment
hardware, or retractor.

"Retractor" means a device for storing part or
all of the webbing in a seat belt assembly.

"Nonlocking retractor" means a retractor from
which the webbing is extended to essentially its full
length by a small external force, which provides no
adjustment for assembly length, and which may or

may not be capable of sustaining restraint forces at
maximum webbing extension.

"Automatic-locking retractor" means a retrac-
tor incorporating adjustment hardware by means
of a positive self-locking mechanism which is
capable when locked of withstanding restraint
forces.

"Emergency-locking retractor" means a retrac-
tor incorporating adjustment hardware by means
of a locking mechanism that is activated by vehicle
acceleration, webbing movement relative to the
vehicle, or other automatic action during an
emergency and is capable when locked of with-
standing restraint forces.

"Seat back retainer" means the portion of some
seat belt assemblies designed to restrict forward
movement of a seat back.

"Webbing" means a narrow fabric woven with
continuous filling yarns and finished selvages.

"Strap" means a narrow non-woven material used
in a seat belt assembly in place of webbing.

"Type 1 seat belt assembly" is a lap belt for
pelvic restraint.

"Type 2 seat belt assembly" is a combination of
pelvic and upper-torso restraints.

"Type 2a shoulder belt" is an upper- torso
restraint for use only in conjunction with a lap belt
as a Type 2 seat belt assembly.

"Load-limiter" means a seat belt assembly com-
ponent or feature that controls tension on the seat
belt to modulate the forces that are imparted to oc-
cupants restrained by the belt assembly during a
crash.

S4. Requirements.

34. 1 (a) Single occupancy. A seat belt
assembly shall be designed for use by one, and only
one, person at any one time.

(b) Pelvic restraint. A seat belt assembly shall
provide pelvic restraint whether or not upper torso

PART 571; S 209-1

restraint is provided, and the pelvic restraint shall
be designed to remain on the pelvis under all condi-
tions , including collision or roll-over of the motor
vehicle. Pelvic restraint of a Type 2 seat belt
assembly that can be used without upper torso
restraint shall comply with requirements for Type
1 seat belt assembly in S4.1 to S4.4.

(c) Upper torso restraint. A Type 2 seat belt
assembly shall provide upper-torso restraint
without shifting the pelvic restraint into the
abdominal region. An upper-torso restraint shall
be designed to minimize vertical forces on the
shoulders and spine. Hardware for upper-torso
restraint shall be so designed and located in the
seat belt assembly that the possibility of injury to
the occupant is minimized.

A Type 2a shoulder belt shall comply with
applicable requirements for a Type 2 seat belt
assembly in S4.1 to S4.4, inclusive.

(d) Hardware. All hardware parts which
contact under normal usage a person, clothing, or
webbing shall be free from burrs and sharp edges.

(e) Release. A Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt
assembly shall be provided with a buckle or buckles
readily acccessible to the occupant to permit his
easy and rapid removal from the assembly. Buckle
release mechanism shall be designed to minimize
the possibility of accidental release. A buckle with
release mechanism in the latched position shall
have only one opening in which the tongue can be
inserted on the end of the buckle designed to
receive and latch the tongue.

(f) Attachment hardware. [A seat belt
assembly shall include all hardware necessary for
installation in a motor vehicle in accordance with
Society of Automotive Engineers Recommended
Practice J800c, "Motor Vehicle Seat Belt Installa-
tion," Novemmber 1973. (48 F.R. 30138-June 30,
1983. Effective: July 30, 1983)] However, seat belt
assemblies designed for installation in motor
vehicles equipped with seat belt assembly
anchorages that do not require anchorage nuts,
plates, or washers, need not have such hardware,
but shall have 7/16-20 UNF-2A or 1/2-13
UNC-2A attachment bolts or equivalent hard-
ware. The hardware shall be designed to prevent
attachment bolts and other parts from becoming
disengaged from the vehicle while in service. Rein-
forcing plates or washers furnished for universal
floor installations shall be of steel, free from burrs
and sharp edges on the peripheral edges adjacent
to the vehicle, at least 0.06 inch in thickness and at

least 4 square inches in projected area. The
distance between any edge of the plate and the
edge of the bolt hole shall be at least 0.6 inch. Any
corner shall be rounded to a radius of not less than
0.25 inch or cut so that no corner angle is less than
135° and no side is less than 0.25 inch in length,
(g) Adjustment.

(1) A Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly shall
be capable of adjustment to fit occupants whose
dimensions and weight range from those of a
5th-percentile adult female to those of a 95th-
percentile adult male. The seat belt assembly
shall have either an automatic-locking retractor,
an emergency-locking retractor, or an adjusting
device that is within the reach of the occupant.

(2) A Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly for
use in a vehicle having seats that are adjustable
shall conform to the requirements of S4.1(g) (1)
regardless of seat position. However, if a seat
has a back that is separately adjustable, the
requirements of S4. 1(g) (1) need be met only with
the seat back in the manufacturer's nominal
design riding position.

(3) The adult occupants referred to in S4.1(g) (1)
shall have the following measurements:

5th-percentile

95th-percentile

adult female

adult male

Weight

102 pounds

215 pounds.

E rect sitting height

30.9 inches

38 inches.

Hip breadth (sitting)

.__ 12.8 inches

16.5 inches.

Hip circumference

(sitting)

36.4 inches .

47.2 inches.

Waist circumference

(sitting)

.. 23.6 inches

42.5 inches.

Chest depth

7.5 inches

10.5 inches.

Chest circumference:

(nipple)

30.5 inches

1

(upper)

29.8 inches

> 44.5 inches.

Oower)

26.6 inches

J

(h) Webbing. The ends of webbing in a seat belt
assembly shall be protected or treated to prevent
raveling. The end of webbing in a seat belt
assembly having a metal-to-metal buckle that is
used by the occupant to adjust the size of the
assembly shall not pull out of the adjustment hard-
ware at maximum size adjustment. Provision shall
be made for essentially unimpeded movement of
webbing routed between a seat back and seat
cushion and attached to a retractor located behind
the seat.

(Rev. 6/30/83)

PART 571; S 209-2

(i) Strap. A strap used in a seat belt assembly
to sustain restraint forces shall comply with the
requirements for webbing in S4.2, and if the strap
is made from a rigid material, it shall comply with
applicable requirements in S4.2, S4.3 and S4.4.

(j) Marking. Each seat belt assembly shall be
permanently and legibly marked or labeled with
year of manufacture, model, and name or
trademark of manufacturer or distributor, or of
importer if manufactured outside the United
States. A model shall consist of a single combina-
tion of webbing having a specific type of fiber
weave and construction, and hardware having a
specific design. Webbings of various colors may
be included under the same model, but webbing of
each color shall comply with the requirements for
webbing in S4.2.

(k) Installation instructions. A seat belt
assembly or retractor shall be accompanied by an
instruction sheet providing sufficient information
for installing the assembly in a motor vehicle
except for a seat belt assembly installed in a motor
vehicle by an automobile manufacturer. [The
installation instructions shall state whether the
assembly is for universal installation or for installa-
tion only in specifically stated motor vehicles, and
shall include at least those items specified in SAE
Recommended Practice J800c, "Motor Vehicle
Seat Belt Installations," November 1973. (48 F.R.
30138-June 30, 1983. Effective: July 30, 1983)1

(1) Usage and maintenance instructions. A seat
belt assembly or retractor shall be accompanied by
written instructions for the proper use of the
assembly, stressing particularly the importance of
wearing the assembly snugly and properly located
on the body, and on the maintenance of the
assembly and periodic inspection of all com-
ponents. The instructions shall show the proper
manner of threading webbing in the hardware of
seat belt assemblies in which the webbing is not
permanently fastened. Instructions for a non-
locking retractor shall include a caution that the
webbing must be fully extended from the retractor
during use of the seat belt assembly unless the
retractor is attached to the free end of webbing
which is not subjected to any tension during
restraint of an occupant by the assembly. Instruc-
tions for Type 2a shoulder belt shall include a
warning that the shoulder belt is not to be used
without a lap belt.

(m) Workmanship. Seat belt assemblies shall
have good workmanship in accordance with good
commercial practice.

S4.2 Requirements for webbing.

(a) Width. The width of the webbing in a seat
belt assembly shall be not less than 1.8 inches,
except for portions that do not touch a 95th-
percentile adult male with the seat in any adjust-
ment position and the seat back in the manufac-
turer's nominal design riding position when
measured under the conditions prescribed in
S5.1(a).

(b) Breaking strength. The webbing in a seat
belt assembly shall have not less than the following
breaking strength when tested by the procedures
specified in S5.1(b): Type 1 seat belt assembly—
6,000 pounds or 2,720 kilograms; Type 2 seat belt
assembly— 5,000 pounds or 2,270 kilograms for
webbing in pelvic restraint and 4,000 pounds or
1,810 kilograms for webbing in upper-torso
restraint.

(c) Elongation. Except as provided in S4.5, the
webbing in a seat belt assembly shall not be ex-
tended to more than the following elongations
when subjected to the specified forces in accord-
ance with the procedure specified in S5.1(c): Type 1
seat belt assembly— 20 percent at 2,500 pounds or
1,130 kilograms; Type 2 seat belt assembly— 30
percent at 2,500 pounds or 1,130 kilograms for
webbing in pelvic restraint and 40 percent at 2,500
pounds or 1,130 kilograms for webbing in upper-
torso restraint.

(d) Resistance to abrasion. The webbing of a
seat belt assembly, after being subjected to abra-
sion as specified in S5.1(d) or S5.3(c), shall have a
breaking strength of not less than 75 percent of the
breaking strength listed in S4.2(b) for that type of
belt assembly.

(e) Resistance to light. The webbing in a seat
belt assembly after exposure to the light of a car-
bon arc and tested by the procedure specified in
S5.1(e) shall have a breaking strength not less than
60 percent of the strength before exposure to the
carbon arc and shall have a color retention not less
than No. 2 on the Geometric Gray Scale published
by the American Association of Textile Chemists
and Colorists, Post Office Box 886, Durham, N.C.

(f) Resistance to micro-organisms. The web-
bing in a seat belt assembly after being subjected
to micro-organisms and tested by the procedures
specified in S5.1(f) shall have a breaking strength
not less than 85 percent of the strength before
subjection to micro-organisms.

(g) Colorfastness to crocking. The webbing in a
seat belt assembly shall not transfer color to a

(Rev. 6/30f83)

PART 571; S 209-3

crock cloth either wet or dry to a greater degree
than class 3 on the AATCC Chart for Measuring
Transference of Color published by the American
Association of Textile Chemists and Colorists,
when tested by the procedure specified in S5.1(g).
(h) Colorfastness to staining. The webbing in a
seat belt assembly shall not stain to a greater
degree than class 3 on the AATCC Chart for
Measuring Transference of Color published by the
American Association of Textile Chemists and
Colorists, when tested by the procedure specified
in S5.1(h).

S4.3 Requirements for hardware.

(a) Corrosion resistance.

(1) Attachment hardware of a seat belt
assembly after being subjected to the conditions
specified in S5.2(a) shall be free of ferrous cor-
rosion on significant surfaces except for per-
missible ferrous corrosion at peripheral edges or
edges of holes on underfloor reinforcing plates
and washers. [Alternatively, such hardware at
or near the floor shall be protected against corro-
sion by at least an electrodeposited coating of
nickel, or copper and nickel with at least a serv-
ice condition number of SC2, and other attach-
ment hardware shall be protected by an elec-
trodeposited coating of nickel, or copper and
nickel with a service condition number of SCI, in
accordance with American Society for Testing
and Materials B456-79, "Standard Specification
for Electrodeposited Coatings of Copper Plus
Nickel Plus Chromium and Nickel Plus
Chromium," but such hardware shall not be
racked for electroplating in locations subjected
to maximum stress. (48 F.R. 30138— June 30,
1983. Effective: July 30, 1983)1

(2) Surfaces of buckles, retractors and
metallic parts, other than attachment hardware,
of a seat belt assembly after subjection to the
conditions specified in S5.2(a) shall be free of
ferrous or nonferrous corrosion which may be
transferred, either directly or by means of the
webbing, to the occupant or his clothing when
the assembly is worn. After test, buckles shall
conform to applicable requirements in
paragraphs (d) to (g) of this section.

(b) Temperature resistance. Plastic or other
nonmetallic hardware parts of a seat belt assembly
when subjected to the conditions specified in S5.2(b)
shall not warp or otherwise deteriorate to cause the
assembly to operate improperly or fail to comply with
applicable requirements in this section and S4.4.

(c) Attachment hardware.

(1) Eye bolts, shoulder bolts, or other bolts
used to secure the pelvic restraint of a seat belt
assembly to a motor vehicle shall withstand a
force of 9,000 pounds or 4,080 kilograms when
tested by the procedure specified in S5.2(c) (1),
except that attachment bolts of a seat belt
assembly designed for installation in specific
models of motor vehicles in which the ends of
two or more seat belt assemblies can not be
attached to the vehicle by a single bolt shall have
a breaking strength of not less than 5,000 pounds
or 2,270 kilograms.

(2) Other attachment hardware designed to
receive the ends of two seat belt assemblies shall
withstand a tensile force of at least 6,000 pounds
or 2,720 kilograms without fracture of any
section when tested by the procedure specified in
S5.2(c) (2).

(3) A seat belt assembly having single attach-
ment hooks of the quick-disconnect type for
connecting webbing to an eye bolt shall be pro-
vided with a retaining latch or keeper which shall
not move more than 0.08 inch or 2 millimeters in
either the vertical or horizontal direction when
tested by the procedure specified in S5.2(c) (3).

(d) Buckle release.

(1) The buckle of a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt
assembly shall release when a force of not more
than 30 pounds or 14 kilograms is applied.

(2) A buckle designed for pushbutton applica-
tion of buckle release force shall have a minimum
area of 0.7 square inch or 4.5 square centimeters
with a minimum linear dimension of 0.4 inch or
10 millimeters for applying the release force, or a
buckle designed for lever application of a buckle
release force shall permit the insertion of a
cylinder 0.4 inch or 10 millimeters in diameter
and 1.5 inches or 38 millimeters in length to at
least the midpoint of the cylinder along the
cyHnder's entire length in the actuation portion
of the buckle release. A buckle having other
design for release shall have adequate access for
two or more fingers to actuate release.

(3) The buckle of a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt
assembly shall not release under a compressive
force of 400 pounds applied as prescribed in
paragraph S 5. 2(d) (3). The buckle shall be
operable and shall meet the applicable
requirements of paragraph S4.4 after the com-
pressive force has been removed.

(Rev. 7/30/83)

PART 571; S 209-4

(e) Adjustment force. The force required to
decrease the size of a seat belt assembly shall not
exceed 11 pounds or 5 kilograms when measured
by the procedure specified in S5.2(e).

(f) Tilt-lock adjustment. The buckle of a seat
belt assembly having tilt-lock adjustment shall lock
the webbing when tested by the procedure
specified in S5.2(f ) at an angle of not less than 30
degrees between the base of the buckle and the
anchor webbing.

(g) Buckle latch. The buckle latch of a seat belt
assembly when tested by the procedure specified in
S5.2(g) shall not fail, nor gall or wear to an extent
that normal latching and unlatching is impaired,
and a metal-to-metal buckle shall separate when in
any position of partial engagement by a force of
not more than 5 pounds or 2.3 kilograms.

(h) Nonlocking retractor. The webbing of a seat
belt assembly shall extend from a nonlocking retrac-
tor within 0.25 inch or 6 millimeters of maximum
length when a tension is applied as prescribed in
S5.2(h). A nonlocking retractor on upper-torso
restraint shall be attached to the nonadjustable end
of the assembly, the reel of the retractor shall be
easily visible to an occupant while wearing the
assembly, and the maximum retraction force shall
not exceed 1.1 pounds or 0.5 kilogram in any strap
or webbing that contacts the shoulder when
measured by the procedure specified in S5.2(h),
unless the retractor is attached to the free end of
webbing which is not subjected to any tension dur-
ing restraint of an occupant by the assembly.

(i) Automatic-locking retractor. The webbing
of a seat belt assembly equipped with an automatic-
locking retractor, when tested by the procedure
specified in S5.2(i), shall not move more than 1 inch
or 25 millimeters between locking positions of the
retractor, and shall be retracted with a force under
zero acceleration of not less than 0.6 pound or 0.27
kilogram when attached to pelvic restraint, and
not less than 0.45 pound or 0.2 kilogram nor more
than 1.1 pounds or 0.5 kilogram in any strap or
webbing that contacts the shoulder of an occupant
when the retractor is attached to upper-torso
restraint. An automatic-locking retractor attached
to upper-torso restraint shall not increase the
restraint on the occupant of the seat belt assembly
during use in a vehicle traveling over rough roads
as prescribed in S5.2(i).

(j) Emergency-locking retractor. An
emergency-locking retractor of a Type 1 or Type 2

seat belt assembly, when tested in accordance with
the procedures specified in paragraph S5.2(j)—

(1) Shall lock before the webbing extends 1
inch when the retractor is subjected to an
acceleration of 0.7g;

(2) Shall not lock, if the retractor is sensitive
to webbing withdrawal, before the webbing
extends 2 inches when the retractor is subjected
to an acceleration of 0.3g or less;

(3) Shall not lock, if the retractor is sensitive
to vehicle acceleration, when the retractor is
rotated in any direction to any angle of 15° or
less from its orientation in the vehicle;

(4) Shall exert a retroactive force of at least
0.6 pound under zero acceleration when attached
only to the pelvic restraint;

(5) Shall exert a retractive force of not less
than 0.2 pound and not more than 1.1 pounds
under zero acceleration when attached only to an
upper-torso restraint;

(6) Shall exert a retractive force of not less
than 0.2 pound and not more than 1.5 pounds
under zero acceleration when attached to a strap
or webbing that restrains both the upper torso
and the pelvis.

(k) Performance of retractor. A retractor used
on a seat belt assembly after subjection to the tests
specified in S5.2(k) shall comply with applicable
requirements in paragraphs (h) to (j) of this section
and S4.4, except that the retraction force shall be
not less than 50 percent of its original retraction
force.

S4.4 Requirements for assembly performance.

(a) Type 1 seat belt assembly. Except as pro-
vided in S4.5, the complete seat belt assembly in-
cluding webbing, straps, buckles, adjustment and
attachment hardware, and retractors shall comply
with the following requirements when tested by
the procedures specified in S5.3(a):

(1) The assembly loop shall withstand a force
of not less than 5,000 pounds or 2,270 kilograms;
that is, each structural component of the
assembly shall withstand a force of not less than
2,500 pounds or 1,130 kilograms.

(2) The assembly loop shall extend not more
than 7 inches or 18 centimeters when subjected
to a force of 5,000 pounds or 2,270 kilograms;
that is, the length of the assembly between
anchorages shall not increase more than 14
inches or 36 centimeters.

PART 571; S 209-5

(3) Any webbing cut by the hardware during
test shall have a breaking strength at the cut of
not less than 4,200 pounds or 1,910 kilograms.

(4) Complete fracture through any solid
section of metal attachment hardware shall not
occur during test.

(b) Type 2 seat belt assembly. Except as pro-
vided in S4.5, the components of a Type 2 seat belt
assembly including webbing, straps, buckles, ad-
justment and attachment hardware, and retractors
shall comply with the following requirements when
tested by the procedure specified in S5.3(b):

(1) The structural components in the pelvic
restraint shall withstand a force of not less than
2,500 pounds or 1,139 kilograms.

(2) The structural components in the upper
torso restraint shall withstand a force of not less
than 1,500 pounds or 680 kilograms.

(3) The structural components in the assembly
that are common to pelvic and upper torso
restraints shall withstand a force of not less than
3,000 pounds or 1,360 kilograms.

(4) The length of the pelvic restraint between
anchorages shall not increase more than 20
inches or 50 centimeters when subjected to a
force of 2,500 pounds or 1,130 kilograms.

(5) The length of the upper torso restraint
between anchorages shall not increase more
than 20 inches or 50 centimeters when subjected
to a force of 1,500 pounds or 680 kilograms.

(6) Any webbing cut by the hardware during
test shall have a breaking strength of not less
than 3,500 pounds or 1,590 kilograms at a cut in
webbing of the pelvic restraint, or not less than
2,800 pounds or 1,270 kilograms at a cut in
webbing of the upper-torso restraint.

(7) Complete fracture through any solid
section of metal attachment hardware shall not
occur during test.

S4.5 Load-limiter.

(a) A Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly vhat in-
cludes a load-limiter is not required to comply with
the elongation requirements of S4.2(c), S4.4(a) (2),
S4.4(b) (4) or S4.4(b) (5).

(b) A Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly that in-
cludes a load-limiter and that does not comply with
the elongation requirements of this standard may
be installed in motor vehicles only in conjunction
v/ith an automatic restraint system as part of a
total occupant restraint system.

(c) In addition to the marking requirements
specified in S4.1(k), a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt
assembly that includes a load-limiter and that does
not comply with the elongation requirements of
this standard shall be permanently and legibly
marked or labeled with the following words:

"This seat belt assembly may only be installed in
vehicles in combination with an automatic
restraint system such as an air cushion or an
automatic belt."

S4.6 Manual belts subject to crash protection
requirements of Standard No. 208.

(a) A seat belt assembly subject to the re-
quirements of S4.6.1 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR
Part 571.208) does not have to meet the re-
quirements of S4.2 (a)-(c) and S4.4 of this standard.

[(b) A seat belt assembly that meets the re-
quirements of 4.6.1 of Standard No. 208 of this part
(§ 571.208) shall be permanently and legibly marked
or labeled with the following statement:

"This dynamically-tested seat belt assembly is
for use only in (insert specific seating position(s),
e.g., "front right") in (insert specific vehicle
make(s), and model(s))." (51 F.R. 31765— September
5, 1986. Effective: September 5, 1986)1

This seat belt assembly may only be installed at a
front outboard designated seating position of a
vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000
pounds or less.

S5. Demonstration Procedures.

S5.1 Webbing.

(a) Width. The width of webbing from three
seat belt assemblies shall be measured after con-
ditioning for at least 24 hours in an atmosphere
having relative humidity between 48 and 67 per-
cent and a temperature of 23° ±2° or 73.4° ±3.6°.
The tension during measurement of width shall be
not more than 5 pounds or 2 kilograms on webbing
from a Type 1 or Type 3 seat belt assembly, and
2,200 ± 100 pounds or 1,000 ±50 kilograms on web-
bing from a Type 2 seat belt assembly. The width
of webbing from a Type 2 seat belt assembly may
be measured during the breaking strength test
described in paragraph (b) of this section.

(b) Breaking strength. Webbing from three
seat belt assemblies shall be conditioned in ac-
cordance with paragraph (a) of this section and
tested for breaking strength in a testing machine
of capacity verified to have an error of not more
than one percent in the range of the breaking
strength of the webbing in accordance with
American Society for Testing and Materials
E4-79, "Standard Methods of Load Verification of
Testing Machines."

(Rev. 9/5/86)

PART 571; S 209-6

t- 1

r-- :z-t

i -— WEBBING

A
B

1 TO 2 INCHES OR 2.5 TO 5 CENTIMETERS
A MINUS 0.06 INCH 0.15 CENTIMETER

FIGURE 1

The machine shall be equipped with split drum
grips illustrated in Figure 1, having a diameter
between 2 and 4 inches or 5 and 10 centimeters.
The rate of grip separation shall be between 2 and
4 inches per minute or 5 and 10 centimeters per
minute. The distance between the centers of the
grips at the start of the test shall be between 4 and
10 inches or 10 and 25 centimeters. After placing
the specimen in the grips, the webbing shall be
stretched continuously at a uniform rate to failure.
Each value shall be not less than the applicable
breaking strength requirement in S4.2(b), but the
median value shall be used for determining the
retention of breaking strength in paragraphs (d),
(e), and (f ) of this section.

(c) Elongation. Elongation shall be measured
during the breaking strength test described in
paragraph (b) of this section by the following
procedure: A preload between 44 and 55 pounds or
20 and 25 kilograms shall be placed on the webbing
mounted in the grips of the testing machine and
the needle points of an extensometer, in which the
points remain parallel during test, are inserted in
the center of the specimen. Initially the points shall
be set at a known distance apart between 4 and 8
inches or 10 and 20 centimeters. When the force on
the webbing reaches the value specified in S4.2(c),
the increase in separation of the points of the
extensometer shall be measured and the percent
elongation shall be calculated to the nearest 0.5
percent. Each value shall be not more than the
appropriate elongation requirement in S4.2(c).

(d) Resistance to abrasion. The webbing from
three seat belt assemblies shall be tested for
resistance to abrasion by rubbing over the hexagon
bar prescribed in Figure 2 in the following manner:

A- WEBBING

B —WEIGHT

C - HEXAGONAL ROD

STEEL -SAE 51416

ROCKWELL HARDNESS- B-97 TO B-101

SURFACE — COLD DRAWN FINISH

SIZE -0.250 - 0.001 INCH OR
6.35 -^ 003 MILLIMETER

RADIUS ON EDGES -0.020 t 0.004 INCH OR
0.5 -*- 0.1 MILLIMETER
D — DRUM DIAMETER— 16 INCHES OR

40 CENTIMETERS
E- CRANK
F — CRANK ARM
G- ANGLE BETWEEN WEBBING - 85 - 2 DEGS.

FIGURE 2

PART 571; S 209-7

The webbing shall be mounted in the apparatus
shown schematically in Figure 2. One end of the
webbing (A) shall be attached to a weight (B) which
has a mass of 5.2 ±0.1 pounds or 2.35 ±0.05 kilo-
grams, except that a mass of 3.3 ±0.1 pounds or
1.50 ±0.05 kilograms shall be used for webbing in
pelvic and upper- torso restraints of a belt assembly
used in a child restraint system. The webbing shall
be passed over the two new abrading edges of the
hexagon bar (C) and the other end attached to an
oscillating drum (D) which has a stroke of 13 inches
or 33 centimeters. Suitable guides shall be used to
prevent movement of the webbing along the axis of
hexagonal bar C. Drum D shall be oscillated for
5,000 strokes or 2,500 cycles at a rate of 60 ±2
strokes per minute or 30 ± 1 cycles per minute. The
abraded webbing shall be conditioned as prescribed
in paragraph (a) of this section and tested for
breaking strength by the procedure described in
paragraph (b) of this section. The median values
for the breaking strengths determined on abraded
and unabraded specimens shall be used to calculate
the percentage of braking strength retained.

(e) Resistance to light. [Webbing at least 20
inches or 50 centimeters in length from three seat
belt assemblies shall be suspended vertically on the
inside of the specimen rack in a Type E carbon-arc
light-exposure apparatus described in Standard
Practice for Operating Light-Exposure Apparatus
(Carbon-Arc Type) With and Without Water for
Exposure of Nonmetallic Materials, ASTM
Designation: G23-81, published by the American
Society for Testing and Materials, except that the
filter used for 100 percent polyester yams shall be
chemically strengthened soda-lime glass with a
transmittance of less than 5 percent for wave
lengths equal to or less than 305 nanometers and
90 percent or greater transmittance for wave
lengths of 375 to 800 nanometers. The apparatus
shall be operated without water spray at an air
temperature of 60° ±2 degrees Celsius or
140° ±3.6 degrees Fahrenheit measured at a point
1.0±0.2 inch or 25±5 millimeters outside the
specimen rack and midway in height. The
temperature sensing element shall be shielded
from radiation. The specimens shall be exposed to
light from the carbon arc for 100 hours and then
conditioned as prescribed in paragraph (a) of this
section. The colorfastness of the exposed and con-
ditioned specimens shall be determined on the
Geometric Gray Scale issued by the American
Association of Textile Chemists and Colorists. The
breaking strength of the specimens shall be deter-

mined by the procedure prescribed in paragraph (b)
of this section. The median values for the breaking
strengths determined on exposed and unexposed
specimens shall be used to calculate the percentage
of breaking strength retained. (49 F.R.
36507-September 18, 1984. Effective: September
18, 1985)1

(f) Resistance to micro-organisms. Webbing at
least 20 inches or 50 centimeters in length from
three seat belt assemblies shall first be precondi-
tioned in accordance with Appendix A(l) and (2) of
American Association of Textile Chemists and Col-
orists Test Method 30-81, "Fungicides Evaluation
on Textiles; Mildew and Rot Resistance of Tex-
tiles," and then subjected to Test I, "Soil Burial
Test" of that test method. After soil-burial for a
period of 2 weeks, the specimen shall be washed in
water, dried and conditioned as prescribed in
paragraph (a) of this section. The breaking
strengths of the specimens shall be determined
by the procedure prescribed in paragraph (b) of
thissection. The median values for the breaking
strengths determined on exposed and unexposed
specimens shall be used to calculate the percentage
of breaking strength retained.

Note.— This test shall not be required on webbing
made from material which is inherently resistant
to micro-organisms.

(g) Colorfastness to crocking. Webbing from
three seat belt assemblies shall be tested by the
procedure specified in American Association of
Textile Chemists and Colorists Standard Test
Method 8—181, "Colorfastness to Crocking:
AATCC Crockmeter Method."

(h) Colorfastness to staining. Webbing from
three seat belt assemblies shall be tested by the
procedure specified in American Association of
Textile Chemists and Colorists (AATCC) Standard
Test Method 107-1981, "Colorfastness to Water,"
except that the testing shall use (1) distilled water,
(2) the AATCC perspiration tester, (3) a drying
time of four hours, specified in section 7.4 of the
AATCC procedure, and (4) section 9 of the AATCC
test procedures to determine the colorfastness to
staining on the AATCC Chromatic Transference
Scale.

S5.2 Hardware.

(a) Corrosion resistance. Three seat belt
assemblies shall be tested in accordance with
American Society for Testing and Materials

(Rev. 9/18/84)

PART 571; S 209-8

Bl 17-73, "Standard Method of Salt Spray (Fog)
Testing." Any surface coating or material not in-
tended for permanent retention on the metal parts
during service life shall be removed prior to
preparation of the test specimens for testing. The
period of test shall be 50 hours for all attachment
hardware at or near the floor, consisting of two
periods of 24 hours exposure to salt spray followed
by 1 hour drying and 25 hours for all other hard-
ware, consisting of one period of 24 hours exposure
to salt spray followed by 1 hour drying. In the salt
spray test chamber, the parts from the three
assemblies shall be oriented differently, selecting
those orientations most likely to develop corrosion
on the larger areas. At the end of test, the seat belt
assembly shall be washed thoroughly with water to
remove the salt. After drying for at least 24 hours
under standard laboratory conditions specified in
S5.1(a) attachment hardware shall be examined for
ferrous corrosion on significant surfaces, that is,
all surfaces that can be contacted by a sphere 0.75
inch or 2 centimeters in diameter, and other hard-
ware shall be examined for ferrous and nonferrous
corrosion which may be transferred, either directly
or by means of the webbing, to a person or his
clothing during use of a seat belt assembly incor-
porating the hardware.

Note.— When attachment and other hardware are
permanently fastened, by sewing or other means, to

FULL THREADED BOLT

ATTACHMENT HARDWARE

OR

SIMULATED FIXTURE

SHOULDER BOLT
EYE BOLT

A- 2 FULL THREADS
B- >0 4 INCH (ICM)

— BELT SECTIONS

OR
OTHER CONNECTION

BOLT ANCHORAGE

-20 NF OR
I/2-I3NC
THREADS

the same piece of webbing, separate assemblies shall
be used to test the two types of hardware. The test
for corrosion resistance shall not be required for at-
tachment hardware made from corrosion-resistant
steel containing at least 11.5 percent chromium or
for attachment hardware protected with an electro-
deposited coating of nickel, or copper and nickel, as
prescribed in S4.3(a). The assembly that has been
used to test the corrosion resistance of the buckle
shall be used to measure adjustment force, tilt-lock
adjustment, and buckle latch in paragraphs (e), (f)
and (g), respectively, of this section, assembly per-
formance in S5.3 and buckle release force in para-
graph (d) of this section.

(b) Temperature resistance. Three seat belt
assemblies having plastic or nonmetallic hardware
or having retractors shall be subjected to the condi-
tions prescribed in Procedure D of American So-
ciety for Testing and Materials D756-78, "Stand-
ard Practice for Determination of Weight and
Shape Changes of Plastics under Accelerated
Service Conditions." The dimension and weight
measurement shall be omitted. Buckles shall be
unlatched and retractors shall be fully retracted
during conditioning. The hardware parts after con-
ditioning shall be used for all applicable tests in
S4.3 and S4.4.

(c) Attachment hardware.

(1) Attachment bolts used to secure the pelvic
restraint of a seat belt assembly to a motor ve-
hicle shall be tested in a manner similar to that
shown in Figure 3. The load shall be applied at an
angle of 45 degrees to the axis of the bolt
through attachment hardware from the seat belt
assembly, or through a special fixture which
simulates the loading applied by the attachment
hardware. The attachment hardware or simulated
fixture shall be fastened by the bolt to the anchor-

FORCE VERTICAL

HORIZONTAL

FORCE VERTICAL

i

FORCE
HORIZONTAL

FIGURE 3

FIXTURE

FIGURE 4

SINGLE ATTACHMENT HOOK

77777777777777

(Rav. 9/18/84)

PART 571; S 209-9

age shown in Figure 3, which has a standard II
16-20 UNF-2B or 1/2-13 UNC-2B threaded
hole in a hardened steel plate at least 0.4 inch or
1 centimeter in thickness. The bolt shall be in-
stalled with two full threads exposed from the
fully seated position. The appropriate force re-
quired by S4.3(c) shall be applied. A bolt from
each of three seat belt assemblies shall be tested.

(2) Attachment hardware, other than bolts,
designed to receive the ends of two seat belt
assemblies shall be subjected to a tensile force of
6,000 pounds or 2,720 kilograms in a manner
simulating use. The hardware shall be examined
for fracture after the force is released. Attach-
ment hardware from three seat belt assemblies
shall be tested.

(3) Single attachment hook for connecting
webbing to any eye bolt shall be tested in the
following manner: The hook shall be held rigidly
so that the retainer latch or keeper, with cotter
pin or other locking device in place, is in a
horizontal position as shown in Figure 4. A force
of 150 ±2 pounds or 68 ± 1 kilograms shall be ap-
plied vertically as near as possible to the free end
of the retainer latch, and the movement of the
latch by this force at the point of application shall
be measured. The vertical force shall be released,
and a force of 150 ± 2 pounds or 68 ± 1 kilograms
shall be applied horizontally as near as possible
to the free end of the retainer latch. The move-
ment of the latch by this force at the point of load
application shall be measured. Alternatively, the
hook may be held in other positions, provided the
forces are applied and the movements of the
latch are measured at the points indicated in
Figure 4. A single attachment hook from each of
three seat belt assemblies shall be tested.

(d) Buckle release.

(1) Three seat belt assemblies shall be tested
to determine compliance with the maximum
bucklp release force requirements, following the
assembly test in S5.3. After subjection to the
force applicable for the assembly being tested,
the force shall be reduced and maintained at 150
pounds on the assembly loop of a Type 1 seat belt
assembly, 75 pounds on the components of a
Type 2 seat belt assembly, or 45 pounds on a
Type 3 seat belt assembly. The buckle release
force shall be measured by applying a force on
the buckle in a manner and direction typical of
those which would be employed by a seat belt oc-
cupant. For pushbutton-release buckles, the

force shall be applied at least 0.125 inch from the
edge of the push-button access opening of the
buckle in a direction that produces maximum
releasing effect. For lever-release buckles, the
force shall be applied on the centerline of the
buckle level or finger tab in a direction that pro-
duces maximum releasing effect.

(2) The area for application of release force on
pushbutton actuated buckle shall be measured to
the nearest 0.05 square inch or 0.3 square cen-
timeter. The cylinder specified in S4.3(d) shall be
inserted in the actuation portion of a lever

•release buckle for determination of compliance
with the requirement. A buckle with other
release actuation shall be examined for access of
release by fingers.

(3) The buckle of a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt
assembly shall be subjected to a compressive
force of 400 pounds applied anywhere on a test
line that is coincident with the centerline of the
belt extended through the buckle or on any line
that extends over the center of the release
mechanism and intersects the extended
centerline of the belt at an angle of 60°. The load
shall be applied by using a curved cylindrical bar
having a cross section diameter of 0.75 inch and
a radius of curvature of 6 inches, placed with its
longitudinal centerline along the test line and its
center directly above the point on the buckle to
which the load will be applied. The buckle shall be
latched, and a tensile force of 75 pounds shall be
applied to the connected webbing during the ap-
plication of the compressive force. Buckles from
three seat belt assemblies shall be tested to
determine compliance with paragraph S4.3(d) (3).

(e) Adjustment force. Three seat belt assemblies
shall be tested for adjustment force on the webbing
at the buckle, or other manual adjusting device
normally used to adjust the size of the assembly.
With no load on the anchor end, the webbing shall
be drawn through the adjusting device at a rate of
20 ± 2 inches per minute or 50 ± 5 centimeters per
minute and the maximum force shall be measured
to the nearest 0.25 pound or 0.1 kilogram after the
first 1.0 inch or 25 millimeters of webbing move-
ment. The webbing shall be precycled 10 times
prior to measurement.

(f ) Tilt-lock adjustment. This test shall be made
on buckles or other manual adjusting devices hav-
ing tilt-lock adjustment normally used to adjust the
size of the assembly. Three buckles or devices shall
be tested. The base of the adjustment mechanism

PART 571; S 209-10

and the anchor end of the webbing shall be oriented
in planes normal to each other. The webbing shall be
drawn through the adjustment mechanism in a direc-
tion to increase belt length at a rate of 20 ± 2 inches
per minute or 50 ± 5 centimeters per minute while the
plane of the base is slowly rotated in a direction to
lock the webbing. Rotation shall be stopped when the
webbing locks, but the pull on the webbing shall be
continued until there is a resistance of at least 20
pounds or 9 kilograms. The locking angle between
the anchor end of the webbing and the base of the ad-
justment mechanism shall be measured to the
nearest degree. The webbing shall be precycled 10
times prior to measurement.

(g) Buckle latch. The buckles from three seat belt
assemblies shall be opened fully and closed at least
10 times. [Then the buckles shall be clamped or
firmly held against a flat surface so as to permit
normal movement of buckle parts, but with the
metal mating plate (metal-to-metal buckles) or
webbing end (metal-to-webbing buckles) with-
drawnfrom the buckle. (45 F.R. 29045-May 1,
1980. Effective: 5/1/80)1 The release mechanism
shall be moved 200 times through the maximum
possible travel against its stop with a force of 30 ± 3
pounds or 14 ± 1 kilograms at a rate not to exceed
30 cycles per minute. The buckle shall be examined
to determine compliance with the performance re-
quirements of S4.3(g). A metal-to-metal buckle
shall be examined to determine whether partial
engagement is possible by means of any technique
representative of actual use. If partial engagement
is possible, the maximum force of separation when
in such partial engagement shall be determined.

(h) Nonlocking retractor. After the retractor is
cycled 10 times by full extension and retraction of
the webbing, the retractor and webbing shall be
suspended vertically and a force of 4 pounds or 1.8
kilograms shall be applied to extend the webbing
from the retractor. The force shall be reduced to 3
pounds or 1.4 kilograms when attached to a pelvic
restraint, or to 1.1 pounds or 0.5 kilogram per
strap or webbing that contacts the shoulder of an
occupant when retractor is attached to an upper-
torso restraint. The residual extension of the web-
bing shall be measured by manual rotation of the
retractor drum or by disengaging the retraction
mechanism. Measurements shall be made on three
retractors. The location of the retractor attached
to upper-torso restraint shall be examined for
visibility of reel during use of seat belt assembly in
a vehicle.

Note.— This test shall not be required on a nonlock-
ing retractor attached to the free-end of webbing
which is not subjected to any tension during restraint
of an occupant by the assembly.

(i) Automatic-locking retractor. Three retrac-
tors shall be tested in a manner to permit the re-
traction force to be determined exclusive of the
gravitational forces on hardware or webbing being
retracted. The webbing shall be fully extended
from the retractor. While the webbing is being re-
tracted, the average force of retraction within plus
or minus 2 inches or 5 centimeters of 75 percent
extension (25-percent retraction) shall be deter-
mined and the webbing movement between adja-
cent locking segments shall be measured in the
same region of extension. A seat belt assembly
with automatic locking retractor in upper torso
restraint shall be tested in a vehicle in a manner
prescribed by the installation and usage instruc-
tions. The retraction force on the occupant of the
seat belt assembly shall be determined before and
after traveling for 10 minutes at a speed of 15
miles per hour or 24 kilometers per hour or more
over a rough road (e.g., Belgian block road) where
the occupant is subjected to displacement with re-
spect to the vehicle in both horizontal and vertical
directions. Measurements shall be made with the
vehicle stopped and the occupant in the normal
seated position.

(j) Emergency-locking retractor. A retractor
shall be tested in a manner that permits the retrac-
tion force to be determined exclusive of the gravi-
tational forces on hardware or webbing being re-
tracted. The webbing shall be fully extended from
the retractor, passing over or through any hard-
ware or other material specified in the installation
instructions. While the webbing is being retracted,
the lowest force of retraction within plus or minus
2 inches of 75 percent extension shall be deter-
mined. A retractor that is sensitive to webbing
withdrawal shall be subjected to an acceleration of
0.3g within a period of 50 milliseconds while the
webbing is at 75-percent extension, to determine
compliance with S4.3(j) (2). The retractor shall be
subjected to an acceleration of 0.7g within a period
of 50 milliseconds, while the webbing is at
75-percent extension, and the webbing movement
before locking shall be measured under the follow-
ing conditions: For a retractor sensitive to web-
bing withdrawal, the retractor shall be accelerated
in the direction of webbing retraction while the
retractor drum's central axis is oriented horizon-
tally and at angles of 45°, 90°, 135°, and 180° to
the horizontal plane. For a retractor sensitive to
vehicle acceleration, the retractor shall be—

(R«v. 5/1/80)

PART 571; S 209-11

(1) accelerated in the horizontal plane in two
directions normal to each other, while the retrac-
tor drum's central axis is oriented at the angle at
which it is installed in the vehicle; and,

(2) accelerated in three directions normal to
each other while the retractor drum's central
axis is oriented at angles of 45°, 90°, 135° and
180° from the angle at which it is installed in the
vehicle, unless the retractor locks by gravita-
tional force when tilted in any direction to any
angle greater than 45° from the angle at which it
is installed in the vehicle.

(k) Performance of retractor. After completion
of the corrosion-resistance test described in para-
graph (a) of this section, the webbing shall be fully
extended and allowed to dry for at least 24 hours
under standard laboratory conditions specified in
S5.1(a). (Then, the retractor and webbing shall be
subjected to dust in a chamber similar to one il-
lustrated in Figure 8 containing about 2 pounds or
0.9 kilogram of coarse grade dust conforming to
the specification given in Society of Automotive
Engineering Recommended Practice J726, "Air
Cleaner Test Code" Sept. 1979. (48 F.R. 30138-
June 30, 1983. Effective: July 30, 1983)1 The web-
bing shall be withdrawn manually and allowed to
retract for 25 cycles. The retractor shall be
mounted in an apparatus capable of extending the
webbing fully, applying a force of 20 pounds or 9
kilograms at full extension, and allowing the web-
bing to retract freely and completely. The webbing
shall be withdrawn from the retractor and allowed
to retract repeatedly in this apparatus until 2,500
cycles are completed. The retractor and webbing
shall then be subjected to the temperature
resistance test prescribed in paragraph (b) of this
section. The retractor shall be subjected to 2,500
additional cycles of webbing withdrawal and
retraction. Then, the retractor and webbing shall
be subjected to dust in a chamber similar to one il-
lustrated in Figure 6 containing about 2 pounds or
0.9 kilogram of coarse grade dust conforming to
the specification given in SAE Recommended
Practice, Air Cleaner Test Code-SAE J726a,
published by the Society of Automotive Engineers.
The dust shall be agitated every 20 minutes for 5
seconds by compressed air, free of oil and
moisture, at a gauge pressure of 80 + 8 pounds per
square inch or 5.6 ±0.6 kilograms per square cen-
timeter entering through an orifice 0.060 ±0.004
inch or 1.5 ±0.1 millimeters in diameter. The web-

bing shall be extended to the top of the cham-
ber and kept exended at all times except that the
webbing shall be subjected to 10 cycles of com-
plete retraction and extension within 1 to 2
minutes after each agitation of the dust. At the
end of 5 hours, the assembly shall be removed
from the chamber. The webbing shall be fully
withdrawn from the retractor manually and al-
lowed to retract completely for 25 cycles. An
automatic-locking retractor or a nonlocking re-
tractor attached to pelvic restraint shall be sub-
jected to 5,000 additional cycles of webbing
withdrawal and retraction. An emergency-locking
retractor or a nonlocking retractor attached to
upper-torso restraint shall be subjected to 45,000
additional cycles of webbing withdrawal and
retraction between 50 and 100 percent extension.
The locking mechanism of an emergency-lock-

RETRACTOR

CYCLING ATTACHMENT

DUST
COLLECTOR

RETRACTOR

20 INCHES OR
50 CENTIMETERS

10 INCHES OR
25 CENTIMETERS

DUST

VALVE a FILTER
• AIR

FIGURE 6

(Rev. 7/30/83)

PART 571; S 209-12

ing retractor shall be actuated at least 10,000
times within 50 to 100 percent extension of web-
bing during the 50,000 cycles. At the end of test,
compliance of the retractors with applicable re-
quirements in S4.3(h), (i), and (j) shall be deter-
mined. Three retractors shall be tested for per-
formance.

S5.3 Assembly Performance.

(a) Type 1 seat belt assembly. Three complete
seat belt assemblies, including webbing, straps,
buckles, adjustment and attachment hardware,
and retractors, arranged in the form of a loop as
shown in Figure 5, shall be tested in the following
manner:

(1) The testing machine shall conform to the
requirements specified in S5.1(b). A double-roller
block shall be attached to one head of the testing
machine. This block shall consist of 2 rollers 4
inches or 10 centimeters in diameter and suffi-
ciently long so that no part of the seat belt
assembly touches parts of the block other than
the rollers during test. The rollers shall be
mounted on anti-friction bearings and spaced 12
inches or 30 centimeters between centers, and
shall have sufficient capacity so that there is no
brinelling, bending or other distortion of parts
which may affect the results. An anchorage bar
shall be fastened to the other head of the testing
machine.

(2) The attachment hardware furnished with
the seat belt assembly shall be attached to the
anchorage bar. The anchor points shall be spaced
so that the webbing is parallel in the two sides of
the loop. The attaching bolts shall be parallel to,
or at an angle of 45 or 90 degrees to the webbing,
whichever results in an angle nearest to 90 de-
grees between webbing and attachment hard-
ware except that eye bolts shall be vertical, and
attaching bolts or nonthreaded anchorages of a
seat belt assembly designed for use in specific
models of motor vehicles shall be installed to pro-
duce the maximum angle in use indicated by the
installation instructions, utilizing special fixtures
if necessary to simulate installation in the motor
vehicle. Rigid adapters between anchorage bar
and attachment hardware shall be used if neces-
sary to locate and orient the adjustment hard-
ware. The adapters shall have a flat support face
perpendicular to the threaded hole for the attach-
ing bolt and adequate in area to provide full sup-

port for the base of the attachment hardware
connected to the webbing. If necessary, a washer
shall be used under a swivel plate or other attach-
ment hardware to prevent the webbing from
being damaged as the attaching bolt is tightened.
(3) The length of the assembly loop from at-
taching bolt to attaching bolt shall be adjusted to
about 51 inches or 130 centimeters, or as near
thereto as possible. A force of 55 pounds or 25
kilograms shall be applied to the loop to remove
any slack in webbing at hardware. The force
shall be removed and the heads of the testing
machine shall be adjusted for an assembly loop
between 48 and 50 inches or 122 and 127 centi-
meters in length. The length of the assembly loop
shall then be adjusted by applying a force be-
tween 20 and 22 pounds or 9 and 10 kilograms to
the free end of the webbing at the buckle, or by
the retraction force of an automatic-locking or
emergency-locking retractor. A seat belt assem-

-RIGID SPACER
(IF NEEDED)

ANCHORAGE
BAR

A- 2 INCHES OR
5 CENTIMETERS

B- 12 INCHES OR
30 CENTIMETERS

FIGURE 5

PART 571; S 209-13

bly that cannot be adjusted to this length shall be
adjusted as closely as possible. An automatic-
locking or emergency-locking retractor when in-
cluded in a seat belt assembly shall be locked at
the start of the test with a tension on the web-
bing slightly in excess of the retractive force in
order to keep the retractor locked. The buckle
shall be in a location so that it does not touch the
rollers during test, but to facilitate making the
buckle release test in S5.2(d) the buckle should be
between the rollers or near a roller in one leg.

(4) The heads of the testing machine shall be
separated at a rate between 2 and 4 inches per
minute or 5 and 10 centimeters per minute until
a force of 5,000 ±50 pounds or 2,270 ±20 kilo-
grams is applied to the assembly loop. The exten-
sion of the loop shall be determined from meas-
urements of head separation before and after the
force is applied. The force shall be decreased to
150 ±10 pounds or 68 ±4 kilograms and the
buckle release force measured as prescribed in
S5.2(d).

(5) After the buckle is released, the webbing
shall be examined for cutting by the hardware. If
the yarns are partially or completely severed in a
line for a distance of 10 percent or more of the
webbing width, the cut webbing shall be tested
for breaking strength as specified in S5.1(b) lo-
cating the cut in the free length between grips. If
there is insufficient webbing on either side of the
cut to make such a test for breaking strength,
another seat belt assembly shall be used with the
webbing repositioned in the hardware. A tensile
force of 2,500±25 pounds or 1,135± 10 kilograms
shall be applied to the components or a force of
5,000 ± 50 pounds or 2,270 ± 20 kilograms shall be
applied to an assembly loop. After the force is re-
moved, the breaking strength of the cut webbing
shall be determined as prescribed above.

(6) If a Type 1 seat belt assembly includes an
automatic-locking retractor or an emergency-
locking retractor, the webbing and retractor
shall be subjected to a tensile force of 2,500 ±25
pounds or 1,135 ± 10 kilograms with the webbing
fully extended from the retractor.

(7) If a seat belt assembly has a buckle in
which the tongue is capable of inverted insertion,
one of the three assemblies shall be tested with
the tongue inverted.

(b) Type 2 seat belt assembly. Components of
three seat belt assemblies shall be tested in the
following manner:

(1) The pelvic restraint between anchorages
shall be adjusted to a length between 48 and 50
inches or 122 and 127 centimeters, or as near
this length as possible if the design of the pelvic
restraint does not permit its adjustment to this
length. An automatic-locking or emergency-lock-
ing retractor when included in a seat belt assem-
bly shall be locked at the start of the test with a
tension on the webbing slightly in excess of the
retractive force in order to keep the retractor
locked. The attachment hardware shall be ori-
ented to the webbing as specified in paragraph
(a) (2) of this section and illustrated in Figure 5.
A tensile force of 2,500±25 pounds or 1,135±10
kilograms shall be applied on the components in
any convenient manner and the extension be-
tween anchorages under this force shall be meas-
ured. The force shall be reduced to 75 ±5 pounds

SHORTENING STROKE

BUCKLE (C)

HINGE STOP (E

- WEBBING (A)

3 LB. WEIGHT (B)

NO TENSION

BUCKLE (C)

WEBBING (A)

LENGTHENING STROKE

NO TENSION

HINGE STOP (E)

3 LB. WEIGHT (B)

PART 571; S 209-14

or 34 ± 2 kilograms and the buckle release force
measured as prescribed in S5.2(d).

(2) The components of the upper-torso restraint
shall be subjected to a tensile force of 1,500 ± 15
pounds or 680 ±5 kilograms following the proce-
dure prescribed above for testing pelvic restraint
and the extension between anchorages under this
force shall be measured. If the testing apparatus
permits, the pelvic and upper-torso restraints
may be tested simultaneously. The force shall be
reduced to 75 ±5 pounds or 34 ±2 kilograms and
the buckle release force measured as prescribed
in S5.2(d).

(3) Any component of the seat belt assembly
common to both pelvic and upper-torso restraint
shall be subjected to a tensile force of 3,000 ±30
pounds or 1,360 ± 15 kilograms.

(4) After the buckle is released in tests of
pelvic and upper-torso restraints, the webbing
shall be examined for cutting by the hardware. If
the yams are partially or completely severed in a
line for a distance of 10 percent or more of the
webbing width, the cut webbing shall be tested
for breaking strength as specified in S5.1(b)
locating the cut in the free length between grips.
If there is insufficient webbing on either side of
the cut to make such a test for breaking
strength, another seat belt assembly shall be
used with the webbing repositioned in the hard-
ware. The force applied shall be 2,500 ±25
pounds or 1,135 ±10 kilograms for components
of pelvic restraint, and 1,500±15 pounds or
680 ± 5 kilograms for components of upper-torso
restraint. After the force is removed, the break-
ing strength of the cut webbing shall be deter-
mined as prescribed above.

(5) If a Type 2 seat belt assembly includes an
automatic-locking retractor or an emergency-
locking retractor, the webbing and retractor
shall be subjected to a tensile force of 2,500 ±25
pounds or 1,1 35 ± 10 kilograms with the webbing
fully extended from the retractor, or to a tensile
force of 1,500 ±15 pounds or 680 ±5 kilograms
with the webbing fully extended from the retrac-
tor if the design of the assembly permits only
upper-torso restraint forces on the retractor.

(6) If a seat belt assembly has a buckle in
which the tongue is capable of inverted insertion,
one of the three assemblies shall be tested with
the tongue inverted.

(c) Resistance to buckle abrasion. Seatbelt
assemblies shall be tested for resistance to abrasion
by each buckle or manual adjusting device normally
used to adjust the size of the assembly. The webbing
of the assembly to be used in this test shall be ex-
posed for 4 hours to an atmosphere having relative
humidity of 65 percent and temperature of 70° F.
The webbing shall be pulled back and forth through
the buckle or manual adjusting device as shown
schematically in Figure 7. The anchor end of the
webbing (A) shall be attached to a weight (B) of 3
pounds. The webbing shall pass through the buckle
(C), and the other end (D) shall be attached to a
reciprocating device so that the webbing forms an
angle of 8° with the hinge stop (E). The
reciprocating device shall be operated for 2,500
cycles at a rate of 18 cycles per minute with a stroke
length of 8 inches. The abraded webbing shall be
tested for breaking strength by the procedure
described in paragraph S5.1(b).

44 F.R. 72131
December 13, 1979

.^US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1985-461-816/10265

PART 571; S 209-15-16

Efftctlvt: January 1, 1972

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 210

Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages — Passenger Cars, Multipurpose
Passenger Vehicles, Trucks and Buses

(Docket No. 2-14; Notice No. 4)

An amendment to Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard Xo. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchor-
ages, was published on October 1, 1970 (35 F.R.
15293). Thereafter, pursuant to §553.35 of the
procedural rules (49 CFR 553.35, 35 F.R. 5119),
petitions for reconsideration were filed by Rolls
Royce, Ltd., International Harvester Co., Chrys-
ler Corp., Ford Motor Co., General Motors
Corp., the Automobile Manufacturers Associa-
tion, Toyota Motor Co., Ltd., American Motors,
Jeep Corp., Chrysler United Kingdom, Ltd., and
Checker Motors Corp.

In response to information contained in the
petitions, and other considerations, certain re-
quirements of the standard are hereby amended
and the effective date of the standard with re-
spect to passenger cars is postponed until Janu-
ary 1, 1972. The petitions for relief from cer-
tain other requirements of the standard are
denied.

1. The effective date of the amended standard
with respect to passenger cars was to have been
January 1, 1971. Each petitioner claimed to be
unable to produce vehicles conforming to the
amended standard by that date. Those who pro-
vided lead time information indicated that
several months would be needed, with estimates
ranging from March 31, 1971, for Rolls Royce, to
January 1, 1972, for a number of manufacturers.
A January 1972 effective date would have the ad-
vantage of coinciding with the effective date pro-
posed for the closely related interim standard on
occupant crash protection (Docket 69-7, Notice
6, 35 F.R. 14941). Since the amendments with
respect lo passenger cars are intended primarily
to enhance the enforceability of the standard
rathiT rhiin to provide new levels of safety, it

has been determined that good cause has been
shown for establishing an effective date for pas-
senger cars of January 1, 1972.

With a single exception, the requests for post-
ponement of the effective date of the standard
with respect to multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses, are denied. One of the pri-
mary reasons for amending the standard was to
extend the protection afforded by seat belts to
occupants of these types of vehicles. A post-
ponement of effective date would leave these ve-
hicles completely without anchorage requirements
for an additional 6 months. Although manu-
facturers who have been installing anchorages
may find it necessary to reexamine the strength
and location of their anchorages, this is not con-
sidered a sufficient ground for postponing the
effective date.

International Harvester requested a postpone-
ment until January 1, 1972, in the date on which
upper torso restraint anchorages will be revjuired
on seats other than front seats in multipurpose
passenger vehicles. On consideration of the lead
time difficulties that have been demonstrated by
this manufacturer, the Director regards the re-
quest as reasonable and has decided to grant the
requested postponement.

2. A number of petitions requested reconsid-
eration of the sections dealing with anchorage
location. Section S4.3.1.4 of the standard states
that "Anchorages for an individual seat belt as-
sembly shall be located at least 13.75 inches apart
laterally for outboard seats and at least 6.75
inches apart laterally for other seats."

General Motors stated that several of its ve-
hicles have anchorages for the center seating
position that are 6.50 inches apart, that some of

PART 571; S 210— PRE 1

Effadlv*: Jonuory 1, 1973

the anchorages for outboard seats are less than
13.75 inches apart, and that there is no basis
either for setting a minimum spacing, or for
setting different minimum spacings for different
seating positions. Similar comments were made
by AMA, Chrysler, Ford and American Motors.

As originally issued. Standard No. 210 had re-
quired anchorages to be "as near as practicable,
15 inches apart laterally." To make the stand-
ard more precise and more easily enforceable,
the notice of September 20, 1969 (34 F.R. 14658),
proposed to delete the qualifying language and
to require that anchorages be 15 inches apart
laterally. The comments indicated that anchor-
ages for center seating positions, particularly the
front positions, would require complete reloca-
tion. The available data on the effects of anchor-
age spacing were not regarded as conclusive
enough to justify imposing this burden on the
manufacturers, and the spacing for anchorages
for inboard locations was accordingly reduced
to 6.75 inches in the amended standard. With-
out clearer biomechanical data, the intent was to
adopt the prevailing industry minimum as the
standard. The same rationale applied to out-
board seating position, where the 15-inch spac-
ing was reduced to 13.75 inches.

It now appears that both spacing employed in
the amended standard failed to reflect prevailing
locations. The Director is accordingly amending
section S4.3.1.4 to establish a minimum spacing
of 6.50 inches.

A further problem with the spacing require-
ment arises from the use of "anchorage" as the
reference point for measurement. As long as the
standard used the qualifying language "as near
as practicable," there was no difficulty. Removal
of that phrase by the notice of September 20,
1969, created a problem of interpret9,tion that
escaped comment until after issuance of the
amended standard. Several petitioners com-
mented that they do not know what point to use
for measurement. The director concedes the de-
ficiency, and accordingly amends section S4.3.1.4
to specify that the spacing is "measured between
the vertical centerlines of the bolt holes."

In conjunction with its request for a reduction
of the spacing requirement. General Motors
stated that where structural members betw ^en the

anchorage and the seating position have the ef-
fect of spreading the seat belt loop apart, the
spacing should be measured between the widest
contact points on the structure. Since the
strength of these structural members is not reg-
ulated, there is no assurance that their perform-
ance in a crash will be equal to that of properly
spaced anchorages. The request offers no im-
provement in occupant crash protection, and
may, in fact, diminish such protection. The re-
quest is therefore denied.

3. The amended standard's other location re-
quirements concern the placement of anchorages
to achieve desirable seat belt angles. Sections
S4.3.1.1 and S4.3.1.3 each use the "nearest belt
contact point on the anchorage" as the lower
point defining the line whose angle is to be
measured. Several petitions expressed uncer-
tainty as to the point described, and on recon-
sideration the Director agrees that clarification
is needed.

In the notice of proposed rule making that
preceded the amended standard (34 F.R. 14658,
Sept. 20, 1969) the line had been run to the
"anchorage". This usage lacked precision, as
stated by several comments. In an attempt to
define a line that would closely approximate the
actual belt angle, the language in question was
adopted. The problem lies in the use of the word
"anchorage", since in most installations the belt
does not actually contact the anchorage. The
point intended was, in fact, the nearest contact
point of the belt webbing with the hardware
that attaches it to the anchorage. In the typical
installation, this point would be on an angle plate
bolted to the anchorage. Sections S4.3.1.1 and
S4.3.1.3 are accordingly amended to use the
phrase "the nearest contact point of the belt with
the hardware attaching it to the anchorage."

4. The test procedures of S5.1 and S5.2 were
the subject of several requests for reconsidera-
tion. Most petitioners stated that the test was
not representative of crash conditions, and
several suggested that it should be displaced by
a dynamic test. Times suggested for such a
dynamic test ranged from 0.1 second to 1.0 sec-
ond, and were said to be the tests used by the
petitioners, or by one or another of the interna-
tional standards organizations. The require-
ment for a 10-second hold period at maximum

PART 571 ; S 210— PRE 2

Effxtiv*: January 1, 1972

load attracted the most strongly adverse com-
ment.

From its inception, Standard No. 210 has con-
templated a static test. The notice of proposed
rule making of September 20, 1969, proposed a
test that was clearly static, in that it involved
a slow rate of load application (2 to 4 inches per
minute). In response to comments that the rate
was too slow, and to avoid problems of inter-
pretation as to where the rate of pull was to be
measured, the procedures were amended to
specify the rate of load application in time rather
than distance, with the full load reached in a
period of from 0.1 to 30 seconds. It should be
noted that the vehicle must be capable of meeting
the requirements when tested at any rate within
this range. To insure that the basic strength of
the structure would be measured whatever the
shape of the load application curve, a hold period
of 10 seconds was specified. The procedures of
the amended standard do no more than give more
specific form to the test contemplated in the
original standard.

The postponement of the effective date of the
amended standard will provide additional time
for passenger car manufacturers to assure them-
selves of compliance with the standard. After
consideration of the issues raised in the petitions
for reconsideration, the Director has concluded
that the tests prescribed by the standard are rea-
sonable, practicable, and appropriate for the af-
fected motor vehicles. The petitions for recon-
sideration of sections S5.1 and S5.2 are therefore
denied.

5. Two petitioners. Rolls Royce and General
Motors, stated that it was not practicable to use
the "seat back" in determining the angle of the
torso line in S4.3.2, in that the seat back angle
may vary according to which of its surfaces is
measured. Although there may be instances
where the angle of the seat back is difficult to
determine, questions arising from such instances
can be resolved, if necessary, by administrative
interpretation, and it has been decided to retain
the reference to "seat back" in section S4.3.2.

6. Several petitioners stated that the sub-
stitution of the word "device" for "provision" in
the definition of seat belt anchorage appeared to
change the meaning of that term. No substan-

tive change was intended, and since the reword-
ing has caused some misunderstanding, the Di-
rector has decided to return to the original
wording.

7. General Motors also petitioned to reinstate
the provision in section S4.3.2 that would allow
the upper torso restraint angle to be measured
from the shoulder to the anchorage "or to a
structure between the shoulder point and the
anchorage". The phrase rendered uncertain the
effective angle of the belt under stress. The
quoted language was deleted in the notice of
September 20, 1969, and no sufficient reason has
been given for reinstating it. The request is
therefore denied.

8. Toyota Motor Co. requested that sections
S5.1 and S5.2 be amended to allow use of body
blocks equivalent to those specified. Although
the standard provides that an anchorage must
meet the strength requirements when tested with
the specified blocks, manufacturers may use
whatever methods they wish to ascertain that
their products meet these requirements when so
tested, as long as their methods constitute due
care. If the Toyota procedures are, in fact,
equivalent, there is no need to amend the stand-
ard to accommodate them. The request is there-
fore denied.

In consideration of the foregoing. Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Standard No. 210, in §571.21 of
Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations is
amended. . . .

Effective date. For the reasons given above,
it has been determined that the effective date of
the amended standard shall be January 1, 1972,
for passenger cars. The effective date for multi-
purpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses
shall be July 1, 1971, except that the effective
date for installation of anchorages for upper
torso restraints for seating positions other than
front outboard designated seating positions shall
be January 1, 1972.

Issued on November 20, 1970.

Charles H. Hartman,
Acting Director.

35 F.R. 18116
Nov. 26, 1970

PART 571; S 210— PRE 3-4

Efftctlvc July 1, 1971

Januaiy 1, 1973

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 210

Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages and Seat Belt Installations;
Reconsideration and Amendment

(Docket No. 2-14; Notice No. 4)

The purpose of this notice is to amend Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards No. 208 and 210, with
respect to the installation of shoulder belts in
multipurpose passenger vehicles exceeding 10,000
pounds GVWR and the provision of anchorages
for shoulder belts in vehicles other than passen-
ger cars.

The seat belt installation standard was amended
on September 30, 1970, to require installation of
seat belts in multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses manufactured after July 1,
1971 (35 F.R. 15222). Exemptions from the
requirement for shoulder belt installation were
provided for certain types and weights of ve-
hicles.

During the course of the subsequent rulemak-
ing activity which led to the issuance of the
occupant crash protection standard, it was de-
termined that the larger weight classes of trucks
and multipurpose passenger vehicles should not
be required to install shoulder belts (35 F.R.
14941, 35 F.R. 16937, 36 F.R. 4600). The stand-
ard therefore required lap belts, but not shoulder
belts, for vehicles over 10,000 pounds GVAVR,
effective January 1, 1972. The September 30
amendment, which is to become effective six
months earlier than the occupant crash protection
rule, had provided a similar exemption for large
trucks but not for multipurpose passenger ve-
hicles, with the result that shoulder belts would
have been required for many large multipurpose
passenger vehicles during the period July 1, 1971-
January 1, 1972, but not afterward. To correct
this inconsistency, the seat belt installation stand-
ard is amended, effective July 1, 1971, to exempt
multipurpose passenger vehicles of more than

10,000 pounds GVWR from the shoulder belt
requirement.

In accordance with the foregoing, section S3.1
of Standard No. 208, as published September 30,
1970 (35 F.R. 15222) is amended effective July 1,
1971

Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchor-
ages, presently requires vehicles other than pas-
senger cars to have shoulder belt anchorages
installed at front outboard seating positions by
July 1, 1971, and at rear outboard seating posi-
tions by January 1, 1972 (35 F.R. 15293, 35 F.R.
18116, 36 F.R. 4291). The Recreational Vehicle
Institute has petitioned for an amendment of the
standard, to delete the requirement for shoulder
belt anchorages ai, jwsitions where shoulder belt
installation is not required by Standard No. 208.

It has been found .that this petition has merit.
The probability of shoulder belt installation by
the owners of these vehicles is very small, and
the difficulty of anchorage installation, particu-
larly in multipurpose passenger vehicles, is often
greater than in passenger cars. The amendment
is therefore considered to be in the public interest.

The request by RVI for a postponement of the
July 1, 1971, effective date for installation of
shoulder belt anchorages has not been found jus-
tified, and the petition is in that respect denied.

In accordance with the foregoing, section S4.1.1
of the present Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
No. 210 (effective July 1, 1971), and the amended
Standard No. 210 as published November 26,
1970 (35 F.R, 18116, effective January 1, 1972),
in 49 CFR 571.21, are both amended ....

PART 571; S 210— PRE 5

Ellacriv*: July 1, 1971

January 1, 1972

The effective dates of the amendments made by be unnecessary, and it is found, for good cause

this notice are as indicated above. Because the shown, that an effective date earlier than 180

amendments relieve restrictions and impose no days after^ issuance is in the public interest,
additional burden on any person, notice and re- 36 F.R. 9869

quest for comments on such notice are found to May 29, 1971

PART 571 ; S 210— PRE 6

Effective: May 18, 1978

PREAMBLE TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 210

Seat Belt Anchorages
(Docket No. 72-23; Notice 3)

This notice amends Safety Standard No. 210,
Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, to eliminate the
"buckle cutout" as an optional confitruration of
the body block test device used for testing the
strength of lap-shoulder belt anchorages, and to
clarify the illustration (Figure 2) of body blocks
used for testing lap belt anchorages. The op-
tional configuration is being deleted because it
unnecessarily complicates the test of the anchor-
ages and is no longer being used by manufac-
turers.

Effective Date: May 18, 1978.

For Further Information Contact:
William E. Smith, Division of Crashworthi-
ness, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-2242).

Supplementary' Information : Standard No. 210
(49 CFR 571.210) requires seat belt anchorages
in motor vehicles to comply with specified
strength requirements. The procedure for
strength testing is set forth in paragraph S.5
of the standard. The tests involve the attach-
ment of a seat belt to the anchorage, followed
by the application of force to the seat belt which
is thereby transferred to the anchorage itself.
Force is applied to Type 1 and Type 2 seat belt
assemblies through body blocks that simulate the
human torso. The body blocks arc illustrated in
Figures 2 and 3 of the standard. This notice
modifies Figures 2 and 3 in accordance with the
notice of proposed rulemaking issued Deeember
16,1976 (41 F.R. 54050).

Figure 2 describes the body block used foi- lap
belt anchorage testing, and there has been some
confusion concerning certain minor specifications
in the Figure. This amendment modifies the

drawing in Figure 2 to clarify the description
of the body block. The change does not affect
the substantive re-quirements of the standard in
any way.

Figure 3 describes the body block used for
combination shoulder and lap belt anchorage test-
ing. An optional "buckle cutout" is shown on
the surface of the body block in Figure 3, per-
mitting a manufacturer to make an indentation
in the face of the body block to accommodate
buckle hardware. NHTSA compliance test ex-
perience with the cutout demonstrates that the
edge of the cutout causes additional stress on the
belt webbing and interferes with its movement,
thereby interfering with the test of the under-
lying anchorage. Comments to the proposal
favored deletion of the "buckle cutout" option
since it is disadvantageous to manufacturers and
is no longer being utilized. This amendment,
therefore, deletes the optional cutout fi'om Fig-
ure 3.

General Motors' comment recommended addi-
tional modifications of the drawing in Figure 2.
The agency has determined, however, that the
suggestion to add shading to define the area of
the body block to be covered by foam padding
does not significantly alter the clarity of the
drawing. General Motors also rex^ommended a
substitute test device for the lap-shoulder belt
body block. This recommendation will possibly
be considered in future nilcmaking.

The engineer and lawyer primarily responsible
for the development of this notice are William
Smith and Hugh Oates, respectively.

Since this amendment does not make any sub-
stantive change in the requirements of the stand-
ard, it is found that an immediate effective date
is in the public interest.

PART 571; S 210— PRE 7

Effective: May 18, 1978

In consideration of the foregoing, Standard Issued on May 15, 1978.
No. 210, 49 CFR 571.210, is amended .... joan Claybrook

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (15 Administrator

U.S.C. 1392, 1407); delegation of authority at 43 F.R. 21892

49 CFR 1.50). May 23, 1978

PART 571; S 210— PRE 8

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE STANDARD NO. 210

Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages

(Docket No. 72-23; Notice 5)

Action: Final rule.

Summary: This notice amends Safety Standard
No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, to
eliminate the anchorage location requirements for
passive seat belt assemblies that meet the frontal
crash protection requirements of Safety Standard
No. 208. The purpose of the amendment is to
give manufacturers wider latitude in passive belt
design in order to facilitate the early introduction
of passive restraints in existing passenger car
designs. The amendment will allow manufac-
turers to experiment with various passive belt
designs to help determine the optimum relation-
ship between anchorage location and pa.ssive belt
effectiveness in a variety of crash motles and
their comfort and convenience. Anchorage loca-
tion would still be indirectly controlled by the
necessity for passive belts to comply with the
Standard No. 208 requirements.

Effective date : November 16, 1978.

Addresses: Petitions for reconsideration should
refer to the docket number and notice number
and be submitted to: Docket Section, Room
5108— Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590.

For further information contact :

William Smith, Office of Vehicle Safety
Standards, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Washington, D.C. 20590
(202) 426-2242.

Supplementary informati,on: Safety Standard
No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages (49
CFR 571.210), specifies zones and acceptable
ranges within which seat belt anchorages must
be located to ensure that the anchorages are in
the proper location for effective occupant re-
straint and specifies strength requirements to

reduce the likelihcKxl of their failure in a crash.
In response to a petition from General Motors
(Corporation, the NHTSA issued a proposal to
delete these anchorage location re/]uirements for
passive belt systems that meet the dynamic
frontal crash protection requirements of Safety
Standard No. 208 (48 PR 22419, May 25. 1978).
The proposal noted tiiat (leneral Motors would
like to use a passive belt design whose anchorages,
in some vehicles, would lie outside the parameters
specified in the standard. GM stated that the
anchorage locations of this design are intended
to ensure the comfort and convenience of the
passive belt so that it will not be disconnected by
vehicle users who find current active belts lacking
in these qualities. General Motors wanted to
introduce this passive belt design prior to the
effective date of the passive restraint require-
ments issued July 5. 1977 (42 PR 34289). As
stated in the preamble of the proposal, the agency
has determined manufacturers should be given
wide latitude in passive belt design in order to
facilitate the early introduction of passive .sys-
tems, since they should save many lives and
prevent hundreds to thousands of injuries. Al-
though the current anchorage location require-
ments were developed primarily for active belt
systems, passive belt systems such as the one used
on the Volkswagen Rabbit have successfully com-
plied with the anchorage location requirements
and met the frontal injuiT criteria of Standard
No. 208 as well. Nonetheless, manufacturers have
said they can develop more effective and comfort-
able passive systems to comply with Standard
208. The agency thinks they should be given the
opportunity. Nevertheless, it is the agency's view
that research should be conducted to detennine
the optimum anchorage locations for the various
passive belt designs in terms of both passive belt

PART 571; S 210— PRE 9

effectiveness and of comfort and convenience for
vehicle occupants. Accordingly, the earlier notice
proposed the deletion of the anchorage require-
ments for passive belts until appropriate require-
ments for these systems can be developed and
incorporated in the standard.

Comments in support of the proposed change
were received from Chrysler, British Leyland,
American Motors, Ford, Volkswagen, General
Motors, and the Association Peugeot-Renault.
These commenters argued that manufacturers
should not be restricted in passive belt design, so
that manufacturers can determine which designs
are the most effective and at the same time ac-
ceptable to the public. The Center for Auto
Safety argued against the proposal, however,
stating that elimination of the anchorage location
requirements may degrade available occupant
protection.

The Center for Auto Safety agreed that manu-
facturers should be allowed flexibility in passive
belt design to facilitate the early introduction of
passive restraints. However, it argued that
elimination of the forward boundary for upper
torso belt anchorages may " ( 1 ) seriously degrade
occupant protection available by allowing the
anchorages to be installed in areas likely to be
struck by the occupant in a side impact and (2)
may result in systems that do not sufficiently re-
strain the occupant from submarining or moving
laterally under the belt." The Center's first con-
cern is that side-impact head injuries will in-
crease if passive belt retractors, buckles, and
other hardware are permitted in areas likely to
be struck by the occupant's head in a side colli-
sion. The comment noted that vehicles equipped
with passive belts are not required to meet the
lateral impact requirements of Standard No. 208
and that manufacturers would, therefore, have
no incentive to design anchorages and other hard-
ware to avoid injuries in non-frontal collisions.

The Center's second concern is that elimination
of the anchorage location requirements will allow
passive belt designs that lead to more lateral
occupant movement and "submarining" in side
crashes, thereby increasing side impact injuries.
The Center also argued that it should be the
responsibility of General Motors to demonstrate
the safety consequences of moving passive belt
anchorages outside the current range require-

ments, before the agency eliminates the require-
ments for passive belts. Finally, the Center is
concerned that once the exemption is allowed, it
might be years before new location requirements
for passive belts are specified.

Regarding the Center's first concern, the pres-
ent requirements do not prohibit the placement
of hardware in areas where they could be struck
by an occupant's head in a side collision. "Wliile
manufacturers may not be constrained by present
standards from placing hardware where it poses
a danger to occupants in side impacts, all manu-
facturers are on notice that the agency is prepar-
ing to propose a side impact standard as
delineated in the agency's rulemaking plan. Thus,
in anticipation of the upgraded side impact re-
quirements, manufacturers should design their
passive belt systems in such a way that they will
not compromise side impact protection.

The Center's concern about the potential for
increased lateral movement and submarining in
side crashes was not supported by any data. The
NHTSA is also concerned about side impact in-
juries. However, the existing location require-
ments for belt anchorages were not specifically
designed to address the problem of lateral occu-
pant motion in non-frontal collisions where the
occupant is restrained by a single, diagonal
passive upper torso restraint used with a knee
bolster.

The notice of proposed rulemaking explicitly
stated that the NHTSA intends to issue separate
anchorage location requirements for passive belts
following research to determine the optimum
locations for passive belt effectiveness, comfort
and convenience, and that the proposed exemp-
tion from the current requirements is only an
interim measure. The NHTSA intends to con-
duct studies to look at the change in injury data
resulting from displacement of the upper anchor-
age point of a single diagonal belt for various
sizes of occupants. The research program in-
cludes testing that will investigate the "sub-
marining" problem and, during frontal oblique
impact simulations, the likelihood of excessive
lateral movement. The agency will consider
simulated side impact testing during this research
program to evaluate potential degradation of
occupant protection in this crash mode. The
agency will also consider anchorage location dur-

PART 571; S 210— PRE 10

ing the upgrading of side impact protection re-
quirements. As stated in the recent "Five Year
Rulemaking Plan," the improvement of occupant
protection in side impacts is one of the NHTSA's
highest priorities.

The Center's suggestion that GM demonstrate
the safety consequences of passive belt anchorages
should be addressed by the NHTSA's intention
to look with great care at manufacturers' com-
pliance testing of all passive belt designs to assure
that these new systems will, in fact, provide at
least the level of overall protecticm now afforded
by conventional restraint systems.

Finally, regarding the Center's concern that
new location requirements for passive belt an-
chorages will not be specified for many years, the
notice of proposed rulemaking and this notice
make it clear that the exemption is only an in-
terim measure to allow improvements in paasive
belt designs. It is consistent, however, with the
attempt to make FMVSS 208 a performance
standard to the greatest extent possible. Never-
theless, should any manufacturer produce passive
belt hardware or systems that cause or exacerbate
injuries that would not occur with active systems
currently in production, the NHTSA's safety
defect authority would permit the agency to in-
vestigate such systems for possible reeall and cor-
rection. Manufacturers are hereby put on notice
of that fact.

In summary, the NHTSA has concluded that
manufacturers should be given wide latitude in
passive belt design in order to aid the early intro-
duction of passive restraints and to aid the de-

velopment of optimum designs in tenns of both
eflFectiveness and comfort and convenience. The
agency agrees that anchorage location recjuire-
ments are important for passive belts, but believes
that more effective requirements can be developed
following further research specifically involving
passive belts. To ensure that safe and effective
systems are being developed, the agency will be
testing many of the new passive systems that will
come on the market prior to the 1982 model year.
In addition, the agency intends to ask manufac-
turers to supply data concerning the perfonnance
of passive systems in both compliance crash test-
ing and in sled and crash testing in other modes.

The NHTSA has determined that this amend-
ment will have no economic or environmental
consequences.

The engineer and lawyer primarily responsible
for the development of this notice are William
Smith and Hugh Oates, respectively.

In consideration of the foregoing. Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 210, Seai
Belt Assembly An-c^harages (49 CFR 571.210), is
amended ....

AUTHORITY: (Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563,
80 Stat. 718 (15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) : delegation
of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on November 3, 1978.

Joan Clay brook
Administrator

43 F.R. 53440
November 16, 1978

PART 571; S 210— PRE 11-12

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 210

Anchorages for Child Restraint Systems
[Docket No. 80-18; Notice 4]

ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY: To permit the securing of child safety
seats, this notice amends Standard No. 210, Seat
Belt Assembly Anchorages, to require all vehicles
with automatic restraint systems at the right front
passenger seating position to be equipped with
anchorages for a lap belt at that position if the
automatic restraint cannot be used to secure a
child safety seat. Some automatic belts cannot be
used to secure child safety seats since they include
only a single, diagonal shoulder belt. The new re-
quirement will enable parents to install a lap belt
if they wish to secure a child safety seat in the
front right outboard seating position. The amend-
ment also requires vehicle manufacturers to in-
clude information in their owner's manuals on
child safety and the location of shoulder belt an-
chorages in the rear seats. The owner's manual
must also provide instructions explaining how a
lap belt can be installed for use with child safety
seats in the front right passenger seating position
in vehicles with automatic restraints that cannot
be used for securing child restraints.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The effective date for all of the
amendments, except for the amendments adding
S6 and S7 to the standard, is September 1, 1987.
The amendments adding S6 and S7 contain infor-
mation collection requirements which must be
approved by the Office of Management and Budget
(0MB). After 0MB approval, the agency will pub-
lish a notice announcing the effective date of S6
and S7 of the standard.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On Decem-
ber 11, 1980 (45 FR 81625), NHTSA issued a notice
of proposed rulemaking to amend Standard No.
210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, to require
anchorages in certain vehicles for child safety seat
tether straps. In addition, the notice proposed
requiring vehicles equipped with automatic

restraint systems at the right front designated seat-
ting position, which cannot be used for the securing
of child safety seats, to have separate anchorages
at that position for the installation of Type 1 lap
belts.

On July 5, 1985 (50 FR 27632) the agency pub-
lished a notice terminating the portion of the pro-
posed rule concerning anchorages for child safety
seat tether straps. As explained in that notice the
agency has decided that the appropriate way to
reduce problems created by tether misuse is to
propose an amendment ( 50 FR 27633 ) to Standard
No. 213, Child Restraint Systems to require all
child safety seats to pass a 30 mile per hour simu-
lated crash test without a tether attached. This
will ensure that all child safety seats provide an
adequate level of safety even if they designed to
be used with a tether strap. This notice announces
the agency decision on the remaining portion of
the proposed rule relating to front passenger seat
safety belt anchorages.

Lap Belt Anchorages for Front Seats

A large percentage of the commenters supported
the proposed requirement on the basis that some
provision is necessary for securing child restraint
systems used in front right seating positions, espe-
cially in vehicles with single, diagonal automatic
belt designs. Several commenters noted that, in
particular, infant safety seats are often used in
that seat so that the infant is within view and
reach of an adult. However, several commenters
stated that the proposal did not go far enough.
Some commenters recommended that in addition
to requiring holes for anchorages, the agency
should require anchorage hardware to be installed
by vehicle manufacturers so that lap belts could
be readily installed by consumers. Other commen-
ters recommended that lap belts be required for
these positions in addition to the anchorages.

A few commenters argued that the proposed an-
chorages should not be required at all because the

PART 571; S210-PRE 13

rear seat is the safest location for the transporta-
tion of children and the proposal would encourage
parents to place their children in the less safe
front seat. Several commenters also requested that
the anchorage strength for the lap belt anchorages
be set at 3,000 pounds rather than the proposed
5,000 pounds, on the basis that the lap belts would
only be used to restrain children, not adults.

The agency agrees that the installation of lap
belts in front seating positions not currently hav-
ing them (vehicles equipped with single, diagonal
automatic belts or with nondetachable automatic
belts that cannot be used for attachment of child
safety seats) would be the optimum situation inso
far as securing child safety seats is concerned.
Short of this, requiring complete attachment
hardware would make the installation of lap belts
somewhat easier than if manufacturers only pro-
vide anchorage holes. However, both of these
approaches involves costs that the agency believes
are not justified because of the limited number of
vehicle owners who would actually have need of
this equipment.

The cost of requiring the actual anchorage
hardware in addition to providing threaded
anchorage holes would be approximately $.30 for
each vehicle, and the cost of requiring the lap belts
to be installed would be approximately $14.00 per
vehicle. If lap belts or anchorage hardware were
required, many owners would be paying for equip-
ment they do not need. The agency does not believe
these costs are justified since the presence of the
threaded hole will allow those vehicle owners who
actually have need of lap belts to easily install
them. The agency has therefore decided to require
only threaded anchorage holes to be present. With
the threaded holes present, the attachment hard-
ware and lap belt can be installed in a short time.

Type of Threaded Holes

Several commenters objected to the proposed
requirement that the anchorage holes be threaded
to accept one specific type of bolt for attaching a
lap belt. They said that Standard No. 209, Seat
Belt Assemblies, permits the use of several types
of bolts and argued that specifying the use of only
one type of bolt would be restrictive. The agency
agrees that manufacturers should have the same
design fiexibility as provided by Standard No. 209.
Therefore, the final rule provides that manufactur-
ers can thread the anchorage holes to accept any
one of the bolts permitted by Standard No. 209.

Anchorage Strength

With regard to anchorage strength, the agency
believes that the lap belt anchorages required by
this amendment should comply with the 5,000
pound requirement currently specified in Stan-
dard No. 210 for Type 1 lap belts, rather than the
3,000 pound requirement recommended by some
commenters. It is true that certain "special" lap
belts designed only for use by children might not
need to meet a 5,000 pound strength requirement.
However, since only anchorage holes are required,
some persons may install typical lap belts which
will be at times, likely used by adults. Adults
might also use the "special" lap belt designed only
for use by children, thinking that it is intended
for use by anyone. For these reasons, the agency
believes it is important for the anchorage strength
to be sufficient to withstand the 5,000 pound force
that could be generated by an adult in a crash.
The agency is therefore adopting a 5,000 pound
strength requirement.

Information in the Owner's Manual

The notice of proposed rulemaking proposed
that the owner's manual in each vehicle provide
specific information about protecting children in
motor vehicles. It proposed that each owner's man-
ual explain how to use a vehicle lap belt to secure
a child safety seat, alert parents that children are
safer in the rear seats, particularly in the center
rear seat, and have a specific warning about the
need to use infant and child safety seats. All 50
States and the District of Columbia now require
children to be fastened into child safety seats. The
notice also propose that the owner's manual pro-
vide information about the proper installation of
a lap belt in the front right passenger seating pos-
ition of a vehicle with an automatic restraint that
cannot be used to secure a child safety seat. In
addition, the notice proposed that the owner's
manual identify the location of the shoulder belt
anchorages that are currently required by the
standard for outboard rear seating positions.

Several commenters said that recommendations
concerning the proper use of lap belts for attach-
ment of child safety seats should be given by the
child safety seat manufacturer rather than the
vehicle manufacturer. They said that the child
safety seat manufacturer is more knowledgeable
about the proper use of its product. The agency
agrees and notes that all child safety seat man-
ufacturers currently provide such information. Ac-

PART 571; S210-PRE 14

cordingly. vehicle manufacturers will only be re-
quired to have a section in the owner's manual
referring to the importance of properly using the
vehicle belts with child safety seats and will not
have to provide specific information about the use
of belts with each type of child safety seat.

Other commenters expressed concern about the
proposed requirement that vehicle manufacturers
state that the center rear seat is the safest position
to secure a child safety seat. The commenters
noted that many vehicles currently do not have a
center rear seat. Other commuters objected to in-
cluding the information in owner's manuals of veh-
icles that do not have a rear seat. The agency
agrees with these objections and has therefore
modified the requirement so that vehicles with no
rear seats do not have to include the statement
and in vehicles with no center rear seat, a man-
ufacturer only has to state that the rear seat is
the safest position. Several commenters argued
that the agency should not require manufacturers
to provide information in the owner's manual since
the agency's noncompliance notification and re-
medy regulations would then apply. They recom-
mended that the manufacturers voluntarily pro-
vide the information.

The agency recognizes that the proposed warn-
ing requirement, which would have required man-
ufacturers to use specific wording on child safety
in the owner's manual, could lead to situations
where manufacturers would have to file petitions
for inconsequentiality for minor variations in the
wording. At the same time, the agency believes it
is important that vehicle owners receive general
information on child safety and specific informa-
tion on installing lap belts at the right front seat.
Thus manufacturers will still have to provide in-
formation about protecting children. However, the
agency has decided against requiring a warning
with prescribed wording about child safety in all
owner's manuals, so as to give manufacturers the
maximum fiexibility to incorporate that informa-
tion effectively.

Finally, the agency is adopting, as proposed, the
requirement that the owner's manual provide in-
formation about the location of the shoulder belt
anchorages for the rear seat. Several commenters
said that few people are aware that the anchorages
are currently present and therefore do not know
that shoulder belts can be installed in rear seats.
No commenter objected to this proposal.

Effective Date

The safety belt anchorage requirements in-
cluded in this amendment become effective Sep-
tember 1, 1987. In response to the notice of pro-
posed rulemaking, various vehicle manufacturers
indicated leadtime needs of one year, 18 months,
two years and three years. Those estimates, how-
ever, reflected the time necessary for designing,
tooling and installing tether anchorages rather
than for the simpler task of providing additional
lap belt anchorages. Standard No. 210 currently
requires anchorages for a Type 2 lap-shoulder
safety belt (an inboard and an outboard fioor an-
chorage for the lap portion of belt and an outboard
anchorage for the upper torso belt) at each front
outboard seating position, even if the vehicle is
equipped with a single, diagonal automatic belt.
However, the inboard anchorage of some diagonal
belts is not suitable for attachment of a lap belt
since the anchorage is designed only to accommo-
date an automatic belt. The amendment adopted
today would require, for some vehicles, the addi-
tion of one more anchorage (an additional inboard
anchorage) than currently required. For any veh-
icles which have a three point nondetachable au-
tomatic belt that cannot be used, two additional
anchorages may be required. After a careful con-
sideration of all comments and an evaluation of
the necessary design changes and tooling require-
ments, the agency has concluded that a leadtime
of one year should be sufficient. However, if the
rule were to go into effect in mid-model year, the
tooling and other costs associated with the rule
will substantially increase. Therefore, the agency
has decided that there is good cause for making
the rule effective on September 1, 1987. A leadtime
of longer than a year is in the public interest since
it will serve to reduce the cost of the rule to man-
ufacturers and consumers.

Issued on October 4, 1985.

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

50 FR 41356
October 10, 1985

PART 571; S210-PRE 15-16

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE

SAFETY STANDARD NO. 210

Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages
(Docket No. 80-18; Notice 5)

ACTION: Final Rule; Response to petitions for
reconsideration.

SUMMARY: This notice responds to two petitions
for reconsideration of the amendments to Standard
No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, publish-
ed on October 10, 1985. Those amendments re-
quired manufacturers to provide anchorages for a
lap safety belt in automatic-restraint equipped
vehicles in which the automatic restraint system
cannot be used to restrain a child safety seat. In
addition, the amendments required manufacturers
to provide certain safety information in their vehi-
cle owner's manual describing how to install the
lap belt. Also, the owner's manual was to state that
children are safer when properly restrained in the
rear seating positions than in front seating posi-
tions and that, in a vehicle with a rear seating posi-
tion, the center rear seating position is the safest.
Two manufacturers, American Motors Corporation
(AMC) and Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota),
filed timely petitions seeking reconsideration of
those amendments. In response to AMC's petition,
the agency has amended the lap belt anchorage re-
quirement to make it clear that if a manufacturer
voluntarily provides a manual lap or lap/shoulder
belt at the front right passenger's seat, it does not
have to provide an additional set of anchorages.
AMC's remaining requests to permit the use of self-
tapping safety belt anchorage bolts and to extend
the September 1, 1987, effective date are denied.
Toyota's request to delete the requirement that
manufacturers state that the center rear seat is the
safest seating position is granted.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendments made by this
notice are effective on August 19, 1986. Manufac-
turers do not have to comply with the requirements
of S4.1.3, S6, and S7 until September 1, 1987.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On October
10, 1985 (43 FR 53364), NHTSA published a final
rule amending Standard No. 210, Seat Belt
Assembly Anchorages. The amendments require

manufacturers to provide anchorages for a lap belt
at the front right seat in vehicles manufactured
after September 1, 1987, if the vehicle is equipped
with an automatic restraint system that cannot be
used to restrain a child safety seat. In addition, the
amendments require manufacturers to provide
safety information in their vehicle owner's
manuals on the proper installation of lap belts in
vehicles equipped with the supplemental lap belt
anchorages. Also, the owner's manual was to state
that children are safer when properly restrained
in the rear seating positions than in front seating
positions and that, in a vehicle with a rear seating
position, the center rear seating position is the
safest. Two vehicle manufacturers, AMC and
Toyota, filed timely petitions seeking reconsidera-
tion of those amendments. In the following discus-
sion, NHTSA addresses the issues raised by the
petitioners.

Anchorage Requirements

AMC said that the language of the lap belt an-
chorage requirement of S4.1.3 of the standard could
be "construed to mean that the supplemental an-
chorages might be required, even if a lap belt is pre-
sent." The NHTSA explained in the preamble to
the October 1985 final rule that the purpose of the
anchorage requirement is to enable vehicle owners
to quickly and easily install a lap belt to secure a
child safety seat in the front right passenger's seat.
The agency agrees with AMC that clearly if a
manufacturer has already provided a lap belt at
that position, there is no need for the supplemen-
tal anchorages. NHTSA has amended the language
of the standard to clarify the requirement by pro-
viding that a manufacturer can, at its option, pro-
vide either the supplemental anchorages or a
manual lap or lap/shoulder belt.

Modification of Automatic Belt Systems

AMC also asked the agency to allow manufac-
turers to provide methods, other than lap belt an-
chorages, to enable vehicle owners to secure child

PART 571; S210-PRE 17

safety seats. AMC said that one "possible approach
would be the adaptation of the automatic restraint
system to secure a child restraint. For example, for
a two-point automatic belt with a door-mounted
emergency release, the manufacturer could include
instructions to the owner on the installation of a
buckle on the lower outboard anchorage. The
automatic belt could then be released from the
door, and buckled at the floor to form a lap belt."
AMC said that it was "not necessarily recommend-
ing the use of these systems, because the questions
of cost, adult misuse, etc., all must be addressed."

As NHTSA explained in the preamble to the
October 1985 final rule, the purpose of the amend-
ment is to address the problems associated with
securing a child safety seat in some types of
automatic restraint systems. For example, some
automatic safety belts cannot be used to secure
child safety seats either because they have only a
single diagonal shoulder belt or because they are
nondetachable and thus cannot be threaded
through the structure of the child safety seat to
hold the safety seat in place. By requiring manufac-
turers to provide threaded anchorage holes in those
vehicles, the agency believed that vehicle owners
who wanted to install a lap belt at the front right
seat could easily and quickly do so by taking the
simple step of threading a bolt into the anchorage.

NHTSA agrees with AMC that it would not be
necessary to require the additional lap belt an-
chorages, if the vehicle owner can adjust the
automatic belt system so that it can effectively
restrain a child safety seat. NHTSA believes that
the ease and simplicity of the adjustment is crucial.
The agency does not want vehicle owners to have
to follow complicated instructions or have to obtain
special tools or have to purchase and install special
attachment (other than the belt itself) hardware
before they can use the automatic belt system to
restrain a child safety seat. The more difficult and
complicated the procedure is, the greater the
possibility that a vehicle owner may improperly ad-
just the automatic belt system. In contrast, if a
vehicle manufacturer has installed the additional
hardware necessary to allow the use of the auto-
matic belt to restrain a child safety seat and all a
vehicle owner has to do is simply operate the
emergency release for the automatic belt and then
reconnect it to the attachment hardware provided
by the manufacturer, NHTSA believes that vehi-
cle owners can quickly, easily, and safely use the
automatic belt to restrain a child safety seat. Thus,
the agency is amending the language of S4.1.3 to

provide that a manufacturer does not have to in-
stall threaded anchorage holes if it has installed
all the necessary hardware needed to adjust the
automatic safety belt to secure a child safety seat.
With this amendment, manufacturers now have
three options for securing child safety seats in
automatic restraint equipped vehicles. First, they
can provide an automatic restraint that can be
used, with no modifications, to secure a child safety
seat. Alternatively, they can provide an automatic
restraint that can be modified or adjusted by the
vehicle owner to secure a child safety seat, as long
as the manufacturer has installed all the hardware
necessary to secure the child safety seat. Finally,
a vehicle manufacturer has the alternative of, at
its option, installing a manual lap or lap/shoulder
belt with its automatic restraint system or pro-
viding threaded holes so that the vehicle owner can
install a manual lap belt. The agency believes that
these three alternatives give a substantial amount
of flexibility to vehicle manufacturers to determine
which approach they want to use and assures that
vehicle owners can quickly, easily, and safely use
child safety seats in the front right seats of
automatic restraint equipped vehicles.

Threaded Holes

The final rule required manufactvirers to provide
threaded holes that would accept a bolt complying
with Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies. AMC
explained that it does not use a threaded nut in its
safety belt assembly, but instead uses a self-
tapping bolt. It said use of the self-tapping bolt
eliminates the possibility of cross-threading or
misalignment caused by paint on the thread of the
nut. AMC asked that the requirement be changed
from providing threaded holes to providing holes
that will accept any type of safety belt hardware.

NHTSA specified the installation of a threaded
hole so that a vehicle owner could quickly, easily,
and safely install a lap belt without using special
tools or purchasing special attachment hardware.
The agency expected that with the threaded holes,
a vehicle owner could, if need be, find the ap-
propriate bolt at a hardware store and install the
bolt with a simple wrench or pliers. The agency is
concerned that a self-tapping bolt of sufficient size
and strength to withstand the forces imposed by
a safety belt is not commonly available. In addi-
tion, it may be more difficult for a vehicle owner
to properly align a self -tapping bolt and exert suf-
ficient force to drive the bolt through the steel floor

PART 571; S210-PRE 18

without a special tool. Therefore, NHTSA has
decided to deny AMC's request, and instead retain
the requirement that manufacturers provide
threaded holes.

Leadtime

Saying that its petition sought several changes
which will impact the design of its vehicles, AMC
requested the agency to provide additional lead-
time to implement any changes adopted by the
agency. The agency does not believe that any ad-
ditional leadtime is necessary. As adopted, the rule
provided nearly two years of leadtime. AMC has
provided no new information to show that it can-
not meet the requirements of the rule within that
period of time. Therefore, NHTSA has decided to
deny AMC's request for additional leadtime.

Owner's Manual Information

The October 1985 final rule requires manufac-
turers to provide certain information in their
owner's manuals about securing child safety seats
in their vehicles. Among the requirements is one
that, in vehicles with a center rear seat, manufac-
turers must state in the owner's manual that the
center rear seat is the safest. Toyota asked the
agency to reconsider that requirement.

Toyota agrees that children are safest when prop-
erly restrained in the rear seat, but it said it does
not have data to show the center rear seat is always
the safest. In addition, Toyota said that in a vehi-
cle with front bucket seats, "depending how a child
is restrained in the center rear seating position, he
or she could hit against the console box and or the
transmission shift lever, which are more solid than
the front seatbacks." Finally, Toyota said that the
required statement might mislead persons into
thinking that the center rear seat is the safest,
regardless of how an occupant is restrained.

NHTSA decided to require a statement about the
safety of the center seat in the owner's manual
based on crash tests and accident data which show
that the center rear seat is safer, particularly in
side impacts, than other seats. For example, side
impact crash tests conducted for the agency have
shown that, as would be expected, test dummies
closer to the struck side of the vehicle experience
larger acceleration than dummies seated away
from that side. In addition to experiencing larger
accelerations, the test dummies located closer to
the side door contacted the interior of the vehicle
as it crushed inward during the impact. (See, for

example, "Countermeasures for Side Impact,"
DOT Contract HS 9-02177.)

Likewise, accident data have generally shown
that the center rear seat is the safest. For exam-
ple, data on injuries to unrestrained occupants
show that occupants of center seating positions
have fewer serious injuries and fatalities than
unrestrained occupants in outboard rear seats.
(See, "Usage and Effectiveness of Seat and
Shoulder Belts in Rural Pennsylvania," DOT
Publication HS 801-398). Data on restrained oc-
cupants in the rear seats are more limited. The
Canadian Ministry of Transport analyzed data on
the fatality and injury rates in Ontario and Alber-
ta for the years 1978-1980. The Alberta data show,
for example, that restrained children (tirth-14
years old) riding in the center rear seat had the
lowest rate of major and fatal injuries. Likewise,
the Ontario data showed that restrained children
(birth- 14 years old) riding in the center rear seat
had the lowest rate of major and fatal injuries.
Likewise, the Ontario data showed that restrained
children (birth-14 years old) riding in the center
rear seat had the lowest fatality rate. NHTSA
acknowledges that because of the small amount of
information available on injuries and fatalities to
restrained children in the rear seat, the results
should not be regarded as conclusive.

NHTSA does not have sufficiently detailed files
on real-world crashes to be able to address Toyota's
statement that for vehicles with bucket seats it is
possible that, depending on how a child is re-
strained, he or she could strike the console box or
other vehicle features that are harder than the
seatback. The agency also has not done any crash
testing of bucket seat vehicles with child test dum-
mies restrained in the rear seat. The agency
agrees, however, that depending on how a child is
restrained and the severity of the crash, it is possi-
ble for a restrained child in the center rear seat of
a bucket seat vehicle to strike a portion of the vehi-
cle's interior in front of the child. Therefore, the
agency has decided to grant Toyota's petition and
has deleted the requirement in S6(b) that manufac-
turers state that the center rear seat is the safest
seating position. NHTSA anticipates that if a
manufacturer has a particular concern about a
design feature in its bucket seat equipped vehicles
that could be struck by a properly restrained child,
the manufacturer would take steps to minimize the
risk posed by the design feature.

Navistar International Corporation (Navistar)
has recently written the agency concerning the ap-
plicability of the owner's manual requirements to

PART 571; S210-PRE 19

vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR)
of more than 10,000 pounds. Navistar said that
such heavy vehicles are generally property-
carrying and service vehicles used for commercial
purposes and would seldom, if ever, be carrying
children. Navistar also noted that the drivers of
those heavy vehicles may never see the owner's
manual, since they may not be the owners of the
vehicles.

The agency believes that Navistar has raised
several good reasons why the owner's manual re-
quirements should be limited to vehicles with a
GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less, the class of vehi-
cle which would normally be transporting children
in child safety seats. Thus, the agency is amending
the standard to limit the owner's manual re-
quirements to vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000
pounds or less.

The agency is also making another minor clari-
fying change to the owner's manual information
requirements.

S6(c) of the standard requires vehicle manufac-
turers to provide information about the location of
the anchorages for shoulder belts in the rear out-
board seats in their vehicles under the following
conditions. Manufacturers are required to provide
the owner's manual information if Standard No.
210 requires them to install shoulder belt an-
chorages at those positions and they have not in-
stalled lap/shoulder belts at those positions as
items of original equipment. Since S4.1.1 of Stan-
dard No. 210 only requires the installation of
shoulder belt anchorages in the rear outboard seats
of passenger cars, the agency is amending S6(c) to
make clear that this portion of the owner's manual
requirements only apply to passenger cars.

For the reasons set out in the preamble, section
571.210 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions is amended as follows:

1. The authority citation for Part 571 would con-
tinue to read as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1403, 1407;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

2. S4.1.3 is amended by revising the first
sentence to read as follows:

S4.1.3 Notwithstanding the requirement of
paragraph S4.1.1, each vehicle manufactured on
or after September 1, 1987, that is equipped with
an automatic restraint at the front right outboard
designated seating position that cannot be used for
securing a child restraint system or cannot be ad-
justed by the vehicle owner to secure a child
restraint system solely through the use of attach-
ment hardware installed as an item of original

equipment by the vehicle manufacturer shall have,
at the manufacturer's option, either anchorages for
a Type 1 seat belt assembly at that position or a
Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly at that
position.

3. The first sentence of S6 is revised to read as
follows:

86 Owner's Manual Information. The owner's
manual in each vehicle with a GVWR of 10,000
pounds or less manufactured after September 1,
1987, shall include:

4. S6(b) is revised to read as follows:

(b) In a vehicle with rear designated seating posi-
tions, a statement alerting vehicle owners that, ac-
cording to accident statistics, children are safer
when properly restrained in the rear seating posi-
tions than in the front seating positions.

5. S6(c) is revised to read as follows:

(c) In each passenger car, a diagram or diagrams
showing the location of the shoulder belt an-
chorages required by this standard for the rear out-
board designated seating positions, if shoulder
belts are not installed as items of original equip-
ment by the vehicle manufacturer at those
positions.

6. S7 is revised to read as follows:

S7 Installation Instructions. The owner's manual
in each vehicle manufactured on or after
September 1, 1987, with an automatic restraint at
the front right outboard designated seating posi-
tion that cannot be used to secure a child restraint
system when the automatic restraint is adjusted
to meet the performance requirements of S5.1 of
Standard No. 208 shall have:

(a) A statement that the automatic restraint at
the front right outboard designated seating posi-
tion cannot be used to secure a child restraint and,
as appropriate, one of the following three
statements:

(i) A statement that the automatic restraint at
the front right outboard designated seating posi-
tion can be adjusted to secure a child restraint
system using attachment hardware installed as
original equipment by the vehicle manufacturer;

(ii) A statement that anchorages for installation
of a lap belt to secure a child restraint system have
been provided at the front right outboard
designated seating position; or

(iii) A statement that a lap or manual lap or
lap/shoulder belt has been installed by the vehicle
manufacturer at the front right outboard
designated seating position to secure a child
restraint.

PART 571; S210-PRE 20

(b) In each vehicle in which a lap or lap/shoulder
belt is not installed at the front right outboard
designated seating position as an item of original
equipment, but the automatic restraint at that
position can be adjusted by the vehicle owner to
secure a child restraint system using an item or
items of original equipment installed in the vehi-
cle by the vehicle manufacturer, the owner's
manual shall also have:

(i) A diagram or diagrams showing the location
of the attachment hardware provided by the vehi-
cle manufacturer.

(ii) A step-by-step procedure with a diagram or
diagrams showing how to modify the automatic
restraint system to secure a child restraint system.
The instructions shall explain the proper routing
of the attachment hardware.

(c) In each vehicle in which the automatic
restraint at the front right outboard designated
seating position cannot be modified to secure a
child restraint system using attachment hardware
installed as an original equipment by the vehicle
manufacturer and a manual lap or lap/shoulder
belt is not installed as an item of original equip-
ment by the vehicle manufacturer, the owner's
manual shall also have:

(i) A diagram or diagrams showing the locations
of the lap belt anchorages for the front right out-
board designated seating position.

(ii) A step-by-step procedure and a diagram or
diagrams for installing the proper lap belt an-
chorage hardware and a Type 1 lap belt at the front
right outboard designated seating position. The in-
structions shall explain the proper routing of the
seat belt assembly and the attachment of the seat
belt assembly to the lap belt anchorages.

Issued on August 12, 1986

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

51 F.R. 29552
August 19, 1986

PART 571; S210-PRE 21-22

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 210

Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages— Passenger Cars, Multipurpose

Passenger Vehicles, Trucks, and Buses

(Docket No. 2-14; Notice No. 4)

51. Purpose and scope. This standard
establishes requirements for seat belt assembly an-
chorages to insure their proper location for effec-
tive occupant restraint and to reduce the likelihood
of their failure.

52. Application. This standard applies to
passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses.

53. Definition. "Seat belt anchorage" means
the provision for transferring seat belt assembly
loads to the vehicle structure.

54. Requirements.
S4.1 Type.

54.1.1 Seat belt anchorages for a Type 2 seat
belt assembly shall be installed for each foward-
facing outboard designated seating position in
passenger cars, other than convertibles, and for
each designated seating position for which a Type
2 seat belt assembly is required by Standard No.
208 in vehicles other than passenger cars.

54.1.2 Seat belt anchorages for a Type 1 or a
Type 2 seat belt assembly shall be installed for each
designated seating position, except a passenger
seat in a bus or a designated seating position for
which seat belt anchorages for a Type 2 seat belt
assembly are required by S4.1.1.

54.1.3 (Notwithstanding the requirement of
paragraph S4.1.1, each vehicle manufactured on or
after September 1, 1987, that is equipped with an
automatic restraint at the front right outboard
designated seating position that cannot be used for
securing a child restraint system or cannot be ad-
justed by the vehicle owner to secure a child
restraint system solely through the use of attach-
ment hardware installed as an item of original
equipment by the vehicle manufacturer shall have,
at the manufacturer's option, either anchorages
for a Type 1 seat belt assembly at that position or a
Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly at that posi-

tion. (51 F.R. 29552— August 19, 1986. Effective:
August 19. 1986)1

54.2 Strength.

54.2.1 Except for side-facing seats, the an-
chorage for a Type 1 seat belt assembly or the
pelvic portion of a Type 2 seat belt assembly shall
withstand a 5,000-pound force when tested in ac-
cordance with S5.1.

54.2.2 The anchorage for a Type 2 seat belt
assembly shall withstand 3,000-pound forces when
tested in accordance with S5.2.

54.2.3 Permanent deformation or rupture of a
seat belt anchorage or its surrounding area is not
considered to be a failure, if the required force is
sustained for the specified time.

54.2.4 Except for common seat belt anchorages
for forward-facing and rearward-facing seats,
floor-mounted seat belt anchorages for adjacent
designated seating positions shall be tested by
simultaneously loading the seat belt assemblies at-
tached to those anchorages.

54.3 Location. As used in this section, "for-
ward" means in the direction in which the seat
faces, and other directional references are to be in-
terpreted accordingly. Anchorages for automatic
and for dynamically tested seat belt assemblies
that meet the frontal crash protection re-
quirements of S5.1 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR
Part 571.208) are exempt from the location re-
quirements of this section.

S4.3.1 Seat belt anchorages for Type 1 seat belt
assemblies and the pelvic portion of Type 2 seat belt
assemblies.

S4.3.1.1 In an installation in which the seat belt
does not bear upon the seat frame, a line from the
seating reference point to the nearest contact
point of the belt with the hardware attaching it to
the anchorage for an nonadjustable seat or from

(Rev. a/19/86)

PART 571; S 210-1

a point 2.50 inches forward of and 0.375 inch above
the seating reference point to the nearest contact
point of the belt with the hardware attaching it to
the anchorage for an adjustable seat in its rear-
most position, shall extend forward from the an-
chorage at an angle with the horizontal of not less
than 20° and not more than 75°.

54.3.1.2 In an installation in which the belt
bears upon the seat frame, the seat belt anchorage,
if not on the seat structure, shall be aft of the rear-
most belt contact point on the seat frame with the
seat in the rearmost position. The line from the
seating reference point to the nearest belt contact
point on the seat frame shall extend forward from
that contact point at an angle with the horizontal
of not less than 20° and not more than 75°.

54.3.1 .3 In an installation in which the seat belt
anchorage is on the seat structure, the line from
the seating reference point to the nearest contact
point of the belt with the hardware attaching it to
the anchorage shall extend forward from that con-
tact point at an angle with the horizontal of not less
than 20° and not more than 75°.

54.3.1.4 Anchorages for an individual seat belt
assembly shall be located at least 6.50 inches apart
laterally, measured between the vertical
centerlines of the bolt holes.

S4.3.2 Seat belt anchorages for the upper torso
portion of Type 2 seat belt assemblies. With the
seat in its full rearward and downward position
and the seat back in its most upright position, the
seat belt anchorage for the upper end of the upper
torso restraint shall be located within the accep-
table range shown in Figure 1, with reference to a
two-dimensional manikin described in SAE Stand-

ard J826 (November 1962) whose "H" point is at
the seating reference point and whose torso line is
at the same angle from the vertical as the seat
back.

S5. Test procedures. Each vehicle shall meet
the requirements of S4.2 when tested according to
the following procedures. Where a range of
values is specified, the vehicle shall be able to meet
the requirements at all points within the range.

S5.1 Seats with Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt an-
chorages. With the seat in its rearmost position,
apply a force of 5,000 pounds in the direction in
which the seat faces to a pelvic body block as
described in Figure 2, restrained by a Type 1 or the
pelvic portion of a Type 2 seat belt assembly, as ap-
plicable, in a plane parallel to the longitudinal
centerline of the vehicle, with an initial force ap-
plication angle of not less than 5° nor more than
15° above the horizontal. Apply the force at the
onset rate of not more than 50,000 pounds per
second. Attain the 5,000-pound force in not more
than 30 seconds and maintain it for 10 seconds.

4* BLOCK COVERED ev
too MED DENSITY CANVAS
COVERED FOAM RUBBCH

FIGURE 2 BODY BLOCK FOR LAP BELT ANCHORAGE

shoulder reference point,

horizontal"!

LINE y^

SAE TWO DIMENSIONAL ]?^c^ i
MANIKIN ill"^ r^

ACCEPTABLE
RANGE

SEATING REFERENCE POINT

FIGURE 1 LOCATION OF ANCHORAGE FOR UPPER TORSO RESTRAINT

S5.2 Seats with Type 2 seat belt anchorages.

With the seat in its rearmost position, apply forces
of 3,000 pounds in the direction in which the seat
faces simultaneously to pelvic and upper torso
body blocks as described in Figures 2 and 3,
restrained by a Type 2 seat belt assembly, in a
plane parallel to the longitudinal centerline of the
vehicle, with an initial force application angle of
not less than 5° nor more than 15° above the
horizontal. Apply the forces at the onset rate of not

PART 571; S 210-2

more than 30,000 pounds f)er second. Attain the
3,000-pound forces in not more than 30 seconds
and maintain them for 10 seconds.

56. Owner's Manual Information. {The owner's
manual in each vehicle with GVWR of 10,000
pounds or less, manufactured after September 1,
1987, shall include:)

(a) A section explaining that all child restraint
systems are designed to be secured in vehicle seats
by lap belts or the lap belt portion of a lap-shoulder
belt. The section shall also explain that children
could be endangered in a crash if their child
restraints are not properly secured in the vehicle.

((b) In a vehicle with rear designated seating
positions, a statement alerting vehicle owners
that, according to accident statistics, children are
safer when properly restrained in the rear seating
positions than in the front seating positions.

(c) In each passenger car, a diagram or
diagrams showing the location of the shoulder belt
anchorages required by this standard for the rear
outboard designated seating positions, if shoulder
belts are not installed as items of original equip-
ment by the vehicle manufacturer at those posi-
tions. (51 F.R. 29552— August 19, 1986. Effective:
August 19, 1986)]

57. Installation Instructions. |The owner's
manual in each vehicle manufactured on or after
September 1, 1987, with an automatic restraint at
the front right outboard designated seating posi-
tion that cannot be used to secure a child restraint
system when the automatic restraint is adjusted to
meet the performance requirements of S5.1 of
Standard No. 208 shall have:

(a) A statement that the automatic restraint at
the front right outboard designated seating posi-
tion cannot be used to secure a child restraint and,
as appropriate, one of the following three
statements:

(i) A statement that the automatic restraint at
the front right outboard designated seating posi-
tion can be adjusted to secure a child restraint
system using attachment hardware installed as
original equipment by the vehicle manufactiu^er;
(ii) A statement that anchorages for installa-
tion of a lap belt to secure a child restraint
system have been provided at the front right out-
board designated seating position; or

(iii) A statement that a lap or manual lap or
lap/shoulder belt has been installed by the vehicle
manufacturer at the front right outboard
designated seating position to secure a child
restraint.

(b) In each vehicle in which a lap or lap/shoulder
belt is not installed at the front right outboard
designated seating position as an item of original
equipment, but the automatic restraint at that
position can be adjusted by the vehicle owner to
secure a child restraint system using an item or
items of original equipment installed in the vehicle
by the vehicle manufacturer, the owner's manual
shall also have:

(i) A diagram or diagrams showing the loca-
tion of the attachment hardware provided by the
vehicle manufacturer.

(ii) A step-by-step procedure wdth a diagram
or diagrams showing how to modify the
automatic restraint system to secure a child
restraint system. The instructions shall explain
the proper routing of the attachment hardware.

(c) In each vehicle in which the automatic
restraint at the front right outboard designated
seating position cannot be modified to secure a
child restraint system using attachment hardware
installed as an original equipment by the vehicle
manufacturer and a manual lap or lap/shoulder belt
is not installed as an item of original equipment by
the vehicle manufacturer, the owner's manual shall
also have:

(i) A diagram or diagrams showing the loca-
tions of the lap belt anchorages for the front
right outboard designated seating position.

(ii) A step-by-step procedure and a diagram or
diagrams for installing the proper lap belt an-
chorage hardware and a Type 1 lap belt at the
front right outboard designated seating position.
The instructions shall explain the proper routing
of the seat belt assembly and the seat belt attach-
ment of the assembly to the lap belt anchorages.
(51 F.R. 29552— August 19, 1986. Effective: Aju&ust
19, 1986)]

Issued on August 12, 1986

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

51 F.R. 29552
August 19, 1986

(R«v. 8/10/80)

PART 571; S 210-3-4

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 211

Wheel Nuts, Wheel Discs, and Hub Caps— Passenger Cars and Multipurpose

Passenger Vehicles

Si. Purpose and scope. This standard pre-
cludes the use of wheel nuts, wheel discs, and
hub caps that constitute a hazard to pedestrians
and cyclists.

52. Application. This standard applies to pas-
senger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, and
passenger cars and multipurpose passenger ve-
hicle equipment.

53. Requirements. Wheel nuts, hub caps, and
wheel discs for use on passenger cars and multi-
purpose passenger vehicles shall not incorporate
winged projections.

INTERPRETATION

A clarification of the term "wheel nut" as used
in the requirements section S3 of Standard No.
211 has been requested. This section states that

"wheel nuts, hub caps, and wheel discs for use on
passenger cars and multipurpose passenger ve-
hicles shall not incorporate winged projections."
A "wheel nut" is an exposed nut that is mounted
at the center or hub of a wheel, and not the ordi-
nary small hexagonal nut, one of several which
secures a wheel to an axle, and which is normally
covered by a hub cap or wheel disc.
Issued on July 22, 1969.

F. C. Turner

Federal Highway Administrator

32 F.R. 2416
February 3, 1967

(Rev. 7/25/69)

PART 571; S 211-1-2

EffMKv*: January 1, 1970

PREAMBLE TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 212
Windshield Mounting — Passenger Cars

A proposal to amend Part 371 of the Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards by adding a
Standard No. 212, Windshield Mounting — Pas-
senger Cars, was published as an advance notice
of proposed rule making an October 14, 1967
(32 F.R. 14281) and a notice of proposed rule
making on December 28, 1967 (32 F.R. 20866).

Interested persons have been given the oppor-
tunity to participate in the making of this amend-
ment, and careful consideration has been given
to all relevant matter presented.

This new standard requires that, when tested
as prescribed, each passenger car windshield
mounting must retain either: (1) not less than
75% of the windshield periphery; or (2) not less
than 50% of that portion of the windshield
periphery on each side of the vehicle longitudinal
centerline, if an unrestrained 95th percentile adult
male manikin is seated in each outboard front
seating position.

Several comments objected to the proposed
standard and in some cases urged that more re-
search should be done before any type of wind-
shield mounting is required. The standard, is
however, part of an integrated program aimed
at accomplishing the widely accepted safety goal
of keeping occupants within the confines of the
passenger compartment during a crash. One
major step in this program is the utilization of
the laminated glazing material prescribed in
Federal motor vehicle safety standard No. 205,
which has resulted in a marked reduction in
serious head injury to occupants known to have
struck the windshield. The windshield mounting
retention requirement prescribed in this standard
takes advantage of this improved glazing ma-
terial and will further minimize the likelihood

of occupants being thrown from the vehicle
during a crash.

Several comments requested reduction of the
75% retention requirement to 50%. The Admin-
istrator concludes that, as an alternative, 50%
retention is acceptable if: (1) an unrestrained
95% percentile adult male manikin is seated in
each outboard front seating position when the
test procedure is performed, and (2) at least
50% of that portion of the windshield periphery
on each side of the vehicle longitudinal centerline
is retained.

Several comments requested that the phrase
"or approved equivalent" be added to the "Dem-
onstration procedures" provision. § 371.11 of the
Federal motor vehicle safety standards provides
that "an approved equivalent may be substituted
for any required destructi\e demonstration pro-
cedure." Consequently, inclusion of the phrase
requested is not necessary.

In consideration of the foregoing, § 371.21, of
Part 371 of the Federal motor vehicle safety
standards is amended by adding Standard No.
212, "Windshield Mounting — Passenger Cars," as
set forth below, effective January 1, 1970.

This rule-making action is taken under the
authority of sections 103 and 119 of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
(P.I> 89-563, 15 U.S.C. §§1392 and 1407) and
the delegation of authority contained in Part 1
of the Regulations of the Office of the Secretary
of Transportation (49 CFR Part 1).

Issued in Washington, D.C. on August 13, 1968.

John R. Jamieson, Deputy
Federal Highway Administrator

33 F.R. 11652
August 16, 1968

PART 571; S 21^— PRE 1-2

Effective: September 1, 1977

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 212

Windshield Mounting
(Docket No. 69-29; Notice 5)

This notice amends Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard Xo. 212, 49 CFR 571.212, Windshield
Mounting, to extend its applicability to multi-
purpose passenger vehicles, tnicks, and buses hav-
ing a gross vehicle weight rating (GV~WR) of
10,000 pounds or less, except for forward control
vehicles and open-body type vehicles with fold-
ing or removable windshields, and to coordinate
its test procedures with those of Standard No.
208, 49 CFR 571.208, Occupant Crash Protection.

An advance notice of proposal rulemaking was
published September 16, 1969 (34 FR 14438),
followed by notices of proposed rulemaking pub-
lished on August 23, 1972 (37 FR 16979) and
January 18, 1974 (39 FR 2274). This notice is
based on the latter notice of proposed rulemak-
ing, and responds to the comments submitted
thereto.

The final nde retains the proposed rule's ex-
tension to nmltipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks,
and buses having a gross vehicle weight rating
(G^'WR) of 10,000 pounds or less. However,
forward control vehicles and open-l)o<ly vehicles
with fold-down wind.shields are excluded from
the application of the standard because of the
impracticability of complying with the require-
ments.

Many manufacturers objected to the require-
ment in the proposal that the dummies used in
the test vehicle not be restrained by active re-
straint systems. Upon impact in a crash test,
unrestrained dummies tend to fly about the pas-
senger compartment, damaging the dummies.

In 1072 the \IITSA proposed the amendment
of Standard Xo. 212 (37 FR 16979) to specify
a 75 percent retention requirement using re-
strained dummies. The purpose of the proposal
was to eliminate optional retention rcfiuiremcnts

and to permit dynamic testing consistent with
other safety standards. In 1974 another ap-
proach was taken with the XIITSA proposing
(39 FR 2274) a 50 percent retention requirement
using unrestrained dummie,s, in anticipation of
the passive restraint requirements that were to
be included in Standard No. 208. Having the
Ijenefit of a large number of comments on both
proposals the NHTSA has determined that both
are suitable, the 1972 approach for vehicles
equipped with active restraints, where dunmiy
damage would be great if the dummy were un-
restrained, and the 1974 approach for vehicles
equipped with passive restraints, since the dummy
would not contact the windshield.

The frontal barrier crash test conditions speci-
fied in the final nde are substantially similar
to those of Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash
Protection, Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone
Inti^usion, and Standard No. 301, Fuel System.
Integrity. This will allow compliance testing
for these standards in one crash test imder cer-
tain circumstances. In this way, much of the
expense associated with crash testing can be
reduced.

Most of the manufacturers who commented on
the proposal objected to the requirement that
the vehicle be tested at a teinpei-ature range of
15° F to 110° F. Some nianufucturers objected
that the higher temperatures would damage sen-
sitive instrumentation. Others argued that the
range should l)e coordinated witli tliat of Stand-
ard No. 301 (49 CFR 571.301) or with ISO regu-
lations. Some asserted that they would have to
build expensive test facilities in order to conduct
tests at the temperature extremes. The NHTSA
has detennined that testing over the specified
range is necessary, in light of the fact that wind-

PART 571 ; S 212— PRE 3

Effective: September 1, 1977

shield moldings have significantly different reten-
tion capabilities at different temperatures. The
NHTSA recognizes that certain additional ex-
penses may be entailed in testing over the speci-
fied temperature range. However, the safety
need to ensure adequate windshield retention
justifies the additional expense.

In consideration of the foregoing, Standard
No. 212, 49 CFR 571.212, is amended to read as
set forth below.

Effective date: September 1, 1977.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89563, 80 Stat. 718 (15
U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.50)

Issued on : August 23, 1976.

John AV. Snow
Administrator

41 F.R. 36493
August 30, 1976

PART 571; S 212— PRE 4

EfFectlve: August 4, 1977

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 212

Windshfeld Mounting
(Docket No. 69-29; Notice 6)

Thi3 notice responds to nine petitions for re-
consideration of a recent amendment (41 FR
36493, August 30, 1976) of Safety Standard No.
212, Windshield Mounting, by extending the effec-
tive date of the amendment from September 1,
1977, to September 1, 1978, and by excluding
"walk-in van-type" vehicles from the standard's
applicability. Other aspects of the petitions for
reconsideration are denied.

Dates: The amendment of August 30, 1976,
will be effective September 1, 1978. The change
in the effective date and the amendment to ex-
clude "walk-in van-type" vehicles from the stand-
ard's applicability should be changed in the text
of the Code of Federal Regulations, effective
August 4, 1977.

For Further Information Contact:
Robert Nelson

National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration
Washington, D.C. 20590
(202 426-2802)

Supplementary Information : Safety Standard
No. 212, Windshield Mounting (49 CFR Part
571.212), was amended August 30, 1976, to mod-
ify the performance requirements and test pro-
cedures of the standard and to extend the
standard's applicability to multipurpose passen-
ger vehicles, trucks, and buses liaving a gross
vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less.
Petitions for reconsideration were received from
International Harvester (IH), Jeep Corporation,
American Motors Corporation (AMC), Volvo of
America Corporation, Toyo Kogyo Co., General
Motors Corporation (GM), Rolls Royce Motors,
Nissan Motor Co. Ltd., and Leyland Cars.

Requests from some of these petitioners that
the new provisions of Standard No. 212 (49

CFR 571.212) be withdrawn entirely are hereby
denied, but several modifications are undertaken
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration (NHTSA), based on a review of the
information and arguments submitted.

Nearly all of the petitioners requested that the
effective date of the new provisions be changed
from September 1, 1977, to September 1, 1978.
Petitioners argued that a lead time of one year
will be insufficient to accomplish design changes
and retooling necessary to adapt passenger-car
windshield technology to other vehicle types.
Petitioners also pointed out that the specifica-
tion of a temperature range in the test conditions
will require manufacturers to undertake more
extensive certification testing than in the past.

The NHTSA has determined that the requests
for additional lead time are justified in light of
the information submitted regarding design
changes that some manufacturers will undertake.
The petitions are, therefore, granted in part and
the effective date of the new provisions is post-
poned to September 1, 1978.

In conformity with the agency's 1972 and
1974 proposals (37 FR 16979, August 23, 1972)
(39 FR 2274, January 18, 1974), an optional
means of meeting the retention requirement (that
exists in the present provisions) was eliminated
by the August 30, 1976, amendments. This was
done to reduce the amount of necessarj' com-
pliance testing and to encourage "simultaneous"
certification testing of separate standards where
practicable. As proposed in 1972, the "75-per-
cent alternative" (retention of 75 percent of the
windshield periphery — dummies properly re-
strained) was made mandatory for al vehicles
not equipped with passive restraints. In this
way, windshield retention tests could be per-

PART 571; S 2ia— PRE 5

Effective: August 4, 1977

formed at tlie same time as tests already required
for fuel system integrity (49 CFE 571.301-75)
that specify restrained dummies.

"Wliile some additional weight is added to the
vehicle by the required dummies, it is the mini-
mum necessary to permit "simultaneous" testing,
and the dummies are restrained so that there is
only incidental, if any, contact with the wind-
shield. Thus, the "75-percent alternative" spec-
ified in the amendments is, basically, a
continuation of the existing requirement that
manufacturers have been meeting for years.

The 1974 proposal to adopt the "50-percent
option" (retention of 50 percent of the wind-
shield periphery on each side of the windshield —
dummies unrestrained) was vigorously objected
to by manufacturers because of the damage that
could occur to dummies during impact with the
windshield. Also, the fuel system integrity
standard was made final in a form that required
restraining the dummies by safety belts if pro-
vided. It was apparent that the "50-percent
option" should only become mandatory as pro-
posed for vehicles equipped with passive re-
straint systems that could protect the dummy
against impact damage. In the case of air cush-
ion restraint systems, of course, some contact
with the windshield by the cusliion or incidental
contact by the dummy is expected during the
crash test. For this reason, the somewhat less
stringent "50-percent option" was made final for
vehicles equipped with passive restraints.

AMC argued that this distinction between ve-
hicles is unjustified. The only reason put for-
ward by AMC was that "dummy impact is not
a critical factor in determining windshield re-
tention." This reason does not, however, support
the AMC request for a reduction in retention
performance from the 75-percent level presently
being met. Rather, it argues for an increase in
the 50-percent level established for those ve-
hicles in which the NHTSA estimated that
dummy and restraint contact could affect results.
If AMC believes that the distinction is not justi-
fied, the agency will review further evidence to
increase the 50- percent requirement (for passive-
equipped vehicles) to the 75-percent level pres-
ently being met in most of today's passenger
cars.

Several commenters objected that the final rule
differed in some respects from the 1972 and 1974
proposals to amend Standard No. 212, taken
separately. AMC, Volvo, and Jeep petitioned to
I'evoke the separate retention requirements for
vehicles with different restraint systems, on the
grounds that such a distinction had never been
proposed. Jeep Corporation also objected to ex-
tension of the standard's applicability to MPV's,
trucks, and buses because of variations in lan-
guage from the proposals.

As earlier noted, the requirement for 75-per-
cent retention conforms to the 1972 proposal.
The only variation from the 1972 proposal was
to implement the performance levels proposed
in 1974 for the vehicles that might be equipped
with passive restraints. It is the agency's view
that "a description of the subjects and issues
involved" in the rulemaking action was published
in the Federal Register as required by the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (the Act) (5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b) (2)), permitting opportunity for com-
ment by interested persons. A reading of the
cases on this provision of the Act supports the
agency's view.

Volvo's petition objected to the fact that the
amendments specify the use of restrained dum-
mies in the test procedures. Volvo stated that
unrestrained dummies should be used because in
actual crash conditions it is the head of an un-
restrained occupant that is most likely to impact
and substantially load the windshield, since the
head of a restrained occupant would not nor-
mally contact the windshield.

While Volvo's statement is true, it must be
understood that test procedures specified in the
standards cannot simulate every element of ac-
tual crash conditions. Rather, the procedures
are based on a variety of considerations, includ-
ing test expense, and degree of complexity.
There were many comments to the prior notices
proposing the amendments in question that
urged the use of restrained dummies, due to the
possibility of damage to the expensive dummies
during the barrier crash tests. These comments
were taken into consideration prior to issuance
of the final rule. Also, the NHTSA concluded
that the vehicle deceleration forces are the pri-
mary forces affecting windshield retention and

PART 571; S 212— PRE 6

Effective: August 4, 1977

not the impact of occupants with the windshield.
The restrained dummies are recjuired. primarily,
for purposes of pcnnitting: simultaneous testing.
The XHTSA concludes that the retention re-
quirements and te.'it. procedures specified in the
amendments will ensure that vehicles are equipped
with windshields that provide the needed pro-
tection for occupant safety.

Volvo's petition also argued that Standard No.
212 "must include a measurement procedure that
weights the various segments of the windshield
peripherj- in a technically accurate maner."
Volso points to tests it has conducted which in-
dicate that "when the unrestrained occupant's
head impacts and substantially loads the wind-
shield, the loading will mo.st likely occur in the
windshield's upper regions and rwt uniformly
throughout the windshield."

"\Miile it is recognized that the degree of dis-
lodging of the windshield from its mounting
may vary at different locations around the pe-
riphery of the windshield, sufficient information
is not available on which to ba,se varying re-
tention requirements (for different areas of the
windshield). Further, the specification of reten-
tion requirements in the terms suggested by
Volvo was not proposed by the agency in 1972
or 1974. This aspect of Volvo's petition is there-
fore denied.

Several petitioners objected to the specifica-
tion of a temperature range in the test conditions
and asked that this provision l)e withdrawn.
Rolls Royce Motors argued that the amendment
will require additional tests to determine the
most critical temperature for windshield reten-
tion and stated that this would greatly increase
the burden on low-volume manufacturers. Gen-
eral Motors and Jeep Corporation stated that
the expansion of the test rex]uirements over a
wide temperature range adds to the stringency
of the standard without any evidence of a safety
need. American Motors petitioned to remove
the 15°F to UO'E temperature range from the
barrier test conditions on the basis that "it was
not specified as a barrier test condition in the
proposal for rulemaking," and on the basis that
there are laborat-ory tests that can serve the
same purpose.

The NHTSA denies all petitions to withdraw
the temperature range from the standard. As

stated in the preamble to the final rule, testing
over the specified range is necessary in light of
the fact that windshield moldings have sig-
nificantly different retention capabilities at dif-
ferent temi)erat.ures. This fact was graphically
confirmed by NHTSA compliance testing in
which windshields retained at low temperatures
were dislodged at higher temperatures (in iden-
tical vehicles). Concerning the objection of
American Motors, the temperature range was
proposed in paragraph S4 of the 1974 proposal
to amend Standard No. 212 (39 FR 2274).

General Motors recommended that the tem-
perature range be revised to specify 66° F to
78 °F limits, to coordinate the Standard 212 test
with the calibration conditions for the Part 572
dummy. General Motors argued that this would
reduce the number of barrier crash tests that
would be required.

The NHTSA rejects this recommendation.
The Part 572 dummies are conditioned in the
66°F-78°F temperature range for calibration
purposes in those standards in wMch the dy-
namic dummy response is part of the require-
ments of the standard. Since the response of
the dummy is not directly involved in the per-
formance requirements of Standard No. 212, the
temperature of the dummies is not significant.
Therefore, it is not necessary to restrict the
temperature range of Standard No. 212 to cor-
respond to the calibration temperature range of
the Part 572 dummies. For purposes of simul-
taneous testing, manufacturers could devise a
means to control the immediate environment of
the test dimimy within the 66°F-78°F calibra-
tion temperature range, independent of the tem-
perature range specified in Standard No. 212.

General Motors also argued that there could
be considerable variation in vehicles condition
and test results, depending on when and where
the vehicle is tested, since there could be an air
temperature of 110°F while windshield com-
ponents are at a much higher temperature due
to "sun load." General Motors, therefore, re-
quested that the temperature requirement be
clarified to specify that the temperature of the
entire vehicle be stabilized between 15°F and
110°F prior to the test

The NHTSA does not intend that vehicles be
tested with the windshield components at tem-

PART 571; S 212— PRE 7

Effective: August 4, 1977

peratures higher than 110°F. For purposes of
clarification, paragraph S6.5 of the new provi-
sions is revised to specify that the windsMeld
mounting material, and all vehicle components
in direct contact with the mounting material are
to be at any temperature between 15 °F and
110°F. Presumably this could be accomplished
by localized heating or cooling of the vehicle
components or by any other method chosen, in
the exercise of due care, by a manufacturer.

The August 1976 amendments to Standard
No. 212 modified the application section to in-
clude multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks
and buses having a gross weight rating of 10,000
pounds or less. "Open-body type" vehicles and
"forward control" vehicles wei"e excluded be-
cause of the impracticability of applying the
barrier crash test to these vehicles. General
Motors has pointed out that the NHTSA failed
to exclude "walk-in van-type" vehicles, which
have essentially the same configuration and
amount of front-end crush space as foi-ward con-
trol vehicles.

The NHTSA recently addressed this same
issue in connection with Standard No. 219,

Windshield Zone Intrusion, and, in the absence
of any objections, amend that standard to ex-
clude walk-in van-type vehicles (41 FR 54945,
December 16, 1976). On reconsideration of the
extended applicability of Standard No. 212 to
these vehicles, the agency concludes that the
same rationale applies. Accordingly, applica-
bility of Standard No. 212 to walk-in van-type
vehicles is withdrawn.

In consideration of the foregoing, the eflFective
date of the amendment to Standard No. 212 (49
CFR 571.212) published August 30, 1976 (41
FR 36493) is changed from September 1, 1977,
to September 1, 1978, and paragraphs S3 and
S6.5 of that text are modified. . . .

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407); delegation of authority
at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on June 29, 1977.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

42 F.R. 34288
July 5, 1977

PART 571; S 212— PRE 8

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY

STANDARD NO. 212

Windshield Mounting; Windshield Zone Intrusion
(Docket No. 79-14; Notice 02)

ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends two safety
standards, Standard No. 212, Windshield
Mounting, and Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone
Intrusion, to limit the maximum unloaded vehicle
weight at which vehicles must be tested for
compliance with these standards. This action is
being taken in response to petitions from the Truck
Body and Equipment Association and the National
Truck Equipment Association asking the agency to
amend the standards to provide relief from some of
the test requirements for final-stage manufacturers.
Many of these small manufacturers do not have the
sophisticated test devices of major vehicle
manufacturers. The agency concludes that the
weights at which vehicles are tested can be lessened
while providing an adequate level of safety for
vehicles such as light trucks and while ensuring that
compliance with these standards does not increase
their aggressivity with respect to smaller vehicles.

EFFECTIVE DATE: Since this amendment relieves
a restriction by easing the existing test procedure
and will not impose any additional burdens upon
any manufacturer, it is effective (upon
publication).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. William Smith, Crashworthiness Division,
National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-2242)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

On August 2, 1979, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration published a notice of
proposed rulemaking (44 FR 45426) relating to two
safety standards: Standard Nos. 212, Windshield

Mounting, and 219 Windshield Zone Intrusion.
That notice proposed two options for amending the
test procedures of the standards that were designed
to ease the compliance burdens of small final-stage
manufacturers.

The agency issued the proposal after learning that
final-stage manufacturers were frequently unable to
certify certain vehicles in compliance with these two
safety standards. The problem arises because of
weight and center of gravity restrictions imposed
upon the final-stage manufacturer by the incomplete
vehicle manufacturer. (The final-stage manufacturer
typically purchases an incomplete vehicle from an in-
complete vehicle manufacturer, usually Ford,
General Motors or Chrysler.) The incomplete vehicle
usually includes the windshield and mounting but
does not include any body or work-performing equip-
ment. Since the incomplete vehicle manufacturer
installs the windshield, it represents to the final-stage
manufacturer that the windshield will comply with
the two subject safety standards. In making this
representation, however, the incomplete vehicle
manufacturer states that the representation is con-
tingent on the final-stage manufecturer's adherence
to certain restrictions. Any final-stage manufacturer
that does not adhere to the restrictions imposed by
the incomplete vehicle manufacturer must recertify
the vehicle based upon its own information, analysis,
or tests. The major restrictions imposed by the
incomplete vehicle manufacturers on the final-stage
manufacturer involve weight and center of gravity
limitation. In many instances, these limitations have
made it impossible for final-stage manufacturers
either to rely on the incomplete vehicle
manufacturer's certification or to complete vehicles
on the same chassis that they were accustomed to
using (prior to the extension of the two safety
standards to these vehicle types). As a result, the
final-stage manufacturer is faced either with buying

PART 571; S 212-PRE 9

the same chassis as before and recertifying them
or with buying more expensive chassis with higher
GVWR's and less stringent weight and center of
gravity Hmitations.

The agency has tried several different ways to
alleviate this problem for the final-stage
manufacturer. The NHTSA has met with
representatives of the major incomplete vehicle
manufacturers to encourage them to respond
voluntarily by strengthening their windshield
structures and reducing the restrictions that they
currently impose upon final-stage manufacturers.
The agency also discussed the possibility of its
mandating these actions by upgrading Standards
Nos. 212 and 219. Ford and General Motors
indicated that the making of any major changes in
these standards could lead to their deciding to
discontinue offering chassis for use in the
manufacturing of multi-stage vehicles. They said
that such chassis were a very small percentage of
their light truck sales and that, therefore, they
would not consider it worth the cost to them to
make any extensive modifications in their vehicles.
NHTSA also asked the incomplete vehicle
manufacturers to be sure that they have properly
certified their existing vehicles and that they are
not imposing unnecessarily restrictive limitations
upon final-stage manufacturers. To this agency's
knowledge, these vehicle manufacturers have
neither undertaken any strengthening of their
vehicles' windshield structures nor lessened any of
their restrictions.

At the same time that the agency was made
aware of the final-stage manufacturers' problems
of certifying to these standards, the agency was
becoming concerned about the possibility that
compliance of some light trucks and vans with
these standards might have made the vehicles
more aggressive with respect to smaller passenger
cars that they might impact. According to agency
information, if these standards require a
substantial strengthening of vehicle frames, the
aggressivity of the vehicles is increased.
Therefore, as a result of the agency's concern
about aggressivity and its desire to address the
certification problems of final-stage manufacturers
in a manner that would not lead to a cessation of a
chassis sales to those manufacturers, the agency
issued the August 1979 proposal. The agency
hoped that the proposal would allow and encourage
incomplete vehicle manufacturers to reduce their

weight and center of gravity restrictions, thereby
easing or eliminating the compliance test burdens
of final-stage manufacturers. The agency believed
that this could occur using either option, because
either would result in vehicles being tested at
lower weights. Currently vehicles are tested under
both standards at their unloaded vehicle weights
plus 300 pounds.

The first option would have required some
vehicles whose unloaded vehicle weights exceeded
4,000 pounds to be tested by being impacted with a
4,000 pound moving barrier. The second option
proposed by the agency would have required
vehicles to be tested at their unloaded vehicle
weight up to a maximum unloaded vehicle weight
of 5,500 pounds. This option was suggested to the
agency by several manufacturers and manufac-
turer representatives.

Comments on Notice

In response to the agency's notice, nine
manufacturers and manufacturer representatives
submitted comments. All of the commenters
supported some action in response to the problems
of final-stage manufacturers. Most of the
commenters also suggested that the agency's
second alternative solution was more likely to
achieve reductions in the restrictions being
imposed by incomplete vehicle manufacturers. The
first option would have created a new, unproven
test procedure, and manufacturers would have
been cautious in easing center of gravity or weight
restrictions based upon this test procedure.
Accordingly, most commenters were not sure that
the first option would achieve the desired results.
The consensus was, therefore, that the second
option should be adopted.

Some manufacturers recommended that both
options be permitted allowing the manufacturer to
decide how to test its vehicles. The agency does not
agree with this recommendation. Not only would it
be more difficult and expensive to enforce a
standard that has alternative test procedures, but
most manufacturers prefer the 5,500 pound weight
limit option. The NHTSA concludes that as a result
of the comments supporting the 5,500 pound
maximum test weight, that this is an acceptable
procedure for testing compliance with these two
standards. Therefore, the standards are amended
to incorporate this procedure.

PART 571; S 212-PRE 10

The major incomplete vehicle manufacturers
commenting on the notice suggested that testing
vehicles at a maximum weight of 5,500 pounds
might provide some immediate relief. None of the
major incomplete vehicle manufacturers provided
any information concerning how substantial that
relief might be. Ford indicated that any relief
might be limited.

The agency believes that the incomplete vehicle
manufacturers must accept the responsibility for
establishing reasonable restrictions upon their
incomplete vehicles. The NHTSA has not been
provided with sufficient evidence substantiating
the statements of the incomplete vehicle
manufacturers that their existing restrictions are
reasonable. In fact, some evidence indicates that
unnecessarily stringent restrictions are being
imposed because incomplete vehicle manufacturers
do not want to conduct the necessary testing to
establish the appropriate weight and center of
g^vity restrictions. Since this amendment should
reduce the severity of the test procedures, the
agency concludes that incomplete vehicle
manufacturers should immediately review their
certification test procedures and reduce the
restrictions being passed on to final-stage
manufacturers.

Due to changes in the light truck market, there is
reason to believe that the incomplete vehicle
manufacturers will be more cooperative than when
the agency spoke to them before beginning this
rulemaking. At that time, light truck sales were
still running well. Now that these sales are down,
these manufacturers may be more solicitous of the
needs of the final-stage manufacturers. If relief is
not provided by the incomplete vehicle
manufacturers, then the agency will consider
taking additional steps, including the upgrading of
Standards Nos. 212 and 219 as they apply to all
light trucks.

General Motors (GM) questioned one of the
agency's rationales for issuing the notice of
proposed rulemaking. GM stated that the agency
concludes that this action will provide a more
appropriate level of safety for the affected vehicles
while the initial extension of these standards to the
affected vehicles provides, in GM's view, only a
slight increase in the level of safety of the vehicles.
GM indicates that since the application of these
standards to the affected vehicles provides only
slight benefits and since this amendment will

reduce those benefits, the standards should not
apply to light trucks and vans. The agency
disagrees with this suggestion.

The agency is currently reviewing the
applicability of many of its safety standards to
determine whether they ought to be extended to
light trucks and other vehicles. Accident data
clearly indicate the benefits that have resulted
from the implementation of safety standards to
cars. The fatality rate for passenger cars has
decreased substantially since the implementation
of a broad range of safety standards to those
vehicles. On the other hand, light trucks and vans
have not had a corresponding reduction in fatality
rates over the years. The agency attributes much
of this to the fact that many safety standards have
not been applied to those vehicles. Since those
vehicles are becoming increasingly popular as
passenger vehicles, the agency concludes that
safety standards must apply to them.

In response to GM's comment that this reduction
in the test requirements for Standard Nos. 212 and
219 will remove all benefits derived by having the
standards apply to those vehicles, the agency
concludes that GM has misinterpreted the effects
of this amendment. This amendment will reduce
somewhat the compliance test requirements for
those light trucks and vans with unloaded vehicle
weights in excess of 5,500 pounds. It will not affect
light trucks with unloaded vehicle weights below
5,500 pounds. According to agency information,
approximately 25 percent of the light trucks have
unloaded vehicle weights in excess of 5,500 while
the remainder fall below that weight. As a result of
weight reduction to improve fuel economy, it is
likely that even more light trucks will fall below the
5,500 pound maximum test weight in the future.
Therefore, this amendment will have no impact
upon most light trucks and vans. In light of the
small proportion of light trucks and vans affected
by this amendment and considering the potential
benefits of applying these standards to all light
trucks and vans, the agency declines to adopt GM's
suggestion that the standards be made inapplicable
to these vehicles.

With respect to GM's question about the
appropriate level of safety for light trucks, the
agency's statement in the notice of proposed
rulemaking was intended to show that the safety of
light trucks and vans cannot be viewed without
considering the relative safety of lighter vehicles

PART 571; S 212-PRE 11

that they may impact. Accordingly, the level of
safety that the agency seeks to achieve by this and
other safety standards is determined by balancing
the interests of the occupants of passenger cars
and heavier vehicles.

GM also questioned the agency's statement that
vehicle aggressivity may be increased by imposing
too severe requirements on these vehicles. GM
suggested that no evidence exists that vehicle
aggressivity is increased as a result of complying
with these standards.

The agency stated in the proposal that it was
concerned that compliance with the standards as
they now exist might have increased the
aggressivity of the vehicles, thereby harming the
occupants of passenger cars that are impacted by
these larger, more rigid vehicles. The agency is
now beginning to examine the full range of vehicle
aggressivity problems. The docket for this notice
contains a paper recently presented by a member
of our staff to the Society of Automotive
Engineers on this subject. The agency tentatively
concludes, based upon the initial results of our
research and analysis, that vehicle aggressivity
could be a safety problem and that the agency
considers that possibility in issuing its safety
standards. The NHTSA notes that Volkswagen
applauds the agency's recognition of the vehicle
aggressivity factor in safety.

As to GM's argument that compliance with the
standards may not have increased vehicle
aggressivity, our information on this point came
from the manufacturers. The manufacturers
indicated that compliance with Standards 212 and
219 requires strengthening the vehicle frame. This
makes a vehicle more rigid. Our analysis indicates
that making a vehicle more rigid may also make it
more aggressive. Therefore, the agency concludes
partially on the basis of the manufacturer's
information, that compliance with the safety
standards as they are written may have increased
the aggressivity of the vehicles.

Ford Motor Company suggested that, rather
than change these two particular standards, the
agency should amend the certification regulation
(Part 568) to state that any vehicle that is barrier
tested would be required only to comply to an
unloaded vehicle weight of 5,500 pounds or less.
Ford suggested that this would standardize all of
the tests and provide uniformity.

The agency is unable to accept Ford's
recommendation for several reasons. First, the
certification regulation is an inappropriate place to
put a test requirement applicable to several
standards. The tests' requirements of the
standards should be found in each standard.
Second, the Ford recommendation would result in
a reduction of the level of safety currently imposed
by Standard No. 301, Ficel System Integrity.

As we stated earlier and in several other notices,
the agency is legislatively forbidden to modify
Standard No. 301 in a way that would reduce the
level of safety now required by that standard.
Even without this legislative mandate, the agency
would not be likely to relieve the burdens imposed
by Standard No. 301. That standard is extremely
important for the prevention of fires during
crashes. Compliance of a vehicle with this standard
not only protects the occupants of the vehicle that
is in compliance but also protects the occupants of
vehicles that it impacts. The agency concludes that
the standard now provides a satisfactory level of
safety in vehicles, and NHTSA would not be likely
to amend it to reduce these safety benefits even if
such an amendment were possible.

With respect to fuel system integrity, several
manufacturers suggested that the agency had
underestimated the impact of that standard upon
weight and center of gravity restrictions. These
commenters indicated that compliance with that
standard requires more than merely adding shielding
to the fuel systems of the vehicles. The agency is
aware that compliance with that standard in certain
instances has imposed restrictions upon
manufacturers. Nonetheless, the agency continues to
believe that as a result of this amendment, the
chassis manufacturers will be able to reduce their
weight and center of gravity restrictions while still
maintaining the compliance of their vehicles with
Standard No. 301.

Chrysler commented that the agency should
consider including the new test procedure in
Standard No. 204 and all other standards thai
require barrier testing. The agency has issued a
notice on Standard No. 204 (44 FR 68470) stating
that it was considering a similar test provision for
that standard. The agency also is aware that any
barrier test requirement imposed upon vehicles
subject to substantial modifications by final-stage

PART 571; S 212-PRE 12

manufacturers will create problems for the final-
stage manufacturers. Accordingly, the agency will
consider the special problems of these manufacturers
prior to the the issuance of standards that might
affect them and will attempt to make the test
requirements of the various standards consistent
wherever possible.

The agency has reviewed this amendment in
accordance with Executive Order 12044 and
concludes that it will have no significant economic or
other impact. Since the regulation relieves some
testing requirements, it may slightly reduce costs
associated with some vehicles. Accordingly, the
agency concludes that this is not a significant
amendment and a regulatory analysis is not required.

In accordance with the foregoing, Volume 49 of
the Code of Federal Regulations Part 571 is

amended by adding the following sentence to the
end of paragraph S6.1(b) of Standard No. 212 (49
CFR 571.212) and paragraph S7.7(b) of Standard
No. 219 (49 CFR 571.219).

Vehicles are tested to a maximum unloaded
vehicle weight of 5,500 pounds.

The authors of this notice are William Smith of
the Crashworthiness Division and Roger Tilton of
the Office of Chief Counsel.

Issued on March 28, 1980.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

45 F.R. 22044
April 3, 1980

PART 571; S 212-PRE 13-14

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 212

Windshield Mounting

51. Scope. This standard establishes wind-
shield retention requirements for motor vehicles
during crashes.

52. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is to
reduce crash injuries and fatalities by providing for
retention of the vehicle windshield during a crash,
thereby utilizing fully the penetration-resistance
and injury-avoidance properties of the windshield
glazing material and preventing the ejection of
occupants from the vehicle.

53. Application. This standard applies to
passenger cars and to multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks, and buses having a gross vehicle
weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less. However, it
does not apply to forward control vehicles, walk-in
van-type vehicles, or to open-body-type vehicles
with fold-down or removable windshields.

54. Definition. "Passive restraint system"
means a system meeting the occupant crash pro-
tection requirements of S5 of Standard No. 208 by
means that require no action by vehicle occupants.

35. Requirements. When the vehicle traveling
longitudinally forward at any speed up to and
including 30 mph impacts a fixed collision barrier
that is perpendicular to the line of travel of the
vehicle, under the conditions of S6, the windshield
mounting of the vehicle shall retain not less than
the minimum portion of the windshield periphery
specified in S5.1 and S5.2.

55.1 Vehicles equipped with passive restraints.

Vehicles equipped with passive restraint systems
shall retain not less than 50 percent of the portion
of the windshield periphery on each side of the
vehicle longitudinal centerline.

55.2 Vehicles not equipped with passive
restraints. Vehicles not equipped with passive
restraint systems shall retain not less than 75 per-
cent of the windshield periphery.

S6. Test conditions. The requirements of S5
shall be met under the following conditions:

S6.1 The vehicle, including test devices and in-
strumentation, is loaded as follows:

(a) Except as specified in S6.2, a passenger car
is loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight plus its
cargo and luggage capacity weight, secured in the
luggage area, plus a 50th-percentile test dummy as
specified in Part 572 of this chapter at each front
outboard designated seating position and at any
other position whose protection system is required
to be tested by a dummy under the provisions of
Standard No. 208. Each dummy is restrained only
by means that are installed for protection at its
seating position.

(b) Except as specified in S6.2, a multipurpose
passenger vehicle, truck, or bus is loaded to its
unloaded vehicle weight plus 300 pounds or its
rated cargo and luggage capacity, whichever is
less, secured to the vehicle, plus a 50th-percentile
test dummy as specified in Part 572 of this chapter
at each front outboard designated seating position
and at any other position whose protection system
is required to be tested by a dummy under the
provisions of Standard No. 208. Each dummy is
restrained only by means that are installed for
protection at its seating position. The load is
distributed so that the weight on each axle as
measured at the tire-ground interface is in propor-
tion to its GAWR. If the weight on any axle when
the vehicle is loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight
plus dummy weight exceeds the axle's proportional
share of the test weight, the remaining weight is
placed so that the weight on that axle remains the
same. For the purposes of this section, unloaded
vehicle weight does not include the weight of
workperforming accessories. Vehicles are tested to
a maximum unloaded vehicle weight of 5,500
pounds.

PART 571; S 212-1

56.2 The fuel tank is filled to any level from S6.5 The windshield mounting material and
90 to 95 percent of capacity. all vehicle components in direct contact with

„ „ „, , . , , . J. J , ^, the mounting material are at any temperature

56.3 The parkmg brake is disengaged and the between 15°F and 110°F.
transmission is in neutral.

56.4 Tires are inflated to the vehicle manu- 41 F.R. 36493
facturer's specifications. August 30, 1976

PART 571; S 212-2

PREAMBLE TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 213

Child Restraint Systems, Seat Belt Assemblies, and Anchorages
(Docket No. 74-9; Notice 6)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This rule establishes a new Standard
No. 213, Child Restraint Systems, which applies to
all types of child restraints used in motor vehicles.
It also upgrades existing child restraint perform-
ance requirements by setting new performance
criteria and by replacing the current static tests
with dynamic sled tests that simulate vehicle
crashes and use anthropomorphic child test
dummies. The new standard would reduce the
number of children under 5 years of age killed or
injured in motor vehicle accidents.

DATES: On June 1, 1980, compliance with the
requirements of this standard will become
mandatory. The current Standard No. 213 is
amended to permit, at the manufacturer's option,
compliance during the interim period either with
the requirements of existing Standard No. 213,
Child Seating Systems, or the new Standard No.
213, Child Restraint Systems.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration should
refer to the docket number and be submitted to:
Docket Section, Room 5108, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Vladislav Radovich, Office of Vehicle
Safety Standards, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C.20590 (202-426-2264)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

This notice establishes a new Standard No. 213,
Child Restraint Systems. A notice of proposed
rulemaking was published on May 18, 1978 (43 FR
21470) proposing to upgrade and extend the

applicability of the existing Standard No. 213, Child
Seating Systems. The existing standard does not
regulate car beds and infant carriers and uses static
testing to assess the effectiveness of child restraint
systems. The new standard covers all types of child
restraint systems and evaluates their performance in
dynamic sled tests with anthropomorphic test dum-
mies. On May 18, 1978, NHTSA also published a
companion notice of proposed rulemaking proposing
to amend Part 572, Anthropomoryhic Test Dummies,
by specifying requirements for two anthropomorphic
test dummies representing 3 year and 6 month old
children (43 FR 21490) for use in compliance testing
under proposed Standard No. 213. The comment
closing date for both notices was December 1, 1978.

At the request of the Juvenile Product Manufac-
turers Association, NHTSA extended the comment
closing date until January 5, 1979, for the portions of
both proposals dealing with testing with the child test
dummies. This extension was granted because
manufacturers were reportedly having problems
obtaining the proposed test dummies to conduct their
own evaluations.

Consumers, public health organizations, child
restraint manufacturers and others submitted
comments on the proposed standard. The final rule is
based on a thorough evaluation of all data obtained in
NHTSA testing, data submitted in the comments,
and data obtained from other pertinent documents
and test reports. Significant comments submitted to
the docket are addressed below. The agency will soon
issue a final rule on the anthropomorphic test dummy
proposal.

Summary of the Final Rule Provisions

The significant portions of the new standard are
as follows:

1. The performance of the child restraint system
is evaluated in dynamic tests under conditions

PART 571; S 213-PRE-l

simulating a frontal crash of an average
automobile at 30 mph. The restraint system is
anchored with a lap belt and, if provided with the
restraint, a supplementary anchorage belt (tether
strap). An additional frontal impact test at 20 mph
is conducted for restraints equipped with tether
straps or arm rests. In that additional test, child
restraints with tether straps will be tested with the
tether straps detached and child restraints with
arm rests will be tested with the arm rest in place
but with the child restraint system belts unbuckled.
The additional 20 mph tests are intended to ensure
a minimum level of safety performance when the
restraints are improperly used.

2. To protect the child, limitations are set on the
amount of force exerted on the head and chest of
the child test dummy during the dynamic testing of
restraints specified for children over 20 pounds.
Limitations are also set on the amount of frontal
head and knee excursions experienced by the test
dummy in forward-facing child restraints and
harnesses. To prevent a child from being ejected
from a rearward-facing restraint, limitations are
set on the amount the seat can tip forward and on
the amount of excursion experienced by the test
dummy during the simulated crash.

3. During the dynamic testing, no load-bearing
or other structrual part of any child restraint
system shall separate so as to create jagged edges
that could injure a child. If the restraint has
adjustable positions, it must remain in its pre-test
adjusted position during the testing so that the
restraint does not shift positions in a crash and
possibly injure a child's limbs caught between the
shifting parts or allow a child to submarine during
the crash (i.e., allow the child's body to slide too far
forward and downward, legs first).

4. To prevent injuries to children during crashes
from contact with the surface of the restraint,
requirements for the size and shape are specified
for those surfaces. In addition, protective padding
requirements are set for restraints used by
children weighing 20 pounds or less.

5. Requirements in Standard No. 209, Seat Belt
Assemblies (49 CFR 571.209), are applied to the
belt restraints used in child restraint systems.

6. The amount of force necessary to open belt
buckles and release a child from a restraint system
is specified so that children cannot unbuckle
themselves, but adults can easily open the buckle.

7. To promote the easy and correct use of all
child restraint systems, they are required to attach
to the vehicle by means of vehicle seat belts.

8. Warnings for proper use of the restraints
must be permanently posted on the restraint so
that the warnings are visible when the restraint is
installed. Other information, such as the height
and weight limits for children using the child
restraint, must also be permanently displayed on
the restraint but it does not have to be visible when
the restraint is installed. The restraint must also
have a location for storing an accompanying infor-
mation booklet or sheet on how to correctly install
and use the restraint.

9. A standard seat assembly is used in the
dynamic testing to represent the typical vehicle
bench seat and thereby aboid the cost of testing
child restraints on numerous vehicle seats.

Applicability of Standard No. 213

The provisions of new Standard No. 213 apply to
all types of child restraints used in motor vehicles
for protection of children weighing up to 50
pounds, such as child seats, infant carriers, child
harnesses and car beds. Beginning on June 1,
1980, compliance with the requirements of this
standard will become mandatory. The current
Standard No. 213 is amended to permit, at the
manufacturer's option, compliance during the
interim period either with the requirements of
existing Standard No. 213, Child Seating Systems,
or of the new Standard No. 213, Child Restraint
Systems.

Dynamic Testing

The requirements to be met in the dynamic
testing of child restraints include: maintaining the
structural integrity of the system, retaining the
head and knees of the dummy within specified ex-
cursion limits (i.e., limits on how far those portions
of the body may move forward) and limiting the
forces exerted on the dummy by the restraint
system. These requirements will reduce the
likelihood that the child using a child restraint
system will be injured by the collapse or disintegra-
tion of the system, or by contact with interior of
the vehicle, or by imposition of intolerable forces
by the restraint system. As explained below,
omission of any of these three requirements would
render imcomplete the criteria for the quantitative
assessment of the safety of a child restraint system

PART 571; S 213-PRE-2

and could very well lead to the design and use of
unsafe restraints.

It was suggested in comments by the child
restraint manufacturers and their trade associa-
tion, the Juvenile Products Manufacturers
Association (JPMA), that available restraints are
performing satisfactorily. According to them, the
new standard imposes expensive testing re-
quirements with instrumented dummies which will
increase the price of child restraints and
discourage the purchasing of child restraints
because of their increased costs. Many manufac-
turers suggested that the agency limit the stand-
ard to tests for occupant excursion and restraint
system structural integrity in dynamic tests and
not require the use of instrumented test dummies
to measure crash forces imposed upon a child.

NHTSA recognizes that some child restraints
perform relatively well, but the agency's testing
has shown that others perform unsatisfactorily.
Measuring only the structural integrity of the
system and the amount of occupant excursion
allowed during the testing does not provide a
measurement of the severity of forces imposed on
a child during a crash and thus does not provide an
accurate assessment of the actual safety of the
system. For example, a manufacturer could design
a restraint with a surface mounted in front of the
child that would allow a small amount of occupant
excursion. However, that surface could impose
potentially injurious forces on a child. NHTSA
believes that the force measurement performance
requirements are a crucial and necessary test to
adequately judge a restraint system's effectiveness
in preventing or reducing injuries. The use of in-
strumented test dummies and force measurement
requirements are crucial elements of Standard No.
208, Occupant Crash Protection, which establish
performance requirements for automatic restraint
systems. NHTSA believes that systems designed
specifically for children should have to provide the
same high degree of occupant protection.

Several manufacturers (GM, Ford, Questor, and
others) and JPMA objected to the proposed head
and chest acceleration limits that must not be
exceeded in the dynamic testing. They argued that
the acceleration limits are based on biomechanical
data for adults and there are no data showing their
applicability to children. Because of the lack of
biomechanical data on children's tolerance to
impact forces, NHTSA has conducted tests of child

restraints with live primates to serve as surrogates
for three-year-old children. Primates are similar in
certain respects to children and, have been used by
GM, Ford and others as surrogates in child
restraint testing to assess protential injuries to
children in crashes. In simulated 30 mph crashes
conducted for NHTSA, similar to the test pre-
scribed in the proposed standard, the primates
either were not injured or sustained only minor
injuries. NHTSA has also conducted child restraint
tests using instrumented test dummies represen-
ting three-year-old children instead of primates. In
the tests, the forces measured on the test
dummies, which had not been injurious to the
primates, did not exceed the head and chest ac-
celeration criteria proposed in the standard.
NHTSA is thus confident that the child restraints
which do not exceed these performance criteria in
the prescribed tests should prevent or reduce injuries
to chOdren in crashes.

Use of instrumented test dummies should not
unduly raise the price of child restraints. Since
many child restraint systems are already close to
compliance, the cost per restraint of any needed
design and testing costs should be minimal.

The May 1978 notice would have required
restraint systems with adjustable positions to meet
the performance requirements of the standards in
any of its adjusted positions recommended for use
in a motor vehicle. The restraint would have had to
remain in its adjusted position during testing.
International Manufacturing Co. requested the
agency to test adjustable restraints in only their
extreme up and down positions. If a manufacturer
chooses to offer a seat with a number of adjustable
positions which it recommends for use in a motor
vehicle, it is important that the seat meet the
performance requirements of the standard at any
of those positions. Therefore, International's
request is denied. NHTSA urges manufacturers
not to include any adjustment positions for their
restraints which are not to be used in a motor
vehicle.

Strollee, Questor and Volvo asked NHTSA to
allow adjustable position restraints to change posi-
tions during the testing, arguing that controlled
change of position can be an effective energy-
absorbing method. Allowing changes from one
adjustment position to another during a crash can
cause injuries to children's hands or fingers caught
between the structural elements of the restraint as

PART 571; S 213-PRE-3

it changes position. Other effective energy-
absorbing methods are available which will not
pose a risk of injury to children. Thus, NHTSA is
not adopting this suggestion.

Child restraint manufacturers and other
interested parties, such as Action for Child
Transportation Safety (ACTS), American
Academy of Pediatrics, Physicians for Automotive
Safety, and Michigan's Office of Highway Safety,
urged NHTSA to lengthen the 30 inch head and
knee excursion requirements for forward-facing
restraints. They argued that some child restraint
systems which have been effective in real world
crashes will exceed the proposed head excursion
limit. NHTSA has reviewed its child restraint tests
and determined that during the last few inches of
excursion the remaining velocity of the head in
impacts with padded surfaces is relatively low.
Because slightly increasing the head excursion
should not increase the forces imposed upon the
child's head, the head excursion limit is changed
from 30 to 32 inches.

The May 1978 notice proposed limiting the
amount of knee excursion in forward-facing child
restraints to 30 inches. The purpose of the knee
excursion limit is to prevent manufacturers from
controlling the amount of head excursion by
designing their restraints so that their occupants
submarine excessively during a crash (i.e., so that
their bodies slide too far downward and forward,
legs first). Many child restraint manufacturers and
JPMA asked the agency to lengthen the knee
excursion limits. They argued that many
restraints, particularly reclining child restraints
where the occupant's knees will be further forward
than a non-reclining child restraint, cannot pass
the knee excursion limit, but do not allow the
occupants to submarine. They claimed that the
reclining feature is a comfort and convenience
device which promotes seat usage since it allows a
child to sleep in the restraint. They recommended
that the agency establish a separate requirement
which would prevent the occupant's torso from
straightening out and submarining under the belts.
NHTSA has tested several child restraints in the
reclining position and determined that the knee
excursion can be lengthened to 36 inches without
allowing submarining if the dummy's torso has
rotated at least 15 degrees forward from its initial
starting position when the knees have reached
their maximum excursion. Thus, the new standard

incorporates a 36 inch knee excursion limit and
requires the test dummy's torso to have rotated at
least 15 degrees forward when the knees have
reached their maximum excursion.

For rear-facing child restraints (i.e., infant
carriers) the May 1978 notice proposed retaining
the dummy's head within the confines of the seat
and preventing the back support surface of the
restraint from tipping forward far enough to allow
the angle between it and the vertical to exceed 60
degrees. If the support surface were allowed to tip
more, the infant in the restraint could slide head
first out of the shoulder straps. GM and Heinrich
Von Wimmersperg pointed out that there is a
conflict between the description of the confines of
rear-facing restraints contained in the text of the
standard and the manner in which the confines are
defined in one of the figures incorporated in the
standard. The text has been modified to correctly
identify the confines of the restraint systems. GM
also commented that the text of the standard
defined the head confinement requirements in
reference to the head target points of the infant
dummy, although the infant dummy, unlike the 3
year child test dummy, does not have target points.
The revised specifications for the infant test
dummy do include head target points and therefore
the confinement requirement is retained as
originally proposed.

Several child restraint manufacturers objected
to limiting the forward tipping of rear-facing
restraints to 60 degrees. They argued that rear-
facing child restraints can tip as much as 70
degrees forward and still retain the child within
the restraint. They also argued that a rear-facing
restraint will hit the instrument panel in the front
seat, or the back of the front seat if the restraint is
used in the rear seat, before the restraint tips 60
degrees. NHTSA is retaining a limit on forward
tipping since a child restraint can be used in a
vehicle with the vehicle's front seat moved to its
extreme forward or rearward position. If the child
restraint is used in the front seat and the vehicle
seat is in the extreme rearward position, the child
restraint can tip forward without striking the
instrument panel. Likewise, a child restraint used
in the rear seat, where the vehicle's front seat is in
its extreme forward position, can tip forward
without striking the back of the front seat.
However, tests done by NHTSA have shown that a
restraint can tip forward as much as 70 degrees

PART 571; S 213-PRE-4

while still retaining the child within the confines of
the restraint. Therefore, the limitation on forward
tipping is being changed to 70 rather than 60
degrees.

One child restraint manufacturer, the American
Association for Automotive Medicine and Heinrich
Von Wimmersperg commented that manufac-
turers of rear-facing restraints may attempt to
comply with the limitation on forward rotation by
designing the normal resting angle of the seat in a
very vertical alignment or by adding attachments
to prop the seat into a vertical position. Either of
those approaches can create an uncomfortable
seating position for the child. They recommended
that the agency establish a minimum resting angle
for rear-facing restraints. The agency is not
adopting this suggestion at this time. By increas-
ing the amount of forward rotation allowed, the
agency should have removed the temptation for
manufacturers to design restraint resting angles
which would make it easier to comply with the
requirement, but would create uncomfortable
seating positions for the child.

The May 1978 notice proposed an additional
djTiamic test at 20 mph for child restraint systems
equipped with tether straps with those straps left
unattached. A number of commenters (such as
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, ACTS,
University of Tennessee, Questor, Bobby Mac, and
Michigan's Office of Highway Safety) commented
that many people fail to connect the tether. They
recommended that this type of restraint be tested
at 30 mph with unattached tethers.

The agency is aware of the benefits and dis-
advantages of child restraints equipped with
tethers, which presently account for over 70 per-
cent of the child restraint sales. The agency's
testing has shown that in 30 mph frontal tests child
restraints with the tethers attached have less
occupant excursion and lower head and chest ac-
celerations than shield-type restraints that do not
use tethers. Tethered restraints also allow far less
occupant excursion in lateral crashes than shield-
type restraints. The available accident data on
child restraints, which includes consumer letters
and accident investigation reports, is limited since
the usage of child restraints is low. It does show,
however, that tethered restraints, both properly
tethered and untethered, have prevented injuries
to children in crashes where other vehicle
occupants were severely injured.

Because of the performance of properly tethered
child restraints under testing and accident condi-
tions, the agency does not want to eliminate those
restraints from the market. At the same time, the
agency wants to reduce or eliminate the possibility of
people not using the tethers that accompany those
restraints. Therefore, the agency is requiring all
seats equipped with a tether to have a visible label
warning people to correctly fasten the tether. In
addition, the agency is considering issuing a
proposal to require vehicle manufacturers to pro-
vide attachments for tether anchorages in all their
vehicles. Having such attachments will enable
parents to easily and properly attach tethers. The
agency is also striving to promote the increased
and proper use of child restraints through educa-
tional programs. As a part of this effort, NHTSA
has conducted a series of regional seminars aimed
at helping grass roots organizations educate
parents about the importance of child restraints. A
NHTSA-sponsored national conference on child
restraint safety is scheduled for December 10-12
in Washington, D.C. to further these educational
programs.

To ensure that restraints equipped with tethers
provide at least a minimum level of protection if
they are misused, the agency will require an addi-
tional dynamic test at 20 mph for those restraints.
When tested with tethers unattached, the
restraints must pass all the dynamic test perform-
ance requirements of the standard.

Energy Absorption and Distribution

Several manufacturers (Questor, Strollee,
Cosco) and JPMA objected to the proposed height
requirements for head restraints used to control
the rearward movement of a child's head in a
crash. The proposal would have slightly increased
the requirements currently set in Standard No.
213. They argued that there was no basis for the
change, which would require them to redesign
their child restraints. The new requirements are
based on anthropometric data on children gathered
since the standard was originally adopted. NHTSA
proposed the new head restraint height re-
quirements in its earlier March 1974 notice of pro-
posed rulemaking on child restraints and many
manufacturers have already redesigned their seats
to comply with the requirements. Since the new
heights more accurately reflect the seating heights
of children than the old requirements, the agency

PART 571; S 213-PRE-5

is adopting them as proposed. The notice proposed
that the top of the head restraint be 22 inches
above the seating surface for restraints used by
children weighing more than 40 pounds. Questor
requested the upper weight be changed to 43
pounds. Since 40 pounds represents the weight of a
50th percentile 5 year old and 23 inches represents
its seating height, the requirement is not changed.

Several manufacturers (Cosco, Strollee,
Questor) and JPMA raised objections to the pro-
posed requirement that head restraints of child
restraint systems have a width of not less than 8
inches. They pointed out that the minimum head
restraint width requirement is intended to prevent
a child's head from going beyond the width of a
head restraint in a lateral or rear impact. They
argued that restraints with side supports or
"wings" should not have to meet the 8 inch width
requirement since the side supports will prevent an
occupant's head from moving laterally outside the
restraint system. NHTSA agrees that the side sup-
ports should help laterally retain the child's head
within the restraint during a side or rear impact
and therefore is exempting those restraints from
the 8 inch minimim width requirement. However,
to ensure that child restraints with side supports
have sufficient width to accommodate the heads of
the largest child using the restraint, the agency
has set a 6 inch minimum width for those
restraints. In addition, to ensure that side supports
are large enough to retain an occupant's head
within the restraint, the agency has set a minimum
depth requirement of four inches for those sup-
ports. Anthropomorphic data show that the head
of a 50th percentile 5 year old child measures 7 in-
ches front to rear and is 6 inches in breadth.
Therefore, a four inch support should contact a suf-
ficient area of the child's head to restrain it.

Manufacturers also questioned if the 8 inch width
requirements is to be measured in restraints with
side support from the surface of the padded side
support or from the surface of the underlying
structure before the padding is added. The
wording of the standard is changed to make clear
that the distance is measured from the surface of
the padding, since the padded surface must be wide
enough to accommodate the child's head.

The notice proposed that the minimum head
restraint height requirement would not apply to

restraints that use the vehicle's seat back to
restrain the head, if the target point on the side of
the head of the test dummy representing a 3 year
old child is raised above the top of the seat back.
Ford said that because of permitted differences in
the dimensions of different test dummies and test
seats, its child restraint will not consistently meet
the requirements. Ford asked that the height
requirement be changed or the manufacturers be
permitted to restrict their restraints to seats with
head restraints or to rear seats which have a flat
surface immediately behind the seat. The standard
allows a manufacturer to specify in its instruction
manual accompanying the restraints which seating
locations cannot be used with the child restraint.
Therefore, no change is necessary, since Ford is
allowed to restrict use of its restraint.

Several manufacturers (Cosco, Strollee,
Questor) and JPMA objected to the proposed force
distribution requirement set for the sides of child
restraint systems. The specifications do not
require manufacturers to incorporate side
supports in their restraints, they only regulate the
surfaces that the manufacturer decides to provide
so that they distribute crash forces over the child's
torso. The commenters requested that the agency
define the term "torso" and explain the reason for
setting different side support requirements for
systems used by infants weighing less than 20
pounds than for systems used by children weighing
20 pounds or more. In restraints for infants less
than 20 pounds, the minimum side surface area
requirements are based on anthropometric data
for a 6-month-old 50th percentile infant to ensure
maximum lateral body contact in a side impact.
Since the skeletal structure of an infant is just
beginning to develop, it is important to distribute
impact forces over as large a surface area of the
child as possible, rather than concentrating the
potentially injurious forces over a small area. For
restraints used by children weighing more than 20
pounds and, therefore, having a more developed
skeletal structure the minimum surface area
requirement is based on anthropometric data for a
50th percentile 3-year-old child to provide restraint
for the shoulder and hip areas of the child.

To enable manufacturers to determine their
compliance with the torso support requirement,
the standard follows the dictionary definition of

PART 571; S 213-PRE-6

"torso" and defines the term as referring to the
portion of the body of a seated anthropomorphic
test dummy, excluding the thighs, that lies
between the top of the seating surface and the top
of the shoulders of the test dummy.

Several manufacturers (Cosco, StroUee,
Questor) and JPMA questioned the basis for pro-
hibiting surfaces with a radius of curvature of less
than 3 inches. They and Hamill also asked if the
measurement of the curvature is to be made before
or after application of foam padding on the
underlying surface. The radius of curvature limita-
tion will prevent sharp surfaces that might concen-
trate potentially injurious forces on the child. It is
based on the performance of systems with such a
radius of curvature that have not produced injuries
in real world crashes. The standard is changed to
require the measurement of the radius of cur-
vature to be made on the underlying structure of
the restraint, before application of foam padding.
Since foam compresses when impacted in a crash,
it is important that the structure under the foam be
sufficiently curved so it does not concentrate the
crash forces on a limited area of the child's body.

For child restraints used by children weighing
less than 20 pounds, the notice proposed that sur-
faces which can be contacted by the test dummy's
head during dynamic testing must be padded with
a material that meets certain thickness and static
compression requirements. A number of manufac-
turers (Strollee, Cosco, GM and Questor) and
JPMA questioned the specifications set for the
padding, arguing that there is no need to change
from the current materials and the specification of
a minimum thickness is design restrictive. Other
commenters (Bobby-Mac, Hamill and American
Association for Automotive Medicine) requested
that the agency establish a test to measure the
energy-absorbing capabilities of the underlying
structure of the restraint, as well as of the
padding.

NHTSA eventually wants to establish dynamic
test requirements using instrumented test
dummies for restraints used by children weighing
20 pounds or less. Such testing would measure the
total energy absorption capability of the padding
and underlying structure. At present, there are no
instrumented infant test dummies, so the agency is
instead specifying long-established static tests of
the padding material.

In response to manufacturer comments, the
NHTSA has reevaluated the materials currently
used in child restraints and determined that those
and other widely available materials can apparently
provide sufficient energy absorption if used with a
specified thickness. The agency has changed the
proposed compression-deflection requirements to
allow the use of a wider range of materials which
should enable manufacturers to provide protective
padding for children without having to increase the
price of the restraint.

The proposed ban on components, such as arm
rests, directly in front of a child which do not
restrain the child was objected to by JPMA, and
some manufacturers (Strollee, Century Products,
International Manufacturing). They argued that
arm restraints should not be banned since they
promote usage of a child restraint by giving the
child an area to rest against or place a book or
other plaything. Other manufacturers (Hamill,
Bobby-Mac), Michigan's Office of Highway Safety,
and the American Academy of Pediatrics
supported the ban arguing that arm rests promote
misuse by creating the impression that a child can
be adequately restrained by merely placing the
arm rest in front of the child. The agency is
concerned that parents' mistaken beliefs about the
protective capability of arm rests may mislead
them into not using the harness systems in the
restraints.

Therefore, such arm rests or other components
only may be installed if they provide adequate pro-
tection to a child when the restraint is misused in a
foreseeable way because of the presence of the arm
rest (i.e., the child is not buckled into the harness
that comes with the child restraint system). To
measure the performance of child restraints with
arm rests and other devices that flip down in front
of the child, those restraints will be tested at 20
mph with the component placed in front of the
child, but without the child strapped into the
restraint system. The restraint must pass the
occupant excursion and other dynamic perform-
ance requirements in that condition.

Child Restraint Beit Systems

The May 1978 notice proposed three alternatives
for the buckle release force required for the
harnesses that restrain a child within the restraint.
Many manufacturers favored the alternative based
on the current Standard No. 213 which establishes
a maximum force of 20 pounds, but does not

PART 571; S 213-PRE-7

establish a minimum force. In order to promote
international harmonization, Volvo endorsed
another alternative proposed by the Economic
Commission of Europe which would set a minimum
force of 2.25 pounds and a maximum of 13.45
pounds. However, Volvo proposed deviating from
the ECE proposal and allowing a maximum release
force of 20 pounds. Michigan's Office of Highway
Safety and the American Seat Belt Council (ASBC)
supported the other alternative which, based on a
study by the National Swedish Road and Traffic
Institute, would have set a 12 pound minimum
force and a 20 pound maximum force. ASBC stated
that this alternative should prevent a small child
from opening the buckle, but not be too strong to
prevent a small adult female from opening the
buckle. Other commenters, such as ACTS and
Borgess Hospital, recommended that the force be
set at a level which children could not manage.
Borgess noted that their experience with 400 ren-
tal child restraints shows that keeping children
from unbuckling their restraints is a common pro-
blem. Physicians for Automotive Safety recom-
mended that all buckle types be standardized and
the release force be set at a level which can be
quickly opened in an emergency.

Based on its review of the comments, NHTSA
has decided to require buckles with a minimum
release force of 12 pounds and a maximum release
force of 20 pounds. The effectiveness of a restraint
depends on the child being properly buckled at the
time of impact. If a child is capable of releasing the
buckle, it can inadvertently or purposely defeat the
protection of the harness system. Setting a
minimum force of 12 pounds should prevent small
children from opening the buckle. Setting a
maximum of 20 pounds as the release force will
enable parents to easily open the buckle. NHTSA
encourages manufacturers of child restraints to
use push button buckles, similar to those used in
automobile belts, so that people unfamiliar with
child restraints can readily unbuckle them in
emergencies. The agency will consider %rther
rulemaking to standardize the buckle if manufac-
turers do not voluntarily adopt this approach.

Likewise, NHTSA has already advised child
restraint manufacturers that physicians have
informed the agency that some children are burned
during the summer by over-heated metal buckles
or other metal child restraint hardware. NHTSA
will monitor manufacturer efforts to eliminate this

problem and determine if additional rulemaking is
necessary.

The proposal that the belt systems in child
restraints meet many of the belt and buckle
requirements of Standard No. 209, Seat Belt
Assemblies, such as those relating to abrasion,
resistance to light, resistance to microorganisms,
color fastness and corrosion and temperature
resistance was not opposed by any of the com-
menters and is therefore adopted. The buckle
release test in Standard No. 209 for child restraint
buckles is deleted, since Standard 213 now sets
new performance requirements for buckles. Ford
noted that the proposal inadvertently dropped a
portion of Standard No. 209's abrasion
requirements, which have been reincorporated in
the final rule.

To prevent the belts from concentrating crash
forces over a narrow area of a child's body, the pro-
posal sets a minimum belt width of IV2 inch for any
belt that contacts the test dummy during the
testings. Hamill requested that pieces of webbing
used to position the principal belts that maintain
crash loads be exempt from the minimum width
requirements. The agency believes that as long as
the test dummy, and thus a child, can contact the
belts during a crash the belts should be wide
enough to spread the crash forces and therefore
Hamill's request is denied.

Methods of Installation

Many commenters, including ACTS, American
Academy for Pediatrics, Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety, and American Seat Belt Council,
said that child restraint systems cannot be used
with some automatic belt systems, since they do
not have a lap belt to secure the child restraint to
the seat. They asked the agency to require all
automatic belt systems to include lap belts.

The agency considers the compatibility of child
restraints with automatic belt systems to be an
important issue. One of the purposes of the
agency's December 12, 1979, public meeting on
child safety and motor vehicles is to obtain the
public's views and information on that and other
child passenger safety issues to assist the agency
in determining whether to commence rulemaking.
One rulemaking option currently being considered
by the agency is to require vehicle manufacturers
to provide anchorages for lap belts in automatic
restraint equipped vehicles so that parents wishing
to install lap belts can easily do so.

PART 571; S 213-PRE-8

A number of manufacturers are voluntarily taking
steps to make automatic belt systems compatible
with child restraint systems. For example, GM pro-
vides an additional manual belt with its optional
automatic lap-shoulder belt system for the front
passenger's seat in the 1980 model Chevrolet
Chevette to enable parents to secure child restraint
systems.

Many of the commenters also asked the agency
to require vehicle manufacturers to install
anchorages or provide predrilled holes to attach
tether anchorages in all their vehicles. They
argued such anchorages or holes will make it easy
for parents to attach tether straps correctly. As
mentioned earlier in this notice, the agency is
considering issuing a proposal to require manufac-
turers to provide attachments for tether
anchorages in all their vehicles.

The May 1978 notice proposed that all child
restraints be capable of being secured to the vehicle
seat by a lap belt. Volvo and Mercedes once again
asked the agency to allow the use of "vehicle
specific" child restraints (systems uniquely designed
for installation in a particular make and model which
do not utilize vehicle seat belts for anchorages). As
explained in the May 1978 notice, such systems can
easily be misused by being placed in vehicles for
which they were not sf)ecifically designed. Stand-
ardizing all restraints by requiring them to be capable
of being attached by a lap belt is an important way to
prevent misuse.

However, since vehicle specific child restraints can
provide adequate levels of protection when installed
correctly, NHTSA is not prohibiting the manufacture
of such devices. The new standard requires them to
meet the performance requirements of the standard
when secured by a vehicle lap belt. As long as child
restraints can pass the performance requirements of
the standard secured only by a lap belt, a manufac-
turer is free to specify other "vehicle specific"
installation conditions.

Labeling

The requirement for having a visible label per-
manently mounted to the restraint to encourage
proper use of child restraints was supported by
many of the commenters, including the Center for
Auto Safety, ACTS, Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety, and Michigan's Office of
Highway Safety. Several manufacturers (Century,
Cosco, Questor) objected to having a visible

label on child restraints, claming that there is not
enough space on some restraints to place all the
required information. Other commenters supported
the visible labeling requirement but suggested that
the visible label only have a single warning telling
people to follow the manufacturer's instructions
(American Association for Automotive Medicine,
Strollee, Hamill). Others suggested placing warnings
about the correct use of the restraint on a visible label
and placing such information as the height and
weight limits for children using the restraint and the
manufacturer's certification that it meets all Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards on a nonvisible label
(GM, PAS).

After reviewing the comments, NHTSA con-
cludes that it is important to have certain warnings
in a visible position to serve as a constant reminder
on how to correctly use the restraint. Because of
the limited space on some restraints, the agency
has shortened the labeling requirements to require
only those instructions most directly concerned
with the safe use of the seat be visible. Thus,
depending on its design, the restraint must warn
parents to secure the restraint with the vehicle lap
belt, snugly adjust all belts provided with the
restraint, correctly attach the top tether strap and
only use a restraint adjustment position which are
intended for use in a motor vehicle.

In response to the agency's request for other
instructions that a manufacturer should give
parents, several commenters (ACTS, Michigan's
Office of Highway Safety, Borgess Hospital) said
that a warning on the label is necessary to prevent
misuse of infant carriers. They said many people
mistakenly place infant carriers in a forward-
facing, rather than a rear-facing position. A
forward-facing position defeats the purpose of
those restraints which are designed to spread the
forces of the crash over the infant's back. Because
of the importance of preventing this type of
misuse, the agency will require the visible label to
also remind parents not to use rear-facing infant
restraints in any other position.

Information about the height and weight limits
of the children for which the restraint is designed,
the manufacturer and model of the child restraint,
and the month, year and place of manufacture and
the certification that the restraint complies with all
applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
would also have to be provided, but that informa-
tion does not have to be on a label that is visible
when the seat is installed.

PART 571; S 213-PRE-9

Many commenters (GM, Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety, Multnomah County Department
of Human Services, Physicians for Automotive
Safety, Center for Auto Safety, and American
Academy of Pediatrics) supported the proposed
requirement that manufacturers inform con-
sumers about the primary consequences of not
following the manufacturer's warning about the
correct use of the restraint. Therefore, the visible
label must state the primary consequence of
misusing the restraint. The same information
would also have to be included in the instruction
manual accompanying the restraint.

Ford objected to the requirement that the label
have a diagram showing the child restraint installed
in a vehicle as specified in the manufacturer's in-
structions. It said that because of the complexity of
the instructions required for proper installation of
a restraint with different types of belt systems, it is
not practical to place all of the information on a
single label. Hamill suggested that because of
those same considerations, the agency should only
require the diagram to show the proper installation
of the restraint at one seating position. Other
commenters, such as the American Academy for
Pediatrics, supported the use of diagrams on the
restraint noting that diagrams can more easily
convey information than written instructions.

To promote the correct use of child restraints,
NHTSA believes that it is important to have a
diagram on the restraint to remind users of the
proper method of installation. However, so that
the label does not become too unwieldy, the agency
will only require manufacturers to provide a
diagram showing the restraint correctly installed
in the right front seating position with a con-
tinuous loop lap /shoulder belt and in the center
rear seating position installed with a lap belt. For
restraints equipped with top tethers, the diagram
must show the tethers correctly attached in both
seating positions. It is important to show the
correct use of a child restraint with a continuous
loop lap/ shoulder belt (a type of belt system used
on many current cars) since such belts must have a
locking clip installed on the belt to safely secure
the child restraint.

GM objected to the requirement that the label be
in block type, which it said makes the label difficult
to read. GM requested that manufacturers be

allowed to use 10 point type with either capitals or
upper and lower case lettering. GM said that using
such type will result in an easier to read label
which, in turn, should promote more complete
reading of the label by the consumer. Since the
type sought by GM should promote the reading of
the label, the agency is changing the requirement
to allow the use of such type as an option.

Several organizations (ACTS, Center for Auto
Safety and Insurance Institute for Highway Safety)
asked the agency to establish performance test to
accompany the requirement that the label be per-
manently affixed to the restraint. They pointed out
that some current paper labels peel off after the
restraint has been used awhile. NHTSA has not
conducted the necessary testing to establish such a
requirement. NHTSA urges manufacturers,
whenever possible, to mold the label into the
surface of the restraint rather than use a paper
label.

Consumers Union and the Center for Auto Safety
suggested that all restraints be graded based on
their performance in frontal and lateral crash tests
and the grades be posted on all the packaging,
labels, and instruction manuals accompanying the
child restraint. The grades would indicate the
seating position within the vehicle with which the
restraint can be safely used. Neither Consumers
Union nor the Center suggested any performance
requirements for establishing the different grades.
Since the proposed grading system is outside of the
scope of the proposed rule and the agency has not
done the necessary testing to determine the
specific tests and performance requirements
necessary to establish such grading system,
NHTSA will evaluate the suggestion for use in
future rulemaking.

Installation Instructions

The May 1978 notice proposed that each
restraint be accompanied by instructions for
correctly installing the restraint in any passenger
seat in motor vehicles. Many commenters (Center
for Auto Safety, Borgess and Rainbow Hospitals,
University of Tennessee And ACTS) suggested
that the requirement for the instructions to accom-
pany the restraint should be more explicit to
require the restraint to have a storage location,
such as a slot in the restraint or a plastic pouch
affixed to the restraint, for permanently storing
the instructions. They point out that storing the

PART 571; S 213-PRE-lO

instructions with the restraint means they will be
available for ready reference and will be passed on
to subsequent owners of the restraint. NHTSA
believes such a requirement would best carry out
its intent to require the instructions to be easily
available to all users and therefore the suggestion
is adopted.

Several manufacturers (Strollee, Cosco) and
JPMA objected to the agency's proposed require-
ment that the instructions state that the center
rear seating position is the safest seating position
in a vehicle. While not questioning the validity of
the accident data showing the center rear seat to
be the safest seating position in most vehicles, they
argued that the agency should consider the
psychological impact of not having the child near
the adult. Accident data have consistently shown
that the occupants in the rear seat are safer than
occupants in the front seat. The same data show
that the center rear seating position is the safest
seating position in the rear seat. To enable parents
to make an informed judgment about how best to
protect their children, NHTSA believes that it is
important to clearly inform them about the safest
seating positions in the vehicle, and is therefore
retaining the requirement.

In response to the agency's request for addi-
tional suggestions to be included in the instruction
manual accompanying the restraint, ACTS sug-
gested that car bed manufacturers informed con-
sumers that the child should be placed with its head
near the center of the vehicle. Because orienting a
child's head in that way will ensure that it is the
maximum distance away from the sides of the
vehicle in a side impact, the agency has adopted
ACTS suggestion. Tennessee's Office of Urban
and Federal Affairs suggested that users should be
told to secure child restraints with a vehicle belt
when the child restraint is in the vehicle but not in
use. Since an unsecured child restraint can become
a flying missile in a crash and injure other vehicle
occupants, the agency has adopted Tennessee's
suggestion.

Test Conditions

The standard specifies requirements for a test
assembly representing a vehicle bench seat to be
used in the dynamic testing. Bobby-Mac com-
mented that the test seat has a more level seating
surface and less support at the forward edge of the
seat than the seats in many current cars. These

differences mean that a child restraint may
experience more excursion on the test seat than on
more angled and firmer car seats, Bobby-Mac said.
NHTSA agrees that in comparison to some
vehicles seats, the test seat may present more
demanding test conditions. However, the test seat
is representative of many seats used in vehicles
currently on the road. Meeting the performance
requirement of the standard on the test seat will
ensure that child restraints perform adequately on
the variety of different seats found in cars on the
road.

Several manufacturers (Cosco and Strollee) and
JPMA raised questions about the requirement pro-
posed for the crash pulse (i.e., the amount of test
sled deceleration required to simulate the crash
forces experienced by a car) for the 20 and 30 mph
tests. The agency had proposed a range of sled test
pulses to allow manufacturers the option of using
pneumatic or impact sled testing machines. Since a
variety of different sled test pulses would be
permitted under the proposal, manufacturers asked
the agency to explain what would happen if they
and the agency tested a child restraint system
using different sled test pulses and produced incon-
sistent results (i.e., a failure using one pulse and a
pass at the other, when both pulses were within the
permissible range). JPMA suggested that the
agency should consider a restraint as in compliance
if the restraint meets all the applicable perform-
ance requirements in a test in which the sled test
pulse lies entirely within the proposed range.

To provide manufacturers with the certainty
they desire, the agency has redefined the sled test
pulse requirement to establish a single 20 mph
(Figure 3) and a single 30 mph (Figure 2) sled test
pulse. Thus, in conducting its compliance testing,
NHTSA may not exceed the sled test pulse set for
the 20 and 30 mph tests. The sled test pulses
chosen by NHTSA are the least severe pulses that
meet the acceleration thresholds proposed in the
notice of proposed rulemaking. Manufacturers are
free to use other sled pulses, as long as the ac-
celeration/time curve of the sled test pulse used is
equal to or greater than the acceleration /time
curve of the sled test pulse set in the standard.

In response to comments by Ford and others
that the durability of the foam used in the standard
seat assembly may influence the test results, the
agency has changed the standard to specify that
the foam in the test seat be changed after each
test.

PART 571; S 213-PRE-ll

GM pointed out that the instructions for position-
ing the test dummy within the restraint did not
specify when in the positioning sequences any of
the restraint's belts should be placed on the test
dummy. An appropriate change has been made to
specify when the belts should be attached. Ford
said that the dummy positioning requirements
result in an "unnatural" positioning of the dummy
within its Tot-Guard restraint so that the dummy's
arms rest on the side of the restraint rather than
with its arms on the padded portion of the shield.
NHTSA notes that a child in a real-world accident
will not necessarily have its arms resting on the
shield. Allowing the test dummy's arm to be posi-
tioned on the shield may inhibit the dummy's
forward movement and make it easier to comply
with the limits on test dummy excursion and
acceleration set in the standard. Thus, Ford's
requested change in the positioning requirements
is rejected.

Flammability

The notice proposed requiring child restraints to
meet the bum resistance requirements of Standard
No. 302, Flammability of Interior Materials. The
requirement was supported by GM, the American
Academy of Pediatrics and the American Seat Belt
Council. No commenters opposed the requirement.
In supporting the requirement, GM said that the
flammability characteristics of child restraints,
"which are in close proximity to an occupant," should
be "compatible with the flammability characteristics
of other parts of the vehicle occupant compartment
interior," which already must meet the performance
requirements of Standard No. 302. The agency
agrees with GM about the desirability of providing all
vehicle occupants with the protection of Standard
No. 302 and is thus requiring all child restraints to
meet the performance requirements of that
standard.

Inertial Reels

Several commenters raised questions about the
effectiveness of vehicle seat belts equipped with
inertial reels in securing child restraints. The
American Academy of Pediatrics requested the
agency to restrict the use of inertial reels to the
driver's seating position. Physicians for Automotive
Safety and ACTS pointed out that continuous loop
lap /shoulder belts with inertial reels must be used
with locking clips to secure a child restraint. They

said that the difficulty of installing such clips
deters their use.

Agency research has found that use of inertial
reels increases the comfort and convenience of
seat belts and thus promotes their use by older
children and adults. Thus, the agency will continue
to require the use of inertial reels in vehicle belt
systems. However, to ensure that inertial reels are
compatible with child restraints, the agency will
soon begin rulemaking on the comfort and con-
venience of vehicle belt systems to require that the
belts used in the front right outboard seating
position have a manual locking device. This
requirement will mean that continuous loop and
other types of inertial reel belt systems can be easily
and effectively used with child restraints. Such
manual locking devices will also be permitted with
belts used in the rear seats. As previously outlined
in this notice, the agency has established several
labeling and installation instruction requirements
which deal specifically with the correct use of lock-
ing clips on continuous loop belts with inertial
reels. Those requirements should reduce or
eliminate problems associated with using child
restraint in current vehicles equipped with inertial
reels.

Costs and Benefits

The agency has considered the economic and
other impacts of this final rule and determined that
this rule is not significant within the meaning of
Executive Order 12044 and the Department of
Transportation's policies and procedures
implementing that order. The agency's assessment
of the benefits and economic consequences of this
final rule are contained in a regulatory evaluation
which has been placed in the docket. Copies of that
regulatory evaluation can be obtained by writing
NHTSA's docket section, at the address given in
the beginning of this notice.

In the 0 to 5 age group, more than 800 children
are killed and more than 100,000 children are
injured annually as occupants of motor vehicles.
Because of the large difference in effectiveness
between restraints that can pass the dynamic test
of the new standard and those which have passed
only a static test, NHTSA projects that there
should be 43 fewer deaths and 6,528 fewer injuries
per year. Because many restraints have already
been upgraded in response to the agency's prior
rulemaking proposal, some of the death and injury

PART 571; S 213-PRE-12

prevention benefits of the standard have already
been realized.

The projected benefits of this standard are limited
by the existing low rate of child restraint use.
However, the labeling and instruction
requirements of this standard should increase the
proper usage of child restraints.
Because of NHTSA's 1974 proposal to upgrade
child restraints, many manufacturers have
currently designed their restraints to meet
dynamic test requirements. Therefore, those
restraints are only projected to increase in price by
approximately $1.00 in order to meet the other
requirements of this standard. Restraints that do
not currently pass dynamic tests would have a
price increase of $16.00 to meet the new
requirements. The average sales weighted price
increase is $4.25.

Numerous commenters (including National
Safety Council, American Academy of Pediatri-
cians, Tennessee Office of Child Development and
North Dakota's Department of Public Health)

urged the agency to make the standard effective
before the proposed May 1, 1980, effective date.
GM and the American Safety Belt Council
requested that the effective date be delayed
beyond the proposed May 1, 1980. Many manufac-
turers have already upgraded their restraints to
the performance requirements set in this rule. The
agency believes that providing six months lead-
time, until June 1, 1980, will provide sufficient
time for the remaining manufacturers to upgrade
their restraints.

The principal authors of this notice are Vladislav
Radovich, Office of Vehicle Safety Standards, and
Stephen Oesch, Office of Chief Counsel.

Issued on December 5, 1979.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator,

44 F.R. 72131
December 13, 1979

PART 571; S 213-PRE-13-14

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY

STANDARD NO. 213

Child Restraint Systems; Seat Beit Assembiies
(Docket No. 74-9; Notice 7)

ACTION: Response tx) petitions for reconsidera-
tion.

SUMMARY: This notice responds to five petitions
for reconsideration and petitions for rulemaking
concerning Standard No. 213, Child Restraint
Systems. In response to the petitions, the agency is
changing the labeHng requirements to permit the
use of alternative language, modifying the
minimum radius of curvature requirement for
restraint system surfaces and extending the
effective date of the standard from June 1, 1980, to
January 1, 1981. In addition, several typographic
errors are corrected in Standard No. 209, Seat Belt
Assemblies.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendments are effective
on May 1, 1980. The effective date of the standard
is changed from June 1, 1980, to January 1, 1981.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Vladislav Radovich,

Office of Vehicle Standards,

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-2264)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December
13, 1979, NHTSA published in the FEDERAL
Register a final rule establishing Standard No.
213, Child Restraint Systems, and making certain
amendments to Standard No. 209, Seat Belt
Assemblies and Anchorages. Subsequently,
petitions for reconsideration were timely filed with
the agency by Cosco, General Motors, Juvenile
Products Manufacturers Association, and Strolee.
Subsequent to the time for filing petitions for
reconsideration, Strolee also filed a petition for

rulemaking to amend the standard. After
evaluating the petitions, the agency has decided to
modify, as fully explained below, some of the
requirements of Standard No. 213. All other
requests for modification are denied. The agency is
also correcting several minor typographical errors
in the text of Standard No. 209.

LABELING

Standard No. 213 requires manufacturers to
place a permanently mounted label on the restraint
to encourage its proper use. General Motors (GM)
petitioned for reconsideration of three of the
labeling requirements.

Section S5.5.2 (f) of the standard requires each
child restraint to be labeled with the size and
weight ranges of children capable of using the
restraint. In its petition, GM said that the
requirement could "unnecessarily preclude some
children from using the restraint or suggest use by
children too large for the restraint." GM also
commented that some infant restraints are
intended to be used from birth and thus the lower
size and weight limitation serves no purpose.

In addition, GM said that stating the upper size
limit for infant restraints in terms of seated height
rather than in standing height is a more
appropriate way to set size limitations for infants.
For example, GM said that an infant with a short
torso and long legs might be precluded from using
the restraint if the limitation is stated in terms of
standing height, while an infant with short legs
and a torso too long for the restraint would be
inappropriately included among ones who could
supposedly use the restraint. GM requested that
infant restraints be allowed to be labeled with an
optional statement limiting use by upper weight
and seated height.

PART 571; S 213-PRE 15

NHTSA agrees that specifying a lower weight
and size limit is unnecessary for an infant carrier
designed to be used from birth and has amended
the standard accordingly. The agency has decided
not to adopt GM's proposal to state the upper size
limit in seating rather than standing height. The
purpose of the label is to provide important
instructions and warnings in as simple and
understandable terms as possible. Standing height,
rather than seating height, is a measurement
parents are familiar with and which is commonly
measured during pediatric examinations. As GM
pointed out, it is possible to establish a limit based
on standing height which would exclude any infant
whose seating height is too high to properly use the
restraint. Therefore, the agency will continue to
require the upper size limit to be stated in terms of
standing height.

GM also requested that manufacturers be
allowed to establish a lower usage limit for
restraints used for older children based on the
child's ability to sit upright rather than on his or
her size and weight. GM said the lower limit "is not
as dependent upon the child's size as it is on the
child's ability to hold its head up (sit upright) by
itself. This important capability is achieved at a
wide range of chOd sizes." NHTSA agrees that the
type of label GM proposes can clearly inform
parents on which children can safely use a
restraint and therefore will permit use of such a
label.

Section S5.5.2(g) of the standard requires the
use of the word "Warning" preceding the
statement that failure to follow the manufacturer's
instructions can lead to injury to a child. GM
requested that the word ' 'Caution" be permitted as
an alternative to "Warning." GM said that since
1975 it has used caution in its labels and owners'
and service manuals as a lead or signal word where
the message conveys instructions to prevent
possible personal injury. GM said that the words
caution and warning are generally accepted as
sjmonymous.

The agency believes that the word "Warning,"
when used in its ordinary dictionary sense, is a
stronger term that conveys a greater sense of
danger than the word "Caution" and thus will
emphasize the importance of following the
specified instructions. Therefore, the agency will
continue to require the use of the word
"Warning."

Section S5.5.2(k) of the standard requires
restraints to be labeled that they are to be used in a

rear-facing position when used with an infant. GM
said that while the requirement is appropriate for
so-called convertible child restraints (restraints
that can be used by infants in a rear-facing position
and by children in a forward-facing position), it is
potentially misleading when used with a restraint
designed exclusively for infants. GM said the
current label might imply that the restraint can be
use in forward-facing positions with children. GM
recommended that restraints designed only for
infants be permitted to have the statement, "Place
this infant restraint in a rear-facing position when
using it in the vehicle." The agency's purpose for
establishing the labeling requirement was to
preclude the apparent widespread misuse of
restraints designed for infants in a forward-facing
rather than rear-facing position. Since GM's
recommended label will accomplish that goal, the
agency is amending the standard to permit its use.

RADIUS OF CURVATURE

Section S5.2.2.1(c) of the standard requires
surfaces designed to restrain the forward
movement of a child's torso to be flat or convex
with a radius of curvature of the underlying
structure of not less than 3 inches. Ford Motor Co.
objected to the three inch limitation on radius of
curvature arguing that measuring the radius of
curvature of the underlying structure would
eliminate designs that have not produced serious
injuries in actual crashes. Ford said the shield of its
Tot-Guard has a radius of curvature from 2.2 to 2.3
inches and it had no evidence of serious injury
being caused by the shield when the restraint has
been properly used.

The purpose of the radius of curvature
requirement was to prohibit the use of surfaces
that might concentrate inpact forces on vulnerable
portions of a child's body. It was not the agency's
intent to prohibit existing designs, such as the Tot-
Guard, which have not produced injuries in actual
crashes. Since a 2 inch radius of curvature should
therefore not produce injury, the agency has
decided to change the radius of curvature
requirement from 3 to 2 inches.

Although the standard sets a minimum radius of
curvature for surfaces designed to restrain the
forward movement of a child, it does not set a
minimum surface area for that surface. Prototypes
of new restraints shown to the agency by some
manufacturers indicate that they are voluntarily
incorporating sufficient surface areas in their
designs. The agency encourages all manufacturers
to use surface areas at least equivalent to those of
the designs used by today's better restraints.

PART 571; S 213-PRE 16

OCCUPANT EXCURSION

Section S5. 1.3.1 of the standard sets a limit on
the amount of knee excursion experienced by the
test dummy during the simulated crash tests. It
specifies that "at the time of maximum knee
forward excursion the forward rotation of the
dummy's torso from the dummy's initial seating
configuration shall be at least 15° measured in the
sagittal plane along the line connecting the
shoulder and hip pivot points."

Ford Motor Co. objected to the requirements
that the dummy's torso rotate at least 15 degrees.
Ford said that it is impossible to measure the 15
degree angle on restraints such as the Tot-Guard
since the test dummy "folds around the shield in
such a manner that there is no 'line' from the
shoulder to the hip point." In addition, restraints,
such as the Tot-Guard, that enclose the lower torso
of the child can conceal the test dummy hip pivot
point.

The agency established the knee excursion and
torso rotation requirements to prevent
manufacturers from controlling the amount of test
dummy head excursion by allowing the test dummy
to submarine excessively during a crash (i.e.,
allowing the test dummy to slide too far downward
underneath the lap belt and forward, legs first). A
review of the agency's testing of child restraints
shows that current designs that comply with the
knee excursion limit do not allow submarining.
Since the knee excursion limit apparently will
provide sufficient protection to prevent
submarining, the agency has decided to drop the
torso rotation requirement. If future testing
discloses any problems with submarining, the
agency will act to establish a new torso rotation
requirement as an additional safeguard.

HEAD IMPACT PROTECTION
Section 5.2.3 requires that each child restraint
designed for use by children under 20 pounds have
energy -absorbing material covering "each system
surface which is contactable by the dummy head."
Strolee petitioned the agency to amend this
requirement because it would prohibit the use of
unpadded grommets in the child restraint. Strolee
explained that some "manufacturers use
grommets to support the fabric portions of a car
seat where the shoulder belt and lap belt penetrate
the upholstery. These grommets retain the fabric
in place and give needed support where the strap

comes through to the front of the unit." Because of
the use of the grommets in positioning the energy-
absorbing padding and belts, the agency does not
want to prohibit their use. However, to ensure that
use of the grommets will not compromise the head
impact protection for the child, the agency will
only allow grommets or other structures that
comply with the protrusion limitations specified in
section S5.2.4. That section prohibits protrusions
that are more than % of an inch high and have a
radius of less than y* inch. Because this
amendment makes a minor change in the standard
to relieve a restriction, prior notice and a comment
period are deemed unnecessary.

BELT REQUIREMENTS

Strolee petitioned the agency to amend the
requirement that all of the belts used in the child
restraint system must be IV2 inches in width.
Strolee said that straps used in some restraints to
position the upper torso restraints have " 'snaps'
so that the parent may release this positioning belt
conveniently." Strolee argued that such straps
should be exempt from the belt width requirement
since "the snap would release far before any loads
could be experienced."

The agency still believes that any belt that comes
into contact with the child should be of a minimum
width so as not to concentrate forces on a limited
area of the child. This requirement would reduce
the possibility of injury in instances where the snap
on a positioning strap failed to open. Strolee's
petition is therefore denied.

StroUee has also raised a question about the
interpretation of section S5.4.3.3 on belt systems.
Strolee asked whether the section requires a
manufacturer to provide both upper torso belts, a
lap belt and a crotch strap or whether a
manufacturer can use a "hybrid" system which
uses upper torso belts, a shield, in place of a lap
belt, and a crotch strap. The agency's intent was to
allow the use of hybrid systems. The agency
established the minimum radius of curvatiire
requirements of section S5.2.2.1(c) to ensure that
any shield used in place of a lap or other belt would
not concentrate forces on a limited area of the
child's body. NHTSA has amended section
S5.4.3.3. to clarify the agency's intent. Because
this is an interpretative amendment, which
imposes no new restrictions, prior notice and a
comment period are deemed unnecessary.

PART 571; S 213-PRE 17

HEIGHT REQUIREMENTS
Strolee asked the agency to reconsider the
requirements for seat back surface heights set in
section S. 5.2. 1.1. Strolee argued that the higher
seat back required by the standard would restrict
the driver's rear vision when the child restraint is
placed in the rear seat.

The final rule established a new seat back height
requirement for restraints recommended for use
by children that weigh more than 40 pounds. To
provide sufficient protection for those children's
heads, the agency required the seat back height to
be 22 inches. The agency explained that the 22 inch
requirement was based on anthropometric data
showing that the seating height of children
weighing 40 or more pounds can exceed 23 inches.
The agency still believes that 22 inch requirement
is necessary for the protection of the largest child
for which the restraint is recommended. NHTSA
notes that child restraints can be designed to
accommodate the higher seat backs without
allowing the overall height of the child restraint to
unduly hinder the driver's vision.

PADDING
In its petition, JPMA claimed that the standard
"calls for the application of outdated specifications"
for determining the performance of child restraint
padding in a 25 percent compression-deflection test.
A review of the most recent edition of the American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) handbook
shows that the compression-deflection test in two of
the three ASTM standards (ASTM D1565)
referenced by the agency has been replaced.
However, the replacement standard does not contain
a 25 percent compression-deflection test. Therefore,
the agency will continue to use the three ASTM
standards referenced in the December 1979 final
rule.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Cosco, Strolee and the Juvenile Products
Manufacturers Association (JPMA) petitioned the
agency for an extension of the June 1, 1980, effective
date. They requested that the effective date be
changed to at least January 1, 1981, and Strolee
requested a delay until March 1, 1981. They argued
that the June 1, 1980, effective date does not allow
manufacturers sufficient time to develop, test and
tool new child restraints.

Testing done for the agency has shown that many
of the better child restraint systems currently on the

market can meet the injury criteria and occupant
excursion limitation set by the standard. Some of
those seats would need changes in their labeling,
removal of arm rests and new belt buckles and
padding to meet the standard. Such relatively
minor changes can be made in the time available
before the June 1, 1980, effective date.

Several manufacturers have informed the
agency that they are designing new restraints to
meet the standard. Based on prototypes of those
restraints shown to the agency, NHTSA believes
that these new restraints may be more convenient
to use, less susceptible to misuse and provide a
higher overall level of protection than current
restraints. Based on leadtime information
provided by individual manufacturers and the
JPMA, the agency concludes that extending the
standard, from June 1, 1980, to January 1, 1981,
will provide sufficient leadtime. Providing a year's
leadtime is in agreement with the leadtime
estimates provided by the manufacturers as to the
time necessary for design and testing, tooling and
buckle redesign.

COMPATIBILITY WITH VEHICLE BELTS

On December 12, 1979, NHTSA held a public
meeting on child transportation safety. At that
meeting, several participants commented about
the difficulty, and in some cases the impossibility,
of securing some child restraint systems with a
vehicle lap belt because the belt will not go around
the restraint. Testing done by the agency during
the development of the recently proposed comfort
and convenience rulemaking also confirms that
problem. The agency reminds child restraint
manufacturers that Standard No. 213, Child
Restraint Systems, requires all child restraints to
be capable of being restrained by a vehicle lap belt.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

45 F.R. 29045
May 1, 1980

PART 571; S 213-PRE 18

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO

FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 213

Child Restraint Systems
(Docket No. 74-09; Notice 8)

ACTION: Correction.

SUMMARY: On May 1, 1980, the agency published a
notice in the Federal Register responding to peti-
tions for reconsideration concerning Standard No.
213, Child Restraint Systems. In response to a
petition from Ford Motor Co., the agency stated in
the preamble of the notice that it was eliminating
the torso rotation requirement of the standard.
However, the notice inadvertently did not amend
the standard to delete that requirement. This
notice makes the necessary amendment.

DATES: The amendment is effective upon publica-
tion in the Federal Register, October 6, 1980.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Stephen Oesch, Office of Chief Counsel,
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. (202-426-2992)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On May 1. 1980,
the agency published a notice responding to
several petitions for reconsideration concerning
Standard No. 213, Child Restraint Systems (45 FR
29045).

Among the petitions was one from Ford Motor
Co. objecting to the requirement that the test
dummy's torso rotate at least 15 degrees during
the simulated crash test of the child restraint.
Ford argued that it is impossible to measure the 15
degree angle on restraints such as its Tot-Guard
which enclose the lower torso of the child and thus
conceal one of the pivot points used in measuring
the dummy's rotation.

In response to the Ford petition, the agency
decided to drop the torso rotation requirement. In

the May 1 notice, the agency explained that the
purpose of the requirement was to prevent manu-
facturers from controlling the amount of head
excursion by allowing the test dummy to sub-
marine excessively during a crash (i.e., allowing
the test dummy to slide too far downward under-
neath the lap belt and forward, legs first). After
further reviewing its child restraint test results,
the agency concluded that restraints meeting the
knee excursion limit of the standard will provide
sufficient protection to prevent such submarining.
Section 5.1.3.1 is revised to read as follows:
S5.1.3.1 Child restraint systems other than rear-
facing ones and car beds. In the case of each child
restraint system other than a rear-facing child
restraint system or a car bed, the test dummy's
torso shall be retained within the system and no
portion of the test dummy's head shall pass
through the vertical transverse plane that is 32
inches forward of point z on the standard seat
assembly, measured along the center SORL (as il-
lustrated in Figure IB), and neither knee pivot
point shall pass through the vertical transverse
plane that is 36 inches forward of point z on the
standard seat assembly, measured along the
center SORL.

Issued on September 26, 1980.

Michael M. Finkelstein
Associate Administrator
for Rulemaking

45 FR 67095
October 9, 1980

PART 571; S213-PRE 19-20

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO

FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 213

Child Restraint Systems
(Ooclcet No. 74-09; Notice 9)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends Standard No. 213,
Child Restraint Systems, to allow the use of thin-
ner padding materials in some child restraints.
The agency proposed the amendment in response
to a petition for rulemaking filed by General
Motors Corporation.

DATES: The amendment is effective on December
15. 1980.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration should
refer to the docket number and be submitted to:
Docket Section, Room 5108, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590. (Docket hours: 8:00
a.m. to 4:00 p.m.)

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Vladislav Radovich, Office of Vehicle Safety
Standards, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-2264)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December
13, 1979, NHTSA issued Standard No. 213, Child
Restraint Systems (44 FR 72131). The standard
established new performance requirements for
child restraints, including requirements for the
padding used in child restraint systems recom-
mended for use by children under 20 pounds (i.e.,
infant carriers).

The padding requirements provide that surfaces
of the infant carrier that can be contacted by the
test dummy's head during dynamic testing must
be padded with a material that meets certain
thickness and static compression-deflection re-
quirements. The standard requires that the pad-

ding must have a 25 percent compression-deflec-
tion resistance of not less than 0.5 and not more
than 10 pounds per square inch (psi). Material with
a resistance of between 3 and 10 psi must have a
thickness of V2 inch. If the material has a resist-
ance of less than 3 psi, it must have a thickness of
at least % inch.

In response to a petition for rulemaking filed by
General Motors Corporation (GM), the agency pro-
posed on October 17, 1980 (45 FR 68694) to modify
the padding requirements to allow the use of thin-
ner padding. GM's petition said that the
compression-deflection resistance of padding is
sensitive to the rate at which deflection occurs
during the test procedure. As the deflection rate
increases during testing, so does the measured
resistance of the material. GM said that the pad-
ding used in the head impact area of its child seat
has a maximum compression-deflection resistance
of 3 psi. However, several different deflection
rates are permitted by the American Society for
Testing and Materials test procedures incor-
porated into Standard No. 213. GM reported that
the measured 25 percent compression-deflection
value of the padding it uses can be as low as 1.8 psi.

To accommodate variations attributable to the
use of the different deflection rates permitted in
the testing, the agency proposed to allow the use
of padding with a compression-deflection resist-
ance of 1.8 psi or more to have a minimum thick-
ness of V2 inch.

The notice denied GM's petition to permit the
use of padding with a compression-deflection
resistance of 0.2 psi and a thickness of % or % inch.

GM, the only party that commented on the pro-
posal, supported the proposed revision.

GM requested the agency to reconsider its deci-
sion to prohibit the use of padding with a
compression-deflection resistance of 0.2 psi. GM
argued that the field performance of its child

PART 571; S213-PRE 21

restraints shows that current padding material is
effective in reducing deaths and injuries.

As explained in the October notice, the agency
agrees that child restraints, such as GM's infant
carrier, which have an energy-absorbing shell can
provide effective protection with padding having
a compression-deflection resistance of 0.2 psi.
Many infant carriers, however, use rigid plastic
shells rather than energy absorbing shells. Manu-
facturers of the rigid plastic shells currently use
padding with a compression-deflection resistance
of 0.5 psi. The agency does not want to degrade
that level of performance and therefore GM's re-
quest is again denied.

COSTS

The agency has assessed the economic and
other impacts of the proposed change to the pad-
ding requirements and determined that they are
not significant within the meaning of Executive
Order 12221 and the Department of Transporta-
tion's policies and procedures for implementing
that order. Based on that assessment, the agency
concludes further that the economic and other
consequences of this proposal are so minimal that
additional regulatory evaluation is not warranted.
When Standard No. 213 was published in the
Federal Register on December 12, 1979, the agen-
cy placed in the docket for that rulemaking a
regulatory evaluation assessing the effect of the
padding requirements set by the standard. The ef-
fect of that rule adopted today is to permit the use
of some padding materials in a thickness of Vz inch
rather than 'A inches. Such a change will slightly
reduce manufacturer padding costs.

The agency finds, for good cause shown, that an
immediate effective date for this amendment is in
the public interest since it relieves a restriction in
the standard that goes into effect on January 1,
1981.

The principal authors of this notice are Vlad-
islav Radovich, Office of Vehicle Safety Stand-
ards, and Stephen Oesch, Office of Chief Counsel.

For the reasons set out in the preamble, Part
571 of Chapter V of Title 49, Code of Federal
Regulations, is amended as set forth below.
§571.213 [Amended]

1. 49 CFR Part 571 is amended by revising

paragraph §S5.2.3.2(b) of §571.213 to read as

follows:

* * * • «

(b) A thickness of not less than Vz inch for
materials having a 25 percent compression-
deflection resistance of not less than 1.8 and not
more than 10 pounds per square inch when tested
in accordance with S6.3. Materials having 25 per-
cent compression-deflection resistance of less than
1.8 pounds per square inch shall have a thickness
of not less than 'A inch.

Issued on December 8, 1980.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

45 FR 82264
December 15, 1980

PART 571; S213-PRE 22

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 213

Child Restraint Systems
(Docket No. 7409; Notice 11)

ACTION: Technical amendment.

SUMMARY: When the final rule establishing
Standard No. 213, Child Restraint Systems, was
issued, it included a section setting requirements
for a diagram to show the proper installation of a
child restraint within a vehicle. Although the
preamble discussed the installation diagram
requirement, the standard inadvertently did not
require the diagram to be placed on the restraint.
This notice makes the necessary technical
amendment to correct the standard.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 26, 1982.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In May 1978.
the agency proposed a substantially upgraded
Standard No. 213, Child Restraint Systems (43
F.R. 21470). In section 5.5.2(a)-(k) of the standard,
the agency proposed requirements for certain
warning and installation labaels for child
restraints. In particular, section 5.5.2(k) proposed
specific requirements for a diagram showing the
proper installation of a child restraint in a
vehicle. Section 5.5.1 of the standard proposed
that all of the labels specified in 5.5.2(a)-(k) would
have to be placed permanently on the child
restraint.

When the agency issued its final rule, it
expanded the labeling requirements for child
restraints (44 F.R. 72131). The preamble for the
final rule discussed the specifics of the expansion
and the reasons for adopting the labeling
requirements. Because of the expansion, the
installation diagram requirement of section
5.5.2(k) of the proposal was redesignated as
section 5.5.2(1) in the final rule. Inadvertently,
section 5.5.1 of the standard was not modified to
reflect the expansion of the labeling requirements

and thus it continued to specify that only the
information found in section 5.5.2(a)-(k) be placed
on the child restraint.

Most manufacturers recognized the intent of
the agency and have placed the correct installation
diagram on their restraints. A number of
manufacturers apparently have not included such
diagrams on their child restraints.

This notice makes the necessary technical
amendment to correct the standard to require the
installation diagram to be placed on a child
restraint. The effective date of this correction is
45 days after the publication of this notice in the
Federal Register. This will allow time for the few
manufacturers that have not included installation
diagrams to prepare the needed diagrams for
their child restraints.

The agency has determined that there is good
cause for not providing additional notice and
opportunity to comment on this technical
amendment. The public has previously had notice
and opportunity to comment on the installation
diagram requirement. This technical amendment
merely corrects an error arising from the
redesignation of the installation diagram
requirement during the rulemaking process.

Issued on July 2, 1982.

Courtney M. Price
Associate Administrator
for Rulemaking

47 F.R. 30077
July 12, 1982

PART 571; S213-PRE 23-24

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 213

Child Restraint Systems for Use in

Motor Vehicles and Aircraft

[Docket No. 74-09; Notice 14]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This final rule amends Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, Child Restraint
Systems, so that child restraint systems can be
certified for use in motor vehicles, or for use in
both motor vehicles and aircraft. The require-
ments for certifying child restraints for use in air-
craft were formerly specified in the Federal Avia-
tion Administration's (FAA) Technical Standard
Order (TSO) ClOO, which required that in order for
child restraint systems to be certified for use in
aircraft, they must first be certified for use in
motor vehicles and then pass three additional per-
formance tests. Simultaneously with the effective
date of this rule, FAA will rescind the require-
ments of TSO ClOO and take action to permit child
restraints certified under the requirements of this
rule to be used in aircraft.

The notice of proposed rulemaking which
preceded this final rule proposed to add the three
performance requirements of the TSO and one
additional performance requirement for restraints
with tether straps to Standard No. 213. This rule
adopts one of the three performance requirements
of the TSO, the inversion test, and requires that
child restraint manufacturers wishing to certify
their products for use in both motor vehicles and
aircraft certify that the product complies with the
requirements of that test. The other performance
requirements proposed in the notice are not incor-
porated in this rule because a joint testing pro-
gram conducted by FAA and NHTSA last year
showed these requirements to be redundant. Child
restraints which passed the existing higher perfor-
mance requirements in Standard No. 213 easily

passed the requirements of the TSO, which in-
dicates that those TSO requirements are unneces-
sary to establish that child restraints are effective
in the differing environment of the aircraft in-
terior. Accordingly, compliance with those re-
quirements is no longer required to certify child
restraints for use in aircraft.

Child restraints which are certified for use in
both motor vehicles and aircraft will be required to
be labeled in red with the phrase "THIS RE-
STRAINT IS CERTIFIED FOR USE IN MOTOR
VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT". Child restraints
certified only for use in motor vehicles will not be
required to change the information currently re-
quired by Standard 213 on their labels.

By combining and simplifying the requirements
for certifying child restraints for use in motor
vehicles and aircraft, FAA and NHTSA hope to en-
courage more child restraint manufacturers to cer-
tify their products for use in both modes of
transportation. The ultimate goal of seeking more
models of child restraints to be certified for use in
both motor vehicles and aircraft is to encourage
families traveling by air to use child restraints for
their children before, during, and after the air
travel portion of their trips.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This rule becomes effective
March 30, 1985.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This rule
amends Standard No. 213, Child Restraint Sys-
tems (49 CFR §571.213), so that child restraint
systems can be certified for use in both motor
vehicles and aircraft, or simply for use in motor
vehicles. These amendments are intended to en-
courage families traveling by air to use child

PART571:S213-PRE25

restraints to protect their children before, during,
and after the air travel portion of their trips.

Background

Need for Increased Use of Child Restraints.
Parents cannot adequately protect their very
young children against the risk of death and injury
while riding in motor vehicles or aircraft either by
holding them in their lap or by fastening a lap belt
around them. The forces generated during sudden
stops even at speeds as low as 10-15 miles per hour
(mph) make it physically impossible for a parent to
hold and protect a child in his or her arms. Using a
lap belt is better, but it is still inadequate for this
purpose (particularly for children under the age of
1 year) because of the physical dimensions, bone
structure, and weight distribution of young
children.

The most effective protection that can be af-
forded these young children are special supple-
mentary seating devices, which are attached to
and secured by the lap belt in the vehicle or air-
craft. These devices, generically referred to as
child restraints, are specifically designed to take
into account the physiological differences between
young children and older children and adults, and
to offer the appropriate protection for these young
children exposed to the large energy levels in-
herent in vehicle crashes.

Efforts to Promote Increased Use of Child
Restraints. The NHTSA has been working hard to
promote the use of child restraints by more
parents. The agency has been advising the various
States on the drafting of mandatory child restraint
use laws. Such laws have now been enacted in 49
States and the District of Columbia. These laws
have significantly increased the sales and use of
child restraints, and increased the public aware-
ness of the safety consequences of allowing
children to travel unrestrained in motor vehicles.

In addition, the NHTSA has been working to
educate the public on the benefits of child
restraints. Working with medical professionals,
childbrith educational programs and others, the
agency has provided information to pediatricians
and prospective parents on ways to protect their
children in motor vehicles. Further, the agency has
developed manuals on how to develop a child
restraint loaner program that can assist parents
unable to afford their own child restraints.

All of these factors have succeeded in greatly in-
creasing the use of child restraints for children

riding in motor vehicles. Currently, restraint uage
for infants less than 1 year old is about 68 per-
cent; and for children ages 1 to 4 the rate is 44 per-
cent; based on the agency's continuing survey of
restraint usage in 19 cities.

Impediments to Increased Use of Child Restraints.

This heightened use and awareness, combined
with the limited number of child restraint models
which can be used in both motor vehicles and air-
craft, caused confusion and frustration for families
traveling by air and car. Both NHTSA and FAA
have standards for child restraints. Until recently,
of the 42 models of child restraints certified under
NHTSA's Standard No. 213 for use in motor vehi-
cles, only five models were also approved under the
FAA's standard for use in aircraft. If a family tried
to take one of the remaining 37 models of child
restraints, they were usually required to check the
restraint along with the rest of their luggage. This
discouraged families from traveling with the unap-
proved child restraints, and resulted in the child
not having the benefit of the safety seat not only
during the takeoff and landing of the aircraft, but
also when the family was driving in a motor vehi-
cle on the ground portions of the trip.

From a safety viewpoint, data on injuries and
fatalities show that travel by air is much safer
than by motor vehicle. For children up to 4 years
of age, approximately one fatality and 10 injuries
occur yearly during commercial air travel vs. over
600 fatalities and 70,000 injuries to motor vehicle
occupants. Consequently, the main benefits from
the use of child restraints will be derived from the
motor vehicle portion of the trip.

The NHTSA Child Restraint Standard

As an initial step toward ensuring that child
restraint systems would offer adequate portection
to their occupants, NHTSA issued Standard No.
213 in 1970. That standard, which was issued
under the authority granted in the National Traf-
fic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as
amended (hereinafter "the Safety Act"; 15 U.S.C.
1381 et seq.), became effective in 1971. As then
drafted, it specified various static tests to ensure
the safe performance of child restraints. However,
subsequent data showed that child restraints
which passed these static tests might not prove ef-
fective at protecting a child in certain vehicle
crash situations.

PART 571; S213-PRE 26

Under the current standard, which became ef-
fective January 1, 1981, the performance of child
restraint systems is evaluated in dynamic tests
under conditions simulating a frontal crash of an
average car at 30 mph. The restraint is anchored
by a lap belt and, if provided with the restraint, by
a supplemental anchorage belt (known as a tether
strap). An additional frontal impact test at 20 mph
is conducted for restraints equipped with either
tether straps or internal harnes and a restraint
surface. In that additional test, child restraints
with tether straps are tested with the straps
detached and child restraints with a restraint sur-
face (e.g., a padded shield) are tested with the
restraint surface in place but with the child
restraint system's internal harness unbuckled. The
additional 20 mph tests are intended to ensure a
minimum level of safety performance when the
restraints are improperly used. Thus, child
restraints with tethers or with a restraint surface
are tested at both 20 and 30 mph, while those
without tethers or such a surface are tested at 30
mph only. Both the 20 mph and the 30 mph tests
are conducted with the child restraint fastened to
a seat representing the typical motor vehicle
bench seat.

To protect the child, limits are set on the
amount of force exerted on the head and chest of a
child test dummy during the dynamic testing of
restraints specified for children over 20 pounds.
Limits are also set on the amount of frontal head
and knee excursions experienced by the test dum-
my in forward-facing child restraints. To prevent a
small child from being ejected from a rearward-
facing restraint, limits are set on the amount that
the seat can tip forward and on the amount of ex-
cursion experienced by the test dummy during the
simulated crash.

Compliance of child restraints with Standard
No. 213 is assured by the requirement in the
Safety Act that manufacturers certify compliance
for each child restraint. The agency may review
the basis for that certification and conduct testing
to assure compliance. The Safety Act provides for
the assessment of civil penalties for failures to
comply with applicable safety standards, and for
certifications which the manufacturer in the exer-
cise of due care has reason to know are false or
misleading in a material respect.

The FAA Child Restraint Standard
In May 1982, the FAA issued its own child

restraint standard. Technical Standard Order
(TSO) ClOO. One of the key factors underlying the
development of TSO ClOO was child restraint
testing conducted by the Civil Aeromedical In-
stitute in 1974. The results of that testing ap-
peared in FAA test report "Child Restraint Sys-
tems for Civil Aircraft" (FAA-AM-78-12, March
1978). Another factor was the FAA's determina-
tion that differences in the environments of air-
craft and motor vehicles necessitated its establish-
ing performance requirements to address the spe-
cial safety risks posed to young children traveling
in aircraft. One of these differences is the tendency
of the seat back of aircraft seats to fold forward
with the application of a very low force. The FAA
determined that there was a need to control the in-
teraction between the young child, especially
those facing rearward in a child restraint, and the
seat back to ensure that the seat back does not ap-
ply unacceptable levels of force onto the child. The
FAA also determined that there was a need to ad-
dress the danger that in-flight turbulence (espe-
cially in the upward direction) might throw a child
out of his or her child restraint.

Accordingly, the FAA drafted TSO ClOO so that
it requires each child restraint to meet the re-
quirements of NHTSA's Standard No. 213 and four
additional requirements. First, while attached to
an aircraft passenger seat with a free-folding seat
back by an aircraft safety belt, and occupied by a
test dummy, each child restraint must provide pro-
tection in an impact producing a 20 mph velocity
change. There is no double testing of child
restraints with tethers as under Standard No. 213.
Such restraints are tested only once in an impact
and with their tethers unattached. Second, each
child restraint must retain its occupant during an
inversion test. Third, each child restraint must
withstand the static forces specified in Federal
Aviation Regulations §25.561 (14 CFR §25.561),
with each of the forces acting separately. Fourth,
TSO ClOO specifies requirements for marking
child restraints with assembly and usage instruc-
tions, providing a copy of such instruction to child
restraint users and submitting a copy of these in-
structions and various technical information and
test results to the FAA. In addition, the TSO pro-
cedures require the establishment and mainte-
nance of a manufacturer quality control system.
The quality control system is intended to assure
that seats are manufactured in such a way as to
meet the standard's performance requirements.

PART571;S213-PRE27

For a child restraint to be approved for use in
aircraft, the manufacturer must submit specified
information to the FAA along with a certifying
statement that the restraint meets the require-
ments of TSO ClOO. After the FAA approval is
issued, if airlines permit, the restraint can be used
for infants or young children during all phases of
flight, including takeoff and landing. Once the
FAA approved a particular model of child re-
straint, that agency followed a policy of accepting
child restraints of that model that were manufac-
tured prior to the date of approval for use in air-
craft during all phases of flight, provided that
those earlier child restraints were substantially
identical to the approved one and were properly
identified as to make and model by a Standard No.
213 certification label.

The result of these differing requirements was
that only a few of the child restraints certified for
use in motor vehicles were also certified for use in
aircraft. In 1983, the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) considered the safety prob-
lems facing young children traveling in motor
vehicles and aircraft and urged that a variety of ac-
tions be taken to promote the use of child re-
straints. It urged that all States adopt laws re-
quiring that infants and young children be placed
in child restraints when riding in motor vehicles. It
also recommended that the DOT simplify its stan-
dards specifying performance requirements for
child restraints by combining all technical re-
quirements into a single standard (NTSB Safety
Recommendations A-83-1, issued February 24,
1983).

After considering the benefits which would
result from the increased use of child restraints,
the FAA and the NHTSA jointly concluded that
the process of certifying child restraints for use in
both motor vehicles and aircraft could and should
be simplified and expedited. By combining the
separate NHTSA and FAA standards into a single
standard under the jurisdiction of a single agency,
child restraint manufacturers could avoid the dif-
ficulties of dealing with different standards,
methods of certification, and testing procedures
promulgated by the two agencies. Accordingly, a
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) was
published at 48 FR 36849, August, 1983.

Details of the NPRM

The NPRM proposed that the NHTSA would be
the sole agency responsible for enforcing the new

Standard No. 213, which would be applicable to
child restraint systems designed for use in both
motor vehicles and aircraft. In essence, the NPRM
proposed that the requirements in both agencies
standards for child restraints be unchanged and
simply combined into an expanded Standard No.
213, with one further performance test added for
child restraints to be certified for use in aircraft.
This would avoid the problems inherent in dealing
with the differing certification procedures of the
two agencies and consolidate all of the require-
ments into one standard.

Under the proposal, manufacturers which
elected to certify their child restraints for use on
aircraft would have to certify that these restraints
could pass those four additional tests. Those
manufacturers which did not elect to certify their
restraints for use on aircraft would not have to
make that certification. The existing requirements
in Standard No. 213 applicable to child restraints
certified for use in motor vehicles were not pro-
posed to be changed in any way by the NPRM.
What was proposed was simply an option for
manufacturers to subject their restraints to some
additional testing if they wanted to certify those
restraints for use on aircraft.

Three of the four additional performance tests
proposed to be added to Standard No. 213 for child
restraints certified for use on aircraft were drawn
almost verbatim from the FAA's child restraint
standard. These additional tests were proposed to
be required to ensure that child restraints cer-
tified for use in aircraft would offer adequate pro-
tection to young children in the unique interior en-
vironment of aircraft.

The first additional test proposed in the NPRM
was a dynamic impact test at 20 mph for all
restraints not equipped with a tether strap. The
child restraint would be attached to a represen-
tative aircraft seat only by the aircraft seat belt at-
tached to the aircraft seat. The child restraint
would not be permitted to fail or deform in a man-
ner that could seriously injure or prevent subse-
quent extrication of the occupant. This test was
taken almost verbatim from paragraph (a)(2)(i) of
TSO ClOO.

The second additional test proposed in the
NPRM would apply only to child restraints
equipped with a tether strap. These restraints
would be tested under the same procedures as un-
tethered restraints, except that the impact would
be at 30 mph with the tether strap unattached. The

PART 571; S213-PRE 28

same criteria for determining satisfactory perfor-
mance specified above for untethered restraints
would again be used. This requirement was not
drawn from TSO ClOO. However, NHTSA decided
to include the requirement because the FAA
believed that, since aircraft seats have no place to
which the tether strap could be anchored, it was
necessary to subject such restraints to a more
stringent performance test to ensure that these
restraints would offer adequate aircraft safety.

The third test proposed in the NPRM was an in-
version test. Its purpose is to ensure that the child
restraint could protect the child from air tur-
bulence. The test, drawn directly from the lan-
guage of paragraph (aK2Kii) of TSO ClOO, would
have required the combination of a child restraint,
test dummy, and aircraft passenger seat to be
rotated to an inverted position and held there
without any failure or deformation of the child
restraint that would seriously injure or prevent
the subsequent removal of the occupant.

The fourth additional test proposed in the
NPRM would have required each child restraint to
withstand the ultimate inertia forces specified in
14 CFR §25.561, with each of those forces acting
separately. This requirement was specified in
paragraph (a)(2Kiii) of TSO ClOO. Engineering
analysis would have been acceptable in lieu of ac-
tual testing to establish compliance with this pro-
posed requirement.

The procedures to be followed in conducting
these tests or analyses were drawn from para-
graph (aK2Kiv) of TSO ClOO. They provided for the
testing or analysis of child restraints to determine
their adequacy for protecting the weight and
stature of child for which the restraint is designed.
The test dummies to be used were those specified
in section S7 of Standard No. 213. Other pro-
cedural provisions related to the placing of the test
dummy in the restraint, the attaching of the re-
straint to the aircraft seat, and the design of the
aircraft seat.

As noted above, the NPRM gave child restraint
manufacturers an option either to certify their
restraints for use in both motor vehicles and air-
craft or to certify the restraints only for use in
motor vehicles. Those electing the latter option
would have been required by the NPRM to include
the statement, "THIS RESTRAINT IS NOT CER-
TIFIED FOR USE IN AIRCRAFT", on the certifi-
cation label and operating instructions for the
child restraint. This labeling requirement was pro-

posed to ensure that parents seeking to buy
restraints for use in both modes of transportation
and airline flight attendants would easily ascertain
whether a particular child restraint was not cer-
tified for use in aircraft.

The NPRM also announced that FAA and
NHTSA would jointly test many models of child
restraints for compliance with the TSO ClOO re-
quirements. The test results generated by this
program were made available to the manufac-
turers of the tested restraints to assist them to
certify their child restraints for use in both modes
of transportation.

FAA-NHTSA Testing of Child Restraints

The testing program evaluated all 42 models of
child restraints currently manufactured and cer-
tified as meeting the requirements of Standard
No. 213 to determine whether they complied also
with the existing requirements of TSO ClOO. (See
DOT HS-806-413) There was some preliminary dif-
ficulty in determining how to establish whether a
child restraint system had "failed or deformed in a
manner that could seriously injure or prevent
subsequent extrication of a child occupant," the
criterion for determining compliance with the
tests in TSO ClOO. The two agencies agreed to use
the performance requirements specified in section
S5 of Standard No. 213, but to exclude the head
and chest acceleration requirements set forth in
section S5.1.2.

All 42 models of child restraints, including the
11 which have tether straps, were subjected to the
20 mph dynamic test while attached to a represen-
tative aircraft seat, and all passed by a con-
siderable margin. Similarly, the three tethered
child seats and eight tethered booster seats were
subjected to a 30 mph impact with the tether unat-
tached, and all again passed by a considerable
margin. The performance of the three tethered
child seats was not appreciably different than was
registered by them in the 20 mph impact test, and
the head and knee excursions measured in this test
were well under those recorded for the restraints
in the Standard No. 213 tests. All 42 models were
subjected to the TSO ClOO inversion test, and all
42 were deemed to have passed those require-
ments. Additionally, all 42 models were subjected
to the static loading tests at the levels specified in
TSO ClOO, and all 42 passed the test.

AK 42 models were also tested to the require-
ments of "old" Standard No. 213, which required

PART 571; S213-PRE 29

the restraint to withstand inertia loads approxi-
mately 3 times greater than those specified in
TSO ClOO. Standard No. 213 was upgraded from
these old requirements primarily because of the
structural failures which occurred in 30 mph
dynamic tests of restraints which met the static
load requirements under the old version of the
standard. NHTSA believed that any of the re-
straints which could satisfy the dynamic testing
requirements of the new Standard No. 213 would
also satisfy the static loading requirements of the
old standard. Since the loads required under the
old standard were approximately 3 times the
level required by the TSO, any devices which could
satisfy the old standard would ipso facto satisfy
the TSO requirements.

In this testing to the levels prescribed under the
old standard, 40 of 42 models of child restraints
passed. The two restraints which failed the tests
did so in only one direction, and at load levels 2'/?
times those required in the TSO.

The joint testing program made it possible for
the manufacturers of every model of child
restraint currently produced to seek prompt FAA
approval for the restraints under TSO ClOO. This
has expedited the process for certifying current
models of child restraints for both aircraft and
motor vehicle use. At present 36 models have
received TSO approval.

However, the Department of Transportation
still believes that it is necessary to proceed with a
final rule in this area. As a practical matter, new
child restraints will be introduced into the market,
and those models would face the same obstacles
which were confronted by current models before
the completion of the joint testing program. It is
poor regulatory policy to subject manufacturers to
needless and repetitious testing of the identical
product to satisfy slightly differing requirements
of two different agencies. These considerations im-
pel FAA and NHTSA to proceed to a final rule at
this time, so that the situation which existed prior
to the joint testing program does not recur at some
future date.

Comments

Most of the more than 20 commenters on the
NPRM endorsed the concept of combining the
FAA and NHTSA standards into one standard.
Some of the commenters expressed qualified sup-
port for the concept, but reserved final judgment
until the results of the joint testing program were
made available to the public.

Only one commenter opposed the basic concept
of combining the two standards, and that opposi-
tion was based on the belief that NHTSA was
neither competent nor properly equipped to
regulate items related to avaiation and the aircraft
industry. First, NHTSA believes it should be em-
phasized that this rule was developed with the
cooperation and support of the FAA, which cer-
tainly has the necessary expertise regarding the
aviation industry. Further, child restraints are not
items which are uniquely related to aviation and
the aircraft industry; most of the lifesaving
benefits of child restraints accrue while the young
child is riding in a motor vehicle. Finally, both
NHTSA and FAA gained new knowledge about
the interplay of the aircraft seat, child restraint,
and child during a sudden deceleration during the
recently completed joint testing program. For
these reasons, the agencies believe it is ap-
propriate to go forward with this rulemaking.

Several comments raised issues outside the
scope of this rulemaking. These included permissi-
ble seat positions for approved child restraints in
aircraft, retroactive certification for aircraft use of
models recently approved for such use, the extent
to which individual airlines must examine the
restraint's certification to determine its validity,
differences in the various airlines' policies permit-
ting the use of child restraints, and so forth. This
rulemaking is addressing only the steps child
restraint manufacturers must take to certify their
products for use in motor vehicles and aircraft.
The procedures regulating the actual use of the
restraints in aircraft are not being addressed
herein; such procedures will be decided solely by
the FAA. These and other questions on the pro-
cedures should be addressed to that agency.

The commenters made several objections to
each of the four proposed additional requirements,
to which compliance would have to be certified if a
manufacturer wanted to certify its child restraint
for use in aircraft. Regarding the first proposed
additional test that child restraints without tether
straps be tested in an aircraft seat at a 20 mph im-
pact, these commenters argued that all child
restraints certified as complying with Standard
No. 213 are already subjected to a 30 mph impact
in the more severe environment of a car seat. Ac-
cordingly, this argument continued, the proposal
to require a lower speed test in a less severe en-
vironment would simply add to the testing burden
for child restraint manufacturers, without en-
suring any higher degree of safety.

PART 571; S213-PRE 30

One of the child restraint manufacturers cor
rectly noted in its comments that the reason for
proposing the 20 mph test in the aircraft seat was
the concern that the more flexible back of such a
seat could snap forward on impact and hit the child
restraint and/or child with additional crash forces
and that those additional forces would not be con-
sidered in the 30 mph test with the restraint at
tached to a car seat. This commenter suggested
that their own testing and some NHTSA tests in
1982 showed that the back of the aircraft seat does
not exert significant forces relative to the crash
forces. The commenter concluded that NHTSA
should delete this proposed requirement unless
the joint testing program showed some evidence
that significant forces were actually exerted.

The joint testing program showed that the
forces to which the test dummy and restraint are
subjected in the 20 mph dynamic test in the air-
craft seat were 1/3 to 1/2 less than those to which
they were subjected in the 30 mph dynamic test in
the car seat. This finding was hardly significant or
surprising, given the lower speed at impact.

A far more significant finding was made re-
garding the amount of the loading imposed by the
flexible aircraft seat back on the restrained dum-
my. For this testing, the aircraft seat back was in-
strumented with a triaxial accelerometer so that
quantitative assessments of the produced forces
could be made. Inspection of the acceleration-time
histories and the loads measured on the aircraft
seat belts revealed that in every test the max-
imum forces generated by the child restraints (as
measured by the test dummy and including the
peak head and chest accelerations and the peak
belt loads) occurred some 25-40 milliseconds before
the occurrence of the peak acceleration of the seat
back. Also, the magnitude of the head and chest ac-
celerations imparted to the child seat occupant by
the restraining action of child seats were much
higher than those imparted later on by the action
of the aircraft seat back. These facts indicate that
the loads imparted when the seat back struck the
child restraint and its occupant are relatively
insignificant when compared with the loads im-
parted by the crash. Confirmation of this was
found in the fact that the seat back acceleration
had no significant influence on the head and chest
accelerations measured in the test dummies. How-
ever, the loads measured on the aircraft seat belt
were increased during the seat back acceleration.
This finding suggests that the load exerted by the

acceleration of the seat back is transferred direct-
ly through the structure of the child restraint to
the seat belt. This fact would again confirm the
view that the seat back acceleration poses no
threat to the occupant of a child restraint.

Based on these results, which occurred in each
test, NHTSA believes that it has been established
that seat back acceleration poses an inconsequen-
tial threat to occupants of child restraints, and that
any restraint which protects its occupant against
the crash forces will adequately protect its occu-
pant against the forces generated by the seat back
acceleration. Given these conclusions, it is un-
necessary to test child restraints for their ability
to protect a child against the threat of the folding
aircraft seat back. Accordingly, the agency has
deleted the requirement that child restraints be
certified for use in aircraft capable of protecting a
restrained child in a 20 mph impact when attached
to an aircraft seat.

Many of the commenters objected to the re-
quirement that tethered restraints be subjected to
a 30 mph crash in an aircraft seat with the tether
unattached. The rationale for these objections was
perhaps best summed up in the NTSB comment.
The NTSB stated that it could understand sub-
jecting restraints with tethers to the same test as
restraints without tethers, and not permitting the
restraints with tethers to have their tether strap
attached during the test. Such a proposal would
ensure that these restraints could pass the same
requirements as other child restraints, and that
they could do so under the conditions present in
aircraft; i.e., with their tether straps unattached.
However, the NTSB continued, it was not justifi-
able to require these restraints to undergo a more
severe test than other restraints. One child
restraint manufacturer commented that this 30
mph test requirement would not ensure any
higher level of safety on aircraft since the aircraft
seats themselves would not withstand a 30 mph
impact. This commenter went on to say that in an
actual crash at 30 mph, there is as much potential
of injury to the child from the failure of the aircraft
seat itself as from the failure of the child restraint.

As indicated above in the section summarizing
the joint testing program, the tests conducted on
child restraints with tethers showed that all of
those restraints easily passed this 30 mph crash
test requirement, that the results were not much
higher than were those measured in the 20 mph
tests, and that the results showed an appreciably

PART571;S213-PRE31

lower force level for the restraints in this test than
were obtained in the Standard No. 213 misuse test.
Given the conclusion that the seat back accelera-
tion does not transmit any significant forces to the
occupant of the child restraint and the fact that
this test imposes lower crash forces than the Stan-
dard No. 213 tests, it seems unnecessary to require
the child restraint manufacturers to certify com-
pliance with this test. The points made in the com-
ments on this proposal also are convincing, so it
has been determined not to incorporate this test in
the final rule.

The third proposed additional test was an inver-
sion test whose purpose is to ensure that the child
restraints certified for use in aircraft could ade-
quately protect the child against the dangers
posed by sudden air turbulence. The commenters
who addressed this issue seemed to generally
agree that this was a hazard which child restraints
for use in aircraft should protect against and that
restraints which passed the requirements of Stan-
dard No. 213 would not necessarily pass this test.
NHTSA also believes that the inversion test was
not shown to be redundant of existing test pro-
cedures, and has determined that this test should
be incorporated in this final rule. The re-
quirements for this inversion test are adopted ver-
batim from those proposed in the NPRM. Several
commenters questioned some of the inversion test
procedures and offered suggested alternatives.
The agency agrees that some refinements could be
made. However, it is necessary first to issue a new
NPRM. The NPRM, which proposes to amend the
requirements for the inversion test adopted in this
rule, discusses these comments further.

The fourth additional test proposed in the
NPRM was a static load test. Several commenters
questioned the need for the relatively low inertial
loads of that test to be applied to the restraints,
considering the much greater loads to which the
child restraint is subjected in the testing for Stan-
dard No. 213. This fact, together with the joint
testing results which showed that all currently
produced child restraints can withstand loads at
least 2V2 times greater than those specified in this
proposed test, leads NHTSA to conclude that this
test is redundant and does not ensure any higher
level of safety. Accordingly, it is not adopted in
this final rule.

Several commenters addressed the criteria used
to determine if a child retraint has passed the two
simulated crash tests and the inversion test appli-

cable to restraints for aircraft use. These criteria
were that the child restraint system "may not fail
nor deform in a manner that could seriously injure
or prevent subsequent extrication of a child occu-
pant." Some of the child retraint manufacturers
asked precisely how one determines if a restraint
has failed or deformed in such a manner. Another
commenter opined that those criteria "are so
vague and subjective as to be of no substantive
value whatsoever."

NHTSA agrees with these commenters' judg-
ment that the criteria for determining compliance
could be made more objective. However, the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act requires that in-
terested persons be given notice of proposed rule-
making and an opportunity to comment thereon
prior to an agency's adopting changed require-
ments as a final rule (5 U.S.C. 553). This provision
of the law prevents the agency from adopting
these more objective criteria in this final rule,
because the interested persons would not have had
an opportunity to comment on those criteria. Ac-
cordingly, NHTSA is today publishing a notice of
proposed rulemaking to incorporate more objec-
tive criteria for the inversion test. This notice has
a 45-day comment period, to provide any in-
terested persons with the chance to comment on
the changes while allowing the agency to move
promptly to incorporate more objective criteria.

Most of the commenters addressed the issues
raised by the language proposed to be labeled on
child restraints which were certified only for use
in motor vehicles. The NPRM proposed that such
child restraints have the statement "THIS RE-
STRAINT IS NOT CERTIFIED FOR USE IN AN
AIRCRAFT." A number of commenters opposed
this "negative" labeling because it could give con-
sumers the impression that such a restraint was
not as safe for motor vehicle use as a restraint
which was certified for use in both aircraft and
motor vehicles. In fact, both restraints would have
been certified as passing the same dynamic tests
for use in motor vehicles. Other problems alleged
to exist with this labeling scheme were that con-
sumers would not be sure whether a child
restraint not bearing such a label could be used
safely in aircraft, and that this "negative" labeling
could result in older, unlabeled and uncertified
seats being used on aircraft. Further, the proposed
labeling could make it difficult for flight atten-
dants to determine which restraints were actually
approved for use in aircraft, causing delays and

PART 571; S213-PRE 32

frustration for parents wishing to use child
restraints on flights. These commenters all re-
quested that the "negative" labeling proposed in
the NPRM be replaced with a simple positive
statement in the final rule.

NHTSA agrees with these comments. The infor-
mational purposes of the labeling requirement
would be better served by simple positive declara-
tions. The labeling requirement adopted in the
final rule specifies that child restraints certified
for use only in motor vehicles recite the same cer-
tification that is currently required, with no addi-
tional statements, and those restraints certified
for use in both motor vehicles and aircraft simply
add a statement of that dual certification.

Finally, a child restraint manufacturer asked
that the final rule clarify the standard aircraft seat
assembly to be used for testing the child restraint.
The NPRM stated in section S7.3(b) that a "repre-
sentative aircraft passenger seat" be used. The
term "representative aircraft passenger seat" was
defined S5 of the NPRM as either a production
seat approved by the FAA or a simulated seat con-
forming to Drawing Package SAS-100-2000.
NHTSA believes this definition is clear, and will
result in consistent test results. No further
changes to this definition have been made in this
final rule.

0MB Clearance

The labeling requirements for child restraints
are considered to be information collection re-
quirements, as that term is defined by the Office of
Management and Budget (0MB) in 5 CFR Part
1320. 0MB has approved the labeling require-
ments for child restraints certified for use in motor
vehicles (CMB No. 2127-0511), but has not ap-
proved the labeling requirements for child re-
straints certified for use in motor vehicles and air-
craft. Accordingly, those labeling requirements
have been submitted to the 0MB for its approval,
pursuant to the requirements of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.l A
notice will be published in the Federal Register
when 0MB approves this information collection.

Impacts

NHTSA has analyzed the impacts of this rule
and determined that the rule is not "major" within
the meaning of Executive Order 12291, but is

"significant" within the meaning of the Depart-
ment of Transportation regulatory policies and
procedures. The rule simplifies and combines the
requirements of two existing government regula-
tios into one regulation. It would not impose any
new burdens upon any manufacturer. If a child
restraint manufacturer wishes to continue certify-
ing one of its child restraint models for use in
motor vehicles only, the requirements for doing so
are unchanged and the testing costs would remain
at about $3,500. If a child restraint manufacturer
wishes to certify a model for use in motor vehicles
and aircraft, its testing costs under Standard No.
213 would increase by about $1,500 to a total of
about $5,000. However, the total testing costs for
certifying a model to this combined Standard No.
213 will be less than the total testing costs for cer-
tifying compliance with Standard No. 213 and TSO
ClOO (estimated at about $8,000). Further, this cost
reduction and the need to certify to only one agen-
cy's regulation, instead of two agencies' regula-
tions, should provide a slightly reduced cost of
compliance for those child restraint manufacturers
that choose to certify their products for use in
motor vehicles and aircraft. Although these im-
pacts are minimal, a regulatory evaluation has
been prepared.

In consideration of the foregoing, the following
amendments are made to section 571.213, Child
Restraint Systems, of Title 49 of the Code of
Federal Regulations.

1. Section SI is amended to read as follows:

51. Scope. This standard specifies requirements
for child restraint systems used in motor vehicles
and aircraft.

2. Section S2 is amended to read as follows:

52. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is to
reduce the number of children killed or injured in
motor vehicle crashes and in aircraft.

3. Section S3 is amended to read as follows:

53. Application, This standard applies to child
restraint systems for use in motor vehicles and
aircraft.

4. The definition of "Child restraint system" in
section S4 is amended to read as follows:

"Child restraint system" means any device
except Type I or Type II seat belts, designed for
use in a motor vehicle or aircraft to restrain,
seat, or position children who weigh 50 pounds or
less.

5. Section S4 is amended by adding the follow-
ing new definitions in alphabetical order:

PART 571:8213 -PRE 33

"Representative aircraft passenger seat" means
either a Federal Aviation Administration ap-
proved production aircraft passenger seat or a
simulated aircraft passenger seat conforming to
Drawing Package SAS-100-2000.

6. Section S5 is amended to read as follows:
S5. Requirements for child restraint systems

certified for use in motor vehicles. Each child
restraint certified for use in motor vehicles shall
meet the requirements in this section when, as
specified, tested in accordance with S6.1.

7. Section S5.5.2 is revised by the addition of a
new paragraph (m) which reads as follows:

(m) Child restraints that are certified as com-
plying with the provisions of section S8 shall be
labeled with the statement "THIS RESTRAINT
IS CERTIFIED FOR USE IN MOTOR VEHICLES
AND AIRCRAFT". This statement shall be in red
lettering, and shall be placed after the certification
statement required by paragraph (e) of this
section.

8. Section S7.3 is revised to read as follows:
S7.3 Standard seat assemblies. The standard

seat assemblies used in testing under this stan-
dard are:

(a) For testing for motor vehicle use, a simu-
lated vehicle use, a simulated vehicle bench seat,
with three seating positions, which is described in
Drawing Package SAS-100-1000 (consisting of
drawings and a bill of materials); and seat.

9. A new section S8 is added to the standard to
read as follows:

S8. Requirements, test conditions, and pro-
cedures for child restraint systems manufactured
for use in an aircraft. Each child restraint system
manufactured for use in both motor vehicles and
aircraft must comply with all of the applicable test
requirements specified in section S5 and, when
tested in accordance with the conditions and pro-
cedures of S8.2, the additional requirements
specified in section S8.1.

58.1 Child containment for conditions of in-
flight turbulence must be determined by inversion
tests. The combination of a representative aircraft
passenger seat, child restraint system, and ap-
propriate test dummy must be rotated from the
normal unright position to an inverted position.
The combination must remain inverted for at least
3 seconds with neither failure nor deformation
that could seriously injure or prevent subsequent
extrication of a child occupant. Child containment
must be demonstrated for rotation in the forward
direction and a sideward direction.

58.2 Each configuration and mode of installa-
tion must be tested for protection of a child of a
weight and stature for which the child restraint
system is designed. The child occupant must be
simulated with an appropriate test dummy as
specified in paragraph S7. Placement of each
restraint system in a representative aircraft
passenger seat and placement of the test dummy
must be in accordance with the manufacturer's in-
structions. Each child restraint system must be at-
tached to the seat by means of an aircraft safety
belt without supplementary anchorage belts or
tether straps; FAA Technical Standard Order ap-
proved safety belt extensions may be used. The
representative aircraft passenger seat used in
each test must have a seat back that is completely
free to fold over.

Issued on August 24, 1984

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

49 FR 34357
August 30, 1984

PART 571; S213-PRE 34

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 213

Child Restraint Systems for Use in
Motor Vehicles and Aircraft

[Docket No. 74-09; Notice 16]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This rule amends the inversion test
added to Standard No. 213, Child Restraint
Systems, to allow those manufacturers which
choose to do so to certify their restraints for use in
both motor vehicles and aircraft. These amend-
ments specify more objective criteria for the
testing procedures and determining compliance
with the inversion tests. This rule adopts what
was proposed, except that the rate of acceleration
and deceleration at the start and finish of the test
is now specified. The rule also specifically allows
manufacturers the option of using any of the speci-
fied aircraft seats and safety belts. In addition,
several typographical errors have been corrected.

EFFECTIVE DATE: April 17, 1985.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: During the
latter half of 1982, the Department of Transporta-
tion had two standards for child restraints. Child re-
straints for use in motor vehicles had to be certified
as complying with the requirements of this agency's
Standard No. 213 (49 CFR §571.213). That standard
specifies performance and labeling requirements
applicable to child restraints. Child restraints for
use in aircraft had to be certified as complying with
the requirements of the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration's (FAA) Technical Standard Order ClOO.
That standard required child restraints to satisfy
differing performance and labeling requirements if
they were to be used in aircraft.

The result of these differing requirements was
that only a few of the child restraints certified for
use in motor vehicles were also certified for use in
aircraft. In early 1983, the National Transporta-

tion Safety Board considered the safety problems
posed for young children traveling in motor vehi-
cles and aircraft and urged that a variety of ac-
tions be taken to promote increased use of child
restraints. One of those recommendations was
that the Department of Transportation simplify
its two different standards setting forth re-
quirements for child restraints, by combining the
standards into a single standard.

After considering the benefits which would
result from the increased use of child restraints,
the FAA and NHTSA jointly concluded that the
process of certifying child restraints for use in
both motor vehicles and aircraft could and should
be simplified and expedited. By combining the
separate NHTSA and FAA standards into a
single standard under the jurisdiction of a single
agency, child restraint manufacturers could avoid
the difficulties of dealing with different stan-
dards, methods of certification, and test pro-
cedures promulgated by the two different agen-
cies. Accordingly, a notice of proposed rulemak-
ing (NPRM) was published at 48 FR 36849,
August 15, 1983.

This notice proposed that NHTSA would be the
sole agency responsible for administering the new
Standard No. 213, which would be applicable to
both child restraints designed for use in motor
vehicles and child restraints designed for use in
aircraft. In essence, the notice proposed that the
requirements in both agencies' standards be
adopted in toto and simply combined in an ex-
panded version of Standard No. 213. This would
eliminate the problems inherent in dealing with
the differing certification and testing procedures
of the two agencies and consolidate all the require-
ments into one standard.

PART 571; S213-PRE 35

After publication of the NPRM. NHTSA and
FAA undertook a joint testing program of all 42
models of child restraints being manufactured at
that time and certified as complying with the re-
quirements of Standard No. 213. The purpose of
the joint testing program was to determine
whether these child restraints could also be cer-
tified as complying with the FAA standard for
child restraints for use in aircraft. The joint
testing program showed that some of the FAA re-
quirements proposed to be added to Standard No.
213 were simply less severe tests of performance
capabilities which had already been measured in
testing to satisfy the NHTSA requirements.
Hence, those requirements were deemed redun-
dant and not necessary to ensure adequate protec-
tion of restraint occupants in aircraft.

NHTSA published a final rule amending Stan-
dard No. 213 at 49 FR 34357, August 30, 1984. That
rule added one additional test to Standard No. 213
which had to be satisfied by those child-restraint
manufacturers which chose to certify their prod-
ucts for use in both motor vehicles and aircraft.
The additional test was an inversion test, whose
purpose is to ensure that child restraints certified
for use in aircraft adequately protect occupants
against the dangers posed by sudden air turbu-
lence. The procedures to be followed were adopted
exactly as proposed in the NPRM, which was in
turn drawn verbatim from the FAA standard.

A number of the comments received in response
to the NPRM agreed with the proposal to include
an inversion test in Standard No. 213, but ques-
tioned the "vagueness and subjectivity" associated
with the inversion test as proposed. After review-
ing both the proposed criteria and the comments
received on that proposal, NHTSA concluded that
the test procedure should be clarified. However,
the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative
Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.) precluded the
agency from adopting the modifications to the test
procedure in the final rule. This was because
5 U.S.C. 553 requires that interested persons
receive notice of proposed rulemaking, and that
such notice shall include either the terms or
substance of the proposed rule or a description of
the subjects and issues involved. The NPRM did
not give the public notice that NHTSA was even
considering different criteria from those which
were proposed, so the final rule could not adopt
such criteria.

To correct this perceived shortcoming of the

final rule, NHTSA published another NPRM on
the same day as the final rule, at 49 FR 34374,
August 30, 1984. That notice proposed to establish
the procedures and criteria used by NHTSA and
the FAA in the joint testing program as the pro-
cedures and criteria to be followed in the inversion
test just added to Standard No. 213. Only one com-
menter responded to this NPRM.

This notice proposed that to prepare for the in-
version test, the subject child restraint should be
attached to a representative aircraft passenger
seat using only an FAA-approved aircraft safety
belt and FAA-approved aircraft safety-belt ex-
tensions, if needed. A representative aircraft
passenger seat was defined as either an FAA-
approved production aircraft passenger seat or a
simulated aircraft passenger seat conforming to
Figure 6.

The commenter stated that this procedure failed
to specify objective criteria, as required by section
102(2) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1391(2)), because it was not
clear that every FAA-approved production pas-
senger seat is the equivalent of the simulated
passenger seat shown in Figure 6. In the same
vein, the commenter argued that it was not clear
that all FAA-approved safety belts and safety belt
extensions were equivalent for the purposes of the
inversion test. If they are not equivalent, the com-
menter argued, the outcome of the inversion test
would depend on the particular seat and/or safety
belt chosen for the tests. When the outcome of the
test is influenced by something other than the
properties of what is being tested, the test is not
objective. To remedy this, the commenter urged
that the inversion test be amended to either
specify the exact seat and safety-belt combinations
which would be used for testing or specify that the
seat and safety belts may be chosen at the manu-
facturer's option from among any of the specified
seats and safety belts.

The inversion test in Standard No. 213 is a
qualitative test, the results of which are mainly
dependent upon the geometry of the aircraft seat
and safety-belt combination. The test results will
not be significantly affected by the seat's struc-
tural and padding characteristics or by the seat-
belt properties. Nevertheless, the commenter is
correct in asserting that the properties of the par-
ticular aircraft seat and safety belt used in a test
might make the difference between the restraint
passing and failing the test in a very marginal

PART 571; S213-PRE 36

case. The agency wishes to emphasize that this is a
possibility, but it has not been demonstrated. In
the joint testing program in which all currently
produced models of child restraints were tested,
all restraints passed the inversion test, using the
criteria adopted in this rule.

To address this possibility, the rule adopts the
commenter's suggestion that the proposed
language be amended to specify that childs
restraint manufacturers may at their option select
any of the specified passenger seats and aircraft
safety belts for use in the inversion test. A com-
plete listing of all FAA-approved aircraft
passenger seats and safety belts can be found in
the FAA's Advisory Circular AC 20-36, which is
updated annually. By adopting this approach,
NHTSA is assuming that the simulated passenger
seat shown in Figure 6 and each of the FAA-
approved passenger seats are equivalent for the
purposes of the inversion test, and that the slight
differences between those seats will not make a
difference in whether a restraint passes or fails
the inversion test. A similar assumption is made
with respect to each of the FAA-approved safety
belts. The agency has adopted a similar approach
in some other standards. See, e.g., S3 of Standard
No. 214, Side door strength (49 CFR §571.214).
Should the agency assumption of equivalence be
shown to be incorrect, NHTSA would amend the
standard to specify those seats and safety belts
which must be used for the inversion test.
However, there is no reason to be that restrictive
at this time.

Once the child restraint and test dummy have
been secured in place in the representative air-
craft passenger seat, the notice proposed that the
seat be rotated around a horizontal axis at a rate of
35 to 45 degrees per second to an angle of 180
degrees, and the rotation would be stopped when
it reached an angle of 180 degrees. The commenter
stated that this language was indefinite because it
did not specify the starting acceleration and stop-
ping deceleration for the rotation. The commenter
stated that the test would be more severe if the
rotation were begun with a sudden jerk and halted
by banging the combination against a stop posi-
tioned at 180 degrees than if it were started and
stopped more gradually. However, the proposed
language does not indicate which of these pro-
cedures is to be used for the testing.

NHTSA agree? with the commenter on this
point, and the language of this final rule specifies

that the inversion test should be conducted to
allow not less than 1/2 second and not more than
1 second for the seat to achieve the required rate
of rotation and to be stopped from that rate of
rotation. These rates of acceleration and decelera-
tion were the ones used in the NHTSA -FAA joint
testing program.

The commenter also stated that there were
some minor typographical errors in section S8.2.3,
S8.2.4. and S8.2.5, and that the explanatory
language beneath Figure 6 needed to be slightly
clarified. NHTSA has made each of these re-
quested changes in this final rule.

As discussed above, NHTSA has decided to
clarify the test procedures and criteria for deter-
mining compliance with the inversion test speci-
fied in Standard No. 213. These requirements of
this inversion test are optional, and need only be
followed by those manufacturers which choose to
certify their child restraints for use in aircraft as
well as in motor vehicles. Manufacturers which
choose to certify their products only for use in
motor vehicles will not be adversely affected by an
early effective date for these amendments. The
amendments made by this notice do not change the
fundamental performance requirement that those
manufacturers which choose to also certify their
products for use in aircraft will have to meet; the
amendment benefits the manufacturers by clarify-
ing the test procedure. Accordingly, I find good
cause for making the amendments in this rule ef-
fective upon publication in the Federal Register.

The NHTSA has analyzed this rule and deter-
mined that it is neither "major" within the mean-
ing of Executive Order 12291 nor "significant"
within the meaning of the Department of Trans-
portation regulatory policies and procedures. No
additional requirements are imposed for restraints
to be certified for use in aircraft, and no additional
requirements are imposed for those restraints to
be certified only for use in motor vehicles. These
amendments simply clarify the testing procedures
to be followed for child restraint systems which
the manufacturer chooses to certify for use in air-
craft. Since the impacts of this rule are minimal,
full regulatory evaluation has not been prepared.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR Part
571.213 is amended to read as follows:

1. Paragraph S4 is amended by revising the
definition of "representative aircraft passenger
seat" to read as follows:

"Representative aircraft passenger seat" means

PART571;S213-PRE37

either a Federal Aviation Administration-ap-
proved production aircraft passenger seat or a
simulated aircraft passenger seat conforming to
Figure 6.

2. Paragraph S8 is revised to read as follows:
S8. Requirements, test conditions, and pro-
cedures for child-restraint systems manufactured
for use in aircraft.

Each child-restraint system manufactured for
use in both motor vehicles and aircraft must com-
ply with all of the applicable requirements
specified in section S5 and with the additional re-
quirements specified in S8.1 and S8.2.

58.1. Installation instructions. Each child-
restraint system manufactured for use in aircraft
shall be accompanied by printed instructions in the
English language that provide a step-by-step pro-
cedure, including diagrams, for installing the
system in aircraft passenger seats, securing the
system to the seat, positioning a child in the
system when it is installed in aircraft, and ad-
justing the system to fit the child. In the case of
each child restraint which is not intended for use
in aircraft at certain adjustment positions, the
following statement, with the manufacturer's
restrictions inserted, shall be included in the
instructions.

DO NOT USE THE ADJUSTMENT

POSITION(S) OF THIS CHILD RESTRAINT
IN AIRCRAFT.

58.2. Inversion test. When tested in accordance
with S8.2.1 through S8.2.5 and adjusted in any
position which the manufacturer has not, in accor-
dance with S8.1, specifically warned against using
in aircraft, each child-restraint system manufac-
tured for use in aircraft shall meet the require-
ments of S8.2.1 through S8.2.6. The manufacturer
may, at its option, use any seat which is a represen-
tative aircraft passenger seat within the meaning
of S4.

58.2.1. A representative aircraft passenger seat
shall be positioned and adjusted so that its horizon-
tal and vertical orientation and its seat-back angle
are the same as shown in Figure 6.

58.2.2. The child-restraint system shall be at-
tached to the representative aircraft passenger
seat using, at the manufacturer's option, any
Federal Aviation Administration-approved air-
craft safety belt, according to the restraint
manufacturer's instructions for attaching the
restraint to an aircraft seat. No supplementary an-
chorage belts or tether straps may be attached;

however. Federal Aviation Administration-ap-
proved safety-belt extensions may be used.

58.2.3. In accordance with S6.1.2.3.1 through
S6.1.2.3.3, place in the child restraint any dummy
specified in S7 for testing systems for use by
children of the heights and weights for which the
system is recommended in accordance with S5.5
and S8.1.

88.2.4. If provided, shoulder and pelvic belts
that directly restrain the dummy shall be adjusted
in accordance with S6.1.2.4.

58.2.5. The combination of representative air-
craft passenger seat, child restraint, and test
dummy shall be rotated forward around a horizon-
tal axis which is contained in the median trans-
verse vertical plane of the seating-surface portion
of the aircraft seat and is located 1 inch below the
bottom of the seat frame, at a speed of 35 to
45 degrees per second, to an angle of 180 degrees.
The rotation shall be stopped when it reaches that
angle and the seat shall be held in this position for
3 seconds. The child restraint shall not fall out of
the aircraft safety belt nor shall the test dummy
fall out of the child restraint at any time during the
rotation or the 3-second period. The specified rate
of rotation shall be attained in not less than
Vz second and not more than 1 second, and the
rotating combination shall be brought to a stop in
not less than V2 second and not more than 1 second.

58.2.6. Repeat the procedures set forth in S8.2.1
through S8.2.4. The combination of the represen-
tative aircraft passenger seat, child restraint, and
test dummy shall be rotated sideways around a
horizontal axis which is contained in the median
longitudinal vertical plane of the seating-surface
portion of the aircraft seat and is located 1 inch
below the bottom of the seat frame, at a speed of
35 to 45 degrees per second, to an angle of
180 degrees. The rotation shall be stopped when it
reaches that angle and the seat shall be held in this
position for 3 seconds. The child restraint shall not
fall out of the aircraft safety belt, nor shall the test
dummy fall out of the child restraint at any time
during the rotation or the 3 second period. The
specified rate of rotation shall be attained in not
less than V2 second and not more than 1 second,
and the rotating combination shall be brought to a
stop in not less than V2 second and not more than
1 second.

3. A new Figure 6 would be added at the end of
§ 571.213, appearing as follows:

PART 571; S213-PRE 38

"A" represents a 2- to 3-inch thick polyurethane foam pad, 1.5 to 2.0 pounds per cubic foot density, over
0.020-inch-thick aluminum pan, and covered by 12- to 14-ounce marine canvas. The sheet-aluminum pan is
20 inches wide and supported on each side by a rigid structure. The seat back is a rectangular frame
covered with the aluminum sheet and weighing between 14 and 15 pounds, with a center of mass 13 to
16 inches above the seat pivot axis. The mass moment of inertia of the seat back about the seat pivot axis
is between 195 and 220 ounce-inch-second^. The seat back is free to fold forward about the pivot, but a stop
prevents rearward motion. The passenter safety belt anchor points are spaced 21 to 22 inches apart and
are located in line with the seat pivot axis.

FIGURE 6: SIMULATED AIRCRAFT PASSENGER SEAT

Issued on April 10, 1985.

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

50 FR 15154
April 17, 1985

PART 571; 8213 -PRE 39-40

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 213

Child Restraint Systems
[Docket No. 7409; Notice 18]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This rule amends Standard No. 213,
Child Restraint Systems, with respect to the re-
quirements applicable to buckles used in child
restraints. The requirement regarding the force
necessary to operate the buckle release mechanism
in the pre-impact test is changed from the previous
minimum level of 12 pounds to a range between 9
and 14 pounds. The maximum release force for the
buckle release in the post-impact test is reduced
from the previous level of 20 pounds to 16 pounds.
Additionally, this rule adds buckle size and buckle
latching requirements to the standard. The effect
of this rule is to ensure that child restraint buckles
are easier for adults to operate, while still ensur-
ing that small children will not be able to open the
buckles by themselves.

EFFECTIVE DATE: February 18, 1986.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: As an initial
step toward ensuring that child restraint systems
would offer adequate protection for their oc-
cupants, NHTSA issued Standard No. 213 in 1970.
That version of the Standard required, among
other things, that the buckle release mechanism
operate when a force of not more than 20 pounds
was applied.

NHTSA issued a new Standard No. 213, Child
Restraint Systems (49 CFR §571.213) at 44 FR
72131, December 13, 1979. This new Standard
substantially upgraded the performance re-
quirements for child restraint systems. It also
specified that the buckles must not release when a
force of less than 12 pounds was applied to the
buckle before conducting the dynamic systems test

required by section S6.1 of Standard No. 213 and
must release when a force of not more than 20
pounds was applied after conducting that dynamic
systems test. The test for measuring the amount of
force needed to release the buckle was to be con-
ducted in accordance with the procedures set forth
in section S6.2 of the standard. The purpose of the
buckle force requirements is to prevent young
children from unbuckling the restraint belt(s),
while allowing adults to do so easily.

After the adoption of the standard, the agency
received information indicating that the minimum
force level needed to release the buckles was too
high to permit many adults to easily release the
buckles. Some of the buckles tested in the field re-
quired more than 20 pounds of pressure to release,
according to a report done for the agency by K.
Weber and N. P. Allen (Docket No. 74-09-GR-120).
This same report concluded that even a force of 20
pounds is difficult for most women to generate
with one hand. The agency has also been provided
with consumer letters received by one child
restraint manufacturer commenting on the dif-
ficulty of operating the child restraint harness
buckles. The agency itself has received numerous
telephone calls from consumers complaining about
the size of the release buttons on child restraint
belts and the high force levels required to operate
them.

The agency's safety concerns over child restraint
buckle force release and size stem from the need
for convenient buckling and unbuckling of a child
and, in emergencies, to quickly remove the child
from the restraint. This latter situation can occur
in instances of post -crash fires, immersions, etc. A
restraint that is difficult to disengage, due to the
need for excessive buckle pressure or difficulty in

PART 571; S213-PRE 41

operating the release mechanism because of a very
small release button, can unnecessarily endanger
the child in the restraint and the adult attempting
to release the child.

This amendment is also intended to reduce the
everyday misuse rate of child restraint harness
and shields. Several studies conducted by Goodell-
Grives, Inc., under contract to NHTSA indicate
that the harness and shield misuse rate for infant
and toddler restraints is between 25 and 40 per-
cent. According to this study and others, misused
child restraints may not only fail to protect the
child in a crash situation, but may increase injury
severity. The December 1984 study asked parents
wfhy they were apparently misusing the hgirness
and shields. The misuse did not result from the
lack of knowledge about the proper use of the
harness and shields, because 95 percent of those
parents knew the child restraint was being used
incorrectly. Although the buckles were not cited
directly, the inconvenience of the harness and
shield operation was the most frequent reason
given for misuse. This amendment will improve
the operational convenience of the harness and
shield buckles and thus should increase the correct
usage rate of child restraint systems.

Accordingly, NHTSA published a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking (NPRM) at 48 FR 20259, May 5,
1983, which proposed several changes to the buckle
release force measurement test procedures. Those
changes were intended to facilitate the use of
buckles which would require approximately 10 1/2
pounds of force to release. The buckle force release
test procedure specified that the buckle was to be
tested both before and after the impact testing of
the child restraint. In both the pre- and post-
impact tests, tension was applied to the buckle
prior to measuring the buckle release force. The
purpose of applying tension was to simulate the
force that would be applied to the buckle by a child
hanging upside down in the child restraint.

The first proposed change was to eliminate the
tension applied to the buckle in the pre-impact
test. While it was considered appropriate for the
post-impact test to simulate tension which would
be present on the buckle in the event of a rollover
crash, it was tentatively concluded that there were
no forces whose presence ought to be simulated in
the pre-impact test. Therefore, the notice proposed
to measure the buckle release force in the pre-
impact test with no load applied to the belt buckle,
except the load exerted by properly adjusting the
belt system around a child.

The second proposed change was to reduce the
minimum buckle force permitted in the pre-impact
test by three pounds, from 12 pounds to 9 pounds.
According to the evidence available to the agency,
a minimum buckle force level of 9 pounds is suffi-
cient to prevent children up to the age of approx-
imately 4 from opening the buckle by themselves.
Further, the notice proposed to set a force of 12
pounds as the maximum force permitted in the
pre-impact test. The NPRM specifically sought
comments on whether this 3-pound range was suf-
ficient to account for the amount of buckle force
variation which inevitably arises from mass pro-
duction manufacturing techniques.

The third change was proposed for the post-
impact testing of the buckles. The tension
previously specified in the standard would still be
applied to the buckles before the release force was
measured. However, the maximum force needed to
release the buckles was proposed to be reduced
from 20 pounds to 16 pounds. A higher force level
is specified in the post-impact test as compared to
the pre-impact test to allow for damage which
could occur to the buckles during an actual crash
and to allow for the additional belt loading which
is possible from a child suspended upside down in
the restraint system. The proposed lowering of the
maximum force level was intended to permit a
large portion of adults to more easily and quickly
release the buckle in normal use (thus encouraging
routine correct use of the restraints which would
provide enhanced child safety) and in emergency
post-crash situations.

The NPRM also proposed a change to Standard
No. 213 in response to complaints about instances
where a child restraint buckle was seemingly
securely fastened by a parent, but subsequently
popped open. This problem is commonly referred to
as false latching. To address this problem, the
NPRM proposed to require that child restraint
buckles meet the latching requirements in section
S4.3(g) of Standard No. 209, Seat Belt Assemblies.
These requirements ensure that the design and
construction of the buckle release mechanism are
sufficiently durable to permit repeated latching
and unlatching of the buckle and that the buckle
releases when it is falsely latched and a minimum
force (in this case, 5 pounds) is applied to it.

The final change proposed in the NPRM related
to the size of the buckle release area. The agency
believed that some of the problems experienced by
parents in fastening and unfastening the child
restraint buckles might be attributable to the size

PART 571; S213-PRE 42

of the buckle release mechanism. For instance, the
smaller the area of a push button release
mechanism, the more difTicult it would be to use
more than one finger, and hence apply a greater
force, to open the buckle. The release mechanisms
on some buckles were too small to allow sufficient
engagement area for easy release of the buckle,
particularly for persons with large hands. Most
child restraint buckles use push buttons to release
the buckle, so the NPRM proposed that push but-
tons have a minimum area of 0.6 square inch. The
minimum surface area requirements applicable to
motor vehicle seat belts were specified for other
types of release mechanisms used on child
restraint buckles.

The NPRM also requested comments on regula-
tory and non-regulatory ways in which the issues
of belt length and shell width could be addressed.
This request was based on the Weber and Allen
report referenced above which raised questions
about the length of the harness webbing used in
child restraints and the seating width of the shells.
The researchers noted that use of winter clothing
significantly increases the amount of harness web-
bing needed to accommodate a fully clothed child.
They reported that a snowsuit can add six inches
to the length necessary for a harness lap belt to ac-
commodate a child. Further, the researchers said
that nearly all child restraints are too narrow for
the size children they claim to accommodate.

The agency received 16 comments on the NPRM,
and the commenters included private citizens,
safety advocacy groups, child restraint manufac-
turers, and the National Transportation Safety
Board. All these comments were considered in
developing this final rule, and the most relevant
ones are specifically addressed in the following
discussion.

Pre-Impact Test Buckle Release Force Limit. In
the NPRM, the agency specifically sought com-
ments on the feasibility of manufacturing buckles
within the 3-pound range. Many of the com-
menters objected to the proposed 9- to 12-pound
release force limits, primarily because the 3-pound
range was said to be too narrow based on current
manufacturing techniques, to ensure that all
buckles would comply with the proposed require-
ment. Some of these commenters asserted that the
proposed 3-pound range would cause the buckle
manufacturers to increase buckle prices in order to
recoup the costs of the changes in manufacturing
techniques and quality control which would have
to be implemented to satisfy the proposed require-

ment. One child restraint manufacturer offered a
statistical analysis of buckle release force tests in
an effort to demonstrate the difficulty of maintain-
ing a 3-pound range with current buckle manu-
facturing techniques. The manufacturer indicated
that buckle release forces can vary up to 3- times
the standard deviation for a given sample. The
standard deviation for current production buckles
is sufficiently large that, given a mean of 10.5
pounds and a range of 3 pounds, some buckles
would have release forces outside the range. A dif-
ferent manufacturer submitted data from tests of
current buckle designs showing that the release
force can vary by as much as 6 pounds for current
buckles. Finally, several commenters objected to
the proposed 9-pound minimum release force on
the grounds that buckles manufactured in com-
pliance with the Canadian child restraint stan-
dard, which specifies an 8-pound minimum release
and 16-pound maximum release force, would not
satisfy the proposed U.S. standard. These com-
menters further stated that NHTSA should use
this opportunity to harmonize this requirement
with the Canadian standard.

In response to these comments, NHTSA has re-
considered its proposed 9- to 12-pound range for the
buckle release force permitted in the pre-impact
testing. The agency has concluded that a 3-pound
range in release force would not be feasible with
current manufacturing techniques, and the bene-
fits of narrowing the feasible range to 3 pounds do
not warrant requiring a change in current manu-
facturing techniques.

The only research study of which the agency is
aware, examining the most appropriate release
force range for child restraint buckles, is entitled
"Child Restraint Systems," published in 1976 by
Peter Arnberg of the National Swedish Road and
Traffic Institute. This study, which is available in
the Greneral Reference section of Docket No. 74-09,
presented the results of testing 80 children aged 2
1/2 to 4 1/2 years and 200 women. This study con-
cluded that child restraint buckles should have a
release force of 40 to 60 Newtons (approximately 9
to 13 1/2 pounds).

After analyzing the comments, NHTSA has
determined that a 5-pound range in buckle release
force is needed to allow for current buckle
manufacturing techniques. Based on this deter-
mination and the recommendations of the Arnberg
study, this rule requires child restraint buckles to
have a release force of between 9 and 14 pounds
before the buckles are subjected to dynamic testing.

PART 571; S213-PRE 43

The agency notes that this rule is not precisely
harmonized with the Canadian standard for child
restraint buckle release forces, which specifies a
minimum release force of 8 pounds before dynamic
testing and a maximum release force of 16 pounds
£ifter dynamic testing. NHTSA has adopted a 9
pound minimum release force because of its con-
cern that 3 1/2- to-4-year-old children could open
their child restraint buckles if the release force
were 8 pounds, as shown in the Arnberg study.
Further, the 14-pound maximum release force be-
fore dynamic testing was added in this rule be-
cause buckles with a release force of more than 14
pounds are difficult for many women to open in
everyday use, as demonstrated in the Arnberg
study. The result of these differing requirements
in the United States and Canada is that buckles
which comply with the Canadian buckles force re-
quirements will not automatically comply with
Standard No. 213. However, buckles which comply
with Standard No. 213 will also comply with the
buckle force requirements of the Canadian
standard.

Pre-Impact Buckle Test Procedure. The NPRM
proposed a new procedure for this test. The same
procediu"es have been used for measuring the
buckle release force in both the pre-impact and the
post-impact testing. Briefly stated, the child
restraint is installed on a standard seat assembly,
the dummy is positioned in the child restraint, a
sling is attached to each wrist and ankle of the
dummy, and the sling is pulled by a designated
force. As noted above, the presence of the dummy
and the force applied to the sling simulate a
rollover crash situation.

The NPRM proposed, and this final rule adopts,
a new test procedure for the pre-impact testing,
because there is no need to simulate a rollover
crash situation before impact. The NPRM pro-
posed placing the buckle on a hard, flat surface and
loading each end of the buckle with a force of 2
pounds before measiu"ing the force required to re-
lease the buckle. None of the commenters objected
to this basic change in the test procedure, and it is
adopted for the reasons stated in the NPRM.

Several commenters did object to the release
force application device, which was proposed as a
rigid, right-circular cone with an enclosed angle of
90 degrees or less. This device would be used to
transfer the release force to the push button
release. Some commenters argued that this device
would not adequately represent real-world push
button actuation. Specifically, they were con-

cerned that the pointed device applies the release
force over an area considerably smaller than that
of a finger or thumb. Other commenters argued in
favor of a different release force application device,
contending that this device would permanently
deface some of the tested buckles.

NHTSA has decided to adopted the proposed con-
ical test device. Its small contact area allows ac-
curate positioning on the release button, which
will yield consistently repeatable test results. The
buckle release force test procedures proposed in
the NPRM, as modified for this final rule, were
conducted by the Calspan Corporation in July
1984 during the annual FMVSS No. 213 com-
pliance test procedures. On the basis of these tests,
the agency concluded that the amended test pro-
cedures simulate real-world actuation of push but-
ton release mechanisms because the release force
is applied in a manner similar to hand operation
and tests with several alternative devices in-
dicated that conical devices produce release force
values consistent with those generated by different
probes. Manufactvirers choosing to test a large
number of buckles to be used on their child
restraints can place a protective surface between
the button and the test device to prevent defacing
of the buckles. Those manufacturers who want to
use an alternative test device are free to do so, pro-
vided that they can correlate the results obtained
with that alternative device with results obtained
with the specified test device, which will be used
by the agency in compliance tests.

The NPRM proposed that the force applied by
the test device be "at the center line of the push
button 0.125 inches from a movable edge and in
the direction that produces maximum releasing ef-
fect." Many commenters argued that this pro-
cedure needed to be refined to take account of the
different release mechanisms. One commenter
stated that there are two different types of push
button release mechanisms, hinged and floating.
A hinged button has one fixed edge and release
forces applied near the fixed edge may not ac-
tivate the release mechanism. Instead, the hinged
button is designed to release when force is applied
near the center of the button or toward the edge
opposite the fixed edge. On the other hand, the
floating button has no fixed edges and is designed
to release when force is applied near the center of
the button. This commenter noted that, while the
force application proposed in the NPRM may be
suitable for hinged buttons, it would be inap-
propriate for floating buttons.

PART 571; S213-PRE 44

The agency agrees with the commenters that
some further refinements should be made to the
test procedures to account for the different types of
push buttons. Accordingly, this rule specifies that,
for hinged buttons, the force shall be applied accor-
ding to the procedures proposed in the NPRM. For
floating buttons, the force shall be applied at the
geometric center of the button. These differing
force application points will take into account the
differing designs of push buttons, without favoring
one or the other design.

Several commenters stated that the NPRM
failed to specify any test procedures for buckles
designed for the insertion of two or more buckle
latch plates, even though a number of buckles on
current models of child restraints are designed to
secure more than one belt. Further, these com-
menters noted that, while the NPRM did specify a
2-pound pre-load force should be applied to buckles
before conducting the pre-impact buckle release
test, it failed to specify the direction in which the
force should be applied. To remedy these perceived
shortcomings, some of the commenters recom-
mended that the final rule specify that the 2-pound
pre-load force be applied along the direction of the
latch plate insertion for single latch plate buckles
and that the 2-pound force be divided by the
number of latch plates and the resultant force ap-
plied to each latch plate in the direction of latch
plate insertion for multiple latch plate buckles.
This final rule adopts this recommendation. The
NPRM's intent was that the force be applied along
the direction of latch plate insertion, and it is ap-
propriate to make this intent explicit in this final
rule. Further, the one pound pre-load force for
multiple latch plate buckles is sufficient force to
simulate the tension which would be present in
properly adjusted belts, yet small enough so as not
to simulate other forces which would not be pre-
sent in normal everyday use.

Along these lines, one commenter suggested that
the pre-load force be increased from two to five
pounds. This commenter stated that the proposed
pre-load force of 2-pounds might not be sufficient to
release the buckles, while the 5-pound load would
assure that the buckles always release. Further,
the commenter noted that Standard No. 209 allows
a false latching load of 5-pounds maximum, and
that this change would make the two Standards
consistent.

NHTSA is not persuaded by these comments,
and has not incorporated the suggested change in
this final rule. For the pre-impact buckle release

force test procedure, the 2-pound pre-load is design-
ed to simulate the separation tension in the
harness restraint system during normal use and
approximate the buckle loading on a restraint
system adjusted for the compliance impact test.

Section S5.2(g) of Standard No. 209, on the other
hand, is not intended to approximate forces
present during normal buckle operation. That
section requires that the buckle latching
mechanism be tested for durability and then the
latch plate or hasp inserted in any position of "par-
tial" engagement (false latching). When the buckle
and latch plate are in this position of "induced"
partial engagement, a force of 5 or less shall
separate the latch plate from the buckle. The
separation of the latch plate is affected without
operating the release mechanism. Since this pro-
cedure is not intended to simulate normal buckle
operation but to test the susceptibility of the
buckle to false latching, it would not be ap-
propriate to incorporate its loading into Standard
No. 213.

Post-Impact Buckle Test Procedure. As noted
above, the NPRM proposed to reduce the max-
imum force needed to release the buckle after it
had been subjected to the impact test from the
20-pound level currently specified to 16 pounds. A
higher release force is specified for the post-impact
test to account for damage which might occur to
the buckle during the impact test and to counter
the forces which could be exerted on the buckle by
a child hanging upside down in rollover crash con-
ditions. The reason for proposing the lower force
was that it was sufficient to account for damage
which might occur to the buckle, and such force
can be generated by almost all women using only
one hand, according to the Arnberg study. The cur-
rent 20-pound force requirement allows buckles
which require two-hand operation by many adults,
and two-hand operation is often awkward and may
adversely affect safety in emergency situations.
The agency notes that the Canadian standard also
specifies a maximum post impact force of 16
pounds. No commenters objected to this proposed
change, and it is adopted herein for the reasons ex-
plained above.

The preamble to the NPRM did not discuss any
other changes to the post-impact testing procedure,
because the agency did not intend to propose any
changes other than reducing the maximum release
force for the buckles. However, section S6.2.2 of
Standard No. 213 as published in the NPRM in-
dicated that the self-adjusting sling which is

PART 571; S213-PRE 45

attached to the dummy to simulate a rollover
crash situation should be attached only to the
dummy's ankles. The Standard currently requires
the sling to be attached to the dummy's wrists and
ankles, and this requirement was inadvertently
omitted from the NPRM language. This final rule
corrects this omission, so no change is specified for
the post-impact testing except the reduction in
buckle release force.

Buckle Latching. The NPRM proposed adding
the latching performance requirements of sections
S4.3(g) and S5.2(g) of Standard No. 209 to Standard
No. 213. These procedures test the latching perfor-
mance of seat belt buckles to ensure that the
buckle materials and structure will operate pro-
perly after numerous cycles of latchings and un-
latchings. As explained in the NPRM, this step
should reduce or eliminate the false latching prob-
lems experienced by child restraint users. False
latching occurs when buckles are apparently latch-
ed, but then subsequently pop open. NHTSA
believes that most of the false latchings result
from poorly designed or cycle degraded latching
mechanisms, and that the Standard No. 209 re-
quirements will eliminate latching mechanisms
which are poorly designed or subject to cycle
degradation.

Most of the commenters who addressed this pro-
posal supported its adoption, although several
commenters stated that additional requirements
may be needed to ensure that false latching does
not continue to be a significant problem. The Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board stated that it
had evidence that brand-new child restraint
buckles, not yet subject to material wear, are prone
to false latching, and that additional requirements
along the lines of the European requirement that
latchplates be ejected by a spring located in the
buckle when the buckle is not properly latched,
may be necessary to prevent false latching. Other
suggestions from the commenters included requir-
ing the use of color-coded push buttons to show
when the buckle was properly latched and requir-
ing specific warnings in the manufacturer's in-
struction manuals urging parents to check for false
latchings every time they fasten the buckles.

NHTSA has adopted the requirements proposed
in the NPRM to reduce the false latching prob-
lems. The agency believes that the Standard No.
209 seat belt buckle tests will identify buckles
which are subject to false latchings because of
materials wear or poor design, because false lat-
ching complaints by consumers have been eli-

minated for motor vehicle seat belts and the agen-
cy expects that these tests will substantially
reduce this problem for child restraint buckles as
well. The agency will continue to monitor prob-
lems of false latchings, and will consider addi-
tional requirements to address that problem if
necessary.

Buckle Size. The NPRM proposed to specify a
minimum area for the buckle release mechanism,
because some of the difficulties reported in opening
child restraint buckles were believed to arise from
the small size of the buckle release mechanism. As
noted earlier, the smaller the area of the push but-
ton, the more difficulty there is in applying the
forces which must be exerted to open the buckle.
Those commenters who addressed this issue sup-
ported the proposed requirement that push buttons
used on child restraints have a minimum release
area of 0.6 square inch, and it is adopted in this
final rule.

Belt Length/Shell Width. The NPRM solicited
comments on steps which could be taken to address
the issues of belt length and shell width. These
issues arose after a research report noted that
children clad in winter clothes need up to six addi-
tional inches of belt webbing, and that many cur-
rent child restraints do not have this extra belt
length. In addition, the report noted that nearly all
child restraints are too narrow for the size children
they claim to accommodate. The NPRM noted that
a long-range solution was for the agency to use ad-
ditional test dummies to simulate larger children.
A possible short-term answer was to conduct the
crash tests with the dvunmies clad in a typical
snowsuit.

Several commenters stated that regulatory ac-
tion was not needed in this area. Child restraint
manufacturers generally believe that the industry
will adjust belt length and shell width in response
to consumer demand, and believe that any regula-
tions at this time would only add costs and
research burden, without substantially benefiting
child safety. The Physicians for Automotive Safety
stated that the agency should approach those
manufacturers with problems in these areas and
request voluntary remedial action, instead of piu"-
suing rulemaking. That group also stated that it
knew of only one model of child restraint with
problems along these lines. The National Trans-
portation Safety Board stated that the agency
should develop regulations in these areas.

Some of the commenters opposed the use of
snowsuits on the test dummies because those

PART 571; S213-PRE 46

snowsuits would absorb some of the crash energy.
According to these commenters, the agency would,
in effect, reduce the severity of the crash tests by so
dressing the test dummies.

In view of the above comments rulemaking will
be deferred in this Eu-ea. The agency will continue
to monitor the issues of seat shell size and harness
webbing length associated with infant and toddler
restraints (40 pounds and below) to determine if
rulemaking in this area will be necessary in the
future.

Editorial Correction. Several commenters no-
ticed that there was a typographical error in sec-
tion S5.4.3.5(a) of the NPRM. That section referred
to testing in accordance with section S6.2.2, while
the correct reference was to section S6.2.1. This
error is corrected in this final rule.

§571.213 [Amended]

In consideration of the foregoing, Title 49 of the
Code of Federal Regulations is amended by revis-
ing §571.213 to read as follows:

1. The authority citation for 571 continues to
read as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1403, and 1407;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

2. Section S5.4.3.5 is revised to read as follows:

*****

S5.4.3.5 Buckle Release. Any buckle in a child
restraint system belt assembly designed to
restrain a child using the system shall:

(a) When tested in accordance with S6.2.1 prior
to the dynamic test of S6.1, not release when a
force of less than 9 pounds is applied and shall
release when a force of not more than 14 pounds is
applied;

(b) After the dynamic test of S6.1, when tested in
accordance with S6.2.3, release when a force of not
more than 16 pounds is applied;

(c) Meet the requirements of S4.3(dX2) of
FMVSS No. 209 (§571.209), except that the
minimum surface area for child restraint buckles
designed for push button application shall be 0.6
square inch;

(d) Meet the requirements of S4.3(g) of FMVSS
No. 209 (§571.209) when tested in accordance with
S5.2(g) of FMVSS No. 209; and

(e) Not release during the testing specified in

S6.1.

* » * * *

3. Section S6.2 is revised to read as follows:

* * * * *

S6.2 Buckle Release Test Procedure. The belt
assembly buckles used in any child restraint
system shall be tested in accordance with S6.2.1

through S6.2.4 inclusive.

*****

4. Section S6.2.1 is revised to read as follows:

*****

56.2.1. Before conducting the testing specified
in S6.1, place the locked buckle on a hard, fiat,
horizontal surface. Each belt end of the buckle
shall be pre-loaded in the following manner. The
anchor end of the buckle shall be loaded with a
2-pound force in the direction away from the
buckle. In the case of buckles designed to secure a
single latch plate, the belt latch plate end of the
buckle shall be loaded with a 2-pound force in the
direction away from the buckle. In the case of
buckles designed to secure two or more latch
plates, the belt latch plate ends of the buckle shall
be loaded equally so that the total load is 2 pounds,
in the direction away from the buckle. For push-
button release buckles the release force shall be
applied by a conical surface (cone angle not ex-
ceeding 90 degrees). For push-button release
mechanisms with a fixed edge (referred to in
Figure 6 as "hinged button"), the release force
shall be applied at the centerline of the button,
0.125 inches away from the movable edge directly
opposite the fixed edge, and in the direction that
produces maximum releasing effect. For push-
button release mechanisms with no fixed edge
(referred to in Figure 6 as "floating button"), the
release force shall be applied at the center of the
release mechanism in the direction that produces
the maximum releasing effect. For all other buckle
release mechanisms, the force shall be applied on
the centerline of the buckle lever or finger tab in
the direction that produces the maximum releas-
ing effect. Measure the force required to release
the buckle. Figiu-e 6 illustrates the loading for the
different buckles and the point where the release
force should be applied, and Figure 7 illustrates
the conical surface used to apply the release force
to push-button release buckles.

5. Section S6.2.2 is revised to read as follows:

*****

56.2.2. After completion of the testing specified
in S6.1, and before the buckle is unlatched, tie a
self-adjusting sling to each wrist and ankle of the
test dummy in the manner illustrated in Figure 4.

PART 571; S213-PRE 47

6. Section S6.2.4 is revised to read as follows: 8. Two new drawings (Figures 6 and 7) are add-

* * * * * ed at the end of §571.213, appearing as follows:

S6.2.4. While applying the force specified in
S6.2.3, and using the device shown in Figure 7 for Issued on August 15, 1985.

push-button release buckles, apply the release
force in the manner and location specified in S6.2.1
for that type of buckle. Measure the force required
to release the buckle. Diane K. Steed

***** Administrator

7. Section S6.2.5 is deleted.

50 F.R. 33722
August 21, 1985

PART 571; S213-PRE 48

1j^

BudcU Pr«-lo«d

^W\

Poutxli

c^

I I 2 Pounds

7a. Slr>«l* Utch PUta

2 Poundi

1 Pourxj

^ ^ ' """'

7b. Ooubl* Latch Plata
Pr»-k>ad

ReleaM Fores

Application

Posiuoo

R«l«a<« Foroa
Application Potitlorv
Puth Button
M*chaniirrtt

0.125 Inch

Release force

Application

Position

7c. HIngad Button

7d. Floating Button

Fiflur* 7. Pr»-<mpact Buckle RoUtOM Fore* Test Sat-up

PART 571; S213-PRE 49

<90O,

Figure 8. Release Force Application Device — Push Button Release Buckles

PART 571; S213-PRE 50

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY

STANDARD NO. 213

Child Restraint Systems
(Docket No. 74-09; Notice 18)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This rule amends Standard No. 213,
Child Restraint Systems, by requiring all child
restraints equipped with tether straps (other than
child harnesses, booster seats, and restraints
designed for use by physically handicapped
children) to pass the 30 miles per hour (mph) test
with the tether strap unattached. This change is
being made because survey results consistently
show that, in the vast majority of instances, child
restraints with tether straps are used by the public
without attaching the tether strap to the vehicle.
This amendment will ensure that children riding in
child restraints with unattached tethers will be af-
fored crash protection equivalent to that afforded
to children riding in child restraints designed
without a tether.

This rule also eliminates the requirement that
those child restraints pass a 20 mph test with the
tether unattached. Since those restraints will now
be required to pass the 30 mph test under the same
test conditions, it is unnecessary for those
restraints to also be tested at a low speed.

Finally, this rule clarifies two items of informa-
tion required to be included in the instructions ac-
companying child restraints. These clarifications
do not alter the amount of information that must
be included in the instructions: they simply explain
what the agency intended to require.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 12, 1986.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Standard No.
213, Child Restraint Systems (49 CFR S571.213)
currently provides two different test configura-
tions applicable to child restraint systems. First, a
30 mph frontal crash test is conducted for all child
restraints. In that test, the restraints are installed
according to the child restraint manufacturer's in-

structions. This test is referred to as Test Con-
figuration I in section S6.1.2.1.1 of Standard No.
213.

Second, a 20 mph test is conducted for two types
of child restraint systems. One type is a child
restraint equipped with an anchorage belt. An-
chorage belts, more commonly referred to as
tether straps, are supplemental belts under to at-
tach the child restraint to the vehicle. The other
type of restraint subject to the 20 mph crash test is
a child restraint with a fixed or movable surface
which helps to restrain the child's forward move-
ment in the event of a crash. This type of child
restraint provides protection by the use of its own
belt system and a surface which can be used in-
dependently of the belt system. Both these types of
child restraints are tested with only the vehicle lap
belt holding the child restraint to the standard test
seat and, in the case of restraints with a fixed or
movable surface forward of the child, without at-
taching the restraint's belt system to hold the test
dummy in place. This test, referred to as Test Con-
figuration II in section S6. 1.2. 1.2 in Standard No.
2l3, is intended to take account of the' possibility
that the tether strap or the restraint's belt system
will either be misused or not used at all by parents.
If this happens, Test Configuration II should en-
sure that these types of restraints will offer
minimal protection even when they are not prop-
erly used.

This rulemaking action addresses only the ques-
tion of restraints with tether straps, and does not
affect restraints with fixed or movable surfaces
forward of the child. Tether straps have presented
a difficult question for the agency since at least
1979. When a tether strap is properly attached, a
child restraint equipped with a tether strap will
generally offer the best protection for child oc-
cupants, particularly those riding in the front seat
or involved in side impact crashes.

PART 571; S 213-PRE 51

However, the results of surveys have continually
shown that tether straps are not attached by the
vast majority of the public. The most recent study
available to the agency on this topic (Cynecki and
Goryl, "The Incidence and Factors Associated
with Child Safety Seat Misuse"; December 1984,
DOT HS-806 676) found that nearly 85 percent of
child restraints with tether straps were used
without properly attaching the tether straps. The
Cynecki and Goryl study recommended that the
best solution for this problem would be to redesign
the restraints to eliminate the need for tether
straps.

This same suggestion had been made previously
by several commenters in connection with the final
rule substantially upgrading the performance re-
quirements fo Standard No. 213; 44 FR 72131,
December 13, 1979. At the time of that rulemaking
action, however, restraints. The agency decided
that it would be inappropriate to issue a rule which
would have the effect of requiring a major redesign
of most child restraint systems then on the market,
especially when the public was just beginning to
appreciate the importance of using child
restraints. Further, NHTSA expected that proper
usage of restraints with tethers would grow as
public awareness and knowledge of child restraints
grew.

When NHTSA reexamined this decision in light
of the Cynecki and Goryl report, the reasoning no
longer seemed valid. First, at this time, approx-
imately one-fifth of all new child restraints, in-
cluding booster seats, are equipped with a tether
strap necessary for the protection of the child occu-
pant. Thus, a rule which would have the effect of
requiring a redesign of these restraints would have
a substantially smaller impact on the child
restraint market now than it would have had in
1979.

Second, and most significant, the expectation of
increased proper use of tether straps has not been
realized. Perhaps the most troubling fact in the
Cynecki and Goryl report cited above was that 78
percent of the persons not using the tether strap to
attach the child restraint to the vehicle knew that
its use was necessary. This indicates that, while
public awarness and knowledge of child restraints
has grown significantly since 1979, that awareness
and knowledge has not resulted in increased
proper use of tether straps.

Because of its concern for the safety of children
riding in motor vehicles, NHTSA tentatively de-

cided that it was no longer reasonable to allow
restraints with tethers to be tested in only a 20
mph crash in the way they will be used by the
public, that is, without attaching the tether strap.
The agency believed that those restraints, like
restraints without tethers, should be tested in a 30
mph crash in the way they will be used by the
public. This would ensure that all child restraints
afforded equivalent protection to children riding
therein.

Accordingly, NHTSA pubhshed a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking (NPRM) on July 5, 1985; 50 FR
27633, proposing that all child restraints other
than child harnesses be tested in the 30 mph crash
test when attached to the test seat only by means
of the lap belt. This proposal was intended to en-
sure that restraints with tethers afford the same
level of protection to child restraint occupants as
do restraints without tethers when tested in the
manner both will be used by the public.

That NPRM also proposed some less significant
changes to Standard No. 213. These were as
follows:

(1) The standard currently specifies that the
child restraint be installed in the center seating
position during the testing. However, many new
vehicles are produced without a front or rear
center seating position. This trend raised the con-
cern that the tests were growing less represen-
tative of the conditions which would be en-
countered by the child restraint when it was in use.
Accordingly, the NPRM proposed to amend Stand-
ard No. 213 to require that child restraints be
tested in one of the two outboard seating positions.
An anticipated added benefit of this change would
be that it would reduce testing costs for the child
restraint manufacturers, because two child
restraints could be evaluated in the same test.

(2) Standard No. 213 requires that all child
restraints equipped with a tether strap be per-
manently lableed with a notice that the tether
strap must be properly secured as specified in the
manufacturer's instructions. The NPRM proposed
that the phrase "For extra protection in frontal
and side impacts" be added in front of that notice.
This change would convey the fact that the tether
strap was a supplementary safety device, ».s pro-
posed in the NPRM, while also affirming that addi-
tional safety protection is afforded when the tether
strap is properly attached.

(3) Two changes were proposed to clarify what
was meant in the requirements concerning the in-

PART 571; S 213-PRE 52

stallation instructions to be provided along with
the child restraint by the restraint's manufacturer.
These were:

(a) The installation instructions are currently
required to state that, in most vehicles, the rear
center seating position is the safest seating
position for installing a child restraint. This
statement in the instructions has resulted in
numerous inquiries to the agency by consumers
wanting to know the safest seating position for
vehicles with only two rear outboard seating
positions. To eliminate this confusion on the part
of the public, the NPRM proposed that the instal-
lation instructions be modified to state that, for
maximum safety protection, the child restraint
should be installed in a rear seating position in
vehicles with two rear seating positions and in
the center rear seating position in vehicles with
three rear seating positions.

(b) The installation instructions in Standard
No. 213 also require that child restraint manu-
facturer to "specify in general terms the types of
vehicles, seating positions, and vehicle lap belts
with which the system can or cannot be used."
This requirement has frequently been errone-
ously interpreted to mean that child restraint
manufacturers are required to state the specific
vehicles, specific seating positions, and the
specific vehicle lap belts with which a child re-
straint manufacturers are required to state the
specific vehicles, specific seating positions, and
the specific vehicle lap belts with which a child
restraint can or cannot be used. The NPRM pro-
posed an amendment to make clear the agency's
intent that the instructions specify the types of
vehicles (e.g., passenger cars, pickup trucks,
vans, buses, etc.), the types of seating positions
(e.g., front, rear, bench, bucket, side facing, rear
facing, folding, etc.) and the types of vehicle
safety belts (e.g., diagonal, lap-shoulder,
emergency locking, etc.) with which the restraint
system can or cannot be used.

A total of 15 comments were received on the
NPRM. The commenters included vehicle manu-
facturers, child restraint manufacturers, the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board, researchers
from two state universities, child safety advocates,
and individual consumers. Each of these comments
was considered and the most significant ones are
addresssed below.

Attaching Tether Straps During the SO MPH Test
and the Need for the 20 MPH Test

Before discussing the comments received on this
issue, the most significant one raised in the NPRM,

NHTSA believes it would be useful to explain the
differences between the different types of child
restraints.

1. Child seats. A child seat is a child restraint
that uses a plastic shell as a frame around the child,
and has a shield, belts, or the like attached to the
shell to restrain the child in the event of a crash.
All but one of the currently produced models of
child seats do not need to have an attached tether
strap to pass the 30 mph test. However, two of the
models which do not need a tether strap to pass the
30 mph test offer a tether strap as an option for ex-
tra protection of the child restraint's occupant.

2. Booster seats. A booster seat is a platform
used to elevate a child in a vehicle. It does not have
a frame or any other structural protection behind
the child's back or head. Booster seats are de-
signed to be used by older children who have
outgrown child seats. By elevating these children,
the booster seat allows the child to see out of the
vehicle and to use the belt system in the vehicle.
About half the current production of booster seats
uses a special harness system attached to the vehi-
cle by a tether strap to provide upper torso
restraint for the booster seat occupant. The other
half of current production of booster seats uses a
small shield in front of the child to provide upper
torso restraint.

3. Child harnesses. A child harness consists of
a web of belts which are placed around the child,
and is then anchored to the vehicle by a tether
strap. Only one model of child harness is currently
in production. Child harnesses are tested only in
the 30 mph test with the tether attached according
to the manufacturer's instructions, and are not
subject to the 20 mph test. The reason for this dif-
fering treatment for child harnesses are compared
to other child restraints is the agency's opinion
that child harness tethers are in fact properly used
by the public, due to the nature of the device— i.e.,
if the tether strap is not attached, it would be
obvious that the child would be completly unre-
strained in the event of a crash.

4. Restraints for use by physically handicapped
children. These restraints are essentially wheel-
chairs, some of which fold so that the wheelchair
can be positioned in the rear seat of passenger
cars. Other restraints are simply devices to tie
down a wheelchair while the child is travelling in a
van, bus, or similar vehicle. All currently produced
child restraints for use by physically handicapped
children use their own belt system and tether
straps to provide the necessary upper torso
restraint. The NPRM did not propose any exemp-

PART 571; S 2 13- PRE 53

tion for these restraints from the proposed require-
ment that they pass the 30 mph test without at-
taching any tether straps. Thus, if the NPRM were
adopted as proposed, all of these restraints would
have to be redesigned.

This final rule establishes the following re-
quirements for the different types of child
restraints. Child seats will not be allowed to have
any tether straps attached during the 30 mph test
required by Standard No. 213. They will also no
longer be required to be tested in the 20 mph test.
However, child harnesses, booster seats, and
restraints for use by physically handicapped
children will be allowed to continue to have tether
straps attached during the 30 mph test. The
reasoning supporting these decisions is set forth
below.

CHILD SEATS

Almost all of the commenters addressing the
agency's proposal to require child seats equipped
with tether straps to pass the 30 mph test without
attaching the tether supported the requirement.
The only commenter which opposed this require-
ment was a child restraint manufacturer, arguing
that a change at this time would "cause confusion
of dealers and consumers with units that required
tethers". The manufacturer further argued that if
this change were made, "the Federal government
must given child restraint manufacturers some
sort of security blanket to protect them from
lawsuits and recall of existing units."

NHTSA does not believe it is very likely that
either dealers or consumers will be confused by the
requirement that child seats with tethers pass the
30 mph test with the tether strap unattached. The
new requirement would apply only to child seats
manufactured after the effective date of this rule.
Child seats manufactured before the effective date
of this rule may be sold even if their tether strap
must be attached to pass the 30 mph test. Hence,
the agency does not see any reason for child seat
dealers to be confused by this rule. Moreover, the
public will receive the manufacturer's instructions
with the child seat explaining how it is to be used.
Thus, there does not appear to be any reason for
the public to be confused by this rule.

NHTSA does hot have any authority to given
restraint manufacturers a "security blanket" to
protect them from lawsuits or recalls of child seats
with tethers. Even if NHTSA believed it was
appropriate to protect a manufactuer from

lawsuits in a particular instance, only Congress has
authority to do so. A recall of child seats must be
based on a determination that the seats either do
not comply with the requirements of Standard No.
213 in effect on the date of manufacture of the seat
or that the seat contains a safety-related defect, as
specified in sections 151 and 152 of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C.
1411 and 1412). If either determinatioon were
made, the manufacturer is required by Section 154
of the Safety act (15 U.S.C. S1415) to remedy the
noncompliance or defect.

For the reasons set forth at length in the NPRM
and briefly reiterated at the beginning of this
preamble, and because only one child seat model is
being produced that requires the tether strap to be
attached, NHTSA is adopting the proposed
requirement that all child seats pass the 30 mph
test without any tether straps attached. This re-
quirement applies to all child seats manufactured
after the effective date of this rule.

As an adjunct to this rulemaking, child seats
equipped with a tether strap will not longer be sub-
ject to the requirement that they also pass a 20
mph test with the tether unattached. Since these
child seats will now be subject to the 30 mph test
with tether unattached, no purpose would be
served by requiring the seats to be tested in a less
severe manner under the same conditions.

BOOSTER SEATS

The commenters split on the issue of whether
booster seats should be required to pass the 30 mph
crash test with the tether strap unattached. The
Insurance Institute of Highway Safety, Chrysler
Corporation, the National Transportation Safety
Board, and two individuals supported the proposed
requirements for the reasons explained in the
NPRM. However, the National Child Passenger
Safety Association, Physicians for Automotive
Safety, the University of Michigan, and resear-
chers associated with the University of North
Carolina opposed the proposed requirement. The
gist of these opposing comments was as follows:
the only means currently available for providing
the needed upper torso restraint to booster seat oc-
cupants is with either a tether strap and harness or
with a short shield in front of the child. A require-
ment to pass the 30 mph test without an attached
tether strap would force manufacturers to equip all
booster seats with a short shield. These com-
menters were concerned about the adequacy of the
safety protection afforded to booster seat occu-
pants by these short shields.

PART 571; S 213-PRE 54

The University of Michigan commented that it is
currently engaged in a research program to
develop an abdominal penetration sensor for the
3-year old dummy currently used in Standard No.
213 testing. They stated that they have undertaken
this research because of their concern about the
abdominal loading to which the short shield ex-
poses the child during the 30 mph crash test. The
University of Michigan concluded its comment by
stating that its preliminary tests with a prototype
of its abdominal penetration sensor suggests that
children are in fact exposed to high abdominal
loading by the short shields used on booster seats
without tethers. The researchers associated with
the University of North Carolina concurred with
the University of Michigan on the need to examine
the abominal loading associated with booster seats
without tethers before mandating that all booster
seats be capable of passing the 30 mph test without
an attached tether.

The agency is also aware of other concerns which
have been expressed by child safety researchers in
connection with the short shields used in booster
seats without tethers. For example, there is con-
cern that older children could be seriously injured
by having their head and neck wrap around the
shield, since the shield is not large enough to
restrain those parts of the body in a crash situa-
tion. This concern was raised in the comments sub-
mitted by the National Child Passenger Safety
Association. Another concern is that the short
shield booster seats do not provide any crotch
restraint. It is possible that smaller children could
submarine under the short shields on booster
seats, leaving these children completely unre-
strained in the event of a crash.

NHTSA wishes to emphasize that booster seats
without tethers comply with all current require-
ments of Standard No. 213 using the 3-year old
dummy. Nevertheless, the issues raised by the
commenters regarding the effectiveness of short
shields on booster seats are matters of concern to
the agency. Since the short shields used on booster
seats without tethers represent the only current
alternative to the use of tether straps on booster
seats, NHTSA has concluded that it would be an
unwise policy to essentially require the use of short
shields on booster seats (by adopting the proposed
requirements) before the agency has investigated
the validity of the above-mentioned safety con-
cerns. If testing showed that short shields did not
provide adequate safety protection to children
after the agency had essentially required the use of

such shields on all booster seats, this rulemaking
would not achieve the agency's goal of improving
the protection offered to child restraint occupants.
Therefore, it is premature to adopt the proposed
requirements as they apply to booster seats.

The agency will investigate the allegations that
have been made about the short shields on booster
seats. The agency investigation, together with the
University of Michigan testing on the abdominal
loading imposed by these short shields, should help
resolve the stated concerns.

There is also an important distinction between
child seats with tethers and booster seats with
tethers, which suggests that it is not as imperative
to require that booster seats not be permitted to
have an attached tether strap during the 30 mph
test. Booster seats equipped with tethers are
designed to be used either with the tether strap at-
tached to the vehicle or with a lap-shoulder belt.
When a lap-shoulder belt in a vehicle so that it will
provide the necessary upper torso support. When
upper torso support is provided by a vehicle
shoulder belt, it is not necessary to attach the
tether strap to provide the necessary upper torso
support.

This feature resulted in observed correct usage
of booster seats equipped with tethers in 38.0 per-
cent of the total cases in the Cynecki and Goryl
report cited above. The tether strap was properly
attached in 8.5 percent of the cases, and the lap-
shoulder belt was correctly used with the booster
seat in 29.5 percent of the observed cases. This
38.0 percent correct usage of booster seats with
tethers compares favorably with the 41.2 percent
correct usage of child seats not equipped with
tethers, and both stand in sharp contrast to the 7.0
percent usage of child seats equipped with tethers.

The reason explained in the NPRM for proposing
that tether straps not be attached during the 30
mph test was because of the overwhelming incor-
rect usage of child restraints with tethers by the
public. However, the data available to the agency
suggest that booster seats equipped with tethers
are used correctly almost as often as child seats
without tethers.

CHILD HARNESSES

The NPRM did not propose to change the cur-
rent treatment for child harnesses in the Standard
No. 213 testing. The surveys and data available to
the agency have not examined the extent to which
child harness tethers are misused by the public.

PART 571; S 213-PRE 55

Moreover, NHTSA believes it would be obvious to
users of child harnesses that the failure to attach
the tether strap would leave the child completely
unrestrained in a crash. The absence of data in-
dicating misuse of child harness tether straps, to-
gether with the obvious need to attach these tether
straps, resulted in the agency's position that the
NPRM should not propose any changes to Stand-
ard No. 213 in this regard: that is, child harness
would be permitted to have their tether straps
attached during the 30 mph test and not be subject
to the 20 mph test. No commenters addressed this
area of the proposal, and the final rule does not
make any changes to the current requirements for
child harnesses for the reasons explained above.

CHILD RESTRAINTS FOR PHYSICALLY
HANDICAPPED CHILDRES

A number of commenters urged the agency to
exempt child restraints designed for handicapped
children from the proposal that all child restraints,
except child harnesses, pass the 30 mph test in
Standard No. 213 without any tether strap at-
tached. A manufacturer of child restraints for
physically handicapped children commented: "Now
that safe transportation for the handicapped child
has become a reality, through the use of restraint
harnesses, tether systems, and wheelchairs
engineered to meet Standard No. 213, it seems
counterproductive for the handicapped population
and manufacturers to start over again."

NHTSA did not intend to require any changes to
thes restraints, and a statement proposing the con-
tinuation of current testing requirements for
restraints for physically handicapped children was
inadvertently omitted from the NPRM. The
agency during the 30 mph test and will not require
these restraints to be subjected to the 20 mph test
without test without the tether attached. NHTSA
has no data showing that these restraints are fre-
quently misused by the public. Additionally, there
is no alternative at present to the use of tether
straps to provide the necessary upper torso sup-
port for physically handicapped children. Hence,
any requirement to eliminate the use of tether
straps on restraints for physically handicapped
children would lessen the protection available for
those children. This was not the agency's intent in
the NPRM.

OTHER ISSUES

The NPRM proposed that child restraints be in-
stalled at one of the two outboard seating positions
on the standard seat during the testing. As ex-

plained above, this was proposed to ensure that the
testing would be representative of the way in
which child restraints would be used by the public.
It was also proposed to enable child restraint
manufacturers to reduce testing costs by eval-
uating two child restraint systems in a single test.

The commenters that addressed this proposed
change generally opposed it. The University of
Michigan commented that there was no basis for
the concern expressed in the NPRM that testing in
the center seating position might not be represen-
tative of the way in which child restraints are used
by the public. The University stated: "We know
from field experience that those restraints that
meet the 30 mph test in the center seating position
also effectively protect children in most crashes."
Stated differently, child restraints that pass the 30
mph crash test in the center seating position have
performed well when installed in the outboard
seating positions of vehicles in use. The available
data on the performance of child restraint systems
indicate that the Standard No. 213 test procedures
are representative of the conditions encountered
by restraint systems when in use.

Further, one child restraint manufacturer and
the University of Michigan stated that the
agency's proposed change might increase testing
costs, instead of achieving the agency's stated in-
tent of reducing those costs. This could happen
because child restraints would be subjected to
slightly differing forces produced by asymmetrical
lap belt anchorages at the outboard seating posi-
tions. Further, it was stated that all child
restraints are not symmetrical, and their test per-
formance might be affected by a twist in one direc-
tion, but not the other. These facts would mean
that all existing models of child restraints would
have to be retested to ensure that the restraints
would pass the Standard No. 213 requirements
when installed at the outboard seating positions. In
addition, the child restraints would have to be
tested at both the left and right outboard seating
positions, because of the differenct forces
presented at these different seating locations.

The proposed change to the required seating
position for testing child restraints is not adopted
in this final rule, because of the reasons set forth in
the comments.

The NPRM also proposed that manufacturers be
required to insert the phrase "For extra protection
in frontal and side impacts" before the notice on
the label that tether straps must be attached in ac-
cordance with the manufacturer's instructions.

PART 571; S 213-PRE 56

This change was proposed in connection with the
proposal to require all child restraints equipped
with tethers to pass the 30 mph test without at-
taching the tethers. The change in the label
language was intended to inform the public that
the tether strap would offer supplementary safety
protection when attached, but that it was not
necessary to attach the tether for adequate
protection.

BMW commented that the proposed change
would have the unintended effect of implying that
it was not necessary to use tether straps, and this
implication would decrease the already low use of
tether straps. The agency believes that the BMW
comment has merit. The possibility of decreasing
tether usage, combined with the fact that child
harnesses, booster seats, and restraints for
physically handicapped children may include tether
straps, the attachment of which is necessary for
adequate protection of the child, have led the
agency to conclude that the proposed change to the
label language should not be adopted in this final
rule.

The other proposed changes were clarifications
to the instructions which must accompany each
child restraint. No commenters addressed these
clarifications, and they are adopted for the reasons
explained in the NPRM.

PART 571 -[AMENDEDl

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
S571.213 is amended as follows:

1. The authority citation for Part 571 continues
to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401,1403, 1407;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

2. S4 is amended by adding the following defini-
tion immediately before the definition of "car
bed":

S4. Definitions.

"Booster seat" means a child restraint which
consist of only a seating platform that does not ex-
tend up to provide a cushion for the child's back or
head.

3. S5.6.1 is revised to read as follows:

55.6.1 The instructions shall state that, for
maximum safety protection, child restraint
systems should be installed in a rear seating posi-
tion in vehicles with two rear seating positions and
in the center rear seating position in vehicles with
such a seating position.

4. S5.6.2 is revised to read as follows:

55.6.2 The instructions shall specify in general
terms the types of vehicles, the types of seating
positions, and the types of vehicle safety belts with
which the system can or cannot be used.

5. S6. 1.2.1 is revised to read as follows:
S6.1.2.1 Test configuration.

56.1. 2.1.1 Test configuration i. In the case of
each child restraint system other than a child
harness, a booster seat with a top anchorage strap,
or a restraint designed for use by physically handi-
capped children, install a new child restraint
system at the center seating position of the
standard seat assembly in accordance with the
manufacturer's instructions provided with the
system pursuant to S5.6, except that the restraint
shall be secured to the standard vehicle seat using
only the standard vehicle lap belt. A child harness,
booster seat with a top anchorage strap, or a
restraint designed for use by physically handi-
capped children shall be installed at the center
seating position of the standard seat assembly in
accordance with the manufacturer's instructions
provided with the system pursuant to S5.6.

56.1.2.1.2 Test configuration II. In the case of
each child restraint system which is equipped with
a fixed or movable surface described in S5.2.2.2, or
a booster seat with a top anchorage strap, install a
new child restraint system at the center seating
position of the standard seat assembly using only
the standard seat lap belt to secure the system to
the standard seat.

Issued on February 10, 1986.

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

51 F.R. 5335
February 13, 1986

PART 571; S 213-PRE 57-58

FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 213

Child Restraint Systems, Seat
(Docket No.

51. Scope. This standard specifies re-
quirements for child restraint systems used in
motor vehicles and aircraft.

52. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is to
reduce the number of children killed or injured in
motor vehicle crashes and in aircraft.

53. Application. This standard applies to child
restraint systems for use in motor vehicles and air-
craft.

54. Definitions. ("Booster seat" means a child
restraint which consists of only a seating platform
that does not extend up to provide a cushion for the
child's back or head. (51 F.R. 5335— February 13,
1986. Effective: August 12, 1986)1

"Car bed" means a child restraint system de-
signed to restrain or position a child in the supine or
prone position on a continuous flat surface.

"Child restraint system" means any device, ex-
cept Type I or Type 11 seat belts, designed for use
in a motor vehicle or aircraft to restrain, seat, or
position children who weigh 50 pounds or less.

"Contactable surface" means any child restraint
system surface (other than that of a belt, belt
buckle, or belt adjustment hardware) that may con-
tact any part of the head or torso of the appro-
net NHTSA Drawing
No. S AS 1000

SOBL SEAT ORIENTATION REfERENCE LINE IHORIZONTALI

SORL Location on the Standard Seat
FIGURE 1A

Belt Assemblies, and Anchorages
74-9; Notice 6)

priate test dummy, specified in S7, when a child
restraint system is tested in accordance with S6.1.

"Representative aircraft passenger seat" means
either a Federal Aviation Administration approved
production aircraft passenger seat or a simulated
aircraft passenger seat conforming to Figure 6.

"Seat orientation reference line" or "SORL"
means the horizontal line through Point Z as
illustrated in Figure lA.

"Torso" means the portion of the body of a
seated anthropomorphic test dummy, excluding
the thighs, that lies between the top of the child
restraint system seating surface and the top of the
shoulders of the test dummy.

S5. Requirements for child restraint systems cer-
tified for use in motor vehicles. Each child
restraint certified for use in motor vehicles shall
meet the requirements in this section when, as
specified, tested in accordance with S6.1.

S5.1 Dynamic performance.

S5.1.1 Child restraint system integrity. When
tested in accordance with 86.1, each child restraint
system shall:

(a) Exhibit no complete separation of any load
bearing structural element and no partial separa-
tion exposing either surfaces with a radius of less
than 'A inch or surfaces with protrusions greater
than % inch above the immediate adjacent
surrounding contactable surface of any structural
element of the system;

(b) If adjustable to different positions, remain in
the same adjustment position during the testing as
it was immediately before the testing; and

(c) If a front facing child restraint system, not
allow the angle between the system's back support
surfaces for the child and the system's seating sur-
face to be less than 45 degrees at the completion of
the test.

(R«v. 2/13/86)

PART 571; S 213-1

S5.1.2 Injury criteria. When tested in accord-
ance with S6.1, each child restraint system that, in
accordance with S5.5.2(f), is recommended for use
by children weighing more than 20 pounds, shall—

(a) Limit the resultant acceleration at the loca-
tion of the accelerometer mounted in the test
dummy head as specified in Part 572 such that the
expression:

1

t_- - t,

J"

adt

2.5

(t. -t.)

shall not exceed 1,000, where a is the resultant
acceleration expressed as a multiple of g (the
acceleration of gravity), and ti and t^, are any two
moments during the impacts.

(b) Limit the resultant acceleration at the
location of the accelerometer mounted in the test
dummy upper thorax as specified in Part 572 to not
more than 60 g's, except for intervals whose
cumulative duration is not more than 3
milUseconds.

S5.1.3 Occupant excursion. When tested in
accordance with S6.1 and adjusted in any position
which the manufacturer has not, in accordance
with S5.5.2(i), specifically warned against using in
motor vehicles, each child restraint system shall
meet the applicable excursion limit requirements
specified in S5.1.3.1-S5.L3.3.

[S5.1.3.1 Chiid restraint systems other than rear-
facing ones and car beds. In the case of each child
restraint system other than a rear-facing child
restraint system or a car bed, the test dummy's
torso shall be retained within the system and no
portion of the test dummy's head shall pass
through the vertical transverse plane that is 32
inches forward of point Z on the standard seat
assembly, measured along the center SORL (as
illustrated in Figure IB), and neither knee pivot
point shall pass through the vertical transverse
plane that is 36 inches forward of point Z on the
standard seat assembly, measured along the center
SORL. (45 F.R. 67095-October 9, 1980. Effective:
10/7/80)1

S5.1.3.2 Rear-facing child restraint systems. In

the case of each rear-facing child restraint system,
all portions of the test dummy's torso shall be

retained within the system and no portion of the
target point on either side of the dummy's head
shall pass through the transverse orthogonal
planes whose intersection contains the forward-
most and top-most points on the child restraint
system surfaces (illustrated in Figure IC).

Ml Upp«( Torao Ball Anchcaa* foi

31 4 Right oi taf, ot ,ha Caniai

• a ahomn m Fig 1A
131 Naaf Lap Ball Buchia Localad 70 Riehi oi

Lah of (ha Caniar SORL aa ahown tn Fig 1A

Locations of Additional Belt Anchorage

Points and Forward Excursion Limit

FIGURE 1B

S5.1.3.3 Car beds. In the case of car beds, all
portions of the test dummy's head and torso shall
be retained within the confines of the car bed.

SoBtback frontal surface plane extended

Forv..,dUmh^ Upp..l.ml,

Upper Restraint \^-^
Surface Point \ \^

f

'"^

/ Note: The llmKa
/ llluetrated mova
/ during dynamic
/ letting

^^

e;— ■» ^

ez:

^

J

Rear Facing Child Restraint

Forward and Upper Head Excursion Limits

FIGURE IC

S5.1.4 Back support angle. When a rear-facing
child restraint system is tested in accordance with
S6.1, the angle between the system's back support
surface for the child and the vertical shall not
exceed 70 degrees.

(Rev. 10f9/B0)

PART 571; S 213-2

S5.2 Force distribution.

S5.2.1 Minimum head support sudace— child
restraints other than car beds.

S5.2.1.1 Except as provided in S5.2.1.2, each
child restraint system other than a car bed shall
provide restraint against rearward movement of
the head of the child (rearward in relation to the
child) by means of a continuous seat back which is
an integral part of the system and which—

(a) Has a height, measured along the system
seat back surface for the child in the vertical
longitudinal plane passing through the longitudinal
centerline of the child restraint systems from the
lowest point on the system seating surface that is
contacted by the buttocks of the seated dummy, as
follows:

Weight ' (in pounds)

Height ' (in inches)

Less than 20 lb 18

20 lb or more, but not more than 40 lb 20

More than 40 lb 22

' When a child restraint system is recommended under S5.5 (f) for use
by children of the above weights.

' The height of the portion of the system seat back providing head
restraint shall not be less than the above.

(b) Has a width of not less than 8 inches,
measured in the horizonal plane at the height
specified in paragraph (a) of this section. Except
that a child restraint system with side supports
extending at least 4 inches forward from the padded
surface of the portion of the restraint system pro-
vided for support of the child's head may have a
width of not less than 6 inches, measured in the
horizontal plane of the height specified in
paragraph (a) of this section.

(c) Limits the rearward rotation of the test
dummy head so that the angle between the head
and torso of the dummy specified in S7 when
tested in accordance with S6.1 is not more than 45
degrees greater than the angle between the head
and torso after the dummy has been placed in the
system in accordance with S6.1.2.3 and before the
system is tested in accordance with S6.1.

S5.2.1.2 A front facing child restraint system is
not required to comply with S5.2.1.1 if the target

point on either side of the dummy's head is below a
horizontal plane tangent to the top of the standard
seat assembly when the dummy is positioned in the
system and the system is installed on the assembly
in accordance with S6.1.2.

55.2.2 Torso impact protection. Each child
restraint system other than a car bed shall comply
with the applicable requirements of S5.2.2.1 and
S5.2.2.2.

55.2.2.1 (a) The system surface provided for
the support of the child's back shall be flat or con-
cave and have a continuous surface area of not less
than 85 square inches.

(b) Each system surface provided for support of
the side of the child's torso shall be flat or concave
and have a continuous surface of not less than 24
square inches for systems recommended for
children weighing 20 pounds or more, or 48 square
inches for systems recommended for children
weighing less than 20 pounds.

(c) Each horizontal cross section of each system
surface designed to restrain forward movement of
the child's torso shall be flat or concave and each
vertical longitudinal cross section shall be flat or
convex with a radius of curvature of the underlying
structure of not less than 2 inches.

55.2.2.2 Each forward facing child restraint
system shall have no fixed or movable surface
directly forward of the dummy and intersected by
a horizontal line parallel to the SORL and passing
through any portion of the dummy, except for
surfaces which restrain the dummy when the
system is tested in accordance with S6. 1.2. 1.2 so
that the child restraint system shall conform to the
requirements of S5.1.2 and S5. 1.3.1.

55.2.3 Head impact protection.

S5.2.3.1 Each child restraint system, other than
a child harness, which is recommended under
S5.5.2 (f) for children weighing less than 20 pounds
shall comply with S5.2.3.2.

(S5.2.3.2 Each system surface, except for pro-
trusions that comply with S5.2.4, which is contact-
able by the dummy head when the system is tested
in accordance with S6.1 shall be covered with slow
recovery, energy absorbing material with the
following characteristics:

(R«v. 5/1 f 80)

PART 571; S 213-3

(a) A 25 percent compression-deflection
resistance of not less than 0.5 and not more than
10 pounds per square inch when tested in accord-
ance with S6.3. (45 F.R. 29045. Effective: 5/1/80)1

1(b) A thickness of not less than V2 inch for
material having a 25 percent compression-
deflection resistance of not less than 1.8 and not
more than 10 pounds per square inch when tested
in accordance with S6.3. Materials having a 25 per-
cent compression-deflection resistance of less than
1 .8 pounds per square inch shall have a thickness of
not less than % inch. (45 F.R. 82264-December
15, 1980. Effective: 12/15/80)1

S5.2.4 Protrusion limitation. Any portion of a
rigid structural component within or underlying a
contactable surface, or any portion of a child
restraint system surface that is subject to the
requirements of S5.2.3 shall, with any padding or
other flexible overlay material removed, have a
height above any immediately adjacent restraint
system surface of not more than % inch and no
exposed edge with a radius of less than Va inch.

55.3 Instailation.

55.3.1 Each child restraint system shall have
no means designed for attaching the system to
vehicle seat cushion or vehicle seat back and no
component (except belts) that is designed to be
inserted between the vehicle seat cushion and
vehicle seat back.

55.3.2 When installed on a vehicle seat, each
child restraint system, other than child harnesses,
shall be capable of being restrained against
forward movement solely by means of a Type I
seat belt assembly (defined in S571.209) that meets
Standard No. 208 (S571.208), or by means of a
Type I seat belt assembly plus one additional
anchorage strap that is supplied with the system
and conforms to S5.4.

55.3.3 Car beds. Each car bed shall be designed
to be installed on a vehicle seat so that the car bed's
longitudinal axis is perpendicular to a vertical
longitudinal plane through the longitudinal axis of
the vehicle.

55.4 Belts, belt buckles, and belt webbing.

55.4.1 Performance requirements. The web-
bing of belts provided with a child restraint system
and used to attach the system to the vehicle or to
restrain the child within the system shall—

1(a) After being subjected to abrasion as
specified in § 5.1(d) or 5.3(c) of FMVSS No. 209
(§ 571.209), have a breaking strength of not less
than 75 percent of the strength of the unabraided
webbing when tested in accordance with S5.1(b) of
FMVSS No. 209. (45 F.R. 29045-May 1, 1980. Ef-
fective: 5/1/80)1

(b) Meet the requirements of S4.3 (e) through (h)
of FMVSS No. 209 (S571.209); and

(c) If contactable by the test dummy torso when
the system is tested in accordance with S6.1, have
a width of not less than IV2 inches when measured
in accordance with S5.4.1.1.

S5.4.1.1 Width test procedure. Condition the
webbing for 24 hours in an atmosphere of any
relative humidity between 48 and 67 percent, and
any ambient temperature between 70° and 77° F.
Measure belt webbing width under a tension of 5
pounds applied lengthwise.

55.4.2 Belt buckles and belt adjustment
hardware. Each belt buckle and item of belt
adjustment hardware used in a child restraint
system shall conform to the requirements of S4.3
(a) and S4.3 (b) of FMVSS No. 209 (S571.209).

55.4.3 Belt Restraint.

55.4.3.1 General. Each belt that is part of a
child restraint system and that is designed to
restrain a child using the system shall be adjustable
to snugly fit any child whose height and weight are
within the ranges recommended in accordance
with S5.5.2 (f) and who is positioned in the system
in accordance with the instructions required by
S5.6.

55.4.3.2 Direct restraint. Each belt that is part
of a child restraint system and that is designed to
restrain a child using the system and to attach the
system to the vehicle shall, when tested in accord-
ance with S6.1, impose no loads on the child that
result from the mass of the system or the mass of
the seat back of the standard seat assembly
specified in S7.3.

(Rev. 12/15/80)

PART 571; S 213-4

55.4.3.3 Seating systems. Except for child
restraint systems subject to S5.4.3.4, each child
restraint system that is designed for use by a child
in a seated position and that has belts designed to
restrain the child shall, with the test dummy
specified in S7 positioned in the system in
accordance with S6. 1.2.3, provide:

(a) upper torso restraint in the form of:

(i) belts passing over each shoulder of the child; or

(ii) a fixed or movable surface that complies with
S5.2.2.1(c), and

(b) lower torso restraint in the form of:

(i) a lap belt assembly making an angle between
45° and 90° with the child restraint seating surface
at the lap belt attachment points, or

(ii) a fixed or movable surface that complies with
S5.2.2.1(c). and

(c) in the case of each seating system recom-
mended for children over 20 pounds, crotch
restraint in the form of:

(i) a crotch belt connectable to the lap belt or
other device used to restrain the lower torso, or

(ii) a fixed or movable surface that complies with
S5.2.2.1(c).

55.4.3.4 Harnesses. Each child harness shall:

(a) Provide upper torso restraint, including belts
passing over each shoulder of the child;

(b) Provide lower torso restraint by means of lap
and crotch belt; and

(c) Prevent a child of any height for which the
restraint is recommended for use pursuant to
S5.5.2 (f) from standing upright on the vehicle seat
when the child is placed in the device in accordance
with the instructions required by S5.6.

55.4.3.5 Buckle Release. lAny buckle in a
child restraint system belt assembly designed to
restrain a child using the system shall:

(a) When tested in accordance with S6.2.1 prior to
the dynamic test of S6.1, not release when a force of
less than 9 pounds is applied and shall release when a
force of not more than 14 pounds is applied:

(b) After the dynamic test of S6.1, when tested
in accordance with S6.2.3, release when a force of
not more than 16 pounds is applied;

(c) Meet the requirements of S4,3(dX2) of
FMVSS No. 209 (§571.209), except that the
minimum surface area for child restraint buckles
designed for push-button application shall be 0.6
square inch.

(d) Meet the requirements of S4.3(g) of FMVSS
No. 209 ($ 571.209) when tested in accordance with
S5.2(g) of FMVSS No. 209; and

(e) Not release during the testing specified in
S6.1. (50 F.R. 33722- August 21, 1985. Effective:
February 18, 1986)1

S5.5 Labeling.

55.5.1 Each child restraint system shall be
permanently labeled with the information specified
in S5.5.2 (a) through (1).

55.5.2 The information specified in paragraphs
(a)-(l) of this section shall be stated in the English
language and lettered in letters and numbers that
are not smaller than 10 point type and are on a
contrasting background.

(a) The model name or number of the system.

(b) The manufacturer's name. A distributor's
name may be used instead if the distributor assumes
responsibility for all duties and liabilities imposed
on the manufacturer with respect to the system by
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,
as amended

(c) The statement: "Manufactured in ," in-
serting the month and year of manufacture.

(d) The place of manufacture (city and State, or
foreign country). However, if the manufacturer
uses the name of the distributor, then it shall state
the location (city and State, or foreign country) of
the principal offices of the distributor.

(e) The statement: "This child restraint system
conforms to all applicable Federal motor vehicle
safety standards."

(f) One of the following statements, inserting
the manufacturer's recommendations for the max-
imum weight and height of children who can safely
occupy the system:

(i) This infant restraint is designed for use by

children who weigh pounds or less and

whose height is inches or less; or

(ii) This child restraint is designed for use only

by children who weigh between and

. pounds and whose height is .

inches or less and who are capable of sitting
upright alone; or

(iii) This child restraint is designed for use only

by children who weigh between and

pounds and are between

and inches in height.

(g) The following statement, inserting the loca-
tion of the manufacturer's installation instruction
booklet or sheet on the restraint:

WARNING! FAILURE TO FOLLOW EACH OF
THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS CAN
RESULT IN YOUR CHILD STRIKING THE
VEHICLE'S INTERIOR DURING A SUDDEN
STOP OR CRASH.

(R*v. B/21/85)

PART 571; S 213-5

SECURE THIS CHILD RESTRAINT WITH A
VEHICLE BELT AS SPECIFIED IN THE
MANUFACTURER'S INSTRUCTIONS
LOCATED

(h) In the case of each child restraint system that
has belts designed to restrain children using them:
SNUGLY ADJUST THE BELTS PROVIDED
WITH THIS CHILD RESTRAINT AROUND
YOUR CHILD.

(i) In the case of each child restraint system
which is not intended for use in motor vehicles at
certain adjustment positions, the following state-
ment, inserting the manufacturer's adjustment
restrictions.

DO NOT USE THE

MENT POSITION(S) OF

ADJUST-

THIS CHILD

RESTRAINT IN A MOTOR VEHICLE.

(j) In the case of each child restraint system
equipped with an anchorage strap, the statement:

SECURE THE TOP ANCHORAGE STRAP
PROVIDED WITH THIS CHILD RESTRAINT
AS SPECIFIED IN THE MANUFACTURER'S
INSTRUCTIONS.

(k) In the case of each child restraint system
which can be used in a rear-facing position, one of
the following statements:

(i) PLACE THIS CHILD RESTRAINT IN A
REAR-FACING POSITION WHEN USING IT
WITH AN INFANT; or

(ii) PLACE THIS INFANT RESTRAINT IN A
REAR-FACING POSITION WHEN USING IT IN
THE VEHICLE.

0) An installation diagram showing the child re-
straint system installed in the right front outboard
seating position equipped with a continuous-loop
lap/shoulder belt and in the center rear seating posi-
tion as specified in the manufacturer's instructions.

(m) Child restraints that are certified as com-
plying with the provisions of section 58 shall be la-
beled with the statement "THIS RESTRAINT IS
CERTIFIED FOR USE IN MOTOR VEHICLES
AND AIRCRAFT". This statement shall be in red
lettering, and shall be placed after the certification
statement required by paragraph (e) of this
section.

S5.5.3 The information specified in S5.5.2
(g)-(k) shall be located on the child restraint system
so that it is visible when the system is installed as
specified in S5.6.

55.6 Installation instructions. Each child
restraint system shall be accompanied by printed
instructions in the English language that provide a
step-by-step procedure, including diagrams, for
installing the system in motor vehicles, securing
the system in the vehicles, positioning a child in the
system, and adjusting the system to fit the child.

55.6.1 [The instructions shall state that, for
maximum safety protection, child restraint
systems should be installed in a rear seating posi-
tion in vehicles with two rear seating positions and
in the center rear seating position in vehicles with
such a seating position. (51 F.R. 5335— February 13,
1986. Effective: August 12, 1986.)!

55.6.2 [The instructions shall specify in general
terms the types of vehicles, the types of seating
positions, and the types of vehicle safety belts with
which the system can or cannot be used. (51 F.R.
5335— February 13, 1986. Effective: August 12, 1986.)]

55.6.3 The instructions shall explain the
primary consequences of noting following the
warnings required to be labeled on the child
restraint system in accordance with S5.5.2 (g)-(k).

55.6.4 The instructions for each car bed shall
explain that the car bed should position in such a
way that the child's head is near the center of the
vehicle.

55.6.5 The instructions shall state that child
restraint systems should be securely belted to the
vehicle, even when they are not occupied, since in a
crash an unsecured child restraint system may
injure other occupants.

55.6.6 Each child restraint system shall have a
location on the restraint for storing the manufac-
turer's instructions.

55.7 Flammability. Each material used in a
child restraint system shall conform to the
requirements of S4 of FMVSS No. 302 (S57L302).

S6. Test Conditions and Procedures.

S6.1 Dynamic Systems Test.

S6.1.1 Test Conditions.

S6.1.1.1 The test device is the standard seat
assembly specified in S7.3. It is mounted on a
dynamic test platform so that the center SORL of
the seat is parallel to the direction of the test plat-
form travel and so that movement between the base
of the assembly and the platform is prevented. The
platform is instrumented with an accelerometer and
data processing system having a frequency
response of 60Hz channel class as specified in
Society of Automotive Engineers Recommended
Practice J211a, "Instrumentation for Impact
Tests." The accelerometer sensitive axis is parallel
to the direction of the test platform travel.

(Rev. 2/13/B6)

PART 571; S 213-6

ACCELERATION FUNCTION FOR AV=30MPH

«0 60

TIMt MILLISECONDS

FIGURE 2

S6.1.1.2 The tests are frontal barrier impact
simulations and for—

(a) Test configuration I specified in S6. 1.2. 1.1,
are at a velocity change of 30 mph with the
acceleration of the test platform entirely within
the curve shown in Figure 2.

(b) Test configuration II specified in S6. 1.2. 1.2,
are at a velocity change of 20 mph with the
acceleration of the test platform entirely vdthin
the curve shown in Figure 3.

ACCELERATION FUNCTION FOR AV- 20MPH.

40
TIME -MILLISECONDS

FIGURE 3

56.1.1.3 Type I seat belt assemblies meeting
the requirements of Standard No. 209 (S571.209)
and having webbing with a width of not more than
2 inches are attached, without the use of retractors
or reels of any kind, to the seat belt anchorage
points (illustrated in Figure IB) provided on the
standard seat assembly.

56.1.1.4 Performance tests under S6.1 are
conducted at any ambient temperature from 66° to
78° F and at any relative humidity from 10 percent
to 70 percent.

S6.1.2 Dynamic Test Procedure.

56.1.2.1 Test Configuration.

56.1. 2.1.1 Test Configuration I. [In the case of
each child restraint system other than a child har-
ness, a booster seat with a top anchorage strap, or a
restraint designed for use by physically handicapped
children, install a new child restraint system at the
center seating position of the standard seat assem-
bly in accordance with the manufacturer's instruc-
tions provided with the system pursuant to S5.6,
except that the restraint shall be secured to the
standard vehicle seat using only the standard vehi-
cle lap belt. A child harness, booster seat with a top
anchorage strap, or a restraint designed for use by
physically handicapped children shall be installed at
the centier seating position of the standard seat
assembly in accordance with the manufacturer's in-
structions provided with the system pursuant to
S5.6. (51 F.R. 5335— February 13. 1986. Effective:
August 12. 1986.)]

56.1.2.1.2 Test Configuration II. [In the case of
each child restraint system which is equipped with
a fixed or movable surface described in S5.2.2.2, or
a booster seat with a top anchorage strap, install a
new child restraint system at the center seat posi-
tion of the standard seat assembly using only the
standard seat lap belt to secure the system to the
standard seat. (51 F.R. 5335— February 13. 1986. Ef-
fective: August 12. 1986.)!

56.1.2.2 Tighten all belts used to attach the
child restraint system to the standard seat
assembly to a tension of not less than 12 pounds
and not more than 15 pounds, as measured by a
load cell used on the webbing portion of the belt.

56.1.2.3 Place in the child restraint any dummy
specified in S7 for testing systems for use by
children of the heights and weights for which the
system is recommended in accordance with S5.6.

S6.1. 2.3.1 When placing the 3-year-old test
dummy in child restraint systems other than car
beds, position the test dummy according to the
instructions for child positioning provided by the
manufacturer with the system in accordance with
S5.6 while conforming to the following:

(a) Place the test dummy in the seated position
within the system with the midsagittal plane of the
test dummy head coincident with the center SORL
of the standard seating assembly, holding the torso
upright until it contacts the system's design
seating surface.

(b) Extend the arms of the test dummy as far as
possible in the upward vertical direction. Extend
the legs of the dummy as far as possible in the
forward horizontal direction, with the dummy feet
perpendicular to the centerline of the lower legs.

<R«v. 2/13/86)

PART 571; S 213-7

(c) Using a flat square surface with an area of 4
square inches, apply a force of 40 pounds, perpen-
dicular to the plane of the back of the standard seat
assembly, first against the dummy crotch and then
at the dummy thorax in the midsagittal plane of
the dummy. For a child restraint system with a
fixed or movable surface described in S5.2.2.2
which is being tested under the conditions of test
configuration II, do not attach any of the child
restraint belts unless they are an integral part of
the fixed or movable surface. For all other child
restraint systems and for a child restraint system
with a fixed or movable surface which is being
tested under the conditions of test configuration I,
attach all appropriate child restraint belts and
tighten them as specified in S6. 1.2.4. Attach all
appropriate vehicle belts and tighten them as
specified in S6.1.2.2. Position each movable
surface in accordance with the manufacturer's
instructions provided in accordance with S5.6.

(d) After the steps specified in paragraph (c) of
this section, rotate each dummy limb downwards in
the plane parallel to its midsagittal plane until the
limb contacts a surface of the child restraint system
or the standard seat. Position the limbs, if neces-
sary, so that limb placement does not inhibit torso
or head movement in tests conducted under S6.

S6.1 .2.3.2 When placing the 6-month-old dum-
my in child restraint systems other than car beds,
position the test dummy according to the instruc-
tions for child positioning provided with the system
by the manufacturer in accordance with S5.6 while
conforming to the following:

(a) With the dummy in the supine position on a
horizontal surface, and while preventing movement
of the dummy torso by placing a hand on the center
of the torso, rotate the dummy legs upward by lift-
ing the feet until the legs contact the upper torso
and the feet touch the head, and then slowly release
the legs but do not return them to the flat surface.

(b) Place the dummy in the child restraint
system so that the back of the dummy torso con-
tacts the back support surface of the system. For a
child restraint system with a fixed or movable sur-
face described in S5.2.2.2 which is being tested
under the conditions of test configuration II, do
not attach any of the child restraint belts unless
they are an integral part of the fixed or movable
surface. For all other child restraint systems and
for a child restraint system with a fixed or movable
surface which is being tested under the conditions
of test configuration I, attach all appropriate child
restraint belts and tighten them as specified in
S6. 1.2.4. Attach all appropriate vehicle belts and

tighten them as specified in S6.1.2.2. Position each
movable surface in accordance with the manufac-
turer's instructions provided in accordance with
S5.6. If the dummy's head does not remain in the
proper position, it shall be taped against the front
of the seat back surface of the system by means of
a single thickness of V4 -inch- wide paper masking
tape placed across the center of the dummy face.

(c) Position the dummy arms vertically upwards
and then rotate each arm downward toward the
dummy's lower body until it contacts a surface of
the child restraint system or the standard seat
assembly, ensuring that no arm is restrained from
movement in other than the downward direction,
by any part of the system or the belts used to
anchor the system to the standard seat assembly.

S6.1.2.3.3 When placing the 6-month-old
dummy or 3-year-old dummy in a car bed, place the
dummy in the car bed in the supine position with its
midsagittal plane perpendicular to the center
SORL of the standard seat assembly and position
the dummy within the car bed in accordance with
instructions for child positioning provided with the
car bed by its manufacturer in accordance with
S5.6.

56.1.2.4 If provided, shoulder and pelvic belts
that directly restrain the dummy shall be adjusted
as follows:

Tighten the belts until a 2-pound force applied
(as illustrated in Figure 5) to the webbing at the
top of each dummy shoulder and to the pelvic web-
bing two inches on either side of the torso mid-
sagittal plane pulls the webbing V4 inch from the
dummy.

56.1.2.5 Accelerate the test platform to
simulate frontal impact in accordance with
S6.1.1.2 (a) or S6.1.1.2. (b), as appropriate.

56.1.2.6 Measure dummy excursion and deter-
mine conformance to the requirements specified in
S5.1 as appropriate.

S6.2 Buckle release test procedure. [The belt
assembly buckles used in the child restraint system
shall be tested in accordance with S6.2.1 through
S6.2.4 inclusive (50 F.R. 33722-August 21, 1985.
Effective: February 18, 1986.)!

S6.2.1 [Before conducting the testing specified
in S6.1, place the loaded buckle on a hard, flat,
horizontal surface. Each belt end of the buckle
shall be pre-loaded in the following manner. The
anchor end of the buckle shall be loaded with a

(Rev. 8/21/85)

PART 571; S 213-8

2-pound force in the direction away from the
buckle. In the case of buckles designed to secure a
single latch plate, the belt latch plate end of the
buckle shall be pre-loaded with a 2-pound force in
the direction away from the buckle. In the case of
buckles designed to secure two or more latch
plates, the belt latch plate ends of the buckle shall
be loaded equally so that the total load is 2 pounds,
in the direction away from the buckle. For push-
button release buckles the release force shall be ap-
plied by a conical surface (cone angle not exceeding
90 degrees). For push-button release mechanisms
with a fixed edge (referred to in Figure 7 as
"hinged button"), the release force shall be applied
at the centerline of the button, 0.125 inches away
from the movable edge directly opposite the fixed
edge, and in the direction that produces maximum
releasing effect. For push-button release
mechanisms with no fixed edge (referred to Figure
7 as "floating button"), the release force shall be
applied at the center of the release mechanism in
the direction that produces the maximum releasing
effect. For all othe buckle release mechanisms, the
force shall be applied on the centerline of the
buckle lever or finger tab in the direction that pro-
duces the maximum releasing effect. Measure the
force required to release the buckle. Figure 7 il-
lustrates the loading for the different buckles and
the point where the release force should be applied,
and Figure 8 illustrates the conical surface used to
apply the release force to push-button release
buckles. (50 F.R. 33722- August 21, 1985. Effec-
tive: February 18, 1986.)!

Pull Horizontally

Buckle Release Test

FIGURE 4

S6.2.2 (After completion of the testing
specified in S6.1, and before the buckle is un-
latched, tie a self-adjusting sling to each wrist and
ankle of the test dummy in the manner illustrated

in Figure 4. (50 F.R. 33722-August 21, 1985.
Effective: February 18. 1986)1

56.2.3 Pull the sling horizontally in the manner
illustrated in Figure 4 and parallel to the center
SORL of the seat assembly and apply a force of 20
pounds in the case of a system tested with a 6
month-old dummy and 45 pounds in the case of a
system tested with a 3 year-old dummy.

56.2.4 [While applying the force specified in
S6.2.3, and using the device shown in Figure 8 for
push-button release buckles, apply the release
force in the manner and location specified in S6.2.1
for that type of buckle. Measure the force required
to release the buckle. (50 F.R. 33722-August 21,
1985. Effective: February 18, 1986.)!

S6.3 Head Impact protection— energy absorbing
material test procedure.

S6.3.1 Prepare and test specimens of the
energy absorbing material used to comply with
S5.2.3 in accordance with the applicable 25 percent
compression-deflection test described in the
American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM) Standard D1056-73, "Standard Specifica-
tion for Flexible Cellular Materials— Sponge or
Expanded Rubber", or D1564-71. "Standard
Method of Testing Flexible Cellular Materials-
Slab Urethane Foam" or D1565-76 "Standard
Specification for Flexible Cellular
Materials— Vinyl Chloride Polymer and Copolymer
open-cell foams.

S7 Test dummies.

57.1 Six-month-old dummy. An unclothed
"Six-month-old Size Manikin" conforming to Sub-
part D of Part 572 of this chapter is used for
testing a child restraint system that is
recommended by its manufacturer in accordance
with S5.6 for use by children in a weight range that
includes children weighing not more than 20
pounds.

57.2 Three-year-old dummy. A three-year-old
dummy conforming to Subpart C of Part 572 of
this chapter is used for testing a child restraint
that is recommended by its manufacturer in
accordance with S5.6 for use by children in a
weight range that includes children weighing more
than 20 pounds.

(ftov. a/21/85)

PART 571; S 213-9

Dimension A-

Insert Webbing'
to Rest Against
Thiis Surface

1/16 inch diameter wire

i)

Dimension B

Direction of Pull

Dimension A - Width of Webbing Plus 1/8 inch
Dimension B - 1/2 of Dimension A

Webbing Tension Pull Device
FIGURE 5

57.2.1 Before being used in testing under this
standard, the dummy is conditioned at any
ambient temperature from 66° F to 78° F and at
any relative humidity from 10 percent to 70 per-
cent for at least 4 hours.

57.2.2 When used in testing under this
standard, the dummy is clothed in thermal knit
waffle-weave polyester and cotton underwear, a
size 4 long-sleeved shirt weighing 0.2 pounds, a
size 4 pair of long pants weighing 0.2 pounds and
cut off just far enough above the knee to allow the
knee target to be visible, and size 7M sneakers with
rubber toe caps, uppers of dacron and cotton or
nylon and a total weight of 1 pound. Clothing other
than the shoes is machine-washed in 160° F to 180°
F water and machine dryed at 120° F to 140° F for
30 minutes.

S7.3 Standard seat assembly. The standard
seat assembly used in testing under this standard
are:

(a) For testing for motor vehicle use, a simulated
vehicle bench seat, with three seating positions,
which is described in Drawing Package
SAS-100-1000 (consisting of drawings and a bill of
materials); and

(b) For testing for aircraft use, a representative
aircraft passenger seat.

S8. Requirements, test conditions, and procedures
for child restraint systems manufactured for use in
an aircraft. [Each child restraint system manufac-
tured for use in both motor vehicles and aircraft
must comply with all of the applicable require-
ments specified in section S5 and with the addi-
tional requirement specified in S8.1 and S8.2.

58.1 Installation instructions. Each child
restraint system manufactured for use in aircraft
shall be accompanied by printed instructions in the
English language that provide a step-by-step pro-
cedure, including diagrams, for installing the
system in aircraft passenger seats, securing the
system to the seat, positioning a child in the system
when it is installed in aircraft, and adjusting the
system to fit the child. In the case of each child
restraint which is not intended for use in aircraft at
certain adjustment positions, the following state-
ment, with the manufacturer's restrictions in-
serted, shall be included in the instructions.

DO NOT USE THE-ADJUSTMENT POSITION{S)
OF THIS CHILD RESTRAINT IN AIRCRAFT.

58.2 Inversion test. When tested in accordance
with S8.2.1 through S8.2.5 and adjusted in any
position which the manufacturer has not, in accor-
dance with S8.1, specifically warned against using
in aircraft, each child restraint system manufac-
tured for use in aircraft shall meet the re-
quirements of S.8.2.1 through S8.2.6. The
manufacturer may, at its option, use any seat
which is a representative aircraft passenger seat
within the meaning of S4.

S8.2.1 A representative aircraft passenger seat
shall be positioned and adjusted so that its horizon-
tal and vertical orientation and its seat back angle
are the same as shown in Figure 6.

(Rev. 4/17/85)

PART 571; S 213-10

FIGURE 6: Simulated Aircraft Passenger Seat

"A" represents a 2- to 3-inch thick polyurethane
foam pad, 1.5-2.0 pounds per cubic foot density,
over 0.020-inch-thick aluminum pan, and covered
by 12- to U-ounce marine canvas. The sheet
aluminum pan is 20 inches wide and supported on
each side by a rigid structure. The seat back is a
rectangular frame covered with the aluminum sheet
and weighing between H and 15 pounds, with a
center of mass 13 to 16 inches above the seat
pivot axis. The mass moment of inertia of the seat
back about the seat pivot axis is between 195 and 220
ounce-inch-second^. The seat back is free to fold
forward about the pivot, but a stop prevents
rearward motion. The passenger safety belt anchor
points are spaced 21 to 22 inches apart and are
located in line with the seat pivot axis. (50 F.R.
15155- April 17, 1985. Effective: April 17, 1985)

S8.2.2 The child restraint system shall be
attached to the representative aircraft passenger
seat using, at the manufacturer's options, any
Federal Aviation Administration approved aircraft
safety belt, according to the restraint manufac-

turer's instructions for attaching the restraint to
an aircraft seat. No supplementary anchorage
belts or tether straps may be attached; however.
Federal Aviation Administration approved safety
belt extensions may be used.

58.2.3 In accordance with S6. 1.2.3.1 through
S6. 1.2.3.3, place in the child restraint any dummy
specified in S7 for testing systems for use by
children of the heights and weights for which the
system is recommended in accordance with S5.5
and S8.1.

58.2.4 If provided, shoulder and pelvic belts
that directly restrain the dummy shall be adjusted
in accordance with S6.1.2.4.

88.2.5 The combination of representative
aircraft passenger seat, child restraint, and test
dummy shall be rotated forward around a
horizontal axis which is contained in the median
transverse vertical plane of the seating surface
portion of the aircraft seat and is located one inch
below the bottom of the seat frame, at a speed of
35 to 45 degrees per second, to an angle of 180
degrees. The rotation shall be stopped when it
reaches that angle and the seat shall be held in this
positon for three seconds. The child restraint shall
not fall out of the aircaft safety belt, nor shall the
test dummy fall out of the child restraint at any
time during the rotation or the three second
period. The specified rate of rotation shall be
attained in not less than one-half second, and not
more than one second, and the rotating
combination shall be brought to a stop in not less
than one half second and not more than one
second.

58.2.6 Repeat the procedures set forth in S8.2. 1
through S8.2.4. The combination of the
representative aircraft passenger seat, child
restraint, and test dummy shall be rotated
sideways around a horizontal axis which is
contained in the median longitudinal vertical plane
of the seating surface portion of the aircraft seat
and is located one inch below the bottom of the seat
frame, at a speed of 35 to 45 degrees per second, to
an angle of 180 degrees. The rotation shall be
stopped when it reaches that angle and the seat

<Re¥. 4/17/85)

PART 571: S 213-11

I ' I 2 Pound!

Budcl* Pr«-l<Md

/^^^

7a. SingI* Ljtch PUti

2 Pounds

2 Pound*

1 Pound l|

^ ^ ' -"

7b. Double Latch Plata
Pre4o«d

nd

Releai« Fores

Application

Position

RalatM Forca
Application Podtlon-
Puth Button
Machanltms

0.125 Inch

Release Fofoe

Application

Position

7c. Hlngad Button

7d. Floatins Button

Figure 7. Pr»-{mpact Buckle RelosM Force Test Set-up

PART 571; S 213-12

<90O,

Figure 8. Release Fores Application Device — Push Button Release Buckles

PART 571; S 213-13

shall be held in this position for three seconds. The rotating combination shall be brought to a stop in

child restraint shall not fall out of the aircraft not less than one half second and not more than

safety belt, nor shall the test dummy fall out of the one second. (50 F.R. 15155— April 17, 1985.

child restraint at any time during the rotation or Effective: April 17, 1985)|

the three second period. The specified rate of

rotation shall be attained in not less than one half 44 F.R. 72131

second and not more than one second, and the December 13, 1979

(Rm. 4/17/S5) PART 571; S 213-14

Eff*cllv*: January 1, 1973

PREAMBLE TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 214

Side Door Strength — Passenger Cars
(Docket No. 2-6; Notice No. 3)

The purpose of this amendment to §571.21 of
Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, is to add
a new motor vehicle safety standard that sets
minimum strength requirements for side doors
of passenger cars. The standard differs in only
a few details from the notice of proposed rule-
making published on April 23, 1970 (35 F.R.
6512).

As noted in the proposal of April 23, the per-
centage of dangerous and fatal injuries in side
collisions increases sharply as a maximum depth
of penetration increases. With this in mind, the
notice of propc^d rulemaking stressed the need
for a door that offers substantal resistance to in-
trusion as soon as an object strikes it. The pro-
posal required a door to provide an average crush
resistance of 2,500 pounds during the first 6
inches of crush. One comment stated that
equivalent protection can be provided by struc-
tures further to the interior of the door and that
the proper measure of protection is the force
needed to deflect the inner door panel rather than
that needed to deflect the outer panel. Although
inboard mounted structures may be effective in
preventing intrusion if the door has a large cross
section, with a correspondingly large distance
between the protective structure and the inner
panel, the standard as issued reflects the determi-
nation that doors afford the greatest protection
if the crush resisting elements are as close to the
outer panel as possible. It follows from this de-
termination that the surface whose crush is to be
measured must be the outer panel rather than
the inner one. The value specified for the initial
crush resistance has, however, been reduced from
2,500 pounds to 2,250 pounds, a value that has
been determined to be more appropriate, par-
ticularly for lighter vehicles.

Two comments suggested that the crush dis-
tance should be the distance traveled by the load-
ing device after an initial outer panel distortion
caused by a "pre-load." This suggestion is with-
out merit, in that it would permit use of need-
lessly light outer panel materials and thereby
diminish the distance between the protective
elements of the door and the occupants.

The comments revealed a considerable differ-
ence of opinion concerning the value and validity
of the concept of "equivalent crush resistance."
The equivalent crush resistance was to be derived
by adding V4 (3000-W) to the average force
required to crush the door 12 inches. It had
been thought that the resulting bias against
heavier vehicles was necessary in that their
greater mass would cause them to move side-
ways less in a collision than lighter vehicles, with
more of the impacting force being absorbed by
the door. Recent studies, however, show that
occupants of heavier vehicles involved in side
collisions generally suffer a lower proportion of
serious injuries and fatalities than persons in
lighter vehicles. In light of these studies and
other information, the standard retains the basic
crush resistance requirement, but deletes the
weight correction factor. Since it is no longer
appropriate to use the term "equivalent crush
resistance," in its place the standard employs the
phrase "intermediate crush resistance." The
slightly lower figure of 3,500 pounds has been
substituted for the 3,750 pound force proposed
in the notice. The effect of the change is to in-
crease slightly the crush resistance required for
vehicles having curb weight less than 1,800
pounds, and to decrease it slightly for vehicles
weighing more than 1,800 pounds.

PART 571; S 214— PRE 1

Effacrivai January I, 1973

Similar reasoning lies behind a change in the
requirement for peak crush resistance. The
available information does not support a peak
crush requirement that increases indefinitely
with increasing vehicle curb weight. The stand-
ard therefore sets a ceiling of 7,000 pounds to the
requirement that the door have a peak crush re-
sistance of twice the vehicle's curb weight. In
effect, the requirement is unchanged from the
proposal for vehicles weighing less than 3,500
pounds, and is diminished for vehicles exceeding
that weight.

Several comments suggested that the vehicle
should be tested with all seats in place, since the
seats may provide protection against intrusion
in side impacts. It is recognized that proper
seat design can contribute to occupant safety.
The retention of the seat would, however, intro-
duce a variable into the test procedue whose
bearing on safety is not objectively measurable
at this time. For this reason, the standard
adopts the proposed requirement that the vehicle
be tested with its seats removed.

It was suggested that the location of force
application should be changed. The location has

been designated to approximate the weakest sec-
tion of that part of the door structure likely to be
struck by another vehicle. The area designated
has been found the most approriate for the bulk
of the automobile population.

Effective date: January 1, 1973.

The majority of comments stated that an effec-
tive date of September 1, 1971, as initially pro-
posed, would not be feasible. After evaluation
of the comments and other information, it has
been determined that the structural changes re-
quired by the standard will be such that many
manufacturers woud be unable to meet the stand-
ard if the September 1, 1971, effective date were
retained. It has been decided that there is good
cause for establishing an effective date more than
1 year after issuance of the rule.

In consideration of the above. Standard No.
214 is adopted as set forth below.

Issued on October 22, 1970.

Douglas W. Toms,
Director.

35 F.R. 16801
October 30, 1970

PART 571; S 214^PRE 2

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 214

Side Door Strength
(Docket No. 2-6; Notice No. 6)

ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY: The purpose of this notice is to amend
Safety Standard No. 214, Side Door Strength, to
aUow manufacturers the option of leaving the seats
in a vehicle while its ability to resist external forces
pressing inward on its door is tested. This amend-
ment was proposed by the NHTSA in response to a
petition for rulemaking from Volvo of America
Corporation (44 FR 33444, June 11, 1979). The
change is intended to give manufacturers broader
design capabilities for improving the safety of vehicle
occupants involved in side impact collisions. The per-
formance levels for the alternative requirements are
lower than those specified in the notice of proposed
rulemaking, due to the agency's consideration of
public comments on that notice.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendment made by this
notice becomes effective upon publication in the
Federal register.

ADDRESSES: Any petitions for reconsideration of
this rule should refer to the docket number and
notice number and be submitted to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. William Brubaker, Office of Vehicle Safety
Standards, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. (202-426-2242).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Safety Standard No. 214, Side Door Strength (49
CFR 571.214), specifies performance requirements
for the side doors of passenger cars to minimize the
life-threatening forces caused by intrusion of

objects such as other vehicles, poles and tree
trunks into the occupant compartment in side-
impact accidents. The standard currently specifies
three static crush tests (initial, intermediate and
peak) to measure the crush resistance of the side
doors. The basis for these tests is that early studies
concerning side impact protection demonstrated
that, in fatal side collisions, most occupants die
because of the door structures collapsing inward
on them. The static crush tests are intended to
ensure that there are strong door structures to
limit this intrusion. Under the peak crush test of
the standard, the vehicle door may not be de-
formed more than 18 inches inward when the door
is subjected to a force of 7,000 pounds, or two
times the curb weight of the vehicle, whichever, is
less.

The existing test procedures of the standard
specify that the vehicle seats are to be removed
during the crush tests. Although it was recognized
when the standard was originally promulgated
that proper seat design can also reduce the amount
of intrusion of side door structures into the
occupant compartment, it was determined that
this standard should measure the integrity of door
structures alone.

Manufacturers have generally incorporated
various types of beams in the outer door panels to
provide crush resistance in compliance with the
standard. Last year, however, Volvo of America
Corporation petitioned the agency to allow vehicle
seats to remain in the automobile during the crush
resistance tests. Volvo stated that it has developed
an advanced side impact protection system that
incorporates the vehicle seats as an essential com-
ponent and dispenses with door beams. Test data
indicate that the Volvo design provides side impact
protection that is equal to or greater than that
provided by current production designs.

FART 571; S 214-PRE 3

In response to Volvo's petition, the agency
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to allow
manufacturers to adopt this option (44 FR 33444,
June 11, 1979). The notice stated that
manufacturers should be encouraged to develop
innovative designs for improving side impact
protection, particularly designs that will improve
vehicle fuel economy because of reduced weight.
Although not included in Volvo's petition, the
proposal specified higher crush resistance levels
for vehicles tested with their seats intact (a
16,000-pound peak force).

The criteria were set at levels intended to assure
an equivalent or greater level of protection
compared to the existing requirements. Agency
data show that the seats of some current models
contribute 4 to 5 thousand pounds of crush
resistance in addition to the crush resistance
provided by the doors themselves. Therefore, the
higher performance levels were proposed to ensure
that the current level of crush resistance that is
being obtained by strong door beams will not be
degraded.

Nearly all of the twelve comments received in
response to the notice supported the proposal to
give manufacturers the option of testing with seats
installed in the vehicle. A majority of the
commenters objected to the higher crush
resistance levels for the alternative procedure,
however. Only Volkswagen Corporation stated
that the standard should not be amended to allow
the option. Following is a discussion of these
comments.

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
stated that the proposed amendment would give
auto manufacturers a broader range of design
alternatives than they currently have to reduce the
likelihood of injuries to occupants of vehicles
struck in the side. Most commenters made similar
statements. Mercedes-Benz of North America
noted that manufacturers would be afforded
greater latitude in selecting designs to comply with
the standard, without sacrificing occupancy
protection, and at the same time could reduce
vehicle weight.

While agreeing with the concept of the proposed
alternative requirement, a large number of com-
menters felt the proposed performance criteria
were too stringent. Peugeot, as well as the Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association, stated that the
current performance levels should apply whether

the seats are left in the vehicle during testing or
not. American Motors Corporation argued that the
proposed crush resistance levels for the alternative
procedure are significantly more stringent than
existing 214 requirements, and that the NHTSA
has not identified any safety need to justify this
higher level of performance.

The agency does not agree that the performance
levels of the standard should be the same whether
the seats are left in the vehicle or are removed. As
noted in the proposal, current vehicle seat designs
often provide four to five thousand pounds of
additional crush resistance above that required by
the standard. Further, the standard was originally
only intended to test the crush resistance of the
doors alone. Therefore, if the performance criteria
were the same with and without the seats in the
vehicle during the test, manufacturers could
reduce the current protection provided by their
doors without upgrading their vehicles in other
areas. Given the large number of fatalities in side
impact accidents, the agency is very concerned
that such a degradation of vehicle performance not
occur under the alternative test procedure.
Therefore, it is the agency's position that there is a
substantial safety need to assure that the level of
protection provided under the alternative
procedure is equivalent to or greater than that
provided under the existing test procedure.

Several commenters argued that the data and
test results relied upon by the agency to establish
the crush resistance levels for the alternative
procedure are too limited, and that research should
be expanded to include tests of other models prior
to establishing the criteria. General Motors stated,
for example, that the two vehicles used in NHTSA
tests may not be representative of other vehicle
designs which could exhibit differing door-to-seat
interaction.

The agency disagrees with these contentions.
Volvo and Ford Motor Company provided the
NHTSA with data from tests they conducted with
seats and without seats installed in some of their
production vehicles. The agency conducted
comparable tests on a Plymouth Volare, and the
tests included both bench seats and bucket seats.
This and other information substantiate that
vehicle seats can and do provide much additional
resistance to side door intrusion. These data
demonstrate that crush resistance levels should be
higher if vehicle seats are left installed during the
testing in order to maintain the level of protection
currently being provided.

PART 571; S 214-PRE 4

Ford Motor Company argued that the proposed
higher performance levels were based on limited
tests of current production models, and that the
higher performance results achieved in those tests
represent built-in reserves by manufacturers above
the minimum performance requirements of the
standard. Ford stated that the crush resistance
criteria of the proposed alternative should not be
set at this upper level of performance. Other
commenters, including Volvo, also argued that the
proposed criteria were too high to allow for
production variances. General Motors stated that
the proposal does not really remove inhibitions to
design innovation due to the increased
performance requirements of the proposed
alternative procedure. Finally, Rolls-Royce Motors
urged that the performance criteria be set low
enough that the potential weight savings offered
by the proposal can be realized in practice.

After considering these comments, the agency
has determined that the crush resistance levels for
vehicles tested with their seats intact should be
somewhat lower than those specified in the
proposal. This will allow for production variances
and enable manufacturers to build in a margin of
protection above the minimum performance
requirements specified in the standard.

In its comments, Volvo Corporation suggested
that the intermediate crush resistance level should
be set at 4,375 pounds (the proposal specified 7,000
pounds) and that peak crush resistance should be
set at 12,000 pounds (the proposal specified 16,000
pounds). Volvo stated that tests of its current
production cars that have door beams indicate a
spread in intermediate crush resistance of
approximately 2,000 pounds. The company noted
that an intermediate crush resistance level that is
twenty-five percent above the existing requirement
would compensate for the addition of seats during
testing and at the same time allow manufacturers a
sufficient margin to comply with the standard. Volvo
also stated that since the seats of some current cars
add approximately 4,000 to 5,000 pounds of peak of
crush resistance, this should be the amount of
increase above the existing requirements, i.e., from
7,000 pounds to 12,000 pounds. Although Volvo's
preliminary testing of its advanced side impact
protection system indicates that the 16,000-pound
requirement could be met, the company feels that the
margin is not sufficient to allow for production
variances.

The agency agrees with Volvo's suggested crush
resistance levels, since they should ensure that the
level of protection provided under the alternative
requirement is at least equivalent to that provided
currently. Therefore, these criteria are adopted in
this amendment. While it is encouraging that
Volvo's advanced system can meet the 16,000-
pound peak force specified in the proposal, this
may be too high for other manufacturers at the
present time, and the agency's primary concern in
allowang the alternative test procedure is to avoid
any degradation of the protection being provided
under the current requirement. The high perfor-
mance of Volvo's advanced system will be considered
very seriously, however, during the planned rulemak-
ing to upgrade side impact protection (an advance
notice of proposed rulemaking concerning improving
side impact protection was recently issued: 44 FR
70204, December 6, 1979).

As noted above, data indicate that current seat
designs contribute approximately 5,000 pounds to
the crush resistance capacity of vehicle side
structures. Therefore, the 12,000-pound peak force
level specified in this amendment will assure the
side impact protection is not degraded, but will
also allow manufacturers to develop new designs
to meet the requirements. As demonstrated by
Volvo, manufacturers will be able to develop new
side structures and seat designs that will provide
over 12,000 pounds of crush resistance without the
use of heavy door beams.

Mercedes-Benz of North America commented
that the "initial" crush resistance requirement of
the proposed alternative should be deleted
(paragraph S3. 2.1 of the proposal). Mercedes
argued that the three-stage static crush tests
assign too much significance to the first stage
(initial crush resistance), since door reinforcement
is necessary primarily to ensure compliance with
this initial test. According to Mercedes, the initial
resistance is achieved within the first six inches of
crush depth (measured at the outer surface of the
door), but that this is not more than one-ninth of
the total energy absorption when testing without
the vehicle seats. When testing with the seats,
according to Mercedes, the percentage of energy
absorption at the outer surface of the door panel is
meaningless with respect to the total energy
management and occupant protection.

The agency does not agree with this rationale.
The initial crush resistance stage is necessary to

PART 571; S 214-PRE 5

ensure that vehicle doors have at least a minimum
of structural integrity. This is particularly
important because of the risk of occupant ejection
if door hinges and latches separate during an
accident, allowing the door to fly open. Although
seat design can ameliorate intrusion into the
occupant compartment to a certain extent, it is
important to coordinate door structure and seat
design to achieve the optimum occupant
protection. Because of the initial crush resistance
requirements, manufacturers may not be able to
delete door beams altogether in some models.
However, manufacturers will be able to use much
lighter beams than are currently being used,
without a reduction in overall performance.

Several commenters addressed the seat location
specified in the proposed alternative requirement.
The proposal provided that vehicles must be able to
meet the specified crush resistance levels with the
vehicle seats located in any position and at any seat
back angle in which they are designed to be
adjusted. Volvo's petition had requested that the
mid, horizontal seat adjustment position be
specified. Volkswagen of America stated that the
new proposed test procedure, with the seat in any
position of its adjustment range, potentially
increases the test effort. Volkswagen argued that
manufacturers would have the obligation to
determine, by a test series, the most adverse test
positions of the seat, and that this would be much
more costly than the existing requirement.

While it may be true that requiring a vehicle to
comply with the seat in any position to which it
can be adjusted will require more effort by
manufacturers, the agency has determined that
this is a necessary aspect of the new procedure. If
the vehicle seats are to be used as an integral part
of the side impact protection system, it is
important that the protection is provided
regardless of where the seat is located along its
adjustment range.

General Motors stated in its comments that it is
reasonable to require demonstrated performance
to assure that the occupant seat will assist in
limiting side crush in any normal driving position.
However, General Motors stated that the same
rationale should not apply to seat back angle, and
that the normal riding or driving angle established
by the manufacturer should be used for compliance
purposes. Volvo's comments agreed with General
Motors regarding seat back angle.

The agency does not see a distinction between
horizontal seat adjustment and seat back angle
adjustment. If a particular seat is designed to be
adjusted through a range of seat back angles, the
vehicle should be able to comply with the
requirement of the standard with the seat back at
any of its adjustment angles, for the same reasons
as noted above for horizontal adjustment. Further,
the agency does not believe that the cost of testing
will be substantially different if manufacturers are
responsible for compliance with the seat in any
adjustment position. Manufacturers, in some
cases, may be able to determine the "worst case"
position for seat location by engineering judgment
and analysis prior to testing the vehicle. If a
manufacturer has designed the vehicle seat to be
an integral part of the side impact protection
system, the manufacturer will likely know which
position provides the most support and resistance
to intrusion (and which provides the least support).

Of the commenters on the proposal, only
Volkswagen Corporation was opposed to the
proposed alternative test procedure. Volkswagen
stated that the proposed requirement is not in
keeping with the original purpose of the
standard— to prevent intrusion. The company
argued that there is a potential for reduced
occupant protection in the case of oblique angle or
"side-swipe" crashes since a vehicle with a door
structure of inferior strength, as compared to
current designs, runs the possible risk of door
destruction or separation. Volkswagen noted that
this could expose vehicle occupants to the risk of
ejection.

While the agency shares Volkswagen's concern
that the occupant protection being afforded by
current vehicle doors not be lessened, it does not
believe that the optional test procedure will result
in reduced performance. The higher crush
resistance requirements for vehicles tested with
their seats installed should ensure that the overall
protection currently provided is maintained.
Moreover, since the initial crush resistance stage is
included in the alternative procedure, in spite of
comments that it should be deleted, door
structures will have to maintain a certain amount
of structural integrity. The 2,250-pound initial
crush resistance level will ensure that door hinges
and latches are of sufficient strength to preclude
separation in most cases. Therefore, the agency

PART 571; S 214-PRE 6

does not believe that the alternative procedure will
lead to increased ejections. The agency does
believe, however, that both the current
requirement and the alternative requirement
should be upgraded. As noted earlier, the agency is
presently involved in rulemaking regarding such
an upgrade of the standard. The agency does not
agree with Volkswagen's contention that the
proposed test procedure is not aligned with the
original purpose of the standard, since it has been
demonstrated that effective seat design can
substantially reduce intrusion into the occupant
compartment.

The notice proposing this amendment
specifically requested comments concerning the
effect modifications to side door structures (i.e.,
lighter door beams or deletion of door beams,
altogether) might have on vehicle integrity in
frontal and front-angular crashes. In response to
this request, Rolls-Royce Motors commented that
the door beams used in its vehicles have had a
negligible effect on vehicle integrity in frontal
crashes. The company added that the requirements
of Safety Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash
Protection, will ensure that manufacturers
maintain sufficient structural integrity for front-
end crashes even with sophisticated vehicle
designs achieving the maximum savings in weight.

American Motors Corporation also stated that
the various safety standards requiring frontal
impact tests will maintain frontal integrity
regardless of modifications to side door structures.
Volvo provided data from off-set crash tests
involving vehicles both with and without door
beams. Both vehicles showed deformation
characteristics (damage to vehicle structure) that
are within the variances found for current
production cars. In light of this information and
the fact that there are other safety standards to
ensure vehicle integrity in frontal impacts, the
agency has concluded that the alternative test
procedure set forth in this amendment will have no
adverse effect on frontal occupant crash
protection.

The agency has reviewed this amendment in
accordance with the specifications of Executive
Order 12044, "Improving Government Regulations,"
and the Departmental guidelines implementing that
order and determined it has no significant

environmental impact and that its economic impact is
so minimal as not to require a regulatory evaluation.
The amendment will merely provide
manufacturers an alternative test procedure for
determining compliance with an existing standard.
For this reason, also, the agency has determined
that an immediate effective date for this
amendment is in order.

The engineer and lawyer primarily responsible
for the development of this rule are William
Brubaker and Hugh Gates, respectively.

In consideration of the foregoing. Safety
Standard No. 214 (49 CFR 571.241) is amended as
set forth below.

Section S3 (S3 through S3.3) is amended to read
as follows and the first sentence of subparagraph
S4(a) is deleted.

§ 571.214 Standard No. 214; Side door strength.

• » » * •

S3 Requirements. Each vehicle shall be able to
meet the requirements of either, at the
manufacturer's option, S3.1 or S3. 2 when any of
its side doors that can be used for occupant egress
are tested according to S4.

53.1 With any seats that may affect load upon
or deflection of the side of the vehicle removed
from the vehicle, each vehicle must be able to meet
the requirements of S3. 1.1 through S3. 1.3.

53. 1.1 Initial Crush Resistance. The initial
crush resistance shall not be less than 2,250
pounds.

53. 1.2 Intermediate Crush Resistance. The
intermediate crush resistance shall not be less than
3,500 pounds.

53. 1.3 Peak Crush Resistance. The peak crush
resistance shall not be less than two times the curb
weight of the vehicle or 7,000 pounds, whichever is
less.

53. 2 With seats installed in the vehicle, and
located in any horizontal or vertical position to
which they can be adjusted and at any seat back
angle to which they can be adjusted, each vehicle
must be able to meet the requirements of S3. 2.1
through S3.2.2.

S3.2.1 Initial Crush Resistance. The initial
crush resistance shall not be less than 2,250
pounds.

PART 571; S 214-PRE 7

53.2.2 Intermediate Crush Resistance. The Issued on March 11, 1980.
intermediate crush resistance shall not be less than

4,375 pounds. ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^

53. 2. 3 Peak Crush Resistance. The peak crush . , • • .^ . °
resistance shall not be less than three and one half

times the curb weight of the vehicle or 12,000 45 F.R. 17015

pounds, whichever is less. March 17, 1980

PART 571; S 214-PRE 8

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 214

Side Door Strength— Passenger Cars
(Docket No. 2-6; Notice No. 3)

51. Purpose and scope. This standard
specifies strength requirements for side doors of a
motor vehicle to minimize the safety hazard caused
by intrusion into the passenger compartment in a
side impact accident.

52. Application. This standard applies to
passenger cars.

53. Requirements. Each vehicle shall be able
to meet the requirements of either, at the manufac-
turer's option, S3.1 or S3. 2 when any of its side
doors that can be used for occupant egress are
tested according to S4.

53.1 With any seats that may affect load upon
or deflection of the side of the vehicle removed
from the vehicle, each vehicle must be able to meet
the requirements of S3. 1.1 through S3. 1.3.

53.1.1 Initiai Crush Resistance. The initial
crush resistance shall be not less than 2,250
pounds.

53.1.2 Intermediate Crush Resistance. The
intermediate crush resistance shall not be less than
3,500 pounds.

53.1.3 Peak crush resistance. The peak crush
resistance shall not be less than two times the curb
weight of the vehicle or 7,000 pounds, whichever is
less.

53.2 With seats installed in the vehicle, and
located in any horizontal or vertical position to
which they can be adjusted and at any seat back
angle to which they can be adjusted, each vehicle
must be able to meet the requirements of S3. 2.1
through S3.2.2.

53.2.1 Initial Crush Resistance. The initial
crush resistance shall not be less than 2,250
pounds.

53.2.2 Intermediate Crush Resistance. The
intermediate crush resistance shall not be less than
4,375 pounds.

S3.2.3 Peak Crush Resistance. The peak crush
resistance shall not be less than three and one half
times the curb weight of the vehicle or 12,000
pounds, whichever is less.

S4. Test procedures. The following procedures
apply to determining compliance with section S3:

(a) Place side windows in their uppermost posi-
tion and all doors in locked position. Place the sill
of the side of the vehicle opposite to the side being
tested against a rigid unyielding vertical surface.
Fix the vehicle rigidly in position by means of
tiedown attachments located at or forward of the
front wheel centerline and at or rearward of the
rear wheel centerline.

(b) Prepare a loading device consisting of a rigid
steel cylinder or semi-cylinder 12 inches in diameter
with an edge radius of one-half inch. The length of
the loading device shall be such that the top surface

CENTERLINE OF VEHICLE

HORIZONTAL LINE
5 INCHES ABOVE THE
LOWEST POINT OF
THE DOOR

1 ?IN P

STRUCTURES ABOVE THE
TOM EDGE OF THE DOOR
DOW OPENING

BOTTOM EDGE

OF DOOR WINDOW

OPFNING

LOWEST POINT OF THE DOOR

^MIDPOINT OF LINE
SIDE VIEW

LOADING DEVICE LOCATION AND APPLICATION TO THE DOOR
FIGURE I

PART 571; S 214-1

of the loading device is at least one-half inch above
the bottom edge of the door window opening but
not of a length that will cause contact with any
structure above the bottom edge of the door
window opening during the test.

(c) Locate the loading device as shown in
Figure I (side view) of this section so that:

(1) Its longitudinal axis is vertical;

(2) Its longitudinal axis is laterally opposite
the midpoint of a horizontal line drawn across the
outer surface of the door 5 inches above the lowest
point of the door;

(3) Its bottom surface is in the same horizontal
plane as the horizontal line described in subdivision
(2) of this subparagraph; and

(4) The cylindrical face of the device is in
contact with the outer surface of the door.

(d) Using the loading device, apply a load to the
outer surface of the door in an inboard direction
normal to a vertical plane along the vehicle's
longitudinal centerline. Apply the load continuously
such that the loading device travel rate does not
exceed one-half inch per second until the loading
device travels 18 inches. Guide the loading device
to prevent it from being rotated or displaced from
its direction of travel. The test must be completed
within 120 seconds.

(e) Record applied load versus displacement of
the loading device, either continuously or in

increments of not more than 1 inch or 200 pounds
for the entire crush distance of 18 inches.

(f) Determine the initial crush resistance,
intermediate crush I'esistance, and peak crush
resistance as follows:

(1) From the results recorded in subparagraph
(e) of this paragraph, plot a curve of load versus
displacement and obtain the integral of the
applied load with respect to the crush distances
specified in subdivisions (2) and (3) of this
paragraph. These quantities, expressed in inch-
pounds and divided by the specified crush
distances, represent the average forces in
pounds required to deflect the door those
distances.

(2) The initial crush resistance is the average
force required to deform the door over the initial
6 inches of crush.

(3) The intermediate crush resistance is the
average force required to deform the door over
the initial 12 inches of crush.

(4) The peak crush resistance is the largest
force recorded over the entire 18-inch crush
distance.

October 30, 1970
35 F.R. 16801

PART 571; S 214-2

EffMHv*! AugutI ]5, 1973

PREAMBLE TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 216

Roof Crush Resistance — Passenger Cars

(Docket No. 2-6; Notice 5)

The purpose of this amendment to Part 571
of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, is to
add a new Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216,
(49 CFR § 571.216) that sets minimum strength
requirements for a passenger car roof to reduce
the likelihood of roof collapse in a rollover acci-
dent. The standard provides an alternative to
conformity with the rollover test of Standard
208.

A notice of proposed rulemaking on this sub-
ject was issued on January 6, 1971 (36 F.R. 166).
As noted in that proposal, the strength of a ve-
hicle roof aflFecta the integrity of the passenger
compartment and the safety of the occupants.
A few comments suggested that there is no
significant causal relationship between roof de-
formation and occupant injuries in rollover acci-
dents. However, available data have shown that
for non-ejected front seat occupants in rollover
accidents, serious injuries are more frequent
when the roof collapses.

The roof crush standard will provide protec-
tion in rollover accidents by improving the in-
tegrity of the door, side window, and windshield
retention areas. Preserving the overall structure
of the vehicle in a crash decreases the likelihood
of occupant ejection, reduces the hazard of oc-
cupant interior impacts, and enhances occupant
egress after the accident. It has been deter-
mined, therefore, that improved roof strength
will increase occupant protection in rollover
accidents.

SUndard 208 (49 CFR §571.208), Ocnipant
Crash Protection, also contains a rollover test
requirement for vehicles that conform to the
"first option" of providing complete passive pro-
tection. The new Standard 216 issued herewith

is intended as an alternative to the Standard 208
rollover test, such that manufacturers may con-
form to either requirement as they choose.
Standard 208 is accordingly amended by this no-
tice; the effect of the amendment, together with
the new Standard 216, is as follows:

(1) From January 1, 1972, to August 14,
1973, a manufacturer may substitute Standard
216 for the rollover test requirement in the first
option of Standard 208; Standard 216 has no
mandatory application.

(2) From August 15, 1973, to August 14,
1977, Standard 216 is in effect as to all passenger
cars except those conforming by passive means
to the rollover test of Standard 208, but it may
continue to be substituted for that rollover test.

(3) After August 15, 1977, Standard 216
will no longer be a substitute for the Standard
208 rollover test. It is expected that as of that
date Standard 216 will be revoked, at least with
respect to its application to passenger cars.

A few comments stated that on some models
fhe strength required in the A pillar could be
produced only by designs that impair forward
visibility. After review of strengthening options
available to manufacturers, the Administration
has concluded that a satisfactory increase in
strength can be obtained without reducing vis-
ibility.

Some comments suggested that the crush lim-
itation be based on the interior deflection of the
test vehicle rather than the proposed external cri-
terion. After comparison of the two methods, it
has been concluded that a test based on interior
deflection would produce results that are sig-
nificantly less uniform and more difficult to
measure, and therefore the requirement based on

PART 571; S 216— PRE 1

EffKflva: Auguil 15, 1973

external movement of the test block has been
retained.

Several changes in detail have been made,
however, in the test procedure. A number of
comments stated that the surface area of the
proposed test device was too small, that the
10-degree pitch angle was too severe, and that
the 5 inches of padded test device displacement
was not enough to measure the overall roof
strength. Later data available after the issuance
of the NPRM (Notice 4) substantiated these
comments. Accordingly, the dimensions of the
test block have been changed from 12 inches
square to 30 inches by 72 inches, the face padding
on the block has been eliminated, and the pitch
angle has been changed from 10 degrees to 5
degrees.

Several manufacturers asked that convertibles
be exempted from the standard, stating that it
was impracticable for those vehicles to be brought
into compliance. The Administration has deter-
mined that compliance with the standard would
pose extreme difficulties for many convertible
models. Accordingly, manufacturers of con-
vertibles need not comply with the standard;
however, until August 15, 1977, they may comply
with the standard as an alternative to conformity
with the rollover test of Standard 208.

A few comments objected to the optional 5,000-
pound ceiling to the requirement that the roof
have a peak resistance of IV^ times the unloaded
vehicle weight. Such objections have some merit,
if the energy to be dissipated during a rollover
accident must be absorbed entirely by the crash
vehicle. In the typical rollover accident, how-
ever, in which the vehicle rolls onto the road
shoulder, significant amounts of energy are ab-
sorbed by the ground. This is particularly true in
heavier vehicles. Some of the heavier vehicles,
moreover, would require extensive redesign, at a
considerably greater cost penalty than in the
case of lighter vehicles, to meet a strength re-
quirement of U/^ times their weight. At the
same time, heavier vehicles generally have a
lower rollover tendency than do lighter vehicles.
On the basis of these factors, it has been deter-
mined that an upper limit of 5,000 pounds on

the strength requirement is justified, and it has
been retained.

It was requested that the requirement of
mounting the chassis horizontally be deleted. It
has been determined that the horizontal mount-
ing position contributes to the repeatability of
the test procedure and the requirement is there-
fore retained.

The required loading rate has been clarified
in light of the comments. The requirement has
been changed from a rate not to exceed 200
pounds per second to a loading device travel
rate not exceeding one-half inch per second, with
completion of the test within 120 seconds.

A number of manufacturers requested that
repetition of the test on the opposite front corner
of the roof be deleted. It has been determined
that, as long as it is clear that both the left and
right front portions of the vehicle's roof struc-
ture must be capable of meeting the require-
ments, it is not necessary that a given vehicle be
capable of sustaining successive force applica-
tions at the two different locations. The second
test is accordingly deleted.

Effective date : August 15, 1973. After evalua-
tion of the comments and other information, it
has been determined that the structural changes
required by the standard will be such that many
manufacturers would be unable to meet the re-
quirements if the January 1, 1973 effective date
were retained. It has therefore been found, for
good cause shown, that an effective date more
than one year after issuance is in the public in-
terest. On or after January 1, 1972, however,
a manufacturer may substitute compliance with
this standard for compliance with the rollover
test requirement of Standard 208.

In consideration of the above, the following
changes are made in Part 571 of Title 49, Code
of Federal Regulations:

1. Standard No. 208, 49 CFR §571.208, is
amended by adding the following sentence at the
end of S5.3, Rollover : "However, vehicles manu-
factured before August 15, 1977, that conform to
the requirements of Standard No. 216 (§ 571.216)
need not conform to this rollover test require-
ment."

PART 571; S 21&— PRE 2

2. A new § 671.216, SUnd»rd No. 216 Roof lasued on D»oember 8, 1971.

CrwA ^«mton^«, ifl added. .. . ^^^^j^ „ Hartman

This rule is issued under the authority of sec- Acting Administrator
tions 103 and 119 of the National Traffic and

Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 16 U.S.C. 1892, 1407, 34 P.I. ISM*

ind the delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.61. D«<«mb«f I, 1971

PART 571; S 216— PRE 8-4

EfftcHvt: Stpttmbtr I, 1973

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 216

Roof Crush Resistance
(Docket No. 69-7; Notice 29)

The purpose of this notice is to postpone the
effective date of the requirements of Standards
No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, and 216,
Roof Crush Resistance, applicable to the upcom-
ing model year, from August 15, 1973, to Sep-
tember 1, 1973.

The amendment of the effective date was pro-
posed in a notice published July 17, 1973 (38
F.R. 19049), in response to a petition filed by
Chrysler Corporation. Chrysler had stated that
the build out of their 1973 models was in danger
of running beyond the August 15 date, due to a
variety of factors beyond the company's control.
In proposing the postponement of the date, the
NHTSA noted that the August 15 date had been
chosen to coincide with the normal changeover
date and that a delay would not appear to have
any effect beyond allowing a slightly prolonged
build-out.

The two comments submitted in response to
the proposal were both favorable. The agency
has not discovered any adverse consequences of a
delay which would make it inadvisable, and has

therefore decided to postpone the effective date
as proposed.

In light of the foregoing, 49 CFR 571.208,
Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection,
is amended by changing the date of August 14,
1973, appearing in S4.1.1 to August 31, 1973, and
by changing the date of August 15, 1973, appear-
ing in S4.1.2 to September 1, 1973. The effective
date of 49 CFR 571.216, Standard No. 216, Roof
Crush Resistance, is changed from August 15,
1973, to September 1, 1973.

Because this amendment relieves a restriction
and imposes no additional burden, an effective
date of less than 30 days from the date of issu-
ance is found to be in the public interest.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718,
15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on August 10, 1973.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

38 F.R. 21930
August 14, 1973

PART 571 ; S 216— PRE 5-6

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 216
Roof Crush Resistance— Passenger Cars

51. Scope. This standard establishes strength
requirements for the passenger compartment
roof.

52. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is
to reduce deaths and injuries due to the crushing
of the roof into the passenger compartment in
rollover accidents.

53. Application. This standard applies to
passenger cars. However, it does not apply to
vehicles that conform to the rollover test require-
ments (S5.3) of Standard 208 (§ 571.208) by
means that require no action by vehicle occupants.
It also does not apply to convertibles, except
for optional compliance with the standard as an
alternative to the rollover test requirements in
S5.3 of Standard 208.

54. Re<]ulrements. A test device as described
in 85 shall not move more than 5 inches, meas-
ured in accordance with S6.4, when it is used to
apply a force of IV2 times the unloaded vehicle
weight of the vehicle of 5,000 pounds, whichever
is less, to either side or the forward edge of a
vehicle's roof in accordance with the procedures
of S6. Both the left and right front portions of
the vehicle's roof structure shall be capable of
meeting the requirements, but a particular ve-
hicle need not meet further requirements after
being tested at one location.

55. Test Device. The test device is a rigid un-
yielding block with its lower surface formed as
a flat rectangle 30 inches x 72 inches.

56. Test Procedure. Each vehicle shall be
capable of meeting the requirements of S4 when
tested in accordance with the following pro-
cedure.

S6.1. Place the sills or the chassis frame of
the vehicle on a rigid horizontal surface, fix the
vehicle rigidly in position, close all windows.

close and lock all doors, and secure any con-
vertible top or removable roof structure in place
over the passenger compartment.

S8.2 Orient the test device as shown in Figure
1, so that—

(a) Its longitudinal axis is at a forward
angle (side view) of 5° below the horizontal,
and is parallel to the vertical plane through the
vehicle's longitudinal centerline;

(b) Its lateral axis is at a lateral outboard
angle, in the front view projection, 25° be-
low the horizodntal;

(c) Its lower surface is tangent to the sur-
face of the vehicle; and

(d) The initial contact point, or center of
the initial contact area, is on the longitudinal
centerline of the lower surface of the test device
and 10 inches from the forwardmost point of
that centerline.

FORCE
FORCE

30"-«sZ^ / ^^^^ DEVICE 10"i^12"\ ^

\ /

RIGID HORIZONTAL SURFACE

FRONT VIEW SIDE VIEW

TEST DEVICE LOCATION AND APPLICATION TO THE ROOF
Figure 1

S6.3. Apply force in a downward direction
perpendicular to the lower surface of the test
device at a rate of not more than one-half inch

PART 571; S 216-1

per second until reaching a force of IV2 times S6.4 Measure the distance that the test de-

the unloaded vehicle weight of the tested ve- vice moves, i.e., the distance between the original

hide or 5,000 pounds, whichever is less. Com- location of the lower surface of the test device

plete the test within 120 seconds. Guide the and its location as the force level specified in

test device so that throughout the test it moves, S6.3 is reached.

without rotation, in a straight line with its lower 36 F.R. 23299

surface oriented as specified in S6.2(a) through December 8, 1971
S6.2(d).

PART 571; S 216-2

M*cMv«i Uffmh^t I, 1973

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 217

Bus Window Rstention and Release
(Dock*t No. 2-10; NoHc* 3)

The purpose of this amendment to § 571.21 of
Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, is to add
a new motor vehicle safety standard that estab-
lishes minimum requirements for bus window
retention and release to reduce the likelihood of
passenger ejection in accidents and enhance pas-
senger exit in emergencies.

A notice of proposed rulemaking on this sub-
ject was published on August 15, 1970 (35 F.R.
13025). The comments received in response to
the notice have been considered in this issuance
of a final rule.

For reasons of clarification, the requirements
paragraph has been reorganized and the demon-
stration procedures paragraph has been replaced
by a test conditions paragraph. Some of the
specifications of the demonstration procedures
paragraph are incorporated under the require-
ments paragraph, and the remainder are retained
under the test conditions paragraph. With the
exception of the changes discussed below, the
reorganization does not affect the substance of
the standard.

In altering the window retention requirements,
the final rule lowers the force application limit,
provides more precise glazing breakage and
glazing yield limits, and exempts small windows.
With respect to the emergency exit requirements,
the standard permits devices other than push-out
windows to be used for emergency exits, permits
buses with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less to
utilize devices other than emergency exits for
emergency egress, and permits an alternate roof
exit when the bus configuration precludes pro-
vision of a rear emergency exit. It also raises
the force limits for release and extension of
emergency exits, deletes the inertial load require-
ment for the release mechanism, and requires
that emergency exit location markings be lo-

cated within each occupant space adjacent to
an exit.

A few changes have been made in the diagram
accompanying the standard. Figure 1, "Adja-
cent Designated Seating Position, Occupant
Spaces, and Push-Out Window Relationship,"
hsis been deleted from the final rule because the
relationship is sufficiently described in the text
of the standard. Accordingly, Figures 2 and 3
have been renumbered as Figures 1 and 2, re-
spectively. A new Figure 3, indicating access
regions for emergency exits which do not have
adjacent seats, has been added. For reasons of
clarification. Figures 2a and 2b and Figures 3a
and 3b in the proposed rule have been placed
beside each other to form Figures 1 and 2 re-
spectively.

The torque in Figures 2a and 2b of the pro-
posed rule has been transferred to the text and
has been explained to indicate that the force
used to obtain the torque shall not be more than
20 pounds. In addition, the clearance specifica-
tions in Figures 1 and 2 have been clarified in
the text to require that the lower edge of the
force envelope shall be located 5 inches above
the seat, or 2 inches above the armrest, if any,
whichever is higher. In several instances, minor
changes have been made in the labeling without
altering the substance of the diagrams.

A number of comments sought changes in the
window retention requirements. Two comments
requested an exemption for intra-city buses be-
cause the probability of rollover accidents would
be minimal in slow-speed operation. Urban
transit buses are subjected to risks of rollover
accidents within the city when they travel at
moderate to high speed on intra-urban express-
ways, and should therefore be covered by the

PART 671; S 217— PRE 1

Effective: September 1, 1973

standard. Accordingly, the request for this
exemption is denied.

Several comments requested an exemption for
small windows. Since there is little likelihood
of passenger ejection or protrusion from window
openings whose minimum surface dimension
measured through the center of the area is less
than eight inches, an exemption for windows of
this size has been granted.

Two comments asked that the 2,000 pound
force application limit in the window retention
requirement be lowered. The data indicates that
a 1,200-pound limit would be more compatible
with the glazing strength. Accordingly, the
2,000-pound force application limit has been
lowered to 1,200 pounds.

Several manufacturers stated that they en-
countered difficulties in ascertaining when the
proposed head form penetration limit of the
window retention requirement had been reached.
After observation of window retention testing,
the NHTSA has concluded that the penetration
limit as specified in the notice of proposed rule-
making is difficult to determine. For this reason
the head form penetration limit has been re-
phrased in terms of the development of cracks
in the glazing and the amount of depression of
the glazing surface in relation to its original
position.

A number of comments objected to the require-
ment that at least 75% of the glazing be retained
in the window mounting during window reten-
tion testing. The NHTSA has determined that
the intent of this requirement is already accom-
plished by the requirement that each window be
retained during testing by its surrounding struc-
ture in a manner which would prevent passage
of a 4-inch sphere, and the requirement is ac-
cordingly deleted from the final rule.

With respect to the emergency exit require-
ments, the standard permits devices other than
push-out windows to be used for emergency
exits. Upon review of the requirements, it has
been determined that devices such as panels and
doors which meet the emergency exit require-
ments would be as effective as push-out windows
for emergency egress. Because the Administra-
tion has concluded that passenger egress is en-
hanced when several emergency exits are pro-

vided, the standard requires tliat in computing
whether a bus meets the unobstructed openings
area requirements, no emergency exit, regardless
of its area, shall be credited with more than 520
square inches of the total area requirement.

A number of motor vehicle manufacturers
sought exemption from the emergency exit re-
quirements for smaller vehicles weighing 10,000
pounds or less GVWR, such as limousines and
station wagons, which are designed to carry
more than 10 persons and are therefore consid-
ered to be buses under NHTSA regulations (49
CFR 571.3). Such vehicles are usually provided
with numerous doors and windows which pro-
vide sufficient unobstructed openings for emer-
gency exit. Therefore the Administration has
concluded that the configuration or these vehicles
satisfies the intent of the standard with respect
to provision of emergency exits, and they are
exempted from the emergency exit openings re-
quirements.

The emergency exit requirements have been
changed to permit installation of an alternate
roof exit when the bus configuration precludes
provision of a rear exit, provided that the roof
exit meets the release, extension, and identifica-
tion requirements. The NHTSA has established
this alternative in order to allow design flexi-
bility while providing for emergency egress in
rollover situations.

A number of comments expressed concern that
the proposed maximum force level for release
and extension of emergency exits in Figures 2a
and b and 3a and b were too low to inhibit in-
advertent operation by passengers and suggested
that the required maximum force level be_ raised.
After consideration of the goals of facilitating
emergency egress and preserving the integrity
of the passenger compartment under normal
operation, it has been determined that the maxi-
mum force levels should be raised from 10 and
30 poimds to 20 and 60 pounds respectively.

One comment submitted the results of testing
which indicated that the 30g inertial load re-
quirement for the release mechanism was un-
necessarily high. The testing also revealed that
the engineering concepts upon which the inertial
load requirement is based are not generally ap-
plied in the industry and that the requirement

PART 571; S 217— PRE 2

Eflcctiv*: S*pl»mb«r 1, 1973

would be impracticable. Moreover, an increase
in maximum force levels for emergency exit op-
eration in the rule should improve latch integ-
rity. For these reasons, the requirement has
been deleted.

The standard requires emergency exit location
markings to be placed in certain occupant spaces
because of a possible contradiction under the
proposed standard between the requirement that
the identification markings' be located within 6
inches of the point of operation and the require-
ment that the markings be visible to a seated
occupant. The NHTSA has concluded that
emergency egress could be hindered if the pas-
senger has difficulty in finding the marking, and
that location of the marking outside of an occu-
pant space containing an adjacent seat, which
would be permitted under the proposed standard,
could create this problem. At the same time it
is desirable for the identification and instructions
to be located near the point of release. There-
fore the final rule requires that when a release
mechanism is not located within an occupant
space containing an adjacent seat, a label indi-
cating the location of the nearest release mech-
anism shall be placed within that occupant space.

The temperature condition has been reworded
to make it clear, in light of the explanation of

usage in § 571.4, that the vehicle must be capable
of meeting the performance requirements at any
temperature from 70° F. to 85° F.

Effective date: September 1, 1973. After
evaluation of the comments and other informa-
tion, it has been determined that the structural
changes required by the standard will be such
that many manufacturers will require an effec-
tive date of at least fifteen months after issuance.
It is therefore found, for good cause shown, that
an effective date more than one year from the
date of issuance is in the public interest.

In consideration of the above. Standard No.
217, Bus Window Retention and Release, is
added to § 571.21 of Title 49, Code of Federal
Regulations, as set forth below.

This rule is issued under the authority of
sections 103, 112, and 119 of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1392,
1401, 1407, and the delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.51.

Issued on May 3, 1972.

Douglas W. Toms
Administrator

37 F.R. 9394
May 10, 1972

PART 571 ; S 217— PRE 3-4

EffKtiv*: S«ptamb«r I, 1971

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 217

Bus Window Retention and Release

(Docket 2-10; Notic* 4)

The purpose of this notice is to respond to
petitions for reconsideration of Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard No. 217, Bus Window Reten-
tion and Release, in § 571.217 of Title 49, Code
of Federal Regulations. The standard was is-
sued on May 10, 1972 (37 F.R. 9394).

International Harvester stated that it manu-
factures an 18-passenger airport limousine, the
"Stageway Coach Conversion", weighing 10,700
pounds GVWR and requested that it be ex-
empted from the requirements of S5.2.1, "Buses
with GVWR of more than 10,000 pounds."
They emphasized that the 18-passenger model is
equipped with 10 side doors, two more than is
provided by a 15-passenger, 10,000-pound, ver-
sion of a similar airport limousine vehicle which
they manufacture. The NHTSA has concluded
that vehicles which provide at least one door for
each three passenger seating positions afford
sufficient means of emergency egress regardless
of their weight. S5.2.1 has accordingly been
amended to provide that buses with a GVWR of
more than 10,000 pounds may alternatively meet
the imobstructed openings requirement of S5.2
by providing at least one door for each three
passenger spaces in the vehicle. The "Stageway
Coach Conversion" falls into the category of
vehicles covered by this amendment and thus
International Harvester's request is granted.

International Harvester, General Motors, and
Chrysler all requested a clarification of the S5.1
window retention requirements because they felt
it was possible to interpret the paragraph as
prohibiting the use of tempered glass for window
glazing. Ford also submitted a request for ex-
emption from the window retention requirements
for buses under 10,000 pounds GVWR based on
its interpretation of S5.1 as precluding the use

of tempered glass. The petitioners stated that
tempered glass would shatter under the applica-
tion of pressure required, and were not certain
whether S5.1(b), describing the development of
cracks in the glazing, would cover this occur-
ence. The NHTSA did not intend to prohibit
the use of tempered glass, and in order to correct
this possible ambiguity, S5.1(b) has been
amended to include shattering of the window
glazing.

General Motors also requested an interpreta-
tion of the method of measuring whether 80
percent of the glazing thickness has developed
cracks as described in S5.1(b). The paragraph
refers to a measurement through the thickness
of glass and not a measurement of the glazing
surface area, as GM suggests it could mean. GM
also doubted that the percentage of glazing thick-
ness which develops cracks could be measured.
The NHTSA has determined that the intent of
the language is clear and that performance of
this measurement is within the state of the art,
so that no change in the language is necessary.
The request is therefore denied.

General Motors requested a clarification of the
term "minimum surface dimension" in paragraph
S5.1(c). The NHTSA agrees that a clarification
is necessary to prevent interpretations which may
not meet the intent of this standard, and the
paragraph has been accordingly amended to
specify that the dimension is to be measured
through the center of the area of the sheet of
glazing.

Greneral Motors stated that it interpreted the
head form travel rate specified in S5.1.1 of two
inches per minute as a "nominal value" require-
ment, since no tolerances are given in the stand-
ard. The test conditions in a safety standard

PART 671; S 217— PRE 5

EffMtIv*! Saptambar 1, 1973

represent the performance levels that the product
must be capable of meeting. They are not in-
structions either to the manufacturers' or the
government's test laboratories, or a requirement
that the product should be tested at "exactly"
those levels. The manufacturers' tests in this
case should be designed to demonstrate that the
vehicle would meet the stated requirements if
tested at tv70 inches per minute. If that is what
General Motors means by a "nominal value", its
interpretation is correct.

In consideration of the foregoing, Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Standard No, 217, Bus Window

Retention and Release, 49 CFR 671.217, is
amended

Effective date : September 1, 1973.

This notice is issued under the authority of
sections 103, 112, and 119 of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1392,
1401, 1407, and the delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.51.

Issued on August 30, 1972.

Douglas W. Toms
Administrator

37 F.R. 18034
September 6, 1972

PART 671; S 217— PRE 6

E#*<tlv«i S«pl«mb«r I, 1973

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 217

Bus Window Retention and Release

(Docket No. 2-10; Nctico 5>

The purpose of this notice is to amend Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 217, Bus Window
Retention and Release, 49 CFR § 571.217, in re-
sponse to petitions received. Several minor
amendments for purposes of clarification have
also been made. The standard was published
initially on May 10, 1972, (37 F.R. 9394), and
amended September 6, 1972 (37 F.R. 18034).

Wayne Corporation has petitioned that the
torque limit of 20 inch-pounds for the actuation
of rotary emergency exit releases in S5.3.2(a) (3)
of the standard is impractical. The Blue Bird
Body Company also objected to the requirement,
requesting that the limit be raised to 225 inch-
pounds in order to avoid inadvertent openings.
The NHTSA has decided, based on these peti-
tions, that a maximum torque requirement is
redudant, since the force magnitude generally is
limited in S5.3.2 to not more than twenty pounds.
Accordingly the torque requirement is deleted
from the rule.

Blue Bird also requested that Figure 3A,
which depicts access region for roof and side
emergency exits without adjacent seats in both
an upright and overturned bus, be made more
explicit.

In response to this request, Figure 3A is being
replaced by two figures, one of which depicts

a side emergency exit (Figure 3A), and the other
a roof emergency exit (Figure 3B). Existing
Figure 3B, depicting access regions for a rear
exit with a rear shelf or other obstruction behind
the rearmost seat, becomes Figure 3C. A new
Figure 3D is added to depict rear seat access
regions in buses not having a rear shelf or other
obstruction behind the rearmost seat, a config-
uration common to school buses. Paragraph
S5.2.1, regarding provision of emergency exits,
is amended to make it clear that a required rear
exit must meet the requirements of S5.3 through
S5.5 when the bust is overturned on either side,
with the occupant standing facing the exit, as
well as when the bus is upright.

In consideration of the above. Standard No.
217, Bus Window Retention and Release, 49 CFR
571.217, is amended ....

Effective date: September 1, 1973.

(Sec. 103, 112, 119, P.L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718,
15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1407) and the delegation
of authority at 49 CFR 1.51.

Issued on February 28, 1973.

Douglas W. Toms
Administrator

38 F.R. 6070
March 6, 1973

PART 571 ; S 217— PRE 7-8

Effactlv*: Jun* 3, 1974

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 217

Bus Window Retention end Release
(Docket No. 2-10; Notice 7)

This notice amends Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard No. 217, "Bus Window Reten-
tion and Release" (49 CFR § 571.217), to exempt
from the standard buses manufactured for the
purpose of transporting persons under physical
restraint. The amendment is based on a notice
of proposed rulemaking published October 1,
1973 (38 F.R. 27227), following petitions re-
ceived from the Bureau of Prisons, United States
Department of Justice.

The comments received in response to the pro-
posal agreed that buses manufactured for the
specified purpose should not be provided with
the emergency exits required by Standard No.
217. The standard specifies that buses contain
emergency exits operable by bus occupants, re-
quirements which the NHTSA considers ob-
viously incompatible with the need to transport
prison inmates. The National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) commented, however, that
compensatory measures should be taken to mini-
mize the likelihood of fire in prison buses, since
the probability of safely evacuating a prison bus
is lees than that of any other type of bus. The
NTSB urged that the exemption be limited to
diesel-fueled buses, since diesel fuel is less likely
to ignite than gasoline.

The NHTSA recognizee the desirability of
minimizing the likelihood of fire in buses. How-

ever, at the present time it is not practical to
expect that all newly manufactured prison buses
be equipped with diesel engines, given the ap-
parent immediate need for the exemption. Ap-
propriate rulemaking action can be taken in the
future if it appears necessary to mitigate from
a safety standpoint the loss of emergency exits
in prison buses.

In light of the above, paragraph S3 of section
571.217, Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations
(Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 217), is
amended. . . .

Effective date: June 3, 1974. This amendment
imposes no additional burdens on any person and
relieves restrictions found to be unwarranted.
Accordingly, good cause exists and is hereby
found for an effective date less than 180 days
from the day of issuance.

(Sees. 103, 112, and 119, Pub. L. 89-563; 80
Stat. 718; 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1491, 1407; delegations
of authority at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on April 26, 1974.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

39 F.R. 15274
May 2, 1974

PART 571; S 217— PRE 9-10

Effective: October 16, 1975

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 217

Bus Window Retention and Release
(Docket No. 75-6; Notice 2)

This notice amends Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard No. 217, Biis Window Reten-
tion and Release, 49 CFR 571.217, to clarify the
marking requirements for emergency exits on
buses. The amendment requires certain mark-
ings on all bus emergency exits except manually-
operated windows of sufficient size and doors in
buses with a GWVR of 10,000 pounds or less.

The amendment was proposed in a notice
published April 18, 1975 (40 FR 17266). Com-
ments were received from Chrysler Corporation
and General Motors. Chrysler concurred with
the proposal. GM, while also concurring, sug-
gested that the wording of the amendment be
modified somewhat. The amendment has been
reworded to reflect more clearly the intent of
this amendment, distinguishing between emer-
gency exits that require markings and those that
do not. The NHTSA has determined that special
emergency exit markings are unnecessary for
doors and manually-operated windows in buses
with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less. This
amendment does not exempt buses with a GVWR
of 10,000 pounds or less from complying with
the unobstructed openings requirements of S5.2.

It only provides that the openings do not have
to be marked as emergency exits. However,
specially-installed emergency exits in such buses,
such as push-out windows, are not exempted
from the marking requirements.

The amendment also allows bus manufacturers
the option of designating an emergency door as
"Emergency Door" or "Emergency Exit." This
will bring Standard No. 217 into conformity
with current NHTSA interpretations of the
emergency exit marking requirements. How-
ever, any emergency exit other than a door must
have the designation "Emergency Exit."

Accordingly, S5.5.1 of 49 CFR .571.217, Bus
Window Retention and Release, is amended ....

Ejfective date: October 16, 1975.

(Sees. 103, 112, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat.
718 (15 U.S.C. 1392. 1401, 1407) ; delegations of
authority at 49 CFR 1.51).

Issued on October 8, 1975.

Gene G. Mannella
Acting Administrator

40 F.R. 48512
October 16, 1975

PART 571; S 217— PRE 11-12

Effective: October 26, 1976

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 217

Bus Window Retention and Release
(Docket NO. 75-3; Notice 2)

This notice amends Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard No. 217, Biui Window Reten-
tion and Release, 49 CFR 571.217, to specify
requirements for emergency doors for school
buses pursuant to the provisions of section 202
of the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety
Amendments of 1974 (Public Law 93-492, 88
Stat. 1484, 15 U.S.C. 1392). It responds to the
congressional mandate to establish standards
concerning school bus emergenc}' exits (15 U.S.C.
§1392(i) (1) (A) (i)).

Section 202 requires that certain school bus
safety standards be published within 15 months
of the passage of the 1974 amendments on
October 27, 1974. In addition, these statutory
provisions remove the otherwise discretionary
authority of the NHTSA to establish lead times
for compliance under the general rulemaking
provisions of the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act by specifying an effective
date for the amendment of 9 months from the
date of publication of this notice (15 U.S.C.
§ 1392(i) (1) (B)). The proposed amendments
upon which this notice is based were published
on February 28, 1975 (40 F.R. 8569).

Many comments were received in response to
the proposal to require either one rear emergency
door or two side emergency doors in the rear
half of the bus passenger compartment. Many
objected that the proposal provided for too few
emergency doors, and requested requirements for
additional side doors and roof exits. Some com-
menters suggested that push-out windows and
the "California" rear exit be required. The
agency does not discourage the inclusion of ad-
ditional emergency exits in school buses so long

as they comply with the requirements applicable
to non-school bus emergency exits. The NHTSA
believes that "California" rear window emer-
gency exits may be preferable in certain circum-
stances and proposes in this issue of the Federal
Register to amend this rule to permit the use of
the "California" rear window along with a side
door emergency exit in place of the rear door
emergency exit. In the alternative, it is pro-
posed to allow tliis option only on rear-engine-
powered school buses. Under either proposal
the requirements of the standard would not be
met by providing two sidedoor emergency exits.
In addition, the subject of roof exits is being
considered and could be the subject of future
rulemaking. However, roof exit requirements
cannot be included in this rulemaking action
because of the statutorily imposed deadline on
promulgation of these amendments.

A number of comments were received opposing
the proposed interlock requirement on the ground
that it would prevent restarting the engine after
the school bus stalls in a dangerous intersection
or a railroad crossing and panicky passengers
jam the release mechinism. The intent of this
requirement is to prevent the initial starting of
the bus engine until the doors have been un-
locked, by a key, combination, or the operation
of a remote switch at the beginning of the day.
The deletion of the phrase "or otherwise inoper-
able" excludes inadvertent jamming of the door
release mechanism from the requirement. The
word "locked" has been defined for this purpose
as not releasable at the door except by a key or
combination. It would include doors openable
by a remote switch.

PART 571; S 217— PRE 13

EffKtiv*: October 26, 1976

Six comments supported the proposal to re-
qiure an audible alarm when the ignition is on
and the release mechanism of any emergency
door is not closed. Five of these, however, ob-
jected that an alarm at each door in addition to
one in the driver's compartment would be un-
necessary and unduly costly. The NHTSA does
not agree. The purpose of audible alarms at
each door is to indicate which release mechanism
is not closed. This is especially critical while
the vehicle is in motion, as it will serve to warn
the passengers in the area of the possibility that
an emergency door could open. In addition, it
will serve as a deterrent to tampering by children
with the emergency door release mechanisms.
Therefore, the requirement that an audible alarm
be positioned at each emergency door and at the
driver's position has been retained.

Objectives were received to the requirement
that the magnitude of force required to activate
the emergency door release mechanism be not
more than 40 pounds. The NHTSA does not
consider that the 40 pound force limit is too
high in light of the location and access require-
ments of this standard. If the maximum force
level were substantially lowered, there would be
a significant likelihood that emergency door re-
lease mechanisms would be inadvertently acti-
vated by a passenger.

In addition, the NHTSA has noted the possi-
bility of ambiguity with respect to the wording
of paragraph S5.4 of the old standard and
S5.4.2 of the proposal. The intent of these para-
graphs is to specify conditions applicable to the
opening of the exit after the release mechanism
has been activated. Accordingly, the wording
of the two paragraphs has been modified to
clearly reflect this intent.

Many school districts and manufacturers ob-
jected to the parallelepiped clearance require-
ment for the emergency doors because of the
number of seats that would be eliminated and
the costs of redesigning van-type school buses to
meet the clearance requirements. In addition,
many commenters pointed out that the 12-inch
aisle in most school buses precludes effective use
of a large exit meeting the proposed require-
ments.

The NHTSA has determined that these argu-
ments have merit. As a result, the proposed
paralellepiped requirements have been modified
by reducing the height from 48 inches to 45
inches, reducing the depth from 24 to 12 inches
for rear exits in buses over 10,000 lbs G\1VR,
and to 6 inches for rear exits in buses under
10,000 lbs GVWR. For side exits the depth has
been eliminated altogether. Additionally, the
forward edge of the side door now coincides
with a vertical transverse plane tangent to the
rearmost point of the adjacent seat, thus permit-
ting simultaneous exiting of two occupants, be-
tween the seat backs and over the seat cushion.

In light of the above, 49 CFR § 571.217, Bus
Window Retention and Release, is amended ....

Effective date: October 26, 1976.

(Sees. 103, 112, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat.
718; Sec. 202, Pub. L. 93-492, 88 Stat. 1484 (15
U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1407) ; delegation of authority
at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on January 22, 1976.

Howard J. Dugoff
Acting Administrator
41 F.R. 3871
January 27, 1976

PART 571; S 217— PRE 14

Efftctive: October 26, 1976

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 217

Bus Window Retention and Release
(Docket No. 75-3; Notice 4)

This notice amends Standard No. 217, Bus
Window Retention and Release, to modify the
emergency exit requirements of the standard in
response to a petition for reconsideration of re-
cent amendments and after consideration of
comments on the agency's proposal to specify
new performance options and labeling for emer-
gency exits.

PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF NOTICE 2

The National Highway TraflSc Safety Admin-
istration (NHTSA) recently amended Standard
No. 217 (49 CFR 571.217) to provide emergency
exit requirements for school buses (41 FR 3871,
January 27, 1976 (Notice 2)). Section S5.2.3.1
of the standard (as it becomes effective for school
buses on October 26, 1976) specifies that a rear
emergency door shall be hinged on the right side.
Chrysler Corporation has petitioned for recon-
sideration of this provision, asking that a manu-
facturer option be provided so that the rear
emergency door or doors on van-type school buses
may be hinged on the right or left.

The purpose of specifying that the rear emer-
gency door hinge to the right is based on the
NHTSA finding that school buses often operate
on rural highways that are bordered by drainage
ditches, and that a school bus that leaves the
highway and rolls over is likely to come to rest
in the right-hand ditch on its right side. When
a bus comes to a rest on its side, the emergency
door on the rear of the bus is easier to operate,
particularly by small children, if it is hinged so
that its operation is assisted by gravity.

Chrysler pointed out that the rear emergency
door on van -type school buses is often used rou-
tinely for loading and unloading passengers.
For this reason, Chrysler offers a single rear

door that hinges at the left side, so that the door
swings out of the way to safely accommodate
curb-side loading. In the case of larger buses,
routine loading and unloading does not occur
through the rear emergency door.

The NHTSA agrees with Chrysler that the
common practice of curb-side loading through
the rear door of van-type school buses justifies a
manufacturer option in selecting the side of the
door which should be hinged. On balance, the
agency considers that the increase in safety for
routine curb-side loading through a left-hinged
door would outweight any potential loss of safety
benefit for emergency evacuation from a van-type
bus that comes to rest on its right side. Accord-
ingly, S5.2.3.1 of the standard is appropriately
amended. The agency also takes the opportunity
to correct an inadvertent reference to emergency
"exit" in S5.2.3.2 when the requirements are
actually intended to apply only to an emergency
"door."

In a matter unrelated to the Chrysler petition,
some uncertainty has arisen over the form of
S5.4 as it was revised in Notice 2 to become effec-
tive October 26, 1976. Also, the division between
buses with a GVIVR of 10,000 pounds or less and
those with a greater GVWR was imperfectly
stated in amending S5.4. For this reason, the
amendment of S5.4 is republished in the correct
form in this notice. No substantive changes are
made in this republication of S5.4.

EMERGENCY EXIT AND LABELING
PROPOSALr-NOTICE 3

At the time the amendments just discussed
were published, the NHTSA published a pro-
posal to clarify certain emergency exit labeling
for all buses, and to replace the established op-
tion for school bus emergency exits with a new

PART 571; S 217— PRE 15

EfFecHve: October 26, 1976

option (41 FR 3878, January 27, 1976; Notice
3). Comments were received from the Lanai
Road Elementary School Parent -Teachers Asso-
ciation, Gillig Brothers (Gillig), Chrysler Cor-
poration, Mr. Allen Braslow, Crown Coach
Corporation (Crown), and International Har-
vester (IH). No comment was received from
manufacturers of transit or intercity buses, or
from the manufacturers of body-on-chassis school
buses. The National Motor Vehicle Safety
Council did not comment on this proposal.

With regard to emergency exit labeling, Mr.
Braslow suggested two labeling changes intended
to assist bus occupants, as well as a requirement
for regular testing of emergency exits in buses
in highway service. Wliile the latter suggestion
lies beyond the authority of the agency under
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act (15 U.S.C. §1391, et seq.), the agency will
consider for future action the suggestion to label
all bus exits in the same manner as school bus
exits, as well as the suggestion to develop a uni-
versal emergency exit insignia with diagramatic
instructions. For the moment, the agency is
limited by the extent of its proposal, and accord-
ingly, makes final the changes as proposed.

Standard No. 217 requires (effective October
26, 1976) school buses to provide either a rear
emergency door or two side emergency doors in
satisfaction of the emergency exit requirements.
In Notice 3, the agency proposed to modify this
option to require either provision of a rear emer-
gency door or, at the option of the manufacturer,
provision of a left-side emergency door and a
"California rear window" exit at the rear of the
bus. This type of rear window exit provides a
large (16 by 48 inch) opening which is more
easily utilized than a side emergency door if a
bus has rolled onto its side. In the alternative,
the agency proposed that the option to use a
rear window exit only be allowed in rear-engine
buses.

The two manufacturers of transit-type school
buses supported the new option, but objected to
the alternative proposal that would limit use of
the option to rear-engine buses. Both Gillig and
Crown build mid-engine school buses with essen-
tially the same configuration as rear-engine buses
and consider the rear window exit equally useful
in these buses. The agency has considered the

mid-engine design and agrees with the argument
made by Crown and Gillig. Accordingly, the
agency amends the standard as proposed to apply
the option to all school buses. Crown Coach
pointed out that the NHTSA proposal to limit
rear-window-exit release mechanisms to a single
release would necessitate a change in existing
hardware. The NHTSA has investigated the
available hardware (consisting in all cases of two
release mechanisms that are located within 36
inches of each other) and concludes that the only
significant safety hazard in some of the designs
is that some require simultaneous operation for
release. For this reason, the agency will allow
not more than two release mechanisms, provided
that the two mechanisms do not have to operate
simultaneously to effect release. If new designs
present a problem of any nature, further rule-
making will be undertaken.

In accordance with recently enunciated De-
partment of Transportation policy encouraging
adequate analysis of the consequences of regula-
tory action (41 FR 16201, April 16, 1976), the
agency herewith summarizes its evaluation of the
economic and other consequences of this pi"oposal
on the public and private sectors, including pos-
sible loss of safety benefits. The option to hinge
some rear emergency doors on the right or left,
and the option to use a "California rear window"
do not involve additional expenditures. The
agency estimates that these additional exit ar-
rangements will not significantly reduce the level
of safety provided in the affected bus categories.
The new requirements for more specific operating
instructions for school bus emergency exits are
calculated to involve annual costs of about
$67,000. Although the agency is unable to quan-
tify the benefit of clearer exit labeling, it is esti-
mated that better instructions will serve to reduce
the possibility of death and injury involved in
an attempt to use the emergency exits. There-
fore, the agency concludes that the amendments
should issue as set forth in this notice.

For the benefit of interested persons, it is noted
that Docket 75-6 concerning labeling of bus
emergency exits is related to this rulemaking.

In consideration of the foregoing. Standard
No. 217 (49 CFR 571.217) as it is amended to
become effective for school buses on October 26,
1976, is revised. . . .

PART 571; S 217— PRE 16

Effective: October 26, 1976

Effective date : October 26, 1976. The effective (Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718

date of tlie amendments numbered 1, 2. 3 and 5 (15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; Sec. 202, Pub. L. 93-192,

is established as 9 months after tlie date of issu- 88 Stat. 1470 (15 U.S.C. 1392) ; delegation of

ance of the amendments on which they are based, authority at 49 CFR 1.50.)

as required by the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus j , ,, „, ,„«„

Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-492, ^""""^ °" ^^^^' "•^- ^•"^•

section 202 (15 U.S.C. 1397(i) (1) (A) ). The j^^^^ ^

effective date of the amendment numbered 4 is Arl ' ' t t •
also established as October 26, 1976, although a

manufacturer can meet the requirements at an 41 F.R. 22356

earlier date if the manufacturer so chooses. June 3, 1976

PART 571; S 217— PRE 17-18

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 217

Bus Window Retention and Release
(Docket No. 7503; Notice 7)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice makes permanent an
interim final rule that modified the agency's
school bus emergency exit standard. The interim
final rule, which was issued in February 1979, was
implemented immediately to increase the
availability of passenger vans for use as small
school buses at reasonable costs. The interim rule
slightly altered several emergency exit
requirements in a manner that made it easier to
mass produce small buses without significantly
affecting the level of safety achieved by those
vehicles. Concurrent with the issuance of the
interim final rule, the agency solicited comments
on the amendments to the standard. This notice
responds to the comments and makes the interim
rule permanent.

EFFECTIVE DATE: Since this notice makes
permanent an existing interim final rule, it is
effective immediately.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On February
8, 1979, the agency published an interim final rule
and a proposal (44 F.R. 7961) to modify the school
bus emergency exit safety standard, Standard
No. 217, Bus Window Retention and Release. In
that notice, the agency made effective immediately
some modifications to the school bus emergency
exit standard to increase the supply of reasonably
priced vehicles suitable for school bus conversion.
Among the changes implemented by the interim
final rule were a slight decrease in the size of rear
emergency exits for vehicles (typically passenger
vans) with gross vehicle weight ratings (GVWR)
less than 10,000 pounds, and increased flexibility
in the location requirements for release
mechanisms on the emergency exits of small school

buses. The agency concluded at the time the
interim rule was issued that the level of safety
achieved by small buses would not be diminished
by these changes and that the changes would
allow more small buses to be mass produced,
thereby lowering their prices. The agency also
asked in the interim final rule for comments on
the advisability of these changes.

In response to the agency's request. Ford,
Chrysler, the Center for Auto Safety, and the
California Highway Patrol (CHP) submitted
comments. The two manufacturers. Ford and
Chrysler, both supported the agency's action. The
Center and the CHP both opposed the action.

The Center and the CHP both argued that the
rear emergency exit in small school buses
(passenger vans which have GVWR's less than
10,000 pounds and are used as school buses)
should not be reduced in size. The Center stated
that the exit should be broad enough for two
students to exit simultaneously in case of an
emergency. The CHP stressed that reducing the
size of the exit would make it too small to permit
the exiting of children in wheelchairs.

With respect to the argument that the size of
the rear exit should allow room to exit students
two abreast, the agency stated in the proposal
that this argument, while valid for larger school
buses, is not meritorious for school vehicles with
GVWR's less than 10,000 pounds. Larger school
buses frequently transport 60 or more school
children. Accordingly, rapid evacuation of those
vehicles in an emergency requires that the
students be able to exit two abreast. In order to
accomplish this, the agency has required that
some space be provided behind the rearmost seat
in these buses so that students exiting through
the narrow center aisles will have room at the
exits to get out two abreast.

PART 571; S217- PRE 19

In small school buses where the number of
students carried frequently is 16 or less, the need
for exiting two abreast to achieve rapid evacuation
is significantly reduced. In recognition of this
factor, the agency has never required bus
manufacturers to provide space behind the rear
seat of small buses that would allow students to
exit two abreast. As a result, the rear seats of
small buses are frequently quite near or are against
the rear bus wall. Students exiting down a bus
aisle, which is normally around 12 inches in width,
reach an exit where no space is provided to exit
two abreast. Accordingly, any requirement that
an exit in small buses be large enough to facilitate
exiting two abreast would not accomplish that
goal. Small bus manufacturers would need to
redesign their bus seat plans in some fashion to
provide space behind the rear seat in order to
allow exiting two abreast. Such a redesign would
significantly decrease the available seating in
small buses. Given the fact that evacuating small
buses has not been a safety problem, the agency
concludes that the cost resulting from the
reduced vehicle seating that would be required to
accomplish the Center's objectives would far
outweigh the benefits. Accordingly, the agency
concludes that a broader rear exit is not needed
in small school buses.

The CHP objected to the same requirement
stating that the new exit door would be too
narrow for wheelchairs. The CHP further stated
that California has always required wider exits so
that wheelchairs can be used in the vehicles.

The agency's new exit requirement is a minimum
size requirement for standard school buses. In
special instances in which larger exits are desired,
such as in buses for carrying the handicapped, the
States may require that their buses have such exits.
The agency deems that approach to be preferable
to its requiring larger exits in all vehicles. The
situation with respect to rear door size is
analogous to that involving seat back height. The
agency requires a minimum seat back height.
New York mandates a seat back height greater
than the Federal specification. The NHTSA has
no objection to the New York requirement and
will not object to requirements by other States
for wider rear emergency exits. The agency also
notes that buses designed for the handicapped
constitute a small portion of all buses and usually
are equipped with special doors and larger aisles.

The Center also objected to the agency's
interpretation that the parallelipiped device used
for measuring rear door size could be lifted up to
1-inch to overcome small protrusions near the
floor. The agency issued an interpretation
permitting this at the time of the implementation
of the standard. This interpretation simply
reflects real-world conditions. Many doors in
vehicles have small door sills or other minor
protrusions that sometimes serve necessary
functions in the proper operation of the door.
These minor protrusions play no significant role
in the ability of students to exit from a vehicle in
an emergency. Therefore, the agency will not
reconsider its interpretation.

The Center objected to the agency's removal of
exit release mechanism location and force
application requirements for small school buses.
The Center agreed that the existing requirements
are more appropriate for larger buses, but it
insisted that the agency should develop another
set of location requirements for smaller buses
instead of abandoning the requirements entirely.

The agency is sympathetic to the Center's
concerns about this issue. The location of the
release mechanism for small school buses in an
easily accessible location is important for the
rapid evacuation of these vehicles in an emergency.
However, the mere setting of location requirements
would not ensure that the release mechanisms
would be accessible. Due to the limited space in
the rear of small buses and the variability of
design in those areas, the agency could not readily
specify a location which would provide the
necessary accessibility. The agency believes that
allowing manufacturers the option of locating the
release mechanism in any easily accessible
location on or near the exit will be more beneficial
to achieving the intended safety results than any
rigid inflexible location requirement. NHTSA
anticipates that product liability concerns and the
agency's authority to declare inaccessible release
mechanisms to be safety-related defects will
suffice to induce the manufacturers to select
accessible locations. The agency will closely
monitor the location and accessibility of the
release mechanisms and, if necessary, use both its
defects and rulemaking authority to take
corrective action.

Finally, the Center objected to the fact that the
agency permitted pull-type release mechanisms.

PART571;S217-PRE20

The Center stated that release mechanism
standardization is helpful in assuring the safe
evacuation of vehicles.

While the agency agrees that standardization
has value in this instance, there are competing
ways for achieving standardization in the case of
small school buses. One way is to require that
small school buses have releases that operate with
an upward motion as in larger school buses.
Another way is to permit small school buses
(which, as noted before, are passenger vans) to
have the same pull-type releases that are found in
other vans and some cars. The agency doesn't
believe that either basis for standardization is
clearly superior from a safety standpoint to the
other. Further, permitting the use of the pull-
type releases will enable the manufacturers to
achieve cost savings. Accordingly, the agency
declines to adopt the Center's recommendation.

Since this notice makes permanent an existing
amendment, it is effective immediately. The
agency has reviewed the amendment in
accordance with E.O. 12291 and concludes that
the rule is not significant under the Department
of Transportation's regulatory procedures. In
fact, by permitting these changes, more buses can
be mass produced, which may result in a small
decrease in the cost of complying with the

standard. Since the economic impact of this rule is
minimal, a regulatory evaluation is not required
for this amendment.

The agency has also considered the effect of this
rule in relation to the Regulatory Flexibility Act
and certifies that it would not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The only economic impact might be a
reduction in bus prices. There would similarly be
no significant impact on a substantial number of
small government jurisdictions and small
organizations.

Finally the agency has analyzed this rule for
purposes of the National Environmental Policy
Act and has determined that it would have no
significant impact on the human environment.

Issued on February 10, 1982.

Diane K. Steed
Acting Administrator

47 F.R. 7255
February 18, 1982

PART 571; S217-PRE 21-22

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 217
Bus Window Retention and Reiease

51. Scope. This standard establishes require-
ments for the retention of windows other than
windshields in buses, and establishes operating
forces, opening dimensions, and markings for
push-out bus windows and other emergency exits.

52. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is
to minimize the likelihood of occupants being
thrown from the bus and to provide a means of
readily accessible emergency egress.

53. Application. This standard applies to
buses, except buses manufactured for the purpose
of transporting persons under physical restraint.

54. Definitions.

"Push-out window" means a vehicle window
designed to open outward to provide for emer-
gency egress.

"Adjacent seat" means a designated seating
position located so that some portion of its occu-
pant space is not more than 10 inches from an
emergency exit, for a distance of at least 15
inches measured horizontally and parallel to the
exit.

"Occupant space" means the space directly
above the seat and footwell, bounded vertically
by the ceiling and horizontally by the normally
positioned seat back and the nearest obstruction
of occupant motion in the direction the seat
faces.

55. Requirements.

S5.1 Window Retention. Except as provided
in S5.1.2, each piece of window glazing and each
surrounding window frame, when tested in ac-
cordance with the procedure in S5.1.1 under the
conditions of S6.1 through S6.3, shall be re-
tained by its surrounding structure in a manner
that prevents the formation of any opening large
enough to admit the passage of a 4-inch diameter
sphere under a force, including the weight of

the sphere, of 5 pounds until any one of the
following events occurs:

(a) A force of 1200 pounds is reached.

(b) At least 80% of the glazing thickness has
developed cracks running from the load contact
region to the periphery at two or more points, or
shattering of the glazing occurs.

(c) The inner surface of the glazing at the
center of force application has moved relative to
the window frame, along a line perpendicular to
the undisturbed inner surface, a distance equal
to one-half of the square root of the minimum
surface dimension measured through the center
of the area of the entire sheet of window glazing.

55.1.1 An increasing force shall be applied
to the window glazing through the head form
specified in Figure 4, outward and perpendicular
to the undisturbed inside surface at the center
of the area of each sheet of window glazing, with
a head form travel of 2 inches per minute.

55.1.2 The requirements of this standard do
not apply to a window whose minimum surface
dimension measured through the center of its
area is less than 8 inches.

S5.2 Provision of Emergency Exits. Buses
other than school buses shall provide unob-
structed openings for emergency exit which col-
lectively amount, in total square inches, to at
least 67 times the number of designated seating
positions on the bus. At least 40 percent of the
total required area of unobstructed openings,
computed in the above manner, shall be provided
on each side of a bus. However, in determining
the total unobstructed openings provided by a
bus, no emergency exit, regardless of its area,
shall be credited with more than 536 square
inches of the total area requirement. School

PART 571; S 217-1

buses shall provide openings for emergency exits
that conform to S5.2.3.

55.2.1 Buses with GVWR of more than 10,000
pounds. Except as provided in S5.2.1.1, buses
with a GVWR of more than 10,000 pounds shall
meet the unobstructed openings requirements by
providing side exits and at least one rear exit that
conforms to S5.3 through S5.5. The rear exit shall
meet the requirements when the bus is upright and
when the bus is overturned on either side, with the
occupant standing facing the exit. When the bus
configuration precludes installation of an accessi-
ble rear exit, a roof exit that meets the re-
quirements of S5.3 through S5.5 when the bus is
overturned on either side, with the occupant stand-
ing facing the exit, shall be provided in the rear
half of the bus.

S5.2.1 .1 A bus with GVWR of more than 10,000
pounds may satisfy the unobstructed openings
requirement by providing at least one side door
for each three passenger seating positions in the
vehicle.

55.2.2 Buses with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or
less. Buses with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less
may meet the unobstructed openings requirement
by providing:

(a) Devices that meet the requirements of S5.3
through S5.5 without using remote controls or cen-
tral power systems;

(b) Windows that can be opened manually to a
position that provides an opening large enough to
admit unobstructed passage, keeping a major axis
horizontal at all times, of an ellipsoid generated by
rotating about its minor axis an ellipse having a
major axis of 20 inches and a minor axis of 13
inches; or

(c) Doors.

55.2.3 School buses.

S5.2.3.1 Each school bus shall comply with
either one of the following minimum emergency
exit provisions, chosen at the option of the
manufacturer:

(a) One rear emergency door that opens out-
ward and is hinged on the right side (either side in
the case of a bus with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or
less); or

(b) One emergency door on the vehicle's left side
that is in the rear half of the bus passenger com-
partment and is hinged on its forward side, and a
push-out rear window that provides a minimum
opening clearance 16 inches high and 48 inches
wide. This window shall be releasable by operation
of not more than two mechanisms which are
located in the high force access region as shown in
Figure 30, and which do not have to be operated
simultaneously. Release and opening of the win-
dow shall require force applications, not to exceed
40 pounds, in the directions specified in S5.3.2.

S5.2.3.2 The engine starting system of a school
bus shall not operate if any emergency door is
locked from either inside or outside the bus. For
purposes of this requirement, "locked" means that
the release mechanism cannot be activated by a
person at the door without a special device such as
a key or special information such as a combination.

S5.3 Emergency exit release.

55.3.1 Each push-out window or other
emergency exit not required by S5.2.3 shall be
releasable by operating one or two mechanisms
located within the regions specified in Figure 1,
Figure 2, or Figure 3. The lower edge of the region
in Figure 1, and Region B in Figure 2, shall be
located 5 inches above the adjacent seat, or 2
inches above the armrest, if any, whichever is
higher.

55.3.2 When tested under the conditions of S6,
both before and after the window retention test re-
quired by S5.1, each emergency exit not required
by S5.2.3 shall allow manual release of the exit by a
single occupant using force applications each of
which conforms, at the option of the manufacturer,
either to (a) or (b). The release mechanism or
mechanisms shall require for release one or two
force applications, at least one of which differs by
90 to 180° from the direction of the initial push-out
motion of the emergency exit (outward and
perpendicular to the exit surface).

(a) Low-force application.

Location: As shown in Figure 1 or Figure 3.

Type of Motion: Rotary or straight.

Magnitude: Nor more than 20 pounds.

PART 571; S 217-2

(b) High force application.

Location: As shown in Figure 2 or Figure 3.

Type of Motion: Straight, perpendicular to the
undisturbed exit surface.

Magnitude: Not more than 60 pounds.

S5.3.3 When tested under the conditions of S6.,
both before and after the window retention test re-
quired by S5.1, each school bus emergency door
shall allow manual release of the door by a single
person, from both inside and outside the bus
passenger compartment, using a force application
that conforms to paragraphs (a) through (c) [ex-
cept a school bus with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or
less does not have to conform to paragraph (a). (47
F.R. 7255-February 18, 1982. Effective:
February 18, 1982).! Each release mechanism shall
operate without the use of remote controls or tools,
and notwithstanding any failure of the vehicle's
power system. When the release mechanism is not
in the closed position and the vehicle ignition is in
the "on" position, a continuous warning sound
shall be audible at the driver's seating position and
in the vicinity of the emergency door having the
unclosed mechanism.

(a) Location: Within the high force access region
shown in Figure 3A for a side emergency door, and
in Figure 3D for a rear emergency door.

(b) Type of motion: Upward from inside the bus;
at the discretion of the manufacturer from outside
the bus. [Buses with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or
less shall provide interior release mechanisms that
operate by either an upward or pull-type motion.
The pull-type motion shall be used only when the
release mechanism is recessed in such a manner
that the handle, lever, or other activating device
does not protrude beyond the rim of the recessed
receptacle. (47 F.R. 7255-February 18, 1982. Ef-
fective: February 18, 1982)J

(c) Magnitude of force: Not more than 40
pounds.

The present S5.4 is renumbered S5.4.1, and the
phrase "Each push-out window or other emer-
gency exit shall, after the release mechanism has
been operated," is replaced by the phrase "After
the release mechanism has been operated, each
push-out window or other emergency exit not re-
quired by S5.2.3," at the beginning of the
paragraph.

S5.4 Emergency exit extension.
S5.4.1 After the release mechanism has been
operated, each push-out window or other emer-

gency exit not required by S5.2.3 shall, under the
conditions of S6, before and after the window
retention test required by S5.1, using the reach
distances and corresponding force levels specified
in S5.3.2, be manually extendable by a single occu-
pant to a position that provides an opening large
enough to admit unobstructed passage, keeping a
major axis horizontal at all times, of an ellipsoid
generated by rotating about its minor axis an
ellipse having a major axis of 20 inches and a minor
axis of 13 inches.

S5.4.2 School bus emergency exit extension.

S5.4.2.1 School bus with a GVWR of more than
10,000 pounds. After the release mechanism has
been operated, the emergency door of a school bus
with a GVWR of more than 10,000 pounds shall,
under the conditions of S6, before and after the
window retention test required by S5.1, using the
force levels specified in S5.3.3, be manually
extendable by a single person to a position that
permits—

(a) In the case of rear emergency door, an open-
ing large enough to permit unobstructed passage
of a rectangular parallelepiped 45 inches high, 24
inches wide, and 12 inches deep, keeping the
45-inch dimension vertical, the 24-inch dimension
parallel to the opening, and the lower surface in
contact with the floor of the bus at all times; and

(b) In the case of a side emergency door, an
opening at least 45 inches high and 24 inches wide.
A vertical transverse plane tangent to the rear-
most point of a seat back shall pass through the
forward edge of a side emergency door.

S5.4.2.1 School Buses Less Than 10,000 Pounds
or Less. A school bus with a GVWR of 10,000
pounds or less shall conform to all the provisions of
S5.4.2 except that the parallelepiped dimension for
the opening of the rear emergency door or doors
shall be 45 inches high, 22 inches wide, and 6 inches
deep.

S5.5 Emergency exit identification.

S5.5.1 In buses other than school buses, except
for windows serving as emergency exits in accord-
ance with S5.2.2(b) and doors in buses with a
GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less, each emergency
door shall have the designation "Emergency
Door" or "Emergency Exit" and each push-out
window or other emergency exit shall have the
designation "Emergency Exit" followed by con-
cise operating instructions describing each motion
necessary to unlatch and open the exit, located
within 6 inches of the release mechanism.

(Rav. 2/18/82)

PART 571; S 217-3

FLOOR BENEATH EMERGENCY EXIT
VIEW PARALLEL TO SEAT BACK

•CLEARANCE AREA AROUND
SEAT BACK. ARM RESTS.
AND OTHER OBSTRUCTIONS

FLOOR BENEATH EMERGENCY EXIT

VIEW PERPENDICULAR TO SEAT BACK

ACCESS REGION IS THE SFATIAL VOLUME CREATED
BY THE INTERSECTION OF THE PROJECTIONS OF THE
AREAS SHOWN IN THE TWO VIEWS

FIGURE 1 LOW-FORCE ACCESS REGION FOR EMERGENCY EXITS HAVING ADJACENT SEATS

FLOOR BENEATH EMERGENCY EXIT

VIEW PARALLEL TO SEAT BACK

FLOOR BENEATH EMERGENCY EXIT
VIEW PERPENDICULAR TO SEAT BACK

•CLEARANCE AREA AROUND
SEAT BACK. ARM RESTS.
AND OTHER OBSTRUCTIONS

FIGURE 2 HIGH-FORCE ACCESS REGIONS FOR EMERGENCY EXITS HAVING ADJACENT SEATS

PART 571; S 217-4

LOW AND HIGH-FORCE ACCESS REGIONS FOR EMERGENCY EXITS WITHOUT

ADJACENT SEATS

NSiOE CCILIMG

INSIDE WALt

Mil

tNSIDE FLOOR -

3A. SIDE EMERGENCY EXIT

NSIDl WALL

ACCESS REGION

FOR HIGH FORCES

INSIDE CEILING

3B. ROOF EMERGENCY EXIT

PART 571; S 217-5

' INSIDE WALI.

Zl INCH RADIUS

WAW/.

Access neoioN

FOR LOW FORCES

, , ACCESS
'/■y'^ REGION

y/^/, FOR MICH 83 INCMtS

V'^ K^y FORCES

^^

^/yX REAR SHELF

IMSIDE FLOOR OF UPRIGHT BUS

•TVPICAL CLEARANCE AROUND OBSTRUCTIONS

3C. REAR EMERGENCY EXIT WITH REAR OBSTRUCTION

ACCESS REGION
FOR LOW FORCES

ACCESS REGION
FOR HIGH FORCES

INSIDE FLOOR

INSIDE WALL

3D. REAR EMERGENCY EXIT WITHOUT REAR OBSTRUCTION

PART 571; S 217-6

■--r

1 1
\i

\_.

L._

»» IVMTHITIC UMMMkAVIN
' » •» TEWSlkt STMfMCTM

' <9^ (lO«*CATiO>i

MA^ACOAT SJtiN nCTCMAAaoiS om

030' OOJ r"«TH(T>c SKi*a
1000' 10 *• 'EXSilf STOENOTH

100' ft\ fLO**CAtiOM

FIGURE 4 HEAD FORM

Examples: (1) Lift to Unlatch
Push to Open

(2) Lift Handle and
Push out to Open

When a release mechanism is not located within
an occupant space of an adjacent seat, a label
meeting the requirements of S5.5.2 that indicates
the location of the nearest release mechanism
shall be placed within the occupant space.

Example: Emergency exit instructions located
next to seat ahead.

S5.5.2 In buses other than school buses, ex-
cept as provided in S5.5.2.1, each marking shall
be legible, when the only source of light is the
normal night-time illumination of the bus in-
terior, to occupants having corrected visual
acuity of 20/40 (Snellen ratio) seated in the
adjacent seat, seated in the seat directly ad-
joining the adjacent seat, and standing in the
aisle location that is closest to that adjacent seat.
The marking shall be legible from each of these
locations when the other two corresponding lo-
cations are occupied.

S5.5.2.1 If the exit has no adjacent seat, the
marking must meet the legibility requirements
of S5.5.2 for occupants standing in the aisle
location nearest to the emergency exit, except
for a roof exit, which must meet the legibility
requirements for occupants positioned with their
backs against the floor opposite the roof exit.

S5.5.3 School Bus. Each school bus emer-
gency exit provided in accordance with S5.2.3.1
shall have the designation "Emergency Door" or
"Emergency Exit," as appropriate, in letters at
least 2 inches high, of a color that contrasts with
its background, located at the top of or directly
above the emergency exit on both the inside and
outside surfaces of the bus. Concise operating
instructions describing the motions necessary to
unlatch and open the emergency exit, in letters
at least three-eights of an inch high, of a color
that contrasts with its background, shall be lo-
cated within 6 inches of the release mechanism
on the inside surface of the bus.

Example: (1) Lift to Unlatch
Push to Open

(2) Lift Handle

Push Out to Open.

• S6. Test conditions.

56.1 The vehicle is on a flat, horizontal sur-
face.

56.2 The inside of the vehicle and the outside
environment are kept at any temperature from
70° to 85° Fahrenheit for 4 hours immediately
preceding the tests, and during the tests.

56.3 For the window retention test, windows
are installed, closed, and latched (where latches
are provided) in the condition intended for
normal bus operation.

56.4 For the emergency exit release and ex-
tension tests, windows are installed as in S6.3,
seats, armrests, and interior objects near the
windows are installed as for normal use, and
seats are in the upright position.

37 F.R. 9394
May 10, 1972

PART 571; S 217-7-8

Effacllv*: March 1, 1974

PREAMBLE TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 218

Motorcycle Helmets
(Docket No. 72-6; Notice 2)

The purpose of this amendment to Part 571
of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, is to
add a new Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No.
218, Motorcycle Helmets, 49 CFR § 571.218, that
establishes minimum performance requirements
for motorcycle helmets manufactured for use by
motorcyclists and other motor vehicle users.

A notice of proposed rulemaking on this sub-
ject was published on May 19, 1972 (37 F.R.
10097). The comments received in response to'
the notice have been carefully considered in this
issuance of a final rule.

In the previous notice, the NHTSA proposed
that, effective September 1, 1974, the perform-
ance levels for the impact attenuation require-
ments be upgraded to that of the Head Injury
Criterion (HIC) required by Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard No. 208. A number of com-
ments on this subject sought to defer a final
determination until further research and addi-
tional tests could be conducted. The agency has
carefully reviewed the issues raised by these
comments and has determined that technical data
presently being generated on this matter by
several investigations should be considered in up-
grading the impact attenuation requirements.
Accordingly, a decision on the upgrading will
be deferred until after this research has been
completed and the results evaluated, and after
any appropriate data have been reviewed.

Comments to the docket on the initial impact
attenuation requirement ranged from abolishing
the time duration criteria of 2.0 milliseconds and
4.0 milliseconds at the 200g and 150g levels, re-
spectively, to increasing these criteria to 2.8
milliseconds at the 200g level and 5.6 milliseconds
at the 150g level. One approach taken in regard
to this requirement contends that the available
test data are insufficient for quantifying time

limits for the relatively short duration accelera-
tions which are involved in helmet testing. Sev-
eral comments questioned the validity of the
proposed time duration limits, since these limits
were based on the optional swing-away (as op-
posed to fixed anvil) test of the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard
Z90. 1-1966, which was omitted from the most
recent issues of the Z90.1 Standard (1971 and
197.3) and was not contained in the proposed
motorcycle helmet standard. An additional com-
ment points out that helmets designed to meet
higher energy impacts than the initial impact
attenuation requirement occasionally have diffi-
c\ilty meeting a 2.0 millisecond requirement at
the 200g level.

A review of available biomechanical data indi-
cates that the head impact exposure allowed by
the 2.0 and 4.0 millisecond limits at the 200g
and 150g levels, respectively, is greater than that
allowed by other measures of head injury po-
tential. It is the agency's view, moreover, that
the best evidence indicates that an increase in
the time duration criteria would permit a sub-
stantial reduction in the protection provided to
the helmet wearer. Since the comments to the
docket did not provide any new data or suf-
ficiently compelling arguments which would
justify relaxing the proposed limits for tolerable
head imi)act exposure, the 2.0 and 4.0 millisecond
criteria are retained as part of the initial im-
pact attenuation criteria.

In response to comments recommending that
the allowable weight of the supporting assembly
for the impact attenuation drop test be changed
to 20% instead of the jiroposed 10% of the
weight of the drop assembly, the NHTSA has
determined that such a change would enable
more durable testing equipment to be used with-

PART 571; S 218— PRE 1

Effective: March 1, 1974

out any significant effect on test results. Accord-
ingly, this weight limitation has been raised to

•20%.

Several comments expressed concern that the
proposed ().U4-inch indentation limit included
under the penetration test would create problems
of measurement. The agency has determined
that the intent of this 0.04-inch indentation limit
is sufficiently accomplished by the requirement
that the striker not contact the surface of the
test headform, and the 0.04-inch indentation
limit is therefore deleted from the final rule.
Further, in consideration of the need to readily
detect any contact by the striker, the agency has
determined that the contactable surfaces of the
penetration test headforms should be constructed
of a metal or metallic alloy which will insure
detection. Several minor changes in the test
conditions for the penetration test have also been
made, without altering the substance of those
conditions.

A number of comments recommended that
where the retention system consists of components
which can be independently fastened without
securing tiie complete assembly, such compo-
nents should not have to individually meet the
retention test requirements. Since helmets have
a tendency to be thrown off by a crash and
motorcyclists sometimes only partially fasten the
retention system where such an option exists, the
agency has concluded- that retention components
as well as the entire assembly should meet the
test requirements in every fastening mode as
specified in the notice of proposed rulemaking.

A number of comments requested that the 105°
minimum peripheral vision clearance to each side
of the midsagittal plane be increased to 120°.
The 105° minimum requirement was proposed
because it satisfies a demand by the public for
the availability of some helmets which provide
added protection to the temporal areas in ex-
change for a minimal reduction in peripheral
vision capability without compromising the safe
limits of peripheral vision clearance. A review
of available field-of-vision studies and the lack
of any evidence to the contrary indicate that 105°
minimum clearance to each side of tie midsagittal
plane provides ample peripheral vision capa-
bility. Since the requests for increasing the

minimum clearance to 120° were not accompanied
by any supporting data or arguments, the
agency has concluded that the standard should
allow the additional protection which the 105°
minimum clearance would permit and, accord-
ingly, this requirement is retained.

With respect to providing important safety
information in the form of labeling, one com-
ment recommended that, due to possible label
deterioration, both the manufacturer's identifica-
tion and the helmet model designation should be
permanently marked by etching, branding,
stamping, embossing, or molding on the exterior
of the helmet shell or on a permanently attached
component so as to be visible when the helmet
is in use. The NHTSA has determined that the
practical effect of this recommendation is accom-
plished by requiring each helmet to be perma-
nently and legibly labeled. The method to be
used to permanently and legibly affix a label for
each helmet is therefore left to the discretion of
the manufacturer. However, in order that there
may be some external, visual evidence of con-
formity to the standard, the labeling requirement
has been further modified to require manufac-
turer certification in the form of the DOT
symbol to appear in permanent form on the
exterior of the helmet shell.

One comment recommended that the prelimi-
nary test procedures include the application of a
10-pound static test load to the apex of a helmet
after it is placed on the reference headform and
before the "test line" is drawn to insure that the
reference marking will be relatively uniform,
thus reducing variances in test results of identical
helmets. The agency concurs in this recom-
mendation and it has been included in the
standard.

A number of comments objected to the loca-
tion of the test line. With respect to the pro-
posed requirement that the test line on the
anterior portion of a helmet coincide with the
reference plane of its corresponding reference
headform, it was pointed out that the helmet's
brow area would have to be excessively thick in
order to meet the impact attenuation criteria at
any point less than approximately 1 inch from
the brow opening. The data indicate that this
objection is valid, and the location of the anterior

FART 571; S 218— PRE 2

ElhcHva: March ), 1974

test line has been modified by placing it 1 inch
ftbo\e and parallel to the reference plane.

A number of comments objected to the pro-
posed requirement that the test line on the
posterior [portion of a helmet coincide with the
basic plane of its corresponding reference head-
form. The principal objection expressed con-
cern that, by e.\tending the posterior test line to
the basic plane, the resulting increase in the
posterior surface of a helmet could cause the
helmet to impact the wearer's neck whera
rearward rotation of the head occurs, thereby
increasing the potential for injury in certain
cases. After further consideration of this
aspect of helmet safety, the agency has deter-
mined that the location of the test line on the
posterior portion of a helmet should be modified
by placing it 1 inch below and parallel to the
reference plane.

Several comments questioned the sufficiency of
the anatomical dimensions and diagrams pro-
vided for the reference head forms in the Ap-
pendix of the notice of proposed rulemaking. Of
these comments, two proposed adopting the
dimensional specifications of the existing ANSI
Z90.1 headform, while a third recommended the

inclusion of an additional reference headform
to accommodate their smallest child helmet. The
agency has concluded that, in order to promote
greater uniformity in testing and more repeatable
results, one of the reference headforms should
have the dimensional specifications of the readily
available Z90.1 headform, the others being scaled
proportionally, and that a reference headform
for smaller child helmets should be added. Ac-
cordingly, the Appendix has been revised to
reflect these changes.

Effective date: March 1, 1974.

In consideration of the foregoing, a new Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 218, Motorcycle
Helmets, is added as § 571.218 of Title 49, Code
of Federal Regulations, as set forth below.

(Sees. 103, 112, 119, Public Law 89-563, 80
Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1407; delegation
of authority at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on August 9, 1973.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

38 F.R. 22390
August 20, 1973

PART 571 ; S 218— PRE 3-4

Ell*cllv«: March 1, 1974

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 218

Motorcycle Helmets
(Docket No. 72-6; Notice 3)

The purpose of this notice is to respond to
petitions for reconsideration and petitions for
rulemaking to amend Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard No. 218, Motorcycle Helmets (49 CFR
571.218).

Standard No. 218, published on August 20,
1973, (38 F.R. 22390), established minimum
performance requirements for helmets manufac-
tured for use by motorcyclists and other motor
vehicle users. Pursuant to 49 CFR 553.35, peti-
tions for reconsideration were filed by the Safety
Helmet Council of America (SHCA) and Lear-
Siegler, Inc., Bon-Aire Division. Additionally,
pursuant to 49 CFR 553.31, petitions to amend
the standard were filed by the Z-90 Committee
of the American National Standards Institute,
Midwest Plastics Corp., Approved Engineering
Test Laboratories, Bell-Toptex, Inc., Premier
Seat and Accessory Co., Safetech Co., Sterling
Products Co., Inc., Lanco Division of Roper
Corp., American Safety Equipment Corp., and
Electofilm, Inc.

In response to information contained in both
the petitions for reconsideration and the peti-
tions for rulemaking, the standard is being
amended in some minor respects, and its effec-
tiveness is temporarily suspended for helmets
that must be tested on headform sizes A, B, and
D. Requested changes in other requirements of
the standard are denied.

1. Effective date. The NHTSA received com-
ments from Royal Industries/Grant Division,
Jefferson Helmets, Inc., and Rebcor, Inc., urging
that the March 1, 1974, effective date be reaf-
firmed and stating that they either have already
produced or could produce helmets by that date
which meet the standard's requirements. The
NHTSA commends these manufacturers for

their outstanding efforts and their positive atti-
tude toward producing safer products.

The parties who submitted petitions, however,
all requested some postponement of the stand-
ard's effective date. The postponement requests
ranged from an indefinite extension to a delay
until the manufacturers are able to test helmets
to the required headforms, and were sought on
the following three grounds : (1) additional time
in order to obtain headforms required for refer-
ence marking and testing; (2) alleged inade-
quacy of the headform diagrams provided in the
final rule; and (3) inability to find a supplier
or forge for the K-lA magnesium alloy required
for the impact attenuation test headforms.

As explained in the preamble to the standard,
the headforms provided in the Appendix of the
notice of proposed rulemaking (May 19, 1972,
37 F.R. 10097), were changed by the agency in
order to utilize the readily available Z90.1 head-
form and to promote greater uniformity in test-
ing and more repeatable results. In view of the
fact that the size C headform of the final rule is
identical to the Z90.1 headform, is readily avail-
able in test laboratories, is used for several on-
going certification programs, and that the other
headforms are scaled proportionally, the NHTSA
anticipated that competition would motivate
both the manufacturers and the test laboratories
to take the initiative cither to obtain or to pro-
duce the other required headforms. It now ap-
pears that the problem of finding a supplier or
forge for the K-lA magnesium alloy required
for the A, B, and D impact attentuation test
headforms is substantial enough to justify the
requests for a postponement of the standard's
effective date for helmets that must be tested on
headform sizes A, B, and D.

PART 571; S 218— PRE 5

Effective: Morch 1, 1974

Because the NHTSA determined that the size
C headform would be identical to the Z90.1 head-
form, the low resonance magnesium alloy
(K-lA) specified for making the Z90.1 head-
form also was specified for headforms required
by the standard. Statements that it might be
difficult to find suppliers or forges for the ma-
terial were first made in the petitions on the
standard. The NHTSA has determined that
other low-resonance magnesium alloys can be
substituted for the K-IA type without causing
significant variances in the results of any of the
helmet tests, so that manufacturers can determine
compliance without undue cost penalties even
where the K-IA alloy is in short supply. Ac-
cordingly, the K-lA alloy is retained as the
basic headform material for the standard.

In view of the foregoing considerations with
particular emphasis on the fact that testing
services through commercial testing laboratories
have been readily available for several years for
the ANSI Z90.1 Standard headform, which is
the size C headform of the standard, the requests
for postponing the standard's effective date are
denied with respect to helmets that fit headform
C.

The petitions for a postponement of the effec-
tive date are granted, however, with respect to
helmets that must be tested on headforms A, B,
and D. A sentence is being added to the Appli-
cation section of the standard, excepting from
its coverage helmets that must be tested on these
headform sizes. The second sentence in S6.1.1
of the standard relating to the selection of a
reference headform to be used for reference
marking should be disregarded until the stand-
ard is made effective for helmets that must be
tested on headform sizes A, B, and D. To fa-
cilitate both the production and availability of
headforms, the NHTSA has contracted with the
Snell Memorial Foundation to monitor the prep-
aration of detail drawings and model headforms
consistent with the requirements of the standard.
The drawings and headforms will be included
in the docket for public examination upon their
completion. A review of the leadtime informa-
tion provided by the comments to the docket
indicates that approximately 8 months of manu-
facturer leadtime will be needed after the detail
dimensional drawings of the A, B, and D head-

forms become available. When the drawings are
available, notice to that effect will be published
in the Federal Register. The planned effective
date for the A, B, and D-size helmets is 8 months
from the date of the publication of that notice.

2. Time duration criteria for impact attenua-
tion test. Petitions on the impact attenuation
test time duration criteria of paragraphs S5.1(b)
ranged from eliminating the time duration cri-
teria of 2.0 milliseconds and 4.0 milliseconds at
the 200g and 150g levels, respectively, to increas-
ing these criteria to 3.0 milliseconds at the 200g
level and 6.0 milliseconds at the 150g level.
None of these petitions raised any issues or sub-
mitted any data different from those already
considered by the NHTSA. The available bio-
mechanical data indicate that the head impact
protection provided to the helmet user by the
standard's time duration criteria is greater than
that which would result from the proposed
changes, and the 2.0 and 4.0 millisecond criteria
are retained.

3. Conditioning period. One petitioner re-
quested that the 24-hour conditioning require-
ment for each of the four impact tests in
paragraph S6.3 be modified to "4 to 24 hours,"
consistent with the requirements of ANSI Z90.1,
arguing that 4 hours is sufficient to condition a
helmet to the various environmental conditions
required for the respective tests without compro-
mising the intent of the standard. Upon further
study of this matter, the NHTSA has concluded
that, although 4 hours would not be sufficient as
a general condition, changing the conditioning
period to 12 hours would facilitate product test-
ing without compromising the intent of the
standard. Accordingly, paragraph S6.3, "Con-
ditioning," is revised by changing the "24-hour"
conditioning requirement to "12 hours" in each
place the 24-hour requirement appears.

4. Low temperature conditioning lequirement.
Three petitioners objected to the —20° F. low
temperature conditioning requirement in para-
graph S6.3(b) on the basis that the requirement
is overly severe. On review of available infor-
mation, this agency has determined that precise
data on the best low temperature requirements
for testing are not available. Pending receipt
of more specific information, therefore, the cold

PART 571 ; S 218— PRE 6

EffacNv*: March 1, 1974

temperature requirement of 14° F. that has been
used up to now by the American National Stand-
ards Institute appears to be the most ap[)ropriate.
Accordingly, paragraph S6.3(b), "Low tempera-
ture," is revised by changing the "-20" F."
conditioning requirement to "14° F.".

5. Projections. One petitioner requested that
paragrapli S5.5, "Projections,"' be changed to
l^ermit a maximum rigid projection inside the
helmet shell of 0.080 in. with a minimum diam-
eter of 0.150 in. The basis for this request is to
allow for the use of eyelets and rivets for attach-
ment of snaps for face shields and retention
systems. The NHTSA is concerned that due
care be exercised with regard to minimizing the
injury producing potential of such fasteners.
Eyelets and rivets for the attachment of snaps
should be designed to form a portion of the
continuous surface of the inside of the helmet
shell. AVhere they are so designed, such attach-
ments would not be "rigid projections." Ac-
cordingly, no revision to this requirement is
necessary.

6. Labeling. One petitioner recommended that
the labeling requirements in paragraph S5.6 be
clarified with the help of manufacturers and
other interested parties. Since the petitioner did
not specify the points requiring clarification and
because no other comments were received on this
subject, the NHTSA has determined that no
sufficient reasons liave been given to change the
labeling requirements.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
571.218, Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 218,
Motorcycle Helmets, is amended. . . .

Effective date: March 1, 1974.

(Sees. 103, 112, 119, Public Law 89-563, 80
Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1407; delegation
of authority at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on January 23, 1974.

James B. Gregory
Administrator
39 F.R. 3554
January 28, 1974

PART 571; S 218— PRE 7-8

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY

STANDARD NO. 218

Motorcycle Helmets
(Docket No. 72-6; Notice 06)

ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY: The purpose of this notice is to amend
Safety Standard No. 218, Motorcycle Helmets, to
extend application of the current requirements to
all helmets that can be placed on the size "C"
headform. The amendment is an interim rule
requiring the certification of all large-size and
many small-size helmets, and will be in effect until
test headform sizes "A" and "D" have been
developed and incorporated in the standard. This
extended application of the standard will establish
a minimum level of performance for a large
number of helmets that are currently not being
tested and certified by manufacturers, but which
are suitable for testing on the size "C" headform.

EFFECTIVE DATE: May 1, 1980.

ADDRESSES: Any petitions for reconsideration
should refer to the docket number and notice
number and be submitted to: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, Nassif Building,
400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.
20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. William J. J. Liu, Office of Vehicle Safety
Standards, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Washington, D.C. 20590(202-
426-2264)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: For reasons
discussed below, on September 27, 1979, the
NHTSA published a notice of proposed rulemaking
to require, as an interim measure, the testing and
certification of all motorcycle helmets that can be
placed on the size "C" headform as described in

Safety Standard No. 218 (44 FR 55612). Only one
comment was received in response to that notice,
supporting the proposal.

Safety Standard No. 218, Motorcycle Helmets (49
CFR 571.218), specifies minimum performance
requirements for helmets designed for use by
motorcyclists and other motor vehicle users.
Currently, the standard is only applicable to a
portion of the annual helmet production.
Paragraph S3 of the standard provides:

* * * The requirements of this standard

apply to helmets that fit headform size C,

manufactured on or after March 1, 1974.

Helmets that do not fit headform size C will not

be covered by this standard until it is extended

to those sizes by further amendments.

"Fitting" is intended to mean something that is

neither too small nor too large. It excludes not only

helmets that are too small to be placed on the size

"C" headform, but also helmets so large that they

could be placed on the size "D" headform were it

available. As explained below, that headform size

is not currently available.

The standard references and describes in its
appendix four test headform sizes ("A", "B", "C",
and "D"). Currently only test headform size "C"
has been developed, and it is identical to the
American National Standard specifications for
Protective Headgear for Vehicular Users, ANSI
Z90.1-1971. The other test headforms are to be
scaled proportionately from the ANSI Z90 (size
"C") headform. The performance requirements of
the standard for helmets fitting other than size C
headforms were held in abeyance until these
additional headform sizes could be developed (39
FR 3554, January 28, 1974). Because of problems
with prototype headforms supplied to NHTSA
under contract (the headforms did not meet

PART 571; S 218-PRE-9

dimensional tolerances considered acceptable),
development of these additional headforms has
been delayed over the past years. However, the
agency now anticipates that the standard will
include requirements for headform sizes "A" and
"D" effective April 1, 1982 (size "B" will be
deleted from the standard).

Last year, the Safety Helmet Council of America
(SHCA) recommended that the agency require
certification of all adult-size helmets on the size
"C" headform. The SHCA stated that the delay in
development of the additional headform sizes has
led to confusion and unfair practices since many
helmets are reportedly being improperly certified
and many other helmets are not being certified
that are required to comply with the standard. The
agency has stated in the past that only helmets
that are subject to compliance with Standard No.
218 should be certified and labeled with the "DOT"
symbol. Apparently, some manufacturers have
used the "DOT" label on untested helmets for
competitive purposes. The SHCA stated that these
practices have placed considerable burdens on the
integrity of manufacturers of high quality helmets.
The organization pointed out that under the ANSI
standard only one headform (size "C") was used to
test all helmets except child-size helmets, and that
approximately 95 percent of current helmet
production could and should be tested on the size
"C" headform and certified for compliance with
Standard No. 218.

The NHTSA Office of Vehicle Safety Standards
has investigated the current labeling and
certification practices of helmet manufacturers. It
was found that most manufacturers currently test
only "medium" size helmets on the size "C"
headform, yet there is considerable variation
among manufacturers as to which helmets are
considered medium. Further, the agency found
that the percentage of helmets subject to
certification under the current applicability of the
standard is substantially greater than the 40
percent that manufacturers are now testing on the
size "C" headform. (Data from the investigation
have been placed in the NHTSA docket under the
docket number of this notice.)

As stated earlier, under the existing applicability
requirements of the standard, only helmets that
"fit" headform size "C" must be certified.
Apparently, interpretation of the term "fit" by

manufacturers has led to some mislabelings and
failures to certify. Under the existing
requirements, "helmets that fit headform size C"
should be all helmets other than those that must be
tested on the other headform sizes. To determine
which helmets must be tested on a particular
headform size, one follows the procedures of
paragraph S6.1.1 of the standard. That paragraph
provides in part:

* * * Place the complete helmet to be tested
on the reference headform of the largest size
specified in the Appendix whose circumference
is not greater than the internal circumference
of the headband when adjusted to its largest
setting, or if no headband is provided to the
corresponding interior surface of the helmet.
Using the procedure of paragraph S6.1.1,
manufacturers currently need only concern
themselves with headform sizes "C" and "D",
since small, child-size helmets that could not
physically be placed on the size "C" headform
would not have to be tested. As to the other helmet
sizes, helmets that "fit headform size C" means
any helmet that can be placed on the size "C"
headform, except those helmets which the
manufacturer can demonstrate could be placed on
a size "D" headform. To make that demonstration,
the manufacturers would have to show that the
internal circumference of the helmet headband or
the corresponding interior surface of the helmet is
larger than the circumference of the size "D"
headform. Even though the size "D" headform is
not currently available, the dimensions of the
headform are specified in the appendix of the
standard, from which the manufacturer can make
its determination. Regarding small, child-size
helmets, the determination whether or not a
particular helmet can be placed on the size "C"
headform should be based on normal fitting
procedures. This means, for example, that undue
force should not be applied to forcibly push the
headform into the helmet. However, efforts
necessary for the ordinary wearing of the helmet
should be employed, such as expanding the lower
portions of a flexible-shell, full-face helmet.
Apparently, many manufacturers have failed to
use these procedures for determining which of
their helmets "fit" headform size "C" and must be
certified.

In light of the improper certification and the
noncertification, the unavailability of the
additional headform sizes at the present time, the

PART 571; S 218-PRE-lO

need to ensure the safe performance of the large
helmets and the apparent sufficiency of the size
"C" headform for testing large helmets, the
agency has concluded that the recommendations of
the Safety Helmet Council of America have merit.
Therefore, this notice amends Safety Standard No.
218 to require all motorcycle helmets that can be
placed on the size "C" headform to be certified in
accordance with the requirements of the standard.
"Placed" is a broader term than "fit" primarily in
that the former term does not imply any upper
limit on helmet size.

Under these interim requirements, more than 90
percent of current helmet production will be tested
on the size "C" headform. Only small, child-size
helmets (size "A") will be excluded since they
cannot physically be placed on the size "C"
headform. As noted in the procedures discussed
above, normal fitting procedures are used to
determine if a particular helmet can be placed on
the size "C" headform, without the use of undue
force.

During its investigation, the NHTSA contacted
manufacturers whose collective market share
exceeds 80 percent of current annual helmet
production. All of these manufacturers indicated
that 90 percent or more of their helmet production
could be placed and tested on the size "C"
headform. Many of the manufacturers indicated
that they are already testing the majority of their
helmets on the size "C" headform for quality-
control purposes, even though not required by the
standard. Also, it was found that helmet shells and
performance characteristics of a particular
manufacturer's helmets do not generally vary
significantly over the various size ranges of
helmets produced.

This amendment is only an interim measure to
establish a minimum level of performance for the
large number of helmets that are currently not
being certified for compliance with Standard No.
218. Testing extra-large helmets on the size "D"
headform would require a higher level of
performance for those helmets, since the weight of
the size "D" headform is greater than that of the
size "C" headform. Therefore, development of the
size "A" and size "D" headforms has continued,
and incorporation of requirements in the standard
for these headforms will occur after development
is completed. However, until this is accomplished.

the agency believes that the performance level that
will be required by testing on the size "C"
headform is preferable to an absence of any
requirements whatsoever. As stated earlier, the
ANSI standard for helmets specifies only one
headform size ("C") for testing all helmets. The
additional headform sizes were originally specified
in Standard No. 218 in response to suggestions
from some manufacturers that requirements be
more "fine-tuned" for the various helmet sizes.

The agency has concluded that the new
requirements will preclude the great majority of
unsafe helmets currently on the road. Further,
with all adult helmets certified, retailers and
consumers will no longer be confused or misled
concerning the DOT certification labels found in
their helmets, and NHTSA's enforcement
activities will become more effective and uniform.

Under these new requirements, extra-large
helmets should be tested on the size "C" headform
without the use of "shims" or other devices to
obtain a secure fit of the helmet on the headform.
Agency tests involving extra-large helmets on the
size "C" headform show results that correlate well
with tests of medium-size helmets on the size "C"
headform. (Data from these tests have been placed
in the NHTSA docket). Therefore, the agency has
concluded that repeatable results can be obtained
under the existing procedures with the size "C"
headform.

The effective date for extending the applicability
of Standard No. 218 to all helmets that can be
placed on the size "C" headform is May 1, 1980.
The agency's past position has been that it would
be "false and misleading," within the meaning of
the statute (15 U.S.C. 1397(C)), for a "DOT"
symbol to appear without qualification on helmets
manufactured before the effective date of the
standard. However, since the standard is currently
effective for helmets that fit size "C" headforms,
and since there is such a widespread variation
among manufacturers as to which helmets they
consider to fit the size "C" headform, the agency
will allow voluntary certification and labeling of
helmets prior to May 1, 1980. This, of course,
would only apply to helmets that can be placed on
the size "C" headform. Small helmets that could
not be placed on the headform could not be
certified with the "DOT" symbol until after the

PART 571; S 218-PRE-ll

standard has been amended to include specifications
for the size "A" headform. Also, helmets certified
and labeled with the "DOT" symbol prior to the May
1, 1980, effective date will be subject to the general
enforcement provisions of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Therefore, manufacturers
will have to exercise "due care" to assure that any
helmet they certify in fact complies with the
performance requirements of Standard No. 218.

The agency has determined that this amendment
does not qualify as a significant regulation under
Executive Order 12044, "Improving Government
Regulations." A final regulatory evaluation of this
amendment has been placed in the docket for the
benefit of all interested persons.

The engineer and lawryer primarily responsible
for the development of this notice are William J. J.
Liu and Hugh Oates, respectively.

In consideration of the above, paragraph S3 of
Safety Standard No. 218, Motorcycle Helmets (49
CFR 571.218), is amended to read as follows:
§ 571.218 Standard No. 218; motorcycle helmets.

S3. Application. This standard applies to
helmets designed for use by motorcyclists and
other motor vehicle users. The requirements of this
standard apply to all helmets that can be placed on
the size C headform using normal fitting
procedures. Helmets that cannot be placed on the
size C headform will not be covered by this
standard until it is extended to those sizes by

further amendment.

*****

(The second sentence in S6.1.1 of the standard
relating to the selection of a reference headform
should be disregarded until the standard is made
effective for helmets that must be tested on
headform sizes A and D.)

Issued on February 29, 1980.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

45 F.R. 15179
March 10, 1980

PART 571; S 218-PRE-12

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NUMBER 218

Motorcycle Helmets
(Docket No. 72-6; Notice 2)

51. Scope. This standard establishes minimum
performance requirements for helmets designed
for use by motorcyclists and other motor vehicle
users.

52. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is to
reduce deaths and injuries to motorcyclists and
other motor vehicle users resulting from head
impacts.

53. Application. This standard applies to
helmets designed for use by motorcyclists and
other motor vehicle users. The requirements of this
standard apply to all helmets that can be placed on
the size C headform using normal fitting pro-
cedures. Helmets that cannot be placed on the size

C headform will not be covered by this standard
until it is extended to those sizes by further
amendment.

S4. Definitions.

"Basic plane" means a plane through the centers
of the right and left external ear openings and the
lower edge of the eye sockets (Figure 1) of a
reference headform (Figure 2) or test headform.

"Midsagittal plane" means a longitudinal plane
through the apex of a reference headform or test
headform that is perpendicular to the basic plane
(Figure 3).

"Reference plane" means a plane above and
parallel to the basic plane on a reference head-

BASIC PLANE

LOWER EDGE OF
EYE SOCKET

Ca/TER OF EXTERNAL
EAR OPENING

Figure 1

PART 571; S 218-1

VERTICAL TRANSVERSE
PLANE AS DETERMINED
BY 36. 1.3(d)

CENTER OF EXTERNAL
EAR OPENING

TEST LINE 1 INCH
BELOW REFERENCE
PLANE

NCTE:

SOLID LINES WOULD CORRESPOND
TO THE TEST LINE ON A TEST
HELMET.

TEST LINE 1 INCH
ABOVE REFERENCE
PLANE

REFERENCE PLANE

VERTICAL TRANSVERSE
PLANE AS DBTERKINED
BY S6.1.3-(b)

BASIC PLANE

l I TEST SURFACE

Figure 2

form or test headform (Figure 2) at the distance
indicated in the Appendix.

"Reference headform" means a measuring
device contoured to the dimensions of one of the
four headforms described in the Appendix, with
surface markings indicating the locations of the
basic, midsagittal, and reference planes, and the
centers of the external ear openings.

"Test headform" means a test device contoured
to the dimensions of one of the four reference
headforms described in the Appendix for all
surface areas that contact the helmet, with surface
markings indicating the locations of the basic,
midsagittal, and reference planes.

"Retention system" means the complete
assembly by which the helmet is retained in posi-
tion on the head during use.

"Helmet positioning index" means the distance
in inches, as specified by the manufacturer, from
the lowest point of the brow opening at the
lateral midpoint of the helmet to the basic plane
of a reference headform, when the helmet is

SECTION TOROJOH THE BASIC PLANE

■/Ofo MINIMW ANCLE

FTBIPHERAL VISION
CLEARANCE

Figure 3

PART 571; S 218-2

firmly and properly positioned on the reference
headform.

S5. Requirements. Each helmet shall meet the
requirements of S5.1 through S5.3 when sub-
jected to any conditioning procedure specified
in S6.3, and tested in accordance with S7.

55.1 Impact attenuation. When an impact at-
tenuation test is conducted in accordance with
S7.1, all of the following requirements shall be
met:

(a) Peak accelerations shall not exceed 400g;

(b) Accelerations in excess of 200g shall not
exceed a cumulative duration of 2.0 milliseconds;
and

(c) Accelerations in excess of 150g shall not
exceed a cumulative duration of 4.0 milliseconds.

55.2 Penetration. When a penetration test is
conducted in accordance with S7.2, the striker
shall not contact the surface of the test headform.

55.3 Retention system.

55.3.1 When tested in accordance with S7.3:

(a) The retention system or its components
shall attain the loads specified without separa-
tion; and

(b) The adjustable portion of the retention
system test device shall not move more than 1
inch measured between preliminary and test load
positions.

55.3.2 Where the retention system consists of
components which can be independently fastened
without securing the complete assembly, each
such component shall independently meet the
requirements of S5.3.1.

55.4 Configuration. Each helmet shall have a
protective surface of continuous contour at all
points in or above the test line described in
S6.1.3. The helmet shall provide peripheral
vision clearance of at least 105° to each side of
the midsagittal plane, when the helmet is ad-
justed as specified in S6.2. The vertex of these
angles, shown in Figure 3, shall be at the point
on the anterior surface of the reference headform
at the intersection of the midsagittal and basic
planes. The brow opening of the helmet shall
be at least 1 inch above all points in the basic
plane that are within the angles of peripheral
vision (see Figure 3).

55.5 Projections. A helmet shall not have any

rigid projections inside its shell. Rigid projec-
tions outside any helmet's shell shall be limited
to those required for operation of essential
accessories, and shall not protrude more than 0.19
inch.

55.6 Labeling.

S5.6.1 Each helmet shall be permanently and
legibly labeled, in a manner such that the label(s)
can be easily read without removing padding or
any other permanent part, with the following:

(1) Manufacturer's name or identification.

(2) Precise model designation.

(3) Size.

(4) Month and year of manufacture. This
may be spelled out (e.g., June 1974), or expressed
in numerals (e.g., 6/74).

(5) The symbol DOT, constituting the manu-
facturer's certification that the helmet conforms
to the applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards. This symbol shall appear on the
outer surface, in a color that contrasts with the
background, in letters at least % inch high,
centered laterally approximately 1^ inches from
the bottom edge of the posterior portion of the
helmet.

(6) Instruction to the purchaser as^ft)lJows:
"Shell and liner constructed of (identify

type(s) of materials).

"Helmet can be seriously damaged by some
common substances without damage being visible
to the user. Apply only the following: (Recom-
mended cleaning agent, paints, adhesives, etc.,
as appropriate).

"Make no modifications. Fasten helmet se-
curely. If helmet experiences a severe blow, re-
turn it to the manufacturer for inspection, or
destroy and replace it." (On an attached tag,
brochure, or other suitable means, any additional,
relevant safety information should be supplied
at the time of purchase).

55.7 Helmet positioning index. Each manu-
facturer of helmets shall establish a positioning
index for each helmet he manufactures. This
index shall be furnished immediately to any per-
son who requests the information, with respect
to a helmet identified by manufacturer, model
designation, and size.

PART .571; S 218-3

S6. Preliminary test procedures. Before sub-
jecting a helmet to the testing sequence specified
in S7., prepare it according to the following
procedures.

56.1 Reference marlcing.

56.1.1 Use a reference headform that is firmly
seated with the basic and reference planes hori-
zontal. Place the complete helmet to be tested
on the reference headform of the largest size
specified in the Appendix whose circumference
is not greater than the internal circumference
of the headband when adjusted to its largest
setting, or if no headband is provided to the cor-
responding interior surface of the helmet.

56.1.2 Apply a 10-pound static load normal to
the helmet's apex. Center the "helmet laterally
and seat it firmly on the reference headform
according to its helmet positioning index.

56.1.3 Maintaining the load and position de-
scribed in S6.1.2, draw a line (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "test line") on the outer surface of
the helmet coinciding with portions of the inter-
section of that surface with the following planes,
as shown in Figure 2:

(a) A plane 1 inch above and parallel to the
reference plane in the anterior portion of the
reference headform;

(b) A vertical transverse plane 2.5 inches be-
hind the point on the anterior surface of the
reference headform at the intersection of the
midsagittal and reference planes;

(c) The reference plane of the reference head-
form;

(d) A vertical transverse plane 2.5 inches be-
hind the center of the external ear opening in
a side view; and

(e) A plane 1 inch below and parallel to the
reference plane in the posterior portion of the
reference headform.

56.2 Helmet positioning. Prior to each test, fix
the helmet on a test headform in the position
that conforms to its helmet positioning index.
Secure the helmet so that it does not shift posi-
tion prior to impact or the application of force
during testing.

S6.2.1 In testing as specified in S7.1 and S7.2,
place the retention system in a position such that

it does not interfere with free fall, impact, or
penetration.

S6.3 Conditioning. Immediately prior to con-
ducting the testing sequence specified in S7., con-
dition each test helmet in accordance with any
one of the following procedures:

(a) Ambient conditions. Expose to a tem-
perature of 70° F. and a relative humidity of
50% for 12 hours.

(b) Low temperature. Expose to a tempera-
ture of 14° F. for 12 hours.

(c) High temperature. Expose to a tempera-
ture of 122° F. for 12 hours.

(d) Water immersion. Immerse in water at a
temperature of 77° F. for 12 hours.

If during testing, the time out of the condition-
ing environment for a test helmet exceeds 5 min-
utes, return the helmet to the conditioning
environment for a minimum of 3 minutes for
each minute out of the conditioning environment
or 12 hours, whichever is less, prior to resump-
tion of testing.

S7. Test conditions.

S7.1 Impact attenuation test.

57.1.1 Impact attenuation is measured by de-
termining acceleration imparted to an instru-
mented test headform on which a complete helmet
is mounted as specified in S6.2, when it is dropped
in guided free fall upon fixed hemispherical and
flat steel anvils.

57.1.2 Each helmet is impacted at four sites
with two successive, identical impacts at each site.
Two of these sites are impacted upon a flat steel
anvil and two upon a hemispherical steel anvil as
specified in S7.1.7 and S7.1.8. The impact sites
are at any point on the area above the test line
described in S6.1.3, and separated by a distance
not less than one-sixth of the maximum circum-
ference of the helmet.

57.1.3 The guided free fall drop heights for
the helmet and test headform combination onto
the hemispherical anvil and flat anvil are 54.5
inches and 72 inches, respectively.

57.1.4 Test headforms for impact attenuation
testing are constructed of magnesium alloy
(K-IA), and exhibit no reasonant frequencies
below 3,000 Hz.

PART 571; S 218-4

S7.1.5 Weight of the drop assembly, as speci-
fied in Table I, is the combined weight of the
instrumented test headform and supporting as-
sembly for the drop test. The weight of the
supporting assembly does not exceed 20% of the
weight of the drop assembly. The center of
gravity of the combined test headform and sup-
porting assembly lies within a cone with its axis
vertical and forming a 10° included angle with
the vertex at the point of impact.

TABLE I

WEIGHTS FOR

IMPACT ATTENUATION TEST

DROP ASSEMBLY

Reference Headform Size

Weight (Lbs)*

A

7.8

B

8.9

C

11.0

D

13.4

'Combined weight of instrumented test headform and
supporting assembly for drop test.

57.1.6 The acceleration transducer is mounted
at the center of gravity of the combined test
headform and supporting assembly with the sen-
sitive axis aligned to within 5% of vertical when
the test headform is in the impact position. The
acceleration data channel complies with SAE
Recommended Practice J211 requirements for
channel class 1,000.

57.1.7 The flat anvil is constructed of steel
with a 5-inch minimum diameter impact face,
and the hemispherical anvil is constructed of steel
with a 1.9-inch radius impact face.

57.1.8 The rigid mount for both of the anvils
consists of a solid mass of at least 300 pounds,
the outer surface of which consists of a steel plate
with minimum thickness of 1 inch and minimum
surface area of 1 ft.^

S7^ Penetration test.

S7.2.1. The penetration test is conducted by
dropping the penetration test striker in guided
free fall, with its axis aligned vertically, onto the
outer surface of the complete helmet, when
mounted as specified in S6.2, at any point above

the test line, described in S6.1.3, except on a
fastener or other rigid projection.

57.2.2 Two penetration blows are applied at
least 3 inches apart, and at least 3 inches from
the centers of any impacts applied during the
impact attenuation test.

57.2.3 The height of the guided free fall is
118.1 inches, as measured from the striker point
to the impact point on the outer surface of the
test helmet.

57.2.4 The contactable surfaces of the penetra-
tion test headforms are constructed of a metal
or metallic alloy having a Brinell hardness num-
ber no greater than 55, which will readily permit
detection should contact by the striker occur.
The surface is refinished if necessary prior to
each penetration test blow to permit detection
of contact by the striker.

57.2.5 The weight of the penetration striker
is 6 pounds, 10 ounces.

57.2.6 The point of the striker has an included
angle of 60°, a cone height of 1.5 inches, a tip
radius of 0.019 inch (standard 0.5 millimeter
radius) and a minimum hardness of 60 Rockwell,
C-scale.

57.2.7 The rigid mount for the penetration
test headform is as described in S7.1.8.

S7.3 Retention system test.

57.3.1 The retention system test is conducted
by applying a static tensile load to the retention
assembly of a complete helmet, which is mounted,
as described in S6.2, on a stationary test head-
form as shown in Figure 4, and by measuring
the movement of the adjustable portion of the
retention system test device under tension.

57.3.2 The retention system test device con-
sists of both an adjustable loading mechanism
by which a static tensile load is applied to the
helmet retention assembly and a means for hold-
ing the test headform and helmet stationary.
The retention assembly is fastened around two
freely moving rollers, both of which have 0.5
inch diameter and a 3-inch center-to-center sepa-
ration, and which are mounted on the adjustable

PART 571; S 218-5

PTQILV fOVIMC KUiTC

pcuwnK orj «uwr*si£

PCRnCH CP RETD/nO

rrsnx test dcvict. wth

DLVCTEK OS DO. WC
CCnW-TO-CWIW SEPtflA-
T1(K 3 DOCS.

BFm.TIt* ASSOSLT

lEnmA STSTD* TEST DEVICE

fi|i(l 4

portion of the tensile loading device (Figure 4).
The helmet is fixed on the test headform as neces-
sary to ensure that it does not move during the
application of the test loads to the retention
assembly.

57.3.3 A 50-pound preliminary test load is ap-
plied to the retention assembly, normal to the
basic plane of the test headform and sym-
metrical with respect to the center of the reten-
tion assembly for 30 seconds, and the maximum
distance from the extremity of the adjustable
portion of the retention system test device to
the apex of the helmet is measured.

57.3.4 An additional 250-pound test load is
applied to the retention assembly, in the same
manner and at the same location as described
in S7.3.3, for 120 seconds, and the maximum dis-
tance from the extremity of the adjustable por-
tion of the retention system test device to the
apex of the helmet is measured.

PART 571; S 218-6

APPENDIX

.5.28.

— 2.58 — 2.il-

REreRENCE BASIC
2.68 FUfl ?LUiE 2

\

\

.32

7.05', CBOTES OF
2 21( EAR OPENING

A V

6.97

I

\

3.18

2.29

CONTOUR AT^

H.83

CONTOUR AT REFraENCE PLANE

6.97

■5.02-
1.911

"T
2.32

lA

2.24

_iB

I \

-14.83 -

CCNTOUR AT BASIC PLANE

-5.28-

KEJIXEMCE
PLATE \
5.28 • 1-+

£ SYM

BASIC PUNE

2.58

I
12.11

K.57- —

ij.gii

OOMTOUR AT PLANE A-A

k.

-1.92-

99

L:

REFERENCE
PLANE

BASIC PUNE 7

2.29
2.11

.- . ^.^7 ^

- H.83 1

CCWTOUR AT PLANE B-B

HEADPOFW A

ALL DIMENSIONS IN INCHES

PART 571; S 218-7

-5. '19

5.19 1

I— 2. 38 -J

CONTOUR AT i

COJTOUR AT REFTOENCE PUNE

CONTOUR AT BASIC PLANE

-5.19 ■,

5.1

REFERHJCE \!2.68
PUmE7 I

BASIC PLANE 7

2.20

'\ 1.77-^=^

-5.15
CONTOUR AT PLANE A-A

5.19

—5.12-
-5.03-

REraraucE

I PLANE

STfM

BASIC PLANE,

-K.65-
-5.03

2.38

2.20

COWOUR AT PUUE B-B

HEADPCRM B

ALL DIMENSIONS IN INCHES

PART 571; S 218-8

-J. 6

-5.90

2.36H

-5.62-

^

REFERDJCE
Oq/ PLANE \|baSIC, I 1 ' '

A

-+-

7.881 CTNTER OF EAR

- en OPBIDC

7.80

2.56 J
CXJNTOUR AT Z

5.10

OCXmXJR AT REFERENCE PLATE

CCNTOUR AT BASIC PLANE

5.90

5.90

RQTKENCE \
PLANE -

e IsYM

1

2.88

2.36

EWSIC PUNE-i

5.12 .;

•■ 5.53 1

CONTOUR AT PIANE A-A

5.58

-5.50-
;:5.i40-

REFEraUCE
FLANE7

BASIC PLANE

z

-5.00—

— 5.'*0-

2.56

2.36

CONTOUR AT PUINE B-B

HEADPCWl C

ALL DIMEKSIONS IN INCHES

PART 571; S 218-9

6.5:

• 3.08 - 2.52 -

REFERENCE BASIC
3.21 PLAJ.'E PLAfJE ' '2.78

A l_

2.67

B.

CEI'lTETi OF EAR
0PEHDJ3

t.3k
_B

<■ 2.1^ -'
CCNTOUR AT l

.r,7i

6.^2

a

\ 3.21

_; /

;2.67

.B

g SW

5.77

ccmam at reterekce plane

5.77

CaTTOUR AT BA.SIC PLAIE

6.31

— 6.31

\
REFERHJCE '■ 3-08
PUUJE-

4.

i .SYK

' BASIC 12.52
: PIANE- '

5.1.8-

5.91

CONTOUR AT PLANE A-A

5.88.-

-—5.77

5.96

REyEREIICE
PIANE -

e iSYM

BASIC plane;

- -5.3"— --j!

~5.77 *

CONTOUR AT PLANE B-B

2.71

2.52

i

i

HEADPORM D

ALL DIMENSIONS IN INCHES

38 F.R. 22390
August 20, 1973

PART 571; S 218-10

Eff*ctlv«: Sept«mb*r I, 1976

PREAMBLE TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 219

Windshield Zone Intrusion
(Docket No. 74-21; Notice 2)

This notice establishes a new Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard No. 219, 49 CFR 571.219, that
regulates the intrusion of vehicle parts from
outside the occupant compartment into a defined
zone in front of the windshield during a frontal
barrier crash test.

The notice of proposed rulemaking on which
this issuance is based was issued on May 20, 1974
(39 F.R. 17768). An earlier notice had been
issued on August 31, 1972 (37 F.R. 17763), pro-
posing a standard that would prohibit penetra-
tion of the protected zone by any part of a
vehicle outside of the occupant compartment
during a 30-mph frontal impact into a fixed
barrier. After further study and an analysis
of comments submitted in response to that no-
tice, the NIITSA determined that the initial
rule was unnecessarily stringent since its near-
total ban on intrusion had the effect of pro-
hibiting entrance into the protected zone or
contact with the windshield by small particles
such as paint chips and glass which do not rep-
resent a danger to the vehicle occupants if they
enter the zone and impact the windshield open-
ing with a limited amount of force.

Consequently, in the notice published on May
20, 1974, the proposed standard on windshield
zone intrusion was amended to permit penetra-
tion by particles, to a depth of no more than
one-quarter inch into a styrofoam template in
the shape of the protected zone and affixed to
the windshield, during a 30-mph frontal barrier
crash.

In addition, the amended proposal published
May 20, 1974, provided that contact by vehicle
parts with the windshield opening in the area
below the protected zone, during a 30-mph bar-
rier crash test, would not be prohibited provided

that the inner surface of tliat portion of the
windshield is not penetrated. The procedure
for determining the lower edge of the protected
zone was also revised.

Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion,
reflects some minor changes incorporated for
clarification following publication of the pro-
posed rule on May 20, 1974. First, open-body-
type vehicles with fold-down or removable wind-
shields have been added to forward control
vehicles as vehicle types to which the standard
does not apply. A structurally unsupported
windshield, essential to the utility of this ve-
hicle type, typically does not remain in place
during a 30-niph frontal barrier crash test, hence
the test is impracticable for this type of vehicle.

In addition, the standard provides that its
prohibitions against penetration by particles to
a depth of more than one-quarter inch into the
styrofoam template and penetration of the inner
surface of the portion of the windshield below
the protected zone do not apply to windshield
molding and other components designed to be
normally in contact with the windshield. This
provision was contained in the proposed stand-
ard published Augu.st 31, 1972 but omitted from
the proposal published May 20, 1974.

The standard as adopted also specifies that
the 6.5-inch-diameter rigid sphere employed to
determine the lower edge of the protected zone
shall weigh 15 pounds, the approximate weight
of the head and neck of an average driver or
passenger.

Comments submitted by Wayne Corporation
and Sheller-Globe Corporation, manufacturers
of funeral coaclies and ambulances, urged that
the standard for windshield zone intrusion con-
tain an exception for such vehicles in view of

PART 571; S 219— PRE 1

Effadlv*: Saplambar 1, 1976

the low incidence of accidents involving funeral
coaches and ambulances, the low volume of pro-
duction of such vehicles, and the high cost of
barrier crash testing. The NHTSA has deter-
mined that these arguments are without merit.
The manufacturers have presented no evidence
to support the contention that funeral coaches
and ambulances are involved in fewer accidents
in proportion to their numbers than other ve-
hicles. Furthermore, several comments criticiz-
ing the allegedly prohibitive costs of compliance
with the standard appear to have erroneously
assumed that every manufacturer must conduct
barrier crash tests. The performance require-
ment for windshield zone intrusion is set out in
S5. of the standard. A manufacturer of funeral
coaches and ambulances may, for example, as-
sure itself that the requirement is met by barrier
crashing the conventional chassis which is a com-
ponent of the special vehicle, modified to simu-
late the dynamic characteristics of the funeral
coach or ambulance. Or, the manufacturer may
use the design characteristic of the vehicle tak-
ing into account the modifications it makes, or
information supplied by the chassis manufac-
turer.

Low volume of production is not an appro-
priate basis for an exemption. As the NHTSA
has maintained in past proceedings where the
same argument was advanced, the appropriate
means to avoid application of a standard on

hardship grounds is a temporary exemption
under 49 CFR Part 555.

Finally, the NHTSA is continuing to promote
compatibility and economy in barrier crash test-
ing by adopting vehicle loading and dummy
restraint requirements in Standard No. 219
identical to those set out in proposed amend-
ments to Standard No. 301, Fv£.l System Integ-
rity, 49 CFR 571.301 (40 F.R. 17036, April 16,
1975). It has therefore required that 50th-
percentile test dummies be placed in the seating
positions whose restraint system is required to
be tested by a dummy under Standard No. 208,
Occupant Crash Protection, 49 CFR 571.208, and
that they may be restrained only by the means
that are installed in the vehicle at the respective
seating positions.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
Part 571 is amended by the addition of a new
Standard No. 219, 49 CFR 571.219, Windshield
Zone Intrusion. . . .

Effective date : September 1, 1976.
(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; delegation of authority
at 49 C.F.R. 1.51.)

Issued on June 9, 1975.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

40 F.R. 25462
June 16, 1975

PART 571; S 219— PRE 2

EPectlva: Saptambcr ), 1976
Saplambar 1, 1977

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 219

Windshield Zone Intrusion
(Docket No. 74-21; Notice 3)

This notice responds to four petitions for re-
consideration of the notice published June 16,
1975 (40 FR 25462), which established a new
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 219, Wind-
shield Zone intrusion, 49 CFR 571.219, regulat-
ing the intrusion of vehicle parts from outside
the occupant compartment into a defined zone
in front of the windshield during a frontal
barrier crash test. The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) hereby
amends Standard No. 219 on the basis of the
information and arguments presented by some
of the petitioners.

Petitions for reconsideration were received
from the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associa-
tion (MVMA), General Motors, Ford, and Jeep.
MVMA, General Motors, and Ford requested
substitution of the term "daylight opening" for
"windshield opening," and General Motors and
Jeep requested a change in the effective date of
Standard No. 219 from September 1, 1976 to
September 1, 1977. In addition, Jeep requested
that Standard No. 219 not become applicable
until final issuance of Standard No. 212, Wind-
shield Mounting, 49 CFR 571.212.

The NHTSA has detennined that the peti-
tions of MVMA, General Motors, and Ford
requesting substitution of the term "daylight
opening" for "windshield opening" have merit,
and they are therefore granted. These peti-
tioners requested that the term "windshield open-
ing" be replaced by the term "daylight opening",
which is defined in paragraph 2.3.12 of section
E, Ground Vehicle Practice, SAE Aerospace-
Automotive Drawing Standards, September,
1963. The part of the windshield below the day-
light opening is protected by the cowling and
instrument panel. There is little likelihood that

in a frontal crash any vehicle component will
penetrate the cowling and instrument panel with
sufficient force to pose a threat to the vehicle
occupants. Therefore, the zone intrusion require-
ments of Standard No. 219 should only apply
to the area of the windshield susceptible to
actual penetration by vehicle components in a
crash. Accordingly, the term "windshield open-
ing" as it is used in Standard No. 219, is replaced
by "daylight opening." The SAE definition of
"daylight opening" has been slightly modified to
reflect the particular characteristics of Standard
No. 219.

The NHTSA has concluded that the petitions
of General Motors and Jeep recjuesting a change
in the effective date of Standard No. 219 should
be granted in part and denied in part. The
economic considerations involved in coordinating
the effective date of Standard No. 219 with that
of Standard No. 212, Windshield Mounting,
justify postponement of the effective date to
September 1, 1977, for application of Standard
No. 219 to all vehicles except passenger cai^s.
However, the effective date of September 1, 1976,
will be retained for passenger cars because of
their greater susceptibility to the intrusion of
vehicle parts against which tliis standard is de-
signed to protect. This postponement of effec-
tive dates also grants in part Jeep's petition
requesting that the applicability of Standard
No. 219 be postponed until final issuance of
Standard No. 212.

In consideration of the foregoing, § 571.219
is amended by revising S4., S5., and S6.1(d) of
Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion,
to read as follows :

Effective date: September 1, 1976, for pas-
senger cars; September 1, 1977, for multipurpose

PART 571; S 219— PRE 3

Effective: September I, 1976
September 1, 1977

passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses with a Issued on November 10, 1975.

GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less. James B. Gregory

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 Administrator

(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; delegation of authority 40 F.R. 53033

at 49 CFR 1.51.) November 14, 1975

PART 571; S 219— PRE 4

Effective: December 16, 1976

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 219

Windshield Zone Intrusion
(Docket No. 74-21; Notice 5)

This notice amends Standard No. 219. Wirul-
shield Zone Inti'usion, to exclude walk-in van-
type vehicles from the requirements of the
standard.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration (NHTSA) proposed to exclude walk-in
van-type vehicles from the applicability of
Standard No. 219 (49 CFR 571.219) in a notice
published March 11, 1976 (41 FR 10451). No
opposition was registered in response to the pro-
posed rulemaking. The National Motor Vehicle
Safety Advisory Council did not take a position
on the proposal.

The NHTSA, therefore, amends Standard No.
219 in accordance with the proposal. For the
information of all interested per.sons, the
NHTSA considers a "walk-in van-type" vehicle
to be only the "step van'" city delivery type of
vehicle that permits a person to enter the vehicle
without .stooping.

It has been determined that this amendment
will have a negligible economic and envii-on-

mental impact, since it creates an exemption
from existing requirements that is expected to
affect relatively few vehicles.

In consideration of the foregoing, paragraph
S3 of Standard No. 219 (49 CFR r)71.219) is
amended ....

Effective date: December 16, 1976. Because
this amen<hnent relieves a restriction and does
not create additional obligations for any person
and because it permits the resumption of manu-
facture of a vehicle type not intended to be cov-
ered by the standard, it is found that an
immediate effective date is in the public interest.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-.-.63, SO Stat. 718
(If) U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; delegation of authority
at 49 CFR l..")0.)

Issued on December 10, 1976.

Charles E. Duke
Acting Administrator

41 FR 54945
December 16, 1976

PART 571; S 219— PRE 5-6

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY

STANDARD NO. 219

Windshield Zone Intrusion
(Doctcet No. 79-14; Notice 2)

ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends two safety
standards, Standard No. 212, Windshield
Mounting, and Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone
Intrusion, to limit the maximum unloaded vehicle
weight at which vehicles must be tested for
compliance with these standards. This action is
being taken in response to petitions from the Truck
Body and Equipment Association and the National
Truck Equipment Association asking the agency to
amend the standards to provide relief from some of
the test requirements for final-stage manufacturers.
Many of these small nmnufacturers do not have the
sophisticated test devices of major vehicle
manufacturers. The agency concludes that the
weights at which vehicles are tested can be lessened
while providing an adequate level of safpty for
vehicles such as light trucks and while ensuring that
compliance with these standards does not increase
their aggressivity with respect to smaller vehicles.

EFFECTIVE DATE: Since this amendment relieves
a restriction by easing the existing test procedure
and will not impose any additional burdens upon
any manufacturer, it is effective (upon
publication).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. William Smith, Crashworthiness Division,
National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-2242)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

On August 2, 1979, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration published a notice of
proposed rulemaking (44 FR 45426) relating to two
safety standards: Standard Nos. 212, Windshield

Mounting, and 219 Windshield Zone Intrusion.
That notice proposed two options for amending the
test procedures of the standards that were designed
to ease the compliance burdens of small final-stage
manufacturers.

The agency issued the proposal after learning that
final-stage manufacturers were frequently unable to
certify certain vehicles in compliance with these two
safety standards. The problem arises because of
weight and center of gravity restrictions imposed
upon the final-stage manufacturer by the incomplete
vehicle manufacturer. (The final-stage manufacturer
typically purchases an incomplete vehicle from an in-
complete vehicle manufacturer, usually Ford,
General Motors or Chrysler.) The incomplete vehicle
usually includes the windshield and mounting but
does not include any body or work-performing equip-
ment. Since the incomplete vehicle manufacturer
installs the windshield, it represents to the final-stage
manufacturer that the windshield will comply with
the two subject safety standards. In making this
representation, however, the incomplete vehicle
manufacturer states that the representation is con-
tingent on the final-stage manufacturer's adherence
to certain restrictions. Any final-stage manufacturer
that does not adhere to the restrictions imposed by
the incomplete vehicle manufacturer must recertify
the vehicle based upon its own information, analysis,
or tests. The major restrictions imposed by the
incomplete vehicle manufacturers on the final-stage
manufacturer involve weight and center of gravity
limitation. In many instances, these limitations have
made it impossible for final-stage manufacturers
either to rely on the incomplete vehicle
manufacturer's certification or to complete vehicles
on the same chassis that they were accustomed to
using (prior to the extension of the two safety
standards to these vehicle types). As a result, the
final-stage manufacturer is faced either with buying

PART 571; S 219, PRE-7

the same chassis as before and recertifying them
or with buying more expensive chassis with higher
GVWR's and less stringent weight and center of
gravity hmitations.

The agency has tried several different ways to
alleviate this problem for the final-stage
manufacturer. The NHTSA has met with
representatives of the major incomplete vehicle
manufacturers to encourage them to respond
voluntarily by strengthening their windshield
structures and reducing the restrictions that they
currently impose upon final-stage manufacturers.
The agency also discussed the possibility of its
mandating these actions by upgrading Standards
Nos. 212 and 219. Ford and General Motors
indicated that the making of any major changes in
these standards could lead to their deciding to
discontinue offering chassis for use in the
manufacturing of multi-stage vehicles. They said
that such chassis were a very small percentage of
their light truck sales and that, therefore, they
would not consider it worth the cost to them to
make any extensive modifications in their vehicles.
NHTSA also asked the incomplete vehicle
manufacturers to be sure that they have properly
certified their existing vehicles and that they are
not imposing unnecessarily restrictive limitations
upon final-stage manufacturers. To this agency's
knowledge, these vehicle manufacturers have
neither undertaken any strengthening of their
vehicles' windshield structures nor lessened any of
their restrictions.

At the same time that the agency was made
aware of the final-stage manufacturers' problems
of certifying to these standards, the agency was
becoming concerned about the possibility that
compliance of some light trucks and vans with
these standards might have made the vehicles
more aggressive with respect to smaller passenger
cars that they might impact. According to agency
information, if these standards require a
substantial strengthening of vehicle frames, the
aggressivity of the vehicles is increased.
Therefore, as a result of the agency's concern
about aggressivity and its desire to address the
certification problems of final-stage manufacturers
in a manner that would not lead to a cessation of a
chassis sales to those manufacturers, the agency
issued the August 1979 proposal. The agency
hoped that the proposal would allow and encourage
incomplete vehicle manufacturers to reduce their

weight and center of gravity restrictions, thereby
easing or eliminating the compliance test burdens
of final-stage manufacturers. The agency believed
that this could occur using either option, because
either would result in vehicles being tested at
lower weights. Currently vehicles are tested under
both standards at their unloaded vehicle weights
plus 300 pounds.

The first option would have required some
vehicles whose unloaded vehicle weights exceeded
4,000 pounds to be tested by being impacted with a
4,000 pound moving barrier. The second option
proposed by the agency would have required
vehicles to be tested at their unloaded vehicle
weight up to a maximum unloaded vehicle weight
of 5,500 pounds. This option was suggested to the
agency by several manufacturers and manufac-
turer representatives.

Comments on Notice

In response to the agency's notice, nine
manufacturers and manufacturer representatives
submitted comments. All of the commenters
supported some action in response to the problems
of final-stage manufacturers. Most of the
commenters also suggested that the agency's
second alternative solution was more likely to
achieve reductions in the restrictions being
imposed by incomplete vehicle manufacturers. The
first option would have created a new, unproven
test procedure, and manufacturers would have
been cautious in easing center of gravity or weight
restrictions based upon this test procedure.
Accordingly, most commenters were not sure that
the first option would achieve the desired results.
The consensus was, therefore, that the second
option should be adopted.

Some manufacturers recommended that both
options be permitted allowing the manufacturer to
decide how to test its vehicles. The agency does not
agree with this recommendation. Not only would it
be more difficult and expensive to enforce a
standard that has alternative test procedures, but
most manufacturers prefer the 5,500 pound weight
limit option. The NHTSA concludes that as a result
of the comments supporting the 5,500 pound
maximum test weight, that this is an acceptable
procedure for testing compliance with these two
standards. Therefore, the standards are amended
to incorporate this procedure.

PART 571; S 219, PRE-8

The major incomplete vehicle manufacturers
commenting on the notice suggested that testing
vehicles at a maximum weight of 5,500 pounds
might provide some immediate relief. None of the
major incomplete vehicle manufacturers provided
any information concerning how substantial that
relief might be. Ford indicated that any relief
might be limited.

The agency believes that the incomplete vehicle
manufacturers must accept the responsibility for
establishing reasonable restrictions upon their
incomplete vehicles. The NHTSA has not been
provided with sufficient evidence substantiating
the statements of the incomplete vehicle
manufacturers that their existing restrictions are
reasonable. In fact, some evidence indicates that
unnecessarily stringent restrictions are being
imposed because incomplete vehicle manufacturers
do not want to conduct the necessary testing to
establish the appropriate weight and center of
gravity restrictions. Since this amendment should
reduce the severity of the test procedures, the
agency concludes that incomplete vehicle
manufacturers should immediately review their
certification test procedures and reduce the
restrictions being passed on to final-stage
manufacturers.

Due to changes in the light truck market, there is
reason to believe that the incomplete vehicle
manufacturers will be more cooperative than when
the agency spoke to them before beginning this
rulemaking. At that time, light truck sales were
still running well. Now that these sales are down,
these manufacturers may be more solicitous of the
needs of the final-stage manufacturers. If relief is
not provided by the incomplete vehicle
manufacturers, then the agency will consider
taking additional steps, including the upgrading of
Standards Nos. 212 and 219 as they apply to all
light trucks.

General Motors (GM) questioned one of the
agency's rationales for issuing the notice of
proposed rulemaking. GM stated that the agency
concludes that this action will provide a more
appropriate level of safety for the affected vehicles
while the initial extension of these standards to the
affected vehicles provides, in GM's view, only a
slight increase in the level of safety of the vehicles.
GM indicates that since the application of these
standards to the affected vehicles provides only
slight benefits and since this amendment vill

reduce those benefits, the standards should not
apply to light trucks and vans. The agency
disagrees with this suggestion.

The agency is currently reviewing the
applicability of many of its safety standards to
determine whether they ought to be extended to
light trucks and other vehicles. Accident data
clearly indicate the benefits that have resulted
from the implementation of safety standards to
cars. The fatality rate for passenger cars has
decreased substantially since the implementation
of a broad range of safety standards to those
vehicles. On the other hand, light trucks and vans
have not had a corresponding reduction in fatality
rates over the years. The agency attributes much
of this to the fact that many safety standards have
not been applied to those vehicles. Since those
vehicles are becoming increasingly popular as
passenger vehicles, the agency concludes that
safety standards must apply to them.

In response to GM's comment that this reduction
in the test requirements for Standard Nos. 212 and
219 will remove all benefits derived by having the
standards apply to those vehicles, the agency
concludes that GM has misinterpreted the effects
of this amendment. This amendment will reduce
somewhat the compliance test requirements for
those light trucks and vans with unloaded vehicle
weights in excess of 5,500 pounds. It will not affect
light trucks with unloaded vehicle weights below
5,500 pounds. According to agency information,
approximately 25 percent of the light trucks have
unloaded vehicle weights in excess of 5,500 while
the remainder fall below that weight. As a result of
weight reduction to improve fuel economy, it is
likely that even more light trucks will fall below the
5,500 pound maximum test weight in the future.
Therefore, this amendment will have no impact
upon most light trucks and vans. In light of the
small proportion of light trucks and vans affected
by this amendment and considering the potential
benefits of applying these standards to all light
trucks and vans, the agency declines to adopt GM's
suggestion that the standards be made inapplicable
to these vehicles.

With respect to GM's question about the
appropriate level of safety for light trucks, the
agency's statement in the notice of proposed
rulemaking was intended to show that the safety of
light trucks and vans cannot be viewed without
considering the relative safety of lighter vehicles

PART 571; S 219, PRE-9

that they may impact. Accordingly, the level of
safety that the agency seeks to achieve by this and
other safety standards is determined by balancing
the interests of the occupants of passenger cars
and heavier vehicles.

GM also questioned the agency's statement that
vehicle aggressivity may be increased by imposing
too severe requirements on these vehicles. GM
suggested that no evidence exists that vehicle
aggressivity is increased as a result of complying
with these standards.

The agency stated in the proposal that it was
concerned that compliance with the standards as
they now exist might have increased the
aggressivity of the vehicles, thereby harming the
occupants of passenger cars that are impacted by
these larger, more rigid vehicles. The agency is
now beginning to examine the full range of vehicle
aggressivity problems. The docket for this notice
contains a paper recently presented by a member
of our staff to the Society of Automotive
Engineers on this subject. The agency tentatively
concludes, based upon the initial results of our
research and analysis, that vehicle aggressivity
could be a safety problem and that the agency
considers that possibility in issuing its safety
standards. The NHTSA notes that Volkswagen
applauds the agency's recognition of the vehicle
aggressivity factor in safety.

As to GM's argument that compliance with the
standards may not have increased vehicle
aggressivity, our information on this point came
from the manufacturers. The manufacturers
indicated that compliance with Standards 212 and
219 requires strengthening the vehicle frame. This
makes a vehicle more rigid. Our analysis indicates
that making a vehicle more rigid may also make it
more aggressive. Therefore, the agency concludes
partially on the basis of the manufacturer's
information, that compliance with the safety
standards as they are written may have increased
the aggressivity of the vehicles.

Ford Motor Company suggested that, rather
than change these two particular standards, the
agency should amend the certification regulation
(Part 568) to state that any vehicle that is barrier
tested would be required only to comply to an
unloaded vehicle weight of 5,500 pounds or less.
Fo^rd suggested that this would standardize all of
the tests and provide uniformity.

The agency is unable to accept Ford's
recommendation for several reasons. First, the
certification regulation is an inappropriate place to
put a test requirement applicable to several
standards. The tests' requirements of the
standards should be found in each standard.
Second, the Ford recommendation would result in
a reduction of the level of safety currently imposed
by Standard No. 301, Fiiel System Integrity.

As we stated earlier and in several other notices,
the agency is legislatively forbidden to modify
Standard No. 301 in a way that would reduce the
level of safety now required by that standard.
Even without this legislative mandate, the agency
would not be likely to relieve the burdens imposed
by Standard No. 301. That standard is extremely
important for the prevention of fires during
crashes. Compliance of a vehicle with this standard
not only protects the occupants of the vehicle that
is in compliance but also protects the occupants of
vehicles that it impacts. The agency concludes that
the standard now provides a satisfactory level of
safety in vehicles, and NHTSA would not be likely
to amend it to reduce these safety benefits even if
such an amendment were possible.

With respect to fuel system integrity, several
manufacturers suggested that the agency had
underestimated the impact of that standard upon
weight and center of gravity restrictions. These
commenters indicated that compliance with that
standard requires more than merely adding shielding
to the fuel systems of the vehicles. The agency is
aware that compliance with that standard in certain
instances has imposed restrictions upon
manufacturers. Nonetheless, the agency continues to
believe that as a result of this amendment, the
chassis manufacturers will be able to reduce their
weight and center of gravity restrictions while still
maintaining the compliance of their vehicles with
Standard No. 301.

Chrysler commented that the agency should
consider including the new test procedure in
Standard No. 204 and all other standards that
require barrier testing. The agency has issued a
notice on Standard No. 204 (44 FR 68470) stating
that it was considering a similar test provision for
that standard. The agency also is aware that any
barrier test requirement imposed upon vehicles
subject to substantial modifications by final-stage

PART 571; S 219, PRE-10

manufacturers will create problems for the final-
stage manufacturers. Accordingly, the agency will
consider the special problems of these manufacturers
prior to the the issuance of standards that might
affect them and will attempt to make the test
requirements of the various standards consistent
wherever possible.

The agency has reviewed this amendment in
accordance with Executive Order 12044 and
concludes that it will have no significant economic or
other impact. Since the regulation relieves some
testing requirements, it may slightly reduce costs
associated with some vehicles. Accordingly, the
agency concludes that this is not a significant
amendment and a regulatory analysis is not required.

In accordance with the foregoing, Volume 49 of
the Code of Federal Regulations Part 571 is

amended by adding the following sentence to the
end of paragraph S6.1(b) of Standard No. 212 (49
CFR 571.212) and paragraph S7.7(b) of Standard
No. 219 (49 CFR 571.219).

Vehicles are tested to a maximum unloaded
vehicle weight of 5,500 pounds.

The authors of this notice are William Smith of
the Crashworthiness Division and Roger Tilton of
the Office of Chief Counsel.

Issued on March 28, 1980.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

45 F.R. 22044
April 3, 1980

PART 571; S 219, PRE-11-12

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 219
Windshield Zone Intrusion

51. Scope. This standard specifies limits for
the displacement into the windshield area of
motor vehicle components during a crash.

52. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is
to reduce crash injuries and fatalities that result
from occupants contacting vehicle components
displaced near or through the windshield.

53. Application. This standard applies to
passenger cars and to multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks and buses of 10,000 pounds or
less gross vehicle weight rating. However, it
does not apply to forward control vehicles,
walk-in van-type vehicles, or to open body-type
vehicles with fold-down or removable wind-
shields.

54. Definitions.

"Daylight Opening" (DLO) means the maxi-
mum unobstructed opening through the glazing
surface, including reveal or garnish moldings
adjoining the surface, as measured parallel to
the outer surface of the glazing material.

"Windshield opening" means the outer surface
of the windshield glazing material.

85. Requirement. When the vehicle traveling
longitudinally forward at any speed up to and
including 30 mph impacts a fixed collision bar-
rier that is perpendicular to the line of travel
of the vehicle, under the conditions of S7, no
part of the vehicle outside the occupant com-
partment, except windshield molding and other
components designed to be normally in contact
with the windshield, shall penetrate the protected
zone template, affixed according to S6, to a depth
of more than one-quarter inch, and no such part
of a vehicle shall penetrate the inner surface of

that portion of the windshield, within the DLO,
below the protected zone defined in S6.

S6. Protected zone template.

S6.1 The lower edge of the protected zone is
determined by the following procedure (see
Figure 1).

(a) Place a 6.5-inch diameter rigid sphere,
weighing 15 pounds, in a position such that it
simultaneously contacts the inner surface of the

LOWEB BOUNDARY OF
WINDSHIELD PflOTECTED
ZONE

HORIZONTAL EXTENSION
BEYOND OUTERMOST
CONTACTABLE POINT

CROSS SECTION OF
PROTECTED ZONE IN
TYPICAL VERTICAL
LONGITUDINAL PLANE

POINT OF CONTACT
BETWEEN SPHERE AND
INNER SURFACE OF
WINDSHIELD

FRONT VIEW

SIDE VIEW

WINDSHIELD PROTECTED ZONE
Figure 1

windshield glazing and the surface of the in-
strument panel, including padding. If any
accessories or equipment such as the steering
control system obstruct positioning of the sphere,
remove them for the purposes of this procedure.

(b) Draw the locus of points on the inner
surface of the windshield contactable by the
sphere across the width of the instrument panel.
From the outermost contactable points, extend

PART 571; S 219-1

the locus line horizontally to the edges of the
glazing material.

(c) Draw a line on the inner surface of the
windshield below and one-half inch distant from
the locus line.

(d) The lower edge of the protected zone
is the longitudinal projection onto the outer sur-
face of the windshield of the line determined
in S6.1(c).

56.2 The protected zone is the space enclosed
by the following surfaces, as shown in Figure 1:

(a) The outer surface of the windshield in
its precrash configuration.

(b) The locus of points 3 inches outward
along perpendiculars drawn to each point on the
outer surface of the windshield.

(c) The locus of lines forming a 45° angle
with the outer surface of the windshield at each
point along the top and side edges of the outer
surface of the windshield and the lower edge of
the protected zone determined in S6.1, in the
plane perpendicular to the edge at that point.

56.3 A template is cut or formed from Styro-
foam, type DB, cut cell, to the dimensions of the
zone as determined in S6.2. The template is
affixed to the windshield so that it delineates the
protected zone and remains affixed throughout
the crash test.

S7. Test conditions. The requirement of S5
shall be met under the following conditions:

57.1 The protected zone template is affixed to
the windshield in the manner described in S6.

57.2 The hood, hood latches, and any other
hood retention components are engaged prior to
the barrier crash.

57.3 Adjustable cowl tops or other adjustable
panels in front of the windshield are in the po-
sition used under normal operating conditions
when windshield wiping systems are not in use.

57.4 The parking brake is disengaged and the
transmission is in neutral.

57.5 Tires are inflated to the vehicle manu-
facturer's specifications.

57.6 The fuel tank is filled to any level from
90 to 95 percent of capacity.

57.7 The vehicle, including test devices and
instrumentation, is loaded as follows:

(a) Except as specified in S7.6, a passenger
car is loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight plus
its rated cargo and luggage capacity weight, se-
cured in the luggage area, plus a 50th-percentile
test dummy as specified in Part 572 of this chap-
ter at each front outboard designated seating
position and at any other position whose protec-
tion system is required to be tested by a dummy
under the provisions of Standard No. 208. Each
dummy is restrained only by means that are in-
stalled for protection at its seating position.

(b) Except as specified in ST. 6, a multipurpose
passenger vehicle, truck or bus is loaded to its
unloaded vehicle weight, plus 300 pounds or its
rated cargo and luggage capacity, whichever is
less, secured to the vehicle, plus a 50th-percentile
test dummy as specified in Part 572 of this chap-
ter at each front outboard designated seating
position and at any other position whose protec-
tion system is required to be tested by a dummy
under the provisions of Standard No. 208. Each
dummy is restrained only by means that are in-
stalled for protection at its seating position. The
load is distributed so that the weight on each
axle as measured at the tire-ground interface is
in proportion to its GAWR. If the weight on
any axle when the vehicle is loaded to its un-
loaded vehicle weight plus dummy weight ex-
ceeds the axle's proportional share of the test
weight, the remaining weight is placed so that
the weight on that axle remains the same. For
the purposes of this section, unloaded vehicle
weight does not include the weight of work-
performing accessories.

40 F.R. 25462
June 16, 1975

PART 571; S 219-2

Effective: October 26, 1976

PREAMBLE TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 220

School Bus Rollover Protection
(Docket No. 75-2; Notice 2)

This notice establishes a new motor vehicle
safety Standard No. 220, School Bus Rollover
Protection, 49 CFR 571.220, specifying perform-
ance requirements for the structural integrity of
the passenger compartment of school buses when
subjected to forces that can be encountered in
rollovei's.

The Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety
Amendments of 1974 (the Act) mandate the is-
suance of Federal motor vehicle safety standards
for several aspects of school bus performance,
including crashworthiness of the vehicle body
and frame. Pub. L. 93-942, section 202 (l.")
IT.S.C. 1392(i)(l)(A)). Based on this maii-
iliiie and on bus body crashworthiness rcscaicli
(DOT-HS-046-3-694), the NHTSA proposed
rollover protection requirements for school buses
(-10 F.R. 8570, February 28, 1975). Citing sta-
tistics on the safety record of school bus opera-
tion, several manufacturers questioned whether
any standard for school bus rollover protection
could be justified.

Tiie Act reflects a need, evidenced in corre-
spondence to the NHTSA from the public, to
protect the children who ride in school buses.
They and their parents have little direct control
over the types of vehicles in which they ride to
school, and are not in a position to determine
the safety of the vehicles. It is for this reason
that the school bus standards must be effective
and meaningful.

At the same time, the safety history of school
buses does not demonstrate that radical modifica-
tion of school bus structure would substantially
decrease occupant death and injury. As Tioted
in the "School Bus Safety Improvement Pro-
prnm" contract conducted by Ultrasystcius. Inc..
(DOT-HS-046-3-694) for the NHTSA :

"School buses are a relatively safe mode of hu-
man transportation. Scliool bus accident rates
and injury/fatality rates on a per-vehicle, per-
vehicle-mile, per-passenger-mile, or per-passen-
ger basis are significantly less than for other
passenger vehicles. Accidents to school children
while enroute to and from school occur primarily
in modes other than as school bus passengers.
However, school bus .safety can and should be
improved."

As a practical matter, the amount of struc-
tural modification called for in this standard is
also limited as a result of the D-month lead time
available to implement the provisions of each
school bus standard after its pi'omulgation. The
various new requirements imposed in response to
the mandate of the Act will reciuii'e considerable
effort by school bus manufacturers to bring their
products into confornnty in the 9-inontli period.

The Physicians for Automotive Safety, The
National Transportation Safety Board, the Home
Insurance Company and other commenters
suggested that the NHTSA had ignored the
recommendations of the report submitted by
Ultrasystems on school bus improvement. The
report concluded that the improved school bus
design tested by Ulti-asystems could withstand a
significantly greater load for the same amount
of roof crush than existing school bus designs.

In fact, tiie NHTSA evaluated the test re-
suits and Ultrasystem's recommendations care-
fully. While the percentage of reduction of roof
crush would be substantial as a result of the
recommended design change, no relationship of
this decrease in deflection to improved safety
for occupants was established. Ultrasystems re-
ported that increases of $500 in cost and 530
pounds were incui'red to aciiicxe several improve-

PART 571; S 220— PRE 1

EfFective: October 26, 1976

merits. includin<; those of the vertical 7oof crusli
test.

The recommendations also implied increased
structural rigidity but did not evaluate its effect
on the amount of energy absorbed by vehicle
occupants in a crash. Also, Ultrasystems, did
not consider the problems of lead time and re-
tooling costs in iiialcing its recommendations.
The NHTSA continues to consider that its pro-
posal of 5% inches of maximum roof crush under
a load equal to II/2 times the vehicle's unloaded
weight provides a satisfactory level of occupant
crash protection. Available data do not support
the conclusion tliat a 2- or 3-inch reduction of
this crush would significantly improve the level
of passenger safety in school buses. It is the
intention of the NHTSA to continually review
accident statistics relating to school bus safety.
Accordingly, future upgrading of the standard
will be considered should such action be war-
ranted based upon availability of appropriate
data.

In response to inquiries from the Motor Ve-
hicle Manufacturers Association and General
Motors as to the origin of the 5%-inch require-
ment, the limit is drawn from the existing School
Bus Manufacturers Institute requirement for
school bus structural integrity (Static Load Test
Code for School Bus Body Structure, issued by
the School Bus Manufacturers Institute).

In adopting the oi/g-inch limit found in the
present industry standard, tlie XIITSA is not
merely preserving the status quo. While a man-
ufacturer may have designed its products to
meet the industry standard in the past, certain
of its i)roducts presumably performed either bet-
ter or worse than tlie nominal design. Con-
formity to NHTSA standards, in contrast.
re(|uires that every vehicle be capable of meeting
the .-)%-inch limit. This means tliat the manu-
facturer must design its vehicles to meet a higher
level of peiformancc, to provide a comi)liance
margin for those of its products which fall below
the nominal design level. Of course, the manu-
facturer can reduce the compliance-margin
problem without I'cdesign by improving the con-
sistency of its manufacturing pi'ocesses.

The standard requires that, upon the applica-
tion of vertical downward force to the bus roof
equal to II/2 times the vehicle's unloaded weight.

the vehicle roof shall not crush more than Si/g
inches, and the emergency exits shall be capable
of being opened, with the weight applied, and
after its release. The National Transportation
Safety Board, the Vehicle Equipment Safety
Commission (VESC), Mercedes-Benz, and the
Action for Child Transportation Safety organiza-
tion suggested other methods for evaluation of
crashworthiness. The NHTSA has considered
these, but concludes that the static test specified
in this standard provides a reasonable means to
determine crashworthiness without unnecessary
testing expense.

Based on submitted comments, the standard
varies in some respects from the proposal. The
sizes of the force application plates used to apply
force and the method of application have been
revised to simplify the test procedures and equip-
ment, and to spread the force over larger areas
of the vehicle roofs of large and small vehicles.
The proposal specified a rigid, rectangular force
application plate 36 inches wide and 20 inches
shorter than the vehicle roof, preventing re-
liance on the roof end structures for rollover
protection in typical body-on-chassis construc-
tion. Commenters pointed out that the end
structures of the roof are almost certain to bear
the weight of a rollover and should be included
in a test of a vehicle's crashworthiness. Several
manufacturers and other commenters recom-
mended an increase in the size of the force ap-
plication plate, in order to permit the foremost
and rearmost roof "bows" of their buses to absorb
a portion of the test load. Ford Motor Company
stated it had performed the test as proposed and
asserted that the roof of its van-type vehicle, as
presently designed could not meet the require-
ment without an increase in the size of the force
application plate to distribute the load over the
entire vehicle roof. Chrysler Corporation stated
it would find it necessary to discontinue produc-
tion of small school buses because of redesign
costs if the requirements were adopted as pro-
posed.

With a view to the safety record of school
buses and the 9-month lead time, the NHTSA
concludes that the force application plate can
be modified so that an additional "bow" or
"bows'' l)ear part of the applied force. It is the
XHTSA's view that a change to permit both

PART 571; S 220— PRE 2

Effaclivt: October 26, 1976

roof end structures to fully contribute to support
of the applied force in the case of buses of more
than 1(),000 pounds would be a relaxation of
current industry practices. Accordingly, the ex-
tent of change recoiniiiended by tlic industry is
not adopted. The XHTSA concludes tluit an
8-inch increase in the length of the force applica-
tion plate is sufficient to allow some portion of
the applied force to be absorbed by tlie end bows
of the roof while maintaining adcijuatc crash
protection. Therefore, for these buses tlie widtli
of the plate remains as proposed while tlie length
of the plate is increased 8 inches.

In the case of lighter buses, which are gen-
erally of the van type, the NHTSA has increased
both the width and lengtli of the plate to en-
compass the entire roof.

The procedure for applying force throiigli tlie
plate has also been modified in some respects.
Many conmients objected that the procedure re-
quired an expensive, complex hydraulic mecha-
nism that would increase the costs of complianrc
without justification. The propo-sal specified an
"ev6nly-distributed vertical force in a downward
direction through the force application plate",
starting with the plate horizontal. Commenters
interpreted these specifications to mean that the
vehicle would be required to absorb the energy
in evenly-distributed fashion and that tlie hori-
zontal attitude of the plate must be maintained.

Actually these specifications were included in
the proposed method to advise manufacturers of
the precise procedures to be employed in com-
pliance testing of their products. Understanding
that some manufacturers may choose to achieve
the required force application by applying
weights evenly over the surface of the plate, the
standard specified an "evenly-distributed force"
to eliminate other methods (such as a concen-
trated force at one end of tlie plate) that could
unfairly test the vehicle structure. Tlie hori-
zontal attitude of the plate was also intended to
establish a beginning point for testing on which
a manufacturer can rely. While these specifica-
tions establish the exact circumstances undei'
which veliicles can be tested, a manufacturer can
depart from them as long as it can be shown
that the vehicle would comply if tested exactly
as specified. In place of tlie perfectly rigid plate
called for in the standard, for example, a manu-

facturer could employ a plate of sufficient stiff-
ness to ensure tliat the test results are not affected
by the lack of rigidity.

Some modification of the test procedures has
been made for simplification and clarity. To
permit placement of the plate on the roof to
begin testing without a suspension mechanism,
the specification for horizontal attitude is mod-
ified to permit the plate to depait from the
horizontal in the fore and aft diioction only.
.Some manufacturers considered the initial ap-
plication of force as an unnecessaiy coinplicution.
However, the initial force application of .500
pounds has been retained in order to permit elim-
ination of inconsequential deformation of the roof
structure prior to measurement of the permissible
51/^ inches of deflection. In instances where the
force application plate weighs more than 500
pounds, some type of suspension mechanism
could be used temporarily to constrain the load
level to the initial value, if the manufacturer
decides to conduct his testing exactly as specified
in the standard's procedures.

The requirement that force be applied "through
the plate" has been changed to "to the plate"
in order to avoid a misunderstanding that the
vehicle must absorb energy evenly over the sur-
face of its roof.

As proposed by several commenters, the rate
of application in pounds per minute has been
changed to inches per second, specifically "at any
rate not more than i/^ inch per second." Manu-
facturers should understand that "any" in this
context is defined by tlie NHTSA (49 CFR
§ .571.4) to mean that the vehicle roof must satisfy
the requirement at every rate of application
within the stated range. General Motors re-
jiorts that as a practical matter, the effect of
speed in rate of application for tests of this
nature is not significant in the range of 0.12
inches per second to 1 inch per second.

The reciuiienient that movement "at any point"
on the plate not exceed Si/g inches has not been
modified despite some objections. The XHTSA
considers it reasonable that excessive crush not
be i)ermitted at the extremities of the plate.
Measurement of movement only at the center of
the plate, for example, would permit total col-
lapse of the structure in any direction as long
as one point on (he bus maintained its integrity.

PART 571; S 220— PRE 3

Effective: October 26, 1976

The preparation of the vehicle for the applica-
tion of force has been modified to specify re-
placement of non-rigid body mounts with
equivalent rigid mounts. The compression of
defornialile body mounts is unrelated to crash-
worthiness of the structure and can therefore be
eliminated to permit testing of the structure
itself.

Accessories or components which extend up-
ward from the vehicle's roof (such as school bus
lights) are removed for test purposes. It is also
noted that the vehicle's transverse frame members
or body sills arc supported for test purposes. In
response to a question from Blue Bird Body
Company, a frame simulator may be used along
with any other variations as long as the manu-
facturer assuies himself that the vehicle would
conform if tested precisely as specified in the
standard.

The vehicle's emergency exits must also be ca-
pable of opening when the required force is ap-
plied, and following release of the force. As
noted in comments, this requirement simulates
the use of the exits after a rollover, whether or
not the vehicle comes to rest on its roof. The
proposed requirement of ability to close these
exits is eliminated because such a capability is
unnecessary in an emergency evacuation of the
bus. For this reason, the requirement has been
modified so that a particular test specimen {i.e.,
a pai'ticular bus) will not be required to meet
requirements for emergency exits which open
following release of force, if the exits have al-
ready been tested while the application force is
maintained.

With regard to the requirements as a whole.
Crown Coach and other manufacturers argued
that the application of 11/^ times the vehicle's
tmloaded weight imfairly discriminates against
buses with a higher vehicle weight-to-passenger
ratio. The XHTSA disagrees, and notes tliat
tlie relevant consideration in rollover is the
weight of the vehicle itself in determining the
energy to be absorbed by the structure. In a
related area, one manufacturer suggested tliat
the increased weight of the XHTSA's contem-
plated new standards for scliool buses would in-
crease unloaded vehicle weight to the point where
redesign would be required to meet the rollover
standard. The XHTSA has considered this

issue and estimates that the only significant new
weight would be for improved seating. This
weight increase would not substantially increase
the severity of the rollover standard.

The State of California suggested consolida-
tion of the rollover standard with the joint
strength. While such a consolidation would ap-
pear logical for school buses alone, the XHTSA
prefers the flexibility of separate standards with
a view to their use independently in the futur<
for other vehicle types. For example, the appli
cation of vertical force to the vehicle structur''
may be appropriate in a vehicle for which the
joint strength requirement would not be appro-
priate.

The State of Georgia requested that transit
systems transporting school children be exempted
from Standard Xo. 220. This commenter ap-
parently misunderstood the applicability of the
standard. It only applies to newly-manufactured
vehicles and does not require modification of
existing fleets, whether or not operated by a
transit authority.

Interested persons should note that the
XHTSA has issued a proposal to modify the
definition of "school bus" (40 F.R. 40854, Sep-
tember 1. 1975) and that if that definition is
adopted the requirements of this standard will
apply to all vehicles that fall within the defini-
tion, whether or not they fall within the present
definition.

In consideration of the foregoing, a new motor
vehicle safety standard Xo. 220, School Bus Roll-
over Protection, is added as § 571.220 of Part 571
of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. . . .

Effective date: October 26, 1976.

The effective date of this standard is estab-
lished as 9 months after the date of its issuance,
as required by the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus
Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-492,
section 202 (15 U.S.C. 1397(i) (1) (A) ).

(Sec. 103, 119. Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (15
U.S.C. 1392, 1407); §202, Pub. L. 93-492, 88
Stat. 1470 (15 U.S.C. 1392); delegation of au-
thority at 49 CFR 1.51)

Issued on January 22, 1976.

Howard J. Dugoff
Acting Administrator
41 F.R. 3874
January 27, 1976

PART 571; S 220— PRE 4

Effactiv*: August 26, 1976

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 220

School Bus Rollover Protection

(Docket No. 73-3; Notice 7)
(Docket No. 73-20; Notice 10)
(Docket No. 73-34; Notice 4)
(Docket No. 75-2; Notice 3)
(Docket No. 75-3; Notice 5)
(Docket No. 75-7; Notice 3)
(Docket No. 75-24; Notice 3)

This notice announces that the effective dates
of the redefinition of "school bus" and of six
Federal motor vehicle safety standards as they
apply to school buses are changed to April 1,
1977, from the previously established effective
dates. This notice also makes a minor amend-
ment to Standard No. 220, School Bus Rollover
Protection, and adds a figure to Standard No. 221,
School Bus Body Joint Strength.

The Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety
Amendments of 1974 (the Act) mandated the
issuance of Federal motor vehicle safety stand-
ards for several aspects of school bus perform-
ance. Pub. L. 93-492, §202 (15 U.S.C. §1392
(i)(l)(A)). These amendments included a
definition of school bus that necessitated a revi-
sion of the existing definition used by the
NHTSA in establishing safety requirements. The
Act also specified that the new requirements
"apply to each school bus and item of school bus
equipment which is manufactured ... on or after
the expiration of the 9-month period which begins
on the date of promulgation of such safety stand-
ards." (15 U.S.C. §1392(i)(l)(B)).

Pursuant to the Act, amendments were made
to the following standards : Standard No. 301-75,
Fuel System Integrity (49 CFR 571.301-75),
effective July 15, 1976, for school buses not
already covered by the standard (40 FR 483521,
October 15, 1975); Standard No. 10.5-75, Hy-
draulic Brake Systems (49 CFR 571.105-75),
effective October 12, 1976 (41 FR 2391, January

16, 1976) ; and Standard No. 217, Bus Window
Retention and Release (49 CFR 571.217), effec-
tive for school buses on October 26, 1976 (41 FR
3871, January 27, 1976).

In addition, the following new standards were
added to Part 571 of Title 49 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, effective October 26, 1976:
Standard No. 220, School Bus Rollover Protec-
tion (41 F.R. 3874, January 27, 1976) ; Standard
No. 221, School Bu^ Body Joint Strength (41
F.R. 3872, January 26, 1976) ; and Standard No.
222, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash
Protection (41 F.R. 4016, January 28, 1976).
Also, the existing definition of "school bus" was
amended, effective October 27, 1976, in line with
the date set by the Act for issuance of the stand-
ards.

The Act was recently amended by Public Law
94-346 (July 8, 1976) to change the effective dates
of the school bus standards to April 1, 1977 (15
U.S.C. i§1392(i)(l)(B)). This notice is in-
tended to advise interested persons of these
changes of effective dates. In the case of Stand-
ard No. 301-75, the change of effective date is
reflected in a conforming amendment to S5.4 of
that standard. A similar amendment is made in
S3 of Standard No. 105-75.

The agency concludes that the October 27, 1976,
effective date for the redefinition of "school bus"
should be postponed to April 1, 1977, to conform
to the new effective dates for the upcoming re-
quirements. If this were not done, the new classes

PART 571; S 220— PRE 5

Effective: August 26, 1976

of school buses would be required to meet existing
standards that apply to school buses (e.g., Stand-
ard No. 108 (49 CFR 571.108)) before being re-
quired to meet the new standards. This would
result in two stages of compliance, and would
complicate the redesign efforts that Congress
sought to relieve.

This notice also amends Standard No. 220 in
response to an interpretation request by Blue
Bird Body Company, and Sheller-Globe Corpora-
tion's petition for reconsideration of the standard.
Both companies request confirmation that the
standard's requirement to operate emergency exits
during the application of force to the vehicle roof
(S4(b)) does not apply to roof exits which are
covered by the force application plate. The
agency did not intend to require the operation
of roof exits while the force application plate
is in place on the vehicle. Accordingly, an
appropriate amendment has been made to S4(b)
of the standard.

With regard to Standard No. 220, Sheller-
Globe also requested confirmation that, in testing
its school buses that have a gross vehicle weight
rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less, it may
test with a force application plate with dimensions
other than those specified in the standard. The
standard does not prohibit a manufacturer from
using a different dimension from that specified,
in view of the NHTSA's expressed position on
the legal effect of its regulations. To certify
compliance, a manufacturer is free to choose any
means, in the exercise of due care, to show that a
vehicle (or item of motor vehicle equipment)
would comply if tested by the NHTSA as spec-
ified in the standard. Thus the force application
plate used by the NHTSA need not be duplicated
by each manufacturer or compliance test facility.
Sheller-Globe, or example, is free to use a force
application plate of any width as Icaig as it can
certify its vehicle would comply if tested by the
NHTSA according to the standard.

In a separate area, the agency corrects the
inadvertent omission of an illustration from
Standard No. 221 as it was issued January 26,
1976 (41 F.R. 3872). The figure does not differ
from that proposed and, in that form, it received
no adverse comment.

In accordance with recently enunciated De-
partment of Transportation policy encoui-aging
adequate analysis of the consequences of regu-
latory action (41 F.R. 16200, April 16, 1976),
the agency herewith summarizes its evaluation of
the economic and other consequences of this ac-
tion on the public and private sectors, including
possible loss of safety benefits. The changes in
effective dates for the school bus standards are
not evaluated because they were accomplished by
law and not by regulatory action.

The change of effective date for the redefini-
tion of "school bus" will result in savings to
manufacturers who will not be required to meet
existing school bus standards between October
27, 1976, and April 1, 1977. The agency calcu-
lates that the only standard that would not be
met would be the requirement in Standard No.
108 for school bus marker lamps. In view of
the agency's existing provision for the marking
of light school buses in Pupil Transportation
Standard No. 17 (23 CFR 1204), it is concluded
that the absence of this equipment until April 1,
1977, will not have a significant adverse impact
on safety.

The interpretative amendment of Standard
No. 220 and the addition of a figure to Standard
No. 221 are not expected to affect the manu-
facture or operation of school buses.

In consideration of the foregoing, Part 571 of
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations is
amended. . . .

Effective dates:

1. Because the listed amendments do not im-
pose additional requirements of any person, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
finds that an immediate effective date of August
26, 1976 is in the public interest.

2. The effective date of the redefinition of
"school bus" in 49 CFR Part 571.3 that was pub-
lished in the issue of December 31, 1976 (40 F.R.
60033) is changed to April 1, 1977.

3. The effective dates of Standard Nos. 105-75,
217, 301-75, 220, 221, and 222 (as they apply to
school buses) are April 1, 1977, in accordance
with Public Law 94-346.

PART 571; S 220— PRE 6

Effective: August 26, 1976

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 Jolin W. Snow

(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; Pub. L. 94-346, Stat. (15 Administrator
U.S.C. § 1392 (i) (1) (B) ) ; delegation of authority

at 49 CFR 1.50.) ^1 "=« ^6027

Issued on August 17, 1976. '^"S"^' ^^' ^ '^*

PART 571; S 220— PRE 7-8

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 220
School Bus Rollover Protection

51. Scope. This standard establishes per-
formance requirements for school bus rollover
protection.

52. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is
to reduce the number of deaths and the severity
of injuries that result from failure of the school
bus body structure to withstand forces encoun-
tered in rollover crashes.

53. Applicability. This standard applies to
school buses.

84. Requirements. When a force equal to IV2
times the unloaded vehicle weight is applied to
the roof of the vehicle's body structure through
a force application plate as specified in S5., Test
procedures—

(a) The downward vertical movement at any
point on the application plate shall not exceed
b% inches; and

(b) Each emergency exit of the vehicle pro-
vided in accordance with Standard No. 217
(§ 571.217) shall be capable of opening as spec-
ified in that standard during the full application
of the force and after release of the force, ex-
cept that an emergency exit located in the roof
of the vehicle is not required to be capable of
being opened during the application of the force.
A particular vehicle {i.e., test specimen) need not
meet the emergency opening requirement after
release of force if it is subjected to the emergency
exit opening requirements during the full appli-
cation of the force.

S5. Test procedures. Each vehicle shall be
capable of meeting the requirements of S4. when
tested in accordance with the procedures set
forth below.

S5.1 With any non-rigid chassis-to-body
mounts replaced with equivalent rigid mounts,

place the vehicle on a rigid horizontal surface
so that the vehicle is entirely supported by
means of the vehicle frame. If the vehicle is
constructed without a frame, place the vehicle
on its body sills. Remove any components which
extend upward from the ^vehicle roof.

55.2 Use a flat, rigid, rectangular force ap-
plication plate that is measured with respect to
the vehicle roof longitudinal and lateral center-
lines;

(a) In the case of a vehicle with a GVWR of
more than 10,000 pounds, 12 inches shorter than
the vehicle roof and 36 inches wide; and

(b) In the case of a vehicle with a GVWR
of 10,000 pounds or less, 5 inches longer and 5
inches wider than the vehicle roof. For pur-
poses of these measurements, the vehicle roof is
that structure, seen in the top projected view,
that coincides with the passenger and driver com-
partment of the vehicle.

55.3 Position the force application plate on
the vehicle roof so that its rigid surface is per-
pendicular to a vertical longitudinal plane and
it contacts the roof at not less than two points,
and so that, in the top projected view, its lon-
gitudinal centerline coincides with the longitu-
dinal centerline of the vehicle, and its front and
rear edges are an equal distance inside the front
and rear edges of the vehicle roof at the center-
line.

55.4 Apply an evenly-distribuiea vertical
force in the downward direction to the force
application plate at any rate not more than 0.5
inch per second, until a force of 500 pounds has
been applied.

55.5 Apply additional vertical force in the
downward direction to the force application plate
at a rate of not more than 0.5 inch per second

(R«v. 8/17/76)

PART 571; S 220-1

until the force specified in S4 has been applied,
and maintain this application of force.

55.6 Measure the downward movement of
any point on the force application plate which
occurred during the application of force in ac-
cordance with S5.5.

55.7 To test the capability of the vehicle's
emergency exits to open in accordance with
S4(b)-

(a) In the case of testing under the full ap-
plication of force, open the emergency exits as
specified in S4(b) while maintaining the force
applied in accordance with S5.4 and S5.5; and

(b) In the case of testing after the release of
all force, release all downward force applied to
the force application plate and open the emer-
gency exits as specified in S4(b).

S6. Test conditions. The following conditions
apply to the requirements specified in S4.

56.1 Temperature. The ambient temperature
is any level between 32° F. and 90° F.

56.2 Windows and doors. Vehicle windows,
doors, and emergency exits are in fully-closed
position, and latched but not locked.

41 F.R. 3874
January 27, 1976

(Rev. 8/17/76)

PART 571; S 220-2

EfUcNvt: October 36, 1976

PREAMBLE TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 221

School Bus Body Joint Strength
(Docket No. 73-34; Notice 3)

This notice establishes a new motor vehicle
safety stanflard. Xo. 221 ; School Bun Body Joint
Strength. 40 CFR .")71.221, specifyin<r a mini-
mum i>eifonnance level for school bus body
panel joint?^.

The Motor \'ehicle and Schoolbiis Safety
Amendments of 1974 (Pvib. L. 9.S-492, 88 Stat.
1470, heroin, the Act) require the issuance of
minimum re(|iiirements for school bus body and
frame crash worthiness. This rulemakinp is pur-
suant to authority vested in the Secretary of
Transportation by the Act and delegated to tiie
Administrator of the XHTSA, and is })receded
by iiotices of proposed rulenmlcin<r issued Jan-
uary 2!). 1074 (.30 F.R. 2400) and March la.
IJ)?.*) (40 F.R. 11738).

One of the sijrnificant injury-producin<r char-
acteristics of school bus accidents, exposure to
sharp metal edjres. occurs when body panels be-
come separated from the structural components
to which they have l>een fastened. In an acci-
dent severe lacerations may result if the occu-
pants of the bus are tossed a<rainst these edjres.
Moreover, if panel separation is preat the com-
ponent may be ejected from the vehicle, jrreatly
increasin^r the possibility of serious injury.

This standard is intended to lessen the likeli-
hood of these modes of injury by requirin<r that
Iwdy joints on school buses have a tensile
strenjrth equal to 60 percent of the tensile
strenjrth of the weakest joined body panel, as
su<r«re.sted by the Vehicle Equipment Safety
Commis-sion (VESC). The NHTSA has deter-
mined that this is an appropriate level of pei-
formance for body joints and that its application
to school buses is both reasonable and practicable.
Furthermore, the XHTSA believes that adoption

of this standard will provide an effective and
meaningful solution to the body panel problem.

It is anticipated that this rule will burden
manufacturers (mly to the extent of requirinji
the installation of more rivets than are currently
used. The XHTSA has reviewed the economic
and environmental impact of this proposal and
determined that neither will be sig^iificant.

In their response to the two XHTSA pro-
posals on this subject, .several of the commenters
sujrfrested that the standard could be met by re-
ducin<r the .strenjrth of the panel rather than
increasiiifr the strenjith of the joint, and that a
minimum joii\t strenjrth should be required. For
several ivasons tiie XHTSA does not believe that
a mininmm absolute joint .strenpth is desirable
at this time. AVhile this standard will tend to
increase the overall strength of buses, it is not
desi<rned to set minimum body panel strength
lequirements. Its purpose is to prevent panels
from separating at the joint in the event of an
accident. In order to deal with the problem of
laceration, this re<rulation must be applicable to
both exterior and interior joints. An absolute
minimum joint strengtli requirement would be
constrained by tiu' level of performance appro-
l)riate for the relatively thin interior panels.
Thus, the overall level of performance could not
be defined in a meaningful fashion without se-
verely and unnecessarily limiting the manufac-
turei-'s flexiliility in designing his product. The
XHTSA .School Bus Rollover Protection Stand-
ard (40 {^FR 571.220), which specifies require-
ments for the structural integrity of school bus
bodies, should result in a practical lower limit
on panel strength and thereby set a practical
absolute minimum joint strength.

PART 571; S 221— PRE 1

EfFective: October 26, 1976

Tlie XIITSA has no evidence tliat tlie mode
of failure found in tlie lavfrer traditional school
huieos also occius in smaller, van-type school
buses currently manufactured by automobile
manufiicturers for use as 11- to l7-passen<^er
school buses. Ford Motor Company commented
that the mode of injury sought to be prevented
by tliis standard does not occur in accidents in-
volvinjr school buses converted from multipur-
pose passenger vehicles (vans). Chrysler Cor-
[)oration suggested that the proposed requirement
is inappropriate when applied to vans with
''coach" Joint construction. Based on these com-
ments, the XHTSA has determined that until
information to the contrary appears -or is de-
veloped these vehicles should not be covered by
the requirement. Accordingly, the application
of the standard has been limited to school buses
with a gross vehicle weight rating over 10,000
pounds.

Several commenters suggested that certain
types of joints might not be susceptible of testing
in the manner specified in this regulation. Up
to this time the NHTSA has not found sufficient
evidence in support of that position to justify
amending the standard. If information is re-

ceived indicating that different test methods are
required for certain applications, appropriate
action will be initiated.

In consideration of the foregoing, a new motor
vehicle safety standard, No. 2'2\^chool Bus Body
Joint Strength, is added as § 571.221 of Part 571
of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, as set
forth below.

Effective date : October 26, 1976.

The effective date of this standard is 9 months
after the date of issuance, as required by the
Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amend-
ments of 1974, Pub. L. 93--492, section 202 (15
U.S.C. 1397(i)(l)(A)).

(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; §202, Pub. L. 93-492, 88
Stat. 1470 (15 U.S.C. 1392); delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on January 22, 1976.

Howard J. Dugoff
Acting Administrator

41 F.R. 3872
January 27, 1976

PART 571; S 221— PRE 2

EfF«c«lv«: August 26, 1976

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 221

School Bus Body Joint Strength

(Docket No. 73-3; Notice 7)
(Docket No. 73-20; Notice 10)
(Docket No. 73-34; Notice 4)

(Docket No. 75-2; Notice 3)

(Docket No. 75-3; Notice 5)

(Docket No. 75-7; Notice 3)
(Docket No. 75-24; Notice 3)

This notice announces that the effective dates
of the redefinition of "school bus" and of six
Federal motor vehicle safety standards as they
apply to school buses are changed to April 1,
1977, from the previously established effective
dates. This notice also makes a minor amend-
ment to Standard No. 220, School Bus Rollover
Protection, and adds a fijfure to Standard No.
221, School Bus Body Joint Strength.

The Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety
Amendments of 1974 (the Act) mandated the
issuance of Federal motor vehicle safety stand-
ards for several aspects of school bus perform-
ance, Pub. L. 93-492, §202 (15 U.S.C. § 1392 (i)
(1)(A)). These amendments included a defini-
tion of school bus that necessitated a revision of
the existing definition used by the NHTSA in
establishing safety requirements. The Act also
specified that the new requirements "apply to
each schoolbus and item of schoolbus equipment
which is manufactured ... on or after the ex-
piration of the 9-month period which begins
on the date of promulgation of such safety stand-
ards." (15 U.S.C. §1392(i)(l)(B)).

Pursuant to the Act, amendments were made
to the following standards : Standard No. 301-75,
Fuel System Integrity (49 CFR 571.301-75),
effective July 15, 1976, for school buses not al-
ready covered by the standard, (40 F.R. 483521,
October 15, 1975) ; Standard No. 105-75, Hy-
draulic Brake Systems (49 CFR 571.105-75),
effective October 12, 1976 (41 F.R. 2391, Jan-

uary 16, 1976) ; and Standard No. 217, Bus Win-
dow Retention and Release (49 CFR 571.217),
effective for school buses on October 26, 1976 (41
F.R. 3871, January 27, 1976).

In addition, the following new standards were
added to Part 571 of Title 49 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, effective October 26, 1976:
Standard No. 220, School Bus Rollover Protec-
tion (41 F.R. 3874, January 27, 1976) ; Standard
No. 221, School Bus Body Joint Strength (41
F.R. 3872, January 26, 1976) ; and Standard No.
222, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash
Protection (41 F.R. 4016, January 28, 1976).
Also, the existing definition of "school bus" was
amended, effective October 27, 1976, in line with
the date set by the Act for issuance of the stand-
ards.

The Act was recently amended by Public Law
94-346 (July 8, 1976) to change the effective
dates of the school bus standards to April 1,
1977 (15 U.S.C. § 1392(i) (1) (B)). This notice
is intended to advise interested persons of these
changes of effective dates. In the case of Stand-
ard No. 301-75, the change of effective date is
reflected in a conforming amendment to S5.4 of
that standard. A similar amendment is made in
S3 of Standard No. 105-75.

The agency concludes that the October 27, 1976,
effective date for the redefinition of "school bus"
should be postponed to April 1, 1977, to confonn

PART 571; S 221— PRE 3

EfFeclive: August 26, 1976

to the new effective dates for the upcoming re-
quirements. If this wei-e not done, the new classes
of school buses would be required to meet exist-
ing standards that apply to school buses (e.g.,
Standard No. 108 (49 CFR 571.108)) before
being required to meet the new standards. This
would result in two stages of compliance, and
would complicate the redesign efforts that Con-
gress sought to relieve.

This notice also amends Standard No. 220 in
response to an interpretation request by Blue
Bird Body Company, and Sheller-Globe Corj^ora-
tion's petition for I'econsideration of the standard.
Both companies request confirmation that the
standard's requirement to operate emergency
exits during the application of force to the ve-
hicle roof (S4(b)) does not apply to roof exits
which are covered by the force application plate.
The agency did not intend to require the opera-
tion of roof exits while the force application
plate is in place on the vehicle. Accordingly, an
appropriate amendment has been made to S4(b)
of the standard.

With regard to Standard No. 220, Sheller-
Globe also requested confirmation that, in testing
its school buses that have a gross vehicle weight
rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less, it may
test with a force application plate with dimen-
sions other than those specified in the standard.
The standard does not prohibit a manufacturer
from using a different dimension from that spec-
ified, in view of the NHTSA's expressed position
on the legal effect of its regulations. To certify
compliance, a manufacturer is free to choose any
means, in the exercise of due care, to show that
a vehicle (or item of motor vehicle equipment)
would comply if tested by the NHTSA as spec-
ified in the standard. Thus the force application
plate used by the NHTSA need not be duplicated
by each manufacturer or compliance test facility.
Sheller-Globe, for example, is free to use a force
application plate of any width as long as it can
certify its vehicle would comply if tested by the
NHTSA according to the standard.

In a separate area, the agency corrects the in-
advertent omission of an illustration from Stand-
ard No. 221 as it was issued January 26, 1976
(41 F.R. 3872). The figure does not differ from
that proposed and, in that form, it received no
adverse comment.

In accordance with recently enunciated De-
partment of Transportation policy encouraging
adequate analysis of the consequences of regu-
latory action (41 F.R. 16200, April 16, 1976),
the agency herewith summarizes its evaluation of
the economic and other consequences of this ac-
tion on the public and private sectors, including
possible loss of safety benefits. The changes in
effective dates for the school bus standards are
not evaluated because they were accomplished by
law and not by regulatory action.

The change of effective date for the redefinition
of "school bus" will result in savings to manu-
facturers who will not be required to meet exist-
ing school bus standards between October 27,
1976, and April 1, 1977. The agency calculates
tliat the only standard that would not be met
would be the requii'ement in Standard No. 108
for school bus marker lamps. In view of the
agency's existing provision for the marking of
light school buses in Pupil Transportation Stand-
ard No. 17 (23 CFR 1204), it is concluded that
the absence of this equipment until April 1, 1977,
will not have a significant adverse impact on
safety.

The interpretative amendment of Standard No.

220 and the addition of a figure to Standard No.

221 are not expected to affect the manufacture
or operation of school buses.

In consideration of the foregoing. Part 571 of
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations is
amended. . . .

Effective dates:

1. Because the listed amendments do not impose
additional requirements of any pereon, the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration
finds that an immediate effective date of August
26, 1976 is in the public interest.

2. The effective date of the redefinition of
"school bus" in 49 CFR Part 571.3 that was pub-
lished in the issue of December 31, 1976 (40 F.R.
60033) is changed to April 1, 1977.

3. The effective dates of Standard Nos. 105-75,
217, 301-75, 220, 221, and 222. (as they apply to
school buses) are April 1, 1977, in • accordance
with Public Law 94-346.

PART 571; S 221— PRE 4

EfFeclive: August 26, 1976

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 John W Snow

(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; Pub. L. 94-346, Stat. (15 Administrator
U.S.C. § 1392 ( i ) ( 1 ) ( B ) ) ; delegation of authority

at 49 CFR 1.50). 41 F.R. 36027

Issued on August 17, 1976. August 26, 1976

PART 571; S 221— PRE 5-6

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 221

School Bus Body Joint Strength

51. Scope. This standard establishes require-
ments for the strength of body panel joints in
school bus bodies.

52. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is
to reduce deaths and injuries resulting from the
structural collapse of school bus bodies during
crashes.

53. Application. This standard applies to
school buses with gross vehicle weight ratings of
more than 10,000 pounds.

54. Definitions.

"Body component" means a part of a bus body
made from a single piece of homogeneous ma-
terial or from a single piece of composite ma-
terial such as plywood.

"Body panel" means a body component used
on the exterior or interior surface to enclose the
bus' occupant space.

"Body panel joint" means the area of contact
or close proximity between the edges of a body
panel and another body component, excluding
spaces designed for ventilation or another func-
tional purpose, and excluding doors, windows,
and maintenance access panels.

"Bus body" means the portion of a bus that
encloses the bus' occupant space, exclusive of the
bumpers, the chassis frame, and any structure
forward of the forwardmost point of the wind-
shield mounting.

55. Requirement. When tested in accordance
with the procedure of S6, each body panel joint
shall be capable of holding the body panel to the
member to which it is joined when subjected to
a force of 60% of the tensile strength of the
weakest joined body panel determined pursuant
to S6.2.

S6. Procedure.

S6.1 Preparation of the test specimen.

56.1.1 If a body panel joint is 8 inches long or
longer, cut a test specimen that consists of any
randomly selected 8-inch segment of the joint,
together with a portion of the bus body whose
dimensions, to the extent permitted by the size
of the joined parts, are those specified in Figure
1, so that the specimen's centerline is perpen-
dicular to the joint at the midpoint of the joint
segment. Where the body panel is not fastened
continuously, select the segment so that it does
not bisect a spot weld or a discrete fastener.

56.1.2 If a joint is less than 8 inches long, cut
a test specimen with enough of the adjacent ma-
terial to permit it to be held in the tension test-
ing machine specified in S6.3.

56.1.3 Prepare the test specimen in accordance
with the preparation procedures specified in the
1973 edition of the Annual Book of ASTM
Standards, published by the American Society
for Testing and Materials, 1916 Race Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.

SpMlman canoriln*

_/- ^3l3H X.

PART 571; S 221-1

S6.2 Determination of minimum allowable
strength. For purposes of determining the mini-
mum allowable joint strength, determine the
tensile strengths of the joined body components
as follows:

(a) If the mechanical properties of a material
are specified by the American Society for Test-
ing and Materials, the relative tensile strength
for such a material is the minimum tensile
strength specified for that material in the 1973
edition of the Annual Book of ASTM Standards.

(b) If the mechanical properties of a material
are not specified by the American Society for
Testing and Materials, determine its tensile
strength by cutting a specimen from the bus
body outside the area of the joint and by testing
it in accordance with S6.3.

S6.3 Strength test.

56.3.1 Grip the joint specimen on opposite
sites of the joint in a tension testing machine
calibrated in accordance with Method E4, Veri-
ification of Testing Machines, of the American
Society for Testing and Materials (1973 Annual
Book of ASTM Standards).

56.3.2 Adjust the testing machine grips so that
the joint, under load, will be in stress approxi-
mately perpendicular to the joint.

56.3.3 Apply a tensile force to the specimen
by separating the heads of the testing machine
at any uniform rate not less than % inch and not
more than % inch per minute until the specimen
separates.

41 F.R. 3872
January 27, 1976

PART 571; S 221-2

Effective: October 76, 1976

PREAMBLE TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 222

School Bus Seating and Crash Protection
(Docket No. 73-3; Notice 5)

This notice establishes a new motor vehicle
safety Sttindaid No. 222, School Bus Seatiny
and Crash Protection, that specifies seatinn;. le-
strainin^r hairier, and impact zone reqniroments
for school buses.

The Motor Vehicle and Schoolbns Safety
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93^02, directed
the issuance of a scliool bus seatinp systems per-
formance standard (and other standards in seven
ai-eas of vehicle performance). The XHTSA
had already i.ssued two proposals for school bus
seatinp systems prior to enactment of the 1974
Safety Amendments (the Act) (.38 F.R. 4776.
February 22. 197.'^) (.39 F.R. 27.-)S.->. July :'.0. 1974)
and subsequently published two additional pio-
posnls (40 F.R. 17855, April 23, 197.->) (40 F.R.
47141. October 8, 1975). Eacli aspect of the re-
quirements was fully considered in tlie course
of this nilemakinjr activity. Conunents receive<l
in response to the most recent pi'oposal were
limited to a few as()ects of the Standard.

The larpest nmnber of conunents were received
on tlic requirement that scliool bus i)assen<rer
seats be equipped witli seat belt ancliora^res at
each seating: [)ositi()ii. The standard relies on
compartmentalization between well-padded and
well-constructed seats to provide occui)ant pro-
tection on school buses (other than van-type
buses). At the same time, seat belt anchora;:es
were proposed so that a <j:i'eater measure of pro-
tection coidd l)e grained if a particular user chose
to use the anchorages by installation of seat belts
together with a system to assuie that seat belts
woidd be worn, properly adjusted, and not
misused.

Bus operators strongly expressed the view that
the presence of seat belt anchorajres would en
courape the installation of seat belts by seliool

districts without providing; the necessary super-
vision of their use. This association of school
bus operatoi's (National School Transpoitation
Association) also (piestioned the benefits that
would be derived from ancKorajre installation as
lonjr as their utilization is not required. In view
of these factois, and the indications that in any
('\ent only a small fraction of school buses would
liave belts installed and properly used, the
NHTSA concludes that the proposed seat belt
anciiorajre re(|iiirement should not be incbided in
this initial school bus >ieafinj;' standard. Fuithei'
study of tiie extent to which belts would be in-
^talled an<l properly used shotdd peiinit moie
cprtainty as the basis for any future action.

NHT.'^A calculations demonstrate that the
stren<rfh characteiistics of the seat specified by
the standard to |)in\ide the correct amotmt of
compaitmentalization also provide the strength
necessary to absorb seat belt loads. This means
that an operator or school district may safely
attach scat belts to the seat frame, even where
anciioi'ajres are not installed as orijriiuil equip-
ment. The seat is strong enoiigli to take the
force of occupants against the seat back if no
belts are utilized, or tlie force of occupants
against seat belts if occupants are restrained by
belts attached to the seat frame tlirough the
anchorages provi(le<l.

Tiie Physicians for Automotive Safety (PAS)
requested that lap belts be required in addition
to the compartmentalization offered by the seat-
ing systems. The agency concluded earliei' in
this rulemaking procedure that compartmentali-
zation provides satisfactory protection and that
a requirement for belts without the assurance of
proper supervision of their use woidd not be an
effective means of providing occupant protection.

PART 571; S 222— PRE 1

Effective: October 26, 1976

PAS lias not provided data oi- aifiiiinciits tliat
would modifv this conclusion, and its re(iui'st is
therefore denied.

PAS. relyinp; on testin^z- undertaken at tlie
University of California at Los Anjieles in 19C7
and 1960, ar<j;ued that a vertical seat haclc height
of '2-i inches aboAe the seatinji' reference point
(SRP) is necessary to atford adeipiate protec-
tion ajiainst occupant injury. The XHTSA, as
noted in its fourth notice of school bus crash
protection, Inised its 20-inch reciuirenient on
newer data <ienerated in dynamic and static test-
infj by A]MF (\)rporation of prototype seats de-
sijrned to meet the proposed requirements of the
standard ("De\elopment of a Unitized School
Bus", DOT-HS-40096P). While the NIITSA
does not dispute that a i)ropeily constructed,
hijrher seat back provides more piotection than
a lower seat back, the data support the a<rency"s
determination that the 20-inch seat back provides
a reasonable level of protection. School bus ac-
cident data do not provide substantial evidence
of a whiplasli injury experience that could justify
a 4-inch increase in .seat l)ack hcipht. For this
reason, the seat back height is made final as
proposed.

Several conunenters objected to applicability
of the standard to school buses with a fiioss ve-
hicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds
or less (lipht school buses), assertinj:' that the
special requirements of the standard for those
buses were inappropriate, or unachievable within
the 9-nionth leadtime for compliance mandated
by the Act.

Chrysler Corporation requested exclusion of
lifrht school buses from this standard for an in-
definite period, and Ford Motor Company re-
quested that essentially the same packajic of
standards as already are provided in its van-type
inulti-pui'pose passen<rer vehicles and school bus
models be required in the futuie, with no addi-
tional protection. Both companies believe that
the relatively small numbers of their vehicles
sold as school buses would have to be withdrawn
from the maiket because of the ex[)ense of tool-
injr new seatino; that offers more crash protection
than present seating;. "Wayne Corporation manu-
factures a light school bus that is not based on
a van-type vehicle, and requested that seats used

in its laiger models be permitted in smaller
models, along with seat belts that comply with
Standard \o. 209.

The Congressional direction to issue standards
for school bus seating systems (l.'i U.S.C.
§ 1392(i) (1) (A) (iv) ) implies that existing seat-
ing and occupant crash protection standards are
insufKcient foi- vehicles that carry sciiool children.
Tiie XHTSA has proposed a combination of re-
quirements for light school buses that differ from
those for heavier buses, liecause the crash pulse
experienced by smaller vehicles is more severe
than that of larger vehicles in similar collisions.
The standard also specifies adequate numbers of
seat belts for the children tiiat the vehicle would
carry, because such restraints are necessary to
provide adequate crasii protection in small ve-
hicles. The requirements applicable to light
school buses are considered reasonable, and are
therefore included in the final rule as proposed.

In AVayne's ca.se, it is not clear why the seat
it has develo[)ed for heavier .school buses will not
serve in its smaller school buses. Seat belts may
need to be attached to the floor to support the
force specified by Standard X'^o. 210 for anchor-
ages. Also, some interior padding may be
necessary to meet the vehicle impact zone re-
(juirements of Sr).3.1.1 (a).

Sheller-Cirlobe Corporation (Sheller) and
AVayue considered unreasonable the standard's
limitation on maxinuun distance between a seat's
.•^RP and the rear surface of the seat or restrain-
ing barrier forward of the SRP (Sr).2). The
limitation exists to minimize the distance an oc-
cupant travels before forward motion is arrested
by tjie padded structure that compartmentalizes
the occupant. Tlie two bus maTUifacturers con-
tend that they must also com[)ly with State re-
quirements for a minimum distance between seats
that results in only 1 inch of tolerance in seating
[)lacement.

.■"'ection 10.1 (d) of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act provides in part :
(d) AVhene\er a Federal motor vehicle safety
standard ... is in etlect, no .State or political
subdivision of a .State shall ha\e any authority
either to establish or continue in effect, with
respect to any motor vehicle oi- item of motor
vehicle ei[uipment any safety standard appli-

PART 571; S 222— PRE 2

Effacllve: Oclsb*r 26, 1976

cable to the same aspect of peifoniuince of
such vehicle or item of equipment wliicli is not
identical to the Federal standard.

It is the opinion of the XHTSA that any
State requirement lelating to seat spacinj;, otlier
than one identical to tlie Federal re(|uirement for
maximum spacing of 20 inches from the SRP, is
preempted under § 103(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d).

Sheller advocated wider seat spncinp for ac-
tivity huses, because seats are occupied for ]on<rer
periods of time on road trips. The NHTSA,
notinp that activity buses are often used on the
open hiplnvay at hifrli speeds for lonir periods of
time, requests comments on the advisability of
specifyinp a seat belt requirement in place of
the seat spacinp requirement in tlie case of these
buses.

Much of ."^heller and AVayne's c(mcern over
tolerances may stem from a misunderstandinfr of
the meaning of "seating reference point'" (SRP).
As defined by the NHTSA (49 CFR .'iTl.S), the
SRP is essentially the manufacturer's design
reference point which simulates the pivot center
of the human torso and thigh, located in accord-
ance witli the SAE Standard J826. Thus the
manufacturer calculates, on its seat design seen
in side projected view, the pivot center of the
iiuman torso and thigh of tlie potential seat occu-
pant, and then establishes a design reference point
that simulates the location of the actual pivot
center. The XHTSA ha.s interpreted that this
design reference point may be fixed by the manu-
facturer with reference to the seating structure
to simplify calculation of its location in a bus
for purposes of measurement and compliance.

Sheller also requested that the "seat perform-
ance forward" testing be simplified by elim-
inating the 8-inch range of locations at which
the lower loading bar can be applied against the
seat back. As noted in the preamble to Notice 4
of this docket in response to a similar request
from Blue Bird Body Company, the NHTSA de-
clines to make this restriction, to discourage tlie
addition of a narrow 2-inch wide structural mem-
ber at this point simply to meet the requirement.
This reasoning remains valid and Sheller's re-
quest is denied.

Sheller also asked that the requirement for
forwai'd-facing seats be eliminated from the
standard, in view of the practice of installing
side-facing seats in some buses for handicapped
students. Tlie NHTSA designed the seating sys-
tem in this standaid for protection from fore and
lift crash forces, and considers it necessary that
the seats be forward-facing to aciiieve the objec-
tive of occupant protection. Comments are so-
licited on whether the provision of this protection
in special vehicles is impractical.

The Vehicle Equipment and Safety Commis-
sion (VESC) asked for a minimum seat width
of 13 inches for each designated seating position,
noting that the standard's formula permits seat-
ing of 12.67 inches in width. The agency does
not believe its standard will encourage seats nar-
rower than tliose presently provided in school
buses, but will watch for any indication tliat that
is occurring. Action can be taken in the future
if it appears tliat seating is being designed to
be narrower tiian at present.

In consideration of the foregoing, a new motor
vehicle safety Standard No. 222. School Bus
Seating and Crank Protection, is added as
S r>7l.222, of Part TiTl of Title 49, Code of Federal
Regulations. . . .

Eifective date: October 26, 1976. The effec-
tive date of this standard is established as 9
months after the date of its issuance, as required
by the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 9.3-492, section 202
(15 U.S.C. 1397(i)(l)(A)).

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, SO Stat. 718 (15
U.S.C. 1392, 1407); §202, Pub. L. 93-492, 88
Stat. 1470 (15 U.S.C. 1392): delegation of au-
thority at 49 CFR 1..50).

Issued on .January 22. 1976.

Howard .1. Dugoff
Acting Administrator

41 F.R. 4016
January 28, 1976

PART 571; S 222— PRE 3^

Effective: October 26, 1976

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 222

School Bus Seating and Crash Protection
(Docket No. 73-3; Notice 6)

This notice responds to two petitions for re-
consideration of Standard No. 222, School Bus
Passenger Seating and Crash Protection, as it
was issued January 22, 1976.

Standard No. 222 (49 CFR 571.222 was issued
January 22, 1976 (41 F.R. 4016, January 28,
1976), in accordance with §202 of the Motor
Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. 93-492 (15 U.S.C. § 1392(i) (1))
and goes into effect on October 26, 1976. The
standard provides for compartmentalization of
bus passengers between well-padded and well-
constructed seats in the event of collision. Peti-
tions for reconsideration of the standard were
received from Sheller-Globe Corporation and
from the Physicians for Automotive Safety
(PAS), which also represented the views of
Action for Child Transportation Safety, several
adult individuals, and several school bus riders.

PAS expressed dissatisfaction with several as-
pects of the standard. The organization objected
most strongly to the agency's decision that seat
belts should not be mandated in school buses.
PAS disagreed with the agency conclusion (39
F.R. 27585, July 30, 1974) that, whatever the
potential benefits of safety belts in motor veliicle
collisions, the poSvSibility of their non-use or
misuse in the hands of children makes them
impractical in school buses without adequate su-
pervision. In support of safety belt installation,
PAS cited statistics indicating that 23 percent
of reported school bus accidents involve a side
impact or rollover of the bus.

While safety belts presumably would be bene-
ficial in these situations, PAS failed to provide
evidence that the belts, if provided, would be
properly utilizetl by school-age childivn. The
agency will continue to evaluate the wisdom of

its decision not tx) mandate belts, based on any
evidence showing that significant numbers of
school districts intend to provide the supervision
that should accompany belt use. In view of the
absence of evidence to date, however, the agency
maintains its position that requiring the installa-
tion of safety belts on school bus passenger seats
is not appropriate and denies the PAS petition
for reconsideration. The agency continues to
consider the reduced hostility of improve<l seat-
ing to be the best reasonable form of protection
against injury.

PAS asked that a separate standard for seat
belt assembly anchorages be issued. They dis-
agree with the agency's conclusion (41 F.R. 4016)
that seat belt anchorages should not be required
because of indications that only a small fraction
of school buses would have belts installed and
properly used. However, PAS failed to produce
evidence that a substantial number of school
buses would be equipped with safety belts, or
that steps would l)e taken to assure the proper
use of such belts. In the absence of such in-
formation, the agency maintains its position that
a seat belt anchorage requirement should not be
included in the standard at this time, and denies
the PAS petition for reconsideration.

The NHTSA does find merit in the PAS con-
cern that in the absence of additional giudance,
improper safety belt installation may occur. The
Administration is considering iiilemaking to
establish performance requirements for safety
belt anchorages and assemblies when such sys-
tems are installed on school bus passenger seats.

PAS also requested that the seat back height
be raised from the 20-inch level sj^ecified by the
standard to a 24-inch level. In support of tliis
position, the organization set forth a "common

PART 571; S 222— PRE 5

Effective: October 26, 1976

sense" argument that whiplash must be occurring
to school bus passengers in rear impact. How-
ever, the agency has not been able to locate any
quantified evidence that there is a significant
whiplash problem in school buses. The crash
forces impartetl to a school bus occupant in rear
impact are typically far lower than those im-
parted in a car-to-car impact because of the
greater weight of the school bus. The new and
higher seating required by the standard specifies
energy absorption characteristics for the seat back
under rear-impact conditions, and the agency
considers that these improvements over earlier
seating designs wil reduce the number of in-
juries that occur in rear impact. For lack of
evidence of a significant whiplash problem, the
PAS petition for a 24-inch seat back is denied.

PAS believed that the States and localities
that specify a 24-inch seat back height would be
precluded from doing so in the future by the
preemptive eileet of Standard No. 222 under
§ 103(f) of the National Traffic and Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)):

g ]^Qg *****

(d) "Wlienever a Federal motor vehicle safety
standard under this subchapter is in effect, no
State or political subdivision of a State shall
have any authority either to establish, or to
continue in effect, with respect to any motor
vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any
safety standard applicable to the same aspect
of performance of such vehicle or item of
equipment which is not identical to the Fed-
eral standard. Nothing in this section shall
be construed to prevent the Federal Govern-
ment or the government of any State or
political subdivision thereof from establishing
a safety requirement applicable to motor ve-
hicle equipment procured for its own use if
such requirement imposes a higher standard
of performance than that required to comply
with the otherwise applicable Federal standard.

Standard No. 222 specifies a minimum seat
back height (S5.1.2) which manufactures may
exceed as long as their product conforms to all
other requirements of the standards applicable
to school buses. It is the NHTSA's opinion that
any State standard of general applicability con-
cerning seat back height of school bus seating

would also have to specify a minimum height
identical to the Federal requirement. Manufac-
turers would not be required to exceed this mini-
mum. Thus, the PAS [letition to state seat back
height as a minimum is unnecessary and has
already been satisfied, although it does not have
the effect desired by the PAS.

With regard to the PAS concern that the
States' seat height requirements would be pre-
empted, the second sentence of § 103(d) clarifies
that the limitation on safety regulations of gen-
eral applicability does not prevent governmental
entities from specifying additional safety features
in vehicles purchased for their own use. Thus, a
State or its political subdivisions could specify a
seat back height higher than 20 inches in the case
of public school buses. The second sentence does
not pennit these, governmental entities to specify
safety features that prevent the vehicle or equip-
ment from complying with applicable safety
standards.

With regard to which school buses qualify as
"public school buses" that may be fitted with
additional features, it is noted that the agency
includes in this category those buses that are
owned and operated by a private contractor under
contract with a State to provide transportation
for students to and from public schools.

Sheller-Globe Corporation (Sheller) petitioned
for exclusion from the seating requirements for
seating that is designed for handicapped or con-
valescent students who are unable to utilize
conventional forward-facing seats. Typically,
side-facing seats are installed to improve entry
and egress since knee room is limited in forward-
facing seats, or spaces on the bus are specifi-
cally designed to accommodate wheelchairs. The
standard presently requires that bus passenger
seating be forward-facing (S5.1) and conform to
requirements appropriate for forward-facing
seats. Blue Bird Body Company noted in a
March 29, 1976, letter that it also considered the
standard's requirements inappropriate for special
seating.

The agency has considered the limited circum-
stances in which this seating would be offered in
school buses and concludes that the seat-spacing
requirement (S5.2) and the fore-and-aft seat per-
formance requirements (S5.1.3, S5.1.4) are not

PART 571; S 222— PRE 6

Effective: October 26, 1976

appropriate for side-facing seats designed solely
for handicapped or convalescent students. Occu-
pant crasli protection is, of couree, as important
for these students as others, and the agency in-
tends to establish requirements suited to these
specialized seating arrangements. At this time,
however, insufficient time remains before the
effective date of this standard to estahlisli differ-
ent requirements for the seating involved. There-
fore, the XHTSA has decided to modif\' its rule
by the exclusion of side-facing seating installed
to accommodate handicapped or convalescent
passengers.

School bus manufacturers should note that
the limited exclusion does not relieve them from
providing a restraining barrier in front of any
forward -facing seat that has a side-facing seat
or wheelchair position in front of it .

Sheller also petitioned for a modification of the
head protection zone (85.3.1.1) that describes
the space in front of a seating position where an
occupant's head would impact in a crash. The
outer edge of this zone is described as a vertical
longitudinal plane 3.25 inches inboard of the out-
board edge of the seat.

Sheller pointed out that van-tj'pe school buses
utilize "'tumble home'' in the side of the vehicle
that brings the bus body side panels and glazing
into the head protection zone. As Sheller noted,
the agency has never intended to include body
side panels and glazing in the protection zone.
The roof structure and overhead projections from
the interior are included in this area of the zone.
To clarify this distinction and account for the
"tumble home," the description of the head impact
zone in S5.3.1.1 is appropriately mmlifiexl.

In accordance, with recently enunciated De-
partment of Transportation policy encouraging
adequate analy.sis of the consequences of regu-
latory action (41 F.R. 16201; April 16, 1976),
the agency herewith summarizes its evaluation of
the economic and other consequences of this action
on the public and private sectors, including pos-
sible loss of safety benefits. The decision to
withdraw re/juirements for side-facing seats used
by handicapped or convalescent students will re-
sult in cost savings to manufacturers and pur-

chasers. The action may encourage production
of specialized buses that would otherwise not be
built if the seating were subject to the standard.
Beeause the requirements are not appropriate to
the orientation of this seating, it is estimated that
no significant loss of safety benefits will occur as
a result of the amendment. The exclusion of
sidewall, window or door structure from the head
protection zone is simply a clarification of the
agency's longstanding intent that these compo-
nents not be subject to the requirements. There-
fore no new consequences are anticipated as a re-
sult of this amendment.

In an area unrelated to the petitions for re-
consideration, the Automobile Club of Southern
California petitioned for specification of a van-
dalism resistance specification for the upholsterj*
that is installed in school buses in compliance
with Standard No. 222. Data were submitted on
experience with crash pads installed in school
buses operated in California. Vandalism damage
was experienced, and its cost quantified in the
submitted data.

The Automobile Club made no argument that
the damage to the upholstery presents a sig-
nificant safety problem. "\Miile it is conceivable
that removal of all padding from a seat back
could occur and expose the rigid seat frame, the
agency estimates that this would occur rarely and
presumably would result in replacement of the
seat. Because the agency's authoiity under the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
is limited to the issuance of standards that meet
the need for motor vehicle safety (15 U.S.C.
§ 1392 (a) ) , the agency concludes that a vandalism
resistance requirement is not appropriate for
inclusion in Standard No. 222.

In light of the foregoing. Standard No. 222
(49 CFR 571.222) is amended. . . .

Effective date: October 26, 1976. Because the
-Standard becomes effective on October 26, 1976,
it is found to be in the public interest that an
effective date sooner than 180 days is in the public
interest. Changes in the text of the Code of
Federal Regulations should be made immediately.

PART 571; 8 222— PRE 7

Effecirve: October 26, 1976

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (15 James B. Gregory

U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; delegation of authority at Administrator

49 CFR 1.50.) 41 F.R. 28506

Issued on July 7, 1976. July 12, 1976

PAET 571; S 222— PRE 8

Effactlve: December 16, 1976

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 222

School Bus Seating and Crash Protection
(Docket No. 73-3; Notice 8)

This notice amends Standard No. 222, School
Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection, to
delay the effective date for maximum rearward
deflection of seats from April 1, 1977, to April 1,
1978.

Standard No. 222 (49 CFR 571.222), as pub-
lished January 28, 1976 (41 F.R. 4016), estab-
lished October 27, 1976, as the effective date of
the standard, as mandated by the Motor Vehicle
and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974 (the
Act) (Pub. L. 93-^92). Congress subsequently
amended the Act by Public Law 94-346 (July
8, 1976) to extend the effective date for the im-
plementation of school bus standards to April
1, 1977.

The NHTSA has promulgated regulations on
several aspects of performance mandated by
Congress in the Act. These, regulations become
effective on April 1, 1977. The agency concludes,
however, that compliance with one provision of
Standard No. 222 by the April 1, 1977, effective
date would be impracticable, would result in
substantial economic waste, and would not be in
the public interest.

Since publication of Standard No. 222, a mis-
understanding has arisen within the industry
concerning the definition of the term "absorbed"
when used in connection with the requirements
in sections S5.1.3.4 and S5.1.4.2. The NHTSA
explained the term "absorbed" in an interpreta-
tion to Thomas Built Buses (July 30, 1976) to
mean "receive without recoil." This interpreta-
tion requires that returned energy be subtracted
from total energy applied to the seat back to
calculate energy "absorbed" by the seat back.

School bus manufacturers tested their seats in
accordance with the NHTSA definition of "ab-
sorbed" and found that the seats continued to

comply with the requirements of Standard No.
222 when tested for forward perfonnance
(S5.1.3), but these same seats were marginally
below the NHTSA requirements for reanvard
seat deflection. Based upon these test data,
petitions have been received from Thomas Built
Buses, Blue Bird Body Company, Carpenter Body
Works, Wayne Corporation, and Ward School
Bus Manufacturing, all requesting a change in
rearward performance requirements.

The NHTSA has examined the data submitted
by the manufacturers and concludes that the
seats upon which the tests were made demonstrate
a high probability of meeting most of the re-
quirements of Standard No. 222. Further, the
agency concludes that to mandate full compliance
with the rearward performance requirements of
Standard No. 222 would require extensive re-
tooling and redesign. This could result in sub-
stantial economic waste of seats now in production
and severe economic hardship for manufacturers.

The NHTSA is particularly concerned that to
require full compliance with the rearward per-
formance requirements at this late date might
mean that manufacturers would be imable to
redesign their seats in time to commence manu-
facture of completed buses on April 1, 1977.
Since single-stage buses produced after April 1,
1977, must meet NHTSA safety requirements in
all other respects, they will be substantially safer
than buses currently in use. Therefore, the
agency finds that it is in the interest of safety
to ensure that these safer buses will be available
on April 1, 1977, to replace older less safe models.
To ensure that safer buses can he marketed witli-
out delay, the NHTSA extends the effective date
of requirements for maximum rearward deflec-
tion of seats to April 1, 1978. It is emphasized

PART 571; S 222— PRE 9

EfFective: December 16, 1976

that the numerous other requirements for school
bus seating, including all other rearward per-
formance requirements, remain in effect, which
ensures adequate interior protection as of April
1, 1977, as mandated by Congress. A proposal
for minor modification of S5.1.4 (to be published
shortly) will permit reinstitution of rearward
deflection requirements following the 1-year delay.

Because of the imminent effective date of the
school bus safety standards and the lead time
required to modify seat design, the NHTSA for
gool cause finds that notice and public procedure
on this amendment are impracticable and con-
trary to the public interest.

In consideration of the foregoing, S5.1.4(b)
of Standard No. 222 (49 CFR 571.222) is
amended by the addition, at the beginning of the
first sentence, of the following phrase: "In the

case of a school bus manufactured on or after
April 1, 1978,".

Effective date: December 16, 1976. Because
this amendment relieves a restriction and does
not impose requirements on any person, it is
found, for good cause shown, that an immediate
effective date is in the public interest.

(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; Sec. 202, Pub. L. 93^92,
88 Stat. 1470 (15 U.S.C. 1392); delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on December 10, 1976.

Acting Administrator
Charles E. Duke

41 F.R. 54945
December 16, 1976

PART 571; S 222— PRE 10

Efhctlve: April I, 1978

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 222

(Docket No. 73-3; Notice 12)

This notice amends Standard No. 222, School
Bus Passenger Seating amd Crash Protection,
increasing the allowable rearward deflection of
seats from 8 to 10 inches. The action is taken in
response to petitions that indicated the current
rearward deflection requirement is unnecessarily
restrictive in that it would require costly retool-
ing of school bus seats with no measurable safety
advantage over a somewhat greater deflection
distance that would not entail significant retool-
ing. Additionally, a minor modification of the
standard is made clarifying the meaning of
"absorbed energy" consistent with an agency
interpretation of that term.

Effective Date: April 1, 1978.

For further information contact :

Mr. Timothy Hoyt, Crashworthiness Divi-
sion, National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-2264).

Supplementary Information : On November 10,
1977, the NHTSA published a notice proposing
to amend the rearward deflection requirement of
Standard No. 222, School Bus Passenger Seating
and Crash Protection. The impetus for that pro-
posal came from several petitions from school bus
manufacturers claiming that the rearward deflec-
tion requirement was unnecessarily restrictive
since it would require significant retooling of
school bus seats which would not be measurably
superior, in terms of safety, to seats designed to
meet a slightly greater deflection distance. They
stated that seats produced in compliance with a
somewhat greater rearward deflection require-
ment, as opposed to the currently specified 8-inch
requirement, would not require retooling. The
NHTSA agreed with the petitioners and, accord-
ingly, proposed to increase the allowable rear-
ward deflection of seats from 8 to 10 inches. By

the same notice, the NHTSA proposed a minor
modification of the standard clarifying the
agency's meaning of absorbed energy.

Only one comment was received in response to
that notice of proposed rulemaking. The Vehicle
Equipment Safety Commission did not submit
comments.

The only commenter. Blue Bird Body Com-
pany, took issue with the agency's proposed
method for limiting rearward seat deflection. It
asserted that the requirement expressed in S5.1.4
(c) of the standard should be the only limitation
on rearward seat deflection. That section pro-
vides that a seat shall not, when tested, come
within 4 inches of any portion of another pas-
senger seat.

Blue Bird's comment is not persuasive. The
requirement of S5.1.4(c) addresses an entirely
separate safety concern than the requirement of
S5.1.4(b). Section S5.1.4(b) limits the rearward
deflection of a seat, by this notice, to a maximum
of 10 inches. That requirement functions as part
of the compartmentalization scheme of Standard
222. Limiting the degree of seat back deflection
helps to contain a child within the seat structures
in the event of an accident. This requirement
should be distinguished from that contained in
S5.1.4(c), which is intended to ensure that a
minimum amount of space remains between seats
following an accident so that a child does not
become trapped. Since both requirements are
necessary to maintain the safety level considered
necessary for school buses, Blue Bird's request is
denied.

Blue Bird stated in its comments a preference
for specifying maximum rearward seat deflection
in terms of inches rather than angle. This com-
ment suggests that Blue Bird misinterpreted the
statements in the notice of proposed rulemaking
as indicating that the NHTSA was cont«mplat-

PART 571; S 222— PRE 11

Effective: April 1, 1978

ing an amendment that would limit the angle of
seat deflection. The reference in the notice to a
40° seat angle was made only to justify the pro-
posed 10-inch maximum seat deflection. A 40°
seat angle roughly translates to 10 inches of rear-
ward seat deflection. Tliere was no intention to
suggest that an angle limitation was under con-
sideration. In fact, the preamble stated that the
NHTSA had abandoned, in earlier rulemaking,
attempts to adopt an angular measurement owing
to the difficulty of making such a measurement.

The agency concludes that the extension of the
allowable rearward deflection of seats from 8 to
10 inches assures passenger safety while minimiz-
ing the cost impact of compliance with the school
bus regulations. Since this amendment relieves
a restriction, it should result in no increase in
costs.

In consideration of the foregoing. Part 571, of
Title 49, CFE, is amended. . . .

The principal authors of this proposal are
Timothy Hoyt of the Crashwortliiness Division
and Koger Tilton of the Office of Chief Counsel.

(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; Sec. 203, Pub. L. 93-492,
88 Stat. 1470 (15 U.S.C. 1392) ; delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on March 1, 1978.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

43 F.R. 9149
March 6, 1976

PART 571; S 222— PRE 12

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 222

School Bus Seating and Crash Protection
(Docket No. 73-3; Notice 13)

Action: Final rule.

Summary: This notice makes final an e.xistinp
interim amendment to Standard No. •2'22,
School Bus Seating and Crash Protection^ in-
creasing the maximum allowable seat spacing
in school buses from 20 to 21 inches. In issuing
the original standard, the agency intended that
the seats be spaced approximately 20 inches
apart (So. 2). However, because of manufac-
turing tolerances, some school bus manufactur-
ers were spacing their seats at distances less
than 20 inches to ensure that the spacing does
not exceed the prescribed maximum. A seat
spacing specification of 21 inches permits 20-inch
spacing of seats by taking manufacturing toler-
ances into fuller account. This spacing will ac-
commodate large high school students while still
ensuring a safe level of school bus seat perform-
ance.

Effective date: Since this amendment merely
makes final an existing interim rule, it is effective
March 29, 1979.

For further information contact:

Mr. Robert Williams, Crashworthiness Divi-
sion, National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202) 426-2264.

Supplementary infoivnafion: On December 22,
1977, the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration issued a proposal to increase the
allowable seat spacing in school buses from 20 to
21 inches (42 FR 64136). Concurrently with that
proposal, the NHTSA issued an interim final rule
permitting buses to be constructed immediately
with the increased seat spacing (42 FR 64119).
This action was taken to provide the amount of
seat spacing in school buses originally intended

by the agency and to relieve immediately prob-
lems created by the unnecessarily limited seat
spacing in buses then being built. The action
resulted from numerous complaints by school bus
users relating to scat spacing. The proposiil and
interim final rule responded to petitions from the
AVisconsin School Bus Association and the Na-
tional School Transportation Association asking
for increased seat spacing.

Tlie agency received many comments in re-
sponse to its December 1977 proposal. Most com-
ments favored some extension in the seat spacing
allowance in school buses. Commenters differed
as to the amount of seat spacing needed to ac-
commodate fully the larger school children. Some
conunenters suggested that the agencj" provide
still more seat spacing than proposed in the
December 22 notice. Other commentei-s sup-
ported the agency's suggested modification.

The agency has reviewed all of the comments
and the petitions concerning this issue and has
concluded that the proposal and interim rule
provide sufficient seat spacing in school buses for
all school children. To provide greater seat
spacing, as sugge^sted by some commenters, might
necessitate changing the seat stiiictures to absorb
more energy. See the December proposal for
further discussion of this point. The NHTSA
does not believe that such a costly change is war-
ranted at this time. The agency notes that as a
result of the interim rule seat spacing in buses
has become adequate to meet the needs for pupil
transportation to and from school. The agency
continues, however, to research tiie proper seating
for activity buses and will address that issue in a
separate notice as soon as all of the research iind
analysis is completed.

PART 571; S 222-PRE 13

In accordance with the foregoing, Volume 49 88 Stat. 1470 (15 U.S.C. 1392) ; delegation of
of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 571, authority at 49 CFR 1.50.)
Standard 'So. 222, School Bm Seating and Crash Issued on March 21 1979.

Protecti^m, is amended .... ' j^^^ Claybrook

The principal authors of this notice are Robert . .

Williams of the Crashworthiness Division and
Roger Tilton of the Office of Chief Counsel.

(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 44 F.R. 18674-18675

(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; Sec. 203, Pub. L. 93-492, March 29, 1979

PART 571; S 222-PRE 14

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 222

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection

[Docket No. 73-3; Notice 15]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends the agency's
school bus seating standard to increase seat
spacing from 21 to 24 inches. This amendment is
being issued to resolve problems experienced by
users, i.e., school districts and contract carriers, to
the effect that mandatory seat spacing at the
prior level inhibited some necessary uses. The
agency finds that an additional space seating
option will not inhibit safety.

DATE: This amendment is effective March 24,
1983.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Standard
No. 222, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash
Protection, was one of several standards
implemented pursuant to the Motor Vehicle and
School Bus Safety Amendments of 1974 (Pub. L.
93-492). The standard regulates the performance
aspects of school bus seats. One portion of the
standard limits the longitudinal spacing between
seats in buses with gross vehicle weight ratings
(GVWR) of more than 10,000 pounds. No seat may
be positioned more than 21 inches from the seat
immediately to the front, measured from the
seating reference point to the seat back or
restraining barrier located in front of the seat.

The initial version of Standard 222 which
became effective on April 1, 1977, limited school
bus seat spacing to 20 inches. Soon after school
buses began to be produced in compliance with
this requirement, users began to experience
problems of inadequate spacing. Because of
quality control and other production problems

affecting seat spacing, manufacturers were
spacing seats significantly less than the 20 inches
permitted by the standard to ensure compliance.
As manufacturers improved their production
techniques, seat spacing was extended.

The agency upon examination of its then
existing data concluded later that same year that
it could extend seat spacing to 21 inches without
adversely affecting the compartmentalization
concept that was the key to protecting children in
the buses. Compartmentalization attempts to
protect children between well padded high-
backed seats. The agency amended the rule
accordingly (42 F.R. 64119, December 22, 1977)
and undertook to study further the
appropriateness of the required seat spacing.

Both the amendment and improved
manufacturer production methods reduced the
number of spacing problems significantly. Some
problems continue to exist, however, especially
concerning buses used to transport children long
distances to and from school, or to and from
school related events which may be located far
from the school itself. The agency has conducted
tests to see whether it could improve seat spacing
to respond to these continuing problems, without
compromise of safety. The tests, which are
available in the Technical Reference Section of
the agency under H73-3 "School Bus Passenger
Seat and Lap Belt Sled Tests," DOT-HS-804985,
December 1978, show that seat spacing could be
increased up to 24 inches without impairing the
concept of compartmentalization. An increase in
seat spacing beyond 24 inches might impair the
ability of the seats to absorb energy in the
manner required by the standard. Accordingly,

PART 571; S222-PRE 15

on February 25, 1982, the agency proposed a
further increase in seat spacing to 24 inches (47
F.R. 8231).

The agency received numerous comments in
response to the notice of proposed rulemaking.
Virtually all of those comments supported the
agency's action. In accordance with the comments
and the existing agency information, the agency,
by this notice, makes final the increased seat
spacing to 24 inches.

Three school districts out of the more than 140
commenters on the February notice objected to
the increased seat spacing. It appears that these
commenters were afraid that the increased seat
spacing was mandatory and that this would in
turn reduce the seating capacity in their vehicles
resulting in the need to purchase additional buses
or realign school routes. This understanding is
not accurate. The increased seat spacing is
merely optional. If a school chooses to have
additional spacing in some or all of its buses, up to
24 inches, this would be permitted. Otherwise,
schools may continue to purchase buses with
seats spaced as they are today. Seat spacing less
than 24 inches is completely within the discretion
of the school that is purchasing the vehicles.

Commenters to the February notice raised
another issue that is somewhat related to seat
spacing. They requested more comfortable seats
and additional leg room for long distance school

buses. These are the vehicles that frequently
have been involved in transporting children to
and from activities or, in some instances, carry
children over long distances to schools in some of
the Western States. The commenters in general
would prefer to have recliner seats or some other
seating system that would be more comfortable
for these uses.

The agency has explored the possibility of
establishing another optional seating mode in
school vehicles that would accommodate the
concerns of these commenters. The agency
concludes that recliner seats could not provide
the same level of safety as provided by existing
seat requirements in school buses. Accordingly,
the agency declines to adopt this suggestion.
NHTSA believes that the seat spacing extension
being made today should address adequately the
problem of comfort in buses used for school
activities.

This amendment is being made effective
immediately. It relieves a restriction, and is
com{)letely optional, and does not require any
manufacturer or purchaser to alter present
practices. Further, the agency has learned that
many companies and purchasers are waiting for
this amendment before purchasing new vehicles.
Therefore, an immediate effective date is in the
public interest.

Issued on March 17, 1983.

Raymond A Peck, Jr.
Administrator
48 F.R. 12384
March 24, 1983

PART 571: S222-PRE 16

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 222

School Bus Seating and Crash Protection

51. Scope. This standard establishes occu-
pant protection requirements for school bus pas-
senger seating and restraining barriers.

52. Purpose. The purpose of this standard
is to reduce the number of deaths and the se-
verity of injuries that result from the impact of
school bus occupants against structures within
the vehicle during crashes and sudden driving
maneuvers.

53. Application. This standard applies to
school buses.

54. Definitions. "Contactable surface" means
any surface within the zone specified in S5.3.1.1
that is contactable from any direction by the test
device described in S6.6, except any surface on
the front of a seat back or restraining barrier 3
inches or more below the top of the seat back or
restraining barrier.

"School bus passenger seat" means a seat in
a school bus, other than the driver's seat or a
seat installed to accommodate handicapped or
convalescent passengers as evidenced by orienta-
tion of the seat in a direction that is more than
45 degrees to the left or right of the longitudinal
centerline of the vehicle.

34.1 The number of seating positions con-
sidered to be in a bench seat is expressed by the
symbol W, and calculated as the bench width in
inches divided by 15 and rounded to the nearest
whole number.

55. Requirements, (a) Each vehicle with a
gross vehicle weight rating of more than 10,000
pounds shall be capable of meeting any of the
requirements set forth under this heading when
tested under the conditions of S6. However, a
particular school bus passenger seat (i.e., test

specimen) in that weight class need not meet
further requirements after having met S5.1.2 and
S5.1.5, or having been subjected to either S5.1.3,

55.1.4, orS5.3.

(b) Each vehicle with a gross vehicle weight
rating of 10,000 pounds or less shall be capable
of meeting the following requirements at all seat-
ing positions other than the driver's seat: (1)
The requirements of §§ 571.208, 571.209, and
571.210 (Standard Nos. 208, 209, and 210) as
they apply to multipurpose passenger vehicles;
and (2) the requirements of S5.1.2, S5.1.3, S5.1.4,

55.1.5, and S5.3 of this standard. However, the
requirements of Standard Nos. 208 and 210 shall
be met at W seating positions in a bench seat
using a body block as specified in Figure 2 of
this standard, and a particular school bus pas-
senger seat (i.e., a test specimen) in that weight
class need not meet further requirements after
having met S5.1.2 and S5.1.5, or having been
subjected to either S5.1.3, S5.1.4, S5.3, or § 571.210
(Standard No. 210).

S5.1 Seating requirements. School bus pas-
senger seats shall be forward facing.

55.1.1 [Reserved]

55.1.2 Seat bacit height and surface area.

Each school bus passenger seat shall be equipped
with a seat back that, in the front projected
view, has a front surface area above the hori-
zontal plane that passes through the seating
reference point, and below the horizontal plane
20 inches above the seating reference point, of
not less than 90 percent of the seat bench width
in inches multiplied by 20.

55.1.3 Seat performance forward. When a
school bus passenger seat that has another seat
behind it is subjected to the application of force
as specified in S5. 1.3.1 and S5.1.3.2, and subse-

PART 571; S 222-1

quently, the application of additional force to
the seat back as specified in S5.1.3.3 and S5. 1.3.4:
(a) The seat-back force/deflection curve shall
fall within the zone specified in Figure 1;

wwwwwwww

|6n, 240IMISI

SEAT BACK FORCE DEFLECTION CURVE
SHALL NOT ENTER SHADED AREAS

4 6 8 10

DEFLECTION IINCHESI

FIGURE I FORCE/OEFLECTION ZONE

(b) Seat back deflection shall not exceed 14
inches; (for determination of (a) and (b) the
force/deflection curve describes only the force
applied through the upper loading bar, and only
the forward travel of the pivot attachment point
of the upper loading bar, measured from the
point at which the initial application of 10
pounds of force is attained.)

(c) The seat shall not deflect by an amount
such that any part of the seat moves to within 4
inches of any part of another school bus passen-
ger seat or restraining barrier in its originally
installed psition;

(d) The seat shall not separate from the ve-
hicle at any attachment point; and

(d) Seat components shall not separate at any
attachment point.

55.1.3.1 Position the loading bar specified in
S6.5 so that it is laterally centered behind the
seat back with the bar's longitudinal axis in a
transverse plane of the vehicle and in any hori-
zontal plane between 4 inches above and 4 inches
below the seating reference point of the school
bus passenger seat behind the test specimen.

55.1.3.2 Apply a force of 700W pounds hori-
zontally in the forward direction through the
loading bar at the pivot attachment point. Reach
the specified load in not less than 5 nor more
than 30 seconds.

55.1.3.3 No sooner than 1.0 second after at-
taining the required force, reduce that force to
350W pounds and, while maintaining the pivot
point position of the first loading bar at the posi-
tion where the 350W pounds is attained, position
a second loading bar described in S6.5 so that it
is laterally centered behind the seat back with
the bar's longitudinal axis in a transverse plane
of the vehicle and in the horizontal plane 16
inches above the seating reference point of the
school bus passenger seat behind the test speci-
men, and move the bar forward against the seat
back until a force of 10 pounds has been applied.

55.1.3.4 Apply additional force horizontally
in the forward direction through the upper bar
until 4,000W inch-pounds of energy have been
absorbed in deflecting the seat back (or restrain-
ing barrier). Apply the additional load in not
less than 5 seconds nor more than 30 seconds.
Maintain the pivot attachment point in the maxi-
mum forward travel position for not less than
5 seconds nor more than 10 seconds and release
the load in not less than 5 nor more than 30
seconds. (For the determination of S5.1.3.4 the
force/deflection curve describes only the force
applied through the upper loading bar, and the
forward and rearward travel distance of the up-
per loading bar pivot attachment point measured
from the position at which the initial application
of 10 pounds of force is attained.)

S5.1.4 Seat performance rearward. When a
school bus passenger seat that has another seat
behind it is subjected to the application of force
as specified in S5. 1.4.1 and S5. 1.4.2:

(a) Seat back force shall not exceed 2,200
pounds;

(b) In the case of a school bus manufactured
on or after April 1, 1978, seat back deflection
shall not exceed 10 inches; (For determination
of (a) and (b) the force/deflection curve de-
scribes only the force applied through the load-
ing bar, and only the rearward travel of the
pivot attachment point of the loading bar, meas-
ured from the point at which the initial applica-
tion of 50 pounds of force is attained.

PART 571; S 222-2

(c) The seat shall not deflect by an amount
such that any part of the seat moves to within
4 inches of any part of another passenger seat
in its originally installed position;

(d) The seat shall not separate from the ve-
hicle at any attachment point; and

(e) Seat components shall not separate at any
attachment point.

55.1.4.1 Position the loading bar described
in S6.5 so that it is laterally centered forward
of the seat back with the bar's longitudinal axis
in a transverse plane of the vehicle and in the
horizontal plane 13.5 inches above the seating
reference point of the test specimen, and move
the loading bar rearward against the seat back
until a force of 50 pounds has been applied.

55.1.4.2 Apply additional force horizontally
rearward through the loading bar until 2,800W
inch-pounds of energy have been absorbed in de-
flecting the seat back. Apply the additional load
in not less than 5 seconds nor more than 30 sec-
onds. Maintain the pivot attachment point in the
maximum rearward travel position for not less
than 5 seconds nor more than 10 seconds and re-
lease the load in not less than 5 seconds nor more
than 30 seconds. (For determination of S5. 1.4.2
the force/deflection curve describes the force ap-
plied through the loading bar and the rearward
and forward travel distance of the loading bar
pivot attachment point measured from the posi-
tion at which the initial application of 50 pounds
of force is attained.)

S5.1.5 Seat cushion retention. In the case of
school bus passenger seats equipped with seat
cushions, with all manual attachment devices be-
tween the seat and the seat cushion in the manu-
facturer's designed position for attachment, the
seat cushion shall not separate from the seat at
any attachment point when subjected to an up-
ward force of five times the seat cushion weight,
applied in any period of not less than 1 nor more
than 5 seconds, and maintained for 5 seconds.

S5.2 Restraining barrier requirements. Each
vehicle shall be equipped with a restraining bar-
rier forward of any designated seating position
that does not have the rear surface of another

school bus passenger seat within 24 inches of its
seating reference point, measured along a hori-
zontal longitudinal line through the seating ref-
erence point in the forward direction.

55.2.1 Barrier-seat separation. The horizontal
distance between the restraining barrier's rear
surface and the seating reference point of the
seat in front of which it is required shall be not
more than 24 inches, measured along a horizontal
longitudinal line through the seating reference
point in the forward direction.

55.2.2 Barrier position and rear surface area.

The position and rear surface area of the re-
straining barrier shall be such that, in a front
projected view of the bus, each point of the bar-
rier's perimeter coincides with or lies outside of
the perimeter of the seat back of the seat for
which it is required.

55.2.3 Barrier performance forward. When
force is applied to the restraining barrier in the
same manner as specified in S5. 1.3.1 through
S5.1.3.4 for seating performance tests:

(a) The restraining barrier force/deflection
curve shall fall within the zone specified in
Figure 1;

(b) Restraining barrier deflection shall not ex-
ceed 14 inches; (For computation of (a) and
(b) the force/deflection curve describes only the
force applied through the upper loading bar,
and only the forward travel of the pivot attach-
ment point of the loading bar, measured from
the point at which the initial application of 10
pounds of force is attained.)

(c) Restraining barrier deflection shall not in-
terfere with normal door operation;

(d) The restraining barrier shall not separate
from the vehicle at any attachment point; and

(e) Restraining barrier components shall not
separate at any attachment point.

S5.3 Impact zone requirements.

S5.3.1 Head protection zone. Any contactable
surface of the vehicle within any zone specified
in S5.3.1.1 shall meet the requirements of S5.3.1.2
and S5.3.1.3. However, a surface area that has
been contacted pursuant to an impact test need
not meet further requirements contained in S5.3.

PART 571; S 222-3

S5.3.1.1 The head protection zones in each
vehicle are the spaces in front of each school
bus passenger seat which are not occupied by
bus sidewall, window, or door structure and
which, in relation to that seat and its seating
reference point, are enclosed by the following
planes;

(a) Horizontal planes 12 inches and 40 inches
above the seating reference point;

(b) A vertical longitudinal plane tangent to
the inboard (aisle side) edge of the seat;

(c) A vertical longitudinal plane 3.25 inches
inboard of the outboard edge of the seat, and

(d) Vertical transverse planes through and 30
inches forward of the reference point.

S5.3.1.2 Head form impact requirement. When
any contactable surface of the vehicle within

the zones specified in S5.3.1.1 is impacted from
any direction at 22 feet per second by the head
form described in S6.6, the axial acceleration at
the center of gravity of the head form shall be
such that the expression

shall not exceed 1,000 where a is the axial ac-
celeration expressed as a multiple of g (the
acceleration due to gravity), and ti and tz are
any two points in time during the impact.

S5.3.1.3 Head form force distribution. When
any contactable surface of the vehicle within the
zones specified in S5.3.1.1 is impacted from any
direction at 22 feet per second by the head form

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PART 571; S 222-4

described in S6.6, the energy necessary to deflect
the impacted material shall be not less than 40
inch-pounds before the force level on the head
form exceeds 150 pounds. When any contactable
surface within such zones is impacted by the
head form from any direction at 5 feet per sec-
ond, the contact area on the head form surface
shall be not less than 3 square inches.

S5.3.2 Leg protection zone. Any part of the
seat backs or restraining barriers in the vehicle
within any zone specified in S5.3.2.1 shall meet
the requirements of S5.3.2.2.

55.3.2.1. The leg protection zones of each ve-
hicle are those parts of the school bus passenger
seat backs and restraining barriers bounded by
horizontal planes 12 inches above and 4 inches
below the seating reference point of the school
bus passenger seat immediately behind the seat
back or restraining barrier.

55.3.2.2. When any point on the rear surface
of that part of a seat back or restraining barrier
within any zone specified in S5.3.2.1 is impacted
from any direction at 16 feet per second by the
knee form specified in S6.7, the resisting force
of the impacted material shall not exceed 600
pounds and the contact area on the knee form
surface shall not be less than 3 square inches.

S6. Test conditions. The following conditions
apply to the requirements specified in S5.

S6.1 Test surface.

surface.

The bus is at rest on a level

S6.2 Tires. Tires are inflated to the pressure
specified by the manufacturer for the gross ve-
hicle weight rating.

6.3 Temperature. The ambient temperature is
any level between 32 degrees F. and 90 degrees F.

56.4 Seat back position. If adjustable, a seat
back is adjusted to its most upright position.

56.5 Loading bar. The loading bar is a rigid
cylinder with an outside diameter of 6 inches
that has hemispherical ends with radii of 3 inches
and with a surface roughness that does not ex-
ceed 63 micro-inches, root mean square. Then
length of the loading bar is 4 inches less than the

width of the seat back in each test. The stroking
mechanism applies force through a pivot attach-
ment at the centerpoint of the loading bar which
allows the loading bar to rotate in a horizontal
plane 30 degrees in either direction from the
transverse position.

S6.5.1 A vertical or lateral force of 4,000
pounds applied externally through the pivot at-
tachment point of the loading bar at any posi-
tion reached during a test specified in this
standard shall not deflect that point more than
1 inch.

S6.6 Head form. The head form for the meas-
urement of acceleration is a rigid surface com-
prised of two hemispherical shapes, with total
equivalent weight of 11.5 pounds. The first of
the two hemispherical shapes has a diameter of
6.5 inches. The second of the two hemispherical
shapes has a 2 inch diameter and is centered as
shown in Figure 3 to protrude from the outer
surface of the first hemispherical shape. The
surface roughness of the hemispherical shapes
does not exceed 63 micro-inches, root mean
square.

56.6.1 The direction of travel of the head
form is coincidental with the straight line con-
necting the centerpoints of the two spherical
outer surfaces which constitute the head form
shape.

56.6.2 The head form is instrumented with an
acceleration sensing device whose output is re-
corded in a data channel that conforms to the
requirements for a 1,000 Hz channel class as
specified in SAE Recommended Practice J211a,
December 1971. The head form exhibits no
resonant frequency below three times the fre-
quency of the channel class. The axis of the
acceleration sensing device coincides with the
straight line connecting the centerpoints of the
two hemispherical outer surfaces which consti-
tute the head form shape.

56.6.3 The head form is guided by a stroking
device so that the direction of travel of the head
form is not affected by impact with the surface
being tested at the levels called for in the
standard.

PART 571; S 222-5

BIHEMISPHERICAL HEAD FORM RAOII

FIGURE 3

S6.7 Knee form. The knee form for measure-
ment of force is a rigid 3-inch-diameter cylinder,
with an equivalent weight of 10 pounds, that has
one rigid hemispherical end with a IV2 inch

radius forming the contact surface of the knee
form. The hemispherical surface roughness does
not exceed 63 micro-inches, root mean square.

56.7.1 The direction of travel of the knee
form is coincidental with the centerline of the
rigid cylinder.

56.7.2 The knee form is instrumented with an
acceleration sensing device whose output is re-
corded in a data channel that conforms to the
requirements of a 600 Hz channel class as spec-
ified in the SAE Recommended Practice J211a,
December 1971. The knee form exhibits no
resonant frequency below three times the fre-
quency of the channel class. The axis of the
acceleration sensing device is aligned to measure
acceleration along the centerline of the cylindrical
knee form.

56.7.3 The knee form is guided by a stroking
device so that the direction of travel of the knee
form is not affected by impact with the surface
being tested at the levels called for in the
standard.

S6.8 The head form, knee form, and con-
tactable surfaces are clean and dry during impact
testing.

41 F.R. 4016
January 28, 1976

PART 571; S 222-6

EffccNv*: S«pt*mb«r 1, 197S

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
STANDARD NO. 301

Fuel System Integrity
(Docket No. 70-20; Notice 2)

This notice amends Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard No. 301 on fuel system integrity to
specify static rollover requirements applicable to
passenger cars on September 1, 1975, and to
extend applicability of the standard to multi-
purpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses
with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less on Sep-
tember 1, 1976.

The NHTSA proposed amending 49 CFR
571.301, Fuel Tanks, Fuel Tank Filler Pipes, and
Fuel Tank Connections, on August 29, 1970, (35
F.R. 13799). Under the proposal the standard
would be extended to all vehicles with a GVIVR
of 10,000 pounds or less. No fuel spillage would
be permitted during the standard's tests. As
proposed, these would include a spike stop from
60 mph, and a 30 mph frontal barrier crash.
Additional tests for vehicles with a GVWR of
6,000 pounds or less would include a rear-end
collision with a fixed barrier at 30 mph, and a
static rollover test following the frontal barrier
crash. With respect to the proposal : the frontal
impact and static rollover tests are adopted but
with an allowance of fuel spillage of 1 ounce
per minute; the spike stop test is not adopted;
and the rear-end fixed barrier collision test is
being reproposed in a separate rule making ac-
tion published today to substitute a moving
barrier.

The proposal that there be zero fuel spillage
was almost universally opposed for cost/benefit
reasons. The NHTSA has concluded that the
requirement adopted, limiting fuel spillage to
1 ounce per minute, will have much the san
effect as a zero-loss requirement. The standa
will effectively require motor vehicles to be c
signed for complete fuel containment, since any
spillage allowed by design in the aftermath of

testing could well exceed the limit of the stand-
ard. At the same time, the 1-ounce allowance
would eliminate concern over a few drops of
spillage that in a functioning system may be un-
avoidable.

Fuel loss will be measured for a 15-minut«
period for both impact and rollover tests.

The NHTSA proposed a panic-braking stop
from 60 mph to demonstrate fuel system integ-
rity. Many commented that this appeared
superfluous, increasing testing costs with no per-
formance improvements, since the proposed front
and rear impact tests represented considerably
higher deceleration loadings than could be
achieved in braking. The NHTSA concurs, and
has not adopted the panic stop test. The frontal
barrier crash at 30 mph has been retained for
passenger cars, and extended to multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses with a
GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less as of Septem-
ber 1, 1976.

The static rollover test was adopted as pro-
posed. It applies to passenger cars as of Sep-
tember 1, 1975, and to multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks, and buses with a GVWR of
6,000 pounds or less, as of September 1, 1976.
The rollover test follows the front barrier crash,
and consists of a vehicle being rotated on ita
longitudinal axis at successive increments of 90°.
A condition of the test is that rotation between
increments occurs in not less than 1 minute and
not more than 3 minutes. After reaching a 90°
increment, the vehicle is held in that position for
5 minutes.

The proposed rear-end crash test incorporated
a fixed collision barrier. Manufacturers gener-
ally favored a moving barrier impact as a closer

PART 571; S 301(9/1/75)— PRE 1

EfNctlvc S«pl*mb*r 1, 1975

simulation of real world conditions. The NHTSA
concurs and is not adopting a rear end fixed
barrier test. Instead, it is proposing a rear-end
moving barrier collision test as part of the notice
of proposed rulemaking published today.

Under the proposal the vehicle would be
loaded to its GVWR with the fuel tank filled to
any level between 90 and 100 percent of capacity.
Many commenters objected on the grounds that
full loading of a vehicle represents an unrealistic
condition in terms of actual crash experience.
The NHTSA does not agree. Although full
loading of a vehicle is not the condition most
frequently encountered, it certainly occurs fre-
quently enough that the vehicle should be de-
signed to give basic protection in that condition.
The vehicle test weight condition has been
adopted as proposed. It should be noted that,
in the parallel notice of proposed rulemaking
issued today, vehicles would be tested under the

weight conditions specified in Standard No. 208,
eflFective September 1, 1975.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
Part 571.301, Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
No. 301, is amended

Effective date: September 1, 1975. Because
of the necessity to allow manufacturers sufficient
production leadtime it is found for good cause
shown that an effective date later than 1 year
after issuance of this rule is in the public in-
terest.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718,
15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on August 15, 1973.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

38 F.R. 22397
August 20, 1973

PART 571; S 301(9/1/75)— PRE 2

Effccllv*: S«pt«mb«r 1, 1975

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 301

Fuel System Integrity
(Docket No. 73-20; Notice 2)

The purpose of this notice is to amend Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fioel
System Integrity^ to upgrade substantially the
requirements of the standard by specifying a
rear moving barrier crash, a lateral moving bar-
rier crash, and a frontal barrier crash including
impacts at any angle up to 30° in either direction
from the perpendicular.

A notice of proposed rulemaking published
August 20, 1973 (38 F.R. 22417) proposed the
imposition of additional testing requirements
designed to ameliorate the dangers associated
with fuel spillage following motor vehicle acci-
dents. In an amendment to Standard No. 301,
published on the same day as the proposal, a
frontal barrier crash and a static rollover test
were specified. In order to ensure the safety of
fuel systems in any possible collision situation,
the NHTSA finds it essential to incorporate ad-
ditional proposed test requirements into the
present standard and to make these requirements
applicable to all vehicle types with a GVWR of
10,000 pounds or less.

Comments in response to the proposal were
received from 29 commenters. Any suggestions
for changes of the proposal not specifically men-
tioned herein are denied, on the basis of all the
information presently available to this agency.
A number of the issues raised in the comments
have been dealt with by the agency in its re-
sponse to the petitions for reconsideration of the
final rule issued on August 20, 1973. In its notice
responding to the petitions, the NHTSA consid-
ered objections to the use of actual fuel during
testing, the siiecified fuel fill level, the applica-
tion of the standard to vehicles using diesel fuel,
the fuel spillage measuring requirement, and the
allegedly more stringent loading requirements

applicable to passenger cars. The type of fuel
subject to the standard was also clarified.

Objections were registered by 13 commenters
to the proposed inclusion of a dynamic rollover
test in the fuel system integrity standard. As
proposed, the requirement calls for a measure-
ment of the fuel loss while the vehicle is in mo-
tion. Commenters pointed out the exceptional
difficulty in measuring or even ascertaining a
leakage when the vehicle is rolling over at 30
mph. The NHTSA has decided that the objec-
tions have merit, and has deleted the dynamic
rollover test. The results of the dynamic rollover
do not provide sufficiently unique data with re-
gard to the fuel system's integrity to justify the
cost of developing techniques for accurately
measuring spillage during such a test, and of
conducting the test itself. The NHTSA has
concluded that the severity of the other required
tests, when conducted in the specified sequence,
is sufficient to assure the level of fuel system
integrity intended by the agency.

Triumph Motors objected to the use of a 4,000-
pound barrier during the moving barrier impacts,
asserting that such large barriers discriminate
against small vehicles. Triumph requested that
the weight of the barrier be the curb weight of
the vehicle being tested in order to alleviate the
burden on small vehicles. The NHTSA has con-
cluded that no justification exists for this change.
The moving barrier is intended to represent
another vehicle with which the test vehicle must
collide. The use of a 4,000-pound moving bar-
rier is entirely reasonable since vehicles in use
are often over 4,000 pounds in weight and a
small vehicle is as likely to collide with a vehicle
of that size as one smaller. The NHTSA con-
siders it important that vehicle fuel systems be

PART 571; S 301-75— PRE 3

Effacllvt: September 1, 1975

designed in such a way as to withstand impacts
from vehicles they are exposed to on the road,
regardless of the differences in their sizes.

Jeep and American Motors objected to the
effective dates of the proposed requirements and
asked that they be extended. Jeep favors an
effective date not earlier than September 1, 1979,
and American Motors favors a September 1,
1978, effective date. The NHTSA denies these
requests. It has found that the time period pro-
vided for development of conforming fuel sys-
tems is reasonable and should be strictly adhered
to considering the urgent need for strong and
resilient fuel systems.

Several commenters expressed concern over the
impact of the prescribed testing procedures on
manufacturers of low-volume specialty vehicles.
The NHTSA appreciates the expense of conduct-
ing crash tests on low-production vehicles, realiz-
ing that the burden on the manufacturer is
related to the number of vehicles he manufac-
tures. However, there are means by which the
small-volume manufacturer can minimize the
costs of testing. He can concentrate test efforts
on the vehicle (s) in his line that he finds most
difficult to produce in conformity with the stand-
ard. These manufacturers should also be aware
that an exemption from application of the stand-
ard is available where fewer than 10,000 vehicles
per year are produced and compliance would
subject him to substantial financial hardship.

In responding to the petitions for reconsider-
ation of the amendment to Standard No. 301,
published August 20, 1973, the NHTSA revised
the fuel system loading requirement to specify
Stoddard solvent as the fuel to be used during
testing. In accordance with that amendment,
the proposed requirement that the engine be
idling during the testing sequence is deleted.
However, electrically driven fuel pumps that
normally run when the electrical system in the
vehicle is activated shall be operating during the
barrier crash tests.

In order to fulfill the intention expressed in
the preamble to the proposal, that simultaneous
testing under Standards Nos. 208 and 301 be
possible, language has been added to subpara-
graph S7.1.5 of Standard No. 301 specifying the
same method of restraint as that required in

Standard No. 208. In its response to petitions
for reconsideration of Standard No. 301 (39 F.R.
10586) the NHTSA amended the standard by
requiring that each dummy be restrained during
testing only by means that are installed in the
vehicle for protection at its seating position and
that require no action by the vehicle occupant.

Suggestions by several commenters that the
application of certain crash tests should be lim-
ited to passenger cars in order to maintain com-
plete conformance to the requirements of
Standard No. 208 are found to be without merit.
Enabling simultaneous testing under several
standards, although desirable, is not the most
important objective of the safety standards. The
NHTSA is aware of the burden of testing costs,
and therefore has sought to ease that burden
where possible by structuring certain of its
standards to allow concurrent testing for com-
pliance. It must be emphasized, however, that
the testing requirements specified in a standard
are geared toward a particular safety need.
Application of the tests proposed for Standard
No. 301 to all vehicle types with a GVIVR of
10,000 pounds or less is vital to the accomplish-
ment of the degree of fuel system integrity neces-
sary to protect the occupants of vehicles involved
in accidents.

No major objections were raised concerning the
proposed angular frontal barrier crash, lateral
barrier crash, or rear moving barrier crash. On
the basis of all information available to this
agency, it has been determined that these pro-
posed crash tests should be adopted as proposed.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
571.301, Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301,
is amended to read as set forth below.

Effective date: September 1, 1975, with addi-
tional requirements effective September 1, 1976,
and September 1, 1977, as indicated.

(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-56", 80 Stat. 718,
15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on March 18, 1974.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

39 F.R. 10588
March 21, 1974

PART 571 ; S 301-75— PRE 4

Elbctlv*: Stpl«mb*r 1, I97S

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 301-75

Fuel System Integrity
(Docket No. 73-20; Notice 3)

This notice responds to petitions for recon-
sideration of the two recent Federal Register
notices amending and upgrading Standard No.
301 (39 F.R. 10586; 39 F.R. 10588) and amends
the standard in several respects.

On March 21, 1974 two notices were published
pertaining to Standard No. 301, Fuel System, In-
tegrity. One notice (39 F.R. 10586) responded
to petitions for reconsideration of an earlier
amendment to the standard (38 F.R. 22397),
while the other (39 F.R. 10588) substantially
upgraded the standard's performance require-
ments. It was the intention of the NHTSA that
the notice upgrading the standard be considered
as the final rule and supersede the notice re-
sponding to petitions. Hereafter, the notice re-
sponding to petitions will be referred to as
Notice 1, while the notice upgrading the stand-
ard will be referred to as Notice 2.

On October 27, 1974, the Motor Vehicle and
Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974 (P.L.
93-192) were signed into law. These amend-
ments to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act incorporate Standard No. 301 as it
was published in Notice 2 on March 21, 1974.
According to the amendment the technical errors
which appeared in Notice 2 may be corrected,
while future amendments are prohibited from
diminishing the level of motor vehicle safety
which was established in the notice. The changes
contained in this notice conform to these statu-
tory requirements.

Due to an oversight. Notice 2 failed to include
two provisions which appeared in Notice 1. The
limitation of the standard's application to ve-
hicles which use fuel with a boiling point above
32°F was inadvertently omitted in Notice 2 and
is hereby reinstated. Notice 2 also failed to in-
clude a provision specifying that vehicles not be

altered during the testing sequences. It was the
intent of the NHTSA that damage or other
alteration of the vehicle incurred during the bar-
rier crashes not be corrected prior to the static
rollover tests. The test requirements are there-
fore amended to prohibit the alteration of ve-
hicles following each of the specified test impacts.

In order to clarify the manner in which the
load is to be distributed during testing of multi-
purpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses,
S7.1.5(b) is amended to require that when the
weight on one of the axles exceeds its propor-
tional share of the loaded vehicle weight, when
the vehicle is loaded only with dummies, the re-
mainder of the required test weight shall be
placed on the other axle, so that the weight on
the first axle remains the same. The loading
specification did not specifically address this
contingency.

The requirement that the load be located in
the load carrying area of multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks, and buses during testing is de-
leted since the agency has determined that such
a limitation is consistent with the provision spec-
ifying distribution of weight in proportion with
the vehicle's gross axle weight ratings.

Petitions for reconsideration were received
from eleven petitioners. Although only those
comments raising issues found to be significant
have been discussed, due consideration has been
given to all requests. Any requests not spe-
cifically discussed herein are denied.

A substantial number of petitioners objected
to the requirement that dummies used during
testing be restrained only by passive means in-
stalled at the seating positions. Petitioners
pointed out that mandatory passive restraint
systems proposed in Standard No. 208 have a
proposed effective date of September 1, 1976;
one year after the September 1, 1975 effective

PART 571; S 301-75— PRE 5

Effective: September 1, 1975

date set for implementation of Standard 301.
This would leave a period of time when most
dummies would be involved in testing while to-
tally unrestrained. Renault, Jeep, American
Motors, Mercedes-Benz, General Motors, and
Ford requested that the dummies be restrained
during testing by wliatever means, active or pas-
sive, are installed at the particular seating posi-
tions. To provide otherwise, they argued, would
unnecessarily expose the dummies to costly dam-
age when subjected to impacts in an unrestrained
condition.

The NHTSA finds petitioners' objections mer-
itorious. Although this agency has determined
that reliable test results can be best obtained
when occupant weight is included in the vehicle
during crash testing, the manner in which that
weight is installed is subject to additional con-
siderations. The NHTSA has made clear its
desire to enable simultaneous testing under more
than one standard where the test requirements
are compatible. Standards 301 and 208 both
require frontal and lateral barrier crash tests
which can be conducted concurrently if the ve-
hicles are loaded uniformly. Since Standard
208 provides for crash testing with dummies in
vehicles with passive restraint systems. Standard
301 testing of these same vehicles should be con-
ducted with dummies installed in the seating
positions provided under Standard 208. The
presence of the passive restraints will protect
the dummies from unnecessary damage and the
required testing for compliance with both stand-
ards can be accomplished simultaneously. Where
a vehicle is not equipped with passive restraints,
and Standard 208 testing is not mandated, weight
equal to that of a 50th percentile test dummy
should be secured to the floor pan at the front
outboard designated seating positions in the ve-
hicles being tested.

Further concern over the damage to which test
dummies might be exposed was manifested by
Jeep and American Motors. They petitioned
for the removal of the dummies prior to the
static rollover tests, arguing that their presence
serves no safety-related purpose. The NHTSA
has granted the request, on the basis of its deter-
mination that the dummies would have little or
no effect on the fuel system's integrity during
the rollover segment of the test procedure.

Jeep and American Motors further suggested
that the standard specify that hardware and
instrumentation be removed prior to the static
rollover test in order to prevent its damage.
This request is denied as unnecessary. Standard
No. 301 contains no specification for the inclusion
of instrumentation during testing. Any instru-
mentation present in the vehicle is there by deci-
sion of the manufacturer to assist him in
monitoring the behavior of the fuel system
during testing, and must be installed and utilized
in such a manner as not to affect the test results.
Therefore, as long as the loading requirements
of the standard are met, manufacturers may deal
with their instrumentation in any fashion they
wish, as long as the test results are unaffected.

Volkswagen urged that unrestrained dummies
not be required during the rear moving impact
test, citing the absence of such a test in Standard
208 and alleging that the integrity of vehicle
fuel systems would not be greatly affected by the
presence of dummies. This request is denied.
The rear moving barrier crash specified in pro-
posed Standard 207, Seating Systems, provides
for the installation of dummies in the same seat-
ing positions as required for Standard 301, thus
permitting simultaneous conduct of the rear bar-
rier crashes required by both standards. In
order to obtain realistic and reliable test results,
occupant weight must be in vehicles during
Standard 301 crash testing. The NHTSA has
determined that unrestrained dummies would
have, at most, slight vulnerability to damage
during rear barrier crash tests, since the impact
is such that the seats themselves serve as pro-
tective restraint mechanisms. It has therefore
been concluded that the best method for includ-
ing occupant weight during rear barrier crash
testing is with test dummies.

Notice 2 specified that the parking brake be
engaged during the rear moving barrier crash
test. Ford requested in its petition for recon-
sideration that this requirement be changed in
order to enable simultaneous rear barrier crash
testing with Standard 207 which provides for
disengagement of the parking brake in its recent
proposal. The NHTSA has decided to grant
Ford's request. The condition of the parking
brake during this test sequence would not so
significantly affect the test results as to warrant

PART 571; S 301-75— PRE 6

Effective: September I, 1975

retention of a requirement thut would prevent
simultaneous testing.

The Recreational Veliicle Institute objected to
the standard, arfruinp that it was not cost-effec-
tive as applied to motor homes. RVI rc(|uested
that. ditTerent test |)rocedures be developed for
motor home manufacturers. Specifically it ob-
jected to what it sMfrpested was a requirement
for unnecessaiy double testin<j in situations
where the incomplete vehicle has already been
tftsted before the motor home mamifacturer re-
ceives it. RVI expressed the view that the motor
home manufacturer should not have to concern
himself with compliance to the i;.\tent that he
must test the entire vehicle in accordance with
the standards test procedures.

Tlie NHTSA has found the requirements of
Standard 301 to he reasonable in that they en-
force a level of safety that has been determined
necessary and provide adequate lead time for
manufacturers to develop methods and means of
compliance. The National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act does not I'equire a manu-
facturei- to test vehicles by any particular
method. It does require that he e.xercise due
Ciire in assuring himself that his vehicles are
capable of satisfying the perfoiinance require-
ments of applicable standards when tested in the
manner i)rescribed. This may be accomplished,
however, by whatever means the manufacturer
reasonably determines to be reliable. If the final
stage manufacturer of a motor home concludes
tliat additional testing by him of the entire ve-
hicle for conqjliance is unnecessary, and he has
exercised due care in completing the vehicle in a
manner that continues its conformity to appli-
cable standards, he is under no obligation to re-
peat tlie procediires of the standards.

RVI further [)ressed its contention that the
standard is not cost-beneficial by arguing that
the agency has not provided specific data indi-
cating a frequency of fuel system fires in motor
homes that would justify the costs imposed by
the standard.

Sufficient record evidence has been fotuid to
support the conclusion that fuel si)illage in the
types of crashes with which the standard deals
is a major safety hazard. The only basis upon
which motor home manufacturers could justify

the exception of their vehicles from Standard
Sflls requirements would be an inherent im-
munity from gasoline spillage. The standard
establishes a reasonable test of a vehicle's ability
to withstand impacts without experiencing fuel
lo.ss. If a motor home is designed in such a
way as to preclude the spillage of fuel during
the prescribed test im[)acts, compliance with the
stanilaid should [)resent no significant hard.ship.

Volkswagen challenged the cost-benefit ra-
tionale of the more extensive performance re-
quirements contained in Notice 2. and proposed
that only the rear barrier crash be retained, if
sufficient data exists to support its inclusion.
The agency has carefully considered the issues
raised in the Volkswagen petition. As discussed
earlier. Standard 301 has been designed to allow
testing for its requirements with some of the
same barrier crash tests that are required by
other standards: 208, 204, 212, and 207. This
should reduce substantially the costs of testing
to Standard 301, especially when viewed on a
cost-|)er-vehicle basis. The NHTSA has con-
cluded that the changes necessary for vehicles
to comply with the standard are practicable and
that the need for such increased fuel system
integrity is sufficient to justify the costs.

The Recreational Vehicle Institute also urged
that the effective date for motor homes be de-
layed 1 year beyond the date set for application
of the standard to other vehicles. RVI contends
that a uniform effective date for all manufac-
turers will create serious problems for the motor
home manufacturer w^ho will not have complying
incomplete vehicles available to him until the
effective date of the standard.

The NHTSA finds RVI's argument lacking
in merit. Adequate lead time has been provided
in Standard 301 to allow final stage manufac-
turers of nuiltistage vehicles to become familiar
with the requirements and to assure themselves
that chassis and other vehicle components are
available sufficiently in advance of the effective
date to enable timely compliance. The availa-
bility of complying incomplete vehicles is a
situation that should |>roperly be resolved in the
commercial dealings between motor home manu-
facturers and their suppliers. If the motor home
manufacturer is unable to obtain complying in-

PART 571 ; S 301-75— PRE 7

Effective: September 1 , 1 975

complete vehicles far enough in advance of the
standards eft'ective date, he might, for example,
work out an arrangement with his supplier
whereby the supplier will provide information
relating to the manner in which the incomplete
vehicle must be completed in order to remain in
compliance witli all applicable safety standards.
Tlie lead time pro\ided in the standards is
planned to take into account the needs of per-
sons at each stage of the manufacturing process,
including final stage manufacturers.

Jeep, American IVTotors, and Toyota urged de-
lays in tJie implementation of various aspects of
the standard. Jeep suggested a new schedule
for application of the standard's requirements to
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and
buses, stating that the current lead time is in-
sufficient to enable completion of necessary de-
sign changes and compliance testing. American
Motors requested a 1-year delay in the effective
date for the static rollover test in order to allow
satisfactory completion of the required Environ-
mental Protection Agency 50,000 mile durability
test. Once vehicles have completed required
EPA testing and certification, their fuel system
components cannot be altered. AMC says that
it cannot make the design changes necessary for
Standard 301 compliance in time to utilize them
in this year's EPA tests. AMC also desires a
2-year delay in the frontal angular, rear, and
lateral impact tests, alleging that that constitutes
the minimum time necessary to produce designs
that comply. Toyota asked for a delay in the
frontal angular crash test for all passenger ve-
hicles until 1978, in order to allow them suffi-
cient time to develop a satisfactory means of com-
pliance with the sjjecified performance level.

All of these requests are denied. The lead time
that has been provided for compliance with
Standard 301 is found adequate and reasonable.
The rollover requirements have been in rule form
for over a year, and the more extensive require-
ments were proposed more than 3 years in ad-
vance of their effective dates. Considering the
urgent need for stronger and more durable fuel
systems, further delay of the effective dat«s is
not justified. On the basis of all information
available, the NHTSA has determined that de-
velopment of comi^lying fuel systems can be
attained in the time allowed. In addition, Con-

gress has expressed in the recently enacted
amendments to the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act its decision that the effective
dates si)ecified in Notice 2 should be strictly
adhered to.

Toyota requested that the requirements of the
rear moving barrier crash not be imposed on
vehicles with station wagon or hatch-back bodies,
alleging difficulty in relocation of the fuel tank
to an invulnerable position. The request is de-
nied as the NHTSA has determined that satis-
faction of the rear barrier crash requirements
by station wagons and hatch-backs is practicable
and necessary.

Volkswagen raised several objections in its pe-
tition to the static rollover test, including asser-
tions that the test does not reflect real world
accidents, and that the test procedure is unclear
since the direction of rotation is unspecified.

The NHTSA does not consider these argu-
ments to be germane. It is true that the static
rollover test, like any "static" test, is not de-
signed as a simulation of the actual behavior of
a vehicle in a dynamic crash situation. It is
intended rather as a laboratory method of quan-
titatively measuring the vehicle properties that
contribute t« safety in a range of crash situa-
tions. The NHTSA has found tliat a vehicle's
performance in the static rollover test is directly
related to the fuel system integrity that is the
goal of the standard, and is an appropriate
means of measuring that aspect of performance.

With regard to the direction of rotation, the
NHTSA has stipulated that only a cetrain
amount of fuel may escape during a 360° rota-
tion of a vehicle on its longitudinal axis. The
vehicle must be capable of meeting this perform-
ance level regardless of the direction of its
rotation.

British Leyland (in a petition for rulemaking)
and Volkswagen requested revision of the aspect
of the barrier crash requirement limiting the
amount of fuel spillage taking place from impact
until motion of the vehicle has ceased. They
stated that the current 1-ounce limitation is too
difficult to measure in the period while the ve-
hicle is moving and suggested that fuel spillage
be averaged over the period from impact until
5 minutes following the cessation of motion.

PART 571; S 301-75— PRE 8

The XHTSA must deny this request. The
purpose of the current limitation on the spillage
of fuel during the impact and post-impact mo-
tion is to prohibit the sudden loss of several
ounces of fuel which might occur, as an example,
by the displacement of the filler cap. Simul-
taneous loss of several ounces of fuel during tlie
impact and subsequent vehicle motion could have
a fire-causing potential, because of sparks that
are likely to be given off during a skid or metal
contact between vehicles.

Chrysler petitioned to have the requirement
specifying tliat the moving barrier be guided
during the entire impact sequence deleted in
favor of a requirement that would allow the
termination of guidance of the barrier imme-
diately prior to impact. They argued that their
suggested procedure is more representative of
real world impacts.

The request is denied. The condition that
there be no trans\erse or rotation;! 1 movement of
the barrier, which has been in effect since Jan-
uary 1, 1972, eliminates random variations be-
tween different tests and therefore makes the
standard more repeatable and objective as re-
quired by the statute.

Jeep requested clarification that a given vehicle
is only required to be subjected to one of the spec-
ified barrier impacts followed by a static roll-
over. This request is granted as it follows the

Effective: September 1, 1975

agency's intent and the standard is not specific
on that point. Section S6. is amended to require
that a single vehicle need only be capable of
meeting a single crash test followed by a static
rollover.

American Motors submitted a request that the
agency finds repetitious of previous petitions,
urging tliat vehicle fluids be stabilized at ambient
temperatures prior to testing. In responding to
earlier petitions for reconsideration from MVMA
and GM in Notice 1, the NJITSA denied a re-
quest for temperature specification, stating that
it intended that the full spectrmn of tempera-
tures encountered on the road be reflected in the
test procedure. That continues to be this agency's
position.

In light of the foregoing S3., S6., S6.1, S6.3,
S7.1.4, and S7.1.5 of Standard Xo. 301, Fml 8yx-
tem Integrity, (49 CFR 571.301) are amended

E-ffective date; September 1, 1975, with addi-
tional requirements effective September 1, 1976
and September 1. 1977, as indicated.

(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718,
15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on November 15, 1974.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

39 F.R. 40857
November 21, 1974

PART 571 ; S 301-75— PRE 9-10

EfFactlva: Septambar 1, 1975

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 301-75

Fuel System Integrity
(Docket No. 73-20; Notice 6)

This notice amends Standard No. 301, Fitel
System Integrity (49 CFR 571.301), to specify
new loading conditions and to establish a 30-
minute fuel spillage measurement period follow-
ing barrier crash tests.

On April 16, 1975, the NHTSA published a
notice (40 F.R. 17036) proposing a revision of
the loading conditions and fuel spillage measure-
ment period requirement in Standard 301. The
NHTSA also proposed in that notice an exten-
sion of the applicability of Standard 301 to
school buses with a GVWR in excess of 10,000
pounds. At the request of several Members of
Congress, the due date for comments on the
school bus proposal was extended to June 26,
1975, and final rulemaking action on it will ap-
pear in a later Federal Register notice.

It was proposed that the current 15-minute
fuel spillage measurement period be extended to
30 minutes in order to allow more time for lenks
to be located and rates of flow to be established.
Measurement of fuel loss during only a 15 minute
time period is difficult because fuel may be es-
caping from various parts of the vehicle where
it is not readily detectable. Chrysler, American
Motors, and General Motors objected to the pro-
posed change and asked that it either not be
adopted or that adoption be delayed for one
year until September 1, 1976.

The commenters argued that the revision was
unnecessary and would involve a change in their
testing methods. The NHTSA has fully consid-
ered these arguments and does not consider the
amendment to prescribe a higher level of per-
formance. It concludes that the 30-minute
measurement period is necessary to achieve ac-
curate measurement of fuel loss and assessment
of vehicle compliance and accordingly amends

Standard 301 to prescribe the longer period for
measurement.

The April 16, 1975, notice also proposed a
change in the Standard 301 loading conditions
to specify that 50th percentile test dummies be
placed in specified seating positions during the
frontal and lateral barrier crash tests, and that
they be restrained by means installed in the ve-
hicle for protection at the particular seating
position. Currently the standard requires (dur-
ing the frontal and lateral barrier crash tests)
ballast weight secured at the specified designated
seating positions in vehicles not equipped with
passive restraint systems. In vehicles equipped
with passive restraints, 50th percentile test dum-
mies are to be placed in the specified seating
positions during testing.

In petitions for reconsideration of this amend-
ment to Standard No. 301 (39 F.R. 40857)
various motor vehicle manufacturers stated that
attachment of such ballast weight to the vehicle
floor pans during the barrier crashes would exert
unrealistic stresses on the vehicle structure which
would not exist in an actual crash. The NHTSA
found merit in petitioners' arguments, and its
proposed revision of the loading conditions is
intended to make the crash tests more represen-
tative of real-life situations.

Only Mazda objected to the proposal. It
argued that curb weight be prescribed as the
loading condition so that it could conduct Stand-
ard .301 compliance testing concurrently with
testing for Standards No. 212 and 204. The
NHTSA does not find merit in Mazda's request
as the Standard 301 loading condition is consid-
ered necessary to assure an adequate level of fuel
system integrity. Since the proposed loading
conditions are more stringent than a curb weight

PART 571; S 301-75— PRE 11

Effective: September 1, 1975

condition, manufacturers could conduct compli-
ance testing for Standards 301, 212, and 204
simultaneously. If the vehicle complied with the
requirements of Standards 212 and 204 when
loaded according to 301 specifications, the manu-
facturer presumably could certify the capability
of the vehicles to comply with the performance
requirements of 212 and 204 when loaded to curb
weight. It should be noted that the NHTSA is
considering amending Standards 212 and 204
to specify the same loading conditions as pro-
posed for Standard 301.

All other commenters supported immediate
adoption of the proposed loading conditions.
Therefore, the NHTSA adopts the loading con-
ditions as they were proposed in the April 16,
1975, notice.

In consideration of the foregoing, S5.5 and
S7.1.6 of Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No.

301, Fuel System Integrity (49 CFR 571.301),
are amended to read as follows :

Effective date: Because this amendment re-
vises certain requirements that are part of 49
CFR 571.301-75, Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
301-75, effective September 1, 1975, and creates
no additional burden upon any person, it is
found for good cause shown that an effective
date of less than 180 days after publication is in
the public interest.

(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; delegation of authority
at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued August 1, 1975.

Robert L. Carter
Acting Administrator

40 F.R. 33036
August 6, 1975

PART 571; S 301-75— PRE 12

Effsctive: S*pl«mb*r 1, 1976

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 301-75

Fuel System Integrity
(Docket No. 73-20; Notice 7)

This notice responds to a petition for recon-
sideration of the notice published August 6, 197.5
(40 FR 33036), which amended Standard No.
301, Fuel System Integrity (49 CFR 571.-301), to
specify new loading conditions and establish a
30-minute fuel spillage measurement period fol-
lowing a barrier crash test.

American Motors Corporation (AMC) has
petitioned for reconsideration of the amendment
to So. 5 of Standard No. 301 insofar as it estab-
lishes an effective date of September 1, 197.'), for
the 30-minute fuel spillage requirement. AMC
requests that the effective date for the 30-minute
fuel spillage measurement time be delayed for
180 days from the date of publication of the rule.

The NHTSA has determined that AMC's peti-
tion has merit. AMC argues that the imposition
of an effective date 2r) days after the publication
of the rule is burdensome because the 30-minute
spillage requirement is a more stringent require-
ment than the previous 15-minute requirement
and therefore requires additional testing to deter-
mine compliance. The NIITSA agrees that 25
days is not enough time to complete the addi-

tional testing. However, the effective date will
be postponed 12 months instead of the 6 months
requested by AMC so that manufacturei-s will
not have to conduct compliance testing for 1976
model vehicles already certified under the old
15-niinute spillage requirement. For these rea-
sons the petition of American Motors Corporation
is granted.

In S5.5 of Standard No. 301, Fuel System
Integrity, (49 CFR 571.301), the amendment of
August 6, 1975 (40 FR 33036), changing the term
"10-minute period" to "25-minute period" effec-
tive September 1, 1975, is hereby made effective
September 1, 1976.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (15
U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; delegation of authority at 49
CFR 1.51).

Issued on October 3, 1975.

Gene G. Mannella
Acting Administrator

40 F.R. 47790
October 10, 1975

PART 571; S 301-75— PRE 13-14

Eff*<llv*: Octobsr IS, 1975
July IS, 1976

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 301-75

Fuel System Integrity
(Docket No. 73-20; Notice 8)

The purpose of this notice is to amend Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, Fuel System
Integrity (49 CFR 571.301) to extend the appli-
cability of the standard to school buses with a
GVAVR in excess of 10,000 pounds. The amend-
ment specifies conditions for a moving contoured
barrier crash for school buses in order to deter-
mine the amount of fuel spillage following
impact.

On October 27, 1974, the Motor Vehicle and
Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, amending
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act, were signed into law (Pub. L. 93-492, 88
StAt. 1470). Section 103(i)(l)(A) of the Act,
as amended, orders the promulgation of a safety
standard establishing minimum requirements for
the fuel system integrity of school buses. Stand-
ard No. 301 currently contains requirements for
school buses with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or
less which will become eflfective beginning Sep-
tember 1, 1976. Larger school buses, which com-
prise approximately 90 percent of the school bus
population, will be included in Standard No. 301
by this amendment.

A proposal to amend Standard No. 301 with
respect to school buses, loading conditions, and
spillage measurement time was publishetl on
April 16, 1975 (40 FR 17036). An amendment
to the Standard specifying certain loading con-
ditions and establishing a 30-minute fuel spillage
measurement period was published on August 6,
1975 (40 FR 33036). At the request of several
members of Congress, the period for comments
on the school bus proposals was extended. This
notice responds to the comments received with
respect to the inclusion of school buses within the
requirements of the standard.

Seven manufacturers opposed the requirement
of a single impact test by a moving contoured
barrier at any point on the school bus body, argu-
ing that such a requirement would necessitate a
proliferation of expensive tests in order to ensure
compliance at every conceivable point of impact.
The NHTSA does not agree. Although not
specifying a particular impact point, the test con-
dition allows for testing at the few most vulner-
able points of each kind of school bus fuel system
configuration. Therefore, only impacts at those
points are necessary to determine compliance. On
the basis of its knowledge of the bus design, a
manufacturer should be able to make at least an
approximate detennination of the most vulnerable
points on the bus body.

Two school bus body manufacturers requested
a requirement that the manufacturer who installs
the fuel system be responsible for compliance
testing, while one chassis manufacturer argued
that responsibility for compliance should re-st
with the final manufacturer. In most cases, if
the basic fuel system components are inchided
in the chassis as delivered by its manufacturer,
the multistage vehicle regulations of 49 CFR
Part 568 require the chassis manufacturer at least
to describe the conditions under which the com-
pleted vehicle will conform, since it could not
truthfully state that the design of the chassis has
no substantial determining effect on conformity.
Beyond that, however, the NHTSA position is
that the decision as to who should perform the
tests and who should take the responsibility is
best not regulated by the government. The eifect
of Part 568 is to allow the final-stage manufac-
turer to avoid primar>- responsibility for con-
formity to a standard if it completes the vehicle
in accordance with the conditions or instructions
furnished with the incomplete vehicle by its inan-

PART 671; S 301-75— PRE 15

Effective; October 15, 1975
July 15, 1976

ufacturer. Whether it does so is a decision it
must make in light of all the circumstances.

This notice extends the proposed exclusion for
vehicles that use fuel with a boiling point below
32° F. to school buses having a GVWR greater
than 10,000 pounds. Fuel systems using gaseous
fuels are not subject to the spillage problems
against which this standard is directed.

The Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission re-
quested that school buses be required to undergo
static rollover tests and that the engine be run-
ning during the tests. Upon consideration, the
NHTSA finds that a static rollover test for school
liuses is impractical in light of the expensive test
facility that would be required. A requirement
that the engine be running during the impact test
would make little difference in the resulting fuel
spillage. Since the standard requires that the
fuel tank be filled with Stoddard solvent during
the impact test, the test vehicle would have to be
equipped with an auxilian' fuel system for the
engine. The expense of modifying the test ve-
hicle to allow the engine to run during the test
would not justify the minimal benefits resulting
from a requirement that the engine be running.
However, the fuel system integrity of school
buses will be continually monitored and analyzed
by the NHSTA. Therefore, suggestions such as
these may be the subject of future rulemaking.

One school bus body manufacturer cited the
infrequency of school bus fires resulting from
collisions as a reason for ameliorating or eliminat-
ing altogether fuel system integrity requirements
for school buses. In pronmlgating these amend-
ments to Standard No. 301, the NHTSA is act-
ing under tlie statutory mandate to develop regu-
lations concerning school bus fuel systems. This
statute reflects the need, evidently strongly felt
by the public, to protect the children who ride
in tlie school buses. They and tlieir parents have
little direct control over the types of vehicles in
which they ride to school, and are therefore not
in a position to determine the safety of the ve-
hicles. Considering the high regard expressed
by the public for the safety of its children, the
NHTSA finds it important that the school bus
standards be effective and meaningful.

The California Highway Patrol expressed the
concern that these amendments would preempt
State regulations to the extent that the State
would be precluded from specifying the location
of fuel tanks, fillers, vents, and drain openings in
school buses. The standard will unavoidably
have that effect, by the operation of section
103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act. However, although a State may not
have regulations of general applicability that
bear on these aspects of performance, the second
sentence of the same section makes it clear that
a State or political subdivision may specify
higher standards of performance for vehicles pur-
chased for its own use, although of course the
Federal standards must be met in any case.

In addition to provisions directly relating to
school buses, this notice clarifies the loading con-
dition amendments in the notice of August 6,
1975, by amending S6.1 to provide for testing
with 50th percentile dummies. The wording of
S6.1 is identical to that of the proposal.

In light of the foregoing, 49 CFR 571.301,
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 301, is
amended. . . .

Effective date; July 15, 1976, in conformity
with the schedule mandated by the 1974 Amend-
ments to the Traffic Safety Act. However, the
effective date of the amendment of S6.1 is October
15, 1975. Because the amendment to that para-
graph clarifies the revision of certain require-
ments which became effective Septemlier 1. 1975,
it is found for good cause shown that an effective
date for the amendment of S6.1 less than 180
days after issuance is in the public interest.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (15
U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; Sec. 202, Pub. L. 93^92, 88
Stat. 1470 (15 U.S.C. 1392) ; delegations of au-
thority at 49 CFR 1.51 and 501.8).

Issued on October 8, 1975.

Gene G. Mannella
Acting Administrator

40 F.R. 48352
October 15, 1975

PART 571; S 301-75— PRE 16

Ef?eclive: As set forth in SS of the standard

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 301-75

Fuel System Integrity
(Docket No. 73-20; Notice 9)

This notice clarifies the eflfective date of the
change in Standard No. 301-75 (49 CFR 571.301-
75) from a 15-niiniite to a 30-ininute fuel spillafre
measurement period following cessation of mo-
tion in barrier crash tests.

Until August 1975, S5.4 of Standard No.
301-75 specified a 15-minute fuel spillage meas-
urement period for the barrier crash test re-
quirements that would become effective September
1, 1975. To allow more time for leaks to be lo-
cated and rates of flow to be established, that
period was extended to 30 minutes in Notice 6
(40 FR 33036. August 6, 1975; correction of
section numbers at 40 FR 37042. August 25,
1975). Notice 6 set the effective date of the
change as September 1. 1975.

In response to a petition for reconsidei'ation
filed by American Motors Corporation, the
NHTSA in Notice 7 (40 FR 47790; October 10,
1975) delayed for 1 year the effective date of
that change, thereby establishing the following
scheme : a 15-minute period would be used in
applying the standard to vehicles manufactured
before September 1, 1976, while a 30-minute
measurement period would be used for vehicles
manufactured after that date.

In Notice 8, which was published on October
15, 1975 (40 FR 48352), the loading conditions
of S6.1 were revised, effective immediately, and
the standard was extended to apply to school
buses with a G^'^VR in excess of 10,000 pounds,
effective July 15, 1976. Because these amend-
ments were made by republishing the entire text

of the standard, it appeared that the effective
date of the change from a 15-minute measure-
ment period to a 30-ininute measurement period
had been advanced from September 1, 1976, to
July 15, 1976, for all vehicles. The NHTSA
did not intend such an advancement, and this
notice amends the standard to reestablish the
September 1, 1976, effective date for vehicles
other than school buses with a GVWR greater
than 10,000 pounds.

The following corrections of Notice 8 are also
made: the standard is designated as "Standard
No. 301-75" and typographical errors in S6.4 and
S7.5.2 are corrected.

In consideration of the foregoing, § 571.301 of
49 CFR Part. 571 (Standard No. 301, Fuel Sys-
tem Integrity), as published in the issue of
October 15, 1975 (40 FR 48352). is redesignated
as § 571.301-75 and amended. . . .

Effective dates: As set forth in the standard.
Changes indicated in the text of the Code of
Federal Regulations should be made immediately.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; Sec. 108, Pub. L. 93-492,
88 Stat. 1470 (15 U.S.C. 1392 note) ; delegation
of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on February 25, 1976.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

41 F.R. 9350
March 4, 1976

PART 571; S 301-75— PRE 17-18

Effective: August 26, 1976

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 301-75

Fuel System Integrity

(Docket No. 73-03; Notice 07); Docket No. 73-20; Notice 010);

(Docket No. 73-34; Notice 04); (Docket No. 75-02; Notice 03);

(Docket No. 75-03; Notice 05); (Docket No. 75-07; Notice 03);

(Docket No. 75-24; Notice 03)

This notice announces that the effective dates
of the redefinition of "school bus" and of six
Federal motor vehicle safety standards as they
apply to scliool buses are changed to April 1,
1977, from tiie previously established effective
dates. This notice also makes a minor amend-
ment to Standard No. 220, School Bus Rollover
Protection, and adds a figure to Standard No.
221, School Bus Body Joint Strength.

The Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety
Amendments of 1974 (the Act) mandated the
issuance of Federal motor vehicle safety stand-
ards for several aspects of school bus perform-
ance, Pub. L. 93^92, §202 (15 U.S.C. § 1392(i)
(1)(A)). These amendments included a defini-
tion of school bus that necessitated a revision of
the existing definition used by the NHTSA in
establishing safety requirements. The Act also
specified that the new requirements "apply to
each schoolbus and item of schoolbus equipment
which is manufactured ... on or after the ex-
piration of the 9-month period which begins on
the date of promulgation of such safety stand-
ards." (15 U.S.C. § 1392(i) (1) (B) ).

Pursuant to the Act, amendments were made
to the following standards: Standard No. 301-75,
Fuel System Integrity (49 CFR 571.301-75),
eflFective July 15, 1976, for school buses not al-
ready covered by the standard (40 FR 483521,
October 15, 1975); Standard No. 105-75, Hy-
draulic Brake Syntem^ (49 CFR 571.105-75),
effective October 12, 1976 (41 FR 2391, January
16, 1976) ; and Standard No. 217, Bm Window
Retention and Release (49 CFR 571.217), effec-
tive for school buses on October 26, 1976 (41 FR
3871, January 27, 1976).

In addition, the following new standards were
added to Part 571 of Title 49 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, effective October 26, 1976:
Standard No. 220, School Bus Rollover Protec-
tion (41 FR 3874, January 27, 1976) ; Standard
No. 221, School Bus Body Joint Strength (41
FR 3872, January 26, 1976) ; and Standard No.
222, School Bus Passenger Seating and Crash
Protection (41 FR 4016, January 28, 1976). Also,
the existing definition of "school bus" was
amended, effective October 27, 1976, in line with
the date set by the Act for issuance of the
standards.

The Act was recently amended by Public Law
94-346 (July 8, 1976) to change the effective
dates of the school bus standards to April 1,
1977 (15 U.S.C. §1392(i)(l)(B)). This notice
is intended to advise interested persons of these
changes of effective dates. In the case of Stand-
ard No. 301-75, the change of effective date is
reflected in a conforming amendment to S5.4 of
that standard. A similar amendment is made in
S3 of Standard No. 105-75.

The agency concludes that the October 27,
1976, effective date for the redefinition of "school
bus" should bo postponed to April 1, 1977, to
conform to the new effective dates for the up-
coming requirements. If this were not done, the
new classes of school buses would be recjuired to
meet existing standards that apply to .school
buses (e.g., Standard No. 108 (49 CFR .571.108))
before being required to meet the new standards.
Tliis would result in two stages of compliance,
and would complicate the redesign effoi'ts that
Congress sought to relieve.

PART 571; S 301-75— PRE 19

Effective: August 26, 1976

This notice also amends Standard No. 220 in
response to an interpretation request by Blue
Bird Body Company, and Sheller-Globe Cor-
poration's petition for reconsideration of the
standard. Both companies request confirmation
that the standard's requirement to operate emer-
gency exits during the application of force to the
vehicle roof (S4(b)) does not apply to roof
exits which are covered by the force application
plate. The agency did not intend to require the
operation of roof exits while the force applica-
tion plate is in place on the vehicle. Accord-
ingly, an appropriate amendment has been made
to S4(b) of the standard.

With regard to Standard No. 220, Sheller-
Globe also requested information that, in testing
its school buses that have a gross vehicle weight
rating (G\^VR) of 10,000 pounds or less, it may
test with a force application plate with dimen-
sions other than those specified in the standard.
The standard does not prohibit a manufacturer
from using a different dimension from that
specified, in view of the NHTSA's expressed
position on the legal effect of its regulations.
To certify compliance, a manufacturer is free to
choose any means, in the exercise of due care, to
show that a vehicle (or item of motor vehicle
equipment) would comply if tested by the
NHTSA as specified in the standard. Thus the
force application plate used by the NHTSA need
not be duplicated by each manufacturer or com-
pliance test facility. Sheller-Globe, for example,
is free to use a force application plate of any
width as long as it can certify its vehicle would
comply if tested by the NHTSA according to
the standard.

In a separate area, the agency corrects the
inadvertent omission of an illustration from
Standard No. 221 as it was issued January 26,
1976 (41 FR 3872). The figure does not differ
from that proposed and, in that form, it received
no adverse comment.

In accordance with recently enunciated De-
partment of Transportation policy encouraging
adequate analysis of the consequences of regula-
tory action (41 FR 16200, April 16, 1976), the
agency herewith summarizes its evaluation of the
economic and other consequences of this action
on the public and private sectors, including pos-

sible loss of safety benefits. The changes in
effective dates for the school bus standards are
not evaluated because they were accomplished by
law and not by regulatory action.

The change of effective date for the redefini-
tion of "school bus" will result in savings to
manufacturei's who will not be I'equired to meet
existing school bus standards between October 27,

1976, and April 1, 1977. The agency calculates
that the only standard that would not be met
would be the requirement in Standard No. 108
for school bus marker lamps. In view of the
agency's existing provision for the marking of
night school buses in Pupil Transportation
Standard No. 17 (23 CFR 1204), it is concluded
that the absence of this equipment until April 1,

1977, will not have a significant adverse impact
on safety.

The interpretative amendment of Standard
No. 220 and the addition of a figure to Standard
No. 221 are not expected to affect the manufac-
ture or operation of school buses.

In consideration of the foregoing. Part 571 of
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations is
amended. . . .

Effective dates:

1. Because the listed amendments do not im-
pose additional requirements of any person, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
finds that an immediate effective date of August
26, 1976 is in the public interest.

2. The effective date of the redefinition of
"school bus" in 49 CFR Part 571.3 that was pub-
lished in the issue of December 31, 1976 (40 FR
60033) is changed to April 1, 1977.

3. The effective dates of Standard Nos. 105-75,
217, 301-75, 220, 221, and 222 ( as they apply to
school buses) are April 1, 1977, in accordance
with Public Law 94-346.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; Pub. L. 94-346, Stat.
(15 U.S.C. §1392(i)(l)(B)); delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.)
Issued on August 17, 1976.

John W. Snow
' Administrator

41 F.R. 36026
August 26, 1976

PART 571; S 301-75— PRE 20

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 301

Fuel System Integrity

51. Scope. This standard specifies require-
ments for the integrity of motor vehicle fuel
systems.

52. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is
to reduce deaths and injuries occurring from fires
that result from fuel spillage during and after
motor vehicle crashes.

53. Application. This standard applies to pas-
senger cars, and to multipurpose passenger ve-
hicles, trucks, and buses that have a GVWR of
10,000 pounds or less and use fuel with a boiling
point above 32° F., and to school buses that have
a GVWR greater than 10,000 pounds and use fuel
with a boihng point above 32° F.

54. Definition. "Fuel spillage" means the fall,
flow, or run of fuel from the vehicle but does not
include wetness resulting from capillary action.

55. General requirements.

55.1 Passenger cars. Each passenger car man-
ufactured from September 1, 1975, to August 31,
1976, shall meet the requirements of S6.1 in a
perpendicular impact only, and S6.4. Each pas-
senger car manufactured on or after September 1 ,
1976, shall meet all the requirements of S6, ex-
cept S6.5.

55.2 Vehicles with GVWR of 6,000 pounds or
less. Each multipurpose passenger vehicle, truck,
and bus with a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less
manufactured from September 1, 1976, to August
31, 1977, shall meet all the requirements of S6.1
in a perpendicular impact only, S6.2, and S6.4.
Each of these types of vehicles manufactured on
or after September 1, 1977, shall meet the require-
ments of S6, except S6.5.

55.3 Vehicles with GVWR of more than 6,000
pounds but not more than 10,000 pounds. Each
multipurpose passenger vehicle, truck, and bus

with a GVWR of more than 6,000 pounds but
not more than 10,000 pounds manufactured from
September 1, 1976, to August 31, 1977, shall meet
the requirements of S6.1 in a perpendicular im-
pact only. Each vehicle manufactured on or after
September 1, 1977, shall meet all the requirements
of S6, except S6.5.

55.4 School buses with a GVWR greater than
10,000 pounds. Each school bus with a GVWR
greater than 10,000 pounds manufactured on or
after April 1, 1977, shall meet the requirements
of S6.5.

55.5 Fuel spillage: Barrier crash. Fuel spill-
age in any fixed or moving barrier crash test
shall not exceed 1 ounce by weight from impact
until motion of the vehicle has ceased, and shall
not exceed a total of 5 ounces by weight in the
5-minute period following cessation of motion.
For the subsequent 25-minute period (for vehicles
manufactured before September 1, 1976, other
than school buses with a GVWR greater than
10,000 pounds: the subsequent 10-minute period),
fuel spillage during any 1-minute interval shall
not exceed 1 ounce by weight.

55.6 Fuel spillage: Rollover. Fuel spillage in
any rollover test, from the onset of rotational
motion, shall not exceed a total of 5 ounces by
weight for the first 5 minutes of testing at each
successive 90° increment. For the remaining test-
ing period, at each increment of 90° fuel spillage
during any 1-minute interval shall not exceed 1
ounce by weight.

S6. Test requirements. Each vehicle with a
GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less shall be capable
of meeting the requirements of any applicable

PART 571; S 301-1

barrier crash test followed by a static rollover,
without alteration of the vehicle during the test
sequence. A particular vehicle need not meet
further requirements after having been subjected
to a single barrier crash test and a static rollover
test.

56.1 Frontal barrier crash. When the vehicle
traveling longitudinally forward at any speed up
to and including 30 mph impacts a fixed collision
barrier that is perpendicular to the line of travel
of the vehicle, or at any angle up to 30° in either
direction from the perpendicular to the line of
travel of the vehicle, with 50th-percentile test
dummies as specified in Part 572 of this chapter
at each front outboard designated seating posi-
tion and at any other position whose protection
system is required to be tested by a dummy under
the provisions of Standard No. 208, under the
applicable conditions of S7, fuel spillage shall not
exceed the limits of S5.5. (Effective: October 15,
1975)

56.2 Rear moving barrier crash. When the ve-
hicle is impacted from the rear by a barrier
moving at 30 mph, with test dummies as specified
in Part 572 of this chapter at each front out-
board designated seating position, under the ap-
plicable conditions of S7, fuel spillage shall not
exceed the limits of S5.5.

56.3 Lateral moving barrier crash. When the
vehicle is impacted laterally on either side by a
barrier moving at 20 mph with 50th-percentile
test dummies as specified in Part 572 of this
chapter at positions required for testing to Stand-
ard No. 208, under the applicable conditions of
87, fuel spillage shall not exceed the limits of
S5.5.

56.4 Static rollover. When the vehicle is ro-
tated on its longitudinal axis to each successive
increment of 90°, following an impact crash of
S6.1, S6.2, or S6.3, fuel spillage shall not exceed
the limits of S5.6.

56.5 Moving contoured barrier crash. When the
moving contoured barrier assembly traveling lon-
gitudinally forward at any speed up to and includ-
ing 30 mph impacts the test vehicle (school bus
with a GVWR exceeding 10,000 pounds) at any

point and angle, under the applicable conditions
of S7.1 and S7.5, fuel spillage shall not exceed
the limits of S5.5.

S7. Test conditions. The requirements of S5
and S6 shall be met under the following condi-
tions. Where a range of conditions is specified,
the vehicle must be capable of meeting the re-
quirements at all points within the range.

S7.1 General test conditions. The following
conditions apply to all tests:

57.1.1 The fuel tank is filled to any level from
90 to 95 percent of capacity with Stoddard sol-
vent, having the physical and chemical prop-
erties of type 1 solvent. Table I ASTM Standard
D484-71, "Standard Specifications for Hydro-
carbon Dry Cleaning Solvents."

57.1.2 The fuel system other than the fuel
tank is filled with Stoddard solvent to its normal
operating level.

57.1.3 In meeting the requirements of S6.1
through S6.3, if the vehicle has an electrically
driven fuel pump that normally runs when the
vehicle's electrical system is activated, it is op-
erating at the time of the barrier crash.

57.1.4 The parking brake is disengaged and
the transmission is in neutral, except that in
meeting the requirements of S6.5 the parking
brake is set.

57.1.5 Tires are inflated to manufacturer's
specifications.

57.1.6 The vehicle, including test devices and
instrumentation, is loaded as follows:

(a) Except as specified in S7.1.1, a passenger
car is loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight plus
its rated cargo and luggage capacity weight, se-
cured in the luggage area, plus the necessary test
dummies as specified in S6, restrained only by
means that are installed in the vehicle for protec-
tion at its seating position.

(b) Except as specified in S7.1.1, a multipur-
pose passenger vehicle, truck, or bus with a
GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less is loaded to its
unloaded vehicle weight, plus the necessary test
dummies, as specified in S6, plus 300 pounds of
its rated cargo and luggage capacity weight,
whichever is less, secured to the vehicle and dis-

PART 571; S 301-2

DIMENSIONS

NOTES:

V OUTER FRAME 60 X 20 X 0 19 IN 1152 X 51 X 5 mml STEEL TUBING. TWO PIECES
WELDED TOGETMEH FOR A 12 0 IN 1305 mml HEIGHT

2. BALLAST TIE DOWNS

3. ALL INNER REINFORCEMENTS AND FRAME GUSSETS OF 4 0 X 2 0 X 0 19 IN
(102 X 51 X 5 mml STEEL TUBING

4. REINFORCE AREAS FOR BOLTING ON FACE PLATES

Letter

In

mm

A

1200

3048

B

600

1524

C

420

1067

0

21 0

533

E

144 0

3658

F

150

381

G

160

406

H

120

305

J

240

610

K

600

1524

L

840

2114

M

220

559

N

120 0

3048

P

16 0

406

0

120

305

R

60

152

FIG. 1-COMMON CARRIAGE FOR MOVING BARRIERS

1100 ♦ 25LB 1499 0 •

113 kgl

AT EACH REAR WHEEL

DIMENSIONS

TOTAL WEIGHT
4000 1 50LB 11814 4 1 22 7 kg)

Letter

In

mm

A

54 0

1372

B

15 8

401

C

30 0

762

0

12 26

311

E

3 75

95

F

24 75

629

G

180

457

H

39 0

991

J

78 0

1981

K

30 0

762

OIA X 6 mm WALLISTEEL TUBING

MOMENTS OF INERTIA
1« • 271 t 13 6 SLUG ft' (367 t 18 4 kg m'l
Ig ■ 3475 • 174 SLUG Ft' 14711 1 236 kg m'
NOTES

1 UPPER FRAME 4 0 IN OIA X 0 25 IN WALL 1102
(THREE SIDESI

2. LOWER FRAME 6 0 IN DIA X 0 50 IN WALL 1152 mm DIA X 13 mm WALLI STEEL TUBING

1 FACE PLATE 0 75 IN 119 mml THICK COLD ROLLED STEEL

4. LEADING EDGE 10X40 IN (26 X 102 mml STEEL BAND. SHARP EDGES BROKEN

5. ALL INNER REINFORCEMENTS 40 X 20 X 0 19 IN 1102 X 51 X 5 mml STEEL TUBING

FIG. 2-COMMON CARRIAGE WITH CONTOURED IMPACT SURFACE ATTACHED

PART 571; S 301-3

tributed so that the weight on each axle as
measured at the tire-ground interface is in pro-
portion to its GAWR. If the weight on any
axle, when the vehicle is loaded to unloaded ve-
hicle weight plus dummy weight, exceeds the
axle's proportional share of the test weight, the
remaining weight shall be placed so that the
weight on that axle remains the same. Each
dummy shall be restrained only by means that are
installed in the vehicle for protection at its seat-
ing position.

(c) Except as specified in S7.1.1, a school bus
with a GVWR greater than 10,000 pounds is
loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight plus 120
pounds of unsecured weight at each designated
seating position.

57.2 Lateral moving barrier crash test condi-
tions. The lateral moving barrier crash test con-
ditions are those specified in S8.2 of Standard
No. 208, 49 CFR 571.208.

57.3 Rear moving barrier test conditions. The

rear moving barrier test conditions are those
specified in S8.2 of Standard No. 208, 49 CFR
571.208, except for the positioning of the barrier
and the vehicle. The barrier and test vehicle are
positioned so that at impact—

(a) The vehicle is at rest in its normal atti-
tude;

(b) The barrier is traveling at 30 mph with
its face perpendicular to the longitudinal center-
line of the vehicle; and

(c) A vertical plane through the geometric
center of the barrier impact surface and perpen-
dicular to that surface coincides with the longi-
tudinal centerline of the vehicle.

57.4 Static rollover test conditions. The ve-
hicle is rotated about its longitudinal axis, with
the axis kept horizontal, to each successive incre-
ment of 90°, 180°, and 270° at a uniform rate,
with 90° of rotation taking place in any time
interval from 1 to 3 minutes. After reaching
each 90° increment the vehicle is held in that posi-
tion for 5 minutes.

57.5 Moving contoured barrier test conditions.

The following conditions apply to the moving
contoured barrier crash test:

S7.5.1. The moving barrier, which is mounted
on a carriage as specified in Figure 1, is of rigid
construction, symmetrical about a vertical longi-
tudinal plane. The contoured impact surface,
which is 24.75 inches high and 78 inches wide,
conforms to the dimensions shown in Figure 2,
and is attached to the carriage as shown in that
figure. The ground clearance to the lower edge
of the impact surface is 5.25 ±0.5 inches. The
wheelbase is 120 ±2 inches.

57.5.2 The moving contoured barrier, includ-
ing the impact surface, supporting structure, and
carriage, weighs 4,000 ±50 pounds with the
weight distributed so that 900 ±25 pounds is at
each rear wheel and 1100 ±25 pounds is at each
front wheel. The center of gravity is located
54.0 ±1.5 inches rearward of the front wheel axis,
in the vertical longitudinal plane of symmetry,
15.8 inches above the ground. The moment of
inertia about the center of gravity is:

4 = 271 ±13.6 slug ft^
/, = 3475± 174 slug ft^

57.5.3 The moving contoured barrier has a
solid nonsteerable front axle and fixed rear axle
attached directly to the frame rails with no
spring or other type of suspension system on any
wheel. (The moving barrier assembly is equipped
with a braking device capable of stopping its
motion.)

57.5.4 The moving barrier assembly is
equipped with G78-15 pneumatic tires with a
tread width of 6.0 ± 1 inch, inflated to 24 psi.

57.5.5 The concrete surface upon which the
vehicle is tested is level, rigid, and of
uniform construction, with a skid number of 75
when measured in accordance with American
Society of Testing and Materials Method E-274-
65T at 40 mph, omitting water delivery as speci-
fied in paragraph 7.1 of that method.

57.5.6 The barrier assembly is released from
the guidance mechanism immediately prior to im-
pact with the vehicle.

38 F.R. 22397
August 20, 1973

40 F.R. 48352
October 15, 1975

PART 571; S 301-4

EffKMv*: S«pt«mb«r I, 1973

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 302
Flammability of Interior Materials — Passenger Cars, Multipurpose Passenger Vehicles,

Trucks, and Buses
(Docket No. 3-3; Notice 4)

This notice amends § 575.21 of Title 49 of the
Code of Federal Regulations by adding a new
motor vehicle safety standard, No. 302, Flam-
mability of Interior Materials. Notices of pro-
posed rulemaking on the subject were published
on December 31, 1969 (34 F.R. 20434) and June
26, 1970 (35 F.R. 10460).

As stated in the notice of December 31, 1969,
the occurrence of thousands of fires per year that
begin in vehicle interiors provide ample justifi-
cation for a safety standard on flammability of
interior materials. Although the qualities of
interior materials cannot by themselves make
occupants safe from the hazards of fuel-fed fires,
it is important, when fires occur in the interior
of the vehicle from such sources as matches,
cigarettes, or short circuits in interior wiring,
that there be sufficient time for the driver to stop
the vehicle, and if necessary for occupants to
leave it, before injury occurs.

The question on which the public responses to
the above notices differed most widely was the
burn rate limit to be required. The rate pro-
posed was 4 inches per minute, measured by a
horizontal test. Some manufacturers suggested
maximum burn rates as high as 15 inches per
minute. The Center for Auto Safety, the Textile
Fibers and By-Products Association, and the
National Cotton Batting Institute, on the other
hand, suggested essentially a zero burn rate, or
self-extinguishment, requirement, with a vertical
rather than a horizontal test. A careful study
was made of the available information on this
subject, including the bum rates of materials
currently in use or available for use, recommen-
dations or regulations of other agencies, and the
economic and technical consequences of various
possible rate levels and types of tests. A con-

siderable amount of Bureau-sponsored research
has been conducted and is continuing on the
subject. On consideration of this data, the Bu-
reau has decided to retain the 4-inch-per-minute
bum limit, with the horizontal test, in this
standard. It has been determined that suitable
materials are not available in sufficient quanti-
ties, at reasonable costs, to meet a significantly
more stringent bum rate by the effective date
that is hereby established. The 4-inch rate will
require a major upgrading of materials used in
many areas, and a corresponding improvement
in this aspect of motor vehicle safety. It is im-
portant that this standard not hinder manufac-
turers' efforts to comply with the crash protection
requirements that are currently being imposed,
and that in the Bureau's judgment are of the
greatest importance. Further study will be
made, however, of the feasibility of, and justifi-
cation for, imposing more stringent requirements
with a later effective date.

As pointed out in several comments, the prob-
lem of toxic combustion by-products is closely
related to that of burn rate. Release of toxic
gases is one of the injury-producing aspects of
motor vehicle fires, and many of the common
ways of treating materials to reduce theii bum
rates involve chemicals that produce highly
poisonous gases such as hydrogen chloride and
Iiydrogen cyanide. The problem of setting
standards with regard to combustion by-products
is difficult and complex, and the subject of con-
tinuing researcii under Bureau auspices. Until
enough is known in this area to form the basis
for a standard, and to establish the proper inter-
action between burn rate and toxicity, this un-
certainty constitutes an additional reason for not
requiring self-extinguishing materials.

PART 571 ; S 302— PRE 1

Efftcllvt: $«pl«mb*r 1, 1972

The proposal specified a particular commercial
gas for the test burn and several comments sug-
gested problems in obtaining the gas for manu-
facture testing. As is the case with all the motor
vehicle safety standards, the test procedures de-
scribe the tests that the regulated vehicles or
equipment must be capable of passing, when
tested by the Bureau, and not the method by
which a manufacturer must ascertain that cap-
ability. Any gas with at least as high a flame
temperature as the gas described in the standard
would therefore be suitable for manufacturer
testing. To make this point clearer, and to use
a more readily available reference point, the
standards been reworded to specify a gas that
"has a flame temperature equivalent to that of
natural gas."

The dimensions of the enclosure within which
the test is conducted have been changed from
those proposed, in order to provide more draft-
free conditions, and consequently more repeat-
able results. Smaller cabinets, furthermore,
evidently are more generally available than
larger ones. Again it should be noted that there
is no necessity that manufacturers duplicate the
dimensions of the test cabinet, as long as they
can establish a reasonable basis for concluding
that their materials will meet the requirements
when tested in such a cabinet.

Several comments questioned the need for
specifying the temperature and relative humidity
under which the material is conditioned and the
test is conducted. The foregoing discussions of
the relation of the standard to manufacturer
testing apply here also. The specification of
temperature and relative humidity for condition-
ing and testing is made to preclude any argu-
ments, in the face of a compliance test failure,
that variations in test results are due to per-
mitted variations in test conditions. The relative
humidity specification has been changed from
65 percent, as proposed, to 50 percent. This
humidity level represents more closely the con-
ditions encountered in use during fairly dry
weather. While it is a slightly more stringent
condition, it is one in wide use for materials
testing, according to the comments, and is not,
in the judgment of the Bureau, a large enough
change in the substance of the proposal to war-
rant further notice and opiwrtunity for comment.

Several comments suggested that the standard
should specify the number of specimens to be
tested, with averaging of results, as is commonly
found in specification-type standards. The legal
nature of the motor vehicle safety standards is
such, however, that sampling and averaging
provisions would be inappropriate. As defined
by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act, the standards are minimum performance
levels that must be met by every motor vehicle
or item of motor vehicle equipment to which
they apply. Enforcement is based on inde-
pendent Bureau testing, not review of manu-
facturer testing, and manufacturers are required
to take legal responsibility for every item they
produce. The result, and the intent of the Bu-
reau in setting the standards, is that manufac-
turers must establish a sufficient margin of
performance between their test results and the
standard's requirements to allow for whatever
variances may occur between items tested and
items produced.

The description of portions to be tested has
been changed slightly, such that the surface and
the underlying materials are tested either sepa-
rately or as a composite, depending on whether
they are attached to each other as used in the
vehicle. In the proposal, surface and underlying
materials were to be tested separately regardless
of how used, an element of complexity found
unnecessary for safety purposes.

In response to comments with respect to ma-
terials that burn at a decreasing rate, to which
the application of the test is not clear, an addi-
tional criterion has been added. If material
stops burning before it has burned for 60 seconds,
and does not burn more than 2 inches, it is con-
sidered to meet the requirement.

In consideration of the foregoing, § 571.21 of
Title 49, Code of Federal Kegulations, is amended
by the addition of Standard No. 302, Flam-
mability of Interior Materials.

Effective date: September 1, 1972. Because
of the extensive design changes that will be
necessitated by this new standard, and the lead-
time consequently required by manufacturers to
prepare for production, it is found, for good

PART 571; S 302— PRE 2

Effective SapUfflbar I, 1973

cause shown, that an effective date later than one Douglas W. Toms

year from the issuance of this notice is in the Director
public interest. 34 PH 289

Issued on December 29, 1970. January 8, 1971

PART 671; S 302— PRE 3-i

Eff«ctlv*: Oclobar 1, 197S

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 302

Flammability of Interior Materials
(Docket No. 3-3; Notice 7b)

This notice modifies the test procedures and
specimen preparation requirements of Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 302, Flammability
of interior materials (49 CFR 571.302). A notice
of proposed rulemaking was issued on May 17,
1973 (38 FR 12934).

Several comments on the notice of proposed
rulemaking suggested exempting small com-
ponents on the basis of size because of the con-
fusion caused by paragraph S4.1. This agency
has not found, however, that the exemption of
a component on the basis of size is consistent
with safety. Rather, NHTSA finds that if a
component is too small to produce an acceptable
test sample, a test sample consisting of the ma-
terial from which the component is fabricated
should be substituted. Consequently, a new sec-
tion S4.1.1 has been added to require surrogate
testing of such components as switches, knobs,
gaskets, and grommets which are considered too
small to be effectively tested under the current
procedures.

A previous notice of proposed rulemaking (36
FR 9565) suggested a scheme for testing single
and composite materials that would allow the
testing of certain configurations of vehicle in-
terior materials not taken into account under
the present scheme. Examples of such configura-
tions are multi-layered composites and single
layers of underlying materials that are neither
padding nor cushioning materials. Comments to
that notice argued that some aspects of the pro-
posed scheme would require some duplicative
testing without providing a measurable safety
benefit.

In response to these arguments, it was pro-
posed (38 F.R. 12934) that S4.2 be amended to
take into account some omissions in the present

scheme and to reduce the complexity of testing
single and composite materials. After reviewing
the comments, the proposed scheme is adopted.
Thus, the standard is amended to require single
materials or composites (materials that adhere
at every point of contact), any part of which is
within 1,^ inch of the surface of the component,
to meet the bum-rate requirements. Materials
that are not part of adhering composites are sub-
ject to the requirements when tested separately.
Those materials that do adhere to adjacent ma-
terials at every point of contact are subject to
the requirements as composites when tested with
the adjacent materials. The concept of "ad-
herence" would replace language presently con-
tained in the standard describing materials as
"bonded, sewed, or mechanically attached." An
illustrative example is included in the text of
the section.

Several comments in response to the notice of
proposed rulemaking requested changes in the
test cabinet, as did comments in response to pre-
vious notices concerning this standard. The
NHTSA has evaluated various recommendations
and suggestions concerning the cabinet. No
changes are proposed in this notice, however, as
sufficient justification has not been found for a
design change at this time.

Paragraph S5.2.1 of the standard presently
provides that materials exceeding 14 inch in
thickness are to be cut down to 14 i^^ch in thick-
ness before testing. As described in the notice
of proposed rulemaking, cutting certain materials
to the prescribed thickness produces a tufted sur-
face upon which a flame front may be propa-
gated at a faster rate than it would be upon the
surface of the material before cutting, thereby
creating an artificial test condition. In order

PART 571; S 302— PRE 5

Effective: October 1, 1975

to avoid this, the requirements for the transmis- In light of the above, Motor Vehicle Safety

sion rate of a flame front are amended in S4.3 (a) Standard No. 302, 49 CFR § 571.302, is

to exclude surfaces created by cutting. amended. . . .

The notice of proposed rulemaking points out Effective date: Oct. 1, 1975.

that a related problem has arisen concerning ^g^^^ ^^3^ ^^9^ p^^^ ^ 89-563, 80 Stat. 718

which surfaces of a test specimen should face the ^^^ ^.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; delegation of authority

flame in the test cabinet. To answer this ques- ^^ ^g CFR 1 51 )

tion and avoid unnecessary test duplication, the a4^ v, i7 iq7k
test procedures are amended to provide that the

surface of the specimen closest to the occupant .. t, ^

_.^- J! J J4.V, James B. Gregory

compartment air space face downward on the a i • • ^ i.

X . J T^u i. i. • J J u Administrator

test frame. The test specimen is produced by

cutting the material in the direction that pro- 40 F.R. 14318

vides the most adverse test results. March 31, 1975

PART 571: S 302— PRE 6

Elbctlv*: September 16, 197S

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 302

Flammabiiity of Interior Materials
(Docket No. 3-3; Notice 9)

On March 31, 1975, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued
a notice modifying the test procedures and speci-
men preparation requirements of Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard No. 302, 49 CFR 571.302, Flam-
mabUity of interior materials (40 FR 14318).
Petitions for reconsideration of the rule were
received from American Motors Corporation,
General Motors Corporation, White Motor Cor-
poration, Chrysler Corporation, Volkswagen of
America, Inc., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,
Ford Motor Company, and the Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association of the United States,
Inc.

The NHTSA notice established a process of
surrogate testing for components which were too
small to test without difficulty using the proce-
dures previously prescribed by Standard No. 302.
The objections raised to this new process by the
petitioners were that (a) the surrogate testing
procedure is an entirely new departure, and the
public should have been afforded an opportunity
for comment, (b) the results of surrogate testing
will in certain cases differ from the results of
t«sting the actual component, (c) the creation of
a surrogate testing sample of certain materials,
such as elastic cord, is impossible, and (d) the
dimensions of the surrogate sample are inappro-
priate.

It should be fully understood that small com-
ponents which would otherwise be included
within the purview of Standard No. 302 are not
excluded by virtue of their size. Further, the
NHTSA intends to utilize a surrogate testing
procedure, among other testing procedures, in
the case of small components as the first step in
determining whether a safety defect exists pur-
suant to section 152 of the National Traffic and

Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Since the testing of
small components is a more difficult process, the
NHTSA concluded in amending Standard No.
302 to include the surrogate testing process that
the new requirement was less stringent than that
currently required by the standard. Further, by
amending the standard the industry could also
be fully apprised of one of the methods the
NHTSA intended to use to determine whether a
section 152 defect existed.

Nonetheless, it appears from the petitions for
reconsideration which were received that a num-
ber of manufacturers feel that they should be
allowed an opportunity for comment. The
NHTSA concludes their request is reasonable and
the rule, as it relates to surrogate testing, is here-
by revoked and is reissued as a notice of proposed
rulemaking in this issue of the Federal Register.
A number of the petitioners questioned the
need for including any small components within
the ambit of Standard No. 302, citing the notice
of proposed rulemaking (38 FR 12934, May 17,
1973) which stated that certain small components
designed to absorb energy are not fire hazards.
Therefore, the petitioners believe the NHTSA
has reversed its previous position.

This understanding is correct. As the NHTSA
said in the preamble to the proposed amendment
to Standard No. 302, issued concurrently with
the amendment to the Standard (March 31, 1975,
40 FR 14340) :

On May 11, 1973, the NHTSA issued a notice
(38 FR 12934) which proposed, inter alia,
amending paragraph S4.1 of Standard No. 302
to enumerate the interior components of vehicle
occupant compartment which fell within the
ambit of the standard.

PART 571; S 302— PRE 7

EfFecllve: September 16, 1975

Comments to the notice, however, liave made
clear that the enumeration of components, even
with the proposed amendment, will continue to
confuse manufacturers required to meet the
standard.

***** *

While some materials exposed to the occupant
compartment air space are not fire hazards, the
burden of ascertaining^ that fact should properly
lie with the manufacturer.

Several petitions also questioned what safety
benefits would come from applyin^j the standard
to small components. As petitioner American
Motors pointed out, the purpose of Standard No.
302 is to provide sufficient time for the occupants
of a vehicle to exit in case of an interior fire.
Thus, even small components which are highly
flammable would hasten the spreading of fires
in motor vehicles, resulting in a serious hazard.

Testing procedures. Petitioners pointed out
that while the preamble provides that the sur-
face of the specimen closest to the occupant com-
partment air space face downward on test frame,
this is not made entirely clear in the body of the
standard itself. The standard is amended to
clarify this matter. Likewise, a definition of
the term "occupant compartment air space" is
added, although this term was used in the notice
of proposed rulemaking without raising a prob-
lem for those commenting.

Extension of effective date of amendment.
Several petitioners asked for an extension of the
effective date. As the surrogate testing proce-
dures have been revoked and reissued as a pro-
posed rule, the NHTSA concludes that an exten-
sion of the effective date is not necessary.

Redesignation of Docket 3-3; Notice 7.
Through a clerical error, two notices were issued
with the heading, "Docket 3-3; Notice 7" (July
11, 1973, 38 FR 18564; March 31, 1975, 40 FR
14318). The notice appearing at 38 FR 18564
is hereby redesignated "Notice 7a" and that ap-
pearing at 49 FR 14318 is redesignated "Notice
7b."

In consideration of the foregoing, Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Standard No. 302, 49 CFR 571.302,
is amended. . . .

Effective date: September 16, 1975.

Because this amendment relieves a restriction,
it is foimd for good cause shown that an im-
mediate effective date is in the public interest.

(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; delegation of authority
at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on September 10, 1975.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

September 16, 1975
40 F.R. 42746

PART 571; S 302— PRE 8

Effective: December 4, 1975

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 302

Flammability of Interior Materials
(Docket No. 3-3; Notice 11)

This notice establishes a new section, S3A.
Defnitions, in Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
No, 302, 49 CFR 571.302.

On September 16, 1975, the NHTSA published
in the P'ederal Register its response to a petition
for reconsideration of Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard No. 302, Flammability of interior ma-
terials (40 FR 42746). The rule established a
definition of the term "occupant compartment air
space" that was supposed to be added to "S3A.
Defnitions.'''' The wording- of the amendment
was faulty, however, since the Definitions section
had not yet been established in Standard Xo.
302. This notice corrects the error by adding
that section to the standard.

Petitions have been received from General
Motors Corporation, Motor Vehicle Manufac-
turers Association, American Motors Corporation,
and Ford Motor Company requesting that the
definition of "occupant compartment air space"
in Notice 9 be revoked. These petitions will be
addressed in a separate notice. The purpose of

this notice is only to promulgate the section head-
ing which was omitted in error from Notice 9.

In light of the above, in place of the amend-
ment numbered 1. in Docket 3-3, Notice 9 (40
FR 42746, September 16, 1975), Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard No. 302 is amended by adding
a new S3A. Defnitions. . . .

Effective date : December 4, 1975. Because this
amendment is of an interpretative nature and
makes no substantive change in the rule, it is
found for good cause shown that an immediate
effective date is in the public interest.

(Sec. 103, 119 Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407); delegation of authority
at CFR 1.51)

Issued on November 28, 1975.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

40 F.R. 56667
December 4, 1975

PART 571; S 302— PRE 9-10

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD NO. 302

Flammability of Interior Materials— Passenger Cars, Multipurpose Passenger Vehicles,

Trucks, and Buses

(Docket N. 3-3; Notice 4)

51. Scope. This standard specifies bum re-
sistance requirements for materials used in the
occupant compartments of motor vehicles.

52. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is
to reduce the deaths and injuries to motor ve-
hicle occupants caused by vehicle fires, especially
those originating in the interior of the vehicle
from sources such as matches or cigarettes.

53. Application. This standard applies to
passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses.

S3A. Definitions.

"Occupant compartment air space" means the
space within the occupant compartment that nor-
mally contains refreshable air. (40 F.R. 42746—
September 16, 1975. Effective 9/16/75. 40 F.R.
56667-December 4, 1975. Effective: 12/4/75)

S4.2 Any portion of a single or composite

material which is within Va inch of the occupant
compartment air space shall meet the require-
ments of S4.3.

54.2.1 Any material that does not adhere to

other material(s) at every point of contact shall
meet the requirements of S4.3 when tested sepa-
rately.

54.2.2 Any material that adheres to other ma-
terial(s) at every point of contact shall meet
the requirements of S4.3 when tested as a com-
posite with the other material(s). Material A
has a non-adhering interface with material B
and is tested separately. Part of material B is
within V2 inch of the occupant compartment air
space, and materials B and C adhere at every
point of contact; therefore B and C are tested
as a composite. The cut is in material C as
shown, to make a specimen V2 inch thick.

S4. Requirements.

S4.1 The portions described in S4.2 of the
following components of vehicle occupant com-
partments shall meet the requirements of S4.3:
Seat cushions, seat backs, seat belts, headlining,
convertible tops, arm rests, all trim panels in-
cluding door, front, rear, and side panels, com-
partment shelves, head restraints, floor coverings,
sun visors, curtains, shades, wheel housing cov-
ers, engine compartment covers, mattress covers,
and any other interior materials, including pad-
ding and crash-deployed elements, that are de-
signed to absorb energy on contact by occupants
in the event of a crash.

84,1.1 Deleted and Reserved.

DEPTH

tinchMl

llluitrdlive Exampl*

Occupant Compartment Atr Space

y^f/-

y4-i

a

Material tested SEPARATELY

NON ADHERING INTERFACE

\Rr\\ADHEHIN(i INTERFACE v\\\\li/ Materials tested a
AM..\.^ . ^lU ^ ^ ^ >■ /2 COMPOSITE

-0*

CUT HERE

S4.3(a) When tested in accordance with S5,
material described in S4.1 and S4.2 shall not
bum, nor transmit a flame front across its sur-
face, at a rate of more than 4 inches per minute.

(Rav. 11/28^75)

PART 571; S 302-1

However, the requirement concerning transmis-
sion of a flame front shall not apply to a surface
created by the cutting of a test specimen for pur-
poses of testing pursuant to S5.

(b) If a material stops burning before it has
burned for 60 seconds from the start of timing,
and has not burned more than 2 inches from the
point where timing was started, it shall be con-
sidered to meet the burn-rate requirement of
S4.3(a).

S5. Test procedure.
S5.1 Conditions.

55.1.1 The test is conducted in a metal cabi-
net for protecting the test specimens from drafts.
The interior of the cabinet is 15 inches long, 8
inches deep, and 14 inches high. It has a glass
observation window in the front, a closable
opening to permit insertion of the specimen
holder, and a hole to accommodate tubing for a
gas burner. For ventilation, it has a }^-inch
clearance space around the top of the cabinet,
ten %-inch-diameter holes in the base of the
cabinet, and legs to elevate the bottom of the
cabinet by three-eighths of an inch, all located
as shown in Figure 1.

55.1.2 Prior to testing, each specimen is con-
ditioned for 24 hours at a temperature of 70° F.
and a relative humidity of 50 percent, and the
test is conducted under those ambient conditions.

55.1.3 The test specimen is inserted between
two matching U-shaped frames of metal stock
1 inch wide and three-eighths of an inch high.
The interior dimensions of the U-shaped frames
are 2 inches wide by 13 inches long. A specimen
that softens and bends at the flaming end so as
to cause erratic burning is kept horizontal by
supports consisting of thin, heat resistant wires,
spanning the width of the U-shaped frame under
the specimen at 1-inch intervals. A device that
may be used for supporting this type of ma-
terial is an additional U-shaped frame, wider
than the U-shaped frame containing the speci-
men, spanned by 10-mil wires of heat-resistant
composition at 1-inch intervals, inserted over the
bottom U-shaped frame.

(Rev. 9/16/75)

PART 571;

55.1.4 A bunsen burner with a tube of %-inch
inside diameter is used. The gas adjusting valve
is set to provide a flame, with the tube vertical,
of 1!4 inches in height. The air inlet to the
burner is closed.

55.1.5 The gas supplied to the burner has a
flame temperature equivalent to that of natural
gas.

S5.2 Preparation of specimens.

55.2.1 Each specimen of material to be tested
shall be a rectangle 4 inches wide by 14 inches
long, wherever possible. The thickness of the
specimen is that of the single or composite ma-
terial used in the vehicle, except that if the
material's thickness exceeds ^ inch, the specimen
is cut down to that thickness measured from the
surface of the specimen closest to the occupant
compartment air space. Where it is not possible
to obtain a flat specimen because of surface cur-
vature, the specimen is cut to not more than ^
inch in thickness at any point. The maximum
available length or width of a specimen is used
where either dimension is less than 14 inches or

4 inches, respectively, unless surrogate testing is
required under S4.1.1.

55.2.2 The specimen is produced by cutting
the material in the direction that provides the
most adverse test results. The specimen is
oriented so that the surface closest to the occupant
compartment air space faces downward on the
test frame.

55.2.3 Material with a napped or tufted sur-
face is placed on a flat surface and combed twice
against the nap with a comb having seven to
eight smooth, rounded teeth per inch.

S5.3 Procedure.

(a) Mount the specimen so that both sides and
one end are held by the U-shaped frame, and one
end is even with the open end of the frame.
Where the maximum available width of a speci-
men is not more than 2 inches, so that the sides
of the specimen cannot be held in the U-shaped
frame, place the specimen in position on wire
supports as described in S5.1.3, with one end
held by the closed end of the U-shaped frame.

5 302-2

(b) Place the mounted specimen in a
zontal position, in the center of the cabinet.

hori-

(c) With the flame adjusted according to
S5.1.4, position the bunsen burner and specimen
so that the center of the burner tip is three-
fourths of an inch below the center of the bottom
edge of the open end of the specimen.

(d) Expose the specimen to the flame for 15
seconds.

(e) Begin timing (without reference to the
period of application of the burner flame) when
the flame from the burning specimen reaches a
point IV2 inches from the open end of the spec-
imen.

(f) Measure the time that it takes the flame
to progress to a point IV2 inches from the
clamped end of the specimen. If the flame does
not reach the specified end point, time its pro-
gress to the point where flaming stops.

(g) Calculate the bum rate from the formula

B = 60xD

Where B = bum rate in inches per minute,

D= length the flame travels in inches, and
T = time in seconds for the flame to travel
inches.

1/2 IN

VENTILATING

CLEARANCE

HEAT

RESISTANT

GLASS

1 1/2 IN

2 1''2 IN

3/4 IN. r^

VENTILATION
HOLES

36 F.R. 289
January 8, 1971

(R»v. 908^5)

PART 571; S 302-3

Section Three

Part 571 -Ruling on Chassis Cabs and Campers Slide-in and Chassis Mount

Part 572— Anthropomorphic Test Dummies

Part 573— Defect and Noncompliance Reports

Part 574— Tire Identification and Recordkeeping

Part 575— Consumer Information Regulations

Part 576— Record Retention

Part 577— Defect and Noncompliance Notification

Part 579— Defect and Noncompliance Responsibility

Part 580— Odometer Disclosure Requirements

Part 581— Bumper Standard

Part 582— Insurance Cost Information Regulations

Part 590— Motor Vehicle Emission Inspections

Department of the Treasury Regulation Relating to Importation of Motor
Vehicles and Items of Motor Vehicle Equipment

MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS
Notice of Ruling Regarding Chassis-Cabs

Inquiry has been received from persons en-
gaged in the sale of trucks, buses, and multi-
purpose vehicles regarding their legal responsi-
bility under the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 for assuring that
vehicles sold by them are in conformity with all
applicable motor vehicle safety standards. Such
persons commonly purchase chassis-cabs from
manufacturers and bodies or work-performing
and load-carrying structures from other manu-
facturers and then combine the chassis-cab with
the body or other structure. A regulation is
being issued this date by the Federal Highway
Administration defining the chassis-cab as a ve-
hicle within the meaning of the Act, requiring
that it meet all motor vehicle safety standards
applicable on the date of manufacture of the
chassis-cab.' Under this regulation the manu-
facturer of a chassis-cab manufactured subsequent
to January 1, 1968, will have responsibility for
compliance with all applicable motor vehicle
safety standards as set forth therein and for
certification of such compliance to distributors
and dealers.

Section 101(5) of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act defines a "manufac-
turer" as any person engaged in the "assembling"
of motor vehicles. Persons who combine chassis-
cabs with bodies or similar structures are, there-
fore, manufacturers within the meaning of the
Act. Inasmuch as the chassis-cab's manufacturer
is responsible for compliance with standards
under the regulation issued today, persons who
add bodies or other structures to such chassis-
cab are not considered manufacturers of the
chassis-cab and, therefore, will not be responsible
for the conformance of the chassis-cab to the
standards certified by the manufacturer of the

' See F.R. Doc. 67-15174. Title 23. in Rules and Regu-
lations Section, supra.

chassis-cab. In numerous instances the chassis-
cab will not be capable of complying with motor
vehicle safety standard 108 because it will not
be equipped with all items of lighting equipment
referred to in such standard. Where vendors
combine a chassis-cab which has not been certified
to be in conformance with standard 108, with a
body or other like structure, such vendor will be
responsible for compliance with the lighting
standard, and where such vendor sells the com-
bined assemblage to another vendor, certification
of compliance with the lighting standard must
accompany the vehicle.

We are advised that a substantial inventory
of chassis-cabs manufactured prior to the effec-
tive date of the initial motor vehicle safety
standards and hence not required to comply with
the same will be held by manufacturers, distrib-
utors, and dealers on January 1, 1968. These
vehicles may contain various items of lighting
equipment manufactured prior to the effective
date of the lighting standard or be designed to
accept such equipment. Under these circum-
stances, it does not appear appropriate to require
compliance with the lighting standard when such
chassis-cabs, i.e., those manufactured prior to
January 1, 1968, are combined with bodies or
similar strucutres. Section 108(a) (1) of the
Act also prohibits any person from manufac-
turing for sale or selling any motor vehicle
manufactured "after the date any applicable
Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect
under this title unless it is in conformity with
such standard •**." Under this provision per-
sons who combine the chassis-cab with a body
or other structure will be responsible for (1)
compliance of the combined assemblage with any
motor vehicle safety standard applicable to the
end use of the combined assemblage in effect on
the date of manufacture of the chassis-cab, com-
pliance with which has not already been certified

PART 571; (RULING)- 1

by the chassis-cab manufacturer, and (2) com-
pliance with all applicable standards in effect on
the date of manufacturer of the chassis-cab to
the extent that the addition of a body or other
structure to the chassis-cab affects the chassis-
cab's previous conformance with applicable
standards.

To insure that the person combining the
chassis-cab with the body or other structure has
adequate information to enable him to meet the
conditions specified above, the regulation being
issued concurrently with this ruling requires the

chassis-cab manufacturer to affix a label to the
chassis-cab which identifies the Federal motor
vehicle safety standards with which the chassis-
cab fully complies for the principal end uses of
such chassis-cab.

Issued in Washington, D.C., on December 29,
1967.

Lowell K. Bridwell,

Federal Highway Administrator

33 F.R. 29
January 3, 1968

PART 571; (RULING)-2

FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS
(FHWA Ruling 68-1)

Notice of Ruling Regarding Campers Slide-in and Chassis-Mount

This ruling is in response to inquiries for a
clarification of the applicability of Federal
Motor vehicle safety standards to certain items
of motor vehicle equipment commonly known as
"campers" which are used mostly for recreational
purposes.

A "camper" can be described generally as a
portable structure designed to be loaded onto, or
affixed to, a motor vehicle to provide temporary
living quarters for recreation, travel, or other
use. The ruling is concerned with two general
categories of campers. The first, a "slide-in
camper", is placed on, or slides onto a completed
vehicle, usually a pickup truck. The second, a
"chassis- mount camper", is mounted on a chassis-
cab.

In past months the Bureau received a number
of written inquiries regarding the applicability
of the glazing material standard (No. 205) to
slide-in campers. These persons received re-
sponses from the Bureau indicating that slide-in
campers would have to comply with standard 205
under certain specified conditions. These re-
sponses of the Bureau apparently received wide-
spread dissemination in the industry. Subse-
quently, additional inquiries were received from
affected persons asking for clarification of the
Bureau's earlier responses with respect to the
question of whether standard 205 was applicable
to glazing materials contained in slide-in campers
sold by the manufacturer of such campers to
members of the public and to dealers when not
an integral part of the vehicle.

The Bureau has reconsidered this question and
determined that the glazing standard is ap-
plicable to slide-in campers.

Standard 205 is applicable to "glazing ma-
terials for use in passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, motorcycles, trucks and buses."

The slide-in camper is an item of motor vehicle
equipment for use in motor vehicles. As such,
glazing materials contained in slide-in campers
must comply with standard 205 when such camp-
ers are sold as a separate unit as well as when
attached to a completed pickup truck. Addi-
tionally, manufacturers of slide-in campers must
also comply with the certification requirements
set forth in section 114 of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C.
1403).

Review of the Bureau's prior communications
with affected persons indicates that such persons,
and others who received notice of such communi-
cations, could justifiably have concluded that
standard 205 was subject to an interpretation
which excluded its application to slide-in camp-
ers sold directly to consumers or to dealers when
not an integral part of the pickup truck. In
these circumstances the Bureau does not regard
it as appropriate that the interpretation of the
applicability of standard 205, which this ruling
announces, should be given retroactive effect.
Further, in view of such reliance a reasonable
time should be afforded affected parties to allow
for possible necessary production adjustments.
Accordingly, it is determined that with respect
to slide-in campers, the interpretation announced
by this ruling shall not become effective until
July 1, 1968.

With regard to the cha.ssis-mouiit camper, it is
an integral part of the vehicle when attached to
a chassis-cab as defined in § 371.3(b), Part 371,
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (33
F.R. 19).

Persons who mount the chassis-mount camper
to the chassis-cab are manufacturers of vehicles
within the meaning of section 102(3) of the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act

PART 571; (RULING)-3

of 1966 (15 U.S.C. 1392). As such, they are to
be guided bv the regulation and ruling on chassis-
cabs issued' December 29, 1967 (33 F.R. 19 and
33 F.R. 29). Under this regulation and ruling
persons combining a chassis-cab manufactured on
or after January 1, 1968, with a body or like
structure (in this case the chassis-mount camper)
are responsible for assuring that the completed
assemblage complies with all applicable standards
in effect on the date of manufacture of the
chassis-cab which had not previously been met

by the manufacturer of the chassis-cab, and for
assuring that previously met standards have not
been adversely affected by the addition of the
chassis-mount camper.

Issued in Washington, D.C., on March 20, 1968.

Lowell K. Bridwell,

Federal Highway Administrator

33 F.R. 5020
March 26, 1968

PART 571; (RULING)-4

Effective. Augutt 1, 1973

PREAMBLE TO PART 572— ANTHROPOMORPHIC TEST DUMMY
(Docket No. 73-8; Notice 2)

The purposes of this notice are (1) to adopt
a re<riilation that specifies a test dummy to
measure the iierformaiice of vehicles in crashes,
and (2) to incorporate tiie dummy into Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208 (49 CFR
§571.208), for the limited purpose of evaluating
vehicles with passive restraint systems manufac-
tured under the first and second restraint
options between August 15, 1973, and August 15,
1975. The question of the restraint system re-
quirements to be in effect after August 15, 1975,
is not addressed by this notice and will be the
subject of future rulemaking action.

The test dnnuny regulation (49 CFR Part
572) and tiie accompanying amendment to
Standard No. 208 were proposed in a notice
published April 2, 1973 (38 F.R. 8455). The
duuuny described in the regulation is to be used
to evahiate vehicles manufactured under sec-
tions S4.1.2.1 and S4.1.2.2, (the first and second
options in the period from August 15, 1973, to
August 15, 1975), and the section incorporating
the dummy is accordingly limited to those sec-
tions. The dmiimy has not been specified for
use with any protection systems after August 15,
1975, nor with active belt systems under the
third restraint option (S4.1.2.3). The recent
decision in Ford v. NHTSA. 473 F. 2d 1241
(6th Cir. 1973), removed the injury criteria
from such systems. To make the dummy ap-
plicable to belts imder the third option, the
agency would lia\e to provide additional notice
and opportunity for comment.

By invalidating the former test dummy
specification, the decision in Chrijxler v. DOT,
472 F. 2d 6.59 (6th Cir. 1972), affected the re-
straint options in effect liefore August 15, 1975,
as well as the mandatory passive restraint re-
quirements that were to be effective after that
date. A manufacturer who built cars with passive

restraints under one of the options would
therefore be unable to certify the cars as com-
plying with the standard, as illustrated by the
necessity for General Motors to obtain a limited
exemption from tlie standard in order to com-
plete the remainder of a run of 1,000 air-bag
equip|)ed cars.

The immediate purpose of this rulemaking is
to reconstitute those portions of the standard
tiiat will enable manufacturers to build passive
restraint vehicles during the period when they
are optional. Tiie test dummy selected by the
agency is the "GM Hybrid II", a composite
develoi)ed by (Jeneral Motors largely from com-
mercially available components. GM had re-
quested NHTSA to adopt the Hybrid II on the
grounds that it had been successfully used in
vehicle tests with passive restraint systems, and
was as good as, or better than, any other im-
mediately available dummy system. On con-
sideration of all available evidence, the NHTSA
concurs in this judgment. One fact weighing
in favor of the decision is that General Motors
has used this duuuny to measure the conformity
of its vehicles to the passive protection require-
ments of Standard 208, in preparation for the
aunoimced introduction of up to 100,000 air-
bag-equipped vehicles during the 1974 model
year.

No other \ehicle uu\nufacturer has announced
plans for the i)roduction of passive restraint
systems diiring the optional phase, nor has any
other vehicle numufacturer come forward with
suggestions for alternatives to Hybrid II. The
NHTSA would have considered other dummies
had some other mamifacturer indicated that it
was planning to produce jiassive restraint vehicles
(luring the option period and that some other
dummy had to be selected in order to allow
them to proceed with their plans. If there had

PART 572— PRE 1

Effaclive: August 1, 1973

been any such plans, NHTSA would have made
every effort to insure that a test device satisfac-
tory to said manufacturer would have been
selected.

This agency recognizes that since various
types of dummy systems have been in use under
the previous specification, any selection of one
dummy, as is required by the Chrysler decision,
will necessitate readjustments by some manu-
facturers. However, considering the quantity of
GM's production, the scope and advanced state
of its passive restraint development program,
and the fact that the Hybrid II does not differ
radically from other dummies currently in use,
in the NHTSA's judgment that dummy repre-
sents the best and least costly choice. That
conclusion has not been contradicted by the com-
ments to the docket.

The agency will not make any final decision
regarding reinstatement of mandatory passive
restraint requirements without further notice and
opportunity for comment. Should the agency
propose mandatory passive restraint require-
ments, the question of the conformity of the
dununy that is chosen with the instructions of
the court in Chrysler will again be open for
comment. The NHTSA strongly encourages the
continuance of the dummy test programs men-
tioned in the comments, in the hope that any
problems that may arise can be identified and
resolved before the dummy specifications for
later periods are issued.

The Hybrid II dummy has been found by
NHTSA to be a satisfactory and objective test
instrument. In sled and barrier tests conducted
by GM with the GM restraint systems and in
sled tests conducted by Calspan Corp. on behalf
of NHTSA, the Hybrid II has produced results
that are consistent and repeatable. This is not
to say that each test at the same nominal speed
and deceleration has produced identical values.

In testing with impact sleds, and to an even
greater extent with crash-tested vehicles, the
test environment itself is complex and necessarily
subject to variations that affect the results. The
test data show, however, that the variance from
dummy to dummy in these tests is sufficiently
small that a manufacturer would have no dif-
ficulty in deciding whether his vehicle would
be likely to fail if tested by NHTSA.

The provisions of the dummy regulation have
been modified somewhat from those proposed in
the notice of proposed rulemaking, largely as a
result of comments from GM. Minor corrections
ha\e been made in the drawings and materials
specifications as a result of comments by GM and
the i)rincipal diunmy suppliers. The dummy
specification, as finally adopted, reproduces the
Hybrid II in each detail of its design and pro-
vides, as a calibration check, a series of perform-
ance criteria based on the observed performance
of normally functioning Hybrid II components.
The performance criteria are wholly derivative
and are intended to filter out dummy aberrations
that escape detection in the manufacturing
process or that occur as a result of impact
damage. The revisions in the performance
criteria, as discussed hereafter, are intended to
eliminate potential \ariances in the test pro-
cedures and to hold the performance of the Hy-
brid II within the narrowest possible range.

General Motors suggested the abandonment of
the definition of "upright position" in section
.')72.4(c), and the substitution of a setp-uii pro-
cedure in section .t7'2.11 to serve both as a
positioning method for the performance tests and
as a measurement method for the dummy's
dimensions as shown in the drawings. The
NHTSA does not object to the use of an ex-
panded set-up [)rocedure, but has decided to
retain the term "upright position" with appro-
l)riate reference to the new section .572.11(1).

The structural properties test of section
•■)72.5{c), which had proposed that the dummy
keep its properties after being subjected to tests
producing readings 2.5 percent above the injury
criteria of Standard No. 208, has been revised
to provide instead that the i)roperties must be
retained after veliicle tests in accordance with
Standard No. 208.

The head performance criteria are adopted as
proi)osed. The procedures have been amended to
insure that the forehead will be oriented below
the nose prior to the drop, to avoid interference
from the nose. In response to comments by the
Road Research Laboratory, American Motors,
and GM. an interval of at least 2 hours between
tests is specified to allow full restoration of
compressed areas of the head skin.

PART 572— PRE 2

Efftctiva: August ), 1973

The neck performance criteria are revised in
several respects, in keei^ing: "itli GM's recom-
mendations. Tlie pendulum impact surface,
shown in F'igure 4, lias been modified in ac-
cordance with GM's design. The zero time point
lias been specified as the instant the pendulum
contacts the honeycomb, the instructions for de-
termining chordal displacement have been
modified, and the pulse shape of the pendulum
deceleration curve has been differently specified.
The ma.ximum allowable deceleration for the
head has been increased slightly to 26g. In
resi)onse to suggestions by the Road Research
Laboratory and the Japan Automobile Manufac-
turers Association (JAMA), as well as GM, a
tolerance has been specified for the pendulum's
impact velocity to allow for minor variances in
the honeycomb material.

AVith respect to the thorax test, each of the
minor procedural changes requested by GM has
been adopted. As with the head, a minimum
recovery time is specified for the thorax. The
seating surface is specified in greater detail, and
the test i)robe orientation has been revised to
refer to its height above the seating surface.
The test probe itself is ex])re.ssly stated to have a
rigid face, by amendment to section 572.11,
thereby reflecting the probes actually used by
XHTSA and G>r. A rigid face for the probe
was also requested by Mercedes Benz.

The test procedures for the spine and abdomen
tests are specified in nmch greater detail than
before, on the basis of suggestions by GM and
others that the former procedures left too much
room for variance. The test fixtures for the
spinal test orientation proposed by GM, and
its projiosed method of load application have
been adopted. The parts of the dummy to be
assembled for these tests are specifically recited,
and an initial .^O" flexion of the dummy is also
specified. The rates of load application and
removal, and the method of taking force readings
are each s|>ecified. The direction of force ap-
plication is clarified in response to a comment by
Vol vo.

The abdomen test is amended with respect to
the initial point of force measurement, to resolve
a particular source of disagreement between
GM"s data and XHTS.-V's. The boundaries of

the abdominal force -deflect ion curve are modified
to accord with the measurements taken by GM
sui«e(iuent to the issuance of tiie notice. The
rate of force a[)plication is specified as not more
tlian ii.l incli per second, in resi)onse to com-
ments by -Mercedes Benz, JAMA, and GM.

The test procedures for the knee tests are
revised to specify the type of seating surface
used and to control the angle of the lower legs
in accordance with suggestions by JAMA, the
Road Research Laboratory, and GM. The in-
strumentation specifications of section 572.11 are
amended to clarify the method of attachment
and orientation of the thorax accelerometers and
to specify the cliannel classes for the chest
potentiometer, the pendulum accelerometer, and
the test probe accelerometer, as requested by
several comments.

The design and assembly drawings for the
test dummy are too cumbersome to publisli in the
Federal Ueghter. During the comment period
on the Ajjril 2 notice, the agency maintained
master copies of the drawings in the docket and
placed the I'eproducible mylar masters from
which the copies were made witli a commercial
blueprint facility from whom interested parties
could obtain copies. The NHT.'^A has decided
to continue this jjractice and is accordingly
placing a master set of drawings in the docket
and the reproducible masters for these drawings
with a l)luei)rint facility.

The drawings as adopted by this notice differ
only in minor detail from those that accompanied
the April 2 notice. The majority of the changes,
iucoi'porated into coirected drawings, have
already been gi\en to those persons who ordered
copies. The letter of June 13, 1973, that ac-
companied the corrected drawings has been
placed in the docket. The June corrections are
incorporated into the final drawing package.
.Vdditioual adjustments are made hereby to re-
flect better the weight distribution of separated
segments of the dummy, to allow other materials
to be used for head ballast, and to specify the
instrument for measuring skin thickness. The
details of these changes are recited in a memo-
randum incorporated into the drawing package.

Kach of the final drawings is designated by
the legend "XHTSA Release R/1/73". Each

PART 572— PRE 3

EffacHv*: Augud 1, 1973

drawing so designated is hereby incorporated as
part of the test dummy specifications of 49 CFR
Part 572. Subsequent changes in the drawings
will not be made without notice and opportunity
for comment.

The incorporation of the Part 572 test dummy
into Standard No. 208 makes obsolete several
test conditions of the standard that had been
adopted to supplement the former test dummy
specifications. The location, orientation, and
sensitivity of test instrumentation formerly
specified by sections S8.1.15 through S8.1.18 are
now controlled by Part 572 are are no longer
necessary within Standard No. 208. Similarly,
the use of rubber components for the head, neck
and torso joints as specified in Part 572, supplant
the joint setting specifications for those joints
in section S8.1.10 of the standard. The NHTSA
has determined that the deletion of the above
portions of the Standard No. 208 will have no
effect on the substantive requirements of the
standard and that notice and public procedure
thereon are unnecessary.

In consideration of the foregoing. Title 49,
Code of Federal Regulations, is amended by the
addition of Part 572, Anthropomorphic Test
Dummy. . . .

In view of the pressing need for a test dummy
to permit the continued development of passive
restraint systems, and the fact that it presently
only relates to a new option for compliance, the
NHTSA finds that there is good cause to adopt
an immediate effective date. Accordingly, Part
572 is effective August 1, 1973, and the amend-
ment to Standard 208 is effective August 15, 1973.

Issued under the authority of sections 103 and
119 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act, P.L. 89-563, 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407,
and the delegation of authority at 38 F.R. 12147.

Issued on July 26, 1973.

James E. Wilson
Associate Administrator
Traffic Safety Programs

38 F.R. 20449
August 1. 1973

PART 572— PRE 4

Effective: August 8, 1977

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 572— ANTHROPOMORPHIC TEST DUMMIES

(Docket No. 73-8; Notice 4)

This notice amends Part 572, Anthropomorphic
Test Dummy, to specify several elements of the
dummy calibration test procedures iind make
minor chancres in the dummy desigrn specifica-
tions. Part 572 is also reorganized to provide
for accommodation of dummies other than the
50th-percentile male dummy in the future.

Part 572 (49 CFR Part 572) establishes, by
means of approximately 250 drawings and five
calibration tests, the exact specifications of a test
device that simulates an adult occupant of a
motor vehicle, for use in evaluating certain types
of crash protection systems provided in accord-
ance with Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash
Protectimi (49 CFR §571.208). Interested per-
sons are advised that NHTSA Docket Nos. 69-7
and 74—14 concerning Standard No. 208 are re-
lated to this rulemaking.

Proposed occupant protection requirements in
Standard Xo. 208 were reviewed by the Sixth
Circuit in 1972 {'■^Chrysler v. Department of
Transportation;' 472 F. 2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972)),
and the dummy previously specified for use in
testing was invalidated as insufficiently objective.
The NHTSA subsequently established new
dummy specifications under Part 572 for the
limited purpose of qualifying passive restraint
systems which manufacturers choose to offer on
an optional basis (38 FR 20499, August 1, 1973).
After examining test experience with the Part
572 dummy, the NHTSA specified its use in a
proposal to mandate passive restraint systems
(39 FR 10271, March 19, 1974).

Recently, the agency proposed minor changes
in calibration procedures and dummy drawings
(40 FR 3.3462, August 8, 1975) in response to the
comments of manufacturers and others on the
March 1974 notice. The August 1975 proposal
only addressed the issue of dummy objectivity

raised by the Sixth Circuit, while issues of
dummy similarity to humans, sensitivity to tast
environment, and dummy positioning in a vehicle
have been treated elsewhere (41 FR 29715, July
19, 1976).

It is noted that the most recent Department of
Transportation proposals on Standard No. 208
(41 FR 24070, June 14, 1976) reflected a modifi-
cation of performance requirements that reduce
the number and types of tests in which the Part
572 dummy would be used in Standard No. 208
dynamic tests. Specifically, rollover and lateral
testing would no longer be required if a lap belt
were installed in the front seating positions. The
NHTSA's July 1976 proposal noted above would
conform existing tests in Standard No. 208 to the
modified approach. It would also increase the
permissible femur force loads that could be reg-
istered on the dummy during impact, and restrict
femur force requirements to compressive forces.
Interested persons should be aware of these sig-
nificant potential changes in the use of the dummy
in Standard No. 208.

As for the dummy objectivity treated by the
proposal that underlies this notice, manufactur-
ers' comments stressed the complexity of the test
environment in which the device is used and their
uncertainty as to how nuich the dummy char-
acteristics contribute to the variability that is
encountered. In somewhat contradictory fashion,
several of the manufacturers repeated requests
for a "whole systems" calibration of the dummy
that would be conducted under conditions ap-
proximating the barrier crash whose complex
variables had just been emphasized.

As is the case with any measuring instrument,
variations in readings can result from imperfec-
tion in the instrument or variations in the phe-
nomenon being measured (in this case, the

PART 572— PRE 5

Effective: August 8, 1977

complex events that occur as a passenger car
impacts a barrier at 30 mph, or is impacted lat-
erally by a 4,000-pound moving barrier, or is
rolled over). While the '"^Chrysler''' court delayed
Standard No. 208 so that vaiiation in the
dummy's behavior could be corrected, it found
the standard (and the dynamic test procedures)
practicable and "designed to meet the need for
motor vehicle safety" (472 F2d at 674, 675).
To meet the need for motor vehicle safety, the
dynamic tests are realistic simulations of the
actual crash environment. Variations in the pre-
cise circumstances to which the dummy is exposed
from test to test are expected.

Simulation of such crashes to provide a "whole
systems" calibration of the dummy would not be
reasonable, however, because of the variations
that are inherent in the 30-mph (and the other)
impacts. Unless the inputs to the dummy during
calibration are precisely controlled, as is the case
with the five sub-assembly tests, the "whole sys-
tems" calibration would be meaningless. To con-
duct precisely controlled 30-mph barrier crash
tests as part of the dummy calibration procedure
would be very expensive, since dummy calibration
is normally performed before and after each
compliance test. The good results obtained in
sub-assembly calibration, and supported by the
controlled "whole dummy" test results referred
to in the preamble to the proposal, make such a
"whole systems" test redimdant. The agency
concludes that introduction into Part 572 of an
extremely expensive and imfamiliar additional
calibration is unjustified.

General Motors (GM), Chrysler Corporation,
Ford Motor Company, and the Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association (IVIVMA) stated that
the dummy construction is unsuited to measure-
ments of latei'ally-imposed force, thereby render-
ing the dummy unobjective in the "lateral impact
environment." While the agency does not agree
with these objections, the modified performance
levels put forward by the Department of Trans-
portation and the agency wo>dd allow manufac-
turers to install lap belts if they do not wish to
undertake lateral or rollover testing. Any manu-
facturer that is concerned with the objectivity of
the dummy in such impacts would provide lap
belts at tlie front seating positions in lieu of
conducting the lateral or rollover tests.

Ford and Chrysler argued that the test dummy
is insufficiently specified despite the approxi-
mately 250 detailed drawings that set forth
dummy construction. Their concern seems to be
limited to minor contour dimensions that they
consider critical to dummy objectivity. To
eliminate any such concern the agency will place
a specimen of the dummy in the data and draw-
ings package and incorporate it by reference into
Part 572.

The MVMA stated that its reading of the
docket comments indicated that the dummy can-
not be assembled as it is designed. The agency
is aware that dimensional tolerances could, at
their extremes, "stack up" to cause the need in
rare instances for selective fitting of components.
Manufacturers can avoid any such problem by
reducing the dispersion of tolerances or by select
fitting of components to avoid tolerance "stack-
up." Of the three dummy manufacturers' com-
ments on this proposal, only Humanoid Systems
(Humanoid) listed discrepancies. The agency
has reviewed the asserted discrepancies and con-
cludes that the specifications themselves, the
manufacturing practices just noted, or the cali-
bration procedures are adequate to resolve the
cited problems. To simplify the dummy, certain
studs located at the side of the dummy femurs
(used for moimting photographic targets and
unnecessary to NHTSA test procedures) are de-
leted because of their potential for reducing re-
peatability under some circumstances. These
studs are designated F/02, G/02, F/25, and G/25.

Bayerische Motorenverken recited test experi-
ence that demonstrated different performance
characteristics among the products of different
dummy manufacturers, although they are all
warranted to meet the specifications of the regu-
lations. NHTSA Keport DOT-HS-801-861
demonstrates that some manufacturer-warranted
dummies did not meet all calibration require-
ments of Part 572. The agency, however, is not
in a position to assume responsibility for the
contractual terms established between private
parties.

Humanoid noted that experience with the vinyl
flesh specification of the dummy led to resolution
of aging problems on which it had earlier com-
mented. The company did recommend latitude
in vinyl formulation to permit market competi-

PAKT 572— PRE 6

Effective: August 8. 1977

tion. General Motors also expressed concern that
specification of the Part r)72 dummy not stifle
innovation. Aldersnn Research Ijahoratories
(ARL) once apain asked that the ag:ency specify
a one-piece castinjr in place of the welded head
presently specified. The afrency sympathizes
witii this interest in improvement of the dummy
manufacturinor techniques. However, the dummy
is a test instrument crucial to the validity of an
important motor veliicle safety standard and as
such, it cannot he loosely described for the benefit
of innovation.

Volkswagen requested improvement in aginof
and in storage techniques for the dummy. The
agency considers that it has met its responsibili-
ties by specifying calibration tests that will sig-
nal improper storage or age-related changes.
Further development in this area is within the
province of the manufacturers and users. Sig-
nificant improvements in aging or storage factors
will, of course, not be ignored by the agency.

Although Ford and American Motors Corpora-
tion (AMC) made no comment on the specifics
of the NHTSA proposal, Chrysler Corporation
and several other veliicle manufacturers, as well
as the dummy manufacturers, supported the pro-
posed changes. The National Motor Vehicle
Safety Advisory Council took no position on the
proposal. The Vehicle Equipment Safety Com-
mission did not comment on the proposal. Hav-
ing carefully reviewed all of the comments
submitted and additional data compiled by the
agency, the changes are adopted, essentially as
proposed. The agency proposed modification of
the five calibration procedures for dummy sub-
assemblies, along with minor changes in the
drawings that describe all components of the
dummy.

HEAD

The head calibration involves dropping the
head 10 inches so that its forehead strikes a rigid
surface and registers acceleration levels that must
fall within a certain range. No comments were
received on the small relocation of measurement
points or the specification of "instant release"
of the head, and the.se modifications are made as
proposed.

The proposal included a specification of 250
microinches (rms) for the finish of the steel plate
on which the head is dropped. The agency had
considered other factors (particularly friction at
the skull-skin interface of the (luimny forehead)
that might affect the accelerometer readings. It
was found that, in most instances, the dummy as
received from the numufacturcr conformed to the
specifications. When deviations were encoun-
tered, treatment of the head in accordance with
manufacturer recommendations eliminated the
effect of these factors on results. Comparison of
data on 100 head drop tests conducted since
issuance of the proposal confirms that conclusion.
Xinety-seven percent of these head drops reg-
istered readings within the specified limits, with
a mean response value of 232g and a standard
deviation of 14g, indicating a coefficient of vari-
ance of 6 percent. Of the three failures, the
response values were 203g, 204g and 263g. All
of the drop tests fell within the specified 0.9- to
1.5-ms time range at the lOOg level. The surface
finish of the drop plate was 63 microinches (rms).
In view of this data, it does not appear necessary
to adjust either the response range as advocated
by Humanoid or the time range as recommended
by Ford. The test results, however, support the
request by a number of conuncnts to change the
proposed 250-microinch finish to a value below
100 microinches (rms). On the basis of the
comments and XHTSA test data, the impact
plate surface finish is specified as any value in
the range from 8 to 80 microinches (rms).

General Motors asked whether coating of the
steel plate is permitteil. Coating is permitted so
long as the 8- to 80-microincli range for the
surface is maintained.

Humanoid reconunended that any lubrication
or surface smoothness introduced by the dummy
manufacturers be made uniform in the interests
of component interchange. Volkswagen also rec-
onunended a skull-to-skin interface finish speci-
fication. The X'HTSA, however, does not believe
that differing procedures for preparation of the
skull-skin interface prevent iutei-change of the
heads, and the requests are therefore not granted.

PART 572— PRE 7

Effective: August 8, 1977

In view of the agency decision to incorporate
by reference a specimen of the Part 572 dinnniy
in the drawings and data package, it is also con-
sidered unnecessary to specify, as requested by
Hunianoid, thickness and performance specifica-
tion for the headfonn at 45 and 90 degrees from
the midsaggital plane. With regards to Hu-
manoid's view that head drop tests are irrelevant
to performance of the dummy as a measuring
instrument, the agency considers them closely
tied to the characteristics of the dummy that
affect its repeatability as a measuring device.

Renault and Peugeot recommended considera-
tion of a revision in the test criteria of Standard
No. 208, in the case of safety belts, to replace the
limitation on head acceleration with a limitation
on submarining. The agency considers the pres-
ent limit on head acceleration a valuable means
to limit head loading and neck hyperflexion in
belt systems as well as other systems. It is a
requirement that is already being met on a pro-
duction basis by Volkswagen.

Toyota stated that the lOg limit on lateral
acceleration during the head drop would be im-
possible to satisfy. The NHTSA's own test ex-
perience did not exhibit any evidence of the noted
problem. None of the manufacturers of dummies
objected to the proposal, and Alderson Research
Laboratories (ARL) supported the lOg limit. It
is therefore made final as proposed.

ARL once more requested consideration of the
one-piece headfonn in place of the welded head-
form presently specified. If, as ARL states, its
customers accept and utilize the one-piece casting,
the agency does not understand the necessity to
modify the specification. ARL's request for con-
sideration of a one-piece neck bracket is subject
to the same response. As earlier noted, the justi-
fication to "freeze'* the dummy specification is
clear from its use as a measurement instrument
that is the basis of manufacturer compliance
with, and agency verification testing to, a major
motor vehicle safety standard.

NECK

Comments generally agreed with the proposed
changes in the dummy neck calibration (attach-
ment of the head form to the neck, and attach-
ment of the neck to the end of a pendulum which

impacts an energy-absorbing element, inducing
head rotation which must fall within specified
limits). General Motors clarified that its engi-
neers' reason for recommending a non-articulated
neck instead of an articulated neck concerned the
cost, maintenance, and complexity of the latter's
construction. Volkswagen agreed with Sierra
Engineering Company (Sierra) that a smaller
tolerance for the pendulum's speed at impact
should be considered. Humanoid agreed with
the agency's view that the articulated neck does
not provide the desired level of repeatability at
this time. Having considered these comments
the agency makes final the proposed location
change for the accelerometers, deletion of § 572.7
(c)(5), and clarification of the "t4" point and
the 26g level.

Manufacturers made several additional recom-
mendations. Humanoid expressed support of
AMC's view that the neck calibration should be
conducted at barrier impact velocity. The agency
has reviewed these comments and finds that the
specified energy levels are adequate for the in-
tended purpose of establishing dynamic response
characteristics and the measurement of repeat-
ability of dummy necks under dynamic test con-
ditions. Testing at higher levels would bring
other dummy components besides the neck into
direct impact interaction, thereby obscuring or
completely masking the measured phenomena.

Volkswagen cautioned against an entirely free
selection of damping materials because of varia-
tion in rebound characteristics produced with
different materials that can achieve conforming
deceleration time histories. The agency agrees
that a limit on rebound should be established to
compliment the choice of damping materials and
has added such a specification to the end of the
text of §. 572.7(b).

Humanoid noted interference in the attachment
of the neck bracket to the backplate of the sterno-
thoracic structure, due to the presence of a weld-
ing bead. The agency has found no interference
in the dummies manufactured by two companies
and concludes that the interference must be asso-
ciated with Humanoid's manufacturing tech-
nique.

PART 572— PRE 8

Effscllve: August 8, 1977

THORAX

The NHTSA proposed several additional speci-
fications for test probe orientation, dummy seat-
ing, and liml) positioning for the calibration test.
The calibration consists of striking the torso of
the seated dummy at two speeds with a specified
striker to measure thorax resistance, deflection,
and hysteresis characteristics. Comments did not
object to the changes and they are incorporated
as proposed.

The agency also proposed several changes in
the drawings for the thorax sub-assembly of the
dummy and, without objection, they are made
final in virtually the same form. ARL indicated
that four heat seals should be used on the zipper.
ARL clarified that the longer socket liead cap
screw is intended to permit sufficient thread en-
gagement, not more latitude in the ballast con-
figuration as stated in the proposal. Humanoid's
request to know the clavicle contours that con-
stitute the Part 572 specification is met by placing
the dummy specimen in the drawings and data
package as earlier noted. Humanoid and Toyo
Kogj'o suggested an increase in clavicle strength.
The agency's experience with the clavicle since
the last consideration of this suggestion has been
that all dummies are not significantly susceptible
to clavicle breakage. Accordingly, the agency
does not consider the modification necessary.

The major suggestion by vehicle and dummy
manufacturers was a slight revision of the thorax
resistance and deflection values, which must not
be exceeded during impact of the chest. The
present values (1400 pounds and 1.0 inch at 14
fps, 2100 pounds and 1.6 inches at 22 fps) were
questioned by GM, which recommends an in-
crease in both resistance and deflection values to
better reflect accurate calibration of a correctly
designed dummy. Comparable increases were
recommended by Humanoid and Sierra. ARL
noted that the present values are extremely
stringent.

The agency's experience with calibration of the
thorax since issuance of the proposal confirms
that a slight increase in values is appropriate,
although not the amount of increase recom-
mended by the manufacturers. The values have
accordingly been modified to 14.50 pounds and
1.1 inches at 14 fps, and 2250 pounds and 1.7
inches at 22 fps. The agency does not set a

minimum limit on the value as recommended by
General Motors, because the interaction of the
deflection and resistance force values make lower
limits unnecessary. The changes in values should
ease ARL's concern about the seating surface,
although the agency's own experience does not
indicate that a significant problem exists with
the present specifications of the surface.

In conjunction with these changes, the agency
has reduced the maximum permissible hysteresis
of the chest during impact to 70 percent as rec-
ommended by GM.

GM requested a clarification of the dummy
limb positioning procedures for purposes of
thorax impact testing, citing the possibility of
limb misadjustment between steps (1) and (4)
of § 572.8(d). The agency has added wording
to subparagraph (4) to make clear that the limbs
remain horizontally outstretched. The agency
does not consider GM's suggested wording to be
adequate for calibration. For example, the atti-
tude of the test probe at impact is not specified.
For this reason, the requested modification is not
undertaken.

Humanoid requested clarification of paragraph
(7) of § 572.8(d) that specifies measurement of
horizontal deflection "in line with the longitudinal
centerline of the probe." Humanoid expressed
concern that, as the thorax rotated backwards,
the horizontal measurement could not be made.
A clarification has been added to the cited
language.

Humanoid also requested a less temperature-
sensitive rib damping material than is presently
employed. The NHTSA concludes that its strict
limitation on permissible temperature and hu-
midity conditions for calibration testing ade-
quately controls the effects of temperature on
this damping material.

LUMBAR SPINE, ABDOMEN

The NHTSA proposed minor modifications of
the lumbar spine construction, and several
changes in the procedures for lumbar spine cali-
bration, which consists of spine flexion from the
upright position, followed by release of the force
which was required to attain this deflection, and
measurement of the return angle. Manufactur-
ers supported the majority of the changes, and

PART 572— PRE 9

Effective: August 8, 1977

they are made final in this notice. The agency
proposed that measurements be taken when
"flexing lias stopped,"' and Toyota, noting the
difficulty of establishing this point under some
circumstances, suggested that the measurement
be made 3 minutes after release. This modifica-
tion is reasonable and is included in the final
action.

Testing at XHTSA's Safety Research Labora-
tory demonstrates the need to clarify proposed
§ 572.9(c) (3) to specify return of the lumbar
spine sufficiently so that it remains in "its initial
position in accordance with Figure 11" unas-
sisted. An appropriate further specification has
been made.

Humanoid requested that the four-bolt attach-
ment of the push plate be revised to two-bolt
attachment in view of Humanoid's practice of
providing a two-bolt plate. The agency has
undertaken its data collection using four-bolt
attachment, and to preserve the uncontested
validity of these data, declines to modify the
proposed specification.

ARL requested reconsideration of NHTSA's
decision to leave unchanged the lumbar cable ball
and socket attachment design. The agency has
continued to examine test results and cannot con-
clude that the present attachment design has
caused a calibration or compliance problem.
Accordingly, ARL's request is denied. An ARL
request to limit the reference to the strength
requirements of the military specification in the
case of lumbar cable swaging is granted. If such
a limitation were not specified, the other elements
of the military specification might arguably be
included in the NHTSA's specification.

Calibration of the abdomen of the dummy is
accomplished by application of a specified force
to the abdomen while the dummy torso is placed
on its back, with a required "force/deflection"
curve resulting. The proposal added a range of
force application rates to make the procedure
more uniform, as well as a 10-pound preload and
further specification of the horizontal surface.
Manufacturers did not oppose these changes.

Manufacturers did oppose the proposed speci-
fication changes that would require the dummy
abdominal sac to be sealed. Various reasons un-
related to abdomen performance were listed
(e.g., transportation of sealed sac in unpressur-

ized aircraft compartment) and available data
show successful calibration in both configurations.
In view of the expressed preference for the un-
sealed design, the leak test has been removed
from the drawings, and the vent is retained.

Humanoid requested that the shape of the ab-
tlominal insert be modified to conform more
closely to the dummy's abdominal cavity. The
shape of the insert affects the dummy perform-
ance, however, and the agency does not consider
a change with unknown consequences advisable
at this time. The agency also concludes that
Humanoid's request to drop all specification of
wall thickness for the abdominal sac is also un-
advisable for this reason.

Ford, the MVMA, and Humanoid noted an
asymmetry of the dummy pelvic castings and
requested a justification for it. The asymmetry
is apparently an artifact of the adoption of
Society of Automotive Engineers specifications,
whose origin is unlaiown. In the agency's judg-
ment, based on experience with numerous Part
572 dummies and evaluation of test results, no
degradation in performance is attributable to the
asymmetry. While the agency intends to further
review the asymmeti-y noted, no action will be
taken without evidence that the specification

affects testing.

LIMBS

Little comment was received on the changes
proposed for limb calibration, which consists of
impacting the knees of a seated dinnmy with a
test probe of a specified weight at a specified
speed and measuring the impact foi'ce on the
dummy femurs. In response to Toyota's request
for clarification, the positioning in accordance
with § 572.11 is followed by the leg adjustments
specified in § 572.10(c), which have the effect of
changing leg position from that achieved under
§ 572.11.

The proposed specification of vinyl skin thick-
ness over the knee face was supported in com-
ments, although two manufacturers requested
that the thickness tolerance be moved upward to
thicken the skin somewhat. Humanoid did sug-
gest elimination of the femur calibration as use-
less, but the agency considers such a control
important to repeatable perfoi-mance of the
dummy.

PART 572— PRE 10

Effective: August 8, 1977

Ford interpreted information contained in con-
tract work undertaken foi- the NHTSA (DOT-
HS-1-00873) to siiow tiiat fenuir force loads
registered too liigh in 50 percent of cases con-
ducted under the calibration conditions of the
standard. In XHTSA tests of 100 dummy knees
on Part 572 dummies (DOT-HS-801 861), the
2,500-pound limit was exceeded only twice. The
same data indicated a tendency for the femur to
register lower than previously estimated, and a
minor reduction of the lower limit is established
in this action. The agency considers the small
reduction to fall within the ambit of the pro-
posal to improve conditions for calibration.

Ford's and ITumanoid's observations with re-
gard to off-center impacts that result in bending
or torque have been dealt with in the recent
agency proposal to limit femur force require-
ments of Standard No. 208 to compressive force.
As for Humanoid's concern that unacceptable
variation is possible in the femur load cell, it is
noted that General Motors and Volkswagen have
both certified thousands of vehicles based on im-
pact readings taken from this dummy with these
femur cells installed.

GENERAL TEST CONDITIONS

The agency proposed minor changes in the
general test conditions of § 572.11 that apply to
dummy test, such as a minimum period of dummy
exposure to the temperature and humidity at
which calibration tests are conducted. With cor-
rection of accelerometer locations, a clarification
of dummy positioning, and an increase of zii)per
heat seals from three to four, the contemplateil
changes are made as proposed.

Sierra requested a broader range of humidity
conditions for the calibration tests, stating that
a range of 10- to 90-percent humidity would not
affect results of "performance tests." The com-
pany cited freezing and desert heat conditions
as reasons for a 6-hour conditioning rather than
the 4-hour conditioning proposed by the agency.
Humanoid and Toyota also addressed this aspect
of the general test conditions. It appears that
Sierra misunderstood the tempei-ature and hu-
midity specifications as applicable to vehicle
performance tests. This rulemaking action ad-
dresses only calibration tests which presumably
would be conducted indoors in a temperature-

contiolled setting, liecause the dummies are not
expected to be stored in areas of great tempera-
ture extremes prior to calibration testing, the
proposed ranges of humidity and temperature
conditions are considered to be effective to sta-
bilize tlie affected (hnumy properties. "While
instrumentation would be affected by the 90-
l)ercent humidity condition suggested by Sierra,
the agency has i-educed the lower humidity con-
dition to a lO-percent level in agreement that the
change does not affect the ability to calibrate the
dmnmy.

Sierra objected that a dummy manufacturer's
warranty of conformity of its products to Part
572 would be complicated by a time specification
for temperature and humidity conditioning. The
company believed that its customers would re-
quire that 4 hours of conditioning occur whether
or not the dunuuy had already stabilized at the
correct temperature. The agency sees no reason
why a purchaser would insist on a senseless con-
dition but, in any case, has no control over the
contractual dealings between the dummy manu-
facturer and the purchaser. The NHTSA cannot
delete necessary stabilizing conditions from its
regulations simply because a purchaser wishes
to make an unreasonable contractual specification
based on it. The same rationale is responsive to
Sierra's request for shorter recovery intervals be-
tween repeated tests.

Toyota supplied data to demonstrate that more
consistent thorax and knee impact tests could be
achieved by using cotton pants on the dummy.
The agency's data do not agree with Toyota's
and no other manufacturer took issue with the
agency's proposal to delete all clothing require-
ments. This deletion is made final as proposed.

ARL asked why the agency's proposed prohibi-
tion against painting dummy components is
(jualified to state "except as specified in this pai't
or in drawings subtended by this part." This
qualification simply preserves the agency's op-
portunity to specify painted components in the
future.

No conclusive evidence of preferable storage
methods was submitted by conunenters. The
agency therefore does not specify that tiie dunuuy
calibrations be preceded by positioning in a spe-
cific posture. To avoid the possibility of intro-
ducing a variable, however, the eye bolt in the

PART 572— PRE 11

Effective: August 8, 1977

dummy head has been relabeled on the drawings
as "not for use in suspending dummy in storage."

Interested persons are advised that the first
stage of choosing a replacement foaming agent
for the specified Nitrosan are complete. Details
are available in document HS-802-030 in the
public docket.

In accordance with recently enunciated Depart-
ment of Transportation policy encouraging ade-
quate analysis of the consequences of regulatory
action (41 FR 16200, April 16, 1976), the agency
herewith summarizes its evaluation of the eco-
nomic and other consequences of this action on
the public and private sectors, including possible
loss of safety benefits. The changes made are all
to existing specifications and calibration proce-
dures and are intended as clarifications of speci-
fications already established. Therefore, the
cost of the changes are calculated as minimal,
consisting at most of relatively small modifica-
tions of test equipment and minor dummy com-
ponents. The number and complexity of
calibration tests are not affected by the changes.
At the same time, the clarification will improve
a manufacturer's ability to conduct compliance
tests of safety systems and will thereby con-
tribute to an increase in motor vehicle safety.

Nofe —

The economic and inflationary impacts of this
rulemaking have been carefully evaluated in ac-
cordance with Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-107, and an Inflation Impact State-
ment is not required.

In anticipation of the use of dummies other
than the 50th-percentile male dummy in compli-
ance testing, the agency takes this opportunity
to reorganize Part 572 so that the 50th-percentile
dummy occupies only one Subpart.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
Part 572, Anthropomorphic Test Dum/my, and
the dummy design drawings incorporated by
reference in Part 572, are amended ....

Effective date : August 8, 1977.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; delegation of authority
at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on January 31, 1977.

John W. Snow
Administrator

42 F.R. 7148
February 7, 1977

PART 572— PRE 12

Effective: July 5, 1978

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 572— ANTHROPOMORPHIC TEST DUMMIES

(Docket No. 74-14; Notice 11; Docket No. 73-8; Notice 07)

This notice amends occupant crash protection
Standard No. 208 and its accompanying test
dummy specification to further specify test pro-
cedures and injury criteria. The changes are
minor in most respects and reflect comments by
manufacturers of test dummies and vehicles and
the XHTSA's own test experience with the
standard and the test dummy.

Date : Effective date— July 5, 1978.

Addresses : Petitions for reconsideration should
refer to the docket number and be submitted to:
Docket Section, Room 5108, Nassif Building, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

For further information contact :

Mr. Guy Hunter,
Motor Vehicle Programs,
National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration,
Washington, D.C. 20590
(202 426-2265)

Supplementary information : Standard No. 208,
Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208),
is a Department of Transportation safety stand-
ard that requires manufacturers to provide a
means of restraint in new motor vehicles to keep
occupants from impacting the vehicle interior in
the event a crash occurs. The standard has, since
Januarj' 1968, required the provision of seat belt
assemblies at each seating position in passengei'
cars. In January 1972 the requirements for seat
belts were upgraded and options were added to
permit the provision of restraint that is "active"
(requiring some action be taken by the vehicle
occupant, as in the case of seat belts) or "passive"
(providing protection without action being taken
by the occupant).

In a separate notice issued today (42 FR
34289; FR Reg. 77-19137), the Secretary of

Transportation has reached a decision regarding
the future occupant crash protection that must be
installed in passenger cars. The implementation
of that decision will involve the testing of passive
restraint systems in accordance with the test pro-
cedures of Standard No. 208, and this notice is
intended to make final several modifications of
that procedure which have been proposed for
change by the NHTSA. This notice also re-
sponds to two petitions for reconsideration of
rulemaking involving the test dummy that is
used to evaluate the compliance of passive re-
straints systems.

DOCKET 74-14; NOTICE 05

Notice 5 was issued July 15, 1976 (41 FR
29715; July 19, 1976) and proposed that Stand-
ard No. 208's existing specification for passive
protection in frontal, lateral, and i-ollover modes
(S4. 1.2.1) be modified to specify passive protec-
tion in the frontal mode only, with an option to
provide passive protection or belt protection in
the lateral and rollover crash modes. Volks-
wagen had raised the question of the feasibility
of small cars meeting the standard's lateral im-
pact requirements: A 20-mph impact by a 4,000-
pound, 60-inch-higli flat surface. The agency
noted the particular vulnerability of small cars
to side impact and the need to provide protection
for them l)ased on the weight of other vehicles
on the liighway, l)ut agreed that it would be
difficult to provide passive lateral protection in
the near future. Design problems also underlay
the proposal to provide a belt option in place of
the existing passive rollover requirement.

Ford Motor Company argued that a lateral
option would be inappropriate in Standard No.
208 as long as the present dummy is used for

PART 572— PRE 13

Effective: July 5, 1978

measurement of passive system performance.
This question of dummy use as a measuring de-
vice is treated later in this notice. General
Motors Corporation (GM) supported the option
without qualification, noting that the installation
of a lap belt with a passive system "would pro-
vide comparable protection to lap-shoulder belts
in side and rollover impacts." Chrysler did not
object to the option, but noted that the lap belt
option made the title of S4.1.2.1 ("complete
passive protection") misleading. Volkswagen
noted that its testing of belt systems without the
lap belt portion showed little loss in efficacy in
rollover crashes. No other comments on this
proposal were received. The existing option
S4.1.2.1 is therefore adopted as proposed so that
manufacturers will be able to immediately under-
take experimental work on passive restraints on
an optional basis in conformity with the Secre-
tary's decision.

There were no objections to the agency's pro-
posal to permit either a Type 1 or Type 2 seat
belt assembly to meet the requirements, and thus
it is made final as proposed.

The NHTSA proposed two changes in the in-
jury criteria of S6 that are used as measures of a
restraint system's qualification to Standard No.
208. One change proposed an increase in per-
missible femur force limits from 1,700 pounds to
2,250 pounds. As clarification that tension loads
are not included in measurement of these forces,
the agency also proposed that the word "com-
pressive" be added to the text of S6.4. Most
commenters were cautionary about the changes,
pointing out that susceptibility to fracture is
time dependent, that acetabular injury could be
exacerbated by increased forces, and that angular
applications of force were as likely in the real
world as axial forces and would more likely
fracture the femur.

The agency is aware of and took into account
these considerations in proposing the somewhat
higher femur force limit. The agency started
with the actual field experience of occupants of
GM and Volkswagen vehicles that have been
shown to produce femur force readings of about
1,700 pounds. Occupants of these vehicles in-
volved in crashes have not shown a significant

incidence of femur fracture. The implication
from this experience that the 1,700-pound figure
can safely be raised somewhat is supported in
work by Patrick on compressive femur forces of
relatively long duration. The Patrick data
(taken with aged embalmed cadavers) indicate
that the average fracture load of the patella-
femur-pelvis complex is 1,910 pounds. This
average is considered conservative, in that ca-
daver bone structure is generally weaker than
living human tissues. While these data did not
address angular force applications, the experi-
ence of the GM and Volkswagen vehicle occu-
pants does suggest that angular force application
can go higher than 1,700 pounds.

The agency does not agree that the establish-
ment of the somewhat higher outer limit for
permissible femur force loads of 2,250 pounds is
arbitrary. Wliat is often ignored by the medical
community and others in commenting on the in-
jury criteria found in motor vehicle safety stand-
ards is that manufacturers must design their
restraint systems to provide greater protection
than the criteria specified, to be certain that each
of their products will pass compliance tests con-
ducted by the NHTSA. It is a fact of industrial
production that the actual performance of some
units will fall below nominal design standards
(for quality control and other reasons). Volks-
wagen made precisely this point in its comments.
Because the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act states that each vehicle must comply
(15 U.S.C. § 1392(a)(1) (a)), manufacturers
routinely design in a "compliance margin" of
superior performance. Thus, it is extremely un-
likely that a restraint system designed to meet
the femur force load criterion of 2,250 pounds
will in fact be designed to provide only that
level of performance. With these considerations
in mind, the agency makes final the changes as
proposed.

While not proposed for change, vehicle manu-
facturers commented on a second injury criterion
of the standard : A limitation of the acceleration
experienced by the dummy thorax during the
barrier crash to 60g, except for intervals whose
cumulative duration is not more than 3 milli-
seconds (ms). Until August 31, 1977, the agency
has specified the Society of Automotive Engi-

PART 572— PRE 14

Effective: July 5, 1978

neers' (SAE) "severity index" as a substitute for
the 60p-3nis limit, because of greater familiarity
of the iiuhistiy with tliat criterion.

General Motors reconimended that tlie severity
index be continued as the chest injury criterion
until a basis for using chest deflection is devel-
oped in place of chest acceleration. GM cited
data which indicate that chest injury from cer-
tain types of blunt frontal impact is a statisti-
cally significant function of chest deflection in
humans, while not a function of impact force or
spinal acceleration. GM suggested that a shift
from the temporary severitj' index measure to
the 60g-3ms measurement would be wasteful,
because there is no "strong indication" tliat the
60g-3ms measurement is more meaningful than
the severity index, and some restraint systems
have to be redesigned to comply with the new
requirement.

Unlike GM, Chrysler argued against the use
of acceleration criteria of either type for the
chest, and rather advocated that the standard be
delayed until a dunmiy chest with better deflec-
tion characteristics is developed.

The Severity Index Criterion allows higher
loadings and therefore increases the possibility
of adverse effects on the chest. It only indirectly
limits the accelerations and hence the forces
which can be applied to the thoi-ax. Accelera-
tion in a specific impact environment is consid-
ered to be a better predictor of injury than the
Severity Index.

NHTSA only allowed belt systems to meet the
Severity Index Criterion of 1,000 instead of the
60g-3ms criterion out of consideration for lead-
time problems, not because the Severity Index
Criterion was considered superior. It is recog-
nized that restraint systems such as lap-shoulder
belts apply more concentrated forces to the
thorax than air cushion restraint, and that in-
jury can result at lower forces and acceleration
levels. It is noted that the Agency is considering
rulemaking to restrict forces that may be applied
to the thorax by the shoulder belt of any seat
belt a.ssembly (41 FR r)4961 ; December 16, 1976).

With regard to the test procedures and condi-
tions that underlie the requirements of the stand-
ard, the agency proposed a temperature range
for testing that would be compatible with the

temperature sensitivity of the test dummy. The
test dummy specification (Part .572, '''' Anthropo-
m<>rphic Test Dummy, ^'' 49 CFR Part 572) con-
tains calibration tests that are conducted at any
temperature between 66° and 78° F. This is
because properties of lubricants and nonmetallic
parts used in the dummy will change with large
temperature changes and will affect the dummy's
objectivity as a test instrument. It was proposed
that the Standard Xo. 208 crash tests be con-
ducted within this temperature range to eliminate
the potential for variability.

The only manufacturers that objected to the
temperature specification were Porsche, Bayer-
ische Motoren Werke (BMW), and American
Motors Corporation (AMC). In each case, the
manufacturers noted that dynamic testing is con-
ducted outside and that it is unreasonable to
limit testing to tlie few days in the year when
the ambient temperature would fall within the
specified 12-degree range.

The commenters may misunderstand their cer-
tification responsibilities under the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Section
108(b)(2) limits a manufacturer's responsibility
to the exercise of "due care" to assure compliance.
The NHTSA has long interpreted this statutory
"due care" to mean that the manufacturer is free
to test its products in any fashion it chooses, as
long as the testing demonstrates that due care
was taken to assure that, if tested by NHTSA
as set forth in the standard, the product would
comply with the standard's requirements. Thus,
a manufactui'er could conduct testing on a day
with temperatures other than those specified, as
long as it could demonstrate through engineering
calculations or otherwise, that the difference in
test temperatures did not invalidate the test re-
sults. Alternatively, a manufacturer might
choose to perform its preparation of the vehicle
in a temporarily erected structure (such as a
tent) that maintains a temperature within the
specified range, so that only a short exposure
during acceleration to the barrier would occur
in a liigher or lower temperature. To assist any
such arrangements, the test temperature condi-
tion has been limited to require a stabilized
temperature of the test dununy only, just prior
to the vehicle's travel toward the barrier.

PART 572— PRE 15

EfFeclive: July 5, 1978

In response to an earlier suggestion from GM,
the agency proposed further specificity in the
clothing worn by the dummy during the crash
test. The only comment was filed by GM, which
argued that any shoe specification other than
weight would be unrelated to dummy perform-
ance and therefore should not be included in the
specification. The agency disagrees, and notes
that the size and shape of the heel on the shoe
can affect the placement of the dummy limb
within the vehicle. For this reason, the clothing
specifications are made final as proposed, except
that the requirement for a conforming "config-
uration" has been deleted.

Renault and Peugeot asked for confirmation
that pyrotechnic pretensioners for belt retractors
are not prohibited by the standard. The stand-
ard's requirements do not specify the design by
which to provide the specified protection, and the
agency is not aware of any aspect of the standard
that would prohibit the use of pretensioning de-
vices, as long as the three performance elements
are met.

"With regard to the test dummy used in the
standard, the agency proposed two modifications
of Standard No. 208 : a more detailed positioning
procedure for placement of the dummy in the
vehicle prior to the test, and a new requirement
that the dummy remain in calibration without
adjustment following the barrier crash. Com-
ments were received on both aspects of the
proposal.

The dummy positioning was proposed to elimi-
nate variation in the conduct of repeatable tests,
particularly among vehicles of different sizes.
The most important proposed modification was
the use of only two dummies in any test of front
seat restraints, whether or not the system is de-
signed for three designated seating positions.
The proposal was intended to eliminate the prob-
lem associated with placement of three 50th-
percentile male dummies side-by-side in a smaller
vehicle. In bench seating with three positions,
the system would have to comply with a dummy
at the driver's position and at either of the other
two designated seating positions.

GM supported this change, but noted that
twice as many tests of 3-position bench-seat ve-
hicles would be required as before. The company
suggested using a simulated vehicle crash as a

means to test the passive restraint at the center
seat position. The agency considers this ap-
proach unrepresentative of the actual crash pulse
and vehicle kinematic response (e.g., pitching,
yawing) that occur during an impact. To the
degree that GM can adopt such an approach in
the exercise of "due care" to demonstrate that
the center seating position actually complies, the
statute does not prohibit such a certification
approach.

Ford objected that the dummy at the center
seat position would be placed about 4 inches to
the right of the center of the designated seating
position in order to avoid interference with the
dummy at the driver's position. While the
NHTSA agrees that a small amount of displace-
ment is inevitable in smaller vehicles, it may well
occur in the real world also. Further, the physi-
cal dimensions of the dummy preclude any other
positioning. With a dummy at the driver's posi-
tion, a dummy at the center position cannot
physically be placed in the middle of the seat in
all cases. In view of these realities, the agency
makes final this aspect of the dummy positioning
as proposed.

GM suggested the modification of other stand-
ards to adopt "2-dummy" positioning. The
compatibility among dynamic tests is regularly
reviewed by the NHTSA and will be again fol-
lowing this rulemaking action. For the moment,
however, only those actions which were proposed
will be acted on.

As a general matter with regard to dummy
positioning. General Motors found the new speci-
fications acceptable with a few changes. GM
cautioned that the procedure might not be suf-
ficiently reproducible between laboratories, and
Chrysler found greater variation in positioning
with the new procedures than with Chrysler's
own procedures. The agency's use of the proce-
dure in 15 different vehicle models has shown
consistently repeatable results, as long as a reason-
able amount of care is taken to avoid the effect
of random inputs (see "Repeatability of Set Up
and Stability of Anthropometric Landmarks and
Their Influence on Impact Response of Automo-
tive Crash Test Dummies." Society of Automo-
tive Engineers, Technical Paper No. 770260,
1977). The agency concludes that, with the

PART 572— PRE 16

Effective: July 5, 1978

minor improvements cited below, the positioning
procedure should be made final as proposed.

The dummy is placed at a seating position so
that its midsagittal plane is vertical and longi-
tudinal. Volkswagen argued against use of the
midsagittal plane as a reference for dummy
placement, considering it difficult to define as a
practical matter during placement. The agency
has used plane markers and plane lines to define
the midsagittal plane and has experienced no
significant difficulty in placement of the dummy
with these techniques. For this reason, and be-
cause Volkswagen suggested no simpler orienta-
tion technique, the agency adopts use of the
midsagittal plane as proposed.

Correct spacing of the dummy's legs at the
driver position created the largest source of ob-
jections by commenters. Ford expressed concern
that an inward-pointing left knee could result in
unrealistically high femur loads because of
femur-to-steering column impacts. GM asked
that an additional 0.6 inch of space be specified
between the dummy legs to allow for installation
of a device to measure steering column displace-
ment. Volkswagen considered specification of
the left knee bolt location to be redundant in
light of the positioning specification for the right
knee and the overall distance specification be-
tween the knees of 14.5 inches.

The commenters may not have understood that
the 14.5- and 5.9-inch dimensions are only initial
positions, as specified in S8. 1.11. 1.1. The later
specification to raise the femur and tibia center-
lines "as close as possible to vertical" without
contacting the vehicle shifts the knees from their
initial spacing to a point just to the left and
right of the steering colunui.

As for GM's concern about instrumentation,
the agency does not intend to modify this posi-
tioning procedure to acconuiiodate instrumenta-
tion preferences not required for the standard's
purposes. GM may, of course, make test modi-
fications so long as it a.ssures, in the exercise of
due care, that its vehicles will comply when
tested in accordance with tiie specification by the
agency.

In the case of a vehicle which is equipped with
a front bench seat, the driver dummy is placed
on the bench so that its midsagittal plane inter-

sects the center point of the plane described by
the steering wheel rim. BMW pointed out that
the center plane of the driver's seating position
may not coincide with the steering wheel center
and that dummy placement would therefore be
unrealistic. Ford believed that the specification
of the steering wheel reference point could be
more precisely specified.

The agency believes that BMW may be de-
scribing otTset of the driver's seat from the steer-
ing wheel in bucket-seat vehicles. In the case of
bench-seat vehicles, there appears to be no reason
not to place the dummy directly behind the steer-
ing wheel. As for the Ford suggestion, the
agency concludes that Ford is describing the
same point as the proposal did, assuming, as the
agency does, that the axis of the steering column
passes through the center point described. The
Ford description does have the effect of moving
the point a slight distance laterally, because the
steering wheel rim upper surface is somewhat
higher than the plane of the rim itself. This
small distance is not relevant to the positioning
being specified and therefore is not adopted.

In the case of center- posit ion dummy place-
ment in a vehicle with a drive line tunnel. Ford
requested further specification of left and right
foot placement. The agency has added further
specification to make explicit what was implicit
in the specifications proposed.

Volkswagen suggested that the NHTSA had
failed to specify knee spacing for the passenger
side dummy placement. In actuality, the speci-
fication in S8. 1.11. 1.2 that the femur and tibia
centerlines fall in a vertical longitudinal plane
has the effect of dictating the distance between
the passenger dummy knees.

The second major source of comments con-
cerned the dummy settling procedure that assures
uniformity of placement on the seat cushion and
against the seat back. Manufacturers pointed
out that lifting the dummy within the vehicle,
particularly in small vehicles and those with no
rear seat space, cannot be accomplished easily.
While the NHTSA recognizes that the procedure
is not simple, it is desirable to improve the uni-
formity of dununy response and it has been ac-
complished by the NHTSA in several small cars
(e.g., Volkswagen Rabbit, Honda Civic, Fiat

PART 572— PRE 17

Effective: July 5, 1978

Spider, DOT HS-801-754). Therefore, the re-
quests of GM and Volkswagen to retain the
method that does not involve lifting has been
denied. In response to Renault's question, tlie
dummy can be lifted manually by a strap routed
beneath the buttocks. Also, Volkswagen's re-
quest for more variability in the application of
rearward force is denied because, while difficult
to achieve, it is desirable to maintain uniformity
in dummy placement. In response to the re-
quests of several manufacturers, the location of
the 9-square-inch push plate has been raised 1.5
inches, to facilitate its application to all vehicles.

A'^olkswagen asked with regard to SIO.2.2 for
a clarification of what constitutes the "lumbar
spine" for purposes of dummy flexing. This
refers to the point on the dummy rear surface at
the level of the top of the dummy's rubber spine
element.

BMW asked the agency to reconsider the
placement of the driver dummy's thumbs over
the steering wheel rim because of the possibility
of damage to them. The company asked for an
option in placing the hands. The purpose of
the specification in dummy positioning, however,
is to remove discretion from the test personnel,
so that all tests are run in tlie same fashion. An
option under these circumstances is therefore not
appropriate.

Ultrasystems, Inc., pointed out two minor er-
rors in 810.3 that are hereby corrected. The
upper arm and lower arm centerlines are oriented
as nearly as possible in a vertical plane (rather
than straight up in the vertical), and the little
finger of the passenger is placed "barely in con-
tact" with the seat rather than "tangent" to it.

Two corrections are made to the dummy posi-
tioning procedure to correct obvious and unin-
tended conflicts between placement of the dummy
thighs on the seat cushion and placement of the
right leg and foot on the acceleration pedal.

In addition to the positioning proposed. Gen-
eral Motors suggested that positioning of the
dummy's head in the fore-and-aft axis would be
beneficial. The agency agrees and has added
such a specification at the end of the dummy
settling procedure.

In a matter separate from the positioning pro-
cedure, General Motors, Ford, and Renault re-
quested deletion of the proposed requirement that
the dummy maintain proper calibration follow-
ing a crash test without adjustment. Such a
procedure is routine in test protocols and the
agency considered it to be a beneficial addition
to the standard to further demonstrate the cred-
ibility of the dummy test results. GM, ho-vcever,
lias pointed out that the limb joint adjustments
for the crash test and for the calibration of the
lumber bending test are different, and that it
would be unfair to expect continued calibration
without adjustment of these joints. The NHTSA
accepts this objection and, until a means for
surmounting this difficulty is perfected, the pro-
posed change to S8.1.8 is withdrawn.

In another matter unrelated to dummy posi-
tioning, Volkswagen argued that active belt sys-
tems should be subject to the same requirements
as passive belt systems, to reduce the cost differ-
ential between the compliance tests of the two
systems. As earlier noted the NHTSA has issued
an advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (41
FR 54961, December 16, 1976) on this subject and
will consider Volkswagen's suggestion in the con-
text of that rulemaking.

Finally, the agency proposed the same belt
warning requirements for belts provided with
passive restraints as are presently required for
active belts. No objections to the requirement
were received and the requirement is made final
as proposed. The agency also takes the oppor-
tunity to delete from the standard the out-of-date
belt warning requirements contained in S7.3 of
the standard.

RECONSIDERATION OF DOCKET 73-8;
NOTICE 04

The NHTSA has received two petitions for
reconsideration of recent amendments in its test
dummy calibration test procedures and design
specifications (Part 572, '■'•Anthropomorphic Test
Dummy,'' 49 CFR Part 572). Part 572 estab-
lishes, by means of approximately 250 drawings
and five calibration tests, the exact specifications
of the test device referred to earlier in this notice
that simulates the occupant of a motor vehicle
for crash testing purposes.

PART 572— PRE 18

Effective: July 5, 1978

Apart from requests for a technical change of
the lumbar flexion force specifications, the peti-
tions from General Motors and Ford contained a
repetition of objections made earlier in the rule-
making about the adequacy of the dummy as an
objective measuring device. Three issues were
raised : lateral response characteristics of the
dummy, failure of the dummy to meet the five
subassembly calibration limits, and the need for
a "whole systems" calibration of the assembled
dummy. Following receipt of these comments,
the agency published notification in the Federal
Register that it would entertain any other com-
ments on the issue of objectivity (42 FR 28200;
June 2, 1977). General comments were received
from Chrysler Corporation and American
Motors, repeating their positions from earlier
comments that the dummy does not qualify as
objective.

The objectivity of the dummy is at issue be-
cause it is the measuring device that registers the
acceleration and force readings specified by
Standard Xo. 208 during a 30-mph impact of the
tested vehicle into a fixed barrier. The resulting
readings for each vehicle tested must remain be-
low a certain level to constitute compliance.
Certification of compliance by the vehicle manu-
facturer is accomplished by crash testing repre-
sentative vehicles with the dummy installed.
Verification of compliance by the NHTSA is
accomplished by crash testing one or more of the
same model vehicle, also with a test dummy in-
stalled. It is important that readings taken by
different dummies, or by the same dummy repeat-
edly, accurately reflect the forces and accelera-
tions that are being experienced by the vehicle
during the barrier crash. This does not imply
tliat the readings produced in tests of two ve-
hicles of the same design must be identical. In
the real world, in fact, literally identical vehicles,
crash circumstances, and test dummies are not
physically attainable.

It is apparent from this discussion that an
accurate reflection of the forces and accelerations
experienced in nominally identical vehicles does
not depend on the specification of the test dummy
alone. For example, identically specified and
responsive dummies would not provide identical
readings unless reasonable care is exercised in the
preparation and placement of the dummy. Such

care is analogous to that exercised in positioning
a ruler to assure that it is at the exact point
where a measurement is to commence. No one
would blame a ruler for a bad measurement if it
were carelessly placed in the wrong position.

It is equally apparent that the forces and ac-
celerations experienced in nominally identical
vehicles will only be identical by the greatest of
coincidence. The small differences in body struc-
ture, even of mass-produced vehicles, will affect
the crash pulse. The particular deployment
speed and shape of the cushion portion of an
inflatable restraint system will also afi'ect results.

All of these factors would affect the accelera-
tions and forces experienced by a human occu-
pant of a vehicle certified to comply with the
occupant restraint standard. Thus, achievement
of identical conditions is not only impossible
(due to the inherent differences between tested
vehicles and underlying conditions) but would
be unwise. Literally identical tests would en-
courage the design of safety devices that would
not adequately serve the variety of circumstances
encountered in actual crash exposure.

At the same time, the safety standards must
be "stated in objective terms" so that the manu-
facturer knows how its product will be tested
and under what circumstances it will have to
comply. A complete lack of dummy positioning
procedures would allow placement of the dummy
in any posture and would make certification of
compliance virtually impossible. A balancing is
provided in the test procedures between the need
for realism and the need for objectivity.

The test dummy also represents a balancing
between realism (biofidelity) and objectivity
(repeatability). One-piece cast metal dummies
could be phuod in the seating positions and
instrumented to register crash forces. One could
argue that these dummies did not act at all like a
human and did not measure what would happen
to a human, but a lack of repeatability could not
be ascribed to them. At the other end of the
spectrum, an extremely complex and realistic
surrogate could be substituted for the existing
Part 572 dummy, which would act realistically
hut differently each time, as one might expect
different humans to do.

PART 572— PRE 19

EfFeclive: July 5, 1978

The existing Part 572 dummy represents 5
years of eflFort to provide a measuring instrument
that is sufficiently realistic and repeat able to
serve the purposes of the crash standard. Like
any measuring instrument, it has to be used with
care. As in the case of any complex instru-
mentation, particular care must be exercised in
its proper use, and there is little expectation of
literally identical readings.

The dummy is articulated, and built of ma-
terials that permit it to react dynamically, simi-
larly to a human. It is the dynamic reactions of
the dummy that introduce the complexity that
makes a check on repeatability desirable and
necessary. The agency therefore devised five
calibration procedures as standards for the eval-
uation of the important dynamic dummy response
characteristics.

Since the specifications and calibration proce-
dures were established in August 1973, a substan-
tial amount of manufacturing and test experience
has been gained in the Part 572 dummy. The
quality of the dummy as manufactured by the
three available domestic commercial sources has
improved to the point where it is the agency's
judgment that the device is as repeatable and
reproducible as instrumentation of such complex-
ity can be. As noted, GM and Ford disagree
and raised three issues with regard to dummy
objectivity in their petitions for reconsideration.

Lateral response characteristics. Recent sled
tests of the Part 572 dummy in lateral impacts
show a high level of repeatability from test to
test and reproducibility from one dummy to an-
other ("Evaluation of Part 572 Dummies in Side
Impacts"— DOT HS 020 858). Further modifi-
cation of the lateral and rollover passive restraint
requirements into an option that can be met by
installation of a lap belt makes the lateral re-
sponse characteristics of the dummy largely
academic. As noted in Notice 4 of Docket 73-8
(42 FR 7148; February 7, 1977), "Any manu-
facturer that is concerned with tlie objectivity of
the dummy in such [lateral] impacts would pro-
vide lap belts at the front seating positions in
lieu of conducting the lateral or rollover tests."

"Wliile the frontal crash test can be conducted
at any angle up to 30 degrees from perpendicular
to the barrier face, it is the agency's finding that

the lateral forces acting on the test instrument
are secondary to forces in the midsagittal plane
and do not operate as a constraint on vehicle and
restraint design. Compliance tests conducted by
NHTSA to date in the 30-degree oblique impact
condition liave consistently generated similar
dummy readings. In addition, they are consid-
erably lower than in perpendicular barrier im-
pact tests, which renders them less critical for
compliance certification purposes.

Repeatability of dwmmy calibration. Ford
questioned the dummy's repeatability, based on
its analysis of "i-ound-robin" testing conducted
in 1973 for Ford at thi-ee differeent test labora-
tories (Ford Report No. ESRO S-76-3 (1976))
and on analysis of NHTSA calibration testing
of seven test dummies in 1974 (DOT-HS-801-
861).

In its petition for reconsideration. Ford
equated dummy objectivity with repeatability of
the calibration test results and concluded "it is
impracticable to attempt to meet the Part 572
component calibration requirements with test
dummies constructed according to the Part 572
drawing specifications."

The Ford analysis of NHTSA's seven dummies
showed only 56 of 100 instances in which all of
the dummy calibrations satisfied the criteria.
The NHTSA's attempts to reproduce the Ford
calculations to reach this conclusion were unsuc-
cessful, even after including the H03 dummy
with its obviously defective neck. This neck
failed badly 11 times in a row, and yet Ford
apparently used these tests in its estimate of
56 percent compliance. This is the equivalent of
concluding that the specification for a stop watch
is inadequate because of repeated failure in a
stop watch with an obviously defective part. In
this case, the calibration procedure was doing
precisely its job in identifying the defective part
by demonstrating that it did not in fact meet the
specification.

The significance of the "learning curve" for
quality control in dummy manufacture is best
understood by comparison of three sets of dummy
calibration results in chronological order. Ford
in earlier comments relied on its own "round-
robin" crash testing, involving nine test dummies.
Ford stated that none of the nine dummies could
pass all of the component calibration require-

PART 572— PRE 20

Effective: July 5, 1978

ments. Wliat the NHTSA learned through
follow-up questions to Ford was that tliree of the
nine dummies were not built originally as Part
572 dummies, and that the other six were not
fully certified by their manufacturers as qualify-
ing as Part 572 dummies. In addition. Ford
instructed its contractors to use the dummies as
provided whether or not they met the Part 572
specifications.

In contrast, recent \HTSA testing conducted
by Calspan (DOT-HS-6-01514, May and June
1977 progress reports) and the results of tests
conducted by GM (USG 1502, Docket 73-8, GR
64) demonstrate good repeatability and reproduc-
ibility of dummies. In the Calspan testing a
total of 152 calibration tests were completed on
four dummies from two manufacturers. The
results for all five calibration tests were observed
to be within the specified performance criteria
of Part 572. The agency concludes that the
learning curve in the manufacturing process has
reached the point where repeatal)ility and repro-
ducibility of the dummy has been fully demon-
strated.

Interestingly, Ford's own analysis of its round-
robin testing concludes that variations among the
nine dummies were not significant to the test
results. At the same time, the overall accelera-
tion and force readings did vary substantially.
Ford argued that this showed unacceptable
variability of the test as a whole, because they
had used "identical" vehicles for crash testing.
Ford attributed the variations in results to
"chance factors," listing as factors placement of
the dummy, postural changes during the ride to
the barrier, speed variations, uncertainty as to
just what part of the instrument panel or other
structure would be impact loaded, instrumenta-
tion, and any variations in the dynamics of air
bag deployment from one vehicle to another.

The agency does not consider these to be un-
controlled factors since they can be greatly re-
duced by carefully controlling test procedures.
In addition, they are not considered to be un-
acceptable "chance factors" that should be elim-
inated from the test. The most important
advantage of the barrier impact test is that it
simulates with some realism what can be experi-
enced by a human occupant, while at the .same
time limiting variation to achieve repeatability.

As discussed, nominally identical vehicles are not
in fact identical, the dynamics of deployment
will vary from vehicle to vehicle, and humans
will adopt a large number of different seated
positions in the real world. The 30-niph barrier
impact recjuires the manufacturer to take these
variables into account by providing adequate
protection for more than an overly structured
test situation. At the same time, dummy posi-
tioning is specified in adequate detail so that the
manufacturer knows how the XHTSA will set
up a vehicle prior to conducting compliance test
checks.

^'■Whole systems'''' calibration. Ford and GM
both suggested a "whole systems" calibration of
of the dummy as a necessary additional check
on dummy repeatability. The agency has de-
nied these requests previously, because the dem-
onstrated repeatability and reproducibility of
Part 572 dummies based on current specification
is adequate. The use of whole systems calibra-
tion tests as suggested would be extremely expen-
sive and would unnecessarily complicate compli-
ance testing.

It is instructive that neither (leneral Motors
nor Ford has been specific about the calibration
tests they have in mind. Because of the variables
inherent in a high energy barrier crash test at
30 mph, the agency judges that any calibration
readings taken on the dummy would be over-
whelmed by the other inputs acting on the dummy
in this test environment. The Ford conclusion
from its round-robin testing agrees that dummy
variability is a relatively insignificant factor in
the total variability experienced in this type of
test.

GM was most specific about its concern for
repeatability testing of the whole dummy in its
comments in response to Docket 74-14; Notice
01:

Dununy whole body response requirements
are considered necessary to assure that a
dummy, assembled from certified components,
has acceptable response as a completed struc-
ture. Interactions between coupled components
and subsystems must not be assumed acceptable
simply because the components themselves have
been certified. Variations in coupling may
lead to significant variation in dummy response.

PART 572— PRE 21

EfFecHve: July 5, 1978

There is a far simpler, more controlled means
to assure oneself of correct coupling of compo-
nents than by means of a "whole systems" cali-
bration. If, for example, a laboratory wishes to
assure itself that the coupling of the dummy
neck structure is properly accomplished, a simple
statically applied input may be made to the neck
prior to coupling to obtain a sample reading, and
then the same simple statically applied input may-
be repeated after the coupling has been com-
pleted. This is a commonly accepted means to
assure that "bolting together" the pieces is prop-
erly accomplished.

Lmnbar spine flexion. The flexibility of the
dummy spine is specified by means of a calibra-
tion procedure that involves bending the spine
through a forward arc, with specified resistance
to the bending being registered at specified angles
of the bending arc. The dummy's ability to flex
is partially controlled by the characteristics of
the abdominal insert. In Notice 04, the agency
increased the level of resistance that must be
registered, in conjunction with a decision not to
specify a sealed abdominal sac as had been pro-
posed. Either of these dummy characteristics
could affect the lumbar spine flexion perform-
ance.

Because of the agency's incomplete explanation
for its actions. Ford and General Motors peti-
tioned for reconsideration of the decision to take
one action without the other. Both companies
suggested that the specification of resistance
levels be returned to that which had existed
previously. The agency was not clear that it
intended to go forward with the stiffer spine
flexion performance, quite apart from the deci-
sion to not specify an abdomen sealing specifica-
tion. The purpose for the "stiffer" spine is to
attain more consistent torso return angle and to
assure better dimimy stability during vehicle ac-
celeration to impact speed.

To assure itself of the wisdom of this course of
action, the agency has performed dummy cali-
bration tests demonstrating that the amended
spine flexion and abdominal force deflection
characteristics can be consistently achieved with
both vented and unvented abdominal inserts
(DOT HS-020875 (1977)).

Based on the considered analysis and review
set forth above, the NHTSA denies the petitions

of General Motors and Ford Motor Company for
further modification of the test dummy specifica-
tion and calibration procedures for reasons of
test dummy objectivity.

In consideration of the foregoing. Standard
No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208) is amended as pro-
posed with changes set forth below, and Part 572
(49 CFR Part 572) is amended by the addition
of a new sentence at the end of § 572.5, General
Description., that states: "A specimen of the
dummy is available for surface measurements,
and access can be arranged through : Office of
Crashworthiness, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590."

In accordance with Department of Transpor-
tation policy encouraging adequate analysis of
the consequences of regulatory action (41 FR
16200; April 16, 1976), the Department has eval-
uated the economic and other consequences of this
amendment on the public and private sectors.
The modifications of an existing option, the
simplification and clarification of test procedures,
and the increase in femur force loads are all
judged to be actions that simplify testing and
make it less expensive. It is anticipated that the
"two dummy" positioning procedure may occasion
additional testing expense in some larger vehicles,
but not the level of expense that would have
general economic effects.

The effective date for the changes has been
established as one year from the date of publica-
tion to permit Volkswagen, the only manufac-
turer presently certifying compliance of vehicles
using these test procedures, sufficient time to
evaluate the effect of the changes on the com-
pliance of its products.

The program official and lawyer principally
responsible for the development of this amend-
ment are Guy Hunter and Tad Herlihy, respec-
tively.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407); delegation of authority
at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on June 30, 1977.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator
42 F.R. 34299
July 5, 1977

PART 572— PRE 22

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 572— ANTHROPOMORPHIC TEST
DUMMIES REPRESENTING SIX-MONTH-OLD AND THREE-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN

(Docket No. 78-09; Notice 4)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice is issued in conjunction
with new Standard No. 213, Child Restraint
Systems, which requires child restraint systems to
be dynamically tested using anthropomorphic test
dummies representing 6-month-old and 3-year-old
children. This notice establishes the specifications
for the dummies to be used in the child restraint
testing. In addition, it sets performance criteria as
calibration checks to assure the repeatability of the
dummy's performance.

DATES: The amendment is effective upon publica-
tion in the Federal Register. December 27, 1979.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration should
refer to the docket number and be submitted to:
Docket Section, Room 5108, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Vladislav Radovich, Office of Vehicle
Safety Standards, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590
(202-426-2264)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

This notice amends Part 572, Anthropomorphic
Test Dummies, to establish specifications and per-
formance requirements for two test dummies, one
representing a 6-month-old child and the other
representing a 3-year-old child. This final rule is
issued to supplement new Standard No. 213, Child
Restraint Systems, published in the Federal
Register for December 13, 1979 (44 FR 72131).
Standard No. 213 evaluates the performance of
child restraints in dynamic sled tests using the
anthropomorphic test dummies whose specifica-

tions are established in this final rule. Restraints
recommended for children weighing 20 pounds or
less will be tested with an anthropomorphic
dummy representing a 6-month-old child and
restraints recommended for children weighing
more than 20 pounds, but not more than 50 pounds
will be tested with an anthropomorphic dummy
representing a 3-year-old child.

On May 18, 1978, NHTSA published a notice of
proposed rulemaking for the anthropomorphic test
dummy amendment (43 FR 21490) and the child
restraint standard (43 FR 21470). The comment
closing date for both notices was December 1,
1978. The May 18, 1978, proposal on the
anthropomorphic dummies noted that the calibra-
tion requirements proposed for the 3-year-old child
test dummy were tentative. The agency said it
would continue further testing on the calibrations
and the results of that work would be placed in the
public docket as soon as possible after the testing
was completed. Based on the testing, NHTSA
tentatively decided to make several minor
modifications to the test dummy specifications and
calibration requirements to improve the accuracy
of the test dummy as a tool for measuring the
performance of child restraints. A copy of the
modifications was placed in the public docket on
September 27, 1978, and the dummy manufac-
turers and child restraint testing facilities were
advised of the modifications. The tentative
modifications were published in the Federal
Register on November 16, 1978 (43 FR 53478).

At the request of the Juvenile Products Manufac-
turers Association, the agency extended the
comment closing date until January 5, 1979, for
the portions of the child restraint and test dummy
proposals dealing with testing with the
anthropomorphic dummies. NHTSA granted the
extension because manufacturers were reportedly
having problems obtaining the proposed test

PART 572-PRE 23

dummies to conduct their own evaluations. Based
on information gathered by the agency about the
availability of testing facilities and dummies, the
agency concluded that manufacturers could con-
duct the necessary testings before the extended
comment closing date.

On December 21, 1978, NHTSA made available
one of the agency's test dummies to General
Motors Corp. (GM) for the purpose of resolving
certain calibration problems GM reported it had
experienced with its own test dummy. All other
interested parties also were advised of the
availability of the NHTSA test dummy and informed
that NHTSA did not plan to issue a final rule on the
test dummy proposal until at least mid-summer.
The agency said it would review additional testing
material submitted to the docket before issuance of
the final rule. The final rule issuance date was
subsequently rescheduled for October 1979 in the
Department's March 1, 1979, Semi-Annual
Regulations Agenda (44 FR Part H, 38) and for
November 1979 in the August 27, 1979 Agenda (44
FR 50195).

Following issuance of the May 1978 notice of
proposed rulemaking, NHTSA conducted addi-
tional testing of the test dummies. This testing,
completed in July 1979, further confirmed the
results of the agency's prior testing which showed
the anthropomorphic dummies to be objective test
devices. The results of this testing were periodically
placed in the public docket so that all interested
parties could comment on them.

This final rule is based on the data obtained in
the agency's testing, data submitted in the com-
ments, and data obtained from other pertinent
documents and test reports. Significant comments
submitted to the docket are addressed below.

Infant Test Dummy

The infant test dummy is based on a simple
design representing the dimensions and mass
distribution characteristics of a 6-month-old child.
The test dummy is used to assess the ability of
infant restraints to retain their occupants and
maintain their structural integrity during dynamic
testing. Because of its construction, the dummy
cannot be instrumented to measure the forces that
would be exerted upon an infant in a crash.
NHTSA's tests have shown the infant dummy will
reliably and consistently represent the dynamics of
an infant during simulated impact tests.

GM, the only party to comment on the specifica-
tion for the infant test dummy, reported that it had
"no significant problem in building or verifying the
compliance of the dummy to the proposed
specification." To improve the durability of the
test dummy, GM recommended adding a wooden
form to the head to maintain its geometry and
using steel instead of lead for ballast in the test
dummy. Since these recommendations should not
affect the dummy's performance and should
increase its durability, NHTSA has adopted a
modified version of the proposed changes. The
changes add a plastic form to the dummy's head,
since a plastic form is easier to manufacture and
duplicate than a wooden form. In addition, a por-
tion of the ballast materials are now required to be
steel and aluminum.

The revised design drawings and a construction
manual for the infant dummy are available for
examination in the NHTSA docket section, which
is open from 7:45 a.m. to 4:15 p.m., Monday
through Friday. Copies of these documents can be
obtained from: Keuffel and Esser Co., 1512 North
Danville Street, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

3-Year-Old Child Test Dummy

The test dummy representing a 3-year-old child
is based on the Alderson Model VIP-3C test
dummy. It was chosen over the other available test
dummies representing a 3-year-old child, such as
the Sierra 492-03 test dummy, because it has more
complete design details, can adequately withstand
the test load imposed during impact testing, has
more accurate anthropometry and mass distribu-
tion, can be easily instrumented for testing, more
closely simulates the responses of a child during
impact testing and has more consistent head and
chest acceleration measurements during impact
testing.

As with the infant test dummy, the final rule
establishes a complete set of design specifications
for the 3-year-old test dummy. For the 3-year-old
test dummy, NHTSA has provided: a drawing
package containing all of the technical details of
the dummy parts and the stages of dummy
manufacture; a set of master patterns for all molded
and cast parts of the dummy; and a maintenance
manual containing instructions for the assembly,
disassembly, use, adjustment and maintenance of
the dummy. These materials will ensure that
manufacturers can accurately and consistently
produce the test dummy.

PART 572-PRE 24

The drawings and the maintenance manual for
the 3-year-old test dummy are available for
examination at the agency's docket section. Copies
of these drawings and the maintenance manual can
be obtained from the Keuffel and Esser Co., 1512
North Danville Street, Arlington, Va. 22201. In
addition, patterns for all the cast and molded parts
are available on a loan basis from the agency's
Office of Vehicle Safety Standards, at the address
given at the beginning of this notice.

Calibration Requirements

Unlike the infant test dummy, the 3-year-old
child test dummy can be instrumented with
accelerometers to measure the forces imposed on
the dummy during an impact. Thus, in Standard
No. 213, Child Restraint Systems, the 3-year-old
test dummy is used to measure the amount of head
and knee excursion and the magnitude of head and
chest acceleration allowed by the child restraint.

Since a test dummy is a complex instrument
required to measure important parameters, it is
essential that the test dummy be properly
calibrated to ensure accurate and repeatable
results. NHTSA has developed detailed test
dummy specifications and instrumentation
requirements to ensure that the test dummies are
as much as possible identically constructed and
identically instrumented. The agency also
developed calibration performance requirements
that the test dummy must meet in dynamic and
static tests. The calibration tests will determine
whether the test dummies are uniformly
constructed and properly instrumented.

In its comments, GM reported that it was unable
to calibrate its 3-year-old test dummies. As
mentioned previously, NHTSA loaned GM one of
the agency's test dummies for the purpose of
resolving the reported calibration problem. Using
the NHTSA test dummy equipped with NHTSA's
accelerometers, GM was able to meet the peak
resultant acceleration requirements set for the
dummy's head in specified pendulum impact tests,
but was not able to meet the lateral acceleration
requirement. When the same dummy was tested
with GM's accelerometers, the dummy did not
meet any of the head acceleration performance
requirements. In the case of the chest calibration
performance requirements, the accelerations
measured by GM test dummies and the NHTSA
test dummy, using both GM's and NHTSA's
accelerometers, were within the range set for peak
resultant and lateral acceleration.

GM also said that because the agency did not
define the term "unimodal" it was not certain that
the acceleration measurements that it made com-
plied with the requirement that the acceleration-
time curves for the head and chest impacts be
unimodal. To clarify the requirement, NHTSA has
defined unimodal in the final rule to mean an
acceleration curve that only has one prominent
peak and has specified that the measured
acceleration-time curve during the head and chest
impact testing need only be unimodal during a
short time period when the accelerations are above
a specified level.

GM attributed the calibration problem to
resonances in the head and chest of the test
dummies. (A resonance is a vibrational state that
can magnify the accelerations imposed on the test
dummy and thus prevent the accurate measure-
ment of those accelerations.) GM said that because
of the possible inaccurate measurements caused by
the resonances, the test dummy cannot be used as
an objective tool for assessing the performance of
child restraint systems.

The calibration testing done for the agency
indicates that the acceleration responses for the
head and chest pendulum impacts include a limited
amount of vibration. Such responses exist to some
extent in any acceleration measuring device and
are also found in similar pendulum impact tests of
the Part 572 adult test dummy. However, dynamic
sled tests of child test dummies in child restraint
systems have demonstrated that the test dummies
produce very repeatable results and do not show
the vibrations found in the more severe pendulum
impact tests. The agency's calibration tests also
show that the test dummies produce very
repeatable results. Even in GM tests of its three
test dummies equipped with GM's instrumenta-
tion, the test dummies produced repeatable
results. Such repeatability could not be obtained
with resonating systems. Based on a review of GM's
and the agency's test data, NHTSA concludes that
the GM calibration failures are not attributable to
resonances, but are very likely due to the
differences, discussed below, in the mounting of
the accelerometers in the GM test dummies.

NHTSA recognizes that because of different
instrumentation and test procedures, different test
facilities may obtain different results in what are
essentially the same tests. To reduce such
differences, NHTSA proposed requirements to
standardize the test and instrumentation pro-
cedures. In calibration tests conducted at Calspan

PART 572-PRE 25

Corporation the measurements of the peak resultant
head accelerations and the lateral head acceleration
were found to be close to the upper limits of the ten-
tative head calibration requirements (112 g peak
resultant acceleration and 5 g lateral acceleration)
proposed by the agency. To further accommodate
expected differences between different testing
facilities, NHTSA has decided to broaden the head
acceleration calibration requirements for peak re-
sultant head acceleration to 115 g's and for lateral
acceleration to 7 g's.

Instrumentation

Based on a review of GM's and the agency's test
data, NHTSA concludes that one of the significant
differences between NHTSA's and GM's test
dummy is the manner in which the accelerometer
mounting plate is attached to the head of the test
dummy. Finding what it thought was an incom-
patibility between the angle of the accelerometer
mounting plate bolt and the angle of the surface of
the plate that attaches to the dummy's head, GM
changed the angle of the surface in its test
dummies. However, NHTSA specified the
difference in the two angles for an important
reason. Having a difference in the angles allows
for a firmer attachment of the accelerometer
mounting plate to the dummy. The difference in
the firmness of the attachment of the
accelerometer mounting plate may account for the
additional acceleration that occurred in the head
calibration tests of the GM test dummies.

GM also asked the agency to set a torque
specification for the accelerometer mounting plate
bolt. In response to GM's request, the agency has
added a torque specification of 10 ft. lbs. to the
specifications set out in the maintenance manual
for the test dummy.

GM said that another possible source of the dif-
ference between the measurements it obtained
with its own test dummies and the measurements
it made with the NHTSA test dummies could be
due to differences in the type and location of the
accelerometers in the test dummies. GM noted that
the specifications proposed in the rule allow the
use of different types of accelerometers by allow-
ing a number of different accelerometer
placements within the test dummy.

As explained below, testing done for the agency
has shown that the use of different types of
accelerometers within the permissible locations
does not prevent the test dummy from producing
accurate and repeatable results. However, to

further reduce the possibility of test differences
due to accelerometer placement, the agency has
more specifically defined several of the permissible
accelerometer mounting locations.

Testing done for the agency at two different
facilities to develop the calibration requirements
used two types of accelerometers and different
accelerometer locations. That testing produced no
appreciable differences in test results and showed
that different facilities could obtain repeatable
results, when the accelerometers are properly
mounted.

The agency's test experience with the adult test
dummy also shows that minor differences in
accelerometer mounting locations do not affect the
ability of the test dummy to produce similar and
repeatable results. The number of permissible
accelerometer locations allowed for the adult test
dummy is in some cases larger than the number
permitted in the child test dummy. Yet no signifi-
cant differences in test results for the adult test
dummy have been encountered due to accelerometer
location.

GM's own test data also indicate that use of dif-
ferent types of properly mounted accelerometers and
different mounting locations produces only minor
variations in the measurements. GM tested
NHTSA's test dummy using two types of
accelerometers mounted at different locations within
the prescribed tolerances. The average measured
acceleration in the chest impact tests varied by only 4
percent between the two types of accelerometers. It
was only when GM used the improperly installed
accelerometer mounting block in the head impact
tests, discussed above, that GM obtained a 14 percent
difference in measured accelerations within the
NHTSA dummy using two types of accelerometers.

Calibration Procedures

GM also raised questions about the procedures
for conducting the chest and head calibration tests.
GM said that the sequence of procedures for posi-
tioning the dummy for the chest pendulum impact
test was ambiguous since it called for the test
dummy to be adjusted so that the area on the chest
of the dummy immediately adjacent to the impact
point is vertical. However, that surface of the
dummy is curved and has variable radii. GM also
pointed out that when the dummy is moved to the
more vertical position, the area that a pendulum
strikes the dummy also moves so that the portion
of the test dummy's chest which is too rigid might
be impacted. NHTSA has changed the dummy's

PART 572-PRE 26

positioning procedures so that a plane tangent to
the surface of the chest immediately adjacent to
the designated impact area is vertical. The posi-
tioning of the pendulum is also changed to ensure
that the pendulum consistently strikes the chest at
the designated point on the chest.

GM also raised questions about the positioning of
the pendulum for the head calibration impact tests.
The proposed requirement specified that the
impact point for the pendulum was to be measured
relative to the top of the dummy's head. GM said
that because of differences in the thickness and
shape of the dummy's skin, the location of the
impact point can vary. GM recommended deter-
mining the impact point relative to the head center
of gravity reference pins which protrude through
the test dummy's skin.

NHTSA has evaluated GM's proposed head
impact positioning procedure and decided to adopt
a modified version of it. A measurement made
from the head center of gravity pins will be used to
determine the head impact point to ensure that all
test dummies will be struck in the same location
during the head impact tests.

GM said that the lumbar spine calibration test
was ambiguous because it did not specify either the
direction in which the force was to be applied to the
lumbar spine or the location on the spine which is
to be used to define the direction of force applica-
tion. GM also pointed out that the procedures
erroneously set requirements for femur friction
plungers which are not included in the 3-year-old
test dummy. NHTSA has corrected the test
procedures to specify the direction of force
application and deleted the reference to friction
plungers.

GM also criticized ambiguities in the specifica-
tion for the amount of chest deflection. NHTSA
has reevaluated the need for a chest deflection
specification and has decided to eliminate the
requirement, since the chest acceleration test
should serve as an adequate calibration test of the
dummy's chest.

Repeatability

Ford, GM and the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association (MVMA) raised questions about the
ability of the 3-year-old test dummy to give
repeatable results in crash testing. MVMA proposed
that the agency conduct another series of tests to
determine the amounts of variances in test results
between the same dummy in several tests and
between different dummies in the same tests.

MVMA and Ford also recommended that the
additional testing also include testing of the
proposed Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
test dummy to determine if it would be an objective
test device. The agency has not conducted an
evaluation of the ECE test dummy since there are
no calibration requirements for that test dummy.
Without calibration requirements, there is no
means to ensure the accuracy of the measurements
obtained by the test dummy and therefore it
cannot be used as an objective test device.

The agency has already conducted three
separate research programs to evaluate the 3-year-
old test dummy as an objective test device. As
explained below, those programs have shown that
the test dummy is an objective device that
produces repeatable test results.

During 1977-78, the agency had simultaneous
research programs conducted at the University of
Michigan's Highway Safety Research Institute and
NHTSA's Vehicle Research and Test Center in
East Liberty, Ohio to develop and evaluate the
calibration performance requirements and test
procedures for the 3-year-old test dummy. Four of
the 3-year-oId test dummies were used in the
testing program. Two of the dummies were tested
by one laboratory and the other two were tested by
the other laboratory. Then the two sets of test
dummies were exchanged by the laboratories and
subjected to the same calibration tests. By setting
up the research program in this manner, the agency
was able to determine if the test procedures and
calibration performance requirements were
repeatable from test dummy to test dummy and
from test laboratory to test laboratory. The test
results from both research programs showed that
the calibration test procedures and performance
requirements produced repeatable results.

The repeatability of the test dummy was
reaffirmed in further testing conducted between
June 1978 and July 1979 at Calspan Corporation.
In that research program, four of the 3-year-old
test dummies were used with two different types of
child restraints— one shield type (Chrysler Mopar)
and one plastic shell with integral harness type
(GM Love Seat). Each of the four test dummies
was subjected to six sled tests at 30 mph in both
types of child restraints. The harness type
restraint was also subjected to 3 sled tests at 20
mph with the top tether strap unattached.

To determine the repeatability of the test
dummies, the head and chest accelerations and the
amounts of head and knee excursion experienced

PART 572-PRE 27

by the test dummies were analyzed. That analysis
showed that the amount of deviation measured by
the same dummy in the different tests was small
and similar in nature to the results obtained with
Part 572 test dummies representing adults, which
have been established as objective test devices.

In addition to examining the results obtained for
the same dummy in different tests, the research
program also examined the results for each of the
four 3-year-old dummies in the same test. Based on
previous testing of test dummies representing
adults, it was determined that if the absolute
deviation of the oberved test results for each per-
formance criteria, such as head acceleration, was
less than six percent from the mean results, then
the dummies had sufficient repeatability. In all but
one of the test results, the deviation from the mean
was less than six percent. The single exception
involved the amount of chest acceleration
measurered in the test dummies in the 20 mph
tests of an untethered harness-type restraint. In
that instance the deviation was only 7.7 percent.
The reason for the variation in that test is probably
due to the increased movement of the seat because
the tether strap was unattached, rather than due
to any variability in the test dummy.

Costs

The agency has considered the economic and
other impacts of this final rule and determined that
this rule is not significant within the meaning of
Executive Order 12044 and the Department of
Transportation's policies and procedures for
implementing that order. The agency's assessment
of the benefits and economic consequences of this
final rule are contained in a regulatory evaluation
which has been placed in the docket. Copies of that
regulatory evaluation can be obtained by writing to
NHTSA's docket section at the address given in
the beginning of this notice.

The cost of the infant test dummy is estimated to
be approximately $1,000. The 3-year-old test
dummy should cost approximately $4,000. The
materials used in the dummies are commercially
obtainable. The availability of the test dummy
drawing and other specifications means that any
manufacturer can produce its own test dummy and
does not have to purchase the test dummy from an
independent test dummy manufacturer.

Strollee, a child restraint manufacturer, and the
Juvenile Products Manufacturers Association
asked the agency to reconsider the calibration

requirements set for the 3-year-old dummy. They
argued that the cost of calibrating the test dummy
is approximately $800 to $1,100. Combined with
the cost of the sled testing, each test of a car seat
could cost approximately $2,000-$3,500. Such
costs "would certainly discourage a manufacturer
from testing frequently," Strollee said.

The calibration requirements set by this final
rule are essential to ensure that the test dummy is
an objective test device that will produce
repeatable results in dynamic sled tests. So that
the requirements would be practicable, the agency
established the minimum number of calibration
tests possible which would still ensure that the test
dummy is properly constructed and properly in-
strumentated. Each manufacturer, in the exercise
of due care, must determine how frequently it will
calibrate its test dummy and how frequently it will
run tests to determine its child restraint's
compliance with Standard No. 213.

In its own testing, the agency has used some test
dummies in as many as 15 tests over a 2-3 week
period without recalibrating them and has not
found any difference in their performance. With
other test dummies, the agency has found it
necessary to recalibrate them after several tests.
However, in its compliance testing the agency will
use properly calibrated dummies.

The principal authors of this notice are Vladislav
Radovich, Office of Vehicle Safety Standards, and
Stephen Oesch, Office of Chief Counsel.

In consideration of the foregoing, Part 572,
Anthropomorphic Test Dummies, of Title 49 of the
Code of Federal Regulations is amended as
follows:

1. A new subsection (c) is added . . . Subpart
A-General, Section 572.4 Terminology (49 CFR
572.4) to read as follows:

(c) The term "unimodal", when used in
Subpart C, refers to an acceleration-time curve
which has only one prominent peak.

2. A new Subpart C-Three Year Old Child, is
added ....

Issued on December 20, 1979.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

44 F.R. 76527
December 27, 1979

PART 572-PRE 28

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 572

Anthropomorphic Test Dummies
(Docket No. 78-9, Notice 5; Docket No. 73-8, Notice 9)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends Part 572. Anthro-
pomorphic Test Dummies, to allow the use of an
alternative chemical foaming agent for molding
the dummy's flesh parts. In response to a Ford
petition, the notice also makes a minor technical
amendment to modify one specification in the
calibration procedures for the neck of the test
dummy representing a 50th percentile male. The
effect of the latter amendment is to simplify the
calibration test.

DATES: The amendment is effective on June 16,
1980.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration should
refer to the docket numbers and be submitted to:
Docket Section, Room 5108, National Highway
Traffic Safety Adminstration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590. (Docket hours: 8:00
a.m. to 4:00 p.m.)

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Vladislav Radovich, Office of Vehicle
Standards, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration,
400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-2264)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice
amends Part 572, Anthropomorphic Test Dum-
mies, to modify the design specification for
molding the test dummy's flesh parts to allow the
use of an alternative chemical foaming agent,
"OBSH/TBPP," to the currently specified "Ni-
trosan." In response to a petition from the Ford
Motor Company, the agency is also making a minor
technical amendment to simplify the calibration
test for the neck used in the 50th percentile male
test dummy. The amendment deletes the current
specification and substitutes the specification used
in the calibration testing of the recently issued
three-year-old child test dummy (44 FR 76527,

December 27. 1979).

The agency published the proposed changes to
the flesh molding and neck calibration specifica-
tions in the Federal Register oi December 18, 1978
(43 FR 58843). Only one party, Ford Motor Co.,
commented on the proposed changes and Ford sup-
ported the adoption of both proposed changes.

Molding Specifications

The agency proposed the changes in the molding
specification because the sole manufacturer of
"Nitrosan," the currently specified chemical foam-
ing agent, has discontinued its production due to
the hazardous propensities of the compound dur-
ing its manufacturing process. Based on an exten-
sive research program to develop and test new
chemical foaming agents (which was fully de-
scribed in the notice of proposed rulemaking), the
agency found that test dummy flesh parts made
from "OBSH/TBPP" have comparable material
properties to those produced with "Nitrosan" and
are superior in some respects. Based on an evalua-
tion of the research results, the agency concludes
that flesh parts produced from "OBSH/TBPP" can
be used for all purposes for which test dummies
are required by the applicable safety standards
and the dummy performance will be equivalent to
the performance of dummies produced with
"Nitrosan." Therefore, the agency is amending the
regulation to allow the use of "OBSH/TBPP."

Drawings and specifications outlining the formu-
lations for molding dummy flesh parts with the
"OBSH/TBPP" compound are available for exam-
ination in NHTSA Docket 73-8 and Docket 78-9.
Room 5108. 400 Seventh Street. S.W.. Washington.
D.C. 20590. Copies of these drawings may also be
obtained from the Keuffel and Esser Company,
1513 North Danville Street. Arlington, Virginia
22201.

Neck Calibration Requirements
In response to a request from Ford, the agency

PART 572 -PRE 29

proposed an amendment to the pendulum impact
test specification established in section 572.7(b) for
the calibration of the 50th percentile male test
dummy. The amendment would have replaced the
current specification with the specification for
calibration testing established for the 3-year old
child test dummy.

The pendulum neck test found in Subpart B of
the standard for the 50th percentile male dummy
is intended to measure the bending properties of
the dummy's neck. The current test specifies that,
during the neck bending procedure, the pendulum
shall not reverse direction until "T = 123 ms." This
means that from the time the pendulum contacts
the arresting material which it must strike, the
pendulum cannot reverse direction for 123 milli-
seconds. The original intent of this requirement
was to negate the effects of arresting material
having rebound characteristics that could force
the pendulum to reverse its motion before the
bending properties of the neck could be measured.
Ford requested a change in this specification
because in certain instances the use of a special
apparatus may be required to hold the pendulum
arm for at least 123 milliseconds after the pen-
dulum has impacted the arresting material.

Research by NHTSA and the industry has
shown that when appropriate crushable materials
are used in pendulum impact tests, the pendulum
does not reverse its motion until the neck has
straightened out and the head's center of gravity
has returned to its original zero-time position
relative to the pendulum. At that time, all
measurements of the neck bending characteristics
are completed and the pendulum's motion there-
after is inconsequential. In light of this research,
the recent addition of Subpart C to Part 572,
specifying requirements for the 3-year-old child
dummy, modified the language concerning rever-
sal of the pendulum arm during the neck impact
test. Section 572.17 of that subpart specifies that
"the pendulum shall not reverse direction until
the head's center of gravity returns to the original
zero time position relative to the pendulum arm."
Under this requirement, a dummy user could only
use an arresting material for the impact test
whose rebound characteristics would not over-
come the pendulum's inertia before the head and
neck returned to the zero time position.

Since the specification in Subpart C of Part 572
represents a simplification of the pendulum

impact test specified in the current Subpart B,
without any degradation of performance
characteristics, the agency is amending section
572.7(b) of Subpart B to read as section 572.17(b) of
Subpart C.

Costs

The agency has considered the economic and
other impacts of this final rule and determined
that this rule is not significant within the meaning
of Executive Order 12044 and the Department of
Transportation's policies and procedures for im-
plementing that order. Based on that assessment,
the agency has concluded also that the economic
and other consequences of this proposal are so
minimal that a regulatory evaluation is not
necessary. The impact is minimal since there is no
estimated increase in the cost of the test dummies
due to the change in the foaming agent and neck
calibration specification. In addition, the amend-
ments would have no adverse environmental ef-
fects.

The engineer and lawyer primarily responsible
for this notice are Vladislav Radovich and
Stephen Oesch, respectively.

In consideration of the foregoing. Part 572,
Anthropomorphic Test Dummies, of Title 49 of the
Code of Federal Regulations is amended as
follows:

1. Technical drawing ATD-6070 incorporated
by reference in Section 572.15 of Subpart
C — 3-Year-Old-Child is amended to add the for-
mulation for "OBSH/TBPP" foaming compound.

2. Technical drawing ATD-7151 incorporated
by reference in Section 572.5 of Subpart B — 50th
Percentile Male is amended to add the formula-
tion for "OBSH/TBPP" foaming compound.

3. The last sentence of Section 572.7(b) of Sub-
part B — 50th Percentile Male is amended to read:

"The pendulum shall not reverse direction until
the head's center of gravity returns to the
original zero time position relative to the pen-
dulum arm."

Issued on June 9, 1980.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

45 FR 40595
June 16, 1980

PART 572 -PRE 30

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 572

Anthropomorphic Test Dummies Representing 6-month-old and

3-year-old Children

(Docket No. 78-09; Notice 6)

ACTION: Response to petition for reconsideration.

SUMMARY: This notice grants in part and denies in
part a General Motors (GM) petition for recon-
sideration of the 3-year-old test dummy require-
ments set in Part 572, Anthropomorphic Test
Dummies. GM said it could not calibrate its test
dummies because of resonances in the dummies,
which prevent accurate acceleration measure-
ments. NHTSA found that GM's calibration prob-
lems are due to its failure to comply with all of the
design specifications set for the dummy and its use
of single axis rather than triaxial accelerometers.
In another notice in today's Federal Register the
agency is proposing to require the use of triaxial
accelerometers. This notice also corrects typo-
graphical errors in the final rule.

DATES: The amendments are effective on June 26,
1980.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Vladislav Radovich, Office of Vehicle
Safety Standards, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-2264)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December
27, 1979, NHTSA published in the Federal
Register a final rule amending Part 572, An-
thropomorphic Test Dummies, to establish
specifications and performance requirements for
two test dummies, one representing a 6-month-old
child and the other representing a 3-year-old child
(44 FR 76527). The dummy is used in testing child
restraint systems in accordance with Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, ChUd
Restraint Systems. General Motors (GM) timely
filed a petition for reconsideration concerning the
specifications and performance requirements set

for the test dummy representing a 3-year-old child.
No other petitions were filed and GM raised no
issues concerning the specifications set for the test
dummy representing a 6-month-old child.

In its petition, GM again argued that the 3-year-
old test dummy is not an objective test device for
acceleration measurement because of resonances
in the test dummy. GM requested the agency not
to use the dummy as an acceleration measurement
device until the resonances are eliminated.

GM also asked the agency to revise its ac-
celerometer specifications to require the axes of
triaxial accelerometers to intersect at a single
point. GM said the change would reduce possible
variability between different types of accelerom-
eters. In addition, GM requested a further change
in the lumbar spine test procedures to permit the
use of either a pull or a push force during the spine
calibration tests.

GM also raised questions about the possible use
of different signal filtering techniques at different
test laboratories. GM said that the use of different
filters might account for differences between its
testing and testing done for the agency.

NHTSA has evaluated GM's comments and the
agency's responses to GM's petition are discussed
below. All requests that are not specifically
granted below are denied.

Signal Filtering

GM argued that one of the possible reasons for
the differences between the test dummy head
calibration test results at GM and other labora-
tories was the use of incorrect filters (devices used
in the electronic processing of the acceleration
measurements) by some laboratories. Part 572 re-
quires the acceleration measurements to be
filtered according to the Society of Automotive
Engineers Recommended Practice J211a. Both
Calspan Corporation and the agency's Vehicle
Research and Test Center (VRTC), which did

PART 572 -PRE 31

testing for NHTSA, used the required filter and
instrumented their test dummies with triaxial ac-
celerometers. The test results at VRTC were all
within the limits set by the agency.

The Calspan test results originally reported to
the agency were also within the limits. In recheck-
ing its data, however, Calspan determined that it
had made an error in calculating the peak result-
ant accelerations in the head calibration test. The
corrected data showed that in one of the four head
calibration tests the peak resultant acceleration
was 116 g's, which exceeds the 115 g limit set in
Part 572. To evaluate possible variability in the
processing of the data by different laboratories,
the agency also had HSRI and VRTC process the
Calspan data. For the tests which exceeded the
calibration limit, there was little variability be-
tween the different laboratories, with HSRI
measuring 118 g's and VRTC measuring 117.4 g's.

The dummies Calspan used in the calibration
testing were subsequently used in sled tests of
child restraint systems. In the sled tests, the dum-
mies provided consistent and repeatable accelera-
tion measurements. Since dummies that experi-
ence 118 g's in the head calibration test can pro-
vide consistent and repeatable acceleration
measurements, the agency, in a separate notice
appearing in today's Federal Register, is propos-
ing to increase the head resultant acceleration
calibration limit from 115 to 118 g's.

NHTSA has found that the University of Michi-
gan's Highway Safety Research Institute (HSRI),
which instrumented its dummies with single axis
accelerometers, did not use the filter required by
Part 572, but instead used a filter that deviates
from the required filter. To determine whether
the use of the HSRI filter made a difference in the
calibration tests conducted by that laboratory, the
agency had HSRI process the accelerations
recorded during its head calibration tests with the
correct filter. Using the correct filter, HSRI found
that in five of the eighteen head calibration tests
the peak resultant acceleration exceeded the
limits set in Part 572. In those five tests, the peak
resultant acceleration ranged from 115.9 to 119.1

g's.

The peak resultant accelerations and the shape
of the acceleration pulses in the HSRI tests that
exceeded the calibration limit were smaller than
and not the same shape as the measurements
made by GM in its tests, which also used test

dummies instrumented with single axis acceler-
ometers. In the two sets of data submitted by GM
to the docket, the peak resultant accellerations
ranged from 119 to 130 g's. In addition, the shape
of the GM head acceleration pulse was different
than the pulses measured in all the testing done
for the agency. In the GM acceleration pulse,
there is a brief secondary peak after initial peak is
reached. Based on the agency's testing of adult
test dummies, such secondary peaks are usually
indications of accelerometer vibration resulting
from improper installation.

The differences between the GM testing and
the testing done for the agency is not attributable
to the use of different filters. When all the test
data is filtered as specified in the standard, the
peak resultant accelerations measured by GM are
still greater than those obtained at the other
three laboratories. As explained below, use of
triaxial accelerometers, rather than the single
axis accelerometers used by GM and HSRI, will
provide repeatable, complying results in the head
calibration test.

Instrumentation

Part 572 allows the use of two different types of
accelerometers (single axis and triaxial) in the test
dummy and sets different axis intersection
requirements for each type of accelerometer. GM
asked the agency to apply the axis intersection re-
quirements set for single axis accelerometers to
triaxial accelerometers. It said such a requirement
would reduce the variability in test measurements
resulting from use of different types of accel-
erometers.

The agency's testing has demonstrated that
variability can be sufficiently controlled by use of
the existing specification with a triaxial ac-
celerometer. Testing done by GM has also shown
that the test dummy can be properly calibrated
with triaxial accelerometers. When GM tested one
of the agency's test dummies with GM's accel-
erometer mounting place and single axis acceler-
ometers, the peak lateral accelerations measured
in the test dummy's head exceeded the limits cur-
rently set in the regulation. Yet when GM tested
the same test dummy equipped with triaxial ac-
celerometers placed on the mounting plate re-
quired by the design specifications, the test dum-
my easily met the calibration requirements.
Therefore, rather than adopt GM's proposal, the

PART 572 -PRE 32

agency is proposing, elsewhere in today's Federal
Register, to require the use of only triaxial accel-
erometers.

Resonances

GM said that "the consistent lack of correlation
between dummy tests at General Motors and at
other laboratories" was attributable to resonances
in the test dummy. It said the dummy could not be
used as an objective test device until the
resonances were eliminated. As explained
previously, the variability between different test
laboratories can be controlled by the use of triaxial
accelerometers.

One reason for the "resonances" in the GM test
results may be GM's failure to use dummies that
fully comply with the agency's design specifica-
tions. The agency's review of some of the
blueprints used in the construction of the GM test
dummies revealed that GM did not use the ac-
celerometer mounting plate required by the
NHTSA design specifications. The mounting plate
used by GM was smaller and presumably lighter
than the plate specified by the agency. Use of a
smaller and lighter plate may have also con-
tributed to the higher acceleration readings ob-
tained by GM.

Thus, the agency denies GM's request not to use
the dummy for acceleration measurement and con-
cludes that the 3-year-old test dummy in-
strumented with triaxial accelerometers is an
objective test device for measuring accelerations
in child restraints.

Spine Calibration

The calibration requirements for the lumbar
spine of the test dummy specify the amount of flex-
ion the spine must experience when force is ap-
plied to it. The calibration procedures specify that
the applied force is to be applied as a pull force.
GM requested the agency to permit the use of a
"push" force saying that it "is more convenient to
apply in some test set-ups."

When the agency developed the spine calibra-
tion tests, both pull and push forces were used to
apply force to the spine. However, the testing
done by the Highway Safety Research Institute
(HSRI) found that use of a push force "proved to
be awkward and inconsistent." HSRI also found
that use of a pull force was simpler procedure and
provided consistent data. Based on the HSRI

testing, the agency has decided to deny GM's
request since the use of a pull force provides a sim-
ple, repeatable method to measure compliance.

Corrections

In the final rule issued on December 12, 1979,
NHTSA amended the instrumentation require-
ments for the chest to more specifically define
several of the accelerometers mounting locations.
The revised specifications inadvertently reversed
two of the axis mounting locations in the chest.
The specifications have been amended in this
notice to correct that error.

The test procedure for conducting the head im-
pact test set forth in the final rule contained a
typographical error. The tolerance for positioning
the test probe was listed as ± 1.1 inches. The
regulation has been amended in this notice to
specify the correct tolerance of ± 0.1 inches.

The performance requirement for the neck
calibration test was incorrectly listed as 84
degrees ± 18 degrees rather than the correct
figure of 84 degrees ± 8 degrees. The necessary
corrections have been made in this notice to the
regulation.

The principal authors of this notice are Vlad-
islav Radovich, Office of Vehicle Safety Standards,
and Stephen Oesch, Office of Chief Counsel.

In consideration of the foregoing, Subpart
C - 3-Year-Old Child of Part 572, Anthropomorphic
Test Dummies, of Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, is amended as follows:

1. Section §572. 1(c)(2) is amended to read as
follows:

(2) Adjust the test probe so that its longitudinal
centerline is at the forehead at the point of or-
thogonal intersection of the head midsagittal plane
and the transverse plane which is perpendicular to
the "Z" axis of the head (longitudinal centerline of
the skull anchor) and is located 0.6 ± 0.1 inches
above the centers of the head center of gravity
reference pins and coincides within 2 degrees with
the line made by the intersection of horizontal and
midsagittal planes passing through this point.

2. The first sentence of section §572.17(b) is
amended to read as follows:

(b) When the head-neck assembly is tested in ac-
cordance with paragraph (c) of this section, the
head shall rotate in reference to the pendulum's
longitudinal centerline a total of 84 degrees ± 8
degrees about its center of gravity, rotating to the

PART 572 -PRE 33

extent specified in the following table at each in-
dicated point in time, measured from impact, with
the chordal displacement measured at its center of
gravity.

3. Section §572.21(c) is amended to read as
follows:

(c) Accelerometers are mounted in the thorax
on the mounting plate attached to the vertical
transverse bulkhead shown in the drawing
subreferenced under assembly No. SA 103C 030 in
drawing SA 103C 001 so that their sensitive axes
are orthogonal and their seismic masses are posi-
tioned relative to the axial intersection point
located in the midsagittal plane 3 inches above the
top surface of the lumbar spine and 0.3 inches dor-
sal to the accelerometer mounting plate surface.
Except in the case of triaxial accelerometers, the
sensitive axes shall intersect at the axial intersec-
tion point. One accelerometer is aligned with its
sensitive axis parallel to the vertical bulkhead and
midsagittal planes, and with its seismic mass
center at any distance up to 0.2 inches to the left,
0.1 inches inferior and 0.2 inches ventral of the
axial intersection point. Another accelerometer is
aligned with its sensitive axis in the transverse

horizontal plane and perpendicular to the mid-
sagittal plane and with its seismic mass center at
any distance up to 0.2 inches to the right, 0.1 inches
inferior and 0.2 inches ventral to the axial intersec-
tion point. A third accelerometer is aligned with
its sensitive axis parallel to the midsagittal and
transverse horizontal planes and with its seismic
mass center at any distance up to 0.2 inches supe-
rior, 0.5 inches to the right and 0.1 inches ventral
to the axial intersection point. In the case of a
triaxial accelerometer, its axes are aligned in the
same way that the axes of three separate accel-
erometers are aligned.

Issued on June 17, 1980.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

45 FR 43352
June 17, 1980

PART 572 -PRE 34

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 572

Anthropomorphic Test Dummies
(Docket No. 78-09; Notice 8)

ACTION: Response to petitions for reconsidera-
tion, final rule and correction.

SUMMARY: This notice amends Subpart C of Part
572, Anthropomorphic Test Dummies, to specify
the use of a triaxial accelerometer in the test dum-
my representing a 3-year-old child. The use of a
triaxial accelerometer will eliminate calibration
problems associated with single axis accel-
erometers. The notice also denies petitions filed by
Ford Motor Company and General Motors Cor-
poration seeking reconsideration of the agency's
June 26, 1980 notice responding to a prior General
Motors Corporation petition for reconsideration.
Finally, the notice corrects a typographical error
in the agency's June 26, 1980 final rule.

DATES: The amendments are effective on
December 15, 1980.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration should
refer to the docket number and be submitted to:
Docket Section, Room 5108, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Vladislav Radovich, Office of Vehicle
Safety Standards, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590
(202-426-2264)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice
amends Subpart C of Part 572, Anthropomorphic
Test Dummies, to change several of the re-
quirements for the test dummy representing a
3-year-old child. The test dummy is used in testing
child restraint systems in accordance with Federal

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, Child
Restraint Systems.

The notice amends Subpart C of Part 572 to
specify the use of triaxial accelerometers, instead
of single axis accelerometers, in the head and chest
of the test dummy. In addition the notice increases
the upper limit for permissible resultant accelera-
tion in the head calibration test from 115 g's to 118
g's. The agency published a notice proposing these
changes in the Federal Register for June 26, 1980
(45 FR 43355). Only two parties, Ford Motor Com-
pany (Ford) and General Motors Corporation (GM),
submitted comments on the proposal. The final
rule is based on the data submitted in those com-
ments, data obtained in the agency's testing and
data obtained from other pertinent documents.
Significant comments submitted to the docket are
addressed below.

This notice also denies petitions filed by Ford
and GM seeking reconsideration of the agency's
June 26, 1980 notice (45 FR 43352) that granted in
part and denied in part a prior GM petition for
reconsideration.

Finally, this notice corrects a typographical er-
ror in an amendment made in the agency's June 26,
1980 notice (45 FR 43352) responding to a prior GM
petition for reconsideration.

Resonances

Ford and GM both agree with the agency that
the test dummy representing a 3-year-old child is
an objective test device for measuring the amount
of head and knee excursion that occurs in child
restraint system testing using the test dummy.
The fundamental disagreement stated in the Ford
and GM comments and petitions for reconsidera-
tion is whether the test dummy is an objective test
device for measuring accelerations in the dummy's
head and chest during child restraint testing. GM
argues that the test dummy is not an objective

PART 572 -PRE 35

device because of the presence of resonances in
the head and chest of the test dummy. Ford says
that the test dummy "may be a suitable measuring
device, when there is no head impact (such as in a
shoulder harness type of child restraint)" during
child restraint testing. It, however, argues that if
there is a head impact in the child restraint
testing, then the test dummy's head will resonate.

Ford and GM both argue that the resonances
can reinforce or attenuate the measurement of im-
pact forces on the test dummy. Thus, if the test
dummy does resonate, the acceleration measured
in the test dummy may not represent the actual
forces experienced by the test dummy.

Ford argues that the source of the resonance is
an oscillation of the urethane skull of the test dum-
my. Ford included with its petition and comments
on the June 26, 1980 proposal the results of several
tests in which it struck the head of the test dummy
with a rubber mallet. Ford said that regardless of
the direction of the impact, the head resonated
with a frequency of approximately 200 Hertz (Hz)
when it was struck.

The agency has reviewed the Ford and other
test data and concluded that the test dummy is an
objective test device that can be used for measur-
ing accelerations. As explained below, the
agency's conclusion is based on an analysis of the
structure of the test dummy's head and chest and
the relationship between that structure and the
impact response of the test dummy.

Many physical structures, such as the test dum-
my's head, have a natural or resonating frequency
at which they will vibrate when they are driven by
a force of the same frequency. When resonance
occurs, small variations in the applied force can
produce large variations in the measured accelera-
tion, thus preventing accurate measurement of the
acceleration. The resonance, however, will not
occur if the driving force is of a frequency that is
below the natural or resonating frequency of the
object being struck.

Analysis of the test dummy shows that the
natural or resonating frequency of the head is ap-
proximately 128 Hz, while the natural frequency of
the accelerometer attachment in the test dummy's
head is approximately 255 Hz. The natural
resonating frequencies of the test dummy's chest
and chest accelerometer attachment are approx-
imately 85 Hz and 185 Hz.

Impacts with hard and unyielding objects, such

as the unpadded portion of a car's instrument
panel, can create high frequencies, generally up to
1,000 Hz. Impacts with soft and yielding surfaces,
such as a padded child restraint, create low fre-
quencies, generally less than 50 Hz.

The test used in Standard No. 213 to evaluate
child restraints does not include impacts with hard
and unyielding surfaces. In Standard No. 213
testing, the child restraint is placed on a vehicle
seat and attached by a lap belt. There is no portion
of a vehicle's interior, such as an instrument panel,
placed in front of or to the side of the vehicle seat.
Thus, during the testing, the dummy will contact
the belts or padded surfaces of the child restraint.
Since the belts and padded surfaces are yielding
and energy-absorbing, contact with them will in-
volve impacts where the frequencies are well
below the natural or resonating frequency of the
test dummy's head and chest.

Ford raised the issue of whether contact be-
tween the head and arms of the dummy during the
testing might produce frequencies that will cause
the test dummy's head to resonate. Ford said that
it had experienced dummy head and arm contact in
some of its tests and resonance occurred.

The agency has conducted more than 150 tests
of child restraint systems. There have only been
2 tests in which the head of the test dummy struck
the toes and resonances occurred. The head-limb
contact occurred in those tests because of massive
structural failures in the child restraint system.

Although resonances did occur when the head
struck the toes, the validity of the acceleration
measurement in those tests is irrelevant for deter-
mining if the child restraint complied with Stand-
ard No. 213, Child Restraint Systems. The struc-
tural failure is, by itself, a violation of the stand-
ard. The agency had not found head and limb
contact affecting acceleration measurements in
any child restraint that maintained its structural
integrity during the testing.

In the past several years, the agency has con-
ducted 10 tests of the Ford TOT GUARD. In one of
those tests, the arm briefly touched the head,
but there was no effect on the acceleration
measurement. The dummy in those tests was posi-
tioned in accordance with the test procedure set
out in Standard No. 213. Since the test procedure
permits the limbs to be positioned so that they will
not inhibit the movement of the head or torso the
agency looked at the effect of positioning the dum-

PART572-PRE36

my's arm in different locations on the shield or the
side of the TOT GUARD. None of the different
arm positions resulted in head to arm contact af-
fecting acceleration measurement.

Triaxial Accelerometers

Part 572 currently allows the use of either triax-
ial accelerometers or single axis accelerometers to
measure accelerations in the head and chest of the
3-year-old child test dummy. The June 26, 1980
notice (45 FR 43355) proposed specifying the use of
only triaxial accelerometers in the test dummy to
eliminate calibration problems caused by single
axis accelerometers. The agency proposed only us-
ing triaxial accelerometers after GM was unable to
calibrate its test dummies with single axis ac-
celerometers. In GM's head calibration tests, the
peak resultant acceleration exceeded the upper
hmit set by the regulation.

GM agreed that use of a triaxial accelerometer
"may reduce the possibility of exceeding the peak
acceleration in the dummy calibration test." It,
however, argued that the use of triaxial ac-
celerometers will not solve the problem of
resonance. As previously explained, the types of
impacts experienced in child restraint testing will
not produce resonances. The purpose of requiring
the use of triaxial accelerometers is to enable
manufacturers to calibrate consistently their test
dummies within the acceleration limits set in the
regulation.

Ford argued that single axis accelerometers are
easier to work with, more reliable and more easily
repaired than triaxial accelerometers. The agency
is not aware of any data, and Ford supplied none,
indicating that triaxial accelerometers are less
reliable than single axis accelerometers. Contrary
to Ford's assertion, a triaxial accelerometer should
be easier to use. The axes and seismic mass center
of the triaxial acceleromter (Endevco model
7267C-750) currently used in dummy testing are
permanently fixed in a mounting block. With
single axis accelerometers, three separate ac-
celerometers must be positioned by each user on a
mounting block in order to instrument the dummy.
Thus the possibility of variation in mounting loca-
tion between different users is increased by the
use of single axis accelerometers.

Single axis accelerometers are more readily
repairable than triaxial accelerometers. The agen-
cy, however, has used triaxial accelerometers in

numerous dummy tests for several years and has
found that their repair experience is comparable
to single axis accelerometers.

Based on all these considerations, the agency
has decided to adopt the triaxial accelerometer re-
quirement as proposed.

Calibration Limit

To accommodate minor variation in test meas-
urements between different test laboratories, the
agency's June 26, 1980 notice (45 Fr 43355) pro-
posed to slightly increase the permissible result-
ant acceleration limit for the head calibration test
from 115 g's to 118 g's. Neither Ford nor GM op-
posed this change, so the agency is adopting it as
proposed. Although the agency is expanding the
upper limit of the calibration range, experience
with the Part 572 adult test dummy has shown
that manufacturers will develop production tech-
niques to produce test dummies that have accel-
eration responses that fall within the middle of the
specified calibration range.

Correction

The final rule established by the agency's June
26, 1980 notice (45 FR 43352) amended the head
calibration head test procedures. The notice in-
advertently made the amendment to section
572.1(c)(2) of Part 572 instead of to section
572.16(c)(2). This notice corrects that typograph-
ical error and makes the amendment to section
572.16(c)(2).

Costs

The agency has considered the economic and
other impacts of this final rule and determined
that this rule is not significant within the meaning
of Executive Order 12221 and the Department of
Transportation's policies and procedures imple-
menting that order. Based on that assessment, the
agency has concluded that the economic and other
consequences of this rule are so minimal that a
regulatory evaluation is not necessary. The impact
is minimal since the primary effect of this rule is to
bind the agency to using one of the two types of
accelerometers formerly permitted by the regula-
tion. The economic impact on manufacturers choos-
ing to purchase triaxial accelerometers needed to
instrument the dummy is approximately $2,500.

The agency finds, for good cause shown, that it
is in the public interest that the amendments made

PART 572 -PRE 37

by this notice have an immediate effective date.
The immediate effective date is needed since the
test dummy will be used in conducting compliance
tests for Standard No. 213, Child Restraint Sys-
tems, which goes into effect on January 1, 1981.

The engineer and lawyer primarily responsible
for this notice are Vladislav Radovich and Stephen
Oesch, respectively.

In consideration of the foregoing. Subpart C of
Part 572, Anthropomorphic Test Dummies, of Ti-
tle 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations is revised
to read as follows:

1. The first sentence of section 572.16(b) is re-
vised to read as follows:

(b) When the head is impacted in accordance
with paragraph (c) of this section by a test probe
conforming to §572.21{a) at 7 fps., the peak result-
ant acceleration measured at the location of the
accelerometer mounted in the headform in accord-
ance with §572.21(b) shall be not less than 95g and
not more than 118g.

2. Section 572.21(b) is revised to read as follows:
(b) A triaxial accelerometer is mounted in the

head on the mounting block (A/310) located on the
horizontal transverse bulkhead as shown in the
drawings subreferenced under assembly SA 103C
010 so that its seismic mass centers are positioned
as specified in this paragraph relative to the head
accelerometer reference point located at the in-
tersection of a line connecting the longitudinal
centerlines of the transfer pins in the sides of the
dummy head with the midsagittal plane of the
dummy head. The triaxial accelerometer is aligned
with one sensitive axis parallel to the vertical
bulkhead and midsagittal plane and its seismic
mass center is located 0.2 inches dorsal to and 0.1
inches inferior to the head accelerometer ref-
erence point. Another sensitive axis of the triaxial
accelerometer is aligned with the horizontal plane
and is perpendicular to the midsagittal plane and
its seismic mass center is located 0.1 inch inferior
to, 0.4 inches to the right of and 0.9 inch dorsal
to the head accelerometer reference point. The
third sensitive axis of the triaxial accelerometer is
aligned so that it is parallel to the midsagittal and
horizontal planes and its seismic mass center is
located 0.1 inches inferior to, 0.6 inches dorsal to
and 0.4 inches to the right of the head accelerome-
ter reference point. All seismic mass centers shall
be positioned within ± 0.05 inches of the specified
locations.

3. Section 572.21(c) is revised to read as follows:
(c) A triaxial accelerometer is mounted in the

thorax on the mounting plate attached to the ver-
tical transverse bulkhead shown in the drawing
subreferenced under assembly No. SA 103C 030 in
drawing SA 103C 001 so that its seismic mass
centers are positioned as specified in this
paragraph relative to the thorax accelerometer
reference point located in the midsagittal plane 3
inches above the top surface of the lumbar spine
and 0.3 inches dorsal to the accelerometer mount-
ing plate surface. The triaxial accelerometer is
aligned so that one sensitive axis is parallel to the
vertical bulkhead and midsagittal planes and its
seismic mass center is located 0.2 inches to the left
of, 0.1 inches inferior to and 0.2 inches ventral to
the thorax accelerometer reference point. Another
sensitive axis of the triaxial accelerometer is
aligned so that it is in the horizontal transverse
plane and perpendicular to the midsagittal plane
and its seismic mass center is located 0.2 inches to
the right of, 0.1 inches inferior to and 0.2 inches
ventral to the thorax accelerometer reference
point. The third sensitive axis of the triaxial ac-
celerometer is aligned so that it is parallel to the
midsagittal and horizontal planes and its seismic
mass center is located 0.2 inches superior to, 0.5
inches to the right of and 0.1 inches ventral to the
thorax accelerometer reference point. All seismic
mass centers shall be positioned within ± 0.05
inches of the specified locations.

4. The document amending Subpart C — Three-
Year-Old Child of Part 572, Anthropomorphic Test
Dummies, of Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations published in the Federal Register of
June 26, 1980 as 45 FR 43352 is corrected by
changing the reference to "Section 571.1(c)(2)"
made in the first amendment to the regulation set
out on page 43353 to read "572.16(c)(2)."

Issued on December 8, 1980.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

45 FR 82265
December 15, 1980

PART 572 -PRE 38

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 572

Anthropomorphic Test Dummies
[Docket No. 85-05; Notice 1]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This document amends regulations
concerning the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's specifications for anthropomor-
phic test dummies by revising sections that state
where copies of drawings may be obtained.

EFFECTIVE DATE: June 19, 1985.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The purpose
of this notice is to amend Part 572 of Chapter V of
Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations by revising
§§ 572.5(a), 572.15(an), and 572.25(a), which state
where copies of drawings and a construction
manual describing the materials and the pro-
cedures involved in the manufacturing of an-
thropomorphic dummies may be obtained. The
amendment changes the supply source for the
drawings and manual from Keuffel and Esser
Company to Rowley-Scher Reprographics, Incor-
porated. This revision is required because of the
sale of the Keuffel and Esser Company reproduc-
tion facilities to Rowley-Scher Reprographics, In-
corporated.

The amendment to Part 572 as set forth below is
technical in nature and does not alter existing
obligations. This notice simply provides the correct
address for obtaining copies of drawings and the
construction manuals. The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration therefore finds for
good cause that this amendment may be made ef-
fective without notice and opportunity for com-
ment, may be made effective within 30 days after
publication in the Federal Register, and is not sub-
ject to the requirements of Executive Order 12291.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR Part
572 is amended as follows:

1. In § 572.5, paragraph (a) is revised to read as
follows: § 572.5 General description.

(a) The dummy consists of the component assem-
blies specified in Figure 1, which are described in
their entirety by means of approximately 250
drawings and specifications that are grouped by
component assemblies under the following nine
headings:

SA 150 M070-Right arm assembly

SA 150 M071-Left arm assembly

SA 150 M050— Lumbar spine assembly

SA 150 M060— Pelvis and abdomen assembly

SA 150 M080-Right leg assembly

SA 150 MOB 1 -Left leg assembly

SA 150 MOlO-Head assembly

SA 150 M020-Neck assembly

SA 150 M030-Shoulder-thorax assembly

The drawings and specifications are incorporated
in this Part by reference to the nine headings, and
are available for examination in Docket 73-8,
Room 5109, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C., 20590. Copies may be obtained
from Rowley-Scher Reprographics, Inc., 1216 K
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20005, attention
Mr. Allan Goldberg and Mr. Mark Krysinski ((202)
628-6667). The drawings and specifications are
subject to changes, but any change will be ac-
complished by appropriate administrative pro-
cedures, will be announced by publication in the
Federal Register, and will be available for ex-
amination and copying as indicated in this
paragraph. The drawings and specifications are
also on file in the reference library of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Services,
General Services Administration, Washington,
D.C.

PART 572-PRE 39

2. In § 572.15, paragraph (a) is revised to read as
follows: § 572.15 General description.

(a) (1) The dummy consists of the component
assemblies specified in drawing SA 103C 001,
which are described in their entirety by means of
approximately 122 drawings and specifications
that are grouped by component assemblies under
the following thirteen headings:

SA 103C 010 Head Assembly
SA 103C 020 Neck Assembly
SA 103C 030 Torso Assembly
SA 103C 041 Upper Arm Assembly Left
SA 103C 042 Upper Arm Assembly Right
SA 103C 051 Forearm Hand Assembly Left
SA 103C 052 Forearm Hand Assembly Right
SA 103C 061 Upper Leg Assembly Left
SA 103C 062 Upper Leg Assembly Right
SA 103C 071 Lower Leg Assembly Left
SA 103C 072 Lower Leg Assembly Right
SA 103C 081 Foot Assembly Left
SA 103C 082 Foot Assembly Right

The drawings and specifications are incorporated
in this Part by reference to the thirteen headings
and are available for examination in Docket 78-09,
Rm 5109, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington,
D.C., 20590. Copies may be obtained from Rowley-
Scher Reprographics, Inc., 1216 K Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C., 20005, attention Mr. Allan
Goldberg and Mr. Mark Krysinski ((202)
628-6667).

(3) An Operation and Maintenance Manual
(dated May 28, 1976, Contract No. DOT-
HS-6-01294) with instructions for the use and
maintenance of the test dummies is incorporated
in this Part by reference. Copies of the manual can
be obtained from Rowley-Scher Reprographics, Inc.
All provisions of this manual are valid unless
modified by this regulation. This document is
available for examination in Docket 78-09.

3. In § 572.25, paragraph (a) revised to read as
follows: § 572.25 General description.

(a) The infant dummy is specified in its entirety
by means of 5 drawings (No. SA 1001 001) and a
construction manual which describe in detail the
materials and the procedures involved in the
manufacturing of this dummy. The drawings and
the manual are incorporated in this Part by
reference and are available for examination in
Docket 78-09, Room 5109, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C., 20590. Copies may be ob-
tained from Rowley-Scher Reprographics, Inc.,
1216 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20005, at-
tention Mr. Allan Goldberg and Mr. Mark Krysin-
ski ((202) 628-6667). The drawings and the manual
are subject to changes, but any change will be ac-
complished by appropriate administrative pro-
cedures, will be announced by publication in the
Federal Register, and will be available for ex-
amination and copying as indicated in this
paragraph. The drawings and manual are also on
file in the reference library of the Federal Register,
National Archives and Records Services, CJeneral
Services Administration, Washington, D.C.

Issued on April 17, 1985

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

50 F.R. 25422
June 19, 1985

PART 572-PRE 40

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 572

Anthropomorphic Test Dummies
(Docket No. 74-14; Notice 45 )

ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY; This notice adopts the Hybrid III test
dummy as an alternative to the Part 572 test dummy
in testing done in accordance with Standard No. 208,
Occupant Crash Protection. The notice sets forth the
specifications, instrumentation, calibration test pro-
cedures, and calibration performance criteria for the
Hybrid HI test dummy. The notice also amends
Standard No. 208 so that effective October 23, 1986,
manufacturers have the option of using either the
existing Part 572 test dummy or the Hybrid HI test
dummy until August 31, 1991. As of September 1,
1991, the Hybrid III will replace the Part 572 test
dummy and be used as the exclusive means of deter-
mining a vehicle's conformance with the perfor-
mance requirements of Standard No. 208.

The notice also establishes a new performance
criterion for the chest of the Hybrid III test dum-
my which will limit chest deflection. The new chest
deflection limit applies only to the Hybrid HI since
only that test dummy has the capability to measure
chest deflection.

These amendments enhance vehicle safety by per-
mitting the use of a more advanced test dummy
which is more human-like in response than the cur-
rent test dummy. In addition, the Hybrid HI test
dummy is capable of making many additional
sophisticated measurements of the potential for
human injury in a frontal crash.

DATES: The notice adds a new Subpart E to Part
572 effective on October 23, 1986.

This notice also amends Standard No. 208 so that
effective October 23, 1986, manufacturers have the
option of using either the existing Part 572 test
dummy or the Hybrid HI test dummy until August
31, 1991. As of September 1, 1991, the Hybrid HI
will replace the Part 572 test dummy and be used
as the exclusive means of determining a vehicle's
conformance with the performance requirements of
Standard No. 208. The incorporation by reference

of certain publications listed in the regulation is ap-
proved by the Director of the Federal Register as
of October 23, 1986.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In December
1983, General Motors (GM) petitioned the agency to
amend Part 572, Anthropomorphic Test Dummies,
to adopt specifications for the Hybrid HI test dum-
my. GM also petitioned for an amendment of Stand-
ard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, to allow the
use of the Hybrid III as an alternative test device
for compliance testing. The agency granted GM's
petition on July 20, 1984. The agency subsequently
received a petition from the Center for Auto Safety
to propose making Standard No. 208's existing in-
jury criteria more stringent for the Hybrid HI and
to establish new injury criteria so as to take advan-
tage of the Hybrid Ill's superior measurement
capability. The agency granted the Center's petition
on September 17, 1984. On April 12, 1985 (50 FR
14602), NHTSA proposed amendments to Part 572
and Standard No. 208 that were responsive to the
petitioners and which, in the agency's judgment,
would enhance motor vehicle safety. Twenty-eight
individuals and companies submitted comments on
the proposed requirements. This notice presents the
agency's analysis of the issues raised by the com-
menters. The agency has decided to adopt the use
of the Hybrid HI test dummy and some of the pro-
posed injury criteria. The agency has also decided
to issue another notice on the remaining injury
criteria to gain additional information about the
potential effects of adopting those criteria.

This notice first discusses the technical specifica-
tions for the Hybrid III, its calibration requirements,
its equivalence with the existing Part 572 test
dummy, and the applicable injury criteria. Finally,
it discusses the test procedure used to position the
dimimy for Standard No. 208 compliance testing and
the economic and other effects of this rule.

PART 572-PRE 41

Test Dummy Drawings and Specifications

Test dummies are used as human surrogates for
evaluation of the severity of injuries in vehicle
crashes. To serve as an adequate surrogate, a test
dummy must be capable of simulating human impact
responses. To serve as an objective test device, the
test dummy must be adequately defined through
technical drawings and performance specifications
to ensure uniformity in construction, impact
response, and measurement of injury in identical
crash conditions.

Virtually all of the commenters, w^ith the excep-
tion of GM, said that they have not had sufficient
experience with the Hybrid III to offer comments
on the validity of the technical specifications for the
test dummy. Since the issuance of the notice, GM
has provided additional technical drawings and a
Society of Automotive Engineers-developed user's
manual to further define the Hybrid HI. These new
drawings do not alter the basic nature of the test
dummy, but instead provide additional information
which will enable users to make sure that they have
a correctly designed and correctly assembled test
dummy. The user's manual provides information on
the inspection, assembly, disassembly, and use of the
test dummy. Having the user's manual available will
assist builders and users of the Hybrid III in pro-
ducing and using the test dummy. GM also provided
information to correct the misnumbering of several
technical drawings referenced in the notice.

In addition, the agency has reviewed the proposed
drawings and specifications. While NHTSA believes
the proposed drawings are adequate for producing
the test dummy, the agency has identified and
obtained additional information which should make
production and use of the test dummy even more ac-
curate. For example, the agency has obtained infor-
mation on the range of motions for each moving
body part of the test dummy. Finally, to promote
the ease of assembly, NHTSA has made arrange-
ments with GM to ensure that the molds and pat-
terns for the test dummy are available to all in-
terested parties. Access to the molds will assist other
potential builders and users of the Hybrid HI since
it is difficult to specify all of the details of the various
body contours solely by technical drawings.

The agency has adopted the new drawings and
user manual in this rule and has made the necessary
corrections to the old drawings. The agency believes
that the available drawings and technical specifica-
tions are more than sufficient for producing,
assembling, and using the Hybrid III test dummy.

Commsrcial Availability of the Hybrid III
A number of commenters raised questions about
the commercial availability of the Hybrid III test
dummy, noting problems they have experienced in
obtaining calibrated test dummies and the in-
strumentation for the neck and lower leg of the
Hybrid III. For example, Chrysler said that it had
acquired two Hybrid III test dummies, but has been
unable to obtain the lower leg and neck instrumen-
tation for five months. Likewise, Ford said that it
has been imable to obtain the knee displacement and
chest deflection measurement devices for the Hybrid
HI. It also said that of the test dummies it had
received, none had sufficient spine stiffness to meet
the Hybrid HI specifications. Ford claimed to have
problems in retaining a stable dummy posture which
would make it difficult to carry out some of the
specified calibration tests. Subsequent investigation
showed that the instability was caused by out-of-
specification rubber hardness of the lumbar spine,
and was eliminated when spines of correct hardness
were used. In addition. Ford said that the necks and
ribs of the test dummy would not pass the proposed
calibration procedures. Finally, Ford said that the
equipment needed for calibrating the dummy is not
commercially available.

Although the commenters indicated they had ex-
perienced difficulty in obtaining the instrumentation
for the Hybrid Ill's neck and lower legs, they did
not indicate that there is any problem in obtaining
the instrumentation needed to measure the three in-
jury criteria presently required by Standard No. 208,
the head injury criterion, chest acceleration, and
femur loading and which are being adopted by this
rule for the Hybrid HI. For example, Volkswagen
said it had obtained Hybrid HI test dummies with
sufficient instrumentation to measure the same in-
jury criteria as with the Part 572. VW did say it had
ordered the additional test devices and instrumen-
tation for the Hybrid III but was told the instrumen-
tation would not be available for six months.

The agency notes that there are now two commer-
cial suppliers of the Hybrid HI test dummy. Alder-
son Research Labs (ARL) and Humanoid Systems.
Humanoid has built nearly 100 test dummies and
ALR has produced five prototype test dummies as
of the end of December 1985. Both manufacturers
have indicated that they are now capable of produc-
ing sufficient Hybrid His to meet the demand for
those dummies. For example, Humanoid Systems
said that while the rate of production is dependent
on the number of orders, generally three test dum-
mies per week are produced. Thus, in the case of the
basic test dummy, there appears to be sufficient
commercial capacity to provide sufficient test dum-
mies for all vehicle manufacturers.

PART 572-PRE 42

As to test dummy instrumentation, the agency is
aware that there have been delays in obtaining the
new neck, thorax, and lower leg instrumentation for
the Hybrid III. However, as Humanoid commented,
while there have been delays, the supplies of the
needed parts are expected to increase. Even if the
supply of the lower leg instrumentation is slow to
develop, this will not pose a problem, since the
agency is not adopting, at this time, the proposed
lower leg injury criteria. In the case of the neck in-
strumentation, the supply problem should be
minimized because each test facility will only need
one neck transducer to calibrate all of its test dum-
mies. The neck instrumentation will not be needed
for a manufacturer's crash testing since at this time,
the agency is not adopting any neck injury criteria.
In the case of the instrumentation for measuring
thoracic deflection, the supplier has indicated that
it can deliver the necessary devices within 3 months
of the time an order is placed. As to Ford's comment
about calibration test equipment, the agency notes
that current equipment used for calibrating the ex-
isting Part 572 test dummy can be used, with minor
modification, to calibrate the Hybrid III test dummy.

Calibration Requirements
In addition to having complete technical drawings
and specifications, a test dummy must have ade-
quate calibration test procedures. The calibration
tests involve a series of static and dynamic tests of
the test dummy components to determine whether
the responses of the test dummy fall within specified
performance requirements for each test. The testing
involves instrumenting the head, thorax and femurs
to measure the test dummy's responses. In addition,
there are tests of the neck, whose structural prop-
erties may have considerable influence on the
kinematics and impact responses of the instru-
mented head. Those procedures help ensure that the
test dummy has been properly assembled and that,
as assembled, it will provide repeatable and
reproducible results in crash testing. (Repeatability
refers to the ability of the same test dummy to pro-
duce the same results when subjected to several
identical tests. Reproducibility refers to the ability
of one test dummy to provide the same results as
another test dummy built to the same specifications.)

Lumbar Spine Calibration Test

The technical specifications for the Hybrid HI set
out performance requirements for the hardness of
the rubber used in the lumbar spine to ensure that
the spine will have appropriate rigidity. NHTSA's
test data show that there is a direct relationship be-
tween rubber hardness and stiffness of the spine and

that the technical specification on hardness is suffi-
cent to ensure appropriate spine stiffness. Accord-
ingly, the agency believes that a separate calibra-
tion test for the lumbar spine is not necessary.
Humanoid supported the validity of relying on the
spine hardness specification to assure adequate
stability of the dummy's posture, even though it
found little effect on the dummy's impact response.
Humanoid's support for this approach was based on
tests of Hybrid III dummies which were equipped
with a variety of lumbar spines having different
rubber hardnesses.

Subsequent to issuance of the notice, the agency
has continued its testing of the Hybrid III test
dummy. Through that testing, the agency found that
commercially available necks either cannot meet or
cannot consistently meet all of the calibration tests
originally proposed for the neck. To further evaluate
this problem, NHTSA and GM conducted a series
of round robin tests in which a set of test dummies
were put through the calibration tests at both GM's
and NHTSA's test laboratories.

The test results, which were placed in the docket
after the tests were completed, showed that none
of the necks could pass all of the originally specified
calibration tests.

In examining the test data, the agency determined
that while some of the responses of the necks fell
slightly outside of the performance corridors
proposed in the calibration tests, the responses of
the necks showed a relatively good match to existing
biomechanical data on human neck responses. Thus,
while the necks did not meet all of the calibration
tests, they did respond as human necks are expected
to respond.

In discussions with GM, the agency learned that
the calibration performance requirements were
originally established in 1977 based on the responses
of three prototype Hybrid III necks. GM first
examined the existing biomechanical data and
established several performance criteria that
reflected human neck responses. GM then built
necks which would meet the biomechanically based
performance criteria. GM established the calibration
tests that it believed were necessary to ensure that
the necks of the prototype test dummies would pro-
duce the required biomechanical responses.
Although extensive performance specifications may
have been needed for the development of specially
built prototype necks, not all of the specifications
appear to be essential once the final design was
established for the mass-produced commercial
version. Based on the ability of the commercially
available test dummies to meet the biomechanical
response criteria, NHTSA believes that the GM-

PART 572-PRE 43

derived calibration requirements should be adjusted
to reflect the response characteristics of commer-
cially available test dummies and simplified as much
as possible to reduce the complexity of the testing.

Based on the results of the NHTSA-GM calibra-
tion test series, the agency is making the following
changes to the neck calibration tests. In the flexion
(forward bending) calibration test, the agency is:

1. increasing the time allowed for the neck to
return to its preimpact position after the pendulum
impact test from a range of 109-119 milliseconds
to a range of 113-128 milliseconds.

2. changing the limits for maximum head rotation
from a range of 67°-79° to a range of 64°-78°.

3. expanding the time limits during which max-
imum moment must occur from a range of 46-56
milliseconds to 47-58 milliseconds.

4. modifying the limits for maximum moment
from a range of 72-90 ft-lbs to a range of 65-80
ft-lbs.

5. increasing the time for the maximum moment
to decay from a range of 95-105 milliseconds to a
range of 97-107 milliseconds.

In the extension (backward bending) calibration
test, the agency is:

1. expanding the time allowed for the neck to
return to its preimpact position after the pendulum
impact test from a range of 157-167 milliseconds
to a range of 147-174 milliseconds.

2. changing the limits for maximum head rotation
from a range of 94 °-106 ° to a range of 81 °-106 °.

3. expanding the time limit during which the
minimum moment must occur from a range of 69-77
milliseconds to 65-79 milliseconds.

4. modifying the limits for minimum moment
from a range of -52 to -63 ft-lbs to a range of -39
to -59 ft-lbs.

5. increasing the time for the minimum moment
to decay from the range of 120-144 milliseconds,
contained in GM's technical specifications for the
Hybrid III, to a range of 120-148 milliseconds.

In reviewing the NHTSA-GM test data, the
agency also identified several ways of simplifying
the neck's performance requirements. In each case,
the following calibration specifications appear to be
redundant and their deletion should not affect the
performance of the neck. The agency has thus
deleted the requirement for minimum moment in
flexion and the time requirement for that moment.
For extension, the agency has eliminated the limit
on the maximum moment permitted and the time
requirement for that moment. The agency has

deleted those requirements since the specification on
maximum rotation of the neck in flexion and minimum
rotation of the neck in extension appear to adequately
measure the same properties of the neck. Similarly,
the agency has simplified the test by eliminating the
pendulum braking requirement for the neck test, since
GM's testing shows that the requirement is not
necessary to ensure test consistency. Finally, the
agency is clarifying the test procedure by deleting the
specification in the GM technical drawings for the
Hybrid III calling for two pre-calibration impact tests
of the neck. GM has informed the agency that the two
pre-calibration tests are not necessary.

Based on the NHTSA-GM calibration test data,
the agency is making two additional changes to the
neck calibration test procedure. Both NHTSA and
GM routinely control the calibration pendulum im-
pact speed to within plus or minus one percent.
Currently available dummy necks are able to meet
the calibration response requirements consistently
when the pendulum impact speed is controlled to
that level Thus, NHTSA believes that the proposed
range of allowable velocities ( ± 8.5 percent) for the
pendulum impact is excessive. Reducing the allow-
able range is clearly feasible and will help maintain
a high level of consistency in dummy neck responses.
The agency has therefore narrowed the range of per-
missible impact velocities to the neck to ± 2 per-
cent. This range is readily obtainable with commer-
cially available test equipment. In reviewing the
neck calibration test data, GM and NHTSA noted
a slight sensitivity in the neck response to
temperature variation. In its docket submission of
January 27, 1986, GM recommended controlling the
temperature during the neck calibration test to 71 °
±1°. NHTSA agrees that controlling the tem-
perature for the neck calibration test will reduce
variability, but the agency believes that a slightly
wider temperatiu-e range of 69 ° to 72 °, which is the
same range used in the chest calibration test, is
sufficient.

Neck Durability

Nissan commented that, in sled tests of the two
test dummies, the neck bracket of one of the Hybrid
III test dummies experienced damage after 10 tests,
while the Part 572 test dummy had no damage. The
agency believes that Nissan's experience may be the
result of an early neck design which has been subse-
quently modified by GM. (See GM letter of Septem-
ber 16, 1985, Docket 74-14, Notice 39, Entry 28.)
The agency has conducted numerous 30 mile per
hour vehicle impact tests using the Hybrid III test
dummy and has not had any neck bracket failures.

PART 572-PRE 44

Thorax Calibration Test

As a part of the NHTSA-GM calibration test
series, both organizations also performed the pro-
posed calibration test for the thorax on the same test
dummies. That testing showed relatively small dif-
ferences in the test results measured between the
two test facilities The test results from both test
facilities show that the chest responses of the Hybrid
III test dummies were generally within the
established biomechanical performance corridors for
the chest. In addition, the data showed that the
Hybrid III chest responses fit those corridors
substantially better than the chest responses of the
existing Part 572 test dummy. The data also showed
that the chest responses in the high speed (22 ft/sec)
pendulum impact test more closely fit the corridors
than did the chest responses in the low speed (14
ft/sec) test. In addition, the data showed that if a
test dummy performed satisfactorily in the low
speed pendulum impact test, it also performed
satisfactorily in the more severe high speed test.

Based on those results, GM recommended in a
letter of January 27, 1986, (Docket No. 74-14, Notice
39, Entry 41) that only the low speed pendulum im-
pact be used in calibration testing of the Hybrid III
chest. GM noted that deleting the more severe pen-
dulum impact test "can lead to increasing the useful
life of the chest structure."

Based on the test data, the agency agrees with the
GM recommendation that only one pendulum impact
test is necessary. NHTSA recognizes that using only
the low speed pendulum impact will increase the
useful life of the chest. However, the agency has
decided to retain the high speed rather than the low
speed test. While NHTSA recognizes that the high
speed test is more severe, the agency believes the
high speed test is more appropriate for a number
of reasons. First, the data showed that the high
speed chest impact responses compared more closely
with the biomechanical corridors than the low speed
responses. Thus, use of the high speed test will make
it easier to identify chests that do not have the cor-
rect biofidelity. In addition, since the higher speed
test is more severe it will subject the ribcage to
higher stresses, which will help identify chest struc-
tural degradation. Finally, the high speed impact
test is more representative of the range of impacts
a test dummy can receive in a vehicle crash test.

Although the NHTSA-GM test data showed that
the production version of the Hybrid III chest had
sufficient biofidelity, the data indicated that
proposed calibration performance requirements

should be lightly changed to account for the wider
range in calibration test responses measured in com-
mercially available test dummies. Accordingly, the
agency is adjusting the chest deflection requirement
to increase the allowable range of deflections from
2.51-2.75 inches to 2.5-2.85 inches. In addition, the
agency is adjusting the resistive force requirement
from a range of 1186-1298 pounds to a range of
1080-1245 pounds. Also, the hysteresis requirement
is being adjusted from a 75-80 percent range to a
69-85 percent range. Finally, the agency is clarify-
ing the chest calibration test procedure by deleting
the specification in GM's technical drawing for the
Hybrid III that calls for two pre-calibration impact
tests of the chest. GM has informed the agency that
these tests are not necessary. These slight changes
will not affect the performance of the Hybrid III
chest, since the NHTSA-GM test data showed that
commercially available test dummies meeting these
calibration specifications had good biofidelity.

Chest Durability

Testing done by the agency's Vehicle Research
and Test Center has indicated that the durability of
the Hybrid Ill's ribs in calibration testing is less than
that of the Part 572 test dummy. ("State-of-the-Art
Dummy Selection, Volume I" DOT Publication No.
HS 806 722) The durability of the Hybrid III was
also raised by several commenters. For example,
Toyota raised questions about the durability of the
Hybrid Ill's ribs and suggested the agency act to
improve their durability.

The chest of the Hybrid III is designed to be more
flexible, and thus more human-like, than the chest
of the Part 572 test dummy. One of the calibration
tests used for the chest involves a 15 mph impact
into the chest by a 51.5 pound pendulum; an impact
condition which is substantially more severe than a
safety belt or airbag restrained occupant would ex-
perience in most crashes. The chest of the Hybrid
III apparently degrades after such multiple impacts
at a faster rate than the chest of the Part 572 test
dummy. As the chest gradually deteriorates, the
amount of acceleration and deflection measured in
the chest are also affected. Eventually the chest will
fall out of specification and will require either repair
or replacement.

In its supplemental comments to the April 1985
notice, GM provided additional information about
the durability of the Hybrid III ribs. GM said that
it uses the Hybrid III in unbelted testing, which is
the most severe test for the dummy. GM said that
the Hybrid III can be used for about 17 crash tests
before the ribs must be replaced. GM explained

PART 572-PRE 45

that it does not have comparable data for the Part
572 test dummy since it does not use that test
dummy in unbelted tests. GM said, however, that
it believes that the durability of the Part 572 test
dummy ribs in vehicle crash testing would be com-
parable to that of the Hybrid III.

Having reviewed all the available information, the
agency concludes that both the Hybrid HI and ex-
isting Part 572 test dummy ribs will degrade under
severe impact conditions. Although the Hybrid HFs
more flexible ribs may need replacement more fre-
quently, particularly after being used in unre-
strained testing, the Hybrid HFs ribs appear to have
reasonable durability. According to GM's data,
which is in line with NHTSA's crash test experience,
the Hybrid Hi's ribs can withstand approximately
17 severe impacts, such as found in unrestrained
testing, before they must be replaced. Ford, in a
presentation at the MVMA Hybrid HI workshop
held on February 5, 1986, noted that one of its belt-
restrained Hybrid HI test dummies was subjected
to 35 vehicle and sled crashes wathout any failures.
The potential lower durability of the ribs in
unrestrained testing should be of little consequence
if the Hybrid III test dummy is used in air bag or
belt testing.

Chest Temperature Sensitivity

The April 1985 notice said NHTSA tests have in-
dicated that the measurements of chest deflection
and chest acceleration by the Hybrid HI are
temperature sensitive. For this reason, GM's
specifications for the Hybrid HI recognize this prob-
lem and call for using the test dummy in a narrower
temperature range (69° to 72° F) to ensure the con-
sistency of the measurements. GM has also sug-
gested the use of an adjustment factor for
calculating chest deflection when the Hybrid HI is
used in a test environment that is outside of the
temperature range specified for the chest. While this
approach may be reasonable to account for the ad-
justment of the deflection measurement, there is no
known method to adjust the acceleration measure-
ment for variations in temperature. For this reason,
the agency is not adopting GM's proposed adjust-
ment factor, but is instead retaining the proposed
69° to 72° F temperature range.

A number of commenters addressed the feasibility
and practicability of maintaining that temperature
range. BMW said that although it has an enclosed
crash test facility, it had reservations about its
ability to control the test temperature within the
proposed range. Daihatsu said that it was not sure
it could assure the test dummy's temperature will

remain within the proposed range. Honda said that
while it had no data on the temperature sensitivity
of the Hybrid HI, it questioned whether the
proposed temperature range was practical.
Mercedes-Benz said it is not practicable to maintain
the proposed temperature range because the flood
lights necessary for high speed filming of crash tests
can cause the test dummy to heat up. Nissan said
it was not easy to maintain the current 12 degree
range specified for the existing Part 572 test dummy
and thus it would be hard to maintain the three
degree range proposed for the Hybrid III. Ford also
said that maintaining the three degree range could
be impracticable in its current test facilities.

Other manufacturers tentatively indicated that the
proposed temperature range may not be a problem.
VW said the temperature range should not be an in-
surmountable problem, but more experience with
the Hybrid HI is necessary before any definite con-
clusions can be reached. Volvo said it could main-
tain the temperature range in its indoor test
facilities, but it questioned whether outdoor test
facilities could meet the proposed specification.
Humanoid indicated in its comments, that it has
developed an air conditioning system individualized
for each test dummy which will maintain a stable
temperature in the test dummy up to the time of the
crash test.

The agency believes that there are a number of
effective ways to address the temperature
sensitivity of the Hybrid III chest. The test pro-
cedure calls for placing the test dummy in an area,
such as a closed room, whose temperature is main-
tained writhin the required range for at least four
hours before either the calibration tests or the use
of the test dummy in a crash test. The purpose of
the requirement is to ensure that the primary com-
ponents of the test dummy have reached the correct
temperature before the test dummy is used in a test.
As discussed below, analytical techniques can be
used to determine the temperature within the test
dummy, to calculate how quickly the test dummy
must be used in a crash test before its temperature
will fall outside the required temperature range.

Testing done by the agency with the current Part
572 test dummy, whose construction and materials
are similar to the Hybrid HI, has determined how
long it takes for various test dummy components to
reach the required temperature range once the test
dummy is placed in a room within that range.
("Thermal Responses of the Part 572 Dummy to
Step Changes in Ambient Temperature" DOT
Publication No. HS-801 960, June 1976) The testing
was done by placing thermocouples, devices to

PART 572-PRE 46

measure temperature, at seven locations within the
dummy and conducting a series of heating and cool-
ing experiments. The tests showed that the thermal
time constants (the thermal time constant is the time
necessary for the temperature differential between
initial and final temperatures to decrease from its
original value to 37% of the original differential)
varied from 1.2 hours for the forehead to 6.2 hours
for the lumbar spine. Using this information it is
possible to estimate the time it takes a test dummy
originally within the required temperature range to
fall out of the allowable range once it has been ex-
posed to another temperature. The rib's thermal
time constant is 2.9 hours. This means, for exam-
ple, that if a test dummy's temperature has been
stabilized at 70.5 ° F and then transferred to a test
environment at 65 ° F, it would take approximately
0.8 hours for the rib temperature to drop to 69° F,
the bottom end of the temperature range specified
in Part 572.

Thus, the NHTSA test results cited above show
that the chest can be kept within the range proposed
by the agency if the test dummy is placed in a
temperature-controlled en\nronment for a sufficient
time to stabilize the chest temperature. Once the
chest of the test dummy is at the desired
temperature, the test data indicate that it can
tolerate some temperature variation at either an in-
door or outdoor crash test site and still be within the
required temperature range as long as the crash test
is performed within a reasonable amount of time and
the temperature at the crash site, or within the vehi-
cle, or within the test dummy is controlled close to
the 69 to 72 degrees F range. Obviously, testing con-
ducted at extremely high or low temperatures can
move the test dummy's temperature out of the re-
quired range relatively quickly, if no means are used
to maintain the temperature of the test dummy
within the required range. However, auxiliary
temperature control devices can be used in the vehi-
cle or the test environment to maintain a stabilized
temperature prior to the crash test. Therefore, the
agency has decided to retain the proposed 69 to 72
degrees F temperature range.

Chest Response to Changes in Velocity

The April notice raised the issue of the sensitivity
of the Hybrid Hi's chest to changes in impact
velocities. The notice pointed out that one GM study
on energy-absorbing steering columns ("Factors In-
fluencing Laboratory Evaluation of Energy-
Absorbing Steering Systems," Docket No. 74-14,
Notice 32, Entry 1666B) indicated that the Hybrid
Ill's chest may be insensitive to changes in impact

velocities and asked commenters to provide further
information on this issue.

Both GM and Ford provided comments on the
Hybrid Ill's chest response. GM said that since the
Hybrid HI chest is designed to have a more human-
like thoracic deflection than the Part 572 test dum-
my, the Hybrid Ill's response could be different. GM
referenced a study ("System Versus Laboratory Im-
pact Tests for Estimating Injury Hazard" SAE
paper 680053) which involved cadaver impacts into
energy-absorbing steering columns. The study con-
cluded that the force on the test subject by the steer-
ing assembly was relatively constant despite
changes in test speeds. GM said that this study in-
dicated that "rather than the Hybrid HI chest be-
ing insensitive to changes in velocity in steering
system tests, it is the Part 572 which is too sensitive
to changes in impact velocity to provide meaningful
information for evaluating steering systems."

GM also presented new data on chest impact tests
conducted on the Hybrid III and Part 572 test dum-
mies. The tests involved chest impacts by three pen-
dulum impact devices with different masses and
three impact speeds. GM said that the test results
show that "the Hybrid III chest deflection is sen-
sitive to both changes in impact velocity and impac-
tor mass." Ford also noted that the Hybrid III ap-
pears sensitive in the range of speed and deflections
that are relevant to Standard No. 208 testing with
belt-restrained dummies.

Ford noted that the GM testing referenced in the
April notice was conducted at higher impact speeds
than used in the calibration testing of the Hybrid
III. Ford said it agreed with GM that the indicated
insensitivity of chest acceleration to speed and load
is a reflection of the constant-force nature of the
steering column's energy absorption features. After
reviewing the information provided by Ford and
GM, NHTSA agrees that in an impact with a typical
steering column, once the energy-absorbing
mechanism begins to function, the test dummy's
chest will receive primarily constant force. The
lower stiffness of the Hybrid III chests would make
it respond in a more human-like manner to these
forces than the existing Part 572 test dummy.

Chest Accelerometer Placement

Volvo pointed out that the chest accelerometer of
the Hybrid III is located approximately at the center
of gravity of the chest, while the accelerometer is
higher and closer to the back in the Part 572 test
dummy. Volvo said that since the biomechanical
tolerance limits for the chest were established us-
ing a location similar to that in the Part 572, it

PART 572-PRE 47

questioned whether the acceleration limits should
apply to the Hybrid III. Volvo recommended chang-
ing the location of the accelerometer in the Hybrid
in or using different chest acceleration criteria for
the Hybrid III.

The agency recognizes that Hybrid HI ac-
celerometer placement should more correctly reflect
the overall response of the chest because it is placed
at the center of gravity of the chest. However, the
dimensional differences between the accelerometer
placements in the two test dimimies are so small that
in restrained crash tests the differences in accelera-
tion response, if any, should be minimal.

Repeatability and Reproducibility

As discussed previously, test dummy repeatabil-
ity refers to the ability of one test dummy to
measure consistently the same responses when sub-
jected to the same test. Reproducibility refers to the
ability of two or more test dummies built to the same
specifications to measure consistently the same
responses when they are subjected to the same test.

Ford said that it is particularly concerned about
the repeatability of the chest acceleration and deflec-
tion measurements of the Hybrid HI and about the
reproducibility of the Hybrid HI in testing by dif-
ferent laboratories. Ford said that once a test dum-
my positioning procedure has been established, the
agency should conduct a series of 16 car crash tests
to verify the repeatability and reproducibility of the
Hybrid III.

In its comments, GM provided data showing that
the repeatability of the Hybrid III is the same as the
existing Part 572 test dummy. Volvo, the only other
commenter that addressed repeatability, also said
that its preliminary tests show that the Hybrid III
has a repeatability comparable to the Part 572. The
agency's Vehicle Research and Test Center has also
evaluated the repeatability of the Hybrid HI and the
Part 572 in a series of sled tests. The data from those
tests show that the repeatability of the two test dum-
mies is comparable. ("State-of-the-Art Dummy
Selection, Volume I" DOT Publication No. HS 806
722.)

GM also provided data showing that the
reproducibility of the Hybrid HI is significantly bet-
ter than the Part 572. In its supplemental comments
filed on September 16, 1985, GM also said that
Ford's proposed 16 car test program was not
needed. GM said that "in such test the effects of
vehicle build variability and test procedure variabil-
ity would totally mask any effect of Hybrid III
repeatability and reproducibility."

The agency agrees with GM that additional testing
is unnecessary. The information Provided by GM
and Volvo shows that the repeatability of the Hybrid
HI is at least as good as the repeatability of the ex-
isting Part 572 test dummy. Likewise, the GM data
show that the reproducibility of the Hybrid III is bet-
ter than that of the existing Part 572 test dummy.
Likewise, the recent NHTSA-GM calibration test
series provides further confirmation that tests by
different laboratories show the repeatability and
reproducibility of the Hybrid III.

Equivalence of Hybrid III and Part 572

As noted in the April 1985 notice, the Hybrid III
and the Part 572 test dummies do not generate iden-
tical impact responses. Based on the available data,
the agency concluded that when both test dummies
are tested in lap/shoulder belts or with air cushions,
the differences between the two test dummies are
minimal. The agency also said that it knew of no
method for directly relating the response of the
Hybrid HI to the Part 572 test dummy.

The purpose of comparing the response of the two
test dummies is to ensure that the Hybrid HI wdll
meet the need for safety by adequately identifying
vehicle designs which could cause or increase occu-
pant injury. The agency wants to ensure that per-
mitting a choice of test dummy will not lead to a
degradation in safety performance.

As mentioned previously, one major improvement
in the Hybrid HI is that it is more human-like in its
responses than the current Part 572 test dummy.
The primary changes to the Hybrid III, that make
it more human-like are to the neck, chest and knee.
Comparisons of the responses of the Part 572 and
Hybrid HI test dummies show that responses of the
Hybrid HI are closer than the Part 572 to the best
available data on human responses. (See Chapter II
of the Final Regulatory Evaluation on the Hybrid
HI.)

In addition to being more human-like, the Hybrid
HI has increased measurement capabilities for the
neck (tension, compression, and shear forces and
bending moments), chest (deflection), knee (knee
shear), and lower leg (knee and tibia forces and
moments). The availability of the extra injury
measuring capability of the Hybrid III gives vehicle
manufacturers the potential for gathering far more
information about the performance of their vehicle
designs than they can obtain with the Part 572.

To evaluate differences in the injury mea-
surements made by the Hybrid HI and the existing
Part 572 test dummy, the agency has reviewed all
of the available data comparing the two test
dummies. The data come from a variety of sled

PART 572-PRE 48

barrier crash tests conducted by GM, Mercedes-
Benz, NHTSA, Nissan, and Volvo. The data include
tests where the dummies were unrestrained and
tests where the dummies were restrained by manual
lap/shoulder belts, automatic belts, and air bags. For
example, subsequent to issuance of the April 1985
notice, NHTSA did additional vehicle testing to com-
pare the Part 572 and Hybrid HI test dummies. The
agency conducted a series of crash tests using five
different types of vehicles to measure differences
in the responses of the test dummies. Some of the
tests were frontal 30 mile per hour barrier impacts,
such as are used in Standard No. 208 compliance
testing, while others were car-to-car tests. All of the
tests were done with unrestrained test dummies to
measure their impact responses under severe con-
ditions. The agency's analysis of the data for all of
the testing done by NHTSA and others is fully
described in the Final Regulatory Evaluation for this
rulemaking. This notice will briefly review that
analysis.

One of the reasons for conducting the analysis was
to address the concern raised by the Center for Auto
Safety (CAS) in its original petition and the In-
surance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) in its
comments that the Hybrid III produces lower HIC
responses than the existing Part 572 test dummy.
As discussed in detail below, the test data do not
show a trend for one type of test dummy to con-
sistently measure higher or lower HIC's or femur
readings than the other. Based on these test data,
the agency concludes that the concern expressed by
CAS and IIHS that the use of the Hybrid III test
dummy will give a manufacturer an advantage in
meeting the HIC performance requirement of
Standard No. 208 is not valid.

In the case of chest acceleration measurements,
the data again do not show consistently higher or
lower measurements for either test dummy, except
in the case of unrestrained tests. In unrestrained
tests, the data show that the Hybrid III generally
measures lower chest g's than the existing Part 572
test dummy. This difference in chest g's measure-
ment is one reason why the agency is adopting the
additional chest deflection measurement for the
Hybrid III, as discussed further below.

HIC Measurements

The April 1985 notice specifically invited com-
ments on the equivalence of the Head Injury
Criterion (HIC) measurements of the two test dum-
mies. Limited laboratory testing done in a Univer-
sity of California at San Diego study conducted by
Dr. Dennis Schneider and others had indicated that

the Hybrid III test dummy generates lower accelera-
tion responses than either the Part 572 test dummy
or cadaver heads in impacts with padded surfaces.
The notice explained that the reasons for those dif-
ferences had not yet been resolved.

In its comments, GM explained that it had con-
ducted a series of studies to address the Schneider
results. GM said that those studies showed that the
Schneider test results are "complicated by the
changing characteristics of the padding material
used on his impact surface. As a result, his tests do
not substantiate impactor response difference be-
tween the Hybrid III head, the Part 572 head and
cadaver heads. After examining our reports. Dr.
Schneider agreed with the finding that padding
degradation resulting from multiple impact ex-
posures rendered an input-response comparison in-
valid between the cadaver and the dummies." (The
GM and Schneider letters are filed in Docket 74-14,
General Reference, Entry 556.)

The agency's Vehicle Research and Test Center has
also conducted head drop tests of the current Part
572 and Hybrid III heads. The tests were conducted
by dropping the heads onto a two inch thick steel
plate, a surface which is considerably more rigid than
any surface that the test dummy's head would hit in
a vehicle crash test. One purpose of the tests was to
assess the performance of the heads in an impact
which can produce skull fractures in cadavers. The
tests found that the response of the Hybrid III head
was more human-like at the fracture and subfracture
acceleration levels than the Part 572 head. The
testing did show that in these severe impacts into
thick steel plates, the HIC scores for the Hybrid III
were lower than for the Part 572. However, as
discussed below, when the Hybrid III is tested in vehi-
cle crash and sled tests, which are representative of
occupant impacts into actual vehicle structures, the
HIC scores for the Hybrid III are not consistently
lower than those of the Part 572 test dummy.

The agency examined crash and sled tests, done
by GM, Mercedes-Benz, NHTSA and Volvo, in which
both a Hybrid III and the existing Part 572 test dum-
my were restrained by manual lap/shoulder belts.
(The complete results from those and all the other
tests reviewed by the agency are discussed in
Chapter III of the Final Regulatory Evaluation on
the Hybrid HI.) The HIC responses in those tests
show that the Hybrid III generally had higher HIC
responses than the Part 572 test dummy. Although
the data show that the Hybrid Ill's HIC responses
are generally higher, in some cases 50 percent
higher than the Part 572, there are some tests in
which the Hybrid Ill's responses were 50 percent
lower than the responses of the Part 572.

PART 572-PRE 49

For two-point automatic belts, the agency has
Hmited barrier crash test data and the direct com-
parability of the data is questionable. The tests using
the existing Part 572 test dummy were done in 1976
on 1976 VW Rabbits for compliance purposes. The
Hybrid III tests were done in 1985 by the agency's
Vehicle Research and Test Center as part of the
SRL-98 test series on a 1982 and a 1984 VW Rabbit.
Differences in the seats, safety belts, and a number
of other vehicle parameters between these model
years and between the test set-ups could affect the
results. In the two-point automatic belt tests, the
data show that the Hybrid III measured somewhat
higher head accelerations than the existing Part 572
test dummy. In two-point automatic belts, the dif-
ferences appear to be minimal for the driver and
substantially larger for the passenger. In air bag sled
tests, the Hybrid Ill's HIC responses were generally
lower; in almost all the air bag tests, the HIC
responses of both the Hybrid III and the Part 572
test dummies were substantially below the HIC limit
of 1,000 set in Standard No. 208. Because of the
severe nature of the unrestrained sled and barrier
tests, in which the uncontrolled movement of the
test dummy can result in impacts with different
vehicle structures, there was no consistent trend for
either test dummy to measure higher or lower HIC
responses than the other.

Chest Measurements

For manual lap/shoulder belts, NHTSA compared
the results from GM, Mercedes-Benz, NHTSA, and
Volvo sled tests, and GM frontal barrier tests. The
NHTSA sled test results at 30 and the Volvo sled
test results at 31 mph are very consistent, with the
mean Hybrid HI chest acceleration response being
only 2-3 g's higher than the response of the existing
Part 572 test dummy. In the 35 mph Volvo sled
tests, the Hybrid III chest acceleration response was
up to 44 percent higher than the existing Part 572
response. The GM 30 mph sled and barrier test data
were fairly evenly divided. In general, the Hybrid
III chest acceleration response is slightly higher than
that of the existing Part 572 test dummy. The
agency concludes from these data that at Standard
No. 208's compliance test speed (30 mph) with
manual lap/shoulder belts there are no large dif-
ferences in chest acceleration responses between the
two dummies. In some vehicles, the Hybrid HI may
produce slightly higher responses and in other
vehicles it may produce slightly lower responses.

As discussed earlier, the agency has limited test
data on automatic belt tests and their comparability
is questionable. The Hybrid III chest acceleration

responses are up to 1.5 times higher than those for
the existing Part 572 test dummy. Only very limited
sled test data are available on air bags alone, air bag
plus lap belt, and air bag plus lap/shoulder belt. In
all cases, the Hybrid III chest acceleration responses
were lower than those for the existing Part 572 test
dummy.

For unrestrained occupants, the Hybrid HI pro-
duces predominantly lower chest acceleration
responses than the existing Part 572 test dummy
in sled and barrier tests, and in some cases the dif-
ference is significant. In some tests, the Hybrid III
chest acceleration response can be 40 to 45 percent
lower than the Part 572 response, although in other
tests the acceleration measured by the Hybrid HI
can exceed that measured by the Part 572 test
dummy by 10 to 15 percent.

In summary, the test data indicate the chest ac-
celeration responses between the Hybrid III and the
existing Part 572 test dummy are about the same
for restrained occupants, but differ for some cases
of unrestrained occupants. This is to be expected
since a restraint system would tend to make the two
dummies react similarly even though they have dif-
ferent seating postures. The different seating
postures, however, would allow unrestrained
dummies to impact different vehicle surfaces which
would in most instances produce different responses.
Since the Hybrid HI dummy is more human-like, it
should experience loading conditions that are more
human-like than would the existing Part 572 test
dummy. One reason that the agency is adding a
chest deflection criterion for the Hybrid III is that
the unrestrained dummy's chest may experience
more severe impacts with vehicle structures than
would be experienced in an automatic belt or air bag
collision. Chest deflection provides an additional
measurement of potential injury that may not be
detected by the chest acceleration measurement.

Femur Measurements

The test data on the femur responses of the two
types of test dummies also do not show a trend for
one test dummy to measure consistently higher or
lower responses than the other. In lap/shoulder belt
tests, GM's sled and barrier tests from 1977 show
a trend toward lower measurements for the Hybrid
III, but GM's more recent tests in 1982-83 show the
reverse situation. These tests, however, are of little
significance unless there is femur loading due to knee
contact. These seldom occur to lap/shoulder belt
restrained test dummies. Also, in none of the tests
described above do the measurements approach
Standard No. 208's limit of 2250 pounds for femur

PART 572-PRE 50

loads. The air bag test data are limited; however,
they show little difference between the femur
responses of the two test dummies. As would be ex-
pected, the unrestrained tests showed no systematic
differences, because of the variability in the impact
locations of an unrestrained test dummy.

Injury Criteria

Many manufacturers raised objections to the ad-
ditional injury criteria proposed in the April 1985
notice. AMC, Ford, and MVMA argued that adopt-
ing the numerous injury criteria proposed in the
April 1985 notice would compound a manufacturer's
compliance test problems. For example, Ford said
it "would be impracticable to require vehicles to
meet such a multitude of criteria in a test with such
a high level of demonstrated variability. Notice 39
appears to propose 21 added pass-fail measurements
per dummy, for a total of 25 pass-fail measurements
per dummy, or 50 pass-fail measurements per test.
Assuming these measurements were all independent
of one another, and a car design had a 95% chance
of obtaining a passing score on each measurement,
the chance of obtaining a passing score on all
measurements in any single test for a single dummy
would be less than 28% and for both dummies would
be less than 8%." Ford, Nissan, VW and Volvo also
said that with the need for additional measurements,
there will be an increase in the number of tests with
incomplete data. BMW, while supporting the use of
the Hybrid III as a potential improvement to safety,
said that the number of measurements needed for
the additional injury criteria is beyond the capability
of its present data processing equipment.

VW said there is a need to do additional vehicle
testing before adopting any new criteria. It said that
if current production vehicles already meet the
additional criteria then the criteria only increase
testing variability without increasing safety. If cur-
rent vehicles cannot comply, then additional infor-
mation is needed about the countermeasures needed
to meet the criteria. Honda said there are insuffi-
cient data to determine the relationship between ac-
tual injury levels and the proposed injury criterion.

As discussed in detail below, the agency has
decided to adopt only one additional injury criterion,
chest deflection, at this time. The agency plans to
issue another notice on the remaining criteria pro-
posed in the April 1985 notice to gather additional
information on the issues raised by the commenters.

Alternative HIC Calculations

The April 1985 notice set forth two proposed alter-
native methods of using the head injury criterion

(HIC) in situations when there is no contact between
the test dummy's head and the vehicle's interior
during a crash. The first proposed alternative was
to retain the current HIC formula, but limit its
calculation to periods of head contact only. However,
in non-contact situations, the agency proposed that
an HIC would not be calculated, but instead new
neck injury criteria would be calculated. The agency
explained that a crucial element necessary for
deciding whether to use the HIC calculation or the
neck criteria was an objective technique for deter-
mining the occurrence and duration of head contact
in the crash test. As discussed in detail in the April
1985 notice, there are several methods available for
establishing the duration of head contact, but there
are questions about their levels of consistency and
accuracy.

The second alternative proposed by the agency
would have calculated an HIC in both contact and
non-contact situations, but it would limit the calcula-
tion to a time interval of 36 milliseconds. Along with
the requirement that an HIC not exceed 1,000, this
would limit average head acceleration to 60 g's or
less for any durations exceeding 36 milliseconds.

Almost all of the commenters opposed the use of
the first proposed alternative. The commenters
uniformly noted that there is no current technique
that can accurately identify whether head contact
has or has not occured during a crash test in all situa-
tions. However, the Center for Auto Safety urged
the agency to adopt the proposed neck criteria,
regardless of whether the HIC calculation is
modified.

There was a sharp division among the commenters
regarding the use of the second alternative; although
many manufacturers argued that the HIC calculation
should be limited to a time interval of approximately
15 to 17 milliseconds (ms), which would limit average
long duration (i.e., greater than 15-17 milliseconds)
head accelerations to 80-85 g's. Mercedes-Benz,
which supported the second alternative, urged the
agency to measure HIC only during the time inter-
val that the acceleration level in the head exceeds 60
g's. It said that this method would more effectively
differentiate results received in contacts with hard
surfaces and results obtained from systems, such as
airbags, which provide good distribution of the loads
experienced during a crash. The Center for Auto
Safety, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
and State Farm argued that the current HIC calcula-
tion should be retained; they said that the proposed
alternative would lower HIC calculations without en-
suring that motorists were still receiving adequate
head protection.

PART 572-PRE 51

NHTSA is in the process of reexamining the
potential effects of the two alternatives proposed by
the agency and of the two additional alternatives
suggested by the commenters. Once that review has
been completed, the agency will issue a separate
notice announcing its decision.

Thorax

At present, Standard No. 208 uses an acceleration-
based criterion to measure potential injuries to the
chest. The agency believes that the use of a chest
deflection criterion is an important supplement to
the existing chest injury criterion. Excessive chest
deflection can produce rib fractures, which can
impair breathing and inflict damage to the internal
organs in the chest. The proposed deflection limit
would only apply to the Hybrid III test dummy, since
unlike the existing Part 572 test dummy, it has a
chest which is designed to deflect like a human chest
and has the capability to measure deflection of the
sternum relative to the spine, as well as accelera-
tion, during an impact.

The agency proposed a three-inch chest deflection
limit for systems, such as air bags, which sym-
metrically load the chest during a crash and a two-
inch limit for all other systems. The reason for the
different proposed limits is that a restraint system
that symmetrically and uniformly applies loads to
the chest increases the ability to withstand chest
deflection as measured by the deflection sensor,
which is centrally located in the dummy.

The commenters generally supported adoption of
a chest deflection injury criterion. For example.
Ford said it supported the use of a chest deflection
criterion since it may provide a better means of
assessing the risk of rib fractures. Likewise, the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety said the
chest deflection criteria."will aid in evaluating injury
potential especially in situations where there is chest
contact with the steering wheel or other interior
components." IIHS also supported adoption of a
three-inch deflection limit for inflatable systems and
a two-inch limit for all other systems. However, most
of the other commenters addressing the proposed
chest deflection criteria questioned the use of dif-
ferent criteria for different restraint systems.

GM supported limiting chest deflections to three-
inches in all systems. GM said that it uses a two-inch
limit as a guideline for its safety belt system testing,
but it had no data to indicate that the two-inch limit
is appropriate as a compliance limit.

Renault/Peugeot also questioned the three-inch
deflection limit for systems that load the dummy
symmetrically and two inches for systems that do

not. It said that the difference between those
systems should be addressed by relocation of the
deflection sensors. It also asked the agency to define
what constitutes a symmetrical system. VW also
questioned the appropriateness of setting separate
limits for chest compression for different types of
restraint systems. It recommended adoption of a
three-inch limit for al 1 types of restraint systems.

Volvo also raised questions about the ap-
propriateness of the proposed deflection criteria.
Volvo said that the GM-developed criteria proposed
in the April 1985 notice were based on a comparison
of accident data gathered by Volvo and evaluated
by GM in sled test simulations using the Hybrid III
test dummy. Volvo said that the report did not
analyze "whether the chest injuries were related to
the chest acceleration or the chest deflection, or a
combination of both."

The agency recognizes that there are several dif-
ferent types of potential chest injury mechanisms
and that it may not be possible to precisely isolate
and measure what is the relevant contribution of
each type of mechanism to the final resulting injury.
However, there is a substantial amount of data in-
dicating that chest deflection is an important con-
tributing factor to chest injury. In addition, the data
clearly demonstrate that deflection of greater than
three inches can lead to serious injury. For example,
research done by Neathery and others has examined
the effects of frontal impacts to cadaver chests with
an impactor that represents the approximate dimen-
sions of a steering wheel hub. Neathery correlated
the measured injuries with the amount of chest
deflection and recommended that for a 50th percen-
tile male, chest deflection not exceed three inches.
(Neathery, R. F., "Analysis of Chest Impact
Response Data and Scaled Performance Recommen-
dations," SAE Paper No. 741188)

Work by Walfisch and others looked at crash tests
of lap/shoulder belt restrained cadavers. They found
that substantial injury began to occur when the
sternum deflection exceeded 30 percent of the
available chest depth ("Tolerance Limits and
Mechanical Characteristic of the Human Thorax in
Frontal and Side Impact and Transposition of these
Characteristics into Protective Criteria," 1982
IRCOBI Conference Proceedings). With the chest
of the average man being approximately 9.3 inches
deep, the 30 percent limit would translate into a
deflection limit of approximately 2.8 inches. Since
the chest of the Hybrid III test dummy deflects
somewhat less than a human chest under similar
loading conditions, the chest deflection limit for
systems which do not symmetrically and uniformly

PART 572-PRE 52

load the chest, such as lap/shoulder belts, must be
set at a level below 2.8 inches to assure an adequate
level of protection.

To determine the appropriate level for non-
symmetrical systems, the agency first reviewed a
number of test series in which cadaver injury levels
were measured under different impact conditions.
(All of the test results are fully discussed in Chapter
III of the Final Regulatory Evaluation on the Hybrid
III.) The impact conditions included 30 mph sled
tests done for the agency by Wayne State Univer-
sity in which a pre-inflated, non-vented air bag
system symmetrically and uniformly spread the im-
pact load on the chest of the test subject. NHTSA
also reviewed 30 mph sled tests done for the agency
by the University of Heidelberg which used a
lap/shoulder belt system, which does not sym-
metrically and uniformly spread chest loads. In
addition, the agency reviewed 10 and 15 mph pen-
dulum impact tests done for GM to evaluate the
effects of concentrated loadings, such as might oc-
cur in passive interior impacts. The agency then
compared the chest deflection results for Hybrid III
test dummies subjected to the same impact condi-
tions. By comparing the cadaver and Hybrid III
responses under identical impact conditions, the
agency was able to relate the deflection
measurements made by the Hybrid III to a level of
injury received by a cadaver.

The test results show that when using a relatively
stiff air bag, which was pre-inflated and non-vented,
the average injury level measured on the cadavers
corresponded to an Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS)
of 1.5. (The AIS scale is used by researchers to
classify injuries an AIS of one is a minor injury, while
an AIS of three represents a serious injury.) In tests
with the Hybrid III under the same impact condi-
tions, the measured deflection was 2.7 inches. These
results demonstrate that a system that symmetri-
cally and uniformly distributes impact loads over the
chest can produce approximately threeinches of
deflection and still adequately protect an occupant
from serious injury.

The testing in which the impact loads were not
uniformly or symmetrically spread on the chest or
were highly concentrated over a relatively small area
indicated that chest deflection measured on the
Hybrid III must be limited to 2-inches to assure
those systems provide a level of protection compar-
able to that provided by systems that symmetrically
spread the load. In the lap/shoulder belt tests, the
average AIS was 2.6. The measured deflection for
the Hybrid HI chest in the same type of impact test
was 1.6 inches. Likewise, the results from the

pendulum impact tests showed that as the chest
deflection measured on the Hybrid III increased, the
severity of the injuries increased. In the 10 mph pen-
dulum impacts, the average AIS was 1.3 and the
average deflection was 1.3 inches. In the 15 mph
pendulum impacts the average AIS rose to 2.8.
Under the same impact conditions, the chest deflec-
tion measured on the Hybrid III was 2.63 inches.

Based on these test results NHTSA has decided
to retain the two-inch limit on chest deflection for
systems that do not symmetrically and uniformly
distribute impact loads over a wide area of the chest.
Such systems include automatic safety belts, passive
interiors and air bag systems which use a lap and
shoulder belt. For systems, such as air bag only
systems or air bag combined with a lap belt, which
symmetrically and uniformly distribute chest forces
over a large area of the chest, the agency is adopt-
ing the proposed three-inch deflection limit. This
should assure that both symmetrical and non-
symmetrical systems provide the same level of pro-
tection in an equivalent frontal crash.

In addition to the biomechanical basis for the chest
deflection limits adopted in this notice, there is
another reason for adopting a two-inch deflection
limit for systems that can provide concentrated
loadings over a limited area of the test dummy. The
Hybrid III measures chest deflection by a deflection
sensor located near the third rib of the test dummy.
Tests conducted on the Hybrid III by NHTSA's
Vehicle Research and Test Center have shown that
the deflection sensor underestimates chest displace-
ment when a load is applied to a small area away
from the deflection sensor. (The test report is filed
in Docket No. 74-14, General Reference, Entry 606.)

In a crash, when an occupant is not restrained by
a system which provides centralized, uniform
loading to a large area, such as an air bag system,
the thorax deflection sensor can underestimate the
actual chest compression. Thus, in a belt-restrained
test dummy, the deflection sensor may read two-
inches of deflection, but the actual deflection caused
by the off-center loading of a belt near the bottom
of the ribcage may be greater than two inches of
deflection. Likewise, test dummies in passive in-
terior cars may receive substantial off-center and
concentrated loadings. For example, the agency has
conducted sled tests simulating 30 mile per hour
frontal barrier impacts in which unrestrained test
dummies struck the steering column, as they would
do in a passive interior equipped car. Measurements
of the pre- and post-impact dimensions of the steer-
ing wheel rim showed that there was substantial
non-symmetrical steering wheel deformation, even
though these were frontal impacts. (See, e.g.,

PART 572-PRE 53

"Frontal Occupant Sled Simulation Correlation,
1983 Chevrolet Celebrity Sled Buck," Publication
No. DOT HS 806 728, February 1985.) The expected
off-center chest loadings in belt and passive interior
systems provide a further basis for applying a two-
inch deflection limit for those systems to assure they
provide protection comparable to that provided by
symmetrical systems.

Use of Acceleration Limits for Air Bag Systems

Two commenters raised questions about the use
of an acceleration-based criterion for vehicles which
use a combined air bag and lap/shoulder belt system.
Mercedes-Benz said that acceleration-based criteria
are not appropriate for systems that reduce the
deflection of the ribs but increase chest acceleration
values. Ford also questioned the use of acceleration-
based criteria. Ford said that its tests and testing
done by Mercedes-Benz have shown that using an
air bag in combination with a lap/shoulder belt can
result in increased chest acceleration readings. Ford
said it knew of no data to indicate that combined air
bag-lap/shoulder belt system loads are more in-
jurious than shoulder belt loads alone. Ford recom-
mended that manufacturers have the option of using
either the chest acceleration or chest deflection
criterion until use of the Hybrid III is mandatory.

As discussed previously, acceleration and deflec-
tion represent two separate types of injury
mechanisms. Therefore, the agency believes that it
is important to test for both criteria. Although the
tests by Mercedes-Benz and Ford show higher chest
accelerations, the tests also show that it is possible
to develop air bag and lap/shoulder belt systems and
meet both criteria. Therefore, the agency is retain-
ing the use of the acceleration-based criterion.

Use of Additional Sensors

Mercedes-Benz said the deflection measuring in-
strumentation of the Hybrid HI cannot adequately
measure the interaction between the chest and a
variety of vehicle components. Mercedes-Benz said
that it is necessary to use either additional deflec-
tion sensors or strain gauges. Renault/Peugeot
recommended that the agency account for the dif-
ference between symmetrical systems and asym-
metrical systems by relocating the deflection sensor.

The agency recognizes that the use of additional
sensors could be beneficial in the Hybrid HI to
measure chest deflection. However, such technology
would require considerable further development
before it could be used for compliance purposes.
NHTSA believes that, given the current level of
technology, use of a single sensor is sufficient for

the assessment of deflection-caused injuries in
frontal impacts.

Femurs

The April 1985 notice proposed to apply the femur
injury reduction criterion used with the Part 572 test
dummy to the Hybrid HI. That criterion Hmits the
femur loads to 2250 pounds to reduce the possibil-
ity of femur fractures. No commenter objected to
the proposed femur limit and it is accordingly
adopted.

Ford and Toyota questioned the need to conduct
three pendulum impacts for the knee. They said that
using one pendulum impact with the largest mass
impactor (11 pounds) was sufficient. GM has
informed the agency that the lower mass pendulum
impactors were used primarily for the development
of an appropriate knee design. Now that the knee
design is settled and controlled by the technical
drawings, the tests with the low mass impactors are
not needed. Accordingly, the agency is adopting the
suggestion from Ford and Toyota to reduce the
number of knee calibration tests and will require
only the use of the 11 -pound pendulum impactor.

Hybrid III Positioning Procedure

The April notice proposed new positioning pro-
cedures for the Hybrid HI, primarily because the
curved lumbar spine of that test dummy requires a
different positioning technique than those for the
Part 572. Based on its testing experience, NHTSA
proposed adopting a slightly different version of the
positioning procedure used by GM. The difference
was the proposed use of the Hybrid HI, rather than
the SAE J826 H-point machine, with slightly
modified leg segments, to determine the H-point of
the seat.

GM urged the agency to adopt its dummy position-
ing procedure. GM said that users can more con-
sistently position the test dummy's H-point using the
SAE H-point machine rather than using the Hybrid
HI. Ford, while explaining that it had insufficient
experience with the Hybrid HI to develop data on
positioning procedures, also urged the agency to
adopt GM's positioning procedure. Ford said that
since GM has developed its repeatability data on the
Hybrid HI using its positioning procedure, the
agency should use it as well. Ford also said that the
use of GM's method to position the test dummy
relative to the H-point should reduce variability.

Based on a new series of dummy positioning tests
done by the agency's Vehicle Research and Test
Center (VRTC), NHTSA agrees that use of the SAE
H-point machine is the most consistent method to
position the dummy's H-point on the vehicle seat.

PART 572-PRE 54

Accordingly, the agency is adopting the use of the
H-point machine.

In the new test series, VRTC also evaluated a
revised method for positioning the Hybrid III test
dummy. The testing w^as done after the results of
a joint NHTSA-SAE test series conducted in
November 1985 showed that the positioning pro-
cedure used for the current Part 572 test dummy
and the one proposed in the April 1985 notice for
the Hybrid III does not satisfactorily work in all cars.
(See Docket 74-14, Notice 39, Entry 39.) The posi-
tioning problems are principally due to the curved
lumbar spine of the Hybrid III test dummy. In its
tests, VRTC positioned the Hybrid III by using the
SAE H-point machine and a specification detailing
the final position of the Hybrid III body segments
prior to the crash test. The test results showed that
the H-point of the test dummy could be consistently
positioned but that the vertical location of the
Hybrid III H-point is 'A inch below the SAE H-point
machine on average. Based on these results, the
agency is adopting the new positioning specification
for the Hybrid III which requires the H-point of the
dummy to be within a specified zone centered V4 inch
below the H-point location of the SAE H-point
machine.

GM also urged the agency to make another slight
change in the test procedures. GM said that when
it settles the test dummy in the seat it uses a thin
sheet of plastic behind the dummy to reduce the fric-
tion between the fabric of the seat back and the
dummy. The plastic is removed after the dummy has
been positioned. GM said this technique allows the
dummy to be more repeatably positioned. The
agency agrees that use of the plastic sheet can
reduce friction between the test dummy and the
seat. However, the use of the plastic can also create
problems, such as dislocating the test dummy during
removal of the plastic. Since the agency has suc-
cessfully conducted its positioning tests without
using a sheet of plastic, the agency does not believe
there is a need to require its use.

Ford noted that the test procedure calls for testing
vertically adjustable seats in their lowest position.
It said such a requirement was reasonable for ver-
tically adjustable seats that could not be adjusted
higher than seats that are not vertically adjustable.
However, Ford said that new power seats can be
adjusted to positions above and below the manually
adjustable seat position. It said that testing power
seats at a different position would increase testing
variability. Ford recommended adjusting vertically
adjustable seats so that the dummy's hip point is as
close as possible to the manufacturer's design

H-point with the seat at the design mid-point of its
travel.

The agency recognizes that the seat adjustment
issue raised by Ford may lead to test variability.
However, the agency does not have any data on the
effect of Ford's suggested solution on the design of
other manufacturer's power seats. The agency viall
solicit comments on Ford's proposal in the NPRM
addressing additional Hybrid III injury criteria.

Volvo said that the lumbar supports of its seats
influence the positioning of the Hybrid III. It
requested that the test procedure specify that
adjustable lumbar supports should be positioned in
their rearmost position. Ford made a similar re-
quest. GM, however, indicated that it has not had
any problems positioning the Hybrid III in seats with
lumbar supports. To reduce positioning problems
resulting from the lumbar supports in some vehicles,
the agency is adopting Ford's and Volvo's sug-
gestion.

Test Data Analysis

The Chairman of the Society of Automotive
Engineers Safety Test Instrumentation Committee
noted that the agency proposed to reference an
earlier version of the SAE Recommended Practice
on Instrumentation (SAE J211a, 1971). He sug-
gested that the agency reference the most recent
version (SAE J211, 1980), saying that better data
correlation between different testing organizations
would result. The agency agrees with SAE and is
adopting the SAE J211, 1980 version of the in-
strumentation Recommended Practice.

Ford and GM recommended that the figures 25
and 26, which proposed a standardized coordinate
system for major body segments of the test dummy,
be revised to reflect the latest industry practice on
coordinate signs. Since those revisions will help
ensure uniformity in data analysis by different test
facilities, the agency is making the changes for the
test measurements adopted in this rulemaking.

Both GM and Ford also recommended changes in
the filter used to process electronically measured
crash data. GM suggested that a class 180 filter be
used for the neck force transducer rather than the
proposed class 60 filter. Ford recommended the use
of a class 1,000 filter, which is the filter used for the
head accelerometer.

NHTSA has conducted all of the testing used to
develop the calibration test requirement for the neck
using a class 60 filter. The agency does not have any
data showing the effects of using either the class 180
filter proposed by GM or the class 1,000 filter
proposed by Ford. Therefore the agency has adopted

PART 572-PRE 55

the use of a class 60 filter for the neck transducer
during the calibration test. The agency also used a
class 60 filter for the accelerometer mounted on the
neck pendulum and is therefore adopting the use of
that filter to ensure uniformity in measuring pen-
dulum acceleration.

Optional and Mandatory Use of Hybrid III

AMC, Chrysler, Ford, Jaguar and Subaru all
urged the agency to defer a decision on permitting
the optional use of the Hybrid III test dummy until
manufacturers have had more experience with using
that test dummy. AMC said it has essentially no
experience with the Hybrid HI and urged the agency
to postpone a decision on allowing the optional use
of that test dummy. AMC said this would give small
manufacturers time to gain experience with the
Hybrid HI.

Chrysler also said that it has no experience with
the Hybrid HI test dummy and would need to con-
duct two years of testing to be able to develop suffi-
cient information to address the issues raised in the
notice. Chrysler said that it was currently develop-
ing its 1991 and 1992 models and has no data from
Hybrid HI test dummies on which to base its design
decisions. It said that allowing the optional use of
the Hybrid HI before that time would give a com-
petitive advantage to manufacturers with more
experience with the test device and suggested in-
definitely postponing the mandatory effective date.

Ford said that the effective date proposed for
optional use of the Hybrid HI should be deferred to
allow time to resolve the problems Ford raised in
its comments and to allow manufacturers time to
acquire Hybrid III test dummies. It suggested defer-
ring the proposed optional use until at least
September 1, 1989. Ford also recommended that the
mandatory use be deferred. Jaguar also said it has
not had experience with the Hybrid III and asked
that manufacturers have until September 1, 1987,
to accumulate information on the performance of the
test dummy. Subaru said that it has exclusively used
the Part 572 test dummy and does not have any ex-
perience with the Hybrid III. It asked the agency
to provide time for all manufacturers to gain ex-
perience with the Hybrid III, which in its case would
be two years, before allowing the Hybrid HI as an
alternative.

A number of manufacturers, such as GM, Honda,
Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen, and Volvo, that sup-
ported optional use of the Hybrid HI, urged the
agency not to mandate its use at this time. GM asked
the agency to permit the immediate optional use of
the Hybrid HI, but urged NHTSA to provide more

time for all interested parties to become familiar
with the test dummy before mandating its use.
Honda said that while it supported optional use, it
was just beginning to assess the performance of the
Hybrid III and needed more time before the use of
the Hybrid III is mandated. Mercedes-Benz also sup-
ported the use of the Hybrid HI as an alternative
test device because of its capacity to measure more
types of injuries and because of its improved
biofidelity for the neck and thorax. However,
Mercedes recommended against mandatory use until
issues concerning the Hybrid Ill's use in side impact,
the biofidelity of its leg, durability and chest deflec-
tion measurements are resolved. Nissan opposed the
mandatory us of the Hybrid HI saying there is a
need to further investigate the differences between
the Hybrid HI and the Part 572. Toyota said that
it was premature to set a mandatory effective date
until the test procedure and injury criteria questions
are resolved. Volkswagen supported the adoption of
the Hybrid HI as an alternative test device, but it
opposed mandating its use. Volvo supported the op-
tional use of the Hybrid HI. It noted that since
NHTSA is developing an advanced test dummy,
there might not be a need to require the use of the
Hybrid III in the interim.

The agency recognizes that manufacturers are
concerned about obtaining the Hybrid HI test
dummy and gaining experience with its use prior to
the proposed September 1, 1991, date for mandatory
use of that test dummy. However, information pro-
vided by the manufacturers of the Hybrid III shows
that it will take no longer than approximately one
year to supply all manufacturers with sufficient
quantities of Hybrid Ill's. This means that manufac-
turers will have, at a minimum, more than four years
to gain experience in using the Hybrid HI. In addi-
tion, to assist manufacturers in becoming familiar
with the Hybrid III, NHTSA has been placing in the
rulemaking docket complete information on the
agency's research programs using the Hybrid HI
test dummy in crash and calibration tests. Since
manufacturers will have sufficient time to obtain and
gain experience with the Hybrid HI by September
1, 1991, the agency has decided to mandate use of
the Hybrid HI as of that date.

As discussed earlier in this notice, the evidence
shows that the Hybrid HI is more human-like in its
responses to impacts than the existing Part 572 test
dimimy. In addition, the Hybrid III has the capability
to measure far more potential injuries than the cur-
rent test dummy. The agency is taking advantage
of that capability by adopting a limitation on chest
deflection which will enable NHTSA to measure a

PART 572-PRE 56

significant source of injury that cannot be measured
on the current test dummy. The combination of the
better biofidelity and increased injury-measuring
capabiHty available with the Hybrid III will enhance
vehicle safety.

Adoption of the Hybrid HI will not give a com-
petitive advantage to GM, as claimed by some of the
commenters, such as Chrysler and Ford. As the
developer of the Hybrid HI, GM obviously has had
more experience with that test dummy than other
manufacturers. However, as discussed above, the
agency has provided sufficient leadtime to allow all
manufacturers to develop sufficient experience with
the Hybrid HI test dummy. In addition, as discussed
in the equivalency section of this notice, there are
no data to suggest that it will be easier for GM or
other manufacturers to meet the performance re-
quirements of Standard No. 208 with the Hybrid III.
Thus GM and other manufacturers using Hybrid III
during the phase-in period will not have a com-
petitive advantage over manufacturers using the
existing Part 572 test dummy.

Finally, in its comments GM suggested that the
agency consider providing manufacturers with an
incentive to use the Hybrid III test dummy. GM said
that the agency should consider providing manufac-
turers with extra vehicle credits during the
automatic restraint phase-in period for using the
Hybrid III. The agency does not believe it is
necessary to provide any additional incentive to use
the Hybrid III. The mandatory effective date for use
of the Hybrid III provides sufficient incentive, since
manufacturers will want to begin using the Hybrid
III as soon as possible to gain experience with the
test dummy before that date.

Optional use of the Hybrid III may begin October
23, 1986. The agency is setting an effective date of
less than 180 days to facilitate the efforts of those
manufacturers wishing to use the Hybrid III in cer-
tifying compliance with the automatic restraint
requirements.

Use of Non-instrumented Test Dummies

Ford raised a question about whether the Hybrid
III may or must be used for the non-crash perfor-
mance requirements of Standard No. 208, such as
the comfort and convenience requirements of S7.4.3,
7.4.4, and 7.4.5 of the standard. Ford said that
manufacturers should be given the option of using
either the Part 572 or Hybrid HI test dummy to
meet the comfort and convenience requirements.
The agency agrees that until September 1, 1991,
manufacturers should have the option of using either
the Part 572 or Hybrid HI test dummy. However,
since it is important the crash performance
requirements and comfort and convenience

requirements be linked together through the use of
a single test dummy to measure a vehicle's ability
to meet both sets of requirements. Therefore, begin-
ning on September 1, 1991, use of the Hybrid III
will be mandatory in determining a vehicle's com-
pliance with any of the requirements of Standard
No. 208.

In addition, Ford asked the agency to clarify
whether manufacturers can continue to use Part 572
test dummies in the crash tests for Standard Nos.
212, 219, and 301, which only use non-instrumented
test dummies to simulate the weight of an occupant.
Ford said that the small weight difference and the
small difference in seated posture between the two
test dummies should have no effect on the results
of the testing for Standard Nos. 212, 219, and 301.
The agency agrees that use of either test dummy
should not affect the test results for those standards.
Thus, even after the September 1, 1991, effective
date for use of the Hybrid III in the crash and non-
crash testing required by Standard No. 208,
manufacturers can continue to use, at their option,
either the Part 572 or the Hybrid III test dummy
in tests conducted in accordance with Standard Nos.
212, 219, and 301.

Economic and Other Impacts
NHTSA has examined the impact of this rulemak-
ing action and determined that it is not major within
the meaning of Executive Order 12291 or significant
within the meaning of the Department of Transpor-
tation's regulatory policies and procedures. The
agency has also determined that the economic and
other impacts of this rulemaking action are not
significant. A final regulatory evaluation describing
those effects has been placed in the docket.

In preparing the regulatory evaluation, the agency
has considered the comments from several manufac-
turers that the agency had underestimated the costs
associated with using the Hybrid III. Ford said that
the cost estimates contained in the April 1985 notice
did not take into account the need to conduct sled
tests during development work. Ford said that for
1985, it estimated it will conduct 500 sled tests re-
quiring 1000 test dummy applications. Ford also said
that NHTSA's estimate of the test dummy inven-
tory needed by a manufacturer is low. It said that
it currently has an inventory of 31 Part 572 test
dummies and would expect to need a similar inven-
tory of Hybrid Ill's. In addition. Ford said that
NHTSA's incremental cost estimate of $3,000 per
test dummy was low. It said that the cost for
monitoring the extra data generated by the Hybrid
III is $2,700. Ford said that it also would have to
incur costs due to upgrading its data acquisition and
data processing equipment.

PART 572-PRE 57

GM said that NHTSA's estimate of a 30-test useful
life for the test dummy substantially underestimates
its actual useful life, assuming the test dummy is
repaired periodically. It said that some of its
dummies have been used in more than 150 tests. GM
also said that the agency's assumption that a large
manufacturer conducts testing requiring ap-
proximately 600 dummy applications each year
underestimates the actual number of tests
conducted. In 1984, GM said it conducted sled and
barrier tests requiring 1179 dummy applications.
GM said that the two underestimates, in effect,
cancel each other out, since the dummies are usable
for at least five times as many tests, but they are
used four times as often.

Mitsubishi said that its incremental cost per
vehicle is $7 rather than 40 cent as estimated by the
agency. Mitsubishi explained the reason for this dif-
ference is that the price of an imported Hybrid III
is approximately two times the agency estimate and
its annual production is about one-tenth of the
amount used in the agency estimate. Volvo also said
the agency had underestimated the incremental cost
per vehicle. Volvo said it conducts approximately
500-600 test dummy applications per year in sled
and crash testing, making the incremental cost in
the range of $15-18 per vehicle based on its export
volume to the United States.

NHTSA has re-examined the costs associated with
the Hybrid III test dummy. The basic Hybrid III
dummy with the instrumentation required by this
final rule costs $35,000 or approximately $16,000
more than the existing 572 test dummy. Assuming
a useful life for the test dummy of 150 tests, the total
estimated incremental capital cost is approximately
$107 per dummy test.

To determine the incremental capital cost per test,
the agency had to estimate the useful life of the
Hybrid III. Based on NHTSA's test experience, the
durability of the existing Part 572 test dummy and
the Hybrid III test dummy is essentially identical
with the exception of the Hybrid III ribs. Because
the Hybrid III dummy chest was developed to
simulate human chest deflection, the ribs had to be
designed with much more precision to reflect human
impact response. This redesign uses less metal and
consequently they are more susceptible to damage
during testing than the Part 572 dummy.

As discussed previously, GM estimates that the
Hybrid HI ribs can be used in severe unrestrained
testing approximately 17 times before the ribs or the

damping material needs replacement. In addition,
GM's experience shows that the Hybrid III can
withstand as many as 150 test applications as long
as occasional repairs are made. Ford reported at the
previously cited MVM A meeting that one of its belt-
restrained Hybrid HI test dummies underwent 35
crash tests without any degradation. Clearly, the
estimated useful life of the test dummy is highly
dependent on the type of testing, restrained or
unrestrained, it is used for. Based on its own test
experience and the experience of Ford and GM cited
above, the agency has decided to use 30 applications
as a conservative estimate of the useful life of the
ribs. Assuming a life of 30 tests before a set of ribs
must be replaced at a cost of approximately $2,000,
the incremental per test cost is approximately
$70.

The calibration tests for the Hybrid HI test
dummy have been simplified from the original
specification proposed in the April 1985 notice. The
Transportation Research Center of Ohio, which does
calibration testing of the Hybrid III for the agency,
vehicle manufacturers and others estimates the cost
of the revised calibration tests is $1528. This is $167
less than the calibration cost for the existing Part
572 test dummy.

Numerous unknown variables wall contribute to
the manufacturers' operating expense, such as the
cost of new or modified test facilities or equipment
to maintain the more stringent temperature range
of 69° F to 72° F for test dummies, and capital
expenditures for lab calibration equipment, signal
conditioning equipment, data processing techniques
and capabilities, and additional personnel. Obviously,
any incremental cost for a particular manufacturer
to certify compliance with the automatic restraint
requirements of Standard No. 208 wall also depend
on the extent and nature of its current test facilities
and the size of its developmental and new vehicle
test programs.

In addition to the costs discussed above, Peugeot
raised the issue of a manufacturer's costs increas-
ing because the proposed number of injury
measurements made on the Hybrid III will increase
the number of tests that must be repeated because
of lost data. Since the agency is only adding one
additional measurement, chest deflection, for the
Hybrid HI the number of tests that will have to
be repeated due to lost data should not be substan-
tially greater for the Hybrid HI than for the Part
572.

PART 572-PRE 58

Effective Date

NHTSA has determined that it is in the public in-
terest to make the optional use of the Hybrid III test
dummy effective in 90 days. This will allow manufac-
turers time to order the new test dummy to use in
their new vehicle development work. Mandatory use
of the Hybrid HI does not begin until September 1,
1991.

In consideration of the foregoing, Part 572,
Anthropomorphic Test Dummies, and Part 571.208,
Occupant Crash Protection, of Title 49 of the Code
of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

Part 572-[AMENDED]

1. The authority citation for Part 572 is amended
to read as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1403, and 1407;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

2. A new Subpart E is added to Part 572 to read
as follows:

Subpart E-Hybrid III Test Dummy

§ 572.30 Incorporated materials

§ 572.31 General description

§ 572.32 Head

§572.33 Neck

§572.34 Thorax

§ 572.35 Limbs

§ 572.36 Test conditions and instrumentation

§ 572.30 Incorporated Materials

(a) The drawings and specifications referred to in
this regulation that are not set forth in full are hereby
incorporated in this part by reference. The Director
of the Federal Register has approved the materials
incorporated by reference. For materials subject to
change, only the specific version approved by the
Director of the Federal Register and specified in the
regulation are incorporated. A notice of any change
will be published in the Federal Register. As a con-
venience to the reader, the materials incorporated by
reference are listed in the Finding Aid Table found
at the end of this volume of the Code of Federal
Regulations.

(b) The materials incorporated by reference are
available for examination in the general reference
section of Docket 74-14, Docket Section, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Room 5109,
400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20590.
Copies may be obtained from Rowley-Scher
Reprographics, Inc., 1216 K Street, N.W.,
Washington, DC 20005 ((202) 628-6667). The draw-
ings and specifications are also on file in the
reference library of the Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Ad-
ministration, Washington, D.C.

§ 572.31 General description

(a) The Hybrid III 50th percentile size dummy
consists of components and assemblies specified in
the Anthropomorphic Test Dummy drawing and
specifications package which consists of the follow-
ing six items:

(1) The Anthropomorphic Test Dummy Parts
List, dated July 15, 1986, and containing 13 pages,
and a Parts List Index, dated April 26, 1986, con-
taining 6 pages,

(2) A listing of Optional Hybrid III Dummy
Transducers, dated April 22, 1986, containing 4
pages,

(3) A General Motors Drawing Package identified
by GM drawing No. 78051-218, revision P and subor-
dinate drawings,

(4) Disassembly, Inspection, Assembly and Limbs
Adjustment Procedures for the Hybrid III dummy,
dated July 15, 1986,

(5) Sign Convention for the signal outputs of
Hybrid II dummy transducers, dated July 15, 1986,

(6) Exterior Dimensions of the Hybrid III dummy,
dated July 15, 1986.

(b) The dummy is made up of the following com-
ponent assemblies:

Drawing Number Revision

78051-61 Head Assembly-Complete- (T)

78051-90 Neck Assembly-Complete- (A)

78051-89 Upper Torso Assembly-Complete- (I)
78051-70 Lower Torso Assembly- Without

Pelvic Instrumentation Assembly,

Drawing No. 78051-59 (C)

86-5001-001 Leg Assembly-Complete (LH)-
86-5001-002 Leg Assembly-Complete (RH)-
78051-123 Arm Assembly-Complete (LH)- (D)

78051-124 Arm Assembly-Complete (RH)- (D)

(c) Any specifications and requirements set forth
in this part supercede those contained in General
Motors Drawing No. 78051-218, revision P.

(d) Adjacent segments are joined in a manner such
that throughout the range of motion and also under
crash-impact conditions, there is no contact between
metallic elements except for contacts that exist
under static conditions.

(e) The weights, inertial properties and centers of
gravity location of component assemblies shall con-
form to those listed in drawing 78051-338, revision S.

(f) The structural properties of the dummy are
such that the dummy conforms to this part in every
respect both before and after being used in vehicle
test specified in Standard No. 208 of this Chapter
(§ 571.208).

PART 572-PRE 59

§ 572.32 Head

(a) The head consists of the assembly shown in the
drawing 78051-61, revision T, and shall conform to
each of the drawings subtended therein.

(b) When the head (drawing 78051-61, revision T)
with neck transducer structural replacement (draw-
ing 78051-383, revision F) is dropped from a height
of 14.8 inches in accordance with paragraph (c) of
this section, the peak resultant accelerations at the
location of the accelerometers mounted in the head
in accordance with 572.36(c) shall not be less than
225g, and not more than 275g. The acceleration/
time curve for the test shall be unimodal to the ex-
tent that oscillations occurring after the main ac-
celeration pulse are less than ten percent (zero to
peak) of the main pulse. The lateral acceleration vec-
tor shall not exceed 15g (zero to peak).

(c) Test Procedure. (1) Soak the head assembly
in a test environment at any temperature between
66° F to 78° F and at a relative humidity from 10%
to 70% for a period of at least four hours prior to
its application in a test.

(2) Clean the head's skin surface and the surface
of the impact plate with 1,1,1 Trichlorethane or
equivalent.

(3) Suspend the head, as shown in Figure 19, so
that the lowest point on the forehead is 0.5 inches
below the lowest point on the dummy's nose when
the midsagittal plane is vertical.

(4) Drop the head from the specified height by
means that ensure instant release onto a rigidly sup-
ported flat horizontal steel plate, which is 2 inches
thick and 2 feet square. The plate shall have a clean,
dry surface and any microfinish of not less than 8
microinches (rms) and not more than 80 microinches
(rms).

(5) Allow at least 2 hours between successive tests
on the same head.

§572.33 Neck

(a) The neck consists of the assembly shown in
drawing 78051-90, revision A and conforms to each
of the drawings subtended therein.

(b) When the neck and head assembly (consisting
of the parts 78051-61, revision T; -84; -90, revision
A; -96; -98; -303, revision E; -305; -306; -307, revi-
sion X, which has a neck transducer (drawing
83-5001-008) installed in conformance with
572.36(d), is tested in accordance with paragraph (c)
of this section, it shall have the following
characteristics:

(1) Flexion (i) Plane D, referenced in Figure 20,
shall rotate, between 64 degrees and 78 degrees,
which shall occur between 57 milliseconds (ms) and

64 ms from time zero. In first rebound, the rotation
of plane D shall cross 0 degree between 113 ms and
128 ms.

(ii) The moment measured by the neck transducer
(drawing 83-5001-008) about the occipital condyles,
referenced in Figure 20, shall be calculated by the
following formula: Moment (Ibs-ft) = My -i- 0.02875
X Fjj where My is the moment measured in Ibs-ft by
the moment sensor of the neck transducer and F^
is the force measure measured in lbs by the x axis
force sensor of the neck transducer. The moment
shall have a maximum value between 65 Ibs-ft and
80 Ibs-ft occurring between 47 ms and 58 ms, and
the positive moment shall decay for the first time
to 0 Ib-ft between 97 ms and 107 ms.

(2) Extension (i) Plane D, referenced in Figure
21, shall rotate between 81 degrees and 106 degrees,
which shall occur between 72 and 82 ms from time
zero. In first rebound, the rotation of plane D shall
cross 0 degree between 147 and 174 ms.

(ii) The moment measured by the neck transducer
(drawing 83-5001-008) about the occipital condyles,
referenced in Figure 21, shall be calculated by the
following formula: Moment (Ibs-ft) = My -(- 0.02875
X Fx where My is the moment measured in Ibs-ft by
the moment sensor of the neck transducer and F^
is the force measure measured in lbs by the x axis
force sensor of the neck transducer. The moment
shall have a minimum value between - 39 Ibs-ft and
- 59 Ibs-ft, which shall occur between 65 ms and 79
ms., and the negative moment shall decay for the
first time to 0 Ib-ft between 120 ms and 148 ms.

(3) Time zero is defined as the time of contact be-
tween the pendulum striker plate and the aluminum
honeycomb material.

(c) Test Procedure. (1) Soak the test material in
a test environment at any temperature between 69
degrees F to 72 degrees F and at a relative humidity
from 10% to 70% for a period of at least four hours
prior to its application in a test.

(2) Torque the jamnut (78051-64) on the neck
cable (78051-301, revision E) to 1.0 Ibs-ft ± .2 Ibs-ft.

(3) Mount the head-neck assembly, defined in
paragraph (b) of this section, on a rigid pendulum
as shown in Figure 22 so that the head's midsagit-
tal plane is vertical and coincides with the plane of
motion of the pendulum's longitudinal axis.

(4) Release the pendulum and allow it to fall freely
from a height such that the tangential velocity at
the pendulum accelerometer centerline at the in-
stance of contact with the honeycomb is 23.0 ft/sec
± 0.4 ft/sec. for flexion testing and 19.9 ft/sec ±
0.4 ft/sec. for extension testing. The pendulum
deceleration vs. time pulse for flexion testing shall

PART 572-PRE 60

conform to the characteristics shown in Table A and
the decaying deceleration-time curve shall first cross
5g between 34 ms and 42 ms. The pendulum
deceleration vs. time pulse for extension testing shall
conform to the characteristics shown in Table B and
the decaying deceleration-time curve shall cross 5g
between 38 ms and 46 ms.

Table A
Flexion Pendulum Deceleration vs. Time Pulse

Time (ms)

Flexion

deceleration

level (g)

10 22.50-27.50

20 17.60-22.60

30 12.50-18.50

Any other time above 30 ms 29 maximum

Table B
Extension Pendulum Deceleration vs. Time Pulse

Time (ms)

Extension

deceleration

level (g)

10 17.20-21.20

20 14.00-19.00

30 11.00-16.00

Any other time above 30 ms 22 maximum

(5) Allow the neck to flex without impact of the
head or neck with any object during the test.

§ 572.34 Thorax

(a) The thorax consists of the upper torso
assembly in drawing 78051-89, revision I and shall
conform to each of the drawings subtended therein.

(b) When impacted by a test probe conforming to
S572.36(a) at 22 fps ± .40 fps in accordance with
paragraph (c) of this section, the thorax of a com-
plete dummy assembly (78051-218, revision P) with
left and right shoes (78051-294 and -295) removed,
shall resist with the force measured by the test probe
from time zero of 1 162.5 pounds ± 82.5 pounds and
shall have a sternum displacement measured relative
to spine of 2.68 inches ± .18 inches. The internal
hysteresis in each impact shall be more than 69%
but less than 85%. The force measured is the pro-
duct of pendulum mass and deceleration. Time zero
is defined as the time of first contact between the
upper thorax and pendulum face.

(c) Test procedure. (1) Soak the test dummy in
an environment with a relative humidity from 10%
to 70% until the temperature of the ribs of the test
dummy have stabilized at a temperature between
69° F and 72° F.

(2) Seat the dummy without back and arm sup-
ports on a surface as shown in Figure 23.

(3) Place the longitudinal centerline of the test
probe so that it is .5 ± .04 in. below the horizontal
centerline of the No. 3 Rib (reference drawing
number 79051-64, revision A-M) as shown in Figure
23.

(4) Align the test probe specified in S572.36(a) so
that at impact its longitudinal centerline coincides
within .5 degree of a horizontal line in the dummy's
midsagittal plane.

(5) Impact the thorax with the test probe so that
the longitudinal centerline of the test probe falls
within 2 degrees of a horizontal line in the dummy
midsagittal plane at the moment of impact.

(6) Guide the probe during impact so that it moves
with no significant lateral, vertical, or rotational
movement.

(7) Measure the horizontal deflection of the ster-
num relative to the thoracic spine along the line
established by the longitudinal centerline of the
probe at the moment of impact, using a poten-
tiometer (ref. drawing 78051-317, revision A)
mounted inside the sternum as shown in drawing
78051-89, revision I.

(8) Measure hysteresis by determining the ratio
of the area between the loading and unloading por-
tions of the force deflection curve to the area under
the loading portion of the curve.

§572.35 Limbs

(a) The limbs consist of the following assemblies:
leg assemblies 86-5001-001 and -002 and arm
assemblies 78051-123, revision D, and -124, revision
D, and shall conform to the drawings subtended
therein.

(b) When each knee of the leg assemblies is im-
pacted by the pendulum defined in S572. 36(b) in ac-
cordance with paragraph (c) of this section at 6.9
ft/sec ± .10 ft/sec, the peak knee impact force,
which is a product of pendulum mass and accelera-
tion, shall have a minimum value of not less than 996
pounds and a maximum value of not greater than
1566 pounds.

(c) Test Procedure. (1) The test material consists
of leg assemblies (86-5001-001) left and (-002) right
with upper leg assemblies (78051-46) left and

PART 572-PRE 61

(78051-47) right removed. The load cell simulator
(78051-319, revision A) is used to secure the knee
cap assemblies (79051-16, revision B) as shown in
Figure 24.

(2) Soak the test material in a test environment
at any temperature between 66° F to 78° F and at
a relative humidity from 10% to 70% for a period
of at least four hours prior to its application in a test.

(3) Mount the test material with the leg assembly
secured through the load cell simulator to a rigid sur-
face as shown in Figure 24. No contact is permitted
between the foot and any other exterior surfaces.

(4) Place the longitudinal centerline of the test
probe so that at contact with the knee it is colinear
within 2 degrees with the longitudinal centerline of
the femur load cell simulator.

(5) Guide the pendulum so that there is no signifi-
cant lateral, vertical or rotational movement at time
zero.

(6) Impact the knee with the test probe so that the
longitudinal centerline of the test probe at the
instant of impact falls within .5 degrees of a horizon-
tal line parallel to the femur load cell simulator at
time zero.

(7) Time zero is defined as the time of contact
between the test probe and the knee.

§ 572.36 Test conditions and instrumentation

(a) The test probe used for thoracic impact tests
is a 6 inch diameter cylinder that weighs 51.5 pounds
including instrumentation. Its impacting end has a
flat right angle face that is rigid and has an edge
radius of 0.5 inches. The test probe has an
accelerometer mounted on the end opposite from
impact with its sensitive axis colinear to the
longitudinal centerline of the cylinder.

(b) The test probe used for the knee impact tests
is a 3 inch diameter cylinder that weighs 11 pounds
including instrumentation. Its impacting end has a
flat right angle face that is rigid and has an edge
radius of 0.2 inches. The test probe has an ac-
celerometer mounted on the end opposite from im-
pact with its sensitive axis colinear to the
longitudinal centerline of the cylinder.

(c) Head accelerometers shall have dimensions,
response characteristics and sensitive mass locations
specified in drawing 78051-136, revision A or its
equivalent and be mounted in the head as shown in
drawing 78051-61, revision T, and in the assembly
shown in drawing 78051-218, revision D.

(d) The neck transducer shall have the dimen-
sions, response characteristics, and sensitive axis

locations specified in drawing 83-5001-008 or its
equivalent and be mounted for testing as shown in
drawing 79051-63, revision W, and in the assembly
shown in drawing 78051-218, revision P.

(e) The chest accelerometers shall have the dimen-
sions, response characteristics, and sensitive mass
locations specified in drawing 78051-136, revision
A or its equivalent and be mounted as shown with
adaptor assembly 78051-116, revision D, for
assembly into 78051-218, revision L.

(f) The chest deflection transducer shall have the
dimensions and response characteristics specified in
drawing 78051-342, revision A or equivalent, and be
mounted in the chest deflection transducer assembly
87051-317, revision A, for assembly into 78051-218,
revision L.

(g) The thorax and knee impactor accelerometers
shall have the dimensions and characteristics of
Endevco Model 7231c or equivalent. Each ac-
celerometer shall be mounted with its sensitive axis
colinear with the pendulum's longitudinal centerline.

(h) The femur load cell shall have the dimensions,
response characteristics, and sensitive axis locations
specified in drawing 78051-265 or its equivalent and
be mounted in assemblies 78051-46 and -47 for
assembly into 78051-218, revision L.

(i) The outputs of acceleration and force-sensing
devices installed in the dummy and in the test
apparatus specified by this part are recorded in
individual data channels that conform to the
requirements of SAE Recommended Practice J211,.
JUNE 1980, "Instrumentation for Impact Tests,"
with channel classes as follows:

(1) Head acceleration— Class 1000

(2) Neck force-Class 60

(3) Neck pendulum acceleration— Class 60

(4) Thorax and thorax pendulum

acceleration— Class 180

(5) Thorax deflection-Class 180

(6) Knee pendulum acceleration— Class 600

(7) Femur force— Class 600

(j) Coordinate signs for instrumentation polarity
conform to the sign convention shown in the docu-
ment incorporated by § 572.31(a)(5).

(k) The mountings for sensing devices shall have
no resonance frequency within range of 3 times the
frequency range of the applicable channel class.

(1) Limb joints are set at Ig, barely restraining the
weight of the limb when it is extended horizontally.
The force required to move a limb segment shall not
exceed 2g throughout the range of limb motion.

PART 572-PRE 62

(m) Performance tests of the same component,
segment, assembly, or fully assembled dummy are
separated in time by a period of not less than 30
minutes unless otherwise noted.

(n) Surfaces of dummy components are not
painted except as specified in this part or in draw-
ings subtended by this part. PART 571 [Amended]

2. The authority citation for Part 571 continues
to read as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1403, 1407;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

3. Section S5 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR
571.208) is amended by revising S5.1 to read as
follows:

§571.208 [Amended]

S5. Occupant crash protection requirements.

S5.1 Vehicles subject to S5.1 and manufactured
before September 1, 1991, shall comply with either,
at the manufacturer's option, 5.1(a) or (b). Vehicles
subject to S5.1 and manufactured on or after
September 1, 1991, shall comply with 5.1(b).

(a) Impact a vehicle traveling longitudinally for-
ward at any speed, up to and including 30 mph, into
a fixed collision barrier that is perpendicular to the
line of travel of the vehicle, or at any angle up to
30 degrees in either direction from the perpendicular
to the line of travel of the vehicle under the ap-
plicable conditions of S8. The test dummy specified
in S8. 1.8.1 placed at each front outboard designated
seating position shall meet the injury criteria of
S6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.3. and 6.1.4.

(b) Impact a vehicle traveling longitudinally for-
ward at any speed, up to and including 30 mph, into
a fixed collision barrier that is perpendicular to the
line of travel of the vehicle, or at any angle up to
30 degrees in either direction from the perpendicular
to the line of travel of the vehicle, under the ap-
plicable conditions of S8. The test dummy specified
in S8. 1.8.2 placed at each front outboard designated
seating position shall meet the injury criteria of
S6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, and 6.2.5.

3. Section S5.2 of Standard No. 208 is revised to
read as follows:

S5.2 Lateral moving barrier crash.

S5.2.1 Vehicles subject to S5.2 and manufactured
before September 1, 1991, shall comply with either,
at the manufacturer's option, 5.2.1(a) or (b). Vehicles
subject to S5.2 and manufactured on or after
September 1, 1991, shall comply with 5.2.1(b).

(a) Impact a vehicle laterally on either side by a
barrier moving at 20 mph under the applicable

conditions of S8. The test dummy specified in
S8. 1.8.1 placed at the front outboard designated
seating position adjacent to the impacted side shall
meet the injury criteria of S6.1.2 and S6.1.3.

(b) When the vehicle is impacted laterally under
the applicable conditions of S8, on either side by a
barrier moving at 20 mph, with a test device
specified in S8.1.8.2, which is seated at the front out-
board designated seating position adjacent to the im-
pacted side, it shall meet the injury criteria of S6.2.2,
and S6.2.3.

4. Section S5.3 of Standard No. 208 is revised to
read as follows:

85.3 Rollover Subject a vehicle to a rollover test
under the applicable condition of S8 in either lateral
direction at 30 mph with either, at the manufac-
turer's option, a test dummy specified in S8. 1.8.1
or S8. 1.8.2, placed in the front outboard designated
seating position on the vehicle's lower side as
mounted on the test platform. The test dummy shall
meet the injury criteria of either S6.1.1 or S6.2.1.

5. Section S6 of Standard No. 208 is revised to
read as follows:

S6. Injury Criteria

S6.1 Injury criteria for the Part 572, Subpart B,
50th percentile Male Dummy.

S6. 1 . 1 All portions of the test dummy shall be con-
tained within the outer surfaces of the vehicle
passenger compartment throughout the test.

S6.1.2 The resultant acceleration at the center of
gravity of the head shall be such that the expression:

1

tj-t,

- / adt

J

2.5

t2-t,

shall not exceed 1,000, where a is the resultant
acceleration expressed as a multiple of g (the ac-
celeration of gravity), and tj and t2 are any two
points during the crash.

S6.1.3 The resultant acceleration at the center of
gravity of the upper thorax shall not exceed 60 g's,
except for intervals whose cumulative duration is not
more than 3 milliseconds.

iiiyjL^ lfiia.li u iiiiiiiLSCwiiu^.

S6.1.4 The compressive force transmitted axially
through each upper leg shall not exceed 2250
pounds.

S6.2 Injury criteria for the Part 572, Subpart E,
Hybrid III Dummy

S6.2. 1 All portions of the test dummy shall be con-
tained within the outer surfaces of the vehicle
passenger compartment throughout the test.

PART 572-PRE 63

S6.2.2 The resultant acceleration at the center of
gravity of the head shall be such that the expression:

1

tj-t,

ti

2.5

t2-ti

shall not exceed 1,000, where a is the resultant
acceleration expressed as a multiple of g (the
acceleration of gravity), and ti and t2 are any two
point during the crash.

56.2.3 The resultant acceleration calculated from
the thoracic instrumentation shown in drawing
78051-218, revision L, incorporated by reference in
Part 572, Subpart E of this Chapter, shall not exceed
60g's, except for intervals whose cumulative dura-
tion is not more than 3 milliseconds.

56.2.4 Compression deflection of the sternum
relative to spine, as determined by instrumentation
shown in drawing 78051-317, revision A, incor-
porated by reference in Part 572, Subpart E of this
Chapter, shall not exceed 2 inches for loadings
applied through any impact surfaces except for those
systems which are gas inflated and provide
distributed loading to the torso during a crash. For
gas-inflated systems which provide distributive
loading to the torso, the thoracic deflection shall not
exceed 3 inches.

56.2.5 The force transmitted axially through each
upper leg shall not exceed 2250 pounds.

6. Section S8.1.8 of Standard No. 208 is revised
to read as follows:

S8.1.8 Anthropomorphic test dummies

S8.1 8.1 The anthropomorphic test dummies used
for evaluation of occupant protection systems
manufactured pursuant to applicable portions of
paragraphs S4.1.2, 4.1.3, and S4.1.4 shall conform
to the requirements of Subpart B of Part 572 of this
Chapter.

S8.1.8.2 Anthropomorphic test devices used for
the evaluation of occupant protection systems
manufactured pursuant to applicable portions of
paragraphs S4.1.2, S4.1.3, and S4.1.4 shall conform
to the requirements of Subpart E of Part 572 of this
Chapter.

7. Section SB. 1.9 of Standard No. 208 is revised
to read as follows:

S8. 1.9.1 Each Part 572, Subpart B, test dummy
specified in S8. 1.8.1 is clothed in formfitting cotton
stretch garments with short sleeves and midcalf
length pants. Each foot of the test dummy is equip-
ped with a size llEE shoe which meets the config-

uration size, sole, and heel thickness specifications
of MIL-S-131192 and weighs 1.25 ± 0.2 pounds.

S8. 1.9.2 Each Part 572, Subpart E, test dummy
specified in S8.1.8.2 is clothed in formfitting cotton
stretch garments with short sleeves and midcalf
length pants specified in drawings 78051-292 and
-293 incorporated by reference in Part 572, Subpart
E, of this Chapter, respectively or their equivalents.
A size llEE shoe specified in drawings 78051-294
(left) and 78051-295 (right) or their equivalents is
placed on each foot of the test dummy.

8. Section S8.1.13 of Standard No. 208 is revised
to read as follows:

S8.1.13 Temperature of the test dummy

88. 1.1 3.1 The stabilized temperature of the test
dummy specified by S8. 1.8.1 is at any level between
66 degrees F and 78 degrees F.

58. 1.13.2 The stabilized temperature of the test
dummy specified by S8. 1.8.2 is at any level between
69 degrees F and 72 degrees F.

9. A new fourth sentence is added to section
S8.1.3 to read as follows:

Adjustable lumbar supports are positioned so that
the lumbar support is in its lowest adjustment
position.

10. A new section Sll is added to read as follows:

Sll. Positioning Procedure for the Part 572
Subpart E Test Dummy

Position a test dummy, conforming to Subpart E
of Part 572 of this Chapter, in each front outboard
seating position of a vehicle as specified in SI 1.1
through SI 1.6. Each test dummy is restrained in
accordance with the applicable requirements of
S4. 1.2.1, 4.1.2.2 or S4.6.

SI 1.1 Head. The transverse instrumentation
platform of the head shall be horizontal within V2
degree.

S11.2 Arms

SI 1.2.1 The driver's upper arms shall be adjacent
to the torso with the centerlines as close to a ver-
tical plane as possible.

Sll. 2.2 The passenger's upper arms shall be in
contact with the seat back and the sides of torso.

SI 1.3 Hands

SI 1.3.1 The palms of the driver test dummy shall
be in contact with the outer part of the steering
wheel rim at the rim's horizontal centerline. The
thumbs shall be over the steering wheel rim and
attached with adhesive tape to provide a breakaway
force of between 2 to 5 pounds.

PART 572-PRE 64

SI 1.3.2 The palms of the passenger test dummy
shall be in contact with outside of thigh. The little
finger shall be in contact with the seat cushion.

S11.4 Torso

Sll.4.1 In vehicles equipped with bench seats, the
upper torso of the driver and passenger test
dummies shall rest against the seat back. The mid-
sagittal plane of the driver dummy shall be vertical
and parallel to the vehicle's longitudinal centerline,
and pass through the center of the steering wheel
rim. The midsagittal plane of the passenger dummy
shall be vertical and parallel to the vehicle's
longitudinal centerline and the same distance from
the vehicle's longitudinal centerline as the midsagit-
tal plane of the driver dummy.

SI 1.4.2 In vehicles equipped with bucket seats,
the upper torso of the driver and passenger test
dummies shall rest against the seat back. The mid-
sagittal plane of the driver and the passenger
dummy shall be vertical and shall coincide with the
longitudinal centerline of the bucket seat.

Sll.4.3 Lower torso

Si 1.4.3.1 H-point. The H -point of the driver and
passenger test dummies shall coincide within ¥2 inch
in the vertical dimension and V2 inch in the horizon-
tal dimension of a point V4 inch below the position
of the H-point determined by using the equipment
and procedures specified in SAE J826 (Apr 80)
except that the length of the lower leg and thigh
segments of the H-point machine shall be adjusted
to 16.3 and 15.8 inches, respectively, instead of the
50th percentile values specified in Table 1 of SAE
J826.

SI 1.4.3.2 Pelvic angle. As determined using the
pelvic angle gage (GM drawing 78051-532 incor-
porated by reference in Part 572, Subpart E, of this
chapter) which is inserted into the H-point gaging
hole of the dummy, the angle measured from the
horizontal on the 3 inch flat surface of the gage shall
be 22V2 degrees plus or minus 2V2 degrees.

Si 1.5 Legs. The upper legs of the driver and
passenger test dummies shall rest against the seat
cushion to the extent permitted by placement of the
feet. The initial distance between the outboard knee
clevis flange surfaces shall be 10.6 inches. To the
extent practicable, the left leg of the driver dummy
and both legs of the passenger dummy shall be in
vertical longitudinal planes. Final adjustment to
accommodate placement of feet in accordance with
Si 1.6 for various passenger compartment configura-
tions is permitted.

SI 1.6 Feet

SI 1.6.1 The right foot of the driver test dummy
shall rest on the undepressed accelerator with the
rearmost point of the heel on the floor surface in the
plane of the pedal. If the foot cannot be placed on
the accelerator pedal, it shall be positioned
perpendicular to the tibia and placed as far forward
as possible in the direction of the centerline of the
pedal with the rearmost point of the heel resting on
the floor surface. The heel of the left foot shall be
placed as far forward as possible and shall rest on
the floor surface. The left foot shall be positioned
as flat as possible on the floor surface. The longi-
tudinal centerline of the left foot shall be placed as
parallel as possible to the longitudinal centerline of
the vehicle.

SI 1.6. 2 The heels of both feet of the passenger
test dummy shall be placed as far forward as possi-
ble and shall rest on the floor surface. Both feet shall
be positioned as flat as possible on the floor surface.
The longitudinal centerline of the feet shall be placed
as parallel as possible to the longitudinal centerline
of the vehicle.

SI 1.7 Test dummy positioning for latchplate ac-
cess. The reach envelopes specified in S7.4.4 are ob-
tained by positioning a test dummy in the driver's
seat or passenger's seat in its forwardmost adjust-
ment position. Attach the lines for the inboard and
outboard arms to the test dummy as described in
Figure 3 of this standard. Extend each line
backward and outboard to generate the compliance
arcs of the outboard reach envelope of the test dum-
my's arms.

SI 1.8 Test dummy positioning for belt contact
force. To determine compliance with S7.4.3 of this
standard, position the test dummy in the vehicle in
accordance with the requirements specified in Sll.l
through SI 1.6 and under the conditions of S8.1.2
and S8.1.3. Pull the.belt webbing three inches from
the test dummy's chest and release until the webb-
ing is within 1 inch of the test dummy's chest and
measure the belt contact force.

SI 1.9 Manual belt adjustment for dynamic
testing. With the test dummy at its designated
seating position as specified by the appropriate re-
quirements of S8.1.2, S8.1.3 and Sll.l through
S11.6, place the Type 2 manual belt around the test
dummy and fasten the latch. Remove all slack from
the lap belt. Pull the upper torso webbing out of the
retractor and allow it to retract; repeat this opera-
tion four times. Apply a 2 to 4 pound tension load

PART 572-PRE 65

to the lap belt. If the belt system is equipped with Issued on July 21, 1986

a tension-relieving device introduce the maximum

amount of slack into the upper torso belt that is

recommended by the manufacturer for normal use

in the owner's manual for the vehicle. If the belt ir ct h

system is not equipped with a tension-relieving aIT"^ ^teed

device, allow the excess webbing in the shoulder belt Admmistrator

to be retracted by the retractive force of the 51 F.R. 26688

retractor. July 25,1986

PART 572-PRE 66

PART 572— ANTHROPOMORPHIC TEST DUMMIES

Subpart A— General

§ 572.1 Scope. This part describes the
anthropomorphic test dummies that are to be used
for compliance testing of motor vehicles and motor
vehicle equipment with motor vehicle safety
standards.

§ 572.2 Purpose. The design and performance
criteria specified in this part are intended to
describe measuring tools with sufficient precision
to give repetitive and correlative results under
similar test conditions and to reflect adequately
the protective performance of a vehicle, or item or
motor vehicle equipment, with respect to human
occupants.

S 572.3 Application. This part does not in
itself impose duties or liabilities on any person. It is
a description of tools that measure the perform-
ance of occupant protection systems required by
the safety standards that incorporate it. It is
designed to be referenced by, and become a part
of, the test procedures specified in motor vehicle
safety standards such as Standard No. 208, Occu-
pant Crash Protection.

§ 572.4 Terminology.

(a) The term "dummy," when used in this
Subpart A, refers to any test device described by
this part. The term "dummy," when used in any
other subpart of this part, refers to the particular
dummy described in that part.

(b) Terms describing parts of the dummy, such
as "head," are the same as names for correspond-
ing parts of the human body.

(c) The term "upright position" means the posi-
tion of the dummy when it is seated in accordance
with the procedures of 572.11(i).

Subpart B— 50th Percentile Male
§ 572.5 General description.

(a) The dummy consists of the component
assemblies specified in Figure 1, which are described
in their entirety by means of approximately 250
drawings and specifications that are grouped by
component assemblies under the following nine
headings:

SA 150 M070 Right arm assembly

SA 150 M071 Left arm assembly

SA 150 M050 Lumbar spine assembly

SA 150 M060 Pelvis and abdomen assembly

SA 150 M080 Right leg assembly

SA 150 M081 Left leg assembly

SA 150 MOlO Head assembly

SA 150 M020 Neck assembly

SA 150 M030 Shoulder-thorax assembly

The drawings and specifications are incorporated in
this Part by reference to the nine headings, and are
available for examination in Docket 73-8, Room
5109, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.
20590. [Copies may be obtained from Rowley-Scher
Reprographics, Inc. 1216 K Street, N.W., Wash-
ing1x)n, D.C. 20005, attention Mr. Allan Goldberg and
Mr. Mark Krysinski ((202) 628-6667). The drav.Tngs
and specifications are subject to changes, but any
change will be accomplished by appropriate ad-
ministrative procedures, will be announced by
pubbcation in the Federal Register, and will be
available for examination and copying as indicated in
the paragraph. The drawings and specifications are
also on file in the reference library of the Federal
Reigister, National Archives and Records Services,
General Services Administration, Washington, D.C.
(50 F.R. 25422-June 19, 1985. Effective: June 19,
1985)1

The drawings and specifications are on file in the
reference library of the Federal Register, National
Archives and Records Service, General Services
Administration, Washington, D.C.

(b) Adjacent segments are joined in a manner
such that throughout the range of motion and also
under crash-impact conditions there is no contact

(ftov. 6/19/S5)

PART 572-1

between metallic elements except for contacts that
exist under static conditions.

(c) The structural properties of the dummy are
such that the dummy conforms to this part in every
respect both before and after being used in vehicle
tests specified in Standard No. 208 (§ 571.208).

A specimen of the dummy is available for surface
measurements, and access can be arranged
through: Office of Vehicle Safety Standards,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

§ 572.6 Head.

(a) The head consists of the assembly shown as
number SA 150 MO 10 in Figure 1 and conforms to
each of the drawings subtended by number SA 150
MOIO.

(b) When the head is dropped from a height of 10
inches in accordance with paragraph (c) of this
section, the peak resultant accelerations at the
location of the accelerometers mounted in the head
form in accordance with § 572.11(b) shall be not
less than 210g, and not more than 260g. The
acceleration/time curve for the test shall be
unimodal and shall lie at or above the lOOg level for
an interval not less than 0.9 milliseconds and not
more than 1.5 milliseconds. The lateral accelera-
tion vector shall not exceed lOg.

(c) Test procedure:

(1) Suspend the head as shown in Figure 2, so
that the lowest point on the forehead is 0.5 inches
below the lowest point on the dummy's nose when
the midsagittal plane is vertical.

(2) Drop the head from the specified height by a
means that ensures instant release onto a rigidly
supported flat horizontal steel plate, 2 inches thick
and 2 feet square, which has a clean, dry surface and
any microfinish of not less than 8 microinches (rms)
and not more than 80 microinches (rms).

(3) Allow a time period of at least 2 hours
between successive tests on the same head.

§ 572.7 Neck.

(a) The neck consists of the assembly shown as
number SA 150 M020 in Figure 1 and conforms to
each of the drawings subtended by number SA 150
M020.

(b) When the neck is tested with the head in
accordance with paragraph (c) of this section, the
head shall rotate in reference to the pendulum's

longitudinal centerline a total of 68° ± 5° about its
center of gravity, rotating to the extent specified
in the following table at each indicated point in
time, measured from impact, with a chordal
displacement measured at its center of gravity that
is within the limits specified. The chordal displace-
ment at time T is defined as the straight line
distance between (1) the position relative to the
pendulum arm of the head center of gravity at time
zero, and (2) the position relative to the pendulum
arm of the head center of gravity at time T as il-
lustrated by Figure 3. The peak resultant accelera-
tion recorded at the location of the accelerometers
mounted in the head form in accordance with
§ 572.11(b) shall not exceed 26g. The pendulum
shall not reverse direction imtil the head's center
of gravity returns to the original zero time position
relative to the pendulum arm.

Time (ms)

Displacement

Rotation (degrees)

± (2 + .08T)

(inches ± 0.5)

0

0

0.0

30

30

2.6

60

46

4.8

Maximum

60

5.5

60

75

4.8

30

95

2.6

0

112

0.0

(c) Test procedure:

(1) Mount the head and neck on a rigid
pendulum as specified in Figure 4, so that the
head's midsagittal plane is vertical and coincides
with the plane of motion of the pendulum's
longitudinal centerline. Mount the neck directly
to the pendulum as shown in Figure 4.

(2) Release the pendulum and allow it to fall
freely from a height such that the velocity at
impact is 23.5 ±2.0 feet per second (fps),
measured at the center of the accelerometer
specified in Figure 4.

(3) Decelerate the pendulum to a stop with an
acceleration-time pulse described as follows:

(i) Establish 5g and 20g levels on the a-t
curve.

(ii) Establish t^ at the point where the rising
a-t curve first crosses the 5g level, t, at the
point where the rising a-t curve first crosses
the 20g level, t^ at the point where the decaying

(Rev. 6/19/65)

PART 572-2

a - 1 curve last crosses the 20g level, and t^ at the
point where the decaying a - 1 curve first crosses
the 5g level.

(iii) t.,-t, shall be not more than 3
milliseconds.

(iv) tj - 1., shall be not less than 25 milliseconds
and not more than 30 milliseconds.

(v) t^-t,j shall be not more than 10
milliseconds.

(vi) The average deceleration between t^ and
tj shall be not less than 20g and not more than
24g.

(vii) Allow the neck to flex without impact of
the head or neck with any object other than the
pendulum arm.

§ 572.8 Thorax.

(a) The thorax consists of the assembly shown as
number SA 150 M030 in Figure 1, and conforms to
each of the drawings subtended by number SA 150
M030.

(b) The thorax contains enough unobstructed
interior space behind the rib cage to permit the
midpoint of the sternum to be depressed 2 inches
without contact between the rib cage and other
parts of the dummy or its instrumentation, except
for instruments specified in subparagraph (d) (7) of
this section.

(c) When impacted by a test probe conforming to
$ 572.11(a) at 14 fps and at 22 fps in accordance
with paragraph (d) of this section, the thorax shall
resist with forces measured by the test probe of not
more than 1450 pounds and 2250 pounds, respec-
tively, and shall deflect by amounts not greater
than 1.1 inches and 1.7 inches, respectively. The in-
ternal hysteresis in each impact shall not be less
than 50 percent and not more than 70 percent.

(d) Test Procedure:

(1) With the dummy seated without back
support on a surface as specified in § 572.11(i)
and in the orientation specified in § 572.1 l(i),
adjust the dummy arms and legs until they are
extended horizontally forward parallel to the
midsagittal plane.

(2) Place the longitudinal center line of the
test probe so that it is 17.7 ±0.1 inches above the
seating surface at impact.

(3) Align the test probe specified in § 572.11
(a) so that at impact its longitudinal centerline

coincides within 2 degrees of a horizontal line in
the dummy's midsagittal plane.

(4) Adjust the dummy so that the surface area
on the thorax immediately adjacent to the pro-
jected longitudinal center line of the test probe is
vertical. Limb support, as needed to achieve and
maintain this orientation, may be provided by
placement of a steel rod of any diameter not less
than one-quarter of an inch and not more than
three-eighths of an inch, with hemispherical
ends, vertically under the limb at its projected
geometric center.

(5) Impact the thorax with the test probe so
that its longitudinal centerline falls within 2
degrees of a horizontal line in the dummy's
midsagittal plane at the moment of impact.

(6) Guide the probe during impact so that it
moves with no significant lateral, vertical, or
rotational movement.

(7) Measure the horizontal deflection of the
sternum relative to the thoracic spine along the
line established by the longitudinal centerline of
the probe at the moment of impact, using a
potentiometer mounted inside the sternum.

(8) Measure hysteresis by determining the
ratio of the area between the loading and
unloading portions of the force deflection curve
to the area under the loading portion of the
curve.

§ 572.9 Lumbar spine, abdomen, and pelvis.

(a) The lumbar spine, abdomen, and pelvis
consist of the assemblies designated as numbers
SA 150 M050 and SA 150 M060 in Figure 1 and
conform to the drawings subtended by these
numbers.

(b) When subjected to continuously applied force
in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section,
the lumbar spine assembly shall flex by an amount
that permits the rigid thoracic spine to rotate from
its initial position in accordance with Figure 11 by
the number of degrees shown below at each
specified force level, and straighten upon removal
of the force to within 12 degrees of its initial posi-
tion in accordance with Figure 11.

Flexion Force (±6

(degrees) pounds)

0 0

20 28

30 40

40 52

PART 572-3

(c) Test procedure:

(1) Assemble the thorax, lumbar spine, pelvic,
and upper leg assemblies (above the femur force
transducers), ensuring that all component
surfaces are clean, dry, and untreated unless
otherwise specified, and attach them to the
horizontal fixture shown in Figure 5 at the two
link rod pins and with the mounting brackets for
the lumbar test fixtures illustrated in Figure 6 to
9.

(2) Attach the rear mounting of the pelvis to
the pelvic instrument cavity rear face at the four
y^ " cap screw holes and attach the front mount-
ing at the femur axial rotation joint. Tighten the
mountings so that the pelvic-lumbar adapter is
horizontal and adjust the femur friction plungers
at each hip socket joint to 240 inch-pounds
torque.

(3) Flex the thorax forward 50° and then
rearward as necessary to return it to its initial
position in accordance with Figure 11 unsup-
ported by external means.

(4) Apply a forward force perpendicular to
the thorax instrument cavity rear face in the
midsagittal plane 15 inches above the top sur-
face of the pelvic-lumbar adapter. Apply the
force at any torso deflection rate between .5
and 1.5 degrees per second up to 40° of flexion
but no further, continue to apply for 10 sec-
onds that force necessary to maintain 40° of
flexion, and record the force with an instrument
mounted to the thorax as shown in Figure 5.
Release all force as rapidly as possible and
measure the return angle 3 minutes after the
release.

(d) When the abdomen is subjected to con-
tinuously applied force in accordance with para-
graph (e) of this section, the abdominal force-
deflection curve shall be within the two curves
plotted in Figure 10.

(e) Test procedure:

(1) Place the assembled thorax, lumbar
spine, and pelvic assemblies in a supine position
on a flat, rigid, smooth, dry, clean horizontal
surface, ensuring that all component surfaces
are clean, dry, and untreated unless otherwise
specified.

(2) Place a rigid cylinder 6 inches in diam-
eter and 18 inches long transversely across the
abdomen, so that the cylinder is symmetrical
about the midsagittal plane, with its longi-

tudinal centerline horizontal and perpendicular
to the midsagittal plane at a point 9.2 inches
above the bottom line of the buttocks, measured
with the dummy positioned in accordance with
Figure 11.

(3) Establish the zero deflection point as
the point at which a force of 10 pounds has
been reached.

(4) Apply a vertical downward force through
the cylinder at any rate between 0.25 and 0.35
inches per second.

(5) Guide the cylinder so that it moves without
significant lateral or rotational movement.

§ 572.10 Limbs.

(a) The limbs consist of the assemblies shown as
numbers SA 150 M070, SA 150 M071, SA 150
M080, and SA 150 M081 in Figure 1 and conform
to the drawings subtended by these numbers.

(b) When each knee is impacted at 6.9 ft/ sec. in
accordance with paragraph (c) of this section, the
maximum force on the femur shall be not more
than 2500 pounds and not less than 1850 pounds,
with a duration above 1000 pounds of not less than
1.7 milliseconds.

(c) Test procedure:

(1) Seat the dummy without back support on a
surface as specified in § 572.11(1) that is
17.3 ±0.2 inches above a horizontal surface,
oriented as specified in § 572.11(1), and with the
hip joint adjustment at any setting between Ig
and 2g. Place the dummy legs in planes parallel
to its midsagittal plane (knee pivot centerline
perpendicular to the midsagittal plane) and with
the feet flat on the horizontal surface. Adjust the
feet and lower legs until the lines between the
midpoints of the knee pivots and the ankle pivots
are at any angle not less than 2 degrees and not
more than 4 degrees rear of the vertical,
measured at the centerline of the knee pivots.

(2) Reposition the dummy if necessary so that
the rearmost point of the lower legs at the level
one inch below the seating surface remains at
any distance not less than 5 inches and not more
than 6 inches forward of the forward edge of the
seat.

PART 572-4

(3) Align the test probe specified in
$ 572.11(a) so that at impact its longitudinal
centerline coincides within ±2° with the
longitudinal centerline of the femur.

(4) Impact the knee with the test probe
moving horizontally and parallel to the midsagit-
tal plane at the specified velocity.

(5) Guide the probe during impact so that it
moves with no significant lateral, vertical, or
rotational movement.

§ 572.11 Test conditions and instrumentation.

(a) The test probe used for thoracic and knee
impact tests is a cylinder 6 inches in diameter that
weighs 51.5 pounds including instrumentation. Its
impacting end has a flat right face that is rigid and
that has an edge radius of 0.5 inches.

(b) Accelerometers are mounted in the head on
the horizontal transverse bulkhead shown in the
drawings subreferenced under assembly No. SA
150 MOlO in Figure 1, so that their sensitive axes
intersect at a point in the midsagittal plane 0.5
inches above the horizontal bulkhead and 1.9
inches ventral of the vertical mating surface of the
skull with the skull cover. One accelerometer is
aligned with its sensitive axis perpendicular to the
horizonal bulkhead in the midsagittal plane and
with its seismic mass center at any distance up to
0.3 inches superior to the axial intersection
point. Another accelerometer is aligned with its
sensitive axis parallel to the horizontal bulkhead
and perpendicular to the midsagittal plane, and
with its seismic mass center at any distance up to
1.3 inches to the left of the axial intersection point
(left side of dummy is the same as that of man). A
third accelerometer is aligned with its sensitive
axis parallel to the horizontal bulkhead in the mid-
sagittal plane, and with its seismic mass center at
any distance up to 1.3 inches dorsal to the axial
intersection point.

(c) Accelerometers are mounted in the thorax by
means of a bracket attached to the rear vertical
surface (hereafter "attachment surface") of the
thoracic spine so that their sensitive axes intersect
at a point in the midsagittal plane 0.8 inches below
the upper surface of the plate to which the neck
mounting bracket is attached and 3.2 inches
perpendicularly forward of the surface to which

the accelerometer bracket is attached. One
accelerometer has its sensitive axis oriented
parallel to the attachment surface in the midsagit-
tal plane, with its seismic mass center at any
distance up to 1.3 inches inferior to the inter-
section of the sensitive axes specified above.
Another accelerometer has its sensitive axis
oriented parallel to the attachment surface and
perpendicular to the midsagittal plane, with its
seismic mass center at any distance up to 0.2
inches to the right of the intersection of the sen-
sitive axes specified above. A third accelerometer
has its sensitive axis oriented perpendicular to the
attachment surface in the midsagittal plane, with
its seismic mass center at any distance up to 1.3
inches dorsal to the intersection of the sensitive
axes specified above. Accelerometers are oriented
with the dummy in the position specified in
§ 572.11(i).

(d) A force-sensing device is mounted axially in
each femur shaft so that the transverse centerline
of the sensing element is 4.25 inches from the
knee's center of rotation.

(e) The outputs of acceleration and forcesensing
devices installed in the dummy and in the test
apparatus specified by this Part are recorded in
individual data channels that conform to the
requirements of SAE Recommended Practice
J211a, December 1971, with channel classes as
follows:

(1) Head acceleration— Class 1000.

(2) Pendulum acceleration— Class 60.

(3) Thorax acceleration— Class 180.

(4) Thorax compression— Class 180.

(5) Femur force— Class 600.

(f) The mountings for sensing devices have no
resonance frequency within a range of 3 times the
frequency range of the applicable channel class.

(g) Limb joints are set at Ig, barely restraining
the weight of the limb when it is extended horizon-
tally. The force required to move a limb segment
does not exceed 2g throughout the range of limb
motion.

(h) Performance tests are conducted at any
temperature from 66° F to 78° F and at any
relative humidity from 10 percent to 70 percent
after exposure of the dummy to these conditions
for a period of not less than 4 hours.

PART 572-5

(i) For the performances tests specified in
§§ 572.8, 572.9, and 572.10, the dummy is posi-
tioned in accordance with Figure 11 as follows:

(1) The dummy is placed on a flat, rigid,
smooth, clean, dry, horizontal, steel test surface
whose length and width dimensions are not less
than 16 inches, so that the dummy's midsagittal
plane is vertical and centered on the test surface
and the rearmost points on its lower legs at the
level of the test surface are at any distance not
less than 5 inches and not more than 6 inches
forward of the forward edge of the test surface.

(2) The pelvis is adjusted so that the upper sur-
face of the lumbar-pelvic adapter is horizontal.

(3) The shoulder yokes are adjusted so that
they are at the midpoint of their anterior
posterior travel with their upper surfaces
horizontal.

(4) The dummy is adjusted so that the rear sur-
faces of the shoulders and buttocks are tangent
to a transverse vertical plane.

(5) The upper legs are positioned symmetrically
about the midsagittal plane so that the distance
between the knee pivot bolt heads is 11.6 inches.

(6) The lower legs are positioned in planes
parallel to the midsagittal plane so that the lines
between the midpoint of the knee pivots and the
ankle pivots are vertical.

(j) The dummy's dimensions, as specified in
drawing number SA 150 M002, are determined as
follows:

(1) With the dummy seated as specified in
paragraph (i), the head is adjusted and secured so
that its occiput is 1.7 inches forward of the
transverse vertical plane with the vertical
mating surface of the skull with its cover parallel
to the transverse vertical plane.

(2) The thorax is adjusted and secured so that
the rear surface of the chest accelerometer
mounting cavity is inclined 3° forward of
vertical.

(3) Chest and waist circumference and chest
depth measurements are taken with the dummy
positioned in accordance with paragraph (i), (1)
and (2) of this section.

(4) The chest skin and abdominal sac are
removed and all following measurements are
made without them.

(5) Seated height is measured from the seating
surface to the uppermost point on the head-skin
surface.

(6) Shoulder pivot height is measured from the
seating surface to the center of the arm elevation
pivot.

(7) H-point locations are measured from the
seating surface to the center of the holes in the
pelvis flesh covering in line with the hip motion
ball.

(8) Knee pivot distance from the backline is
measured to the center of the knee pivot bolt
head.

(9) Knee pivot distance from floor is measured
from the center of the knee pivot bolt head to the
bottom of the heel when the foot is horizontal
and pointing forward.

(10) Shoulder width measurement is taken at
arm elevation pivot center height with the
centerlines between the elbow pivots and the
shoulder pivots vertical.

(11) Hip width measurement is taken at widest
point of pelvic section.

(k) Performance tests of the same component,
segment, assembly, or fully assembled dummy are
separated in time by a period of not less than 30
minutes unless otherwise noted.

(1) Surfaces of dummy components are not
painted except as specified in this part or in draw-
ings subtended by this part.

Subpart C— Three Year Old Child

Sec.

572.15 General description.

572.16 Head.

572.17 Neck.

572.18 Thorax.

572.19 Lumbar, spine, abdomen and plevis.

572.20 Limbs.

572.21 Test conditions and instrumentation.

Subpart C— Three Year Old Child

§ 572.15 General description.

(a)(1) The dummy consists of the component
assemblies specified in drawing SA 103C 001,
which are described in their entirety by means of
approximately 122 drawings and specifications
grouped by component assemblies under the
following headings:

PART 572-6

SA 103C 010 Head Assembly

SA 103C 020 Neck Assembly

SA 103C 030 Torso Assembly

SA 103C 041 Upper Arm Assembly Left

SA 103C 042 Upper Arm Assembly Right

SA 103C 051 Forearm Hand Assembly Left

SA 103C 052 Forearm Hand Assembly Right

SA 103C 061 Upper Leg Assembly Left

SA 103C 062 Upper Leg Assembly Right

SA 103C 071 Lower Leg Assembly Left

SA 103C 072 Lower Leg Assembly Right

SA 103C 081 Foot Assembly Left

SA 103C 082 Foot Assembly Right

The drawings and specifications are incorporated
in this part by reference to the thirteen headings
and are available for examination in Docket 78-09,
Room 5109, 400 Seventh Street S.W., Wash-
ington, D.C. 20590. (Copies may be obtained from
Rowley-Scher Reprographics, Inc., 1216 K Street,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005, attention Mr.
Allan Goldberg and Mr. Mark Krysinski ((202)
628-6667). (50 F.R. 25422-June 19,1985. Effec-
tive: June 19, 1985)1

(2) The patterns of all cast and molded parts for
reproduction of the molds needed in manufactur-
ing of the dummies are incorporated in this part by
reference. A set of the patterns can be obtained on
a loan basis by manufacturers of the test dummies,
or others if need is shown, from the Office of
Vehicle Safety Standards, NHTSA, 400 Seventh
Street S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

(3) [An Operation and Maintenance Manual
(dated May 28, 1976, Contract No. DOT-
HS-6-01294) with instructions for the use and
maintenance of the test dummies is incorporated in
this Part by reference. Copies of the manual can be
obtained from Rowley-Scher Reprographics, Inc.
All provisions of this manual are valid unless
modified by this regulation. This document is
available for examination in Docket 78-09. (50 F.R.
25422-June 19, 1985. Effective: June 19, 1985)1

(4) The drawings, specifications and the manual
are subject to changes, but any change will be
accomplished by appropriate administrative pro-
cedures and announced by publication in the
Federal Register and be available for examination
and copying as indicated in this paragraph.

(5) The drawings, specifications, patterns, and
manual are on file in the reference library of the
Federal Register, National Archives and Records
Service, General Services Administration,
Washington, D.C.

(b) Adjacent segments are joined in a manner
such that throughout the range of motion and
also under simulated crash-impact conditions,
there is no contact between metallic elements ex-
cept for contacts that exist under static condi-
tions.

(c) The structural properties of the dummy are
such that the dummy conforms to this part in
every respect both before and after being used in
tests specified by Standard No. 213, Child
Restraint Systems (§ 571.213).

§ 572.16 Head.

(a) The head consists of the assembly shown in
drawing SA 103C 001 by number SA 103C 010,
and conforms to each of the drawings listed
under this number on drawing SA 103C 002,
sheet 8.

(b) When the head is impacted in accordance
with paragraph (c) of this section by a test probe
conforming to § 572.21(a) at 7 fps., the peak
resultant accelerations measured at the location
of the accelerometers mounted in the headform
in accordance with § 572.21(b) shall be not less
than 95g, and not more than 115g. The recorded
acceleration-time curve for this test shall be
unimodal at, or above the 50g level and shall lie
at, or above that level for an interval not less
than 2.0 and not more than 3.0 milliseconds. The
lateral acceleration vector shall not exceed 7g.

(c) Test Procedure:

(1) Seat the dummy on a seating surface hav-
ing a back support as specified in § 572.21 (h) and
orient the dummy in accordance with § 572.21(h)
and adjust the joints of the limbs at any setting
between Ig and 2g, which just supports the
limbs' weight when the limbs are extended
horizontally forward.

(2) Adjust the test probe so that its
longitudinal centerline is at the forehead at the
point of orthogonal intersection of the head mid-
sagittal plane and the transverse plane which is
perpendicular to the "Z" axis of the head
(longitudinal centerline of the skull anchor) and
is located 0.6 ± .1 inches above the centers of the
head center of gravity reference pins and coin-
cides within 2 degrees with the line made by the
intersection of horizontal and midsagittal planes
passing through this point.

(3) Adjust the dummy so that the surface area
on the forehead immediately adjacent to the pro-
jected longitudinal centerline of the test probe is
vertical.

(R*v. e/ie/«s)

PART 572-7

(4) Impact the head with the test probe so that at
the moment of impact the probe's longitudinal
centerline falls within 2 degrees of a horizontal line
in the dummy's midsagittal plane.

(5) Guide the probe during impact so that it
moves with no significant lateral, vertical, or rota-
tional movement.

(6) Allow a time period of at least 20 minutes
between successive tests of the head.

§ 572.17 Neck.

(a) The neck consists of the assembly shown in
drawing SA 103C 001 as number SA 103C 020, and
conforms to each of the drawings listed under this
number on drawing SA 103C 002, sheet 9.

(b) When the head-neck assembly is tested in
accordance with paragraph (c) of this section, the
head shall rotate in reference to the pendulum's
longitudinal centerline a total of 84 degrees ± 8
degrees about its center of gravity, rotating to the
extent specified in the following table at each
indicated point in time, measured from impact,
with the chordal displacement measured at its
center of gravity. The chordal displacement at
time T is defined as the straight line distance
between (1) the position relative to the pendulum
arm of the head center of gravity at time zero, and
(2) the position relative to the pendulum arm of the
head center of gravity at time T as illustrated by
Figure 3. The peak resultant acceleration recorded
at the location of the accelerometers mounted in
the headform in accordance with § 572.21(b) shall
not exceed 30g. The pendulum shall not reverse
direction until the head's center of gravity returns
to the original zero time position relative to the
pendulum arm.

Chordal

Rotation

Time (ms)

Displacement

(degrees)

± (2 + .08T)

(inches ±0.8)

0

0

0

30

21

2.2

60

36

4.3

Maximum

62

5.8

60

91

4.3

30

108

2.2

0

123

0

(c) Test Procedure:

(1) Mount the head and neck on a rigid pendulum
as specified in Figure 4, so that the head's

midsagittal plane is vertical and coincides with the
plane of motion of the pendulum's longitudinal
centerline. Mount the neck directly to the
pendulum as shown in Figure 15.

(2) Release the pendulum and allow it to fall
freely from a height such that the velocity at im-
pact is 17.00 ± 1.0 feet per second (fps), measured
at the center of the accelerometer specified in
Figure 4.

(3) Decelerate the pendulum to a stop with an
acceleration-time pulse described as follows:

(i) Establish 5g and 20g levels on the a-t curve.

(ii) Establish ti at the point where the a-t
curve first crosses the 5g level, t2 at the point
where the rising a-t curve first crosses the 20g
level, ts at the point where the decaying a-t curve
last crosses the 20g level, and t4 at the point where
the decaying a-t curve first crosses the 5g level.

(iii) t2-ti, shall be not more than 4
milliseconds.

(iv) t3-t2, shall be not less than 18 and not
more than 21 milliseconds.

(v) t4-t3, shall be not more than 5 milliseconds.

(vi) The average deceleration between t2 and
ta shall be not less than 20g and not more than 34g.

(4) Allow the neck to flex without contact of the
head or neck with any object other than the
pendulum arm.

(5) Allow a time period of at least 1 hour
between successive tests of the head and neck.

§ 572.18 Thorax.

(a) The thorax consists of the part of the torso
shown in assembly drawing SA 103C 001 by
number SA 103C 030 and conforms to each of the
applicable drawings listed under this number on
drawings SA 103C 002, sheets 10 and 11.

(b) When impacted by a test probe conforming
to § 572.21(a) at 13 fps. in accordance with
paragraph (c) of this section, the peak resultant ac-
celerations at the location of the accelerometers
mounted in the chest cavity in accordance with
§ 572.21(c) shall be not less than 50g and not more
than 70g. The acceleration-time curve for the test
shall be unimodal at or above the 30g level and
shall lie at or above the 30g level for an interval not
less than 2.5 milliseconds and not more than 4.0
milliseconds. The lateral acceleration shall not
exceed 5g.

(c) Test Procedure:

(1) With the dummy seated without back sup-
port on a surface as specified in § 572.21(h) and

PART 572-8

oriented as specified in § 572.21(h), adjust the
dummy arms and legs until they are extended
horizontally forward parallel to the midsagittal
plane, the joints of the limbs are adjusted at any
setting between Ig and 2g, which just supports the
limbs' weight when the limbs are extended
horizontally forward.

(2) Establish the impact point at the chest mid-
sagittal plane so that it is 1.5 inches below the
longitudinal centerline of the bolt that attaches the
top of the ribcage sternum to the thoracic spine
box.

(3) Adjust the dummy so that the tangent plane
at the surface on the thorax immediately adjacent
to the designated impact point is vertical and
parallel to the face of the test probe.

(4) Place the longitudinal centerline of the test
probe to coincide with the designated impact point
and align the test probe so that at impact its
longitudinal centerline coincides within 2 degrees
with the line formed by intersection of the horizon-
tal and midsagittal planes passing through the
designated impact point.

(5) Impact the thorax with the test probe so that
at the moment of impact the probe's longitudinal
centerline falls within 2 degrees of a horizontal line
in the dummy midsagittal plane.

(6) Guide the probe during impact so that it
moves with no significant lateral, vertical or rota-
tional movement.

(7) Allow a time period of at least 20 minutes
between successive tests of the chest.

§ 572.19 Lumbar spine, abdomen and pelvis.

(a) The lumbar spine, abdomen, and pelvis con-
sist of the part of the torso assembly shown by
number SA 103C 030 on drawing SA 103C 001 and
conform to each of the applicable drawings listed
under this number on drawing SA 103C 002,
sheets 10 and 11.

(b) When subjected to continuously applied force
in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section,
the lumbar spine assembly shall flex by an amount
that permits the rigid thoracic spine to rotate from
its initial position in accordance with Figure 18 of
this subpart by 40 degrees at a force level of not
less than 34 pounds and not more than 47 pounds,
and straighten upon removal of the force to within
5 degrees of its initial position.

(c) Test Procedure: (1) The dummy with lower
legs removed is positioned in an upright seated
position on a seat as indicated in Figure 18, ensur-
ing that all dummy component surfaces are clean,
dry and untreated unless otherwise specified.

(2) Attach the pelvis to the seating surface by a
bolt C/328, modified as shown in Figure 18, and
the upper legs at the knee axial rotation joints by
the attachments shown in Figure 18. Tighten the
mountings so that the pelvis-lumbar joining sur-
face is horizontal and adjust the femur ball-flange
screws at each hip socket joint to 50 inch pounds
torque. Remove the head and the neck and install a
cylindrical aluminum adapter 2.0 inches in
diameter and 2.80 inches long in place of the neck.

(3) Flex the thorax forward 50 degrees and then
rearward as necessary to return to its initial posi-
tion in accordance with Figure 18 unsupported by
external means.

(4) Apply a forward pull force in the midsagittal
plane at the top of the neck adapter, so that at 40
degrees of the lumbar spine flexion the applied
force is perpendicular to the thoracic spine box.
Apply the force at any torso deflection rate
between 0.5 and 1.5 degrees per second up to 40
degrees of flexion but no further; continue to apply
for 10 seconds the force necessary to maintain 40
degrees of flexion, and record the highest applied
force at that time. Release all force as rapidly as
possible and measure the return angle 3 minutes
after the release.

§ 572.20 Limbs.

The limbs consist of the assemblies shown on
drawing SA 103C 001 as Nos. SA 103C 041, SA
103C 042, SA 103C 051, SA 103C 052, SA 103C
061, SA 103C 062, SA 103C 071, SA 103C 072, SA
103C 081, SA 103C 082, and conform to each of the
applicable drawings listed under their respective
numbers of the drawing SA 103C 002, sheets 12
through 21.

§ 572.21 Test conditions and instrumentation.

(a) The test probe used for head and thoracic im-
pact tests is a cylinder 3 inches in diameter, 13.8
inches long and weighs 10 lbs., 6 ozs. Its impacting
end has a flat right face that is rigid and that has
an edge radius of 0.5 inches.

(b) Accelerometers are mounted in the head on
the mounting block (A/310) located on the horizon-
tal transverse bulkhead shown in the drawings

PART 572-9

subreferenced under assembly SA 103C 010 so that
their sensitive axes are orthogonal and their seismic
masses are positioned relative to the axial intersec-
tion point. Except in the case of tri-axial
accelerometers, the sensitive axes shall intersect at
the axial intersection point located at the intersection
of a line connecting the longitudinal centerlines of
the transfer pins in the sides of the dummy head with
the midsagittal plane of the dummy head. One
accelerometer is aligned with its sensitive axis
parallel to the vertical bulkhead and midsagittal
plane, and with its seismic mass center at the mid-
sagittal plane at any distance up to 0.3 inches dorsal
and 0. 1 inches inferior to the axial intersection point.
Another accelerometer is aligned with its sensitive
axis in the horizontal plane and perpendicular to the
midsagittal plane, and with its seismic mass center at
any distance up to 0.2 inches inferior to, 0.4 inches to
the right of, and 1 inch dorsal to the axial intersection
point (right side of dummy is the same as that of
child). A third accelerometer is aligned with its sen-
sitive axis parallel to the midsagittal and horizontal
planes, and with its seismic mass center at any
distance up to 0.2 inches inferior to, 0.6 inches dorsal
to, and 0.4 inches to the right of the axial intersection
point. In the case of a tri-axial accelerometer, its axes
are aligned in the same way that the axes of three
separate accelerometers are aligned.

(c) Accelerometers are mounted in the thorax on
the mounting plate attached to the vertical
transverse bulkhead shown in the drawings
subreferenced under assembly No. SA 103C 030 in
drawing SA 103C 001 so that their sensitive axes
are orthogonal and their seismic masses are posi-
tioned relative to the axial intersection point
located in the midsagittal plane 3 inches above the
top surface of the lumbar spine and 0.3 inches
dorsal to the accelerometer mounting plate sur-
face. Except in the case of tri-axial accelerometers,
the sensitive axes shall intersect at the axial in-
tersection point. One accelerometer is aligned with
its sensitive axis parallel to the vertical bulkhead
and midsagittal planes, and with its seismic mass
center at any distance up to 0.2 inches to the right,
0.2 inches inferior and 0.1 inches ventral of the
axial intersection point. Another accelerometer is
aligned with its sensitive axis in the horizontal
transverse plane and perpendicular to the mid-
sagittal plane and with its seismic mass center at
any distance up to 0.3 inches to the left, 0.2 inches

inferior and 0.2 inches ventral to the axial intersec-
tion point. A third accelerometer is aligned with its
sensitive axis parallel to the midsagittal and
horizontal planes and with its seismic mass center
at any distance up to 0.3 inches superior, 0.6 inches
to the right and 0.1 inches ventral to the axial
intersection point. In the case of a tri-axial
accelerometer, its axes are aligned in the same
way that the axes of three separate accelerometers
are aligned.

(d) The outputs of accelerometers installed in the
dummy, and of test apparatus specified by this part,
are recorded in individual data channels that con-
form to the requirements of SAE Recommended
Practice J211a, December 1971, with channel
classes as follows:

(1) Head acceleration— Class 1,000.

(2) Pendulum acceleration— Class 60.

(3) Thorax acceleration— Class 180.

(e) The mountings for accelerometers have no
resonance frequency less than 3 times the cut-off
frequency of the applicable channel class.

(f) Limb joints are set at the force between l-2g,
which just supports the limbs' weight when the
limbs are extended horizontally forward. The force
required to move a limb segment does not exceeed
2g throughout the range of limb motion.

(g) Performance tests are conducted at any
temperature from 66° F to 78° F and at any
relative humidity from 10 percent to 70 percent
after exposure of the dummy to these conditions
for a period of not less than 4 hours.

(h) For the performance tests specified
§§ 572.16, 572.18, and 572.19, the dummy is
positioned in accordance with Figures 16, 17, and
18 as follows:

(1) The dummy is placed on a flat, rigid, clean,
dry, horizontal surface of teflon sheeting with a
smoothness of 40 microinches and whose length
and width dimensions are not less than 16 inches,
so that the dummy's midsagittal plane is vertical
and centered on the test surface. For head tests,
the seat has a vertical back support whose top is
12.4 ±0.2 inches above the seating surface. The
rear surfaces of the dummy's shoulders and but-
tocks are touching the back support as shown in
Figure 16. For thorax and lumbar spine tests, the
seating surface is without the back support as
shown in Figures 17 and 18 respectively.

PART 572-10

(2) The shoulder yokes are adjusted so that
they are at the midpoint of their anterior-posterior
travel with their upper surfaces horizontal.

(3) The dummy is adjusted for head impact and
lumbar flexion tests so that the rear surfaces of the
shoulders and buttocks are tangent to a transverse
vertical plane.

(4) The arms and legs are positioned so that
their centerlines are in planes parallel to the
midsagittal plane.

(i) The dummy's dimensions are specified in
drawings No. SA 103C 002, sheets 22 through 26.

(j) Performance tests of the same component,
segment, assembly or fully assembled dummy are
separated in time by a period of not less than 20
minutes unless otherwise specified.

(k) Surfaces of the dummy components are not
painted except as specified in this part or in
drawings subtended by this part.

Subpart D— Six Month Old Infant
§ 572.25 General Description.

(a) The infant dummy is specified in its entirety
by means of 5 drawings (No. SA 1001 001) and a
construction manual which describes in detail the
materials and the procedures involved in the
manufacturing of this dummy. The drawings and
the manual are incorporated in this part by
reference and are available for examination in
Docket 78-09, Room 5109, 400 Seventh Street
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590. Copies may be
obtained from Rowley-Scher Reprographics, Inc.
1216 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C, 20005,
attention Mr. Allan Goldberg and Mr. Mark
Krysinski ((202) 628-6667). The drawings and the
manual are subject to changes, but any change will
be accomplished by appropriate administrative
procedures and announced by publication in the
Federal Register and be available for examination
and copying as indicated in this paragraph. The
drawings and manual are on file in the reference
library of the Federal Register, National Archives
and Records Services, General Services
Administration, Washington, D.C. (50 F.R.
25422-June 19, 1985. Effective: June 19, 1985)

(b) The structural properties and dimensions of
the dummy are such that the dummy conforms to
this part in every respect, both before and after
being used in tests specified by Standard No. 213
(571.213).

|§ 572.30 Incorporated Materials.

(a) The drawings and specifications referred to
in this regulation that are not set forth in full are
hereby incorporated in this part by reference. The
Director of the Federal Register has approved the
materials incorporated by reference. For materials
subject to change, only the specific version ap-
proved by the Director of the Federal Register and
specified in the regulation are incorporated. A
notice of any change will be published in the
Federal Register. As a convenience to the reader,
the materials incorporated by reference are listed
in the Finding Aid Table found at the end of this
volume of the Code of Federal Regulations.

(b) The materials incorporated by reference are
available for examination in the general reference
section of Docket 74-14, Docket Section, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Room
5109, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.
20590. Copies may be obtained from Rowley-Scher
Reprographics, Inc., 1216 K Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.20005 ((202) 628-6667). The
drawings and specifications are also on file in the
reference library of the Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records
Administration, Washington, D.C.

§ 572.31 General Description.

(a) The Hybird III 50th percentile size dummy
consists of components and assemblies specified in
the Anthropomorphic Test Dummy drawing and
specification package which consists of the follow-
ing six items:

(1) The Anthropomorphic Test Dummy Parts
List, dated July 15, 1986, and containing 13 pages,
and Parts list Index, dated April 26, 1986, contain-
ing 6 pages,

(2) A listing of Optional Hybrid III Dummy
Transducers, dated April 22, 1986, contained 4
pages

(3) A General Motors Drawing package iden-
tified by GM drawing No. 78051-218 revision P
and subordinate drawings.

(4) Disassembly, Inspection, Assembly and
Limbs Adjustment Procedures for the Hybrid III
Dummy, dated July 15, 1986,

(5) Sign Convention for the signal outputs of
Hybrid III Dummy Transducers, dated July 15,
1986,

(6) Exterior Dimensions of the Hybrid III
Dummy, dated July 15, 1986.

(Rev. 7/25/86)

PART 572-11

(b) The dummy is made up of the following com-
ponent assemblies:

Drawing Number Revision

78051-61 Head Assembly-Complete- (T)

78051-90 Neck Assembly-Complete- (A)

78051-89 Upper Torso Assembly-Complete- (I)

78051-70 Lower Torso Assembly- Without

Pelvic Instrumentation

Assembly, Drawing

Number 78051-59 (C)

86-5001-001 Leg Assembly-Complete (LH)-
86-5001-002 Leg Assembly-Complete (RH)-
78051-123 Arm Assembly-Complete (LH)- (D)
78051-124 Arm Assembly-Complete (RH)- (D)

(c) Any specifications and requirements set forth
in this part supercede those contained in General
Motors Drawing No. 78051-218, revision P.

(d) Adjacent segments are joined in a manner
such that throughout the range of motion and also
under crash-impact conditions, there is no contact
between metallic elements except for contacts that
exist under static conditions.

(e) The weights, inertial properties and centers
of gravity location of component assemblies shall
conform to those listed in drawing 78051-338,
revision S.

(f) The structural properties of the dummy are
such that the dummy conforms to this part in every
respect both before and after being used in vehicle
test specified in Standard No. 208 of this Chapter
(A571.208).

§ 572.32 Head.

(a) The head consists of the assembly shown in
the drawing 78051-61, revision T, and shall con-
form to each of the drawings subtended therein.

(b) When the head (drawing 78051-61, revision
T) with neck transducer structural replacement
(drawing 78051-383, revision F) is dropped from a
height of 14.8 inches in accordance with paragraph
(c) of this section, the peak resultant accelerations
at the location of the accelerometers mounted in
the head in accordance with 572.36(c) shall not be
less than 225g, and not more than 275g. The
acceleration/time curve for the test shall be
unimodal to the extent that oscillations occurring
after the main acceleration pulse are less than ten
percent (zero to peak) of the main pulse. The
lateral acceleration vector shall not exceed 15g
(zero to peak).

(c) Test Procedure. (1) Soak the head assembly
in a test environment at any temperature between

66 degrees F to 78 degrees F and at a relative
humidity from 10% to 70% for a period of at least
four hours prior to its application in a test.

(2) Clean the head's skin surface and the sur-
face of the impact plate with 1,1,1 Trichlore thane
or equivalent.

(3) Suspend the head, as shown in Figure 19, so
that the lowest point on the forehead is 0.5 inches
below the lowest point on the dummy's nose when
the midsagittal plane is vertical.

(4) Drop the head from the specified height by
means that ensure instant release onto a rigidly
supported flat horizontal steel plate, which is 2
inches thick and 2 feet square. The plate shall have
a clean, dry surface and any microfinish of not less
than 8 microinches (rms) and not more than 80
microinches (rms).

(5) Allow at least 2 hours between successive
tests on the same head.

§ 572.33 Neck.

(a) The neck consists of the assembly shown in
drawing 78051-90, revision A and conforms to
each of the drawings subtended therein.

(b) When the neck and head assembly (con-
sisting of the parts 78051-61, revision T; -84;
-90, revision A; -96; -98; -303, revision E;
-305; -306; -307, revision X, which has a neck
transducer (drawing 83-5001-008) installed in con-
formance with 572.36(d), is tested in accordance
with paragraph (c) of this section, it shall have the
following characteristics:

(1) Flexion, (i) Plane D, referenced in Figure
20, shall rotate, between 64 degrees and 78
degrees, which shall occur between 57 milliseconds
(ms) and 64 ms from time zero. In first rebound,
the rotation of plane D shall cross 0 degree
between 113 ms and 128 ms.

(ii) The moment measured by the neck
transducer (drawing 83-5001-008) about the oc-
cipital condyles, referenced in Figure 20, shall be
calculated by the following formula: Moment (Ibs-
ft) = My -I- 0.02875 X Fx' where My is the moment
measured in Ibs-ft by the moment sensor of the
neck transducer and F^ is the force measure
measured in lbs by the x axis force sensor of the
neck transducer. The moment shall have a max-
imum value between 65 Ibs-ft occurring between
47 ms and 58 ms, and the positive moment shall
decay for the first time to 0 Ib-ft between 97 ms
and 107 ms.

(Rev. 7/25/86)

PART 572-12

(2) Extension, (i) Plane D, referenced in Figure
21, shall rotate between 81 degrees and 106
degrees, which shall occur between 72 and 82 ms
from time zero. In first rebound, the rotation of
plane D shall cross 0 degree between 147 and 174
ms.

(ii) The moment measured by the neck
transducer (drawing 83-5001-008) about the
occipital condyles, referenced in Figure 21, shall be
calculated by the following formula: Moment (Ibs-
ft) = My + 0.02875 X Fx' where My is the moment
measured in Ibs-ft by the moment sensor of the
neck transducer and F^ is the force measure
measured in lbs by the x axis force sensor of the
neck transducer. The moment shall have a
minimum value between -39 Ibs-ft and -59 Ibs-ft,
which shall occur between 65 ms and 79 ms, and
the negative moment shall decay for the first time
to 0 Ib-ft between 120 ms and 148 ms.

(3) Time zero is defined as the time of contact
between the pendulum striker plate and the
aluminum honeycomb material.

(c) Test Procedure. (1) Soak the test material in
a test environment at any temperature between 69
degrees F to 72 degrees F and at a relative
humidity from 10% to 70% for a period of at least
four hours prior to its application in a test.

(2) Torque the jamnut (78051-64) on the neck
cable (78051-301, revision E) to 1.0 Ibs-ft ±.2
Ibs-ft.

(3) Mount the head-neck assembly, defined in
paragraph (b) of this section, on a rigid pendulum
as shown in Figure 22 so that the head's midsagit-
tal plane is vertical and coincides with the plane of
motion of the pendulum's longitudinal axis.

(4) Release the pendulum and allow it to fall
freely from a height such that the tangential velocity
at the pendulum accelerometer centerline at the in-
stance of contact with the honeycomb is 23.0 ft/sec
± 0.4 ft/sec. for flexion testing and 19.9 ft/sec ±
0.4 ft/sec. for extension testing. The pendulum
deceleration vs. time pulse for flexion testing shall
conform to the characteristics shown in Table A
and the decaying deceleration-time curve shall first
cross 5g between 34 ms and 42 ms. The pendulum
deceleration vs. time pulse for extension testing
shall conform to the characteristics shown in Table
B and the decaying deceleration-time curve shall
cross 5g between 38 ms and 46 ms.

Table A
Flexion Pendulum Deceleration vs. Time Pulse

Time (ms)

Flesion

deceleration

level (g)

10 22.50-27.50

20 17.60-22.60

30 12.50-18.50

Any other time above 30 ms 29 maximum

Table B
Extension Pendulum Deceleration vs. Time Pulse

Time (ms)

Extension

deceleration

level (g)

10 17.20-21.00

20 14.00-19.00

30 11.00-16.00

Any other time above 30 ms 22 maximum

(5) Allow the neck to flex without impact of the
head or neck with any object during the test.

§ 572.34 Thorax.

(a) The thorax consists of the upper torso
assembly in drawing 78051-89, revision I and shall
conform to each of the drawings subtended
therein.

(b) When impacted by a test probe conforming
to /R572. 36(a) at 22 fps ± .40 fps in accordance
with paragraph (c) of this section, the thorax of a
complete dummy assembly (78051-218, revision P)
with left and right shoes (78051-294 and -295)
removed, shall resist with the force measured by
the test probe from time zero of 1162.5 pounds ±
82.5 pounds and shall have a sternum displacement
measured relative to spine of 2.68 inches ± .18
inches. The internal hysteresis in each impact shall
be more than 69% but less than 85%. The force
measured is the product of pendulum mass and
deceleration. Time zero is defined as the time of
first contact between the upper thorax and pen-
dulum face.

(c) Test procedure. (1) Soak the test dummy in
an environment with a relative humidity from 10%
to 70% until the temperature of the ribs of the test
dummy have stabilized at a temperature between
69 degrees F and 72 degrees F.

(Rsv. 7/25fB6)

PART 572-13

(2) Seat the dummy without back and arm sup-
ports on a surface as shown in Figure 23.

(3) Place the longitudinal centerline of the test
probe so that it is .5 in + .04 in. below the horizon-
tal centerline of the No. 3 Rib (reference drawing
number 79051-64, revision A-M) as shown in
Figure 23.

(4) Align the test probe specified in S572. 36(a)
so that at impact it longitudinal centerline coin-
cides within .5 degree of a horizontal line in the
dummy's midsagittal plane.

(5) Impact the thorax with the test probe so
that the longitudinal centerline of the test probe
falls within 2 degrees of a horizontal line in the
dummy's midsagittal plane at the moment of
impact.

(6) Guide the probe during impact so that it
moves with no significant lateral, vertical, or rota-
tional movement.

(7) Measure the horizontal deflection of the
sternum relative to the thoracic spine along the
line established by the longitudinal centerline of
the probe at the moment of impact, using a poten-
tiometer (ref. drawing 78051-317, revision A)
mounted inside the sternum as shown in drawing
78051-89, revision I.

(8) Measure hysteresis by determining the ratio
of the area between the loading and unloading por-
tions of the force deflection curve to the area under
the loading portion of the curve.

§ 572.35 Limbs.

(a) The limbs consist of the following assemblies:
leg assemblies 86-5001-001 and -002 and arm
assemblies 78051-123, revision D, and -124,
revision D, and shall conform to the drawings
subtended therein.

(b) When each knee of the leg assemblies is
impacted by the pendulum defined in S572. 36(b) in
accordance with paragraph (c) of this section at 6.9
ft/sec + .10 ft/sec, the peak knee impact force,
which is a product of pendulum mass and accelera-
tion, shall have a minimum value of not less than
996 pounds and a maximum value of not greater
than 1566 pounds.

(c) Test Procedure, (c) The test material con-
sists of leg assemblies (86-5001-001) left and
(-002) right with upper leg assemblies (78051-46)
left and (78051-47) right removed. The load cell
simulator (78051-319, revision A) is used to secure

the knee cap assemblies (79051-16, revision B) as
shown in Figure 24.

(2) Soak the test material in a test environment
at any temperature between 66 degrees F to 78
degrees F and at a relative humidity from 10% to
70% for a period of at least four hours prior to its
application in a test.

(3) Mount the test material with the leg
assembly secured through the load cell simulator to
a rigid surface as shown in Figure 24. No contact is
permitted between the foot and any other exterior
surfaces.

(4) Place the longitudinal centerline of the test
probe so that at contact with the knee it is colinear
within 2 degrees with the longitudinal centerline of
the femur load cell simulator.

(5) Guide the pendulum so that there is no
significant lateral, vertical or rotational movement
at time zero.

(6) Impact the knee with the test probe so that
the longitudinal centerline of the test probe at the
instant of impact falls within .5 degrees of a
horizontal line parallel to the femur load cell
simulator at time zero.

(7) Time zero is defined as the time of contact
between the test probe and the knee.

§ 572.36 Test Conditions and Instrumentation.

(a) The test probe used for thoracic impact tests
is a 6 inch diameter cylinder that weighs 51.5
pounds including instrumentation. Its impacting
end has a flat right angle face that is rigid and has
an edge radius of 0.5 inches. The test probe has an
accelerometer mounted on the end opposite from
impact with its sensitive axis colinear to the
longitudinal centerline of the cylinder.

(b) The test probe used for the knee impact tests
is a 3 inch diamenter cylinder that weighs 11
pounds including instrumentation. Its impacting
end has a flat right angle face that is rigid and has
an edge radius of 0.2 inches. The test probe has an
accelerometer mounted on the end opposite from
impact with its sensitive axis colinear to the
longitudinal centerline of the cylinder.

(c) Head accelerometers shall have dimensions,
response characteristics and sensitive mass loca-
tions specified in drawing 78051-136, revision A or
its equivalent and be mounted in the head as shown
in drawing 78051-61, revision T, and in the
assembly shown in drawing 78051-218, revision D.

(Rev. 7/25/86)

PART 572-14

(d) The neck transducer shall have the dimen-
sions, response characteristics, and sensitive axis
locations specified in drawing 83-5001-008 or its
equivalent and be mounted for testing as shown in
drawing 79051-63, revision W, and in the
assembly shown in drawing 78051-218, revision P.

(e) The chest accelerometers shall have the
dimensions, response characteristics, and sensitive
mass locations specified in drawing 78051-136,
revision A or its equivalent and be mounted as
shown with adaptor assembly 78051-116, revision
D for assembly into 78051-218, revision L.

(f) The chest deflection transducer shall have the
dimensions and response characteristics specified
in drawing 78051-342, revision A or equivalent
and be mounted in the chest deflection transducer
assembly 87051-317, revision A for assembly into
78051-218, revision L.

(g) The thorax and knee impactor ac-
celerometers shall have the dimensions and
characteristics of Endevco Model 7231c or
equivalent. Each accelerometer shall be mounted
with its sensitive axis colinear with the pendulum's
longitudinal centerline.

(h) The femur load cell shall have the dimen-
sions, response characteristics, and sensitive axis
locations specified in drawing 78051-265 or its
equivalent and be mounted in assemblies 78051-46
and -47 for assembly into 78051-218, revision L.

(i) The outputs of acceleration and force-sensing
devices installed in the dummy and in the test ap-
paratus specified by this part are recorded in

individual data channels that conform to the re-
quirements of SAE Recommended Practice J211,
JUN 1980, "Instrumentation for Impact Tests,"
with channel classes as follows:

(1) Head acceleration— Class 1000

(2) Neck force-Class 60

(3) Neck pendulum acceleration— Class 60

(4) Thorax and thorax pendulum
acceleration— Class 180

/(5) Thorax deflection -Class 180

(6) Knee pendulum acceleration— Class 600

(7) Femur force-Class 600

(j) Coordinate signs for instrumentation polarity
conform to the sign convention shown in the docu-
ment incorporated by §572.3 l(aX5).

(k) The mountings for sensing devices shall have
no resonance frequency within range of 3 times the
frequency range of the applicable channel class.

(1) Limb joints are set at Ig, barely restraining
the weight of the limb when it is extended horizon-
tally. The force required to move a limb segment
shall not exceed 2g throughout the range of limb
motion.

(m) Performance tests of the same component,
segment, assembly, or fully assembled dummy are
separated in time by a period of not less than 30
minutes unless otherwise noted.

(n) Surfaces of dummy components are not
painted except as specified in this part or in draw-
ings subtended by this part. (51 F.R. 26688— July 25,
1986. Effective: October 23, 1986)1

(Rev. 7f25/86)

PART 572-15-16

ARM ASS Y

SA 150 M070 RIGHT

SA 150M071 LEFT

LUMBAR SPINE

ASS Y

SA 150 MOSO

PELVIS AND
ABDOMEN ASS Y
SA 1 50 M060

LEG ASSY

SA 1 50 M080 RIGHT

SA 150 MOB 1 LEFT

HEAD ASSY
SA I50M010

NECK ASS Y
SA 150 M020

SHOULDER THORAX

ASSY

SA 1 SO M030

FIGURE NO 1

coDNECTme mae

STSEL BLOCK c
r' X 1*" X 24'

HEAD POSITIONING FOR OM)P TESTS

FKSURE NO. 2

^PENDULUM
PIVOT POINT

HEAD ROTATION ANGLE

CHOROAL
OISTLACEMENT

HEAD POSITION
AT TIME "O"

FIGURE NO 3
NECK COMPONENT TEST

PART 572-ART PAGE 1

INERTIAL PROPERTIES OF PENDULUM
WITHOUT TEST SPECIMEN.

WEIGHT 65.2 LBS.

MOMENT OF INERTIA 24.6 LB-FT SEc'
ABOUT PIVOT AXIS

CG OF PENDULUM
APPARATUS WITHOUT
TEST SPECIMEN

3/16" STRUCTURAL
STEEL TUBE

PIVOT

ACCELEROMETER

1.5"

ALUMINUM HONEYCOMB
(HEXCELL 1.8LBS/CU. FT.)
REF.

• 3" X 6" X 3/8" PLATE (SHARP EDGES)

CO OF TEST SPECIMEN

FIGURE NO. 4
NECK COMPONENT TEST

PART 572-ART PAGE 2

LINE OF FORCE APPLICATION

FIGURE NO 7
FIGURE NO 6

ATTACHMENT
&/ 16-24 BOLTS

FIGURE NO. B

FIGURE NO 9

ATTACHMENT 10 32 SCREWS
(FOUR PLACES!

LINK ROD IITEMS F/04 AND G/04
DRAWING NO SA 1 5OMO02 SHEET 1 1
ATTACHMENT TO BEDPLATE
WITH 3/0 24 BOLTS

FIGURE NO. 5
LUMBAR FLEXION TEST

*

rrvW) PLACES)

1

~r'

1 ,

-

i

7/8

♦

r^

. ^ . ^» (. -^ SS.

--

\

r \' . J

t

1

1 2-3/4 1

3

t

-■

1 i^ _j
1"

] 1

1

|« 2-1/4 ^

J

" 1-1/4-*

* »REF m

—

1

r\

/

L J

-_-

\. Nv . 1/JSa STL. STOCK 7-1/2 LONG

\ \X WELOEO TO ANCLE

1

2

V4

1

J

1

t-f

EF

>s\

r ^

rl 1

"

\\

2

/8

r-U-,--
1 : 1

. 1 _tw

'

vU-4, — fSX,

i

1

•-3/8 t

VIDE SLOT (TWO PL«

/ ' I ' V ' 1 '

cesi / \ — 46'>TYe.

ex6STRUCTUBALSTL. ANGLE '

TOLSRANce ♦ i/a-

FIGURE NO 6

SUPPORT BHACICET
LUMBAR TtST FIXTURE

PART 572-ART PAGE 3

1-9/16 ♦ 1/32

1"

-3 13/16-

-6 ■ 5/8 -

X'

fT

5/16-24 TAP THRU { 2 HOLES)

FIGURE NO. 7
MOUNTING BRACKET-LUMBAR TEST FIXTURE

9/32 DRILL THRU
4 PLACES

TOLERANCE + 1/64"
MATERIAL: STEEL
WELDED CONSTRUCTION

9/16 DRILL THRU
- 3/8 24 TAP THRU TOP PLATE «. [ ^ PLACES

TOP OF TUBING

~4i

111

h1/4 mi

=14

9/16 DRILL THRU
4 PLACES

9/16 DRILL HOLE %-

MATL STEEL 1/4 THICK PLATE & 2 X 2-1/4 WALL SO TUBING
WELDED CONSTRUCTION

FIGURE NO 8
BEDPLATE LUMBAR TEST FIXTURE

TOLERANCE t 1/32"

PART 572-ART PAGE 4

.1 I

.25

CONST: ALUMINUM OR STL. WELDMENT
TOLERANCE: t .03 TWO PLACES
t .005 THREE PLACES

■1.75-

.25 R
4 PLACES

I

3 000 ■
- 3 50-

1^^

—t4 .50 U—

<k

+

.50 OIA.

1.38

CLEAR DRILL
FOR 10-32 SCREW
4 PLACES

FIGURE 9
Loiding Plate- Lumbar Tast Fixture

V2SR (4 PLACES)

90
80

60

FORCE 60

(LBS.I

0.25

_L

0.50 075

DISPLACEMENT -INCHES

FIGURE NO 10

ABDOMEN COMPONENT TEST

1.00

• 88

•73

1.30

PART 572-ART PAGE 5

VERTICAL MATING SURFACE OF SKULL
PARALLEL TO THE VERTICAL BACKLINE

1.7"
SPACER (REF.)

(3°REF)

FIGURE No. 11

UPRIGHT SEATED POSITION FOR LINEAR MEASUREMENTS

PART 572-ART PAGE 6

Space for figures 12 thru 14
reserved for future use.

PART 572-ART PAGE 7

3/16" STRUCTURAL
STEEL TUBE

INERTIAL PROPERTIES OF PENDULUM
WITHOUT TEST SPECIMEN.

WEIGHT 65.2 LBS.

MOMENT OF INERTIA 24 5 LB-FT SEC^

ABOUT PIVOT AXIS

ACCELEROMETER

5 11/16" REF

CGOF PENDULUM
APPARATUS WITHOUT
TEST SPECIMEN

ALUMINUM HONEYCOMB

(HEXCELL 1 BLBS/CU FT.)

REF.

3" X 6" X 3/8" PLATE (SHARP EDGES)

■ CG OF TEST specimen"' LEADING EDGE OF NECK
MUST BE ALLIGNED WITH
LEADING EDGE OF PENDULUM

FIGURE NO. 15
NECK COMPONENT TEST

PART 572-ART PAGE 8

IMPACTOR SUPPORT WIRE

FIGURE NO. 16
HEAD IMPACT TEST

PART 572-ART PAGE 9

IMPACTOR FACE TO BE VERTICAL^ 2°
AT CONTACT OF CHEST "

IMPACTOR SUPPORT WIRE

FIGURE NO. 17
CHEST IMPACT TEST

PART 572-ART PAGE 10

1.00" RADIUS

DRILL .53 THRU

DRILL .26

.125

2.70

Vi-20 SOC. HD. SCR. WELDED
TO C 328 SCR. BOLTED
THROUGH TABLE

PULL FORCE IN THE MID-SAGITTAL
PLANE PERPENDICULAR TO THE CHEST
INSTRUMENT CAVITY REAR FACE.

UPPER LEGS
SECURED BY

ROUGH TABLE

METAL TABLE

FIGURE NO. 18
LUMBAR SPINE FLEXION TEST

PART 572- ART PAGE 11-12

Effective Ortobci 1, 1971

PREAMBLE TO PART 573— DEFEa REPORTS

(Docket No. 69-31; Notice No. 2)

On December 24, 1969, a notice of proposed
rulemaking entitled, "Defect Reports", was pub-
lished in the Federal Register (34 F.R. 20212).
The notice proposed requirements for reports
and information regarding defects in motor
vehicles, to be submitted to the National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration by manufac-
turers of motor vehicles pursuant to sections 112,
113, and 119 of the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1401, 1402, and
1407).

The notice requested comments on the pro-
posed requirements. All comments received have
been considered and some are discussed below.

Several comments asked whether both the
fabricating manufacturer and the importer of
imported vehicles were required to comply with
all the proposed requirements. A similar ques-
tion was asked in regard to manufacturers of
incomplete vehicles and subsequent manufac-
turers of the same vehicles. In response to the
comments, § 573.3 proyides that in the case of
imported vehicles, compliance by either the
fabricating manufacturer or the importer of the
imported vehicle with §§ 573.4 and 573.5 of this
part, with respect to a particular defect, shall be
considered compliance by both. In the case of
vehicles manufactured in two or more stages,
compliance by either the manufacturer of the in-
complete vehicle or one of the subsequent manu-
facturers of the vehicle with §§ 573.4 and 573.5
of this part, with respect to a particular defect,
shall be considered compliance by both the in-
complete vehicle manufacturer and the subse-
quent manufacturers.

Many comments requested that the time for
the initial filing of the direct information report
be increased to allow opportunity for the exten-
sive and complex testing often necessary to deter-
mine whether a defect is safety-related. As

proposed, the time for initially filing the report
was within 5 days after the discovery of a defect
that the manufacturer subsequently determined
to be safety-related. In response to these com-
ments, § 573.4(b) provides that the report shall
be submitted by the manufacturer not more than
5 days after he or the Administrator has deter-
mined that a defect in the manufacturer's ve-
hicles relates to motor vehicle safety.

Several comments requested the deletion of one
or more items of information proposed for inclu-
sion in the defect information report. Objec-
tions to providing an evaluation of the risk of
accident due to the defect, a list of all incidents
related to the defect, and an analysis of the
cause of the defect were based on the ground that
the information would be inherently speculative.
The proposed requirements for these three items
of information have been deleted. In place of
the list of incidents, § 573.4(c) (6) requires a
chronology of all principal events that were the
basis for the determination of the existence of
a safety-related defect. In accordance with the
deletion of the list of incidents, the provision in
the proposal requiring quarterly reports to con-
tain information concerning previously unre-
ported incidents has also been deleted.

Several comments stated that the requirement
in the proposal for the submission of a copy of
all communications sent to dealers and pur-
chasers concerning a safety-related defect would
create an imreasonable burden on the manufac-
turers. The comments reported that the manu-
facturers would be required to submit to the
Administration a large volume of useless cor-
respondence between the manufacturers and in-
dindual dealers or purchasers. To mitigate this
problem, § 573.4(c) (8) provides that the manu-
facturers shall submit to the Administration
only those communications that are sent to more

PART 573— PRE 1

Effcctiv*: October I, 1971

than one dealer or purchaser. For the same rea-
son, the requirement in § 573.7 that a manufac-
turer submit a copy of all communications, other
than those required under § 573.4(c) (8), regard-
ing any defect, whether or not safety-related, in
his vehicles, is also limited to communications
sent to more than one person.

Many comments requested that a regular
schedule for submitting quarterly reports be es-
tablished. They suggested that this be accom-
plished by requiring that the first quarter for
submitting a quarterly report with respect to a
particular defect be the calendar quarter in
which the defect information report for the
defect is initially submitted. As proposed, the
first quarter began on the date on which the de-
fect information report was initially submitted.
Several of these comments also objected to the
proposed requirements for submitting both
quarterly reports and annual defect summaries
on the ground that the latter would be partially
redundant. In response to these comments, the
proposed requirement for filing a separate series
of quarterly reports for each defect notification
campaign has been deleted. Instead, § 573.5(a)
requires that each manufacturer submit a
quarterly report not more than 25 working days
after the close of each calendar quarter. The in-
formation specified in § 573.5(c) is required to be
provided with respect to each notification
campaign, begirming with the quarter in which
the campaign was initiated. Unless otherwise
directed by the Administration, the information
for each campaign is to be included in the
quarterly reports for six consecutive quarters or
until corrective action has been completed on all

defective vehicles involved in the campaign,
whichever occurs sooner.

The proposed requirement for filing annual
summaries has been deleted. Instead, § 573.6
(d) requires that the figures provided in the
quarterly reports under paragraph (c) (5), (6),
(7), and (8) of §573.5 be cumulative. In addi-
tion, § 573.5(b) requires that each quarterly re-
port contain the total number of vehicles pro-
duced during the quarter for which the report is
submitted.

Several changes have been made for the pur-
pose of clarification, § 573.4(c) (8) requires
that manufacturers submit three copies of the
communications specified in that section. In
response to questions concerning the use of com-
puters for maintaining owner lists, a reference to
computer information storage devices and card
files has been added to § 573.6 to indicate that
they are suitable. A reference to first purchasers
and subsequent purchasers to whom a warranty
has been transferred, and any other owners
known to the manufacturer, has been added to
the same section to make clear that the owner
list is required to include both types of pur-
chasers as well as other known owners.

Effective date: October 1, 1971.

Issued on February 10, 1971.

Douglas W. Toms,

Acting Administrator, National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration.

36 F.R. 3064
February 17, 1971

PART 573— PRE 2

Effcctlva: May 6, 1974

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 573— DEFECT REPORTS

(Docket No. 69-31; Notice 5)

This notice amends the Defect Reports regula-
tion (49 CFR Part 573) to require manufactur-
ers to submit vehicle identification numbers as
part of the information furnished by them to the
NHTSA. A notice of proposed rulemaking re-
garding this subject was published November 7,
1972 (37 F.R. 23650).

The purpose of including VIN's in defect re-
ports would be to improve the notification of
owners of vehicles involved in safety defect noti-
fication campaigns. The State Farm Insurance
Company had suggested, for example, that in"-
surance companies could use VIN's to identify
vehicles which they insure, and to themselves
notify owners of record. The Center for Auto
Safety also requested the inclusion of VIN's in
defect reports, so it could more readily inform
persons who inquire whether particular vehicles
were subject to campaigns. Other possible uses,
it was noted, would be that State and local in-
spection facilities could determine, as part of
inspection programs, whether particular vehicles
had been subjected to campaigns, and if so,
whether they had been repaired.

The proposal would have required the submis-
sion in the "defect information report" (§ 573.4),
within five days of the defect determination, of
the vehicle identification number for each vehicle
potentially affected by the defect. It also pro-
posed to substitute "line" for "model" as one of
the identifying classifications describing poten-
tially affected vehicles.

The comments demonstrated that the vehicle
identification number is a useful tool for locating
second and later owners of vehicles. In a study
conducted by the Ford Motor Company and the
State Farm Insurance Company, a fairly signifi-
cant percentage of owners who either had not
received or responded to the initial notification

mailed by the manufacturer did respond to sub-
sequent letters sent on the basis of the VIN.

As a result of comments received, however, the
NHTSA has decided that vehicle identification
numbers should only be required to be supplied
in the second "quarterly report", approximately
six months after a campaign is initiated, rather
than in the defect information report as pro-
posed. Only the VIN's for vehicles not repaired
by that date are required to be provided. The
NHTSA believes this approach will provide the
safety benefits to be derived from having pub-
licly available lists of defective vehicle VIN's
and will also reduce duplication and facilitate
the agency's efforts to compile and report the
information.

The NHTSA requests that vehicle identifica-
tion numbers be submitted in a form suitable for
automatic data processing (magnetic tape, discs,
punched cards, etc.) when more than 500 num-
bers are reported for any single campaign. While
not required by this notice, the use of automatic
data processing for large campaigns will facili-
tate the dissemination of the information for the
agency. The agency may include specific re-
quirements in this regard at a later time.

The comments argued that the benefits of hav-
ing VIN's available during the initial stages of
a campaign are limited, and that the compilation
of identification numbers for every vehicle in a
campaign would create significant problems for
manufacturers related to conducting campaigns.
The NHTSA believes these comments to have
merit. It is clear that the chief use of VIN's
will be to notify other than first purchasers,
i.e., owners of older vehicles, as the names of
these owners will not be available to manufac-
turers. By delaying the furnishing of VIN's
until the filing of the second quarterly report,
the VIN's reported will represent to a greater

PART 573— PRE 3

Effective: May 6, 1974

degree the names and addresses of second and
later owners. The later reporting will also re-
duce the possibility that first purchasers will
receive duplicate notices.

Many comments challenged generally the util-
ity of the VIN in notification campaigns. Other
comments complained that insurance companies
might abuse the information; for example, by
cancelling policies on defective vehicles. Still
others believed VIN's to be privileged proprie-
tary information, both taken separately and
when combined with other information submit-
ted pursuant to Part 573.

While it is true that the effectiveness of the
requirement will depend to an extent upon the
voluntary activities of third parties, the NHTSA
does not view this as a reason not to issue the
requirement. The offers of insurance companies
and other groups to participate in notification
campaigns appear to be reasonable and properly
motivated. There has been no evidence brought
to the NHTSA's attention to support the allega-
tions of possible misuse of the information by
insurance companies.

The agency also cannot agree that information
identifying defective vehicles is or relates to pro-
prietary information. The comments on this
point seem to equate what may be embarrassing
information with notions of confidentiality.

There is no basis under existing statutory defini-
tions of confidentiality for including within
them VIN's or other information identifying
defective vehicles.

The proposed substitution of "line" for
"model" in the descriptive information for ve-
hicles was opposed in one comment because the
term "line" is apparently more suited for pas-
senger cars than other vehicle types. The com-
ment indicated that "model" is a more appro-
priate term for trucks. In light of this comment,
the terms are specified as alternatives in the
regulation.

In light of the above, Part 573 of Title 49,
Code of Federal Regulations, "Defect Reports,"
is amended. . . .

Effective date : May 6, 1974.

(Sections 103, 112, 113, and 119, Pub. L. 89-
563, 80 Stat. 718; 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1402,
1407, and the delegation of authority at 49 CFR
1.51 Office of Management and Budget Approved

04-R5628.)

Issued on January 30, 1974.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

39 F.R. 4578
Februarys, 1974

PART 573— PRE 4

Effective: August 6,1974

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 573— DEFECT REPORTS

(Docket No. 69-31; Notice 6)

This notice responds to petitions for reconsid-
eration of the iiniPiidinent of 49 CFK Part r>'-i.
"Defect Keports," reqiiirinfr tlie siilirnission to
NHTSA of tlie vehicle identification numbers
(VIX) of motor \eiiicles found to contain safety
rehited defects. The amenchnent was i)ublisiied
February ">. 1974 (89 F.K. 4578). K.xcept inso-
far as granted by this notice, the requests of the
petitioners are denied.

Two petitions for reconsideration, one from
General Motors Corporation and tlie other from
Chrysler Corporation, were received. Both pe-
titions objected to the requirement that VIX's
be reported in the second quarterly report filed
subsequent to the initiation of the defect notifi-
cation campaign. Hoth jminted out that the
XHTSA had stated in the amendment published
February 5, 1974, that it was desirable to defer
reporting VIX's until six months had passed
from the time a notification cam[)ai;;n had begun.
Both petitioners argued that the time for filing
the second quarterly report is frequently less
than six months, and suggested that tlie third
quarterly rejwrt rather than the second was the
more appropriate quarteily report to ('(intain
vehicle identification numbers, (ieneiai Motors
indicated that the a\erage e!a[>sed time from the
initiation of a notification caiii[)aign to tlie filing
of the second quarterly report is four and one-
half months, while the elajjsed time until the
filing of the third quarterly report is, on the
average. se\en and one-half months. The
NHTSA still believes it reasonal)le to allow a
six-month period from the initiation of the cam-
paign to elapse before VIX's are submitted.
Accordingly, the NHTSA has granted the jieti-
tions insofar as they request that VIX's be re-
ported in the third quarterly report submitted
to NHTSA by the manufacturer.

Chrysler objected to the VIX reporting re-
quirement generally, on the basis that it is un-
necessary and will not produce the desired
results. It is requested that an evaluation of the
usefulness of the requirement be conducted after
it is in efi'ect, and that ai)propriate modifications
be made if the rerpiirement fails to achieve the
desired results. General .Motors requested that
XHTSA maintain a public record of requests for
VIX's so that future consideration can be given
to the extent that the data is useful, and to whom
it is useful. The XHTSA believes that public
availability of VIX's will facilitate locating and
repairing defective \ehicles no longer in the
hands of first purchasers. At the same time it
agrees to conduct an evaluation of the efficacy of
the requirement once it is in effect. The extent
of usage is a relevant aspect of an evaluation of
this type, and the XHTSA sees no prohibition
against maintaining a public record of requests
for the infoi'mation.

The amended regulation will be effective
August (i, 1974. and as such will require all third
quarterly re|)orts submitted to XHTSA on or
after that date to contain appropriate vehicle
identification numbers. The cH'ective date has
been changed from May 6, 1974, as a result of
the change requiring the third rather than the
second quarterly report to contain VIX's. As a
practical matter. VIX's will be required to be
rei)orted in the third ([uarterly report for all
defect notification cami)aigns initiated on or
after January- 1. 1974 (XHTSA camjiaign num-
bers 74-0001 and subsequent campaigns).

In light of the above, 49 CFR Part 573, Defect
Reports, is amended by revising § 573.5(e) ....

PART 573— PRE 5

EfFeclive; August 6,1974

Effective date: August 6, 1974. Issued on May 6, 1974.

(Sees. 103, 112, 113, and 119, Pub. L. 89-563, n r m

80 Stat. 718; 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1402, 1407, (jene Or. Mannella

and tlie delegation of autiiority at 49 CFR 1.51; ^^^^'^S Administrator

Office of Management and Budget approved 39 F.R. 16469

04-R5628.) May 9, 1974

PART 573— PRE 6

EKective: December 10, 1974

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 573— DEFECT REPORTS
(Docket No. 74-7; Notice 2)

This notice amends Piirt 578 — "Defect Re-
ports" by revolcin-r tlie retjuirement tliat manu-
facturers of motor \eliicles report quarterly to
the National Hifrhway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion production fij^ures for \eliiclcs manufactured
or imported during^ tiie calendar (piarter. A
notice of pniposed i-uleuiakin^' in wliicli this
amendment was [)roposed was puhlisiied January
15. 1974 (39 FR 1863).

The XHTSA is revokinj^ the requirement for
the reiwrtinp of quarterly production tijrures be-
cause it has found that the value of tiie informa-
tion has not justified tiie burden on manufac-
turers of providinp it. This amendment will
eliminate the need for manufacturers to file
quarterly reports unless they are conducting no-
tification campaijrns durintj the calendar quarter.

The notice of proposed rulemakiii<i of January
15, 1974. proposed to e.xtend the ai)])licability of
the Defect Reports reniilations to include manu-
facturers of motor vehicle equipment, and to
modify the information required to be reported.
Since the issuance of this projjosal, Couf^ress has
amended sections of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act which deal with manu-
facturers' responsibilities for safety related de-
fects in motor \eiiicles and motor vehicle
equipment. (Pub. L. 93--t92, Oct. 27. 1974)
These amendments to the Safety Act in part
enlarge the responsibilities of manufacturers of
motor vehicle equipment for safety related de-
fects, intimately the Defect Reports rejrulations
will reflect comi)letely the expanded scope of the
statutory amendments. While the language of

the proposed rule of January 15, 1974. is in most
cases sufficiently broad to reflect these statutory
changes, the scope of the proposal under the
previous language of the Safety Act is materially
ditferent. Consequently, the NUTS A has decided
to issue a further notice, with opportunity for
public comment, that specifically reflects the e.\-
panded scope of the statutory amendments. This
notice will be issued at some time following the
effective date (December 26. 1974) of the statu-
tory amendments.

The NHTSA has determined, however, that
relief from the i)roduction-figures reporting re-
quirements should not be further deferred, and
by this notice deletes those requirements from
the Defect Reports regulation.

In light of the above, 49 CFR Part 573. Defect
Reports, is amended by revoking and reserving
paragraph (b) of section 573.5 ("Quarterly re-
ports'').

Effective date: December 10. 1974. This
amendment relie\es a restriction and imposes no
additional burden on any person. Consequently
good cause e.xists and is hereby found for an
effective date less than 30 days from publication.

(Sees. 108, 112, 113, 119. Pub. L. 89-563. 80
Stat. 718, 15 IT.S.C. 1397, 1401. 1402, 1408; dele-
gation of authority at 49 CFR 1.51)

Issued on December 4, 1974.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

39 F.R. 43075
December 10, 1974

PART 573— PRE 7-8

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 573— DEFECT AND NONCOMPLIANCE REPORTS

(Docket No. 74-7; Notice 4)

This notice amends Part 573, Defect and Non-
compliance Reports, by adding reporting require-
ments for equipment manufacturers and altering
somewhat the requirements for veliicle manufac-
turers as autliorized by tlie 1074 Motor Vehicle
and Schoolbus Safety Amendments. The amended
regulation requires the submission of reports to
the agency concerning defects and noncompliance
with safety standards and specifies the informa-
tion to be included in those reports.

Effective date: January- 2.1. 1979.

Addresses: Petitions for reconsideration should
refer to the docket number and be submitted to:
Room .")108, \assif Building, National Highway
Traffic ^Safety Administration, 400 Seventh
Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

For further inform<Jtio-n contact :

Mr. James Murray, Office of Defects Investi-
gation, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-2840)
SufpJ^ mentary inforviatiwi :

This notice amends Part 573, Defect and Non-
compliance Reports. A notice of proposed rule-
making was publislied on September 19, 1975 (40
F.R. 43227), proposing new requirements for ve-
hicle and equipment manufacturers regarding
submittal to the NHTSA of defect and noncom-
pliance reports as authorized by the Motor Ve-
hicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974
(the Amendments) (Pub. L. 93-492).

Sections 151 to 160, or Part B of the Amend-
ments alter the defect notification requirements
of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966 ("the Act") (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.).
These Amendments require manufacturers of \\\o-
tor vehicle replacement equipment to i\otify
purchasers and to remedy any defects or non-
compliances following tlie manufacturer's or tlie

Administrator's determination that the equipment
contains cither a defect which relates to motor
vehicle safety or a noncompliance with an ap-
plicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard.
Prior to the enactment of these provisions, manu-
facturers of motor vehicle equipment were re-
sponsible under the Act for notification of defects
or noncompliances only following a determination
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istrator that the item of equipment contained a
safety-related defect or failed to comply (Sec.
113(e). Pub. L. 89-563, 15 U.S.C. 1402).'

Comments on the proposal were received from
manufacturers, safety organizations, and manu-
facturer representatives. The Vehicle Equipment
Safety Conunission did not submit comments.
All comments were considered and the most sig-
nificant ones are discussed below.

I. Scope.

Several manufacturers objected to the scope of
the regulation indicating that it exceeded the
agency's authority to regulate vehicle and equip-
ment manufacturers. For example, manufactur-
ers allegeil that the agency only has authority
over safety-related defects and accordingly
should restrict the defects mentioned in this sec-
tion to safety-related defects. Further, many
equipment manufacturers apparently thought
that they would be required to retain purchaser
and owner lists of all vehicles containing items
of their ecpiipment.

The intent of this regulation is not to impose
upon equipment manufacturers recordkeeping re-
([uirements for all ecjuipment that they manufac-
ture. This regulation merely imposes limited
recordkeeping requirements for that equipment
which is determined to be defective or in
noncompliance. In other words, an equipment
manufacturer, after discovery of a defect or

PART 573— PRE 9

noncompliance, would ascertain from a vehicle
manufacturer the identity of the vehicles and
vehicle owners possessing the affected equipment.
Notification would then be sent to those owners.
The NHTSA would require that the equipment
manufacturer retain the records of those sent
notice of the defect.

Several manufacturers requested that the
agency limit the applicability of this regulation
to safety-related defects. They argued that the
NHTSA has no authority to require information
pertaining to non-safety-related defects. Section
1.58 of the Act specifically authorizes the agency
to require information on any defect, whether or
not safety-related, in order to enable it to under-
take defect investigations which permit a deter-
mination regarding the safety-related nature of
the defect. Much of this regulation pertains only
to safety-related defects and each section indi-
cates whether it applies to all defects or only
those that are safety related.

II. Application.

Many manufacturers complained about the use
of the term "direct control" in Section 573.3(a).
Some manufacturers contended that the use of the
term was unnecessary. Importers contended that
they should not be required to submit reports
where a defect is identified before the vehicles
leave their direct control since the Act considers
them to be manufacturei's and they would be in
direct control of vehicles being imported. The
Center for Auto Safety would have the agency
drop the term and replace it with "beyond their
place of final manufacture."

In the notice of proposed rulemaking, the
NHTSA indicated the reasoning for excluding
vehicles and equipment within the "direct con-
trol" of the manufacturer from the reporting re-
quirements. Vehicles and equipment within the
direct control of manufacturers are virtually as-
sured of remedy of any defect or noncompliance,
because they are still within the physical posses-
sion of the manufacturer. In the NPRM it was
noted that direct control does not include in the
possession of a dealer or distributor. For vehicles
and equipment possessed by those entities, reports
concerning defects or noncompliance would be
required to be submitted to the agency. The
agency declines to adopt the suggestion of the

Center for Auto Safety for reasons explained in
the NPRM. The phrase "beyond the place of
final manufacture" is not broad enough to handle
all instances where vehicles are still within the
direct control of the manufacturer. For example,
vehicles might be stored on a manufacturer's lot
far removed from the place of manufacture.
Nonetheless, these vehicles are still within the
direct control of the manufacturer. Therefore,
the agency concludes that the term "direct con-
trol" best accomplishes the objective of providing
a limited exclusion from the reporting require-
ments. The agency agrees with importers that
since they are considered manufacturers under
the Act, vehicles that manifest defects while they
are within their direct control are excluded from
the reporting requirements.

Some manufacturers apparently misunderstood
the requirements of Section .573.3(d). Manufac-
turers indicated that reports should be required
to be filed either by the brand name owner or the
manufacturer, not by both. The section as writ-
ten permits this. Compliance with the reporting
requirements by the brand name owner shall be
considered compliance by the manufacturer.
Either one is permitted to submit the required
reports. The Act treats tire brand name owners
as manufacturers. Therefore, the wording of this
section has been changed to reflect the responsi-
bility of tire brand name owners.

Several commenters requested that the name of
fabricating manufacturers not be submitted since
this might cause competitive disadvantage to the
brand name or trademark owner. The NHTSA
finds it a legitimate need to know the actual
manufacturer of a product. That manufactiirer
could, for example, be manufacturing the same or
similar components for other brand name or
trademark owners. The agency would need this
information to ensure that all potentially defec-
tive or noncomplying equipment is remedied.

Many manufacturers complained of the re-
quirements in Section 573.3(f) that reports be
filed both by the equipment manufacturer and the
vehicle manufacturer where an equipment manu-
facturer's equipment has been used by more than
one vehicle manufacturer. Manufacturers stated
that this requirement is duplicative and costly,
providing identical information from both

PART 573— PRE 10

sources. The XHTSA stated in tlie NPRM that
this issue had been thoroughly considered prior
to tlie issuance of the XPRM. It has again been
explored by the agency in response to these com-
ments and the agency concludes that the dual
reporting requirement for the 573.o report is nec-
essary. Reports submitted by equipment and
vehicle manufacturers will have difTerent infor-
mation in them. In both cases, the information
is of importance to the agency in pursuing its
defects and noncompliance obligations. There-
fore, this requirement has been letained. It
should be reaffirmed for clarity that where an
equipment manufacturer's equipment is used in
vehicles of only one vehicle manufacturer, reports
need only be submitted by that vehicle manu-
facturer.

On a related matter, the XIITSA agrees that
reports required under Section 573.6 need not be
filed by both vehicle and equipment manufactur-
ers. These reports need only be filed by the
manufacturer undertaking tiie recall. Section
573.3(f) has been amended to reflect this change.

Other commenters on this section indicated
their disapproval of the shared responsibility for
remedying defects and noncompliance between
vehicle and equipment manufacturers. Section
.'J73.3 places certain reporting responsibilities
upon both equipment and vehicle manufacturers,
depending upon the nature of the defect. For
the most part, vehicle manufacturers are respon-
sible for reports relating to defects or noncom-
pliance in their vehicles while equipment
manufacturers are responsible for I'eports on their
defective or noncomplying equipment. In those
instances where a defect or noncompliance is dis-
covered in equipment installed in tlie \ehicles of
more than one vehicle manufacturer, both the
ccjuipment and vehicle manufacturers must re-
port. Equipment manufacturers suggested that
vehicle mamifacturers should be res{)onsible for
defects and noncompliance reports while vehicle
manufacturers want to place tlie burdens upon
equipment manufacturers. The XHTSA ado[)ted
the present scheme of shared respousiljility be-
tween vehicle and cfiuipment manufacturers for
comi)liance with agency regulations in response
to the 15)74 Amendments. Congress indicated in
those amendments that equi|)inent and vehicle
manufacturers should share tlie burden of rem-

edying defects in their equipment and vehicles.
The XHT.SA concludes that the reporting re-
quirements outlined in this regulation implement
the basic intent of those Amendments.

III. Definitions.

Many commenters objected to the definitions of
original and replacement equipment. Further,
some of these commenters indicated that the
XHTSA had little, if any, authority to place
i-esponsibility on an original equipment manufac-
turer, since Section I.")!* of the Act makes the
vehicle manufacturers responsible for original
equipment. The X'HTSA has deleted the defini-
tions of original and replacement equipment from
Part 573 since both terms are defined in Part 579.
The XHTSA notes that with respect to the
authority to place responsibility for defects or
noncompliance upon original equipment manu-
facturers rather than the vehicle manufacturer.
.Section 1.59 states that the Act's defect and non-
compliance scheme of responsibility shall be con-
trolling unless otherwise provided ])y regulation.
Therefore, the XHTSA does have the authority
to shift the responsibility from the vehicle manu-
facturer to the equipment manufacturer if it
determines that such alteration will advance the
efficiency of enforcement actions. Part 579.
Deject and Noncompliance Responsibility, out-
lines the responsibilities of the various manufac-
turers and defines "replacement" and "original"
equipment.

Commenters also requested that the agency de-
fine the term "safety-related defect" so as to
clarify the agency's intent in this area. The
XHT.*^.\ has in the past rejected requests to es-
tablish a specific definition of safety-related
defect. Whether or not a defect is safety-related
depends upon a variety of factors and must be
ascertained based upon the circumstances of each
separate case. Thus, a specific definition cannot
feasibly be created.

Ford Motor Company argued that the agency's
pieambular di.scussion tended to indicate that the
dcnnitiou of "first [)iirchaser foi- pui'poses other
tiiau resale" would include the dealer or distrib-
utor. This was not the intent of the regulation.
"First purchaser" is based on a similar statutory
term and has been used by the agency for years
with a specific meaning. The fir.st purchase oc-

PART 573— PRE 11

curs where the purchaser does not buy the vehicle
with the purpose of reselling it. Obviously, sale
of a vehicle to a dealer presupposes that the
dealer intends to resell the vehicle to the ultimate
consumer or purchaser. Therefore, sale to a
dealer would not constitute the sale to the first
purchaser for purposes other than resale. The
use of the term first-purchaser list in the pre-
amble of the proposal in reference to the lists
required to be retained by equipment manufac-
turers was a colloquial use of the term rather
than its more precise meaning under the Act.

IV. Defect and noncompliance Information reports.

Prestolite Company interpreted the require-
ments of iSection .573.5(a) to mean that they
would be required to file a report with the
XHTSA every time a defective piece of equip-
ment was brought to their attention, since there
is no specific definition of safety-related defect.
This they suggested would be a burdensome re-
quirement. Such a requirement is not the intent
of this regulation. A manufacturer submits a
report to the XHTSA when either it or the
agency makes a determination under Section 151
or 152 of the Act that a defect related to motor
vehicle safety in fact exists. A failure of a single
piece of equipment may not occasion the finding
of a safety-related defect. Further, some equip-
ment failures might have no adverse safety
effects. Therefore, every failure of equipment will
not necessarily require a report to the NHTSA.
It is incumbent upon the agency and each manu-
facturer to make a good faith determination con-
cerning the safety relatedness of any defect before
a report under this paragraph is filed.

International Harvester (IH) suggested that a
manufacturer should not have to file a I'eport if
it intends to file a petition for inconsequentiality.
The XHTSA does not agree with this position.
The agency needs to know of potential safety-
related defects or noncompliances at the earliest
possible time. If a manufacturer intends to file a
petition for inconsequentiality, it should indicate
such in the report as part of the information
supplied in accordance with subparagraph (c)
(8).

Many manufacturers objected to the 5-day re-
quirement in Section 573.5(b) under which infor-
mation must be submitted within 5 working days

after a safety-related defect or noncompliance
has been discovered. Manufacturers suggested
increasing the number of working days and
changing the word "submitted" to "mailed.'"
Ford requested that the 5-day period not begin
until written notification is received from the
XHTSA for agency-initiated determinations.

The agency does not find persuasive arguments
for altering the existing 5-working day require-
ment. The XHTSA needs this information as
rapidly as possible to aid expeditious notification
and recall. Xot all information need be supplied
within the 5 working days if some of it is un-
available. The I'egulation clearly states that any
unavailable information would be submitted later
as it becomes available. The XHTSA also con-
siders it unnecessary to change the word "sub-
mitted" to "mailed." The term "submitted" is
broader than "mailed." Information may be sub-
mitted by mailing it or delivering it to the agency
in person. If mailed, it must be mailed within
5 working days.

With respect to the alleged insufficient time to
prepare information in 5 working days, the
XHTSA notes that this requirement has existed
in Part 573 for several years. Since the require-
ment has operated smoothly for that period of
time, the agency declines to adopt recommenda-
tions that would change it.

The XHTSA declines to adopt Ford's
recommendation concerning agency-initiated de-
terminations. Agency initiated defect or non-
compliance determinations are made after
thorough investigations conducted by the
XHTSA. A manufacturer is aware of these on-
going investigations, and therefore, it should not
be unnecessarily burdened or surprised when the
XHTSA makes a determination. Since the need
for expeditious action exists after an agency de-
termination and tiie manufacturer is aware of a
pending agency decision, the XHTSA considers
it adequate that a manufacturer submit the report
in 5 working days after receipt of either written
or oral agency notification.

Several equipment manufacturers contended
that the requirements of paragraph (c) (2) would
impose additional burdens upon them to mark the
equipment that they manufacture. Paragraph
(c) (2) requires defect and noncompliance reports

PART 573— PRE 12

to contain certain information tiiat identifies tlie
defective or nonconiplying eiiuipment. For ex-
ample, they argued that the requirements foi- tlie
date of manufacture of tlie affected equipment
would be burdensome since nmch of their equip-
ment is not dated according to time of manufac-
ture. Therefore, they suggested that the NIITSA
only require date of manufacture information
when it is known.

It is important to remember that Part 573 is
for the most part a reporting regulation. It is
not a recordkeeping or labeling regulation. A
manufacturer, under the regulation, only sup-
plies to the N'HTSA that information which is
available to it. In the case of date of manufac-
ture of equipment, the equipment manufacturer
in most instances need not label its equipment in
such a manner as to identify its date of manu-
facture. The regulation merely directs a manu-
facturer to supply such information to the
NHTSA in its reports. Obviously, if a manu-
facturer does not know the dates of manufacture,
it would be unable to supply them to the agency.
However, a manufacturer must supply the ap-
proximate dates of manufacture if that informa-
tion is available.

Manufacturers should note that the manufac-
turing date requirement is included in the regu-
lation for the benefit of the equipment
manufacturer. If that manufacturer knows the
approximate dates when a defective piece of
equipment was produced, then its recall can be
limited to equipment manufactured during those
dates. On the other hand, a manufacturer with-
out such infoi-mation might be required to under-
take a more extensive recall of its ecjuipment to
ensure that all defective products are recalled.

The Center for Auto Safety requested that the
XHTSA require motor vehicle manufacturers to
submit the vehicle identification numbers (VIN)
of vehicles involved in any recall activity. The
XHTSA does not require this information in the
Part 573.5 reports because the agency nonnally
has no need at the time of the reports issuance
for such information. The agency does require
the VIX's to be submitted in the Part 573.6 re-
ports for those vehicles that are uncorrected in a
manufacturer's recall. In these instances, the
agency uses the information to supplement a

manufacturer's recall efforts. Until such time as
a manufacturer determines that some vehicles are
uncorrected however, the agency usually has little
use for VIX information on all lecalled \ehicles.
In those limited instances wlien \'IX information
is necessary at the time of submission of the Part
573.5 report, the agency has the ability to request
it from a maimfacturer.

In regard to paragraph (c)(3), several manu-
facturers objected to the requirement that the
precise number of vehicles or equipment in each
category be reported. These manufacturers
stated that often this information is not known.
The XHTSA agrees and therefore modifies the
section to require the submittal of this informa-
tion when it is known. Chrysler suggested that
the agency require the numbers of affected ve-
hicles to be submitted by GVWR breakdown
rather than by model. The agency disagrees with
this recommendation since it usually undertakes
recalls based upon model classification, not upon
GVAVR categories. Therefore, the submission of
information based upon a GVWR classification
would not be as useful as a classification based
upon vehicle model.

Atlas Supply Company suggested that the
agency not require the information specified in
paragraph (c) (4) since, for tire manufacturers,
tires are destroyed, making the required calcula-
tions difficult. Paragraph (c) (4) reciuires the
provision of information that estimates the per-
centage of defective or noncomplying equipment
on vehicles. The XHTSA considers estimates of
the amount of affected vehicles or equipment to
be necessary to obtain an idea of the scope of the
defect or noncompliance problem. Since the sec-
tion merely requires an estimate, the agency does
not consider this to place a difficult burden upon
manufacturers.

Many manufacturers complained about the re-
• luirements of paragraph (c) (6) which requires
the submission of information upon which the
determination was made that a safety-related de-
fect exists. These manufacturers indicated that
it would impose unreasonable buidens upon
manufacturers by requiring them to retrieve a
large amount of information in a short period of
time and to retain vast amounts of data. The
intent of this section is to provide a sunmiary to
the XHTSA of the information upon which a

PART 573— PRE 13

manufacturer based his defect determination.
This information, since it has been used by a
manufacturer for its determination of a defect,
should be readily available to it. The NHTSA
notes that the submission of summary informa-
tion is intended to reduce a manufacturer's bur-
dens. However, the specificity and clarity of
information must be maintained, and the agency
might require further information if the sum-
mary information is inadequate. The NHTSA
has reworded the paragraph somewhat to indicate
that it is only necessary to submit a summary of
the information upon which the determination
was based.

Several manufacturers suggested that the re-
quirement for submission of noncompliance test
data in paragraph (c) (7) would require them to
conduct tests and submit details of test proce-
dures to the agency. This paragraph requires
only that manufacturers supply the results and
data of tests, if any are conducted, upon which a
noncompliance determination was based. Test
procedures need not be submitted. If a noncom-
pliance determination is made on information
other than tests, then that information would be
submitted.

Manufacturers claimed that they would be un-
able to submit a plan for remedy as required by
paragraph (c) (8) in the required 5 working days.
The NHTSA needs to have an indication of a
manufacturer's plan for remedy as soon as pos-
sible. Like all of the information required by
this section, the plan need not be extensively de-
tailed in the initial 5-working day period and is
subject to modification if subsequent circum-
stances warrant a change. In other words, a
manufacturer is not binding itself to only those
items established in the plan submitted during
the first 5 days after a defect or noncompliance
has been determined to exist. The NHTSA has
amended the wording of this paragraph some-
what to indicate that a copy of a manufacturer's
plan for remedying a defect or noncompliance
will be made public in the NHTSA docket.

The Center for Auto Safety argued that para-
graph (c) (9) should require actual copies of the
defect or noncompliance notice bulletins or com-
munications, not representative copies. The
reason the NHTSA used the terminology con-

tained in the notice is that in some instances a
manufacturer has a multiple mailing of one com-
munication. To require actual copies of multiple
mailings would require copies of each of these
identical communications. Therefore, the agency
allows a representative copy (e.g., one actual
copy) of such information. The NHTSA con-
cludes that this requirement fulfills the agency's
need for accurate copies.

V. Quarterly defect reports.

Many manufacturers disagreed with the
agency's scheme for quarterly defect reports out-
lined in Section 576.6. Equipment manufacturers
suggested that vehicle manufacturers should be
responsible for these reports, while vehicle manu-
facturers asserted that the equipment manufac-
turers are better able to accomplish the reporting
requirements. The NHTSA requires any manu-
facturer, either vehicle or equipment, undertaking
a recall to comply with the quarterly reporting
requirement. This report tells the agency the
status of recalls, and therefore, is best accom-
plished by the party conducting the recall. The
NHTSA declines to adopt suggestions that would
change this scheme.

Subparagraph (b) (6) requires the submission
of information on the number of vehicles or
equipment that is determined to be unreachable.
Several manufacturers argued for deletion of this
information suggesting that it was impossible to
ascertain why certain vehicles or equipment are
unreachable. The manufacturer need only give
the reasons why vehicles are unreachable when
such information is available to him. This infor-
mation aids the agency in understanding the
effectiveness of a recall. The agency can deter-
mine from this data the number of vehicles still
in use that were not corrected by a manufacturer
and why.

VI. Purchaser and owner lists.

The intent of this section was misunderstood
by a number of commenters. Many manufactur-
ers, both equipment and vehicle, indicated that
this requirement burdened them with new record-
keeping requirements far beyond those currently
in existence. This is not the case. For example.
Part 573.7(a) requires vehicle manufacturers to
maintain lists of owners of vehicles involved in a

PAKT 573— PRE 14

notification campaign, not all vehicles produced.
General rccordkeepino: requirements for veiiicle
and eciuipment manufacturers are found in the
Act and in the agency's regulations in Part 576.
These general recordkeeping requirements are not
atTect«d by this regulation.

Equipment manufacturers strenuously objected
to paragraph (c) as placing huge recordkeeping
burdens upon them while achieving little in the
way of benefits. The agency does not find these
arguments persuasive. The recordkeeping re-
quirement in this paragraph is limited. The
agency has reworded this section to clarify an
equipment manufacturer's recordkeeping require-
ments. This requirement does not mandate an
equipment manufacturer to make and retain a
list of all purchasers of its equipment as the
equipment is sold. Equipment manufacturers
will be required to retain a list of individuals,
dealers, distributors and manufacturers deter-
mined by the manufacturer or the agency to be in
possession of potentially defective or noncomply-
ing equipment. This limited requirement is
within the authority granted by Section 112(b)
of the Act. The list would be compiled during
the course of a defect or noncompliance cam-
paign. If an equipment manufacturer is unable
to find those in possession of its equipment, no
list is required to be retained. The burden im-
posed by this requirement is minimal since it
merely requires that manufacturers retain some
information that will, by necessity, be generated
should they be required to conduct either a defect
or noncompliance campaign.

With respect to paragraph (b), tire manufac-
turers indicated that each tire does not have a
different identification number and therefore the
paragraph should be amended somewhat to reflect
this. The agency agrees and has modified the
language accordingly.

VII. Notices, bulletins, and other communications.

Many manufacturers objected to the require-
ments in Section 573.8 as being too broad and
beyond the scope of the NHTSA's authority.
This section requires the submission of informa-
tion concerning defects in equipment and vehicles.
Further, the manufacturers recommended that
the parentheticals be deleted from the section and

that the term "defect" be changed to "safety-
related defect." The agency does not agree with
these conmients.

First, the agency needs information concerning
any defect in a manufacturer's product, not just
those defects that a manufacturer deems to be
safety-related. The Act contemplates a two-
pronged ajjproach to defects determinations.
Either a manufacturer or the agency can make
such a determination. For the agency to carry
out its half of that responsibility, it needs infor-
mation pertaining to all defects so that it can
then judge for itself whether a defect is in fact
safety related. To require only information per-
taining to manufacturer-detennined safety-related
defects, would in effect mean that manufacturers
would not be required to submit defect informa-
tion to the agency until such time as that manu-
facturer had made a safety-related defect
determination. This would stymie the agency's
ability to make independent judgments concern-
ing defects that is necessary for proper enforce-
ment of the Act. In the past year, the NHTSA
has made several safety-related defect detennina-
tions on the basis of infonnation routinely sub-
mitted by manufacturers concerning defects that
they had not considered safety-related. For
example, some Airstream Trailers and Wliite
Trucks were recalled when the agency discovered
safety-related problems that were mentioned in
those companies' technical bulletins. Therefore,
the agency needs all types of defect information,
not just information that manufacturers deter-
mine to be safety-related.

Second, the parentheticals were added to this
section to help clarify the type of information
intended to be covered by its requirements. These
lists are not all-inclusive. The NHTSA con-
cludes, however, that they do clarify the type of
information the agency seeks to obtain from a
manufacturer, and therefore, they will be retained
in the regulation.

The agency has deleted from Section 573.8 all
references to noncompliances. All noncompliances
must be reported to the agency under Part 573.5
(c)(9). Therefore, it is unnecessary to include
references to noncompliances in this paragraph.

In response to the allegations that the agency
has no authority to require submittal of defect

PART 573— PRE 15

infonnation, whether or not safety related, Sec-
tion 158 of the Act specifically grants the agency
that authority.

VIII. Address for submitting required reports and
otKer information.

The address listed in Part 573.9 has been
altered to reflect the new agency organization and
authority for enforcement actions.

In accordance with agency policy, the NHTSA
has considered the costs and benefits of this re-
quirement. The agency concludes that the regu-
lation will help enforcement of defect and
noncompliance cases by ensuring that adequate
information is submitted to the NHTSA. The
costs to both industry and government of the
regulation will be less than $5 million annually.

The principal authors of this notice are James
Murray of the Office of Defects Investigation and
Roger Tilton of the Office of Chief Counsel.

In consideration of the foregoing. Part 573,
Defect and NoncoTnpliaTwe Reports, of Volume
49 of the Code of Federal Regulations is
amended. . . .

(Sees. 108, 112, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat.
718 ; Sees. 102, 103, 104, Pub. L. 93-492 ; 88 Stat.
1470; 15 U.S.C. 1397, 1401, 1408, 1411-1420; dele-
gation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on December 18, 1978.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

43 F.R. 60165-60169
December 26, 1978

PART 573— PRE 16

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 573

Defect and Noncompliance Reports
(Docket No. 74-7; Notice 7)

ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY: The purpose of this final rule is to
amend 49 ('FR Part 57S— Defect and Noncompliance
Reports, to delete certain reporting requirements for
motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment manufac-
turers conducting a defect or noncompliance noti-
fication campaign. Under this rule, motor vehicle
manufacturers no longer have to submit, in the third
quarterly report to the agency, the vehicle identifica-
tion number (VIN) for each vehicle for which cor-
rective measures have not been completed. Other
quarterly report information requirements are also
deleted or clarified, based on the agency's ex-
perience since 1974 with this portion of the defect
and noncompliance reports.

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 6, 1986

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Part 573-
Defect and Noncompliance Reports, includes re-
quirements for manufacturers to report to NHTSA
safety-related defects and nonconformities with
Federal motor vehicle safety standards, to maintain
lists of purchasers and owners notified of defective
and noncomplying motor vehicles and items of equip-
ment, and to provide the agency with quarterly
reports on the progress of defect and noncompliance
notification campaigns. The quarterly reports must
contain specified information and be submitted for
six consecutive quarters after initiation of a cam-
paign, unless corrective action is completed earlier.
This rule amends only section 573.6 of Part 573
which sets forth the information required to be sub-
mitted to the agency in these quarterly reports. The
notice of proposed rulemaking, which was issued on
March 27, 1985 (50 FR 12056), proposed to delete
or clarify certain information requirements in the
third quarterly report. This amendment was pro-
posed in response to a petition by the Motor Vehi-
cle Manufacturers Association (MVMA). The agency
received comments on the proposal from nine motor
vehicle manufacturers and the MVMA. All com-
ments supported the proposal as lessening an ad-
ministrative and cost burden. The agency is adopt-
ing the changes as proposed.

First, the rule deletes the requirement in section
573.6(hX7) that manufacturers submit, in the third
quarterly report to the agency, the VIN for each
vehicle for which corrective measures have not been
completed. All commenters supported this change,
stating that the deletion of these VIN's from the
third quarterly report would lessen the admin-
istrative and cost burdens of producing the informa-
tion and would not adversely affect the progress of
safety campaigns. In addition, all commenters
agreed that these VIN's would be supplied to the
agency, if requested, within a reasonable time.

As stated in the proposal, this rule will not change
the agency's practice of assisting any individual vehi-
cle owner who requests recall information about a
particular vehicle or item of equipment. The agency
will continue to provide information to enable the
owner to contact the appropriate office of the
manufacturer.

Second, this rule also deletes the requirement in
section 573.6(bX4) that each quarterly report include
the number of vehicles or items of equipment
estimated to contain the defect. This total number
is initially supplied to NHTSA under the re-
quirements of section 573.5 which states that the
manufacturer's first report must include informa-
tion specifically identifying the vehicles or items of
equipment potentially containing the defect or non-
compliance, and the percentage of those vehicles or
equipment items estimated to actually contain the
defect or noncompliance.

The agency's purpose in having this number up-
dated in the quarterly reports has been to determine
the potential size of notification campaigns. Ford
Motor Company stated that updated information
could be sent, if needed, within 10 working days.
Ford added that information requiring supplier
analysis on returned components would take longer.
The agency concludes that updated estimates in the
quarterly reports are no longer necessary. NHTSA
will continue to receive quarterly report information
on the number of vehicles or items of equipment in-
volved in the notification campaign under section
573.6(bK3). The requirement in section 573.6(bX4)
is therefore deleted in the rule.

PART 573; PRE 17

Third, commenters also agreed with the proposed
amendment to the language in section 573.6(b)(5)
which clarifies the agency's intent that the number
of vehicles and equipment items inspected and
repaired and the number inspected and determined
not to need repair should be separately reported.
The rule adopts this clarification.

Fourth, the rule deletes the requirement in sec-
tion 573.6(c) concerning the correction of errors in
quarterly reports. Under this section, manufacturers
must submit revised information in quarterly reports
when they determine that an original report con-
tained incorrect data concerning the number of
vehicles or items of equipment (1) involved in a
notification campaign, (2) estimated to contain the
defect, or (3) determined to be unreachable for in-
spection for any reason. The agency does not believe
submittal of this information on a regular basis is
necessary and commenters agreed, adding the data
could be supplied if necessary, upon request from
NHTSA.

In their comments. Ford requested that the final
sentence of section 573.6(b)(6) be deleted. This sec-
tion requires that the number of vehicles or items
of equipment, which are determined to be unreach-
able for inspection due to export, theft, scrapping,
failure to receive notification, or other reasons, be
reported to NHTSA. The last sentence of the sec-
tion requires that the number of vehicles or items
of equipment in each of these categories be specified.
The agency did not propose in the March notice that
this sentence be deleted, because this information
is utilized by the agency. For example, NHTSA
keeps track of the number of owners who were
unreachable to assist the agency in determining
whether renotification to new owners is necessary
or whether additional types of notification should be
adopted. Moreover, the manufacturers currently
receive notice of whether a vehicle or equipment
item has been exported, stolen, or scrapped by
return postcard, from the person notified of the cam-
paign. Therefore, this requirement is not changed.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR Part
573 is amended as follows:

1. The authority citation for Part 573 is revised
to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: 15 U.S.C. 1397, 1401, 1408,
1411-20; delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

2. Section 573.6 is revisedto read as follows:
Section 573.6 Quarterly Reports

(a) Each manufacturer who is conducting a de-
fect or noncompliance notification campaign to man-
ufacturers, distributors, dealers, or purchasers, shall
submit to NHTSA a report in accordance with para-
graphs (b) and (c) of this section, not more than 25
working days after the close of each calendar
quarter. Unless otherwise directed by the NHTSA,
the information specified in paragraphs (bXl)
through (5) of this section shall be included in the
quarterly report, with respect to each notification
campaign, for each of six consecutive quarters begin-
ning with the quarter in which the campaign was in-
itiated (i.e., the date of initial mailing of the defect
or noncompliance notification to owners) or correc-
tive action has been completed on all defective or
noncomplying vehicles or items of replacement
equipment involved in the campaign, whichever
occurs first.

(b) Each report shall include the following
information identified by and in the order of the
subparagraph headings of this paragraph.

(1) The notification campaign number assigned
by NHTSA.

(2) The date notification began and the date
completed.

(3) The number of vehicles or items of equipment
involved in the notification campaign.

(4) The number of vehicles and equipment items
which have been inspected and repaired and the
number of vehicles and equipment items inspected
and determined not to need repair.

(5) The number of vehicles or items of equipment
determined to be unreachable for inspection due to
export, theft, scrapping, failure to receive notifica-
tion, or other reasons (specify). The number of
vehicles or items of equipment in each category shall
be specified.

(c) Information supplied in response to the
paragraphs (b)(4) and (5) of this section shall be
cumulative totals.

Issued on: December 31, 1985.

Diane K. Steed
Administrator
51 F.R. 397
January 6, 1986

PART 573; PRE 18

PART 573— DEFECT AND NONCOMPLIANCE REPORTS

(Docket No. 74-7; Notice 4)

573.1 Scope.

573.2 Purpose.

573.3 Application.

573.4 Definitions.

573.5 Defect and noncompliance information
report.

573.6 Quarterly report.

573.7 Owner lists.

573.8 Notices, bulletins, and other communications.

573.9 Address for submitting required reports
and other information.

lAUTHORITY: 15 U.S.C. 1397, 1401, 1408, 1411-20;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50. (51 F.R.
397— January 6, 1986. Effective: January 6, 1986)1

§ 573.1 Scope.

This part specifies requirements for manufacturers
to maintain lists of purchasers and owners of
defective and noncomplying motor vehicles and
motor vehicle original and replacement equipment,
and for reporting to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration defects in motor vehicles
and motor vehicle equipment, for reporting non-
comformities to motor vehicle safety standards,
for providing quarterly reports on defect and non-
compliance notification campaigns, and for pro-
viding copies to NHTSA of communications with
distributors, dealers, and purchasers regarding
defects and noncompliances.

§ 573.2 Purpose.

The purpose of this part is to inform NHTSA of
defective and noncomplying motor vehicles and
items of motor vehicle equipment, and to obtain in-

formation for NHTSA on the adequacy of manufac-
turers' defect and noncompliance notification cam-
paigns, on corrective action, on owner response,
and to compare the defect incidence rate among
different groups of vehicles.

§ 573.3 Application.

(a) This part applies to manufacturers of
complete motor vehicles, incomplete motor ve-
hicles, and motor vehicle original and replacement
equipment, with respect to all vehicles and equip-
ment that have been transported beyond the di-
rect control of the manufacturer.

(b) In the case of a defect or noncompliance
determined to exist in a motor vehicle or equip-
ment item imported into the United States, com-
pHance with §§ 573.5 and 573.6 by either the
fabricating manufacturer or the importer of the
vehicle or equipment item shall be considered
compliance by both.

(c) In the case of a defect or noncompliance
determined to exist in a vehicle manufactured in
two or more stages, compliance with §§ 573.5 and
573.6 by either the manufacturer of the incom-
plete vehicle or any subsequent manufacturer of
the vehicle shall be considered compliance by all
manufacturers.

(d) In the case of a defect or noncompliance
determined to exist in an item of replacement
equipment (except tires) compliance with §§ 573.5
and 573.6 by the brand name or trademark owner
shall be considered compliance by the manufac-
turer. Tire brand name owners are considered
manufacturers (15 U.S.C. 1419(1)) and have the
same reporting requirements as manufacturers.

(e) In the case of a defect or noncompliance
determined to exist in an item of original equip-
ment used in the vehicles of only one vehicle

(Rev. 1/6/86

PART 573-1

manufacturer, compliance with §§ 573.5 and 573.6
by either the vehicle or equipment manufacturer
shall be considered compliance by both.

(f) In the case of a defect or noncompliance
determined to exist in original equipment in-
stalled in the vehicles of more than one vehicle
manufacturer, compliance with § 573.5 is required
of the equipment manufacturer as to the equip-
ment item, and of each vehicle manufacturer as
to the vehicles in which the equipment has been
installed. Compliance with § 573.6 is required of
the manufacturer who is conducting a recall
campaign.

§ 573.4 Definitions.

For purposes of this part:

"Act" means the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended (15
U.S.C. 1391 et seq.).

"Administrator" means the Administrator of
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion or his delegate.

"First purchaser" means first purchaser for
purposes other than resale.

§ 573.5 Defect and noncompliance information
report.

(a) Each manufacturer shall furnish a report
to the NHTSA for each defect in his vehicles or
in his items of original or replacement equipment
that he or the Administrator determines to be
related to motor vehicle safety, and for each
noncompliance with a motor vehicle safety stand-
ard in such vehicles or items of equipment which
either he or the Administrator determines to exist.

(b) Each report shall be submitted not more
than 5 working days after a defect in a vehicle or
item of equipment has been determined to be
safety-related, or a noncompliance with a motor
vehicle safety standard has been determined to
exist. Information required by paragraph (c)
of this section that is not available within that
period shall be submitted as it becomes available.
Each manufacturer submitting new information
relative to a previously submitted report shall
refer to the notification campaign number when
a number has been assigned by the NHTSA.

(c) Each manufacturer shall include in each
report the information specified below.

(1) The manufacturer's name: The full cor-
porate or individual name of the fabricating
manufacturer and any brand name or trademark
owner of the vehicle or item of equipment shall
be spelled out, except that such abbreviations as
"Co." or "Inc.," and their foreign equivalents,
and the first and middle initials of individuals
may be used. In the case of a defect or noncom-
pliance determined to exist in an imported vehicle
or item of equipment, the agent designated by
the fabricating manufacturer pursuant to section
110(e) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1399(e)) shall be also
stated. If the fabricating manufacturer is a cor-
poration that is controlled by another corporation
that assumes responsibility for compliance with
all requirements of this part the name of the
controlling corporation may be used.

(2) Identification of the vehicles or items of
motor vehicle equipment potentially containing
the defect or noncompliance.

(i) In the case of passenger cars, the identifi-
cation shall be by the make, line, model year, the
inclusive dates (month and year) of manufacture,
and any other information necessary to describe
the vehicles.

(ii) In the case of vehicles other than passen-
ger cars, the identification shall be by body style
or type, inclusive dates (month and year) of
manufacture, and any other information necessary
to describe the vehicles, such as GVWR or class
for trucks displacement (cc) for motorcycles,
and number of passengers for buses.

(iii) In the case of items of motor vehicle
equipment, the identification shall be by generic
name of the component (tires, child seating sys-
tems, axles, etc.), part number, size and function
if applicable, the inclusive dates (month and
year) of manufacture, and any other information
necessary to describe the items.

(3) The total number of vehicles or items of
equipment potentially containing the defect or
noncompliance, and where available the number
of vehicles or items of equipment in each group
identified pursuant to paragraph (c) (2) of this
section.

PART 573-2

(4) The percentage of vehicles or items of
equipment specified pursuant to paragraph
(c) (2) of this section estimated to actually con-
tain the defect or noncompliance.

(5) A description of the defect or noncompli-
ance, including both a brief summary and a de-
tailed description with graphic aids as necessary,
of the nature and physical location (if appli-
cable) of the defect or noncompliance.

(6) In the case of a defect, a chronology of all
prinicipal events that were the basis for the de-
termination that the defect related to motor ve-
hicle safety, including a summary of all warranty
claims, field or service reports, and other infor-
mation, with their dates of receipt.

(7) In the case of a noncompliance, the test
results or other data on the basis of which the
manufacturer determined the existence of the
noncompliance.

(8) A description of the manufacturer's pro-
gram for remedying the defect or noncompliance.
The manufacturer's program will be available for
inspection in the public docket. Room 5109, Nassif
Building, 400 Seventh St., SW., Washington, D.C.
20950.

(9) A representative copy of all notices, bulle-
tins, and other communications that relate di-
rectly to the defect or noncompliance and are sent
to more than one manufacturer, distributor,
dealer, or purchaser. These copies shall be sub-
mitted to the NHTSA not later than 5 days after
they are initially sent to manufacturers, distribu-
tors, dealers, or purchasers. In the case of any
notification sent by the manufacturer pursuant to
Part 577 of this chapter, the copy of the notifica-
tion shall be submitted by certified mail.

§ 573.6 Quarterly reports.

((a) Each manufacturer who is conducting a
defect or noncompliance notification campaign to
manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or purchas-
ers, shall submit to NHTSA a report in accord-
ance with paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section,
not more than 25 working days after the close of
each calendar quarter. Unless otherwise directed
by the NHTSA, the information specified in
paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(5) of this sec-
tion shall be included in the quarterly report,
with respect to each notification campaign, for

each of six consecutive quarters beginning with the
quarter in which the campaign was initiated (i.e.,
the date of initial mailing of the defect or noncom-
pliance notification to owners) or corrective action
has been completed on all defective or noncomply-
ing vehicles or items of replacement equipment in-
volved in the campaign, whichever occurs first.

(b) Each report shall include the following infor-
mation identified by and in the order of the sub-
paragraph headings of this paragraph.

(1) The notification campaign number assigned
by NHTSA.

(2) The date notification began and the date
completed.

(3) The number of vehicles or items of equip-
ment involved in the notification campaign.

(4) The number of vehicles and equipment items
which have been inspected and repaired and the
numbe of vehicles and equipment items inspected
and determined not to need repair.

(5) The number of vehicles or items of equip-
ment determined to be unreachable for inspection
due to export, theft, scrapping, failure to receive
notification, or other reasons (specify). The
number of vehicles or items of equipment in each
category shall be specified.

(c) Information suppled in response to the
paragraphs (b) (4) and (b) (5) of this section shall be
cumulative totals. (51 F.R. 397— January 6. 1986.
Effective: January 6, 1986)]

§ 573.7 Purchaser and owner lists.

(a) Each manufacturer of motor vehicles shall
maintain, in a form suitable for inspection such as
computer information storage devices or card files,
a list of the names and addresses of the registered
owners, as determined through State motor vehi-
cle registration records or other sources, or the
most recent purchasers where the registered
owners are unknown, for all vehicles involved in a
defect or noncompliance notification campaign in-
itiated after the effective date of this part. The list
shall include the vehicle identification number for
each vehicle and the status of remedy with respect
to each vehicle, updated as of the end of each
quarterly reporting period specified in § 573.6.
Each list shall be retained, beginning with the date
on which the defect or noncompliance information
report required by § 573.5 is initially submitted to
the NHTSA, for 5 years.

(R«v. 1/6 /S6)

PART 573-3

(b) Each manufacturer (including biand name
owners) of tires shall maintain, in a form suitable
for inspection such as computer information stor-
age devices or card files, a list of the names and ad-
dresses of the first purchasers of his tires for all
tires involved in a defect or noncompliance notifi-
cation campaign initiated after the effective date
of this part. The list shall include the tire identifica-
tion number of all tires and shall show the status of
remedy with respect to each owner involved in
each notification campaign, updated as of the end
of each quarterly reporting period specified in
§ 573.6. Each list shall be retained, beginning
with the date on which the defect information
report is initially submitted to the NHTSA, for 3
years.

(c) For each item of equipment involved in a
defect or noncompliance notification campaign in-
itiated after the effective date of this part, each
manufacturer of motor vehicle equipment other
than tires shall maintain, in a form suitable for
inspection, such as computer information storage
devices or card files, a list of the names and ad-
dresses of each distributor and dealer of such
manufacturer, each motor vehicle or motor vehicle
equipment manufacturer and most recent pur-
chaser known to the manufacturer to whom a
potentially defective or noncomplying item of
equipment has been sold, the number of such items
sold to each, and the date of shipment. The list
shall show as far as is practicable the number of
items remedied or returned to the manufacturer
and the dates of such remedy or return. Each list

shall be retained, beginning with the date on which
the defect report required by § 573.5 is initially
submitted to the NHTSA for 5 years.

§ 573.8 Notices, bulletins, and other
communications.

Each manufacturer shall furnish to the
NHTSA a copy of all notices, bulletins, and other
communications (including warranty and policy ex-
tension communiques and product improvement
bulletins), other than those required to be sub-
mitted pursuant to § 573.5(c) (9), sent to more than
one manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or pur-
chaser, regarding any defect in his vehicles or
items of equipment (including any failure or
malfunction beyond normal deterioration in use, or
any failure of performance, or any flaw or unin-
tended deviation from design specifications),
whether or not such defect is safety-related. Copies
shall be submitted monthly, not more than 5 work-
ing days after the end of each month.

§ 573.9 Address for submitting required reports
and other information.

All required reports and other information, ex-
cept as otherwise required by this part, shall be
submitted to the Associate Administrator for
Enforcement, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Washington, D.C. 20590.

43 F.R. 60169
December 26, 1978

PART 573-4

EffMMv*: May 32, 1971

PREAMBLE TO PART 574— TIRE IDENTIFICATION AND RECORDKEEPING

(Docket No. 70-12; Notice No. 5)

On November 10, 1970, the National Highway
Safety Bureau (now the National Higliway
Traffic Safety Administration, or NHTSA) pub-
lished the Tire Identification and Recordkeeping
Regulations (35 F.R. 18116). Thereafter, pur-
suant to § 553.35 of the rulemaking procedures
(49 CFR Part 553, 35 F.R. 5119), petitions for
reconsideration or petitions for rulemaking were
filed by the American Retreaders' Association,
Inc., the Armstrong Rubber Co., Bandag Inc.,
the National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Associa-
tion, Inc., the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the
Lee Tire and Rubber Co., Chrysler Corp., the
Rubber Manufacturers Association, Ford Motor
Co., the Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., Pirelli Tire
Corp., the B. F. Goodrich Co., Uniroyal Tire Co.,
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., Michelin Tire Corp.,
the Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., White Motor
Corp., Bert Schwarz-S&H Inc., and the Truck
Trailer Manufacturers Association. Several pe-
titioners requested the opportunity to demonstrate
difficulties they were having meeting the regula-
tion as i.ssued, and as a r^ult a public meeting
was held December 21, 1970. Notice of the meet-
ing was published in the Federal Register (35
F.R. 19036) and the transcript of the meeting
is in the public docket. The substance of the
petitions and comments made at the meeting have
been considered. Certain parts of the Tire Iden-
tification and Recordkeeping Regulation are
hereby amended.

The definition of "Tire brand name owner" in
§ 574.3(c) is changed to make it clear that a
person manufacturing a brand name tire that he
markets himself is not a brand name owner for
the purposes of this regulation.

The regulation is amended to except from its
requirements tires manufactured for pre-1948 ve-
hicles. This exception is consistent with the

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard for pas-
senger car tires (Standard No. 109).

After consideration of the comments in the
petitions concerning the tire identification num-
ber requirements, several changes have been made.

1. Section 574.5 is amended to specify the num-
bers and letters to be used in the identification
number.

2. Figures 1 and 2 are modified to allow three-
quarters of an inch, instead of one-half inch,
between the DOT symbol and the identification
number and between the second and third group-
ing. Tires with cross section width of 6 inches
or less may use %2"i"ch letters. The DOT sym-
bol may be located to the right of the identifica-
tion number as well as above, below, or to the
left of the identification number. Retreaders,
as well as new tire manufacturers, may locate the
DOT symbol above, below, to the left, or to the
right of the identification number. The mini-
mum depth of the identification number has been
changed from 0.025 inch to 0.020 inch, measured
from the surface immediately surrounding the
characters.

3. The second grouping, identifying the tire
size, has been changed with respect to retreaded
tires to provide that if a matrix is used for
processing the retreaded tire the code must iden-
tify the matrix used. The change requiring re-
treaded tire identification numbers to contain a
matrix code rather than a size code was made
because, in the event of a defect notification, the
matrix would be a more meaningful method of
identifying the suspect tires and it was consid-
ered impracticable to require retreaders to in-
clude the tire size in the tire-identification
number.

4. The third grouping, for identifying the
significant characteristics of the tire, has been
changed to provide that if a tire is manufactured

PART 574— PRE 1

Effacllv*: May 22, 1971

for a brand name owner the code shall include
symbols identifying the brand name owner,
which shall be assigned by the manufacturer
rather than by the NHTSA. Manufacturers are
required to provide the NHTSA with the sjon-
bols assigned to brand name owners upon the
NHTSA's request. This change should result in
a shorter identification number and allow manu-
facturers greater flexibility in the use of the
third grouping.

Standard No. 109 presently requires that pas-
senger car tires contain a DOT symbol, or a
statement that the tire complies with the stand-
ard, on both sidewalls of the tire between the
section width and the bead. The requirement
in Standard No. 109 is being changed by notice
published in this issue (36 F.R. 1195 to provide
that the DOT symbol may be on either sidewall,
in the location specified bj' this regulation. The
requested change that the DOT symbol be allowed
on tires for which there is no applicable standard
in effect is denied, since such use would tend to
give consumers the impression those tires were
covered by a Federal standard.

Several petitioners requested that other DOT
symbols (located as required by the present
Standard No. 109) be permitted to remain on
the tire along with the three-digit manufactur-
er's code number assigned pursuant to that
standard. The Tire Identification and Record-
keeping regulation does not prohibit the con-
tinued use of the symbol and code number pro-
vided the numbers are not close enough to the
identification number to be confused with it.
In no event should the three-digit number, for-
merly required by Standard No. 109, immediately
follow the tire identification number.

As a result of petitions by vehicle manufac-
turers the requirement in § 574.10 that vehicle
manufacturers maintain the record of tires on
each vehicle shipped has been changed to elim-
inate the requirement that this information be
maintained by identification number. It would
evidently be axtremely difficult and expensive for
the vehicle manufacturer to record each tire iden-
tification number. Vehicle manufacturers have
stated that their present system provides records
that enable them to notify the purchaser of a
vehicle that may contain suspect tires.

Several petitioners requested that the effective
date of the regulation be extended beyond May 1,
1971. The 1970 amendment to the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act requires
that the pro\'isions relating to maintaining rec-
ords of tire purchasers shall be effective not later
than 1 year after the date of enactment of these
amendments (May 22, 1971). It has been deter-
mined that in view of the complexities involved
in establishing the recordkeeping system re-
quired and the effect of the same on existing
processes, good cause exists for making the regu-
lations effective on the latest date manufacturers
are required by statute to maintain records. It
is further determined that a May 22, 1971, effec-
tive date is in the public interest.

Effective date : May 22, 1971.

Issued on January 19, 1971.

Douglas W. Toms,
Acting Administrator, National
Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration.

36 F.R. 1196
January 26, 1971

PART 574— PRE 2

Elhttlv*: May 22, 1971

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 574— TIRE IDENTIFICATION AND

RECORDKEEPING

(Docket No. 70-12; Notice No. 9)

Amendment to Figure 2 Concerning the Location of the Tire Identification Number

for Retreaded Tires

The purpose of this amendment is to provide
retreaders with an alternative location for the
placement of the tire identification number.

On January 26, 1971, the National Highway
TraflBc Safety Administration published Docket
No. 70-12, Notice No. 5, a revised version of the
Tire Identification and Record Keeping Regula-
tion, 49 CFR Part 574 (36 F.R. 1196). Section
574.5 requires retreaders to permanently mold or
brand into or onto one sidewall a tire identifica-
tion number in the manner specified in Figure
2 of the regulation. Figure 2 requires that the
tire identification number be located in the area
of the shoulder between the tread edge and the
maximum section width of the tire. The regula-
tion specified this location because, generally, it
is the area upon which retreaders apply new re-
tread material.

Bandag, Inc., has petitioned for rulemaking to
allow the tire identification to be below the sec-
tion width of the tire. The petition requests this
relief because the Bandag process only affects
the tread surface, a comparatively smooth surface
is needed for application of the identification
number, and many casings have no smooth area

between the tread edge and the maximum section
width.

Therefore, in view of the above. Figure 2 of
Part 574 (36 F.R. 1200) is hereby amended as
set forth below to require that the tire identifica-
tion number be on one sidewall of the tire, either
on the upper segment between the maximum sec-
tion width and the tread edge, or on the lower
segment between the maximum section width
and bead in a location such that the number will
not be covered by the rim flange when the tire is
inflated. In no event should the number be on
the surface of the scuff rib or ribs.

Effective date: May 22, 1971.

Because this amendment relieves a restriction
and does not impose any additional burden on
any person it is found that notice and public
procedure thereon are unnecessary and imprac-
ticable, and that, for good cause shown, an effec-
tive date less than 30 days after the date of
issuance is in the public interest.

Issued on May 21, 1971.

Douglas W. Toms
Acting Administrator

PART 574— PRE »-4

KNcMvvi Nev*mb«r •, 1*79

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 574— TIRE IDENTIFICATION AND RECORD KEEPING

(Docket No. 70-14; Notice 15)

The purpose of this araondment to Part 574
of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, is to
provide that the second group of symbols within
the tire identification number shall, in the case
of new tires, be assigned at the option of the
manufacturer rather than conforming to the tire
size code presently found in Table I of the regu-
lation.

Under the present system, even if the presently
unassigned symbols "O" and "R" are used, a
maximum of 900 tire size codes can be assigned.
Due to the many new tire sizes being introduced,
it is necessary to change the system to allow
more flexibility. Therefore, Table I is herewith
deleted, new tire manufacturers are allowed to
assign their own two-digit code for the tire size,
and retreaders are allowed to use either a self-
assigned matrix code or a self-assigned tire size
code. Eaw;h new tire manufacturer will still be
required to use a two-symbol size code and to
maintain a record of the coding system used,
which shall be provided to the National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration upon written
request. It is recommended but not required
that manufacturers use the code sizes previously
assigned by this agency for active sizes, and re-
use the codes for obsolete sizes when additional
size codes are needed.

A notice of proposed rulemaking on this sub-
ject was published on June 16, 1972 (37 F.R.
11979). The comments received in response to
the notice have been considered in the issuance
of this final rule. The rule is issued as it ap-
peared in the proposal including the letter "T"
inadvertently omitted from the proposal.

Three of the tire manufacturers who com-
mented favored the proposed change, and the
National Tire Dealers and Retreaders Associa-
tion, the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Asso-
ciation and The European Tyre and Rim

Technical Organisation commented without ob-
jection to the proposed change.

Bandag, Inc., a retreader of tires, objected to
the proposed change on the grounds that allow-
ing tire manufacturers to assign their own tire
size code would remove one of the methods a
retreader has to determine the tire size of a
casing to be retreaded.

Mvrcedes-Benz of North America and Volks-
wagen of America did not favor the change
because of the possibility of confusion for the
vehicle manufacturer that equips its vehicle with
several manufacturers' tires.

The principal objection raised by Bandag
should be considerably alleviated by an amend-
ment tx) Standard No. 109 (36 F.R. 24824) under
consideration, which would require tire manu-
facturers to place the actual tire size, as well as
other pertinent information, between the section
width and the bead of the tire so that the infor-
mation will be less susceptible to obliteration
during use or removal during the retreading
process.

With respect to the comment by Mercedes-
Benz of North America and Volkswagen of
America, it was concluded that because the exist-
ing system does not provide enough symbols to
meet the anticipated introduction of new tire
sizes, the proposed change is necessary. Mer-
cedes' recommendation that "G", "Q", "S", and
"Z" be added or that a three-digit size code be
used was rejected, because the additional symbols
suggested are difficult to apply to the tire, and
the addition of a third symbol would, according
to the tire manufacturers, be impractical and
inefficient.

A list of the tire size codes assigned up to this
time is published in the general notice section of
this issue of the Federal Register (37 F.R. 23742).
The NHTSA urges tire manufacturers to use

PART 574— PRE 6

Effadlv*: Novambar 8, 1972

these existing codes for tire sizes presently being
produced and to work within their tire and rim
associations to make code assignments for new
tire sizes on an industry-wide basis and reuse
obsolete size codes wherever possible. In this
way the usefulness of the tire size code to the
vehicle manufacturer will be maintained.

In consideration of the foregoing, in Part 574
of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Table
I is deleted and § 574.5 is amended ....

Effective date: November 8, 1972.

Because this amendment relieves a restriction,
and because of the immediate need for the intro-
duction of new tire size codes, it is found for

good cause shown that an eflFective date less than
30 days from the date of issuance is in the public
interest.

Issued under the authority of sections 103,
112, 113, 119 and 201 of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401,
1402, 1407 and 1421, and the delegation of au-
thority at 49 CFR 1.51.

Issued on October 31, 1972.

Charles H. Hartman
Acting Administrator

37 F.R. 23727
November 8, 1972

PART 574— PRE 6

Ellccllvt: April 3, 1974

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 574— TIRE IDENTIFICATION AND RECORD KEEPING

(Docket No. 71-18; Notice 7)

This notice amends Standard No. 119, New
pneumatic tires for vehicles other than passenger
cars, -19 CFR 571.119, to specify lettering sizes
and modified treadwear indicator requirements
for tires. In addition, it amends Part 574, Tire
Identification, 49 CFR 574, to permit the labeling
of certain tires with the symbol DOT prior to
the effective date of the standard. This notice
also responds to petitions for rex;onsideration of
Standard 119's effective date by maintaining the
present date of March 1, 1975.

To avoid a coetly production shutdown on the
effective date to engrave tire molds with the
DOT compliance symbol required by the stand-
ard, the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration (NHTSA) proposed a modification
of the Part 574 prohibition on the symbol's use
prior to the effective date (39 F.R. 3967, Jan-
uary 31, 1974). The Rubber Manufacturers
Association and five tire manufacturers agreed
that the DOT should be engraved on tire molds
prior to the effective date, but objected to the
expense of covering the DOT with a label stating
that "no Federal motor vehicle safety standard
applies to this tire," when the DOT appears on
tires which (presumably) satisfy Standard 119
requirements. Firestone pointed out that the
large label size could obscure other label infor-
mation. Goodrich noted that, as proposed, the
DOT could be molded on tires which met no
standard and could mislead a user if the label
fell off.

The NHTSA will not permit the appearance
of the DOT compliance symbol on any item of
motor vehicle equipment to which no standard
is applicable. The terms "applicability" and
"applies" have only one meaning for Federal
motor vehicle safety standards : that the vehicle
or equipment concerned is subject to a safety
standard. To permit use of the DOT symbol on

vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment to
which no standard applies would confuse the
meaning of the symbol and the concept of com-
pliance.

In response to Firestone and Goodrich, the
NHTSA has modified the lettering size on the
label and limited use of the DOT symbol to tires
for which a standard has been issued. With the
small lettering size, the rubber labels used on
retread tires can be applied over the DOT symbol
in fulfillment of the requirement. Another
method which manufacturers did not mention
but which would be permissible is the removal
of the DOT at the same time imperfections are
buffed off the tire.

All comments on the proposal objected to the
specific location requirements for treadwear in-
dicators based on the concept of even tread wear
across the tread width. Goodyear demonstrated
in a meeting with the NHTSA Tire Division on
February 13, 1974, and detailed in its submission
to the Docket, the difficulty in equating ideal tire
wear with actual road experience. They recom-
mended the simpler concept that a tire has worn
out when any major tread groove has only %2 in
tread remaining. The NHTSA has concluded
that treadwear indicators must be placed at the
discretion of the manufacturer to give a person
inspecting the tire visual indication of whether
the tire has worn to a certain tread depth. Ac-
cordingly, the lateral location requirements for
treadwear indicators have been deleted from the
standard.

There was no discussion of the lettering size
and depth proposal, and these proposals are
adopted as proposed.

The comments requested reconsideration of the
standard's March 1, 1975, effective date (pub-
lished February 1, 1974, 39 F.R. 4087), asserting
the need for 18 months of lead time following

PART 574— PRE 7

fffactlve: April 3, 1974

publication of this notice to engrave tire molds
as required by the standard. The NHTSA has
found that 11 months is sufficient leadtime to
accomplish these changes, and accordingly these
petitions are denied.

To correct an inadvertent omission in the
amendment of Standard No. 119 in response to
petitions for reconsideration (39 F.R. 5190,
February 11, 1974), superscripts are added to
Table III entries for "All other, A, B, C, D
range tires".

In consideration of the foregoing, Parts 571
and 574 of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations,
are amended. . . .

Effective date: Standard No. 119 amendments:
March 1, 1975. Part 574 amendment: April 3,

1974. Because the Part 574 amendment creates
no additional burden, and because modification
of tire molds must begin immediately, it is found
for good cause shown that an effective date less
than 180 days after issuance is in the public
interest.

(Sees. 103, 112, 119, 201, Pub. L. 89-563, 80
Stat. 718; 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1407, 1421; dele-
gation of authority at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on March 28, 1974.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

39 F.R. 12104
April 3, 1974

PART 574^PRE 8

Effective: September 3, 1974

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 574 —

TIRE IDENTIFICATION AND RECORDKEEPING

(Docket No. 70-12; Notice 19)

This notice amends tlie Tire Identification and
Recordkeeping regulation, 49 CFR Part 574, to
establish an optional universal registration for-
mat for tire registraMou forms. It also requires
manufacturers of new tires to redirect registra-
tion forms of otlier manufacturers of new tires
which have been forwarded to them in error.

On March 9, 1973, the NHTSA issued a notice
of proposed rulemaking (38 F.R. 6398) propos-
ing a uni\ersal registration form for tire identi-
fication and record keeping. The notice was
issued in response to requests from multi-brand
tire dealers who were faced with a multiplicity
of ditl'erenv forms and procedures for tire regis-
tration. Currently, the regulation merely re-
quires manufacturers and reneaders to supply a
"means" of registration. The proposed rule also
envisioned that a copy of the form would be
provided to the first purchaser and that manu-
facturers and retreaders would be required to
redirect registration forms which had been for-
warded to them in error.

All comments received in response to the notice
were sympathetic to the problems faced bj' the
multi-brand dealers, and the majority were will-
ing to provide a ''unixersal forin" if requested
by a dealer.

Most manufacturers, however, pointed out that
their exclusive dealerships had received training
in the use of the current form, as had their own
personnel, and that a total cliangeo\er would
work a hardship without a concomitant benefit
for single-!)rand dealers. In view of these com-
ments, XIITSA has decided to promulgate the
universal registration format, which appears as
Fig. 3, as an optional format to be followed if
requested by a dealer and as a guide if a dealer
prefers to supply his own forms.

The proposal to require tire manufacturers
and retreaders to forward all misdirected regis-
tration forms within 30 days was universally
opposed by new-tire manufacturers, who stated
that they are currently particii)ating in a volun-
tary but limited program for forwarding these
misdirected forms. Furthermore, new-tire manu-
facturers believe they should not be responsible
for misdirected retreaded tire registration forms,
as there are over 5,000 tire retreaders in the
country and such a task would be formidable.
One new-tire manufacturer indicated that he had
received over 15,000 misdirected retreaded tire
registration forms during January 1973. The
docket contained only one submission from the
retreading industry, and it did not deal with the
problem of misdirected forms.

It also appears from the comments received
and other information available to XHTSA that
new-tire manufacturers maintain a computer-
based registration process, while only approxi-
mately 25Tf) of the retreading industry utilizes
computers for this purpose. Thus, the require-
ment for forwarding all misdirected forms would
fall heavily on both segments of the industry,
new-tire manufacturers in that most misdirected
forms appear to be sent to them and retreaders
in that a majority are ill-equipped to carry out
the forwarding functions.

Therefore, rather than issue an all inclusive
forwarding requirement at this time, XIITSA
has decided to require only that new-tire manu-
facturers redirect new tire registraiton forms
erroneously forwarded to them. Further, the
XPITSA has determined that a 90-day forward-
ing period will be sufficient, rather than the 30
days originally proposed. It is expected that
the n.se of the manufacturer's logo on the uni-
versal registration format and increased vigilance

PART 574— PRE 9

Effective: September 3, 1974

on the part of tlie industry will substantially
curtail the number of misdirected forms. If it
later appears that tire registrations are not being
properly received, the NHTSA intends to take
further action in this area.

The notice proposed that tire manufacturers
furnish their dealers with duplicate copies of the
registration form so that a copy could be given
to consumers at the time of j^urchase. This pro-
vision was objected to by all new-tire manufac-
turers and the retreaders' association. In their
view, the increased expense served no viable
function as Part 574 currently requires all pur-
chasers to be notified by certified mail of safety
defects. They argued that the possession of a
duplicate registration form would not aid the
purchaser in the case of recall. The manufac-
turers also said that the completion of registra-
tion forms is often reserved until the end of the
day or other slack time, and further that the

consumer automatically receives a copy of his
tire identification number on the guarantee if
one is given.

The NHTSA finds these arguments to have
merit, and the requirement to give the purchaser
a copy of the registration form is deleted from
the final rule.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
574.7 is amended

Effective date : September 3, 1974.

(Sees. 103, 112, 113, 119, 201, Pub. L. 89-563,
80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1402, 1407,
1421; delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on May 28, 1974.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

39 F.R. 19482
June 3, 1974

PART 574^PRE 10

Effective: November I, 1974

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 574-TIRE IDENTIFICATION AND RECORDKEEPING

(Docket No. 70-12; Notice 21)

This notice amends 49 CFR Part 574 to pro-
vide that the Universal Reg:istration Forms
supplied by dealers must conform in size and be
similar in format to Figure 3 of the regulation.

On June 2, 1974, 49 CFR Part 574 was
amended to require a Universal Registration
Format when tire registration forms are supplied
by manufacturers to dealers (39 F.R. 19482).
Three petitions for reconsideration were received
in response to this notice. All three, Michelin
Tire Corporation, Rubber Manufacturers Asso-
ciation, and the Firestone Tire and Rubber Com-
pany, requested that the regulation be amended
to require that dealer-supplied registration forms
also conform in size and be similar in format to
Figure 3 of the regulation. The petitioners
pointed out that registration handling method-
ology has been standardized throughout the in-
dustry, and that the use of diflFerent sizes and
formats would be costly and inefficient. The
NHTSA concurs in this assessment, and there-
fore amends 49 CFR 574.7(a) to require that the
dealer-supplied forms must conform in size and
be similar in format to Figure 3.

In addition, Firestone petitioned to revise
Figure 3 slightly and to extend the effective date
of the amendment to 120 days after the response
to the petitions for reconsideration. Since 49
CFR 574.7 currently requires only that the forms
be "similar" to Figure 3, Firestone's proposed
modification is authorized by the regulation and
no amendment to the standard is needed. Fire-
stone's request to e.xtend the effective date of the
standard is denied, as NUTS A has determined
sufficient lead time was available from the date
the amendment was issued to prepare forms.

In consideration of the foregoing, the last sen-
tence of 49 CFR 574.7(a) is amended. . . .

Effective date: November 1, 1974.

(Sees. 103, 112, 113, 119, 201, Pub. L. 89-563,
80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1402, 1407,
1421; delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on October 29, 1974.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

39 F.R. 38658
November 1, 1974

PART 574— PRE 11-12

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 574 — TIRE IDENTIFICATION

AND RECORDKEEPING

(Docket No. 70-12; Notice 22)

This notice corrects the authority citations
to Part 574, Tire Identifcatian and Recordkeep-
ing, and makes other small corrections of cita-
tions in the text of the regulation to reflect statu-
tory amendments. This correction is being made
to conform the statutory authority citations to
the existing statute.

Effective dates: Since these technical corrections
do not affect the responsibilities under the regu-
lation, they are made effective December 26, 1978.

For further information contact:

Roger Tilton, Office of Chief Counsel,
National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washing-
ton, D.C. 20590 (202-426-2992).

Supplementary information: Since issuance of
the Tire Identification and Recordkeeping regu-
lation, several changes have been made to the
agency's authorizing statute that require
NHTSA to correct the authority citations of the
regulation. "While authority citatoins found in
NHTSA 's regulations and standards are not
parts of the rules, they are useful to those who
wish to review the legislative background of the
rulemaking action. Therefore, NHTSA cor-
rects the authority citations for clarity and to
provide information to those who are interested.
The agency also corrects Part 574.2 and 574.8
by altering the existing reference to section 113.
Section 113 was the safety defect and noncom-
pliance notification section of the National Traffic

and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Pub. L.
89-563). Section 102 of the 1974 Motor Vehicle
and Schoolbus Safety Amendments (Pub. L.
93— 192) transferred the notification pro\'isions
from section 113 to section 151 and 152 of the
Safety Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 1411 and
1412). Since the regulation currently refers to
the old Act rather than the Act as amended, the
agency is correcting the affected provisions of
the regulation to bring them up to date.

Since this notice simply corrects references in
the regulation and its authority citations with-
out altering any of its substantive provisions, the
Administrator finds that notice is unnecessary
and that an immediate effective date is in the
public interest.

In consideration of the foregoing, Volume 49
of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 574,
Tire Identif cation and Recordkeeping, is
amended. . . .

(Sees. 103, 108, 112, 119, 201, Pub. L. 89-563,
80 Stat. 718 (15 U.S.C. 1392, 1397. 1401, 1407,
1421); Sees. 102, 103, 104, Pub. L. 93-492, 88
Stat. 1470 (15 U.S.C. 1397, 1401, 1411-1420);
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50).

Issued on December 18, 1978.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

43 F.R. 60171
December 26, 1978

PART 574^PRE 13-14

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 574 — TIRE IDENTIFICATION AND RECORDKEEPING

(Docket No. 70-12; Notice 23)

Action: Amendment of rule.

/Summary: Congress has recently amended the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966 (the Safety Act) to e.xenipt manufacturers
of retreaded tires from the registration require-
ments of the Act. This notice makes conforming
amendments to the regulations implementing the
tire registration requirements of the Act. The
amendment is being published as a final rule
without notice and opportunity for comment and
is eflFective immediately, rather than 180 days
after issuance, since the agency lacks discretion
on the manner implementing this Congressional
mandate.

Effective date : February 8, 1979.

For further information contact :

Arturo Casanova, Office of Vehicle Safety
Standards, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202) 426-1715.

Supplementary information: Congress has re-
cently enacted the Surface Transportation Assist-
ance Act of 1978, P.L. 95-599. Section 317 of
that Act amends the Safety Act by exempting
manufacturers of retreaded tires from the regis-
tration requirements of section 158(b) of the
Safety Act.

This amendment modifies the requirements of
Part 574 to specify that manufacturers of re-
treaded tires are not subject to the mandatorj'
registration requirements set forth in that Part.
Manufacturers of retreaded tires are free to con-
tinue voluntarily registering the tires, and the
agency encourages these manufacturei-s to pro-
vide some means for notifying purchasei-s in the
event of a recall of tires that do not comply with

federal safety standards or contain a safety-
related defect. However, this choice will be left
to the individual retreadei-s.

The remaining obligations of retreaders under
Part 574 are set forth in §§ 574.5 and 574.6, which
provisions are not affected by this amendment.
Those sections require that the retreader label
contain certain information on its tires. These
provisions allow a retreader who determines that
some of its tires do not comply with a Federal
safety standard or contain a safety-related defect
to warn the public of that fact, and indicate the
label numbers of the aflFected tires.

Since Congress has amended the Safety Act to
exempt the manufacturers of retreaded tires from
the registration requirements, this amendment of
Part 574 is published without notice and oppor-
tunity for comment. The Administrator finds
good cause for foregoing these procedures in this
instance, because Congress has specifically man-
dated this action, and the agency has no author-
ity to disregard a legislative mandate. For the
same reason, this amendment is effective imme-
diately, rather than 180 days after issuance.

The agency has reviewed the impacts of this
amendment and determined that they will reduce
costs to the manufacturers. Further, the agency
has determined that the amendment is not a sig-
nificant regulation within the meaning of Execu-
tive Order 12044.

The program official and attorney principally
responsible for the development of this amend-
ment are Arturo Casanova and Stephen Kratzke,
respectively.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
Part 574, Tire Identification and Recordkeeping,
is amended ....

PART 574— PRE 15

AUTHORITY : Sections 103, 108, 112, 119, 201, Issued on January 31, 1979.
Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (15 U.S.C. 1392, Joan Claybrook

1397, 1401, 1407, 1421); sees. 102, 103, 104, Pub. Administrator

L. 93-492, 88 Stat. 1470 (15 U.S.C. 1411-1420) ;

Stat. 2689 (15 U.S.C. 1418) ; delegation of au- 44 F.R. 7963

thority at 49 CFR 1.51. February 8, 1979

PART 574— PRE 16

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 574

Tire Identification and Recordlteeping;
Interim Final Rule and Request for Comments

(Docket No. 70-12; Notice 24)

ACTION: Interim final rule and request for
comments.

SUMMARY: In October 1982, Congress adopted
an amendment to the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (the Safety Act) regard-
ing tire registration requirements of 49 CFR Part
574, Tire identification and recordkeeping. Those
requirements are intended to provide tire manu-
facturers and brand name owners with the names
of tire purchasers so that the purchasers can be
notified in the event that their tires are determined
to contain a safety defect or to fail to comply with a
safety standard.

The amendment prohibits this agency from re-
quiring independent tire dealers and distributors
(i.e., those whose business is not owned or con-
trolled by a tire manufacturer or brand name
owner) to comply with the existing tire registra-
tion requirements in Part 574. All other tire
dealers and distributors must continue to comply
with those requirements.

The prohibition regarding independent dealers
and distributors is self-executing and became ef-
fective on the date of enactment, October 15, 1982.
In place of the existing requirements, the amend-
ment directed the Secretary of Transportation to
require each of those dealers and distributors to
furnish a registration form to each tire purchaser
after the dealer or distributor has first filled in the
tire identification number(s) of the tire(s) sold on
the form. Purchasers wishing to register their tires
may then do so by filling in their name on the form
and mailing the completed form to the tire manu-
facturer or brand name owner. Because the new

statutory requirements regarding registration of
tires sold by independent dealers and distributors
are not self-executing, they do not affect those
dealers and distributors until this agency has
issued and put into effect a rule adopting those re-
quirements. This rule accomplishes that result.

The Safety Act amendment also requires that
the agency specify the format and content of the
forms to be used in complying with the new
requirements. This rule sets forth those specifica-
tions.

DATES: This rule is effective beginning June 20,
1983.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Prior to the
enactment of the Motor Vehicle Safety and Cost
Savings Authorization Act of 1982 (hereinafter
referred to as the Authorization Act) (Pub. L.
97-311), all tire dealers and distributors were re-
quired by 49 CFR Part 574, Tire identification and
recordkeeping, to register all sales of new tires.
Under that regulation, NHTSA required dealers
and distributors to write specified information
(i.e., the purchaser's name and address, the
dealer's name and address, and the identification
numbers of the tires) on a registration form and
send the completed form to the tire manufacturer,
brand name owner (hereinafter referred to as "tire
manufacturer") or its designee.

Tire registration provisions of the Authorization
Act. Compliance with the requirement for man-
datory registration was uneven. While virtually all
tires on new vehicles were registered, slightly less
than half of all replacement tires were registered.
In its report on the Authorization Act, the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce found that

PART 574-PRE 17

dealers and distributors whose business was owned
or controlled 'by a tire manufacturer registered
between 80 and 90 percent of the replacement tires
they sold. However, dealers and distributors whose
businesses were not owned or controlled by a tire
manufacturer (hereinafter collectively referred to
as "independent dealers") registered only 20 per-
cent of the replacement tires that they sold {Id. at
8).

In an effort to improve the registration rate for
the tires sold by independent dealers, Congress in-
cluded a tire registration provision in the Authori-
zation Act. That provision amended section 158(b)
of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966 (hereinafter referred to as "Safety
Act") (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.) to prohibit the
Secretary of Transportation from requiring inde-
pendent dealers to comply with the Part 574 re-
quirements for mandatory registration. (The
Secretary's authority under the Safety Act has
been delegated to the NHTSA Administrator, 49
CFR 1.50.) Dealers and distributors other than
independent dealers (hereinafter collectively re-
ferred to as "non-independent dealers") remain
subject to these requirements.

The prohibition concerning independent dealers
was self -executing (i.e., its effectiveness was not
conditioned on prior action by this agency) and
became effective on the date of enactment of the
Authorization Act, October 15, 1982. Thus, even
without any amendment by the agency to Part 574,
its requirements for mandatory registration
ceased on October 15 to have any effect insofar as
they apply on their face to independent dealers.

In place of the mandatory registration process.
Congress directed that a voluntary process be
established for independent dealers. Section
158(b) (2) (B) provides

The Secretary shall require each dealer and distributor
whose business is not owned or controlled by a manufac-
turer of tires to furnish the first purchaser of a tire with

' As explained in the House Report on the Authorization Act,
" 'company owned and controlled' means a significant compo-
nent of direct equity ownership of the dealer or distributor
which gives that party, as a factual matter, effective control of
the business. Thus, it would not encompass buy-sell agreements,
mortgages, notes, franchise agreements or similar financial ar-
rangements which a tire company may have with a dealer or
distributor." H.R. Rep No. 576, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 8-9 (1982).

a registration form (containing the tire identification
number of the tire) which the purchaser may complete
and return directly to the manufacturer of the tire. The
contents and format of such forms shall be established by
the Secretary and shall be standardized for all tires. Suf-
ficient copies of such forms shall be furnished to such
dealers and distributors by manufacturers of tires.

Under the voluntary process, the primary
responsibility for registering tires sold by inde-
pendent dealers is shifted from the dealer to the
purchaser. NHTSA is mandated by section
158(b) (2) (B) to require the independent dealer to

(1) fill in the identification number(s) of the tire(s)
sold to a purchaser on a registration form and then

(2) hand the form to the purchaser. If the pur-
chaser wishes to register the tires, he or she may
do so by filling in his or her name and address, add-
ing postage and sending the completed form to the
tire manufacturer or its designee.

In addition, NHTSA is required by section
158(b) (3) to evaluate the effect of the svwtch to
voluntary tire registration on the registration rate
for tires sold by independent dealers. That evalua-
tion must be conducted at the end of the two year
period following the effective date of the Authori-
zation Act, i.e., October 15, 1984. In the evalua-
tion, the agency is required to assess the efforts of
the independent dealers to encourage consumers
to register their tires and the extent of the dealers'
compliance with the voluntary registration pro-
cedures established by this notice. NHTSA is
required also to determine whether to impose any
additional requirements on dealers for the purpose
of promoting higher registration levels.

The agency has received several telephone in-
quiries from independent dealers as to whether,
notwithstanding the amendments to section
158(b), they could elect to continue following the
requirements for mandatory registration. It does
not appear that the independent dealers have this
option. Section 158(b)(2)(B) specifies that the
agency "shall require each . . . (independent
dealer) to furnish the first purchaser of a tire with
a registration form (containing the tire identifica-
tion number of the tire) which the purchaser may
complete and return directly to the manufacturer
of the tire." However, nothing in the section ap-
pears to preclude the purchaser from voluntarily
giving the form back to the dealer for transmission
to the manufacturer or his designee. Comments
are requested on the issues raised by these inde-

PART 574-PRE 18

pendent dealers as well as on the reasons why
some independent dealers desire the opportunity
to continue mandatory registration.

Congress made no provision for immediate
replacement of mandatory registration by volun-
tary registration. Unlike the amendment pro-
hibiting the agency from requiring independent
dealers to follow the mandatory registration proc-
ess, the amendment concerning voluntary regis-
tration is not self-executing. Before voluntary
registration can be initiated, the agency must first
issue a rule requiring participation by the indepen-
dent dealers in the voluntary registration process
and put that rule into effect.

New standardized registration forms. In addition
to setting forth such a requirement, this rule also
specifies the content, format and size of the
registration forms to be used by the independent
dealers. This aspect of the rule responds to the
directive in section 158(b) (2) (B) for the stand-
ardization of such forms. NHTSA wishes to em-
phasize that this rule does not require standardiza-
tion of the forms used by nonindependent dealers.
Tire manufacturers need not make any change in
the forms which they have been providing those
dealers.

In selecting interim requirements standardizing
the content, format and size of registration forms
to be provided to or used by independent dealers,
NHTSA has made the minimum changes to Part
574 necessary to comply with section 158(b) (2).
This approach will minimize both the burdens of
this nilemaking and the period during which in-
dependent dealers are not subject to any registra-
tion requirements.

The new standardized forms would be very
similar to the forms which the manufacturers have
been providing dealers over the last eight years.
Since 1974, Part 574 has specified the type of infor-
mation for which blanks and titles are to appear on
registration forms. (§ 574.7(a) (l)-(3)). This infor-
mation includes the name and address of the tire
purchaser, the tire identification number, and the
name and address of the dealer or other means by
which the manufacturer could identify the dealer.
This rule would require the new registration forms
for independent dealers to have blanks and titles
for the same information.

This rule also adopts as mandatory the format
specifications which have appeared as a suggested

guide in Part 574. Those specifications have been
generally followed since 1974 without any com-
plaints from either manufacturers or dealers.

In recognition of the shift of primary respon-
sibility for registering tires from the independent
dealer to the purchaser, this rule substitutes a new
reminder on the form. The old reminder warned
the dealer that registration of tires was required
by Federal law. The new reminder informs the pur-
chaser that completing and mailing the form will
enable the tire manufacturer to contact him or her
directly in the event that the tire is recalled for
safety reasons, i.e., if the tire is determined to con-
tain a safety defect or to fail to comply with an ap-
plicable safety standard.

Both a maOing address and a statement about
appropriate postage must be printed on each form.
The House report states that the form is to be
presented to the purchaser in a manner suitable for
mailing. (H.R. Rep. No. 576, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 8
(1982)). Thus, the form itself must be mailable
without the necessity of the purchasers providing
an envelope. Forms provided by the manufacturers
must be preaddressed to either the manufacturer
or its designee. As to postage, the form must bear
the statement that first class postage is required.
This notation will ensure that the purchaser
realizes that post card postage is not sufficient. If
insufficient postage were placed on the form, it
would not be delivered and the tire would not be
registered. The need for first class postage is ex-
plained below.

This rule standardizes the size of the form so that
all forms will be mailable using a single stamp of
the same class of postage. The suggested guide in
Part 574 specifies dimensions of 3V4 inches in
width and 1\ inches in length. This rule does not
adopt those dimensions because, under existing
postal regulations, a form 3 'A inches by 7:*/^ inches
is too small to be mailed unless enclosed in an
envelope. Since NHTSA does not wish to require
manufacturers to provide self-addressed
envelopes, the agency has adopted the dimensions
in the postal regulations for cards mailable without
envelopes under first class postage as the dimen-
sions for the registration forms. Thus, the forms
must be rectangular; not less than .007 inches
thick; more than 3V2 inches, but not more than 6i/g
inches wide; more than 5 inches, but not more than
IIV2 inches long. If any of those maxima were ex-
ceeded, a single, first class stamp would not be suf-

PART 574-PRE 19

ficient postage. The agency has not adopted a post
card-sized form due to uncertainty whether such a
form would be large enough to permit the easy,
legible recording of all of the necessary informa-
tion.

Finally, the mandatory format requirements in-
clude a requirement that the form must show the
manufacturer's name to prevent confusion of
dealers and purchasers. This will enable the in-
dependent dealer to determine the brand of tire for
which a particular form is to be used for registra-
tion purposes. This requirement is necessary since
independent dealers often sell several different
brands of tires. Since the dealer will have as many
different types of registration forms as it has dif-
ferent brands of tires for sale, the dealer must have
some way of identifying the appropriate form. The
name may appear either in the mailing address or
anywhere else on the form.

Continued use of old registration forms. During
the limited period that this interim rule is in effect,
the agency will provide the option of using existing
forms instead of the new standardized ones. Elec-
tion of that option is conditioned upon the tire pur-
chaser's being provided not only with a form bear-
ing the tire identification numbers and the dealer's
name and address, but also with an envelope that is
suitable for mailing the form, bears the same
reminder to consumers required on the new forms,
and is addressed to the tire manufacturer or its
designee.

Source of registration forms. Under the require-
ments for mandatory registration requirements
which previously applied to independent dealers,
those dealers were permitted to use either the
registration forms provided by the tire manufac-
turers or use forms obtained from other sources.
The latter type of form was typically one pur-
chased from a clearinghouse. The clearinghouse
forms were not manufacturer specific (i.e., did not
bear any mark or information identifying a par-
ticular tire manufacturer or brand name) and thus
could be used to register any manufacturer's tires.
When the forms of a clearinghouse were com-
pleted, they were returned to the clearinghouse.
The clearinghouse would then forward them to ap-
propriate manufacturers.

Except under the circumstances described above
in the discussion of the temporary continued use of
existing forms, the amendments to section 158(b)

and their legislative history compel an end to the
practice of using forms which are not addressed to
the manufacturer or its designee. Forms may con-
tinue to be addressed to an intermediary such as a
clearinghouse if that intermediary has been desig-
nated by a tire manufacturer to serve as an initial
recipient or as an ultimate repository for registra-
tion forms. Further, the amendments require
standardization of the forms to be used by indepen-
dent dealers. Hence, while independent dealers are
still permitted to obtain registration forms from a
source other than the tire manufacturers, those
forms must comply with all of the requirements ap-
plicable to forms provided by manufacturers.

Responsibility for filling out and mailing
registration form. The responsibility for com-
pleting the registration forms would be divided
between independent tire dealers and purchasers.
The tire dealer would be required to fill in the iden-
tification number of each tire sold and his name
and address or some other unique identifier like a
code number. The necessity for having the dealer's
name and address arises from the statutorily-
required evaluation of the voluntary registration
requirements. In order to conduct that evaluation,
the agency will need information on the registra-
tion rates for tires sold by individual independent
dealers. This information will aid NHTSA in identi-
fying different levels of registration among dealers
and evaluate the reasons underlying those dif-
ferences. The simplest and most effective way of
ensuring the recording of the dealer's names and
addresses is to require the recording of the infor-
mation by the party who can most accurately pro-
vide it. A dealer's proper name and address are ob-
viously better known to that dealer than to his
customers. Further, through the use of an inexpen-
sive rubber stamp, the dealer can record that infor-
mation on a form much more easily and quickly
than a tire purchaser can.

After the dealer has filled in this information and
handed the card (and envelope under the option for
using existing forms) to the tire purchaser, it is the
purchaser's responsibility to complete the registra-
tion process. If a purchaser wishes to register his
new tire, he must fill in his name and address,
place the appropriate postage on the form (or
envelope) and mail it.

Other issues. Any questions concerning the
classification of a particular dealer as independent

PART 574-PRE 20

or otherwise should be addressed in writing to the
Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the street address given
above. The legislative history cited early in this
notice provides some guidance on this point.
NHTSA notes that it is possible for motor vehicle
dealers to be considered tire dealers in certain
situations, as specified in 49 CFR 574.9. Whether a
new motor vehicle dealer is required to follow the
procedures for mandatory or voluntary registra-
tion depends on whether the dealer is owned or
controlled by a tire manufacturer. The agency
believes that most motor vehicle dealers would be
considered independent dealers for the purposes of
Part 574. These motor vehicle dealers are re-
minded that they should provide the motor vehicle
purchaser with a voluntary tire registration form
at the time they deliver the new vehicle to the pur-
chaser, and with the identification number(s) of all
of the vehicle's tires and the dealer's name and ad-
dress entered on the form.

Enforcement of the new provisions of Part 574
would be carried out under sections 108-110 of the
Safety Act. Failure to comply with the new provi-
sions would be a violation of section 108(a) (2) (D)
which prohibits failure to comply with any order or
other requirement applicable to any manufacturer,
distributor or dealer pursuant to Part B of the
Safety Act. Section 109(a) provides that a civil
penalty of $1,000 may be assessed for each viola-
tion of section 108. Under section 110(a), the
agency could seek an injunction against a violator
of section 108 to prevent further violations.

The information collection requirements con-
tained in this rule have been submitted to the
Office of Management and Budget (0MB) for its
approval, pursuant to the requirements of the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501
et seq.). A notice will be published in the Federal
Register when 0MB approves this information col-
lection.

As noted above, this rule is being issued as an in-
terim final rule, without prior notice and oppor-
tunity for comment. NHTSA believes that there is
good cause for finding that notice and comment
rulemaking is impracticable and contrary to the
public interest in this instance. The absence of any
tire registration requirements for independent
dealers has created an emergency necessitating
immediate action.

The agency is concerned that, until a rule re-
garding voluntary registration can be imple-
mented, registration of tires sold by independent
dealers may fall well below the 20 percent rate
which existed prior to the enactment of the
Authorization Act on October 15. As long as this
situation lasts, substantial numbers of tire pur-
chasers may be unable to register their tires.
Although some efforts are being made by indepen-
dent dealers to continue to follow the mandatory
registration process, the agency does not have any
indication how widespread or successful those ef-
forts are. Purchasers whose tires are unregistered
will not receive direct notification from the
manufacturer of those tires in the event that the
tires are found to contain a safety defect or to fail
to comply with an applicable standard. Ignorant of
the safety problem, the purchasers will continue to
drive on tires presenting a threat to their safety
and that of other motorists.

Providing opportunity for comment is also un-
necessary to a substantial extent. Many of the new
provisions of Part 574 were expressly mandated by
Congress.

Nevertheless, this agency is providing an oppor-
tunity to comment on this notice during the 45
days following its publication in the Federal
Register. Those comments will be carefully con-
sidered since the agency does not intend to main-
tain this rule as the permanent final rule on volun-
tary registration. A permanent final rule will be
issued not later than October 14, 1983.

NHTSA seeks comments from all interested
parties on what requirements should be included in
the permanent final rule. Pursuant to a contract
with the agency, American Institutes for Research
in the Behavioral Sciences has explored ways of
more effectively structuring and wording the
voluntary registration forms to induce as many
purchasers as possible to complete their forms and
send them to the manufacturers. Copies of the
results of the Institute's work have been placed in
the docket. Comments are requested on that work.
Comments are also requested on the feasibility of
using post card sized forms. The agency is uncer-
tain whether those forms would provide sufficient
space to permit the easy, legible recording of the
requisite information. If so, then this alternative
appears attractive since the lower postal rate for
such cards could induce a higher rate of registra-
tion by purchasers.

PART 574-PRE 21

The results of the contract study on registration
forms and all comments submitted in response to
this notice will be considered by the agency in
selecting the provisions to include in the perma-
nent final rule. If, after examining the study, the
agency determines that the registration forms for
independent dealers should be significantly
altered, a notice of proposed rulemaking will be
issued to ensure full comment on those changes.

The requirements of this rule become effective
30 days after the date on which it is published in
the Federal Register. The 30-day period provides
adequate time for tire manufacturers to print and
distribute the new voluntary registration forms (or
envelopes, under the option for using existing
forms) to the independent dealers. Since this rule
requires no change to the forms provided to or
used by nonindependent dealers, manufacturers
and nonindependent dealers may continue to use
their current forms.

NHTSA has analyzed the impacts of this action
and determined that it is neither "major" within
the meaning of Executive Order 12291 nor
"significant" within the meaning of the Depart-
ment of Transportation regulatory policies and
procedures. The requirements concerning the
registration forms for independent dealers will im-
pose minimally higher costs on tire manufacturers.
Compared to the costs and administrative burdens
to independent dealers of complying with the Part
574 requirements for mandatory registration, in-
dependent dealers should achieve slight savings
under this rule. Requirements for nonindependent
dealers are not changed by this rule. Consumers
purchasing tires from independent dealers will
now have to pay 20 cents for postage if they wish
to register those tires. The bearing of this cost by
consumers has been mandated by Congress. For
these reasons, a full regulatory evaluation has not
been prepared.

The agency has also considered the impacts of
this action on small entities, and determined that
this rule will not have a significant economic im-
pact on a substantial number of those small en-
tities. The agency believes that few if any of the
tire manufacturers are small entities. Although
many dealers are considered to be small entities,
this rule will not have a significant impact on them.
The requirements for tire manufacturers are un-
changed except that the size, content and cost of

the registration forms they supply to independent
dealers would be slightly different. No change at
all is made in the requirements for nonindependent
dealers. Independent dealers will realize minimal
savings from this rule. Small organizations and
governmental units which purchase tires from in-
dependent dealers will have to pay postage to
register those tires. However, those costs will not
be significant.

All interested persons are invited to comment on
this interim final rule. It is requested but not re-
quired that 10 copies be submitted.

All comments must be limited not to exceed 15
pages in length. Necessary attachments may be ap-
pended to these submissions without regard to the
15 page limit. This limitation is intended to en-
courage commenters to detail their primary
arguments in a concise fashion.

If a commenter wishes to submit certain infor-
mation under a claim of confidentiality, three
copies of the complete submission, including pur-
portedly confidential information, should be sub-
mitted to the Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the street
address given above, and seven copies from which
the purportedly confidential information has been
deleted should be submitted to the Docket Section.
A request for confidentiality should be accom-
panied by a cover letter setting forth the informa-
tion specified in the agency's confidential business
information regulation (49 CFR Part 512).

All comments received before the close of
business on the comment closing date indicated
above will be considered, and will be available for
examination in the docket at the above address
both before and after that date. To the extent
possible, comments filed after the closing date will
also be considered. However, the rulemaking ac-
tion may proceed at any time after that date, and
comments received after the closing date and too
late for consideration in regard to the action will be
treated as suggestions for future rulemaking. The
NHTSA will continue to file relevant material as it
becomes available in the docket after the closing
date, and it is recommended that interested per-
sons continue to examine the docket for new
material.

Those persons desiring to be notified upon
receipt of their comments in the rules docket
should enclose, in the envelope with their com-
ments, a self-addressed stamped post card. Upon

PART 574-PRE 22

receiving the comments, the doci<et supervisor will
return the post card by mail.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR 574

Consumers protection, Motor vehicle safety.
Motor vehicles. Rubber and rubber products, Tires.

PART 574— (Amended)

In consideration of the foregoing, the following
amendments are made to Part 574, Tire Identifica-
tion and Recordkeeping, of Title 49 of the Code of
Federal Regulations:

1. Section 574.1 is revised to read as follows:

§574.1 Scope.

This part sets forth the method by which new tire
manufacturers and new tire brand name owners
shall identify tires for use on motor vehicles and
maintain records of tire purchasers, and the
method by which retreaders and retreaded tire
brand name owners shall identify tires for use on
motor vehicles. This part also sets forth the
methods by which independent tire dealers and
distributors shall record, on registration forms,
their names and addresses and the identification
number of the tires sold to tire purchasers and pro-
vide the forms to the purchasers, so that the pur-
chasers may report their names to the new tire
manufacturers and new tire brand name owners,
and by which other tire dealers and distributors
shall record and report the names of tire pur-
chasers to the new tire manufacturers and new tire
brand name owners.

2. Section 574.3 is amended by adding a new
paragraph (c) (1) immediately after "Definitions
used in this part." and redesignating existing
paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(4) as paragraphs
(c) (2) through (c) (5):

§ 574.3 Definitions.

• • • • *

(c) • • *

(1) "Independent" means, with respect to a
tire distributor or dealer, one whose business is
not owned or controlled by a tire manufacturer
or brand name owner.

• • * • •

3. Section 574.7 is revised to read as follows:

§574.7 Information requirements — new tire
manufacturers, new tire brand name
owners.

(a) (1) Each new tire manufacturer and each
new tire brand name owner (hereinafter referred
to in this section and § 574.8 as "tire manufac-
turer") or its designee, shall provide tire registra-
tion forms to every distributor and dealer of its
tires which offers new tires for sale or lease to tire
purchasers.

(2) Each tire registration form provided to in-
dependent distributors and dealers pursuant to
paragraph (a) (1) of this section shall comply with
either paragraph (a) (2) (A) or (B) of this section.

(A) Each form shall contain space for re-
cording the information specified in para-
graphs (a) (5) (A) through (a) (5) (C) of this sec-
tion and shall conform in content and format to
Figures 3a and 3b. Each form shall be:

(i) Rectangular;

(ii) Not less than .007 inches thick;

(iii) Greater than 3V2 inches, but not
greater than 6'/s inches wide; and

(iv) Greater than 5 inches, but not greater
than IIV2 inches long.

(B) Each form shall comply with the same
requirements specified in paragraph (a) (4) of
this section for forms provided to distributors
and dealers other than independent distrib-
utors and dealers.

(3) Each tire manufacturer or designee which
does not give an independent distributor or
dealer forms complying with paragraph
(a) (2) (A) of this section shall give that
distributor or dealer envelopes for mailing forms
complying with paragraph (a) (2) (B) of this sec-
tion. Each envelope shall bear the name and ad-
dress of the tire manufacturer or its designee
and the reminder set forth in Figure 3a.

(4) Each tire registration form provided to
distributors and dealers, other than independent
distributors and dealers, pursuant to paragraph
(a) (1) of this section shall be similar in format
and size to Figure 4 and shall contain space for
recording the information specified in paragraph
(a) (5) (A) through (a) (5) (C) of this section.

(5) (A) Name and address of the tire pur-
chaser.

(B) Tire identification number.

PART 574-PRE 23

(C) Name and address of the tire seller or
other means by which the tire manufacturer
can identify the tire seller.

(b) Each tire manufacturer shall record and
maintain, or have recorded and maintained for it
by a designee, the information from registration
forms which are submitted to it or its designee. No
tire manufacturer shall use the information on the
registration forms for any commercial purpose
detrimental to tire distributors and dealers. Any
tire manufacturer to which registration forms are
mistakenly sent shall forward those registration
forms to the proper tire manufacturer within 90
days of the receipt of the forms.

(c) Each tire manufacturer shall maintain, or
have maintained for it by a designee, a record of
each tire distributor and dealer that purchases
tires directly from the manufacturer and sells them
to tire purchasers, the number of tires purchased
by each such distributor or dealer, the number of
tires for which reports have been received from
each such distributor or dealer other than an in-
dependent distributor or dealer, the number of
tires for which reports have been received from
each such independent distributor or dealer, the
total number of tires for which registration forms
have been submitted to the manufacturer or its
designee, and the total number of tires sold by the
manufacturer.

(d) The information that is specified in para-
graph (a) (5) of this section and recorded on
registration forms submitted to a tire manufac-
turer or its designee shall be maintained for a
period of not less than three years from the date on
which the information is recorded by the manufac-
turer or its designee.

4. Section 574.8 is revised to read as follows:

§ 574.8 Information requirements— tire distributors
and dealers.

(a) Independent distributors and dealers. (1)
Each independent distributor and each indepen-
dent dealer selling or leasing new tires to tire pur-
chasers or lessors (hereinafter referred to in this
section as "tire purchasers") shall provide each
tire purchaser at the time of sale or lease of the
tire(s) with a tire registration form.

(2) The distributor or dealer may use either
the registration forms provided by the tire
manufacturers pursuant to § 574.7(a) or
registration forms obtained from another
source. Forms obtained from other sources shall

comply with the requirements specified in
§ 574.7(a) for forms provided by tire manufac-
turers to independent distributors and dealers.

(3) Before giving the registration form to the
tire purchaser, the distributor or dealer shall
record in the appropriate spaces provided on
that form:

(A) The entire tire identification number of
the tire(s) sold or leased to the tire purchaser;
and

(B) The distributor's or dealer's name and
address or other means of identification known
to the tire manufacturer.

(4) Multiple tire purchases or leases by the
same tire purchaser may be recorded on a single
registration form.

(b) Other distributors and dealers. (1) Each
distributor and each dealer, other than an indepen-
dent distributor or dealer, selling new tires to tire
purchasers shall submit the information specified
in § 574.7(a) (5) to the manufacturer of the tires
sold, or to its designee.

(2) Each tire distributor and each dealer, other
than an independent distributor or dealer, shall
submit registration forms containing the infor-
mation specified in § 574.7(a) (5) to the tire
manufacturer, or person maintaining the infor-
mation, not less often than every 30 days.
However, a distributor or dealer which sells less
than 40 tires, of all makes, types and sizes during
a 30-day period may wait until he or she sells a
total of 40 new tires, but in no event longer than
six months, before forwarding the tire informa-
tion to the respective tire manufacturers or their
designees.

(c) Each distributor and each dealer selling new
tires to other tire distributors or dealers shall sup-
ply to the distributor or dealer a means to record
the information specified in § 574.7(a) (5), unless
such a means has been provided to that distributor
or dealer by another person or by a manufacturer.

(d) Each distributor and each dealer shall im-
mediately stop selling any group of tires when so
directed by a notification issued pursuant to sec-
tions 151 and 152 of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1411 and
1412).

Issued on April 21, 1983.

Raymond A. Peck, Jr.,
Administrator
48 F.R. 22572
IMay 19, 1983

PART 574-PRE 24

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 574
Tire Code Marks Assigned to New Tire Manufacturers

ACTION: Publication of tire code marks assigned
to new tire manufacturers.

SUMMARY: The NHTSA last published a com-
plete listing of the tire code marks assigned to new
tire manufacturers in 1972. Since that time, there
have been several additions and changes in names
and addresses for the assigned code marks. This
publication will inform the public of those additions
and changes.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 574.5
of the Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, re-
quires tire manufacturers to mold a tire identifica-
tion number onto or into the sidewall of each tire
they manufacture. In the case of new tires, the
first two digits of the tire identification number are
the code mark assigned to the manufacturer. This
code mark identifies the manufacturer and the
plant where the tire was manufactured.

The NHTSA published a complete listing of the
tire codes at 37 FR 342, January 11, 1972. This list

enables interested members of the public to iden-
tify the manufacturer and place of manufacture of
any new tire.

Since 1972, there have been several changes in
the names of the manufacturers and the plant ad-
dresses for the assigned code marks. Further,
there have been some 150 additional code marks
assigned for new tires since the 1972 publication.
Accordingly, this updated listing of the assigned
code marks for new tires is being published to
bring the public up-to-date with the revisions and
new code numbers which have been assigned since
the publication of the 1972 list.

Issued on June 8, 1983.

Kennerly H. Digges,

Acting Associate Administrator

for Rulemaking

48 F.R. 27635

June 16, 1983

PART 574-PRE 25-26

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 574

Tire Identification and Recordkeeping

[Docket No. 70-12; Notice 25)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This final rule sets forth the re
quirements relating to the registration of new
tires sold by independent dealers and
distributors. Recording the names and addresses
of the first purchasers and transmitting this in-
formation to the manufacturers will make it possi-
ble for those purchasers to be contacted in the
event that the tires are recalled by the manufac-
turers for safety reasons. These requirements
supersede those contained in the interim final
rule on this subject published in the May 19, 1983,
edition of the Federal Register.

This rule primarily clarifies some aspects of the
provisions of the interim final rule concerning the
tire registration form to be provided by the tire
manufacturers to the independent dealers. These
changes, which were made to maximize the regis
tration of tires sold through independent dealers,
are as follows:

(1) The size of the registration form to be given
to the consumer by independent dealers has been
reduced, so that only a 13-cent postcard stamp
need be affixed to the registration form. The in-
terim final rule had specified that a first-class
mail-sized card be used for the registration form.
This change was made to minimize the costs for
consumers to register their tires.

(2) The statement in the upper left corner of
that registration form, informing the tire pur-
chaser of the importance of completing and
returning the form, has been modified so as to be
more comprehensible and more effective at mo-
tivating the purchaser to register his or her tires.

(3) Instructions to the tire purchaser have been
added, so that the purchaser will print instead of
write his or her name on the registration form.

(4) That portion of the registration form which

is to be filled in by the independent dealer (i.e.,
the portion for filling in suitable identification of
the dealer and the tire identification number(s)of
the tire(s) sold) must be shaded with a 10-percent
screen tint. This change was made to emphasize
to the tire purchaser the limited amount of infor-
mation which the purchaser must fill in to
register his or her tires.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The changes made by this
notice become effective March 25, 1984. As of that
date, the tire manufacturers will be required to
provide registration forms in compliance with
this rule, and they must cease their distribution
of the forms specified by the interim final rule. In-
dependent dealers may continue to use the forms
specified by that rule until their existing supplies
of that form are exhausted or until April 1, 1984,
whichever comes first.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Background

Motor Vehicle Safety and Cost Savings
Authorization Act of 1982

The Motor Vehicle Safety and Cost Savings
Authorization Act of 1982 (hereinafter referred to
as "the Authorization Act") amended the Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966 (hereinafter referred to as "the Safety Act")
by requiring this agency to change its tire regis-
tration requirements insofar as they applied to in-
dependent tire dealers and distributors. (This
class of dealers and distributors is defined below.)
These requirements are set forth in 49 CFR Part
574, Tire Identification and Recordkeeping.
Before the Authorization Act became effective.
Part 574 required all tire dealers and distributors

PART 574: PRE 27

to comply with the mandatory registration sys-
tem. Under the system, dealers and distributors
were required to record certain information (i.e.,
the tire purchaser's name and address, seller's
name and address, and the identification
number(s) of the tire(s) sold) on a registration
form and send the completed form to the tire
manufacturer or the brand-name owner (herein-
after collectively referred to as "tire manufac-
turers") or a designee of the tire manufacturer.

The tire registration requirements were
adopted pursuant to requirements in the Safety
Act intended to insure that tire purchasers could
be notified if their tires are recalled for safety
reasons, either because they contain a safety-
related defect or because they do not comply with
an applicable safety standard. The purchasers of
unregistered tires would not be directly notified
in those instances and would instead unknowing-
ly continue to drive on unsafe tires.

On examining the rate of tire registration. Con-
gress found a substantial difference between the
rates for tires sold by independent dealers
(dealers and distributors whose business is not
owned or controlled by a tire manufacturer) and
those sold by nonindependent dealers (dealers
and distributors whose business is owned or con-
trolled by a tire manufacturer). Independent
dealers, who handle slightly less than half of the
replacement tires sold annually, registered about
20 percent of the tires they sold. Nonindependent
dealers, whose sales account for the balance of an-
nual replacement tire sales, registered between
80 and 90 percent of their tires.

Given the importance of tire registration to
safety. Congress determined that an alternative
method of registration should be instituted for
tires sold by independent dealers. Accordingly, it
included provisions in the Authorization Act pro-
hibiting the Secretary of Transportation from re-
quiring independent dealers to comply with the
mandatory registration requirements. (In view of
the high rate of registration of tires sold by non-
independent dealers. Congress did not mandate
any change in the application of the mandatory
registration requirements to those dealers.) The
prohibition regarding independent dealers was
self-executing (i.e., its effectiveness was not con-
ditioned on any prior rulemaking or other im-
plementing action by this agency) and became ef-
fective on the date that the Authorization Act
became law, October 15, 1982.

In lieu of requiring independent dealers to com-
ply with the mandatory registration process. Con-
gress directed that they comply with a voluntary
registration process to be established by the
Secretary. Under the voluntary process, the
primary responsibility for registering tires sold
by independent dealers is borne by the purchaser
instead of the dealer. NHSTA is mandated by the
Safety Act, as amended by the Authorization Act,
to require that independent dealers (1) fill in the
tire identification number(s) of the tire(s) sold to a
purchaser on a registration form and then (2) give
the form to the purchaser. If the purchaser
wishes to register the tires, he or she may do so
by filling in his or her name and address, adding
postage, and sending the form to the tire manu-
facturer or its designee.

To ascertain whether the changes mandated by
the Authorization Act have the desired effect of
increasing the registration rate of tires sold by in-
dependent dealers. Congress directed NHTSA to
conduct an evaluation covering the 2-year period
ending October 14, 1984. Upon completion of the
evaluation, NHTSA must determine the extent to
which independent dealers have encouraged pur-
chasers to register their tires and the extent to
which those dealers have complied with the
voluntary tire registration procedures. Further,
the agency is required to determine whether to
impose any additional requirements on the in-
dependent dealers or the manufacturers for the
purpose of promoting higher levels of tire
registration.

The provision in the Authorization Act man-
dating a voluntary registration system for in-
dependent dealers was not self-executing. Thus,
the voluntary system could not become effective
until NHTSA issued a rule establishing that
system. An interim final rule doing so was
published at 48 Fed. Reg. 22572, May 19, 1983,
and became effective June 20, 1983.

Interim Final Rule

The interim final rule imposed the following re-
quirements on the various parties:

Tire manufacturers. Except as noted, new
registration forms had to be provided for in-
dependent dealers. All of those forms were re-
quired to be identical in format and content and
within the size range specified in the interim final
rule. Alternatively, the manufacturer could pro-
vide independent dealers with preaddressed

PART 574; PRE 28

envelopes in which tire purchasers could mail the
mandatory registration forms. In either case, the
manufacturer would have to maintain a record of
all returned registration forms for at least 3
years after receipt.

No change was made in the requirements
regarding forms provided to nonindependent
dealers.

Tire dealers and distributors which sell tires to
other dealers and distributors. These parties are
required to give the purchasing dealer or dis-
tributor the registration forms provided by the
tire manufacturers so that that dealer or distribu-
tor can comply with the applicable tire registra-
tion requirements. The new forms must be pro-
vided to independent dealers.

Nonindependent dealers. No changes were
made to the tire registration requirements ap-
plicable to these parties. They are still required
to follow the mandatory tire registration system
formerly applicable to all tire dealers. Thus, the
nonindependent dealers must record the pur-
chaser's name and address, the tire identification
number(s) of the tire(s) sold, and a suitable iden-
tification of themselves as the selling dealer on a
tire registration form, and return the completed
forms to the tire manufacturers or their
designees.

Independent dealers. These dealers were re
quired by the interim final rule to record the tire
identification number(s) of the tire(s) sold, along
with their name and address, on a registration
form and give the form to the tire purchaser.

The interim final rule sought comments on the
issues raised by the requirements specified
therein, and specifically asked commenters to ad-
dress the issue of adopting the registration form
devised by the American Institute for Research
in the Behavioral Sciences pursuant to a contract
with the agency.

Final Rule
After considering the comments on the interim
final rule, NHTSA has decided to retain most of
the requirements in that rule. Several changes
have been made to the requirements regarding
the forms to be provided to independent dealers.
These changes are relatively minimal and do not
disturb the essential continuity of the voluntary
registration requirements. Accordingly, both the
tire manufacturers and the independent dealers
should be able to implement the voluntary

registration system as amended by this rule with
minimal disruption to the practices they have
been following since the interim final rule became
effective.

Voluntary Tire Registration Procedures

Several commenters stated that independent
dealers that wish to continue following the man-
datory tire registration requirements should be
permitted to do so. The premise underlying these
comments is that mandatory registration, when
properly implemented, is the most effective
means of insuring that virtually ail replacement
tires are registered.

While NHTSA does not disagree with the
premise of these commenters, the agency is not
free to adopt their suggestion. Section 158(b)(2KB)
of the Safety Act specifies that this agency
. . . shall require each . . . (independent dealer)
to furnish the first purchaser with a registra-
tion form (containing the tire indentification
number of the tire) which the purchaser may
complete and return directly to the manufac-
turer of the tire. (Emphasis added.)
This mandate to the agency is completely in-
clusive, directing the agency to make the volun
tary registration procedures applicable not simp-
ly to independent dealers in general, but to
"each" independent dealer. Further, this mandate
is not offset by any express authority to make ex-
ceptions.

As a practical as well as a legal matter, in-
dependent dealers may nevertheless register the
tires they sell if they first comply with the volun-
tary registration procedures. Independent
dealers are not prohibited from filling in the infor-
mation required by the voluntary procedures on
the forms specified by those procedures, furnished
the forms to tire purchasers, and then offering to
fill in the balance of the information and mail the
form to the manufacturer.

Based on the comments, it appears that some
commenters are confused about the status of
motor vehicle dealers under the mandatory and
voluntary registration procedures. The preamble
to the interim final rule mentioned motor vehicle
dealers only very briefly because they are
minimally affected by the voluntary registration
procedures. The preamble stated that there are
two situations in which motor vehicle dealers are
considered to be tire dealers and are required to
register the tires on the vehicles as specified in

PART 574; PRE 29

section 574.9. In these situations, the preamble
noted that whether the motor vehicle dealer
would be required to follow the mandatory or
voluntary registration procedures would depend
on whether the motor vehicle dealer's business
was owned or controlled by a tire manufacturer.
Since such ownership or control seems highly im-
probable, the preamble stated that the motor
vehicle dealer would in all likelihood have to
follow the voluntary registration procedures.

The discussion in that notice left some com-
menters uncertain whether the original equip-
ment tires on new vehicles were subject to man-
datory or voluntary registration procedures. This
uncertainty apparently arose because the interim
final rule made no mention of the mandatory tire
registration requirements that have been ap-
plicable to original-equipment tires since 1971. No
mention of these requirements was made, since
the notice did not propose to amend section
574.10, which specifies the actions to be taken by
motor vehicle manufacturers to register their
original-equipment tires.

The two situations to which the interim final
rule's preamble referred are those situations in
which the motor vehicle dealer, as opposed to the
motor vehicle manufacturer, is responsible for
registering tires. These situations, which are
relatively infrequent, are set forth in section
574.9. First, if a motor vehicle dealer sells a used
vehicle or leases a vehicle for more than 60 days,
and the vehicle is equipped with new tires, the
dealer must register the tires on the vehicle. Sec-
ond, if a motor vehicle dealer sells a new vehicle
and the vehicle is equipped with tires other than
those shipped with the vehicle by the motor vehi-
cle manufacturer, the motor vehicle dealer must
register the tires on the vehicle. The interim final
rule was intended to make clear that motor vehi-
cle dealers whose business is not owned or con-
trolled by a tire manufacturer should follow the
voluntary registration procedures in those two
rare types of situations, when the vehicle dealer
is responsible for registering the tires on the
vehicle.

One commenter urged that NHTSA delete the
requirement that independent dealers record
their name and address on the registration form
before giving that form to the tire purchaser.
This commenter noted that Congress stated the
Authorization Act's voluntary registration provi-
sions had been adopted partially for the purpose

of reducing the burdens which mandatory regis-
tration procedures paced on independent dealers.
Further, the commenter asserted that the Autho-
rization Act requires only that the independent
dealers record the tire identification number on
the registration form, and that the absence of any
mention of further specific information to be
filled in by independent dealers is evidence that
Congress did not intend those dealers to have to
fill in any information other than the identifica-
tion number. Finally, this commenter noted that
NHTSA had indicated in the preamble to the in-
terim final rule that the dealer's name and ad-
dress was needed on the registration form to aid
the agency in evaluating the voluntary registra-
tion process. This commenter stated that it would
be sufficient for evaluation purposes for the
registration forms used by independent dealers
to show simply that they came from that class of
dealers, instead of identifying a specific indepen-
dent dealer. It was further suggested that this in-
formation would be all that was needed for the
agency to determine the extent to which volun-
tary registration had been successful at increas-
ing the rate of tire registration for tires sold by
independent dealers.

Similarly, two tire manufacturers commented
that a manufacturer should not be required any
longer to maintain records which show, for each
of its tires sold by an independent dealer, the
identity of that particular dealer. They argued
that manufacturers should only be required to
maintain registration for independent dealers as
a group. These commenters also asserted that
this information was all that the agency needed to
determine whether or not voluntary registration
had successfully increased the registration rate
for tires sold by independent dealers.

The preamble to the interim final rule may not
have adequately explained the full breadth of the
evaluative task which Congress instructed the
agency to perform. In order to conduct a proper
evaluation which not only reports the aggregate
results of the voluntary registration program but
also attempts to explain those results, the agency
will need to be able to determine registration
rates for individual dealers. With that ability, the
agency can differentiate dealers with high rates
from dealers with low ones and then proceed to
attempt to assess the reasons for those differ-
ences. Having performed that analysis, the agen-
cy would be in a position to provide Congress

PART 574; PRE 30

with insight about the impact of the voluntary
registration program. It would also enable the
agency to determine what additional require-
ments, if any, should be adopted to improve the
registration program. NHTSA may find that
those improvements can be more effectively ob-
tained by enforcing the requirements established
by this notice than by imposing additional re-
quirements on all independent dealers.

NHTSA believes that it has authority under
the Authorization Act to require independent
dealers to record not only the tire identification
numbers but also their names and addresses on
registration forms. There is no express prohibi-
tion against the agency's requiring dealers to fill
in more than the tire identification numbers.
While the Authorization Act makes no mention of
requiring dealers to fill in their names and ad-
dresses, the agency does not regard that fact as
dispositive. The Authorization Act does not, in
fact, specify that the dealer's name and address is
to be filled in by either the dealer or the pur-
chaser. Since there isn't any clear indication that
it was Congress' intent that this information no
longer be required, the agency will not infer such
intent from Congress' decision not to assign that
task expressly to any particular party. It appears
that Congress has left the question of that assign-
ment to NHTSA's discretion. Since the names
and addresses of dealers have long been recorded
on registration forms and since that information
is needed to enable the agency to conduct an ef
fective evaluation, this agency believes that it
should continue to be recorded. In view of the fact
that dealers are more likely than purchasers to
provide this information accurately, and since
dealers can easily resort to the expandiency of a
stamp bearing their name and address, NHTSA
reaffirms its decision to assign the task of filling
in that information to the dealers.

As to the tire manufacturers, the burden on
them regarding the identity of specific indepen
dent dealers is simply to continue doing what
they have been doing since 1971, i.e., maintaining
registration records for each dealer. The agency
believes that continued maintenance of these
records is warranted by the value of dealer
specific information to the evaluation and to tire
recall campaigns. In fact, the agency recently
issued a special order to nine tire manufacturers
to obtain information on the registration rates for
individual independent dealers. The agency will

continue to monitor those rates.

Several commenters suggested that the agen-
cy, when conducting its evaluation of the effect of
the voluntary registration program on the regis-
tration rate, determine its own baseline for regis-
tration of tires sold by independent dealers
before that program began. The commenters
urged that the agency not adopt the 20-percent
rate mentioned in the legislative history of the
Authorization Act. In lieu of that figure, the com-
menters offered several lower ones, including a
figure of 7 percent. The agency intends to deter-
mine its own baseline. The special order men-
tioned above will provide the information neces-
sary for that determination.

Registration Forms

In selecting the registration form to be used by
independent dealers under the interim final rule,
the agency consciously sought to find a form that
would satisfy all of the statutory requirements
for the voluntary registration system, while mak-
ing as few changes as possible to existing forms
being used under the mandatory registration sys-
tem. This conservative approach was necessary
because the amendments to the Vehicle Safety
Act did not provide adequate lime to follow nor-
mal rulemaking procedures and seek comments
on more far-reaching changes.

To determine outside the strictures of a rigid
time schedule what type of form would be most
effective in inducing tire purchasers to register
their tires, NHTSA contracted with American In-
stitute for Research in the Behavioral Sciences
(AIRBSI to conduct a study. AIRBS designed a
postcard size registration form separated into
two parts by a line of perforation. The top part,
which would be detached and retained by the pur-
chaser, would contain a message explaining the
importance of tire registration to the purchaser
and motivating the purchaser to register the tires
by sending the form to the manufacturer. On the
reverse of the top side, there would be a space
where the purchaser could record the registra-
tion information and save it for his or her per
sonal records.

The bottom part of the AIRBS registration
form would be the part that would be sent to the
tire manufacturer. On one side would be the
manufacturer's preprinted address. On the other
would be space for filling in the tire registration
information.

PART 574; PRE 31

The agency placed the AIRES study and form
in the public docket and requested in the interim
final rule that interested persons comment on the
contractor's recommendations. Several commen-
ters addressed the desirability of adopting the
AIRES form as the registration form to be used
by independent dealers. Many commenters stated
that a postcard-sized form was too small to allow
the necessary information to be legibly recorded.
One commenter argued that the AIRES form
would not be any more effective at encouraging
consumers to register their tires than the simple
one-part card mandated in the interim final rule,
and that the AIRES form might actually be more
confusing. Another commenter objected to the
AIRES form because the perforated edge of the
portion of the form to be returned to the manufac-
turer could not be automatically fed through a
microfilming machine. The same commenter also
argued that the printing costs for the AIRES
form would be about 12 percent higher than those
for the form mandated in the interim final rule.

After considering these comments, NHTSA
has decided not to adopt the AIRES form. That
form poses a number of potential problems which
neither AIRES nor the agency foresaw. Further,
NHTSA does not believe that use of a two-part
form is necessary. AIRES stated in its study that
the reason for its recommending a two-part form
was its belief that the space available on a single-
part form was insufficient to allow the printing of
the motivational message to the consumer, the in-
structions, and the necessary registration infor-
mation with type and spacing large enough to
permit easy reading. In the agency's own judg-
ment, the single-part form mandated by this final
rule will not be overly crowded, will avoid the
potential problems which commenters attributed
to the two-part form, and will be almost as suc-
cessful in motivating consumers to register their
tires as would the two-part form.

However, the agency has adopted the AIRES
recommendation that the registration forms pro-
vided to consumers be postcard size. It will be
less expensive for tire purchasers to use 13-cent
postcard stamps to mail registration forms of that
size, and this low cost might motivate some pur-
chasers who would not otherwise do so to register
their tires. The maximum dimensions permitted
by the U.S. Postal Service for a postcard are 4V4
by 6 inches. This area is, in NHTSA's judgment,
sufficient to permit the motivational message and

the space for recording the required information
to appear on the same size of the card, without be-
ing overly crowded or difficult to read. Given the
importance of encouraging consumers to return
the completed tire registration forms, and the
likely effectiveness of lower postage costs at en-
couraging consumers to return the forms, this
rule specifies that the registration forms be of the
dimensions permitted for using postcard stamps.

Some other minor changes are made in this
notice to the registration form required by the in-
terim final rule. First, the motivational message
has been changed so that it is now identical to
that recommended by AIRES. The AIRES mes-
sage provided stronger encouragement to send
the form to the manufacturer and will be readily
understood by consumers.

Second, the agency has decided to require the
form to include instructions to the tire purchaser
to print his or her name and address on the form.
Those instructions were inadvertently omitted
from the interim final rule. They have now been
added at the urging of several of the commenters.

One commenter requested that tire manufac-
turers be allowed to divide the spaces for record-
ing the purchaser's name and address into little
boxes so that each letter or number would be
printed in a separate box. According to this com-
menter, this approach would help insure accurate
transcription by the manufacturer of the informa-
tion on the registration forms. Eased on its
assessment of the AIRES study, the agency has
decided not to adopt this change. AIRES in-
dicated to this agency that the use of boxes
discourages people from filling in information on
forms and that the return rate for the registra-
tion forms would therefore be higher if boxes
were not used.

Third, NHTSA is adopting a requirement that
contrasting shading be used for the area of the
form containing the blanks to be completed by the
independent dealer and that a white background
be used for the areas to be completed by the tire
purchasers. AIRES recommended this require-
ment in its study as a means of emphasizing to the
tire purchaser the minima! quantity of informa-
tion which he or she must record in order to
register his or her tires. AIRES indicated that
the shading could be achieved by using a
10-percent screen tint. The tinted forms would be
inexpensive to produce and still easily readable
by data processors.

PART 574; PRE 32

One manufacturer commented that independ-
ent dealers should be required to enter both their
name and address and their dealer identification
number assigned by the manufacturer on the
registration form. The dealer identification
number is a unique identifier assigned by a tire
manufacturer to each dealer selling that manufac
turer's tires. This commenter asserted that re-
quiring the dealer identification number to be
placed on the registration forms would greatly
simplify the data-processing task for the manufac
turer as it recorded the information from the
registration forms sent in by tire purchasers.

NHTSA agrees that such a requirement would
simplify the manufacturers' task, but only at the
cost of significantly complicating the registration
responsibilities of the independent dealers. The
dealer identification numbers assigned to a par-
ticular dealer are not coordinated among the
various tire manufacturers. Thus, an independent
dealer which sells tires produced by seven dif-
ferent manufacturers would have seven different
dealer identification numbers assigned to it. The
interim final rule required independent dealers to
record their name and address on the registration
form. This could be done simply by purchasing
and using a rubber stamp with the dealer's name
and address on it. If the final rule were amended
to require the dealer to also record its dealer
identification number, and the independent
dealer sold seven different manufacturers' tires
(as in the example above), the dealer would either
have to fill in its name, address, and identification
number by hand on each registration form or buy
seven different rubber stamps. If it chose to pur-
chase seven different rubber stamps, the dealer
would also have to be certain that it used the ap
propriate stamp for each manufacturer's registra-
tion form. If the dealer used the wrong dealer
identification number on a manufacturer's
registration form, it would complicate the manu-
facturer's data-processing task. After considering
these facts, NHTSA has decided not to adopt this
comment, and the independent dealers remain
subject to the requirement that they record their
name and address on the registration form before
giving the form to the tire purchaser.

Other Issues

Several commenters objected to the language
in the interim final rule stating that enforcement
of this regulation would be under the authority of

sections 108-110 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C.
1397 99) and that each violation could subject the
violator to a penalty of $1,000. These commenters
noted that the Committee report on the Authori-
zation Act stated an expectation that indepen-
dent dealers which failed to comply with the
voluntary registration requirements would not
have to pay the maximum penalty unless there
was a clear, continuous pattern of violations.

The statutory provisions recited in the interim
final rule are consistent with the committee
report. Section 109 of the Safety Act provides
that the amount of any penalty imposed by the
agency should reflect consideration of the size of
the business which committed the violation and of
the gravity of the violation. As a matter of prac-
tice, the agency makes a distinction in its enforce-
ment activities between isolated violations and
continuous patterns of violations. The agency will
continue to make this distinction and thus will be
following the guidance in the committee report.

Some commenters urged that the agency per-
mit continued use of registration forms addressed
to clearinghouses. These forms, which were per-
mitted under mandatory registration, were
generic instead of manufacturer-specific (i.e., they
did not bear any mark or information identifying
them for use in registering a particular manufac-
turer's tires) and thus could be used to register
any manufacturer's tires. The tire dealer would
fill in the manufacturer or brand-name owner
identified on the tire to be registered, and send
the forms to a clearinghouse. The clearinghouse
would then forward the information to the ap-
propriate manufacturer or brand-name owner.

As explained in the preamble to the interim
final rule, the amendments to section 158(b) of the
Safety Act and their legislative history compel an
end to the practice of using forms which are not
addressed to a specific manufacturer or its
designee. Section 158(b) requires that the pur-
chaser be able to send the form directly to the
manufacturer of the tire, and that the forms used
by independent dealers be standardized for all
tires. Hence, the agency cannot permit continued
use of forms which are not manufacturer specific
and which are not addressed to a particular manu
facturer or its designee.

One commenter asked that dealers be allowed
to continue to use the forms mandated by the in-
terim final rule until the supply was exhausted.
The interim final rule permitted the continued

PART 574: PRE 33

use of the forms used under mandatory registra-
tion as long as the manufacturers provided pre-
addressed envelopes in which to enclose those
forms. To minimize the expenses and disruption
associated with the transition from the interim
final rule to this final rule, independent dealers
will be permitted to continue using the forms
specified by the interim final rule until their
existing supplies are exhausted, or until April 1,
1984, whichever comes first. As of the effective
date of this rule, the manufacturers will be re-
quired to provide registration forms in com-
pliance with this rule, and distribution of the
forms specified under the interim final rule must
be ended.

A related issue was raised in a petition which
Cooper Tire & Rubber Company ("Cooper") sub-
mitted for reconsideration of the interim final
rule. Cooper currently has a no-charge warranty
program for two tire lines. As part of that pro-
gram. Cooper has printed a booklet and registra-
tion form. The form, which was developed and
printed before the interim final rule was issued,
contains a different motivational statement than
was mandated by the interim final rule. Further,
it does not contain a notation to affix first-class
postage on the reverse side. Cooper reported that
it had achieved a 66-percent registration rate for
the two tire lines, using its own registration
forms.

After considering these minor variations, the
agency has decided that this Cooper registration
form can be considered as complying with the re-
quirements of the interim final rule. It is signifi-
cant that Cooper prepared and began distributing
these forms in December 1982, before the interim
final rule had been published. From the interval
of January 1, 1983, to June 20, 1983, Cooper
achieved a 66-percent registration rate for tires
sold by independent dealers, when there were no
registration requirements applicable to inde
pendent dealers. This suggests that the Cooper
form has been effective at motivating consumers
to return that form, and achieving higher tire
registration rates is the goal of the change in tire
registration procedures.

NHTSA wishes to emphasize that Cooper was
in a unique postion, and that permitting the varia-
tions in the Cooper form from that mandated by
the interim final rule does not mean that the
agency will countenance variations from the form
prescribed by this final rule. This form has been

developed after considering the AIRES study,
and it is important that it be used in connection
with tire registration, to insure that the NHTSA
evaluation of the voluntary tire registration sys-
tem is conducted with an effective standardized
registration form.

One commenter suggested that there would be a
stronger incentive for consumers to register
their tires if the agency were to require the
manufacturers to prepay the postage for the
registration forms. Adopting such a requirement
was one of the actions which the House commit-
tee report indicated could be adopted after the
2-year evaluation period if the agency determined
that further steps were necessary to achieve ade-
quate registration rates. The implication of this
discussion in the report is that the requirement
may not be adopted at an earlier time. Accord-
ingly, the agency is not adopting a requirement
for prepaid postage.

Several commenters stated that the 30-day
period between the publication of the interim
final rule and its effective date was inadequate to
allow the necessary registration forms to be
printed and distributed to all of the manufac-
turer's independent dealers. Accordingly, they
asked that a longer leadtime period be estab-
lished for this final rule. The agency understands
that it is asking the manufacturers to move very
expeditiously to print and distribute the volun-
tary registration forms. NHTSA believes that
short leadtime periods are necessary due to the
importance of registration and to the require-
ment to conduct an evaluation of voluntary regis-
tration 2 years after passage of the Authorization
Act. At the same time, the agency wishes to make
some accommodation of the request for additional
leadtime. Accordingly, the agency is specifying
an effective date of 45 days after publication of
this notice. This date will still require expeditious
action by the manufacturers, but does provide 2
more weeks than were allowed for the interim
final rule.

The information-collection requirements con-
tained in this rule have been submitted to and ap-
proved by the Office of Management and Budget
(0MB), pursuant to the requirements of the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501
et seq.). Those requirements have been approved
through May 31, 1985 (0MB #2127-0050). All
printed registration forms must display this 0MB
clearance number and expiration date in the up-

PART 574; PRE 34

per right-hand corner of the form.

NHTSA has analyzed the impacts of this rule
and determined that it is neither "major" within
the meaning of Executive Order 12291 nor "sig-
nificant" within the meaning of the Department
of Transportation regulatory policies and pro-
cedures. The changes in the requirements for the
registration forms to be provided by tire manu-
facturers to independent dealers will impose
minimally higher costs on those manufacturers.
Compared to the costs and administrative burdens
imposed on independent dealers under man-
datory registration, those dealers should achieve
a slight savings under this rule. Consumers pur-
chasing tires from independent dealers will now
have to pay for postage if they wish to register
their new tires. The assumption of that cost by
consumers was mandated by Congress. For this
reason, a full regulatory evaluation has not been
prepared.

The agency has also considered the impacts of
this rule on small entities, as required by the
Regulatory Flexibility Act. NHTSA believes that
few, if any, of the tire manufacturers are small
businesses. Although many of the dealers could
be considered small businesses, this rule will not
have a significant impact on them. As noted
above, they may experience a slight savings as
compared to the mandatory registration re-
quirements. The requirements for tire manufac-
turers are unchanged, except for some minor
changes which they must make to the registra-
tion forms to be provided to independent dealers.
Small organizations and governmental units will
have to bear the minor expense of paying postage
for any new tires they register. Based on the
foregoing, I certify that this rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.

In consideration of the foregoing, the following
amendments are made to Part 574, Tire Identifi-
cation and Recordkeeping, of Title 49 of the Code
of Federal Regulations.

1. Section 574.3 is amended by adding a new
paragraph (cMl) immediately after "Definitions
used in this part. " and redesignating existing
paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(4) as paragraphs (c)(2)
through (c)(5):

§ 574.3 Definitions.

• • • * *

(c) • • *

(1) "Independent" means, with respect to a tire
distributor or dealer, one whose business is not
owned or controlled by a tire manufacturer or

brand name owner.

*****

3. Section 574.7 is revised to read as follows:

§ 574.7 Information requirements — new tire
manufacturers, new tire brand name owners.

(a)(1) Each new tire manufacturer and each new
tire brand name owner (hereinafter referred to in
this section and § 574.8 as "tire manufacturer") or
its designee, shall provide tire registration forms
to every distributor and dealer of its tires which
offers new tires for sale or lease to tire pur
chasers.

(2) Each tire registration form provided to in-
dependent distributors and dealers pursuant to
paragraph (a)(1) of this section shall contain space
for recording the information specified in para-
graphs (a)(4)(A) through (a)(4)(C) of this section and
shall conform in content and format to Figures 3a
and 3b. Each form shall be:

(A) Rectangular;

(B) Not less than .007 inches thick;

(C) Greater than S'/z inches, but not greater
than e'/s inches wide; and

(D) Greater than 5 inches, but not greater than
6 inches long.

(3) Each tire registration form provided to
distributors and dealers, other than independent
distributors and dealers, pursuant to paragraph
(a)(1) of this section shall be similar in format and
size to Figure 4 and shall contain space for record-
ing the information specified in paragraphs
(a)(4)(A) through (a)(4)(C) of this section.

(4)(A) Name and address of the tire purchaser.

(d) The information that is specified in
paragraph (a)(4) of this section and recorded on
registration forms submitted to a tire manufac-
turer or its designee shall be maintained for a
period of not less than three years from the date
on which the information is recorded by the
manufacturer or its designee.

4. Section 574.8 is revised to read as follows:

§ 574.8 Information requirements— tire dis-
tributors and dealers.

(b) Other distributors and dealers. (1) Each dis-
tributor and each dealer, other than an indepen-
dent distributor or dealer, selling new tires to
tire purchasers shall submit the information

PART 574: PRE 35

specified in § 574.7(a)(4) to the manufacturer of
the tires sold, or to its designee.

(2) Each tire distributor and each dealer, other
than an independent distributor or dealer, shall
submit registration forms containing the informa-
tion specified in § 574.7(a)(4) to the tire manufac-
turer, or person maintaining the information, not
less often than every 30 days. However, a distrib-
utor or dealer which sells less than 40 tires, of all
makes, types and sizes during a 30-day period
may wait until he or she sells a total of 40 new
tires, but in no event longer than six months,
before forwarding the tire information to the
respective tire manufacturers or their designees.

(c) Each distributor and each dealer selling

new tires to other tire distributors or dealers
shall supply to the distributor or dealer a means to
record the information specified in § 574.7(a)(4),
unless such a means has been provided to that
distributor or dealer by another person or by a
manufacturer.

Issued on February 3, 1984.

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

49 FR 4755
February 8, 1984

PART 574; PRE 36

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 574

Tire Identification and Recordkeeping

(Docket No. 8407; Notice 2]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This rule amends Part 574 to give
retreaders of tires for motor vehicles other than
passenger cars an option during the retreading
process of either removing the original manufac-
turer's DOT symbol from the sidewall of the
finished retread or leaving that symbol on the tire.
This action is taken because NHTSA has deter-
mined that no significant safety interest is served
by requiring that retreaders remove the original
manufacturer's DOT symbol as part of the re-
treading process. That requirement, which did not
expressly appear in Part 574, resulted from un-
foreseen events and from unexpected effects of
the language in Part 574. This rule avoids im-
posing unnecessary costs on these retreaders
without degrading the safety of the tires or the
safety value of the information available to
consumers.

EFFECTIVE DATE: February 15. 1985.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards require that a
DOT symbol appear on the sidewall of most new
and retreaded tires as a means of certifying com-
pliance with the performance requirements of the
applicable safety standard. Thus, the DOT symbol
must appear on new tires for use on passenger
cars which are subject to Standard No. 109, new
tires for use on vehicles other than passenger cars
which are subject to Standard No. 119, and
retreaded passenger-car tires which are subject to
Standard No. 117. (For the sake of easy reference,
tires for use on motor vehicles other than passen-
ger cars will be referred to as "non-car tires"

throughout the rest of this preamble.)

Regulations issued under the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act expressly prohibit
the presence of the DOT symbol on tires not sub-
ject to a Federal safety standard. 49 CFR Part 574,
Tire Identification and Recordkeeping, provides,
in pertinent part: "The DOT symbol shall not ap-
pear on tires to which no Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard is applicable ..." (574.5). Since
retreaded non-car tires are the only new or
retreaded tires not subject to a Federal safety
standard, they are the only tires subject to that
prohibition.

NHTSA adopted the language in § 574.5 because
of its concern that the appearance of the DOT sym-
bol on tires to which no safety standard was ap-
plicable would confuse consumers. That is,
NHTSA believed that consumers could mistakenly
conclude that the tires in question met some ap-
plicable Federal requirements, when, in fact, there
were no such requirements.

However, although the agency's concern in
adopting the prohibition in § 574.5 was with the
addition of a DOT symbol to a tire that was not
subject to any Federal safety standard, the
language of the prohibition was broader. It did not
simply state that manufacturers cannot add the
DOT symbol to tires to which no Federal safety
standard is applicable. It stated that the DOT sym-
bol "shall not appear" on such tires. The breadth of
that language gave rise to a duty not only to re-
frain from adding a DOT symbol to tires to which
no safety standard was applicable, but also to
remove an original manufacturer's symbol when,
as in the case of retreaded non-car tires, the tires
were subject to a safety standard when new but
are not subject to any standard when retreaded.

PART 574 -PRE 37

In no other circumstances under the Safety Act,
such as in the remanufacturing of a vehicle, is a
person required to remove a previous manufac-
turer's certification. Additionally, the agency
learned that most non-car tire retreaders had not
been removing the original manufacturer's DOT
symbol.

NHTSA tentatively concluded that there was no
safety or informational value associated with the
requirement that non-car tire retreaders remove
the original manufacturer's DOT symbol. Accord-
ingly, the agency published a notice of proposed
rulemaking on this subject at 49 FR 20880, May 17,
1984. That notice explained in detail the origins of
the prohibition in § 574.5, and the bases for the
agency's tentative conclusions that no safety or in-
formational purposes were served by the require-
ment that retreaders of non-car tires remove the
original manufacturer's DOT symbol from the side-
wall of the tire. Further, the notice noted that
although NHTSA had received over 10,000 con-
sumer complaints regarding non-car tires since
1976, not one of those complaints related to the
presence or absence of the DOT symbol on a re-
treaded non-car tire. The hypothetical consumer
confusion which NHTSA thought might occur has
in fact not occurred with respect to retreaded non-
car tires. Accordingly, NHTSA proposed that the
prohibition in § 574.5 be replaced by language
which would give non-car tire retreaders the op-
tion of removing the original manufacturer's DOT
symbol or leaving it on the finished retread, while
emphasizing the those retreaders were still pro-
hibited from adding a new DOT symbol to the side-
wall of retreaded non-car tires.

Three commenters responded to the notice of
proposed rulemaking. All three supported the
agency's proposal to eliminate the requirement
that non-car tire retreaders remove the original
manufacturer's DOT symbol. One of the com-
menters suggested that the agency move beyond
its proposed option for these retreaders to remove
or not remove the original manufacturer's DOT
symbol, and instead require that any non-car tires
with a DOT symbol on the sidewall retain that
DOT symbol after the retreading is completed.

The agency has not been persuaded by this com-
ment, for the reasons expressed in the proposal.
To repeat, the value of the DOT symbol on a worn
tire carcass in assessing the probable performance
capabilities of a retreaded tire is not very signifi-
cant. Intervening factors, such as latent problems

with the carcass, inadvertent damage to the car-
cass during the retreading process, the amount of
old tread not buffed off during the retreading, and
the application and design of the new tread are of
far greater significance in determining the per-
formance of the retread than is the condition of the
carcass when the tire was new. Those retreaders
which choose to retain the original manufacturer's
DOT symbol on the sidewall are free to do so, and
those retreaders which choose to remove the
original manufacturer's DOT symbol are also free
to do so, since NHTSA has concluded that the sym-
bol has so little significance for purchasers of
retreaded non-car tires. Hence, the proposed
change to the language in § 574.5 is hereby
adopted, for the reasons set forth in the proposal.

NHTSA has analyzed this rule and determined
that it is neither "major" within the meaning of
Executive Order 12291 nor "significant" within the
meaning of the Department of Transportation
regulatory policies and procedures. The impact of
this rule is simply to authorize a practice which
has been followed by most non-car tire retreaders
for the last 7 years (i.e., not removing the original
manufacturer's DOT symbol). No additional paper-
work or costs will be imposed as a result of this
rule. No cost savings are expected, either, since
this rule merely authorizes existing practices.
Since the impacts associated with the rule are so
minimal, a full regulatory evaluation has not been
prepared.

NHTSA has also analyzed this rule in accord-
ance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Based on
that analysis, I certify that this amendment will
not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. This rule
does not impose any additional burden on tire
retreaders, because it merely authorizes a practice
most of them have followed, i.e., leaving the
original manufacturer's DOT symbol on the side-
wall of the finished retread. Those retreaders
which have not followed that practice will be able
to reduce their costs slightly by leaving that sym-
bol on the sidewall, if they choose. Small organiza-
tions and small governmental jurisdictions which
purchase retreaded non-car tires will not be af-
fected by this rule. To the extent that this rule
might produce some cost savings for the re-
treaders by allowing them not to buff off the ori-
ginal manufacturer's DOT symbol, those savings
are already reflected in the prices charged for
most retreaded non-car tires. Hence, no significant

PART 574 -PRE 38

savings are expected for small entities as a result
of this rule. A full Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
has not been prepared for this rule.

Finally, the agency has considered the en-
vironmental implications of this rule in accordance
with the National Environmental Policy Act and
determined that this rule will have no effect on the
human environment.

LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 49 CFR PART 574:
Labeling, motor-vehicle safety, motor vehicles,
reporting and recordkeeping requirements, rub-
ber and rubber products, tires.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR § 574.5
is amended by revising the introductory text to
read as follows:

574.5 Tire identification requirements.

Each tire manufacturer shall conspicuously
label on one sidewall of each tire it manufactures,
except tires manufactured exclusively for mileage-
contract purchasers, by permanently molding into
or onto the sidewall. in the manner and location
specified in Figure 1, a tire identification number
containing the information set forth in paragraphs
(a) through (d) of this section. Each tire retreader,
except tire retreaders who retread tires solely for
their own use, shall conspicuously label one side-
wall of each tire it retreads by permanently
molding or branding into or onto the sidewall, in
the manner and location specified in Figure 2, a
tire identification number containing the informa-

tion set forth in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this
section. In addition, the DOT symbol required by
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards shall be
located as shown in Figures 1 and 2. The DOT sym-
bol shall not appear on tires to which no Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard is applicable, ex-
cept that the DOT symbol on tires for use on motor
vehicles other than passenger cars may, prior to
retreading, be removed from the sidewall or al-
lowed to remain on the sidewall, at the retreader's
option. The symbols to be used in the tire iden-
tification number for tire manufacturers and
retreaders are; "A, B, C, D, E, F, H, J, K, L, M, N,
P. R, T, U, V, W, X. Y. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0." Tires
manufactured or retreaded exclusively for
mileage-contract purchasers are not required to
contain a tire identification number if the tire con-
tains the phrase "for mileage contract use only"
permanently molded into or onto the tire sidewall
in lettering at least 'A inch high.

* * * m *

Issued on January 10, 1985.

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

50 FR 2287
January 16, 1985

PART 574-PRE 39-40

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 574

Tire Code Marks Assigned to New Tire Manufacturers

ACTION: Publication of tire code marks assigned
to new tire manufacturers.

SUMMARY: The agency first published a complete
listing of the tire code marks assigned to new tire
manufacturers in 1972. The second publication of
this listing in June 1983 added an additional 150
code marks. Since that last publication, there have
been several additions and changes in names and
addresses for the assigned code marks. This
publication will inform the public of those addi-
tions and changes as reported to the agency.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section
574.5 of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, re-
quires tire manufacturers to mold a tire identifica-
tion number into or onto the sidewall of each tire
they manufacture. In the case of new tires, the
first two digits of the tire identification number
are the code mark assigned to the manufacturer.
This code mark identifies the tire manufacturer
and the plant where the tire was manufactured.

The NHTSA first published a complete listing of
the tire codes at 37 FR 342, January 11, 1972. This
list enables interested members of the public to
identify the manufacturer and place of manufac-
ture of any new tire. The NHTSA published an up-
dating of the tire codes at 48 FR 27635, June 16,
1983, adding some 150 additional code marks
assigned to new tire manufacturers since the 1972
publication.

This update listing of the assigned code marks
for new tire manufacturers is being published to
bring the public up to date with the revisions and
new code numbers which have been assigned since
the publication of the 1983 list.

Issued on March 11, 1985.

Barry Felrice
Associate Administrator
for Rulemaking

50 FR 10880
March 18, 1985

PART .574-PRE 41-42

ADDITIONAL TIRE CODES ASSIGNED
New Tire Manufacturers

M8 Premier Tyres Limited, Kalamassery, Kerala State, India

Y8 Bombay Tyres International Limited, Hay Bunder Road, Bombay, Maharashtra, India 400 033

C9 Seven Star Rubber Company, Ltd., 2-1 Chang-Swei Road, Pin-Tou Hsiang, Chang-Hua,
Taiwan, R.O.C.

F9 Dunlop New Zealand, Limited, P.O. Box 40343, Upper Hutt, New Zealand

H9 Reifen-Berg. 5000 Koln 80 (Mulheim), Clevischer Ring 134, West Germany

J9 P.T. Intirub, 454 Cililitan, P.O. Box 2626, Besar, Jakarta, Indonesia

K9 Natier Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd., 557, Shan Chiao Road, Sec. 1, Shetou, Changhua, Taiwan,
R.O.C. 511

M9 Uniroyal Tire Corporation, Uniroyal Research Center, Middlebury, CT 06749

N9 Cia Pneus Tropical, Km105/BR, 324, Centro Industrial Desubae 44100, Feira de Santana,
Bahia, Brazil

P9 MRF, Ltd., P.B. No. 1 Ponda, Goa 403 401, India

T9 MRF, Ltd., Thiruthani Road, ichiputhur 631 060, Arkonam, India

U9 Cooper Tire & Rubber Company, 1689 South Green Street, Tupelo, MS 38801

V9 M & R Tire Co., 309 Main Street, Watertown, MA 02172

Code Old Name

AA General Tire & Rubber Co.
One General Street
Akron, Ohio 44329

Reported Name Change
New Tire Manufacturers

New Name

GenCorp Inc.

One General Street

Akron, OH 44329

BB B.F. Goodrich Tire Company
5400 E. Olympic Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90022

B.F. Goodrich Tire Company
Department 6517
P.O. Box 31
Miami, OK 74354

LK Uniroyal Croyden, S.A.
Carrera 7A, No. 22-1
Call, Colombia

WT Madras Rubber Factory, Ltd.
175/1 Mount Road
Madras, India

H2 Sam Yang Tire Mfg. Co., Ltd.
Song Jung Eup
Junnam, Korea

Productora Nacional de Llantas, S.A.
Carrera 7A, No. 22-1
Call, Colombia

Madras Rubber Factory, Ltd.
Tiruvottiyur High Road
Madras 600 019 India

Kumho & Co., Inc.
555 Sochon-Ri
Songjung-Eup
Kwangsan-Kun
Chonnam, Korea

PART 574- PRE 43

MISCELLANEOUS NEW TIRE MANUFACTURERS TRANSACTIONS
As Reported to NHTSA

Manufacturer

Code

Armstrong Rubber Company

CE

Bridgestone Tire Company

LH

Ceat, S.p.A.

HU

Cooper Tire & Rubber Company

U9

Dayton Tire & Rubber Company

DC

Dunlop Olympic Tyres

DT,DU,WM,W4

Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp.
ditto

ditto
Firestone Tire & Rubber
ditto

General Tire & Rubber Company

B.F. Goodrich Company

ditto

ditto

ditto

ditto
Nitto Tire Company, Ltd.

Olympic Tire & Rubber Co., Pty.,
Ltd.

ditto

Remark

Plant closed 4/3/81

Purchased from UNIROYAL as of 6/13/82

Sold to Pirelli Tire Corp. in May 1984

Purchased from Pennsylvania Tire &
Rubber on 1/25/84

Purchased from Dunlop on 11/1/75

Merger of Dunlop and Olympic on
4/29/81

DF, DH,DJ,DP, WN Plants closed

DT, DU, WM W4 Plants sold to Dunlop Olympic on
4/29/81

DC
DC
VV

LV

BJ
BK
BM
BN
BP
N3

WM, W4

WN

Plant sold to Firestone T&R on 11/1/75

Purchased from Dunlop T&R on 11/1/75

Plant sold to Viskafors Gummifabrik
in April 1980

Purchased from Mansfield-Denman
on 11/30/78

Plant sold 12/79

Plant sold 1/80

Plant sold to Olympic in 7/75

Plant sold 8/81

Plant sold 5/78

Plant sold to Ryoto Tire Co., Ltd., on
1/23/80

Sold to Dunlop Olympic on 4/29/81
Plant closed in 1978

PART 574-PRE 44

MISCELLANEOUS NEW TIRE MANUFACTURERS TRANSACTIONS

As Reported to NHTSA

(Continued)

Manufacturer

Pennsylvania Tire & Rubber of
Mississippi

Pirelli Tire Corporation

Ryoto Tire Company

SAMYAND Tire, Inc.
UNIROYAL, Inc.

VIskafors Gunnmifabrik AB

Code
WK

HU

N3

XU
LH

VV

Remark
Plant sold to Cooper T&R on 1/24/84

Plant purchased from Ceat, S.p.A. in
May 1984

Plant purchased from NittoTire
Company on 1/23/80

Plant closed in 1976

Plant sold to Bridgestone Tire Company
on 6/13/82

Plant purchased from Firestone T&R in
April 1980

PART 574-PRE 45-46

PART 574— TIRE IDENTIFICATION AND RECORDKEEPING

(Docket No. 70-12; Notice No. 5)

Sec

574.1 Scope.

574.2 Purpose.

574.3 Definitions.

574.4 Applicability.

574.5 Tire identification requirements.

574.6 Identification mark.

574.7 Information requirements— tire manufac-

turers, brand name owners, retreaders.

574.8 Information requirements— tire distribu-

tors and dealers.

574.9 Requirements for motor vehicle dealers.

574.10 Requirements for motor vefiicle manufac-

turers.

§ 574.1 Scope.

This part sets forth the method by which new
tire manufacturers and new tire brand name
owners shall identify tires for use on motor
vehicles and maintain records of tire purchasers,
and the method by which retreaders and retreaded
tire brand name owners shall identify tires for use
on motor vehicles. This part also sets forth the
methods by which independent tire dealers and
distributors shall record, on registration forms,
their names and addresses and the identification
number of the tires sold to tire purchasers and pro-
vide the forms to the purchasers, so that the pur-
chasers may report their names to the new tire
manufacturers and new tire brand name owners,
and by which other tire dealers and distributors
shall record and report the names of tire pur-
chasers to the new tire manufacturers and new tire
brand name owners.

§ 574.2 Purpose.

The purpose of this part is to facilitate notifica-
tion to purchasers of defective or nonconforming
tires, pursuant to sections 151 and 152 of the Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966, as amended (15 U.S.C. 1411 and 1412)

(hereafter the Act), so that they may take ap-
propriate action in the interest of motor vehicle
safety.

§ 574.3 Definitions.

(a) Statutory definitions. All terms in this part
that are defined in section 102 of the Act are used
as defined therein.

(b) Motor vehicle safety standard definitions.
Unless otherwise indicated, all terms used in this
part that are defined in the Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards, part 571 of this subchapter (hereinafter
the Standards), are used as defined therein.

(c) Definitions used in this part. (!) "Mileage
contract purchaser" means a person who pur-
chases or leases tire use on a mileage basis.

1(2)1 "Independent" means, with respect to a
tire distributor or dealer, one whose business is
not owned or controlled by a tire manufacturer
or brand name owner.

1(3)1 "New tire brand name owner" means a
person, other than a new tire manufacturer, who
owns or has the right to control the brand name
of a new tire or a person who licenses another to
purchase new tires from a new tire manufacturer
bearing the licensor's brand name.

((4)1 "Retreaded tire brand name owner"
means a person, other than a retreader, who
owns or has the right to control the brand name
of a retreaded tire or a person who licenses
another to purchase retreaded tires from a
retreader bearing the licensor's brand name.

[(5)1 "Tire purchaser" means a person who
buys or leases a new tire, or who buys or leases
for 60 days or more a motor vehicle containing a
new tire for purposes other than resale.

§ 574.4 Applicability.

This part applies to manufacturers, brand
name owners, retreaders, distributors, and deal-

(R«v. 3/2S(84)

PART 574-1

ers of new and retreaded tires for use on motor
vehicles manufactured after 1948 and to manufac-
turers and dealers of motor vehicles manufactured
after 1948. However, it does not apply to persons
who retread tires solely for their own use.

§ 574.5 Tire identification requirements.

[Each tire manufacturer shall conspicuously
label on one sidewall of each tire it manufactures,
except tires manufactured exclusively for mileage-
contract purchasers, by permanently molding into
or onto the sidewall, in the manner and location
specified in Figure 1, a tire identification number
containing the information set forth in paragraphs
(a) through (d) of this section. Each tire retreader,
except tire retreaders who retread tires solely for
their own use, shall conspicuously label one
sidewall of each tire it retreads by permanently
molding or branding into or onto the sidewall, in
the manner and location specified in Figure 2, a
tire identification number containing the informa-
tion set forth in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this
section. In addition, the DOT symbol required by
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards shall be
located as shown in Figures 1 and 2. The DOT sym-
bol shall not appear on tires to which no Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard is applicable, ex-
cept that the DOT symbol on tires for use on motor
vehicles other than passenger cars may, prior to
retreading, be removed from the sidewall or al-
lowed to remain on the sidewall, at the retreader' s
option. The symbols to be used in the tire iden-
tification number for tire manufacturers and
retreaders, are: "A, B, C, D, E, F, H, J, K, L, M,
N, P, R, T, U, V, W, X, Y, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0."
Tires manufactured or retreaded exclusively for
mileage-contract purchasers are not required to
contain a tire identification number if the tire con-
tains the phrase "for mileage contract use only"
permanently molded into or onto the tire sidewall
in lettering at least one-quarter inch high. (50 F.R.
2288-January 16, 1985. Effective: February 15,
1985)1

(a) First grouping. The first group, of two or
three symbols, depending on whether the tire is
new or retreaded, shall represent the manufac-
turer's assigned identification mark (see § 574.6).

(b) Second grouping. For new tires, the second
group, of no more than two symbols, shall be used
to identify the tire size. For retreaded tires, the
second group, of no more than two symbols, shall
identify the retread matrix in which the tire was
processed or a tire size code if a matrix was not
used to process the retreaded tire. Each new tire
manufacturer and retreader shall maintain a
record of each symbol used, with the correspond-
ing matrix or tire size and shall provide such record
to NHTSA upon written request.

(c) Third grouping. The third group, consisting
of no more than four symbols, may be used at the
option of the manufacturer or retreader as a
descriptive code for the purpose of identifying
significant characteristics of the tire. However, if
the tire is manufactured for a brand name owner,
one of the functions of the third grouping shall be
to identify the brand name owner. Each manufac-
turer or retreader who uses the third grouping
shall maintain a detailed record of any descriptive
or brand name owner code used, which shall be
provided to the Bureau upon written request.

(d) Fourth grouping. The fourth group, of three
symbols, shall identify the week and year of
manufacture. The first two symbols shall identify
the week of the year using "01" for the first full
calendar week in each year. The final week of each
year may include not more than 6 days of the
following year. The third symbol shall identify the
year. (Example: 311 means the 31st week of 1971,
or Aug. 1 through 7, 1971; 012 means the first
week of 1972, or Jan. 2 through 8, 1972.) The sym-
bols signifying the date of manufacture shall im-
mediately follow the optional descriptive code
(paragraph (c) of this section). If no optional
descriptive code is used the symbols signifying the
date of manufacture shall be placed in the area
shown in Figures 1 and 2 for the optional descrip-
tive code.

§ 574.6 identification mark.

To obtain the identification mark required by
§ 574.5(a), each manufacturer of new or retreaded
motor vehicle tires shall apply after November 30,
1970, in writing to Tire Identification and Record-
keeping, National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration, 400 Seventh Street SW.,
Washington, D.C. 20590, identify himself as a
manufacturer of new tires or retreaded tires, and
furnish the following information:

(a) The name, or other designation identifying
the applicant, and his main office address.

(Rev. 1/16/85)

PART 574-2

(b) The name, or other identifying designation,
of each individual plant operated by the manufac-
turer and the address of each plant, if applicable.

(c) The type of tires manufactured at each plant,
e.g., passenger car tires, bus tires, truck tires,
motorcycle tires, or retreaded tires.

3. Section 574.7 is revised to read as follows:

§ 574.7 Information requirements— new tire manu-
facturers, new tire brand name owners.

(a)(1) Each new tire manufacturer and each
new tire brand name owner (hereinafter referred
to in this section and § 574.8 as "tire manufac-
turer") or its designee, shall provide tire registra-
tion forms to every distributor and dealer of its
tires which offers new tires for sale or lease to tire
purchasers.

n

TIRE IDENTIhlCATION
NUMBER

SPACING-i
1 4" MIN I
3 4" MAXl^

OPTION 1

REF SYMBOL

DOT)000( ;vXX>0(E

--4— I

TIRE SIZE

DATE OF MANUFACTURE

(2) Each tire registration form provided to
independent distributors and dealers pursuant
to paragraph (a) (1) of this section shall contain
space for recording the information specified
in paragraphs (a) |(4)1 (A) through (a) 1(4)1 (C)
of this section and shall conform in content
and format to Figures 3a and 3b. Each form
shall be:

((a) Rectangular;

(b) Not less than .007 inches thick;

(c) Greater than 3V2 inches, but not
greater than 6'/« inches wide; and

(d)l Greater than 5 inches, but not greater
than I6| inches long.

[(3)1 Each tire registration form provided to
distributors and dealers, other than independent
distributors and dealers, pursuant to paragraph
(a) (1) of this section shall be similar in format and
size to Figure 4 and shall contain space for

Notes

1 . Tire identification number shall
be in Futura Bold, Modified
Condensed or Gotfiic characters
permanentlY molded 10 020 to
0 040" deep, measured from the
surface immediately surrounding
characters! into or onto tire at
indicated location on one side.
(See Note 4)

2. Groups of symbols in the identification
number shall be in the order indicated
Deviation from the straight line arrange
ment shown will be permitted if required
to conform to the curvature of the tire

MANUFACTURERS
IDENTIFICATION MARK

TIRE TYPE CODE
(OPTIONALI

OPTION 2

TIRE IDENTIFICATION
■ NUMBER •

SPACING'
1/4" Ml
3/4" MAX

^1
N

Xil|

SPACING

1/4" MIN
3/4" MAX

-X

ABOVE. BELOW OR TO THE LEFT Pk/^T

OR RIGHT OF TIRE IDENTIFICATION [J\J \
NUMBER

When Tire Type Code is omitted, or par
tially used, place Date of Manufacture in
the unused area

Other print type will be permit

ted if approved by the administration

MIN

LOCATE ALL REOUIRED LABELING
IN LOWER SEGMENT OF ONE SIDEWALL
BETWEEN MAXIMUM SECTION WIDTH
AND BEAD SO THAT DATA WILL NOT BE
OBSTRUCTED BY RIM FLANGE

•5/32" LETTERING FOR TIRES OF LESS THAN
6.00 INCH CROSS SECTION WIDTH AS WELL AS
THOSE LESS THAN 13" BEAD DIAMETER MAY BE
USED

FIGURE 1 -IDENTIFICATION NUMBER FOR NEW TIRES

(Rav. 3/2S'84)

PART 574-3

SPACING

1/4" MIN
3/4' MAX

OPTION 1

-1'

TIRE IDENTIFICATION
NUMBER

^r

REF MVSS
No. 117, 56.^

DOT-R XXX XX XXX XXX

y^

MANUFACTURERS
IDENTIFICATION
MARK

TIRE SIZE

TIRE
TYPE CODE
(OPTIONAL)

DATE OF
MANUFACTURE

'USE 5/32" LETTERING FOR TIRES OF LESS
THAN 6.00 INCH CROSS SECTION WIDTH AS
WELL AS THOSE LESS THAN 13" BEAD DIAMETER

LOCATE

TIRE IDENTIFICATION
NUMBER IN THIS AREA
BUT NOT ON THE
SCUFF RIB(S).

SPACING

1/4" MIN
3/4" MAX

OPTION 2

TIRE IDENTIFICATION
NUMBER

NOTES

1

SPACING
1/4" MIN -
3/4" MAX

XXXXX XXX XXX
DOT-R

ABOVE, BELOW OR TO THE LEFT
OR RIGHT OF TIRE IDENTIFICATION
NUMBER.

3.

Tire identification number shall be in "Futura
Bold, Modified, Condensed or Gothic" char-
acters permanently molded (0.020 to 0.040"
deep, measured from the surface immediately
surrounding characters) into or onto tire at
indicated location on one side.
(See Note 4)

Groups of symbols in the identification num-
ber shall be in the order indicated. Deviation
from the straight line arrangement shown will
be permitted if required to conform to the
curvature of the tire.

When Tire Type Code is omitted, or partially
used, place Date of Manufacture in the unused
area.

Other print type will be permitted if approved
by the Administration.

FIGURE 2-IDENTIFICATION NUMBER FOR RETREADED TIRES

PART 574-4

IMPORTANT A

In caM of a r*c«ll, w« can raach you only If w« hav*

your nam* and addraaa. You MUST tand In thit SHADED AREAS MUST

BE FILLED IN BY SELLER

card to ba on our racall list.

Do It today.

TIRE IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS

QTV

l|2|3|4|5|6|7|e|9|to]l1

CUSTOMER'S NAME (PKua PHnO

CUSTOMER S ADDRESS

em (TATC zipcooc

NAMC or ookic* wwcH SOLO rne

DfMfirsAaowu

10%
Screen

Tint

A Preprinted tire manufacturer's name— unless the manufacturer's
name appears on reverse side of thie form.

Fig. 3a— Registration form for independent distributors and dealers-
tire identification number side

Name and address of
tire manufacturer or
its designee

(Preprinted)

Affix a

postcard

stamp

Fig. 3b— Registration form for independent distributors and dealers-
address side

(Rav. 2>8ie4)

PART 574-5

h

7 3/8" 1 1/8"

/ IMPORTANT FEDERAL LAW REQUIRES
' TIRE IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS MUST

BE REGISTERED

(PLEASE PRINTl

®

RETURN TO

©

CUSTOMER'S NAME

ADDRESS

QTY

TIRE IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS 1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

n

n

MM

ZIP
iOPTIONALI

^^Tf 1111 Fl FFT \/FHiri F Mn

SELLERS NAME AND/OB MANUFACTURER SELLER

NUMBER

ADDRESS

rr

III!

1

J

CIT-. STATE

ZIP

(a) PREPRINTED TIRE MANUFACTURERS'
LOGO OR OTHER IDENTIFICATION
AND MAILING ADDRESS

(B) microfilm NUMBER

LOCATION IF NECESSARY

A-B AREAS TO SUIT TIRE

MANUFACTURERS

REQUIREMENTS

Fig. 4— UNIVERSAL FORMAT

recording the information specified in
paragraphs (a) [(4)1 (A) through (a) [(4)1 (C) of
this section.

[(4)1 (A) Name and address of the tire pur-
chaser.

(B) Tire identification number.

(C) Name and address of the tire seller or
other means by which the tire manufacturer
can identify the tire seller.

(b) Each tire manufacturer shall record and
maintain, or have recorded and maintained for it
by a designee, the information from registration
forms which are submitted to it or its designee. No
tire manufacturer shall use the information on the
registration forms for any commercial purpose
detrimental to tire distributors and dealers. Any
tire manufacturer to which registration forms are
mistakenly sent shall forward those registration
forms to the proper tire manufacturer within 90
days of the receipt of the forms.

(c) Each tire manufacturer shall maintain, or
have maintained for it by a designee, a record of
each tire distributor and dealer that purchases
tires directly from the manufacturer and sells them

to tire purchasers, the number of tires purchased
by each such distributor or dealer, the number of
tires for which reports have been received from
each such distributor or dealer other than an in-
dependent distributor or dealer, the number of
tires for which reports have been received from
each such independent distributor or dealer, the
total number of tires for which registration forms
have been submitted to the manufacturer or its
designee, and the total number of tires sold by the
manufacturer.

(d) The information that is specified in para-
graph (a) [(4)1 of this section and recorded on
registration forms submitted to a tire manufac-
turer or its designee shall be maintained for a
period of not less than three years from the date on
which the information is recorded by the manufac-
turer or its designee.

§ 574.8 Information requirements— tire distributors
and dealers.

(a) Independent distributors and dealers. (1)
Each independent distributor and each indepen-
dent dealer selling or leasing new tires to tire pur-

(Rev. 3/25/84)

PART 574-6

chasers or lessors (hereinafter referred to in this
section as "tire purchasers") shall provide each
tire purchaser at the time of sale or lease of the
tire<s) with a tire registration form.

(2) The distributor or dealer may use either
the registration forms provided by the tire
manufacturers pursuant to S 574.7(a) or regis-
tration forms obtained from another source.
Forms obtained from other sources shall comply
with the requirements specified in § 574.7(a) for
forms provided by tire manufacturers to in-
dependent distributors and dealers.

(3) Before giving the registration form to the
tire purchaser, the distributor or dealer shall
record in the appropriate spaces provided on
that form:

(A) The entire tire identification number of
the tire(s) sold or leased to the tire purchaser;
and

(B) The distributor's or dealer's name and
address or other means of identification
known to the tire manufacturer.

(4) Multiple tire purchases or leases by the
same tire purchaser may be recorded on a single
registration form.

(b) Other distributors and dealers. (!) Each
distributor and each dealer, other than an indepen-
dent distributor or dealer, selling new tires to tire
purchasers shall submit the information specified
in S 574.7(a) |(4)J to the manufacturer of the tires
sold, or to its designee.

(2) Each tire distributor and each dealer, other
than an independent distributor or dealer, shall
submit registration forms containing the infor-
mation specified in S 574.7(a) [(4)| to the tire
manufacturer, or person maintaining the infor-
mation, not less often than every 30 days. How-
ever, a distributor or dealer which sells less than
40 tires, of all makes, types and sizes during a
30-day period may wait until he or she sells a
total of 40 new tires, but in no event longer than
six months, before forwarding the tire informa-
tion to the respective tire manufacturers or their
designees.

(c) Each distributor and each dealer selling new
tires to other tire distributors or dealers shall sup-
ply to the distributor or dealer a means to record
the information specified in § 574.7(a) [(4)1, unless
such a means has been provided to that distributor
or dealer by another person or by a manufacturer.

(d) Each distributor and each dealer shall im-
mediately stop selling any group of tires when so

directed by a notification issued pursuant to sec-
tions 151 and 152 of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1411 and
1412).

§ 574.9 Requirements for motor vehicle dealers.

(a) Each motor vehicle dealer who sells a used
motor vehicle for purposes other than resale, or
who leases a motor vehicle for more than 60 days,
that is equipped with new tires or newly retreaded
tires is considered, for purposes of this part, to be a
tire dealer and shall meet the requirements speci-
fied in § 574.8.

(b) Each person selling a new motor vehicle to
first purchasers for purposes other than resale,
that is equipped with tires that were not on the
motor vehicle when shipped by the vehicle manu-
facturer is considered a tire dealer for purposes of
this part and shall meet the requirements specified
in § 574.8.

§ 574.10 Requirements for motor vehicle manufac-
turers.

Each motor vehicle manufacturer, or his desig-
nee, shall maintain a record of tires on or in each
vehicle shipped by him to a motor vehicle distribu-
tor or dealer, and shall maintain a record of the
name and address of the first purchaser for pur-
poses other than resale of each vehicle equipped
with such tires. These records shall be maintained
for a period of not less than three years from the
date of sale of the vehicle to the first purchaser for
purposes other than resale.

Interpretation

Under section 113(f) of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1402(f)) and
Part 574, it is the tire manufacturer who has the
ultimate responsibility for maintaining the records
of first purchasers. Therefore, it is the tire
manufacturer or his designee who must maintain
these records. The term "designee," as used in the
regulation, was not intended to preclude multiple
designees; if the tire manufacturer desires, he may
designate more than one person to maintain the re-
quired information. Furthermore, neither the Act
nor the regulation prohibits the distributor or
dealer from being the manufacturer's designee,
nor do they prohibit a distributor or dealer from
selecting someone to be the manufacturer's
designee provided the manufacturer approves of
the selection.

(R*«. 3/2S/84)

PART 574-7

With respect to the possibiHty of manufac- 36 F.R. 4783

turers using the maintained information to the March 12, 1971
detriment of a distributor or dealer, NHTSA

will of course investigate claims by distributors ^^ ^•^- 13757
or dealers of alleged misconduct and, if the ^ ^ ' '

maintained information is being misused, take 36 F.R. 16510

appropriate action. August 21, 1971

PART 574-8

PREAMBLE TO TIRE CODE AAARKS ASSIGNED TO NEW TIRE MANUFACTURERS

The purpose of this notice is to publish the
code numbers assigned to new-tire manufacturers
imder the Tire Identification and Recordkeeping
Regulation, 49 CFR Part 574 (36 F.R. 1196).

The Tire Identification and Recordkeeping
Regulation (hereafter Part 574) requires that
new, tires manufactured after May 22, 1971, be
marked with a two-symbol manufacturer's code,
and that retreaded tires be marked with a three-
symbol manufacturer's code. The manufactur-
er's code is the first grouping within the tire
identification number (after the symbol "DOT"
or "R" where required).

Under Part 574 a separate code number is
assigned to each manufacturer's plant. Table 1
of the notice lists the code numbers assigned and
the manufacturer that received each code num-
ber. Table 2 lists the same information by

manufacturer. Codes assigned to retreaders will
be available for inspection in the Docket Section,
Room 5217, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington,
D.C. 20590.

The codes assigned to new-tire manufacturers
replace the three-digit code numbers required on
new brand-name passenger car tires manufac-
tured prior to May 22, 1971, under Standard No.
109. (The list of numbers assigned under
Standard No. 109 was published in the Federal
Register of July 2, 1968, 34 F.R. 11158.)

Issued on April 14, 1971.

Rodolfo A. Diaz,

Acting Associate Administrator,

Motor Vehicle Programs.

36 F.R. 7539
April 21, 1971

PART 574; (TIRE CODE)— PRE 1-2

PREAMBLE TO TIRE SIZE CODES

The purpose of this notice is to publish an
updated list of tire size codes assie^Ied by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
in accordance with the Tire Identification and
Record Keeping regulation, 49 CFR Part 574
(36F.R. 1196).

The Tire Identification and Record Keeping
regulation requires that a tire identification num-
ber be placed on new and retreaded tires, and
that the second grouping of the number be a
code that identifies the tire size or, in the case
of a retreaded tire, the tire matrix. New tire
manufacturers have up to now been required to
use a specific tire size code assigned to the tire
size by the NHTSA. Because of the number of
new tire sizes being introduced into the market,
the possible combinations of letters and numbers
have been virtually exhausted.

In order to accommodate new tire sizes the
regulation is being amended by notice published
elsewhere in this issue (37 F.R. 23727), to allow
each tire manufacturer to assign a two-symbol

size code of his own choice, rather than having
the number assigned by the agency. However,
it is urged that manufacturers maintain tlie as-
signed tire size code for existing tire sizes, and
that they reuse obsolete tire size codes for new
sizes wherever possible.

For convenience of reference, an updated list
of the tire size codes assigned by the NHTSA is
published below for the information and guid-
ance of tire manufacturers.

This notice is issued under the authority of
sections 103, 113, 119, 201 and 1402, 1407, 1421
and 1426; and the delegations of authority at
49 CFR 1.51 and 49 CFR 501.8.

Issued on October 26, 1972.

Robert L. Carter
Associate Administrator
Motor Vehicle Programs

38 F.R. 23742
November 8, 1972

PART 574; (TIRE CODE)— PRE 3-4

Table 1. List of AlphaNumeric Code Assignments to New Tire Manufacturers
(Based on the foiiowing Aipha-numeric code with letters: ABCDEFHJKLMNPTUVWXY

and Nos. 123456789)

Code No. Neu- Tire Manufacturers

AA The General Tire Co.

AB The General Tire Co.

AC The General Tire Co.

AD ... The General Tire Co.

AE . The General Tire Co. (Spain).

AF The General Tire Co. (Portugal).

AH The General Tire Co. (Mexico).

AJ _. Uniroyal, Inc.

AK Uniroyal, Inc.

AL Uniroyal, Inc.

AM Uniroyal, Inc.

AN Uniroyal, Inc.

AP Uniroyal, Inc.

AT Avon Rubber Co. (England).

AU Uniroyal, Ltd. (Canada).

AV . The Sieberling Tire & Rubber Co.

AW Samson Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd. (Israel).

AX Phoenix Gummiwerke A.G. (Germany)

AY Phoenix Gummiwerke A.G. (Germany).

Al Manufacture Francaise Pneumatiques Michelin,

Poitiers, France.
A2 Lee Tire & Rubber Co.. Anhanguera Highway,

Kilometer 128. Sao Paulo, Brasil.
A3 General Tire & Rubber Co., Mount Vernon,

Illinois 62864.
A4 Hung-A Industrial Co., Ltd., 42 JyonPo-Dong

PusanjinKu, Pusan, Korea.
A5 Debickie Zakladv Opon Samochodowych "Stomil,"

Al.l Maja 1, .'59-200 Debica, Poland.
A6 . Apollo Tires Ltd., Jos. Anne M.C.Road, Cochin

682016, Kerala, India.
A7 Thai Bridgestone Tire Co. Ltd., Tambol Klong-1,

Amphur Klong Luang. Changwad Patoom,

Thani, Thailand.
A8 _ P.T. Bridgestone Tire Co. Ltd., Desa Harapan

Jaya-Belcasi, Km27Jawa Barat, Indonesia.
A9 General Tire & Rubber Co., 927 S. Union, St.,

Bryan, Ohio 44350.

BA The B. F. Goodrich Co.

BB The B. F. Goodrich Co.

BC The B. F. Goodnch Co.

BD The B. F. Goodrich Co.

BE The B. F. Goodrich Co.

BF The B. F. Goodrich Co.

BH The B. F. Goodriui Co. (Canada).

BJ .. . The B. F. Goodrich Co. (Germany).

BK The B. F. Goodrich Co. (Brazil).

BL The B. F. Goodrich Co. (Colombia).

BM. „ The B. F. Goodrich Co. (Australia).

BN The B. F. Goodrich Co. (Philipines).

BP The B. F. Goodrich Co. (Iran).

BT Semperit Gummiwerke A.G. (Austria).

BU Semperit Gummiwerke A.G. (Ireland).

BV IRI International Rubber Co.

BW The Gates Rubber Co.

BX The Gates Rubber Co.

BY The Gates Rubber Co.

Bl Manufacture Francaise Pneumatiques Michelin,

LaRoche Sur Yon, France.
B2 Dunlop Malaysian Industries Berhad, Selangor,

Malaysia.
B3 Michelin Tire Mfg. Co. of Canada Ltd., Bridge-
water, Nova Scotia.
B4 Taurus Hungarian Rubber Works, 1965 Budapest,

Kerepesi DTI 7, Hungary.
B5 Olsztynskie Zaklady Opon Samochodowych

"STOMIL," Al.Zwyciestwa 71, Olsztyn, Poland.
B6 Michelin Tire Corp., f.O. Box 5049, Spartanburg,

S. Carolina 29364.

Code No. New Tire Manufacturers

B7 Michelin Tire Corp., 2306 Industrial Road,

Dothan, Alabama 36301.
B8 Cia Brasiliera de Pneumaticos Michelin Ind.,

Estrada Da Cachamorra 5000, 23000 Campo

Grande, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil.
B9 Michelin Tire Corp., 2520 Two Notch Road, P.O.

Box 579. Lexington, S. Carolina 29072.
CA The Mohawk Rubber Co.

CB The Mohawk Rubber Co.

CC The Mohawk Rubber Co.

CD Alliance Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd. (Israel).

CE The Armstrong Rubber Co.

CF The Armstrong Rubber Co.

CH The Armstrong Rubber Co.

CJ Inoue Rubber Co., Ltd. (Japan).

CK Not assigned.

CL Not assigned.

CM Continental Gummiwerke A.G. (Germany).

CN Continental Gummiwerke A.G. (France).

CP Continental Gummiwerke A.G. (Germany).

CT Continental Gummiwerke A.G. (Germany).

CU . _ Continental Gummiwerke A.G. (Germany).

CV The Armstrong Rubber Co.

CW The Toyo Rubber Industry Co., Ltd. (Japan).

CX The Toyo Rubber Industry Co., Ltd. (Japan).

CY McCreary Tire & Rubber Co.

CI Michelin "(Nigeria) Ltd., Port Harcourt, Nigeria.

C2 Kelly Sprin^ield Companhia Goodv-ear Do Brasil,

Km-128 Americana, Sao Paulo, Brazil.
C3 McCreary Tire & Rubber Co., 3901 Clipper Road,

Baltimore, Maryland 21211.
C4 Armstrong Rubber Co., Eagle Bend Industrial

Park, Cunton, Tennessee.
C5 Poznanskie Zaklady Opon Samochodowych

"STOMIL," ul. Starolecka 18. Poznaii. Poland.
06 Mitas NP Praha 10-Zahradni Mesto, Komarovova

1900, Praque, Czechoslovakia.
C7 Ironsides Tire & Rubber Co., 2500 Grassland

Drive, Louisville, Ky 40299.
C8 Bridgestone Hsin Chu Plant, Chung Yi Rubber In-
dustrial Co. Ltd., No. 1 Chuang Ching Road,

Taiwan.
IC9 Seven SUr Rubber Company, Ltd, 2-1 Chang-

Swei Road, Pin-Tou Hsiang, Chang-Hua,

Taiwan, R.O.C.J

DA The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp.

DB The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp.

DC The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. (Canada).

DD The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. (England).

DE The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. (England).

DF . The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. (England).

DH The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. (Scotland).

DJ„ The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. (Ireland).

DK The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. (France).

DL.„ The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. (France).

DM The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. (Germany).

DN The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. (Germany).

DP . . The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. (England).
DT The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. (Australia).

DU The Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. (Australia).

DV . . Vredestein (The Netherlands).

DW Vredestein (The Netherlands).

DX Vredestein Radium (The Netherlands).

DY Denman Rubber Manufacturing Co.

Dl Viking-Askim-1800 Askim, Norway.

D2 Dayton Tire & Rubber CO., P.O. Box 1000,

La Vergne, Tennessee 37086.
D3 United Tire & Rubber Co., Northam Ind. Park

Cobourg, Ontario, Canada K9A 4K2.

(Rtv. 1/16/85)

PART 574; (TIRE C0DE)-1

Code No. New Tire Manufacturers

D4 __ . Dunlop India Ltd., P.O. Box Sahaganj, Dist.
Hooghly, West Bengal, India.

D5 Dunlop India Ltd., Ambattur, Madras-600053, India.

D6 '_'.'. ~- Borovo, Ygoslavenski Kombinat Gume i Obose,

Borovo, Yugoslavia.
D7 Dunlop South Africa Ltd., Ladvsmith plant 151,

Helpmekaar Road, Danskraal Ind. sites. Rep. of

D8 Dunlop South Africa Ltd., Durban Plant 265,

Sydney Road, 4001 Durban, Rep. of S. Africa.

D9 United Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd., 275 Belfield

Road, Rexdale, Ontario, Canada, M9 W 5C6.

EA_ __ Metzeler A.G. (Germany).

EB Metzeler A.G. (Germany).

EC Metzeler A.G. (Germany).

ED ^ Okamoto Riken Gomu Co., Ltd. (Japan).

EE _ Nitto Tire Co., Ltd. (Japan).
EF Hung Ah Tire Co., Ltd. (Korea).

EH Bridgestone Tire Co., Ltd. (Japan).

EJ Bridgestone Tire Co., Ltd. (Japan).

EK Bridgestone Tire Co., Ltd. (Japan).

EL Bridgestone Tire Co., Ltd. (Japan).

EM ^ Bridgestone Tire Co., Ltd. (Japan).
EN Bridgestone Tire Co., Ltd. (Japan).

EP Bridgestone Tire Co., Ltd. (Japan).

ET Sumitomo Rubber Industries, Ltd. (Japan).

EU Sumitomo Rubber Industries, Ltd. (Japan).

EV Kleber-Colombes Co. (France).

EW _ __ Kleber-Colombes Co. (France).
EX. Kleber-Colombes Co. (France).

EY Kleber-Colombes Co. (France).

El Chung Hsin Industrial Co. Ltd., Taiehong Hsin,

Taiwan.
E2 Industria de Pneumatico Firestone SA, Sao Paulo,

Brazil.
E3 Seiberling Tire & Rubber Co., P.O. Box 1000,

La Vergne, Tennessee 37086.
E4 Firestone of New Zealand, Papanuvi, Christ

Church 5, New Zealand.
E5 Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd.. P.O. Box 992,

Port Elizabeth 6000, S. Africa.
E6 Firestone Tunisie SA, Boite Postale 55, Menzel-

Bourguiba, Tunisia.
E7 Firestone East Africa Ltd., P.O. Box 30429,

Nairobi, Kenya.
E8 Firestone Ghana Ltd., P.O. Box 5758, Accra,

Ghana.
E9 . .. Firestone South Africa (Pty), P.O. Box 496, Brits

0250, South Africa.

FA The Yokohama Rubber Co., Ltd. (Japan).

FB The Yokohama Rubber Co., Ltd. (Japan).

FC _ The Yokohama Rubber Co., Ltd. (Japan).

FD The Yokohama Rubber Co., Ltd. (Japan).

FE The Yokohama Rubber Co., Ltd. (Japan).

FF Michelin Tire Corp. (France).

FH Michelin Tire Corp. (France).

FJ Michelin Tire Corp. (France).

FK Michelin Tire Corp. (France).

FL Michelin Tire Corp. (France).

FM Michelin Tire Corp. (France).

FN Michelin Tire Corp. (France).

FP Michelin Tire Corp. (Algeria).

FT Michelin Tire Corp. (Germany).

FU Michelin Tire Corp. (Germany).

FV Michelin Tire Corp. (Germany).

FW Michelin Tire Corp. (Germany).

FX Michelin Tire Corp. (Belgium).

FY Michelin Tire Corp. (The Netherlands).

Fl Michelin Tyre Co. Ltd., Baldovie Dundee, Scotland.

F2 CA Firestone Venezolana, Valencia, Venezuela.

F3 Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatic Michelin,

Roanne, France.

F4 Fabrica De Pneus Fapobol, Sari Rua Azevedo

Coutinho 39-1.0, Oporto, Portugal.

Code No.

New Tire Manufacturers

F5 Fate S.A.l.C.L, Avda Alte Blanco Encalada 3003,

Buenos Aires, Argentina.

F6 General Fabrica Espanola (Firestone Owned)

Torrelavega Plant, Spain.
F7 General Fabrica Espanola (Firestone Owned)

Puente San Miguel Plant, Spain.
F8 Vikrant Tyres Ltd., K.R.S. Road, Mysore

(Karnataka State) India.
IF9 Dunlop New Zealand, Limited, P.O. Box 40343,

Upper Hutt, New Zealand!

n Tire Corp. (Spain).

n Tire Corp. (Spain).

n Tire Corp. (Spain).

n Tire Corp. (Italy).

n Tire Corp. (Italy).

n Tire Corp. (Italy).

n Tire Corp. (Italy).

n Tire Corp. (United Kingdom).

n Tire Corp. (United Kingdom).

n Tire Corp. (United Kingdom).

n Tire Corp. (United Kingdom).

n Tire Corp. (Canada).

n Tire Corp. (South Vietnam).

HA Michelii

HB Michelii

HC .. Michelii

HD Michelii

HE Michelii

HF Michelii

HH Michelii

HJ Michelii

HK . Michelii

HL Michelii

HM Michelii

HN Michelii

HP Michelii

HT CEAT (Italy).

HU CEAT (Italy).

HV CEAT (Italy).

HW" Withdrawn.

HX The Dayton Tire & Rubber Co.

HY The Dayton Tire & Rubber Co.

HI De La SAFE Neumaticos Michelin, Valladolid,

Spain.
H2 SamYang Tire Mfg. Co. Ltd., Song Jung Pit.,

Junnam, Korea.
H3 Sava Industrija Gumijevih, 64,000 Kranj, Yugo-
slavia.

H4 Bridgestone-Houfu, Yam^uchi-ken, Japan.

H5 Hutcninson-Mapa, 45120 Chalette Sur Loing,

France.
H6 Shin Hung Rubber Co. Ltd., 156 Sang Pyong-Dong

Junju, Kyung Nam, Korea.
H7 Li Hsin Rubber Industrial Co. Ltd., 42 Yuan Lu

Road, Sec. 1, Taiwan, China.
H8 _ Firestone, 2600 South Council Road, Oklahoma

City, OK. 73124.
|H9 Reifen-Berg, 5000 Koln 80 (Mulheim), Clevischer

Ring 134, West Germany!
JA The Lee Tire & Rubber Co.

JB The Lee Tire & Rubber Co.

JC The Lee Tire & Rubber Co.

JD_ The Lee Tire & Rubber Co.

JE The Lee Tire & Rubber Co.

JF The Lee Tire & Rubber Co.

JH The Lee Tire & Rubber Co.

JJ The Lee Tire & Rubber Co.

JK The Lee Tire & Rubber Co.

JL_ _ The Lee Tire & Rubber Co.

JM The Lee Tire & Rubber Co.

JN The Lee Tire & Rubber Co.

JP The Lee Tire & Rubber Co.

JT The Lee Tire & Rubber Co.

JU The Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Canada).

JV_ The Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Canada).

JW The Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Canada).

JX Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Canada).

JY Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Argentina).

Jl Phillips Petroleum Co., BartlesvUle, OK 74004.

J2 Bridgestone Singapore Co. Ltd., 2 Jurong Port

Road, Jurong Town, Singapore 22, Singapore.

J3 Gumarne Maja, Puchov, Czechoslovakia.

J4 Rubena N.P., Nachod, Czechoslovakia.

J5 Lee Tire & Rubber Co., State Rt. 33, Box 799,

Logan, Ohio 43138.
J6 JaroSavl Tire Co., Jaroslavl, USSR.

J7 R&J Mfg. Corp., 1420 Stanley Dr., Plymouth,

Indiana 46563.

(Rev. 1/16/85)

PART 574; (TIRE C0DE)-2

Code No. Seu' Tire Manufacturers

J8 DaChung Hua Rubber Ind. Co., Shanghai Tire

Plant, 839 Hanyshan Rd., Shanghai, China.
IJ9 P.T. Intirub, 4,^4 Cilihtan, P.O. Box 2626, Besar,

Jakarta, Indonesia]

KA Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Australia).

KB Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Australia).

KC Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Brazil).

KD Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Colombia).

KE Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Republic of Congo).

KF Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (France).

KH _ Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Germany).

KJ Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Germany).

KK Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Greece).

KL Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Guatemala).

KM Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Luxembourg).

KN Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (India).

KP Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Indonesia).

KT Lee Tire & Rubber Co. Otaly).

KU Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Jamaica).

KV Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Mexico).

KW Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Peru).

KX Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Philippines).

KY Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Scotland).

Kl Phillips Petroleum Co., 1501 Commerce Drive,

Stow, Ohio 44224.

K2 Lee Tire & Rubber Co., Madisonville, KY 42431.

K3 Kenda Rubber Industrial Co. Ltd., Yuanlin, Taiwan.

K4 Uniroyal S.A., Queretaro, Qte. Mexico.

K5 VEB Reifenkombinat Furstenwalde, GDR-124

Furstenwalde-Sud, Trankeweg Germany.
K6 Lee Tire & Rubber Co., One Goodyear Blvd.,

Lawton, Oklahoma.
K7 Lee Tire & Rubber Co., Camino Melipilla KM16,

Maipu Box 3607, Santiago, Chile.
K8 Kelly Springfield Tire Co., Peti Surat 49, Shah.

Alam, Sehngor, Malaysia.
IK9 Natier Tire & Rubber (Jo., Ltd., 557 Shan Chiao

Road, Sec. 1, Shetou, Changhua, Taiwan, R.O.C.

5111

LA Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (South Africa).

LB Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Sweden).

LC Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Thailand).

LD Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Turkey.)

LE Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Venezuela.)

LF Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (England).

LH Uniroyal, Inc. (Australia).

LJ Uniroyal, Inc. (Belgium).

LK Uniroyal, Inc. (Columbia).

LL Uniroyal, Inc. (France).

LM Uniroyal, Inc. (Germany).

LN __ Uniroyal, Inc. (Mexico).

LP Uniroyal, Inc. (Scotland).

LT Uniroyal, Inc. (Turkey).

LU Uniroyal, Inc. (Venezuela).

LV Mansneld-Denman-General Co., Ltd.

(Canada).

LW Trelleborg Rubber Co., Inc. (Sweden).

LX Mitsuboshi Belting, Ltd. (Japan).

LY _ Mitsuboshi Belting, Ltd. (Japan).

LI Goodyear Taiwan Ltd., Taipei, Taiwan, Rep. of

China.
L2 Wuon Poong Industrial Co., Ltd., 112-5 Sokong-

Dong, Chung-Ku, Seoul, Korea.
L3 Tong Shin Chemical Products Co., Ltd., Seoul,

Korea.
L4 Cipcmp Intreprinderea De Anvelope, Da'iubiana,

Romania.
L5 Lassa Lastik Sanayi VeTicaret, A.S. Fabnkas,

Kosekoy, P.K. 250 Izmit, Turkey.
L6 Modi Rubber Limited, Modipurnam Plant. Meerut

UP250110, India.
L7 Cipcmp Intreprinderea De Anvelope, Zalau,

Romania.
L8 Dunlop Zimbabwe Ltd., Donnington, Bulawayo,

Zimbabwe.

Code No. New Tire Manufacturers

MA The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

MB The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

MC „ The (joodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

MD The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

ME The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

MP The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

MH The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

MJ The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

MK The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

ML The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

MM The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

MN The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

MP The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

MT The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

MU The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Argentina)

MV._ The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., (Australia)

MW The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Australia).

MX The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Brazil).

MY The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Colombia).

Ml Goodyear Maroc S.A. Casablanca, Morocco.

M2 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Madisonville, KY 42431.

M3 Michelin Tire Corp., 730 S. Pleasantburg Drive,

Greenville, S. Carolina 29602.

M4 Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co., Logan, Ohio 43138.

M5 Michelin Tire Mfg. Co. of Canada Ltd., P.O. Box

5000, Kentville, Nova Scotia B4NV36.
M6 (Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., One Goodyear Blvd.,

Lawton, OK 73504.
M7 Goodyear DeChile S.A.I.C, Camino Melipilla

K.M.16 Maipu, P.O. Box 3607, Santiago, Chile.
|M8 Premier Tyres Limited, Kalamassery, Kerala

Sute, India)
|M9 Uniroyal Tire Corporation, Uniroyal Research

Center, Middlebury, CT 067491
NA The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Republic

of Congo).

NB The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (England).

NO The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (France).

ND The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Germany).

NE The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Germany).

NF „ The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Greece).

NH The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

NJ The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Luxem-
bourg).

NK The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (India.)

NL The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Indonesia).

NM The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Italy).

NN The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Jamaica).

NP The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Mexico).

NT The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Peru).

NU The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co (Philippines).

NV. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Scotland).

NW The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (South

Africa).

NX The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Sweden).

NY The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Thailand).

Nl Maloja AG Pneu Und Gummiwerke, Ormalinger-

strasse Gelterkinden, Switzerland, CH 4460.
N2 Hurtubise Nutread, 525 Viekers Street, Tona-

wanda, N.Y. 14150.
N3 Rvoto Tire Co., Ltd., Kuwana Plant, 2400 Arano

Nakagami, Tohin-Cho Inabe-Gun, Mie-ken. Japan.
N4 ,_ Cipcmp Intreprinderea De Anvelope, Victoria,

Romania.
N5 Pneumant, VEB Reifenwerk Riesa, Paul-Greifzu-

Strasse 20, 84 Riesa, Germany.
N6 Pneumant VEB Reifenwerk Heidenau Haudtstrass.

44 GDR, 8312 Heidenau, (iermany.
N7 Cipcmp Intrepinderea De Anvelope, Caracal,

Romania.
N8 Lee Tire & Rubber Co. (Goodyear, Malaysia Ber-

had), Peti Surat 49, Shah Alam, Selengor,

Malaysia.

(Rev. 1/16/85)

PART 574; (TIRE C0DE)-3

Code No. New Tire Manufacturers

|N9 Cia Pneus Tropical, Kml05/BR, 324, Centre In-
dustrial Desubae 44100, Feira de Santana,
Bahia, Brazil|
PA The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Turkey).

PB .. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Venezuela).
PC The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Canada).

PD The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Canada).

PE The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Canada).

PF The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Canada).

PH The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.

PJ The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.

PK _ The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.

PL . ... The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.

PM . The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.

PN The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.

PP . The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.

PT . The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.

PU. .. . The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.

PV The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.

PW _ The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.

PX _ The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.

PY . . The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.

PI _ Gislaved Gummi Fabriken, 33200 Gislaved, Sweden.

P2 Kelly Springfield, Madisonville, Ky. 42431.

P3 Skepplanda Gummi AB, 440-40 Alvangen, Sweden.

P4 Kelly Springfield, Route 33, Logan, Ohio 43138.

P5 General Popo S.A., Central Camionera, Zona In-
dustrial, San Luis Potosi S.L.P., Mexico.
P6 . . Kelly Springfield Tire Co., One Goodyear Blvd.,

Lawton, OK 73504.
P7 Kelly Springfield, Camino Melipilla K.M.16, Maipu,

P.O. Box 3607, Santiago, Chile.
P8 China National Chemicals Import & Export Corp.,

Shandong Branch, Quingdao 97 Cangtai Rd.,

China.

IP9 MRF, Ltd., P.B. No. 1 Ponda, Goa 403401, India!

TA _ The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.
TB ... The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Argentina).
TC The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Australia).

TD _ The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Australia).

TE The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Brazil).

TF The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Colombia).

TH The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Republic of

Congo).
TJ. .. The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (England).
TK The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (France).

TL .. The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Germany).

TM The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Germany).

TN _ The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Greece).

TP The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Guatemala).

TT . . The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Luxembourg).
TU _ The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (India).
TV _ The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Indonesia).
TW_ The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Italy).

TX The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Jamaica).

TY .. The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Mexico).
Tl _ Hankook Tire Mfg. Co., Ltd., Seoul, Korea.

T2 Ozos (Uniroyal) A.G., Olsztyn, Poland.

T3 Debickie Zattldy Opon Samochodowych, Stomil,

Debica, Poland (Uniroyal).
T4 S.A. Carideng (Rubber Factory), Jan Rosierlaan

114, B 3760 Lanaken, Belgium.
T5 . . Tigar Pirot, 18300 Pirot, Yugoslavia.
T6 Hulera Tomel S.A., Sta. Lucia 198 Fracc. Ind.

San Antonio, Mexico, 16, D.F.
T7 Hankook Tire Mfg. Co. Inc., Daejun Plant, 658-1

Sukbong-RI, Daeduk-kun, Choongchung Namdo,

Korea.
T8 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Goodyear Malaysia

Berhad, Peti Surat 49, Shah Alam, Selangor,

Malaysia.
|T9 MRF, Ltd., Thiruthani Road, Ichiputhur 631 060,

Arkonam, India]

UA The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Peru).

UB The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Philippines).

Code No. New Tire Manufacturers

UC The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Scotland).

UD The Kelly-Spnngfield Tire Co. (South Africa).

UE The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Sweden).

UF The Kelly-Soringfield Tire Co. (Thailand).

UH The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Turkey).

UJ The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Venezuela).

UK The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Canada).

UL The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Canada).

UM The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Canada).

UN The Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. (Canada).

UP Copper Tire & Rubber Co.

UT Copper Tire & Rubber Co.

UU Carlisle Tire & Rubber Division of Carlisle

Corp.

UV Kyowa Rubber Industry Co., Ltd. (Japan).

UW Not assigned.

UX Not assigned.

UY Not assigned.

Ul Lien Shin Tire Co. Ltd., 20 Chung Shan Road,

Taipei, Taiwan.
U2 Sumitomo Rubber Industries Ltd., Shirakawa City,

Fukoshima Pref. Japan (Dunlop).
U3 _ Miloje Zakic, 3700 Krusevac, Yugoslavia.

U4 Geo. Byers Sons, Inc., 46 East Town Street, Co-

lumbus, Ohio 43215.
U5 Farbentabriken Bayer GMBH, D 5090 Leverkusen,

West Germany.
U6 Pneumant-VEB Reifenwerk Dresden, GDR-8040

Dresden, Mannheimer Strasse Germany.
U7 Pneumant-VEB Reifenwerk Neubrandenburg

GDR-20 Neubrandenberg, Germany.
U8 Hsin Fung Factory of Nankang Rubber Corp.

Ltd., 399 Hsin Shing Road, Yuan San, Taiwan.
|U9 Cooper Tire & Rubber Company, 1689 South

Green Street, Tupelo, MS 388011

VA The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

VB The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

VC The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

VD The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

VE The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

VF The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

VH The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

VJ_ _ The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

VK . The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

VL The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Canada).

VM The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Canada).

VN _ __ The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Canada).

VP The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Italy).

VT The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Spain).

VU __ Withdrawn.

VV _ The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Sweden).
VW The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Japan).

VX The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (England).

VY The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Wales).

VI Livingston Tire Shop, North Main Street, Hubbard,

Ohio 44425.
V2 Volzhsky Tire Plant, Volzhsk 404103, USSR.

V3 Tahsin Rubber Tire Co. Ltd., Tuchen VUlage

Taipei, Hsieng, Taiwan.
V4 Ohtsu Tire & Rubber Co., Miyakonojo City, Miya-

zaki Pref., Japan (Firestone).

V5 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Mexico City, Mexico.

V6 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Cuernavaca, Mexico.

V7 Voronezhsky Tire Plant, Voronezh 494034 USSR.

V8 Boras Gummi Fabrik A.B. Dockvagenl, S502 38

Boras, Sweden (Mac Ripper Tire and Rubber

Company).
IV9 M & R Tire Co., 309 Main Street, Watertown, MA

021721
WA The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (France).

WB The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Costa Rica).

WC The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Australia).

WD The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

(Switzerland).

(Rev. 1/16/85)

PART 574; (TIRE C0DE)-4

Code No.

WE .

WF

WH

WJ

WK

WL

WM

WN„

WP..

WT_.

WU„

WV..

WW..

WX..

WY

Wl._

W2..

W3..

W4._
W5..

W6„,

W7..

W8_

W9.

XA.

XB

XC

XD

XE_

New Tire Manufacturers

Withdrawn.

The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Spain).
The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Sweden).
The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Australia).
Pennsylvania Tire & Rubber Company

of \fississippi.
The Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.
Olympic Tire & Rubber Co. Pty., Ltd.

(Australia).
Olympic Tire & Rubber Co Pty., Ltd.

(Australia).
Schenuit Industries, Inc.
Madras Rubber Factory, Ltd. (India).
Not Assigned.
Not Assigned.
Not Assigned.
Not Assigned.
Not Assigned.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., P.O. Box 1000, La

Vergne, Tennessee 37086.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Wilson, N. Carolina

27893.
Vredestein Doetinchem B.V., Doetinchem, The

Netherlands (B.F. Goodrich).
Dunlop Tyres. Somerton, Victoria, Australia.
Firestone Argentina SAIC, Antartida, Argentina,

2715 Llavollol, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., P.O. Box 1355,

Commerce Center, Makati, Risal, Philippines.
Firestone Portuguesa S.A.R.L., Apartado 3, Alco-

chete, Portugd.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. Ltd., P.O. Box Pra-

kanong 11/118. Bangkok, Thailand.
Industrie De Pneumaticos Firestone S.A., Caixa

Postal 2505, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil.
Pirelli Tire Corp. (Italy).
Pirelli Tire Corp. (Italy).
Pirelli Tire Corp. (Italy)
Pirelli Tire Corp. (Italy),
Pirelli Tire Corp. (Italy).

Code No. New Tire Manufacturers

XF _ Pirelli Tire Corp. (Spain).

XH Pirelli Tire Corp. (Greece).

XJ Pirelli Tire Corp. (Turkey).

XK Pirelli Tire Corp. (Brazil).

XL Pirelli Tire Corp. (Brazil).

XM _ Pirelli Tire Corp. (Argentina).

XN Pirelli Tire Corp. (England).

XP Pirelli Tire Corp. (England).

XT VeithPirelli A.G. (Germany).

XI Tong Shin Chemical Products, Co. Inc., Seoul,

Korea.
X2 Hwa Fong Rubber Ind. Co. Ltd., 45 Futsen Road,

Yuanlin, Taiwan.
X3 ___ Belotserkovsky Tire Plant, Belaya Tserkov,

256414, U.S.S.R.

X4 Pars Tyre Co., (Pirelli), Saveh, Iran.

X5 .JK Industries Ltd., Kankroli, Udaipur District,

Rajasthan. India.
X6 . Bobruvsky Tire Plant. Bobruysk 213824 L'.S.S.R.

XT Chimkentsky Tire Plant, Chimkent 486025 U.S.S.R.

X8 _ _ Dnepropetrovsky Tire Plant, Dnepropetrovsk

320033 U.S.S.R.
X9 .. Moscovsky Tire Plant, Moscow 109088 U.S.S.R.

XO Nizhnekamsky Tire Plant, Nishnekamsk 423510

U.S.S.R.
Yl Companhia (Joodyear DoBrasil, KM-128 Ameri-
cana, Sao Paulo, Brasil.

Y2 Dayton Tire Co., Wilson, N. Carolina 27893.

Y3 Seiberling Tire & Rubber Co., WUson, N. Carolina

27893.
Y4 Davton Tire & Rubber Co., 345- 15th St. S.W..

Barberton, Ohio (Firestone).
Y5 Tsentai Rubber Factory, 27 Chung Shan Rd., E.I.

Shanghai, China.
Y6 I.T. International Sdn. Bhd., P.O. Box 100 Alor

Setar Kedah, Malaysia.
Y7 Bridgestone Tire Co., (MS. A.) Ltd.. 1-24 Waldron

Dr., La Vergne, Tenn.
IY8 Bombay Tyres International Limited, Hay Bunder

Road, Bombay, Maharashtra, India 400" 0331

(Rev. 1/16/85)

PART 574; (TIRE C0DE)-5

Miscellaneous New Tire Manufacturers Transactions
As Reported to NHTSA

Manufacturer
Armstrong Rubber Company
Bridgestone Tire Company
Ceat, S.p.a.
Cooper Tire & Rubber Company

Dayton Tire & Rubber Company

Dunlop Olympic Tyres

Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp.
ditto
ditto

Firestone Tire & Rubber
ditto

General Tire & Rubber Company

B.F. Goodrich Company

ditto
ditto
ditto
ditto

Nitto Tire Company, Ltd.

Olympic Tire & Rubber Co., Pty., Ltd.
ditto

Pennsylvania Tire & Rubber of Mississippi

Pirelli Tire Corporation

Ryoto Tire Company

SAMYAND Tire, Inc.
UNIROYAL, Inc.

Viskafors Gummifabrik AB

Code
CE
LH
HU

U9

DC

DT, DU, WM, W4

DF, DH, DJ, DP, WN

DT, DU, WM, W4

DC

DC
VV

LV

BJ
BK
BM
BN
BP

N3

WM, W4

WN

WK

HU
N3

xu

LH

VV

Remark
Plant closed 4/3/81

Purchased from UNIROYAL as of 6/13/82
Sold to Pirelli Tire Corp. in May 1984

Purchased from Pennsylvania Tire & Rubber on

1/24/84

Purchased from Dunlop on 11/1/75

Merger of Dunlop and Olympic on 4/29/81

Plants closed

Plants sold to Dunlop Olympic on 4/29/81

Plant sold to Firestone T&R on 11/1/75

Purchased from Dunlop T&R on 11/1/75

Plant sold to Viskafors Gummifabrik in April 1980

Purchased from Mansfield-Denman on 1 1/30/78

Plant sold 12/79

Plant sold 1/80

Plant sold to Olympic in 7/75

Plant sold 8/81

Plant sold 5/78

Plant sold to Ryoto Tire Co., Ltd. on 1/23/80

Sold to Dunlop Olympic on 4/29/81
Plant closed in 1978

Plant sold to Cooper T&R on 1/24/84

Plant purchased from Ceat, S.p.a. in May 1984

Plant purchased from Nitto Tire Company on
1/23/80

Plant closed in 1976

Plant sold to Bridgestone Tire Company on
6/13/82

Plant purchased from Firestone T&R in April
1980

PART 574; (TIRE C0DE)-6

TABLE 3. TIRE SIZE CODES

Tire Size Tire Size

Code Designation '

AA 4.00-4

AB 3.50-4

AC 3.00-5

AD 4.00-5

AE 3.50-5

AF 6.90-6

AH 3.00-8

AJ 3.50-6

AK 4.10-6

AL 4.50-6

AM 5.30-6

AN 6.00-6

AP 3.25-8

AT 3.50-8

AU 3.00-7

AV 4.00-7

AW 4.80-7

AX 5.30-7

AY 5.00-8

Al H60-14

A2 4.00-8

A3 4.80-8

A4 5.70-8

A5 16.5X6.5-8

A6 18.5X8.5-8

A7__ CR70-14

A8 2.75-9

A9 4.80-9

BA 6.00-9

BB 6.90-9

BC 3.50-9

BD „_ 4.00-10

BE 3.00-10

BF 3.50-10.

BH „ 5.20-10

BJ 5.20 R 10

BK 5.9-10

BL 5.90-10

BM 6.50-10

BN 7.00-10

BP 7.50-10

BT 9.00-10

BU 20.5 X 8.0-10

BV 145-10

BW 145 RIO

BX 145-10/5.95-10

BY 4.50-10 LT Si

Bl 5.00-10 LT

B2 3.00-12

B3 4.00-12

B4 4.50-12

B5 4.80-12

B6 5.00-12

Tire Size Tire Size

Code Designation '

B7 5.00 R 12

B8 5.20-12

B9 5.20-12 LT

CA 5.20 R 12

CB 5.30-12

CC 5.50-12

CD 5.50-12 LT

CE 5.50 R 12

CF 5.60-12

CH 5.60-12 LT

CJ 5.60 R 12

CK 5.9-12

CL 5.90-12

CM 6.00-12

CN 6.00-12 LT

CP 6.2-12

CT 6.20-12

CU 6.90-12

CV 23.5 X 8.5-12

CW 125-12

CX 125 R 12

CY 125-12/5.35-12

CI 135-12

C2 135 R 12

C3 135-12/5.65-12

C4 145-12

C5 145 R 12

C6 145-12/5.95-12

C7 155-12

C8 155 R 12

C9 155-12/6.15-12

DA 4.80-10

DB 3.25-12

DC 3.50-12

DD 4.50-12 LT

DE 5.00-12 LT

DF 7.00-12

DH 5.00-13

DJ 5.00-13 LT

DK 5.00 R 13

DL 5.20-13

DM 5.20 R 13

DN 5.50-13

DP 5.50-13 LT

DT 5.50 R 13

DU 5.60-13

DV 5.60-13 LT

DW 5.60 R 13

DX 5.90-13

DY 5.90-13 LT

Dl 5.90 R 13

D2 6.00-13

D3 6.00-13 LT

Tire Size Tire Size

Code Designation '

D4 6.00 R 13

D5 6.2-13

D6 6.20-13

D7 6.40-13

D8 6.40-13 LT

D9 6.40 R 13

EA 6.50-13

EB 6.50-13 LT

EC 6.50-13 ST

ED 6.50 R 13

EE 6.70-13

EF 6.70-13 LT

EH 6.70 R 13

EJ 6.9-13

EK 6.90-13

EL 7.00-13

EM 7.00-13 LT

EN 7.00 R 13

EP 7.25-13

ET 7.25 R 13

EU 7.50-13

EV 135-13

EW 135 R 13

EX 135-13/5.65-13

EY 145-13

El 145 R 13

E2 145-13/5.95-13

E3 150 R 13

E4 155-13

E5 155 R 13

E6 155-13/6.15-13

E7 160 R 13

E8 165-13

E9 165 R 13

FA 165-13/6.45-13

FB 165/70 R 13

FC 170 R 13

FD 175-13

FE 175 R 13

FF 175-13/6.95-13

FH 175/70 R 13

FJ 185-13

FK 185 R 13

FL 185-13/7.35-13

FM 185/70 R 13

FN 195-13

FP 195 R 13

FT 195/70 R 13

FU D70-13

FV B78-13

FW BR78-13

FX C78-13

FY 7.50-12

' The letters "H", "S", and "V" may be included in the tire size designation at^jacent to or in place of a dash
without affecting the size code for the designation.

' As used in this table the letters at the end of the tire size indicate the following: LT— Light Truck, ML—
Mining & Logging, MH— Mobile Home, ST— Special Trailer.

PART 574; (TIRE C0DE)-7

TABLE 2. TIRE SIZE COOES-Continued

Tire Size Tire Size
Code Designation '

Fl 140 R 12

F2 6.5-13

F3 185/60 R 13

F4 A70-13

F5 A78-13

F6 CR78-13

F7 2.25-14

F8 2.75-14

F9 3.00-14

HA 6.70-14 LT

HB 165-14 LT

HC 2.50-14

HD 5.00-14 LT

HE 5.20-14

HF 5.20 R 14

HH 5.50-14 LT

HJ 5.60-14

HK 5.90-14

HL 5.90-14 LT

HM 5.90 R 14

HN 6.00-14

HP 6.00-14 LT

HT 6.40-14

HU 6.40-14 LT

HV 6.45-14

HW 6.50-14

HX 6.50-14 LT

HY 6.70-14

HI 6.95-14

H2 7.00-14

H3 7.00-14 LT

H4 7.00 R 14

H5 7.35-14

H6 7.50-14

H7 7.50-14 LT

H8 7.50 R 14

H9 7.75-14

JA 7.75-14 ST

JB 8.00-14

JC 8.25-14

JD 8.50-14

JE 8.55-14

JF 8.85-14

JH 9.00-14

JJ 9.50-14

JK 135-14

JL 135 R 14

JM 135-14/5.65-14

JN 145-14

JP 145 R 14

JT 145-14/5.95-14

JU 155-14

JV 155 R 14

JW 155-14/6.15-14

JX 155/70 R 14

JY 165-14

Jl 165 R 14

J2 175-14

Tire Size Tire Size

Code Designation '

J3 175 R 14

J4 185-14

J5 185 R 14

J6 185/70 R 14

J7 195-14

J8 195 R 14

J9 195/70 R 14

KA 205-14

KB 205 R 14

KC 215-14

KD 215 R 14

KE 225-14

KF 225 R 14

KH 620 R 14

KJ 690 R 14

KK AR78-13

KL 195-14 LT

KM 185-14 LT

KN A80-22.5

KP B80-22.5

KT C80-22.5

KU D80-22.5

KV E80-22.5

KW F60-14

KX C60-14

KY J60-14

Kl L60-14

K2 F80-22.5

K3 G80-22.5

K4 H80-22.5

K5 J80-22.5

K6 A80-24.5

K7 B80-24.5

K8 BR78-14

K9 D70-14

LA DR70-14

LB E70-14

LC ER70-14

LD F70-14

LE FR70-14

LF G70-14

LH GR70-14

LJ H70-14

LK HR70-14

LL J70-14

LM JR70-14

LN L70-14

LP LR70-14

LT C80-24.5

LU D80-24.5

LV E80-24.5

LW F80-24.5

LX 077-14

LY B78-14

LI C78-14

L2 CR78-14

L3 D78-14

L4 DR78-14

Tire Size Tire Size

Code Designation •

L5 E78-14

L6 ER78-14

L7 F78-14

L8 FR78-14

L9 G78-14

MA GR78-14

MB H78-14

MC HR78-14

MD J78-14

ME JR78-14

MF 205-14 LT

MH G80-24.5

MJ H80-24.5

MK 7-14.5

ML 8-14.5

MM 9-14.5

MN 6.60 R 15

MP 2.00-15

MT 2.25-15

MU 2.50-15

MV 3.00-15

MW 3.25-15

MX 5.0-15

MY 5.20-15

Ml 5.5-15

M2 5.50-15 L

M3 5.50-15 LT

M4 5.60-15

M5 5.60 R 15

M6 5.90-15

M7 5.90-15 LT

M8 6.00-15

M9 6.00-15 L

NA 6.00-15 LT

NB 6.2-15

NC 6.40-15

ND 6.40-15 LT

NE 6.40 R 15

NF 6.50-15

NH 6.50-15 L

NJ 6.50-15 LT

NK 6.70-15

NL 6.70-15 LT

NM 6.70 R 15

NN 6.85-15

NP 6.9-15

NT 7.00-15

NU 7.00-15 L

NV 7.00-15 LT

NW 7.10-15

NX 7.10-15 LT

NY 7.35-15

Nl 7.50-15

N2 7.60-15

N3 7.60 R 15

N4 7.75-15

N5 7.75-15 ST

N6 8.00-15

PART 574; (TIRE C0DE)-8

TABLE 3. TIRE SIZE CODES— Continued

Tire Size Tire Size

Code Designation '

N7 8.15-15

N8 8.20-15

N9 8.25-15

PA 8.25-15 LT

PB 8.45-15

PC 8.55-15

PD 8.85-15

PE 8.90-15

PF 9.00-15

PH 9.00-15 LT

PJ 9.15-15

PK 10-15

PL 10.00-15

PM 7.50-15 LT

PN 7.00-15 TR

PP 8.25-15 TR

PT 9.00-15 TR

PU 7.50-15 TR

PV 125-15

PW 125 R 15

PX 125-15/5.35-15

PY 135-15

PI 135 R 15

P2 135-15/5.65-15

P3 145-15

P4 145 R 15

P6 145-15/5.95-15

P6 155-16

P7 155 R 15

P8 155-15/6.35-15

P9 165-15

TA 165-15 LT

TB 165 R 15

TC 175-15

ID 175 R 15

TE 175-15/7.15-15

TF 175/70 R 15

TO 180-15

TJ 185-15

TK 185 R 15'

TL 185/70 R 15

TM 195-15

TN 195 R 15

TP 205-15

TT 205 R 15

TU 215-15

TV 215 R 15

TW 226-15

TX 225 R 15

TY 235-15

Tl 235 R 15

T2 J80-24.5

T8 ER60-15

T4 D78-13

T6 A78-15

T6 DR70-13

T7 HR60-15

T8 E60-14

Tire Size Tire Size
Code Designation '

T9 205/70 R 14

UA 215/70 R 14

UB H60-15

UC E60-15

UD F60-15

UE FR60-15

UF G60-15

UH GR60-15

UJ J60-15

UK L60-16

UL 4.60-15

UM 2.75-15

UN 2.50-9

UP 2.50-10

UT 5.00-9

UU 6.7-10

UV C70-15

UW D70-15

UX DR70-15

UY E70-15

Ul ER70-16

U2 F70-15

U3 FR70-15

U4 G70-15

U5 GR70-15

U6 H70-15

U7 HR70-15

U8 J70-15

U9 JR70-15

VA K70-15

VB KR70-15

VC L70-15

VD LR70-15

VE _.. 17-400 TR

VF 185-300 TR

VH 185-300 LT

VJ AR78-15

VK BR78-15

VL C78-15

VM D78-15

VN E78-15

VP ER78-15

VT F78-16

VU FR78-15

VV 078-15

VW GR78-15

VX H78-15

VY HR78-15

VI J78-16

V2 JR78-15

V3 L78-15

V4 LR78-15

V6 N78-16

V6 17-15 (17-380 LT)

V7 17-400 LT

V8 11-15

V9 11-16

WA L84-15

Tire Size Tire Size
Code Designation '

WB 11.00-15

WC 2.25-16

WD 2.50-16

WE 3.00-16

WF 3.25-16

WH 3.50-16

WJ 5.00-16

WK 5.10-16

WL 5.50-16 LT

WM 6.00-16

WN 6.00-16 LT

WP 6.50-16

WT 6.50-16 LT

WU 6.70-16

WV 7.00-16

WW 7.00-16 LT

WX 7.50-16

WY 7.50-16 LT

Wl 8.25-16

W2 9.00-16

W3 10-16

W4 8.25-16 LT

W5 9.00-16 LT

W6 11.00-16

W7 19-400 C

W8 165-400

W9 235-16

XA._. 185-16

XB 19-400 LT

XC G45C-16

XD E50C-16

XE F50C-16

XF 7.00-16 TR

XH 7.50-16 TR

XJ 8.00-16.5

XK 8.75-16.5

XL 9.50-16.5

XM 10-16.5

XN 12-16.5

XP 185 R 16

XT 4.60-17

XU 2.00-17

XV 2.25-17

XW 2.50-17

XX 2.76-17

XY 3.00-17

XI 3.25-17

X2 3.50-17

X3 6.50-17

X4 6.50-17 LT

X5 7.00-17

X6 7.50-17

X7 8.26-17

X8 7.60-17 LT

X9 225/70 R 14

YA G60C-17

YB H60C-17

YC 195/70 R 15

PART 574; (TIRE C0DE)-9

TABLE 3. TIRE SIZE CODES— Continued

Tire Size Tire Size

Code Designation '

YD 4.20-18

YE 8-17.5 LT

YF 11-17.5

YH 7-17.5

YJ 8-17.5

YK 8.5-17.5

YL 9.5-17.5

YM 10-17.5

YN 14-17.5

YP 9-17.5

YT 205/70 R 15

YU 2.25-18

YV 2.50-18

YW 2.75-18

YX 3.00-18

YY 3.25-18

Yl 3.50-18

Y2 4.00-18

Y3 4.50-18

Y4 6.00-18

Y5 7.00-18

Y6 7.50-18

Y7 8.25-18

Y8 9.00-18

Y9 10.00-18

lA 11.00-18

IB 6.00-18 LT

IC 6.00-20 LT

ID L50C-18

IE 7.00-18 LT

IF 12-19.5

IH 2.00-19

IJ 2.25-19

IK 2.50-19

IL 2.75-19

IM 3.00-19

IN 3.25-19

IP 3.50-19

IT 4.00-19

lU 11.00-19

IV 9.5-19.5

IW 10-19.5

IX 11-19.5

lY 7-19.5

11 7.5-19.5

12 8-19.5

13 9-19.5

14 14-19.5

15 15-19.5

16 16.5-19.5

17 18-19.5

18 19.5-19.5

19 6.00-20

2A 6.50-20

2B 7.00-20

2C 7.50-20

2D 8.25-20

2E 8.5-20

Tire Size Tire Size

Code Designation '

2F 9.00-20

2H 9.4-20

2J 10.00-20

2K 10.3-20

2L 11.00-20

2M 11.1-20

2N 11.50-20

2? 11.9-20

2T 12.00-20

2U 12.5-20

2V 13.00-20

2W 14.00-20

2X 6.50-20 LT

2Y 7.00-20 LT

21 13/80-20

22 14/80-20

23 2.75-21

24 3.00-21

25 2.50-21

26 2.75-20

27 10.00-22

28 11.00-22

29 11.1-22

3A 11.9-22

3B 12.00-22

3C 14.00-22

3D 11.50-22

3E 4.10-18

3F 4.10-19

3H 7-22.5

3J 8-22.5

3K 8.5-22.5

3L 9-22.5

3M 9.4-22.5

3N 10-22.5

3? 10.3-22.5

3T 11-22.5

3U 11.1-22.5

3V 11.5-22.5

3W 11.9-22.5

3X 12-22.5

3Y 12.5-22.5

31 15-22.5

32 16.5-22.5

33 18-22.5

34 215/70 R 15

35 225/70 R 15

36 185/60 R 13

38 9.00-24

38 10.00-24

39 11.00-24

4A 12.00-24

4B 14.00-24

4C 3.50-7

4D 3.00-4

4E 12.5-24.5

4F 11-24.5

4H 12-24.5

Tire Size Tire Size

Code Designation '

4J 13.5-24.5

4K 7.00-20 ML

4L 7.50-20 ML

4M 8.25-20 ML

4N 9.00-20 ML

4P 10.00-20 ML

4T 10.00-22 ML

4U 10.00-24 ML

4V 11.00-20 ML

4W 11.00-22 ML

4X 11.00-24 ML

4Y 11.00-25 ML

41 12.00-20 ML

42 12.00-21 ML

43 12.00-24 ML

44 12.00-25 ML

45 13.00-20 ML

46 13.00-24 ML

47 13,00-25 ML

48 14.00-20 ML

49 14.00-21 ML

5A 14.00-24 ML

5B 14.00-25 ML

5C 10.3-20 ML

5D 11.1-20 ML

5E 12.5-20 ML

5F 9-22.5 ML

5H 9.4-22.5 ML

5J 10-22.5 ML

5K 10.3-22.5 ML

5L 11-22.5 ML

5M 11-24.5 ML

5N 14-17.5 ML

5P 15-19.5 ML

5T 15-22.5 ML

5U 16.5-19.5 ML

5V 16.5-22.5 ML

5W 18-19.5 ML

5X 18-22.5 ML

5Y 19.5-19.5 ML

51 23-23.5 ML

52 18-21 ML

53 19.5-21 ML

54 23-21 ML

55 6.00-13 ST

56 7.35-14 ST

57 8.25-14 ST

58 7.35-15 ST

59 8.25-15 ST

6A 12.00-22 ML

6B 4.30-18

6C 3.60-19

6D 3.00-20

6E 4.25-18

6F MP90-18

6H 3.75-19

6J MM90-19

6K 3.25-7

PART 574; (TIRE CODE)-10

TABLE 3. TIRE SIZE CODES-Contlnued

Tire Size Tire Size
Code Designation '

6L 2.75-16

6M 4.00-16

6N 7.9

6P 25X7.50-15

6T 27X8.50-15

6U 27X9.50-15

6V 29X12.00-15

6W 31X 13.50-15

6X SIX 15.50-15

BY C70-14

61 Not Assigned

62 Not Assigned

63 Not Assigned

64 Not Assigned

65 Not Assigned

66 3.40-5

67 4.10-4

68 4.10-5

69 175-14 LT

7A 11-14

7B E78-14 LT

7C G78-15LT

7D H78-15LT

7E 180 R 15

7F 185-16 LT

7H 205-16 LT

7J 215-16 LT

7K F78-16LT

7L H78-16LT

7M L78-16LT

7N 135 RIO

7P 6.95-14 LT

7T 7-14.5 MH

7U 8-14.5 MH

7V 9-14.5 MH

7W 4.25/85-18

7X A78-14

7Y 7.50-18 MPT

71 10.5-18 MPT

72 12.5-18 MPT

73 12.5-20 MPT

74 14.5-20 MPT

75 10.5-20 MPT

76 10.5-20

77 8.25-10

78 150 R 12

79 150 R 14

8A iy«-19

8B iy.-i9y«

8C 2-12

8D 2-16

8E 2-17

8F 2-17 R

8H 2-18

8J 2-19

8K 2-19 R

8L 2-19y4

8M 2-22

Tire Size Tire Size
Code Designation '

8N 2-22J4

8P 2y.-15

8T 2y4-16

8U 2y,-17

8V 2^4-18

8W 2%-19

8X 2y,-19R

8Y 2>i-20

81 2^-8

82 2^-9

83 2)4-16

84 2)4-17

85 2)4-18

86 2)4-19

87 2)4-19 R

88 2y4-9

89 2y4-16

9A 2y4-17

9B 2y4-17R

9C 3-10

9D 3-12

9E 21x4

9F 22x4)4

9H 15.50-20

9J 18.50-20

9K 19.50-20

9L 2/4-14

9M 2)4-20

9N 2y4-16R

9P 2y4-18

9T 10-20

9U 11-24

9V 11.25-24

9W 15x4)4-8

9X 14.75/80-20

9Y 23x5

91 25x6

92 15x4)4-8

93 18x7-8

94 21 X 8-9

95 23x9-10

96 27 X 10-12

97 2.00-15 TR

98 2.50-15 TR

99 3.00-15 TR

OA GR60-14

OB 560 X 165-11

OC 680 X 180-15

OD 8.55-15 ST

OE 3.50-14

OF 3.25-14

OH 3.50-15

OJ AR70-13

OK B60-13

OL 245/60 R 14

OM 255/60 R 15

ON 2y4-15

OP 2.60-20

Tire Size Tire Size
Code Designation '

OT Not Assigned

OU BR60-13

OV 15.00-20

OW 16.00-20

OX 12/80-20

OY 14/80-24

01 15.5/80-20

02 13-22.5

03 21-22.5

04 9/70-22.5

05 10/70-22.5

06 11/70-22.5

07 12/70-22.5

08 13/70-22.5

09 7.25/75-17.5

10 8.00/75-17.5

20 8.75/75-17.5

30 9.50/75-17.5

40 7.25/75-16.5

50 8.00/75-16.5

60 8.75/75-16.5

70 9.50/75-16.5

80 6.70-14 C

90 7-17.5 C

RA 125-12 C

RB 125-13 C

RC 125-14 C

RD 125-15 C

RE 135-12 C

RF 135-13 C

RH 135-14 C

RJ 135-15 C

RK 145-10 C

RL 145-12 C

RM 145-13 C

RN 145-14 C

RP 145-15 C

RT 155-12 C

RU 155-13 C

RV 155-14 C

RW 155-15 C

RX A60-13

RY C60-15

Rl 155-16 C

R2 165-13 C

R3 165-16 C

R4 175-13 C

R5 175-15 C

R6 175-16 C

R7 185-13 C

R8 185-15 C

R9 195-15 C

AO 195-16 C

BO 205-15 C

CO 215-14 C

DO 215-15 C

EO 225-14 C

FO 225-15 C

PART 574; (TIRE C0DE)-11

TABLE 3. TIRE SIZE CODES— Continued

Tire Size Tire Size
Code Designation '

HO 225-16 C

JO 235-14 C

KO 235-15 C

LO 235-16 C

MO 21-400 C

NO 3.50-20

PO 3.75-15

TO 3.60-18

-UUO 3.00-10 C

VO 4.00-10 C

WO 4.00-8 C

. XO 4.50-8 C

: IyO 265/60 R 14

AR 215/60 R 15

Tire Size Tire Size

Code Designation '

BR LR60-15

CR ER60-15

DR D60-13

ER C60-13

FR D60-14

HR. 175/70 R 14

JR MN90-18

KR MR90-18

LR 4.25-19

MR 230-15

NR 5.4-10

PR ER60-13

TR FR60-14

UR C60C-15

Tire Size Tire Size
Code Designation '

VR 13/80-24

WR 175-16 C

XR 195-16 C

YR BR70-13

IR 185-15 LT

2R 13-22.5 ML

3R MR70-15

4R E60-26.5

5R 6.7-12

6R 5.4-14

7R 7.4-14

8R 5.4-16

9R 4.60-18

36 F.R. 7539
April 21, 1971

PART 574; (TIRE C0DE)-12

Effactiva: January 1, 1970

PREAMBLE TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION
Action on Petitions for Reconsideration — Amendment

Regulations requiring manufacturers of pas-
senger cars and motorcycles to provide informa-
tion on vehicle stopping distance (§ 375.101), tire
reserve load (§375.102), and acceleration and
passing ability (§375.106) were issued by the
Federal Highway Administrator and published
in the Federal Register on January 25, 1969 (34
F.R. 1246). Several petitions for reconsideration
of these regulations were received. In response
to these petitions, and in order to clarify and
simplify the requirements and the information
to be provided to purchasers, these regulations
are hereby amended and reissued in the form set
forth below.

1375.101 V ehicle stopping distance. This sec-
tion required that manufacturers state the tire
size, type and size of brakes, method of brake
actuation and auxiliary brake equipment, and
maximum loaded and lightly loaded vehicle
weights. The effect of stating these requirements
was to greatly restrict the grouping of vehicles
and options that was permitted for the pur-
poses of furnishing information. It has been de-
termined that in order to reduce the required
number of different information documents, man-
ufacturers should be permitted to group vehicles
at their discretion, as long as each vehicle in the
group can meet or exceed the performance levels
indicated, and the vehicles in each group are
identified in the terms by which they are nor-
mally described to the public. The requirement
for specific descriptive information is therefore
deleted.

Since the information must be valid for all
vehicles in the group to which it applies, the re-
quirement that it refer to the smallest tire size
offered has been found unnecessary, and deleted.
It has also been determined that variations in
stopping distances between different vehicles at
30 mph are not as meaningful for comparison

purposes as those at 60 mph, and therefore in-
formation is required only for the latter speed.

It should be noted that the regulations estab-
lish the conditions under which the performance
level represented by the information provided
can be met or exceeded by every vehicle to which
the information applies. They do not establish
the procedures by which manufacturers should
generate the information, although those pro-
cedures are to be inferred from the regulations.
For example, both sections contain the condi-
tion that wind velocity is zero. This does not
mean that manufacturers' tests must be con-
ducted under still air conditions; it means that
the performance level establishexi must be attain-
able by all vehicles in the group under those
conditions. One obvious method of satisfying the
condition from the manufacturer's standpoint is
to conduct verification tests under adverse wind
conditions (tailwind for braking, headwind for
acceleration). As another example, the condition
that ambient temperature be between 32°F and
100°F means that the information presented must
be attainable by all vehicles in the group at all
temperatures within that range (when other con-
ditions are as stated).

I'he amended section requires that stopping
distances be those attainable without lock-up on
any wheel. This condition is the most mean-
ingful from a safety standpoint, since steering
control tends to be lost when wheels are locked.
Several petitioners submitted data showing min-
imal differences in maximum and lightly loaded
vehicle weight stopping distances to support
their request for substitution of a single test
weight. Their results, however, were apparently
derived from tests conducted with locked wheels,
under which conditions stopping distance be-
comes a function largely of vehicle velocity and
the friction coefficient between the tire and the

PART 575— PRE 1

Efftttiv*: January 1, 1970

road, and has no relationship to vehicle weight.
It is believed that the condition of no wheel
lock-up will result in data showing meaningful
difTerences in stopping distances test weights.
Accordingly, the requirement of information cov-
ering these two vehicle weight conditions is re-
tained, and petitions on this point are denied.

The section as issued required performance in-
formation for a partially failed service brake
subsystem ("emergency brake system") only at
maximum loaded vehicle weight. It has been de-
termined that in some cases the most adverse
condition may occur at lighter loads. The
amended rule therefore requires information for
"the most adverse combination of maximum or
lightly loaded vehicle weight and complete loss
of braking in one or the other of the vehicle
brake subsystems."

Several petitioners suggested that information
be limited to one test weight, instead of requiring
it for both lightly loaded and maximum loaded
vehicle weight. It has been determined, how-
ever, that information on both conditions may
reveal vehicles having superior brake balance, and
the advantage of anti-skid or load proportioning
devices, and also aid purchasers who travel mainly
in one or the other of the loading conditions. The
petitions to that effect are therefore denied.

§ 375.102 Tire reverse load. The section re-
quired that manufacturers state the number of
passengers and the cargo and luggage weight
for two different loading conditions, and the ac-
tual vehicle weight within a range of no more
than 100 pounds under those conditions. These
requirements restricted the grouping of vehicles
and options that was permitted for the purposes
of furnishing information. It has been deter-
mined that in order to reduce the required num-
ber of different information documents, manu-
facturers should be permitted to group vehicles
by recommended tire size designations regard-
less of weight, as long as the reserve load figure
is met or exceeded by every vehicle in the group.
The requirements for providing weight and load-
ing information are therefore deleted.

Section 375.102 as issued required that reverse
load figures be provided for the vehicle at nor-
mal vehicle weight (2 or 3 persons and no lug-
gage )as well as maximum loaded vehicle weight.
It also required the furnishing of a "tire over-

load percentage", the percentage difference be-
tween the load rating of a tire at recommended
inflation pressures for normal vehicle weight
and the load on the tire at maximum loaded
vehicle weight. Several petitions suggested that
the providing of these various percentage figures
would tend to confuse persons to whom the in-
formation is furnished, and therefore decrease
its usefulness to the consumer. Representatives
of consumer groups have also suggested, in earlier
proceedings concerning the consumer information
regulations, that for maximum usability the in-
formation should be as simple and clear as pos-
sible. In light of these considerations, it has
been determined that the tire reserve load figure
provided should be limited to a single percentage
for each recommended tire size designation, at
maximum loaded vehicle weight and the manu-
facturer's recommended inflation pressure. The
requirements for tire reserve load at normal ve-
hicle weight and for tire overload percentage ac-
cordingly are deleted.

Two further changes in the calculation methods
have been made for simplicity and clarity. In-
stead of using the actual load on each wheel as
the basis for calculation, the wheel load figure is
changed to one-half of each axle's share of the
maximum loaded vehicle weight. This reflects
the method used in Standard No. 110 for de-
termining the vehicle maximum load on the tire.
Also, the denominator of the fraction repre-
senting the tire reserve load percentage is changed
from the load on the wheel to the load rating of
the tire. A tire with a load rating of 1500
pounds, for example, used with a wheel load of
900 pounds, would have a reserve load percentage
of 40% (600/1500 X 100) rather than 66%%
(600/900 X 100). The former figure has been
determined to be someAvhat more meaningful in
cases of large reserve loads.

§ 375.106 Acceleration and passing ability.
The section as issued required that times be pro-
vided for acceleration from 20 to 35 mph and
from 50 to 80 mph, and times and distances for
prescribed passing maneuvers involving two lane
changes. On the basis of petitions submitted,
and further consideration of the need for sim-
plicity and clarity in the information presented,
it has been determined that the most useful in-
formation would be in the form of passing dis-

PART 575— PRE 2

Ifftdtv*: January 1, 1970

tances nnd times for a simple straight-line pass-
ing maneuver at low and high speeds. In order
to eliminate the difficulties of conducting a uni-
form passing maneuver involving a long pace
vehicle and a limiting of the passing speed pre-
cisely to a specified level, the information re-
quired is to be derived on the basis of a time-
distance plot of vehicle performance at maximum
acceleration from 20 to 35 and 50 to 80 miles per
hour.

For reasons discussed above in regard to section
375.101, the requirement of providing the weight
of the vehicle is deleted from this section.

Because the amended section does not require
information relating to an actual passing maneu-
ver, but only that based on two straight-line
acceleration maneuvers with a simple graphic
computation, the exception of manufacturers of
500 or fewer vehicles annually from certain of the
requirements is removed from this section.

Several petitioners contended that the re-
quirement that information be provided under
the condition of full-power operation of a vehicle
air conditioner would lead to variable, non-
repeatable results. This may be true of the re-
sults achieved in manufacturers' tests. The in-
formation presented is not, however, to be simply
the results of manufacturers' tests, but rather a
minimum level of performance that can be met
or exceeded by every vehicle to which the in-
formation applies. Manufacturers are free, there-
fore, to adjust the data to account for any varia-
tion in results that might be encountered. The
degradation of acceleration ability by the use of
an air conditioner may be significant in some
cases, and therefore it is important from the
standpoint of safety that it be reflected in the in-
formation provided. The petitions to the con-
trary are accordingly denied.

Some petitioners objected to the required use of
a correction factor to ambient conditions in ac-
cordance with SAE Standard J816a, pointing out
that the factor was designed to be applicable ex-
clusively to engine dynamometer testing and not
to road testing of vehicles. The contention has

been found to have merit. In the section as
amended, ranges of ambient conditions of tem-
perature, dry barometric pressure, and relative
humidity are provided, and the information is
required to be valid at all points within those
ranges.

In addition to the above, a new paragraph (c),
containing specific definitions, is added to section
375.2. Definitions.

In order to allow adequate time for manufac-
turers to prepare the information, the three sec-
tions are effective for vehicles manufactured on
or after January 1, 1970.

In consideration of the above, 49 CFR
§§ 375.101, 375.102, and 375.106 are amended, and
a new paragraph (c) is added to § 375.2, to read
as set forth below. This notice of action on
petitions for reconsideration is issued under the
authority of sections 112 and 119 of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C.
1401. 1407) and the delegation of authority by
the Secretary of Transportation to the Federal
Highway Administrator. 49 CFR 1.4(c).

Issued : May 19, 1969.

F. C. Turner

Federal Highway Administrator

S*c.

375.1

375.2

375.3

375.4

375.5

375.6

SUBPART A— GENERAL

Scop*.

Definitions.

Matter Incorporated by reference.

Applicability.

Separability.

Requirements.

SUBPART B— CONSUMER INFORMATION ITEMS

375.101 Vehicle Stopping Distance.

375.102 Tire reserve load.

375.103 Reserved.

375.104 Reserved.

375.105 Reserved.

365.106 Acceleration and passing ability.

May 23, 1969
34 F.R. 8112

PART 675— PRE 3-4

iff*<tlv*: Januonr 1, 1970

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

Amended regulations concerning the furnishing
of consumer information for motor vehicles, 49
CFR §§ 375.101, 102, 106, were published in the
Federal Register of May 23, 1969 (34 F.R. 8112).
Sections 375.101, Vehicle Stopping Distance, and
375.106, Acceleration and Passing Ability, in sub-
sections (d)(7) and (d)(1) (vii) respectively,
specified that the information provided shall be
valid for road surfaces with a skid number of
70, as measured in accordance with American
Society for Testing and Materials Method E-274
at 40 miles per hour, omitting water delivery as
specified in paragraph 7.1 of that Method.

Several petitions for reconsideration have been
received, requesting that the skid number condi-
tion be set at higher level because there are only
a limited number of test tracks presently with
surfaces of that low a skid number. It is recog-
nized that the level of 70 may be somewhat lower
than many existing test track and road surfaces.
It has been determined, in light of the petitions
received, that the skid number condition can be
set at a somewhat higher level without detracting
from the value of the information provided or
the enforceability of the regulations. Accord-
ingly, the figure "70" in sections 375.101(d)(7)
and 375.106(d)(1) (vii) is hereby changed to
"75".

One petitioner requested a delay in the effec-
tive date of the regulation because of diflSculties
in obtaining equipment for the measurement of
skid number. In light of the relaxation of the
skid number requirement embodied in this notice,
and the possibility of temporarily leasing either
measuring equipment or test facilities, evidenced
by fact that only one such request was received,
the request for a delay in effective date is denied.

Since this amendment relaxes a requirement
and imposes no additional burden on any person,
notice and opportunity for comment thereon are
unnecessary and the amendment is incorporated
into the above- referenced regulations without
change in the effective date. This notice of
amendment in response to petitioners for recon-
sideration is issued under the authority of sec-
tions 112 and 119 of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1402, 1407)
and the delegation of authority by the Secretary
of Transportation to the Federal Highway Ad-
ministrator, 49 CFR § 1.4(c).

Issued on July 14, 1969.

F. C. Turner

Federal Highway Administrator

34 F.R. 11974
July 16, 1969

PART 576— PRE 6-6

EfftcHv*: D*<»mb*r 1, 1969
January 1, 1970

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

Regulations requiring manufacturers of motor
vehicles to provide information to consumers con-
cerning performance characteristics of their ve-
hicles were published on January 25, 1969 (34
F.R. 1246), and amended on May 23, 1969 (34
F.R. 8112). By notice of July 11, 1969 (34 F.R.
11501) it was proposed that the regulations be
amended to require manufacturers to provide the
information to prospective purchasers, as well as
those who have already bought a vehicle, and also
to provide the information to the Administrator
30 days before the information is required to be
provided to purchasers.

No general objections to the proposed amend-
ment were received. One manufacturer objected
to the requirement of providing copies to the
Administrator 30 days in advance, on the basis
that this did not allow sufficient lead time from
the date of the proposal. In light of the fact
that the information required to be provided
consists only of performance figures that the
manufacturer is certain can be exceeded by its
vehicles, that the information must be provided
in large quantities to dealers by January 1, 1970,
and that no other manufacturers evidenced dif-
ficulty in meeting the December 1 date, the objec-
tion is found not to be meritorious.

The Automobile Manufacturers Association
made two suggestions for changes to the regula-
tion, both of which have been accepted and in-
corporated into the regulation. One change adds
language to make it clear that the locations at
which the information is to be provided are out-
lets with which the manufacturer has some legal
connection. The other is that the date on which
information relating to newly introduced vehicles

is required is the "announcement date", on which
dealers are authorized to display and sell the
vehicles.

The proposal stated that three copies should be
submitted to the Administrator by December 1,

1969. It has been determined that in light of
the need for immediate processing and the large
amount of information that will be received at
that time, a somewhat larger number of copies
will be needed. The number of copies has been
changed, accordingly, from three to ten. Since
the additional burden on automotive manufac-
turers of providing these copies appears to be
insubstantial, a further notice of proposed rule-
making is found to be unnecessary. Other minor
changes in wording are made for clarity.

Effective Dates: Subsections (a) and (b) of
§ 375.6, Requirements, are eflFective January 1,

1970. Subsection (c) of that section is effective
December 1, 1969.

In light of the foregoing. Subpart A— General,
of 49 CFR Part 375 is amended to read as set
forth below. This amendment is issued under
the authority of sections 112 and 119 of the Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15
U.S.C. 1401, 1407), and the delegation of au-
thority from the Secretary of Transportation
to the Federal Highway Administration, 49 CFR
§ 1.4(c).

Issued on October 16, 1969.

E. H. Holmes, Acting

Federal Highway Administrator

34 F.R. 17108
October 22, 1969

PART 575— PRE 7-8

EfhcHv*: NevcmlMr 36, 196*

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION
Motorcycle Brake Burnishing Requirement

On May 23, 1969, the Federal Highway Ad-
ministration published 49 CFR § 375.101, Vehicle
Stopping Distance, of the Consumer Information
Regulations (34 F.R. 8112). Paragraph (e)-
(1) (ii) of that section, describing the burnishing
procedures for motorcycles, is as follows: "Same
as for passenger cars, except substitute 30 m.p.h.
for 40 m.p.h. and 150° F. for 250° F., and main-
tain hand lever force to foot lever force ratio
of approximately 1 to 2."'

A manufacturer has stated that such a burnish-
ing procedure, which was drawn from a draft
SAE Recommended Practice, would be inappro-
riate for its vehicles, and suggests that the re-
quired burnishing procedures should be that rec-
ommended by the manufacturer. Since it appears
that a uniform burnishing procedure suitable for
all motorcycles has not yet been developed, the
suggestion is found to have merit, to the extent
that manufacturers have recommended such pro-
cedures. A general burnishing procedure must
still be specified, however, for the purpose of
determining compliance of those vehicles for
which the manufacturers have not made a proce-
dure publicly available. Accordingly, subpara-
graph {e)(l)(ii) of section 375.101 is hereby
amended to read as follows :

^'■Motorcycles. Adjust and burnisl; brakes in
accordance with manufacturer's recommendations.
Where no burnishing procedures have been rec-
ommended by the manufacturer, follow the pro-
cedure specified above for passenger cars, except
substitute 30 m.p.h. for 40 m.p.h. and 150° F.
and 250° F., and maintain hand lever force to
foot lever force ratio of approximately 1 to 2."

The Consumer Information regulations rex|uire
manufacturers to submit information to the

FHWA by December 2, 1969, and it is important,
therefore, that this amendment to the regulations
be made effective without delay. The regulations
require only that the manufacturers submit in-
formation to purchasers (and to the FHWA)
as to performance levels that can be met or ex-
ceeded by their vehicles, and it is not necessary
that vehicles be retested as long as they perform
as well under the manufacturers' own burnishing
procedures as under the previously specified ones.
Manufacturers are, of course, free to provide new
performance figures at any time, under the pro-
cedures specified in Part 375. If in a particular
case a manufacturer determines that its vehicles
may not be able to meet the performance figures
provided when its own recommended burnishing
procedures are utilized, and is not able to provide
new and appropriate figures within the time
specified, it should include a notation to that effect
at the time that the figures are first provided to
the FHWA. The vehicles in question will not
be considered to be in violation of the regulations
if they meet the performance figures provided
under the previously specified burnishing pro-
cedures, and if new and corrected figures are pro-
vided under section 375.101, as amended, not later
than September 1, 1970.

Because of the importance of providing to con-
sumers by January 1, 1970, the probability that
few if any manufacturers will be adversely
affected by the amendment, and the provisions
for relief included herein, notice and public pro-
cedure thereon are found to be impracticable,
unnecessary, and contrary to the public interest,
and the amendment described above is made effec-
tive on publication in the Federal Regiat.or.

(■•V. 11/26/691

PART 575 -PRE 9

IffwHv*! N*v*mb«r 26, 1969

This amendment is issued under the authority Issued on November 24, 1969.
of sections 112 and 119 of the National Traffic

and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. ■^* ^' '^^^^^

1401, 1407), and the delegation of authority from Federal Highway Administrator

the Secretary of Transportation to the Federal 34 f.R. 18865

Highway Administrator, 49 CFR § 1.4(c). Nov»mb«r 26, 1969

(I.V. 11/26/49) PART 676— PRE 10

EfftcHvt: January 1, 1972

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

(Availability Requirements)

The purpose of this notice is to amend section
575.6 of the Consumer Information Regulations
(49 CFR Part 575) to require that the informa-
tion supplied pursuant to Subpart B of the Reg-
ulations be provided in sufficient quantity to
permit retention by prospective customers or
mailing to them upon request. A notice of pro-
posed rulemaking was published on January 14,
1971 (36 F.R. 557), proposing to carry out the
legislative mandate of P.L. 91-625 (84 Stat. 262).
That legislation was designed to remedy diffi-
culties resulting from the current practice of
making consumer information available only in
the showroom, by permitting the Secretary to
require that the information be provided in a
printed format which could be retained by cus-
tomers who visit the showroom or mailed to
others upon their request.

A limited number of comments were received
in response to the Notice, some of which merely
expressed support for the additional require-
ment. The Chrysler Cororation requested that
the amendment be clarified to provide that tem-
porary unavailability would not constitute a
failure to comply with the regulations. As is
noted in the Notice of proposed rulemaking, the
uncertainty of demand makes it difficult to estab-
lish precise standards as to what is "sufficient."
It has been determined, therefore, that any fur-
ther specification of this provision would be in-
appropriate at this time. It is intended that

manufacturers and dealers will cooperate to take
all reasonable steps to ensure that a continuous
supply of the information is available.

The Chrysler Corporation further requested
that the regulation clearly indicate that a rea-
sonable charge can be made for the materials.
The legislative history of P.L. 91-625 indicates
that a major purpose of the amendment was
to make consumer information more easily avail-
able to consumers in making their purchase. A
charge for consumer information on several
makes and models of vehicles could present the
car shopper with as great an obstacle to avail-
ability of information as is the case with the
present system. In view of this purpose and the
general aim of the consumer information regu-
lations to provide for as wide a dissemination
of information as possible, it has been deter-
mined that the retention copies should be pro-
vided without charge.

In consideration of the above, 49 CFR
576.6(b) is amended. . . .

Effective date: January 1, 1972.

Issued on September 28, 1971.

Douglas W. Toms
Administrator

36 F.R. 19310
October 2, 1971

PART 575— PRE 11-12

EffKtlv*: Morth 1, 1979

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575 — CONSUMER INFORMATION

(Truck-Camper Loading)
(Docket No. 71-7; Notke 5)

This notice reissues the portion of 49 CFR
§571.126, Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No.
126, Trucker-Camper Loading^ that was pre-
viously applicable to tnick manufacturers as
a consumer information regulation, 49 CFR
§ 575.103, Truck-Camper Loading. It also re-
sponds to petitions for reconsideration of Stand-
ard No. 126 on issues that are not addressed in
Notice 4, which is published in this issue (37 F.R.
26605).

Petitions for reconsideration of Standard No.
126 (37 F.R. 16497) were filed by Chrysler Cor-
poration (Chrysler), Ford Motor Company
(Ford), General Motors Corporation (GM), Jeep
Corporation (Jeep), Motor Vehicle Manufac-
turers Association (MVMA) Recreational Vehicle
Institute, Inc. (RVI) and Toyota Motor Sales
USA, Inc. (Toyota).

In response to information contained in some
of the petitions, the portions of the standard
previously applicable to truck manufacturers are
being reissued under this notice as a consumer
information regulation for the reasons stated in
Notice 4. Minor amendments are also made to
the regulation on the basis of some of the peti-
tions while the Administrator has declined to
grant requested relief from other requirements
of the regulation.

1. Effective date. GM has petitioned for a de-
layed eflFective date. As a truck manufacturer,
GM feels that additional lead time is required
"to develop, process, and print the necessary in-
formation on an orderly basis." The Admin-
istration has found for good cause shown that
an effective date earlier than 180 days after
issuance of Standard No. 126 was in the public
interest; however, to allow truck manufacturers
sufficient time for testing to determine cargo

center of gravity locations the effective date of
the requirements applicable to truck manufac-
turers is being extended 2 months, until March
1, 1973.

2. Definiti(m8 and information. As discussed
in Notice 4 Ford objected to the definition of
"cargo weight rating" and the term "total load".
Standard No. 126 has been amended to meet
Ford's objections, and similar changes are made
in the terminology of the new truck consumer
irtformation regulation.

Ford also suggests that the phrase "any addi-
tional weight carried in or on the camper" should
be substituted for "the weight of camper cargo,
and the weight of passengers in the camper" in
paragraph S5.2.1(d) of Standard No. 126, now
§ 575.103(e)(3). It believes the suggested lan-
guage would be more meaningful to the average
user and that the present language could be con-
strued as endorsing the carrying of passengers in
campers. Ford's request is denied. The NHTSA
considers that the specificity of references to
cargo and passengers is more meaningful to con-
sumers than the general reference to "any addi-
tional weight". Further, given the prevalence of
carrying passengers in campers, the NHTSA
does not believe that the present language can
realistically be considered to have a significant
effect on this practice.

Both Ford and GM objected to the paragraph
requiring the manufacturer to furnish trailer
towing recommendations, on the grounds of
vagueness and lack of prior notice and oppor-
tunity to comment. The NHTSA concurs, and
is deleting this requirement.

Ford suggests that paragraph S5.2.1(a) of
Standard No. 126 (now § 575.103(e) (1) should
be revised to make clear that the slide-in camper

PART 575— PRE 13

Effective: March 1, 1973

also has a center of gravity designation deter-
mined in accordance with the regulation, which
falls within the boundaries specified by the ve-
hicle manufacturer. Since campers manufactured
before the effective date of the regulation may
be mounted on trucks manufactured after March
1, 1973, Ford's suggestion has not been adopted.

GM has petitioned that a warning be required
to accompany the regulation's information, stat-
ing that the longitudinal center of gravity is only
one of the many factors affecting the overall per-
formance of a vehicle and that other factors con-
cerning vehicle handling should be considered
by the operator. The NHTSA denies GM's pe-
tition on this point. Proper loading and load
distribution in truck-camper combinations is a
highly significant handling factor, and such a
warning might cause a truck operator to feel
the loading information presented is of little
significance. The regulation does not, however,
prohibit GM or other manufacturers from fur-
nishing such additional warnings if they see fit.

GM has also asked for a confirmation of its
assumption that "the pictorial representation of

the recommended longitudinal center of gravity
zone for the cargo weight rating need not be to
scale but can be generalized so long as the lon-
gitudinal boundaries of the zone are clearly set
forth." The NHSTA agrees with this inter-
pretation.

Elective Date : March 1, 1973.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
Part 575 is amended by adding a new § 575.103,
Ti'uck- camper Loading. . . .

This notice is issued pursuant to the authority
of sections 112 and 119 of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 USC
1401, 1407) and the delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.51.

Issued on December 6, 1972.

Douglas W. Toms
Administrator

37 F.R. 26607
December 14, 1972

PART 575— PRE 14

Efftctiv*: April 1, 1973

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

Truck-Camper Loading
(Docket No. 71-7; Notice 6)

This notice responds to petitions for reconsid-
eration of 49 CFR § 575.103, Truck-camper load-
ing^ "with amendments extending the effective
date to April 1, 1973, and allowing optional
wording of certain statements until October 1,
1973.

On December 14, 1972, Part 575 of Title 49,
Code of Federal Regulations, was amended by
adding § 575.103 Truck-camper loading (37 F.R.
26607). The amendment was in essence that
portion of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Stand-
ard No. 126, Truck-camper loading that applied
to manufacturers of trucks accommodating slide-
in campers, as originally published on August 15,

1972 (37 F.R. 16497). Pursuant to 49 CFR
§ 553.35, petitions for reconsideration of § 575.103
have been filed by General Motors Corporation
and International Harvester Company. Ford
Motor Company has asked for a clarification.

In response to information contained in these
petitions the regulation is being amended in cer-
tain respects, and a new effective date of April 1,

1973 adopted. Requested changes in other re-
quirements of the regulation are denied.

1. Effective date: Both petitioners request de-
lay of the effective date of the regulation for at
least 60 days, until May 1, 1973 at the earliest.
One reason for the request is that petitioners had
printed their manuals on the basis of the notice
of August 15, 1972, and that the additional time
is needed to print new materials conforming to
modified tezts published on December 14, 1972.
General Motors also states that the additional
time is needed to prepare and disseminate data
in a manner meeting the requirement that it be
available to prospective purchasers. 'While data
has been prepared for each truck, it has not yet
been consolidated into a single sheet or pamphlet

suitable for showroom display and availability.
The requests of both petitioners reflect the prob-
ability that the material will not be submitted
to the Administrator at least 30 days before it is
available to prospective purchasers, as required
by § 575.6(c), and the possibility that the data
will not be ready by March 1, 1973.

The NHTSA has determined that good cause
has been shown for postponement of the effective
date until April 1, 1973. This agency recognizes,
however, that the minor textual changes made in
the December notice create problems of conform-
ity for those manufacturers who in good faith
relied on the August notice in ordering materials.
Accordingly, the regulation is being amended to
allow the earlier wording on an optional basis
until October 1, 1973. These amendments permit
use of the phrase "total load" instead of "total
cargo load" in paragraph (e) (3) where it twice
appears, and the legend "Aft End of Cargo Area"
for "Rear End of Truck Bed" in Figure 1, Truck
Loading Information. The word "rating" ap-
pearing on the last line of paragraph (e) (5) is
properly "ratings" as printed in the August
notice, and a correction is made. Further, the
NHTSA considers it important that a manufac-
turer fulfill the requirements of § 575.6(b) by
making information available to prospectiv^e pur-
chasers when trucks manufactured on or after
April 1, 1973 are placed on sale. Considering the
short lead time between December 14. 1972 and
February 1, 1973 and the intervening holidays,
the NHTSA will not take enforcement action
with respect to the furnishing of information
under §§575.103 and 575.6(c) prior to April 1,
1973, if manufacturers provide information to
this agency as required by those sections not later
than the date by which the information must be
provided to prospective purchasers.

PART 575— PRE 16

Elbcriv*: April 1, 1973

2. Admiyiistrative Procedure Act. Harvester
believes that the Administrative Procedure Act
was violated in that interested persons were not
provided an opportunity to comment upon pro-
viding information under Part 575 prior to
enactment of §575.103. The NHTSA views
Harvester's comment as a narrow construction of
the requirements of the Act, and disagrees with
petitioner's conclusion. The content of § 575.103
was proposed on April 9, 1971 (36 F.R. 6837)
and adopted as a safety standard on August 15,
1972 (37 F.R. 16497). Pursuant to petitions for
reconsideration from Chrysler Corporation, Ford
Motor Company, Greneral Motors, Jeep Corpora-
tion, and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers' Associa-
tion that Standard No. 126 would be more
appropriate as a consumer information regula-
tion, the NHTSA adopted § 575.103 on December
14, 1972 with content virtually identical to that
issued in the previous August. Thus the agency
considers it has met 5 USC § 553 by providing
notice of the terms and substance of the rule, and
an opportunity to comment. It is true that notice
was not provided on the specific issue that dis-
tinguishes the consumer information regulation
from a motor vehicle safety standard (i.e., avail-
ability of information to a prospective purchaser
and the agency at specified time periods), but the
NHTSA considers this issue a minor one in rela-
tion to the regulation as a whole for which ade-
quate notice was given. In view of the weight
of comment that the standard should properly
be a consumer information regulation, no further
notice was deemed necessary. The NHTSA has

already in this notice indicated its willingness to
liberally interpret § 575.6(c) because of the time
factor involved.

3. Clarification. Ford Motor Company has
asked for a clarification of the term "weight of
occupants" used to compute "cargo weight rat-
ing", as defined by the regulation. Specifically,
Ford inquires whether the weight is that of a
95th percentile male — that of an "occupant" as
defined by § 571.3(b) — or that of a person weigh-
ing 150 pounds, the figure applicable to other
consumer information regulations and used in the
safety standards.

The NHTSA intended "weight of occupants"
to be the "normal occupant weight" figure of
150 pounds specified in Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard No. 110 rather than that of a 95th
percentile male, which is greater. To clarify this,
the phrase, "computed as 150 pounds times the
number of designated seating positions," is added
to the regulation.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
§ 575.103, Truck-camper loading, is amended ....

Effective date : April 1, 1973.

(Sec. 112 and 119, Pub. L. 89-563; 80 Stat. 718,
15 USC 1401, and 1407 ; delegation of authority
at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on February 12, 1973.

Douglas W. Toms
Administrator

38 F.R. 4400
February 14, 1973

PART 575— PRE 16

EffacMv*: February 2», 1973

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

Subpart A — General
(Docket No. 73-5; Notice 1)

This notice amends the definition section of the
regulation on Federal motor vehicle consumer
information reflecting previous amendments to
definitions in the Federal motor vehicle safety
standards.

The definitions of "brake power unit" and
"lightly loaded vehicle weight" in 49 CFR
§ 575.2(c) have been obsoleted by recent amend-
ments to these terms in Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard No. 105a, Hydraulic Brake Systems
(37 F.R. 17970). "Brake power unit" has been
redefined to more accurately describe the char-
acteristics of the component concerned. The
term "curb weight" used in defining "lightly
loaded vehicle weight" has been replaced by "un-
loaded vehicle weight" (as defined in § 571.3) as
a more precise description of vehicle condition.
Finally, "Maximiun sustained vehicle speed"

should be grammatically a speed "attainable"
rather than "obtainable".

Effective date : February 28, 1973. Since these
amendments are primarily a matter of form and
have no significant effect on substantive require-
ments, it is found for good cause that notice and
public procedure thereon is unnecessary, and an
immediate effective date is in the public interest.

(Sec. 112, 119 Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718, 15
U.S.C. 1401, 1407; delegation of authority at 49
CFR 1.51.)

Issued on February 21, 1973.

Douglas W. Toms
Administrator

38 F.R. 5338
February 28, 1973

PART 575— PRE 17-18

Elfoctiv*: Jun* 11, 1973

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

Subpart A — General
(Docket 72-24; Notice 2)

This notice amends 49 CFR 575, Consumer
Information, to require manufacturers to iden-
tify specially-configured vehicles not available
for purchase by the general public as "special
vehicles" in the information submitted to the
NHTSAunder § 575.6(c).

A notice of proposed rulemaking to this effect
was published on November 8, 1972 (37 F.R.
23732). As noted in that proposal, inclusion of
these vehicles in compilations or rankings pub-
lished by this agency as consumer information
serves no beneficial purpose, and could confuse
the consumer.

No comments opposed the proposal. General
Motors Corporation commented that the amend-
ment should more clearly indicate that the spe-
cial vehicle identification requirements only
apply to the information supplied to NHTSA
under § 575.6(c). The new section reflects this
suggestion.

Ford Motor Company agreed with GM that
the special vehicle identification is useful in in-
formation supplied to NHTSA. Ford also sug-
gested, however, that consumer information on
special vehicles need not be included at all in the

information supplied "on location" to prospec-
tive purchasers in accordance with § 575.6(b).
The NHTSA does not have information at pres-
ent to support or repudiate this suggestion, which
is beyond the scope of the proposal. If Ford or
any other person wishes to petition for rule-
making on this subject, the agency will consider
it for possible future rulemaking.

In response to an implied question by Truck
Body and Equipment Association, Inc., the
amendment does not change the applicability of
the Consumer Information regulations, as set
forth in Subpart B of Part 575.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
Part 575, Consumer Information, is amended. . . .

Effective date: June 11, 1973.

(Sees. 112, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718,
15 U.S.C. 1401, 1407; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on May 1, 1973.

James E. Wilson
Acting Administrator

38 F.R. 11347
May 7, 1973

PART 575— PRE 19-20

EffccNvc: $«pt«mb«r I, 1974

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

(Docket No. 25, Notice 8)

This notice establishes a Consumer Informa-
tion regulation on Uniform Tire Quality Grad-
ing. The notice is based on proposals published
March 7, 1973 (38 F.R. 6194), and August 14,
1973 (38 F.R. 21939). An earlier proposal,
published September 21, 1971 (36 F.R. 18751)
was later withdrawn (April 21, 1972; 37 F.R.
7903). Comments submitted in response to these
proposals have been considered in the prepara-
tion of this notice.

The regulation will require tire manufacturers
and brand name owners to provide relative grad-
ing information for 13-, 14- and 15-inch tire size
designations for tire traction, treadwear, and
high speed performance. The respective grades
will be molded into or onto the tire sidewall,
contained in a label affixed to each tire, and
provided for examination by prospective pur-
chasers in a form retainable by them at each
location where tires are sold. The requirements
are effective with respect to passenger cars when
they are equipped with new tires bearing quality
grades.

Treadwear : The regulation requires each tire
to be graded for treadwear performance using
numbers which indicate the percentage of tread-
wear the tire will produce when compared to the
treadwear obtained from a "control tire" speci-
fied in the regulation. Each tire will be graded
with either the number "60", representing tread-
wear performance less than 80 percent of the
control tire's, or the number "80", "120", "160"
or "200", representing at least that percentage
of control tire wear. The grades are fewer in
number and represent broader performance
ranges than those proposed, as a result of com-
ments that the proposed grades were too numer-
ous and would not take into account inherent
differences in tire performance.

The method for obtaining treadwear grades is
essentially that proposed in the notice of March 7,
1973. Treadwear grades will be determined by
using a convoy of up to four identical passenger
cars with one vehicle equipped with four identi-
cal control tires, and each of the remaining ve-
hicles equipped with four identical manufactur-
er's tires (candidate tires) having the same
nominal rim diameter as the control tire. The
NHTSA intends that the convoy vehicles be
driven as similarly as possible with respect to
such factors as steering and braking. The ve-
hicles are run for 16,000 miles over a surface
that will produce control tire wear equal to be-
tween 65 and 85 percent of original tread depth.
The proposal had suggested that the tires be
worn to 90 percent of tread depth. This per-
centage has been reduced to prevent the tires
from being worn below their treadwear indi-
cators. The proposal had further suggested that
candidate tires be loaded to 100 percent of the
load specified for their inflation pressure in the
1972 Tire and Rim Association Yearbook. In
response to comments that vehicles are rarely
loaded to that extent in practice, the load has
been changed to 90 percent of the load specified
for the inflation pressure in the 1972 Tire and
Rim Association Yearbook. The NHTSA be-
lieves the road test method for measuring tread-
wear to be the most satisfactory that is presently
available. Moreover, the method has been used
for many years by tire manufacturers to eval-
uate the treadwear potential of newly developed
tire designs and compounds.

Many comments agreed that a 16,000-mile
road test was appropriate for grading the tread-
wear of radial tires. Some comments urged,
however, that only a 12,000-mile test be specified
for bias and bias/belted tires. The NHTSA has

PART 575— PRE 21

EfF«cllv«: Stplambir 1, 1974

not accepted this recommendation as it believes
the comparative data for candidate tires of dif-
ferent construction types will necessarily be
more accurate if the comparisons are based on
the same degree of control tire wear.

Certain comments referred to the existing na-
tional energy shortage, requesting that the
agency take into account the problems presented
by the shortage in the final requirements. The
NHTSA recognizes the degree of energy that
will be necessary to perform the appropriate
grading tests, particularly with respect to the
test for treadwear grading. Research has been
undertaken and will continue with a view to
reducing the energy needs to establish treadwear
performance without adversely affecting the va-
lidity of test results. The NHTSA invites sug-
gestions or proposals in this regard, including
supportive data, directed to the establishment of
alternative methods or tests for grading tire
treadwear.

Traction: Each tire will bear a traction grade
of "90", "105", or "120", representing at least
that percentage of control tire performance. The
test for obtaining traction grades is similar to
that proposed on March 7, 1973. It utilizes a
two-wheeled test trailer built essentially to speci-
fications in American Society of Testing and
Materials E-274-70, Skid Resistance of Paved
Surfaces Using a FuU-Scale Tire. The test con-
sists of towing the trailer over specified wet test
surfaces, equipped first with identical control
tires, and then with identical candidate tires of
the same rim diameter as the control tire. The
average coefficient of friction is computed when
one trailer wheel is locked on each of the two
surfaces at 20, 40, and 60 miles per hour. The
grade, similarly to the treadwear grade, is the
comparative difference between candidate and
control tire performance. The final rule differs
from the notice in that the proposed traction
grade representing less than 90 percent of control
tire performance has not been included. This
results from the notice proposing to amend
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109 (49
CFR 571.109) (38 F.R. 31841; November 19,
1973) to require all passenger car tires to achieve
at least this level of control tire performance.
The NHTSA expects that this requirement will
become effective on the effective date of this

regulation, thereby necessitating the deletion of
the grade. The other grades specified differ from
those proposed to the extent that the range be-
tween grades has been increased to better allow
for inherent gradations in actual tire perform-
ance.

Many comments urged that grading for tire
traction not be established at this time. The
comments argued that the current state of the
art has not advanced to the point where reliable
and reproducible results can be obtained using
the proposed two-wheel trailer method.

The NHTSA believes the traction test issued
by this notice, utilizing the two-wheeled trailer,
is an objective procedure, capable of producing
repeatable results, and is therefore satisfactory
for the purpose of measuring and grading
straight-line, wet-surface braking traction. In
this regard, on the basis of information received
from General Motors, that company is presently
using the identical methodology in the specifica-
tions for tire traction for its "TPC" specification
tire. This tire is presently manufactured by
numerous domestic tire companies. Moreover,
grading tire traction is a necessary adjunct, in
the view of NHTSA, to grading tire treadwear,
for it is commonly known that treadwear and
traction performance result from diverse tire
properties. The two teste, therefore, serve as a
check that manufacturers will not design tires
that perform well in one area at the expense of
performance in the other. The minimum trac-
tion performance requirement recommended by
the comments as a substitute for traction grading
is insufficient, in the view of NHTSA, to serve
this function alone.

Many comments stated that traction test sur-
faces should be defined by test surface composi-
tion and skid number, rather than by skid
number alona as proposed. It was argued that
without a surface specification, reversals in tire
performance may occur. The NHTSA agrees
that the inclusion of precise surface specifications
may improve the reliability of traction test re-
sults. It has not adopted such specifications in
this notice as they have not been previously pro-
posed. However, recent developments have been
made in the establishment of test surfaces by the
Federal Highway Administration of the Depart-
ment of Transportation. Test surfaces developed

PART 575— PRE 22

EffKtIv*: Stptambtr 1, 1974

by that agency are proposed in a notice issued
concurrently with this notice (1061) for later
inclusion in the regulation.

Some comments argued that the description of
this grading parameter as "traction" was mis-
leading, as the proposed test dealt only with wet
braking traction and not dry pavement or cor-
nering traction. They suggested therefore that
the grading parameter be referred to as braking
or stopping traction, or as ''wet-surface traction."
The NHTSA does not dispute that these other
traction properties are important aspects of tire
traction, and expects to add these performance
aspects to the traction grading scheme when ap-
propriate test procedures are developed. The
NHTSA does not believe, however, that the de-
scription of the existing test as "traction" is
misleading. The terminology suggested by the
comments, in the view of NHTSA, would be
over technical and unnecessary.

High speed performance: High speed per-
formance grades of "A", "B", or "C" are required
to be afiixed to each tire based on its performance
on the high speed laboratory test wheel which is
presently used in testing for conformity to Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109. The test
utilized is as proposed — an extension of the
Standard No. 109 high speed performance test.
A tire will be graded "C" if it only passes the
Standard No. 109 test. In order to achieve a
grade of "B", the tire must run without failure
an additional 1/2 hour at 425 rpm and two addi-
tional hours, one at 450 rpm and the other at
475 rpm. To achieve a grade of "A" the tire
must be run without failure an additional hour
at 500 rpm and another hour at 525 rpm. The
NHTSA has recently revised the criteria for tire
failure in Standard No. 109 (38 F.R. 27050;
September 28, 1973) and the revised criteria are
the criteria included in this rule.

The principal comment regarding the proposed
high speed grading format was that it should
consist of only two grades — one recommended
for general use and the other for use by emer-
gency vehicles. The comments argued that fur-
ther grading of high speed performance was
unnecessary and would promote high speed driv-
ing. The NHTSA views the suggested 2-grade
scheme as rendering any high speed grade mean-
ingless for most consumers. Essentially, it pro-

vides no information other than conformity to
Standard No. 109. The NHTSA believes driv-
ing habits with respect to speed do differ among
the driving population and that the grading
scheme should be based on that consideration.

Control Tires: Both treadwear and traction
grades are based on comparative results using a
control tire specified in the rule. The control
tires are 2-ply, rayon tires of bias construction,
in sizes 6.50 x 13, 7.75 x 14, and 8.55 x 15. The
control tire in each specified rim diameter will
be used in testing all candidate tires having that
rim diameter. The precise specifications for the
tires are identical to those proposed.

Control tires will be manufactured pursuant
to NHTSA contract and will be used in NHTSA
compliance testing. They will be made available
to the industry for testing purposes, and the
NHTSA will accept, for purposes of compliance
tests, results based upon their performance. The
agency may consider manufacturers who use dif-
ferent test devices to have failed to exercise the
due care contemplated by the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act should their tires
fail to perform to the specified grades when
subject to agency tests.

The final rule modifies certain aspects of the
proposed rule apart from the grading tests. In
response to several comments, labels are not re-
quired to be affixed to the tread surface of tires
which are furnished as original equipment on
new vehicles. These vehicles are generally driven
before sale, and labels on the tire tread surface
are therefore of questionable value. Information
on these tires will still be required to be otherwise
furnished with the vehicle, and available for re-
tention by prospective purchasers. The NHTSA
did not, however, agree with comments recom-
mending that the affixed label requirement be
deleted entirely. Tires are frequently on display
in sales outlets, and the affixed label will provide
consumers with the clearest understanding of the
grades applicable to a particular tire.

The grades molded onto the tire sidewall are
required to be placed between the shoulder and
the maximum section width, rather than between
the maximum section width and the bead as pro-
posed. The NHTSA believes the grades should
apply only to the original tire, and the placement
of grades above the maximum section width

PART 575— PRE 23

EffwHva: Saptombar 1, 1974

increases the likelihood that grades will be re-
moved if the tire is retreaded.

Certain comments expressed the view that
providing information for tires placed on new
vehicles and furnishing that information to the
NHTSA 30 days before the vehicles are available
to the public is difficult to accomplish because of
the variety of tire and vehicle combinations in-
volved. The NHTSA does not believe sufficient
justification has been shown for deleting these
requirements. While some modification may be
necessary to existing manufacturer practices, the
NHTSA cannot agree that the regulation pre-
sents unmanageable problems for manufacturers.

Effective date: September 1, 1974. The
NHTSA has issued this notice pursuant to an
order of the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia. That order specifies that
the regulation take effect on September 1, 1974.

In light of the above, sections 575.4 and 575.6
are revised, and a new section 575.104 "Uniform
Tire Quality Grading", is added in Chapter V,
Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. . . .

(Sees. 103, 112, 119, 201, 203; Pub. L. 89-563,
80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1407, 1421,
1423; delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on December 28, 1973.

Jamee B. Gregory
Administrator

39 F.R. 1037
January 4, 1974

PART 576— PRE 24

Effective-. May 9, 1974

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

(Docket No. 25; Notice 11)

This notice revokes the Uniform Tire Quality
Grading regulation published January 4, 1974
(39 F.R. 1037), and responds to petitions for
reconsideration received with respect to the
regulation.

The Uniform Tire Quality Grading regulation
specified the use of "control tires" in the estab-
lishment of grades for treadwear and traction.
The NHTSA expected that control tires would
be manufactured by an industry source pursuant
to NHTSA contract, and would be available for
both industry and government use. A solicita-
tion for a proposal to manufacture control tires
was advertised to the domestic tire industry.
Two proposals were received. Each, however,
has been determined to be nonresponsive to the
solicitation, which has accordingly been can-
celled.

Due to the failure of NHTSA to procure a
control tire, the agency must revoke the Uniform
Tire Quality Grading regulation in its present
form. The revocation of the regulation renders
moot the petitions for reconsideration received.

On May 2, 1974, an order was entered by the
United States District Court for the District of
Columbia in the case of Nash v. Brinegar (Civil
Action No. 177-73) requiring the NHTSA to
issue, by June 15, 1974, a notice of proposed
rulemaking for a revised Uniform Tire Quality
Grading regulation having a proposed effective
date of May 1, 1975.

In light of the above, § 575.104 "Uniform Tire
Quality Grading" of Chapter V, Title 49, Code
of Federal Regulations, is revoked, effective

(Sees. 103, 112, 119, 201, 203; Pub. L. 89-563,
80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1407, 1421,
1423; delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on May 6, 1974.

Gene G. Mannella
Acting Administrator

39 F.R. 16469
May 9, 1974

PART 575— PRE 25-26

EfFecllve: March 13, 1975

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

(Docket No. 74-18; Notice 2)

This notice amends Part 575, Consumer In-
formation, so that tlie requirement that manu-
facturers have consumer informal ion available
in showrooms does not apply to special vehicles
not available to the general public.

On April 26, 1974, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration proposed to amend
Part 575 to provide consumers with information
for only those vehicles which they were eligible
to purchase (39 F.R. 14728). The proposal,
which was in response to a petition from Ford
Motor Company, stated tliat information con-
cerning special vehicles would continue to l^e
made available to eligible purchasers. Com-
ments concerning the proposal were received
from American Motors Corporation, General

Motors Corporation and Chrysler Corporation.
All comments favored the proposal.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
575.7 is amended. . . .

Ejfective date: March 13, 1975. Because the
amendment relieves a restriction, it is found for
good cause shown that an etfective date imme-
diately ui)on publication is in the public interest.

(Sees. 103, 112, 114, 203, Pub. L. 89-563, 80
Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1407, 1423; dele-
gation of authority at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on March 7, 1975.

Noel C. Bufe
Acting Administrator

40 F.R. 11727
March 13, 1975

PART 575— PRE 27-28

Effective January 1, 1976
July I, 1976
January I, 1977
July 1, 1977

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

(Docket No. 25; Notice 17)

This notice establishes Uniform Tire Quality
Grading Standards. The notice is based on pro-
posals published June 14, 1974 (39 F.R. 20808,
Notice 12), August 9, 1974 (39 F.R. 28644,
Notice 14), and January 7, 1975 (40 F.R. 1273,
Notice 15). Comments submitted in response to
these proposals have been considered in the prep-
aration of this notice.

A rule on this subject was issued on January
4, 1974 (39 F.R. 1037). It was revoked on May
9, 1974 (39 F.R. 16469), due to the inability of
the NHTSA to obtain from the tire industry
"control tires" which were to have been used as
the basis for determining the comparative per-
formance grades for treadwear and traction.

The rule issued today requires manufacturers
to provide grading information for new passen-
ger car tires in each of the following perform-
ance areas: treadwear, traction, and temperature
resistance. The respective grades are to be
molded into or onto the tire sidewall, contained
in a label affixed to each tire (except for OEM
tires) , and provided for examination by prospec-
tive purchasers in a form retainable by them at
each location where tires are sold.

TREADWEAR

Treadwear grades are based on a tire's pro-
jected mileage (the distance which it is expected
to travel before wearing down to its treadwear
indicators) as tested on a single, predetermined
test run of approximately 6400 miles. A tire's
treadwear grade is expressed as the percentage
which its projected mileage represents of a
nominal 30,000 miles, rounded off to the nearest
lower 10% increment. For example, a tire with
a projected mileage of 24,000 would be graded
"80", while one with a projected mileage of 40,000
would be graded "130".

The test course has been established by the
NHTSA in the vicinity of San Angelo, Texas,
as described in Appendix A. It is the same as
that discussed at the public briefings on this sub-
ject which took place July 23 and July 29, 1974,
except that the direction of travel has been re-
versed on the northwest loop to increase safety
by reducing the number left turns. The course
is approximately 400 miles long, and each
treadwear test will require 16 circuits. It is
anticipated that both the industry, at each manu-
facturer's option, and the agency will perform
treadwear tests on this course; the former for
establishing grades, and the latter for purposes
of compliance testing, i.e., testing the validity
of the grades assigned. To arrange for alloca-
tions of test time at the site, industry members
should contact the NHTSA facility manager,
P.O. Box 6591, Goodfellow Air Force Base, San
Angelo, Texas 76901; telephone (915) 655-0546.
While manufacturers are not required to test on
the site, it would be to their advantage to do so,
since the legal standard against which com-
pliance with the rule will be measured is a tire's
performance in government tests on that course.

The method of determining projected mileages
is essentially that proposed in Notice 12 as modi-
fied by Notices 14 and 15 in this docket. The
treadwear performance of a candidate tire is
measured along with that of course monitoring
tires (CMTs) if the same general construction
type (bias, bias-belted, or radial) used to monitor
changes in course severity. The CMTs are tires
procured by the NHTSA — one group each of
the three general types — which are made avail-
able by the agency for purchase and use by regu-
lated persons at the test site. To obtain course
monitoring tires, regulated persons should con-
tact the NHTSA facility manager at the aboVe
address.

PART 575— PRE 29

Effective: January 1, 1976
July 1, 1976
January 1, 1977
July 1, 1977

Each test convoy consists of one car equipped
witli four CMTs and tliree or fewer other cars
equipped witli candidate tires of the same con-
struction type. (Candidate tires on the same
axle are identical, but front tires on a test vehicle
may differ from rear tires as lonfj as all four
are of the same size designation.) After a two-
circuit break-in period, the initial tread depth of
each tire is determined by averaging the depth
measured at six equally spaced locations in each
groove. At the end of every two circuits (800
miles), each tire's tread depth is measured again
in the same way, the tires are rotated, vehicle
positions in the convoy are rotated, and wheel
alignments are readjusted if necessary. At the
end of the 16-circuit test, each tire's overall wear
rate is calculated from the nine measured tread
depths and their corresponding mileages-after-
break-in as follows: The regression line which
"best fits" these data points is determined by
applying the method of least squares as described
in Appendix C; the wear rate is defined as the
'ibsolute value of the slope of the regression line,
in mils of tread depth per 1000 miles. This
wear rate is adjusted for changes in course se-
verity by a multiplier consisting of the base wear
rate for that type of course monitoring tire
divided by the measured average of the wear
rates for the four CMTs in that convoy. A
candidate tire's tread depth after break-in
(minus 62 mils to account for wearout when the
tread wear indicators are reached) divided by its
adjusted wear rate and multiplied by 1000, plus
800 miles, yields its projected mileage. The pro-
jected mileage is divided by 30,000 and multiplied
by 100 to determine the percentage which, when
rounded off, represents the candidate tire's tread-
wear grade.

A discussion of the NHTSA response to the
comments on treadwear grading follows.

Duration of hreak-in period and test. The 400
mile break-in period originally proposed in Notice
12 was extended in Notice 15 to 800 miles, to
permit the rotation of each tire between axles
after 400 miles. The Rubber Manufacturers
Association (RMA) suggested that a 1600-mile
break-in, by permitting each tire to be rotated

once through each position on the test car, would
provide more reliable results. An analysis of var-
iance in a study conducted by the NHTSA showed
no significant variations in wear from one side of
a car to the other. Further, a review of data
from extensive testing on the San Angelo course
showed no anomalies or consistent variations in
wear rate occurring after the first 800 miles.
The NHTSA is convinced that the 800-mile
break-in period is sufficient to allow a tire to
establish its equilibrium inflated shape and stabi-
lize its wear rate. Therefore, the RMA sugges-
tion has not been adopted.

Many of the comments to Notice 12 suggested
that testing distances greater than 6400 miles
are necessary for accurate tread life projections.
Testing to 40%, .50%, and even 90% of wearout
was urged. Unfortunately, only the submission
of North American Dunlop was accompanied by
substantive data. These data, showing non-linear
wear rates, were of questionable validity because
the tires were not broken in prior to testing and
because the data were collected by different test
fleets in different parts of the country. None-
theless, as a result of the large number of adverse
comments, the NHTSA requested further in-
formation from all knowledgeable and concerned
parties to document and substantiate the position
that a longer treadwear test is necessary. The
additional data were requested in a written in-
quiry to the RMA and in Notice 15. Because
of the need to limit test time, test cost, and fuel
consumption, the objective was to de*:ermine the
minimum test distance which can reliably pre-
dict ultimate tire treadwear life.

The responses to these requests have been re-
viewed and analyzed. Again, the NHTSA finds
the industry data and conclusions that greater
testing distances are necessary lacking in rigor
and completeness. In most cases, the conditions
of the industiy tests were not disclosed or did
not coincide with the prescribed control proce-
dures. Serious doubt is cast upon the conclusions
because of inadequate information on one or more
of the following test conditions: changes in
weather and season, course severity, conformity
with prescribed break-in period, mileage between

PART 575— PRE 30

readinjjs, method of projected mileage, size of
convoy, number of tires tested, and uniformity
and frequency of tread depth measurement.

A controlled test propram recently completed
by the NUTS A was designed to test the hypoth-
esis that the rate of wear of tires is constant after
an 800-mile break-in. The design and conclu-
sions of the test are discussed in detail in a paper
by Brenner, Scheiner, and Kondo ("Uniform
Tire Quality Grading; Effect of Status of AVear
on Tire AVear Rate," NIITSA Techncial Note
T-lOlIf, March, 1975 — General Reference entry
no. 42 in this docket.) The general conclusions
of the test are: (1) that the inherent rate of
wear of tires, after an 800 mile break-in period,
is constant and (2) that the projected tread life
for a tire estimated from a 6,400-mile test after
800-mile break-in is accurate for all three tire
types. Accordingly, the 6,400 mile test period
has been retained.

Grading based on minimum -performance. The
RMA e.\pressed strong disagreement with any
system in which treadwear grades are based on a
tire line's minimian projected mileage on the San
Angelo test course, urging instead that the aver-
age performance of a line is a more appropriate
grade. The RMA suggested further that the
proposed grading system "ignores the bell-shaped
distribution curve which describes any perform-
ance characteristics and would require the down-
grading of an entire line of tires until no portion
of the distribution curve fell below any selected
treadwear grade, notwithstanding tliat the large
bulk of a given group of tires was well above
the grade."

The NHTSA rejects the arguments and the
position taken by tl>c industry on this issue. It
is precisely the fact tliat, in industrial {)rocesses
involving production of large numbers of items,
the products group themselves into the so-called
l)ell-shaped or noiinal distribution which allows
for measurement of central tendency and varia-
tion and forms the basis of scientific quality
control.

Tests performed by the NIITSA and described
in the paper cited above have shown conclusively
that different production tires exhibit considerable

Effactlva: January 1, 1976
July 1, 1976
January 1, 1977
July 1, 1977

differences in their variability about their respec-
tive average values. Thus, two different tire
brands might have identical average values for
treadwear, but differ markedly in their variance
or standard deviation. These diffeernces would
probably be attributable to differences in process
and quality control.

Recognition of differences in inherent variabil-
ity among tire manufacturers and tire lines is
of the utmost importance to the consumer. The
average or mean measure of a group of tires does
not provide sufficient information to enable the
consumer to make an informed choice. If one
tire on a user's car wears out in 10,000 miles,
the fact that the "average" tire of that type
wears to 25,000 miles in the same driving environ-
ment does not alter his need to purchase a new
tire. Ideally, the con-sumer might be provided
with more information if he were given a meas-
ure of the mean (central tendency) and standard
deviation (variability) for each tire type, but the
complexity and possible confusion generated by
sucli a system would negate its advantages. In
the NHTSA's judgment, the most valuable single
grade for the consumer is one corresponding to
a level of performance wihch he can be reason-
ably certain is exceeded by tlie universe popula-
tion for that tire brand and line.

As with the other consumer information regu-
lations issued by this agency, a grade represents
a minimum performance figure to which every
tire is expected to conform if tested by the gov-
ernment under the procedures set fortli in the
rule. Thus, any manufacturer in doubt about
the performance capabilities of a line of his tires
is free to assign a lower grade than what might
actually be achieved, and he is expected to ensure
that substantially all the tires marked with a
particular grade are capable of achieving it.

Homogeneity of course monitoring tires.
Another aspect of the Notice 12 proposal which
generated much controversy is the adoption by
the NIITSA of production tires for use as course
monitoring tires. The commenters suggested that
changes in course severity be monitored instead
by tires iminufactured imder rigidly specified
conditions to ensure homogeneity. Because varia-

PART 575— PRE 31

Effective: January 1, 1976
July 1, 1976
January 1, 1977
July 1, 1977

tions in the performance of course monitoring
tires are reflected in tieadwcar projections for
all candidate tires, it follows that the more homo-
geneous the universe of the monitoring tires, the
more precisely the performance of the candidate
tires can be graded. The NHTSA is in complete
accord with the industry's desire to minimize the
variability of tires chosen for course monitoring.
Tlie development of specifications for special
"control tires", in which materials, processing,
and other conditions are rigidly controlled to a
degree beyond that possible for mass production,
will continue. The NHTSA hopes to work with
the tire industry to reduce the variability of
course monitoring tires to the maximum extent
possible. However, it should be noted that an
earlier version of this regulation had to be re-
voked due to the difficulty in obtaining such
"control tires." Recent tests (sunmiarizcd in the
paper cited above) demonstrate that implementa-
tion of a viable treadwear grading system need
not be delayed further, pending development of
special tires. In these tests, the current radial
CMTs — Goodyear Custom Steelgards chosen from
a single, short production run — show a coofHcient
of variation (standard deviation of wear rate
divided by mean) of 4.9%. This degree of uni-
formity is commensurate with universally ac-
cepted criteria for test control purposes. Hence,
grading of radial tires may be started inmie-
diately. The tentatively adopted bias and bias-
belted CMTs showed coefficients of variation of
7.3% and 12.4%, respectively. Existing test data
indicate that the NHTSA will be able to identify
and procure other tires of tliese two construction
types, exhibiting homogeneity compai'able to tlie
current radial CMTs, in time for testing in
accordance with the implementation schedule set
out below. In any event, the variability of course
monitoring tires will be taken into account by the
NHTSA in connection with its compliance test-
ing. At worst, the degree of grading imprecision
associated with CMT variability will be no
greater than one-half the levels measured for
the current bias and bias-belted tire lots, because
the standard deviation for the average of a set of
four tires is equal to one-half that of the universe

standard deviation. It is the NHTSA's judg-
ment that treadwear grades of this level of preci-
sion will provide substantially more meaningful
information to tlie prospective tire buyer than is
currently available.

To make efficient use of the available CMTs,
the NHTSA expects to conduct treadwear tests
with used CMTs, as well as with new ones. This
will not aifect any mileage projections, because
the inherent wear rate of tires is constant after
break-in. Test results will be discarded if the
treadwear indicators are showing on any of the
CMTs at the end of a test.

The need for three separate course monitoring
tires. Many commenters suggested that a single
CIMT of the bias-ply type be used, arguing that
the use of a different CMT for each general con-
struction type would create three separate tread-
wear rating systems. These suggestions appear
to result from a misunderstanding of the role of
the course monitoring tires. They are not used
as yardsticks against which candidate tires are
graded. Instead, they are used to monitor
cliangcs in the severity of the test course. Ex-
peiiments performed by the NHTSA (Brenner,
F.C. and Kondo, A., "Elements in the Road
Evaluation of Tire Wear", Tire tScicnce and
Technology, Vol. I, No. 1, Feb. 1973, p. 17— Gen-
eral Reference enti-y no. 17 in this docket) show
tiuit changes in test course severity will affect
tires of differing construction types to differing
degrees. For exami)le, the impi'ovement in pro-
jected tread life from the severest to the mildest
test courses in tlie experiments was 12% for bias
tires, yet it was 91% for bias-belted tires and
140% for radial tires. In fact, a variety of
factors influence course severity, each having
different relative effects on the various tire types.
Therefore, the use of a single couise monitoring
tire on cour.ses of varying severity, or even on a
given course whose severity is subject to varia-
tion due to weatlier and road wear, would not
permit tlie correct adjustment of measured wear
rates for environmental influences. Only with
a CMT for each construction type can a single,
uniform treadwear grading system be established.

PART 575— PRE 32

Expression of treadicear grades. The system

of treadwear grading: proposed in Notice 12 spec-
ified six grades, as follows:

Grade X (projected mileage less than 15,000)

Grade 15 (projected mileage at least 15,000)

Grade 25 ( " " " " 25,000)

Grade 35 ( " " " " 35,000)

Grade 45 ( " " " " 45,000)

Grade 60 (

60,000)

Among the objections to this proposal was that
small diflferences in actual treadwear in the vi-
cinity of grade boundaries would be misrepre-
sented as large differences because of tlie breadtli
of the predetermined categories. The NHTSA
was also concerned that the broad categories
could in some cases reduce the desirable competi-
tive impact of the treadwear grading system if
tires of substantially differing treadwear per-
formance were grouped in the same grade. For
these reasons, a relatively continuous grading
system was proposed in Notice 15, in wliich tires
would be graded with two digit numbers repre-
senting their minimum projected mileages in
thousands of miles as determined on the San
Angelo test course. The major objection to both
of these proposals was that grades expressing
projected mileages would lead consumers to ex-
pect every tire to yield its indicated mileage.
The manufacturers were especially concerned
that this would subject them to implied warranty
obligations, despite the disclaimer on the label.
The NHTSA remains convinced that treadwear
grades wliich are directly related to projected
mileages are the most appropriate way of ex-
pressing treadwear performance. To overcome
any possible misinterpretation by consumers, the
grading system established today is changed
from tliat of Notice 15 to indicate relative per-
formance on a percentage basis, as described
above. This decision is based in part upon the
fact that testing perfonned to date on the SaTi
Angelo course has given projected mileages that
are generally higiier than those the average user
will obtain; i.e., it appears to be a relatively mild
course.

Effective: January I, 1976
July 1, 1976
Januory 1, 1977
July 1, 1977

Wheel alignment procedure. Test vehicle
wheel alignment procedures received considerable
comment. Notice 12 proposed alignment to ve-
liicle manufacturer's specifications after veliiclc
loading. Notice 15 proposed that this be done
before loading, and that the measurements taken
after loading he used as a basis for setting align-
ment for tlie duration of the test. Tlie majority
of the commenters .strongly favored a return to
tlie original procedure. Tiie NHTSA takes par-
ticular cognizance of the fact that tliosc com-
menters who have actually tried both procedures
in testing at San Angelo find the procedure of
Notice 12 to be satisfactory and practicable, and
that of Notice 15 to be unusable. NHTSA repre-
sentatives at San Angelo have reported satis-
factory operation on a variety of vehicles using
the originally propo.sed procedure, and have not
observed any uneven tire wear that would indi-
cate alignment problems. For these reasons, the
final rule prescribes alignment procedures which
are identical witli those proposed in Notice 12.

Tire rotation procedure. Several commenters
objected to using the proposed '"X" rotation
procedure for testing radial tires. The NHT.SA
is aware that this procedure differs from that
recommended by many groups for consumers'
use. AVhile some vehicle and tire manufacturers
recommend that radial tires be rotated only fore-
aft, others recommend no rotation at all and
yet others are silent on the subject. The primary
reason for these other metliods appears to be to
improve passenger comfort by reducing vibra-
tion. No data liave been submitted, iiowever, to
suggest that tlie proposed method luis any adverse
or uneven effect on radial tire wcai'. I'liither,
this method has the advantage, for treailwear
testing, of balancing out any side-to-side or axle
wear differences attributable to the vehicle or to
the course. Accordingly, the proposed tire rota-
tion method has been adopted without change.

Choice of grooves to he measured. Some com-
menters suggested that treadwear projections be
calculated from measurements of the mo.st worn
grooves on candidate tires, rather than from the
averages of measurements made in all grooves.

PART 575— PRE 33

Effective: January 1, 1976
July 1, 1976
January 1, 1977
July I, 1977

It was argued that, because many States require
replacement of passenger car tires wlien tread-
wear indicators appear in any two adjacent
grooves, the proposed method of calculation
would yield misleadingly high projections. Anal-
ysis of projections based on both methods
(Brenner, F.C. and Kondo, A., "Patterns of
Tread Wear and Estimated Tread Life," Tire
Science and Technology^ Vol. 2, No. 1, 1973 —
General Reference entry no. 27 in this docket)
shows a high correlation between the resulting
tire rankings. Because the treadwear grading
system established today is based on relative
performance, there is no disadvantage in adopting
the proposed method. On a related issue, the
E.T.R.T.O. pointed out that some grooves near
the tire shoulder which are designed only for
esthetic reasons exhibit practically no wear, and
suggested that measurements be made only in
those grooves which contain treadwear indicators.
This suggestion has been adopted.

Calculation of projected mileage. Several
methods for calculating the tire wear rates to be
used in determining projected mileages were con-
sidered. Notice 12 proposed calculating the
geometric mean of the wear rates measured for
each 800-mile increment. This approach was
rejected because the geometric mean is extremely
sensitive to inaccurate readings in any single
measurement. Use of the arithmetic mean of
the incremental wear rates appears to be the
general industry practice. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the intermediate readings have no effect on
such a calculation, because the result is a func-
tion only of the initial tread depth (after
break-in) and that measured 6,400 miles later.
Therefore, a wear rate calculated by the industry
method is extremely sensitive to errors in these
two measurements. In Notice 15, the NHTSA
proposed that wear rate be calculated by the
least-squares regression method, as described
above. This approach has the advantage of
weighting all measurements and minimizing the
effect of inaccurate readings, so it has been
adopted.

Differing tires on a single test vehicle. Uni-
royal and the E.T.R.T.O. argued that each test
convoy vehicle should be equipped with four iden-
tical tires; the reason given was that otherwise,
the performance of a candidate tire would be a
function of the tires chosen by the NHTSA for
use on the other axle of the test vehicle during
compliance testing. Tlie NHTSA is unaware of
any data that support this position. The rule
adopted today requires that all vehicles in a single
convoy be equipped with tires of the same general
construction type, and that all tires on a single
vehicle be of the same size designation. In exten-
sive testing at San Angelo with this procedure,
none of the suggested undesirable variations has
been observed.

Differing test vehicles in a single convoy. Sev-
eral commenters suggested that the rule specify
that all vehicles in a given convoy be identical,
to reduce variations in projected treadlife. The
NHTSA is in complete agreement with the
premise that those variables Avhich can be iden-
tified and which can affect treadwear results
should be controlled as closely as is feasible.
Variations in vehicle type, however, do not ap-
pear to produce significant variations in tread-
wear projections. Nevertheless, to minimize
such variations, tires will be tested for compliance
only on vehicles for which they are available as
original equipment or recommended replacement
options. Where practical, all vehicles in a given
convoy will be of the same make. However, to
test tires designed for the range of wheel sizes
available, the suggested method would require a
proliferation of course monitoring tires, one for
each combination of wheel size and construction
type. Therefore, the suggestion has not been
adopted.

Accuracy of tread depth measurements. The
RMA suggested that the interval between meas-
urements be increased to 1,600 miles to reduce the
effects of measurement error. However, if this
interval were used instead of 800 miles, only five
readings would be obtained in the 6,400 mile
treadwear test, so errors in any one reading
would result in a greater overall error. A re-
cently completed study (Kondo, A. and Brenner,

PART 575— PRE 34

F.C., "Ro|)oit on Round-Robin Groove D(>|)tli
MeasuriiifT Experiment," NHTiSA Technical .Vote
T-I012, March 1975 — General Reference entry
no. 44 in this docket) shows that variations
amonp measurements of tlie same tread dei)tii by
different operators do not present a serious prob-
lem. The study found that tlie only sijjnificant
variations in measurement results occur as a re-
sult of differences in measuring techni([ues
between different laboratories. Since these tech-
niques are consistent witliin a piven laboratory,
the different laboratories arrive at the same re-
sults in terms of the slope of the tread depth
rejjression line that is the basis of the treadwcar

grade.

TRACTION

Traction grades are based on a tire's traction
coefficient as measured on two wet skid pads, one
of asphalt and one of concrete. Because a method
for producing identical skid test surfaces at dif-
ferent sites lias not yet been developed, the
NHTSA has established two skid pads, described
in .Vppendix B, near the treadwear test course in
San Angelo. These pads represent typical higli-
way surfaces. The asphalt surface has a traction
coefficient, when tested wet using the American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
E 501 tire, of 0.50 ±0.10. The concrete surface
was described in Notice 12 as having a traction
coefficient, when similarly tested, of 0.47 ± COf).
Due to surface polishing, this coefficient has de-
clined and stabilized at 0.35 ± 0.10. As with
the treadwear course, these pads are available
for use by manufacturers as well as the agency.
P'or allocations of test time, industry members
should contact the NIITSA facility manager at
the above address.

Before each candidate tire test, the traction
coefficient of each surface is measured with two
ASTM tires to monitor variations in the surface,
using a two-wheeled test trailer built in ac-
cordance with ASTM Method E-274-70. The
candidate tire's traction coefficient is similarly
measured on each surface, and then adjusted by
adding a fixed coefficient (0.50 for asphalt, 0.35

EReclive: January 1, 1976
July 1, 1976
January 1, 1977
July 1, 1977

for concrete) and subtracting the average co-
eliicicnt obtained from measurements with the
two ASTM tires.

The tire industry's major objection to the pro-
posed rule was that, with four possible grades
fur traction, two tires might be graded ditl'ereiitly
without a meaningfvd difference in their per-
formance. The RMA suggested a scheme with
two grade categories aliove a minimum requiie-
ment. The rule issued today, by setting two
tlireshold levels of perfoiiiuuice, estal)lishes three
giades: "0", for perfoiiiiance below the first
threshold; "*", for performance above the first
tiiiesiioli] ; and "**■', for ])ei'formunce above tlie
second threshold. The NIITSA is convinced tiiat
the grades thus defined reflect significant differ-
ences in traction performance.

Firestone suggested that fiirthei- testing may
demonstrate that only one pml is necessary to
give the best and most consistently repeatable
results. However, the ranking of a group of
tires based on their performance on one surface
can differ fi'oin tlieir ranking on anotlier surface.
In fact, one tii'c niiuiufacturer suggested tliat an
additional sui'face of low coelficient be included
in the testing scheme for this reason. The
XHT.SA agrees that an additional surface may
increase the utility of the traction grading sj-s-
tem, and anticipates a proposal to implement this
suggestion in the future.

The .suggestion of Pirelli, that measurements
be made during the period between 0.5 and 1.5
seconds after wiieel lockup instead of the period
between 0.2 and 1.2 seconds, has been adopted.
To permit more efficient use of the skid [)ads, tiie
rule specifies a test sequence which differs slightly
from that originally i)roi)ose(l : instead of being
tested rei)eatedly on the asphalt pad and then
repeatedly on the conci-ete pad, each tire is run
alteinately over the two pads. A change in
])aragraph (f) (2) (i) (A) permits tires to be con-
ditioned on the test trailer as an alternati\e to
conditioning on a i)assenger car. Anotlier change
facilitates the use of traileis witii iiistiuinenta-
tion on only one side, whicli had been inad-
vertently precluded by the wording of the
proposed rule.

PART 575— PRE 35

EfFecfive: January T, 1976
July 1, 1976
January 1, 1977
July 1, 1977

TEMPERATURE RESISTANCE

The major objection to the proposed high
speed performance grading scheme was that it
was neither necessary nor beneficial to the con-
sumer. Several commenters pointed out that
Standard No. 109 specifies testing a tire against
a laboratorj' wheel at a speed corresponding to
85 mph, and argued that certification of a tire
to this minimum requirement provides the con-
sumer with adequate information about its per-
formance at all expected driving speeds. They
suggested that only one higher grade be estab-
lished, for tires designed to be used on emergency
vehicles. Some commenters indicated that, as
proposed, the rule seemed to condone or even
encourage the unsafe operation of motor vehicles
above legal speed limits. To preclude this mis-
interpretation, the third tire characteristic to be
graded has been renamed "temperature resist-
ance". The grade is indicative of the running
temperature of the tire. Sustained high tem-
perature can cause the material of the tire to
degenerate and reduce tire life, and excessive
temperature can lead to sudden tire failure.
Therefore, the distinctions provided by three
grades of temperature resistance are meaningful
to the consumer. Except for the name change,
this aspect of quality grading has been adopted
as proposed. A grade of "C" corresponds to the
minimum requirements of Standard No. 109.
"B" indicates completion of the 500 rpm test
stage specified in paragraph (g)(9), while "A"
indicates completion of the 575 rpm test range.

PROVISION OF GRADING INFORMATION

Several commenters objected to the proposed
tread label requirement, suggesting that point-
of-sale material such as posters and leaflets could
provide the consumer with adequate information
about tire grades. For the reasons discussed in
Notice 12, the NHTSA is convinced that labels
affixed to the tread of the tire are the only satis-
factory method of providing complete informa-
tion to replacement tire purchasers. Therefore,
the scheme for transmitting quality grading in-
formation to consumers, combining sidewall mold-

ing, tread labels, and point-of-sale materials, has
been adopted substantially as proposed. A
change in paragraph (d)(1) (ii) clarifies the
respective duties of vehicle manufacturers and
tire manufacturers to provide information for
prospective purchasers.

Several vehicle manufacturers requested that
new vehicles not be required to be equipped with
graded tires until six months after the date that
tires must be graded. These commenters appear
to have misunderstood the scope of the quality
grading standard. The NHTSA expects that
tires which comply with the standard will appear
on new vehicles as inventories of ungraded tires
are depleted. Part 575.6 requires of the vehicle
manufacturer only that he provide the specified
information to purchasers and prospective pur-
chasers when he equips a vehicle with one or
more tires manufactured after the applicable
effective date of this rule.

The NHTSA has determined that an Infla-
tionary Impact Statement is not required pur-
suant to Executive Order 11821. Industry cost
estimates and an inflation impact review are filed
in public Docket No. 25. This review includes
an evaluation of the expected cost of the rule.

In consideration of the foregoing, a new
§ 575.104, "Uniform Tire Quality Grading Stand-
ards" is added to 49 CFR Part 575. . . .

Effective dates. For all requirements other
than the molding requirement of paragraph
(d)(l)(i)(A) : January 1, 1976, for radial ply
tires; July 1, 1976, for bias-belted tires; January
1, 1977, for bias ply tires. For paragraph
(d) (1) (i) (A) : July 1,1976, for radial ply tires;
January 1, 1977, for bias-belted tires; July 1,
1977, for bias-ply tires.

(Sees. 103, 112, 119, 201, 203; Pub. L. 89-563,
80 Stat. 718 (15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1407, 1421,
1423) ; delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on May 20, 1975.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

40 F.R. 23073
May 28, 1975

PART 575— PRE 36

Effective: Jonuory 1, 1976
July 1, )976
January 1, 1977
July 1, 1977

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

(Docket No. 25; Notice 18)

This notice republishes, with minor changes,
paragraphs (e) (1) (v) and (f) (2) (i) (B), Figure
2, and the appendices of § 575.104, Uniform Tire
Quality Grading Standards, which was published
May 28, 1975 (40 F.R. 23073; Notice 17).

In describing the rims on which candidate tires
are to be mounted, Notice 17 inadvertently re-
ferred to the Appendix to Standard No. 110.
On February 6, 1975, the definition of "test rim"
in Standard No. 109 was amended and the Ap-
pendix to Standard No. 110 was deleted (Docket
No. 74-25; Notice 2; effective August 5, 1975).
Under the new definition, a "test rim" may be
any of several widths, only one of which is equal
to that listed under the words "test rim width"
in Table I of the Appendix to Standard No. 109.
Paragraphs (e)(1) (v) and (f)(2)(i)(B) are
corrected to specify the rim mounting scheme in
terms of the new definition.

As Figure 2 was published in the Federal Reg-
ister, the words "DOT Quality Grades" appeared
as the Figure's title. In fact, the words are a
part of the text which must appear on each tread
label required by paragraph (d)(1)(B), and
accordingly the figure is republished with the
correct title.

The treadwear test course described in Ap-
pendix A is changed so that the loops are traveled
in the following order: south, east, and north-
west. This change is designed to increase safety
by reducing the number of left turns. The table
of key points and mileages is revised to reflect

the change. Corresponding changes are made in
the numbers used to designate these points in the
text and in Figure 3.

To prevent the bunching of test vehicles at
STOP signs and thereby increase safety, the
speed to which vehicles must decelerate when
abreast of the direction sign is changed in Ap-
pendix A to read "20 mph".

The reference to Figure 2 in the second para-
graph of Appendix B is corrected to indicate
that the asphalt skid nad is depicted in Figure
4. The shading of the skid pads is corrected to
correspond to the description in the text.

The first two paragraphs of Appendix C,
Method of Least Squares, were omitted. Those
paragraphs are now inserted and the graph is
designated as Figure 5.

In consideration of the foregoing, paragraplis
(e) (1) (v) and (f) (2) (i) (B), Figure 2, and the
appendices to § 575.104 of Title 49, Code of Fed-
eral Regulations, are republished. . . .

(Sees. 103. 112, 119, 201, 203; Pub. L. 89-563,
80 Stat. 718 (15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1407, 1421,
1423) ; delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on June 25, 1975.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

40 F.R. 28071
July 3, 1975

PART 575— PRE 37-38

Effective: Januory 6, 1976

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

(Docket No. 75-27; Notice 2)

This notice amends Standard No. 105-75, Hy-
draulic Brake Systems, 49 CFR 571.105-75, to
revise the parking brake test procedure (S7.7).
In addition, this notice amends Subpart B of
Part 575, Consumer Information, 49 CFR
§ 575.101, by replacing the present test procedures
in that section for passenger car testing with
equivalent procedures from Standard No. 105-75.

The NHTSA proposed a modification of the
parking brake test procedures in Standard No.
105-75 to permit a reapplication of the parking
brake if the first application of the brake failed
to hold the vehicle stationary on the test in-
cline. Toyo Kogyo requested the modification as
representative of normal driver action (in cases
where the application appears to be insuflGicient
to hold the vehicle), justifying the change as
necessary to permit new vehicle components to
stretch or "set" during the initial application as
occurs in any vehicle delivered to a purchaser.
The NHTSA agreed that reapplication would be
a reasonable test procedure and proposed a re-
vision of S7.7.

Comments were received from Toyo Kogyo,
General Motors, American Motors Corporation,
and Chrysler Corporation in support of the
change. No comments were received that ob-
jected to the proposal. The standard is amended
accordingly.

The NHTSA also proposed that the consumer
information item requiring publication of the
stopping ability of passenger cars and motor-
cycles (49 CFR §575.101) be modified for pas-
senger cars so that test data developed under
Standard No. 105-75 could be the basis for the
required consumer information. The existing
test procedures of the consumer information item
would be replaced by Standard No. 105-75 test
procedures, and a transition period until Jan-

uary 1, 1977, would be provided to allow manu-
facturers latitude in adopting the new procedures.

The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
(MVMA), Chrysler Corporation, American Mo-
tors Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and
General Motors Corporation supported the mod-
ifications. The MVMA and Ford pointed out an
inadvertent omission in the proposal of a required
change in the present loading specification (max-
imum loaded vehicle weight) to the Standard
No. 105-75 loading specification (gross vehicle
weight rating (GVWR)). No comments op-
posed the modification, and the consumer in-
formation it€m is therefore amended as proposed,
with the additional modification noted by the
MVMA and Ford. The transition period for
use of either loading specification conforms to
the transition period for use of either test pro-
cedure (until January 1, 1977). The MVMA
asked for a June 1, 1977, date for transition to
the new loading specification but did not explain
the need for more time. The NHTSA will con-
sider any data on this subject submitted by the
MVMA.

With regard to test loading, Chrysler Cor-
poration repeated a request for revision of the
loading conditions of Standard No. 105-75. The
request was earlier submitted improperly as a
petition for reconsideration of an NHTSA ac-
tion which did not deal with test loading (40
F.R. 24525, June 9, 1975). Section 553.35 of
NHTSA regulations (49 CFR 553.35) allows
petitions for reconsideration of rules issued by
the NHTSA, but in this case no rule was issued
on test loading that could form the basis for re-
consideration. The NHTSA discussed Chrysler's
request at a meeting with Chrysler officials on
August 21, 1975. Based on the limited informa-
tion presented by Chrysler at that meeting, the

PART 676— PRE 89

EfFeclive: January 6, 1976

NHTSA has concluded that a reduction in test
weight would not be justified. At the meeting it
was agreed that Chrysler would submit any addi-
tional data it had in support of the request. To
date no data have been received, and the NHTSA
cannot meaningfully reconsider Chrysler's re-
quest without further data.

The NHTSA also proposed modification of the
means for establishing the skid number of the
surface on which stopping distance tests are con-
ducted in Standard No. 105-75, Standard No.
121, Air Brake Systems, Standard No. 122, Mo-
torcycle Brake Systeins, and the Consumer
Information Item on brake performance. Com-
ments received were not in agreement on how to
accomplish the transition from the former ASTM
method to the new one. The skid number pro-
posal will therefore be treated separately at a
later date so that its resolution will not delay
this amendment of the parking brake and con-
sumer information item test procedures.

In consideration of the foregoing, amendments
are made in Chapter V of Title 49, Code of Fed-
eral Regulations. . . .

Effective date : January 6, 1976. Because these
amendments, to the extent that they impose new
substantive requirements, are made optional for
an interim period, and because manufacturers
must plan future testing based on the test pro-
cedures as they exist in the present standard, it
is found for good cause shown that an immediate
effective date is in the public interest.

(Sec. 103, 119 Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (15
U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.51).

Issued on December 31, 1975.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

41 F.R. 1066
January 6, 1976

PART 575— PRE 40

Effective: April 1, 1976

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

(Docket No. 76-1; Notice 2)

This notice amends 49 CFR 567 and 575 to
allow manufacturers an alternative method of
referring: purchasers to appropriate consumer
information tables.

On January 22, 1976, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration issued in the
Federal Register (40 FR 3315) a notice which
proposed amending 49 CFR 575, Consumer In-
formation, and 49 CFR 567, Certification, to allow
the consumer information document provided to
the purchaser of a vehicle to refer the reader to
the vehicle's certification label to detennine which
information applied to that vehicle. This infor-
mation, which relates to the perfoniiance char-
acteristics of the vehicle, is required to be made
available to purchasers by 49 CFR 575.6(a).
Currenth% if the document containing this infor-
mation also contains information relating to other
vehicles, the document itself must clearly indi-
cate which information is applicable to the ve-
hicle purchased. The NHTSA proposal was
made in response to a petition from the General
Motors Corporation which suggested that the
proposed alternative procedure would for some
companies be a more efficient and less costly
method of accomplishing the purposes of the
regulation.

Comments in support of the proposal were re-
ceived from General Motors Corporation, Amer-

ican Motors Corporation, Chrysler Corporation
and Ford Motor Company. No comments in
opposition were received.

Based on the petition of General Motors and
the comments concerning the notice of proposed
rulemaking, the NHTSA concludes that allowing
an alternative method of designating the appro-
priate consumer information tables would reduce
the possibility of error and lessen the cost to the
manufacturer.

In consideration of the foregoing, Parts 567
and 575 of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations,
are amended. . . .

Effective date : April 1, 1976. Because the pro-
cedures established herein arc optitmal and im-
pose no increased burden on any party, it is
found for good cause shown that an immediate
effective date is in the public interest.

(Sec. 103, 112, 114, 119, Pub. L. 80-563, 80
Stat. 718 (15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1403, 1407);
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on : March 26, 1976.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

41 FR. 13923
April 1, 1976

PART 575— PRE 41-42

Effactlva: June 14, 1976

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

(Docket No. 75-27; NoHce 4)

This notice amends Standard No. 105-75,
Hydraulic Brake Systems, and Standard No. 122,
MotarcycU Brake Systems, to modify the means
for establishing^ the frictional resistance of the
surface on which stopping distance tests are con-
ducted. A similar amendment is made to Part
575, Consumer InfwmMiati, of Title 49 of the
Code of Federal Regulations.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration (NHTSA) proposed the change in
Standard No. 10.5-75 (49 CFR 571.10.5-75).
Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems (49 CFR
571.121), Standard No. 122 (49 CFR 571.122).
and the Consumer Information Regulations (49
CFR 575.101) in response to a petition from
British-Leyland Motors Limited (40 FR 45200,
October 1, 1975). The existing test procedure
in these regulations has specified use of the
American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM) E-274-65T procedure, using an ASTM
E249 tire that is no longer manufactured.

Responses were received on the proposed
ASTM change from White Motor Corporation
(White), Mack Trucks, Inc. (Mack), Freight-
liner Corporation (Freightliner), Ford Motor
Company (Ford), General Motors Corporation
(GM), Chrysler Corporation (Chry.sler), Amer-
ican Motors Corporation (AMC), and Interna-
tional Harvester (IH). The National Motor
Vehicle Safety Advisory Council made no com-
ment on the proposal.

Most commenters supported use of the new
test procedure and tire, although they differed in
recommendations for correlating the reading
produced under the new procedure with that
produced under the old procedure. Manufactur-
ers are presently certifying compliance to brake
standards on test surfaces with a satisfactory
reading under the old procedure, and they should
be able to continue testing and certifying com-

pliance on the same surface without any increase
in the severity of the tests. To accomplish this
transition, the correlation in readings between
the procedures has been determined, and the dif-
ference is reflected in a change of the dry surface
value from "skid number" 75 to "skid number"
81.

Freightliner urged postponement of any action
until it could be supported by "adequate and
statistically reliable test data." AMC also rec-
ommended that the NHTSA do nothing "until
tlie industry has had sufficient time to evaluate
and verify the performance of the ASTM E501
test tire on all types of surfaces."

The change in procedure is prompted by the
ASTM decision to utilize a new tire in ascertain-
ing the frictional coefficient of test surfaces. As
a result the old tire is no longer manufactured
and only the new tire is available for skid num-
ber measurement. Manufacturers have conducted
comparative tests with the new tire to determine
the correlation between the readings given by the
two tires. Neither Freightliner nor AMC sub-
mitted data showing that the agency's proposal
to adjust the dry surface skid number upwards
is unjustified. Only Mack submitted data and it
supported the NHTSA and Federal Highway
Administration test data that have been placed
in the docket. General Motors considered the
agency's proposed upward adjustment to be the
maximum desirable based on its data. Interna-
tional Harvester, Chrysler, and Ford supported
the change in dry surface skid number without
qualification, and White suggested that a skid
number of 85 be utilized. The agency finds that
the AMC and Freightliner requests for further
delay are unjustified.

Ford and Freightliner asked that the skid
number for the lower coefficient (wet) surface
also be adjusted. The agency's purpose in pro-

PART 575— PRE 43

EfFeclive: June 14, 1976

posing the adjustment is limited to changes nec-
essary to avoid a modification of tlie test surfaces
or an increase in the severity of performance
levels specified under the safety standards. The
NHTSA earlier concluded that change of the wet
surface specification was unnecessary, and no evi-
dence has been supplied that would modify the
earlier determination.

General Motors noted that an editorial change
to the newer ASTM procedure does not appear
in early publications of that procedure. To put
all interested persons on notice of the editorial
change, the NHTSA has included the change in
its references to the ASTM E274-70 procedure.

Freightliner asserted that the newer procedure
included modification of a formula that justified
a larger upwards adjustment than that proposed
by the agency. Actually, the modifications only
corrected an error in the earlier formula which
had no effect on the determination of frictional
coefficient. Manufacturers either utilized a test
trailer that obviated the need for calculations
using the formula, or were aware of the error
and corrected for it in their calculations. Thus
the adjustment requested by Freightliner is not
warranted.

In accordance with recently-enunciated De-
partment of Transpoi'tation policy encouraging
adequate analysis of the consequences of regula-
tory action (41 FR 16201, April 16, 1976), the
agency herewith summarizes its evaluation of the
economic and other consequences of this amend-
ment on the public and private sectors, including
possible loss of safety benefit. Because the new
references to procedures and a test tire are ex-
pected to accord with existing practices, the
amendment is judged not to have any significant
impact on costs or benefits of the standards and
consumer information item that are modified by
the change.

Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems, is pres-
ently subject to judicial review under Section
105(a) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act (15 U.S.C. Section 1394(a)). The
U.S. Court of Appeals hearing the petition for
review has indicated that it prefers to review the
standard as it presently exists, without unneces-
sary amendment. To the degree possible, the
agency is complying with that request and there-
fore, in the case of Standard No. 121, will delay
the update of ASTM procedure until review is
completed.

It is noted that this change in procedure for
ascertaining the frictional resistance of the test
surface does not invalidate data collected using
the older procedure, and manufacturers can pre-
sumably certify on the basis of stopping distance
tests conducted on surfaces measured by the old
tire.

In consideration of the foregoing, amendments
are made in Chapter V of Title 49, Code of
Federal Regulations. . . .

Effective date: June 14, 1976. Because the
older test tire is no longer manufactured, and
because the amendment of procedure and test tire
is intended only to duplicate the existing proce-
dure and tire, this amendment creates no addi-
tional requirements for any person, and an
immediate effective date is found to be in the
public interest.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; delegation of authority
at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on June 8, 1976.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

41 F.R. 24592
June 17, 1976

PART 575— PRE 44

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION REGULATIONS

Uniform Tire Quality Grading
(Docket No. 25; Notice 24)

Action; Final rule.

Summary: This notice announces the etfective
dates for implementation of a uniform tire qual-
ity grading regulation with respect to bias and
bias-belted tires, as authorized by Section 203 of
the National Ti-affic und Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966. This notice also responds to com-
ments on, and makes final, proposals concerning
course monitoring tires and labeling as well as to
petitions for reconsideration of the rule.

Elective date: For all requirements, other than
the molding requirement of paragraph (d)(1)
(i) (A), the effective dates are: March 1, 1979 for
bias ply tires, and September 1, 1979 for bias-
belted tires.

For paragraph (d) (1) (i) (A), the molding re-
quirement, the effective dates are: September 1,
1979 for bias ply tires, and March 1, 1980 for
bias-belted tires. Xo effective date is established
at this time for radial tires.

Addresses: Petitions for reconsideration of the
tire labeling amendments should refer to the
docket number and be submitted to: Room 5108,
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street S.W., Wash-
ington, D.C. 20590.

For fv/rther information contact :

Dr. F. Cecil Brenner, Office of Automotive
Ratings, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202) 426-1742.

Supplementary information: On May 28, 1975
(40 FR 23073), the NHTSA published as a final
rule a regulation pertaining to Uniform Tire
Quality Grading (UTQG) as authorized by the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966 (the Act) (15 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.). The

purpose of this regulation is to alleviate confusion
in the purchase of passenger car tires and to
provide simple comparative data upon which an
informed tire selection can be made by consum-
ers. Under the regulation, tires will he graded
in three areas of performance: treadwear, trac-
tion, and temperature resistance.

Implementation of the regulation was delayed
pending litigation of the validity of its grading
procedures. In B.F. Goodrich et al v. Depart-
ment of Transportation^ 541 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir.,
1976), the court upheld for the most part the
agency's approach to tire quality grading. The
court remanded for further agency consideration,
however, two aspects of the regulation. First, the
court suggested that the NHTSA reexamine tlie
labeling requirements of the regulation to ensure
that sufficient warnings would Ik> provided to
consumers to avoid the misapplication of the
label infonnation. Second, the court remanded
to the agency the matter of the selection of course
monitoring tires, for the agency to complete its
testing and selection of the three course monitor-
ing tires or, if this had already been accom-
plished, for reopening of the record to permit a
brief period of industry conunent on the selec-
tions. The court upheld the rule in all other
respects.

Pursuant to the remand in the B. F. Goodi-ich
decision, the agency issued two proposals; one to
modify labeling requirements and the other an-
nouncing the selection of the couree monitoring
tires. Comments were received from several
manufacturers and manufacturer representatives.
This notice responds to those comments.

In response to the publication of the ITTQG
regidation (May 28, 1975) (40 FR 23073), the
agency received several petitions for reconsidera-

PART 575— PRE 45

tion. The. agency announced that these petitions
would not be immediately answered owing to the
ongoing litigation involving the regulation (40
FR 57806). Since the challenge to the regulation
has now been disposed of by the court, this notice
responds fully to those petitions for reconsidera-
tion.

/. Labeling (Notice 21).

On December 13, 1976, the NHTSA published
a notice of proposed rulemaking to revise the
traction and temperature resistance labeling re-
quirements of UTQG (49 CFR 575.104). That
notice was in response to the decision in the B. F.
Goodrich case.

The petitioners in the B. F. Goodrich case
argued that the then existing labeling require-
ments would be misleading in several respects
pertaining to traction testing and temperature
resistance. The court, remanded those issues to
the agency for further consideration, suggesting
the addition to the labels of clarifying warnings.
The agency's December 13, 1976 notice proposed
warnings in accordance with the court's decision
that would ensure that UTQG label information
would not be misconstrued.

The NHTSA received seven comments in re-
sponse to the notice of proposed rulemaking.
Most of these comments favored the warnings
proposed by the agency with several comments
proposing minor editorial changes for clarity.
The agency has altered somewhat the final version
of these warnings in consideration of the com-
ments. The Vehicle Equipment Safety Commis-
sion did not submit comments.

Treadwear Labeling

The Rubber Manufacturers Association
(RMA) recommended in its comments that the
agency modify the treadwear example in Figure 2
which explains that tires rated at 200 will achieve
twice the mileage as tires ratad at 100. RMA
indicated that few if any commercially available
tires could achieve such a rating. Accordingly,
they suggested that the example show that a tire
rated 150 would wear li/o times as well as a tire
graded 100.

The agency considers RMA's suggestion to
have merit. Initially, the 200 figure was selected
for the example because it facilitates understand-

ing of the treadwear grading concept since it
speaks in terms of round numbers (e.g., a tire
grade 200 wears twice as well as a tire grade
100). However, since few tires can achieve such
a rating, the example would have little practical
application. Therefore, the agency modifies the
example to reflect that 150 represents a treadlife
11/2 times as good as that represented by the
grade of 100.

Traction Labeling

Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, Firestone
Tire and Rubber Company, and the RMA sug-
gested in their comments that the NHTSA amend
the traction infomiation in Figure 2 of the label
to indicate that the tires were tested under con-
trolled conditions on specified government test
surfaces. The agency believes that this informa-
tion is useful to prevent misleading the consumer
and amends Figure 2 accordingly.

General Motors Corporation (GM) re<"om-
mended that the agency add further warnings to
the ti'action information that would indicate that
actual traction results would diifer depending
upon tread depth, road surface, and speed. GM
contended that the proposed warning did not
suiRciently detail the extent of the limitations
upon the use of these traction data.

The NHTSA is concerned that the warnings
printed in the tire information be kept to the
absolute minimvuu in length while ensuring ade-
quate consumer information. If warnings and
tire information become so lengthy as to become
burdensome upon the consumer to read, it is pos-
sible that the information would go unused. The
agency has determined that the statement in the
warning that a tire was "measured under con-
trolled conditions on specified government test
surfaces" indicates that the test results were
achieved under highly specified conditions.
Clearly, changes in any of the test conditions
could affect the traction results. This meaning
is obvious from the present wording of the warn-
ing and further elaboi'ation would needlessly
lengthen the tire information. Therefore, the
agency declines to adopt GM's suggested modifi-
cation.

The agency has reached the position that the
clarity of the traction grading information might

PART 575— PRE 46

be enhanced by the use of the letters A, B, and C
in place of the symbols **, *, and O presently
employed to denote traction grades. A proposal
to motlify the traction ".n-ailiiifr system by substi-
tution of the lettei-s A, B, and C for the present
traction symbols is published concurrently with
this notice in the proposed rule section of tlie
Federal Register.

Temperature Resistance Labelinji

Several commenters sufj^estetl that the tire tem-
perature warning be clarified to indicate that ex-
cessive speed, underinflation, or excessive loading,
either alone or in combination, can result in tem-
perature increases and possible tire failure. The
commenters suggested this change because heat
build-up can occur at normal speeds when there
is tire underinflation or overloading. The current
proposal, however, implies that heat build-up
would only occur at excessive speeds. The
NHTSA agrees with this suggestion and nuxlifies
the temperature warning accordingly.

The RMA suggested that the label elaborate
on the meaning of the temperature grades C, B,
and A. The grades C, B, and A represent com-
parative differences in a tire's ability to with-
stand the generation of heat without suti'ering
structural degeneration and potential tire failure.
Although the grades C, B, and A in themselves
do not inform a consumer of the specific amount
of difference between tires in the three grades,
the grades do convey to the consumer the fact
that one tire performs better than the other in
this specific test. To specify more exactly the
amount of difference in heat dissipation repre-
sented by each grade or the technical nature of
the test involved would merely confuse many-
people not versed in the technical nature of the
test. Therefore, the agency has determined that
the temperature grading method should be re-
tained as it is. The NHTSA notas further that
the court in the B. F. Goodrich case examined
this aspect of temperature grading and found it
to be adequate.

Miscellaneous Labeling

Several commenters requei^ted that the agency
implement a labeling system similar to that em-
ployed by the Federal Trade ('onuuission (FTC)
under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Pub.

L. 03-637). The FTC in its regulations (16 CFR
Part 702) permits the display of warranty infor-
mation in any of four locations. The commenters
to Notice 21 suggested that the agency should
adopt the FTC's approach since Congress could
not have intended that our regulations be more
burdensome than those imposed under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Warranty Act).

The purpose of the Warranty Act is to ensure
the open display of warranty data in order to
provide consumei-s an opportunity to make buy-
ing choices based upon available warranties. The
purpose of UTQG is similar but not identical to
the Warranty Act. UTQG, like the Warranty
Act, is intended to provide information to the
consumer permitting him or her to make a ra-
tional choice in the selection of a product —
specifically tires. Beyond the warranty data,
however, the UTQG will dispel some of the in-
accuracies and otherwise misleading information
currently extant in the tire marketing: business.

Congress considered tire retailing procedures
to be a substantial problem. Ac^-ordingly, the
Congress enacted a special provision in the Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966 to provide information to consiuners on
these products. The agency considers this spe-
cific mandate to justify the requirement that
grading information be provided in several loca-
tions. At present, grading information must be
contained on the tire sidewall (49 CFR 575.104
(d)(l)(i)(A)), on a label affixed to the tread
surface (49 CFR 575.104(d) (1) (i) (B) ), and in
the information furnished under CFR 575.6(a)
and (c) to motor vehicle purchasers and to pro-
spective purchasers of vehicles or tires (49 CFR
575.104(d) (l)(ii) and (iii)). The provision of
UTQG information in several locations will en-
sure the broadest possible dissemination of this
information to consumers.

Further, unlike many other consumer goods
that can be adequately handled by the Warranty
Act, tires deserve additional consumer safeguards
owing to their varied methods of marketing and
their importance to traffic safety. Many con-
sumer gcKKis are purchase<l only as a single final
unit from a retail outlet (e.g., small appliances).
Tires, on tlie other hand, can l>e purchased indi-
vidually or can come, as in the case of original
equipment, as a component of another retail

PART 575— PRE 47

product (a motor vehicle). Accordingly, the
need for maximum dissemination of information
through several labeling locations is increased by
the varied methods of tire retailing. The crucial
role of tires in motor vehicle safety makes it
imperative that infonnation on tire quality be
brought to the attention of consumers regardless
of the marketing method employed.

The agency has previously carefully assessed
its requirements for labeling in compliance with
UTQG. In that assessment the agency deter-
mined that the Congressional mandate coupled
with the unique nature of tire marketing war-
ranted the labeling requirements established by
the NHTSA. Further, the court in the B. F.
Goodrich case upheld this labeling approach.
Therefore, the agency declines to adopt the modi-
fication suggested by the commenters concerning
the establishment of alternative labeling rather
than mandatory labeling in several locations.

With regard to the wisdom of the UTQG
labeling system in comparison with Warranty
Act provisions, it is instructive that the FTC
Chairman concluded in a September 16, 1977
letter to Goodyear that "it is apparent that the
Uniform Tire Quality Grading System will pro-
duce useful, reliable information for the buying
public." The letter contained no suggestions for
improvement of the UTQG regulation, or that
the UTQG regulation is in conflict with the
Warranty Act.

On a matter of general application to the infor-
mation label issue, Goodyear recommended that
the agency ensure that the tire grading informa-
tion will be presented to the tire purchaser. To
achieve this goal, Goodyear suggested that the
tire retailer be required to display the informa-
tion. Without such a requirement they argued,
tire grading information would not be useful.

The agency agrees that the provision of infor-
mation in an easily identifiable and readily ac-
cessible location is necessary to the success of the
tire grading concept. This is one of the reasons
that the agency has been insistent about requiring
the display of this information in a uniform
fashion. The NHTSA encourages the open dis-
play of this information but remains convinced
that the requirement that tires contain a label on
the tire tread explaining the grading system is

necessary for purposes of informing the public of
tire grading. This label cannot be removed from
the tire prior to sale. It is noted that a proposal
to modify the requirements for this label is pub-
lished concurrently with this notice in the pro-
posed rule section of the Federal Register.

II. Cmirse Monitoring Tires

On February 14, 1977, the agency issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking that tentatively
selected the course monitoring tires (CMT's) to
be used for treadwear testing (42 FR 10320;
February 22, 1977). The CMT's are run on the
treadwear test course simultaneously with candi-
date tires in order to provide an index of course
variability that allows the adjustment of tread-
wear results for such variability. The agency
had previously selected the CMT's for radial
tires. The court m.B. F. Goodrich suggested that
the NHTSA select all three of the CMT's con-
currently including bias ply and bias-belted
CMT's which the agency had previously not se-
lected. The court further suggested that the
agency permit a short comment period to receive
responses on the agency CMT selections.

Most of the comments to this proposal did not
question the selection of tires chosen by the
NHTSA. Rather, the comments focused upon
alleged inadequacies in the NHTSA rulemaking
procedures and the statistical analysis employed
by the agency to determine the coefficients of
variation (COV) for the tires selected. Several
commenters criticized aspects of the UTQG pro-
cedures previously determined to be valid by the
court in the B. F. Goodrich case.

Adequacy of NHTSA Data

B. F. Goodrich and several other commenters
argued that the agency did not provide ample
time for meaningful comment to the notice an-
nouncing the selection of CMT's. These com-
menters alleged that the agency did not submit
data to the docket in a timely fashion nor in
complete form. For example, they argued that
over 2,000 pages of data were docketed on Feb-
ruary 14, 1977, which could have been placed in
the docket as it was generated through the
months of testing.

The agency placed in the public docket on
February 14, 1977, more than 2000 pages of data

PART 575— PRE 48

accumulated through tests of the course monitor-
ing tires. The notice announcing the CMT selec-
tions was issued simultaneously, and both the
data and the notice were promptly brought to the
industry's attention, even though the notice was
not publislieil by the Federal Register until
February 22. Thus, the industry was given
somewhat more than the 30-day comment period
to analyze and evaluate the data. Comiucnters
should note that the court in the B. F. Goodrkh
case considered that a 30-day comment period
would be sufficient to permit atlcquate comment
on the agency announcement of the CMT selec-
tions.

The agency did not submit the data pertaining
to the CMT selections to the docket in a piece-
meal fashion as the commenters suggested should
be done for several reasons. Plrst, until all the
data were generated and reviewed by the agency
no decision could be made concerning the ade-
quacy, in light of the court's mandate, of the
CMT's initially selected by the agency. Only-
after accumulating a mass of data from many
tests could the agency be sure of its selections and
accordingly go forward with a notice making
public its selections. To have released this infor-
mation prior to the actual determination of the
adequacy of the chosen tires would have been
premature.

A second reason for waiting to release the in-
formation was the ongoing litigation on the sub-
ject of UTQG. The court's remand did not
formally reach the agency until the mandate is-
sued on December 3, 1976. Sine* further agency
rulemaking action depended upon the outcome of
the B. F. Goodrich case, the XHTSA considered
it necessarj' to receive the final mandate of the
court prior to continuing with its rulemaking
eflFort with respect to UTQG. Upon receipt of
the mandate of the court, the agency began rule-
making in compliance with the remand. Rule-
making proceeded expeditiously even though
petitioners in the B. F. Goodrich case had filed
a petition for certiorari.

A further criticism by the commenters con-
cerned an alleged continued withholding by the
agency of data nece.ssary for infonncd comments
on the CMT selections. Several commenters
stated that the data in the docket contain omis-

sions. For example, the numbered data do not
progress in a serial manner.

The agency has not withheld relevant informa-
tion from the docket as the commenters suggest.
The extent that the numbered data (test num-
l)ers) do not proceed in a .serial manner re-
sults from the inclusion of the docket only of
those tests involved with the computation of the
coefficients of variation (COV). The COV's were
computed from the first 6,400-mile cycle (after
an 800-mile break-in) of the CMT. as prescribed
in the UTQG regulation. Subsequent cycles run
on the same CMT were not run for purposes of
computing the COV. Therefore, subsequent test
cycles of the same tires were deleted from tlie
docketed data so as not to be confused with the
computation of the COV's. All of the data upon
wliich the agency based its detenninations per-
taining to the COV's were placed in the docket.

A further argument of the commenters was
that the agency failed to include an analysis of
the data indicating how our conclusions concern-
ing COV's were achieved. The agency has used
an established method for the determination of
the coefficients of variation. The method chosen
is an accepted statistical technique. The XHTSA
does not consider it necessary to reprcnlucc under-
lying, routine computatitms when each set of data
is put into the docket.

In connection with the alleged lack of informa-
tion in the docket, several commentei-s suggested
that the XHTSA make further submissions to
the docket concerning the test procedures used
by the agency in testing tlie CMT's. The existing
rule on UTQG contains the test procedures for
conducting treadwoar tests, and the B. F. Good-
rich case upheld these test procedures. When the
agency tests CMT's, the procedures outlined in
the rule are, of course, rigidly followed. Xo
other infoi-mation relevant to the conduct of these
tests exists to be placed in the docket.

Some commentci-s argued that the XHTSA
should make public some of the test variables in
existence on the days tests were conducted. For
example, they suggested that weatlier could have
an impact upon test results and, therefore, rec-
ords of such weather conditions should be made
available to them. The agency did not maintain
such records, for the simple reason that tlie CMT
procedure is specifically intended to account for

PART 575— PRE 49

all such variables. Of course, data such as
weather conditions, can be determined from the
information contained in the docket. The test
data list the date each test was iim. If parties
care to gather extraneous data for their own
purposes, weather infonnation for the days in
question can be obtained by contacting a weather
service. It should be noted that many major tire
manufacturers test in Southwest Texas. Indeed,
Goodyear has stated in a brochure which de-
scribes its San Angelo proving ground, that "the
San Angelo area presents the most ideal condi-
tions for tire testing in the United States."
(Docket 25, GR 86.)

The RMA requested as part of their comments
that, since further information should in their
opinion be placed in the docket, the agency ex-
tend the comment period. The agency, as stated
above, placed all pertinent information in the
docket, obviating the need for an extended com-
ment period. Further, NHTSA procedures for
requesting extensions, 49 CFR 553.19, require that
such a request be submitted not less than 10 days
before expiration of the coinnient period in ac-
cordance with those procedures. Instead, the
RAL\ included a request for extension in the
body of their docket comment. It should be
noted that, while the procedurally defective re-
quest was not granted, the agency has continued
to accept and consider the comments of the RMA
and others that have been received well after the
comment closing date.

Several commenters suggested that the NHTSA
publish the base course wear rates for the CMT's
chosen by the agency. Publication of these wear
rates, the commenters argued, was necessary for
their testing of the CMT's and thus for meaning-
ful comments on Notice 22. The agency dis-
agrees that it is necessary to have the base course
wear rates for purposes of commenting upon the
tires selected by the agency as CMT's. It is the
coefficient of variation experienced in the testing
that is relevant to their selection as monitors of
the course, and the base course wear rate is ir-
relevant to this consideration.

Since the commenters desired the publication
of these figures, albeit irrelevant to the selection
of the CMT's, the agency hereby makes them
public. The wear rates for the bias ply tire

(Armstrong Surveyor 78) and for the bias-belted
tire (General Jumbo 780) are 9.00 mils and 6.00
mils per 1,000 miles, respectively. Since these
figures have no impact upon the selection of
CMTs announced in Notice 22, no comment
period is required as a result of the publication
of the base course wear rates.

Firestone submitted two NHTSA technical
papers for inclusion in the Docket. These papers
have been modified by Firestone's underlining
without other comment. These papers are in-
cluded in the docket even though they are not
relevant to the present UTQG regulation.

Possible Radial Wear Rate Problem

In Notice 22, the agency stated that the data
appeared to indicate that the wear rate for some
radial tires may not be constant. The NHTSA
concluded, therefore, that radials would not be
included for the time being under the UTQG
rule, since computations made under that rule
contemplate a constant adjusted wear rate for
projection purposes. Industry commenters ob-
jected to this treatment of radials and argued
that the agency should not proceed with any of
the grading requirements unless it proceeds with
them all simultaneously.

These commenters cited the B. F. Goodrich case
which remanded the course monitoring tire issue
to the agency, because a selection of all of the
CMT's had not been made prior to the establish-
ment of an effective date for the implementation
of the rule to all tire types. The commenters
interpreted this court mandate to mean that the
agency was required to proceed with the promul-
gation of grading requirements for all three tire
types concurrently. The agency does not inter-
pret the court decision in that manner.

The 6th Circuit Court remanded to the agency
the issue of the selection of the CMT's. It should
be noted that at the time of the court decision
the agency had not selected the bias and bias-
belted CMT's even though it had established the
effective dates for all tire types. Moreover, the
court noted that the selection of the radial CMT
had been based upon a series of tests (reported
in NHTSA Technical Note T-1014) which were
flawed by a problem not clearly identified or ex-
plained. The court's conclusion, therefore, was

PART 575— PRE 50

that it was inappropriate to schedule the eflFective
date for compliance of tires with UTQG when
the NHTSA had not given notice and invited
comment on its selection of the CMT's. This
mandate of the court does not prohibit the pro-
inulgation of the rule in phases, however.

The court's opinion stated that it would be
inappropriate to require grading of a tire when
all of the procedures (in this case the CMT selec-
tion) had not been chosen, and commentetl upon,
for that tire. The court did not, in the opinion
of the XIITSA, state that the agency could not
proceed with rulemaking on some tire types pend-
ing further study of the application of the rule
to another tire type. Therefore, the agency does
not find merit in the position of the commenters
who allege that the agency must proceed with a
rule for all tire types at the same time.

The agency has responded to the remand in
Notice 22 by announcing the selection of all
CMT's. That notice gave the industry adequate
time to comment upon the agency's selections.
However, until possible problems concerning the
testing of radials are resolved, the agency will
not set an effective date for the application of
the rule to radial tires. As long as an effective
date applicable to the grading of radials is not
established prior to the establishment of grading
procedures for that tire, the NHTSA can imple-
ment the rule with respect to the other tire types
and is not in violation of the court's remand.

Several commenters argued that regardless of
the court mandate, the NHTSA should not go
forward with tire grading for two tire types
while excluding radials. The commenters as-
serted that altered test procedures for radials
could result in different tests or a different test
course for radial tires which would make com-
parisons between them and the other tire types
meaningless.

By this comment, it is apparent that some
people may have misunderstood the agency's
earlier notice announcing the possible problem
with radials. The problem that may attend tlie
grading of radial tires is one of computing the
wear rate after the 6400-mile te,st ha-s l)een com-
pleted, since there is some evidence suggesting
that these tires may not wear at a constant rate
after only an 800-mile break-in. No comparable

problem has been found for bias and bias-belted
tires. Ample data have been generated demon-
strating that the wear rates for bias ply and
bias-l)elted tires aie constant after an 800-mile
break-in. At present there are no plans to alt«r
the test course or the actual test procedures. If
changes were considered neces.sary in either the
test coui-se or procedures, careful attention would
then be given to their impact upon the compara-
tive nature of the grades given other tire types.
The agency would not implement test procedures
for radial tires that differ from the procedures
used for bias and liias-ljelted tii'es without afford-
ing adequate time for comment upon such test
procedures and without carefully evaluating com-
ments received on such test procedures.

The agency would like to note that with re-
spect to the issue of radials, it was stated in the
earlier notice that an apparent problem had been
discovered with radials. The agency is not yet
convinced that this problem does exist. How-
ever, until such time as further analysis can be
accomplished, the NHTSA considers it pi-ndent
to proceed cautiously with the implementation of
the UTQG recjuirements for radial tires.

Several commenters questioned the validity of
the test procedures for testing treadwear. Good-
year stated that the driving instnictions are un-
clear and, in particular, the braking procedure is
not good. Tliey stated further that the spacing
in convoys was dangerously close on comers.
Cooper Tire Company stated that the tests could
not be repeated within statistically acceptable
margins of error and, therefore, would be unen-
forceable.

The NHTSA does not agree with these com-
ments questioning the validity of the test meth-
odolog}'. The agency has determined that these
procedures provide a viable testing technique
which can be duplicated for enforcement pur-
poses. Further, the court in B. F. Goodrich up-
held the test methmlology. Accordingly, the
agency sees no need to mmlify the test procedures.

Goodyear also argued that the test course has
been changed since the last update of the rule by
the agency. For example, tliey argued that some
stop signs are now yield signs. On a test course
of this size and nature, minor modifications of
road signs are to be expected with certain regu-

PART 575— PRE 51

larity. The regulation only lists "key points" to
assist regulated parties, and has updated the
regulation to reflect changes in these key points
and will continue to do so. The minor changes
in the test track which liave occurred since the
last publication of the regulation are included in
this notice.

The agency notes that with respect to sign
changes in the treadwear course, such minor
changes have no significant impact on tire grad-
ing. The use of CMT's is designed to reduce the
eifects, if any, of the course variables, including
course markings. Therefore, the agency consid-
ers that minor changes in the road markings
which will occur from time to time should have
no impact upon the comparative ratings of tires.
Nevertheless, the NHTSA will make every eifort
to update the regulation periodically to reflect
changed course markings.

///. Effective dates

Several commentere asserted that the agency
must propose effective dates to give the industry
time to comment on the appropriateness of such
dates. Notice 22 did not propose effective dates
for the implementation of the regulation to bias
and bias-belted tires. The agency has established
the effective dates for all provisions other than
the molding requirement as seven months from
the publication of the final rale in the case of
bias ply tires and 13 months from publication in
the case of bias-belted tires. An additional six
months has been provided in each case for the
revision of tire molds. The issue of effective
dates was litigated in the B. F. Goodrich case.
The court there held that the implementation
lead time as chosen by the agency was sufficient.
The determination was based upon an evaluation
of the capacity of the treadwear course and trac-
tion skid pads in i-elation to the number of tires
to be tested. Therefore, since the agency has not
modified the test procedure in any manner, there
is no need to raise again the issue of effective
dates as long as the agency allows the same lead
time as was held valid by the court. Moreover,
as noted in the court's opinion, the agency will
closely monitor the actual use of the treadwear
course and traction skid pads and will exercise
its discretion to extend the lead time periods if it
should become necessary to do so in the future.

Cooper Tire Company stated that changing the
order of implementation of the requirements re-
quires a reassessment of the effective date require-
ments. For example, radial tires no longer will
be the first tire type to be tested. According to
Cooper, a manufacturer may be harmed by the
change in the order of implementation and fur-
ther study of the effective dates is thus warranted.

The agency does not agree that a change in the
order of implementation of the grading regula-
tion for different tire types requires total recon-
sideration of the effective dates. As set forth in
this notice and in Notice 22, bias ply will be the
first tire construction type required to be graded.
A count by NHTSA staff of the number of pas-
senger tire lines set forth in a standard reference,
"1977 Tread Design Guide" (published by the
Tire Information Center, Commack, New York),
excluding winter treads (snow tires) and dupli-
cates of the same tread design, indicates that of
some 1139 tire lines on the market, approximately
■431 are radials, 408 are bias-ply, and the remain-
ing 300 are bias-belted. Therefore, if ample time
was provided in the previous rule for the testing
of radials, and the court held that the lead time
was sufficient, there certainly should be sufficient
lead time to test bias ply tires which are fewer
in number. Although this change may create
greater test burdens for individual manufactur-
ers, it vdll not impair the ability of the test fa-
cilities to accommodate tire grading.

IV. Statistical Comments

The RMA criticized the NHTSA's statistical
analysis of the data upon which the coefficients
of variation were derived. The RMA submitted
a paper written by Dr. Shelemyahu Zacks pur-
porting to discredit the NHTSA's analysis.
Througli this paper the RMA suggested that the
coefficients of variation (COV) were larger than
the agency had indicated.

The analysis done by the NHTSA was con-
ducted according to statistically acceptable pro-
cedures, but the NHTSA concluded that it would
be prudent to obtain an impartial review of both
the Zacks' and the NHTSA's analyses of the
COV's. The agency contracted with a noted
statistician, Dr. Herbert Solomon, who reviewed
the agency's procedures in view of Dr. Zacks'
criticisms of those procedures and concluded that

PART 575— PRE 52

the agencj' was correct in its method of computa-
tion of the COV's. The full text of both the
Zacks and Solomon papers as well as the agency's
analyses of the former are in the public docket.

Subsequent to the Solomon report, the RMA
submitted several comments intended to refute
the accuracy of the report. In particular, the
RMA contended that the use by NHTSA of "n"
("n" = sample size), rather than "n-1", as the
divisor in computing the sample standard devia-
tion was incorrect and produced an inaccurately
low GOV. After careful review of tliis (juestion.
the agency has concluded that the use of "n" in
the formula for the sample standard deviation
is a proper statistical approach as a step in the
process of detennining the sample GOV. More-
over even if the alternative "n-l" fonnula were
adopted, the resulting COV's of 4.74, 3.08, and
2.70 for bias, belted bias, and radial tires respec-
tively would still fall within the 5% coefficient
of variation which was approved by the court in
the B. F. Goodrich case. The RMA's other con-
tentions were also carefully reviewed and were
found to be invalid and to reiterate much of the
information contained in earlier RMA comments.
Therefore, the agency declines to adopt the sta-
tistical approach proffered by the RMA as well
as the other recommendations of the RMA that
attend their method of statistical analysis.

B. F. Goodrich submitted a statistical study by
its engineering staff of models of the wear be-
havior of tires. (G. Thomas AVright, "The Ade-
quacy of Linear Models in Tread Life Testing").
The agency's analysis of the study revealed that
significant errors in the study accounted for
Wright's differences with the linear model em-
ployed in the regulation. The agency analysis
was placed in the docket, and B. F. Goodrich
subsequently filed a rebuttal to the analysis. Re-
view by the agency of tiuit rebuttal confirms that
Wright's differences with the regulation's linear
model involve his failure to observe conventional
statistical precepts.

Uniroyal submitted comments suggesting that
the NHTSA testing procedure did not adequately
consider the effects of actual driving conditions
upon tire grades. Uniroyal conducte<l a random
sampling of tires on automobiles in parking lots.
The conclusion of that study was that tires wear

at varied rates depending upon the type of car,
size of tire, load on the tire, and many other
variables. Uniroyal suggested that its results
indicated that it would have to test unlimited
combinations of its tires to ensure correct grading.

The NHTSA has always stated that UTQG
does not give an exact measurement of a tire's
life under all conditions. The agency realizes
that tire life will vai-j- dejiending upon a number
of conditions. The court in B. F. Goodrich also
recognized this fact when it stated that no test
designed to grade millions of tires will \y^ perfect.
Few measuring techniques are. However, for
this reason the agency cautions individuals con-
cerning misapplication of the grading informa-
tion.

The Uniroyal survey yields results that are to
be expected but that have no impact upon the
validity of the UTQG test procedures. The test
procedures for UTQG control most of the vari-
ables. The course, speexl, drivers, stopi)ing con-
ditions, and many other variables are controlled
for tire testing purposes. For those environ-
mental variables beyond the control of the agency,
the NHTSA uses the GMT to measure their
effect. The Uniroyal study did not control these
variables. Accordingly, it does not present an
accurate picture of comparative data between tire
lines. The agency has detennined that compar-
ing different tires under similar conditions on the
treadwear course and traction skid pads does
yield excellent comparative data. Therefore, the
agency discounts the value of the Uniroyal study
for purposes of questioning the validity of UTQG
testing. The Uniroyal study merely indicates
that the public must be cautioned against the
misuse of grades provided on the tires. The
NHTSA concludes that the warnings provided
on the grading label information provide suffi-
cient cautionary advice to the consumer.

Cooper Tire Company ran computer tests in-
tende<l to show that the same tire might receive
different grades with any two tire treadwear tests.
According to Cooper this indicated that the
UTQG requirements are unenforceable.

It has been argued in the past that enforcement
testing for many of tlie agency's regidations and
standards depends upon a t«st of a single piece
of equipment or motor vehicle and accordingly

PART 575— PRE 53

the results cannot be projected to all vehicles or
equipment. In other words, the commenters sug-
gest that a noncompliance in one vehicle or item
of motor vehicle equipment does not mean that
all vehicles are defective.

The agency's enforcement actions pertaining to
all standards have been conducted, in the past,
using a variety of data. A failure of equipment
or a vehicle to reach a performance standard
during an agency enforcement test indicates a
potential noncompliance. The agency then goes
to the manufacturer of the affected vehicle or
equipment and requests the results of the manu-
facturer's tests or other data upon which he based
his certification of compliance with the standard.
A similar method of enforcement is contemplated
for UTQG.

V. Petitions for Reconsideration.

On May 28, 1975, the NHTSA published the
final UTQG rule. In response to that rule, sev-
eral petitions for reconsideration were received
by the agency. A response to these petitions for
reconsideration was delayed pending the outcome
of the litigation in the B. F. Goodi'ich case.
Several of the issues raised in the petitions have
been answered by that litigation or in subsequent
notices issued by the agency. The NHTSA will
now respond to those issues raised in the peti-
tions and not previously addressed.

Several tire manufacturei"s commented that the
lead time allowed prior to the effective date of
the regulation was not adequate. The Japan
Automobile Tire Manufacturers' Association, Inc.
argued that there were significant time problems
in the shipment of tires to the United States for
treadwear testing on our test course and trans-
mission of the resultant data back to Japan.

The issue of lead time was litigated in the
B. F. Good-rich case. The court upheld the
agency's proposed lead time. Since the agency
does not propose to reduce the amount of lead
time from that proposed in 1975, there should be
no problem with meeting the effective date of the
regulation.

Automobile manufacturers argued that they
need more lead time than tire manufacturers
since the specificity of the data required in the
owner's manual forces them to wait until tliey

receive the newly graded tires before printing
the manuals. On a related point, many of the
manufacturers suggested that the agency require
in the owner's manual only general tire grading
information. They argued that this is necessary
l>ecause frequently manufacturers are una;ble to
obtain the tire with which they normally equip
their cars. In sucli an event, they would have to
print a new owner's manual containing the new
tire information and would be required by Part
575 of our regulations to submit a copy of this
new information to the NHTSA 30 days prior to
its issuance.

The agency has determined that the automobile
manufacturers should operate under the same
lead time constrictions as the tire manufacturers.
Therefore, the effective date of the requirements
applicable to the tire manufacturers shall also be
applicable to the automobile manufacturers. This
will ensure complete dissemination of grading
information at the earliest possible time.

The agency has concluded that the manufac-
turer's suggestion to provide only general tire
information in the owner's manual has merit.
It would be cumbersome for a manufacturer to
submit to the agency for 30-day review its own-
er's manual information every time a change in
tires was contemplated or required. The agency
considers it sufficient for purposes of informing
consumers, for manufacturers to provide general
grading information in tlie owner's manual. This
information would explain the grading system,
giving the cautionary warnings to the consumer
concerning the possible misuse of the UTQG in-
formation. The consumer could then be directed
to look at the tire sidewall for the particular
grading of the tire. The rule has been amended
to reflect this modification.

The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
(MVMA) and GM argued that the temperature
resistance grading system would be misleading to
consumers. Both suggested a two grade approach
to temperature testing using the "high speed"
designation for tires designed to operate under
those conditions. The agency does not agree that
the temperature information will be misleading.
The implementation of the proposed warnings on
the misuse of the temperature infonnation should
prevent any potential for consumer misunder-

PART 575— PEE 54

standing. The agency notes further that the
court upheld the existing temperature resistance
test.

Several manufacturers suggested that the
N^HTSA exempt the space saver tire from the
UTQG rex]uirements. They argued that this tire
is designed for a limited life and for a special
use only and, therefore, should not be required
to comply with the regulation.

The NHTSA agrees that the space saver tire
and other temporary' use spare tires should be
exempt from the requirements of the regulation.
These tires are of reduced size or are inflatable.
They are designed so that as installed in the
vehicle, they reduce vehicle weight and create
more vehicle interior space. Since the useful life
of these tires is frequently limited to 2,000 miles,
it would be inappropriate to require them to
comply with the treadwear requirements. The
agency amends the regulation to indicate that the
space saver and temporary use spare tires are
exempted from the regulation's requirements.

Volkswagen and the European Tyre and Rim
Technical Organisation (ETRTO) argued that
the treadwear information would confuse the
public and be misused. ETRTO argued further
that treadwear grading has nothing to do with
safety and should be deleted from the require-
ments.

The treadwear labeling requirements are proper
and were upheld by the court. Accordingly, the
agency declines to change or delete those require-
ments as suggested by the manufacturers. Fur-
ther, the agency notes that the UTQG regulation
is promulgated under a special authorization of
the Act (15 U.S.C. 1423) . It is a consumer infor-
mation regulation issued at the behest of the
Congress.

On a related matter of labeling, ETRTO also
requested that the words "treadwear", "tempera-
ture", and "traction" not be required to be molded
into the sidewall owing to the expense of that
operation. Once again, the 6th Circuit upheld
the agency on its proposed labeling requirements
while suggesting additional warnings to prevent
the misuse of that information. The NHTSA
requires the use of the words "traction", "tread-
wear", and "temperature", because these words

will help avoid confusion as to the meaning of
the symbols molded onto the tire sidewall.

ETRTO also suggested that NHTSA extend
the effective dates for the traction requirements
since the standard test trailer can not accommo-
date small tires. The agency declines to extend
the etfective date for the implementation of the
requirements. However, small tires are being ex-
cluded from the requirements until such time as
a test trailer is equipped to test them.

Dunlop recommended that the lowest of the
three possible tire traction grades be eliminated,
on grounds that an open-ended grade would
allow production of tires with extremely poor
traction in order to obtain higher treadwear or
temperature resistance grades. In effect, Dunlop
was requesting a minimum traction standard.
The agency has an outstanding proposal that
would establish such a minimum standard (38
FR 31841) ; November 19, 1973) and will respond
to Dunlop's request by means of the separate
rulemaking.

Dunlop suggested that the agency permit the
tire information to be molded onto the tire in
two tiers using smaller size lettering. Currently
the regulation requires that the information be
molded into the sidewall in either one or three
tiers using y^ inch lettering. Dunlop argued that
some of their tires are too small to permit the
display of information printed in one tier without
conflicting with other infonnation molded on the
sidewall. Further, they stated that the depth of
their tires was such that three tiers of infonna-
tion would not easily fit on them.

The exclusion of the smallest tires from the
UTQG requirements for the time being may
alleviate this problem since these are the tires
that present the greatest problems concerning
available space for sidewall molding. Nonethe-
less the agency amends the regulation to reduce
the print size of the required molding from y^
inch to %2 inch. Finally, the NHTSA can see
no reason not to permit the molding of informa-
tion into the sidewall in two tiers. Accordingly,
the agency amends the regulation establishing a
format for two tier information.

In a comment by P^TRTO, it was suggested
that the agency clarify its position with respect
to the use of front wheel drive and rear wheel

PART 575— PRE 55

drive vehicles in a convoy for treadwear testing.
The regulation states that the vehicles used will
be rear wheel drive vehicles, but the preamble
(Notice 17) stated that testing would be accom-
plished by the use of vehicles for which the tires
were designed, which might include front wheel
drive vehicles. In accordance with the regulation
which was issued in 1975 and upheld by the court,
the agency has determined that only rear wheel
drive vehicles will be used for treadwear testing.
This removes the possibility that any vehicle
variations between front and rear wheel drive
vehicles will aflfect the tire test results.

In accordance with Department policy encour-
aging adequate analysis of the consequences of
regulatory action, the agency has evaluated the
anticipated economic and other consequences of
this amendment on the public and private sectors.
The agency has determined that the regulation
will benefit tire consumers by affording them
more detailed information upon which to make
informed tire purchases. The regulation will
thus reduce some of the existing confusing claims
associated with tire marketing.

As the purpose of UTQGs is to help the con-
sumer make an informed choice in the purchase
of passenger car tires, the agency will soon ini-
tiate action to evaluate whether the rule is meet-
ing this goal. It is planned that surveys will be
undertaken to determine how easily imderstand-
able and meaningful the grades are to purchasers,
how the grades are utilized in purchase decisions
and any measurable economic effect that may
occur both within the passenger tire industry and
to consumers as a result of the rule. The empha-
sis will be on the utility of the grading system to
consumers. Major points of interest of the con-

sumer survey will be the extent to which consum-
ers use the grading system in their purchase
decisions, the extent to which it has increased
their knowledge and awareness of the characteris-
tice of various tire constructions and tire lines
and whether they feel the grading system is valid
and worthwhile.

Ejfective date f ruling : Under section 203 of the
Act, the Congress stated that the regulation
should become effective not sooner than 180 days
nor later than one year from the date that the
i-ule is issued. Based upon this direction and
other agency findings concerning required lead
time for grading tires, the agency has determined,
and the Court has upheld, that phased implemen-
tation of the rule in essentially 6-month intervals
is appropriate.

The program official and lawyer principally
responsible for the development of this rulemak-
ing document are Dr. F. Cecil Brenner and
Richard Hipolit, respectively.

In consideration of the foregoing Part 575.104
of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
is amended. . . .

(Sees. 103, 112, 119, 201, 203; Pub. L. 89-563,
80 Stat. 718 (15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1407, 1421,
1423) ; delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on July 12, 1978.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

43 F.R. 30542
July 17, 1978

PART 575— PRE 56

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION REGULATIONS

Temperature for Tire Testing
(Docket No. 25; Notice 25)

Action: Final rule.

Surmnary: This notice establishes a uniform tire
testing temperature for the test requirements of
the Uniform Tire Quality Grading regulation
and the Federal motor vehicle safety standard
for non-passenger-car tires. Tliis amendment
simplifies existing requirements by permitting
various tire tests to be conducted at the same
temperature.

Effective date: July 17, 1978.

For further information contact :

Arturo Casanova III, Crash Avoidance Di-
vision, Office of Vehicle Safety Standards,
National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washing-
ton, D.C. 20590 (202) 426-1715.

Supplementary information: The National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
proposed on March 3, 1977 (42 FR 12207), to
amend the ambient temperature conditions for
tire testing contained in Standard No. 119, New
Pneumatic Tires for Vehicles Other Than Pas-
senger Cars (49 CFR 571.119), and in Part 575,
Uniform Tire Quality Grading (49 CFR 575.104)
(UTQG). The purpose of this proposed amend-
ment was to harmonize existing tire testing tem-
peratures as requested by the Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company. The ambient temperatures
were previously specified as follows:

Standard No. 109: "100±5° F."

Standard No. 119: "any temperature ... up to
100° F."

UTQG : "at 105° F."

In the notice of proposed rulemaking, the
agency proposed to amend Standard Xo. 119 and
UTQG to reflect the tire temperature utilized in

Standard No. 109 (100±5° F.). As an alterna-
tive method of expressing the test temperature,
the NHTSA proposed to amend the standards to
specify "any temperature up to 95° F.

Five comments were received in response to
that proposal. All comments favored the pro-
posed amendment that would have instituted a
100±5° F. temperature. The Vehicle Equipment
Safety Commission did not take a position on
this proposal.

After consideration of the issues involved in the
proposal and review of the comments, the agencj'
has determined that the test temperature should
be expressed as "any temperature up to 95° F."
Accordingly, Standard No. 119 and UTQG are
amended to specify temperature testing at "any
temperature up to 95° F." It is the NHTSA's
opinion that the 95° F. test temperature is in
effect the same test temperature as would be
achieved by using the 5-degree tolerance (100=t5).

The NHTSA has often stated in interpretations
on similar issues that the use of tolerances in
safety standards reflects a misunderstanding of
the legal nature of the safety standards. Stand-
ards are not instructions, but perfonnance levels
that vehicles or equipment are required by law to
be capable of meeting. Any tolerance in this
context would be meaningless and misleading,
since it would merely have the etfect of stating a
performance level that the equipment must meet
when tested by the government, but in a confus-
ing manner.

Recognizing that no measurement is pci-fectly
precise, a manufacturer's tests should lx> designed
to show, using tire testing temperature as an
example, that his tires will comply with the re-
quirements at exactly 95° F. This may Ik' done
in at least two ways : ( 1 ) by using a test method

PART 575-PRE 57

that corresponds so closely to the required tem-
perature that no significant differences could
occur as a result of differences between the actual
temperature and the specified one, or (2) by de-
termining which side of the specified temperature
is adverse to the product tested, and being sure
that the actual temperature of the test differs
from the specified one on the adverse side.

The amendment of Standard No. 119 and
UTQG to reflect the 95° F. temperature creates
a different temperature phraseology for those
standards than exists in Standard No. 109 which
still has the 100±5° F. temperature. As stated
earlier, the NHTSA considers the Standard No.
109 temperature tolerance to mean in actuality
''any temperature up to 95° F." However, since
modification of that standard was not proposed
in the earlier notice, the agency does not amend
it in this final rule. However, the agency intends
to issue an interpretive amendment that will
amend Standard No. 109 to adopt the alternative
expression for tire temperature testing (any tem-
perature up to 95° F.) unless objections are re-
ceived.

In accordance with Departmental policy en-
couraging analysis of the impact of regulatory
actions upon the public and private sectors, the
agency has determined that this modification will

result in no appreciable safety gains or losses.
These amendments may result in slightly lower
costs for tire temperature testing since all tem-
peratures will be uniform.

Since these amendments relieve restrictions and
impose no additional burdens, it is found for
good cause shown that an immediate effective
date is in the public interest.

In consideration of the foregoing, . . . amend-
ments are made in Parts 571 and 575 of Title 49,
Code of Federal Regulations.

The program official and lawyer principally
responsible for the development of this rulemak-
ing document are Arturo Casanova and Roger
Tilton, respectively.

(Sees. 103, 112, 119, 201, 203, Pub. L. 89-563,
80 Stat. 718 (15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1421, 1423);
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on July 12, 1978.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

43 F.R. 30541
July 17, 1978

PART 575-PRE 58

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION REGULATIONS

Uniform Tire
(Docket No.

This notice amends the Uniform Tire Quality
Grading (UTQG) Standards to revise the grad-
ing symbols used to indicate traction grades and
responds to a petition for reconsideration of the
effective dates for the information requirement
regarding first purchasers of motor vehicles. The
notice, further, responds to petitions for recon-
sideration submitted by the Rubber Manufactur-
ers Association and The Goo<lyoar Tire & Rubber
Company, regarding an amendment of the tire
testing temperature employed in the UTQG
regulation and the non-passenger-car tire safety
standards, which established a single test tem-
perature for the performance requirements of the
two standards. The notice also withdraws a
NHTSA proposal to modify the tread label re-
quirements of the Uniform Tire Quality Grading
Standard. These actions are intended to aid
consumer understanding of the UTQG giading
sj^tem and facilitate industry tire testing.

Effective date: October 23, 1978.

For further infomuction contact :

Dr. F. Cecil Brenner. Office of Automotive
Ratings, Xational Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590, (202) 426-1740.

Supplementary inforrruition : On Julv 17, 1978,
(43 FR 30542), XHTSA republished Vhe UTQG
Standards (49 CFR 575.104) to assist the con-
sumer in the informed purchase of passenger car
tires. (Docket No. 25, Xotice 24). The standard
requires that manufacturers and brand name
owners provide simple comparative data on tire
performance, which can be considered by purchas-
ers in selecting between competing tire lines.
Concurrently, with issuance of the final rule, the
agency proposed modifications of the standard's
provisions relating to traction grading symbols
and tread labels (43 FR 30586; July 17, 1978).

Quality Grading
25; Notice 27)

Traction Grading Symbols

The notice of proposed rulemaking (43 FR
30586), issued concurrently with the republished
final rule, proposed revision of the symbols used
to denote tire traction grades. The agency in-
vited comment on the use of an A, B, C hierarchy
of traction grades in place of the **, *, 0 S3'stem
now required by paragraph (d) (2) (ii).

The Automobile Club of New York commented
tiiat the proposed traction gi'ading symbols would
be "far more meaningful to consumers" than the
asterisks and zeros used in the existing regulation.
The National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Associa-
tion viewed the letter grading proposal as an
improvement, and, in response to Notice 24, the
Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, Office of the
Consumer Advocate approved of an A, B, C
grading system as falling within the experience
of all consumei-s.

The only negative comment came from Atlas
Supply Company which expressed concern that,
if consumers are warned, as the rule requires,
that tires with a C traction grade may have poor
traction performance, they may assume that a C
temperature re,sistance grade likewise denotes
poor temperature resistance qualities. Atlas rec-
ommended that tiie lowest traction grade be abol-
ished completely and that only the symbols A
and B be used to represent traction grades.

In fact, the agency is cun-ently considering
promulgation of a tire traction safety standard
which would set a minimum performance level
such that tires falling within the lowest UTQG
traction performance grade would not comply
with the safety standard (43 FR 11100; March
16, 1978, and 38 FR 31841; November 19, 1973).
Pending issuance of such a standard, however,
consumers should not be misled as to the nature
of the C temperature grafle, since the explanation
of the grading system, to be furnished under the

PART 575— PRE 59

standard, specifically states that the C grade in-
dicates a level of perfonnance which meets the
applicable Federal safety standard.

The agency has concluded that the A, B, C
grading symbols for traction perfonnanc* will be
an aid to consumer understanding of the UTQG
system due to the general familiarity with letter
grading systems and the hierarchy inherently
associated with these symbols. Consumer com-
prehension of the grading system will also be
improved by eliminating the need to use three
different sets of symbols. The symbols A, B, and
C are, therefore, adopted to represent traction
grades under the UTQG Standard.

Tread Label Requirements

The existing UTQG regulation provides that
each passenger car tire, other than one sold as
original equipment on a new vehicle, shall have
affixed to its tread surface a label indicating the
specific treadwear, traction, and temperature
grades for that tire, as well as a general explana-
tion of the grading system. In its July 17, 1978
notice of proposed rulemaking (43 FR 30586),
the agency proposed to amend section 575.104
(d) (1) (i) (B) of the standard, to require only
general grading information on the tread label,
while retaining a separate requirement that spe-
cific grades be molded on the tire sidewall. The
tread label would have been modified to include a
statement referring the consumer to the tire side-
wall for the actual grades of the particular tire.
The notice also proposed that specific tire grades
be supplied, at the manufacturer's option, on
either tread labels or on the sidewall during the
six-month period prior to the effective dates of
the molding requirement.

In commenting on the notice, Goodyear argued
that provision of specific grading infonnation on
the tread label would not be feasible and would
add to the cost of implementation of the stand-
ard. American Motors Corporation commented
that provision of specific gi'ades in two places
would be redundant and an unnecessary expense.

However, Michael Peskoe, an individual in-
volved in early development of the standard,
argued that the tread labeling requirement is not
redundant, since tire sidewall molding was in-
tended primarily to supply a permanent record

of the tire grades, to be considered when replac-
ing the tires, rather than to convey information
to the prospective purchaser. He also stated that,
with regard to cost and feasibility considerations,
tire specific identification labels, bearing informa-
tion such as tire line and size, are already in
widespread use within the industry to aid in the
distribution of tires. Therefore, the burden of
adding the specific UTQG grades for the par-
ticular tire classification should be minimal.

The Automobile Club of New York and Mr.
Peskoe commented that provision of specific tire
grades only on the sidewall would hinder use of
the infonnation in the situation, common in tire
dealerships and service stations, where tires are
displayed on racks, sidewall to sidewall. Tires
would have to be removed from the display rack
before the grades molded on the sidewall could
be observed. The problem would be compounded
where the purchaser wishes to compare the grades
on several tires.

Wliile NHTSA is concerned with keeping the
cost of the UTQG regulation at a minimum,
existing tire labeling and marketing practices
lead the agency to the conclusion that tread labels
containing specific tire grading information
should continue to be required for replacement
tires. The agency had earlier determined that
identification of specific tire grades on tread
labels is feasible and involves a very limited cost
to manufacturers and consumers. Tire-specific
tread labels have been demonstrated to be an
integral and necessary part of the regulation's
plan for getting useful information to tire pur-
chasers. The proposal to require only general
grading information on tire tread labels is, there-
fore, withdrawn.

Effective Dates for Point of Sale Information
Notice 24 set March 1, 1979, in the case of bias-
ply tires and September 1, 1979, in the case of
bias-belted tires, as effective dates for all UTQG
requirements except the molding requirements of
paragraph (D)(l)(i)(A). The molding require-
ments applicable to bias and bias-belted tires
were made effective September 1, 1979, and March
1, 1980, respectively.

The purpose of this delayed phase-in schedule
for tire sidewall molding is to provide manufac-
turers with extra time to prepare new tire molds

PART 575— PRE 60

containing grading information. However, the
delay in effective dates for tire molding ha<l the
unintended effect of creating a six-month interval
between the time vehicle manufacturers must
provide point of sale information on tire quality
grading to prospective purchasers, and first pur-
chasers of motor vehicles (49 CFR 575.104(d)
(1) (ii) and (iii)) and the date on which grading
information actually must appear on the tires
sold. In the case of information to be furnished
to first purchasers under paragraph (d) (1) (iii),
potential for confusion exists since consumers
will be referred to the tire sidewall for specific
tire grades, when in many easels, molds will not
yet have been modified for the tire lines being
supplied.

To correct this situation, American Motors
Corporation has petitioned NHTSA to recon-
sider the effective dates for paragraph (d)(1)
(iii). American Motors has recommended that
the effective dates for paragraph (d)(1) (iii) be
amended to correspond to those of paragraph
(d) (1) (i) (A), the molding requirement. The
agency has already recognized the difficulties in-
volved in providing specific grades for original
equipment tires through the use of tread labels
(39 FR 1037; January 4. 1974) or point of sale
information (43 FR 30547; July 17, 1978). To
better coordinate the availability of specific tire
grading information on tire molds and the pro-
vision of explanatory information through ve-
hicle owner's manuals, American Motors' petition
for reconsideration is granted. The effective
dates for paragraph (d)(1) (iii) are changed to
September 1, 1979, for bias-ply tires and March 1,
1980, for bias-belted tires.

Paragraph (d) (1) (ii) of the regulation re-
quires that vehicle and tire manufacturers furnish
to prospective purchasers an explanation of the
UTQG grading system. Although this provision
also takes effect six months prior to the tire mold-
ing requirements, the agency has concluded that
no corresponding change in effective dates is nec-
essary. Paragraph (d)(l)(ii) provides for the
availability of valuable information to prospec-
tive tire purchasers, since specific grading infor-
mation will be available on replacement tires sold
during the six-month phase-in period. Further,
the paragraph contains no potentially confusing

reference to the tire sidewall as does paragraph
(d) (1) (iii). Prospective vehicle purchasers who
obtain tlie information prior to the sidewall mold-
ing effective dates will be given the opportunity
to familiarize themselves in advance with the
new grading system.

Temperature for Tire Testing

On March 3, 1977 (42 FR 12207), NHTSA
proposed to amend Standard Xo. 119, Neio Pneu-
matic Tires for Vehicles Other Than Passenger
Cars (49 CFR .571.119), and the UTQG Stand-
ards to establish the same ambient temperature
for tire testing in both standards, to allow more
efficient use of tire test facilities. The notice
proposed "any temperature up to 95° F" and
''100±5° F" as alternative means of phrasing
the new. identical test temperature.

After consideration of comments, the agency-
determined that the ambient test temperature
should be expressed as "any temperature up to
95° F" (43 FR 30541; July" 17, 1978). NHTSA
received petitions for reconsideration from the
Rubber Manufacturers Association (RMA) and
The Goodyear Tire & Rubl)er Company, recom-
mending that the test temperatures for Standard
Xo. 119 and the UTQG regidation include toler-
ances and be specified as "100° F±5° F." As
XHTSA has frequently stated in past notices
on these and other standards (e.g., 40 FR
47141; October 8, 1975), such a recommenda-
tion reflects a mi.sundei-standing of the legal
nature of motor vehicle standards, X'^HTSA
standards are not instructions to test engineei-s,
but performance levels that vehicles and equip-
ment must be capable of meeting. The use of a
tolerance range in this context is confusing since
it creates ambiguity as to the perfonnance level
required.

Establishment of a precise performance re-
quirement, expressed without a tolerance, still
recognizes that measurement techniques cannot
be controlled perfectly. Given a specified per-
fomianco level, manufacturers can design their
tests to assure compliance in at least two ways:
(1) by using a test procedure that conforms so
closely to the specified measurement tliat no sig-
nificant variations could <K'Cur. or (2) by deter-
mining which side of the specified level is adverse

PART 575— PRE 61

to the product being tested, and targeting test
conditions so tliat any deviation will occur on the
adverse side. In this case, a tire manufacturer
may use an ambient temperature slightly above
95° F to demonstrate, through adveree conditions,
that its tire would comply at the specified tem-
perature.

In its petition for reconsideration, Goodyear
commented that all test laboratories should em-
ploy the same ambient temperatui'e conditions.
However, such uniformity is not advantageous
in a regulatoi*}' context, since government com-
pliance testing and manufacturers' laboratory
evaluations are undertaken for different purposes.

Goodyear also argued that a fixed 95° F test
temperature and a "100±5° F" tolerance range
do not establish "in effect the same test tempera-
ture", as stated in the agency's July 17, 1978
notice (43 FE 30541). A fixed 95° F requirement
is, in fact, from the manufacturers' perspective
identical to a "100d=5° F" provision, since, given
a controlled variation in test conditions of 5° F
in either direction from the target temperature,
manufacturers seeking to assure compliance with
a 95° F requirement will set their test target
temperature at 100° F. For these reasons, the
petitioners' recommendation of a "100±5° F" test
temperature is rejected.

The RMA and Goodyear petitions noted that
the open-ended nature of the requirement "any
temperature up to 95° F" appeared to require
that tires be capable of attaining specified per-
fonnance levels when tested at temperatures
ranging from 95° F to sub-zero conditions. The
RMA petition stated as its primary concern the
possibility, under the UTQG system, that a tire
could be conditioned at a higher temperature than
that at which it is tested for temperature resist-
ance. Such inconsistency could, the RMA sug-
gested, result in the tire being underinflated
during testing.

The agency has concluded that the ambient
temperature specification "at 95° F" more ac-
curately describes the fixed temperature which
the agency intended to establish than does the
open-ended provision "any temperature up to
95° F." Standard No. 119 and the UTQG

Standards are, therefore, amended by substitu-
tion of a fixed temperature requirement of 95°
F in place of "any temperature up to 95° F."

To the extent that the RMA and Goodyear
petitions for reconsideration are not granted by
this amendment, the petitions are denied.

In accordance with Departmental policy en-
couraging analysis of the impact of regulatory
actions upon the public and private sectors, the
agency has determined that these actions will
have no appreciable negative impact on safety.
Since the modification of effective dates relieves
a restriction, and the change in grading symbols
will result in no new burdens, no additional costs
will be imposed on manufacturers or the con-
sumer. Withdrawal of the tread labeling pro-
posal imposes no new costs not contemplated in
issuance of the UTQG Standards. The new tem-
perature phraseology has absolutely no effect on
the tire perfonnance requirements, but will elim-
inate any possible ambiguity in the standards'
meaning. For these reasons, the agency hereby
finds that this notice does not have significant
impact for purposes of the internal review.

Effective date: In view of the need for a fixed
temperature requirement to allow tire perform-
ance testing to proceed, and the ongoing prepara-
tion by the industry for implementation of the
UTQG system, the agency finds that an inrnae-
diate effective date for the amendments to Stand-
ard No. 119 and the UTQG regulation is in the
public interest.

In consideration of the foregoing, the follow-
ing amendments are made in Part 575 and 571

(Sec. 103, 112, 119, 201, 203, Pub. L. 89-563, 80
Stat. 718 (15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1421, 1423);
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.) )

Issued on October 23, 1978.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

43 F.R. 50430-50440
October 30, 1978

PART 575— PRE 62

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

Uniform Tire Quality Grading

(Docket No. 25, Notice 31)

Action: Final rule and establishment of effective
dates.

Summary: This notice announces the effective
dates for application of the Unifonn Tire Qual-
ity Grading (UTQG) regulation to radial tires
and discusses comments on previously announced
testing and analysis of radial tire treadwear
under the road test conditions of the UTQG
regulation. This notice also interprets the effect
of the thirty-day stay of the UTQG effective
dates, granted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, and corrects an inadvertant
error in the text of the regulation.

Effective date: For all requirements other than
the molding requirement of paragraph (d)(1)
(i) (A) and the first purchaser requirement of
paragraph (d)(1) (iii), the effective date for
radial tires is April 1, 1980.

For paragraph (d) (1) (i) (A), the molding
requirement, and paragraph (d) (1) (iii), the first
purchaser requirement, the effective date for
radial tires is October 1, 1980.

For further information contact :

Dr. F. Cecil Brenner, Office of Automotive
Ratings, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 205 (202) 426-1740.

Supplementary information: Acting under the
authority of the National Traffic and Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Act of 1966 (the Act) (15 U.S.C.
1381, et seq.), the NHTSA republished as a final
rule the UTQG Standards, establishing a system
for grading passenger car tires in the perform-
ance areas of treadwear, traction and temperature
resistance (43 FR 30542); July 17, 1978). The
regulation will provide consumers with useful,
comparative data upon which to base informed

decisions in the purcha,se of tires. Extensive
rulemaking preceded the July I7th notice, and a
comprehensive discussion of the regulation's pur-
pose and technical justification may be found in
a series of earlier Federal Register notices (40
FR 23073; May 28, 1975; 39 FR 20808; June 14,
1974); 39 FR' 1037; January 4, 1974; 36 FR
18751 ; September 21, 1971).

The July 17 notice also established effective
dates for application of the regulation to bias
and bias-belted tires. Establishment of an effec-
tive date for radial tires was deferred pending
further analysis of test results relating to the
treadwear properties of radials. Questions con-
cerning the two other performance areas of the
standard, traction and temperature resistance had
previously been resolved, and therefore are not
discussed in this notice.

On November 2, 1978, NHTSA issued a notice
(43 FR 51735; November 6, 1978) announcing
the availability for inspection of the results of
the agency's test program for radial tires and
NHTSA's analysis of the test results (Docket 25;
Notice 28). A thirty-day period, later extended
to 45 days (43 FR 57308; December 7, 1978), was
provided for public comment on the data and
analysis. After examination of all comments re-
ceived, NHTSA has concluded that an effective
date for grading of radial tires under the UTQG
system can and should be established at this time.

Need for Grading of Radial Tires
In response to Notice 28, several commenters
pointed out the importance of extending the
UTQG Standards to radial tires at the earliest
possible date. The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), while recognizing the establishment of a
credible system for grading bias and bias-belted
tires as a substantial accomplishment, commented

PART 575— PRE 63

that extension of the system to radial tires will
be of special significance to the public. The FTC,
the Center for Auto Safety (CFAS), and Con-
sumer's Union noted the increasing share of the
tire market represented by radial tires, which
now account for approximately half of the re-
placement tire market and an even higher per-
centage of original equipment sales. CFAS noted
that NHTSA's test data revealed significant dif-
ferences in treadwear properties among radial
tires of different manufacturers. In fact, it is
likely, based on the data, that some radial tires
may yield twice the mileage of those of other
manufacturers.

CFAS and the City of Cleveland's Office of
Consumer Affairs commented on the need, ex-
emplified by the recent recall of 14.5 million
radials by one domestic tire manufacturer, to
make safety a factor in the purchase of radial
tires. The City of Cleveland reported encounter-
ing consumer frustration with present tire mar-
keting practices and expressed concern that
inability on the part of consumers to ascertain
the quality of tires they are buying may lead to
careless and ill-advised purchasing decisions and
unsafe operating practices. NHTSA agrees and
has seen no new arguments that suggest Congress'
directive for establishing a uniform system for
grading motor vehicle tires should not be ful-
filled by the contemplated method.

Extent of NHTSA Radial Tire Testing
General Motors Corporation and the Rubber
Manufacturers Association (RMA) contended
that NHTSA's tests of radial tire treadwear were
inadequate as a basis for extension of the UTQG
regulation to radial tires. General Motors argued
that radial tire treadwear does not become con-
stant after tires are broken in, but continues to
vary upward and downward, as evidenced by
comparing adjusted wear rates in the final 6,400
miles of NHTSA's 38,400-mile radial tire tread-
wear test with the averages of adjusted wear
rates from several 6,400-mile test series. The
RMA stated its position that radial tire wear
rates continue to decline in the later stages of
tire life, pointing to NHTSA and RMA test data
on the subject. Both General Motors and the
RMA contended that, given the nature of radial
tire treadwear, NHTSA must test some radial

tires to actual wearout to confirm that treadwear
projections based on 6,400-mile tests correlate
closely with actual tire treadlife.

NHTSA has not suggested that radial tire
treadwear is precisely constant after break-in.
Rather the agency's position, as stated in Notice
28, is that radial tire treadwear after break-in
can be adequately described by a straight line
fitted to a series of data points representing tread
depth against miles traveled, thereby providing
an adequate basis for treadwear projections.
Variations in wear rate of the type noted by
General Motors and the RMA cause a sinuous
fluctuation in wear pattern which can be closely
approximated by a straight line projection of
treadwear based on the first 6,400 miles of testing.

NHTSA chose not to run tested tires to actual
wearout because such tests are expensive and time
consuming, and accurate projections of treadlife
are possible with tires which have substantial
wear, but are not worn out. For these reasons,
projecting radial tire treadlife from tests nm
short of wearout is common in the industry (e.g.,
"A Statistical Procedure for the Prediction of
Tire Tread Wear Rate and Tread Wear Rate
Differences" by Dudley, Bower, and Reilly of the
Dunlop Research Centre) and is, the agency has
concluded, a reliable means of determining tire
treadwear properties of radial, bias, and bias-
belted tires.

Accuracy of the Treadwear Grading Procedure
for Radial Tires
General Motors, Michelin Tire Corporation,
and the RMA commented that the existing
UTQG procedures does not project the treadlife
of radial tires with a sufficient degree of accuracy,
based on the data submitted to the rulemaking
docket in connection with Notice 28. General
Motors and the RMA noted that treadwear
projections calculated only from wear rates ob-
served in the initial 6,400-mile test sequence dif-
fered in some cases by one or two UTQG grade
levels from projections based on wear rates from
later 6,400-mile test cycles or from averages of
several test cycles. These commenters noted that
the range of such differences was slightly higher
when individual tires were compared rather than
tlie averages of four-tire sets. Michelin expressed
concern that the regulation would create an im-

PART 575— PRE 64

pression of equality among tires which in reality
vary in quality. General Motoi-s suggested that
projections based on later test cycles or averages
established over a longer t«st period would pro-
vide a more accurate projection of actual tread-
life.

NHTSA established the 6,400-mile test se-
quence, with an 800-mile break-in, after consid-
ering the adequacy of the data which could be
obtained over that test distance and the expendi-
ture of money and resources required for addi-
tional testing. The grades arrived at by projecting
from later test series or combinations of series
were generally consistent with the results ob-
tained in the fii-st 6,400 miles of testing, and
those variations which did occur were relatively
minor.

As noted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Depart-
ment of Transportation, 541 F.2d 1178 (1976),
no system designed to grade millions of tires can
be expected to approach perfection. Considering
the present absence of tire quality information
in the market place, the agency has concluded
that the UTQG treadwear grading procedure
provides reasonable accuracy when applied to
radial tires and will be of significant value to tire
consumers in making purchasing decisions.

General Motors commented that tire grades
should be assigned based on the lowest mileage
projected for any tire among a set of four candi-
date tires and not on the average projected mile-
age of a four tire set. The UTQG regulation
states that each tire will be capable of providing
at least the level of performance represented by
the UTQG grades assigned to it. UTQG grades
based solely on either average grade levels or on
the projected mileage of a particular tested tire
would not provide an adequate basis for con-
sumer reliance on the grading information. In
determining accurate treadwear grades for tire
lines, manufacturers must consider the popula-
tion variability evidenced in their tire testing.

Validity of the CMT Adjustment Procedure
The UTQG regulation accounts for environ-
mental influences on candidate tire wear rates
during testing by means of an adjustment factor
derived by comparing the wear rates of concur-
rently run course monitoring tires (CMT's) with

an established CMT base course wear rate
(BCWR) (49 CFR 575.104(d)(2)). In Notice
28, NHTSA explained how the same adjustment
procedure could be used to correct for a measure-
ment anomaly that generates the appearance of
a higher wear rate for radial tires in the first
4,000 miles of testing following the 800-mile
break-in. In response to Notice 28, CFAS re-
viewed the UTQG adjustment procedure, as it
applies to radial tires, and commented that this
procedure is the proper method for grading
radials. However, Michelin and the RMA, in
their comments on that notice, suggested that the
CMT adjustment procedure may be invalid for
radial tires, both in the context of wear rate
changes and as a control on environmental fac-
tors.

The RMA argued that NHTSA has not pro-
vided supporting data for its theory that the
shift in radial tire wear rate during the initial
phases of treadlife is caused by changes in tire
geometry as the tire attains its equilibrium shape.
However, detailing the underlying mechanism of
the apparent change in wear rate is incidental to
the fact that radial tire wear rates do stabilize
in a consistent fashion, permitting use of the
CMT adjustment to project treadlife with reason-
able accuracy.

The RMA contended that wear patterns of
certain radial tires differ markedlj' from the ap-
parent accelerated pattern observed by NHTSA
during the first 4,000 miles of treadlife after the
800-mile break-in, and that NHTSA's test of
several tire brands provided an inadequate basis
to draw conclusions about radial tires in general.
Michelin, although citing no data on the subject,
commented that an accelerated wear pattern in
the early stages of treadlife may not exist in all
radial tires to the same degree.

NHTSA's test of radial tire treadwear, re-
ported in Notice 28, included ten different tire
brands, selected to include a wide range of prices
and materials, as well as both domestic and for-
eign manufacture. This sample constitutes a
reasonable and adequate basis upon which to draw
conclusions concerning tires available on the
American market. In spite of the wide variety
of radial designs included in NHTSA's test, the
agency found the wear rate patterns of the tires
studied to be remarkably consistent in the initial

PART 575— PRE 65

6,400-miles of testing, after the 800-mile break-in.
This consistency is exemplified by treadwear
projections in the paper "Test of Tread Wear
Grading Procedure — the Course Monitoring Tire
Adjustment on Radial Tire Wear Rates", by
Brenner and Williams (Docket 25, General Ref-
erence No. 105), which compared estimates of
tread life for nine sets of candidate tires based
on data from the first 6,400 miles of testing after
break-in, with estimates based on data from 6,400
to 38,400 miles of testing. The projections com-
puted from these data sets did not differ signifi-
cantly, indicating that the UTQG adjustment
procedure accurately accounted for the initial
wear rate characteristics of all tires tasted.

Based on this test experience, the agency be-
lieves that the data from its tests and analysis of
that data has demonstrated that the wear pat-
terns exhibited by radial tires early in their
treadlives are sufficiently consistent to penult ac-
curate projection of treadwear based on the exist-
ing UTQG test procedure. NHTSA plans to
closely monitor testing at the San Angelo course
to insure that the UTQG test procedure accom-
modates future developments in tire technology
and continues to provide an accurate basis for
treadwear grading.

On the question of consistency beyond the ini-
tial 4,000 miles of testing, both Michelin and the
RMA argued that not all tires tested by NHTSA
responded to environmental factors in an identi-
cal manner, as demonstrated by comparing
graphs of unadjusted candidate tire wear rates
by test cycle with graphs of data from concur-
rently run CMT's. The RMA also noted that
graphic representations of radial tire adjusted
wear rates per test cycle were not always hori-
zontal, but in some cases sloped somewhat upward
or downward.

Close examination of the graphs of unadjusted
candidate tire wear rates and CMT wear rates
indicates that the wear rates fluctuated in a rea-
sonably parallel fashion in all but an insignificant
number of cases. NHTSA has never contended
that every tire of every brand must behave in a
perfectly consistent manner before a valid grad-
ing system can be established. NHTSA finds
that the level of consistency exhibited by the
tested tires is sufficient to confirm the validity of

the CMT approach as a reasonably fair and
reasonably reliable means of radial tire grading.

With regard to the slope of the adjusted wear
rate curves, NHTSA has applied a test of inde-
pendence to this data to determine if the adjusted
wear rates of the tasted tires were dependent on
the test cycle. In no case was the slope signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 95 percent con-
fidence level. In fact, of the curves which slanted
to any measurable degree, sixteen had a slightly
positive slope and seventeen had a slightly nega-
tive slope, as would be expected if the true slope
were zero. This analysis suggests that CMT and
candidate tires continue to wear in a consistent
fashion beyond the initial phase of testing.

The RMA's comments suggest that some con-
fusion may exist as to whether CMT's are to be
reused for testing after an initial 6,400-mile test
cycle after break-in. Since radial tires, including
CMT's, exhibit an apparent change in wear pat-
tern during this initial phase of treadlife, when
measured by a tread depth gauge, the CMT ad-
justment procedure will be accurate only if new
candidate tires are run with new CMT's so that
the wear rate change occurs in all tires simul-
taneously.

Radial CMT's were run beyond the initial
6,400-mile cycle in NHTSA's testing announced
in Notice 28, in order to provide an extended
comparison of CMT's and candidate tires run
concurrently. In its UTQG compliance testing,
however, NHTSA will use new radial CMT's,
broken-in in accordance with 49 CFR 575.104
(d) (2) (v), for each 6,400-mile test.

Also on the issue of the CMT adjustment pro-
cedure, the RMA commented that NHTSA's test
data indicate a coefficient of variation (COV)
for radial CMT's of over 5 percent, the standard
upheld in the B. F. Goodrich case as the agency's
target for the maximum permissible level of
variability for these tires. Much of the data
cit«d by the RMA on this point involved test
cycles beyond the initial 6,400-mile cycle, after
break-in. Data on the variability of CMT's at
test distances beyond 6,400 miles, after break-in,
are irrelevant to the UTQG system, since, as
noted above, radial CMT's will not be reused
after an initial 6,400-mile test cycle.

PART 575— PRE 66

In examining data from the initial test cycle,
the RMA combined wear rates from several test
vehicles and then developed COV's from tiiat
data, thereby interjecting vehicle variability into
the computation. Vehicle variability, wliile un-
related to the properties of the tire, has tlie etfect
of inflating coefficients of variation. A\nien this
extraneous factor is removed from tlie computa-
tion, the test data indicate a GOV well within
the acceptable 5 percent level.

Michelin expressed concern that running
CMT's of a standard size with candidate tires of
differing sizes may lead to inaccuracy in the ad-
justment of data. National Bureau of Standards
Technical Note 486, "Some Problems in Measur-
ing Tread Wear of Tires," by Spinner and
Barton (Docket 25, General Reference Xo. 4),
compared projected mileages for three sizes of
radial and bias-ply tires of several manufacturers
run under different road conditions. Data in the
report suggest that tires of different sizes react
similarly to differing external conditions. There-
fore, the practical burden of providing a different
CMT for each size of candidate tire may be
avoided.

Finally, General Motors and the RMA asserted
that, in order to facilitate comparisons among
radial, bias, and bias-belted tires, BCWR's must
be established by running the three types of
CMT's concurrently to limit the influence of en-
vironmental variables on the test results. The
RMA also contended that a BCAVR cannot be
established without running CMT's to actual
wearout.

NHTSA established BCVVR's through experi-
ence with tires of all three construction types in
over 5 million tire miles of testing over a two
year period. In tiie course of this extensive test-
ing, each tire type can be expected to have en-
countered a random mix of environmental
conditions resulting in a similar net impact on
treadwear.

Other Comments
Michelin commented that the regulation's pro-
cedure of rotating tires among different positions
on a test vehicle, but not between vehicles, pre-
cludes the detection of vehicle mechanical prob-
lems which could affect grading. Adequate
preventive maintenance of test vehicles is the

primary safeguard against distortion of data by
vehicle malfunctions. Additionally, an analysis
of variance of the data obtained in a convoy or
on a vehicle provides another effective method of
detecting a malfunction. (See, "Elements in the
Road Evaluation of Tire Wear", by Brennci- and
Kondo, Docket 25; General Reference Xo. 17).
XIITSA does not believe that rotation of tires
among vehicles would significantly improve on
these existing techniques.

General Motors noted that several tires studied
by XHTSA had to be removed from the test due
to failure or uneven wear prior to actual wearout
and suggested that the agency must account for
these anomalies before proceeding with rule-
making.

Early in the course of rulemaking on UTQG,
XHTSA concluded that considerations of cost
and consumer understanding required some
limitation on the number of grading categories
in which UTQG information would be presented.
Based on examination of numerous comments in
the rulemaking docket, the agency concluded that
treadwear, traction, and temperature resistance
are the tire characteristics of greatest importance
to consumers. For this reason, information on
subjects such as evenness of tread wear and stis-
ceptibility to road hazard damage, while of value
to consumers, is not provided under the regula-
tion. X'HTSA will consider General Motors
comment, however, as a suggestion for possible
future rulemaking.

The RMA noted several minor computational
and otlier errors in the previously referred to
paper by Brenner and Williams (Docket 25,
General Reference X'o. 105), submitted to the
docket in connection with Xotice 28. Some of
these errors were corrected by a subsequent sub-
mission to the docket (Docket 25, General Refer-
ence N'o. 105A). In any case, the errors were of
a non-substantive nature and had no impact on
the agency's rulemaking process and decisions.

Impact of the Thirty Day Stay
of Effective Dates
On January 10, 1979, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit, in the case B. F.
Goodrich Co. r. Department of Transportation
(Xo. 78-3392), granted a thirty-day stay of the
effective dates for application of the UTQG regii-

PART 575— PRE 67

lation to bias and bias-belted tires. The refla-
tion was scheduled to become eflfective March 1,
1979 for bias-ply tires and September 1, 1979 for
bias-belted tires, with the exception of the side-
wall molding requirements of paragraph (d) (1)
(i) (A) and the first purchaser requirements of
paragraph (d) (1) (iii) which were to become
effective September 1, 1979 and March 1, 1980
for bias and bias-belted tires, respectively.

NHTSA interprets the Sixth Circuit's action
as postponing the effective dates of the UTQG
regulation one month to April 1, 1979 for bias-ply
tires and October 1, 1979 for bias-belted tires.
However, the effective dates for the molding re-
quirements of paragraph (d) (1) (i) (A) and the
first purchaser requirements of paragraph (d)
(l)(iii) are postponed to October 1, 1979 for
bias-ply tires and April 1, 1980 for bias-belted
tires to a^ow manufacturers time to convert tire
molds. This postponement of effective dates has
been taken into account, in establishing effective
dates for application of the regulation to radial
tires, to assure adequate lead time for completion
of tire testing.

In accordance with Departmental policy en-
couraging adequate analysis of the consequences
of regulatory actions, the agency has evaluated
the anticipated economic, environmental and
other consequences of extending the UTQG regu-
lation to include radial tires and has determined
that the impact of this action is fully consistent
with impacts evaluated in July 1978 in establish-
ing effective dates for bias and bias-belted tires.
Based on the authority of Section 203 of the Act,

previous agency findings concerning required lead
time for grading tires, and the decision of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
B. F. Goodrich, the NHTSA hereby establishes
radial tire effective dates consistent with the basic
six-month phase-in schedule announced on July
17, 1978 (43 FR 30542) for bias and bias-belted
tires.

In an unrelated matter, NHTSA's FEDERAL
REGISTER notice announcing effective dates for
application of the UTQG Standards to bias and
bias-belted tires (43 FR 30542) ; July 17, 1978)
contained an inadvertent error in use of the word
"of" rather than the intended word "are" in the
first sentence of the third section of Figure 2 of
the regulation. This error is corrected by sub-
stitution of the woi-d "are" in place of "of" in
Figure 2.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Uniform
Tire Quality Grading Standards (49 CFR
575.104), are amended ....

The program official and lawyer principally
responsible for the development of this rulemak-
ing document are Dr. F. Cecil Brenner and
Richard J. Hipolit, respectively.

(Sec. 103, 112, 119, 201, 203; Pub. L. 89-563,
80 Stat. 718 (15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1407, 1421,
1423) ; delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on March 9, 1979.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

44 F.R. 15721-15724
March 15, 1979

PART 575— PRE 68

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 575-CONSUMER INFORMATION

Uniform Tire Quality Rating
(Docket No. 25; Notice 35)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends the Uniform Tire
Quality Grading (UTQG) Standards through minor
modifications in the format of tire tread labels used
to convey UTQG information. The modifications
are intended to assure that tires are labeled with
the correct UTQG grades, to permit flexibility in
the design of labels, and to facilitate consumer
access to the grading information.

EFFECTIVE DATE: December 1, 1979.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dr. F. Cecil Brenner, Office of Automotive
Ratings, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-1740).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On January 8,
1979, NHTSA published a request for public
comment (44 F.R. 1814) on a petition for
rulemaking submitted by Armstrong Rubber
Company asking that the UTQG regulation be
amended to permit tire grading information and
explanatory material concerning the UTQG
system to be furnished to consumers by means of
two separate tire tread labels rather than the
single label called for in the regulation (49 CFR
575.104(d) (1) (i) (B)). Armstrong, joined by Atlas
Supply Company, contended that the chance of
mislabeling tires would be reduced, if UTQG
grades could be placed on the same label with tire
identification information. However, practical
limitations exist on the size of tread labels which
can be effectively applied and retained on the tire
tread surface. Some manufacturers reportedly
encountered difficulty in fitting tire identification
information, UTQG grades, and required UTQG
explanatory information on a single label. For this
reason, Armstrong and Atlas suggested that
UTQG explanatory information be furnished on a

separate label adjacent to a label containing UTQG
grades and tire identification information.

In view of the favorable comments received in
response to NHTSA's request for comment on the
Armstrong petition, the agency proposed to
modify the tread label format requirements to
employ a two-part label format (44 F.R. 30139;
May 24, 1979). NHTSA proposed that Part I of the
label contain a display of the UTQG grades
applicable to the particular tire while Part H would
contain the general explanation of the grading
system. At the manufacturer's option Parts I and
n could appear on separate labels. To assure that
the labels would be legible to consumers, the notice
also proposed requirements for orientation of the
label text and minimum type size.

Commenters on the proposal were in general
agreement that flexibility in the design of tire
tread labels is a desirable goal. While some
manufacturers expressed the opinion without
explanation that two-part labels would be
impractical for their operations, others welcomed
the proposal as a means of dealing with label size
limitations.

Some commenters favored retention of the
original label format pointing out that the
proposed label would be slightly longer than its
predecessor and arguing that the proposed label
would isolate the tire grades from the explanatory
material. Some industry sources expressed the
opinion that the proposed changes would be of no
benefit to consumers.

NHTSA disagrees with these criticisms of the
proposal. The new format should increase the
length of the label by only a fraction of an inch,
if at all, and should not pose a problem to
manufacturers wishing to employ a single label.
The separation of the grades from the explanatory
material should not create confusion since the two

PART 575-PRE 69

parts could be separated by no more than one inch
in any case. The agency has reached the conclusion
that displaying grades for all three performance
categories together on Part I of the label will in
fact benefit consumers by facilitating access to the
information.

Maximum retainability will be assured with the
new format since manufacturers may choose to
employ two labels if they are unable to fit all of the
necessary information on a single label of a
manageable size. Similarly, the possibility of
mislabeling will be reduced, because the two-part
option makes it possible in all cases to include ap-
plicable UTQG grades on tire identification labels.
For these reasons, NHTSA has determined to
adopt the proposed two-part label format with
minor modifications.

Several commenters suggested that orientation
of the tread label text should not be specified in the
regulation since flexibility in label design would be
reduced by such a requirement. However, NHTSA
has concluded that since most manufacturer's tire
identification labels are arranged with lines of type
running perpendicular to the tread circumference,
tires are most likely to be displayed so that labels
with this orientation will be easily readable by con-
sumers. Therefore, the agency has chosen to retain
the proposed requirement regarding label text
orientation.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company suggested the
possibility of printing Part I of the proposed label
below Part H, when both parts are contained on a
single tread label. NHTSA finds this suggestion
unacceptable because the UTQG grades would be
difficult to locate if preceded by a body of textual
material.

Goodyear also commented on several occasions
that specifying a minimum type size for the printing
of labels would be of no benefit since many factors
other than type size, such as letter style, spacing,
and format, contribute to legibility. NHTSA agrees
that a minimum type size requirement alone is insuf-
ficient to assure the readability of labels. For this
reason, NHTSA has chosen to withdraw its pro-
posed minimum type size requirement at this time.
The agency will, however, continue to monitor in-
dustry compliance with the labeling requirements to
ascertain whether a comprehensive set of re-
quirements is necessary to assure that tread labels
will be legible to consumers.

The agency has found considerable merit in
another Goodyear suggestion, to delete the range
of possible grades adjacent to the categories
"TRACTION" and "TEMPERATURE" on Part
H of the label. These letters were originally in-
cluded on the label to provide a display on which
the grade attributable to a particular tire could be
marked. Since grades will now be marked on Part I
of the label, the range of possible grades in Part H
is superfluous and has been deleted from the re-
quired format. If, however, manufacturers wish to
display the array of grades on both Part I and Part
II of their labels, NHTSA has no objection to this
practice.

Goodyear was joined by General Tire & Rubber
Company in requesting that NHTSA clarify whether
the three category headings, "TREADWEAR,"
"TRACTION," and "TEMPERATURE," in Part I
of the proposed label must be laid out side by side,
across the label, or one below the other, down the
label. In the interest of flexibility, the regulation
makes either of these layouts acceptable, although
the relative order of the categories must be main-
tained to permit easy reference to the explanatory
material.

Similarly, several manufacturers recommended
that the regulations permit grades to be displayed
either to the right of or directly below the grading
category to which they apply. Again, to facilitate
efficient label design, the regulation permits the
use of either of these locations for the display of
grades.

Industry commenters asked that NHTSA clarify
whether the use of lower case letters in the label
text, as set out in Figure 2 of the regulation,
precludes manufacturers from printing labels us-
ing all capital letters in the label text. The regula-
tion has been modified to permit the optional use of
all capital letters in printing the text of Figure 2.

NHTSA wishes to confirm Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Company's understanding that the words
"Part I" and "Part 11" appearing in Figure 2 as
proposed are for reference purposes only and need
not be printed on the tread label. General and the
Rubber Manufacturers Association called
NHTSA' s attention to certain typographical errors
in the proposed Figure 2 text, which have been cor-
rected in the amendment as adopted.

Several manufacturers suggested that the
original label format be permitted as an option, or

PART 575-PRE 70

that, as a minimum, waste be avoided by allowing
labels printed with the original format to be used
up regardless of the adoption of a new label for-
mat. NHTSA considers the new two-part label for-
mat to be superior to the original format in terms
of clarity and readability. Therefore, the agency
has concluded that universal conversion to the new
format is desirable. However, since manufacturers
have expended significant resources in efforts to
comply with the original labeling requirement,
NHTSA will permit the use of labels employing the
original format, at the manufacturers option, until
October 1, 1980. This period of flexibility should
permit any labels already printed to be used up and
allow a smooth transition to the new format.

Since this amendment will increase manufac-
turers' flexibility in complying with the UTQG

labeling requirements, and since the transition to
the new labeling format will be phased in so as to
avoid economic waste, the agency has found that
this notice does not have significant impact for
purposes of internal review. In view of the fact
that some manufacturers may still be in the proc-
ess of obtaining labels for their bias-belted tire
lines, this amendment will become effective
December 1, 1979.
Issued on November 20, 1979.

Joan Claybrook,
Administrator
44 F.R. 68475
November 29, 1979

PART 575-PRE 71-72

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION

Uniform Tire Quality Rating
(Docket No. 25; Notice 37)

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

SUMMARY: This notice corrects an inadvertent
error in the text of the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration's (NHTSA) final rule
modifying the tread label format used under the
Uniform Tire Quality Grading (UTQG) Standards
(49 CFR 575.104).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On November
29, 1979, NHTSA published a notice (44 F.R.
68475) making minor modifications in the final
format of tire tread labels used to convey UTQG
information to consumers. That notice contained
jm inadvertent error in the text of Figure 2 of the
regulation in that the words "one and one-half'
were substituted for the words "one and a half
under the heading "Treadwear" in Part II of the
tread label text. The notice is therefore revised to
reflect the intended wording.

F.R. Doc. 79-36522 appearmg at 44 F.R. 68475
is corrected at page 68477 in the third column as
follows:

Figure 2, Part II of the Uniform Tire Quality
Grading Standards, 49 CFR 575.104, is corrected
by substitution of the words "one and a half in
place of the words "one and one- half under the
heading "Treadwear".
Issued on January 22, 1980.

Michael M. Finkelstein,
Associate Administrator
for Rulemaking

45 F.R. 6947
January 31, 1980

PART 575-PRE 73-74

PREAMBLE TO PART 575— CONSUMER INFORMATION REGULATIONS
UNIFORM TIRE QUALITY GRADING

(Docket No. 25; Notice 38)

ACTION: Interpretation.

SUMMARY: This notice clarifies the procedure to
be used under the Uniform Tire Quality Grading
(UTQG) Standards in measuring tread depth of
tires without circumferential grooves or with a
limited number of grooves. The regulation's
provision for measurement of tread depth in tire
grooves has given rise to questions concerning the
proper means of measurement for such tires. This
notice is intended to facilitate testing of tires of
this type.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This interpretation is effective
immediately.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Richard Hipolit, Office of the Chief
Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-1834).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The UTQG Standards (49 CFR 575.104) require
the grading of passenger car tires on three
performance characteristics: treadwear, traction
and temperature resistance. In setting forth the
procedure to be followed in evaluating treadwear
performance, the regulation states that, after an
800-mile break-in, tires are to be run for 6,400
miles over a designated course, with tread depth
measurements to be taken every 800 miles. The
regulation specifies that tread depth is measured
at six equally spaced points in each tire groove
other than shoulder grooves, avoiding treadwear
indicators. Tire grooves are typically arranged
symmetrically around the center of the tread.

On May 24, 1979, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) published in the
Federal Register (44 FR 30139) an interpretation
that tires designed for year round use do not
qualify as "deep tread, winter-type snow tires,"

which are excluded from the coverage of the UTQG
regulation by 49 CFR 575.104(c). In response to
this interpretation, the Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company commented to NHTSA (Docket 25;
Notice 32-011) that a technical problem may exist
in the measurement of tread depth of tires for year
round use since circumferential grooves are absent
in the designs of many such tires.

NHTSA is aware that certain other standard tire
designs, as well as year round designs, may
incorporate lugs, discontinuous projections molded
in the tread rubber, separated by voids, in place of
ribs defined by circumferential grooves. In other
cases, the limited number of grooves on the tire
could lead to inaccurate results if measurements
were made in only those grooves.

To assure accurate tread depth measurements on
tires lacking circumferential grooves, and tires with
fewer than four grooves, measurements are to be
made along a minimum of four circumferential lines
equally spaced across the tire tread surface. These
lines are to be symmetrically arranged around a
circumferential line at the center of the tread. The
outermost line on each side of the circumferential
tread centerline is to be placed within one inch of the
shoulder.

Measurements are to be made at six equally spaced
points along each line. If the design of the tire is such
that, on a particular circumferential line, six equally
spaced points do not exist at which groove or void
depth exceeds by Heth of an inch the distance from
the tread surface to the tire's treadwear indicator,
measurements are not to be taken along that line. If
measurements cannot be taken on four equally-
spaced, symmetrically-arranged lines, the require-
ment for equal spacing does not apply.
Measurements in that case are to be taken along a
minimum of four lines, with an equal number of
symmetrically arranged measured lines on either
side of the tread centerline.

PART 575-PRE 75

NHTSA recognizes that, due to the The principal author of this notice is Richard J.

implementation schedule of the regulation, certain Hipolit of the Office of Chief Counsel,

manufacturers may have already conducted Issued on March 24 1980
treadwear tests on tires falling within the scope of
this interpretation. The Agency does not object to

the use in grading of treadwear data generated , ri K t

prior to the publication date of this notice, if such , , . . 7 ,

J, -J- ii.uj ■ 1 Admmistrator
data was acquired usmg a test method varymg only

in minor, non-substantive respects from the 45 F.R. 23441

method described in this interpretation. April 7, 1980

PART 575-PRE 76

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENTS TO PART 575-CONSUMER INFORMATION
REGULATIONS; UNIFORM TIRE QUALITY GRADING

(Docket No. 25; Notice 39)

ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends the Uniform Tire
Quality Grading (UTQG) Standards to exclude
from the requirements of the regulation tires
produced in small numbers, which are not
recommended for use on recent vehicle models.
The amendment is intended to reduce costs to
consumers and reduce regulatory burdens on
industry in an area where the purchase of tires
based on comparison of performance
characteristics is limited.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This amendment is effective
immediately.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dr. F. Cecil Brenner, Office of Automotive
Ratings, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-1740).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The UTQG Standards 49 CFR § 575.104 are
intended to enable consumers to make an informed
choice in the purchase of passenger car tires
through the use of comparative performance
information relating to tire treadwear, traction
and temperature resistance. The standards apply
to new pneumatic tires for use on passenger cars
manufactured after 1948. Deep tread, winter-type
snow tires, space-saver or temporary use spare
tires, and tires with nominal rim diameters of 10 to
12 inches have been excluded from the application
of the regulation (49 CFR § 575.104(c)).

Several tire manufacturers and dealers have
informed the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) that a small class of tires
exists for which marketplace competition based on
performance characteristics is extremely limited.
These tires, which are purchased for use on
vehicles manufactured after 1948 but nonetheless

considered by their owners to be classic or antique,
are produced in small numbers in a wide variety of
designs and sizes. Purchasers of these tires are
reportedly concerned primarily with appearance,
authenticity, and availability rather than tire
performance.

Information supplied by Intermark Tire
Company indicates that a similar limited market
exists for tires used on older vehicles requiring tire
sizes no longer employed as original equipment on
new vehicles. Intermark petitioned NHTSA to
remove these tires from the coverage of the
regulation on the basis that little market
competition exists in their sale and that availability
is the primary factor in the purchase of this class of
tire.

In order to reduce costs to consumers and
eliminate the need for industry to grade the
multiplicity of small lines of tires in which
comparative performance information would have
limited value, NHTSA published a notice
proposing to remove certain limited production
tires from the application of the UTQG regulation
(45 FR 807; January 3, 1980). Four criteria, were
specified to define limited production tires. First
the annual production by the tire's manufacturer
of tires of the same design and size could not
exceed 15,000 tires. Second, if the tire were
marketed by a brand name owner, the annual
purchase by the brand name owner could not
exceed 15,000 tires. Third, the tire's size could not
have been listed as a manufacturer's recommended
size designation for a new motor vehicle produced
or imported into this country in quantities greater
than 10,000 during the preceding calendar year.
Fourth, the annual production by the tire's
manufacturer, or the total annual-purchase by the
tire's brand name owner, if applicable, of different
tires otherwise meeting the criteria for limited

PART 575-PRE 77

production tires could not exceed 35,000 tires. The
proposal also clarified that differences in design
would be determined on the basis of structural
characteristics, materials and tread pattern,
rather than cosmetic differences.

Commenters on the proposal, including the Rubber
Manufacturers Association, the National Tire
Dealers and Retreaders Association, Dunlop
Limited, Intermark, Kelsey Tire Company and
McCreary Tire and Rubber Company agreed that
tire quality grading should not be required for limited
production tires. Among the reasons stated for
support of the proposal were expected cost savings to
industry and the consumer and the special
consideration affecting the purchase of these tires.
After consideration of these comments, the agency
has adopted the proposed amendment with minor
modification.

Intermark pointed out a possible anomalous
situation which could result from the wording of
subparagraph (c) (2) (iv) of the proposal. That
provision placed a 35,000 tire limit on a
manufacturer's total annual production of tires
meeting the limited production criteria, or, in the
case of tires marketed under a brand name, on the
total annual purchase of limited production tires by a
brand name owner. Thus, under this commenter's
reading of (c) (2) (iv), 40,000 tires meeting the criteria
of subparagraphs (c) (2) (i), (ii), and (iii) could be
produced by a manufacturer, sold in groups of 10,000
to four different brand name owners, and still qualify
as limited production tires. At the same time,
another manufacturer could produce 40,000 tires
meeting the first three criteria for sale in its own
company outlets and be required to grade the tires.
To make it clear that the 35,000 tire limitation on
rrtanufacturer's production applies whether or not
the tires are marketed by a brand name owner,
subparagraph (c)(2)(iv) has been modified by
substituting the word "and" for "or."

Kelsey Tire Company asked how the criteria would
apply to tires which are produced abroad in large
numbers but are imported in quantities which would
fall within the unit limitations of subparagraphs
(c) (2) (i), (ii), and (iv) of the proposal. To make clear
that the criteria are to be applied to foreign tires only
insofar as they are imported in this country,
subparagraphs (c) (2) (i) and (iv) have been modified
to refer to "annual domestic production or
importation into the United States by the tire's

manufacturer." The reference to "importation ... by
the tire's manufacturer" includes in the total all tires
entering the United States for sale under the name of
the manufacturer, regardless of the shipping or title
arrangements made by the manufacturer with
distributors. Similarly, subpargraphs (c) (2) (ii) and
(iv) have been modified to clarify the status of tires
purchased by brand name owners.

McCreary and Intermark argued that the unit
restrictions on production of tires meeting the
criteria are too restrictive and should be eliminated
or eased significantly. McCeary predicted that the
total number of classic car tires produced by
individual manufacturers will grow, although
production runs of individual designs and sizes will
remain small. Intermark contended that
production limitations unfairly penalize efficient
manufacturers and that a new vehicle
recommended size designation provision such as
proposed subparagraph (c) (2) (iii) would be
sufficient to define the intended class of limited
production tires.

NHTSA considers the stated limitations broad
enough to encompass the "classic" car tire market
as it is presently constituted. With regard to the
larger production runs of tires in outdated sizes,
NHTSA beHeves that the production of tires in
numbers greater than the proposed limitations is
suggestive of wider availability and resulting
increased competition which would make UTQG
information of greater value. Further, relaxing or
eliminating unit restrictions could result in the
exclusion from the application of the standard of
high performance or racing tires which are not
recommended as original equipment. The agency
believes that comparative tire grading information
should be available to purchasers of tires of this
type. NHTSA will monitor the limited production
tire market to determine whether future market
changes require revision of the 35,000 tire
limitation.

Pursuant to E.G. 12044, "Improving
Government Regulation," and implementing
departmental guidelines, the agency has
considered the effects of this amendment. It
reaffirms its earlier determination that the
amendment is not significant and that the effects
are so minimal as not to warrant preparation of a
regulatory evaluation. NHTSA has determined
that these amendments will result in modest cost
savings to industry and consumers, while having
no appreciable effect on safety or the environment.

PART 575-PRE 78

Because this amendment relieves a restriction
and because the agency desires to minimize any
possible interruption in tire production pending the
effective date of this amendment, the amendment
is effective immediately.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
$ 575.104(c) is amended to read:

$575,104 Uniform tire quality grading

standards.

* • • • •

(c) Application.

(1) This section applies to new pneumatic
tires for use on passenger cars. However, this
section does not apply to deep tread, winter-
type snow tires, space-saver or temporary use
spare tires, tires with nominal rim diameters of
10 to 12 inches, or to limited production tires
as defined in paragraph (c) (2) of this section.

(2) "Limited production tire" means a tire
meeting all of the following criteria, as
applicable:

(i) The annual domestic production or
importation into the United States by the
tire's manufacturer of tires of the same
design and size as the tire does not exceed
15,000 tires;

(ii) In the case of a tire marketed under a
brand name, the annual domestic purchase
or importation into the United States by a
brand name owner of tires of the same
design and size as the tire does not exceed
15,000 tires;

(iii) The tire's size was not listed as a
vehicle manufacturer's recommended tire
size designation for a new motor vehicle
produced in or imported into the United
States in quantities greater than 10,000
during the calendar year preceding the year
of the tire's manufacture; and

(iv) The total annual domestic production
or importation into the United States by the
tire's manufacturer, and in the case of a tire
marketed under a brand name, the total
annual domestic purchase or purchase for
importation into the United States by the
tire's brand name owner, of tires meeting
the criteria of subparagraphs (c) (2) (i), (ii),
and (iii) of this section, does not exceed
35,000 tires.

Tire design is the combination of general
structural characteristics, materials, and tread
pattern, but does not include cosmetic, identifying
or other minor variations among tires.

The principal authors of this notice are Dr. F.
Cecil Brenner of the Office of Automotive Ratings
and Richard J. Hipolit of the Office of Chief
Counsel.

Issued on March 24, 1980.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

45 F.R. 23442
April 7, 1980

PART 575-PRE 79-80

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 575

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends the Consumer
Information Regulations by deletion of the re-
quirement that manufacturers supply information
on acceleration and passing ability to vehicle first
purchasers and prospective purchasers. The notice
also revises the timing of manufacturers' submis-
sions of performance data to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). These
modifications, which were proposed in response to
a General Motors Corporation petition for rule-
making, are intended to lessen regulatory burdens
on industry, while providing performance data in a
manner more useful to consumers.

EFFECTIVE DATES: The amendment of section
575.6(d) is effective June 1, 1981. The deletion of
section 575.106 is effective immediately, July 7,
1980.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ivy Baer, Office of Automotive Ratings,
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W.. Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-1740)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Consumer
Information Regulations (49 CFR Part 575) provide
first purchasers and prospective purchasers with
performance information relating to the safety of
motor vehicles and tires. This information is in-
tended to aid consumers in making comparative
purchasing decisions and in the safe operation of
vehicles. General Motors Corporation petitioned
NHTSA to delete requirements for consumer in-
formation on passenger car and motorcycle stop-
ping distance (49 CFR 575.101), passenger car tire
reserve load (49 CFR 575.102), and passenger car
and motorcyle acceleration and passing ability

(49 CFR 575.106), on the basis that this information
is of limited value to consumers. In response to
this petition, NHTSA proposed (44 FR 15748;
March 15, 1979) to delete the requirement for ac-
celeration and passing ability information and to
limit the application of the tire reserve load provi-
sions to vehicles with significant cargo capacity,
thus dropping the requirement for most passenger
cars. NHTSA also proposed that vehicle manufac-
turers submit performance data to the agency at
least 90 days before model introduction, compared
to the 30-day advance submission which had been
required (49 CFR 575.6).

Timing of Data Submission

The primary purpose of the advance submission
to NHTSA is to permit the agency to compile and
disseminate performance data in a comparative
format for use by prospective vehicle purchasers.
A major criticism of the consumer information pro-
gram in the past has been that comparative infor-
mation reached the consumer too late in the model
year to be of real value in choosing between
competing vehicles. A 90-day advance submis-
sion would permit the agency to assemble and
distribute comparative information early in the
model year, when it would be of greatest value to
consumers.

Some industry commenters questioned the need
for earlier submission of data on the basis that
agency delays in publishing the data will result in
comparative information being available late in
the model year, in spite of the earlier submission.
Other manufacturers argued that consumer in-
terest in the information is limited in any case.
General Motors suggested that vehicle design
changes during the model year rapidly outdate the
information, further limiting its value.

However, the Center for Auto Safety (CFAS)
commented that it receives numerous requests

PART 575-PRE 81

from consumers for comparative information on
motor vehicles. CFAS also pointed out the popu-
larity of comparative motor vehicle information on
the rare occasions when such information is made
available by independent publishers. NHTSA has
concluded that consumer interest in comparative
performance information would be substantial if
the information were made available in a timely
manner. Further, NHTSA has determined that
few running design changes during the model year
are so major as to significantly affect the perform-
ance characteristics covered by the consumer in-
formation regulations.

The success of the Environmental Protection
Agency in publishing its popular fuel economy
guides in a timely manner indicates that publica-
tion of vehicle information by NHTSA early in the
model year is practical. However, based on past
experience, it appears that a 90-day advance sub-
mission is the minimum leadtime necessary for
NHTSA to publish and distribute the information.

Some manufacturers indicated they may have
difficulty providing accurate performance informa-
tion 90 days in advance of model introduction due
to the possibility of last minute design changes.
However, American Motors Corporation com-
mented that a 90-day advance submission require-
ment would pose no problem at new model intro-
duction, although it would inhibit running changes
during the model year. In view of the importance
of supplying comparative information early in the
model year, NHTSA has adopted the proposed 90-
day advance submission requirement for model
introduction. However, to avoid delaying the in-
troduction of product improvements, the 30-day
notice period has been retained for changes occur-
ring during the model year.

Tire Reserve Load

In response to General Motors' petition,
NHTSA proposed modifying the tire reserve load
information requirement to limit its application to
trucks and multipurpose passenger vehicles with a
g^oss vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or
less, and to passenger cars with a maximum cargo
capacity of 25 cubic feet or more. The regulation
had applied to all passenger cars, but not to trucks
or multipurpose passenger vehicles.

Comments from many industry and consumer
sources recommended deleting the tire reserve
load information requirement completely. CFAS

commented that consumer interest in tire reserve
load information has been limited. Many comments
from car, truck and recreational vehicle manufac-
turers expressed concern that presenting informa-
tion on tire reserve load may encourage vehicle
overloading by misleading consumers into think-
ing that vehicles have additional load carrying
capacity. Several commenters suggested that
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 110 and
120 provide the appropriate means of ensuring
that vehicles are equipped with tires of adequate
size and load rating.

A recent study conducted for NHTSA (Docket
79-02, Notice 1-016) indicates that tire reserve load
is an important factor in preventing passenger car
tire failure. Additional information is being gath-
ered on this subject and the agency is planning to
propose amendment of Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard 110 to require a minimum tire
reserve load on passenger cars. Preliminary analy-
sis suggests that a tire reserve load percentage of
10% or greater is necessary to provide an ade-
quate safety margin.

NHTSA has found that presently available in-
formation is not sufficient to justify extension of
the tire reserve load requirements to light trucks
and multipurpose passenger vehicles at this time.
However, in view of the safety implications of tire
reserve load for passenger cars and in the absence
of a requirement for minimum tire reserve load,
NHTSA believes that information on this subject
should be available to passenger car purchasers
and owners. The agency has concluded that provi-
sion of tire reserve load information in its present
form does not encourage vehicle overloading, since
a warning against loading vehicles beyond their
stated capacity must accompany the information.

For these reasons, NHTSA has determined that
the existing requirement for tire reserve load in-
formation must remain in effect at least until the
completion of rulemaking on the possible amend-
ment of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
110. If the provision of tire reserve load informa-
tion no longer appears necessary then, the agency
will reconsider the status of tire reserve load as a
consumer information item. At this time, however,
NHTSA withdraws the proposal to modify the tire
reserve load consumer information requirements.

Acceleration and Passing Ability

The final aspect of NHTSA's proposal was dele-

PART 575-PRE 82

tion of acceleration and passing ability (49 CFR
575.106) from the consumer information re-
quirements. The acceleration and passing ability
provision required information on the distance and
time needed to pass a truck traveling at 20 mph
and at 50 mph. The passing vehicle was permitted
to attain speeds of up to 35 mph and 80 mph in the
respective maneuvers.

In proposing deletion of this requirement,
NHTSA felt that the national interest in energy
conservation had substantially diminished con-
sumer demand for rapid acceleration capability.
Further, the high speed driving permitted by the
test procedures appeared to contradict the safety
and energy saving policies behind the national
55-mph speed limit. Commenters on the proposal,
including American Motors, CFAS, General
Motors and Volkswagen of America, unanimously
agreed that the acceleration and passing ability
provision was no longer of interest to consumers
and had become inconsistent with national goals.
Section 575.106 has, therefore, been deleted from
the consumer information regulations.

NHTSA's regulatory evaluation, conducted pur-
suant to E.O. 12044, "Improving Government
Regulations" and departmental guidelines, in-
dicates that the amendments are not significant.
They decrease the regulatory burden on industry,
while having no appreciable negative impact on
safety. A copy of the regulatory evaluation can be
obtained from the Docket Section, Room 5108,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.
Also, the amendments will have no measurable
effect on the environment.

Because the amendments as they pertain to ac-
celeration and passing ability relieve a restriction,
and to avoid any unnecessary costs in complying
with this requirement, the deletion of section
575.106 is effective immediately. So that useful
performance information can be provided to con-
sumers for model year 1982 vehicles, the amend-
ment to section 575.6 is effective June 1, 1981.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR Part

575, Consumer Information Regulations, is
amended as follows:

1. Section 575.6(d) is amended to read:
§575.6 Requirements

• « * * *

(d) In the case of all sections of Subpart B, other
than §575.104, as they apply to information sub-
mitted prior to new model introduction, each
manufacturer of motor vehicles shall submit to the
Administrator 10 copies of the information
specified in Subpart B of this part that is ap-
plicable to the vehicles offered for sale, at least 90
days before it is first provided for examination by
prospective purchasers pursuant to paragraph (c)
of this section. In the case of §575.104, and all
other sections of Subpart B as they apply to post-
introduction changes in information submitted for
the current model year, each manufacturer of
motor vehicles, each brand name owner of tires,
and each manufacturer of tires for which there is
no brand name owner shall submit to the Ad-
ministrator 10 copies of the information specified
in Subpart B of this part that is applicable to the
vehicles or tires offered for sale, at least 30 days
before it is first provided for examination by pro-
spective purchasers pursuant to paragraph (c) of
this section.

2. Section 575.106 is deleted.

The principal authors of this proposal are Ivy
Baer of the Office of Automotive Ratings and
Richard J. Hipolit of the Office of the Chief
Counsel.

Issued on July 7, 1980.

Joan Clay brook
Administrator

45 FR 47152
July 14, 1980

PART 575-PRE 83-84

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 575

Consumer Information Regulations

Uniform Tire Quality Grading

(Docket No. 25; Notice 4)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends the Uniform Tire
Quality Grading (UTQG) Standards to provide for
the testing of metric tires, tires with inflation
pressures measured in kilopascals. Since the
original UTQG test requirements were written
prior to the introduction of metric tires and
specified inflation pressures measured in pounds
per square inch, modification of the regulation is
now necessary to identify inflation pressures ap-
plicable to metric tires. The notice also makes
technical changes in the UTQG traction test pro-
cedure to facilitate efficient use of test facilities.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendments are effective
immediately.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dr. F. Cecil Brenner, Office of Automotive
Ratings, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590, 202-426-1740

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The UTQG
standards prescribe test procedures for evaluation
of the treadwear, traction, and temperature
resistance properties of passenger car tires.
Grades based on these are used by consumers to
evaluate the relative performance of competing
tire lines. Test procedures for all three perform-
ance categories were established specifying infla-
tion pressures in pounds per square inch.

Following the introduction of metric tires with
inflation pressures measured in kilopascals, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) recognized the need to add metric infla-
tion pressures to the UTQG test procedures. The
agency proposed (44 F.R. 56389; October 1, 1979;
Notice 34) that for purposes of traction testing.

metric tires would be inflated and tire loads deter-
mined using a prescribed inflation pressure of 180
kPa. Under the proposal, other tires would con-
tinue to be tested at an inflation pressure of 24 psi.
NHTSA's notice also proposed modification of the
temperature resistance test procedure to provide,
in the case of metric tires, for use of inflation
pressures 60 kPa less than the tires' maximum
permissible inflation pressure.

In response to comments, NHTSA modified the
original proposal (45 F.R. 35408; May 27, 1980;
Notice 40) to include treadwear testing in the pro-
posed modifications and to incorporate a table in-
dicating treadwear, traction, and temperature
resistance test inflation pressures for tires with
various maximum permissible inflation pressures
in kilopascals and pounds per square inch. In the
proposed table, different test inflation pressures
were specified for tires with differing maximum
permissible inflation pressures.

The agency also proposed, in Notice 34, modifi-
cation of the traction test procedure to permit the
adjustment of candidate tire test results with
standard tire results obtained either before or
after the candidate tire test sequence, so long as
all data to be compared were collected within the
same two-hour period. This change was intended
to promote efficient use of the traction test
facilities by permitting data from more than one
candidate tire test sequence to be adjusted by
comparison with the same standard tire sequence.

Upon examination of additional data, NHTSA
concluded that a three-hour period could be em-
ployed without affecting the accuracy of the test
results. Use of a three-hour period would permit
more than one candidate tire test sequence to be
run both before and after the corresponding stand-
ard tire test sequence. A three-hour period for
comparative testing was proposed in Notice 40.
Having received no negative comments on the

PART 575-PRE 85

traction test sequence proposal as stated in that
notice, NHTSA has determined that the amend-
ment will be adopted as proposed.

On the proposed changes to provide for testing
of metric tires, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
noted that the table of test inflation pressures pro-
posed in Notice 40 calls for variations in the
prescribed test inflation pressure depending on
the maximum permissible inflation pressure of the
tested tire. The original traction procedure
specified a single test inflation pressure for all
tires. Goodyear expressed concern that such a
change could affect test results and, consequently,
tire grades, and require wasteful additional
testing to confirm grades already assigned.
Goodyear recommended that NHTSA adopt the
amendment proposed in Notice 34 that all metric
tires be tested using the inflation pressure 180 kPa
and all other tires be tested using the original 24
psi inflation pressure.

NHTSA agrees that unnecessary costs asso-
ciated with the UTQG Standard should be avoided.
For this reason, the agency has determined that
reference to traction testing will be deleted from
the table of test inflation pressures, and the addi-
tion of the metric traction test inflation pressure
of 180 kPa proposed in Notice 34 will be adopted
instead. Those aspects of Notice 40 pertaining to
treadwear and temperature resistance testing of
metric tires will be adopted as proposed in that
notice.

Pursuant to Executive Order 12044, "Improving
Government Regulations," and implementing
Departmental guidelines, the agency has con-
sidered the effects of these amendments. NHTSA
reaffirms its earlier determination that the amend-
ments are not significant and that the effects are
so minimal as not to warrant preparation of a
regulatory evaluation. NHTSA has determined
these amendments will result in modest cost sav-
ings to industry and consumers, while having no
appreciable effect on safety or the environment.

Because these amendments will facilitate the
efficient and accurate completion of testing pres-
ently underway, the amendments are effective
immediately.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
§575.104 is amended as follows:

1. In section 575.104(e)(2)(ii) by substitution of

the words "the applicable pressure specified in
Table 1 of this section," in place of the words "an
inflation pressure 8 pounds per square inch less
than its maximum permissible inflation pressure."

2. In section 575.104 (f) (2) (i) (B) and (D) by addi-
tion of the words, "or, in the case of a tire with in-
flation pressure measured in kilopascals, to 180
kPa" following the words "to 24 psi."

3. In section 575.104(f)(2)(vii) by addition of the
following sentence, at the end thereof: "The stand-
ard tire traction coefficient so determined may be
used in the computation of adjusted traction coeffi-
cients for more than one candidate tire."

4. In section 575.104 (f)(2)(viii) by addition of
the words, "or, on the case of a tire with inflation
pressure measured in kilopascals, the load speci-
fied at 180 kPa," following the words "at 24 psi,"
and by addition of the sentences, "Candidate tire
measurements may be taken either before or after
the standard tire measurements used to compute
the standard tire traction coefficient. Take all
standard tire and candidate tire measurements
used in computation of a candidate tire's adjusted
traction coefficient within a single three hour
period" following the first sentence thereof.

5. In section 575.104 (g) (1) by substitution of the
words "the applicable pressure specified in Table 1
of this section," in place of the words "2 pounds per
square inch less than its maximum permissible in-
flation pressure."

6. In section 575.104(g)(3) by substitution of the
words "the applicable pressure specified in Table 1
of this section," in place of the words "2 pounds per
square inch less than the maximum permissible in-
flation pressure."

7. In section 575.104(g)(6) by substitution of the
words "applicable inflation pressure specified in
Table 1 of this section," in place of the words "infla-
tion pressure that is 8 pounds per square inch less
than the tire's maximum permissible inflation
pressure."

8. In section 575.104(g)(8) by substitution of the
words "the applicable pressure specified in Table 1
of this section," in place of the words "2 pounds per
square inch less than that the tire's maximum per-
missible inflation pressure."

9. By addition of the following table at the con-
clusion of the text of that section:

PART 575-PRE 86

Table 1. — Test Inflation Pressures

Maximum permissible
inflation pressure

32

36

40

240

280

300

lb/in'

lb/in'

lb/in'

kPa

kPa

kPa

Pressure to be used in tests for

treadwear and in determination of tire

load for temperature resistance testing. 24 28 32 180 220 180

Pressure to used for all aspects of

temperature resistance testing other

than determination of tire load. 30 34 38 220 260 220

The principal authors of this notice are Dr. F.
Cecil Brenner of Office of Automotive Ratings and
Richard J. Hipolit of the Office of Chief Counsel.

Issued on October 15, 1980.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

45 FR 70273
October 23, 1980

PART 575-PRE 87-88

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 575

Consumer Information Regulations; Uniform Tire Quality Grading

(Docket No. 25; Notice 45)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends the Uniform
Tire Quality Grading Standards to permit
tire grades to be molded on the tire sidewall
beginning at any time up to six months after
introduction of a new tire line. This
amendment, which was proposed in response
to a petition from Atlas Supply Company, is
intended to avoid disruption of production
while tire grades are determined. The notice
also extends the deadline for conversion to
new format tire tread labels in order to
permit unused supplies of old-format labels to
be used up.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 15, 1981.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On January 26, 1981, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
published a notice of proposed rulemaking (46
F.R. 8063; Docket 25, Notice 44) proposing
amendment of the sidewall molding and tread
labeling requirements of the Uniform Tire
Quality Grading (UTQG) Standards (49 CFR
575.104). In response to a petition for
rulemaking filed by Atlas Supply Company,
NHTSA proposed a four month phase-in
period for molding of UTQG grades on the
sidewalls of tires of newly introduced tire
lines. Under the regulation as originally
issued, all covered tires were required to
have UTQG grades molded on the sidewall
(49 CFR 575.104(d)(l)(i)(A)). Atlas, with

support from the Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company and the General Tire & Rubber
Company, requested that initial production
runs of new tire lines be exempted from the
molding requirement pending determination
of UTQG grades.

The notice of proposed rulemaking also
responded to a petition for rulemaking
submitted by Armstrong Rubber Company.
Armstrong had requested that the deadline
for conversion to the new UTQG tread label
format established in Docket 25, Notice 35 (44
F.R. 68475; November 29, 1979) be extended
at least nine months to permit supplies of old-
format labels to be used up. In response to
Armstrong's petition, NHTSA proposed that
the deadline for conversion to the new format
be extended from October 1, 1980, until April
1, 1982.

As indicated in the Notice of Intent
published by NHTSA on April 9, 1981, (46
F.R. 21203), NHTSA is currently reviewing
the requirements of the Uniform Tire Quality
Grading System regulatory program, to
determine the degree to which it accurately
and clearly provides meaningful information
to consumers in accordance with the
requirements of 15 U.S.C. 1423. Proposed
rulemaking or further action on this question
will be published within thirty days of this
notice.

Proposed Rulemaking— Decision

NHTSA received several comments from
tire and motor vehicle manufacturers on the
proposed amendments. After review of these
comments, the agency has concluded that,

PART 575 -PRE 89

while amendment of the regulation is
warranted, several changes in the specifics of
the proposal are desirable.

Proposed Rulemaking— Comments

Support for the concept of a temporary
exemption from the UTQG molding
requirements for new tire lines was indicated
by both tire and motor vehicle industry
sources. The Rubber Manufacturers
Association (RMA) commented that such an
exemption would resolve difficulties
associated with grading new tire lines, and
save costs to manufacturers, while not
significantly affecting the distribution of
grading information to the public.

Ford Motor Company expressed its opinion
that a temporary exemption would make
good economic sense by permitting full
utilization of production facilities while
UTQG grades are determined. Full utilization
of equipment was a primary goal of the Atlas
petition, which expressed concern that a
substantial investment in tire molds would be
unproductive while UTQG testing was
conducted using a small initial sample of
tires.

Goodyear also expressed general support
for the proposal, since it would permit UTQG
grades to be based on testing of production
tires. Goodyear noted that while UTQG
testing of prototype tires is possible, testing
of production tires is desirable because of the
greater variety of sizes available for testing.

While supporting the proposal for a molding
exemption period, tire industry commenters
uniformly agreed that the four-month period
proposed by NHTSA would be inadequate.
Goodyear, Atlas, and the RMA agreed that a
six-month period would be preferable. These
commenters viewed four months as the
period in which grades could be determined
and molds stamped under optimal conditions.
However, these sources pointed out that
unexpected delays in tire selection, testing,
data analysis, retesting, or stamping could
easily extend beyond the four-month period.
Atlas' comments suggested that the potential
for delay is even greater where multiple
sources of supply are involved. In order to

allow for potential uncontrollable delays of
this nature, NHTSA has determined that the
period for introduction of molded grades on
new tire lines will be extended to six months
from the date production commences.

NHTSA's notice of proposed rulemaking
on this subject contained a proposed
requirement that motor vehicle
manufacturers affix to the window of each of
their vehicles equipped with tires exempted
from the molding requirement a sticker
containing tire-specific UTQG information.
This proposal was intended to assure that
prospective vehicle purchasers have access
to UTQG information. Tire-specific grades
for original equipment tires are not available
on tread labels or in vehicle manufacturers'
point of sale information. However, the
window sticker proposal was uniformly
opposed by motor vehicle and tire industry
commenters.

General Motors Corporation, Chrysler
Corporation, Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
and Goodyear all argued that significant
assembly line problems would result from
adoption of a window sticker requirement.
Comments received from these manufacturers
indicated that several lines of tires are
frequently used as original equipment on a
single vehicle model and, under the proposal,
more than one tire line without molded
grades could be available for use in an
assembly plant at one time.

Given this diversity of tire use,
commenters pointed out, assembly line
personnel would have to inspect each vehicle
and determine whether ungraded tires were
being used. These employees would then
have to determine the correct UTQG window
sticker -to be affixed to the vehicle. Under
such a system, labeling errors would be likely
in the absence of costly and time-consuming
reinspection. Alternatively, expensive
special parts identification and storage
programs could be undertaken to track
ungraded tires through the plant and affix
the appropriate labels when the tires are
used.

Several commenters argued that such a
labeling program would be unreasonably
burdensome and expensive in comparison to

PART 575 -PRE 90

the benefits which would be expected from
such a program. Ford Motor Company
estimated that UTQG window stickers would
result in an annual cost to that company of
$50,000. General Motors (GM) estimated that
window stickers could be affixed at a cost of
$.50 per car if used on all cars it produced.
According to GM, this cost would be much
higher in the limited application
contemplated by the proposal, due to
increased scheduling and inspection costs.

At the same time. General Motors,
Chrysler, and Goodyear argued that the
major importance of UTQG is in the
replacement market and that tire grades
seldom influence new car purchases. GM
pointed out that it establishes its own
performance criteria for original equipment
tires beyond the UTQG performance
categories, and that in this way vehicle
purchasers are assured of getting suitable
tires regardless of molded UTQG grades.

While Ford suggested several alternatives
to the window sticker proposal, the other
commenters addressing the issue
recommended that no accommodation at all is
necessary for ungraded original equipment
tires. In this regard, Goodyear noted that the
estimate used in the notice of proposed
rulemaking that no more than five percent of
original equipment tires would be ungraded
was probably high and the actual figure will
likely be considerably below that estimate.
NHTSA is also aware that in the event a
vehicle purchaser is interested in UTQG
information on original equipment tires
temporarily exempted from the molding
requirement, UTQG information would be
readily available from local tire dealers and
other sources. In view of the above
considerations, NHTSA has determined that
the proposed UTQG window sticker is
unnecessary and unduly burdensome and the
proposal for such a sticker is withdrawn.

NHTSA's notice of proposed rulemaking
also proposed a sunset provision for the
molding requirement change. This provision
would have automatically terminated the
molding exemption at the end of three years,
unless the agency determined that an
extension were necessary. Goodyear and the

RMA pointed out in their comments that a
sunset provision is unnecessary, since the
agency already has the authority to review
and amend the regulation at any time, if it
appears that the exemption is not working as
planned. In fact. Atlas recommended that the
agency review the effect of the amendment
no later than 18 months after its effective
date.

Goodyear noted that, if the sunset provision
is adopted, unforeseen delays in completion
of NHTSA's review could lead to disruptions
in the event the three-year sunset period
expires before the review process can be
completed and the exemption extended.
While NHTSA plans to monitor the effect of
the molding exemption and will propose any
necessary modifications, the agency has
concluded that the proposed sunset provision
is unnecessary and potentially disruptive.
Therefore, the sunset provision is
withdrawn.

Finally, only one commenter expressed an
opinion on the proposal to extend the
deadline for conversion to the new tread label
format. As discussed in Armstrong's petition
on this subject, the original October 1, 1980,
effective date appeared appropriate at the
time it was established. However, a sudden
market shift toward radial tires resulted in
unused supplies of old-format labels for bias-
belted tires. In order to permit existing
stocks of labels to be used, NHTSA proposed
extension of the deadline for conversion to
the new label format until April 1, 1982.

Goodyear complained that it had scrapped
unused supplies of old-format labels when the
format change took effect and argued that
extension of the deadline at this time would
not be fair and equitable. Goodyear went on,
however, to state its preference that the
deadline for conversion be eliminated
altogether in the interest of efficient use of
available materials.

NHTSA regrets that Goodyear found it
necessary to dispose of a quantity of old-
format labels which could not be used up
prior to the October 1 deadline. However, the
agency believes that such economic waste
would only be compounded by requiring
disposal of labels which may have been

PART 575 -PRE 91

retained by other manufacturers. At the
same time, complete elimination of the
conversion deadline could indefinitely delay
conversion to the new label format, which the
agency considers superior. For these reasons,
the deadline for conversion to the new tread
label format is extended until April 1, 1982.
Of course, manufacturers and brand name
owners wishing to use new-format labels
prior to that date are free to do so.

Several commenters stressed the need to
act quickly on the proposed amendments in
order to avoid production disruptions and
economic penalties which may be encountered
in the planned introduction of new tire lines.
Since the changes outlined above relieve
restrictions and have these beneficial effects,
they are made effective immediately upon
publication.

NHTSA has evaluated these amendments
and found that their effect would be to
provide minor cost savings for tire
manufacturers and brand name owners.

Accordingly, the agency has determined that
the amendments are not a major rule within
the meaning of Executive Order 12291 and
are not significant for purposes of
Department of Transportation policies and
procedures for internal review of proposals.
The agency has further determined that the
cost savings are not large enough to warrant
preparation of a regulatory evaluation under
the procedures. The agency has also
determined that the amendments, which relieve
restrictions and provide minor cost savings,
will not significantly affect a substantial
number of small entities. Finally, the agency
has concluded that the environmental
consequences of the amendments will be
minimal.

Issued on July 30, 1981.

Raymond A. Peck, Jr.
Administrator
46 F.R. 41514
August 17, 1981

PART 575 -PRE 92

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 575

Consumer Information Regulations
(Docket No. 7902; Notice 5)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends the Consumer
Information Regulations to permit amendment of
previously submitted motor vehicle performance
information at any time up to 30 days prior to new
model introduction. This amendment is intended
to reduce regulatory burdens on industry by
allowing greater flexibility in the implementation
of pre-introduction product changes.

EFFECTIVE DATE: June 1, 1982.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Consumer
Information Regulations (49 CFR Part 575)
require that manufacturers of motor vehicles and
tires provide prospective purchasers and first
purchasers with information on the performance
of their products in the areas of vehicle stopping
ability (49 CFR §575.101), vehicle tire reserve
load (49 CFR §575.102). truck camper loading (49
CFR §575.103), and uniform tire quality grading
(49 CFR §575.104). In addition to the requirements
that information be furnished directly to
consumers, manufacturers are required to submit
information to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) prior to the
introduction of new vehicle models and tire lines
or modification of existing lines. This advance
submission requirement is intended to permit the
agency to compile the information supplied by
various manufacturers in a comparative format
for distribution to consumers.

As originally issued, and presently in force, the
regulation requires that all information be
submitted to NHTSA at least 30 days prior to the
date on which the information is made available
to prospective purchasers (49 CFR §575.6(d)). The
regulation requires that information must be
made available to prospective purchasers not

later than the day on which the manufacturer
first authorizes the subject product to be put on
public display and sold to consumers (49 CFR
§575.6(c)).

To enable NHTSA to compile the information
in a comparative booklet for distribution early
enough in the model year to be useful to most
consumers, the agency amended the regulations
to require that motor vehicle manufacturers
submit information at least 90 days in advance of
new model introduction (45 F.R. 47152; July 14,
1980). The 30-day period was retained for post-
introduction vehicle changes and for tire quality
grading information. The amendment was
originally scheduled to take effect June 1, 1981,
but the effective date was postponed until June 1,
1982 (46 F.R. 29269; June 1, 1981), to allow
consideration of a petition from Ford Motor
Company requesting greater flexibility in the
requirement.

Ford contended that the 90-day advance
submission requirement could create hardships
for manufacturers when last minute pre-
introduction product changes, resulting from
component supply difficulties or other factors,
affect the performance characteristics covered by
Part 575. In such a situation, a manufacturer
could be forced to delay introduction of a vehicle
model until a new 90-day advance notice period
had been completed. To avoid this result, Ford
recommended that manufacturers be permitted
to amend initial pre-introduction submissions at
any time prior to 30 days before model
introduction. NHTSA responded with a notice of
proposed rulemaking to permit such revisions in
the event of unforeseeable pre-introduction
modifications in vehicle design or equipment (46
F.R. 4054; August 10. 1981; Docket 79-02; Notice
4). This proposal was among the deregulatory
measures discussed in the Administration's

PART 575; PRE 93

notice of intent on measures to aid the auto
industry.

NHTSA received comments from seven motor
vehicle manufacturers and importers in response
to the notice of proposed rulemaking. All
commenters agreed that the proposed amendment
would be an improvement over the established
90-day requirement, in that greater flexibility
would be provided in the introduction of necessary
product changes. As noted by Ford, the
amendment would facilitate implementation of
product development and marketing schedules,
while still providing information adequate for
NHTSA's purposes. NHTSA agrees and has
determined that the proposed amendment should
be adopted with one modification.

General Motors and Volkswagen of America,
Inc. commented that limiting changes in
performance information to those resulting from
"unforeseeable" product changes is inappropriate.
Volkswagen argued that only the manufacturer
can adequately judge whether product changes
are unforeseeable, and that agency attempts to
enforce such a requirement could lead to
undesirable consequences. Moreover, a
manufacturer acting in good faith could be faced
with a dilemma if the manufacturer is unable to
conclude that a needed product change was
unforeseeable, although in fact it had not been
anticipated in a particular instance. (Docket 79-02,
Notice 4, No. 004). General Motors argued that
cost factors alone are a sufficient incentive to
manufacturers to avoid last minute product
changes and therefore no foreseeability standard
is necessary to insure that changes are made in
good faith. General Motors suggested that if any
qualifier is thought necessary, "unforeseen" or
"unanticipated" would be preferable. (Docket
79-02, Notice 4, No. 007).

NHTSA continues to believe that some provision
is necessary to assure that only good faith product
changes form the basis for modifications of pre-
introduction submissions. However, NHTSA does
not wish to inhibit product changes which the
agency may believe could have been foreseen, but
honestly were not. To avoid this result, the
agency has concluded that "unforeseen" rather
than "unforeseeable" is a more appropriate
description of the types of product changes which
would justify amendments of pre-introduction
consumer information submissions.

Volkswagen and General Motors also
commented that the 90-day advance submission
requirement is unnecessary and that the original
30-day period should be retained. Volkswagen
contended that the agency could not use the
manufacturers' submissions until 30 days prior to
model introduction in any case because the data
would be subject to change. Volkswagen also
suggested that manufacturers could circumvent
the 90-day requirement by making minimal
performance claims in their initial submissions
and amending the information at a later date.
General Motors commented that the further in
advance information is submitted, the less
accurate it will be, and that the successful
publication of the Environmental Protection
Agency's fuel economy guide establishes the
feasibility of publishing comparative information
with a brief advance submission period.

NHTSA's past experience indicates that 30
days is inadequate for this agency to compile,
publish and distribute a useful comparative
booklet. Moreover, any design or equipment
related inaccuracies inherent in a 90-day advance
submission can be corrected under the amendment
adopted in this notice. While it is true that the
agency could not publish and distribute the
information until the period for amendment of
initial submissions expired, the agency could
compile the information and begin the publishing
process, incorporating any necessary changes
prior to printing. Comments submitted by
Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. (Docket 79-02,
Notice 4, No. 001), suggest that the number of
required changes will be small. Finally, the type
of abuse noted by Volkswagen would be
precluded under the amended regulation because
the type of revision described would not have
been necessitated by unforeseen product
changes.

Commenters also suggested rescinding the
advance submission requirement completely or
rescinding the stopping distance and tire reserve
load provisions. Still other commenters
recommended that the agency reassess the costs
and benefits of the Consumer Information
Regulations as a whole. The rationale for these
recommendations centered on the alleged lack of
consumer interest in the information and the
limited amount of information provided under the
program.

PART 575; PRE 94

As noted by commenters, NHTSA has proposed
rescission of the requirement that auto
manufacturers provide tire reserve load
information to the public and the agency (46 F.R.
47100: September 24, 1981). However, in
conjunction with the Administration's efforts to
ease regulatory burdens on the auto industry, the
agency wishes to maintain a functioning consumer
information program as a possible substitute for
mandatory safety regulations. As part of the
agency's ongoing program to identify and eliminate
unnecessary regulatory burdens, NHTSA plans
to review the benefits of and need for the
Consumer Information Regulations as a component
of the agency's total regulatory program. If this
review indicates that the consumer information
program is not useful and cost-beneficial, the
future of the regulation will be addressed in a
later rulemaking proceeding.

NHTSA has evaluated this relieving of a
restriction and found that its effect will be to
provide minor cost savings for motor vehicle
manufacturers. Accordingly, the agency has
determined that the action is not a major rule
within the meaning of Executive Order 12291 and
is not significant for purposes of Department of
Transportation policies and procedures for
internal review of regulatory actions. The agency

has further determined that the cost savings are
so minimal as to not warrant preparation of a
regulatory evaluation under the procedures. The
agency certifies pursuant to the Regulatory
Flexibility Act that the action will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities because the cost savings
will be modest and few, if any, motor vehicle
manufacturers can be considered small entities
within the meaning of the statute. Finally, the
agency has concluded that the environmental
consequences of the proposed change will be of
such limited scope that they clearly will not have
a significant effect on the quality of the human
environment.

Issued on February 11, 1982.

Raymond A. Peck, Jr.
Administrator

47 F.R. 7257
February 18, 1982

PART 575; PRE 95-96

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 575

Consumer Information Regulations
(Docket No. 8109; Notice 2)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends the Consumer
Information Regulations by revocation of the
requirement that motor vehicle manufacturers
provide information on passenger car tire reserve
load. The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration has concluded that this
information is without value to consumers, and
that deletion of the requirement will avoid
unnecessary regulatory burdens on industry.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This amendment is effective
immediately.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Consumer
Information Regulations (49 CFR Part 575)
require that manufacturers of motor vehicles and
tires provide consumers with information on the
performance of their products under various
performance criteria. In the case of motor vehicle
manufacturers, information is required in the
areas of passenger car and motorcycle stopping
distance (49 CFR §575.101), passenger car tire
reserve load (49 CFR §575.102), and truck camper
loading (CFR §575.103). National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) regulations
require that motor vehicle manufacturers supply
the required performance information in writing
to first purchasers of their motor vehicles at the
time of delivery (49 CFR §575.6(a)) and that the
information be made available for examination by
prospective purchasers at each location where
the vehicles to which it applies are sold (49 CFR
§575.6(c)). The information must also be
submitted in advance to NHTSA (49 CFR
§575.6(d)).

On September 24. 1981, NHTSA published in
the Federal Register a proposal to delete from
the Consumer Information Regulations the

requirement for provision of information on
passenger car tire reserve load (46 F.R. 47100;
Docket No. 81-09, Notice 1). Tire reserve load is
the difference between a tire's stated load rating
and the load imposed on the tire at maximum
loaded vehicle weight. This difference is
expressed as a percentage of tire load rating
under the regulation.

NHTSA's proposal noted that a NHTSA
analysis, "The Relationship Between Tire Reserve
Load Percentage and Tire Failure" (Docket No.
81-09, Notice 1. No. 002), had concluded that no
relationship exists between tire reserve load
percentage and tire failure rate. This analysis
was based on the results of a study prepared for
NHTSA by Chi Associates, "Statistical Analysis
of Tire Failure vs. Tire Reserve Load Percentage"
(Docket No. 81-09, Notice 1, No. 001), using tire
reserve load data obtained from eight automobile
manufacturers under special order from this
agency. The proposal also noted the lack of major
differences among manufacturers' reported tire
reserve load percentages, and the safeguards
against overloading contained in Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 110 (FMVSS No.
110), Tire Selection and Rims.

In response to its proposal to delete the
requirement for tire reserve load information,
NHTSA received comments from seven motor
vehicle manufacturers and importers. The
commenters were unanimous in their support of
the agency's proposal. Comments received
generally focused on the lack of benefit to
consumers resulting from provision of tire
reserve load information.

Several commenters noted the lack of any
proven safety benefit from the tire reserve load
regulation. Two commenters. Ford Motor
Company and Volkswagen of America. Inc., cited
the above mentioned NHTSA analysis in support

PART 575: PRE 97

of the proposition that tire reserve load is an
invalid predictor of tire failure (Docket No. 81-09,
Notice 1, Nos. 004 and 006). General Motors
Corporation (Docket No. 81-09, Notice 1, No. 007)
and American Motors Corporation (Docket No.
81-09, Notice 1, No. 008, referencing its prior
comment. Docket No. 79-02, Notice 1, No. 012)
argued that FMVSS No. 110 is sufficient to
protect against the installation of tires with
inadequate load carrying capacity.

American Motors also pointed out that much of
the information required under the tire reserve
load regulation is redundant of information which
must be included on glove compartment placards
pursuant to FMVSS No. 110. In this regard,
information on recommended tire size designation
and recommended inflation pressure for maximum
loaded vehicle weight, required under paragraphs
(c)(2) and (3) of the tire reserve load regulation (49
CFR §575.102(c)(2) and (3)) is essentially the same
as that required under paragraphs s4.3(c) and (d)
of FMVSS No. 110 (49 CFR §575.110, s4.3(c) and
(d)).

Several commenters argued that not only is
tire reserve load information lacking in safety
value, but it may actually pose a danger to
highway safety. Renault USA, Inc., Volkswagen,
General Motors and American Motors all
expressed concern that provision of tire reserve
load information would mislead consumers into
loading their vehicles beyond gross vehicle
weight ratings (Docket No. 81-09, Notice 1, Nos.
003, 006, 007, 008). Renault and American Motors
also noted that the tire reserve load regulation
fails to take into account the effect of inflation
pressure, thus further limiting the usefulness of
the regulation and creating additional potential
hazards resulting from improper tire inflation.

Chrysler Corporation and General Motors
emphasized the minimal consumer interest in tire
reserve load information (Docket No. 81-09,
Notice 1, Nos. 005 and 007). As evidence of this
minimal interest, both manufacturers noted the
lack of consumer requests for point of sale
information currently available.

Some cost savings are likely to result to
automobile manufacturers as a result of deletion
of this requirement. General Motors pointed out
that, even if tire reserve load is dropped from the
consumer information regulations, manufacturers
will still be required to print and distribute

booklets containing information on vehicle
stopping distance and thus cost savings will be
limited (Docket No. 81-09, Notice 1. No. 007).
However, Ford commented that elimination of
the tire reserve load provision would result in
some savings in manpower and computer time
(Docket No. 81-09, Notice 1, No. 004). Similarly,
Volkswagen noted that manufacturers' booklet
publication costs would be reduced and reporting
requirements simplified if the proposed
amendment were adopted (Docket No. 81-09,
Notice 1, No. 006).

In view of the lack of benefits of the tire
reserve load information requirements, the
potential for reduction of unnecessary regulatory
burdens by deletion of these requirements, and
the other considerations discussed above,
NHTSA has concluded that the tire reserve load
requirements of the Consumer Information
Regulations should be revoked. In order to avoid
continued imposition of unncessary regulatory
burdens, this amendment relieving a restriction
is made effective immediately.

Several commenters also suggested rescinding
the vehicle stopping distance information
requirement of the regulation, thereby eliminating
all requirements for vehicle specific consumer
information applicable to passenger cars. While
beyond the scope of this rulemaking proceeding,
NHTSA is reviewing the benefits of and need for
other aspects of the Consumer Information
Regulations in connection with a petition for
rulemaking submitted by General Motors. If this
review indicates that vehicle stopping distance
information is not useful, the potential deletion of
this requirement will be made the subject of a
future rulemaking proceeding.

NHTSA has evaluated this relieving of a
restriction and found that its effect would be to
provide minor cost savings for motor vehicle
manufacturers. Accordingly, the agency has
determined that this action is not a major rule
within the meaning of Executive Order 12291 and
is not significant for purposes of Department of
Transportation policies and procedures for
internal review of regulatory actions. The agency
has further determined that the cost savings are
minimal and do not warrant preparation of a
regulatory evaluation under the procedures.

The agency certifies, pursuant to the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, that this action will not "have a

PART 575; PRE 98

significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities," and that a Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis was therefore not required.
Few, if any, motor vehicle manufacturers can be
considered small entities within the meaning of
the statute. Small organizations and small
government jurisdictions will not be significantly
affected by this action. These entities could be
affected by the action as motor vehicle
purchasers. However, the agency has determined
that tire reserve load information is not of value
to purchasers. Moreover, possible cost savings
associated with the action will be minor in the

case of individual purchasers.
Issued on May 28, 1982.

Raymond A. Peck, Jr.
Administrator

47 F.R. 24593
June 7, 1982

PART 575; PRE 99-100

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 575

Consumer Information Regulations; Uniform Tire Quality Grading
(Docket No. 25; Notice 46)

ACTION: Interim final rule and request for
comments.

SUMMARY: This notice makes several technical
amendments to the test procedures in the
regulation on Uniform Tire Quality Grading
(UTQG). The UTQG regulation specifies that the
tire rim size and tire loading used in testing
individual tires are to be determined by using
Table 1, Appendix A of Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard No. 109, New pneumatic tires.
Since the portion of Table 1, Appendix A relied
upon by the UTQG regulation was deleted in a
previous agency rulemaking, effective June 15,
1982, reliance upon that Appendix will no longer
be appropriate after that date. This notice
replaces the references to Appendix A with
equivalent methods for determining rim size and
tire loading.

DATES: This amendment is effective June 15,
1982.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Uniform
Tire Quality Grading (UTQG) regulation (49 CFR
575.104) requires that manufacturers and brand
name owners of passenger car tires provide
consumers with information on the treadwear,
traction and temperature resistance of their
tires. This information is to be generated in
accordance with procedures specified in the
regulation.

Two parameters specified in the test procedures
are the proper test rim width for each tire, and
the load under which the tire is to be tested. The
UTQG regulation refers to Appendix A of Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109 (FMVSS
109) for the determination of rim size to be used
for testing purposes. Table 1 of Appendix A
provides a complete listing of tire sizes available

in this country and for each size indicates the
proper test rim size and maximum loads at
various tire pressures.

The UTQG regulation also refers to Appendix A
of FMVSS 109 for the determination of tire load.
The tire load for temperature resistance testing
is the load specified in Appendix A of FMVSS 109
for the tire pressure listed in Table 1 of the UTQG
regulation. Thus, load is currently determined by
obtaining the tire pressure from Table 1 of the
UTQG regulation and finding the load for that
pressure level in Appendix A. The tire load for
treadwear and traction testing is determined in
the same way, except that the load level found in
Appendix A is multiplied by 85 percent.

Beginning on June 15, 1982, reliance upon
Appendix A o£ FMVSS 109 to determine rim size
and tire load for UTQG testing will no longer be
possible. On that date, the agency's amendment
(December 17, 1981; 46 F.R. 61473) deleting Table
1 of Appendix A will become effective. As
FMVSS 109 is currently written, the tire
manufacturers and brand name owners must
submit the rim size information to NHTSA for
incorporation in Table 1. Under the amendment,
they will be able to satisfy FMVSS 109 by either
securing the incorporation of the information in a
publication of a standardization organization like
the Tire and Rim Association or one of its foreign
counterparts or by submitting it to the agency,
their dealers, and others who request it, without
the need for the information's incorporation in
any other document.

As to tire load information, the tire
manufacturers and brand name owners must
currently calculate loads for pressure levels
ranging from 16 to 40 pounds per square inch in
most cases and submit the information to NHTSA
for incorporation in Table 1. After June 14. they
need determine the load only for a single

PART 575; PRE 101

pressure level, the maximum one. The
responsibilities of the manufacturers and brand
name owners under amended FMVSS 109
regarding load information may be satisfied in
the same fashion as their responsibilities
regarding rim size.

The deletion of Table 1 of Appendix A was
intended to reduce an unnecessary regulatory
burden placed by FMVSS 109 on the tire industry
and the agency. The action was not intended to
make any change in the UTQG test procedures.
However, the deletion of Table 1 of Appendix A
necessitates amending the UTQG regulation so
that rim size and tire load can be determined
without reference to that appendix.

This notice provides the means for making
those determinations. The rim size to be used for
UTQG testing is the same size specified by the
tire manufacturer or brand name owner in a
publication of a standardization association or in a
submission directly to the agency. This provision
does not in any way change the rim size used for
UTQG testing. Instead, it simply changes the
source of obtaining the rim size information.

As to tire loading, the UTQG testing will
henceforth rely upon mathematical calculation
involving a tire's maximum load, as molded on its
sidewall, instead of relying upon information
submitted by the manufacturer or brand name
owner to any organization or agency. Under the
new procedure, the maximum load is multiplied
by a factor, ranging from .851 to .887 depending
on the tire's maximum inflation pressure, and the
result is rounded. The rounded result is used for
temperature resistance testing. For treadwear
and traction testing, the rounded result is
multiplied by 85 percent. In most instances, this
procedure produces the same load as is currently
obtained by reference to Table 1 of Appendix A.
In those instances in which the load is different,
the degree of difference is so slight that the
difference will not have any practical effect on
the UTQG test results.

The agency finds good cause for issuing these
amendments without prior notice and comment.
The agency believes that prior notice and
comment are unnecessary. The revisions are
technical and editorial in nature. In most instances,
the revisions produce no changes in the procedures
under which tires are tested for UTQG purposes.
In the few instances in which there will be a

change, the change is so slight as to be
substantively insignificant. Although the agency
has concluded that prior notice and comment are
unnecessary, it has decided to go beyond the
minimum requirements of the Administrative
Procedures Act and provide a 60-day comment
period on these amendments. For the same
reasons set forth above and to permit continued
implementation of the UTQG regulation, the
agency finds good cause for making the revisions
effective immediately.

Since this proceeding is merely intended to
allow the continued implementation of the UTQG
regulation without any change in the manner of
implementation, NHTSA has determined that
this proceeding does not involve a major rule
within the meaning of Executive Order 12291 or a
significant rule within the meaning of the
Department of Transportation regulatory
procedures. Further, there are virtually no
economic impacts of this action so that preparation
of a full regulatory evaluation is unnecessary.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act does not require
the preparation of flexibility analyses with respect
to rulemaking proceedings, such as this one, for
which prior notice and comment is not required
by the Administrative Procedures Act. If the
requirement for preparation of such analyses
were applicable, the agency would certify that
this action would not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities.
As noted above, this action will make essentially
no change in the implementation of the UTQG
regulation.

NHTSA has concluded that this action will
have essentially no environmental consequences
and therefore that there will be no significant
effect on the quality of the human environment.

Interested persons are invited to submit
comments on the agency's action announced above
and on any other topics relevant to this notice. It
is requested but not required that 10 copies be
submitted.

All comments must be limited not to exceed 15
pages in length. Necessary attachments may be
appended to these submissions without regard to
the 15-page limit. This limitation is intended to
encourage commenters to detail their primary
argument in a concise fashion.

If a commenter wishes to submit certain
information under a claim of confidentiality, three

PART 575; PRE 102

copies of the complete submission, including
purportedly confidential information, should be
submitted to the Chief Counsel, NHTSA. at the
street address given above, and seven copies
from which the purportedly confidential
information has been deleted should be submitted
to the Docket Section. Any claim of confidentiality
must be supported by a statement demonstrating
that the information falls within 5 U.S.C. section
552(b)(4), and that disclosure of the information is
likely to result in substantial competitive
damage; specifying the period during which the
information must be withheld to avoid that
damage; and showing that earlier disclosure
would result in that damage. In addition, the
commenter or, in the case of a corporation, a
responsible corporate official authorized to speak
for the corporation must certify in writing that
each item for which confidential treatment is
required is in fact confidential within the meaning
of section (b)(4) and that a diligent search has bee"n
conducted by the commenter or its employees to
assure that none of the specified items have
previously been disclosed or otherwise become
available to the public.

All comments received before the close of
business on the comment closing date indicated
above will be considered, and will be available for
examination in the docket at the above address

both before and after that date. To the extent
possible, comments filed after the closing date
will also be considered. However, the rulemaking
may proceed at any time after that date, and
comments received after the closing date and too
late for consideration in regard to the action will
be treated as suggestions for future rulemaking.
NHTSA will continued to file relevant material as
it becomes available in the docket after the
closing date; it is recommended that interested
persons continue to examine the docket for new
material. Those persons desiring to be notified
upon receipt of their comments in the rulemaking
docket should enclose, in the envelope with their
comments, a self-addressed stamped postcard.
Upon receiving the comments, the docket
supervisor will return the postcard by mail.

Issued on June 11, 1982.

Raymond A. Peck, Jr.
Administrator

47 F.R. 25930
June 15, 1982

PART 575; PRE 103-104

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 575

Consumer Information Regulations; Uniform Tire Quality Grading
(Docket No. 25; Notice 48)

ACTION: Interim final rule and request for
comments.

SUMMARY: This notice makes a technical
correction to the test procedures used in Uniform
Tire Quality Grading (UTQG). A recently issued
amendment to those procedures inadvertently
omitted certain factors to be used in determining
the load under which tires are to be tested for
traction. This notice corrects the prior
amendment. This notice also provides that, for a
two-year period, tires whose test loads would
change significantly as a result of the use of the
treadwear, temperature resistance and traction
load factors shall continue to be tested at the
loads used in UTQG testing prior to June 14,
1982. The agency intends this notice to ensure
that test loads will not significantly change from
previously specified loads.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The UTQG amendment is
effective on August 12. 1982.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Under the
UTQG system, tires sold in this country are
tested and grades are assigned for treadwear,
traction, and temperature resistance. Prior to
June 15. 1982. the UTQG Standards provided that
the tire rim size and test loads used for UTQG
testing were to be obtained from the tire tables of
Appendix A to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard No. 109. New pneumatic tires. However,
those tables were deleted from FMVSS 109
effective June 15, 1982. In order to provide a
substitute means for determining rims and test
loads for all three performance characteristics,
NHTSA published an interim final rule on June
15. 1982 (47 F.R. 25930). The June 15 notice
specified alternative methods for determining
test rim sizes and test loads, without having to

refer to the now-deleted tire- tables of Standard
109.

Of relevance here is the new procedure for
determining test loads. That procedure requires
multiplying the maximum tire load appearing on
the tire's sidewall by certain specified factors.

The agency's June 15 correction notice
inadvertently omitted factors for traction
testing. The factors which were listed in that
notice were those appropriate for treadwear and
temperature resistance testing only. Therefore,
the agency is now correcting the table set forth in
the June 15 notice to include the factors to be used
in UTQG traction testing. The agency has selected
these factors, like those specified in the June 15
notice for treadwear and temperature resistance
testing, in an attempt to produce approximately
the same test load as was previously specified by
reference to the tire tables of Standard 109. The
agency believes that for most tire types and sizes,
this procedure will produce tire load specifications
which differ from loads specified by the old
procedure by less than 10 pounds. The agency
believes that this difference will not be large
enough to produce significant differences in test
results, but invites comment on this point.

The agency has identified 14 individual tire
sizes which would have differences of more than
10 pounds in test loads under the load factors for
treadwear, temperature resistance or traction
testing under UTQG. These discrepancies
apparently result from differences in the manner
in which various tire companies determine
maximum tire loads and "design" loads. For these
14 tires, the agency is specifying as an interim
measure that the loads previously determined by
reference to the tire tables may continue to be
used for a period of two years. The two-year
period will permit the tire manufacturers to make
any design changes they feel necessary in these

PART 575; PRE 105

tires. While the agency believes that those 14 tire
sizes represent the only tires now sold in the U.S.
with load discrepancies of greater than 10
pounds, there may be others. Commenters are
requested to inform the agency of any additional
tires for which such a discrepancy exists. These
tires will be added to that list when final action is
taken on the interim final rule.

The agency finds good cause for issuing this
amendment without prior notice and comment.
The agency believes that prior notice and
comment are unnecessary, since the revisions are
technical and editorial in nature. They are
intended to allow the continued implementation
of the UTQG regulation in the same manner as it
was before June 15, 1982. Although the agency
has concluded that prior notice and comment are
unnecessary, it has decided to go beyond the
minimum requirements of the Administrative
Procedures Act and provide a comment period on
this amendment. For the same reasons set forth
above and to permit continued implementation of
the UTQG regulation, the agency finds good
cause for making the revisions effective
immediately.

Since this amendment is not intended to cause
any significant change in implementation of the
UTQG regulation as it existed on June 14, 1982,
NHTSA has determined that this proceeding
does not involve a major rule within the meaning
of Executive Order 12291 or a significant rule
within the meaning of the Department of
Transportation regulatory procedures. Further,
there are virtually no economic impacts of this
action so that preparation of a full regulatory
evaluation is unnecessary.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act does not
require the preparation of flexibility analyses
with respect to rulemaking proceedings, such as
this one, since the agency certifies that this action
would not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. As noted
above, this action will make essentially no change
in the implementation of the UTQG regulation.

NHTSA has concluded that this action will
have essentially no environmental consequences
and therefore that there will be no significant
effect on the quality of the human environment.

Interested persons are invited to submit
comments on the agency's action announced
above and on any other topics relevant to this

notice. It is requested but not required that 10
copies be submitted.

All comments must be limited not to exceed 15
pages in length. Necessary attachments may be
appended to these submissions without regard to
the 15-page limit. This limitation is intended to
encourage commenters to detail their primary
argument in a concise fashion.

If a commenter wishes to submit certain
information under a claim of confidentiality three
copies of the complete submission, including
purportedly confidential information, should be
submitted to the Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the
street address given above, and seven copies
from which the purportedly confidential
information has been deleted should be submitted
to the Docket Section. Any claim of confidentiality
must be supported by a statement demonstrating
that the information falls within 5 U.S.C. section
552(b)(4), and that disclosure of the information is
likely to result in substantial competitive damage;
specifying the period during which the information
must be withheld to avoid that damage; and
showing that earlier disclosure would result in
that damage. In addition, the commenter or, in
the case of a corporation, a responsible corporate
official authorized to speak for the corporation
must certify in writing that each item for which
confidential treatment is required is in fact
confidential within the meaning of section (b)(4)
and that a diligent search has been conducted by
the commenter or its employees to assure that
none of the specified items have previously been
disclosed or otherwise become available to the
public.

All comments received before the close of
business on the comment closing date indicated
above will be considered, and will be available for
examination in the docket at the above address
both before and after that date. To the extent
possible, comments filed after the closing date
will also be considered. However, the rulemaking
may proceed at any time after that date, and
comments received after the closing date and too
late for consideration in regard to the action will
be treated as suggestions for future rulemaking.
NHTSA will continue to file relevant material as
it becomes available in the docket after the
closing date; it is recommended that interested
persons continue to examine the docket for new
material. Those persons desiring to be notified

PART 575; PRE 106

upon receipt of their comments in the rulemaking
docket should enclose, in the envelope with their

comments, a self-addressed stamped postcard.

Upon receiving the comments, the docket Raymond A. Peck, Jr.

supervisor will return the postcard by mail. Administrator

47 F.R. 34990

Issued on August 5, 1982. August 12, 1982

PART 575; PRE 107-108

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 575

Consumer Information Regulations
Uniform Tire Quality Grading

[Docltet No. 25; Notice 52]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice suspends, on an interim
basis, the treadwear grading requirements of the
Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards
(UTQGS). No change is made in the requirements
of grading the traction and temperature
resistance performance of new tires except for a
minor change in the format for molding those
grades on tires.

The UTQGS treadwear grading requirements
are intended to aid consumers in assessing the
value of new tires in terms of relative treadwear
performance. This suspension is being adopted
because available information and analysis
indicate that the treadwear grades are
apparently not only failing to aid many
consumers, but also are affirmatively misleading
them in their selection of new tires. The
unreliability of the treadwear grades arises from
two major sources. One is the variability of
treadwear test results, which could be caused by
either the lack of sufficient measures in the
treadwear test procedures to ensure
repeatability, or by the inherent complexity of
the structure of individual tires themselves,
which would preclude reproducibility of test
results and, thus, comparative examination
between or among tires. The other major source
of unreliability is substantial differences among
the practices of the tire manufacturers in
translating test results into grades.

The agency has identified a wide variety of
presently uncontrolled and perhaps
uncontrollable sources of variabUity in the
treadwear test procedure, and believes that other
sources remain to be discovered. Although some
or all of these sources may ultimately be found to

be controllable to the extent that the variability
in test results is reduced to acceptable levels,
considerable research must be completed before
the agency can determine whether or how that
can be achieved. Much of the necessary research
has already been initiated. When the research is
completed, the agency will determine whether
the suspension of treadwear grading should be
lifted.

The agency is also amending Part 575 to change
the format for molding grades on the sidewalls of
new tires. The new format, which would include
traction and temperature resistance grades but
not treadwear grades, must be used on new tires
produced in molds manufactured after (180 days
after publication in the Federal Register). The
agency expects and directs that manufacturers
will cease printing tire labels and consumer
information materials which include treadwear
grades described or characterized as having been
determined by or under the UTQGS procedures
of the United States Government.

As a result of the amendments adopted by this
notice, consumers will cease to be misled by
unreliable treadwear grade information. In
addition, the costs of implementing the treadwear
grading program will no longer be imposed on the
manufacturers and consumers.

DATES: The suspension of the existing
requirements relating to treadwear grades, and
the new alternative provision specifying the
format for the molding of only traction and
temperature resistance information on new tires
are effective February 7, 1983. The provision
requiring use of the new format is effective for
tires produced in molds manufactured on or after
August 8, 1983.

PART 575; PRE 109

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 203
of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act requires the Secretary of Transportation to
prescribe a "uniform quality grading system for
motor vehicle tires." As explained in that section,
this system is intended to "assist the consumer to
make an informed choice in the purchase of motor
vehicle tires." The uniform tire quality grading
standards (UTQGS) became effective April 1,
1979, for bias tires; October 1, 1979, for bias
belted tires; and April 1, 1980, for radial tires.
UTQGS requires manufacturers and brand name
owners of passenger car tires to test and grade
their tires according to their expected
performance in use with respect to the properties
of treadwear, traction, and temperature
resistance, and provide consumers with
information regarding those grades.

Treadwear Testing and Grading Process

This notice focuses on the treadwear grades.
Unlike grades for the properties of traction and
temperature resistance, the treadwear grades
have never been intended to promote safety.
Their essential value has always been to aid
consumers in selecting new tires by informing
them of the performance expectations of tread
life for each tire offered for sale, so that they can
compare on a common basis the relative value of
one tire versus another. Although these grades
are not intended to be used for predicting the
actual mileage that a particular tire will achieve,
the relevance and effectiveness of the grades
depend directly on the accuracy of the
projections of tread life derived from tests and
assigned by grades.

The grades are based on a tire's projected
mileage (the distance which it is expected to
travel before wearing down to its treadwear
indicators) as tested on a single, predetermined
course laid out on public roads near San Angelo,
Texas. Each treadwear test consists of 16 circuits
of the approximately 400 mile long course. A
tire's tread depth is measured periodically during
the test. Based upon these measurements, the
tire's projected mileage is calculated. A tire's
treadwear grade is expressed as the percentage
which its projected mileage represents of a
nominal 30,000 miles. For example, a tire with a
projected mileage of 24,000 would be graded "80,"

(i.e., 24,000 is 80 percent of 30,000 miles), while
one with a projected mileage of 39,000 would be
graded "130," (i.e., 39,000 is 130 percent of 30,000,
rounded).

Because the measured treadwear upon which
grades are based occurs under outdoor road
conditions, any comparison between candidate
tire performances must involve a standardization
of results by correction for the particular
environmental conditions of each test. To do this,
the treadwear performance of a candidate tire is
measured in all cases in conjunction with that of a
so-called "course monitoring tire" (CMT) of the
same construction type. The treadwear of the
standardized CMT's is measured to reflect and
monitor changes in course severity due to factors
such as road surface wear and environmental
conditions. The actual measured treadwear of the
candidate tire is adjusted on the basis of the
actual measured treadwear on the CMT's run in
the same convoy, and the resulting adjusted
candidate tire treadwear is used as the basis for
assigning the treadwear grade.

To promote their uniformity, the CMT's are
selected from a single production lot
manufactured at a single plant, under more
stringent quality control measures (set by
contract with NHTSA) than would otherwise
apply to production tires.

Each test convoy consists of one car equipped
with four CMT's and three or fewer other cars
equipped with candidate tires of the same
construction type. Candidate tires on the same
axle are identical, but front tires on a test vehicle
may differ from rear tires as long as all foul* are of
the same size designation. After a two-circuit
break-in period, the initial tread depth of each
tire is determined by averaging the depth
measured in each groove at six equally spaced
locations around the circumference of the tire. At
the end of every two circuits (800 miles), each
tire's tread depth is measured again, the tires are
rotated on the car, and wheel alignments may be
readjusted as needed to fall within the ranges of
the vehicle manufacturer's specifications. At the
end of the 16-circuit test, each tire's overall wear
rate is calculated from the nine measured tread
depths and their corresponding mileages after
break-in by using a regression line technique.

Part 575 requires that the treadwear grading
information be disseminated in three ways. First,

PART 575; PRE 110

the actual grade must be molded onto the
sidewall of each tire. Second, the grade and an
explanation of the treadwear grading process
must appear on a paper label affixed to the tire
tread. Third, the grade and the same explanation
must be included in materials made available to
prospective purchasers and first purchasers of
new motor vehicles and tires.

Agency's Recent Actions

The basis and validity of the UTQGS has been a
longstanding source of controversy and
uncertainty within the agency and among
interested parties. In view of the manifest
potential conflict between the clear desirability of
a valid, effective program to enable more
informed consumer choice in the marketplace and
the potential for serious adverse effect on the
marketplace of an inadequate or potentially
misleading programmatic result, the agency
responded to its own enforcement uncertainties,
described more fully below, by reviewing the
current state of knowledge concerning the
UTQGS, and addressing the specific sources of
variability already identified.

Variability due to treadwear test procedures.
In response to longstanding concerns about the
variability and unreliability of the treadwear test
results and grades and about the underlying
causes of these problems, the agency conducted a
review in May 1982 of treadwear test procedures
being used by the tire testing companies in San
Angelo. That review confirmed the existence of
numerous uncontrolled sources of potential
variability in treadwater test results. The
potential cumulative effect of those sources
would produce test result variability approaching
the unacceptable magnitude long asserted by
many tire manufacturers. The high level of test
result variability could result in tires with better
actual treadwear performance being graded as
inferior to tires with worse actual performance,
or vice versa.

The review did not, however, address in detail
the relative significance of the various sources of
variability. That question and the ultimate
question of whether the identified sources of
variability can be sufficiently controlled so as to
bring the overall amount of variability down to an
acceptable level can be answered only after

extensive research and testing.

Among the sources of variability discussed in
the review were the weight scales intended to
assure the proper loading of the cars used in the
testing convoys, errors or inconsistencies
introduced by variations in the amount of force
applied to the probes used to measure tread
depth and tendencies of measuring personnel to
"search" for tread depth measurements
consistent with expected rates of treadwear,
discrepancies in the level of the training of
technicians, fairly wide tolerances on critical
alignment settings, unquantifiable variations in
vehicle weights and weight distribution and
suspension modification, and variations in driver
techniques and in weather conditions on the
course.

Each of the specific identified sources of such
variability is discussed in detail below.

Variability due to grade assignment practices.
Following the initial implementation of UTQGS,
the agency sent a special order to the tire
manufacturers to obtain information regarding
their practices for translating treadwear test
results into grades. The response indicated wide
variation within the industry regarding those
practices. Some manufacturers evaluated data by
applying statistical procedures to estimate the
percentage of their production which would equal
or exceed a particular grade. Other
manufacturers did not use such a procedure,
relying instead on business and engineering
judgment in assigning grades. The agency
tentatively concluded that these differing
practices created the substantial likelihood that
different manufacturers, although faced with
similar test results, would assign different grades
to their tires. Accordingly, NHTSA issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking requesting
comment on a standardized process for
translating test results into grades. (46 F. R.
10429, February 2, 1981). Commenters generally
criticized the proposed process, particularly for
its failure to account properly for undergrading.
The agency is continuing its efforts aimed at
developing a uniform procedure for translating
test results into treadwear grades. However,
until this problem is resolved, the unreliability of
treadwear grades is compounded by the fact that
the relationship between test results and
assigned grades is not a constant one from

PART 575; PRE 111

manufacturer to manufacturer.

Variability inherent in the nature of tire
structure. A potential for an unquantified degree
of variability is inherent in the differences
between seemingly identical (i.e., in terms of
brand, line, size, and manufacturing lot) tires. The
potential arises from the complex combination of
a variety of factors, including the materials,
designs, and manufacturing procedures, that go
into the production of tires. The materials include
the rubber composition and various reinforcing
materials such as rayon, steel, polyester, etc.,
which themselves are developed from
complicated manufacturing processes. The design
of a tire includes such factors as the cross section
shape, the orientation and structure of the
reinforcing materials, the tread design, and the
construction (bias, bias-belted, or radial). The
manufacturing procedures include the processes
employed during manufacturing and the
conditions such as temperatures and tim.es of
vulcanization. Separately and together, these
variables can have a significant effect on tread
life.

In the production of tires, the manufacturers
use a variety of techniques in an attempt to
control all of these variables and to achieve a
consistent level of quality and performance for
their different products. The success of these
efforts varies from tire line to tire line, lot to lot,
and from manufacturer to manufacturer. The
complexity of the entire process will inevitably
lead to some variation in performance, including
treadwear performance between nominally
identical tires.

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING

Based on the assertions and submissions of the
tire manufacturers and the agency's review of the
test procedures and of its own enforcement data,
the agency tentatively concluded in July 1982
that treadwear grading under UTQGS should be
suspended pending completion of research
regarding the extent to which the sources of
variability could be isolated and reduced.
Accordingly, it issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking to obtain both written comments and
oral testimony on suspending treadwear grading
(47 F.R. 30084. July 12, 1982) and to schedule
a public meeting August 12, 1982. The agency

stated that it was issuing the proposal principally
to avoid the dissemination of information
potentially misleading to consumers and
secondarily to minimize the imposition of
unwarranted compliance costs on industry and
consumers. The agency noted its concern that the
treadwear grading was not only failing to achieve
its statutory goal of informing consumers, but
also affirmatively misleading them.

In defending UTQGS against earlier judicial
challenges, NHTSA had taken the position that
the treadwear test procedure was adequately
specified to ensure that test result variability
was limited to acceptable levels. See B.F.
Goodrich v. Department of Transportation, 541 F.
2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1976) (hereinafter referred to as
"Goodrich /"); and B.F. Goodrich v. Department
of Transportation, 592 F. 2d 322 (6th Cir. 1979).
For example, the agency had stated in the
Goodrich I litigation that variables in the testing
procedure are controlled and taken into account,
principally through the selection of a single test
course and the use of CMT's. With respect to
certain potential sources of variability, the
agency stated that their effects on treadwear
testing and grading would be minimal. The
agency indicated in its suspension proposal that it
could no longer make the same representations.
These statements have been further undermined
by information now available to the agency.

The notice summarized the material relied
upon by the agency in making its tentative
conclusions, including the information and
arguments submitted by the tire manufacturers.
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, for
example, found that treadwear test results could
vary up to 30 percent even for CMT tires, which
are specially manufactured for maximum
homogeneity. That company also pointed out
several possible causes of the variability,
including variability in test vehicles and driver
techniques as well as deficiencies in the details of
the test procedures themselves. General Tire and
Rubber Company reported additional sources of
variability, including vehicle wheel alignment,
weight distribution, and test course
environmental factors. B.F. Goodrich Company
stated that differences in tire tread composition
between candidate tires being tested and the
CMT's could be a major source of variability. As a
group, the tire manufacturers generally

PART 575; PRE 112

contended that the variability of the test results
is too g^eat to permit meaningful treadwear
grading or compliance testing. The agency's own
preliminary research confirms this conclusion
and supports the need for the suspension.

The proposal also discussed the agency's
enforcement data and described at length the
review conducted by NHTSA of the treadwear
testing companies. The agency emphasized that
the list of sources of variability mentioned in the
review was not exhaustive, but intended merely
to be illustrative of the types of possible such
sources and of the difficulties which exist in
seeking to establish a treadwear test procedure
that could produce valid, repeatable results. The
agency found that the combination of the
examined sources represented a potential for test
result variability of serious dimensions. Each
potential source of variability was described and
the potential effect of them on test results was
estimated. For example, effects of ± 34 or 35
points were estimated for two sources of
variability and ± 14 points for another.

Summary of Comments on Proposal

Written comments and oral testimony were
received from a variety of sources, although the
most detailed ones were from tire manufacturers.
While there was a division of opinion regarding
the merits of the proposal, most commenters
favored the suspension. Proponents of the
suspension included tire manufacturers, several
tire manufacturers' associations, tire dealers, a
motor vehicle manufacturer, some consumers,
and a public interest group. Proponents agreed
with the agency's statement that the treadwear
test results and grades were so variable and
unreliable as to confuse and mislead consumers.
They also listed again the factors that they
thought were causing the variability. Some
proponents suggested that the problems are so
serious that simple suspension was inadequate.
They urged that the agency go further and
rescind the treadwear provisions altogether.

Opponents of the proposed suspension included
one tire manufacturer, a tire dealer, a public
interest group, a county consumer protection
agency, and a number of consumers. The tire
manufacturer argued that the treadwear grade
information was sufficiently correlated with

actual differences in tire performance to be
helpful to those consumers who use that
information. It acknowledged that there was
variability in the treadwear test results and
differences in the grade assignment practices,
but contended that these problems could be
satisfactorily controlled through further
identified changes in UTQGS. The manufacturer
argued that even if there were difficulties in
enforcing the current treadwear requirements,
the overall value of the comparative treadwear
information justified retention of the
requirements while the enforcement problems
were addressed. The public interest group
argued that NHTSA was ignoring its statutory
mandate, as interpreted by that group, in
contemplating a suspension of treadwear
grading. That opponent argued further that the
agency ha,d artificially narrowed the options
under consideration in this rulemaking
proceeding.

Two tire testing companies submitted detailed
comments regarding their testing practices. They
generally argued that the problems discussed in
the agency's review of testing companies did not
apply to them. One asserted further that the
suspension would have a severe economic impact
in the San Angelo, Texas area, where treadwear
tests are conducted. The San Angelo Chamber of
Commerce concurred in that assessment.

Summary of Suspension Decision

NHTSA has decided to suspend the treadwear
provisions of UTQGS because available
information and analysis indicate that the
treadwear grades are apparently not only failing
to aid many consumers, but are also affirmatively
misleading them in their selection of new tires.
The capacity of these grades to mislead
consumers arises principally from variability in
treadwear test results unrelated to actual
differences in measured or projected
performance, and secondarily from differences
among manufacturers in their translation of test
results into grades. In its proposal, the agency
identified some of the wide variety of
uncontrolled sources of variability in the
insufficiently specific treadwear test procedures.
The agency has been able to quantify the effect of
only some of those sources. Other sources are

PART 575: PRE 113

believed to exist and continue to be discovered.
Indeed, the tire manufacturer opposing the
suspension reported only last November its
discovery of a "major unreported source of
variability." (Letter from R. H. Snyder, Uniroyal
Tire Company, to Raymond Peck, NHTSA
Administrator, November 12, 1982, Docket 25,
Notice 47, No. 090).

In their comments to the agency, the opponents
of the suspension did not controvert the premise
of the agency that there is substantial variability
in test results and that there are specific
identified sources of much of that variability. The
tire manufacturer opposing suspension conceded
that test result variability and differences in
grading practices can be so large as to result in
changes between the order in which tires are
ranked based on test results and the order in
which they are ranked based on grades. Indeed,
comparisons of the agency's own compliance test
data and grades assigned by the tire
manufacturers indicate that these ranking
changes occur with some frequency and can be
substantial. Moreover, the opponents did not
deny that there were significant problems with
enforcing the treadwear requirements of Part 575
as they are now written.

Where the rank order of measured
performances or assigned grades changes, it is
clear that only one of such differing results can in
fact be objectively correct and valid. Any such
change in ranking thus represents a clear and
present danger that grades can be affirmatively
misleading. Resulting purchasing decisions based
on such incorrect grades are not merely wrong,
but represent instances in which the government-
created program of consumer assistance through
the dissemination of objective comparative
information has in fact affirmatively misled the
consumers which are intended to be assisted.

Although the sources of variability may
ultimately be controllable to the extent that the
variability and unreliability derived from
treadwear test results and grades are reduced to
lower, more acceptable levels, considerable
research must be completed before that is even a
possibility. Even if such research were now
complete, it is not clear at this point how much of
the current test-derived variability and
unreliability could be eliminated. Much of the
necessary research has already been initiated.

When the research is completed, the agency will
address the question of whether the problems can
be reduced to the point that it can begin
considering whether to reinstate the UTQGS
treadwear system.

Rational for Suspension Decision

Magnitude of the Overall Variability
and Reliability Problem

Available data demonstrate that the treadwear
test results can vary substantially and that the
treadwear grades assigned by the manufacturers
are unreliable for the purposes of comparing
tires. Data submitted by the tire manufacturers
indicate that subjecting tires of a particular type
and line to the same tests on separate occasions
produces differences in test results of up to 80
points. The agency's own compliance test data
include examples of significant test result
variability. •

Moreover, in addition to test result variability,
the process of assigning grades can and
demonstrably has introduced other unacceptable
levels of uncertainty as far as the consumer is
concerned. Treadwear grades are often not a
reliable indicator of the relative tread life of tires
because the order in which tires are ranked on
the basis of test results can differ significantly
from the order in which they are ranked on the
basis of grades. The magnitude of these
crossovers (i.e., changes in rank) can be

'The agency believes that the enforcement data are a
particularly significant source of information since the data
comprise the most complete set of test results available. They
reflect consistent application of test procedures under the
direction of a single party, the agency, under circumstances
involving the greatest incentive of any interested party to
minimize variability in data, the exigencies of the certainty
required for enforcement purposes. In fact, to attempt to
resolve doubts as to variability, the agency has in fact refined
its enforcement test procedures to a greater extent than is
required by Part 575. For example, all enforcement tests are
conducted by a single contractor, eliminating the influence of
differences between test facilities. Highly accurate electronic
scales are used to determine wheel loads. Very precise wheel
alignment equipment is used. That equipment has been
operated by the same skilled technicians for all compliance
tests since mid-1981. Thus, NHTSA believes that statements
regarding test variability which are based on these
enforcement data could tend only to understate the variability
experienced by others in testing tires and assigning grades.

PART 575: PRE 114

substantial, as is shown in a graph which B. F.
Goodrich constructed by plotting the agency's
enforcement data against the grades assigned by
the tire manufacturers for the same tires. (This is
the same graph shown on page III-2 of the
agency's regulatory evaluation for this
rulemaking action and is similar to one prepared
by Uniroyal.) Goodrich's graph includes
information on radial ply tires primarily,
although it also covers tires of other construction
types. There are numerous examples in the graph
of tires whose test results fell within a 10 point
range, but whose assigned grades were spread
over an 80 to 100 point range. Some tires had
average test results which were 10 points below
those of other tires, but were assigned grades as
much as 60 or 70 points higher. Some tires
assigned the same grade had average test results
that were scattered over a 100 point range. These
phenomena are not restricted to a particular
portion of the graph, but exist throughout, from
the left side where bias ply and bias belted tires
predominate to the right side where radial ply
tires predominate.

The magnitude and pervasiveness of the
crossovers and grading quirks means that the
treadwear grades have the capacity for more
than simply confusing consumers about the
relative performance of tires exhibiting nearly
the same performance. The possibility exists for
confusion even between some tires in the lower
third percentile and some tires in the upper third
percentile of treadwear performance. Thus,
whether a prospective purchaser seeking the
particular size (i.e., diameter) of tire appropriate
for his or her vehicle is looking at the entire
spectrum of construction types, or is focusing on a
single construction type only, there is a
significant possibility that the person may be
misled about the relative performance of tires.
The possibility is greatest in the latter case, since
the smaller the difference in actual performance
between tires under consideration, the greater
the probability that test variability and
crossovers will cause the grades of those tires to
be misleading about the relative performance of
those tires. The ranges in grades for particular
construction types are not very large when
compared with the magnitude of the problems
created by test variability and crossovers.
Treadwear grades typically range from 60-120 (a

60 point range) for bias ply tires of all sizes, 90-150
(a 60 point range) for bias belted tires of all sizes,
120-200 (an 80 point range) for 13 inch diameter
radial ply tires, 160-220 (a 60 point range) for 14
inch diameter radial ply tires, and 170-220 (a 50
point range) for 15 inch radial ply tires. The
ranges for radials are particularly relevant since
radials account for most original equipment tires
on new cars and a substantial majority of
replacement tires for used cars.

It is considered especially significant that the
occurrence of such rank changes is not uncommon.
For examples for each of a majority of the tires in
Goodrich's graph, other tires could be found in
the graph which had a lower assigned grade but
which, based on compliance test results,
exhibited superior performance.

Although the agency recognizes that the
graphs submitted by Goodrich and Uniroyal
reflect, in part, manufacturer-to-manufacturer
differences in grade assignment procedures and
not just variability in test results, the agency
considers the analyses made using the graphs to
be significant since they point out the extent to
which consumers may in fact be misled by
treadwear grades. In its analysis, Uniroyal
calculated a correlation coefficient of 0.763 for the
two variables (test results and grades),^ and a
similar rank order correlation. The coefficient of
0.763 implies that only about 58 percent (the
square of the correlation coefficient) of the
variation in tire treadwear grades can be
explained by actual differences in treadwear

^sing a slightly different data base, B. F. Goodrich
calculated a correlation coefficient of 0.78 between the agency's
enforcement trest results and assigned grades.

'While the argument has been made that this aspect of
variability should not be taken into account because it is
entirely within the control of the grading manufacturer, the
agency is not able to conclude from the data before it that any
actually assigned grade is without basis in test data. In
implementing the statute to determine whether the sanctions
imposed by the statute and agency regulation should be
applied to given manufacturers, the agency has been forced to
conclude that all assigned grades so reviewed have been
reasonable, based on agency and manufacturer supporting
data. Under such circumstances, the agency finds that the
overwhelming policy purpose of the UTQGS to inform
consumers of comparative tire data, in a meaningful way (i.e.,
one that is valid, reasonably accurate, and objectively
verifiable for enforcement purposes) in order to affect their
tire purchase decisions, requires that this uncertainty also be
taken into account.

PART 575; PRE 115

performance. The agency estimates that as many
as 10 of the 40 percentage points of unexplained
variability may be due to differences in grade
assignment practices.'

In reaching its decision that currently
documented levels of variability are
unreasonable and cannot sustain retention of the
UTQGS treadwear grading requirements in their
present form, the agency has been guided by two
principal conclusions: first, the rank order of test
results and the rank order of assigned grades can
and do change with repeated testing under
currently allowable procedures. This result has
also taken place when the agency's own, far more
carefully controlled compliance efforts are the
basis for the test.

Second, the levels of certainty and
predictability which the agency expected would
be achieved over time and which the agency so
represented to the courts which have upheld
UTQGS against charges of unacceptable
uncertainty, have not been achieved in fact.

At a minimum, the agency concludes that such
a level of potential rank order change, under
applicable test procedures, is unacceptable. The
agency also concludes that unless the level of
certainty previously asserted by the government
in litigation can be verified to exist, the continued
integrity of the process is undermined to a
separate and unsupportable degree.

Agency research is thus primarily directed to
the determination of the degree to which these
effects can be eliminated.

Specific Sources of Variability

The agency's proposal described a variety of
potential sources of variability in the treadwear
test results based on a review of testing being
done in San Angelo. The tire manufacturers
supporting the suspension, and the commenting
tire testing companies generally agreed that
many of such sources contributed to test result
variability. While some commenters, especially
two testing companies describing in detail their
own testing practices, disputed the magnitude of
the variability that could be caused by several of
the sources, it remains uncontroverted that the
sources identified in the proposal are potential
contributors to variability.

One such testing company objected to the

inference it drew from the proposal that the
agency believed that the testing companies as a
group were to blame for the variability in the test
results. That company also stated its belief that
the proposal unfairly criticized the practices of
testing companies as though all such companies
followed identical practices. The agency
recognizes, and reaffirms its conclusions, that the
primary source of test variability lies in the
shortcomings of the test procedures themselves.
Further, it rejects any implication that the
testing companies were improperly following
such procedures.

The agency emphasizes that the list of sources
in the proposal was not exhaustive. The proposal
specifically noted that the list was included for
illustrative purposes only. It was recognized that
additional research would likely reveal other
sources, of the indisputable and undisputed levels
of variability. Indeed, the record of comments has
provided information regarding several
previously unmentioned sources of variability,
e.g., tire/wheel rim width combinations and the
effect of rubber's high coefficient of thermal
expansion on tire groove depth measurement.

The following specific sources of variability
have been confirmed by the agency as a result of
the current rulemaking proceeding.

Problems of instrumentation— scales. Some
testing companies use scales that are designed
for weighing objects up to 20,000 pounds. Scales
are rarely accurate below 10 percent of their
maximum measuring capacity. Since the loads
being weighed for UTQGS purposes are less than
half that level, the potential for inaccurately
loading the tires on the test cars is obvious. This
problem is compounded by the inability of many
such scales to provide readings more precise than
at 5 pound intervals. The combination of these
factors could lead to significant potential
measurement errors.

Using a ratio of 1:4 between changes in load
and changes in treadwear, the agency stated in
its proposal that a 20 to 30 pound error in
measuring a 700 to 800 pound load could cause
test results errors of ± 20 to 34 points in a tire
with a treadwear grade of 200. The two tire
testing companies submitting detailed comments
stated that their own scales are regularly
calibrated, and that maximum weighing errors of
not more than 10 pounds could be expected under

PART 575: PRE 116

such circumstances. One of the companies also
argued that the ratio between load changes and
treadwear changes is actually closer to 1:1. The
agency cannot now determine with certainty the
correct ratio between changes in tire load and
changes in treadwear. Even assuming such actual
ratio may be lower than 1:4, the agency believes
that scale miscalibration is a factor that can
potentially contribute significantly to variability
in treadwear test results.

— tread depth probes. Tire testing companies
currently measure tread depth by means of either
mechanical gauges with dial indicators or
electronic devices which translate probe
displacement into a voltage reading in mils or
thousandths of an inch. NHTSA's tests of
measurement devices produced measurement
errors of between 3 and 5 mils for electronic
probes and up to 10 mils for mechanical gauges,
with the magnitude of error appearing to depend
on the amount of the pressure placed on the
probe. Variations in pressure can be caused by
differences in strength or technique among
personnel or even by the gradual effect of fatigue
on a given technician. The resulting measurement
differences on tires graded from 160 to 200 can
cause treadwear grading errors of ± 2 to 3
points. The two tire testing companies argued
that measurement errors of 10 mils were in fact
difficult to achieve and would not normally be
expected to occur. The agency concurs that the
typical such error would be expected to be less
than 10 mils, but concludes that variation in the
pressure placed on the probes remains one of the
potential sources which collectively has
produced high levels of test variability.

Electronic probes are subject to other sources
of measurement error. The lack of temperature
compensation in some of the electronic probes can
cause drifts in both the zero reading and the gain.
One tire testing company did note that its
electronic probes are attached directly to a
computer, and asserted that they are capable of
measuring accurately over a wide range of
temperatures. While such drift can be corrected
for in such a process, the agency has determined
that such corrections are not in fact routinely
sought or made by testing companies in general.
Further, any change in probe force at the bottom
of the groove for tires with varying hardness will
generate different tread depth readings

depending on the spring constant, the amount of
deflection used in the design, and the shape of the
tip on the electronic probe. The use of
uncalibrated springs produces additional
measurement differences.

— wheel alignment equipment and procedures.
The agency has determined that treadwear is
very sensitive to wheel alignment, much more so
than had previously been understood by
interested parties. One of the two tire testing
companies agreed with this proposition. B. F.
Goodrich supported this proposition by asserting
that 4/32nds of an inch increase in toe-in can
decrease tread life by 15 to 30 percent. Since Part
575 permits the wheels to be aligned anywhere
within the vehicle manufacturers' specified range
of acceptable alignments, differences in toe-in are
possible. Armstrong Rubber Company cited
various vehicle manufacturer specifications
which had a minimum-to-maximum range of from
5/32nds to 14/32nds of an inch.

The comments on the proposal reveal that the
use of different toe-in settings for a given vehicle
can and do occur. Some testing companies align
wheels to the minimum toe-in setting within the
acceptable range while others align to the mid-
point of the range. Indeed, practices of the two
commenting tire testing companies vary in
precisely this fashion, with one aligning to the
minimum point and the other to the mid-point.

Differences in wheel alignment may also occur
as a result of differences in the frequency of
wheel alignment and in the skill of the technicians
who perform the alignments. The two tire testing
commenters asserted that they use accurate
alignment equipment and well-trained personnel.
Assuming this to be true for these particular
companies, however, does not remove wheel
alignment as a potential source of variability
even with respect to their testing. As noted
above, the wheel alignment practices of these two
companies vary significantly. Further, for these
as well as the other tire testing companies, the
problem of maintaining the alignment equipment
in proper adjustment is a formidable one.
Although all testers have suitable alignment
equipment, their success in using it to achieve
accurate results depends on the skill of the
technicians operating it, the calibration of the
equipment, and the frequency of alignment during
a test.

PART 575; PRE 117

Problems of measurement. The agency
believes that several measurement problems
contribute to variability as well. Observed but
currently unquantifiable measurement errors
occur as a result of information feedback during
testing, i.e., access by measuring personnel to the
previous day's tread depth measurements and
resulting conscious or unconscious bias to parallel
or duplicate those measurements. The agency
also believes error to be caused by the
documented practice of some testing companies
to establish an absolute level of coefficient of
variation, i.e., the degree of variability among the
separate measurements of depth in the same
groove around the circumference of the tire.
Some technicians tend to "hunt" for groove
depths as uniform as possible around the
circumference of the tire, on the understandable
but not factually supportable or recognizable
assumption that such variation should be
minimized.

One tire testing company indicated in its
comments that it took steps to avoid these
sources of variability. Even assuming this
company is fully successful in that effort, the
agency believes that such problems exist for
other testing companies, and would compromise
the success of the program unless all companies
were equally successful.

Problems with vehicle maintenance and use.
The agency continues to believe that factors
relating to the test cars produce substantial
variability. One of these factors is the wide
variation found in the approaches of the testing
companies to achieving a proper vertical load on a
tire. Some testing companies allow the weight to
be placed forward of the front wheels, rearward
of the rear wheels, or even on the vehicle
exterior. In addition, some but not all companies
place heavy deer guards on the front of their test
cars.''

The overloading of some test cars also
produces unquantifiable effects on treadwear test
results. Some testing companies load their cars to
whatever weight is required to achieve the
appropriate load level for a test tire. As a result,
the gross vehicle weight rating for the specific

^Some tire testing companies stated that weight is removed
from their cars to compensate for the deer guards. However,
the agency did not observe any accurate means of weight
compensation.

cars themselves may be exceeded, necessitating
the use of special springs or shims to reestablish
normal ride height. Such heavy loads can cause
the cars to bottom out, while the variations in
springs create differences in roll stiffness and
weight transfer among vehicles of the same type.

Each of these practices introduces changes in
the handling characteristics of the cars and in
different polar moments of inertia, between and
among wheels, vehicles, and the entire test fleet.
These factors would produce different rates of
tire wear as the cars corner, accelerate, or
decelerate.

The two commenting tire testing companies
indicated that they attempt to control these
sources of variability. However, there is no
evidence that those efforts are fully successful,
and agency observations indicate that the other
companies are not in practice as careful as those
two companies.

Problems with drivers and weather conditions.
The agency found in its review that drivers of the
test cars varied significantly in their skill and
driving techniques. These differences are
reflected in the frequency and severity of
accelerations and decelerations. Further, the
agency believes that adverse weather conditions
may affect driving techniques and thereby
treadwear. One tire testing company indicated
that it carefully sought to limit these sources of
variability. However, not all testing companies
have adopted the same measures. In addition,
adverse weather conditions cannot be controlled.

CMT tread composition. Most CMT's-do not
currently have tread composition similar to that
of most candidate tires. As a result, a substantial
question has been raised as to whether the use of
the CMT measurements in fact validly
compensate for environmental effects upon
candidate tire wear. The last two lots of radial
CMT's contained about 30 percent natural
rubber. Most tires produced in the U.S. do not
contain any natural rubber, while some Japanese
tires contain substantial quantities of it. the
presence of a significant percentage of natural
rubber in CMT's is important since natural
rubber is more sensitive to temperature changes
than the current tread compounds used in tires,
and in general wears at a faster rate in hot
weather than the current materials do. Thus,
where the CMT in use contains a larg«

PART 575; PRE 118

percentage of natural rubber and the candidate
tires do not, candidate tires graded in hot
weather would be expected to have higher grades
than those graded in cool weather.

The significance of CMT tread composition
appears to be borne out by a report from B. F.
Goodrich. That company stated that candidate
tires made of compounds similar to that of the
CMT's received more consistent ratings than
those whose compounds were less similar. B. F.
Goodrich's analysis indicates also that the latter
tires can receive different relative rankings.

Wheel rim width. Armstrong asserted in
comments that the tolerance permitted on rim
widths to be used with a given size of tire is a
significant source of variability. The agency lacks
any corrobative information with respect to this
previously unrecognized problem, but will
address the issue as another potential source of
variability as efforts continue to complete
research on treadwear testing variability.

Grade assignment practices. There are
significant differences among the tire
manufacturers in the procedures they use to
translate treadwear test results into grades.
These differences arise partially from the
differing degree of conservatism that the various
manufacturers exercise in selecting a grade for a
group of tires so as to ensure that the
performance of all tires in the g^oup exceed that
grrade as required by Part 575 (See discussion
above).

Unlroyal Petition

On January 21, 1983, Uniroyal petitioned the
agency to make three significant changes to the
treadwear test procedures. These changes
involve a new procedure for running CMT's, the
rotation of candidate tires through each wheel
position in a four-car convoy, and a doubling of
the break-in period.

The agency has completed its preliminary
review of this petition and, in view of the
pendency of the current proceeding, has also
taken it into account as if it were a
supplementary filing to the docket.^

Under the Uniroyal petition, CMT's would no
longer be run in the same convoys as candidate
tires, but in a separate convoy using CMT's
exclusively. The CMT's would be rotated through

each position in the CMT convoy. This procedure
is claimed to substantially reduce vehicle and
driver related sources of variability, while
reducing costs. However, its validity depends
upon the accuracy of Uniroyal's conclusion that
the course environment factors measured by the
CMT process do not produce rapidly changing
treadwear effects, i.e., that the course
environment effect on treadwear changes slowly,
if at all.

Similarly, the rotation of candidate tires
through each position in the test convoys is
claimed by Uniroyal to greatly reduce driver and
vehicle related variability for those tires. All
vehicles in a convoy would be nominally identical.
No front wheel drive vehicles could be used due,
according to Uniroyal, to "load distribution
problems." Uniroyal does not state how it would
deal with the problem of declining number of rear
wheel drive models being produced, and the
difficulty in matching all tire lines with the
limited number of those models.

Finally, Uniroyal found that the break-in effect
for new tires occurred beyond the 800-mile period
currently specified in the regulations. It stated
that establishing a longer period would provide a
more accurate estimate of treadwear rates.

NHTSA regards Uniroyal's petition as further
evidence of the necessity for suspending the
treadwear provisions of UTQGS while the agency
conducts research and testing to determine the
feasibility of reducing variability to more
acceptable levels. Uniroyal has revealed yet
another previously unidentified factor,
barometric pressure, apparently capable of
contributing significantly to the variability of
test results. Although Uniroyal has proposed
several changes which it believes would
substantially reduce certain sources of
variability, it does not suggest how other factors
identified in its petition are to be addressed.

Those factors are barometric pressure,
temperature, and wet road surfaces. Uniroyal
supplied information indicating that the manner

^he disposition at this time of the pending notice of
rulemaking does not, of course, affect the pendency of this
petition before the agency, since only a suspension of the
UTQGS is involved. The petition will thus be treated both as a
comment to the current proposal and as a petition directed
toward the modification of the suspended portion of the
UTQGS and a request for their reinstatement as so modified.

PART 575; PRE 119

in which temperature differences affect
treadwear is more complicated than previously
supposed. While some compounds wear more
rapidly as temperature increases, Uniroyal
reported the example of a tire which wore more
rapidly as temperature decreased. Further, the
degree of temperature affect was substantial.
While Uniroyal's testing showed that one family
of tires was only slightly affected by an eight-
degree average temperature difference, that
same difference caused a 20 percent change in
wear rate for another family of tires. Further,
Uniroyal noted that wet road surfaces could
significantly affect the rate of treadwear and
admitted that some allowance must be made for
this phenomenon, but didn't indicate how that
might be accomplished.

Much of the work done by Uniroyal in support
of its proposal is similar to the agency's ongoing
research, and it may be that the agency's efforts
will lead to the development of test procedures
similar to those suggested by Uniroyal. However,
Uniroyal's work does not obviate the need for
NHTSA to complete its own research and testing
and make its own judgments about the changes
that might be made to the test procedures. The
agency cannot now conclude that Uniroyal's
proposal would reduce test variability to
acceptable levels. Much more research and testing
would be necessary before the agency could even
consider proposing to adopt those or any other
significant changes.

Not only would the agency need to address the
significance of the failure of Uniroyal's proposals
to address certain sources of variability, but it
would also need to examine the implications of
Uniroyal's proposals which in some cases go well
beyond those suggested by Uniroyal in its
petition. For example, Uniroyal's proposal for
rotating candidate tires through each of 16 wheel
positions on test convoys would necessitate a
doubling of the mileage driven by treadwear
testing convoys from 6,400 miles to 12,800 miles
(16 x 800). The additional expense and time
necessary to conduct such extended testing
would be substantial.

Further, although Uniroyal urges the making
of substantial and fundamental changes to the
treadwear test procedures and the theory
underlying those procedures, it argues, without
providing the basis for that argument, that there

would not be any necessity for retesting all tires
in accordance with the modified procedures.
Uniroyal apparently contemplates a marketplace
in which some tires that were tested and graded
under the existing, inadequate procedures are
offered for sale side-by-side with others that are
tested under new, revised procedures. Thus,
Uniroyal would allow the continued
dissemination of misleading treadwear
information.

In the agency's judgment, the need to make
these types of substantial and fundamental
changes would render wholesale retesting and
suspension unavoidable. The inescapable
conclusion from the necessity of making these
changes is that the grades generated under the
existing procedures are unreliable and should not
be presented to the public as a basis for choosing
between alternative tires. Further, since the
grades that would be assigned to a particular tire
if tested under the current and new procedures
would differ, the grades would be inherently
incompatible. As a matter of responsibility to the
consumer and of fairness, the agency could not
contemplate the simultaneous use of two
fundamentally different yardsticks to measure
the treadwear performance of tires.

To avoid this situation, all tires would have to
be retested and regraded. To provide time for the
completion of these activities and to ensure that
substantial numbers of tires graded under the
existing procedures are not still in the
marketplace when the tires graded under the
new ones are introduced, a suspension of the
treadwear testing requirements would be
necessary.

Inadequacy of Alternatives

NHTSA considered several alternative courses
of action in reaching its decision. In addition to
suspending the treadwear grading provisions of
Part 575, the agency considered rescinding them.
NHTSA also considered retaining the provisions
intact while it conducted its research and
attempted to determine whether modifications to
the test procedures and grade assignment
practices could reduce variability to acceptable
levels for UTQGS purposes.

Rescission. Several commenters argued that the
problems with the treadwear grading program

PART 575: PRE 120

were so substantial and intractable that
rescission of the treadwear provisions was the
only appropriate step for the agency to take at
this time. While the agency believes that the
problems now identified with respect to the
UTQGS treadwear ratings are extensive and
serious, that some of them can be addressed only
after substantial research, and that some or all
may not be fully solved even then, it is convinced
there is a substantial possibility that its planned
research could eventually lead to amendments
that would reduce identified treadwear test
result variability to acceptable levels. For
example, if the agency were able to develop an
appropriate procedure for rotating all tires
among the cars in a test convoy, the contribution
of vehicle and driver effects to test result
variability might be greatly reduced. Similarly,
the agency's development and adoption of
statistical procedures that would bring
uniformity to the translation of test results into
grades might contribute significantly to reliable
treadwear grading.

In such a case, any remaining variability could
more confidently be able to be considered
attributable to the inherent complexity of tires
themselves. At that stage, a failure to attain
significant improvements in the repeatability or
reproducibility of tests might well force the
agency to the conclusion that no grading system
based on measured and projected treadwear
could be possible.

Precisely because of the levels of uncertainty
now understood to exist as a result of test result
variability, however, the agency is not now able
to assess whether or not this will likely be the
case. Absent some further evidence on this point,
and taking into account the positive benefits to
the consumer and the orderly working of the
market place which a properly functioning
UTQGS treadwear system would produce, the
agency is unwilling to rescind the program of
treadwear rating entirely at this time.

Continue treadwear grading and make
improvements in treadwear grading process as
they are developed. While conceding that there
are variability problems, several commenters
argued that the treadwear grades are still
sufficiently useful to warrant their retention.
They argued further that the agency should
simply proceed to make available changes to the

treadwear testing procedures and adopt other
changes as they are developed. One commenter
argued that if the treadwear grading information
were more accurate than the information which
previously existed in the marketplace, the agency
was obligated to continue treadwear grading.

NHTSA believes that the critical issue is in this
case not merely whether the treadwear grading
provisions are currently fulfilling their statutory
objective, that of assisting consumers to make
informed choices in purchasing new tires, but of
equal or greater importance whether such
provisions may to the contrary be affirmatively
frustrating the achievement of that objective. As
interpreted by the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals,
the UTQGS provisions in section 203 of the Act do
not contemplate "theoretical perfection" in
providing such assistance. Goodrich I, at 1189. It
calls only for "reasonably fair and reasonably
reliable grading procedures." Id. The agency
believes that this is an appropriate statement of
the principal underlying test of certainty which
the procedures should satisfy. Procedures which
fail to meet that test will tend inappropriately to
increase the sales of some tires and decrease
those of other tires through inaccurately
representing the relative performance of either
or both.

In the agency's view, it appears that the
current procedures fail to meet that
reasonableness test on several counts. Such
procedures are not reasonably reliable because of
the excessive magnitude of the overall
variability.

Moreover, the grades produced under the
treadwear grading procedures are not merely
imperfect, they appear to be affirmatively
misleading.

These problems are not minor. They do not
affect only those tires which differ moderately in
performance. As noted above in the discussion of
the overall variability and reliability problem, the
rank reversals produced by the procedures can
be substantial and are not uncommon. Tires
which are significantly superior to others in
performance may be graded significantly below
those tires, and vice versa. Tires whose test
results show performance differences of up to 100
points may be assigned the same grade.

Thus, while some consumers might be aided in
choosing between some tires, particularly those

PART 575: PRE 121

with very substantial differences (gr3ater than
100 points) in treadwear performance, there
appears to be a significant likelihood that
consumers choosing among closer performing
tires will be misled. The agency believes that
most consumers fall into the latter category. As
noted above, the threshold considerations of tire
size and tire construction type should lead most
persons considering the purchase of a new tire to
look at a universe of potential candidate tires for
purchase whose treadwear grades differ by
significantly less than 100 points. Accordingly, it
appears that the treadwear grading procedures
are neither reasonably fair to the tire
manufacturers nor reasonably reliable in guiding
those consumers who will in fact be purchasing
tires for a given vehicle.

The agency believes that the unreasonableness
of the level of reliability of the current treadwear
grading procedures is compounded by the
possibility that many of the identified sources of
variability, and thus the overall level of
variability, might eventually be able to be
significantly reduced, after a period of research
and testing, at costs that are not prohibitive.

The agency regulatory evaluation discusses a
wide range of possible changes that the agency
believes could ultimately reduce test-induced
variability to more acceptable levels. Among
these are requirements for calibration of
alignment equipment, tighter specifications for
alignment, load distribution, tire-rim width
matchings and CMT composition, prohibition
against information feedback, standardization of
equipment calibration and tread measurement
procedures, limitations on driver acceleration
rates and cornering techniques, limitations on
tire temperature during tread depth
measurement, standardization or elimination of
deer guards, standardized statistical procedure
for grade /assignment, and rotation of candidate
and CMT's tires among test cars. The actions
which appear at this point to hold the greatest
potential for improving the reliability of the
grades are adoption of the grade assignment
procedure, rotation of the tires, more precise
specification of wheel of alignment, and
specification of the composition of CMT's.

The relative importance of many of these
factors is currently unknown. As a result, it is not
possible to determine or assess what actual result

in improved repeatability may be achievable, and
how or at what level such an improved result
might be determined to be acceptable. However,
the agency believes that together such factors
contribute substantially to the variability of
treadwear test results and unreliability of the
resulting grades. The agency's research efforts
are expected to provide information about the
relative importance of individual sources of
variability and the degree to which each source
can be controlled.

The agency expects that its research and
testing will also provide an indication of the cost
of implementing controls on these factors. Based
on the costs of the current procedures, the agency
has no current basis for concluding whether the
costs associated with effective controls would be
reasonable either separately or collectively. The
current cost of treadwear testing is an average of
$.09 per tire. Based on indications from Goodyear
that the retail markups for manufacturing costs
may be 100 percent, that testing cost would have
an $.18 retail price effect, against a retail price of
$40 to $70 for a new tire. Thus, for example, a
doubling of testing expenses would bring the
retail price effect of testing costs up to an
average of only $.36 per tire, a presumptively
reasonable economic impact in and of itself.

As to the suggestion that the agency
immediately commence to make changes in the
treadwear testing procedures and make other
changes as they are developed, the agency
emphasizes that its research and testing have not
proceeded sufficiently to enable it to determine
either precisely how to define and implement the
individual changes or which of those changes will
make enough to a contribution to reducing overall
variability to warrant adoption. The agency does
not believe that the few currently acknowledged
options would make a significant change in the
overall level of variability. Identifying the range
of necessary and appropriate changes will require
iterative testing, given the interplay of the many
sources of variability.

The issue of adopting an appropriate statistical
procedure to standardize the assignment of
grades bears special mention. Although the
agency has already proposed such a procedure (46
F.R. 10429, February 2, 1981), commenters
on that proposal pointed out a variety of
shortcomings, particularly with respect to its

PART 575; PRE 122

failure to properly account for undergrading. No
cotnmenter in the present rulemaking proceeding
has suggested that the procedure as proposed in
February 1981 be adopted at this time. The
agency is continuing its analysis of the extent and
nature of the changes which might be made to the
proposal.

The agency does not agree with the suggestion
by a public interest group that the mere
possibility that the current treadwear grading
information may be better than pre-UTQGS
information on treadwear would justify
continuation of treadwear grading during the
period of any further review. In NHTSA's
judgment, it is not clear whether and to what
extent the UTQGS treadwear information would
in fact be superior to any or all information
previously available for distinguishing between
tires on the basis of expected tread life. To the
degree that the UTQGS system is arguably
superior in format and direct comparability
among tire lines or manufacturers, however, such
apparent advantage derives entirely from those
aspects of the system which the agency has found
to be most flawed: the accuracy and validity of
the UTQGS value as expressed in the grade.
Stated differently, it is precisely that aspect of
the UTQGS which distinguishes it from market
claims of manufacturers which also introduces
the clear probability that false information is
being disseminated by or under the auspices of
the government itself. The probable objective
falsity of at least some of the information now
being disseminated through UTQGS converts the
clarity and apparent simplicity of the UTQGS
reporting format from an asset to its most
damaging liability. Fully cognizant of the view
expressed by this commenter that some
information, or a less than perfect-functioning
system, is better than no information or no
system at all, the agency cannot agree. The
agency concludes that the government has a
superior duty not to participate in such an effort
to the probable detriment of consumers, who
have every reason to demand, and must
necessarily be expected to assume, that such
participation implies and connotes, a higher level
of certainty than the agency can now find in this
well-intentioned effort. Given the shortcomings
of the UTQGS system as now understood, price
differentials and information voluntarily supplied

by the manufacturers as to probable treadwear
performance may be as useful to consumers as
the current grades.'

After weighing the possible benefits of the
current grades against the potentially extensive
problems created by those grades in their effects
on consumers and tire manufacturers, NHTSA
concludes that the appropriate course of action is
suspension pending completion of its research
and testing progrram.

The agency believes that continuing to require
the tire manufacturers to comply with the
treadwear grading requirements in the interim is
not appropriate, because of the above discussed
impossibility of enforcing those requirements in
an objective way. NHTSA noted in its proposal
that the wide variability in its compliance test
results prevented the agency from concluding
with any certainty whether tires were incapapble
of achieving the grades assigned to them.
Commenters on the proposal did not controvert
the agency's statements on this point.

In the agency's opinion, requiring the tire
manufacturers and consumers to continue to bear
the costs of treadwear testing during the time
necessary to complete the research and testing
concerning test procedure improvements would
be unreasonable and unwarranted since the
treadwear grading program is apparently neither
reasonably fair to the tire manufacturers nor
reasonably reliable as a guide to consumers.
Although the cost per tire is not large, those costs
total approximately $10 million annually.

Amendments Adopted by This Notice

This notice adopts several amendments
relating to the treadwear grading provisions of
Part 575. Most important, it adopts a suspension
of those provisions effective upon the date that
this notice is published in the Federal Register.

'To compound the agency's dilemma on this point, the
number of consumers potentially aided by treadwear grading
information, and thus the number of consumers potentially
misled by an invalid result, is apparently fairly limited.
According to information submitted by Uniroyal at the public
meeting, only 30 percent of consumers surveyed by them even
knew about the UTQGS information, after their promotional
efforts, and only 60 percent of those consumers stated they
would plan to use that information in making their next tire
purchase. Thus, only 18 percent of consumers are potentially
benefited, or potentially misled, by the treadwear information.

PART 575; PRE 123

On that date, manufacturers will no longer be
required to submit treadwear grading
information to this agency or to disseminate it to
consumers through moldings on the side of new
tires, paper labels on the treads on new tires, or
consumer information materials. The only
information that would be required to be
submitted or disseminated on or after that date
would be traction and temperature resistance
grading information.

The agency believes there is ample
justification for an immediate effective date. The
suspension relieves a restriction and will aid in
ending as quickly as is reasonably practicable the
possibility that consumers will be misled by the
treadwear grading information.

The agency is not requiring that manufacturers
immediately cease disseminating treadwear
information already printed or embodied on tires
or tire molds, through the means formerly
required by Part 575. Such a requirement would
be impracticable. The greatest problem is
associated with the molding of treadwear
information on the tires. Discontinuation of that
practice would necessitate making changes to the
molds being used to produce new tires.
Specifically, the manufacturers would have to fill
in the indentations used to print the word
"TREADWEAR" and the appropriate grade on
the sidewall of each new tire. The total cost to the
tire industry of making those changes to all molds
would be approximately $11 million. Instead of
requiring that all molds be changed
simultaneously, the agency is requiring that all
tires produced in molds manufactured after (180
days after publication in the Federal Register),
use a format which provides for the molding of
only traction and temperature resistance grades
on new tires.

I Although the manufacturers could cease
printing labels and consumer information
materials containing treadwear information
almost immediately, they are confronted with the
problem of existing inventories of labels and
materials containing that information. The
agency has decided to allow the manufacturers to
exhaust those inventories. The agency expects
that after the effective date of this suspension,
the labels and materials printed and used by the
manufacturers to comply with the UTQGS
provisions of Part 575 will not contain that

information. The continued printing of labels and
materials that set forth the treadwear grades
without revealing the suspension of the
treadwear requirements, or the absence of any
participation by the government in procedures to
use similar tests or measurement systems as a
basis for warranties or other forms of
representation as to treadwear expectancy,
would be doubly misleading, i.e., it could be
misleading as to the relative performance of tires,
but also would be misleading as to the current
existence of a government sanctioned system for
grading treadwear.

The agency believes that the publicity given
this notice will minimize the likelihood that
consumers will be misled as a result of the
continued molding of treadwear information on
some new tires and the continued dissemination
for a relatively short period of treadwear
information by means of labels and other
materials. Probable media coverage of the
agency's conclusions in taking this action should
reduce the extent of any consumer reliance on
them. Further, consumers would be even less
likely to rely on the grades after the existing
inventories of those lables and materials are
exhausted. After then, only the grade would
appear on the tire. There would not be any
explanatory information concerning the
development or meaning of the grade. As the
molds are replaced, even the treadwear grade
would disappear from the tire, during the
pendency of this suspension.

Status of Research

As NHTSA noted in its proposal, it has begun
several research activities aimed at reducing the
variability of treadwear test results. The agency
is proceeding diligently to complete these
activities. One program discussed above would
attempt to establish the relationship between
treadwear, tire inflation pressure, and load. The
program to develop this relationship is partially
completed, with final results expected by the end
of February. If such a relationship could be
established, it could aid future research to
determine the effects of rotating tires through all
positions in test car convoys. Rotating tires in
this fashion would tend to minimize the
variability that is caused by differences in

PART 575; PRE 124

vehicles and in driver techniques. A contract to
test the validity of the rotation concept is
expected to be awarded by late spring of this
year.

Another program is aimed at establishing the
effect of reducing tolerances on permitted test
vehicle loading configurations, wheel alignment,
driver techniques, and tread depth measurement
techniques. A contract for this program is
expected to be awarded soon.

A third program will attempt to quantify the
individual sources of treadwear test variability

through a statistical analysis of existing
enforcement data. This research program has
already begun and should be completed by the
end of February.

Research planned for the future includes an
attempt to achieve greater accuracy in test
equipment, to specify test vehicle maintenance
procedures, and to account for differences in the
testing and tread depth measurement
environment. A contract for this work is expected
to be awarded by late summer of this year.

Issued on February 1, 1983.

Raymond A Peck, Jr.
Administrator
48 F. R. 5690
February 7, 1983

PART 575; PRE 125-126

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 575

Customer Information Regulations;
Uniform Tire-Quality Grading

[Docket No. 80-14; Notice 8]
[Docket No. 25; Notice 54]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends the Uniform Tire
Quality Grading Standards (UTQGS) by revising
the procedure used to establish tire loads under
which temperature-resistance tests are con-
ducted. This amendment is being issued to make
test loads under the temperature-resistance test
consistent with test loads specified for the high-
speed test in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Stan-
dard (FMVSS) 109. It is anticipated that this
amendment will assure that UTQGS temperature-
resistance tests and FMVSS 109 high-speed tests
may, to the maximum possible extent, be con
ducted together.

DATE: This amendment is effective July 1, 1984.
Certain minor technical amendments in the notice
are effective immediately on publication.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On Decem
ber 17, 1981, NHTSA amended FMVSS 109, which
establishes performance requirements for new
automobile tires, by deleting the tire tables in Ap-
pendix A of that standard. Information in these
tables was previously used, among other pur
poses, to specify tire test loads under the UTQGS.
Therefore, with the deletion of the tire tables of
FMVSS 109, it was necessary to establish alterna
five procedures for determining UTQGS test
loads. Interim procedures were established by
NHTSA on June 15 and August 12. 1982, in 47 FR
2.5930 and 34990, and public comment was invited
on the adopted technical approaches. On August
19, 1982. the agency issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking, inviting further public comment on
other possible approaches to be used in specifying
test loads under the UTQGS. See 47 FR 36260.

This notice establishes these procedures in final
form.

The UTQGS establish procedures for testing
tires to evaluate their traction, temperature
resistance, and tread-wear performance. (On
February 7. 1983, NHTSA suspended the tread-
wear portion of the UTQGS, pending the comple-
tion of research intended to determine the causes
of the high levels of test variability found in
tread-wear test results, and to reduce that
variability. (See 48 FR 5690.)) The test procedures
specify loads to be placed on the tire. Those loads
differ for each of the three types of tests. Prior to
the deletion of the FMVSS 109 tire tables, tem-
perature-resistance tests were conducted at the
maximum load specified in those tables for a tire
pressure 8 pounds per square inch (psi) below the
tire's maximum inflation pressure. Tread-wear
tests were conducted at 85 percent of the load for
temperature-resistance testing. Traction tests
were conducted at 85 percent of the maximum
load specified in the tire tables for tire pressures
of 24 psi or 180 kilopascals, as appropriate.

With the deletion of the tire tables, the agency
developed a range of numerical factors which
relate a tire's maximum load rating, as stated on
the tire's sidewall, to the appropriate test load.
Rather than relying on the tables, manufacturers
or others conducting tests under the UTQGS
would simply multiply the maximum load by the
factor to determine the test load. This procedure
resulted in at most a 10-pound change in the load
at which tests were conducted, for all but a small
number of tires. P'or these remaining tires, the
agency provided that tests would be conducted at
the same load as was done prior to June 15 (rely-
ing on the tire tables), until July 1. 1984. After
that date, test loads would be determined by us-

PART 575; PRE 127

ing the load factors.

Shortly after the load-factor procedure was
established the Rubber Manufacturers Associa-
tion and the Cooper Tire Company raised objec-
tions to it. These parties pointed out that prior to
the deletion of the tire tables, a single test could
be used to demonstrate compliance with high-
speed requirements under FMVSS 109 and tem-
perature-resistance testing under the UTQGS.
However, after the deletion of the tire tables,
slightly different loads would be specified for
those two purposes. (When the tire tables were
deleted, NHTSA specified a single test-load fac-
tor of 88 percent of the tire's maximum load for
high-speed testing under FMVSS 109.)

On August 19, 1982, NHTSA issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking, inviting comment on
methods for restoring equivalent load specifica-
tions for purposes of high-speed testing under
FMVSS 109 and temperature-resistance testing
under the UTQGS. The agency proposed three
possible methods for achieving this result, and re-
quested that commenters present any other alter-
natives they felt appropriate. The three NHTSA
alternatives were:

(1) To amend the UTQGS temperature-resis-
tance test by deleting the load factors and speci-
fying a single 88-percent factor, as was done with
FMVSS 109.

(2) To amend the FMVSS 109 high-speed test
by deleting the 88-percent factor and adopting
the series of load factors used in the UTQGS
temperature-resistance test.

(3) To amend FMVSS 109 and the UTQGS by
relying on load information published by industry
standardization organizations such as the Tire
and Rim Association and The European Tyre and
Rim Technical Organization. This approach would
be much the same as the procedure previously
followed by the agency in relying on the FMVSS
109 tire tables.

Virtually all comments received on the agency's
notice of proposed rulemaking recommended
adopting the third alternative, since it is the
closest to past practice and would assure that test
data derived under the pre-June 15 procedures
would still be valid. Also, some tire manufac-
turers felt this option would minimize the "load
range creep" phenomenon, in which tire manufac-
turers were encouraged by vehicle manufac-
turers to increase incrementally the load rating
of a tire, thus permitting the use of a smaller, less

expensive tire for a given automobile. These in-
creases could ultimately result in overloaded tire
operation. The tire manufacturers felt that the
existence of tabulated load information would
discourage the load creep phenomenon. On the
other hand, the European Tyre and Rim Tech-
nical Organization favored the first alternative
(testing at 88 percent of maximum load), due to
the simplicity of that approach.

NHTSA has concluded that the first alterna-
tive is preferable, and is herein amending the
UTQGS accordingly. That alternative has the ad-
vantage of being the simplest to use, and has been
shown to work well in FMVSS 109. The agency is
concerned that adoption of alternative 3 could
/esult in the reinstitution of NHTSA tire tables.
Information on tires not listed by one of the stan-
dardization organizations would be submitted to
NHTSA under that alternative. However, com-
menters requested that information on such tires
be published by NHTSA to make it available to
all interested parties, thereby resulting in new
tire tables, albeit on a smaller scale. The possibil-
ities also exist of inconsistent data entries for
tires appearing in more than one table and omis-
sions of certain tires from all tables. The
undesirability of this unwieldy system is clear
and the disadvantages of the continued reliance
on tire tables was discussed fully in the notices in-
volving the deletion of the FMVSS 109 tire tables.

With regard to the load range creep phenome-
non, the agency does not agree that the third
alternative would discourage such actions to any
greater degree than would the other alternatives.
Under the third option, all a manufacturer would
have to do to change a tire's load rating would be
to submit new information to a standardization
organization. Further, the agency has ample
authority to deal with this problem and will take
appropriate action to prevent such actions where
safety would be jeopardized.

In the case of the second option, amending
FMVSS 109 to adopt varying load factors would
disrupt testing programs under that standard
which have worked well for the past year using
the 88-percent load criterion. Further, adopting
the varying load factors is slightly more complex
than using the single 88-percent factor. There-
fore, the agency considers option 1 to be the
preferable alternative.

Adoptive alternative 1 will produce no changes
in tire testing under FMVSS 109. However, the

PART 575; PRE 128

Rubber Manufacturers Association points out
that adoption of this alternative will increase tire
test loads for UTQGS purposes by from 1 to 3 per-
cent for certain tires.

For the vast majority of currently produced
tires (p-metric sizes with maximum inflation
pressure of 240 kilopascals), the increase in test
load is approximately 1.6 percent. An increase in
load of this small a magnitude is insufficient to af-
fect temperature-resistance grades. Also, the ma-
jority of tires are graded "C" for temperature
resistance, a grade which merely signifies
minimum compliance with the high-speed test of
FMVSS 109. Therefore, increasing the test loads
for UTQGS temperature-resistance purposes
(which should theoretically make that test more
stringent! will not affect the grades of those tires.
Therefore, the amendments promulgated herein
should impact only a very small number of tires.
To the extent that the adoption of identical test
loads for the FMVSS 109 high-speed test and the
UTQGS temperature-resistance test permits the
two tests to be run together, this amendment will
produce an overall reduction in testing costs.

This amendment is being made effective on
July 1, 1984, to coincide with the effective date
for test-load factors for traction and tread-wear
testing for all tires, as specified in the August 2,
1982, Federal Register notice.

Two minor amendments are also being promul-
gated in this notice for which, due to their tech-
nical nature, the agency finds good cause for mak-
ing effective immediately. The first of these adds
three size designations to table 2A of the UTQGS,
as requested by the Japanese Automobile Tire
Manufacturers Association. This addition will
avoid (until July 1, 1984) having to test these tires
at significantly different test loads than those
specified through the FMVSS 109 tire tables. The
second technical amendment clarifies that the
traction-test pavement-wetting procedure is that
specified in the 1979 version of American Society
for Testing and Materials Method E 274.

Since this rule should not cause any significant
change in implementation of the UTQG regula

tion, NHTSA has determined that this pro-
ceeding does not involve a major rule within the
meaning of Executive Order 12291 or a significant
rule within the meaning of the Department of
Transportation regulatory procedures. F'urther,
there are no significant economic impacts of this
action, so that preparation of a full regulatory
evaluation is unnecessary.

Tht agency has also considered the impacts of
this rule in accordance with the Regulatory Flex-
ibility Act. I certify that this action will not have
a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. As noted above, this ac-
tion will make essentially no change in the im-
plementation of the UTQG regulation.

NHTSA has concluded that this action will
have essentially no environmental consequences
and therefore that there will be no significant ef-
fect on the quality of the human environment.

Part 575-CONSUMER INFORMATION REG-
ULATIONS

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR Part
575 is amended as follows:

1. Section 575.104(gK6) is revised to read as
follows:

* * 4< * *

(6) Press the tire against the test wheel with a
load of 88 percent of the tire's maximum load
rating as marked on the tire sidewall.

2. Section 575.104(h)(1) is revised to read as
follows:

(h) Determination of test load. To determine
test loads for purposes of paragraphs (e)(2)(iii) and
(f)(2)(viii), follow the procedure set forth in
paragraphs (hH2) through (5) of this section.

3. Table 2 of section 575.104 is amended by
deleting the words "and temperature resistance"
from the heading of the middle column of the
table.

4. Table 2A of section 575.104 is amended by
adding the following new entries at the bottom of
the table:

PART 575; PRE 129

Tire size designation Temp resistance Traction

Temp resistance

Max. pressure

32

36

40

695

785

855

915

1015

1105

845

915

980

5.20-14 695 785 855 591

165-15 915 1015 1105 779

185/60 R 13 845 915 980 719

Tread-wear

Max. pressure

32

36

40

591

667

727

779

863

939

719

778

833

5. The references to "ASTM Method E 274-70" ~ ~ ZT-T — T

in sections 575.104(fHl)(iii) and (f)(l)(iv) are deleted Ah"^' t T

and replaced by "ASTM Method E 274-79." Administrator

Issued on March 5, 1984. .„ p^ oqoq

March 9, 1984

PART 575; PRE 130

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 575

Consumer Information Regulations

Operation of Utility Vehicles on Paved Roadways

(Docket No. 82-20; Notice 2)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This final rule adds a new require-
ment to the Consumer Information Regulations,
applicable to "utility vehicles", i.e., multipurpose
passenger vehicles which have a short wheelbase
and special features for occasional off-road use.
Some of these special features cause utility
vehicles to handle and maneuver differently from
ordinary passenger cars under certain driving con-
ditions. A driver who is unaware of the differences
and who makes sharp turns or abrupt maneuvers
when operating utility vehicles on paved roads may
lose control of the vehicle or rollover. To inform
drivers of the handling differences between utility
vehicles and passenger cars, this amendment re-
quires manufacturers to place a prescribed sticker
on the windshield, dashboard or some other promi-
nent location of the vehicle to alert operators. In
addition, the new regulation requires manufac-
turers to include information in the vehicle
Owner's Manual concerning the proper method of
on- and off-road driving for utility vehicles.

DATES: This amendment is effective September
1, 1984.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice
amends the Consumer Information Regulations (49
CFR 575) to add a new requirement applicable to
"utility vehicles"— multipurpose passenger
vehicles (49 CFR 571.3) which have a short
wheelbase and special features for occasional off-
road operation. This new regulation addresses a
safety concern resulting from a possible lack of
owner awareness about the proper handling and
operation of utility vehicles. These vehicles have
features which cause them to handle and maneuver
differently than ordinary passenger cars under
certain on-pavement driving conditions. Those
features include: short wheelbase, narrow track.

high ground clearance, high center of gravity, stiff
suspension system and, often, four-wheel drive.
Examples of utility vehicles in current production
include: AMC Jeeps, Chevrolet Blazer, Ford
Bronco, Dodge Ram Charger, Toyota Land
Cruiser, and the CMC Jimmy.

Because of the drivers' apparent unfamiliarity
with the unique characteristics of these vehicles
(their higher center of gravity, narrower track and
stiffer suspensions), utility vehicles are more likely
to go out of control or roll over than passenger cars
during sharp turns or abrupt maneuvers on paved
roads, especially at high speeds. Certain research
studies appear to indicate that utility vehicles are
disproportionately represented in rollover ac-
cidents than are passenger cars, and that the rates
of death and disabling injury per accident could be
twice as high for utility vehicles. (These studies are
discussed more fully in this notice.)

In response to these factors, the agency issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking on December 30,
1982 (47 FR 58323) to require a new consumer in-
formation regulation which would require
manufacturers to alert utility vehicle drivers of the
unique handling characteristics of these vehicles.
As noted in that proposal, the agency believes that
the differences in safety statistics and apparent
performance with regard to utility vehicles are
likely influenced by the lack of awareness by utility
vehicle drivers concerning the operational charac-
teristics of these vehicles, especially under condi-
tions approaching the limits of vehicle perform-
ance. The occurrence of accidents at observed
rates makes it clear that operators do not under-
stand or appreciate the need for adjusting their
driving habits to coincide with physical differences
between utility vehicles and ordinary passenger
cars.

PART 575; PRE 131

The proposed amendment to the Consumer In-
formation Regulations specified a prescribed
sticker which manufacturers would be required to
place in a prominent vehicle location to alert
drivers concerning the special handling character-
istics of utility vehicles. Additionally, the proposed
regulation specified that manufacturers would be
required to include information in the vehicle
Owner's Manual concerning the proper method of
handling and maneuvering these vehicles when
driven on paved roads.

There were twenty comments to the notice of
proposed rulemaking. Nearly all of these sup-
ported promulgation of the proposed new regula-
tion, in principle. However, many commenters did
not accept the agency's basis for the rulemaking
and nearly all of the comments recommended
various changes. The following is a discussion of
the major comments, along with agency's response
and final conclusions.

Basic Premise of the New Regulation

The proposal cited a study conducted by the
Highway Safety Research Institute of the Univer-
sity of Michigan which found that utility vehicles
rollover at a rate at least five times higher than
that experienced by the average passenger car
("On Road Crash Experience of Utility Vehicles",
see NHTSA Docket 82-20). In addition, the pro-
posal noted that NHTSA fatal accident report data
indicate that on a statistical basis, given a rollover
accident, occupants are more likely to be killed in
utility vehicles than in passenger cars (probability
twice as high). Several manufacturers took strong
exception to the Michigan study and challenged its
scientific accuracy in certain regards, citing
statements by the study's author that it was not a
definitive project. Although these manufacturers
did not oppose the proposed new regulation, they
strongly objected to using the cited research as
support for the regulation. Several manufacturers
also stated that the proposal focused too narrowly
on the physical characteristics of utility vehicles
and failed to take into account the driver and
environmental factors which affect the safety
operation of these vehicles.

The agency did not intend to imply that it is only
the unique physical characteristics of utility
vehicles which are responsible for the great
number of accidents in these vehicles. The basic
premise of the new regulation, as evidenced by

statements in the proposal, is that drivers are ap-
parently unaware of the unique handling char-
acteristics of these vehicles as compared to
ordinary passenger cars, and that this coupling of
unique vehicle attributes and lack of awareness is
apparently a large part of the problem.

Regarding the research cited in the proposal, the
agency also did not intend to imply that further
study would not be advantageous or that the
Michigan study is an exhaustive, definitive state-
ment concerning the actual accident experience of
utility vehicles. However, the agency does believe
that the information from the Michigan study,
together with NHTSA's own data and other
research cited below, is sufficiently reliable to in-
dicate that utility vehicles are involved in a
substantial number of accidents which appear to be
related to their unique handling characteristics, of
which their operators may not be fully aware.

In addition to the research mentioned in the pro-
posal, the agency also notes the following informa-
tion which has been submitted to the Docket con-
cerning this proceeding: "A Comparison of the
Crash Experience of Utility Vehicles, Pickup
Trucks and Passenger Cars," Reinfurt, et al..
Highway Safety Research Center, University of
North Carolina, September 1981: "Analysis of
Fatal Rollover Accidents in Utility Vehicles," S. R.
Smith, NHTSA, February 1982; "Insurance
Losses Personal Injury Protection Coverage,
Passenger Cars, Vans, Pickups, and Utility
Vehicles, 1979-1981 Models," HLDI, 1-18-1,
September 1982. These studies also indicated
significant rollover accident experience with utility
vehicles. While it may be true that these studies do
not quantify the contributions of the various possi-
ble causes of this accident experience (vehicle
characteristics, driver characteristics, vehicle use,
environmental factors, etc.), the agency believes
that this research does indicate a serious problem
which should be brought to the attention of vehicle
owners and which can be alleviated by the
dissemination of information to alert vehicles
owners and drivers.

Appiication

Several commenters requested changes and
clarifications in the definition of "utility vehicle"
as set forth in the proposal's application section.
The proposal specified the following:

PART 575; PRE 132

"This Section applies to multipurpose pas-
senger vehicles which have special features for
occasional off-road operation ('utility
vehicles')."

Commenters noted that the utility vehicles at issue
typically have a wheelbase of 1 10 inches or less and
recommended that this specification be added to
the definition so that other vehicles are not in-
advertently included in the regulation's applica-
tion. Manufacturers were particularly concerned
that certain vehicles such as long wheel base utility
trucks like the General Motors "Suburban" line,
motor homes and multi-use recreational vehicles
would be included even though they do not have
the same rollover propensities as utility vehicles.
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
argued that the application of the rule should be
limited to those vehicles most likely to present
rollover concerns. The agency generally agrees
with these concerns. As noted in the proposal, the
vehicles which are intended to be covered are those
with relatively short wheelbases, narrow tracks,
high ground clearances, high centers of gravity
and stiff suspensions. The proposal also mentioned
four-wheel drive as a characteristic of utility
vehicles. While four-wheel drive is typically a
characteristic of those vehicles, it was mentioned
in the proposal only because it is descriptive of the
majority of vehicles at issue. Four-wheel drive in
and of itself, however, has very little to do with the
rollover propensities involved in this rulemaking,
and the agency did not intend to include a vehicle
simply because it had four-wheel drive if it did not
also have the characteristics which necessitate
alerting drivers to special handling methods.

After reviewing these comments and informa-
tion concerning the vehicles at issue, the agency
has determined that the definition should include a
110-inch wheel base specification in order to
segregate those vehicles which are dispropor-
tionately involved in rollover accidents. Thus, as
specified in this new regulation, utility vehicles are
multipurpose passenger vehicles which have a
wheel base of 110 inches or less and special
features for occasional off-road operation (which
may or may not include four-wheel drive).

One manufacturer recommended that the new
regulation also apply to four-wheel drive light
pickup trucks (GVWR of 8,500 pounds or less) as
well as to utility vehicles. The manufacturer did

not supply any information, however, indicating
that the same accident experience occurs with
respect to light pickup trucks. Moreover, data
before the agency do not indicate that this vehicle
class has a different rollover experience than
ordinary passenger cars. Therefore, the fact that
certain pickup trucks have four-wheel drive does
not seem to be sufficient reason for including this
vehicle type in the standard's application. As noted
earlier, there is no indication that four-wheel drive
alone leads to the rollover propensities which are
the subject of this rulemaking action. The agency
will continue to monitor the accident experience of
these vehicles, however, to determine if they
should be included in the standard at some time in
the future.

Sticker Location

The proposal preceding this new regulation
specified that manufacturers shall affix a sticker to
"the instrument panel, windshield frame or in
some other location in each vehicle prominent and
visible to the driver", to alert drivers concerning
the special handling characteristics of utility
vehicles. Several commenters requested that this
requirement specifically include the driver's sun
visor as an acceptable location for the required
sticker. One commenter stated that the warning
should be of a more permanent nature than a
sticker affixed to the windshield or instrument
panel. That commenter stated that, if the sticker is
located on the instrument panel, it should be
behind the plastic lens so that it cannot be re-
moved, arguing that the sticker should remain per-
manently affixed so that subsequent vehicle
owners are made aware of "the vehicle's sensi-
tivity to certain maneuvers."

The agency considers the driver's sun visor to be
a "prominent" location in a vehicle, and is modify-
ing the language of this requirement to specifically
mention that vehicle location. The agency agrees
that the sticker should be of a permanent nature,
but does not believe that it is necessary at this time
to require the sticker to be placed, for example,
behind the plastic lens of the instrument panel.
There is no wish to place design restrictions on
manufacturers, but the agency does intend for the
sticker to be permanently affixed in a prominent
position and readily visible to drivers. Stickers
similar to the placard required in FMVSS 110
would be considered adequate.

PART 575; PRE 133

Sticker and Manual Language

A majority of the commenters recommended
clarification and changes in the prescribed
language for the warning sticker and information
in the vehicle Oumer's MarnuiL The proposal
specified that the sticker shall have the language
prescribed "or similar language", and included the
following caveat:

"The language on the sticker required by this
paragraph may be modified as is desired by the
manufacturer to make it appropriate for a
specific vehicle design, to ensure that consum-
ers are adequately informed concerning the
unique propensities of a particular vehicle
model."

As proposed, this caveat was not appHcable to the
language required in the vehicle Owner's Manual.
Numerous commenters requested that this flex-
ibility be allowed for the Owner's Manual as well.
One commenter stated that there is no way the
sticker can "ensure" consumers are adequately in-
formed. One commenter requested that manufac-
turers be allowed to place the required information
in any section of their Owner's Manual they
choose, rather than in the "introduction" and "on-
pavement" driving sections as prescribed in the
proposal. Several commenters also suggested that
the word "rollover" be specifically included in the
required warnings, on the basis that "loss of con-
trol" does not sufficiently describe the hazard.

The agency agrees that language flexibility may
be useful for the Owner's Manual as well as for the
prescribed sticker, in order to ensure that con-
sumers are adequately informed concerning the
unique characteristics of a particular vehicle
design. That modification is made in this notice.
The agency believes that the objection to use of the
word "ensure" in the specified caveat is a matter
of semantics since the agency's intent is that
manufacturers make every attempt to adequately
inform its customers. It was for this reason that
the language flexibility is being allowed. The
agency also agrees that use of the word "rollover"
in the sticker and Oumer's Manual might more ac-
curately describe the possible consequences of
sharp turns or abrupt maneuvers than the phrase
"loss of control" used alone. Accordingly, that
word is added to the language specified in this
notice. Finally, the agency agrees that manufac-
turers should be allowed to place the required "on-

pavement" driving information in any prominent
location of their Owner's Manual they desire,
rather than only in a section specifically labeled
"on pavement driving". However, the agency
believes that the specified introductory statement
must be included in the Manual's introduction (or
preface) so that any person consulting the Manual
will be aware that driving guidelines are included
in the Manual.

One commenter requested that the required in-
formation be allowed in a supplement to the
Oumer's Manual, i.e., a separate pamphlet. The
agency has no objections to additional, or com-
prehensive supplements which further describe
driving methods and operating procedures for
utility vehicles (one manufacturer currently pro-
vides such a Supplement). However, the agency
believes that the two prescribed (or similar)
statements should be placed in the general Owner's
Manual since some operators might be more likely
to consult the Manual, which includes all informa-
tion concerning their vehicles, than they would
supplements. Further, the required statements are
short and should not be onerous to manufacturers.

Effective Date

The proposal specified that the new regulation, if
promulgated, would become effective 60 days after
publication of a final rule. Several manufacturers
stated that their Owner's Manuals are typically up-
dated only at the beginning of a new model year
and that longer than 60 days is needed to comply
with the requirements of the regulation. After
considering these comments, the agency has con-
cluded that the new regulation should become ef-
fective September 1, 1984, coincidental with the
typical introduction of new models. This is longer
than the 60-days leadtime specified in the proposal
and should allow all manufacturers sufficient time
to comply with the requirements.

NHTSA has examined the impacts of this new
regulation and determined that this notice does not
qualify as a major regulation within the meaning of
Executive Order 12291 or as a significant regula-
tion under the Department of Transportation
regulatory policies and procedures. The agency has
also determined that the economic and other im-
pacts of this rule are so minimal that a regulatory
evaluation is not required. The prescribed sticker
and additional information required in the vehicle
Oumer's Manual will result in only minimal costs

PART 575; PRE 134

for vehicle manufacturers and will not likely result tions or governmental units which purchase utility

in any cost increase for consumers. vehicles. Moreover, few, if any, vehicle manufac-

The agency also considered the impacts of this turers would qualify as small entities under the

rule under the precepts of the Regulatory Flexibil- ^^t.

ity Act. I hereby certify that the regulation will not Issued on May 7, 1984.
have a significant economic impact on a substantial

number of small entities. As just discussed, the Diane K. Steed

cost of the required sticker and information will be Administrator

extremely small. Accordingly, there will be vir- 49 F.R. 20016

tually no economic effect on any small organiza- May 11, 1984

PART 575; PRE 135-136

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 575

Consumer Information Regulations

Operation of Utility Vehicles on Paved Roadways

[Docket No. 82-20; Notice 3)

ACTION: Final rule, response to petitions for
reconsideration.

SUMMARY: This final rule responds to petitions
for reconsideration filed by American Motors Cor-
poration and Subaru of America, Inc., with regard
to the agency's requirement that manufacturers of
utility vehicles inform drivers of those vehicles of
the propensity of such vehicles to rollover. Ameri-
can Motors and Subaru pointed out in their peti-
tions that the scope of this requirement includes
certain passenger car derivatives such as the AMC
Eagle and the Subaru four-wheel drive vehicles
which do not have the operating characteristics
which were the focus of the rule. Therefore, the
agency is herein clarifying the regulations to ex-
empt passenger car derivatives.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This amendment is effective
September 1, 1984.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On May 11,
1984, NHTSA amended its Consumer Information
Regulations (49 CFR 575) to add a new require-
ment applicable to "utility vehicles" — multipur-
pose passenger vehicles (49 CFR 571.3) which have
a short wheelbase (110 inches or less) and special
features for occasional off-road operation. See 49
PR 20016. This new regulation addresses a safe-
ty concern resulting from a possible lack of owner
awareness about the proper handling and opera-
tion of utility vehicles have features which causes
them to handle and maneuver differently than
ordinary passenger cars under certain on-
pavement driving conditions. Those features in-
clude: short wheelbase, narrow track, high ground
clearance, high center of gravity, stiff suspension

system and, often, four-wheel drive. Examples of
utility vehicles in current production which were
cited in the agency's final rule include: AMC Jeeps,
Chevrolet Blazer, Ford Bronco, Dodge Ram Charger,
Toyota Land Cruiser, and the CMC Jimmy.

On June 11, 1984, the agency received petitions
for reconsideration of the utility vehicle labeling
rule from American Motors Corporation and
Subaru of America, Inc. Both manufacturers
pointed out that although the preamble to the
agency's final rule indicated that the rule was in-
tended to apply to a class of vehicles with attri-
butes which might tend to increase the likelihood
of vehicle rollover (high center of gravity, narrow
track, stiff suspension, etc.), the actual language of
the rule applied to certain vehicles without these
attributes. In particular, these manufacturers
were concerned that the labeling requirements
would apply to their four-wheel drive vehicles
which are derived from passenger cars, i.e., the
American Motors Eagle and the Subaru four-wheel
drive station wagons, sedans, and Brat. Both
manufacturers requested that the agency clarify
the scope of the rule to exclude these vehicles.

Since the American Motors and Subaru vehicles
in question are certified as multipurpose
passenger vehicles under 49 CFR Part 567, have a
wheelbase of 110 inches or less and have four
wheel drive, they would fall within the "utility
vehicle" definiiion in the Consumer Information
Regulations, and would therefore be subject to the
rollover warning label requirements. However,
the manufacturers are correct in pointing out that
the main thrust of the agency's May 11 rule was to
regulate the more traditional types of utility
vehicles, such as the Jeep CJ series and the Toyota
Land Cruiser.

PART 575 -PRE 137

To assess the appropriateness of subjecting the
Eagle and Subaru model lines to the labeling re-
quirements, the agency analyzed its accident data
to determine the frequency of involvement in fatal
rollover accidents for various types of vehicles.
Fatality data were obtained from the agency's
Fatal Accident Reporting System, while vehicle
registration information was obtained from R. L.
Polk data. The rollover rate for the Eagle is much
lower than that for the more traditional utility
vehicles, and is, in fact, lower than that for all
passenger cars. This data strongly supports the
American Motors argument that the Eagle should
not be subject to the labeling rule. The case for the
Subaru vehicles is less clear, since their rollover
fatality rate is between that of passenger cars and
the more traditional utility vehicles. However, the
Subaru four-wheel drive vehicles have a rollover
fatality rate which is virtually identical to that of
their two-wheel drive counterparts, which are not
subject to the labeling requirement, and is still
only about 'A that of more traditional util-
ity vehicles. Subaru submitted data with its recon-
sideration petition indicating that the handling
characteristics of the Subaru four-wheel drive
vehicles are on a par with those of passenger cars,
and superior to those of more traditional utility
vehicles. Therefore, the agency is exempting
passenger car derivative multipurpose passenger
vehicles from the rollover labeling requirements.
These vehicles are typically based upon a passen-
ger car chassis, then modified to have certain at-
tributes common to trucks or utility vehicles. The
Subaru and Eagle vehicles are the only vehicles
currently sold in the Untied States which fall
within this exemption.

The amendments promulgated herein are effec-
tive September 1, 1984, to coincide with the effec-
tive date of the May 11 labeling rule. The agency
finds good cause for making this amendment effec-
tive less than 180 days after publication. The
amendment relieves an inappropriate restriction,
avoiding the need to provide warning information
in vehicles which do not pose an unusual risk of
rollover.

NHTSA has examined the impacts of this new
regulation and determined that this notice does
not qualify as a major regulation within the mean-
ing of Executive Order 12291 or as a significant
regulation under the Department of Transporta-
tion regulatory policies and procedures. The agen-
cy has also determined that the economic and
other impacts of this rule are so minimal that a
regulatory evaluation is not required. The rule
merely exempts a small number of vehicles from
the labeling rule, which imposed minimal costs.
The agency also considered the impacts of this rule
under the percepts of the Regulatory Flexibility
Act. I hereby certify that the regulation will not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. The cost of the required
sticker and information will be extremely small,
and only a small number of vehicles are being ex-
empted. Accordingly, there will be virtually no
economic effect on any small organizations or gov-
ernmental units which purchase utility vehicles.
Moreover, few, if any, vehicle manufacturers
would qualify as small entities under the Act.

In consideration of the foregoing, paragraph
575.105(b) is amended to read as follows:
§575.105 Utility Vehicles

(b) Application. This section applies to multipur-
pose passenger vehicles (other than those which
are passenger car derivatives) which have a wheel-
base of 110 inches or less and special features for
occasional off-road operation ("Utility vehicles").

Issued on August 6, 1984.

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

49 FR 32069
August 10, 1984

PART 575 -PRE 138

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 575

Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards
Effective Dates for Reimplementation of Treadwear Grading

(Docket No. 25; Notice 58)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This rule sets forth the effective
dates for the reimplementation of the treadwear
grading requirements under this agency's Uniform
Tire Quality Grading Standards (UTQGS). Those
requirements were suspended after the agency
found high levels of variability in treadwear test
data and grade assignment practices. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit vacated the agency's suspension of the
treadwear grading requirements on April 24, 1984.

In response to the court, NHTSA published a
notice on August 13, 1984, proposing dates on
which tires would again be required to comply
with the treadwear grading requirements. Subse-
quently, the agency learned that there were some
problems with reimplementing treadwear grading
for bias belted tires by the proposed dates.
Therefore, the agency published a notice on
September 12, 1984, asking for public comment on
what effect, if any, this newly discovered informa-
tion should have on the proposed schedule for
reimplementing treadwear grading for bias belted
tires.

Despite these agency actions to reinstate tread-
wear grading, the U.S. Court of Appeals issued an
order on September 27, 1984, finding NHTSA in
violation of its April 24 order, and directing the
agency to either reinstate the treadwear grading
requirements in full "forthwith" or to apply to that
court for a modification of the mandate and pro
vide a reasonably prompt reimplementation sched-
ule. NHTSA filed an application for a modification
of the mandate on October 11, 1984. On October 31,
1984, the U.S. Court of Appeals granted NHTSA's
application and ordered NHTSA to reimplement

treadwear grading in accordance with the sched-
ule proposed by NHTSA in its October 11 filing.
That same schedule is set forth in this rule.

DATES: In the case of bias ply tires, requirements
that treadwear information be included on paper
labels affixed by tire manufacturers to tire treads
and for the submission of consumer information
brochures to NHTSA for review are reimple-
mented effective December 15, 1984. Those bro-
chures are required to be distributed to prospec-
tive purchasers by tire dealers effective January
15, 1985. Requirements regarding the molding of
treadwear grades on tire sidewalls become effec-
tive again on May 15, 1985.

In the case of bias belted tires, requirements
that treadwear information be included on paper
labels and for the submission of the consumer in-
formation brochures to NHTSA for review are re-
implemented effective March 1, 1985. The bro-
chures must be distributed to prospective purchas-
ers effective April 1, 1985. The requirements re-
garding the molding of treadwear grades on tire
sidewalls become effective again on August 1, 1985.

In the case of radial tires, requirements that
treadwear information be included on paper labels
and for the submission of the consumer informa-
tion brochures to NHTSA for review are reimple-
mented effective April 1, 1985. The brochures
must be distributed to prospective purchasers ef-
fective May 1, 1985. The treadwear grades must be
molded on the sidewall of all new radial tires
manufactured on or after September 1, 1985.

In the case of vehicle manufacturers, the re-
quirements to include treadwear grading informa-
tion in the vehicle consumer information are
reimplemented effective September 1, 1985.

PART 575; PRE 139

The amendments made to the UTQGS by this
rule are effective December 19, 1984. This action is
taken to permit those manufacturers which choose
to do so to comply with the treadwear grading re-
quirements before the mandatory reimplementa-
tion dates listed above.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: NHTSA sus
pended treadwear grading requirements under
the UTQGS at 48 FR 5690. February 7. 1983. This
action was announced after the agency found high
levels of variability in treadwear test results and
in the grade assignment practices of the various
tire manufacturers. This variability resulted in a
substantial likelihood that treadwear information
being provided to the public under this program
would be misleading, i.e., that the assigned grades
could, in many instances, incorrectly rank the ac-
tual treadwear performance of different tires.

On April 24, 1984, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
vacated the agency's suspension of the treadwear
grading requirements in Public Citizen v. Steed,
733 F.2d 93. NHTSA interpreted the court's action
as requiring the agency to reimplement the tread-
wear grading requirements at the earliest reason-
able time. To comply with this interpretation of
the court order, NHTSA published a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking at 49 FR 32238, August 13, 1984.
That proposal set forth the following dates for
reimplementing treadwear grading requirements:

AUGUST 13 SCHEDULE

Bias Ply and Bias
Belted Tires

Radial Tires

Tire manufacturers

complete testing November 15, 1984 June 15, 1985

Affix paper labels and

submit brochures to

NHTSA for review December 15, 1984 July 15, 1985

Distribute brochures

to the public January 15, 1985 August 15, 1985

Modify all molds to
include treadwear

May 15, 1985 December 15. 1985

Include treadwear
grading in vehicle
manufacturer's
consumer information
booklet

September 1, 1985

The reason for proposing different reimple-
mentation dates for bias ply and bias belted tires,
on the one hand, and radial tires, on the other, was
the need to procure new course monitoring tires
(CMT's, for the radial tires. As of that date,
NHTSA believed that its existing supply of bias
ply and bias belted CMT's would be adequate for
testing those tire types. This fact would allow the
manufacturers to begin their testing very quickly,
which would in turn allow the treadwear grading
requirements to be reimplemented more quickly.

However, shortly after publication of that
notice, the agency determined that its existing
supply of bias belted CMT's showed unacceptably
high levels of variability, and concluded that it
would be inappropriate to use such tires as CMT's.
A notice announcing these determinations was
published at 49 FR 35814, September 12, 1984.
This notice asked for public comment on what ef-
fect, if any, this newly discovered information
would have on the dates proposed for the reimple-
mentation of treadwear grading for bias belted
tires.

Despite these agency actions to reimplement
treadwear grading, the U.S. Court of Appeals
issued an order on September 27, 1984, finding the
agency in violation of the court's April 24 order.
The court gave the agency a choice of either im-
mediately reinstating treadwear grading in full,
or, within 14 days of September 27, applying to the
court for a modification of its earlier order and pro-
viding the court with a reasonably prompt
schedule for reimplementing the treadwear
grading requirements.

In accordance with this order, NHTSA applied
for a modification of the court's April 24 mandate
on October 11, 1984. This application was accom-
panied by a proposed schedule for reimplementing
treadwear grading and an affidavit in support
thereof. The schedule which the agency proposed
to the court is shown on the next page.

This schedule was the same as that proposed in
the August 13 notice for reimplementing tread-
wear grading for vehicle manufacturers and for
bias ply tires. However, it accelerated the
reimplementation of treadwear grading by 3 1/2
months from what had been proposed for radial
tires in the August 13 notice, and postponed the
proposed dates for bias belted tires by 2 1/2
months. In formulating this revised schedule,
NHTSA considered all nine comments received on
the August 13 notice, and the one comment it

PART 575; PRE 140

PROPOSED SCHEDULE

Bias Ply Tires Bias Belted Tires Radial Tires

Tire manufacturers
complete testing

November 7, 1984

February 1. 1985

March 1, 1985

Affix paper labels and submit
brochures to NHTSA for review

December 15, 1984

March 1, 1985

April 1, 1985

Distribute brochures to the
public

January 15, 1985

April 1, 1985

May 1. 1985

Modify all molds to include
treadwear

May 15, 1985

August 1, 1985

September 1, 1985

Include treadwear grading in
vehicle manufacturer's consumer
information booklet

September 1. 1985

received on the September 12 notice. The agency
received an additional comment regarding the
September 12 notice on October 12, the comment
closing date for that notice. That additional com-
ment was not considered by the agency in pre-
paring its October 11 application.

The court issued an order on October 31, 1984,
granting NHTSA's application for a modification
of the court's earlier mandate, and ordered the
agency to reimplement treadwear grading accord-
ing to the schedule proposed by the agency in its
October 11 application. This final rule implements
the court's October 31 order.

Comments received on previous notices. As
noted above, all but one of the comments received
in response to the agency's August 13 and
September 12 notices were considered while the
agency formulated the revised schedule for reim-
plementing treadwear grading which was sub-
mitted to the court on October 11. What follows is
a brief explanation of the agency's response to the
more significant comments.

The petitioners in the U.S. Court of Appeals
submitted their motion to enforce judgment,
which they filed with the court, as a comment to
the agency on its August 13 proposed schedule.
The essential allegation of that motion was that
the August 13 schedule was not reasonably
prompt. NHTSA responded to this allegation in
considerable detail in the application and affidavit
in support thereof filed with the court on October

11. Rather than repeat this lengthy response
herein, this rule incorporates by reference the ap-
plication and affidavit filed October 11 as the agen-
cy response to petitioners' comments. Copies of
the application and affidavit are available in
Docket No. 25, Notice 58, and any interested per-
sons are advised to contact the Docket Section to
obtain a copy of those documents.

Several tire manufacturers commented that the
August 13 notice was unclear as to whether the
agency would permit tire manufacturers to modify
their molds to show treadwear grading informa-
tion prior to the dates by which they were re-
quired to modify all their molds. These manufac-
turers stated that they wanted to modify some of
their molds before the effective dates when they
had to have all of their molds modified. This issue
arises because of amendments made to the
UTQGS in connection with the agency's suspen-
sion of the treadwear grading requirements. Since
NHTSA had concluded that there was a substan-
tial likelihood that treadwear information would
be misleading, the UTQGS were amended to pro-
hibit the sidewalls of tires from showing any
treadwear grades. As long as that prohibition, con-
tained in 49 CFR §575.104(i)(2Kii), remains in effect,
tire manufacturers may not legally begin con-
verting their molds to show the treadwear grades
on the sidewalls of their tires.

NHTSA wishes to encourage the manufacturers
to reimplement the treadwear grading require-

PART 575; PRE 141

ments as expeditiously as possible, to comply with
the decision in Public Citizen v. Steed, supra. The
agency intended to allow manufacturers to imple-
ment any of the necessary steps, including not just
the molding of the grades on the sidewall, but also
paper labels and the submission and distribution of
consumer information brochures, as soon as was
feasible. If some requirements can be satisfied by a
particular manufacturer prior to an effective date
specified in this rule, it would serve no interest to
prohibit that manufacturer from disseminating
treadwear grading information to consumers.
Hence, a manufacturer is permitted to comply
with any of these reimplemented treadwear
grading requirements in advance of the effective
dates specified herein. These dates represent the
agency's best judgment as to the earliest dates by
which it would be reasonable to require all tires to
again comply with the treadwear grading re-
quirements. However, manufacturers may comply
with the requirements of this notice sooner than
the mandatory effective dates, if they wish. To
make this intent more clear, a statement has been
added to the DATES section to the effect that the
amendments made by this rule take effect upon
publication. This action immediately removes the
prohibition on molding treadwear grades on the
sidewalls of tires, which was a part of the action
taken by NHTSA in connection with the decision
to suspend treadwear grading.

Most tire manufacturers also indicated that
they could meet the dates proposed in the August
13 notice for reimplementing treadwear grading
for radial tires, albeit "with some difficulty". This
notice accelerates that schedule by shortening the
time available for the agency's completion of its
tasks while retaining the proposed amount of time
following these tasks for the manufacturers to
achieve compliance. This acceleration was made
possible as the result of CMT's being made
available to the agency more quickly, and the agen-
cy accelerating its own testing. The time periods
allowed to the manufacturers for completing each
step of the reimplementation process (3 months
for testing, 1 month to print paper labels and
draft the consumer information brochure to be
submitted to NHTSA for its review, 1 month to
distribute the brochures to all dealers, and 6
months to modify all molds) will require the
manufacturers to move expeditiously, but are
reasonable for completing each of the needed
steps.

One manufacturer asked for additional time in
reimplementing treadwear grading for radial tires
imported from other countries. The comment
stated that there is a logistical problem in shipping
the tires for testing into the U.S., clearing them
through customs, shipping the tires to Texas for
testing, conducting the tests and evaluating the
data, printing the labels in the U.S. and shipping
them overseas, and finally affixing the paper labels
to the tires for sale before shipping them into the
United States to be offered for sale. The comment
concluded by requesting an additional 2 months
period for affixing paper labels to imported radial
tires, and for an additional 1 month to modify all
molds to include the treadwear grade.

NHTSA considered these logistical problems.
However, the agency believes that radial tires to
be imported into the United States can be shipped
early enough so that the tires will be in Texas for
testing very early, since the foreign producers are
well aware of the logistical burdens confronting
them. The testing and analysis for these tires
would then be among the first completed on radial
tires. While the agency agrees that it is more dif-
ficult for manufacturers of imported tires to
reimplement treadwear grading than manufac-
turers of domestic tires, the agency believes that
the time allotted for reimplementing is feasible
and reasonable for all manufacturers. Accordingly,
the schedule set forth in this final rule establishes
the same dates for compliance with radial tire
treadwear grading requirements for both foreign-
and domestically-produced tires.

The comments on the proposed dates for reim-
plementing treadwear grading for bias ply tires all
indicated that those dates were feasible, and those
dates have been adopted as proposed.

Three manufacturers asked in their comments
for an additional month for testing bias belted
tires. That would be the same period of time allot-
ted for testing radial tires. The August 13 notice
proposed to allow only 2 months for testing bias
belted tires, since there are only about 350 bias
belted tire designs. Radial tires, for which 3
months were proposed for testing, are produced in
about 1,400 designs. Hence, the difference in the
number of tires to be tested suggested to NHTSA
that bias belted tire testing could be completed in
less time than would be needed for radial tire
testing. The commenters asking for additional
testing time for bias belted tires did not provide
any evidence that the proposed 2 months for

PART 575; PRE 142

testing bias belted tires was insufficient. Absent
such evidence, NHTSA has no basis for concluding
that the proposed 2-month period for testing is in-
sufficient. Accordingly, this final rule adopts the
proposed 2-month testing period for bias belted
tires.

The only comment addressing the proposed date
for reimplementing treadwear grading re-
quirements for vehicle manufacturers stated that
the proposed September 1, 1985, date was accept-
able as long as the agency had a final rule publish-
ed by March 1, 1985. This rule is published well in
advance of that date.

Impact analyses. NHTSA has determined that
this final rule is neither "major" within the mean-
ing of Executive Order 12291 nor "significant"
within the meaning of the Department of Trans-
portation regulatory policies and procedures. The
treadwear grading is being reimplemented in its
current form as a result of the court decision in
Public Citizen v. Steed, supra, and the dates set
forth herein for reimplementation were ordered to
be established by the same court in its October 31,
1984, order. The agency is required to comply with
those court orders. Most of the analysis in the
regulatory evaluation which accompanied the
agency's suspension of treadwear (Docket No. 25;
Notice 52) is still applicable to this rule. In that
regulatory evaluation, NHTSA estimated that the
costs of treadwear grading were about $10 million
annually to tire manufacturers and brand name
owners. That is equivalent to less than 6 cents per
tire. These costs are well below the level for classi-
fying a rule as a major action. A separate
regulatory evaluation has not been prepared for
this rule, because the costs and impacts of tread-
wear grading set forth in the regulatory evalua-
tion accompanying the suspension of treadwear
grading are still the agency's estimate of the ef-
fects of treadwear grading.

Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the
agency has considered the impacts of this rule on
small entities. I hereby certify that this rule will
not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. Therefore, a
regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.
NHTSA concluded that few, if any, of the manufac-
turers and brand name owners are small entities.
To the extent that any of these parties are small
entities, the additional costs imposed by reimple-
menting treadwear grading for passenger-car tires
are slightly less than 6 cents per tire ($10

million total costs/178 million passenger car tires
produced annually). This does not constitute a
significant economic impact. Small organizations
and small governmental units will be minimally af-
fected in their tire purchases as a result of the
minimal additional costs imposed by reimple-
menting treadwear grading. Further, those
minimal costs will have minimal impacts on the
costs and sales for any tire dealers which might
qualify as small entities.

NHTSA has also considered the environmental
impacts of this rule. While it is possible that
reimplementation of treadwear testing may have
some negative effects on the environment around
the Texas test course in terms of increased fuel
consumption and increased noise and air pollution,
NHTSA has concluded that the environmental con-
sequences of this rule are of such limited scope
that they will clearly not have a significant effect
on the quality of the human environment.

Effective date. As noted above, the amendments
made by this rule are effective as of the date this
rule is published in the Federal Register. NHTSA
has taken this step so that the tire manufacturers
and brand name owners who wish to reimplement
any portion of the treadwear grading require-
ments in advance of the dates by which they are
required to do so may follow that course of action.
Prior to the effective date of these amendments,
§575.104(1) prohibits manufacturers from molding
treadwear grades on the sidewalls of tires.
Manufacturers and brand name owners which are
unable or unwilling to reimplement treadwear
grading in advance of the mandatory compliance
dates specified herein will not be affected by an im-
mediate voluntary compliance date for these
amendments, because they are not required to
reimplement before the mandatory compliance
dates. There is also a public interest in complying
with the court orders as soon as possible. For
these reasons, NHTSA has concluded that there is
good cause for specifying an immediate effective
date for the amendments made by this rule.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR
§575.104 is amended as follows:

1. By revising paragraph (i) and adding new
paragraphs (j), (k), and (1) to read as follows:

(i) Effective dates for treadwear grading re-
quirements for radial tires.

PART 575; PRE 143

(1) Tread wear labeling requirements of §575.104
(dKlKiKBK2) apply to tires manufactured on or after
April 1, 1985.

(2) Requirements for NHTSA review of tread-
wear information in consumer brochures, as
specified in paragraph 575.6(dK2), are effective
April 1. 1985.

(3) Treadwear consumer information brochure
requirements of paragraph 575.6(c) are effective
May 1. 1985.

(6) Treadwear sidewall molding requirements of
§575.104(d)(l)<i)(A) apply to tires manufactured on
or after September 1, 1985.

(j) Effective dates for treadwear grading re-
quirements for bias ply tires.

(1) Treadwear labeling requirements of §575.104
(d)(l)(i)(B)(2) apply to tires manufactured on or after
December 15, 1984.

(2) Requirements for NHTSA review of tread-
wear information in consumer brochures, as
specified in paragraph 575.6(d)(2), are effective
December 15, 1984.

(3) Treadwear consumer information brochure
requirements of paragraph 575.6(c) are effective
January 15, 1985.

(4) Treadwear sidewall molding requirements of
§575.104(d)(l)(i)(A) apply to tires manufactured on
or after May 15, 1985.

(k) Effective dates for treadwear grading re-
quirements for bias belted tires.

(1) Treadwear labeling requirements of §575.104
(d)(l)(i)(B)(2) apply to tires manufactured on or after
March 1, 1985.

(2) Requirements for NHTSA review of tread-
wear information in consumer brochures, as
specified in paragraph 575.6(d)(2), are effective
March 1. 1985.

(3) Treadwear consumer information brochure
requirements of paragraph 575.6(c) are effective
April 1, 1985.

(4) Treadwear sidewall molding requirements of
§575.104(d)(l)(i)(A) apply to tires manufactured on
or after August 1, 1985.

(1) Effective date for treadwear information re-
quirements for vehicle manufacturers.

Vehicle manufacturer treadwear information re-
quirements of §§575.6(a) and 575.104(d)(l)(iii) are ef-
fective September 1, 1985.

2. By deleting Figure 6.

Issued on December 14, 1984.

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

49 F.R. 49293
December 19, 1984

PART 575: PRE 144

PART 575-CONSUMER INFORMATION

SUBPART A— GENERAL

§ 575.1 Scop«.

This part contains Federal Motor Vehicle Con-
sumer Information Regulations established under
section 112(d) of the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. 1401(d))
(hereinafter "the Act").

§ 575.2 Definitions.

(a) Statutory definitions. All terms used in this
part that are defined in section 102 of the Act are
used as defined in the Act.

(b) Motor Vehicle Safety Standard definitions.
Unless otherwise indicated, all terms used in this
part that are defined in the Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards, Part 571 of this subchapter (herein-
after "The Standards") are used as defined in the
Standards without regard to the applicability of a
standard in which a definition is contained.

(c) Definitions used in this part.

"Brake power unit" means a device installed in a
brake system that provides the energy required to
actuate the brakes, either directly or indirectly
through an auxiliary device, with the operator
action consisting only of modulating the energy
application level.

"Lightly loaded vehicle weight" means—

(1) For a passenger car, unloaded vehicle
weight plus 300 pounds (including driver and
instrumentation), with the added weight
distributed in the front seat area.

(2) For a motorcycle, unloaded vehicle weight
plus 200 pounds (including driver and instrumen-
tation), with added weight distributed on the
saddle and in saddle bags or other carrier.

"Maximum loaded vehicle weight" is used as
defined in Standard No. 110.

"Maximum sustained vehicle speed" means
that speed attainable by accelerating at
maximum rate from a standing start for 1 mile.

"Skid number" means the frictional resistance
measured in accordance with American Society for
Testing and Materials Method E-274 at 40 miles
per hour, omitting water delivery as specified in
paragraph 7.1 of that Method.

§ 575.3 Matter Incorporated by reference.

The incorporation by reference provisions of
S 571.5 of this subchapter applies to this part.

§ 575.4 Application.

(a) General. Except as provided in paragraphs
(b) through (d) of this section, each section set forth
in Subpart B of this part applies according to its
terms to motor vehicles and tires manufactured
after the effective date indicated.

(b) Military vehicles. This part does not apply
to motor vehicles or tires sold directly to the
Armed Forces of the United States in conformity
with contractural specifications.

(c) Export. This part does not apply to motor
vehicles or tires intended solely for export and so
labeled or tagged.

(d) Import. This part does not apply to motor
vehicles or tires imported for purposes other than
resale.

§ 575.5 Separability.

If any section established in this part or its ap-
plication to any person or circumstances is held in-
valid, the remainder of the part and the application
of that section to other persons or circumstances is
not affected thereby.

§ 575.6 Requirements.

(a) At the time a motor vehicle is delivered to the
first purchaser for purposes other than resale, the
manufacturer of that vehicle shall provide to that
purchaser, in writing and in the English language,
the information specified in Subpart B of this part

PART 575-1

that is applicable to that vehicle and its tires. The
document provided with a vehicle may contain
more than one table, but the document must either
(1) clearly and unconditionally indicate which of
the tables apply to the vehicle with which it is
provided, or (2) contain a statement on its cover
referring the reader to the vehicle certification
label for specific information concerning which of
the tables apply to that vehicle. If the manufac-
turer chooses option (2), the vehicle certification
label shall include such specific information.

Example 1: Manufacturer X furnishes a document
containing several tables, which apply to various
groups of vehicles that it produces. The document
contains the following notation on its front page:
"The information that applies to this vehicle is
contained in Table 5." The notation satisfies the re-
quirement.

Example 2: Manufacturer Y furnishes a document
containing several tables as in Example 1, with the
following notation on its front page:
Information applies as follows:

Model P. 6-cylinder engine— Table 1.

Model P. 8-cylinder engine— Table 2.

Model Q-Table 3.

This notation does not satisfy the requirement, since
it is conditioned on the model or the equipment of the
vehicle with which the document is furnished, and
therefore additional information is required to select
the proper table.

(b) At the time a motor vehicle tire is delivered
to the first purchaser for a purpose other than
resale, the manufacturer of that tire, or in the case
of a tire marketed under a brand name, the brand
name owner, shall provide to that purchaser the
information specified in Subpart B of this part that
is applicable to that tire.

(c) Each manufacturer of motor vehicles, each
brand name owner of tires, and each manufacturer
of tires for which there is no brand name owner
shall provide for examination by prospective
purchasers, at each location where its vehicles or
tires are offered for sale by a person with whom
the manufacturer or brand name owner has a con-
tractual, proprietary, or other legal relationship,
or by a person who has such a relationship with a
distributor of the manufacturer or brand name
owner concerning the vehicle or tire in question,
the information specified in Subpart B of this part
that is applicable to each of the vehicles or tires
offered for sale at that location. The information
shall be provided without charge and in sufficient
quantity to be available for retention by prospec-
tive purchasers or sent by mail to a prospective
purchaser upon his request. With respect to
newly introduced vehicles or tires, the information
shall be provided for examination by prospective
purchasers not later than the day on which the
manufacturer or brand name owner first
authorizes those vehicles or tires to be put on
general public display and sold to consumers.

This figure indicates braking performance that can be met or exceeded by the vehicles to which it applies, without locking the wheels, under different
conditions of loading and with partial failures of the braking system The information presented represents results obtainable by skilled drivers under
controlled road and vehicle conditions, and the information may not be correct under other conditions

Description of vehicles to which this table applies:

A Fully Operational Service Brake Load

Light
Maximum

B Emergency Service Brakes (with Par-
tial Service Brake System Failure)

C Brake Power Unit Failure

Maximum Load

1 \f^

, J \xf

1 -l/S

0 100 200 300 400 500
Stopping Distance in Feet from 60 mph.

FIGURE 1

PART 575-2

(d) (1) (i) Except as provided in paragraph
(d) (1) (ii) of this section in the case of all sections of
Subpart B, other than § 575.104, as they apply to
information submitted prior to new model intro-
duction, each manufacturer of motor vehicles shall
submit to the Administrator 10 copies of the infor-
mation specified in Subpart B of this part that is ap-
plicable to the vehicles offered for sale, at least 90
days before it is first provided for examination by
prospective purchasers pursuant to paragraph (c) of
this section. (2) In the case of § 575.104, and all
other sections of Subpart B as they apply to post-
introduction changes in information submitted for
the current model year, each manufacturer of motor
vehicles, each brand name owner of tires, and each
manufacturer of tires for which there is no brand
name owner shall submit to the Administrator 10
copies of the information specified in Subpart B of
this part that is applicable to the vehicles or tires of-
fered for sale, at least 30 days before that informa-
tion is first provided for examination by prospective
purchasers pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section,
(ii) Where an unforeseen pre-introduction mod-
ification in vehicle design or equipment results in
a change in vehicle performance for a character-
istic included in Subpart B of this part, a manu-
facturer of motor vehicles may revise information
previously furnished under (d) (1) (i) of this section
by submission to the Administrator of 10 copies of
revised information reflecting the performance
changes, at least 30 days before information on
the subject vehicles is first provided to prospec-
tive purchasers pursuant to paragraph (c) of this
section.
(2) In the case of § 575.104, and all other sec-
tions of Subpart B as they apply to post-introduction
changes in information submitted for the current
model year, each manufacturer of motor vehicles,
each brand name owner of tires, and each manufac-
turer of tires for which there is no brand name
owner shall submit to the Administrator 10 copies of
the information specified in Subpart B of this part
that is applicable to the vehicles or tires offered for
sale, at least 30 days before it is first provided for
examination by prospective purchasers pursuant to
paragraph (c) of this session.

f 575.7 Special vehicles.

A manufacturer who produces vehicles having a
configuration not available for purchase by the
general public need not make available to ineligible
purchasers, pursuant to S 575.6(c), the information
for those vehicles specified in Subpart B of this part,
and shall identify those vehicles when furnishing the
information required by $ 575.6(d).

SUBPART B— CONSUMER INFORMATION ITEMS
§ 575.101 Vehicle stopping distance.

(a) Purpose and scope. This section requires
manufacturers of passenger cars and motorcycles
to provide information on vehicle stopping distances
under specified speed, brake, loading and pavement
conditions.

(b) Applicatwn. This section applies to passenger
cars and motorcycles manufactured on or after
January 1, 1970.

(c) Required information. Each manufacturer
shall furnish the information in (1) through (5)
below, in the form illustrated in Figure 1, except
that with respect to (2) and (3) below, a manufac-
turer whose total motor vehicle production does not
exceed 500 annually is only required to furnish per-
formance information for the loaded condition.
Each motorcycle in the group to which the informa-
tion applies shall be capable, under the conditions
specified in paragraph (d), and utilizing the pro-
cedures specified in paragraph (e), of performing at
least as well as the information indicates. Each
passenger car in the group to which the information
applies shall be capable of performing at least as
well as the information indicates, under the test
conditions and procedures specified in S6 and S7 of
Standard No. 105-75 of this chapter (49 CFR
571.105-75) or, in the case of passenger cars
manufactured before January 1, 1977, and at the
option of the manufacturer, under the conditions
specified in paragraph (d) of this section and the
procedures specified in Paragraph (e) of this section.

If a vehicle is unable to reach the speed of 60 miles
per hour (mph), the maximum sustained vehicle
speed shall be substituted for the 60 mph speed in
the requirements specified below, and in the presen-
tation of information as in Figure 1, with an aster-
isked notation in essentially the following form at
the bottom of the figure: "The maximum speed
attainable by accelerating at maximum rate from a
standing start for 1 mile." The weight requirements
indicated in paragraphs (cX2), (3), and (4) of this sec-
tion are modified for the motorcycles (and at the
option of the manufacturer, in the case of passenger
cars manufactured before January 1, 1977) by the
fuel tank condition specified in paragraph (d) (4) of
this section.

(1) Vehicle description. The group of vehicles
to which the table applies, identified in the terms by
which they are described to the public by the
manufacturer.

(2) Minimum stopping distance tvith fuUy
operational service brake system. The minimum
stopping distance attainable, expressed in feet,

PART 575-3

from 60 mph, using the fully operational service
brake system—

(A) In the case of a motorcycle, at lightly
loaded and maximum loaded vehicle weight;
and

(B) In the case of a passenger car, at lightly
loaded vehicle weight and at gross vehicle
weight rating (GVWR), except for a passenger
car manufactured before January 1, 1977, and
tested, at the option of the manufacturer,
under the conditions and procedures of
paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, which
passenger car shall be tested at lightly loaded
vehicle weight and at maximum loaded vehicle
weight.

(3) Minimum stopping distance with partially
failed service brake system. (Applicable only to
passenger cars with more than one service brake
subsystem.) The minimum stopping distance at-
tainable using the service brake control, ex-
pressed in feet, from 60 mph, for the most
adverse combination of GVWR or lightly loaded
vehicle weight and partial failure as specified in

55.1.2 of Standard No. 105-75 of this chapter.
However, a passenger car manufactured before
January 1, 1977, and tested, at the option of the
manufacturer, under the conditions and pro-
cedures of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section,
shall be tested at maximum loaded vehicle
weight instead of GVWR.

(4) Minimum stopping distance with in-
operative brake power assist unit or brake power
unit. (Applicable only to passenger cars equipped
with brake power assist unit or brake power
unit.) The minimum stopping distance, ex-
pressed in feet, from 60 mph, using the service
brake system, tested in accordance with the re-
quirements of S5.1.3 of Standard No. 105-75 of
this chapter. However, in the case of a passenger
car manufactured before Janaury 1, 1977, vehi-
cle loading may, at the option of the manufac-
turer, be maximum loaded vehicle weight in
place of the GVWR loading specified under

55.1.3 of Standard No. 105-75.

(5) Notice. The following notice: "This figure
indicates braking performance that can be met
or exceeded by the vehicles to which it applies,
without locking the wheels, under different
conditions of loading and with partial failures of
the braking system. The information presented

represents results obtainable by skilled drivers
under controlled road and vehicle conditions, and
the information may not be correct under other
conditions."

(d) Conditions. The data provided in the format
of Figure 1 shall represent a level of performance
that can be equalled or exceeded by each vehicle in
the group to which the table applies, under the
following conditions, utilizing the procedures set
forth in (e) below:

(1) Stops are made without lock-up of any
wheel, except for momentary lock-up caused by
an automatic skid control device.

(2) The tire inflation pressure and other
relevant component adjustments of the vehicle
are made according to the manufacturer's
published recommendations.

(3) For passenger cars, brake pedal force does
not exceed 150 pounds for any brake application.
For motorcycles, hand brake lever force applied
IV4 inches from the outer end of the lever does
not exceed 55 pounds, and foot brake pedal force
does not exceed 90 pounds.

(4) Fuel tank is filled to any level between 90
and 100 percent of capacity.

(5) Transmission is in neutral, or the clutch
disengaged, during the entire deceleration.

(6) The vehicle begins the deceleration in the
center of a straight roadway lane that is 12 feet
wide, and remains in the lane throughout the
deceleration.

(7) The roadway lane has a grade of zero per-
cent, and the road surface has a skid number of
81, as measured in accordance with American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
Method E-274-70 (as revised July, 1974) at 40
mph, omitting the water delivery specified in
paragraphs 7.1 and 7.2 of that Method.

(8) All vehicle openings (doors, windows,
hood, trunk, convertible tops, etc.) are in the
closed position except as required for instrumen-
tation purposes.

(9) Ambient temperature is between 32°F and
100°F.

(10) Wind velocity is zero.
(e) Procedures.

(1) Burnish.

(i) Passenger cars. Burnish brakes once
prior to first stopping distance test by conduct-

PART 575-4

ing 200 stops from 40 mph (or maximum sus-
tained vehicle speed if the vehicle is incapable
of reaching 40 mph) at a deceleration rate of 12
fpsps in normal driving gear, with a cooling in-
terval between stops, accomplished by driving
at 40 mph for a sufficient distance to reduce
brake temperature to 250°F, or for one mile,
whichever occurs first. Readjust brakes ac-
cording to manufacturer's recommendations
after burnishing.

(ii) Motorcycles. Adjust and burnish brakes
in accordance with manufacturer's recommen-
dations. Where no burnishing procedures
have been recommended by the manufacturer,
follow the procedures specified above for
passenger cars, except substitute 30 mph for
40 mph and 150° F for 250°F, and maintain
hand lever force to foot lever force ratio of ap-
proximately 1 to 2.

(2) Ensure that the temperature of the hot-
test service brake is between 130°F and 150°F
prior to the start of all stops (other than bur-
nishing stops), as measured by plug-type ther-
mocouples installed according to SAE Recom-
mended Practice J843a, June 1966.

(3) Measure the stopping distance as specified
in (c) (2), (3), and (4), from the point of applica-
tion of force to the brake control to the point at
which the vehicle reaches a full stop.

truck, or attached to an incomplete vehicle with
motive power, for the purpose of providing shelter
for persons.

"Cargo weight rating" means the value specified
by the manufacturer as the cargo-carrying capac-
ity, in pounds, of a vehicle, exclusive of the weight
of occupants, computed as 150 pounds times the
number of designated seating positions.

"Slide-in camper" means a camper having a
roof, floor and sides, designed to be mounted on
and removable from the cargo area of a truck by
the user.

(e) Requirements. Except as provided in
paragraph (f) of this section each manufacturer of
a truck that is capable of accommodating a slide-in
camper shall furnish the information specified in
(1) through (5) below:

(1) A picture showing the manufacturer's
recommended longitudinal center of gravity
zone for the cargo weight rating in the form il-
lustrated in Figure 1 . The boundaries of the zone
shall be such that when a slide-in camper equal in
weight to the truck's cargo weight rating is in-
stalled, no gross axle weight rating of the truck
is exceeded. Until October 1, 1973 the phrase
"Aft End of Cargo Area" may be used in Figure
1 instead of "Rear End of Truck Bed".

§575.102 [Reserved].

§ 575.103 Truck-camper loading.

(a) Scope. This section requires manufacturers
of trucks that are capable of accommodating slide-
in campers to provide information on the cargo
weight rating and the longitudinal limits within
which the center of gravity for the cargo weight
rating should be located.

(b) Purpose. The purpose of this section is to
provide information that can be used to reduce
overloading and improper load distribution in
truck-camper combinations, in order to prevent ac-
cidents resulting from the adverse effects of these
conditions on vehicle steering and braking.

(c) Application. This section applies to trucks
that are capable of accommodating slide-in
campers.

(d) Definitions. "Camper" means a structure
designed to be mounted in the cargo area of a

HE COMMENDED
lOCAIlON FOR
• ROOCENTEB
F Gft'viTv (O"

FIGURE 1 TRIK:k LOADING INfORMAT I ON

(2) The truck's cargo weight rating.

(3) The statements: "When the truck is used
to carry a slide-in camper, the total cargo load of
the truck consists of the manufacturer's camper
weight figure, the weight of installed additional
camper equipment not included in the manufac-
turer's camper weight figure, the weight of
camper cargo, and the weight of passengers in
the camper. The total cargo load should not ex-

(Rev. 6/7/82)

PART 575-5

ceed the truck's cargo weight rating and the
camper's center of gravity should fall within the
truck's recommended center of gravity zone when
installed." Until October 1, 1973 the phrase "total
load" may be used instead of "total cargo load".

(4) A picture showing the proper match of a
truck and slide-in camper in the form illustrated in
Figure 2.

FIGURE 2 EXAMPLE OF PROPER TRUCK AND CAMPER MATCH

(5) The statements: "Secure loose items to
prevent weight shifts that could affect the balance
of your vehicle. When the truck camper is loaded,
drive to a scale and weigh on the front and on the
rear wheels separately to determine axle loads. In-
dividual axle loads should not exceed either of the
gross axle weight ratings (GAWR). The total of the
axle loads should not exceed the gross vehicle
weight rating (GVWR). These ratings are given on
the vehicle certification label that is located on the
left side of the vehicle, normally the dash, hinge
pillar, door latch post, or door edge next to the
driver. If weight ratings are exceeded, move or
remove items to bring all weights below the
ratings."

(f) If a truck would accommodate a slide-in
camper but the manufacturer of the truck recom-
mends that the truck not be used for that piupose,
the information specified in paragraph (e) shall not
be provided but instead the manufacturer shall
provide a statement that the truck should not be
used to carry a slide-in camper.

§ 575.104 Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards.

(a) Scope. This section requires motor vehicle
and tire manufacturers and tire brand name
owners to provide information indicating the
relative performance of passenger car tires in the
areas of treadwear, traction, and temperature
resistance.

(b) Purpose. The purpose of this section is to
aid the consumer in making an informed choice in
the purchase of passenger car tires.

(c) Application. (1) This section applies to new
pneumatic tires for use on passenger cars.
However, this section does not apply to deep tread,
winter-type snow tires, space-saver or temporary
use spare tires, tires with nominal rim diameters of
10 to 12 inches, or to limited production tires as
defined in paragraph (cX2) of this section.

(2) "Limited production tire" means a tire
meeting all of the following criteria, as applicable:
(i) The annual domestic production or impor-
tation into the United States by the tire's
manufacturer of tires of the same design and
size as the tire does not exceed 15,000 tires;

(ii) In the case of a tire marketed under a
brand name, the annual domestic purchase or
importation into the United States by a brand
name owner of tires of the same design and
size as the tire does not exceed 15,000 tires;

(iii) The tire's size was not listed as a vehicle
manufacturer's recommended tire size designa-
tion for a new motor vehicle produced in or im-
ported into the United States in quantities
greater than 10,000 during the calendar year
preceeding the year of the tire's manufacturer;
and

(iv) The total annual domestic production or
importation into the United States by the tire's
manufacturer, and in the case of a tire manufac-
turer, and in case of a tire marketed under a
brand name, the total annual domestic purchase
or purchase for importation into the United
States by the tire's brand name owner, of tires
meeting the criteria of paragraphs (cX2) (i), (ii),
and (iii) of this section, does not exceed 35,000
tires.
Tire design is the combination of general struc-
tural characteristics, materials, and tread pattern,
but does include cosmetic, identifying or other
minor variations among tires.

(d) Requirements.
(1) Information.

(i) Each manufacturer of tires, or in the case
of tires marketed under a brand name, each
brand name owner, shall provide grading in-
formation for each tire of which he is the
manufacturer or brand name owner in the
manner set forth in paragraphs (d) (1) (i) (A)
and (d) (1) (i) (B) of this section. The grades for
each tire shall be only those specified in
paragraph (d) (2) of this section. Each tire shall
be able to achieve the level of performance
represented by each grade with which it is

PART 575-6

labeled. An individual tire need not, however,
meet further requirements after having been
subjected to the test for any one grade.

(A) Except for a tire line, manufactured
within the first six months of production of
the tire line, each tire shall be graded with
the words, letters, symbols, and figures
specified in paragraph (d) (2) of this section,
permanently molded into or onto the tire
sidewall between the tire's maximum section
width and shoulder in accordance with one of
the methods in Figure 1.

(B) (/) Each tire manufactured before Oc-
tober 1, 1980, other than a tire sold as original
equipment on a new vehicle, shall have affixed
to its tread surface in a manner such that it is
not easily removable a label containing its
grades and other information in the form il-
lustrated in Figure 2, Part II, bearing the
heading "DOT QUALITY GRADES." The
treadwear grade attributed to the tire shall be
either imprinted or indelibly stamped on the
label adjacent to the description of the
treadwear grade. The label shall also depict
all possible grades for traction and temper-
ature resistance. The traction and temper-
ature resistance performance grades attri-
buted to the tire shall be indelibly circled.
However, each tire labeled in conformity with
the requirements of paragraph (dXlXiXBX^)
of this section need not comply with the provi-
sions of this paragraph.

{2) Each tire manufactured on or after
October 1, 1980, other than a tire sold as
original equipment on a new vehicle, shall
have affixed to its tread surface so as not
to be easily removable a label or labels con-
taining its grades and other information in
the form illustrated in Figure 2, Parts I
and II. The treadwear grade attributed to
the tire shall be either imprinted or in-
delibly stamped on the label containing the
material in Part I of Figure 2, directly to
the right of or below the word "TREAD-
WEAR". The traction and temperature
resistance performance grades attributed
to the tire shall be indelibly circled in an ar-
ray of the potential grade letters (ABC)
directly to the right of or below the words
"TRACTION" and "TEMPERATURE"
in Part I of Figure 2. The words "TREAD-
WEAR," "TRACTION," and "TEMPER-
ATURE," in that order, may be laid out

vertically or horizontally. The text part of
Part II of Figure 2 may be printed in
capital letters. The text of Part I and the
text of Part II of Figure 2 need not appear
on the same label, but the edges of the two
texts must be positioned on the tire tread
so as to be separated by a distance of no
more than one inch. If the text of Part I
and the text of Part II are placed on sepa-
rate labels, the notation "See EXPLAN-
ATION OF DOT QUALITY GRADES"
shall be added to the bottom of the Part I
text, and the words "EXPLANATION OF
DOT QUALITY GRADES" shall appear at
the top of the Part II text. The text of
Figure 2 shall be oriented on the tire tread
surface with lines of type running perpen-
dicular to the tread circumference. If a
label bearing a tire size designation is at-
tached to the tire tread surface and the tire
size designation is oriented with lines of
type running perpendicular to the tread
circumference, the text of Figure 2 shall
read in the same direction as the tire size
designation.

(ii) In the case of information required in
accordance with § 575.6(c) to be furnished to
prospective purchasers of motor vehicles and
tires, each vehicle manufacturer and each tire
manufacturer or brand name owner shall as
part of that information list all possible grades
for traction and temperature resistance, and
restate verbatim the explanations for each
performance area specified in Figure 2. The in-
formation need not be in the same format as in
Figure 2. In the case of a tire manufacturer or
brand name owner, the information must in-
dicate clearly and unambiguously the grade in
each performance area for each tire of that
manufacturer or brand name owner offered for
sale at the particular location.

(iii) In the case of information required in
accordance with § 575.6(a) to be furnished to
the first purchaser of a new motor vehicle,
other than a motor vehicle equipped with bias-
ply tires manufactured prior to October 1,
1979, and April 1, 1980, and a radial-ply tire
manufactured prior to October 1, 1980. each
manufacturer of motor vehicles shall as part of
the information list all possible grades for trac-
tion and temperature resistance and restate
verbatim the explanation for each perform-
ance area specified in Figure 2. The informa-

PART 575-7

tion need not be in the format of Figure 2, but it
must contain a statement referring tiie reader
to the tire sidewall for the specific tire grades
for the tires with which the vehicle is equipped.
(2) Performance.

(i) Treadwear. Each tire shall be graded for
treadwear performance with the word
"TREADWEAR" followed by a number of
two of three digits representing the tire's
grade for treadwear, expressed as a percen-
tage of the NHTSA nominal treadwear value,
when tested in accordance with the conditions
and procedures specified in paragraph (e) of
this section. Treadwear grades shall be
multiples of 10 (e.g., 80, 150).

(ii) Traction. Each tire shall be graded for
traction performance with the word "TRAC-
TION," followed by the symbols C, B, or A
(either asterisks or 5-pointed stars) when the
tire is tested in accordance with the conditions
and procedures specified in paragraph (f) of
this section.

(A) The tire shall be graded C when the
adjusted traction coefficient is either:

(1) 0.38 or less when tested in accord-
ance with paragraph (f) (2) of this section
on the asphalt surface specified in
paragraph (f) (1) (i) of this section, or

(2) 0.26 or less when tested in accord-
ance with paragraph (f) (2) of this section
on the concrete surface specified in
paragraph (f) (1) (i) of this section.

(B) The tire may be graded B only when
its adjusted traction coefficient is both:

(1) More than 0.38 when tested in
accordance with paragraph (f) (2) of this
section on the asphalt surface specified in
paragraph (f) (1) (i) of this section, and

(2) More than 0.26 when tested in
accordance with paragraph (f) (2) of this
section on the concrete surface specified in
paragraph (f) (1) (i) of this section.

(C) The tire may be graded A only when
its adjusted traction coefficient is both:

(1) More than 0.47 when tested in accord-
ance with paragraph (f) (2) of this section on
the asphalt surface specified in paragraph
(f) (1) (i) of this section, and

(2) More than 0.35 when tested in accord-
ance with paragraph (f) (2) of this section on
the concrete surface specified in paragraph
(f) (1) (i) of this section.

(iii) Temperature resistance. Each tire shall
be graded for temperature resistance perform-
ance with the word "TEMPERATURE" fol-
lowed by the letter A, B, or C, based on its
performance when the tire is tested in accord-
ance with the procedures specified in paragraph
(g) of this section. A tire shall be considered to
have successfully completed a test stage in
accordance with this paragraph if, at th end of
the test stage, it exhibits no visual evidence of
tread, sidewall, ply, cord, innerliner or bead
separation, chunking, broken cords, cracking or
open splices a defined in § 571.109 of this
chapter, and the tire pressure is not less than
the pressure specified in paragraph (g)(1) of
this section.

(A) The tire shall be graded C if it fails to
complete the 500 rpm test stage specified in
paragraph (g) (9) of this section.

(B) The tire may be graded B only if it
successfully completes the 500 rpm test stage
specified in paragraph (g) (9) of this section.

(C) The tire may be graded A only if it
successfully completes the 575 rpm test stage
specified in paragraph (g) (9) of this section.

(e) Treadwear grading conditions and proce-
dures.— (1) Conditions, (i) Tire treadwear per-
formance is evaluated on a specific roadway course
approximately 400 miles in length, which is
established by the NHTSA both for its own com-
pliance testing and for that of regulated persons.
The course is designed to produce treadwear rates
that are generally representative of those en-
countered in public use for tires of differing con-
struction types. The course and driving procedures
are described in Appendix A to this section.

(ii) Treadwear grades are evaluated by first
measuring the performance of a candidate tire
on the government test course, and then
correcting the projected mileage obtained to ac-
count for environmental variations on the basis
of the performance of course monitoring tires of
the same general construction type (bias, bias-
belted, or radial) run in the same convoy. The
three types of course monitoring tires are made
available by the NHTSA at Goodfellow Air
Force Base, San Angelo, Tex., for purchase by
any persons conducting tests at the test course.

(iii) In convoy tests each vehicle in the same
convoy, except for the lead vehicle, is
throughout the test within human eye range of
the vehicle immediately ahead of it.

(Rev. 6/15/82)

PART 575-8

(iv) A test convoy consists of no more than
four passenger cars, each having only rear-
wheel drive.

[(v) On each convoy vehicle, all tires are
mounted on identical rims of design or measur-
ing rim width specified for tires of that size in
accordance with 49 CFR 571.109, § 4.4.1(a) or
(b), or a rim having a width within - 0 to -k 0.50
inches of the width listed. (47 F.R. 25931-June
15, 1982. Effective: June 15, 1982)1

(2) Treadwear grading procedure, (i) Equip a
convoy with course monitoring and candidate tires
of the same construction type. Place four course
monitoring tires on one vehicle. On each other
vehicle, place four candidate tires that are identical
with respect to with identical size designations. On
each axle, manufacturer and line.

(ii) Inflate each candidate and each course

monitoring tire the applicable pressure in

Table 1 of this section,
[(iii) Load each vehicle so that the load on

each course monitoring and candidate tire is 85

percent of the test load specified in § 575.104(h).

(47 F.R. 25931-June 15, 1982. Effective: June

15, 1982)1

(iv) Adjust wheel alignment to that specified
by the vehicle manfuacturer.

(v) Subject candidate and course monitoring
tires to "break-in" by running the tires in con-
voy for two circuits of the test roadway (800
miles). At the end of the first circuit, rotate
each vehicle's tires by moving each front tire
to the same side of the rear axle and each rear
tire to the opposite side of the front axle.

(vi) After break-in, allow the tires to cool to
the inflation pressure specified in paragraph
(e) (2) (ii) of this section or for 2 hours,
whichever occurs first. Measure, to the nearest
0.001 inch, the tread depth of each candidate
and course monitoring tire, avoiding tread-
wear indicators, at six equally spaced points in
each groove. For each tire compute the
average of the measurements. Do not include
those shoulder grooves which are not provided
with treadwear indicators.

(vii) Adjust wheel alignment to the manufac-
turer's specifications.

(viii) Drive the convoy on the test roadway
for 6,400 miles. After each 800 miles:

(A) Following the procedure set out in
paragraph (e) (2) (vi) of this section, allow

the tires to cool and measure the average
tread depth of each tire;

(B) Rotate each vehicle's tires by moving
each front tire to the same side of the rear
axle and each rear tire to the opposite side of
the front axle.

(C) Rotate the vehicles in the convoy by
moving the last vehicle to the lead position.
Do not rotate driver position within the
convoy.

(D) Adjust wheel alignment to the vehicle
manufacturer's specifications, if necessary.

(ix) Determine the projected mileage for
each candidate tire as follows:

(A) For each course monitoring and can-
didate tire in the convoy, using the average
tread depth measurements obtained in
accordance with paragraphs (e) (2) (vi) of this
section and the corresponding mileages as
data points, apply the method of least squares
as described in Appendix C of this section to
determine the estimated regression line of y
on X given by the following formula:

y = a + bx

1000

where:
y = average tread depth in mils,
x = miles after break-in,
a = y intercept of regression line (reference tread

depth) in mils, calculated using the method of least

squares; and

b = the slope of the regression line in mils of tread
depth per 1,000 miles, calculated using the method
of least squares. This slope will be negative in
value. The tire's wear rate is defined as the ab-
solute value of the slope of the regression line.

(B) Average the wear rates of the four
course monitoring tires as determined in ac-
cordance with paragraph (e) (2) (ix) (A) of
this section.

(C) Determine the course severity adjust-
ment factor by dividing the base wear rate
for the course monitoring tire (see note
below) by the average wear rate for the four
course monitoring tires determined in ac-
cordance with paragraph (e) (2) (ix) (B) of
this section.

NOTE.-The base wear rates for the course
monitoring tires will be furnished to the
purchaser at the time of purchase.

(R«v. 6/1S/82)

PART 575-9

(D) Determine the adjusted wear rate for
each candidate tire by multiplying its wear
rate determined in accordance with para-
graph (e) (2) (ix) (A) of this section by the
course severity adjustment factor deter-
mined in accordance with paragraph
(e) (2) (ix) (C) of this section.

(E) Determine the projected mileage for
each candidate tire using the following
formula:

1000 (a -62)

-h800

Projected mileage =

o

where:

a = y intercept of regression line (reference tread depth)
for the candidate tire as determined in accordance
with paragraph (e) (2) (ix) (A) of this section.

b' = the adjusted wear rate for the candidate tire as
determined in accordance with paragraph
(e) (2) (ix) (D) of this section.

(F) Compute the percentage of the
NHTSA nominal treadwear value for each
candidate tire using the following formula:

p _ Projected Mileage
30,000

xlOO

Round off the percentage to the nearest
lower 10% increment.

(f) Traction grading conditions and proce-
dures.—(1) Conditions, (i) Tire traction perform-
ance is evaluated on skid pads that are established,
and whose severity is monitored, by the NHTSA
both for its compliance testing and for that of reg-
ulated persons. The test pavements are asphalt and
concrete surfaces constructed in accordance with
the specifications for pads "C" and "A" in the
"Manual for the Construction and Maintenance of
Skid Surfaces," National Technical Information
Service No. DOT-HS-800-814. The surfaces have
locked wheel traction coefficients when evaluated in
accordance with paragraphs (f) (2) (i) through
(f)(2)(vii) of this section of 0.50 ±0.10 for the
asphalt and 0.35 ±0.10 for the concrete. The loca-
tion of the skid pads is described in Appendix B to
this section.

(ii) The standard tire is the American Society
for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E 501 "Stand-
ard Tire for Pavement Skid Resistance Tests."
(iii) The pavement surface is wetted in ac-
cordance with paragraph 3.5, "Pavement Wet-
ting System," of ATSM Method E 274-[791,
"Skid Resistance of Paved Surfaces Using a
FuU-Scale Tire."

(iv) The test apparatus is a test trailer built
in conformity with the specifications in
paragraph 3, "Apparatus," of ASTM Method
E 274-[791, and instrumented in accordance
with paragraph 3.3.2 of that Method, except
that "wheel load" in paragraph 3.2.2 and tire
and rim specifications in paragraph 3.2.3 of
that Method are as specified in the procedures
in paragraph (f) (2) of this section for standard
and candidate tires.

(v) The test apparatus is calibrated in ac-
cordance with ASTM Method F 377-74,
"Standard Method for Calibration of Braking
Force for Testing of Pneumatic Tires" with
the trailer's tires inflated to 24 psi and loaded
to 1,085 pounds.

(vi) Consecutive tests on the same surface
are conducted not less than 30 seconds apart.

(vii) A standard tire is discarded in accord-
ance with ASTM Method E 501.

(2) Procedure, (i) Prepare two standard tires
as follows:

(A) Condition the tires by running them
for 200 miles on a pavement surface.

(B) Mount each tire on a rim of design or
measuring rim width specified for tires of its
size in accordance with 49 CFR 571.109,
§ 4.4.1(a) or (b), or a rim having a width
within -0 to -1-0.50 inches of the width
listed. Then inflate the tire to 24 psi, or, in
the case of a tire with inflation pressure
measured in kilopascals, to 180 kPa.

(C) Statically balance each tire-rim com-
bination.

(D) Allow each tire to cool to ambient
temperature and readjust its inflation pres-
sure to 24 psi, or, in the case of a tire with in-
flation pressure measured in kilopascals, to
180 kPa.

(ii) Mount the tires on the test apparatus
described in paragraph (f) (1) (iv) of this sec-
tion and load each tire to 1,085 pounds.

(iii) Tow the trailer on the asphalt test sur-
face specified in paragraph (f) (1) (i) of this sec-
tion at a speed of 40 mph, lock one trailer
wheel, and record the locked- wheel traction
coefficient on the tire associated with that
wheel between 0.5 and 1.5 seconds after
lockup.

(Rev. 3/9/84)

PART 575-10

\*

ss*

*^*

^^,,^CTONB rf»,p,^^^^

Curvaiur* lo
Suit Mold

±

'^e

TREADWEAR 160 _^ |
TRACTION B "^ ""

TEMPERATURE B ^ i

^^<:
^

SAMPLE
Quihiv GrM

Curv^tufe to
Suit Mold

Locale Qudiiiy gtadci Miween the
shoulder and Ihe fnanmum leciion
width

Note The qualiTv gradsi ihall tie m

Fuiura Bold Modified Condensed or
Goihtc character! perrndnently molded
I 020 lo 040 dmpi mto or onto the
lire IS irtdicaled

Figure 2

[Part 1] DOT Quality Grades

Treadwear

The treadwear grade is a comparative rating based on the wear rate of the tire when tested under controlled conditions
on a specified government test course. For example, a tire graded 150 would wear one and a half (IVz) times as well on
the government course as a tire graded 100. The relative performance of tires depends upon the actual conditions of
their use, however, and may depart significantly from the norm due to variations in driving habits, service practices,
and differences in road characteristics and climate.

Traction

The traction grades, from highest to lowest, are A, B, and C, and they represent the tire's ability to stop on wet
pavements as measured under controlled conditions on specified government test surfaces of asphalt and concrete. A
tire marked C may have poor traction performance. WARNING: The traction grade assigned to this tire is based on
braking (straightahead) traction tests and does not included cornering (turning) traction.

Temperature

The temperature grades of A (the highest), B, and C, representing the tire's resistance to the generation of heat and its
ability to dissipate heat when tested under controlled conditions on a specified indoor laboratory test wheel. Sustained
high temperature can cause the material of the tire to degenerate and reduce tire life, and excessive temperature can
lead to sudden tire failure. The grade C corresponds to a level of performance which all passenger car tires must meet
under the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 109. Grades B and A represent higher levels of performance on
the laboratory test wheel than the minimum required by law. WARNING: The temperature grade for this tire is
established for a tire that is properly inflated and not overloaded. Excessive speed, under-inflation, or excessive
loading either separately or in combination, can cause heat buildup and possible tire failure.
[Fart II] All Passenger Car Tires Must Conform to Federal Safety Requirements in Addition to These Grades.

(Rev. 6/15/82)

PART 575-11

(iv) Repeat the test on the concr^'te surface,
locking the same wheel.

(v) Repeat the tests specified in paragraphs
(f) (2) (iii) and (f) (2) (iv) of this section for a
total of 10 measurements on each test surface.

(vi) Repeat the procedures specified in para-
graphs (f) (2) (iii) through (f) (2) (v) of this section,
locking the wheel associated with the other tire.

(vii) Average the 20 measurements tJiken on
the asphalt surface to find the standard tire trac-
tion coefficient for the asphalt surface. Average
the 20 measurements taken on the concrete sur-
face to find the standard tire traction coefficient
for the concrete surface. The standard tire trac-
tion coefficient so determined may be used in the
computation of adjusted traction coefficients for
more than one candidate tire.

(viii) Prepare two candidate tires of the same
construction type, manufacturer, line, and size
designation in accordance with paragraph (f) (2)
(i) of this section, mount them on the test ap-
paratus, and test one of them according to the
procedures of paragraph (f) (2) (ii) through (v) of
this section, except load each tire to 85% of the
test load specified in § 575.104(h).

(ix) Compute a candidate tire's adjusted
traction coefficient for asphalt (/la) by the
following formula:

/la = Measured candidate tire coefficient for
asphalt +0.50

- Measured standard tire coefficient for asphalt

(x) Compute a candidate tire's adjusted trac-
tion coefficient for concrete (/ig) by the follow-
ing formula:

/ip = Measured candidate tire coefficient for con-
crete + 0.35

- Measured standard tire coefficient for concrete

(g) Temperature resistance grading. (1) Mount
the tire on a rim of design or measuring rim width
specified for tires of its size in accordance with 49
CFR 571.109, § 4.4.1(a) or (b) CFR 571.109,
§ 4.4.1(a) or (b) and inflate it to the applicable
pressure specified in Table 1 of this section.

(2) Condition the tire-rim assembly to any
temperature up to 95°F for at least 3 hours.

(3) Adjust the pressure again to the applicable
pressure specified in Table 1 of this section.

(4) Mount the tire-rim assembly on an axle,
and press the tire tread against the surface of a
flat-faced steel test wheel that is 67.23 inches in
diameter and at least as vdde as the section
width of the tire.

(5) During the test, including the pressure
measurements specified in paragraphs (g) (1)
and (g) (3) of this section, maintain the
temperature of the ambient air, as measured 12
inches from the edge of the rim flange at any
point on the circumference on either side of the
tire at any temperature up to 95°F. Locate the
temperature sensor so that its readings are not
affected by heat radiation, drafts, variations in
the temperature of the surrounding air, or
guards or other devices.

(6) [Press the tire against the test wheel with a
load of 88 percent of the tire's maximum load
rating as marked on the tire sidewall. (48 F.R.
8929-March 9, 1984. Effective: July 1, 1984)1

(7) Rotate the test wheel at 250 rpm for 2
hours.

(8) Remove the load, allow the tire to cool to
95°F or for 2 hours, whichever occurs last, and
readjust the inflation pressure to the appHcable
pressure specified in Table 1 of this section.

Table 1.— Test Inflation Pressures

Maximum permissible
inflation pressure

32
lb/in'

36

lb/in'

Pressure to be used in tests for treadwear
treadwear and in determination of tire
load for temperature resistance testing

Pressure to be used for all aspects of
aspects of temperature resistance testing
other than determination of tire load

24

30

28

34

lb/in'

32

38

no

kPa

280
kPa

300
kPa

180

220

220

260

180

220

(Rev. 3/9/84)

PART 575-12

(9) Reapply the load and without interruption
or readjustment of inflation pressure, rotate the
test wheel at 375 rpm for 30 minutes, and then at
successively higher rates in 25 rpm increments,
each for 30 minutes, until the tire has run at 575
rpm for 30 minutes, or to failure, whichever oc-
curs first.

(h) Determinationoftestload.Kl) To determine
test loads for purposes of paragraphs (e) (2) (iii)
and (f) (2) (viii), follow the procedure set forth in
paragraphs (h) (2) through (5) of this section. (48
F.R. 8929-March 9, 1984. Effective: July 1, 1984)1

(2) Determine the tire's maximum inflation
pressure and maximum load rating both as
specified on the tire's sidewall.

(3) Determine the appropriate multiplier cor-
responding to the tire's maximum inflation
pressure, as set forth in Table 2.

(4) Multiply the tire's maximum load rating by
the multiplier determined in paragraph (3). This
is the tire's calculated load.

(5) Round the product determined in para-
graph (4) (the calculated load) to the nearest

multiple of ten pounds or, if metric units are
used, 5 kilograms. For example, 903 pounds
would be rounded to 900 and 533 kilograms
would be rounded to 535. This figure is the test
load.

TABLE 2*

Maximum infla-

Multiplier to be
used for treadwear

Multiplier to
be used for

tion pressure

testing

traction testing

32 psi

.851

.851

36 psi

.870

.797

40 psi

.883

.753

240 psi

.866

.866

280 psi

.887

.804

300 psi

.866

.866

* NOTE: Prior to July 1, 1984, the multipliers in the above
table are not to be used in determining loads for the tire size
designations listed below in Table 2A. For those designations,
the load specifications in that table shall be used in UTQG
testing during that period. These loads are the actual loads at
which testing shall be conducted and should not be multiplied by
the 85 percent factors specified for treadwear and traction
testing.

Table 2A

Tire Size Designation

Temp Resistance

Max Pressure

Traction

S2

S6

iO

Treadwear

Max Pressure

(48 F.R. 8929-March 9, 1984. Effective: July 1, 1984)1
(R.V. 3/9/84) PART 575-13

ss

36

iO

145/70

R13

615

650

685

523

523

553

582

155/70

R13

705

740

780

599

599

629

663

165/70

R13

795

835

880

676

676

710

748

175/70

R13

890

935

980

757

757

795

833

185/70

R13

990

1040

1090

842

842

884

926

195/70

R13

1100

1155

1210

935

935

982

1029

155/70

R14

740

780

815

629

629

663

693

175/70

R14

925

975

1025

786

786

829

871

185/70

R14

1045

1100

1155

888

888

935

982

195/70

R14

1155

1220

1280

982

982

1037

1088

155/70

R15

770

810

850

655

655

689

723

175/70

R15

990

1040

1090

842

842

884

927

185/70

R15

1100

1155

1210

935

935

982

1029

5.60-13

725

810

880

616

616

689

748

[5.20-14

695

785

855

591

591

667

727

165-15

915

1015

1105

779

779

863

939

185/60

R13

845

915

980

719

719

778

833

[(i) Effective dates for treadwear grading
requirements for radial tires.

(1) Treadwear labeling requirements of §575.104
(d)(l)(i)(B)(2) apply to tires manufactured on or
after April 1, 1985.

(2) Requirements for NHTSA review of tread-
wear information in consumer brochures, as
specified in paragraph 575.6(d)(2), are effective
April 1, 1985.

(3) Treadwear consumer information brochure
requirements of paragraph 575.6(c) are effective
May 1, 1985.

(6) Treadwear sidewall molding requirements of
§575.104(d)(l)(i)(A) apply to tires manufactured
on or after September 1, 1985.

(j) Effective dates for treadwear grading require-
ments for bias ply tires.

(1) Treadwear labeling requirements of §575.104
(d)(l)(i)(B)(2) apply to tires manufactured on or
after December 15, 1984.

(2) Requirements for NHTSA review of
treadwear information in consumer brochures,
as specified in paragraph 575.6(d)(2), are effec-
tive December 15, 1984.

(3) Treadwear consumer information brochure
requirements of paragraph 575.6(c) are effective
January 15, 1985.

(4) Treadwear sidewall molding requirements of
§575.104(d)(l)(i)(A) apply to tires manufactured
on or after May 15, 1985.

(k) Effective dates for treadwear grading re-
quirements for bias belted tires.

(1) Treadwear labeling requirements of §575.104
(d)(l)(i)(B)(2) apply to tires manufactured on or
after March 1, 1985.

(2) Requirements for NHTSA review of treadwear
information in consumer brochures, as specified in
paragraph 575.6(d)(2), are effective March 1, 1985.

(3) Treadwear consumer information brochure re-
quirements of paragraph 575.6(c) are effective
April 1, 1985.

(4) Treadwear sidewall molding requirements of
§575.104(d)(l)(i)(A) apply to tires manufactured on
or after August 1, 1985.

(1) Effective date for treadwear information re-
quirements for vehicle manufacturers.

Vehicle manufacturer treadwear information
requirements of §§575. 6(a) and 575.104(d)(l)(iii)
are effective September 1, 1985. (49 F.R. 49293-

December 19, 1984. Effective: see Preamble to
Docket No. 25; Notice 58)]

§575.105 Utility Vehicles

(a) Purpose and scope. This section requires
manufacturers of utility vehicles to alert drivers
that the particular handling and manuvering
characteristics of utility vehicles require special
driving practices when those vehicles are operated
on paved roads.

(b) Application. This section applies to
multipurpose passenger vehicles (other than those
which are passenger car derivatives) which have a
wheelbase of 110 inches or less and special features
for occasional off-road operation ("Utility
vehicles").

(c) Required information. Each manufacturer
shall prepare and affix a vehicle sticker as specified
in paragraph 1 of this subsection and shall provide
in the vehicle Owner's Manual the information
specified in paragraph 2 of this subsection.

(1) A sticker shall be permanently affixed to
the instrument panel, windshield frame,
driver's side sun visor, or in some other loca-
tion in each vehicle prominent and visible to
the driver. The sticker shall be printed in a
typeface and color which are clear and con-
spicuous. The sticker shall have the following
or similar language:

This is a multipurpose passenger vehicle which
will handle and maneuver differently from an or-
dinary passenger car, in driving conditions which
may occur on streets and highways and off road.
As with other vehicles of this type, if you make
sharp turns or abrupt maneuvers, the vehicle
may rollover or may go out of control and crash.
You should read driving guidelines and instruc-
tions in the Owner's Manual, and WEAR YOU
SEATBELTS AT ALL TIMES.

The language on the sticker required by
paragraph (1) and in the Owner's Manual, as re-
quired in paragraph (2), may be modified as is
desired by the manufacturer to make it appro-
priate for a specific vehicle design, to ensure that
consumers are adequately informed concerning
the unique propensities of a particular vehicle
model.

(Rev. 12/19/84)

PART 575-14

(2) (i) The vehicle Owner's Manual shall include
the following statement in its introduction.

As with other vehicles of this type, failure to
operate this vehicle correctly may result in loss of
control or an accident. Be sure to read "on-
pavement" and "off-road" driving guidelines
which follow.

(ii) The vehicle Owner's Manual shall include

the following or similar statement:

Utility vehicles have higher ground clearance
and a narrower track to make them capable of
performing in a wide variety of off-road applica-
tions. Specific design characteristics give them a
higher center of gravity than ordinary cars. An
advantage of the higher ground clearance is a

better view of the road allowing you to an-
ticipate problems. They are not designed for
cornering at the same speeds as conventional
2-wheel drive vehicles any more than low-slung
sports cars are designed to perform satisfac-
torily under off-road conditions. If at all possi-
ble, avoid sharp turns or abrupt maneuvers. As
with other vehicles of this type, failure to
operate this vehicle correctly may result in loss
of control or vehicle rollover.

§ 575.106 Deleted

34 F.R. 8112
May 23, 1969

PART 575-15-16

APPENDIX A

Treadwear Test Course and
Driving Procedures

INTRODUCTION

The test course consists of three loops of a
total of 400 miles in the geographical vicinity
of Gk)odfellow AFB, San Angelo, Texas.

The first loop runs south 143 miles through the
cities of Eldorado, Sonora, and Juno, Texas, to
the Camp Hudson Historical Marker, and re-
turns by the same route.

The second loop runs east over Farm and
Ranch Roads (FM) and returns to its starting
point.

The third loop runs northwest to Water Val-
ley, northeast toward Robert Lee and returns via
Texas 208 to the vicinity of Goodfellow AFB.

ROUTE

The route is shown in Figure 3. The table
identifies key points by number. These numbers
are encircled in Figure 3 and in parentheses in
the descriptive material that follows.

Southern Loop

The course begins at the intersection (1) of
Ft. McKavitt Road and Paint Rock Road
(FM 388) at the northwest corner of Goodfellow
AFB.

Drive east via FM 388 to junction with Loop
Road 306 (2). Turn right onto Loop Road 306
and proceed south to junction with US 277 (3).
Turn onto US 277 and proceed south through
Eldorado and Sonora (4), continuing on US 277
to junction with FM 189 (5). Turn right onto
FM 189 and proceed to junction with Texas 163
(6). Turn left onto Texas 163, proceed south
to Camp Hudson Historical Marker (7) and onto
the paved shoulder. Reverse route to junction of
Loop Road 306 and FM 388 (2).

Eastern Loop

From junction of Loop Road 306 and FM 388
(2) make right turn onto FM 388 and drive east
to junction with FM 2334 (13). Turn right onto
FM 2334 and proceed south across FM 765 (14)
to junction of FM 2334 and US 87 (15). Make
U-turn and return to junction of FM 388 and
Loop Road 306 (2) by the same route.

^^ ROBERT LtE

WATER VALLEY

AVENUE C ICONVOV OATEI -^^liJirjjg] J^ @

GOODFELLOft AIR FORCE BASE -^^/jpg^ K-^ll^

SAN ANGELO TEXAS (TT^ l^t^

N

. CAMP HUDSON SITE

Northwestern Loop

From junction of Loop Road 306 and FM 388
(2), make right turn onto Loop Road 306. Pro-
ceed onto US 277, to junction with FM 210.5(8).
Turn left onto FM 2105 and proceed west to junc-
tion with US 87 (10). Turn right on US 87 and
proceed northwest to the junction with FM 2034
near the town of Water Valley (11). Turn right

PART 575-17

onto FM 2034 and proceed north to Texas 208
(12). Turn right onto Texas 208 and proceed
south to junction with FM 2105 (9). Turn left
onto FM 2105 and proceed east to junction with
US 277 (8). Turn right onto US 277 and proceed
south onto 306 to junction with 388 (2). Turn
right onto 388 and proceed to starting point at
junction of Ft. McKavitt Road and FM 388 (1).

DRIVING INSTRUCTIONS

The drivers shall run at posted speed limits
throughout the course unless an unsafe condition
arises. If such condition arises, the speed should
be reduced to the maximum safe operating speed.

BRAKING PROCEDURES AT STOP SIGNS

There are a number of intersections at which
stops are required. At each of these intersections
a series of signs is placed in a fixed order as
follows:

Sign Legend
Highway Intersection 1000 (or 2000) Feet

STOP AHEAD
Junction XXX
Direction Sign (Mereta— )
STOP or YIELD

PROCEDURES

1. Approach each intersection at the posted
speed limit.

2. When abreast of the S T 0 P AHEAD sign,
apply the brakes so that the vehicle decelerates
smoothly to 20 mph when abreast of the direction
sign.

3. Come to a complete stop at the STOP sign
or behind any vehicle already stopped.

KEY POINTS ALONG TREADWEAR

TEST COURSE, APPROX. MILEAGES,

AND REMARKS

Mileages Remarks

1 Ft. McKavitt Road &

0

FM388

2 FM388 & Loop 306 .

3

STOP

3 Loop 306 & US277 .

10

4 Sonora

72
88

5 US277&FM189 ..

6 FM 189 & Texas 163

124

7 Historical Marker . .

143

U-TURN

(Camp Hudson)

4 Sonora

214
276

3 Loop 306 & US 277.

2 FM 388 & Loop 306

283

13 FM 388 &FM 2334.

290

STOP

14 FM 2334 & FM 765 .

292

STOP

15 FM 2334 & US 87 . .

295

U-TURN

14 FM 2334 & FM 765 .

298

STOP

13 FM 388 & FM 2334 .

300

STOP/YIELD/
BLINKING RED
LIGHT

2 FM 388 & Loop 306

307

STOP/YIELD/
BLINKING RED
LIGHT

8 US 277 &FM 2105 .

313

9 FM 2105 & Texas 208

317

STOP

10 FM2105&US87 ..

320

STOP

11 FM2034&US87 ..

338

12 FM 2034 & Texas 208

362

YIELD

9 FM 2105 & Texas 208

387

8 FM 2105 & US 277 .

391

YIELD/ STOP

2 FM 388 & Loop 306

397

1 Ft. McKavitt Road &

400

FM388

PART 575-18

APPENDIX B

Traction Skid Pads

Two skid pads have been laid on an un-
used runway and taxi strip on Goodfellow AFB.
Their location is shown in Figure 4.

The asphalt skid pad is 600 ft x 60 ft and is
shown in black on the runway in Figure 4. The
pad is approached from either end by a 75 ft
ramp followed by 100 ft. of level pavement.
This arrangement permits the skid trailers to
stabilize before reaching the test area. The ap-

proaches are shown on the figure by the hash-
marked area.

The concrete pad is 600 ft x 48 ft and is on
the taxi strip. The approaches to the concrete
pad are of the same design as those for the
asphalt pads.

A two lane asphalt road has been built to con-
nect the runway and taxi strip. The road is
parallel to the northeast-southwest runway at a
distance of 100 ft. The curves have super-eleva-
tion to permit safe exit from the runway at op-
erating speeds.

CONCRETE SNO
PAVEMENT

FIGURE 4

PART 575-19-20

APPENDIX C
Method Of Least Squares

The method of least squares is a method of
calculation by which it is possible to obtain a
reliable estimate of a true physical relationship
from a set of data which involve random error.
The method may be used to establish a regres-
sion line that minimizes the sum of the squares
of the deviations of the measured data points
from the line. The regression line is conse-
quently described as the line of "best fit" to the

data points. It is described in terms of its slope
and its "y" intercept.

The graph in Figure 5 depicts a regression
line calculated using the least squares method
from data collected from a hypothetical tread-
wear test of 6,400 miles, with tread depth meas-
urements made at every 800 miles.

In this graph, (xj, yj) [j = 0, 1,...8] are the
individual data points representing the tread
depth measurements (the overall average for the
tire with 6 measurements in each tire groove)
at the beginning of the test (after break-in and
at the end of each 800-mile segment of the test.

w

0.
UJ

a

o
<
lij

(xo.Yo)

• (xg.ye)

• ("e-ye'

(xs.vs)

X

-L

800 1600 2400 3200 4000

MILES

4800

5600

6400 X

Figure 5

PART 575-21

The absolute value of the slope of the regres- The "y" intercept of the regression line (a)

sion line is an expression of the mils of tread in mils is calculated by the following formula:
worn per 1,000 miles, and is calculated by the
following formula:

b= 1000

iJ=0 j = 0 j = 0

1-^ - 1

j = 0

' (?)

8 8

a =

r^ 1 _ _ 1 ^9 Z^i " 90W) Z^i

(Rev. 12/19/84) PART 575-22

EINcDv*: Auguit 15, 1974

PREAMBLE TO PART 576— RECORD RETENTION
(Docket No. 74-31; Notice 1)

This notice establishes an immediate temporary
requirement for retention by motor vehicle manu-
facturers of records concerning malfunctions
that may be related to motor vehicle safety.

By a separate notice published today, 39 FR
30048, the NHTSA proposes to establish perma-
nent requirements for the retention of records
by manufacturers. The proposed rule would
require motor vehicle manufacturers to retain
for 5 years all records in their possession relating
to failures, malfunctions, or flaws that could be
a causative factor in accidents or injuries. These
records are needed in agency investigations of
possible defects related to motor vehicle safety,
or of nonconformity to the safety standards and
regulations. A fuller discussion of the proposal
is contained in that notice.

The NHTSA finds it important that existing
records and those that may be generated or ac-
quired while this rulemaking is under considera-
tion not be disposed of prior to the permanent
effectiveness of the rule. In order to maintain
the status quo, therefore, this rule is issued to be

effective immediately upon posting for public
inspection at the Federal Register. For the
reasons stated, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b),
notice and public procedure thereon with respect
to this interim notice are found to be imprac-
ticable and contrary to the public interest. This
rule in its present form will be effective only
until action is taken upon the proposed perma-
nent rule issued concurrently.

In light of the foregoing, a new Part 576,
Record Retention, is added to Title 49, Code of
Federal Regulations.

Effective date : August 15, 1974.

AUTHORITY: Sec. 108, 112, 113, 119, Pub. L.
89-563, 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. 1397, 1401, 1402,
1407; delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.51.

Issued on August 13, 1974.

James B. Gregory
Administrator
39 F.R. 30045
August 20, 1974

PART 57ft— PRE 1-2

PART 576- RECORD RETENTION
(Docket No. 74-13; Notice 1)

Sec.

576.1 Scope.

576.2 Purpose.

576.3 Application.

576.4 Definitions.

576.5 Basic Requirement.

576.6 Records.

576.7 Retention.

576.8 Malfunctions Covered.

§ 576.1 Scope. This part establishes require-
ments for the retention by motor vehicle manu-
facturers of complaints, reports, and other
records concerning motor vehicle malfunctions
that may be related to motor vehicle safety.

§ 576.2 Purpose. The purpose of this part
is to preserve records that are needed for the
proper investigation, and adjudication or other
disposition, of possible defects related to motor
vehicle safety and instances of nonconformity
to the motor vehicle safety standards and asso-
ciated regulations.

§ 576.3 Application. This part applies to all
manufacturers of motor vehicles, with respect to
all records generated or acquired after August
15, 1969.

§ 576.4 Definitions. All terms in this part
that are defined in the Act are used as defined
therein.

§ 576.5 Basic Requirements. Each manufac-
turer of motor vehicles shall retain as specified
in 5 576.7 all records described in § 576.6 for a
period of 5 years from the date on which they
were generated or acquired by the manufacturer.

§ 576.6 Records. Records to be retained by
manufacturers under this part include all docu-
mentary materials, films, tapes, and other infor-
mation-storing media that contain information
concerning malfunctions that may be related to
motor vehicle safety. Such records include, but
are not limited to, communications from vehicle
users and memoranda of user complaints; reports
and other documents related to work performed
under, or claims made under, warranties; service
reports or similar documents from dealers or
manufacturer's field personnel; and any lists,
compilations, analyses, or discussions of such
malfunctions contained in internal or external
correspondence of the manufacturer.

§ 576.7 Retention. Duplicate copies need not
be retained. Information may be reproduced or
transferred from one storage medium to another
(e.g., from paper files to microfilm) as long as
no information is lost in the reproduction or
transfer, and when so reproduced or transferred
the original form may be treated as a duplicate.

§ 576.8 Malfunctions covered. For purposes
of this part, "malfunctions that may be related
to motor vehicle safety" shall include, with re-
spect to a motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle
equipment, any failure or malfunction beyond
normal deterioration in use, or any failure of
performance, or any flaw or unintended deviation
from design specifications, that could in any
reasonably foreseeable manner be a causative
factor in, or aggravate, an accident or an injury
to a person.

39 F.R. 30045
August 20, 1974

PART 576-1

fffacMv*: March 26, 1973

PREAMBLE TO PART 577— DEFECT NOTIFICATION
(Docket No. 72-7; NoNco 2)

This notice establishes a new regulation cover-
ing notifications of motor vehicle safety defects
and nonconformity to safety standards. The
notice proposing these regulations was published
May 17, 1972 (37 F.R. 9783).

The regulation is intended to improve the re-
sponse of owners in vehicle notification cam-
paigns. Data which the NHTSA has been re-
ceiving on the completion rates of notification
campaigns show a wide range of completion
rates, with campaigns involving newer vehicles,
and more serious safety problems, having higher
completion rates than others. In many cam-
paigns, however, the rate is alarmingly low.

An examination of the notifications sent by
manufacturers reveals wide disparity in emphasis.
Although precise evaluation of the impact of no-
tification letters is difficult, due to its being
largely subjective, the NHTSA is of the opinion
that many notifications have tended to deem-
phasize the safety problems involved. Some
of these notification letters are questionably
within the requirements of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, and litigation on
a case by case basis to improve them is prac-
ticable. These regulations are intended to ensure
that all notification letters contain sufficient in-
formation, as determined by NHTSA, to prop-
erly notify purchasers.

The regulation applies to manufacturers of
incomplete and complete motor vehicles, and
motor vehicle equipment. In the case of ve-
hicles manufactured in two or more stages, com-
pliance by any one of the manufacturers of the
vehicle is considered compliance by all. This
provision is based on similar language in the
Defect Reports regulation (Part 573 of this chap-
ter), and is included in response to comments
received.

The regulation requires the notification to con-
tain substantially the information specified in

the proposal. It requires each notification to
begin with a statement that it is sent pursuant
to the requirements of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act. The NHTSA did
not concur with comments to the effect that the
inclusion of this statement would not promote
the purpose of the regulation. The regulation
requires the notification to state that the manu-
facturer, or the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administrator, as the case may be, has deter-
mined that a defect relating to motor vehicle
safety (or a noncompliance with a motor vehicle
safety standard) exists in the vehicle type, or
item of motor vehicle equipment, with which the
notification is concerned. When the manufac-
turer (or the Administrator) has, as part of his
determination, also found that the defect may
not exist in each such vehicle or equipment item,
he may include a statement to that effect. The
NHTSA has decided to allow such statements
based on comments that many defects in fact do
not exist in each vehicle or equipment item of the
group whose owners are notified.

The manufacturer must also describe the de-
fect, evaluate the risk it poses to traffic safety,
and specify measures which the recipient should
take to have it remedied. In each case, the regu-
lation requires information which the NHTSA
has determined will meet these objectives. In
describing the defect, the manufacturer must
indicate the vehicle system or particular items
of equipment affected, describe the malfunction
that may occur, including operating conditions
that may cause it to occur, and precautions the
purchaser should take to reduce the likelihood of
its occurrence. In providing that the vehicle sys-
tem affected be mentioned, the regulation reflects
comments to the effect that listing each particular
part involved would be too technical to be useful
to most consumers.

PART 577— PRE 1

EfFcctIv*: March 26, 1973

In evaluating the risk to traffic safety, the man-
ufacturer must indicate if vehicle crash is the po-
tential result, and whatever warning may occur.
Where vehicle crash is not the potential result,
the manufacturer must indicate the general type
of injury which the defect can cause. Although
many comments protested that it was impossible
to predict a specific type of injury, the NHTSA
believes that manufacturers can easily foresee the
general type of injury, such as asphyxiation, that
cnn result from those defects which are not ex-
pected to result in crashes.

In stating measures to be taken to repair the
defec'., tlie requirements differ in the case where
the manufacturer's dealers repair the vehicle free
of charge to the purchaser, where the manufac-
turer merely offers to pay for the repair, and
where he refuses to pay for the repair. The pur-
pose of this distinction is to provide information
sufficient to have adequate repairs made in each
case.

Where the manufacturer's dealers repair the
vehicle free of charge, the notification must in-
clude a general description of the work involved,
the manufacturer's estimate of when his dealers
will be supplied with parts and instructions, and
his estimate of the time reasonably necessary to
perform the labor involved in correcting the de-
fect. The agency's position is that consumers are
entitled to know approximately when their cars
will be repaired and how much labor is needed
in order for the repair to be made. The NHTSA
realizes that dealers frequently retain vehicles
longer than the actual work involved, due to
difficulties in scheduling, repairs. However,
manufacturers are free to impart this informa-
tion to consumers under the regulation. Some
comments objected to requiring manufacturers
to provide information on when replacement
parts will be available, on the basis that manu-
facturers cannot know, at the time a notification
is issued, precisely when parts deliveries will be
made to dealers. To include this information, it
is argued, would therefore delay the issuance of
the notification. The NHTSA has modified the
proposed language to allow manufacturers to
"estimate" when corrective parts will be available.
The estimate would be based on the manufac-
turer's knowledge at the time the notification is
sent, thereby eliminating any reasons for delay.

When manufacturers do not provide for repairs
to be made by dealers, the notification is required
to contain, in addition, full lists of parts and com-
plete instructions on making the repairs. The
regulation also requires the manufacturer to
recommend, generally, where the vehicle should
be repaired, and manufacturers are free to make
general and specific recommendations. This re-
quirement reflects the intent of the proposal that
manufacturers who believe particular repairs may
require special expertise should indicate that
fact to purchasers.

Wlien the manufacturer does not offer to pay
for repairs, he must, in addition, include full
cost information on necessary parts. The notice
would have required the retail cost of all parts,
and information on labor charges of the manufac-
turer's dealers in the general area of the purchaser.
In response to comments, the cost information is
limited to the suggested retail price of parts.
Manufacturers have indicated they do not set ac-
tual prices of parts, but do have suggested list
prices. With respect to labor charges, manufac-
turers have indicated that labor charges vary,
and that requiring them to ascertain exact charges
would delay issuance of notifications. The
NHTSA believes these comments to be well-
founded, and has dropped the proposed require-
ments regarding labor charges. Consumers will
still have information on costs of parts, and time
necessary for repairs to be performed, from
which they can obtain a fair idea of the cost of
a repair.

The reguations prohibit the notification from
stating or implying that the problem is not a de-
fect, or that it does not relate to motor vehicle
safety. Moreover, in those cases where the noti-
fication is sent pursuant to the direction of the
Administrator, it cannot state or imply that the
manufacturer disagrees with the Administrator's
finding. Many comments opposed these require-
ments on the basis that they unconstitutionally
limited manufacturers' freedom of speech. The
NHTSA emphatically rejects this contention.
Notification letters are not intended to serve as
forums where manufacturers can argue that prob-
lems are not safety-related or dispute the Ad-
ministration's findings. Their purpose is to un-
ambiguously and adequately induce owners to
remedy a potentially hazardous situation. The

PART 577— PRE 2

NHTSA is of the opinion that there is ample
precedent that allows the Federal government to
require manufacturers to warn purchasers in a
particular manner that certain products they
manufacture may l)e hazardous. If a manufac-
turer does not believe that his condition is a
safety-related defect, he is not required by law to
notifj' owners at all. It is only when he deter-
mines that a defect exists that he must notify in
accordance with the regulations. Similarly, when
the Administrator has made the finding that a
certain product is defective, the manufacturer
can administratively and judicially challenge this
determination as provided in the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act before sending a
notification.

The NHTSA received other objections to the
proposed requirements. Numero\is tire manu-
facturers argued that parts of the regulation
dealing with repairs of defects are inappropriate
when applied to them, since repairs generally
meant replacement. Certain manufacturers of
lighting equipment argued that notification re-
quirements should not apply to them at all. The
NHTSA disagrees with both of these contentions.
In the case of tire manufacturers, the NHTSA
believes that the requirements can be followed.
If the repair of a defective tire entails its re-
placement, this can certainly be stated within the
regulator^' scheme. Similarly, lighting equip-
ment manufacturers are responsible for defects
to the same extent as manufacturers of other
equipment. The NHTSA rejects completely the
argument that no lighting failures can be con-
sidered safety-related because of the millions of
lights that bum out every year without resulting
in accidents. The question in each case is not
whether a failure may occur, but whether a defect
exists, and whether the defect may cause a haz-
ardous situation to arise.

The notice of proposed rulemaking would
have prohibited manufacturers from making
statements contemporaneous with the notification
that disagreed with its conclusions. This pro-
posal has not been adopted. After careful con-
sideration, the NHTSA has determined that its
inclusion is probably unnecessary. The agency's
position is that if notification letters clearly and
unambiguously describe and evaluate defects in
accordance with this regulation, other statements

Effactlv*: Mareh 26, 1973

by manufacturers will not normally affect re-
actions of consumers.

Certain comments requested that manufac-
turers be allowed to state in the notification that
it does not constitute an admission of liability or
wrongdoing. The regulation does not preclude
the making of such statements, as the agency
has concluded that their inclusion will not sig-
nificantly deter owners from having repairs made.

One comment suggested that the notification
be required to contain a postage-free card by
which consumers could notify manufacturers
when vehicles had been sold or otherwise disposed
of. "While the NHTSA believes this practice
would be advantageous in improving notification
campaigns, it has concluded that such a require-
ment would be outside the scope of the regula-
tion, which is limited to notifications to first pur-
chasers and warranty holders.

Certain comments objected to the regulations
on the ground that they prescribed a rigid format
in an area where each case must be treated sep-
arately, and thus where flexibility was required.
The NHTSA has modified to some extent the
proposed restrictions on format. Manufacturers
are free, within the limits established, to com-
pose notifications to fit each case. As issued, these
regulations do not require rigid, inflexible letters
(only the first two sentences must contain specific
statements in a set order), but require that man-
ufacturers include certain important items of in-
formation. It is hoped that manufacturers in
meeting these requirements will provide required
information in easily understandable form.

In light of the above, a new Part 577, "Defect
Notification" is added to Chapter V of Title 49,
Code of Federal Regulations, to read as set forth
as below.

Effective date: March 26, 1973. Because these
requirements are not technical in nature, and do
not require lead times for compliance, good cause
exists, and is hereby found, for an effective date
less than 180 days from the day of issuance.

Issued on January 17, 1973.

Douglas Toms
Administrator

38 F.R. 2215
January 23, 1973

PART 577— PRE 3-4

EffKMvt: April 17, 1973

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 577— DEFEa NOTIFICATION

(Docket No. 72-7; Notic* 3)

This notice responds to petitions for recon-
sideration of the Defect Notification regulations,
published January 23, 1973 (38 FR 2215). Peti-
tions were received from the Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company, Chrysler Corporation, the
Motor and Equipment Manufacturers' Associa-
tion, and the Recreational Vehicle Institute. , A
petition was also received from the Wagner Elec-
tric Company. Although not received within 30
days of the regulation's publication (49 CFR
553.35), it has been considered in the preparation
of this notice. Insofar as this notice does not
grant the requests of the petitioners, they are
hereby denied.

The Firestone Tire and Rubber Company has
petitioned for reconsideration of section 577.6.
"Disclaimers", which prohibits manufacturers
from starting or implying that the notification
does not involve a safety related defect. Fire-
stone requested that the provision, for Federal
Constitutional reasons, be dropped from the rule.
This request is denied. The NHTSA does not
believe, for the reasons set forth in the notice of
January 23, 1973 (38 FR at 2216), that the pro-
vision is violative of the Constitution.

Chrysler Corporation has requested that the
phrase, "his dealers" be modified in section 577.4-
(e)(1) (ii), which requires the manufacturer to
estimate the date by which his dealers will be
supplied with corrective parts and instructions.
It argues that the phrase "his dealers" could be
interpreted to mean all dealers, regardless of
whether all of the manufacturer's dealers are in-
volved in the campaign. This request is denied.
Neither section 113 of the Safety Act nor the
regulation require a notification campaign to ex-
tend to all of the manufacturer's dealers, whether
or not they have any involvement in a particular
campaign. The NHTSA does not believe that
the phrase "his dealers", when read in context,
means all of the manufacturer's dealers.

Chrysler also asks that special requirements be
specified for the notification of "noncompliance
non-operational defects", citing as an example
the improper placement of the VIN plate under
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 115. Chrysler
states that existing provisions of the regulation
dealing with malfunctions (specifically 577.4-
(c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4)), and evaluating the risk
to traffic safety (sections 577.4(d), (d)(1),
(d)(1) (i), (d)(1) (ii), (d)(2)) are not perti-
nent to these defects. This request is denied.
The NHTSA does not believe that separate re-
quirements for notification of the type of defect
described by Chrysler are either necessary or
desirable. If a particular defect does not in-
volve a malfunction, to be in compliance with
the regulation a manufacturer should, in response
to the appropriate provisions of the regulation,
indicate that to be the case. The NHTSA be-
lieves this approach will notify purchasers of the
defect as effectively as separate, more specific re-
quirements. The NHTSA does not agree that
the relationship to safety of these types of defects
should not be evaluated in notification letters,
similarly to other defects.

The Motor and Equipment Manufacturers As-
sociation (MEMA objects to the requirements of
sections 577.4(e)(2) (vi) and 577.4(e) (3) (vi)
that the manufacturer recommend whom the pur-
chaser should have perform necessary repair
work, and requests that these provisions be de-
leted. MEMA argues that the requirement is
anti-competitive in that it sanctions the steering
of consumers to vehicle dealerships for repairs,
to the detriment of the independent repair in-
dustry, even when the manufacturer does not pay
for the repair. MEMA argues that original
equipment replacement parts are frequently more
expensive than competitively produced parts, re-
sulting in added costs to owners. It argues also
that limiting repairs to dealers precludes the use

PART 577— PRE 5

E«Mliv*: April 17, 1973

of the full domestic repair industry, which
should be utilized fully given the magnitude of
recent notification campaigns.

While the NHTSA appreciates the concern of
this association in not being precluded from a
large market, the NHTSA believes the require-
ment as issued to be consistent with the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and the
need for motor vehicle safety. The NHTSA
has, in issuing the requirement, indicated that
manufacturers should indicate to purchasers
when special expertise may be necessary to cor-
rect defects. The repairs in issue do not involve
normal maintenance, but constitute defects whose
proper repair is essential to the safety of the na-
tion's highways. Frequently these repairs in-
volve a higher degree of expertise and familiarity
with a particular vehicle than that required to
perform normal maintenance. If such expertise
will more likely be found at dealerships, in the
view of the vehicle manufacturer, the NHTSA
believes that opinion should be imparted to pur-
chasers.

Moreover, even if the NHTSA deleted the re-
quirement the manufacturer could if he desired,
consistently with the regulation, recommend a re-
pair facility. The NHTSA would not prohibit
the making of such a recommendation, for it is
responsive to the statutory requirement that the
notification contain a statement of the measures
to be taken to repair the defect (15 U.S.C.
1402(c)). Moreover, the argument that the reg-
ulation stifles competition does not appear to
have merit. In the event the manufacturer does
not bear the cost of repair, the regulation
(■§ 577.4(e) (3) (i)) requires the manufacturer to
provide the purchaser with the suggested list
price of repair parts. As a consequence, pur-
chasers will be provided with information with
which they can "shop", with full knowledge, for
the least expensive repair facilities. The peti-
tion is accordingly denied.

The Recreational Vehicle Institute (RVI) has
petitioned that the requirements of both section
577.4(a), requiring an opening statement that the
notification is sent pursuant to the Act, and sec-
tion 577.6, prohibiting disclaimers, be deleted.
RVI argues such requirements may result in de-
lay by manufacturers in determining that defects

exist, forcing the use of administrative and legal
procedures before purchasers are notified. The
agency cannot accept the position that the notifi-
cation should be diluted because of possible eva-
sion by manufacturers. The NHTSA believes
that the need that notification letters fully in-
form purchasers outweighs the possible problems
caused by manufacturers delaying their notifica-
tions to purchasers until forced to notify them.
The request is denied.

RVI points out that section 577.4 seems to as-
sume that defects will be evidenced by some
form of mechanical failure. It asks, therefore,
whether a safety-related defect can exist where
proper corrective action to avoid an occurrence
or possible occurrence is appropriate maintenance
or operational use. RVI also requests, if
NHTSA adheres to its present position regard-
ing these issues, that it undertake rulemaking
to define "safety related defect". For the fol-
lowing reasons, these requests are denied. There
is no intent in the regulation to limit the concept
of safety related defects to those involving me-
chanical failures. As stated above, in reply to
the petition from Chrysler, non-mechanical de-
fects can be the basis of defect notification, and
purchasers can be fully notified of them under
the present regulatory scheme. Moreover, the
NHTSA believes any attempt to precisely define
safety related defect would be ill-advised.
Whether a defect exists depends solely on the
facts of each particular situation. The fact that
such determinations may encompass a wide va-
riety of factual situations, and may consequently
be difficult to make, does not mean that it is
necessary, desirable, or even possible to replace
the decision with a simple formula. The NHTSA
believes, on the contrary, that the relatively broad
definition of defect contained in the Safety Act
is best suited to the wide variety of defective
conditions that may arise.

RVI has also pointed out that references to a
manufacturer's dealers in section 577.4(e), speci-
fying measures to be taken to repair the defect,
overlook the fact that manufacturers' dealers may
not always provide service facilities, or that
manufacturers may use service facilities other
than dealers. The NHTSA agrees with RVI,
and has therefore modified the provisions of that

PART 577— PRE 6

E4*ctlv*: April 17, 1973

section to include "other service facilities of the
manufacturer", as well as his dealers.

RVI requested that the regulation be amended
to permit compliance by either a component
manufacturer or a vehicle manufacturer, .vhen
the defect involves a specific component. RVI
also requested that compliance be permitted by
either the vehicle alterer or the complete vehicle
manufacturer in cases involving altered vehicles.
The regulations do not prohibit the sending of
notification letters by persons other than the ve-
hicle manufacturer. Accordingly, no modifica-
tion of the regulation is called for. However,
manufacturers who do utilize the services of
others in meeting requirements still bear the ulti-
mate responsibility for compliance with the
regulation under the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act.

The Wagner Electric Company has requested
that the provisions of the regulation regarding
manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment (ex-
cluding tires) be reconsidered in light of the fact
that, under present marketing procedures, it is
difficult or impossible for such manufacturers to
notify jobbers, installers, dealers, or consumers.
The notification required by the regulation is
directed at the notification sent to retail purchas-
ers and not that sent to distributors or dealers
of the manufacturer. The notification of the
latter is subject only to the statutory provision

of section 113 of the Safety Act (15 U.S.C.
1402). Moreover, manufacturers of equipment
(other than tires) who do not have the names
of first purchasers are not required to notify
them either under the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act or the regulation. Tliere is
consequently no need for modification of the
regulation for the reasons presented by Wagner,
and its request is accordingly denied.

In light of the above. Part 577 of Title 49,
Code of Federal Regulations, "Defect Notifica-
tion", is amended ....

Effective date: April 17, 1973. These amend-
ments impose no additional burdens on any per-
son, and serve only to clarify the application of
existing requirements to specific situations. Ac-
cordingly, notice and public procedure thereon
are unnecessary, and good cause exists for an
effective date less than thirty days from the day
of publication.

(Sec. 108, 112, 113, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat.
718 as amended, sec. 2, 4, Pub. L. 91-265, 84
Stat. 262 (15 U.S.C. 1397, 1401, 1402, 1408);
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.51)

Issued on April 10, 1973.

James E. Wilson
Acting Administrator

38 F.R. 9509
April 17, 1973

PART 577— PRE 7-8

Effective: September 14, 1975

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 577— DEFECT NOTIFICATION

(Docket No. 74-42; Notice 2)

This notice amends 49 CFR Part 577, Defect
Notif cation, to require that bilingual notification
be sent to owners in certain cases, and to clarify
the wording manufacturers are required to use
to indicate their determination that a safety-
related defect exists.

A notice of proposed rulemaking on this sub-
ject was published on November 25, 1974, (39
F.R. 41182) and an opportunity afforded for
comment. The Center for Auto Safety had
questioned the efficacy of defect notification
campaigns in Puerto Rico conducted in the Eng-
lish language since the primary language of that
Commonwealth is Spanish. A National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
survey in Puerto Rico confirmed that there was
a need for bilingual defect notification. It was
proposed that whenever the address of the pur-
chaser is in either the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico or the Canal Zone the notification be sent
in both the English and Spanish languages.

The notice also proposed clarifying § 577.4(e)
(1) so that the second paragraph of a notifica-
tion letter could no longer be written to reflect
a manufacturer's belief that the cause of a defect
is an item other than that which he manufac-
tured.

Only Chrysler Corporation and Firestone Tire
and Rubber Company commented on bilingual
notification. Both stated that it was not neces-
sary for the Canal Zone. Firestone also felt
that the requirement to translate the notification
would delay its mailing, and voiced tlie belief
that NHTSA must express the exact wording
in Spanish for § 577.4(a) and (b). Chrysler
commented that it had been providing bilingual
notification to owners of automobiles purchasefl
in Puerto Rico but that extensive and burden-
some data-processing reprogramnnng would l)e
required to identify owners of vehicles originally

purchased on the mainland and later taken to
Puerto Rico.

The NHTSA believes that the language prob-
lem is a significant factor in the below-average
response to notification campaigns in Puerto
Rico, and that owner response rate to campaigns
in the Canal Zone will improve if notifications
are provided in Spanish as well as English.
Information from the Census Bureau indicates
that more than 50% of the residents of each area
speak Spanish as their primary language. Trans-
lation may delay mailing to these areas a few
days, but this is deemed inconsequential com-
pared with the benefits to be derived by an im-
proved response to campaigns. This agency
does not consider that it need specify tlie exact
wording in Spanish of § 577.4(a) and (b). If
it appears that manufacturers are providing
ambiguous statements it will consider the matter
further. Finally, since section 153(a)(1) of the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,
15 U.S.C. 1413(a)(1), requires notification to be
sent to the person wlio is registered under State
law as {.he owner of the vehicle to be campaigned,
Chrysler's comments on reprogramming of data
do not appear to have merit.

This notice also amends § 577.4(b) (1), which
presently requires the second sentence of the
notification to state that the manufacturer has
determined that a defect which relates to motor
vehicle safety exists in its motor vehicles or
motor vehicle equipment. Certain notification
letters have characterized the defect as existing
in a vehicle ur item of equipment not manufac-
tured by the manufacturer making the determi-
nation. The intent of the section is that a
manufacturer of motor vehicles would state its
determination that the defect exists in the motor
vehicle it manufactures, while a manufacturer
of motor vehicle equipment would state its de-

PART 577— PRE 9

Effective: September 14, 1975

termination tliat the defect exists in the motor
vehicle equipment it manufactures. If tlie manu-
facturer believes tiie cause of the defect to be an
item other than that which he manufactured,
that information can be imparted in tlie other
parts of the notification, but not in the second
parajirapli wiiere the content is specifically pre-
scribed.

Kelsey-IIayes Company and Skyline Corpora-
tion commented on the proposal to clarify
§ 577.4(b)(1). Both objected to it, feeling that
the present refrulatioii is adequate and that the
mandatory statement may be prejudicial. How-
ever, in the opinion of this ajjency, manufactur-
ers with limited experience in composinji notifi-
cation letters have in many cases misinterpreted

§ 577.4(b) (1). Clarification of the sentence
should eliminate mistakes.

In consideration of the foregoing:, Part 577 of
Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Deject
Notif cation, is amended. . . .

Effective date: September 14, 1975.

(Sec. 108, 112, 113, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80
Stat. 718; sec. 2, 4, Pub. L. 91-265, 84 Stat. 262
(15 U.S.C. 1397, 1401, 1402, 1407) ; delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on June 10, 1975.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

40 F.R. 25463
June 16, 1975

PART 577- PRE- 10

EfFectlve: Jun« 28. 1977

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 577— DEFECT NOTIFICATION

(Docket No. 75-10; Notice 2)

This notice amends 49 CFR Part .577, "Defect
Notification," to conform to g§ 151 throu^rh 160
of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act (the Act) (Pub. L. 93-492, 88 Stat. 1470,
October 27. 1974; 15 U.S.C. 1411-1420).

The amendments of Part 577 were published
as a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Fed-
eral Register on May 6, 1975 (40 FR 19651).
Approximately 30 comments were received from
vehicle and equipment manufacturers, equipment
distributors, trade associations representing these
groups, and the Center for Auto Safety. The
National Motor Vehicle Safety Advisory Council
did not take a position on this proposal. Inter-
ested persons are advised that XHTSA Dockets
75-30 (Defect and Noncompliance Responsibil-
ity), 7.5-31 (Petitions for Hearing on Notification
and Remedj- of Defects or Failure to Comply),
and 74-7 (Defect and Noncompliance Reporting)
are relevant to the subject matter of this rule-
making.

The agency is amending its earlier notification
procedures to reflect the major expansion of
manufacturer responsibilities under the Motor
Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of
1974 to notify vehicle and equipment owners or
purchasers of noncompliances with safety stand-
ards and of defects that relate to motor vehicle
safety (hereinafter referred to as defects), chief
of which is that remedy shall be without charge
in mo.st cases.

The new regulation specifies the content, tim-
ing, and form of notification that complies with
the requirements set forth in § 153 of the Act.
Distinctions among notifications that arise under
different circumstances are set forth in detail.
Provisions concerning disclaimers in the notifica-
tion and conformity to the statutory requirement.s
are carried over from the former Part 577.

Comments on the proposal were generally in
agreement with the revision of the regulation, in
recognition that the revision reflects responsibili-
ties already a matter of law. Several questions
were raised with regard to the authority for or
wisdom of specific provisions of the proposed
regulation, and these are discussed below.

Motor vehicle manufacturers and the Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA)
expressed strong support for modification of the
statutory definitions of "original equipment" and
"replacement equipment'' that allocate responsi-
bility for notification and remedy between vehicle
and equipment manufacturers. The agency has
issued a separate proposal to redistribute respon-
sibility (40 FR 56930, December 5. 1975) which
addresses the issues raised. Resolution of that
proposal will be responsive to the issues raised
by the MVMA and vehicle manufacturers. To
simplify any future action in this area, the two
terms are no longer set forth in Part 577.

In the definitions section of the regulation, the
phrase "in good faith" has been added to the
definition of "first purchaser" to conform to its
meaning under § 108(b) (1) of the Act.

The Recreational Vehicle Industry Association
(RVIA) requested that vehicle alterers be per-
mitted to meet (assume) the obligations of manu-
facturers for notification and remedy on a
voluntary basis. Without notice and oppor-
tunity for conmient on this idea, the agency does
not consider it wise to modify the regulation as
suggested by the RVIA.

NOTIFICATION PURSUANT TO A
MANUFACTURER'S DETERMINATION

Section 151 of the Act provides that a manu-
facturer who determines in good faith that a
defect or noncompliance exists in its products

PART 577— PRE 11

EfFective: June 28, 1977

"shall furnish notification to the Secretary and
to owners, pui'chasers, and dealers in accordance
with section 153, and he shall remedy the defect
or failure to comply in accordance with section
154."

Section 577.5 of Part 577 provides for manu-
facturer-initiated notifications in accordance with
§ 151. The section specifies, among other things,
that a statement appear in the notification that
the manufacturer has determined that a defect
or noncompliance exists in identified vehicles or
equipment. An additional statement may be
made to indicate that the problem may not exist
in each such vehicle or item of equipment. The
MVMA and American Motors Corporation
(AMC) believed that a better approach would
be to state that the defect or noncompliance
exists in some, but not all, vehicles or items of
equipment (if such is the case), and that an
owner should bring his vehicle in for inspection
in any case. The agency does not believe that
either the MVMA or AMC has an expertise in
this area and declines to adopt the suggested
modification.

Paragraph (e) of § 577.5 requires a clear de-
scription of the defect or noncompliance, includ-
ing, among other things,
(e) ***

(2) A description of any malfunction that
may occur. The description of a noncompli-
ance with an applicable standard shall include
the difference between the performance of the
noncomplying vehicle or item of replacement
equipment and the performance specified by
the standard;

The MVMA viewed the phrase "any malfunc-
tion" as overbroad and ambiguous, in that a
manufacturer would be held to correctly antici-
pate a malfunction, whether or not related to
safety or the noncompliance. The agency agrees
that such a description would go beyond the
purpose of the notification and therefore has
narrowed somewhat the language proposed.

Vehicle manufacturers and the MVMA argued
that the second sentence of paragraph (e) (2)
should be deleted because an exact description
of the difference in performance due to noncom-
pliance would be too technical for comprehension
by most owners, require extensive and expensive

testing in some cases that would delay notifica-
tion, and be the basis for a technical violation of
the regulation. The agency believes that the
description is valuable to vehicle or equipment
owners in understanding the noncompliance, but
agrees that a detailed description could delay
notification unnecessarily. Accordingly, the
phrase "in general terms" is added to modify the
required description.

The Center for Auto Safety (the Center) be-
lieved that the statement required by (e) to
minimize the chances of an accident before
remedy failed to mention prior warnings that
the vehicle's operating characteristics might of-
fer. While prior warning is adequately covered
by the "evaluation of risk" statement made re-
garding the possibility of vehicle crash (para-
graph (f)(l)(ii)), the agency has added a
comparable requirement to paragraph (f ) (2)
(that covers "non-crash" type defects and non-
compliances).

The Specialty Equipment Manufacturers As-
sociation objected that any evaluation of the risk
to motor vehicle safety would be speculative and
therefore was unjustified. This requirement,
however, is based on the specific requirement of
§ 153(a) of the Act, and cannot be eliminated.

The Center believed that the evaluation of risk
to motor vehicle safety is a discretionary state-
ment that need not be made by a manufacturer.
This is not the case. Section 577.5 is a require-
ment that the information (b) through (g) be
listed and, under paragraph (f), the evaluation
must either describe the crash hazard or be a
description of the "general type of injury to
occupants, or [others], that can result."

Paragraph (g) of i§ 577.5, dealing with meas-
ures to be taken by the owner, proved to be the
greatest source of comments on the proposal.
The paragraph is divided into subparagraphs
dealing with notification of remedy without
charge and notification of remedy for which the
manufacturer will charge. This distinction is
based on § 154(a) (4) of the Act which limits the
"remedy without charge" to vehicles or equip-
ment first purchased no more than 8 years (3
years in the case of tires) before notification in
accordance with §§ 151 or 152.

Paragraph (g) (1) specifies requirements both
for notification when the remedy must be under-

PART 577— PRE 12

EfFecllve: June 28. 1977

taken and also notification when the manufac-
turer vohintarily decides to remedy without
charge. The MVMA and General Motors (GM)
felt that manufacturei-s imdertakin'r vohmtary
remedy should not be subjected to the same noti-
fication requirements as those manufacturers
required to remedy. The agency distinguishes
between the separate duties of notification and
remedy, however, and notes that the notification
requirements of § 153 of the Act contain no ex-
ceptions for older vehicles and equipment. The
MVMA's abbreviated list of requirements for a
voluntary remedy do not fulfill the requirements
of §153. For example, § 153(a) (2) requires
that the notification contain an evaluation of the
risk to motor vehicle safety.

It is the agency's philosophy that a manu-
facturer undertaking a remedy should provide
the same information to the owner whether or
not the remedy is undertaken voluntarily. In
this way, an owner will be apprised of the infor-
mation necessary to make informed decision.
Also, events beyond the manufacturer's control
will not be able to negate the remedy without
agency or manufacturer's knowledge. For these
reasons, the agency does not modify the require-
ments as suggested.

Aside from the general suitability of para-
graph (g)(l)'s requirements for a voluntary
remedy, manufacturers raised more specific ques-
tions about the separate provisions.

International Harvester Company (IH) as-
serted with regard to paragraph (g)(1) (i) that
no basis existed for the exception of replacement
equipment from the right to refund as a means
of remedy. In the agency's view, § 154(2) (B)
of the Act clearly limits the remedy for items of
replacement equipment to either repair or re-
placement.

IH objected to the requirements that the
earliest date for repair set under paragraph
(g) (1) (ii) be premised on anticipated receipt by
dealers of necessary parts for repair. The com-
pany pointed out that some repair parts would
not typically be forwarded to a dealer for repair
until a specific request has arisen. The agency
would like to clarify that the "earliest date" can
be established as a certain number of days fol-
lowing inspection of the defective or noncomply-

ing vehicle. Thus a manufacturer need only
calculate the time that it would take to get the
parts to the dealer following an inspection and
then state that the earliest date for repair will
follow the date of inspection by that amount.

AMC argued that the requirement for a gen-
eral description of the work and amount of time
involved in a repair without charge by the manu-
facturer's dealer exceeded the authority of the
Act and is unnecessary when the manufacturer
undertakes repair. The same argument was
made with regard to paragraphs (g)(1) (v) and
(vi). The agency disagrees, and notes that the
specific authority listed in § 153(a) is "in addi-
tion to such other matters as the Secretary may
prescribe by regulation." As for the need for a
general description, it is concluded that the owner
would value knowledge of the time involved and
the nature of the repair that is involved, to cor-
rectly weigh the gravity of the problem. Cor-
respondingl}-, the otfer of replacement or refund
is more helpful to the owner if it includes the
detail that has been specified.

In paragraph (g)(1) (iv), the MVMA asked
for parallelism with the construction of para-
graph (g)(1) (iii). It is accomplished by the
addition of "or its dealers" following the word
"manufacturer.'' IH suggested the addition of
"authorized service centers" to the list, but this
is unnecessary in view of the NHTSA's interpre-
tation of "dealer" to include an authorized service
center.

The Center, Mack Trucks, and Crane Carrier
Corporation (CCC) commented on paragraph
(g)(1) (iv)'s requirement that the method or
basis for a manufacturer's assessment of depre-
ciation be specified. The two manufacturers
suggested use of a retailer's price guide as the
basis. The Center suggested that a method for
determination of depreciation be devised by a
panel of industry, government, and consumer
representatives. The legislative history indicates
that retailer price guides should not be the sole
criterion, and thus the Mack and CCC recom-
mendations are not adopted. Until there is some
indication that the manufacturers' chosen meth-
ods of assessment are unreasonable, the agency
does not consider it necessary to exercise its
authority in this area, and the Center's sugges-
tion is also not adopted.

PART 577— PRE 13

Effective: June 28, 1977

The greatest objections were raised regarding
the statement advising an owner how to inform
the NHTSA if he believes that the notification
or remedy is inadequate, or that the remedy was
untimely or not made in accordance with the
notification. PACCAR, AMC, Chrysler, GM,
IH, the RVIA, and the MVMA considered the
statement to be, in some respects, beyond the
agency's statutory authority and not contem-
plated by Congress. As earlier noted, § 153 is
prefaced by a general grant of authority to the
agency to specify the contents of the notification.

The agency has considered the objections, in
any case, particularly in view of the decision to
require the same notification in the case of vol-
untary and mandatory remedy notices. It is
concluded that modification of the statements to
reflect the exact terms of § 154(a) (6) is appro-
priate.

Manufacturers objected to the language of
paragraph (g) (1) (vii) (C) that invites owner
complaints if a remedy is not efl'ected within a
reasonable period. The agency considers timeli-
ness to be an aspect of whether a manufacturer
has failed or is unable to provide a remedy as
specified in § 153(a) (6) of the Act. The agency
does agree that remedy by replacement or refund
should not be limited to the first 60 days, since
it might follow a failure to repair within that
60-day period. In conforming to § 154(b)(1),
the agency substitutes "tender" for "first at-
tempt." Also reference to extension by the
Administrator of the 60-day repair period has
been added to paragraph (g) (1) (vii) (C) (1).

GM suggested that an additional statement be
made to owners, advising them of recourse avail-
able with the manufacturer if the dealer's re-
sponse is unsatisfactory. The agency considers
this desirable but, without the benefit of notice
and opportunity for comment, declines to make
this addition. Paragraph (g) (1), of course, only
sets forth what the manufacturer "shall include"
in its notification, and it may make such addi-
tional statements as it deems necessary.

There was no comment on the second part of
§ 577.5 that deals with manufacturer notices in
which remedy without charge is not required and
is not volunteered. Accordingly, the paragraph
is adopted as proposed.

NOTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
ADMINISTRATOR'S DETERMINATION

Section 577.6 provides for Administration-
ordered notifications in accordance with § 152.
Paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) set forth require-
ments for the three types of notification contem-
plated by the Act. Manufacturers made no
comment on the requirements for notification
ordered by the Administrator in the first instance,
and paragraph (a) is accordingly made final as
proposed.

PACCAR objected to provisional notification
as placing an unreasonable burden on the manu-
facturer, rendering any court decision in its
favor meaningless. Section 155(b) of the Act
clearly contemplates such an order, however, and
the regulations consequently do provide for it.

Comments were received on the proposed con-
tent of the provisional notification. The MVMA
pointed out that the requirement in paragraph
(b) (2) should be clarified to permit a statement
that the defect or non-compliance may not occur
in all the described vehicles. The agency agrees
and adds a paragraph similar to § 577.5(d).

With regard to the proposed paragraph (b)
(4), the MVMA asked that reference to a
"United States District Court" be broadened to
"the Federal courts" and that the statement make
clear that the NHTSA and not the court is order-
ing provisional notification. The agency concurs
in these clarifications and they are made where
appropriate in the final rule.

The requirements of paragraphs (b)(5), (6),
and (7) provide for a description of the Admin-
istrator's determination, his evaluation of the
hazard, and the recommended measures to avoid
uni'easonable hazard resulting from the defect
or noncompliance. Fiat requested that the de-
scription, evaluation, and recommended measures
be provided by the NHTSA. As specified in the
requirements, it is the "Administrator's stated
basis" that must be described, and the measures
"stated in his order" that must be listed. The
agency intends to include in each order a de-
scription, evaluation, and list of measures that
permit quotation or paraphrase by the manufac-
turer.

Chrysler and the MVMA asked that a manu-
facturer be permitted more latitude to explain

PART 577— PRE 14

Effscllve: June 28, 1977

its position than provided for in paragraph
(b) (8). The ajienc'v has considered this request,
and cone hides tliat extensive advocacy of the
manufacturer's position would detract from the
intent of the provisional notification to put the
owner on notice of potential problems. The
Chrysler and MVMA suggestion is therefore not
adopted.

In the required statement dealing with avail-
ability of remedy and reimbursement in the
event the court upliolds the Administrator's de-
termination (paragraph (b)(9)), Chrysler ar-
gued that the suggestion of reimbursement would
generate poor customer relations if a repair were
sought or undertaken during pendency of a court
proceeding in which the manufacturer prevailed.
The agency is aware of the possibility for some
misunderstanding but is certain that the provi-
sional notification was intended by the Congress
to encourage owners to consider repair or other
corrective action while the manufacturer contests
the determination. For this reason, the notice
of possible reimbursement remains in the regu-
lation. The first statement in (b) (9) (i) has
been clarified in one minor respect.

The MVMA requested that the phrase "for
repair" be substituted for "in repairing" to per-
mit manufacturers to make clear that reimburse-
ment would only cover the repairs that were
reasonable and necessary to correct the defect or
noncompliance. The NHTSA believes that the
term "reasonable and necessary" makes clear
what repairs would be reimbursed should the
court uphold an Administrator's determination.

The MVMA asked, and the agency agrees, that
the reimbursement statement be qualified by the
limitations that appear in the statute.

Paragi-aph (b) (10) requires a statement
whether, in the manufacturer's opinion, a repair
of the defect or noncompliance is possible. GM
asked that "feasible" be substituted for "possible"
and the agency makes the change in agreement
that it more clearly reflects the judgement made
by a manufacturer in choosing its preferred
remedy. The MVMA and Chrysler made the
more basic objection that (b)(10) assumes that
a defect or noncompliance exists prior to the
court's ruling, and that it requires unjustified
effort to develop repair parts and facilities before
a decision is reached on the validity of the Ad-

ministrator's determination. The agency is of
the view that the level of detail specified is justi-
fied in these cases and necessary to fulfill the
purpose of provisional notification contemplated
by Congress. The agency has modified the word-
ing to make clear that reimbursement for ex-
penses are limited to those necessary and
reasonable for repair.

With regard to proposed paragraph (b)(12),
the MVMA asked that only notification and not
remedy be mentioned. There will be a discussion
of remedy in the notification, however, and the
owner should be encouraged to inquire further
as to this aspect of the notification.

Firestone and the Automotive Parts and Ac-
cessories Association felt that the regulations
should apply to the agency and that it should
be required to advise the owner, purchaser, and
dealer in the event its determination is not up-
held by the courts. The statutory' scheme being
implemented by Part 577 concerns manufacturer
obligations under §§ 151 through 160 of the Act
to notify and remedy safety problems in vehicles.
The agency does not consider an expansion of
the regulations beyond this purpose as appro-
priate. Nothing, of course, prevents the manu-
facturer from making such a notice to the owner
or others.

Paragraph (c) of § 577.6 deals with final
notification following a court decision in the
Administrator's favor, and it is adopted, with
corrections similar to those made in the other
sections. Because the MVMA objected to ref-
erence to being "upheld in a proceeding in a
United States District Court" as the basis for
the post-litigation order, the agency has sub-
stituted the language of the Act. Also, reference
to "a date" on which provisional notification was
ordered is corrected to "the date" to reflect that
it will in all cases be a specific date.

TIME AND MANNER OF NOTIFICATION

The major problem with regard to the time
and manner of notification concerned the statu-
tory requirement (§ 153(c)(1)) that notification
be,

§ 153 * * *
(c) * * *

(1) in the case of a motor vehicle, by first
class mail to each person who is registered

PART 577— PRE 15

Effective: June 28, 1977

under State law as the owner of such vehicle
and whose name and address is reasonably
ascertainable by the manufacturer through
State records or other sources available to
him;

PACCAR, Volkswagen, and IH expressed
their doubts that all State records would be
available or that alternative services would pro-
vide timely information. The agency has in-
corporated the statutory requirements in this
regulation word-for-word and, on that basis, de-
clines to modify it. As for the suggestion that
"reasonably ascertainable" be defined, it is the
agency's view that the phrase is only given
meaning by the separate factual situations that
arise. The agency cannot agree with PACCAR
that records are not "reasonably ascertainable"
simply by virtue of delay in retrieving them.

Sheller-Globe Corporation asked if certified
mail would be considered the equivalent of first
class mail for meeting the requirements. As a
school bus manufacturer, Sheller-Globe wanted
certainty of notification to school districts and
other customers. The NHTSA does not consider
them equivalent in view of relevant legislative
history. Congress considered the U.S. Postal
Service regulation that prohibits foi-warding of
certified mail and they concluded that first class
mail would be a superior means of obtaining
notification.

With regard to the maximum times permitted
for issuance of notification, the Center asked
that the period be reduced to 30 days in the
case of all Administration-ordered notifications.
Some manufacturers asked that the 30-day period
for provisional notification be expanded to 60
days. B.F. Goodrich stated that notification
letters cannot be printed in advance of actual
mailing, because the date for earliest remedy
must be included in the letter. The agency has
weighed the conflicting views, and concludes that
a 60-day period is justified for administration-
ordered recalls. The provisional notification re-
quirement is amended accordingly.

IH suggested that public notice of defects or
noncompliances in items of replacement equip-
ment would be adequate, and that notice to the
most recent purchaser should be optional. The

agency has simply conformed its regulation to
the statutory requirements of § 153(c).

OTHER MATTERS

The MVA suggested that the disclaimer sec-
tion of the regulation could be clarified by an
additional paragraph permitting manufacturer
statements that a notification does not "constitute
an admission by the manufacturer that it has
been guilty of negligence or other wrong doing."
The agency views this statement as exactly the
type of disclaimer that could contribute to a
reader's decision not to take action in response to
notification and accordingly declines to adopt the
MVMA reeommendation.

With regard to the MVMA concern that tech-
nical violations of the regulations not be pursued
as a violation of the Act under § 577.9, the
agency expects to continue to enforce the Act
and its regulations in a reasonable manner, calcu-
lated to avoid arbitrariness or irrationality.

After-mai-ket equipment manufacturers and
their associations expressed the view that the
notifica,tion scheme was unworkable for notice
to equipment purchasers, that wear of parts in
normal use conflicted with the concept of safety-
related defects, and that the 8-year period for
remedy without charge was too long. Also, the
establisliment of a cut-off based on the date of
retail sale appeared impractical, because records
of these transactions are not maintained. As a
response, the agency notes that the regulation
conforms to the statute's language and clearly
expressed Congressional intent. Experience to
date, with the requirements does not demonstrate
that they are in fact unworkable. The issues of
improper installation and remanufactured parts
were not addressed by the statute, and resolution
of these issues wil require some experience with
situations as they arise.

The RVIA asked that the agency exercise its
authority to require the submission to manufac-
turers by dealers of the names and addresses of
purchasers. The agency takes this recommenda-
tion under advisement but, as it is beyond the
scope of Part 577, does not act on it in this
notice.

In consideration of the foregoing. Part 577,
"Defect Notification," of Title 49, Code of Fed-

PART 577— PRE 16

Effective: June 28, 1977

eral Regulations, is renamed "Defect and Xon- Issued on December 22, 1976.

compliance Notification" and is amended to read

as set forth below.

Effective dat*: June 28, 1977. John W. Snow

(Sees. 108, 112, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. Administrator

718; Sec. 102, 103, 104, Pub. L. 93-492, 88 Stat.

1470 (15 U.S.C. 1397, 1401, 1407, 1411-1420; 41 F.R. 56813

delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50) December 30, 1976

PART 577— PRE 17-18

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 577

Defect and Noncompliance Notification
(Docket No. 80-17; Notice 1)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends the defect and non-
compliance notification regulation to require that
manufacturers include the agency's toll free Auto
Safety Hotline number in their defect and non
compliance notification letters. The amendment is
being made to provide a means of easy access to
the agency by consumers who may have com-
plaints about the recall and remedy of their
vehicles or equipment. Since it is a minor technical
amendment, it is being made effective immediate-
ly without notice or opportunity for comment.

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 22, 1981.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. James Murray, Office of Defects
Investigation, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590,
202-426-2840

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice
makes a minor technical amendment to Part 577,
Defect and Noncompliance Notification, to require
manufacturers conducting recall campaigns to in-
clude the agency's toll free Auto Safety Hotline
number in the notification letters.

Existing notification letters are required to
state that a consumer may contact the agency if he
or she feels that remedy of a defect or non-
compliance is not being made without charge or in
a reasonable time. Manufacturers also frequently
include their address and a toll free number that
consumers can call to complain to the manufac-
turer about the status of a remedy. The agency
believes that the use of manufacturer toll free
numbers is a good idea and has decided that the
agency's toll free number should also be included

in the letter. This will provide easy access for con-
sumers to the agency for reporting any complaints
concerning the recall or remedy of their vehicles.
It also will provide timely information to our En-
forcement office pertaining to the compliance with
our regulations by the manufacturers.

Since this is a minor technical amendment and
will result in little impact upon manufacturers, the
agency finds for good cause shown that it is in the
interest of safety to make the amendment effec-
tive immediately without notice and opportunity
for comment.

In consideration of the foregoing. Title 49 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, Part 577, Defect and
Noncompliance Notification, is amended by revis-
ing the introductory sentence in paragraph
577.5{g)(l)(vii) to read as follows:

(vii) A statement informing the owner that he
or she may submit a complaint to the Administra-
tor, National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.
20590 or call the toll free Auto Safety Hotline at
800-426-9393 (Washington, D.C. area residents may
call 426-0123), if the owner believes that-
* « * «

The principal authors of this notice are Mr.
James Murray of the Office of Defects Investiga-
tions and Roger Tilton of the Office of Chief
Counsel.

Issued on January 14, 1981.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

46 FR 6971
January 22, 1981

PART 577-PRE 19-20

PART 577— DEFECT AND NONCOMPLIANCE NOTIFICATION
(Docket No. 72-7; Notice 2)

Sec.

577.1 Scope.

577.2 Purpose.

577.3 Application.

577.4 Definitions.

577.5 Notification pursuant to a manufacturer's

determination.

577.6 Notification pursuant to the Administrator's

determination.

577.7 Time and manner of notification.

577.8 Disclaimers.

577.9 Conformity to statutory requirements.

Authority: Sees. 108, 112, 119, Pub. L. 89-563;
80 Stat. 718; Sees. 102, 103, 104, Pub. L. 93-492,
88 Stat. 1470 (15 U.S.C. 1397, 1401, 1408, 1411-
1420; delegations of authority at 49 CFR 1.51
and 49 CFR 501.8)

§ 577.1 Scope.

This part sets forth requirements for notifica-
tion to owners of motor vehicles and replacement
equipment about the possibility of a defect
which relates to motor vehicle safety or a non-
compliance with a Federal motor vehicle safety
standard.

§ 577.2 Purpose.

The purpose of this part is to ensure that
notifications of defects or noncompliances ade-
quately inform and effectively motivate owners
of potentially defective or noncomplying motor
vehicles or items of replacement equipment to
have such vehicles or equipment inspected and,
when necessary, remedied as quickly as possible.

S 577.3 Appiication.

This part applies to manufacturers of com-
pleted motor vehicles, incomplete motor vehicles,
and replacement equipment. In the case of
vehicles manufactured in two or more stages,
compliance by either the manufacturer of the in-
complete vehicle, any subsequent manufacturer,
or the manufacturer of affected replacement
equipment shall be considered compilance by
each of those manufacturers.

§ 577.4 Definitions.

For purposes of this part:

"Act" means the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
1391 et seq.

"Administrator" means the Administrator of
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion or his delegate.

"First purchaser" means the first purchaser
in good faith for a purpose other than resale.

"Owners" include purchaser.

S 577.5 Notification pursuant to a manufacturer's
determination.

(a) When a manufacturer of motor vehicles
or replacement equipment determines that any
motor vehicle or item of replacement equipment
produced by him contains a defect which relates
to motor vehicle safety, or fails to conform to an
applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard,
he shall provide notification in accordance with
paragraph (a) of § 577.7, unless the manufac-
turer is exempted by the Administrator (pur-
suant to section 157 of the Act) from giving
such notification. The notification shall contain
the information specified in this section. The
information required by paragraphs (b) and (e)
of this section shall be presented in the form
and order specified. The information required

PART 577-1

by paragraphs (d) through (g) of this section
may be presented in any order. Notification
sent to an owner whose address is in either the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or the Canal Zone
shall be written in both English and Spanish.

(b) An opening statement: "This notice is sent
to you in accordance with the requirements of
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act."

(c) Whichever of the following statements is
appropriate:

(1) "(Manufacturer's name or division) has
determined that a defect which relates to
motor vehicle safety exists in (identified motor
vehicles, in the case of notification sent by a
motor vehicle manufacturer; identified replace-
ment equipment, in the case of notification
sent by a replacement equipment manufac-
turer);" or

(2) "(Manufacturer's name or division) has
determined that (identified motor vehicles, in
the case of notification sent by a motor vehicle
manufacturer; identified replacement equip-
ment, in the case of notification sent by a re-
placement equipment manufacturer) fail to
conform to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard No. (number and title of standard)."

(d) When the manufacturer determines that
the defect or noncompliance may not exist in
each vehicle or item of replacement equipment,
he may include an additional statement to that
effect.

(e) A clear description of the defect or non-
compliance, which shall include—

(1) An identification of the vehicle system
or particular item(s) of motor vehicle equip-
ment affected.

(2) A description of the malfunction that
may occur as a result of the defect or non-
compliance. The description of a noncom-
pliance with an applicable standard shall
include, in general terms, the difference between
the performance of the noncomplying vehicle
or item of replacement equipment and the per-
formance specified by the standard;

(3) A statement of any operating or other
conditions that may cause the malfunction to
occur; and

(4) A statement of the precautions, if any,
that the owner should take to reduce the chance
that the malfunction will occur before the de-
fect or noncompliance is remedied.

(f ) An evaluation of the risk to motor vehicle
safety reasonably related to the defect or non-
compliance.

(1) When vehicle crash is a potential occur-
rence, the evaluation shall include whichever
of the following is appropriate:

(i) A statement that the defect or non-
compliance can cause vehicle crash without
prior warning; or

(ii) A description of whatever prior warn-
ing may occur, and a statement that if this
warning is not heeded, vehicle crash can
occur.

(2) When vehicle crash is not a potential
occurrence, the evaluation must include a state-
ment indicating the general type of injury to
occupants of the vehicle, or to persons outside
the vehicle, that can result from the defect or
noncompliance, and a description of whatever
prior warning may occur.

(g) A statement of measures to be taken to
remedy the defect or noncompliance, in accord-
ance with paragraph (g) (1) or (g) (2) of this
section, whichever is appropriate.

(1) When the manufacturer is required by
the Act to remedy the defect or noncompliance
without charge, or when he will voluntarily so
remedy in full conformity with the Act, he
shall include—

(i) A statement that he will cause such
defect or noncompliance to be remedied
without charge, and whether such remedy
will be by repair, replacement, or (except
in the case of replacement equipment) re-
fund, less depreciation, of the purchase
price.

(ii) The earliest date on which the defect
or noncompliance will be remedied without
charge. In the case of remedy by repair,
this date shall be the earliest date on which
the manufacturer reasonably expects that
dealers or other service facilites will receive
necessary parts and instructions. The manu-
facturer shall specify the last date, if any.

PART 577-2

on which he will remedy tires without
charge.

(iii) In the case of remedy by repair
through the manufacturer's dealers or other
service facilities:

(A) A general description of the work
involved in repairing the defect or non-
compliance; and

(B) The manufacturer's estimate of the
time reasonably necessary to perform the
labor required to correct the defect or non-
compliance.

(iv) In the case of remedy by repair
through service facilities other than those of
the manufacturer or its dealers:

(A) The name and part number of each
part that must be added, replaced, or
modified;

(B) A description of any modifications that
must be made to existing parts which shall
also be identified by name and part number;

(C) Information as to where needed parts
will be available;

(D) A detailed description (including ap-
propriate illustrations) of each step required
to correct the defect or noncompliance;

(E) The manufacturer's estimate of the
time reasonably necessary to perform the
labor required to correct the defect or non-
compliance; and

(F) The manufacturer's recommenda-
tions of service facilities where the owner
should have the repairs performed.

(v) In the case of remedy by replacement,
a description of the motor vehicle or item of
replacement equipment that the manufacturer
will provide as a replacement for the defective
or noncomplying vehicle or equipment.

(vi) In the case of remedy by refund of
purchase price, the method or basis for the
manufacturer's assessment of depreciation.

(vii) A statement informing the owner that
he or she may submit a complaint to the Ad-
ministrator, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 or call the toll-free
Auto Safety Hotline at 800-424-9393
(Washington D.C. area residents may call
426-0123), if the owner believes that-

(A) The manufacturer, distributor, or
dealer has failed or is unable to remedy
the defect or noncompliance without
charge.

(B) The manufacturer has failed or is
unable to remedy the defect or noncom-
pliance without charge—

(1) (In the case of motor vehicles or
items of replacement equipment, other
than tires) within a reasonable time,
which is not longer than 60 days in the
case of repair after the owner's first
tender to obtain repair following the
earliest repair date specified in the no-
tification, unless the period is extended
by the Administrator.

(2) (In the case of tires) after the
date specified in the notification on
which replacement tires will be avail-
able.

(2) When the manufacturer is not required
to remedy the defect or noncompliance with-
out charge and he will not voluntarily so
remedy, the statement shall include—

(i) A statement that the manufacturer is
not required by the Act to remedy without
charge.

(ii) A statement of the extent to which
the manufacturer will voluntarily remedy,
including the method of remedy and any
limitations and conditions imposed by the
manufacturer on such remedy.

(iii) The manufacturer's opinion whether
the defect or noncompliance can be remedied
by repair. If the manufacturer believes that
repair is possible, the statement shall in-
clude the information specified in paragraph
(g) (1) (iv) of this section, except that—

(A) The statement required by para-
graph (g) (1) (iv) (A) of this section shall
also indicate the suggested list price of
each part.

(B) The statement required by para-
graph (G) (1) (iv) (C) of this section shall
also indicate the manufacturer's estimate
of the date on which the parts will be
generally available.

PART 577-3

§ 577.6 Notification pursuant to Administrator's
determination.

(a) Manufacturer-ordered-notification. When
a manufacturer is ordered pursuant to section
152 of the Act to provide notification of a defect
or noncompliance, he shall provide such notifica-
tion in accordance with §§ 577.5 and 577.7, ex-
cept that the statement required by paragraph
(c) of § 577.5 shall indicate that the determina-
tion has been made by the Administrator of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

(b) Provisional notification. When a manu-
facturer does not provide notification as required
by paragraph (a) of this section, and an action
concerning the Administrator's order to provide
such notification has been filed in a United States
District Court, the manufacturer shall, upon the
Administrator's further order, provide in accord-
ance with paragraph (b) of § 577.7 a provisional
notification containing the information specified
in this paragraph, in the order and, where spec-
ified, the form of paragraphs (b) (1) through
(b) (12) of this section.

(1) An opening statement: "This notice is
sent to you in accordance with the require-
ments of the National Traffic and Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Act."

(2) Whichever of the following statements
is appropriate:

(i) "The Administrator of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration has
determined that a defect which relates to
motor vehicle safety exists in (identified
motor vehicles, in the case of notification
sent by a motor vehicle manufacturer; iden-
tified replacement equipment, in the case of
notification sent by a replacement equipment
manufacturer);" or

(ii) "The Administrator of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration has
determined that (identified motor vehicles,
in the case of notification sent by a motor
vehicle manufacturer; identified replacement
equipment, in the case of notification sent
by a replacement equipment manufacturer)
fail to conform to Federal Vehicle Safety
Standard No. (number and title of stand-
ard)."

(3) When the Administrator determines that
the defect or noncompliance may not exist in
each such vehicle or item of replacement
equipment, the manufactiu-er may include an
additional statement to that effect.

(4) The statement: "(Manufacturer's name
or division) is contesting this determination in
a proceeding in the Federal courts and has
been required to issue this notice pending the
outcome of the court proceeding."

(5) A clear description of the Admini-
strator's stated basis for his determination, as
provided in this order, including a brief sum-
mary of the evidence and reasoning that the
Administrator relied upon in making his de-
termination.

(6) A clear description of the Adminis-
trator's stated evaluation as provided in his
order of the risk to motor vehicle safety rea-
sonably related to the defect or noncompliance.

(7) Any measures that the Administrator
has stated in his order should be taken by the
owner to avoid an unreasonable hazard result-
ing from the defect or noncompliance.

(8) A brief summary of the evidence and
reasoning upon which the manufacturer relies
in contesting the Administrator's determina-
tion.

(9) A statement regarding the availability
of remedy and reimbursement in accordance
with paragraph 9(i) or 9(ii) below, whichever
is appropriate.

(i) When the purchase date of the vehicle
or item of equipment is such that the manu-
facturer is required by the Act to remedy
without charge or to reimburse the owner
for reasonable and necessary repair expenses,
he shall include—

(A) A statement that the remedy will
be provided without charge to the owner
if the Court upholds the Administrator's
determination.

(B) A statement of the method of rem-
edy. If the manufacturer has not yet
determined the method of remedy, he shall
indicate that he will select either repair,
replacement with an equivalent vehicle or
item of replacement equipment, or (except

PART 577-4

in the case of replacement equipment) re-
fund, less depreciation, of the purchase
price; and

(C) A statement that, if the Court up-
holds the Administrator's determination,
he will reimburse the owner for any rea-
sonable and necessary expenses that the
owner incurs (not in excess of any amount
specified by the Administrator) in repair-
ing the defect or noncompliance following
a date, specified by the manufacturer,
which shall not be later than the date of
the Administrator's order to issue this
notification.

(ii) When the manufacturer is not re-
quired either to remedy without charge or
to reimburse, he shall include—

(A) A statement that he is not required
to remedy or reimburse, or

(B) A statement of the extent to which
he will voluntarily remedy or reimburse,
including the method of remedy if then
known, and any limitations and conditions
on such remedy or reimbursement.

(10) A statement indicating whether, in the
manufacturers opinion, the defect or noncom-
pliance can be remedied by repair. When the
manufacturer believes that such remedy is
feasible, the statement shall include:

(i) A general description of the work and
the manufacturer's estimate of the costs in-
volved in repairing the defect or noncom-
pliance;

(ii) Information on where needed parts
and instructions for repairing the defect or
noncompliance will be available, including
the manufacturer's estimate of the day on
which they will be generally available;

(iii) The manufacturer's estimate of the
time reasonably necessary to perform the
labor required to correct the defect or non-
compliance; and

(iv) The manufacturer's recommendations
of service facilities where the owner could
have the repairs performed, including (in
the case of a manufacturer required to re-
imburse if the Administrator's determination
is upheld in the court proceeding) at least

one service facility for whose charges the
owner will be fully reimbursed if the Ad-
ministrator's determination is upheld.

(11) A statement that further notice wil be
mailed by the manufacturer to the owner if
the Administrator's determination is upheld
in the court proceeding; and

(12) An address of the manufacturer where
the owner may write to obtain additional in-
formation regarding the notification and rem-
edy.

(c) Post-litigation notification. When a man-
ufacturer does not provide notification as re-
quired in paragraph (a) of this section and the
Administrator prevails in an action commenced
with respect to such notification, the manufac-
turer shall, upon the Administrator's further
order, provide notification in accordance with
paragraph (b) of § 577.7 containing the informa-
tion specified in paragraph (a) of this section,
except that—

(1) The statement required by paragraph
(c) of § 577.5 shall indicate that the determina-
tion has been made by the Administrator and
that his determination has been upheld in a
proceeding in the Federal courts; and

(2) When a provisional notification was is-
sued regarding the defect or noncompliance
and the manufacturer is required under the
Act to reimburse—

(i) The manufacturer shall state that he
will reimburse the owner for any reasonable
and necessary expenses that the owner in-
curred (not in excess of any amount specified
by the Administrator) for repair of the de-
fect or noncompliance of the vehicle or item
of equipment on or after the date on which
provisional notification was ordered to be
issued and on or before a date not sooner
than the date on which this notification is
received by the owner. The manufacturer
shall determine and specify both dates.

(ii) The statement required by paragraph
(g)(1) (vii) of §577.5 shall also inform the
owner that he may submit a complaint to
the Administrator if the owner believes that
the manufacturer has failed to reimburse
adequately.

PART 577-5

(3) If the manufacturer is not required un-
der the Act to reimburse, he shall include—

(i) A statement that he is not required
to reimburse, or

(ii) When he will voluntarily reimburse,
a statement of the extent to which he will
do so, including any limitations and condi-
tions on such reimbursement.

§ 577.7 Time and manner of notification.

(a) The notification required by § 577.5 shall—

(1) Be furnished within a reasonable time
after the manufacturer first determines the
existence of a defect which relates to motor
vehicle safety, or of a noncompliance.

(2) Be accomplished—

(i) In the case of a notification required
to be sent by a motor vehicle manufacturer,
by first class mail to each person who is reg-
istered under State law as the owner of the
vehicle and whose name and address are rea-
sonably ascertainable by the manufacturer
through State records or other sources avail-
able to him. If the owner cannot be reason-
able ascertained, the manufacturer shall
notify the most recent purchaser known to
the manufacturer.

(ii) In the case of a notification required
to be sent by a replacement equipment man-
ufacturer—

(A) By first class mail to the most re-
cent purchaser known to the manufacturer,
and

(B) (Except in the case of a tire) if
determined by the Administrator to be
necessary for motor vehcile safety, by pub-
lic notice in such manner as the Admin-
istrator may determine after consultation
with the manufacturer.

(iii) In the case of a manufacturer re-
quired to provide notification concerning any
defective or noncomplying tire, by first class
or certified mail.

(b) The notification required by any para-
graph of § 577.6 shall be provided:

(1) Within 60 days after the manufacturer's
receipt of the Administrator's order to provide
the notification, except that the notification
shall be furnished within a shorter or longer
period if the Administrator incorporates in his
order a finding that such period is in the pub-
lic interest; and

(2) In the manner and to the recipients
specified in paragraph (a) of this section.

§ 577.8 Discialmers.

(a) A notification sent pursuant to § 577.5 or
§ 577.6 regarding a defect which relates to motor
vehicle safety shall not, except as specifically
provided in this part, contain any statement or
implication that there is no defect, that the defect
does not relate to motor vehicle safety, or that
the defect is not present in the owner's vehicle
or item of replacement equipment.

(b) A notification sent pursuant to § 577.5 or
§ 577.6 regarding a noncompliance with an ap-
plicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard
shall not, except as specifically provided in this
part, contain any statement or implication that
there is not a noncompliance or that the non-
compliance is not present in the owner's vehicle
or item of replacement equipment.

§ 577.9 Conformity to statutory requirements.

A notification that does not conform to the re-
quirements of this part is a violation of the Act.

38 F.R. 2215
January 23, 1973

PART 577-6

Effective: September 30, ]978

PREAMBLE TO PART 579— DEFECT AND NONCOMPLIANCE RESPONSIBILITY

(Docket No. 75-30; Notice 2)

This notice issues a new regulation, Part 579,
Defect and Noncomplia/nce Responsibility. The
puqjose of the regulation is to allocate between
motor vehicle and equipment manufacturers the
responsibilities under the 1974 Motor Vehicle and
Schoolbus Safety Amendments for recalling and
remedying defective or noncomplying motor ve-
hicles and equipment. The regulation makes tire
manufacturers responsible for original equipment
tires as well as tires sold as replacement equip-
ment. Otherwise, the regulation adopts the re-
sponsibility scheme in the 1974 Amendments.
With this notice, the agency defere final action
on its proposal concerning the responsibilities
of original equipment manufacturers that supply
equipment to five or more vehicle manufacturers.
Effective date : September 30, 1978.
Addresses: Petitions for reconsideration should
refer to the docket number and be submitted to:
Room 5108, Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street.
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

For further information contact :

Mr. James Murray, Office of Defects Inves-
tigation, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (202-426-2840).

This notice issues a new regulation. Part 579,
Defect and Noncompliance Responsibility. A
notice of proposed rulemaking was published on
December 5, 1975 (40 F.R. 56930) proposing
some reallocation between motor vehicle and
equipment manufacturei-s of the responsibilities
for safety-relate<l defects and noncompliances
with safety standards. These responsibilities in-
clude the duty to notify purchasers of any safety-
related defects or noncompliances with safety
standards and to make remedy without charge
to the purchaser. Currently, the allocation of
defect and noncompliance responsibility is gov-
erned by section 159(2) of the National Traffic

and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as
amendetl, (the Act) (15 U.S.C. 1419(2)).

The Act authorizes the agency to allocate
equitably responsibility for defects and noncom-
pliances between equipment and vehicle manu-
facturers. The substance of the agency's 1975
NPRM was to shift the burdens of compliance
somewhat from the vehicle to the equipment
manufacturer. As the NPRM on this issue stated,
the legislative historj' of the Act indicates that
the Congress intended for the agency to ensure
that its defect and noncompliance regulations re-
flect the realities of the relationship between
equipment and vehicle manufacturers.

Comments were received from equipment and
vehicle manufacturers and from their representa-
tives. All comments were considered. The Ve-
hicle Equipment Safety Commission did not
submit comments.

General ilotors Corporation suggested that
section 579.1 be changed to indicate that the
regulation applies only to Part. B of the Act,
Discovery, notification, and remedy of motor ve-
hicle defects, not to Part A, General provisions.
Since this regulation exercises the authority
granted by section 159 of the Act and that section
specifically states that it applies only to Part B
of the Act, the agency has incorporated GM's
recommendexl change.

The Midland Ross Corporation suggested that
the agency add several minor definitions to the
list of definitions. They suggested, for example,
that the agency define phrases such as "an item
of motor vehicle equipment," and "an item of
defective or noncomplying equipment."

AVith respect to "motor vehicle equipment," the
agency notes that the term is defined in the
Act at section 102(4). Since the agency does
not intend to alter that definition, the term is
not defined in this section.

PART 579— PRE 1

EfFective: September 30, 1978

"Defective and noncomplying equipment" also
does not require definition for purposes of this
section, since "noncomplying equipment" ob-
viously means equipment that does not comply
with an applicable Federal motor vehicle safety
standard. "Defective equipment," on the other
hand, cannot be defined in a fashion that would
be appropriate for all cases. "Wliether equipment
is defective in a manner that requires action
imder the Act would depend upon the type of
the equipment involved as well as the nature
and extent of the defect. As such, "defective"
is a legal determination made on a case-by-case
basis and the term, therefore, cannot be abso-
lutely defined in advance.

Many manufacturers complained about
NHTSA's definition of "original equipment."
The Eaton and Bendix Corporations, for ex-
ample, indicated that they thought NHTSA
had violated its authority to issue regidations
with respect to this term. They suggested that
section 159 does not grant sufficient latitude for
the agency to alter the Act's definitions to the
extent found in the regulation. The agency
disagrees. The language in section 159, "Except
as otherwise provided in regulations of the Sec-
retary," and the legislative history of that sec-
tion very clearly pennit the agency to modify the
definitions of section 159 of the Act if the agency
detennines that it would be in the interest of an
equitable distribution of enforcement respon-
sibilities upon the various manufacturers. In this
instance, the agency has determined that the
minor definitional changes included in this reg-
ulation will better meet the needs of both the
agency and the manufacturers for efficient re-
calls and remedies.

Several commentei-s questioned the term "ex-
press authorization" as it is used in Part 579.4
(a)(2). The agency stated in the NPKM pre-
amble that express authorization was not limited
to written authorization and that "any type of
express authorization given by the vehicle manu-
facturer for the installation of equipment should
be sufficient to make the manufacturer respon-
sible for that equipment." The preamble went
on to state that "what constitutes adequate au-
thorization will depend upon the facts of each
case." Since the issuance of the preamble, noth-
ing has occurred that leads to a simplified defini-

tion of the term "express authorization." There-
fore, the agency declines to adopt a definition
for this term and restates that it depends upon
the circumstances of each case.

Several commenters indicated that proposed
paragraph (1) under section 579.4(a) was over-
broad in that it required a vehicle manufacturer
to be responsible for equipment manufactured by
him even when that equipment was not in-
stalled by him or at his direction. NHTSA
agrees with these commenters and has deleted
paragraph ( 1 ) from that section and renumbered
the section accordingly.

Section 579.4(b) defines "replacement equip-
ment" to include tires. The commenters on this
paragraph, Goodyear and Firestone, agreed with
this definition. They stated that they thought
it appropriate for tire manufacturers to be re-
sponsible for defects and noncompliances in their
equipment.

With respect to the application of this regula-
tion to the tire manufacturers, several misunder-
standings occurred. Fruehauf Corporation
indicated that the fabricating manufacturer of
a tire sliould be the one responsible for the recall
of those tires and not the brand name owner.
The agency has held the brand name manufac-
turer responsible in the past for tire identification
and recordkeeping (Part 574). The Act in sec-
tion 159(1) holds brand name owners of tires
responsible for defects and noncompliances by
specifying that the brand name owner shall be
deemed the manufacturer of the tires. The agency
sees no reason to alter this established pattern
of responsibility. However, a fabricating manu-
facturer and brand name manufacturer might
establish by contract that the fabricating manu-
facturer would conduct all notification and recall
campaigns.

In the preamble to the NPRM, the agency
erroneously stated that tire manfacturers were
required to retain the names and addresses of the
owners of vehicles upon which their tires were
mounted as original equipment. Tire manufac-
turers pointed out that this was inaccurate. Part
574 requires tire manufacturers to retain lists of
people to whom their tires were sold, including
vehicle manufacturers. The vehicle manufac-
turer would have the names of the owners of the

PART 579— PRE 2

Effective: Ssplember 30, 1978

vehicles upon which potentially defective or non-
compljing tires were mounted and, if necessary,
would supply that list to a tire manufacturer
undertaking a recall campaign.

Proposed Part 579.5(a) and (b) received very
few comments. Commenters to these provisions
suggested only minor modifications in their lan-
guage. GM and the Motor Vehicle Manufac-
turers Association suggested that the term
"safety-related" be added to both sections before
defect to indicate that manufacturers only had
responsibilities for such defects. Under the Act,
manufacturers need only recall and remedy de-
fects that are in fact determined to be safety-
related. Accordingly, the agency agrees with the
commenters and amends the language of the sec-
tion accordingly.

GM stated that the last part of paragraph (a)
of proposed section 579.5 is unnecessary. That
part of the sentence that read "installed on or
in the vehicle at the time of its delivery to the
first purchaser" is identical to the sentence in
section 579.4(a) that defines original equipment.
Therefore, its inclusion at this point is redundant
and unnecessary. The agency has modified the
section by the deletion of that portion of the
sentence.

NHTSA is publishing this regulation without
taking final action on proposed section 579.5(c),
and is modifying 579.5(a) to delete all reference
to paragraph (c). Paragraph (c) would have
placed defect and noncompliance responsibilities
upon equipment manufacturers that supplied

equipment to five or more vehicle manufacturers.
This action is being taken without making any
substantive determination on the merits of para-
graph (c). A subsequent notice will deal with
that paragraph and the comments thereon. How-
ever, due to the delay in the issuance of this
Part and mindful of the fact that the modified
definitions are important to the agency's enforce-
ment scheme, NHTSA has determined that it
is in the interest of efficiency to adopt the
definitions sections of this regulation as proposed
with some minor motlifications, while retaining
a responsibility section that basically retains the
same responsibility provisions as the Act.

The agency has reviewed this regulation with
respect to its potential costs and other impacts
and has determined that any costs or other im-
pacts will be minimal.

Accordingly, Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations is amended by the addtion of Part
579

(Sees. 103, 108, 112, 113, Pub. L. 89-563, 80
Stat. 718, Sec. 102, Pub. L. 93-492, 88 Stat. 1470
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1397, 1401, 1411-1420; delega-
tion of authority at 49 CFR 1.60.)

Issued on August 24, 1978.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

43 F.R. 38833-38834
August 31, 1978

PART 579— PRE 3-4

PART 579— DEFECT AND NONCOMPLIANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY

S*c.

579.1 Scope.

579.2 Purpose.

579.3 Application.

579.4 Definitions.

579.5 Defect and noncompliance responsibility.

§ 579.1 Scope.

This part sets forth the responsibilities under
Part B of the Act of manufacturers for safety-
related defects and noncompliances with Federal
motor vehicle safety standards in motor vehicles
and items of motor vehicle equipment.

I 579.2 Purpose.

The purpose of this part is to facilitate the
notification of owners of defective and non-
complying motor vehicles and items of motor
vehicle equipment, and the remedy of defective
and noncomplying vehicles and items of equip-
ment, by equitably reapportioning the respon-
sibility for safety-related defects and noncom-
pliances with Federal motor vehicle safety
standards among manufacturers of motor vehicles
and motor vehicle equipment.

§ 579.3 Application.

This part applies to all manufacturers of
motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment.

I 579.4 Definitions.

(a) "Original equipment" means an item of
motor vehicle equipment (other than a tire)
which was installed in or on a motor vehicle at
the time of its delivery to the first purchaser if—

(1) The item of equipment was installed on
or in the motor vehicle at the time of its delivery
to a dealer or distributor for distribution; or

(2) The item of equipment was installed by
the dealer or distributor with the express au-
thorization of the motor vehicle manufacturer.

(b) "Replacement equipment" means—

(1) Motor vehicle equipment other than
original equipment as defined in paragraph (a)
of this section; and

(2) Tires.

(c) "The Act" means the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended.

§ 579.5 Defect and noncompliance responsibility.

(a) Each manufacturer of a motor vehicle
shall be responsible for any safety-related defect
or any noncompliance determined to exist in the
vehicle or in any item of original equipment.

(b) Each manufacturer of an item of replace-
ment equipment shall be responsible for any
safety-related defect or any noncompliance deter-
mined to exist in the equipment.

43 F.R. 38835
August 31, 1978

PART 579-1-2

Effactiv*: March 1, 1973

PREAMBLE TO PART 580— ODOMETER DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

(Docket No. 72-31; Notice 2)

The purpose of this notice is to estabish a reg-
ulation that will require a person who transfers
ownership in a motor vehicle to give his buyer
a written disclosure of the mileage the vehicle
has traveled. The regulation carries out the di-
rective of section 408(a) of the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act, Public Law
92-513, 86 Stat. 947, and completes the provi-
sions of the Act under Title TV, Odometer
Requirements.

The regulation was first proposed in a notice
published in the Federal Register on December 2,
1972 (37 F.R. 25727). As a result of numerous
comments on the proposal, the regulation as is-
sued today diflFers in some respects from its ini-
tial form.

As stated in the proposal, the agency's goals
were to link the disclosure statement as closely
as possible to the documents required for transfer
of ownership, so that buyers and sellers would
know of the need for disclosure, and to do so in a
manner that would not introduce an additional
document into motor vehicle transactions. The
agency therefore proposed the use of the certifi-
cate of title as the document for odometer dis-
closure.

Upon review of the comments, it became evi-
dent that in most jurisdictions it would not be
feasible to use the title certificate to convey odom-
eter information. The main drawback to its use
lies in the prevalence of state laws providing
that if a vehicle is subject to a lien, the title is
held by the lienholder. As a result, it appears
that in a majority of cases private parties selling
motor vehicles do not have possession of a cer-
tificate of title, and convey their interest by other
means.

In those States that permit the owner of a
vehicle subject to a lien to retain the title, the

lienholder will be unable to make the odometer
disclosure on the title if he attempts to sell the
vehicle after repossession. In many States,
furthermore, the title certificate is not large
enough to contain an adequate odometer dis-
closure, and the existing data processing and
filing equipment would not accommodate an en-
larged certificate.

There appears to have been some apprehension
that the Federal government intended to compel
the States to amend their certificates of title.
The Act does not, however, confer any authority
over the States in this regard. Even if the regu-
lation were to require transferor disclosure on the
title, the States could decline to provide a form
for disclosure on the title. This voluntary aspect
of the States' participation is a further impedi-
ment to the use of the title certificate.

After review of the problems created by the
use of the certificate of title, the agency has de-
cided that the purposes of the Act are better
served by prescribing a separate form as the dis-
closure document in most cases. Section 580.4
has been amended accordingly. To avoid the
need for duplicate State and Federal disclosures
in States having odometer disclosure laws or
regulations, the section permits the State form
to be used in satisfaction of the Federal require-
ment, so long as it contains equivalent informa-
tion and refers to the e.xistence of a Federal
remedy.

It should be noted that although the certificate
of title is no longer required to be used for dis-
closure, it can still be used as the disclosure
document if it contains the required information
and if it is held by the transferor and given by
him to the transferee. The basic concept is that
the disclosure must be made as part of the trans-
fer, and not at some later time.

PART 580— PRE 1

ERacllva: March ], 1973

In addition to tlie changes from tlie proposal
represented by the change from the certificate of
title to a separate form, there are other differences
from the proposal in the regulation. For pur-
poses of convenience, the following discussion
treats the amended sections in sequence.

In section 580..3, the proposed definition of
transferor might in some jurisdictions include a
jjerson who creates a security interest in a vehicle.
This tyi)e of transaction was not intended to be
regulated, and the definitions have been amended
accordiiifrly.

In section 580.4, in addition to the changes dis-
cussed above, other modifications have been made.
In response to a comment suggesting that the
disclosure would be made after the purchaser
had become committed to buying the vehicle,
tiie order of § 580.4(a) has been rearranged to
specify that the odometer disclosure is to be
made before the other transfer documents are
executed.

The items listed under § 580.4(a) have been
increased to allow for additional identification
of the vehicle and owner that would be necessary
on a separate disclosure document. If the dis-
closure is a part of another document, however,
§ 580.4(a)(1) provides that items (2) through
(4) need not be repeated if found elsewhere in
the document. A number of comments noted
that the items under (a) might often be redun-
dant.

A new paragraph (b) has been inserted in
§ 580.4 to require a reference to the sanctions
provided by the Act. No specific form is re-
quired, but the inclusion of such a statement is
considered essential to notify the transferee of
the reason why he is being given the odometer
information.

The former paragraph (b) of § 580.4 has been
renumbered as (c), and the alternative methods
for odometer disclosure discussed above are found
as paragraphs (d) and (e).

A new section, § 580.5, Exemptions, has been
added in response to a number of comments that
objected to the application of the requirements
to categories of vehicles for which the odometer
is not used as a guide to value. Buses and large
trucks, for example, are routinely driven hun-
dreds of tliousands of miles, and their main-

tenance records have traditionally been relied on
by buyers as the principal guide to their condi-
tion. The NHTSA is in agreement with the
position taken by Freightliner, White, and the
National Association of Motor Bus Operators,
and has therefore created an exemption for larger
vehicles. The exemption applies to vehicles
having gross vehicle weight ratings of more than
16,000 pounds.

A second category of exempt vehicles has been
created for antique vehicles, whose value is a
function of their age, condition, and scarcity, and
for which the odometer mileage is irrelevant. A
third exempt category consists of vehicles that are
not self-propelled, such as trailers, most of which
are not equipped with odometers.

Several vehicle manufacturers stated that the
proposal would require them to give disclosure
statements to their distributors and dealers, and
that such a requirement would be both burden-
some and pointless. Upon consideration of the
nature of manufacturer-dealer transactions, it has
been decided to exempt transfers of new vehicles
that occur prior to the first sale of the vehicle for
purposes other than resale.

The odometer disclosure form set forth in
§ 580.6 has been reworded to make it clearer.
Space for additional information about the ve-
hicle and owner has been included so that the
vehicle will be readily identifiable if the dis-
closure statement becomes separated from the
other transfer documents. In accordance with
the instructions of the Act, the transferor is
directed to state that the mileage is unknown if
he knows that the actual mileage differs from
the mileage shown on the odometer. Although
several comments suggested that the true mileage,
if known, should be stated, such a statement is
not provided for in the Act and would not
afford the buyer with reliable information about
the vehicle.

The effective date proposed in the notice was
to have been six months after issuance. Two
States, perhaps under the impression that they
were required to change their forms, requested
an additional six months. Other comments,
notably that of the National Automobile Dealers
Association, urged an immediate effective date in
order to make the disclosure requirements coin-

PART 580— PRE 2

EffacNvc March 1, 1973

cide with the effect Lveness of the other parts of
Title IV of the Act. Upon consideration of the
important contribution the disclosure require-
ments make to the effectiveness of the Act's
other provisions, it has been decided thai an ef-
fective date earlier than six months after issuance
is advisable.

Accordingly, the regulation is to become effec-
tive March 1, 1973. Although it is likely that
most private persons will remain unaware of the
disclosure requirements for some time after
March 1, 1973, a person who does not know of
the requirement will not have "intent to defraud"
imder section 409(a) of the Act and will there-
fore not be subject to liability solely because he
has failed to make the required statement. The
persons most immediately affected by the dis-
closure requirements are commercial enterprises
such as dealers and wholesalers, and of these the

largest group, represented by NADA, has
already indicated its desire for an early effective
date. The earlier effective date is therefore con-
sidered appropriate.

In consideration of the foregoing, a new Part
580, Odometer Disclosure Requirements, is added
to Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, to read
as set forth below.

Issued under the authority of section 408(a)
of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost
Savings Act, P.L. 92-513, 86 Stat. 947, and the
delegation of authority at 49 C.F.R. 1.51.

Issued on January 23, 1973.

Douglas W. Toms,
Administrator.

38 F.R. 2978
January 31, 1973

PART 580— PRE 3-4

Effectlva: January I, 1978

PREAMBLE TO PART 580— ODOMETER DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

(Docket No. 77-03; Notice 2)

This notice amends the odometer disclosure
statement that must be executed upon each sale
of a motor vehcile. The fonner statement often
proved confusing and was sometimes used in a
misleading manner. The amended statement is
clearer and less likely to be misused.
EflFective date : January 1, 1978.
For further information contact:

Kathleen DeMeter, Office of the Chief Coun-
sel, National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washing-
ton, D.C. 20590 (202-426-1834).

Supplementary information: The disclosure
statement is required by 49 CFR Part 580, Odom-
eter Disclosure Requirements, a regulation issued
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration (NHTSA) to implement the require-
ments of the Motor Vehicle Information and
Cost Savings Act (Pub. L. 92-513, as amended
by Pub. L. 94-364; 15 U.S.C. 1901-1991). The
regulation, which has been in effect since March 1,
1973, requires each transferor of a motor vehicle
to give the transferee a written statement attest-
ing to the accuracy of the vehicle's odometer.

Experience with the regulation has shown sev-
eral respects in which it should be improved. In
response to a petition for rulemalcing submitted
by the National Automobile Dealers Association,
and in recognition of the need for improvements
in the disclosure statement, the NHTSA issued a
notice on February 9, 1977 (42 F.R. 9045) which
proposed changes in the form and content of tlie
odometer disclosure statement.

Differences between proposed mul fnal rule.
The final rule differs from the proposed rule in
several respects. The notice had proposed to re-
quire the disclosure form to include the last
license plate number, State and year. In view of
the number of comraenters who stated that this

information was not needed to identify a vehicle
or to trace a vehicle's history, the agency has de-
cided to delete this requirement from the final
rule.

The notice proposed a substantial enlargement
of the disclosure form, including a certification
that the odometer was either not altered, or al-
tered for repair or replacement purposes only.
This certification had been proposed in response
to the NADA petition, and drew few critical
comments. Two commenters raised Fifth Amend-
ment questions concerning these additional boxes.
The Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare's Office of Consumer Affairs noted that these
alternative certifications might give rise to pos-
sible violations of the transferor's right against
self-incrimination since a willful false certifica-
tion may amount to an admission of a violation
of the Act. The NHTSA, however, believes that
no Fifth Amendment problem could arise. In
cases dealing with this issue the Supreme Court
has held that where the dominant purpose of a
record-keeping requirement is to compel criminals
to keep incriminating records, the statute is in-
valid and the 5th Amendment may be invoked.
However, where the record-keeping requirements
have an independent purpose and do not involve
a selective group which is inherently suspect of
criminal activities, the statute is valid and the
5th Amendment may not be invoked. All busi-
nessmen, as well as all consumers, who sell auto-
mobiles would be required to execute odometer
disclosure statements. Statements are not re-
((iiired only of those individuals who are most
often found to tamper with otlometers. The pri-
mary purpose of a statement is to inform a poten-
tial buyer of the car's mileage so that he may
liave an index to the condition and value of the
\eliic.le. The fact that individuals who tamper
with vehicle odometers would be executing in-

PART 580— PRE 5

EfFeclive: January I, 1978

criminating records is not the dominant purpose
of this requirement. Consequently, these provi-
sions will be retained in the final rule with one
minor change suggested by a commenter. In
view of the fact that these certifications actually
involve three separate statements, instead of two
as indicated in the NPRM, the NHTSA had de-
cided to divide the second certification into two:
first, that the odometer was altered and the
mileage is identical to that before repair; and
second, that the odometer was altered and reset to
zero, with a statement of the mileage on the
original odometer or the odometer before repair.

Several commenters suggested that the trans-
feree's name and address should be provided in a
disclosure statement, in addition to his signature.
This would provide a useful tool in tracing the
vehicle's history and consequently, the NHTSA
has decided to require that this information be
included.

With the gradual conversion to the metric sys-
tem now going on in the United States, the regu-
lation has also been changed to provide for
odometer readings that are expressed in kilo-
meters where the vehicle records the distance
traveled in metric units.

The bulk of the comments received were favor-
able. The primary objection was that the pro-
posed final effective date of April 15, 1977, did
not allow adequate time for new forms to be pre-
pared and printed. In addition, it would have
increased costs because it would not have allowed
sufficient time for stocks of the present form to be
depleted. In response to these comments, the
agency has adopted an effective date of January
1, 1978.

One of the original goals of NHTSA was to
link the disclosure statement as closely as possible
to the documents required for transfer of owner-
ship, so that buyers and sellers would know of
the need for disclosure. To accomplish this goal
in a manner that would not introduce an addi-
tional document into motor vehicle transactions,
the agency proposed to use the certificate of title
as the document for odometer disclosure.

The comments to that initial proposal per-
suaded the agency that providing the odometer
reading on the title would not be feasible as the

sole method of disclosure. NHTSA still believes,
however, that placing odometer information on
the certificate of title will be useful both to con-
sumers and to law enforcement officials. This
belief is substantiated by a recent resolution of
the National Association of Attorneys General,
which endorsed odometer information on State
certificates of title as the most effective means to
ensure a permanent record of the mileage history
of a motor vehicle, and by the development by
the American Association of Motor Vehicle Ad-
ministrators of model procedures for the disclo-
sure of odometer information on vehicle titles.
Such a record would be easily accessible to gov-
ernmental enforcement agencies as well as pro-
spective purchasers of used motor vehicles.

The notice of February 7, 1977, proposed to
allow the use of a State document containing
odometer disclosure information if the State
document contained "all" of the information re-
quired on the Federal form. A comment from
the Attorney General of Ohio pointed out that it
would be difficult for States to include "all" of
the odometer information on their titles because
of the limited space available. Consequently,
NHTSA has decided to revise § 580.4(f) to ac-
commodate those States that provide odometer
information on their titles by establishing a pro-
cedure under which States can have their titles
approved for use as odometer disclosure state-
ments. In view of the utility of titles and their
limited space, the procedure would permit short-
ening the odometer provisions on the title where
necessary. Although a shorter disclosure might
sacrifice clarity to a degree, the agency regards
this as an acceptable price for gaining the bene-
fits of a combined title and odometer disclosure.

States that wish to have their certificates of
title satisfy the Federal odometer disclosure re-
quirements must meet the basic provisions of the
Federal requirement, with the following excep-
tions:

(1) The citation to the Federal law may be
deleted in favor of a reference to State law. The
reference provisions could then state that "Fed-
eral and State regulations require you to state the
odometer mileage upon transfer of ownership.
(Citation to State law instead of Federal law)."

PART 580— PRE 6

EfF«cliva: January 1, 1978

(2) The initial statement of the odometer read-
ing and the following alternate certifications
should be included on the title. States may, how-
ever, condense that information as long as none
of the certifications are lost. An example of such
condensation could be "I certify to the best of my

knowledge that the odometer reading is

and reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle de-
scribed herein or (check if applicable).

□ 1. The amount of mileage stated is in ex-
cess of 99,999 miles, or

□ 2. The odometer reading is not the actual
mileage."

3. The transferee's signature must still appear
on the title but it need not expressly indicate
acknowledgement of receipt of the disclosures.

4. The certification that the odometer was
either not altered or altered for repair or replace-
ment purposes may be deleted.

All deviations on the certificate of title from
the Federal requirements must be approved by
the XHTSA prior to the use of State titles as
substitutes for the Federal form. The exceptions
noted above are to be used by the States only as
guides in preparing conforming titles. In order
for the citizens of a State to use the certificate of
title as their odometer disclosure form, the Ad-
ministrator of the State Department of Motor
Vehicles must first request an exemption from the
provision of the disclosure requirement by sub-
mitting such request in writing with a copy of
the proposed certificate of title. The NHTSA
will then notify the Administrator of its decision
to accept or refuse the request and the reasons
for its decision. Upon receipt of the NHTSA's
acceptance of the request for an exemption, the
State may proceed with a campaign to notify
consumers, dealers and distributors of such ac-
ceptance. It shall be the State's responsibility
to publicize that its title may be used in place of
the odometer disclosure statement.

AdditioTwl comments. One commenter asked
whether there would be specifications for size.
There are none, with the understanding that all
print should be legible to the naked eye. Another
commenter suggested that section 580.4(c)(3) be
changed to add the word "believed" so that the

reading would be "I hereby certify that to the
best of my knowledge the odometer reading as
stated above is believed NOT to be the actual
mileage. . . ." NHTSA considers this addition
unnecessary because the certification already
states "to the best of my knowledge."

A commenter proposed that the form should Ije
amended to say that the names and addresses of
prior owners are available from a State agency.
NHTSA has determined that this should not be
added. The addresses are not available from
some State agencies and such a provision would
therefore be of limited utility. Another addition
that was suggested was to add a reference to the
minimum damages and attorneys fees available
under the Federal law. This was proposed to
alert consumers to the fact that certain impedi-
ments to enforcement, such as the expense of
lawyers and proof of actual damages, are re-
moved by the Act. These references, like any
other additions desired by the States or trans-
ferors, may be added, but will not be required
due to space limitations and to a determination
that they are not necessary if there is sufficient
publicity of the law.

An individual commented that the seller should
be allowed to estimate the amount of mileage
difference and explain the error. There is cer-
tainly no prohibition against a seller doing so,
but NHTSA sees no benefit to be gained in re-
quiring this. A buyer can, and certaintly should,
request such information, but anyone who has
violated the Act will, nonetheless, not provide a
truthful statement of the mileage difference or
the reason for that difference. The result could
be that a buyer is unknowingly led into reliance
on this false statement, whereas an independent
check of his own could have produced the truth.

It was suggested that positive introductory
statements be used for the certification sections.
The commenter noted that in its experience, when
a positive introductory statement is lacking, the
seller fails to check any box. Its proposal would

modify the statement as follows: "I

state that the odometer now reads

miles and I hereby certify that to the best

of my knowledge the odometer reading as stated
above reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle

PART 580— PRE 7

Effective: January 1, 1978

described below, unless one of the following state-
ments is checked.

□ (1) I hereby certify that the odometer
reading reflects the amount of mileage in ex-
cess. . . ."

□ (2) I hereby certify that to the best of my
knowledge the odometer reading as stated above
is NOT . . ."

The NHTSA has not experienced the failure to
check a box when a positive introductory state-
ment is lacking and consequently, will retain the
statement in the proposed rule. Should it become
evident that a positive introductory statement is
needed, further rulemaking will be undertaken.
It should be noted that the form suggested by
this commenter would significantly shorten the
length of this provision, thus it would be an
acceptable alternative only where the odometer
disclosure is on the certificate of title.

A suggestion was made to provide a notice that
an auxiliary odometer had been used in the ve-
hicle. The auxiliary odometer would interrupt
the operation of the regular odometer and cause
it to register less than the vehicle's actual mile-
age. The seller would therefore be required by
the present language of the regulation to notify
the buyer of the odometer error. In view of this,
NHTSA considers it unnecessary to refer spe-
cifically to an auxiliary odometer.

It was also suggested that the owner of a ve-
hicle be allowed to replace or adjust the odometer
to reflect actual mileage. The commenter noted
that occasionally odometers jump ahead 10, 20,
or 30 thousand miles and if the odometer cannot
be altered to read the actual mileage instead of
the mileage on the odometer before repair or re-
placement, the trade-in value would be drastically
decreased to the harm of the owner. NHTSA
believes that the few cases in which the odometer
malfunctions and rolls forward too fast are too
slight to justify this provision. Such a provision
would create a loophole for those who wanted to
roll back their odometer and then claim that it

was rolling over too fast and they had to fix it
by moving it backward. Anyone whose odometer
did jump could replace or repair the odometer,
set it to zero so that a buyer would not be misled
by the odometer reading, and upon sale provide
a statement to the buyer that the mileage is NOT
actual and that the actual mileage is less than
that shown on the odometer or on the repair or
replacement sticker. More importantly, it should
be noted that the repair and replacement pro-
visions, wherein the owner is required to reset the
odometer to the mileage before repair or replace-
ment or to zero, are part of the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act (section
407(a)). Consequently, they are not susceptible
to change by NHTSA, but only by Congress.

Requests by commenters that odometer read-
ings be required on registration forms, that state-
ments be required to be retained, and that
manufacturers be required to furnish 6 digit
odometers are not applicable to this rulemaking
action. It should be noted that a retention re-
quirement for odometer disclosure statements will
be issued soon and that a proposed rule requiring
tamper-proof odometers which indicate when
they have exceeded 100,000 miles or kilometers
was issued on December 7, 1976. The proposed
effective date of the latter rule is September 1,
1979.

In consideration of the foregoing. Part 580,
Odometer Disclosure Requirements is amended. . .

The lawyer principally responsible for this rule
is Kathleen DeMeter.

(Sec. 408, Pub. L. 92-513, 86 Stat. 962, as
amended by Pub. L. 94-364, 90 Stat. 983 (15
U.S.C. 1988) ; delegation of authority at 49 CFR
501.8(i).)

Issued on July 25, 1977.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

42 F.R. 38906-38908
August 1, 1977

PART 580— PRE 8

Effective: March 9, 1978

PREAMBLE TO PART 580— ODOMETER DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

(Docket No. 77-06; Notice 2)

The Secretary of Transportation is authorized
by the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost
Savings Act to specify requirements for retention
of odometer statements by dealers and distribu-
tors of motor vehicles. This notice prescribes the
manner in which this information should be re-
tained. The intended effect of this regulation is
to afford the government and aggrieved parties
documentation necessary to prove a violation of
the Act, and to pinpoint exactly where the viola-
tion occurred.

Effective date : March 9, 1978.
For further information contact:
Kathleen DeMeter, Office of Chief Counsel,
National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration, 400 Seventh Street, SW.. Washing-
ton, D.C. 20590 (202-426-1834).

Supplementary information: The Motor Ve-
hicle Information and Cost Savings Act (Pub. L.
92-513, 86 Stat. 947-963, 15 U.S.C. 1901-1999)
directed the Secretary of Transportation to issue
regulations to require each transferor of a motor
vehicle to give the transferee a written statement
of the mileage shown on the vehicle's odometer
and to advise the transferee if the mileage shown
on the odometer was known to be different from
the vehicle's actual mileage. A regulation was
issued pursuant to section 408 of the Act to pre-
scribe the manner of disclosure (49 CFR Part
580), but the Secretary chose not to exercise the
authority given him under subsection 408(a) to
specify the manner in which such information
was to be retained.

The 1976 amendments to the Act (Pub. L.
94-364, 90 Stat. 981) conferred extensive investi-
gative powers upon the Secretary. One effect of
the.se new powers is to enhance the value of a
record retention requirement as an investigatory
tool. The disclosure statement plays an impor-

tant role in the investigation of odometer tamper-
ing and fraud. In order to prove that an
odometer lias been rolled back or otherwise tamp-
ered with in violation of the Act, it must be pos-
sible to ascertain the amount of actual mileage
the vehicle has been driven. An effective way of
discovering this information is by examining pre-
vious odometer mileage statements required to be
executed by all owners in the chain of title.

To enhance the ability of the statement to pro-
tect all future transferees a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) was issued on November 1,
1977, which would not only require the dealers
and distributors to retain for four years the state-
ments issued to them but would also require them
to retain for four years a copy of each statement
which they issued. Such retentions would afford
the government and aggrieved parties the neces-
sary documentation to prove a violation of the
Act, and also to pinpoint exactly where that vio-
lation occurred. All of the comments submitted
in response to the NPRM have been considered
and the most significant ones are discussed below.

The final rule is almost identical to the NPRM.
Tlie NPRM proposed that odometer mileage
statements be retained in chronological order.
The final rule permits mileage statements to be
retained in an order appropriate to the business
requirements of each dealer and distributor. A
majority of commenters objected to the chrono-
logical order provision. A number of other
methods of filing were suggested, such as by ve-
hicle identification number and alphabetical order
by the customer's last name. Due to the wide
variety of methods of filing presently used, the
NHTSA believes that a single mandated method
of filing would result in unnecessary cost and
du]>lication. Therefore, tlie new section permits
dealers and distributors to retain odometer mile-
age statements in a manner consistent with their

PART 580— PRE 9

EfFecfive: March 9, 1978

existing recordkeeping procedures. The section
requires that however the recordkeeping system
is organized, it must permit a systematic retrieval
of odometer statements.

One commenter suggested that a longer lead-
time was necessary to accommodate changes in
filing procedures. However, since recordkeeping
requirements need not be changed, there should
be no lead time problems.

Several commenters objectefd to the scope of
the rule. There appeared to be some confusion
among the commenters as to whether the rule
applied to insurance companies, manufacturers
and financial institutions. The final rule applies
to all dealers and distributors of motor vehicles.
A "dealer" is defined in section 402 of the Act as
"any person who has sold 5 or more motor ve-
hicles in the past 12 months to purchasers who
in good faith purchase such vehicles for purposes
other than resale." A "distributor" is defined in
the same section as "any person who has sold 5
or more vehicles in the past 12 months for re-
sale." Given these definitions, a manufacturer
would be a "distributor." However, § 580.5 of
Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations specifically
exempt manufacturers who sell vehicles to dealers
from the requirements of executing disclosure
statements. Section 583.7 of this final rule has
been reworded to make it clear that only those
"dealers" and "distributors" who are required to
execute disclosure statements must retain them.
Financial institutions and insurance companies do

not fall within any of the exemptions set forth in
§ 580.5, so they must execute and retain the state-
ments unless the transfers involve vehicles that
are so badly damaged that they cannot be re-
turned to the road. In such transfers, the agency
has ruled that the damaged vehicles are no longer
"motor vehicles" for purposes of the disclosure
regulations.

In light of the foregoing, Part 580, Odometer
Disclosure Requirements, of Title 49, Code of
Federal Regulations, is amended as set forth
below.

The lawyer principally responsible for this rule
is Kathleen DeMet«r.

The rule does not require any persons to create
additional records or to alter their business prac-
tices apart from keeping records they might once
have discarded. In view of the expected benefits
to the Department's enforcement program, it is
found for good cause that the rule may be issued
with an immediate effective date.

(Sees. 408, 414, Pub. L. 92-513, 86 Stat. 947,
as amended Pub. L. 94-364, 90 Stat. 981 (15
U.S.C. 1988, 1990(d)); delegation of authority
at 49 CFR 1.50(f).).

Issued on March 7, 1978.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

43 F.R. 10921-10922
March 16, 1978

PART 580— PRE 10

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 580-ODOMETER DISCLOSURE

REQUIREMENTS

(Docket No. 77-06; Notice 4)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice allows States to use an
abbreviated odometer disclosure statement on all
motor vehicle ownership documents. The existing
regulation permitted the shortened form to be used
merely on the certificate of title. The purpose of
this expansion is to increase State usage of
odometer disclosure statements.

DATE: The effective date is the date of publication
in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kathleen DeMeter, Office of Chief Counsel,
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590. (202-426-1834).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 408 of
the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings
act (15 U.S.C. 1988) requires each transferor of a
motor vehicle to provide to the transferee a
written disclosure of the distance travelled by the
vehicle. 49 CFR Part 580 prescribes the informa-
tion to be included on the disclosure statement. On
August 1, 1977, NHTSA amended the odometer
disclosure statement (42 FR 38906). The amended
statement is clearer than the former statement
and less likely to be misused, but it is also longer.
NHTSA has urged the States to include the
odometer statement on the title. Six States had
included the original statement. In commenting on
the longer statement, several States observed that
the title, with its size limitations, presented more
problems with inclusion of the odometer statement
than did other documents relating to the transfer
and ownership of motor vehicles. Because of this,
the 1977 amendment specifically allowed a
shortened form to be used on certificates of title,
but not on other ownership documents.

On May 7, 1979, the NHTSA issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking in which it granted a petition

by the American Association of Motor Vehicle
Administrators (AAMVA) to amend the Federal
odometer disclosure requirements to allow the
abbreviated form to be used on ownership
documents other than the certificate of title (44 FR
28032). The AAMVA emphasized that many of the
State documents used to evidence ownership of
motor vehicles are too small to accommodate the
additional information required. They argued that
States should not have to rely on separate
odometer forms for these transfers but should be
allowed to use the shortened form on all documents
which evidence ownership, not only on the
certificate of title.

Seven States responded to the notice of proposed
rulemaking. Comments were received from the
motor vehicle departments in Virginia,
Washington, Delaware, Wisconsin, New Jersey,
Texas, and Oregon. Most comments were
favorable. The Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles
asked that the short form be acceptable on all
applications for title. The more State documents
that contain mileage information the more difficult
it will be for odometer rollbacks to go undetected.
Consequently, the NHTSA encourages the use of
the short form on applications for title as well as
certificates of title.

Washington and Wisconsin suggested respec-
tively that the introductory paragraph citing the
Federal law be deleted or shortened due to
document size limitations. The August 1, 1977,
amendment to the disclosure form noted that a
reference to State law may be substituted for the
citation to the Federal law.

Consistent with this interpretation, it is the
agency's opinion that the actual law need not be
cited if a warning statement appears such as that
suggested by Washington, "Warning False
Statements Violate Federal Law."

PART 580; PRE- 11

The Texas State Department of Highways and
Public Transportation offered the only negative
comments to the proposal. It argued that a pur-
chaser who finances a motor vehicle could not
execute a form on the certificate of title at the time
of sale because the certificate is held by a bank or
financial institution as security. Although the
Texas comment illustrates the difficulties of trying
to require the use of titles for odometer disclosure,
the amendment is permissive and would not
require Texas to change its practices in any way.

In accordance with Executive Order 12044, the
regulation has been reviewed for environmental
and economic impacts. It has been determined that
the cost of implementing this regulation will be
minimal. There are no additional requirements.

The regulation permits States to provide certain
information on ownership documents but does not
require them to do so. There are no environmental
or other economic impacts, therefore, this regula-
tion is not significant.
Issued on December 20, 1979.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator, National
Highway Traffic Safety
Administration

45 F.R. 784
January 3, 1980

PART 580; PRE- 12

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 580

Odometer Disclosure Requirements
[Docl(et No. 81-13; Notice 2]

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This rule amends 49 CFR Part 580 to
exempt from the Odometer Disclosure
Requirements all sales of new motor vehicles by a
motor vehicle manufacturer directly to any
agency of the United States. The purpose of this
exemption, which is being issued pursuant to a
petition by , General Motors Corporation, is to
relieve manufacturers of the burden of complying
with this requirement.

EFFECTIVE DATE: December 20. 1982.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Since
March 1, 1973, a regulation (49 CFR Part 580) has
been in effect which requires the transferor of a
motor vehicle to make written disclosure to the
transferee concerning the odometer reading and
its accuracy. This regulation lists four exceptions
where the transferor need not disclose the
vehicle's mileage.

On December K), 1981, in response to a petition
from General Motors Corporation, NHTSA
published (46 F.R. 60482) a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) which proposed creating a
fifth category of exempt transactions. That
category consists of all sales in conformity with
contractual specifications of motor vehicles by a
manufacturer directly to any agency of the
United States. GM noted that most of a vehicle
manufacturer's transfers are already exempt
from the disclosure requirements and this
exemption would merely extend the existing
exemption. GM stressed that the disclosure
requirements were designed to protect
consumers against odometer fraud in retail
transactions. The conditions lending themselves

to fraud in the retail market are, GM argued, non-
existent in manufacturer-to-government sales.

Two comments were received in response to
the NPRM. Chrysler Corporation supported the
proposed change without qualification. PACCAR,
Inc. supported the concept of the additional
exemption and the rationale behind it, but
expressed reservations about the unsettled issue
of NHTSA's authority to promulgate any
exemption to the odometer disclosure regulation.
PACCAR noted correctly that two Federal
District Courts have invalidated the exemption
for trucks over 16,000 GVWR on the basis that
the NHTSA is not authorized to make any
exemptions to the law.

Section 408 (a) of the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act (15 U.S.C. 1988)
states that the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation shall prescribe rules requiring
transferors to give written mileage disclosures to
transferees in connection with the transfer of
ownership of a motor vehicle. It is the
interpretation of NHTSA that this grant of
rulemaking authority empowers the agency to
also make exceptions to the requirement where it
is shown that no mileage statement is necessary.
NHTSA recognizes that there is a conflict
between its interpretation of the Act and the
interpretation of the United States District
Courts for the Districts of Nebraska and Idaho.
While these decisions are not binding precedent
in other Federal courts, they may, however, be
used as guidance and followed should the issue
arise in the future with respect to the same or one
of the other exemptions. Therefore, NHTSA has
advised interested persons of the two court
opinions and their conflict with the current
language of the regulation and forewarned them

PART 580: PRE 13

that the issue has not been resolved. NHTSA is legal counsel to determine what course of action

proceeding with this rulemaking action on the will most effectively protect their legal rights,
basis that its interpretation is correct, but is also Issued on October 5, 1982.

advising manufacturers to consult with their

Raymond A. Peck, Jr.
Administrator
47 F. R. 51884
November 18, 1982

PART 580; PRE 14

PART 580— ODOMETER DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

(Docket No. 72-31; Notice 2)

§ 580.1 Scope.

This part prescribes rules requiring the
transferor of a motor vehicle to make written
disclosure to the transferee concerning the
odometer mileage and its accuracy, and requiring
the retention of odometer mileage statements by
motor vehicle dealers and distributors, as directed
by section 408(a) and 414(b) of the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act, Pub. L.
92-513, as amended by Pub. L. 94-364.

§ 580.2 Purpose.

The purpose of this part is to provide each
purchaser of a motor vehicle with odometer infor-
mation to assist him in determining the vehicle's
condition and value, and to preserve records that
are needed for the proper investigation, and
adjudication or other disposition, of possible viola-
tions of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost
Savings Act.

§ 580.3 Definitions.

All terms defined in Sections 2 and 402 of the
Act are used in their statutory meaning. Other
terms used in this part are defined as follows:

"Transferor" means any person who transfers
his ownership in a motor vehicle by sale, gift, or
any means other than by creation of a security
interest.

"Transferee" means any person to whom the
ownership in a motor vehicle is transferred by
purchase, gift, or any means other than by creation
of a security interest.

§ 580.4 Disciosure of odometer information.

(a) Before executing any transfer of ownership
document, each transferor of a motor vehicle shall

furnish to the transferee a written statement signed
by the transferor, containing the following
information:

(1) The odometer reading at the time of
transfer;

(2) The date of transfer;

(3) The transferor's name and current address;

(4) The transferee's name and current address;
and

(5) The identity of the vehicle, including its
make, model, year, and body type, and its vehicle
identification number.

(b) In addition to the information provided
under paragraph (a) of this section, the statement
shall refer to the Motor Vehicle Information and
Cost Savings Act and shall state that incorrect
information may result in civil liability and civil or
criminal penalties.

(c) In addition to the information provided under
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section,

(1) The transferor shall certify that to the best
of his knowledge the odometer reading reflects
the actual miles or kilometers the vehicle has
been driven; or

(2) If the transferor knows that the odometer
reading reflects the amount of mileage in excess
of the designed mechanical odometer limit of
99,999 miles /kilometers, he shall include a state-
ment to that effect; or

(3) If the transferor knows that the odometer
reading differs from the number of
miles/ kilometers the vehicle has actually traveled
and that the difference is greater than that caused
by odometer calibration error, he shall include a
statement that the odometer reading is not the ac-
tual mileage, and should not be relied upon.

PART 580-1

(d) In addition to the information provided
under paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of this section, the
transferor shall certify that:

(1) The odometer was not altered, set back, or
disconnected while in the transferor's pos-
session, and he has no knowledge of anyone else
doing so;

(2) The odometer was altered for repair or
replacement purposes while in the transferor's
possession, and the mileage registered on the
repaired or replacement odometer was identical
to that before such service; or

(3) The odometer was altered for repair or
replacement purposes, the odometer was
incapable of registering the same mileage, it was
reset to zero, and the mileage on odometer
before repair was miles/ kilometers.

(e) The transferee shall acknowledge receipt of
the disclosure statement by signing it.

(f) (1) If the laws or regulations of the State in
which the transfer occurs require the odometer
disclosure to be made on the certificate of title or
other State documents which evidences ownership,
the transferor may make the disclosure required
by this section by executing the State certificate of
title or such other ownership document. In order to
utilize the above documents as substitutes for the
Federal odometer disclosure statement, they must
contain essentially the same information required
by paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) of this section. If
the information contained thereon varies in any
way from that required for the Federal form, the
State must obtain approval from the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration before its
certificate of title or other ownership document
can be used as a substitute for the Federal form.
Such approval may be obtained by submitting a
copy of the proposed document to the Office of the
Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590.

(2) The NHTSA shall respond to the State's
request within 30 days of receipt of such request.

(3) If a document, other than the certificate of
title, provided under the laws or regulations of
the State in which the transfer occurs contains
all of the statements required by this section, the
transferor may make the disclosure required by
this section either by executing the State
document or by executing the disclosure form
specified in § 580.6.

(g) If there is no State document as described in
paragraph (f) of this section, the transferor shall
make the disclosure required by this section by
executing the disclosure form specified in § 580.6.

§ 580.5 Exemptions.

Notwithstanding the requirements of § 580.4—

(a) [A transferor of any of the following motor
vehicles need not disclose the vehicle's odometer
mileage;

(1) A vehicle having a gross vehicle weight
rating, as defined in § 571.3 of this chapter, or
of more than 16,000 pounds;

(2) A vehicle that is not self-propelled;

(3) A vehicle that is 25 years old or older; or

(4) A vehicle sold directly by the manufacturer
to any agency of the United States in conformity
with contractual specifications. (47 F.R.
51884-November 18, 1982. Effective:
December 20, 1982)1

(b) A transferor of a new vehicle prior to its first
transfer for purposes other than resale need not
disclose the vehicle's odometer mileage.

§ 580.6 Disclosure form.

Odometer Mileage Statement
(Federal regulations require you to state the
odometer mileage upon transfer of ownership. An
inaccurate or untruthful statement may make you
liable for damages to your transferee, for attorney
fees, and for civil or criminal penalties, pursuant to
sections 409, 412, and 413 of the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act of 1972 (Pub. L.
92-513, as amended by Pub. L. 94-364).

I, state that the

(transferor's name. Print)
odometer of the vehicle described below now
reads miles/ kilometers.

D (1) I hereby certify that to the best of my
knowledge the odometer reading as
stated above reflects the actual mileage of
the vehicle described below.

n (2) I hereby certify that to the best of my
knowledge the odometer reading as
stated above reflects the amount of
mileage in excess of designed mechanical
odometer limit of 99,999 miles/ kilometers
of the vehicle described below.

PART 580-2

D (3) I hereby certify that to the best of my
knowledge the odometer reading as
stated above is NOT the actual mileage of
the vehicle described below, and should
not be relied upon.

Transferee's Name and Address (buyer) .
(Street)

Make

Model

Body type

Vehicle identification number

Year

(City) (State)

Receipt of copy Acknowledged

(ZIP Code)

(Transferee's signature, buyer)

Check one box only.

D (1) I hereby certify that the odometer of said

vehicle was not altered, set back, or § 580.7 Odometer mileage statement retention.

disconnected while in my possession, and ^ , , , ,• ., r , . , ,

T . „„^ „^ . ,„]^^„^ ^f „„„ „ „io A ; Each dealer or distributor of a motor vehicle who

1 have no knowledge or anyone else doing . ■ , , , ■ t^

IS required by this Part to execute an odometer

r_, ,„. - ' , .r 1 1 , disclosure statement shall retain for four years

D (2) I hereby certify that the odometer was ^^^^ odometer mileage statement which he

altered for repair or replacement pur- ^^^^-^^^ ^^ ^j^^jj ^j^^ ^^^^-^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^

poses while in my possession, and that the hotostat, carbon, or other facsimile copy of each

mileage registered on the repaired or udometer mileage statement which he issues. He

replacement odometer was identical to ^^^^u ^^^-^ ^^^^ odometer mileage statement at

that betore such service. ^.^ pj-jmary place of business in an order that is

D (3) I hereby certify that the repaired or appropriate to this business requirements and that

replacement odometer was incapable of permits systematic retrieval. The statement may

registering the same mileage, that it was be reproduced (e.g., photocopies or put on

reset to zero, and that the mileage on the microfilm) as long as no information or identifying

original odometer or the odometer before ^larks such as signatures are lost in the reproduc-

repair was miles. ^,0^.

Transferor's Address (seller)

(Street)

(City) (State) (ZIP Code)

Transferor's Signature (seller) 38 F.R. 2978

Date of Statement January 31, 1973

PART 580-3

Effective: September 1, 1978

PREAMBLE TO PART 581— BUMPER STANDARD
(Docket No. 74-11; Notice 12; Docket No. 73-19; Notice 9)

This notice establislies a new hiiinper standard,
limiting damage to vehicle bumpers and other
vehicle surfaces in low-speed crashes.

The standard, 49 CFR Part 581, is issued
under the authority of Title I of the Motor
Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act,
Public Law 92-513, 15 U.S.C. 1901-1991. In
addition to specifying limitations on damage to
non-safety-related components and vehicle sur-
face areas, it also incorporates the safety require-
ments currently contained in Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 215, Exterior Pro-
tection.

Since the enactment of the Motor Vehicle In-
formation and Cost Savings Act, the XHTSA
has issued four proposals to establish a front and
rear end damage ability standard that fulfills
the objectives espoused in the law. Title I
(Bumper Standards) directs the XHTSA to de-
velop standards which "shall seek to obtain the
maximum feasible reduction of costs to the pub-
lic and to the consumer. . . .'" Improving the
damage resistance of a vehicle in low-speed im-
pact situations will, in the opinion of Congress,
save the consumer a significant amount of money.

During the past several years of ongoing rule-
making in the bumper area, the N^'HTSA has
continued to conduct studies and examine input
from all interested persons. The most recent
proposal was published March 12 of this yeai'
(40 FR 11598). After thoroughly reviewing the
available data and comments submitted to the
docket, the XHTSA has concluded that the pro-
visions contained in tlie March notice would con-
stitute a large step towards accomplishment of
the goals described in Title I.

On January 2, 1975, the XHTSA proposed a
reduction in the impact speeds specified in Stand-
ard 215 and proposed in Part 581 (40 FR 10).
The NHTSA's proposal was based primarily on

the residts of two agency-sponsored studies which
indicated that the cost and weight of many cur-
rent production bumpers, in light of inflation and
fuel shortages, made the bumpers no longer cost-
beneficial. Information presented at public hear-
ings on the notice and comments submitted to
the docket brought to light additional data which
the XHTSA carefully examined. After review-
ing its previous studies in light of this new evi-
dence, the agency concluded that the 5-mph
protection level (and the 3-mph corner impact
level associated with it) should not be reduced.
In its March 12, 1975, notice (40 FR 11598) the
X'^HTSA fully explained this decision. Com-
ments have been received from Toyo Kogyo,
Volkswagen, Xissan, Motor Vehicle Manufactur-
ers Association, Chrysler, General Motors, Toy-
ota, and Gulf & Western urging the X'HTSA to
reconsider its rejection of the lower impact test
speeds proposed in January.

For the reasons discussed in the March Federal
Register notice the X^HTSA has determined that
the pendulum and barrier impact speeds should
not be reduced and should remain at 5 mph.

General Motors (GM) submitted two docu-
ments, dated January 9, 1976. and January 15,
1976, which analyzed the costs and benefits of
1974 bumper systems based on field surveys con-
ducted in Fort Wayne, Indiana and Milford,
Michigan. The conclusion reached by GM in
these studies was that the 1974 model year
bumper systems were not cost-beneficial. They
re<iuested, based on the result of this study, that
any i-aising of the current bumper standard re-
quirements be delayed until longer-term benefit-
cost analyses are made.

The XHTSA has examined this study and has
concluded that the proposed Part 581 damage-
ability standard, which will upgrade the bumper
requirements, should be implemented in accord-

PART 581— PRE 1

Effective: September 1, 1978

ance with the time scliedule set forth in this
notice. GM in its study has cliosen to analyze
the cost-effectiveness of bunii)er systems desijzned
solely for safety component protection. The
costs considered by GM have been those occa-
sioned not only by damajie to safety-related
components, but to non-safety-related vehicle
areas, as well. AVhile it may be true that a
bumper system that is designed primarily for
safety component protection will also provide
some degree of protection a<rainst non-sufety-
related damage, it is unreasonable to evaluate the
cost-effectiveness of such a system on its capabil-
ity to perform outside its primary design func-
tion. A bumper system designed to comply with
Title I would necessarily provide protection to
both safety and non-safety-related components
and would thereby reduce the degree of damage
suffered by most 1974 model vehicles involved in
front and rear impacts. The cost-effectiveness
of a Title I system, thus, cannot be realistically
measured by an examination of 1974 systems
which have been designed to provide a lower
level of damage protection.

GM gathered data only on its own 1974 model
cars and concluded that the impact of Standard
215 on all vehicles has not been cost -beneficial.
Conclusions based on such limited data, however,
are not sufficient reason for suspending further
rulemaking to improve the damage protection
capabilities of bumpers. As explained in the
March 12, 1975, notice, considerable data have
been presented indicating that the bumper sys-
tems on some current-model automobiles are
heavier and costlier than necessary. This un-
necessary weight not only adds to the initial
costs, but also increases the life-time operating
costs of the vehicle. The use of such bumpers,
it has been concluded, has been the result of un-
necessary design choices by motor vehicle manu-
facturers. Studies conducted by the XHTSA
and Houdaille Industries, Inc., a bumper manu-
facturer, indicate that bumper systems utilizing
current technology and designed to meet the Part
581 damageability requirements need not weigh
any more than pre-standard-215 bumper systems.
Basing future ndemaking on the results of a
cost-benefit analysis utilizing bmnper systems
that have not been optimized would lie imreason-
able.

In the March 12. 1975, notice, the NHTSA
proposed alternative effective dates for imple-
mentation of the initial Part 581 test require-
ments. The applicable requirements call for
restricted surface damage except to components
that actually contact the impact ridge of the
pendulum test device or that fasten such compo-
nents to the vehicle chassis frame. Commenters
were asked to address the feasibility of satisfying
the proposed damage criteria by September 1,
1976, September 1, 1977, or September 1, 1978.
Chrysler said it could meet the prescribed damage
level by September 1, 1976, but only if certain
modifications in the test requirements were made.
Volvo also stated that it could comply by Sep-
tember 1976, but warned of a significant cost
penalty. Toyo Kogyo and British Leyland
stated they could meet a September 1, 1977 effec-
tive date. Toyo Kogyo, however, conunented that
this woidd occasion high development costs.
British Leyland, on the other hand, .said that it
could satisfy an earlier effective date, but only at
significant cost. American Motors, Ford, and
Toyota urged a September 1, 1978, effective date
saying that amount of lead time was necessary
to obtain compliance.

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety,
the National Association of Independent Insur-
ers, and State Farm urged a 1976 effective date
citing the need for regulation of damage to ve-
hicle components and- surface areas aside from
those directly related to safety. The Insurance
Institute supported its reijuest for a 1976 effective
date by stating that many existing cars are sub-
stantially able to meet the initial Part 581 re-
([uirements.

In the NHTSA's view, adoption of a 1976 or
1977 effective date would impose serious lead
time problems on a number of manufacturers.
Based upon information submitted by the auto-
mobile industry, bringing vehicles into compli-
ance by September 1, 1976 or 1977, if possible at
all, would entail the expenditure of large sums
of money for redesign and retooling. A Sep-
tember 1, 1978 effective date would assure satis-
factory compliance with the Part 581 require-
ments and would avoid the high costs that would
occur as a result of an earlier effective date.

The NHTSA has, therefore, concluded that a
September 1, 1978, effective date should be

PART 581— PRE 2

Effective: September 1, 1978

adopted foi- iniplpiiiontation of the initial Part
581 damapeability re(niirements. Tliis amount
of lead time appeals necessary foi- all manufac-
turers to come into conformity with the provi-
sions.

Toyo Kopyo, American Motors, Motor Vehicle
Manufactuiers Association. C'iirysler, and Ford
urped a delay in the proposed September 1, 1970
effective date for implementation of the "no
dama<re" humper re(]uirements. Toyo Kofryo le-
quested a 1983 effective date, while the other
mnmifacturers sn^'jrested tliat no upjrraded re-
([iiiremenls he sclieduled until field data ha^"e
been <rnthered indicating the success of the in-
terim requirements. The Xatioiial Association
of Independent Insurers, anxious for early im-
plementation of the full ran<re of bumper per-
formance requiiements, supported adoption of
the proposed 1979 effective date.

The NHTSA has examined all of these com-
ments and has concluded that the September 1.
1979 effective date should be adopted. This
would provide a lead time of approximately 4
years, which appears sufficient to brinp the ve-
hicles into compliance. Awaitinp the results of
field data lelated to the interim requirements is
not practicable. The information currently be-
fore the a<rency indicates that the pi'oposed 1979
surface damape limitation is a substantial step
towards achieving the level of bumper efficiency
described by Conprress in the Cost Savings Act.
'Waiting for the accumulation and analysis of
additional information would unnecessarily and
unreasonably delay the implementation of Part
iiSl, a standard the agency is diiected by law to
pronndgate.

The NHTSA has proposed in several past
notices the adoption of test requirements that
woidd allow the manufacture of vehicles with
soft exterior siirfaces. Currently, the Standard
Xo. 215 exterior protection standard prohibits
contact with Planes A and li of the pendtdum
test device since those areas represent parts of
the vehicle that house safety components such as
headlamps. Most vehicles constructed with soft
exterior surfaces would not be able to comply
with the Standard Xo. 215 requirements since by
tiieii' very nature they would yield to the imi)act
of the pendulum. Tlie ([uality of soft face
bumper systems which is not taia'ii info account

i)V the Planes A and H prohibition is tiiat such
systems can be constructed in a manner that as-
snies return of the system to its oi'iginal contours
following an impact. The XIIT.'^A pioposal
would permit contact with the planes at limited
force and jiressure levels. These force and pres-
sure limitations were intended to assure that the
bumper system would yield in a collision to a
degree that would nunimize damage to the other
\ehicle"s components.

(^ouuueuts to the proposal to allow contact
with Planes .V and B focused on that provision's
test conditions and it> specification of i)ressure
limitations. According to coiiimentcrs. tlu- pre-
scribed instrumentation of Planes A and B is not
practicable since it would be costly with allegedly
unreliable test results.

British Leyland. Renaidt, and Peugeot wanted
the agency to clarify the nde by specifying that
no instrmnentation is necessary on the pendulum
where there is no contact during testing with
Planes .V and B. This fact should be clear based
on prior interpretations given by the XHTSA.
It has been stated many times in the past that a
nuinufacturer need only exercise due care in as-
suring that his vehicle would comply with the
requirement of a standai'd when tested by the
XHTSA in the manner presci-ibed. The manu-
facturer need not conduct the tests prescribed in
the standard in order to satisfy this duty. De-
pending upon the circumstances tlieie may be
other means by which he can certify his vehicles'
compliance. In the case at issue, the instrumented
pendulum would oidy serxc to assure that impact
with the planes would not exceed the stated
maxinnun levels. If there is no contact witii
these planes then obviously the instrmnentation
would ser\e no i)urposc.

Volvo suggeste<l that the pro\isioii permitting
Planes A and B contact not be added to the
standard until a measuring device can be better
defined. .Vmerican Motois. however, presented a
suggestion that it contended would significantly
simplify the test procedure without diminishing
the desired level of \ehicle protection. It sug-
gested that the 200-psi limitation be deleted and
that a force lindtation of 2000 pounds .on the
combined surfaces of Planes A and B above the
impact ridge and 2000 pounds total force on
Plane A below the impact ridge be adopted.

PART 581— PRE 3

Effective: September 1, 1976

American Motors stated that the 200-psi specifi-
cation was unnecessary in lijrht of tiie daniajie
limitations contained in tlie standard.

The initial Part 581 damajre criteria [proposed
to go into effect September 1. 1076, or 1077, or
1978 (made effective by this notice for September
1, 1978)] presented some problems for Volks-
wajren, American Motors. Chrysler, Volvo, and
Ford with respect to the areas in which damage
would be permissible. The proposed section
(Sr).3.8) limits change to surface areas and safety
components, but permits damage to the bumper
face bar. The manufacturers argued tliat dam-
age should also be permitted to cosmetic filler
panels, bumper guards, nerf strips, license plate
brackets, stone shields, and other components
which are not specifically part of the vehicle
body. The support for this position is that these
components appear to be included in the pro-
posal's description of items that would not be
subject to damage limitation during tlie interim
period.

The relevant language of Sr).3.8 states that
vehicles shall have no damage except to the
buuiper face bar and the components and asso-
ciated fasteners that directly attach the bumper
face bar to tlie chassis frame. The bumper face
bar is defined as any component of the bumper
system that contacts the impact ridge of the
pendulum test device. Stone shields and cos-
metic filler panels would not be excepted from
the damage criteria unless they directly attach
the bmnper face bar to the chassis frame. Based
upon the information currently before the agency,
it has determined that neither stone shields nor
filler panels are intended to serve such a function.

l^umper guards and nerf strips which ai-e lo-
cated in a position where they are contacted by
the impact ridge of the test device would be
considered as a bumper face bar with the lateral
metal component (commonly known as a bumper)
considered as a component that directly attaches
the bumper face bar to the vehicle cliassis frame.
This reasoning would also apply to bumper sys-
tems that have a layer of plastic, riibber, or some
other material covering the underlying load
bearing structure. The covering material woidd
be considered the bumper face bar and the (uider-
lying structure woidd be considered a component
that attaches the face bar to the chassis frauie.

Toyo Kogyo commented that the damage cri-
teria contained in 85.3.8 would necessitate the
addition of 13 pounds to the bumper which would
change the emission rank of some cars and
thereby increase tlieir fuel consumption from 4
to 8 percent. The cost of counteracting the in-
creased fuel consumption would, according to
Toyo Kogyo, range from $100 to $200 per car.

The additional lead time allowed by the Sep-
tember 1, 1978 date for implementation of the
initial damage criteria should enable Toyo Kogyo
to concentrate its efforts on minimizing any in-
crease in the weight of complying vehicles.

State Farm expressed concern over the appli-
cation of the S5.3.8 damage criteria to vehicles
with soft face systeuis. They asserted that al-
lowing damage to the bumper face bar and asso-
ciated components would, in the case of soft face
bmnper systems, permit damage to the entire
front and rear end of the vehicle. This could
occur since some soft-face constriiction utilizes a
single large component in the front and rear
of the vehicle that takes on the appearance of
the vehicle body, but by definition would be the
bumper face bar. It was State Farm's sugges-
tion that damage be permitted only to those
portions of the bumper face bar that actually
come in contact with the impact ridge of the
pendulum test device. This would in their opin-
ion avoid the possibility of widespread damage
to areas not actually contacted.

The XHTSA finds State Farm's concern un-
founded. The 2000-pound total force limitation
to the combined surfaces of Planes A and B of
the pendulum test device will have the effect of
preventing any substantial damage to the areas
mentioned by State Farm. For this reason, the
NHTSA denies State Farm's request to revise
the langiiage of S5.3.8.

Ford Motor Company criticized the provision
prohibiting bieakage or release of fasteners or
joints (S5.3.9) as unreasonable. It asserted that
efficient production requires keeping to a mini-
nnmi the efforts involved in installing moldings
and insignia. Of iuiportance, in their opinion,
is assuring that the moldings and insignia resist
"popping'" on rough roads and during minor
parking lot impacts. However, they assert that
the performance level that would be achieved by

PART 581— PRE 4

ER«cHve: September 1, 1978

85.3.0 is unreasonably liiph since, in their view,
Dioldinps wiiich pop off can bo easily reinstalled
with minimal cost and inconvenience to the car
owner.

The XHTSA disa<!:rees with Ford's argument.
To allow tlie type of damape described by Ford
would be partially to defeat the effectiveness of
the standard. Ornaments that fall off and trim
strips tliat pop off must be repaired if the value
of the vehicle is to be maintained. The time and
money invested by an individual who must ob-
tain such a repair followinjr a relatively minor
collision can be avoided if the manufacturer is
required to comply with the performance level
of Sa.S.n. The XHTSA disagrees with Ford's
assessment of the time, cost, and effort involved
in obtaining such repairs. The apency has there-
fore determined that to carry out the Congres-
sional intent to reduce the cost of low-speed
accidents, it must require ornaments and trim
strips to be immune from damage under the test
conditions of the standard.

There were numerous comments on the damage-
ability requirements proposed to go into effect on
September 1, 1979. Many of the manufacturers
suggested a change in the maxinmm dent limita-
tion (85.3.11) and requested that a certain
amount of bvunper set be allowed. In its March
12 notice, the XHTSA pioposed to limit damage
to the bumper face bar to permanent dents no
greater than % inch from the original contour.
The proposed %-inch deviation was based on a
Louis Harris & Associates survey of public re-
actions to bumper damage at various depths.
This survey was commissioned by Houdaille
Industries, Inc., a manufacturer of bumpers.

International Xickel Co. and Toyota requested
that the provision be revised to allow a 3/4-inch
deviation from the original bumper contour. In
light of the results of the Harris survey, which
indicated that consumers did not consider dam-
age to be significant until the dents reached a
depth of 1/4 to ¥2 inch, the XHTSA denies their
request and adopts the proposed %-inch limita-
tion. To allow deviations to a depth of % inch
would be to disregard the results of tlie survey
by permitting damage which would be considered
significant by many consumers. This would
undercut achievement of the purpose of the Part

581 bumper standard to reduce consumer loss of
time and money.

Toyo Kogyo, American Motors. International
Xickel, and Houdaille urged that the provision
(85.3.11) be amended to permit a certain degree
of bumper set. It was pointed out that the im-
pact to a bumper during testing can result in
two types of contour change, dent and set.
Bumper set is an overall movement or flattening
of tlie bumper face bar which wlien minor is
rarely detectable by the unaided hinnan eye.
Under the currently proposed provision the
%-inch deviation limitation would apply to both
setting and denting, witli tiie total of these two
types of deviations limited to 3/^ inch. Thus, the
permissible degree of dent deviation would ac-
tually be less than % inch. Compliance with
such a requirement would, according to comment-
ers, result in the production of heavier and more
costly bumper systems.

Since the N'^HTSA has based its %-inch devia-
tion limitation on consumer reaction to a dent of
that depth, it agrees with commenters that a
certain degree of bumper set could be permitted
in addition to dent without visibly altering the
level of allowable bumper damage. Minor set is
generally imperceptible. Thus, allowing it to
occur during impact tests would not significantly
reduce the level of performance currently assured
in the proposed provision. The X'HTSA hereby
amends Part 581 to permit % inch of bumpei'
set in addition to dents of % inch.

Consumers Union asserted that the XHTSA
should not require near-zero level of damage on
all cars since such a regulation would prevent
manufacturers from offering as an option cars
with cheap, lightweight, expendable bumpers
which meet the standard's other requirements.
The XHTSA finds no merit in this suggestion
and for the following reasons denies the request.
First of all, to make compliance with the "no
damage'' provisions optional would be to dis-
regard the mandate of Congress in the Cost
Savings Act, which instructs the agency to pro-
mulgate a standard that will reduce consumer
costs occasioned by bumper damage. Second,
cars produced with lower performance bumpers
would be less expensive than those meeting the
Part 581 criteria. They might, therefore, seem
more appealing to consumers who are unaware

PART 581— PRE 5

Effective; September 1, 1978

of the costly dainape tliat miplit be incurred
chirine low-speed collisions. Tiie purpose of
Title I of the Cost Savings Act is to protect
consumers from such an eventuality. Third,
mass production is the factor that will keep
manufacturinjr costs at a low level. If only
some vehicles are constructed with damage-
resistant bumpers, the cost of tliose vehicles is
likely to be liigliei' than necessary because of
this factor.

Xationwide Mutual Insurance Co. and the
National Association of Independent Insurers
expressed concern that tlie %-inch deviation
limitation was too lenient. Xationwide felt that
the %-inch deviation constituted a relaxation of
the XHTSA's previous position that only a
dimple should be allowed to the bumper. The
XHTSA has concluded, based on the Harris sur-
vey, that a dent % inch in depth would be in-
consequential to most car owners. Prescribing
such a deviation as the maximmii allowable in a
5-mph barrier or pendulum impact is, therefore,
in keeping with the goal of reducing economic
loss occasioned by low-speed collisions.

The Xational Association of Independent In-
surers suggested that the %-inch deviation be
upgraded to require that the dent extend over a
minimum area in a dishing fashion whicli would
be less noticeable. This suggestion is rejected
since the %-inch provision has been fully sup-
ported as pro\i(ling a damage level that fulfills
the goals of Title I. In addition, prescribing a
dishing effect as a necessary element for compli-
ance would not take into account the various
types of impacts to which a vehicle is subject.

State Farm urged that the prohibition against
separations of surface materials, paint, polymeric
coatings, or other materials from the surface to
which they are bonded be extended to cover the
bumper face bar during barrier impact tests.
Under the current proposal these surface damage
limitations would apply only to parts of the
vehicle other than the bumper face bar. State
Farm asserted that the limitation of application
of the no-surface-damage requirements to vehicle
surfaces other tlian the bumper face bar was in-
tended to accommodate the pendulum impact.
They therefore see no justification for applying
the same limitation during barrier impact testing.

The XHTSA denies State Farm's request.
Wliile both barrier and pendulum impacts can
cause some chipping or flaking of chrome or soft-
face material (depending upon the type of system
being tested), such damage is insignificant. Ap-
plication of a no-surface-damage requirement to
the bumper face bar would probably result in
manufacturers having to upgrade their plating
process or use more sophisticated covering ma-
terials to assure compliance. This could result
in significant cost increases with little, if any,
increase in benefits.

Both State Farm and British Leyland re-
quested that S7.1.1 of Part 581 be clarified to
indicate that the pendulum impacts from 16 and
20 inches are intended to be inclusive. Since
compliance with the pendulum impact require-
ments at any height between 16 and 20 inches
would necessitate meeting the damage criteria at
heights infinitesimally close to 16 and 20 inches,
the clarification requested by these commenters
is insubstantial. The XHTSA, however, amends
S7.1.1 to include the 16- and 20-inch heights as
subject to the damage criteria, since some persons
apparently considered it unclear.

Chrysler requested a modification of the Pait
581 longitudinal pendulum impact test to specify
that the required pendulmu impacts be at least
12 inches apart laterally and 1 inch apart ver-
tically from any prior impact. The request is
denied, since such a modification would prohibit
more than one hit in the same area of the bumper.
Under the current Part 581 proposal, an impact
witliin 12 inches laterally must be separated from
any prior impact by 2 inches, vertically. Based
upon available accident data, the XHTSA has
concluded that a vehicle will be involved in an
average of approximately 2 to 3 bumper collisions
at speeds of 5 mph or less in its 10-year life.
On an individual vehicle basis, the distribution
or the area of the bumper affected by these im-
pacts cannot be predicted. In order to assure a
performance level that corresponds with real-
world conditions, the XHTSA has determined
that each bumper must be capable of meeting the
prescribed damage criteria when subjected to
more than one pendulum impact in the same area
of the bumper.

A substantial number of comments were re-
ceived from individuals concerned that the Part

PART 581— PRE 6

Effective: September 1, 1978

581 bumper standard inifrlit in some way limit
the recyclinfi of bumpers in the afterniarket. This
concern is unfounded, since tiie requirements
contained in Part ^>Hl ensure tliat a wide variety
of materials can continue to be used in bumper
systems. The provisions in no way restrict the
use of metals in bumper systems.

Chrysler arpued that the pendulum test device
should be used only as a means of ass\iring uni-
form bumper height. In its opinion, the pen-
dulum impact test does not constitute an appro-
priate means of evaluating bumper damapeability
since the i)endulum is i-igid. heavy, and aggres-
sive.

Tile XHTSA does not find Chry.sler's argument
meritorious. To delete the pendulum impact
test as a means of establishing bumper damage-
ability resistance would be to lower considerably
the proposed level of perfoiniance cunently con-
tained in Part 581. The pendulum impact re-
quirements assure that a vehicle is capable of
involvement in various types of low-speed col-
lisions without sustaining significant damage.
They impose localized stresses at various points
on the bumper face bar while the barrier impacts
only establish a vehicle's overall ability to with-
stand impacts at specified energy levels, assuring

the basic strength f)f the front and rear hiuiqier.
In order to satisfy its Congressional mandate by
reducing the economic loss occasioned by low-
speed collision damage, the XHT.'^A has con-
cluded that the Part 581 tminpcr staiidaid must
prescribe test rec|uireineiits that measure a ve-
hicle's damageability ciiaracteiistics in both bar-
rier and pendulum-type stress situations.

In light of the foregoing. Title 49, Code of
Federal Regulations, is amended ....

1. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No.
215, Exterior Protection (49 CFR 571.'215), is re-
voked.

2. A new Part 581, Bumper Standard, is added
to read as set forth below.

Effective date: September 1, 1978.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; sec. 102, Pub. L. 92-513,
86 Stat. 947 (15 U.S.C. 1912) delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on February 27, 1976.

James B. Gregory,
Administrator, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration

41 F.R. 9346
March 4, 1976

PART 581— PRE 7-8

Effcclixe: SapUmbtr 1, 1978

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 581— BUMPER STANDARD

(Docket No. 74-11; Notice 17; Docket No. 73-19; Notice 14)

This notice responds to petitions for recon-
sideration of the March 4, 1976, Federal Register
notice (41 FR 9346) establisliinfj a new bumper
standard that limits daiua<re to vehicle Ijumpers
and other vehicle surfaces in low-speed crashes.
Effective Date: September 1, 1978.
Address: Petitions should be submitted to:
Administrator, National Hijrhway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street. S.W.. Wash-
ington, D.C. 20590.
For Further Information Contact:

Tim Hoyt, Office of Crashworthiness.
Motor Vehicle Programs.
National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration,
Washington. D.C. 20.590 (202-426-2264).

SupplementaiT Information:

The standard. 49 CFR Part 581. i.ssued under
the authority of Title I of the Motoi' Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act. Public Law
92-513. 15 U.S.C. 1901-1991. limits damage to
non-safety related components and vehicle sur-
faces and incorporates the safety-related damage
criteria of the current Standard No. 215, Ex-
terior Protection (49 CFR Part 571.215). lender
the new standard, all vehicles maiiufactuied on
or after Septemlier 1, 1978, must be capable of
undergoing prescribed pendulum and barrier
crash tests while experiencing damage only to
the vehicle bumper and those components that
attach it to the vehicle frame. Vehicles manu-
factured on or after September 1. 1979. must be
capable of undergoing tiie same tests while ex-
periencing no damage to vehicle exterior surfaces
except on the bumper, where dents not exceeding
% inch and set not exceeding % ^^^^ niay occur.

Petitions for reconsideration were received
from General Motors (GM). Ford. Chrysler.
American Motoi-s Corporation (AMC). Gulf &

Western, Nissan, and Leyland Cars. The issues
raised by petitioners focu.sed primarily on Part
58rs cost-benefit basis, its leadtime. and its dam-
age criteria.

GM, Ford, Chrysler. AMC, Nissan, and Gulf &
^^'cste^l stated that the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) failed
to present evidence that Part 581 would be cost
beneficial. Ford stated that the record support-
ing Part 581 gives no assurance that the public
will realize incremental savings once the stand-
ard is implemented. Chrysler, Nissan, and Gulf
&Western cited cost and weight increases which
they alleged would impose additional burdens
on car owners over and above those presently
experienced. AMC complained that the pro-
vision for escalating the bumper requirements
after one year would result in costly and complex
bumper designs, since such a schedule would pro-
hibit the optimization of bumper systems.

Petitioners requested that the agency demon-
strate tliat the requirements of Part 581 will
provide cost savings greater than those currently
provided by Standard No. 215, Exterior Protec-
tion. It was suggested by GM. AMC, and Ford
that the agency undertake field studies to gather
data to support the Part 581 standard. Several
nuinufacturers suggested that implementation of
Part 581 be postponed until such time as a field
study is completed.

Petitioners' arguments have been raised in past
comments to Federal Register notices proposing
a Part 581 bumper standard. The NHTSA
found them impersuasive then and hereby rejects
them once again. The NHTSA and Houdaille
Industries conducted cost benefit studies on com-
I)liance with the Part 581 bumper requirements.
The studies indicate that bumper systems using
current technology and designed to meet the
standard's requirements will provide a favorable

PART 581— PRE 9

Effective: September 1, 1978

cost -benefit ratio. Petitioners liave not presented
evidence tliat effectively disputes tlie conclusions
reached in these studies.

Conductinjr field studies as a means of <rather-
injr evidence to support iniplementation of tlie
Part 581 standard is unrealistic and would not
demonstrate as accurately as the Houdaille and
NHTSA studies the positive cost-savin<r poten-
tial of tlie standard. Many manufacturers are
continuinji' to comply with the current Standard
21o bumper requii'ements by means of inefficient,
unoptimized bumpers. Data gathered on these
systems thus would not indicate tlie full possi-
bilities of bumpers specifically desip:ned to meet
the Pait 581 requirements in an efficient manner.
Once manufactuiers start utilizing the technol-
ofry and materials available to them the full
benefits of the Part 581 bumper standard can be
realized. Until such time, however, manufac-
turers have it within their power to cause field
study results to be misleadinjr and unrepresenta-
tive of the potential of Part 581.

The XHTSA has ample evidence in the record
that manufacturers are capable of nieetinjr the
requirements of Part 581. It also has evidence
that compliance can be achieved in a cost -efficient
manner. There has been no evidence presented
by any of the petitioners that the standard would
have a negative cost-benefit impact if met in the
ways outlined by Houdaille and the NHTSA
in their studies. The ajjency therefoi'e rejects
the cost-benefit objections raised by petitioners.

AMC requested additional leadtime to meet
the requirements of Part 581. It contended that
it needs 36 months" leadtime to comply with Part
581. It asked that the initial effective date of
the standard be delayed until September 1, 1979.

The NHTSA finds AMC's request without
merit. The 30-month leadtime for the initial
requirements and the 42-month leadtime for the
final requirements is considered adequate for
compliance. No other manufacturers have ex-
pressed conceiTi over attaining- the level of per-
formance prescribed for 1978, and evidence in
the record indicates that most vehicles already
come close to satisfying: the specified damage
criteria. The request of AMC is therefore denied.

General Motors objected in its petition to the
prescribed escalation of the bumper requirements

for September 1, 1979, only 1 year after the
standard's initial effective date. It stated that
compliance with two sets of bumper re([uirements
witliin such short period of time would result
in unrecoverable costs relating to research, design,
development, and tooling, and would inhibit the
feasibility of optimizing its bumper systems.

Ford Motor Company stated that it plans to
redesign its passenger cars for 1981 due to the
requirements of the Energy Policy and Conser-
vatioii Act (Pub. L. 94-163) and associated legis-
lation. Ford explained that compliance with
Part 581 will entail some redesign. It therefore
requested that the bumper standard's effective
date be delayed until September 1, 1980, so that
these necessary redesigning efforts can be accom-
plished simultaneously.

The agency has found both General Motors'
and Ford's requests persuasive. It has therefore
issued a notice proposing to delay for 1 year the
implementation of the second phase of biunper
requirements from September 1, 1979. until Sep-
tember 1, 1980. This action does not conform
exactly to Ford's i-equest. However, the NHTSA
does not know of any vehicles that would require
major design changes until implementatoin of
the more stringent second phase requirements.

Filler panels and stone .shields were identified
in the March 4. 1976, final ride as exterior ve-
vehicle surfaces that must experience no damage
as a result of the prescribed test impacts. GM,
Chrysler, and AMC objected to this interpreta-
tion of the level of damage resistibility filler
panels and stone shields must achieve. GM con-
tended that these components are part of the
bumper system and provide the transition be-
tween the bumpei' face bar and body panels. It
stated that bumper stroke causes unavoidable
surface scratches, abrasions, and displacements,
which could be eliminated only by using expen-
sive materials and mounting techniques. Chrysler
pointed out that filler panels are designed to flex
during bumper impacts and may not return to
exactly their original contour. According to
AMC, however, once a deformed bumper is re-
paired following an impact, the flexible filler
panel will return to its original contour. All
three maniifacturei's requested that filler panels
be permitted to sustain some degree of damage
during testing.

PART 581— PRE 10

Effaclive: September 1, 1978

The a<rcncv has recxamiiipd the role of filler
panels and stone shields in the hiiniper system
and finds that althoii<rh they do not actually hold
the bumper to the veliicle frame, they are cos-
metic components that aie [)art of the entire sys-
tem that performs the task of attachinjr the
bumper to the frame of the cai-.

The XHTSA has concluded that peiiiiittinjr
damape to tiller panels and stone shields will not
sijrnificantly dejrrade the le\el of ])erf()rmance
required for vehicles manufactured after Sep-
tember 1. 1078. The flexibility of the filler panel
and stone shiehl material enables it to withstand
(leformin<r iuii>acts witiiout permanently losinjr
its sha[)e, but as lon<r as the bumper and com-
ponents attachinjr it to the \ehicle frame are
permitted to sustain damage as a result of im-
pacts, the filler panel and stone shield may like-
wise sustain some depree of dauiajre. Since these
components are less visible than the bumper it-
self, the small anioimt of damage that they will
inctir will noruially not be as significant as that
allowed to the bumper. Therefore, filler panels
and stone shields on vehicles manufactured from
September 1. 1978. to Aufrnst 31. 1979. will be
l)ermitted to sustain damage durin<r the pre-
scTil>ed test impacts. This, in essence, jrrants
the requests of petitioners. The a<rency will
address in an upcoininp notice the application
of dama<re criteria to stone shields and filler
panels on vehicles manufactured after Septembei'
1. 1979.

Ford and Chrysler charped that the Part 581
damapre criteria are impracticable and lackinp
in objectvity. Specifically, they objected to the
critei'ia that allow no sepai'ations or deviations.
and require certain systems to operate in a nor-
mal manner. .\ccordin<r to petitioners, these
criteria are not objective since the reqini'euients
of no sepai'ation and no deviations can be inter-
preted as meaning that even the most microscopic
deviations and separations are prohibited, or
alternatively that only those deviations that are
readily apparent are prohibited. With regard
to the requirement that certain systems operate
in a normal maimer, petitioneis stated that the
nieanin<r of "normal" is unclear and can he inter-
pivted differently by different people. Ford and
Chrysler expressed concern that the apency will

interpret the meaning of these damage criteria
in a manner conflicting: with their interpretation.
To resolve the situation to which it is objecting,
Chrysler sufrpested that tiie requirements be re-
vised to allow minimal and inconsequential de-
viations, while Ford suppested that the apency
withdraw S,").3.2 and S.'i.S.r) and parts of S.5.3.3.
.S;").3.8, Sr).3.10. and S.5.3.11 pendinp development
of objective criteria to enable manufacturei's to
predict accurately whether their vehicles will
comply.

The apency undei"stands the petitioners" con-
cerns, but finds that a simple interpretation of
the cited requirements is adequate to satisfy their
objections. The damape criteria allowinp no
deviations and no separations are not intended
to apply to microscopic chanpes in the \ehicle
followinp test impacts. The types of deviations
and separations addressed by Part 581 ai'e those
that are perceptible without the use of sophisti-
cated mapnifyinp or measurinp equipment. What
is required is that the vehicle not reflect any
normally observable chanpes in the stated areas
followinp the prescribed test procedure. Damape
that is only identifiable by use of uiicroscopically-
oriented equipment would not be considered as
prohibited under Part 581.

With repard to the requirement that a vehicle's
iiood. trunk, and doors operate in the normal
manner, the standard is simply providinp that
these systems continue to operate followinp the
test impacts in the same mannei' as they did be-
fore the impacts. This refpiirement has been a
part of Standard Xo. 215. Exterior Profecticyn.
since its implementation on September 1. 1972.
Xo compliance contro\ersies have ever arisen con-
cerninp it.

T.ieyland Cars and A^fC re<|uested that the
requirements of S5.3.11, allowinp no more than
%-inch set and %-inch dent to the bumper face
bar. be made applicable to the component that
backs up the bumper face bar. Leyland Cars
e.\plaine<l that some of its bumpers are covered
by a rubber or plastic moldinp which, under Part
581. would be considered as the buuiper face bar.
It requested that the component over which the
moldinp is placed be permitted to sustain the
same depree of set allowed for the bumper face
bar. .VMC asked that the component underly-

PART 581— PRE 11

Effective: September 1, 1978

in<5 the molding be permitted to experience dents
up to %-inch as is tiie bumper face bar.

Tlie NHTSA finds petitioners' concerns un-
founded. The prohibition against set and dent-
ing applies to veiiicle exterior surfaces. From
the description of tiie component supplied by
Ford and Ciirysler it appears that it is com-
pletely covered by the molding and is not an
exterior surface area of the vehicle. Therefore,
it may experience damage during test impacts.
The molding enveloping.the reinforcement would
represent the exterior surface that is subject to
the requirements of S5.3.11.

Xissan and Gulf & AVestern objected to the pre-
scribed limitations on set and denting contained
in S5.3.11. Nissan requested that the damage
criteria be revised to allow 14-incli dent and
1-inch set, instead of the currently required %-
inch dent and %-inch set. It was Nissan's con-
tention that such a revision would cause only a
slight cliange in the appearance of a damaged
vehicle, while enabling a considerable change in
a vehicle's cost and weight. Gulf & "Western
alleged that there was no economic justification
for the %-inch dent and 3^-inch set requirements
since they are based solely upon a public opinion
poll. It requested that the Part 581 requirements
not be implemented until an economic justifica-
tion is presented.

The NHTSA finds both Nissan's and Gulf &
Western's requests lacking in merit. A survey
conducted by Louis Harris & Associates of public
reaction to various degrees of bumper damage
showed that a significant number of people con-
sider i/^-inch dents to be damage they would
repair. Based upon this information and cost
aiul weight data contained in the various studies
upon which the agency relied in the fonuula-
tion of the standard, it has been determined that
the amendhient requested by Nissan would ad-
versely affect the results to be acliieved by imple-
mentation of the Part 581 bumper standard.
The results of the Harris survey have definite
economic significance in that those individuals
indicating that a certain degree of damage was
significant enough that they would have it re-
paired were providing the pollster with cost data.
Damage that is repaired will liave a financial
impact on the car owner. By the same token.

damage that is detectable and thereby have an
economic impact on the car owner. These cost
factors were all considered in deciding on the
%- and %-inch damage limitations. For these
reasons, the requests of Nissan and Gulf &
Western are denied.

Chrysler objected to the procedure prescribed
for measuring the depth of bumper dents
(S5.3.11(b) ), charging that it is unreasonable,
inaccurate, and lacks objectivity. Chrysler al-
leged that the end points of the straight line
described in the test procedure for connecting
the bumper contours adjoining the contact area
are locations that are subjective on bumper face
bars with compound curvature. It also charged
that the si)ecified measurement method lacks ob-
jectivity and can be used only for determining
the depth of dents in flat surfaces. Chrysler
requested that the agency clarify the provision.

Although the objections raised by Chrysler
illustrate that some configurations are more dif-
ficult to measure than others, it is the agency's
judgement that the method described in S5.3.-
11(b) is valid and still the most feasible means
of determining the extent of damage. Location
of the end points of the straight line used to
measure the depth of bumper dents does not, in
the opinion of the NHTSA, pose a problem. In
order to establish the exact location of the end
points, the manufacturer may either paint or
chalk the pendulum test device. In this way,
the pendulum will leave a mark on the precise
area of contact.

With regard to Chi'ysler's objections concern-
ing tlie measui'ement of dents, it should be noted
that the straight line measurement technique is
not necessarily a test procedure. Rather, the
language specifying that a deviation from orig-
inal contour not exceed %-inch when measured
from a straight line connecting the bumper con-
tour adjoining the contact area should be con-
sidered a definition of a dent. Deformations
outside the contact area on the bumper surface,
siicii as recessions of a larger area of the bumper,
are defined as set.

The agency realizes that the measurement of
dent and set on some bumpers with complex
curvature )nay not be a simple procedure. In
such cases, the testers nmst use measurement pro-

PART 581— PRE 12

Effective: September 1, 1978

cedures tlint will enable thcni to accuintely
measure the <lo<rreo of dent the himiper has in-
cnn-cd. In situations involvinjr a concave face
bar, n reference line can Ix* established by plac-
ing a strai<rht line across the area of contact
pi'ior to impact. After completion of the actual
impact the chancre in bumper contour can be
nieasui-ed from the previously established infer-
ence line. Ill situations involviiif: a convex face
bar. or more complex surfaces, it may be neces-
sary for the nuiniifacturer to remove tiie bumper
followinfr impact in order to compare it with
an unimpacted bumper, or to make a cast of the
pi-eimpact bumper for comparison with the
bumper for comparison with the bumper follow-
in;: the prescribed testinp.

Chrysler also requested that Sr>.3.11 lie
amended to specify that bumi)er set be measured
relative to tlie vehicle frame in perpendicular,
parallel, and vertical directions with respect to
the vehicle's lonjritudinal centerline. It stated
that such a revision would reduce tiie task of
measuring permanent set to a reasonable level.

The XHTSA denies this request since Chrysler
has i)resented no information indicatinjr that the
currently prescribed measurement procedure is
unfeasible. The agency knows of no rea.son why
reference lines relati\e to the vehicle frame can-
not be established from which bumper set can be
measured. To adopt Chrysler's suppested method
for measurement would unduly complicate the
procedure since determination of the vehicle lon-
pritudinal centerline is complex.

GM charged that the XHTSA's definition of
bumper face bar may include license plate brac-
kets that arc attached to the vehicle bumper.
since these components may contact the impact
ridpe of the pendulum test device. If identified
as the bumper face bar, these license plate
brackets would be required to meet the level of
performance prescribed for bumpers. Accord-
inp to GM. such a result would be extremely
costly. License plate brackets capable of comply-
ing with the bumper daniape criteria would be
expensive to produce as well as to replace. This.
in GM"s opinion, would have a negative cost-
l>enefit impact.

"While the XHTSA aprees that license plate
brackets should not be required to meet the dam-

ape criteria of the bumper face, the XHTSA
believes that it is pood desipn practice to locate
license plates in an area other than the bumper
face. However, recopniziiip the limited space
available on the front of some cars for license
plate placement, the XHTSA is reluctantly will-
inp to plant GM's petition on this point. The
apency will, in the future, review industry prac-
tice on the placement of license plates on new
automobiles in an etToit to deteiiinne if future
rulemakinp on this mattei- would be desirable.

AMC recjuested in its petition that the
XHTSA amend the requirements limitinp the
total force on planes A and B to 2.000 pounds
(Sr)..S.7) to permit a force of 2.000 pounds on
plane A below the impact ridpe and a force of
2,000 pounds on the combined surfaces of planes
A and B above the impact ridpe. AMC based
its recpiest on the premise that the current re-
quirement allows the full 2,000-poun(l force to
be exerted either above or below the imi)act ridpe
of the test device. It pointed out that the
XHTSA stated in an earlier notice that tlie
2.000-pound limit would prevent any substantial
damape to the vehicle. Based upon this. AMC
arpued that allowinp 2.000 pounds of force both
above and below the impact ridpe would not ex-
pose those surface areas to any preater force than
would lie allowed under the current require-
ments.

The XHTSA disaprees with AMC's conten-
tion. The force limitation contained in Part "iRl
is intended to assure that the primary force of
the impact is directed at the bumper face bar.
Althouph all 2.000 pounds of allowable force
could be directed to the area either abo\e or be-
low the impact ridpe. this total amount of force
would not be a sipnificant damape factor. How-
ever, if the areas covered by i)lanes .V and B
were allowed to sustain a total force of 4.000
pounds, the focus of iirimaiy force on the
bumper face bar would not be assured and the
type of appressive bumper system Part o81 is
desipned to prevent could be utilized. AMC's
request is therefore denied.

AMC requested that Part 581 be amended to
include a provision appearinp in the January 2.
197;"), proposal (40 FR 10) that stated a vehicle
need not meet further requirements after havinp

PART 581— PRE 13

Effective: September 1, 1978

been subjected to either the lonjjitudinal pen-
duhim impacts followed by the barrier impacts,
or the corner pendulum impacts.

The agency has stated in past notices that a
vehicle will be involved in an average of three
low-speed collisions in its 10-year life. There
is no way to predict which portion of the bumper
will be afi'ected in these impacts. Therefore, it
was decided that vehicles should be recjuired to
meet tlie prescribed damage criteria when sub-
jected to the entire series of test impacts. To
provide otherwise would be to establish a level
of performance lower than necesasry to protect
a vehicle from the full range of potentially dam-
aging impacts it is likely to incur during its on-
road life. It was for this reason that the provi-
sion appearing in the January 2. 1975, proposal
was not adopted. It is for this same reason that
the agency denies AMC's request.

The text of the Title I bumper standard has
in previous notices and the March 4, 1976, final
ride been published in the format of a motor
vehicle safety standard. Since the bumper stand-
ard is actually an entire part within Chapter V

of the Code of Federal Regulations, the format
must be changed in order that it may be prop-
erly codified. The content of the standard will
remain the same. This notice, however, revises
the numbering system so that it conforms to the
Code of Federal Regulations format.

The principal authors of this notice are Guy
Hunter, Office of Crashworthiness, and Karen
Dyson, Office of Chief Counsel.

In light of the foregoing, 49 CFR Part 581,
is amended and i-ecodified. . . .

Effective date: September 1, 1978.

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; sec. 102, Pub. L. 92-513,
86 Stat. 947 (15 U.S.C. 1912) ; delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.)

Issued on May 4, 1977.

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

42 F.R. 24056
May 12, 1977

PART 581— PRE 14

Effective: August 1, 1977

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO PART 581— BUMPER STANDARD
(Docket No. 73-19; Notice 19 & Docket No. 74-11; Notice 22)

This notice corrects an inadvertent error in the
notice that changed the format of Part 581,
Bumper Sfandard, so that its nuniberinfr system
conformed to the Code of Federal Regulations
format (42 FR 24056; May 12, 1977). In that
notice, the new numbering was not totally in-
corporated into the body of the regulation.

For further information contact:

Mr. Tim Hoyt
Office of Crashworthiness
Motor Vehicle Programs
National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration
Washington, D.C. 20590
202-426-2264

Supplemental information: On May 12, 1977,
the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration published a Federal Register notice (42
FR 24056; FR Doc. 77-13235) responding to
petitions for reconsideration of the March 4,
1976, notice (41 FR 9346) establishing a new
bumper standard. The May notice also changed
the format of Part 581. The text of the bumper
standard was previously published in the format
of a motor vehicle safety standard. Since the
standard is actually an entire part within Chap-

ter V of the Code of Federal Regulations its
numbering system was revised in order that it
could be properly codified.

When Part 581 was published with its revised
format, only the section headings were properly
renumbered. The texts of the various sections
were inadvertently left unchanged. This notice
revises the section references in the body of the
regulation to conform to the new format.

The principal author of this notice is Karen
Dyson, Office of Chief Counsel.

In accordance with the foregoing, changes
should be made to 49 CFR Part 581, Bumper
Standard. . . .

(Sec. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; sec. 102, Pub. L. 92-513,
86 Stat. 947 (15 U.S.C. 1912); delegations of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50 and 49 CFR 501.8.)

Issued on July 26, 1977.

Robert L. Carter
Associate Administrator
Motor Vehicle Programs

42 F.R. 38909
August 1, 1977

PART 581— PRE 15-16

Effective: September 11, 1978

PREAMBLE TO PART 581— BUMPER STANDARD
(Docket No. 73-19; Notice 24)

This notice responds to a request from Ford
Motor Company for further interpretation of
the bumper damageability requirements of Part
581, Bumper Standard, and announces the photo-
graphic procedure NHTSA will use as an aid in
determining whether damage to filler panels and
stone shields (shielding panels) is normally ob-
servable for purposes of compliance with the
standard. This interpretation assists manufac-
turers in ascertaining whether contemplated
bumper designs will provide a level of perform-
ance consistent with the requirements of Part 581.
This notice also corrects an inadvertent error in
the previously announced effective dates for
Phase I of the bumper requirements.

Date: This interpretation and the correction to
Part 581 are effective immediately.

For further information contact:

Mr. Richard Hipolit, Office of Chief Counsel,
400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.
20590 (20^-426-9512)

Supplementary information: NHTSA has
established, through issuance of Part 581,
Bumper Standard (49 CFR Part 581), require-
ments for the impact resistance of vehicles in low
speed collisions. The effective dates of Part 581
are September 1, 1978, for components other than
the bumper face bar and certain associated fasten-
ers (Phase I), and September 1, 1979 for all ve-
hicle components (Phase II). On May 15, 1978,
the agency published a notice (43 FR 20804) sum-
marizing its interpretation of various aspects of
the Part 581 damage resistance requirements as
they relate to vehicle exterior surfaces. Ford
Motor Company has asked for additional clari-
fication of the requirement of paragraphs
581.5(c) (10) and (11) of the standard, in a June
22, 1978, request for interpretation that has been
placed in the public docket.

APPLICATION OF THE DAMAGE

CRITERIA TO BUMPER FACE BARS

AND ATTACHED COMPONENTS

The Phase II requirements prohibit permanent
deviations from the original contours of veliicle
exterior surfaces following pendulum and barrier
impacts. An exception is made for the "bumper
face bar," whose surface is permitted %-inch
deviation from its original contour and position
relative to the vehicle frame (set) and a %-inch
deviation from its original contour on areas of
contact with the barrier face or the impact ridge
of the pendulum test device, (dent) (§581.(c)
(11)). Bumper face bar is defined in §581.4
as "any component of the bumper system that
contacts the impact ridge of the pendulum test
device." NHTSA has stated that tlus definition
includes components of a multipiece bumper
which are connected as part, of the same load
l)earing structure to a bumper system component
which is contacted either by the pendulum test
device or the test barrier (43 F.R. 20804; May 15,
1978).

Ford has inquired as to the applicability of
this definition of bumper face bar to a variety
of components such as directional signals and
shielding panels, which may be mounted to a load
bearing structure while themselves performing
no structural function. Components which do
not perform a load bearing function are not nec-
essarily components of the bumper system (and
potentially bumper face bar) solely as the result
of their incidental mounting on or near a load
bearing structure of the bumper system. Com-
ponents must be examined on a case-by-case
basis to determine whether they constitute com-
ponents of the bumper system.

The agency stated in a previous notice that
shielding panels are considered a component of

PART 581— PRE 17

Effective: September 11, 1978

the bumper system and thus will qualify as
bumper face bar if contacted in testing (43 F.R.
20804; May 15, 1978). The same would be true
of other cosmetic components directly associated
with the bumper system's function such as manu-
facturing cut-out patches and tape strips the
primary funtcion of which is to hide protrusions,
primary function of which is to hide protrusions,
fasteners, or other unsightly aspects of the

Illumination devices, e.g., fog lamps and di-
rectional signals, are not associated with the
bumper system's function and could not qualify
as components of the bumper system, even if
contacted by the pendulum test device or barrier.

Still other components could be considered
components of the bumper system, depending on
their application in a particular vehicle design.
For example, a gi'ille, which would generally be
associated with the vehicle body, could perform
a protective function as a component of a bumper
system in a soft-face configuration, and could
therefore qualify as a component of the bumper
system.

The agency recognizes that components
mounted to a bumper face bar, but not them-
selves considered face bar because they are not
part of the bumper system or are not impacted
in testing, will necessarily move with the set of
the bumper face bar, although they do not qualify
for the permissible %-inch set allowance of (c)
(11) (i). However, the stricter damage limita-
tions of paragraph 581.5(c) (10), applicable to
such components, are actually limited to "nor-
mally observable changes in the started area
following the prescribed test procedures" (42 F.R.
24058; May 12, 1977). "[MJovement of small
patches covering manufacturing process cut-outs
on the face bar" and movement of shielding
panels with the set of the bumper are not con-
sidered normally observable (43 F.R. 20804; May
15, 1978). Similarly, non-bumper (e.g., fog-
lamps) and other bumper system components
(e.g., tape strips), attached to or built into a
bumper face bar but not contactable by the test
device, would not be considered to have normally
observable damage when they simply move with

the set of the face bar. Such movement would,
however, be normally observable if the function
of the mounted component were impaired, e.g.,
by misalignment, in the case of a fog lamp beam,
to the extent that it would not be adjustable to
its normal aim.

The thin, polymeric tape strips described above
typically are adhesively bonded to the surface
areas of the bumper face bar. The impact of the
pendulum test device or test barrier with the
bumper face bar may cause distortions on por-
tions of the face bar not directly impacted during
testing and cause localized separation on these
tape strips from the face bar surface, in the form
of wrinkling or bubbling.

The agency had previously stated that, "while
both barrier and pendulum impacts can cause
some cliipping or flaking of chrome or soft- face
material (depending on the type of system being
tested), such damage is significant" (41 F.R.
9346; March 4, 1976). This reasoning also gov-
erns minor damage to tape strips, such as wrin-
kling or bubbling, so long as the strips are
contactable and thus qualify as bumper face bar.
This interpretation would apply equally whether
the damage happened to fall at the area of im-
pact or elsewhere on the face bar.

Any component of the bumper system which
can be contacted by the impact ridge of the pen-
dulum test device in any permissible pendulimi
stroke is considered bumper face bar for testing
of that bumper system, whether or not it was
actually contacted in a particular test sequence.
Further, the interpretation concerning non-con-
tactable but load bearing components of multi-
piece bumpers discussed above, although ori-
ginally announced in the context of metal
bumpers (43 F.R. 20804; May 15, 1978), would
also govern a multipiece bumper assembly
equipped with plastic or rubber bumper guards
or nerf strips. Thus, all load bearing components
of the bumper assembly, whether plastic, rubber,
or metal would be considered bumper face bar
and be entitled to a %-inch set if they are con-
nected as a part of the same load bearing struc-
ture.

PART 581— PRE 18

Effective: September II, 1 978

MEASUREMENT OF DAMAGE TO THE
BUMPER FACE BAR

Paraofraph 581.5(c) (11) provides:

Thirty minutes after completion of each
pendulum and barrier impact test, the bumper
face bar shall have —

(i) No permanent deviation greater than
% inch from its ori^nal contour and position
relative to the vehicle frame; and

(ii) No permanent deviation ^eater than
% inch from its orifjinal contour on areas of
contact with the barrier face or the impact ridge
of the pendulum test device measured from a
straight line connecting the bumper contours
adjoining any such contact area.

Ford has inquired as to the measurement tech-
niques the agency will use in determining com-
pliance with these damage limitations. NHTSA
has previously recognized that "the measurement
of dent and set on some bumpers with complex
cui-vature may not be a simple procedure" (42
F.R. 24056; May 12, 1977). In many cases there
may be more than one procedure by which
damage can be accurately measured. Innovations
in measurement techniques may be needed as new
bumper designs are developed. Therefore, while
the agency can express the basic measurement
geometry (which appears to be Ford's basic con-
cern) that establish compliance with the damage
limits, it cannot specify a particular method to
be used in measuring those distances in all cases.

Ford requested resolution of the inadvertent
inconsistency between agency statements in the
May 1978 interpretation that "the two types of
deviation are additive in an area of contact with
the barrier face or impact ridge" but that "the
localized deviation permitted by paragraph (ii)
is measured taking any contour in the area of
impact and measuring its movement from its
location prior-to-impact to post-impact." The
first statement accurately reprasents that the de-
viations are additive in the area of contact with
the barrier or pendulum. The second statement
failed to make the different and intended point
that the contour of the cx)ntact area is measure^l
from the contour previous to contact, but only
after movement of the surface position and con-
tour relative to the vehicle frame attributable to

set has been subtracted. It should be noted that
contour change attributable to set must result
from a generalized flattening of the bumper sur-
face outside the area of contact. Otherwise the
concept of dent would be indistinguishable from
contour set.

The agency rejects Ford's suggestion to merely
measure the contour in the contact area in rela-
tion to the surrounding contour following impact.
The best example of why the original contour
must serve as the baseline is the case in which
the contact area consisted of a %-inch protru-
sion from the surrounding area prior to impact
and a %-inch depression in relationship to the
surrounding contour following impact. The re-
sulting dent would actually be %-inch deep.

Ford further recommended that all dent meas-
urements be made in vertical sections of the
plane of impact which produced the dent.
Recognizing the nee<l for flexibility in the meas-
urement of complex bumper configurations, Ford
has withdrawn this portion of its request for
interpretation.

Ford has questioned the portion of NHTSA's
previous interpretation (43 F.R. 20804; May 15,
1978) which stated that dent may Ise measured
"along any dimension, i.e., width, length, depth,"
from any line connecting the adjacent bumper
contours. The agency has decided that the %-
inch dent limitation of § 581.5(c) (11) (ii) should
presently be limited to depth measurements only.
Development of the Phase II face-bar contour
requirements and studies which formed the basis
for the %-inch dent requirements during the
rulemaking proceeding focused primarily on
limitation of the depth of deviations. A %-inch
dent limitation measured in any direction might,
at this time, impose an unanticipated burden in
some cases and perhaps restrict the flexibility of
manufacturers in selecting bumper systems for
diff'erent model sizes which provide a suitable
balance among the interrelated considerations of
damage resistance, weight reduction, and cost.
Should future testing and bumper design devel-
opments indicate that further face-bar dent limi-
tations would l)e lieneficial, sucli a requirement
will be the subject of a future rulemaking notice.

PART 581— PRE 19

Effective: September 11, 1978

Finally, Ford has asked whether there can be
more than one contact area for purposes of meas-
uring damage resulting from a particular im-
pact. It is clear that multiple areas of contact
between the bumper face bar and the impact
ridge or test barrier may exist, thus creating
multiple areas in which dent may occur. Given
the complexity of some bumper designs, it would
be unrealistic and impractical to require that all
damage incurred in an impact be combined for
measurement i^urposes. Deviations caused by
impact at non-contiguous locations on the bumper
system will be treated as separate contact areas,
and damage in each of these areas will be
measured separately, without reference to any
other area of contact.

PHOTOGRAPHIC PROCEDURES TO AID

IN EVALUATING DAMAGE TO

SHIELDING PANELS

NHTSA's previous interpretation of the Part
581 requirements (43 F.R. 20804; May 15, 1978)
addressed the problem of judging damage to ve-
hicle shielding panels for pur}X)ses of determin-
ing compliance with paragraph 581.5(c) (10).
That provision addresses all exterior surfaces
other than bumper face bar and prohibits per-
manent deviation from original contours or
separation of materials from the surface to which
they are bonded. The interpretation reiterated
that the agency does not consider damage to
shielding components to be in violation of the
standard if that damage is not "normally ob-
servable." In the case of shielding panels,
damage not visible in good quality, photographic
prints of the suspect area would not be con-
sidered by the agency to be "normally observ-
able." The notice indicated that the Office of
Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC), formerly
the Office of Standards Enforcement, would
establish standard procedures by which NHTSA
would take its evaluative photographs.

While NHTSA originally stated that 8 by 10
inch photographic prints would be employed, the
agency has concluded that the use of contact
prints of that size may present practical dif-
ficulties due to the limited availability and un-
wieldiness of large cameras. Further study of

existing photographs indicates that 4 by 5 inch
contact prints are adequate for the agency's
testing.

Upon completion of impact tests in accordance
with the test procedures of paragraph 581.7,
OVSC photographs shielding panel areas that
may have experienced permanent deviation or
separation of materials.

View Camera. OVSC uses a standard 4 by 5
inch View Camera with focal length of 127 mm,
a maximum aperture of f/4.7, a coated lens, and
available shutter speeds of 1 second to 1/400
second.

Film. OVSC uses type 52 Pola Pan 4 by 5
inch film for Polaroid prints.

lUimiination. OVSC takes the photographs
indoors using the following illumination proce-
dures: (11) illuminating the area to be photo-
graphed with crosslighting using two 1,000-watt
photofloods lamp for main light, and one 1,000-
watt photoflood lamp for fill-in light ; and (2)
positioning the photoflood lamps so that the light
rays strike the subject area at a 45° angle from
a distance of 10 feet from the area being photo-
graphed.

Camsra position. OVSC positions the camera
at a distance of 6 feet from the center of the
suspect area and utilizes ground glass focusing
to properly focus the camera for that distance.
Photographs are taken both at 90° and 45° angles
relative to the suspect area.

Exposure. OVSC utilizes a General Electric,
DeJur or Weston photoelectric exposure meter
to determine the exposure requirements. Light
readings are taken by measuring the intensity
of reflected light from a Kodak Gray Card placed
upon the area to be photographed. The meter
is placed near enough to the subject (gray card)
to indicate the average reflected light (at least
within a distance equal to the width of the sub-
ject being photographed). A light reading is
obtained and set opposite the film speed which
is indicated on the meter so that the f/stop or
the aperture settings and shutter speeds coincide.
The correct camera setting is read directly from
the meter.

PART 581— PRE 20

Effective: September 11, 1978

Photographic print. OVSC produces 4 by 5
inch black and white pliotogjaphic contact prints
from the Polaroid film.

Examination of contact print. OVSC examines
the completed contact print with the unaided
eye for compliance with 581.5(c) (10).

CORRECTION OF PHASE I
EFFECTIVE DATES

On May 12, 1977, NHTSA published a Federal
Register notice (42 F.R. 24056) responding to pe-
titions for reconsideration and revising the format
of Part 581 as originally announced on March 4,
1976 (41 F.R. 9346). Those notices inadvertently
indicated that the Phase I exterior surface re-
quirements, now contained in paragraph 581.5
(c)(8), would apply to vehicles manufactured
from September 1, 1978 to August 1, 1979. The
requirements of paragraph 581.5(c)(8) actually

apply to vehicles manufactured until August 31,
1979, and the regulation is therefore corrected to
reflect the intended effective dates.

In consideration of the foregoing, the date
"August 1, 1979," contained in 49 CFR §581.5
(c)(8), is hereby corrected to read "August 31,
1979."

The program official and lawyer principally
responsible for this document are Nelson Gordy
and Richard Hipolit, respectively.

(Sees. 103, 119, Pub. L. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) ; sec. 102, Pub. L. 92-513,
86 Stat. 947 (15 U.S.C. 1912) ; delegation of au-
thority at 49 CFR 1.50).

Joan Claybrook
Administrator

43 F.R. 40229^0232
September 11, 1978

PART 581— PRE 21-22

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 581

Bumper Standard
(Docket No. 73-19; Notice 29)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This notice amends the Bumper
Standard to reduce the test impact speeds
required by that standard to 2.5 mph for
longitudinal front and rear barrier and pendulum
impacts and 1.5 mph for corner pendulum impacts.
The notice also amends the damage resistance
criteria of the standard to eliminate limitations
on the damage which may be incurred by the
bumper face bar and associated components and
fasteners in bumper testing.

The agency finds that under this action net
benefits will accrue to the public and to the
nation's consumers. This action is thus required
by the mandate of the Motor Vehicle Information
and Cost Savings Act that any bumper standard
issued under that statute "seek to obtain the
maximum feasible reduction in costs to the public
and to the consumer," taking into account the
..-e^sts and benefits of implementation, effects on
insurance and legal costs, savings in consumer
time and inconvenience and considerations of
health and safety.

Any reduction in costs related to bumper
systems, including savings from reduced fuel
consumption, will exceed any reduction in
benefits which may occur because of increases in
damage, insurance costs, delay and inconvenience,
and other matters. This action will thus increase
and seek to maximize the net consumer and
public benefits of the standard. The agency also
finds that this action will cause no reduction in
vehicle safety.

EFFECTIVE DATE: July 4, 1982.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The "Part
581 Bumper Standard" (49 CFR Part 581) specifies
levels of damage resistance performance which

passenger motor vehicles must provide in low
speed collisions. Bumper performance is measured
in test impacts with both a fixed collision barrier
and a pendulum test device. Bumpers must meet
damage criteria which preclude any damage at all
to vehicle exterior surfaces, which ensure
protection of various safety-related components
of the vehicle, and which allow only minimal
damage to the bumper itself.

Background

The history of the Part 581 bumper standard
has been long, extremely controversial and
fraught with uncertainty. The current action is
the culmination of years of study, analysis and
agency action and reaction.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 215

In its initial efforts in the field of bumper
regulation, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) issued Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 215. Exterior
Protection, under the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety Act). 15 U.S.C. 1381
et seq. As initially implemented on September 1,
1972, that standard imposed requirements which
prohibited damage to specified safety-related
components and systems, e.g., headlights and fuel
systems, in a series of perpendicular barrier
impacts, at 5.0-mph for front and 2.5-mph for rear
bumper systems.

One year later, several new requirements
became effective under FMVSS 215. First, rear
barrier impact speeds were increased from
2.5-mph to 5.0-mph. Second, the standard specified
5.0-mph perpendicular front and rear pendulum
impacts and 3.0-mph corner front and rear
pendulum impacts. Third, a bumper height
requirement was in fact established by specifying
that the longitudinal pendulum impacts must be

PART 581; PRE 23

made between a height of 16-20 inches. (The
corner pendulum impacts were limited to a height
of 20 inches until September 1, 1975, when the
standard specified that they must be made within
the same 16-20 inch height range.)

Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act

On October 20, 1972, Congress enacted the
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act,
("the Act"). 15 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. The stated
purpose of Title I of the Act is to "reduce economic
losses associated with low speed collisions of
motor vehicles." 15 U.S.C. 1901(b). Section 102(a)
directed the Secretary of Transportation' to
promulgate bumper standards in accordance with
the criteria of section 102(b) which requires that
such standards —

seek to obtain the maximum feasible reduction
of costs to the public and to the consumer,
taking into account:

(A) the cost of implementing the standard and
the benefits attainable as the result of
implementation of the standard;

(B) the effect of implementation of the
standard on the cost of insurance and
prospective legal fees and costs;

(C) savings in terms of consumer time and
inconvenience; and

(D) considerations of health and safety,
including emission standards.

15 U.S.C. 1912 mil}

The Act also provides that the bumper standards
must not conflict with motor vehicle safety
standards issued under the Safety Act. 15 U.S.C.
1912(b)(2).

Adoption of the Part 581 Standard

Pursuant to both the new authority of the Act
and that of the Safety Act, NHTSA established
the Part 581 Bumper Standard in 1976. 41 Fed.
Reg. 9,346 (March 4, 1976). As adopted, this

'The authority of the Secretary to promulgate safety
standards has been delegated to the NHTSA Administrator.
49 CFR 1.51(a).

standard combined the safety features of FMVSS
215 with new damage resistance criteria intended
to promote consumer cost savings.

The Part 581 standard established compliance
test procedures which consist of a series of five
test impacts on both the front and the rear
bumper. Each test series includes one longitudinal
barrier impact, two longitudinal pendulum impacts
and two corner pendulum impacts.

The Part 581 standard sets forth substantive
requirements in terms of damage resistance
criteria which took effect in two stages. The first
stage, or "Phase I" of the Part 581 standard,
became effective on Setpember 1, 1978, on which
date FMVSS 215 was ipso facto revoked. Phase I
incorporated the former FMVSS 215 safety
criteria, and added new damage resistance criteria
which prohibited damage to all exterior vehicle
surfaces, e.g., sheet metal, other than the bumper
face bar and related components and fasteners.

More stringent damage resistance criteria,
known as the "Phase 11" criteria, became effective
one year later, on September 1, 1979. The Phase
II criteria expanded Part 581 by also imposing
limits on the amount of "dent" and "set" damage
which could be sustained by the bumper face bar
itself in the same series of test impacts. "Dent"
refers to permanent deviation from the original
contour of the bumper face bar in areas of contact
with the barrier face or the impact ridge of the
pendulum test device. "Set" refers to permanent
deviation of the bumper from its original contour
and position relative to the vehicle frame. Phase
II limited allowable dent to 3/8 inch, and set to 3/4
inch, each as measured thirty minutes after
completion of each test impact.

Early Proposals and Evaluations of the
Bumper Standard

1973

NHTSA initially proposed a Part 581 standard
in August 1973, while FMVSS 215 was in force,
but after the passage of the Act. This 1973
proposal would have required protection against
damage in 5.0-mph test impacts. 38 Fed. Reg.
20,899 (August 3, 1973).

1975

NHTSA thereafter issued a second Part 581
proposal, in January 1975. This revised proposal

PART 581; PRE 24

would not only have reduced (at least temporarily*
the impact speeds required by FMVSS 215, but
also would have reduced the damage resistance
criteria contained in the Part 581 proposal still
pending from 1973. 40 Fed. Reg. 10 (January 2,
1975). These proposed reductions were based
primarily on the results of two intervening
agency-sponsored studies, which indicated that
the cost and weight of many of the then-current
production bumpers had made such bumpers no
longer cost-beneficial. The 1975 proposal would
also have reduced the number of longitudinal
pendulum impacts from six front and six rear, to
three front and three rear.

After considering information and arguments
submitted in response to the August 1973 and
January 1975 proposals, the agency issued yet
another proposal in March 1975. 40 Fed. Reg.
11,598 (March 12. 1975). At that time, the agency
withdrew the January 1975 proposal regarding
test speeds, and proposed instead only to amend
the still pending 1973 proposal to reduce the
number of longitudinal pendulum impacts to two
front and two rear.

1976

The agency finally promulgated the Part 581
Bumper Standard in March 1976, specifying
5.0-mph test impact speeds and requiring a total
of five barrier and pendulum impact tests for the
front bumper and five for the rear.

1977

In 1977, however, NHTSA issued two further
rulemaking proposals. The first would have
delayed the effective date of the Phase II damage
criteria one year. 42 Fed. Reg. 10,862 (February
24, 1977). The second, which replaced the first,
proposed three alternatives: (1) a one-year delay
of Phase II; (2) a one-year delay with a consumer
information program on bumper performance in
the interim; and (3) an indefinite delay of Phase II
and substitution of the information program. 42
Fed. Reg. 30,655 (June 16, 1977). These proposals
were withdrawn by the agency in November of
that same year. 42 Fed. Reg. 57,979 (November 7,
1977).

Also in 1977, NHTSA decided to undertake a
series of long term studies of its existing and
proposed rulemaking efforts. As a part of this
initiative, it began a multi-year evaluation of the

Part 581 Bumper Standard. This evaluation which
was released in April 1981, is discussed in detail
below.

1978

In 1978, and after the effective date of the
5.0-mph, Phase I standard, the Senate
Appropriations Committee included in its report
on the fiscal year 1979 Appropriations Act for the
Department of Transportation a directive that
NHTSA conduct studies and analyses reevaluating
to the maximum extent feasible the question of
the level of bumper damage resistance which
would be most cost-beneficial to the consumer.
The Committee further directed the agency to
modify the Part 581 standard (i.e., the standard to
which this current rulemaking is addressed) in
accordance with the results of such analyses. S.
Rep. No. 938, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1978).

1979

In February 1979, the agency completed a
Preliminary Analysis which concluded that
2.5-mph bumpers offered approximately $77 more
net benefits than 5.0-mph bumpers. In March
1979, the agency published an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking seeking public comment on
its February analysis. The notice indicated that
the responses would be used to aid NHTSA in
preparing a final report to the Senate
Appropriations Committee and in determining
the possible need for changes in the Part 581
standard.

In June 1979, NHTSA published a "Final
Assessment of the Bumper Standard." That
document estimated the net benefits of alternative
bumper standards specifying test impact speeds
of 2.5 mph. 5.0 mph, and 7.5 mph. The agency at
that time concluded that a standard specifying
5.0-mph impact speeds should be retained since it
was believed to provide slightly more lifetime
vehicle net benefits ($39) than one specifying
2.5-mph impact speeds. In December 1979. the
agency updated its assessment based on
comments received from the automotive and
insurance industries. It concluded that the
advantage of the 5.0-mph standard over the
2.5-mph standard was less than previously
thought, offering only $11-29 more lifetime vehicle
net benefits than a standard specifying 2.5-mph
speeds.

PART 581: PRE 25

1980

In late 1980. during the final days of the 96th
Congress, a House-Senate conference committee
reported out a bill which would have statutorily
reduced the test speed in the Part 581 standard to
2.5 mph for a two-year period. H. R. Rep. No. 1371,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1980). Sharp differences
of opinion regarding the relative merits of the
agency's two 1979 bumper analyses were
highlighted in the Congressional debates. See,
e.g., Senate debate of September 25, 1980, 126
Cong. Rec. S13499-501. However, Congress
adjourned without taking final action on the bill.

1981

In April 1981, NHTSA published a notice of
intent to review the Part 581 standard and propose
again to modify the requirements of the Part 581
Bumper Standard. 46 Fed. Reg. 21,203 (April 9,
1981).

Also in April 1981, NHTSA completed and
published its "Evaluation of the Bumper
Standard," which it had begun in 1977. Based
upon continually developing data and analyses,
this report addressed in still further detail the
costs and benefits of each phase of the agency's
bumper requirements, beginning with the initial
FMVSS 215 standard. The April 1981 Evaluation
incorporated newly developed data from various
agency studies on insurance claims for vehicles
manufactured since the Part 581 standard took
effect, on the incidence and extent of low speed
collision damage, and on bumper costs. Unlike
previous studies, the Evaluation separately
analyzed front and rear bumpers. It found that
regulated front bumpers tended to be cost
effective while rear bumpers were not. This
study, in accordance with both the Senate's 1978
directive and the provisions of Executive Order
12291, formed the basis for the agency's
undertaking the current rulemaking.

Current Rulemaking

October 1981 Proposal and Analysis

On October 1, 1981, NHTSA published a notice
of proposed rulemaking (the NPRM) seeking
comments on nine different alternatives for
amending Part 581. 46 Fed. Reg. 48,262. The
proposals ranged from one reducing the test

impact speed to 2.5 mph for rear bumpers only to
one eliminating all test impact requirements for
front and rear bumpers except as necessary to
maintain a height requirement. Specifically, the
nine alternatives were as follows:

— Alternative I A would have reduced the test
impact speeds for rear bumpers only to 2.5 mph
for longitudinal impacts and to 1.5 mph for corner
impacts. It would have maintained the test impact
speed for front bumpers at 5.0 mph and would
have maintained the Phase II damage resistance
criteria. (5.0 mph front/2.5 mph rear, Phase II)

— Alternative IB would have made the changes
included in alternative lA and substituted Phase I
damage resistance criteria for Phase II criteria for
front and rear bumpers. (5.0-mph/2.5-mph, Phase I)

— Alternative IIA would have eliminated the
damage resistance criteria for rear bumpers only,
with the exception of the criterion that is
intended to ensure uniform bumper height by
requiring bumper contact with a pendulum test
device within a specified height range. It would
have maintained the 5.0-mph test impact speed
and Phase II criteria for front bumpers. (5.0
mph/height only. Phase II)

— Alternative IIB would have made the changes
included in alternative IIA and substituted Phase

I criteria for Phase II criteria for the front
bumper. (5.0 mph/height only. Phase I)

— Alternative III A would have reduced the
test impact speed for front and rear bumpers to
2.5 mph for longitudinal impacts and 1.5 mph for
corner impacts. It would have retained the Phase

II damage criteria. (2.5 mph/2.5 mph. Phase II)

— Alternative IIIB would have made the changes
included in alternative IIIA and substituted
Phase I criteria for Phase II criteria for front and
rear bumpers. (2.5 mph/2.5 mph, Phase I. This
alternative is referred to below as the 2.5-mph/
2.5-mph alternative.)

— Alternative IVA would have reduced the test
impact speed for front bumpers to 2.5 mph for
longitudinal impacts and 1.5 mph for corner
impacts. It would also have eliminated the
damage criteria for rear bumpers with the
exception of the bumper height criterion. (2.5
mph/height only. Phase I)

— Alternative IVB would have made the changes
included in alternative IVA and substituted
Phase I criteria for Phase II criteria for front
bumpers. (2.5 mph/height only. Phase I)

PART 581; PRE 26

— Alternative V would have eliminated the
damage resistance criteria for front and rear
bumpers, with the exception of the bumper
height criterion, (height only/height only)

The alternatives set forth in the NPRM were
developed during the preparation of a Preliminary
Regulatory Impact Analysis (PRIA) (Docket 73-19,
Notice 27. No. Oil).' The PRIA which was
published for public comment simultaneously
with the NPRM, built upon all of the agency's
earlier evaluations and assessments. To encourage
close scrutiny of the PRIA and the NPRM, and in
recognition of the limited empirical data on
several important issues, the agency specifically
requested comment on 25 detailed questions
which were set forth in the NPRM.

Using the present Part 581 standard for
comparison, the PRIA estimated the changes in
costs and benefits that were likely to occur if the
standard were modified in each of the ways set
forth in the October notice of proposed rulemaking.
The PRIA concluded that the differences in
probable net benefits among several alternative
bumper standards were small. The results of the
PRIA suggested that while 5.0-mph bumper
requirements had in fact reduced lifetime repair
costs for cars, they also had increased both car
purchase prices and fuel consumption. The 5.0-mph
bumper requirements had in fact reduced lifetime
repair costs for cars, they also had increased both
car purchase prices and fuel consumption. The
5.0-mph bumper requirements were found to have
decreased insurance company claims payments
and overhead, but also to have increased the
manufacturing costs of car companies.

Public Meetings

The agency conducted two public meetings on
the NPRM on October 22 and November 12, 1981.
in fulfillmment of the statory requirement that

'In preparing the PRIA. the agency also considered the
possibility of raising, as well as lowering the required test
impact speeds. The 1979 Final Assessment stated that a
7.5-mph bumper would have marginally greater net benefits
than a 5.0-mph bumper. However, the Executive Summary for
that document indicated that the conclusions regarding the
7.5-mph bumper were based on substantially less data than were
the conclusions regarding the 5.0-mph bumper and thus that
the conclusions about the 7.5-mph bumper were far less reliable.
Subsequently obtained data and analyses have not provided
any basis for placing more credence in those three-year-old
conclusions aboiit 7.5-mph bumpers.

all interested persons be given an opportunity to
present orally data, views and arguments on the
October 1981 NPRM. The agency scheduled two
separate meetings instead of a single extended
one in response to a request by insurance industry
representatives. Those representatives requested
an opportunity to introduce data relating to
suggested new compliance technologies whose
use would reportedly allow the existing
requirements of the Part 581 standard to be
retained with little if any modification, but at
greatly reduced economic cost. In the notice
announcing the meetings, the agency urged all
interested parties to provide technical and
economic data that would help focus the issues at
the first public meeting, and indicated that the
second meeting would be used to allow others to
respond to testimony at the first meeting. 46 FR
48958 (October 5, 1981).

The views and arguments advanced by
responding parties with substantial economic
interests at stake, e.g.. the insurance and
automotive manufacturing industries, were
similar to those previously expressed in response
to earlier analyses, proposals, and requests for
comments. However, commenters did submit
significant new data on several issues, including
those relating to the cost and weight of bumpers
providing different levels of protection.

Positions of Interested Parties

Time impact speed. Insurance industry
representatives, generally joined by consumer
representatives, expressed their support for
retaining the current Part 581 requirements, based
upon assertions of favorable benefit and cost
analyses of the current standard, safety
considerations, and the legislative history of the
Act. Insurance representatives further
contended that the legislative history indicates a
Congressional intent that bumper standards be
established at a level of 5.0 mph. They strongly
opposed the option of adopting Regulation No. 42
of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (ECE).'

'ECE Regulation No. 42 requires that a car's safety systems
continue to operate normally after the car has been impacted
by a pendulum or moving barrier on the front and rear
longitudinally at 4 kilometers per hour (about 2.5 mph) and on a
front and rear corner at 2.5 kilometers per hour (about 1.5 mph)
at 455 mm (about 18 inches) above the ground under loaded and
unloaded conditions. See discussion under "Harmonization," below.

PART 581: PRE 27

Some insurance industry commenters contended
that the record in this proceeding is insufficient to
support any reduction of the damage resistance or
safety requirements of the Bumper Standard
below current levels. These commenters, joined
by an organization presenting arguments on
behalf of consumers, argued (1) that in order to
amend the standard the agency must be able to
establish affirmatively that any selected
alternative is one which uniquely meets the
statutory criteria of the Act and the Safety Act,
in a manner superior to any and all others, and (2)
that on the record the agency is not able to make
such a finding with respect to any particular
alternative.

Auto industry commenters overwhelmingly
supported the alternative proposing reduction of
test impact speeds to 2.5 mph in longitudinal
impacts and 1.5 mph in corner impacts, and
substitution of Phase I damage criteria for Phase
II criteria. Among the reasons stated in support of
this alternative were assertions of cost-benefit
analyses for that alternative more favorable to
the consumer, the results of the agency's prior
analyses, the similarity of this alternative to ECE
Regulation No. 42, the greater relevance of the
2.5-mph design speed to the speed of the typical
parking lot collision, and the enhanced prospects
of gathering field data on the relative merits of
2.5-mph and 5.0-mph bumpers.

Three foreign manufacturers stated that they
favored adoption of the requirements of ECE
Regulation No. 42, but that the 2.5-mph/2.5-mph
alternative was their second choice because of its
similarity to the European standard. Several
other manufacturers, while not advocating the
adoption of the ECE requirements as such, noted
the desirability of harmonizing United States and
European bumper requirements. Some domestic
and foreign automakers expressed reservations
about adoption of the ECE standard in its
entirety, but advocated adopting certain aspects
of that standard, such as eliminating the fixed
barrier test or establishing a single permissible
bumper height.

A trade association representing materials
suppliers registered its support for the 5.0-mph/
5.0-mph standard, asserting that the standard
provides the added advantage of affording actual
protection at speeds above 5.0 mph. One bumper
component manufacturer proposed the additional

alternative of lowering the pendulum impact
speed to 2.5 mph, while retaining the 5.0-mph
impact speed for barrier tests. That commenter
contended that the pendulum test, which
concentrates force on a particular area of the
bumper, is a disproportionately severe test which
prevents use of optimum 5.0-mph bumper designs.

A number of private individuals also submitted
views on the proposed alternatives. The majority
of those commenting favored retention of existing
Part 581 requirements, although apparently some
comments were based on factual representations
contained in media reports of the rulemaking
proceeding, instead of the data and issues
actually under review. See, e.g., Docket 73-19,
Notice 27, No. 209. Insurance industry and public
interest commenters claimed that public opinion
favors the 5.0-mph/5.0-mph standard, and that
significant, if not determinative weight should be
given to such alleged preferences.

Phase I-Phase II damage resistance
requirements. Several commenters specifically
addressed the issue of differences between the
Phase I and Phase II damage criteria. Automakers
addressing the issue uniformly favored return to
the Phase I criteria. Two manufacturers advocated
elimination of all criteria addressed to damage to
non-safety components. The insurance industry
generally favored retention of the Phase II
criteria, as did a component parts manufacturer,
although one insurance industry commenter
advocated consideration of permitting nonself-
restoring energy absorbing devices.

Other test procedure modifications. Commenters
discussed several other alternative approaches to
the Phase I-Phase II issue, including merely
amending the bumper standard test procedures.
One modification discussed by several commenters
would allow manual repositioning of bumper or
shielding-panel components during testing. Both
insurance and auto industry commenters agreed
that manual repositioning would be a desirable
modification of the bumper system test procedure.
However, some auto industry commenters also
stated that eliminating the Phase II damage
criteria would serve to alleviate much of the need
for manual repositioning.

Three vehicle manufacturers and one component
supplier recommended limiting the number of
pendulum test impacts so that the bumper
standard test procedure would more closely

PART 581; PRE 28

approximate real life experience. These
commenters advocated reducing the number of
pendulum impacts to one longitudinal impact and
one corner impact per bumper, or to one
longitudinal and two corner impacts per bumper.
For additional details concerning comments on
the NPRM, see the appendix to this notice.

Agency Decision

Drawing on the best available data, public
comments submitted in response to the October
1981 NPRM, and comments presented at NHTSA's
public meetings on October 22 and November 12,
1981, NHTSA has now completed a Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis (FRIA) of the bumper
standard alternatives. Docket 73-19, Notice 29,
No. 001. Careful consideration was given to the
data and analyses contained in the FRIA and all
comments received in the rulemaking proceeding.
Responses to all significant comments are
contained either in this notice or the FRIA. Based
on its review of all of these materials, the agency
has decided to adopt the 2.5-mph/2.5-mph, Phase I
alternative. The alternative reduces to 2.5 mph
the front and rear longitudinal barrier and
pendulum impacts for testing compliance with
the safety and damage resistance criteria and
substitutes Phase I damage resistance criteria
for Phase II criteria.

In the agency's judgment, neither costs savings
nor safety considerations warrant the retention
of the current standard. Indeed, the agency
believes that the changes in the damage
resistance criteria and the compliance test speed
are necessary in order to comply with the
requirements of the Act that the standard seek to
provide the maximum feasible reduction in costs
to the public and the consumer.

As discussed in more detail below and in the
FRIA, the extensive data analyzed by the agency
and the reasoned assumptions made by the
agency after opportunity for public comment
have led the agency to the firm conclusion that
the current 5.0-mph/5.0-mph standard does not
meet the statutory requirements. Stated simply,
the current standard does not provide or seek to
provide the maximum feasible reductions in cost.
Therefore, the agency has determined that the
current standard can no longer be retained in
accordance with the Act. Similarly, it is clear that
a standard imposing a height-only requirement

for front and rear bumper systems would provide
fewer net benefits than other alternatives
considered in this rulemaking proceeding.

The agency recognizes that no single remaining
alternative is dramatically superior in terms of
net benefits over the wide ranges of reasoned
assumptions made about the values of certain
important variables. However, after careful
comparison of the current standard and the
specific proposed alternatives under ranges of
assumptions, the agency concludes that the
2.5-mph/2.5-mph, Phase I alternative best satisfies
the statutory criterion that the bumper standard
"seek to obtain the maximum feasible reduction
of costs to the public and to the consumer."

The agency has concluded that the alternatives
involving differential front and rear impact speed
requirements are less desirable because of
uncertainties surrounding the effects of impacts
between bumpers with different levels of
aggressivity. These alternatives received no
support among commenters. Alternatives
involving height-only requirements for rear
bumpers appeared to provide slightly less net
benefits than the 5.0-mph/2.5-mph and 2.5-mph/
2.5-mph alternatives under most sets of
assumptions considered.

Alternatives which have higher impact speed
requirements and would produce essentially the
same net benefits, differ from the selected
alternative principally in that they make an even
trade of additional dollars saved in avoided
damage for additional dollars spent for damage
protection at such higher speeds. Those
alternatives would thus fail to meet the test of
the statutory criteria with respect to "maximum
feasible reduction of costs." The initial direct
costs to consumers of the selected alternative are
less than those of that alternative which would in
the agency's judgment be most likely to provide
comparable net benefits, the 5.0-mph/2.5-mph
alternative.

The agency has also concluded that reducing
the impact speed to 2.5 mph and eliminating the
Phase II damage criteria will not have an adverse
effect on safety. Such amendments will have no
discernible effect on the number of accidents,
deaths or injuries that occur annually.

The new standard adopted in this notice will
provide greater latitude and incentive for car
manufacturers to improve bumpers through the

PART 581; PRE 29

innovative use of new designs and materials,
while conforming to the clear Congressional
directive that the agency promulgate and enforce
a minimum performance standard seeking
maximum feasible reductions in cost. Also, the
chosen alternative best advances the goal of
harmonization with international standards while
meeting applicable statutory requirements.

Pursuant to Executive Order 12291, the agency
has concluded that there is a strong and
reasonable basis in the record of this rulemaking
proceeding for the factual conclusions and choices
of data and methodologies underlying the
selection of the 2.5-mph/2.5-mph alternative.

Agency Rationale

The sharply opposed positions of the
commenters on the many complex technical,
analytical and policy issues raised in this
proceeding provide dramatic evidence of the
difficulty which the agency has faced in reaching
this decision. The primary issues involved in the
agency's decision are as follows.

Resolution of uncertainty. The Act directs not
only that a bumper standard be adopted and
maintained, but also that such standard be set at
the particular level of performance which "seeks to
provide the maximum feasible reduction of costs
to the public and to the consumer," taking into
account specified elements of costs and benefits.

On several of the issues presented in choosing
among the various alternatives, the agency was
confronted with uncertainties arising either from
conflicts among data or from the absence or
limited nature of relevent, reliable data.

Because of the prior history of the standard
and the sequence of technology used by
manufacturers to comply over time, field
performance data under real world conditions are
sharply limited to empirical data on two types of
systems, as discussed elsewhere in this notice. As
a result, the combination of the specificity of the
statutory language and the limited nature of the
data available has left the agency certain of the
need to act, but marginally less certain as to
which of the available alternatives and which
means of analysis of such alternatives will
produce the result most in conformity with the
intent of Congress.

For several years, the agency has been taking
all prudent steps to obtain more data to reduce

uncertainty with respect to the appropriate
standard and to analyze and account for the
possible effects of remaining uncertainties on
certain key variables. In a number of areas, more
reliable data could not be developed by the
agency. In the PRIA, the agency carefully
identified and explained the assumptions it made
in those areas and invited public scrutiny and
comment. To ensure full discussion of all of the
issues presented, the agency asked detailed
questions regarding those assumptions in the
October 1981 NPRM.

The agency's assumptions were the subject of
extensive public comment. The agency received
over two hundred comments from a full spectrum
of interested parties and sought to gather all
available data on the subject of this proceeding.
New data, estimates and arguments were received
which have assisted the agency in adjusting and
refining its analysis of the standard and the
alternatives.

The agency believes that sufficient information
exists to make all determinations required by
applicable statutory criteria. The uncertainties
confronting the agency now are significantly less
than those which existed when the current
standard was promulgated. The agency knows far
more now about the benefits and costs of bumper
standards with various levels of performance
requirements than it did then. In the agency's
judgment, there is no reasonable prospect of
obtaining more definitive data under the continued
application of the existing Part 581 standard.

The record is most clear on the issue of the
present standard's noncompliance with the criteria
in the Act. If the agency were now setting a bumper
standard for the first time, it could not justify
establishing a 5.0-mph/5.0-mph standard. The
existing 5.0-mph standard provides significantly
less net benefit to the public and consumers than
would several of the proposed alternatives with
less stringent performance requirements.

The record and empirical data before the
agency are less definitive with respect to some
aspects of the agency's assessment of the proposed
alternative standards. Some uncertainty continues
to exist with respect to several issues, including
the proper economic value to be assigned to delay
and inconvenience, the number of relevant low-
speed impacts which a car may be expected to
sustain over its lifetime, the proper economic

PART 581; PRE 30

value to be assigned to damage which car owners
themselves elect not to repair, the proper factor
to be applied to determine the relationship
between increases in bumper weight and resulting
increases in the weight of other vehicle systems
and structures to accommodate the heavier
bumpers (secondary weight), and the extent of
weight reductions which would accrue if various
alternative standards were adopted.

NHTSA has explored these areas of uncertainty
to the limits of available data and appropriate
analytical techniques. Ultimately, the agency has
relied in these areas upon inferences from
available data, informed judgment about
engineering, technical, economic and legal
matters, and the informed and expert opinion of
commenters on the issue of which alternative
level of performance requirements will best
achieve the policy objectives set forth in both the
Cost Savings and Safety Acts.

The agency has subjected its interim findings
and conclusions to sensitivity analyses, to
identify and isolate the most significant (i.e.,
outcome determinative) variables and to
determine the levels of confidence which may be
placed on the values ultimately assigned to such
variables. Where NHTSA could not with certainty
assign a single value to a variable determined to
be significant, the agency in all cases employed a
range of values based upon the best available
information. Those ranges generally include the
values recommended by the commenters. The use
of these ranges permitted the agency to examine
the sensitivity of the results of its analysis and
ensure the integrity of the outcome.

Finally, the agency identified the sets of
assumptions it believes are most probable, and
subjected each of its comparative analyses to
various combinations of such values. These
choices and related assumptions are discussed
below in this notice and in greater detail in the
FRIA itself.

Selection of test speeds, cost savings
considerations— threshold factors. In its efforts
to ensure the fullest consideration of the current
standard and the proposed alternatives, NHTSA
analyzed the net benefits of the standard and
each alternative both by the use of average
values and the use of extreme values for those
variables about which there was either a
significant measure of uncertainty or sharp and

irreconcilable differences of opinion among the
commenters. Some of the extreme assumptions
were favorable to the current standard, while
others were favorable to a reduced standard. The
extreme values so analyzed represent in most
cases neither a probable nor a reasonable
outcome of events. Such analysis illustrates the
most extreme of the possible outcomes in order to
ensure the fullest consideration of the results of
the agency's action.

Under the three sets of those extreme
assumptions deemed to be the more reasonable
by the agency, the net benefit calculation was
found to favor a reduced standard. In these
comparisons, all but one alternative proposal
proved superior to the 5.0-mph/5.0-mph standard
in terms of net benefits. See Table X-9 of the
FRIA.

Only under the fourth set of extreme
assumptions considered by the agency did the
current standard yield more net benefits than did
the alternatives. See Table X-9 of the FRIA.
However, the agency considers it virtually
impossible that the factual elements of that
combination of assumptions could occur in reality,
in large part because of inherent contradictions in
economic or behavioral results that would be
associated with such alignment. See Chapter XI
of the FRIA.

Therefore, the agency can not, consistent with
its statutory mandate, retain the existing
standard.

Similarly, alternative V, which would have
eliminated all but the height requirement for
both front and rear bumpers, also is found to fail
to maximize net benefits to the consumer under
the range of combinations of assumptions
considered. No set of assumptions or average set
forth in Tables X-9 and X-10 of the FRIA showed
superior net benefits for alternative V.
Accordingly, this alternative has been rejected
by the agency.

Given the relatively flat nature of the cost and
benefit curves over the range between the
5.0-mph/2.5-mph and 2.5-mph/height-only
alternatives, the choice among the remaining
alternatives is more difficult. Particular sets of
assumptions would suggest the superiority of
various alternatives which retain some level of
front bumper impact requirements but which
would eliminate all impact requirements, and

PART 581; PRE 31

retain only a height requirement, for rear
bumpers. However, any such apparent superiority
in each case occurs only in the unique event of one
combination of assumptions. Viewed as a whole,
the data and probabilities associated with all
combinations of assumptions preclude any
reasonable finding that an alternative is superior
where the range of necessary factual preconditions
is so narrow.

First, under the sets of assumptions considered
by the agency to be most likely or representative,
the 2.5-mph/unregulated alternative cannot be
found to be the alternative which is most likely to
maximize net benefits. See Table XI-4 of the
FRIA. Under all three sets of assumptions in that
table considered by the agency to represent the
most likely or average values for disputed
elements of fact, the 2.5-mph/unregulated
alternative provides fewer net benefits than does
the 2.5-mph/2.5-mph alternative. Under two of
those sets of facts, the net benefits of the
2.5-mph/unregulated alternative are also inferior
to those of the 5.0-mph/2.5-mph alternative.

Second, while the net benefits of the 5.0-mph/
unregulated alternative are closer to those of the
5.0-mph/2.5-mph and 2.5-mph/2.5-mph alternatives,
they are still inferior. The net benefits of that
alternative exceed those of the 2.5-mph/2.5-mph
alternative in only one instance in Tables X-9, X-10
and XI-4. In several instances, the 5.0-mph/
unregulated alternative yields less net benefits
than does either the 5.0-mph/2.5-mph or 2.5-mph/
2.5-mph alternative.

Finally, there is another consideration which
leads to the rejection of the 5.0-mph/unregulated
alternative. Any alternative not providing front
and rear impact protection at the same speed
raises uncertainty about the aggressivity results
or other effects of differential requirements.

Among the alternatives having differential
requirements, the 5.0-mph/unregulated alternative
has the most extreme differential. Since there are
not any hard data on the effects of this differential,
those effects could not be factored into the net
benefit calculations in the FRIA. However, the
agency's engineering judgment leads it to the
conclusion that implementing a standard with
such a differential would cause front bumpers to
be more aggressive than rear bumpers. This
aggressivity differential would cause rear ends of
cars to receive greater but presently unquantifiable

levels of damage in car-to-car collisions than they
would if the impact speed requirements were
identical.

The amount of any such additional rear end
damage would offset in whole or in part any
incremental benefits derived from requiring front
bumpers to comply with more stringent
requirements. Since these possibilities are not
reflected in the net benefit figures for
alternatives with differential front and rear
impact speeds in Chapters X and XI of the FRIA,
such net benefit figures would have to be
considered overstated in the event that
differential requirements were imposed.

The agency notes that implementing a standard
with different front and rear bumper requirements
could tend, in a front-to-rear collision between
two cars, to have the undesirable effect of
subsidizing some of the damage costs of the
driver of the striking vehicle, who is most likely
to be deemed under law to be at fault in causing
the collision.

Finally, although commenters differed on the
actual effects of differential impact speed
requirements for front and rear bumpers, no
commenter advocated adoption of a bumper
standard requiring different test impact speeds,
and some manufacturers suggested that
consumer expectations would make bumpers
subject to height-only requirements unacceptable
in the marketplace.

Selection of test speeds, cost savings
considerations— final decision. The considerations
discussed above and the requirement in section
102 that the agency's standard seek to maximize
cost reductions thus necessitated the determination
by the agency of which of the remaining
alternatives, i.e., the 5.0-mph/2.5-mph and 2.5-mph/
2.5-mph alternatives, would seek to provide the
greatest superiority in net benefits.

Based on the analysis in the FRIA, the agency
concludes that the 2.5-mph/2.5-mph alternative
more fully satisfies all aspects of the statutory
mandate than does the 5.0-mph/2.5-mph
alternative. The agency's choice between these
two alternatives was reached after comparing the
estimated results of implementing these
alternatives under all examined sets of extreme
assumptions, as well as under those sets of
assumptions deemed by the agency most
representative or most likely to occur. Under the

PART 581; PRE 32

sets of extreme assumptions in Table X-9 of the
FRIA, an equal number of sets support the choice
of each of these two alternatives.

However, when the highly unlikely fourth set
of assumptions in Table X-9 is discarded, and the
net benefits developed using the first three sets
of assumptions in lines 1 through 3 of that table
are averaged to represent equal probabilities of
outcome for each of the sets of facts (See line 1 of
Table XI-4), the 2.5-mph/2.5-mph alternative is
clearly superior. This alternative yields $42 in net
benefits relative to the current standard,
compared with $33 in net benefits for the 5.0-mph/
2.5-mph alternative.

The agency's direct comparison of these two
alternatives in Table XI-4 under other sets (lines
2 and 3 of that table) of assumptions discloses that
the 2.5-mph/2.5-mph and the 5.0-mph/2.5-mph
alternatives would yield varying net benefits that
do not differ greatly.

The agency has noted above the absence of
hard data that would be desirable in determining
precise values for some of the variables involved
in projecting costs and benefits. It is important to
note, however, that the variables about which the
sharpest disagreements of fact have arisen in the
record, e.g., the frequency of low speed accidents,
the value of delay and inconvenience, and the
appropriate factor to apply to arrive at secondary
weight, are in fact also those variables which are
the least significant to the outcome of the agency's
net benefit calculations. For example, as shown in
Table XI-2 of the FRIA, using the value for each
of these variables which most favors retaining
the current standard would reduce the net
benefits of the 2.5-mph/2.5-mph alternative by
only $4-12 over the life of the car. A shift in the
values assigned to these variables would thus be
least likely to produce a change in the outcome of
the agency's determinative net benefit
calculations. Thus, the variables about which the
greatest controversy has arisen are in most cases
also those which are least important in the
decision-making process.

In selecting this alternative, the agency was
also guided by its conclusion that where two or
more alternatives yield net benefits or ranges of
net benefits which are difficult to distinguish, the
cost savings goal of the Act is most fully satisfied
by selecting the alternative with the requirements
which impose the lowest direct, immediate costs.

The 2.5-mph/2.5-mph alternative is the one
which imposes the least direct, immediate costs
on the consumer, i.e., the least increase in the cost
of a new car. To illustrate this point, if the
unregulated bumper is considered the baseline,
the agency's analysis indicates that the increase
in direct immediate cost to the consumer for
bumper system components alone would be $21-41
for a car equipped to comply with the 2.5-mph/
2.5-mph alternative, but $30-58, or 50 percent
higher, for a car equipped to comply with the
5.0-mph/2.5-mph alternative. The choice of the
2.5-mph/2.5-mph alternative over the 5.0-mph/
2.5-mph alternative reduces the direct bumper
component cost increases by $9-17, and the
difference would be even greater if secondary
weight costs were considered. See Table VII-8 of
the FRIA.

Selection of the alternative with less stringent
requirements, and thus lower immediate costs,
avoids forcing consumers to spend more in
purchasing a new car in order to obtain what
would only eventually, if at all, amount to
equivalent net savings or benefits.

If the agency did not select the alternative with
the lower immediate costs, the consumer would
be required to spend additional money in pursuit
of benefits whose occurrence and amount are less
certain. The agency believes that the consumer is
best served by an approach which in close cases
favors the more certain over the less certain
equivalent net benefit. NHTSA believes that this
interpretation of the Act most fully implements
the objectives of the Congress and of Executive
Order 12291 and represents the soundest public
policy.

The agency also must recognize, and if possible
implement, the apparent distinction made in the
Act between obtaining the "maximum feasible
reduction of costs to the public and to the
consumer" (emphasis added). The legislative
history of the Act does not suggest a reason for
the apparent distinction between the public at
large and those who may purchase cars. One
possible interpretation of this distinction is that
Congress meant to seek the maximum possible
benefits for the public in general, including those
not purchasing cars. Once the agency has
determined that the net benefits of the 5.0-mph/
2.5-mph and 2.5 mph/2.5-mph alternatives are
close, the agency believes that the only

PART 581: PRE 33

interpretation which would give appropriate
weight to the statutory distinction between the
"public" and "consumer" would be the alternative
which better permits the marketplace to work
efficiently and to produce innovative designs, the
implementation of which will reduce overall costs
to society as well as the purchasers of new cars.

Several automobile manufacturers and
component suppliers commented that reduction
of the test impact speed to 2.5 mph would facilitate
use of new components and technologies,
including plastics, ultra-high strength steel, and
single-unit bumper systems. NHTSA believes
that such design flexibility would be beneficial to
the public at this time for several reasons.
Innovation could result in more effective bumpers
at lower cost to the public than would otherwise
be available. Innovation and variety will allow
individual consumers to apply their own individual
value determinations on such important issues as
the cost of delay and inconvenience, by opting to
purchase more protection than would be cost-
beneficial to the consuming public at large under
the Act. Innovation, variety and a range of
implemented choices in the marketplace will
permit the agency to monitor cost and benefit
trends and collect data about different
performance levels of bumpers in the future.

The 2.5-mph/2.5-mph alternative will permit
more innovation than the 5.0-mph/2.5-mph
alternative because the former allows wider
design freedom. Moreover, the 2.5-mph/2.5-mph
alternative will increase the economic incentive
of the manufacturers to retool because the parts
for the new designs could be used on both the
front and rear bumper systems of a vehicle.
Without such innovation and retooling, the
designs of bumpers are more likely to remain
static, at least in the short run, and the benefits of
innovative designs will be unrealized or
significantly delayed.

There are other considerations that support
the selection of the 2.5-mph/2.5-mph alternative.
As noted above, any alternative specifying the
same front and rear impact speed is deemed
preferable to alternatives involving differential
front and rear test impact speeds since an
alternative with symmetrical requirements
would not raise uncertainty about the effects of
differential requirements. Further, a bumper
standard requiring differential front and rear

impact speeds would lead to increased production
costs and an increase in replacement part
inventories as a result of probable losses in
commonality of front and rear bumper components.
Reduced commonality in a mass production
market would be likely to increase the consumer
cost of new vehicles and replacement parts.

In view of these differences between the
alternatives and the probable consequences of the
selection of each, the policies and requirements of
the Act favor the choice of the 2.5-mph/2.5-mph
alternative. As noted later in this preamble, the
goal of section 102 is not to provide maximum
protection against damage in low-speed collisions
without regard to the cost of such protection.
Instead, the goal is to reduce front and rear end
damage in low-speed collisions under a statutory
criterion and specific considerations that, when
read together, indicate the most appropriate
result is the one that minimizes the total consumer
and public expenditure related to such damage
and its prevention. The agency believes that the
distinctions it has drawn between and the choices
it has made among the alternatives are fully
consistent with, and required in furtherance of,
the policies of the Act.

Selection of test speeds; safety considerations.
As discussed in more detail later, adoption of the
2.5-mph/2.5-mph alternative will not have any
measurable effect on the risk that future accidents
might be caused by safety components which
malfunction due to damage incurred in prior low-
speed collisions and which are left unrepaired.
Available data indicate that very few accidents
occur as a result of malfunctioning of those vehicle
components which are subject to the safety
criteria of the bumper standard. The agency
concludes that far fewer accidents could be
attributed, and only by speculation, to a failure to
repair such components after they had been
damaged in the only type of collision relevant to
this discussion, i.e., one which might occur at an
impact speed between 2.5 mph and 5.0 mph.

Similarly, the agency concludes that reducing
the bumper standard test speeds will not increase
the risk that safety components damaged in such
low-speed collisions will cause injury in subsequent
accidents caused by other factors. The only
safety-related system that is covered by the
safety criteria of the Part 581 bumper standard
and that might contribute to injury in the event

PART 581; PRE 34

of an accident is the fuel system. However, the
data relied upon by one commenter addressing
this issue predated the effective date of FMVSS
301, Fuel System Integrity. That safety standard
provides protection, independent of and
substantially superior to that of the bumper
standard, against the risk that fuel leaks will
create a safety hazard in an accident.

The agency concludes also that reducing the
test speeds for the safety criteria will not
measurably affect the high-speed crash energy
management of cars. The difference in the energy
management capability of 5.0-mph bumpers and
2.5-mph bumpers is negligible at crash speeds
such as those (30 mph) specified in the safety
standards regulating the crashworthiness of new
cars.

Finally, NHTSA concludes that reducing the
bumper standard test impact speeds will neither
create inconsistencies with any of the safety
standards nor make compliance with those
standards more difficult.

Comer impact speeds. It should be noted that
selection of a 2.5-mph test impact speed for
longitudinal impacts also necessitates the selection
of a 1.5-mph corner impact requirement. The
1.5-mph corner impact speed represents an
equivalent proportional reduction in the 3.0-mph
corner impact speed in the current standard as
compared to the reduction from 5.0 mph to 2.5
mph for longitudinal impacts. The agency has
always established corner impact speeds at lower
levels due to the greater damage potential of
corner pendulum impacts relative to longitudinal
pendulum impacts at the same speed. The greater
relative severity of the corner impact results
from the concentration of crash force on a single
location, which is inherent in a corner impact, and
the fact that impact absorbing devices are
designed to provide maximum protection in the
more common longitudinal impacts. If the
proportional relationship of the longitudinal and
corner impact speeds were not maintained, the
effort to maximize net benefits would be
frustrated.

Phase I versus Phase II. Making a choice
between Phase I and Phase II damage resistance
criteria was also difficult because of the limited
empirical data available for comparing
performance under the two sets of criteria. Phase
I of the Part 581 standard remained in effect for

only one model year (MY), 1979, and available
information indicates that many manufacturers
proceeded directly to bumper designs intended to
meet the Phase II requirements prior to their
effective date. The information that is available
from surveys of vehicle owners and from insurance
files indicates no discernible difference between
the net benefits of MY 1974-78 and MY 1980
bumpers. Even if this information did reveal a
difference, there are no data which the agency
could use to determine the relative contributions
of Phase I and Phase II to those benefits.

No compliance testing of MY 1979 models was
conducted by NHTSA. The agency's compliance
test results for MY 1980 suggest greater levels of
protection for MY 1980 cars than is found in
empirical data on real world damage experience
for Phase II bumpers. The agency believes that in
such cases agency decisions must be more strongly
influenced by real world data since they reflect
actual experience and are more reliable
indicators of future real world experience. The
insurance claim and survey data reflect the
myriad variations in accident conditions and
circumstances encountered in actual driving. In
contrast, the compliance tests involve a limited
and idealized set of conditions and circumstances.
Those tests were necessarily chosen by the
agency with the knowledge that they were
imperfect surrogates from which to predict on-
road experience.

Those commenters addressing the issue
generally noted the cost and weight savings
available by deleting the Phase II requirements.
Commenters also pointed out that the increased
use of non-metallic face bars has decreased the
visibility of dent and set and thus greatly changed
the circumstances under which such damage
must be evaluated. Moreover, as suggested in the
comments, deletion of Phase II would eliminate
present difficulties in evaluating minor damage in
compliance testing. The agency has been unable
to determine that there are any net benefits
associated with the Phase II damage criteria,
independent of impact speed requirements.

The agency has also noted and taken into
account the factual information and assertions
submitted by representatives of the insurance
industry concerning the possible use of more
economical compliance technology such as nonself-
restoring energy absorbers. The use of such

PART 581; PRE 35

technology is prevented by the current Phase II
requirements. The availability of such technology
on new bumper systems is a desirable result,
independent of the impact speed requirement
imposed by the bumper standard. Retaining the
Phase II requirements would inhibit the further
development of such technology.

Finally, the agency took into account the
importance of distinguishing in its analyses
among favorable net benefit results attributable
to impact speed reduction only, those results
attributable to action with respect to Phase II
only, and those results attributable to both
aspects of the decision. Factual data exist in the
record only with respect to the first and third of
these areas. Thus, any attribution of benefits to
the Phase II requirements would be too
speculative as a basis for agency decision. The
agency believes that the probable effect of its
current decision will be the introduction of
bumper systems exhibiting at least some
characteristics of 5.0-mph, Phase I bumpers.
Bumper face bars and reinforcements designed
for 5.0-mph impacts, and therefore most probably
capable of affording even greater actual protection
as a result of over-design to ensure compliance,
will undoubtedly continue to be used in at least
some new cars in the short term. Effectively,
5.0-mph, Phase I bumpers will thus be produced
under the new standard, on an interim basis and
for some portion of the new car fleet. The
performance of these cars can and will be
monitored closely by the agency to estimate the
actual effects of the shift to Phase I criteria.

For all of these reasons, the agency has
concluded that the Phase II criteria are not
justified and that those criteria should be deleted
from the standard.

Removal of optional equipment during
compliance testing. Several commenters
contended that existing Part 581 test procedures
restrict the installation of certain optional
equipment prior to sale of a vehicle to a first
purchaser. Although one domestic manufacturer
stated that its optional equipment sales were not
restricted, other automobile and equipment
manufacturers commented that existing test
procedures inhibit installation of fog lamps,
running lights, and headiamp washers.
Commenters recommended dealing with this
problem by removing such equipment prior to

testing, exempting such items from the
protective criteria, or limiting testing to standard
equipment only.

NHTSA believes that the safety value of
optional equipment such as fog lamps has yet to
be demonstrated conclusively. To the extent that
the equipment does serve a safety function,
permitting its removal during testing would
encourage its installation and thereby promote
safety. Further, distinguishing between optional
equipment installed before the purchase of a new
car and that installed after such purchase serves
little purpose, since equipment installed after
purchase would be just as likely to be damaged in
a low-speed collision. Moreover, such a distinction
unfairly discriminates in favor of aftermarket
suppliers at the expense of manufacturers and
dealers wishing to attach equipment prior to the
sale of new cars. The agency also notes that
possible cost savings from factory installation of
optional equipment are lost if such installation is
discouraged by the test requirements. For these
reasons, the agency has amended the standard to
permit removal of fog lamps, running lights,
other optional equipment attached to the bumper
face bar, and headlamp washers prior to testing.

Harmonization. The Trade Agreements Act of
1979 {19 U.S.C. 2532(2)), requires that the agency
consider harmonization with international
standards in its regulatory actions. In the present
context, ECE Regulation No. 42 is relevant.

NHTSA has formally endorsed enhanced efforts
at harmonization between and among international
standards in presentations to the Group of
Experts on the Construction of Vehicles (Working
Party 29) which operates under the ECE's Inland
Transport Committee. Explicit harmonization of
a United States bumper standard with the ECE
regulation could have some positive economic
effects since domestic manufacturers might
experience lower costs due to reduced need for
differentiation in design and equipment between
cars for sale in this country and cars for export. In
addition, European manufacturers subject to the
ECE regulation could experience similar reduced
costs.

This consideration, however, cannot be deemed
to be controlling where United States law creates
specific performance or policy criteria for
regulatory action. With regard to ECE Regulation
No. 42, NHTSA has concluded that the Act

PART 581; PRE 36

imposes specific criteria relating to cost savings
which the ECE regulation does not address.
Further, it is noted that the Act mandates the
bumper standards issued thereunder be drafted
so that they regulate performance instead of
directly regulating bumper design. Certain
provisions of the ECE regulation would impose
statutorily impermissible design restrictions on
vehicles produced for sale in this country. Finally,
NHTSA has concluded that potential bumper
mismatch problems could result from substituting
the height requirement specified in that regulation
for the requirement in the Part 581 Bumper
Standard. NHTSA will continue to pursue the
question of harmonization in appropriate forums,
but at this time merely notes that the 2.5-mph/
2.5-mph, Phase I alternative selected in this
rulemaking is far more compatible with the ECE
regulation than the current Part 581 standard or
the 5.0-mph/2.5-mph alternative.

Number of pendulum impacts. Some commenters
suggested that the number of pendulum test
impacts required by the standard be reduced.
However, given the likelihood that some cars may
incur more than two low-speed bumper impacts in
their lifetime, and the possibility that all such
impacts may be either longitudinal or corner
impacts and may involve the same bumper, the
agency has concluded that the current procedure
is appropriate to assure that each bumper is able
to withstand the impacts to which it may in fact
be subjected over its lifetime.

Public opinion survey. Some commenters
alleged that public opinion strongly favors the
retention of bumper requirements at current
levels and should control the agency's decision in
this rulemaking. As evidence of public opinion,
two commenters cited a survey conducted by the
Opinion Research Corporation, Inc., (ORC) for the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.

NHTSA disagrees with the commenters'
suggestion about public opinion. First, the level of
bumper standards established by the agency
under the Act cannot be determined merely on
the basis of what members of the public
understand to be the relevant facts and issues, or
what they themselves would prefer. The Congress
has determined the public policy which must be
applied by the agency, and the agency's decision
must be reached in accordance with the statutory
criteria. Those criteria do not include public

preferences as such, although as noted in the
FRIA, adequately demonstrated public preference
may be relevant to assessments of future market
demand and the response options available to the
auto manufacturing and insurance industries.

Second, the agency does not believe that the
ORC survey provides reliable evidence on public
preferences regarding economic values associated
with bumper alternatives before the agency. An
analysis of the text of the survey discloses that
the structure and specific questions asked did not
compensate for the public's general lack of
detailed information concerning the costs and
benefits of bumpers. Yet the survey asked a
variety of questions which could be meaningfully
answered only by persons knowledgeable about
such matters. Also, many of the specific questions
may have inadvertently encouraged respondents
to give inflated estimates of the value of the
current bumper standard. For these and other
reasons discussed in chapter III of the FRIA, the
agency regards the ORC survey as an inconclusive
indicator of informed public opinion.

Legal issues. Some commenters advocating
retention of the current standard have questioned
the adequacy of the record in this proceeding to
provide a basis for decision and have challenged
in advance the legal soundness of any decision to
amend the standard.

In this rulemaking proceeding, the agency has
compiled voluminous materials over a period of
years which have been used in analyzing
competing alternatives. Through the notice and
comment process and two public meetings, the
agency has received over two hundred comments
from a full spectrum of interested parties and has
gathered all available data on the subject of this
proceeding. New data, estimates and arguments
have been received which have assisted the
agency in refining its analysis of the standard.

As noted above, the agency recognizes that a
degree of uncertainty is present in some of its
calculations and conclusions by virtue of the
absence of conclusive real world data relating to
certain categories of benefits and costs. However,
this lack of factual certainty no more absolves the
agency of its duty under section 102 of the Act to
ensure that a bumper standard exists which in
fact complies with the requirement to seek
maximum feasible reductions in cost than could
similar uncertainties have arguably absolved the

PART 581; PRE 37

agency of its duty to issue a standard in the first
instance. Under the Act, the agency is directed to
adopt and maintain a standard. That standard is
further required to meet certain stautory criteria.
Implicit in this and any similar statutory
mechanism is both a prohibition against rescinding
an existing standard altogether and maintaining
a standard which, on the basis of a developing
evidentiary foundation is found either not to have
any net benefits, or to have fewer net benefits
than any one or more different standards. As
noted above, explicit instructions to the effect
were directed to the agency in 1978.

The agency does not accept an expansive view
of the limitations imposed on the agency's action
in this proceeding by the Act, as inferred by some
commenters from the provisions of the Act itself.
The agency is cognizant of the relevant statutory
criteria imposed by this organic Act and has
acted in accordance with them.

The statute does not require, and the legislative
history does not support, an inference of
Congressional intent that the agency be
completely certain regarding the relevant factual
issues before it conducts rulemaking under this
Act. To the contrary, the Act, its legislative
history and Congressional action to date have
emphasized the presence of significant uncertainty
on all of the relevant issues discussed in this
notice. Recognition of the uncertainty may be
seen in, for example, the wording of the criterion
in section 102 governing the setting of the level of
the bumper standard. The agency is not required
to establish a standard that produces the
maximum feasible reduction in costs, but one that
"seeks to obtain" such a reduction. The agency
has always considered itself bound to proceed
with continuing review and rulemaking even in
the presence of uncertainty. This conclusion and
interpretation of the statute is consistent with
the agency's actions since enactment, and is
explicity reasserted in this notice.

The statute also does not mandate that the
standard be set so as to require the use of the
most protective bumpers which can be produced.
From the beginning of its action under the
provisions of the Act, the agency has always
recognized that such bumpers would be so
expensive to produce and replace that their use
would involve a net economic loss for consumers.
38 Fed. Reg. 20,899 (August 3, 1973). As the

agency also noted in that notice, rulemaking
under the Act involves the balancing of many
factors to determine what level of performance is
most beneficial to the public and the consumer.

As the agency interprets the Act and its history,
the purpose of the Act's bumper provisions is to
secure cost savings for the public and the
consumer. The bumper provisions address the
issues of the costs of damage in low-speed
collisions and the costs of avoiding that damage
and authorize and direct the agency to set
standards that minimize the combined total of
these costs to the public and the consumer. The
goal of seeking cost savings is promoted by setting
the standards and as appropriate adjusting them
toward the level where the marginal benefits
equal marginal costs. That is, if raising bumper
performance from its unregulated level yields
more incremental benefits, reflected in damage
reduction, than the incremental costs of increased
damage protection, the standard should be raised.
The impact speed requirements should be raised
to the point where the incremental increase in
damage avoided equals the incremental increase
in costs. This is the point at which the cost
savings or net benefits are maximized.

Raising the requirements above that point of
equality would not provide the public and
consumer with any additional cost savings. Two
possibilities exist regarding the relationship of
incremental benefits and costs above the point.
One is that incremental benefits will be less than
the incremental costs at all points above the point
of equality. In that event, raising the requirements
above the point of equality would reduce the cost
savings achievable at that point. The other
possibility is a variation on the first in that
incremental benefits will equal or at least appear
to equal incremental costs over some range of
requirement levels immediately above the point
of equality. The FRIA suggests that there may be
a range over which incremental benefits and costs
appear to be roughly equal. Setting requirements
within such a range would not, however, increase
cost savings, and would thus be of questionable
validity. It would result in a simple trading of
dollars, that is, receiving only as much in reduced
damage as one pays for increased damage
protection.

In this rulemaking action, NHTSA has
determined that the 2.5-mph/2.5-mph alternative

PART 581; PRE 38

is more likely than the current standard and the
other alternatives to be the point of equality, that
is, where the incremental benefits first equal the
incremental costs. Accordingly, the agency has
selected that alternative as the new standard. As
noted above, setting a higher standard would not
increase the savings to the public and consumers.
A higher standard would only increase the direct,
immediate costs which each new car purchaser
must bear.

Some commenters have asserted that a 5.0-mph
test impact speed is necessary to satisfy the
expectations voiced in Congress during
deliberations on the Act. While these expectations
are relevant, the determinative fact in all
instances must be what the Congress in fact did
through legislative action. In the Act, the
Congress did not set a particular standard, but
instead adopted the maximum feasible cost
reduction criterion, and required that bumper
standards be set in accordance with it. The
criterion is a deliberately flexible one which
permits and even requires that bumper standards
be adjusted based on available information.

Some commenters suggested that the agency is
legally bound to maintain the Part 581 Bumper
Standard at its present level because the standard
incorporates the safety criteria of former FMVSS
215. One insurer asserted that the criteria in
section 103(a) of the Safety Act must form a basis
for any decision to amend the Bumper Standard.
Those criteria require that safety standard be
practicable, be stated in objective terms, and meet
the need for motor vehicle safety. 15 U.S.C.
1392(a). Another insurer cited the legislative
history of the Act in support of the proposition
that Congress intended safety considerations to be
controlling in establishing bumper standards.

Given the hybrid nature of the Part 581
Standard, this rulemaking action was initiated
under the concurrent authority of the Act and the
Safety Act. Without deciding whether the criteria
established for safety standards under section 103
necessarily be applied in all cases under the Act
where any safety relationship can be asserted,
the agency has concluded, based on the discussion
in this notice and the FRIA, that its actions in this
proceeding are in all respects in accordance with
the applicable criteria of the Safety Act itself.

By the same token, this action does not conflict
with safety standards promulgated under the

Safety Act. To the extent that bumper standards
may be considered to be safety standards, the
5.0-mph safety criteria of Part 581 have been
determined to be unsupported, even under the
Safety Act criteria, and are amended by this
notice. Reducing the test speed does not make
compliance with any safety standard more
difficult. The changes made by this rulemaking
action do not necessitate any change in efforts to
comply with existing safety standards. To the
degree that pedestrian impact protection is a
relevant safety consideration, current agency
research on the subject suggests the possibility of
an adverse safety consequence from bumpers
designed for impact speeds of 5.0 mph or higher.

The Final Regulatory Impact Analysis

NHTSA's FRIA estimates the changes in costs
and benefits likely to result from amending the
Bumper Standard. In assessing the relative merits
of the alternative bumper standard amendments
described in the notice of proposed rulemaking in
this proceeding, NHTSA has considered all
available evidence and viewpoints in order to
quantify and analyze the various factors relevant
to determining bumper system net benefits.

As discussed in the agency's FRIA, the primary
measure of benefits of the Part 581 Bumper
Standard is the economic cost of the damage
avoided by use of a bumper designed to provide
protection at a higher impact speed. In the
agency's FRIA, this cost was determined for each
alternative standard by computing the cost of
repaired damage and unrepaired damage. The
cost of damage was computed by first using the
results of vehicle owner surveys and insurance
company claim files to estimate the frequency of
damage to bumper systems. This figure was then
analyzed in terms of the projected effectiveness
of that bumper system in preventing damage, as
estimated from insurance records and by use of
engineering judgment.

Reduced levels of savings representing the
value of damage which the vehicle owner decides
not to have repaired were determined by first
estimating the repair costs for unrepaired
damage described by car owners. NHTSA then
reduced the repair cost by a range of values to
reflect the fact that the damage was not repaired,
the effect of vehicle age on the value of that
damage, and the absence of any out-of-pocket
expenses incurred by the car owner.

PART 581; PRE 39

The agency's calculation of benefits also took
into account insurance cost savings beyond the
value of the damage avoided by the bumper
system, i.e., through savings in administrative
expense. Savings in consumer time and
inconvenience resulting from damage avoidance
at various levels of bumper damage resistance
were also considered as benefits of bumper
regulation. Such savings include the value of time
saved at the scene of a low-speed accident,
reduced time and expense in obtaining repair
estimates, and savings in the avoided cost of
obtaining alternative transportation while
collision damage is repaired. Finally, although not
subject to quantification in the agency's economic
analysis, the agency considered the possible
beneficial or adverse effects of bumper
requirements on vehicle safety.

A very important cost impact of bumper
regulation is the increase in new car prices
attributable to the use of bumper systems
providing greater levels of damage resistance.
This cost consists of the cost of the bumper system
itself and the cost of upgrading other vehicle
components to support the additional weight of
more damage resistant systems (i.e., the cost of
secondary weight). The FRIA examines the
changes in such costs that would result from
adopting test speeds below those in the current
standard. The costs used in the agency's FRIA
represent the marginal change in costs resulting
from changing from the current bumper standard
to an alternative standard requiring lower levels
of bumper performance. Costs are calculated in
terms of actual cost to the consumer. Finance
charges associated with that portion of the
vehicle purchase price attributable to the bumper
are considered and taken into account as
appropriate.

In addition to the effect on the initial cost of
purchasing a car, the added operating cost of
driving a car with a heavier bumper system has
been considered. The agency has estimated the
additional fuel costs incurred in carrying the
extra primary and secondary weight associated
with bumper systems providing greater levels of
damage resistance performance. Costs and
benefits to be accrued in the future have been
discounted to reflect their value in current
dollars. Results of the FRIA have been stated in
terms of positive or negative net benefits for the

various alternative standards, as compared to the
costs and benefits of the current 5.0-mph/5.0-mph
standard. See chapters X and XI of the FRIA.

In the agency's analysis, several factual issues
are of particular importance, and the data and
opinion evidence relied upon by the agency are
summarized in greater detail below.

Frequency of bumper-related collisions. As
noted above, benefits derived from the damage
avoidance properties of bumpers are computed
by estimating first the frequency of bumper-
related collisions, and then the ability of the
bumper system to protect the car in those
collisions. Levels of protection thus computed
yield benefits in terms of the costs which would
otherwise have been incurred in connection with
the avoided damage.

In 1970, the Ford Motor Company conducted a
survey of actual observed damage to Ford cars in
parking lots. Based on that survey, earlier
NHTSA analyses estimated that the average car
experienced 3.63 low-speed collisions involving
its bumpers during its lifetime.

In the PRIA, the agency estimated the frequency
of unreported, low-speed collisions at a lower
number, based on the results of a telephone survey
of principal operators of cars. That survey was
conducted for NHTSA by Westat, Inc.

The agency's October 1981 NPRM specifically
requested that commenters address the issue of
the best method of estimating such low-speed
collision frequency. Responding commenters
disagreed on the relative merits of the cited
damage frequency estimates. While car
manufacturers argued for the use of figures
derived from the Westat study, insurers generally
favored higher estimates. Commenters addressing
this issue generally expressed the view that the
actual figure for low speed collision frequency
would be somewhere below the figure of 3.63
lifetime impacts estimated from the parking lot
surveys by Ford.

The agency agrees with commenters that the
Ford survey is inadequate for use in the current
context, by virtue of various factors, including its
concentration on urban areas. The agency believes
that the Westat survey, and the comments to the
record by interested parties represent superior,
and the best available, data on low-speed accident
frequency. They have been considered in the
computation of this factor. NHTSA has considered

PART 581; PRE 40

the possible use of crash recorders on cars to
assess accident frequency, but finds that this
approach would be prohibitively expensive and
not technically feasible at this time. For these
reasons, the FRIA incorporates a range of values
for low-speed accident frequency, using as the
bounds of the range the highest estimate
provided in the comments and the lower estimate
derived from the Westat survey data.

Bumper system effectiveness. On the question
of the effectiveness of bumper systems designed
to provide protection at differing impact speeds,
estimates used in the PRIA were based on
comparisons by agency experts between the
performance of cars with Part 581 bumpers and
with pre-standard cars. The agency was able in
the PRIA to make extensive use of field data to
determine the effectiveness of bumpers designed
to provide protection in 5.0-mph impacts. NHTSA
was able also to supplement insurance industry
data on reported accidents with Westat survey
data on damage incurred in unreported accidents.

However, no similar data on the effectiveness
of bumpers designed to provide protection at
other impact speeds exists. As a result, the
agency was forced to rely in its PRIA on data
concerning MY 1973 rear bumpers for its
estimates of 2.5-mph bumper effectiveness. These
were the only bumpers ever sold in this country
which were required to provide 2.5-mph
protection. As an alternative and cross-check, the
agency also considered in the PRIA estimates
which had been developed for use in the June
1979 Final Assessment of the Bumper Standard,
and which were based on engineering judgment
of the agency's experts regarding the relative
effectiveness of various bumper systems. The use
of these estimates was supported by the insurance
industry in its review of the 1979 Assessment.

Using this methodology, the agency estimated
that 2.5-mph bumpers would achieve 67 percent
of the effectiveness of 5.0-mph bumpers in low-
speed collisions. That is, 2.5-mph bumpers would
be two-thirds as effective in preventing damage
as 5.0-mph bumpers would be.

Car and insurance industry commenters joined
in arguing the unreliability of estimates based on
the performance experience of MY 1973 rear
bumpers. They stressed the lack of comparability
between these early bumpers and the 2.5-mph
bumper systems which would be produced today.

citing the absence of any uniform height
requirement for MY 1973 bumpers, the actual
similarity of MY 1973 bumpers to unregulated
bumpers of prior years, the increased uniformity
among bumper designs in the present vehicle
fleet, and other factors related to the vehicle fleet
mix. NHTSA agrees with commenters that data
on MY 1973 rear bumpers fail to provide an
accurate approximation of current 2.5-mph
designs. NHTSA has concluded therefore that the
methodology employing MY 1973 rear bumper
data should not be used in estimating current
levels of bumper effectiveness.

NHTSA has considered relying upon European
data relating to the performance experience of
bumpers designed in compliance with ECE
Regulation No. 42 to assess the effectiveness of
2.5-mph bumpers but has concluded that adequate
data of that type are not available. Although
alternative data sources were specifically sought
in NHTSA's October 1981 NPRM, no field data on
the effectiveness of alternative systems in other
countries were introduced into the record by
commenters. Moreover, European bumpers are
required to be designed to meet a safety standard
only, and are tested under different procedures
than American bumpers. Finally, differences in
fleet composition and average vehicle weight, as
well as the greater frequency of urban driving in
Europe, would limit the relevance of data based
on vehicles in use abroad to predicted vehicle
experience in American driving conditions.

Insurance industry commenters presented to the
record data on certain laboratory tests undertaken
on production vehicles alleged to have been
equipped with 2.5-mph bumpers, i.e., pickup trucks
and multipurpose passenger vehicles not subject to
the Part 581 requirements. NHTSA has concluded,
based on the evidence in the record, that the
damage levels reported in the insurance industry
tests are not sufficiently relevant to predict 2.5-mph
bumper performance. The tests reported upon were
of limited scope, and no data have been introduced
or are known to the agency from which to conclude
that the bumper systems tested were designed to,
or would in fact, comply with the Part 581
requirements in 2.5-mph barrier and pendulum
impacts. Moreover, a commenter from the auto
industry pointed out an instance in which the
insurance claim frequency for a car equipped with a
Part 581 bumper was actually higher than for its

PART 581; PRE 41

counterpart, the four-wheel drive, multipurpose
passenger vehicle version which was equipped with
an unregulated bumper. The agency has therefore
concluded that estimates based on extrapolation
from field data better account for factors such as
crash angle, impact speed, frequency of occurrence
and vehicle fleet mix. Thus, NHTSA makes use in
the FRIA of the 67 percent effectiveness figure
employed in the 1979 Assessment, but now applies
this factor to the superior lifetime damage
estimates derived from the 1981 Evaluation.

Primary bumper costs and weight. With respect
to the increase in costs associated with bumper
systems providing greater levels of damage
protection, many motor vehicle manufacturers
submitted previously unavailable estimates of
the cost and weight penalties associated with
providing bumpers meeting current 5.0-mph
performance requirements, as compared with the
cost of complying with a 2.5-mph, Phase I
requirement or with the ECE Regulation No. 42
bumper requirement.

The agency estimates in the FRIA that the
primary cost differences between 5.0-mph and
2.5-mph Phase II bumper systems can be best
expressed as a range from $18 to $35. The
corresponding range of weight differences is
estimated to be from 15 to 33 pounds. The $18 to $35
and 15 to 33 pound ranges are based on estimates
submitted to NHTSA by the manufacturers and
reflect the range of representative cost and weight
savings estimates submitted.

In their submissions to the rulemaking docket,
the manufacturers generally did not identify all
changes in design or components that would take
place if the bumper standard were reduced to 2.5
mph/2.5 mph. Certain changes were specifically
noted, however. Manufacturers stated that such a
reduction would allow the removal of self-
restoring, heavy duty energy absorbers and
noted that they would probably make that
change. Some manufacturers also identified
reducing face bar thickness and removing some
reinforcements as being among the changes
possible if the standard were reduced.

Although the estimates of cost and weight for
2.5-mph bumper systems included in the FRIA
generally agree with current estimates of
representative manufacturers, and are consistent
with those confidential submissions made in
response to the 1979 advance notice of proposed

rulemaking, other independent estimates have
been generated which indicate that even greater
weight reductions are possible if the Part 581
bumper standard were reduced to 2.5 mph/2.5
mph. For example, the 1979 Final Assessment
cited a weight reduction estimate of 43 pounds
developed by a design engineer under contract
with NHTSA. Since the 43 pound figure was
developed in reference to cars averaging 3,350
pounds in weight, the appropriate value
applicable to the lighter average car produced
today would be less. Assuming that weight loss in
primary bumper weight would be proportional to
total vehicle weight, the appropriate figure for
today's cars would be approxiamtely 36-37
pounds. Notwithstanding the higher value thus
represented, the upper range set forth in the
FRIA is 33 pounds. If the higher figures of 36-37
pounds were used, the weight and cost differential
between 5.0-mph and 2.5-mph bumpers, and thus
the benefits of the lower impact speed, would be
even greater.

In addition, other independent cost studies
submitted as evidence in the record indicate that
the actual costs for all manufacturers of
components such as energy absorbers may in fact
be higher than cost estimates by the car
manufacturers who submitted data on this point.
See, for example. Docket No. 81-07 Notice 1, No.
006. If the cost avoided by removing such energy
absorbers from a car were as high as $48, instead
of the $20 estimated in confidential submissions
responding to the 1979 advance notice of proposed
rulemaking (as updated to reflect the weight of
current cars), the additional cost savings of
reducing the Part 581 standard to 2.5 mph/2.5 mph
would be increased by $28, thereby enhancing the
cost reduction attributable to that alternative. In
this case, although the result may be to
underestimate the benefit of the lower standard,
the agency has chosen to use in the FRIA the
lower cost and weight estimates submitted by the
manufacturers who commented in response to the
NPRM, since such lower values produce benefit
calculations less favorable to the regulatory
result urged by the car manufacturers involved.

Secondary weight and cost. On the subject of
secondary weight, NHTSA relied in its PRIA on
methodologies developed by the Transportation
Systems Center (TSC) of Cambridge, Massachusetts,
and General Motors. The TSC methodology

PART 581; PRE 42

assumes that, in the case of vehicles with unitized
bodies, the vehicle body will not be affected by
changes in bumper weight. This methodology
results in a secondary weight factor of .5: that is,
one half pound of secondary weight will be added
to the rest of the vehicle for each pound of added
bumper weight. The General Motors methodology,
based on actual component weights of MY 1974
General Motors products, assumes that all the
weight of a unitized vehicle body is affected by
secondary weight. This methodology results in a
secondary weight factor of about 1.0.

The agency has concluded, based on all
comments received, that the assumptions of the
TSC methodology concerning vehicles with
unitized bodies are extreme. One manufacturer
submitted an estimate of secondary weight based
on its analysis of its most efficient new car
designs. That analysis indicates a secondary
weight factor of 0.7 (i.e., seven-tenths of a pound
added for each pound of added bumper system
weight). Since all of these were new designs for
which secondary weight factors may be lower
than for for the fleet as a whole, the agency
considers that this estimate most likely represents
the lower bound of secondary weight factors in
the current vehicle fleet. Older, existing
production car designs, which would also be
affected by a reduced standard, would be likely to
have a secondary weight factor of 1.0 or higher.
The agency has concluded that there is no
adequate basis to establish a higher value than
that based upon actual component weight
analysis, and accordingly the agency makes use of
both the .7 and 1.0 factors in the FRIA.

Only two commenters addressed the issue of
the cost of secondary weight. Both commenters
suggested that NHTSA's estimate of $.72 per
pound in the PRIA represents the lower bound of
possible secondary weight costs, since it was
based only on the cost per pound of structural
components and did not include cost effects on
weight dependent subsystems such as tires and
brake linings. However, the agency believes that
while changes such as upgrading brake linings or
marginally increasing tire size to accommodate
increased bumper weight will undoubtedly occur
to some extent, they are impossible to quantify in
terms of dollar costs on the record before the
agency. Thus, the agency continues to use only
the cost of major structural materials such as

cold-rolled steel and aluminum to reflect
secondary weight cost more conservatively.
Because of an error discovered by the agency in
its original computation of the markup factor
used in the PRIA, the agency has now corrected
the cost of secondary weight and uses $.60 per
pound in the FRIA.

Use of consumer costs instead of manufacturer
variable costs. In calculating for the FRIA the
cost savings available from modified bumper
requirements, NHTSA considered manufacturers'
variable cost savings, but not reductions
attributable to savings on dealer markup, which
represent some additional potential consumer
savings. Several motor vehicle manufacturers
endorsed NHTSA's inclusion of variable cost
savings in its analysis and projected savings of 10
to 30 percent resulting from reducing the Bumper
Standard impact speed level to 2.5 mph. However,
the manufacturers also commented that consumer
cost (which includes dealer markup), rather than
variable cost, is a more realistic determinant of
the cost of bumper regulation.

The agency believes that use of consumer costs
is more consistent with the requirements of the
Act. Using the newly submitted cost savings
estimates supplied by the auto manufacturers,
and the agency's independent analysis of the
reasonableness of these estimates based on the
use of teardown studies, NHTSA stated cost
savings in terms of consumer costs in its FRIA.
The FRIA employs a sensitivity analysis to assess
the effect on consumer prices of various possible
bumper standard alternatives.

Finance charges. In its PRIA, NHTSA added the
cost of new car finance charges to the cost of current
bumper systems. While several auto industry
sources saw no difficulty with consideration of
finance changes from the standpoint of economic
theory, certain representatives of the auto and
insurance industries noted that the principal of a
car loan, in addition to the interest, should have
been discounted to estimate true consumer
savings. The agency agrees that the approach used
in the PRIA overstated consumer savings because
of the failure to discount the loan principal also.
In estimating new car costs in the FRIA, the
agency has discounted both the principal and the
interest of new car loans.

Percentage of new car purchases which are
financed. One commenter argued that the agency

PART 581; PRE 43

overestimated the percentage of vehicle purchases
which are financed, and the duration of the
financing obtained. However, the agency's
figures on loan duration and percentage of new
car sales financed are based on the latest available
information from the Federal Reserve Board. The
commenter based its alternate suggested
percentage figure on data which included used
car sales, which are less frequently financed.
Moreover, to the extent that a small percentage
of new car sales are not financed through
consumer credit, e.g., fleet sales, these sales are
nonetheless commonly financed through business
borrowing at an even higher interest rate. Thus,
the agency has not changed its analysis in
response to this comment.

Retooling costs. Comments by one domestic
manufacturer at NHTSA's public meeting on
bumpers indicated that that company would incur
a one time retooling cost of one million dollars if
the present bumper standard were amended to
reduce the test impact speed. Another major
domestic manufacturer contended that this cost
is irrelevant because, if it were not economically
favorable to manufacturers to retool, such
expenses would not be incurred. The agency has
concluded that in computing overall societal costs
of the regulation, this expense is relevant and
should be considered. However, retooling costs
have already been included in the agency's
estimates of new car costs and thus are not
addressed as a separate item in the FRIA.

Fuel consumption. In addition to the initial
expense of purchasing a bumper system providing
increased damage resistance performance, more
stringent bumper standards which require heavier
systems increase vehicle operating expenses. The
added weight of the bumpers causes an increase
in fuel consumption. As discussed above, projected
weight savings from reduction of the bumper
standard test impact speed to 2.5 mph would be
significant, even for smaller cars. In its PRIA,
NHTSA estimated that each additional pound of
weight adds 1.1 gallons to t'ne lifetime fuel
consumption of a passenger vehicle. Some
commenters accepted this fuel penalty figure as a
reasonable approximation. One manufacturer
advocated use of a higher figure. However, the
source of the 1.1 gallon estimate, a major
domestic auto manufacturer, revised its estimate
downward to 1.0 gallons per pound, based on

testing and simulation studies on new, lighter
weight cars. The agency is using this revised
lower figure to be conservative in its estimates of
benefits associated with the proposed alternatives
to the current 5.0-mph standard.

NHTSA in its PRIA used a projected 1982 fuel
cost in 1981 dollars of $1.60 per gallon in calculating
the cost of the fuel consumed in carrying additional
bumper weight, with small additional real price
increases (in terms of 1981 dollars) in subsequent
years. The four major domestic automakers
concurred in the use of this figure in comments on
the notice of proposed rulemaking. However,
figures in the latest Department of Energy (DOE)
and Data Resources, Inc. (DRI) forecasts suggest
that an estimate of $1.28 per gallon more
accurately reflects current pricing trends.
Accordingly, the agency has used this figure as
the 1982 average price in the FRIA.

Discount rate. For purposes of its PRIA,
NHTSA used a discount rate of 10 percent in
assessing the current value of future costs and
benefits. This rate has been established by the
Office of Management and Budget for use in
Government analyses. Since, however, it is
arguable that a statutory mandate to consider
actual costs and benefits would require the
agency to at least analyze the actual discount rate
as well in reaching its conclusions, such an
analysis was undertaken. See Table III-6 of the
FRIA. Although one commenter suggested a
lower figure, NHTSA has concluded that, given
the insensitivity of net benefits to changes in the
discount rate, the 10 percent rate is appropriate
at this time. This figure represents a compromise
between competing schools of thought as defined
in economic literature, and has been used in past
agency regulatory analyses. Its continued use
facilitates the comparison of costs and benefits of
different regulatory actions. Thus, the 10 percent
figure has been retained as the basis for the
discount rate used throughout the FRIA, in
estimating the current value of both costs and
benefits.

Lifetime distribution of accident frequency.
NHTSA based its discounting in the PRIA on the
assumption that accident frequency is distributed
over a vehicle's lifetime, in proportion to the
number of miles traveled each year by the vehicle.
Car manufacturers differed on the validity of this
assumption, with some contending that accident

PART 581; PRE 44

rates are higher for older vehicles. If this were
true, then the net benefits of reducing the
bumper standard would be even greater than
estimated by the agency in the FRIA. However,
NHTSA has concluded that the evidence presented
on actual distribution of accidents over vehicle
lifetime is not sufficiently reliable to attempt
more specific yearly estimates, because, among
other things, it includes both high- and low-speed
accidents and the correlation between these types
of accidents has not been established. Thus, the
agency continues to use its original assumption
on this point.

Effect of non-bumper related design changes
on repair costs. A member of the insurance
industry contended that not all increases in
damage-per-claim figures occurring since
implementation of the bumper standard should be
attributed to the standard. According to that
commenter, new components, such as rectangular
headlamps and one-piece plastic front-end panels,
which have come into use since implementation of
Federal bumper standards, have added to damage-
per-claim figures used by NHTSA to assess the
effect of the bumper standard. Commenters made
no showing regarding the costs of the various
front-end components, the extent of their use in
given model years, or the frequency and extent of
their damage. Further, as several auto industry
commenters noted, the increased complexity of
the 5.0-mph bumper system makes that system
more expensive to repair or replace when
damaged in an impact above its design speed of
5.0 mph. Thus, the record provides no objective
basis for the agency to modify its analysis.

Value of unrepaired damage. In the PRIA,
NHTSA valued the cost of unrepaired damage at
the full cost to repair that damage. However,
several auto manufacturers commented that such
damage should be valued at some lesser figure or
should not be counted at all. One manufacturer
placed the figure at not more than 50 percent of
the cost to repair the damage. The agency's 1979
Final Assessment placed the figure at 75 percent.
NHTSA has concluded that unrepaired damage
clearly imposes some cost. The value of this cost,
however, would necessarily vary with the age of
the car, other cumulative damage, whether or not
bumper-related, and other factors. NHTSA
believes that a range of 50 to 75 percent of the full
cost of repair represents a reasonable balancing

of competing considerations and has used such a
range to approximate the value of unrepaired
damage in the FRIA.

One commenter suggested that consumer
tolerance for cosmetic vehicle damage increases,
and the value of such damage should therefore
decrease, with vehicle age. However, the agency
has no way of assessing this effect and therefore
considers it too speculative to include in the
FRIA. Therefore, the agency has not amended its
calculations in response to this comment.

Current versus future technology. Throughout
the consideration of bumper effectiveness, cost,
and weight, the agency has been faced with the
alternatives of relying on historical data based on
the experience of previous model year vehicles,
or on calculations based on present or future
technologies. The difficulty of the choice is
apparent. The former approach has the advantage
of greater and superior empirical data, but may
not fully account for the most recent advances in
design or materials technology. The latter
approach may more fully reflect state current and
future conditions, but the absence of any empirical
or field data introduces significantly greater
elements of uncertainty.

Insurance industry and consumer representatives
criticized the agency's analysis for relying on
bumper designs used in the late 1970's instead of
the best bumper technology available today.
These commenters contended that state-of-the-art
bumpers in use on the latest vehicle models are
lighter, more efficient, and cost less than
bumpers on earlier models and are more
representative of bumpers which will be used in
the future. An insurance industry representative
and one component supplier commented that new
technologies involving use of plastics could
positively affect the net benefits of 5.0-mph
bumpers. Motor vehicle manufacturers countered
that use of a representative current bumper
system as the basis for cost and weight estimates
is more realistic, because it is more reflective of
immediate cost/benefit impacts and because
styling considerations frequently limit the use of
the most efficient bumper design available.

The agency believes that analysis of the
bumper regulation should be based on real world
conditions and that it is unrealistic to assume that
the most advanced technology will be used in all
cases. While the use of alternative technologies

PART 581; PRE 45

could affect costs and benefits if such technologies
were widely adopted, no evidence has been
presented that cost, styling, production or other
constraints would permit universal acceptance of
these new technologies. More important, even if
designs more efficient in terms of costs and weight
were chosen to represent 5.0-,mph bumpers in the
FRIA, the effect of this change on the FRIA
outcome would be negated in large part by the
necessary parallel assumption that bumper
systems offering lower levels of protection would
also be designed and implemented at the most
efficient levels possible. Therefore, NHTSA has
concluded that projections of bumper net benefits
must continue to be based on data relating to real
world bumper systems.

Insurance premium increases. Many comments
submitted by insurance industry sources and
others noted that insurance premiums would
increase if the bumper standard impact speed
were lowered from its current levels. Insurers
generally concurred that the level of such collision
insurance premium increase would be 10 percent
if the bumper standard test impact speed were
reduced to 2.5 mph. The agency has reviewed in
detail the cost of increased collision damage costs
and the increased administrative overhead
burden that would be incurred. Based on this
analysis and on the assumption that only actual
cost increases would be approved by state
regulatory bodies for pass through and recovery
in the form of rate increases the agency can not
agree that such estimates are accurate. NHTSA
accounts for insurance cost increases through
estimates in the FRIA of increased collision
damage costs and administrative overhead.

Effect on insurance companies, bumper
component suppliers, and new car dealers. The
agency's October 1981 notice of proposed
rulemaking requested comments on the effect
which amendment of the bumper standard would
have on the insurance industry and bumper
component suppliers. Members of these
industries did not respond to this inquiry, except
with regard to the insurance premium estimates
noted above. Motor vehicle manufacturers
addressing this point generally concluded that
effects on related industries would not be major.
Although one source predicted a reduction in the
dollar sales volume of bumper component parts,
increased sales of replacement parts would tend

to offset to some extent the lower per unit cost of
bumper replacement parts.

One industry which did claim a major interest
in this proceeding was the automobile retail sales
industry, as represented by the National
Automobile Dealers Association. That organization
pointed out the devastating effects on its
membership of the recent depressed automotive
retail sales market and provided data indicating
the effect on car sales of price increases similar in
magnitude to those resulting from the Part 581
Bumper Standard.

Consumer time and inconvenience. Several
commenters addressed issues relevant to the
consideration by NHTSA, as mandated by the Act,
of the value of consumer time and inconvenience
related damage incurred in low-speed collisions.
NHTSA's PRIA incorporated a figure of $26 per
incident as the value of consumer time and
inconvenience associated with assessment and
repair of low-speed collision damage. Insurance
industry and consumer representative commenters
presented results of a survey conducted for that
industry by Opinion Research Corporation which
seemed to suggest that a much higher per
accident value should be placed on time and
inconvenience. However, NHTSA has concluded
that the results of this survey do not require
revision of the agency's estimates of the value of
delay and inconvenience.

Commenters citing the Opinion Research survey
placed values of $150 to $200 per incident on the
delay and inconvenience resulting from low-speed
accidents, in contrast to NHTSA's PRIA estimate
of $26. However, review of the survey results
suggests that these estimates may include the
value of repair costs to be borne by consumers,
i.e., the deductible amount of the consumers'
collision insurance, usually $100, a cost accounted
for elsewhere in NHTSA's analysis.

Also, the Opinion Research survey focused
attention on the delay and inconvenience involved
in having collision damage repaired. NHTSA's
estimates are based on average time loss for all
accidents, including those in which damage was
minimal and/or not repaired. The survey included
questions which could be accurately answered
only by persons with detailed knowledge of the
costs and benefits of bumper systems. Moreover,
apparent biases in some of the survey questions
may have inflated survey respondents' estimates

PART 581; PRE 46

of the value of damage avoidance. When the effect
of the above noted factors is accounted for, the
insurance industry and consumer representative
commenters' estimates and the NHTSA estimate
do not differ greatly.

Some automobile industry and consumer
representatives commented that the agency's
estimate of $10 per incident for the cost of
alternate transportation while low-speed collision
damage is repaired may be too low. A consumer
organization commented that the agency
underestimated the time lost at the scene of an
accident and in obtaining repair estimates. It
suggested that NHTSA had also understated the
expense of being without a car while collision
damage is repaired. It should be noted that the
agency's Analysis counts savings in delay and
inconvenience for all accidents, whether or not
damage is actually repaired. Since damage is not
always repaired, the agency's figures translate
into a higher per accident savings for those
accidents where repairs are actually made.
Nevertheless, after consideration of the
comments on these issues, the agency has now
used, and has performed a sensitivity analysis
using, a range of costs for time and inconvenience
of $26 to $50 in the FRIA.

Safety issues. Insurance industry and other
commenters expressed concern that reduction of
the test impact speed requirements of the
standard would pose a risk to vehicle safety due
to increased damage to safety-related
components. As evidence of the safety impact of
bumper regulation, one insurance industry
commenter cited a study in which it examined
accident claims involving rear impacts to MY
1973 and 1974 vehicles. According to this
commenter, the results of this study indicate
reductions in trunk lid and taillamp damage on
certain models when the bumper standard for
rear bumpers was upgraded in MY 1974. This
commenter also noted reductions in trunk lid,
trunk latch and tailpipe damage on some models
in data from NHTSA's driver survey, although
the commenter concluded that the survey was of
such limited scope as to preclude the drawing of
significant conclusions. The commenter asserted
that components of the type protected by the
Bumper Standard do affect safety in that, even if
their malfunction does not actually cause an
accident, it increases the risk to occupants once

an accident occurs, e.g., through leaking fuel from
a damaged fuel system.

Several auto industry sources commented that
current bumper requirements do not provide
significant safety benefits. One major domestic
manufacturer cited studies conducted by Westat
and Indiana University's Institute for Research
in Public Safety (Docket No. 73-19, Notice 27, No.
041) in support of its assertion that only one
percent of accidents are caused by safety
component malfunctions which could have resulted
from low-speed collision damage. This commenter
contended, moreover, that the nature of these
malfunctions (e.g., lamps not working) does not
permit the inference that even this low incidence
of contribution to accident causation is
attributable to collisions, but is instead more
commonly experienced as a result of maintenance
neglect (e.g., failure to replace burned-out bulbs).
As a result, the commenter argues that low-speed
collision damage is a minuscule factor in motor
vehicle safety. Another major manufacturer also
commented that the bumper standard's connection
to safety is tenuous, and that there is no evidence
that safety would be compromised by amendment
of the bumper standard requirements. Other
automakers commented that a 2.5-mph bumper
standard would be adequate in any event to
protect vehicle safety components.

Other commenters asserted that 5.0-mph
bumper requirements may in fact have a net
adverse effect on vehicle safety. An auto industry
trade association commented that the extra
weight and rigidity of more damage resistant
bumpers could adversely affect crash deformation
characteristics and rates of crush and energy
absorption so as to reduce potential levels of
occupant protection in higher speed collisions.
Another auto industry commenter argued that
while 5.0-mph bumpers do not contribute
significantly to safety through protection of safety
components, the added weight of those bumpers
necessarily reduces accident avoidance capability
by adversely affecting braking and cornering
performance.

Finally, the agency's own developing research
into pedestrian impact protection indicates a
clear possibility of conflict between affording
enhanced safety protection in this area and
increasing or even maintaining the current
bumper standard.

PART 581: PRE 47

After consideration of the extensive discussion
of this issue in the record of this proceeding,
including the Indiana University study referenced
above, NHTSA has concluded both that no safety
based justification exists for the current 5.0-mph
bumper requirements, and that relaxation of the
impact speed requirements would not compromise
any known safety consideration. In the agency's
judgment, a safety need for 5.0-mph bumpers has
never been demonstrated, either before issuance
of the FMVSS 215 and Part 581 standards or by
subsequent experience. Moreover, the argument
that protection of safety systems in low-speed
collisions is important for purposes of vehicle
crashworthiness as well as crash avoidance is not
convincing in view of the fact that the only Part
581 criterion which contributes significantly to
crashworthiness, i.e., the criterion relating to the
fuel system, is now protected much more
effectively by FMVSS 301.

NHTSA has also considered the energy
management consequences of this action with
respect to compliance with the applicable FMVSS
requirements relating to occupant crash
protection and fuel system integrity. Insurance
industry commenters noted that the crash energy
of a 2.5-mph collision is one quarter that of a
5.0-mph collision. Thus, it was suggested that
2.5-mph bumpers would be less effective in
managing crash energy than 5.0-mph bumpers.
However, a number of motor vehicle manufacturers
commented that in the 30.0-mph barrier impact
used to determine compliance with various
crashworthiness FMVSS, the vehicle bumper
absorbs only a small percentage of the crash
energy, generally less than 5 percent. Moreover,
some manufacturers commented that reduction of
the bumper test impact speed requirements
would permit removal of space consuming and
aggressive energy absorbers and stiff frame rails
which may actually inhibit design of vehicles for
efficient high-speed energy management. Also,
reduction of bumper test impact requirements
could lead to reduced aggressivity of the
impacting vehicle in side collisions.

After review of comments received, NHTSA
has concluded that reduction of bumper test
impact requirements would not have a negative
effect on high-speed crash energy management.
The amount of energy generated in a 5.0-mph
barrier impact is less than three percent of that

generated in a 30.0-mph barrier crash. The energy
generated in a 2.5-mph barrier impact is one
percent of 30.0-mph crash energy. Thus, although
5.0-mph bumpers may absorb more energy than
2.5-mph bumpers, the difference is negligible in a
30.0-mph barrier impact. Moreover, as suggested
by commenters, the 5.0-mph bumper requirements
may inhibit efficient vehicle energy management
design. NHTSA has concluded that 5.0-mph
bumpers make no significant contribution to
occupant crash protection or to protection of fuel
system components which may be damaged in
high-speed crashes.

Thus, the agency's action does not conflict with
any existing safety standards.

Other Issues

Accounting for vehicle size in testing. NHTSA
requested that commenters consider whether the
test procedure adequately accounts for vehicle
size differences. While some commenters
suggested that car size is a factor in damage
resistance, those commenters expressing an
opinion on the issue commented that the existing
test requirements adequately account for these
effects. Those requirements adjust test pendulum
weight to the mass of the vehicle tested.
Commenters also noted that size and weight
differences among cars are decreasing as
downsizing progresses. Thus, change in the test
procedures to account for vehicle size differences
does not appear to be warranted.

Manual repositioning of bumper system
components during testing. Several commenters
suggested the desirability of allowing manual
repositioning of bumper or shielding-panel
components during testing. These commenters
suggested that such a procedure would reduce
costs, increase design flexibility, promote the use
of new technologies, and reduce the subjectivity
now inherent in the evaluation of shielding-panel
damage. However, some auto manufacturers also
stated that eliminating the Phase II damage
resistance requirements would alleviate much of
the need for manual repositioning. Since the
Phase II criteria are being replaced by Phase I
criteria, and manual repositioning might introduce
uncertainties into the test procedure, the agency
has decided not to permit manual repositioning.

Bumper height. On the issue of bumper height,
several auto manufacturers commented that the

PART 581; PRE 48

height requirements of the standard account for a
substantial portion of the benefits of the standard.
One automaker referred to matching heights as
the single most important requirement of the
standard. A major insurer, however, contended
that a matching requirement associated with an
"ineffective" impact speed of 2.5 mph would be
meaningless. This commenter also contended that
only 49 percent of reported accidents are bumper-
to-bumper accidents.

Of course, a significant proportion of reported
accidents would be side impacts, rollovers, and
single vehicle collisions rather than bumper-to-
bumper impacts. Therefore, it does not necessarily
follow that damage incurred in non-bumper-to-
bumper accidents is attributable to bumper
mismatch. Moreover, unreported accidents would
be expected to include a higher proportion of
bumper-to-bumper accidents than would reported
accidents because bumper-to-bumper contact
would prevent significant damage in a number of
cases. Thus, a number of bumper-to-bumper
accidents would not appear in the figures for
reported accidents.

Finally, the agency notes that the height of
some vehicle structural components may be
determined by the height of the bumper. To the
degree that uniform side structural members,
additional levels of protection may result in side
impact collisions from matching of bumpers and
frame rails. NHTSA concludes that the height
requirement is a useful component of the bumper
regulation. Height standardization is maintained
under the amendment announced in this notice.

One commenter advocated lowering the
prescribed bumper height to less than 16 inches,
the current low bound for pendulum testing. This
commenter contended that low bumpers would
optimize pedestrian protection characteristics,
minimize aerodynamic drag, and reduce injuries
in side impacts. NHTSA will consider the
contribution of bumper height in connection with
ongoing research in the areas of pedestrian
protection and side impacts. However, until such
time as the effects of bumper height in these
areas can be fully evaluated, the very high
transition cost of converting existing vehicle
designs and the desirability of consistency with
bumper heights of the existing vehicle fleet
makes it preferable that the present height
requirements be maintained.

Effective date. Some automobile manufacturers
commented on the need for expeditious action to
amend the standard. One manufacturer noted
that final action by March 1982 would permit
bumper system modifications to be made in time
for introduction of model year 1983 vehicles.
Another commented on the long leadtimes
necessary for introduction of product changes.
Yet another stated that an effective date for
bumper standard amendments in the near future
would permit incorporation of bumper system
changes in a new vehicle model currently in the
design stage. In view of these considerations, and
because this action relieves a restriction, NHTSA
has determined that good cause exists to make
this amendment effective 45 days from the date
of publication of this notice in the Federal
Register.

Requirements for Analyses

NHTSA has determined that this proceeding
involves a major rule within the meaning of
Section 1, paragraph (b)(1), of Executive Order
12291 in that it is likely to result in an annual
effect on the economy of $100 million or more.
The agency estimates that current bumper
requirements add between $140 to $200 to the
cost of a new car compared to the cost of a car
with unregulated bumpers. The reduction of test
impact speed requirements for each of the
roughly 11 million vehicles expected to be sold in
this country annually is likely to result in an
impact on the economy far exceeding $100 million.
For this same reason, this action is considered
significant for purposes of Department of
Transportation procedures for internal review of
regulatory actions. The agency's FRIA for this
action has been placed in the public docket.
Copies may be obtained by contacting the Docket
Section, Room 5108, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20590.

Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the
agency has considered in its FRIA the impact of
this rulemaking action on small entities. The
agency certifies that this action will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Therefore, a regulatory
flexibility analysis is not required for this action.
The agency has concluded that few, if any,
manufacturers of motor vehicles and bumper

PART 581; PRE 49

components or vehicle insurers are small entities.
New car dealers will not be significantly affected
because this action is unlikely to significantly
affect new car sales levels for individual
dealerships. To the extent that such sales may be
affected, the effect would be positive. While
increased car collision damage repairs may result
from this action, the impact on individual repair
shops is not expected to be significant. Again, the
effect would be positive.

The economic effects of this action on small
organizations and governmental units will
generally be the same as those on the general
public. As purchasers of new cars, these
organizations and units will experience the same
increase in net benefits. While this action could
result in a minor increase in police time spent at
the scene of some low-speed accidents, this effect
is not expected to be significant.

In developing this final rule, NHTSA considered
the bumper standard promulgated by the
International Standards Organization and
adopted by the ECE. However, the agency found
that standard to be inappropriate for use in this

country since it does not adequately deal with
consumer cost savings considerations as required
by the Act.

NHTSA has prepared an Environmental
Assessment of the likely environmental
consequences of this proposal. This Assessment
has been placed in the public rulemaking docket
(Docket 73-19; Notice 27, No. 004). Based on this
Assessment, the agency has concluded that this
action will not have a significant effect on the
human environment and that, for this reason, an
Environmental Impact Statement will not be
prepared for this action.

Issued on May 14, 1982.

Raymond A. Peck, Jr.
Administrator

47 F.R. 21820
May 20, 1982

PART 581; PRE 50

Appendix

The following is a summary of the more major
comments submitted in response to the notice of
proposed rulemaking and discussed in more
general terms in the preamble of this notice. This
summary is organized in broad terms according
to the interest groups from which the comments
were received. Responses to these comments are
set forth in the preamble to the final rule and in
the FRIA.

Insurance Industry and Consumer
Representative Comments

In commenting on the issue of low-speed damage
frequency, insurance industry and consumer
representatives criticized the Westat survey on a
number of grounds. The Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety (IIHS) and Consumers Union
contended that the survey understates damage
frequency due to memory weaknesses on the part
of survey respondents. IIHS also noted that
nonprincipal drivers were not surveyed directly
and cited discrepancies between the original
Westat survey and a follow-up survey emphasing
operators of later model vehicles. Allstate
Insurance Company contended that the Westat
survey cannot be used to make judgments about
the effects of changing the bumper standard on
the frequency of damage to safety components
because the sample size is too limited, and that
the survey is not representative because it covers
only unreported damage. Allstate advocated use
of a higher estimate, although not as high as that
suggested by the Ford survey results. IIHS also
suggested that use of the Westat survey
improperly accounts for accidents reported to
police. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company contended that the study understates
the number of low-speed impacts due to the
probable existence of impacts with parked
vehicles, and of accidents not reported to the
person interviewed.

On the issue of bumper effectiveness, IIHS and
the Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI) supplied
results of laboratory tests on current vehicles not
required to meet the Part 581 standard, ie.,
pickup trucks and multipurpose passenger
vehicles. These commenters reported
substantially poorer bumper performance on
these vehicles, which, according to these

commenters, would comply with a 2.5-mph
bumper requirement.

IIHS also argued that vehicle size is a major
determinant of the amount and frequency of
crash-related property damage. Thus, IIHS
contended NHTSA's assessment of bumper
effectiveness is biased in favor of older,
unregulated vehicles because the more recent
vehicle mix includes greater numbers of more
damage prone smaller vehicles. Moreover, IIHS
argued, imports are more frequently involved in
property damage accidents than are domestically
produced vehicles, further biasing the analysis
against later model years which include a larger
percentage of imported vehicles.

The American Insurance Association and State
Farm contended that the discount rate of 10
percent applied by the agency to determine the
present value of future expenditures is too high.
Since bumpers represent an investment which
displaces other consumption, these commenters
argued that a more accurate discount rate would
be 4 percent. Allstate commented that the
discounting factor should be applied to inflated
costs rather than current costs.

On the subject of delay and inconvenience, the
Center for Auto Safety (CFAS) placed the cost of
a rental vehicle, which may be required while low-
speed collision damage is repaired, at $24 to $30
per day. CFAS estimated that consumers use 1.6
gallons of gasoline in obtaining a single damage
repair estimate and that each such estimate now
costs $35 on the average. CFAS also contended
that the agency underestimated the lost lost at
the scene of an accident and in obtaining repair
estimates.

An insurance industry representative submitted
data from a public opinion poll which, according to
the commenter, demonstrates overwhelming
public support for the 5.0-mph bumper standard.
The commenter also asserted that this poll
indicates people are willing to pay for the higher
levels of protection provided by the 5.0-mph
bumper standard. CFAS also argued that the
public supports the 5.0-mph bumper requirements.

The insurance industry argued that ECE
Regulation No. 42 is irrelevant and inappropriate
to requirements of the Cost Savings Act, primarily
because it does not address the issue of
protection against economic damage. According
to the insurance industry, the ECE requirements

PART 581; PRE 51

amount to merely a weaker version of FMVSS 215.
Moreover, this source contended the ECE
standard focuses in part on design rather than
performance characteristics, and thus is not in
accordance with United States statutory
requirements for issuance of performance
standards.

Librerty Mutual Insurance Company commented
that the current Part 581 requirements do not
adequately account for vehicle dive, which can
contribute to bumper underride in accident
situations. Presumably, dive-induced mismatch
damage would be increased under ECE
requirements.

On the issue of new technologies, IIHS argued
that new materials, i.e., polycarbonite plastics,
which could significantly reduce the weight of
bumpers meeting current 5.0-mph requirements
are available at this time. State Farm advocated
the possible use of sacrificial components, ie.,
components which must be adjusted or replaced
after a collision, as a means of reducing bumper
cost and weight.

Auto Industry Comments

In addressing the question on the issue of low
speed collision frequency. General Motors
Corporation and Ford Motor Company commented
that studies conducted by Ford overstate damage
frequency, principally due to their emphasis on
vehicles used in urban areas. These commenters
suggested that the Westat survey is a more
reliable source of data because it is more current
and is based on a more representative sampling
system.

Chrysler Corporation, American Motors
Corporation, and Volkswagen of America, Inc.
commented that neither the Ford nor West data
provide an adequate means of assessing low-
speed collision frequency. These commenters
suggested that use of crash recorders or other
controlled tests is necessary to generate data.

In questioning the value of MY-1973 bumpers in
assessing 2.5-mph bumper effectiveness, several
commenters pointed out that MY-1973 bumpers
were Yiot subject to a pendulum impact test and
thus were not required to be of a uniform height.
Commenters noted that MY-1973 rear bumpers
were essentially the same as MY-1972 bumpers,
but with stronger mounting brackets. This
comment is consistent with State Farm's comment

that its research revealed no difference in
performance between MY-1973 and 1972 rear
bumpers. Some commenters also concluded that
new 2.5-mph bumpers would perform better in
the current vehicle mix than did MY-1973 bumpers
in previous years, due to the increased uniformity
of current bumper designs. General Motors, Ford,
and Chrysler joined in attacking the relevance of
laboratory tests as a means of assessing the
relative performance of bumpers, stating that
such tests have never been correlated to real
world conditions.

American Motors suggested that NHTSA
consider the European experience with 2.5-mph
bumpers under ECE Regulation No. 42. However,
General Motors commented that its German
subsidiary reported an absence of field data on
the effectiveness of 2.5-mph bumpers in Europe.
Moreover, General Motors contended that the
European bumper standard is purely a safety
standard and that bumpers designed to meet that
standard would not be representative of future
American 2.5-mph designs. In General Motors'
opinion, the estimates used in NHTSA's 1979
Final Assessment provide the best available
information on bumper effectiveness at
alternative design speeds.

Several auto industry sources argued that
unregulated bumpers produced in the future
would provide greater levels of damage resistance
performance than pre-standard bumpers. The
factor most commonly cited in support of this
contention was that consumer expectations
would require that bumpers provide higher levels
of performance. Insurance cost considerations,
international harmonization, and experience in
designing improved bumpers were also cited as
contributing to the prospects for improved
performance from future unregulated bumpers.
Certain auto industry sources estimated that
unregulated bumpers would exceed 1.5-mph
performance and, at least initially, provide
performance approximating that available under
a 2.5-mph Phase I standard or ECE Regulation
No. 42.

In discussions of bumper cost and weight
savings from use of 2.5-mph bumpers, estimates
of overall weight savings ranged from 8 lbs. for
Volkswagen to over 38 lbs. for Volvo of America
Corporation. Ford reported weight savings of 34
lbs. for its European Escort model compared to

PART 581; PRE 52

its American counterpart as a result of differing
bumper requirements. Associated cost savings of
roughly $35 were estimated by several
manufacturers.

On the related issue of secondary weight, a
recent General Motors analysis of seventeen late
model front-wheel drive vehicles produced a
secondary weight factor of .72. General Motors
stated that this factor was used in the design
process of its recent "X" and "J" car models.
Toyota Motor Company also estimated a secondary
weight factor of .7 for its current models. Renault
agreed that the correct secondary weight factor
is greater than .5. Comments received from Ford,
Chrysler, and American Motors all contended
that a secondary weight factor of 1.0 would be
appropriate for NHTSA's analysis.

The fuel penalty factor of 1.1 gallons of fuel
consumed for each additional pound of bumper
weight, used in NHTSA's Preliminary Regulatory
Impact Analysis, was based on testimony presented
by General Motors before Congress. General
Motors, in its comments on the notice of proposed
rulemaking on bumper standard amendments,
revised its estimate downward to 1.0 gallon of
fuel per pound of vehicle weight. However,
several other motor vehicle manufacturers
commented that the 1.1 gallon figure is reasonable.
Chrysler noted that a higher figure could be used.

Chrysler estimated the increased cost to repair
5.0-mph bumpers as compared to 2.5-mph bumpers
at between $70 and $90. BMW of North America,
Inc. cited an analysis prepared by a West
German technical institute which found that at
impact speeds of 18 kph (approximately 11 mph)
and higher, repair costs for American-made
bumpers are greater than for European bumpers
due to more expensive bumper shock absorbers
and body components. BMW also noted a West
German insurance study reporting that the great
majority of all collisions occur at speeds above
11 kph.

General Motors and Ford commented that
NHTSA's figure for the hourly value of lost time
is too high. General Motors contending that the
figure should be somewhere between the average
hourly wage rate and the minimum wage. Ford
argued that a figure of $3.50, roughly half the
average hourly earnings figure, would be more
accurate. This figure is consistent with a
Consumer's Research report which concluded that

commuters are willing to pay 42 percent of an
hour's wage to save one hour of travel time.
Regarding the cost of alternate transportation
while collision damage is being repaired. Ford
concurred in the agency's estimate of $10 per
incident. Volkswagen commented that the figure
seemed too low, and General Motors suggested
that the agency consider the actual cost of rental
vehicles.

Chrysler expressed the opinion that insurance
premiums would decrease due to a reduction in
bumper repair costs if the performance
requirements of the standard were lowered. Ford
commented that insurance industry premium
discounts and surcharges based on vehicle
damage claims experience provide a significant
marketplace incentive to manufacturers to design
vehicles providing better damage resistance
performance.

Daimler-Benz AG, Renault, and Peugeot S.A.
cited cost and consistency considerations as the
basis for their positions in support of the ECE
standard. Other commenters suggested that cost
savings, e.g., savings in tooling and testing costs,
would result from harmonization. Renault
estimated weight savings of 14-15 kg. for its
vehicles equipped with bumpers designed to meet
the ECE standard.

Volkswagen and American Motors discussed at
length their position that the fixed-barrier impact
test should be dropped from the standard. ECE
Regulation No. 42 does not require a fixed-barrier
test. According to Volkswagen, elimination of the
barrier test would reduce testing costs, promote
international harmonization, and make the
standard more equitable. Volkswagen criticized
the barrier test as unreliable, unsophisticated,
and adding nothing to the standard. American
Motors contended that the pendulum test alone
would be sufficient, since it assures height
standardization and proper bumper geometry to
minimize override, and the versatile positioning
of the pendulum permits testing of the entire
bumper system. American Motors suggested that
the pendulum test could be run with the vehicle
idling to provide a test relevant to dynamic
situations. Volvo suggested the alternative of
employing the ECE test procedure with damage
criteria taken from the Part 581 standard.

Volkswagen and BL Technology Ltd. pointed
out that the ECE standard provides for pendulum

PART 581; PRE 53

impact at a single height rather than within a
height range as is the case with the Part 581
standard. BL Technology contended that the ECE
height requirement should be adopted in this
country to promote harmonization and reduce costs.
BL Technology also noted that the single height
requirement permits reduced vertical bumper
width thereby improving engine cooling. However,
Volkswagen argued there is little difference
between the Eruopean and United States' height
requirements in terms of benefits and that the
Part 581 requirement should be retained to avoid
possible mismatch with vehicles already in use.

On the subject of Phase I versus Phase II
damage criteria Ford and General Motors
questioned the cost-effectiveness of the Phase II
requirements. General Motors argued that
NHTSA's analysis overstates the benefits of the
Phase II standard because the agency
overestimates the effectiveness of Phase II
bumpers in impacts at speeds of 5.0 mph or below.
General Motors added that NHTSA must consider
the 5 lbs. of additional weight and resulting $6
additional fuel cost imposed by the Phase II
requirements. Information supplied by Volvo and
the Bureau of Labor statistics suggests that initial
consumer costs of between $10 and $15 result
from the Phase II requirements. Ford contended
that no true Phase I bumpers have ever been
produced because model year 1979 vehicles
represented a transition period between FMVSS
215 and Part 581, Phase II.

Ford contended that the pendulum test is not
appropriate for assessing damage resistance
properties of the bumper itself due to its
concentration of force in particular locations. This
test, in combination with the Phase II criteria
may, according to Ford, require use of expensive
energy absorbers even if the test impact speed
were lowered to 2.5 mph. Although Davidson
Rubber Division commented that the Phase II
criteria posed no problem for soft face systems,
that manufacturer at the same time advocated
reduction of the pendulum impact speed to 2.5 mph.
BL Technology and General Motors commented
that return to Phase I criteria would encourage
design innovation and the use of new, lighter
weight materials. Mitsubishi Motors Corporation
favored the Phase I criteria because bumper
deformation would improve the crash energy
management characteristics of the bumper system.

Ford also noted objectivity problems in
evaluating bumper damage under the Phase II
criteria. Finally, Ford argued that the increased
use of rubber and polymeric bumper materials
has changed consumer perceptions and reduced
the visibility of and concern about minor dents
and similar damage which was inherent in the use
of chrome-plated bumpers.

Two auto manufacturers advocated dropping
not only the damage criteria applicable to the
bumper system itself, but all criteria limiting
damage to the exterior surfaces of the vehicle.
Saab-Scania of America, Inc. made this suggestion
in the context of a possible decision to retain the
5.0-mph test impact speed requirement. Toyota's
comment noted vehicle cost and weight could be
reduced by eliminating the exterior surface
protection requirements.

Commenters addressing the issue differed on
the extent of manual repositioning which should
be permitted. Ford recommended permitting
manual repositioning which could be performed
without special equipment or experience.
Volkswagen favored manual repositioning
without tools, while Chrysler suggested that
manual repositioning without "special" tools be
permitted.

On the question of new technologies. Ford and
Volkswagen commented that relaxation of the
bumper standard requirements would permit use
of fiberglass bumpers, plastic face bars, rubber
mountings, and ultrahigh strength steel
components which could result in cost and weight
savings, increased styling flexibility and
improved aerodynamic characteristics. Davidson
Rubber offered compressible plastics, ie., foam or
honeycomb materials, as examples of materials
which could be used if the standard requirements
were lowered. C&F Stamping Company, Inc. cited
plastics and single-unit bumper systems. American
Motors commented that return to Phase I would
increase usage of SMC Components. Chrysler
noted the potential for cost and weight savings
from ultrahigh strength steel if Phase II criteria
were eliminated. One component supplier, Molnar
Industries, Inc. noted the availability of fiber
reinforced plastic bumpers which it contended
may make lowering the bumper standard
requirements unnecessary.

47 F.R. 21820
May 20, 1982

PART 581; PRE 54

PREAMBLE TO AN AMENDMENT TO PART 581

Bumper Standard

[Docket No. 73-19; Notice 32]

ACTION: Interpretive amendment.

SUMMARY: The Part 581 Bumper Standard
specifie.^ that certain equipment be removed from a
vehicle before testing. This notice clarifies the wor-
ding of a May 20, 1982, amendment to make it clear
that (1) no change was intended in the requirement
as it related to trailer hitches and license plate
brackets, i.e., that all trailer hitches and license plate
brackets are removed, whether or not they are op-
tional equipment, and (2) all running lights and fog
lamps which are optional equipment should be
removed, whether or not they are mounted on the
bumper face bar.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 23, 1983.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section
581.6(aX5) of the Bumper Standard specifies that cer-
tain equipment be removed from a vehicle before
testing. Prior to the most recent amendment, the sec-
tion specified that trailer hitches and license plate
brackets be removed from the vehicle. The standard
was amended in a notice published in the Federal
Register (46 FR 48262) on May 20, 1982, which,
among other things, expanded the specified equip-
ment that is removed to include headlamp washers
and certain optional equipment, i.e., running lights,
fog lamps, and equipment mounted on the bumper
face bar. The section was revised to read:

Trailer hitches, license plate brackets, running
lights, fog lamps, other optional equipment
mounted on the bumper face bar and headlamp
washers are removed from the vehicle.

The amended section might be read to be more
restrictive than the former section as it relates to
trailer hitches and license plate brackets, i.e., that
only trailer hitches and license plate brackets which
are optional equipment must be removed. This notice
clarifies the wording of that amendment to make it
clear that no change was intended in the recjuirement

as to these types of equipment. Thus, this notice
makes it clear that all trailer hitches and license
brackets must be removed. The agency neither pro-
posed nor intended any change in the requirement
as it relates to those types of equipment.

Another possible question of interpretation under
the amended section is whether all running lights and
fog lamps which are optional equipment should be
removed, or only those which are mounted on the
bumper face bar. This notice clarifies the wording
of the amendment to make it cleai* that running lights
and fog lamps which are optional equipment should
be removed, whether or not they are mounted on the
bumper face bar.

This amendment is an interpretive amendment
which does not change the substantive requii'ements
of the Bumper Standard in any respect. According-
ly, it is found for good cause shown that notice and
comment are unnecessaiy and that an immediate ef-
fective date is in the public interest.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR Part 581
is amended as follows:

§581.6 [Amended]
Section 581.6(aX5) is revised to read:

f O \ T^ SP ¥

(5) Trailer hitches, license plate brackets, and
headlamp washers are removed from the vehicle.
Running lights, fog lamps, and equipment mounted
on the bumper face bar are removed from the vehi-
cle if they are optional equipment.

Issued on September 19, 1983.

Diane K. Steed
Deputy Administrator

48 FR 43331
September 23, 1983

PART581-PRE 55-56

PART 581— BUMPER STANDARD
(Docket No. 74-11; Notic* 12; Docket No. 73-19; Notice 9)

I 581.1 Scope. This standard establishes re-
quirements for the impact resistance of vehicles
in low speed front and rear collisions.

§ 581.2 Purpose. The purpose of this stand-
ard is to reduce physical damage to the front
and rear ends of a passenger motor vehicle from
low speed collisions.

S 581.3 Application. This standard applies to
passenger motor vehicles other than multipur-
pose passenger vehicles.

§ 581.4 Definitions. All terms defined in the
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings
Act, P.L. 92-513, 15 U.S.C. 1901-1991, are used
as defined therein.

"Bumper face bar" means any component of
the bumper system that contacts the impact ridge
of the pendulum test device.

§ 581.5 Requirements.

(a) [Each vehicle shall meet the damage criteria
of $S 581.5(c) (1) through 581.5 (c) (9) when im-
pacted by a pendulum-type test device in accord-
ance with the procedures of § 581.7(b), under the
conditions of § 581.6, at an impact speed of 1.5
m.p.h., and when impacted by a pendulum-type
test device in accordance with the procedures of
$ 581.7(a) at 2.5 m.p.h., followed by an impact into
a fixed collision barrier that is perpendicular to the
line of travel of the vehicle, while traveling longi-
tudinally forward, then longitudinally rearward,
under the conditions of S 581.6, at 2.5 m.p.h." (47
F.R. 2182-May 20, 1982. Effective: July 4, 1982)1

(b) I Reserved. 1

(c) Protective criteria.

(1) Each lamp or reflective device except
license plate lamps shall be free of cracks and
shall comply with applicable visibility require-
ments of S4.3.1.1 of Standard No. 108 ($ 571.108
of this part). The aim of each headlamp shall
be adjustable to within the beam aim inspection
limits specified in Table 2 of SAE Recommended
Practice J599b, July 1970, measured with a me-
chanical aimer conforming to the requirements
of SAE Standard J602a, July 1970.

(2) The vehicle's hood, trunk, and doors
shall operate in the normal manner.

(3) The vehicle's fuel and cooling systems
shall have no leaks or constricted fluid passages
and all sealing devices and caps shall operate in
the normal manner.

(4) The vehicles' exhaust system shall have
no leaks or constrictions.

(5) The vehicle's propulsion, suspension,
steering, and braking systems shall remain in
adjustment and shall operate in the normal
manner.

(6) A pressure vessel used to absorb impact
energy in an exterior protection system by the
accumulation of gas pressure or hydraulic pres-
sure shall not suffer loss of gas or fluid accom-
panied by separation of fragments from the
vessel.

(7) The vehicle shall not touch the test de-
vice, except on the impact ridge shown in Figures
1 and 2, with a force that exceeds 2000 pounds
on the combined surfaces of Planes A and B of
the test device.

(R«v. 7/4/62)

PART 581-1

FRONT VIEW

(11) Reserved.

§ 581.6 Conditions. The vehicle shall meet
the requirements of § 581.5 under the following
conditions:

(a) General.

(1) The vehicle is at unloaded vehicle
weight.

(2) The front wheels are in the straight
ahead position.

TOP VIEW

h "■ ►!

FRONT VIEW

(8) The exterior surfaces shall have no separa-
tions of surface materials, paint, polymeric coat-
ings, or other covering materials from the surface
to which they are bonded, and no permanent devia-
tions from their original contours 30 minutes after
completion of each pendulum and barrier impact,
except where such damage occurs to the bumper
face bar and the components and associated fast-
eners that directly attach the bumper face bar to
the chassis frame.

(9) Except as provided in § 581.5(c) (8),
there shall be no breakage or release of fasteners
or joints.

(10) Reserved.

(3) Tires are inflated to the vehicle manu-
facturer's recommended pressure for the specified
loading condition.

(4) Brakes are disengaged and the trans-
mission is in neutral.

(5) ITrailer hitches, license plate brackets, and
headlamp washers are removed from the vehicle.
Rimning lights, fog lamps, and equipment mounted
on the bumper face bar are removed from the ve-
hicle if they are optional equipment. (48 F.R.
43331-September 23, 1983. Effective: September
23, 1983)1

(b) Pendulum test conditions. The following
conditions apply to the pendulum test procedures
of § 581.7(a) and § 581.7(b):

(1) The test device consists of a block with
one side contoured as specified in Figure 1 and
Figure 2 with the impact ridge made of AlSl
4130 steel hardened to 34 Rockwell "C." The
impact ridge and the surfaces in Planes A and B
of the test device are finished with a surface
roughness of 32 as specified by SAE Recom-
mended Practice J449A, June 1963. From the
point of release of the device until the onset of
rebound, the pendulum suspension system holds
Plane A vertical, with the arc described by any
point on the impact line lying in a vertical plane

(R«v. 9/23/83)

PART 581-2

(for S 581.7(a), longitudinal; for S 581.7(b). at
an angle of 30° to a vertical longitudinal plane)
and having a constant radius of not less than
11 feet.

(2) With Plane A vertical, the impact line
shown in Figures 1 and 2 is horizontal at the
same height as the test device's center of per-
cussion.

(3) The effective impacting mass of the test
device is equal to the mass of the tested vehicle.

(4) When impacted by the test device, the
vehicle is at rest on a level rigid concrete surface.

(c) Barrier Test Condition. At the onset of a
barrier impact, the vehicle's engine is operating
at idling speed in accordance with the manufac-
turer's specification. Vehicle systems that are not
necessary to the movement of the vehicle are not
operating during impact.

§ 561 .7 Test Procedures.

(a) Longitudinal Impact Test Procedures.

(1) Impact the vehicle's front surface and
its rear surface two times each with the impact
line at any height from 16 to 20 inches, inclusive,
in accordance with the following procedure.

(2) For impacts at aheight of 20 inches,
place the test device shown in Figure 1 so that
Plane A is vertical and the impact line is hori-
zontal at the specified height.

(3) For impacts at a height between 20
inches and 16 inches, place the test device shown
in Figure 2 so that Plane A is vertical and the
impact line is horizontal at a height within the
range.

(4) For each impact, position the test de-
vice so that the impact line is at least 2 inches
apart in vertical direction from its position in
any prior impact, unless the midpoint of the
impact line with respect to the vehicle is to be
more than 12 inches apart laterally from its
position in any prior impact.

(5) For each impact, align the vehicle so
that it touches, but does not move, the test de-
vice, with the vehicle's longitudinal centerline
perpendicular to the plane that includes Plane A
of the test device and with the test device in-
board of the vehicle corner test positions speci-
fied in S 581.7(b).

(6) Move the test device away from the ve-
hicle, then release it to impact the vehicle.

(7) Perform the impacts at intervals of not
less than 30 minutes.

(b) Comer impact test procedure.

(1) Impact a front corner and a rear comer
of the vehicle once each with the impact line at
a height of 20 inches and impact the other front
comer and the other rear corner once each with
the impact line at any height from 16 to 20
inches, inclusive, in accordance with the follow-
ing procedure.

(2) For an impact at a height of 20 inches,
place the test device shown in Figure 1 so that
Plane A is vertical and the impact line is hori-
zontal at the specified height.

(3) For an impact at a height between 16
inches and 20 inches, place the test device shown
in Figure 2 so that Plane A is vertical and the
impact line is horizontal at a height within the
range.

(4) Align the vehicle so that a vehicle cor-
ner touches, but does not move, the lateral center
of the test device with Plane A of the test device
forming an angle of 60 degrees with a vertical
longitudinal plane.

(5) Move the test device away from the ve-
hicle, then release it to impact the vehicle.

(6) Perform the impacts at intervals of not
less than 30 minutes.

41 F.R. 9346
March 4, 1976

PART 581-3-4

Effective: February 1, 1975

PREAMBLE TO PART 582— INSURANCE COST INFORMATION REGULATION

(Docket 74-40; Notice 2)

Tliis notice establishes an insurance cost in-
formation regulation pursuant to the Motor Ve-
hicle Information and Cost Sanngs Act (15
U.S.C. 1901 et seq.). The regulation is based
upon a notice of proposed rulemaking published
November 4, 1974 (39 F.R. 38912) and comments
submitted in response to the notice.

Tlie regidation will require automobile dealers
to distribute to prospective purchasers informa-
tion which compares differences in insurance costs
for dilTerent makes and models of passenger motor
vehicles based upon differences in their damage
susceptibility and crashworthiness. In the ab-
sence of insurance cost information that reflects
damageability and crashworthiness, this rule does
no*^. at the present time, have an effect on auto-
mobile dealers. Damage susceptibility and crash-
woi-thines.s studies currently being conducted by
the XHTSA are exi)ected to influence the in-
surance rate structure by providing data which
will enable the insurance industry to take these
factors into account. As this occi rs. the NHTSA
will prepare comparative indices for the dealers
to distribute to prospective purchasers.

Several comments on the proposed ndemaking
discussed the merits of the Motor Vehicle In-
formation and Cost Savings Act and are there-
fore beyond the scope, of this rulemaking. Other
comments offered methods for performing the
damage susceptibility and crashworthiness stud-
ies. These comments have been forwarded to the
technical staff performing the studies. Two com-
ments suggested minor changes in the text of the
regulation for clarity and to make the proposed
regulation more consistent with the purposes of
the Act. These suggestions have been adopted

in the final regidation. Their effect is that the
insurance cost information disseminated by the
dealers would be in the form of comparative
indices, based on differences in damage suscepti-
bility and crashworthiness, rather than simply
the insurance premium rate which is determined
by many factors.

One comment expressed the view that provid-
ing this information to consumers within 30 days
after its publication in the FederaJ Register was
an excessive burden upon the dealers. The
XHTSA does not believe that sufficient justifica-
tion for this position has been made in light of
the need to provide the information to the con-
sumer in time for it to be of use to him in pur-
chasing an automobile.

Therefore, a new Part 582, Insurance Cost In-
formation, is added in Chapter V, Title 49, Code
of Federal Regulations, to read as set forth below.

Effective date : Although the final rule is effec-
tive February 1, 1975, as specified in the Cost
Savings Act. the dates when automobile dealers
will be required to distribiite insurance cost in-
formation are dependent upon NHTSA progress
in developing such information and will be pub-
lished at a later date in the Federal Register.

(Sec. 201(c), P. L. 92-513, 86 Stat. 947 (15
T'.S.C. 1941(e)); delegation of authority at 49
CFR 1.51).

Issued on January 31, 1975.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

40 F.R. 4918
February 3, 1975

PART 582— PRE 1-2

PART 582-INSURANCE COST INFORMATION REGULATIONS

§ 582.1 Scope. This part requires automobile
dealers to make available to prospective pur-
chasers information reflecting differences in in-
surance costs for different makes and models of
passenger motor vehicles based upon differences
in damage susceptibility and crashworthiness,
pursuant to section 201(e) of the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act (15 U.S.C.
1941(e)), herein "the Cost Savings Act."

§ 582.2 Purpose. The purpose of this part is
to enable prospective purchasers to compare dif-
ferences in auto insurance costs for the various
makes and models of passenger motor vehicles
based upon differences in damage susceptibility
and crashworthiness, and to realize any savings
in collision insurance resulting from differences
in damageability, and any savings in medical pay-
ment insurance resulting from differences in
crashworthiness.

§ 582.3 Definitions.

(a) Statutory definitions. All terms used in
this part which are defined in section 2 of the
Cost Savings Act are used as so defined.

(b) Definitions used in this part.

(1) "Automobile dealer" means any person
who engages in the retail sale of new or used
automobiles as a trade or business.

(2) "Collision insurance" means insurance
that reimburses the insured party for physical
damage to his property resulting from auto-
mobile accidents.

(3) "Insurance cost" means the insurance
premium rate, as expressed in appropriate in-
dices, for collision and medical payment, includ-
ing personal injury protection in no-fault states.

(4) "Medical payment insurance" means in-
surance that reimburses the insured party for
medical expenses sustained by himself, his
family, and his passengers in automobile acci-
dents.

§ 582.4 Requirements.

(a) Each automobile dealer shall provide the
insurance cost information specified in § 582.5 for
examination by prospective purchasers at each
location where he offers vehicles for sale.

(b) The information shall be provided with-
out charge and in sufficient quantity to have it
available for retention by prospective purchasers,
within 30 days after its publication in the Federal
Register.

(c) The information shall be in English and,
if a significant portion of the prospective pur-
chasers do not speak English, in the non-English
language most widely spoken by prospecive pur-
chasers.

§ 582.5 Insurance cost information form.

The insurance cost information provided pur-
suant to section 582.4 shall be presented as
follows: [Form to be specified].

40 F.R. 4918
February 3, 1975

PART 582-1-2

PREAMBLE TO PART 585-AUTOMATIC RESTRAINT
PHASE-IN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

(Docket No. 74-14; Notice 43)

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: On April 12, 1985, NHTSA issued a
notice proposing a number of amendments to Stand-
ard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection. Based on its
analysis of the comments received in response to that
notice, the agency has decided to take the following
actions: retain the oblique crash test for automatic
restraint equipped cars, adopt some New Car Assess-
ment Program test procedures for use in the stand-
ard's crash tests, provide in the standard for a due
care defense with respect to the automatic restraint
requirement, and require the dynamic testing of
manual lap/shoulder belts in passenger cars. This
notice also creates a new Part 585 that sets reporting
requirements regarding compliance with the
automatic restraint phase-in requirements of the
standard.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendments made by this
notice will take effect on May 5, 1986, except the re-
quirement for dynamic testing of manual safety belts
in passenger cars will go into effect on September 1 ,
1989, if the automatic restraint requirement is
rescinded.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On July 11, 1984 (49 FR 28962), the Secretary of
Transportation issued a final rule requiring automatic
occupant protection in all passenger cars. The rule is
based on a phased-in schedule beginning on
September 1, 1986, with full implementation being re-
quired by September 1, 1989. However, if before

April 1, 1989, two-thirds of the population of the
United States are covered by effective state man-
datory safety belt use laws (MULs) meeting specified
criteria, the automatic restraint requirement will be
rescinded.
More specifically, the rule requires:

• Front outboard seating positions in passenger
cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1986, for
sale in the United States, will have to be equipped
with automatic restraints based on the following
schedule:

• Ten percent of all cars manufactured on or
after September 1, 1986.

• Twenty-five percent of all cars manufactured
on or after September 1, 1987.

• Forty percent of all cars manufactured on or
after September 1, 1988.

• One hundred percent of all cars manufactured
on or after September 1, 1989.

• During the phase-in period, each car that is
manufactured with a system that provides automatic
protection to the driver without the use of safety belts
and automatic protection of any sort to the passenger
will be given an extra credit equal to one-half car
toward meeting the percentage requirement. In addi-
tion, each car which provides non-belt automatic pro-
tection solely to the driver will be given a one vehicle
credit.

• The requirement for automatic restraints will be
rescinded if MULs meeting specified conditions are
passed by a sufficent number of states before April 1,
1989, to cover two-thirds of the population of the
United States. The MULs must go into effect no later
than September 1, 1989.

In the July 1984 notice, the Secretary identified
various issues requiring additional rulemaking. On
April 12, 1985, the agency issued two notices setting

PART 585-PRE 1

forth proposals on all of those issues. One notice (50
FR 14589), which is the basis for the final rule being
issued today, proposed: reporting requirements for
the phase-in, deletion of the oblique test, alternative
calculations of the head injury criterion (HIC), allow-
ing the installation of manual belts in convertibles,
use of the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP)
test procedures, and adoption of a due care defense.
The notice also proposed the dynamic testing of
manual lap/shoulder belts for passenger cars, light
trucks and light vans. The second notice (50 FR
14602) set forth the agency's proposals on the use of
the Hybrid III test dummy and additional injury
criteria. NHTSA has not yet completed its analysis of
the comments and issues raised by the Hybrid III pro-
posal or the proposal regarding convertibles and
dynamic testing of safety belts in light trucks and
light vans. The agency will publish a separate Federal
Register notice announcing its decision with regard to
these issues when it has completed its analysis.

Oblique Crash Tests

Standard No. 208 currently requires cars with
automatic restraints to pass the injury protection
criteria in 30 mph head-on and oblique impacts into a
barrier. The April 1985 notice contained an extensive
discussion of the value of the oblique test and re-
quested commenters to provide additional data re-
garding the safety and other effects of deleting the
requirements.

The responses to the April notice reflected the
same difference of opinion found in the prior
responses on this issue. Those favoring elimination
of the test argue that the test is unnecessary since
oblique crash tests generally show lower injury levels.
They also said the additional test adds to the cost of
complying with the standard - although manufac-
turers differed as to the extent of costs. Four manufac-
turers suggested that any cost reduction resulting
from elimination of the test would be minimal, in part
because they will continue to use the oblique tests in
their restraint system developmental programs,
regardless of what action the agency takes. Another
manufacturer, however, said that while it would con-
tinue to use oblique testing during its vehicle develop-
ment programs, the elimination of the oblique test in
Standard No. 208 would result in cost and manpower
savings. These savings would result because the parts
used in vehicles for certification testing must be more
representative of actual production parts than the
parts used in vehicles crashed during development
tests.

Those favoring retention of the test again em-
phasized that the test^is more representative of real-
world crashes. In addition, they said that occupants in
systems without upper torso belts, such as some air
bag or passive interior systems, could experience con-
tact with the A-pillar and other vehicle structures in
the oblique test that they would not experience in a
head-on test. Although, again, there were conflicting
opinions on this issue -one manufacturer said that
oblique tests would not affect air bag design, while
other manufacturers argued that the oblique test is
necessary to ensure the proper design of air bag
systems. The same manufacturer that said air bag
design would not be affected by the oblique test, em-
phasized that vehicles with 2-point automatic belts or
passive interiors, "may show performance charac-
teristics in oblique tests that do not show up on
perpendicular tests." Similarly, one manufacturer
said that oblique tests will not result in test dummy
contact with the A-pillar or front door- while another
manufacturer argued that in the oblique test contact
could occur wdth the A-pillar in vehicles using non-
belt technologies.

After examining the issues raised by the com-
menters, the agency has decided to retain the oblique
tests. There are a number of factors underlying the
agency's decision. First, although oblique tests
generally produce lower injury levels, they do not
consistently produce those results. For example, the
agency has conducted both oblique and frontal crash
tests on 14 different cars as part of its research ac-
tivities and NCAP testing. The driver and passenger
HIC's and chest acceleration results for those tests
show that the results in the oblique tests are lower in
31 of the 38 cases for which data were available.
However, looking at the results in terms of vehicles, 6
of the 14 cars had higher results, exclusive of femur
results, in either passenger or driver HIC's or chest
accelerations in the oblique tests. The femur results
in approximately one-third of the measurements were
also higher in the oblique tests. Accident data also in-
dicate that oblique impacts pose a problem. The 1982
FARS and NASS accident records show that 14 per-
cent of the fatalities and 22 percent of the AIS 2-5 in-
juries occur in 30 degree impacts.

The agency is also concerned that elimination of the
oblique test could lead to potential design problems in
some automatic restraint systems. For example, air
bags that meet only a perpendicular impact test could
be made much smaller. In such a case, in an oblique
car crash, the occupant would roll off the smaller bag
and strike the A-pillar or instrument panel. Similarly,
the upper torso belt of an automatic belt system

PART 585-PRE 2

could slip off an occupant's shoulder in an oblique
crash. In belt system with a tension-relieving device,
the system will be tested with the maximum amount
of slack recommended by the vehicle manufacturer,
potentially increasing the possibility of the upper
torso belt slipping off the occupant's shoulder. In the
case of passive interiors, an occupant may be able to
contact hard vehicle structures, such as the A-pillar,
in oblique crashes that would not be contacted in a
perpendicular test. If the A-pillar and other hard
structures are not designed to provide protection in
oblique crashes then there would be no assurance, as
there presently is, that occupants would be adequate-
ly protected. 'Thus, the oblique test is needed to pro-
tect unrestrained occupants in passive interiors, and
to ensure that air bags and automatic or manual safe-
ty belts are designed to accommodate some degree of
oblique impact.

The agency recognizes that retention of the oblique
test will result in additional testing costs for manufac-
turers. The agency believes, however, that there are a
number of factors which should minimize those costs.
First, even manufacturers opposing retention of the
oblique test indicated that they will continue to per-
form oblique crash tests to meet their own internal re-
quirements as well as to meet the oblique test re-
quirements of the Standard No. 301, Fuel System In-
tegrity. Since the oblique tests of Standard No. 208
and Standard No. 301 can be run simultaneously, the
costs resulting from retention of the oblique crash
test requirements of Standard No. 208 should not be
significant.

Dynamic Testing of Manual Belts

The April notice proposed that manual lap/shoulder
belts installed at the outboard seating positions of the
front seat of four different vehicle types comply with
the dynamic testing requirements of Standard No.
208. Those requirements provide for using test dum-
mies in vehicle crashes for measuring the level of pro-
tection offered by the restraint system. The four vehi-
cle types subject to this proposal are passenger cars,
light trucks, small van-like buses, and light multipur-
pose passenger vehicles (MPV's). (The agency con-
siders light trucks, small van-like buses, and light
MPV's to be vehicles with a Gross Vehicle Weight
Rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less and an
unloaded vehicle weight of 5,500 pounds or less. The
5,500 pound unloaded vehicle weight limit is also used
in Standard No. 212, Windshield Retention, and
Standard No. 219, Windshield Zone Intrusion. The
limit was adopted in those standards on April 3, 1980

'(45 FR 22044) to reduce compliance problems for
final-stage manufacturers. Readers are referred to
the April 1980 notice for a complete discussion of the
5,500 pound limit.)

Currently, manual belts are not subject to dynamic
test requirements. Instead they must be tested in ac-
cordance with Standard No. 209, Seat Belt
Assemblies, for strength and other qualities in
laboratory bench tests. Once a safety belt is certified
as complying with the requirements of Standard No.
209, it currently may be installed in a vehicle without
any further testing or certification as to its perform-
ance in that vehicle. The safety belt anchorages in the
vehicle are tested for strength in accordance with
Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages.

The April 1985 notice also addressed the issue of
tension-relieving devices on manual belts. Tension-
relieving devices are used to introduce slack in the
shoulder portion of a lap-shoulder belt to reduce the
pressure of the belt on an occupant or to effect a more
comfortable "fit" of the belt to an occupant. The
notice proposed that manufacturers be required to
specify in their vehicle owner's manuals the maximum
amount of slack they recommend introducing into the
belt under normal use condition. Further, the owmer's
manual would be required to warn that introducing
slack beyond the maximum amount specified by the
manufacturer could significantly reduce the effec-
tiveness of the belt in a crash. During the agency's
dynamic testing of manual belts, the tension-relieving
devices would be adjusted so as to introduce the max-
imum amount of slack specified in the owner's
manual.

The agency proposed that the dynamic test require-
ment for passenger cars take effect on September 1,
1989, and only if the Secretary determines that two-
thirds of the population is covered by effective safety
belt use laws, thereby rescinding the automatic
restraint requirement. Should such a determination
be made, it is important that users of manual belts be
assured that their vehicles offer the same level of oc-
cupant protection as if automatic restraints were in
their vehicles. Absent a rescission of the automatic
restraint requirement, application of the dynamic
testing requirements to manual safety belts in
passenger cars would be unnecessary since those
belts would not be required in the outboard seating
positions of the front seat. In the case of light trucks,
light MPV's and small van-like buses, the agency pro-
posed that the dynamic test requirement take effect
on September 1, 1989. The proposed effective date
for light trucks, light MPV's and van-like buses was

PART 585-PRE 3

not conditional, because those vehicles are not
covered by the automatic restraint requirement and
will likely continue to have manual safety belts.

Adoption of the requirement

As discussed in detail below, the agency has decided
to adopt a dynamic test requirement for safety belts
used in passenger cars. The agency is still analyzing
the issues raised in the comments about dynamic
testing for safety belt systems in other vehicles and
will announce its decision about safety belt systems in
light trucks, MPV's and buses at a later date.

Most of the commenters favored adopting a
dynamic test requirement for manual belts at least
with respect to passenger cars, although many of
those commenters raised questions about the lead-
time needed to comply with the requirement. Those
opposing the requirement argued that the field ex-
perience has shown that current manual belts provide
substantial protection and thus a dynamic test re-
quirement is not necessary. In addition, they argued
that dynamic testing would substantially increase a
manufacturer's testing costs, and its testing
workload. One commenter said that because of the
unique nature of the testing, it could not necessarily
be combined with other compliance testing done by a
manufacturer. The same commenter argued that
vehicle downsizing, cited by the agency as one reason
for dynamically testing belts, does not create safety
problems since the interior space of passenger cars
has remained essentially the same as it was prior to
downsizing. The commenter also argued there is no
field evidence that the use of tension-relieving devices
in safety belts, the other reason cited by the agency in
support of the need to test dynamically manual safety
belts, is compromising the performance of safety
belts.

The agency strongly believes that current manual
belts provide very substantial protection in a crash.
The Secretary's 1984 automatic protection decision
concluded that current manual safety belts are at
least as effective, and in some cases, more effective
than current automatic belt designs. That conclusion
was based on current manual safety belts, which are
not certified to dynamic tests. However, as discussed
in the April 1985 notice, the agency is concerned that
as an increasing number of vehicles are reduced in
size for fuel economy purposes and as more tension-
relieving devices are used on manual belts, the poten-
tial for occupant injury increases. The agency agrees
that downsizing efforts by manufacturers have at-
tempted to preserve the interior space of passenger

cars, while reducing their exterior dimensions.
Preserving the interior dimensions of the passenger
compartment means that occupants will not be placed
closer to instrument panels and other vehicle struc-
tures which they could strike in a crash. However, the
reduction in exterior dimensions can result in a
lessening of the protective crush distance available in
a car. Thus the agency believes it is important to en-
sure that safety belts in downsized vehicles will per-
form adequately. In the case of tension-relieving
devices, agency tests of lap/shoulder belt restrained
test dummies have shown that as more slack is in-
troduced into a shoulder belt, the injuries measured
on the test dummies increased. Thus, as discussed in
detail later in this notice, the agency believes it is im-
portant to ensure that safety belts with tension-
relievers provide adequate protection when they are
used in the manner recommended by vehicle manu-
facturers. This is of particular concern to the agency
since the vast majority of new cars (nearly all
domestically-produced cars) now are equipped with
such devices. For those reasons, the agency is adopt-
ing the dynamic test requirement.

The adoption of this requirement will ensure that
each and every passenger car, as compared to the
vehicle population in general, offers a consistent,
minumum level of protection to front seat occupants.
By requiring dynamic testing, the standard will
assure that the vehicle's structure, safety belts, steer-
ing column, etc., perform as a unit to protect oc-
cupants, as it is only in such a test that the synergistic
and combination effects of these vehicle component
can be measured. As discussed in detail in the Final
Regulatory Evaluation (FRE), vehicle safety im-
provements will result from dynamic testing; and, as
discussed later in this notice, such improvements can
often be made quickly and at low cost.

The agency recognizes that manufacturers may
have to conduct more testing than they currently do.
However, the dynamic testing of manual belts in
passenger cars, as with testing of automatic
restraints, can be combined with other compliance
tests to reduce the overall number of tests. The agen-
cy notes that in its NCAP tests, it has been able to
combine the djmamic testing of belts with measuring
the vehicle's compliance with other standards. The
agency has followed the same practice in its com-
pliance tests. For example, the agency has done com-
pliance testing for Standard Nos. 208, 212, 219, and
301 in one test. The agency would, of course,
recognize a manufacturer's use of combined tests as a
valid testing procedure to certify compliance with
these standards.

PART 585-PRE 4

Effective Date

Two commenters argued that the requirement
should become effective as soon as practical. As
discussed in the April 1985 notice, the agency pro-
posed an effective date of September 1, 1989, because
it did not want to divert industry resources away
from designing automatic restraints for passenger
cars. The agency continues to believe it would be in-
appropriate to divert those resources for the purposes
of requiring improvements on manual belt systems
that might not be permitted in passenger cars.

Other commenters asked for a delay in the effective
date -one asked for a delay until September 1, 1991,
while another asked that the effective date be set 2-3
years after the determination of whether a sufficient
number of States have passed effective mandatory
safety belt use laws. NHTSA does not agree there is a
need to delay the effective date beyond September 1,
1989 for passenger cars. Commenters argued that
the time span between any decision on rescission of
the automatic restraint requirements (as late as April
1, 1989) and the effective date of the dynamic testing
of manual belts (September 1, 1985) is too short to
certify manual belts.

The agency believes there is sufficient leadtime for
passenger cars. Most of the vehicle components in
passenger cars necessary for injury reduction
management are the same for automatic restraint
vehicles and dynamically tested manual belt vehicles.
Additionally, as indicated and discussed in the April
notice, approximately 40 percent of the passenger
cars tested in the agency's 35 mph (NCAP) program
meet the injury criteria specified in Standard No. 208,
even though a 35 mph crash involves 36 percent more
energy than the 30 mph crash test required by Stand-
ard No. 208. In addition, the FRE shows that with
relatively minor vehicle and/or restraint system
changes some safety belt systems can be dramatically
improved. This is further evidence that development
of dynamically tested manual belts for passenger cars
in 30 mph tests should not be a major engineering
program. Thus, a delay in the effective date for
passenger cars is not needed.

Webbing tension-relieving devices

With one exception, those manufacturers who com-
mented on the proposal concerning tension-relieving
devices supported testing safety belts adjusted so
that they have the amount of slack recommended by
the manufacturer in the vehicle owner's manual.
However, one manufacturer and two other com-
menters objected to the provision related to dynamic

testing with the tension-relieving device adjusted to
the manufacturer'^ maximum recommended slack
position. The manufacturer objected to a dynamic
test that would require any slack at all to be intro-
duced into the belt system, on the grounds that un-
controlled variability would be introduced into the
djTiamic test procedure, which would then lack objec-
tivity. The manufacturer asserted that it might have
to eliminate all tension-relieving devices for its safety
belts.

The agency's proposed test procedure was intended
to accommodate tension-relieving devices since they
can increase the comfort of belts. At the same time,
the proposal would limit the potential reduction in ef-
fectiveness for safety belt systems with excessive
slack. The agency does not agree that this test pro-
cedure need result in the elimination of tension-
relieving devices from the marketplace. As men-
tioned earlier, other manufacturers supported the
proposal and did not indicate they would have to
remove tension-relieving devices from their belt
systems. The commenter opposing the requirement
did not show that injury levels cannot be controlled
within the specified injury criteria by testing with the
recommended amount of slack, as determined by the
manufacturer. The recommended slack could be very
small or at any level selected by the manufacturer as
appropriate to relieve belt pressure and still ensure
that the injury reduction criteria of Standard No. 208
would be met. As a practical matter, most tension-
relievers automatically introduce some slack into the
belt for all occupants. Testing wathout such slack
would be unrealistic.

The two other commenters objected to the proposal
that manual belt systems using tension-relieving
devices meet the injury criteria with only the
specified amount of slack recommended in the
owner's manual. They stated that most owners would
not read the instructions in the owner's manual re-
garding the proper use of the tension-relieving
device. They said an occupant could have a false sense
of adequate restraint when wearing a belt system ad-
justed beyond the recommended limit.

The agency's views on allowing the use of tension
relievers in safety belts were detailed in the April
1985 notice. The agency specifically noted the effec-
tiveness of a safety belt system could be compromised
if excessive slack were introduced into the belt.
However, the agency recognizes that a belt system
must be used to be effective at all. Allowing manufac-
turers to install tension-relieving devices makes it
possible for an occupant to introduce a small amount
of slack to relieve shoulder belt pressure or to divert

PART 585-PRE 5

the belt away from the neck. As a result, safety belt
use is promoted. This factor should outweigh any loss
in effectiveness due to the introduction of a recom-
mended amount of slack in normal use. This is par-
ticularly likely in light of the requirement that the
belt system, so adjusted, must meet the injury criteria
of Standard No. 208 under 30 mph test conditions.
Further, the inadvertent introduction of slack into a
belt system, which is beyond that for normal use, is
unlikely in most current systems. In addition, even if
too much slack is introduced, the occupant should
notice that excessive slack is present and a correction
is needed, regardless of whether he or she has read
the vehicle's owner's manual.

Exemption from Standard Nos. 203 and 204

One commenter suggested that vehicles equipped
with dynamically tested manual belts be exempt from
Standard Nos. 203, Im-pact Protection for the Driver
from the Steering Control Systems, and 204, Steering
Column Rearward Displacement. The agency does
not believe such an exemption would be appropriate
because both those standards have been shown to pro-
vide substantial protection to belted drivers.

Latching procedure in Standard No. 208

One commenter asked that Standard No. 208 be
modified to include a test procedure for latching and
adjusting a manual safety belt prior to the belt being
dynamically tested. NHTSA agrees that Standard
No. 208 should include such a procedure. The final
rule incorporates the instructions contained in the
NCAP test procedures for adjusting manual belts, as
modified to reflect the introduction of the amount of
slack recommended by the vehicle manufacturer.

Revisions to Standard No. 209

The notice proposed to exempt dynamically tested
belts from the static laboratory strength tests for
safety belt assemblies set forth in S4.4 of Standard
No. 209. One commenter asked that such belts be ex-
empted from the remaining requirements of Stand-
ard No. 209 as well.

NHTSA agrees that an additional exemption from
some performance requirements of Standard No. 209
is appropriate. Currently, the webbing of automatic
belts is exempt from the elongation and other belt
webbing and attachment hardware requirements of
Standard No. 209, since those belts have to meet the
injury protection criteria of Standard No. 208 during
a crash. For dynamically-tested manual belts,

NHTSA believes that an exemption from the webbing
width, strength and elongation requirements (sec-
tions 4.2(a)-(c)) is also appropriate, since these belts
will also have to fheet the injury protection re-
quirements of Standard No. 208. The agency has
made the necessary changes in the rule to adopt that
exemption.

The agency does not believe that manual belts
should be exempt from the other requirements in
Standard No. 209. For example, the requirements on
buckle release force should continue to apply, since
manual safety belts, unlike automatic belts, must be
buckled every time they are used. As with retractors
in automatic belts, retractors in dynamically tested
manual belts will still have to meet Standard No.
209's performance requirements.

Revisions to Standard No. 210

The notice proposed that dynamically tested
manual belts would not have to meet the location re-
quirements set forth in Standard No. 210, Seat Belt
Assembly Anchorages. One commenter suggested
that dynamically tested belts be completely exempt
from Standard No. 210; it also recommended that
Standard No. 210 be harmonized with Economic
Commission for Europe (ECE) Regulation No. 14.
Two other commenters suggested using the "out-of-
vehicle" dynamic test procedure for manual belts con-
tained in ECE Regulation No. 16, instead of the pro-
posed barrier crash test in Standard No. 208.

The agency does not believe that the
"out-of-vehicle" laboratory bench test of ECE Regula-
tion No. 16 should be allowed as a substitute for a
dynamic vehicle crash test. The protection provided
by safety belts depends on the performance of the
safety belts themselves, in conjunction with the struc-
tural characteristics and interior design of the vehi-
cle. The best way to measure the performance of the
safety belt/vehicle combination is through a vehicle
crash test.

The agency has already announced its intention to
propose revisions to Standard No. 210 to harmonize it
with ECE Regulation No. 14; therefore the com-
menters' suggestions concerning harmonization and
exclusion of dynamically tested safety belts from the
other requirements of Standard No. 210 will be con-
sidered during that rulemaking. At the present time,
the agency is adopting only the proposed exclusion of
anchorages for dynamically tested safety belts from
the location requirements, which was not opposed by
any commenter.

PART 585-PRE 6

Belt Labelling

One commenter objected to the proposal that
dynamically tested belts have a label indicating that
they may be installed only at the front outboard
seating positions of certain vehicles. The commenter
said that it is unlikely that anyone would attempt to
install a Tj-pe 2 lap shoulder belt in any vehicle other
than the model for which it was designed. The agency
does not agree. NHTSA believes that care must be
taken to distinguish dj-namically tested belt systems
from other systems, since misapplication of a belt in a
vehicle designed for use with a specific dynamically
tested belt could pose a risk of injury. If there is a
label on the belt itself, a person making the installa-
tion will be aware that the belt should be installed
only in certain vehicles.

Use of the Head Injury Criterion

The April 1985 notice set forth two proposed alter-
native methods of using the head injury criterion
(HIC) in situations when there is no contact between
the test dummy's head and the vehicle's interior dur-
ing a crash. The first proposed alternative was to re-
tain the current HIC calculation for contact situa-
tions. However, in non-contact situations, the agency
proposed that a HIC would not be calculated, but in-
stead new neck injury criteria would be calculated.
The agency explained that a crucial element
necessary for deciding whether to use the HIC
calculation or the neck criteria was an objective
technique for determining the occurrence and dura-
tion of head contact in the crash test. As discussed in
detail in the April 1985 notice, there are several
methods available for establishing the duration of
head contact, but there are questions about their
levels of consistency and accuracy.

The second alternative proposed by the agency
would have calculated a HIC in both contact and non-
contact situations, but it would limit the calculation to
a time interval of 36 milliseconds. Along with the re-
quirement that a HIC not exceed 1000, this would
limit average head acceleration to 60gfs or less.

Almost all of the commenters opposed the use of
the first proposed alternative. The commenters
uniformly noted that there is no current technique
that can accurately identify whether head contact has
or has not occurred during a crash test in all situa-
tions. However, one commenter urged the agency to
adopt the proposed neck criteria, regardless of
whether the HIC calculation is modified. There was a
sharp division among the commenters on the second
proposed alternative. Manufacturers commenting on

the issue uniformly supported the use of the second
alternative; although many manufacturers argued
that the HIC calculation should be limited to a time in-
terval of approximately 15 to 17 milliseconds (ms),
which would limit average head accelerations to 80-85
g's. Another manufacturer, who supported the sec-
ond alternative, urged the agency to measure HIC
only during the time interval that the acceleration
level in the head exceeds 60 g's. It said that this
method would more effectively differentiate results
received in contacts with hard surfaces and results
obtained from systems, such as airbags, which pro-
vide good distribution of the loads experienced during
a crash. Other commenters argued that the current
HIC calculation should be retained; they said that the
proposed alternatives would lower HIC calculations
without ensuring that motorists were still receiving
adequate head protection.

NHTSA is in the process of reexamining the poten-
tial effects of the two alternatives proposed by the
agency and of the two additional alternatives sug-
gested by the commenters. Once that review has been
completed, the agency will issue a separate notice an-
nouncing its decision.

NCAP Test Procedures

The April 1985 notice proposed adopting the test
procedures on test dummy positioning and vehicle
loading used in the agency's NCAP testing. The com-
menters generally supported the adoption of the test
procedures, although several commenters suggested
changes in some of the proposals. In addition, several
commenters argued that the new procedures may im-
prove test consistency, but the changes do not affect
what they claim is variability in crash test results. As
discussed in the April 1985 notice, the agency
believes that the test used in Standard No. 208 does
produce repeatable results. The proposed changes in
the test procedures were meant to correct isolated
problems that occurred in some NCAP tests. The
following discussion addresses the issues raised by
the commenters about the specific test procedure
changes.

Vehicle test attitude

The NPRM proposed that when a vehicle is tested,
its attitude should be between its "as delivered" condi-
tion and its "loaded" condition. (The "as delivered"
condition is based on the vehicle attitude measured
when it is received at the test site, with 100 percent of
all its fluid capacities and with all its tires inflated to
the manufacturer's specifications. For passenger

PART 585-PRE 7

cars, the "loaded" condition is based on the vehicle's
attitude with a test dummy in each front outboard
designated seating position, plus carrying the cargo
load specified by the manufacturer).

One commenter said that the weight distribution,
and therefore the attitude, of the vehicle is governed
more by the Gross Axle Weight Rating (defined in 49
CFR Part 571.3) than the loading conditions iden-
tified by the agency. The commenter recommended
that the proposal not be adopted. Another commenter
said that the agency should adopt more specific pro-
cedures for the positioning of the dummy and the
cargo weight. For example, that commenter recom-
mended that the "cargo weight shall be placed in such
manner that its center of gravity will be coincident
with the longitudinal center of the trunk, measured
on the vehicle's longitudinal centerline." The com-
menter said that unless a more specific procedure is
adopted, a vehicle's attitude in the fully loaded condi-
tion would not be constant.

The agency believes that a vehicle attitude
specification should be adopted. The purpose of the
requirement is to ensure that a vehicle's attitude dur-
ing a crash test is not significantly different than the
fully loaded attitude of the vehicle as designed by the
manufacturer. Random placement of any necessary
ballast could have an effect on the test attitude of the
vehicle. If these variables are not controlled, then the
vehicle's test attitude could be affected and potential
test variability increased.

NHTSA does not agree that the use of the Gross
Axle Weight Rating (GAWR) is sufficient to deter-
mine the attitude of a vehicle. The use of GAWR only
defines the maximum load-carrying capacity of each
axle rather' than in effect specifying a minimum and
maximum loading as proposed by the agency. In addi-
tion, use of the GAWR may, under certain conditions,
make it necessary to place additional cargo in the
passenger compartment in order to achieve the
GAWR loading. This condition is not desirable for
crash testing, since the passenger compartment
should be used for dummy placement and instrumen-
tation and not ballast cargo. Thus the commenter's
recommendation is not accepted.

The other commenter's recommendations regard-
ing more specific test dummy placement procedures
for the outboard seating positions were already ac-
commodated in the NPRM by the proposed new
SlO.1.1, Driver position placement, and SIO.1.2,
Passenger position placement. Since those proposals
adequately describe dummy placement in these posi-
tions, they are adopted.

NHTSA has evaluated the commenter's other sug-

gestion for placing cargo weight with its center of
gravity coincidents with the longitudinal center of the
trunk. The agency does not believe that it is
necessary to determine the center of gravity of the
cargo mass, which would add unnecessary complexity
to the test procedure, but does agree that the cargo
load should be placed so that it is over the longitudinal
center of the trunk. The test procedures have been
amended accordingly.

Open window

One commenter raised a question about the require-
ment in S8.1.5 of Standard No. 208 that the vehicle's
windows are to be closed during the crash test. It said
adjustment of the dummy arm and the automatic
safety belt can be performed only after an automatic
belt is fully in place, which occurs only after the door
is closed. Therefore, the window needs to be open to
allow proper arm and belt placement after the door is
closed.

NHTSA agrees that the need to adjust the slack in
automatic and dynamically-tested manual belts prior
to the crash test may require that the window remain
open. The agency has modified the test procedure to
allow manufacturers the option of having the window
open during the crash test.

Seat back position

One commenter recommended that proposed
S8.1.3, Adjustable seat back placement, be modified.
The notice proposed that adjustable seat backs should
be set in their design riding position as measured by
such things as specific latch or seat track detent posi-
tions. The commenter suggested two options. The
first option would be to allow vehicle manufacturers
to specify any means they want to determine the seat
back angle and the resulting dummy torso angle. As
its second option, the commenter recommended that
if the agency decides to adopt the proposal, it should
determine the "torso angle with a H-point machine ac-
cording to SAE J826." The commenter said that
depending on how the torso angle is established, dif-
ferent dummy torso angles could result in substantial
adjustment deviations that can affect seat back place-
ment.

The purpose of the requirement is to position the
seat at the design riding position used by the
manufacturer. The agency agrees with the com-
menter that manufacturers should have the flexibility
to use any method they want to specify the seat back
angle. Thus, the agency has made the necessary
changes to the test procedure.

PART 585-PRE 8

Dummy placement

Foot rest

One commenter made several general comments
about dummy placement. It agreed that positioning is
very important and can have an influence on the out-
come of crash tests. It argued that both the old and
the proposed procedures are complicated and imprac-
tical to use. The commenter claims this sitution will
become more complicated if the Hybrid III is permit-
ted, since the positioning must be carried out within a
narrow temperature range (3°F) for the test dummy
to remain in calibration.

The commenter also believes that the positioning of
the dummy should relate to vehicle type. It said that
the posture and seating position of a vehicle occupant
will not be the same in a van as in a sports car. For ex-
ample, it said it has tried the proposed positioning
procedures and found that they can result in an "un-
natural" position for the dummy in a sports vehicle.
The commenter argued that this "unnatural" position
would then lead to a knee bolster design which would
perform well in a crash test, but would likely not pro-
vide the same protection to a real occupant because of
difference in positioning. The commenter recom-
mended that the old positioning procedure be re-
tained and the new procedure be provided as an op-
tion for those manufacturers whose vehicles cannot
be adequately tested othenvise.

Because consistency in positioning the dummy is re-
quired prior to test, NHTSA believes that a single set
of procedures should apply. As discussed in the April
1985 notice, the agency proposed the new procedures
because of positioning problems identified in the
NC AP testing. Allowing the use of the old positioning
procedures could lead to sources of variability, thus
negating a major objective of the procedures. The
commenter's suggestion is therefore not adopted.
The agency also notes that during its NCAP testing,
which has involved tests of a wide variety of cars (in-
cluding sports cars), trucks and MPV's, NHTSA has
not experienced the "unnatural" seating position
problem cited by the commenter.

Knee pivot bolt head clearance

Two commenters said that the proposal did not
specify the correct distance between the dummy's
knees, as measured by the clearance between the
knee pivot bolt heads. The commenters are correct
that the distance should be IP/* inches rather than
the proposed value of 14V2 inches. The agency has
corrected the number in the final rule.

One commenter believes that a driver of cars
equipped with foot^rests typically will place his or her
left foot on the foot rest during most driving and
therefore this position should be used to simulate nor-
mal usage. The commenter said that using the foot
rest will minimize variations in the positioning of the
left leg, thus improving the repeatability of the test.
In a discussion with the commenter, the agency has
learned that the type of foot rest the commenter is
referring to is a pedal-like structure where the driver
can place his or her foot.

For vehicles without foot rests, the commenter
recommended the agency use the same provisions for
positioning the left leg of the driver as are used for
the right leg of the passenger. It noted that position-
ing the driver's left leg, as with the passenger's right
leg, can be hampered by wheelwell housing that pro-
jects into the passenger compartment and thus similar
procedures for each of those legs should be used.

NHTSA agrees that in vehicles with foot rests, the
test dummy's left food should be positioned on the
foot rest as long as placing the foot there will not
elevate the test dummy's left leg. As discussed below,
the agency is concerned that foot rests, such as pads
on the wheelwell, that elevate the test dummy's leg
can contribute to test variability. The agency also
agrees that the positioning procedures for the
driver's left leg and the passenger's right leg should
be similar in situations where the wheelwell housing
projects into the passenger compartment and has
made the necessary changes to the test procedure.

Wheelwell

One commenter believes that the wheelwell should
be used to rest the dummy's foot. It said that position-
ing the test dummy's foot there is particularly ap-
propriate if the wheelwell has a design feature, such
as a rubber pad, installed by the manufacturer for this
purpose.

NHTSA disagrees that the dummy's foot should be
rested on the wheelwell housing. The agency is con-
cerned that elevating the test dummy's leg could lead
to test variability by, among other things, making the
test dummy unstable during a crash test. Although
the wheelwell problem is similar to the foot rest prob-
lem, placement of the test dummy's foot on a
separate, pedal-like foot rest can be accomplished
while retaining the heel of the test dummy in a stable
position on the floor. That is not the case with pads
located on the wheelwell.

PART 585-PRE 9

Another commenter also said that the proposed
procedure for positioning the test dummy's legs in
vehicles where the wheelwell projected into the
passenger compartment was unclear as to how the
centerlines of the upper and lower legs should be ad-
justed so that both remain in a vertical longitudinal
plane. In particular, it was concerned that in a vehicle
with a large wheelhousing, it may not be possible to
keep the left foot of the driver test dummy in the ver-
tical longitudinal plane after the right foot has been
positioned. It believes that the procedure should
specify which foot position should be given priority; it
recommended that the position of the right leg be re-
quired to remain in the plane, while bringing the left
leg as close to the vertical longitudinal plane as possi-
ble. The agency agrees that maintaining the inboard
leg of the test dummy in the vertical plane is more
easily accomplished since it wall not be blocked by the
wheelwell. The agency has modified the test pro-
cedure to specify that when it is not possible to main-
tain both legs in the vertical longitidinal plane, that
the inboard leg must be kept as close as possible to
the vertical longitudinal plane and the outboard leg
should be placed as close as possible to the vertical
plane.

Lower leg angle

One commenter argued that proposed sections on
lower leg positioning (SlO.1.2.1 (b) and SlO. 1.2.2 (b))
wall not result in a constant positioning of the test
dummy's heels on the floor pan, thus causing dif-
ferences in the lower leg angles. It stated that the
lower leg angles will affect the femur load generated
at the moment the foot hits the toe board during a col-
lision. The commenter therefore proposed that the
test procedure be revised to include placing a 20
pound load on the test dummy's knee during the foot
positioning procedure. The commenter did not,
however, explain the basis for choosing a force of 20
pounds.

NHTSA believes that use of the additional weight
loading and settling procedure proposed by the com-
menter wall add an unnecessary level of complexity to
the test procedure wathout adding any corresponding
benefit. The positioning of the test dummy's heel has
not been a problem in the agency's NCAP tests. Ac-
cordingly, the agency is not adopting the
commenter's recommendation.

Shoulder adjustment

One commenter asked the agency to specify that
the shoulders of the test dummy be placed at their

lowest adjustment pc-ition. While the shoulders are
slightly adjustable, ^the agency believes that specifying
an adjustment, position is unnec sary. The agency's
test experience has shown that the up and down move-
ment of the shoulders is physically limited by the test
dummy's rubber "skin" around the openings where the
arms are connected to the test dummy's upper torso.

Dummy lifting procedure

One commenter was concerned about the dummy
lifting proposed in (Section SlO. 4.1, Dummy Vertical
Upward Displacement). It said that if the dummy lift-
ing method is not standardized, test results could be
affected by allowring variability in the position of the
dummy's H point (the H point essentially represents
the hip joint) through use of different lifting methods.
It recommended use of a different chest lifting
method to avoid variability in the subsequent posi-
tioning of the test dummy H-point.

The agency is not aware of any test data indicating
that the use of different lifting methods is a signifi-
cant source of variability. As long as a manufacturer
follows the procedures set forth in SlO. 4.1 in position-
ing the test dummy, it can use any lifting procedure it
wants.

Dummy settling load

One commenter was concerned about the proposed
requirements for dummy settling (SlO. 4.2, Lower tor-
so force application, and SlO. 4. 5, Upper torso force
application). The commenter believes that the pro-
posals are inadequate because they do not prescribe
the area over which to apply the load used to settle
the test dummy in the seat. The commenter said that
if the proposed 50 pound settling force is applied to an
extremely small contact area, then the dummy may
be deformed. It recommended that the load be applied
to a specified area of 9 square inches on the dummy.
In addition, it recommended that the agency specify
the duration of the 50 lb. force application during the
adjustment of the upper torso; it suggested a period
of load application ranging from 5 to 10 seconds.

NHTSA and others have successfully used the pro-
posed settling test procedures in their own tests
without having any variability problems. Unless ab-
normally small contact areas are employed, or ex-
tremely short durations are used, standard
laboratory practices should not result in any such
problems. The agency believes that further specifying
the area and timing of the force application is not
necessary.

PART 585-PRE 10

Dummy head adjustment

One commenter pointed out that it is impossible to
adjust the head according to SlO.6, Head Adjust-
ment, because the Part 572 test dummy does not have
a head adjustment mechanism. The agency agrees
and has deleted the provision.

Additional dummy settling and shoulder belt posi-
tioning procedures

One commenter suggested a substantial revised
dummy settling procedure and new procedures for
positioning of the shoulder belt. NHTSA believes that
its proposed procedures sufficiently address the set-
tling and belt position issues. In addition, the com-
menter did not provide any data to show that
variability would be further reduced by its suggested
procedures. A substantial amount of testing would be
needed to verify if the commenter's suggested test
procedures do, in fact, provide any further decrease
in variability than that obtained by the agency's test
procedures. For those reasons, the agency is not
adopting the commenter's suggestions for new pro-
cedures.

Diie Care

In the April 1985 notice, the agency proposed
amending the standard to state that the due care pro-
vision of section 108(bX2) of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1397(b)(2)) ap-
plies to compliance with the standard. Thus, a vehicle
would not be deemed in noncompliance if its manufac-
turer establishes that it did not have reason to know
in the exercise of due care that such vehicle is not in
conformity with the standard.

Commenters raised a number of questions about
the proposal, with some saying that the agency
needed to clarify what constitutes "due care," others
recommending that the agency reconsider the use of
"design to conform" language instead of due care and
another opposing the use of any due care provision.

A number of commenters, while supporting the use
of a due care provision, said that the proposal pro-
vides no assurance that a manufacturer's good faith
effort will be considered due care. They said that the
agency should identify the level of testing and
analysis necessary to constitute due care. Another
commenter emphasized that in defining due care, the
agency must ensure that a manufacturer uses
recognized statistical procedures in determining that
its products comply with the requirements of the
standard.

Another group of commenters requested the agen-
cy to reconsider its decision not to use "design to con-
form" language in the standard; they said that the
agency's concerns about the subjectivity of a "design
to conform" language are not greater and could well
be less than that resulting from use of due care
language.

One commenter opposed the use of any due care
language in the standard. It argued that the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act requires the
agency to set objective performance requirements in
its standards. When a manufacturer determines that
it has not met those performance requirements, then
the manufacturer is under an obligation to notify
owners and remedy the noncomplying vehicles. It
argued that the proposed due care provision, in ef-
fect, provides manufacturers with an exemption from
the Vehicle Safety Act recall provisions.

As discussed in the July 1984 final rule and the
April 1985 notice, the agency believes that the test
procedure of Standard No. 208 produces repeatable
results in vehicle crash tests. The agency does,
however, recognize that the Standard No. 208 test is
more complicated than NHTSA's other crash test
standards since a number of different injury
measurements must be made on the two test dum-
mies used in the testing. Because of this complexity,
the agency believes that manufacturers need
assurance from the agency that, if they have made a
good faith effort in designing their vehicles and have
instituted adequate quality control measures, they
will not face the recall of their vehicles because of an
isolated apparent failure to meet one of the injury
criteria. The adoption of a due care provision provides
that assurance. For the reasons discussed in the July
1984 final rules, the agency still believes use of a due
care provision is a better approach to this issue than
use of a design to conform provision.

As the agency has emphasized in its prior inter-
pretation letters, a determination of what constitutes
due care can only be made on a case-by-case basis.
Whether a manufacturer's action will constitute due
care will depend, in part, upon the availability of test
equipment, the limitations of available technology,
and above all, the diligence evidenced by the
manufacturer.

Adoption of a due care defense is in line with the
agency's long-standing and well-known enforcement
policy on test differences. Under this long standing
practice if the agency's testing shows noncompliance
and a manufacturer's tests, valid on their face, show
complying results, the agency will conduct an inquiry
into the reason for the differing results. If the agency

PART 585-PRE 11

concludes that the difference in results can be ex-
plained to the agency's satisfaction, that the agency's
results do not indicate an unreasonable risk to safety,
and that the manufacturer's tests were reasonably
conducted and were in conformity with standard,
then the agency does not use its own tests as a basis
for a finding of noncompliance. Although this inter-
pretation has long been a matter of public record.
Congress, in subsequent amendments of the Vehicle
Safety Act, has not acted to alter that interpretation.
The Supreme Court has said that under those cir-
cumstances, it can be presumed that the agency's in-
terpretation has correctly followed the intent of the
statute. (See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S.
544, 544 n. 10 (1979))

Phase-In

Attribution rules

With respect to cars manufacturered by two or
more companies, and cars manufactured by one com-
pany and imported by another, the April 1985 notice
proposed to clarify who would be considered the
manufacturer for purposes of calculating the average
annual production of passenger cars for each
manufacturer and the amount of passenger cars
manufacturered by each manufacturer that must
comply with the automatic restraint phase-in re-
quirements. In order to provide maximum flexibility
to manufacturers, while assuring that the percentage
phase-in goals are met, the notice proposed to permit
manufacturers to determine, by contract, which of
them will count, as its own, passenger cars manufac-
tured by two or more companies or cars manufac-
tured by one company and imported by another.

The notice also proposed two rules of attribution in
the absence of such a contract. First, a passenger car
which is imported for purposes of resale would be at-
tributed to the importer. The agency intended that
this proposed attribution rule would apply to both
direct importers as well as importers authorized by
the vehicle's original manufacturer. (In this context,
direct importation refers to the importation of cars
which are originally manufactured for sale outside
the U.S. and which are then imported without the
manufacturer's authorization into the U.S. by an im-
porter for purposes of resale. The Vehicle Safety Act
requires that such vehicles be brought into conformi-
ty with Federal motor vehicle safety standards.)
Under the second proposed attribution rule, a
passenger car manufactured in the United States by
more than one manufacturer, one of which also

markets the vehicle, would be attributed to the
manufacturer which markets the vehicle.

Jhese two proposed^ruies would generally attribute
a vehicle to the manufacturer which is most responsi-
ble for the existence of the vehicle in the United
States, i.e., by importing the vehicle or by manufac-
turing the vehicle for its own account as part of a joint
venture, and marketing the vehicle. (Importers
generally market the vehicles they import.) All com-
menters on these proposals supported giving
manufacturers the flexibility to determine contrac-
tually which manufacturer would count the passenger
car as its own. The commenters also supported the
proposed attribution rules. Therefore, the agency is
adopting the provisions as proposed.

Credit for early phase-in

The April 1985 notice proposed that manufacturers
that exceeded the minimum percentage phase-in re-
quirements in the first or second years could count
those extra vehicles toward meeting the re-
quirements in the second or third years. In addition,
manufacturers could also count any automatic
restraint vehicles produced during the one year
preceding the first year of the phase-in. Since all the
commenters addressing these proposals supported
them, the agency is adopting them as proposed. The
agency believes that providing credit for early in-
troduction will encourage introduction of larger
numbers of automatic restraints and provide in-
creased flexibility for manufacturers. In addition, it
will assure an orderly build-up of production capabili-
ty for automatic restraint equipped cars as con-
templated by the July 1984 final rule.

One commenter asked the agency to establish a
new credit for vehicles equipped with non-belt
automatic restraints at the driver's position and a
dynamically -tested manual belt at the passenger posi-
tion. The commenter requested that such a vehicle
receive a 1.0 credit. The commenter also asked the
agency to allow vehicles equipped with driver-only
automatic restraint systems to be manufactured after
September 1, 1989, the effective date for automatic
restraints for the driver and front right passenger
seating positions in all passenger cars. In its August
30, 1985 notice (50 FR 35233) responding to petitions
for reconsideration of the July 1984 final rule on
Standard No. 208, the agency has already adopted a
part of the commenter's suggestion by establishing a
1.0 vehicle credit for vehicles equipped with a non-
belt automatic restraint at the driver's position and a
manual lap/shoulder belt at the passenger's position.
For reasons detailed in the July 1984 final rule, the

PART 585-PRE 12

agency believes that the automatic restraint require-
ment should apply to both front outboard seating
positions beginning on September 1, 1989, and is
therefore not adopting the commenter's second sug-
gestion.

Phase-In Reporting Requirements

The April 1985 notice proposed to establish a new
Part 585, Automatic Restraint Phase-in Reporting
Requirements. The agency proposed requiring
manufacturers to submit three reports to NHTSA,
one for each of the three automatic restraint phase-in
periods. Each report, covering production during a
12-month period beginning September 1 and ending
August 31, would be required to be submitted within
60 days after the end of such period. Information re-
quired by each report would include a statement
regarding the extent to which the manufacturer had
complied with the applicable percentage phase-in re-
quirement of Standard No. 208 for the period covered
by the report; the number of passenger cars manufac-
tured for sale in the United States for each of the
three previous 12-month production periods; the ac-
tual number of passenger cars manufactured during
the reporting production (or during a previous pro-
duction period and counted toward compliance in the
reporting production period) period with automatic
safety belts, air bags and other specified forms of
automatic restraint technology, respectively; and
brief information about any express written contracts
which concern passenger cars produced by more than
one manufacturer and affect the report.

One commenter questioned the need for a reporting
requirement, saying that the requirement was un-
necessary' since manufacturers must self-certify that
their vehicles meet Standard No. 208. The agency
believes that a reporting requirement is needed for
the limited period of the phase-in of automatic
restraints so that the agency can carry out its
statutory duty to monitor compliance with the
Federal motor vehicle safety standards. During the
phase-in, only a certain percentage of vehicles are re-
quired to have automatic restraints. It would be vir-
tually impossible for the agency to determine if the
applicable percentage of passenger cars has been
equipped with automatic restraints unless manufac-
turers provide certain production information to the
agency. NHTSA is therefore adopting the reporting
requirement.

The same commenter said that requiring the report
to be due 60 days after the end of the production year
can be a problem for importers. The commenter said

that production records may accompany the vehicle,
which may not actually reach the United States until
.30 or 45 days after the production year ends. The
commenter asked the agency to provide an appeal
process to seek an extension of the period to file the
report. The agency believes that the example
presented by the commenter represents a worst case
situation and complying with the 60 day requirement
should not be a problem for manufacturers, including
importers. However, to eliminate any problems in
worst case situations, the agency is amending the
regulation to provide that manufacturers seeking an
extension of the deadline to file a report must file a
request for an extension at least 15 days before the
report is due.

Calculation of average annual production

The agency also proposed an alternative to the re-
quirement that the number of cars that must be
equipped with automatic restraints must be based on
a percentage of each manufacturer's average annual
production for the past three model years. The pro-
posed alternative would permit manufactiirers to
equip the required percentage of its actual production
of passenger cars with automatic restraints during
each affected year. Since all commenters addressing
this proposal supported it, the agency is adopting it as
an alternative means of compliance, at the manufac-
turer's option. In the case of a new manufacturer, the
manufacturer would have to calculate the amount of
passenger cars required to have automatic restraints
based on its production of passenger cars during each
of the affected years. Since the agency has decided to
adopt the alternative basis for determining the pro-
duction quota, it has made the necessary conforming
changes in the reporting requirements adopted in this
notice.

One commenter also requested the agency to clarify
whether a manufacturer does have to include its pro-
duction volume of convertibles when it is calculating
the percentage of vehicles that must meet the phase-
in requirement. The automatic restraint requirement
applies to all passenger cars. Thus, a manufacturer's
production figures for passenger car convertibles
must be counted when the manufacturer is
calculating its phase-in requirements.

Retention of VINs

In order to keep administrative burdens to a
minimum, the agency proposed that the required
report need not use the VIN to identify the particular
type of automatic restraint installed in each

PART 585-PRE 13

passenger car produced during the phase-in period.
Since that information could be necessary for pur-
poses of enforcement, however, the agency proposed
to require that manufacturers maintain records until
December 31, 1991, of the VIN and type of automatic
restraint for each passenger car which is produced
during the phase-in period and is reported as having
automatic restraints. Although direct import cars are
not required to have a US-format VIN number, those
cars would still have a European-format VIN number
and thus direct importers would be required to retain
that VIN information. (The agency is considering a
petition from Volkswagen requesting that direct im-
port cars be required to have US-format VINs.)

The reason for retaining the information until 1991
is to ensure that such information would then be
available until the completion of any agency enforce-
ment action begun after the final phase-in report is
filed in 1990. The agency believes this requirement
meets the needs of the agency, with minimal impacts
on manufacturers, and therefore is adopting it as pro-
posed. One commenter asked whether a manufac-
turer is required to keep the VIN information as a
separate file or whether keeping the information as a
part of its general business records is sufficient. As
long as the VIN information is retrievable, it may be
stored in any manner that is convenient for a
manufacturer.

In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR Part
571.208 is amended as follows:

The authority citation for Part 571 would continue
to read as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1403, 1407;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

1. Section S4. 1.3. 1.2 is revised to read as follows:
S4.1.3.1.2 Subject to S4.1.3.4 and S4.1.5, the

amount of passenger cars, specified in S4. 1.3. 1.1
complying with the requirements of 84. 1.2.1 shall be
not less than 10 percent of:

(a) the average annual production of passenger
cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1983,
and before September 1, 1986, by each manufacturer,
or

(b) the manufacturer's annual production of pas-
senger cars during the period specified in S4. 1.3. 1.1.

2. Section 4.1.3.2.2 is revised to read as follows:
S4.1.3.2.2 Subject to S4.1.3.4 and S4.1.5, the

amount of passenger cars specified in S4. 1.3.2.1 com-
plying with the requirements of S4. 1.2.1 shall be not
less than 25 percent of:

(a) the average annual production of passenger
cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1984,

and before September 1, 1987, by each manufacturer,
br

(b) the manufacturer's annual production of pas-
senger cars during the period specified in S4. 1.3.2.1.

3. Section 4.1.3.3.2 is revised to read as follows:
S4.1. 3.3.2 Subject to S4.1.3.4 and S4.1.5, the

amount of passenger cars specified in S4. 1.3.3.1 com-
plying with the requirements of S4. 1.2.1 shall not be
less than 40 percent of:

(a) the average annual production of passenger
cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1985,
and before September 1, 1988, by each manufacturer
or

(b) the manufacturer's annual production of pas-
senger cars during the period specified in S4. 1.3. 3.1.

4. Section S4. 1.3.4 is revised to read as follows:
S4. 1.3.4 Calculation of complying passenger cars.

(a) For the purposes of calculating the numbers of
cars manufactured under S4. 1.3. 1.2, S4. 1.3.2.2, or
S4.1.3.3.2 to comply with S4.1.2.1:

(1) each car whose driver's seating position com-
plies with the requirements of S4. 1.2. 1(a) by means
not including any type of seat belt and whose front
right seating position will comply with the re-
quirements of S4.1.2.1(a) by any means is counted as
1.5 vehicles, and

(2) each car whose driver's seating position com-
plies with the requirements of S4. 1.2. 1(a) by means
not including any type of seat belt and whose right
front seat seating position is equipped with a manual
Type 2 seat belt is counted as one vehicle.

(b) For the purposes of complying with S4. 1.3. 1.2,
a passenger car may be counted if it:

(1) is manufactured on or after September 1, 1985,
but before September 1, 1986, and

(2) complies with S4. 1.2.1.

(c) For the purposes of complying with S4. 1.3.2.2,
a passenger car may be counted if it:

(1) is manufactured on or after September 1, 1985,
but before September 1, 1987,

(2) complies with S4.1.2.1, and

(3) is not counted toward compliance with
84.1.3.1.2

(d) For the purposes of complying with 84.1.3.3.2,
a passenger car may be counted if it:

(1) is manufactured on or after September 1, 1985,
but before September 1, 1988,

(2) complies with 84.1.2.1, and

(3) is not counted toward compliance with
84.1.3.1.2 or 84.1.3.2.2.

PART 585-PRE 14

5. A new section S4.1.3.5 is added to read as follows:
S4. 1.3.5 Passenger cars produced by more than one

manufacturer.

54. 1.3.5.1 For the purposes of calculating average
annual production of passenger cars for each
manufacturer and the amount of passenger cars
manufactured by each manufacturer under
S4. 1.3. 1.2. S4. 1.3. 2.2 or S4. 1.3.3.2, a passenger car
produced by more than one manufacturer shall be at-
tributed to a single manufacturer as follows, subject
to S4. 1.3.5.2:

(a) A passenger car which is imported shall be at-
tributed to the importer.

(b) A passenger car manufactured in the United
States by more than one manufacturer, one of which
also markets the vehicle, shall be attributed to the
manufacturer which markets the vehicle.

54.1.3.5.2 A passenger car produced by more than
one manufacturer shall be attributed to any one of the
vehicle's manufacturers specified by an express writ-
ten contract, reported to the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration under 49 CFR Part 585,
between the manufacturer so specified and the
manufacturer to which the vehicle would otherwise be
attributed under S4. 1.3. 5.1.

6. A new section 84. 6 is added to read as follows:
S4.6 Dynamic testing of manual belt systems.

54.6.1 If the automatic restraint requirement of
S4.1.4 is rescinded pursuant to 84. 1.5, then each
passenger car that is manufactured after September
1, 1989, and is equipped with a Type 2 manual seat
belt assembly at each front outboard designated
seating position pursuant to 84. 1.2.3 shall meet the
frontal crash protection requirements of 85.1 at those
designated seating positions with a test dummy
restrained by a Type 2 seat belt assembly that has
been adjusted in accordance with 87.4.2.

54.6.2 A Type 2 seat belt assembly subject to the re-
quirements of S4. 6.1 of this standard does not have to
meet the requirements of S4.2(a)-(c) and 84.4 of
Standard No. 209 (49 CFR 571.209) of this Part.

7. 87.4.2 is revised to read as follows:

87.4.2 Webbing tension relieving device. Each vehi-
cle with an automatic seat belt assembly or with a
Type 2 manual seat belt assembly that must meet
S4.6 installed in a front outboard designated seating
position that has either manual or automatic devices
permitting the introduction of slack in the webbing of
the shoulder belt (e.g., "comfort clips" or "window-
shade" devices) shall:

(a) comply with the requirements of 85. 1 with the
shoulder belt webbing adjusted to introduce the max-
imum amount of slack recommended by the manufac-
turer pursuant to S7.4.2.(b);

(b) have a section in the vehicle owner's manual that
explains how the tension-relieving device works and
specifies the maxin\um amount of slack (in inches)
recommended by the vehicle manufacturer to be in-
troduced into the shoulder belt under normal use con-
ditions. The explanation shall also warn that in-
troducing slack beyond the amount specified by the
manufacturer can significantly reduce the effec-
tiveness of the shoulder belt in a crash; and

(c) have an automatic means to cancel any shoulder
belt slack introduced into the belt system by a
tension-relieving device each time the safety belt is
unbuckled or the adjacent vehicle door is opened, ex-
cept that open-body vehicles with no doors can have a
manual means to cancel any shoulder belt slack in-
troduced into the belt system by a tension-relieving
device.

8. Section 8.1.1(c) is revised to read as follows:
88.1. 1(c) Fi^i system capacity. With the test vehicle

on a level surface, pump the fuel from the vehicle's
fuel tank and then operate the engine until it stops.
Then, add Stoddard solvent to the test vehicle's fuel
tank in an amount which is equal to not less than 92
and not more than 94 percent of the fuel tank's usable
capacity stated by the vehicle's manufacturer. In ad-
dition, add the amount of Stoddard solvent needed to
fill the entire fuel system from the fuel tank through
the engine's induction system.

9. A new section 8.1.1(d) is added to read as follows:
88. 1.1(d) Vehicle test attitude. Determine the

distance between a level surface and a standard
reference point on the test vehicle's body, directly
above each wheel opening, when the vehicle is in its
"as delivered" condition. The "as delivered" condition
is the vehicle as received at the test site, with 100 per-
cent of all fluid capacities and all tires inflated to the
manufacturer's specifications as listed on the vehicle's
tire placard. Determine the distance between the
same level surface and the same standard reference
points in the vehicle's "fully loaded condition". The
"fully loaded condition" is the test vehicle loaded in ac-
cordance with 88.1.1(a) or (b), as applicable. The load
placed in the cargo area shall be centered over the
longitudinal centerline of the vehicle. The pretest
vehicle attitude shall be equal to either the as
delivered or fully loaded attitude or between the as
delivered attitude and the fully loaded attitude.

10. 87.4.3 is revised by removing the reference to
"S10.6" and replacing it with a reference to "810.7."

11. 87.4.4 is revised by removing the reference to
"810.5" and replacing it with a reference to "810.6."

12. 87.4.5 is revised by removing the reference to
"88.1.11" and replacing it with a reference to "810."

PART 585-PRE 15

13. Section 8.1.3 is revised to read as follows:
S8.1.3 Adjicstable seat back placement. Place ad-
justable seat backs in the manufacturer's nominal
design riding position in the manner specified by the
manufacturer. Place each adjustable head restraint in
its highest adjustment position.

14. Sections 8.1.11 through 8.1.11.2.3 are removed.

15. Sections 8.1.12 and 8.1.13 are redesignated
8.1.11 and 8.1.12, respectively.

16. Section 10 is revised to read as follows:

SlO Test dummy positioning procedures. Position a
test dummy, conforming to Subpart B of Part 572 (49
CFR Part 572), in each front outboard seating posi-
tion of a vehicle as specified in SlO.l through SlO. 9.
Each test dummy is:

(a) not restrained during an impact by any means
that require occupant action if the vehicle is equipped
with automatic restraints.

(b) restrained by manual Type 2 safety belts, ad-
justed in accordance with SlO. 9, if the vehicle is
equipped with manual safety belts in the front out-
board seating positions.

SlO.l Vehicle equipped with front bucket seats.
Place the test dummy's torso against the seat back
and its upper legs against the seat cushion to the ex-
tent permitted by placement of the test dummy's feet
in accordance with the appropriate paragraph of SlO.
Center the test dummy on the seat cushion of the
bucket seat and set its midsagittal plane so that it is
vertical and parallel to the centerline of the vehicle.

SlO. 1.1 Driver position placement.

(a) Initially set the knees of the test dummy 11%
inches apart, measured between the outer surfaces of
the knee pivot bolt heads, with the left outer surface
5.9 inches from the midsagittal plane of the test dum-
my.

(b) Rest the right foot of the test dummy on the
undepressed accelerator pedal with the rearmost
point of the heel on the floor pan in the plane of the
pedal. If the foot cannot be placed on the accelerator
pedal, set it perpendicular to the lower leg and place
it as far forward as possible in the direction of the
geometric center of the pedal with the rearmost point
of the heel resting on the floor pan. Except as
prevented by contact with a vehicle surface, place the
right leg so that the upper and lower leg centerlines
fall, as close as possible, in a vertical longitudinal
plane without inducing torso movement.

(c) Place the left foot on the toeboard with the rear-
most point of the heel resting on the floor pan as close
as possible to the point of intersection of the planes
described by the toeboard and the floor pan. If the
foot cannot be positioned on the toeboard, set it

perpendicular to the lower leg and place it as far for-
ward as possible with the heel resting on the floor
pan. Except as prevented by contact with a vehicle
surface, place the Iteft leg so that the upper and lower
leg centerlines fall, as close as possible, in a vertical
plane. For vehicles with a foot rest that does not
elevate the left foot above the level of the right foot,
place the left foot on the foot rest so that the upper
and lower leg centerlines fall in a vertical plane.

SlO. 1.2 Passenger position placement.

SlO. 1.2.1 Vehicles with a flat floor pan/toeboard.

(a) Initially set the knees IPA inches apart,
measured between the outer surfaces of the knee
pivot bolt heads.

(b) Place the right and left feet on the vehicle's
toeboard with the heels resting on the floor pan as
close as possible to the intersection point with the
toeboard. If the feet cannot be placed flat on the
toeboard, set them perpendicular to the lower leg
centerlines and place them as far forward as possible
with the heels resting on the floor pan.

(c) Place the right and left legs so that the upper
and lower leg centerlines fall in vertical longitudinal
planes.

SlO. 1.2.2 Vehicles with wheelhouse projections in
passenger compartment.

(a) Initially set the knees 11% inches apart,
measured between outer surfaces of the knee pivot
bolt heads.

(b) Place the right and left feet in the well of the
floor pan/toeboard and not on the wheelhouse projec-
tion. If the feet cannot be placed flat on the toeboard,
set them perpendicular to the lower leg centerlines
and as far forward as possible with the heels resting
on the floor pan.

(c) If it is not possible to maintain vertical and
longitudinal planes through the upper and lower leg
centerlines for each leg, then place the left leg so that
its upper and lower centerlines fall, as closely as
possible, in a vertical longitudinal plane and place the
right leg so that its upper and lower leg centerlines
fall, as closely as possible, in a vertical plane.

S10.2 Vehicle equipped with bench seating. Place a
test dummy with its torso against the seat back and
its upper legs against the seat cushion, to the extent
permitted by placement of the test dummy's feet in
accordance with the appropriate paragraph of SlO.l.

SlO. 2.1 Driver position placement. Place the test
dummy at the left front outboard designated seating
position so that its midsagittal plane is vertical and
parallel to the centerline of the vehicle and so that the
midsagittal plane of the test dummy passes through
the center of the steering wheel rim. Place the legs,

PART 585-PRE 16

knees, and feet of the test dummy as specified in
SlO.1.1.

S 10.2.2 Passenger position placement. Place the
test dummy at the right front outboard desig^nated
seating position as specified in SIO.1.2, e.xcept that
the midsagittal plane of the test dummy shall be ver-
tical and longitudinal, and the same distance from the
vehicle's longitudinal centerline as the midsagittal
plane of the test dummy at the driver's position.

510.3 Initial test dummy placement. With the test
dummy at its designated seating position as specified
by the appropriate requirements of SlO.l or SlO.2,
place the upper arms against the seat back and
tangent to the side of the upper torso. Place the lower
arms and palms against the outside of the upper legs.

510.4 Test dummy settling.

510.4.1 Test dummy vertical upward displacement.
Slowly lift the test dummy parallel to the seat back
plane until the test dummy's buttocks no longer con-
tact the seat cushion or until there is test dummy
head contact with the vehicle's headlining.

510.4.2 Lower torso force application. Using a test
dummy positioning fixture, apply a rearward force of
50 pounds through the center of the rigid surface
against the test dummy's lower torso in a horizontal
direction. The line of force application shall be 6V2 in-
ches above the bottom surface of the test dumm/s but-
tocks. The 50 pound force shall be maintained with the
rigid fbcture applying reaction forces to either the floor
pan/toeboard, the 'A' post, or the vehicle's seat frame.

510.4.3 Test dummy vertical downward displace-
ment. While maintaining the contact of the horizontal
rearward force positioning fixture with the test dum-
my's lower torso, remove as much of the 50 pound
force as necessary to allow the test dummy to return
downward to the seat cushion by its own weight.

510.4.4 Test dummy upper torso rocking. Without
totally removing the horizontal rearward force being
applied to the test dummy's lower torso, apply a
horizontal forward force to the test dummy's
shoulders sufficient to flex the upper torso forward
until its back no longer contacts the seat back. Rock
the test dummy from side to side 3 or 4 times so that
the test dummy's spine is at any angle from the ver-
tical in the 14 to 16 degree range at the extremes of
each rocking movement.

Si 0.4. 5 Upper torso force application. With the test
dummy's midsagittal plane vertical, push the upper
torso against the seat back with a force of 50 pounds
applied in a horizontal rearward direction along a line
that is coincident with the test dummy's midsagittal
plane and 18 inches above the bottom surface of the
test dummy's buttocks.

510.5 Placement of test dummy arms and hands.
With the test dummy positioned as specified by SlO.3
and without indifcing torso movement, place the
arms, elbows, and hands of the test dummy, as ap-
propriate for each designated seating position in ac-
cordance with S 10.3.1 or S 10.3.2. Following place-
ment of the arms, elbows and hands, remove the force
applied against the lower half of the torso.

S 10.5.1 Driver's position. Move the upper and the
lower arms of the test dummy at the driver's position
to their fully outstretched position in the lowest possi-
ble orientation. Push each arm rearward, permitting
bending at the elbow, until the palm of each hand con-
tacts the outer part of the rim of the steering wheel at
its horizontal centerline. Place the test dummy's
thumbs over the steering wheel rim and position the
upper and lower arm centerlines as close as possible
in a vertical plane without inducing torso movement.

SlO.5.2 Passenger position. Move the upper and the
lower arms of the test dummy at the passenger posi-
tion to fully outstretched position in the lowest possi-
ble orientation. Push each arm rearward, permitting
bending at the elbow, until the upper arm contacts
the seat back and is tangent to the upper part of the
side of the torso, the palm contacts the outside of the
thigh, and the little finger is barely in contact with the
seat cushion.

510.6 Test dummy positioning for latchplate access.
The reach envelopes specified in S7.4.4 are obtained
by positioning a test dummy in the driver's seat or
passenger's seat in its forwardmost adjustment posi-
tion. Attach the lines for the inboard and outboard
arms to the test dummy as described in Figure 3 of
this standard. Extend each line backward and out-
board to generate the compliance arcs of the outboard
reach envelope of the test dummy's arms.

510.7 Test dummy positioning for belt contact force.
To determine compliance with S7.4.3 of this stand-
ard, position the test dummy in the vehicle in accord-
ance with the appropriate requirements specified in
SlO.l or S10.2 and under the conditions of S8.1.2 and
S8.1.3. Pull the belt webbing three inches from the
test dummy's chest and release until the webbing is
within 1 inch of the test dummy's chest and measure
the belt contact force.

SlO.9 Manual belt adjustment for dynamic testing.
With the test dummy at its designated seating posi-
tion as specified by the appropriate requirements of
S8.1.2, S8.1.3 and SlO.l through SlO.5, place the
Type 2 manual belt around the test dummy and fasten
the latch. Remove all slack from the lap belt. Pull the
upper torso webbing out of the retractor and allow it
to retract; repeat this operation four times. Apply a 2

PART 585-PRE 17

to 4 pound tension load to the lap belt. If the belt
system is equipped with a tension-relieving device in-
troduce the maximum amount of slack into the upper
torso belt that is recommended by the manufacturer
for normal use in the owner's manual for the vehicle. If
the belt system is not equipped with a tension relieving
device, allow the excess webbing in the shoulder belt to
be retracted by the retractive force of the retractor.

17. Sll is removed.

18. S4. 1.3.1.1, S4.1.3.2.1, S4. 1.3.3.1, S4.1.4 and
S4.6.1 are revised by adding a new second sentence to
S4. 1.3. 1.1, S4. 1.3.2.1, S4. 1.3.3.1 and S4.1.4 and a
new second sentence to S4.6.1 to read as follows:

A vehicle shall not be deemed to be in non-
compliance with this standard if its manufacturer
establishes that it did not have reason to know in the
exercise of due care that such vehicle is not in con-
formity with the requirement of this standard.

19. S8.1.5 is amended to read as follows:
Movable vehicle windows and vents are, at the

manufacturer's option, placed in the fully closed posi-
tion.

20. S7.4 is amended to read as follows:
S7.4. Seat belt comfort and convenience.

(a) Automatic seat belts. Automatic seat belts in-
stalled in any vehicle, other than walk-in van-type
vehicles, which has a gross vehicle weight rating of
10,000 pounds or less, and which is manufactured on
or after September 1, 1986, shall meet the re-
quirements of S7.4.1, S7.4.2, and S7.4.3.

(b) Manual seat belts.

(1) Vehicles manufactured after September 1,
1986. Manual seat belts installed in any vehicle, other
than manual Type 2 belt systems installed in the front
outboard seating positions in passenger cars or
manual belts in walk-in van-type vehicles, which have
a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less,
shall meet the requirements of S7.4.3, S7.4.4, S7.4.5,
and S7.4.6.

(2) Vehicles manufactured after September 1, 1989.

(i) If the automatic restraint requirement of S4.1.4
is rescinded pursuant to S4.1.5, then manual seat
belts installed in a passenger car shall meet the re-
quirements of S7.1. 1.3(a), S7.4.2, S7.4.3, S7.4.4,
S7.4.5, and S7.4.6.

(ii) Manual seat belts installed in a bus, multipur-
pose passenger vehicle and truck with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less, except for
walk-in van-type vehicles, shall meet the re-
quirements of S7.4.3, S7.4.4, S7.4.5, and S7.4.6.

571.209 Standard No. 209, Seat belt assemblies.

1. A new S4.6 is added, to read as follows:

S4.6 Manual belts subject to crash 'protection re-
quirements of Standard No. 208.

(a) A seat belt assembly subject to the requirements
of S4.6.1 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR Part 571.208)
does not have to m^eet the requirements of S4.2 (a)-(c)
and S4.4 of this standard.

(b) A seat belt assembly that does not comply with
the requirements of S4.4 of this standard shall be per-
manently and legibly marked or labeled with the
following language:

This seat belt assembly may only be installed at a
front outboard designated seating position of a vehi-
cle with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000
pounds or less.

571.210 Standard No. 210, Seat Belt Assembly An-
chorages.

1. The second sentence of S4.3 is revised to read as
follows:

Anchorages for automatic and for' dynamically
tested seat belt assemblies that meet the frontal crash
protection requirement of S5.1 of Standard No. 208
(49 CFR Part 571.208) are exempt from the location
requirements of this section.

PART 585 -AUTOMATIC RESTRAINT PHASE-
IN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

1. Chapter V, Title 49, Transportation, the Code of
Federal Regulations, is amended to add the following
new Part:

PART 585 -AUTOMATIC RESTRAINT PHASE-
IN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Sees.

585.1 Scope.

585.2 Purpose.

585.3 Applicability.

585.4 Definitions.

585.5 Reporting requirements.

585.6 Records.

585.7 Petition to extend period to file report.

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407; delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

585.1 Scope.

This section establishes requirements for passenger
car manufacturers to submit a report, and maintain
records related to the report, concerning the number
of passenger cars equipped with automatic restraints
in compliance with the requirements of S4.1.3 of
Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection (49
CFR Part 571.208).

585.2 Purpose.

The purpose of the reporting requirements is to aid
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
in determining whether a passenger car manufac-

PART 585-PRE 18

turer has complied with the requirements of Standard
No. 208 of this Chapter (49 CFR 571.208) for the in-
stallation of automatic restraints in a percentage of
each manufacturer's annual passenger car produc-
tion.

585.3 Applicability.

This part applies to manufacturers of passenger
cars.

585.4 Definitions.

All terms defined in section 102 of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C.
1391) are used in their statutory meaning.

"Passenger car" is used as defined in 49 CFR Part
571.3.

"Production year" means the 12-month period be-
tween September 1 of one year and August 31 of the
following year, inclusive.

585.5 Reporting requirements.

(a) General reporting requirements.

Within 60 days after the end of each of the produc-
tion years ending August 31, 1987, August 31, 1988,
and August 31, 1989, each manufacturer shall submit
a report to the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration concerning its compliance with the re-
quirements of Standard No. 208 for installation of
automatic restraints in its passenger cars produced in
that year. Each report shall -

(1) Identify the manufacturer;

(2) State the full name, title and address of the of-
ficial responsible for preparing the report;

(3) Identify the production year being reported on;

(4) Contain a statement regarding the extent to
which the manufacturer has complied with the re-
quirements of S4.1.3 of Standard No. 208;

(5) Provide the information specified in 585.5(b);

(6) Be written in the English language; and

(7) Be submitted to: Administrator, National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh
Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

(b) Report content.

(1) Basis for phase-in production goals.

Each manufacturer shall provide the number of
passenger cars manufactured for sale in the United
States for each of the three previous production
years, or, at the manufacturer's option, for the cur-
rent production year. A new manufacturer that is, for
the first time, manufacturing passenger cars for sale
in the United States must report the number of
passenger cars manufactured during the current pro-
duction year.

(2) Production.

Each manufacturer «hall report for the production
year being reported on, and each preceding produc-
tion year, to the extent that cars produced during the
preceding years are treated under Standard No. 208
as having been produced during the production year
being reported on, the following information:

(i) the number of passenger cars equipped with
automatic seat belts and the seating positions at
which they are installed,

(ii) the number of passenger cars equipped with air
bags and the seating positions at which they are in-
stalled, and

(iii) the number of passenger cars equipped with
other forms of automatic restraint technology, which
shall be described, and the seating positions at which
they are installed.

(3) Passenger cars produced by more than one
manufacturer.

Each manufacturer whose reporting of information
is affected by one or more of the express written con-
tracts permitted bv section S4. 1.3.5.2 of Standard
No. 208 shall:

(i) Report the existence of each contract, including
the names of all parties to the contract, and explain
how the contract affects the report being submitted,

(ii) Report the actual number of passenger cars
covered by each contract.

585.6 Records.

Each manufacturer shall maintain records of the
Vehicle Identification Number and type of automatic
restraint for each passenger car for which informa-
tion is reported under 585.5(b)(2), until December 31,
1991.

585.7 Petition to extend period to file report.

A petition for extension of the time to submit a
report must be received not later than 15 days before
expiration of the time stated in 585.5(a). The petition
must be submitted to: Administrator, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh
Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590. The filing of a
petition does not automatically extend the time for fil-
ing a report. A petition will be granted only if the
petitioner shows good cause for the extension and if
the extension is consistent with the public interest.

Issued on March 18, 1986

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

51 F.R. 9801
March 21, 1986

PART 585-PRE 19-20

PART 585— AUTOMATIC RESTRAINT PHASE-IN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

(Docket No. 74-14; Notice 43)

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407; delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

565.1 Scope.

This section establishes requirements for
passenger car manufacturers to submit a report,
and maintain records related to the report, concer-
ning the number of passenger cars equipped with
automatic restraints in compliance with the re-
quirements of S4.1.3 of Standard No. 208, Occu-
pant Crash Protection (49 CFR Part 571.208).

585.2 Purpose.

The purpose of the reporting requirements is to
aid the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration in determining whether a passenger
car manufacturer has complied with the re-
quirements of Standard No. 208 of this Chapter (49
CFR 571.208) for the installation of automatic
restraints in a percentage of each manufacturer's
annual passenger car production.

585.3 Applicability.

This part applies to manufacturers of passenger
cars.

585.4 Definitions.

((a) All terms defined in section 102 of the Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15
U.S.C. 1391) are used in their statutory meaning.

(b) "Passenger car" means a motor vehicle with
motive power, except a multipurpose passenger
vehicle, motorcycle, or trailer, designed for carry-
ing 10 persons or less.

(c) "Production year" means the 12-month
period between September 1 of one year and
August 31 of the following year, inclusive. (51 F.R.
37028— October 17, 1986. Effective: November 17,
1986)]

585.5 Reporting requirements.

(a) General reporting requirements.

Within 60 days after the end of each of the pro-
duction years ending August 31, 1987, August 31,
1988, and August 31, 1989, each manufacturer
shall submit a report to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration concerning its com-
pliance with the requirements of Standard No. 208
for installation of automatic restraints in its
passenger cars produced in that year. Each report
shall-

(1) Identify the manufacturer;

(2) State the full name, title and address of the
official responsible for preparing the report;

(3) Identify the production year being
reported on;

(4) Contain a statement regarding the extent
to which the manufacturer has complied with the
requirements of S4.1.3. of Standard No. 208;

(5) Provide the information specified in
585.5(b);

(6) Be written in the English language; and

(7) Be submitted to: Administrator, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

(b) Report content.

(1) Basis for phase-in production goals. Each
manufacturer shall provide the number of
passenger cars manufactured for sale in the United
States for each of the three previous production
years, or, at the manufacturer's option, for the cur-
rent production year. A new manufacturer that is,
for the first time, manufacturing passenger cars
for sale in the United States must report the
number of passenger cars manufactured during

(Rev. 10/17/86)

PART 585-1

the current production year. [For the purpose of
the reporting requirements of this Part, a
manufacturer may exclude its production of con-
vertibles, which do not comply with requirements
of S4.1.2.1 of Part 571.208 of this Chapter, from
the report of its production volume of passenger
cars manufactured for sale in the United States.
(51 F.R. 37028— October 17, 1986. Effective:
November 17, 1986)]

(2) Production. Each manufacturer shall
report for the production year being
reported on, and each preceding production year,
to the extent that cars produced during the
preceding years are treated under Standard No.
208 as having been produced during the production
year being reported on, the following information:

(i) the number of passenger cars equipped
with automatic seat belts and the seating
positions which they are installed,

(ii) the number of passenger cars equipped
with air bags and the seating positions at
which they are installed, and

(iii) the number of passenger cars equip-
ped with other forms of automatic restraint
technology, which shall be described, and the
seating positions at which they are installed.

(3) Passenger cars produced by more than one
manufacturer. Each manufacturer whose repor-
ting of information is affected by one or more of
the express written contracts permitted by section
S4. 1.3.5.2 or Standard No. 208 shall:

(i) Report the existence of each contract,
including the names of all parties to the con-
tract, and explain how the contract affects
the report being submitted,

(ii) Report the actual number of passenger
cars covered by each contract.

585.6 Records.

Each manufacturer shall maintain records of the
Vehicle Identification Number and type of
automatic restraint for each passenger car for
which information is reported under 585.5(bX2),
until December 31, 1991.

585.7 Petition to extend period to file report.

A petition for extension of the time to submit a
report must be received not later than 15 days
before expiration of the time stated in 585.5(a).
The petition must be submitted to Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 20590.
The filing of a petition does not automatically ex-
tend the time for filing a report. A petition wall be
granted only if the petitioner shows good cause for
the extension and if the extension is consistent
with the public interest.

Issued on March 18, 1986.

Diane K. Steed
Administrator

F.R. 51 9801
March 21, 1986

(Rev. 10/17/86)

PART 585-2

Effective: July 5. 1975

PREAMBLE TO PART 590— MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSIONS INSPECTION CRITERIA

(Docket No. 72-24; Notice 2)

This notice issues a regulation to establish
emissions inspection criteria for a diafrnostic in-
spection demonstration projects funded pursuant
to the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost
Savings Act (15 U.S.C. 1901, ct seg.). The
regulation is based upon a notice of proposed
rulemaking published Jime 11, 1974 (39 F.R.
20501 ) and upon comments submitted in response
to the notice, and is issued in consultation with
the Administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency.

Under Title 15 U.S.C, Section 1962(a), a
State may obtain a grant from the Federal gov-
ernment for the purpose of establishing and
operating a diagnostic inspection demonstration
project. The purpose of the grant program is
to explore the feasibility of using diagnostic test
devices to conduct diagnostic safety and emission
inspection of motor vehicles. The demonstration
projects are also designed to help the Federal
and State governments determine the best means
of structuring safety and emissions inspection
programs. Pursuant to the requirements of
section 1962(b), this rule establishes emissions
inspection criteria to be met by projects funded
under this program. The criteria established
govern the manner of operation of five Feder-
ally-funded State diagnostic inspection demon-
stration projects to be conducted in Alabama,
Arizona, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
and Tennessee, and do not, in themselves, impose
requirements on any other State or upon any
individual.

The subject most commonly discussed in the
comments was whether a loaded test mode or a
high speed no load test mode would be more
effective than the basic idle-only mode inspection
procedure in detecting vehicles with very higli
emission levels and in diagnosing problems.
Because this program calls for demonstration
projects and is in the nature of a feasibility

study, the \HTSA considers that the most ap-
propriate course is to compare the alternative
procedures and, in this way, generate data which
may ultimately resolve the question. Accord-
ingly, the States will bo allowed to choose be-
tween loaded-mode and no-load inspection pro-
cedures. For similar reasons no-load inspection
procedures will include botli low and high speed
measurements until such time as the data col-
lected indicates that unloaded high-speed meas-
urements are unwarranted.

Since one of the major purposes of the pro-
gram is to determine whether this type of in-
spection is both feasible and cost beneficial, the
criteria do not specify that the emission levels
be the lowest attainable, but represent a fair bal-
ance between low rejection rates which would
result in limited program effectiveness and high
rejection rates which would result in adverse
public reaction. In the event that the actual
rejection rate varies significantly from our esti-
mate of approximately 30 percent, the emissions
criteria will be modified to bring the rate to the
desired level. Because the emission criteria are
less stringent than those permitted under the
Federal Emission Certification Test criteria, it
is not anticipated that conflicting requirements
on engine design will result from their applica-
tion in this program.

Two comments were addressed to the point
that the mechanical dynamometer suggested for
use in the loaded mode inspection may not simu-
late normal road loading as well as an electric
dynamometer. The purpose of the dynamometer
is to provide an adequate load to tlie engine to
allow detection of carburetor main and power
circuit malfunctions and ignition misfiring un-
der load. Because this function does not require
trae road load duplication NHTSA does not
consider that the more expensive electric dyna-
mometer should be required.

PART 590— PRE 1

Effective: July 5, 1975

General Motors Corporation sup;gested that
oxides of nitro<;en (XOx) measurement be in-
cluded in the emission inspection criteria. The
Environmental Protection A<j:ency recommended
waiting; until such time as NO, controlled ve-
hicles account for a more significant part of the
vehicle population in order to make such a pro-
gram meaningful. NO, measuring instruments
suitable for this type of inspection have not
been developed to a point where low cost, re-
liable instruments are readily available. Fur-
thermore, tuning a cai' without NOx controls
tends to increase the NO, emissions slightly
while reducing the hydrocarbon and carbon
monoxide emissions. Therefore, NHTSA agrees
with the EPA that until newer vehicles with
NOx control devices begin to account for a more
substantial part of the overall vehicle popula-
tion, the level of reduction of emissions of oxides
of nitrogen that might be obtained is not large
enough to warrant the inclusion of NOx inspec-
tion at this time.

Wliile the criteria developed in this rulemak-
ing would be appropriate for emissions inspec-
tion of light duty trucks and other light duty
vehicles, NHTSA has decided not to include
these vehicles in tlie data pool for the demon-
stration projects. The rule requires that the
idle speed of the vehicle at the time of inspection
must not be more than 100 rpm greater than
tliat recommended by the manufacturer. The
purpose of this requirement is to ensure that

high idle speeds are not masking excessive idle
carbon monoxide levels. At the suggestion of
the American Motors Corporation the units of
measure for proposed emission levels are more
specifically identified than in the notice of pro-
posed rulemaking. The unit of measurement of
carbon monoxide concentration is Mole percent,
while that for hydrocarbon concentration is ppm
as hexane.

Therefore, a new Part 590, Motor Vehicle
Emission Inspections, is added in Chapter V,
Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. . . .

Effective date: This part becomes eflFective
July 5, 1975. The notice of proposed rulemak-
ing had proposed an effective date 30 days after
issuance of the final rule. Because the five States
that have received grants have all developed
their emission inspection in accordance with the
proposed criteria, they will not be adversely af-
fected by an immediate effective dat«. Good
cause is accordingly found for an immediate
effective date.

(Section 302(b)(1), Pub. L. 92-513, 86 Stat
947, 15 U.S.C. 1901; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.51.)

Issued on June 5, 1975.

James B. Gregory
Administrator

40 F.R. 24904
June 11, 1975

PART 590— PRE 2

PART 590-EMISSION INSPECTIONS

Sec.

590.1

Scope.

590.2

Purpose.

590.3

Applicability.

590.4

Definitions.

590.5

Requirements.

590.6

No-load inspection.

590.7

Loaded-mode inspection

590.8

Inspection conditions.

§ 590.1 Scope.

This part specifies standards and procedures
for motor vehicle emission inspections by State
or State-supervised diagnostic inspection demon-
stration projects funded under Title III of the
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings
Act (15 U.S.C. 1901, et seq.).

§ 590. Purpose.

The purpose of this part is to support the
development of effective regulation of automo-
bile exhaust emissions and thereby improve air
quality, by establishing appropriate uniform
procedures for diagnostic emission inspection
demonstration projects.

§ 590.3 Applicability.

This part does not impose requirements on
any person. It is intended to be utilized by
State diagnostic inspection demonstration pro-
jects operating under Title III of the Cost Sav-
ings Act for diagnostic emission inspections of
passenger cars powered by spark-ignition en-
gines.

§ 590.4 Definitions.

All terms used in this part that are defined in
49 CFR Part 571, Motor Vehicle Safety Stand-
ards, are used as defined in that Part.

§ 590.5 Requirements.

A diagnostic inspection demonstration project
shall test vehicles in accordance with either the
no-load inspection criteria specified in section
590.6, or the loaded-mode inspection criteria
specified in section 590.7.

§ 590.6 No-load inspection.

(a) Criteria. The vehicle must meet the fol-
lowing criteria when tested by the no-load in-
spection method.

(1) The vehicle's idle speed, measured with
the transmission in the position recommended
by the manufacturer for adjusting the idle
speed, shall not be more than 100 rpm higher
than the idle speed recommended by the manu-
facturer.

(2) Concentrations of emission samples
taken from each exhaust outlet shall not ex-
ceed the following levels:

(i) For model years 1967 and earlier:
hydrocarbons (HC) 1200 ppm as hexane,
and carbon monoxide (CO) 9.0 mole per-
cent.

(ii) For model years 1968 through 1973:
HC 600 ppm as hexans, and CO 7.0 mole
percent.

(b) Method. No-load inspection is conducted
by measuring two emission samples from each
exhaust outlet. The first emission sample is col-
lected with the vehicle's transmission in neutral
and the engine operating at 2250 rpm. The
second sample is collected with the vehicle's
transmission in the position recommended by
the manufacturer for adjusting the idle speed,
and the engine idling.

§ 590.7 Loaded-mode inspection.

(a) Criteria. When the loaded-mode inspec-
tion is conducted, concentrations of the emission

PART 590-1

samples taken from each exhaust outlet for each
of the three phases of the driving cycle in Table
I, conducted in the sequence indicated, shall not
exceed the levels given in Table II. For the

purpose of determining the weight classification
of a motor vehicle for the loaded-mode inspec-
tion, 300 pounds are added to the vehicle's un-
laden curb weight.

Table I

Curb weight plus 300
lbs

Driving cycle (speed-load combination)

1st phase high cruise 2d phase low cruiser 3d phase idle

3,801 lbs and up 48 to 50 mi/h at 27 to 30 hp 32 to 35 mi/h at 10 to 12 hp At idle.

2,801 to 3,800 lbs 44 to 46 mi/h at 21 to 24 hp 29 to 32 mi/h at 8 to 10 hp Do.

2,000 to 2,800 lbs 36 to 38 mi/h at 1 3 to 1 5 hp 22 to 25 mi/h at 4 to 6 hp Do.

High cruise

Table II
Low cruise

Idle

1967 and earlier model years

HC 900 ppm

as hexane
CO 4.5 mole

percent

1968 through 1973

HC 450 ppm

as hexane
CO 3.75 mole

percent

HC 900 ppm
as hexane

CO 5.5 mole
percent

HC 450 ppm
as hexane

CO 4.25 mole
percent

HC 1,200 ppm
as hexane

CO 9.0 mole
percent

HC 600 ppm
as hexane

CO 7.0 mole
percent

(b) Method. Loaded-mode inspection for the
first two phases of the driving cycle described
in Table I is conducted by measuring the levels
of emission concentrations from each exhaust
outlet of a motor vehicle operated on a chassis
dynamometer, with the vehicle's transmission in
the setting recommended by the vehicle manu-
facturer for the speed-load combination being
tested. For the idle phase, vehicles with auto-
matic transmissions are tested in drive, and ve-
hicles with standard transmissions are tested in
neutral.

§ 590.8 Inspection conditions.

(a) The vehicle engine is at its normal oper-
ating temperature, as specified by the vehicle
manufacturer.

(b) An engine speed indicator with a grad-
uated scale from zero to at least 2500 rpm is
used for the unloaded inspection procedure.

(c) The equipment used for analyzing the
emission concentration levels—

(1) Has a warm-up period not to exceed 30
minutes;

(2) Is able to withstand sustained periods
of continuous use;

(3) Has a direct and continuous meter
readout that allows readings for concentration
levels of carbon monoxide (CO) from 0-10
mole percent, and of hydrocarbon (HC from
0-2000 ppm as hexane; and if used for the
loaded-mode inspection, has at least one addi-
tional expanded direct and continuous readout
for concentration levels of carbon monoxide
and of hydrocarbon, such as from 0-5 mole
percent and from 0-1000 ppm as hexane re-
spectively;

(4) Has an accuracy of better than +5%
of the full scale reading for each concentration
range;

(5) Permits a reading for each emission
concentration level, within 10 seconds after

PART 590-2

the emission sample has been taken, that is not tricai calibration system which itself is based

less than 90% of the final reading; and on a standard gas.

(6) Has a calibration system using a stand- 40 F.R. 24904

ard gas, or an equivalent mechanical or elec- June 11, 1975

PART 590-3-4

M««tlv«: Dtcttnbar 14, 196S

PREAMBLE TO DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATION RELATING TO IMPOR-
TATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND ITEMS OF MOTOR VEHICLE EQUIPMENT

On April 10. 1968, Public Law 90-283 was
enacted to amend the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. 1391-
1409) by adding a new section 123. This section
provides a procedure whereby the Secretary of
Transportation is authorized, upon petition by a
manufacturer of 500 or less vehicles annually, to
temporarily exempt such vehicles from certain
Federal motor vehicle safety standards. The
procedures for temporary exemption of such ve-
hicles adopted by the Department, as published
in the Federal Register on September 26, 1968
(33 F.R. 14457), require each exempted vehicle
to bear a label or tag permanently affixed con-
taining certain information including a statement
listing the safety standards for which an exemp-
tion has been obtained. Since vehicles so
exempted will no longer bear the "valid certifi-
cation as required by section 114 of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
(15 U.S.C. 1403)" which is required by 19 CFR
12.80(b)(1) if a motor vehicle offered for im-
portation is not to be refused ent'-y, it is deemed
desirable to amend 19 CFR 12.80(b) to allow
entry of exempted vehicles bearing the exemp-
tion labels or tags required under the regulations
of the Department of Transportation (23 CFR
217.13).

In addition, the Automobile Manufacturer's
Association, Inc.. on behalf of itself and its
member companies, has made a showing of the
necessity of importing and using for purposes of
test or experiment for a limited time on the
public roads, of a limited number of nonconform-
ing motor vehicles manufactured outside the
United States. The Association has requested
an amendment of 19 CFR 12.80(b) (2) (vii)
which currently, among other things, allows the
importation of such vehicles for such purposes
only upon a declaration by . the importer that
these vehicles will not be licensed for use on the
public roads.

In consideration of the foregoing, § 12.80(b)
is amended as follows :

Subparagraph (b)(1) is amended by changing
the period following the words "so labelled or
tagged", to a comma and (b) (2) (vii) is amended
to read as follows:

§ 12.80 Federal Motor vehicle safety standards.

* • • • *

, (b) • • •

(1) * • • or (iii) (for vehicles only which
have been exempted by the Secretary of Trans-
portation from meeting certain safety stand-
ards) it bears a label or tag permanently
affixed to such vehicle which meets the require-
ments set forth in the regulations of the De-
partment of Transportation, 23 CFR 217.13.

(2) • * *

(vii) The importer or consignee is im-
porting such vehicle or equipment item
solely for the purposes of show, test, experi-
fnent, competition, repairs or alterations and
that such vehicle or equipment item will not
be sold or licensed for use on the public
roads: Provided, That vehicles imported
solely for purposes of test or experiment
may be licensed for use on the public roads
for a period not to exceed one year, where
such use is an integral part of tests or ex-
periments for which such vehicle is being
imported, upon condition that the importer
attach to the declaration description of the
tests or experiments for which the vehicle
is being imported, the period of time during
which it is estimated that it will be necessary
to test the vehicle on the public roads, and
the disposition to be made of the vehicle
after completion of the tests or experiments.

* * • * •

(Sec. 108, 80 Stat. 722, 15 U.S.C. 1397)
Since the first amendment is necessitated to
conform to regulations of the Department of

M.V. IMPORT— PRE 1

Eff«ctlv«: Dactmbcr 14, 196t

Transportation presently in eflFect and the second Approved : November 29, 1968.

will affect a very limited number of persons Joseph M. Bowman,

with a legitimate interest in road testing non- Assistant Secretary

conforming vehicles, notice and public procedure of the Treasury.

thereon is not considered necessary and good Approved: December 9, 1968.

cause is found for dispensing with the delayed Lowell K. Bridwell,

effective date provision of 5 U.S.C . 553(d). Federal Highway Administrator.

Therefore, the amendments shall be effective 33 p jj 19577

upon publication in the Kederal Register. December 14 1968

[SEAL]

Lester D. Johnson

Commissioner of Customs

M.V. IMPORT— PRE 2

Eff«r(Iv«: Jun« 10, 19- I

PREAMBLE TO AMENDMENT TO DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATION RELATING
TO IMPORTATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND ITEMS OF MOTOR VEHICLE EQUIPMENT

(T.D. 71-122)

A notice was published in the Federal Register
on February 18, 1971 (36 F.R. 3121), that it
was proposed to amend § 12.80 of the Customs
Regulations (19 CFR 12.80) to make the follow-
ing substantive changes:

1. To provide that motor "ehicles and motor
vehicle equipment brought into conformity un-
der bond, shall not be sold or offered for sale
until the bond is released ;

2. To make clear that the term motor vehicle
as used in § 12.80 refers to a motor vehicle as
defined in the National Traffic and Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Act of 1966 ;

3. To require a declaration of conformance
accompanied by a statement of the vehicle's
original manufacturer as evidence of original
compliance ;

4. To require that declarations filed under
paragraph (c) of § 12.80 be signed by the im-
porter or consignee; and

5. To add a bond requirement for the produc-
tion of a declaration of original compliance and
a dexlaration of conformity after manufacture.

Interested persons were given an opportunity
to submit relevant data, views, or arguments.
No comments were received. The amendments
as proposed, with minor editorial changes, are
hereby adopted as set forth below to become
effective 30 days after the date of publication in
the Federal Register .

Robert V. Mclntyre,

Acting Commissioner of Customs.

A.PPROVED: April 22, 1971.

Eugene T. Rossides,

Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

APPROVED: May 3, 1971.

Douglas W. Toms,

Acting Administrator, National

Highway Traffic Safety Administra-

tion.

36 F.R. 8667
May 11, 1977

M.V. IMPORT— PRE 3^

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY REGULATION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF MO-
TOR VEHICLES AND ITEMS OF MOTOR VEHICLE EQUIPMENT

Notice of a proposal to add § 12.80 to Part 12 of
the Customs Regulations to prescribe regulations
providing for the admission or refusal of motor
vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment which
are offered for importation into the United States
and which are subject to Federal motor vehicle
safety standards promulgated by the Department
of Transportation in 49 CFR Part 571, pursuant to
the provisions of the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, was published in the
Federal Register for November 30, 1967 (32 F.R.
16432). Interested persons were given an oppor-
tunity to submit relevant data, views, or
arguments in writing regarding the proposed
regulations. All comments received have been
carefully considered.

In response to those comments, in addition to
several minor changes, the first paragraph of
5 12.80(b) has been amended to provide for the en-
try, without written declaration, of motor vehicles
and items of motor vehicle equipment intended for
export and so labeled. A new provision is also add-
ed (S 12.80(b) (2) (iv)) to provide for the entry, upon
written declaration, of new vehicles intended for
resale which do not fully conform to the safety
standards because of the absence of readily at-
tachable equipment items:

Provided, That the importer or consignee under-
takes to attach the missing items before such
vehicles are offered to the general public for sale.
Finally, the importation of nonconforming vehicles
for competition purposes will be permitted under
S 12.80(b) (2) (vii) if the vehicle will not be licensed
for use on the public roads.

Part 12 is accordingly amended to add a new
centerhead and section as follows:

Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment
Manufactured on or after January 1, 1968

§ 12.80 Federal motor vehicle safety standards.

(1) Standards prescribed by the Department
of Transportation. Motor vehicles and motor
vehicle equipment manufactured on or after
January 1, 1968, offered for sale, or introduction
or delivery for introduction in interstate com-
merce, or importation into the United States
are subject to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards (hereafter referred to in this section
as "safety standards") prescribed by the Secre-
tary of Transportation under sections 103 and
119 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966. (15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407) as
set forth in regulations in 49 CFR Part 571.
A motor vehicle hereafter referred to in this
section as "vehicle" or item of motor vehicle
equipment (hereafter referred to in this section
as "equipment item"), manufactured on or after
January 1, 1968, is not permitted entry into the
United States unless (with certain exceptions
set forth in paragraph (b) of this section) it is
in conformity with applicable safety standards
in effect at the time the vehicle or equipment item
was manufactured,
(b) Requirements for entry and release.

(1) Any vehicle or equipment item offered
for importation into the customs territory of
the United States shall not be refused entry
under this seciton if (i) it bears a certification
label affixed by its original manufacturer in
accordance with section 114 of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
(15 U.S.C. 1403) and regulations issued there-
under by the Secretary of Transportation (49
CFR Part 567) (in the case of a vehicle, in the
form of a label or tag permanently affixed to
such vehicle or in the case of an equipment
item, in the form of a label or tag on such
item or on the outside of a container in which
such item is delivered), or (ii) it is intended
solely for export, such vehicle or equipment

M.V. IMPORT-1

item and the outside of its container, if any,
to be so labeled and tagged, or (iii) (for ve-
hicles only which have been exempted by the
Secretary of Transportation from meeting cer-
tain safety standards) it bears a label or tag
permanently affixed to such vehicle which
meets the requirements set forth in the regu-
lations of the Department of Transportation,
49 CFR 555.13.

(2) Any such vehicle or equipment item
not bearing such certification or export label
shall be refused entry unless there is filed with
the entry, in duplicate, a declaration signed
by the importer or consignee which states
that:

(i) Such vehicle or equipment item was
manufactured on a date when there were no
applicable safety standards in force, a verbal
declaration being acceptable at the option of
the district director of customs for vehicles
entering at the Canadian and Mexican bor-
ders; or

(ii) Such vehicle or equipment item was
not manufactured in conformity with ap-
plicable safety standards but has since been
brought into conformity, such declaration to
be accompanied by the statement of the
manufacturer, contractor, or other person
who has brought such vehicle or equipment
item into conformity which describes the
nature and extent of the work performed; or

(iii) Such vehicle or equipment item does
not conform with applicable safety stand-
ards, but that the importer or consignee will
bring such vehicle or equipment item into
conformity with such safety standards, and
that such vehicle or equipment item will not
be sold or offered for sale until the bond (re-
quired by paragraph (c) of this section)
shall have been released; or

(iv) Such vehicle is a new vehicle being
imported for purposes of resale which does
not presently conform to all applicable safety
standards because readily attachable equip-
ment items are not attached, but that there
is affixed to its windshield a label stating the
safety standard with which and the manner
in which such vehicle does not conform and

that the vehicle will be brought into con-
formity by attachment of such equipment
items before it will be offered for sale to the
first purchaser for purposes other than re-
sale; or

(v) The importer or consignee is a non-
resident of the United States, importing
such vehicle or equipment item primarily
for personal use or for the purpose of making
repairs or alterations to the vehicle or equip-
ment item, for a period not exceeding 1 year
from the date of entry, and that he will not
resell it in the United States during that
time: PROVIDED, That persons regularly
entering the United States by a motor vehicle
at the Canadian and Mexican borders may
apply to the district director of customs for
an appropriate means of identification to be
affixed to such vehicle which will serve in
place of the declaration required by this
paragraph; or

(vi) The importer or consignee is a mem-
ber of the armed forces of a foreign country
on assignment in the United States, or is a
member of the Secretariat of a public inter-
national organization so designated pursuant
to 59 Stat. 669 on assignment in the United
States, or is a member of the personnel of a
foreign government on assignment in the
United States who comes within the class of
persons for whom free entry of motor ve-
hicles has been authorized by the Department
of State and that he is importing such ve-
hicle or equipment item for purposes other
than resale; or

(vii) The importer or consignee is im-
porting such vehicle or equipment item
solely for the purpose of show, test, experi-
ment, competition, repairs or alterations and
that such vehicle or equipment item will not
be sold or licensed for use on the public
roads: PROVIDED: That vehicles imported
solely for purposes of test or experiment
may be licensed for use on the public roads
for a period not to exceed one year, where
such use is an integral part of tests or ex-
periments for which such vehicle is being
imported, upon condition that the importer
attach to the declaration a description of
the tests or experiments for which the ve-

M.V. IMPORT-2

hide is being imported, the period of time
during which it is estimated that it will be
necessary to test the vehicle on the public
roads, and the disposition to be made of the
vehicle after completion of the tests or ex-
periments.

(viii) Such vehicle which is not manufac-
tured primarily for use on the public roads
is not a "motor vehicle" as defined in section
102 of the National Traffic and Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. 1391);
or

(ix) Such vehicle was manufactured in
conformity with applicable safety stand-
ards, such declaration to be accompanied by
a statement of the vehicle's original manu-
facturer as evidence of original compliance.

(3) Any declaration given under this sec-
tion (except an oral declaration accepted at the
option of the district director of customs un-
der subparagraph (2) (i) of this paragraph)
shall state the name and United States address
of the importer or consignee, the date and
the entry number, a description of any equip-
ment item, the make and model, engine serial,
and body serial numbers of any vehicle or
other identification numbers, and the city and
State in which it is to be registered and prin-
cipally located if known, and shall be signed
by the importer or consignee. The district
director of customs shall immediately forward
the original of such declaration to the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration
of the Department of Transportation.

(c) Release under bond. If a declaration
filed in accordance with paragraph (b) of this
section states that the entry is being made under
circumstances described in paragraph (b) (2)
(iii), or under circumstances described in para-
graph (b)(2) (ii) or (ix) of this section where
the importer at time of entry does not submit a
statement in support of his declaration of con-
formity the entry shall be accepted only if the
importer gives a bond on Customs Forms 7551,
7553, or 7595 for the production of either a
statement by the importer or consignee that the
vehicle or equipment item described in the dec-
laration filed by the importer has been brought
into conformity with applicable safety stand-

ards and identifying the manufacturer, contrac-
tor, or other person who has brought such ve-
hicle or equipment item into conformity with
such standards and describing the nature and
extent of the work performed or a statement of
the vehicle manufacturer certifying original con-
formity. The bond shall be in the amount re-
quired under § 25.4(a) of this chapter. Within
90 days after such entry, or such additional
period as the district director of customs may
allow for good cause shown, the importer or con-
signee shall deliver to both the district director
of customs, and the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration a copy of the statement
described in this paragraph. If such statement
is not delivered to the district director of cus-
toms for the port of entry of such vehicle or
equipment item within 90 days of the date of
entry or such additional period as may have
been allowed by the district director of customs
for good cause shown, the importer or consignee
shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the dis-
trict director of customs those vehicles or equip-
ment items, which were released in accordance
with this paragraph. In the event that any such
vehicle or equipment item is not redelivered
within 5 days following the date specified in the
preceding sentence, liquidated damages shall be
assessed in the full amount of a bond given on
Form 7551. When the transaction has been
charged against a bond given on Form 7553, or
7595, liquidated damages shall be assessed in the
amount that would have been demanded under
the preceding sentence if the merchandise had
been released under a bond given on Form 7551.

(d) Merchandise refused entry. If a vehicle
or equipment item is denied entry under the pro-
visions of paragraph (b) of this section, the
district director of customs shall refuse to release
the merchandise for entry into the United States
and shall issue a notice of such refusal to the
importer or consignee.

(e) Disposition of merchandise refused entry
into the United States; redelivered merchandise.
Vehicles or equipment items which are denied
entry under paragraph (b) of this section or
which are redelivered in accordance with para-
graph (c) of this section and which are not ex-

M.V. IMPORT-3

ported under customs supervision within 90 days
from the date of notice of refusal of admission
or date of redelivery shall be disposed of under
customs laws and regulations; Provided, however,
That any such disposition shall not result in an
introduction into the United States of a vehicle
or equipment item in violation of. the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.

(Sec. 623, 46 Stat. 759, as amended, sec. 108,
80 Stat. 722; 19 U.S.C. 1623; 15 U.S.C. 1397)

Since motor vehicles and items of motor vehicle
equipment subject to the standards prescribed in
49 CFR Pa/rt 571, may shortly be in transit to
United States ports of entry, it is important that
these regulations be put into effect at the earliest
possible date. It is therefore found that the ad-

vance publication requirement under 5 U.S.C.
553 is impracticable and good cause is found for
adopting these regulations effective upon publi-
cation in the Federal Register.

(SEAL)

Lester D. Johnson
Commissioner of Customs
APPROVED:January 2, 1968.

Matthew J. Marks,
Acting Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury
APPROVED:January 5, 1968.

Alan S. Boyd

Secretary of Transportation

33 F.R. 360
January 10, 1968

M.V. IMPORT-4

<r U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1987— 181-763/ '♦0246

DOT HS807 143
September 1987

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